Copyright 2000 Federal News Service, Inc.
Federal News Service

April 26, 2000, Wednesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 2195 words

HEADLINE: SENATE FLOOR REMARKS BY SENATOR JESSE HELMS (R-NC)

SUBJECT: ABM TREATY WITH RUSSIA

LOCATION: U.S. CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TIME: 11:09 A.M. EDT DATE: WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2000

BODY:

SEN. HELMS: I have a slight difficulty with my balance due to a temporary defect in my feet, and I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to deliver my remarks seated.

PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE: Without objection.

SEN. HELMS: I thank the chair. How are you doing?

Mr. President, the news media are buzzing with speculation that President Clinton will attempt in his final months in office to strike a major arms control deal with Russia, including a new ABM Treaty that would limit the United States' ability to defend itself against ballistic missile attack. White House officials have openly stated their concern that Mr. Clinton faces the prospect of leaving office without a major arms control agreement to his credit, the first president in memory to do so. And from this president, a man uniquely absorbed with his legacy that perhaps it would be for him a personal tragedy.

So, Mr. Clinton wants an agreement, a signing ceremony, a final photo op. He wants a picture shaking hands with the Russian president, broad smiles on their faces, large ornately bound treaties under their arms as the cameras click for perhaps the last time -- a final curtain call.

Now, I must observe, Mr. President, that if the price of that final curtain call is a resurrection of the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty that would prevent the United States from protecting the American people against missile attack, then that price, Mr. President, is just too high.

With all due respect, I do not intend to allow this president to establish his legacy by binding the next generation of Americans to a future without a viable national missile defense. For nearly eight years, while North Korea and Iran raced forward with their nuclear programs, and while China stole the most advanced nuclear secrets of the United States, and while Iraq escaped international inspections, President Clinton did everything in his power to stand in the way of deploying a national missile defense.

You want some facts, Mr. President? Let's state some for the record. In 1993, just months after taking office, Mr. Clinton ordered that all proposals for missile defense interceptor projects be returned unopened to the contractors who had submitted them. In December of that same year, 1993, he withdrew the Bush administration's proposal for fundamentally altering the ABM Treaty to prevent deployment of national missile defenses at a time when Russia was inclined to strike a deal. By 1996, three years after taking office, Mr. Clinton had completely gutted the national missile defense program. He slashed the national missile defense budget by more than 80 percent -- 80 percent. In 1997, he signed two agreements to revive and expand the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty including one that would expand ABM

restrictions to prevent not just national missile defense for the American people but to constrain theater missile defenses to protect our troops in the field.

Then for the next three years, the president, heeding some of his advisors no doubt, refused to submit those agreements to the United States Senate, despite making a legally binding commitment to submit them. He made that commitment to me in writing. He did not submit them because he was afraid that the Senate would reject them, while in doing so would clear the way for rapid deployment of missile defenses. To this day he still has not fulfilled his legal requirement to submit those treaties to the United States Senate's advice and consent.

Now then, in December 1995, Mr. Clinton vetoed legislation that would have required the deployment of a national missile defense with an initial operational capability by the year 2001. Three years later, in 1998, he again killed missile defense legislation, the American missile protection act, which called for the deployment of national missile defense as soon as its technology was ready, by threatening a veto and rallying Democratic senators to filibuster the legislation.

Only in 1999 did he at long last sign missile defense legislation into law, but only after it passed both houses of Congress, don't you see, Mr. President, by a veto-proof majority, and only after the independent Rumsfeld Commission had issued a stinging bipartisan report declaring that the Clinton administration had dramatically underestimated the ballistic missile threat to the United States.

While Mr. Clinton was doing all this, costing America almost eight years in a race against time to deploy missile defenses, our adversaries were forging ahead with their missile systems. While Mr. Clinton was dragging his feet, for example, foreign ballistic missile threats to the United States grew in terms of both range and sophistication. Today several Third World possess or are developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical, biological or nuclear warheads against cities in the United States.

Now, according to the Rumsfeld Commission, both North Korea and Iran are within five years of possessing viable ICBMs capable of striking the continental United States. And North Korea may already today have the capacity to strike Alaska and Hawaii. And just last month communist China explicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons against United States cities should the United States take any action to defend democratic Taiwan in the event that Beijing launch an invasion of Taiwan.

So, Mr. Clinton is in search of a legacy. La-de-da -- he already has one. The Clinton legacy is America's continued inexcusable vulnerability to ballistic missile attack. The Clinton legacy is eight years of negligence. The Clinton legacy is eight years of lost time.

But in the twilight of his presidency, Mr. Clinton now wants to strike an ill-considered deal with Russia to purchase Russian consent to an inadequate U.S. missile defense. One single site in Alaska to be deployed, but not until 2005, in exchange for a new revitalized ABM Treaty that would permanently bar any truly national missile defense system.

The president, you see, Mr. President, is attempting to lock this nation, the United States of America, into a system that cannot defend the American people. And the president is trying to resurrect the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty, which would make it impossible for future enhancements to U.S. national missile defense in general. The agreement that Mr. Clinton proposes would not permit space-based sensors. It would not permit sufficient numbers of ground-based radars. It would not permit additional defenses based on alternate missile interceptor systems, such as naval sea-based interceptors. Now, all of these and more, Mr. President, are absolutely necessary to achieve a fully effective defense against the full range of possible threats to the American people.

And Mr. Clinton's proposal is not a plan to defend the United States; it is a plan to leave the United States defenseless. It is in fact a plan to salvage the antiquated and invalid U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty. That is what it is, no more, no less. It is a plan, Mr. President, that is going nowhere fast in protecting the American people. Because after dragging his feet on missile defense for nearly eight years, Mr. Clinton now fervently hopes that he will be permitted in his final eight months in office to tie the hands of the next president of the United States.

He believes that he will be allowed to constrain the next administration from pursuing a real national missile defense. Is that what he believes or even hopes?

Well, I for one have a message for President Clinton: Not on my watch, Mr. President. Not on my watch -- it is not going to happen. Let's be clear, to avoid any misunderstandings down the line: any modified ABM Treaty negotiated by this administration will be DOA, dead on arrival, at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which as the chair knows I happen to be the chairman of.

Now, this administration's failed security policies have burdened America and the American people long enough. In a few months the American people will go to the polls to elect a new president, a president who must have a clean break from the failed policies of this administration. He must have the freedom and the flexibility to establish his own security policies. And to the length that I am capable, Mr. President, it is my intent to do everything in my power to ensure that nothing is done in the next few months by this administration to tie the hands of the next administration in pursuing a new national security policy, based not on scraps of parchment but rather on concrete defenses -- a policy designed to protect the American people from ballistic missile attack, a policy designed to ensure that no hostile regime, from Teheran to Pyongyang to Beijing, is capable of threatening the United States of America and the American people with nuclear blackmail.

Any decision on missile defense will be for the next president of the United States to make -- not this one. It is clear that the United States is no longer legally bound by the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty. And isn't it self-evident that the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty expired when the Soviet Union, our treaty partner, ceased to exist? Legally speaking, I see no impediment whatsoever to the United States proceeding with any national missile defense system we, the American people and this Congress, choose to deploy.

That said, for political and diplomatic reasons, the next president -- the next president may decide that it is in the U.S. interests to sit down with the Russians and offer them a chance to negotiate and agree on this matter. Personally I do not believe that a new ABM Treaty can be negotiated with Russia that would permit the kind of defenses that America needs, because as Henry Kissinger said last year in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, and I quote him, "Is it possible to negotiate a modification of the ABM Treaty?" Kissinger continued, "Since the basic concept of the ABM Treaty is so contrary to the concept of an effective missile defense, I find it," Mr. Kissinger said, "I find it difficult to imagine this, but I would be opened to argument," he added, "provided" -- and let me emphasize these words as Henry Kissinger emphasized them: "provided that we do not use the treaty as a constraint on pushing forward on the most effective development of a national and theater missile defense."

Now then, like Dr. Kissinger, I am open to the remote possibility that a new administration, unencumbered by the current president of the United States and his desperate desire for a legacy, and this administration's infatuation with the U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty, could enter into successful negotiations with the Russians.

Now, the Republican nominee for president, Mr. Bush of Texas, has declared that on taking office he will give the Russians an opportunity to negotiate a revised -- a revised ABM Treaty, one that will permit the defenses that America needs. But Mr. Bush made it clear that if the Russians refuse he will go forward nonetheless and deploy a national missile defense. And good for him. Mr. Bush believes in the need for missile defense, and he will negotiate -- he will negotiate from a position of strength. By contrast, President Clinton clearly has no interest whatsoever in missile defense. His agenda is not to defend America from ballistic missile attack but to race against the clock to get an arms control agreement in any -- and he means any agreement that will prevent his going down in history as the first president in memory not to do so.

So, it is obvious I think that any negotiations Mr. Clinton enters into in his final months will be from a position of desperation and weakness. For this administration, after opposing missile defense for almost eight years, to attempt at the eleventh hour to try to negotiate a revised ABM Treaty is too little too late. This administration has long had its chance to adopt a new security approach to meet the new threats and challenges of the post-Cold War era. This administration, the Clinton administration, chose not to do so.

So, this administration's time for grand treaty initiatives is clearly at an end. For the remainder of this year, the Foreign Relations Committee will continue its routine work. We will consider tax treaties, extradition treaties, and other already-negotiated treaties. But we will not consider any new last-minute arms control measures that this administration may negotiate and cook up in its final closing months in office. And as the chairman of this committee, I make it clear that the Foreign Relations Committee will not consider the next administration bound by any treaty this administration may try to negotiate in the coming eight months.

[LC]

Copyright 2000 National Broadcasting Co. Inc.
NBC News Transcripts

SHOW: MEET THE PRESS (10:00 AM ET)

June 4, 2000, Sunday

LENGTH: 2353 words

HEADLINE: SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN DISCUSSES ELIAN GONZALEZ, ARMS CONTROL, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE BUSH CAMPAIGN

BODY:

MR. RUSSERT: Senator John McCain, welcome back. Let's go right to it. If President McCain was sitting in the Oval Office this morning, would he be able to do anything to prevent Elian Gonzalez from going back to Cuba?

SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN: I would imagine not, given the situation that exists. But I was intrigued by your previous guest's allegation that the Young Pioneers are simply an organization that admire Mr. Marti. The fact is that it's a long-held tradition for Communist indoctrination and it alarmed me and alarmed all Americans to see that kind of uniform and that kind of indoctrination into communism, which is clearly, even in Mr. Putin's view, a failed philosophy being inoculated on a young boy in the United States of America.

MR. RUSSERT: But it's pretty clear he's going back to Cuba.

SEN. MCCAIN: Yeah. Well, apparently so. And he will grow up in a society where the family is not paramount, the state is. That's what Communist doctrine is about, and I regret it.

MR. RUSSERT: Senator, Russia: missile defense system. Mr. Putin has put forward the idea of the United States and Russia jointly developing a missile defense system. Is that plausible?

SEN. MCCAIN: Given the state of Russian technology, I don't think it's plausible, because I don't think they have that capability. Ronald Reagan agreed when this idea first became something that was part of American policy that he would share the technology with the Russians or other potential adversaries once we developed it. I don't see anything wrong with that, but I don't expect the Russians to be able to contribute significantly to the development of it.

MR. RUSSERT: The sensitivity of that technology--President Clinton had said earlier in the week that we would share it with other civilized nations. Do you believe Russia is civilized enough that we can entrust them with this kind of technology?

SEN. MCCAIN: Well, it's defensive technology in nature. I think that it's still some years away. And, by the way, I believe that we should proceed as rapidly as possible with sea-based missile defense systems, since I think that's the most viable way of protecting United States' interests throughout--and troops throughout the world. But I think that the Russians could probably handle some of it, since it's defensive in nature. But I think what we're talking about here is a situation where the president of the United States may be, in his waning days in office, making an agreement, or reaching conclusions that would bind future administrations. I hope the president of the United States doesn't do that.

MR. RUSSERT: What if the Russians say, "Senator, you can't develop a sea-based missile defense system. That's a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and we will not concur with any change in the treaty." Do we go ahead unilaterally without Russian permission?

SEN. MCCAIN: I think we should. I think we can better explain to the Russians and the world that these systems are defensive in nature, that we have an obligation to defend Americans where they are threatened. For example, the 37,000 American troops that are in South Korea. North Korea, obviously, is one of the great rogue nations and poses a great threat. So I think we should, but I think we could proceed carefully and diplomatically. By the way, I do agree

with Mr. Putin. There are great similarities between NBC media people and KGB apparatchiks. I think there are a lot of similarities.

MR. RUSSERT: I thought you'd get that in. Let me--that threw me off stride, Senator, I must tell you. The--George W. Bush proposed last week that he would be for even a more robust missile defense system, worldwide system, if you would, and then also look at unilaterally cutting the number of nuclear weapons we have, perhaps even below the level of 2,000 that we could jointly agree with the Russians. Secretary of Defense William Cohen was on this program. I asked him about that. Let me show you his answer and get your view:

(Videotape):

SECRETARY WILLIAM COHEN: And so what you do by going up higher in defense, you will force the Russians and others to raise their limits much higher. So it's kind of an internal inconsistency in that, and it's one that ought to be looked at. And I think that in order to make it fair, I think that Governor Bush should have an opportunity to meet with the Joint Chiefs and meet with Admiral Meese, who is the commander of strategic command, and go through this so that we can deal with the situation as it is and likely to be. And then I think that he and then Vice President Gore will be in a better position to debate this in a way that's responsible and I think informed.

(End videotape)

MR. RUSSERT: What do you think?

SEN. MCCAIN: Well, I think that we're sort of arguing, in all due respect to my friend, Secretary Cohen, in the old era of mutual issue of destruction. Russia is not the great threat to world peace today. It's the rogue nations and the development of weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation, places like Iraq, North Korea, etc. And as dangerous as Russia was, the old Soviet Union, we did have a certain amount of assurance that there would not be an all-out nuclear attack. We don't have those kinds of assurances with these rogue nations and people like Saddam Hussein and Kim Jung Il and others.

So I think it's important that we put this in the context of our ability to develop the kinds of defenses that are necessary, not against a huge incoming attack of multimissiles, but first, the rogue nations, and then develop the systems which are defensive in nature. These are defensive systems. They harm no one. And I believe that we can proceed with its development and can convince our allies and adversaries alike that that is going to ensure their safety and security, as well as ours.

MR. RUSSERT: How about Governor Bush suggesting unilaterally bringing down the number of nuclear weapons, perhaps even fewer than Russia possesses?

SEN. MCCAIN: Well, I think the thinking there is that if we are able to defend ourselves, then we can reduce our inventory. And I don't see anything wrong with that, my friends on the left have argued for those measures for a long, long time. But I think it's also clear that we are a ways away from either one of those, and at this time, I would like for the president of the United States not to make any agreements that would impair any abilities we might have to exercise any of those options.

MR. RUSSERT: Do you think that Governor Bush should take up Secretary Cohen's offer of a briefing or reject it as political in nature, as he did?

SEN. MCCAIN: I think that it's fairly routine for candidates for president of the United States to receive security briefings. And I'm sure they'd be made available to him. But the context that--unfortunately, that Secretary Cohen's comments were made is that Governor Bush is not well-informed. I think Governor Bush is very well-informed by people like Colin Powell, George Shultz, Condoleezza Rice and many others who have a great deal of expertise in these areas, and I'm sure are keeping him very well-informed.

MR. RUSSERT: There was a big fund-raiser for Governor Bush in Arizona the other night, and you were a no-show. Why?

SEN. MCCAIN: I was in California. Tom Davis, chairman of the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, has got a very ambitious agenda for me. I was over there campaigning for those candidates over there. Governor Bush understands that, and we've conversed about it. And so I was glad to do more good for the party by campaigning for our candidates over in California. We all know that those races over there are critical, among others, to the Republicans maintaining control of Congress.

MR. RUSSERT: The fact that they were raising soft money at that dinner, did that trouble you?

SEN. MCCAIN: It always troubles me because the situation has lurched completely out of control. Republicans set a record one week; the Democrats the other. If on this program a few years ago I'd have said there's a fund-raiser coming up where you can buy a ticket for $500,000, you wouldn't have believed it. Now, there's no accountability. The Washington Post this morning has editorialized about this 527 loophole. At least we could get full disclosure, you would think, of people who donate to American political campaigns, but it's completely out of control and I'm very troubled by it.

MR. RUSSERT: Of the 17 congressional candidates that you have stumped for, Senator, eight of those Republicans are against any bans on soft money. And they oppose your legislation. Why would you use your credentials, your image, your reputation, your energy, to campaign for people who oppose you on campaign finance reform?

SEN. MCCAIN: Well, first of all, they may not support McCain-Feingold, but the majority of them do support at least elements of it. I also believe that maintaining Republican control is probably a better way to achieve our goal. Now, I know that you may rebut that and I think legitimately so. In 1993, the Democrats, had control of both houses of Congress and the presidency. They passed campaign finance reform in the House and in the Senate with a Democrat president, President Clinton, and they never did anything on campaign finance reform. I also believe that the candidates I've been campaigning for over time, even if they're presently opposed, will support campaign finance reform as every elected representative will be forced to do so by the American people.

MR. RUSSERT: Are you still absolutely insistent that you will not accept the vice presidential nomination?

SEN. MCCAIN: Yes.

MR. RUSSERT: No way.

SEN. MCCAIN: I asked Governor Bush that I wouldn't be considered in our meeting in Pittsburgh, and he took me at my word. And I think that pretty well brings closure to the issue.

MR. RUSSERT: And if the convention turned to you, you'd still say no?

SEN. MCCAIN: I don't think those scenarios transpired, at least in recent years, and so I just don't see that as a scenario, particularly since you need to go through a certain process to be eligible, as you know.

MR. RUSSERT: And you won't go through that process?

SEN. MCCAIN: No.

MR. RUSSERT: On this program a few weeks ago, your old friend Pat Robertson appeared...

SEN. MCCAIN: I saw it.

MR. RUSSERT: ...and let me roll a tape for you and give you a chance to respond to him:

(Videotape, May 7, 2000):

MR. RUSSERT: But you told Newsweek you'd be very concerned with McCain being one heartbeat away.

MR. PAT ROBERTSON: I would be very concerned. I would. I don't want to get into character assassination. He's been through enough in this procedure, but I don't think he would make a good president. And I won't go into any further details, but I have enough information that indicates that we need somebody with his hand on the nuclear trigger and on other levers of government.

MR. RUSSERT: Whoa, whoa, what are you suggesting?

MR. ROBERTSON: I'm suggesting we need somebody who wouldn't go into a man's hometown and make extreme statements like that on the spur of the moment. This is very dangerous. Can you imagine dealing with our foreign powers and you get mad and you fly off the handle? It could be very dangerous. And I'm serious. It would be very dangerous and I think we should have balanced leaders.

(End videotape)

MR. RUSSERT: What's that all about, Senator?

SEN. McCAIN: I don't have any idea except that he authenticates my argument that his kind of leadership and that kind of rhetoric is bad for the Republican Party. He practices the politics of division rather than addition and I--the reason why I repudiated that kind of leadership is I think it's bad for the party and bad for the nation and he authenticates the rationale for my speech.

MR. RUSSERT: Several conservatives have spoken out against Tom Ridge, the governor of Pennsylvania, to be selected as vice president. You know Tom Ridge well. He is pro-abortion rights. Could George W. Bush be able to select someone like Tom Ridge, Tom Ridge himself, with his position on abortion and still keep the Republican Party unified?

SEN. McCAIN: I believe so. In a more general sense, Governor Bush has said that he would not impose a litmus test on his running mate, and I think that's correct because I think the criteria is: Who can best serve as president of the United States? So I think Governor Ridge is highly qualified. He brings a great deal to the ticket. And I believe that there should not be any single reason for him to be disqualified, and I'd be proud to campaign for him.

MR. RUSSERT: During the campaign, you opposed the removing of the flag from the state Capitol in South Carolina or said it was something the state should decide themselves. After the campaign, you went back to the state, in a mea culpa, said, "You know, I was wrong on this. I think that flag should come down." It has come down, but it's at a memorial site on the same grounds. Is that acceptable to you?

SEN. McCAIN: I think it's acceptable to the majority of the people of South Carolina. I know it is not acceptable to the NAACP. In my mind, it's probably the best compromise, given the emotions surrounding the issue. At least it's off the top of the state Capitol. And, by the way, that was not my finest hour in this campaign, as you know.

MR. RUSSERT: I want to bring closure to one other subject. During the campaign, when you were a guest here, we talked about Richard Quinn, your campaign manager. Since that time, I've had numerous conversations with Richard Quinn, and he has said that his article about David Duke was wrong; that he now believes that Duke was an unrepentant racist; that the T-shirt I showed on the scene with Abraham Lincoln, he was not aware of some of the language on the back of it; and that the bumper stickers we showed he never sold; and that it was a site that was linked to his that was selling those. He finds them repulsive. He severed that link, and he wanted you and our audience to know that.

SEN. McCAIN: Well, I thank you for saying that, Tim, because you gave him an opportunity to respond. Like all of us, I'm sure that Richard Quinn has done some things or been involved in things that he wishes he hadn't. But he's a friend of mine. He ran, I think, a very good campaign, a very high-level campaign in South Carolina, and I appreciate his help.

MR. RUSSERT: Senator John McCain, we thank you very much for joining us this morning.

SEN. McCAIN: Thank you, Tim.

June 2, 2000, Friday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING

LENGTH: 5102 words

HEADLINE: JOHN MCLAUGHLIN'S "ONE ON ONE"

GUESTS: SENATOR JOSEPH BIDEN, JR. (D-DE) AND SENATOR JON KYL (R-AZ)

SUBJECT: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

TAPED: FRIDAY, MAY 12, 2000 BROADCAST: WEEKEND OF JUNE 3-4, 2000

BODY:

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: All systems go.

Air Force Lieutenant General Ron Kadish says next month's test of the Pentagon's missile interceptor will be a success. The target, a missile system to defend against attack by rogue states like North Korea, operational by 2005. But will President Clinton give the go-ahead over Russian objection? Will a national defense missile system deter or destabilize? We'll ask Senator Jon Kyl and Senator Joseph Biden.

ANNOUNCER: Brought to you in part by ADM; feeding the world is the biggest challenge of the new century because by the time this baby is old enough to vote, the world will have nearly 2 billion new mouths to feed. ADM, supermarket to the world.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Senator Kyl, what's the sudden urgency on the creation of a missile shield? This is not a new idea. It was first launched, I think, in '82, I think, with Daniel Graham (sp), a general, and Edward Teller. Why now?

SEN. KYL: Two things. First of all, the shield you're talking about was designed to deter a strategic massive attack from the then-Soviet Union. That was the SDI, or "Star Wars," as some called it. That's no longer what we're talking about. What's now being proposed is a very limited system of a few missiles that could deter or defeat a limited attack from primarily a rogue state like North Korea.

And the second answer, why now? It will take five years to get such a system deployed. Within that period of time, it is likely that countries like North Korea, Iran and perhaps others will have a capability of hitting the United States with a missile.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What's the likelihood that a rogue state, which we can further define as the program proceeds, like North Korea, can launch an intercontinental ballistic missile any time soon? Do we have a CIA report? Do we have any proof positive that they even have a nuclear weapon?

SEN. BIDEN: It is likely they could launch a missile that could carry a weapon of mass destruction, probably not a nuclear weapon, because of its weight, probably a biological weapon or a chemical weapon, within the next four to seven years that could strike the continental United States. We're talking about, though, them having a capacity, by all the reports we're given, of having somewhere between five and nine of these missiles within that time frame.

So the system we're talking about, what is driving the urgency here -- let me put it another way. No one at the Defense Department would be pushing the system you just saw a picture of within the time frame we're talking about were the report to say Korea wasn't going to be able to do this in 20 years, for 20 years. But because of the time frame, that's

what's pushing an inordinately rapid testing regime. That is, the next test, as you said, someone you've talked to said it's going to work.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yeah.

And do you agree with what he said, that we're talking about chemical and biological weapons, we're not talking about a nuclear threat from North Korea?

SEN. KYL: Well, there's going to be a nuclear threat. But I think they do agree that the first warhead to put on would probably be the somewhat lighter-weight chemical or biological weapon.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Are we talking about the Northern Hemisphere protection, which would be Hawaii, principally, and Alaska?

SEN. KYL: The first two vulnerable states are Hawaii and Alaska, and then shortly thereafter, or some period thereafter, the West Coast and then on to the rest of the country.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Why is North Korea a principal threat? Is it because of Kim Jong Il, the successor to Kim Il Sung, who no one has even talked to, I don't think, from the United States? Am I right?

SEN. KYL: I don't know that there have been any high-level conversations with him. Part of it is that he is a very unstable kind of leader. Part of it is they've been very belligerent in their threats against South Korea. And part of it is that they are known to be working on a nuclear capability, and they have tested these missiles, one of which recently had parts fall off not too far from the coast of the United States.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But isn't there a premise here that there's a hostile intent somewhere lurking in the background of North Korea? And is it not true -- you tell me -- that South Korea and North Korea, in this coming month of June, may sit down at the table together?

SEN. BIDEN: John, I think we're overreacting, and let me explain why I think -- and I'm sure Jon disagrees. Here's the scenario they tell us as to why we need this system so quickly -- assuming it works. Number one, that no one is arguing that the North Koreans will spontaneously fire any weapon of mass destruction on a missile at the United States of America. They say the problem will come if North Korea aggressively moves on South Korea, we keep our commitment to South Korea and respond, they threaten, if you respond, we will hit you with a missile.

Now, that's kicking the can down the road a little bit, John. And that's why my view is that what we should do is be very, very cautious about this missile defense system and what it may unintentionally produce. For example, Jon and many very bright guys like Jon think that this system that you just showed a picture of, if you said to Jon, "Jon, if you could have that system tomorrow, but that's all you get, would you take it?" Jon will tell you no because he wants a whole system, a system not just to protect against rogue states, to protect against China.

Now what happens if you build this system? China now has 18 nuclear missiles -- 18. They're going to go to 250 to 1,000 because they're going to sit and say, "Wait a minute, 18 -- they may be able to stop my 18. I've lost my deterrent capability."

What do you think, John? You know the area, what do you think's going to happen if China goes to 250 to 1,000, what do you think Japan's going to do?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, it's going to be an international arms race.

SEN. BIDEN: You got it.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And that's one of the possible negatives here.

And I would also point out to you, Jon, just to deepen the wound a little, that the reaction of the Chinese government to the proposal and it's a Clinton proposal, correct?

SEN. KYL: Right.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But this proposal of 100 interceptor missiles located in Alaska, with an alarm system, I guess, in North Dakota, this is what they say about it: "Not a single significant country in the world supports this plan. We hope you'll give it up. If not, we'll be ready." And that's from the director of arms control in China.

SEN. KYL: Yeah, these guys have a lot of standing to talk. Twice before they've threatened the United States under the same scenario that Joe pointed out: If we dare to interfere in whatever action they may take against Taiwan, as one of them said, "We think you care more about Los Angeles than you do about Taiwan."

I do think we need to have the capability to thwart the kind of blackmail that a country like or Iraq or Iran or North Korea, or perhaps even China might tend to throw our way because they've got this capability.

But it is not my intention -- if I could just -- since Joe characterized my position here, if I could just slightly modify it. It's not my position that we ought to develop today a more robust system than the one designed. But we should not tie our hands for, in the future, having the capability of going to some sea-based assets, some space-based assets or other land-based assets as the threat continues to evolve.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Why not contemplate an alternate course of action rather than a protective shield? If there is hostile intent that can be established of a nation like North Korea, if it's proven; if it is also shown that the government is as unstable as is characterized by your opposite guest, then why not engage in a preemptive strike?

SEN. KYL: Well, that's a real --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You wouldn't violate the ABM Treaty, right? (Laughter.)

SEN. KYL: (Laugs.) You'd violate a whole lot of other things

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It was good enough for the Israelis back in the early '80s, when they took out the Osirus (sic) reactor in Tehran -- not Tehran, but in Baghdad.

SEN. KYL: (Inaudible.)

SEN. BIDEN: And you don't mean a nuclear strike against it; you mean take out the capability --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Take out their capability with conventional bombs.

SEN. KYL: Yeah. Well, that may be an option in certain scenarios, but I don't think that we want to leave that as our only option here. The bottom line, John, is this: It is immoral for any leader of the United States to leave American citizens vulnerable to this kind of attack, if we are going to try to play a role in the world.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, I want you to address my question of a preemptive strike. What's really wrong with it? Would it create a wider war, a wider conflict? Well, so would a rogue missile --

SEN. KYL: No, no. John --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- discharged by --

SEN. KYL: -- what we are proposing here is purely defensive; it's purely defensive. We threaten no one with this. And unless somebody threatens us or throws a missile our way, it doesn't go into effect. But we at least have the capability of protecting American --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But you are relying on a technologically unproven instrument to defend yourself, whereas a preemptive strike goes right in; it's surgical, it takes it out, and it would take years to rebuild it.

Would you contemplate a preemptive strike?

SEN. BIDEN: Yes, I would. And when we were talking -- remember, when North Korea was talking about moving on South Korea, I went to the floor and suggested that. We should in fact, if they continue their nuclear program and they move aggressively, not rule out a preemptive strike.

Look -- well, I can see your man putting "time up."

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: That's all right. Don't worry about him.

SEN. BIDEN: All right.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Let me take care of him. Let me ask you this.

SEN. BIDEN: All right. Okay.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: There are other nations besides North Korea that fall within the categorization of "rogue states." There is Iran, and we know that the Russians have been helping the Iranians. There's Pakistan, which has the weapon, and there is India, which has the weapon.

SEN. BIDEN: You got it.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you see any of these other rogue states as providing a true cause and justification for a $60 billion commitment, over 15 years, to produce this system?

SEN. BIDEN: This system will not protect against the latter two nations you have mentioned because they have too many of the weapons.

I think, John -- let me give you a radical idea. There is a professor and an arms-control -- and a scientist named Darwin (sp), who suggested that maybe we have what they call a boost-phase interceptor.

What would happen, John, if the Russians would agree that we would jointly run, on Russian soil, an interceptor system that would intercept any Iranian or Iraqi missiles because they are growing concerned about their capability, and we jointly protect that? There would be a guarantee that those missiles could never hit the United States because -- by the way, what John has not pointed out -- and not intentionally -- is you -- MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It could have been intentional.

SEN. BIDEN: -- and by the way, what is going to happen here; as they develop these missiles, John, what they do with these missiles, when you have a hundred interceptors, is they have the ability to put out these decoys. We are only testing, John, a missile as -- by the way, one of the smartest guys in the country General Welch, who used to head up this whole operation, came to speak with me. And he said: "Joe, these tests here that are going on, even if they succeed, they don't tell you much of anything. They only test from two azimuths; they don't test at all about the ability to intercept what is likely to be deployed further down the road."

Look, the question for me is, at the end of the day, are my grandchildren more or less secure? And I ask this, John: If you build a missile defense system that causes China, Japan, India, Pakistan to vastly increase their nuclear capability -- you tell me -- are we more secure or less secure?

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What do you have to say to that?

SEN. KYL: Well, there's a lot that needs to be -

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Clarified?

SEN. KYL: -- corrected here. First of all, the threat that currently exists is a relatively limited threat, and what's being proposed is just enough to meet that threat.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Right now.

SEN. KYL: That's correct, and --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: But you have no doubt that this is going to evolve.

SEN. KYL: That's right.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: -- into the full-blown strategic shield that was recommended by Ronald Reagan.

SEN. KYL: No --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: You don't think it will?

SEN. KYL: No, I don't. And what we're talking about is having the ability to use some space-based assets and some sea-based assets that would have the capability to do what Joe is suggesting, and that is a better chance of getting a missile in the boost phase. Now, whether you locate that in southern Russia --

SEN. BIDEN: Now he's with us, John.

SEN. KYL: -- or you locate that on an Aegis cruiser and, mentioning Japan, for example, we've got the workings of a relationship with both Israel and Japan which would enable us to help protect them as well as the United States for a missile launched in that region.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: So no 100 interceptors? This plan now under consideration is not the way to go?

SEN. KYL: No, what I'm saying is that this is not the be-all and end-all, and you don't want to accept this and then limit your future capability. What's being negotiated by the administration is, you take the 100 missiles, that's all you get ever, period. And what we're saying is, leave enough flexibility to be able to evolve the system with the threat to include some of these other capabilities --

SEN. BIDEN: John --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Before we get into that, I just want to know, I just want to hear from Jesse Helms and the reason that he gives for disapproving of this Clinton proposal of a limited defense shield. Here is the senator.

SEN. JESSE HELMS (R-NC): (From videotape.) Not on my watch, Mr. President. Not on my watch. It's not going to happen. Let's be clear, to avoid any misunderstandings down the line. Any modified ABM Treaty negotiated by this administration will be DOA -- dead on arrival --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: The first question is, is this plan going to pass the Senate? And the second, is it going to be voted on? Is it going to be approved? Is it going to become the law of the land? Secondly, is his reason for objecting to it -- one would say, going into this subject, that Jesse would (be) behind it. He's a conservative, he believes strongly in national defense, but he's against it. Is it because he doesn't want to tie the hands of a future president to what this president lays out as a plan?

SEN. KYL: I believe he articulated that as his primary reason. I doubt that there will be any vote this year or any approval this year of an agreement between the administration and Russia on an NMD system or ABM modification.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Will the Senate pass -- will the Senate approve of this plan?

SEN. KYL: I don't think that it'll be even presented this year. It certainly wouldn't be voted on this year. I mean, you heard the chairman say that it wouldn't --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: That pretty much killed it.

SEN. BIDEN: I think it's not appropriate what the chairman said, and I work with him every day. I'm his counterpart in the Foreign Relations Committee. There's a mix of his concern about having the next president make the decision. He concluded that statement by saying, "I'm not about to give this man another photo op." And so there's a little bit of politics in this.

Let's get something straight here. The president of the United States of America has been asked to accommodate a plan and the ABM Treaty which the Senate went on record as saying they wanted. They said they wanted a thin national missile defense. That's the plan you showed in the beginning with the diagram. The president of the United States has further said that he, if he negotiates that, he will negotiate a second phase, and that is that there will be a second phase in which we can further broaden that plan.

These guys, understandably, are afraid that what's going to happen is there's going to be an agreement that's going to politically lock the next president, if it's George Bush, into a position the public likes very much, which allowing this limited nuclear defense and the continuation of the ABM Treaty. Let's get something straight, John. They don't want the ABM Treaty, period. That is the beginning, the middle, and the end, and there's a rationale for it. It's a logical one, and that is they want to be able to have space-based systems, sea-based system, and land-based system.

Now, you're sitting in Beijing or in Berlin, and the United States says, "We've got a space-based system that we're going to employ." Now, what do you think that's going to do in every capital in the world when they conclude that, "Now wait a minute, they have greater" -- I mean, this is -- this is --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Let me turn to you for that. But for the clarification, let's describe the ABM. The ABM provides that a nation cannot build a system that will defend itself against incoming weapons. The logic being that it then provides them with a place to hide so that --

SEN. KYL: The logic is that you're totally vulnerable to attack.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: They're totally vulnerable.

SEN. BIDEN: And therefore, you wouldn't attack.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Therefore, you would not attack, correct.

SEN. KYL: And it also limits sea-based and space-based assets. And here's what we need to understand. By space-based assets, first we're talking about the kinds of satellites that can communicate to people on the ground where the tracking of a missile is so that you have a better chance of hitting it. We're talking about something called SBIRS-Low, it's a satellite that will be able to tell the people on the ground where to aim. This is not a space-based asset that should be prohibited.

And on sea-based assets, the first thing we're talking about here is developing an Aegis cruiser capability of standing off of the coast of Korea or Israel or wherever it might be, and having a better chance of getting that missile in its boost phase. As Joe was talking about, you'd much rather get it in its boost phase because, (A) it's over the territory of the enemy; (B) it's going very slowly as it's going up in the air, and if you have to rely upon your land-based system as it's coming down on top of you, it's traveling about 15,000 to 17,000 miles an hour, it's very hard to hit. So these are two reasons why you at least want to have the flexibility of going to some use of space-based assets as well as sea-based components.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: We'll be right back.

(Announcements.)

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What do Governor George Bush and Vice President Al Gore think of this missile shield to protect the United States? We'll put that question to our guests, but first, here are their distinguished profiles.

Born, Oakland, Nebraska; 58 years of age; wife, Caryll; two children. Republican; Presbyterian. University of Arizona, BA, Phi Beta Kappa; University of Arizona, Doctor of Laws. Arizona Law Review, editor-in-chief. Jennings, Strauss and Sammon (sp), a Phoenix law firm, 23 years. United States House of Representatives, Arizona, eight years. United States Senate, Arizona, six years and currently. Committees: Appropriations, Select Intelligence, Judiciary. Hobbies: National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, NASCAR, avid racing fan. Jon Kyl.

Born, Scranton; 57 years of age; wife, Jill; three children. Catholic, Democrat. University of Delaware, BA; Syracuse University, Doctor of Laws. New Castle, Delaware, County Council, two years. United States Senate, 27 years and currently. Committees: Judiciary, Foreign Relations, ranking Democrat. Hobbies: golfing. Joseph Biden.

The question is, can you enlighten me as to what Vice President Gore's views are on a missile defense shield?

SEN. BIDEN: Yes. He thinks there should be a limited -- what they call a thin missile defense to defend against rogue states, in conjunction with an amendment to the ABM Treaty; to have offensive and defensive capability, but keep the ABM Treaty in place.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, the president, who is his boss, the president favors what we have been talking about here. He's behind this --

SEN. BIDEN: Well, it's the same position, John; that is, to amend the ABM Treaty to accommodate this limited national defense. That is the combination that they both support.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: And we know that Mr. Putin over in -- Vladimir Putin, who is the head of state in Russia, disapproves of all of this.

SEN. BIDEN: I'll make you a bet that Putin will sign on to a system that would in fact demonstrate to him there's no threat to their missile capability and only directed at rogue states.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Is it true that Vladimir Putin and the Russians do not like the onerous job of maintaining their 7,500 nuclear warheads? It's expensive, and they'd like to have that cut way down. So the president, in order to induce him to give us a waiver, if that's the right word, from the ABM Treaty on the matter of these 100 interceptors, he will cut our strategic stockpile of warheads down to, say, 2,000, or 2,500. Is that possible? Will there be a deal?

SEN. KYL: I think the president will try to make a deal. One of the factors of the deal will be to reduce our warheads. And as you point out, the Russians can't afford to maintain their warheads, and they'll be down in the 2,000 range or thereabouts.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: At what point do we enter the zone of unsafe with regard to the number of strategic nuclear warheads?

SEN. BIDEN: We have a thing called the SIOP. That's our targeting position. I think it's at a thousand.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: A thousand? Don't you find that surprisingly low, a thousand? Shouldn't it at least be 1,500? And the Joint Chiefs said -- didn't the Joint Chiefs say this week that they want 2,500 and no less?

SEN. KYL: The Joint Chiefs believes it needs to be a minimum of 2,500, that's correct.

SEN. BIDEN: That's because, John, what they do, they have 60 missiles to take out Moscow, for example; redundancy. It's called the SIOP. They should go back and look at the SIOP. It's a different world. That is, what are the specific targets?

SEN. KYL: John, if I could --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Well, 1,500, it seems to me, is not a high number if we are in a multi-polar world. I think you're still dealing, perhaps, in a bipolar mentality.

SEN. BIDEN: Hey, no, John. Let's face it. Under the Bush administration, we didn't even target China. Let's get something straight here. Let's make sure we know what we're talking about.

SEN. KYL: The problem is you have to think -- and you can't really talk to much about what we call the SIOP because it's highly classified.

SEN. BIDEN: But it's just targeting.

SEN. KYL: It breaks down -- it's targeting -- but it breaks down into where you put your weapons. For example, at a thousand warheads, you might have three or four --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Can you make some news here today?

SEN. KYL: No -- but you'd have a very --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Can you tell us what we are really talking about?

SEN. KYL: -- but you'd have a very few submarines -- very few, less than that -- and a few bombers and a few missiles on land. Any one of those systems would be highly vulnerable if you reduce the numbers to that level, apart from the question of what kind of targeting you needed.

(Announcements.)

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Governor Bush met with Foreign Minister Ivanov of Russia. And reportedly, he told him that the governor favored the idea of a shield. Who is on the right side of this, politically, for the upcoming November presidential election?

SEN. KYL: I think the American people find it incomprehensible that they aren't protected today from the missile threat, and I think the American people want us to have that protection.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: What do you think? Who has got the --

SEN. BIDEN: I think if the American people knew that there is no possibility of defending against the tens of hundreds, thousands, of missiles that the Russians have and others will possess, that they would think the best thing to do is get rid of these nuclear weapons to the lowest numbers that we can.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: So neither one has the edge?

SEN. KYL: I don't think so.

SEN. BIDEN: But we'll find -- I wish it would be an issue in the debate. I think it's one of those national issues that should be the center of debate; I predict it won't be.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Senator Joseph Biden, and Senator John Kyl, thank you very much for being my guests.

SEN. BIDEN: Thank you.

END OF REGULAR SEGMENT PBS SEGMENT FOLLOWS

PBS SEGMENT.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you think that President Clinton is counting on Vladimir Putin to give him, Clinton, a legacy?

SEN. KYL: I think he is going to try to negotiate a deal with Putin, partially to get a legacy. I think the president believes it would be a good thing to tie in the ABM Treaty, limiting our national missile defense only to the single site that he is talking about. So he is going to try hard to negotiate that deal.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: The president's legacy is afflicted with recollections of impeachment and Lewinsky. Putin knows that. And Putin knows that that gives him -- or does it? -- a certain leverage over Clinton. Do you see it that way?

SEN. BIDEN: No, I don't see it that way, at all. I think that's gobbledygook.

I think what Putin sees is he needs the United States desperately for any possibility of economic recovery. There is no chance of Russia making it without our cooperation; that's what he sees. Clinton walks in with the high hand here. There is nothing Putin can give him; it's only what the president can give Putin.

And by the way, the legacy -- Jesus, my grandfather used to say: "John, if you want to live like a Republican, vote Democrat. Man, you have never had it so good; you're making more money than you ever made in your whole life, and it's because of a Democratic president." And then that part of the legacy is going to be out there.

Part of the legacy is crime's down seven years in a row; no Republican ever did that. Part of the legacy is that there is lower birth --

SEN. KYL: I didn't think this was going to be a campaign speech (laughs) -- I mean, come on. (Laugs.)

SEN. BIDEN: Come on.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: It looks like Joe --

(Cross talk.)

SEN. KYL: What I don't agree -- don't agree with Joe more is that the pressure is on Clinton on this deal; it's not on Putin.

Putin's got the beginning of his term now, he's got all the time he needs, he's got all the cards with him. I think it's going to be very hard for Clinton to drive a deal, and I'm really fearful of what he's likely to give away in order to get that deal from Putin.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: James Rubin spoke at the State Department about a man by the name of Savelyev, who is a famous -- in Russia at least missile scientist who was at a Baltic Institute of Technology, and he invited 28 Iranians to join him in a discussion of advanced metallurgy and the dynamics of high temperature metals, et cetera. And it was pretty clear that he was giving them data on the bomb. This was interrupted in October when Vice President Gore wrote Putin a letter and told him that this had to stop, and Putin obliged.

Now, has this come up at all in congressional hearings, the role of this man, Savelyev, and the endorsement that he got to do this from Putin himself when Putin was in charge of the Foreign Service Corps in Russia -- back in '97, I think it was. Do you recall the story?

SEN. KYL: I do.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Do you want to speak to that?

SEN. KYL: Well, I will say Joe and I have worked together, along with a lot of our colleagues, over the years to try to get the Russians to back off of this kind of support. They've been --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: To Iran?

SEN. KYL: Yes. They've been doing this kind of thing for a long time. And in fits and starts we've had some success, but by and large we haven't been able to stop them from doing this kind of thing.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: This must be very upsetting to the Israelis.

SEN. KYL: Well, it is. It's very upsetting to all of us because Russia does in fact contribute to the proliferation of these weapons.

SEN. BIDEN: And it's very upsetting to a lot of us who -- like Pete Domenici and me and others, who know you can significantly impact on this, John, by giving these folks something else to do. They can't eat, they have no money. There's 9,000 scientists and people involved in the nuclear industry in those cities out there. And guess what? We're not doing a -- I mean, when we try to decide how to get them other employment, get them out of the business -- we don't want them selling themselves out there.

SEN. KYL: We've sent them $4 billion, I mean, that isn't chopped liver. (Laugs.)

SEN. BIDEN: Well, but we've sent it the wrong way. What we're doing is we should be dismantling -- anyway --

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: One famous name we didn't -- in this area that has become famous by reason of a study that he put together with some notables that I know you respect and you respect, is Don Rumsfeld.

SEN. BIDEN: Yeah.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Now, does Don Rumsfeld and the results of his study of this whole issue of our vulnerability to nuclear missiles from rogue states, does that figure in our consideration of this whole subject?

SEN. KYL: We wouldn't be here talking today had it not been for Rumsfeld and his commission report, which woke the intelligence community up to the fact that these threats were a lot more imminent than we had previously thought. So I think they were --

SEN. BIDEN: What we're talking about is the rogue state threat, John. We've got to keep our eye on the ball here. The rogue state threat can be met by something other than a system that can also meet a threat against -- theoretically, a threat against China and Russia.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: Yeah, but you won't forget the importance of preemptive strikes, will you?

SEN. BIDEN: Hell, no. Hell, no.

MR. MCLAUGHLIN: There you go. We'll go out on that note. (Laughter.)

END

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: June 6, 2000

May 23, 2000, Tuesday

LENGTH: 17504 words

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE REQUIREMENTS

CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)

WITNESSES: WALTER SLOCOMBE, DEFENSE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLICY; GEN. HENRY SHELTON, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; GEN. HENRY SHINSEKI, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF; ADM. JAY JOHNSON, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; GEN. JAMES JONES JR., MARINE CORPS COMMANDANT; GEN. MICHAEL RYAN, AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND ADM. RICHARD MIES, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

LOCATION: 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TIME: 9:32 A.M. EDT DATE: TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2000

BODY:

SEN. WARNER (Gavel.) Committee will come to order. The committee meets today to receive testimony on the United States Strategic Nuclear Requirements. The Senate, which has the advice and consent responsibility under the Constitution, must remain well-informed on all issues relating to treaties, those in force as well as those being contemplated.

This committee, together with others, have a special role to play, a special responsibility regarding the international commitments that relate to our nation's national security.

The ongoing debate regarding the administration's negotiating position on START III is largely about U.S. nuclear requirements. Hence today's hearing will involve matters related to the military implications of a prospective START III treaty.

Recent press reports have described the debate that is taking place in the administration in preparation for the president's summit meeting in Moscow early in June. This debate should take place. It is a vital part of our process and the long-term survival of our nation, and indeed that of our allies.

The Senate, through this hearing, is participating in that debate. And I want to make it very clear, I wish the president well, and I say that with great sincerity. This is an important summit. I hope, as a consequence of the meetings, that the message that will be forthcoming at the conclusion is a positive one, not only for the United States and Russia, but indeed for the world. I look upon this summit as a building block laying a foundation for the next president of the United States to build on, especially in the area of arms control.

But I say with respect to the president and all those concerned that Congress, especially the United States Senate, has a role with regard to treaties. Let me emphasize that any international agreement limiting U.S. armed forces or armaments must be entered into only pursuant to the treaty-making powers set forth in the Constitution.

The administration has attempted often to circumvent the Senate in a range of arms control agreements. It did so regarding the so-called ABM Treaty demarcation agreement until the Senate blocked entry into force of the CFE flank

agreement, until the president certified that the demarcation agreement would be submitted to the Senate for advice and
consent.

I call your attention to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961. It makes the president's obligations very clear in law. And I quote: "No action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the armed forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner except pursuant to treaty-making power of the president set forth in Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless authorized by the enactment of further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States," end quote.

Every arms control treaty resolution or ratification that has come before the Senate since 1989 has included a declaration that any international agreement that limits U.S. armed forces or armaments may only be entered into pursuant to the president's treaty-making power under the Constitution.

Now, I've had the privilege, in my modest career, to be involved in this subject for some time. Twenty-eight years ago this month, I was part of the delegation of the president of the United States, Richard Nixon, when we went to Moscow. My specific duties at that time related to the completing of the incidence-at-sea agreement. But the day after that agreement was signed, they entered into the initial arms control agreements with then-President Brezhnev, and more specifically the ABM Treaty. I remember it very well.

And I make these observations. Now that the Cold War has ended, should we have put an end to the strategic theory called mutual assured destruction, which holds that for deterrence to be effective, the United States and Russia need to leave themselves completely vulnerable to massive nuclear attack.

Even during the Cold War, the notion that defense would undermine deterrence was questionable. Today such a notion is, I think, long overdue for review. Unfortunately, in my judgment, the Clinton administration has failed in any significant way to move the United States away from the lingering effects of mutual assured destruction. The administration continues to characterize the ABM Treaty as, quote, "the cornerstone of strategic stability," end quote, even though it is clear that the treaty fundamentally prevents the United States from confronting new post-Cold War threats.

Twenty-eight years ago, when we were there in Moscow, with the best of intentions, we never foresaw the capabilities of other nations, and we all know which they are today; more specifically, North Korea, Iran, possibly someday Iraq; and indeed, the question mark always lingers over China. We did not foresee at that time these threats poised at our nation.

So I think I've made enough comment on that, and I do that with respect to our president and all those engaged. An important issue in this debate is whether or not the U.S. should accept strategic reductions below those tentatively agreed by the president, President Clinton and President Yeltsin in the March '97 at Helsinki. At Helsinki, the United States and Russia committed to negotiate a START III treaty that limits the size to between 2,000 and 2,500 strategic warheads.

Recently, Russia has made it clear its preference for deeper cuts to approximately 1,500 warheads per side. I question, what is the depth of concern regarding the possibility that our negotiators would agree to a START III treaty that limits us to 2,000 or 1,500 deployed strategic warheads? Some believe that such deep cuts would undermine our deterrence posture or result in a less flexible and stabilizing force. Today's hearings will raise those issues and give our distinguished panel an opportunity to answer.

Of the many important issues to be addressed today, I believe that the following questions are critical. What is the military significance of designing the U.S. strategic force posture around the START III treaty based on the Helsinki framework? And how does this change, if the U.S. is required to reduce to 2,000 or 1,500 warheads deployed, how does that change it?

How will reduced force levels under a START III treaty affect our ability to maintain a viable and stabilizing triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems? What changes in counting rules does the United States require under START III to ensure that low nuclear limits do not force the U.S. to give up conventional weapons platforms? What are the military

implications of the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia under a START III regime?

What are START III's implications for our ability to deter the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in regional conflicts while maintaining strategic stability among the major nuclear powers? Will the low force levels being considered for START III encourage countries other than Russia to seek nuclear peer status with the United States? Should the Senate be concerned that the United States may be pressing ahead towards a START III agreement without having conducted a recent comprehensive review of our strategic nuclear policy doctrine and requirements?

In the markup of this committee just two weeks ago for the Fiscal Year 2001 defense authorization bill, this committee adopted a provision that would require the conduct of such a review. Moreover, this provision, which was adopted unanimously by the committee, expresses the sense of the Congress, and I quote, "that such review should be used as the basis for establishing future United States arms control objectives and negotiating positions," end quote.

It is vitally important for the Senate and the people of this great nation to understand the military significance of the various options that are being considered for any prospective START III treaty. I'm well aware that the answers to many of these questions that I have posed and that other members will ask will involve classified and sensitive information. Therefore, we will have a closed session immediately following this open hearing.

I urge the witnesses to be as forthcoming as possible in the open, but I respect their judgment regarding answers that need to be reserved for a closed session. I particularly want to thank the chairman, General Shelton, for calling me with regard to this subject, and I've made the arrangements that you requested accordingly. I urge senators to respect the importance of the closed session and the essential requirement to make no public disclosure of proceedings that take place in this closed session.

As a citizen of this great nation, I respect the constitutional duties of our president to conduct the foreign affairs of our nation. Summit meetings are an important of this president and all presidents' responsibilities. But Congress, especially the United States Senate, has a role, a very balanced role, under our Constitution to play.

I welcome our distinguished witnesses. We will receive testimony from the honorable Walter Slocombe, undersecretary of Defense for policy; General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Shinseki, chief of staff of the Army; Admiral Jay Johnson, chief of naval operations; General Jones, commandant of the Marine Corps; and General Michael Ryan, chief of staff of the United States Air Force. We also are pleased to include Admiral Mies, commander-in-chief, United States Strategic Command.

Senator Levin.

SEN. CARL LEVIN (D-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming all of our witnesses this morning. It's a very significant subject and it's very worthy of congressional discussion and deliberation. I would hope that as our president approaches the summit that the Senate's advice or senators' advice would be constructive. Going up to this summit, it seems to me, constructive advice, if there is a treaty that ultimately results from this summit or later on down the road -- we will surely have adequate time to consider any such treaty. But in advance of the summit, I think it is important that the Senate act as constructively as possible for this or any other president facing such a summit.

The number of nuclear weapons that are needed to deter are not produced by the Pentagon out of thin air. They're determined presumably in response to guidance that is the result of a policy decision. In making their recommendations, the Pentagon is responding to policy goals that have been determined by the civilian leadership.

The president decided in the presidential decision directive that the principal policy of the United States is to deter. Deterrence is the key. How many weapons are needed to deter an adversary? Well, to be effective, the adversary has to believe that the U.S. can and will deliver the nuclear weapons.

But one of the most difficult questions here, at least for me, has been to separate what are the appropriate questions for the civilian leaders and what are the appropriate questions for our military leaders to decide. The determination of what is adequate deterrence, in my judgment, is a policy decision for the civilians. Will we need 1,000 weapons with the power of 50,000 Hiroshima weapons to deter?

The policymakers should decide what is necessary to deter a rational leader of another country. What another nation values most in other words, what types of targets need to be destroyed in order to deter, in my judgment, is fundamentally a policy question, with the exception of military targets, which the other country might value most, which seems to me a judgment which our military should be basically making.

What number or percentage of targets need to be destroyed to deter effectively, it seems to me, is basically a policy decision. What number of nuclear weapons is necessary to destroy those numbers and types of targets, it seems to me, is basically a military question.

But unless we sort of analyze for ourselves -- and each one may reach a different conclusion on that -- as to what is the civilian responsibility and what is the military responsibility, it seems to me that we will be talking about numbers in the abstract. We've heard that the Pentagon says that we need, for instance, 2,000 or 2,500 nuclear weapons to deter. The ultimate number of weapons, it seems to me, is driven not by the Pentagon but by a policy decision by our civilian leaders as to what a rational leader in another country would cause that leader to refrain from attacking our country.

And that is essentially a decision, what is necessary to deter, which I believe is a civilian decision, and so that when we read and hear that the Pentagon says that a certain number of weapons is needed to deter, I hope that our representatives here, from the Pentagon, both civilian and military, will tell us more precisely what is meant by that statement. Is that a statement made by military leaders, or is that a statement which they conclude is necessary in order to carry out the civilian guidance which they have received, and if so, what has that guidance been?

So, we have a number of questions facing us this morning. How does the U.S. military respond to the policy guidance, put in place a force structure to meet that guidance? And what strategic forces does the United States need to meet the policy guidance and maintain a strong deterrent? And many other concerns, including whether or not our policy is launch on warning, whether we want to be reliant on launch on warning, what are the counting rules, and questions such as that, which go into the ultimate question of what is needed to deter.

So there are many questions that we need to address this morning, some very fundamental questions, questions which really have not been looked at for many, many years by the Congress, and I think it's very constructive, hopefully, that we look at them now so that we can see whether or not, as we move out of the Cold War era, we can realistically now look at the guidance, see whether or not it is still relevant to the current world, and if changes are appropriate, what that means in terms of the structure of our nuclear forces.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator Levin. We'll press right on with the hearing. Last week I endeavored to have this hearing, and it was abruptly cut off by an arcane Senate rule that says no committees can meet, and so forth, but we're gonna press right on.

Secretary Slocombe, we'll start off with you, followed by General Shelton, and then our distinguished panel of chiefs.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, members of the committee. It is, as always, an honor to represent the secretary of defense before this committee today, on this occasion to discuss an issue which is of great importance to the security of this country and the peace of the world: the role of our nuclear forces in U.S. defense policy and the implications of possible future agreed reductions and limitations of those forces.

As you suggested in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, for reasons that are I think plain to this committee, there are very sharp limits on what it is prudent to say publicly about U.S. nuclear plans under any circumstances, and about U.S. negotiating position while they are still being formulated for ongoing talks, including at the summit level.

However, there are certain principles that are basic and that are public that guide us on both these issues. The strategic policy for our nuclear forces, including plans for their employment, is set forth by the president of the United States. Detailed guidance to implement his broad national strategy, as established by the president, is issued from time to time by the secretary of defense, and in still greater detail on a biannual basis by the joint chiefs of staff. On the basis of this

guidance, the United States Strategic Command annually develops a detailed operational plan for the employment of
our strategic forces.

While the risk of large-scale nuclear war is now very low, our nuclear forces continue to serve as an important hedge against an uncertain future. They are also a guarantee of our security commitment to our allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing, acquiring or using their own nuclear weapons.

The current policy of the United States with respect to the employment of our nuclear arsenal was set forth in a presidential directive in the autumn of 1997. That policy incorporates long-standing principles adhered to by successive administrations since at least the 1970s. Under the current directive, as in the past, U.S. military planning for strategic nuclear weapons and their employment is focused on deterring a nuclear war, and it emphasizes the survivability of our nuclear systems and the infrastructure necessary to endure preemptive attack and still respond in overwhelming levels. Our overall nuclear employment policy according to states -- the United States forces must be capable of and be seen to be capable of holding at risks those critical assets and capabilities that a potential adversary most values. Additionally, our nuclear weapons must have the capability and survivability to be executed effectively under all conditions of warning and alert, ranging from a surprise no-notice attack, to an attack carried out after full force generation, including cases where we ride out an attack.

The United States is and has long been committed to appropriate and jointly agreed upon reductions in our strategic nuclear forces, both because such reductions can enhance our security, and because progress on reducing the U.S. and Russian arsenals helps to build sound relations with Russia and maintain international support for our nonproliferation efforts. In seeking to move toward a START III treaty with Russia in the context of an amendment to the AMB Treaty, the administration has continued the effort, which has been carried on by every administration since at least that of President Johnson, to stop the growth of nuclear dangers and to seek significant, gradual, verifiable, and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear forces consistent with maintaining the nation's security.

The administration's proposals for START III follow the agreement made at Helsinki in March 1997 which outline the major elements for a future treaty. The United States' agreements on force levels and the other elements agreed at Helsinki were supported by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the STRATCOM commander-in-chief at the time. At Helsinki, as the committee knows, the presidents agreed that START III would establish the ceiling for the United States and Russia to be reached by the end of 2007, with 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. That level will be 30 to 45 percent below that permitted by START II, and approximately two-thirds below what is permitted by START I. Although the Russians have proposed lower levels, it remains the U.S. position that START III should reflect the Helsinki agreement on levels.

In an important new development promoting the irreversibility of deep reductions, the presidents also agreed in Helsinki that both sides would seek agreement on transparency into strategic nuclear warhead stockpiles, and for some monitored elimination of strategic nuclear weapons that were not in a deployed status. They also agreed that the United States and Russia would explore possible measures regarding limitations on tactical nuclear system. And as I mentioned before, they also -- they have agreed subsequently in Cologne that there will be discussions on the possibility of modifying the ABM Treaty, in the U.S. view, to permit a limited defense against the rogue state threat.

The United States does not seek reductions for their own sake. For the Department of Defense and for the administration as a whole, the standard of what reductions or other proposed arms control measures are acceptable will continue whether they are compatible with maintaining nuclear deterrence in line with the policy I have summarized. The Department of Defense, including the joint chiefs of staff and the commander-in-chief of strategic command, was fully consulted in connection with the agreement in Helsinki in 1997 on the 2,000 to 2,500 level. Any consideration of proposals for different levels would be subject to the same process.

I would be happy to discuss all these issues in more detail during the closed session, which I appreciate the committee's understanding the requirement for it.

That concludes my statement.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very, Secretary Slocombe. General Shelton.

GEN. SHELTON: Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, other distinguished members of the Senate, it's a great pleasure to be in front of you again this morning and have the opportunity to testify regarding this very significant issue.

Let me also up front thank the Congress and especially the members of this committee for your sustained and
significant support of our armed forces, as evidenced by the great work that you did on the FY 2001 Authorization Act.

Today, the joint chiefs welcome the chance to give our assessment of America's current and future strategic nuclear force requirements, and how that affects the negotiating framework for possible future START III negotiations with Russia. As mentioned earlier, in addition to my testimony, the commander-in-chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Admiral Mies, would like to make a brief opening statement, after which all of us will be prepared to take your questions.

Although, as the chairman mentioned up front, or cautioned up front, there's very little that we can talk about in specifics in an open session. In your invitation for your hearing, Mr. Chairman, you and Senator Levin asked the joint chiefs to provide our assessment of the potential impact of a new START III agreement on the ability of our armed forces to ensure the national security of the United States. As you're aware, this is a national security issue of the very highest order. And as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, a summit is scheduled next month between President Clinton and President Putin in Moscow, and it's expected that possible START III talks will be on the list of topics to be discussed. We're also aware of the recently publicly stated Russian interest in going beyond the numbers suggested at the Helsinki summit in March of 1997.

First, let me say that we are pleased to see the Russian Duma ratify START II. Pending Senate concurrence and ratification of the START II agreement, we are prepared to reduce the number of our strategic warheads from the START I limit of 6,000 to the START II limit of 3,500. Let me also add that the chiefs favor additional negotiated reduction in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. We were fully consulted before the summit in Helsinki, and have supported the START III negotiating framework that seeks to reduce the number of strategic warheads to the 2,000 to 2,500 range. As I said, the chiefs support further strategic arms reductions, and the START III framework adopted at Helsinki. However, there are concerns that must be addressed.

As stated, Mr. Chairman, as you mentioned yourself, it's difficult to go into detail in an open session, but in general, we have considered additional reductions in our nuclear arsenal, and have an ongoing analysis of the previously agreed to framework for START III. And while the joint chiefs would welcome the opportunity to reduce the levels of nuclear arms, our concern first and foremost is always the United States military ability to safeguard and enhance the security of the United States.

Thus, from a military perspective, several challenges must be addressed with any new proposals for a lower warhead ceiling. First, we must consider the impact that lowering the bracket might have on our current conventional force structure. As you know, some of our strategic platforms have very important conventional deterrents and operational roles as well. We must maintain our ability to effectively continue the current mix of delivery platforms in the nuclear triad. Secondly, we must be able to execute our national strategic nuclear plan in the event that this were to become necessary. Mr. Chairman, it's also important to recall that the START framework only requires the destruction of strategic weapon launches and delivery vehicles, not the warheads themselves.

Finally, there are other pertinent factors, some of which you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that should be considered as we examine the appropriate warhead levels, such as whether or not proposed levels lead to greater stability, our nuclear stockpile reliability, the tactical and nuclear weapons imbalance that exists, the worldwide weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and the multinational aspects of nuclear development.

Mr. Chairman, we again, we appreciate the opportunity to meet with the committee today and to share our views with you. And we look forward to amplifying our comments and more fully addressing your concerns either here or in the closed session, as appropriate.

At this time, I would like to give Admiral Mies the opportunity to present his opening statement. Thank you.

SEN. WARNER: Admiral Mies.

ADMIRAL RICHARD MIES: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, distinguished senators, I really appreciate the opportunity to also be here before your committee this morning. Before I begin, I'd also like to thank you, each of you, for your sustained support to the Department of Defense to our strategic deterrent forces and also for your continued commitment to a safe, reliable and secure nuclear weapons stockpile through the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program.

SEN. WARNER: I wish to thank you, Admiral, for making time available here on Capitol Hill to brief individually and collectively the members of this committee. It was that briefing that prompted me to explore the possibility of having this hearing as early as possible. I wish to thank you.

ADM. MIES: Yes sir.

Deterrence of aggression and coercion is a cornerstone of our national security strategy, and our strategic nuclear forces serve as the most visible and most important element of our commitment to this principle. These forces represent our nation's ultimate insurance policy. Nuclear weapons help keep the Cold War cold. And although the risk of massive nuclear attack has decreased significantly and the role of nuclear weapons in this post-Cold War environment has changed dramatically, deterrence of major military attack on the United States and its allies, particularly attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, still remains our highest defense priority. The president has affirmed that nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitment to our allies, and a disincentive to all those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And although the Cold War has ended, there still remain a number of potentially serious threats to our national security, including regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats and wild cards. Cooperative threat reduction, arms control, presidential initiatives, and numerous confidence-building measures have brought about many positive changes in the strategic posture of both the United States and Russia, and I think these changes reflect a new, more stable, and constructive relationship.

We are pleased that Russia has ratified START II, and if the conditions they have attached to that ratification are deemed acceptable and START II enters into force, we are prepared to move to a START II compliant force in a deliberate, prudent manner. That force will be a credible, robust deterrent, with sufficient flexibility to respond to future challenges. It provides a cushion against imperfect intelligence and surprises, and it preserves a reconstitution capability as a hedge against unwelcome political or strategic developments. And as the chairman has indicated, the joint chiefs of staff and U.S. Strategic Command have supported the principles of the Helsinki framework to further enhance our national security and reduce the risk of war.

However, as the chairman has also indicated, that does not mean that all our concerns with the details of that framework have been completely satisfied. The strategic environment has also changed since Helsinki. Today, I think we have a much better appreciation of the risks and the concerns associated with further reductions than we had two years ago. As one example, we are much more aware of the potential that START attribution and counting rules may have on our conventional bomber capability than we did prior to the Helsinki Accord.

As a second example, Russia has placed increased reliance on their nuclear weapons employment in their declaratory policies, and recent statements by senior Chinese officials also may point towards an increased role for nuclear weapons in their foreign policy.

The chairman has already mentioned a number of factors that must be considered as we evaluate further arms control reductions. As I have previously testified, I believe that further reductions in strategic delivery systems beyond START II need to be complemented by a more comprehensive consideration, considerations of increased stockpile transparency, including greater accountability and transparency of non-strategic of tactical nuclear warheads; limitations on nuclear weapons production infrastructures; the relationship of third-party nuclear weapon stockpiles; the impact on our extended deterrence security commitments to our allies; and the implications of deploying strategic defensive systems.

For understandable reasons, there is little I can say publicly about the details of these considerations because of the security classifications associated with our security forces, and I would be happy to discuss these issues in more detail during the closed session. Additionally, there are some issues I am naturally reluctant to discuss while our Department of Defense policy is still in formulation.

As we proceed to lower numbers, stability, the assurance against being caught by surprise, the safety in waiting, rather than numerical parity, is the most important criteria in assessing prospective arms control measures. As Albert Walstader (sp) wrote many years ago, "Relaxation of tensions, which everyone thinks is good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard, which everyone thinks is bad."

As we reduce our strategic delivery systems to lower levels, parity in numbers alone becomes less and less important. Issues such as transparency, irreversibility, production capacity, aggregate warhead inventories and verifiability become more and more significant. It is ultimately the character and the posture of our strategic forces, characteristics like weapon system reliabilities, characteristics and posture more than the numbers, that makes the strategic environment stable or unstable.

Additionally, because we have neither new delivery platforms nor new warheads in development, we must not be hasty in taking irreversible steps to reduce our capability or flexibility. Deterrence ultimately depends not on our capability to strike first but on the assurance that we always have a capability to strike second.

I believe the emerging debate about further reductions in our nuclear forces is timely and should be guided by two fundamental principles which have been articulated by both a former national security adviser and a former special assistant to the president on arms control. First, we should continue to focus on arms control measures which directly and demonstrably enhance stability and reduce the risks of war. Second, given the clear risks and the elusive benefits inherent in additional deep cuts, the burden of proof should be on those who advocate such reductions to demonstrate exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance our national security.

Strategic deterrence will be a fundamental pillar of our national security for the foreseeable future. An early strategist's metaphor that nuclear planners are like home builders remains true today. A wise architect doesn't design only for the benign environments but for the worst weather conditions that one can reasonably anticipate -- hurricanes, earthquakes, floods and the like.

And I think, in the nuclear world, we have consistently maintained a building code for our nuclear forces to ensure they can weather the most stressed environments. And as we look to further reductions, we need to maintain our strategic deterrent force structure with that wise architect's prudent design criteria in mind. Our force structure needs to be robust, flexible and credible enough to meet the worst threats we can reasonably postulate. Our nation must always maintain the ability to convince potential aggressors to choose peace rather than war, restraint rather than escalation, and termination rather than conflict continuation.

Thank you very much.

SEN. WARNER: Admiral, again, I wish to commend you. That's a very good statement, and I think it frames the issues before the whole nation right now.

General Shinseki. We'll just go in that order right on down.

GEN. SHINSEKI: Mr. Chairman, I don't have a formal opening or written statement, but I would like to assure you that, much as the chairman and Admiral Mies have done, I'd like to add my thanks to the committee for the great support the Army has received. I'd also like to lend my support to the chairman's statement on where the chiefs stand. It is my position as well. And I would like to express my confidence in Admiral Mies's assessment of risk as he has outlined in his opening statement, and also his plan for dealing with that risk in meeting our responsibilities.

And with that, I'll stand ready for questions.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Admiral Johnson.

ADM. JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Allow me to add my own thanks to you and the committee for calling this important hearing. The subject is worthy of our most serious review, analysis and debate, and we stand ready to be active participants in that. Thank you, sir.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, General Ryan.

[LC]

GEN. RYAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here. I have no formal statement except to reiterate some of the points that were made here, particularly the need to continue to have a viable deterrent force based on a flexible capability to survive with survivable nuclear weapons and sufficient not only with respect to a bilateral treaty with Russia but with any emerging nations that come forth with a strong nuclear capability, which we see in China and others. And I thank you for calling this hearing on a very, very important strategic issue, important to the survival of this nation. Thank you, sir.

SEN. WARNER: Indeed, it is; and to many of our allies also, the policies we set. General Jones.

GEN. JONES: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I associate myself fully with the comments of the chairman and our commander-in-chief to my left. Clearly whatever we do ought not to be driven by a predetermined number of systems to be agreed to; rather, it should be derived from a strategy that reflects what is clearly in our national interest and in the interest of our allies, that is independent of the economic realities that appear to be at the heart of current Russian motivations in this regard, that reflects considerable thought with regard to emerging global realities and the expanding nuclear weapons club and that considers the tactical nuclear weapons imbalance as a fact that clearly bears on this problem.

We should also recognize that the journey is more important than the destination, since strategic force reductions are essentially irreversible. The United States, in my judgment, continues to require a worst-case deterrent capability vice a best-case capability. And the process to do all of these things is ongoing. It's a difficult issue, difficult subject, and will take time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: I thank you, General. Admiral, you don't have anything further to add at this time. General Shelton, under the Goldwater-Nickles legislation, this committee took the initiative and indeed the Congress followed in making available to each and every member of the Joint Chiefs the opportunity to go directly and see the president if they felt so strongly about an issue. In this instance, do I judge that this distinguished group of chiefs have reached a consensus among themselves, and has any chief indicated a desire to go directly to the president, so far as you know, and express his views?

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, the consensus reached was that we did, in fact, support the Helsinki framework. We have outlined some of the issues this morning that we will have to debate, will have to take into consideration, as we move toward the Helsinki framework. But all of us felt very comfortable, and none of the chiefs have gone forward expressing or have expressed in a (tank?) session any disagreement with the Helsinki framework.

SEN. WARNER: I think that's important that we understand that. And we recognize the confidentiality of your procedures and your debate among yourselves, but I judge it was a very thorough and lengthy debate among the chiefs over a period of time on this issue before you arrived at that consensus. Would that be correct?

GEN. SHELTON: That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and on numerous occasions.

SEN. WARNER: Now, again, I think we should all look at the forthcoming summit in a positive -- certainly I do -- a positive framework. Nevertheless, accompanying summits is a flurry of reports that come out initially before, during, and then, of course, the statement that is issued afterwards. And now there are indications that Russia wants to go below the Helsinki numbers. You have indicated your concurrence with the Helsinki, and therefore I presume opposition to going below. Is that correct?

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, as of today, the only thing we've seen from the Russians has been what's been reported in the press, their statement about wanting to go down possibly as low as 1,500. And the Joint Chiefs, again, support Helsinki. We have not been asked to consider anything that is outside the Helsinki framework.

SEN. WARNER: Well, then I want to ask a very carefully drafted question, which I will read, hoping that I can probe that comment of yours a bit further. In the 1997 Helsinki joint statement on parameters on future reductions in nuclear

forces, President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to a tentative START III structure that would entail further reductions in deployed strategic warheads to between 2,000 and 2,500 per side.

The White House fact sheet released on March 21, 1997 -- and I ask that be made a part of today's record -- indicated that such reductions would represent a 30 to 45 percent reduction in the number of deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II and more than a 65 percent reduction in the number of warheads permitted under START I.

It's my understanding that the chiefs have endorsed the Helsinki framework but would have reservations -- I repeat, reservations -- about any START III agreement that would require reductions below the Helsinki levels. What concerns, if any, do you have about reductions below the Helsinki levels? And I'll ask each of you to respond to that question. First, General.

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, again, it is hard to get into any detail in an open session. I outlined -- you outlined some of the concerns that I believe we would need to address. Myself and Admiral Mies outlined some others. First of all, we would need to make sure that any anticipated reductions at any point did not impact our conventional force.

But right up front you ask how a reduction below these levels would contribute to the security of the United States --

SEN. WARNER: Or not contribute.

GEN. SHELTON: Or not contribute. But in our case we approach it from how does it contribute to our security, and what does it do to stability -- how would it affect our ability to carry out the current guidance? Everything that the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mies does, is related to what we have been asked to do by our civilian leadership. That is the presidential directives PDD 60 from the president, as well as the nuclear weapons deployment guidance that is given to us by the secretary of Defense. And then there are a whole host of other issues that are associated with it, such as the tactical imbalance that we have and what percentage of those weapons might have strategic application. We have reliability -- as you reduce your warheads, how reliability starts to affect your available number of weapons. Again, I think it's important that upfront we understand that the total numbers do not -- are not equal to the available numbers. You have different platforms that are in maintenance; you have a host of warheads at any point that are not available for a given number of reasons. And again, at the very worst case, which is how the Joint Chiefs look at it, do we have the capability at the reduced numbers, whatever that number is we have been asked to look at, to make sure that we are survivable and that we could still carry out our mission, and produce unacceptable damage, unacceptable risks for the potential adversary, so that he in fact would be discouraged from launching against us to start with? That's just a few of the issues.

But the bottom line is as you start to come down you need to make sure that you have taken a look, a hard look at the guidance that is given to go with those numbers, and also that you have the underlying analysis that you had in fact war gamed against a potential adversary to ensure that those things that are near and dear to our citizens, specifically to the Joint Chiefs for our national security, are in fact taken into account.

SEN. WARNER: General, you have mentioned the underlying analysis. I find that the absence of a comprehensive review of this subject -- in other words, contemporary review -- to be a distinct handicap as we move into this series of negotiations. Would it not have been helpful for you and the chiefs to have had such a review, as you worked on your deliberations and preparation for such guidance as you wished to make to the president in this forthcoming (summer ?)?

GEN. SHELTON: Mr. Chairman, we feel very comfortable with the Helsinki framework that has been laid out. If we wanted to depart from that framework in any way, then we need to pause and do the necessary review, the necessary analysis, to ensure that any departure from that framework show that our national security in fact is as good as it is today or enhanced.

SEN. WARNER: Now, basically the framework -- a question for each of you -- is the Helsinki Accords and any discussion to go below those levels, what the implications you feel would be on our strategic deterrence policy; and, secondly, the absence of a review. General Shinseki? That is a comprehensive review to help guide your discussion.

GEN. SHINSEKI: Mr. Chairman, I think that's worthy of discussion. I would go back to the chairman's position. The last analysis that I am privy to is the Helsinki Accord in which the analysis, the assessments were made -- Admiral

Mies's discussion of deterrence and stability -- it's not just about numbers -- is all included in that assessment. I am very comfortable with the numbers as laid out in meeting our strategic guidance, provided to us in the deliberations that went into the Helsinki Accords -- those numbers are what we have. And I think further assessment, analysis, would be required for any other discussion.

SEN. WARNER: Are you concerned from the standpoint of our nation's policy if we were to go below those numbers at Helsinki?

GEN. SHINSEKI: Until you do the analysis, Mr. Chairman, it would be difficult to answer that question. But I --

SEN. WARNER: Okay, when you do the analysis -- well, we're at the summit -- supposing the summit came out with some type of agreement between the two to go below and the analysis hadn't been made -- that's the very question that's before us.

GEN. SHINSEKI: Well, as we have all indicated, Mr. Chairman, the Helsinki numbers are the last set of detailed analysis provided.

SEN. WARNER: Right. Admiral Johnson?

ADM. JOHNSON: I am in agreement with the chairman and General Shinseki, sir. I am quite comfortable with the Helsinki framework as described this morning. I am quite uncomfortable going outside the Helsinki framework without the requisite analysis on a subject of such major strategic importance.

SEN. WARNER: I thank you for that forthright answer.

General Ryan?

GEN. RYAN: I agree with my colleagues to the right -- SEN. WARNER: That's the chief of naval operations, yes.

GEN. RYAN: Absolutely -- in that the -- we have not looked at the implication below, but some of the things that start to emerge as you think about numbers below 2,000 to 2,500 bring into question the strategy in an overall sense, and also what tactical nuclear weapons issues start to emerge as they take on strategic significance because of their numbers. So I agree. I am uncomfortable below the Helsinki Accords.

SEN. WARNER: I thank you very much, and I am glad you brought the tactical issue up. That was to be my second question. But my time is running short, so I hope another member addresses the tactical issue. If not I'll on my return address this issue.

General Jones?

GEN. JONES: Mr. Chairman, I agree with the CNO's summation entirely.

SEN. WARNER: The chief of naval operations. And I thank you then.

Admiral Mies?

ADM. MIES: Mr. Chairman, I am happy to address your question in much greater detail in closed session. But I would say that I do feel that we have conducted within the Helsinki framework and have had the opportunity to brief both the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chairman, and the members of the secretary of Defense's staff, including the secretary, in a very comprehensive way, on the concerns and risks associated with reductions to lower numbers. I think just outlining the major points, and I certainly agree with the CNO's assessment, Senator Levin spoke very eloquently of the responsibilities on both the policy side and the military side. And I think from my pure strategy standpoint, as you go lower and lower in numbers, and you retain the existing strategy, you at some point in time have difficult executing that national strategy, and you get in a situation where you have disconnects, strategy-to-task disconnects in your ability to execute the strategy. And therefore, to a certain degree as you go lower you have to have a comprehensive review and possible changes to your strategic guidance.

Secondly, I would argue that, as I said in my statement, stability becomes a principal concern as you go lower and lower and lower. And there is a cushion in larger numbers. And there is a tyranny in smaller numbers that reduces stability in certain situations. So the issue is not parity in numbers as much as it is stability that ought to be the criteria. And that has to -- that requires a fair amount of dynamic analysis and war gaming to convince yourself that your forces are postured and their capabilities are such that you can deter under a wide variety of situations.

I think finally the bottom line has to be as you think about lower and lower numbers the real issue is how do you articulate the case that those lower numbers enhance our national security and make us --

SEN. WARNER: Or not enhance -- I want that to be stressed.

ADM. MIES: Or not enhanced, to make us more stable and more secure.

SEN. WARNER: I'd pick up on one of your words, "disconnect." The fundamental premise -- we have always got to work with in arms control is what is in the minds of a potential adversary: Do they perceive a weakness? And in my judgment those disconnects would provide a basis for the perception in an adversary of a weakness in our deterrence policy. Do you agree with that?

ADM. MIES: That's certainly a consideration in our deliberations, and will always be a consideration: How much is adequate to deter under what situations? And there certainly is a subjective evaluation that goes into that.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you.

ADM. MIES: Yes, sir.

SEN. WARNER: Now, Secretary Slocombe, you have had the benefit of hearing the chiefs. I think out of respect of the secretary and the president you should be the final one to respond, and then I'll turn to Senator Levin.

MR. SLOCOMBE: I would simply emphasize that the position of the United States is that the numbers for a possible START III agreement should be the Helsinki numbers. Before we would -- the Russians have obviously proposed lower numbers -- that's a matter of public record. Before we would agree to go to lower numbers, we would certainly do the analysis and the complete consultation with the CINC and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that I agree would be fully required under that assumption.

But our present policy is that the Helsinki numbers are the appropriate numbers for START III.

SEN. WARNER: I think that's a very good response.

Senator Levin?

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: For our colleagues -- we'll try to do each a six-minute round, and then go to a second round if that will be necessary, and then move as quickly as we can into a closed session.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First let me commend our witnesses this morning for their testimony and for their determination not to prejudge the outcome of an analysis before it's made. That may sound obvious, but I am afraid it is not always obvious. Each one of you have said that you have not been presented with a proposal to a specific number below the Helsinki numbers, and that until you are you are going to withhold judgment. You have indicated you have a number of concerns which would have to be addressed -- legitimate concerns all. There may be some additional concerns as well, and some additional factors I would think that you would be considering if an when such a proposal comes before you.

For instance, would you be looking at the change in the conventional targets that might exist in other countries in the last few years? Would that be a factor? The reduction in the number of conventional targets reflecting the reduction in

conventional capability in other countries, if there had been such a reduction in the last few years? Would a factor -- would you consider for instance the proposed reduced number of nuclear targets in such a proposal? Presumably if there is a proposed reduction in the number of weapons that would mean at least some reduction in the number of nuclear silos or nuclear targets in the other country. Would factors such as that be included in your deliberations on any such proposal? General Shelton?

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Levin, certainly those would in fact be part of the analysis, along with, as we have mentioned, several other very significant factors that would have to be taken into consideration.

SEN. LEVIN: And there may be many other --

GEN. SHELTON: Many others, yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: Let me -- Secretary Slocombe, let me ask you this question: What does the Pentagon take into consideration when looking at these proposals in this regard? Do you look at the damage that would be caused by a U.S. retaliatory attack -- not just to the specific targets, but for instance the number of civilians that would be killed by such an attack under various scenarios?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Certainly one of the factors which is taken into account in any analysis of the adequacy of a plan is the damage it would cause -- and there are a variety of measures of damage. As a matter of policy, the United States does not target civilians. But there is no question that any use of nuclear weapons would involve very substantial civilian casualties, and there are models for attempting to estimate what those casualties would be.

SEN. LEVIN: Would that be a factor in any opponent's mind as to the deterrence of our retaliatory attack, the deterrence effect?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think it inevitably would be a factor. I think, particularly given some of the countries that are relevant here, it wouldn't be the only factor, or necessarily even the most important factor.

SEN. LEVIN: And -- but it would be a factor?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Certainly.

SEN. LEVIN: And would you be able to supply us in closed session with -- under each of the scenarios -- what those casualties are?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I don't personally have those numbers with me, even for closed session. Admiral Mies may.

SEN. LEVIN: Do you have those with you, admiral?

ADM. MIES: I have probably some numbers with me. But I certainly don't think I have a comprehensive listing for all the possible scenarios that we -- that are required. So I would certainly take that question for the record.

SEN. LEVIN: What is the role of our conventional capability in all of these analyses? For instance, if we have a huge conventional imbalance in our favor, is that a factor in terms of a deterrence policy? Does that factor into a strategic deterrence policy?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I would rather discuss that issue in closed session, if I could, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: The presidential directive in 1997 -- and I think here I am safe to say this is unclassified -- what I am going to say the emphasis in that directive is on deterring nuclear war -- is that correct?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes.

SEN. LEVIN: And that the guidance removes all previous references to waging a nuclear war successfully and prevailing in a protracted nuclear war -- is that correct?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I don't have in my head what parts of that directive have been released publicly. But we have said that this is a policy which has been the policy of the United States for a long time, that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. That one of the principles --

SEN. LEVIN: Would you just provide that for the record, as to what I said, as to whether it's accurate or not specifically?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Well, because it is a question is something not there -- let me explain -- N

SEN. LEVIN: No, something was removed from a previous directive that's my question.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Of course it supersedes the previous directive.

SEN. LEVIN: I just want to know whether or not there was any references in the previous directives which were removed in 1997. That's my question. You could give us that for the record.

MR. SLOCOMBE: Sure.

SEN. LEVIN: Thanks. Now, I went through a number of questions and gave my judgment as to what was civilian policy, what would be military decisions, and I am wondering whether or not we could go through those and, Secretary Slocombe, you could tell me whether or not what your judgment is on it. What is necessary to deter -- is that a policy decision or is that a military decision?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Ultimately it is a policy decision, but it has to be informed by military advice about how an exchange would work.

SEN. LEVIN: All right. Now, as to what number of percentage of targets need to be destroyed in order to deter? Is that a policy question or a military question?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Ultimately I think all of these questions are policy questions in the sense that ultimately even military judgments are subject under our Constitution to civilian control. But the question of whether -- how much is enough is I think ultimately a policy judgment, but it has to be informed by understanding the military consequences of a course of action.

SEN. LEVIN: When the president is given his options, or given proposals, is he told what percentage of various types of targets would be destroyed and what civilian population destruction would exist under each of the various options? Is that part of his presidential directive's background, or is that something that the Pentagon does for the first time in implementing more general policy guidelines?

MR. SLOCOMBE: In general the latter.

SEN. LEVIN: So that -- okay, now, is that done by the -- is that analysis, 80 percent, 70 percent, 90 percent of various types of targets would be eliminated under various scenarios -- is that done by the civilians in the Pentagon, or is that done by the Chiefs?

MR. SLOCOMBE: It's done by STRATCOM in a quite transparent way. The actual analysis is done at STRATCOM, and the results insofar as relevant to details of how the analysis is done are transparent, both to the joint staff and to a very small group of people in the joint staff, and in the civilian side in OSD.

SEN. LEVIN: And finally, does STRATCOM or do you or do the chiefs decide that a certain percentage of targets would need to be destroyed in order to deter? Is that a civilian decision? Is that a STRATCOM decision? Is that a Joint Chiefs decision that a certain percentage of each type of targets would need to be destroyed in order to deter?

MR. SLOCOMBE: We -- I'd really rather answer that question in closed session, because it has to do with how we evaluate the -- how we evaluate the various options.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you. My time is up. Thank you. Thank you all.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Inhofe.

SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I am hoping that we will get -- we have -- just real good straightforward answers. It bothers me when we talk about going into executive session. I can remember when -- because the public needs to hear these things. I was very proud, General Ryan, of General Jumper when he came out and told the truth about what our competition is doing in air-to-air and air- to-ground combat vehicles. It's a wake-up call for America. It's necessary. I was very proud of George Tenet when he appeared before this committee and agreed that we are in the most threatened position as a nation that we have been in in this nation's history, because of the nature of what's out there. Several of us have disagreed with -- and I am very pleased that the chairman brought up the ABM Treaty and the mutual-assured destruction strategy, how that no longer has application today. Certainly even Henry Kissinger is saying that may have made sense back when they had two superpowers. But it's, quote, "nuts" to make a virtue out of our vulnerability. So it's a different world now than it was.

I would like to read to you -- having been one of only four members of the Senate to vote against the ratification of the START II Treaty, I would like to read the statement that I made on the Senate floor at that time:

My major concern is that the START II Treaty is being interpreted by the Clinton administration and by some in Russia as precluding our right and our ability to build the kind of effective missile defense that we need. On December 28th, 1995, President Clinton vetoed the Defense authorization bill by saying its further steps toward national missile defense would set U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, jeopardizing Russian ratification of START II. The president's clear message is that he believes the START II and the national missile defense are incompatible. Apparently some Russians agree.

I went on to complete my statement, in finally saying if the president believes that the priority of protecting the American people with defense must be sacrificed to gain Russian approval of START II, then I say it's a price that's too high to pay. And I am not reading that to imply that I was prophetic at that time, but what I felt was true at that time I still feel is true today.

So I am hoping that we will be able to respond to some of these things so that the public can be made aware of it. First of all, a lot of discussion has been made toward the framework of the Helsinki Accord. So let's say we are talking about somewhere between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads. If that's true, we have to figure out how to get there. And you folks are the experts, and certainly you know how to get there. So we would have to get let's say from 6,000 down to 2,000 that would be 4,000.

If we were to use 50 Peacekeepers, that would score in our counting, as 500, I understand. I believe that's correct, Admiral Mies. De-MIRVing the Minuteman IIs would be about 1,000. The other area is not quite as easy to work with because we're talking about knocking down the Ohio class inventory from 18 to 14, which I think everyone agrees is something that may be desirable, and then reducing some of the warheads. That's comes to about 1,000. That still means that we're 1,500 short.

Now, my question would be, to Admiral Johnson, and General Ryan, and Admiral Mies, because they're the ones that would be affected by this, in order to get down there, you're going to have to do something to our inventory of B-52s, our Ohio class submarines, and both of these vehicles have conventional capabilities. So, my question would be, what is this going to have, what is this going to do in damaging our conventional capabilities if we have to do that? And maybe we don't have to -- maybe one of the three of you can tell us what else we can do. We'll start with Admiral Mies, if you would, please.

ADM. MIES: In general response to your question, the counting rules and the attribution rules that we have referred to in the START framework pose problems as you come lower and lower and force you to difficult choices. And sometimes unintended consequences result from that. It's very clear to get to the number 2,000 you have mentioned, you would need some degree of counting rule relief for modification or attribution change to preserve your conventional capability, the conventional capability particularly of your bomber force, to reach that number. And so there's a framework issue there with regard to the implications for not just your strategic forces and the capability that you would

like to retain at lower numbers, but also for your conventional force capability, and understanding how those counting rules and attribution rules impact that capability is very important, and understanding, too, what kind of relief you could conceivably get in a negotiation to modify those counting rules and --

SEN. INHOFE: I do want to come back to that, but I'm running out of time here and I wanted to get to General Ryan concerning the B-52s.

GEN. RYAN: Yes, sir. We need some either counting rule relief or re-attribution as the numbers come below about -- down to the Helsinki Accord levels in order to protect conventional bomber capability, and that would be part of the negotiation as we went to that level.

SEN. INHOFE: Okay. Then, then do all of you agree that we would have to have some counting rule changes in order to do this? Do you generally agree, Admiral Johnson, with Admiral Mies and his comments?

ADM. JOHNSON: I do, Senator Inhofe.

SEN. INHOFE: All right. One last question, Mr. Chairman. I know my time has expired, but in an article recently, this is 11 May 2000, Admiral Mies, the Washington Times indicated that you believed, and this was a quote, -- U.S. Strategic Command needs about 2,500 warheads to execute its nuclear deterrence and war-fighting missions. I -- when I read that, I kind of had that down as a minimum figure. Did you mean that -- first of all, is the quote accurate? And secondly, did you mean that as a minimum figure?

ADM. MIES: The quote's not accurate because I have never talked to anybody in the media about this issue, and I have never discussed this in an unclassified forum, and so I can honestly tell you that the quote is entirely inaccurate. I have, as I have already briefed you, given my assessments of the risks and concerns as you come down to lower levels, and I have briefed the chairman and the joint chiefs and the secretary of defense and his staff on this issues, but I have never made a declaratory statement of that nature.

SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Admiral Mies. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Senator Lieberman.

SEN. JOSEPH LIEBERMAN (D-CT): Thanks -- thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you. I appreciate the extent to which we're all acknowledging, though there's a natural way, as we talk about these arms control agreements that we talk numbers of warheads, of deployed warheads, that there is a, necessarily a strategy and a guideline, and in this case a presidential directive behind those numbers. And my question is this, and derives somewhat from the new context we're in as we're focused on emerging nuclear powers and rogue states. And the question is, to what extent, if any, have we adjusted our nuclear strategy to account for new or emerging nuclear capable states? And I ask that particularly with regard to START III discussions, because if I have it correctly, the goals that were set out in Helsinki for START III are to be achieved by 2007. By 2007, presumably the nuclear status quo in the world will be different than it is today.

So, perhaps I should begin with Secretary Slocombe and then ask General Shelton and Admiral Mies if they want to add. To what extent does our nuclear strategy, is it dynamic, and even today, to what extent does it allow for emerging nuclear states?

MR. SLOCOMBE: Yes, it is dynamic. It does allow or take into account changes in the overall strategic situation, not just the balance or the relationship with Russia. I would make the observation in numerical terms, the Russian forces is so very much larger than any other force that is gonna exist for a long time into the future, but in many of the numerical arguments and the arguments about highly sophisticated capabilities, the enduring requirement to be able, if the situation came up, to deter Russia pretty much dominates that part of the analysis. In many ways, the problem of dealing with third countries is more difficult, but it's not primarily an issue of numbers of nuclear weapons.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: General Shelton, do you want to add to that?

GEN. SHELTON: I want to say, Senator Lieberman, I think you put your finger right on one of the things. I mentioned as one of the last concerns, not necessarily in that order, the fact that we are in a more multi-polar world from a nuclear perspective even than we were when we first adopted the Helsinki framework back in '97. Today, we see India, Pakistan, potentially on the horizon, we see North Korea, as the chairman mentioned, potentially Iraq. We've got Iran. We've got China, with an uncertain path as to where they're going at this particular time. And so, it is one of the concerns that we feel we must address in the new, in the guidance discussions that would accompany any further reductions.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you, Admiral Mies.

ADM. MIES: I would agree with both Mr. Slocombe and the chairman. The whole issue of multi- -- the need to address multi-polar stability as you address a bilateral treaty framework is a critical issue that obviously is of concern, particularly as new threats emerge, threats that may be today unpredictable. Additionally, I would say that the guidance that goes into the development of the strategy is very dynamic. It gets routinely reviewed, and issues of concern are routinely brought to the highest levels of national leadership for revision in the interpretation of the presidential decision directive. The presidential decision directive itself, there was a comprehensive review conducted, and one of the reasons that the presidential decision directive was issued, and the previous directive was canceled, was the very issue of how do you address emerging rogue nation threats.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: If the -- our nuclear strategy then considers emerging nuclear threats, including those from countries that we would consider rogue nations, how does this strategy make the judgment that we've been dealing with here as we cross the bridge to developing a national missile defense, which is that unlike the Cold War, where we were dealing with a very powerful adversary but one we assumed was rationally and therefore we ended up with a theory of mutual assured destruction -- crazy in it's way, literally mad, but somehow it worked. If we're dealing here now, and some of the emerging nuclear states with leadership whose stability we question, how do we allow for that in the development of our nuclear strategy? In other words, is there a role for deterrence, nuclear deterrence, as we deal in the process, as you develop the strategy with emerging nations that are led by people that we fear are not stable or rational? Secretary Slocombe.

MR. SLOCOMBE: There certainly is a role for deterrence, even in that situation. I think it's less that people like this are irrational as that they have a very different set of values than other people, including they may be less risk averse. They may put a very low value on the suffering of their own population and a greater value on the survival of the regime and being able to dominate a region. Deterrence -- we have made clear that any use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or our forces or our allies would meet with prompt and overwhelming response, from which no weapon in the American military arsenal would be excluded. I think that is a powerful deterrent. I think, as someone who was not in the government at the time, I think that that message conveyed to Saddam Hussein had a powerful deterrent effect on him during the Gulf War.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: And you think it would to leaders of other rogue nations?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I think it has a powerful deterrent effect. The reason that we are considering so carefully the possibility of a limited national missile defense is I personally believe it would also be valuable to make such an attack not only fatal because of the certainty of retaliation, but futile because it would not actually succeed in carrying out the mission which was assigned to it. But I think there's no question that the prospect of deterrence by retaliation is an extremely important element in dealing with rogue states as with others.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: General Shelton or Admiral Mies, do you want to add to that answer?

GEN. SHELTON: I fully concur with Mr. Slocombe. I would only add that I think that that is an extremely important part of our policy, the deterrent effect, and also that the potential adversary understands up front that should deterrence fail there will be a terrific price to pay for that.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right. Admiral Mies.

ADM. MIES: I agree entirely with what's been said. I think the challenge for us as we deal with some of the emerging threats is that the greater danger is there may be threats that we can't deter, threats that are faceless, that from the terrorist threats.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: From non-state entities, for instance.

ADM. MIES: As one example.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Yes.

ADM. MIES: And therefore, there may be instances where deterrence alone is not enough. But clearly deterrence has a very, very important role as we look to the nature of these threats and their emergence.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: And in those cases where deterrence was not enough, presumably we would want to have some sort of defense capability.

ADM. MIES: I think that's an issue that we have to address as a national policy, and I think that debate is clearly ongoing as to how you want to deal with it.

SEN. LIEBERMAN: Right. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Senator Smith.

SEN. BOB SMITH (R-NH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me pick up, Mr. Chairman, where you suggested we might go, which would be to the tactical area. Is there anyone who would disagree with me if I said that there's not a clear line of demarcation today between strategic weapons and many of our, other tactical weapons that we may face? Since no one is disagreeing, I would say that then you are in agreement with that statement. So let me ask this question, and maybe we could have each of you answer, starting with --

SEN. WARNER: Mr. Smith, if I could interrupt you, and I'll do this on my time, not yours, but I think for those following this hearing, and indeed there's a vast network of communications from this room across the nation, I think we need some distinction between the strategic and the tactical. Basically, the strategic are the intercontinental that go way up to very a very high apogee and come down, whereas the tactical can be launched from submarines and ships, surface ships, and some versions of our aircraft. But, Admiral, I think it's important for our viewers to understand that as Senator Smith presses this. Do you want to clarify anything I said?

ADM. MIES: I think that's true in a general context, but I think the lines of distinction between strategic and tactical are often blurred and tend to be treaty distinctions more than their real distinctions --

SEN. WARNER: Just for those trying to follow this important hearing --

ADM. MIES: -- clearly some of the weapons, tactical weapons, that fall under the tactical category can be used with strategic effect -- and have relatively long ranges and identical or similar capabilities.

SEN. SMITH: Right on that point, Admiral, are we being constrained in any way by these long-term agreements? In what we can do with our, either strategic or tactical weapons?

ADM. MIES: I think the fundamental issue that we need to address is as we come lower and lower in the START framework, what START doesn't do is it doesn't in any way address the non-strategic nuclear warheads in a meaningful way. And so the issue is in a future START III environment to essentially capture some of those non-strategic nuclear weapons which are to a certain degree unconstrained by the existing treaties.

SEN. SMITH: Well, let me ask it this way, and have someone else certainly respond. If we were to agree to an aggregate warhead total of 2,500, say, how important would it be to have theater nuclear missiles, for example, or even non-deployed warheads be part of the count? General Shelton.

GEN. SHELTON: Well, Senator -- SEN. SMITH: Would you agree that we should have them as part -- could you make the case that they should be made part of the count, based on what we know of the differences, the blending between tactical and strategic?

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Smith, as you're aware, we do have an INF Treaty that addresses it. But when you look at START, the tactical nuclear weapons, per se, are not addressed. And as a result of the imbalance that exists between Russia and the United States, that ranges anywhere from about roughly on a ratio of -- I can't go into the exact numbers because it's a, because it's open -- but from about 4.1 to 14 to 1 ratios, we feel like that as you bring those numbers down, specifically if you look at going outside the Helsinki framework, that needs to be wrapped into the discussion, because as these numbers get lower and lower, these tactical nuclear weapons that could have strategic implications, or strategic applicability, need to be addressed.

SEN. SMITH: Well, when -- Mr. Secretary, was the last comprehensive review of U.S. deterrence at the Helsinki time, was that accurate? When was --

MR. SLOCOMBE: There was a comprehensive review of the significance of the Helsinki levels, and the last kind of formal review was the so-called "nuclear posture review" which was, I think, in 1995.

SEN. SMITH: Okay. In that review, did you, did you factor in the number of different countries, number one, that -- other than obviously the former Soviet Union--

GEN. SHELTON: Yes.

SEN. SMITH: -- now Russia? And number two, did you factor in the ability or capability of tactical weapons to assume some strategic possibility?

GEN. SHELTON: Yes. This tactical weapons argument can cut both ways. As I think you know, the Russians for many years have taken the position that because American and other NATO aircraft in Europe can deliver nuclear weapons to Russia, to the Soviet Union as it then was, they should be counted as equivalent to strategic weapons. The issue of the significance of tactical nuclear weapons, of their military utility, is certainly one of the very important issues we have to look at. And it's one of the reasons that the U.S. has insisted that one of the items on the Helsinki agenda be dealing with tactical nuclear weapons.

SEN. SMITH: So, I want to make sure I get a clear answer. So, it is the position of the chiefs here and the secretary that we should not count any tactical nukes in the count toward meeting that 2,500?

GEN. SHELTON: That's the position of the United States.

SEN. SMITH: Is that the position of the joint chiefs?

ADM. MIES (?): I would just qualify, it's important to recognize that the 2,500, the 2,000 to 2,500 doesn't count strategic warheads to begin with. It counts -- it counts strategic delivery systems, the launches, and attributes those launches. So, when you start talking about a framework that would count aggregate warheads, tactical and non -- strategic and non-strategic, in a sense you're talking about a completely different framework, because the framework, as currently structured, is built on launcher accountability, not on warhead accountability.

SEN. SMITH: It's also built on the mutual assured destruction concept of the Soviet Union versus the United States, and I don't, personally, I don't think that we've factored in enough of the current threat and we're focusing on a treaty that goes back several, several years. Just one final question -- direct specific question, as my time's expired -- Admiral Johnson, would it be helpful under the counting rules to exclude submarines undergoing maintenance that are off-line?

ADM. JOHNSON: I think that's one of the things we ought to look at in terms of counting rule relief, yes.

SEN. SMITH: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Reed. According to our calculations, Senator Reed, you followed
Senator Lieberman in joining the --

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): But let me yield to Senator Landrieu.

SEN. WARNER: We'll be happy to (receive ?) Senator Landrieu at this time. Thank you very much.

SEN. MARY LANDRIEU (D-LA): Thank you, Senators. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Levin, and I hope that this hearing can be helpful today. Obviously Congress does have a role to play, a clear and specific role, as the United States periodically reviews our nuclear force structure.

On the other hand, though, Mr. Chairman, I do want to say for the record that when our country is preparing
negotiations on a treaty, particularly one as important and as sensitive as START III, I believe that those of us in
Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, in a nonpartisan way, should support the executive branch and not interfere
with treaty negotiations that could be quite beneficial.

We should let our various views be known. We are entitled to our opinions and to our analysis. That's why the people
of our states elected us to serve. And we can seek to influence those negotiations through letters, floor statements,
meetings that are appropriate, press releases; there are many tools available to us.

But I do want to say for the record that our seeking to ascertain or determine the U.S. bottom line in a public or even a
closed hearing does not, in my view, assist U.S. negotiators. Nor does it necessarily guarantee the desired outcome of
every member of this committee without doubt, which is the increased security and strength of the United States of
America.

So I think that today's hearing has been somewhat helpful. I hope the statements remain helpful in the ways that our
country needs to move forward. There are many good questions answered. I look forward to further discussions at our
non-public hearing where we can be a little bit more specific. But I would say that I appreciate the issues raised to help
us perhaps reframe our future plans regarding transparency, third-party stockpile issues, the reliability of our current
stockpile, the questions about deterrence, the importance of deterrence in terms of retaliation against weapons of mass
destruction and some other things that are very important for us to consider.

Since many of my questions were answered, I will retain the rest of my questions for the closed meeting. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much, Senator. And the chair wishes to advise we have such good attendance here
as members, and the time of the meetings we each have at noon will require us to conclude the open session as soon as
each member has had their opportunity to ask the questions in open and proceed directly to S-407, where we will
resume our hearing.

Senator Sessions.

SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Mr. Chairman, this is indeed an important matter. I know that we ought to try to
serve in partnership with the executive branch as they negotiate treaties, and we certainly have the ability to make some
progress on START II and maybe go beyond START II in reduction of weaponry. But from what I've been able to
ascertain, when we're talking about a range of 1,500, that is below what we can accept. And I think there will be
congressional outcry over that and a lot of concern.

I understand, from what I can hear from the cautious and carefully-worded statements of the gentlemen before us here
today, that you share that concern. If that's so, we're going to have a real problem. We're not going to be able to go that
way if it undermines the safety and security of this country. And I know the ranking member said that adequacy of
deterrence is a matter for civilians, that types of targets is a policy question. I guess that means for politicians. The
percentage of targets needed to deter an adversary is a policy question. But I think we need your opinions on that.

I've got a lot of issues. I came here, like everybody else did, from different backgrounds. We've got demands on us. I saw my March of Dimes people in the hall a while ago. They want to talk about health care issues. But I've got to talk to some people whose life is given to the safety and security of this nation.

And we appreciate your willingness to share your concerns with us. And as I understand what so far has been said is that this group does not endorse going as low as has been published in the paper we may be considering going; that is, in the 1,500 range. And it strikes me that that would be unwise. We might as well get that out on the table to begin with.

I did want to ask about -- Admiral Mies, you indicated that we should ask ourselves, would these further reductions enhance our security? And I think that's a fundamental question for us today. What are some of your concerns if we were to go down -- and when we're talking about 1,500, are we talking about launchers now or weapons?

ADM. MIES: I would assume that any numbers being discussed in the recent Russian proposals would basically be within the START framework, and therefore the attribution and counting rules that apply in general within START would affect launchers, not exact numbers of warheads.

SEN. SESSIONS: Would you share with us your concerns, maybe without even using -- well, if you would give us some numbers; but if not, just generally what could happen if we get too low on those numbers. How is our security impacted?

ADM. MIES: Well, as I've tried to indicate in my earlier testimony, as you come lower with an existing strategy, essentially it disconnects your ability to execute the strategy as you come lower and lower in your forces. Certainly there's a concern in the symmetry in our stockpiles and with stockpile transparency in general, because again, in general, you're only reducing your strategic launchers. You're not directly affecting the non-strategic or the tactical nuclear weapon inventories of either side. And to a certain degree, you're not addressing some of the concerns associated with production capacities and other asymmetries as well. So there's an asymmetry issue in the larger stockpiles that's an area of concern.

Ultimately, it's not an issue of numbers. It's an issue of stability. What is your strategy, and how do you implement that strategy in a way that you are comfortable or confident that you can deter potential adversaries?

SEN. SESSIONS: But it is numbers. If it were 10, that wouldn't be enough. I mean, a number does make a difference.

ADM. MIES: Certainly numbers make a difference, but numbers also influence your options with respect to what kind of strategy you may have to adopt. The strategy you'll adopt at 10 will be far, far different than the strategy you would adopt at 6,000, I think.

SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I guess the agreement -- we're talking about numbers in this treaty, so we're talking about numbers. Everybody's talking about numbers. And at some point, numbers do make a difference. Let me ask you one more question. Are you confident in our ability to identify all potential safety and reliability problems in all weapons expected to be included in the enduring nuclear stockpile? How might any uncertainties in the annual nuclear warhead certification impact your ability to carry out your mission, General Mies?

ADM. MIES: I'm confident that we have a robust stockpile surveillance program which is designed to really detect, as best we can, problems associated with the stockpile. And we also have a robust surveillance program with our delivery systems as well, because the ultimate weapon system reliability is not just a function of warhead reliability, but it's really a function of the integrated system in its total performance.

I'm comfortable we have a robust surveillance system in place. But at the same time, if you look at the history of the stockpile, if you look at the history of our systems, we have always had surprises. And I think it would be naive for us to not anticipate we won't have future surprises in that regard.

SEN. SESSIONS: So margin for error is necessary, in your opinion.

ADM. MIES: Certainly your margins as you go to lower numbers is a consideration in your analysis with respect to stability or operational flexibility in being able to deal with unanticipated events. And I think that's a prime

consideration. And I don't think there's any disagreement within OSD or DOD on this issue. The importance of a strong, robust surveillance program is critical.

SEN. SESSIONS: Mr. Chairman, thank you for -- Mr. Chairman, I just would add that I believe we have a unique role in the world today, and I don't think that that role requires us to abdicate our leadership. It does not require us to eliminate the lead we may have in nuclear weaponry or any other defense capability.

I think it would be a colossal error of historic proportions if we just unilaterally, because friends and people, nations we want to be friends with, ask us to abolish our lead, that we just do so. That does not make sense and is not what a great nation ought to do. We've got a history of leading the world in a positive direction. The world will not be better off if the United States is on a par with many other nations in nuclear weaponry, in my view. And so we want to maintain this continual reduction in forces as much as we can. I understand our military people agree. But there is a limit to how low we can go, and thank you for leading this inquiry.

SEN. WARNER: I thank the gentleman from Alabama. Now, Senator Reed, you and Senator Cleland are the wrap-up hitters here before we go into a closed session.

SEN. JACK REED (D-RI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I've got several questions I'd like to ask the closed session, but let me ask a very basic question first to Admiral Mies. Admiral Mies, we've been talking a lot about numbers. Could you just explain how we count things and also the alternative ways we could approach counting? And I presume these are being considered as part of the discussions for the upcoming summit. Confirm that presumption, if you would.

ADM. MIES: Basically, the START framework has a series of attribution and counting rules such that for a given weapon system, that weapon system is attributed to deliver or carry a certain number of nuclear warheads. And therefore, every one of those delivery systems, whether it's a Trident submarine or a B-52 bomber or a Minuteman ICBM, is attributed, whether it really carries or not, that number of warheads. And there is a certain inspection and verification regime that exists to periodically check each other's side to ensure that we are, in a sense, being truthful in that regard. So it's a framework that consists of launcher accountability.

SEN. REED: So this fixation with certain numbers -- we've talked about 2,500, 2,000, 1,500 -- in some respects (precedes?) the notion of the framework that's out there. We could change the framework, change the numbers we're looking at, and still, in your view, achieve the kind of strategic security that you are tasked for in your role as head of Strategic Command.

ADM. MIES: Certainly, as I think we come lower and lower, ultimately we are obliged to change the framework. We will not have a choice, because the constraints of the counting rules and the attribution rules at some point in time start to break down and lead you to choices that are not necessarily in the national interest. And that's why earlier I said you would need some degree of counting rule or attribution rule relief.

SEN. REED: But that is, I presume -- perhaps we've misspoken here. That presumably is part and parcel of these discussions, that this is not a situation where we're simply looking at numbers as described by the stockpile, but we're also looking at the framework. I may be right or wrong.

ADM. MIES: Certainly within the existing Helsinki framework, a certain amount of discussion about how those rules could or possibly should be modified, but certainly living within the existing framework that was agreed. I think the issue, as you think about further reductions below that, requires a more comprehensive look. But because we have been dealing primarily, as Secretary Slocombe said, with the Helsinki accord, there has not been a great deal of discussion about a different framework. And it would be very, very -- I think a much more lengthy process to look at a different framework.

SEN. REED: Mr. Slocombe, would you like to comment?

MR. SLOCOMBE: That's exactly right. The problem is, for example, in the area of conventional bombers -- and the chief of staff of the Air Force should certainly address this -- we need a long-range conventional bomber force of a certain size. That's going to be B-52s. It will include B-52s. How you deal with the fact that some of the B-52s will

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have a nuclear mission and some will have a conventional mission is exactly the kind of issue which has to be addressed.

There are elaborate rules in the existing agreements about how to do these attributions, how to do the downloading; as Admiral Mies says, how to verify those numbers. Those issues are the kind of nitty-gritty detail that will have to be addressed -- indeed, will to some degree have to be addressed even in START III, and would certainly have to be addressed if there was any consideration of going lower.

SEN. REED: Thank you. Just a final general question, and that is that sometimes we get also fixated on sort of one side of the equation. There's two sides to the equation; that is, essentially what the Russians would give up. And your strategy, your missile count, your security, is a function of what they give up and what we are sure they cannot replace. And I wonder if you might, Mr. Slocombe and Admiral Mies, comment on the fact that part of any end game is not just what we're conceding, what number we arrive at; it's looking across the table, if you will, where they're at so you can feel sure we are secure. Mr. Slocombe?

MR. SLOCOMBE: It's certainly true that various people have made the point that you have to do a dynamic analysis in a number of senses, and one of them is you have to look at the impact on the other side's forces of different arrangements.

SEN. REED: Admiral Mies, why don't you to comment from a tactical position, a military position?

ADM. MIES: I certainly agree. We certainly would give strong consideration to that. But again, our forces are not just designed to deter the Russian forces. And so you have to take into consideration the broader issue of how do you deter a number of forces in a multipolar world of diverse and unpredictable threats, to a certain degree, in a bilateral treaty framework with Russia.

SEN. REED: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Cleland.

SEN. MAX CLELAND (D-GA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm sitting here thinking about -- by the way, thank you very much for your service, and thank you for helping us tackle this difficult issue. I'm sitting here thinking about General Powell's point to me once when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that we must use the American military to stay out of war, but if we get in a war, win and win quickly.

I think that's a point we ought to consider, that first -- (inaudible). Therein comes the concept of deterrence. And how much is enough? How many warheads are enough? But I wonder if, instead of warheads, we shouldn't be thinking about detonations. Detonations equal destruction. And I think that's what we're talking about here, not just numbers of ships or planes or missiles, but amount of destructive capability to deter. And deterrence then equals security. So how many detonations and how much destructive power do we have to deter a strike on us so that that enhances our security?

I think those numbers shift, quite frankly. I think it was one thing in 1945, certainly was another thing in the '50s and '60s. Certainly with the technology we have now, it's another number. I think this shifts all the time. I understand that we have the destructive power, if we unleashed an attack on the Russians and the Russians released an attack on us, we have a combined destructive capacity to unleash, within 30 minutes on each other, 100,000 Hiroshima bombs, in effect.

So the destructive power here has dramatically increased. I understand one missile out of one Trident submarine -- the Trident submarines are based in Georgia at Kings Bay -- carries enough destructive power equivalent to all the bombs dropped in Western Europe in World War II. So I would hate for us to get wrapped around an axle here with just sheer numbers, and I'd like to move the discussion to destructive power and look at the concept of deterrence and see if we aren't really talking about not deterring war but ensuring survival.

It does seem now, with the end of the Cold War, that a new strategy has emerged, primarily put forward by the man who occupied my Senate seat, Sam Nunn, working with Senator Lugar, and that is cooperative threat reduction. That gets us into the whole strategic arms reduction treaties and a sense that our security is enhanced if we reduce

cooperatively the destructive power that our mutual nations can inflict upon one another. I think that's what gets us into this debate.

I wonder if we are going down the path of cooperative threat reduction, a la Nunn-Lugar, and helping the Russians to build down their nuclear capacity, which we apparently see as in our interest, that they reduce their warheads, and whether we help them with monies to secure their warheads that they even have today, that our security is actually enhanced by their reduction. They seem to see that their security is enhanced by their reduction. The Duma just adopted START II with certain restrictions. They would like to go even further, because they see it in their security interest. And maybe we should see it in ours.

So it seems to me that we are moving in the right direction -- cooperative threat reduction, a la Nunn-Lugar. But I am surprised that the number of targets in the nuclear war plan have increased by 20 percent. So I think we're a little schizophrenic here. I just wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you'd like to take a crack at this.

We are moving in the area of arms reduction, because it seems to me this nation and the Russians seem to feel it's in our interest as nations and will enhance our security if this balance of nuclear terror is actually reduced in the number of warheads, which is destructive power. Are we pursuing that, or are we actually increasing the number of targets in the nuclear war plan?

MR. SLOCOMBE: I'd like to discuss the issue of the number of targets in classified session, because it is obviously a very sensitive issue. But there is no question that it is the objective of this administration, as I think it has been the objective of administrations for years and years going back, as I said, at least to the '60s, that to reduce the burdens, the scale of the risks of nuclear war. As Admiral Mies has said, and absolutely rightly, that is not simply a question of how many nuclear weapons exist; it has a lot to do with the characteristics of those nuclear weapons. You have to take into account a number of factors. But I want to particularly comment on what you said at the beginning.

It is very important to remember that we are talking about weapons of immense destructive power. This is -- the -- I can't -- I've tried to do it in my head -- I can't do it in my head the calculation you have obviously done about how many Hiroshimas, but they are weapons of immense destructive power, and the world will be a better place if we continue to find ways to control that threat.

I also think it's very important -- you made the point about cooperative threat reduction with Russia. The relationship with Russia now is fundamental -- for all the problems that we have with them and they have with us -- is fundamentally different from the relationship we had with the Soviet Union. And I think all of us would agree that much of what we are talking about is hedging against an event which we think is quite remote. We have to hedge against it. But the course that we want to follow is a cooperative course with Russia. The Russians when they talk about this talk about it in exactly the same turns, that we both recognize when we are talking about a different relationship from the one we have now for all of its problems and the one we hope to have in the future. That doesn't make it any less important to do it right. But it's very important to keep that in perspective.

SEN. CLELAND: General Shelton, we built up a massive amount of warheads during the Cold War, as did the Russians. We are in a different relationship with them now. Do you see it in our strategic national security interests to work with the Russians cooperatively and jointly bit by bit, slowly, maybe inch by inch, to reduce the balance of nuclear terror by reducing the number of warheads, by reducing the amount of destruction we could levy on one another?

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Cleland, first I think you will find that all of us in the Joint Chiefs are supportive of the cooperative threat reduction plan, Nunn-Lugar, and that we feel like this program should be supported, and we need to continue to work on those issues.

As you said, when you look at our strategic deterrence, it is more than sheer numbers, and those numbers tie back into what our strategy is. And so at some point as you come down in the numbers you need a very thorough review and a thorough analysis to underpin that to ensure that the -- in an issue this important to our nation that our numbers that we anticipate reducing can still meet what our strategy is and still ensure the survivability of our nation, and therefore enhance our security posture versus just reducing the numbers and creating therefore greater uncertainty in terms of our survivability.

SEN. CLELAND: Thank you. Do you think that with the other kind of potential threats, the so-called rogue nations, the bad actors, whatever, obviously they don't have 6,000 nuclear warheads like the Russians. They obviously may not have but one or two. Does the strategy of deterrence apply to that kind of threat, or are we just in another ballgame there?

GEN. SHELTON: I think, Senator Cleland, that to some degree with the types of nations that we have commonly referred to as "rogue nations" that may possess just a minimum capability, deterrence I think is still very important. I think that they understand that these types of systems have a signature -- they have a return address associated with them. And so we immediately know where it is coming from, and therefore could take the actions that have been discussed here this morning, if the president, if our nation elected to do that. I think that is a powerful signal to them.

I do think that there is another issue associated with this that deals with how they might elect to come at us, and if they elected to use that one or two that they had, whether or not we were able to defend ourselves against that of course is part of the ongoing debate which we think is appropriate.

SEN. CLELAND: And, Mr. Chairman, one final question. Am I correct in understanding that the Joint Chiefs have not yet concluded your analysis of how much is enough so to speak in terms of the nuclear strategy of deterrence? Is that correct?

GEN. SHELTON: Senator Cleland, we are comfortable with the strategy the United States has right now, and our ability to carry out that strategy within the Helsinki framework. If we want to depart from that, we would not feel comfortable short of a comprehensive review of the strategy.

SEN. CLELAND: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you, Senator Cleland. I always enjoy following your question-and-answer colloquy with our witnesses, and I must say I would like to make an observation drawn on some quarter of a century plus involved in this issue.

Secretary Slocombe, I hope when we go to the summit and the question of the national missile defense, the limited structure that is in law for rogue attacks, unintentional and the like -- when that discussion takes place that the president makes reference to sort of the unwritten but nevertheless basic philosophy of all presidents since Lyndon Johnson, and that is -- and I expressed this privately to the so to speak my counterpart in the Russian Duma when he visited here last week. And that is in all of these calculations and formulations with the Soviet Union and indeed now with Russia, there is an underlying concept that there will be in -- then in the Soviet Union and now in Russia -- a rational framework of decision-makers before any trigger is pulled. That is not the case with these rogue nations that we face around the world. That is not the case. Indeed, in sum, irrationality has been the hallmark. And that's why it is so urgent for us to address this national missile defense system of a limited capability.

Lastly, I think that we didn't cover fully -- I think Senator Smith worked on it very hard -- this tactical thing. But we have got to go back in history. It was President Bush who made the decision to unilaterally eliminate most of our tactical nuclear weapons, and they ranged from artillery, nuclear tactical missiles, sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, except the sea-launched cruise -- this was all taken out of our inventory. And in sharp contrast, the Russians have retain theirs to the point where we dropped from 10,000 down to maybe 1,500 in inventory basically here in the continental limits of the United States. They still have upwards of 10 or 12 thousand of these weapons. So the question is: Should we seek to address this issue of tactical nuclear weapons and any framework under START III? I think you have answered that in the affirmative, have you not, Admiral Mies?

ADM. MIES: Yes, sir. And I think there are some initiatives in the current Helsinki framework that are attempts to honestly start to address that issue, because historically they have not been fully addressed. But --

SEN. WARNER: Well, I think that's a tremendous disparity.

Secretary Slocombe, out of fairness, you have heard the proceedings today -- we thank the president, the secretary and yourself for letting us have this very important panel. Any wrap-up comments you wish to make before we go into --

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Copyright 2000 Roll Call, Inc.
Roll Call

May 1, 2000

LENGTH: 1121 words

HEADLINE: National Defense: One Milestone At a Time

BYLINE: By Rep. John Spratt

BODY:

The Pentagon will soon do a "Deployment Readiness Review" on a national missile defense (NMD) system. Despite its name, this review will decide just one thing: whether what we have warrants pouring concrete for a radar in the Aleutians. This is one of several components in a missile defense system, and one with the longest lead time. In other words, it must be started soon if it is to be completed on schedule with other components.

The Pentagon's assessment will go to the President Clinton, who will then decide whether to start construction of the NMD radar in May 2001.

His decision will mark a major milestone in the program, but two even more important milestones are still to come: first, whether to move from demonstration to engineering; and second, whether to move from engineering to production of the interceptors that will be deployed.

This decision process is drawing criticism on the left and right. Critics on the left argue that we should not take any step that may result in withdrawal from or abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Critics on the right believe that we should make an irrevocable decision to deploy, notwithstanding the ABM Treaty.

Both camps seem to assume that the Pentagon's Deployment Readiness Review and the President's follow-up decision represent the final deployment decision. Both are mistaken and give the administration's centrist approach too little credit.

NMD is within our reach, but not yet within our grasp. Not long ago, Gen. Larry Welch and a review group of 11 took a long, hard look at this program.

Early in their report, they warned against "near-term deployment at the expense of properly completing the development activities needed for a system that meets the stated operational needs."

For example, the operational "Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle" will not be coupled to an operational booster and tested until 2003. Since the operational booster packs 10 times the thrust of the provisional booster, the coupling of the two is a major event that will not be tested until the seventh flight test.

So the first flight test of an operational, integrated interceptor, supposedly the objective system, will not occur until 2003 at the earliest; and until then, no one can say whether The United States is ready to deploy.

I have followed more than a few weapon systems over the years, and I have seen ambitious schedules, performance and cost goals left in the dust. Ironically, in the case of NMD, what we now hear from official sources is more hedging than hype.

Listen, for example, to caveats issued by Phil Coyle, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation: "The aggressive schedule established for NMD presents a major challenge. The NMD program will have to compress the work of 10 to 12 years into eight or less. As a result, many of the design and (test and evaluation) activities will be performed concurrently. Programs delays ... demonstrate an extremely high-risk schedule."

The conclusion one draws from Welch and Coyle is that we are not ready for a final deployment decision yet. The technology has not yet proved itself through rigorous testing, and an "irrevocable" decision to deploy would be untimely.

That's why Gen. Welch characterizes the Deployment Readiness Review as more of a technology feasibility review than a deployment review. This does not mean the system will never work. The test results to date are encouraging. But the system still needs to prove its mettle through rigorous testing.

There is far more to the President's decision than deciding whether NMD is promising. It is unclear whether construction of the radar bed in Alaska violates the ABM Treaty, but it clearly raises ABM Treaty issues. So our relations with Russia are linked to the President's upcoming decision, and this in turn affects other nations, including our allies.

We cannot let the Russians trump our decision to have missile defenses against limited ballistic missile threats, nor can they reasonably deny us the right to select our single site or a second site, when the defenses we are deploying will not change the strategic balance between us, now or for the foreseeable future.

But surely we do not want abrupt termination of the ABM Treaty to scuttle our chances for a deal on START III, or worse, wreck our Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, especially on the heels of the ratification of START II by the Russian Duma. CTR programs have already eliminated more warheads than any missile defense system now conceived could ever hope to counter.

The rogue missile threat is emerging, but the threat arising from the spread of nuclear materials is even greater. If we unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty and undercut our efforts to stop proliferation, we may find that we have hastened the threat we were trying to thwart.

Although NMD development has a way to go, it is well ahead of our diplomacy. Neither Russia nor our NATO allies have yet adjusted to the change we propose in the strategic balance. We must take the time to explain the need for ballistic missile defenses not only to Russia, but our allies, who, after the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the Senate, are uneasy about the U.S. commitment to arms control.

In short, we still have our diplomatic work cut out for us. That is why we cannot scrap the ABM Treaty and ignore other diplomatic considerations to deploy a still-unproven NMD system. After 17 years and $50 billion, a limited NMD system is taking shape.

I am pleased with the progress we are making and satisfied with the administration's resolve. I think the administration has taken a reasonable, centrist approach and is committed to developing a defense against a limited threat as quickly as technology will allow. At the same time, it is trying to work with Russia to modify the ABM treaty to permit deployment when the technology proves itself.

NMD may be the most politicized program in the history of weapons-system procurement. It is past time that we treated NMD as we would any other system.

It should be rigorously tested, and when it shows that it can meet its operational requirements, it should be deployed, but only in concert with other measures to strengthen national security.

Ground-based NMD has been a long time coming, and the worst thing Congress can do now is mandate a rush to completion or switch from a bird in the hand (ground-based interceptors) to a bird in the bush (boost-phase interceptors). Boost-phase interceptors require technologies that are not even ready for development, much less deployment.

Rep. John Spratt (D-S.C.) is a member of the Armed Services subcommittee on military procurement.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

May 31, 2000, Wednesday

SECTION: DEPARTMENT DEFENSE BRIEFING

LENGTH: 616 words

HEADLINE: THE NEWSHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER

INTERVIEW WITH: WALTER SLOCOMBE, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF POLICY THOMAS GRAHAM, PRESIDENT, LAWYERS ALLIANCE FOR WORLD SECURITY ROBERT ZOELLICK, ADVISOR TO GOVERNOR BUSH DANIEL GOURE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

BODY:

GWEN IFILL: For more, we turn to four arms control experts. Walter Slocombe is undersecretary of Defense for policy. Thomas Graham was President Clinton's special representative for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. He is currently president of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security. Robert Zoellick is a foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate George W. Bush, and he served in the State Department during the Bush administration. And Daniel Goure served in the Pentagon during the Bush administration, and is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.

Mr. Secretary, what is it that President Clinton plans to take to President Putin this weekend in Russia?

MR. SLOCOMBE: He plans to take the proposition that almost 30 years after the ABM Treaty was signed, it is in our interests, both us and Russia and the rest of the world, to modify to permit limited defenses against these rogue state threats, and that it is far better that we deal with this within a context of arms PAGE #2 SLOCOMBE ET AL.

And I think what you can see building here is a desire that people need the United States to be defended against the types of rogue threats and unauthorized launches. I think there's a pretty broad consensus on that. The question is: How do you do that? And I think there's a growing view that the administration's approach has been first late and now wrong.

MS. IFILL: Ambassador Graham, is there any sense on your part that the Bush administration is too ambitious, the Clinton administration not ambitious enough, and that in any case, Russia or China would accept any of this?

MR. GRAHAM: Well, I think in one sense both sides are too ambitious. I don't think we need to make a deployment decision now. I don't think we should rush ahead with respect to this system. I think the most important thing is reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, as Governor Bush did suggest.

But I think that as far as a missile defense system is concerned, there's very serious problems with it. We could create serious problems with the Chinese, possibly with the Russians. To my mind, there's a real threat as to the degree to which -- the real question is the degree to which there's a real threat there. So I think that we have to be very careful in proceeding ahead with missile defense, which just a few days ago was agreed by all the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United States, that it is the cornerstone of strategic stability and should be preserved and strengthened. And none of these plans sound to me like they're likely to do that.

MS. IFILL: Mr. Goure, one of the things the president suggested today is he would be willing to share missile technology as kind of a carrot for the European nations. Is this something that -- but he was very unclear about whether Russia would be included in this sharing arrangement. Is that a good idea?

MR. GOURE: Well, it's not only a good idea, but it's also not a new idea. In fact, in the prior Bush administration, the effort was made -- in fact, there was an initial dialogue about sharing then missile technology with the Yeltsin

Copyright 2000 MacNeil/Lehrer Productions
The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

May 4, 2000, Thursday Transcript #6721

LENGTH: 9500 words

HEADLINE: Arms Control;
Peackeeping;
Legacy;
In Memoriam

BYLINE: ANCHOR: JIM LEHRER; GUESTS: EDWARD WARNER, Assistant Secretary of Defense; STEPHEN CAMBONE, National Defense University; BRUCE BLAIR, Center for Defense Information; COLUM LYNCH, Washington Post; IBRAHIM KAMARA, U.N. Ambassador, Sierra Leone; MONSIGNOR PHILIP MURNION, National Pastoral Life Center; CORRESPONDENTS: MIKE JAMES; TERENCE SMITH; BETTY ANN BOWSER; SUSAN DENTZER; RAY SUAREZ; SPENCER MICHELS; MARGARET WARNER; FRED DE SAM LAZARO; GWEN IFILL; TERENCE SMITH; KWAME HOLMAN

BODY:

RAY SUAREZ: Good evening. I'm Ray Suarez. Jim Lehrer is on vacation. On the NewsHour tonight, as the U.S. prepares for a Russian summit meeting, we get three perspectives on the arms control agenda; we examine the latest crisis for U.N. peacekeepers-- this one is in Sierra Leone; our "legacy of Vietnam" series looks at a group of Southeast Asian refugees who resettled in Minnesota; and we remember a prince of the Roman Catholic Church, Cardinal John O'Connor, who died last night. It all follows our summary of the news this Thursday.

NEWS SUMMARY

RAY SUAREZ: The protest on Puerto Rico's Vieques Island ended peacefully today. Federal agents evicted more than 200 people from a U.S. Navy bombing range during a dawn raid. Some of the activists had been there for a year, demanding the site be closed for good. In Washington, a Pentagon spokesman was asked whether anyone might still be hiding on the base.

VICE ADM. ROBERT NATTER, U.S. Navy: We're going to search the area as best we can. We think it's going to be very thorough. Some of it will be done on ground, a lot of it will be done from the air. The type of terrain there doesn't allow for people to live for a very long time. It's a lot of scrub brush; there is no water. It's what you carry in. There is no food. So we would anticipate somewhat did head out into the bush, they would come back looking for food and water pretty soon, and it's also pretty hot.

RAY SUAREZ: Attorney General Reno said the protesters would not be charged unless they returned to the base or assaulted federal officers. Russian President Putin signed the START II Treaty today. It calls for Russia and the U.S. to reduce stockpiles of nuclear warheads. The Russian parliament approved it last month after a seven-year deadlock. But Putin has warned he'll abandon arms control agreements if the U.S. builds a missile defense system. We'll have more on the arms control issue right after the News Summary. The United Nations pressed for the release of hostages today in Sierra Leone in West Africa. Rebels have abducted at least 69 U.N. peacekeepers and observers this week. Four others are missing and presumed dead. The peacekeepers are trying to monitor a peace accord in the civil war in the former British colony. We'll have more on this story later in the program tonight. The Catholic archbishop of New York, Cardinal John O'Connor, died last night. He'd had a brain tumor removed in August, and suffered complications. He was elevated to Cardinal in 1985, and strongly supported Church positions on abortion and homosexuality. At the Vatican today, a spokesman said Pope John Paul II was deeply saddened.

JOAQUIN NAVARRO-VALLS, Vatican Spokesman: Cardinal O'Connor was an extraordinary figure of the Catholic Church in the United States, an extraordinary witness to faith and human dignity. He was a faithful shepherd, always performing his priestly duties with great compassion.

RAY SUAREZ: Cardinal O'Connor was 80. His funeral will be held Monday in New York. We'll have more on this story later in the program tonight. This was the 30th anniversary of the Kent State University shootings. Survivors and others gathered for ceremonies on the Ohio campus. Four students were killed and nine were wounded on May 4, 1970, when National Guardsmen opened fire during a Vietnam War protest. It happened after days of demonstrations and the burning of the Army ROTC building. A computer virus dubbed the "love bug" spread worldwide today. The virus appeared in e-mails titled "I love you." When they were opened, the bug reproduced and overwhelmed computer networks. It crippled systems across Asia and Europe, and infected computers in Congress, the CIA, and the Pentagon. The FBI said it was investigating. That's it for the News Summary tonight. Now it's on to arms control, U.N. peacekeeping in Africa, the Laotians of Minnesota, and remembering Cardinal O'Connor.

FOCUS - ARMS CONTROL

RAY SUAREZ: The U.S. and Russia talk arms control again. We start with some background from Kwame Holman.

KWAME HOLMAN: The last few weeks have been a busy time for American and Russian diplomats, as they prepare for next month's summit in Moscow between President Clinton and Russian President Vladimir Putin. And the top item on their agenda will be an old standby from Cold War days, arms control. The administration is working to persuade Russia to agree to changes to the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty that would allow the United States to deploy an antimissile defense system in this country. The ABM. Treaty prohibits a national missile defense system that is capable of shooting down incoming missiles. But despite meetings last week between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, the two sides had differences.

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, Secretary of State: We've had much to talk about in these past two days, and although we don't agree on all the issues, as I told the foreign minister, this is only to be expected; after all, we can't both be right all the time.

IGOR IVANOV, Foreign Minister, Russia: (Translated) We believe, and it has been stressed at the highest level, that the ABM. Treaty of 1972 should remain a cornerstone of the strategic stability and the basis for strategic stability in the world.

KWAME HOLMAN: The American plan now on the drawing board is much less ambitious than the so-called "star wars" system proposed in 1983 by President Reagan to stop a massive missile assault from the Soviet Union. Within the next three months, President Clinton is expected to decide if the U.S. should go ahead with the system aimed at stopping a small number of missiles launched from such countries as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Also on the U.S.-Russian agenda is a new treaty to reduce further both nations' nuclear arsenals. Last month, the Russian Duma ratified both the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty which was rejected last year by the U.S. Senate, and a strategic arms reduction treaty with the U.S. called START II. That pact calls on each country to reduce its deployed nuclear weapons from 6,000 to between 3,000 and 3,500. START II would take those totals even lower.

SPOKESMAN: The President of the Russian federation and the President of the United States.

KWAME HOLMAN: When Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met in Helsinki three years ago, they agreed START III should reduce each side's deployed nuclear weapons to between 2,000 and 2,500. Now there are reports Russia wants to go even lower. But last week, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, North Carolina Republican Jesse Helms, declared the Senate would not consider any arms treaty negotiated by the Clinton administration.

SEN. JESSE HELMS, (R) North Carolina: Not on my watch, Mr. President. Not on my watch, it's not going to happen.

KWAME HOLMAN: It was the next day when Albright offered this response.

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT: As far as what was said yesterday from the Hill, I believe that the American people support a policy that seeks to both further reduce nuclear dangers left over from the Cold War and to address new threats. And we're going to continue to pursue this policy in the months ahead.

KWAME HOLMAN: But the Russian government upped the ante, saying it would not go ahead with START II reductions if the U.S. pushes forward on a national missile defense system.

RAY SUAREZ: For more on U.S.-Russia arms control, we get three perspectives. Edward Warner is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, and is the pentagon's senior representative to the arms control talks with Russia. Stephen Cambone is Director of Research at National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, and was staff director of the commission to assess the ballistic missile threat. And Bruce Blair is the President of the Center for Defense Information, and was a nuclear missile launch officer in the early 1970's.

Assistant Secretary Warner, let's start with you. Now that Russia is fully ratified and the United States is signed up and fully ratified, what does START II oblige both powers to do?

EDWARD WARNER, Assistant Secretary of Defense: Well, first I must say that because there was a change to the START II Treaty that was negotiated in 1997, the two ratifications aren't quite in sync, so there still is a piece of an agreement to needs to go before the Senate. When START II comes into effect, it calls for a reduction down to 3,000 to 3500 total strategic warheads. It has a ban on all land-based multiple warhead intercontinental range ballistic missiles and a series of other sub ceilings. It will bring the forces down from START I levels that are up around 6,000 weapons, to the 3,000 to 3500.

RAY SUAREZ: And START III talks are in the air, and people are talking about what they may bring. Aren't the Russians looking for a much lower eventually total of deployable warheads than the United States is?

EDWARD WARNER: The two Presidents, President Clinton and President Yeltsin, agreed at Helsinki in 1997, that once START II is ratified they would move onto negotiate START III. The agreed ceiling to be sought at that time was 2,000 to 2500, down 1,000 from the START II level. By the way, the START II level wouldn't be implemented at this point until 2007. So we've still got some years. Yes, the Russians within six months began to talk about a somewhat lower level, as low as 1500, versus the 2500. We continue to believe, we did detailed analysis on the acceptability of the 2000 to 2500 at that time back in '97. We continued to look at those issues. We believe that the basis for at least the ongoing negotiations, there's now discussions, nearly negotiations, is still the number agreed at Helsinki, but we're prepared to hear out the Russians on their ideas for going lower.

RAY SUAREZ: Stephen Cambone, should we meet the Russian desire to lower those thresholds even further than previously planned?

STEPHEN CAMBONE, National Defense University: To reach a START III levels, you mean. I don't think so at this point. I think, as Ted has pointed out, we did do a careful look at the numbers of 2,000, 2500. We're certain that the numbers of warheads at that limit will meet our defensive requirements. And we understand that the Russians would like to see a lower number, mostly for economic reasons. But if they can live at 1500 and they can understand that our requirements are met at 2500, I think that's a reasonable situation. And we don't need to go down to lower numbers.

RAY SUAREZ: Bruce Blair, should we catch the spirit of the moment and try to meet the Russians' eventual totals?

BRUCE BLAIR, Center for Defense Information: Absolutely. I think that the numbers that they are bandying about of 1500 strategic warheads are none too low for the United States. I think the President can step up to this issue and proclaim that mutual deterrence and stability does not require the ability to launch 2,000 or 3,000 nuclear weapons at one another, and that we can and should continue the process of further reductions of nuclear weapons if for no other reason than to send the right message to the rest of the world, and to the 180 odd countries meeting in New York right now that we are serious about disarmament, and wish to see a successful extension of the nonproliferation treaty.

RAY SUAREZ: Can START II be implemented and can we start talking about START III, while on this separate track looms the issue of anti-ballistic missile systems?

BRUCE BLAIR: Well, we've painted ourselves into yet another corner on nuclear arms control. The Russians, as Secretary Warner pointed out, insist that the U.S. Senate ratify a number of protocols that were negotiated with the Clinton administration in 1997. And among those are protocols that essentially preserve the A B M Treaty. They also say that before START II will go into effect, that we have to have a START III Treaty negotiated, that is they will not

deactivate weapons under START II until START III is more or less in the bag. At the same time, the Clinton administration says we won't negotiate a final deal on START III until the Russians have agreed to yet new amendments or revisions of the AB M Treaty to allow us to go forward with national missile defense. And of course, then the Republican Senate says nyet, no to all of the above, a pox on all your houses, they want to jettison the ABM Treaty. So we've put in jeopardy really the whole network of arms control treaties, the start regime, anti-ballistic missile treaty, any number of other treaties, according to Putin are in jeopardy, along with the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. So the outcome of this diplomacy on national missile defense, this negotiation with the Russians, will be extremely consequential for American security.

RAY SUAREZ: Secretary Warner, does the ABM proposal put START in jeopardy?

EDWARD WARNER: There is no doubt that at this point there is a close inter linkage between the issue of the potential modification of the ABM Treaty and arms reductions. In some sense that's been the case from the very beginning. The original SALT agreements in the late 60's, early 70's, were the first SALT agreement and the ABM Treaty. So offense and defense are connected to one another. We want to modify the ABM Treaty because there is an emerging threat from the likes of North Korea and Iran with long range missiles coupled with weapons of mass destruction that will over the coming few years be able to threaten the United States territory. We ought to have the capability to protect the American people and the American homeland. The ABM Treaty of 1972, between Russia and the United States, then the Soviet Union of course, does permit limited defenses. The Russians have a limited defense system around Moscow. Now their system given 70's technology is a limited regional defense. We would propose a defense that is very thin in its ability too shoot down incoming enemy weapons. But it would cover all 50 states. So there is no doubt that the proposal we have represents a departure from the treaty as signed and agreed way back in the 70's. We need to be able to proceed to field that defense. There is strong consensus for that on the Hill, there's consensus among the major Presidential candidates on this issue and so forth. The Russians so far would certainly prefer that we stick with the current ABM Treaty and not be permitted to field the defense. Wee been in intensive discussions with them since last fall to try to convince them that we can move in tandem to deploy a limited national missile defense, sustain the main purpose of the treaty, which bans the deployment of an extensive defense that could threaten either side's nuclear deterrent. This thin defense won't do that. And we could move on from START II to START III. The two need to move in parallel at this point. We should be able to do so. We've sought to convince the Russians of this. So far they have not, as you saw from Foreign Minister Ivanov a few moments ago, we believe as they come to realize, that limited national missile defense is very likely to be in the American future, that they will come to decide that it's worthwhile to preserve the fundamental purposes of the ABM Treaty by in fact modifying.

RAY SUAREZ: Well, Steven Cambone, where does that leave arms reduction talks?

STEPHEN CAMBONE: Well, I think it will depend on whether the Russians indeed do come to the conclusion that missile defense is going to go forward. There is some history here that we ought to remember and recall. In 1993, when START II was originally negotiated, the preamble to that treaty said that it was being done in cognizance of, in recognition of that we had an ongoing discussion then in 1993 with the Russians for a much broader system of defense than we were even proposing today. So the Russians have known that this process has been going forward for quite some time. So, that's one. Two, the agreement that was reached in '97 that is the subject now of discussion, has two parts to it really. One part has to do with theater missile defenses, let's leave that to the side for the moment. The other part is succession, that is, that there is that there now be four signatories to the treaty other than the United States. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

RAY SUAREZ: All former members of the Soviet Union.

STEPHEN CAMBONE: Now the Russians have attached to their ratification of START II the requirement that that succession agreement be in turn ratified by the United States Senate. It is that maneuver, if you will, that Senator Helms is objecting to.

RAY SUAREZ: Leaving the United States to negotiate with four foreign powers instead of one.

STEPHEN CAMBONE: Four, rather than one. And so then the question becomes, how can we get to a reasonable defense if the prior requirement is that we have to negotiate now with four and not just one? So the Senate is reacting and saying wait, slow down, let make sure we understand what we're going to do with defenses and how we're going to

get there, and having made that set of decisions, we can reasonably move to the next question, which is moving beyond
2000 to 2500 number which in fact was agreed as well in 1997. So the package has been reopened not by Washington,
but by Moscow.

BRUCE BLAIR: Well, Moscow does feel threatened by this proposal for deployment of national missile defense. And I think it's really important to understand that it will provoke reactions by Russia and China that could very well increase the net nuclear threat to the United States -- for example, in particular, by reinforcing Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons and on their strategy of prompt, early, massive use of nuclear weapons in the face of threat.

RAY SUAREZ: Well, let me get a quick response to that idea from Secretary Warner, that would push Russia to
produce more warheads, not fewer.

EDWARD WARNER: Two things happened with Russia in the 90'S. As Russia's conventional forces collapse, there's no doubt within their doctrine and their general policies they are more prepared to use nuclear weapons if they are faced with grave threats to their security. But that's because conventional weapons are down. On the other issue, the Russians, I think in the last analysis, will agree to reductions in strategic offensive arms, and the lowering, and the modification of the AMB Treaty. They're going to lower it due to economic necessity, the end of service life in many of their systems, under any condition.

RAY SUAREZ: Gentlemen, thank you all. Still to come on the NewsHour tonight, U. N. peacekeepers under attack in Africa....

FOCUS - PEACEKEEPING CRISIS

RAY SUAREZ: Still to come on the NewsHour tonight, U.N. Peacekeepers under attack in Africa, the Laos legacy from the Vietnam War, and the death of Cardinal O'Connor.

RAY SUAREZ: Spencer Michels begins our coverage of the U.N. peacekeepers.

SPENCER MICHELS: United Nations peacekeeping forces are again caught in the crossfire of civil war, this time in the small west African nation of Sierra Leone. The U.N. said today that four peacekeepers, reportedly all Kenyans, are missing and presumed dead, and another eight are wounded, in fighting with forces of the revolutionary united front, the RUF, the principal rebel group in Sierra Leone. The country, with 4.5 million people, is a former British protectorate bordering Liberia and Guinea that gained independence in 1961. Its people are mostly subsistence farmers. This week, 69 U.N. peacekeepers trying to implement a peace agreement signed last July were captured by the rebels. A 23-member Indian detachment is reported surrounded by rebels in the east, and the U.N. command has lost contact with other units. The peace accord was designed to end a bloody eight-year-long civil war that left tens of thousands dead and thousands of others maimed, bearing the brutal signature of the rebels: Amputated hands and arms. The killings and abductions were swiftly denounced by United Nations officials.

MARIE OKABE, United Nations Spokesperson: The secretary-general expresses his outrage at the continuing deliberate attacks on U.N. personnel in Sierra Leone by armed groups and individuals belonging to the revolutionary united front.

SPENCER MICHELS: The attack was the worst on U.N. peacekeepers since ten Belgians were slaughtered trying to end the genocidal civil war in the central African nation of Rwanda in 1994. The previous year, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in Somalia. Some 8,500 troops, mostly from Africa and India, were deployed in April by the United Nations to begin disarming the rebels. The final force is to number 11,000, the largest peacekeeping contingent in the world. But getting the troops has been difficult. No American forces are to be involved on the ground. The U.N.-brokered peace deal, known as the Lome Accord, sparked controversy by giving some government power to the rebels. The agreement also granted blanket amnesty to all rebels, though war crimes prosecutions could take place. Rebel leader Fadoy Sankoh, who became a government minister by virtue of the peace agreement, and controls the country's major revenue stream, its rich diamond mines, agreed late Wednesday to free any hostages held by his forces. Peacekeepers had earlier surrounded his compound the capital of Freetown. Sankoh, who has made similar promises in the past, received a stern warning today from the U.S. State Department.

Copyright 2000 The New York Times Company
The New York Times

June 1, 2000, Thursday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 29; Column 1; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 825 words

HEADLINE: Clinton's Best Deal Would Be No Deal

BYLINE: By Thomas Graham; Thomas Graham, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was the chief political analyst at the United States Embassy in Moscow from 1994 to 1997.

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

Barring a sudden change of heart, President Vladimir Putin of Russia will do the United States a great service when he sits down with President Clinton this weekend and refuses to modify the Antiballistic Missile Treaty to allow the United States to deploy a limited missile defense.

Why does Russian opposition work in America's interest? We are still in the early stages of a serious debate over a national defense against missile attacks and, more broadly, over our nuclear strategy in the new century. Without a consensus on these important points, it is simply wrong to cut a deal with Moscow, either now or in the remaining months of the Clinton presidency.

The Clinton administration, of course, does not see it that way. Mr. Clinton does not want to be the first president in decades to fail to sign a significant arms control agreement with the Russians. When the summit meeting was announced several weeks ago, officials hoped to make an arms-control agreement its centerpiece, and saw reasons for optimism.

In April, Mr. Putin pushed the long-delayed ratification of the second strategic arms reduction treaty, known as Start II, through the Russian Parliament. The Clinton administration took this as a sign that he was prepared to deal. American officials were also encouraged that Sergei Ivanov, director of Russia's national security council and a close Putin confidant, had not flatly opposed amending the ABM treaty, which bans missile defense systems, during a visit to Washington in February.

Subsequent discussions, however, have shattered the administration's optimism, and it has since tried to lower expectations. Last week, Samuel Berger, the White House national security adviser, stated that he did not expect arms control issues to be resolved this weekend. Rather, he said, the summit would be "a good opportunity for us to explain our view of the problem, and for President Putin to express his view of the problem."

The administration still hopes to cut a deal before Mr. Clinton leaves office, but that remains wishful thinking. The Russians have little incentive to negotiate. The debate in the United States over the reliability of the missile-defense technology and the scope of the system we should build is growing. Our European allies are becoming more concerned, and China is adamantly opposed to missile defense systems. This only encourages Mr. Putin to stand his ground.

The Russians are also concerned that an American missile defense could eventually undermine the effectiveness of their own nuclear arsenal, arguably their last remaining claim to great power status. The problem is not the limited system the Clinton administration wants to deploy against the threat of missile attacks from North Korea.

The Russians know that the White House's proposed system would pose no defense against their arsenal. But over the next decade, as the technology improves, they fear that without the ABM treaty's controls, a more effective system could be built.

Also worrying the Russians are the economic constraints that will force them to reduce their nuclear arsenal, as weapons can no be longer be maintained or replaced, to below 1,500 warheads, regardless of what the United States does. The last thing they can afford is a new high-tech arms race.

To overcome Moscow's resistance, the Clinton administration could be tempted to sweeten the pot further in its last months by promising to reduce the capabilities of a national defense system. That would be the wrong approach at this time.

As Gov. George W. Bush and others have noted, there is a new world out there: the nuclear equation has changed radically. The challenge has expanded beyond maintaining stability between two nuclear-armed superpowers. Arsenals in Russia and the United States may be reduced, but others, notably in China, will increase. Nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile technology will almost inevitably continue to spread to rogue states.

While it would be folly to lightly discard the strategic arms treaties that have maintained stability for the last 30 years, it would be equal folly not to reassess these treaties in light of the changes over the past decade. In this environment, we do not need a quick decision on whether to deploy a national missile defense system. Instead, we need to forge a domestic consensus about anything we might build, and we must persuade our allies in Europe and East Asia to endorse whatever path we choose.

Yes, we should be talking all along to the Russians to assess their views and reactions. But until we have done our work at home and with our allies, we should be wary of signing any treaty with Moscow.

Logically, only the next administration can conclude this debate. And that is why, if events unfold as expected, Americans should be prepared to thank Vladimir Putin for looking out for their interests by saying no to President Clinton on missile defense.

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GRAPHIC: Drawing (Joe Magee)

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: June 1, 2000

Copyright 2000 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER

May 26, 2000, Friday, FINAL

SECTION: EDITORIAL,

Pg. A18

LENGTH: 707 words

HEADLINE: CLINTON-GORE WANDER AIMLESSLY IN MIST OF COLD WAR MENTALITY

BYLINE: WILLIAM SAFIRE COLUMNIST

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

The best national missile defense requires a bold rhetorical offense.

George W. Bush and a phalanx of famed Cold Warriors brought it off this week. They denounced the arms-control doves seeking to curry favor with Vladimir Putin at the forthcoming Moscow summit meeting as - hold your breath - a pack of unreconstructed Cold War relics.

For years, those who dared propose a limited missile defense of American cities against rogue nations or terrorists drew brickbats from accommodationists. Withdrawal from the outdated ABM treaty would upset the Russians, we were warned, and thereby stop Start (the strategic arms treaties).

With Bill Clinton's election, a compromise was struck: The United States would spend tens of billions in research developing a limited defense against a few missiles from Iraq or North Korea, but one that would not pose a threat to the thousands of Russian ICBMs. Even this half-loaf was to be half-baked. Because the president was skeptical of our technology and unwilling to offend his left by countering the mounting danger, the United States poked along with no sense of urgency. Even if our limited system were to work, Clinton never intended to risk Russian disapproval by deploying it. But now, with the CIA estimating nuclear blackmail from rogue states as a distinct possibility, congressional and public opinion is putting pressure on Clinton for action. His grudging response, outlined in this space last month, was to seek a weak deal with Putin at the summit. Allow us to make minor changes in the ABM treaty, enabling us to put up a puny defense, was the Clinton idea; in return, we will reduce our missile force in the Start III treaty all the way down to the level the Russian military can afford. Sen. Jesse Helms saw this bad ABM deal in prospect and announced that amendments tying the next president's hands would be "dead on arrival" in the Senate. That effectively exposed the Putin-Clinton dealing on ABM and Start III as a meaningless charade. But it posed a political appearance problem for the Bush campaign. How to oppose the summit stunt without seeming to be obstructionist, triumphalist, nasty to the Russians or, worst of all, subject to accusations of being an unreconstructed Cold Warrior? Bush's answer: First, trot out the heavy hitters who helped win the Cold War. He lined up Nixon-Ford's Henry Kissinger and Don Rumsfeld, Reagan's George Shultz, his father's Colin Powell and Brent Scowcroft. (No James Baker; forgot his phone number.) One by one, these mainly hard-line heroes endorsed the candidate's call for a limited anti-missile system. Kissinger, who wrote the ABM treaty, asserted that it belonged to a long-gone bipolar world.

But this performance by the Bush front-line brain trust was played with a remarkable rhetorical twist. Instead of hunkering down to await the usual "unreconstructed Cold Warriors" blast from the White House, Bush charged the Clinton-Gore administration with being "locked in a Cold War mentality."

That stole the opposition's clothes. Calling for "a new era of nuclear security," Bush announced: "The Cold War era is history. Our nation must recognize new threats, not fixate on old ones." He anticipated a knee-jerk Gore reaction with a built-in response: "It is possible to build a missile defense and defuse confrontation with Russia. America should do both."

June 5, 2000, Monday, Late Edition - Final

SECTION: Section A; Page 29; Column 5; Editorial Desk

LENGTH: 691 words

HEADLINE: ESSAY;
Mistake in Moscow

BYLINE: By WILLIAM SAFIRE

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

BODY:

"We have agreed to a statement of principles," President Clinton told a joint news conference in Moscow, "which I urge you to read carefully."

Noting that the Russian and American sides disagreed on whether a limited missile defense against rogue states posed a threat to the mutual deterrence of the ABM treaty, Clinton added: "The statement of principles that we have agreed to I thought reflected an attempt to bring our positions closer together . . . let me say I urge you all to read that."

O.K., let's read it. The central issue is whether the U.S. will allow Russia to hold us to the ABM treaty negotiated 30 years ago with the Soviet Union. We want to build defenses against the few missiles from terrorist nations, not the thousands held by Russia. President Vladimir Putin of Russia wants to make us pay for his permission by slashing our offensive missile forces in Start III down to levels our military leaders consider imprudent.

Clinton went along with the sweeping assertion that the two nations "reaffirm their commitment to that ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability."

Putin then gave Clinton a little wiggle room by agreeing that the missile threat from other nations "represents a potentially significant change in the strategic situation . . ." and to "consider possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty." That means allowing the U.S. to defend its cities against rogue nations, terrorists and accidental launches only in ways that Moscow approves.

Thrice did Clinton embrace the word viability, which means "capable of living." He committed the U.S. "to strengthen the ABM treaty and to enhance its viability" and agreed that we "attach great importance to enhancing the viability of the Treaty. . . ."

So here we have Clinton breathing new life into the cold-war treaty provided Putin will allow some minor amendments that may not meet future U.S. defense needs.

And then the outgoing American president stepped into the incoming Russian president's trap. He paid for Putin's permission to tinker with the ABM treaty with an enormous concession:

"They agree that issues of strategic offensive arms cannot be considered in isolation from issues of strategic defensive arms and vice versa. . . ."

Read that again to savor its import: that is the principle of linkage. It's what Putin's military wanted and what Clinton never should have given.

"Issues of strategic offensive arms" means Start III: the reduction of the massive U.S. and Russian arsenals. The issue there is how far to cut: our military says our strength would be sapped at fewer than 2,000 missiles, while the Russians - who can't afford to keep that many nukes - want us to weaken our worldwide missile forces by 25 percent more.

"Issues of strategic defensive arms" means ABM and our national missile defense against dictators who could threaten us with nuclear blackmail and against a possible Chinese threat. By mistakenly linking reductions in Start III (our missile offense) to the minor modification of ABM (our missile defense), Clinton played into Russian hands, making future arms negotiation more difficult for his American successor.

Now here comes the strange part. Putin must know the substantial difference in approach between candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush. Gore goes along with Clinton and presumably will embrace his ABM-Start III linkage. Bush wants a free hand with a limited anti-missile system and would set our offensive missiles at a level to suit our deterrent needs, inviting the Russians to reciprocate. Huge policy difference.

And yet Putin said, "We're familiar with the programs of the two candidates . . . we're willing to go forward on either one of these approaches."

Did he mean to ad-lib that? Was he misinterpreted? Having won his linkage with Clinton-Gore, is the inexperienced Putin willing to toss that advantage aside with Bush? Is a puzzlement.

Despite Clinton's policy error, he neither embraced the K.G.B.'s man nor called him "Volodya." Our president's demeanor remained coolly correct, and we can at least be thankful for that.

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LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE: June 5, 2000