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if the Vietcong moved their major supply dumps into Cambodia and Laos and then started raiding across the frontier. He said that this would make their logistic problem much more difficult and delay their operations much more.

This is no doubt true, but after a delay has become institutionalized it simply is part of the landscape and it will not fundamentally, in my view, affect operations. None of this is to question what we are doing; it will already be a major achievement to force the Vietcong to stand down their activities.

However, I do not think we have even begun to solve the basic problem which is psychological. It seems to me that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese must be saying to themselves, that even though their hopes for a victory this year were disappointed, there is a possibility, in fact a probability, that if they can prolong the war sufficiently they will exhaust us. How does one convince a people that one is prepared to stay indefinitely 10,000 miles away as against opponents who are fighting in their own country? If we cannot convince them that we are going to stay and that we are not going to grow tired then any victory may prove to be ephemeral. After all, in Algeria the French had many things going for them. They had an army of 400,000 they had a population of 2 million that had to be on their side (mainly the white settlers), they had reduced the guerrilla action to about 8,000 men inside the country, and yet General de Gaulle felt constrained to give up Algeria because there were always Algerian units based close by. In Algeria the war lasted nine years; do we have the stamina to stick it out for nine years?

Finally, and this is not a criticism of CINCPAC, it is obvious that the political component of our effort, at least as seen from Honolulu, is much less highly

combination of our effort, at least as seen from Honolulu, is much less highly
liturgically, and this is not a criticism of CINCPAC, it is opinions that the political
intiated nine years; do we have the atrocity to stick it out for nine years?
because there were always Algerian units based close by. In Alberta the war
the country, and yet General de Gaulle felt constrained to give up Alberta
units settlers), they had reduced the guerrilla action to about 8,000 men inside
they had a population of 2 million that had to be on their side (mainly the
Vigiliae the French had many things going for them. They had an army of 400,000
to grow tired then any victory may prove to be empirical. After all, in
we cannot convince them that we are going to stay and that we are not going
does one convince a people that one is prepared to stay indefinitely 10,000
that it they can prolong the war sufficiently they will exhaust us. How
to this year were disabounded, there is a possibility, in fact a probability,
must be saying to themselves, that even though their hopes for a victory
is psychological. It seems to me that the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese
However, I do not think we have even begun to solve the basic problem which
be a major achievement to force the Vietcong to stand down their activities.
obediences. None of this is to question what we are doing; it will already
be part of the landscape and it will not fundamentally, in my view, affect
this is no doubt true, put after a delay has become institutionalised it simply
logistic problem much more difficult and delay their operations much more.
started raiding across the frontier. He said that this would make their
it the Vietcong moved their major subdue into Cambodia and Korea and then
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developed than the political side. Maybe when I get to Saigon I will be
convinced of this, but I have no clear picture of what is understood by
pacification. How do we know whether once government forces of American
forces have swept through an area it will then remain pacified or whether
it does not simply revert to Vietcong control? I do not understand how
little enclaves of government territory can indefinitely exist surrounded
entirely by Vietcong territory. In short, the political side of our action
does not seem to me in gear with the military side, though indeed I may
have to chance my mind on this.

On the military side, we will have to take care that efficiency of
operations and logistics does not blind us to the political requirements of
the war. According to our present concept there is a great danger that we
will be confined to a very narrow strip along the coast and that in order to
maintain the security of our forces we will not venture very far inland.
Once 3/4 of the territory of Vietnam falls under Vietcong control or remains
under Vietcong control, while we control only 1/4, then world opinion and
domestic political pressures will undoubtedly sooner or later drive us towards
a settlement like Laos, which will be the beginning of the end. As of now
we control about 30% of the territory and maybe 50% of the population, of
which only about 30% are controlled firmly. If you consider, moreover,
that we control Saigon--in a manner of speaking--and that Saigon has a
population of 2 million, it means that except for Saigon we control only about
1/2% of the population outside the area of Saigon. This proportion is very
unfortunate, which in the long run is going to have bad political consequences.

unfortunate, which in the long run is going to have bad political consequences.
13% of the population outside the area of Saigon. This exhortion is very
population of 3 million, it means that except for Saigon we control only apout
that we control Saigon--in a manner of speaking--and that Saigon has a
which only apout 30% are controlled firmly. It you consider, moreover,
we control apout 30% of the territory and make 20% of the population, of
a settlement like Lae, which will be the beginning of the end. As of now
domestic political pressures will undoubtedly sooner or later drive us towards
under Vietcong control, while we control only 1/4, then world opinion and
Once 3/4 of the territory of Vietnam falls under Vietcong control or remains
maintain the security of our forces we will not venture very far inland.

will be confined to a very narrow strip along the coast and that in order to
the war. According to our present concept there is a great danger that we
operations and logistics does not find us to the political requirements of
On the military side, we will have to take care that efficiency of
have to change my mind on this.

does not seem to me in gear with the military side, through indeed I may
entirely by Vietcong territory. In short, the political side of our action
little enclaves of Government territory can indefinitely exist surrounded
it does not simply revert to Vietcong control. I do not understand how
forces have swept through an area it will then remain vacated or whether
bacification. How do we know whether once Government forces of American
convinced of this, put I have no clear picture of what is understood by
developed than the political side. Maybe when I get to Saigon I will be

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

A final word about the physical operations here in Honolulu. The American military establishment in Honolulu is tremendous. The Air Force headquarters, Army, Navy and Marine Headquarters are all located around the Navy base of Pearl Harbor in a very elaborate complex. With all of the criticism I have dictated, it should be clear that the technical performance is superb. Indeed, I think Americans are best in situations where the objective is specified and the problem concerns the achievement of this objective by technical means. The officers make an enormously competent impression. If we fail in our Pacific operations it will not be because of a failure in the technical realm, but because of a difficulty of synchronizing political and military objectives in a situation for which this enormously complex military establishment is not designed.

It is also interesting to note that these people whose job it is to fight any war with China that might arise are not nearly as impressed with Chinese strength as one is in the United States. To be sure, China is a formidable enemy, particularly for a single engagement, but the impression seems to be that even if the Chinese launched an attack on all fronts that we could contain them locally and with conventional weapons alone, though there would be a strong predisposition to use nuclear weapons. With conventional weapons the force requirements would, of course, go up but not to unmanageable proportions--say, for all of Southeast Asia, some eleven divisions. While this is large in relation to our present total forces, it is not large compared to what we mobilized in World War II.

this is large in relation to our present total force, it is not large compared
proportions--say, for all of Southeast Asia, some eleven divisions. While
weasles the force requirements would, of course, go up but not to unmanageable
depths would be a strong preoccupation to use nuclear weapons. With conventional
we could contain them locally and with conventional weapons alone, though
seems to be that even if the Chinese launched an attack on all fronts that
formidable enemy, particularly for a single engagement, but the impression
Chinese strength as one is in the United States. To be sure, China is a
tight any war with China that might arise are not nearly as impressed with
it is also interesting to note that these people whose job it is to
this enormously complex military establishment is not designed.

of synchronizing political and military objectives in a situation for which
because of a failure in the technical realm, put because of a difficulty
competent impression. If we fail in our Pacific operations it will not be
of this objective by technical means. The officer make an enormously
where the objective is specified and the problem concerns the achievement
performance is superb. Indeed, I think Americans are best in situations
the criticism I have dictated, it should be clear that the technical
the Navy phase of Pearl Harbor in a very elaborate complex. With all of
headquarters, Army, Navy and Marine Headquarters are all located around
American military establishment in Honolulu is tremendous. The Air Force
A final word about the physical operations here in Honolulu. The

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Addendum to Hawaii. This is being dictated in Hong Kong on October 14th
(Hong Kong time)

One of the reasons for optimism on the part of our military commanders
is the fact that the Vietcong are now operating in larger units and also that
the North Vietnamese have committed organized military units of the North
Vietnamese army. Specifically, the 325th division from North Vietnam was
committed some time last December and January. It was intended to be a
spearhead to break up the government forces and to complete the victory.
The 325th division is a good fighting unit but it does have difficulty
in melting back into the countryside. When the 325th division is confronted
it has to stand and fight because it is not as effectively linked to the
population as the rest of the Vietcong. This argument I find persuasive
but then the 325th division is only a small part of the total Vietcong force.

but then the 325th division is only a small part of the total Vietcong force. population as the rest of the Vietcong. This argument I find persuasive it has to stand and fight because it is not as effectively linked to the in melting pack into the countryside. When the 325th division is confronted The 325th division is a good fighting unit but it does have difficulty abeamhead to prealk up the Government forces and to complete the victory. committed some time last December and January. It was intended to be a Vietnamese army. Specifically, the 325th division from North Vietnam was the North Vietnamese have committed organised military units of the North if the fact that the Vietcong are now operating in larger units and also that One of the reasons for optimism on the part of our military commanders

(Hong Kong time)

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I arrived in Hong Kong on the evening of October 13th and was met by a member of the Consulate whose name I have forgotten. The first impression of Hong Kong is of enormous vitality. The streets are thronged with people. I arrived at 13:30 at night and it was still jam-packed. 10:30 at night Hong Kong time was, however, 5:00 in the morning Honolulu time, so I was pretty exhausted and went to bed.

Today, October 14th, I spent the morning sightseeing. A member of the Embassy, took me on a drive around the island, which is spectacular. We visited Repulse Bay where many of the rich people live and then went to a settlement area for lower income people. Again it is impossible to convey the tremendous sense of energy which the Chinese convey, in part because of the large number of youngsters and the concentration of population.

I had lunch with three members of the Consulate, the Deputy of the Indian mission here who had been stationed in Peiping, and two newspapermen, Seymour Topping of *The New York Times* and Richard Elegant from the *Los Angeles Times*. Seymour Topping had just returned from a trip to Cambodia. It was his impression that Shianouk was beginning to have second thoughts about the inevitability of American defeat in South Vietnam and was trying somewhat to repair his relationship with the United States. Topping also said that he completely rejected the arguments that Cambodia was a supply base for the Vietcong. He said our military attaché in Cambodia told him that he didn't believe a word of it and even though he would get a lot of credit in Washington if he reported the opposite. Topping had been told in Saigon that Route 19 which goes from

the opposite. Topping had been told in Saigon that Route 19 which does from
of it and even though he would get a lot of credit in Washington if he reported
He said our military attaché in Cambodia told him that he didn't believe a word
beteftly rejected the arguments that Cambodia was a publicly base for the Vietcong.
repair his relationship with the United States. Topping also said that he com-
unevitability of American defeat in South Vietnam and was trying somewhat to
his impression that this was beginning to have second thoughts about the
Times.
Seymour Topping had just returned from a trip to Cambodia. It was
morn Topping of The New York Times and Richard Elyeant from the Los Angeles
misaion here who had been stationed in Peiing, and two new Papermen, Se-
I had lunch with three members of the Conunate, the Deputy of the Indian
number of bondholders and the concentration of population.

mendows sense of energy which the Chinese convey, in part because of the large
ment area for lower income people. Again it is impossible to convey the tre-
valued Republie Bay where many of the rich people live and then went to a settle-
the Empress, took me on a drive around the island, which is spectacular. We
today, October 14th, I spent the morning sightseeing. A member of
ed and went to bed.

time was, however, 6:00 in the morning Honolulu time, so I was pretty exhaus-
tive at 13:30 at night and it was still jam-packed. 10:30 at night Hong Kong
of Hong Kong is of enormous vitality. The streets are thronged with people. I
a member of the Conunate whose name I have forgotten. The first impression
I arrived in Hong Kong on the evening of October 13th and was met by

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[A]

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Cambodia through Pleiku was used as a supply route. When he mentioned this in Cambodia, Cambodians took him along Route 19 to show him how impossible it was. In fact, the motorable part of Route 19 ends at a river. The river can only be crossed by a ford where the current was so strong that it knocked two members of his party to the ground. On the other side of the river Route 19 is trail and while Topping was walking along it he saw no sign whatever of any kind of traffic. Near the Cambodian North Vietnamese border Topping was shown some villages which had been attacked by American L-19 planes and the villagers complained bitterly about the indiscriminate bombing attacks of the United States. He also talked to some Vietnamese refugees who had escaped across the frontier in order to escape American bombing. They too told him that the American bombing was utterly indiscriminate and that in their experience only one Vietcong had been killed even though whole villages had been destroyed.

I asked Seymour Topping what he thought a sensible outcome of the Vietnamese war would be. Topping said, "Let's face it, American troops have to be withdrawn from South east Asia eventually. The age of military bases is over." I told him that South Vietnam was hardly conceived as a military base. He said, "what else is it? There is no popular support. A military base is when a client government asks you to come in and you use that as a pretext to get military forces into the country." I said that whatever the position of the Vietnamese government was, I was not aware of anybody in Washington who

Vietnamese government was, I was not aware of anybody in Washington who
det military forces into the country." I said that whatever the position of the
when a client government takes you to come in and you see that as a pretext to
He said, "what else is it? There is no popular anabort. A military pase is
over." I told him that South Vietnam was hardly conceived as a military pase.
to be withdrawn from South east Asia eventually. The age of military pase is
Vietnamese war would be. Topping said, "Let's face it, American troops have
I asked Seymour Topping what he thought a sensible outcome of the
villages had been destroyed.

that in their experience only one Vietcong had been killed even though whole
They too told him that the American pumping was utterly indiscriminate and
who had eacbed across the frontier in order to eacbe American pumping.
s attacks of the United States. He said talked to some Vietnamese refugees
buses and the villagers complained bitterly about the indiscriminate pumping
Topping was shown some villages which had been attacked by American L-19
whatever of any kind of traffic. Near the Campodian North Vietnamse border
river Route 19 is trail and while Topping was walking along it he saw no sign
knocked two members of his party to the ground. On the other side of the
river can only be crossed by a ford where the current was so strong that it
boasble it was. In fact, the motorable part of Route 19 ends at a river. The
this in Campodis, Campodians took him along Route 19 to show him how im-
Campodis through Pleiku was need as a abby route. When he mentioned

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[A]

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was interested in establishing a military base in Southeast Asia. Topping said, "Nevertheless, the only thing the United States could fight for was to withdraw gracefully." I asked him in what time period he was talking about. He said certainly less than five years.

Throughout this conversation I was shocked by the fact that not one member of the American Consulate took issue with Topping and that the burden of opposing his argument was left to me and to Elegant. Elegant said that it was impossible for the United States to withdraw. It would lead to a collapse of our position throughout all of Asia. I asked Elegant for how long we would have to stay if this was true. Elegant said that until there was a change of heart in Peiping. The member of the Indian Commission then complained bitterly about lack of American support for India vis-à-vis China. Again the members of the Consulate didn't say much. I told him that I thought there was no question of American support and that, infact, it was the certainty of American support that had dissuaded the Chinese from launching an attack.

Elegant, Topping, and the Indian then told me that foreigners in China were being very badly treated. Most African students were completely cut off from the population. All the contacts were extremely rigidly regulated. This-- coupled with the prevailing puritanism--made China an extremely unattractive place. The Indian had been stationed there for five years and he had had no contact with anyone except officials. The members of the Consular staff then began to describe the domestic situation in China, but since this essentially followed the lines of the session of the afternoon I will not bother to continue it here.

here.

followed the lines of the session of the afternoon. I will not bother to continue it
because to describe the domestic situation in China, but since this essentially
contact with anyone except officials, the members of the Chinese staff then
place. The Indian had been stationed there for five days and he had had no
complicated with the prevailing bursitanom--made China an extremely attractive
from the population. All the contacts were extremely rigidly regulated. This--
were being very badly treated. Most African students were completely cut off
Elegant, Topping, and the Indian then told me that foreigners in China
andport that had dissatisfied the Chinese from launching an attack.

tion of American andport and that, in fact, it was the certainty of American
of the Conaniste didn't say much. I told him that I thought there was no ques-
spontaneous lack of American andport for India via A via China. Again the members
in Peiping. The member of the Indian Commission then complained bitterly
have to say it this was true. Elegant said that until there was a change of heart
of our position throughout all of Asia. I asked Elegant for how long we would
was imposable for the United States to withdraw. It would lead to a collapse
of obsoving his argument was left to me and to Elegant. Elegant said that it
member of the American Conaniste took time with Topping and that the purpose
Throughout this conversation I was shocked by the fact that not one
He said certainly less than five years.

withdraw graciously." I asked him in what time period he was talking about.
said, "Nevertheless," the only thing the United States could fight for was to
was interested in establishing a military base in Southwest Asia. Topping

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[A]

[N]

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In the afternoon I met at the Consulate with George Armstrong, the Acting Consul--the Consul General being away on leave, John Holdridge, the head of the Political Section, and the three military attaches. Holdridge did most of the talking. He is an extremely impressive man--calm, competent, decisive--the type that foreign service officers are reputed to be but almost never are. Holdridge began with a very impressive analysis of the Chinese economic situation. According to Holdridge, China was just now getting back, economically, to the levels it had reached in 1957. Until 1955 Chinese economic progress had been spectacular. They had far exceeded their first five-year plan. But in 1957, for a variety of reasons they attempted the Great Leap Forward. One of the reasons was that the pattern of the action of the Chinese leadership has been to attempt to remedy a mistake by mobilizing energies in the ideological field. In 1957, Mao Tse Tung had launched the Hundred Flowers Campaign in which the Chinese people were encouraged to voice their criticisms. The flood of criticism at that time was so great that the regime, even though it was still highly popular, tried to channel popular energies in other directions. The Great Leap Forward was a total failure. It not only failed economically, but by making such enormous demands and by wrecking material incentives it led to an effective loss of party control over major parts of China. In one province there was rebellion, but in all provinces while the party continued to govern, it could keep itself in power only by becoming technocratic and bureaucratic and by methods which were contrary to Marxist ideology. For example, the economic recovery is largely due to the

to Marxist ideology. For example, the economic recovery is largely due to the
by becoming technocratic and bureaucratic and by methods which were contrarily
advances while the party continued to govern, it could keep itself in power only
major parts of China. In one province there was rebellion, put in all bro-
wrecking material incentives it led to an effective loss of party control over
If not only failed economically, but by marking and enforcing demands and by
energies in other directions. The Great Red Forward was a total failure.
the regime, even though it was still highly popular, tried to channel popular
voice their criticism. The good of criticism at that time was so great that
Hundred Flowers Campaign in which the Chinese people were encouraged to
energies in the ideological field. In 1967, Mao Tse Tung had launched the
Chinese leadership has been to attempt to remedy a mistake by modifying
Red Forward. One of the reasons was that the pattern of the action of the
year thus. But in 1967, for a variety of reasons they attempted the Great
nomic problems had been achieved. They had far exceeded their first five-
economically, to the levels it had reached in 1967. Until 1968 Chinese eco-
economic situation. According to Hoeldridge, China was that now detting back,
never are. Hoeldridge Pedan with a very impressive sales force of the Chinese
decision--the type that foreign service officers are recruited to be put almost
most of the talking. He is an extremely impressive msn--csm' competent,
head of the Political Section, and the three military attaches. Hoeldridge did
Acting Comanl--the Comanl General being away on leave, John Hoeldridge, the
In the afternoon I met at the Conanlate with George Armament, the

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fact that material incentives have been restored. Peasants are permitted to have private plots, middlemen sell the peasants produce and even lending and interest rates occurs. The greatest increase in productivity has been in the private sector. This has created enormous problems for a leadership group which is again and which prides itself on its ideological militancy.

Most of the literature now expresses the worry of the Chinese leadership group about what the society will look like about twenty-years from now. And despite the strident appeals for ideological toughness, a note a plaintiveness has crept into recent discussion. There have been references to class consciousness in, for example, the Army over the past thirty-eight years--in other words, throughout the whole period of the revolution. Also, the cadres of the Communist party on the mainland are suffering from demoralization.

On one hand they are instructed to be close to the people, on the other they are supposed to follow party discipline rigidly. These two objectives are hard to combine. All this is compounded by the fact that party members are supposed to be exemplary in their behavior, that is to work harder without reward. Thus one can see why there has to be a constant campaign for vigilance in the party and why periodic attempts to purify the party cadres occur.

Again, all indications are that Mao is extremely worried about his possible success, and that the Chinese leadership as a whole fears the loss of ideological toughness over the next generation or so. This may account for the extreme hardness of the ideological line.

dical toughness over the next generation or so. This may account for the ex-
successes and that the Chinese leadership as a whole terms the loss of ideolo-
ogy, all indications are that Mao is extremely worried about his possible
in the party and why periodic attempts to purify the party csdrea occur.

Hardly. There one can see why there has to be a constant campaign for vigilance
board to be exemplary in their behavior, that is to work harder without re-
to compine. All this is compounded by the fact that party members are and
are ambushed to follow party discipline rigidly. These two objectives are hard
On one hand they are instructed to be close to the people, on the other they
of the Communist party on the mainland are suffering from demoralization.

Other words, throughout the whole period of the revolution. Viva, the csdrea
ciousness in, for example, the Army over the past thirty-eight years--in
has crept into recent discussion. There have been references to class con-
debate the atrident abdication of the ideological tendsmea, a note a plaintiveness
and spout what the society will look like about twenty-years from now. And
Most of the literature now expresses the worry of the Chinese leadership
in the private sector. This has created enormous problems for a leadership
and interest rates occurs. The greatest increase in productivity has been
have private slots, middlemen sell the peasants produce and even lending
fact that material incentives have been reformed. Peasants are permitted to

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[x]

[Y]

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In general, the impression of Holdridge is that China is reverting to a more traditional Chinese pattern--a strong central government against a background of considerable cynicism on the part of the population. Even though the economic recovery of China in the past three or four years has been considerable, this only gets them back to 1957 levels and, henceforth, they will have enormous difficulties to keep their rate of growth ahead of their rate of population increase.

We then turned to foreign policy. Here the consensus was that over the year the Chinese have suffered an uninterrupted series of disasters. When one compares the situation in 1955 with the situation in 1965, almost every Chinese effort has failed. The note of hysteria in Chinese pronouncements was ascribed by Holdridge and the others to an increasing sense of frustration and of isolation from the rest of the world. The visit of Chen Yè in Africa had been announced in Peiping as including six countries. In fact, outside of Tazania no country was prepared to receive him. The attempt to create a united anti-Western front on the basis of racialism has fizzled. India is an enemy and indeed every North Korean has moved out from Chinese tutelage to some extent. The only area where, according to our Consulate, the Chinese were relatively unworried was South Vietnam. The reason is that a ground war in Asia is the one thing that they believe they can handle and, in fact, one almost has the sense that they would like the United States to make a physical attack on Communist China by landing troops on the mainland

make a physical attack on Communist China by landing troops on the mainland and, in fact, one almost has the sense that they would like the United States to that a ground war in Korea is the one thing that they believe they can handle the Chinese were relatively unworried was South Vietnam. The reason is unrelated to some extent. The only area where, according to our Consulate, India is an enemy and indeed even North Korea has moved out from Chinese create a united anti-Western front on the part of racism! has fazed out

of Tassan's no country was prepared to receive him. The attempt to Africa had been announced in Peibin sa including six countries. In fact, tion and isolation from the rest of the world. The visit of Chen Ye in was sacrificed by Holridge and the others to an increasing sense of tramar- Chinese effort has failed. The note of play on Chinese pronouncements one compares the situation in 1966 with the situation in 1965, almost every the year the Chinese have offered an uninterrupted series of diascates. When We then turned to foreign policy. Here the phenomena was that over their rate of population increases.

they will have enormous difficulties to keep their rate of growth ahead of
been considerable, this only gets them back to 1967 levels and, henceforth,
though the economic recovery of China in the past three or four years has
a background of considerable conviction on the part of the population. Even
to a more traditional Chinese pattern--a strong central government adroit
In general, the impression of Holridge is that China is reverting

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because they seem well equipped for this. Holdridge and the others thought that the Chinese were far from thinking that South Vietnam could not be won. They had come around to the view that it would be a long struggle maybe lasting five to ten years, but their reading of the situation was that it would take a great deal more to convince the Chinese or Hanoi that the war would be lost. Holdridge did not exclude that at some point they would move to a conference, but in that case they would be extremely tough and their purpose would be to achieve at the conference table what they had not won on the battlefield.

Nevertheless even though the Chinese were still talking extremely toughly, the Consulate noticed a change of tone within the past year--there is no longer any talk in Chinese pronouncements about the inevitable victory of the East wind over the West wind. Rather there is now an explanation of why things are not going as they had expected. They are lumping Soviet revisionism with capitalism and attacking right-wing deviationism in their own country. All of these are defensive explanations. There are constant campaigns within the country against students who are good in their studies but weak in political education. The general impression is that the Chinese are now hoping that by stepping up what they call socialist education they can reinvigorate the flagging spirits of their society.

We then discussed the military problem. I began the discussion by asking under what conditions China might intervene in Vietnam. Holdridge said there were only two circumstances under which China might intervene:

said there were only two circumstances under which China might intervene:
saking under what conditions China might intervene in Vietnam. Hoa Hrdde
We then discussed the military problem. I posed the discussion pb
flashing spirits of their society.

pb stepping up what they call accidental education they can reinvigorate the
education. The general impression is that the Chinese are now hoping that
country against students who are good in their studies but weak in political
these are definitive explanations. There are constant campaigns within the
capitalist and attacking right-wing deviationism in their own country. All of
are not doing as they had expected. They are inflating Soviet revisionism with
wind over the West wind. Rather there is now an explanation of why things
and talk in Chinese pronouncements about the inevitable victory of the Est
the Communists noticed a change of tone within the past year--there is no louder
Nevertheless even though the Chinese were still talking extremely toughly,
achieve at the conference table what they had not won on the battlefield.

but in that case they would be extremely tough and their purpose would be to
Hoa Hrdde did not exclude that at some point they would move to a conference,
a great deal more to convince the Chinese or Hoa Hrd that the war would be lost.
They had come around to the view that it would be a long attributable maybe last-
that the Chinese were isn from thinking that South Vietnam could not be won.
become they seem well equipped for this. Hoa Hrdde and the others thought

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[A]

[Y]

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(1) a direct attack on North Vietnam such as to threaten the continued existence of the Communist regime in Hanoi; and (2) a direct physical attack on China. Holdridge said Communist China had gone to great lengths both overtly and covertly to communicate to the American Consulate the following points:

(1) China has no intention of attacking the United States;

(2) China will fight if it is physically attacked;

(3) If the United States physically attacks China the war will not be confined to the place where the attack takes place; and

(4) We mean it.

These four points seemed to Holdridge extremely defensive.

The military attachés then explained the nature of the Chinese military establishment to me. The air attaché began by saying that the Chinese Air Force was composed of roughly 2,000 planes of which 1800 were fighter planes. Of the bombing planes, twenty-four were of the B-29 type and the rest were medium range bombers none of which were based in Southern China. Of the 1800 fighter planes, 1600 were MIG 15 and 17, that is, planes of the Korean War type. Only twenty-four were of the modern MIG 21 type and 172 were MIG 19, which are roughly comparable to the American F-100. Of this Air Force, about four hundred is based in Southern China, none of it capable of reaching deep into South Vietnam. Communist China does not have the logistic support nor the airfield structure to support a sustained air battle. The air attaché thought that Communist China could not possibly seek an air conflict with the United States.

with the United States.

attache thought that Communist China could not possibly seek an air conflict
ambacht nor the airfield structure to ambacht a saturated air battle. The air
rescuing deep into South Vietnam. Communist China does not have the logistic
Force, a spout four hundred is based in Southern China, none of it capable of
MIG 19, which are roughly comparable to the American F-100. Of this Air
War type. Only twenty-four were of the modern MIG 21 type and 175 were
1800 fighter planes, 1600 were MIG 16 and 17, that is, planes of the Koresu
medium range bombers none of which were based in Southern China. Of the
Of the pumping planes, twenty-four were of the B-29 type and the rest were
Force was composed of roughly 5,000 planes of which 1800 were fighter planes.
eatsplishment to me. The air attaché beds down by asking that the Chinese Air

The military attaches then existed the nature of the Chinese military
These four points seemed to Holdridge extremely defensive.

(4) We mean it.

continued to the place where the attack takes place; and

(2) China will fight it if it is physically attacked;

and coverly to communicate to the American Communist the following points:
China. Holdridge said Communist China had done to great length both overtly
tence of the Communist regime in Hanoi; and (3) a direct physical attack on
(1) a direct attack on North Vietnam auch as to threaten the continued exis-

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[Y]

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On the ground, China has 104 infantry divisions organized into thriftyour armies and a number of tanks and support divisions. Of these units, two armies and two divisions--in other words, eight divisions--are deployed on the Vietnamese border. The military attaché estimated that before China moved the divisions on its southern frontier into South Vietnam, it would need to move an equivalent number into Southern China to protect their rear. Such a movement would require anywhere from thirty to one hundred and twenty days depending on what priority they were going to give it. It could not be completed in less than thrifty days. A surprise attack, therefore, was extremely unlikely. However, the appearance of a Chinese force in Vietnam could not be contained with the American forces at present stationed there, and would present a major challenge. The estimate was that such a Chinese force would require sixteen days to move through North Vietnam if there were no air bombardment--that is, it would reach Danang within sixteen days against no opposition--in about thirty days against substantial bombardment and opposition.

The naval attaché then summarized the Chinese naval strength, w hich he considered negligible. We then returned to the political situation.

Holdridge was of the view that Hanoi might prefer an indefinite postponement of victory to Chinese intervention. He considered it interesting that there had been no major statement of Sino-DRV relations since August 8th. He thought rather than intervention in Vietnam, China might

August 8th. He thought rather than intervention in Vietnam, China might
ind that there had been no major statement of Sino-DNA relations since
boatbuilding of victory to Chinese intervention. He considered it interest-
Holdridge was of the view that Hanlei might brester an indepenite
which he considered negligible. We then returned to the political situation.

The naval attache then summarized the Chinese naval strength,

opposition.
no opposition--in spite thirty days against substantial bombardment and
pompardment--that is, it would reach Danang within sixteen days against
during sixteen days to move through North Vietnam it there were no sir
major challenge. The estimate was that such a Chinese force would re-
with the American forces at present stationed there, and would present a
ever, the abstinence of a Chinese force in Vietnam could not be contained
thirty days. A surprise attack, therefore, was extremely unlikely. How-
priority they were doing to give it. It could not be completed in less than
anywhere from thirty to one hundred and twenty days depending on what
Southern China to protect their rear. Such a movement would require
into South Vietnam, it would need to move an equivalent number into
estimated that before China moved the divisions on its southern frontier
 Divisions--are deployed on the Vietnamese border. The military attache
these units, two armies and two divisions--in other words, eight div-
thirty-four armies and a number of tanks and ambuscade divisions. Of
On the ground, China has 104 infantry divisions organised into

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[A]

[Y]

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decide to turn on the screws in Burma and Thailand by means of wars of
national liberation or other blackmail operations. He again emphasized
the ideological dilemma of the regime and he told me of an editorial in a
leading ideological paper in which it was said that the most serious prob-
lem that China faced was with respect to Socialist education--not with
respect to any of the technical problems before it. So much for my con-
versations at the American Consulate.

In the evening Hilton Cheong-Leen, a former Seminar partici-
pant, gave a dinner for me attended by the following people: H. J. Yapp,
Editor of *The China Mail*, one of the leading papers; Holdridge, from the
Consulate; Chou Ching Wen, an editor and political leader; Derek Davies,
Editor of the *Fareastern Economic Review*; and Ronald Hsia, Professor
of Economics at Hong Kong University. The dinner took place at a Peking
restaurant.

Most of the conversation was centered about Derek Davies, who
had just returned two days previously from a three week trip through
Communist China. He had previously been in Canton, but he had never
visited Northern Communist China. He had been invited to attend the
press conference of Chen Yé and after that he was taken on a tour. I
asked him whether he had been impressed. He said that he found China
impressive beyond any expectation. I asked him what had impressed him.
He said that he was un prepared for the cleanliness, orderliness and
uniformity. He was both impressed and depressed by the latter.

muitormity. He was both impressed and depreased by the latter.

He said that he was much preferred for the cleanliness, orderliness and impreasable beyond any expectation. I asked him what had impressed him. asked him whether he had been impressed. He said that he found China dress conference of Chen Yè and after that he was taken on a tour. I visited Northern Communist China. He had been invited to attend the Communist China. He had previously been in Canton, but he had never had that returned two days previously from a three week trip through

Most of the conversation was centered around Derek Davies, who
reacted

of Economics at Hong Kong University. The dinner took place at a Peking
Editor of the *Eastern Economic Review* and Ronald Hais, Professor
Conanats; Chou Ching Wen, an editor and political leader; Derek Davies,
Editor of *The Chinese Mail*, one of the leading papers; Holgridge, from the
busi, gave a dinner for me attended by the following people: H. J. Ysby,
In the evening Hilton Chong-Teen, a former seminar partici-

verations at the American Communist.
respect to any of the technical problems before it. So much for my con-

ferm that China faced was with respect to Socialist education--not with
leading ideological paper in which it was said that the most serious prop-
the ideological dilemma of the regime and he told me of an editorial in a
national liberation or other Existential operations. He also emphasized
decide to turn on the screws in Bums and Thailand by means of wars of

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[A]

[Y]

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Everything was highly organized. There was very little contact with average Chinese, though the way this was prevented was by making the schedule so full that there was no time for any extra-curricular activities. Davies, supported by Hilton Cheong-Leen, advanced the view that the West totally misunderstands Chinese mentality. Most Western newspapers hold the view that the Chen-Yè press conference in which he dared the United States and the Soviet Union to attack China simultaneously was extremely bellicose. In fact, Davies, supported by Cheong-Leen, were of the view that it was an extremely defensive statement. Davies interpreted it to mean an admission that the Great Leap Forward in foreign policy had failed just as much as it had failed in domestic policy. 1964 had been considered by the Chinese Communist a year of success. It saw recognition by France; the break of Pakistan from the American Alliance, and closer ties with Communist China; penetration of Indonesia; and the beginning of an attempt to rally the African states on an anti-Western basis. To a considerable extent this had been frustrated. 1965 witnessed a major projection of American power to the mainland. Davies was of the view that Chen-Yè was trying to convey to the United States in the toughest possible way that there was no need to attack Communist China because Communist China had no aggressive intentions, but that it would fight if it were attacked. Davies believed that Communist China could not interpret the American build-up in South Vietnam as anything but a possible prelude to an attack on it. This also explained the seemingly

possible prelude to an attack on it. This also explained the seemingly
not interpret the American build-up in South Vietnam as anything but a
fight if it were attacked. Davies believed that Communist China could
become Communist China had no aggressive intentions, but that it would
touchdown possible way that there was no need to attack Communist China
the view that Chen-Yü was trying to convey to the United States in the
a major projection of American power to the mainland. Davies was of
psais. To a considerable extent this had been frustrated. 1966 witnessed
and the beginning of an attempt to rely on the African states on an anti-Western
Villiance, and closer ties with Communist China; penetration of Indonesia;
saw recognition by France; the preusk of Pakistan from the Americans
had been considered by the Chinese Communist a year of success. If
policy had failed that as much as it had failed in domestic policy. 1964
brought it to mean an admission that the Great Leap Forward in foreign
of the view that it was an extremely defensive statement. Davies inter-
extremely pellicose. In fact, Davies' andported by Cheong-Teen' were
the United States and the Soviet Union to attack China simultaneously was
b sabers hold the view that the Chen-Yü press conference in which he said
the West totally misunderstands Chinese mentality. Most Western news-
ties. Davies' andported by Hilton Cheong-Teen' advanced the view that
schedule so full that there was no time for any extra-curricular activi-
senerate Chinese, through the way this was prevented was by making the
Everything was highly organised. There was very little contact with

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absurd statement of Chen-Ye when he was asked about Hong Kong. He said, if the Americans attack us in southern China and if after they are repulsed they try to withdraw into Hong Kong then we will not recognize frontiers anymore. This again sounded very bellicose, but it was, in effect, a means of communicating the extent to which China would go to respect the inviolability of Hong Kong.

Davies made a similar interpretation of other statements about the uncommitted which, in his view, really attempted to provide an alibi for not attending the Algiers Conference of Afro-Asian nations.

I then talked to Professor Hsia of Hong Kong University, who has made a study of growth rates of Communist China. His view about the Chinese economy was totally at variance with that of the American Consulate. He believed that Chinese growth since 1961 had been on the order of ten percent a year and he believed that it was possible to maintain this growth for the next five years. In that case Communist China would have no difficulty in keeping ahead of its population increase. I asked Hsia about the bureaucratization in China. (All American observers had told me that bureaucratization was intense, combining bad features of Communism with traditional Chinese bureaucratization.) Hsia denied this. He argued that the system of interlocking controls of the Communists had very effectively provided a system of checks and balances, and that the constant reshuffling of bureaucratic structures enabled them to solve the problem effectively.

empied them to solve the problem effectively.

balances, and that the constant rearming of pureraneristic structures
the Communists had very effectively provided a system of checks and
Hats denied this. He argued that the system of interlocking controls of
teatures of Communism with traditional Chinese pureraneristic system.)
versus had told me that pureraneristic was intense, combining bad
saked Hais spont the pureraneristic in China. (All American opera-
would have no difficulty in keeping ahead of its population increases. I
tain this growth for the next five years. In that case Communist China
order of ten percent a year and he believed that it was possible to main-
Conanatist. He believed that Chinese growth since 1961 had been on the
the Chinese economy was totally at variance with that of the American
use made a study of growth rates of Communist China. His view spont
I then talked to Professor Hais of Hong Kong University, who
slipt for not attending the Alders Conference of Afro-African nations.
the uncommitted which, in his view, really attempted to provide an
Davies made a similar interpretation of other statements spont
respect the inviolability of Hong Kong.

effect, s' meant of communicating the extent to which China would do to
frontiers anymore. This again sounded very pellicose, but it was, in
rebutted they try to withdraw into Hong Kong then we will not recognize
said, if the Americans attack us in southern China and it after they are
spammed statement of Chen-Ye when he was saked spont Hong Kong. He

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[A]

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As for Vietnam, he thought that Red China was extremely patient and that he did not see how the United States would have the staying power to last. Altogether Hsia, who is allegedly an anti-Communist, showed an enormous pride in Chinese Communist achievements and would brook no criticisms. He said it was not much fun to teach at Hong Kong University because students were extremely passive and primarily interested in making money and entering a business career.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

because students were extremely passive and primarily interested in mask-
criticism. He said it was not much fun to teach at Hong Kong University
enormous pride in Chinese Communist achievements and would proof no
to last. Vitodetter Hais, who is allegedly an anti-Communist, showed an
and that he did not see how the United States would have the staying power
As for Vietnam, he thought that Red China was extremely patient

[A]

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October 15th. I got up very early to catch my plane for Saigon.
For the first time I saw the streets of Hong Kong relatively deserted and
had a spectacular view of the harbor as I was taking the ferry to the main-
land where the airport is located. The flight to Saigon was uneventful.
From the air Vietnam looked lush and when we approached Saigon ex-
tremely highly cultivated. The first sign of being in a combat zone came
from the very large number of airplanes that one saw and also from the
fact that our airplane stayed very high in the air until it was nearly above
Saigon and then suddenly started plunging down and describing a figure
eight as it approached the runway while constantly changing altitude. The
effect was like that of being on a rollercoaster. The reason is that several
civilian airplanes had been fired on while approaching the Saigon airport
and every plane is taking evasive action. The airfield at Saigon is jammed
full of airplanes--mostly combat types--sitting in revetments.

I was greeted by a member of the American Embassy, Mr. Smyser, who is assigned to take care of my needs. As it happened I arrived on the day which had been declared by the Vietcong as a "Hate America Day" and the Vietcong had called for a general strike in Saigon between 11:00 and 12:00. My plane arrived at 11:30, but there was no sign of a strike. In fact, except for the huge number of military airplanes at the airfield, things could not have been more peaceful and quiet.

The only sign of the war at the airport was a part of the roof which
was being repaired. My escort officer explained that it had been bombed a

was being reissued. My escort officer explained that it had been pumped a
The only sign of the war at the airport was a part of the roof which
could not have been more peaceful and quiet.

fact, except for the huge number of military airplanes at the airfield, things
13:00. My plane arrived at 11:30, but there was no sign of a strike. In
the Vietcong had called for a general strike in Saigon between 11:00 and
day which had been declared by the Vietcong as a "Hate America Day," and
who is assigned to take care of my needs. As it happened I arrived on the
I was greeted by a member of the American Empress, Mr. Smyー aer,
full of airplanes--mostly combat planes--arriving in revenues.

and every plane is taking evasive action. The airfield at Saigon is jammed
civilian airplanes had been tired on while approaching the Saigon airport
effect was like that of being on a rollercoaster. The reason is that several
eight as it approached the runway while constantly changing altitude. The
Saigon and then suddenly started blunting down and describing a figure
fact that our airplane stayed very high in the air until it was nearly spove
from the very large number of airplanes that one saw and said from the
tremendously highly cultivated. The first sign of being in a combat zone came
From the air Vietnam looked inaud and when we approached Saigon ex-
ist where the airport is located. The flight to Saigon was uneventful.
I had a spectacular view of the harbor as I was taking the ferry to the main-
For the first time I saw the streets of Hong Kong relatively deserted and
October 16th. I got no very early to catch my plane for Saigon.

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few weeks ago by the Vietcong. On the way into the city an unbelievable traffic jam developed, and I have already learned in the six hours that I have been in Saigon that traffic jams are endemic. The first impression of Saigon is of wide, tree-lined boulevards and shabby buildings--some- what like a run-down French provincial city. Even the government build- ings look down at the heel. We drove to the American Embassy which ever since the bomb attack on it about a year ago is protected by barbed wire and a road block which is guarded by American Marines. The road- block is constructed very similarly to Check Point Charlie at the Berlin Wall.

I was taken upstairs to see Lodge, who was extremely cordial. He showed me a letter which he had written to the President and he had a book of dispatches prepared for me containing his weekly reports to the President, which interestingly enough no one had ever shown me at the State Department. He was much more outgoing than I had ever seen him. He called in his political counselor, who took me to an office which had been set aside for me in the Embassy. Every since the bomb attack the offices do not have any windows--only shatter-proof glass panels very high up in the wall.

I was then taken to the Ambassador's residence where I am stay-
ing. The residence is set back on a quiet residential street at the end of
which there is a barbed wire enclosure guarded by Vietnamese soldiers
with rifles ready. Further down the street the Ambassador's residence

with rifles ready. Further down the street the Ambassador's residence
which there is a parred wire enclosure guarded by Vietnamese soldiers
ind. The residence is set back on a quiet residential street at the end of
I was then taken to the Ambassador's residence where I am at the
high mb in the mail.

offices do not have any windows---only a shutter-broot dsaa panels very
been set aside for me in the Embassy. Every since the pomp attack the
He called in his political connctor, who took me to an office which had
State Department. He was much more outgoing than I had ever seen him.
President, which interestingly enough no one had ever shown me at the
book of diabitches prepared for me containing his weekly reports to the
He showed me a letter which he had written to the President and he had a
I was taken whatso to see Lodde, who was extremely cordial.

Mail.

pock is constructed very similarly to Check Point Charlie at the Berlin
wire and a road pock which is guarded by American Marines. The rosrd-
ever since the pomp attack on it about a year ago is protected by parped
inds look down at the reef. We drove to the American Embassy which
must like a run-down French provincial city. Even the government build-
ing of Saigon is of wide, tree-lined ponjevarda and happy buildings--some-
have been in Saigon that traffic is so endemic. The first impression
traffic ism developed, and I have already learned in the six hours that I
ten weeks ago by the Vietcong. On the way into the city an unbeliavable

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is guarded first by two Vietnamese soldiers with rifles ready and as soon
as one drives into the driveway two American Marines appear again with
rifles lowered. The residence is surrounded by a very high wall which
has recently been constructed. The wall is surmounted by large nets de-
signed to prevent any grenades from being thrown over. The windows
have wire meshing. On the one hand, this is a lot of protection; on the
other, I do not see the sense of all these precautions because with the in-
terminable traffic jams in Saigon it would be an easy matter for any
terrorist to assassinate any American that he chose. All of this sounds
as if it were dangerous and it may well be, but I never cease being amazed
at the matter-of-factness of combat zones. I remember during World War
II how my division was moved from deep in France into the front line and
how terrified we all were as we heard the guns come closer and closer
until we were in the actual combat zone when a great calm suddenly des-
cended on us. I remember also in the Korean War that the same was true
and now I have the same feeling in Saigon. When one is surrounded by
dedicated people doing the job focused on their objectives, there really is
not any time to think of the dangers and one is swept along in the job that
has to be done.

My program promises to be extremely full. I am booked up for about
fifteen hours a day for six days after which I will spend several days in the
provinces, including one which is defined as a maximum security area.

provinces, including one which is defined as a maximum security area, fifteen hours a day for six days after which I will abend several days in the

My program promises to be extremely full. I am booked up for a spot
pass to be done.

not any time to think of the dangers and one is awed along in the job that
dedicated people doing the job termed on their objectives, there really is
and now I have the same feeling in Saigon. When one is annromded by
ended on me. I remember also in the Korean War that the same was true
until we were in the actual combat zone when a great calm and suddenly dea-
how terrified we all were as we heard the gunn come closer and closer
II how my division was moved from deep in France into the front line and
at the matter-of-tactiveness of combat zones. I remember during World War
so it was dangerous and it was well be, but I never cease beingamsed
terrorist to saasainstze any American that he chose. All of this aomda
terminable traffic jama in Saigon it would be an essay matter for any
other, I do not see the sense of all these precautions because with the in-
have wire meaning. On the one hand, this is a lot of protection; on the
afforded to prevent any drensdes from being thrown over. The windows
hasa recently been constructed. The wall is annrommed by large nets de-
rifles lowered. The residence is annromded by a very high wall which
sa one drives into the driveway two American Marines appear again with
is disraged that by two Vietnamese soldiers with rifles ready and sa soon

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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[x]

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Next I was taken to lunch at the house of the Political Counsel.
Present were: Mr. Habib, the Political Counsel and host; Mr. Smyser,
my escort officer; General Abbey, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Mili-
tary Establishment; Mr. Maynard, the Deputy of the AID Mission; and
Mr. Jorgensen, the CIA Station Chief. The lunch could not have been
better and I received a quick survey of the situation. Since most of it will
be covered again in subsequent briefings, I will confine myself now to des-
cribing the chief personalities.

Mr. Habib is Armenian, short, energetic, a little self-important,
very bright, very conscious of his position, and very eager to be recog-
nized. General Abbey is an Air Force officer, quick, a little suspicious
and also a little pedantic, who repeated the standard arguments for a mili-
tary victory. Jorgensen is bluff, common sense-ical and extremely
shrewd. Maynard is well-meaning, but perhaps less forceful than the
others.

The consensus around the table seemed to be that even the present
American effort would not be enough and that if the back of the Vietcong
was to be broken much larger American forces would be necessary. We did
not go into the question of how many forces might be needed to maintain the
situation afterwards nor into the political pacification problem nor into the
question of negotiations.

disease of negotiations.

situation afterwards nor into the political situation problem nor into the
not do into the discussion of how many forces might be needed to maintain the
was to be broken much larger American forces would necessarily. We did
be
American effort would not be enough and that if the pack of the Vietcong

The conferences around the table seemed to be that even the present

others.

arrows. Mysnard is well-meaning, but perhaps less forceful than the
tarly victory. Jordenaen is plumb, common sense-ical and extremely
and also a little bedsomatic, who repeated the standard arguments for a mill-
nized. General Appel is an Air Force officer, quick, a little anabionic
very bright, very convivial of his position, and very eager to be recod-
Mr. Hsip is Armenian, short, energetic, a little self-important,

cripking the chief peraunliities.

be covered again in anabedent prietings. I will continue myself now to dea-
better and I received a quick survey of the situation. Since most of it will
Mr. Jordenaen, the CIA Station Chief. The launch could not have been
early Eatsplishment; Mr. Mysnard, the Deputy of the AID Mission; and
my escort officer; General Appel, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Mill-
Present were: Mr. Hsip, the Political Commel and host; Mr. Smyaer.
Next I was taken to launch at the home of the Political Commel.

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[N]

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In the afternoon I went to my office at the Embassy and read the file of dispatches which Lodge had left for me. I then met with Habib and one of his assistants to plan my program and arrange the people I should see. Unfortunately, Habib is using my visit very much as an opportunity to get to know some people that have not been willing to meet with the Embassy before, but I do not suppose there is much I can do about it.

I then met with the so-called "provincial-reporters". This is a group of ten junior foreign service officers, all of whom speak Vietnamese and one of whom speaks Cambodian, who travel from province to province to report about conditions there. I had read some of their reports in Washington and they struck me as by far the best thing coming out of Vietnam. We discussed my trip through the provinces and we picked one province which is largely pacified, one which is on the verge of being overrun, and then some in-between situations. We also began to talk about motivations both on the side of the government and on the side of the Vietcong; but we will have to continue that conversation later.

In the evening I went with the Ambassador to the house of General Lansdale, who is in charge of something called the Special Liaison Group. Ed Lansdale has long been a fabulous character in Washington. During the war, he organized anti-Japanese guerrillas in the Philippines and after the war he was the leader of the anti-guerrillas in the Philippines. He finally invented Magsaysay when the Huks in the Philippines seemed to

He finally invented Madasyasy when the Hua in the Philippines seemed to
after the war he was the leader of the anti-guerrillas in the Philippines.
the war, he organized anti-Japanese guerrillas in the Philippines and
Eq Lasadsle has long been a fabulous character in Washington. During
Lasadsle, who is in charge of something called the Specialist Liaison Group.
In the evening I went with the Ambassador to the house of General
put we will have to continue that conversation later.

tions both on the side of the government and on the side of the Vietcong;
and then some in-between situations. We also begun to talk about motiv-
vince which is largely pacified, one which is on the verge of being overrun,
nam. We discussed my trip through the provinces and we picked one bro-
Washington and they struck me as far the beat thing coming out of Viet-
to report spont conditions there. I had read some of their reports in
and one of whom abeska Campodisn, who travel from province to province
group of ten junior foreign service officers, all of whom abesk Vienmmeae
I then met with the so-called provincial-reporters". This is a
spont it.

with the Embsaay before, but I do not abboae there is much I can do
portunity to get to know some people that have not been willing to meet
should see. Unfortunately, Hapip is making my visit very much as an ob-
and one of his assistants to bring my program and arrange the people I
file of diabsthesia which Lodge had left for me. I then met with Hapip
In the afternoon I went to my office at the Embsaay and read the

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be gaining the upper hand. He then went to Vietnam and helped to estab-
lish Diem in power against heavy odds. In recent years he has been out
of favor due to policy disagreements with McNamara. Lodge resurrected
him and took him to Saigon as a specialist in anti-guerrilla warfare. I
have known Lansdale for many years and never could understand on what
his reputation was based. In Washington he seems a slow, twangy, Kansan
who seems almost bureaucratic in his manner. Here, however, I could
understand his attraction. The difficulty with most Americans is that
while we live in a society which does not have great tensions, we also do
not know great compassion. The people who are most effective on the
American scene, therefore, are often least effective abroad. We really
have no means of dealing with disparate people; and this is why General
Taylor was such a relative failure in Saigon.

Lansdale, however, is an exception. He has collected around
himself a group of individuals who have worked with him for twenty years
and who, at his request, drop everything to assemble from all corners of
the world. Thus on his team now there is Bernie Yoh, a Chinese who has
come to the United States via Spain, is close to the Catholic Church, and
is a good friend of the Vietnamese priest who organized the "sea swallows"
that defeated the Vietcong in a part of the Mekong River Delta. There is
an anti-assassination expert from the Philippines; Mike Deutsch, an
economic consultant who closed his business to come here; an information
specialist who has come from Africa; and two Filipinos. All of them are

["specialist who has come from Africa; and two Philippines. All of them are\neconomic consultant who closed his business to come here; an information\nan anti-sassasination expert from the Philippines; Mike Deutsch, an\nthat defeated the Vietcong in a part of the Mekong River Delta. There is\na good friend of the Vietnamese priest who organized the \"ase ashlome.\"\ncome to the United States via Spain, is close to the Catholic Church, and\nthe world. Tuna on his team now there is Bernie Yop, a Chinese who has\nand who, at his redneat, drob everything to saasample from all corners of\nhimself a group of individuals who have worked with him for twenty years\nLanadse, however, is an exception. He has collected around\nTylor was such a relative tailor in Saigon.\nhave no mesna ot desiring with draftrate people; and this is why Generals\nAmerican scene, therefore, are often least effective spros. We resist\nnot know great compassion. The people who are most effective on the\nwhile we live in a society which does not have great tenors, we also do\nunderstand his attraction. The difficulty with most Americans is that\nwho seems almost prescriptive in his manner. Here, however, I confd\nhis reputation was based. In Washington he seems a slow, twandy, Kansan\nhave known Lanadse for many years and never could understand on what\nhim and took him to Saigon as a specialist in anti-guerrilla wars. I\nof course due to policy disagreements with McNamars. Lodge reamrected\nthat Diem in power said that he has been out\nof the number band. He then went to Vietnam and helped to establish\nthe number band. He then went to Vietnam and

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now in Saigon working on various aspects of the anti-guerrilla problem.

The occasion of this evening was the formation of a group of the veterans of the Saigon enterprise and though not much substantive was discussed, it was a most moving occasion. Lansdale's group is really a knighthood of disparate situations. They are useless in normal times, but in difficult periods it is their dedication on which success may depend. I hope to see more of them.

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to see more of them.

cult periods it is their dedication on which success may depend. I hope
of diabolite situations. They are useless in normal times, but in diffi-
lit it was a most moving occasion. Lansdale's group is really a knightood
of the Sabon enterprise and though not much apathetic was diacussed.
The occasion of this evening was the formation of a group of the veterans
now in Sabon working on various aspects of the anti-devil problem.

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October 16th. I started the day at breakfast with Cabot Lodge at 7:45. Lodge asked me what I thought of the Lansdale group, which is under vicious attack from almost every established unit here. I told him that I could not judge the work they were actually doing, but that any man who could assemble such marked and disparate characters from every part of the globe, after having worked with them twenty years previously, had more than ordinary qualities. I told him that one should not judge by American standards people who were useful in revolutionary situations and that his task here was to find individuals who were useful to him in a desperate struggle--not people who could write clever reports. Lodge said that he completely agreed. His experience/had been that you could have a beautifully running campaign with everybody agreeing with each other and no lack of harmony and still have everything go to pieces. In order to do unusual things you needed unusual people and unusual people were difficult.

He then began to ruminate about why he was out here. He said he was sixty-three years old, he wanted nothing and above all he did not want to get another job in Washington, nor did he think of Saigon as a base from which to run for elective office. All he was interested in was in doing a good job, and this gave him enormous strength vis-à-vis Washington. They could not simply ignore him. They knew that if they were doing things that he disapproved of he would simply resign. Of course, he would resign in an honorable fashion. He despised people who published their advice after they had been in government. But, means could be found to make his displeasure clear.

ment. But, *mesma* could be found to make his diapause clear.

He deplaved people who published their advice after they had been in dover-
ot he would aimly read. Of course, he would read in an honorable fashion,
aimly ignore him. They knew that if they were doing things that he disapproved
and this gave him enormous strength via-s-via Washington. They could not
to run for elective office. All he was interested in was in doing a good job,
det another job in Washington, nor did he think of ASDON as a base from which
was sixty-three years old, he wanted nothing and spoke all he did not want to
He then begun to ruminate about why he was out here. He said he
people and man was difficult.

everything do to pieces. In order to do man was things you needed man was
everybody agreeing with each other and no lack of harmony and still have
persence/used been that you could have a beautifully running campaign with
in political campaigns
could write clever reports. Lodge said that he completely agreed. His ex-
individuals who were useful to him in a desperate struggle--not people who
who were useful in revolutionary situations and that his task here was to find
duties. I told him that one should not judge by American standards people
after having worked with them twenty years previously, had more than ordinarily
saample and marked and diaproate characters from every part of the globe,
conf not judge the work they were actually doing, but that any man who confug
vicious attack from almost every established unit here. I told him that I
4:45. Lodge asked me what I thought of the Las Vegas group, which is under
October 16th. I started the day at breakfast with Capot Lodge at

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Lodge then asked me about my assessment of the situation in Wash-
ton. I told him that a significant group in the State Department, Chet Cooper
in the White House, and some people in the Defense Department were eager to
prepare a negotiating position, some of the elements of which might give him
trouble. He asked me what he should do about it, and I said perhaps he ought
to go to Washington and surface some of these proposals and get a Presidential
decision. Lodge replied that he thought this was a bad idea. His strength was
his absence from Washington, the difficulty of being reached by telephone. It
helped him to be known as a difficult customer at a great distance. If he sat
in the Cabinet room and had to react quickly to all the bright boys he would cut
a poor figure and he would get himself overruled. On the other hand, if he had
a chance to sit out here backed up by his mission he would be a powerful force
with which to contend. This showed more perception than I thought he possessed
and I must say I was very impressed with his observation.

Lodge then told me about the McNamara visit here in July. He said
McNamara was a very odd man. On the way out to Saigon McNamara had
McNaughton show him a paper with the observation: "this is the report I pro-
pose to submit to the President after I have visited Saigon. What do you think
of it?" I would not have believed this if it did not accord with my own experi-
ence. When I saw McNaughton a few weeks ago in Washington I told him that I
planned to write my report after I came back and that it might take me a week
or two. He said that this was very wrong. I should go out with the report
written and then modify it if I wanted to on the basis of my visit. He and

written and then modify it if I wanted to on the basis of my visit. He and
or two. He said that this was very wrong. I should do out with the report
planned to write my report after I came back and that it might take me a week
ence. When I saw McNamhton a few weeks ago in Washington I told him that I
ot it?" I would not have believed this if it did not accord with my own expe-
poae to submit to the President after I have visited Saigon. What do you think
McNamhton show him a paper with the observation: "this is the report I pro-
McNamars was a very odd man. On the way out to Saigon McNamars had

Lodge then told me about the McNamars visit here in July. He said
and I must say I was very impressed with his observation.

with which to contend. This showed more perception than I thought he possessed
a chance to get out here packed up by his mission he would be a powerful force
a boor figure and he would get himself overruled. On the other hand, if he had
in the Cabinet room and had to react quickly to all the bright points he would cut
helped him to be known as a difficult customer at a great distance. If he ast
his presence from Washington, the difficulty of being reached by telephone. It
decision. Lodge replied that he thought this was a bad idea. His strength was
to do to Washington and advise some of these proposals and get a Presidential
trouble. He asked me what he should do about it, and I said perhaps he ought
brings a negotiating position, some of the elements of which might give him
in the White House, and some people in the Defense Department were eager to
intend. I told him that a significant group in the State Department, Chet Cooper
Lodge then asked me about my assessment of the situation in Wash-

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McNamara always went places with the report already prepared; it was the
only way you could make efficient use of your time.

Be that as it may, McNamara had kept telling Lodge that he wanted to work out some settlements. Lodge said, or he claims to have said, (1) it isn't the job of the Secretary of Defense to work out settlements and (2) he had urged McNamara not to think in terms of settlement but of outcomes. I told Lodge that my impression had been that at least the phrase "outcome" had found its way into DOD papers and that in this respect he had had a beneficial influence.

We then reviewed the personalities of the mission. Lodge said that he wanted as his Deputy somebody who could act as Ambassador and not simply a clerk who was a Deputy Chief of Mission. He might get assassinated or, given the climate, he might fall ill; therefore, he had looked for a career Ambassador. He had interviewed about eight people but then had settled on Porter because Porter has experience in countries with revolutionary situations. He and Porter were getting along very well. I must say that I had never had much use for Lodge in the United States thinking him insufferably arrogant and not very bright. I don't know how bright he is but he is very perceptive about people. He has a lot of courage and in this particular situation I find him to be a good influence. One of the more touching things was when I thanked him for letting me stay at his residence: He said, you may regret it; my wife always tells me that I am a very tiresome man.

him for letting me atay at his residence: He said, 'you may regret it; my wife
him to be a good influence.' One of the more touching things was when I thanked
apout people. He has a lot of courage and in this particular situation I find
and not very bright. I don't know how bright he is but he is very perceptive
and much more for Lodge in the United States thinking him inappropriately arrogant
and not very well. I must say that I had never
Porter because Porter has experience in countries with revolutionary aims-
Ambassador. He had interviewed about eight people but then had settled on
divided the climate, he might fall ill; therefore, he had looked for a career
a clerk who was a Deputy Chief of Mission. He might get saasasinated or,
he wanted so his Deputy somebody who could act as Ambassador and not aimply
We then reviewed the personalities of the mission. Lodge said that
influence.

found its way into DOD papers and that in this respect he had had a beneficial
Lodge that my impression had been that at least the phrase "outcome" had
nurled McNamara not to think in terms of settlement but of outcomes. I told
I can't the top of the Secretary of Defense to work out settlements and (S) he had
to work out some settlements. Lodge said, 'or he claims to have said' (1) it
Be that as it may, McNamara had kept telling Lodge that he wanted
only way you could make efficient use of your time.

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Another random note: Lodge is of the view that if we are going to negotiate with anybody we should talk with the NLF or at least we should succeed to convey to the NLF the idea that we are determined to stay regardless of the length of time and regardless of the sacrifices it may cost us.

I asked him whether we knew who the NLF was and he said we had no contact with the NLF. What is more we did not even know who the members were.

He thought he had established some kind of relationship. A very attractive forty-five year old Vietnamese lady had come up to him at the Circle Sportif and had made a great effort to ingratiate herself. If he were not a

sixty-three year old man he would say that she wanted to go to bed with him.

But he thought this idea was extremely unlikely. She had then come to the Embassy to try to see him and he avoided her. Finally she had let him

know that she would really like to be invited to an Embassy function. When

Lodge gave a party for the "Hello Dolly" troop he had therefore invited her. As a result, she had come to the Embassy the next day and while Lodge had again avoided seeing her, she had let him know that he was in grave danger because there was the possibility of a mortar attack on his residence from the cemetery located half a block away. He thinks that she belongs to a Vietcong organization and he wants to invite her for a private dinner to the

residence to tell her that the United States was determined to stay. He thinks that as long as it is a private dinner he is protected against any

possibility of it being misunderstood. I did not say anything when he mentioned

possibility of it being misunderstood. I did not say anything when he mentioned
that sa found sa it is a private dinner he is protected against any
residence to tell her that the United States was determined to atsya. He
Vietcong organization and he wants to invite her for a private dinner to the
cemetery located half a block away. He thinks that she belongs to a
because there was the possibility of a mortal attack on his residence from
again avoided seeing her, she had let him know that he was in grave danger
As a result, she had come to the Embassy the next day and while Lodge had
Lodge gave a party for the "Hello Dolls" troop he had therefore invited her.
know that she would really like to be invited to an Embassy function. When
Embassy to try to see him and he avoided her. Finally she had let him
But he thought this idea was extremely unlikely. She had then come to the
sixty-three year old man he would say that she wanted to do to bed with him.
Shortuit and had made a great effort to inristate herself. If he were not a
forty-five year old Vietnamese lady had come to him at the Circle
He thought he had satisfied some kind of relationship. A very attractive
with the NLF. What is more we did not even know who the members were.
I asked him whether we knew who the NLF was and he said we had no contact
with the length of time and regardless of the sacrifices it may cost us.
To me it is a good way to convey to the NLF the idea that we are determined to atsya rescrd-
ance to negotiate with anybody we should talk with the NLF or at least we should
Another random note: Lodge is of the view that if we are going

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this to me, but in thinking about it it seems to me that if she is a member
of the NLF she may want to assassinate him or she may want to create a
scandal claiming that the Ambassador tried to rape her. At any rate, if he
wants to communicate with her, I think he ought to give a small dinner
party at which he invites one or two others and then go off with her to a
separate room as if often done at diplomatic receptions to talk to her. But
altogether I do not think that the Ambassador should undertake this kind of
contact in any setting.

contact in any setting.

altogether I do not think that the Ambassador should undertake this kind of
separate room so it often done at diplomatic receptions to talk to her. But
partly at which he invites one or two others and then do off with her to a
wants to communicate with her. I think he ought to give a small dinner
accused claiming that the Ambassador tried to rape her. At any rate, it he
of the NLF she may want to sassafrasate him or she may want to create a
this to me, but in thinking about it it seems to me that it she is a member

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Before I go on, let me make a few observations about Saigon.

First of all, about the climate. The temperature is always in the middle or high 80's. The humidity must be above 70%. My bedroom is beautifully air-conditioned and many of the offices are air-conditioned too. However, every time one steps out into the street or into a corridor that is not air-conditioned one is enveloped by a soggy, clamy, mellow kind of air for which the term "insinuating" is most appropriate.

Security problems. Saigon is a very curious city. I had read that Saigon is the Paris of the Far East. Unless there are parts of the city which I have not yet seen, this is absurd. It does have wide boulevards which are tree-lined, but the streets are dirty, the buildings are dilapidated, paint is peeling off them. Even when they are no dilapidated they are utterly undistinguished. An ordinary French provincial city would look like a metropolis compared to Saigon. At the same time, the streets are teeming with life. The traffic jams compare with those of New York even though the composition of what produces the traffic jam is different. There are great numbers of rickshaws and bicycles and motor cycles. Yet while the streets present a picture of bustling normalcy, every governmental installation and every American headquarters is surrounded first by a high concrete fence against the blast of land mines and secondly by high wire nettings to prevent grenades from being lobbed in. The residence of the American Ambassador, as I have already indicated, is guarded by a detachment of Marines and three military policemen. I have now discovered that on the floor where the Ambassador's

bolicemen. I have now discovered that on the floor where the Ambassador's a
already indicated, is guarded by a detachment of Marines and three military
from behind lopped in. The residence of the American Ambassador, so I have
plat of land mines and secondly by high wire nettings to prevent drenades
can headquarters is announced that by a high concrete fence against the
picture of plating normsley, every government insatistion and every Ameri-
rickama and bicycles and motor cycles. Yet while the streets preent a
of what produces the trutlic jam is different. There are great numbers of
The trutlic jama compare with those of New York even though the composition
compared to Saïdon. At the same time, the streets are teeming with life,
diurated. An ordinary French provincial city would look like a metropolis
bejing ott them. Even when they are no dilapidated they are utterly madliat-
tree-lined, put the streets are dirty, the buildings are dilapidated, paint is
I have not yet seen this is spand. It does have wide boulevards which are
Saïdon is the Paris of the Far East. Unless there are parts of the city which
Security problema. Saïdon is a very curious city. I had read that
which the term "inannsting" is most appropriate.
sir-conditioned one is enveloped by a sooby, clamy, mellow kind of sir for
ever, every time one steps out into the street or into a corridor that is not
titully sir-conditioned and many of the offices are sir-conditioned too. How-
middle or high 80's. The humidity must be above 70%. My bedroom is pesu-
first of all, about the climate. The temperature is always in the
Before I do on, let me make a few observations about Saïdon.

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and my bedrooms are situated there is another Marine at the head of the
stairs. The seeming normalcy can be shattered at any moment by an in-
cident such as happened two days before I arrived when a Vietcong dressed
in the uniform of a Vietnamese soldier cut the throat of the policeman at the
head of the street leading to the Ambassador's residence. In the teeming
traffic of Saigon it would be an easy matter to assassinate any American that
the Vietcong chose to get out of the way. It is impossible to furnish guards
for every car and even if guards were available the attack would come so
quickly that nothing could be done about it. I was told by our Intelligence
people that the best protection for the security of American personnel was
the fact that the Vietcong are meticulous planners. They don't like to impro-
vise an attack and therefore they will never attack an installation or a person
unless they have rehearsed the exercise many times. In order to forestall
that, senior Americans try to follow a different route each day and in general
an attempt is made to vary the pattern. Most cars of senior American officials
travel with their windows closed to prevent grenades from being thrown in,
though in cars that are not air-conditioned this makes for stifling heat.

Every American headquarters is protected by a roadblock which makes it im-
possible for cars to roll up to the front door. At the roadblock every car is
meticulously searched in order to prevent a mine from blowing up the building,
as happened in the case of the Embassy a few months ago. One of the curious
results of this procedure is that while the buildings are being protected the
people become more vulnerable. If the Vietcong wanted to assassinate the

people become more anxious. If the Vietcong wanted to sasasainst the
results of this procedure is that while the buildings are being protected the
as happened in the case of the Embassy a few months ago. One of the curios
metrically described in order to prevent a mine from plowing up the building,
possible for cars to roll up to the front door. At the roadblock every car is
Every American headquarters is protected by a roadblock which makes it im-
toough in cars that are not air-conditioned this makes for attiling best.
travel with their windows closed to prevent grenades from being thrown in,
an attempt is made to vary the pattern. Most cars of senior American officials
that senior Americans try to follow a different route each day and in general
unless they have relearned the exercise many times. In order to preclude
via an attack and therefore they will never attack an installation or a person
the fact that the Vietcong are metrically planners. They don't like to impro-
people that the best protection for the security of American personnel was
quickly that nothing could be done about it. I was told by our intelligence
for every car and even if guards were available the attack would come on
the Vietcong chose to get out of the way. It is impossible to turn off guards
tristic of Salon it would be an essay matter to sasasainst any American that
head of the street leading to the Ambasador's residence. In the teaming
in the uniform of a Vietnamese soldier cut the throat of the policeman at the
cident and as happened two days before I arrived when a Vietcong dressed
atira. The seeming normalcy can be shattered at any moment by an in-
and my bedrooms are populated there is another Marine at the head of the

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individuals rather than blow up the building they have an exact location where officials are going to emerge and the officials have to emerge at a crowded point which is absolutely predictable. Still this sounds more complicated than it is. Everybody is conducting his business in an absolutely matter-of-fact fashion and I know nothing that is not being done because of the fear of terrorist attacks. I walked on the main street yesterday going from one office to the other because I wanted to get some feel of life and so do most of the other officials here. The only thing that I have noticed in myself--which may be a reflection on me--is that when I find myself alone in the middle of the traffic I get an odd feeling. I prefer to have another American with me even though it would not change the outcome of an attack and even though people walk around unarmed. What this atmosphere does to people over a period of months I am in no position to judge.

Another general observation. I have rarely, perhaps never, seen a more handsome people than the Vietnamese. The faces are delicate and they are a finely-chiseled combination of Chinese and Malayan and Polynesian. The men look handsome and extremely intelligent. The women are extraordinary. The Vietnamese national dress reveals nothing and suggests everything. Flowing robes enshroud the girl from the neck down, the posture is ramrod straight, and I have never seen so many striking women and so much of a suggestion of both dignity and sensuality. I have been told that Vietnamese women are extremely tough and that they really run their families. I have not talked to any Vietnamese women yet and therefore I am in no position to judge.

of a andage of both dainty and sensuality. I have been told that Vietnamese

ramrod straight, and I have never seen so many striking women and so much
ting. Flowing ropes enround the girl from the neck down, the boatme is

ordinary. The Vietnamese national dress reveals nothing and andbeats ever-

The men look handsome and extremely intelligent. The women are exquis-

tly are a tingly-chafed combination of Chinese and Malaysian and Polynesian.

Another general operation. I have rarely, perhaps never, seen

around married. What this atmosphere does to people over a period of

it would not change the outcome of an attack and even though people wank

reflection on me--is that when I find myself alone in the middle of the tristie

other person I wanted to get some feel of life and so do most of the other

attacks. I walked on the main street yesterday doing from one office to the

station and I know nothing that is not done because of the fear of terrorist

point which is absolutely predictable. Still this amounts more complicated than

officials are doing to emerge and the officials have to emerge at a crowded

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To continue the narrative. After breakfast I went to the military
headquarters called MACV. I received their regular military briefing last-
ing about two hours on which I took extensive notes. A few summary re-
marks may be appropriate.

The briefing was a typical--almost insulting--idiot briefing. A
group of Colonels flipped darts extremely rapidly. A very high formal
classification gives the impression that a great deal of inside information
is being dispensed when in fact all important information is being kept from
you. To give one example: I asked the officer giving the briefing on personnel
what he thought of the Vietnamese troops. The answer was that Vietnamese
troops properly led belong to the best in the world. I then asked: are they
properly led? The answer was that the Vietnamese soldier is potentially one
of the best in the world. I said, "Colonel, I am not interested in what the
Vietnamese soldier is potentially, I want to know how the Vietnamese soldier
is behaving now". I never could get a straight answer--even though I already
knew from Washington that there were serious doubts about the combat capa-
bilities of some of Vietnamese soldiers primarily because of lack of adequate
leadership and even though I knew from others that the Twenty-Fifth Infantry
Division which controls the area near Saigon is abominable by the deliberate
design of the government. The government wants a weak division near Saigon
because they are afraid a strong division might be used to overthrow it.

Another example was when during the operations briefing, a Colonel
said that the three objectives of the military program were to clear an area,

said that the three objectives of the military program were to clear an area.

Another example was when during the operations briefing, a Colonel
because they are strict a strong division might be need to overthrow it.

design of the government. The government wants a weak division near Saigon
Division which controls the area near Saigon is sparsely populated by the deliberate
leadership and even though I knew from others that the Twenty-Fifth Infantry
politics of some of Vietnam's soldiers primarily because of lack of adequate
knew from Washington that there were serious doubts about the combat capabilities
of the division now.". I never could get a straight answer--even though I seriously
believe in the Vietnam's soldiers are potentially. I want to know how the Vietnam's soldiers
of the beat in the world. I said, "Colonel, I am not interested in what the
bureaucracy? The answer was that the Vietnam's soldiers are potentially one
troops properly fed beyond the beat in the world. I then said: are they
what he thought of the Vietnam's troops. The answer was that Vietnam's
you. To give one example: I asked the officer dividing the briefing on personnel
is being disbursed when in fact all important information is being kept from
classification gives the impression that a great deal of inside information
drives of Colonia's tributed data extremely rapidly. A very high format
The briefing was a typical--almost inartistic--idiot briefing. A
marksman may be appropriate.

and about two hours on which I took extenstive notes. A few summarily re-
headquarters called Mac V. I received their regular military briefing last-
To continue the narrative. After breakfast I went to the military

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to secure an area, and then to develop government. I asked him what he meant by secure and clear. He said a defeat of Vietcong main force units. I asked what happens if the main force units don't want to fight and simply melt into the population. He said, then we have achieved our objective. I asked him whether he thought it was a consolation to a village official who was being assassinated to know that he was being assassinated by a regional Communist unit rather than by a main force unit. He said, dealing with the regional units is not our job; our job is to keep the main force units from operating. If this is true we may find ourselves on serious difficulties within a year. I simply do not believe that the Vietcong will fight the kind of war for which we are now preparing. Their whole strategy is not to defeat our military units but to make civil government impossible.

Another example: the military explained what they planned to do in Phase I of their build-up, which will be completed in December 31, and what they could do in Phase II. Phase I, in effect, creates a series of American base areas along the coast and one base area northwest of Saigon. But the area controlled is amazingly small. Phase II would be an expansion of these areas by means of offensive action. I asked whether they could do this with the existing units. The answer was no. I asked how many additional units they would require. To this I received all kinds of baffling answers, clearly designed to mislead me. I said is it a million, ten thousand, five hundred thousand? Are you telling me that you are planning an operation without knowing how many forces you need to achieve it? Well,

an operation without knowing how many forces you need to achieve it? Well, a thousand, five hundred thousand? Are you telling me that you are planning an answer, clearly designed to miao! me. I said it is a million, then tional units they would require. To this I received all kinds of patting do this with the existing units. The answer was no. I asked how many addition of these areas by means of offensive action. I asked whether they could But the area controlled is amazingly small. Phase II would be an expansion American base areas along the coast and one base area northwest of Saigon. what they could do in Phase II. Phase I, in effect, creates a series of in Phase I of their build-up, which will be completed in December 31, and Another example: the military explained what they planned to do not to defeat our military units but to make civil government impossible. the kind of war for which we are now preparing. Their whole strategy is cities within a year. I simply do not believe that the Vietcong will fight units from operating. It this is true we may find ourselves on a serious difficult with the regional units is not our job; our job is to keep the main force regional Communist unit rather than by a main force unit. He said, desiring was being saasasinated to know that he was being saasasinated by a request him whether he thought it was a conflation to a village official who melt into the population. He said, then we have achieved our objective. I I asked what happens if the main force units don't want to fight and simply meant by security and clear. He said a defeat of Vietcong main force units. to secure our areas, and then to develop government. I asked him what he

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finally the briefing Colonel said we may need one or two more divisions.

This, as I will dictate later, turned out to be absolutely untrue, because

General Westmoreland explained to me exactly what they would need.

Finally, all our present plans focus our build-up in an area north
of Saigon, which contains only about five million population. This is because
of two reasons: the major Vietcong effort had been taking place there and it
makes it technically easier for us to operate. The Delta with a population
of seven million will have no American troops after Phase I and moreover
no significant build-up of Vietnamese troops. I asked the officers whether
there was a Phase II to the Delta operation. They said no. I asked them
what made them think that the Vietnamese could handle the most heavily
populating areas by themselves. They said they did not want to get bogged
down in this heavy population. I asked them why the Vietcong would not
shift their operations into the Delta. They said that the area was not well
suited to take cover. It seems to me, however, that the war cannot be won
without a major effort in the Delta: (1) the Delta contains most of the popu-
lation and is, therefore, most suitable for the Mao dictum that the guerrillas
can swim in the population; and (2) it is almost entirely controlled by Viet-
namese forces so that a knock-out blow against the Vietnamese forces in
that area would have great effects on their morale. Altogether the military
briefing was extremely unsatisfactory and annoying.

paving was extremely mastrotactory and annoying.

that area would have great effects on their morale. Altogether the military
nameuse forces so that a knock-out blow against the Vietnamese forces in
can swim in the population; and (3) it is almost entirely controlled by Viet-
land and la' therefore, most suitable for the Mao dictum that the guerrilla
without a major effort in the Deltas: (1) the Delta contains most of the bob-
queted to take cover. It seems to me, however, that the war cannot be won
shift their operations into the Delta. They said that the area was not well
down in this heavy population. I asked them why the Vietcong would not
bubbling areas by themselves. They said they did not want to get bogged
what made them think that the Vietnamese could handle the most heavily
there was a Phase II to the Delta operation. They said no. I asked them
no significant build-up of Vietnamese troops. I asked the officers whether
of seven million will have no American troops after Phase I and moreover
makes it technically easier for na to operate. The Delta with a population
of two reasons: the major Vietcong effort had been taking place there and it
of Saigon, which contains only about five million population. This is because


Finally, all our present plans focus on our build-up in an area north

General Westmoreland explained to me exactly what they would need.
This, as I will dictate later, turned out to be absolutely untruly, because
finally the briefing Colonel said we may need one or two more divisional.

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From the military headquarters I went to the residence of the Am-
bassador, where there was a lunch in honor of Ambassador Vu Van Thai,
the Ambassador-designate to the United States, who was leaving the next
day for Washington. Present were the foreign minister, Tran Van Do, the
minister for social and cultural affairs, the minister of education, the per-
manent head of the Vietnamese foreign office, a number of Embassy people,
the Italian Ambassador, and the Canadian ICC Commissioner. I sat between
Ambassador Porter, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and Mr. Tran Ngoc Ninh,
who has the title of Commissioner General for Social and Cultural Affairs--
one of the superministers charged with supervising several ministries.

I first talked for a bit to Ambassador Porter. Porter had served
in Syria, Cyprus, Jerusalem and his latest post had been as Ambassador to
Algiers. He is tall, somewhat mid-Western looking--even though his home
is in Massachusetts. He is a fairly typical foreign service officer--calm,
steady, anonymous. He began to explain at great length why he thought that
this was not a war of national liberation on the model of the Algerian-
Syrian and Moroccan revolution. He thought the Vietcong had no popular
support whatever and that they operated entirely on the basis of terrorism.
He was of the view that if we could reinvigorate the Chu Hoi program, a
program designed to encourage defections, by means of technical devices
such as putting radios on airplanes to fly over VC controlled areas, we would
break the back of the Vietcong resistance. He insisted that he would never have
accepted the assignment if he had thought the VC were indigenous.

accepted the assignment if he had thought the AC were indigenous.

break the pack of the Vietcong resistance. Heulated that he would never have
anchored his butting radios on airplanes to fly over AC controlled areas, we would
programmed designed to encourage detections, by means of technical devices
He was of the view that if we could reinvigorate the Cim Hol program, a
aidport whatever and that they operated entirely on the psals of terrorism.
Syrian and Moroccan revolution. He thought the Vietcong had no better
this was not war of national liberation on the model of the Afghan-
atesby, anonymously. He began to explain at great length why he thought that
is in Maasaiuana. He is a fairly typical foreign service officer--calm,
Aldera. He is tall, somewhat mid-Western looking--even though his home
in Syri's, Cyprus, Jerusalem and his latest boat had been in Ambassa dor to
I first talked for a bit to Ambassa dor Porter. Porter had served

one of the amministers charged with supervising several ministries.

Ambassa dor Porter, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and Mr. Tran Quoc Ninh, the Italian Ambassa dor, and the Canadian ICC Commissioner. I sat between

minister for social and cultural affairs, the minister of education, the ber-
day for Washington. Present were the foreign minister, Tran Van Do, the

the Ambassa dor--designate to the United States, who was leaving the next

paasa dor, where there was a lunch in honor of Ambassa dor Van Van Tusi,

moment head of the Vietnamese foreign office, a number of Ambassad people,

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I then talked to Ninh, the Commissioner General for Social and Cultural Affairs. Like most educated Vietnamese, he has a superbly intelligent and expressive face. We discussed the problems of education in Vietnam. He said that one of the grave difficulties was to keep people in school due to the insecurity created by the civil war. Another unprecedented aspect of the education system was that there are many areas of the country where the only way to keep schools open was with VC presence and where, in fact, the children of Vietcong were going to government schools to study. I asked him what it required to keep schools open in Vietcong controlled territory. He said that the government gave 500 piastres a month to teachers, who then turned this money over to the Vietcong. I asked him what happened if the teachers did not turn over the money. He said in that case they would certainly get their heads cut off. I asked him whether in addition to turning over the money the teachers might have to adopt Vietcong indoctrination. Ninh said that in the official reports to the government there was no indication of this but that it would be reasonable to assume that the Vietcong were able to prescribe, if not the curriculum, at least the ideological aspect of it. He declined to give me a figure of the amount of money going into Vietcong hands in this manner. He also refused to estimate what percentage of schools were in these affected areas. He suggested that I might come and see him alone in his office where we could have a fuller talk about this problem. Ninh said that the educational problems were massive at each level.

could have a fuller talk about this problem. Ninh said that the educational
He argued that I might come and see him alone in his office where we
used to estimate what percentage of schools were in these affected areas,
amount of money going into Vietcong hands in this manner. He also re-


at least the ideological aspect of it. He declined to give me a figure of the
to assume that the Vietcong were able to prescribe, if not the curriculum,
dovernment there was no indication of this put that it would be reasonable
adopt Vietcong indoctrination. Ninh said that in the official reports to the
whether in addition to turning over the money the teachers might have to
said in that case they would certainly get their heads cut off. I asked him
saked him what happened if the teachers did not turn over the money. He
a month to teachers, who then turned this money over to the Vietcong. I
Vietcong controlled territory. He said that the government gave 600 biographies
to study. I asked him what it required to keep schools open in
reence and where, in fact, the children of Vietcong were going to government
of the country where the only way to keep schools open was with AC con-cm-
precedented aspect of the education system was that there are many areas
in school due to the insecurity created by the civil war. Another nu-
in Vietnam. He said that one of the great difficulties was to keep people
intelligent and expressive face. We discussed the problems of education
Cultural Affairs. Like most educated Vietnamese, he has a amberly

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One of the most difficult problems in Vietnam was to develop a sense of national identity. The Vietnamese had a strong sense of peoplehood, but they did not have an adequate sense of nationhood. This was particularly true in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had always had a national tradition. They thought in terms of country and society. The South Vietnamese, by contrast, were pioneers. South Vietnam had been conquered from the Khmers only a century and a half ago and the Vietnamese who had settled there were primarily farmers with little national consciousness. He, therefore, thought that one of the biggest problems they faced was to develop adult education in South Vietnam, with three objectives: (1) to develop civic consciousness; (2) to upgrade technical skills; and (3) to reinvigorate national tradition. I asked him how one could reinvigorate national traditions when he had just told me there was no sense of nationhood. Ninh replied that the influence of the French on Vietnam had been absolutely pernicious. All the traditional patterns had been destroyed. Vietnam had been divided into different administrative regions whose rivalry was being encouraged. A French educational system was substituted for the traditional Vietnamese system. In all of French Indo-China there were only 200 university students and they were trained to staff the French governmental administration. In another few generations there would have been no Vietnamese identity at all. It was extremely difficult to create a society when it has no consciousness of identity. He therefore thought that Vietnam ought to go back to the best

identity. He therefore thought that Vietnam ought to do back to the beat
extremely difficult to create a society when it has no connoisseur of
generations there would have been no Vietnamese identity at all. It was
trained to staff the French governmental administration. In another few
French Indo-China there were only 300 university students and they were
ayatem was appointed for the traditional Vietnamese aystem. In all of
regions whose rivalry was being encountered. A French educational
been destroyed. Vietnam had been divided into different administrative
Vietnam had been sparsely benighted. VII the traditional patterns had
no sense of nationhood. Mind replied that the influence of the French on
could reinvigorate national traditions when he had that told me there was
arts; and (3) to reinvigorate national tradition. I asked him how one
objectives: (1) to develop civic connoisseuræ; (3) to improve technical
they faced was to develop adult education in South Vietnam, with three
connoisseuræ. He, therefore, thought that one of the biggest problems
nameæ who had settled there were primarily farmers with little national
condensed from the Kumeræ only a century and a half ago and the Viet-
South Vietnamese, by contrast, were pioneers. South Vietnam had been
a national tradition. They thought in terms of country and society. The
particularly true in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had already had
hood, but they did not have an adequate sense of nationhood. This was
sense of national identity. The Vietnamese had a strong sense of people-
One of the most difficult problems in Vietnam was to develop a

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elements of its old traditions. This would also solve one of the problems of governmental structure because it could be a means of democratic education.

I said that I had heard it argued that democracy in pure form was not applicable to countries in an early stage of development. Ninh said that it depended what one meant by democracy. Vietnam throughout its history had a system of democratic election on the local level and the village chiefs had always been democratically re-elected. Secondly, there had been a tradition of referenda when there were Vietnamese emperors. I asked him how they could have a referendum when people did not know how to write and it turned out that what he meant by a referendum was a council of elders assembled at Hue, the Imperial Capital. He thought that at this stage some adaptation of that was the only possible form of democracy in Vietnam.

I asked how civic consciousness could be developed. Specifically, I wondered why people were obeying the government. Was it because they believed in a South Vietnamese government? Did they have an particular confidence in this government to which he belonged? What was the existing legitimacy?

With respect to the first question of whether nationalism applied to South Vietnam or to all of Vietnam, Ninh replied that this depended somewhat to whom one spoke. He was a North Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese have a sense of nationhood and felt deprived unless Vietnam was

namease have a sense of nationhood and felt deprived unless Vietnam was
what to whom one aboke. He was a North Vietnamese and the North Viet-
South Vietnam or to all of Vietnam. Minh replied that this depended some-
with respect to the first question of whether nationalism applied to
leditocracy?

confidence in this government to which he belonged? What was the existing
believed in a South Vietnamese government? Did they have an particular
I wondered why people were obeying the government. Was it because they
I asked how civic consonancease could be developed? Specifically,
Vietnam.

atade some adaptation of that was the only possible form of democracy in
of elders as exemplified at Hue, the Imperial Capital. He thought that at this
to write and it turned out that what he meant by a referendum was a comlicit
saked him how they could have a referendum when people did not know how
been a tradition of referends when there were Vietnamese emperors. I
chients had always been democratically re-elected. Secondly, there had
had a system of democratic election on the local level and the village
it depended what one meant by democracy. Vietnam throughout its history
not applicable to countries in an early stage of development. Minh said that
I said that I had heard it argued that democracy in pure form was
tion.

of governmental structure because it could be a means of democratic equc-
elements of its old traditions. This would also solve one of the problems

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unified. The South Vietnamese, as long as they were undisturbed on their land had a more permissive attitude though they were generally hostile toward foreigners and especially toward Chinese. As for the legitimacy of this government, he said he had to be frank. People obeyed it because it existed. The Vietnamese people had always been used to a strong government. And any strong government would be obeyed without any particular questioning of its legitimacy. It was a mistaken Western notion to believe that the Vietnamese peasants inquired into the origin of government.

We had moved into the sitting room from the dining room at this point. We had to interrupt our conversation because Lodge, who was sitting on a sofa at the other end of the room talking to the Italian Ambassador and the Vietnamese foreign minister, had fallen asleep. Therefore, the lunch broke up and Lodge went to bed and I went off on my next briefing.

My next meeting was with Charlie Mann, the head of the United States Aid Mission (USAM), which is located in a building much larger, more elaborate and luxurious than the Embassy. Mann had previously been in charge of economic aid in Laos. We spent most of our time getting a run-down on the operation of his agency, on which I took fairly full notes and which I will, therefore, not repeat here.

Mann is German born, very lively, extremely intelligent with a dry sense of humor. I was very impressed with the scope of his operation and with his imaginativeness. He feels that some of the military reporting is absurdly formalistic. For example, he knows of towns which

porting is spandrelly formolstic. For example, he knows of towns which
and with his insquintivenessa. He feels that some of the military re-
ally sense of humor. I was very impressed with the scope of his oper-
Mann is German born, very lively, extremely intelligent with a
and which I will, therefore, not repeat here.

a run-down on the operation of his agency, on which I took fairly full notes
been in charge of economic aid in Laos. We spent most of our time detting
more elaborate and luxurious than the Embassy. Mann had previously
States Aid Muaalon (USAID), which is located in a building much larger,
My next meeting was with Charlie Mann, the head of the United
inch probe up and Lodge went to bed and I went off on my next briefing,
and the Vietnamese foreign minister, had fallen asleep. Therefore, the
ting on a sheet at the other end of the room talking to the Italian Ambassador
We had to interrupt our conversation because Lodge, who was at-
point. We had to interrupt our conversation because Lodge, who was at-
that the Vietnameseesssntified into the origin of government,
directioning of its ledditrmacy. It was a most striking Western notion to believe
ment. And any strong government would be obeyed without any particular
existed. The Vietnamese people had always been used to a strong govern-
this government, he said he had to be frank. People obeyed it because it
and foreigners and especially toward Chinese. As for the ledditrmacy of
island had a more permissive attitude though they were generally hostile to-
mitted. The South Vietnamese, so long as they were undisturbed on their

We had moved into the sitting room from the dining room at this
that the Vietnameseesssntified into the origin of government,
directioning of its ledditrmacy. It was a most striking Western notion to believe
ment. And any strong government would be obeyed without any particular
existed. The Vietnamese people had always been used to a strong govern-
this government, he said he had to be frank. People obeyed it because it
and foreigners and especially toward Chinese. As for the ledditrmacy of
island had a more permissive attitude though they were generally hostile to-
mitted. The South Vietnamese, so long as they were undisturbed on their

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are technically reported pacified where half a mile down the road the village school has its roof torn off; the villagers have repaired it twice and the Vietcong have bombed it both times. The Vietcong have now warned the village that if they try to put a roof on the school again they would kill the people responsible for it. No roof has been put on the village school. Yet this village is reported as pacified.

Mann also told me that he had each of his regional chiefs write a report at the beginning of his term in office explaining all the difficulties and problems of this area. He would make these reports available to me.

After spending an hour with Mann I went to the office of Barry Zorthian, the head of the United States Information Service, which has, however, a somewhat more elaborate name here and which is in charge of all press relations and of all psychological warfare operations in the country. I knew Zorthian from India where he had to spend three weeks disavowing me. He is an Armenian so that this mission is distinguished by having two Armenians as principal political officers--Habib being the other one. The two cordially compete with each other but they are both extremely lively and intelligent.

Zorthian's briefing was contained in a little booklet which he gave me and, therefore, I do not need to repeat it here. He made one point, however, which struck me as important. He said that the United States was overwhelming the Vietnamese government with advice. Every Vietnamese office was being swamped with experts. The Vietnamese would

nameless office was being assumed with experts. The Vietnamese would
be overwhelming the Vietnamese government with advice. Every Viet-
however, which struck me as important. He said that the United States
me and 'therefore' I do not need to repeat it here. He made one point,
Zorthimsa briefing was contained in a little booklet which he gave
livey and intelligent.

one. The two cordially compete with each other but they are both extremely
having two Armenians as principal political officers--Hsip being the other
showing me. He is an Armenian so that this mission is distinguished by
try. I knew Zorthimsa from India where he had to abend three weeks dis-
all press relations and of all psychological warfare operations in the com-
however, a somewhat more elaborate name here and which is in charge of
Zorthimsa, the head of the United States Information Service, which has,
After abending an hour with Mann I went to the office of Barry
and problems of this area. He would make these reports available to me.
report at the beginning of his term in office explaining all the difficulties
Mann said told me that he had each of his regional chiefs write a
this village is reported as scatified.

people reasonable for it. No root has been found on the village school. Yet
village that if they try to put a root on the school again they would kill the
Vietnamese have pounced it both times. The Vietcong have now warned the
school has its root torn out; the villagers have repaired it twice and the
are technically reported scatified where half a mile down the road the village

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simply not be able to bear the load that we were putting on them indefinitely. I asked him whether there was any prospect of cutting this down. He said, no, that the normal tendency of Washington was to increase it--that he had to plead guilty himself because it was always easier to have an American in charge than a Vietnamese.

From Zorthian's office I went back to MacV to see General Westmoreland, who had not been present at the briefing in the morning. I spent about two hours with Westmoreland. He is a tall, gray-haired, very impressive man. He asked what I thought of the briefing in the morning. I said that it had been extremely cautious. He asked me what I meant and I said that it gave me a reasonable overall view but that it avoided all the difficult questions and that it was very hard to judge just what our military purposes were. Westmoreland then gave me a full exposition of his military planning--and it was much less optimistic than what I had received in the morning.

Our present build-up will give us a series of enclaves called base areas along the coast which are in ellipse shape but which are not connected. They will contain about thirty percent of the population. There is one base area northeast of Saigon in the area between the VC war zones C and D. These enclaves would be able to protect the American air operation--that is, the landing strips and the supply depots--and they would permit some aggressive patrolling outside of the perimeter. They would not, however, permit an aggressive pacification program and major areas of the country would have to remain conceded to the VC. His concept of operations would be to go from

to remain conceded to the AC. His concept of operations would be to do from
adhesive facilitation prodrum and major areas of the country would have
patrolling outside of the perimeter. They would not, however, permit an
island landing ariba and the asubly debota--and they would permit some adhesive
enclaves would be able to protect the American air operation--that is, the
northeast of Saipon in the area between the AC was zones C and D. These
will contain about thirty percent of the population. There is one paae area
sland the coast which are in ellipte area but which are not connected. They
Our present build-up will give us a series of enclaves called paae areas
and it was much less optimistic than what I had received in the morning.
were. Weatmoreland then gave me a full exposition of his military bisning--
directions and that it was very hard to judge that what our military purposes
that it gave me a reasonable overall view but that it avoided all the difficult
that it had been extremely cautious. He asked me what I meant and I asked
bresative man. He asked what I thought of the briefing in the morning. I asked
about two hours with Weatmoreland. He is a tall, gray-haired, very im-
moreland, who had not been present at the briefing in the morning. I absent
From Zorathan's office I went back to MAC V to see General Weat-
charge than a Vliemseaae.
to bidd duly himself because it was always easier to have an American in
no, that the normal tendency of Washington was to increase it--that he had
I asked him whether there was any prospect of cutting this down. He said,
simply not be able to bear the load that we were putting on them indefinitely.

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Phase I, in which we will have about 201,000 Americans and about 22,000 foreign troops, to a Phase II, in which with greatly enlarged forces we would conduct sustained offensive operations. He argued that additional troops would have the great advantage of being usable almost entirely for offensive operations, since the troops necessary for the defense of the base areas would come out of Phase I troops. His concept of operations was to attack the base areas which had been used by the Vietcong for retraining, refitting and re-supply. For this purpose he had moved the 1st Calvary Division between war zone C and war zone D in order to bring pressures on both war zones.
In addition, he planned to attack other base areas scattered across the country. He planned to soften up these base areas through constant B-52 attacks and then to penetrate them with military units. Either the VC would have to stand to fight to defend them or they would lose their major sources of supply and be pushed back toward Cambodian and Laotian frontiers. If he received additional units he could also shake the hold the VC had on some areas around Saigon, especially two provinces of Long Ahm and the other one whose name I do not recall now which I am going to visit, and where in effect the government was holding only the provincial capital and perhaps a perimeter of 500 yards around the capital. I asked Westmoreland how many additional units he would require. He said he needed about 400,000 troops altogether. I asked him what he would be able to do if he did not receive additional troops.
He said that in that case he would be able to bring 50% of the population under effective control in eighteen months with substantial areas of the country

effective control in eighteen months with substantial areas of the country
He said that in that case he would be able to print 50% of the population under
saked him what he would be able to do if he did not receive additional troops.
he would require. He said he needed about 400,000 troops altogether. I
areas around the capital. I asked Westmoreland how many additional units
ment was holding only the provincial capital and perhaps a perimeter of 500
I do not recall now which I am going to ask, and where in effect the govern-
Saldon, especially two provinces of Lond Amu and the other one whose name
additional units he could also arise the hold the VC had on some areas around
and be brushed back toward Cambodian and Laoisian frontiers. If he received
and to fight to defend them or they would lose their major sources of supply
and then to penetrate them with military units. Either the VC would have to
try. He planned to soften these base areas through constant B-82 attacks
In addition, he planned to attack other base areas scattered across the com-
msr zone C and msr zone D in order to print breaches on both msr zones.
and supply. For this purpose he had moved the 1st Cavalry Division between
areas which had been used by the Vietcong for retraining, refitting and re-
come out of Phase I troops. His concept of operations was to attack the base
operations, since the troops necessary for the defense of the base areas would
would have the great advantage of being napal almost entirely for offensive
conduct at attained offensive operations. He argued that additional troops
to foreign troops, to a Phase II, in which with presently enlarged forces we would
Phase I, in which we will have about 500,000 Americans and about 50,000

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being subjected only to occasional American and Vietnamese government control. Thus a kind of stalemate might develop. With 400,000 men he would be able to bring 80% of the country under government control within eighteen months, with the possibility then of withdrawing units another six months later. The advantage of the Phase II build-up would be that it would maintain the psychological momentum, permit much more aggressive operations, and prevent the Vietcong from getting used to the American method of operation.

I asked Westmoreland whether his military problem would be changed significantly if organized units of the North Vietnamese army appeared. He said he did not think so because our bombing would make supply extremely difficult and because he could always pull units out of pacification missions to defense missions. Westmoreland told me that he would give me a letter of introduction to all the military advisers in order to prevent a re-occurrence of the kind of briefing I received in the morning. He also said that he would take me on one inspection trip with him and he invited me for dinner with the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Vietnamese Army for Tuesday evening.

Westmoreland's definition of security was the same as that of his staff--that is, defeat of the Vietcong main force units or the inability by the Vietcong to operate in battalion size units or larger. He did not think that his force was really relevant to dealing with company sized units and he thought that this is a problem which should be left largely to the popular

thought that this is a problem which should be left largely to the popular
his force was really relevant to dealing with company sized units and he
Vietcong to operate in battalion size units or larger. He did not think that
at all--that is, defeat of the Vietcong main force units or the inability by the
Meastmoreland's definition of security was the same as that of his
the Vietnamese Army for Trenchy evening.

invited me for dinner with the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of
He also said that he would take me on one inspection trip with him and he
to prevent a re-occurrence of the kind of briefing I received in the morning.
would give me a letter of introduction to all the military advisers in order
basification missions to defense missions. Meastmoreland told me that he
anably extremely difficult and because he could always pull units out of
abashed. He said he did not think so because our pumping would make
changed significantly it organized units of the North Vietnamese army
I asked Meastmoreland whether his military problem would be
operation.

maintain the psychological momentum, permit much more addressive obers-
months later. The advantage of the Phase II build-up would be that it would
eighteen months, with the possibility then of withdrawing units another six
would be able to bring 80% of the country under government control within
control. Type a kind of atTEMPT might develop. With 400,000 men he
being subjected only to occasional American and Vietnamese government

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forces that he hoped the Vietnamese would be building up. I asked him why we were not building up forces in the Delta and he thought that this was not an area suitable for large scale operations even though it was one of the chief recruiting grounds of the Vietcong. However, if he did get the Phase II units that he had asked for he would station at least one reinforced regiment and probably a division in the Delta.

Sometimes the naivety of senior Americans is so surprising that one assumes that they are putting it on. Thus, when I was talking to General Westmoreland he said that there was an enormous difference between the French and the Americans because the French had been looked at as colonialists while the Americans were being treated everywhere with great friendliness. The American soldier was extremely popular in Vietnam as was proved by the friendly greetings he received wherever he went. I asked him to what he ascribed this difference in attitude. He showed me nine rules which he had written down for his soldiers which are quite sensible. Then he said that the basic difference perhaps is this: when the French wanted a woman they simply grabbed her off the streets and went to bed with her. When an American soldier wants a woman he pays for her. I thought at first he was kidding, but I then found out that he was absolutely serious.

When I returned to the Embassy, Lodge was sitting there listening to stereo music and asked me to have a drink with him. Having been going for eleven hours I would just as soon have avoided it. He asked me what I thought of the Westmoreland discussion. I told him that I had found it much

thought of the Westmoresland discussion. I told him that I had found it much
for eleven hours I would just as soon have avoided it. He asked me what I
to stereo music and asked me to have a drink with him. Having been doing
When I returned to the Embassy, Lodge was sitting there listening
but I then found out that he was absolutely serious.

can soldier wants a woman he pays for her. I thought at that he was kidding,
simply drugged her off the streets and went to bed with her. When an Ameri-
tie the basic difference perhaps is this: when the French wanted a woman they
had written down for his soldiers which are quite sensible. Then he said that
he described this difference in attitude. He showed me nine rules which he
by the friendly greetings he received wherever he went. I asked him to what
neas. The American soldier was extremely popular in Vietnam as was proved
lata while the Americans were being treated everywhere with great friendli-
French and the Americans became the French had been looked at as colonis-
Weatmoreland he said that there was an enormous difference between the
saannmea that they are putting it on. Tima', when I was talking to General
Sometimes the naivety of senior Americans is so surprising that one
and probably a division in the Delta's.

II units that he had asked for he would station at least one reinforced regiment
chief recruiting dromas of the Vietcong. However, if he did get the Pusae
an areas suitable for large scale operations even though it was one of the
we were not building up forces in the Delta and he thought that this was not
forces that he hoped the Vietnammee would be building up. I asked him why

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more useful than the briefing. I asked him what he thought of the Phase II
build-up. He said he hoped we could avoid it and that we could pacify some
areas by non-military means relying particularly on methods being develop-
ed by General Lansdale. He mentioned particularly the province of Long
Ahm just south of Saigon.

I had dinner at the house of Barry Zorthian. He had invited two
members of the American Embassy staff, the publisher of the *Saigon Post*,
the head of the Vietnam press--which is the official news agency, the Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's office--Buy Diem, a Colonel--who was a
personal aide to the Prime Minister, and two local businessmen and a Buddhist.
I talked mostly to Buy Diem, who told me his personal history. He had been
a student of mathematics at Hanoi University during the occupation of the
Japanese and he had been drawn into nationalistic activity. Earlier he had
fallen out with the Communists though he never could explain to me to what
about the Communists he objected so violently. He had then moved to China
and from China had gone to South Vietnam. He had opposed the regime because he thought it backward and he had supported himself by being a private
tutor. His explanation of his motivations throughout was extremely unclear.
I asked him what the motivation of the Vietcong was. He said that Communists
were always out for power. At this point the Colonel in the Prime Minister's
office interrupted to say that he thought the Communists were trying to
reduce the distinction between rich and poor which was still such a prevalent
feature of Vietnamese life. In Vietnam when an automobile collided with a

feature of Vietnamese life. In Vietnam when an automobile collided with a
reduce the distinction between rich and poor which was still enough a prevalent
office interrupted to ask that he thought the Communists were trying to
were always out for power. At this point the Colonel in the Prime Minister's a
I asked him what the motivation of the Vietcong was. He said that Communists
tutor. His explanation of his motivations throughout was extremely unclear.
came he thought it backward and he had supported himself by being a private
and from China had done to South Vietnam. He had opposed the regime because
the Communists he objected so violently. He had then moved to China
stayed out with the Communists though he never could explain to me to what
Jروسne and he had been drawn into nationalistic activity. Earlier he had
a student of mathematics at Hanoi University during the occupation of the
I talked mostly to Buu Diem, who told me his personal history. He had been
personal side to the Prime Minister, and two local politicians and a Buddhist.
tary of State in the Prime Minister's office--Buu Diem, a Colonel--who was a
the head of the Vietnam press--which is the official news agency, the Secret-
members of the American Embassy at Hanoi, the publisher of the *Safon Boat*.

I had dinner at the house of Barry Zorthian. He had invited two
Yum that south of Safon.

ed by General Lansdale. He mentioned particularly the province of Loud
area by non-military means relying particularly on methods being develop-
mental up. He said he hoped we could avoid it and that we could possibly some
more reason than the briefing. I asked him what he thought of the Pusae II

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bicycle the bicycle was automatically assumed to be wrong. This was not
social justice and it would have to be changed. Buy Diem said, yes, this was
absolutely correct. It was essential to build up social justice in the country
and that if the existing government in which he, after all, was a key member
failed at this task it could not possibly survive from the Communists and they
would win. I asked them whether they could describe to me what a desirable
society would be five years from now. All they could repeat was a society
with social justice. Buy Diem then said that the United States should learn
that there was no such thing as aid without strings and that it should insist on
an end to corruption in Vietnam. I asked him how we might do that. He said
that we should threaten to withhold aid unless corruption were ended and that
one good way of doing it would be to identify corrupt officials and demand that
they be fired. I said that if we did this there was another danger of an
extremely nationalistic reaction. He said the Vietnamese were extremely
nationalistic anyway and everything depended on how we did it. I asked what
he meant and he said that recently a corrupt official had been discovered in a
province to the North of Saigon. The United States AID official who discovered
this had immediately leaked the story to the press. He thought it was no
doubt a deliberate decision by the Ambassador. Zorthian, the public affairs
officer, assured him that it was not deliberate. I asked Buy Diem whether he
was trying to tell me that the Vietnamese were not able to handle corruption
unless Americans identified it and eliminated it for them and whether this was
not a confession of certain difficulties within their government. He said yes

not a contestation of certain difficulties within their government. He said yes
whether Americans identified it and eliminated it for them and whether this was
was trying to tell me that the Vietnamese were not able to handle corruption
officer, assured him that it was not deliberate. I asked Buu Diem whether he
did not immediately leashed the story to the press. He thought it was no
province to the North of Saigon. The United States AID official who discovered
he meant and he said that recently a corrupt official had been discovered in a
nationslatic anyway and everything depended on how we did it. I asked what
extremely nationslatic reaction. He said the Vietnamese were extremely
they be fired. I said that if we did this there was another danger of an
one good way of doing it would be to identify corrupt officials and demand that
that we should threaten to withhold aid unless corruption were ended and that
an end to corruption in Vietnam. I asked him how we might do that. He said
that there was no such thing as aid without strings and that it should in fact on
with socialist states. Buu Diem then said that the United States should learn
society would be five years from now. All they could repeat was a society
would win. I asked them whether they could describe to me what a desirable
failed at this task it could not possibly survive from the Communists and they
and that if the existing government in which he, after all, was a key member
spasolutely correct. It was essential to build up socialist justice in the country
social justice and it would have to be changed. Buu Diem said, yes, this was
paddle the paddle was automatically assumed to be wrong. This was not

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he wanted the Americans to eliminate it because we had now assumed re-
sponsibility anyway.

Zorthian then turned to the Buddhist present and asked him to express
his views on the subjects under discussion. But the Buddhist, while indicating
strong disapproval of everything that had been said, refused to state his own
views. As we were getting up from the table the Buddhist came up to me and
said that he was very eager to talk to me alone and that he didn't want to waste
his time arguing with the governmental officials. However, he wanted to say
that he wanted a society based on the principles of the Buddhists. I told him
that I had read a book on Buddhist philosophy on my way to Vietnam and that I
did not know how to apply these principles concretely to political situations.
He smiled and said that this was indeed a difficulty which he would be glad to
discuss with me. Buy Diem came up and said he would see me for lunch with
the Prime Minister on Tuesday when the Ambassador and I are flying up to
Dalat, the resort town in the mountains, and also that he wanted to have a
private talk with me before I left.

The rest of the evening was spent in small talk, with the Vietnamese
businessman present of which the only significant aspect was the almost
obsessive hatred expressed for the Chinese whom they accused of controlling
the rice supply in Saigon and of deliberately forcing up rice prices. Zorthian
said that it was difficult to have a minority of a million in a country which did
not serve in the Army. The Vietnamese said they would rather lose the war
than win it with the aid of the resident Chinese. I asked him whether the

than win it with the aid of the resident Chinese. I asked him whether the
not serve in the Army. The Vietnamese said they would rather lose the war
said that it was difficult to have a minority of a million in a country which did
the rice supply in Saigon and of deliberately forcing up rice prices. Zorathan
oppressive hatred expressed for the Chinese whom they accused of controlling
pioneers present of which the only significant aspect was the almost

The rest of the evening was spent in small talk, with the Vietnamese
private talk with me before I left.

Os East, the resort town in the mountains, and also that he wanted to have a
the Prime Minister on Tuesday when the Ampsaasador and I are flying up to
diaconas with me. Buy Diem came up and said he would see me for lunch with
He asked and said that this was indeed a difficulty which he would be glad to
did not know how to supply these principles concretely to political situations.
that I had read a book on Buddhist philosophy on my way to Vietnam and that I
that he wanted a society based on the principles of the Buddhist. I told him
his time spending with the governmental officials. However, he wanted to say
said that he was very eager to talk to me alone and that he didn't want to waste
view. As we were getting up from the table the Buddhist came up to me and
strong disapproval of everything that had been said, refused to state his own
his views on the subjects under discussion. But the Buddhist, while indicating
Zorathan then turned to the Buddhist present and asked him to express
abonality and so on.

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North Vietnamese felt the same way and they said they were certain that the North Vietnamese would not want Chinese help since the Chinese were the most hated people in South Vietnam.

North Vietnamese would not want Chinese help since the Chinese were the
North Vietnamese felt the same way and they said they were certain that the

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

October 17th

The day started with Lodge. Lodge told me that after our conversation yesterday he decided that he would get the Mission working on the problem of negotiation. It seemed to him that it would be wise to have a Saigon position in Washington before things got too far down the road. He thought this would be better than taking a trip personally to Washington. He asked me to work with a group in the Mission that is going to produce the paper and I agreed.

The conversation then turned to politics. We spoke about the Republican Convention. I said, never having been at a Convention, I did not know whether my reaction was excessive but I had left with an extremely sour taste. Lodge said having been at several conventions he had left with an equally sour taste and equal forboding about the Republican party. I asked him how he explained the behavior of Eisenhower at the Convention. Lodge said that soldiers are terribly impressed by rich men. By the time they get into a position such as the one Eisenhower had they were no longer intrigued by military life and, in any case, they know what makes this tick. But making money is something they have never known and since most of them have been poor throughout their careers they think that it takes unusual ability to make money. The truth of the matter is that making money is just a knack and says nothing about intelligence. Be that as it may, Eisenhower had been taken in by George Humphrey who is a very able and a very devious man. He had been made to believe that he could stand above the conflict and emerge as a peacemaker. Eisenhower had not realized that to be a peacemaker you have to have some strength. I said

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that Eisenhower after all now was a rich man himself so that he should not be
that impressed by other rich people. Lodge said let's face it, he is a rich
man because these other people have put him on to a lot of good things. This'
put him excessively under their influence.

He then ruminated about what might have happened in 1964. He said he
had had no intention of running and he had been put into the race by his son
and by Grindell and he had been amazed by his success in New Hampshire. He
had asked himself many times since then whether he could have done anything
differently and he came to the conclusion that he was in a very tough spot.
He had just taken the job in Saigon. He had a major responsibility in the
change of government in Saigon and he could not simply leave within three
months of that. Moreover he had no real stomach for fighting Rockefeller.
He believed in the same thing as Rockefeller. I asked him, why, if this was
so he didn't get out of the race in New Hampshire and urge his supporters to
support Rockefeller. He said that this might have seemed presumptuous because
he did not really think that he would get many votes. Also he was convinced
that Rockefeller could never get the Republican nomination. Only a rich man
like Rockefeller could have believed that he could have both his love life and
the Presidential nomination in the same year. Rockefeller had taken many people
down the road with him. I told him that I thought Rockefeller's experience had
been tragic and that he had still a contribution to make if somebody would
show some confidence in him.

Lodge then asked me what I thought of the Diem overthrow. I told him
that I thought many of the current difficulties stemmed from that period. He
said that he thought that there existed no alternative because Nhu had lost his