HENRY KISSINGER

Paul, Mac, Jack Galvin, friends.

Paul did not want to give me credit for my economic acumen. The reason the timing came up was that I pointed out to him I had been engaged to speak from 7:15 to 7:35, and that my fee would rise proportionately as the evening progressed.

I better explain that that was a joke.

Whenever Paul makes, whenever anyone makes, comments on my economic acumen, I recall when Bill Simon was Secretary of Treasury. He used to say that my knowledge of economics was the best argument against universal suffrage he had ever known.

This is an evening I would not have missed. There are few people that I admire as much as my old friend, Mac Mathias. We were brought together by his father-in-law in the far-off days when I was a young professor at Harvard working on foreign policy. Mac was a young Congressman interested in arms control and an enlightened approach to foreign policy within the Republican party. We've been friends ever since. I know what Mac has done for our country, and I know how committed he has been to relations with Germany. I also know what Jack McCloy, the grand old man of German-American relations, thought of him, and so I want to thank the American Council on Germany for giving me this opportunity to pay tribute to this distinguished American.

Mac could not be succeeded by a more appropriate person than Jack Galvin. Within NATO, the relationship of Germany and the United States is, I would say, decisive. Germany supplies the largest ground forces. The United States has had a very substantial armed force in Germany as well, and it was essential to hold NATO together in a very complicated period. I've seen Jack at many international meetings, and I had the privilege of talking to him outside these meetings. I don't think the Council could be under better leadership than it will be with Jack Galvin.

Now let me say something about the state of German-American relations. It is quite true that those relations have been very close to my heart. It is not so much because I was born in Germany, because when I lived in Germany as a young man it was a difficult period. But at the end of the war, when I was there as an American soldier, I saw the collapse of a totalitarian system. I also saw the dedication of people who began, who had the unbelievable courage, to begin rebuilding their country amidst the rubble of those cities. I then understood that an end had to be put to the enmity that had characterized us in two world wars.

American Council on Germany

June 21, 1993

When one reflects on German history, one finds this: Between the Treaty of Westphalia and the creation of the German empire, Germany was the battleground of Europe. Almost all European wars were fought on German soil, while the surrounding countries tried to manipulate its divisions for their benefit. After 1871, as long as Bismarck was in power, Germany was a stabilizing element in the European community. Afterwards, it fell prey to the temptation of attempting to protect itself against all its neighbors simultaneously and thereby frightening each of them individually. So one could argue that the tragedy of German history has been that Germany has been either too weak or too strong for the peace of Europe.

At the end of World War II, Germany and the western world were very fortunate that there emerged in the Federal Republic a Chancellor whom I consider one of the great men of our time. Where Bismarck tried to protect Germany by dexterity, Adenauer tried to relate Germany to the world through reliability. And in the 1950's, the leaders of Germany made a heroic decision: that they would put integration with the West before unification. There was a great temptation and indeed there was an opportunity in 1952 to try to play Germany's neighbors and the United States against each other. But Adenauer decided that Germany was part of the West and had to be built into the West. And even though at first there was not unanimity on this direction, by the 1960's all major German parties accepted it. It was the historic turning point in the history of Germany and in the history also of the relations of the United States with Europe. That is what needs to be built on today.

We now live in a different period. In the 1950's and 1960's, there was a profound ideological conflict. Soviet armies were standing on the Elbe. There were two German states. And a number of institutions grew up that were very appropriate to that period. There was NATO for the military protection of Europe. There was the European Community to give a home to a divided Germany in a setting larger than the nation and also to end historic European rivalries, and there were a number of subsidiary institutions like the West European Union that never developed very fast.

The two major institutions have now lost some of their original significance. There no longer is a threat on the Elbe, and there is no longer a military danger in any way comparable to what existed in the 50's and 60's. Also, with the unification of Germany, political relationships in Europe have become more complex. When Germany was divided, it was possible for the Federal Republic to subordinate its political views to a considerable extent to Paris and its strategic views to the United States because it was necessary to elaborate a distinction between the two German states. Now Germany is united. Now eastern Europe has become democratic, and therefore the role of Germany, the weight of Germany, is bound to change, and Germany is certain to conduct the normal policy of a great power as

time goes on. I don't say this in any sense of concern. I say this as a challenge to all of us, because in this new world the relationship between the United States and Europe is, in my view, if anything, more important - in any event more complicated, than it was in the previous period. It is true that we no longer have to fear a mass Soviet attack across the Elbe. I think in retrospect the probability of a mass Soviet attack across the Elbe was always somewhat exaggerated, though that is a belief that was also held by me. But what we do have to expect, and what we do have to answer now are a number of questions: First, what is the relationship supposed to be between Europe and the United States and between Germany as the strongest single country in Europe and the United States? Second, what is to become of NATO in this situation? Third, what is the function of the European Community and, in fact, what do we mean by the European Community? Where is it? Does it end at the German-Polish border?; at the Polish-Russian border?; or is it to be opened even to successor states of the former Soviet Union? What is to be the relationship to the semi-chaotic situations that are developing east of Germany?

In all of these questions I think it would be a disaster to everybody if the various nations proceeded on their own and if they were not able to develop a sense of common purpose, and I must tell you of my own concern: that we seem to be in every country more concerned with technical problems and not addressing these fundamental issues. As an American, of course, I focus mostly on what we do in the United States. In Russia, the best we can do is damage limitation. I do not believe the idea that somehow or other the future of peace in the world depends primarily on what happens in Russia. I would in fact say the opposite. I would say the future of what happens in Russia depends much more on what happens between Europe and the United States. It was the cohesion of the West, the superior performance of the West, that impelled the Soviets into reexamining their premises. If we look into the former Soviet Union, I would say that one of the most predictable results of the future, no matter who governs there, will be a growth of nationalism. It is the one unifying feature. It is the one way to escape the humiliation of the collapse of their institutions and of their empire. I do not say this in any sense critically, but Russian nationalism may produce east of Germany or certainly east of Poland, Yugoslav-type conditions, maybe not with the same brutality, but certainly with some of the chaotic character. Far away from Europe, in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, that is already happening. I do not know any educated Russian who accepts the independence of the Ukraine. I have never heard any official Russian speak of the Ukraine in any other way except as a temporary separation. Russians have to this day not accepted the present borders, or the situation of Crimea, or many other things. That is a fact of life. Europe and the United States, Germany and the United States, need to address the question of how they view the

6

7

future of that area and not hide behind economic aid programs as the only means of dealing with it. I happen to be for the economic aid program because it is important to overcome the historic Russian sense of isolation, but I frankly look at it as a damage limiting enterprise, as an admission ticket to something else.

We have taken it so much for granted that Europe and the United States are together that we forget that the only formal institution that ties Europe to the United States is NATO. It is the only place where there is a regular need to meet, and it has an extraordinary infrastructure and elaborated systematic means of planning and exchanging ideas. The only thing it lacks right now is a purpose. And that purpose can no longer be supplied exclusively by military means. There has to be found a political content to NATO, some of whose components I have already described. There has to be someplace where Europe and the United States can discuss what they will do in perfectly foreseeable crises, not just militarily but also politically and economically.

I do not know whether Jack Galvin will agree with me, but I am not a great advocate of inviting the former republics of the Soviet Union to Brussels for consultations. I don't think NATO was designed for that purpose. I also don't see what Uzbekistan is doing in NATO headquarters because if Uzbekistan is in NATO, why not Pakistan? This feeds the idea that we have not seen a breakup of the Soviet Union but that Moscow is still running everything, and that every former republic now belongs there. At any rate, NATO does not seem to me the place to discuss this question. NATO ought to be reserved for the political and military direction of the western alliance. Now within that alliance I am not panicked if the Europeans want to develop a greater sense of their own identity. If we can live with the European Economic Community, where competition is free and safe, I do not think we have to worry about a greater military cooperation between the Europeans themselves, since in most foreseeable circumstances they will need us. I cannot foresee circumstances in which they would be more ready to go to war than we are or would rather go to war without us than with us.

At any rate, I do not think the military problem is the dominant problem. The political problem is the one that we have not sufficiently addressed in recent years, and above all we have not practiced the art of cooperation and the art of giving an emotional content to the Atlantic relationship. Everybody is to blame for that, including our own government. Running to Moscow, taking dramatic initiatives is very fulfilling, but building structures depends on creating some sense of community. That is the big task ahead of us. It has been proven that while Europe can do many things together, it is in the end necessary to have some participation in the affairs extending from Europe through the United States, and I would say

that while this is not widely discussed, this should be one of the top priorities of our government. This is why I told Dick Holbrooke, the distinguished new ambassador who can play and will play a very major role, that I could not think of a more exciting and important assignment for anybody than the Embassy in Bonn.

All of you who are from Germany and who are concerned with Germany know very well that the unification of Germany is a shock not just for East Germany but for West Germany. It means that the patterns of thinking of the postwar period have to be broken, not just in the former German Democratic Republic, but in the Federal Republic. This goes far beyond economics. It means that the period that one could seek shelter without assuming absolute responsibility is coming to an end and that Germany now has to develop its own perception of international affairs and its own vision of itself. This occurs at a moment when the postwar generation that led Germany, the Adenauer generation, in both parties, is leaving office. We will look back with nostalgia to Chancellor Kohl as we will do to Chancellor Schmidt, people who were formed in the postwar period, to whom it was second nature, people who remembered the wartime period and who were educated before the war. The new generation that is coming into power has never lived in a united Germany before and suffers from what one of the German cabinet members has said to me is a problem of rootlessness. This happens at the precise moment that also the political framework is weakening. Of course, there is a lot of consultation going on, but it almost always concerns technical problems. The tremendous, almost spiritual experiences of the 50's, when one had to ask one's self: unification or integration?; defense or free-floating politics?; what do we mean by the western world? That experience could not be repeated exactly now - there is no modern equivalent for it.

We have to raise the relationship out of the bureaucratic impasse which it is in and deal with the new conditions. My German publisher said recently to me that he absolutely has to bring out the German edition of the book that I am writing now simultaneously with the English edition because if he does not, so many Germans are going to buy the English edition that there will be no market for the German one. That shows how much we have grown together. When I first met Mac Mathias I was Director of the International Seminar at Harvard, dedicated to the proposition that it was so rare for Europeans to be able to come to America and to meet colleagues, that if one provided a two month experience to that effect, it would make a useful contribution. It was tremendously exciting. Today it would be ridiculous.

We have grown together. We do have a common destiny. So I'd like to say, Mac, you, McCloy, and your German counterparts, the Adenauers, the Brandts, the Schmidts, the Kohls, have done a great service. Now the task

is to create equivalents in this generation in a more complicated, maybe even a more exciting prospect. But really everything is open in Europe for new construction and to shape the future, not by thinking that we can do little gimmicks here and there in individual programs in different parts of the East, but by asking ourselves what kind of a world we want to create, and then going ahead and doing it. And I am sure that having met the old challenge, we'll meet the new one too. Thank you very much.

Now I'm told I can take questions until somebody stops me.

### Q. Is there something that can be done in the short term to fill the long-term security vacuum in Eastern Europe?

A. Well, first of all we have to define what we mean by Eastern Europe and what we mean by vacuum. Let me give you my ideas. The Europe that needs to be constructed within the framework that I described stops at the Polish-Russian border. And if we get confused about this we will just get into a never-never land. This does not mean that we cannot and should not have excellent relations with the former Soviet Union. But I think that is a totally separate problem with a totally different style of evolution. I think the first thing that should be done is to move Poland and at least the Czech Republic as rapidly as possible towards, and preferably into, the European Community. The second problem is security in Eastern Europe. Should Poland and the other former satellites, or at least the ones I've mentioned, join NATO? I do not think that would be a good idea because I believe that the symbolism of a Russian retreat followed by the advance of NATO would have such an upsetting impact in Moscow that it could generate a backlash that is unnecessary. On the other hand, we should make clear by all other means that military pressure against Poland and these other countries would have the gravest consequences, equivalent to an attack on NATO. So I believe there should be close consultations. There should even be internal planning. I think this is extremely necessary because I believe it is highly likely that as Russia gains strength, which is what we say we want with our economic programs, its relations with the other former republics of the Soviet Union will deteriorate. And then the tendency of threatening neighboring countries, not invading but threatening them, might return as a feature of Russian policy. It is, of course, possible that a nation changes completely, but when a country has acted a certain way for four hundred years, I would say it reflects a certain proclivity which one should not totally ignore.

### Q. (Unrecorded)

A. Let me first state my view about Russia. As I said, I support aid to Russia. I do not support aid for any particular individual because we should not get ourselves involved in the domestic politics of a revolutionary

10

situation in which the dynamics are out of our control. But I have no quarrel with the level of aid or aid per se. Second, I believe that whoever governs in Russia, even Yeltsin, will be driven to appeal increasingly to the nationalist sentiment. The more successful he is in consolidating himself, the more likely this will be. Therefore, I do not believe that helping any one person avoids the nationalist thing, and I do not think it can be avoided. It has to be dealt with. It is to my mind a fact of life. Third, with regard to Yugoslavia, I do not believe that Russia is in a position to engage in organized military intervention far from its borders. So this is reason enough to desist from action in Yugoslavia. I do believe, though, that had we been militarily involved in Yugoslavia, the existing government in Russia would have disassociated from us faster than it will in any case. That would have been the price we would have paid. We might have seen Russian volunteers on the Serbian side. I was not in favor of ground intervention in Serbia, but not for the reason of Russian backlash. Among the reasons that I would give against it, Russian backlash would be a relatively minor factor.

### Q. (Unrecorded)

A. I do believe that if war breaks out in Kosovo or Macedonia, and if Albania gets involved, which I consider highly probable, Turkey will not stand aside. Then we will have a colossal mess. At that point we will not be able to afford factfinding missions. At that point we will need a strategy, and it would be highly desirable if we could convey a sense of that strategy ahead of time before decisions are made, which is another thing that we should be discussing.

### Q. (Unrecorded)

A. I think that has become everybody's alibi for their own failures. You mean the German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia? The reasoning about Slovenia and Croatia seems to be this: by failing to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent nations one could have insisted that before they become independent, that they agree to certain safeguards for the Serbian minority. If that had been done, then one could have agreed to their independence, and the Serbian minorities would have lived happily under Croatian rule. I don't believe that. I think that - probably for certain domestic reasons - Kohl accelerated the recognition, and that provided an excuse for the Serbs to do what they would have done anyway. I do not believe that the Serbs would have voluntarily lived in a Croatian state no matter what safeguards they had received. Then the next step is, having recognized Slovenia and Serbia, we were forced to recognize Bosnia. I don't accept that either. Bosnia was never a nation, has no ethnic individuality, and I think it was a grave mistake, whoever did it, whenever they did it, to try to constitute Bosnia as a separate nation. It should have

11

been put under some trusteeship. I probably would have preferred it if the
German government had been a little slower in recognizing it. I think this
is a way of dumping everybody else's unwillingness to bite the bullet on
the Germans, and I don't think it is justified in this case.

Q. How do you see the development of fundamentalist Islam?

A. I think it will get worse and worse. Islamic fundamentalism, as has been often stated, is a rebellion against Marxism, Capitalism, and centuries of humiliation. It offers an explanation for why the Muslim world has not regained the eminent position it once had. I believe that until it conspicuously fails somewhere, it will have a certain attraction. It is obviously powerful in Algeria. It is apparently becoming so in Egypt, and I think the relations not only of Europe but of the West with Islam are going to be extremely difficult and complex. And that is another thing that requires a philosophical or conceptual approach not just settling the manifestations and coming up with technical solutions to the manifestations, but a sense of what we have not had in the West anywhere. It is equivalent to the article that George Kennan wrote in 1947 that explained to us why Communism produced tensions and why and how it would transform itself. We don't have this, so we deal with individual issues on a tactical basis, and that tends to multiply complexities.

12