BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(President's Statement on Laos)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER AND
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

MARCH 6, 1970

AT 1:07 P.M. EST

FRIDAY

Key Biscayne, Florida

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the President's statement.
Dr. Kissinger is here this morning to discuss that statement
with you and to discuss Laos with you.

What Dr. Kissinger says should be attributed to
the White House or White House officials, and should not
be put in quotation marks. You can paraphrase what
Dr. Kissinger says, but you should not directly quote him.

Dr. Kissinger.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what does the President ask
the Prime Minister of Britain and the Soviets to do under
the Geneva Accords?

DR. KISSINGER: Under Article IV of the Geneva
Accords, the signatories will consult with each other about
maintaining the agreements, and he is appealing to them
under the provisions of these Articles to use their
influence on getting started in the project of consultation
which will lead to the restoration of the Geneva Accords.

What specific measures they will then come back
with, we, of course, don't know. We are quite flexible
as to the method by which this is achieved. The two co-
chairmen, of course, have the responsibility and have
been given the responsibility in this respect by the
Geneva Agreements.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can we take this document as
an admission by the United States that this country also
has violated the Geneva Accords in response to Communist
violations or are we still claiming that we live up to the
Accords?

DR. KISSINGER: As you know, of course, there is
no judicial process with respect to the Geneva Accords
which determines what you are entitled to do after the
other side has first violated them.

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We have taken the position that the Government of Laos is entitled to ask for help in self-defense and to maintain the Geneva Accords. Our view is that we believe the Geneva Agreements are still valid, that we want them restored, that all the measures we have taken have been at the request of the Laotian Government, a government, moreover, which was not our creation but which was installed at the urging of North Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

I think the activities that we have engaged in and that we are here describing speak for themselves.

Q The activities?

DR. KISSINGER: The activities that we have described here speak for themselves. These are the activities we have undertaken. They have been in response to North Vietnamese violations. They have been at the invitation of the Laotian Government, and their purpose is to bring about the restoration of the Geneva Agreements. We have no desire to upset the Agreements, and we would be satisfied with the full observance of them.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how many American pilots have been killed in this bombing and air support operation? That is one of the key questions raised on Capitol Hill.

DR. KISSINGER: The figures of casualties in Laos are difficult to break down because they are being reported as part of the Vietnam operation. The total number is less than 300 in the six years that this has been going on.

Q Are these all airmen or pilots?

DR. KISSINGER: I really don't have the exact breakdown there. They are airmen. No American has been killed in ground combat operations.

Q How many planes have we lost?

DR. KISSINGER: Again, the number is absorbed in the Vietnam reporting and, therefore, there may be some double counting involved. The total number, in the six years, is in the neighborhood of 400.

Q Does that include helicopters?

DR. KISSINGER: Does it include what?

Q Helicopters as well as fixed-wing?

DR. KISSINGER: That includes everything.

Q How many in the past two months?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have that.

Q Have you any idea?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have that breakdown.

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Q Do you have any breakdown that is more recent than in the six years? Perhaps, let's say, for the last year or the last six months?

DR. KISSINGER: That is the total figure that I have. You would have to assume that it is somewhat proportional to the rate of our efforts. We have said in the statement that our efforts have increased in relation to the Vietnamese violations.

Q Would you say that more than half of these --

DR. KISSINGER: As I said, I don't have the exact breakdown there. Therefore, I don't want to say that it is more than half. I don't have it broken down. I think it is less than half, I am practically certain it is less than half, but I don't want to be pinned down on that.

Q Doctor, have the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments been notified in advance of the request that the President is announcing in this statement, and, if so, have they reacted to the formal notice?

DR. KISSINGER: I am just reminded that I am to repeat the question. My friend Ziegler is giving me the evil eye from behind, which is the worst way to get it. (Laughter)

The question is have the Soviet Union and Great Britain been notified in advance that we would appeal to them.

The answer to that question is no. Their Ambassadors were called into the State Department this morning, and they were handed the letters by the Secretary of State.

Q Has Prime Minister Wilson recently requested the Soviet Government to join him in resuming the Geneva process in connection with Laos?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is has the Prime Minister repeatedly asked the Soviet Union to join him in having the Accords restored.

The answer is that Prime Minister Wilson on several occasions made exploratory moves with the Soviet Union to this effect and has been in the past rebuffed. Our hope is that given the increasing intensity of the combat and what we assumed could be the Soviet interest in establishing the principle of neutrality in the region which they themselves have so frequently urged, that the Soviet Union will pay greater attention to the direct appeal by the President of the United States.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say that we have no plans for introducing ground combat forces into Laos. Are those plans subject to change, and can you flatly declare that no ground combat forces will be put into Laos?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is with respect to the statement that we have no plans, and does it mean that these plans are irrevocable.

That is a big word, but I must also call your attention to the fact that the Secretary of Defense has stated that under no circumstances would we use combat forces in Laos without asking for Senatorial approval first. My personal judgment is that the plans are not likely to be changed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us whether some of these so-called advisors have actually participated in military actions to the extent of firing weapons, directing fire, calling in artillery and that kind of thing?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether the so-called advisors have been engaged in specific military activities, such as firing weapons, calling in artillery and so forth.

I really can't give you the answer as to their precise activity. From their casualty rate, which is zero, it seems to me that they could not have been in the thick of combat. No advisor has been killed in six years of war. Therefore, I would not think that their activities take them into the middle of the military activities. This is my understanding.

But you ask me about what specific operations they have conducted. I really haven't the details.

Q Let me put the question this way: Do you know whether their orders prevent them from participating directly in military engagements?

DR. KISSINGER: They are not supposed to participate directly in military activities, but I do not wish to make a flat statement that one or another advisor may contradict. I can only repeat that the figures we have given as to their casualties seem to speak for themselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, two questions: Are there Chinese forces in northern Laos, and do we have restrictions on how far bombing may go up near the river? There have been reports that there is a three-mile limit beyond which our bombers may not go.

DR. KISSINGER: The question is are there Chinese forces in northern Laos, and the second question is there restrictions on American bombing within -- three miles of the Chinese border?

Q No, of the river south of the border.

DR. KISSINGER: There is some Chinese road-building activity in northern Laos. The bombing activities in northern Laos are strictly controlled in the sense that they take place only at the request of the Laotian Government and then only on the specific recommendation of our Ambassador.

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Therefore, it is not necessary to establish specific lines beyond which bombing may not go because those lines are generally established when there is a wide authorization. But I think you are safe in assuming that we would exercise the greatest restraint with respect to any military action that might be interpreted ambiguously by Communist China.

Our intentions in Laos are not to have Laos appear as a military base or a potential military base, directed either at North Vietnam, even less at Communist China. Our activities are carefully controlled in order to avoid any such implication.

Q Doctor, in the statement released, you say --

DR. KISSINGER: Can you tell me the page number?

Q Page five. You say there are 626 total Americans involved in military advisory or military training capacities, or logistic support. In the top sentence you say there are no American ground combat troops in Laos.

Do you have or foresee any plans in the future in increasing the capacity of the military advisory or the military training force in Laos?

DR. KISSINGER: The question refers to the numbers of the individuals that are now in Laos and as they are broken down on page five of the document, the President's statement. The question is whether we expect an increase in that number.

Let me explain first what these numbers are. The logistics personnel that are mentioned here are almost entirely civilian and almost entirely contract personnel. They are not military people. We have listed them here only in order to be meticulously accurate. We have listed anybody who could conceivably be considered as supporting logistically military operations as logistics personnel. We could have broken down this figure.

We erred on the side of overstating rather than understating the logistics personnel that are related to military operations. We lump everybody who has any logistics role at all.

Second, even if it is not directly related to military operations.

The number of military personnel is much less. It is a little over 200, and most of those are in training and advisory capacities. The total number of American personnel in Laos has remained constant since this Administration has been in office. We expect it to remain so. There is no plan to increase it. There may be very minor fluctuations of half a percent one way or the other, but there is no intention, no plan, to increase the number of American personnel in any of these categories now in Laos.

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Q If Hanoi continues to escalate the war in Laos, will we continue to escalate it in response to their escalation?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is if Hanoi continues to escalate the war in Laos, will we continue to escalate the war in response to their escalation.

Let me answer this in a general way. I know that there is a profound concern, and this Administration is very much aware of the fact -- there is a profound concern that we are engaged in an open-end commitment and we may slide into another situation similar to the one we found ourselves in in Vietnam.

There is one problem in analyzing any political situation, that one may always draw the lessons of the last encounter and apply them to the next one. Throughout the 1950's and part of the 1960's, the fear was that we got ourselves into the Korean War because we defined what we were going to do too rigidly, and gave the other side a rather too accurate description of what we would or would not do in certain circumstances. I mention this because there may be dangers both ways.

This Administration is not going to slide into open-ended commitments without carefully controlling and assessing each step along the way. On the other hand, I do not think, and we do not believe, it would serve the national interest if we gave an absolutely flat description of what we would or would not do in circumstances that have not yet arisen.

We have been careful in our response up to now. We will continue to be careful. We plan to continue to be careful. But we also believe that peace in Vietnam and peace in Southeast Asia will be affected by the degree to which the existing peace settlements are being maintained.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in view of the statement today, will the Administration now release the testimony before the Symington Committee?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is in view of the statement today, will the Administration now release the testimony of the Symington Committee.

The Secretary of State plans to consult with the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and with Senator Symington. We have every confidence that we will be able to work out some arrangement by which those portions of the testimony that are consistent with the statements here -- that is, not necessarily consistent but which are in the same area of information as the statement here, that we will be able to work out an arrangement by which they can be made public.

Q Have we consulted with the government of that land since the present crisis began on the defense of Thailand if the forces of Hanoi should move down to the Mekong River?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is have we consulted with the Government of Thailand since the present offensive began about the defense of Thailand should the North Vietnamese forces move up to the Mekong River.

We have, of course, been in consultation with the Government in Thailand about the situation in Laos. We have not given up on the Geneva Agreements yet and, therefore, the contingency to which you refer has in our view not yet arisen.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is Presidential approval, specific approval, for each mission necessary for the air support missions we fly, particularly the B-52 bombing missions?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is: Is Presidential approval necessary for each mission that we fly, specifically for the B-52 bombing missions.

Let me take the B-52 mission first.

The B-52 missions in northern Laos have required Presidential approval. I can give you one explanation in this respect which may indicate the care with which we have approached this problem.

I have read in the newspapers rather detailed accounts of the escalation of the war that is being produced by the use of B-52s in northern Laos, giving the impression that we bomb there every day. The fact of the matter is there has been exactly one B-52 raid in northern Laos -- one.

Q Are you saying northern?

DR. KISSINGER: I am talking about the Plain of Jars area. I am not talking about the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which does not represent escalation.

In the area of the Communist offensive there has been one B-52 raid. This is what people are talking about when they speak of escalation.

Q How many planes?

DR. KISSINGER: I can't get into the details. It doesn't make any difference. It is the principle of the thing. I won't go into the number of planes that were used. There was one raid on one day.

The problem we face with respect to the use of B-52s in northern Laos was that we saw the Communist buildup over a period of months and there were many extremely lucrative targets that would have been extremely suitable for B-52s.

We constantly rejected proposals to use B-52s because we did not want to provide a provocation for an attack; because we wanted to make sure that we would not be the first to escalate. We used the B-52s once after the offensive started, partly for military and partly for political reasons in order to make clear that we were viewing the situation with some seriousness.

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The major point that I want to make is that there
has been no indiscriminate escalation; that it has been
carefully conducted, and, as the facts indicate, it has,
of course, been a very restrained use.

Q Can you say whether the reports of some of
the Senators that we are now dropping more bombs on Laos
than we have dropped in North Vietnam are true, or could
you evaluate that for us?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is are the reports
of some Senators that we are dropping more bombs on Laos
than we drop on North Vietnam are true.

Again, let me make clear the priority of our
bombing effort in Southeast Asia. The first priority is
always South Vietnam. The second priority is interdiction
of supplies into South Vietnam, primarily on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. Only the third priority would be support for
activities that might be going on in northern Laos.
Therefore, when you ask about the tonnage of bombs that
may be dropped on Laos, you have to make a distinction
between what area you are talking about. I don't have the
tonnage figures.

It seems implausible to me, but I don't want to
make a flat statement because I don't have the tonnage
figures and I haven't examined it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the Soviet Union thus far
has resisted British suggestions that we help restore
the Geneva Agreements. Do we have any particular reason
to believe that this call by President Nixon will receive
a better response from them?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is similar to one
that I have already been asked, whether in view of the
fact that the Soviet Union has rejected British proposals
to restore the Geneva Agreements we have any reason to
believe that they are likely to be more receptive to the
President's appeal to restore the Geneva Agreement.

I don't want to speculate about what the Soviet
Union might do. It is our belief that it cannot be in
the Soviet interest to permit the flagrant violation of
an agreement which was made by a previous Administration,
very substantially on the basis of proposals which the
Soviet Union made itself.

We don't believe it can be in their interest to
have the principle of neutralization, which they are
pushing in many other areas, flouted by another Communist
state, and we, as a matter of fact, don't believe it can
be in the interest of North Vietnam to undermine the
credibility of its proposals that they may be making
elsewhere when a settlement which was again made very
largely on the basis of Hanoi's proposal is being over-
thrown.

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But except for this sort of abstract reasoning, we have
no reason to expect one thing or another. We are hopeful,
though, that the Soviet Union will recognize that it is
also in their interests.

Q On what you just said about proposals they
may be making elsewhere, are you tying Soviet action here
to progress on disarmament or in any other field?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is are we tying
Soviet actions here to progress on disarmament.

No, that is not what I meant. What I meant was
that very often in other trouble spots the Soviet Union
and other Communist states have proposed the neutralization
of the area concerned as one of the ways to avoid great
power rivalry and conflict.

To the extent that this principle is being under-
mined, it must affect the credibility of similar proposals.
We are not making an explicit relationship between this and
the other.

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Q Does the outcome of the coalition government in Laos affect our view of a coalition government in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is does the outcome of the coalition government in Laos affect our view with respect to a coalition government in Vietnam.

Our view with respect to a coalition government in Vietnam has been often stated. It is that we will not participate in imposing a coalition government on Vietnam.

Of course, the Laotion Government was negotiating among the parties concerned.

It must affect, however, one's confidence in the feasibility of this particular arrangement for guaranteeing fair political competition when, within six months of signing it, the Communist forces in Northern Laos attacked the neutralist forces, that is, the forces of the very Prime Minister that they helped install, and when the whole arrangement is being systematically attacked. So from that point of view, it must affect the credibility of North Vietnamese proposals that have a similar content in Vietnam.

Q Doctor, could you discuss the problem that would be presented to this government if the Communists should go on striking in Northern and Eastern Laos?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is what is the problem that would be presented to this Government if the Communists were to strike North and East in Laos.

I was running it over in my mind. North would take them into China, wouldn't it?

I don't think we would resist that.

Q Further over.

DR. KISSINGER: The problem that would be presented to this Government would be that we would be confronted with a deliberate overthrow of the Geneva Agreement. We might then face a situation in which a Communist government gets installed in Vientiane, and in which the interdiction of supplies in the Laos panhandle towards South Vietnam might become legally much more difficult, and yet it is a matter of the gravest concern for us because 90 percent of the supplies for South Vietnam and most of the manpower travels through the Laotion panhandle. It would raise profound security concerns in Thailand.

Therefore, overthrowing the Geneva Agreement is a matter which we cannot consider with indifference.

Q I am a little puzzled. The question was what would happen if the Communists moved North and East. I assume what you are saying is if they moved South.

DR. KISSINGER: I interpreted the question to mean what is the problem for us if the whole country is being attacked.

Q That is right.

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DR. KISSINGER: The North presents a problem for the Soviet Union which is tied with the military alliance to Communist China, and I wouldn't want to tell them what to do.

Q Would you evaluate that danger? Would you evaluate how great this risk is that they could overrun the entire country?

DR. KISSINGER: You know this de Gaulle cartoon which says, "Would somebody like to ask a question to my answer?"

Would I evaluate the danger that they might overrun the whole country?

The conflict in Laos has fluctuated back and forth with Communist offenses during the dry season and then Communists temporarily retreating during the rainy season. There is, therefore, always the question of whether they are going to go beyond the line, the 1962 line.

The problem with this is that in 1962 there were three areas. There was a Governmental area, a neutralist area, and a Communist area. When the tri-partite government was established in July 1962, each of these areas was controlled by the army of the particular leader that they represented.

Within a year of signing the Agreement, the Communists attacked the neutralists and they have since then swallowed most of the former neutralist area. So when one now talks of the 1962 line, one is often talking of the Communist plus neutralist area and not of the Communist area, strictly speaking.

It is not yet fully clear whether the Communists this year intend to go beyond their line of furthest advance. If they stop where they are now, then they have gone somewhat further than before, but it might still be within the framework of existing rules.

If they go any significant distance, then we will know the answer to your question. The reason we have today sent those letters is in order to bring about a situation in which the basic framework of the Accords is being maintained, and we are still hopeful that this can be achieved.

Q Dr. Kissinger, it seems to me one of the questions that the Senate continues to ask is whether we not at the mercy of the Communists in this situation, A, in Laos, itself, and, B, in Moscow. There is nothing that you have said that indicates the initiative lies anywhere else but in the hands of the Communists.

DR. KISSINGER: The question is are we at the mercy of the Communists. I suppose the fashionable answer is no. We conduct our policy without regard to anything anybody else does.

You know that is nonsense. Of course our actions are affected by what the Communists do. How else can it be? The Communists have 67,000 troops in Laos. They are on the offensive. Of course we are influenced, and to that extent at the mercy of their actions, since we cannot control their actions.

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We are trying to influence their actions. We are trying to bring about a situation in which they recognize that for greater interest, and not just for the local situation, they will want to preserve the peace and neutrality of Laos.

But, of course, our actions are produced to some extent, but we have taken an initiative today. This was not triggered directly by them, but there is a relationship between their action and ours that is unavoidable.

Q You touched on this in the statement, but could you expand on why you put out this document and also how you put it together?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is why we put out the document, and how did we put it together.

First of all, why did we put out the document.

As the President pointed out in the statement, it would have been no political problem for him to put the facts before the American public at any point. If you read his statement carefully, his press conference statements carefully, he has very strongly implied that we were engaged in some such activities before, because if he had wanted to flatly deny that we were doing something he would have done so.

By referring to other activities that it is not in our interest to reveal now, he made it quite clear that something was going on in Northern Laos.

The reason he did not do so is, first, because of our desire to provide the greatest possibility for the restoration of the Geneva Agreement.

The North Vietnamese, even though they have several combat units in Laos, have never formally admitted that they had anybody in Laos.

We also thought that the Soviet Union might find it difficult to be helpful if there was a formal admission of something that was quite well known, and that certainly key Senatorial committees have known for several years, but, nevertheless had never been formally acknowledged by the American Government, not because we wanted to hide it from the American people, but, primarily, because of our concern of the international impact. We did not want to provide a pretext for overthrowing the Laotian Accords. However, once the public debate reached the point where it was thought that we might be engaged in an open ended commitment of ground forces, and where the concern might be created that we were out of control of the situation, we had to balance, as we always did, the impact on American confidence as against the impact on the local situation.

Secondly, after the North Vietnamese intervention became so blatant that it couldn't possibly be denied anymore, some of the previous restraints fell away. The decision to make this statement was reached at a meeting of the National Security Council at the end of last week. It was fully concurred in by all the Departments. The President took a very active hand in drafting the statement. There was a major contribution by the Departments of State and Defense. This statement, therefore, represents the Administration's view and has obviously the full support of the entire Administration. But the President played a major role in drafting significant sections of it.

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Q Would you elaborate at all on just what it is that the military advisors do in Laos, and could you also give us perhaps a breakdown as to how many of these people that are listed in this 616 figure or the 320 figure, for that matter, on page five, are Army people and how many may be in AID or CIA, or any of these other categories?

DR. KISSINGER: I think what you are really interested in is USIS, isn't it?

The question is how these 616 people that are listed on page five breakdown, how many of them are military people and how many of them are in other agencies.

The other part of the question is what do the advisors actually do.

I have already said as much about that second question as I am going to say. They are engaged in general training and advisory roles, and they cannot be very actively engaged in combat by the nature of the casualties that have been suffered over a six-year period.

As to the number of military personnel I can give you, that is 228. That includes every military person in Laos, including those attached to the Embassy in diplomatic status.

We have stated in the paper how many are engaged in advisory or training capacities. That is 320. If you subtract 228 from 320 you can find out how many civilians are engaged in military training and advisory activities. I wouldn't want to say what agencies they represent. There are some 300 AID people.

The figures you are interested in is how many people are engaged in anything that is remotely connected with military operation, and that is essentially the 320 I have given. You can, if you want to, count the logistics personnel, which really have a dual function. But they are not engaged in anything close to military operations.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the latest Pentagon figures of losses over Laos over the past three or four years were 192, I believe. That was the figure for last November.

Are there any additional losses of airmen, air crews, in the Navy and Air Force? Have you any figures you can give us?

DR. KISSINGER: The only figure which is easy to come by is that figure which you just gave, because I think that is the figure of missing.

Q Captured or missing.

DR. KISSINGER: Captured or missing. I think that is the current figure. I think it is 193, though I am not sure. That one is broken down because it is reported to the International Control Commission. The others are difficult to isolate.

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Incidentally, that rough estimate of casualties
that I gave before included the 193.

Q Souvanna Phouma made an offer to Hanoi
to allow them to use the Ho Chi Minh Trail if they would,
in effect, stop attacking militarily in the rest of the
country.

Did you know about this offer? What do you think
of it? Is it acceptable to the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is that Souvanna
Phouma apparently offered to let the Vietnamese use the
Ho Chi Minh Trail if they would leave the rest of the
country.

First of all, I have not seen the actual text.
I have seen newspaper reports of what he has said, and I
have seen some official reports which, however, are also
dependent on what the newspaper reports said, because
this was said to the press.

Our impression is that this is not radically
different from what he has said before. Our position is
that we want to restore the Geneva Agreement; that if
North Vietnamese troops withdraw from Laos, and if the
neutral government is permitted to function again, we
have achieved our primary objectives in Laos.

What would happen if North Vietnamese troops
left Laos but the Ho Chi Minh Trail continued to be used
while combat is going on in South Vietnam is something
that we prefer to face when the situation arises.

The basic proposition that we want to make is
this: If North Vietnam wants neutrality and security
and peace in Laos, we are more than ready to restore the
1962 Geneva Accords. We want nothing in Laos.

Secondly, of course, one of our principal
objectives is peace in Vietnam, and the Ho Chi Minh Trail
problem can hopefully be settled by ending the war in
Vietnam.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

END

(AT 1:55 P.M. EST)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 5:13 P.M. PST.

APRIL 20, 1970

MONDAY

San Clemente, California

MR. ZIEGLER: The ground rules will be the same as always, White House officials.

DR. KISSINGER: All I want to say is, if you remember what happened to a group at John Hopkins who asked me the wrong question --- (Laughter)

Q Are you ready for questions?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Is not this withdrawal rate that you are announcing now approximately the same as it has been for the last three or four months?

DR. KISSINGER: If you average it out over a monthly period, it is roughly the same as that over the last few months. It's significance resides in the fact that we are now projecting it over the period of a year, and therefore giving it a certain irreversibility.

Q But it could be at a very rapid clip at the end, or you could have none for the next six months and then a lot if you wanted to?

DR. KISSINGER: It could be that, but it will not. That would be incorrect. We will not commit ourselves to a regular monthly rate, but we are also not playing games of putting everything into the last three months.

There will be significant withdrawals this year and there will be significant withdrawals next year, but we have to retain flexibility between various months as we have in the past, depending on the military situation.

Q, When the President says, "Spring" here, I assume he means April and May. Have you any specific time?

DR. KISSINGER: The planning date we are using is something towards the end of May, during May.

Q Thirteen months, then?

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DR. KISSINGER: No, we will have twelve months, give or take a few weeks.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that the significance of this large figure over a long period of time is that it gives it a certain irreversibility. Could you be more specific? It is irreversible?

DR. KISSINGER: This figure?

Q Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: This figure under foreseeable circumstances is irreversible, yes. You know, if there are events totally beyond anything that can now be foreseen -- but I cannot conceive that it will not be met.

Q I don't want to quibble with you over the time period, but if this is in fact going to take place by the end of May, 1971, this represents a slight reduction in the rate we have had, Is it in fact that?

DR. KISSINGER: It is not our intention to have a reduction. What would be the reduction, the 200 a month, if you average it out?

Q Something like that, yes. But the rate went up some small extent in December, also.

DR. KISSINGER: There will not be. By this time next year, with the additional withdrawals which may be foreseeable at that point, it will be clear that there will be no reduction in the rate. But the only thing we don't want to do is commit ourselves to a given figure every month, and we have not in fact had the same figure every month.

Q Are you saying that this figure is the minimum of planned reduction, and that actually there may be a higher reduction than this?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but usually toward the end of a withdrawal period, we have in the past made other announcements. Certainly as we come to the end of a period of such significant reduction, we will have other planning figures in mind.

Q Do you expect just not to replace troops or will there actually be a large number of these troops pulled out of Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't understand the question.

Q Will the reduction be achieved by not replacing troops whose terms of service have expired during the next year or is what you will actually do is go in and pull out units?

DR. KISSINGER: In the past we have pulled out units. Of course, the preferred method is not to replace troops who complete the end of their term. I have not actually seen the detailed plans, so I cannot be sure that I can tell you whether any troops are going to be pulled out before the end of their term.

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Q Does this mean that the President will not now make another troop withdrawal statement until the end of the year, projected?

DR. KISSINGER: Unless events of such a radical nature occur to make it possible to change the program. This is the program on which he is operating and this is the program we expect to meet and will meet.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are we talking about authorized troop ceilings here, as we have in the past?

DR. KISSINGER: We are talking about authorized troop ceilings, yes.

Q Is this new formula designed to get you over a period of particular uncertainty for the next two or three or four months?

DR. KISSINGER: No. We could have gotten over whatever period of uncertainty may exist by any number of devices. If you remember, over fifty percent of the last increment was withdrawn within the last 45 days of the period. So we could have adopted that method and followed it. If we had wanted to continue on the four month's cycle, we could have continued this method.

The primary reason is to indicate our confidence in the process, to permit a longer term planning projection, to leave no doubt in anybody's mind what we are intending to do, and to prevent these constant periods of uncertainty as to how we will be affected by the short-term swings of the situation.

We intend this as a sign of our confidence, not as a maneuver to get over what has been reported as a temporarily difficult period, which, incidentally is always reported at the beginning of any troop withdrawal.

Q What is the troop ceiling a year from now, about 200,000?

DR. KISSINGER: 284,000. The question is, what is the troop ceiling about a year from now. Well, the present troop ceiling is 434,000. The new troop ceiling will be 434,000 minus 150,000 or, 284,000.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there had been some discussion in the last troop cutback and during the trip of Vice President Agnew talking with some of our allies who have contributing forces in Vietnam about the prospects of their cutting back their own troops in the face of our continued withdrawal. Can you discuss that with us? Can you tell us about the allied plans?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether any allies are planning to withdraw troops of their own and that this had been discussed during Vice President Agnew's trip. First,

First of all, the announcement of any cuts by allies should, of course, be made by them. It is possible that there may be some small withdrawals and we have had some discussions with allies on this subject. The thing that this longer term announcement does is to permit everybody to make their own projections and also it helps our principal allies, namely, the South Vietnamese, know what will happen in all foreseeable circumstances.

But there may be some reductions by some allies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what are your expectations for the next couple of months militarily?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is: What are my expectations militarily over the next couple of months. There has been, as you know, a curious infiltration pattern in the sense that there has been a much larger infiltration of material than of personnel. There has been a fairly substantial infiltration of personnel, but a relatively larger infiltration of material.

Historically, the campaigning season in South Vietnam has been in the winter and spring. The rainy season is going to start fairly soon and that will make it progeessively more difficult to coordinate large-scale operations.

On the other hand, our expectation is that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese will be operating on the basis of a more protracted warfare strategy with occasional high points and less of the massive onslaughts of the Tet offensive. So, we will not be surprised if there are occasional high points over the next few months, but we do not expect the massive, Tet-like attack.

Secondly, we expect attacks on the South Vietnamese forces to test their readiness and to test their ability to carry out the Vietnamization program. But the attacks on us will be largely attacks by fire and the high point type of attacks which we have seen in the last two weeks.

Q Apart from one brief reference to Communist penetration in Laos, the President does not discuss the growing turmoil in Indochina outside of South Vietnam. Is there any particular reason for his silence on this point?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is that except for a brief reference to Laos, the President makes no reference to the turmoil in Indochina.

There should have been a brief reference to Cambodia, unless the typist slipped. We want to make sure that Laos and Cambodia are treated with equal dignity. We have troubles enough as it is.

Q That is a very brief reference.

DR. KISSINGER: We stated our view with respect to Laos at great length and with excessive precision, several weeks ago in Key Biscayne.

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Our view on Cambodia is that we support the neutrality of
Cambodia. The turmoil in Cambodia is caused by events with
which we have nothing to do. They were not caused by us but
by the presence of 50,000 North Vietnamese who are there in
violation of the 1954 agreement. It is not we who are causing
any turmoil in Cambodia and it is important that we keep our
sense of perspective about this. It is not we who are attacking
Cambodian forces.

Now, there is turmoil, and it is, of course an
disquieting element, but it may also be that the North Vietnamese
are pressing in Cambodia because the possibility of scoring a
decisive victory in South Vietnam seems to have diminished.

In many ways I think that these events may well heighten
the prospects of negotiation because they may bring the realization
to everybody that there are unforeseen elements in this war that
are in the interests of nobody.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in referring to the Malik statement,
he has since made a statement which seems to have retracted his
first statement. Is this the Trollope ploy? Are you going to
take the most confident of his statements instead of the most
unrealistic one he made?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is that we have two Malik
statements to choose from and we chose the one that is more
optimistic. It is difficult to imagine that a Soviet diplomat
says things that have not been thought through and have not been
authorized by Moscow.

It is even more unlikely that he would say such a thing
without some concert with Hanoi. We don't know exactly what they
had in mind, whether they simply wanted to test our reaction
or whether they were in fact probing with a serious intent, nor
do we exclude the possibility that Hanoi started going down one
road and changed its mind.

A collective leadership sometimes has difficulty making
up its mind and we have had other evidence that the leadership in
Hanoi has some difficulty in developing a clear line. We thought
that whatever the intentions of the Soviet Union, we would take
this opportunity to make clear what our attitude towards negotia-
tion was and whether they intended to probe us or not, to use
this opportunity to make clear to the Soviet Union, to Hanoi and
to anybody else that we were flexible as to the methods of
settling it, that we were willing to discuss Vietnam separately
or the Indochinese problem as a unit. What the real Soviet
intentions were will become apparent in their response to our
statement. Regardless of what their intentions are now, we have
put it on the table for the time that is inevitable when serious
negotiations must happen.

Q To what extent was the South Vietnamese government
brought into this final decision on the troops and are they in
full accord with this figure that the President has decided on?

DR. KISSINGER: We have every confidence that the
South Vietnamese Government goes along with this figure.

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In that same area, what about the American Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the generals in the field like General Abrams
and Admiral McCain? What is their feeling? Are they fully in
accord with this program?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the American military are in full agreement with the
program. Now, it is not easy to persuade military people of the
proposition that they are as well off with 150,000 fewer troops
than they were with the existing forces. So, it is not a natural
conclusion to which you are led by the military profession that
your situation may be enhanced by the reduction of your strength.
But within this limitation, the military commanders have been
brought to see the wisdom of the policy. (Laughter)

Q Would you explain the reference to letters written
on April 7th?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. The question is: Would I explain
the reference to letters written on April 7th.

The President wrote letters to all the signatories of
the Geneva Accords of 1962 along the lines of the letter that he
had previously written to Prime Minister Kosygin inviting consulta-
tions about how the Accords of 1962 could be implemented and how
the neutrality of Laos could be safeguarded.

It was one more of the steps that we have taken together
with the two letters to the Soviet Prime Minister, the second
of which, incidentally, has not yet had a reply, to indicate that
we are not interested in a political gain, and even less in a
military gain in Laos, as we are genuinely interested in arrangements
that safeguard the security of everybody.

Q Did he send a letter to China?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

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Q Is it possible that the replies in Ambassador Malik's speeches last week were replies to the President's second letter, and also the April 7 letter?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether Mr. Malik's speech might be a reply to the President.

Well, I must say I don't happen to belong to the school of thought that looks at diplomacy as a mystery play in which the other side throws out clues and we guess at the answer. I think especially the Soviet Union, when they want to answer a letter, they usually answer it.

On the other hand, it seems fairly clear that Malik could not have been unfamiliar with the President's letter, and that the letter formed a general backdrop. So in this sense, I would say it is a response to the President's letter, and even with the backtracking he has done over the weekend, the statements about a Geneva Conference were somewhat more forthcoming than they have been before.

The Soviet Union has not, in recent years, indicated that any outside negotiations could take place under any foreseeable circumstances with respect to Indochina, so I would say, Stuart, that Malik's reply certainly could not have been uninfluenced by the President's letter.

Q What are we going to do about Cambodia's request for military aid?

DR. KISSINGER: We are studying it. We are looking at it in the overall context of the situation. We have no interest in a military base in Cambodia, in a military advantage in Cambodia, or a military involvement in Cambodia.

What we want to bring about is respect for Cambodian neutrality. Since our objective is to end the war in South Vietnam, and since we have stated that we want to retain no military bases or military presence in South Vietnam, we are not looking for a military role in any other part of Indochina, and our general approach is to attempt to bring peace to this area and not to find ways of conducting a war.

Q The President makes no mention of free elections in his speech. He is now talking about free decision of the South Vietnamese people. Is this a change in our policy, that we no longer are seeking free elections as a settlement in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is that free elections were not mentioned but free decision is.

Our view is that free elections are the best way to determine the popular will, but we have indicated that we are flexible in some other parts and are open to other approaches.

Q What is the statement that a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces about? Are you talking about the situation on the ground in terms of political control or could you tell us what the President means there on Page 3?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is, the statement refers to the fact that a fair political settlement must reflect the existing balance of forces, and does that reflect the situation on the ground?

What we mean to express is this: Any realistic person much recognize -- and this is true for both sides -- that neither side is going to be willing to give up at the Conference table what it was not willing to give up on the battlefield. Neither side is going to be able to trick the other one into a position of political defeat without the other side noticing it.

The best agreements are those in which everybody has a stake in maintaining. Therefore, no one is going to ask the other side to agree to a political settlement that leads to its complete destruction.

This is why we expressed last year that we were willing to permit the National Liberation Front to participate in the political process. We have just chosen another formulation to make clear that what we mean is a realistic discussion about the balance of political forces.

Now let's be perfectly candid about this. You thought I would say clear, but I won't. (Laughter)

Q. You may be sorry you didn't say clear, but go ahead. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: After what you said about me the other night, I will never be clear again. (Laughter)

To determine just what the existing relationship of political forces is in any situation is not easy, even among people with less of a history of distrust, but this is the attitude with which we would approach negotiations, and this is the general objective that we would attempt to reach.

Q. Could I be more direct on that point? Does this mean that we would be willing to accept a partitioning in South Vietnam where the Communist forces are in place and do control the countryside?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is, would we be willing to accept the partitioning of South Vietnam?

We have often said that we are willing to accept any solution that the South Vietnamese are prepared to accept. Partitioning has not turned out to be the most useful device in many of these situations, and it seems to be the one approach to which both sides seem equally opposed.

On the other hand, if both sides came to us with that proposition, that would create an entirely new situation. We wanted to state in this not a specific set of proposals which we would have to reserve for a negotiation, but a general philosophy and approach, partly because we believe that in addition to ill will which exists in abundance, there is also a profound distrust which is not understandable.

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This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 7:40 P.M. EDT.

APRIL 30, 1970

THURSDAY

THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

MR. ZIEGLER: Realizing that many of you gentlemen
would not be able to attend the later briefing and get to your
assignment, as we have done before, we are having this pre-
briefing. The ground rules are: Attributable to White House
sources, no direct quotations.

We would appreciate it if you would keep the fact
of this briefing to yourselves, as in the past.

I think we can go directly to questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how many American troops
are going to be involved in this operation?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have the precise figure. You
will have to get it from the Defense Department. I think
it is upwards of 10,000. I think it is close to 15,000, but
you will have to get the precise figure from Defense.

Q Is that American troops?

DR. KISSINGER: You will have to get the precise
figure from the Defense Department.

Q It is comparable to the South Vietnamese earlier?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but there are some South Viet-
namese troops with this operation.

Q Were you talking about 10,000 or 15,000 Americans
or combined?

DR. KISSINGER: I think combined.

I think you should rely for your figures on the
Defense Department. I don't have the precise figures here.
I know there is a South Vietnamese airborne unit involved,
in this operation.

Q Where is it?

DR. KISSINGER: It is in the so-called Fish Hook
area, about 50 miles northwest of Saigon. It is Area 352 and 353
and it is the headquarters area within which the command
and control center is located, primarily the communications
equipment. The personnel, of course, move around into various
positions.

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Q Is this an off-shoot of the South Vietnamese operation or was that operation framed in that direction? Can you relate it to the operation which began 24 or 48 hours ago?

DR. KISSINGER: It is part of the same concept and part of the same approach, but I think it is perhaps correct to describe the South Vietnamese operation as the first phase of it.

Q How far into Cambodia is it? How far across the border?

DR. KISSINGER: The base areas extend about 20 miles. Now, again, we don't want to be held to the precise distance, and we cannot say that we would not go 22 miles, but this is the general order of magnitude. We are not thinking of deep penetration into Cambodia. We are thinking of penetration sufficient to destroy the supplies that are located in these base areas.

Q Suppose they pull it back?

DR. KISSINGER: It is possible that they will withdraw their troops. It is highly unlikely that they can withdraw their supplies.

Q But suppose they move their communication facilities and the structure of headquarters further back, 50 miles into Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: During this operation or later on?

Q Later on?

DR. KISSINGER: After this operation is completed, I think if the supply dumps were located 50 miles into Cambodia, and they had to traverse 50 miles of Cambodia before they go into Vietnam, we would face a different situation.

Q How long do you anticipate these operations will last?

DR. KISSINGER: Again, I don't want to commit myself to a particular time, but I would think six weeks to two months is the outside figure.

Q For the whole thing?

DR. KISSINGER: For this particular operation that we are starting tonight.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you mean American troops are going in there to remain for you estimate six weeks to two months?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I am saying this is the outside. There will be two phases of this. If there is military contact there, there will be a military phase, and then there will be an effort to destroy the supply dumps and the communications facilities and that will take whatever time it takes to destroy them.

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But I gave you an outside figure. Our estimates
are actually for a somewhat shorter operation.

Q To what degree were the Cambodians consulted
and informed of this operation?

DR. KISSINGER: The Cambodians were informed of
this operation. They were not consulted in the technical
sense. We have reason to believe, however, that they do not
object to it, to put it mildly.

Q I don't want to turn this into a geography
class, but is there a map handy where you can show us this
area?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we will get it for you. The
President has a map when he appears on television.

Q On page 2 you say that "we shall do our best to
provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian
Army needs." What are you talking about there in terms of
arms?

DR. KISSINGER: We are talking about rifles, a few
mortars. We are not talking about heavy, complicated equipment
that requires advisors and requires a large training establish-
ment and a significant American military presence.

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Q These are American weapons or more of the captured Soviet weapons?

DR. KISSINGER: It may include American weapons but we are not talking about a big aid program in the traditional sense. It is nothing compared to the request we have received.

Q Would this indicate we are going to give them --

DR. KISSINGER: Let me add, incidentally, that up to now no equipment has been given by us directly. Most of the equipment which we have encouraged has come from South Vietnamese sources.

Q In this sense, you are talking about direct, rifles, mortars, and you say nothing compared with what was requested?

DR. KISSINGER: We don't exclude it. Up to now, what has been given has been given indirectly. We prefer to do it through third party and Asian channels but we don't want to preclude doing some through American channels.

Q Is this the answer to General Lon Nol or are we keeping this in abeyance?

DR. KISSINGER: This is an interim answer to Lon Nol.

Q You say we will not require heavy American military equipment. You said we will not send the kind of equipment that requires advisors?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no plans to have an American Military Advisory Group in Cambodia of any size.

Q When you say we are going after a command control center, is that because it is a base supply area?

DR. KISSINGER: Primarily because it is a base supply area and secondly, because it is a communications center.

We have no expectation of capturing the actual headquarters personnel, nor do we know that they are precisely in that area in any one given period. Their headquarters personnel moves around in this base area, in these two base areas, plus an area of South Vietnam adjoining it.

The strong probability is that the personnel will have left by the time we move in there but we have expectation of destroying their communication facilities and above all, their supply dumps.

To us, the significance of these base areas, let me stress, the significance of the base area is the supplies that it has taken them a period of months to accumulate, and that during the rainy season they will

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find difficulty to replenish, so we can buy a period of eight months in which these base areas cannot support military operations in South Vietnam.

Q Can you start from the beginning on this map, also the business of small advisors going in with the South Vietnamese and the other big operation?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let me explain these are not all of the base areas. There are several others. These are some of the most significant ones. This is Base Area 704, 367 and 706, this is Base Area 353, and you can read the numbers yourself.

Now, the operation which is conducted by the South Vietnamese with American logistic support is in Base Areas 367 and 706, that is the so-called "Parrot's Beak" which is 35 miles from Saigon. This is generally an area from which guerrilla operations are supported and supplied. This is not an area from which main force units operate.

There is one main force regiment in this area but it is primarily a supply area for guerrillas and it has supply dumps, rice stores, and we have already captured, rather, the South Vietnamese have captured caches of mortar ammunition and mortars and small arms.

In other words, this is an area from which guerrilla actions are supported and there may be anywhere from 5,000 to 8,000 troops in this area. I would not be surprised if there were extensive fighting in this area, but it is more likely they will withdraw and abandon the caches.

The operation which is starting tonight is in Base Area 352 and 353 which is the headquarters area for COSVN, for the Command of South Vietnam. This has extensive communications installations and significant supply depots: In this area there are main force units and this area supplies the equipment for, and the material for significant main force operations in the Third Corps Tactical Zone.

Now, this area we expect to be defended. It has always been defended when we went in there with reconnaissance units and to what extent they will defend it or abandon the supplies remains to be seen.

Q About two weeks ago, some intelligence sources said that the COSVN Headquarters had moved across the line into South Vietnam. Have they shifted again?

DR. KISSINGER: You have to distinguish two things: These base areas extend on both sides of the line and on the map which the President is showing tonight this was not intended for a briefing, actually, these two blotches ought to be closer together in order to extend on the South Vietnamese side of the line. Of course, the operation will sweep also through the South Vietnamese side of the line and the personnel of the headquarters rotates through this whole zone.

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We are not interested primarily in the personnel. Our interest is in the supply dumps and in the communications and support facilities that are located there. So I will repeat, we will not measure the success of these operations by personnel who are killed or captured, we will measure it in terms of the dislocation of their supply and control system.

Q Henry, I don't think we are going to have the figures by the time we go on. Are you saying that in this operation tonight it is going to involve thousands of American soldiers?

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q And the total force, do you know?

DR. KISSINGER: Of both operations?

Q No, of the one tonight.

DR. KISSINGER: I just don't know the exact number. I am really not being evasive.

Q I know, but I am thinking we wouldn't know when we go on.

Q There will be an awful clamor to know how many American boys are going into Cambodia tonight.

Q You suggested it was mainly American?

DR. KISSINGER: About three-quarters. I don't want to mislead you.

Q Is it 15,000 in the whole operation or just in this 352 and 353?

GENERAL HAIG: I think we have to be careful. This is an early stage of the operation.

DR. KISSINGER: I would appreciate it if you would not use these figures because the operation just started now, at eight o'clock, so, really, for reasons of the security of the forces, if you can keep it to using "several thousand of" type figures.

MR. ZIEGLER: Defense will not be giving the details of this operation tonight.

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct, and you will not be scooped. I will say less than this in the other briefing.

Q Is it fair to assume, as I have, that one reason for not giving the figures is you won't know how many will be necessary, if things go well you will need less, and if things go badly you will need more?

DR. KISSINGER: No, Dan. The numbers will not exceed the numbers I have mentioned here. It is not that

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we have 50,000 in reserve. How much less than this is
something I find hard to say.

General Haig is right, for the security of our
forces, no purpose would be served by being precise tonight.
I promise you no precise figures will be given by any of
the Departments and I will say less than this in the press
briefing.

If you say several thousand you will be all right,
but don't say 10,000 or 15,000. We are not trying to hide
it. By the end of the day tomorrow, I would think that a
rather precise description of the order of battle will be
released.

Q What do you hope to achieve by this?

DR. KISSINGER: What we hope to achieve by this
operation is to disrupt the supply system of the forces of
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces operating in South
Vietnam.

Our primary concern is with the security of our
forces in South Vietnam. It is not primarily an operation
relevant to Cambodia. It will have the by-product or it
may have the by-product of also disrupting the supplies
from which the Communist forces have been sustaining
operations into Cambodia. But the principal objective is
to disrupt the supplies that are going into South Vietnam,
to protect the Vietnamization program and to prevent the
Communists from tying this whole area together and dispersing
their supplies deeper into Cambodia.

We also hope that the other side will recognize
now that when the President warned them about the con-
sequences of their actions that he meant it, and that they
will realize that there is no way around a serious
negotiation, that they cannot start offenses in Laos and
Cambodia and a series of high points designed to increase
American casualties simply in order to wear us out without
ever getting into a serious discussion with us.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President mentions the
political risks involved. What was the thinking in terms
of other risks that might be involved by a campaign of this
size?

DR. KISSINGER: Like what?

Q The risk that may be involved as far as
China is concerned, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it must be obvious to you
gentlemen that this was an extremely difficult decision,
that it was a decision that could have been avoided if we
had simply let things slide for several months.

It was the judgment of the President that in the
light of all the risks and in the light of all the problems
we face, this was the only right thing to do and the safest
course with respect both to American lives and with respect
to the credibility of the American performance, not only in
Southeast Asia but in other parts of the world where
worrisome developments are taking place.

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Q In light of the fact, as the President points out, that the enemy has been using these areas for many years, what have they done in the past two or three weeks to have triggered so major a decision on the Administration's part?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I think we have to get the question in perspective. If by major decision one means the crossing of American troops into Cambodia, one has to remember that there are 40,000-plus North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.

We are not attacking Cambodian forces, we are attacking territory controlled by the North Vietnamese, under exclusive North Vietnamese control, from which they have been attacking us from South Vietnam.

Why was it not done before? It was not done before because as long as Sihanouk was in power in Cambodia we had to calculate, weigh the benefits of his neutrality against the military disadvantages of the base areas.

Moreover, as long as Sihanouk was in power, the base areas were limited in extent, that is, they were confined to a rather restricted territory and he kept them on a rather short leash as far as rice supplies were concerned.

So that while they were major areas for supplies, they were not the overwhelming offensive threat that they can be when they are tied together into one contiguous territory extending for 600 miles along the frontier, in which they have complete flexibility of movement and shifting around, and which eventually will be supplied from the sea. Their movements on Phnom Penh in the last two weeks, the systematic harassing of provincial capitals, which has the intention of bringing down the government in Phnom Penh while the United States stands by impotently, with the impact that this might have on Vietnamization psychologically, in addition to the military disadvantages, triggered the President into his decision.

I did not completely answer the question. We do not estimate a major reaction from Communist China but, of course, we could be wrong.

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Q How do you estimate the risk of serious countermeasures by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong?

DR. KISSINGER: We, of course, have to take that into account and we have pointed out that we would have to be prepared to take countermeasures if they took them. But we hope that the conclusion they will take from these events -- we are not escalating our peace terms. The door to negotiations is wide open, but it is time for serious negotiations and it is time to stop the invective.

Q. Doctor, can you tell us whether or not the rifles we have agreed to supply to Cambodia would include the M-16?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no plan to send M-16 rifles to Cambodia.

Q What sort are we sending?

DR. KISSINGER: We are talking of equipment of the type that was given to the People's Self Defense Forces in South Vietnam.

Q Do these attacks include Base 609 as indicated in that map or not?

DR. KISSINGER: Not in the attacks we are describing today. What further actions we will be taking depends on the reaction of the other side.

Q Can you give us an estimate of the size of the enemy units in the area that we are attacking tonight?

DR. KISSINGER: I think I had better stay away from order of battle estimates at this early stage. Of course, we have no way of knowing whether the enemy will resist or fade away.

Q But you do expect this to be defended?

DR. KISSINGER: The other one is defended also, but the other one is a different terrain. It has a civilian population in it and therefore it cannot be fortified to the extent that this area may or may not be.

Q Did you mention before the figure 5,000 to 8,000?

DR. KISSINGER: That is in the area in the South.

Q Could I ask you about this 40,000 that you say have been in there for a long time? Has that been augmented or is there any change in this 40,000 figure in recent months?

DR. KISSINGER: The total number of these 40,000 has not been significantly augmented since the overthrow of Sihanouk but the style of operation has changed enormously. They have pushed deep into Cambodia. They are harrassing and attacking towns. They have cut every road into Phnom Penh from every direction except the west. They don't always keep it cut, but they are trying to create such a feeling of insecurity and perhaps drive up the rice prices that there may be a popular upheaval. They are actively attempting to organize a national liberation front and it is important to remember that in this area we are not talking about a civil war. No one is pretending that Cambodians are doing this. This is done

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by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong without the slightest pretext that Cambodians are involved.

Q Aren't these the same people we have been fighting in South Vietnam and in effect by us attacking them in Cambodia now we have simply switched the area of contact?

DR. KISSINGER: That is exactly right. These are the people who are attacking us in Vietnam and we are pursuing them into their base areas. This is not primarily a Cambodian operation.

Q Is this the reason why the pasification program and some of the other evidences of military activity in the Delta area has gone very well for us lately, because they are all in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it is hard to say what the reason is. I don't think it is correct to say, and I don't want to mislead you by saying that they are all in Cambodia. I would guess that about 15 percent of their force is pushed deep into Cambodia.

Q 5,000?

DR. KISSINGER: Let's say 5,000 to 8,000. Now, don't hold me to those figures. This is a rough estimate because they are milling around. They have pushed out the perimeter of these base areas a considerable further distance than it was before and what they have in effect done is to push the Cambodian authority out of the entire border area.

They have not yet filled the void in that border area on a contiguous basis, but they have pushed the Cambodians out. I would think that they have probably moved the main center of their activities somewhat further west than it was when they were oriented entirely against us.

But these are units which up to four weeks ago were fighting only Americans and South Vietnamese. They had nothing to do with the Cambodian situation and they have imposed an enormous military liability on us for five years, a price which we were willing to pay in order to keep Cambodia neutral.

Q Is it a fair impression that this is a "go-for-broke" effort on our part?

DR. KISSINGER: That is an unfair impression. It is not a "go-for-broke" effort. It is an effort to make our program succeed. We are not going for broke.

Q It is not a swift surgical type of operation, is it? We are in Cambodia now to stay?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to debate with you about what a surgical operation is.

Q In and out.

DR. KISSINGER: It is an in-and-out operation in the sense that it is certain that three months from now we will not be in Cambodia in these areas and we have no intention of occupying any Cambodian territory. We will not stay in Cambodia. We will not fight a war in Cambodia, about Cambodia.

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This is a war that is being fought against the North Vietnamese who are stationed in Cambodia and who are harrassing Cambodia but above all are undermining the security of our forces in Vietnam.

Q Are we, Dr. Kissinger, going to pursue the enemy through Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: Not as part of this operation.

Q Has the Presidential decision been made that we are not going to pursue them?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I think your first description is a better one. I don't like the word "surgical" but it is an operation in which we will go into Cambodia to defeat North Vietnamese occupiers of Cambodian territory who are fighting our forces in South Vietnam. When we have achieved our objective which will be in a finite time, we will withdraw from these areas. We are not in Cambodia to stay. It is totally incorrect to assume we are in Cambodia to stay.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you probably are aware that there is a popular theory in town that what the President has done is give the green light to this operation to the military as a kind of bone for overriding the advice of some of his military advisors not to continue with the withdrawal of troops for an indefinite period. Is there any truth to that at all?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no truth in that whatsoever.

Q What do you mean when you say that our further actions will depend on the reactions of the other side to this if we are not going to do anything else other than get in there and pick up their arms and destroy their installations and get out?

DR. KISSINGER: The question was, do we have any intention of going into other base areas and the answer to that is what we do in other base areas will depend to an extent on what the enemy actions will be. The other base areas are not of the same significance as the ones that have been entered.

Q But you are not ruling out trying this operation again if they build up another base area like this somewhere else?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not ruling it out, but we are not committed to it.

Q You are not ruling out further operations in Cambodia apart from those areas affected tonight?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not ruling it out, but we are not committed to it. We want to make clear that when I say "other operations in Cambodia" I am talking about North Vietnamese occupied territory that is threatening the security of our forces in South Vietnam. I am not talking about landing paratroopers in Phnom Penh, for example.

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MR. ZIEGLER: Isn't it correct that they should not refer to this 609 in projections ahead?

Q That is the reason I asked the question.

DR. KISSINGER: I would not give numbers. These numbers are our own internal numbers.

Q Henry, throughout the President's speech he uses verbs like "humiliate" and "defeat" quite often.

Could you point us to Communist documents, strategy, exercises, et cetera, that indicate that this is the intention of the North Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: I can only point you to their behavior in the negotiations that they have conducted with us. They have demanded from us that we must unconditionally withdraw our forces in a six-months period; that we must over-throw the existing Saigon Government before -- I am using their terminology -- before negotiations can even begin, after which they still will not even say what will happen in any precise way, so I characterized the practical implications of their proposals.

I don't like to play the game of quoting. I can get you articles that are written in Hanoi which are extremely strident and which would have implications and, in fact, we had an original intention of quoting from one but then we decided that this is not really a fair way of proceeding because these are written for their own internal propaganda and I am not making much out of it.

I am simply saying that the practical consequences of their proposals, of their mode of operation in which they have now sold us the beginning of negotiations three different times, in which they try to conduct themselves vis-a-vis our public, in which the negotiations are a detective story in which they throw out vague clues and we have to guess the answer, and then periodically profound articles appear where it is suggested that we missed a hint and because of that hint negotiations are stalemated.

I would suggest that serious people trying to solve an anguishing problem would find it possible to express their proposals in concrete terms rather than an elliptical reference to passing visitors. So, we attempt to characterize the practical consequence of their actions rather than the documents which I could also produce but if I did produce them I really would not be quite fair.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 8:14 P.M. EDT)

[c]

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 8:14 P.M. EDT.

APRIL 30, 1970

THURSDAY

THE BRIEFING ROOM

MR. ZIEGLER: I think Jerry Warren may have mentioned
the ground rules. You have noted the embargo on the statement
which you have of the President's Address this evening.

The ground rules are, you can attribute what Dr.
Kissinger says to White House officials. It is not for
direct quotation.

Q Is there any reason we can't put this on the
record?

MR. ZIEGLER: Because I have just stated the ground
rules.

Q Is there any reason we can't begin transmitting
this on our wires as we leave here?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, sir, because it is embargoed
until 9:00.

Q How far is that communication headquarters
from the border of Cambodia.

DR. KISSINGER: I will repeat the questions. The
question is, how far is the communication headquarters from
the border.

Let me explain what we are talking about here.
This whole area contains major supply dumps, and the
communications network for the headquarters. The personnel
in the headquarters rotate around within the area mentioned
here, on both sides of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, and
therefore, where the personnel is at any given moment is not
easy to predict.

We are not interested in the personnel. We are
interested in the supply depots and in the communications
equipment. The whole area extends 20 miles inside Cambodia,
give or take a mile or two.

Q Has it already started, the whole operation?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

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Q Can you tell us where the area is that is referred to in connection with the American operation?

DR. KISSINGER: There are Vietnamese ground units involved also, with what you call the American operation, but the location is here in the so-called Fish Hook area.

Q Dr. Kissinger, since apparently the Cambodian government has not requested us to cross its border, under what theory are we proceeding in the present operation?

DR. KISSINGER: We are proceeding on the theory that the Commander in Chief is protecting the security of our forces. This is territory which is technically inside Cambodia, completely occupied by North Vietnamese forces, containing very little Cambodian population, if any, and it is an operation which has not been condemned, to put it mildly, by the Cambodian government.

Q Is there any relation to the Parrot's Beak operation? We can't see the map.

DR. KISSINGER: The Parrot's beak area is here, a distance of some 35 miles from Saigon. The Fish Hook area is here, northwest of Saigon, a distance of about five miles.

Q It is not just in the Parrot's Beak area?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the predominantly South Vietnamese operation is in the Parrot's Beak area, and the combined operation is in the so-called Fish Hook area.

Q How many Americans are involved?

DR. KISSINGER: Because the operation has just started, we would prefer not to give the actual figures tonight, but there are several thousand.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are there ground troops involved, American ground troops?

DR. KISSINGER: American ground troops are involved.

Q Is this COSVN Number 1 and Number 2?

DR. KISSINGER: I won't identify any units tonight. The Defense Department no doubt will give you a full briefing on the American units tomorrow. It is an area that has often been described as COSVN 1 and 2.

Q This is dominantly South Vietnamese or dominantly American?

DR. KISSINGER: If you take the operation all along the frontier, it is probably slightly more South Vietnamese, but I don't have the exact breakdown.

Q Are Australian forces involved?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no Australian forces involved.

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Q Is this an American invasion of Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether this is an American invasion of Cambodia. Let me repeat again what I have said before, which is important to keep in mind.

There are 40,000 North Vietnamese and Communist troops in Cambodia. These troops are expanding these base areas and trying to fit them together in one contiguous area. They are pushing out from these areas towards Phnom Penh, with some of their advance elements.

There is not the slightest pretense in these operations that this is a civil war or any pretense at this stage that there are Cambodians involved. Therefore, when we are talking about invasion, if we want to be clear who has invaded whom, we have to talk about a North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

The American operation is directed against the base areas, from which military activities are being conducted into South Vietnam. The American forces will be in there only so long as it is necessary to destroy the supplies that are in these areas.

They will be withdrawn after this operation is completed, and we do not expect the length of this operation to be much more than six weeks to two months. We don't want to tie ourselves to a specific date, but we are talking about a brief operation. We are talking about entirely North Vietnamese territory.

Q What is to prevent the Communists from coming back and rebuilding these bases?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the question is what is to prevent the Communists from coming back and rebuilding these bases?

Well, theoretically, a number of things could prevent the Communists from coming back and rebuilding these bases. But in any event, with the beginning of the rainy season, it will be difficult for the Communists to restore their supplies across the Ho Chi Minh Trail, to even begin supplying it for several months, and it will take them several months more to build up the supplies to their present level.

During this period, we hope that Hanoi will realize that the time for serious negotiation has finally come, and that the expectation of wearing us down and of establishing a casualty level beyond which we will not endure, will prove to be in vain.

Q Will American ground troops be used as long as necessary to protect the Phnom Penh and Lon Nol government?

DR. KISSINGER: The purpose of this operation is to protect American forces in South Vietnam, and to protect the Vietnamization program and our American

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objectives in Vietnam. This is not a war in Cambodia or primarily about Cambodia as far as we are concerned.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the name of the province in Cambodia in which the COSVN headquarters is located, the attacking center?

DR. KISSINGER: I frankly don't know the name of the province in Cambodia. The South Vietnamese province to which it extends is Tay Ninh Province. But the distance of this base area from the frontier is roughly 20 miles.

Q When did the attack begin?

DR. KISSINGER: About seven o'clock this evening.

Q Why was it necessary for American troops to go in there? Why could not the South Vietnamese do it?

DR. KISSINGER: Because the South Vietnamese are engaged in an operation in the Parrot's Beak area, and because it was judged for military reasons that this was the best way of doing it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are the withdrawals continuing from South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The troop withdrawal program announced by the President is unaffected by the decision.

Q Can you give the percentage of American troops as against the South Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: The total operation, you mean?

Q I am speaking of the combined operation.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I can't do that without giving you the total figures which I would prefer - not to give tonight. In the Fishhook operation, there are more Americans than Vietnamese forces.

Q Are they under our command?

DR. KISSINGER: They are under our command, yes.

Q How many Americans in the Parrot's Beak operation?

DR. KISSINGER: You are not going to get me in a numbers game again, gentlemen. In the Parrot's Beak operation, there were -- don't hold me to the precise figure -- but I would guess 100 or less.

Q Are there any other nation's troops, any Korean troops?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no Korean troops and no third-country troops.

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Dr. Kissinger, I didn't understand your answer to a recent question about the troop withdrawals. Are there now troop withdrawals?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have the precise schedule of troop withdrawals before me this evening. I said in my BACKGROUNDER in San Clemente that there would be significant troop withdrawals this year from South Vietnam, and I have said that our troop withdrawal program has not been affected by the current operation. So there is nothing new with respect to troop withdrawals to announce to this group tonight.

Dr. Kissinger, could you give us the Administration's expectations of the options or reaction open to North Vietnamese, to the Chinese and to the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: Stated as a theoretical question, of course, you would have to run the gamut from strong to conciliatory reaction. It is theoretically possible that the North Vietnamese will escalate the fighting for a limited period of time. However, any supplies that they will use up in this reaction will not be available for other purposes that they had planned for the rest of the summer, and our judgment is that this operation over a period of months will save rather than cost lives, and reduce the North Vietnamese military capability rather than enhance it, because, otherwise, we obviously would not have conducted the operation.

Within Cambodia, Murrey, if one looks at it abstractly, the possibilities range from increasing their activities, depending on your judgment on whether their actions are caused by provocations or . their own rationale. If they have their own rationale, as we think is probable, then the destruction of a substantial portion of their supplies and the worry about the security of the other base areas may reduce their willingness to launch themselves deep into Cambodia.

But primarily, what is open to Hanoi and what we have made clear to Hanoi, and what we repeat is open to Hanoi is that the time for serious negotiation is still here. We are not increasing our demands. We are not attempting to humiliate them, but we are trying to make clear that this process in which the opening of negotiations is endlessly sealed with veiled hints of possibilities that may be possible if we paid something in advance, that this period should now be concluded and be replaced by the beginning of serious negotiations.

Whatever the invective might be immediately, we think on sober reflection they will realize that an honorable peace is available to them.

Now with respect to the Soviet Union, we would think that the Soviet Union should very carefully and will undoubtedly weigh carefully its overall relationship with the United States, as against whatever propaganda advantage might be gained over what is a

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technical incursion, and that it will decide that the
offer we have extended to it of an era of negotiation
outweighs other factors.

Q If the Congress attempts to block these
decisions by the President, is their feeling taken into
consideration?

DR. KISSINGER: The President is a man who
grew up in Congress and I am sure that he took the
congressional reaction into consideration.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page two, the President
talks about supplying weapons along with other countries
to Cambodia. Does this mean that we have decided to
provide a limited amount of small arms directly to the
Cambodian Government in answer to their request?

DR. KISSINGER: We have so far given our
assistance by encouraging third-country sales. We have
not yet delivered some of these weapons directly but I
cannot exclude that this may happen. But we have not
adopted a massive military aid program which would require
a continuing and large advisory presence.

Q Did the President give any consideration at
all to the National Commitments Resolution that passed
overwhelmingly last August?

DR. KISSINGER: I can only repeat what I said
before, that the President gave full consideration to
these factors. This has been a very difficult and in many
ways a very painful decision, and one that would have been
possible to avoid, and simply let things rock along.

It was his judgment that for the security of our
forces in Vietnam, for the credibility of American policy
in many parts of the world, and for the future security
of the United States, that he had no choice, and he,
therefore, made the decision.

Q In an earlier war, there was no invasion of
sanctuaries for fear of Chinese intervention. Is the
President so sure in this case that there will be no
Chinese intervention?

DR. KISSINGER: No one can tell. Do you all
understand the question? The question is that in an
earlier war there was no invasion of the sanctuaries for
fear of Chinese intervention. Is the President so sure
that there will be no intervention, or that there will be
no Chinese intervention?

If one could be sure in policy-making, it would
be an easier process. Our best judgment is that the risks
of this course, of doing this, are less than the risks of
not doing it.

It was very carefully considered and it is our
judgment that doing nothing would have been more dangerous,
would have risked more lives and, therefore, the decision
was taken.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you talk about a main force
buildup. What was their reaction to our action tonight of

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our allies in South Vietnam? Did we talk to them ahead
of time, or SEATO?

DR. KISSINGER: Our allies have been informed
and I cannot give you the full details of their
reaction, but I have no reason to believe that they
don't approve it.

Q How about the prisoner of war compounds mentioned? Are there any Americans?

DR. KISSINGER: We do not know.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President speaks of
a main force buildup in the sanctuaries. How many enemy
troops were in the sanctuary how many days ago, and how
many are there now, in your judgment?

DR. KISSINGER: We would like to reserve details
of the opposing order of battle until the military
operations are somewhat further advanced. In the Parrot's
Beak area, the estimate was of something between 5,000
and 10,000.

Q As of what time?

DR. KISSINGER: As about two weeks ago. And
this is the area from which they have been attacking this
town which I can never pronounce, Svay Rieng, or something
like that.

In this area, the number is probably larger,
but it is not at all certain that they will choose to
defend either area, but I repeat, we are not interested
in the personnel, we are interested in the supplies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President speaks here of
an age of anarchy and attacks or systematic destruction
of great universities and on great institutions.

Is he contending that these attacks on univer-
sities and other institutions are keyed in with the
Communist effort in Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: No, he does not intend to say
that there is a direct relationship between what goes
on in Southeast Asia and what goes on domestically
in many countries. But he holds the view that there is
a psychological relationship.

Q Does this invasion indicate that you are
pursuing a military victory in South Vietnam in advance
of progress at the peace table?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I have to
reject the phrase "invasion." We are not invading
Cambodia. We are moving into North Vietnamese-controlled
territory from which they have expelled Cambodian control
for many years.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, if a similar threat was along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, would we also enter Laos?

DR. KISSINGER: The threat posed by these areas, along the Cambodian frontier, is there proximity to major centers of population in South Vietnam, and to major concentrations of allied and American forces in South Vietnam, and therefore, to the security of our forces in South Vietnam.

There is no Leotian territory that poses a similar threat, and there is no base area of this nature in Laos.

Q I would like to ask two things; one is how long has that threat that you just referred to existed?

DR. KISSINGER: The base areas have existed for five years, but the present nature of the threat is different from the threat that existed previously. As long as Sihanouk was in power in Cambodia, we had to weigh the benefits in long-range historical terms of Cambodian neutrality as against any temporary military advantages, and we made no efforts during the first 15 months of this Administration to move against the sanctuary.

Secondly, prior to the middle of March, these base areas were confined in extent, and were kept on somewhat short rations by the supply of rice which the Cambodian government permitted to enter these base areas. Since then, these base areas have been pushed into Cambodia, and they are being connected with one another.

A supply route to the sea is likely to develop. This in turn will enable the Communists to push their supply depots deeper into Cambodia, and if one combines the existing supply depots with the contiguous frontier of 600 miles totally controlled by the Communists, a new situation has arisen that did not exist four weeks ago, and did not exist two weeks ago, before they started pushing deep into Cambodia.

Q Dr. Kissinger, didn't the Lon Nol government invite this invasion by stating their opposition to the Communists?

DR. KISSINGER: I find it difficult to believe that the Cambodian army has terrified the Vietnamese forces in these sanctuaries that have been fighting the American forces.

Q The speech says on Page 2 that we will provide aid, but the aid we will provide will be limited. What aid are we going to start beginning to supply?

DR. KISSINGER: It will be mostly in the nature of small arms, and perhaps such things as mortars, but no weapons that require foreign advisors or of great technical complexity.

Q When did the President make the decision to take the action that was initiated tonight, and when did he make the decision on the action that was initiated yesterday?

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DR. KISSINGER: I don't think that I want to give the dates on which the President made these decisions, but I can say that both decisions were made after the speech on April 20.

Q Did the impetus come from General Abrams and the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think that I want to provide a check list of who recommended what, except to say that the President has thought about these problems deeply, and thoughtfully, and I must say, having seen him wrestle with this, he was not pushed into it, and he did not do it in order to balance off any bureaucratic considerations.

Q Was the President held back in these decisions by the possibility that there was something to the Malik offer of negotiations? Was that a factor in the delay?

DR. KISSINGER: The question was, was the President held back by Yakov Malik's peace move.

No. Of course, if the Soviet proposal had eventuated, it might have made it unnecessary to take this decision. But what forced the Administration to address these particular contingencies was the explicit open movement of the Communist forces out of the sanctuary areas, and beyond even the vaguest definition of sanctuary areas, towards Phnom Penh.

I must repeat again, if one is talking of invasion, that is the invasion that has taken place.

Q —Dr. Kissinger, are you saying that in three to six weeks all of the American combat troops will be out of Cambodian territory? You said it would take three weeks to two months.

DR. KISSINGER: I said six weeks to two months. I expect that by that time all American forces will be out of Cambodian territory.

Q Just ten days ago the President was telling us that Vietnamization was going so well, he was withdrawing 150,000 troops. I don't understand what has happened in the meantime to cause us to take what to many people seems to be an escalating military action..

DR. KISSINGER: Again, let me point out what was said before. We are fighting now 10 to 15 miles inside Cambodia, exactly the same troops that we are normally fighting inside Vietnam. The thing that has changed is not the nature of the enemy or the character of the enemy. Therefore, it is not self-evident that this is an escalation.

Secondly, what has escalated is the movement of these Communist forces out of their sanctuary areas into Cambodia, their attempt to create a contiguous stretch of Communist controlled territory along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border in which they would then have much greater freedom of movement than they ever had in the previous period, and which in combination with other moves represented what the President judged to be an unacceptable threat to security.

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Q Wouldn't it be a military decision rather than the timing of the decision which kept Secretary Rogers from telling the Foreign Relations Committee about this part of the operation?

DR. KISSINGER: About which part of the operation?

Q Any part of the operation.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I suggest that you ask Secretary Rogers, but of course, military necessity was one of the factors. It was one of the factors and there were others.

Q The Foreign Minister of Cambodia says that their government did not give permission to yesterday's military sweep, that they object to it, and they have launched a protest to South Vietnam and to our Government. Can you explain their objection to this?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is that the Foreign Minister of Cambodia does not approve of yesterday's operation, and that he lodged a protest. There have also been other expressions from Cambodia, by other spokesmen, that indicate that anything that removes the Vietnamese from their territory is welcome. But I would think that this is an understandable position of a government that does not want to give additional pretext for Communist movements into their territory.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 8:50 P.M. EDT.)

[L]

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 11:50 A.M. EDT.

MAY 1, 1970

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As you ladies and gentlemen know, the President this morning went to the Department of Defense. He left here at 8:30 and returned at about 10:30. He reviewed the operations in South Vietnam and along the Cambodian border.

I thought it would be good this morning to have Dr. Kissinger here to take some of your questions. The ground rules with Dr. Kissinger are as before.

Q In other words, BACKGROUND, right?

Q No direct quotes?

MR. ZIEGLER: Right.

Q There were some direct quotations used out of the briefing last night, and the thing was placed on White House officials in some cases. Is there any reason why we cannot do that today?

MR. ZIEGLER: If those quotes were used in that way, Stu, obviously they were used erroneously. We will find out where those quotes were used and we will discuss it with that publication.

The ground rules are, you can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to White House officials, but there are to be no direct quotations. I think we were clear on that last night.

Q I don't mean to argue the point, but I am kind of curious. In broadcasting, we don't put things in quotes and it is hard to visualize how to handle it, and I am not sure of the reason for it. Is there a real reason why we cannot say White House officials say thus and so?

Q Especially a very precise White House official? (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: The real reason is there has to be a verb used in there, and I only use a verb every seventh sentence. (Laughter)

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MR. ZIEGLER: You can use direct quotations if he will speak in German. (Laughter)

Q I accept that.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will do it the way I stated.

DR. KISSINGER: All right, I will take a few questions.

Q What were the reports the President received on how the operation is going?

DR. KISSINGER: The operation obviously, as you recognize, is now in its very early stages. It is, up to now, proceeding according to plan. Casualties, up to now, have been very light. There have been only a few minor contacts with the enemy.

It is too early to judge what this foretells about the continuation of the operation, but up to now it is proceeding exactly as it was planned, and the casualties have been light.

Q How far have they gone into Cambodia? I think you said last night it extends about 20 miles inside Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: The details of the military operation you can get at the Pentagon. The units have penetrated some distance into Cambodian territory, in both of the base areas that are being attacked, that is to say 352 and 353, and they have reached the objectives that were set for the first day's operation.

Q Have they found the caches of supplies they were looking for?

DR. KISSINGER: We do not expect to find any caches of supplies for several days, because we are now operating all around the periphery of these base areas, and it will really not be until the military phase is well advanced that one can go systematically to look for the caches.

But to answer your question precisely, no caches were found or looked for last night. You should not expect that there would be any found for several days. This is not the objective of this phase of the operation, though it is the basic objective of the overall operation.

Q You said last night that the objective was more in the way of finding caches and communications gear than related to personnel?

Q Why is that? What is the reason for that?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, the terrain is of such a nature that we recognize that the personnel can melt into the countryside. But more importantly, the limitation on the North Vietnamese operations in the south at this moment is not personnel. They do have a manpower shortage, but they can replace the personnel.

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The limitation is the supply situation, that it
takes several months for supplies moving down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail to reach their destination. They they have to be pre-
stocked. They have to be related to the on-going operations
and it is our judgment that without a well elaborated supply
system, the Communist effort in South Vietnam cannot operate
at its peak efficiency.

I have had occasion to describe to this group
before that the method is to have these caches along the
Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontier, and as the offensive
is cranked up, they move the supplies forward of their units
and the units divulge out of the sanctuaries into their supplies.

So if we can reduce their supplies, it limits the
operations in South Vietnam, and it may also affect the
operations in Cambodia.

Q Would you describe how mobile these supply caches are and why they could not be melted into the jungle as well as the personnel?

DR. KISSINGER: These supply caches are really
cuite extensive, and could not be moved that rapidly. Of
course, they may be able to move some small arms, but the
supplies of rice, of ammunition, and of crew-served weapons,
they are unlikely to be able to move during the military
operation.

Q What reaction have you had internationally?

DR. KISSINGER: We have not had any reaction yet
from the Communist countries. The reaction from our allies
that are involved in the war has been predictably favorable.
We have not had any formal reaction from our European allies.

Q How about the Cambodian government?

DR. KISSINGER: The Cambodian situation is extremely
complex, but we have reason to believe that the Cambodian
government is not in acute distress over this decision.

Q You said last night that you started out
with several thousand American troops involved. Are
substantial numbers of troops being added today, this weekend?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into the details
of the military operation that is still in the process of
unfolding. The situation is that several thousand troops
have been introduced now; that there are others that are
in reserve that will be introduced if a strong resistance
should develop, but if it does not develop, they will, of
course, not be introduced.

So a lot depends on whether the opponent decides
to fight in this area or whether he evacuates.

Q The map you showed us last night showed a
number of red sanctuary areas besides the one called Fish Hook
and Parrot's Beak. Will we thrust into these other areas?

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DR. KISSINGER: As the President pointed out, he has authorized attacks on sanctuary areas, and what we will do depends on developments, including the reaction of the enemy.

Q Have we started to send arms to Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: We have continued the sort of program with which you are familiar. We have not started a new program.

Q I mean American arms.

DR. KISSINGER: I am not sure whether American arms have actually arrived in Cambodia, but as I indicated to you yesterday, this is a question of timing, it is not a question of policy.

Q How much of the supply along the Cambodian border goes down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and how much goes by sea?

DR. KISSINGER: On this theologians in our intelligence community have been sharply divided for a long period of time.

But at any rate, the issue has been settled in the last six months, because Sihanoukville has been closed in recent months to Communist shipping that goes to the base areas.

So in recent months, and at this moment, all of the supplies come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Q If Sihanoukville is closed, aren't there other areas they can get the supplies through in the South?

DR. KISSINGER: Our estimate is that the vast majority of the supplies at this particular moment into the base areas come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This theory is confirmed by the fact that the flow of logistics down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in recent months has been much higher than before, and disproportionate to the men coming down, so it must be replacing other lines of supply that had been open through Sihanoukville.

Q Has there been any increase in interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by air and various other means?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I would, in fact, estimate there has been a slight decline.

Q Can you estimate or tell us what has happened in the vicinity of Phnom Penh? What is the objective combat situation there, because the President spoke of encirclement last night.

DR. KISSINGER: What the Communists have done is push forces out of their sanctuaries into Cambodia. These units are not very huge military units. They are generally 300 to 500 in size, and they cut the roads that lead from Phnom Penh into the countryside. They have cut the roads in every direction except the road to the West.

Now they do not maintain these road blocks 24 hours regularly. What they are trying to do is create a general feeling of insecurity. They take a town and leave it again,

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and take another town and leave it. But we estimate that
some 5,000-plus North Vietnamese troops are operating
in this harassing fashion in an area in circumference which
varies between 15 to 20 miles up to 40 miles from Phnom Penh.

Q Dr. Kissinger, we have said in the past that we think that North Vietnam is engaged in a protracted war plan to extend this war over a long period of time and try to wait us out. In this operation we say we don't expect to kill or capture a lot of their men and that it will take number of months before they can resupply and rebuild their communications center there.

What do you say to the argument that all we are
doing is buying time, perhaps six months, and then they can
come back and create the same situation we have now?

DR. KISSINGER: If this theory is right, then it is not obvious what we would gain by facing the situation now for an indefinite period. The assumption of our strategy has always been, whether we do this or not, that at some point the cost of continuing the war is disproportionate to the objective that they may achieve in the war. Therefore, what we are doing is raising the cost to them of continuing the war; of gaining probably, if the operations are successful, more than six months, because it will take them about four months before they can re-start significant supply operations.

It will then take them another period of months
before they have restocked these areas, assuming we make
no effort to interfere with the re-stocking of these areas,
which would not be an inevitable conclusion for them to draw.
Therefore, in this period, it will be more difficult for
them to sustain protracted major operations in the South,
and therefore, it will be possible in this period to consoli-
date the pacification program.

Whether this is enough or not, only the future
will tell, but it is not insignificant.

Q This Administration developed a plan for ending the war in Vietnam, and we were told from time to time after that, that things were doing according to plan and events were happening on schedule. Was this operation a part of that plan?

DR. KISSINGER: No, because we did not plan the over-
throw of Sihanouk. Our objective has been to end the war,
not to fulfill a plan. The over-throw of Sihanouk, the
pushing into Cambodia out of the sanctuaries, the attempt
to link the sanctuaries into one continuous band of
territory and open the route to the sea, all of these are
developments which we, A, did not plan, and B, did not
foresee, which puts us into good company, because Hanoi
also did not foresee this.

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Q. Is that original plan now scrapped?

DR. KISSINGER: No. The basic principle of the original plan still continues, which is that we are ready to pursue a negotiating track, and if that is not successful, as long as it is not successful, we will pursue a Vietnamization track, and this program we are now carrying out attempts to strengthen both.

Q. Will we defend the Cambodian capital against the Communist take-over?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into such matters. We have no plans to introduce American troops into the Cambodian war, as such. Our operations are really to the Vietnamese side of the war, but we would think that what we are doing will make it more difficult for the Communist forces that occupy Cambodia to use the territories they are occupying against the Cambodians.

Q. Did the President have a chance to discuss this question with the full National Security Council before?

DR. KISSINGER: The President discussed this issue with the full National Security Council on several occasions, and he discussed it separately with each of the individual members of the National Security Council.

Whatever the outcome of this decision, it was made on the basis of the most careful and thoughtful, and as I said yesterday, prayerful consideration in which all the principal advisors were closely involved.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the President this morning, after his visit to the Pentagon, indicated that he discussed among other things, future plans. Was he discussing the future of this present operation, or was he talking about the possibility of similar operations by American troops?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously when one engages in an operation of this type which may evoke reactions, it is important to think through the contingencies that might arise. The President discussed those, as well as plans to implement the warnings he has repeatedly given and repeated yesterday.

Q. What is the ratio of American troops to South Vietnamese troops in the Fish Hook area?

DR. KISSINGER: The ratio in the Fish Hook area is there more American troops than Vietnamese troops.

Q. Can you give us any kind of a ratio, other than that?

DR. KISSINGER: Don't hold me to it precisely. My rough estimate is about two to one.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the overthrow of Sihanouk in Cambodia was advantageous or disadvantageous to the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: We were content with the previous situation. We made no attempt to change it. It had major military problems for us in the possession of the base areas. On the other hand, it had the political utility that it confined the formal war in Vietnam to the country of Vietnam, except for the Laotian operation.

We had no incentive to change it. We made no effort to change it. We were surprised by the development. One reason we showed such great restraint against the base areas was in order not to change this situation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what kind of situation in South Vietnam will our operation, if successful, leave the enemy in? Roughly, for example, how many men will they be leaving there and how short of supplies will they be and will it be possible for us to take a new military initiative against these enemy forces in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: To the extent that the enemy forces in South Vietnam are deprived of forces, it should improve the position of the South Vietnamese and American forces and thereby strengthen the Vietnamization program. It would still leave, I would guess, some 70,000 North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. But it is not, as I said, the numbers that concern us as much as their supplies.

Q How short of supplies will this 70,000 be? Can they last six months?

DR. KISSINGER: They can last. What is likely to be affected is the intensity of operations. They will probably be able to sustain guerrilla operations and an occasional high point.

It is hard to imagine that they could mount a Tet type offensive without significant re-stocked supplies. Our judgment is that what we are doing in Cambodia now, in the Communist occupied territories of Cambodia, will save American lives over a period of two to three months.

Q Did you feel that they were preparing for a Tet type offensive?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe they were preparing for a series of high points designed to push American casualties as high as possible, not of the scope of the Tet offensive, though, but even that should be reduced.

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Q Will we perhaps change our military strategy in South Vietnam now and go after these 70,000 troops that will be short of supplies?

DR. KISSINGER: Our basic strategy in Vietnam remains the same.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you and the President assume that the President can sustain the course he announced last night regardless of what Congress may do?

DR. KISSINGER: The President, luckily for him, does not ask my political advice. Therefore, I have no judgment about what impact the Congressional reaction will have. But I am certain that the President must believe that he can stay on this course or he would not have started it. I know he has every intention of staying on this course.

Q Why was Congress informed but not consulted about this move?

DR. KISSINGER: Because the President thought that in fulfillment of his obligations as Commander-in-Chief for the security of our forces and the lives of our men in Vietnam, that he had the right to move against North Vietnamese-occupied territories in Cambodia, fighting the troops that are fighting us in South Vietnam.

We are expanding the war to Cambodia. We are not fighting Cambodians. We are not involved in the Cambodian war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, as a former professor, would you have a judgment of the impact of this on the campuses?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I am glad I don't have to give a seminar at Harvard this week. (Laughter)

Q Or Yale?

DR. KISSINGER: I never go to Yale anyway. (Laughter)

Q Was the decision to use American troops in the Fish Hook operation rather than South Vietnamese purely a military decision or was it military and political?

DR. KISSINGER: A decision that involves the lives of our men like this would not be taken as a primarily political decision. That was made on the military ground that it was necessary in this area to use the fire power that only the American forces had.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said that we were surprised by Sihanouk's overthrow. Did we have no inkling of it and if we did not, does this tell us anything about our intelligence operations over there?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say two things about that. Sihanouk did not have any inkling of it and he had more riding on it than we did. Secondly, we did not have any intelligence people in Phnom Penh at the time. There had been no diplomatic relations between the United States and Cambodia for, I think, 4 or 5 years prior to last August. After that we put only a skeleton diplomatic staff in there and no ambassador, only a charge'. We had no intelligence operation at all in Phnom Penh out of respect

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respect for Sihanouk's sensibilities, and we did not know. But
in the nature of things, it was almost impossible to know that
this could take place because Sihanouk was playing a very
complicated game of posturing himself and of using his domestic
situation internationally and it got out of control.

Everyone seems to have been surprised, Hanoi, Peking,
Moscow, the Australians who are there, and we, and last but not
least, Sihanouk.

Q. You make the point a while ago, and you made it
again last night, I think, that his was not a widened war
because we were moving against North Vietnamese-held territory.

DR. KISSINGER: And Viet Cong.

Q. Yes. These areas are held by the people who are
fighting us in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Right.

Q. Extending that theory, if you take that theory,
why should we not move against sanctuaries which are in North
Vietnam itself and invade North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Because we don't make policy by logical
syllogism. We have an understanding with the North Vietnamese
that they will not cross the demilitarized zone. We did not
make this. This was part of the understanding of the bombing
halt. This is in fact the only ground sanctuary area from which
they can threaten our forces with ground forces in Vietnam. But
if they launched a significant effort against our forces in
South Vietnam from the North Vietnamese territory, in other words,
if they broke the understanding, we would have to look at that
problem.

But that does not mean we would invade it with
ground forces.

Q. But you are not suggesting by that answer that we
did not change the ground rules with this attack on the sanctu-
aries in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: We changed the ground rules that had
not been part of any previous understanding. We had not attacked
sanctuaries as long as the sanctuaries were confined in geography
as long as they were not used to turn all of Cambodia into one
large base area, and as long as the whole context of the war
remained as it was.

It was the other side that changed the general ground
rules of operation from these base areas which forced us into
this position.

Q. One thing I am still not clear on is what happened
between the President's speech in San Clemente on the withdrawal
of troops from South Vietnam and last night that caused him to
take this action?

DR. KISSINGER: What happened was that up to the time
of the speech in San Clemente the Communist forces in the
sanctuary areas had started pressing already into Cambodia, but
still within something that could tolerantly be described as

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slightly expanding the frontiers of the sanctuaries and improv-
ing their defensive position in the sanctuaries. Within several
days of the President's speech and his explicit warning, and a
warning that was conveyed also through other ways, these forces
debouched out of these sanctuaries in a totally unambiguous
manner and penetrated more deeply into Cambodia and raised the
explicit prospect that we thought we could control through the
things which the President said in his San Clemente speech.

Q This is several days after the speech, are you
saying, or before?

DR. KISSINGER: After.

Q Is this action, then, in defense of Cambodia
primarily?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q What you just said would imply that.

DR. KISSINGER: No. I said that the debouching out of
the sanctuary areas has the practical consequence of turning the
border area, instead of a series of isolated enclaves which were
dependent on the government in that area for rice supplies, into
a contiguous territory which becomes largely self-sustaining and
turns a series of enclaves into one large area;

Q Given the importance of these supplies to the
Communist effort, why are they making so little effort to defend
them?

DR. KISSINGER: Because they have a difficult problem.
First of all, it is too early to tell whether they will in fact
defend them in the area in which the attack started yesterday and
indeed it is too early to tell whether they will defend them in
the Parrot's Beak because in the Parrot's Beak the operation has
gone in behind them and, is only now pushing from the rear into
the area where we think the supplies are located.

But the military problem they face is whether they
want to throw in men after the supplies. They probably do not
have the equipment and fire power to stand up to the forces we
have put into the headquarters area and the decision they have to
make is whether exacting some casualties from us is worth
destruction of the units they would have to sacrifice to do this.
The outcome will be the same either way.

Q Are you certain you can find the supplies?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I am not going to be looking for
them, but the people who are, we have been told that it will be
a long time. These are well-camouflaged and it will be a long
and complicated operation. So, we will have to stay in the area
looking for them for several weeks. But we have had no report
that would indicate that there is any doubt about the existence
of these supplies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you give us what estimate you
have on the size of the Communist force in these sanctuaries and
where you think they will go when they pull out, whether they will

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go into Cambodia, back up in to Laos, or North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: We have had so much trouble thinking of our movements that we have not addressed the question of where they might go with the same care. The total number of enemy forces in all of the sanctuaries we estimate at between 40,000 and 50,000. They could go deeper into Cambodia, but then they would be going largely with the supplies they can carry and without equipment to sustain a prolonged operation. They could go back into Laos or they could simply go deeper into Cambodia and sit there without penetrating the heavy populated parts of Cambodia, sit there without any great offensive capability, waiting for the resupply in about eight month's time.

Any one of these three is possible and which they will choose depends, of course, on them. Of course they know that we are prepared to have a reasonable negotiation that makes no attempt to humiliate them. We think that from their point of view this would be the best course to take.

THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.

END

(AT 12:27 P.M. EDT)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(Southeast Asia)

'70 MAY 9 PM 2:46

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

10:04 A.M. EDT

MAY 9, 1970

SATURDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The groundrules for this session are the same as in the past. You can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to White House officials, no direct quotations.

Dr. Kissinger.

Q Did you watch the sun come up? (Laughter.)

MR. KISSINGER: No.

Q Ron, is there an embargo on time on what is given out here?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q What did he say?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I was in the situation room plotting the war. (Laughter.)

Mr. Ziegler says, "Put that off the record." It sounds even better in German. (Laughter.)

Q I assume that is off the record, too.

Q Are you waiting for questions, sir?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, that is what I usually do.

Q The President last night when speaking of the possibility of North Vietnamese coming across the DMZ mentioned that some people say 250,000 to 300,000. Did he actually mean to say that large a number or perhaps could it have been a slip of the tongue from 25 to 30,000?

DR. KISSINGER: I would interpret that as a figure of speech. What was intended to be conveyed is that if there is a substantial crossing over the Demilitarized Zone by North Vietnamese units and a substantial abrogation of the understanding which led to the bombing halt, we would then have to reconsider our position and we would be prepared to take the most effective steps to preserve the security of our forces.

Q Is this being conveyed to Hanoi, that he didn't really mean the figure he gave?

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DR. KISSINGER: I don't think that they will come across with 247,000 and say "We missed by 3,000." But we will leave no doubt in Hanoi's mind that a substantial violation of the DMZ would force us to reconsider our position.

Q Would you rule out the use of nuclear weapons when you use the phrase "most effective steps?"

DR. KISSINGER: Nuclear weapons will not be used in Vietnam under any circumstances.

Q What is this flotilla business? Are we involved in going up the Mekong and are we defying our own line we have set?

Q Could we have the question?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I will repeat the question.

The question is what is that flotilla business and are we involved in going up the Mekong and are we drawing a line along the Mekong?

The rules of engagement which the President has laid down remain in force for all Americans participating in operations in Cambodia. In other words, no American will go beyond 21 miles into Cambodia, although we could, if we find a substantial enemy cache, go a mile further.

But the general rule of engagement is the one laid down by the President and we will not deviate from that in any significant manner. We can't be held to a mile or two with respect to it during combat operations but this is the intention.

Therefore, the American participation in that operation which represents something like 10 percent of the total force, probably a little less than 10 percent of the total force, will not go beyond the line established by the President.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can I ask another question about last night? The President indicated that we are ahead of schedule in our Cambodian operations and therefore could start withdrawing units next week. Could you tell us what the schedule was expected to be and just specifically how we are ahead of schedule?

DR. KISSINGER: As you remember from the backgrounder I gave before the operation started, I said that we would of course prefer it if there were no resistance in any of the areas and that our primary objective was supplies and communications, not personnel.

On the other hand, prudent planning had to assume that some of the base areas might be defended and therefore in all the plans we made for each of the base areas, we allowed first for a combat phase designed to push enemy forces out of the area and then, secondly, for a phase of destroying the supplies.

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As you gentlemen know, and ladies, there hasn't really been a distinguishable combat phase in any of these base areas because there hasn't been any systematic attempt to defend any of these areas.

I might say, incidentally, that this is just about the best thing from our point of view, because if there had been substantial resistance there would also have been much larger American casualties. And I will repeat, as far as we are concerned the personnel is easier for them to replace by far than the really very large amounts of equipment that we have captured.

When I saw you, I set the outside deadline at about eight weeks. We have maintained this simply to have a safety valve for unexpected contingencies. But within this eight-week limit that I gave you at the first backgrounder, the proportion of early withdrawals has shifted.

But what the President meant to convey is that as these base areas, as specific base areas are cleaned out, we will stop operations in these base areas, withdraw our troops from these particular base areas, and we will do that progressively in each base area as we remove the supplies from these base areas.

We will probably announce next week the end of at least some of the smaller or one of the smaller base areas. We will announce the end of operations in each base area as it is completed.

Q Does that rule out, Dr. Kissinger, the introduction of more American troops simultaneous with withdrawal of any of these units in other base areas?

DR. KISSINGER: It does not rule out the attempt to clean out other base areas, but the major base areas have all been penetrated now and there may be smaller base areas left. Those, however, would not require very extensive operations. We will easily meet the deadline that we have indicated and starting next week we will be on a declining curve.

But as long as we are in these base areas, it would be absurd to impose interim deadlines on ourselves partly because we have discovered in at least two of the base areas such large quantities of equipment that we are really going to have a massive problem just getting it out of there. Right now we don't have any idea where to put it. So we are going to have a logistics problem just moving it out.

We had a cable yesterday in which one of our commanders said cataloging this with one company is like using one company to go through the Long Binh complex. I don't know whether you gentlemen know the Long Binh complex. It is a supply area. You know what this refers to maybe. Our big holdup right now is not combat operations but, in some of the base areas, to get the equipment out.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, when the President says that all U. S. forces will be out by June 30, including advisors, does he mean that there will be no further use of American air cover, American advisors, American naval or other ground personnel in any future operations in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: In this phase, what you have described is correct. What would happen in terms of the use of air power alone, not connected with ground operations, if there were a substantial buildup that threatened our forces, we would have to reserve on. But there is no intention to conduct any ground operations into Cambodia supported by American forces after the deadline that we have given.

Q What I am asking to clarify that, is, is the President foreclosing the use of American advisors or any other American personnel on the ground with future South Vietnamese actions?

DR. KISSINGER: That would be my interpretation of what he said, yes.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you clarify whether there have been any modifications in the Nixon Doctrine? The President mentioned it last night in connection with the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos. At another point he talked about America being finished as the peace keeper in Asia if certain things came about. To what extent does the Doctrine still pertain?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether there have been any modifications in the Nixon Doctrine based on the press conference.

One of the interesting experiences I have had in my job is to have people quote the Nixon Doctrine to Nixon as an inhibition on his actions. But let me explain what he had in mind. First of all, what the Nixon Doctrine says and how we interpret it.

First, the Nixon Doctrine has stressed that there should be a maximum degree of self-defense by the threatened countries; secondly, that if the countries themselves could not defend themselves there should be, to the greatest degree possible, regional cooperation; that the United States would help only where its participation would make a difference and where there has been a substantial local effort to bring about defense.

Obviously there can be countries where the disparity and strength between it and other countries is so great that by no conceivable effort could they defend themselves against their neighbor.

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To give an example, if Laos were to be attacked
by Communist China, one couldn't say that this has to be
done entirely by local resources. I am not saying
necessarily what we would do in these circumstances. I am
just giving you a case where if there is an enormous
disparity of strength, one can push it to the extreme, but
to the greatest degree possible our intent is to be in
a position where what we do makes the difference rather
than where we take over the principal line of defense,
where everything depends on American programs and American
conceptions. There obviously has to be an interim period.

Southeast Asia is an unusual case in the sense
that we have 400,000 plus troops there. What the President
meant to say yesterday is that within the framework of
the Nixon Doctrine, that is to say that within the framework
where the United States would act as the reserve force
in those areas where we think our national interest is
involved, our credibility will disappear if we do not act
when we have indicated that we should have.

But the principal defense of the countries of
Southeast Asia should be organized first by the countries
themselves, and then by a regional grouping. And we, however,
have to understand that there may be a transitional period
in which it is difficult to draw absolute lines from one
phase to another.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in connection with Cambodia,
while we have been focussing on the sanctuary problem, other
things have been taking place in the country. There have
been reports, particularly several days ago, of deteriorating
conditions around Phnom Penh. Two questions related to that:
First of all, if the conditions continue to deteriorate
are we prepared to see the Phnom Penh taken over by the
communists or the fall of the Lon Nol Government without
taking some kind of action on our own? A second related
question: It was reported by these Congressmen that the
President told them -- and there is some confusion about
this -- that Lon Nol either asked for 400,000 troops or
arms for 400,000 troops and we rejected that. Then they
asked for 200,000. What is the fact of the matter here?

DR. KISSINGER: They got the sequence wrong.
Lon Nol asked for 200,000 and we asked him to reconsider.

Q Troops or arms?

DR. KISSINGER: Arms for 200,000 troops. We asked him to reconsider it, which he did. Then he asked for 400,000. (Laughter) So this was the problem.

Q Was there any indication where he is going
to get these troops? How many troops does he have, about
60,000, or something like that?

DR. KISSINGER: He has bold thinking. (Laughter)

At any rate, this was the aid request before us.
Our judgment was that leaving aside the merit of the figures,
nothing we could possibly do along this line could make
any difference in the time scale relevant to the immediate
threat.

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Secondly, as the President pointed out in his speech, our objective in whatever we do in Cambodia is the security of our forces in Vietnam and we do not want to be drawn into a war in Cambodia.

You must recognize that this is a delicate period for me to give a precise list of contingencies, but our objective with respect to Cambodia will be to prevent, insofar as we can, the use of Cambodia to add to the threat to our forces in Vietnam and to rely, insofar as possible, on Asian cooperation and local conditions, together with some degree of American help, to preserve the situation in Cambodia. We will not use American ground forces in Cambodia.

Q Dr. Kissinger, given the nature of the terrain in Cambodia and given the further fact that the President said or criticized past practices of step-by-step invovlement and talked about making decisive moves, how can you set either a time limit on withdrawals or a distance for penetration unless you are being either arbitrary or political about it or both?

DR. KISSINGER: Can I choose one or two?

Q You can choose any part of it.

DR. KISSINGER: From what I have seen of the student groups with which I have been meeting this year -- this week; it seems like a year -- did I depart from the script?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think that the difference between 20 or 40 miles makes any difference to them, so that the political advantage to us of establishing that line is not self-evident.

Q Political refers to the withdrawal.

DR. KISSINGER: If you will remember the backgrounder I gave the evening the operation started, you will remember that I then said, before there was any political outcry, that we would withdraw within six to eight weeks. This was said before the operation ever started. It was never intended to last longer than six to eight weeks. And we have not changed our schedule in the slightest except insofar as this was made possible by the absence of resistance.

We have not changed the schedule for the phase of removing the supplies. In fact, we have run into so many supplies that we have the difficulty I have mentioned.

Why did we establish 20 miles? Our intelligence indicated that all the base camps were located within 20 miles of the border and we had made a rather careful study going back over a period of years, not with the intention of occupying the base camps, but simply in order to know where the base camps were located. It has proved to be the case that in the areas which we have penetrated that all of the caches seem to be located in this general area.

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So that the limit was established by a prior
intelligence assessment of the depth of these base areas and
could just as well have been 30 miles if our assessment
had been that the base areas extended back that far. The
limit was established in the directive that authorized the
operation three days before any operation ever started
and had nothing to do with any political considerations.
It had only to do with our judgment of the depth and the
extent of the base areas with our determination to do no
more than clean out the base areas.

Q You said there would be no ground forces
used in Cambodia. Does that mean also we will have
no American military advisors in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: Except for the attaches which
are normally assigned to the embassy, there will be no
American advisors with Cambodian units.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you please run down
briefly what you consider to be the enemy capabilities for
reaction in the current scene, time frame, between now and
say the beginning of the monsoons, toward what we are now
doing in Cambodia; in other words, to determine the level
of risk in terms of enemy capabilities?

DR. KISSINGER: In order to answer that question
you have to make two determinations: One is, are the
enemy actions in Cambodia a response to ours? Secondly,
what is the enemy capability to act?

With respect to the first question, obviously
in making our decision we had to consider whether by going
into the base areas we were making it more likely for the
North Vietnamese to operate deep into Cambodia; whether,
in short, we were provoking them into deeper penetrations
of Cambodia. We did not make the decision to go into the
base areas until we were persuaded on the basis of
intelligence reports and our analysis of the situation that
they had made the decision to go deeper into Cambodia
to set up a contiguous territory in which they could
establish the National Liberation Front; in other words,
that they were acting for purposes that were relatively
independent of our action.

We have rather conclusive evidence that this
decision -- in fact we had overwhelming evidence -- had
been taken. If you look at the fact that they had moved
towards establishing a provisional government before
we moved, and if you consider that it is inconceivable
that they would establish that unless they were imagining
getting some contiguous territory with some provincial
capital from which it could operate, I think their
public actions support what we have really overwhelming
independent evidence for.

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Now the second question is what is their capability to sustain these operations? Their capability, vis-a-vis the Cambodian Army, does not have to be very large for them to be effective. It is not necessarily profoundly affected by the monsoon season. So it is not inconceivable that even during the monsoon season they can create a fair amount of dislocation.

On the other hand, I think Ron is going to distribute some of our latest figures of the amount of weapons we had captured as of last night. While I won't read the figures, I think we have already captured more ammunition than the other side, and we have literally not even begun to count the total amount, but what we have inventoried up to now represents more ammunition than the other side expended in all of South Vietnam in the first four months of this year. They expended about 330 tons in the first four months of this year and we have already captured about 400 tons. So there is no question that for major operations during the monsoon season, their capability has been significantly degraded.

The question to ask is, how much of a capability do you need to fight the Cambodian Army? That is, of course, if the Cambodian Army is capable of putting up any sort of resistance. Then, I would think their capability will not be very great. We have had reports, for example, even prior to these latest hauls, that whenever there has been an extended fight, extended being defined as something more than four hours, between the Cambodians and the North Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese have had to break it off because they ran out of ammunition. But we have no conclusive evidence as to that. The North Vietnamese capability in Cambodia depends more on the resistance of the Cambodians than on their own strength.

Q Henry, that figure of 330 tons, that is all the ammunition that all the enemy forces have used in South Vietnam in the first four months?

DR. KISSINGER: That is the estimate that I got from the Pentagon.

Q How does that compare with the tonnage we have used in that same period of time?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have that figure, but I am sure it is much less.

Q But on what order of magnitude?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't even want to guess at that. I just don't have that figure, but I am sure it is much less.

Q Is that a surprisingly small figure?

DR. KISSINGER: Stuart, I quite honestly have no idea what tonnages of ammunition means. You see, they use mostly small arms and mortars. Therefore, they can expend more rounds to get tons. But I don't want to get into a logistics game because I have given you what I know. Any other speculation you would really have to get from the Pentagon.

Dan?

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Q Dr. Kissinger, do I understand you correctly that you are saying that you found what you expected to find in that Fishhook area? Your briefing and the President's remarks indicated you were looking for COSVN headquarters, not people.

Are you contending you found that?

DR. KISSINGER: We said that the Fishhook area is the area in which COSVN headquarters had been operating. I believe I said -- I didn't check my backgrounder -- that at what specific point COSVN is operating at any one moment of time within that area or close to that area is difficult to predict.

We did want to get their supplies and to disrupt their communications. We have evidence that we have done the latter simply from monitoring their communications, and we have found actually more supplies -- well, it is hard to know what we expected to find there since we obviously had no precise inventory.

We expected to find a major supply area in the Fishhook area. We have found a very major supply area in the Fishhook area.

I would say that if the operation there stopped tomorrow, which it will not, it would already be a very great success from this military point of view.

For example, when this operation started one of the local newspapers, which was not fully in accord with what we did, wrote an editorial in which it pointed out that even the most successful operations previously, like Cedar Falls, only gained us four to six months time. I frankly had not heard of Cedar Falls at that point.

So we did some research as to the comparison between Cedar Falls which lasted 19 days and the Cambodian operation which has up to now only lasted nine days.

We have already captured 9 times as many individual weapons, 32 times as many crew-served weapons, 31 times as much ammunition, 5 times as many prisoners; just to give you an idea of the magnitude of the operation and of comparing Cedar Falls to this.

Again, let me not mislead you. We are not saying that this enables us to win the war. The purpose of this is not to impose our terms on Hanoi. We reaffirm the very sweeping and generous terms of the President, of his April 20 speech and the April 30 speech. We are not attempting to humiliate Hanoi. We are not attempting to break its back.

We are trying to bring home to Hanoi that the cause of negotiation, an honorable peace, is better than an endless continuation of the war. And it is our judgment that we have already gained enough time for them to ask themselves seriously that question.

We of course cannot determine what answer they will give. But in military terms, even up to today, we have found very substantial supplies in the Fishhook area and in one

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other base area and we have not even begun to look into
some of those which we have just entered.

Q On the diplomatic side, Dr. Kissinger, could
you make a broader appraisal in terms of what the total
world diplomatic posture is in terms of the consequences of the
Cambodian operation?

What effects do you see it had, plus or minus, on
overall U.S. foreign policy interests?

Q Could you repeat the question?

DR. KISSINGER: The question was whether I could make
an assessment of the overall diplomatic impact of plus and minus
of the Cambodian operation.

Of course, when you engage in an operation of this
kind, you pay some price. And the balance that we have to
determine is the advantages against the disadvantages.

We have paid some price in the sense that some countries
worry that we are again on an endless escalation ladder and
that those who have worried that Vietnam and Southeast Asia
might deflect our energies from their concerns have been given
new fuel.

There are some who argue that it has affected our
relationships with other Communist countries.--I am just giving you
the negatives -- and that it may have hampered the possibilities
of negotiations.

On the other side one would have to say that many
of the fears that have been expressed will be reduced and most
of them will be eliminated by the success of the operation
and by the demonstration that we meant what we said when
we announced it is limited in scope and finite in its objective.

With respect to relations with the major Communist
countries, we of course received a protest from the Soviet Union.
It is clear that the Soviet Union did not, shall we say,
approve our action. But in the larger context, I think this
action may serve to bring home to both countries that to let
matters lie in critical areas around the world may produce crises
that neither of them intended and therefore underline the necessity
of more fundamental negotiations to prevent this sort of
situation from developing.

After all, everybody knows or should know that we did
not set in motion the chain of events that began with Sihanouk's
overthrow. Indeed we did not, and I must say neither did
the Soviet Union. And I mention it only to underline that events
can happen if things are not brought under control that
neither side will be able to control once they have reached a
certain point.

So actually we believe that when this immediate period
of tension is transcended, as we are certain it will be, that if
both sides draw the correct lessons from the experience, that
the prospects for negotiations may even be enhanced on a deeper
level, not necessarily on Cambodia.

Now, with respect to Hanoi, I know that there is a

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school of thought that maintains that you cannot use pressure to negotiate with Hanoi. But I think if you look at the experience of the last 18 months, and this may be true, it may be that the qualities that make the North Vietnamese such courageous fighters make it impossible for them to negotiate.

But it is also the experience of the last 18 months that ought to make it clear that deescalation does not necessarily produce a willingness to negotiate.

When you, Murrey, met with Le Duc Tho last July, we were reducing forces, deescalating military operations, had just offered sweeping peace proposals, had just agreed to let the NLF participate in the political process, and nevertheless I think you will admit his behaviour towards you was, if not insolent, at least intransigent.

What we are attempting to do with this operation is not to defeat Hanoi, but to try to get Hanoi over the threshold that it has never crossed, which is that we are prepared to make an honorable peace, that we are prepared to give them a shot at the political process, but we are not prepared as an entrance prize into negotiation to guarantee them political and military control because then we are not talking about a negotiation.

Once they have crossed that threshold as we have repeatedly said, we will be flexible and generous.

Is Hanoi going to be prepared to make that decision? I recognize it is a tough decision for people who have fought for 30 years to settle for something that is not guaranteed. So I am not even saying this very critically.

Is Hanoi prepared to make the decision? I don't know. If it is not prepared to make that decision, if we have to continue to go the Vietnamization route, then I would think what we have done in Cambodia is going to gain us enough time to reinsure the Vietnamization process.

This vast amount of supplies that we have pulled out of this base area must make some difference. It just cannot be that the North Vietnamese are the first people in history that are immune to any sort of material consideration.

Then, if we gain these seven to eight months, this at least gives us that much leeway within Vietnam and hopefully those two factors can reinforce themselves to produce a serious negotiation.

I am not predicting a serious negotiation. But I would think that once this immediate crisis is over, unless domestic dissent in this country reaches a point where Hanoi believes that no matter what the local situation it need simply await the collapse of our domestic position ---

Q Dr. Kissinger, just to elaborate on that last point, if you were in Hanoi or Moscow, how would you assess in the light of this experience the capability of the President of the United States to take firm unilateral measures to try to bring about the desired negotiation in this situation?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem is not how many firm

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unilateral decisions the President of the United States will
take because what we have to do is to develop a policy over
a longer period. We are not going to undertake Cambodian type
operations every six weeks.

The lesson that Cambodia may teach Hanoi is that if
pushed beyond a certain point, we may do things that were
not necessarily foreseeable in terms of their previous
calculations and therefore may produce unpredictable risks
for them.

Now in terms of maintaining domestic support over
the longer period, of course, for somebody like myself coming from
academic life, this is personally an extremely anguishing
problem. These are my students. I have been teaching them,
These are my colleagues. So it cannot be an easy problem.

So this is not a very joyful occasion from that
point of view. Yet we believe that what we are doing is the
best protection of the very people who are rioting against
us, even though they will not thank us for it now.

We believe that what we are doing is the best means
of speeding up the end of the war. We are determined to hold
this course. How Hanoi will assess it I don't know.

We recognize the anguish and concern of the people who
are protesting and we hope that they will recognize at some
point that no group in this country--certainly those who are
in responsibility must be included-- has a monopoly of anguish
on this conflict.

We have had to make the decision and believe it will
help the war more quickly end to go this way. How Hanoi will
assess it; we believe that the majority of the people are with
us, but we are not eager for a confrontation. In a confrontation
there aren't going to be any victors, there are only going
to be victims.

Q In any of the many discussions or meetings that
were held before this decision to go into Cambodia was made
was there ever in your opinion a thorough
examination of the student problem in which the military and
civilian officials of this government participated?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say a word about these
discussions that I have seen so fully covered in the press. You
didn't ask me this, but let me make one point anyway. For
example, there has been a story that we didn't get an
intelligence estimate about likely consequences.

It is a relief at least to have the criticism shift
from excessive pedantry to excessive rashness,
but there was an intelligence estimate.

Actually, as it turns out, it was correct, which is
more amazing. What the intelligence estimate predicted
the reaction of the major countries to be, turned out to be the
reaction of the major countries.

I have that intelligence estimate.

Was the student problem considered, as such? I will

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have to deal with that on two levels.

In terms of policy decisions, it is very difficult to deal, to factor in the student problem as one of the considerations. So if you ask me when we went into Cambodia were we conscious of the fact that there would be very strong, perhaps even violent, opposition on the campuses, I would have to say yes, we were conscious of it and the President decided that painful as this was for him he would have to pay the price.

He believed and we all believe that it is in the interest of the people who are doing the protesting, even though they are not necessarily recognizing this now.

Secondly, speaking of my own personal experience, I can think of no other single problem, strange as this may be, with which the President has spoken so much to me about and to others. But as to the student problem in its deeper sense -- because I would have to say that of course the students are profoundly upset by Vietnam and by some of the other problems -- I think it would be a great mistake if we believed that the unrest on the campuses today is exclusively, or maybe even primarily, caused by Vietnam.

The unrest on the campuses has very deep, and if I can use a big word, maybe even metaphysical causes in that it is the result of the seeming purposelessness of the modern bureaucratic state, of the sense of impotence that is produced in the individual in relation to decisions that far transcend him and that he does not know how to influence,-- the result of 30 years of debunking by my colleagues and myself in which now the academic community has managed to take the clock apart and doesn't know how to put it together again.

So I think all of these causes are going to be with us a long time. I don't think that we are helping the problem by encouraging the belief that emotional spasms are the way to make profound historical choices much as we sympathize. And we have shown our sympathy, most of us in this building, by spending more time with students this week than we have on our primary jobs.

So it was considered, but we believe it is a deep and long-term problem.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have had some time now since Jacob A. Malik on April 16 suggested that Russia was interested in conferences to end this war and called him down a few days later.

Can you give us your impression of the motives behind it and whether it was cleared with Hanoi and then what happened?

Q Question, please?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether it is my judgment that the Malik overture a few weeks ago was previously cleared with Hanoi and what the motives behind it may have been.

First, I continue to believe that a Soviet

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Deputy Foreign Minister is unlikely to make unauthorized off-the-cuff statements. That would be a novel experience in the Soviet history. And if it were true, it would give strength to the convergence theory that they are becoming more like us.

At any rate, our judgment was that it had to represent a significant policy strand in the Soviet Union and therefore had to be authorized, and in a limited sense it represented a shift in the Soviet position in the sense that they had maintained previously that an international conference was not competent to deal with the problems of Indochina.

Was it previously cleared with Hanoi? Again, it is inconceivable that with Le Duan on the way to Moscow and with Le Duc Tho in Moscow that such a statement could have been made in opposition to Hanoi.

I don't know whether this is true, but it would be a very unlikely event. All the Communist countries have to dance a very complicated minuet because they are positioning themselves not only in relationship to us but also in relationship to each other.

And therefore when Communist China indicated strong opposition to the idea of a conference, this had to affect the attitudes of the other participants. And therefore the Soviet Union pulled back from the proposal.

But let us be clear what they pulled back from. They did not pull back from the idea of a conference at some point. What they pulled back from was the idea of a conference now, which they hadn't really said they were supporting.

So the prospect of an international conference on Indochina as a possible means of settling the conflict was kept alive. The timing seemed to be put in the more distant future.

That is really all that is necessary at this particular point. It is not inconceivable that somewhere in the medium term future either Hanoi or Moscow would come back to this proposal which was surfaced and never really withdrawn as a basic idea and of course you know that in our April 20 speech we maintained our readiness to consider such a course.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Doctor.

END

(AT 10:58 A.M. EDT)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 9:30 A.M. EDT.

MAY 16, 1970

SATURDAY

KEY BISCAYNE, FLORIDA

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger is here to take your questions regarding Southeast Asia. The ground rules are as always, attributable to White House officials, no direct quotations.

Let me repeat those ground rules: White House officials, no direct quotations.

DR. KISSINGER: Does anyone have a question for my answers? (Laughter)

Q Dr. Kissinger, we have been familiar, because of the President's speech to the Nation, and the press conference that he held, and the two backgrounder sessions that were held by a White House official who you know ---

DR. KISSINGER: You are going to get the verbs today. (Laughter)

Q As the reasons for the Cambodian operation, it has been presented to us steadfastly as a matter involving the protection of the security of American forces in South Vietnam.

Now Secretary of Defense Laird has held a meeting with reporters in Washington in which he says that the threat from Communist forces in these sanctuaries to our forces in South Vietnam was receding, the threat was reduced for U. S. troops entering Cambodia because the enemy was looking the other way towards its operations in Cambodia.

We found, he said, that Vietnamese Communist forces were facing in the opposite direction from South Vietnam and moving away.

Now this is diametrically opposed to everything the Administration has said publicly and privately thus far. I would ask you, who has been lying to us and through us to the American people?

DR. KISSINGER: I like the constructive spirit in which the question has been put.

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No one has been lying to you. The explanation that we have given to you on this subject has been perfectly consistent. We made the point in the two backgrounders and the President said in his address that the Communist forces were moving out of their base areas into Cambodia.

In order to accomplish this objective, it was physically inevitable that they would face away from Vietnam and into Cambodia. There was no other way they could go into Cambodia except by facing into Cambodia. Our concern was that if they succeeded in creating a contiguous belt of territory which would then be supplied from the seas, coupled with the base areas that had already been established, that this would create an intolerable situation in South Vietnam, not that month, but in the months to follow.

The location of the caches that we have found makes it perfectly obvious that the North Vietnamese effort in Cambodia was basically directed towards South Vietnam, and whether in any tactical period they would face one way or the other was not the decisive consideration.

The decisive consideration was, as the President pointed out and as I repeated, that the North Vietnamese forces were pushing into Cambodia for the purpose of establishing a contiguous belt of territory or maybe taking over the whole country, and that after that had been accomplished, if the caches had remained in the area where they were, that the situation would become intolerable.

Nobody was lying. The Secretary and the President emphasized two different aspects of the same problem.

Q Henry, can I ask you about another facet of this operation? The South Vietnamese, according to Mr. Ziegler and other spokesmen, are acting without U. S. control; that is, we are not exercising control over what they do.

DR. KISSINGER: The South Vietnamese forces?

Q Yes. What is to prevent them from continuing their operations, and in effect annexing the country of Cambodia as another province and bogging down to the point where our withdrawal of American troops is threatened?

DR. KISSINGER: We have established the schedule of our withdrawal both from Cambodia and from South Vietnam. We intend to keep both of those schedules and we will not permit ourselves to be diverted from either of these schedules.

With respect to South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, our concern has been with the independence and neutrality of Cambodia. We do not want Cambodia to become an extension of North Vietnamese power, but we also have no interest in having Cambodia become a province of South Vietnam, nor do we have any reason to suppose that this will take place.

We are in consultation with the government of South Vietnam. We have every reason to believe that the sanctuary operations will be completed by South Vietnamese troops on approximately the same schedule as ours, and that what the

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South Vietnamese troops will do in Cambodia after that will depend on penetrations of the North Vietnamese, but will not have an autonomous character.

Q Do we have any assurance to that affect by the Saigon government, or is that just a hope on our part?

DR. KISSINGER: We have reason to believe that this will be the case.

Q Are you saying that they are going to pull out when we pull out -- that is what you have reason to believe?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe that the sanctuary operations will be completed around July 1. Now it may be that if there are any supplies left that are required to be removed and have not been able to be removed on schedule, that this may slip by a few days, but in effect, what I am saying is what you have suggested.

Q Dr. Kissinger, another high level Administration source is reported to have said that although our original explanation of the target in Cambodia was described as COSVN, a sophisticated and rather extensive installation, that our forces in fact went around it on either side and missed it. Does this jell with the intelligence you have around the town of Memot in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: We have not been short of high-ranking officials expressing views in the last few weeks. (Laughter)

If you remember the backgrounder that I gave the night that the operation started, you will remember that I emphasized the fact that the primary objective was the supplies; the secondary objective was the communication system.

I said then, before the operation started, that we had no real expectation of capturing the COSVN personnel and that the possibility of finding the specific location from which it was operating at any one time was not very great.

It is true that the initial operation was designed to go around the areas where we thought the greatest concentrations of the enemy were in order to minimize casualties and on the theory that we were above all, interested in the supply system.

With respect to these objectives, the figures on caches speak for themselves. The communications were substantially disrupted for a matter of weeks. They are slowly coming back, but even so, the general ability to conduct coordinated operations has been disrupted for some period, which is however, shorter than the period it takes to replace supplies, because this is only a question of replacing communications equipment.

COSVN headquarters is a mobile unit that operates out of four or five locations, and it would have been miraculous if we had found the particular site in one operation.

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We believe that in the area we have achieved
substantially what we went in to do.

Q We asked this question at your last backgrounder, but do you have any indication yet what is going to happen to these arms that are being seized? Are they going to be sent to the Cambodian government?

DR. KISSINGER: We really have a massive problem getting them out of there to begin with. They exceed the expectation, and as I pointed out before, they represent about six to eight month's supplies depending on the category, at full operation for the North Vietnamese.

Many of them we will take out. Some of them we will have a blow-up in place, because in the time available before the rainy season, we will not be able to get them all out. Some, particularly small arms ammunition that fits Cambodian rifles, we may give to the Cambodians, but we have not made a decision on how to dispose of these yet. Actually, the equipment is more than the Cambodians could handle at this particular moment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what about future operations in Cambodia by us and/or the South Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: The President has indicated that we are not planning any future ground operations in Cambodia. Secondly, with respect to any other operations, these will depend on the North Vietnamese activities directed at our forces in South Vietnam, but we will not become involved with combat forces in Cambodia for Cambodian objectives.

Q You made the point about the South Vietnamese not engaging in autonomous operations?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is, will the South Vietnamese become involved in autonomous operations?

Q You used the word autonomous for South Vietnamese operations, and I was wondering whether you were ---

DR. KISSINGER: The South Vietnamese sanctuary operations are going to conclude as I pointed out, on roughly the same time scale as ours. We will pull out our advisors and any logistics personnel by June 30.

If a massive North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia should develop, then the relationship and the reaction of the South Vietnamese would have to be reserved, but we will not become involved with American military personnel in Cambodia.

Q The point I was making, in answering, before you talked in terms of a possible future South Vietnamese action on Cambodia would not be autonomous. I assume you were saying that what they would do, they would certainly consult with us first, or what?

DR. KISSINGER: I think you misunderstood my phrase. I said that the South Vietnamese operations that are being conducted in Cambodia today we are aware of, and they have generally consulted with us.

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That phase of the operation which is directed at the sanctuaries, as I pointed out, will be completed. What happens after that -- if after some time period there should be new developments -- then this will have to depend in part on the assessment of the situation, but we will not, and there is no intention, and we would not favor any attempt by South Vietnam to annex Cambodia or to make Cambodia a province of South Vietnam.

Our interest in Southeast Asia is the independence and neutrality of Cambodia, and we would be prepared at any point to undertake international arrangements that would guarantee the independence and neutrality of Cambodia.

Q Can you tell me if our intelligence indicates that the Communists might have the capability for a massive offensive around the end of June in Cambodia and do I understand correctly that if that should occur, we would still leave and leave the South Vietnamese to fight that offensive or challenge it?

DR. KISSINGER: I am very reluctant to make so many assumptions. First, there can be little doubt that the Vietnamese ability to mount a major offensive has been severely impaired by the operations in the sanctuaries. We believe that the North Vietnamese ability to launch a major offensive in South Vietnam has been set back by at least six to eight months so that the usual dry season offensive would have to be at least substantially delayed over what seemed possible a few months ago.

Within Cambodia the problem is that the forces required to mount a major offensive are much smaller than the forces that would be required to mount a major offensive within South Vietnam.

So it is theoretically possible for the North Vietnamese to mount an offensive in Cambodia before they are capable of launching one in South Vietnam. Still, we do not look for a major Communist offensive in Cambodia at the end of June and we think that the Communist forces in Cambodia will have to devote many of their energies to consolidate what they now have in Northeastern Cambodia and that they will not be able to make a sustained attack on the Southern part of Cambodia for several months to come, so that your question is very hypothetical.

In any event, we intend to withdraw our forces by June 30.

Q What arms are we giving to Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: As the President pointed out, we are giving mostly small arms. We are not giving sophisticated, complicated equipment that requires military advisors or instructors. I think the last type of weapon we have given are mortars. We have not gone beyond that. We generally give them infantry-type weapons.

Q What forces do the North Vietnamese have in Northeastern Cambodia that they are going to consolidate and if they have a big sanctuary there, why aren't we going after that one?

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[LC]

DR. KISSINGER: This is the bloodthirstist bunch I have ever seen. Those evenings in Miami really make them raring to go. Never get them up so early in the morning, Ron. (Laughter)

MR. ZIEGLER: You should see them at 11:00. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: You can push these arguments very far. The other day one of your colleagues pointed out to me that North Vietnam is a sanctuary, too, and suggested that we go after that, although I had the impression -- I may have been wrong -- that we might not have found her unqualified approval if we had taker her advice.

MR. ZIEGLER: Do you want to stand up and be recognized? (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: I will tell you, you have a pretty bloodthirsty bunch here.

At any rate, the purpose of this operation was to go after the well-established logistics areas where they had the communications facilities and had the supplies built up over the period of months. They use these supply caches as a sort of traditional rear area supply base, and then we would move the supplies forward out of there ahead of their troops, as I pointed out before, and adopted the pattern that is typical of the North Vietnamese operation of fighting into their supplies and they would always position ahead of themselves just enough for one offensive push.

When that was finished, the troops would withdraw into the base areas and they would stock their forward caches again when they were ready to mount an offensive. This was a very tough problem for us, because while we were looking for caches in South Vietnam, and while we usually found over a period of eight to ten months -- usually a period of about ten months -- what we have found in two weeks in Cambodia, this was a slow process which did not touch the core of their supply system, and which they could replenish after we picked it up.

Another thing these bases did was to give them rest areas where they were relatively safe from allied intervention. We had prisoners tell us that they spent as much as three-quarters of their time in the base areas, and one-quarter of their time fighting in South Vietnam.

Incidentally, 90 percent of the prisoners we have captured have fought only in South Vietnam, have never fought in Cambodia. Of course we have not captured any of these who are fighting in Cambodia, so this is not a conclusive test.

Now, of course, unless we are going to occupy all of Cambodia, it is clear that there are going to be some areas in which there are going to be North Vietnamese, but to say that there are going to be North Vietnamese does not mean that they are going to have a well-stocked, well-supplied system of caches from which trails lead forward into the combat zone and from which they have a highly developed logistics system, and therefore, we believe it will take them at least a year to build up a sanctuary in Northeastern Cambodia of the type which we have encountered all along the North Vietnamese frontier.

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Even if they did that, it would then be about
two days march from the South Vietnam frontier and
another day or two or three from there to wherever the
combat would be, and it would complicate their supply
situation.

We have never said that this operation in Cambodia
is going to be decisive and perhaps I should use this
opportunity to point out what I think it will do and what I
think it will not do.

What it will do for a period of some months
is to decouple for the first time in years their main
force operations from their guerrilla operation. Those
of you who know North Vietnam will know their main force
of operation was to keep the main efforts in the frontiers
or within South Vietnam, and use them to create turmoil
in target areas and to relieve pressure on their guerrillas
in the target provinces. Then the guerrillas could
be used to churn things up for a time, and then when it
was needed, the main forces could come back.

As General Giap pointed out, we had the problem
that we could not fight the main forces and the guerrillas
simultaneously. When we fought the guerrillas, the main
forces were active, and vice versa.

For a period of ten months, depending on how you
affect the supply picture, the main forces are pushed
back into Cambodia and will not be able to operate as large
military units within South Vietnam.

Secondly, while they have supply caches in South
Vietnam, they will now have to be careful about how they
use their ammunition. We have captured, for example, enough
weapons to equip 40 battalions of their present battalion
size.

They have about 10,000-plus troops that were
coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and they were slated
to arrive within IIT and IV Corps area within the next few
weeks. It is going to be very difficult for them to
find weapons and ammunitions to use.

So again, while it is possible for them to conduct
operations at a somewhat low guerrilla level, it will be
more difficult for them to have the high points they had
planned again for some six to ten months.

That, in turn, should give the South Vietnamese
an opportunity to consolidate themselves. We believe
they have gained a lot of confidence through these Cambodian
operations. They had never conducted division-size
operations before and they have now turned out to be
quite effective and in fact, its a symptom of the time
that now people are more worried about their aggressiveness
where six months ago everyone was saying these units could not
fight at all.

So all we are claiming is that we gain six to
ten months for the South Vietnamese to gain the confidence
and for them to be able to target themselves on the guerrillas
and to be able to stand on their feet at the sanctuaries
are rebuilt. It would be foothardy for somebody to build

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[L]

those sanctuaries so close to the frontiers, because
somebody might come after them again.

Q Like Americans?

DR. KISSINGER: Not Americans. So this is what
has been achieved, and I gave you this long answer because
it might explain why a Communist base in Northeast
Cambodia is not as worrisome as a series of base areas
right smack up against the frontier which they were before,
and all along the frontier.

Q Some remarks by spokesmen at the State Department
yesterday were interpreted as public encouragement for
South Vietnam and Cambodia for a joint defense plan
for the defense of Cambodia. Are those interpretations
correct? Are we encouraging them to form a joint
defense plan?

DR. KISSINGER: It is consistent with the Nixon
doctrine that the countries of Asia should, in the first
instance, attempt to defend themselves by their own
resources, and when that is not possible, do it on a
regional basis.

Therefore, it is certainly consistent with
the Nixon doctrine for the countries in this region to
cooperate with each other for their mutual defense. Our
concern is the effort these countries make in one part of
the region and the support we have promised them in other
parts of the region, and to make sure that they don't scatter
their efforts.

But as a general principle, over a long period
of time, it is certainly correct to say that we believe that
the countries of Southeast Asia should take the primary
responsibility for their joint defense. We have always
said this. This is nothing new.

Q Could you assess for us the probability of
Prince Sihanouk coming back to Cambodia and setting up his
government? Is that a likelihood, in your opinion?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, people who have once tasted
high office find themselves very reluctant to leave it,
except academicians, of course. I think there is a
possibility of that. If the Communists succeed in taking
a provincial capital and holding it in a reliable way, that
Prince Sihanouk will come back with his provincial government.
He will not be living in the style to which he had been
accustomed in Phnom Penh, and he will have to adjust to a
slightly different mode of operation, but I would suspect
that he would come back.

Now we should not look at the problem of Sihanouk,
however, entirely in terms of personalities. We recognize
that Sihanouk was not a pro-Communist when he was thrown
out of office, and we believe that he was attempting to
steer a neutralist course by his life. The problem is, however,
for better or worse, this revolution which we did not seek and
which we did not encourage, has made it physically impossible
for him to be anything other than the captive of the
Communist forces which will be bringing him back.

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When he was in power in Phnom Penh, he operated by
a delicate balance of right wing and left wing forces,
some of which he deliberately encouraged, sometimes leaning
one way, sometimes leaning another way.

As I pointed out before, it is my personal judgment
that at least part of the revolution against him was
indirectly engineered by him in order to give himself bar-
gaining power in Moscow and Peking and to be able to
demonstrate that he had a right wing opposition that had
to be placated and that only he could keep under control.

Whatever else happens, if Sihanouk comes back
and whatever his intention, the forces that will be supporting
him will all be Communist dominated and in the process
of bringing him over, those forces which he had needed to
balance the situation will have to be destroyed. This is
an unavoidable fact of the situation.

So the Sihanouk who might be coming back, whatever
his personal intentions or whatever the sincerity of his
attitude, would be a different Sihanouk than the one who
left office, primarily because the balance of forces on which
he depends will have been altered.

Q Dr. Kissinger, before Sihanouk was ousted,
there was an arrangement in Cambodia by which the North Vietnamese
limited their activities to a particular area, and we had
learned to live with it.

Now, after Sihanouk was ousted this arrangement
broke down. Without going into what caused the arrangement to
break down, have we not precluded, by going into the sanctuaries,
the possibility of re-establishing the arrangement by Sihanouk's
successor or by Sihanouk himself if he came back, and in effect,
given them a war to fight?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, sometimes one has
the impression we are living in a never-never land where we
have to apologize for destroying supplies from which for
years Americans have been killed. It was a heavy handicap
on us to have these big supply depots established all along
the Cambodian frontier. It is a handicap which we accepted
because we thought that the neutrality of Cambodia might
be a model of something that could happen all over the area.

There was an effort by Sihanouk, to this Administration
at least, to squeeze the sanctuaries as much as possible, and
his mission in Moscow and Peking was to attempt to negotiate
to eliminate the sanctuaries.

To say that we had learned to live with them is
to say that we had to accept a very heavy military handicap
for the sake of respect for the neutrality of a country in
an area where we wanted to maintain the neutrality.

Now, I know of no law that says that the North
Vietnamese must be able to conduct a war in South Vietnam with
American toleration. The solution to the problem is not to
re-establish the sanctuaries in Cambodia. The solution of the
problem is to conduct a serious, generous negotiation.

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If you studied the President's speech of April 20,
he made some very significant suggestions as to the nature
of a political evolution in South Vietnam. We have always
believed that the way to end the war in Vietnam is through
negotiation.

Now Hanoi has a choice now. It can try to get
back to the situation of a year ago or of six months ago,
get its sanctuaries back. In the meantime, the South Vietnamese
will be strengthened and another round of inconclusive war
will start, or it may be conclusive war, or they can
negotiate on the same terms we have offered before.

We are not raising our terms just because we
think we have made some military progress. It is not going
to be possible, partly for the reasons that I gave in answer
to Dan Rather's question and partly for the fact that it is
impossible to turn back history to return to the status quo
of March 17.

From this point of view, that is true, but on the
other hand there is a way out by means of negotiation, and
I am sure that if they want to continue fighting, they will
find some means of getting supplies into South Vietnam.
We are not looking at this as a decisive thing.

Q Dr. Kissinger, that was half of my question.
The other half is the global diplomatic efforts of this
operation.

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Q Can you assess not only the diplomatic effect on the talks, but also the global diplomatic efforts?

DR. KISSINGER: First on the talks, obviously we don't expect anything spectacular to happen while the military operations in Cambodia are still going on. But we hope and we are prepared that after this phase of military operations are completed that the other side will take a good, hard look at the situation and that it will conclude that the continuation of the war involves so many uncertainties and that a negotiation towards a peace, which is fair to all, is the best outcome.

We have said on innumerable occasions that we want a political solution in which all significant forces in South Vietnam are given an opportunity and that we want a future for South Vietnam in which the South Vietnamese people can express themselves.

Now, it should not be beyond the wit of man to come up with some formula which realizes this objective. Up to now the other side has asked for the whole political framework in effect to be turned over to them before negotiations even started. In other words, they wanted to prejudice the whole outcome. If they are really concerned with giving the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to express themselves they will find us prepared to talk to them with an open mind on the subject.

Q So we believe that if Hanoi is ever willing to talk seriously, then perhaps after the present excitement dies down, then during the summer they might re-evaluate their situation and talk in the spirit with which I have now sketched to you.

We have not raised our terms. We have no intention to humiliate them. We have no intention not to recognize that they have fought for a long period of time for their convictions and we would certainly attempt to implement by our best lights when we said the people of South Vietnam ought to be given an opportunity to shape their own fate.

Now, as for the global diplomatic consequences, as I pointed out last week, the immediate diplomatic consequences were about as we anticipated. The countries we thought would protest protested.

It has not led, up to now, to any permanent impairment or any serious diplomatic impairment of any of the countries with which we are dealing.

Again, the question we face is this: After the Cuban missile crisis, for example, contrary to all expectations, there began a period of major diplomatic contacts between the major nuclear powers, partly because the major nuclear powers had concluded that the danger of an unrestricted confrontation in that period was too great. That period led to the Nuclear Test Ban.

We are ready to talk seriously with any country that shares our own feeling that the exploitation of international tension and the continuation of some of these rivalries contains dangers that might prove to be unmanageable.

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So, again, while undoubtedly the action in which we
engaged had a temporarily unsettling effect, it may in the long
run be a possible contribution. That is certainly the attitude
with which we approach the future. We are not approaching it in
a spirit of confrontation and heightening tension. We are
approaching it with an attitude that we want to eliminate the
causes of conflict and begin serious cooperation with all major
countries.

Q What you have just said there about the analogy
with the Cuban missile crisis, it seems to me, bears out what
some of these official sources that you have talked about earlier
have been saying, that what President Nixon wanted to do in this
operation, really, was to convince the Soviet Union of our
toughness and, as Secretary Laird said, the enemy was facing
away and our danger in the Cambodian sanctuaries was less.

Was the Cambodian operation an attempt, really, to
convince the Soviet Union of our toughness in hopes of tying
it into the negotiations you mentioned here?

DR. KISSINGER: Secretary Laird said nothing else than
what we said. To the extent that you are implying that we found
ourselves in a nice, tranquil situation and hardly being able to
restrain ourselves to get a little war going we said to ourselves,
"Here are these North Vietnamese charging into Cambodia; let's
smack them when the danger to us is eliminated," that is an
absolutely incorrect conclusion which I will not accept. The
reason we did what we did is the reason that was stated in the
President's speech and in my backgrounder:

The North Vietnamese were expanding their sanctuaries
for the purpose of magnifying their threat to South Vietnam; to
give an opportunity to Vietnamization and to insure the withdrawal
of our forces.

Obviously, if you want to show toughness to the Soviets
you don't tackle the Vietnamese in Cambodia. There were no
Soviet forces in Cambodia. There were no Soviet interests
directly involved in Cambodia.

I want to say flatly that the intention of confronting
the Soviet Union played no role whatever in our consideration.
The purpose was not to produce a confrontation with the Soviet
Union. The intention was not to trigger the Soviet Union into
some concessions.

What I described to you was what could be a result and
the result was precisely the unintended emergence in the crisis
in the sense that nobody wanted Sihanouk overthrown and yet he
was overthrown and that if the Soviet Union could have picked a
place in which difficulties would arise with the United States,
it would not have picked Cambodia any more than we would have
picked Cambodia as a place for our military actions.

But I want to say flatly that confrontation with the
Soviet Union, forcing the Soviet Union into a conciliatory
posture, or any of these other phrases, had absolutely nothing to
do with the decision in Cambodia which was taken entirely in
terms of the local area.

Q To turn that coin over, there are now reports
of a counterattack against some of our personnel in Cambodia,
that they are beginning to stand and fight. Can you project
what possible dangers we could foresee in the very near future
there of a large-scale counterattack and possibly losing some
of these large supplies that we have captured.

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DR. KISSINGER: Well, the shock effect of our first move into Cambodia was so great that most of the Communist forces really ran and that there was practically no resistance for the first week. Now, some of the forces are seeping back into the area, launching attacks on our forces. Our judgment is that the purpose of these Communist attacks is to increase American casualties rather than to recapture the supplies.

We, of course, will do everything in our power to prevent the recapture of these supplies. We don't think that there is any major danger of our losing a significant portion of the supplies, but of course we are moving them out and destroying them as rapidly as we possibly can.

We also don't think that these attacks can amount to much more than harrassing tactics. They have a real problem in assembling major units and supplying them to fight Americans. And to the extent that they are fighting us their casualties go up and that again reduces the effectiveness of these main force units. So, they have a major problem.

Q You said we only had one goal in our move into Cambodia, but you admit that there were side effects, not only did you put the enemy on notice that we were unpredictable, but you also told the Soviet Union that; did we not?

DR. KISSINGER: Any action in international affairs that a major country like the United States takes has side effects. Obviously, what we did in Cambodia had an effect on the Soviet Union. I did not say that it did not have an effect on the Soviet Union. I said that the objective of the operation was not the Soviet Union and to the extent that the Soviet Union was affected, it was a price we were prepared to pay. But it was not one that we sought to pay.

On the question of predictability and unpredictability, if I can be philosophical for a moment, this is a very serious decision to make. On some levels one wants to be predictable and on most levels one wants to be predictable. But if the other side gets the idea -- and here I am talking particularly about Hanoi -- gets the idea that our actions cannot possibly be affected by anything they do, that they can set quotas of American casualties and slowly bleed us, then their planning becomes very easy and the pressure on us becomes greater and greater.

So, I would say that unpredictability should be kept at a minimum, but it is not always harmful that if pushed too far this is not true. This was not the intention because the Soviet Union was not pushing us in Cambodia.

MR. ZIEGLER: In relation to the implication of your question, while the backgrounder was underway, Mr. Deakin, we checked with the Secretary of Defense and in no way whatsoever did the Secretary of Defense make a statement that would imply the operations into the Cambodian sanctuaries were conducted for any other purpose or under any other set of circumstances other than what we had previously discussed many times.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

AT 10:20 A.M. EDT)