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ANNOUNCER: Today for all of our guests in Europe and participants in Rome, London, Paris, Hamburg, and Helsinki, Worldnet presents a discussion on American foreign policy and United States-Soviet relations.

Now from our studios in Washington, D.C., here is your moderator, Paul Duke.

MR. DUKE: We are pleased to have with us today, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger who is joining us from New York City. Welcome to Worldnet, sir.

DR. KISSINGER: Thank you; glad to be here.

MR. DUKE: I would like now to go immediately to our participating countries for their opening questions. I would like to remind everyone to please identify yourselves and your organization. We will begin with Rome.

Go ahead, first question, please, Rome.

QUESTION: (inaudible), Italian Television, Channel One.

Mr. Kissinger, do you think that the Iran-contra connection in some ways reminds us of the Watergate affair?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I think the Iran-contra connection is a totally different issue. Watergate was a series of events related to American domestic politics in which the perpetrators were trying to gain some benefit for one political party.

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The Iran-contra connection was an attempt to carry out the understanding of those who did it of what was in the best interests of the United States. It was a foreign policy decision. That, too, has two different parts. The sale of arms to Iran may have been a mistake as I believe it was, but it was an exercise of a foreign policy prerogative. The diversion of funds was against the spirit of the law at the minimum, and that is a different matter.

But at any rate, I do not think that there is a connection or a similarity between the Watergate affair and the Iran-contra affair.

QUESTION: How do you think that President Reagan will come out of this affair?

DR. KISSINGER: I think if there are no further revelations, I believe that President Reagan will recover during the course of the spring, during the course of the winter and the spring. He will focus the country on new foreign policy initiatives. Those will take the place in the national debate of the investigation of what has already happened, which, of course, must be investigated. I believe that in 1987 we will see significant progress in American foreign policy despite these immediate difficulties.

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MR. DUKE: All right; stand by Rome. We will not go to London for a question from that post. Go ahead, please, London.

MR. PICK: This is Hella Pick of the Guardian.

Dr. Kissinger, you went to Moscow with President Nixon in '74. In the light of the Irangate now, how do you see Mr. Gorbachev, the present leadership, reacting? How do you see the Soviets position on arms control in the light, both at Reykjavik and now the Irangate?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, in 1974, when President Nixon went to Moscow, he was within a month of resignation -- or a little more than a month of resignation -- and it was clear that he was in difficulties that probably could not be remedied. I don't believe that President Reagan is in anything like these difficulties.

Secondly, throughout the Watergate affair, the Soviets did not actually try to take advantage of the discomfiture of the President. The pressure started later, about a year and a half later as a result of a variety of other things, including the general weakening of the executive authority.

I have believed all along that Gorbachev would try to make an agreement with President Reagan, obviously during the incumbency of President Reagan. To wait two years is really

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to wait for four to six years. The new president always
takes twelve to eighteen months to get organized before he
can begin to negotiate seriously. By that time, so many
other things may have happened that I do not believe that the
Soviets will wait for that. I expect some new Soviet
approaches early in the new year, and I believe progress will
be made in the arms control negotiations.

QUESTION: Do you think that the administration is now
in a position to respond to anything that comes from Moscow,
or do you think that there now a power vacuum, particularly
in the light of President Reagan's operation?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think it would be idle to deny
that the situation in Washington right now is one of
preoccupation with the immediate problem. On the other hand,
one could argue, and I would argue, that it may also liberate
President Reagan. He has two years left. There is no longer
time to be clever in domestic maneuvering. One might as well
do what one thinks the right thing is: Get to the
essentials. I believe that whatever vacuum exists, can be
filled by decisive presidential action.

MR. DUKE: Thank you, London. We will now go to Paris.
Go ahead, please, Paris.

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QUESTION: I have a rather technical question. Last Tuesday, Secretary of State Shultz spoke about a deterrence based on bombers and cruise missiles, ballistic missiles being phased out. What do you think about this kind of offensive weapon against the Soviet Union (inaudible) air defense?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not agree with the administration. I do not even know what the administration's view is. I disagree with the view that has been expressed. I believe that to shift to bombers and cruise missiles in the light of Soviet air defense and the absence of any air defense in the United States, would create an enormous set of problems that, at the minimum, have not been adequately analyzed.

Secondly, it will force us into a position where we have to bring pressure or recommend to our allies that they ought to give up their existing programs in missiles, specifically France and Britain and to some extent China which is not an ally but a friendly country. I believe that that is a mistake. I don't agree with it, and I believe that in the evolving debate, it will be seen that this is not a sustainable position.

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MR. DUKE: Thank you, Paris. We will next go to Hamburg for the first question from West Germany. Go ahead, please, Hamburg.

QUESTION: Yes, Mr. Kissinger, my name is Mr. Keith, Chris Keith (phonetic). I work for the Hamburg Morning Post which is now part of the (inaudible) Company.

I have a question concerning the comparison that Mr. Koolosh (phonetic) happened to draw between Mr. Gorbachev and (inaudible) minister of (inaudible).

Do you think that there was any longing damage done to the relations between West Germany and Russia?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it may not have been the most tactful formulation in the world, but I don't think any lasting damage was done. The Soviets generally choose when they are going to be insulted, and they also generally choose the moment when they want to be reconciled. I believe that Gorbachev, for a variety of reasons, wanted to bring some pressure on the Federal Republic and cease on this remark which may not have been the most (inaudible) remark to have made. Nevertheless, I do not believe any lasting damage was done, and the Soviets operate on the basis of personal irritation.

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MR. DUKE: Thank you very much, Hamburg. Next we will go to Helsinki for questions from there. Go ahead, please, Helsinki.

MR. KOULUMIES: This is Jyrki Koulumies from Finnish Broadcasting Company in Helsinki, Channel One.

Dr. Kissinger, do you think that the Iranian-contra arms scandal has hurt the credibility of the foreign policy of the present administration?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that the sale of arms to Iran was a terrible mistake from every point of view. The United States, as a democracy, cannot carry out one policy as a declaratory policy and an opposite policy as a secret policy. That was just a bad mistake; but any administration can make a mistake. One has to weigh that against the, on the whole, very successful foreign policy that had been conducted until then.

To some extent, in some regions of the world, this has affected the credibility of the United States. But in the long run, the credibility of the United States depends on a longer record than just one incident. And so I believe that it is a mistake from which we can recover. I have every confidence that we shall recover from it.

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MR. KOULUMIES: Dr. Kissinger, I was mainly thinking about the professionalism of that administration has been questioned: the previous cases of Poindexter's remarks about the Libyan-Gadhafi things and so forth, so it would mainly be a question of professionalism. So you don't agree with this?

DR. KISSINGER: Is it professionalism? I am not sure I understood the question properly. Could you rephrase it, please?

QUESTION: Well, the professionalism in the government, they seem to be not fully aware of the influence of their decisions, and the decisions, on the whole haven't been thought through thoroughly.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think it was an ill-conceived policy. Let me separate the two issues.

The opening to the Iran as a concept was not a mistake; in fact, that was correct. To use the sale of arms as an instrument and to think one could keep arms sales secret, that was a mistake. You can say it was not professional. There were a lot of mistakes made in that connection. To that extent, it has certainly impaired the prestige and, to some extent, the credibility of some of our foreign policy.

I repeat: It is a single mistake related to a single issue and is, therefore, something from which we can recover.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you seem to take a hopeful, even optimistic view about the future for American foreign policy in 1987. This is a view which clashes with a rather widespread opinion here in the nation's capital that the Reagan Administration's foreign policy has been severely jeopardized by the Iranian scandal.

How do you account for the view here in Washington as contrasted with your own outlook stemming from this affair?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, in Washington one is inevitably preoccupied with the immediate situation. And I must say it is not a pretty spectacle to see so many members of an administration disavow any of its responsibility for things in which, after all, they are part of that administration. So that is not the most elevating thing that I have observed.

On the other hand, my relative optimism is based on the fact that in the end what determines the foreign policy of nations and their successors are the underlying factors. The underlying factors that have produced negotiations between east and west, for example, are the Soviets need a period of relaxation for a variety of reasons: primarily because they cannot undertake reforms and international tension simultaneously; and the United States, for its reasons, is also ready, if not eager for a period of relaxation.

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Now the question is: Can this be expressed in specific agreement? Even there some considerable progress has been made. So I think that when the current excitement has died down, when the investigation has been clarified and the administration can return to focusing on positive objectives, I believe that the underlying factors still show a condition that makes me fundamentally optimistic that some agreement will be reached before the end of the Reagan Administration.

Indeed, I think the debate in the west ought to be what sort of agreement is in the common interest.

QUESTION: But you do predict an agreement, then, in 1987?

DR. KISSINGER: I predict that considerable progress will be made in 1987. Whether an agreement will be concluded in 1987, that is difficult for me to judge. But I would be very surprised and very disappointed if no progress were made.

MR. DUKE: Let us return now, to our participants for further questions. We go back to Rome for your additional questions, please.

QUESTION: I am Chazare Marini (phonetic) from the Academy Division of National Affairs (phonetic). Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

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My question is: Since you assume that there is a
standing possibility for an agreement within the time of this
administration, do you think that the framing for this
agreement is very much the same that falls at the top of
Reykjavik summit meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not an unqualified admirer of the
Reykjavik framework. There are parts of it which I agree
with, and there are parts of it which worry me. I think the
fifty percent reduction is an important symbolic step. I
would prefer it if the fifty percent reduction were
accompanied by some technical changes in the composition of
the (inaudible), specifically, a reduction in the number of
warheads that each missile can carry, because if you simply
reduce by fifty percent with the existing weapons, you do not
really reduce the dangers very much; but it is an important
symbolic step.

Secondly, I believe that something can be done and maybe
should be done about the intermediate or medium-range
missiles in Europe. I would personally prefer it if it were
not a zero option but a, say, a fifty percent reduction of
these forces.

As I said earlier, I believe the idea to abandon
missiles in the second five years of that ten-year program

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ought to be reconsidered. But something can be negotiated
for the second five-year period.

The question of SDI: There has been apparently some
agreement on the ten-year moratorium on deployment. Now the
question is how one defines the permitted, scientific
testing. Some of these will lead to intense debate, at least
within the United States, especially with respect to SDI.
But I believe that some progress with respect to some of the
issues discussed at Reykjavik is possible.

I would prefer it if we did not simply pick up
everything that was discussed at Reykjavik in twenty-four
hour negotiations. It is not that that means to advance
highly technical discussion.

QUESTION: This is (inaudible), Italian Television,
Channel One.

Dr. Kissinger, when you were the Director of the
National Security Council with President Nixon, you started a
foreign policy completely separate from that of the State
Department. Was it a dangerous example?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the way some people have
understood it, it may be a dangerous example. We were not
that separate. We ran a very elaborate interdepartmental
machinery, in which we invited the opinion of the various

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departments, especially the State Department, in what they
thought were planning exercises. We then took some of these
ideas into the secret diplomacy in which they did not
participate. But we -- that is we in the White House -- had
a very good idea of what the departmental recommendations
were. The departments did not always have a very clear idea
of what we were doing in the specific negotiations.

Secondly, the number of negotiations that were conducted
secretly were really extremely limited. There were really
only three: One was on Vietnam, in which case we kept the
Secretary of State and the Ambassadors informed of what we
were doing; the opening to China, which was very limited in
time period -- that is to say it was announced publicly after
one week of secrecy and was then returned into channels; the
preparation for it took about a year and a half. But that
was not something which required large -- At one or two
points when the arms control negotiations were deadlocked,
which were conducted in regular channels, an attempt was made
from the White House to break the deadlock. In one case, it
succeeded. But we did not conduct operations out of the
White House.

But your question really was: Was it a bad precedent?
I think one has to keep in mind that the president of the

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United States has to conduct foreign policy in a way with which he feels comfortable. Secretary (inaudible) you today if the president wants to ask his chauffer for foreign policy advice, nobody can stop him. And whether he uses a department or his staff really depends on what confidence he has.

The way to remedy the problem is to establish closer relations of confidence between the departments and the president and not to reduce organization charts that establish a formally legalistic hierarchy. But it may be that I set a bad example; I don't deny that. It worked, though, in our period. We didn't have any problems like this.

MR. DUKE: And now back to London. Go ahead, please, London.

QUESTION: Richard Beaston (phonetic) from the Times of London.

Dr. Kissinger, you sound very optimistic about the president's chances of pulling together his administration in the new year.

Could you tell us who you think, of his administration, would have to go before he can start to build up again -- build up his administration again? There seems to be a lot

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of speculation that at least some senior members of his cabinet will have to go.

Who do you think will be going?

DR. KISSINGER: I really am not close enough to those discussions to have a judgment as to who should go. I think it is essential for the president to create, again, a sense of teamwork among his advisors and not to have this appearance that they are all primarily interested in protecting either their own positions or their departmental positions.

Secondly, to focus it in some coherent approach to the future rather than a semi-diplomatic negotiation among departments. I think he has taken a very important step in appointing Mr. Frank Carlucci as security advisor. I know Carlucci. He has a distinguished record, and he will bring a much more systematic and forward-looking approach into the operation of the National Security Council, which became unnecessarily operational and not sufficiently focused on long-range strategy.

As to personnel, I think that will shape out as a sense of direction is restored to our diplomacy. I don't want to speculate as to who should go and who shouldn't.

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QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, Nick Cowing (phonetic) of ITN, Channel Four News.

How dangerous for President Reagan and, in particular, Vice President Bush, do you think, the unexpected release of Eugene Hasenfus from Nicaragua will prove to be? Do you expect he will be asked to testify on the Hill about what he was doing in Nicaragua, and is this going to embarrass the administration?

DR. KISSINGER: You all should understand that I have no first-hand knowledge of that situation and I probably know no more about it -- I am sure I know no more about it, about the details of it, than you do.

I would suspect -- first of all, I don't think Hasenfus knows very much, other than what happened at the end station of that private resupply process to the contras.

Fundamentally, I don't think it's a good idea to conduct American foreign policy through private enterprise or through the initiative of private individuals.

I suspect there will be some modest embarrassment to the administration and maybe marginally more for Vice President Bush than for the president. But it is important to keep in mind in these investigations that fundamentally we are dealing with two major decisions: One, the sale of arms, and

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the other, at least, illegal in the sense of the spirit of
the law, diversion of funds, to the contras. Those were the
two big decisions. All the rest are implementing decisions
which follow, more or less, logically from the initially
wrong decision. One should not be confused by a flood of
revelations about implementing decisions, that there is more
wrong than has already been discovered.

So I think there will be an additional modest
embarrassment. I don't believe it will add significantly to
what is already known.

QUESTION: But what leads you to say that you believe there will be some modest embarrassment? Why will there be this embarrassment?

DR. KISSINGER: Because it seems to me that as details
of that supply-line become obvious, it will probably show
that there was at least greater or considerable knowledge on
the part of a number of officials. I am simply speculating.

As details of any covert operation, when it becomes
public, looks embarrassing because the odds are against its
success to begin with. Then when it fails, it sometimes even
looks ridiculous.

I remember the last intelligence investigations and when
these covert operations became public, it was truly somewhat

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embarrassing. They never look brilliant when the fail and
you never attract the most agreeable human beings into
conducting them.

MR. DUKE: Dr. Kissinger, let me ask you a follow-up
question about Nicaragua. Again, here in Washington, there
is a wide-spread impression that Congress may now suspend
government aid to the contras as a consequence of the Iranian
scandal. Does that concern you?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that is a good possibility
because it was a close vote in both Houses to begin with and,
together with the electoral results, it could easily happen.

Yes, it does concern me. Whether there should be aid to
-- whether aid should be given to the contras or not is an
important question involving national security, future
foreign policy. I think it should be discussed on its
merits. It should be decided on its merits. It should not
be affected by the aberrations of those who engaged in this
complex and weird scheme of funding something that the
Congress had prohibited.

I think that is essentially irrelevant to the question
of whether the United States should support the contras.

MR. DUKE: Let us return overseas and this time we go to
Paris. Go ahead, please.

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QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, this question is from Paris.
If you were now in charge of American foreign policy, would
you accept the Soviet proposal made at the CSCE Conference in
Vienna for a Human Rights Conference in Moscow?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, let me give the answer in my
capacity as a private citizen, not as an aspirant to
governmental office.

I have not really studied the details of that proposal.
I don't think Moscow is an ideal place for a human rights
conference. But in principle, yes, I would think we have
only to gain from a conference on human rights, unless the
definition of it is such that we think it's too loaded.

Basically, human rights is the issue in which the West's
position is very strong.

QUESTION: This question is posed on behalf of a group
of permanent representatives to the Council of Europe located
in Strasbourg. What would be the consequences in the field
of conventional forces in Europe if the zero option in the
nuclear forces relationship were to materialize?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, if we are talking about zero
option with respect to medium-range missiles in Europe, the
major significance of the zero option with respect to medium
range missiles, is that the Soviet capacity to attack Europe

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with short-range weapons and intercontinental weapons is not
reduced in any significant way.

The American capacity to retaliate from Europe is
destroyed, so that the psychological balance is changed, if
not the military balance because we can still retaliate from
the United States if we chose.

One of the major reasons for deploying medium-range
missiles was to establish an organic link between the defense
of Europe and the defense of the United States to couple
those two. The technical price would be substantially
reduced it not eliminated.

So, I would prefer that the negotiation involve a fifty
percent cut in medium range missiles similar to the one
discussed in strategic missiles rather than the zero option.
To the extent that the nuclear retaliation is diminished, of
course, the importance of conventional forces increases.
That would be particularly true if the zero option were to
include the abandonment of all missiles on both sides.

I suppose we can live with the zero option, but it is
not my preferred solution. Indeed, I think it is a mistake.

MR. DUKE: Again, to Hamburg. Go ahead, please.

QUESTION: This is (inaudible) from Hamburg. Mr.
Kissinger, I would like to ask you: President Reagan's

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position obviously has been weakened by the Iran/Iraq affair. Now, speculation is it has been weakened so much that the Russians might say, "With this administration we don't want to talk and we leave it at that for the next two years."

Thus, it might delay a treaty about arms limitation. Is that possible?

DR. KISSINGER: Certainly, it is possible. The question is: Is it likely? I don't believe it is very likely because if the Soviets want to wait for two years, they are really waiting for much more than two years because when the new president comes in he has to reorganize. He has to organize his government. He has to establish a new relationship with the Congress.

As a practical matter, no serious negotiations could really take place for the better part of the first year and then it would take another substantial period to get them completed, so we are talking about a four-year delay.

Also, a new president would find it very difficult, totally, to reverse the policies of his predecessor. So, of course, it is possible that they will wait two years; but I don't think it is likely and I don't think western policy should be based on that assumption.

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MR. WOLF: This is Tom Wolf, Reuters, in Hamburg. Dr. Kissinger, do you think that the way the Reagan Administration approached policies toward the Soviet Union has been correct because it has been severely criticized over here in Europe?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that the main approach of the Reagan Administration has been correct. I did not approve of some of the rhetoric which seemed to me too exuberant, but the fundamental approach from the beginning of the administration, which was to attempt to restore America's confidence in itself first and to build up American strength first was important in order to overcome some of the problems that the administration inherited.

Secondly, we did not have a really good negotiating partner in the Soviet Union. At first Brezhnev was ill, then Andropov was ill; Chernenko. It was not really until the emergence of Gorbachev that the Soviets could organize themselves for a serious negotiation.

There have been problems internally in the American government in establishing a purposeful definition of objectives, and I regret this. The main direction of the policy, I think, was much better than our European critics allow us and better than the rhetoric that supported it.

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MR. WOLF: There is always talk here in Europe that America's interest is turning away from Europe, turning to the Pacific area, turning to Japan and new friendships there. Do you think that America is on the verge of turning off from Europe, turning toward Japan and the Pacific area?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, if you look at the economic statistics, look at the areas that are developing most rapidly, there has been a tremendous growth in the Pacific which exceeds the growth in the Atlantic which started from a much higher base.

I would think that the Pacific area is becoming more important. But that does not mean that the Atlantic has become less important. It means that the United States has had to focus itself on two problems simultaneously.

I don't think the big problem in relations between Europe and the United States is the shift from the Atlantic to the Pacific. There are two big problems that both sides of the Atlantic ought to be aware of.

One is the shift within the United States in the center of political influence from the East Coast whose leadership groups were psychologically oriented towards Europe, towards the middle west and far west where the relationship to Europe is more intellectual and less emotional than was the case in

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the previous period. That produces a certain change in
emphasis.

Secondly, if one looks ahead for ten to fifteen years,
if the western hemisphere should start exploding,
particularly if there should be turmoil in Central America,
especially in Mexico, it could happen that the attention of
the United States will be shifted not from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, but from the Atlantic and the Pacific to the Rio
Grande and that a new American isolationism could develop.
That is something that both sides of the Atlantic should be
aware of and work to prevent.

But shifting from Europe to the Pacific, that, I do not
believe is a realistic option or one that will actually be
carried out by any foreseeable American administration.

MR. DUKE: We will now move to Helsinki again. Go
ahead, please, Helsinki.

QUESTION: This is (inaudible) again from Helsinki.

Dr. Kissinger, do you think that President Reagan was in
Reykjavik unprepared to meet such a comprehensive package
which Mr. Gorbachev offered?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think it is important to keep
the following in mind. I have attended four summits and I
have studied as many of the others as I could. It is

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absolutely unprecedented that a leader appears at the summit, presents a paper of the existence of which he has not even informed the other side, puts it on the table, and asks for an immediate negotiation. That is unprecedented, discourteous, and disdainful. Frankly, I criticize the American delegation for having agreed to negotiate it at all. No president could be prepared for a scheme of that scope and negotiate it right on the spot.

I think what we should have done is to say, "Thank you very much. This is an interesting proposal. We will study it. We will now ask you a few questions about it. In a few weeks, maybe Shevardnaze and Mr. Shultz should meet. In a few months, after they have met, you and I can meet again, and then we can discuss these proposals from the basis that I, too, have studied them." So, yes, President Reagan was not prepared to discuss it. He couldn't be.

These are very complicated issues, and no president and no Secretary-of-State could be prepared to negotiate them cold. I don't know what possessed the Soviets to choose such a tactic. Frankly, I don't know what possessed us to go along with it.

**QUESTION:** So you don't read it as just a new sign of the new effective Gorbachev "let's do it" tactic?

[L.C.]

PAGE 27 KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER: I think that Mr. Gorbachev should raise a little hell with his own advisors. What would he have achieved if he had taken President Reagan by storm? What if he had managed to get him to agree to something which, when he took it back to Washington and to the allies, would have created a storm of protest?

He would have achieved a propaganda victory, but he would have set back the negotiating progress.

My believe is that when heads of government meet, the outcome should be very pretty well determined in advance. It is too dangerous for the heads of government of the two super powers to meet and physically, because they are worse off than if they had not met as a result and to adopt a procedure in which either you have a disagreement, which is what happened, or you have an agreement that will then lead to endless discussion. It is not a responsible procedure, and I am surprised that Gorbachev did it. I don't think it was either in the Soviet interest.

QUESTION: We are going now to the CSCE Stockholm agreement on confidence-building measures. The Soviets accept it in that agreement, on-the-spot verification.

Do you read this as a totally new approach by the Soviets?

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DR. KISSINGER: I don't think the Soviets have yet made a fundamental decision of whether they want to have an agreement that really makes a difference or whether they make some agreements that meet some surface Western proposals but leave, in effect, everything unchanged. I am not superimpressed by the ability to fly Soviet aircraft or Warsaw Pact aircraft with advance notification over the territory. I don't believe that this will give us a great deal of verification in addition to what we already have from established sources.

If it is a symptom that the Soviets are willing to go further, yes. But I have my doubt about this whole concept of confidence-building measures because people say, "Let's do something irrelevant because it builds confidence."

I would say the way to build confidence is to do something that is relevant and let's focus on things that we really want rather than on things that look good because they may create the conditions for something else further down the road.

I am not opposed to it, but I am not overwhelmed by it, either.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, on a more general line, when you were Secretary of State, detente was the name of the game

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at least in the newspaper headlines. Now the administration
seems to be able to achieve supremacy over the Soviets and then
negotiate from a position of strength.

Is this a new trend?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't think the administration
has ever said that it wants military superiority over the
Soviet Union. And in the nuclear age, that is an objective
that is, for all practical purposes, unrealizable, and the
attempt to achieve it is probably much too dangerous.

The policy of detente, that the administrations in which
I served persuaded was based on the premise that the Soviet
Union and the United States are condemned to coexist by
modern technology and by the disproportion between ends and
means in the military field. Therefore, they have not only
to discipline their armaments, but they also have to
discipline their political action.

Every subsequent administration, no matter how much they
have tried to deviate from that in one direction or another,
have been driven back to this basic concept. Of course, each
administration has to interpret the meaning of this in its
own way. But my impression is that the Reagan
Administration, whatever its early rhetoric, is now within

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PAGE 30 KISSINGER

the framework of that definition and is not seeking to
achieve what you call supremacy over the Soviet Union.

MR. DUKE: We are packing in a lot of questions today.
We have already completed two rounds of questioning. Now we
have time for still more. So we will go back to our
participants for a final round robin.

First, starting with Rome.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, I am Chazare Marini, from the
(inaudible) of International Affairs.

If we could return to the subject of conventional and
nuclear defense of Europe, I would like to have your views on
the point where the decision of NATO to strengthen its
conventional posture, remains valid. And in view of the
efforts that are now being made to consider also some sort of
European defense against ballistic missiles connected with
the SDI, whether you consider that there is a possibility, in
terms of resources and budget resources, to cover these
different possibilities or if it is not, which would be the
priority, in your view?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that the conventional
defense of Europe should be strengthened, and I think it can
be strengthened. After all, Europe has a larger population
and a larger gross national product, taken as an entity, than

[L.C.]

PAGE 31 KISSINGER

the Soviet Union by itself, even without the help of the
United States. So I think the conventional defenses can be
strengthened.

At the same time, we must not create the impression that
we would rather be defeated with conventional weapons than
resort to nuclear weapons because if we do that -- though I
am against the idea of no first use of nuclear weapons, the
Soviet Union must be left with the belief that in an
extremity, faced with a minimum defeat, the West would rather
resort to nuclear weapons than let itself be overrun with
conventional weapons. How to establish a balance is
something that has never yet been successfully addressed, but
I think it is extremely important.

Now with respect to SDI: I have supported at least some
forms of SDI for the United States because it seems to me
impossible for democratic leaders to say that the security of
their population depends on the mass extermination of their
population. This is an immoral concept and it is also a
psychological untenable concept.

Therefore, I believe that some strategic defense of
Europe is also important. Now, what kind of a defense, how
extensive it should be -- that is something that would
require careful study. But it is inherently logical to

[L]

PAGE 32 KISSINGER

follow the Soviet point of view that the beginning of arms
control must be a defensive weapon, while the offensive
weapons return their capability for mass exterminations of
population.

Now which priority I would choose -- I would probably
recommend doing both. But I would be willing to pay some
price in conventional capabilities to achieve some capacity
for defense, if only as a sense of responsibility to the
peoples one it is supposed to protect.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, do you believe that the possibility -- zero option which, in your view, should remain for the defense of Europe is reconcilable with the zero option?

DR. KISSINGER: It is reconcilable with the zero option, but it puts an enormous burden on the United States and it may confuse the Soviets about their possibilities. I have always opposed the zero option from the time it was first put forward in 1981 as a negotiating ploy that the NATO countries never thought the Soviets would accept.

QUESTION: This is Peter Parrish (phonetic) from the Institute of (inaudible), in London.

I would like to go back to your earlier point about the
shift in the center of political gravity in the United States

[L.C.]

PAGE 33 KISSINGER

from the Atlantic seaboard to the West and Southwest and so
on. You suggested the European countries should learn to
adjust to that.

I wondered if you had any particular thoughts in mind
how, over the next several years, they could adjust to that
in ways which could reduce the potential danger, perhaps by
shouldering a greater burden in defense or by changes in
trade policy or whatever.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all I didn't respond to
an earlier question, but which I think is relevant in this
context, which is the emergence of greater unity on defense
in Europe. I think that is extremely important because it
will make Europe capable of participating on a more nearly
equal basis in the discussion on the common defense. And it
will reduce American temptation to trust these to some of the
political pressures that emerge every two or four years in
this country.

Secondly, I believe that it is important to get to a
more comprehensive approach to matters of long-term economic
policy. An attempt in this direction is already being made.

Thirdly, I believe that in the period that began with
the formation of NATO and the Marshall Plan, Europeans
develop the idea that they had a certain attitude in their

[L]

PAGE 34 KISSINGER

own domestic politics with respect to the alliance because in
the end the United States might not carry out all of their
recommendations.

I would now say to our European friends: Be careful
what you recommend because the United States may accept it,
that the new leadership groups that are emerging may not be
as finely tuned to what the Europeans do not express because
-- take the zero option as an example. After all, Europeans
have proposed it, so why shouldn't it be accepted.

In the back of their minds, most Europeans were hoping -
- at least those Europeans that have the missiles brought to
Europe, that this negotiation would fail, was not perhaps as
fully understood in the United States as it might have been.
So it requires considerable sensitivity now on both sides of
the Atlantic.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) Paris. Dr. Kissinger, you
partially answered my question already. I will ask it,
anyway.

Do you believe that deterrence could be based on systems
using non-nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, exclusively?

DR. KISSINGER: Not exclusively. I think that we have
to reduce the excessive reliance on nuclear weapons that we
inherited from a period when the United States had a huge

[L]

PAGE 35 KISSINGER

nuclear superiority. But I do not think we can afford to go
to the other extreme of so devaluing the nuclear deterrence,
that there is a belief that a conventional defeat will be
accepted because history proves that conventional balances
are extremely difficult to calculate.

In two world wars, Germany achieved considerable
military successes with really numerically inferior
conventional forces by concentrating them at the critical
places. So simply counting up the numbers of divisions on
both sides is not going to be enough of a demonstration. And
a purely conventional balance has historically proved almost
impossible to achieve, for purposes of deterrence. It would
be very dangerous to give up every reliance of nuclear
weapons, even though the reliance should be reduced. I
recognize that is a very difficult thing to discuss, to
settle in the abstract.

QUESTION: This is Peter Dash (phonetic), German Television speaking.

For me the Iranian scandal is an indication that
something in your constitution is wrong. Every president
tends to run into problems like that in his second period.
For me, this is obviously that it is difficult to be
attractive as president for his own advisors or the party for

[L.C.]

PAGE 36 KISSINGER

the people for leaders in foreign countries and everybody
knows definitely the presidency will end as of the 20th of
January, 1988. Therefore, my question is: should you amend
-- must you amend the constitution? Does it make sense that
the president is as long president as the majority of the
people vote for him?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't think that the two term
amendment was a very good idea, even though we have had
presidents where I was glad that we had a two-term amendment.
I don't apply that to the current president. But I don't
think the two-term limitation is at the heart of the present
problems or at the heart of some previous problems. I think
that the heart of these problems is the difficulty of
controlling a government of the size of the American
government, R OF BANbsence of the disciplined civil service
and by bringing in so many outsiders who then, as time goes
on, develop perhaps an excessive notion of the power that has
been temporarily entrusted to them, and they forget that it
is a trust, and that it is temporary.

That is how to manage these large bureaucracies. That
is an unsolved problem, but that has not -- it really does
not depend so much on the constitution, because another
interesting aspect about these crisis when they occur is that

[L.C.]

PAGE 37 KISSINGER

they are usually totally unnecessary. The Iranian crisis did not have to happen. We were not under any great pressure to do it, so it happened in an area of policy that was not being watched very carefully. In a way that even was true of Watergate, which I said earlier was a different issue. That is something to reflect about. I don't have a good solution to it, but I don't think it is the American constitution, I think it is the way of bureaucracy is being conducted of the size and the scope and the frequent inexperience of the outsiders that come in to run it.

**QUESTION:** This is (inaudible), Italian Television Channel One from Rome. In your opinion, Dr. Kissinger, which country really supports terrorism in Europe?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, in my opinion, I think the country that bears a heavy responsibility is Syria. I want to make clear, I negotiated for two months and over many years with President Assad, and I have very high regard for his nationalism and for his intelligence and for his toughness, but I think it is an emperical fact that much of the terrorism or some of the terrorism emanates from a territory controlled by Syria. I think Libya has played a certain facilitating role, and I don't think the Soviet Union and the East European countries can avoid responsibility for the

[L]

PAGE 38 KISSINGER

training that they give to terrorists groups even -- and the
intelligence support they give them even if they don't
participate in the individual terrorist acts.

The man who throws a rock down a mountainside covered
with boulders cannot disclaim responsibility for a rock
slide, because the rock that killed the passerby was not the
rock he threw. So those are the countries that I think bear
some considerable responsibility. Of course, Iran bears a
very serious responsibility as well, as they have proved in
these arms negotiations where they obviously took the
position that they could control the release of American
hostages.

QUESTION: This is Nick Cowing of ITN in London. May I return to SDI, Dr. Kissinger? On SDI, the Soviet Union yesterday announced what many SDI critics in the West have long predicted that Moscow now has a cost effective and survivable capability, that is in Paul Nitze's words, to neutralize SDI through space mines, reduced boost phase, special screening of Soviet missiles and increase multiple warheads and decoys.

Do you view this as just an empty Soviet threat at a
critical time in this Geneva negotiation or is this likely to
have some effect on the president's determination to continue

[c]

PAGE 39 KISSINGER

with SDI, the fact that according to the Soviets, we can
override it before it even comes into effect?

DR. KISSINGER: I have not studied this Soviet scheme
and it sounds to me like -- there are so many ideas that
Western scientists put forward that are opposed to SDI. The
question is, and obviously one has to balance the beings by
which a defense can be overcome against the effectiveness of
the defense, so obviously any resource that is devoted to
overcoming a defense is subtracted from the resources
available for pure destructiveness.

One of the advantages of some form of SDI is that it
complicates the calculations of an aggressor. I am not
saying that we should go mindfully ahead in a maximum
deployment of SDI, my view has been all along that the
deployment of SDI should be related to the size of the
offense. If the offense can be reduced, the defense
obviously can be reduced. I am opposed to singling out SDI
and abolishing it and then playing numbers games with the
remaining offensive forces in a way that does not make any
real difference. Six thousand warheads that remain after a
fifty percent cut can do any damage that anybody can conceive
both the strategic forces and the population.

[L]

PAGE 40 KISSINGER

So, yes, what you have pointed out is a problem that
should be studied. The way to study it and the way to come
to an understanding about it is in a formal negotiation about
relating offense to defense in which it is clearly understood
that the difference will be no larger than is needed to
accomplish certain objectives with respect to the offense and
will therefore to be diminished by reducing the offense
including some of the weapons you prescribed.

MR. DUKE: We have time for one short question and one
short answer. So we go back to Hamburg.

QUESTION: I would like to ask you about South Africa.
There the Soviet Union is taking clearly sides by supporting
the ANC and (inaudible). On the other hand, you and the
United States are not taking clearly sides. Therefore, the
danger is that the Soviet Union in the long run -- South
Africa in the long run might become a Soviet Union
(inaudible). How important is South Africa with the security
of the West?

DR. KISSINGER: I think South Africa is important, but
we cannot take sides in this dispute in the manner in which
it now arises. What the Western countries should take sides
for is a moderate solution; that is to say that the white
population has to agree to some democratic power sharing and

[L]

PAGE 41 KISSINGER

the non-white population has to agree that the solution must
be democratic.

MR. DUKE: I regret that our time is now up. As we
conclude today's discussion, I would like to thank all of our
guests overseas and especially Dr. Kissinger for being with
us today.

I am Paul Duke for Worldnet in Washington.

END OF TRANSMISSION

United States
Information
Agency

Washington, D.C. 20547

JAN 14 1987

Office of the Director

USIA

January 9, 1987

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Subsequent to my previous letter, I am pleased to enclose an additional
summary of the audience reaction and media usage report received to date
on your successful December 18 WORLDNET interactive program.

Again thank you for taking time from your busy schedule to appear on WORLDNET.

Best wishes.

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

WORLDNET 308/EURONET 176

December 18, 1986

(Additional Summary)

**GUEST:** Dr. Henry Kissinger
Henry Kissinger Associates, Inc.

**SUBJECT:** U.S.-Soviet Relations

## HELSINKI

USIS Helsinki reported that "Finland's most-watched current affairs program 'A Studio' (estimated viewership: 1.5 million) carried a nine-minute segment from the December 18 interactive with Dr. Kissinger as the lead item on its December 19 broadcast. All of the questions asked from Helsinki were included."

## TEL AVIV

"As expected, subject WORLDNET was an excellent program vehicle for the Post. U.S.-Soviet relations is a subject of intense interest to a variety of Post contacts in the government, media and academia. The other subjects covered, particularly the effect of the investigation into the Iran arms - Contras controversy on the Presidency, were of equal, if not greater, interest. Dr. Kissinger's usual exceptional performance and global outlook in answering questions drew favorable comments from the attending audience and held their attention and interest throughout the discussion."

Post was not interactive, however a small, but important group was invited. "The audience included: Dr. Ariel Levite, Researcher, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University; Professor Mikhail Agursky, Researcher, Soviet and East European Center, Hebrew University; Mr. Moshe Ishon, Editor-in-Chief, Hatzofe daily paper; Mr. Shaul Ben-Hayim, Foreign Affairs Editor, Maariv (second largest circulation newspaper); Mr. Nitsan Horowitz, Foreign Affairs Editor, 'Galei Zahal' (Army Radio); and others."

"Excerpts of Kissinger's WORLDNET were carried by 'Galei Zahal' Army Radio. Editor Horowitz filed his story from USIS premises and succeeded to make the 5:00 p.m. news magazine, only minutes after the transmission took place. Estimated listenership: 350,000."

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

JAN 05 1987

USIA

DEC 24 1986

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As promised, I am enclosing the preliminary reports received from our embassies to date concerning your excellent WORLDNET interactive satellite program of December 18. As indicated earlier, the clarity and depth of your remarks on such a broad subject were sincerely appreciated by our European audiences.

Video cassette copies of the program will be made available to our posts worldwide and we are satellitating it to Latin America in both English and Spanish versions.

As soon as available, you will receive the final audience reaction and media usage report.

Thank you again for your fine contribution to WORLDNET.

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associated, Inc.
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

WORLDNET 308/EURONET 176

December 18, 1986

**INTERACTIVE POSTS:** Rome, Helsinki, London, Paris, Hamburg

ROME

USIS Rome reported: "RAI evening news anchorman for TG-1, Bruno Vespa, and President of Institute for the International Affairs, Cesare Merlini, were interactive participants for this WORLDNET.

"The audience included news agency journalists: Ennio Are, ADN-Kronos, Franco Eminente, Agencia Italia and Cesare Protetti, ANSA.

"Newspaper journalists were: Garbriel Bertinetto, L'Unita'; Giuseppe Columba, Il Messaggero; Stefano Folli, La Voce Repubblicana, Mauro Mita, La Voce Repubblicana, Guido Moltedo, Il Manifesto; Pietro Scagliusi, L'Europeo and Franco Venturini, Corriere Della Sera.

"Radio journalist Giacome Forte of Radio Citta' Future attended. Others attending were: Antongiulio de Robertis, De Gasperi Peace Foundation; Francesco Castorina, Ministry of Defense; Giuseppe Stano, NATO and Paolo Vittorelli, Istrid.

"For clarity of expression, range and depth of foreign policy questions addressed, this WORLDNET with Dr. Kissinger has few precedents. Our audience left the program talking animatedly about Kissinger's answers on Reykjavik, 'Irangate', strategy defense vs. strategic offense, and his reflections on the management of foreign policy. The journalists in the audience and the two participants indicated that Dr. Kissinger answered questions directly and thoroughly. Almost everyone stayed on for over 30 minutes discussing the broad range of questions covered in the hour-long program.

"Bruno Vespa noted that Kissinger's language was so clear that the questioner was left with no doubt as to his meaning. Despite his absence from government, his knowledge about foreign policy developments was outstanding. The Deputy Chief of the Italian Ministry of Defense's Office of Political Military Affairs said that the use by WORLDNET of non-governmental figures gives an opportunity for people in Europe to hear other authoritative viewpoints.

"Even radical left Il Manifesto reporter Guido Moltedo said that today's speaker showed his brilliance in the way he handled the topics with a European frame of mind that made him particularly suited for European audiences."

-2-

"Italy's main evening news program RAI Channel-1 broadcast five minutes of Dr. Kissinger's December 18 WORLDNET using the interview conducted from our studio by TG-1 Anchorman Bruno Vespa. The estimated prime time audience on RAI-1 is 11 million.

"The program will be re-broadcast by Lazio regional network Teleitalia-41 on Saturday December 20 at 10:00 P.M. to a potential audience of 140,000.

"Centrist leading Corriere Della Sera (circulation 490,000) and Florence centrist La Nazione (circulation 235,000) carried stories December 19 drawn on the ANSA News Agency report. Corriere's headline read: 'Kissinger: 'It Shall Not Be Another Watergate';' La Nazione's: 'Kissinger 'It Is Not a Watergate'." Both articles cited WORLDNET by name. Corriere Della Sera underscored, among other things, Kissinger's statement that 'Irangate' is a mistake in foreign policy but 'Reagan will regain his popularity in the Spring concurrently with important progress in arms reduction negotiations with the USSR'...'in the long term a single mistake cannot affect the credibility of an Administration as a whole...'

"Headline on the Italian communist party organ L'Unita' (200,000 copies printed in 1985) read: 'Kissinger: 'With Me Secret Negotiations Did Not Fail.' Gabriel Hertinetto, the L'Unita' correspondent, referring to the satellite teleconference reported that 'Kissinger did not mince words when it came to condemning or criticizing the present Administration...' and that 'the man who ran the American foreign policy for several years often insisted that the bureaucratic machine didn't function up to par...' He also underlined Kissinger's criticism of how the Reykjavik summit was handled. 'Reagan was absolutely unprepared, no other President or Secretary of State could possibly have been, given the circumstances...'"

## HELSINKI

"USIS Helsinki's participant was Jyrki Koulumies, Head of Current Affairs, Finnish Broadcasting Company, Channel-1.

"Post's evaluation: An excellent interactive. Interest is always high in what Dr. Kissinger has to say, and he did not disappoint us. We believe that his comments will have a beneficial impact for the U.S. when they are broadcast on national television this evening.

"Expected media placement: This interactive was an exclusive for Mr. Koulumies. The questions posed from Helsinki will be broadcast at 9:00 p.m. on Friday, December 19, as the lead item in Finland's most-watched current affairs program, 'A Studio'."

-3-

LONDON

USIS London reported: "London's participants were: Petter Parrish, Director, Institute of U.S. Studies, University of London; Iwan Morgan, Principal Lecturer in Politics, City of London Polytechnic; Richard Beeston, *The Times*; Hella Pick, *The Guardian* and Nik Gowing, ITN Channel-4 News.

"This was an excellent program, and we hope to have the opportunity to have Dr. Kissinger on WORLDNET again soon. Dr. Kissinger has a remarkable ability to put things in a different and clearer perspective. He did so today, in distinguishing the Iran affair from Watergate; in his judgment that the NSC has become too operational, and his skepticism about the value of confidence building measures. He also offered the European audience some good advice about understanding the American people and leadership, as when he advised them not to propose something if they did not mean it (i.e., the zero option)."

PARIS

USIS Paris reported: "The interactive with Dr. Kissinger was warmly received by our audience today, an indication not only of the respect he commands here, but also of the audience's appreciation that WORLDNET would present a guest with views not always in line with Administration policy. Programs like this one go a long way in giving WORLDNET credibility with the skeptical French. As usual, Dr. Kissinger's responses were informed, and, at turns, provocative and entertaining. He smoothly handled foreign policy questions that ranged from the African continent, through the Middle East and even into Central America.

"Our questioners were Admiral Sevestre of the Revue De Defense Nationale, Claudine Canetti, a freelance journalist, and a group of permanent representatives to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

"Our audience included: Pierre Audigier, SDGN; France Badrichani, French Institute of Telecommunications (Telecom); Colonel Jean-Louis Clouet Des Pesriches, SGDN; Irene Comeau-Ruffin, IFRI; Sabin Covemaeker, Telecom; Aspirant Donville, SGDN; Christine Eade, Telecom; Kathryn English, Telecom; Pascal Epremian, Telecom; Arnaud Fayolle, Telecom; Patrick Genzling, Telecom; Thierry Germaine-Bonne, Telecom; Ambassador Jacques Jessel; Guy Kemkeng, Telecom; Lieutenant Colonel Ledueil, SGDN; Eric Mathieu, Telecom; Marc Hellinger, Telecom; Vincent Moulin, Telecom; Colonel Moulems, SGDN; Patrick Righenzi, Telecom; Jean-Christophe Romer, Insed; Francoise Storhaye, AFCA; Anee De Tinguay, Institutue D'Etudes Politiques; Antoine Trannoy, Telecom; Loic Tribot La Spiere, CEPS; General Woisard, CEPS."

-4-

"In addition, AmConsul Strasbourg reports a high-level audience of permanent representatives to the Council of Europe. They were: Ambassador Collin McLean of the United Kingdom; Ambassador Erling Quaade of Denmark; Ambassador Vincent Bruyns of The Netherlands; and Roger Massie, Secretary of the Political Committee of the CDE Parliamentary Assembly."

HAMBURG

"USIS Hamburg filed the following evaluation of the Kissinger interactive: Articulate and informative, Dr. Kissinger provided a thoughtful analysis of world affairs. The Hamburg journalists in attendance appreciated his wit and penetrating insights. All found it useful and agreed it provided food for thought and served as excellent background. Those concerned with 'hard news' found it somewhat thin. Concensus was that Dr. Kissinger's views of the Iran arms deal were the most interesting.

"Post's participants included: Christoph Keese, *Hamburger Morgenpost*; Peter Staisch, North German TV (NDR); Thomas Wolf, Reuters; Kimbacher, Georg, SAT-1 (National Cable TV News).

"In a six-column spread across the top of pages 2-3, the left-of center daily *Hamburger Morgenposten* reported on the subject interactive under the headline 'The Iran Affair Isn't Watergate.' The paper quoted Kissinger as believing the facts (of the weapons deal) will soon become known, allowing President Reagan to 'concentrate on the significant issues during the remaining years of his Presidency. In other extractions from the interactive, the paper quoted Kissinger on:

- FRG Chancellor Kohl's published comparison of Gorbachev and Goebbels. 'Not the most tactful formulation,' Kissinger said, but not leading to any long-term damage.

- Kissinger's wariness toward the 'zero option.'

-His belief that a US-USSR arms agreement would be signed in 1987. He blamed the lack of a Reykjavik agreement on 'unreasonable' Soviet demands which no president could agree to and still expect Congressional or allied approval. The story ended: '(The journalists) saw a friendly statesman: Kissinger smiled often, listened patiently, and answered with examples from his own experience. The conference was arranged by the U.S. Information Service.'

"Accompanying photo showed journalists watching Kissinger in USIS Hamburg's WORLDNET studio.

"SAT-1 (National Cable TV) included over a minute of interactive footage in a 90 second story stressing Kissinger's belief that the Soviets will have to deal with the Reagan Administration (rather than waiting for a new president)."

-5-

LISBON

"Portugal's National Television station (RTP) used a one-minute excerpt of Henry Kissinger's remarks on the significance of the transfer of American arms to introduce its report on the arms sale controversy. The prime time evening news telecast reaches an estimated audience of 3 million.

"In the December 19 edition of Lisbon's, rightist O Dia carried under the title: 'In Kissinger's Opinion There is No Comparison with 'Watergate'; a three-column piece excerpted remarks of Dr. Kissinger on (A) 'The Administration's attempt to open a channel with Iran,' (B) 'Irangate' and 'Watergate' (C) 'The Reykjavik summit,' and (D) 'Terrorism.'"