DONALD RUMSFELD

SUITE 405
400 NORTH MICHIGAN AVENUE
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60611

TELEPHONE 312-645-0251
FACSIMILE 312-645-0258

AUG 0 5 1999

August 2, 1999

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry:

I thought a bit about some possible names to consider inviting to the function for François de Rose.

The list I'm sending is more illustrative than specific suggestions.

First, it would be nice to have people François knows, such as David Rockefeller and Bob Ellsworth. David Abshire may know him. Pierre Salinger knows him, and President Ford has met him. I suspect he has met George Shultz. Stevy Davignon knows him and Oscar de la Renta has met him.

Then there is a category of people he might know who it might or might not make sense to include, such as the French Ambassador to the U.S. and the French Ambassador to the UN.

I suspect he knows some of the former U.S. Ambassadors to France, such as Evan Galbraith.

A couple of other thoughts might be the senior person at the Council on Foreign Relations, whom he may know, and possibly the senior person at the IISS, which he has been active in over the years.

You asked for some suggestions and this is the best I can do. If you want to visit by phone, give me a call.

As I indicated to you at the Grove, I would be delighted to co-host it with you, if that makes sense from your standpoint.

With my best wishes,

DHR/rap
080299

DONALD RUMSFELD

TELEPHONE 312-645-0251
FACSIMILE 312-645-0258
E-MAIL: DRUMSFELD@aOL.COM

October 20, 1999

OCT 2 1 1999

Dear Henry:

I promised to get back to you with some dates in April and May, 2000 for the de Rose function.

In April I am fairly clear. I have a RAND meeting on April 12, 13, 14 in Washington, so good days for me would be April 10 or 11, or the evening of April 14, or April 15 and 16.

I am committed in San Francisco on April 19, 20, 21, so those are out. I am also tied up on April 26. Almost any other time in April I could do it.

May is just jammed. I could do it May 22 in New York or May 26, 27 or 28. At the present time I am holding May 8-12 and May 29-June 2 - those dates are not committed yet, but I have given them away until I check back with those folks.

Why don't you take a look at your calendar to see if any of these make sense, but before you go back to François, please double check with me to see if they are still open, and then we can commit to a date.

Thanks very much,

Regards,

(Signed in his absence)

DR/nsp
102099.5

HENRY A. KISSINGER
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022
(212) 759-7919

DONALD H. RUMSFELD
400 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 645-0251

November 3, 1999

Dear Bernie:

Our friend, François de Rose, will celebrate his 90th birthday next year. The Rumsfeld and Kissinger families believe this is an appropriate occasion to thank him for his many contributions to democratic values and the Western Alliance throughout his long life.

We have invited François and his family for dinner in New York on the evening of Monday, May 22nd, at the Kissinger residence, 435 E. 52nd Street, and wanted you to know that he has specifically asked that you and Ann be a part of this special evening. Complete details will follow but, in the meantime, we hope that you will save the date on your calendar and plan to be with us.

P.S. Please call Jody Williams in Henry's office to let us know if this date is convenient for you.

Gen. Bernard Rogers
1467 Hampton Ridge Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

Remarks of the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
Center for Security Policy
10th Annual Dinner
9th Annual Keeper of the Flame Award
October 7, 1998

Chairman Ed Meese, distinguished Members of the House and Senate, public officials -- past and present -- ladies and gentlemen. Good evening.

I see so many here who have served our country with distinction in so many important ways - Senators Cochran, Kyl and Wallop, Secretaries Jim Schlesinger and Al Haig, and many others. And there is Dr. Fritz Kraemer. There is a true "keeper of the flame." It is a privilege as well as a pleasure to be with you all.

Frank -- my congratulations to you for your ten years of contributions to our country's security. You and your associates at the Center deserve, and have, our appreciation. We all know and respect the energy, persistence and patriotism that you have brought to the national security debate and are grateful for it.

Senator Thad Cochran, I thank you for your generous words. As you know, your Committee's very useful "Proliferation Primer" was given to each of our Commission members at our first session. You have made important contributions on these key subjects, and I congratulate you for them.

* * * *

I find since I first arrived in Washington, D.C., to work on Capitol Hill back in 1957, fresh out of the Navy, that while we went back home at regular intervals, I seem to keep finding myself back here on some project or another for over several decades now. I must say that this most recent assignment, the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, has been particularly interesting, because the subject is so important.

This evening I want to talk a bit about our report, first because it is a message that needs to be heard, and, second, because there's no group who has done more and can do still more to carry that message.

As you will recall, the U.S. Intelligence Community's 1995 National Intelligence Estimate caused quite a stir in the national security community for a number of reasons. As a result, the Congress established our Commission to provide an independent assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United States -- including Alaska and Hawaii. Our charter was not to look at other threats or possible responses.

As one of our Commissioners put it, our task was to find out, Who has them? Who is trying to get them? When are they likely to succeed? Why do we care? and, When will we know?

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Thanks to Speaker Gingrich and Minority Leader Gephardt for the House, and Senate Leaders Lott and Daschle, the members of our bipartisan Commission were truly outstanding. They included:

* Dr. Barry Blechman, the former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Carter Administration;

* Retired four-star general Lee Butler, former Commander of the Strategic Air Command;

* Dr. Richard Garwin of IBM, a distinguished scientist;

* General Larry Welch, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and CEO of the IDA;

* Paul Wolfowitz, former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, former Ambassador to Indonesia, and Dean of the Nitze School at Johns Hopkins University; and

* James Woolsey, former Director of the CIA in the Clinton Administration.

* Also with us this evening is Dr. Steve Cambone, currently the Director of Research at the National Defense University. Steve did a superb job as Staff Director for the Commission.

Two of our Commissioners are here this evening, and I'd like them to stand and be recognized for their important work.

* Dr. William Graham, former Science Advisor to President Reagan. Bill Graham has done a superb job. Thank goodness we had the benefit of his technical experience and knowledge.

* Dr. William Schneider, former Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance in the Reagan Administration. Bill kept us sane with his unfailing good humor, penetrating as it is, and challenged by his keen insights.

The members of the Commission spent an enormous number of hours, over six months and received over 200 briefings. Not surprisingly, given our different backgrounds and experiences -- military, technical, policy oriented, but all with decades of experience dealing with the Intelligence Community and its products -- we started out with a variety of viewpoints. As we proceeded, each time we seemed to be diverging in our views, we called for more briefings and focused back on the facts.

After extensive discussion and analysis, we arrived at our unanimous conclusions and a unanimous recommendation. As General Welch said, the facts overcame our biases and opinions and drove us to our unanimous conclusions. And in this city, unanimity is remarkable, especially on a subject as heated as this.

Given that so few people will be able to read our classified final report of some 307 pages, with several hundred additional classified pages of working papers and technical analysis, and that the unclassified executive summary was only 36 pages, that our conclusions were unanimous makes them considerably more persuasive.

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During the course of our deliberations, almost every week there was an event somewhere in the world related to ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction -- whether the Ghauri missile launch by Pakistan, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions, continued stiff-arming of the U.S. and the U.N. inspectors by Iraq, the Shahab 3 missile firing in Iran, and more recently North Korea's Taepo Dong 1 three-stage launch. The pace of these significant events, while disturbing to be sure, provided a vivid backdrop for our work.

* * * *

It is clear the Gulf War taught regional powers that they are ill-advised to try to combat U.S. or Western armies, navies and air forces. They can neither deter nor prevail against those vastly greater conventional capabilities. That being the case, it's not surprising that they seek asymmetrical advantages and leverage to enable them to change the calculations of Western nations and ways to threaten and deter them as well as their neighbors.

They have several cost effective options. Terrorism is one. Cruise missiles are also an increasingly attractive option in that they are both versatile and relatively inexpensive. At some point they may well become a weapon of choice.

And, third, there are ballistic missiles.

* It is not happenstance that some 25-30 countries either have or are seeking to acquire ballistic missiles. They are very attractive, and relatively inexpensive when compared to armies, navies and air forces;

* Second, like cruise missiles, they can be launched from land, sea or air and have the flexibility of carrying chemical, biological or nuclear warheads; and

* Third, they have the compelling advantage of being certain to arrive at their destinations -- since there are no defenses against them.

Those of us from Chicago recall Al Capone's remark that "You get more with a kind word and a gun than you do with a kind word alone." We can substitute "ballistic missile" for "gun" and the names of some modern day Al Capones.

The term "rogue countries" is an unfortunate phrase, since it suggests that their behavior might be erratic. While unusual to us, their actions are rational for them and not unpredictable. To say that such countries would be deterred or dissuaded from using terrorist attacks, cruise missiles or ballistic missiles with weapons of mass destruction, because of the vastly greater power of the U.S. and the West, is to misunderstand. As Lenin said, "the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize." These are terror weapons, and they work.

Having these capabilities in the hands of such countries forces a different calculation on the part of the U.S. and any nation that has interests in their regions.

* * * *

The Commission's unanimous conclusions were these:

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China and Russia continue to pose threats to the U.S., although different in nature. Each is on an uncertain, albeit different, path. With respect to North Korea and Iran, we concluded each could pose a threat to the U.S. within five years of a decision to do so, and that the U.S. might not know for several years whether or not such a decision had been made. Given that UNSCOM sanctions and inspections are unlikely to be in place, it is increasingly clear that Iraq has to be included with North Korea and Iran.

We concluded unanimously that these emerging capabilities are broader, more mature, and evolving more rapidly than had been reported, and that the intelligence community's ability to provide timely warning has been and is being eroded and that the warning time of deployment of a ballistic missile threat to the United States is reduced. Finally, we concluded that under some plausible scenarios, including re-basing or transfer of operational missiles, sea- and air-launch options, shortened development programs that might include testing in a third country, or some combination of these, the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment.

* * * *

One important reason is that the emerging powers are secretive about their programs and increasingly sophisticated in deception and denial. They know considerably more than we would like them to know about the sources and methods of our collection, in no small part through espionage. And they use that knowledge to good effect in hiding their programs.

We concluded that there will be surprises. It is a big world, it is a complicated world, and deception and denial are extensive. The surprise to me is not that there have been and will continue to be surprises, but that we are surprised that there are surprises. We don't, won't, and can't know everything. We must recognize that some surprises will occur and take the necessary steps to see that we invest so that our country is arranged to deal with the risks that the inevitable surprises will pose. As von Clausewitz wrote, "The unexpected is the prince of the battlefield."

* * * *

The second key factor relative to reduced warning is the extensive and growing foreign assistance, technology transfer and foreign trade in ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Foreign trade and foreign assistance are, in our view, not a "wild card." They are a fact. The contention that we will have ample warning of developments in nations with "indigenous" ballistic missile development programs misses the point. I don't know of a single nation on earth with an "indigenous" ballistic missile program. There may not have been a truly indigenous ballistic missile development program since Robert Goddard. The countries of interest are helping each other. They are doing it for a variety of reasons -- some strategic, some financial. But, be clear -- technology transfer is not rare or unusual, it is pervasive.

The intelligence task is difficult. There are more actors, more programs and more facilities to monitor than was the case during the Cold War. Their assets are spread somewhat thinly across many priorities. Methodological adjustments relative to collecting and analyzing evidence is, in our view, not keeping up with the pace of events. We need to remember Baldy's

4

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Law: "Some of it (what we see), plus the rest of it (what we don't see) equals all of it." Or, as Dr. Bill Graham frequently reminded us, "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

Specifically, Russia and China have emerged as major suppliers of technology to a number of countries. There is the advent and acceleration of trade among second-tier powers to the point that the development of these capabilities may well have become self-sustaining. Today they each have various capabilities the others do not. As they trade -- whether it's knowledge, systems, materials, components, or technicians -- they benefit from each other and are able to move forward on separate development paths, all of which are notably different from ours or that of the Soviet Union. And, they are able to move at a more rapid pace.

To characterize the programs of target nations as "high-risk" is a misunderstanding of the situation. These countries do not need the accuracies the U.S. required. They do not have the same concerns about safety that the U.S. has. Nor do they need the high volumes the U.S. acquired. As a result, they are capable of using technologies, techniques and even equipment that the U.S. would have rejected as too primitive as much as three decades ago. But let there be no doubt -- they are successfully and rapidly developing the capabilities necessary to threaten the United States.

As I mentioned, we considered a series of ways nations can shorten the missile development process and, therefore, warning time. They included launching shorter-range missiles by air or sea, by placing them in another country, by missile testing in another country, by the turn-key sale of entire ballistic missile systems to other countries, or some combination.

These approaches have been characterized as "unlikely." But each has been done. They are not new, novel, high-risk or unlikely.

As Jim Woolsey pointed out, making ICBMs was like the old 4-minute mile barrier. It seemed impossible until Roger Bannister broke it. Today it's relatively easy.

* * * *

On the subject of sanctions, you will recall that President Clinton recently said that sanctions legislation causes them to "fudge." It was an honest statement. However, "fudging" can have a dangerous effect.

5

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There are several ways to "fudge":

* First, simply don't study or analyze a matter if the answer might put your superiors in an uncomfortable position;

* Delay studying or reporting up information that would be "bad news";

* Narrowly construe an issue, so that the answer will not be adverse to your boss's views or positions; and

* Last, select assumptions that assure that the answer will lead to your desired conclusions. For example, you could study carefully whether or not the U.S. will have adequate warning of "indigenous" ballistic missile development programs, even though "indigenous" ballistic missile development programs don't exist.

In short, the effect of "fudging" is to warp and corrupt the intelligence process. It is corrosive. Leaders have to create an environment that is hospitable to the truth -- whether it is bad news or good news -- not an environment that forces subordinates to trim, hedge, duck and, as the President said, "fudge."

* * * *

The recent TD-1 space launch vehicle test is an object lesson and also a warning. Many were skeptical for technical reasons that the TD-1 could fly at all. It had been the conventional wisdom that "staging" and systems integration were too complex and difficult for countries such as North Korea to accomplish in any near time frame. Yet North Korea demonstrated staging twice.

The likelihood that a TD-2 will be successfully tested has gone up considerably since the August 31st flight. The likelihood that a TD-2 flight could exceed 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers in range with a nuclear payload has gone up as well. And, the likelihood that we will not know very much in advance of a launch what a TD-2 will be capable of continues to be high.

Now, the TD-1 launch was interesting with respect to North Korea, but given the reality of technology transfer, what happens in North Korea also is important with respect to other countries, for example, Iran. We can be certain that North Korea will offer that capability to other countries, including Iran. That has been their public posture. It has been their private behavior. They are very, very active marketing ballistic missile technologies. In addition, Iran not only has assistance from North Korea, but it also has assistance from Russia and China, which creates additional options and development paths for them.

* * * *

What does this all mean by way of warning? Well, it powerfully reinforces our Commission's conclusions that technology transfer is pervasive and that deception and denial work. I've mentioned "surprises," which of course go to the issue of warning. When do we know something? Put another way -- when is what we do know sufficiently clear that it becomes actionable?

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Roberta Wohlstetter's brilliant book *Pearl Harbor*, and the foreword to it, compellingly argue that:

> "...we were not caught napping at the time of Pearl Harbor. We just expected wrong. And it was not our warning that was most at fault, but our strategic analysis. We were so busy thinking through some "obvious" Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice they actually made."

It may have been a somewhat "improbable" choice, but it was not all that improbable. We provided the undefended target, and if we know anything from history, it is that weakness is provocative. Weakness entices others into adventures they otherwise would avoid. "The risk is that what is strange is thought to be "improbable," and what seems improbable is not taken seriously."

The book goes on to point out that:

> "Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility, but also responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give to those who need it (and this is happening today). It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure it is the occasion, which is usually too late."

> "The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens, is everything involved in a government's failure to anticipate effectively."

Does that sound familiar?

* * * *

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Our Commission's unanimous recommendation was that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment of ballistic missile threats be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning. Specifically, we believe the Department of State should review its policies and priorities, including sanctions and non-proliferation activities, as well as our alliance activities; the intelligence community should review U.S. collection capabilities, given their changing and increasingly complex task; and, last, that the defense establishment should review both U.S. offensive and defensive capabilities as well as strategies, plans and procedures that are based on an assumption of extended warning.

In short, we are in a new circumstance and the policies and approaches that were appropriate when we could rely on extended warning no longer apply.

* * * * *

Recently I have been asked about the reception our report has received. I would say it has been surprisingly good.

* First, the press. The reaction was superb from Bill Safire, but across the country it has been modest. But then there has been a lot of unusual news competition here in Washington, D.C., to say nothing of the news of:

- Russia's economic problems and protests and the last Soviet intelligence chief, Mr. Primakov, being named Prime Minister.

- The Asian financial crisis.

- The Chicago Cubs' Sammy Sosa's brilliant chase for the home run title, to say nothing of Mr. McGwire's accomplishment.

- And, if you can believe it, Quaddafi, of all people, holding a 5-nation summit.

* As to the Department of State and the National Security Council, I am not aware of any public reaction.

* The only reaction from the Department of Defense I am aware of was to reiterate their belief that the U.S. will have ample warning of "indigenous" ballistic missile development programs, with which we, of course, would readily agree, if, in fact, any "indigenous" ballistic missile programs actually existed -- which they don't. As General Lee Butler said at one of our Commission's Congressional hearings, "If you are determined to do it, there is no body of evidence that cannot be ignored."

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* In the Intelligence Community we see positive changes already. I think it is reasonably certain that the next National Intelligence Estimate will look quite different from the last one. The initial press report on the release of the Commission's findings quoted an "anonymous CIA source" as contending that our report was a "worst case." But that was before the North Korean three-stage TD-1 launch in August. We have not seen that phrase used again since. Indeed, our report could prove to have been a "best case," if and when North Korea and/or Iran announce and demonstrate still greater ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities, as they most surely will in the months ahead.

* * * *

We are in a relaxed post-Cold War environment, with increased exchanges of scientists and students, relaxed export controls, leaks of classified information appearing in the press almost daily, espionage continuing apace, an explosion of "demarches," which provide vital information that eventually is used to our disadvantage, and increased international trade of sophisticated dual-use technology.

It is increasingly clear that anti-proliferation efforts, coupled with the inevitable imposition of still more sanctions --which already cover a large majority of the people on earth -- are not stopping other nations from acquiring increasingly sophisticated weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies.

There are two schools of thought as to how to deal with this obvious failure:

* One is to try still harder and impose still more sanctions.

* The second approach is to seriously work to prevent the availability of the most important technologies, try to delay the availability of the next tier of information, but to recognize that we live in a world where those who don't wish us well will inevitably gain sophisticated weapons, and that, therefore, the answer is to invest as necessary in the offensive and defense capabilities and the intelligence assets that will enable us to live with these increasingly dangerous threats.

* * * *

We hear a lot about the defense budget and the top line pressure -- that we can't afford more. Look, our country may not be wealthy enough to do everything in the world that everyone in the world may wish, but the first responsibility of government is to provide for the national security. And, let there be no doubt, our country is more than wealthy enough to do everything important that we need to do. Defense expenditures at 3% of GNP are the lowest in my adult lifetime. We need to stop the mindless defense cuts, rearrange our national defense to fit the post-Cold War world, and invest as necessary to assure our nation's ability to contribute to peace and stability in our still dangerous and increasingly untidy world.

* * * *

I am optimistic that we will find our way. We are not a nation with but one leader. Our strength is that we have multiple centers of leadership.

9

Klaus Ruppert

Pellwarmer Str. 5
90 425 Nürnberg
Tel. und Fax 0911/345 3

JAN 2 2 1999

Sehr geehrter Herr Dr. Kissinger,

eigentlich wollte ich Ihnen schon lange einen Brief schreiben.

Es gibt einige besondere Anlässe für mich dies zu tun, wie Sie den weiteren Ausführungen entnehmen können.

Zunächst einmal war es gar nicht so einfach, überhaupt Ihre Adresse zu erhalten. Hier war mir dankenswerter Weise das Kulturamt der Stadt Fürth behilflich. Ich dachte mir, daß dort Ihre Anschrift noch am ehesten zu erhalten sei, nachdem Sie bekanntlich Ehrenbürger dieser Stadt sind. Ich hoffe, die freundliche Dame bzw. ihr Ressort wird deswegen keine Schwierigkeiten bekommen, nachdem der Datenschutz hier in Deutschland ja sehr groß geschrieben wird.

Lassen Sie mich am besten Punkt für Punkt vorgehen, auch deshalb, um Ihnen die Zusammenhänge deutlicher vor Augen zu führen.

Meine Mutter - Jahrgang 1908 und vor einem Jahr verstorben - erzählte uns Kindern früher des öfteren, daß sie den kleinen „Henry“ sehr gut aus ihrer Kindheit in Erinnerung habe. Sie bzw. Ihre Eltern müssen, wenn ich das recht erinnere, in einer der nächsten Seitenstrassen zum Haus meiner Großeltern in Fürth gelebt haben (eventuell in der Mathildenstr. ?). Mein Großvater hatte in der Sommerstr. 11 eine Spiegelfabrik, der Name meiner Großeltern war. Bartenbacher. Vielleicht sagt Ihnen das noch etwas, zufällig. Daß Sie mit der „kleinen Rosa“ gespielt haben könnten, daran werden Sie sich sicher nicht mehr erinnern. Das wollte ich Ihnen immer schon einmal schreiben und dabei möglicherweise alte Erinnerungen wieder wachrufen.
Es wäre für uns natürlich von einigem Interesse, von Ihnen hierzu etwas zu erfahren.

Sie sind ein alter Anhänger der SpVgg. Fürth, die sich ja heuer anschickt, an alte ruhmreiche Zeiten in den 20er-Jahren anzuknüpfen. Des öfteren bin ich auch im Ronhof, um die aktuelle Entwicklung zu begutachten. Ich darf Ihnen hierzu sagen, daß ich da sozusagen erblich belastet bin, da mein Großvater im Vorstand der SpVgg in den 10-/bzw. 20 - Jahren war; so viel ich weiß, war er Schatzmeister.

Ich persönlich habe - als einziger Nürnberger in unserer Familie - in den 60-er und 70-er Jahren für „meinen geliebten Club“ als Amateur gespielt und möchte diese herrliche Zeit nicht missen. Kontakte bestehen heute noch und wir verfolgen unverändert mit Herzblut - wenn auch etwas gemäßigter - das Schicksal unseres FCN. Wir hoffen natürlich, daß er die 1. Liga wird halten können und es vielleicht dann nächstes Jahr wieder das älteste deutsche Derby, diesmal in der höchsten deutschen Klasse geben wird. Was haben wir für wunderbare, heiß umkämpfte, aber stets faire Spiele mitgemacht !

Ich bin inzwischen 61 Jahre alt, als Bankaufmann bei der jetzigen Hypo-/Vereinsbank - ehemalige Bayerische Staatsbank in München, später Fürth und dann Nürnberg, in Ruhestand und kann mich nun zusammen mit meiner Frau Marianne, ausgiebig meinen zahlreichen Hobbies widmen. Dazu zählt u. a. auch die Mundart-Dichtung, fränkisch natürlich. Es begann mit der Übersetzung des LUKAS - Evangeliums durch Herrn Pfarrer Preß aus Hallstadt bei Bamberg und setzte sich dann über einige Klassiker, wie Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Fontane, Mörke u. a. fort und schließlich kamen dann „eigene Produktionen“ dazu. Nachdem Sie ja Franke sind und dies ja auch gar nicht leugnen wollen, erlaube ich mir, Ihnen eine kleine Auswahl beizulegen. Vielleicht veranlaßt Sie dieses oder jenes ein wenig zum Schmunzeln! Was mich sehr freuen würde! (Es ist nur unglaublich schwierig, einen Verlag hierfür zu finden!)

Erst vor kurzem konnten wir Sie im Fernsehen mit einem Heine - Gedicht (?) anläßlich des 80. Geburtstages von Altbundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt - den ich sehr verehre - bewundern. Auch dort ließen Sie ja „den Franken“ anklingen.

Bitte wenden !

Ob Sie mir/uns wohl ein Bild mit einer persönlichen Widmung zur Verfügung stellen würden? Das fänden wir großartig. Danke hierfür im voraus!

Selbstverständlich wäre es ein wundervolles Ereignis für uns, wenn wir Sie einmal anläßlich Ihrer öfteren Besuche hier persönlich kennen lernen dürften!!

Nun hoffe ich sehr, sehr geehrter Herr Dr.Kissinger, daß dieser Brief Sie überhaupt erreichen wird und Ihr persönlicher Referent (in) ihn auch für wert befindet, Ihnen vorgelegt zu werden.

Jedenfalls zunächst herzlichen Dank, daß Sie sich Zeit genommen haben, mir „zuzuhören".
Über Antwort würden wir uns hier sehr freuen.

Mit persönlichen Grüßen

Ihr

PS. Ich weiß zwar nicht, ob Sie, wie viele große amerikanische Politiker – z.B. fast alle Präsidenten in der Pionierzeit – auch **Freimaurer** (Free-mason) sind. Ich gehöre der hiesigen Loge LUGINSLAND an, während mein leiblicher Bruder Horst als Fürther in der dortigen, altehrwürdigen Loge „Wahrheit und Freundschaft", die auch mit USA-Bürgern zusammen arbeitet („Truth and friendship"), seine freimaurerische Heimat hat.
In der Freimaurerei sind Menschen aller Nationen rund um den Erdball – mit Ausnahme der totalitären System-vereint, eine Weltbruderkette und eine großartige Idee! Wir haben hier Juden, Moslem, Hindu, Buddhisten etc., die alle Brüder sind.

Alles Gute für Sie und Ihre Familie !

1

DIE BÄRCHSCHAFD

Zu Dionys, dem Dyranna iss gschlichn,
Damon, in da Husn a klanns Schwerdla.
Ned vo da Seidn sinns gwichn,
Bisn dawischd homm, drinna im Gärdla.
„Woss wolldsdn mit dem Messala, dous soong !?“
„Den Dyranna wolldi daschloong!“
Nou wardner, dess werrsd am Greiz nu bereia !“

„Iech bin“, draff da Damon, „zum Sterm bereit.
Und dou ned beddln um mei Leem.
Abba willdsma a Gnad du geem,
Nou biddadi um drei Dooch Zeit.
Zur Hochzeit vo mein Schwesterla mechad in gäih.
Iech louda mein Freind dou als Bärng.
Wenni nimma kumm, nou konnsd den derwärng !“

Dou lächeld der Keenich mit archer List
Und sachd zuna nach korzn Bedenkn:
„Däi drei Dooch willada schenkn.
Abba horch, wenns rum iss, däi Frist
Und du nonni zrickkumma bist,
Nou hullama fei den andern
Und du konnsd allaans in der Gechend rumwandern.“

Dou gäihda zum Freind: „Der Keenich,
Hot gsachd: „Dei Leem gild nu weenich.“
Doch gibdama drei Dooch Zeit,
Bis mei Schwester ihr Mannla hot gfreit.
Als Pfand deeda diech scho neema !
Abba zvuur bini zrick, sunst mäißdami scheema !“

„Dess machi, „versprichdna da Freind, „bei Gott !“
Und lieferdsi aus dem Dyranna.
Derwall ziechd da ander vo danna.
Und vur dem dridden Morchenrot
Er ess Schwesterla scho verheirat hot.
Nou rennda zrick, um den Freind auszulösn
Ass da Hend vo dem Keenich, dem bösn.

Aff amol douds reenga vo ooma rou.
Vo di Berch sterzn Quelln
Und lassn Streem und Bech oschwelln.
Dou stäihda am Ufa:“ Woss solliner dou ?“
Und scho reißd da Strudl di Brickn nou.
Donnernd sprenga däi mechdichn Woong
Dess Brickngewölbe midsamd inn Boong.

2

Und trostlos rennda ann Ufarand.
Er schaut hie und schaut nieba:
„Ja, hulldmi denn kanna rieba !?“
Abba kanna bringd den einsama Rufa
Nieba ans andere Ufa.
Ka Schiffa mit seim Boot
Hilfdna ass seina Not.

Dou sinkda hi und dout fläiha,
Di Hend zum Zeus erhoom:
„Lou nooch mit dem Strom sein Doom !
Ess renna di Stundn, di Sunna stäihd hoch;
Scho ball iss vabei da ganze Dooch.
Allmächd, wenn dessner gäihd goud !
Sunst binni zrick - und mei Freind, der ist doud !“

Abba nu schlimma werrd inn Strom sei Woud.
Und di Welln douts ans Ufa hi sprenga.
Und Stundn um Stundn vagenga.
Dou backdna di Angsd und er faßtsi ann Moud.
Und schmeißdsi dollkiehn nei in di Floud.
Wäia Varrickda douta roudern.
Da Herrgodd dabarmdsi - scho issa driema, da Broudern.

Etz issa am Ufa und glei rennda weida.
Er dankd seim Herrgodd und iss ganz heida.
Dou kumma aff amol di Reiba assn Wald:
„Dir hefma, mei Läiba, diech machma etz kald !“
Und inn Weech dennasna schnell vasperrn.
Und brilln dou rum ganz greißlich und blärrn:
„Dei letzts Stindla iss kumma und ezat moußt sterm !“

„Woss wolldadenn, den falschn dawischdadoufei !
Iech hobb nix, wäi mei Leem
Und dess moui dem Keenich geem.
Nou nimmda ann dess Gwehr wech glei
Und hauts dem nexdn in die Goschn nei.
Zwa weidere daschlechda im Nu.
Dou renna di andern schnell davu.

Dass etz di Sunna su roubrennd hättsaned grod brauchd.
Da Damon iss ferdi und ferchderlich gschlauchd.
Zum Herrgodd beed'a und fast hatta gflennd:
„Etz hosdmi doch gredd grod ass Reibahend,
nedamol da Strom, da wilde, hotma woss oham kennd.
Und etz sollidou wergli vaderm !
Und mei Freind, da goude, fier miech moua sterm !?“

3

Abba horchner wäis sproudeld silberhell !
Ganz in da Näh heerdas rauschn.
Und vulla Ondachd douda lauschn.
Dou schau hi, ass dem Felsn gor schnell
Springd a Wässerla ass ann frischn Quell.
Ganz glickli knäidasi nieda
Und benetzd seine brennadn Glieda.

Di Sunna dout leise di Bleddla beweeng
Und mold aff di glenzndn Maddn
Vo di Beim gigandische Schaddn.
Dou kummana zwa Wanderer endgeeng.
Scho willa ann dene voriebazäihng,
Dou heerda grodnu wäis soong:
„ Auweiala, etz werrnsna grod anns Greiz noschloong.“

Und di Angsd befliecheld sein Fouß
Vur Sorng vill und Qualn.
Dou sichda inn di Amdrotsstrahln
Vo da Fern däi Zinna vo Syrakus;
Endgeeng kummdna da Philostratus,
Vom Heisla da reedliche Hieda.
Der erkennd entsetzt glei sein Gebieda.

„ Laß nooch ! Dein Freind, den reddsd nimmermehr.
Su laaf um dei eings Leem !
Si hengana grod aaf etz ehm.
Aff diech stundnlang gward hot er
Vulla Hoffnung aff dei Wiederkehr.
Den fesdn, mudichn Glaum
Konnd aa da Hohn vom Dyranna iehm ned raum.“

Und wenns zu speed iss und iech konna ned
Als Redda willkumma ascheina,
Nou sollmi der Doud middna vaeina.
Da Dyranna, da bloudi, sollsi riehma ned,
Dass da Freind ned zum Freind ghaldn hätt !
Vo Läib und Drei di Ohrn sollna klinga,
Nou konna uns alle zwa glei umbringa.

Und di Sunna sinkd nieda und er stäihd an da Pfordn
Und sichd, wäis ess Greiz grod aheeha.
Ann haafn Leid umandastäiha.
Sie zäihngna scho naaf, sein Freind jetz dordn;
Dou schreida quer ieba däi riesiche Hordn:
„ Miech, Henka, miech moußd dawärng,
ned den andern, den schuldlosn Bärng !“

Wäis stauna, all däi Leid ringsumher !
Indi Arm liengsasi zu zweid.
Und waana dennas vur Schmerz und vur Freid.
Ka aanzichs Auch sichdma dränaleer.
Sugor da Keenich heerd vo dera Wundermär.
Und aa er spierd a menschlichs Riehrn.
Schnell läßda däi zwaa zu sich fiehrn.

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

March 29, 1999

Dear Mr. Rusnak:

Dr. Kissinger appreciated your invitation to contribute an article for the next edition of *International Issues* focusing on cooperation in the V-4 region and is sorry to have to decline. A number of other commitments and a great deal of travel in the weeks ahead to promote the recently published third volume of his memoirs unfortunately prevent him from undertaking any new projects at this time.

Dr. Kissinger hopes you will understand and, again, thanks you for being in touch.

Mr. Urban Rusnak
*International Issues*
Bratislava

VIA FAX 011/421/7/59783333

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300
TELEFAX (212) 753-7248

HK: editor Urban Rusnak invites you-- together w/ PMs of Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary & Slovakia--to write article for next issue of *Intl. Issues*, a Slovak quarterly on *intl. relations*, focusing on cooperation in the V-4 region.

DEADLINE: May 2nd / LENGTH: not specified

Regret, no time ✓

Accept & find out length ___

Jody

04/03 '99 09:03

FAX +421.7.5978.3333

MZV SR OSSP 1
24/7 OR ANAP

→→→ MZV SR OSSR

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MEDZINÁRODNÉ OTÁZKY

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

JOURNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, DIPLOMACY, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE

Urban Rusnák
Editor in Chief

Bratislava, 28. February 1999

MAR 0 4 1999

The political development in Slovakia after the September 1998 general elections created a new atmosphere in our society. One of the most visible changes in the foreign policy made by the new Slovak Government was a new approach to the neighbouring countries and in particular to the idea of revitalisation of the Visegrad co-operation.

As a contribution to the discussion on revitalisation of the Visegrad co-operation editors of the INTERNATIONAL ISSUES - the first quarterly journal of international relations in the Slovak Republic decided to dedicate the coming issue No. 2/99 to the co-operation in the V-4 region.

According to the new editorial policy, every issue of the INTERNATIONAL ISSUES should be dedicated to one of the priorities of the Slovak Foreign Policy, with a contribution of a key person(s) related to the matter. Last two issues, please find enclosed to the letter, were dedicated to the security questions in Central Europe and position of Slovakia in the NATO enlargement process, with an article submitted by Mr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General (4/98) and the issue No. 1/99 to the Slovak-EU relation and EU enlargement process with a contribution of Mr. Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission.

Excellency, for this reason I would appreciate very much, if you personally as a world know scholar and former State Secretary of the U.S.A could also contribute to our journal on the above mentioned matter as one of the key authors of the issue, together with the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. In your famous book *The History of Diplomacy* you mentioned the great importance of regional co-operation in Central Europe for further stability of the continent. The editorial deadline is May 2, 1999 and publishing the Visegrad-oriented INTERNATIONAL ISSUES No. 2/99 could be a part of the regional support for Slovakia's integration efforts.

Your Excellency, thank you further for your support.

His Excellency
Mr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20006

DROTAČKA CESTA 46, 811 02 BRATISLAVA
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

TEL: 00 421 7 593 561 25
00 421 7 593 561 18

Fax: 00 421 7 5978 3599
00 421 7 62602517

04/03 '99 08:58

TX/RX NO. 0896

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MEDZINÁRODNÉ OTÁZKY

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Urban Rusnák
Editor in Chief

MAR 1 8 1999

Bratislava, 28, February 1999

Your Excellency, thank You further for your support.

DROTÁRSKA CESTA 46, 811 02 BRATISLAVA
SLOVAK REPUBLIC

TEL.: 00 421 7 593 541 25
00 421 7 593 541 18

Fax: 00 421 7 5978 3599
00 421 7 62802517