This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(Chicago, Illinois)

### CONTENT OF THIS BRIEFING IS STRICTLY EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 P.M. EDT SEPTEMBER 19, 1970. IT MAY BE ATTRIBUTED TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. DIRECT QUOTATION IS NOT PERMITTED.

### AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, AND JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

AT 1:30 P.M. CDT

SEPTEMBER 16, 1970

WEDNESDAY

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MR. KLEIN: Gentlemen, I would like to first thank you all very much for joining us today in this briefing.

We appreciate the fact that many of you have traveled a considerable distance to come to this, and we hope that you will find it as worthwhile as we think it will be in terms of having an opportunity for a frank and open discussion on the entire field of foreign policy.

I ought to tell you first of all that I really am here because Dr. Kissinger wanted protection, and we don't yet have all our air marshals trained. (Laughter)

Looking at some of you as old friends, and these meetings have all been great for me because I see so many old friends, I will tell you one bit of advice I got when I walked in the White House. When you see the companions I am surrounded with, you will understand why it was so good.

On the first day I came into the White House on the 21st of January, 1969, I picked up the phone and I was looking out the window awed by being in this place where so many great men have been and made decisions.

A voice on the other end of the phone said, "Herb, now that you are a national monument, I have one piece of advice for you. Watch out for the pigeons." (Laughter) That has been pretty good advice.

I might start off first by just explaining briefly the ground rules we would like to operate under today. We have found in working with these briefings that it has worked best if we do them entirely on a background basis. So that in terms of the discussions you will hear from Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Sisco, we would like to regard them entirely as on a background basis. In our terms, that means that if you refer to them we would want them referred to as Administration sources, and no one should be quoted directly or by name.

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In the other part of the program that we will have when the President arrives here from Kansas -- in his presentation -- what we would want is to have any reference to him be in the third person; that is, if you are paraphrasing something which the President has said during the briefing, if you refer to it in terms such as "The President is known to feel this way," or "Administration sources say the President says this," or through a third person so that at no time you are saying that the President directly implied this or in any way quote him directly.

So, the third person would be the ground rule for that.

Finally, in terms of ground rules, we have found that this type of session works best if we allow some delay at the conclusion of the session so that we can provide you with transcripts to work from later. We will air mail special those to each of you at the conclusion of this.

So what we would like to do is set a release time for any information you have for a Sunday A.M., release, which in our terms would be 6:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

I see a couple of Saturday afternoon editors frowning at me. I think all of you will recall that I edited a morning newspaper, and I met certain prejudices.

Q Would you put the deadline again, sir?

MR. KLEIN: 6:00 p.m. Saturday, Eastern Daylight, which would be Sunday A.M. release, which allows Saturday night television.

Before I go on, I might just ask now if there are any questions regarding the ground rules?

Next, I would like to introduce a man from my office who some of you may have talked to on the phone when I am out. He is my deputy, who has been helping on this. This is Jeb Magruder over here.

Ron Zeigler, my co-host in this program, has done so much to help us in all of this, will be here with the President. You will have a chance to meet him during that part of the briefing and also at the time when we have the reception, which will follow.

I might just tell you a little bit about the purpose of these and how they work so far. We decided a considerable time ago when the President made a study of how things ought to be translated in terms of the great complexities of foreign policy and other policies today. He felt that we would do a public service if we did all we could to provide this type of an informal backgrounder in as many areas as possible. So that those who have to analyze the news, regardless of what side they finally come up on, would have the opportunity to hear the background of why the policies were formed, and the opportunity to very freely question those who are in key advisory roles in the formation of this particular policy.

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One of the things we would hope most is in your question period, which will come in the latter part of the afternoon, that you will feel free to ask whatever question you have, whether it has come up during the briefing or not, so we have that kind of a direct opportunity to allow these gentlemen to give you their answers for your own analysis all the way through.

We have difficulty in terms of how many people we can accommodate and how many we can invite for these briefings. We feel that they work best if we keep it at about this size so that we can have this more informal contact and, therefore, many who we would like to have here we have not been able to invite strictly on the basis of size and numbers.

You gentlemen. represent 10 Midwestern States.. You represent the third regional briefing that we had. We had first a national briefing in San Clemente at the time right after the start of Cambodia. We had one in New Orleans which was the second one for Southern editors and some of the border State editors. We had a third recently in San Clemente from the Western States and this will be followed in a short time by one for the Northeast and those in the remainder of the Eastern part of the country, probably somewhere in that general area.

We also have made an effort to be certain that we have not tried to decide what your editorial policies are or what your policies will be as a result. I think if you look around the room, you will find that we have a cross-section of views on not only political issues but international issues as well.

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Finally I might say that the President has a strong
feeling that it is highly important that officials of the
government, including the President of the United States,
be in various parts of the country so that we have an
opportunity to really get a feel of what people are thinking
about in whatever section of the country it may be. I think
that all of you who have traveled considerably, and who go
to the ASNE and AP and other meetings know that certainly
there is a difference in the view between what someone in
the South or the Midwest or the West or East may look at a
particular issue.

We look forward to your questions in part as a
means of finding what things most interest you, what things
most puzzle you. So it is part of our effort to bring the
government closer to the people and to get a better
understanding what you as opinion leaders are feeling in
terms of having these regional briefings which have been of
great help to us, and we would hope that they have been of
help to those who have attended.

We have with us today two members of our team, and
I might say again that talking to old friends, I am very
proud of the team that I work with in the White House. I
think we have people who are not there because they are out
as hacks looking for a job. We have people who have
intellectual stature, people who have good backgrounds in
various jobs and ones who would do better, I am sure,
financially outside, but who are making I believe a
contribution towards government itself. I think that the
examples we have today will bear out the point which we could
also in domestic and other fields with other parts of our own
team all the way around.

Our program today is to first have Dr. Kissinger
run through I think a rather complete background as to
what our policies are, but to get first into the question of
how do we get to these places and what are the things
taking place, the events, the trends in history which form
these policies.

We will follow that with Secretary Sisco, who is
our top advisor on the Middle East, and who is in moment by
moment contact with that very difficult situation, and then
after that, as I said, we will have a period for full questions.

Most of you are very familiar with the career of
Dr. Kissinger. I might say first of all he is a man who not
only reads the first section of the newspaper, but the
sports page. You will find his name uniquely on the social
page, the entertainment page, and also occasionally on the
editorial page.

He has a distinguished record as a professor of
government at Harvard. He was the head of the Center for
International Affairs at the time he left to join the
President as the Director of the National Security Council.

I said in San Clemente recently something which I
have reflected on since, and I think it is very true. You
hear a lot of things in a very trite way about someone who
is a man for the times, but I think if you look at the

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unique nature of the National Security Council and the
structure of this Administration, he is a man who uniquely
fits that time, and if you stop to think afterward, as to
who else might do the job he does, I think you would find it
very difficult to come up with someone else who had the
background in the approach to it which could so well fit
the time.

He is a man who has been a student of foreign policy
over many years. He was one of the leaders from 1958 on,
and perhaps before that in the constant studies of
disarmament, which has led us to the drafts of many
of our policies which are proceeding well in terms of SALT.

You will learn in listening that we are talking
about new policies, policies for the Seventies, policies which
reflect the times when we need to change from those which
have succeeded in the post World War II era to now, and those
ahead.

I think if you look, you would have to say that the
President is the architect of the new policies you will have
described; certainly if that is the case, you have...
to say that Dr. Kissinger is both a draftsman and a consultant
in a very important way in these policies.

Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Herb, I appreciate this introduction.

I have to say from the way things are going in
academia, I think you exaggerated a little bit when you
said it would be easy for somebody like me to get a better
job than the one I now have. In fact, the way things are
going, I may not be able to get any job when I leave this
position.

As I understand it, I am here to communicate with
you. That reminds me of a story of a Christian who was
thrown into the arena with the lions and started praying.
When he looked up, he saw a lion also holding his paws in
a reverent attitude. He said, "Well, at least I am
communicating." The lion said, "I don't know about you, but
I am saying grace."

So I will talk to you about the general philosophy
in foreign policy of the Nixon Administration, what we are
trying to do, where we are trying to go. I will also discuss
a few of the specific policies which we are carrying out to
implement our basic approach. Secretary Sisco will talk in
greater detail about one particular area, which happens to be
one everybody's mind, namely, the Middle East.

I am sure that when the history of this period is
written, it will appear that the great transition in American
policy, in American foreign policy, occurred not in the
early Sixties when it was publicly proclaimed, but in the
late Sixties when this Administration came into office. When
you think back to some of the events of last April and May,
when we announced the decision to penetrate the enemy
sanctuaries in Cambodia, many of our critics accused us of

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excessive rhetoric that dealt primarily in categories of
international involvement that were no longer adequate. But
if you read back to the inaugural speech of President Kennedy
in 1961, you will find phrases compared to which anything
this President has ever said in his term of office sounds
very modest, indeed. This President has never said that we
will fight any foe, we will support any friend, we will bear
any burden, we will pay any price to support the survival of
liberty around the world.

I am not saying this as a criticism of a previous
Administration, because like many others, I was enormously
impressed by the idealism of the Kennedy Inaugural Address.
I am saying it to indicate how tremendously events have
changed since the early Sixties.

I think in historical retrospect it will appear
that the early Sixties were the last flowering of the era of
American foreign policy, which was ushered in by the Marshall
Plan, the period that saw the emergence of the United States
in international affairs, and that this Administration had
the task of adjusting American foreign policy to new realities,
two and a half decades after the war had ended and after the
dislocations of the war in many parts of the world had been
overcome, and after domestic frustrations had taught us the
limitations of American influence.

It is not said in criticism of predecessors to
point out that we have had to shepherd a transition from an
era of almost unlimited optimism to one that had to adjust
itself to a more normal style of international affairs.
The war saw the end also of American isolation, but it was a
very untypical world into which we projected ourselves. At
the end of the war, the United States was the only western
country, the only non-Communist country that was capable of
conducting a sustained foreign policy.

All the other countries had been severely damaged
by the war. Every one of the traditional great powers had
been either defeated at one stage or another during the war,
or had been occupied at one stage or another during the war,
with the exception of Great Britain. She perhaps went
through the worst experience of all, namely, to win a war
and find that you have become a less than great power, in
fact, have become no longer a world power.

In these circumstances, with many new nations
coming into being, the United States found itself in a
position where all over the world security depended almost
entirely on American decisions and where economic
development and progress depended almost entirely on American
programs. It is in those circumstances that there grew up
the state of mind, which I am frank to say was exemplified
so very much by our predecessors in the early 1960's, that
almost every solution to every problem in the world had to
be originated in Washington, and that unless the United States
ran the show, nothing would happen at all.

Yet we have had to learn, and not even primarily
through the war in Vietnam, which so many people will cite --
we would have had to learn in any event that what seemed to

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us natural at the end of the war was really a very untypical state, and in the long term not a healthy state of international affairs. It is not healthy for us and it is not healthy for other countries that we assume the principal responsibility for both defense and progress and foreign policy around the world. It is not only beyond our physical resources, which I am not absolutely sure about, but it is probably beyond our psychological resources to act with foresight in every part of the world at every moment in time.

If I could digress into making a personal observation for a moment, I am often asked, "What have you learned in your position that you did not know as a professor?" You cannot find a Harvard professor who will make an admission on that subject with great spontaneity. There is indeed one aspect of the sort of positions that we occupy such that your best reflection would best come after your period in office. But one thing has struck me very much, and it is this:

When I was a professor, once I had identified a problem, I could usually give it as much time as it needed to do the best thing I could do with it. It was theoretically possible that I was wrong, though not many students passed my courses if they made that assertion.

But at any rate, I could do then the best of which I was capable. So identifying the problem was in a way tantamount to producing whatever solution I was capable of finding.

In the jobs that Joe and I occupy, identifying a problem is only the very beginning of the difficulty. There are many problems of which I am perfectly well aware, and for which I even think I have a solution, or for which I am quite confident that I could find a solution if I could ever get around to them.

One of the problems in the higher offices is to establish a priority among your challenges in such a way that hopefully you will solve the high priority ones before the middle priority ones hit you. But every once in a while these things get out of whack and you get hit by something which you simply never got around to dealing with, and then you gentlemen point out, quite correctly now, "Why in God's name was not there adequate planning?"

To make another digression, planning is a waste of time unless it is done by the people who have got to execute it. Unless you can get the attention of the top policy makers, you are just writing theoretical academic papers.

I made this digression only partly to prove how important I am, but primarily to point out that when you look at the top decision makers of the United States who have responsibilities for every part of the world at every moment of time, this priority problem which I described can become unmanageable. Therefore it is in our interest, and it is in the interest of other countries, that others bear partially the physical, but above all the psychological burden of making some of these initial decisions, if you will, of taking some of these priorities. And this is in a

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word the basic thrust of our foreign policy and the basic
objective of the Nixon Doctrine.

This aspect which I will call American self-
interest, and also world interest, is compounded by other
international events that have radically changed the inter-
national situation as we knew it in the Forties and Fifties
and early Sixties. First, the countries whose structures
have been smashed by the war have now to a remarkable extent
recovered, partially and in some cases largely as a result
of American assistance. Europe now is economically more
potent than it has ever been in its history, and politically
much more assertive than it has been before, and therefore
it does not make any sense for the United States to continue
the position of tutelage vis a vis Europe, or Japan, as was
the case previously.

Secondly, many of the newly developed countries
which in the early stages of the postwar period were
completely dependent on the United States, and which moreover
were beginning the very difficult process of developing
their own political structure, have now advanced enough so that
they can make a greater contribution. So that is one of the
changes.

Another change that is matching the change in the
non-Communist world is the change in the Communist world.
Throughout the early Sixties, one thought of the Communist
world as a monolithic whole, under more or less central
direction, engaged in consistently aggressive policies. No
one under-estimates today, certainly not this President,
the ideological hostility of Communism, but the situation
in the Communist world has changed.

First, it is patent that Communism is no longer
monolithic. The wildest public reception that I have ever
seen for anybody was that received by the President in
Stalinist Romania, in a Romania that is considered in many
respects the hard line state in Eastern Europe, which indicated
that even after thirty years or nearly thirty years of
Communist rule, there is an enormous reservoir of faith in
Western values.

Within each Communist country, the incongruity of
a Communist Party that is very ideologically oriented, in a
modern state which is becoming increasingly technological and
bureaucratic, is becoming more and more apparent. Every
Communist state has today itself either the problem of how
you can plan or how you can run a modern, large scale
economy on the basis of total state planning, or what the
Communist Party is supposed to do in a state which is no
longer undergoing a revolution, which is no longer going through
the process of industrialization, but which has to be run like
a going concern.

Thirdly, and most fundamentally -- these other
problems are manageable for the Communists and this last one
may also be manageable, but the last one is very serious -- the
fact that according to Communist ideology the spread of
Communism ought to bring about universal peace. Instead, the
Red Army has had to be used four times in the postwar period,

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always against allies, always against Communist states.

The deepest rivalry which may exist in the world today
is not necessarily that between us and the Soviet Union,
serious as that disagreement is, but that between the
Soviet Union and Communist China. Along a frontier of
4,000 miles, there are territorial claims on one side and
a military buildup on the other. This is made more severe
by the dispute between the two great Communist states as to
which of them represents the center of Communist orthodoxy,
which gives a quasi-religious connotation to their conflict.
So leaders in Moscow and in Peking, whatever their
ideological views, have to take into account the fact that
their rivalry is an important aspect of international
policy, giving a greater degree of flexibility to our policy.

Another crucial change that has occurred is the
change in the security situation, and that is not necessarily
working in our favor.

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One reason why the United States in the immediate post-war period could assume the burden or the responsibility for the defense of almost the entire non-Communist world was because the strategic military balance was overwhelmingly in our favor.

In as late as 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union had around 40 ICBM's. We had over 1000 bombers and over 200 missiles that could reach the Soviet Union.

In short, our strategic superiority was overwhelming. The Soviet Union could not respond to our pressure on Cuba by bringing pressure on areas where we were vulnerable such as Berlin, because they had to be worried that we might do to them what later the Israelis did to the Arabs; namely, launch a preemptive strike.

Therefore, our strategic superiority defended not only us but all our allies and even those countries that were not our allies, but that were thought to be likely to trigger an American response.

There were many people, including myself, who criticized John Foster Dulles' massive retaliation doctrine in the 1950's. But in historical retrospect, it was correct for the conditions of that period.

But today, the Soviet Union has over 1,400 long-range missiles. In other words, they have increased the number of their missiles 30-fold since 1962. Indeed, they have more long-range missiles than we do today.

In these circumstances, this does not mean that they are superior to us, or that they can defeat us. They cannot do this. But it is a different decision for the President of the United States to risk general nuclear war when the strategic equation is this than it was throughout most of the post-war period.

Therefore, the possibility of defending other countries with strategic American power alone has fundamentally changed, and no amount of reassurance on our part can change these facts.

It is for all of these reasons that the President enunciated in Guam in the summer, July of 1969, what has come to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine." The Nixon Doctrine attempts in a general way to state the degree of responsibility which we can assume around the world under contemporary conditions.

It says, first, we will, of course, meet our commitments. It says, secondly, in the case of an attack by a nuclear country on a non-nuclear country, we recognize that we have a specific responsibility for the defense of that non-nuclear country, because if we did not we would really be opening the door to the acquisition by every country around the world of nuclear weapons. And this we believe would create an even more dangerous situation than the one that exists today. We are not saying we will defend every non-nuclear country, we are only saying we recognize this as a special problem. But thirdly and most importantly, we said that the defense and the

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the development of other countries is in the first instance their
responsibility. In the second instance, it is the responsibility
of the region in which they are located. The United States can
participate when our interests require it and dictate it, but
we can participate only where what we do makes a difference, not
where what we do represents the only weight in the scale.

We do not believe it is healthy for the United States or for
other countries to pretend that the security and the progress of other
countries is more in our interest than in theirs, that we have a
greater stake in the future of other countries than they do.

We do not believe that it is possible to have other countries
and other regions of the world march exclusively or primarily to
American tunes. They have to develop their own ideas which we can
then support. They have to be partners in common projects, not only
in the sense of making financial contributions, but in the sense, in
the more important sense, of making intellectual contributions.

There are many people who see the Nixon Doctrine as a new
American isolationism, and the President never tires of pointing
out that it is not isolationism. It is the realistic basis on which
the United States can remain involved in the rest of the world. It
is the only basis that the American people support. It is the only
basis that the American Government can sustain.

Therefore, we believe it is a better guarantee to other
countries than sweeping pronouncements that lead to an erratic
American performance of total involvement for one brief period, and
then total retreat, from these involvements in another period.

Now, we admit the Nixon Doctrine states an approach. It
is not a cookbook. It states a philosophy, not a detailed set of
policies, but it is a crucial change in our approach to the conduct
of international affairs. And as we implement it, and the years
go by, I think it will become more and more apparent.

Of course, as you go from one phase of American foreign
policy to another phase, you inevitably run into vestiges of the
old while you are trying to build the new.

One of the aspects of foreign policy that differs from
intellectual contemplation is that you can never or very rarely
start afresh. You have always got the existing policy while you
are trying to implement a new one.

In any event, too brutal changes have a tendency to shake.
the confidence of other countries who can regulate their action to
ours in part only by the steadiness of our performance.

Keeping these things in mind, one of the basic charges
that the President has given to all of his key associates, to all
the members of the National Security Council, is he always wants to
know where we are going before he is prepared to discuss individual
tactics.

He does not like to be drawn into a discussion of great
detail.

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I had to learn this lesson very early in the Administra-
tion when the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese started an offensive
and, geared to the different style of operation of the previous adminis-
tration, many of our military wanted to come rushing over to the
White House and run the battle from the Situation Room.

I told them, "Wait a minute and let me check with the
President as to what he wants to do." I went in to him and said,
"They want to come over." He said, "Is there any decision I need
to make now, that I can make?" I said, "No." He said, "I don't
want to see them until they are ready with a decision that I have
to make. Then they should come back. But I don't want to be
cluttered up with a lot of tactical considerations that aren't my
business."

That is a very crucial aspect of the style of this Adminis-
tration. The basic question that the President keeps asking is,
"Where are we going?" We submitted, for example, yesterday, a
program on foreign aid, which went very much through this process.
The President first developed the basic guidelines of our foreign
policy as I have described them. He then called in a task force
of outside experts and leaders of their communities, headed
by Rudy Peterson, the Chairman of the Bank of America.

He told him, "I don't want to go to Congress every year
and tell them they have to appropriate this much for foreign aid just
because they have appropriated that much for foreign aid last year.
We need a rationale for foreign aid that makes sense in the 70's,
as the rationale of the past programs may have made sense in the 50's."

He told them, "All you have to do is to convince me that
this is the right approach."

I am not going to go through all the recommendations of
the Peterson Task Force, but the basic thrust of the recommendation,
of the analysis, was that too much of our foreign aid was still
gear ed to the views that were generated by the Marshall Plan, that
there had been a confusion of objectives, that every American program
tended to be spread over all the objectives that had ever been de-
vised over the last 20 years.

Therefore, the thrust of the Peterson recommendations most
of which, at least the basic philosophy of which was adopted by the
President after consultation with the National Security Council, was
to group these objectives into major categories, have all the pro-
grams relevant to each category under a discrete management, to set
our foreign aid goals not on the basis of abstract percentages of
the Gross National Product, or on the basis of historical aid
levels, but on the basis of objective criteria which we can set
as a result of national policy.

We will make recommendations to the Congress based on the
message which we have submitted to the Congress for consultation
yesterday.

Another good example is in the area of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks. We were confronted early in the Administration by
two schools of thought. One school of thought said, "You can't

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trust the Russians. Any agreement you make with them is going to be broken." And I have to say from what we have seen in the Middle East recently, you can find some evidence for that point of view.

There was another school of thought that said, "Any conversation is useful. So, go charge into the conference." We were confronted by an abstract ideological debate between those who wanted to talk for talking's sake, almost, and those who wanted to elevate suspiciousness into a principle of national policy.

The President said he did not want to settle that issue in the abstract. He ordered the most full-scaled study that I believe -- and this is a field in which I have been an independent expert -- which I know has ever been made, of every individual weapon system.

We analyzed what our independent intelligence capabilities were, what violation was possible, what violation was strategically significant, what we could do about a violation, if it occurred, and we have devised our negotiating proposals based on this study.

To apply it, if I may, to the Middle East type of situation, if in the strategic arms field we were told they have just built 20 missiles in violation of the agreement, we would know what this meant.

It is a completely different problem from what we face in the Middle East where we had to make a proposal in a totally new situation, with a weapon system that didn't even exist when we started the negotiations. I am saying that there has been an enormously careful preparation for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and one shouldn't necessarily draw conclusions from one experience to another.

One of the reasons why we are cautiously optimistic in the field of strategic arms is because we have made these full studies, because our proposals to the Soviets reflect these studies, and because this has given us unparalleled flexibility.

If you look at previous negotiations on limitations of arms, you can see that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty took about five years to negotiate. The Non-proliferation Treaty took about four and a half.

In these negotiations on strategic arms, we can now say this: We can't say that it will succeed, but we can say that if they fail it will be as the result of a political decision, on the basis that the Soviets have decided to adopt a hard line. It will not be because the subject matter has proved obdurate. Both sides have conducted negotiations on a businesslike basis. The proposals have been carefully prepared on our side and in fairness, one has to say that the Soviet proposals have provided a basis from which one can negotiate.

So that if we confine the discussions to the merits of the subject, we think we know how the differences can be narrowed and how we could make progress in the negotiations. And I repeat, we are cautiously optimistic about these negotiations.

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Let me say one word about the Middle East which Secretary Sisco will also, of course, cover in much greater detail.

When we came into office, the overwhelming national concern was with Vietnam, and even today there are periodic outbursts of popular manifestations on the issue of Vietnam. Yet, the problem of Vietnam, as I will explain to you in a minute, is one which we believe is not unmanageable.

At any rate, it is not a problem which is likely to lead to general war. We believe our policy will succeed. We are confident that it will succeed. But if it should not succeed, in that sense the probability of its leading to expansion of hostilities is very low.

In the Middle East, we face a much more difficult situation. We face local rivalries which involve the great nuclear powers on opposite sides, but which they cannot necessarily control. No great power planned the hijacking that occurred. No one can be sure that some local group may not generate a sequence of events which may engage the nuclear powers even against their will. And this is why we have, with urgency, and with great emphasis, pushed the peace offensive with which Secretary Sisco is so notably associated.

The issues are extraordinarily complex. Somebody said in the 19th Century with respect to an issue then, the Schleswig-Holstein question, that only three people had ever understood it: One had died, the second had gone mad, and he was the third, and he had forgotten it. (Laughter)

Joe Sisco has understood the Middle East problem. I won't tell you into which category he fits. (Laughter)

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The complexity of the issue is that a solution
totally satisfactory to all sides is probably unattainable.
The best that is attainable is a solution with which each
side is equally dissatisfied, so that you spread the
dissatisfactions fairly. Much of the editorial comment has
gone in waves of what I frankly consider excessive optimism
and excessive pessimism. The situation was never as good
as it was described at the end of July, and it is not as bad
as it is often described today. Joe and I often talked
about the euphoria at the end of July and said to ourselves
we have just started what is relatively the easiest part,
namely, getting a cease fire and getting the agreement on
negotiations. Whatever problems this creates are nothing
compared to the complexities that will emerge when the
parties get down to serious negotiations, which I must
remind you, gentlemen, they have yet to do.

Similarly, in the despondency that one sometimes
detects now in some of the editorial comments, one finds
the reverse side of the previous euphoria. No one should
ever have expected that the road from the beginning of this
initiative to the conclusion of a peace settlement would be
smooth. The passions are too deep. The war has gone on too
long. The distrust is much too profound to be able to
avoid periodic blow-ups.

The parties have to make their record. They have
profound domestic pressures on them. Those elements on
every side that do not want a settlement have a high
incentive continuously to create a new crisis. It is not
clear yet whether every great power and specifically the
Soviet Union is always clear about what it really wants in
the Middle East, whether it really wants to make a
settlement. But what is clear is that there will be no
settlement unless everybody is willing to make some
sacrifices. There can be no settlement in which all the
demands are made on one side, or in which the United States
is asked to supply all the solutions, to come forward with
all of the proposals, deliver all the parties and bear all
the onus for every step along the way.

All the great powers, and especially those who may
get involved, have a responsibility to make their contribution
and if they make it, then I think we have no reason at
this moment to be pessimistic. What we may be seeing are
the birth pains of what may turn out to be yet a possible
settlement of a very complex situation, and if not of a
settlement, at least of a substantial defusing.

It is interesting to note that the cease fire still
is in effect with all the uproar of the last few weeks.

Now let me turn to what if it is not our most
dangerous problem is certainly our most anguishing problem,
the problem of Vietnam. One sometimes despairs to talk
about Vietnam, because almost anything that can possibly be
said has already been said by all of the parties to the
debate. The debate hastaken on a liturgical quality in
which people tend to repeat their arguments.

Let me say that this Administration understands
the anguish that produces much of this concern. We understand

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that many are impatient about a war that seems to have no
conclusion. But we have, I believe, also a right to ask for
understanding of the problem that we have faced. We
inherited a war that had gone on for five years. We found
540,000 Americans engaged in war. We did not have a choice
of deciding in the abstract of whether we should be in Vietnam
or not. When we came in, we were in Vietnam. We had to
measure our decisions against the impact both internationally
and domestically of a collapse of an American effort that
had been conducted for such a long period of time.

We have yet to find -- you can joke about the
domino theory as much as you want to and as much as is
fashionable in my former circles -- but it is striking
that in all the travels that the President has taken, among
all of the leaders who have come through the Oval Office,
and I have sat in on almost all of these conversations, we
have yet to see the foreign leader who tells us, "For God's
sake, get out of Vietnam. It isn't worth it." Most of
the foreign leaders, in fact I would say almost all, no
matter what they say publicly, tell us exactly the opposite.

Therefore, a precipitate collapse of the
American effort in Vietnam could lead to such a collapse of
confidence in the American word around the world that it
would accentuate the difficulties, rather than diminish them.
Wherever you look around the world today, you see most
notably in the Middle East today, but it is true in Europe
and in other parts of the world, a great deal of the peace
and of the stability depends on the confidence other people
have in the American promise, and in the American performance.
If the United States utterly fails in something that it has
undertaken with so much effort, it is bound to affect the
judgments of other countries as to the degree to which the
United States can be significant in their area.

Look at the history of Japan. Twice in a century
it changed its domestic structure entirely, and with it its
foreign policy orientation, not on the basis of abstract
ideology, but because of a change in the balance of power
as they perceived it. They went from feudalism to emperor
worship in the 1860's because of the forcible opening of
Japan by Admiral Perry. They went from emperor worship to
democracy in 1945 as a result of their defeat in World War II.
Who can say that if they become convinced that the United
States has become irrelevant in Asia that they will stick on
our side simply because of an abstract loyalty. And if Japan,
which already has the third largest gross national product
in the world, and an enormous rate of expansion, should
change its orientation, the security problems we face today
will look trivial compared to what could happen under those
circumstances.

Domestically, too, the President has often said
we have an obligation not only to those who demonstrate, but
to those who do not, and also to the mothers of those who
have suffered and often died there. And so we have not
believed that we will ease our domestic -- not our domestic
situation, but the domestic conditions in this country by
yielding to street demonstrations. If you look back on our
Vietnam performance, you will see that we have kept every
promise that we have made. We will have reduced the
American presence in Vietnam by next May 1 by over 260,000

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men. We have reduced our air operations in Vietnam by a significant amount. We have embarked on a program of a significant strengthening of the South Vietnamese forces that will enable us to continue reductions of the American presence. The operations in Cambodia have been followed by a reduction in the level of combat in South Vietnam, just as we said that they would, so that combat casualties in South Vietnam in July and August, and the first half of September, have been at the lowest level since late 1965.

In late 1965, the total number of Americans there was still lower, so that the percentage of casualties is at the lowest level since there has been a significant American military involvement there. So we believe we are on the way to achieving our objective.

Let me answer a few questions that always come up in this connection. I understand the trauma of many of the people who were associated with the policy that got us into the war, who now feel that they must prove that they no longer associate themselves with it. I know also that in the fifth year of the war, the sixth year of the war now, no brilliant solutions are open to us. So that it is, of course, possible for anyone taking the negative to point out certain weaknesses in any approach. But if you look, for example, at the recommendations that were made in 1968 by many of our critics about what they considered a new, bold, daring policy, you will see that we have carried out almost all of these measures, and in every case, I would say, almost without exception, exceeded them.

When Senator Kennedy in August 1968 made a speech in which he said he was picking up the fallen banner of his brother, and pronounced the declaration of conscience against President Johnson on the Vietnamese war, he associated with that a program for action which we have far exceeded since then.

Many people will say that Vietnamization dooms us to staying there forever. This is not the record of the last few years, and we have no reason to believe that it will be the record of the next few years. Then some people will say we should negotiate rather than build up the South Vietnamese. Let me make one observation with respect to this. Of course, we would prefer to negotiate. We know that the quickest way to get out of Vietnam is through negotiations. Maybe it is the most reliable way. But we also know this. The North Vietnamese have not fought for 25 years to give up now to mere expressions of American goodwill what it has been impossible to extract from them on the battlefield. Unless the North Vietnamese find a situation which makes it in their interest to negotiate, they will never negotiate. Over the last four years we have been told again and again that only one more measure would bring about fruitful negotiations. It has been one of the great North Vietnamese skills to present the negotiations in Paris as if they were a detective story in which they throw out vague clues and we have to guess at the answer.

Hordes of well meaning Americans have passed through Paris and have been fed little tidbits of information which

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make them believe that if only one more step were taken by
the United States, the millennium would have arrived, or
at least fruitful negotiations. We were told fruitful
negotiations would follow on the following measures: The
end of the bombing; our willingness to talk to the NLF;
our willingness to make a token withdrawal; our willingness
to announce a withdrawal of 100,000 men; our withdrawal of
100,000 men; our appointment of a new ambassador to Paris.
We have done every one of these things, and fruitful
negotiations did not follow.

If Hanoi negotiates with us, it will be in part
because of Vietnamization. If Hanoi negotiates with us, it
will be because they are convinced that time is no
longer on their side, that on the contrary, the longer the
war continues, the stronger South Vietnam becomes, and that
as Vietnam becomes stronger, they will find it increasingly
difficult negotiating further.

This is why many of us believe that the efforts in
Cambodia have helped negotiations in the long run. rather
than hurt them. But we are not saying that negotiations will
succeed. I am saying that Vietnamization is the means to
make negotiations succeed, and if Vietnamization succeeds,
negotiations may succeed.

But in any event, we are determined to reduce our
presence in Vietnam consistent with the Nixon Doctrine,
either through negotiations or through Vietnamization, and
if we meet next year, you will see that we will have kept
that promise as much as we have kept every other promise that
we have made in Vietnam.

Some people say we are too much dependent on the
Government in South Vietnam. I would try to impress you
and say we are completely independent of the government in
South Vietnam. But you could not take me seriously if I
said this. When you are fighting in an allied country with
an army that is over 500,000 men strong now, of course they
have an influence over our action. What we are trying to do
is to bring about a situation in which they can increasingly
stand on their own feet. We are trying to bring about a
situation consistent with the Nixon Doctrine in which we can
pass over the burden of responsibility to them, and when that
point is reached, then we will indeed be much freer of their
actions than we are today.

So on Vietnam, we believe that we are on the right
course in a difficult situation in which serious people have
had different points of view, but in which the greatest asset
we could have would be enough show of public support so
that the North Vietnamese are not counting on American
division to bring about the collapse of our efforts.

Since the end of the operations in Cambodia, the
South Vietnamese have gained a considerable amount of time.
The military activity, as you know, has been less, and we
will have to see now over the next few months whether the
negotiations will get impetus. We have sent our most
experienced diplomat there, and he has wide flexibility,
and we will have to see what will be possible on the
negotiating front.

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I just want you to know that we are committed to
bringing about peace in Vietnam and that we are determined
to do so, and that we hope to be able to bring it about.

Let me just make a few general observations. I
have given you a general approach, and I have spoken about
specific policies, but the great challenge we face is to
build a structure for peace in the new conditions of
international affairs. If you look at history, you will find
those periods that have been truly peaceful have been those
that have engaged the participation of many nations,
and those leaders who have contributed to the making of
these have been those who have not let themselves be
deflected in the short term and have kept their eyes on the
big objective.

In every area that we attempt to deal with, we are
trying to look five years ahead. We are working on a five
year program in the security field. I have discussed foreign
aid. We are trying to work on regional programs in the
same way. We have started a program approach for each area
of the world which lumps all of our efforts together. But
one of the biggest problems we face, of course, is domestic.
We were accused at one stage of being divisive, and of
course a great deal depends on what assessment one makes of
what the cause of our contemporary domestic turmoil is, and
to talk about this meaningfully, one would have to
spend at least as much time as I have already imposed on you,
and I think that would be cruel punishment.

But if you would look around the world, you will
have to come to the conclusion that the turmoil is not caused
primarily, or at least exclusively, by the causes that are
ascribed to it. There are student riots in Berlin, where the
students participate in government, and there are student
riots in Paris where they don't participate in it.
There are student riots in Oxford, which has a tutorial
system, and there are student riots in Rome, where there are
hug lectures. There are riots in this country because
of Vietnam, race and slums, allegedly, and there are riots
in Holland which has no Vietnam, no race problem, and no
slums. In other words, we are dealing with a problem of
contemporary society, of how to give meaning to life for a
generation, for a younger generation in states that are
becoming increasingly bureaucratic and technological.

I am not making these observations as criticisms,
but to point out what the problem is. We cannot in response
to vocal pressures pursue policies which we believe to be
disastrous. History proves that the public does not
forgive their leaders for bringing about disasters, even if
the disaster at the time reflected the popular will.

Chamberlain, when he made the Munich agreement,
had 85 to 90 per cent of the British public behind him. It
did not save him two years later when it turned out that that
agreement had brought about a great misfortune.

So we believe that we have a responsibility
according to the best judgments which we can make to lay
before the American people and to carry out policies that

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we believe are conducive to a long-term structure for peace. In this time, it is absurd to have a political debate on the desirability of peace. No one has a monopoly on the desire for peace. Nor has anyone a monopoly on anguish about lack of peace. That is something we all start from. The problem though is whether we can build something, area by area, and internationally, which will move us forward towards a real relaxation of tension and not just towards an illusory progress for which we have to pay dearly after a year or two.

Peace depends not only on the desire for it, but on the willingness to face the fact that it has a security aspect, that it has a moral aspect, and that it must accommodate the conflicting interests of many diverse peoples. That is what we are attempting to work on, and hopefully, thoughtfully.

As I have pointed out to you in the beginning, the pressures of modern government are such that no one should pretend that it has always been done in every respect perfectly, or that there are not areas in which the priority problem that I described to you earlier catches up with any administration. But I have tried to describe to you the thrust of it, and I know that it is not the words which will justify it. And the performance, and the performance will be judged by whether we were in fact able to usher in an era of peace. Thank you very much.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much, Henry. I think all of you gentlemen, my colleagues, have recognized that in my introduction I engaged in no flattery.

We have two things in prospect. One is Secretary Sisco, and then we have a brief coffee break. Maybe you would like to take a second and stand up and stretch before we get into the Middle East.

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MR. KLEIN: I noted a major tiff in terms of what kind of demonstrations they have going on in Chicago. On our way in I saw a crowd gathered on the corner and I had the car windows down to see what was the current issue and who we are after this time.

A young man was standing on a platform. He was saying something like, "Would you have this beautiful young thing clothed in long midi-skirts when you have this opportunity to see beautiful legs?"

So we have a big new issue for demonstrations here.

I would like at this time to introduce the Assistant. Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. He has a long background of service in foreign service. He was Assistant Secretary for the United Nations prior to the time that President Nixon appointed him to his present position.

For him this is a homecoming. He is a product of Chicago who grew up here. He received his Doctorate at the University of Chicago and, despite all of that, he has done a good job for the Administration.

Henry asked me to say that.

Joe has had the position, probably one of the busiest ones in Washington in recent weeks, because he has been the man who has been working with Secretary Rogers and has been working with the National Security Council. He has taken the responsibility for being most close to what is happening on the moment-by-moment basis in the Middle East.

When you say moment-by-moment basis in the Middle East, you are talking in split second terms.

He is not in charge of hijacking. I ought to make that clear. He is in charge of trying to help us look at the things we can do to capitalize on the gains we have made and to enlarge the gains, ones that we would hope would lead in the long term toward peace in perhaps the most volatile area in the world.

With that, I would like to present Secretary Sisco.

MR. SISCO: Herb, thank you very much.

I am very glad to be part of this road show and to continue to be the straight man for Henry Kissinger.

You know, I was brought up on the West Side of Chicago. I must say that this has been pretty good training for my present position. I think Henry has already alluded to the complexity of the Middle Eastern problem.

Not only do you have the deep suspicions that arise from the Arab-Israeli dispute, but you have very, very serious divisions within the Arab World itself.

And on top of this is super-imposed the conflicts of the major powers and, in particular, the United States and the Soviet Union.

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I am glad that Henry alluded to the fact that on this problem there is the tendency to move from euphoria on the one hand and to doom and gloom on the other.

It is very complicated, but it is one that really requires the constant application of the United States, as well as others, because it really is the real meat and potatoes issue in terms of possible war and peace over the future. And we have been operating on the assumption that the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States any more than we want one with the Soviet Union over the Middle East; that it does not want a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities because it would confront the Soviet Union with very difficult choices indeed, as it would confront the United States.

But as Henry has indicated, what has not been demonstrated is whether the Soviet Union is fully prepared to work towards a political settlement which would stabilize this area and diminish the risk of confrontation which, after all, is an overriding objective insofar as the United States is concerned.

I say this because there is the view, and it is very difficult to arrive at and answer, that the Soviet Union may believe that it can derive sufficient unilateral advantage from the turmoil; that its principal concern has to be whether this situation can remain controlled and remain managed.

So as the Soviet Union asks itself this question as to whether it desires a political solution, it has to weigh the lack of manageability, the lack of control in this area, the possibility, if not the probability, that it could get out of control, against whatever political advantages it may feel it has been able to achieve as a result of years and months of turmoil.

In August of this year, we put forward a new initiative which all sides accepted, the Egyptians, Israelis, the Jordanians. It was a very simple proposition.

The parties were expected to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of the United Nations' representative, Ambassador Jarring, and part of this agreement was a cease fire that comprised a so-called "stand still" and, in simple terms, this meant that both sides were committed to the notion that during the cease fire period, a 90 day cease fire, neither would try to develop any military advantage in respect to one another.

In simple terms, not only was the shooting to stop, but a stand-still meant a stand-still.

And in addition, the parties were expected to start talking on a new basis, something which the parties had been unwilling to do since the end of the June War in 1967. When Nasser and Hussein accepted the American initiative in August, they said clearly and explicitly for the first time, "We commit ourselves to make peace with Israel."

And, secondly, "We commit ourselves explicitly to recognize Israel's right to exist as a sovereign and equal state within so-called secure and recognized borders."

In turn, the Israelis committed themselves to the principle of withdrawal from the territories that were occupied during the

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June War.

So that our hope is and was that the parties could begin
for the first time a genuine negotiation, indirectly at the outset;
at a closer range as progress was made.

Based on these specific commitments this: left as the
primary job: What would be the final borders, what would be the
practical security arrangements that they could agree to to make the
difference between a paper peace and a real peace.

We have had a setback, and notice I use the word "setback",
because it is not irreparable. I think Henry very properly
has emphasized that the cease fire is being maintained. The
Israelis are still sitting on their bunkers right along the
Suez Canal today waving across the Canal at their Egyptian
counterparts.

We have a very distinct impression that neither side,
for different reasons, wants to start shooting again.

What about the nature of this setback, and, really, we
have had two kinds. First is the question of the violations of
the cease fire standstill, and, secondly, I want to say a word
about the implications of this hijacking in the broader context
of our ongoing efforts to achieve a political solution.

Insofar as the violations are concerned, there are three
kinds in particular which we are satisfied, based on our own
means, are confirmed violations that have been committed by the
UAR.

First, a number of new sites have been erected. And don't
misunderstand what I say when I say a number of new sites have
been erected. What this means is that a number of positions
have been dug out, parapets have been dug, positions for
revetments, positions for the receipt of missiles. So you have
one violation -- a number of new positions.

Secondly, there are a number of cases where positions
were only partially built at the time of the cease fire and today
we note that they are either completed or nearly completed, or
certainly at an advanced stage of completion. And that is a
second kind of violation.

And, third, we know that in a number of instances certain
positions were unoccupied; in other words, there was no missilry,
no missile-related equipment in these positions whatsoever.
But today in a number of these positions there is missile
equipment, not necesaarily operational, but missile equipment
that is in some of these positions.

And you have had generally a movement of these positions
and the missiles somewhat closer to the Suez Canal.

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All of these activities are contrary to paragraph C of the cease fire standstill which said that neither side was to derive a military advantage, neither side was to try to improve these positions, neither side was to do anything more than to limit itself to maintaining the positions and the sites which were occupied at the time of the cease fire.

So, we are satisfied that there have been specific violations and we are satisfied that we have had these confirmed by our own means.

It is very easy both to over-estimate and to underestimate the significance of these violations. Insofar as the impact on the balance between the Egyptians and the Israelis, our feeling is that the Israelis have been put to some greater disadvantage than that which existed before the cease fire.

However, this can be compensated for by whatever the nature of the on-going military relationship which exists and which is active between the United States and Israel.

The President and Secretary Rogers have made it very clear that we do not intend to permit the balance to tip against Israel in this situation. Of course, the question I am most often asked is, "What about the Russians?"

I think I can summarize this in a very, very simple way. These violations could not have taken place without the knowledge and the complicity of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are right on the ground. The Soviets are heavily involved in the UAR. They have got technicians, they have got advisers, they have got people there in an operational capacity.

These violations could not have taken place without their knowledge and without their complicity. And regardless of what one might say about the impact of these violations on the balance, and the fact that I have tried to emphasize here that whatever effect on the balance can be compensated for, by whatever the United States decides to do in assisting Israel militarily.

I think the more important significance of the violations is in the political-psychological framework Israel today is saying time and time again that if the other side does not hold to this kind of an agreement, what hope can there be if, in fact, they get into serious negotiations, with a fundamental agreement designed to stabilize relationships between the two countries and to put this area on ice, what hope can they put to the commitments of the other side?

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This is what concerns us primarily in the political and in the psychological framework.

Let me say something about the second setback, and then I am going to come back to the question of why we believe that this situation is still reparable. All of you know that the recent spate of hijackings have been the responsibility of the so-called PFLP, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a small, terrorist, splinter group within the overall so-called Palestine Liberation Organization.

This is a tough crowd. It is Maoist-oriented, it is led by a man by the name of George Habash and it does not believe in a peaceful solution. One of the things that probably has not come out very clearly in the press, one must understand these hijackings in the context that King Hussein had accepted the American peace proposal.

Not only are the hijackings intended to dramatize the role of this organization, but basically, they are aimed at weakening the structure in Jordan, at weakening King Hussein, and basically, it is aimed at trying to prevent a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

And it is important, I think, that all of you understand this, because I think we in the government, as well as on the outside, may begin to concentrate on the isolated incident without giving full weight to the broader implications.

Thus far, our efforts have been reasonably successful. In concert with the British, the Germans, with the Israelis, with the Swiss, we mandated the International Red Cross to try to get these hostages out. We have succeeded thus far in getting 375 out of the 425 that were on these planes, a little over 50 of whom are still being held by the PFLP.

The present demands of the PFLP are these: They want the Swiss to release three Fedayeen they are holding, they want the British to release this young lady that was responsible for this hijacking on the El Al plane about a week ago and the TWA aircraft about a year ago on Labor Day, and they want the Germans to release three that they hold.

In addition, they want the Israelis to release two Algerians that the Israelis are holding, as well as some ten or 11 members of the Lebanese Army and two or three others.

And finally, they want the Israelis to commit themselves to the principle of exchange: In other words, the Israelis have in their hands a number of Fedayeen and they want the Israelis to commit themselves to release at the moment an unspecified number of Fedayeen before the remainder of the 50-some hostages are set free.

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Our policy has been a very simple one. We are doing
everything that we can through diplomatic channels to
secure the release of all of the passengers without
discrimination. Of the remaining 55, you have Americans,
you have some with Israeli passports, you have got Swiss,
you have got British, Germans, a variety in this group.

The Fedayeen are attempting to treat all Americans
as Israelis, and therefore, they are saying, "Before
we release the Americans" -- and in their terms Israelis --
"there has got to be a commitment from the Israelis to
release X number of Fedayeen."

We have got nothing to throw into this pot. We
are not holding any Fedayeen. Therefore, basically, the
decisions to be made on this are the decisions of the
British, Swiss, German and Israeli Governments who are
the ones who have the necessary quid pro quos.

But what we are doing behind the scenes quietly,
very vigorously, very intensively, is to try to keep this
group together and to move together on the basis of securing
the release of all of the hostages without discrimination.

But now we have had a further complicating feature,
and that is you have had an intensification of the
tension in Jordan, particularly since various wings of
the Palestinian groups have divided and argued over whether
the hijackings have been a very desirable thing from
their point of view.

And the situation is difficult. And we have had a
case where the Fedayeen and King Hussein have agreed
over the past months to three or four cease fires, none
of which have been maintained.

And so, King Hussein in the last 24 hours, has taken
a very important action by having declared, in effect,
marital law and having replaced his civilian government
with military leaders, province leaders as well as members
of a new military cabinet.

So that I think, as we look ahead, I think we must
watch very, very carefully the evolving situation in
Jordan, not only because of its relationship to the
hostages, but much more fundamentally. We are convinced
that if serious talks were to take place between Israel
and Egypt, Nasser is in a position to make peace and
to make that peace stick.

To the degree to which King Hussein can continue
to maintain stability and to run his own house, this I think,
would be a very positive thing in terms of his own ability,
his own capacity to make any peace in the future stick
once these negotiations are started.

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One more word on why we believe this situation is
reparable, and why our efforts over the next few weeks
will be, one, to try to maintain the cease fire, discourage
any of these people from resuming the shooting; secondly,
we are seeking rectification of these violations through
diplomatic efforts both in Cairo and in Moscow.

And the reason why this ought to be doable is
primarily because of the fact that each country that is
involved has pressures on them where of all of the
alternatives, the political alternative is a much
preferable alternative to the military option. Time is
not necessarily on the side of Nasser. As a result of
his acceptance of the American initiative, he has had to
take on the Iraqis and the Syrians, as well as the
Palestinians.

Time is not necessarily on the side of Hussein,
because he has obvious serious internal difficulties, vis
a vis the Fedayeen. Time is not necessarily on the side
of the Israelis, for here you have a country of two
and a half million people who are having to maintain a very
substantial defense indeed at great cost, surrounded by
some 100 million Arabs soon to become 200 million, where
the military option over the coming years is hardly
attractive as a political option, which would mean
stabilizing the situation and giving them, as well as the
other people in the area, an opportunity to get on with
their own development.

So, this is what the outlook is over the next couple
of weeks: More diplomatic efforts to try to repair it,
but bear in mind that this American initiative is by no
matter dead. Not only is the cease fire holding, but
you have here a commitment made by both sides which neither
has disavowed: namely, the commitment that Nasser undertook
to make peace with Israel, based on recognizing its
existence within secure borders, as well as the principle
of withdrawal.

This is going to be tough. It is going to be complex.
I don't know whether we are going to be able to pull it
off. But certainly, from the point of view of our own
interests, peace and stability in this area is the thing
which will help assure, if anything can assure, against
a possible confrontation, against a much more complicated
situation between the major powers.

Thank you very much.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Joe. I don't know anyone else
who could cover such a complex subject in such a concise
way and do such a good job.

I might just close this part by pointing out when
you think about the areas we have covered, I think it bears
out the principal point which Henry made very early, that
in world policy today, there just is no judging as to what
is going to come up next.

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We think that the policies which the President has evolved, if you look over a period of a year and if you look at a period of a year and a half, have really brought tremendous changes, but it is not something you can sit on at any given moment, because a name we haven't heard of becomes a major name and a major problem within a matter of days, at almost any time.

So, you have to have people who are on top of things in a very quick manner, if you are to continue to work towards solving these problems wherever they may turn up in any part of the world.

With this, I think, we would do best if we break briefly for coffee. We would like to have you do that and we will return in 15 minutes so that we can have a full period of time for your own questions and our attempts to answer them.

Again, as I said at the beginning, when you are thinking about the questions you might like to ask, we have covered a variety of subjects, but the questions you have, need in no way, be limited to the subjects we have covered or, if you feel that any point wasn't clear or you would like some additional explanation, feel free to ask.

The main thing we are asking is that we would like a good give and take and looking at the people I know around this room, I don't think there is much doubt we will have it.

(A brief recess was taken.)

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DR. KISSINGER: I am transgressing on Herb Klein's
functions, but Herb is on the telephone. While I won't
start this session with the grace that he would, let us say
the best way to handle it would be for you to direct questions
to either Secretary Sisco or to me or to both of us, if you
want to hear both of us on the subject, and we will attempt
to answer them.

Q Mr. Sisco, if the King of Jordan should be
assassinated or overthrown, are there elements in the
military that you think would be capable of running the
country or is there chaos there without the King on top?
Your opinion, of course.

MR. SISCO: There probably are. It is a very "iffy"
question. No State Department man likes to answer "iffy"
questions, but I would merely say that he is really the cement
that binds this country together. You have got Palestinians
and non-Palestinians in Jordan. He is an important symbol
of courage and unity. The Hashemite Kingdom that he represents
is well respected, and while there might be alternatives in so
far as various leadership elements within the Army, I doubt
that there is anything in existence that would provide the
kind of unity and cement that he effects in this situation.

Q Does Hussein have an heir?

MR. SISCO: He does. I think it is two children.
I think unfortunately, if I recall, they are both female,
however.

Q What is his apparent attitude toward the United
States?

MR. SISCO: Of Hussein?

Q Yes.

MR. SISCO: The relations between Jordan and the United
States are very friendly indeed. Hussein has always
recognized that the legitimate interests of the United States,
the national interests of the United States, are best served
by a policy where not only is the security of Israel
protected and maintained as a sovereign state, but likewise
where the United States has as many friends in the Arab world
as possible. He is a moderate. He has probably been the
most devoted to the concept of a political solution of all
of the Arab leaders.

The role that he played in the June war where he
could have stayed out, but intervened and got hurt in the
process--I would say that Jordan and the Jordanian people
suffered more than any other people as a result of the
June war --it gave him a stature in the Arab world which
previously he did not enjoy. Hussein over the years has been
historically accused of being an American stooge. He is
friendly to the West. He would like to see this area stabilized.
He would like to see American influence maintained in this
area.

I think the critical thing is whether a political
solution can be achieved that meets the legitimate concern of

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of both sides, and by that I mean it protects the security
of both sides, and yet gets at the two fundamental questions.

From the Israeli point of view, they want peace
based on reciprocal commitments between themselves and the
Arabs, and in so far as the Arabs are concerned, they don't
see peace being possible on the basis of substantial
acquisition of territory. Their view is Israel must choose
between peace and territory. So the key issues are
contractual peace and the question of withdrawal from the
occupied territories.

Q I think you indicated you were not sure about the USSR in this Middle East situation, and yet at the same time, the fact that you accuse the USSR of complicity in violating the cease-fire, this would seem to me to pretty well demonstrate what their attitude is.

I believe they have been gaining power during
these troubled times, and I remember in the India-Pakistan
dispute when the USSR said stop the fighting, and it stopped
because apparently there was a decision.

So what leads you to believe that the USSR might
be indeed willing to tolerate a peace at this time?

MR. SISCO: A couple of reasons, and one can't be
sure. First of all, the June war demonstrates that neither
of the major powers has sufficient control over this situation
to prevent another war between the Arabs and the Israelis.
We tried shortly before the June war, and neither of us
succeeded.

So the first concern that the Russians must have,
and it is not too different a concern that we would have in
these circumstances, if this thing gets out of control with
each side helping their principal client, the risk that
confronts them is the risk of confrontation. They have to
weigh that. Our judgment is that if they should come to the
conclusion that with the developments, for example, of the
Fedayeen, as a formidable political force in this area,
another uncontrollable element, I might add, that risks are
just too dangerous, that they had better settle for a
solution, and particularly since the kind of solution they
are pressing for obviously is a solution which is from their
point of view on the best possible terms, give maximum support
to their Arab clients, and try to get the best possible deal.

But even in circumstances of a political solution,
the Russians must tell themselves that obviously the
animosity between the Arabs and the Israelis is not going
to stop on the day that peace agreement is signed. So the
opportunities for political competition, if I can put it this
way, between ourselves and the Soviet Union do not stop on
the day that that peace agreement has been signed.

From our own point of view, we think that would
create circumstances not only much more favorable to
stability, but much more favorable to maintaining peace, and
I might say much more favorable to the West, because we feel
that it is the turmoil primarily that the Soviet can exploit
and are exploiting in the area.

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We obviously feel that in light of the cease-
fire violations that it is necessary now to make a publicized
and large military aid commitment to the Israelis. You say
that the Rogers initiative is not dead. Nasser at least
publicly feels he now has to say that it is dead.

What moves are available to us now to counteract
the impact that this aid is going to have in the Arab world
in terms of keeping the peace initiative alive?

MR. SISCO: First of all, in maintaining the
balance, it is not necessary to escalate in any serious way,
and you have here a situation where, one, we cannot afford to
disregard the violations of the cease-fire, and secondly,
we cannot afford to disregard continuing ongoing military
shipments from the Soviet Union to Cairo, let alone the fact
that the Soviets are directly involved in the UAR in an
operational capacity.

This is a very difficult tightrope that the United
States has to walk. The balance, as far as we are concerned,
ought to be a balance that discourages both sides from
pushing the button on the next war. We are not interested in
a balance that would give the opportunity to one side or
the other to commit open aggression, to break the cease-fire,
and frankly to vanquish the other side.

So it is that kind of a balance that tries to
take into account both sides. Of course, as you know, we are
also supplying Jordan. We are also supplying Saudi Arabia
to a limited extent. We are also supplying Lebanon to a very
limited extent. That is on the military side.

But on the political side, I think the thing that
can counterbalance this to some degree is for the United
States to try to pursue this initiative in terms of trying to
meet the legitimate concerns of both sides. In other
words, when we put together this initiative, we tried to
include in it something which Israel was interested in,
namely, a commitment from Nasser that he is willing to make
peace and recognizes Israel as a state. We tried to get
into this framework something which Nasser and Hussein were
interested in, namely, the principle of withdrawal. The only
way in which we are going to maintain our influence in both
places is to pursue a policy of friendly relations with all
of the countries, and to try to exercise our influence in
the direction of a settlement that we would consider
reasonable, meeting the legitimate concerns of both sides,
which means, Jim, a settlement something less than the
maximum terms that both sides are expressing today.

That is tough going. It means we are going to have
to exercise influence when we get to the stage of where, if
as we hope, serious negotiations are being pursued.

In the event of deterioration of the situation
in the Middle East, at what point, if any, would the United
States intervene militarily in direct terms?

MR. KLEIN: Could I ask, just because it will help
us in terms of seeing various parts of the states and

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[c]

everything, when you do ask a question, would you please identify yourselves?

MR. FISHER: Roy Fisher, Chicago Daily News.

MR. SISCO: Again, this is one of these "iffy" questions, and I really don't like to say too much even on background, because I find that these backgrounders, Henry, have a way of making all sorts of banner headlines. In the San Clemente backgrounder which Henry and I gave two weeks ago, I made the rash statement that we did not preclude the possibility, if the parties really wanted it, of some kind of a peace-keeping role. We have had banner headlines for two weeks saying that we had called for a Soviet-American condominium over the Middle East. So I am going to be extremely careful in response to your question here today.

There are no plans to intervene. Obviously in our planning, and particularly within the framework of the National Security Council, in this kind of situation, it is normal, routine planning to cover every contingency and to weigh what the pros and cons are, based on what we see coming in the future. But there have been no decisions, no plan to intervene, and I would say that in terms of future developments, all of these are in a contingency stage.

MR. BLACK: I would like to give you a rest by asking Dr. Kissinger a question. Mr. Black, Cincinnati Enquirer. How much confidence does it give you in the Russians' willingness to keep an agreement in view of their violations or complicity in violations in the Middle East if some accord were reached at SALT?

DR. KISSINGER: This is a very important question. One of the things that I find so puzzling in the Soviet performance on the cease-fire in the Middle East is to try to figure out a motive for it. If they had let the negotiations get started, for example, with all the tensions that this process inevitably is bound to create, and if then after the negotiations had reached a stalemate, as at some point they will before one can make further progress, if then there had been a violation, there would have been many apologists for it. But why the Egyptians and the Russians violated the cease-fire literally practically from the first day onward in a way that was so flagrant, I have really found it very hard to explain to myself. I do not know about your view on that, Joe, but that I find very puzzling. Whether that means that they are moving generally to a hard line, or whether they are going along with an Egyptian move that they felt they could not stop, that the events of the next few weeks will show.

With respect to SALT and in commenting generally about the Soviet performance, this Administration has never believed that the Soviets will keep an agreement just because they like to keep their word. We have always assumed that as Marxists they would believe that they will keep an agreement only so long as it serves their interests. As Marxists, they have almost no mechanism by which they would keep an agreement that is against their interests.

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Therefore, the only SALT agreement that they will keep is one that they believe is in their interests, and if we ever put ourselves in the position where our survival is dependent entirely on their good will or on their good faith, or even if our security is dependent on it, we are in bad shape.

That is one of the reasons why we made these exhaustive studies before we made our SALT proposals, despite the fact that many disarmament advocates were batting away at us saying "You have to show trust and good faith" and so forth. We believe that the only agreement that can last is one that puts a minimum strain on good faith and trust.

Therefore, I believe that the SALT agreement, as it is now structured, is not to a very large extent dependent on their good faith. That is to say, our margin of survival vis a vis the Russians is much greater than the Israeli margin of survival vis a vis the Egyptians, if the Egyptians move, say, 100 missiles. That is of great significance to the Israelis and they can move that very quickly.

In order to upset the strategic balance vis a vis us, the Russians would have to construct, not just move, they would have to construct hundreds of missiles. Our studies show that they could not do that rapidly enough for us not to find out. Also, if they did that, we would of course take counter measures, and we know what counter measures are to be taken.

If the Russians ever get the idea in a SALT agreement that they could get a free ride, that they could construct hundreds of missiles, and then we would do nothing, then we would be in terrible shape. Then they will do it. But as long as it takes them now about 18 months to construct an SS-9 silo, we generally pick it up after a maximum of six months, and usually a much shorter time than that. So if we saw a lot of silos being constructed in the Soviet Union, then we would know that they are breaking the agreement. Then we would take our counter measures and we know what counter measures we will have to take, and they are well within our means.

So I have no excessive confidence in their performance. I am worried and we are all worried by this rather flagrant abuse, particularly as it is so hard to ascribe a rational purpose to it, but we can proceed on our SALT course, if it stays within the present framework, with a high degree of confidence, not in their word, but in our ability to take counter measures.

Dr. Kissinger, one area that you did not talk about before was Latin America. You have Mr. Allende, a Marxist, elected in Peru. Could you talk just briefly about our long range view and the present dangers and opportunities and activities?

DR. KISSINGER: The election in Chile brought about a result in which the man backed by the Communists,

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and probably a Communist himself, had the largest number of votes by 30,000 over the next man, who was a conservative. He had about 36.1 per cent of the votes. So he had a plurality.

The two non-Communist parties between them had, of course, 64 per cent of the votes, so there is a non-Communist majority, but a Communist plurality. I say that just to get the picture straight.

According to the Chilean election law, when nobody gets a majority, the two highest candidates go to the Congress. The Congress then votes in a secret ballot and elects the President. That election is October 24th. In Chilean history, there is nothing to prevent it, and it would not be at all illogical for the Congress to say, "Sixty-four per cent of the people did not want a Communist government. A Communist government tends to be irreversible. Therefore, we are going to vote for the No. 2 man. This is perfectly within their constitutional prerogatives. However, the constitutional habit has developed that Congress votes for the man that gets the highest number of votes. But then, of course, it has never happened before that the man with the highest number of votes happens to represent a non-democratic party, which tends to make his election pretty irreversible. I have yet to meet somebody who firmly believes that if Allende wins there is likely to be another free election in Chile."

So this is the situation that is now confronted by Chile. By a constitutional habit, the Congress votes for the man with the highest number of votes. The man with the highest number of votes is the candidate backed by the Communists.

There is the additional problem that the Congress is not elected at the same time as the President, so in the Congress, as it now stands, the total number of seats is 200. The group that backs Allende, including the Communists, has 82 seats, so that all Allende has to do is pick up 19 seats from the other parties, and he will be in. The conservative candidate, that is, the No. 2 candidate, around whom the rallying would have to take place, has only about 45 seats. So he would have to pick up 57 or something like that to make it.

So both the internal structure of the Congress, plus constitutional habits, would argue that Allende is likely to win the Congressional election, barring something extraordinary. This problem is compounded by the fact that the non-Communist parties in Chile have been very divided among themselves, and you have the unusual phenomenon of people arguing, "Well, maybe Allende won't be so bad. Maybe he will run a democratic system". And it is the usual revolutionary dilemma that, with a revolutionary seeking power, those who represent the non-revolutionary side do not all at the same time clearly understand what is happening. Therefore you have a great deal of confusion in Chile.

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Now, it is fairly easy for one to predict that if Allende wins, there is a good chance that he will establish over a period of years some sort of Communist government. In that case you would have one not on an island off the coast which has not a traditional relationship and impact on Latin America, but in a major Latin American country you would have a Communist government, joining, for example, Argentina, which is already deeply divided, along a long frontier, joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia, which has also gone in a more leftist, anti-U.S. direction, even without any of these developments.

So I don't think we should delude ourselves that an Allende take-over in Chile would not present massive problems for us, and for democratic forces and for pro-U.S. forces in Latin America, and indeed to the whole Western Hemisphere. What would happen to the Western Hemisphere Defense Board, or to the Organization of American States, and so forth, is extremely problematical. So we are taking a close look at the situation. It is not one in which our capacity for influence is very great at this particular moment now that matters have reached this particular point.

But you asked me about what the situation is. It is one of those situations which is not too happy for American interests.

MR. TODD: Bill Todd, Rockford Star. Dr. Kissinger, speaking of off shore islands, and closer to home, I saw a report recently that the Soviet Union seems to be sneaking into Cuba. Is there anything to that report, and if so, how serious does the administration view it?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet Union, of course, is very heavily established in Cuba as it is. It spends about $1 million a day there, just to keep the island's economy going. What the reports are probably referring to, the reports that you mention, is the visit of the fleet units of the Soviet Union.

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That in itself is not inconsistent with any under-
standing we have, certainly not against the letter. If they start
operating strategic forces out of Cuba, say Polaris type sub-
marines and use that as a depot, that would be a matter we would
study very carefully.

What the Soviet Union has to decide is this: Really, the
principles that Joe Sisco advanced for a Middle East settlement apply
to us too. As you look around the world, both sides, simply by
the logic of events, have innumerable opportunities to take small
gains and to harass the other, or they can ask themselves what is
required for a more permanent settlement? In which case, they have
to forgo some tactical advantages for the sake of an agreeable
atmosphere.

For example, if we put the Polaris submarine into the Black
Sea, we have every right to do it. There are many newspapers who
would say that is a provocative thing to do. Why operate so close
to the Soviet border?

I am not saying everyone would hold that view. If one
significantly changes the deployment of one's strategic forces, that
is something the other side is bound to notice.

Therefore, both sides have to decide whether they want
to restrain measures which they have a legal right to take, in the
interest of some longer term settlements, or whether they want to
press every advantage they have a legal right to take.

We are watching these events in Cuba and it isn't yet clear
what exactly, the Soviet Union is doing there. The fleet is rotating
in and out, and we are watching events very carefully.

Q Secretary Sisco, and Dr. Kissinger, I am not asking
what would we do, but in your roles as advisors to the President, how
far do you think we should be prepared to go to protect the indepen-
dence of Israel and our commitments in the Middle East?

MR. SISCO: The first think I would do is ask Henry
Kissinger what he thinks. (Laughter)

First, let's be very clear about the use of this word
"commitment." We do not, as you know, have any legal treaty signed
with Israel and, therefore, in the literal sense there is no legal
commitment.

On the other hand, our role in the establishment of the
State of Israel, a history of the relationships between the United
States and Israel over two decades, I think it is very clear that
there is strong support in our country in all strata of society
for the existence of the State of Israel and for its right to live
free of the threat of the use of force.

After all, I am not saying anything more than what is
contained in the charter of the United Nations. We have felt that
in the long run peace and security for Israel can only be achieved
by a genuine political peace agreement; that regardless of maintain-
ing the balance by military means, where you have a situation where
it is the military option that is being exercised by both sides to a
limited or a greater extent, you have got there an inherent situation
of instability.

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So I think you have put it very well. No one obviously can say what we would do in a given circumstance. This is something which obviously the President would have to decide.

I think that any serious threat in the sense of a threat that would affect fundamentally the security of Israel and to threaten seriously its very existence would be something which would have a qualitative affect on the balance of power, not only in regional terms, but likewise in global terms. And I think this is how the President would really have to weigh this in this situation.

It is a pretty diplomatic answer, Henry. (Laughter)

Q Walter Ridder, Gary-Post Tribune.

I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger, in view of what we have been discussing here today, I notice there has been no mention of Red China. What role, if any, is Red China playing in the Realpolitik of today?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, Communist China is one of the great nations in terms of population in the world. There really has not been a reliable census of China in a long time. But the estimate is that one is dealing there with a population of 800 million people with the longest unbroken record of self-government of any nation in the world today and maybe in history; a country that has always exerted overwhelming influence in Asia to the point where, as late as the middle of the 19th century, they thought of themselves as the center of the world.

What role is China playing? I have already alluded to the impact that China has on the Soviet Union, a frontier of 4,000 miles, on which there are 800 million people on one side, 30 million people on the other. In high school history textbooks on China, major slices of Siberia are shown as parts of China. They are claiming everything that Russia acquired in the 19th century as part of China. For example, Vladivostok, all the maritime provinces of the Soviet Union, they show as Chinese territory.

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You can ..., imagine how the United States would feel, first of all, if there were 800 million Canadians, if the Canadians started constructing nuclear weapons aimed at the United States, and if they claimed every territory, say, within a 50-mile belt along our frontier.

This is about that same weird feeling that the Chinese evoke in the Soviet Union. And if you want to get a Soviet citizen, or Soviet official, really agitated, you talk to him about Communist China. Almost anything else he can handle in a tough, calm, manner. But Communist China is obviously a very sore point.

I will get to the other impacts of Communist China in a minute.

At the same time, there is the dispute in ideology, which makes things particularly intractable. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union is incomparably stronger than Communist China. Therefore, Communist China attempted to compensate for its physical inferiority by ideological superiority or by a claimed ideological superiority. They are attempting to challenge Moscow's claim to leadership in the Communist world by advancing a particularly aggressive form of ideology. Therefore, they are contesting with the Soviet Union everywhere around the world on the ground that the Soviet Union is selling out to the West, and, therefore, driving the Soviet Union in a more intransigent direction.

On some levels, for example, Stalin had an easier job settling with us than any of his successors have had or than the present leadership has, because the present leadership always has to calculate the risk it runs in losing control of the Communist Parties around the world to the Chinese, if they go too far in the direction of relaxation of tensions.

And I don't exclude that this is a factor in Soviet behavior even in the Middle East, where the Chinese at this moment are not a major force yet, but where precisely to keep them from becoming a major force the Soviet Union constantly has to prove its ideological virility.

So the Chinese have an impact on international politics far beyond their physical strength, through their ideological aggressiveness.

In Italy, for example, they have these Maoist shock troops running around stirring up unrest, again out of proportion to any real numbers, and out of the control of the Italian Communist Party which really would like to come to power by the same methods that the Chilean Communist Party is trying to come to power.

Incidentally, the impact of the Chilean thing -- to complete that previous question -- on Italy could be very considerable. This is the impact of Communist China in terms of rivalry.

Then Communist China has a particularly Chinese problem in conducting international affairs. We in the West think of foreign policy in terms of sovereignty, of more or less equal states adjusting their relations to each other by negotiations.

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[L]

The Chinese throughout their history, literally throughout their history, have never had to conduct foreign affairs on this model. The Chinese have either been predominant or subservient. They have never come up against equals. Until the middle of the 19th Century, the Chinese were so far predominant over any of their neighbors, culturally, politically, militarily, that they never had to deal with them on the basis of equality.

When the first British envoy appeared in Peking, the encounter was portrayed in terms of the British bringing tribute to the Chinese emperor because that is what everyone else did. Therefore, many intellectuals argue on the questions, "Were the Chinese an aggressive people? Where they not an aggressive people?" That is Western doctrine applied to the Chinese.

They didn't have to be an aggressive people because in every country in Asia when the Chinese were strong, there was Chinese suzerainty. They all recognized Chinese pre-eminence.

Then from the 19th Century to the middle of the 20th Century the Chinese were the objects of great, power politics. They couldn't deal with anyone else as equals. So one of the problems the Chinese have, not even so much as Communists but just as Chinese, is to conduct international affairs as we understand it or as the Russians understand it.

And the proof of that is that there is literally no country with which the Chinese have managed to get along. It didn't make any difference. I have talked to diplomats who were in Peking and as far as I can tell everybody is treated abominably, and it doesn't make a great deal of difference. It really doesn't make any difference whether you are a Communist or not.

So how to adjust to this world is very tough for the Chinese intellectually as Chinese on top of being Communists.

On the other hand, looking at the world through Peking's eyes, they see the eerie phenomenon that the Russinas are building up their forces in the Far East to a point where now the Russians have already more forces facing China than they have facing Europe and have them deployed in a very aggressive posture towards the Chinese. Believe me, the Russians do not believe in negotiating on the basis of good will.

When the Russians negotiate, they put some tangible chips into the pot. And these Russian forces are growing by every month. So when the Chinese look at this, they are facing a reality.

As far as we are concerned, we recognize the fact that China is a tremendous phenomenon in Asia. We can't talk it away. We can't pretend it isn't there.

So we have adopted the posture that we don't judge countries on the basis of what they say so much as on the basis of what they do. And we are in principle willing to negotiate with them on a business-like basis the way we are willing to negotiate on a business-like basis with everyone else, and we took some steps last year to indicate our readiness. In fact, talks began in Warsaw.

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