FVANO

PAR

[L]

JUN 1 3 1988

S-085062 0075(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:36) F6602.DOC 01/15/87

111

Dr. KISSINGER. I think Reykjavik was a serious shock to many Europeans.

Chairman NUNN. And also, as you note, they talk about going to zero nuclear weapons. The Europeans have to ask, what is America's policy, where are we going.

Senator Warner, my time has expired and you are next.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Kissinger, I will just pick up on my chairman's reference to the trip that Senators Byrd, Pell, Boren, Nunn, and myself took. Almost without exception, every leader of the five nations that we visited—and you are familiar with the trip—for foreign ministers and defense ministers were quite supportive of the INF Treaty and the timing.

I certainly listened attentively and talked to a number of persons outside of those that we met with directly. If there is a credible collection of viewpoints contrary to the INF Treaty, I did not perceive it to exist.

Do you find that there is?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think one has to do this country by country. I think the nuclear-armed countries of NATO were so shaken by Reykjavik, where they thought we were giving away their nuclear weapons, that they decided that, since this administration was not likely to leave office without giving away some nuclear weapons, it was better for them if we gave away ours rather than theirs.

This is particularly true of the British, who were worried about the Trident program and whose understanding of the Internal German trends is not as highly developed as that in France.

In France there is also the sense that a Germany completely dependent in the nuclear field on France might have certain benefits for the French political influence. I think, incidentally, that latter is a short-sighted view and it is not likely to stand the test of time.

Within the Federal Republic, the problem is that the people who have been most disillusioned are also the ones with the longest tradition of pro-American feelings, and therefore for them to go public now and indicate reservations which they know to be futile would mortgage their political position even more than they feel that it has been jeopardized.

So I think this is not an issue on which simply asking people gives you a good count. I am quite convinced that at the beginning of this process, if European leaders had been given another choice, say 50 percent reduction at first and another 50 percent in the case of conventional disarmament, I believe it would have been received in a much more positive way.

But this is all water over the dam now and within the present context no European leader will want to risk his political position by attacking a fait accompli.

Senator WARNER. Well, we are now negotiating a START agreement. Do you think there is adequate consultation and consideration being given to allied views as we work on the START agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, the START agreement, strangely enough, has less of an impact, because the Europeans did not stake their own political position on the deployment of the weapons that are now being negotiated.

PART A

[L]

JUN 13 1995

S-085062 0076(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:39) F6602.DOC 01/15/87

112

Now again, one has to ask oneself, what kind of political consultation? I believe there has been adequate political consultation in the sense of keeping the Europeans meticulously informed of the details of the negotiations. I do not believe there has been adequate consultation on the grand strategy that emerges from all of these agreements, not because we have kept it from them but because we have not developed it for ourselves.

We do not know ourselves where the current process leads us. On the one hand, INF shifts the nuclear defense of Europe to weapons based in the United States or at sea, and at the same time we are cutting these weapons by 50 percent and shifting the ratios with respect to land-based weapons to an even more unfavorable direction to the United States. The practical result will be, as soon as people start doing the figures, to raise even more doubts about the American willingness to initiate general nuclear war in the defense of Europe.

So what our nuclear strategy will be after we have made all of these agreements is something that we absolutely have to face, for ourselves and within the alliance.

And in this sense, there has not been adequate consultation because there has not been an adequate thinking through. Take an issue which I am sure those of you who deal with NATO know very well. There are four submarines technically assigned to NATO. I do not attach any importance to that because it is sort of a theological point what "assignment" means.

But it seems to me obvious that when we are down to 17 submarines, which we will be after the START agreement, that we will not be able to maintain that particular commitment. Now, has that been explained to the Europeans? Have we explained alternative ways by which we will meet our commitment and, above all, what exactly is going to be the strategy of nuclear war after a START agreement?

This is something we need to think through.

Senator WARNER. The application of the doctrine of flexible response is what you are speaking to?

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator WARNER. In the event it is the judgment of the President and others—and hopefully the allies would be a part of that formation of the judgment—that we cannot reach a START agreement at this coming summit or within the foreseeable balance of this President's term, what procedures would you recommend to hold in place the work, the valuable work that has been done on START, should it go on to the next Administration?

Dr. KISSINGER. I must tell you, I am not familiar with the details of the negotiation. I have the greatest difficulty visualizing how they can possibly work out the verification procedures for a START agreement when I look at the difficulties we have had with the INF verification procedures, which deal with only one category of weapon and at zero level.

But they can do a Vladivostok type agreement, in which they state, as they more or less did agree after the Washington summit, where they stand in the negotiations, and hand that on to their successors.

PART A

[LC]

VANCOV

JUN 13 1983

S-085062

0077(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:42)

F6602.DOC 01/15/87

113

I am frankly uneasy about a forced draft push toward START without thinking through the strategic implications of some of the questions with respect to which I have raised.

Senator WARNER. In particular, the verification aspect of the START?

Dr. KISSINGER. The verification aspect and what exactly is—

Senator WARNER. You are not suggesting it is unachievable?

Dr. KISSINGER. No, I think it is achievable, but I think that arms control theory was developed in the late fifties and it has now become almost a numbers game.

For example, after the Soviet heavy missiles are cut by 50 percent and our land-based missiles are cut by whatever percentage we decide to cut them, on any foreseeable projection the ratio of Soviet warheads to our land-based missiles that is available will be greater *after* the 50 percent cut than before the 50 percent cut.

And so I ask the question, what exactly are we trying to achieve? Are we simply trying to cut 50 percent or are we trying to improve the situation?

And I would like to see an agreement where we can say the situation has been improved: one, with respect to war-fighting stability; second, with respect to the population. That is my concern.

The question is what is it we should try to achieve?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

I believe, Senator Shelby, you are next under the early bird rule.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, Senator Nunn was talking about, as I picked up, a lack of a coherent strategy or a grant/strategy. Maybe "grant strategy" was your word. Why have we not linked our various negotiations on arms control—conventional, short-range, strategic, and so forth—in some sense, if we have a grant strategy?

Dr. KISSINGER. Partly because it is an intellectually very difficult problem and partly because—you take conventional arms control. I have written some articles with greater or lesser eloquence on that subject. But the fact of the matter is I have not actually thought through what I mean by "conventional arms control."

And I have started going around various research institutions to see what work they have done, to get my own thought processes started. And most of the work that has been done on arms control is in the nuclear field. And then there is the bureaucratic problem that it is so difficult to evolve a position within our government that in fact it has never happened.

But we have used up our fat with respect to this, and I think in the future they ought to be linked together.

Senator SHELBY. Dr. Kissinger, is conventional arms control in any sense a numbers game? You know, alluded to the numbers game as far as reducing so many strategic weapons or so many intermediate range weapons. But is conventional weapons something else?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, conventional arms control has of course a number of major problems. One is that no amount of arms control can eliminate the fact that the Soviets have interior lines of com-

PART A

[L]

JUN 13 1983

P VANCOR

S-085062 0078(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:44) F6602.DOC 01/15/87

114

munication and therefore can reinforce in Europe or almost any-
where along their frontiers faster than the defenders can.

Secondly, verification of conventional arms control is far more difficult than nuclear arms control. In the 1920's, Germany was open for full inspection. its army was limited to 100,000 men. It was not permitted to have heavy weapons. And yet, they managed to work around that agreement to a point where two years after they broke it and started rearmament they were already one of the most substantial armies in Europe, and four years afterwards they were the most substantial army in Europe.

Third, there are a number of really extraordinarily difficult problems to which I do not pretend to have the answer. For example, do we want the Soviets to withdraw whatever is being withdrawn to beyond the Urals, to the western military district, or do we want them to destroy it? And if we want them to destroy it, where? How do we know it is being destroyed.

Fourth, any disarmament—any arms control that applies in the conventional field to Europeans, since they have no place to withdraw, given the short distances, they will have to demolish them. They will have to destroy the weapons that are being reduced.

So I have a whole set of intellectual problems, on which I do not pretend I have the answers, but which need to be solved and need to be solved fairly urgently. Then I have seen a Rand Corporation study which some of you gentlemen may be familiar with which argues that, unless the reductions in Europe are 5 to 1 they actually make the situation worse.

Now, to the public that does not sound like a super-plausible presentation. And then when you say 5 to 1, 5 to 1 of what?

I think the Rand people come to the conclusion that the only think that we really can have a chance of verifying is tanks and heavy artillery, and that most of the other weapons would elude verification.

I have not done any independent study on this, so I am quoting it, not endorsing it.

Senator SHELBY. Doctor, if you had had your druthers, and I know we have an accomplished fact, or what looks like it is beginning to be on INF, would you have started at another starting point rather than INF negotiations?

Dr. KISSINGER. You never know what you would have done if you had been there. I opposed the zero option proposal from the minute it was put forward. I would have preferred to have any other number than zero, say, a 50-percent reduction symmetrically at first, and then have the remainder on the basis of a very significant conventional reduction of the Soviets.

We have absolutely no idea how the Soviets view conventional arms control. They talk about asymmetrical reductions, and that sounds impressive. When they were here I asked two members of their party what they meant by asymmetrical reductions, and they said to trade Soviet tanks for American strike aircraft.

Well, if we trade strike aircraft on top of the INF deployment, that in effect makes it impossible to mount any retaliation from Europe. So I would at least like to see what they have in mind before we get ourselves into a box from which the initiation of a nuclear defense becomes illogical.

PART A

JUN 13 1988

R VANCAS

S-085062 0079(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:46) F6602.DOC 01/15/87

115

Senator SHELBY. You have to draw some goals there before you start into real negotiations, had you not?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, prior to the first vote, the Chair announced it might be in the interest of all members if all members left at one time and then came back, thereby allowing Dr. Kissinger to share his views with everyone present. I would suggest to the Chair we follow that.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Are you through?

Senator SHELBY. If my time is up. If you want to give me 6 more minutes, I will take it.

Senator LEVIN. We are all going to vote at one time because none of us want to miss you, so we will be back in 10 minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator LEVIN. The committee will come to order.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for your understanding. you are an old pro, and you know the problems we have.

Going back to the Republican side, Senator McCain would be next, followed by Senator Glenn.

Senator MCCAIN. May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I go on, I would like to submit my statement for the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

[L.C.]

We cannot rely on rhetoric about conventional force improvements, low cost or cost free improvements, or revisions in how we assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance to deal with the military risks that will still exist if we abolish our INF forces. The most critical problem NATO faces is not to agree on new force requirements, but rather to correct the past mortgages in terms of problems in total strength, readiness, deployment, sustaining capability, and equipment modernization that have built up over a period of decades.

To be blunt, I do not believe that either the American public or the voters of any European nation are willing to pay to correct these mortgages, much less make more force improvements than they are already making. I think the best that can happen to what is now an unacceptable conventional balance is to fund a few effective force improvements in conventional forces which can be made at something very close to existing resource levels, or in spite of a limited decline in total national defense spending.

As long as one ignores the current trends in the balance, it is possible to point to many individual areas where various efforts to correct NATO's inferiority in conventional forces have produced some important force improvements in the past. I have asked my staff, however, to look at what some of the overall trends in force strength have been since 1965, and the results are anything but reassuring.

If we look at the equipment actually in the unit equipment of the key active comBAT units and reserve forces in the Central Region -- the NATO forces in Belgium, the FRG, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland -- work by Phillip Karber of Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald reveals the following trends:

* In 1967, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had near parity in active army manpower. Both sides had approximately 800,000 men. In 1987, NATO still had about 780,000 men, but the Warsaw Pact had nearly one million.

* In 1967, NATO had about 5,500 medium tanks and the Warsaw Pact had about 12,500. In 1977, NATO had about 5,600 medium tanks and the Warsaw Pact had about 16,000. In 1987, NATO had about 6,500 tanks, but the Warsaw Pact had 16,900. The Warsaw Pact has not only increased its lead in tank strength, the USSR has converted most of its older tanks to the use of laser ranger finders, and many to the use of active armor. Given the Israeli experience with similarly upgraded Soviet T-62 tanks and the U.S. M-60 series, this gives at least Soviet forces something close to qualitative parity with the average tank deployed in NATO.

85-662

234

* The Warsaw Pact has acquired a massive advantage in infantry fighting vehicles. In 1967, NATO had about 11,500 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and the Warsaw Pact had about 13,200. In 1977, NATO had about 12,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and the Warsaw Pact had about 19,000. In 1987, NATO had about 14,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, but the Warsaw Pact had 22,000. It is important to note that the Warsaw Pact has recently produced heavily armed infantry fighting vehicles more than nine times faster than NATO.

* The Warsaw Pact advantage in anti-tank guns has increased steadily. In 1967, NATO had about 1,850 anti-tank guns, and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,450. In 1977, NATO had about 700 anti-tank guns and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,800. In 1987, NATO had about 300 anti-tank guns, but the Warsaw Pact had 1,500.

* NATO has lost any meaningful hope of making anti-tank guided missiles into a force multiplier. In 1967, NATO had about 1,100 anti-tank guided missiles, and the Warsaw Pact had about 750. In 1977, NATO had about 3,000 anti-tank guided missiles and the Warsaw Pact had about 4,500. In 1987, NATO had about 7,500 anti-tank guided missiles, but the Warsaw Pact had 11,000.

* The Warsaw Pact has massively increased its advantage in regular tube artillery, while converted to modern self-propelled weapons which are generally superior in range and tube life to the weapons in NATO forces. In 1967, NATO had about 1,800 major artillery weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,400. In 1977, NATO had about 2,200 major artillery weapons and the Warsaw Pact had about 4,800. In 1987, NATO had about 2,100 major artillery weapons, but the Warsaw Pact had 6,800.

* NATO's efforts to deploy multiple rocket launchers have been more than offset by increases in Warsaw Pact numbers, and the Warsaw Pact has also rapidly modernized its holdings. In 1967, NATO had no multiple rocket launchers, and the Warsaw Pact had about 700. In 1977, NATO had about 140 multiple rocket launchers and the Warsaw Pact had about 900. In 1987, NATO had about 200 multiple rocket launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had 1,100.

* NATO has shifted from superiority to inferiority in short range artillery firepower. In 1967, NATO had 2,000 medium and heavy mortars, and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,800. In 1977, NATO only had about 1,800 medium and heavy mortars and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,000. In 1987, NATO still had 1,800 medium and heavy mortars, but the Warsaw Pact had 2,800.

* NATO has cut its air strength at a time the Warsaw Pact has rapidly begun to catch up in deployed combat aircraft technology, and has caught up in overall mission-

85-062 235

118

[LC]

relevant range-payload capability. In 1967, NATO had 1,300 combat aircraft, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,900. In 1977, NATO had dropped to about 1,500 combat aircraft and the Warsaw Pact had dropped slightly to about 2,800. In 1987, NATO only had about 1,400 combat aircraft, but the Warsaw Pact still had 2,800.

* NATO has lost any hope of using attack helicopters as a force multiplier. In 1967, NATO had 50 attack helicopters, and the Warsaw Pact had none. In 1977, NATO had about 460 attack helicopters and the Warsaw Pact had about 240. In 1977, NATO had about 550 attack helicopters, but the Warsaw Pact had 800.

* In 1967, NATO had 700 air defense guns, and the Warsaw Pact had about 3,800. In 1977, NATO had about 1,200 air defense guns and the Warsaw Pact had about 3,200. In 1987, NATO had about 2,200 air defense guns, and the Warsaw Pact had 3,200.

* The previous trends in air defense guns might seem reassuring, but the reality is very different when one considers surface-to-air missiles. In 1967, NATO had 1,100 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, and the Warsaw Pact only had about 600. In 1977, NATO had about 1,200 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had taken the lead and had about 1,600. In 1987, NATO had about 1,350 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had 2,100.

* If one looks at total crew served weapons, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has taken a massive new lead, while it has also caught up in many areas of quality. In 1967, NATO had 27,400 crew served weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had about 39,900. In 1977, NATO had about 29,740 crew served weapons and the Warsaw Pact had about 56,640. In 1987, NATO had about 36,100 crew served weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had 71,000 -- nearly twice as many.

* If one looks at the shifts in total crew served weapons weight by an effectiveness score and combined into armored division equivalents, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has still taken a massive new lead when weapons quality is fully taken into account. In 1967, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalent to 1.5 for the Warsaw Pact. In 1977, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalent to 1.8 for the Warsaw Pact. In 1987, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalent to 2.2 for the Warsaw Pact.

These trends are summarized in statistical and graphic terms in the first three of the attached tables. I agree that the resulting Warsaw Pact superiority is not great enough to offer the Warsaw Pact the kind of confidence it would need to attack NATO. Nevertheless, the balance has clearly shifted against NATO in spite of decades of rhetoric about "flexible response," and it will clearly continue to do so unless we face up to the fact that this

85-62 236

Committee will have to ask for a major supplement to the FY1989 budget and the current Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).

To make this point even more clearly, virtually all of the experts we have heard to date have agreed that the Warsaw Pact is catching up in most areas of deployed conventional technology, and has caught up or surpassed the average level of deployed tactical technology in NATO in a number of key areas. Let's consider what this really means given the trends in total military production of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during 1984-1986.

I am providing these trends in equipment production and modernization in the last three attached tables, as a member of my staff has compiled them from recent reporting by the Department of Defense. These tables have been informally reviewed by the Department of Defense, and show that NATO only produced about 40% of the tanks of the Warsaw Pact, 55% of the other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 20% of the towed artillery, 19% of the self-propelled artillery, and 24% of the AA artillery. NATO also lagged behind in combat aircraft, although far less significantly. The only areas where NATO led were in transport aircraft and naval construction.

I ask the members of this committee to consider these sets of trends in depth before we include any rhetoric about conventional options in our report on the INF Treaty, and ignore the vital importance of improving our remaining theater and strategic nuclear weapons and of encouraging the British and French to do everything possible to modernize their forces.

Either we are going to seek a supplement to the current budget and the FDYP on a bipartisan basis, or all the words about improved conventional option will simply mislead the American people. Either our major allies will follow our example, and indeed do far more, or all the improvements made will be cosmetic and the talk about conventional capability will be empty rhetoric.

If this Committee is not prepared to being work on February 18th to revise and expand the conventional programs in our FY1989 defense budget, and is not prepared during the course of the year to propose specific force improvements to our allies -- rather than indulge in another mindless exercise in ally-bashing under the name of "burden sharing", then let's be honest. Anything we say about conventional options will be meaningless, or depend on the sudden willingness of the Warsaw Pact to rush into unilateral disarmament.

Further, I do not really believe that any member of this committee really believes we can or will fund enough additional money for conventional options to reduce our dependence on the need to modernize our remaining theater nuclear and our strategic nuclear systems in ways that will provide us with an effective capability for graduated

85-162 237

PART A

[L]

S-085062 0081(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:48)

F6602.DOC 01/15/87

126

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for again, your always illuminating and stimulating testimony, as well as response to the inquiries of the Members.

I read your testimony with great interest, Doctor, and I have to say I came away to some degree questioning where we go next. You call for a major shift in European attitudes that would respond to the INF treaty, and I certainly am in total agreement with that, by creating a cohesive strategy and stronger European forces, and I think your eloquent statement sets that our very clearly.

But I wonder if you or I believe that we or Europe will pay for the improved conventional and theater nuclear capabilities that we need. I have analyzed the data on NATO and Warsaw Pact force modernization and U.S. and European military equipment production in great detail, and these data show me, anyway, that NATO fell behind the Warsaw Pact in virtually every measure of conventional force strength during a period when both we and our allies were increasing real defense spending far more quickly than we are today or in the future.

I suspect that you know far better than I do that the constraints on NATO are enforced by money, the size of the Warsaw Pact effort, and the fact that most of the key technologies for any conventional defense initiative will take a decade or so to fully deploy, plus we have acute limits on current military equipment production facilities.

I would like to begin by asking you your opinion as to the trends in the conventional balance, as to whether you feel there is any conceivable chance that NATO will fund a robust conventional defense option over the next 5 years, and if so, what should their priorities be.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe there is some chance, as a result of the impact of recent events, that Europe will make a more coherent if not a larger effort. We have to face the fact that if this effort is not made, and if these inconsistencies in NATO strategy that I have pointed our and that almost all experts agree on are not met, that sooner or later we will have to pay a price for it. This may be deferred, but there are no free lunches in foreign policy. Sooner or later one will have to pay a price for one's omissions. There will be some crisis in which we will come up short.

Now, the first step has to be that the alliance lays out what its requirements ought to be so that at least if it falls short, it knows where it has fallen short, and why, and that it develops some kind of coherent military strategy that the key Alliance members agree to.

Senator MCCAIN. And your view of what their priorities should be?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe—well, from where we are—of course, the strengthening of conventional forces is generally agreed on as a desirable objective, though it is never reached.

Now, to meet some of the problems caused by the INF agreement, a European capability for stand-off weapons would, in my view, be highly disirable, and if the British and French were to combine to create a stand-off weapon, the United States should be very sympathetic. You would then ask yourself, what is the sense of

PART A

[L]

R

YANCI

JUN 13 1988

S-085062 0082(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:51) F6602.DOC 01/15/87

127

going through all these exercises in arms control if you find an-
other weapon that replaces the weapon you have taken out.

Still, I would favor a European stand-off weapon. I would favor
some cruise capability for some of the dual-purpose aircraft based
in Germany. And I would favor some of the modernization propos-
als that have been made with respect to the nuclear tactical forces
in Germany.

But it becomes very difficult if we do these things piecemeal and
one at a time.

Senator **MCCAIN**. Thank you, Doctor.

I am sure you are also aware that the fastest growing area in
Warsaw Pact forces has been nuclear forces, that to a significant
degree will not be reduced as a part of the INF agreement. This
includes a rise in theater nuclear strike aircraft that JCS estimates
have given them a 3-to-1 advantage in numbers, which has more
than doubled their range payload capability and includes a 50-per-
cent increase in short-range nuclear delivery systems since 1980.

Given this background, if you had known we were going to elimi-
nate the Pershing II and GLCM, would you still have supported the
reductions in other NATO theater nuclear systems that cut 2,800
warheads from the NATO stockpile?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not think those 2,800 are relevant to the problems caused by the INF agreement. They were all short range, if I remember correctly.

Senator **MCCAIN**. And you do share a lot of our concerns about
Genscherization or the triple zero option?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am very concerned about the trends in the Fed-
eral Republic towards the triple zero option which will have as an
inevitable corollary a no first use doctrine, and that will then
create a distinction between the non-nuclear and the nuclear mem-
bers of the NATO and between the European members of NATO
and the American members of NATO. You cannot ask countries
that are not themselves attacked to run risks which the attacked
country is not prepared to run for itself, and it will create an in-
creasingly complex psychological situation.

Senator **MCCAIN**. It also appears to me, Doctor, conspicuous by
its absence from Chancellor Kohl's statements is any commitments
towards modernization of existing short-range nuclear forces.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have known Chancellor Kohl for 30 years, and
there is absolutely no doubt that he belongs to the most pro-Ameri-
can wing of the Christian Democratic Party, which in turn has
been most consistently supportive of the United States, and we
have to ask ourselves what brought him to the point where he is
today.

By instinct, he would want to be supportive. It reflects domestic
pressures that have been accentuated by recent events.

Senator **MCCAIN**. Thank you very much, Doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **NUNN** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator McCain.

I believe next is Senator Glenn.

Senator **GLENN**. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

There are some benefits to a filibuster in that last night I had a
chance to read your statement in its entirety and reread parts of it.
So some good comes out of a filibuster, and I thought that your's

ART A

[L]

JUN 13 1989

S-085062 0083(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:53)

F6602.DOC 01/15/87

R VANC

128

was one of the more thoughtful statements in this whole process
that I had seen.

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you.

Senator GLENN. I want to compliment you on your statement, and I mean that in all sincerity.

Your position on INF is basically that the treaty has problems,
but we would do more damage by not going forward with it now.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

Senator GLENN. On page 7 of your testimony you said that "since
its early days, arms control theory has developed a life of its own.
It used to be argued that arms negotiations should be an essential
complement to broader strategic and foreign policies. Today the
tail comes close to wagging the dog. Care must be taken lest esoter-
ic arms control schemes become an end in themselves, thereby
eliminating any relationship to defense strategy."

I could not agree with you more. I am nervous about us rushing
into a START agreement prematurely. I am concerned that we
may be considering that the INF Treaty sets a basis that we now
can use in future arms control negotiations, and I doubt that very
much. I think that future arms control is going to have to get into
more of some of the areas you talk about here, such as verification
and conventional balances. At some point along the way, we have
to consider bringing other nuclear powers into the equation. We
may be a ways from that now.

And also, I do not think we are going to feel very safe, unless we
get back to our traditional American emphasis on control of fissile
material, which we had for some 40 years.

Now, that leaves us with where we go from here with regard to
START. Do you have a series of proposals as guidelines for START
that would fit within a strategic framework?

I am looking at the INF Treaty as sort of a given, it is going to
go through.

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree.

Senator GLENN. But the important thing now is making sure
that as we move on to START, we set a pattern that will work in
the future.

Could you set us down some guidelines for START?

Dr. KISSINGER. Senator, I agree with you on INF. The only
reason I keep reiterating it, it is really two-fold, one, to show the
Europeans that some people in the United States understand our
psychological problem and second, to alert us to the problems that
need to be dealt with here, and not to consider INF as the end of a
process.

Now, with respect to START, I am extremely uneasy. If you
accept the premise that any elimination of nuclear weapons is in
itself desirable, a 50-percent reduction is a great thing. Then you
can say getting rid of two categories of weapons is good, and then
you can say a 50-percent reduction is good.

But if you look at it at the other end and ask yourself in what
way is our security situation improved after the 50 percent reduc-
tion, if you put these numbers into ratios of warheads and so forth,
then I come to the following concerns.

One, even if the Soviet heavy missiles are cut by 50 percent, the
ratio of warheads that the Soviets have available to target at our

PART A

JUN 13 1988

P VANCRO

S-085062 0084(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:55) F6602.DOC 01/15/87

129

remaining missiles goes from about 3-to-1 to about 4.5 to 4.8-to-1. So I do not see the benefit that we have achieved in strategic stability.

Second, the number of our submarines is cut to 17 or 18 but the number of Soviet antisubmarine forces is not affected because they are not part of the agreement. The number of our airplanes are cut, but the Soviet air defenses are not affected by the agreement. So air defenses are not limited, submarine defenses are not limited, but antimissile defenses are limited, or are attempted to be limited.

It is a sort of a one-sided equation, and I would really plead for putting arms control reflection not into the framework of a numbers game of how many warheads we have reduced, but where we will be after they are reduced.

Then for every gain in stability, you pay a price someplace else. I find it hard to visualize how we can continue to say that we will be forever ready to treat an attack on Munich like an attack on Chicago when the numbers of warheads and the comparative counts raise the question of what are you going to attack when you do use neclear weapons, and what risks do you run to the security of your own forces?

And that gets to your most important question of what do I think would be the right proposal. Of course, one of the difficulties when you are outside the government and do not have big staffs is that if you as an individual are asked to come up with an alternative proposal, it may not be all that persuasive. So if you do not like my ideas, that does not mean that 15,000 people in the State Department and 20,000 in the Defense Department could not come up with a better idea than I can come up with by myself.

I state that as a theoretical possibility, but do not hold me to it too strictly. [Laughter.]

I have been tempted to a view that if we could go to mobile, single-warhead, land-based missiles, that the danger of surprise attack would be substantially reduced. Other problems would arise, namely, how are you going to use your strategic weapons in defense of allies. But that problem exists now because we have no clearcut military mission of a counterforce nature for our strategic forces now.

So I would welcome an attempt to base the land-based forces of both sides on single-warhead missiles that could be permitted to be mobile, and I would not then worry so much about numbers. I mean, the numbers should be equal, but I would then not see any great magic in whether the number is at one level than another. That is, of course, not a complete answer to your question.

I also, I certainly favor the idea that the Chairman put forward as an interim measure on the Strategic Defense Initiative for the protection, for ballistic missile defense of some missile sites.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. My time is up.

Just one comment. You stated that the INF magnifies divisive trends.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator GLENN. I would think that you would see START as even more of a magnification of divisive trends.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, you see, the trouble is with all of these proposals, in each country there is such a large constituency of people who are yearning for agreement and who see in every agreement a

PART A

JUN 13 1988

F1040

Valkyrie

S-085062

0085(01)(13-JUN-88-13:44:57)

F6602.DOC 01/15/87

130

beginning of a change of Soviet attitude, and who tend to treat foreign policy psychiatrically.

I think the first reaction to a 50-percent cut will be one of great euphoria and great relief. But when you begin thinking about it and you begin to ask yourself what will be the security situation afterwards, that is when questions arise. And we are drifting into a situation where we have hooked ourselves, the whole West has hooked itself to the slogan of reductions. It has become sacramental.

Second, on-site inspection have become especially sacramental so if we are given the right to some on-site inspection, you then do not have to analyze anymore what machinery you need, how much are you permitted to inspect. I would be interested to get an intelligence estimate of what percentage the on-site inspection provisions of the INF agreement add to what we could have found by national means.

I would be amazed if it is very significant.

I am not against it, and I am not so worried about violations on INF because I do not see the strategic purpose they would serve. But I do warn against the ritualization of arms control in which certain things become sloganized. We ought to ask ourselves what exactly is it we are achieving. And what exactly is it that that on-site inspection does.

And when I read about hundreds of inspectors, I ask myself, who are they going to report to and who is going to read all of this stuff, and how do you get it to any decision?

I am not questioning it. I am just saying that you cannot just throw the word on-site inspection around and think that in itself is a breakthrough.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, You mentioned in response to Senator McCain that Chancellor Kohl is one of the most pro-American people that we could hope to have in West Germany. That may be the case. But all of us who attended a conference recently, the Wehrkunde Conference, were struck by the anomaly of having Mr. Dregger sit next to Egon Bahr and Mr. Vogel and link hands metaphorically.

And so Chancellor Kohl, while he may be pro-American, nonetheless may be under similar pressure from his own right.

Dr. KISSINGER. This is exactly the point that I have been trying to make. When Chancellor Kohl came back from Washington, he was congratulated by Egon Bahr for the delay he achieved in facing the modernization issue.

and Dregger, whom I have also known for 30 years, I was getting some award in Germany last May, came to see me and pleaded with me to use whatever influence I have, he had a totally wrong impression of my influence to abort the agreement.

And now we are seeing an alliance between some of the right-wing people and some of the neuralist people, which is extremely worrisome. And the traditional, the Adenauer wing is fragmenting.

In the German history of the modern state system, there has never been an alliance between Germany and any Western country.

PART A

JUN 13 1983

FVAN03

S-085062 0086(01)(13-JUN-88-13:45:00)

F6602.DOC 01/15/87

131

There has been occasional friendship with Russia. But never with a Western country, because France was the hereditary enemy. Adenauer was the first German who tied Germany to the West. And that is what is now in jeopardy, and that is why we should be so worried. And we contributed to this state of affairs.

Senator COHEN. Dr. Kissinger, at Wehrkunde I used the phrase Genscherism, and that was the equivalent of using the phrase secular humanism in the face of Pat Robertson's delegates, it got quite a reaction at that time.

I also said something to the effect that the West Germans were forming a parade and they were about to march down through a nuclear-free corridor right into the Neville Chamberlain square. And that also produced a rather remarkable reaction among the delegates who were there.

But frankly, I think that some of this language has to be used to shake somebody to their senses, because the dynamic has been set in motion now which could lead to not only the double zero but the triple zero that you have talked about.

And I do not know what it is going to take to shake that momentum, because it has taken on a force of its own.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, a reliable American foreign policy would help. And by reliable I mean one that does not change every few years.

Senator COHEN. Well, that would help. I have tried to take this into account.

The Germans were very concerned when President was first elected. He was seen as being too warlike. Then they became really alarmed after Reykjavik because he was seen as the apostle of peace, and that worried them too.

We have a problem with their reaction. They seem to coin a new phrase every 5 or 10 years. One it was decoupling. We have heard that for about 10 years. Now it is singularization, and now they are focusing upon that.

So they come up with a new phrase about every 5 years in order to demonstrate their particular historical alarm. So it is not just the United States, it is also a question of Germany as well.

Dr. KISSINGER. I am not saying it is all our fault. But we have to recognize that in Germany we have a divided country with unnatural borders, a capital in a town that has no historical relationship to being the capital.

And therefore rapid changes in American policy, no matter how meritorious, are going to create disproportionate responses among a very insecure people that has a very complex history.

Senator COHEN. Let us face it. The zero-zero was not our proposal. That was Helmut Schmidt's proposal.

So it is not exactly something that has emanated from Ronald Reagan. That came from Helmut Schmidt, and they cannot lay the blame upon an American proposal that somehow has laid them naked to their enemies. This is something that they proposed back in 1980 or 1981.

Also, I think you mentioned the French and the British combining their efforts to develop a standoff weapon. I am more concerned about the new proposal about Franco-German cooperation. It sounds right on the surface. Dr. Schlesinger and others, I think Dr.