recommended a series of measures to stimulate investment, such as accelerated depreciation for new plants and equipment in areas of high unemployment, a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 48 to 46 percent, and eliminating the present double taxation of dividends. I strongly urge the Congress to pass these measures to help create the productive, permanent jobs in the private economy that are so essential for our future. All of the basic trends are good; we are not on the brink of another recession or economic disaster. If we follow prudent policies that encourage productive investment and discourage destructive inflation, we will come out on top -- and I am sure we will.

We have successfully cut inflation by more than half: when I took office, the Consumer Price Index was rising at 12.2 percent a year. During 1976, the rate of inflation was five percent.

We have created more jobs; over four million more jobs today than in the Spring of 1975. Throughout this Nation today we have over 88 million people in useful, productive jobs -- more than at any other time in our Nation's history. But, there are still too many Americans unemployed. This is the greatest regret that I have as I leave office.

We brought about with the Congress, after much delay, the renewal of general revenue sharing. We expanded community development and Federal manpower programs. We began a significant urban mass transit program.

MORE

Federal programs today provide more funds for our states and local governments than ever before, $70 billion for the current fiscal year.

Through these programs and others that provide aid directly to individuals, we have kept faith with our tradition of compassionate help for those who need it. As we begin our third century we can be proud of the progress that we have made in meeting human needs for all of our citizens.

We have cut the growth of crime by nearly 90 percent. Two years ago, crime was increasing at the rate of 18 percent annually. In the first three quarters of 1976, that growth rate had been cut to two percent. But crime, and the fear of crime, remains one of the most serious problems facing our citizens.

We have had some successes. And there have been some disappointments.

Bluntly, I must remind you that we have not made satisfactory progress toward achieving energy independence.

Energy is absolutely vital to the defense of our country, to the strength of our economy, and to the quality of our lives. Two years ago I proposed to the Congress the first comprehensive national energy program:

A specific and coordinated set of measures that would end our vulnerability to embargo, blockade, or arbitrary price increases, and would mobilize U. S. technology and resources to supply a significant share of the free world's energy after 1985.

Of the major energy proposals I submitted two years ago, only half belatedly became law. In 1973, we were dependent upon foreign oil imports for 36 percent of our needs. Today we are 40 percent dependent, and we'll pay out 34 billion dollars for foreign oil this year alone. Such vulnerability at present or in the future is intolerable and must be ended.

The answer to where we stand on our national energy effort today reminds me of the old argument about whether the tank is half full or half empty. The pessimist will say we have half failed to achieve our ten-year energy goals, the optimist will say that we have half succeeded. I am always an optimist, but we must make up for lost time.

We have laid a solid foundation for completing the enormous task which confronts us. I have signed into law five major energy bills which contain significant measures for conservation, resource development, stockpiling and standby authorities.

We have moved forward to develop the Naval Petroleum Reserves; to build a five hundred million barrel strategic petroleum stockpile; to phase-out unnecessary government allocation and price controls; to develop a lasting relationship with other oil consuming nations; to improve the

MORE

efficiency of energy use through conservation in automobiles,
buildings and industry; and to expand research on new
technology and renewable resources, such as wind power,
geothermal and solar energy.

All these actions, significant as they are for the
long term, are only the beginning. I recently submitted to the
Congress my proposals to reorganize the federal energy
structure, and the hard choices which remain if we are serious
about reducing our dependence upon foreign energy.

These include programs to reverse our declining
production of natural gas and increase incentives for domestic
crude oil production. I propose to minimize environmental
uncertainties affecting coal development, expand nuclear
power generation and create an energy independence authority
to provide government financial assistance for vital energy
programs where private capital is not available.

We must explore every reasonable prospect for meeting
our energy needs when our current domestic reserves of oil
and natural gas begin to dwindle in the next decade.

I urgently ask Congress and the new Administration to
move quickly on these issues. This Nation has the resources
and the capability to achieve our energy goals if its government
has the will to proceed, and I think we do.

I have been disappointed by inability to complete
many of the meaningful organizational reforms which I contem-
plated for the Federal Government, although a start has been
made.

For example, the Federal Judicial System has long
served as a model for other courts. But today it is threatened
by a shortage of qualified Federal judges and an explosion
of litigation claiming Federal jurisdiction.

I commend the new Administration and the Congress
for the recent report and recommendations of the Department
of Justice, undertaken at my request, on "the needs of the
Federal Courts." I especially endorse its proposals for a
new commission on the judicial appointment process.

While the Judicial Branch of our Government may
require reinforcement, the budgets and payrolls of the other
branches remain staggering. I cannot help but observe that,
while the White House Staff and the Executive Office of the
President have been reduced and the total number of civilians
in the Executive Branch contained during the 1970's, the
Legislative Branch has increased substantially, although the
membership of the Congress remains at 535. Congress now
costs the taxpayers more than a million dollars per member;
the whole Legislative budget has passed the billion dollar
mark.

I set out to reduce the growth in the size and
spending of the Federal Government, but no President can
accomplish this alone. The Congress sidetracked most of my
requests for authority to consolidate overlapping programs
and agencies, to return more decision-making and responsibility
to State and local governments through block grants instead

MORE

Page 9

of rigid categorical programs and to eliminate unnecessary
red tape and outrageously complex regulations.

We have made some progress in cutting back the
expansion of Government and its intrusion into individual
lives -- but, believe me, there is much more to be done; and
you and I know it. It can only be done by tough and tempor-
arily painful surgery by a Congress as prepared as the
President to face up to this very real political problem.

Again, I wish my successor, working with a substantial
majority of his own party, the best of success in reforming
the costly and cumbersome machinery of the Federal Government.

The task of self-government is never finished. The
problems are great; the opportunities are greater.

America's first goal is and always will be peace
with honor. America must remain first in keeping peace in
the world. We can remain first in peace only if we are never
second in defense.

In presenting the State of the Union to the Congress
and to the American people, I have a special obligation as
Commander-in-Chief to report on our national defense. Our
survival as a free and independent people requires, above
all, strong military forces that are well-equipped and
highly trained to perform their assigned mission.

I am particularly gratified to report that over
the past two and a half years we have been able to reverse
the dangerous decline of the previous decade in real resources
this country was devoting to national defense. This was
an immediate problem I faced in 1974. The evidence was
unmistakable that the Soviet Union had been steadily
increasing the resources it applied to building its military
strength.

During this same period the United States' real
defense spending declined. In my three budgets, we not
only arrested that dangerous decline, but we have
established the positive trend which is essential to our
ability to contribute to peace and stability in the world.

The Vietnam War, both materially and psychologically,
affected our overall defense posture. The dangerous anti-
military sentiment discouraged defense spending and unfairly
disparaged the men and women who serve in our armed forces.

The challenge that now confronts this country is
whether we have the national will and determination to
continue this essential defense effort over the long term,
as it must be continued. We can no longer afford to
oscillate from year to year in so vital a matter. Indeed,
we have a duty to look beyond the immediate question of
budgets, and to examine the nature of the problem we will
face over the next generation.

I am the first recent President able to address
long-term basic issues without the burden of Vietnam. The
war in Indochina consumed enormous resources, at the very

MORE

Page 10

time that the overwhelming strategic superiority we once enjoyed was disappearing. In past years, as a result of decisions by the United States, our strategic forces levelled off. Yet, the Soviet Union continued a steady, constant buildup of its own forces, committing a high percentage of its national economic effort to defense.

The United States can never tolerate a shift in strategic balance against us, or even a situation where the American people or our allies believe the balance is shifting against us. The United States would risk the most serious political consequences if the world came to believe that our adversaries have a decisive margin of superiority.

To maintain a strategic balance we must look ahead to the 1980's and beyond. The sophistication of modern weapons requires that we make decisions now if we are to ensure our security ten years from now.

Therefore I have consistently advocated and strongly urged that we pursue three critical strategic programs: the Trident missile launching submarine; the B-1 bomber, with its superior capability to penetrate modern air defenses; and a more advanced intercontinental ballistic missile that will be better able to survive nuclear attack and deliver a devastating retaliatory strike.

In an era where the strategic nuclear forces are in rough equilibrium, the risks of conflict below the nuclear threshold may grow more perilous. A major long-term objective, therefore, is to maintain capabilities to deal with, and thereby deter, conventional challenges and crises, particularly in Europe.

We cannot rely solely on strategic forces to guarantee our security or to deter all types of aggression. We must have superior Naval and Marine forces to maintain freedom of the seas, strong multi-purpose tactical Air Forces, and mobile, modern ground forces.

Accordingly: I have directed a long-term effort to improve our worldwide capabilities to deal with regional crises.

-- I have submitted a five-year Naval building program indispensable to the Nation's maritime strategy.

-- Because the security of Europe and the integrity of NATO remain the cornerstone of American defense policy, I have initiated a special, long-term program to ensure the capacity of the alliance to deter or defeat aggression in Europe.

As I leave office, I can report that our national defense is effectively deterring conflict today. Our Armed Forces are capable of carrying out the variety of missions assigned to them. Programs are underway which will assure we can deter war in the years ahead.

But I also must warn that it will require a sustained effort over a period of years to maintain these capabilities. We must have the wisdom, the stamina and the

MORE

courage to prepare today for the perils of tomorrow, and
I believe we will.

As I look to the future -- and I assure you I
intend to go on doing that for a good many years -- I can
say with confidence that the State of the Union is good,
but we must go on making it better and better.

This gathering symbolizes the Constitutional
foundation which makes continued progress possible,
synchronizing the skills of three independent branches
of government, reserving fundamental sovereignty to the
people of this great land.

It is only as the temporary representatives and
servants of the people that we meet here -- we bring no
hereditary status or gift of infallibility and none
follows us from this place. Like President Washington,
like the more fortunate of his successors, I look forward
to the status of private citizen with gladness and
gratitude. To me, being a citizen of the United States
of America is the greatest honor and privilege in this
world.

From the opportunities which fate and my fellow
citizens have given me, as a member of the House, as Vice
President and President of the Senate, and as President of
all the people, I have come to understand and place the
highest value on the checks and balances which our
founders imposed on government through the separation of
powers, among co-equal Legislative, Executive and Judicial
Branches.

This often results in difficulty and delay, as
I well know, but it also places supreme authority under
God, beyond any one person, any one branch, any majority
great or small, or any one party. The Constitution is the
bedrock of all our freedoms; guard and cherish it; keep
honor and order in your own house; and the Republic will
endure.

It is not easy to end these remarks; in this
chamber, along with some of you, I have experienced many,
many of the highlights of my life. It was here that I stood
28 years ago with my freshman colleagues as Speaker Sam
Rayburn administered the oath -- I see some of you now:
Charlie Bennett, Dick Bolling, Carl Perkins, Pete Rodino,
Harley Staggers, Tom Steed, Sid Yates, and Clem Zablocki,
and I remember those who have gone to their rest.

It was here we waged many, many a lively battle,
won some, lost some, but always remaining friends. It was
here, surrounded by such friends, that the distinguished
Chief Justice swore me in as Vice President on December 6,
1973. It was here I returned eight months later as your
President to ask not for a honeymoon, but for a good
marriage.

I will always treasure those memories and ..
your many, many kindnesses. I thank you for them all.

MORE

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 4, 1976

No. 159

As Prepared by Delivery

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
L'ENEANT PLAZA

APRIL 4, 1976

Rabbi Hertzberg, Dean Rosovsky, Mr. Wilkins, distinguished guests, friends:

I am honored by this award, and by your most generous introduction.

The greatness of America has been not so much its physical strength as its moral significance. Since its birth this nation has stood for something larger than itself. Americans have always had a sense of mission; we have been inspired by the knowledge that we were champions of liberty and progress for all mankind. We have been not only a refuge for those fleeing persecution, but the defense of democracy, and bulwark for others in time of need, a feeder of the hungry and a solace to the suffering. And history continues to present us these challenges and more. Today we bear a central responsibility for maintaining peace and shaping a global structure which can help realize mankind's dream of an end to conflict and hatred.

These are the qualities and responsibilities and hopes which tie America to Israel. No people knows more vividly than the Jewish people that morality must be more than a theory — it must be a quality of human conduct. No people yearns more for tranquility than those who historically have been the first victims of its loss. And no people perceives more acutely that peace depends ultimately not on political arrangements but on the conscience of mankind.

History is often cruel, but the wisest are those who know that fate can be shaped by human faith and human courage. The true realists are those who recognize that all great achievements were a dream before they became a reality. These are qualities that have enabled the Jewish people to survive their tragedies. These are the qualities that brought about the state of Israel. These are qualities that guarantee the future of the people of Israel. And these are qualities which peoples and nations everywhere must possess if they are to be free.

## The Moral Basis of Foreign Policy

History challenges us amid the world's ambiguities to shape events by our own purposes and ideals. If democratic societies like America and Israel are to prosper, we must summon the unity and resolve to be masters of our futures on the basis of our values.

The decisions that must be made are always difficult — for foreign policy deals with the interaction of sovereign entities. No country, no matter how strong, can impose its will on the world. Today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons, diffusion of power and growing interdependence, foreign policy is more than ever an enterprise of incomplete and imperfect solutions. Tension is unavoidable between moral values, which are invariably cast in absolute terms, and efforts to achieve them, which of necessity involve compromise.

For further information contact:

PR #159

-2-

This accounts for much of the foreign policy debate in democratic societies, which to some extent is a rebellion against the contemporary world. In all democratic societies the temp- tation is great to deny the circumstances of the contemporary world and to blame them on individuals, to confuse optimism with the shallow projection of the desirable.

But we cannot escape the conditions around us. Morality without pragmatic action is empty. just as pragmatism without moral direction is like a rudderless ship. The true optimists are those who are prepared to face complexity and who have the faith that their people can master it by dedication and vision.

If democracies like America and Israel are to survive and flourish in a world of sovereign states and competing wills, they must stand firmly for their belief in human dignity; otherwise we will lose our bearings. There is no way to make these choices, and to navigate between the shoals of temptation and danger, without a strong inner moral conviction. Equally, we need a mature and hard-headed understanding of the difficult choices that must be made, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival.

For Americans, foreign policy has always been more than the search for stability. Americans have a vision of a world of justice that drives all our efforts. A pragmatic policy alone would be empty of humanity; it would lack direction, and roots, and heart.

But equally if policy becomes excessively moralistic, it can turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on virtue can make impossible any solution or negotiation. Good results may be given up or sabotaged in the quest for the elusive ideal. Some of this country's most serious errors — of both involvement and abdication — were driven by misguided moral arguments. Some intervention began as crusades to reform other societies; and we were isolationist in the 1930s to preserve our purity and register our distaste for the balance of power.

Our responsibility to conduct a moral, far-sighted and realistic policy has grown in recent years. In a world made smaller by technology and communications, events anywhere are instantly known and have effects in distant places. Never before have the destinies of nations been more intertwined — not only practically but morally.

And so we have a stake in a peaceful world and an environment where man's aspirations for justice and liberty and dignity have the greatest chance of fulfillment. The ultimate safety of every minority, every oppressed people, lies in a world where respect for human dignity governs the affairs of nations. Peace can be said to exist only when the insecurity of nations is eased, the hopes of people for economic advance are fulfilled, international habits of restraint and conciliation are nurtured, and men experience at last the blessings of a world of justice and progress.

## Peace in the Middle East

I have spoken at some length about the moral foundation of our foreign policy to this group which is so concerned and serious about the survival of Israel. For the relationship between America and Israel depends ultimately not on formal assurances but on the links of our peoples and the reality of our values.

The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal friend and a fellow democracy, whose very existence represents the commitment of all free peoples. The moral strength of the people of Israel, which has so often meant the margin of victory in war, gives us confidence that Israel will also win peace. No people has earned it more.

Time and events have brought us to a threshold in Middle East history — an unprecedented opportunity to realize the peace of which we all have dreamed; a peace in the interest of all the peoples of a region that has experienced enough anguish for this generation.

PR #159

-3-

— Israel, having proven by its own courage that it is here to stay, has taken equally courageous steps toward peaceful resolution of the conflict.

— Some of her Arab neighbors, for the first time ever, are now speaking openly and wisely of making peace and ending generations of conflict.

— The United States has demonstrated to both sides its commitment to continue to promote a just and enduring solution.

— The relationships among the major outside powers, if conducted with reason and firmness, can create a global environment of restraint that will enhance security and the possibilities of peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

Israel obviously faces profound problems — not the least of which is that in any negotiation with her neighbors, she will be asked to yield the physical buffers of territory in exchange for intangible pledges. Indeed, Israel's gains will be intangible even as she achieves her own stated objectives of a formal peace treaty and diplomatic recognition by her neighbors. So the process of peace inevitably presents her with many anguishing decisions — and the pain is shared by all of us who are friends of Israel and who are dedicated to further progress towards peace. Throughout this process we owe Israel our compassion and support.

The risks and obstacles are many. Steps taken must be carefully thought out and realistic. But we must move together, with courage and with a vision of how reality can be shaped by a vision of peace. And we must not paralyze ourselves by a suspiciousness that deprives our relationship of dignity and our cooperation of significance.

The United States will help keep Israel strong — to ensure that peace is seen clearly to be the only feasible course. We will never abandon Israel — either by failing to provide crucial assistance, or by misconceived or separate negotiations, or by irresolution when challenged to meet our own responsibility to maintain the global balance of power.

We will never forget that America's responsibility for peace includes, above all, responsibility for the fate of smaller nations who rely upon us as the ultimate defender of their survival and freedom and that Israel's fate is inseparable from the future of human dignity. America will not abandon a friend because to do so in one part of the world would shake confidence in every part of the world. There will be no American weakness or abdication for this can only tempt adversaries, confuse allies, and undermine security in the world, ultimately to the grave peril of our country.

Moral ideals and practical interest thus come together. Peace in the Middle East is a goal shared by Americans and by Israelis alike. The road towards it will be a common one. And so, in truth, as we pursue the course of peace, our guarantees rest not so much in any formal agreements or reassurances endlessly repeated but in the deeper ties of emotion and morality, history and principle, that can never be sundered.

The dream of peace is the dream of the prophet Isaiah — that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore." It is the benediction of Leviticus — that "the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee and grant thee peace." This dream is both an inspiration and a duty. And those who strive for it know both the pain and the exhilaration of man's noblest endeavor.

The United States and Israel will have the courage and the faith to seek this dream and fulfill it.

********

668

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: GERALD R. FORD, 1976

United States Ambassador
to Lebanon

*Announcement of Intention To Nominate Francis E. Meloy. April 21, 1976*

The President today announced his intention to nom-
inate Francis E. Meloy, Jr., of the District of Columbia,
to be Ambassador to the Republic of Lebanon. He will
succeed G. McMurtrie Godley, who has resigned. Mr.
Meloy has been serving as Ambassador to Guatemala
since December 1973.

Mr. Meloy was born on March 28, 1917, in Washing-
ton, D.C. He received his B.A. degree from American
University in 1939 and his M.A. from Yale University
in 1941. He served in the United States Naval Reserve
from 1942 to 1946.

In 1946, Mr. Meloy became a Political and Economic Consular and later Principal Officer in Dhahran. From 1949 to 1953, he served at the Department of State as a member of the Policy Reports Staff and as Assistant to the Director and Deputy Coordinator of International Conferences in the Executive Secretariat. He was a member of the Tenth NATO Council meeting in Paris during 1952. He was Chief of the Political Section in Saigon from 1953 to 1955 and a Political Officer in Paris from 1955 to 1959. He became Special Assistant in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs in 1960 and was named Director of the Office of Western European Affairs in 1962. From 1964 to 1969, he was Deputy Chief of Mission in Rome and served as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from 1969 to 1973.

President's Commission on
Personnel Interchange

*Announcement of Appointment of Nine Members of the Commission. April 22, 1976*

The President today announced the appointment of
nine persons as members of the President's Commission on
Personnel Interchange for terms of 2 years. They are:

WALTER W. BARTO, JR., of Meadowbrook, Pa., vice president, corporate affairs, SmithKline Corp., Meadowbrook, Pa.

DOUGLAS P. BENNETT, of Bethesda, Md., Director, Presidential Personnel Office, The White House.

ROBERT E. DAVIS, of Yardley, Pa., president and chief executive officer, Thiokol Corp., Bristol, Pa.

EDWIN L. HARPER, of Villa Nova, Pa., vice president, chief admin-
istrative officer, Pilot-Teed Products Corp., Philadelphia,
Pa.

WILLIAM N. LETSON, of Pittsburgh, Pa., vice president, general counsel, and secretary, Westinghouse Electric Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa.

JAMES P. LOW, of McLean, Va., president, American Society of Association Executives, Washington. D.C.

JAMES ROOSEVELT, of Corona Del Mar, Calif., president, James Roosevelt & Co.; lecturer in social ecology at the University of California at Irvine, Calif.

C. MAXWELL STANLEY, of Muscatine, Iowa, chairman of the board, Stanley Consultants, Inc., Muscatine, Iowa.

JACK K. WILLIAMS, of College Station, Tex., president, Texas A & M University and University System, College Station, Tex.

The purpose of the Commission is to develop an Execu-
tive Interchange Program in order to provide closer co-
operation between the Government and the private sector.
They also advise the President as to ways of promoting
the interchange between the Government and the private
sector.

Central Intelligence Agency

*Announcement of Intention To Nominate E. Henry Knoche To Be Deputy Director. April 22, 1976*

The President today announced his intention to nom-
inate E. Henry Knoche, of Fairfax, Va., to be Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. He will succeed Lt. Gen.
Vernon Anthony Walters, United States Army, who is
resigning. Mr. Knoche has been Associate Deputy to the
Director of Central Intelligence since 1975.

Born on January 14, 1925, in Charleston, W. Va., Mr. Knoche received his A.B. degree from Washington and Jefferson College in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Knoche joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1953 as an intelligence analyst specializing in political and military affairs. From 1962 to 1967, he was Special Assistant to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. He became Executive Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center in 1967. He became Deputy Director of the CIA's planning and budgeting activities in 1969 and was named Deputy Director of the Office of Current Intelligence during 1970. From 1972 to 1975, he was responsible for several of the Agency's areas, including the Intelligence Directorate's Office of Strategic Research, until his appointment as Associate Deputy.

Mr. Knoche is married to the former Angie Papoulas,
and they have five sons.

Volume 12—Number 17

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#531

AT THE WHITE HOUSE
WITH RON NESSEN

AT 11:39 A.M. EDT

JULY 12, 1976

MONDAY

MR. NESSEN: You have seen the Airport and Airway Development Act signing, and I think you have the background on that, fact sheets and so forth. If not, Margaret Earl will help you with it.

In about a half hour or so the President is going to be meeting with the leaders of six Jewish congregations which have been in existence since colonial times. This is a Bicentennial event, and the Rabbis of these six colonial congregations are going to present a letter to the President in which, as a Bicentennial commemoration, they reaffirm the loyalty of the American-Jewish community to the American dream and the American territory. I have a copy of the letter here. This is sort of recalling that these same six congregations had written to President Washington on the occasion of his inauguration expressing their dedication to America and so forth.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

MR. NESSEN: I can get you a copy of the letter.

There is one addition to the President's schedule. Tonight the President is going to be going over to the Convention of the National Exchange Clubs. It is a service club like the Lions and so forth. They are having their convention over at the Sheraton Park and the President will speak briefly after dinner, at about 8:30. There will be a travel pool here. I don't expect to have a copy of the remarks ahead of time.

Q Is he going to the dinner, Ron?

MR. NESSEN: No, he is not going to the dinner.

Q Did he just make up his mind on this?

MR. NESSEN: No, this was accepted about ten days ago.

MORE

#531

sure that extreme environmental demand and endless environmental delays do not make progress impossible in America.

We can make government a responsible, capable servant of the people and a powerful instrument of progress without letting the government enslave us with endless rolls of redtape and regulation. We can do all of this and more, too, because we have the will, the courage, and the resources and the imagination to do it. We can build a better America—stronger, wealthier, safer, healthier, happier America—an America that we can be proud to leave to our children and to our grandchildren.

Let us work together to reach that goal together, and let's celebrate this Bicentennial Year with hope, with pride, and with increasing prosperity, and with confidence in a promising future.

That is the way I look at America's prospects. So we can all say, as we do today, "I am proud to be an American and proud of America."

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 2:30 p.m. at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

## B'nai B'rith Women

The President's Remarks at a Reception for Delegates to the Organization's International Bicentennial Convention. March 9, 1976

Mrs. Smith, Mrs. Rockefeller, my daughter Susan, and all of you wonderful members of this great organization, B'nai B'rith—and I see a few men chiseling in:

Really, Betty was supposed to be here along with Mrs. Rockefeller. Unfortunately, she is out in Arizona and California today and tomorrow. Let me give you some inside dope, sort of a family secret. She is going to Arizona and California to try and get my votes up to her polls.

[Laughter]

But I do want to welcome you all to the wonderful White House. You are going to have the privilege of hearing Happy Rockefeller and Susan. And they are very good speakers. And when I heard that you were all here, I thought I would come over and pre-empt about a minute or two of your time.

I have had the privilege and the pleasure of working with your organization as well as your male counterparts over the years when I was in Michigan and particularly when I was in—we have only got 47 more States to go.

[Laughter]

I do want to say a word very seriously for a moment. The United States has long had a history of supporting

the Government of Israel. I think all of us recognize that this is an issue that is not partisan. Great Democratic Presidents, great Republican Presidents have stood firm and fast in recommending programs, recommending policies, recommending appropriations for the security and the survival of Israel, and this Administration is doing exactly the same thing.

We recognize, of course, that Israel is a democratic country in an area that is controversial, complex, volatile. And the 3 million-plus citizens of Israel, because of their staunch and steadfast defense of freedom, need the help and assistance of 215 million Americans whether they are Democrats or Republicans.

I happen to have heard on the way over here that you have a great theme for 1976, one that ties in with the Bicentennial of our country and that we should be celebrating this beginning of a third century because of the great heritage that we have inherited from our forefathers who gave us what we have through their hard work, their wisdom, their knowledge for the last 200 years.

There is an old saying that I used to hear in Sunday school—and that goes back a long time—that the beauty of Joseph's coat is its many colors. The strength, as I see it, of America today is what our forefathers gave us through their hard work and all of the other wonderful characteristics that they exhibited during this period of two centuries.

We started, as you know, with something less than 3 million Americans when the Constitution and our government was actually formed, but over the years America has welcomed people from all over the world. We have opened our doors and the net result is, we have a special character, a special strength in this country because we are—as I said, the beauty of Joseph's coat is its many colors.

And in the future, the United States must equally welcome those who come from other shores because we have been given an opportunity here that exists no place in the world except America to enjoy the blessings of freedom, the blessings of opportunity in politics, in economics, in professions, and elsewhere. We are so fortunate in this great country and it is our obligation and our responsibility, regardless of any political persuasion we may have, to stand tall and strong for America at home and America abroad.

And let me just close with this final comment. I know that in the breasts and the minds of each and every one of you, as it is in all of your fellow Americans, a great sense of pride in this country. And I, literally, at night, when I go to sleep, say to myself—and I think you probably do, too—that I am proud to be an American and I am proud of America.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 3:18 p.m. in the East Room at the White House.

Volume 12—Number 11

Q: Has the capability, hasn't he?

MR. NESSEN: I guess so, but he has not.

Q: Anything you can say about deciding not to wait for another 24-hour cycle and go the overland evacuation route?

MR. NESSEN: I would say only that having had the motorcade postponed last night because of no assurances of safety and the same thing happening a second time, the feeling was there was nothing to lead us to believe that we could get that assurance tomorrow.

Q: We have been urging Americans to leave Lebanon for months and months. 6,000 did and 1400 didn't. All of a sudden we have escalated it and made it kind of an urgent advice to leave and help you do it. Is there some possibility of impending action in Beruit that we think may happen that might imperil the people? Is that why the emphasis now, or is it just to keep the British company?

MR. NESSEN: No, Jerry, I wouldn't take it that lightly. For one thing, the situation has changed from what it was in the last several months because you have had two Americans murdered for one thing. Up to now you have had Americans in Beruit that have mingled and traveled without harrassment throughout the country as Americans. Now you have had two Americans deliberately killed. That changes the situation somewhat. You have had almost all the other Westerners -- the British and the French -- make the decision to evacuate. It was decided that it would be better not to leave the Americans as the only Westerners who had not left.

Q: I have heard many speculative reports that Syria is about to open an offensive to impost peace on Lebanon by force, and that this would escalate the danger.

MR. NESSEN: I don't want to speculate on that from here. I think the reasons I have given give you some idea of what the feeling was.

Q: Ron, do you have any idea who long this evacuation by sea will take? Is this going to be pretty well wrapped up in one day?

MR. NESSEN: I would think if it continues to go smoothly, I would think it would be wrapped up in a couple of more hours, at most.

Q: Will the large ship be escorted to Athens?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know. You can check with Greener on that. I don't know the answer to that.

Q: What is the President's mood -- somber?

MR. NESSEN: I would say serious and somber.

Q: Is he in pajamas or sport clothes?

MR. NESSEN: He has on a brown suit, white shirt, and tie.

Q: In reference to Syrian troops in Lebanon, is it still Administration policy that we would like all intervention withdrawn?

MR. NESSEN: It is certainly an policy that we would like the situation settled peacefully. As I have said before, the larger the outside military intervention, the greater the risk of the conflict expanding and escalating.

Q: That means we would like the Syrians to leave.

MR. NESSEN: I think I'll answer in that way and not specifically.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#582

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON NESSEN

AT 11:42 A.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 17, 1976

FRIDAY

MR. NESSEN: Let me mention a couple of schedule things.

You know that Prince Saud of Saudia Arabia is with the President and afterward -- probably after this briefing -- we will have a written report on their meeting.

There are a couple of extra items on the schedule today. At noon, a group of Members of Congress are coming in to discuss with the President some views they have on a couple of pieces of energy legislation. This was requested by the Members and will be a relatively short meeting. Senators Percy, Ribicoff, Glenn, Pastore, Javits; Congressmen Price and Anderson and some staff people from the Government will be there.

Q Is that John Anderson?

MR. NESSEN: We will find out.

Q Is the President going to tell them of any initiatives to prevent the proliferation of enriched nuclear fuel?

MR. NESSEN: I think the whole question of nuclear fuel production is one of the items they want to discuss, but I don't know what will be said by the participants at the meeting since it hasn't taken place yet.

Q Can you be more specific? What do you mean, energy?

MR. NESSEN: They requested the meeting. One of the pieces of energy legislation is the production of nuclear fuel.

Q Are they going to talk about offshore oil, Ron?

Q Ron, if they could just come out and talk to us about the meeting, it would save you a lot of grief. Can they come out and talk to us?

MR. NESSEN: I will ask them.

MORE

#582

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

January 13, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

----------

ESTABLISHING THE UNITED STATES
SINAI SUPPORT MISSION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 2441 note), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), including but not limited to Sections 531, 621, 633, 901, and 903 thereof (22 U.S.C. 2346, 2381, 2393, 2441, 2443), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. (a) In accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and notwithstanding the provisions of Part I of Executive Order No. 10973, as amended, there is hereby established the United States Sinai Support Mission, hereinafter referred to as the Mission.

(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975, and the provisions of this order, carry out the duties and responsibilities of the United States Government to implement the 'United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai' in connection with the Basic Agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed on September 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement, subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for national security affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).

(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Mission to ensure that the United States role in the Early Warning System enhances the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes the cause of peace.

(d) At the head of the Mission there shall be a Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Director shall be a Special Representative of the President. There shall also be a Deputy Director, who shall be appointed by the President. The Deputy Director shall perform such duties as the Director may direct, and shall serve as the Director in the case of a vacancy in the office of the Director, or during the absence or disability of the Director.

more

2

(e) The Director and Deputy Director shall receive such compensation, as permitted by law, as the President may specify.

Sec. 2. (a) The Director shall exercise immediate supervision and direction over the Mission.

(b) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law, employ such staff as may be necessary.

(c) The Director may, to the extent permitted by law and the provisions of this order, enter into such contracts as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order.

(d) The Director may procure the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants, in accordance with the provisions of Section 626 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2386), and section 3109 of title 5 of the United States Code.

(e) As requested by the Director, the agencies of the Executive branch shall, to the extent permitted by law and to the extent practicable, provide the Mission with such administrative services, information, advice, and facilities as may be necessary for the fulfillment of the Mission's functions under this order.

Sec. 3. (a) In accordance with the provisions of Section 633 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2393), it is hereby determined to be in furtherance of the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that the functions authorized by that act and required by this order, may be performed, subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this Section, by the Director without regard to the following specified provisions of law and limitations of authority:

(1) Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529).

(2) Section 3710 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 8).

(3) Section 2 of Title III of the Act of March 3, 1933 (47 Stat. 1520, 41 U.S.C. 10a).

(4) Section 3735 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 13).

(5) Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 665), Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (41 U.S.C. 11), and Section 9 of the Act of June 30, 1906 (34 Stat. 764, 31 U.S.C. 627), so as to permit the indemnification of contractors against unusually hazardous risks, as defined in Mission contracts, consistent, to the extent practicable, with regulations prescribed by the Department of Defense pursuant to the provisions of the Act of August 28, 1958, as amended (50 U.S.C. 1431 et seq.) and Executive Order No. 10789 of November 14, 1958, as amended.

more

June 10, 1976

NOTICE TO THE PRESS

The President met with President Jaafar Nimeiri of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan in the Oval Office today at 10:35 a.m. for 40 minutes. Also attending the meeting on the Sudanese side were Minister of Education Mansour Khalid and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Francis Deng. Brent Scowcroft and Acting Secretary of State Robinson attended on the American side.

The President expressed pleasure in this first personal meeting with President Nimeiri who is making a private visit to the U.S. The meeting afforded the opportunity for an exchange of views on matters concerning Africa and the Middle East as well as bilateral relations between the Sudan and the United States. The President also thanked President Nimeiri for the successful efforts by the Government of Sudan which helped secure the release of our five American citizens that had been detained in Eritrea. The President feels that President Nimeiri is a constructive force for peace and stability in both the Arab and African worlds. He wished President Nimeiri every success in his travels which will take him to eight different states.

# # #

[L]

- 3 -

#504-6/4

Q Ron, you say they will be here tomorrow afternoon. Will they also be on the plane?

MR. NESSEN: They will also be abundantly on the press plane and on Air Force One for the pool.

That is the weekend trip, and there will be a travel pool going over tomorrow to CBS for the Face the Nation show. The President will leave here about 11:35 and will return about 12:35.

Q Has that been expanded to a full hour or is that just a 30-minute interview?

MR. NESSEN: Thirty minutes.

Q Will tapes be available?

MR. NESSEN: That is something you have to take up with CBS.

I don't have any other thoughts about tomorrow's schedule other than for guidance the President hopes to be able to get out and play a little golf tomorrow, hopefully staying out of the woods.

Looking ahead to next week, two things that you might be interested in, the President has invited the President of Botswana, President Seretse Khama, to visit the White House Wednesday at 11:00. President Khama is in the United States on a private visit following a stop in the United Kingdom.

Then the next day, on Thursday, the President is going to meet with President Jaafar Nimeiri of Sudan. President Nimeiri is also on a private visit to the United States, during which he will travel to a number of States. He is taking the opportunity of this private visit to meet with the President.

Q Ron, at any of these meetings, are they tied in with the President's Southern African initiative or just more of the -- will he be talking about that or is it just coincidence?

MR. NESSEN: In the case of Botswana, as you may know, the United States believes that Botswana, which is in Southern Africa, is making considerable progress in developing a multiracial society. The United States is pledged to help Botswana with its development. The United States also feels that President Khama and his Government have played a constructive role in the efforts to find a negotiated settlement for the problems of Southern Africa, so I suppose the short answer to your question would be yes, I would expect the problems of Southern Africa to be discussed at the meeting.

MORE

#504

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 17, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Jerusalem, Israel)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

KINGS HOTEL

8:05 A.M. (Jerusalem time)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So many of you listening to Ron's briefings have got the idea that I had left the trip that it was felt useful on this last day for me to answer some questions and Ron agreed, provided I didn't make an opening statement. (Laughter)

I will be glad to answer any questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, it has been almost a week since you made your statement about resigning unless your integrity was restored. Do you feel any better about it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will answer this question, but then I won't answer any other questions on that subject. We will keep it there. I stick by what I said a week ago and now the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is going to look into the matter.

Q There is a report in the morning papers that President Nixon has instructed you to get in touch with Palestinian leaders in the near future. Do you have a comment on that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no basis to this report.

Q Mr. Secretary, how certain are the technicians and the scientists that information given to Egypt cannot be used to manufacture a bomb?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is important to get this agreement into some sort of a perspective. We have agreements on nuclear reactors, I believe, with 28 other countries. You can check the exact number. The issue of diversion has never been raised in the face of our safeguards except in the last month because of the India nuclear explosion. The India nuclear explosion occurred with material that was diverted not from an American reactor under American safeguards, but from a Canadian reactor that did not have appropriate safeguards.

MORE

- 2 -

We have always been confident that the safeguard agreements upon which we have insisted and on which we shall insist in this particular case, are adequate to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. Nevertheless, we will review these safeguards in the negotiations that have to take place with Egypt or with any other government with which we will negotiate a similar agreement to make doubly sure that there aren't any loopholes in it.

This reactor will take from six to eight years to build and in that period, will, of course, provide an incentive to concentrate on, among others, on economic development rather than on military purposes; a period of time within which we believe that the turn towards peace in the Middle East can be finally accomplished.

Q Are the Israeli officials that you have made this explanation to satisfied with it? Are they confident as you are that there will be no diversion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Needless to say, for a country that has lived as precariously as Israel, anything with even a vague potential for affecting the military situation is a source of some concern.

I believe, however, that those Israeli officials with whom I have had an opportunity to talk and with whom the President has had an opportunity to talk, realize that there is no danger of military diversion, that they are reassured and I believe that this whole matter is going to blow over very quickly.

Q Mr. Secretary, has there been any discussion in any degree of detail between you or the President and the Israelis on the problem of withdrawal from the 1967 territories that were seized by the Israels and what is their reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been no discussion in the talks between the President and the Israelis on this trip and for that matter between myself and the Israelis on any previous trip of a specific line to which Israel should withdraw in the course of negotiations.

We have deliberately adopted a step by step approach in which the United States did not put forward any precise idea, but rather permitted the parties to crystalize their own thinking and only when that had occurred has the United States put forward specifics. Those who were on trips with me know that we spent sometimes agonizing weeks letting the parties crystalize their own thinking before we emerged with something called the United States proposal to bridge gaps that had already become very narrow.

So the United States has not talked to Israel either on this trip or on my previous trips about any particular line but only about the general process of withdrawal that will be part of a negotiation, to which Israel has of course always agreed.

MORE

[L.C.]

- 4 -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course I shouldn't anticipate what may be in the joint statement that is still under discussion, and in fact, which I will have to be discussing right after the press conference, however, enough has been said publicly by senior officials about the agreement in principle by the United States to look at the military needs of Israel on a longer term basis that I don't think you would go overboard to speculate that we would agree to this.

Q How much, a million and a half a year?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, we are not talking about either specific figures or about a specific time. We are talking about the principle of it.

Q Mr. Secretary, what will the next step be in the Middle East peace negotiation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, you remember that in Egypt President Sadat pointed out that there were some further exchanges needed between the various Arab countries before the Arab countries could decide which would be the most appropriate next step. What the United States is prepared to do is to exchange informally ideas with all of the parties to see which course will crystallize and that, in turn, will require that there are some prior discussions among the Arab countries.

As far as the United States and Israel is concerned, we expect to see the Foreign Minister in the United States next month and the Prime Minister at an early date, and we will then discuss a common approach to the negotiation.

Q Mr. Secretary, has President Assad definitely agreed to attend the Geneva conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know whether that question has ever been formally put to him this way, but certainly all our discussions were within the framework of the theory of him attending the Geneva conference, and I don't believe there is any problem about that.

Q Have you noticed any change in attitudes or concern among the leaders you discussed because of the uncertainty you cast over your future because of your comments in Salzburg?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not discussed the issue with any of the leaders with whom we have met and I have not had that impression. Of course, there is some hope in the State Department. (Laughter)

MORE

- 5 -

Q Can you give us an overview of what you think has happened in the Arab countries and Israel in terms of what is the situation now, as you see it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think, to understand the situation now, one has to consider it in the perspective of what has occurred in the six or seven months since the initiative, in which the President's trip culminated, began. When this initiative began the Middle East was polarized between the Arab world on the one side, and Israel on the other, with the Arab world backed by the Soviet Union, Israel backed by the United States.

As a result, every conflict in the Middle East had the insoluable quality of a superpower confrontation and the United States' role was seen as that of simply representing one of the sides in a dispute which had been festering for 25 years. Last November, there began a diplomatic turn in which the United States, without giving up its traditional friendship and support for Israel, at the same time began to move into a position where it could be helpful to all of the parties in the process of negotiation and where in turn, the other countries in the Middle East began to reconsider their one-sided reliance on only one of the countries.

This process leading to disengagement negotiations culminated in the Presidential trip which has to be seen on many levels. On the one level, as a symbolic affirmation of a dramatic reversal in the whole historic evolution of this area; at the same time as enabling the United States to begin a relationship with all of the countries in the area, not based on the exigencies of a particular crisis, but based on the long-term prosperity and progress of the area, and the President's visit and conversation in all of these countries has served to crystallize and to put into a focus this direction of the relationship between the United States and all of the countries in the area.

And thirdly, it has enabled the President to engage in preliminary conversations, not about the tactics of how peace should be made, but about the general direction of the peace efforts, and I therefore think that the Middle East policy, if we can stay on this course, and we all recognize that this is a very tricky and complicated area, could mark one of the turning points in the post-war diplomatic history.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in your opinion and that of United States, how can the Palestinians effectively and constructively be brought into this whole negotiating process that has just been described?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, the most efficient way for the Palestinians to be brought into the process is through a Jordanian negotiation in which there is the historical background and for which Israel has always declared its readiness in principle. As for other steps that might be taken, I think it is premature to speculate at this point when there are other issues, such as borders and territory, that require more urgent consideration.

MORE

- 6 -

Q Mr. Secretary, a few minutes ago in response to a question on withdrawal from the occupied lands, you said at the end of your response, "to which Israel has always agreed."

What is it on withdrawal that Israel has always agreed to?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Israel has always agreed that it did not insist on holding all the territories acquired or occupied in the 1967 war. The dispute between Israel and her neighbors has concerned to what precise line Israel should withdraw. This is an issue that did not have to be faced in the stages of negotiations through which we have been going.

Q Mr. Secretary, we really can't sense very well what the mood or the style of the talks is with the President and these leaders. Could you describe a little bit involving when you are in the room, what it is like and how they approach subjects and somewhat of the tone of what goes on?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President's style in negotiatons is a very reflective style, that is to say he does not go in there with ten specific points to bargain on a specific agreement. He believes that as President his greatest contribution is to set a general direction, to make sure the parties with which we are dealing understand our basic purposes and then to leave it to others to fill in the details of the day to day negotiations. That is all the more necessary as in a six to four hour meeting one can in any event only cover the main directions. Therefore, in these meetings, the President always attempts to make sure and in my view does so very effectively to put across to the leader with whom he is talking what the general purposes are of the United States.

He then elicits from them a statement of the directions in which they want to go. I want to stress, the purpose of this trip is not simply to design or primarily to design a negotiation process for the next three months, but to bring about an understanding which can sustain the process over the next few years.

Secondly, in discussing the bilateral relationships, we attempt to define what the long-term purposes are that we and the country which we are visiting can share within the framework of which then the precise technical arrangements can be worked out.

Peter.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there was an air of haste about the Declaration of Principles which was issued in Cairo. Can you tell us when preparations for that Declaration began?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know whether you can deduce from the typos an air of haste. The preparations for the Declaration of Principles began about ten days -- On my

MORE

- 7 -

last visit to President Sadat, after the completion of the
Syrian disengagement agreement, it was agreed first to set up
the Cooperation Commission and, secondly, that specific
details of that Commission would be spelled out during the
course of the President's visit.

So as soon as I returned, preparations began about
spelling out the details of that aspect of it. The
nuclear part had been negotiated since April, I believe,
by a visiting team of Egyptians and it happened to
crystallize at about the time of the Presidential visit and
there was no long-term design to make it coincide with the
Presidential visit. It just happened to coincide
with the Presidential visit and it was, therefore, included
as part of the general package. The basic idea had been
in preparation before the President arrived.

It was then discussed in great detail by the two
Presidents and was reduced into a concrete statement on
Thursday night. The Administrative difficulty that
existed was that the party was divided between Alexandria
and Cairo and, by passing the documents back and forth
between Alexandria and Cairo, a few lines of the communique
were inadvertently dropped. Ziegler said he would take
responsibility for that. (Laughter.) I sure as hell won't.
(laughter.)

MORE

- 8 -

Q There is a feeling here in one's conversations with Israelis that there is a mood which presumes that the Arab strategy right now is to consolidate their position preparatory to the long-range design of continuing an offensive to liquidate the State of Israel.

On the basis of your talks with the Arabs to date
what reassurance, if any, can you give the Israeli populace
that this is or is not in the long range design or scheme
of the Arab neighbors that surround them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: People who have lived for 25 years with the threat of extinction, whose neighbors for its entire history have not recognized its existence, needless to say lives with a premonition of catastrophe that is not true of almost any other state, and therefore the sense of catastrophe, partly as a result of Jewish history, partly as a result of Israel's history, has to be deep in the souls of everybody here and we, as Americans, have to understand it.

On the other hand, it is our conviction that for
the first time in the existence of Israel, the Arab states,
even the more radical ones like Syria, are talking about
a continuing State of Israel and that some of the Arab
states seem to have made a rather crucial decision to seek
to work out modalities of coexistence with the State of
Israel.

Now this is an entirely new experience for Israel, and it is also difficult and a painful adjustment for Israel to see that the polarization that had been characteristic of the area through most of the history of Israel, with the United States totally on one side and the Soviet Union totally on the other, is also changing to a more complex relationship.

In my experience one of the more moving aspects
of the disengagement negotiations has been to see the
transformation of that fear into a sense that in the course
of the negotiations a greater sense of security has
developed through the process that the President initiated
last October, and I believe that as a result of this trip
and of the events that will follow this trip, that Israel
will understand that its long-term security is more surely
guaranteed by what is now going on and in fact it is the
only way to assure it.

This doesn't mean, however, that as one goes through
particular phases there may not be elements of uncertainty
and even elements of pain, but we will face them with a
sense of partnership and understanding that has been
characteristic of our previous efforts.

MORE

- 9 -

Q Can you comment on reports this morning that you are also about to sign an agreement whereby Israel will be given assistance in the direction of a nuclear power plant?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is of course difficult for me to comment on things that will be in a joint statement, but it is reasonable to assume that we are prepared to make agreement with Israel that we have also made with Egypt.

Q You say we are?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In principle.

Q You mean on the nuclear plants?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why don't you wait until we -- I don't think I should answer any more questions on what may or may not be in a communique that may or may not be published.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you stated that it would be most desirable if Jordan would be the spokesman for the Palistinians, however, both Syria and Egypt made it abundantly clear they regard the Palestiné Liberation Organization, possibly some of the branches, as a legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians. Does the United States intend to deal with the PLO and would it recognize them as the legitimate spokesman of the Palestinians if Egypt and Syria insisted on this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. What I said was thát this is one and perhaps the most efficient way of doing it. We consider the question now premature. We will not make our decision based primarily on what this or that other state in the area may recommend.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you be willing to recommend as a next step in the negotiations disengagement talks between Israel and Jordan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has always favored in principle talks between Israel and Jordan and it is my understanding that Israel is not in principle opposed to talks between Israel and Jordan. The problem is whether one can find some framework within which these talks may take place. If the two parties agree on talks, the United States would be prepared to be helpful and to play a useful role.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END (AT 8:31 A.M. Jerusalem time)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DPC 237

TRANSCRIPT OF DAILY NEWS BRIEFING
MONDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1976, 12:50 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FUNSETH: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. Questions?

Q Bob, Israel is now undergoing some considerable political uncertainty. Could you tell us what the State Department thinks the impact might be on Middle East negotiations prospects?

A I have no judgement on that.

Q Good question though. (Laughter)

Q Hell of a question. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any comment on the Syrian seizure of newspapers in Lebanon?

Q Including two American newspapers.

Q Including two American news agencies.

A I understand the two American agent offices have re-opened this morning.

In any case, our support for the principle of freedom of the press is well known. We strongly deplore

A-2

violations of this principle wherever they occur in the
world.

Q Was this a violation of that principle?

Besides your general statement I wish you would
respond to the situation at hand.

A ON BACKGROUND, Barry, the only information
I have is -- and I am not deprecating it by saying "only" --
but the only information I have is public reports of
what happened. But, ON BACKGROUND, it certainly appears
to me that this is a violation of freedom of the press
when newspaper offices are closed.

Q Did the United States communicate with any
of the parties about this?

A As of this morning we are looking into
this.

Q Do you know whether it was a violation of the
understandings reached in Riyadh and Cairo?

A I do not know.

Q When you say you are looking into it, does
that mean you did or you did not communicate?

A We are looking into the matter.

Q Yes. But, the question was: Are you

A-3

communicating with anybody about it?

Q Has the United States -- I am sorry.

A Let me see if I can be more specific.

Q Bob, on the same issue, I think this is getting very picayune, but if you understand that the American news agencies involved have been re-opened, I take it that is an understanding based beyond news reports. So, therefore, you must have information available to you concerning *An-Nahar* and the other papers that have been occupied by the Syrian agencies -- the Syrian army, that goes beyond newspaper reports.

I am a little bit puzzled by what I think is an ambiguous or hesitant action on your part to condemn what appears to be a clear violation of what American policy has been.

A ON BACKGROUND, the only information we have this morning is that we understand *Newsweek* and UPI re-opened, but that the other papers remained closed. That is all I have. But, I stand four square by the statement I made initially -- that we strongly deplore violations of this principle wherever they occur.

[L.C.]

A-4

Q Do you deplore Syrian violation of this principle?

A We deplore violations wherever they occur.

Q Are you willing to put the word "Syrian" in there in this current event?

A I think that what I have said this morning is consistent with what I have said when violations occur anywhere in the world.

Q Bob, months ago when Syria first moved into Lebanon you almost daily made a statement in support of Lebanese sovereignty. I wonder if you could assess for us, now that the dust, is settling what the state of Lebanese sovereignty is from a U.S. viewpoint and what the prospects are of Syria withdrawing its forces from Lebanon?

A I think the last question about withdrawal of the Arab peace keeping force should be directed to the Lebanese. That force is there with the consent of the present Lebanese government. Lebanon now has a President and they have a Prime Minister and they have a government and that is well known.

A-5

Q All right.

About the future of Lebanon's sovereignty, do you
see it as very bright this morning?

A We have confidence that President Sarkis
will be able to bind the wounds in Lebanon and we certainly
support the Lebanese government. The most important
problem, of course, confronting Lebanon today is the
economic question and this is one which we have been
discussing with his envoy, Ghassan Tueini, who came
here at our invitation and who will be back in Washington
during the course of this week for further discussions
with American officials.

Q Do you know -- on another subject -- do
you know how long --

B-1

Q On that same subject --

A Yes, Marvin.

Q -- what is the amount of aid that the Lebanese envoy is asking for?

A I do not have anything on that. I do not know that we have a figure yet. I think the initial talks -- at least, it is my understanding -- concerned the dimensions of the problem. I do not know whether we have gotten down to actual cost figures.

Q Could you check, because it's --

A I will, yes. I will check.

Q Bob, I asked you -- excuse me, still with the Middle East --

A Go ahead.

Q -- I asked you before -- I think the way I put it is what effect you thought the political unrest in Israel might have on negotiations prospects. I was asking for a judgment, and you didn't have one; but can you tell me in a practical way: Can there be continued efforts by the United States to deal with the situation and promote negotiations, in light of the current situation in Israel?

B-2

A You are asking me essentially about an internal political development and how that would affect the larger problem of the search for peace in the Middle East. And I think -- certainly speaking for the present Administration -- our efforts continue. The incoming Administration has also gone on record as saying that this is a subject of high priority. I just really cannot go beyond saying that.

Q In other words, you're saying you think the Rabin government is in a stable enough position that you can continue to deal with them regarding negotiations in the Middle East, or are you sort of holding back and awaiting developments?

A I have seen nothing that would suggest that anyone is holding back in terms of pursuing the Middle East effort, but I have -- please remember that a new Administration is taking over the 20th of January and I do not want to be in a position of making assessments on their behalf for the period when they will have the responsibility.

Q Also on the Middle East, Secretary-General Waldheim in an interview published today says that he's received

B-3

strong encouragement, both from the United States
and from Arab governments, and is seeking the same kind of
encouragement from the Israeli Government to intervene
actively in the Middle East. Can you confirm that
we have -- the United States Government has encouraged
Waldheim in these efforts, and what's our general attitude
toward it?

A I think the Secretary said in general terms
that we certainly supported the Secretary-General's efforts,
after his meeting with him last week. I cannot go beyond
that.

Q Bob, is the Secretary going to become an
honorary Globetrotter tomorrow?

A That is right. At noon. It will be open
for coverage.

Q Will he be wearing shorts? (Laughter.)

A I have asked him this question, but he has not
confirmed it. I think he is getting a basketball and a jersey
with No. "1" on it.

Q Is that here?

A Here. It will be in the Benjamin Franklin Room.

Q What time will that be?

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 7, 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today sent the following Directive to the Secretary of Commerce.

Would you please assure that the Department of Commerce takes steps to permit the public inspection and copying of boycott-related reports to be filed in the future with the Department of Commerce. Only business proprietary information regarding such things as quantity and type of goods exported, the release of which could place reporting firms at a competitive disadvantage, should not be made available to the public.

During the past year, there has been a growing interest in and awareness of the impact of the Arab boycott on American business. Disclosure of boycott-related reports will enable the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact of the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American companies.

I have concluded that this public disclosure will strengthen existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East. The action I am directing today should serve as a reaffirmation of our national policy of opposition to boycott actions against nations friendly to us.

###

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 7, 1976

THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET

The President today directed the Secretary of Commerce to take appropriate steps to permit, prospectively, the public inspection and copying of boycott-related reports filed with the Department of Commerce. Only business proprietary information regarding such things as quantity and type of goods exported, the release of which could place reporting firms at a competitive disadvantage, will not be made publicly available.

During the past year there has been a growing interest in and awareness of the impact of the Arab boycott on American business. Disclosure of boycott-related reports will enable the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact of the Arab boycott and to monitor the conduct of American companies. The Department of Commerce will commence public disclosure of reports regarding boycott-related requests received by American companies on or after October 7, 1976.

Public disclosure of boycott reports will complement positive steps already taken by the Ford Administration to oppose the boycott and to insure that American citizens and firms will be fully protected from any discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex that might arise from foreign boycott practices. These steps have included the following:

1. In March, 1975, the President established a special White House task force under the direction of the Office of the White House Counsel to conduct a study and to make recommendations regarding actions which could be taken in connection with various aspects of the impact of foreign boycotts and related discrimination.

2. Effective October 1, 1975, the Department of Commerce made it mandatory rather than optional for United States firms to inform the Department whether or not they had complied with requests from foreign governments for information on boycott-related matters.

3. In November, 1975, President Ford announced the most far-reaching Executive Branch actions ever directed at foreign boycott practices. This action was the culmination of the study which the President had directed be undertaken earlier in the year. The President announced decisions and actions to insure that American citizens and firms will be fully protected from any discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex that might arise from foreign boycott practices. The President further issued specific directives to implement his decisions.

(a) The President signed a Directive to the Heads of All Departments and Agencies which prohibited under Executive Order 11478 and relevant statutes, any Federal agency from taking into account in making selections for overseas assignments any exclusionary policies of a host country based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Federal agencies were requested to inform the State Department of visa rejections based on exclusionary policies and the State Department would attempt through diplomatic channels to gain entry for those individuals.

(MORE)

(OVER)

-2-

(L[C])

(b) The President instructed the Secretary of Labor to require Federal contractors and subcontractors that have job applicants or present employees applying for overseas assignments to inform the Department of State of any visa rejections based on the exclusionary policies of a host country. The Department of State would then attempt, through diplomatic channels, to gain entry for those individuals.

(c) The President proposed the Economic Coercion Act of 1975 to prohibit a business enterprise from using economic means to coerce any person or entity to discriminate against any U. S. person or entity on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.

(d) The President directed the Secretary of Commerce to amend the Export Administration Act's regulations to:

(1) prohibit complaint with any boycott request which would discriminate against U. S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.

(2) extend the reporting requirements to any person or firm other than the exporter handling any phase of the export transaction (such as banks, insurers, shipping companies, and freight forwarders).

(e) The President stated that his Administration would not tolerate discriminatory commercial banking practices or policies based upon the race or religious belief of any customer, stockholder, employee, officer or director of a bank and that such practices or policies are incompatible with the public service function of a banking institution in this country.

(f) The President supported legislation to amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which covered sex and marital status, to include prohibition against any creditor discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin against any credit applicant in any aspect of a credit transaction. This legislation passed the Congress and was signed by President Ford on March 23, 1976.

(g) The President urged the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities Dealers to take whatever action necessary to insure that discriminatory exclusion in the investment banking industry was not tolerated and that nondiscriminatory participation was maintained.

4. On December 1, 1975, the Secretary of Commerce ceased Commerce Department dissemination of information on trade opportunities containing boycott requests.

5. On January 16, 1976, the Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust suit against an American company charging it with implementing an agreement to refuse to deal with U. S. subcontractors blacklisted by certain Arab countries and to require U. S. subcontractors to refuse to deal with blacklisted persons or entities.

(MORE)

6. On April 29, 1976, the Secretary of Commerce directed that all charging letters issued for violations of the Export Administration Act regulations relating to the boycott be made public.

7. On October 4, 1976, President Ford signed the Tax Reform Act under a provision of which foreign source income attributable to certain boycott-related activity will lose the tax benefits of the foreign tax credit, the Domestic International Sales Corporations ("DISCs"), and the deferral of United States tax on foreign source income.

These actions have put an effective end to foreign discrimination against American firms or citizens on the basis of religion, national origin, race, color, or sex. Public disclosure of boycott reports will further strengthen existing policy against the Arab boycott of Israel without jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East.

###

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#581

AT 11:45 A.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 16, 1976

THURSDAY

MR. NESSEN: The Economic Policy Board did have its meeting today, postponed from the other day. It was for the purpose that I mentioned, which was to review at least some of the features of the tax bill. The President did not make any decisions there at the meeting.

Q Ron, you were sitting in on the whole meeting?

MR. NESSEN: John was.

Q Did the President make any comment about it at all that might be of interest to us?

MR. NESSEN: It was mostly an informal and discussion meeting and not a decision-making meeting.

Q Did they talk about tax breaks for college parents who have given to colleges that are non-public schools that he talked about last night?

MR. NESSEN: That is not in the bill.

Q I am sorry. No, I understand that.

MR. NESSEN: At 11:00, the President had a meeting with Ambassador Volpe and Jeno Paulucci. The purpose of this was to discuss the Italian earthquake. As you may know, Mr. Paulucci was in Italy earlier this month and before he went, the President asked him to make an assessment of the earthquake relief program and determine how the U.S. relief efforts were going and any suggestions he might have for improving them, and also, his more general impressions of the earthquake area and the general Italian situation.

So, just by way of background, the United States has provided Italy with $25 million in earthquake relief assistance since the initial earthquake, which was on May 6th. In case you don't recall, an estimated 1,000 people were killed and about 70,000 were left homeless. I think you may recall that Vice President Rockefeller and the AID Administrator, Daniel Parker, went to Italy at the President's direction later in May to survey the damage and to recommend an American effort.

MORE

#581

- 11 -

#581-9716

Q Ron, you said it is being reviewed by the
Justice Department?

MR. NESSEN: Right.

Q Do you think it is also being reviewed by the
Central Intelligence Agency?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know enough about the details,
myself.

Q Ron, I apologize if this question has been
asked before, but last week, the President, when he
was speaking to the B'nai B'rith, suggested that he favored
some kind of anti-boycott legislation. We tried to get
Mr. Baker, his campaign chairman, to explain what kind of
anti-boycott legislation the President favors.

MR. NESSEN: Why would you ask Jim Baker?

Q Because he was available and he is the
campaign chairman.

MR. NESSEN: A target of opportunity.

Q We thought possibly this was a political
maneuver on the President's part and Mr. Baker was absolutely
astounded to learn that the President favored anti-boycott
legislation since he opposed it on the Hill. Could you tell
us what kind of anti-boycott legislation he now favors?

MR. NESSEN: Do you have the transcript of what
the President said?

Q At the B'nai B'rith?

MR. NESSEN: Yes.

Q I am sure it is available in your office.

MR. NESSEN: What he said was -- he went on and
talked about the whole boycott situation and what he had
done about it and at one point, he said something about
"legislation if necessary," and that is an unchanged position,
that the steps he has taken, steps to deal with this practice,
those steps are working and somewhere down the line, if they
don't work fully and adequately, at that point, he would then
support some kind of legislation, if necessary, to deal
with the problem.

Q He does not favor anti-boycott legislation
as of this moment?

MR. NESSEN: He has not changed his position
at all, Bob.

MORE

#581

- 12 -

#581-9/16

Q There is some in the tax bill pending and apparently, there has been no decision on vetoing or not vetoing the tax bill, right?

MR. NESSEN: That is correct.

Q What does he think about the provision in the tax bill that would deny tax breaks to people who honor the boycott?

MR. NESSEN: I don't know what specific wording was finally agreed to in that area. I know that some versions of that were opposed in testimony by Administration witnesses on grounds that the President, last November, took action to deal with the boycott.

Q Did that come up today in the review?

MR. NESSEN: I did not attend that entire meeting. I will have to ask, John.

Q Ron, can I go back to the auto strike for a minute? While the President was in his residence yesterday afternoon at Ann Arbor -- that period when you said old friends would drop in on him -- did he by any chance see anybody connected with either the Ford Motor Company or with the United Auto Workers?

MR. NESSEN: Not that I know of. I will check and see who came to see him but I am not aware of any plan to do that.

Q Ron, as long as we returned to the Ford strike, if my memory is correct, this is the largest -- in terms of number of workers out -- the largest strike in the United States in six years. Does the President have any comment whatever, recognizing his economic philosophy and all the rest of it—nevertheless, I think it is the largest strike in the United States in six years -- does the President of the United States have any comment whatever to offer to reporters and from them to the public on this strike?

MR. NESSEN: I think, Jim, he has commented each time he has been asked about this over the past few days. I have commented on it each time I have been asked about it over the past few days and the comment is always the same, because it is his view, and that is that the collective bargaining process should be allowed to work, and it is working.

Q Michigan is one of the few States where published polls show Ford ahead of Carter. Is there any concern if the strike goes on close to the election, or beyond, that it will hurt him politically in Michigan?

MORE

#581

1460

[LC]

Last night, as some of you may know, I engaged in a very serious discussion about the need for maintaining a strong national defense. My opponent and I differ on how to go about that process. One of those differences is represented by the model that you work on, that I have just seen, and I think it is a crucial issue in this campaign.

But first, let me congratulate all of you for winning the Zero Defect Award. I am glad you are not working for the Carter campaign. [Laughter] I might say parenthetically that there are a lot of defects to choose in that campaign, but one of the biggest of Mr. Carter's defects is his opposition to the B-1 bomber.

As you and I meet this morning, thousands of American servicemen all around the globe are standing watch, some patrolling borders, some sailing a ship, and some manning our aircraft. As Commander in Chief, I am responsible for each one of them. We owe each one of those young Americans not just our support and our prayers—we owe them the very best equipment that this country can buy.

Our current manned bomber, the B-52, is already more than 20 years old, and by the time the B-1 is ready to take its place, the B-52 will be in operation over four decades. I don't believe that any President should ask any serviceman to defend his country in a combat aircraft that is older than he is.

Last night, we both agreed on the need for toughness in facing the Soviet Union. But toughness requires more than talk. It requires having the right weapon systems. If we want peace in the world, we have to let our enemies know we are willing to defend the peace. They may or they may not understand that in English, but this B-1 is the message that they will clearly understand.

The B-1 is one of the clearest examples as to what is at stake in this campaign. My opponent either favors the cancelling or the delay of the B-1. His running mate in the Senate, Senator Mondale, voted against the B-1 in the Senate no less than three times. They say the B-1 is unnecessary. I certainly hope and pray that is true, but what if those critics are wrong?

The very fact that we don't have the B-1 could well invite a challenge from abroad. If we are wrong about buying the B-1, the cost will be measured in dollars and cents. If we are wrong about not buying the B-1, the cost could well be measured in lives and in blood.

As President, I will not take the chance. Our children will live in a future where Soviet technology poses an increasing threat to the security of the United States. The B-1 bomber provides graphic proof to our friends and to our enemies that 200 years have not diminished America's commitment to freedom.

The B-1 bomber is not the only major difference in this campaign. Another fundamental critical issue is the proper size of America's defense budget. The issue is simple. Our

opponent wants to cut it. We want to keep it intact and keep it strong.

Over the last year and a half, our opponent has cited various figures as to how much the defense budget ought to be cut. About a year ago, Mr. Carter said it could be cut $15 billion. A few months ago he changed and said it could be cut $7 to $9 billion, and now the figure they use is $5 to $7 billion.

They are vague about the place where those cuts could be made, but the realities of manpower needs and pension requirements and many, many other fixed costs ensure that a cut of that magnitude—whether it is 15, or 7-to-9, or 5-to-7—would have to come from weapon system procurement. That would be a strategic tragedy for America. It would be an economic tragedy for the State of California and other States which do the research and development and build this wonderful weapon system.

Our opponent's platform amounts to an overall policy of "fire them and hire them." First, $5 to $7 billion in defense cuts would put you and thousands and thousands of others out of work. Then the Humphrey-Hawkins bill would try to put you back to work in deaden public service jobs. That formula would be a triple disaster. It would mean less defense, it would mean less real employment, it would mean more taxes and more inflation.

Our opponents have managed to turn the words of President Teddy Roosevelt upside down. Some of you may recall that Teddy Roosevelt once said, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." Our opponent wants to speak loudly and carry a fly swatter. Such an attitude is a danger to our military and diplomatic stability abroad and to our economic stability here in America.

World peace depends on continued American military strength. Over the years, the workers of California have played a vital role in maintaining that strength and keeping that peace. You have done a great job. In the next 4 years, I am going to see that you keep right on doing it.
Thank you, and congratulations.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:35 a.m. at the B-1 Division of the Rockwell International Corporation. In his opening remarks, the President referred to Robert Anderson, president and chief executive officer of Rockwell International.

As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release.

## Arab Boycott of American Businesses

*The President's Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce. October 7, 1976*

Volume 12—Number 41

1461

During the past year, there has been a growing interest in and awareness of the impact of the Arab Boycott on American business. Disclosures of boycott-related reports will enable the American public to assess for itself the nature and impact of the Arab Boycott and to monitor the conduct of American companies.

I have concluded that this public disclosure will strengthen existing policy against the Arab Boycott of Israel without jeopardizing our vital interests in the Middle East. The action I am directing today should serve as a reaffirmation of our national policy of opposition to boycott actions against nations friendly to us.

GERALD R. FORD

NOTE: The text of the memorandum was released in Los Angeles, Calif.

## National Volunteer Firemen Week

Proclamation 4467. Dated October 7, 1976. Released October 8, 1976

By the President of the United States of America, a proclamation

Throughout America, especially in small towns, communities, and in rural areas, approximately one million volunteer firefighters outnumber fulltime paid firefighters by about four to one.

From the beginning of our Nation's history, they have risked, and often sacrificed, their lives fighting fires in their communities with no expectation of financial reward. This unselfish concern for life and property is a manifestation of the best in the American character.

In recognition of the enormous contributions made by these volunteers, the House (September 21, 1976) and the Senate (October 1, 1976) have requested that the President proclaim the week of October 3, 1976, as National Volunteer Firemen Week (H.J. Res. 1008).

Now, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning October 3, 1976, and ending October 9, 1976, as National Volunteer Firemen Week.

As requested by the Congress, I call upon the people of the United States to observe that week with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this seventh day of October, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and first.

GERALD R. FORD

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register. October 8, 1976]

## Commission on Postal Service

Announcement of the Appointment of Two Members and Designation of Chairman. October 7, 1976

The President today announced the appointment of two persons as members of the Commission on Postal Service. The Commission was established by Public Law 94-421 of September 24, 1976. The appointees are:

KENT RHODES, of Chappaqua, N.Y., president, Reader's Digest Foundation, Pleasantville, N.Y.

HOBART TAYLOR, JR., of the District of Columbia, partner in the law firm of Dawson, Quinn, Riddell, Taylor and Davis, Washington, D.C.

The President today also announced the designation of Gaylord Freeman, of Wayne, Ill., as Chairman of the Commission on Postal Service. Mr. Freeman, former chairman of the board of the First National Bank of Chicago, is currently the honorary chairman of the board of the First National Bank of Chicago.

The Commission shall identify and study the problems facing the U.S. Postal Service and recommend actions to be taken to resolve those problems.

The Commission shall transmit to the President and to the Congress a final report on or before March 15, 1977.

NOTE: The announcement was released at Los Angeles, Calif.

## President's Committee on Science and Technology

Announcement of Appointment of Nine Members and the Designation of the Vice Chairman of the Committee. October 7, 1976

The President today announced the appointment of nine persons as members of the President's Committee on Science and Technology. They are:

Volume 12—Number 41

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OCTOBER 7, 1976

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Los Angeles, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

GERALD R. FCRD

###

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DECEMBER 4, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President today announced his intention to nominate William J. Porter, of Massachusetts, a Foreign Service Officer of the class of Career Minister, to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He will succeed James E. Akins who has resigned.

Since March 1974, Ambassador Porter has been Ambassador to Canada. Prior to his appointment, he was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. During 1971, he was appointed by the President as his Personal Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to head the United States Delegation at the Paris meetings on Viet Nam. From 1967 to 1971, he was Ambassador to Korea after having served as Deputy Ambassador to Viet Nam, with the personal rank of Ambassador from 1965 to 1967. He was Ambassador to Algeria from 1962 to 1965. During 1961-62, he was Principal Officer with the personal rank of Minister in Algiers, after having training in the Arabic language during 1960-61.

In 1957, Ambassador Porter became Director of the Office of North African Affairs and was Deputy Chief of Mission in Rabat from 1953 to 1957 after having been Principal Officer. He was a political adviser to the Chief of Voice of America in New York from 1951 to 1953. During 1946 he served as Acting Palestine Desk Officer at the State Department and was Political Officer in Jerusalem (1946-48) and a Principal Officer (1948-50).

Born on September 1, 1914, in Staleybridge, England, Ambassador Porter became a naturalized U. S. citizen in 1936. He was educated at Boston College and Thibodeau College of Business Administration in Fall River, Massachusetts. He was in private business in Fall River, Massachusetts from 1933 to 1936 and served as private secretary to Minister Montgomery in Budapest during 1936-37. He began his Foreign Service career in Baghdad in 1937, and later went to Beirut (1941-43), and Damascus (1943-46).

Ambassador Porter is married to the former Eleanore Henry. They have two children.

# # #

- 20 -

#278-7/22/75

Q Secondly, can you tell us the Congressmen the President has conferred with about this during the negotiations?

MR. NESSEN: I have heard it come up a number of times in his weekly meetings with both Republican and Bipartisan Congressional leaders.

Q In terms of conferring with them?

MR. NESSEN: Explaining what the process is and what the various unresolved issues have been, and how the United States wanted to have them resolved.

Q But my question goes to the word "conferring." In other words, have Senator Mansfield and Senator Sparkman of the Foreign Relations Committee and others been consulted in advance on parts of the treaty or Act?

MR. NESSEN: I need to check on the exact number of consultations and discussions.

Q Ron, if the Ford Administration is committed, as I understand it, to the survival of Israel, why is there so much pushing by the Administration on Capitol Hill to get permission to sell so many batteries of Hawk missiles to Jordan, who has just allied itself with Syria?

MR. NESSEN: The arms sales to Jordan have been going on for quite some time. There has been no change or increase.

Q They deny that. They say that $350 million is more than I think in the last decade to Jordan.

MR. NESSEN: The arms relationship with Jordan has been an old one and has been going on for some time. These particular batteries have been under discussion for several months.

And the other point to remember is that these are purely defensive weapons.

Q You said today there is no updating of Eastern European borders. Why is it this point has been written about over and over again by responsible correspondent groups --

MR. NESSEN: I don't know why. There is a misunderstanding, but I suggest you read the Final Act. I suggest you attend the Hartman and Sonnenfeldt briefing and the Kissinger briefing because I do think this has been somewhat generalized and oversimplified.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Ron.

END (AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)

#278

Jordan Arms

[10]

- 5 -

#279-7/23/75

Q Was there such a letter sent?

MR. GREENER: I will have them check on that
for you.

Q As I understand it, you are an Air
Force officer, is that true?

MR. GREENER: Yes, I was one. I am no longer.

Q The reason I ask this is because yesterday
Ron Nessen, when asked about the Hawk missile, defined
this as a defensive weapon. Jaynes' Weapon System and
Aviation Week and Space Technology point out this
particular missile has a range of 22 miles, can be mounted
on a mobile vehicle, so if it were put on the Jordanian
side of the Jordan River they could knock commercial planes
out of the approach space to Ben Gurion Airport in Tel
Aviv.

On what basis does the President's Press
Secretary claim this thing, 500 of which they are trying
to sell to Jordan, is a defensive missile? Could you
tell me, as an Air Force officer?

MR. GREENER: Thank you very much, Les. (Laughter)

Q I will let you off on that. The Army uses
this, not the Air Force.

MR. GREENER: That is exactly what the Hawk
missile was designed for, to be a defensive missile.

Q Is it an antiaircraft or antitank gun?

MR. GREENER: Antiaircraft defensive missile.

Q 22 miles?

MR. GREENER: You quoted the figures. I would
have to check on that, Les.

Q Bill, on something else, there are reports
this morning that the President is going to be sending up
a second decontrol plan later this week that would
lengthen the phase-out period maybe three years instead
of two and one-half. It might also jiggle around that $12.50
ceiling price he specified earlier.

Is it true that a second decontrol plan is in
the works?

MORE

#279

- 4 -

#279-7/23/75

Q Have you checked on whether there will be a briefing here on Friday?

MR. GREENER: We have not decided yet, but I expect we will, particularly to clean up anything before we depart on the trip, but it won't be at the same time.

Q Is the President taking a direct part in the conversations this morning between Kissinger and Ambassador Dinitz?

MR. GREENER: No, he is not.

Q When Secretary Hathaway met with the President on July 15, did Secretary Hathaway offer to resign?

MR. GREENER: When Secretary Hathaway came in on July 15, he told the President that he was extremely tired and felt he had a mild depression and he brought up the question of perhaps he should leave. The President quickly stated he was not concerned with that, that his first concern was his health, and he had him go see Dr. Lukash and if the doctor felt he should go in for further tests at Bethesda, that he would recommend he do it.

He did see Dr. Lukash. He did recommend further tests. He has been at Bethesda for eight days undergoing treatment for exhaustion and mild depression. I am sure that the President wishes him a speedy recovery, and his quick return to his duties as Secretary of the Interior.

Q May I follow up Dick's question. Will the President meet with Dinitz and Kissinger?

MR. GREENER: Of course he is meeting with Secretary Kissinger in his regular meeting this morning. Whether there will be any further meeting at this point, I don't have anything further on that.

Q That was not my question. My question is, Dick asked you about the meeting with Dinitz and Kissinger. My question is, will they then meet with the President?

MR. GREENER: There are no plans at this time, but I will check.

Q Was there any word out of the White House about a letter the President sent to President Assad of Syria?

MR. GREENER: No.

MORE

#279

Israel

[L]

- 14 -

#271-7/16/78-

 folks? Then we don't really know it is the same

MR. GREENER: We don't.

Q We don't have an idea of who the White House has invited to breakfast?

MR. GREENER: We can check for you right now, Bob, and find out.

Q I want to pursue this one step further. Does the White House have any reaction to the vote of the Foreign Ministers of the Muslim countries to expel Israel from the United Nations, including the vote of the Turkish Foreign Minister?

MR. GREENER: Let me just quote one thing from Kissinger yesterday on that, and then I will give you what else I have on it.

He said that "we have not said exactly what we will do if the" -- I am quoting Secretary Kissinger -- charter of the United Nations is violated, in our view. We believe that the expulsion of member States by the General Assembly, which is a responsibility under the charter of the Security Council, would be an act which would affect the American participation in the activities of that body. To what degree and in what manner remains to be determined, but we believe that the charter should be strictly observed and should not be used for punitive purposes that are incompatible with it."

That really is about all. I have nothing to add.

Q Bill, I believe that the Turkish Foreign Minister's vote and the other Muslim countries votes were given after Mr. Kissinger made that statement. What I am wondering is, is the attitude of Turkey in this situation going to reflect on the desire of the United States to resume military aid to Turkey?

MR. GREENER: The President's position on the military aid to Turkey remains the same, Bob.

Q Do you have anything to say about the report that the industrial production rose for the first time since last September? This report came out yesterday afternoon.

MR. GREENER: I don't know. I will find out. I am sure we have something.

MORE

#271

- 12 -

#271-7/16/75

Q Exactly as outlined Monday?

MR. GREENER: Yes.

Q No changes in the plan at all?

MR. CARLSON: No.

Q Why didn't he send it up Monday when he thought he would?

MR. CARLSON: I think that has been covered in the last two days of briefings.

Q But it has not been answered, though.

Q What is on for the rest of the week? Are there any highlights, any big speeches, any new conferences or anything?

MR. GREENER: None that I know of.

Q Where will he be on the weekend?

MR. GREENER: He expects to be in Washington over the weekend.

Q Not Camp David?

MR. GREENER: There are no plans at this time to go to Camp David.

Q In view of the President's expressed concern for speed and movement on settlement of the Middle East, what is his feeling about the lack of any reply from Jerusalem on the latest Middle East proposals, and from Cairo on Prime Minister Fahmy's statement that Egypt will not agree to the renewal of the U.N. police mandate in Sinai?

MR. GREENER: As to the second part of your question, Dick, we are aware of it and it is under study -- the Egyptian statement -- and we will be discussing this with the other interested parties.

As for the first part, I have no answer for you, but I will be glad to check.

Q Are we still reassessing the American position in regard to Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

MR. GREENER: We are still reassessing the entire Middle East situation.

MORE

#271

- 13 -

#271-7/16

Q All of the countries?

MR. GREENER: It is not completed as yet.

Q When is that study going to be completed, Bill?

MR. GREENER: I don't have a date for you.

Q Do you know why the additional delay? I think a look at the transcript would indicate that some general timeframes were given and they were moved back at least once, perhaps more than once.

MR. GREENER: Delay on the final reassessment?

Q Yes, and the delay in the White House being able to say the reassessment is now completed. I am not talking about whether it would be announced, the details of it or anything, just each time we ask it is not complete.

MR. GREENER: The initial delay, as you know, was primarily as a result of the opportunity to meet with Sadat and Rabin, and needed to hold that until that was complete. Following that, there have been other developments and until that is assessed, it is all part of the reassessment.

Q What are the other developments?

MR. GREENER: The other developments are the meetings that the Secretary of State has just recently had with Rabin.

Q Bill, can I ask about tomorrow morning's meeting?

MR. GREENER: Yes.

Q Presumably, these are the same Congressmen that were here last week when the President announced what he called a compromise proposal. My question is, what has happened in the meantime that necessitates their coming down again?

MR. GREENER: I think it is merely an update on the situation to see how things are going both here and in Congress.

Q Are these the same people -- I am sorry, I was under the impression from what you said originally that perhaps he was courting some new votes as opposed to the votes --

MR. GREENER: I said I did not have the list of people yet.

MORE

#271

The Secretary
of State

[L]

Speech

AMERICAN UNITY AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference.*

Senator Sparkman, Senator Allen, Mayor Siebels, Ladies and Gentlemen: I want to discuss with you today the basic elements of our foreign policy and why Americans can be proud of their nation's role in the world and confident of its future.

Since the first settlers sought refuge on this untamed Continent, America has represented to all the world man's capacity to shape his own destiny. And for the past 30 years global peace and prosperity have depended to an extraordinary degree on our efforts. When World War II ended, this country took the lead in helping Europe and Japan recover from devastation. We created institutions that have expanded trade and prosperity worldwide. We forged peacetime alliances with the major industrial democracies. We have maintained the balance of power; we have mediated conflict. We have fed the hungry, contributed to economic development, educated young men and women from other lands, and welcomed refugees from oppression to our shores.

No other nation has made such a contribution. No other nation can make such a contribution now. And today, the age-old issues of war and peace, of maintaining stability and advancing human hopes, of preserving the peace and promoting progress continue to summon a vigilant and purposeful America.

But Americans have a right to ask: The world

may need us, but do we need the world? Do our policies abroad serve American interests and American ideals?

A look at our contemporary agenda leaves no doubt that peace for us is inseparable from global tranquillity and that our well-being is intimately bound up with the prosperity of the rest of the world.

* Never before in history have the weapons of war been so gigantic, so dangerous, and so unsuitable for the pursuit of political objectives. We have no more fundamental task than to maintain the strategic balance, for we otherwise risk our survival. We have no more urgent obligation than to check the nuclear arms race, for we otherwise risk global holocaust.

* While in military terms the world is still bipolar, there are now many centers of economic power and political initiative. Clearly, political, military, and economic power are no longer synonymous. Of the democratic nations only the United States is strong in every field. Thus our responsibilities are inescapable. Whether this country acts or fails to act has profound consequences.

* While the world has been free of war on a global scale for more than a generation, regional and local conflicts still abound. Unless they are resolved through diplomacy they pose grave risks to the general peace. We have seen all too clearly that conflict in the Middle East threatens confrontation between the superpowers and economic dislocation for all nations.

August 14, 1975

Birmingham, Ala.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

PR 411

2

* The ever-present danger of local conflict takes on a more ominous dimension as we face the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we do not halt their spread, nuclear war will become ever more possible and the risks of theft, accident, and black-mail will multiply. Should the United States withdraw from its security commitments, this process would accelerate, for nations which now rely on us may feel compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons.

* Events have proved that industrial and developing nations are part of a single international economic system on which the prosperity of all depends. The supply and price of energy, the availability of food and other vital raw materials, the strength of currencies and the flow of trade are all vital for a healthy and productive American economy.

Much depends upon this generation of Americans. Because of our size, our strength, our traditions, America is a leader among nations, whether we like it or not. We cannot always assure our preferred solutions, but few solutions are possible without our cooperation. If we do not care about global stability, if we do not help resist aggression, if we do not work for a more equitable and productive world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will take our place—at least no nation that believes in our values. Force and the threat of force would become the rule of the day, and mankind's material and spiritual fortunes would be dealt grave blows. Ultimately we would pay the price ourselves.

Other nations must do more, but this nation must continue to do its share. We still have a unique and irreplaceable contribution to make to a world of peace and prosperity and justice. Our leadership remains needed to mobilize friends and allies to organize a wider international cooperation.

We have the advantage of the boundless assets with which this country is blessed: Our industrial strength and agricultural productivity, the sinews of military power, and the talent of a free people. But these will serve us little without unity and common purpose. We must know what we want for America and we must be willing to defend and to promote it. We must avoid extremes of belligerosity followed by extremes of abdication. We need a steady course that our people can understand, which gives courage to our allies and pause

to our adversaries. In this period of global change, when the simple categories of the immediate post-war period no longer match the complex realities of the modern world, dialogue, public support, and confidence are needed more than ever before.

The citizens of this country have met this challenge. Your sense of responsibility has sustained an enlightened American participation in the world. You knew that America could not thrive in isolation; you understood that our values deserved to be defended and promoted; you realized that the basic decency and generosity of the American people made our leadership not a matter of arrogant pride but a contribution to the well-being of mankind.

Today the issues that rent our unity in the past decade are behind us. The resilience of our national spirit is being demonstrated anew. We can move forward together with confidence to face the great challenges of our time. Let me now discuss the challenges we face and how we plan to meet them.

## National Defense

First, we have maintained and improved our national defense. Peace requires an equilibrium of power—and this Government will maintain it. No great nation leaves its safety to the mercy or the goodwill of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers—and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a defense that cannot be challenged.

## Friends and Allies

The second pillar of our foreign policy is steadfast support of allies. Our alliances with the major industrial democracies have prospered for 30 years because they reflect common interests in a new era, as well as a shared heritage of principles and values. They are an essential element of global stability. These bonds were forged a generation ago to protect weaker allies against a military threat. Today we work together as equals on issues far beyond security. We have strengthened our European defenses, but we have also coordinated our respective approaches to easing tensions with the

3

East; and we have cooperated closely in our economic and energy policies.

As a result, our ties with Europe and Japan have never been stronger. This was reaffirmed in the President's visit to the NATO Summit in Brussels at the end of May, in his meeting with key Allied leaders in Helsinki, and in his recent consultations in Washington with Prime Minister [Takeo] Miki of Japan. Beyond the technical problems of the daily agenda lies the deeper necessity for the great democracies to demonstrate that in an age of turmoil they can shape their own destinies.

Our smaller allies and friends around the world are important factors in global stability. We have learned the lesson of Viet-Nam: American military involvement cannot substitute for a nation's efforts to mobilize its people to defend itself. Nor will we permit allies to blackmail us by pretending that their security means more to us than to them. But the fact remains that military assistance to allies is an essential national interest of the United States. It contributes to local or regional balances of power; it helps deter local conflict; it cements important political relations; and it makes much less likely the need for direct American involvement. When we cut off supplies to an ally, for whatever reason, we inflict a setback on ourselves—as has been demonstrated by the severe damage to our national security caused by the embargo of military supplies to Turkey. Nothing would undermine local or global stability more than if America were to prove unwilling to continue to provide material support to those small and brave friendly nations who want and need our help. If our adversaries maintain their support for their allies, by what reasoning—and at what price—can we do less?

## Relations with the Soviet Union

On the basis of our strength and allied unity, this Administration has sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. There must be no misunderstanding of what we are doing. We are trying to manage a fundamental conflict of moral purposes and interests in the shadow of nuclear holocaust; we are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential values and ideals.

In a crisis situation, such as the Mayaguez incident, or the October 1973 Middle East alert, or the Jordanian crisis of 1970, or the Soviet attempt

to build a naval base in Cuba in 1970, we have reacted firmly and decisively—and in the face of an outcry from some who now accuse us of being insufficiently vigilant. It is the firm policy of this Administration to resist encroachment and attempts to gain unilateral advantage.

At the same time, the hope for lasting peace depends on building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers. The United States has stated these principles on many occasions, and embodied them in formal documents in our summit meetings with Soviet leaders. Similar principles of international conduct were stated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed by 35 Heads of Government in Helsinki 2 weeks ago. They are not a guarantee of peace but a definition of peace—a standard of behavior to which we must insure adherence by our own determination and vigilance. They are a framework for our own efforts, not a substitute for them.

We also successfully engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations to resolve concrete political problems. This effort has brought some success. A Four-Power agreement on Berlin in 1971 ended two decades of constant crisis. And our relationship with the Soviet Union has helped so far to restrain big-power conflict in the Middle East.

Central to our agenda has been the limitation of strategic nuclear armaments. In 1972 we reached an agreement which froze the Soviet numerical buildup for 5 years and restricted no American programs. Therefore we consider the 1972 SALT [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks] agreement to be unquestionably in America's interest. It prevented an existing missile gap from widening, and it permitted us to maintain and even to increase our lead in multiple warheads, bombers, and other areas of military technology.

Last November in Vladivostok President Ford reached agreement with General Secretary Brezhnev on the principles of a new accord which is also unmistakably in our interest. If achieved, this agreement will bring about strict numerical equality of strategic systems. It will limit the strategic arms competition for a 10-year period. Thus for the first time defense planning will not be driven by fear of unknown military expansion by the other side. And once this common ceiling is implemented we can move immediately to negotiate mutual reductions.

4

We have negotiated other arms control agree-
ments with the Soviet Union to prevent accidental
war, and to prohibit the stationing of nuclear
weapons on the deep seabed or in outer space.

The negotiations in Vienna on force reduc-
tions in Central Europe will be the next test for the
process of relaxing tensions. If progress toward
peace in Europe is to prove durable, it is time to
reduce on a secure and mutual basis the large
standing armed forces now facing each other in the
center of the Continent.

The United States pursues the process of easing tensions from a position of self-confidence and strength. It is not we who were on the defensive at Helsinki; it is not we who were being challenged by all the delegations to live up to the principles being signed. At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiation. The Conference put forward our standards of humane conduct, which have been—and still are—a beacon of hope to millions.

The winds of change are blowing from the West; the ideals of liberty and the challenges of technical innovation come from the West. The efforts of Communist countries to participate in the rest of the world, after decades of autarchy, are a sign of the vigor and attraction of our economic system. These are assets of our diplomacy, which we should be prepared to use.

In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course, and the only policy that can be pursued by any Administration charged with responsibility for the lives of Americans. The American people have no desire for a policy of confrontation for its own sake. When both sides have the military power to annihilate mankind, it would be utter recklessness to invite tension needlessly.

But the United States has never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively or as a cover for the pursuit of unilateral advantage. In Portugal, a focus of current concern, the Soviet Union should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external powers for this purpose, in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours, is

inconsistent with any principle of European secu-
rity. Events in Portugal have their origin in the
dynamics of Portuguese history. But 80 percent of
the Portuguese people have declared unmistakably
their desire for a democratic system and demo-
cratic parties. The attempt by an anti-democratic
and doctrinaire minority to thwart this desire is
meeting inevitable and growing popular resistance.

The United States welcomed the Portuguese
revolution. We and our allies have supported its
aims diplomatically and materially. We sympathize
with those moderate elements who seek to build
Portugal by democratic means. We will oppose and
speak out against the efforts of a minority that
appears to be subverting the revolution for its own
purposes. The Portuguese people should know that
we and all the democratic countries of the West are
d deeply concerned about their future and stand
ready to help a democratic Portugal. And at some
point we and our European allies must ask our-
selves whether major Communist influence in a
government is compatible with membership in an
alliance dedicated to resisting Communist
aggression.

This Administration shall never forget the
moral difference between freedom and tyranny.
Nor shall we forget that peace, too, is a moral
imperative. We have been firm in the face of
challenge even as we have sought to ease tensions
and move the world closer to peace. We will not let
the American people be lulled into a false sense of
security. We shall continue on our course.

The combination of strength and conciliation
requires self-restraint in our public debate. Let us
put an end to the swings between confrontation
and false hopes, between belligerence and exhilara-
tion which have marked earlier periods. Let us not
take for granted the stability and relative tranquil-
lity that we have achieved. Let us stop acting as if
we had anything to fear from progress toward
peace. Let those who offer us tough rhetoric define
what precisely they propose to do. What is their
exact alternative? What borders do they plan to
change and by what means? What level of expanded
defense expenditures are they willing to sustain
over what period of time and for what purpose? Are
they not urging a policy of deliberate confronta-
tion? Can we gain support from any of our major
allies for such a radical alternative?

Above all, let us face the fact that many of

5

[Lc]

our difficulties abroad are of our own making. If we are to be vigilant against Communist encroachment, we must stop dismantling or demoralizing our intelligence services. If we are to maintain the world balance of power, we cannot assault our defense budget or impose arms embargoes against key allies. If we are to advance our interests in our diplomacy, we cannot deny ourselves flexibility by legislating blanket restrictions on economic relations with other countries. In short, America cannot be strong abroad unless it is strong at home.

## The New Dimension of Economic Challenge

Partly because of our success in maintaining the world balance of power and fostering the growth of other nations, a new dimension of economic issues is coming to the fore in international relations: Energy, food, other commodities, and trade.

In this realm of diplomacy, the strength of the American economy is among our greatest assets. All of America's objectives—our military security, our economic well-being, our relations with allies and adversaries and developed and developing nations—hinge on the vitality of the American economy. As President Ford said, "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do."

The world now needs that confidence. The industrialized nations have been undergoing the most serious economic crisis since the 1930's. As then, they are experiencing that economic stagnation breeds political instability, that it undermines the public support which enables governments to act with assurance and democratic societies to thrive. And, as then, we are learning how much the solution depends above all on an intangible quality of confidence and belief in a better future.

The industrial democracies are now being tested. They must surmount social and economic strains and reinvigorate their free institutions. President Ford's talks at Helsinki with allied leaders and his meeting in Washington with the Prime Minister of Japan focused on the crucial importance of a thriving American economy to world economic recovery; they produced a determination to deal with the global economic challenge cooperatively. The United States is prepared to intensify its consultations and to seek a coordi-

nated approach. We are aware of our global responsibility and we shall meet it in the months to come.

The success of these efforts will be of vital importance to the rest of the world. The industrial nations account for 65 percent of the world's output and 70 percent of its trade. Thus, the economic well-being of the developing nations, too, depends on broad cooperation with the industrialized world. Unfortunately, too many nations seek to exact by ideological confrontation what can only be achieved through reasoned cooperative dialogue. The United States is prepared for a serious and constructive cooperative dialogue. We are ready to develop equitable economic relations with all nations. But we will never accept bloc pressure or blackmail.

Early next month, a Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly will convene in New York to deal with the issues of economic interdependence. It will be a fateful occasion because it can determine the nature of the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. On the President's behalf I will present a series of American proposals looking toward a new approach to the relationship between the industrialized countries and those needing their help. We do so because we are convinced that our own economic health will be served by a world economy which is both expanding and perceived as fair. And our own security will be enhanced if we live in a world where frustration and despair give way to cooperation and a sense of our interdependence.

We enter this dialogue with confidence and good will. Our technological innovation, the productivity of our farms and industries, our educated and industrious people, and the blessing of our physical resources have given us the strength and responsibility for leadership.

In no area is this more striking than in the field of food. Our agricultural productivity is admired and desired all over the world. America's farmers and those who process and sell our food can be proud of their contribution to American strength in what is becoming an increasingly important dimension of our foreign policy and world leadership. America has generously provided food aid to scores of foreign nations. But the gap between consumption and production is growing constantly. While we are prepared to continue food aid this cannot provide a long-term answer to feeding the world's hungry. Therefore, a World Food

6

[103]

Conference was convened in Rome last November at United States initiative. Acting on many American proposals, the Conference organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries and to channel resources—including the new wealth of the oil producers—to improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

We intend as a matter of principle to make our food policy a model for cooperative relations between producers and consumers of vital and scarce commodities and between developed and developing countries. In this way we serve our own as well as a general interest. America's farmers will benefit from a steady global demand for their product; as world production is expanded, the burden of shortages and higher prices will be lifted from our consumers; our political relations with scores of developing nations will be enhanced; and conditions of order worldwide will be improved.

## The American Responsibility

Thirty years ago the United States was the world's only great power. Since then our allies and our adversaries have naturally grown in strength, recovering from the devastation of World War II. The cold war world of two rigid blocs now belongs to history: the Communist world is fragmented; our allies and friends and the new nations have asserted their own identities. The diversity even among the developing countries—among producers and consumers of vital materials such as oil—is increasingly apparent. We live in a world of some 150 independent nations, a world of diffused power, subject to the domination of no nation.

Such a world is an exciting challenge for America. For it is the kind of environment most consistent with *our* values. It is not we who have to fear from the relaxation of tensions or the spread of initiative and opportunity. We can only benefit from diversity, change, economic competition, the free flow of ideas, and the sharing of responsibilities. We have the capacity to shape from this complexity a new pattern of order and new hope for human progress.

But what this nation can do in the world depends upon how we conduct ourselves at home. For our national strength in every respect rests on our unity as a people. There is a fundamental difference between the requirements of foreign policy and of domestic policy. In our own society, only

some issues are matters of governmental concern; we can address these issues selectively, accommodate the different groups concerned, and legislate a solution that hopefully disposes of the problem.

Foreign policy, on the other hand, is the sum total of our nation's action abroad. Our involvement with the world outside is continual. Our action cannot be fragmented into a series of individual compromises except at grave risk. Every decision sets in motion a sequence of events and is, in turn, perceived by other nations as symbolic of our intentions and capabilities. Though we are a system of separated powers in Washington, to the world we are *one* government and *one* nation.

Our democratic system—and the broad participation of all of our people and private and public institutions—presents a constant challenge to fashion unity out of diversity. We have done so in moments of crisis in the past; we must do so today in a moment of historic opportunity.

And here the recent controversies between the two branches of our government give cause for serious concern. The Administration is held responsible for virtually every difficulty around the world—whether or not they resulted from its policies—and then is hamstrung in its capacity to act flexibly and purposefully.

* In energy, the lack of determined action on conservation and alternative sources seriously jeopardizes our efforts with other oil-consuming nations to reduce our vulnerability and to improve our bargaining position towards the producers.

* In Latin America, attempts to give impetus to a new dialogue are impaired by trade restrictions and automatic legislative sanctions that reduce our negotiating flexibility.

* In East-West relations, the leverage required to protect our national interest has been reduced by blanket legislative restrictions which have failed as well to achieve the humanitarian objectives they were meant to serve.

* In the Eastern Mediterranean, the stalemate over our military relations with Turkey threatens to unhinge the Eastern flank of NATO. The President has proposed a compromise to break this Congressional deadlock; the Senate, nearly half the House, and the leaders of both parties in both Houses have supported it. When the Congress reconvenes in September we hope for a rapid,

7

cooperative solution before irreparable damage is
done to our national security.

The country cannot afford the dominance of *either* branch over the other. This is not a constitutional or legal dispute. The issue is how to conduct a single, purposeful foreign policy in our democratic system. Our Constitution gives the Congress wide authority in key areas of our foreign and defense policy. But the President represents the nation abroad; he must have the possibility of shaping and carrying out a coherent policy. Accommodating special or parochial interests through a series of compromises does not necessarily produce coherence; contention between the Executive and Congress risks falling between two stools on too many grave issues.

The two branches of our Government have shown their ability in recent years to work cooperatively. On many issues honest differences of opinion were reconciled and a common position achieved: the Romanian trade agreement; the basic direction of our Middle East policy; the preparation for the Special Session of the General Assembly; and many issues in arms control and policy.

Let us build on this. The President is a man of Congress; he regards its members as his colleagues, and he has pledged to cooperate with them. The Administration will make every effort to consult, inform, and work with the Congress in making foreign policy. When we are divided, when partisanship produces bitter debates, we can do damage that outlasts our present emotions; we harm not

only the country's fortunes today but the hopes of future generations. But when we are united together there is no force stronger than the power of free men acting in unity.

## Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, our nation has gone through a searing decade. Assassination, war, and internal turmoil have all left their mark upon us. We began the 1960's secure in our belief in the goodness of our purpose, confident of our power to shape our future, and proud of our youthful vitality. Yet 15 years later, tested by extraordinary events, many came to believe that we were powerless to affect the world and that our boldness had given way to the weariness and timidity of old age.

Already we can begin to see that the pessimists, as so often, spoke too soon. Despite a constitutional crisis unmatched since the 1860's, our Government remains strong and our freedoms stand undiminished. People the world over have been reminded by our adversity that their only real hope for a better life lies in America's continued commitment to a free and peaceful world. The Administration has responded by making clear that we will not retreat from our obligations abroad, and that we will not be shaken by divided purpose at home.

Once again, a troubled world needs a strong and confident America. It offers us no simple choices but rather what Americans have always welcomed: A challenge to our courage, an opportunity to fresh accomplishment, a summons to greatness.

The Secretary
of State

Speech

July 15, 1975

Minneapolis, Minnesota

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FOREIGN POLICY

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the
Upper Midwest Council.

Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have long looked forward to coming to Minnesota because it is the home of a man I admire enormously, the one man who likes to talk almost as much as I do—Senator Humphrey. At the hearings on my nomination as Secretary of State, Senator Humphrey instructed me with much wisdom on the difficult job ahead. His advice was right on the mark, and has been ever since. He is a good friend, and a great statesman. Minnesotans can be proud that he represents them in the United States Senate, for he is an example of the spirit of our country—its decency, its humanity, and its strength.

America has now entered upon its 200th year as a free nation. In those 2 centuries our country has grown from a small agricultural nation with very few responsibilities beyond its borders to a world power with global responsibilities. Yet, while the range of interests has changed massively, our commitment to the values that gave birth to our nation has remained unaltered.

These are the aspects of our national experience I would like to address today: the pursuit of America's values as a humane and just example to others; and the furthering of America's interests in a world where power remains the ultimate arbiter. How do we reconcile and advance both aspects of our national purpose? What, in our time, is the significance of the age-old quandary of the relationship between principle and power?

Through the greater part of our history we

have been able to avoid the issue. A fortunate margin of safety and an unexplored continent produced the impression that principle and power automatically coalesced, that no choice was necessary or that only one choice was possible.

But now for nearly a decade our nation has been weighed down by uncertainty and discord. We have found ourselves doubtful of our virtue and uncertain of our direction largely because we have suddenly realized that like other nations before us we must now reconcile our principles with our necessities. Amid frustration, many Americans questioned the validity of our involvement in the international arena; in the wake of our disappointments, some abroad now doubt our resolve.

We are, I believe, emerging from this period with a renewed sense of confidence. Recent events have brought home to us—and to the rest of the world—that a purposeful, strong, and involved America is essential to peace and progress. These same events have also reminded us of the contribution this country made in the 30 years since World War II—and what is at stake in the next 30 years.

The United States can look back on an extraordinary generation of achievement. We have maintained a stable balance of power in the world; we have preserved peace and fostered the growth of the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped shape the international trade and monetary system which has nourished global prosperity. We promoted decolonization and pioneered in development assistance for the new nations. We have taken major initiatives to forge more reliable and positive relationships with the major Communist powers.

PR 372

2

In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, in an international system not of empire but of scores of independent states, the global contribution of one nation—the United States—has been without precedent in human history. Only a nation of strong conviction and great idealism could have accomplished these efforts. We shall not turn our backs on this legacy.

## The Modern Agenda

Today we face a new agenda. Our accomplishments over the past generation have changed the world and defined our tasks for the coming decades:

* Our allies, the major industrial democracies, have recovered their vigor and influence. We are transforming our alliances into more equal partnerships. We shall act in harmony with friends whose security and prosperity is indispensable to our own and whose cooperation is essential for progress and justice.

* The incredible destructiveness of modern weapons has transformed international politics. We must maintain our military strength. But we have an obligation, in our own interest as well as the world's, to work with other nations to control both the growth and the spread of nuclear weapons.

* In our relations with the Communist powers we must never lose sight of the fact that in the thermonuclear age general war would be disastrous to mankind. We have an obligation to seek a more productive and stable relationship despite the basic antagonism of our values.

* Thirty years of economic and political evolution have brought about a new diffusion of power and initiative. At the same time, interdependence imposes upon all nations the reality that they must prosper together or suffer together. The destinies of the world's nations have become inevitably interwined. Thus, the capacity of any one nation to shape events is more limited, and consequently our own choices are more difficult and complex.

## The Legacy of Our Past

To deal with this agenda we require strength of purpose and conviction. A nation unsure of its values cannot shape its future. A people confused

about its direction will miss the opportunity to build a better and more peaceful world. This is why perhaps our deepest challenge is our willingness to face the increasing ambiguity of the problem of ends and means.

We start with strong assets. Throughout our history we have sought to define and justify our foreign policy in terms of principle. We have never seen ourselves as just another nation-state pursuing selfish aims. We have always stood for something beyond ourselves—a beacon to the oppressed from other lands—from the first settlers to the recent refugees from Indochina. This conviction of our uniqueness contributed to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a powerful force.

But the emphasis on principle has also produced a characteristic American ambivalence. Relations with a world of nations falling short of our ideal have always presented us with dilemmas. As a people, we have oscillated between insistence on our uniqueness and the quest for broad acceptance of our values; between trying to influence international developments and seeking to isolate ourselves from them; between expecting too much of our power and being ashamed of it; between optimistic exuberance and frustration with the constraints practicality imposes.

Through most of our history we have sought to shield our country and hemisphere from outside intrusion, to shun involvement in balance-of-power politics. Soldiers and diplomats—the practitioners of power—have always been looked upon with suspicion. We considered generosity in relief efforts, the encouragement of free international trade, and the protection of our economic interests abroad as the only wholesome forms of international involvement.

Our founding fathers were sophisticated men who understood the European balance of power and knew how to profit from it. For the succeeding century and a half, our security was assured by favorable circumstances over which we had little influence. Shielded by two oceans, and enriched by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special situation as universally valid to nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own.

Indeed, the concern of other nations for security reinforced our sense of uniqueness. We were a

3

haven for millions, a place where the injustices, inequities, privations, and abridgements of human dignity which the immigrants had suffered were absent, or amenable to rapid redress. As our strength and size expanded, we remained uncomfortable with the uses and responsibilities of power and involvement in day-to-day diplomacy. At the turn of the century, for example, there were soul-searching debates over the Spanish-American War and our first acquisition of noncontiguous territories. While many saw our policies as dictated by our interests, others considered them our entrance into a morally questionable world.

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems—all these were invoked to banish the reality of power. And when our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1917, Woodrow Wilson translated our geopolitical interest in preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe into a universal moral objective. We fought to “make the world safe for democracy.”

The inevitable disillusionment with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationist sentiment. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward, as we sought to deal with the problems of our own society—even as that same depression simultaneously generated real dangers abroad.

We were stirred from isolation only by external attack and we sustained our effort because of the obvious totalitarian evil. We opposed all-out war, and total victory further strengthened our sense of moral rectitude—and ill prepared us for the aftermath. Of all the nations involved, we alone emerged essentially unscathed from the ravages of conflict—our military power, economic strength, and political confidence intact. And in the postwar bipolar world of cold war confrontation we believed we faced a reincarnation of the just defeated foe—an apparently monolithic and hostile ideological empire whose ambitions and values were antithetical to our own.

Our success and the preeminent position it brought convinced us that we could shape the globe according to American design. Our preponderant power gave us a broad margin for error so we believed that we could overwhelm problems through the sheer weight of resources. No other nation possessed so much insurance against so

many contingencies; we could afford to be imprecise in the definition of our interests. Indeed, we often imagined that we had nothing so selfish as interests—only obligations and responsibilities. In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our cause.

## America's Role

We no longer live in so simple a world. We remain the strongest nation and the largest single factor in international affairs. Our leadership is perhaps even more essential than before. But our strategic superiority has given way to nuclear balance. Our political and economic predominance has diminished as others have grown in strength and our dependence on the world economy has increased. Our margin of safety has shrunk.

Today we find that—like most other nations in history—we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Today we must conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of our interests. We must be thoughtful in defining our interests. We must prepare against the worst contingency and not plan only for the best. We must pursue limited objectives and many objectives simultaneously. In this effort, the last decade has taught us:

* That our power will not always bring preferred solutions; but we are still strong enough to influence events, often decisively.

* That we cannot remedy all the world's ills; but we can help build an international structure that will foster the initiative and cooperation of others.

* That we can no longer expect that moral judgments expressed in absolute terms will command broad acceptance; but as the richest and most powerful nation, we still have a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a sponsor of world order.

* That we cannot banish power politics from international affairs, but we can promote new and wider communities of interest among nations; we can mute the use and threat of force; we can help establish incentives for restraint and penalties for its absence; we can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation; and we can help construct a more equitable pattern of relations between developed and developing nations.

4

This new complexity has produced in some a
rebellion against contemporary foreign policy. We
are told that our foreign policy is excessively prag-
matic, that it sacrifices virtue in the mechanical
pursuit of stability. Once attacked as cold-war
oriented, we are now criticized by some as insensi-
tive to moral values. Once regarded as naive in the
use of power, we are now alleged to rely too much
on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most
generous of nations, we now stand accused by
some of resisting a more equitable international
economic system.

It is time to face the reality of our situation.
Our choice is not between morality and pragma-
tism. We cannot escape either, nor are they incom-
patible. This nation must be true to its own beliefs
or it will lose its bearings in the world. But at the
same time it must survive in a world of sovereign
nations and competing wills.

We need moral strength to select among often
agonizing choices and a sense of purpose to navi-
gate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But
we need as well a mature sense of means, lest we
substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of
survival.

Clearly we are in need of perspective. Let me
state some basic principles:

**Foreign policy must start with security.** A
nation's survival is its first and ultimate responsibil-
ity; it cannot be compromised or put to risk. There
can be no security for us or for others unless the
strength of the free countries is in balance with
that of potential adversaries; and no stability in
power relationships is conceivable without
America's active participation in world affairs.

The choices in foreign policy are often diff-
icult and the margins are frequently narrow; imper-
fect solutions are sometimes unavoidable. In the
Second World War, for example, we joined forces
with countries whose values we did not share in
order to accomplish the morally worthy objective
of defeating Nazism. Today we cooperate with
many nations for the purpose of regional stability
and global security, even though we disapprove of
some of their internal practices. These choices are
made consciously, and based on our best assess-
ment of what is necessary.

At the same time, security is a means not an
end. The purpose of security is to safeguard the
values of our free society. And our survival is not

always at stake in international issues. Many of our
decisions are not imposed on us by events. Where
we have latitude we must seize the moral oppor-
tunity for humanitarian purposes.

Our assistance to developing nations, for
example, serves both foreign policy and humani-
tarian ends. It strengthens political ties to other
nations. It contributes to expanded trade; close to
90 percent of our foreign assistance is eventually
spent in this country. And our assistance reflects
our values as a people, because we cannot close our
eyes to the suffering of others. Because of history
and moral tradition, we cannot live with ourselves
as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation.

In the whole field of foreign aid, and particu-
larly in food aid, America's record is unsurpassed.
We and the world owe much to leaders with vision
and compassion like Senator Humphrey who
drafted the Food for Peace legislation some 20
years ago.

Finally, our values link the American people
and their government. In a democracy the conduct
of foreign policy is possible only with public sup-
port. Therefore your government owes you an arti-
culation of the purposes which its policies are
designed to serve; to make clear our premises, to
contribute to enlightened debate, and to explain
how our policies serve the American people's ob-
jectives. And those principles—freedom, the dignity
of the individual, the sanctity of law—are at the
heart of our policy; they are also the foundation of
our most basic and natural partnerships with the
great industrial democracies which are essential to
our safety and well-being.

Morality and Policy

The relation of morality to policy is thus not
an abstract philosophical issue. It applies to many
topics of the current debate. It applies to relations
with the Communist powers, where we must
manage a conflict of moral purposes and interests
in the shadow of nuclear peril; and it applies in our
political ties with nations whose domestic practices
are inconsistent with our own.

Our relationship with the Communist powers
has raised difficult questions for Americans since
the Bolshevik Revolution. It was understood very
early that the Communist system and ideology
were in conflict with our own principles. Sixteen
years passed before President Franklin Roosevelt
extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet

[L.C.]

5

Government. He did so in the belief, as he put it, that "through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened."

Today again courageous voices remind us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to defend freedom. About this there is no disagreement.

There is, however, a clear conflict between two moral imperatives which is at the heart of the problem. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship between the two superpowers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance—when both sides have the capacity to destroy civilized life—there is no alternative to coexistence. In such conditions the necessity of peace is itself a moral imperative. As President Kennedy pointed out: "In the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

It is said, correctly, that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the furthering of Soviet objectives. In a world of nuclear weapons capable of destroying mankind, in a century which has seen resort to brutal force on an unprecedented scale and intensity, in an age of ideology which turns the domestic policies of nations into issues of international contention, the problem of peace takes on a profound moral and practical difficulty. But the issue, surely, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they also serve our own. Constructive actions in Soviet policy are desirable *whatever* the Soviet motives.

This Government has stated clearly and constantly the principles which we believe must guide U.S.-Soviet relations and international conduct and which are consistent with both our values and our interests:

* We will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve our security. We will as a matter of principle and national interest oppose attempts by any country to achieve global or regional predominance.

* We will judge the state of U.S.-Soviet relations not by atmospherics but by whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

* All negotiations will be a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable observance of agreements.

* We will insist, as we always have, that progress in U.S.-Soviet economic relations must reflect progress toward stable political relationships.

* We will never abandon our ideals or our friends. We will not negotiate over the heads of, or against the interests of, other nations.

* We will respond firmly to attempts to achieve unilateral advantage, or to apply the relaxation of tensions selectively.

Beyond the necessities of coexistence there is the hope of a more positive relationship. The American people will never be satisfied with simply reducing tension and easing the danger of nuclear holocaust. Over the longer term, we hope that firmness in the face of pressure and the creation of incentives for cooperative action may bring about a more durable pattern of stability and responsible conduct.

Today's joint manned mission in space—an area in which 15 years ago we saw ourselves in almost mortal rivalry—is symbolic of the distance we have traveled. Practical progress has been made on a wide range of problems. Berlin has been removed as a source of conflict between East and West; crises have been dampened; the frequency of U.S.-Soviet consultation on bilateral and multilateral problems is unprecedented; the scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the state of affairs 10, even 5, years ago. The agreements already achieved to limit strategic armament programs—the central weapons of our respective military arsenals—are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Your Senator [Walter F.] Mondale is a strong and constructive advocate of such strategic arms control efforts.

Our immediate focus is on the international actions of the Soviet Union not because it is our only moral concern, but because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. As a consequence of improved foreign policy relationships, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. But we have done so quietly, keeping in mind the delicacy of the problem and stressing results rather than public confrontation.

Therefore, critics of detente must answer:

6

What is the alternative that they propose? What precise policies do they want us to change? Are they prepared for a prolonged situation of dramatically increased international danger? Do they wish to return to the constant crises and high arms budgets of the cold war? Does detente encourage repression—or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the demands for openness that we are now witnessing? Can we ask our people to support confrontation unless they know that every reasonable alternative has been explored?

In our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States will maintain its strength, defend its interests, and support its friends with determination and without illusion. We will speak up for our beliefs with vigor and without self-deception. We consider detente a means to regulate a competitive relationship—not a substitute for our own efforts in building the strength of the free world. We will continue on the course on which we are embarked because it offers hope to our children of a more secure and a more just world.

These considerations raise a more general question: To what extent are we able to affect the internal policies of other governments and to what extent is it desirable?

There are some 150 nations in the world, and barely a score of them are democracies in any real sense. The rest are nations whose ideology or political practices are inconsistent with our own. Yet we have political relations and often alliances with some of these countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Europe.

Congressman [Donald M.] Fraser has raised this issue with great integrity and concern, and I have profited from many discussions with him. We do not and will not condone repressive practices. This is not only dictated by our values but is also a reflection of the reality that regimes which lack legitimacy or moral authority are inherently vulnerable. There will therefore be limits to the degree to which such regimes can be congenial partners. We have used, and we will use, our influence against repressive practices. Our traditions and our interests demand it.

But truth compels also a recognition of our limits. The question is whether we promote human rights more effectively by counsel and friendly relations where this serves our interest, or by confrontational propaganda and discriminatory legislation.

And we must also assess the domestic performance of foreign governments in relation to their history and to the threats they face. We must have some understanding for the dilemmas of countries adjoining powerful, hostile, and irreconcilable totalitarian regimes.

Our alliances and political relationships serve mutual ends; they contribute to regional and world security, and thus support the broader welfare. They are not favors to other governments, but reflect a recognition of mutual interests. They should be withdrawn only when our interests change and not as a punishment for some act with which we do not agree. In many countries, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in many countries—especially in Asia—it is the process of American disengagement that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline, and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices.

The attempt to deal with those practices by restrictive American legislation raises a serious problem, not because of the moral view it expresses—which we share—but because of the mistaken impression it creates that our security ties are acts of charity. And beyond that, such acts—because they are too public, too inflexible, and too much a stimulus to nationalistic resentment—are almost inevitably doomed to fail.

There are no simple answers. Painful experience should have taught us that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. Therefore let me state the principles that will guide our action:

* Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

* The United States will speak up for human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments.

* We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

7

* We will not lose sight of either the requirements of global security or what we stand for as a nation.

## The Domestic Dimension

For Americans, then, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy, but how. The issue is whether we have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; whether we will look behind easy slogans and recognize that our great goals can only be reached by patience, and in imperfect stages.

The question is also whether we will use our moral convictions to escape reality or as a source of courage and self-confidence. We hear too often assertions that were a feature of our isolationist period: That a balance of power is a cynical game; that secret conspiratorial intentions lurk behind open, public policies; that weapons are themselves the sources of conflict; that intelligence activities are wicked; that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement.

These are the counsels of despair. I refuse to accept the premise that our moral values and policy objectives are irreconcilable. The ends we seek in our foreign policy must have validity in the framework of our beliefs or we have no meaningful foreign policy. The maintenance of peace is a moral as well as a practical objective: Measures to limit armaments serve a moral as well as practical end; the cohesion of our alliances with the great industrial democracies makes our way of life and our principles more secure; cooperation to improve the world economic system enhances the well-being of peoples; policies to reconcile the rich nations and the poor, and to enhance the progress of both, serve a humane as well as a political end.

We live in a secular age which prides itself on

its realism. Modern society is impersonal and bu-
reaucratized. The young, who in every generation
crave a sense of purpose, are too often offered
cynicism and escapism instead of a faith that truly
inspires. All modern democracies are beset by
problems beyond the margin of governments' abili-
ty to control. Debunking of authority further
drains democratic government of the ability to ad-
dress the problems that beset it. A world of tur-
moil and danger cries out for structure and leader-
ship. The opportunities that we face as a nation to
help shape a more just international order depend
more than ever on a steady, resolute, and self-
assured America.

This requires confidence—the leaders’ confi-
dence in their values, the public’s confidence in its
government, and the nation’s collective confidence
in the worth of its objectives.

Thus, for this nation to contribute truly to
peace in the world it must make peace with itself.
It is time to put aside the cynicism and distrust
that have marked, and marred, our political life for
the better part of the past decade. It is time to
remind ourselves that while we may disagree about
means, as Americans we all have the same ultimate
objective—the peace, prosperity, and tranquillity of
our country and of the world.

And most of all, it is time we recognized that
as the greatest democracy the world has ever
known, we are a living reminder that there is an
alternative to tyranny and oppression. The revolu-
tion that we began 200 years ago goes on, for most
of the world still lives without the freedom that
has for so long been ours. To them we remain a
beacon of hope and an example to be emulated.

So let us come together for the tasks that our
time demands. We have before us an opportunity
to bring peace to a world that awaits our
leadership.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

Third Class Bulk Rt.

THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

[il]

Special Report

No. 15

April 1975

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO SOVIET JEWS IN ISRAEL

The rate of Soviet Jewish emigration registered dramatic changes from the 1960's to the 1970's. From a trickle of a few hundred persons a year allowed to leave the Soviet Union prior to 1970, the annual total rapidly increased to more than 30,000 in 1973.

The two principal refugee organizations assisting these emigrants soon found their resources severely taxed. The 32-nation Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) and the American-operated U.S. Refugee Program (USRP), were created in the early 1950's to help refugees from eastern Europe and the Middle East establish themselves predominately in western Europe and North and South America. ICEM's function was to provide refugees with transportation assistance to countries of resettlement and USRP was to help refugees with housing, care, and counselling.

Recognizing the need for substantial funds to help the increased numbers of Soviet refugees in the early 1970's, President Nixon issued a Presidential Determination accompanying the foreign assistance act in May 1972 for $2 million to aid Soviet refugees during fiscal year 1972. Of this total, $1.85 million went to ICEM for its travel loans and $150,000 to USRP for private grants to individuals.

In fiscal year 1973, with the number of emigrants increasing, Congress took the initiative and appropriated $50 million for "assistance to Israel or another suitable country, including assistance for resettlement . . . of Jewish or other similar refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Congress provided $36.5 million in fiscal year 1974, and authorized $40 million for fiscal year 1975.

For the most part, these funds, along with the much more substantial funds from worldwide private sources, have gone to assist Israel in the reception and resettlement of Soviet refugees, following a plan developed by Israel's Ministry of Absorption and the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAI). U.S. Government funds, administered by the Department of State's Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs, go to the Jewish Agency for Israel through the United Israel Appeal, Inc. (UIA), a voluntary agency accredited to the U.S. Government.

The projects which U.S. Government funds help finance fall into three broad categories:

* Care and maintenance while in transit.

* Expansion of Israel's infrastructure to receive and resettle present and future immigrants.

* Assistance, such as language training,

2

[lc]

## U.S.-Sponsored Absorption Centers and Hostels

scholarships, vocational training, maintenance, etc., to individual immigrants.

Total UIA expenditures to aid Israel's immigrant absorption programs in 1974 came to $74,225,000 and was distributed to the full range of programs. A summary of these programs and the funds allocated to each, follows.

### Enroute Care and Maintenance Costs for Refugees—$1,875,000

Jewish refugees migrating from the Soviet Union usually reach Austria by train. Those going to Israel are taken to a transit center near Vienna leased by the Jewish Agency and managed by the Austrian Red Cross.

Capacity of the center is 250 persons. The refugees spend 1-3 days there, undergo initial processing for Israel, receive general information, and arrange shipment of their baggage and other

possessions. From grant funds, JAI receives $40

### Enlargement of Transit Center in Austria—$187,177

This program originally called for an expenditure of $500,000 to enlarge the transit center at Schoenau Castle, near Vienna, including improvements to the heating system and new kitchen equipment. This work was suspended in the fall of 1973 after Schoenau transit operations were halted at the request of the Government of Austria. Kitchen equipment has been moved to the new transit center and Schoenau, although not in use, remains under long-term JAI lease.

### Construction or Acquisition of New Absorption Centers and Hostels—$12,750,000

The Jewish Agency maintains 52 absorption centers in Israel, some with apartments (a few with mobile homes) for immigrant families, others with hostel-type living and eating accommodations for single persons, couples, the elderly, and persons requiring special academic training.

Refugees normally spend 4-6 months in absorption centers while learning Hebrew, acclimatizing themselves, and ultimately locating employment and a permanent home.

The grant program provides for five new absorption centers:

* Rehovot, between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, with 96 one-bedroom apartments in four buildings, plus the usual classrooms and office space for the Jewish Agency and Israeli Government resettle-ment assistance personnel. The Rehovot Absorption Center was dedicated Febru-ary 4, 1974, in a ceremony attended by officials of the Israeli and American Governments as well as by American Jewish leaders. The center has been fully operative since May 1974.

* Kiryat Sharet Absorption Center in Holon, between Rehovot and Tel Aviv. This hostel-type center will contain 192 residential units. It was to have been completed by late 1974, but work was delayed by lack of manpower due to mobilization at outbreak of the 1973 October War. Projected completion date: Spring 1975.

* Kiryat Yam Absorption Center, on the Mediterranean between Haifa and the

3

## Location of U.S.-Supplied Mobile Homes

Lebanese border, a complex of three nine-story buildings also has a projected completion date of Spring 1975.

* Kfar Saba Absorption Center, between Tel Aviv and Haifa, will have 120 hostel-type one-room apartments. Completion is scheduled in November 1976.

* Ra'anana Absorption Center, just south of Kfar Saba, will consist of 144 apartments in its five-building complex. Projected completion date is April 1977.

## Construction or Acquisition of Medical Facilities—$6,000,000

Israel has found that Soviet medical personnel—doctors, dentists, nurses, and practical nurses—need extensive retraining and usually upgrading of their skills in order to meet Western standards. Grants have gone to support construction of two institutions offering this training while also pro-

viding medical treatment available to refugee immigrants:

* Rambam Hospital, Haifa. Grant funds have paid for an additional floor of a new building. The hospital has extensive training programs, with Soviet immigrants among the trainees. The floor provided by the grant has 63 beds, laboratories, a seminar room, and nephrology and intensive care wards with modern equipment.

* Shaare Zedek Medical Center, presently under construction, will be the new home of an old Jerusalem institution and one of the world's outstanding hospital complexes. It will offer extensive medical and nursing training as well as treatment. From grant funds, $4 million will pay most of the cost of two outpatient clinic buildings, to be named after Emma Lazarus, the Jewish-American humanitarian whose poem is emblazoned on the Statue of Liberty. Completion is projected for 1977.

## Construction or Acquisition of Apartments and Mobile Homes—$30,450,000

Housing is one of Israel's most acute problems. Grant funds have provided for construction or acquisition of 1,355 apartments, all of which are occupied at nominal rentals by newly arrived families.

Also under this program, 124 surplus U.S. Government mobile homes, originally used for victims of hurricane Agnes in Pennsylvania, have been shipped to Israel and installed for use at absorption centers. In addition, to relieve overcrowding at absorption centers, $4 million has been allocated for short-term rentals of privately owned apartments; these serve as temporary homes for refugee immigrants during the initial absorption process. Some 13,500 refugees were housed in more than 2,300 rental apartments during 1974.

The permanently acquired apartments are in buildings or complexes of buildings throughout the country (i.e., as for all projects under the grant, within the borders of pre-1967 Israel).

## Mobile Homes Available and Occupied December 1974

<table><thead><tr><td></td><td>Projected</td><td>Completed</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Ashkelon</td><td>54</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>Kfar Gevirol</td><td>12</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Kfar Yonah</td><td>28</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Ofakim</td><td>18</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Or Akiva</td><td>12</td><td>8</td></tr></tbody></table>

4 [c]

Major U.S.-Sponsored Housing Projects

Apartment Construction Projected and Completed
December 1974

<table><thead><tr><td></td><td>Projected</td><td>Completed</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Ashdod</td><td>240</td><td>96</td></tr><tr><td>Ashkelon</td><td>96</td><td>96</td></tr><tr><td>Karmiel</td><td>212</td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>Kiryat Ata</td><td>44</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>Kiryat Motzkin</td><td>164</td><td>164</td></tr><tr><td>Kiryat Yam</td><td>240</td><td>240</td></tr><tr><td>Migdal Ha'emek</td><td>199</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td>Netivot</td><td>80</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Sderot</td><td>80</td><td>32</td></tr></tbody></table>

University Scholarships—$4,200,000

Grant financial assistance to students consists of three elements: Tuition payments directly to universities, living expenses, and rent paid directly to the individual on a formula developed by Israel's Student Authority.

Assistance under this program goes to Soviet refugee students attending some 40 Israeli institutions of higher learning. During the academic year ended spring 1973, 1,925 students received scholarships and stipends; for the year ended spring 1974 the figure was 2,326, and a peak of 2,400 students was reached in August 1974. Institutions enrolling the larger numbers of these students in 1973-74 were The Technion in Haifa (415), Tel Aviv University (337), Hebrew University in Jerusalem (276), School for Practical Engineers in Beersheba (271), Elonei Yitzek Matriculation Program (111), and Haifa University Institute (106). In addition, nine teachers' seminaries had 114 students enrolled under this program.

Training and Retraining for Artisans and Technicians—$1,225,000, and Maintenance Costs for On-the-Job Trainees—$1,550,000

Immigrant artisans, technicians, mechanics—"blue-collar workers"—do not necessarily pass through absorption centers. Many go directly into jobs, while simultaneously attending part-time language or vocational training courses. Others, including beginners as well as the experienced, participate in training and retraining programs provided by the Jewish Agency to familiarize the students with Israeli standards and work procedures while increasing their skills. Assistance consists of supplementary wages in some cases and, if required, maintenance costs and living expenses for families, if the trainee is at a distance from home. There were about 2,900 beneficiaries under these programs in 1974. These included 11 Soviet doctors, 5 laboratory technicians, and 28 nurses in a special program of medical and paramedical training or retraining at Hadassah Hospital, Jerusalem. Grant funds provided stipends for the students and training equipment and materials.

Maintenance Costs at Absorption Centers and Hostels—$12,263,823

During a typical month in 1974 there were about 7,100 Soviet refugees living in 140 absorption centers and other institutions. Cost of their maintenance averaged $90.37 per individual per month, reimbursed to the Jewish Agency from the grant program.

5

## Proposed Sites for Youth Aliyah Dormitories

### Absorption of Academicians—$1,800,000

Israel has problems utilizing the skills of a significant number of highly educated Soviet immigrants until they can learn Hebrew and adapt to the new society and its requirements for their specialties. This particular program provides funds to employ scientists in basic research at universities during resettlement, and grants to individuals to establish themselves professionally, to business and industry to provide employment, and to encourage employment in the arts of musicians, writers, and designers. Of 59 Soviet refugees who received financial assistance in 1974, 45 were affiliated with university-level institutions. The total included 31

engineers in various categories, 8 physicists, 3 biologists, 3 chemists, 3 mathematicians, 2 economists, and 1 each anthropologist, veterinarian, astrophysicist, linguist, agronomist, metallurgist, statistician, designer, geneticist.

### Youth Aliyah Institutions—$1,200,000

The Youth Aliyah program, peculiar to Israel, trains immigrant and other children: orphans, the troubled, those whose families cannot house or provide for them. The institutions, situated over most of the country, are designed to produce useful citizens from among immigrants and residents alike.

During 1974, the grant provided care and maintenance under Youth Aliyah for 1,400 to 1,900 Soviet refugee children per month. Additional funds will support construction of two modest dormitories.

### Contingency Planning for 1975

The Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs of the Department of State has obligated and expended all funds under the 1973-74 allocations of $74.5 million for assistance to Soviet refugees resettling in Israel. In turn, most of those funds allocated for assistance to individuals by the United Israel Appeal were exhausted. Payments on capital construction are made as work progresses. The Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs receives quarterly reports from the United Israel Appeal and auditors attached to the U.S. Mission in Geneva periodically check the program in Israel. The U.S. Treasury receives the interest from unexpended funds.

Since the relaxation of Soviet emigration restrictions for Jews wishing to move to Israel, up to the present, the U.S. Government has aided close to 100,000 Soviet refugees in Israel. Of these, 14,000 emigrated in 1971, 31,500 in 1972, 33,500 in 1973, and 17,000 in 1974. The 1975 monthly totals to date continued at about the same rate as the last months of 1974.

At the present time, both USRP and ICEM are discussing proposed expenditures of the $40 million which has been authorized but not appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 1975. Ten million dollars under a continuing resolution will be utilized almost entirely for assistance to individuals. Proposed capital construction projects include new absorption centers at Ra'anana, Tiberias, and Hadera and considerable additional housing.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[107]

November 26, 1975

No. 580

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
HOTEL PONTCHARTRAIN
DETROIT, MICHIGAN
NOVEMBER 25, 1975

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on April 29, 1965, President Ford, then a Michigan Congressman, issued a statement in which he condemned Turkey for the genocide of the Armenian people. Last December 13, 1974, the White House informed me that the President was sticking to his condemnation of the Ottoman Turkish Government of 1913.

On April 8, 1975, the House passed a resolution, voted overwhelmingly, to mark April 24 this year as a national day of remembrance of man's inhumanity to man, particularly in the massacre of the Armenian people.

According to Congressman Henderson of North Carolina, at the urging of the State Department the words "in Turkey" were deleted from that resolution because of delicate negotiations on the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece.

When that resolution passed the House and went to the Senate Subcommittee chaired by Senator Hruska of Nebraska, the Associated Press reported on April 23, 1975 that time is running out, and the State Department has bottled the resolution, did not want the resolution out of Senator Hruska's Subcommittee.

According to Senator John Tunney -- Jerry Hill, his chief aide -- your office contacted Senator Hruska and said under no means should any resolution on the Armenians come out of that Committee.

Could you explain to me why so much pressure on a simple resolution marking the observance of sixty years?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I am delighted to go to news conferences in which I learn some news, and the fascinating events which you have just described are all news to me. I cannot tell you how moved I am when I hear Congressmen and Senators report the intolerable pressures to which they are exposed by the Department of State which prevents them from passing legislation. I will quickly get in touch with those of my aides who have that tremendous influence so that they can use their pressure when it will do me some good. (Laughter)

I have to tell you that most of the detailed events you described here are news to me. It is obvious that the United States attaches importance to its friendship with Turkey, a country with which we have a long relationship and which is in a very strategic position.

It is also clear that in the face of the arms cut-off that was already taking place, we would not want to upset that relationship more than was necessary.

-2-

PR 580

I did not personally involve myself in the discussions of the Armenian resolution. What happened to the Armenians sixty years ago was a great tragedy occurring in the Ottoman Empire, not in the present Government of Turkey. But I think that the stories of that overpowering influence of my office on the Congressional committees are, like Mark Twain's death, "slightly exaggerated."

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the debate on foreign policy and the press, particularly during a campaign year, offers a chance for dialogue and dissent in the public. How does that affect your ability to conduct the foreign relations of the United States?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Nobody should take the position that foreign policy cannot be conducted in the face of a democratic debate. In fact, it is the essence of a vital democracy that it can conduct a coherent foreign policy while debating the fundamental issues.

At the same time, the foreign policy of the United States deals with the permanent interests and values of the United States. These should not be determined primarily by partisan considerations. Therefore, some restraint -- some greater restraint -- should be placed on the foreign policy debate by both sides than on domestic debate. The Administration in office should not claim that is the repository of all wisdom and remember, as we do, that there is a continuity in American foreign policy that includes the Administrations of both parties. The opposition should keep in mind that we should not give the impression to foreign countries that the basic direction of our foreign policy in all categories is going to get changed every eight years.

So within these limits I think that debate should go on and can be fruitful and, as far as we are concerned, we will certainly welcome it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Kissinger, in your speech last night you talked about the lack of restraint shown by the Soviet Union and Cuba in intervening militarily in Angola. What in practical terms can you do about it for the United States? What reaction can there be?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Our primary concern at this moment is to put an end to it and to see whether an African solution can be found to an African problem. That is to say, whether the countries of Africa and the local forces in Angola can work out a solution without turning Angola into an arena for great power rivalry.

**QUESTION:** In other words, a coalition government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We certainly favor the report of the Conciliation Committee of the Organization of African Unity which called for negotiation among all three groups and a possible coalition government, yes.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you feel that step-by-step negotiations in the Middle East no longer are useful, and that perhaps you should move to a conference form of negotiations for a more permanent settlement of the question.

Are those reports accurate? And why is step-by-step negotiation no longer useful? And also, what form of conference negotiations are you talking about?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I just glanced at such a report in one of our leading eastern newspapers, and I am afraid to contradict them because then they will write an editorial against me. (Laughter)

-3-

PR 580

That would be such an unusual event for them that I dare not do it.

Basically our view has always been that we are prepared to support the step-by-step approach if the parties want it. Specifically, we are prepared, and continue to be prepared, to support a negotiation between Syria and Israel with respect to the Golan Heights. And in that respect I do not agree with that particular report which I have seen.

However, if the parties would not be able to agree on a negotiation, we would be willing to encourage a Geneva-style negotiation or a Geneva negotiation based on the original participants and on the original letters of invitation. Failing that, we are prepared to have a preparatory conference to the Geneva Conference or an informal meeting again of the original membership. So we are prepared to support any negotiating effort that the parties themselves are.

**QUESTION:** But are step-by-step negotiations out, or --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No.

**QUESTION:** They are not out?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** They are not out.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, last night you referred to the need for a prosperous economy, the divisions of a planet between North and South, the rebirth of some of our former opponents after World War II, and you closed with the statement that our foreign policy is not a burden.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Is not a burden, yes.

**QUESTION:** What would you say to the eight million unemployed in this nation, particularly in a city like Detroit that has been hard hit by the recession, and to those citizens who are opposed to continuing foreign aid?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would say to them that, first of all, the unemployment is not caused in any sense by foreign aid. Even technically, the money we spend for foreign aid is useful to the other countries only because they spend it here, and, therefore, it makes jobs rather than depriving people of jobs.

Secondly, I would say to the unemployed that they have to understand -- and I would say to all Americans that they have to understand -- that our prosperity and our security are now inextricably linked with that of the rest of the world. And as events in the past five years have shown, if the rest of the world collapses economically, whatever difficulties we have here will be greatly magnified; and if there is conflict, it will run major risks for the United States.

So I would say that our foreign commitments and our foreign involvement reflect not a favor to other countries and not an act of charity, but that they are an expression of the American self-interest, and are in the interest of all Americans, including the unemployed.

Now, of course we must reduce unemployment in America, and we must have a strong economic recovery. When the leaders of the industrial democracies met two weeks ago this was recognized as the principal goal of all these countries -- pre-eminently of ours. So I do not want to set up an opposition in which our people have to suffer for the sake of foreign policy. Our people have to understand that the economic difficulties in this country are

-4-

PR 580

not caused by our foreign policy and that they would be worse without a
forward-looking foreign policy.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, UN Secretary Waldheim is reportedly having difficulty in effecting a continuation of the so-called cease-fire on the Golan. Do you have any more encouraging word at this time, and what if the agreement is not continued after Sunday's deadline?

And since I am on the question of the UN, would you care to comment on
whether there will be a censorship on Moynihan, Mitchell and their associates
at the UN against the brutal majority?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, with respect to the discussions that Secretary-General Waldheim is conducting, I have not yet seen an official report by Secretary-General Waldheim of what he was told in Damascus and in Jerusalem, though I expect to find this when I return to Washington today.

What is being discussed is not a continuation of the cease-fire but a con-
tinuation of the mandate of the UN forces on the Golan Heights; that is to
say, of the UNDOF group. We still believe that an extension of the mandate
is essential, and that an increase in tension on the Golan Heights would
serve nobody and would create the most serious difficulties for all those
who want to make progress toward peace, while not helping the more radical
elements either.

With respect to Ambassador Moynihan, I have repeatedly stated that he has our
full confidence. There is no question of muzzling him -- for that matter,
there is no physical possibility of muzzling my friend Pat Moynihan. (Laughter)

But that has never been the issue. There has not been an issue. There
has been no dispute. This is an invented crisis.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, Bill Leggit, writing in the current issue of *Sports Illustrated*, said that the proposed baseball trip by major league players to Cuba -- governmental approval of that is imminent as late as this week. Can you comment on the status of that proposal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It was imminent at one point; it is not imminent now.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I hate to digress from these important subjects of discussion here this morning, but you were to meet with some of our labor leaders and editors here this morning. I wonder if you could comment on what those discussions involved.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I met with the labor leaders last night and with the editors this morning. One of the purposes for me of these trips is to get a feeling for what is on the minds of the various concerned citizens in the areas that I visit, and, therefore, I usually schedule three or four groups of people of various professions and concerns and have a give and take.

In order to permit the frankest kind of discussion, I always have those off
the record, so it would not be appropriate for me to discuss the content
of these conversations. But I do want to say that I find these meetings
extremely helpful in giving me, within the limited time available, a feel
of what is on the minds of the leaders of the areas that I visit.

**QUESTION:** Could you give us a broad overview, for instance, of what the chief concern is of most people?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am afraid if I give an overview, they will give an overview, and then we will never hear the end of it. (Laughter)

-5-

PR 580

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, last night you described the success of American foreign policy. I believe that many would consider it not so successful, given events of the last several weeks -- such as the Japanese proposals at Rambouillet calling for debt moratorium, a new international development and rapid development of thermonuclear fusion power. Also, you have similar proposals coming out of the UNCTAD Conference at Geneva and Soviet discussions of the transfer ruble. You also have the revolutionary success in Angola, the unstoppable revolution in Portugal and in the Middle East where your policy has basically backfired with the hegemony now of the Communist party in Lebanon. What makes you believe with these international developments, and domestically the exposures of your and the National Security Council involvements in gun-running, dope-pushing and assassinations that you will be able to, number one, escalate toward confrontations with the Soviets around Bangladesh, the Middle East or Angola -- or, number two, that you will be able to contain the growing influence of the U.S. Labor party in the LaRouche-Evans Presidential campaign?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I like the objectivity with which your questions are put to me, (Laughter) permitting an easy yes-and-no answer. (Laughter)

Of course, I have to say my perspective is perhaps a little biased, but it is not exactly the same as yours. The United States cannot keep others from making proposals that we do not approve of. But the test of the policy is not whether these proposals are made, but whether they are accepted; and we were extremely satisfied by the results of the Rambouillet Conference, and we think that the results of it indicate that the industrial democracies are working more closely together than at any time in the postwar period.

The other items you raised are too complicated to deal with at this brief meeting.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said recently that the arms talks with the Soviet Union are stagnated.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes.

**QUESTION:** What is causing the stalemate and what are the chances for breaking it? What will it take to break it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the stalemate has been caused basically by the issue of whether to count the so-called BACKFIRE bomber and how to take into account the so-called cruise missiles in relation to the overall totals that had been agreed to at Vladivostok. These are complicated technical issues, and the status of the negotiations is such that if that deadlock is broken, it can be concluded reasonably rapidly after that in working out the details.

The prospects are hard to foretell at this moment. It is our position -- we are prepared to review our position, if the Soviet Union is prepared to review its position. We cannot make new proposals simply because the Soviet Union rejects our old proposals without offering any alternatives. If the Soviet Union is prepared to review its attitude, then we can see what can be modified in ours, so that a mutually acceptable compromise can emerge.

At this point I cannot give you a judgment of the degree to which this is possible, because there have not been any detailed talks since my last press conference.

**QUESTION:** Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you consider it a possibility that you might be meeting with one or another of the Soviet leaders before the end of the year on that subject?

-6-

PR 580

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That possibility exists, but it is not yet absolutely firm.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, some Canadian sources are under the impression this morning that you are unduly critical of their own self-interest when it comes to their own oil. How do you see that again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I was self-critical of their interests?

**QUESTION:** Of Canadians' interests, preserving their self-interest when it comes to their oil.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You mean in answer to a question yesterday?

**QUESTION:** Yes; apparently so.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have not seen these comments, and I was afraid there might have been a loose microphone around a dinner table again yesterday. (Laughter)

We understand the Canadian concern with looking after their own interest with respect to their own oil. We have our own concerns with respect to the refineries in the Middle West that have been put there primarily because of the expectation of Canadian oil. Therefore, we have to work out some arrangement by which both of these concerns can be met.

We consider our relations with Canada excellent, and that these problems can be worked out amicably and in a cooperative spirit. So if my answer yesterday came across as critical, it was not intended that way. It was intended to state a problem which we both have, and which we should both attempt to solve -- and are attempting to solve.

**QUESTION:** You foresee no difficulties?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I foresee difficulties, but I foresee that we will solve them.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, Aviation Week and Space Technology has accused you and the President of a deliberate policy of secrecy and deception at the SALT talks. Do you have any response to that editorial?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it is a disgrace when the President and the Secretary of State can be accused of deliberately deceiving the American public with respect to alleged violations of our major adversary. Serious people are bound to differ when you have complicated weapons systems on both sides of great technological complexity. When there is a report of violation, it is investigated. That takes some time. Then representations are made. That may take some time. But there has been no violation that has been reported that has not been brought to the attention of the Soviet Union and has not been energetically pursued -- or, I should rather say, no allegation of a violation -- and I think this is an unworthy editorial.

**QUESTION:** Therefore, to follow up, they say the Soviet Union is building an irreversible Soviet military advantage. You say that is totally wrong?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Soviet Union is building up its strategic forces but not on the basis of violations of the agreement, but on the basis of investment in its strategic forces. I do not believe that the Soviet Union can build an irreversible advantage in strategic forces against the United States if we are on our toes. They will certainly not do it on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement. Whether they do it by being willing to

-7-

PR 580

spend more than the United States is another matter. But on the basis of violations of the SALT agreement, it is not correct.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there is this continuation of sniping by forces in Washington that you will leave the Administration before the end of the year. Is that possible; is it probable? And could your Congressional critics put you in a position where you just could not function?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have no plan to leave the Administration. I received perhaps excessive praise at one stage. I may receive excessive criticism now -- and I admit that I consider any criticism excessive. (Laughter)

As I said yesterday, you cannot conduct foreign policy without authority, and if the authority of the Government is constantly eroded, foreign policy will suffer. But I think that senior officials have to be prepared to take criticism as well as praise, and I am not complaining about it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, following that up, sir, are there any indications that the revelations of the Pike Committee and the Church Committee have had specifically detrimental effects on foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am not so familiar with the revelations of the Pike Committee. I am familiar with charges of the Pike Committee. On the whole, I think that the Church Committee has attempted to do a serious job with a very difficult subject -- with an assignment that it did not seek out but that was given to it. Nevertheless, even though the effort was serious, it was not helpful to the conduct of our foreign policy for the publication of all these documents to take place, and this is why the President opposed it.

**QUESTION:** Could you expand on this point that you made in your speech last night that Russia's interventionist policy must inevitably threaten other relationships? You were speaking in reference to Angola. Could you expand more precisely on what you meant there?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I meant it is difficult to reconcile this with the principles of co-existence that were signed in 1972, and this would have to be taken into account by our policy if it continues.

**QUESTION:** Could you elaborate on the policy of the State Department in response to the proposals that were made by Japanese Minister Miki at Rambouillet where he called for a worldwide economic development program to be facilitated by the establishment of a new economic -- new monetary institutions, that called for a debt moratorium for the underdeveloped sector, and for international cooperation on rapid development of thermo-nuclear fusion power. And, secondly, could you explain why the contents of Minister Miki's offer had not been reported to the American press and instead are being confined to the chambers of the National Security Council?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, if Prime Minister Miki made such proposals, it is his responsibility to put them to the American press if he wants them published.

I, frankly, am not familiar -- I may not have focused on his presentation, but I do not recall this degree of detail.

But, at any rate, there is no reason, from our side, not to have Japanese proposals put forward -- except a courtesy that the Japanese would put forward their own proposals, and not we.

-8-

PR 580

Now, with respect to the specific proposals, the United States is opposed to debt moratorium because it would fall almost exclusively on us, and because we do not believe that this is the right way of proceeding.

The United States strongly favors a major effort of the developed countries to establish a better cooperation with the developing countries. At the United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly, the United States put forward a very sweeping program in many categories of income maintenance, new investment, help to the poorest countries, food reserves in which the industrial countries and the developing countries could cooperate, and in which the United States could show greater flexibility.

The United States will support that program. That is our program. Other countries are free to put forward their program. Thermonuclear fusion -- the peaceful uses of thermonuclear fusion have not even been solved yet, and, therefore, it is not the most immediate issue that is before mankind. But our proposal has been put forward -- our position has been put forward in great detail on September 1st before the Special Session of the General Assembly.

Those are the programs that we support. Other countries have every right to put forward their proposals, but we do not necessarily endorse them.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, one time the U. S. was successful in stopping opium poppy production in Turkey and it is our understanding now that the production of poppies is growing again. Has the United States given up totally on using diplomacy to try to limit the supply of heroin to this country?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. We consider that the control of opium traffic is one of our most important objectives, and we have been working with the Turkish Government on the control of the poppy production. It is a very important domestic political issue in Turkey because the swing districts are also the districts in which poppy production is most widespread. But we have worked out with the Turkish Government a process of harvesting by which the so-called straw process, by which the poppy harvest is processed in governmental plants; and, therefore, the private sale of the opium is, to all practical purposes, eliminated.

This has so far worked rather well. And Representative Rangel, who has been one of the chief advocates of this program, looked into it and found it extremely helpful.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, when will you make a visit to black Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope during the course of next year.

**QUESTION:** Can you give us a specific date?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. The dates depend on other international events; but I have talked to several African leaders, and I hope to visit there next year.

**QUESTION:** Members of the Congressional Caucus have criticized you repeatedly for not going over to visit black Africa in the past. Can you comment on that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have been in close touch with members of the Black Caucus, and they have worked together with us on a policy paper in which we want to take their views into account. I have been so heavily

-9-

PR 580

engaged in the Middle East problems that were more urgent, if not more
important, and I have been out of the country so much on these other trips
which were caused by immediate crises that I could not take a trip to
Africa. But I hope very much to be able to do it next year.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you see any indication that the OPEC nations will be contemplating oil increases for the United States this year or next year ?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Price increases?

**QUESTION:** Yes. And, if so, what can we do to negotiate on the basis of some of the foodstuffs that we ship to them?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, there is a meeting -- the so-called consumer-producer conference is scheduled to meet in Paris on December 16th, and we will get a clearer indication at that point of what the long-term policy of the oil-producing nations is.

Our impression is that there is no immediate risk of an increase in oil
prices. But, as I said yesterday, it is a serious matter for all of the
industrial countries, as well as for the developing countries, to have
their domestic economies or their development programs made totally subject
to decisions that are taken far away, and which are entirely made without
reference to their concerns. Therefore, we hope very much that the OPEC
nations will think very seriously before they contemplate another increase.

**QUESTION:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * *