DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By Cao NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:15 p.m., August 16, 1971

K: Mr. President. Well, congratulations, you scored another coup!

P: We stirred them up a little.

K: It was absolutely spectacular!

P: It had an enormous effect with the stockmarket.

K: I saw where it went up 30 points so far.

P: We sure pre-empted a hell of a lot of people.

K: The thing that's so interesting about your style of leadership is that you never make little news, it is always big news.

P: So many have said that it was like the China news. It reminds people of that again.

K: Yeah.

P: How was your journey?

K: I just got back about 15 minutes ago. I was going to call you; I was just getting my things together.

P: Well, how did it go?

K: First, the meeting with the Vietnamese was essentially a holding action. We settled the prisoner point exactly as we wanted it.

P: Good.

K: Up to now they haven't agreed to hand over the lists of prisoners or ... and now they have agreed to hand over the lists and release prisoners all over China. The only thing left is the political thing. They said it was national concord ...

P: We won't do it, we just won't do it.

K: I think we are moving towards a settlement. They began the meeting by criticizing your press conference and saying that they were dealing through intermediaries. I was brutal to them; I have never talked so brutally to anybody. Absolutely brutal. I said it is absolutely a waste of time to talk to you anyway, you don't have any instructions. Then he turned it around and

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:15 p.m., August 16, 1971 -- page 2

K: (cont'd) said he had instructions to say this. Then he had a break --
uh -- then I gave him a summary which I had gone over before, 8 points
which I had gone over with Bunker last week, so that we have our own 8-point
program. It had nothing we haven't gone over before but just to have
something in writing.

P: Yeah.

K: Then he had a break. He came back and said he consider that
extremely constructive and said in effect, everything could be settled but we had that other thing, the political hang-up. He absolutely insisted
on another meeting on 13 September. I said we have given them the 8 points
but he insisted on another meeting. If they refuse then, Mr. President,
we will be in great shape. I have to be over there anyway to talk to the
Chinese.

P: The 13th you will go back?

K: And that will be it!

P: Le Duc Tho was not there?

K: No. As hard as General Walters thinks they are going to settle at
the next meeting, I do not believe that. I think they will settle in November.
Think it will end up as a prisoner exchange.

P: After all, we have something in October.

K: In September we have the accidental war thing ............ and the
announcement of your trip coming out of that trip.

P: Well, good.

K: The Chinese couldn't have been more helpful and cooperative and
their attitude was a lot warmer than at the last meeting.

P: What did you discuss with them?

K: We discussed the date of your trip.

P: Good. Did they seem to --

K: They have to get instructions but I don't expect any problem. I
gave them two dates, one in February as a temporary date and one in

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:15 p.m., August 16, 1971 -- page 3

K: (cont'd) in March. If they turn down February and take March, we can say it wasn't a political thing, we gave them an earlier one. I gave them a rundown on the accidental war ...... and if the agreement was signed, the Russians would invite you but that you would go there after Peking but that we would announce it before and we would let them know in advance. Not ganging up on Pakistan but ............ also suggested if they have any influence in Pakistan that would deprive the Indians ............ They kept me an hour longer and made me late for the other meeting.

P: Good, good.

K: The Vietnamese don't have any fire left. You say they are stringing me along; we are not getting anything out of it but for what I don't know. Their response to a proposal which gives them literally -- which I think McGovern will have to accept -- they will have to launch an offensive.

P: They must be aware that there must be quite a record here.

K: And the record has them on ........

P: September 13th before the announcement. What are you going to tell Dobrynin tomorrow?

K: I am going to tell him that we accept for May 22nd and want to announce it on September 15th. I have a draft ______ which I will show you tomorrow.

P: I think that would be very good. And that is a good time to tell him too. This move on the economic front will have quite an impact on both Moscow and Peking.

K: Mr. President, it shows that and it shows you a re a man of tremendous moves. It also will have a tremendous affect on Hanoi. You take tremendous steps.

P: It will begin to get home to them, maybe.

K: With the Chinese, you have their respect totally and you have the Russians.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Dato 5/27

10:10 p.m., August 16, 1971 -- page 4

P: It will be interesting to see Dobrynin's reaction tomorrow. Of course, he won't be able to speak for the government but his reaction will have some influence on them. Say, "Now, look, we want to nail it down, we don't want any crapping around now. September 15th and that's that."

K: On the whole ...... it is one of those shameful things. They are not really getting a damn thing out of it. They have fought 25 years only to have Thieu still in office.

P: Do you think they will do it then after the election?

K: I think they will. They have no place to go. Two years ago, they would say, you lost the war why don't you accept it and today they say ............ but they say in three years we will be put off but 3 years is a long time off.

P: Good, good. On the economic announcement, Connally was the big wheel on this. He did a hell of a job. We pulled it off together and also really had an enormous affect. Has people like Rockefeller walking on the clouds.

K: Really?

P: Oh, yes. He called me and said it was the greatest thing since MBFR.

K: I wanted to see the press comments -- I didn't call you right away until I could go over them. The consensus seems to be that it was the boldest move since the ________.

P: I hope it will work now. It may have finally stepped this country out of ________ created by the press.

K: The economy is partly a psychological problem. No matter what happens if you take the attitude that things will get better, things will get better.

P: Yeah.

K: I don't know anything about these things, but it looks like a damn ingenius program to me.

DEClassified
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 p.m., August 16, 1971 -- page 5

P: Poses some problems for the Japanese but we have done everything for them and they have done nothing for us. Now they will have to come to us for a few things. The thing that will hurt would be the automobiles -- for them, that's their life blood. Well, Henry, good to talk to you. Get back to bed.

K: Okay.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Laird
8/17/71 8:25 a.m.

L: I'm still plugging away at raising a little hell.

K: You sure got them stirred up here.

L: I can't be for backing away at this time on our defense posture.

K: Well, I am on your . . . I am on the side of something in the neighborhood of the figure you gave.

L: I didn't even use a figure. Someone gave for example the figure of $80 billion. I said if you used that you would still be in the neighborhood of what it was in '64. This isn't what I called you about. I may get in trouble for hard-lining it but I've got to back it because it affects our '72 budget. The President knows I'm going to. . .

K: No, the President wanted to do it himself. That's his problem.

L: I wonder if the President understands the problem I am having on herbicides around fire bases.

K: We've just extended it.

L: When?

K: In the last few days.

L: I haven't gotten it yet.

K: It should be on the way over to you.

L: Good.

K: It was extended to December 1.

L: But I haven't had it since March. So now I've got the authority to use it till December 1?

K: Yes.

L: Also, on getting the supply parts into Vietnam -- I have had to open up lines and put them on overtime. There are a couple of plants that will have to be shut down. We're giving them a year's business in two-months' time. It would help if we could extend it to October 30.

K: Why don't you do that?

By NARA, Date

TELECON

Phil Farley

8/17/71 9:20 a. m.

F K: They are having a very full schedule in Vienna this week unless they have trouble getting the Russians to talk.

K: It's Helsinki I hope.

F: I'm sorry; I'm really out of phase. Of course it's Helsinki. Gerry is running into some reluctance in the delegation to move on the fallback.

K: Gerry has the discretion to go to the fallback and we'll back him no matter what his delegation says. I think we have got to get down to business.

F: They are introducing it informally on Friday.

K: You tell him we'll back him up.

F: Okay, one thing. In his letter he has explicit reference to how in the next stage: ABM ban and reductions. He wants to know how closely this is to be tied together. Is there a linkage or just a general statement.

K: I think at this point it's a general statement, but we won't get into that yet. This is just an expression of the President's general feeling.

F: That's helpful. He just wanted to have it in his head whether these are goals or preconditions.

K: Goals at this point.

F: One other question. I have never been over there. It looks like with the Congress out of town and everyone all away next week it would be feasible for me to visit Helsinki.

K: I think you should. We'll know how to reach you. Who will be at your desk?

F: Spurgeon.

K: I think you should go. I would like to go myself.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Sim Fentress/Kissinger
10:35 a.m. 8/17/71

F: What have we done to you?

K: I am trying to be cooperative with you people and when you quote someone about me you give me a chance to comment. You did it to me with Ellsberg and now you have an Indian official saying "?????????" and its a lie.

F: Indian diplomat saying --

K: According to Indian diplomat "if ______ joins India/Pakistan ???? ???, India can expect no help from U.S. ???? "

F: They are using you.

K: They are trying to be pushed into what they will do anyway. I see you as people when I am told not to see you. You promised two months ago that you would check with me. Or Sidey did.

F: You are the kind of guy who gets talked about and quoted and we don't call anytime someone says something but I guess we will have to call each time.

K: But this is a time when someone ? / / / / . And I am a chief culprit. And it's a direct quote.

F: I will talk with Sidey..

K: He is on the West Coast.

F: I know that. When someone picks up a quote from HAK or about him --

K: You should at least hear my side. I did warn India about a coming rapprochment. They have less reason to complain and almost exactly contrary to the truth.

F: We will start a new rule around here. It's a recurring problem. You have a valid complaint. We pick up so much on you and not with anyone else.

K: You printed a damaging quote from Ellsberg where when asked how many VN killed, I said it was a racial question. You could have checked with Elliot Osborne who was there. I just want to give my

By NARA, Date 5/27

-2-

side of the question when I am going out of my way with you.

F: Suppose you sit in a meeting of 6 people and everyone there says this was said and almost total agreement with what was said, should we call you? We hate to bug you.

K: I can't think of any instance where it happens.

F: But if it's sensitive.

K: If you are reasonably sure it happened but if a possibility -- if I meet with a group of radicals even if 100% says I said it, it's not conclusive. But with a meeting of responsible people and they say the same thing then you have a valid case.

F: I will talk with Hugh and if anyone here has an alledged
quote they will check with you.

K: Only if it's going to be used.

F: But it could be used out of NY. So we better check and run
it through your guy. There will be occasions but not many. How's
everything else going? You weren't in on shaping of this new poli

K: I designed it but I thought I would spread the credit around.

By NARA, Date 5/87

TELECON

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

12:15 p.m., August 17, 1971

J: How are you?

K: How are you? I haven't seen you for three or four days.

J: You did a tremendous thing.

K: You keep nagging and sometimes it turns out all right.

J: I issued a statement and I think it was all right. It at least
 got some attention. You didn't get out to San Clemente?

K: I'm coming tomorrow.

J: We will talk to you then.

K: If you can hop over for a day or two, I would like to see you.

J: We'll try next week. It depends on our small child -- whether
 she can get out here. Then we will come after Tuesday. I am giving
 a speech on the 24th and we'll come after that, but we will call you
 first. The main purpose for my call is this: We are having an Asian
 Seminar here in Aspen run by Phil Talbot. There are three or four
 experts in the group who are so high and knowing you are doing all
 kinds of thinking, I wanted you to know about them. First there's
 Phil -- he is tremendous.

K: Yes, he is outstanding. How long is the seminar going to last?

J: It will be through on Saturday. The other fellow is a medical
doctor who has apparently spent a lifetime immersed in this subject
and he is one of the most erudite men. He is H. Stanley Bennett,
Director of the Laboratories for Reproductive Biology, at the University
of North Carolina. He is unbelievable in the knowledge of the background
and philosophy and history and most minute detail and with the constructive
outlook for today. The other fellow is a young Chinese professor --
Wei-Ming Tu -- who is really brilliant.

K: I will get him to San Clemente.

J: The fourth is Lionel Landry, Executive Vice President of the
Asia Society. Those four are outstanding. I thought it was my duty

By

NARA, Date

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

12:15 p.m., August 17, 1971

- 2 -

to tell you about these four individuals. If you will put your girl
on, I will give her the details.

K: All right. I look forward to seeing you out there. Give my best to Marion. I will hear from you next week.

J: Right.

Senator Javits lists the following in the order of their brilliance,
in his estimation. They are presently at the Aspen Institute in
Colorado and a meeting could be set up through Senator Javits at
303/925-3426. The Seminar concludes at noon on Saturday, August
at which time these persons will be leaving Aspen.

(1) Phillips Talbot
(Foreign Service Officer; former Ambassador to Greece)
Now President of the Asia Society in New York

(2) H. Stanley Bennett, M.D.
Director, Laboratories for Reproductive Biology
University of North Carolina

(3) Wei-Ming Tu [Chinese]
Assistant Professor History
University of California at Berkley

(4) Lionel Landry
Executive Vice President of the Asia Society in New York

lds

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Amb. Jha/Kissinger
12:40 p.m. 8/17/71

K: I have got -- I find in two weekly news magazines statements from Indian officials. One, in NEWSWEEK, *in* not identified is an attack on me which was that I was thinking only of Peking and driving you into Pakistan. In TIME a diplomat was quoted as saying: "?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?". I don't know whether it's in your interest to start a crisis with the WH and it's for you to decide. But on second it's a lie and your Foreign Minister knows it's a lie.

J: We will correct it. I am in Chicago. When I get to Washington I will flash a message back.

K: I will go out of my way for a special consideration of India. But if this is the way you want it I will get out of it and handle it in normal channels. You saw my memo from India and I thought I was offering India a special privileged relationship with the WH.

J: I will see it's corrected. I am going to the West Coast. The 25th and 28th I must be in Washington.

K: Let's aim for something next week on the West Coast.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
3:27 p.m. 8/17/71

K: How do you feel?

R: Fine, thanks.

K: I am sending over a memo of my conversation of yesterday. I think it's self-explanatory. No spectacular movement. I think you are right, nothing will happen until after October.

R: I was talking with Ellsworth Bunker. Problem in VN.

K: I saw his talking points and I think he has to be tough with Thieu.

R: I am making them tougher. It will be suicide if Minh withdraws. Everything we have been saying will be undercut. We will be supporting a single man, Thieu. We will have no answer.

K: If in-fighting is __________ we will have no moral basis.

R: I don't think the President fully focused on it because of other problems. I can see how it will destroy the Vietnamization program. I will finish my discussion with Ellsworth. Everything else gone __________ so far.

K: Japanese must be spinning.

R: They are in terrible shape. I told Haldeman that foreign policy considerations be put into the plan. I will talk with Connally. I think they are willing to cooperate.

K: We can't do in the Japanese again.

R: We got one thing out on automobiles with Canada at the last minute. That would have shaken Canadian government. I think coordination is good but we have to be careful.

K: I couldn't agree more.

By. NARA, Dale 3/27

TELCUN
Braden/Kissinger

5:10 p.m.

8/17/71

B: Where are you?

K: In Washington. Calling to protest about your broadcast.

B: What broadcast?

K: Your column where I killed a State Dept. study on foreign news sources.

B: Really?

K: Why didn't you check with me?

B: I probably should have.

K: It's not misinterpretation, it's a lie.

B: I got it --

K: It's a lie. I didn't know such a study existed. I have now checked because *Skan* Secy. of State didn't want anything on paper so he killed it. Our reason was to get ______ to the President. Ray Cline study. I never killed a bureaucratic paper.

B: There was a study?

K: I find now there is but I didn't kill it. Why would I?

B: It had all the ring of truth.

K: You are not malicious --

B: I felt you wouldn't want speculation of this.

K: Let's not worry about what I would do. I didn't know about they study and I didn't kill it. xW So it's wrong.

B: Want me to run a correction?

K: Is it worth it? Yes, I think so.

B: Yes. At the end of a story -- contrary to what was said in this column, Henry Kissinger did not kill a story.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Braden/Kissinger

5:10 p. m. 8/17/71

-2-

K: Or we know of it's existence.

B: Or know of its existence.

K: I may kill that guy who leaked it if I know who it is.

B: I can't tell you. I thought it was right.

K: If you printed it you had reason to believe it. You are a serious, honorable guy.

B: Did you read the other part of it?

K: It wasn't wrong but won't improve my relations with you here in town.

B: I thought you wouldn't like ? ? ? ? Rogers.

K: I didn't like it.

B: I didn't know the Cline story was wrong. I hate to do you wrong.

K: See you on the West Coast. I am going out tomorrow.

B: I will run a thing on it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By: CNAR Date: 05/17/71

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

8/17/71 5:28pm

D: Once again, I received after lunch with you a telegram saying in Moscow they agree with your proposal as a first step to have on basis of mutual . . . about ships calling on ports. They agree it should be for 14 days now on both bases.

K: We will get that order immediately.

D: How do we handle it?

K: Let me give the instructions tomorrow and then let you know the requirements. But you can consider it done.

D: Someone will call me tomorrow?

K: Yes.

D: Further things dealing with ships and maritime business should be discussed by experts, but on the date we will discuss it at a later stage.

K: Yes, and I prefer that it not be discussed until I get back, because of the bureaucratic confusion . . .

D: Okay, and when you come back we will discuss . . .

K: But you can consider the two-week thing done. It's just a question of a day or two to give the orders . . . and I have given instructions on a most urgent basis to Rush . . . and you can tell this to Moscow in the sense that we have discussed it. Any further problems? There will be no further problems

D: I hope not.

K: We do this in our mutual interest and this will be kept. It is a question of management and we will solve it. There will be no other misunderstanding by Rush.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Dean Acheson
8/17/71; 6:50 p. m.

A: All I wanted to say is that the next election will be one on the domestic issues -- but I don't want to turn it upside down for you (laughter). I think you did a damn good job.

K: Aren't you nice. Modesty is not one of my virtues, but I can't claim credit for this one. It is getting awfully dangerous to attack him.

A: I was very much amused and I quite agree I think this is a damn man to fool with. Somebody asked me if I would write a piece about John Lindsay joining the Democratic Party. I said I couldn't because I would have to say he was trying to show that "rats do board sinking ships." Tell the President I made that contribution. This is just to cheer you up.

K: Thank you, Dean. I am off the West Coast tomorrow but I hope to see you when I get back.

A: You won't have a good time but at least you can get out of Washington. I think you are doing alright.

K: Let's have lunch soon after I get back.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
Peterson/Kissinger
9:13 a.m. 8/18/71

K: You finally did it. Got yourself into the headlines. Screwed the Japanese.

P: It's non-discriminatory. I need to talk about where we go on Japan.

K: I was going to call and SRG for Mon and Tues. next week on the Coast.

P: Before that you and I need to discuss basic strategy.

K: The tough things.

P: Don't you think we have to get together first?

K: Absolutely. I am leaving at noon. I have a meeting at 10:00 and 11:00.

P: What are you doing now.

K: I have some things to do. Why don't you come in 20 minutes.

P: I will come over at 9:30.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [illegible]

NARA, Date 5/27

TELCÓN
Rogers/Kissinger

10:07 a.m.

8/18/71

K: I just wanted to catch up with you before I left. I will stay in close touch from out there about anything that might go on.

R: What time do you leave?

K: 1:30. The only outstanding item is the Sept. 30 signing.

R: He hasn't called.

K: He will. He has to confirm it.

R: Anything magic about the date?

K: It's the one that Haldeman and the President gave.

R: That makes it fairly magic. The trip to Alaska is Sept. 27.

K: 26th. Medici is here 27th and 28th so they picked the first day afterwards. Gromyko has to leave -- that's that.

R: Fukuda will be in Alaska so I should go.

K: And Alex.

R: That would be nice.

K: I think we will invite him.

R: I have a speech on the 28th and 29th in ________.

K: That doesn't hurt. I think we should stick with the 30th.

R: OK.

K: I will call you and if you will let me know. We have given the Chinese two dates and I will write them on a slip of paper and send them over.

R: You and I are in complete accord on India Pakistan thing which can blow up at any time.

K: I am really outraged about what they said I said in India. I

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Rogers/Kissinger

10:07 a.m. 8/18/71

-2-

said the very opposite. They are the only people with whom I gave
a warning on raprochment. I really think maybe they are --

R: I am to.

K: I wonder when you see Dobrynin you could --

R: I will but not a special thing. Another thing -- I think we
should give sensible--

K: Arms thing.

R: A way to do it that doens't appear to ______ them.

K: I have mentioned it everytime you have raised it.

R: We have to know what's involved. If Pakistanis say no then
we can't but if they agreed.

K: If it takes the heat off us it's better for them. We can
wait to see what Williams brings back.

R: I will explore it with Hilaly. When you think of what's
involved -- $2 million of goods which can be purhased in inter-
national arms markets. We will be suffering for months with this.
They are saying people dying from this. It's bunk but you can't
stop it. Kennedy will come back. If we can say it's stopped --

K: We will stay in touch on this.

that

R: Because of problems that will arise, we should give serous
thought. I will stay in touch.

K: I will send you those two dates.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folger
By CHARA Date Stator

*

TELCORN
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger
11:09 a.m. 8/18/71

D: You are still here?

K: I am leaving at 1:00. I have had a telegram from Bahr who appr apparently is closer to that communications channel then Rush who is in Berlin. "I am now send you this on behalf of Rush. It's noting to worry about any longer. Relax. Access questions are settled. All that are left are general consultate and pass ports in Soviet Union. We hopt to finish tomorrow. Rush will tell you how it was possible. Many things brought together the conclusion. ? ? ? ? ? Please thank the President on behalf of Chancellor and my best regards." When Rush is in Berlin that communications link doesn't go to Berling because you don't help us that way.

D: Some excitement. Otherwise it's too easy.

K: I sent that telegram at 3:00 yesterday.

D: Both of them?

K: Identical ones to Rush and Bahr to say there are nothing except orders coming from President and me. On the 14 day thing, we have issued instructions to State Dept. to proceed immediately.

E: They will call us.

K: they will call you. If not in a week, let me know. Other problems will be bureaucratic. We have also asked for a meeting of experts on other issues. You can call tomorrow on the 30th.

D: OK.

K: We will await your call. The next thing is I will hear from you

D: Yes on these major things.

K: We are relaxed about it. On psychological point, if there could be a quick answer so the President doesn't feel --

D: In a week.

K: No worry on our side. We have brought it to this point and want to keep the spirit. Another point, when we have other things in train I will let you have a final decision on Kama Riber thing

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CNARA Date 05/01

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:09 a.m.

8/18/71

-2-

when Foreign Minister is here. Around the end of Sept. It's not
connected with him and no need to bother him. Around the end of
Sept. we will straighten it out.

D: I will call you and work it out.

K: You have an invitation to come out to the West Coast.

D: It depends on how I get ? ? ? . I appreciate. Your Ambassador in Burundi -- Millardi -- he mentioned to our diplomat that he was personally invited to go by the President and you to Peking.

K: He x is a liar.

D: I was impressed, especially after I looked at the map!

K: You can assume on a general proposition that no one has been
invited and Millardi will go XXX if there's a delegation of
2800 and he will be 2700.

D: He mentioned it proudly to our Ambassador and this is the only telegram I have ever gotten from Burundi.

K: There will be no surprises from us.

D: I was amused!

K: Burundi! Jesus!

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Amb. Jha/Kissinger

12:36 p.m.

8/18/71

J: I have sent the message. I haven't see the note. I sent it strongly worded. XXXXX Can you fix the date for my coming now?

K: Hold on a minute. Coleman, what's a good date on the coast? The 26th or 25th. Either one.

J: 26th or 25th. I hope we can have two sessions of longer than an hour.

K: I will set aside two hours.

J: I will fly to Los Angeles.

K: I will pick you up. Let's aim for the 25th. I will have you picked up by helicopter. And two hours. If you could correct it for TIME I would be grateful.

J: This is kind of story -- I will try. Your ______ by in India worse according to them. I don't know who there man is here in Washington.

K: Sim Fentress.

J: I will contact him.

K: We need to discuss the more fundamental issues. We will discuss it on the West Coast.

By: CCO NARA, Date: 8/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Under Secretary Irwin

1:00 p.m., August 18, 1971

K: I'm running for a plane.

I: I'm calling on our conversation about the Charge at the British Embassy. I am about to contact Millard and also give a letter along the lines we talked about.

K: I haven't called him yet. Let me call him and tell him you and I are together on this.

I: All right. I will call him later this afternoon and get him to come in late today or tomorrow.

K: Fine. I'll call him right now.

lds

[Note for file: Mr. Kissinger was unable to reach Millard. Instructed Col Kennedy to do so. Col Kennedy talked with Millard and passed Mr. Kissinger's message.]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12557
By CNARA Date Stot

TELECON

Amb. D

8/18? /71

K: Anatole, how are you?

D: You already calling from West Coast?

K: That's right.

D: Oh ________.

K: That's right. Uh, Anatole, we are having a slight bureaucratic problem with the Berlin thing that I wanted to discuss with you. While I was in the air Rush reported officially that he had made a tentative agreement. Rogers then ordered him to come back for a week so that he could look it over to see whether it was in accord with Presidential directives. Now, I am very reluctant to overrule this because if there is any problem about whether it is in accord with Presidential directives I can settle it because I write the directives.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: So, what I want to tell you, I have asked Rush to see whether he could get it reversed without appealing to me.

D: I understand.

K: If he cannot get it reversed I've asked him to ask for a two-week recess...

D: Why not for one week?

K: Or one week, I didn't give a time, I said for a short recess. But I want to assure you . . . I've talked to the President by telephone. We stand behind the agreement and there is simply a bureaucratic problem to get everybody lined up.

D: Oh I see. Okay.

K: So you have . . . I just want Gromyko to understand that it is just . . . If he aske for a recess which is not a hundred percent sure, it is entirely technical

D: I understand.

K: And we expect to have it initialed the first week of September.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folsom
By D. NARA Date 9-1-69

TELECON

Amb. D

8/18/71 p. m.

D: Initial what?

K: Well, you know.

D: Oh . . . at the beginning, the settlement between Ambassadors.

K: That's right.

D: By beginning of September.

K: That's right.

D: Okay.

K: Or during maybe the first week of September. But I repeat we stand by what Rush has done and we will not ask for any changes.

D: Oh I see. I understand. Okay.

K: But it's a way for us to get the State Department lined up.

D: Yes so . . .

K: Well, what I've told Rush is if he can get it changed without appealing to us then it will go normally. If he cannot do it then I asked him to come home and if there's any disagreement it comes to me.

D: But you say what was agreed upon by Rush up till now you still buy, yes?

K: Yes, so you have nothing to worry about.

D: I understand, thank you very much.

K: It's simply a question of management and we will stand literally behind everything that has been agreed upon.

D: Thank you, I will notify Gromyko.

K: But if you can have a little patience to let us go through our bureaucratic procedures.

D: I understand.

K: And I've also told Rush to explain the situation to Fallin.

D: Okay, I think it is fair enough. Thank you very much, I will notify Gromyko. Thank you for calling and have a nice time.

DECEMBER 13
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Haldeman/Kissinger
9:22 a.m. 8/26/74 19/71

K: Where are you?

H: Lost in the Grand Tetons.

K: Is it beautiful?

H: It is, as a matter of fact. It's worth the trip. Run on the lake in a boat this morning. Have you talked to the President today?

K: No.

H: Question of whether there's a possibility of making the announcement in (any other time) rather than noon.

K: I haven't discussed time yet. What time are you thinking of?

H: If possible, in the ohter place.

K: There's an 8 hour time difference. I guess if we did it at 10:00 at night it would be 6:00 in the morning.

H: They probably wouldn't do that.

K: I doubt it.

H: It gives us more mileage.

K: Something to be said for varying the pattern and help with other clients. Rush is running to an agreement and State doesn't know about the by-play and trying to slow him down and Russians giving more concessions then we ask for. If Rogers does try to get to him it would help if the President says we want a fast agreement. They can't understand why it's moving so fast and not take orders to slow down. I can probably handle it from here. Don't want him to be surprised. On the other one, I left the time open. I am certain they will go again for the way we did it last time. I will raise it. Out here this economic thing is a good deall. You are getting good TV out here. Springfield speech well played.

H: You are in Calif. ?

K: Yes. I was at Freeman Gosden's last night and he mood has totally changed.

H: You have problems with labor people now. We will see you tonight.

K: I will be at the plane.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Irwin/Kissinger

9:47 a.m.

8/19/71

I: I talked with Millard this morning and Zumwalt and Zumwalt says that the other Admiral will know this and they feel they have to tell him about it. He feels it's better to go to the Joint Committee first and Ron Spiers feels so here. Want to bring it to your attention.

K: Is Millard agreeable to that?

I: Wanted to check with his government first to see whether they have question of proceeding with it.

K: Who wanted to go to committee first?

I: At State and Zumwalt. It will come to the attention of other admiral and therefore preferable to go to other committee. Zumwalt thought there might be flack and flack might be lessened if committee approached first.

K: I doubt that. But it's true the Admiral will learn about it.

I: Zumwalt feels it's better to consult with him first rather than have it. In that case better to consult with committee. So you may or may not soften the objection but soften attitudes of it. In the light of that, before I turned over a letter to Millard or send to committee or did anything like that I wanted to check with you what your thoughts were.

K: I have to accept tactical judgment of people who know the issues better than I so I would go along with it. But give the British a chance to see whether it's what they want.

I: I will go to his government before we go to the committee.

K: If they give the go ahead, we should do as you suggest.

I: I have a letter to Millard which says from the Ambassador's conversation with Kissinger and subsequent conversation, we understand desire of their navy to discuss environmental and human problems in their area. Will not infringe on letter or spirit of agreement and would appreciate being informed. That's about it. We will go ahead on this basis.

K: Thank you.

By NARA, Dalo

5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
8/19/71 9:53 a.m.

R: I had another talk at some length yesterday with ____ Brown and Bill Sullivan. They told me something that I thought was a little disturbing, that Ellsworth Bunker, when he talked to the President, came away with the feeling that the President had no interest in the elections.

K: Complete nonsense. I saw that in the Sullivan statement to the working group -- I don't see how he could have . . .

R: Well, Bill got it from Bunker. He said he was trying to get some indication from the President either in a letter or orally but he wasn't able to see the President again.

K: We can get him a letter. I went over those points from with you. We feel very strongly that we can't have an uncontested election there.

R: I know. He is seeing Minh today -- Minh is thinking of withdrawing you know. And he is seeing Thieu tomorrow. If we could get a letter out from the President . . .

K: You want a letter?

R: It would help.

K: Okay, we'll get it for you. I don't think they talked about the problem. They may have talked about Ky and the President may not have expressed any particular view about that. But with Minh he is very concerned.

R: I knew he would be, and you saw the Stevenson thing.

K: If you can get a draft letter here we'll go ahead with it.

R: Okay. Something else, I didn't get those other things . . .

K: Oh God damn. We will have them to you in two hours. Or . . .

R: We can say them right now.

K: No one will know what we are talking about anyway. The first is February 21; the second is March 16. And that's influenced by . . .

R: I heard from Mitchell Sharp this morning. He says that Kosygin has accepted an invitation to visit Canada on October 18. Mitchell is probably coming down to talk to me next week about the economic matters. I was thinking that we've been looking for a time and he hopes that . . .

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

8/19/71 9:53 a.m. p. 2

K: I think that's essential. Why don't we try to settle something when you talk to him? It is not in our interest to look like we are rushing up there in reply to Kosygin.

R: That's right.

K: Why don't we get you some dates that you can take up with him when he is down next week.

R: Okay good Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
8/19/71 1:12 p.m.

R: I was going over this tentative agreement Rush made. It has a lot of what we think are failures to comply with the NSDM. I don't really understand it. I am now sending him a telegram telling him not to finalize it on Monday. I'm saying go to the meeting but don't sign the thing and then let's talk about it. On access it's okay, but on rights and responsibilities we've taken a beating. In some places he directly violates the NSDM, uses words we expressly said not to. I don't understand.

K: I have just been going through the bables. I haven't had a chance to compare. The access looked pretty good and also _______________. But I haven't studied rights and responsibilities.

R: That's where it's touchy and gives the Russians more authority than it should on visas and passports.

K: On the tactics of having Rush come back and discussing it I see no problem with it. I asked Haig to tell Eliot this morning -- the President told Rush in a general way that he was eager to get an agreement on Berlin. And that we wanted it, within limits, to do what could be done. But he said nothing on any specific problem.

R: I got the impression that Rush was disregarding all instructions. I didn't know whether the President said to do anything he wants. Our people have been working hard as hell, but on the rights and responsibilities . . . the British are sort of alarmed too.

K: We have till Monday. Let's both talk to the President when he gets in, or I'll mention it. I see no problem with having Rush come back -- it will only delay it for a week.

R: Unless he's got some window-dressing planned.

K: I think we should keep the publicity about it to a minimum to give us a chance to go over it.

R: Parts of it we can claim credit for, but on closer analysis I think we took a beating.

K: You do?

R: Yes.

K: It's a stinking negotiation to begin with. I have never been for the concept of it. But I see nothing wrong with bringing Rush back. The

By NARA, Dale

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
8/19/71 1:12 p.m. p. 2

only suggestion I have is not to do anything to Rush that looks like a
reprimand. If he goes to Hahr and starts leaking . . .

R: We won't make any reprimands. All we'll say is not to have
any signing ceremony either with a signature or initials and after the
Monday session come back and we can talk it over because there appear
to be some inconsistencies between the agreement and the NSDM.

K: That looks all right to me.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-1252
By: CHNARA Date: 8/19/71

TELCORN

Dobrynin/Kissinger

1:50 p.m.

8/19/71

D: How are you?

K: Fine.

D: What's the weather over there?

K: Glorious.

D: Had a chance to swim?

K: It's a little cool. The water is cold here. The air is warm. Are you
coming out?

D: I am waiting you know for what.

K: I have all the actresss lined up for you.

D: It's quite a temptation. You shouldn't use for an ambassador.

K: Why not? You wouldn't want up to seduce one of our own. Rush went
ahead and concluded the agreement. We are going to ask him on Monday --
State is going crazy because they don't know why it's working so fast --
so he will come back for a week. He may not initial the agreement but I ask
pay no attention. Everything will go on as it is. I can't refuse the
Secy. to call back the Ambassador. If there's a disagreement between State
and him, we will rule for him. We have achieved one thing -- Rush is saying
good things about Abrasimov. Done a first class job.

D: Good, I will tell him.

K: Bahr in ecstasy. Chancellor happy.

D: All begun to sound like a success.

K: Bureaucrats have been foiled.

D: He will be back as you mentioned the first week in Sept.

K: Yes.

D: Everything you mentioned yesterday is going this way.

K: Except yesterday instructions not to go further until he has gone home. But him to go as far as possible and make it look like it will be finished. He will say he has to check with State and we cannot refuse that but no problem. I think

Dobrynin/Kissinger

1:50 p.m.

8/19/71

They have found a formula for use of passports. It looks to me that it's
settled. Now we have the bureaucracy to worry about. Simply time x consuming.
I think we will make the deadline or maybe miss it by a few days. Want you to
understand what's going on. Internal American problems. No disagreement
on plans.

D: Don't work too hard. You will need your strength for further instructions.

K: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CNARA Date 05/01/81

J. W. B. K. E.
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

Aug. 19, 7:00 p.m.

By NARA, Dalo

K: What I let them do is get Rush back next week. Deaton is dumb

but I can't refuse to let the Secretary of State talk to him. But if
there is any disagreement we may have to invoke you to rule on
behalf of Rush. But I don't think it will come to that. The only
reason I wanted you to know is so that if you get any phone call

P: You mean State wants to delay it?

K: State has a few legalistic nit-picks Mr. President that will take me
a half an hour to explain to you. The basic fact is that we made an
agreement - a proposal on February 6 and that the agreement we got
is better in every respect than the proposal we ourselves made which
is almost incredible.

P: Right.

K: And Rush thinks

P: Well why is State bitching than?

K: State is bitching because it has moved so fast that Rush - it looks as if Rush did it all.

P: Great, let him do it than.

K: Then they found some legalistic things. Well, of course they must
suspect that we did something from here.

P: Oh sure.

K: Because Rush has just gone - well I think we can get

P: Well, do you think the announcement is going to be good?

K: Of Berlin.

P: Yes.

K: Oh yes. It will now be delayed a week. We were going to be ready to
announce it Monday, but I have got to let them bring Rush back.

P: One week. OK, fine.

K: But we will have it done by September 1. Because if that screws up the
summit will screw up.

P: Yes.

By NARA, Dale S/27

K: And we really have our good faith engaged and it is - given the fact that the whole thing is a lousy negotiation it is as well as we could do.

P: Yes. OK.

K: Right Mr. President.

P: Well then the deal is to-I will hold the line with State.

K: Right. And we will give them instructions that they shouldn't say anything.

P: Right. In the meantime we will-on the election thing just --

K: Put a lid on.

P: Cold turkey. That's right. say nothing, say nothing.

K: I saw Freeman Gosden yesterday. He says he checked around the 15 leaders of the Los Angeles business community and they are ecstatic about your program.

P: You know we really - we will talk about it tomorrow - but we really pulled a plug on these people, haven't we. Meany came out against it.

K: That's good. Well you can run against special interests.

P: That's right.

K: I think the few words I heard you say when you arrived are a very good platform.

P: You heard that. I said well there are special interests in labor and business who are against this but the country is for it. So I am for the country. A good deal, don't you think?

K: I think that is the way to put it.

P: Right.

K: Right Mr. President. I hope you some rest here.

P: Well, you have some fun with your kids.

K: Thank-you.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Amb. Jha/Kissinger
morning 8/19/71

J: I have a message to convey. The Prime Minister has run into a problem with Parliament ? ? ? ? . Wonder if possible to change the date. 3-8 November. Can be in Washington and any two days inbetween.

K: xkxxixx It will take until tomorrow to find out. The President is travelling.

J: She asked me to say she hopes you understand her embarassment. Coming from London and arriving on the 3rd or through the 8th.

K: What days in the week are they? We can probably do it.

J: Third is a Wed.

K: Yeah.

J: Run to weekend on 6-7.

K: Whe wants to leave on 8th?

J: To be in India on the 10th.

K: Some of our people were asking whether the Prime Minister would xx be willing to do it on the West Coast. What do you think? Not an official request

J: If I can say, she will probably prefer it. Everytime she comes here, she sees only this coast. She thought she would like to see West Coast and go back from there.

K: The President has played with that idea. I will see what I can arrange. As late as the 8th.

J: Leaving on the 8th. Not be able to reach the West Coast before the 4th. 4th an effective date. You expect me the 25th.

K: If it's still convenient.

J: I will be in Los Angeles the 24th. The same place and call you.

K: I will send a helicopter for you.

J: The TIME guy says he already apologized to you.

K: No.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
The President
8/19/71 (?) p.m.

K: Well, if it's an unopposed election there's going to be all hell to pay. And that's why I think . . . Minh didn't even start campaigning. He announced on August first and here we are on August 19th and he's already withdrawn, and the campaign wasn't supposed to start till August 24th.

P: Which proves he's under the control of the Communists, huh?

K: That's how it looks to me.

P: Yeah, right.

K: Or at least under the radical Buddhists who in turn are under the control of the Communists.

P: Same thing. Well, that's all right. You know, as a matter of fact, all this is going to be irrelevant Henry. You know that.

K: Oh yeah. I think the big games are now going to be . . .

P: We're playing, you know, the economic front and the Russian front and . . . Incidentally, on the Russian announcement what date did we pick?

K: Well, I suggested to him the 15th as a first choice and the 16th as a second choice.

P: Well, either day is okay. But you know the interesting thing is we made the China announcement on the 15th; we made the economic announcement on the 15th. It would be very good to make this announcement on the 15th.

K: Oh really. Well, I gave it to him as our first choice.

P: Fine, fine.

K: And he said he ought to have an answer by next week. We have one problem I wouldn't have bothered you with, with State on Berlin. That has moved so fast and so unexpectedly . . .

P: They want to slow it down, huh?

K: . . . that they are now nit-picking away at it, partly frankly I think the reason is that Rogers

[END OF TAPE]

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
The President

8/19/71 p.m.

K: Sorry to disturb you.

P: It's all right, fine, no problem.

K: I wanted you to be aware of something. We've just had a
Reuters dispatch that Minh has withdrawn from the race in Vietnam and
that will mean that some of our people are going to be anguishing all over
the place. Now, I feel that part of this . . . maybe Thieu was unwise in
some of the things he did, but I think partly it's also rigged by the Buddhists
and the Communists and this would explain why they didn't settle at the last
meeting, that they knew this was coming. And what we would like to do is
to put a lid on comments on our side for a while . . .

P: Total, total.

K: . . . and see perhaps whether we could get Thieu to get a new
election law and, above all, I don't think we should turn on Thieu at this
late moment.

P: Turn on him? Never, never . . . I hope never.

K: Well, that's the trend in the State Department.

P: Well, the hell with them.

K: They see in this a God-sent opportunity to get rid of him.

P: No, we must never do that. It's like what they did killing Diem.

K: Exactly.

P: Never. Never, never, never. They're to shut up. They're
to say nothing without my approval.

K: Exactly. Well, if I may do that, Mr. President . . .

P: Fine. You tell them that's the order and . . . it isn't too bad
you know. The Communists let Thieu win, so he wins.

K: It's no crime to have an anti-Communist win an election . . . to
run . . . But we may be able to get another . . . you know get the election
deferred, get a new electoral law or whatever. At any rate I don't think we
should now give the impression that we are turning on Thieu.

P: I'm not sure we ought to defer the election. I mean, you know,
let's get it over with, don't you think.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Peter Peterson

8/20/71 9:03 a.m.

K: If you tell the Japs to stop tuna fishing off Alaska we'll consider it.

P: Consider what Henry?

K: Do you realize that they have been hit at 30 day intervals?

P: The question I have is on the paper we are doing on Japan. My current feeling . . . the end reevaluation is so major and insulting to them that some of the earlier scenario about smaller things they could do are liable to get washed under

K: I agree.

P: I would at this meeting seek out the most important general approach. What should be done is setting up the major goals and setting up some mechanism between the governments for achieving these goals. But at this meeting the best thing is to work out the best possible

K: I think that's the only thing to do at this meeting. Why don't you come out a day early and we'll talk about it?

P: Okay.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
8/20/71 10:35 a.m.

R: On the Rush thing, we have done what you wanted . . .

K: I just talked to the President to give you his views.

R: Let me say this, we have got the telegram -- it's on the way. I am worried the President is going to get a black eye.

K: I haven't studied the details of the deal. His feeling is he doesn't want an international crisis over it before he knows the problem and the specific objections that we have. He thought what went out yesterday was handleable. He wanted to see the detailed objections before we decide on three weeks or on one week. Frankly, he would like an agreement, and fairly soon, for domestic reasons.

R: Well, if he and you are giving Rush the idea that it didn't matter . . .

K: No one gave him that idea.

R: When we called him he said 'have you checked with San Clemente' which gave me that impression. It doesn't make any difference to me if the President wants it, but I think he will be accused of selling out Berlin. Rush has openly violated the President's instructions.

K: He got no detailed instructions from me on any of the points you have in your telegram. The President specifically did mention to him that he was eager to get an agreement and stated that fairly strongly. But it doesn't make any sense for him to say he wanted him to violate his instructions.

R: No, and there's no reason for Rush to do it now -- he had another meeting on Monday.

K: On the tactics of the day-to-day sessions, I am usually behind Hillenbrand.

R: Let me say this. I don't think it is totally unmanagable, but I think it is important for Rush to say this is an referendum. He is acting as if this is his own baby. And I think the President will get clobbered.

K: It should come back ad referendum. And second, we should identify the problems and solve them after that. He shouldn't lock it in on Monday. What we don't want is a commitment to delay and to let our allies know that we have problems.

R: How much delay should we have?

By CCO

NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

8/20/71 10:35 a.m. p. 2

K: About two weeks.

R: I think it will be tough for the President to focus on this. Everyone is euphoric about getting an agreement, but it's not just the agreement but what the agreement contains. You are going to have people like McCloy and Clay and that gang very upset.

K: Why? The objections in the telegram don't seem to me ones McCloy would raise hell about.

R: Yes he will. First, the things in the NSDM you said don't do and he did them all.

K: Like what?

R: The language. The NSDM said don't use these words. Use the word "Berlin" when . . . . . . Then there are two or three other places not violating the spirit, but the language of the NSDM. He could have said something like "It looks good, but we'll wait for Monday."

K: That part of it I don't understand. Why he did something on one day rather than another I don't understand, and the President has nothing to do with that part of it. I don't know why he did it.

R: I don't either. Agreements can be good or bad. But I have a feeling this will be construed as the United States being out-traded.

K: What do the Germans think?

R: I don't know. At any rate, I don't like to have him openly violate the specific language, and to do it at a time when he didn't have to. Then he says he wants to help the German government because they have got an election coming up. He ought to be thinking about the President and the election he's got coming up.

K: No, he's the one we have to think about. After I saw your cable Wednesday, Sonnenfeldt called me on the plane and asked me whether I had any objections to your cable saying that he should come back. I said no. Then I saw his cable to you saying that Abrasimov had made all the major concessions.

R: Sure, if that had been the case we'd have had no problem.

K: I haven't studied the text yet. What I don't want is headlines saying the thing is on the verge of blowing up.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

8/20/71 10:35 a.m. p. 2

R: No, that won't happen. Our problem is in the anxiety to get an agreement we don't end up with a bad one. It seems to me that we need not only a good agreement but the support of those people like McCloy and Clay.

K: Could we get Rush back without making too many waves and just see where we are.

R: That's what we want to do.

K: That's what he should do ad referendum. Are you sending a new telegram out here?

R: Yes.

K: I will look at that and if there any any problems I will call you directly.

R: I am taking the weekend off, but you can talk with Ted Eliot.
I don't want him to think this is his agreement -- it's the President's

K: Absolutely, Rush is not the figure we are interested in. If we have any problems I'll check with Ted Eliot.

R: I think he should know that when we say ad referendum we mean that.

K: Exactly.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

8/20/71 1:00 p.m.

DK: I need some background guidance on the Big Minh withdrawal.

K: If I were were you I would bet on Thieu to win the election now.

DK: You think so?

K: Well, he's his own worst enemy, so he may wind up beating himself.

DK: Really Henry, what do you foresee?

K: Let's see first what happens. Maybe Minh will come back in. I just don't want to speculate.

DK: You think it's possible that he will be back in?

K: It's not totally impossible.

DK: So it's safe for me to say that we are maintaining contacts and hope he may come back.

K: Don't say White House sources say.

DK: No.

K: I haven't canvassed all the possibilities, but there's an appeal before the Vietnam Supreme Court on the Ky candidacy.

DK: I thought that had been resolved.

K: No. Frankly I have not looked actively into that, but I was told two weeks ago that the decision was still to come.

DK: Is it your expectation that the White House may have something to say about it today?

K: No.

DK: You don't think so?

K: I would be amazed. Ziegler would be disobeying my orders.

DK: Thieu being his own worst enemy, is that about the tough election law

K: I have a lot of sympathy for that law on the one hand. He does want a mandate. Our political scientists have seen that if you have more than two

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELECON
Dave Kraslow

8/20/71 1:00 p.m. p. 2

candidates it's only a vague expression of the popular will. My own
personal view is that his mistake wasn't the law, but to let the Ky
matter happen.

DK: You mean putting pressure on people not to sign Ky's petition?

K: Well, whatever he did.

DK: What else is going on? You look terrific, suntanned. Does it
look pretty quiet for the next few days.

K: That's what I expect.

DK: If I call on Monday maybe we can arrange lunch.

K: Okay, and if you people ask me, I might come up to the Times.

DK: Oh good. I will check into that. Shall we set a date for our lunch now?

K: Let's say Tuesday.

DK: About 1:00,

K: That will be fine, but call me Monday.

Dk: Okay, thank you Henry.

By NARA, Date

5/27

TelCon - 10:55 - 8/20/71
Mr. Kissinger
Herb Kaplow

(Missed beginning of conversation - on other phone)

HK: ... What does that do to our negotiating position generally?

HAK: I don't think I want to make any comment now but we are looking at it very intensively.

HK: Is there anything that can be done.

HAK: The Supreme Court hasn't ruled on the Ky candidacy. There was an appeal by the Supreme Court. We are looking at it now to see what can be done.

HK: It is a most unfortunate development now.

HAK: We are staying off the record.

HK: Does this compromise our negotiating position.

HAK: Why don't you quit. I will see you later before we leave here. I don't want to give a lot of off the cuff opinion now.

By NARA, Dale S/27

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

8/20? /71

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I thought you would be pleased to know I was just talking with Colson and he said the lead editorials in both the NYTtimes and the Washington Post took on Geo. Meany and --

K: Terrific!

P: And the nation should rally behind the President in this effort and the Congress should--

K: Tremendous!

P: (laughter)

K: Well, I think, Mr. President, that that's the way we can rally the people. I don't think anyone wants to be form the special interests.

P: That's it.

K: And I think this call for sacrifice is what people want to hear.

P: Yeah. I took that -- as you know I've been sort of taking that line a bit and --

K: I noticed it.

P: Like yesterday. I didn't hit Meany personally but I just said *we* well, I know the special interests have different view but everybody's got to give something so that everybody can be benefitted* from it.

K: Yeah. I think it's terrific. And I think that the mood in the country -- it's the leadership, the fact that you took a big bite. Most people don't understand the details and that doesn't matter.

P: They for example don't know that by far the *big* biggest bite was the bite on gold.

K: Well, I think what you *did* will turn out to be one of the great economic steps in the post-war period. Now, incidentally, we have had a *very* special emissary from Sato here.

P: Yeah.

K: And he wants -- it's getting embarrassing. He wants to extend an invitation to you to visit Japan, he will guarantee an overwhelming reception, and --

By NARA, Date 5/27

President/Kissinger

8/20/71

-2-

P: I would go.

K: I told him I would have to check with you. I don't think we should connect it with the Peking trip, Mr. President.

P: No, it should be after Peking.

K: I think so because it will drive the Chinese --

P: No, after Peking, absolutely.

K: My guess would be --

P: Maybe after Russia.

K: That's what I would recommend. End of June, early July would be my recommendation.

P: Right. Incidentally, I think that on Berlin, too, the perfect ploy there is the one I mentioned to you, get Bill and say look, the economic thing we really requires that we have a good announcement this week, if we can; that coming at this point would be very helpful.

K: Well, I talked to Bill this morning and he, as it turns out, your instinct was absolutely right, he doesn't know what he's talking about. These bureaucrats have given him a brief and he says he just wants to make sure McCloy and Clay can't get mad at us.

P: Right.

K: And, so, I've called Rush and called Dobrynin, so everybody understands what's going on.

P: And did Bill sort of agree that we don't want to wait three weeks--

K: That's already agreed. So I thought the best thing we can do is to low-key it to get Rush back. Let's see, him fight for his draft and if there's a deadlock we'll have to rule with Rush. I think I can avoid a deadlock, because frankly Bill doesn't understand it.

P: What ... picayunish crap?

K: Well, what he's picking -- exactly. The thing he's picking on- but what's basically getting these gueys, Mr. President, is that they know damn well you've been in touch with Rush.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

President/Kissinger

8/20/71

-3-

P: Oh, sure.

K: And they know you did it and it kills them. They were willing to settle for something infinitely less good. This is --

P: The point is, Bill's going to get plenty of credit out of this, too. What the hell? Rush is an Ambassador.

K: Bill has never been better off then now.

Kx

P: That's right.

K: Everyone's is giving him credit for outstanding foreign policy.

P: Another thing, too, it would be very good if he had this done before he speaks to the Legion.

K: When is that?

P: Next week.

K: I don't think it will be completely --

P: Well --

K: He's k now agreed that they can initial it --

P: Yeah.

K: But they that they can put it ad referendum and I will explain to Dobrynin
They may have to give us a word or two someplace which doesn't mean
anything, just to prove that Rogers has done something.

P: OKay.

K: But within a week we'll have handled it.

P: Good.

K: But I'm delighted the way this domestic thing is going.

P: It came at the right time. On the Vietnam one, it's really a sticky one but --

K: Well, Bunker has already talked to Thieu and Thieu is willing to put Ky on the ballot now.