January 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: John Deardourff

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: The McClaughty Paper and the Draft Issue

There are a number of points in the attached memo which probably
are correct, particulary on pages 7 - 9. My own views are as follows:

1. Some system of universal national service would probably be the most equitable. However, it may be politically unwise.

2. I am strongly opposed to relying exclusively on a professional army.

3. Experience in Britain has shown that it is very hard to recruit volunteers in times of full employment. Over a long period of time, it also raises serious questions of separation from country.

4. All things considered, I would prefer to stick to the present system unless we feel we can come out for universal service.

State your mind we feel we can come out for national service.

4. Will you think considered? I would prefer to stick to the present time, it also raises serious questions of separation from country.

3. Experience in Britain past shown that it is very hard to recruit men.

5. I am strongly opposed to relying exclusively on a professional man.

1. Some states of national service would properly be correct, certainly on better 1 - 3. If own views are as follows:

There are a number of points in the attached memo which properly

SUBJECT: The McCreary letter and the Draft Issue

FROM: Henry V. Kraemer

TO: John Deergomli

MEMORANDUM

January 53, 1964

Research Institute Recommendations

COPYRIGHT 1964 BY RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., 589 FIFTH AVE., NEW YORK. SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTIONS

Friday, January 3, 1964

The coldwar in '64: What are the chances of a settlement?
Will things ease up or get tense again? What about disarmament?
How will coldwar trends affect the U.S. gov't and the economy?

This Report summarizes the best judgments of the RIA staff.
We believe that the main '64 directions are already clear enough,
once you cut through the smog of propaganda and hopeful talk.

LBJ's statement "We want to end the coldwar, once and for all,"
and his intention to launch a new American "peace offensive"...
Partly, these words mirror LBJ's sincere desire to try for peace,
partly his wish not to let Khrushchev be the only "peace lover".

Trouble is peace-talk is being misunderstood, giving rise to
the Grand Illusions of '64: that great things are about to happen,
that peace is ready to break out, disarmament just a step beyond.

Nothing could be farther from reality: The peace guarantee
lies in the predominance of U.S. power, not in Kh's love of peace.
We predict that disarmament, drastic arms cuts won't get anywhere.
There will be a lot of propaganda talk, some careful feeling out,
... but no actual dismantling of armed forces.

To understand why the coldwar is not going to end this year,
look closely at the 9 major Soviet aims in the world struggle --

...Devitalization of the West's NATO military alliance.
...Western acceptance of Soviet control over East Europe.
...Legal & permanent separation of Berlin from W. Germany.
...A non-aggression pact between Warsaw & NATO nations.
...A reduction of American military forces in West Europe.
...Expansion of trade with the Western industrial nations.
...Weakening or destruction of the CENTO & SEATO alliances.
...Extension of Soviet footholds in the Mideast & Africa.
...Penetration in Latin America, ending the Monroe Doctrine.

Not only has Kh not renounced a single one of these aims,
but he's using a policy ("detente") that enables him to push them
more effectively than ever before -- without the "hard" line.

What HAS changed, then? A great deal, most of it flowing
from the central event of recent history -- the '62 Cuba crisis.
That was the watershed between the old coldwar and the new one.
As this Report stressed at the time (November 2, 1962) --

"We have seen the first 'war' of the nuclear-missile age,
as it will be fought where U.S. & USSR face each other DIRECTLY.

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Both powers well know that they dare not use their big weapons, that victory isn't possible, that the fruits of war are ashes.

"That does not eliminate war, but changes its character. In other words, we've been through the first sudden, dangerous, quickly terminated collision of the new age. The 'war' ended, as most wars do, with the beginning of 'peace' negotiations."

The negotiations went on throughout 1963. Their result: a series of agreements, not on how to end the coldwar struggle, but *how to keep it under control*, keep it from "going nuclear".

Don't look for these agreements in treaties or documents; they're unwritten, unofficial, haven't even any sanction in law. Some go back to letters between Kh & JFK after the Cuba crisis, some are in bits of McNamara's & Rusk's speeches, Kh's answers. Much is in messages carried back & forth by neutral diplomats.

These agreements form the "ground rules" of the new coldwar: they will be observed by both sides in three important areas:

1. **Nuclear war:** Both sides are determined to avoid crises or accidents that could escalate into a nuclear catastrophe. You'll see some tense moments but neither side will get panicky. In fact, each side will usually *know* what the other is up to: step & counter-step will unfold like a script everyone has read.

2. **Red China:** The Big Two are more worried about Mao Tse-tung than about each other. He plays dirty, runs risks, flouts rules. And he'd like to see the Big Two incinerate each other in war, leaving the world a bit safer. That's why both want to stop him.

Means there'll be examples of real U.S.-USSR collaboration. Both U.S. & USSR will send arms, aid, technicians, equipment into places like India, Morocco, Tanganyika...to keep Red China out. But there are limits to this collaboration -- the Soviets have to be allowed to operate independently of Red China, that U.S. mustn't push Peiping too far, force Moscow to intervene.

3. **Growth of neutralism:** This is what both sides see coming, the world they've made up their minds they'll have to live with. It's a retreat for both from hopes of 2 years ago, but it's also the only world they can inhabit without blowing each other to bits.

This same idea is now taking hold everywhere -- in the UN, among developing countries, even in Berlin. As Mayor Willy Brandt puts it, "This will be neither a Soviet nor a U.S. century."

Thus, it's clear that 1964 will see a battle for position, the preliminaries for the next big round, NOT the end of the War. They'll make '64 the year of the Great Pause, not the Great Peace.

It's still as Eisenhower and Kennedy always described it -- that would last at least a generation; still as Lenin -- a struggle to the end with only one victor.

Issue No. 1, Issued Weekly by Tax Research Institute, Inc., 589 Fifth Ave., N. Y.
N. Y. 10017. $24 per yr. Second class mail privileges authorised at New York, N. Y.

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For business, too, 1964 will be a year of consolidation. Business will be generally GOOD, especially in the first half. Many companies in sensitive industries will be taking advantage of this period to get set for the somewhat rougher period, later. Others will be using this year to prepare for the 1965-66 boom.

In short, this is a year when the totals will mean little for you and your company. Many firms will prosper in 1964, but some will have to sweat for each added dollar of business. Reason: The economy described below is one that's starting to puff hard as it nears the top of the hill. In such an economy, of course, the premium is on energy, cost-&-profit-consciousness, of course, the premium is on energy, cost-&-profit-consciousness,

In terms of some of the familiar measures of total business, here's how our economic staff sees 1964 in comparison with '63:

**Gross National Product**, the total output of goods & services, will reach about $615 billion for the full year -- up over 5%... Consumer, business & gov't sectors will all share about equally.

**Industrial Production**, the physical output of all factories, mines, etc, will run at about 130% of the 1957-59 average in '64. This is nearly 5% over the record average of 124 reached in '63.

**Retail Sales**, in all types of stores, will be about $255 bil, for another 4½% annual increase. But note that automobile sales, biggest single item in the total, will show little, if any, gain.

Little of this year-to-year gain will be due to **price hikes**. Consumer prices will be up another 1%-1½% over this year's level, but much of the rise will be in the cost of services, as usual. Wholesale prices of goods will show only an "upcreep" over '63.

**All in all, '64 will shape up as a year of stiff competition,** in which finished goods makers & sellers make a beginning toward passing along the higher materials costs they've been absorbing. In most lines, price **firming** will be more the typical situation than substantial price **increases**. The fight will be for **volume**.

**Possibility of an automobile strike at the end of August** will play a big part in shaping the year for all businesses... We do not believe the negotiations will lead to a **strike** -- but no one can be sure, so makers must prepare for the worst.

Detroit aim: **close out the '64 model run by the end of June,** rush the model changeover in July, start the '65s before August, so dealers can at least take orders even if the plants close.

This will produce an **unusual lift during the first half --** in effect, seven months' production squeezed into six months. Same thing in steel, rubber, glass, diecasting, tool-making, etc. All will turn in better-than-usual performances in early 1964, then experience **deeper-than-usual summer slumps in July-August...**

Only an auto settlement before June can avert this distortion.

If an auto strike does come, Sept-Oct business will suffer, of course. And a long strike could push the economy into a slump.

What about the tax cut? Gov't economists aren't really sure just what effect it will have on business, or when it'll be felt. Though it's popular to talk of the "cut retroactive to Jan 1", date for the reduction in withholding probably will be April 1.

Sec'y Hodges and Walter Heller talk of a $620 billion GNP, are still using a "conservative working figure" of $612 billion. The RIA staff believes the conservative figure will be closer.

Several threats will hang over business through the year, keep a lid on the amount of further expansion to be expected.

...High unemployment: Any steps taken to ease joblessness -- whether shorter hours, increased jobless pay, or "make-work" -- will result in higher business costs, directly or indirectly. Means a tightening of the profit squeeze, a limiting of growth.

And if nothing is done, the number of unemployed will climb, as we indicated last week, with even more serious results.

...The heavy consumer debt load can't grow very much more without putting a dangerous strain on the economic machinery. Instalment debt payments already eat up 13% of disposable income.

Aiden of repayment puts an automatic limitation on buying:

...The balance of payments deficit will be with us in '64, may well force new gov't restrictive actions before year-end. Demand for goods taken to halt the drain on gold reserves -- a move in interest rates for instance, or tight import curbs -- could result in curbs on domestic activity, coming at a bad time.

Net effect of Washington's act will be expansionist in '64, despite Johnson's stress on "frugality" in his upcoming Messages.

Fact is LBJ's "let us continue" theme for the '64 campaign will mean a steady flow of federal funds pumped into the economy. There will be even more emphasis on public works than under JFK, and new aerospace, defense programs will replace those curtailed, as Johnson demonstrates his attack on "pockets of poverty".

RIA prediction: The outlook beyond '64 is for a real boom. If our staff is right about '64 -- no sharp rise for the year, but no serious falloff for total business at any point either -- this should lay the economic groundwork for a truly impressive expansion in all segments of business, getting under way in '65.

We'll be spelling this out in detail in future reports...

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THE ANNOUNCER: We have a wonderful audience here today and a very stimulating program to present. So let's get ahead and get things under way. Ladies and gentlemen, may I present the General Chairman of today's Philadelphia Party to People Forum, Mr. Phillip T. Sharples.

MR. SHARPLES: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. This program is the sixth and final in the series of Party to People Forums that have been held throughout the United States under the sponsorship of the Republican National Committee. The previous Party to People Forums and their panels of distinguished statesmen, legislators and Republican Party leaders have discussed a variety of major issues facing the American people. It is now my privilege to introduce to you the Honorary Chairman of the Philadelphia Party to People Forum, a loyal and generous and capable Republican, Mr. Raymond Pitcairn. (Applause.)

These Party to People Forums are performing a dual purpose. First they serve to enlighten all Americans on domestic and foreign issues through the exchange of questions and answers between you and the panel. And secondly, your contributions towards the

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improvement of our governmental structure and standards
of policy will guide us in the fabrication of the
Party's 1964 platform.

I would now like to turn this program over to
Mr. Robert Merriam, National Coordinator of the Party
to People's Forum, who is also substituting for Senator
Scott as moderator. May I, if I haven't lost it, read
a telegram from Mr. Scott.

"Sincerely regret inability to moderate Forum
today due to an estimated fifteen or more quorum calls
and votes on the Civil Rights Bill today. My clear
duty is to be present on the floor of the United States
Senate voting with the great majority of our Party for
Civil Rights for all Americans. Best wishes for a
wonderfully successful Party to People Forum.
Sincerely, Hugh Scott."

MR. MERRIAM: Thank you very much, Mr.
Sharples, and ladies and gentlemen. May I say I share
your regret that Senator Scott will not be our moderator
today. But I think all of us fully understand the
importance of the matters which have detained him in
Washington. I want to say just a few very brief words
about the Party to People program which was initiated

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as a result of a suggestion made by General Eisenhower
last January. It was his thought it would be extremely
important between the time he suggested this and the
Republican National Convention that there be full and
frank and detailed discussion by prominent Republican
leaders in response to questions from people in various
communities as to the major programs and platform
planks which the Republican Party will be considering
at its convention next month.

I might say these meetings are in no way,
shape or form a substitute for the Platform Committee
deliberations or its hearings which will commence on
the sixth of July in San Francisco. But they are
meant to present to the Platform Committee, the one
hundred delegates who are selected for membership on
that Committee, ideas and thoughts and comments about
vital issues of the day. And they are meant addition-
ally to make it known to the American people that the
Republican Party is a Party of ideas and ideals and a
Party which is continually searching for the best
solution to the many troubling problems of the day.
This is, as Mr. Sharples mentioned, the sixth and final
of these major forum series. We have had in addition

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a large number of smaller forum meetings conducted by various state organizations, and you will hear a summary of one of those during the course of the afternoon here in your own home state of Pennsylvania.

Additionally we have circulated now over one half million copies of an issue questionnaire to people in various parts of the country asking them for their views on important issues of the day, asking for their advice as to what the Republican Party's position should be. All these activities will be summarized at the opening session of the Platform Committee in San Francisco.

On behalf of the Republican National Committee, I would like to thank all of you for your attendance here today and say that to myself, who has now sat through five, and today is six, of these meetings, they have been a most stimulating activity and one which I think will be of extremely good value to the Platform Committee and to the Republican Convention in its meeting next month. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. SHARPLES: Thank you, Mr. Merriam. I mentioned a few moments ago that the panels of the Party to People Forums are comprised of distinguished

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statesmen and Republican leaders. I now have the pleasure of presenting this panel to you. First, former Secretary of Defense and now president of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, Mr. Thomas S. Gates. (Applause.)

Next, for many years a congressman from the State of Minnesota, who I may say has just made a perfectly magnificent speech at a luncheon of the Republican Finance Committee, Dr. Walter Judd. (Applause.)

Next, the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, professor and one who has served on the National Security Council planning staff, Dr. William Kintner. (Applause.)

Next, the American Ambassador to Italy during President Eisenhower's administration, Mrs. Claire Booth Luce. (Applause.)

Next, the Director of Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe. (Applause.)

And next, a gentleman who very promptly and courageously substituted at the last minute, Mr. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey. (Applause.)

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And finally, the former president of the
United States, the best loved and most trusted American
General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, our national anthem.

(Whereupon the national anthem was played.)

I now turn this meeting over to Mr. Merriam,
our moderator.

MR. MERRIAM: Thank you very much. I
wonder if we couldn't give a rousing hand of applause
to Mr. Sharples, the chairman of this meeting.

(Applause.)

I'd like to take one minute to tell you of
the format of this meeting so that we will all under-
stand precisely what is going to happen. The question-
naires which I mentioned to you earlier, which I say
were circulated throughout the country, we've had a
number of important questions submitted to us on
various subjects. Each of this Party to People's
Forums have been on a separate subject matter. The
subject of this one, as I think you all know, is our
foreign policy. We have asked people who have
submitted comments to us in the past, seven of our
fellow citizens or neighbors to direct those questions

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to the panel, and we will ask the members of the panel
to comment on these questions as they arise.

In addition, each one of you has been given,
I believe, a small card on which you may address a
question to the panel, and from time to time the ushers
will go through the audience. If you will just hold
your cards up, they will be handed back. And as many
as we possibly can will be answered further on the
subject of our foreign policy.

To start the program off, I am going to ask
two of the questioners to come forward in the interest
of time so that one will be prepared when the other is
finished. The first question will be addressed to the
panel by Mr. James Cavanaugh, who is a Philadelphia
lawyer. Mr. Cavanaugh.

MR. CAVANAUGH: I would like to direct my
question to General Eisenhower. General, it seems
clearly evident that in the past several years our
alliances throughout the world have steadily disinte-
grated. I would like to ask the General why this has
happened and what we can do about it.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I think that most of us
will understand why these alliances were established

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and what are their basic purposes. What we are asking here is the question as to why they seem to be prospering so little; indeed why they seem to be weakened in their influence in keeping the peace of the world.

I think this has to be brought back somewhat to the methods that we used, leadership methods we used in our own country. You see, foreign policy, there are various parts of it, and we do wrong to speak about one foreign policy of the United States. There is no such thing.

We all have common objectives. All parties and all Americans, I think, have the common objective of seeing peaceful relations with others, expanding our friendships so we can trade in better fashion and so the whole world and all humankind can, in the spirit of cooperation, advance both at home and abroad.

But when you come down to the methodology and practices that we observe in any country or in any group of countries, now this becomes -- it comes back largely to the personal convictions of our leaders and to personalities and leadership in all of those countries, not only our own. I am quite sure that we've had in the past several years less of experienced

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personnel in these fields than we have been accustomed
to have. And, therefore, I think a number of mistakes
have been made. The United States must be a leader
by reason of its moral -- that is, its spiritual, moral
strength, its economic strength, its military strength.
It has to be a leader, but it must not attempt to be a
boss. And any time we attempt to take our own pet
theories of government and cooperation and force them
on someone else, we've gotten not better cooperation,
we've gotten more resentment.

I think that there has been some enlarging of
our experience in these past several years. I would
hope and expect that this situation is going to improve.
But I think that we have to remember you cannot conduct
important diplomatic affairs through public speeches.
You cannot get up and call someone that you want as
your partner stupid or tell him that he is not doing
his proper share in the alliance and all that sort of
thing. These are the things that have to be done
person to person behind closed doors. And after having
reached the measure of agreement, then it should be so
announced. There should be always the atmosphere, the
whole purpose of cooperation which should be stressed

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and not domination.

I would think there is no use to belabor further the point as to why I believe we have been weak. I just believe that methods, and indeed some personal failures, have been responsible. Not all of them on our side. But on the other hand, I think some of them have been our fault.

MR. MERRIAM: Mrs. Luce, we are very happy to have you here today. And from your many months of experience on the firing line during the Eisenhower administration, I wonder if you would care to comment on this problem?

MRS. LUCE: The question being?

MR. MERRIAM: The question being what in fact has happened to our alliance.

MRS. LUCE: Well, there is a resurgence of nationalism in Europe, and everywhere else in the world for that matter. I think we should all remember that the reason we call ourselves the free west is because we do permit and encourage the freedom of nations other than ourselves, and with that freedom goes the right to make their own foreign policy. So we cannot, as General Eisenhower said, in our conduct in foreign

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policy in relation to Europe behave as though we ran
our half of the world while condemning Soviet Russia
for trying to run its half. We must deal with nations
as partners. And I do believe that this has been not
done well in the last years.

Our task is more difficult because of this
resurgence of nationalism and because it is more
difficult, it is more important than ever. General
Eisenhower has said to keep our European allies, and
I'm thinking in this case most specially of Rome, where
at all times our willingness to discuss privately in
the diplomatic way, using diplomatic methods, our
differences, I have been very shocked in these last
years at Republican attacks, and the attacks from
Washington on General DeGaulle. They have become
oversimplified to the point where you might think there
is a nasal interpretation of history. And the size
of General DeGaulle's nose had something rather
sinister to do with the breakdown of the Atlantic
Alliance. It may very well be, as was once said, had
Cleopatra's nose have been an inch longer, the history
of the world might have been changed. But the history
of NATO will not be changed by the size of General

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DeGaulle's nose, his ego or his personality unless we refuse to talk to him as though he were an ally worthy of our respectful attention and our sympathies with the problems that he has as the leader of a democratic nation. So I do feel with General Eisenhower that there has been a breakdown of understanding of our diplomacy in Washington for some time now.

MR. MERRIAM: You are suggesting we win by a nose rather than lose by a nose. Congressman Judd, who I have pursued throughout this land and other lands, so I know he is on the move, I wonder if you would care to comment on some of your observations on what has happened in the various parts of the world in our alliances?

DR. JUDD: I think one of the basic reasons, and I am merely enlarging or saying in a different way what has already been said, is the impression that a lot of our strongest and best allies have obtained from the leadership of our country in the last three and a half years that we are more interested in some kind of a settlement with the enemy at almost any cost than we are in forthright, unwavering dedication to human liberty, including those behind the iron curtain.

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I wonder how many times now the Soviet Union has
followed its regular policy outlined by Mao Tse Tung;
fight, and then pause, and while they pause, consolidate.
Fight again and rest, and then pause. And whenever
they are in trouble, they come and talk peaceful co-
existence, disarmament, of course without inspection,
and relaxation of tension. We think some changes have
taken place. And then we pursue them to get a settle-
ment that will let us out of our troubles and scare the
daylights out of our allies. They know that several
times in the past agreements were made by the United
States, or promises were made that weren't kept. Deals
were made privately, always with the best of intentions.
Deals with the enemy at the expense of our own principles
and at the expense of our friends. They are afraid of
it. They will frankly tell you that we are likely to
do it again.

A very prominent Frenchman told me something,
talking about General DeGaulle, he said General DeGaulle
was not pro-communist. He is afraid of the Soviet
Union. That is the one that could make trouble for
his friends. He is not afraid for Red China. It
couldn't possibly attack him in France in the next twenty

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years, if then. He says he doubts our constancy.
He thinks probably you are going to pull out of South-
east Asia. After all, aren't there prominent members
of the administration in power making speeches hinting
to that effect? Well, if we pull out under some face-
saving device, General DeGaulle is not going to give up
Southeast Asia. He is going to try to hold it
together and build some kind of a sphere of influence,
perhaps influence Red China and keep Red China in the
ring, and thereby keep the Soviet Union so busy watching
Red China that it can't make trouble for his France.
This is a disaster in my point of view.

He won't succeed in influencing Red China.
You can't jump on his logic and can't condemn him for
following our example, what effect we are going to have
in influencing the Soviet Union in our private
negotiations with them which our allies feel are behind
their back. We ought to forthrightly recognize our
hopes for peace and security are best served by letting
the world know we stand behind the free peoples, we are
a dependable ally, and this is the most effective way
to influence our enemies.

Someone has put it, what is our greatest state,

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interdependence with Western Europe or interdependence
with the communists. What is our best hope? It is
interdependence with the Western Europe. We act as if
we can't trust DeGaulle. We can trust the Soviet
Union, we can trust Khrushchev. We can trust Tito.
This kind of spectacle makes me feel unhappy and a
little ashamed and fearful. And if it does that to
Americans, what in the world does it do to poople
around the world?

MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Strausz-Hupe, I think you
are giving me a signal there that you want to comment.

DR. STRAUSZ-HUPE: I believe that Congressman
Judd -- I think what we must ask ourselves is what is
it that we want the most? What is our major objective?
I believe on the basis of resources, common interests,
our major objective has got to be the making of the
western world, what we call the Atlantic Community.
And it is precisely the confusion over priorities which
has undermined the spirit of solidarity which once upon
a time, under the previous administration, made the
Western Alliance strong. There is one very good
example. The Despatch, when it was published in
Moscow, released in Moscow, it was accompanied by an

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agreed communique signed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. And in this communique, the contracting parties declared that they were discussing a non-aggression pact between the NATO powers and the Warsaw Pact powers. Precisely a proposition made by the Soviet foreign minister, Gromyko, in 1959 and then indignantly rejected by the Western powers.

Now this whole rapport was dignified as a particular point in discussion in the agreed communique. Therefore, we cannot be surprised that some of our allies in Europe, some of our allies the world over weren't certain as to exactly what is exactly our major purpose. Do we want to concede the Western Alliance in Europe, I mean its present state, its present status, to the Soviet Union as a counter, let us say, for reduction of armament, or do we really believe that the Western Alliance is non-negotiable, or certainly that we cannot negotiate with the Soviets except with the complete agreement that we limit the members of the NATO Pact.

I think this ambiguity in our foreign policy more than anything else has undermined NATO. That is

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responsible for what is now called the crisis of NATO.

MR. MERRIAM: Secretary Gates, I think you wanted to add a word.

MR. GATES: While the question has been basically answered by the previous speaker, Mr. Chairman, I think there have been changes in military policies that have been weakening, of a weakening character as well. While we would all admit that our military policy today is indivisible from economic policy and political policy and financial policy for that matter, nonetheless it is the basis of the strength of NATO which is the alliance that has until now kept the peace.

The new administration invented a word called "flexible response". I never quite figured out what it was, because I thought we had a flexible response also. However, this dealt with the possibility of fighting limited wars in Europe against the Russians with conventional forces and changed the atomic capability and the integration of atomic weapons into our forces in NATO in a fashion quite different from the Eisenhower strategy. I think this, in effect, weakened the deterrent of the United States and weakened the alliance. Perhaps the president will recall he was never afraid of

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independent nuclear capability on the part of our NATO
allies. Rather than enforcing that principle, we have
dropped back into what now seems to me to be sort of a
nuclear detent.

MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Kintner?

DR. KINTNER: I would like to summarize the
view of a very cynical European about our policy. The
important point to bring out is the attitude the nations
have for each other that make or break an alliance.
One European defined U.S. policy this way; to be neutral
with our enemies, friendly with the neutrals and hostile
to our allies. This, of course, is an exaggerated
statement. I think the point just made by Mr. Gates,
our dealing with the Europeans in the military field
particularly, we have carried on many unilateral
discussions. For example, with taking out our missiles
from Turkey and Italy without consulting with the NATO
council. We made a unilateral decision in the Nassau
conference regarding the strategic power the British
would get. Even though this was the most crucial
question before the entire Alliance. It is this high-
handed type of dealing which leads to the type of
attitude which reflects in this cynical European

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observation.

MR. MERRIAM: I think the second question goes to the point you were making, Secretary Gates. Perhaps we would like to expand on it briefly. I will call on Miss Gloria Sabatini, who is a pharmacist in Philadelphia, who asks this question.

MISS SABATINI: My question is directed to Mr. Gates. Is it possible to have a limited war in Europe if the Russians attack?

MR. MERRIAM: Secretary Gates?

MR. GATES: I guess I didn't know that question was coming. I think the policy -- I think anything is possible. But I think the policy that we operated on was that there could be no such thing as a limited war in NATO where heavy concentration of Soviet and United States forces were involved. I think we felt this was a showdown, and it would go very quickly across the continent of Europe and endanger our own security. The very purpose of this alliance was a call to strategy, and obviously was not entirely done with the idea of benefiting our neighbors. It was done in the United States' self interest. I believe that we operate, or I have to operate in my position, at

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least in the Defense Department, on the theory that such
a war was not possible.

MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Kintner?

DR. KINTNER: I might point out that Mr. Khrushchev takes the same position. On January sixth, 1961, he said there are three types of wars we have to deal with, thermonuclear war which he doesn't want now because he still is inferior to us. He doesn't believe a limited war in Europe or anyplace else is possible because this might blow up or escalate, expand into a thermonuclear war. However, he is all in favor of what he calls wars of national liberation, such as is going on in Viet Nam or Laos, or perhaps in the Zanzibar area. These, he said, are of such a nature that the communists must support these wars as their sacred duty. And these are the ways that he would like to fight us, trying to work around our nuclear power. We have not yet found the answer to deal with these wars. But if we give up our nuclear powers in the basic confrontation, we have no chance of winning either encounter.

MR. MERRIAM: Mr. President, is it possible that some of our European allies are interpreting this discussion by the administration and its leaders, as he

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suggests, in the possibility of a limited war and
really saying we are not going to use nuclear weapons?

GEN. EISENHOWER: Well, this, of course, was
a basic preoccupation. Chancellor Adenauer, when he
was in office, he was alarmed by the statements he
heard that although America had this great nuclear
power, it would never use it until after the Soviets
had used it against us. And, therefore, when the
great overwhelming forces that Russia could, land forces,
could mobilize, concentrate on the western borders of
the iron curtain countries, they could sweep right
square over Europe with very little defense. It would
be a long time before our lines could stiffen and so
position itself so that it could make an effective
defense. He said this in no uncertain terms.

He said if this is going to be the policy of
the United States to permit again the overrunning of
Europe by a dictatorship and then some time later
coming back to battling your way across to liberate us
again, he said "you have lost Europe". We must, as he
stated, intervene in the event of an attack of this
kind with whatever power is necessary. And I must say
I agree with him.

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MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Strausz-Hupe, you are a student of these matters. Do I not recall correctly that in some of General DeGaulle's speeches, talking about a force with his nuclear capacity, that he was concerned with whether we would or would not use our nuclear power?

DR. STRAUSZ-HUPE: I think many of us are not exactly happy about the idea of that plan. Last but not least, because it probably is not going to stand for another six or seven years. By the time it's going to stand, in all likelihood it's going to be obsolete. However, there is an exceedingly good case to be made for a collective European nuclear deterrent such as proposed by Mr. Jean Monet, the spiritual father of the European Common Market. Such a united European nuclear force would consist of the British, the French and whatever other European contributions to be made. There is no reason why such a force, which in the very nature of things, countercity, counter-valued, why such a force could not be coordinated in a strategic objective with the force of NATO. As a matter of fact, it could be integrated with NATO. But most certainly there is no reason why our European

24

allies should have not only a collective European
nuclear force, but also a collective European nuclear-
electronic industry that goes with such a force.

In this age of ours, you are not a first rate
industrial power if you do not have what is called,
for short, nuclear-onics. And we in this country
should understand that the Europeans collectively want
to have the full range of the industry and have the
capability for war and peace. And instead of trying
to develop all kinds of gimmicks for keeping the actual
control of nuclear weapons in our hands and giving them
some toys to play with, instead of that, we should
abrogate the McMann Act and arrive at a clear under-
standing with our European allies on the exchange not
only of the nuclear hardware, of the weapons, but also
of the knowhow of the science. For if we do that
collectively, we will remain forever by decades ahead
of the Soviets and their allies. For this is not
simply an arithmetic matter. This is a geometric
progression. If we and the Europeans really exchange
what we know about these things and help one another to
develop these new industries, the leadership of the
Western world, at least industrially and militarily,

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will remain assured.

MR. MERRIAM: My former Commander and Chief has asked for foreign ideals.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I had not gone as far as the Doctor had in explaining all the tensions and the nuances of the simple proposition that the United States should be ready to use its force to protect Western Europe no matter what kind of forces they had to use. But what I wanted to add is this, this is not academic with me whatsoever. I advocated this same thing he is stating now for years, and I believed in it. I believe we were shortsighted when we didn't repeal the McMann Act and didn't give to our allies the same weapons we knew our enemies already had and in the same sequence. There may have been some sense, and I think there was. In 1947, when Mr. Baruch introduced his plan in the United Nations for giving all of this nuclear science over to an international body, but once having been confronted with the knowledge that the Soviets had both the atomic and the thermonuclear bombs and were developing them rapidly, we no longer had the slightest excuse to giving our best allies secondary types of equipment and weapons with which to defend themselves.

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I believe if we don't trust them and play with them in good faith and partnership, we shouldn't expect all of our allies to go down the drain.

MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Judd?

DR. JUDD: This is saying the same thing perhaps in another way. Our shortage is not on power. There is plenty of power in the North Atlantic. It is the shortage in unity and the lack of unity starts with loss of confidence or lack of confidence. And to answer the basic question in another way, is the limited war possible, to put it this way, the shortest way, your most likely way to prevent a nuclear war is let them know we are willing to use nuclear weapons if they push too far. There is no such thing as power without the will to use it.

Now you take President Johnson's speech at Swarthmore a week ago in which he recited how many more missiles and this and that we have than the rest of the world put together. But at the same time we indicate that we aren't prepared to use it. Then I don't think the other side is going to be terrified by that. You look back to '61. President Kennedy made a speech, a television broadcast, with the map of Laos and

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explained why it couldn't be allowed to go down. And apparently Khrushchev didn't watch the telecast and wasn't convinced. He kept on pushing, and so we didn't do anything. And then we started the Bay of Pigs, and it was tough going. And then we decided not to go through. They moved in and encouraged and closed three checkpoints in Berlin we didn't do anything. Eight more, we didn't do anything. Eleven more, we didn't do anything. Two weeks later started to throw out the Test Ban Treaty, and their pledge not to have nuclear atmospheric tests, and went ahead. I am saying this to give credit for the present administration, they went ahead for nine dreary months of weakness in moral resolve until President Kennedy went to the United Nations on September twenty-fifth when the Soviet Union said it was going to have Berlin by the end of the year, and he said we have calmly resolved that we will use whatever measures are necessary to defend Berlin. The Soviet Union never once again said they were going to get it by the end of the year. It was resolved. The problem now is strength of character, steadfastness and will of not to go to war, but to prevent war.

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MR. GATES: It might be worth adding that I understand the basic national security policy has not been revised since 1961. They are certainly not operating under the language of our policy. I wonder what the policy is.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I don't know. But I'll tell you this, at one time the term "going to the brink" or "brinkmanship" was the term they originally made fun of Foster Dulles. I think they had better be knowing how to use that kind of a method in that practice.

MR. MERRIAM: May I ask, when we welcome questions from the audience, we have not had many yet. Don't be bashful, folks. Mrs. Mary Mather has a question for the panel.

MRS. MATHER: I should like to direct my question to the panel as a whole. Is it likely there will be any successful steps taken towards disarmament in the near future, and what should be the American position concerning the disarmament negotiations?

MR. MERRIAM: Mr. Frelinghuysen, would you care to comment?

CONG. FRELINGHUYSEN: I'm not quite sure why I should be given the honor to direct myself to a

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question like that. I don't think any of us are sufficiently wiseminded readers to be able to predict. I would doubt very much that there is any great likelihood of meaningful disarmament in the near future. This would depend on several factors, in my opinion. One essential factor being the sincerity, the honest desire of the other side to enter into any kind of meaningful negotiations towards that end. And I myself cannot see any great reason for optimism on that score. Another way in which we might have steps, whether they would be successful steps towards disarmament, is another question, would be if we should enter into negotiations of some kind without taking a sufficient look at what the consequences were.

I think what we have done so far has, a number of us asking questions, has been about whether we got enough out of it. In other words, if we are going to enter into some major change in the stages between powers, you ought to end up in the same relative position that we were before we started. We would certainly not want unilateral disarmament, as an example, which would weaken us substantially but keep the other side as strong as it was before; and as a result of our

30

weakening, give us substantially less.

So I don't think there is any alternative for
the American position but to be wary, but not to be
blind to an opportunity that should develop. The
atmosphere, it does not seem to me to be one that could,
by any stretch of the imagination, be called a detent.
I think a detent would be a step before any further
major disarmament. So I would not see any step beyond
those that have been taken that would possibly have any
chance of success in the near future.

HARRY KNABLE: Mr. Secretary, I wear the
Congressional Medal. I am Harry Knable, Company B,
Fourth Infantry, Third Division. I want to ask a
question. Who is the cause of the trouble in South
America?

MR. MERRIAM: Well, we are getting to that
point. We will answer your question. That's correct.
Secretary Gates, would you care to comment in your
experience with your office the problem of disarmament?

HARRY KNABLE: You answer.

MR. MERRIAM: We'll get to it.

HARRY KNABLE: My buddies didn't die in vain.
I fought in six battles.

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MR. MERRIAM: Okay, we'll answer it.

HARRY KNABLE: Bring Ike on that floor.

MR. MERRIAM: Let us answer it. His question, as I understand it, is with reference to the problem of South America and what we should do there to improve our situation.

MRS. LUCE: I would answer that question by telling a funny story, if I may. I went to a lecture not long ago, and there was a sociologist who was ragging on the question of the population explosion. And he said to the audience, "Somewhere in the world every nine and a half seconds there is a woman who is giving birth to a baby. What are we going to do about that?"

And someone in the back of the room raised his hand and said, "I think we should find that woman and stop her immediately."

One of the real serious problems in Latin America is the population explosion that has overtaken what few intelligent and well thought out plans the Latin Americans themselves have had for stabilizing their economy and their political situation. That is a very grave problem. I do not think it is one that

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can be laid at our door. Although it is one, I suppose, that we can, if we put our minds to it, find some way of helping them with it. But all of Latin America is in a state of ferment. I wish we could make a more fruitful effort to encourage unity among the Latin American nations themselves.

I believe -- by the way, it would make me very angry, the whole idea of the Alliance for Progress was begun by the Eisenhower administration, although if you were to read the papers, you would think it was an invention entirely of the Democrats brought about owing to the fact that probably the Republican administration had done nothing about it. I feel that our problems in Latin America are extremely, extremely serious, and that we will have to begin, or at least such is my opinion, by trying to educate and feed the people and not by trying to make them contented simply with a diet of what we call democratic government. We've got to get on with the business of making it possible for them to live before we can teach them how to vote and how to conduct their own business.

MR. MERRIAM: I didn't think I was going to get such an enthusiastic response to my request for

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questions from the audience. But we do have a quieting one here to you, Secretary Gates. Has the Alliance for Progress really made progress in offsetting communism in South America, or has it simply put money in the wrong hands? Signed by Santiago Nadiel, if I pronounce it correctly.

MR. GATES: I think Mrs. Luce has answered most of that question. A more competent answer than I can give, frankly.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I think Mrs. Luce's primary thesis is absolutely correct. You get into this trouble, we say we want to help one of the countries in South America. Well, you are immediately bombarded if you visited that country with such propositions by students, all kinds of bodies and groups of people who want to, and they say all you Yankees are doing is giving money to the government. You are perpetuating the government in power, and all they are doing is keeping us down. We must remember when you talk about South America, you've got one of the greatest social problems in all the world. You've got extremely rich families. Then you've got a very poor, poverty stricken population.

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Now how to bring about any amelioration of
this situation without overleaping the governments is
the problem. Because they want the money, whatever
assistance you give them, and do it their way. If we
give them, if we can reach agreements with the separate
and respective governments in each nation to use this
money so far as possible to bring about, let's say, a
gradual social revolution, then I think we've got a
decent approach to the problem. We cannot do this by
moving in and giving money to the government, or on the
other side, just go and scattering a minimum of help
throughout the whole population. I'd say that a
revolution in South America is inevitable. The big
problem is, is it going to be evolutionary in coming
about peaceably and with intelligence, or is it going
to come about violently. It is to our advantage that
it come about in an evolutionary basis, and peaceably,
to the benefit of everybody, not only Latin America,
but ourselves.

MR. MERRIAM: We've got a number of questions
from the audience, including one from Mrs. Eleanor
Schnurr, which is reflected in a question which also
had been submitted to us previously by Mr. Joseph

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Resnick.

MR. RESNICK: I should like to direct my question to Mrs. Luce. The United Nations has been in existence now for nearly twenty years. Has it accomplished anything, and what is its future?

MRS. LUCE: Well, again on the good old Churchillian principle, the jaw jaw is better than war war. The United Nations, I think, has been very useful in providing a place where every nation feels that it can blow its top. Many critics of the United Nations have feared it on the basis of the possibility that it is trying to become what they call a world government or a supergovernment. Well, if there is anything the members of the United Nations are not, it is one world. It is every man for himself in the United Nations, and very often, as they put it, let Washington or Moscow take the hindmost. It is a forum of people whose nationalities and cultures are very old and coherent. It is a forum for the new nations who air their problems and grievances. It is not always an edifying spectacle to watch. But it is invariably interesting, and Americans who keep their ears open learn a great deal about what various nations in the world feel about

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themselves. And to this extent it is providing us, as
well as its members, with an invaluable education.

Now as far as what it has accomplished, who-
ever expected in the beginning that it could prevent a
world war if it itself was not the armed policeman?
The United Nations is in no position to put the bite on
anyone because it's military teeth are exceedingly
frail, and such ones as it has have to be paid for by
Uncle Sam's dentist.

I do not in any sense, for any reason whatsoever, fear the existence of the United Nations and continue as a citizen greatly to welcome the opportunity it gives people to blow off steam which might otherwise blow up in little wars here and there in our face.

But there are, as General Eisenhower says,
a number of specific instances in which the United
Nations provided a good place to toss a hot potato.
And he will give you those incidents, because the
American ambassador in the UN under his administration
fielded a lot of these very difficult situations and
kept them in the United Nations from spreading into a
conflict between the nations.

GEN EISENHOWER: All I wanted to add was two

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or three specific instances to get this thing in close focus. In 1957, some time about that, we sent a United force to act in between the quarrel between Israel and several of the Arab nations. And the force was very successful and has given a lot of confidence to that region, and there has been far less difficulty there than there would have been in its absence.

And indeed, I think the United Nations prevented a war, a very serious war.

There is no question in my mind, we would have had a completely communist government except for the intervention by the United Nations.

And certainly in 1950, the action of the National Security Council, luckily when the Soviets absented themselves because they didn't like us for something or stayed out so they couldn't use the veto, and the whole United Nations stood behind the United States in saying that the communists will not be allowed to take over South Korea. And indeed, I think there were fifteen different nations that gave small contingents. As a matter of fact, the British Empire gave one division. South Korea and ourselves took the bulk of the casualties. But their moral support and

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their actual physical support was good. So there are
a number of things and in different branches of the
United Nations where they have done a great deal of
good.

MR. MERRIAM: Congressman Frelinghuysen?

CONG. FRELINGHUYSEN: I was going to call attention to some of the specific episodes that General Eisenhower mentioned. The United Nations presently has troops in Cyprus. We do not know that is going to solve the problem that has been going on for centuries between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. But I would think the role is a successful one. The role of a policeman is certainly not one, as Mrs. Luce pointed out, of developing a major power or a superstate. So far its development has been along quite modest lines to perhaps too considerable an extent financed by the United States. But I would think this is not the less a useful role.

I would like also to comment very briefly on
what the future of the United Nations may be. Because
that perhaps should be of more concern to us than how
much it has accomplished in the past twenty years.
My first feeling would be that perhaps the United

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Nations has grown too quickly. I'm sure twenty years ago we never dreamt it would have as many member nations as it does. And it is quite possible that those growing pains may continue into the future. That does not present a problem to us as a major power and contributor and supporter of the United Nations. Because it is conceivable that a majority in the United Nations on some future occasion will turn around and, in effect, try to bite the hand that feeds it. And it is for this reason, I think, in many areas that people are critical of the role of the responsibility of the United Nations.

I'm not sure how it's coming out, but I would hope to see some way of developing a more considerable role for the United States as a result of its very substantial contributions to the UN than we have today. In other words, one vote for the United States and one vote for some of the new and admittedly small nations, I wouldn't call them by name, may not be the right way to accomplish what the United Nations should be trying to achieve. It is also quite possible, and this is looking down the road and borrowing trouble, that we may be faced with the proposal that we admit to

40

the United Nations, nations that we consider highly
undesireable. And when we come to that prospect, I
think we again have a problem which perhaps someone on
the panel would like to comment on.

MR. MERRIAM: Could I just read this question on this point? In fact, this question is addressed to you, Mrs. Luce. Mrs. Luce, shall Red China be admitted to the UN at this time? Signed by J. Kane. Before you answer it, could I just read a quote which I ran across the other day from a senator which rather interested me, in a speech on the floor, saying among other things, "In my opinion, the American people would refuse to support the United Nations if communist China shoots its way into membership." The senator was Lyndon B. Johnson in 1954.

MRS. LUCE: May I speak to that thorny
question and begin by telling another funny story?

MR. MERRIAM: Please do.

MRS. LUCE: As you all know, there has been
a very serious dispute, in fact a schism; in fact, what
Moscow and Peking themselves call a split, in the
monolithic ranks of communism. And in fact the whole
communist world. But anyone who knows China, and the

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one who knows it best here is Dr. Judd, who will tell you that the natural enemy of the Chinese is the Russians. For demographic and geographic reasons and historic reasons, the Chinese do not like the Russians. Believe me, their ideological split which has given this whole thing the character of a religious war is really based on political arguments which go very deep and have much to do with the fact that imperialist Russia with the help of Stalin, took from China two-thirds, or twice as much territory as it has now.

Now at dinner the other night, and this is a funny story, at dinner the other night a diplomat in Washington told me this story which is kicking around the embassies. Someone asks the Chinese what Peking would do if Russia went to war against China. And the Chinese said, "Well, you see it's like this; the first week the Russians would capture a million Chinese prisoners. The second week they would capture two million, and at the end of a month they would have perhaps ten or twenty million prisoners. And then Mao Tse Tung would send a telegram to Khrushchev saying 'Now will you surrender'?"

Bernard Shaw once said when anybody says

42

anything and you think he is funny, look for the hidden
truth. The hidden truth in this is that China twenty
years from now will account for one-half the population
of the world. Now our decisions which have to be
made are whether we intend to subdue this vast people
with nuclear annihilation, which I don't think any of us
want to do, or whether, while remaining firm against
their aggressive policies we find some way of making
friends of them.

Now it is wholly possible that China, despite
our desire not to bring in an aggressive member of the
UN, will be voted into the United Nations. I think
this will have, one, from our point of view, very
interesting aspects. Because we will see right there
in the United Nations the hatred that exists between
Red China and Red Russia. And when thieves fall out,
wise men may often prosper in an honorable argument.
So while we did not want it largely because of our
difficulties with the status of Formosa, if it should
happen, it will not be altogether a prospect without
some good side. And in addition, I feel that even
though Red China were to come into the UN, it would be
a sad thing to blow it out of existence for this one

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reason.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I'd like to ask Mrs. Luce, would you favor taking it in as a citizen of the United States?

MRS. LUCE: As a citizen of the United States, I think we would have to find, and now I disengage everyone on this panel from my views which are personal and are shared by no candidate of the Republican Party, and as far as I can find, no one in the administration -- it is, therefore, an absolutely personal point of view, and don't please hold it against any one here -- I think from careful reading of the dispute that has been raging between Moscow and Peking that the Chinese are willing to discuss some arrangements about Formosa which will save their face and preserve our position and the freedom of Formosa. This will take a tremendous amount of diplomatic labor, and this is the labor which rightly or wrongly General DeGaulle has volunteered on his own to undertake.

But I do not think that our quarrel with the Chinese people is by any means irresolvable. The Chinese people feel great affection for Americans. In contrast, I am talking about the people, not the

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officials, their leaders, in contrast to, say, what they feel about the Russians. And I believe that we must begin to make, which this administration has not made, some effort to go over the heads of the communist leaders to the people of China to encourage some hope in them that their daily diet of death by starvation may become a little more life sustaining.

In this connection, while I did not favor the wheat deal last year, I see no possible argument for selling wheat to Red Russia which isn't better than selling it to or giving it to Red China for this reason; that we got nothing out of the Russians. And there is a possibility of getting some measure of stability in the far east out of the Red Chinese and gaining time, if while holding a firm stick in our hands, we look about to see if there are any carrots that we might honorably offer to them. As I say, no one but myself is of this view, and I merely offer it for what it's worth.

MR. MERRIAM: I think Dr. Judd wants to rebut for a moment.

DR. JUDD: I gather Mrs. Luce, at the last end of her remarks, made clear what I don't think she

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quite made clear at the beginning. The door has always
got to be open for friendship of the Chinese people.
But there is no possibility until there are some deeds
to indicate a change in the attitude of the politburo.
The most incredible shortsightedness, shortsighted
mistake we could make is to let up on the policy of
pressure which has got Red China in terrible trouble.
Furthermore, it is a mistake to assume that this split
is on Chinese and Russian grounds. It is a split
within the world communist movement.

The communists in this country, the communists
in Russia and the communists in China are split into
two factions, one of which is led by a man who was born
a Chinese named Mao, and the other which is led by a
man who was born a Russian and named Khrushchev. But
it isn't over Russian national interest. It is over
timing and how to carry on the world revolution.

Mr. Khrushchev reiterated that in the most
plain terms in his speech on his seventieth birthday
only a couple months ago. And the announcement in the
spring that the Soviet Union had kicked out Molotov,
Kaganovich and Malenkov; why did they kick them out?
Because they are Chinese? No. They think Mao is

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most nearly right in interpreting Marxism and Leninism
than is Khrushchev. And so were six of the old line
communists in our country kicked out of the Communist
Party last December. They have never accepted
Khrushchev's deStalinization. This is a quarrel deep
between two factions in the communist party.

We must never imagine that communists are
nationalists. When you become a communist, you reject
your national loyalty and your national allegiances.
I hope that the old Chinese loyalty to race and pride
and culture will ultimately assert itself. It would
if we keep the pressure on. You let them get two or
three more generations, and the older Chinese that are
friendly to us are gone and another generation has been
brought up, then you will find a quite different
situation, I fear.

The argument, because the Chinese have always
absorbed their conquerors in the past and always will,
it is like the argument of saying to a man who comes in
with cancer, saying don't worry about it, you've got a
lot of other diseases and you got over that, so you'll
get over this one. No. There are fellows who die
today who never died before. It is the first time they

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ever died, because this is the first time they had that
disease.

Don't ever think that Khrushchev -- he
doesn't have to fight China. If he can get a change
of six or eight people in the Chinese communist polit-
buro, then he controls China as well as the Soviet
Union. All he has to do is move a few Mao Tse Tungs
and Chu En Lais and a few others of them out, and then
he controls both of them.

I think the most dangerous policy we could
follow is let it drift along, let it drift along.
This thing has to be brought to a head. You bring
Red China into the United Nations; turn it around this
way, you can watch Asia go the minute Red China is
admitted. They know that China has won, and we had
better know it too. You talk about being able to have
an exhibition in the United Nations of the hostility
between the Chinese and the Russians. The communists
will have it. They can have a lot of fights among
themselves. But there won't be anybody else around to
enjoy the entertainment.

Now one more thing on this united business.
There is no reason to believe that Red China will get

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in if the United States will take a strong policy.
People will say what are we going to do this time.
When I get called in to see a patient, I don't say,
"Well now lady, have you picked out the undertaker that
you should send your husband to" when I'm paid to get
him well? No. My job is to get him well.

Look, the United Nations, the majority of the
United Nations members has never once voted against the
position of the United States on any major issue, and
they are not going to vote against our position on this
issue if they know we are constant and firm. But if
they think we are maneuvering to make some arrangements,
then you can't ask them to be firmer, little countries,
than we, the strong countries are. You will get a
stampede of countries, not because they weakened, but
because they became convinced that the United States
was weakened.

You drag the United Nations down to the level
of gangsters so that thereby you are going to appease
them, and you've just sealed the doom of the United
Nations as an instrument of justice and freedom and
liberty. You converted the police force into league
with the gangsters. I don't know anything that is more

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important than to keep this point before the world.

I believed in the United Nations one hundred percent. And the thing to do is to get nations to raise their behavior to the level required in the United Nations. We are not keeping Red China out. We are not stubbornly, arbitrarily, capriciously hiding our heads in the sand as people say. Red China is stubbornly, arbitrarily, capriciously refusing to qualify.

I'll bet you can't get into the University of Pennsylvania, of which you used to be the president, without a high school diploma, even if you've got a gun. They won't let you in. Let them qualify. We can negotiate, try to get her to qualify. If she'll give up whatever the charter says she has to give up. Someone said you got the Soviet Union in, what is the difference. It's too bad we got some bad actors in already. Why gobring some more in?

MR. GATES: Maybe I'd better say it was my father who was president of the University of Pennsylvania.

MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Strausz-Hupe, I think you have a comment.

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DR. STRAUSZ-HUPE: Far be it from me to discriminate between communists. I think nothing is more dangerous than this idea that there are good communists and soft communists and hard communists and bad communists. It is a very dangerous myth; incidentally, a myth propounded by one of our eminent senators.

However, there is one fact about China which is very important. And that is that China, at this particular moment, has no long range power whatsoever. It is the Soviets that have the power to destroy us, not the Chinese. And, therefore, it is extremely dangerous to play our cards in such a way as to strengthen those poor, frightened Soviets against those dangerous, warmongering Chinese, which, of course, is not at all true in actual fact. Chinese foreign policy has been extremely circumspect. Soviet foreign policy has been adventurous.

I am using here their own words, adventurous. If at all, Mao has been the conservative. The Soviets have tried these gambols. For example, the closing of the Autobahn towards Berlin, Cuba. These are Soviet adventures. They have endangered the world peace,

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not the Chinese. Therefore, I would consider it extremely unfortunate if the idea would get hold of the American public that it is the poor Soviets that must be reinforced against the yellow hordes. This, of course, is nonsense.

Yet the Soviets very subtly, through various means of communication, various media to various groups, are trying to promote the idea that they are going to be the restraining influence in the world above these adventurous Chinese. And, therefore, trying to shift the main thrust of our policy, which always must be directed against the containment of the Soviet Union first and foremost, and not the Chinese.

And lastly, this is just purely power political realism; if you have to choose in the game of balance of power between two parties, always choose the weaker against the stronger. So if there is a balance of power policy being played, which is a pretty crude business -- but a great deal of foreign policy is pretty crude -- then by all means let us seek out the Chinese rather than the Soviets. I'm not saying that the Chinese are fragrant as a rose. But between the two, I'd much rather would deal with the Chinese than

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with the Soviets.

MR. MERRIAM: Thank you, Dr. Strausz-Hupe.

MRS. LUCE: I do not wish to leave in any-
one's mind the impression that because I see the ghastly
predicament of the Chinese people, who are unable to
sustain themselves, are literally forced to fight for
living room, that I am in favor of weakening in South
Viet Nam or in Southeast Asia or giving in on Formosa
or in any other way, seeming to appease the Chinese out
of fear. Because the Doctor is perfectly right. Our
real enemy is our powerful enemy, the Russians, and not
the Chinese. The Chinese are without ships, without
weapons. There is no way that they can destroy
America for the long forseeable future, and the
Russians can.

But I agree with him. I think a very
frightening thing is happening in America, which is the
growth of the psychology that because the Russians and
Chinese are quarreling and the quarreling is serious,
which indeed it is, that the Russians are going to come
down on our side and be friendly with us. This is
perfect nonsense. Nothing could suit their hands
better than to have us embroiled in a war with Red China

53

because they could get Mao Tse Tung that way and
recapture the Chinese communist body very easily by
asking for his head as the price of their aid.

So the split is not good news for us. This
we must not forget. And also we must hold firm in
South Viet Nam.

Now at this moment I am disgusted with the
administration and a great many people who suddenly
have begun a general yowl, screaming, beating their
breasts, crying like banshees because Senator Barry
Goldwater, for example, mentioned we might have to use
certain types of nuclear small arms to peel off the
leaves. The thing that bothers me is that it may well
be that is what, if we are going to hold firm in South
Viet Nam, we may find ourselves doing after the election
is over.

I think that everyone believes we have to
absolutely hold this position. Now the administration
today is very fond of saying, and I have heard this
personally said, that the administration's position
rests on General Eisenhower's 1954 pronouncement or
letter, which was it -- pronouncement -- and that they
are simply carrying out Eisenhower policy in South Viet

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Nam today, that everything that is happening there is practically under his remote control and direction. That is, of course, nonsense. Now I wish he would speak.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I agree.

MR. MERRIAM: Mrs. Luce, we are going to let him speak about that in a minute. I want to conclude with this section where we are dealing with the UN and some of its problems by saying that there have been a number of questions from the audience with reference to the satellite nations and so forth. In that connection, the very distinguished representatives of two organizations have asked to present brief resolutions to us. I think we should do this at this time. The first one is Mr. Lev E. Dobrienski, professor of Soviet economics at Georgetown University, and chairman of the Captive Nations Committee. I have imposed on Professor Dobrienski the very difficult task of simply presenting the resolution. Is he here?

PRCF. DOBRIENSKI: General Eisenhower, distinguished panellists and fellow citizens. The Republican Party strongly supports the eventual liberation and independence of the captive nations in Europe,

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Asia and in this hemisphere. In the cold war we vividly recognize the strategic importance of these nations to our national interests and the interests of the free world. We firmly oppose the present policy of accommodation and the loosery interdependence with the communist empire which saps the vital energies of our natural allies behind the iron, bamboo and sugar curtains and weakens one of the most powerful leverages the free world possesses against further Sino-Russian aggression and the outbreak of a global holocaust.

In our view the captive nations in toto, not only the few in central Europe, but the many in the USSR and those in Asia constitute one of our most formidable weapons for cold war victory with a concrete and well-planned cold war strategy designed for victory. These nations and peoples which amount to close to one billion would generate pressures for freedom throughout the communist empire that would progressively eliminate the prospect for any world domination by the two power centers in Moscow and Peking.

We outrightly repudiate the notions that little can be accomplished for the captive nations in the paramilitary and psychopolitical spheres and that

56

what might be done would lead to a hot global engage-
ment. On the contrary, with imagination, will and
comprehension, much can be done to place our cold war
adversaries on a perpetual and corrosive defensive,
thereby minimizing the chances of another hot world
war, advancing a policy of emancipation, the Republican
Party calls for an implementation of public law 8690,
the Captive Nations Week Resolution signed by President
Eisenhower, and promises to focus constant world
attention on all the captive nations enumerated in that
law and on Cuba; without fear it will concentrate on a
dozen captive non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union
which would cast an entirely different image of this
inner empire, this empire state, in the eyes of the
world. It will maximize towards the end of expansive
freedom the enormous power of patriotic nationalism
that resides exclusively and solely in the captive
nations and peoples not in their unrepresentative and
imposed communist governments. Through every available
medium it will persistently advance the principles of
national self determination and independence to the
sharp contrast to the reactionary force of Soviet Russia
and Red Chinese imperial colonialism.

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57

Through these and other practical means, a
Republican administration will shape the minds and
inspire the hearts of men everywhere. Particularly
those in the communist empire towards victory and
freedom.

MR. MERRIAM: Thank you, Dr. Dobrienski,
and your resolution will be submitted to the Platform
Committee at their July meeting. There is one other
comment on both of them to be made. Mr. Vito Abraitis,
who is the president of the National Lithuanian Society
of America, has an additional resolution.

MR. ABRAITIS: Mr. Chairman, distinguished
panel members, ladies and gentlemen. The Baltic area,
comprising of the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia, the nations bound together with our country by
ties of unreserved friendship, native countries of our
many good citizens, deserves our vivid interest and
deep concern because of this situation imposed by the
Soviet Union in flat violation of the principles so
essential in maintaining of freedom, justice and peace
all over the world.

Its tyrannical position and present political
situation made the Baltic area and their people

58

particularly important to the forces struggling for the
ideals of freedom, since it became a cultural, idealogic-
al and political beachhead of the free world within the
very area now ruled directly by the Soviet Union.

Therefore, this area by no means should be abandoned
carelessly to the forces of enslavement or written off
either as an insolvable casualty or insignificant loss.
Thus the passive policy expressed in long recognition
of cooperation of the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia into the Soviet Union is insufficient.

Since the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States is one
of the legacies of the Second World War, our diplomatic
action, while directly dealing with Moscow in an
attempt to normalize east-west relations through the
liquidation of remnants of that war, must be directed
not to play constant retreat in making concession after
concession to the request of the Soviet government, but
on the contrary, to make clear to the Kremlin that the
ending of Soviet occupation of the Baltic States is also,
among other things, an essential element for east-west
easing of tension and a prerequisite for the establish-
ment of just and durable peace in Europe.

While taking stand for this reorganization

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and emancipation of former colonies, our government has
to utilize United Nations machinery, especially its
Commission 24, same should be used to implement the
right of independence of the Baltic nations also.

Finally, our government should give full
moral support and necessary material aid to appropriate
efforts of Baltic exiles and Americans descending from
that area in order to enable them to play a significantly
essential part in our common struggle for freedom,
justice and durable peace in the world. Thank you.

GEN. EISENHOWER: I'd like to make a comment
about these two resolutions. Inherent in both
resolutions is the implication that we are trying to
address ourselves to a great many millions of people
and not to their common interests. This, I think, is
implicit in the remarks Mrs. Luce made some time back.
I think this is something that we should not think of
as a remote possibility. I believe that technology
today is making it possible, or making it almost
impossible, for anyone to jam our broadcasts. And at
once we can be sure that the people of South America
and Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, all the captive nations,
and indeed the people in China -- eventually they will

60

get radios too, you know -- and in the Soviets them-
selves, eventually, by keeping up a drumfire of a
respect for the individual and the right to a dignified
life, one in which he has something to eat, I believe
we can defeat communism in the world. I know that
the scientists are helping us every single day to make
this a possibility.

MR. MERRIAM: Dr. Kintner?

DR. KINTNER: One of the great deficiencies
of the United Nations is that it is not operating inside
communist controlled territory. It was denied the
right of investigation in Hungary. It was denied the
right of observing the removal of the missiles in Cuba.
At the same time the Soviet Union uses the United
Nations to help bring about the end of colonial regimes
in the west. They are the greatest imperial colonial
power on earth today. We must make sure that there
is not a double standard in the United Nations for the
communist enslaved territories and for the freeing of
the remaining colonial regions in the west. We do
this by making the United Nations stick to its Charter,
and then it can become the vehicle to bring about what
General Eisenhower has just suggested.