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for the no first use of nuclear weapons, because there would
be no benefit from denuclearizing if weapons based outside
the territory could be used on the territory. And I have
noticed that the French President already felt obliged to
make a public statement to the effect that French weapons
would not be used on German territory.

On the other hand, the no first use doctrine implies that
NATO would prefer to be defeated with conventional weapons to
using nuclear weapons, and when we have reached the point
where the distinction between whether one accepts defeat or
not depends on the nature of weapons used, one has in effect
abandoned the nuclear guarantee and the link between Europe
and the United States.

So these are two dangerous tendencies that have developed
partly as a result of the INF Treaty. With respect -- and
these link us explicitly to the problems of arms control as
it confronts the Atlantic alliance.

When I first started out in academic life working on arms
control, the advocates of arms control were saying that some
place ought to be left in the considerations of strategy for
arms control because the new weapons were unprecedentedly
destructive.

I feel now we are reaching a point where one has to ask
for some space to be left in arms control theory for security
policy, and where we run the risk that arms control theory,

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20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

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arms control, becomes an end in itself.

I have had the opportunity to read the testimony before this Committee, for example, of Professor Kaiser, an old friend of mine and a fine man. But I have noticed that, in the attempt to vindicate the modernization of these weapons, proposals are being made that get us down the same road as the INF again, that is that in order to modernize INF he proposes withdrawing all the artillery, nuclear artillery, and then links the INF reductions to conventional reductions.

And before we know it, we will be engaged in an arms control exercise that loses any relationship to a coherent NATO strategy. And this is by a man who would agree with every premise that I have stated and whom I consider one of the pillars of defense policy, certainly within the Social Democratic Party.

So this should not be taken as a criticism of him, but rather as an indication that even the most thoughtful observers are now having great difficulty relating arms control and security policy and the need for developing this.

In all of these exercises, I have stressed the importance of Europe developing a more autonomous and more coherent role with respect to its own defense. In the United States we have supported a united Europe in the economic field, but we

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1 have been aloof in the military field, though I noticed with
2 great agreement the comments made by President Reagan
3 yesterday indicating our support for a greater European
4 identity in the defense field.

5 Finally, I devoted some pages to the relation -- to the
6 impact of the new Soviet leadership on East-West relations
7 and U.S.-NATO relations, and I simply want to make one
8 point. I do not want to engage in a debate about Gorbachev's
9 real motives and I do not pretend to know Gorbachev's real
10 motives.

11 I note simply this fact: No Soviet leader has ever
12 accepted several of the key policies of his predecessor. So
13 no matter what one assumes about Gorbachev's intentions, we
14 cannot make western policy rely on an essentially psychiatric
15 analysis of a single Soviet leader.

16 Secondly, one has to look at history. For 400 years the
17 Russian empire under czar and commissar has expanded, for any
18 number of reasons. But to establish a political and security
19 relationship, an equilibrium, between that empire, that has
20 eleven time zones, and its much smaller neighbors has been
21 one of the security problems of Europe and Asia and the
22 Middle East for hundreds of years.

23 It cannot be removed by one individual, even if he were
24 to conceive peace in the manner in which Americans conceive
25 it. And there is no indication in either the Russian or

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communist history that even a conciliatory Soviet leader
would have a necessarily parallel view.

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So it is absolutely imperative not only that we develop a
strategic doctrine, but that we get some concept of what kind
of a world equilibrium we are after, and that we do not lose
ourselves in an orgy of personal relationships.

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Nor should we assume that the Soviet leadership — that
the Soviet economic reforms automatically guarantee a more
peaceful foreign policy, since their purpose is to make the
Soviet Union strong, not to make the Soviet Union
conciliatory.

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These are my main points, Mr. Chairman, which I concluded
with an appeal, which is not necessary in this Committee, for
bipartisanship in the treatment of these issues, because if
the United States is assumed to be changing its policy or
reviewing its policy every four to eight years, if our
national interest is never perceived to be settled, then we
become a factor of instability.

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And I find it painful when I read that a senior member of
Chancellor Kohl's party said that they could not go along
with the modernization proposals of the Administration
because they did not know what the next President was going
to do and they did not want to expose themselves to American
changeability.

I think this is a situation that we need to remedy on

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this side of the Atlantic no matter who wins the election
this year.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]