MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: December 17, 1971; 2:00 p.m.
The American Enterprise Institute
1150 17th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

PARTICIPANTS: Group gathered by the Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution and Peace (see list attached)
Henry A. Kissinger
Coleman S. Hicks (Notetaker)

[Dr. Kissinger was introduced by Dr. Glenn Campbell of the Hoover Institution.]

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) I have always thought that there is nothing more boring than having a senior official get up at a meeting and say that his actions were conceived the best way possible, that all alternatives were considered, and that only ignorance on the part of the people listening could cause them to question his decisions. Now let me tell you our actions have been well conceived, all alternatives were considered, and only ignorance could cause you to question me. (Laughter) Let me speak briefly now and then answer questions that you may have about foreign affairs.

Before beginning though, let me make a few comments about Dave Packard. I don't want you people to make it too comfortable for Dave on the West Coast; it will make it all the harder for us to get him back here to Washington. You know, in government there are always a few key men who have intelligence, of course, but who demonstrate another capacity, the capacity to dominate events by the force of their character and by their integrity. That is the case with Dave Packard. Washington will be less effective and lonelier when Dave leaves.

Dave and I have been colleagues in what we hope will be one of the transition periods in the development of foreign affairs. When this

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Administration came into office the philosophy of the post-war period, a philosophy dominated by the Marshall Plan, had run its course. In the 1960's, public discussion of foreign affairs focused almost exclusively on Vietnam. I think that a few years from now people will look back and wonder what all the excitement on the Vietnam issue was all about. In this Administration we have reduced casualties there from 300 a week to 10, and removed 400,000 Americans at the same time that the domestic situation in Vietnam has improved. How can we possibly be criticized on a record like that by the very people that got us into Vietnam? Gentlemen, the war in fact is over. The only question remaining is the rate at which it is being ended. This should be obvious. I don't want to talk any more about Vietnam unless you have questions.

The really key issue for our Administration is not Vietnam. Rather it is the challenge of adjusting to the broad change in the post-war international scene. Following the war, all problems in the free world were problems that we were held responsible for settling. Our attitude at that time was similar to the enthusiasm that we had earlier showed for isolationism. We saw no problem as insoluble, and took on the full burdens of the free world. By the late 1960's, though, this situation had changed. First, the very countries that we had aided with the Marshall Plan had strengthened themselves economically and politically. Secondly, our opponents had experienced a split among themselves more severe than the division between the Communist and non-communist camps. Third, the new nations have abandoned their rhetoric, and moved independently as new factors in international affairs. And fourth, the strategic military balance vis-a-vis the Soviets has changed drastically.

In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis supporters of Kennedy were proud to say that the President had gone to the brink of war. At that time, if you remember, there were some 60 Soviet missiles operational, all standing open and requiring ten hours to fuel. Now we face 1500 Soviet missiles well dug into silos; in addition, we face a continually growing submarine fleet. These are facts of life that we simply must deal with.

The basic thrust of foreign affairs in this Administration has been to define a role for the United States for the foreseeable future. We want to see the beginning of an era in which we develop firmer notions about the scope and the limits of our involvement in foreign affairs.

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I am often asked what I have learned in this job. You must well know that Harvard professors do not easily admit that at any point in time they did not know everything. I am sure that I will be more reflective after I have left this position. But I do know I have learned one important lesson. A professor, as I was once, can pick a topic and work on it as long as he wants; he can even change his mind and get credit for having great courage. (Laughter) In my job, I get just one guess and I never have the luxury of being able to change my mind. The really important decision-making limit in our democracy is the number of problems that one government can handle. The more problems that must be resolved in Washington, the more likely it is that the decisions won't get proper attention.

This problem is reflected in the Nixon Doctrine. We believe that for the United States to take on all the world problems would be impossible, not only physically, but certainly psychologically. When the President speaks about a generation of peace, he is looking toward a new order, an order more secure because more people have a share in it, because more people have helped to build it.

In building this new order, though, we must be realistic about our opponents. We have no illusions about Russia and China, for instance. Last month's developments on the Asian subcontinent demonstrated irresponsibility, at the kindest, on the part of the Russians. But we don't want to appoint Moscow as the sole spokesmen for the communist world. We believe Peking should speak for itself.

When we came into office, there were two schools of thought about dealing with the Soviets. The first school said that it was simply impossible to deal with them. The second advocated what I call the psychotherapeutic theory of handling the Soviets. Under this theory, improving our dealings with the Soviets is simply a problem of bettering our interpersonal relationships. What is important is to talk, even if you are talking about subjects that are not meaningful. We don't follow these theories. We think that it is worthwhile to deal with the Russians, but we talk only about meaningful problems. We have trouble enough understanding our own psychology (laughter), without trying to figure the Russians out.

What we have done with the Russians is to have dealt with them concretely on specific issues. We have high hopes that those developments

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on specific issues will be reflected fully at the coming summit. This is
where we stand in general.

But the world is an explosive place, as witnessed by last month's
events on the subcontinent of Asia. Unfortunately, I can't speak to you
in detail today about the developments in South Asia, but I will say that
certain public statements that I have read have been astounding. One is
the notion that in any dispute the United States must simply count the
number of people on each side, and back the most populous nation. Even
this Administration has the capacity to distinguish 500 million people
from 100 million people (laughter). But if we always pursued a policy
of supporting the biggest nation, we would be doomed to irrelevance.
The stronger nations would have no need of us, the weaker nations could
not have us.

On South Asia, our arguments have also been seriously misstated.
We have never said that we supported the Pakistani treatment of the
Bengalis in East Pakistan. Neither have we indicated that we have no
sympathy for the Indian refugee problem. What we have said is that
there was no justification for India to take military action at the time that
it did. We were headed toward an Indian-Pak solution; indeed, it was
perhaps for exactly that reason that the Indians precipitated the armed
conflict.

In looking at this dispute in South Asia, we must face the facts.
The Indians are armed with some $500 million worth of Soviet equipment.
They used this Soviet military support to attack another nation, while
the Soviets diplomatically used their veto to cripple the UN into impotence.
If this approach to dealing with international affairs can go unchallenged,
it will have profound consequences for the world order. In the Middle
East, for instance, we are asking the Israelis to withdraw their forces
from certain areas in exchange for a Security Council guarantee and the
potential for such Soviet action exists elsewhere in the world. . . for
instance, in Iran, in Indonesia, and so forth.

Sure, this Administration could have declared neutrality in the South
Asia conflict, and gotten approbation from major newspapers. The advan-
tages of this approach prior to the coming elections would be obvious.
But we couldn't see this as a proper course, because of its long-range
impact on international affairs, especially in terms of the Russian and

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Chinese view of our role in international affairs. From the start, our policy has been simple. We have tried to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan. I think we can say that we did succeed in bringing the war to an end and that we did contain certain implications that this conflict might have had for other areas of the world.

So that is a general view of foreign affairs, and a more specific look at one problem. Now, are there any ignorant people out there who have questions for me?

**Question:** Let me display my ignorance by saying that as a Nixon supporter I have been hard-put to answer questions from people about why your presence in Peking occurred precisely at the time of the China vote in the United Nations. Didn't that have a direct effect on expulsion of the Taiwanese?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me explain the sequence that was involved in this affair. As an introduction, I believe that the two events were unrelated. The fact that they were unrelated, of course, doesn't deny that one might have an effect on the other. I believe, though, that there was no effect by the second China trip on the outcome of the UN voting on Chinese representation.

During the first trip to China in July we had really only some 48 hours for our small staff to discuss essential matters with the Chinese. It became apparent at that time that a second trip would be required, and it was agreed to then.

Among the problems that required additional attention were technical matters. You know, the Chinese in their long history and culture have never had the experience of encountering an American press party. I had to break the news to them about the scope of the accompanying press party slowly. (Laughter) Additionally, of course, we had to discuss matters of agenda. The only question at the end of the first China trip was the timing for the second one.

I will be candid with you. Originally, we tried to set the second trip at the end of September, but that came too close to the Chinese celebrations on October 1st. In any event, of course, we subsequently found that China was in domestic upheaval at that time; so the end of

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September would not have worked in any case. During the first week of October, Haile Selassie was in China. Following his visit, we were already in the middle of October. The fact of the matter is that we actually picked the date (the 18th) for the second trip.

We did this after looking at the prior history of the China voting in the United Nations. If you will look at the record you will find that the vote in the United Nations on China representation has never taken place before the 15th of November. We thought that we could go to China, return, and use to our advantage the argument that one could oppose the Chinese in the United Nations and still deal with them diplomatically.

Additionally I believe, and all indications were to this effect, that the Chinese were really not ready for the United Nations this year. Of course, when they were voted in they had to come to New York, but personally I do not think they were very eager to settle the issue this year. When we were in China I certainly had the feeling that the Chinese thought they were making a great concession to the United States to be talking about a presidential trip at a time when we were opposing them vigorously in the United Nations. Well, so much for the question of whether the trip and the UN vote were related. Let me turn now to the question of what consequences the second trip had.

I have thought about this in great detail and carefully gone over the list of nations voting on the China issue this year, and I cannot find the vote of a single country which I believe would have been different if we hadn't gone to China. I do believe my July visit had an impact on the admission of Red China to the United Nations, but I do not think that the second trip did. The mistake in October was not to have me in China; it was rather a diplomatic problem. When there are nations like Guyana, Uganda, Botswana, and so forth, voting against us, and we need only three votes to preserve a seat for Taiwan, it seems to me that our arguments (which consisted of complicated legal documents about the status of the two-China policy) were not the most persuasive tools we might have brought to bear. There were other possibilities, the details of which I won't go into now. The first trip? Yes, I do believe there was an impact, in general. It sped up perhaps by one year the result in the United Nations. You know last year there was a majority in favor of seating Red China in the United Nations, and it was only a year away for that to reach the necessary two-thirds. But personally I believe the benefits from the China initiative will far outweigh this one-year acceleration on the changeover in the United Nations.

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**Question:** (Dr. Campbell) Due to the time constraints on Dr. Kissinger's in his important office, let me at this time indicate that he will be able to take only one more question.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, let me take two.

**Question:** On the India-Pakistan matter, how do you see that a political settlement was possible there when India would not negotiate with Sheikh Mujib who, after all, was the elected representative of the people of East Pakistan?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Look, this notion of setting aside so-called "legal representatives" is not entirely unknown in South Asia. The West Pakistani elected representatives were also set aside at the same time those from the East were. And the Indians, who have had four provinces under presidential decree, seem to me to be ill-postured for outrage at the setting aside and suspension of elected assemblies. To raise the Mujib question in this context seems to me to be similar to the argument that Hitler was right in attacking Poland because the Poles wouldn't give him the corridor that he demanded.

On the Mujib issue, let me indicate that we made serious efforts to get the Pakistanis and the representatives of Bangla Desh together for negotiations. In September, we nearly succeeded. It was India that broke the back of those proposed talks. When Mrs. Gandhi was here in Washington, we indicated to her that we would press for the release of Mujib. When the Pak Foreign Minister was here he told us that on the 20th of December the government of Pakistan would be handed over to civilian authorities. Of course, those authorities were not to be the elected representatives in East Pakistan; but it was to mean the retirement of Yahya.

Nobody questioned that Mujib's release was an essential element in the negotiations. But India wanted Yahya to commit suicide. India wanted him to release Mujib and immediately make him the chief of negotiations. We all knew that the problem was time. Let me say now, gentlemen, that I predict we will not hear too much shouting from the Indians on behalf of Sheikh Mujib now that their troops are in East Pakistan. We asked the Indians what time-frame we were working with. They did not give us an answer. We knew that Mujib was the key, but for the Indians to make Mujib their number one demand, and to make

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that demand a pre-condition for peace in South Asia when in practice
it meant the collapse of Pakistan, was not particularly sensible.

We don't say that India was wrong on all the small issues: on
Mujib, on negotiations, and so forth. What we do say, though, is that
India was wrong in starting the war.

**Question:** Your visit to Peking shocked me and many other conservatives like me. Just last Saturday Bill Buckley, a friend of both of ours, said that you are as good an anti-communist as any of us. Can you reassure us that the U.S. trip is not simply a tool to hand over things to the Communists? We have been looking for that from you or from the President, but haven't been getting it.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We are not going to hand anything over to the Communists. When you see the communique with China (and I think it is fair to say that I have some idea what that communique will look like) you will realize this. It is necessity that has brought us together: for the Chinese, the fear of their neighbors; for us, the need for diplomatic maneuvering room and the knowledge that there can be no stable peace in Asia which excludes a nation of 800 million people.

No, we are not going to China to hand anything over. We wouldn't
have to go all the way to Peking to do that. We have been faced, gentlemen,
with the full brunt of the mass media, with student demonstrations, with
Establishment critics. . . We won't be going to Peking to make concessions.
What we are doing is a reflection of international and domestic pressures
on us to position ourselves in a way to dominate events, and to avoid
conditions in which we are simply buffeted from one crisis to another.

**Question:** Did this have to be in Peking?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, in retrospect, it is always easy to raise questions and think that things might have been done another way.

**Question:** (Paul McCracken) Can you comment, Henry, on how this looked in Peking?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Politically in China this was a very tough initiative. For nearly 25 years they have publicly characterized the United States as a nation of warmongers and running dogs. They have similarly

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proclaimed their revolutionary virginity to the world. It obviously came
as an enormous emotional shock to the Chinese to give up a revolutionary
virginity that they can never regain.

But China is under serious pressure from her neighbor. The sub-
continent problems of the last month show rather dramatically an American
interest there. If there were a nation in Asia with the military strength of
Russia and with the 800 million people of China dominating the subcontinent,
it would clearly threaten the European theater that we have always known
to be vital to our interest. We are responsible for the establishment of
the channel with the Chinese; that is true. But I think you will find, as
the months go on, that the materials that pass through the channels do
not flow only in one direction. This I can assure you.

[At this point, Dr. Kissinger's remarks ended and he left the room.]

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Attendance list (as of December 13)

for Hoover Institution Board of Overseers luncheon

on December 17

Hoover Institution Board Members

William J. Baroody
President, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research

Henry T. Bodman
former Chairman of the Board, National Bank
of Detroit

David Tennant Bryan
Chairman, Richmond Newspapers, Inc.

Joseph J. Burris
Burris and Lagerlof, Los Angeles

Joseph Coors
Executive Vice President, Adolph Coors Co.,
Golden, Colorado

Frederick C. Crawford
F. C. Crawford Foundation and former President, TRW
Corporation, Cleveland
Paul L. Davies, Jr.,
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, San Francisco
Reinhold Dreher
Trustee, The Louis Calder Foundation, New York
Northcutt Ely
Attorney, Washington, D.C.
Robert D. Fisher
Chairman, The Seeley G. Mudd Fund, Los Angeles
Paul F. Grady
former Partner, Price Waterhouse & Co.
Harold H. Helm
Chairman, Executive Committee, Chemical Bank,
New York
Allan Hoover
New York
Herbert Hoover, III
Los Angeles
Marron Kendrick
President, Schlage Lock Company, San Francisco
A. Carl Kotchian
President, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Burbank, Ca.
Hobart D. Lewis
President, Reader's Digest Association, Inc.
Richard W. Lyman
President, Stanford University
Ian K. MacGregor
Chairman, American Metal Climax, Inc., New York
Frank E. Mason
Leesburg, Virginia
Jeremiah Milbank, Jr.
New York

Thomas F. Johnson Director of Research

Robert J. Pranger Director of National Security Studies

Karl Voss Director of Special Projects

Other Guests

Eva Adams Former Treasurer of the United States

Richard V. Allen Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs

Ronald Berman Director, National Endowment for the Humanities

Patrick J. Buchanan Special Assistant to the President

Anna Chennault Donor of General Claire Lee Chennault's papers to the Hoover Institution

Kenneth R. Cole, Jr. Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

Herbert V. Frayer Scaife Family Charitable Trusts, Pittsburgh

Bryce N. Harlow former Counsellor to the President

Harold C. Hinton Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University

Fred Malek Special Assistant to the President

Paul W. McCracken Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

W. D. McElroy Director, National Science Foundation

R. Daniel McMichael Scaife Family Charitable Trusts, Pittsburgh

G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

John Lord O'Brien Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.

David Packard Deputy Secretary of Defense

Harold C. Passer Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs

William H Rehnquist Justice of the United States Supreme Court