ARMS CONTROL AND SUBVERSIVE WAR

In the rapidly multiplying field of arms control speculation, deep thought
has already been given to a variety of negotiable solutions that would make ther-
monuclear war less likely. Chiefly, these programs have been designed (a) to
strengthen the defensive (or "deterrent") capacities of national security forces
<u>vis-à-vis</u> the offensive (or "first-strike") capability, and (b) to minimize the
incidence of accidental or unintended events that might produce total conflict.
Arms control theorization has even extended to the spheres of "local" or "limi-
ted" violence by estimating the probable effects of a stable-deterrence arms
control plan on these phenomena or by conjecturing about certain direct regional
measures of arms control.

But, on the whole, this latter problem has not been very deeply examined,
nor has there been a sufficient amount of attention paid to the inter-relation
of various kinds of arms control and the marginal but significant area of con-
flict known as "internal" or "subversive" war. In part the omission has been
due to the fact that first things obviously require the most urgent priority;
in part, because it is not strikingly evident that arms control and subversive
war have any but the most casual strategic connection. This essay does not pro-
pose to treat the subject with finality, but rather to break some fresh ground
which may, in turn, contribute to new thinking and more extensive research. It
is primarily an attempt to combine on paper those factors that would seem to
weigh heavily in any serious consideration of the matter.

For purposes of the discussion, a certain amount of controversial definition
will need to be introduced. Most critical is the description of types of vio-
lence which any projected arms control scheme would have to deal with directly
or at least affect obliquely. It is now obvious that even a total thermonuclear
war can be fought in a variety of imaginable ways, depending on a number of fac-
tors surrounding its origin and progress, among which are the following:

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1) The strategic intention embodied in the choice and mixture of weapons systems.

2) The relative invulnerability of the defensive ("second-strike") power, which affords a greater latitude of retaliatory strategies.

3) The character of the war, whether it is a war of escalation, of surprise attack, etc.

4) The influence of changing technology.

5) Accidental or irrational factors.

Below the threshold of what we have termed "total thermonuclear war," which is defined as a war in which the aggressive power seeks the strategic surrender of the adversary through a massive and relatively simultaneous application of counter-force strength (or the defensive power seeks to forestall this contingency through pre-emption), there are innumerable nuances of violence, each determined by the application of some criterion (or criteria) of limitation: geographical, qualitative, quantitative, temporal, generative, participatory, etc. We shall mention only what appear to be the major types:

1) The strategic thermonuclear war of limited design or war of attrition. Such a war would not massively and simultaneously challenge the direct adversary, but would be designed to weaken or demoralize him seriously. Instances of this type of conflict would be a sudden and sufficiently massive nuclear strike by the Soviet Union against-- for example-- Turkey, with immediate requests for a ceasefire and negotiations once the damage had been done, or an attritional war-- designed to see which side could take it longest without capitulating or escalating-- waged either according to counterforce or counter-population principles.

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2) The much-commented "classical nuclear limited war," fought probably over a large but circumscribed terrain with a discriminatory use of targets and weapons on both sides. Mutual stable deterrence in the "total" sphere would be counted on to keep this type of conflict from escalating.

3) War of the same general character between nuclear opponents or their close proxies, but restricted to non-nuclear weapons. It is not sometimes adequately recognized to what extent a war of this type would throw the advantage to the defense both in the realms of land warfare and protection against strategic bombing; this very fact argues that an aggressive power may not be willing to fight such a war.

4) Wars of either variety-- in the first case, largely potential and hypothetical at this moment-- in which secondary or tertiary powers might confront each other without direct intervention by the "Greats" or their alliance systems, with no role of proxy action involved. It is not unreasonable to assume that wars of this type have already been "deterred" by the thermonuclear power of the "Greats"; the Arab-Israeli War of 1947 is, however, an exception.

5) Classical wars of internal repression within a bloc of alliance system, such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956. A similar pattern-- though hopefully more humane-- might have applied in the West if NATO forces had been committed to the defense of the legitimate French regime against the activist coups of 1960 or 1961 at the request of the government.

6) Wars directed toward the seizure of power in a state, which are generally designated as "revolutionary." These wars may be, in character, either

(a) "civil," such as the uprising of the ELAS in Greece in the late 1940's, or

(b) "colonial," such as the war the French are waging in Algeria.

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Neither adjective is intended to imply an ethical judgment in discriminating these wars. Further, such wars may be (c) substantially autonomous, like the Syrian revolt from the U.A.R., or (d) heavily influenced by direct or oblique support from a major power bloc on the outside, like the Czech coup of 1948 or, indeed, the unhappy Cuban adventure of last spring. "Revolutionary" or "subversive" wars may be mixed with reference to points (a) and (b) above: the Laotian conflict, for example, seems to partake of this situation. Further discriminations could be made in terms of ideologies, tactics, and phasing.

7) We combine, and for purposes of discussion dismiss, all isolated political acts of violence below the threshold of Category Six which are not specifically directed toward the seizure or sharing of power in a state or some significant territorial area.

It is evident that many of the foregoing categories are susceptible to further subdivisions in terms of various restraints which the participants may impose on themselves or which may be imposed by the will of the larger powers; conversely, they may be further distinguished by their relative extension into the psychological, political, diplomatic, and economic spheres of a wider context, again perhaps at the conscious behest of the major powers.

The above may seem a rather tedious preamble to a discussion that is intended to deal directly only with what we have called Category Six. But it has been desirable to set the terms of the discussion in their full relation to other contingent elements, since it will shortly be made clear that the interaction of types of conflict and the safeguards that can be devised against them is the context that is uniquely meaningful.

The close relation of the colors of the spectrum of violence and their mu-
tual relation to any significant type of arms control is dictated by our inter-
pretation of the Soviet challenge. It is the announced intention of the Commu-
nist powers to prevail in the world by one means or another, sooner or later.
The renunciation or conditional abandonment of one area of violence simply means
that other paths of aggression are held to be more suitable and less dangerous
in the achievement of final goals. Consequently, it follows that the negotiated
relaxation of pressure or threat in one sphere (specifically, that of strategic
thermonuclear war) seems destined to produce increased pressures in other areas,
some of which may be entirely outside the nominal definition of violence. In
the context of any negotiated arms control agreement designed to stabilize fac-
tors of potential imbalance at the highest level, there would seem to be some
urgency for investigating the side-effects expected to accrue in other areas.
Subversive war is one of these categories which has, somewhat belatedly, come
into prominence.

Commentators generally feel that if the danger of total thermonuclear war
is minimized through arms control, the incidence of local and sub-threshold wars
is likely to increase. Naturally one would not wish to represent this specula-
tion as a perfect inverse proportion; on the other hand, the argument appears to
have a good deal of cogency if we refer back to our analysis of the global Commu-
nist design and the substitution of pressures. If arms control can produce a maxi-
mum of stable deterrence, then violence at the lower levels may well be encou-
raged by the maximal guarantee that their escalation will not occur. With one
avenue of aggression foreclosed, it is probable that others will seem more temp-
ting-- a principle that tends to operate with or without arms control.

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but probably depending ultimately on the placement of a moratorium on the arms race-- could add considerably to this kind of deterrence. But it has been less often recognized that the types of war represented by Categories Two-thru-Five have either never taken place at all or have been rather effectively suppressed for some time. The reasons for this are complicated and subject to argument, but we shall state some of them below:

1) Other modes of procedure have appeared more profitable and less risky to the aggressive bloc.

2) Wide-reaching alliance systems have carried with them the implication that few overt local wars could remain territorially limited.

3) There has been a deep-seated fear that such wars would inexorably result in nuclear escalation.

4) The ambiguity of deterrence policies has forestalled these wars.

5) The military forces of the two blocs have not, in general, been tailored recently to fight and sustain such wars.

Whatever reasons are involved and in what mixture, it has been clear for some time that major emphasis is being placed by the Communists on the possibility of encouraging and materially aiding subversive or internal conflict. The attractiveness of this method is that it is relatively cheap, frequently ambiguous, and that it seems to work well enough to whet the Soviet imperialist appetite. It causes Western forces to be redeployed in secondary areas. Above all, it dovesails nicely with the simultaneous struggle of the underdeveloped peoples for independent sovereignty and, beyond that, for abrupt termination of many surviving ligatures with the colonial powers. It presents a critical and difficult challenge to the West in both the psycho-political and deterrent spheres.

A pervasive characteristic of the various types of violence that we have examined is that as the categories descend from total strategic conflict to subversive war, their non-violent qualities tend, paradoxically, to become more total

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and to engage the complex instrumentalities of political, diplomatic, and economic action. A fifteen-minute exchange of salvos of several hundred ICBM's is illustrative only of technical complexity. One might argue that such warfare was distinctly anti-economic, and it is probably anti-political as well, since it does not really strive for ultimate goals through the exercise of equivalent means.

But in a war of limitation and, especially, in subversive conflict the opportunity and indeed the necessity is for manifold types of non-violent action, each of them contributing significantly to the prospect for victory. The now well-recognized formula for the successful waging of subversive war does not depend ultimately on the number of effectives and weapons, but rather on the ability of the revolutionary forces to disrupt and demoralize the existing state apparatus, win the allegiance of the national population through persuasion or intimidation, and conduct effective diplomatic and propaganda campaigns in the wider world.

None of these are factors that arms control can very well touch, or touch directly. This is in part because arms control is designed to affect objective and material factors; it is also because arms control is fundamentally an artificial complement to military deterrence, and no effective deterrent exists or has been devised on the scale of subversive war.

As in the area of thermonuclear war, it is doubtful whether the two sides could negotiate very meaningfully about curbing the potential for subversive war-- through such measures as arms embargoes, limitations on technical and military groups, etc.-- unless the blocs were relatively persuaded that a rough equivalence of competence existed on both sides and that it was unprofitable to pursue the competition further. This is clearly not, and for cardinal doctrinal

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reasons will probably never be, the attitude of the Communists. We must therefore
live with the situation and attempt to challenge it.

This observation nevertheless leads us to conclude that there is a curious
complementarity between the prerequisites for negotiation in all spheres of vio-
lence: a relative balance of capabilities. This fact is firmly recognized in the
area of total strategic conflict, and it is quite widely held that détente in more
localized areas can only be achieved some day if the West is willing to spend much
greater effort and resources on creating land-force strength with an acknowledged
capacity for defense in depth against an enemy thrust without automatically re-
sorting to escalation. It may be no less true that the possibility of deterring
subversive war or waging it successfully depends on the creation of an equivalent
competence. Unfortunately, the techniques of this area of violence are those in
which the West is least skilled, and, for a host of praiseworthy reasons, most
hesitant.

It is unlikely that this exaggerated type of "graduated" or "staggered" de-
terrence can ever come into being, for economic and other reasons. If it did,
what it would really amount to is the application of an extensive and discrimi-
nating "counterforce" strategy at all levels of violence: a resort that would be
exceedingly costly and incredibly difficult to manage. Otherwise, the problem
becomes one of substituting as well as possible for this alternative, and recog-
nizing the consequences of the fact that it is not a reality.

Arms control is, as we have suggested, an aspect of deterrence, but it leads
in the opposite direction from counterforce deterrence, which is inherently de-
stabilizing and the generator of the typical tensions of an accelerated arms race.
The bitter paradox at the lower end of violence is that arms control of any sort
may very well be impossible and unnegotiable unless the West first builds its
"petty counterforces" to support its position in the bargaining. There is also,

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as we have said, the likelihood that negotiated arms control at the upper level would itself multiply basic pressures at the lower.

This explanation is not to be construed as an academic exercise in praise of arms control. The central problem is that we are gravely confronted with the consequences of subversive war, manipulated in part from the Communist capitals, and that the prospect is for increased pressure. A viable strategy of defense must be devised to hold the line. Discriminating counterforce, accompanied by much more prescient methods of troop-training and much closer co-operation between military and political agencies, is one line of action that needs to be explored. The possibility of a slightly graduated threat of retaliation is another. Arms control is possibly a third. It is obvious that there will be no simple solution. But it is equally clear that we must be better prepared to deter that form of subversive war that gnaws away at our vital positions or, failing this, pursue such a war successfully.

We reiterate that we are not sanguine about the arms control approach. It is a much more nebulous proposition than, for example, restraints against thermonuclear war. The fact remains that there are certain measures which, if taken, might tone down the incidence of subversive war, not all of them in the category of weapons and forces but all directly related to the mechanics of this type of conflict. Among these might be:

1. A negotiated pattern of arms embargoes.

2. The right of a national state to appeal for positive international aid in coping with subversive forces, and the obligation of the international organization to intervene in certain cases.

3. An international convention against brainwashing, propagandizing of prisoners of war, and other forms of psychological violence.

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4) Strengthening of the Geneva Convention distinction between military and civilian combattants, which would at least amount to a reclarification of principle even if sanctions were out of the question.

It is exceedingly unlikely that the Communist countries would care for this type of arrangement, modest as it may seem. This does not mean, however, that it is totally useless to state or suggest such restraints.

In the last analysis, it is unlikely that arms control will have much bearing on the problem of subversive war, except possibly to intensify it if there is a mutually negotiated stable-deterrence plan at the upper level. Even such items as force or weapons limitations, neutralized zones, and the like, which would appear to have a distinct bearing on the character of "limited war," count for little in Category Six. For one thing, the nominal aggressor would not be a party to the agreements. He would not refrain from the use of any practicable means for achieving his objective, the seizure of the state. Restraints like force limitations, if imposed on the legitimate regime, might ease his path to power. The psychological factors on which his success ultimately rests would remain undisturbed. Insertion of an international peace force between the contenders could work only in an area that was not of primary interest to the major powers, and even then it is likely that it would rebound to the advantage of the subversive force-- for it would at least, in a sense, legitimize it.

In the absence of controlling subversive war by agreement, it becomes necessary to check it through the application of various types of low-grade deterrence, not all of them of a military character. Should these restraints fail-- as they must on occasion, since at their best they will be far from foolproof-- we must have viable local strategies for winning anticipated subversive wars or at least for restoring the *status quo ante*. The best deterrence in such a war, as Indo-

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china seems to prove, is often the capability for timely counter-attack, selecting static enemy targets for assault just as he is able to select ours. Such military action requires swift and accurate intelligence, and intelligence-gathering is largely a condition of retaining the confidence of the civilian population. It is also probable that certain aspects of counter-subversion should not be missed out of hand.

This is not the place for discussion of the tactics of subversive or guerrilla war. We have merely wished to consider the relation of types of conflict and their significance in the arms control perspective. Our conclusion is that subversive war shows little prospect of being controlled by arrangement, and that controls in other sectors may even make this one more volatile. However, there are methods for the relative deterrence of subversion which, if tested, developed, and applied, might make this a less fruitful field of enterprise for Communist expansion, and enhance the general climate for negotiated arms control.

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