EUROPE

Press release dated Jan 3, 1974

just wondered what your reaction was to that flight and the attention you got on it. Did you feel like an average traveler?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, they don't have stewardesses on Air Force One. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that same personal note, there are a lot of people who are interested—particularly women—interested in your future. Could you tell us your marriage plans?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't plan them. [Laughter.]

Q. What can you tell us about your plans to get married?

Secretary Kissinger: I said three weeks ago when a particular plan was mentioned, that that particular plan—I commented on that particular plan and I said that I would not make any future comments on my personal situation. I would be spending too much of my time. I don't want to upset too many people. [Laughter.] Humility has always been my outstanding trait. [Laughter.] Jerry is going to issue a statement putting that part off the record. [Laughter.]

## Declarations With Western Europe

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the President's trip to Europe which you say could take place as early as the spring, would there be two separate declarations made? Do you foresee that, one with the Common Market and one with NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, the present plan is to have two declarations, one with the Common Market and one with NATO. The reason is that not every member of the Common Market is also a member of NATO and therefore it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to construct a document that took care of both of these groupings.

Secondly, in the Common Market, the nine members speak as a unit, while in NATO they are still represented in their capacities as individual nations. And therefore there will be two declarations: one dealing with the issues of mutual security and the political

issues related to that, and the second one related to the emerging European identity, the American position vis-a-vis that and the united Europe's position vis-a-vis the United States, the economic issues, and that part of the political relationship that is relevant to the relations of a united Europe with the United States.

As I said, we have made very good progress on the NATO declaration and we are also making progress on the declaration with the European Community. We have to stress again that to us this is not just a paper exercise, nor is it an attempt on our part to define legal obligations which can then be enforced by one party against the other, which is obviously not the case. It is an attempt on our part to give the democracies an opportunity to prove that not all achievements in foreign policy are to be sought in relations with adversaries, but that those countries whose unity and strength and dynamism brought them to the point where relations with adversaries can be improved can also define a future for themselves in a world which is different from that of the early 1950's.

It is an opportunity for creativity, not a legal haggle in which we are trying to get this or that clause, and in this process I think the effort has already generated a great deal of reexamination on both sides of the Atlantic and will in retrospect, I think, be seen as having made a useful contribution.

Q. If you get these two declarations for the sake of clarity, then when will the President be making the trip to Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: Whenever those declarations are ready for signature and for the final stages of the negotiations, the President would like—

Q. No time frame?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I indicated that I thought when somebody mentioned this spring that that was a possibility. But the final decision has not been made, and we do not want to set a date and then give ourselves a deadline that puts us under pressure.

We will follow the same procedure that we

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followed in other negotiations; that is, we set
the date when there is a reasonable progress
in sight.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is impeachment
going to affect the President's foreign policy
initiatives in the coming year—I mean, the
whole fight over it and the threat in Con-
gress?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no reason to
assume that there will be an impeachment,
and therefore I don't want to speculate on
that. We can only conduct foreign policy on
the assumption that the principles that we
have attempted to implement of a new rela-
tionship with our friends, of accelerating
the progress in easing tensions with our ad-
versaries, are basic principles of American
policy which the President will continue to
pursue because they are right and independ-
ent of the situation to which you have re-
ferred.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there have been some
reports that since the President has been be-
leaguered by the challenge and the complexi-
ties of Watergate that you, as a Secretary of
State, have been carrying out policy perhaps
in a more independent way than in the first
four years, when you served as an adviser.
I wonder, sir, if you could address yourself to
that question.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have read
those reports, and they are totally incorrect.
I think the idea developed because now that I
am Secretary of State the press is traveling
with me and sees me more regularly than
they did on previous trips and also there is a
more detailed reporting of my day-to-day
activities because of the necessity of daily
press briefings emerging out of one of the
great departments.

I see the President when we are in town
together every morning for a minimum of
half an hour, but usually for a much more
extended period than that. When we are not
in the same town, I cannot recall a day when
we do not talk on the telephone. When I
travel, I send the President a report at the
end of every day. I am in close touch with
General Haig [Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,

Assistant to the President] and General
Scowcroft [Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Dep-
uty Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs], who are manning the
White House, with whom I usually talk on
the telephone even when I am on trips and
from whom I always get a report. Before I
go on a trip, the President and I sit down,
as we always have, and he tells me what his
general strategy is and what he wants me to
accomplish.

Having worked as closely together as we
have for five years, there is no necessity for
him—and it isn't his style anyway—to go
into every last tactical detail. But this is not
new; this is the way it has always been.

I do not believe that the great departments
of the government can be personal fiefdoms
of individual men. The constitutional respon-
sibility for conducting foreign policy resides
in the President. The Secretary of State has
to be the agent of the President, or he repre-
sents nothing. And in this present situation
in America, I believe that government has to
be regular and it has to be conducted on the
basis of existing constitutional practice. And
I therefore totally reject the idea that I am
attempting to conduct an independent policy.

Europe's Reaction to U.S. Initiatives

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to the two
European declarations, did you really give us
all the reasons why there are going to be two
declarations? You had said in your New
York speech that you wanted a new Atlantic
charter, and you had spoken of defense, po-
litical, and economic matters as realistically
being connected.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. The Europeans came back and said, no,
no, we don't want them connected; we want
two declarations. Isn't this really what hap-
pened or has been evolving?

Secretary Kissinger: No. What happened
was when we made the proposal, I think it is
fair to say that we did not expect that we
were raising a controversial issue. We had
reason to believe, on the basis of conversa-

January 28, 1974

83

tions which the President had had with the British Prime Minister and exchanges which the President had had with other European leaders, that this would be an issue that would be relatively noncontroversial, would be greeted with some enthusiasm, and would lead fairly rapidly to a general declaration.

In this respect, as I pointed out last week, the European reaction surprised us and, I am frank to say, disappointed us. Now, what was the reason for this?

There were many causes, one of them being that this was also the year in which the Europeans attempted to form their political union and that some of the European countries thought that there was an inconsistency between at one and the same time fostering European union and greater Atlantic cooperation.

Given the way the constitution of the European Community is written, one or two countries can block the views of the majority, because it requires the approval of all of them.

Secondly, many European countries had domestic problems of their own, and therefore the process by which they responded to the initiative was somewhat slow and somewhat uncertain. It was reflected, for example, in the fact that the Europeans could not decide among themselves how to respond. That is to say, there was one proposal which still existed at the time of the meeting between the President and President Pompidou at Reykjavik, that the declaration should be developed at the level of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the individual countries. We agreed to that.

Then there was a proposal that there be a series of bilateral meetings between the United States and key European countries. We had 15 bilateral meetings between the United States and key European countries, including five by the President himself, with Foreign Ministers of other countries, in one case the British Cabinet Secretary. And at that time we were still talking about a comprehensive declaration because we were dealing with the European countries as individual countries.

At the end of July, without, incidentally, discussing the matter with us, the Europeans decided that for the part that concerned economics they were going to attempt to use our initiative as a device to form European unity and to go for the first time in their experience through the exercise of developing a common political position.

So at that point, when the Europeans decided that some issues were going to be handled by the Nine and others were going to be handled by NATO, we agreed that the two could be split but would be signed essentially simultaneously so that their total effect would be in any event one common approach.

Then, having decided that we were going to do it on a common basis, it took the Europeans three months to develop a common declaration. And while it was a major achievement for them to get anything agreed to among nine countries, its content, in our view, did not reflect the difficulty of achieving a consensus, and therefore it led to another set of negotiations.

This is the history as I see it. Now, I know there were many criticisms made that we were trying to link together political, economic, and military things and that that was not appropriate. The fact of the matter is that in practice they are linked, whether they are in two declarations or in one declaration. And the fact of the matter, however, even more importantly, is we do not conceive these declarations as a means of blackmail on the Europeans. We do not conceive them as something that we can use in defining a legal obligation from which we can develop certain demands.

What we are trying to do is to see whether the free countries in totally changed conditions from those of the 1950's can define a future for themselves and can work cooperatively along these ranges of issues.

If we want a confrontation with the Europeans on economic matters, those of you who know Washington will be aware of the fact that we don't need a declaration. Our economic agencies are delighted to have a confrontation.

With a declaration, what we are trying to

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Department of State Bulletin

do is to have a long-term political objective which would put at rest all of these arguments: Is the United States planning a con- dominium with the Soviet Union—an argu- ment that cannot be answered in the ab- stract.

We have told the Europeans, "For God's sake, let's sit down together. What is the world we are trying to bring about? We are willing to discuss with you what policies should be done unilaterally, what policies should be done jointly, and we are willing to put our détente thinking before you and you put yours before us, and let's talk about it on that basis."

All we want from these declarations is that they create the framework for it, not a legal dicker in which one side then produces a document as if we were going to court.

*Q. If the short answer, then, is that there aren't going to be any trade concessions—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are no short answers in my press conferences. [Laughter.] These guys have gotten totally out of control since I stopped briefing them. [Laughter.]

*Q. If the short answer is that there aren't going to be any trade concessions, how rapidly and at what pace will the administration begin reevaluating our military contribution to Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not saying the short answer is that there won't be any trade concessions, because there are negotiations going on within the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] framework in which, of course, our trade bill will be an essential component and we expect that there will be an agreement also on trade matters.

However, the new reality that has been created by the energy crisis, in terms of reserves and so forth, will force all countries to take a new look at their economic relationships. And I think it will make some of what you previously considered to be irritating competitive aspects seem somewhat less important and will make their solution somewhat easier.

*Q. Just a piece of detail. How many countries would you like to see involved as consumers and producers in any kind of group? To put it another way, how many will appeals be made to?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will announce that next week. We are in the process of discussing it, and it is one of the issues which the President has yet to decide. But we have a pretty clear idea already.

*Q. On the order of 20?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In that general area.

## Détente and Soviet Domestic Policies

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the publication of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's book will have any effect on our détente with Russia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our view about détente has never been geared to our approval of the Soviet domestic system. We have always maintained that we recognize that there is an important difference and, in many significant respects, incompatibility between the Soviet domestic system and our system.

It did not indicate moral approval in any respect of the Soviet system—even less, of course, of the conditions described in that book.

Our view about détente is produced by the horrors that a nuclear war would inflict on mankind and therefore the obligation that is imposed on the leaders of all countries to do their utmost to prevent such a catastrophe from arising.

This is why we are seeking to moderate Soviet foreign policy conduct. This is why we believe it is essential for high-level contact to be maintained, and easy communication between the President and the rulers of the Soviet Union. And therefore, while we have our own views of the conditions which are described in this book, they do not obviate the necessities that I have described.

*Q. Incidental to an earlier question about travel, is there a possibility, and if so how strong, of another visit by the President to*

January 28, 1974

85

the Soviet Union this coming year and also
one to Japan?

Secretary Kissinger: There has been al-
ready an agreement in principle that the
President would visit Japan this year, and
we believe that this is an agreement that can
be carried out.

There has also been an agreement which
was reached at the last summit that the
President would visit the Soviet Union this
year, and this, too, in fact we are planning
for.

Now, the exact date of the visit to the
Soviet Union will depend on progress in
negotiations which would justify Presiden-
tial participation in meetings with the Gen-
eral Secretary, principally SALT [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks].

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I follow up on the impeachment question, which I don't think you answered the first time I asked it. Do you think the President can be the leader of the free world in pretty ambitious schemes to maintain economic stability and world peace while he is under unprecedented attack at home and fighting for the very Presidency here in the coming months?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the
President can do it, and I believe that his
foreign policy will be recognized as valid in
the years ahead.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, if I could follow on Pat's
[Patrick J. Sloyan, Hearst Newspapers]
question, do you think it is possible that new
foreign policy initiatives would be part of
the President's defense on impeachment?

Secretary Kissinger: The foreign policy
of the United States, I think, will be seen to
have been carried out in a consistent, respon-
sible manner over the years, according to
principles that have been laid down in annual
foreign policy reports, and I believe that it
will be recognized that the measures are con-
ducted on their own merit and not for do-
mestic reasons.

The Press: Thank you very much, Mr.
Secretary.

United States Protests Attack
on Search Mission in Viet-Nam

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on De-
cember 17.

Press release 456A dated December 17

The Department of State of the United
States of America presents its compliments
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has
the honor to refer to the Agreement on End-
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
Nam of January 27, 1973.

On December 15, 1973, communist forces
attacked three unarmed helicopters of the
Four-Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT)
in Binh Chanh District, Gia Dinh Province
of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This attack
resulted in the destruction of one helicopter,
the death of one American and one Viet-
namese and the wounding of several Amer-
icans and Vietnamese in the party. These
helicopters and personnel were engaged in
the search for missing personnel, a humani-
tarian mission specifically authorized by the
Agreement. The helicopters were clearly
marked in orange, the color designating them
as FPJMT vehicles. As is customary, the
communist side had been notified in advance
of the details of this search mission and had
been invited to participate.

The United States condemns in strongest
terms this unprovoked act by the communist
side and deplores the unnecessary loss of life
which has resulted. The United States is
gravely concerned over this latest contempti-
ble violation of the Agreement by the com-
munist side. The United States notes that the
communist side has consistently adopted a
callous attitude toward the provisions of the
Agreement that call for a full accounting of
the missing-in-action. Now, not content with
obstructing the implementation of those pro-
visions through its indifference and total lack
of cooperation, the communist side has again
resorted to criminal acts to prevent their
implementation.

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Department of State Bulletin

ences of philosophic perspective about the
purposes of the conference, which I believe
were eased to some extent through the con-
ference. But preparation was not the issue.

Sometimes there are disagreements not
because people do not understand each other
but because they understand each other only
too well. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, may we move on to that second phase? Solzhenitsyn?

Secretary Kissinger: Let's say I'll take
two more questions on energy and then we'll
move on to the next phase.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. —what is your reaction to European
plans for increasing negotiations with the
Arab countries en bloc?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no objection to the Europeans negotiating as a unit. We have a general view about bilateral arrangements that do not follow general rules of conduct, but these two objectives can be reconciled. And secondly, of course we have a general interest—as does Europe—in political contacts that may occur that may contribute, or not, to the evolution of peace in the Middle East.

I'll take one more question—yes—on energy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind the
points which we agreed upon at this confer-
ence—such as sharing of resources and tech-
nology—what would be the effect or the im-
pact on the U.S. acceptance of something in
the area of the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties?

Secretary Kissinger: You mean the Mexi-
can charter?

Q. Yes. Considering that you have agreed
upon so many points which are in the area.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm going to be in
Mexico in two weeks, and I'm going to save
my answer for that occasion. But the United
States expressed its views on President Eche-

verria's idea on the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties in my speech at the Gen-
eral Assembly. Our view is that the concept
is useful and that we are prepared to coop-
erate with elaborating a charter that spells
out the rights and obligations of all coun-
tries—of developed, as well as developing,
countries. So we find the concept useful, and
we will have to see now what can be negoti-
ated in the forums that are open. And there
is a negotiation on it going on now in Geneva.

Now, on Solzhenitsyn: The United States
has always looked with sympathy and great
appreciation on the expression of freedom of
thought in all societies. We have regretted
some of the manifestations that interrupt
this.

We do not know enough about the specific
circumstances of the departure of Mr. Sol-
zhenitsyn. And the only problem that we have
seen here is the extent to which our human,
moral, and intellectual concern for Solzhe-
nitsyn and people of similar convictions
should affect the day-to-day conduct of our
foreign policy. In any event, we are delighted
that Solzhenitsyn is not in some of the diffi-
culties that were feared yesterday.

Q. To follow that up, Mr. Secretary, would
Mr. Solzhenitsyn be welcome in the United
States if he sought to reside here?

Secretary Kissinger: He would certainly be
welcome to reside in the United States if he
desired.

Q. How would this affect détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Our constant view
has been that the necessity for détente, as
we conceive it, does not reflect approbation
of the Soviet domestic structure. The neces-
sity of détente is produced by the unaccepta-
bility of general nuclear war under present
conditions. The accumulation of nuclear arms
has to be constrained if mankind is not to de-
roy itself.

This is a question that will be before hu-
manity under all circumstances, and before
American governments, as long as the accu-
mulation of nuclear arms continues. So the
United States will pursue a policy to reduce

March 4, 1974

229

the dangers of war, to increase the possibilities of peace, and to limit the danger of nuclear conflict.

Q: Sir, do you think Mr. Solzhenitsyn is really better off today than he was yesterday with his wife still in the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot judge to what extent his wife will be kept in the Soviet Union, and I don't think it would be helpful to make a final judgment until all the circumstances can be more clearly seen.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

## President Nixon Honors Energy Conference Representatives at White House Dinner

Following is an exchange of toasts between President Nixon and Walter Scheel, Federal German Foreign Minister and President of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, at a dinner at the White House on February 11.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated February 18

### PRESIDENT NIXON

Gentlemen and Miss Ray [Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission]: It is for all of us in this house a very great honor to have such a distinguished company on this occasion.

And as I welcome the Foreign Ministers of the 12 nations that are represented at this conference, as well as the Finance Ministers and other Ministers of Economic Affairs, I want you to know that we are privileged to have you here again. Most of you have been here before, when either the heads of government or heads of state have visited the United States.

In speaking to you today, I am not going to get into some of the technical matters that I understand have been covered at rather considerable length in your discussions earlier in the day.

I thought that perhaps it would be more useful for this distinguished company if I were to speak to you not simply in terms of the energy problem, which very properly has been the subject of primary discussion, but

to put that problem in a larger context of the world in which we live and the other problems which we face to which that, of course, is very, very closely related.

I think everybody in this room is aware of the fact that we are here at what I would call a watershed of world history. We are here at a time when we have seen the conclusion of a very long and difficult war in which the United States was involved in Viet-Nam, a time when we have seen the beginnings toward movement, toward what we hope would be not just a temporary but a permanent peace in the Mideast.

Also over the past few years during the time that I have been in this office and during the time that most of you have been in the offices you hold, we have seen the whole world change. Not only the United States but other free-world nations have opened a new dialogue with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China.

We have also seen that at the present time, as a result of that dialogue, negotiations are taking place that no one would have predicted three or four years ago—negotiations with regard to the reduction of forces in Europe, negotiations insofar as the European Security Conference is concerned, negotiations which are taking place between the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of limiting nuclear arms.

When we look at this record and of all of the events that have come together before

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Department of State Bulletin

United States and that its presence must be eliminated forthwith.

We can acknowledge the profound patriotism of those views. Were the executive authorities of the two countries to share them, however, they would be squarely on a collision course.

The plain fact of the matter is that geography, history, and the economic and political imperatives of our times compel the United States and Panama to have a joint stake in the Panama Canal enterprise. It follows that with respect to that enterprise they should comport themselves as partners and friends —preserving what is essential to each, protecting and making ever more efficient a vital international line of communication and, I suggest to you, creating a model for the world to admire of how a small nation and a large one can work peacefully and profitably together.

I think that is not too grand a design.

## Secretary Holds News Conference at the White House

President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko met at the White House on April 12. Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger after the meeting. Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to President Nixon, introduced the Secretary.

Press résumé 141 dated April 12

Mr. Ziegler: Secretary Kissinger, as you know, participated in the meeting this morning, and we thought he could give you a briefing on the session. So he is here to do that. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger: The President continued the discussions here he had with Mr. Podgorny [Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet] in Paris; and they reviewed—Foreign Minister Gromyko and the President reviewed the entire range of U.S.-Soviet relations, with particu-

lar attention to the issues that will come up at the summit.

Now, in terms of the summit preparation, I think it is fair to say that we are about at the same level, if not somewhat ahead, of the discussions that preceded the previous summit—that is, we are reviewing the whole range of U.S.-Soviet bilateral arrangements to see which of them will lend themselves to conclusion at the time of the summit and to use the summit to expedite some technical issues that have been under discussion for a while and to make agreements in a variety of areas of some significance.

The one outstanding issue that still requires solution is the issue of SALT. And so much has been said about this that it is increasingly difficult to put it into a reasonable perspective.

The issue of SALT, as I have explained on many occasions, is an inherently very complicated one. It is complicated because we are now dealing with qualitative restrictions rather than quantitative restrictions; that is to say, we are dealing with the change in technology rather than mere numbers. It is complicated also because the Soviet Union and the United States, for their own reasons, have designed their weapons in different ways. The Soviet Union has emphasized large land-based weapons. The United States has emphasized smaller and presumably more flexible land-based weapons. This was done by our free decision—not at the request of the Soviet Union. But the result is that it makes the weapons systems of the two sides difficult to compare, and therefore the definition of equivalence is objectively difficult.

Therefore, when we talk about complexities in negotiations in SALT, this does not mean that détente is in any difficulty, nor does it mean that progress is unreasonably slow. It does mean that the subject is difficult and that the President is determined to deal with it in the confidence that the decisions that are made will affect the security of the United States for a period of time much longer than his term in office, but for decades ahead.

Now, the status of the SALT negotiation

April 29, 1974

457

is this. As I pointed out in a press conference I held at the State Department some weeks ago, it is unlikely that we can achieve a comprehensive agreement of a permanent nature certainly by the time of the summit meeting. There remains a possibility of a substantial agreement of a more limited sphere. As we have pointed out, the Soviet Union has made a proposal to us on the occasion of my visit to Moscow. We are now developing a counter-proposal, which we will submit to the Soviet Union within the next few weeks. And then we will see what the prospects are.

But as was said after the President met Chairman Podgorny in Paris, there is progress in the SALT negotiations. We will not hurry them as a result of an artificial deadline. But we do believe that there is a possibility of making substantial progress in certain areas this year, in the area of SALT, and there is a certainty that substantial agreements will be achieved in other areas during the course of the President's visit to Moscow.

I will be glad to take a few questions about this meeting today.

*Q. Is there a date set?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have talked about a date, and it will be announced, we think, within the next few weeks. It has not been absolutely put into final shape. But I think there is a substantial agreement on that.

*Q. Can you give us some definition of the area in which you might have a limited agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have indicated that we consider the area of multiple warheads one in which there is the greatest urgency for progress, because of the rapid advance in technology. And this is the area to which we have paid the greatest attention.

I might add that we have also reviewed the whole field of arms control negotiations to see whether progress can be made in any other area and we believe that there are possibilities in other areas as well.

*Q. Is MIRV [multiple independently testable reentry vehicle] the high priority, though? Do you think you will be able to achieve some kind of limited agreement on that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, that is the issue that we have tried to explain, that progress has been made. We are not yet sure that an agreement can be made by the time of the summit. But we are making progress, and we will have to see where we stand as the summit approaches.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are the President's feelings when it is suggested that he may have to negotiate from a position of weakness in the summit meeting because of his domestic problems?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, having sat in on all of the meetings that the President has had this week with President [of Algeria Houari] Boumediene, and again this morning with Foreign Minister Gromyko, he does not conduct himself as if he were in a position of weakness, nor do foreign leaders treat him as if he were in a position of weakness. The President represents the United States and is the elected official of the entire country. And he is conducting foreign policy the way he has always conducted it, with concern for the national interest.

*Mr. Ziegler:* Because of the Secretary's schedule, I should have said in the beginning we only have time for a couple of more questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see the possibility of the June summit not being held because of some lack of progress in SALT?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The summit has never been geared to any one negotiation. Every previous summit has had three major areas of negotiation and then one general necessity.

The three areas of negotiation have been to see whether technical negotiations that were going on in the bureaucracy and that were going on independent of the summit could be expedited by the concern that the leaders show for progress in their relations; and there have been a number of agreements

458

Department of State Bulletin

made at the summit which it would be idle
to pretend were directly negotiated at the
summit, which nevertheless would not have
happened without the summit or at least
would not have happened so rapidly without
the summit—last year, one on aviation; the
year before on shipping. So we have this
category of problem.

The second is to make significant agree-
ments in major fields such as economics and
other cooperative ventures that are negoti-
ated at a high level and that are concluded
at the summit.

The third is to make progress in the field
of the control of arms. That may or may not
include a SALT agreement because, as I
have pointed out, the limitation of strategic
weapons concerns the most basic security of
both sides and must not be rushed for a par-
ticular negotiation. And we, quite candidly,
cannot tell you now more than that progress
is being made. How far it will have gone by
June, we will have to leave to the future.

Fourthly, there is the necessity that the
leaders of the two countries who have it in
their hands to, on the one hand, produce a
cataclysm and, on the other, benefit hu-
manity should meet regularly to review the
whole range of their relationship and possi-
ble areas of tension, as well as possible areas
of cooperation. This is independent of any
agreement that they might make, and it is
in itself an important utility of the summit.

So whether or not there will be a SALT
agreement, the summit will take place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you noticed that
marriage has in any way affected your out-
look toward life in general or foreign policy
in particular?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have to give
the answer that Ziegler recommends for this
particular thing.

Q. What does he recommend?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, he recommends
that I say it hasn't affected mine but it has
affected my wife's. [Laughter].

United States and Saudi Arabia
To Expand Cooperation

Joint Statement ¹

Following discussions between the Govern-
ment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and
the United States of America, the two coun-
tries are prepared to expand and give more
concrete expression to cooperation in the field
of economics, technology and industry, and in
the supply of the Kingdom's requirements
for defensive purposes.

His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd
al-'Aziz al Sa'ud has accepted an invitation
to visit the United States in the near future
to discuss these matters with President
Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.

In moving to strengthen their relations,
both governments reaffirm their hope that a
just and durable peace will be realized in the
Middle East so that all its peoples may enjoy
stability and work for the development and
prosperity of the region.

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation
to 6th Special U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on April 10 confirmed the nom-
inations of the following-named persons to
be Representatives of the United States to
the sixth special session of the U.N. General
Assembly: John A. Scali; William E. Schauf-
ele, Jr.; John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Repre-
sentative from the State of Alabama; Robert
N. C. Nix, U.S. Representative from the
State of Pennsylvania; and Clarence Clyde
Ferguson, Jr. The Senate also confirmed the
nomination of Barbara M. White to be the
Alternate Representative of the United
States to the special session.

¹Issued at Washington and Riyadh on Apr. 5
(press release 133).

April 29, 1974

459

the particular heads-of-government conferences which might take place over this period? There does seem to be an accelerated schedule of possibilities for a series of high-level meetings during the summer.

Secretary Kissinger: May I express my gratification at the end of the strike of the Washington Post.

Q. We ended it—

Secretary Kissinger: If I had had a vote, I might have extended it 48 more hours. [Laughter.]

Q. We ended it in order to cover your trip.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware of any accelerated schedule of Presidential trips. The meetings with foreign heads of state that are being considered have all been on the calendar for a long time as possibilities. The summit meeting with the Soviet leaders has been under discussion—was scheduled over a year ago. No other firm decisions have been made. Meetings with European leaders have always been related to concrete accomplishments. And if we had wanted a summit meeting simply for show, it was easy enough to arrange during March and April, and we deliberately did not do so, since we did not think that the conditions at the time warranted it. What else may happen depends on the outcome of other negotiations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been about a month since you returned from Moscow. When you see Mr. Gromyko on Monday, will you be able to present to him American counterproposals to their SALT proposals?

Secretary Kissinger: SALT will be one of the subjects discussed in Geneva with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Though I despair of saying anything on SALT that does not make huge headlines slightly different from what I intended, it will undoubtedly be discussed. I will not present to the Foreign Minister a detailed American counterproposal, but I will present to him various considerations that, if he considers them worthy of discussions, could lead to an American counterproposal.

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to the foreign aid subject, the request for the Far East was larger rather than smaller than in previous years. And I wondered how you associate this with the détente with China and with the Soviet Union and whether in particular the $165 million for Korea reflects danger there, or does it reflect an upset in the internal situation in Korea that needs to be corrected?

Secretary Kissinger: The increase in funds for Asia is largely due to the increased cost of imports into, particularly, Southeast Asia for fuel, fertilizer, and similar materials.

The program for Korea is not related in any sense to the domestic conditions that have developed there.

In terms of détente with the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China, it is of course clearly understood that neither of these countries has a veto over policies that we consider necessary for a stable international order. But we have no reason to believe that any part of this foreign assistance program, certainly not any part for Asia, will have a bad effect on our détente policies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the question of SALT, there has been a report that the United States plans unilaterally to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. I wonder if you could say, first of all, if these reports are true, and if so, by how much—and if they are true, whether there is any relationship, or might be any relationship, between this kind of move on the part of the United States and an attempt to break the deadlock in the SALT negotiations involving forward-based systems.

Secretary Kissinger: To take your last point first, the present discussions in SALT are not deadlocked in any sense on the issue of forward-based systems, and the range of issues that are being discussed now does not have forward-based systems as one principal element. So whatever is being done with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, it

540

Department of State Bulletin

is unrelated to the issue of the forward-based systems in SALT and indeed is unrelated to the SALT negotiations altogether.

Secondly, it is our policy not to reduce these tactical nuclear weapons, except either in fullest consultation with our allies or in a negotiation with the Soviet Union in which, again, there would be the fullest consultation with our allies. We do not have a program now for the reduction of our tactical nuclear forces in Europe. We have attempted —and I think this is what these reports refer to—to develop a rational policy for the stockpiles and for the possible use of the stockpiles. But we are not planning any unilateral steps. And the reports must have referred to internal studies that are being conducted on a planning basis.

## Purposes of Summit Talks

Q. Mr. Secretary, because of the public confidence you have talked about that is necessary for the conduct of foreign policy, and the public support for it, and because of the almost inevitable probability that—or inevitability that—any agreements that are negotiated at the summit will be questioned as to political motivation, and because apparently we are not ready for a major SALT agreement anyway, why wouldn't it be a wise move simply to postpone the summit until impeachment is out of the way?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it is a mistake to consider the summit as being related entirely to SALT. There are many reasons for the summit. And there are many types of agreements that can be made at the summit.

One is to use the summit for an acceleration of agreements that would probably be made anyway but which, if they take their bureaucratic course, could be delayed for many months and sometimes years; secondly, to develop agreements in various areas of cooperation unrelated to arms control; thirdly, to develop arms control agreements not necessarily in the field of strategic arms limitations; and fourthly, to give an opportunity to the leaders of the two most powerful countries in the world—and the

two countries that have the capability of destroying each other and humanity in the process—to exchange views on the evolution of their policies and particularly exchange views on the best steps to preserve the peace.

In all of these categories, incidentally, we expect that progress will be made at the summit.

Now, with respect to SALT, whether or not a significant agreement can be reached by the time of the summit is not yet clear. It is a mistake to assume that the only significant agreement is a comprehensive permanent agreement that settles all issues for all time. There are many major agreements that could be made of very great significance that would fall short of a comprehensive permanent agreement. Whether or not those agreements can be reached at the time of the summit, I repeat, depends on the discussions that will take place between now and the summit. In any event, the summit could give an impetus to those negotiations.

Our attitude is that we will not rush an agreement in order to complete it by the summit but we will not fail to conclude an agreement simply because the summit coincides with an intense domestic debate which is totally unrelated to our foreign policy and in which our foreign policy has not been the subject of any significant challenge.

Again, with respect to the issues that may be raised on any agreement in the strategic arms field that may be reached, I am confident that we will be able to defend it on its merits. And when you deal with the issue of nuclear strategy, you are dealing with the survival of the United States and the survival of many other countries that depend on us. And the United States will not play with this or deal with it in an irresponsible manner.

Q. Are you foreseeing, Mr. Secretary, a constructive round of negotiations—of disengagement negotiations—while the shooting goes on in the Golan Heights, or if you want it the other way around, do you foresee a shooting process while you are shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have the im-

May 20, 1974

541

pression that the intensity of the fighting
has diminished in the last week, and I would
hope that both sides will exercise great re-
straint while the negotiations are in process.

I do not forecast that this next round will
necessarily bring a solution to the negotia-
tions. But we do hope that we will make
some progress.

Les [Leslie Gelb, New York Times].

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us your
position on the proposed level of American
defense spending, whether you think it is
appropriate, whether a reduction could be
made, and whether it is consistent with your
foreign policy aims?

Secretary Kissinger: I support the present
level of defense spending, and I believe it is
consistent with our foreign policy aims.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Chancellor [of the Federal Republic of Germany Willy] Brandt, speaking on behalf of the European Community, has offered political guarantees for a peace settlement in the Mideast. One such settlement has been reached by you. Do you consider this offer to be a helpful component in your Mideast strategy?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been in very
close contact with Chancellor Brandt, both
during the planning of his trip and while he
was on the trip. We believe that the policy
of the Federal Republic in the Middle East
has been constructive and consistent with
close Atlantic relationships, and we believe
that he has made a helpful contribution on
his visits.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports
that representatives of the Egyptian Gov-
ernment have made private contacts with
American arms manufacturers. What is the
attitude of the U.S. Government toward cash
sales by American manufacturers to Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: I have heard rumors
that American arms manufacturers have
made contact with the Egyptian authorities,
rather than the other way around.

On the issue of military assistance to
Egypt, whether sale or credit, this has not

been formally raised by the Egyptian Gov-
ernment. We don't expect it to be raised in
the near future. It would have to be consid-
ered in the light of the circumstances that
exist when it is raised. But it is not now be-
fore us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the State Depart-
ment's oft-stated policy of balance of power
in the Middle East still the policy of the
United States? Is the Rogers formula re-
garding the—or the view of the United Na-
tions resolution—still the policy of the United
States? And what do you consider insubstan-
tial changes in the territorial limits for Is-
rael?

Secretary Kissinger: The present condi-
tions are not the conditions in which the
previous incumbent conducted his foreign
policy, and therefore I see no point in my
commenting on proposals that he may have
made four years previously.

The United States is committed to the se-
curity and survival of Israel, and this com-
mitment has not changed.

Complex Arms Control Issues

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson has
contended, or maybe "charged" is a better
word, that the administration is interested
in a "quick fix" in this Moscow summit, pri-
marily because of domestic considerations,
and that all you are likely to seek is only an
extension of the present interim agreement
on arms control. What is your response to
that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I had a long
session with Senator Jackson this morning
on several topics. I have great respect for
the views of Senator Jackson. At the same
time, I agree very much with a column that
I read this morning which emphasized the
need not to conduct this debate by means of
slogans and in terms of casting doubts on
the motives of the participants in this de-
bate.

The issues are extremely serious and ex-
tremely complicated. And if one uses charged

542

Department of State Bulletin

words like "quick fix," then one really pre-judges the answer.

The issue is whether, in the light of an evolving technology, one can break out of a comprehensive agreement those items that, if they are not dealt with now or in the very near future, will not be able to be dealt with at all—not because the summit is imminent, but because the technology will have advanced to a point after which control will become impossible or deployment will have reached a point after which verification will become meaningless. This is the overriding issue.

Second, the implication is always left that there is something about the interim agreement that is disadvantageous to the United States.

And I think it is about time that we recognize the fact, first, that at the time the interim agreement was made, the United States had no program for land-based missiles. The United States had no program—was not building any sea-based missiles. The Soviet Union was building 90 land-based missiles a year and 144 sea-based missiles. The United States stopped no program as a result of the interim agreement. The Soviet Union stopped several programs and on top of it had to remove 209 older missiles from its force.

Secondly, it is not true that the interim agreement leaves the United States at a numerical disadvantage. This numerical disadvantage can be computed only if one omits from the calculation the 630 B-52's that were in our force in 1972 and the 452 B-52's that are in our force today. And the fact that there are 180 less in our force today is not a decision of the Soviet Union; it is a unilateral decision of our administration, proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thirdly, if one looks not at launchers, but at deliverable warheads, the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union has increased during the period of the interim agreement and will continue to increase during the whole period of the interim agreement. And one is hit by warheads—not by launchers.

Therefore, it is not helpful to us to talk

ourselves into a state of mind in which we are strategically inferior.

Therefore, whether or not the interim agreement should be extended depends on an analysis of where the interim agreement leads us and what the projections are. And it depends further on an analysis of what we get in return for it.

The overwhelming issue, as we see it, is the issue of multiple independent warheads whose deployment on the Soviet side is imminent. Once these multiple warheads are fully deployed on both sides, and one has then warheads upward of 10,000 on both sides, or any number that technology can make possible, then we face a situation of unprecedented nuclear plenty and a potentially enormous gap between first- and second-strike capabilities. That is what we are attempting to reduce in these negotiations.

Any analysis of our domestic situation should make clear that there is very little to be gained domestically by making a SALT agreement this year. We are concerned with the evolution of the arms race, with peace in the world, and with security.

Now, our judgment may or may not be correct. But that is what the debate should be and not whether it is a "quick fix" against a long-term agreement.

Q. Could you tell us what Senator Jackson's reaction to this argument was?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we did not have time to get into that argument in as much detail as we got into some other arguments we're having [laughter], but it is one that I intend to discuss with him at greater length when I return from our trip.

As long as we're talking about this, let me emphasize also that we are not opposed to reductions. We do believe, however, that reductions in the absence of some control over the multiple warheads will magnify the problem that we have described. Reductions will be in the hundreds. The growth in warheads will be in the thousands. And there will be a total disparity between the capabilities that develop if reduction becomes our only objective. But we do agree with Senator Jackson that reductions can be and should be one of

May 20, 1974

543

the objectives of SALT negotiations. They
are not as time urgent as the other one.

— Mr. Binder [David Binder, New York Times].

Cuban Participation in Inter-American Talks

Q. Mr. Kissinger, several Latin American countries have proposed the participation of the Cuban Foreign Minister at the next round of informal meetings of hemisphere Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires. And you have apparently said they would be willing to participate in such informal meetings in a constructive manner. I'm asking whether you see an evolution of inter-American relations that could allow the American Secretary of State to seek informal meetings scheduled with other Latin American Ministers and the Cuban Foreign Minister.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, it
has happened before. But the decision at
present—if we had to vote on it today—our
vote would be negative. We left it that the
Argentine Government, as the host govern-
ment, would consult with all other govern-
ments to see what the consensus is as this
conference approaches.

We of course will also consult with the
governments as the time for this conference
approaches. But as of now, our position is
as I have described.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it more hopeful to-
day that a compromise formula could be
found to resolve the dispute over the Jack-
son-Vanik amendment?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I met this
morning with Senators Jackson, Ribicoff,
and Javits, and we agreed that we would
continue our discussions after my return.
And I don't think it would be helpful for me
to try to anticipate what the outcome would
be. But I think we all approached the dis-
cussions with the attitude that it was a se-
rious problem for which we would try to
find a constructive solution.

Q. On this forthcoming trip, do you ex-
pect to get involved in any other phase of

the Mideast problem, for example, the West
Bank, or do you plan to meet with any of
the oil-producing nations?

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly I would expect to visit Jordan, and obviously that would involve there a discussion of the issues that Jordan is primarily interested in. And there is a possibility of visiting one or two of the oil-producing nations. But the shape of this trip beyond the first stop is not fully clear yet, and a great deal will depend on the evolution of the negotiation and how many trips may have to be taken between Damascus and Jerusalem and where one will leave the negotiation when I leave the area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, having been granted export licenses to Argentina to send cars to Cuba, is the economic-denial program still viable, and what are you going to do about the Canadian locomotive companies which have already started shipping and are under the same obligation?

Secretary Kissinger: The decision with respect to Argentina was to permit American companies that are chartered in foreign countries to comply with the laws of the countries in which they are located—to deal with an anomaly of our legislation which makes American companies that are incorporated in foreign countries subject to U.S. law rather than to the law of the country in which they are domiciled in case there's a conflict. It was not based on considerations of Cuba policy.

Therefore the behavior of American com-
panies in those countries will depend on the
policies the countries pursue vis-a-vis Cuba.
And our own view on that has not changed.

Q. But the policy is still viable?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe it is.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you ascertain as yet
whether it will or will not be necessary for
you to make a second preparatory trip to
Moscow before the summit?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that will be-
come clearer after I have talked to Foreign
Minister Gromyko, and that would be re-

544

Department of State Bulletin

lated largely to SALT issues if it became necessary.

**Q.** If you decided such a trip was necessary, is it unlikely that it would be at the end of this current trip? Would you presumably return to Washington before going to Moscow?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Are you afraid that Marilyn [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post] will come to Moscow with me? [Laughter.]

**Q.** I just want to make sure you have ample time to rest before you go to Moscow.

**Secretary Kissinger:** My intention is to return to Washington to restore my emotional equilibrium. [Laughter.]

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, do you still believe that a disengagement agreement with Syria is necessary in order to continue progress in the Middle East, or could developments between Israel and Egypt continue even without disengagement?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, of course, this would depend on decisions made by Egypt and Israel. I have been given to understand that progress between Egypt and Israel requires progress between Syria and Israel, and I have had no reason to doubt that.

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, is it possible that you would return to Geneva on this trip to complete the disengagement negotiation?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I am not sure —as I pointed out—that we can complete the negotiation on this trip. There are many more uncertain factors in this negotiation than there were in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation.

If the negotiation seems to be progressing, it is not excluded that this could happen. But we have really not considered it yet.

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson was a little worried when he talked to a reporter this week about the possibility of secret understandings and commitments that involve this foreign aid package. Did he raise that question, and what did you tell him if he did?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I don't want to comment on my discussions with Senator Jackson. I can answer your question: There are no secret commitments with respect to the foreign aid program.

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, to follow up on that further, do you have anything specific to present to Mr. Gromyko beyond what you've already said, when you get to Geneva, relative to SALT? And how can you expect the Soviet Union to restrain itself from deploying MIRV's [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] when we are, as you just said, continuing to deploy them ourselves?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, obviously, restraints on the deployment of MIRV's would have to be reciprocal. The Soviet Union, when I was in Moscow last time, presented to us its consideration on how MIRV's could be limited and what other steps could be taken. As I pointed out, but not very lucidly at the time, this represented an advance in the Soviet position, though not yet sufficient for us to find it acceptable.

If I had not already used the word, I would say that what we need is a "conceptual breakthrough." [Laughter.] But what is necessary now is to see whether some of the Soviet ideas that were presented in Moscow could be adapted to our requirements in terms of numbers and in terms of general approach.

We can discuss this with the Foreign Minister. If it seems that then an American proposal embodying numbers, time frames, and so forth, would be useful, then we can make it. But obviously any proposal on any limitations will have to be reciprocal— which does not mean it has to be exactly numerically equivalent.

**Q.** Well, does that mean that we're willing to stop deploying the MIRV's?

**Secretary Kissinger:** We are willing to accept limitations on our MIRV deployment in return for limitations on their MIRV deployment, but the issue is at what level.

**Q.** Dr. Kissinger, are you doing anything

May 20, 1974

545

the situation concerning a peaceful settle-
ment in the Middle East and to questions of
security and cooperation in Europe, includ-
ing the question of limitation of armed forces
and armaments in Central Europe. There was
also a continuation of the consideration of
questions concerning the further development
of mutual relations between the USSR and
the USA, in particular in the economic and
trade field. The talks were businesslike and
constructive in character.

Taking part in the talks from the Soviet
side were Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of
the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov,
Assistant to the General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union; G. M. Korniyenko and
M. D. Sytenko, Members of the Collegium of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.
Participating from the American side were
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the
USA to the USSR; H. Sonnenfeldt, A. Hart-
man, A. Atherton, C. Maw and W. Hyland,
responsible officials from the Department of
State.

Statement of March 27

Press release 119 dated March 28

On March 27 talks continued between L. I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union; A. A. Gromyko,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;
and Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
of the USA and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.

In the course of the talks which took place
in a businesslike and constructive atmos-
phere, there was a continuation of the con-
sideration of a number of questions concern-
ing mutual relations between the USSR and
the USA, and also several international prob-
lems.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE 3

VISIT IN THE USSR OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY A. KISSINGER

In accordance with the previously reached
understanding, Henry A. Kissinger, Secre-
tary of State of the United States and As-
sistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, visited Moscow from 24 to 28 March.
He had discussions with Leonid I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Mem-
ber of the Politburo of the Central Commit-
tee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR.

Taking part in the discussions on the So-
viet side were: The Ambassador of the USSR
in the United States A. F. Dobrynin, Assist-
ant to the General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union A. M. Alexandrov, members of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
G. M. Korniyenko and M. D. Sytenko. On the
American side: the Ambassador of the
United States to the USSR Walter J. Stoes-
sel, Jr., officials of the Department of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Arthur A. Hartman, Al-
fred L. Atherton, Carlyle E. Maw, William G.
Hyland, and Jan M. Lodal of the Staff of the
National Security Council.

An exchange of views was held on a broad
range of questions of mutual interest in con-
nection with the preparation for the visit to
the Soviet Union of the President of the
United States, Richard Nixon.

The sides noted with satisfaction that the

³Issued at Moscow and Washington on Mar. 28
(White House press release).

April 22, 1974

417

course taken by the two countries toward a
relaxation of tension and a major improve-
ment of relations between them continues to
be implemented successfully and brings tan-
gible results. The exceptional importance of
the fundamental decisions adopted at the two
previous Soviet-American summit meetings,
first of all the basic principles of relations be-
tween the USSR and the United States, the
agreement on the prevention of nuclear war,
and the agreements on the limitation of stra-
tegic arms, has been convincingly demon-
strated.

The sides are determined to pursue, on the
basis of strict observance of the obligations
they have assumed, the established policy
aimed at making the process of improving
Soviet-American relations irreversible.

In the course of the discussions, consider-
able attention was given to the problem of the
further limitation of strategic arms. The
sides agree that, despite the complexity of
this problem, there are possibilities for reach-
ing mutually acceptable solutions. They are
determined to continue to make energetic ef-
forts to find such solutions. Certain other
questions relative to the area of arms limita-
tion and disarmament were also considered.

Noting the favorable development of bi-
lateral relations in a number of directions de-
termined by the agreements signed by the
USSR and the United States, the two sides
intend to develop further mutually beneficial
ties and businesslike cooperation in different
areas, including trade, economic and scien-
tific and technological areas on a long-term
basis.

In discussing international problems, par-
ticular attention was paid to the state of af-
fairs regarding a peaceful settlement in the
Middle East. It was agreed that, taking into
account their special role at the Geneva Peace
Conference on the Middle East, the sides
would make efforts to promote the solution of
the key questions of the Middle East settle-
ment.

The questions pertaining to security and
cooperation in Europe were also examined,
first of all the progress of the conference on
security and cooperation in Europe and the

state of the talks on the reduction of armed
forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The exchange of views was held in a con-
structive and businesslike atmosphere. The
sides are convinced that it has been an impor-
tant stage in the preparation for the success-
ful holding of the forthcoming Soviet-Amer-
ican summit meeting and for Soviet-Amer-
ican relations in general.

Secretary Kissinger Visits Bonn

En route to Moscow, Secretary Kissinger visited Bonn on March 24 and he met with Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. Following is the transcript of a news conference held that day by Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Scheel.¹

Press release 111 dated March 25

Secretary Kissinger: If you permit me, I will speak in English so that you don't think my German has an anti-European intention. The Foreign Minister and I had our characteristically friendly, constructive, and wide-ranging discussion. I briefed him about our plans for the visit to the Soviet Union, and we achieved complete agreement about the line that the United States will take in the talks in the Soviet Union.

Of course, a good part of our conversation concerned European-American relations. As far as the United States is concerned, it has always favored, and it continues to favor, the development of European unity in all respects, political as well as economic.

The United States has always believed and
continues to believe that the interests of Eu-
rope and the United States are closely inter-
twined. And we therefore believe that any
thoughtful, systematic consideration of our
policies will lead to the conclusion that our
policies can pursue a parallel course without
prejudice to the right of the European coun-

¹ Secretary Kissinger's opening remarks and the first question and answer were in English. The remainder of the transcript is a translation from German by the American Embassy at Bonn.

418

Department of State Bulletin

that spirit and will carry out our policy in
that attitude. We will never forget the spe-
cial responsibility we, the United States and
the Soviet Union, have for preserving peace
for the benefit of mankind.

It is in this spirit that I would like to pro-
pose a toast to the Foreign Minister, with
whom we have had so many useful conversa-
tions, and to lasting friendship between the
Soviet and American peoples.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, MARCH 27 ²

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished
guests: On behalf of all of my colleagues, I
would like to thank you for the extraordinary
hospitality we have received here.

The last time I was in this house was the
evening on which the strategic arms agree-
ment was signed. The Foreign Minister and
I negotiated through the better part of the
night, then we assembled again in the morn-
ing and came to a conclusion, and by that eve-
ning the agreement was signed. It was a very
momentous occasion because it was the first
time that the two greatest countries in the
world, the two most powerful countries in the
world, accepted voluntary restrictions. It was
important also because it symbolized that the
United States and the Soviet Union have
great responsibility toward preserving the
peace of the world. They exercise this re-
sponsibility in what they do toward each
other, and they exercise it in relation to other
parts of the world as well.

Since we have started on this course, it has
been a fundamental principle of our foreign
policy to bring about a situation in which the
two countries can be more secure with each
other and in which they can use their influ-
ence to help bring peace to other parts of the
world as well. This principle has again been
confirmed in our meetings here; and as we
prepare for the summit of this year, we hope

to make more significant progress by what-
ever concrete agreements can be reached.

The most fundamental agreement of all,
which is not written down, is that the United
States and the Soviet Union are committed to
a constant improvement of their relations.
They will strive to maintain in all parts of
the world a policy of cooperation, even if tem-
porary obstacles might arise. This will be the
goal of American foreign policy, and the fre-
quency of our meetings testifies to the fact
it is also the goal of Soviet policy.

So it is in this spirit that I would like to
propose a toast to you, Mr. Foreign Minister,
and all your associates, and to the strength-
ening of friendship between the United States
and the Soviet Union.

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Mr. Secretary of State, gentlemen, com-
rades: We wish to thank you first of all for
your hospitality. Many important things have
indeed been achieved in Soviet-American re-
lations. First and foremost, they have been
achieved as a result of the two Soviet-Amer-
ican summit meetings—during the visit to
the capital of this country of U.S. President
Nixon and during the visit of the General
Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brezh-
nev to the United States. The agreements
then concluded are of paramount importance,
both for our two countries and for the cause
of world peace. Thus we can say that a truly
solid foundation, a truly strong foundation,
has been created for further movement ahead
toward the deepening, the broadening, and
the improvement of Soviet-American rela-
tions.

The task now is—and I am happy to say
that both you and we are in agreement on
this—to use these achievements and this
strong foundation for further steps toward
the still greater improvement of those rela-
tionships. This is the goal that must be served
by the forthcoming Soviet-American summit
meeting. It is this goal, too, that must be
served by this present meeting during your
visit to Moscow.

What we wanted to see in results from this

²Given at a luncheon hosted by Secretary Kissinger at Spaso House, the American Ambassador's residence (press release 120 dated Mar. 28). Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke in Russian.

April 22, 1974

415

meeting, insofar as the Soviet side is concerned, was clearly defined by General Secretary Brezhnev during his first meeting with you. And that is success—a success that will be of benefit to our two peoples and to world peace.

The problems facing the participants in these exchanges of views are important and, at the same time, complex. We can firmly say for ourselves—and this is something that you have heard uttered by General Secretary Brezhnev—we are in favor of that. We are in favor of such results. We value especially the words you uttered just now to the effect that you are firmly committed to that line. And that is our line, too, in Soviet-American relations. It is the line of our country, our people, our party, the Central Committee and its Politburo, and personally the line of General Secretary Brezhnev.

We feel that the further steps that we can take and the further efforts we can make will depend on that joint determination of both our sides, as has indeed been stated by both of us. For, indeed, a tunnel has to be built from both ends. And that is true not only in tunnel building; it is true in politics, too. It would be good, very good indeed, if this new meeting could culminate in good or, better still, in excellent results. We could then transfer all these results into guarantees of success for all subsequent meetings.

May I propose a toast to our further good relations and their development, to the success and the good results of this meeting, and looking ahead, may I also drink to the results of the forthcoming summit meeting, because this is indeed what we want to see.

To your health, Mr. Secretary of State, and to the health of the other Americans present.

## STATEMENTS CONCERNING CONVERSATIONS

### Statement of March 25

Press release 112 dated March 26

On March 25 talks took place in the Kremlin between L. I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Com-

munist Party of the Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and A. A. Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State of the USA and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In the course of the discussions, which were of a businesslike and constructive character, there was a review of the situation and perspectives of Soviet-American relations in the light of the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of the President of the USA, Richard M. Nixon. In particular, questions were considered about a further limitation of strategic arms. There also took place an exchange of views concerning the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The following assisted in the talks:

#### On the Soviet side:

Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

#### On the American side:

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the USA to the USSR; H. Sonnenfeldt, A. Hartman, and W. Hyland, responsible officials from the Department of State.

### Statement of March 26

Press release 115 dated March 27

On March 26 talks continued between L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; and Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the USA and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Special attention was given to a review of

416

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Officials at Moscow

Secretary Kissinger visited Moscow March 24-28 and he met with General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, and other Soviet officials. Following are texts of Secretary Kissinger's arrival statement, exchanges of toasts at luncheons on March 25 and March 27, statements concerning the conversations, and a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MOSCOW, MARCH 24

Press release 110 dated March 25

I've come here at the request of President Nixon to prepare for his talks with General Secretary Brezhnev. We are convinced in the administration that the peace of the world depends importantly on the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and we will work constructively and seriously with the Soviet Union to make progress toward the goals which we all share, including limitation of armaments. We will do so with the attitude that none of our countries will take special advantage of situations in any part of the world, that progress toward peace between our countries is in the interest of all the peoples of the world.

I expect we will make concrete progress on a number of outstanding issues and that we will agree all of us have an obligation to promote them in every part of the world.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, MARCH 25 ¹

Foreign Minister Gromyko

Honorable Mr. Secretary of State, honored
American guests, comrades: It gives me

pleasure to greet you, Mr. Secretary of State,
and the persons accompanying you to Mos-
cow.

It is far from the first time that you have
been in our capital during the last two years.
This fact in itself is significant. It means
that our contacts have become constant and
regular. They comprise a substantial part of
the useful practice of exchange of opinions
which has become established between our
countries.

Quite recently we met with President
Nixon and you in Washington. A wide range
of questions of interest to both sides was
discussed. Now the discussions are being
held here in Moscow. They are of particular
significance since they are connected with
preparations for the forthcoming visit of
President Nixon to the Soviet Union.

As for the Soviet side, as L. I. Brezhnev
noted, we would wish the forthcoming sum-
mit meeting to be marked by new important
steps on the path of development of peaceful
relations between our states and improve-
ment of the international atmosphere. I think
that the American side also shares this ap-
proach.

During the last two to three years the
U.S.S.R. and the United States have traveled
a long way in their relations. The essence of
the favorable changes in Soviet-American
relations is determined by the joint deter-
mination of our countries to prevent the
threat of war and to foster the strengthen-
ing of international security and the devel-
opment of broad mutually advantageous co-
operation.

¹ Given at a luncheon hosted by Foreign Minister Gromyko (press release 114 dated Mar. 26). Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke in Russian.

April 22, 1974

413

Much has already been done along this path. As a result of the two Soviet-American summit meetings, fundamentally important decisions and specific measures were taken which were the starting point for a cardinal reconstruction of relations between our countries. The agreement on the prevention of nuclear war concluded during the visit of L. I. Brezhnev and the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement signed during their earlier meeting with the President are of particular significance in this regard.

I think it would be only fair to point out the noteworthy personal contribution of Secretary of State Kissinger in this whole matter.

But much still remains to be done. To put it briefly, the basic task is to move ahead in the direction which has been set, guided by what has already been achieved, so that the process of improving Soviet-American relations becomes a constant factor of international peace.

As far as various specific issues are concerned, given the required consistency and a realistic and constructive approach by both sides, we are confident that mutually acceptable solutions can always be found. The main thing is to adhere to the central line, to observe the agreements already achieved, and strictly to fulfill the obligations taken.

The experience of previous meetings of this kind confirms their great importance for assuring successful results of summit negotiations. It appears that this will also be the case this time.

I propose a toast to your health, Mr. Secretary of State, and to the health of the other American guests.

## Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished Soviet friends: As the Foreign Minister pointed out in his characteristically precise fashion, this is far from my first visit to the Soviet Union. In fact, it is my sixth visit.

When I came here two years ago, to Lenin Hills, the beginning of relaxation of tension

between the United States and the Soviet Union had just started. We had no experience in dealing with global problems on a co-operative basis. On that occasion I had the privilege for the first time to meet General Secretary Brezhnev, whose name will forever be associated with bringing about a change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. On that occasion we concluded agreement on basic principles to govern our relationship and we made major progress on limiting strategic arms.

In the two years past, many agreements have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union—an agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, being the most significant. But more than these two agreements, what has happened over the last two years reflects the recognition that the United States and the Soviet Union, dealing with each other on a basis of strict equality, have a special obligation for the preservation of peace. If our two nations attempt to take advantage of each other, if we attempt to black-mail each other or deal with each other from a strong position, then there can be no peace either among ourselves or in the world. But if we deal with each other cooperatively, if we recognize that neither of us can gain a permanent strategic advantage either militarily or politically anywhere in the world, then we can bring about lasting peace and all man-kind will benefit.

This spirit of cooperation, of dealing with each other cooperatively and fairly, which was started two years ago has gained in strength and will continue. Occasionally we encounter obstacles, but we are determined to remove them. Occasionally we find domestic criticism, but we are determined to overcome it. So this administration remains committed to strengthen its relationship with the Soviet Union. We want to make the next summit as significant as the preceding two. Our greatest goal is that over the next three years we can make the relationship that has grown up between our two peoples and our leaders irreversible.

We will conduct our conversations here in

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Department of State Bulletin