of World War II, met in San Francisco, they still maintained similar embassies when

And as the nations of the world, adopted and sustained by the honors
150 years ago.

they too found inspiration and guidance in many of the points emulated some
still. In 1948 when new nation after new nation wrote their constitutions,
are not at a conclusion, relating at the top of the mountain, we are travelers
Neither discussion nor trial and error is finished 150 years later: we
and our posterity....

promote the general welfare
provide for the common defense
inure domestic tranquillity
establish justice
form a more perfect Union

"We, the people of the United States, in order to

bowers from the consent of the governed."...
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
and the Peculiar of Happiness. That to ensure these rights,
certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
"We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are

Declaration of Independence and on Constitution, which follow.

Philosophers of the 18th century in almost the same words as those of our

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they created the United Nations. The deep significance of this result for the American people has been obscured by the controversies which are, and were expected to be, the principal task of that body. Its Charter sets forth commitments of the now 81 members, both as to purpose and as to standards of conduct, which are entirely congenial to American purpose and long-range policy. The Charter sets the terms of reference for both debate and behavior, providing strong support for those who comply with it and multiplying the costs for those who would violate or ignore it. This gravitational pull of the Charter is an invaluable asset of the American people, just because their own aspirations are parallel. That these aspirations are demonstrably shared by so many other peoples underlines the humanist base of the American experience and of the ideas around which we revolve.

"We, the people of the United Nations

Determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal right of men and women and of nations large and small, and

To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, and for these ends

To practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

To unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

To insure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed forces shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

common interest, and

tion of methods that authorities shall not be used, save in the

To name, by the substance of principles and the institute

security, and

To unite our attention to maintain international peace and

another as a good neighborhood, and

To maintain complete and cordial relations in peace with one
further freedom, and further justice and

To promote social progress and better standards of life in
national law can be maintained, and

the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of inter-

To establish conditions under which justice and respect for
women and of nations large and small, and

and with of the human being, in the equal right of men and

To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human being, in the equality of men and

of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought much harm to
Determined to serve, succeding generations from the source

so many other peoples underlie the fundamental basis of the American experience
of the American people, just because their own
are an invaluable asset of the American people, just because their own

For those who would violate or ignore it. This gravitational bull of the Charter
providing strong support for those who comply with it and multitudinous the costs
of the Charter, affects the terms of tolerance for both debate and behavior.

conduct, which are entirely congenial to American public and long-range
minutes of the now 81 members, both as to public and as to standard of
expected to be, the principal task of that body. Its Charter sets forth con-
American people has been acclaimed by the controversies which are, and were
they created the United Nations. The deep significance of this result for the

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To employ international machinery for the promotion of the
economic and social advancement of all people, have resolved to
combine our efforts to accomplish these aims." ....

B. <u>The American Outlook</u>

In spite of the basis provided by an agreed national purpose which by
its terms is clearly not limited to the domestic scene and by the strong indi-
cations that these aspirations are shared by other nations and peoples, the
United States lacks at present a clearly articulated concept of national purpose
in international affairs. It has not appreciated the implications of its accepted
national purpose as they relate to the position of the United States in the world
today. Reasons for this failure are many, but perhaps the most important lie
in the nature of democracies in general and of the American democracy in
particular.

By its nature, a democracy must give first attention to the needs and
aspirations of its individual citizens. It must, therefore, concentrate on the
objectives and problems which appear familiar and important to them. In
normal times during the past, individual private citizens have had little
contact with problems abroad or experience in dealing with them; for them the
familiar and urgent problems have been schools, roads and local government,
the tasks of making a living and raising a family. In the past, these tasks
were essentially local and afforded no insights into events or conditions
abroad and imposed no necessity for being concerned with them.

In the United States this characteristic has been reinforced by history.

In the United States the characteristic has been replaced by history: a
shame and imposed to necessity, by penalty, connected with them, the
responsibility of the past and the events or conditions
inasmuch as the past has been the cause of the present and the
familiar and urgent problems have been solved, roads and local government,
contract with problems should or experience in dealing with them; for them the
normal times during the past, individual private citizens have had little
opportunity and problems which appear familiar and important to them: in
the abstractions of its individual citizens. It must, therefore, concentrate on the
by its nature, a democracy must give that attention to the needs and
barriers.

In the nature of democracies in general and of the American democracy in
body. Reasons for this failure are many, but perhaps the most important is
national purpose as they relate to the position of the United States in the world
in international status. It has not abbreviated the implications of its adopted
United States laws at present a clearly affirmative concept of national purpose
as regards these aspirations are shared by other nations and peoples: it
is formula is clearly not limited to the domestic scene and by the same limit-
ing in spite of the state provided by an agreed national purpose which di-

8. The American Outlook

combine our efforts to accomplish these aims. . . .
economic and social advancement of all people, we have resolved to
To employ international machinery for the promotion of the

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The American people have been absorbed for the past three centuries in the enormous and satisfying task of settling, developing, and governing their country. Since the area was large and many of the problems new, the task called for concentration and effort; yet, because of natural advantages, not the least of which were the abundance of the country and the insulation against foreign interference provided by others, success was great. Both the concentration and the success turned Americans away from foreign interests and the nature of the success served to conceal their importance. Their successes at home not only gave them no reason for looking outwards, but contributed to their confidence that any problems arising abroad, which might threaten domestic tranquility, would be readily soluble.

This combination of factors has prevented either the public or its leaders in the past from giving more than the most casual and intermittent attention to the foreign objectives of the United States and from relating the specific problems which have arisen to any scheme of objectives or overall concepts. It even concealed the need for developing any such scheme.

De Tocqueville observed this characteristic over a hundred years ago.

"Experience, instruction, and habit may almost always succeed in creating a species of practical discretion in democracies and that science of the daily occurrences of life which is called good sense. Good sense may suffice to direct the ordinary course of society; and amongst a people who education has been provided for, the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal affairs of the country may more than compensate for the evils inherent in a democratic government. But such is not always the case in the mutual relations of foreign nations.

must relations of foreign nations, the democratic government. But such is not always the case in the country may move than candidates for the elective office in a number of democratic free states in the internal affairs of the and amongst a people who have been provided for, the Good sense may suffer to affect the ordinary course of society, the science of the daily occurrences of life which is called good sense, creating a species of practical disaffection in democracies and that 'exhilaration, inflammation, and habit may almost always succeed in

De Tecumseh operated this characteristic over a hundred years ago.

concepts. If even concealed the need for developing any such scheme, specific problems which have arisen to any scheme of objectives or overall attention to the foreign objectives of the United States and from relating the factors in the past from giving more than the most casual and intermittent

This combination of factors has prevented either the public or its democratic tranquillity, would be readily soluble.

their confidence that any problems arising abroad, which might threaten home not only drive them from no reason for looking outwards, but contributed to the success of the success served to conceal their importance. Their success of consultation and the success turned Americans away from foreign interests and the foreign interference provided by others, success was great. Both the concern the fear of which were the abundance of the country and the inflation against called for concentration and effort. But because of natural advantages, not only the USA was large and many of the problems new, the task enormous and accompanying task of settling, developing, and governing their

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"Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a
democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the
perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient.
Democracy is favorable to the increase of the internal resources
of a state; it tends to diffuse a moderate independence; it pro-
motes the growth of public spirit, and fortifies the respect which
is entertained for law in all classes of society: and these are
advantages which only exercise an indirect influence over the
relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy is
unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to per-
severe in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence
of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with
secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience."

The environment which led to this behavior and approach is being broken
down. Technological developments are in the process of undermining the
simple domestic patterns which led to the basic unconcern of private citizens
with matters beyond the continental boundaries. In the first place, the
destructive power of weapons and their range have been prodigiously increased
with the result that the mainland of the United States is militarily vulnerable
to a degree entirely new in its history. Moreover, changes in the international
scene, such as the relative decline of British power, place on the United
States, for the first time, both initial and ultimate responsibility for its own
defense. Secondly, technological change has increased the complexity
of productive economic relations and consequently the interdependence of the
world economy. The United States not only needs raw materials and markets
abroad for itself and for its associates, but also it is involved in a world
economy, the level of which affects the level of prosperity in the United
States. This change means that the U.S. economy is more dependent on

States. This change means that the U.S. economy is more dependent on
economy, the level of which affects the level of prosperity in the United
sposed for itself and for its associates, but also it is involved in a world
world economy. The United States not only needs raw materials and markets
of productive economic relations and consequently the interdependence of the
defence. Secondly, technological change has increased the complexity
of states, for the first time, both initial and ultimate responsibility for its own
science, and as the relative decline of British power, place on the United
to a degree entirely new in its history. Moreover, changes in the international
with the result that the mainland of the United States is militarily vulnerable
determinative power of weapons and their range have been proportionally increased
with matters beyond the continental boundaries. In the first place, the
simple domestic patterns which led to the basic concern of private citizens
down. Technological developments are in the process of undermining the
the environment which led to this behavior and approach it being broken
security, and it will not await their consequences with patience."

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happenings outside the boundaries of the United States than at other times in
its past.

Because of these developments, it is no longer possible "to insure
the domestic tranquillity", "to provide for the common defense", or "to
promote the general welfare" of the people of the United States without relation-
ships with other peoples and, in varying degrees, dependence on them. Perhaps
it never was. In the past we have depended on other peoples in a variety of
ways; in the nineteenth century, for example, we depended on foreign capital
and foreign migration in part for the development of the country and on the
British Navy for our general security. But because of the relative simplicity
of the economy and strategy of the time, this dependence, even when its
existence was recognized, was not considered of fundamental importance. We
believed that we would always be able to get along on our own.

Now, however, technological change has made this dependence
fundamental. While it exists as a fact, implications from it have perhaps not
penetrated through the land. But by its nature it gradually invades the private
lives of ordinary citizens and in that way broadens the range of matters
appearing familiar and urgent to them. There are few families in the United
States who, within the last ten or fifteen years, have not had husbands or
sons stationed in some foreign land. This wide and repeated experience
is forcing upon all Americans a consciousness that they are involved in the
world outside. In the same way American business is now seeking raw
materials and markets all over the globe. These changes thus offer possi-

material and markets all over the globe. These changes thus offer a vast
world舞台. In the same way American business is now seeking raw
materials and markets all over the globe. These changes thus offer a
vast

famine and markets all over the globe. These changes thus offer a
vast
world舞台.
While it exists as a fact, implications from it have been not
penetrated through the land. But by a nature it gradually invades the private
famine and markets all over the globe. These changes thus offer a
vast
famine and markets all over the globe. These changes thus offer a
vast

believed that we would always be able to get silent on our own.
existence was recognised, was not considered of fundamental importance.
be of the economy and stability of the time, this dependence, even when its
British Navy for our general security. But because of the relative simplicity
and foreign migration in part for the development of the country and on the
way; in the nineteenth century, for example, we depended on foreign cabbits
it never was. In the past we have depended on other people in a variety of
ships with other people and, in varying degrees, dependence on them. Tendential
promote the general welfare of the people of the United States without relation-
the domestic stability, to provide for the common defense, or to
because of these developments, it is no longer possible to imagine
its past.

habenature outside the boundaries of the United States than at other times in
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bilities of modifying domestic patterns of thought, and thereby of developing
a meaningful concept of national purpose in international affairs, and they also
require that this be done.

While, in this sense, the choice of involvement in the world around
us is imposed on the American people, it does not follow that they would not
have made this choice voluntarily. The humanistic drive that made "the
pursuit of happiness" a private right and a public interest would not have
permitted complete indifference to what went on in the outside world, parti-
cularly as the people of the United States approached the solution of their
material needs. For, the moral of the 17th century Protestant remains with us.

"No man is an Iland, intire of itself; every man is a peece of
the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away
by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie
were, as well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine owne were;
any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in
Mankind..."

Or as Benjamin Franklin put it,

"For my own Part, when I am employed in serving others, I do
not look upon myself as conferring Favours but as paying
Debts. In my Travels, and since my Settlement, I have received
much kindness from Men, to whom I shall never have any
Opportunity of making the least direct Return. And numberless
Mercies from God, who is infinitely above being benefitted by
our Services. Those kindnesses from Men, I can therefore only
Return on their Fellow Men ... "

It would seem, therefore, that the basis for a concept of national
purpose in international affairs, can be found by relating the objectives found

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in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble of the Constitution to international affairs. This involves a recognition that the United States is becoming increasingly involved in a changing world. Other countries will be gaining in economic organization and strength; in population; in developing resources; in military power. American dependence on intellectual and technical interchange, and on esthetic, artistic and spiritual impulses from other countries, on raw materials and other products from overseas will tend to grow. This is a matter beyond American control; it is imposed by the increase of population here and elsewhere, the continued rise in standard of living, the impossibility of defense within national borders. Probably also the rapid spread of atomic information and technique of guided missiles will reduce the comparative lead which the United States (and the Soviet Union) have in military power to a point where military superiority becomes almost meaningless.

The conduct by a nation of its foreign affairs involves taking an end-less series of decisions, big and little. Each is an opportunity to move toward the realization of long-range objectives. Crises in each case also present an opportunity to move toward realization of these objectives. But use cannot be made of small decisions, nor advantage taken of great crises, unless the United States is clear about its objectives and unless these objectives are well understood by the American people.

The principal reason for making this report is to contribute to the clarification of American objectives. Without such clarity, we will have

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difficulty in acting purposefully in a world of flux. With it we shall be able
to make constructive use of crises and give a sense of direction to the many
small decisions the totality of which determine the success of American
foreign policy and the image of us by other nations.

C. <u>Global Objectives and Their Necessity</u>

I

The principal objective of the United States is to bring about, with the
help of like-minded peoples, a world environment in which the people of the
United States can continue to develop in conformity with the principles,
expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, arising
out of the great religious and philosophic affirmations of the dignity of man.
The achievement of this objective requires coping with two major forces
abroad in the world today.

(a) The dangers posed by the Soviet bloc and international communism with its stated objective, and its self-ordained destiny of world dominion.

(b) The nature and requirements of the revolution which is shaking
the world today.

It is unnecessary to elaborate on the characteristics of the Soviet bloc
of or international communism, their aggressiveness, their expansionist
tendencies by force or guile, their messianic drives, their desire to remake
the world in their own image; nor is there any need to explain how their spread
throughout the world would defeat our objective. Mention of the Korean war,

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Dien Bien Phu, Hungary or the Middle East is not needed to illuminate this problem.

More elaboration is required, however, with respect to the world revolution, for while it creates obstacles to the achievement of the principal objective of the United States, it also affords opportunities. A major element of this revolution is the disintegration of world order. During the past three hundred years or so the international affairs of the world have been ordered through a framework consisting of a relatively small number of major powers, centered in Europe, with colonies and client states dependent on them scattered over the globe. The American states were, of course, colonies at the beginning of this period and even after they achieved their independence they rarely were active in international affairs outside the hemisphere.

The elements of the old framework included:

(a) The concept of the state as a person whose domestic life was of no concern to other states and in which they had no legitimate interest.

(b) The concept that a state had no legal duty not to go to war; that there was no legal distinction between aggression and defense.

(c) An acceptance of the idea that if a state had the force to impose its will on others, particularly more backward peoples, it had the right to do so. This idea was accepted even by the backward peoples.

(d) An acceptance of the idea that a state had certain standards and responsibilities, whether at war or at peace, particularly with respect to its conduct toward other states and their citizens who were engaged in lawful activities.

The conduct toward other states and their citizens who were engaged in lawful seasons.

The conduct toward other states and their citizens who were engaged in lawful seasons, whether at war or at peace, neutrally with respect to

(c) An acceptance of the idea that it is right to impose its will on others, neutrally, more backward peoples, if it had the right to do so.

(b) An acceptance of the idea that it is right to impose its will on others, neutrally, more backward peoples, if it had the right to do so.

(d) The concept that a state had no legal duty not to do what that state considered to be its duty.

(a) The concept of the state as a person whose elements lie in the form of

they merely were active in international affairs outside the metropolis,
at the beginning of this period and even after they achieved their independent status, centered in Europe, with colonies and client states dependent on the mother country, centered in America, of course, the American states were, of course, centered on the mother country, with colonies and client states dependent on the mother country, and so the international affairs of the world have been.

The element of this revolution is the disintegration of which order, during the objective of the United States, it also attests opportunities. A major element of this revolution is the disintegration of which order, during the objective of the United States, it also attests opportunities. A major

Revolution, for which it creates obstacles to the achievement of the utopianism. More elaboration is required, however, with respect to the world problem.

The problem.

The problem of the Middle East is not needed to illuminate this problem.

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This framework began to break down at the time of World War I and its dissolution has been completed in recent years. Virtually all the elements of the framework have now disappeared. Western Europe is no longer the center of the world, colonialism is dead, there are vast numbers of neo-states claiming independence and equality but not recognizing the responsibilities going with that status, aggressive war is condemned (although no one is quite sure what constitutes aggression), and states or groups of states are claiming a juridical interest in the "domestic" affairs of other states. Not all these changes are for the worse, but combined they present many problems to be solved.

A second major element in the world revolution is the continuous and violent increase of population occurring in most areas of the world. Since this growth is not necessarily coordinated with possibilities for economic development, it causes social dislocations, economic distress and grave threats to national and regional stability, particularly in Asia.

A third element is the revolution of rising expectations, which appears to have caught the imagination of all, including the most backward peoples. It involves an unwillingness on the part of people all over the world to continue to accept the misery and poverty which have been their lot and a yearning for something better, not only economically but also in terms of self-respect and self-expression. There are many obstacles, political, social, and economic, to the achievement of these yearnings and there will be many disappointments. Where there are disappointments there will be turmoil and disorder.

Where there are dissatisfactions there will be tension and disorder.

To the achievement of these ends there will be many dissatisfactions.

Self-expression. These are many characteristics, political, social, and economic.

Something better, not quite economic, but also in terms of self-respect and

something better, not quite political, social, and economic.

It involves an unfamiliarity with the sort of people all over the world to continue

to have caught the imagination of all, including the most backward people.

A third element is the revolution of living expectations, which appears

good to national and regional stability, particularly in Asia.

Development, it causes social disintegration, economic disintegration, andative

this down is not necessarily cooking with bad habits for economic

good to the world, colonialism is dead, there are vast numbers of neo-states existing

the framework has now disappeared. Western Europe is no longer the center

dissolution has been completed in recent years. Actually all the elements of

This framework began to break down at the time of World War I and it is

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A fourth pressure is the rise of nationalism in most of Asia and Africa and to a certain extent in Latin America. As can be seen in the world today, nationalism can lead to unrest and civil war, to interference with the free exchange of goods and services, and to international conflicts. None of these conditions contributes to the achievement of our objective.

Finally technological change, as has already been pointed out with respect to the United States, constitutes an important element of this world revolution. For it is technological change which is altering the lives of, people all over the world and giving them new concepts of what their life may be. It is also imposing new requirements on them, requirements for concerted activities in many fields if they wish to use these new techniques.

The two forces at large in the world, with which the United States must cope if it is to achieve its objectives, militant communism and the world revolution, are thus related. This relationship has two aspects; in a sense, communism is a part of the world revolution and a distorted expression of it but communism also seeks to exploit the disorder and hopes created by the revolution to achieve its objectives. It is in this latter sense that world communism is the great danger to the United States.

The American national objective is also related to the world revolution. The United States was, after all, the first of the colonies to win freedom from empire in the name of the rights of man, and its aspirations are shared by men all over the world. Its basic national objective thus involves working with the world revolution in such a way that these aspirations may be realized

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and communist domination defeated. This general objective falls logically
into a number of more specific ones.

The first is to prevent further expansion of the Soviet bloc by direct
military aggression. To do so the United States must maintain a position of
military power which will make aggression appear unsafe, unprofitable and
uncertain in communist eyes and which will suggest that their struggle to
dominate the world revolution can be more profitably carried out in non-
military fields. Insofar as this involves deterring general war, this "deterrence"
is a major United States objective on its own merits because a general war
would be a disaster for all the world.

But having thereby persuaded the Soviet bloc to abandon aggressive
military action, temporarily at least, as an instrument of policy, the United
States is still far from realizing its purposes. Subversion, seduction and
plain disorder remain as powerful weapons of the bloc which can work through
the forces of nationalism, want and misery, overpopulation and the like, to
prevent the creation of a world in which we would like to live, and which
can also create conditions detrimental to the United States. Quite apart
from whatever uses to which they may be put by the Soviet bloc, many of
the forces of the world revolution contain in themselves the seeds of
developments which are contrary to the U. S. objective. This is a fact, not
because the forces themselves are necessarily evil or contrary to that objective
but because they may be carried to unwholesome extremes. In addition,
therefore, to its specific objective of deterring further Soviet military

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aggression and deterring general war, the United States has a series of
objectives for dealing with other aspects of the Soviet drive toward world
domination and for inducing the world revolution into constructive channels.

First among these is the survival of the United States, or as _The Federalist_ put it, "the _safety_ of the people". Survival of the United States implies not merely that the continental island shall not be invaded and our institutions overthrown, but also that they and the people who created them and flourish under them shall not wither under threat of nuclear blackmail or through the denial of markets in which to buy and sell. But survival means more than this; it means economic growth and human development for the people of the United States. Stated in this way, however, the objective of survival affords no clue of how to deal with communism or the world revolution. It seems clear, however, that survival in this sense does not mean isolation and focusing our attention on an internal development which is conceived as going on apart from the rest of the world. Any such approach would be contrary to the trends of the times, military, economic and psychological, and to our national purpose.

Survival in this sense implies at least three affirmative objectives.
The first is that the United States shall continue its development along the
lines laid down in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and
increase its material and spiritual strength. While this may seem, at first
glance, to be a domestic rather than an international objective, it must be
the foundation of our foreign policy, for without that strength we cannot achieve

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our international objectives.

Secondly the United States must work for the creation of conditions which will permit and assist the development of other peoples toward an increasing realization of the dignity of man. In accordance with our own pluralistic traditions, these efforts by the United States will not seek to impose particular institutions or patterns of life in various parts of the globe. In fact, they should be made in the recognition that variety and experimentation are the source of future growth. This objective requires the widest kind of free exchange of people, ideas and goods and services.

Thirdly and implicit in the second objective, is the necessity for the United States to counter the efforts of the Soviet bloc to exploit the world revolution for its own ends. These objectives are obviously interrelated; for example, a particular action might be undertaken which would contribute to the economic strength of the United States, provide a hitherto non-existent opportunity for economic livelihood for an underdeveloped people, thereby contributing to the stability of the region and weakening Soviet efforts toward disorder. The precise emphasis on the three objectives will vary from region to region and these questions of choice and emphasis can be better discussed in the regional chapters which follow.

Notwithstanding these questions of emphasis, these objectives require the development of a general international order. For man cannot trade or exchange ideas, let alone realize more subtle aspects of his worth in a world characterized by disorder, riot and rebellion. The United States should,

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therefore, devote all possible efforts politically, militarily and economically
to bring about an evolution toward world order and to preserve it as it emerges
at different times in different places. This is the keystone of our international
objectives. In this concept, however, order is not static; it involves the
notion of orderly change. But even in this notion of change, the emphasis is on
order.

As a part of this effort, the United States will work to maintain the
peace, not as an end in itself, but as that state of society which under
ordinary conditions contributes most to the realization of basic human values.
Peace is, thus, not an abstraction, but the resultant of a number of elements
in balance, including the threats to human values imposed by maintaining
peace at any price in a given situation and those which would be created
by war in the same situation. This concept of peace, together with that
of the need for order requires the exhaustion of all devices for maintaining the
peace before falling back on force as a means of foreign policy. But it also
contemplates the use of force when there appears to be no other alternative
for preserving human values and international order in the longer run.

This statement of objectives focuses the dispute between the United
States and the leaders of the Soviet Union. While in the long run, we both
seek an international order, the bases of that order differ. Our concept sees
the realization of human dignity as the reason for creating that order, and the
nature of man as providing the possibility for doing so. Theirs does not take
this view of the nature of man or the importance of his dignity; and for this

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reason, they are permitted the luxury of a more casual attitude toward order and can promote disorder when that seems more expedient.

II

The objectives described above are global in the sense that they are the objectives of the United States to be sought generally throughout the world. They are global in two other senses. In their emphasis on order and the dignity of man, they reflect the aspirations of men everywhere and are consistent with them, and in most cases they cannot be realized unilaterally but require the cooperative effort of others. Some of the forces imposing this requirement have been mentioned above as elements of the world revolution occurring today -- the disintegration of international order, the revolution of rising expectations and technological change. Some of their consequences should be traced in greater detail.

For example some sort of international order is essential to the achievement of the fundamental objectives of the United States. Yet the national purposes of the United States would hardly permit it to impose that order by fiat, even if it had the power to do so. It must therefore, seek an agreed basis for that order and this will involve a variety of cooperative arrangements toward this end.

Similarly if the revolution of rising expectations is to be met, there will have to be a far greater exchange of goods, services and ideas and far greater certainty that this exchange will be uninterrupted than now exists.

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The factors entering into this wider exchange are not fully worked out, but they
too will require a variety of cooperative efforts. These might include:

a) A general access to raw materials and sources of energy on terms which do not admit of exploitation of either the landlord or the consumer. The notion of the exploitation of the exporter of raw materials has become a recognized classic, but the notion of the exploited consumer, though not so well known, is just as important to be avoided.

b) The adequate development of autonomous techniques of economic organization. It may be through such development that the problem of fair exchange referred to above may be dealt with. Considerable advances have been made along these lines within Europe.

c) Guaranteed freedom of essential transport by sea, air, and certain
international highways and waterways. This, of course, is related closely
to both of the two previous factors.

d) Uninterrupted communication with opportunities for all people to
participate.

Although technological change offers possibilities of meeting the
revolution of rising expectations, it requires an order beyond and above that
of nation states in order to do so. It is quite clear that under today's conditions
productive economic relations require a variety of international arrangements
in order to attain complete utility. Even the United States is not self-sufficient
in raw materials; it sells about ten per cent of its agricultural production
abroad; and it is deeply committed to patterns of international trade. This

The draft and it is deeply committed to terms of international trade. This in raw materials if able about per cent of its annualized production in order to attain complete utility. When the United States is not self-sufficient productive economic relationship rectangle a variety of international arrangements of nation states in order to do an. It is due clear that under today's conditions revolution of trading expeditions, it requires an order beyond and above this. Although technological change offers possibilities of meeting the barriolade.

c) Unununurbed communication with opportunities for all people to both of the two previous factors.

d) International highways and waterways. This, of course, is referred closely.

e) Guaranteed freedom of essential transport by sea, air, and certain land made alone those lines within Europe.

f) The adequate development of autonomous techniques of economic self know, is just as important to be avoided.

Recognized classed, but the notion of the exploited consumer, though not so notion of the exploitation of the exporter of raw materials has become a which do not admit of exploitation of either the landlord or the consumer. The

g) A general access to raw materials and sources of energy on terms too weak to require a variety of cooperative efforts. These might include:

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situation is far more true for other countries not so fortunate as the United
States in their economic bases.

A third important force for a common minimum of objectives among all
peoples and for cooperative efforts among them is the technical necessity for
various types of concerted activities to safeguard and enrich mankind. Some
responses to these pressures have been already made. For example, the
allocation of wavelengths for radio broadcasting, which is essential if the
airwaves are to be used at all, has been achieved through an international
agreement which on the whole has stood up fairly well through the years. But
technical necessities run through a wide range of matters which have not yet
been fully dealt with - for example, diseases of men, and of the animals and
crops on which they depend, safety on the sea and in the air, and the wide
range of problems arising from nuclear energy.

Since this last group of problems is currently before the public in a
distorted form, perhaps a special comment is called for. Most of the public
discussion is concerned with the effects of testing hydrogen bombs; it has
not concerned itself with problems connected with the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy such as the disposal of radioactive wastes and the hazards which would
be created if a nuclear power plant got out of control, if it "ran away". While
there are differences of opinion among informed observers concerning dangers
inherent in tests of nuclear weapons at the present level, they are all
extremely concerned with the problems arising from the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy in populated areas. The nature of these problems requires some sort of

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international control.

Changes in military technology, related to the same set of worries, provide another force toward a type of international organization. The defense of the United States, and of other countries, cannot be realized in the face of modern technology within their national boundaries. Small countries are powerless to protect themselves against the forces available. Even large countries like the United States require bases on points outside their boundaries for long-range detection, air interception and other forms of defense in depth, and they also need to draw on resources, human and natural, outside their boundaries for the requirements of effective defense. This state of affairs calls, at the lowest level, for a combination of international arrangements which will permit effective defense and at a higher one for arrangements which will limit the necessities of effective defense.

Although the areas involved, geographical and functional, are not the same, the existence of these various forces at work together suggests that the national interest of the United States and virtually all nations requires a limited delegation of powers to the end that these necessary common interests may be served. Reference has already been made to the need of a new world order to replace the vanished old. These forces suggest the basis, as well as the need of a new world order to replace the vanished old. These forces suggest the basis, as well as the need, for the new order, which will be based on a combination of elements drawn from the past and the present. These will include

["The question of elements drawn from the past and the present. These will include\nbiparts, as well as the need, for the new order, which will be based on a com-\nportment of a new world order to replace the vanished old. These forces suggest the\nrepeal of the vanished old. These forces announce the past, so well at the need\nserved. Reference was already been made to the need of a new world order to\ndefend the powers to the end that these necessary common interests may be\nnational interest of the United States and virtually all nations require a limited\nsame, the existence of these various forces at work together suggests that the\nWith the areas involved, geographical and functional, are not the\nwhich will limit the necessity of effective defense.", "Attacks which will permit effective defense and at a higher one for arrangements\nagainst allies at the lowest level, for a combination of international arrangements\nfor the requirements of effective defense. This state of\ndepot-batteries for the requirements of effective defense, and they also need to draw on resources, human and natural, outside\nof the United States, require bases on points outside their boundaries like the United States require bases on points outside their boundaries. Even if they\nare sufficient to protect themselves against the forces available, even if they\n

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the old concept that a state has certain minimum responsibilities toward other states and their citizens and somewhat newer ones that no state has unlimited rights to be a public nuisance and that all states are subject to an exercise of international eminent domain.

It should be noted that all these pressures are working in direction consistent with the objectives of the United States. They are seeking an international order in which the potentialities of man may be better realized. They do not threaten his dignity; they offer to enrich it.

### III

These pressures add strength to the position of the United States as it seeks to achieve its position in the world, but apart from them, it stands in an unparalleled position of power, economically, militarily and ideologically. The economic and military facts are well-known, and their significance is often understood. In the United States there has been created a higher standard of living for a larger population than has previously been achieved in history. At the same time its economy has made a significant contribution to the overall growth of the world's economy since the end of World War II through economic aid and investment and trading abroad. It continues to have a great capacity to make such contributions and others, such as technical and scientific. Its military forces, built and maintained without sacrificing the standard of living of the people, provide the main deterrent to general war and are a significant factor in the maintenance of order in the world. These economic

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and military facts are thus a major contribution both to stability and opportunities for human growth.

Important as these are, the United States must remember that it can, and it already has, exported more than technical "know-how", or economic or military power. While it is important that the United States should offer, wherever appropriate, to contribute its technical competence where it is needed, it would be a sorry pass if better ways of tightening screws were all it had to offer to a waiting world. Although it would almost seem that we had consciously tried to present this image of ourselves, it fortunately is not true.

The revolution which is sweeping Asia and Africa is a Western revolution of which the creation of the United States and its growth are an important part.

It is not without significance that U.S. Supreme Court cases on freedom of speech are cited as authority before the Supreme Court of India, or that the federal structures are being adopted in many of the emerging states of Asia and Africa. Even in Europe, to whom we owe so much, it is recognized that the United States has much to offer in the way of social institutions contributing to the dignity of all men. If the United States can live up to the Western traditions and recapture the leadership of its own revolution, it has in its hand an almost limitless force for the realization of its own objectives.

This, of course, does not mean that American civilization is to be imposed or copied. In fact, an essential element of American civilization is its recognition of plurality and belief in its utility. Nevertheless its interest in

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the well-being of individuals represents a universal aspiration toward the
dignity of man which offers great opportunities. The reality of this interest
is demonstrated to the world by the interest of this country in helping other
peoples to improve their lot and by the relative success which the peoples
of the New World have achieved in cooperative peacemaking in the Western
Hemisphere. This interest makes it easier for the United States to cooperate
in cultural, technical, scientific and philosophical exchange, where we have
much to offer and much to receive.

IV

However comforting this analysis of the forces which support the
international objectives of the United States may be, it must nevertheless be
recognized that there are a variety of obstacles to their realization. Some of
these are features of the domestic scene in the United States, others arise
abroad from a variety of causes, historical, religious, economic, social,
psychological, but without any consciously rational opposition to our objectives,
and finally there is the Soviet bloc consciously and willfully opposed to our
objectives because of a different view of the nature of man.

Among the features of the American scene which act as obstacles
to the realization of our objectives are the following. Most of these are capable
of being overcome and some are in the process of being so. The first of
these is a principal target of this report -- the lack of a clear-cut affirmation
of American ideals and objectives, accompanied by continuous action

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indicating our intention to make these objectives real. This lack is a handicap in two ways; without a clear image of where we intend to go, we ourselves find it difficult to act with sureness and consistency and similarly other people cannot find their position in relation to ours or the leadership they may be seeking. Related to this is a failure to project an accurate image of our society and its values. A particular aspect of this is, of course, the treatment of religious and racial minorities in the United States. The achievements in religious toleration and race relations are often quite obscured by the weaknesses which persist and this distortion leads others to question the sincerity of our purposes generally. The same may be said of the confusing clamor which accompanies many of our political actions, ranging from presidential elections to congressional investigations which, by giving the impression that we are doing what may be the right thing for the wrong reasons, raises doubts not only as to our sincerity but also as to our intelligence. The fear among many American economic interests of foreign economic competition, although competition is one of our symbols, has similar effects.

Another weakness lies in our approach to problems abroad. The United States appears to lack confidence, patience and humility in facing them. Some historical reasons for this have already been suggested, but perhaps more important is the fact that the United States lacks trained personnel who are skilled in dealing with other peoples and who find satisfaction in doing so. These factors tend to prevent the United States from assuming responsibility in cases where it could exercise decisive influence, and thereby weaken our position.

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There is a rough parallel between these domestic obstacles to our objectives and those arising abroad. One of these is the lack of any system of values commanding general acceptance abroad. This arises from a failure to perceive the dignity of man as a common aspiration of all peoples or from a failure to articulate such a perception in appealing terms. A second obstacle is the absence of any quick and easy solution to most of the world's economic and social problems. With so many people living in misery and at hazard, these delays and uncertainties produce discord and disorder. In addition, many of the problems, by reason of history or nature, are extraordinarily complex, in many cases so complex that they are not fully understood by the people involved. Among these problems are those relating to the demands and aspirations of nationalism and sovereignty and to the effect of those demands on the hope for a world order which will be effective politically and economically.

In addition, there are some attitudes about the United States, widely held abroad, which act as obstacles to the achievement of our objectives. One of these is the accepted stereotype of the United States as a country without culture, crassly materialistic, and lacking in basic values. Another is a fear of competition or conquest by American private enterprise which is often accompanied by a feeling that American foreign policy is working primarily to develop new opportunities for American private enterprise, to

primarily to develop new opportunities for American private enterprises, to
its own accompanied by a realization that American foreign policy is working
is a test of competition or competition by American private enterprises which
without culture, currently unimportant, and lacking in basic values. Another
One of these is the associated attitude of the United States as a country
held abroad, which act as an obstacle to the achievement of our objectives.

In addition, there are some attitudes about the United States, widely
politically and economically.

of those demands on the hope for a world order which will be effective
the demands and aspirations of nationalism and sovereignty and to the effect
acted by the people involved. Among these problems are those relating to
ordinarily complex, in many cases so complex that they are not fully under-
addition, mark of the problem, by reason of history or nature, are extra-
al basis, these delays and uncertainties produce discord and disorder. In
economics and social problems. With so many people living in mainly and
operae is the essence of any quick and easy solution to most of the world's
from a failure to attribute such a perception in appealing terms. A second
to benefit the quality of man as a common ascription of all people or
of values commanding general acceptance abroad. This arises from a failure
objectives and those arising abroad. One of these is the lack of any system

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invade markets now belonging to others or to exploit raw materials which are
properly the property of others.

While formidable, these barriers do not seem final. Many of them
can be overcome through a better projection of our image and our objectives.

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## II. THE AMERICAN NATIONAL PURPOSE AND ACTION

### I

While a clear statement of national purpose, on either domestic or international matters, is significant by itself, it is nevertheless true that, to have real meaning, the national purpose must be translated into action. This means that an examination of American objectives in our relations with the rest of the world must go beyond a few propositions too vague to be applied. But any attempt to break the whole into manageable parts produces its own dilemmas. Each important problem in our foreign relations soon emerges into every other one; it is difficult to deal with the part separate from the whole, but the whole is too big to grasp. In following sections an attempt is made to take a closer look by means of a regional approach, which, despite its limitations, has its advantages.

Objectives stated in regional terms, if they are to be helpful or realistic, must be considered against the background of both general objectives and differences in American purposes in different areas. They must take into account that the principal regions vary widely in characteristics and circumstances. For this reason, many purposes may be realized best on the basis of regional cooperation and many world-wide objectives can best be realized through cooperation among regions.

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This regional analysis will be made in the framework imposed by our
national purposes. Elements of that framework will be -

a) A preference for international order and, where change is called
for, for orderly change.

b) A preference for nations which share our basic objectives.

c) A preference for nations evolving toward government under law
for human development and dignity.

d) A preference for nations cooperating with the broad purposes
expressed in the United Nations Charter.

It will also be made with the knowledge that the translation of
national purpose into action is a more difficult task abroad than it is at
home. Even at home this translation presents problems; for, in spite of
the fact that the national purpose of the United States derives from the needs,
a spirations and behavior of the people of the United States, its realization
involves problems of choice, priority, ambiguity, and technique which are
not easy to solve. Even at home, realization of the national purpose may be
frustrated in part by the effects of the behavior of others. For example,
if the leaders of the Soviet Union behaved otherwise, portions of the defense
budget could be used for example, for education.

When, however, it becomes a question of translating national purpose
into action abroad, the importance of the needs, aspirations, and behavior
of other countries, leaders, and peoples becomes infinitely more significant.

of other countries, leaders, and peoples become aintimately more significant into action abroad, the importance of the needs, aspirations, and behavior of the leaders of the Soviet Union behaved otherwise, portions of the defense industries in part by the effects of the behavior of others. For example,

if the leaders of the Soviet Union behaved otherwise, portions of the defense industries in part by the effects of the behavior of others. For example, not easy to solve. Even at home, realization of the national purpose may be involved problems of choice, priority, ambiguity, and technique which are aspirations and behavior of the people of the United States, its realization the last that the national purpose of the United States derives from the needs, home. Even at home this transaction presents problems for, in spite of national purpose into action is a more difficult task, spread than it is at it will also be made with the knowledge that the realization of expressed in the United Nations Charter.

d) A preference for nations cooperating with the prior purpose for human development and equality.

e) A preference for nations evolving toward a government under law

f) A preference for nations which share our basic objectives.

for, for orderly change.

a) A preference for international order and, where change is called national purposes, elements of that framework will be -

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While the definition of our national purpose is a matter for our determination, these other factors clearly are not. Consequently, the realization of our national purpose abroad is far less under our control than at home and may be impossible in many cases. The existence of a number of forces in the world which are beyond the influence of the United States has to be accepted as a basic element of the foreign relations of the United States.

This is not to say, however, that the United States cannot realize any part of its national purposes abroad. The chances of such realization depend on how effectively national purpose is translated into action.

This depends on a careful analysis of the outside forces and their relationship to our national purposes and to the tools available to us for carrying them out. Our national purposes have been broadly defined as securing the way of life called for in the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble of the Constitution. These include security against aggression, security of our economic interests and the creation of conditions necessary for an international order. Because the world is passing through a period of great change, such conditions must include mechanisms for providing orderly change. In analyzing relationship of these purposes to the outside world, the first step is to examine the attitudes, aspirations, purposes and actions of the people in the various regions and of their leaders to see whether these interfere with our purposes or support them. This examination must be made region by region and country by country.

purposes or support them. This examination must be made region by region and country and of their leaders to see whether these interests with our examination the attitudes, aspirations, purposes and actions of the peoples in relation to these purposes to the outside world, the that step is to take.

conditions must include mechanisms for providing orderly change. In analyzing
order. Because the world is passing through a period of great change, and
economic interests and the creation of conditions necessary for an international
Constitution. These include security against aggression, security of our
of life called for in the Declaration of Independence and the FREEMARK of the
out. Our national purposes have been clearly defined as securing the way
to our national purposes and to the tools available to us for carrying them
out. This depends on a careful analysis of the outside forces and their relationship

any part of its national purposes abroad. The chances of such realization
This is not to say, however, that the United States cannot realize
as a basic element of the foreign relations of the United States.

world which are beyond the influence of the United States but to be accepted
be impossible in many cases. The existence of a number of forces in the
national purpose abroad is far less under our control than at home and may
these other factors clearly are not. Consequently, the realization of our

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This analysis should assist the United States in determining what forces in any region or country are consistent with its objectives and thereby in determining specific policy objectives. In general, these policy objectives will be to support and strengthen those forces which are consistent with our purposes and to isolate and weaken those which are opposed. These specific policy objectives should be the focus of all action by the United States in the area and the means chosen must be appropriate to the particular objective.

Before turning to the means which are available to the government of the United States for carrying out policy objectives in the different regions and countries, it must be stressed that it is not only the government which is carrying on the foreign relations of the United States. Thousands of private citizens, corporations and foundations are doing so as well. It is easy to think of a number of countries where the behavior of the senior representative of a corporation doing business there has more effect on the country than that of the U.S. ambassador, and there are many others where the work of our great foundations has done more toward creating a true image of the United States than official activities. These private activities are, of course, not subject to government control and will not follow short-range fluctuations in the United States policy in ordinary cases. Nevertheless because they are manifestations of the American purpose, they are usually consistent with it in the longer term. Because they are not subject to the

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limitations of governmental activities, they give to the total of United
States foreign policy a flexibility and range of impact that is very important.

This is not an argument for complete laissez-faire in this field.

There is great need for communication in both directions between the leaders in the private and public aspects of national affairs so that there may be some sort of fundamental agreement on what the objectives of the United States are. But given this agreement, there should be great latitude given to the private sector in carrying out its specific objectives within the framework imposed by the national objectives.

As far as the government is concerned, it has a number of means available to it in carrying out its policy objectives in the various regions and countries. They include -

a) Political means, represented by the tools of diplomacy, by international agreements, by influences exercised through the United Nations, and the like.

b) Economic means, represented by grants or loans for economic purposes, by trade agreements, by economic advisory services, including the services provided by the International Bank and similar agencies, by private investment, and the like.

c) Military means represented by military assistance, military training missions, U.S. bases and forces abroad, and the like.

d) Technical means represented by special techniques in the

["d) Technical means represented by specialist techniques in the training missions, U.S. bases and forces abroad, and the like.", "e) Military means represented by military assistance, military private investment, and the like.", "", "f) Economic means represented by grants or loans for economic purposes, by trade agreements, by economic advisory services, including economic advisory services, by economic advisory services,

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physical sciences, education, public health, public administration, business management, and the like.

e) Psychological means represented by all sorts of propaganda media, but including also the psychological effects of political, military and other means.

f) Cultural, social and moral means.

Cutting across all these means is the problem of simple communication.
For these means to be successful, the United States must be able to make
understood, both at home and abroad, why they have been chosen and
what they are supposed to achieve. This is not an easy task, even at
home, and it is more difficult abroad. Communication may be helped by
the kind of analysis suggested -- relating the means to a specific policy
objective which is central to a clearly stated national objective.

Each of these means must be supplied by men skilled in its use,
but mere skill in application is not enough. It must be applied so as to
support the particular policy objective which has been determined to be
relevant to our national purpose and this determination should not be made
initially by the skilled expert in techniques. This is not to say that a
technically unsound project can be justified by political reasons, but rather
that the policy objective must be identified first and then the technical projects
must be selected which best support it.

In considering the various means which are available for carrying out

In considering the various means which are available for carrying out
what he selected which best supports it.

that the policy objective must be identified that and then the recourant protect
technically unsound protect can be justified by political reasons, but rather
initially by the skilled expert in technique. This is not to say that a
relevant to our national purpose and this determination should not be made
support the particular policy objective which has been determined to be
but mere skill in application is not enough. It must be applied so as to

Each of these means must be applied by men skilled in its use,
objective which is central to a clearly stated national objective.

the kind of analysis suggested -- relating the means to a specific policy
home', and it is more difficult abroad. Communication may be helped by
what they are supposed to achieve. This is not an easy task, even at
understood, path at home and abroad, why they have been chosen and

(i) Cultural, social and moral means.

and other means.

(ii) Psychological means represented by all sorts of propaganda, military
media, but including also the psychological effects of political, military

(iii) Psychological means represented by all sorts of propaganda, public administration, business management, and the like.

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the policy objectives of the United States, care must be taken to use the
one which will best support the particular policy objective and there should
be no automatic assumption that any particular means is more or less
appropriate than the others. Such an attitude toward means does not
exist in the United States at present. There is a general feeling in the United
States that economic aid and technical assistance are the best means and
that political means are not appropriate for use by the United States.
A careful study will show that in many cases this is not so.

By an analysis of this sort, the identification of the policy objective
for each region or country and the selection of appropriate supporting
operational objectives, the national purpose can be effectively translated
into action. This analysis will provide a focus which will eliminate incon-
sistent and mutually self-defeating actions and which at the same time will
assist Congress and the people of the United States in understanding and
supporting the foreign activities of the United States.

In translating objectives into action there often arises a dilemma
which requires a balance to be struck between visible and practical in-
struments of power and those aspects of power which derive from moral
political, and psychological factors. This dilemma is not the ethical question
of the role of morals in foreign policy; it arises from the fact that the object
of policy is to induce people to act one way rather than another and that
ideas are a powerful force in determining conduct. The dilemma cannot be

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resolved by surrendering the physical instruments of power. Both the United
States and other peoples and nations have an enormous stake in American
power, even if they are reluctant to confess it. On the other hand, physical
presence will not avail for long unless we can establish bonds of principle
and values to justify it.

II.

American capacity to influence events in other parts of the world
is large but not unlimited. The limitations involve not only material and
military resources but such matters as trained manpower, public under-
standing, and the time and energy of leaders. We cannot do everything we
"could" do everywhere all the time; choices must be made and if we do not
make them ourselves, they will be made for us by events. A large part of
the official decision-making process is, therefore, an exercise in adjusting
priorities, with large stakes riding on the outcome. There is no formula by
which this can be done automatically, even though our procedures might be
steadily improved.

We recall that in World War II the Allies gave a clear first priority
to the defeat of Germany, but the second priority effort in the Pacific was
sufficient to defeat Japan before a major re-deployment from the European
Theater was effected. This suggests that a choice is not necessarily
all or nothing; various intermediate grounds may be possible. Perhaps the

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majority of choices are of this type, that there will always be some which will not permit any compromise. We must accept a variety of burdens, for a variety of reasons, allocating our effort in the light of relative urgencies, the means most appropriate to the task, and the judgment as to what the United States could accept as its share in relation to what other can do. Whatever the merit of individual priorities, it is clear that they are no better than the national purpose on the basis of which they are made. The clearer we are about our national purpose and our role in the world, the most consistent and meaningful will be the choices we make.

Perhaps the first choice which the United States must make with respect to its purposes abroad involves resolving the competition between domestic and foreign demands for the finite resources, human and material, which are available for carrying them out. During the current shortage of teachers in the United States, for example, do we keep them here training Americans, or do we send some abroad in technical assistance programs in furtherance of our international objectives? Related to this is the choice between strengthening the social or economic base at home, and meeting emergencies at the rim of the conflict. This choice involves weighing the seriousness of the emergency, the cost of meeting it, including the actual cost and the cost of the loss to the base, and the benefits expected from strengthening the base, including increased capacity to meet similar emergencies in the future.

Another choice involves the resolution of some of the long-range

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preferences mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, with shorter range
necessities, strategic, political, or economic. This choice too involves
a fairly complex weighing of factors -- the gravity of the necessity, the
expected consequences of meeting it for the short-run and the long, and the
like. A particular aspect of this choice is found in the contradictions which
often arise between mobilizing resistance to communist expansion and
identifying the objectives of the United States with the national objectives
of other peoples. Finally, the United States will have to choose between
various countries and regions in allocating the finite resources which are
available for international purposes.

Resolution among choices of this sort will be made by taking into
account the basic preferences referred to above and the nature of the problem
in the light of its effect on our general objectives. This resolution will not
be easy and there will be many cases where it will not be possible to have
the best of all possible worlds. That choices must be made is an important
element of our foreign relations which is not generally recognized in the
United States. The choice and its consequences will be less painful,
however, if it is made consciously with our national objectives in mind, than
if it is made for us by the motion of outside forces, willed or random.

III

It is fashionable for Americans to talk about "leadership" and the
"initiative" and, indeed, both are wholesome reminders of our responsibility.

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American leadership is indeed indispensable and any absence of such leadership begets irritation, confusion and chaos. But leadership should not take the form of domination, The essence of freedom is unity through respect for diversity. In some situations, this implies willingness to accept the leadership of others. Apart from sharing the burdens more widely, sharing leadership builds up the prestige, experience and sense of responsibility of our partners in common cause.

A somber development of recent decades, from an American point of view, has been the relative decline of Western Europe as a center of power and influence. Inevitable though this decline was in certain respects, it should be recognized as a serious blow to us. Our objectives should include careful attention to possibilities for strengthening the international roles of countries which are closely allied to us in purpose and interest, such as the Commonwealth, Western Europe, Japan, perhaps India, and the leaders of Latin America.

The present position of the United States is such that whatever we do, or do not do, has a significant impact upon events abroad. Decisions made through inaction are ordinarily lost without trace and their importance is overlooked. Some problems, initially threatening, wither away with time and are better left alone. Others, if not foreseen and attended to in early stages, develop into dangerous and costly crises. The art is to recognize which is which. Pas trop de zele has been a useful maxim of diplomacy but

which is which. Past trends have been a useful maximum of diplomacy but
stages, develop into dangerous and costly crises. The art is to recognise
and are better felt alone. Others, if not foreseen and attended to in early
in overreacted. Some problems, initially threatening, wither away with time
made through inaction are ordinarily lost without trace and then importance
do, or do not do, has a significant impact upon events abroad. Declarations
The present position of the United States is such that whatever we
leaders of Latin America.

such as the Commonwealth, Western Europe, Japan, perhaps India, and do
roles of countries which are closely allied to us in purpose and interest,
include careful attention to possibilities for attaining the international
it should be recognised as a serious blow to us. Our objectives should
power and influence. Inevitable though this decline was in certain respects,
of view, has been the relative decline of Western Europe as a center of

A combat development of recent decades, from an American point

partners in common cause.

ship builds up the prestige, experience and sense of responsibility of our
ship of others. Alert from sharing the burdens more widely, sharing leader-
diversity. In some annotations, this implies willingness to accept the leader-
true form of domination. The essence of freedom is unity through respect for
ship deports irritation, confusion and chaos. But leadership should not take
American leadership is indeed indelibleable and any absence of such leader-

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America's new role now puts a high premium upon alertness, in order that both action and inaction can be thoughtfully and skillfully devised.

IV

Responsibility for meeting the Soviet threat is ours by the grace of history and is readily left to us by others. We must attempt to mobilize the will and the resources of the world community to meet it, to convert the struggle into one between the Soviet Union and all the rest.

We have sometimes been tactless, but our friends abroad have not always been helpful in understanding our problem. The rivalry between us and the Soviet Union is not directly over bilateral issues, but over our concern about what the Soviet Union threatens to do to somebody else, in Europe, the Middle East or Asia, and about the threat to values of freedom and human dignity we share with many nations. Our own American experience suggests that neutralism in the present world is a luxury which can be enjoyed just because the United States confronts the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, we face a serious difficulty in explaining our purposes in genuine terms to those who seem to share the same objectives. If public understanding at home would permit us to do the things we must do, without exaggerating the Soviet threat, we might reduce the prestige which we regularly confer upon the Soviet Union as well as the resentment we encounter elsewhere. We may discover that the more effective way to mobilize

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# III LATIN AMERICA

## A. The Present Situation

Latin America has a special significance for the United States, which arises from the history and geography of the New World. The Latin American republics achieved their independence from colonial rule a little later than the United States in the name of the same principles of Western European liberal thought which lay behind our Declaration of Independence. But, fearing that independence might be short-lived if it depended solely on nationalism, the leaders of the Latin American revolutions developed the idea of a union of the American republics through an American pact. Thus, added to the centrifugal concept of individual and national freedom was a centripetal concept of a free association of nations united by similar aspirations for freedom and respect for human dignity.

This is the origin of the Organization of American States. The first meeting of the Independent Nations of America was held in Panama in 1826, called by Simon Bolivar and welcomed by Henry Clay, then Secretary of State. During the following century, the concept was broadened and deepened. Although the record is far from perfect, the trend has been unmistakable: the greater the respect for diversity, the greater the possibilities for common action. Regional cooperation has been based on four principles -- non-intervention, consultation, common action and mutual security.

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In the New World, thus, there has grown up the first effective regional organization of modern times. The political importance of this is tremendous, both as an example and as a practical problem of international law; for without the insistence of the Latin American republics under the leadership of Alberto Lleras Camargo, the Charter of the United Nations would not have included Article 51 which authorizes regional organizations for collective self-defense.

Without this Article and the experience and example afforded by the Organization of American States, NATO would not have been possible. The United States, therefore, has been a partner with Latin America in developing an important institution of modern international life.

This is one element of the special relationship between the United States and Latin America. Another is the feeling of responsibility which the United States has historically felt for the area. That feeling can be traced through the history of the Monroe Doctrine and through some of the curious experiments in intervention during the first quarter of the 20th century. While parts of this history were not appreciated in Latin America and perhaps do not reflect credit on us, the story clearly indicates that the feeling of responsibility has persisted.

One further element of the special relationship must be mentioned. Latin America is the region where the United States has its greatest opportunity for realizing its objectives because of proximity and similarity of historical development and aspirations. Our performance here, therefore, will have important repercussions elsewhere.

independent republics elsewhere...
development and abstractions. Our performance here, therefore, will have
for realizing its objectives because of stability and similarity of historical
link in America is the region where the United States has its greatest opportunity
One further element of the special relationship must be mentioned.

said.
on us, the story clearly indicates that the feeling of responsibility has been
history were not associated in Latin America and perhaps do not reflect credit
in intervention during the first quarter of the 20th century. While parts of this
history of the Monroe Decade and through some of the curious experiments
States has historically felt for the area. That feeling can be traced through the
and Latin America. Another is the feeling of responsibility which the United
This is one element of the special relationship between the United States
institution of modern international life.

therefore, has been a partner with Latin America in developing an important
of American States. NATO would not have been possible. The United States,
Without this Article and the experience and example allowed by the Organization
Article 3 of which authorizes regional organizations for collective self-defense
These Commandos, the Charter of the United Nations would not have included
the instance of the Latin American republics under the leadership of Alvaro
Porto as an example and as a practical problem of international law for without
organization of modern times. The political importance of this is tremendous.
In the New World, thus, there has grown up the first effective regional

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With respect to the region itself, it should be noted that there is great diversity. First, there is great climatic and geographic variety. Then, the size of the countries varies greatly from Brazil with 60,000,000 people and an area larger than the United States to Costa Rica with area smaller than West Virginia and a population of less than a million. There are also great differences in political institutions and the degree of economic development in the different countries.

In spite of this diversity, however, there are strong tendencies for unity in the region. These come from the common colonial system which left with few exceptions a common inheritance of language, religion, history, institutions and culture.

The relative strength of Latin America is increasing. Her population is growing at a rate exceeding any part of the world save Oceania and there is room in which it can expand. Latin America has only seven per cent of the world's population and nineteen per cent of its land. Its economic progress in the last decade has been outstanding and its natural resources are far from being fully developed. Consequently it seems fair to say that the region stands on the verge of great economic growth.

There are, however, some difficulties in the economic picture. Many countries depend on the export of a single crop or commodity which is sold in a world market having alternate sources of supply. These countries are thus vulnerable to economic forces beyond their control. This vulnerability is

uninhabitable to economic forces beyond their control. This vulnerability is
a world market having alternate sources of supply. These countries are thus
independent on the export of a single crop or commodity which is sold in
the last decade has been outstanding and its natural resources are far from
world's population and nineteen per cent of its land. Its economic progress
room in which it can expand. Latin America has only seven per cent of the
growing at a rate exceeding any part of the world save Oceania and there is
The relative strength of Latin America is increasing. Her population is
and culture.
few exceptions a common inheritance of language, religion, history, institution
in the region. These come from the common colonial system which left with
In spite of this diversity, however, there are strong tendencies for unit-
countries.
political institutions and the degree of economic development in the different
and a population of less than a million. There are also great differences in
larger than the United States to Costs Rios with area smaller than West Virginia
of the countries varies greatly from Brazil with 60,000,000 people and an area
diversity. First, there is great climatic and geographic variety. Then, the size
With respect to the region itself, it should be noted that there is great
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reinforced by the fact that the economic life of the region is strongly influenced
by the general level of business activity in the United States and more specific-
ally by the thirty or forty large American corporations which do a significant
share of the total business in Latin America. One has only to think of Anaconda
in Chile, Grace in Peru, United Fruit in Central America, or Creole in Venezuela
to appreciate this.

This vulnerability is described as a fact of the present scene. This description does not imply that some one has been at fault or that the vulnerability is being consciously exploited by outside forces. Quite the contrary is true. For example, the basic pattern for oil concessions all over the world at present, the division of the net profits in equal shares between the producer and the government granting the concession, was first established in Venezuela by the United States oil companies when concessions elsewhere were much more favorable to the producer. Today, the large United States corporations working in Latin America have very enlightened policies, although it must be admitted that this happy state has not always existed. They and their employees strive to be good members of the communities where they work and to contribute to their sound development.

Furthermore, the economic scene reflects a real economic interdependence in the New World. Although the operations of these companies have great influence in Latin America, the same Latin American operations are important to the United States economy as well. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact

to the United States economy as well. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact
influence in Latin America, the same Latin American operations are important
come in the New World. Although the operations of these companies have di-
Furthermore, the economic scene reflects a real economic interdepend-
ent economic interdependence.

to be good members of the communities where they work and to contribute to
that this happy state has not always existed. They and their employees strive
in Latin America have very enhanced policies, although it must be admitted
favorable to the producer. Today, the large United States corporations work
by the United States oil companies when concessions are much more
and the government granting the concession, was that established in Venezuela
present, the division of the net profits in equal shares between the products.
true. For example, the basic pattern for oil concessions all over the world at
will be being consciously exploited by outside forces. Outside the country is
description does not imply that some one has been at fault or that the owner
This vulnerability is described as a fact of the present scene. This
is to appreciate this.

in Chile, Grace in Peru, United Fruit in Central America, or Creole in Venezuela's
share of the total business in Latin America. One has only to think of Unacorda
only by the thirty or forty large American corporations which do a significant
by the general level of business activity in the United States and more specific-
reinforced by the fact that the economic life of the region is strongly influenced

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that fifty per cent of the foreign trade of the United States is carried on in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada.

Finally is must be pointed out that for the purposes of defense, the Western Hemisphere is crucial to the United States. Without it the United States may be strategically untenable and it would need the economic base which the region provides in order to survive. However, the present military organization of the hemisphere does not add to its military strength.

## B. United States Objectives

In Latin America, as in other regions, the objectives of the United States are derived from an application of our general objectives to the scene, and the forces acting in it, which has just been described. In order to maintain its strength, to assist in the creation of conditions permitting the achievement of human dignity, and to counteract the influence of world communism, the United States will seek --

a) To carry forward the traditions of regional cooperation which have existed for more than one hundred years and which have provided the world with useful examples, and to expand and develop this cooperation into the broad field of human development.

b) To maintain a strong and pervasive community of interest with Latin America.

If these general objectives are then translated into more specific terms, we arrive at the following objectives:

If these general objectives are then translated into more specific terms, America.

p) To maintain a strong and pervasive community of interest with Latin field of human development.

n useful examples, and to expand and develop this cooperation into the broad field of human development.

States will seek —

**human dignity**, and to counteract the influence of world communism, the United States will seek to assist in the creation of conditions permitting the achievement of forces acting in it, which has thus been described. In order to maintain its are derived from an application of our general objectives to the scene, and the objectives of the United States, as in other regions, the objectives of the United States in Latin America, are as follows:

station of the hemisphere does not add to its military strength.

the region provides in order to survive. However, the present military organization of the United States may be strategically unenable and it would need the economic base which Western Hemisphere is crucial to the United States. Without it the United States must be pointed out that for the purpose of defense, the Western Hemisphere, including Canada.

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a) The maintenance of peace in Latin America and the prevention of any part of the hemisphere from becoming a base for hostile forces from outside the hemisphere. This is both an aspect of the quest for order and an effort to maintain the security of the United States.

b) The economic development of Latin America and the strengthening of its economic institutions through a combination of public and private effort.

This objective is directed not only at providing the economic basis for human development within the area but at reducing the threats to the economy of the United States inherent in the existing economic weakness of the region.

c) The strengthening of democratic forces and democratic political institutions in the region. This objective is aimed not only at improving the possibilities for human dignity but at reducing the threats to order created by the totalitarian regimes in the region.

d) The increase of cultural exchange within Latin America and between Latin America and North America and the strengthening of educational institutions in the region. This exchange will contribute to human development in Latin America and the United States.

### C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of these Objectives

There are a number of forces which present obstacles to the achievement of these objectives. One of these is the tendency of leaders in the United States and the public generally to take Latin America for granted, unless there is a crisis. This behavior is not the sort which contributes to a pervasive

The United States and the public generally to take Latin America for granted, unless there are a number of forces which present obstacles to the achievement of these objectives. One of these is the tendency of leaders in the United States to maintain the status quo and not to seek to改革 the government of Latin America and the strengthening of educational institutions in the region. This exchange will contribute to human development in Latin America and North America and the strengthening of educational institutions in the region. This exchange will reduce the threat to order created by possibilities for human dignity but at reducing the threats to the economy of the United States inherent in the existing economic weakness of the region.

d) The increase of cultural exchange within Latin America and between the countries of the region requires the strengthening of democratic forces and democratic political institutions in the region. This objective is aimed not only at improving the economic institutions in the region, but at reducing the threats to order created by the strengthening of democratic forces and democratic political institutions in the region.

c) The strengthening of democratic forces and democratic political institutions in the region is directed not only at providing the economic basis for human development within the area but at reducing the threats to the economy of the United States inherent in the existing economic weakness of the region.

b) The economic development of Latin America and the strengthening of the security of the United States is the objective of the United States. This objective is directed not only at providing the economic basis for human development within the area but at reducing the threats to the economy of the United States inherent in the existing economic weakness of the region.

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community of interest with Latin America. It can perhaps be corrected as there
arises a growing awareness of the importance of Latin America to the United
States, economically and politically. Its economic importance has already
been mentioned and cannot help but be recognized at all levels as economic ties
further develop. Politically it has only to be noted that if the Latin American
deleagations side with the Afro-Asian bloc in the General Assembly of the United
Nations, the United States cannot achieve its policies there.

Another force which threatens the achievement of United States object-
ives is the growing nationalism of the region. This springs from many factors.
Among them are pride in the history and culture of the region and in its new
vitality and growth, resentment that foreigners exercise an enormous degree of
control over the economic life, and a fear that the region is being exploited.
It can produce tensions which threaten the stability of the region and can lead
to interference with the economic development of a country by cutting it off
from capital, skilled manpower and techniques required for that development.
It can also deny to the United States both markets and raw materials which it
needs.

Fortunately there are a number of things which the United States can do
toward modifying the development of this nationalism through both private
action and governmental. One of the most important is for United States corpor-
ations to continue the enlightened policies which have characterized their oper-
ations in Latin America in recent years. Wherever possible, these activites

activities in Latin America in recent years. Whenever possible, these activities to continue the enhanced policies which have characterized their object and governmental. One of the most important is for United States corporation toward modifying the development of the nation through both private

Fortunately there are a number of things which the United States can do needs.

It can also deny to the United States both markets and raw materials which it from capital, skilled manpower and techniques required for that development.

It can produce tensions which threaten the stability of the region and can lead to control over the economic file, and a fact that the region is being exploited, vitality and growth, assessment that foreigners exercise an enormous degree of Among them are brought in the history and culture of the region and in its new life is the growing nationality of the region. This stands from many factors.

Another force which threatens the advancement of United States object is the United States cannot achieve its policies there.

delegations side with the Afro-American party in the General Assembly of the United States, politically it has only to be noted that if the Latin American further develop, politically it has only to be noted that if the Latin American been mentioned and cannot help but be recognised at all levels at economic, states, economically and politically. Its economic importance has already been a growing awareness of the importance of Latin America to the United community of interest with Latin America. It can perhaps be corrected as there

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should be carried on in partnership with local interests. The creation of the Creole Foundation in Venezuela is an example of a new type of constructive action by a corporation which can contribute to a favorable climate of opinion.

Another is for the United States, the corporations and the countries themselves to work together to diversify the single-crop, export economies so that these countries may become less vulnerable economically. This is a field where technical assistance has much to offer. It would appear also that a new institution is called for to make an effective contribution in this direction, a Regional Development Authority organized under the Organization of American States, which would have responsibility for stimulating the economic development of the region and authority to assist projects which, in their early stages at least, would not be considered sound enough for loans under the standards of the International Bank. The United States could funnel the economic aid, which it should provide for the region on the same basis as it provides such aid for other regions, through the Authority. Under this approach the economic development of the region would become a shared effort which directly and indirectly would lessen the economic vulnerability of the area and thereby lessen the reasons for irrational nationalism. It would build on the traditions of cooperation which have persisted and stress the special relationship between Latin America and the United States.

Many concrete benefits would accrue to the United States through such a development. By lessening the dependence of the local economy on a single

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commodity or the operations of a single corporation it would thereby lessen
the pressures for economic nationalism which might cut off the United States
from markets or raw materials. By affording possibilities for economic growth,
and thereby to the hope of the people for human development, it would con-
tribute to stability and order, while at the same time contributing to greater
economic exchange in which the United States could share. This development
could also serve as a model in other parts of the world of this sort of cooper-
ative regional effort toward ends which the United States is seeking.

In addition, a Regional Development Authority, working under the
Organization of American States, could provide an effective counter to the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. At present, in the
field of economics, ECLA stands far above any Latin American organization in
influence and prestige. In some respects, the doctrines which it has been
propounding are at variance with U. S. objectives in the region. It would
appear, therefore, that this was a situation where the United States could
achieve more by working through a regional body than through the United
Nations.

Still another economic problem is presented by the fact that the five
Central American republics have recently formed a common market and propos-
als are being circulated for a hemispheric common market and common currency-
credit system. These proposals create serious questions for the United States
-- should it take the lead in developing these regional activities, follow

--- should it take the lead in developing these regional activities, follow
credit system. These proposals are based on a series of directions for the United States
 States are being circulated for a comprehensive common market and common currency.
Central American republics have recently formed a common market and trade
Still another economic problem is presented by the fact that the Latin
Nations.

achieve more by working through a regional body than through the United
 States, therefore, that this was a situation where the United States could
proceeding are at variance with U. S. objectives in the region. It would
influence and prestige. In some respects, the doctrine which it has been
field of economics, ECLA stands far above any Latin American organization in
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. At present, in the
Organization of American States, could provide an effective counter to the
static regional effort toward ends which the United States is seeking.

could also serve as a model in other parts of the world of this sort of coöper-
economic exchange in which the United States could share. This development
tribute to stability and order, while at the same time contributing to greater
and thereby to the hope of the people for human development, it would con-
front markets or raw materials. By affording possibilities for economic growth,
the premises for economic nationalism which might cut off the United States
commodity or the operations of a single corporation it would thereby lessen

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reluctantly the lead of the Latin Americans, or ignore the proposals? As far
as the ultimate position of the United States in such an organization is con-
cerned, the question is not easy and deserves close study; but it would seem
that the United States should support these efforts on the part of the Latin
Americans and should seek to mould the evolving institutions into forms in
which the United States could participate.

Another difficult problem, which poses a serious threat to the achieve-
ment of U. S. objectives in Latin America, is the appeal of communism. This
appeal arises from a number of factors. In the first place, the successes of
the U.S.S.R. in marshalling assets for rapid economic development appeal to
the imagination of those Latin Americans who recognize the necessity for the
rapid economic development of their region and who are not satisfied with the
economic, political and social results of private enterprise as it operates in
their vicinity. Furthermore, the wide gap which separates the rich and the
poor in many countries, the land-hunger of a landless peasantry, the limited
opportunities for a satisfying career for educated or semi-educated persons
who lack means or position, all stimulate an interest in the communist system
which in theory does not permit the existence of any of these things. This
psychological climate makes possible the creation of strong communist move-
ments, even without the direct support of the U.S.S.R. Once in being these
movements can become serious threats to the objectives of the United States.
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members of the official communist party in Brazil and consider the possibilities
which have been offered to the U.S.S.R. by analogous cases in Europe and Asia
to recognize the reality of this threat.

This threat, however, involves a range of problems not easy to solve.
The Latin American attitude toward intervention prohibits direct action by the
United States alone to eliminate a communist regime once it is legally estab-
lished there. The United States is thus compelled to work affirmatively to pre-
vent such an event from occurring. Given the existing patterns of life, this
is not an easy task; it cuts across questions of economic growth, democracy
and human development. Our best hope is that an indirect approach to the pro-
lem, the partnership in economic and related human development, will under-
mine the bases of the appeal of communism. This threat offers an interesting
example of the case where there is a close relationship between communism
and the world revolution, yet where the United States is not getting at the root
of the problem if it concentrates on the communist threat per se.

In looking at the defense of Latin America against major military threats
from outside the hemisphere, one cannot help concluding that, for the foresee-
able future, defense must be provided by the United States and that the Latin
American states cannot contribute effective force to this defense. This con-
clusion suggests that a defense community like NATO is not necessary and that
consequently supporting military aid programs are not called for. Absent such
a need, the adverse effects of this sort of military aid demand that it be

a need, the adverse effects of this sort of military and demand that it be
consequently supporting military and programs are not called for. A patent such
a statement suggests that a defense community like NATO is not necessarily and that
American states cannot contribute effective force to this defense. This con-
stable future, defense must be provided by the United States and that the Latin
from outside the hemisphere, one cannot help concluding that, for the foresee-
able future, one cannot help concluding that, for the foreseen

In looking at the defense of Latin America against major military threats of the problem if it concentrates on the communist threat per se, we not an easy task: it cuts across questions of economic growth, democracy, and human development. Our heat hope is that an indirect approach to the geo-political question of the appeal of communism. This threat offers an interesting item, the partnership in economic and related human development, will underlie such an event from beginning. Given the existing patterns of life, this United States alone to eliminate a communist regime once it is legally established. The Latin American attitude toward intervention prohibits direct action by the United States, however, involves a range of problems not easy to solve, to recognise the reality of this threat.

which have been offered to the U.S.A. by analogous cases in Europe and Asia
members of the official communist party in Brazil and consider the possibility

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reduced or eliminated. In practice today these adverse effects can be seen. Military aid strengthens the armed forces or a particular service within any given country and as a result relatively weakens other forces there. This imbalance may lead to the overthrow of democratic institutions there and the establishment of a military dictatorship. In addition, military aid programs are usually conducted with military objectives in mind and consequently strengthen the dictatorships as much or more than the democracies which often refuse to enter into such programs. In addition, military aid, by injecting arms into a relatively unarmed area, may lead to an armaments race, thereby offering opportunities for intervention to other forces outside the hemisphere. In these ways military aid can and does contribute to military and political instability. In the absence of positive advantages, military aid to Latin America thus produced results contrary to our objectives for the area. It is an example of a means which is being used in a vacuum, a means which is not serving a pre-determined policy objective. The Organization of American States offers the basis for the international arrangements necessary to provide for the defense of the area against overt threats from outside the hemisphere.

It also offers the best means of maintaining the internal stability of the region. Within that framework, techniques of arbitration, mediation, conciliation and consultation have all but eliminated wars between Latin American countries in recent years. While population growth and economic rivalries may increase frictions in the future, the United States can probably rely on these

["increase friction in the future, the United States can probably rely on these countries in recent years. While population grown and economic rivalries and inflation and competition have all but eliminated was between Latin American countries. Within that framework, techniques of arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and consultation have all but eliminated was between Latin American countries. Within that framework, techniques of

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arrangements for securing its objectives in the future. This reliance should not, however, be purely passive, but should include imaginative development of these arrangements toward meeting the changing problems.

D. Conclusions

Therefore, the following pattern of actions by the United States is called for in order to achieve its objectives in Latin America.

a) A reliance on the United States alone, working through the Organization of American States, for the defense of the Hemisphere against outside military threats.

b) A reliance on the traditions of consultation, arbitration and mediation and the Organization of American States for maintaining regional order.

c) A combined effort through private enterprise and a Regional Development Authority, assisted by economic aid from the United States, for the economic development of the region. In both the private and public activities, the stress would be on partnership and cooperation, thereby building on the traditions of cooperation.

d) A reliance on cooperative economic development to lessen the vulnerability of the economy to outside forces and to contribute to the feeling that Latin Americans were sharing in the planning, the direction and the fruits of their development, thereby undermining the sources of extreme nationalism.

e) A similar reliance on economic growth in this framework to contribute to human dignity and thereby to destroy the appeal of indigenous communist movements.

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f) A reliance on these developments to strengthen democratic forces in the region. This reliance would be supported by a reduction of the support of non-democratic forces now provided by military aid programs.

This pattern of actions is consistent with our general international objectives and indeed derives from them. The movement produced by them is in the direction of a hemisphere in which the people of the United States can continue to develop in accordance with their fundamental concepts. The emphasis is on strengthening hemispheric cooperation and interchange which will contribute not only to the material and moral strength of the United States, but to the creation of conditions permitting an increasing realization of the dignity of man.

Largely because of geography, the problem of coping with the Soviet bloc and world communism becomes for this region one of influencing the world revolution in a constructive way. The emphasis, therefore, is on economic and human development and on the maintenance of order. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the proposed pattern of action is that it does not squarely face the political problem of the Trujillos. Yet this weakness is in a sense a reflection of the pluralism inherent in our objectives. In this manifestation, it amounts to a statement that until a local totalitarian regime becomes a significant threat to the stability and general development of the region the United States will not take direct military or political action against it.

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# IV. WESTERN EUROPE

## A. The Present Situation

The selection of Western Europe only, rather than Europe, for treatment in this Chapter is a tragic fact but nevertheless a part of the present situation. The selection seems justified on the basis of the hard facts of Soviet control demonstrated in Hungary last fall. These facts make the translation of the national purpose into action in Western Europe as opposed to Eastern different tasks.

For the United States, the cardinal feature of the European scene lies in the fact that it is our mother region, in every sense of the word. The United States is a nation with three and a half centuries of a history of its own; the rest of its history, twenty-five centuries or so, is that of Western Europe and the Mediterranean basin. The people of the United States came here largely from the same area and owe their religions, culture, institutions and even their national purpose to the traditions and efforts of Graeco-Judeao-Christian civilization. This debt and inheritance makes for a common approach and shared sympathies, but it can also lead to underestimating the importance and the difficulty of maintaining a real community between the United States and Europe.

The dominant feature of the Western European scene today is the contrast between it and the scene in April, 1945 or even April, 1948. The task of reconstruction, material and spiritual, was immense and the obstacles in the

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way were many. Yet the political institutions and economy of Europe have been reconstituted, thanks partially to the Marshall Plan and other U. S. assistance, but the achievement also reflects the enduring vitality of the people and their devotion to free institutions and human dignity.

During the economic revival of Europe, a process continuing today, Europe's industrial plant has been rebuilt and modernized, its standards of management improved, its labor standards bettered. As a result, economic productivity has been increased and the distribution of economic benefits widened. In spite of these successes which contribute to the economic strength of the region and to the continued viability of its institutions, there still remain serious economic weaknesses and imbalances, and deep fissures in the social structure of many states.

A second important feature of the present scene is the fact that important groups of Europeans are either opposed to U. S. objectives and methods, or mistrust them. The most notorious of these groups are the French and Italian communist parties which hold a significant fraction of the popular and parliamentary vote. But in addition, in these countries and elsewhere a large portion of the non-communist Left questions the objectives and methods of the United States in varying degrees ranging from mild doubt to deep distrust. Then there are other groups, perhaps more on the traditional Right, who find in the anti-colonial, the anti-monopoly and other policies of the United States a naked attempt to steal markets, opportunities and power. Still others are disturbed by what

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appears to be an abandonment by the United States of its traditional close
association with Western Europe in favor of newer associations with Asiatic
and African peoples.

The third important feature is the dependence of Western Europe on raw
materials and especially fuel from outside the region to keep its economy run-
ning. It is obvious that these imports can be, and are being, interfered with.
Important groups of Europeans can find no gap in the logic of the anti-colonial
movements which draw on the political and philosophical heritage of the West
to deny Europe the means of economic survival.

At the same time, Western Europe is unable to defend itself against the
U.S.S.R. without the assistance of the United States; and even with that assist-
ance, it can defend itself only at great cost. NATO provided a temporary sense
of military security, but even that is now fading with an increased recognition
by Europeans of their dependence on the nuclear weight of the U.S. air force.

This combination of factors cannot help but lead to a recognition that
Europe's economic and military power has shrunk and its position in the world
has changed. This in turn leads large numbers of Europeans to believe that
they have lost control over their own destiny, both militarily and economically,
with the result that they can see no logical course of conduct open to them
save a defeatist neutralism.

Aside from the threat of Soviet domination, direct or indirect, the major
political problem confronting Europe is the question of the reunification of

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Germany. As long as Germany remains divided, the pressures for reunification in the Federal Republic will threaten the stability of NATO and the Western European community. Within the Federal Republic it will cause political differences. It will also cause tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the West. Any terms of reunification now forseeable threaten the unity of the Western European community and, according to some, the health of Europe.

The fifth important feature of the European scene is the growing tendency toward functional integration in Europe. The growth in types of activity has been marked. Beginning with the OEEC and the EUP, it has developed into the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the Common Market. It has threatened to extend outside Europe, through for example, plans for the joint European development of Africa.

## B. The Objectives of the United States in Western Europe

In the light of our national objectives it is not difficult to determine our principal objectives in Western Europe by examining a few possible alternatives. If Western Europe were to collapse for economic causes or otherwise, or if it were to fall under the domination of the Soviet bloc, either by conquest or by becoming neutral in an anti-Western sense, the United States would have failed to maintain a world environment in which its people could develop in accordance with its humanistic traditions. It would also have failed, and failed disastrously, to deal with the Soviet bloc, which would have been enormously strengthened by the addition of enormous resources in industrial plant and skilled manpower. It would have failed to create conditions in which men

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could increasingly realize their own worth, not only in Europe itself, but else-
where, for if democratic institutions cannot survive in their birthplace, what
hope can people elsewhere have in them.

Therefore, the United States must --

a) assist in preventing the U.S.S.R. from controlling Western Europe and, to that end, should revitalize NATO in accordance with the technical and strategic realities of today,

b) work for a strong and pervasive community of interest with Western Europe, for a greater awareness of the fundamental community of the Western World, and for the maintenance of the free institutions of Europe, both as ends in themselves and as examples to the rest of the world,

c) assist in whatever way possible in the formation of effect-
ive political and economic unification of Western Europe
as a source of internal strength for the region and of added
power against the U.S.S.R.,

d) assist in establishing more permanent and mutually profit-
able relationships between Western Europe and the under-
developed areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In determining how the forces working against the objectives of the
United States can be sterilized and those favoring them can be strengthened,

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problems of the military defense of Europe will be examined first. The effect-
iveness of NATO today is central to this question. NATO was created during a
period when nuclear weapons were relatively scarce, to coordinate the military
forces of its members with the objective of deterring an invasion of Western
Europe by the USSR with conventional forces and of strengthening Western
Europe's will to resist. On the whole NATO has achieved a great success in
these objectives. With respect to political and economic matters, the mission
of NATO has been less clear and success less apparent.

Now, however, the basis of NATO has been much eroded. An era of
nuclear plenty has succeeded the era of nuclear scarcity, and in the new era
the USSR has great capacity for nuclear destruction. The character of the
nuclear umbrella provided by the U.S. Strategic Air Command has therefore
been much changed since the early days of NATO. Furthermore, recent events
in Europe have undermined earlier assumptions about the character of the poten-
tial attack on Western Europe. Today it seems highly unlikely that any Eastern
European satellite or combination of them could, or would, mount an effective
attack on Western Europe or that the U.S.S.R. would hazard an assault by
conventional arms against Western Europe across the satellites. This change
suggests that NATO, as now conceived has no logical military function. This
conclusion does not mean that no useful tasks exist for NATO, or that it can be
abandoned. In fact the very opposite is true.

In the first place, NATO cannot be abandoned because such an abandon-
ment would lead to exultation in the U.S.S.R. and additional defeatism in

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Europe. Secondly, Western Europe must be capable, in some measure, of defending itself and this capacity must be apparent for all to see, or the very situation which existed in 1950 will be recreated. These premises call for a reordination of NATO.

One of the difficulties with NATO at present is that while there is broad agreement between the member countries as to their purpose in Europe, all the members save the United States, lack the means to carry out that purpose. The French Army is in Algeria, the German Army is nonexistent, the British Army is being dissolved; but the real difficulty is that only the United States has nuclear weapons, and more particularly for this area, tactical nuclear weapons. In order to revitalize NATO, to give the Western European countries a sense of effective participation in the alliance and a feeling that they have a measure of control over their own destiny, it is necessary for the United States to share tactical nuclear weapons and doctrine concerning their use with the NATO countries.

As the law now stands, such sharing is impossible, but the assumptions on which the law was based have been undermined by the coming of nuclear plenty. The basic interests of the United States demand that the law should be changed.

This change would give new life to NATO and its members and it would make Western Europe less vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. By giving these countries the capacity to sting, this program would lessen their feelings of

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helplessness and would weaken thereby the forces of defeatism and neutralism.

The possession of tactical nuclear weapons by our allies in Europe presents, however, serious problems in the organization and control of the armed forces of Europe. It raises questions of whether these weapons might be used to advance individual objectives of members of the alliance rather than for the common defense, and of how this use might be prevented. In the last analysis, the degree of this danger depends upon the extent of common purpose within the alliance. As the leaders and the people of the Atlantic community are conscious of broad areas of common purpose, this danger will be small. If they cannot perceive a common purpose which overrides individual objectives, this danger looms large. The tendencies toward common purpose could perhaps be strengthened by giving the nuclear weapons, not to our allies individually, but to the NATO forces jointly under the central command.

The future of Germany is central to the future of NATO. The attitude toward NATO, just expressed, assumes either that Germany will remain divided and the Federal Republic a cooperating member of NATO or that a reunified Germany will be a cooperating member of NATO. The second of these assumptions seems quite impossible; the U.S.S.R. would not permit reunification on such terms. The first also presents serious difficulties because of the strong internal political pressures against such a policy. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine any sort of NATO with a united and neutralized Germany outside it.

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Germany thus, presents a real dilemma, not only for NATO but for the future of Western Europe. Although it has made a remarkable recovery during the last ten years both economically and politically, there are substantial elements of insecurity in the German scene. The present West German state, as typified by its "capital village", Bonn, is regarded as a makeshift structure which does not command deep loyalties. As prosperity continues and the internal issues of establishing new institutions are solved, West Germans are becoming increasingly concerned with reunification and the position of Germany in relation to Western Europe, the United States and the U.S.S.R. The yearning for reunification is becoming almost an obsession. At the same time, Adenauer's concept of reunification being achieved through rearmament and the Western alliance is becoming less and less plausible for most Germans. They are thus turning toward a policy of "flexibility" and direct negotiations with Moscow. There is every indication that any such policy would be disastrous for this the future of Germany and of Western Europe, for the USSR will not permit reunification without concessions which would mortgage the future of Germany.

The West Germans are also very suspicious about rearmament. The insistence of the United States on German rearmament has made them feel that it is a scheme to serve our interests rather than theirs. Furthermore, they are haunted by fears that their Western allies lack the capability and even the intention of defending Western Germany effectively. Under the circumstances,

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they see themselves in a worse position if they attempt to resist than if they
do not.

These forces and tendencies in Western Germany can easily lead to dangerous experiments in foreign policy and, therefore, pose serious problems for the United States. To some extent, the reordination of NATO, suggested above, should counteract some of the fears of the Germans, but the general tendencies away from conventional military forces, which are apparent throughout the world, cannot but add to them. Although in current negotiations on disarmament the United States has stressed the importance of settling political questions, it does not appear likely that the United States can contribute much in the foreseeable future toward German reunification. The best alternative available appears for the United States to work for the further integration of Western Europe, in the expectation that West Germany can find in such a development the security and the sense of justification which will lessen the obsession with reunification.

In the field of economics, the major task for the United States is to assure Europe of the sources of energy which are needed. At present Europe must import more than one-fifth of its fuel and this dependence on imports is rising. The costs are large and the sources of supply insecure. There is no short and easy answer to this problem, although the development of nuclear power plants offers some hope for the period ten to fifteen years ahead.

This problem must be attacked as a whole for Europe and Europe must
take the initiative. Steps to be taken include more efficient use of energy

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resources in Europe by research in fuel-saving and coal-mining techniques, by improving fuel transportation facilities in Europe, by increasing the search for oil there, and by increasing research, training and development in the field of nuclear power. At the same time steps must be taken to reduce the vulnerability of Europe to interruptions of the flow of oil from a single source. These include larger storage and distribution facilities in Europe, the development of alternate sources of supply and alternate means of transportation and, most important, the creation of sound incentives to stimulate the flow of fuel to Europe. The United States should cooperate in these developments.

Western Europe faces similar problems with respect to many raw materials, which come from areas which are still or were at one time colonial dependencies. The flow of these materials can be interfered with in many ways and the export of raw materials is often connected psychologically with a colonial status and is therefore resented.

In an effort to deal with these problems of fuel and raw materials in a creative way the United States should join in the creation of an Atlantic Development Community in which Western Europe, Canada, the United States and some of the Latin American countries could participate. This Community would become the focus of relations between the Western community and the rest of the world.

Such a focus would serve several purposes. It obviously demonstrates the continuing interest of the United States in the welfare of Europe. Such a demonstration is a useful blow in the cold war. Secondly, this focus is

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constructive and peaceful, not defensive and military. These characteristics serve to weaken the mistrust of the methods and objectives of the United States existing among important groups in Europe and elsewhere.

As a focus of relationships between the Western community and the rest of the world, the Atlantic Development Community would seek to demonstrate the creative possibilities in international exchange of goods and services. It would not be solely concerned with getting oil or raw materials for Europe, but with fruitful exchange leading to the economic and social development of the areas from which these products come. In these areas, there is a scarcity of skilled manpower, proven techniques and capital goods which are the prerequisites to raising productivity of agriculture, commerce and industry. In Europe, on the other hand, there is a reservoir of these things, and also the capacity and need to produce more capital goods. These goods and services can be exchanged for fuel and raw materials with mutual benefit. As the economies of the exporting areas become more developed and the benefits of production more widespread in consequence of these developments, the leaders and the peoples of these areas will become more and more interested in continuing and expanding these exchanges.

The Community thus has several advantages. It offers to Europe not only the possibility of working out its own economic salvation but also the opportunity of making a real contribution to the world. Both these should attack the feeling of defeatism. This approach also offers to the United States an

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opportunity of working out the conflict between its traditional policy of anti-colonialism and its support of the Western European powers, and of making a contribution to European integration.

The United States has a real interest in the unification of Europe. Not only are there political and economic benefits to be derived from it, but aspirations toward it play an important part in the history and hopes of Europe to which the United States should not appear indifferent or opposed. In addition these aspirations have an appeal for Eastern Europe and thereby constitute a source of behavior there which is probably not compatible with Soviet objectives in that region.

However, outside the Atlantic Development Community, there is not much the United States can do to further European unification. The major steps will have to be taken by the Europeans themselves and there is some doubt as to whether it is either possible or wise for the United States to try to coerce them into taking any particular step or series of steps. The appropriate role for the United States in this development is that of the helpful midwife. In particular, it should be alert to reverse any tendencies which would lead to the neutralization of a unified Europe or which would make unification a threat to the underlying community of interest in the Western World.

## D. Conclusions

Within this framework the operational objectives of the United States involve the creation of a partnership between Western Europe and the United

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States for the creation of conditions there and elsewhere which will further the
realization of human dignity. Basic to this partnership is the recognition that
while Western Europe has lost its position as hub of the universe, it still has
important contributions to make to the world in terms of politics, culture and
economies.

The elements of this partnership include --

a) A strategic defense provided by the United States and a
local defense provided by a revitalized NATO armed with
tactical nuclear weapons, both aimed at curbing aggress-
ions by the Soviet bloc.

b) An Atlantic Development Community which will secure adequate sources of energy and raw materials for the European economy in exchange for the application of European and American skills in the economic development of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These activities are undertaken not as ends in themselves but as the necessary foundation for an environment in which the United States can thrive in accordance with its traditions and in which other peoples may seek their own development in accordance with theirs.

c) An increasing development of intra-European institutions carrying on various aspects of European economic and

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political life across the traditional boundaries of the states of Europe. These activities are undertaken in furtherance of historic European aspirations and as fundamental to the economic and political health of Europe. As such, they contribute to order and strength in the region.

Such a framework would make a major contribution to the realization of the objectives of the United States, not only in Europe, but in the world generally.

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# V. THE MIDDLE EAST

## A. The Present Situation

Unlike Latin America and Western Europe, the Middle East is today a region of crisis. It is in a revolutionary ferment where the old bases of life, social, political, economic and cultural, are undergoing revolutionary change. The overwhelming mass of the people are just awakening to the realization that it is no longer necessary for them to continue to live in poverty and misery. This realization is essentially an emotional reaction against nearly all they have ever experienced, but it has not yet advanced beyond this stage to the point of providing a new course of action. Unfortunately for us, much of this emotional reaction centers on the long and unsatisfactory historical relationship with the West and the servitudes imposed by the West on the region. It finds its fruition in violent anti-colonialism directed primarily against Britain and France, as the two principal colonial powers involved, but also against the West generally.

To complicate this picture an unbelievable gap, material and spiritual, exists between the "haves" and the "have-nots" of the region and between urban and rural groups. An additional friction is provided by the existence of tribal and other groups whose aspirations are at variance with those of their so-called fellow countrymen and who may be excluded from avenues of political power. Typical of these are the Kurds in Azerbaijan, Iraq, Syria and Jordan,

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and, more recently, the Palestine Arabs in Jordon.

The new leaders of the Middle East are not secure enough in their
position to impose rational and orderly procedures upon this revolution. As
a rule, they are strong men who have emerged as leaders without previous
training or experience in government or administration. Yet they are faced
with domestic problems which would tax those far better trained and far more
experienced than they who had the support of established institutions. Follow-
ing the line of least resistance, these leaders are virtually compelled to con-
solidate their followings by exploiting emotional issues which arouse the
people. The most convenient of these are anti-Western issues and other ex-
ternal matters which distract the people from the pressing internal problems
which cannot be dealt with except through stability and orderly procedures.

This picture is subject to the qualification that wide differences exist
within the region, differences not so much in the basic elements which are
the product of a common history, religion, and culture but rather in the degree
to which any given state has evolved toward maturity as a nation. In some
areas considerable progress has been made, and leadership is evolving into
a government which is capable of carrying on the slow and difficult work needed
for achieving the unarticulated aspirations of the masses. But in others there
is turmoil, with no effective government and only a variety of leaders strug-
gling for power.

It is the fashion in the area to call for industrial development. The

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leaders seek this industrial progress to consolidate their own power, to im-
press the outside world, and in the sincere belief that such industrialization
will raise the level of their peoples. The region, however, is not prepared
for such development. It lacks the order, the administrative organization, the
skilled manpower and the countless elements that make up the foundation of
industrial strength. Such industrialization as has been attempted in the region
has created stresses and imbalances which have often added to its instability.

The idea of Arab unity, the image of the Arab empire of the eighth cen-
tum, exercises a great hold over much of the region. Its boldest image is of
a federation of 90 million people extending from the Atlantic to the Persian
Gulf. The idea offers a powerful tool for influencing behavior in the region,
which can be used both by local leaders in furtherance of their own policies
and position, as both Nasser and Saud have tried to do, and by outside powers
who have the skill to do so. In some respects it is so powerful a force that
it cannot be disregarded by local leaders even when from the practical point
of view it is in their interest and that of their followers to do so. Saud finds
himself in this position in many of his dealings with Nasser.

This image is confronted with the reality not only of a hodge-podge
of Arab states, but of the state of Israel. In Arab eyes, particularly since the
events of November, 1956, Israel is regarded as a tool of Western imperialism
and as an aggressor with a policy of unlimited immigration and a consequent
policy of territorial expansion. It becomes therefore a threat to the image of
Arab unity.

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The Arab-Israeli conflict reflects the changing relationships of the region with other areas of the world. The outbreak of actual fighting dates from the British withdrawal from Palestine which was symbolic of the decline of British power within the area. It is perfectly clear that Britain cannot provide order in the region as she once did. Secondly, the Arab-Israeli conflict marks the entry of the USSR into politics in the Middle East. As a result the conflict has become a part of the struggle between the West and the USSR and an element in the prestige of the United Nations. It can no longer be dealt with purely on its own merits.

The Middle East is not particularly well-endowed by nature in climate, terrain, or resources, so far as is now known, except for the fabulous supplies of oil, which have become so critical to other peoples of the world. Yet until recently, this oil has had save in a few cases, only a negative value for the leaders and peoples of the region. They have no use for it themselves; they see in it only a sweet to deny to others, not a key to unlock their own future. Added to this is the fact that oil is not allocated equally throughout the region; some states have it in abundance, others apparently not at all.

Working alone, each of these factors tends toward instability and disorder; together, they compound this effect. Thus, the present situation in the Middle East presents little to support the general objectives of the United States.

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B. <u>Objectives of the United States in the Middle East</u>

Because the existence of the conditions just described, the objectives of the United States must be, in an absolute sense, somewhat more modest than in the regions previously discussed. The Middle East is a region where the United States must cope with the world revolution in an acute form and in the face of many disadvantages not present in Western Europe and Latin America. To do so it should try -

a) To work for the establishment of order and stability in the region in order to eliminate the continual threat of disorder which jeopardizes the general order of the world and in order to develop a climate where the people of the region may have an opportunity for growth and human satisfactions.

b) To work for conditions whereby the oil of the region which is essential to Western Europe and other regions may be exchanged on a mutually profitable basis for goods and services which will contribute to the human and material development of the Middle East.

More specifically, these objectives imply that -

a) The United States should use whatever means are appropriate to strengthen the position of leaders, who are willing to work toward these objectives, so that they will be free to turn from emotional, external issues to the difficult tasks of organization and development at home. This requires us to build up the confidence of the peoples of the Middle East, not in us, but in their own leaders.

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b) The United States should assist the leaders to develop constructive and attainable goals for the region which can replace the negative, emotional reactions of the people as a motivating force for life there.

c) The United States should work with its Western European allies so that the sale of oil to Europe can lead to a widely shared economic growth for the region with the broad objective of human development.

d) The United States with the help of its Western European allies should seek to maintain the internal peace of the region and to secure it against outside aggression.

These objectives constitute an effort to induce the social economic and political revolution occurring in the Middle East into fruitful channels and to encourage the development of institutions which contribute to the realization of human dignity.

### C. Considerations Affecting the Achievement of These Objectives

The most serious problem standing in the way of these objectives lies in the emotional residues of anti-colonialism. Any intervention with military force in the area and even aspects of economic or technical assistance or the operations of the oil producers can and will be attacked as colonialism. If the attack touches the masses, the leader in power may have to adopt it or be swept away. Thus, some of the principal means for assisting in the development of stability contain in themselves threats to that stability in the short-run.

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Yet this is a risk which the United States must take, for to do nothing is to court disaster. This is a clear case where "style" is important, The way in which the United States uses the various means at its disposal can either add to the strength of the appeal of the leader attacking these activities as a new colonialism, or make his appeal absurd.

The latent threat of anti-colonial feelings must always be kept in mind by the United States, but also by its Western European allies. Their position is even more difficult because among them are in fact the ex-colonial powers of the region who remain as colonial powers governing other peoples for whom the peoples of the Middle East feel an affinity by reason of race or religion. These facts suggest the desirability of avoiding unilateral action by any of the Western powers and of the use of multilateral devices such as the proposed Atlantic Development Community.

The position of Israel poses very difficult but similar problems. It constitutes a major threat to the stability of the region in several ways. Internally in the Arab states it is a subject with high emotional impact, particularly in the cities, where it provides politicians with the sort of external issue with which they can build up political support but which is incapable under the present circumstances to being satisfied. It is thus a source of turmoil and disorder and frequently an obstacle to constructive action. On the one hand, it thus contributes to the instability of the region and on the other the best solution for the problem can be found only by increasing stability. For,

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as a leader feels himself secure in his position, he can abandon this issue
and turn to more constructive tasks. As the constructive tasks catch the
imagination of the people and give them hope, the people will be less influ-
enced by the image of Israel as a scapegoat for all their misery.

Within the region, the threat of further armed conflict between the Arab
states and Israel is constantly present. Indeed each considers the other the
aggressor and therefore considers armed action justified. Furthermore, under
Egyptian leadership extermination of Israel has become a declared objective
of Arab nationalism.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a part of the struggle between
the West and the Soviet bloc. The USSR is using Arab resentment as a tool
to drive Western influence from the region and using Arab needs for weapons
as an entering wedge of its own. Under the circumstances, it could be sug-
gested that the obvious course for the United States would be to abandon
Israel entirely. Yet were it to do so, the United Nations would suffer a heavy
blow in the destruction by violence of the state which in effect was created
under its auspices. In addition, the political consequences in the United
States would be severe.

The conflict, therefore, is one with which the United States must be
prepared to live with until the time when a general political settlement can
be worked out with the Soviet Union. To lessen the tensions, however, the
United States should undertake the following -

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a) Guarantee that Israel will not expand further or dominate the Arab States.

b) Persuade Israel to give up some territory, preferably that south of Beersheba so that the Arab states may unite if they desire.

c) Persuade Israel to absorb the refugees from the Gaza strip and perhaps other Arab refugees.

d) Persuade Israel to limit its immigration so as to be able to absorb these refugees and to live more within its means than its present policy of unlimited immigration permits.

Without some action of this kind the United States will fail in its general objective of dealing with the Soviet threats to the region, for the Soviet bloc will be offered unlimited opportunities to portray the United States as an enemy of the Arab world and thereby to work its way into the region as the only protector of the Arabs.

It is evident that the USSR has a strategic interest in the Middle East as the path to Africa and South Asia, quite apart from the question of oil. It is probable, however, that it has no present plans to take over the region and that its objectives for the time being can be realized by the continuation of disorder there. It has numerous means at its disposal for doing so. One of these is, of course, the inability of the United States and its allies to secure a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Another is the Kurdish people stretching from Azerbaijan S.R. through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Jordan. This