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MAY 29, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, USSR)

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the
United Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations
with each other and to place these relations on the firmest
possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the
threat of war and to create conditions which promote the
reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of
universal security and international cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations
and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as
economics, science and culture, will meet these objectives
and contribute to better mutual understanding and business-like
cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of
third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests
of the peoples of both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

**First.** They will proceed from the common determination
that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting
their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.
Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA
and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development
of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty,
equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual
advantage.

**Second.** The USA and the USSR attach major importance
to preventing the development of situations capable of causing
a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they
will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to
prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise
restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to
negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions
and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a
spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral
advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly,

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are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

**Third.** The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

**Fourth.** The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

**Fifth.** The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

**Sixth.** The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

**Seventh.** The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

**Eighth.** The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

**Ninth.** The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

**Tenth.** The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

**Eleventh.** The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The Development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

**Twelfth.** The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

For the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States
of America

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the
Central Committee, CPSU

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MAY 29 1972

Office of the White House Press Secretary

JOINT U.S.-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

By mutual agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the USSR President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

President Nixon and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR conducted talks on fundamental problems of American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the conversations were:

On the American side: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State; Jacob D. Beam, American Ambassador to the USSR; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

On the Soviet side: A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The discussions covered a wide range of questions of mutual interest and were frank and thorough. They defined more precisely those areas where there are prospects for developing greater cooperation between the two countries, as well as those areas where the positions of the two Sides are different.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

Guided by the desire to place US-Soviet relations on a more stable and constructive foundation, and mindful of their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and for facilitating the relaxation of international tension, the two Sides adopted a document entitled: "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed on behalf of the US by President Nixon and on behalf of the USSR by General Secretary Brezhnev.

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Both Sides are convinced that the provisions of that document open new possibilities for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the USSR.

Having considered various areas of bilateral US-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement of relations is possible and desirable. They expressed their firm intention to act in accordance with the provisions set forth in the above-mentioned document.

As a result of progress made in negotiations which preceded the summit meeting, and in the course of the meeting itself, a number of significant agreements were reached. This will intensify bilateral cooperation in areas of common concern as well as in areas relevant to the cause of peace and international cooperation.

## Limitation of Strategic Armaments

The two Sides gave primary attention to the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear war. They believe that curbing the competition in strategic arms will make a significant and tangible contribution to this cause.

The two Sides attach great importance to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between them.

These agreements, which were concluded as a result of the negotiations in Moscow, constitute a major step towards curbing and ultimately ending the arms race.

They are a concrete expression of the intention of the two Sides to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, as well as to carry out the obligations assumed by them in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Article VI). Both Sides are convinced that the achievement of the above agreements is a practical step towards saving mankind from the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Accordingly, it corresponds to the vital interests of the American and Soviet peoples as well as to the vital interests of all other peoples.

The two Sides intend to continue active negotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct them in a spirit of goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security.

Both Sides are also convinced that the agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR, signed in Washington on September 30, 1971, serves the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of all mankind.

## Commercial and Economic Relations

Both Sides agreed on measures designed to establish more favorable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the USSR. The two Sides agree that realistic conditions exist for increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice.

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Believing that these aims would be served by conclusion of a trade agreement between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides decided to complete in the near future the work necessary to conclude such an agreement. They agreed on the desirability of credit arrangements to develop mutual trade and of early efforts to resolve other financial and economic issues. It was agreed that a lend-lease settlement will be negotiated concurrently with a trade agreement.

In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a US - Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.

Each Side will help promote the establishment of effective working arrangements between organizations and firms of both countries and encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts.

## Maritime Matters Incidents at Sea

The two Sides agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would mark a positive step in facilitating the expansion of commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An Agreement was concluded between the two Sides on measures to prevent incidents at sea and in air space over it between vessels and aircraft of the US and Soviet Navies. By providing agreed procedures for ships and aircraft of the two navies operating in close proximity, this agreement will diminish the chances of dangerous accidents.

## Cooperation in Science and Technology

It was recognized that the cooperation now underway in areas such as atomic energy research, space research, health and other fields benefits both nations and has contributed positively to their over-all relations. It was agreed that increased scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and shared effort for common goals is in the interest of both nations and would contribute to a further improvement in their bilateral relations. For these purposes the two Sides signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and technology. A US-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation will be created for identifying and establishing cooperative programs.

## Cooperation in Space

Having in mind the role played by the US and the USSR in the peaceful exploration of outer space, both Sides emphasized the importance of further bilateral cooperation in this sphere. In order to increase the safety of man's flights in outer space and the future prospects of joint scientific experiments, the two Sides agreed to make suitable arrangements to permit the docking of American and Soviet spacecraft and stations. The first joint docking experiment of the two countries' piloted spacecraft, with visits by astronauts and cosmonauts to each other's spacecraft, is contemplated for 1975. The planning and implementation of this flight will be carried out by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences, according to principles and procedures developed through mutual consultations.

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Cooperation in the Field of Health

The two Sides concluded an agreement on health cooperation which marks a fruitful beginning of sharing knowledge about, and collaborative attacks on, the common enemies, disease and disability. The initial research efforts of the program will concentrate on health problems important to the whole world -- cancer, heart diseases, and the environmental health sciences. This cooperation subsequently will be broadened to include other health problems of mutual interest. The two Sides pledged their full support for the health cooperation program and agreed to continue the active participation of the two governments in the work of international organizations in the health field.

Environmental Cooperation

The two Sides agreed to initiate a program of cooperation in the protection and enhancement of man's environment. Through joint research and joint measures, the United States and the USSR hope to contribute to the preservation of a healthful environment in their countries and throughout the world. Under the new agreement on environmental cooperation there will be consultations in the near future in Moscow on specific cooperative projects.

Exchanges in the Fields of Science, Technology
Education and Culture

Both Sides note the importance of the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields in 1972-1973, signed in Moscow on April 11,1972. Continuation and expansion of bilateral exchanges in these fields will lead to better understanding and help improve the general state of relations between the two countries. Within the broad framework provided by this Agreement the two Sides have agreed to expand the areas of cooperation, as reflected in new agreements concerning space, health, the environment and science and technology.

The US side, noting the existence of an extensive program of English language instruction in the Soviet Union, indicated its intention to encourage Russian language programs in the United States.

II. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Europe

In the course of the discussions on the international situation, both Sides took note of favorable developments in the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts.

They agree that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.

Both Sides view the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin as a good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned, including the USA and the USSR. The two Sides believe that the implementation of that agreement in the near future, along with other steps, will further improve the European situation and contribute to the necessary trust among states.

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Both Sides welcomed the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on August 12, 1970. They noted the significance of the provisions of this treaty as well as of other recent agreements in contributing to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contri-
butions to the positive trends on the European continent toward
a genuine detente and the development of relations of peaceful
cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles
of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-
interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence
and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The US and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay.

Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.

The Middle East

The two Sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to contribute to his mission's success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US and the USSR, the achievement of such a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.

Indochina

Each side set forth its respective standpoint with regard to the
continuing war in Vietnam and the situation in the area of
Indochina as a whole.

The US side emphasized the need to bring an end to the military conflict as soon as possible and reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that the political future of South Vietnam should be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

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The US side explained its view that the quickest and most
effective way to attain the above-mentioned objectives is
through negotiations leading to the return of all Americans
held captive in the region, the implementation of an interna-
tionally supervised Indochina-wide ceasefire and the subsequent
withdrawal of all American forces stationed in South Vietnam
within four months, leaving the political questions to be re-
solved by the Indochinese peoples themselves.

The United States reiterated its willingness to enter into
serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese Side to settle
the war in Indochina on a basis just to all.

The Soviet Side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle
of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for their freedom,
independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the pro-
posals of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam, which provide
a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam
problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of
the DRV, for a complete and unequivocal withdrawal of the troops
of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples
of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for them-
selves their fate without any outside interference.

## Disarmament Issues

The two Sides expressed their positions on arms limitation and
disarmament issues.

The two Sides note that in recent years their joint and parallel
actions have facilitated the working out and conclusion of treaties
which curb the arms race or ban some of the most dangerous types
of weapons. They note further that these treaties were welcomed
by a large majority of the states in the world, which became
parties to them.

Both sides regard the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, as an
essential disarmament measure. Along with Great Britain, they
are the depositories for the Convention which was recently
opened for signature by all states. The USA and the USSR will
continue their efforts to reach an international agreement
regarding chemical weapons.

The USA and the USSR, proceeding from the need to take into
account the security interests of both countries on the basis
of the principle of equality, and without prejudice to the
security interests of third countries, will actively participate
in negotiations aimed at working out new measures designed
to curb and end the arms race. The ultimate purpose is general
and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under
strict international control. A world disarmament conference
could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

## Strengthening the United Nations

Both Sides will strive to strengthen the effectiveness of the
United Nations on the basis of strict observance of the UN
Charter. They regard the United Nations as an instrument for
maintaining world peace and security, discouraging conflicts,
and developing international cooperation. Accordingly, they
will do their best to support United Nations efforts in the
interests of international peace.

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Both Sides emphasized that agreements and understandings reached in the negotiations in Moscow, as well as the contents and nature of these negotiations, are not in any way directed against any other country. Both Sides proceed from the recognition of the role, the responsibility and the prerogatives of other interested states, existing international obligations and agreements, and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.

Both Sides believe that positive results were accomplished in the course of the talks at the highest level. These results indicate that despite the differences between the USA and the USSR in social systems, ideologies, and policy principles, it is possible to develop mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of both countries, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

Both Sides expressed the desire to continue close contact on a number of issues that were under discussion. They agreed that regular consultations on questions of mutual interest, including meetings at the highest level, would be useful.

In expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him in the Soviet Union, President Nixon invited General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman N. V. Podgorny, and Chairman A. N. Kosygin to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time. This invitation was accepted.

# # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 29, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Kiev, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

PRESS CENTER - DNIEPRO HOTEL

10:50 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger's remarks will be on the record. He will go directly to your questions.

Q. On the trade matter, you really expected before you went to get a trade agreement, did you not, regardless of whether it was linked with Vietnam? You really had hoped to get an agreement. Everybody said so before you went. Can you give us a little more background?

DR. KISSINGER: Ron's instructions are to say it is obvious to us you were not at the morning briefing.

Q. I read it word for word.

DR. KISSINGER: The original or the translation? (Laughter)

We never expected to get a trade agreement here. We never even attempted to negotiate a trade agreement here. The trade issue has several components. There is the sale of grain on a long-term basis. There is the maritime issue. There is the issue of credits. There is the matter of granting the most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, and there is lend-lease. There is the repayment of lend-lease debts.

We never intended to wrap all of these up into a trade agreement. Then there is another issue, namely, the development of natural gas resources in Siberia, which is a very large project in which the Soviet Union is interested, and about which it has been talking to various American private concerns.

We never expected or ever intended to wrap all of these up in Moscow. What we expected to do is to set up the economic commission within the framework of which they could be systematically addressed, in which the various parts could be related to each other. We always expected that when Secretary Peterson comes over here during the course of the summer that the major progress would be made.

In relation to the total package, there were some peripheral issues which I pointed out this morning in which we thought some progress could be made, such as the grain deal and the maritime issue. Those are linked because the grain deal depends in part on the solution of the shipping problem and in part on the nature of the credits that can be extended.

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On lend-lease we made considerable progress, and we settled, in effect, all issues except one. We expect to make further progress on that during the next months, and we expect to make substantial progress on the total package during the course of the summer. So we are substantially on schedule and we have done the key part of it, which was to set up the Economic Commission within the framework of which all these parts could be related to each other.

Q. What does the President plan to discuss with the Shah of Iran? What problems do we have with him, if any?

Q. That is a quick switch.

Q. The man is smart. He can switch.

DR. KISSINGER: Ron gave me instructions, and then changed his mind. Will you stand in front of me so I can see your lips move? (Laughter)

We expect to have a general review of the world situation, particularly developments in the Middle East and in South Asia, since Iran is really a bridge to both of these countries, and no doubt some of the issues of the Persian Gulf will be discussed, including some of the oil problems.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in a recent interview, Secretary of State Rogers said on public television, "So, as effectively as we can, we are going to assure the Soviet Union on this trip that the new U. S. policy toward China is not an anti-Soviet move." Did that come up in the private talks in that way?

DR. KISSINGER: As I said this morning, our basic position with respect to both of these large Communist countries is that we will not discuss one of them in the capital of the other. We recognize that they have serious differences with each other on a number of issues in which the United States is not primarily engaged, one of them being the border dispute, the other one being an ideological conflict over the interpretation of Leninist doctrine with respect to which our competence is not universally recognized. (Laughter)

So, therefore, we do not discuss the bilateral Sino-Soviet issues in the respective capitals. We have made clear both publicly and in private talks that our policy toward the People's Republic is in no sense directed against the Soviet Union: that we have no interest in threatening legitimate Soviet interests, and that we are pursuing our policy toward the People's Republic in order to solve the bilateral issues that exist between us. I think that has been made clear.

Q. Henry, could you possibly give us some additional information in detail, and if it is not possible in detail, in general, on the essence of the conversations that the President had with Mr. Brezhnev, covering the extent, the number of hours, and we would like to know how many hours and how it broke down in time. What I would like to know in particular is, were they here essentially reviewing the post-World War II history of U. S. -Soviet relations?

DR. KISSINGER: You mean all the conversations put together?

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Q. Yes, or were they concentrating on immediate problems? What can you tell us in terms of the scope and range of the discussions?

DR. KISSINGER: There were several types of meetings with Soviet leaders. There were three private meetings with Mr. Brezhnev that extended over a considerable period of time. Then there was an equal number of meetings at which Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny were present with the President. Then, of course, there were three planary sessions. You can check these because they were announced. I may be off by one on each of these.

To answer your question, there were both general discussions and specific discussions. There were at least two occasions that I remember in which there was a general review of the world situation, of the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relationships, but with particular emphasis on the future of what role these countries could play toward each other for the preservation of world peace and stability. For the rest of the time, there were specific topics.

As we told you, for example, on Tuesday both the afternoon and evening session dealt with SALT. The evening at the dacha was primarily devoted to Vietnam. Some of the topics that were discussed between the President and the Soviet leaders were then followed up by Secretary Rogers or myself in other conversations. Secretary Rogers had several extended meetings with Prime Minister Kosygin. I had several meetings, first on SALT with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov and later on other issues with Gromyko. Therefore, the answer to your question, Murray, is that the talks were extensive, they were very frank and they covered both the general and the specific.

Q. May I ask why there was this joint declaration as a separate document, and why it was not simply included in the communique, and who it was that initiated that idea?

DR. KISSINGER: I covered part of that this morning, but let me answer it again. The original idea was to have some general principles stated in the communique, just as we did in Peking. Then it was suggested that if our relations moved forward on as broad a front as they seemed to be moving, and if we made one or two really significant agreements, that perhaps it would be appropriate if we marked what at least we intended to be a departure in U.S. Soviet relations by something other than a section of a communique, by a somewhat more formal declaration. When this idea was first advanced, it was noted and put aside in order to see whether our relations, in fact, justified attempting to express some basic principles on which to base relations, and while a general outline of what these principles might be existed, it was left open whether they would be folded into the communique or whether they would be made as a separate declaration.

Then the Soviet leaders and the President decided that we could responsibly and indeed should responsibly have a separate document, given the fact that we had moved forward on a broad front, and given also the fact that it was at least our intention -- and we hope, of course, the reality will not belie this -- to mark the transformation from a period of rather rigid hostility to one in which, without any illusions about the differences in social systems, we would try to behave with restraint and with a maximum of creativity in bringing about a greater degree of stability and peace.

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DR. KISSINGER: It did not hang in the air in that sense. In trying to understand these discussions, what I think is striking about them is that here are two countries that conduct a global foreign policy and, therefore, do not have to prove to themselves constantly that they are engaged in this part of the world and that part of the world; that they can talk about particular problems and still be conscious of the fact that there are other problems in the world, all of which they have an interest in at some time, a more or less equal interest.

So it would be incorrect to say that Vietnam was the unspoken assumption of every conversation.

Q. What about the Middle East, Henry, how did that come up and do you have a feeling that there was a better understanding of our position than previously?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Middle East was fully discussed. I know the Middle East was fully discussed. The degree of the understanding that was achieved will have to wait developments.

I was asked this morning are there secret understandings; is this or that going to happen, just as I was asked on the occasion of my visit here, "Did you have a secret deal with the Soviet leaders"? This is not the way these things happen.

When two great powers deal with each other, one of the best things they can do for each other is to make absolutely sure that they understand each other's point of view. What actions they then take, based on the understanding of that point of view, only the future can tell. Therefore, I don't want to speculate.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us, please, sir, can you expand on what happened with the mention of the Soviet-Jewish problem, please, sir, in any way, shape or form?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't go into the detail of any of these things except to repeat again what I said before: This is a particularly complex issue to raise in a country that is bound to consider it an internal problem.

Q. Did you come away with the feeling that the Soviet Union could live with the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors?

DR. KISSINGER: I would have to say that I don't want to speculate on what the Soviet Union will do about particular American actions. Certainly a full opportunity existed for the expression of these points of view and we certainly made clear why we have taken certain actions and why we believe we have to continue them.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said there is one lend-lease issue that remained unsettled. Does that issue have a dollar sign in front of it and if so, can you give us a rough amount?

DR. KISSINGER: If it is unsettled, how can I give you an amount?

Q. What is the issue?

DR. KISSINGER: All the issues of lend-lease concern the terms of repayment. This is one of them. I don't think the amount is the most unsettled issue.

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Q. The President, before he left, cautioned us all against overblown expectations out of the summit. Would you characterize in a few words what you feel and what the President feels came out of this in terms of its success in meeting the minimal expectations that you and he went with?

DR. KISSINGER: What we attempted to do at the summit was to bring together negotiations that have been conducted on a broad front over a period of a year and to see whether they could be formed into a pattern of US-Soviet relationships rather than simply a series of individual actions.

Secondly, and very importantly, we attempted to conclude the SALT negotiations because we do believe that to put the central armaments of both sides for the first time under agreed restraint is an event that transcends in importance the technical significance of the individual restrictions that were placed on various weapon systems.

Thirdly, we wanted to see whether, as major powers, we could take account of the fact that we are living in a period which has some of the characteristics of traditional diplomacy in the sense that you are getting more states that are being active but with one important difference: in traditional diplomacy the aim was to, through an accumulation of small advantages, to gain a qualitative edge over other countries. In the nuclear age, the most dangerous thing to aim for is a qualitative edge over your major rivals.

Therefore, the constant attempt to accumulate petty advantages creates such an atmosphere of insecurity and such an enormous danger that the world may not be able to live with it.

So what we attempted to do was to see, through the SALT agreement and the other agreements, and, above all, through the many conversations across the broad spectrum, to see whether it is possible to express the policies of these countries that do have this great responsibility in some form that recognizes these realities.

This is why these principles should be something more than just platitudes. Now, again, I must repeat: we are not naive. It is perfectly possible that six months from now it will turn out that we are again in a period of extreme hostility.

If that has happened, both countries will have lost an opportunity and the world will have lost an opportunity. So we think the achievement is that we have made these agreements, that SALT has been concluded and that at least there has been a recognition for the first time on both sides not just that this or that problem has to be solved, but maybe that a new style of international relations has to be developed.

How successful we will be in implementing that, only the future will tell.

Q. As we sit here in Kiev talking about this, then, you have met your goals?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we essentially met the goals we set for ourselves. You can still argue with us -- unusual as that would be for Newsweek -- that the goals were not the right ones to set, but I have to say that we more or less met the goals we set for ourselves.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you give us a general idea of the schedule for the European Security Conference and MBFR and is '72 realistic?

DR. KISSINGER: Realistic for what?

Q. That the conference can take place this year.

DR. KISSINGER: Another realistic what?

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[L]

Q. That the conference can take place this year?

DR. KISSINGER: Our belief is that both these conferences should be very carefully prepared. We are prepared to engage in preparatory discussions on the European Security Conference and on MBFR this year. We expect the more realistic date for both of them, certainly for the European Security Conference, will be next year. That is, at least as far as we are concerned, the plan on which we are operating. MBFR, as I pointed out, this morning, is a subject of enormous complexity in many ways. It is of much greater complexity than SALT because the weapons are so different. The reinforcement problem is new and you are dealing with an alliance. But we have done a lot of work on it and we will be ready to engage in exploratory talks in the reasonably near future.

Q. Henry, was that exploratory talk on the Security Conference or on MBFR?

DR. KISSINGER: Both.

Q. When Syria got out of hand, when we got worried about activities in Cuba, when we felt we had to mine -- we have had, after all, a pattern of quick consultation, an explanation of what we are doing, in some cases bringing about a change. The President complimented the Russian leaders on finally turning to restraint in the Middle East. You and Ambassador Dobrynin ironed out a reaffirmation of the Cuban agreement. This thing has been going on for sometime. What is so new about the Statement of Principles that would give us a different course?

DR. KISSINGER: We have, in the past, dealt with a series of crises which, when concluded, were expressed in some statement relevant to that crisis. We have not in the past attempted to lay down general rules of conduct ahead of the crisis by which the basic relationships of the countries could be defined.

In fact, you could argue that many of the crises that arose were crises into which one side or the other or both stumbled through a series of events in which they had either not been in sufficient contact, miscalculated each other's reactions, or attempted to achieve some advantage.

Now, again, Max, no one can be so naive as to say that if they built another submarine base in Cuba, that the most telling argument will be the third principle of this declaration. What one would have to hope is that for both sides, before such a step is taken this gives us a possibility for an exchange and possibilities for restraint and arguments for restraint within each government that might not otherwise exist. So, this is to act with fore-sight on matters that in the past we have had to solve through crises.

Q. What I was really asking is: Haven't these principles really already governed our conduct in many areas?

DR. KISSINGER: It is very rare in foreign policy, Max, that you can say -- and we would not maintain -- that as of this day something totally new, that has never happened before, arose.

Some of these principles have governed our conduct, usually ex post facto after a crisis, and it is true that both sides have on the whole refrained from pushing crises to the extreme. They may have governed our conduct during crises.

What we are not attempting to do is see whether they govern our conduct to prevent crises.

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, as a result of these talks, is any change imminent in our policy of bombing North Vietnam and keeping the mines armed?

DR. KISSINGER: This is an essentially tactical question. What we want in Vietnam -- to which the matters to which you refer are means -- what we want is a serious negotiation leading to a rapid end of the war and, therefore, the end of the operations to which you refer.

It has to be seen in the context of a negotiation and not in the context of actions taken unilaterally. We do not intend to take unilateral actions.

Q. To follow up Max's question, after Mr. Brezhnev's trip to France, there was a statement of basic principles involving relationships between France and the Soviet Union. Following Mr. Podgorny's trip to Turkey, you also had a similar statement of basic principles which follows up the statements of basic principles between the United States and the Soviet Union signed today.

Was that a Soviet initiative that follows in a pattern and how do you relate our statement of basic principles to the other two?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, it makes some difference whether the two great nuclear powers, whose rivalry has characterized the postwar period, sign such a statement than when it is signed by countries which, whatever their importance, do not have the means to affect global policy.

Secondly, it is of no doubt true that the Soviet Union has attempted, for a variety of purposes, to codify its relationships to many countries.

Thirdly, the idea that principles should be expressed at the end of the visit was a joint one. After all, we had them in our Peking summit. The idea to make them a separate declaration was initially a Soviet proposal which we shelved pending an examination of whether we could make a really meaningful statement.

Now, again I want to make clear: We are not saying that these principles can be a cookbook to which you need merely refer to have a guide for future actions; nor are we saying that it is not perfectly possible that these principles can be broken almost immediately: nor am I rejecting the possibility at all that they are intended as a tactical device to lull certain people. All of this is possible.

If any of these events happen, particularly the last event, then we will act with, I believe, a firmness that we have shown in the crisis to which Max has referred, and in that case I would say a great opportunity has been lost and then some other leaders somewhere along the line will have to address the problems to which these principles address themselves, namely, the problem of how to have a peaceful world in an age in which a cataclysm depends on the decisions of men.

So we have laid out a road map. Will we follow this road? I don't know. Is it automatic? Absolutely not. But it lays down a general rule of conduct which, if both sides act with wisdom, they can, perhaps, over a period of time, make a contribution. At this point it is an aspiration. We would not have signed it if we did not believe there was a chance for implementing this aspiration.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, after the non-proliferation treaty was signed, many of us who were trusting and naive believed the defense appropriations would go down. Instead, the Russians' went way up and ours went way up. Can you

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believe that our defense appropriations will go down and there will be a substantial reappropriation of resources, and if not, isn't all of it a waste?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I believe in certain categories the defense appropriations will go down somewhat. I also believe that we will have to continue major programs in those fields in which negotiations are still going forward and in which agreement has not been achieved, because if these negotiations prove anything, it is that it was our unwillingness to disarm unilaterally that has made it possible to get this bilateral agreement.

A substantial reduction of defense expenditures can be a byproduct of disarmament agreements, but the justification for this agreement is that for the first time it levels off the arms race; that in significant categories one can at least see a ceiling from which one can move to other areas instead of a constant multiplication of other weapons which produce their own problems and never give the statesmen an opportunity to see what could be done.

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Incidentally, nobody who had really analyzed the arms race could assume that the non-proliferation treaty would lead to a substantial reduction of armaments, because it affected other countries: it didn't really affect us.

Q. You know, Senator Jackson has said that the Russians now have a 50 megaton missile, and he questions whether the SALT agreement will really give us protection. Can you tell us, first of all, whether he is correct that they have this super-missile; and secondly, whether this agreement cuts off the SS-9s at a safe level? What do you think?

DR. KISSINGER: I wouldn't go into a discussion of the megatonnage of individual Soviet weapons, but it is clear that the Soviets have weapons of substantial explosive power and that they are probably building some that are even more powerful than the ones we have seen.

I would maintain that the argument you have mentioned to us confuses two separate issues: One, the size of the explosive power on warheads of existing weapons; and two, the growth of the arsenal of these weapons. This agreement does nothing about the size of the warheads. This will have to be done, if at all, in a follow-on agreement. It does do something about the number of launchers on which these warheads can be built.

Therefore, the SS-9 is frozen at its current level of 309, but in this category nothing will prevent the Soviet Union from putting larger warheads on those weapons that they have. The argument that some criticism are making, that therefore, the agreement is dangerous, is fallacious because we would face the problem of these larger warheads, plus additional missiles, without the agreement. That is the argument.

We admit we have insisted at a time when most of our critics were denying it that -- and we have always said it -- the SS-9 is a threat to our retaliatory force, and it remains a threat to our retaliatory force. What this agreement does is to freeze the number of launchers. It does not affect the size of the warhead. On the other hand, if there were no agreement, there would be more launchers and more warheads, and therefore, we have reduced the danger by the margin of the number of weapons that would be built were it not for this agreement.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the Vietnam issue, did either side advance proposals which the other side indicated that it would respond to at a future time, or is the dialogue at a high level on this issue suspended for practical purposes?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not want to go into the details of the Vietnam negotiations or discussions because I do not think it would serve any useful purpose, except to say that the discussions were very extensive.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said earlier that the Middle East issue was fully discussed, but did either nation offer any contribution toward achieving some tangible progress, to the talks?

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DR. KISSINGER: A great deal depends here on how you would define "tangible progress," because anything that keeps the situation from becoming more inflamed is at least a negative sort of progress. There was a rather full exchange of views, which I think can contribute to at least this negative progress I mentioned.

Q. At the bottom of the negotiations is the degree of trust between the people involved in them. Can you dwell on the measure of trust that may have developed between the President and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends on what you mean by "trust". If you mean by that that the leaders have suddenly grown extraordinarily fond of each other and that they will do for each other things just because they have concluded that they are regular fellows, that obviously cannot happen between serious people. On the other hand, usually these leaders deal with each other through cables, and what is filtered through the machinery takes on an increasingly abstract quality as it travels to the higher level.

Now, I think that in the future when a communication of one to the other arrives, they will understand the intangibles of the communication infinitely better than they did before because they will be able to refer to some very detailed and concrete discussions that have taken place. The President has always approached these meetings, if you look at his press conferences, from a totally unsentimental point of view, and he has not had the illusion that he could charm leaders, who have been brought up on their belief of a superior understanding of objective factors, by his personality.

So in the sense that there is now a better understanding of what both sides are really talking about, in the sense that they will now at least have the raw material from which they can assess communications to each other in terms of the motivations and basic attitudes, I think trust has developed, but not to the point that it could survive a major challenge that one side would put to the other that affects its own estimate of its vital interests. So I would put the answer within that limitation.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, another one of the arguments that is made with regard to the strategic arms agreement is that it may have the effect of directing, or redirecting rather, the arms construction effort. What reason is there to think this can be controlled?

DR. KISSINGER: This agreement, if it is not followed on by other negotiations, will, over a period of time, permit a qualitative race or a race in the weapons systems which are not frozen by the agreement.

We have, in this agreement, however, covered a broader range of weapons, because the definition of land based intercontinental missiles and sea based intercontinental missiles, is rather sweeping, if you read it.

I believe, and we believe, and the Soviet leaders agree -- in fact, we have expressed this in our public declaration -- that we should start follow-on negotiations as soon as possible in order to reduce the danger to which you refer. The danger to which you refer is real; it is not imminent, but over a period of time it would definitely exist.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, I believe somewhere in the communique, it said that the two powers recognize the present boundaries in Europe. In a sense, does that mean that we recognize them as they exist in the permanent division of Germany, and do we, in a sense, therefore, return to the old style diplomacy of spheres of influence?

DR. KISSINGER: It seems to be my fate to have to answer the charge of old style diplomacy. We use the phrase, relations should be based -- I don't have the text in front of me -- on certain principles in which inviolability of frontiers was one of them. We did not use the adjective to which you referred.

Secondly, the phrase we used is somewhat less strong than the one that the German government has used in its treaty with the Soviet Union, and it is, of course, somewhat difficult for us to be more German than the Germans on the issue of German unification.

So what we have interpreted this statement, these principles, to mean, is that we do not favor the use of force in changing boundaries, and that we believe the foreign policy ought to be conducted on the principle of territorial integrity, but we do not preclude negotiations.

We do not believe it has anything to do with spheres of influence, because if you look at it, I think it is the 11th principle, you will see that both sides have renounced any claim to special spheres of influence, and we consider that one of the positive aspects of the communique.

Q. Henry, at the risk of your not wanting to write our stories for us, as you have said before, would you admit to any disappointments in the course of this summit conference? Is there anything that you came to get that you didn't get?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, you know, it is a sort of silly answer to say that we achieved essentially what we came to achieve, in that the agenda we had set ourselves and the possible goals were more or less realized.

Now I have to say right away that serious people can quarrel with the goals. Maybe we didn't set the goals high enough. I think I read somewhere early in the Johnson Administration, if you define the miraculous is the attainable, you can perform miracles every day.

It really would be psychologically better if I told you there were two things that we failed at, and of course, perhaps, you know, we didn't conclude the Maritime agreement, though the problem was more on our side than on the Soviet side.

But I would have to say, unbearable as that may make us sound, that essentially what we had planned to do, what we had expected to achieve, was more or less achieved, give or take ten percent.

Q. May I follow that up and say was there anything that was broken through or resolved here, other than the exchange of views on such a high level, that you can point to, that was not expected?

DR. KISSINGER: You see, this summit has been really very painstakingly prepared over a long period of time, and one of the things we said to each other early was, don't let us surprise each

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other at the summit, because when Heads of State suddenly present something unexpected to the opposite number, you can, of course, say maybe you have achieved something spectacular, but more likely you will produce an impasse or an attitude of, "Good God, what am I dealing with here!" Because each leader has his own constituency at home, however you define it, and therefore, we very painstakingly worked out this agenda ahead of time.

Now this doesn't mean that the results were clear ahead of time, but the possible results were understood and they depended, of course, on the kind of conversations that the President had with the Soviet leaders.

"We think that the leaders ought to know what the basic position is they are going to face, roughly what they attempt to achieve, because it is tough enough for Heads of Government who have myriads of other concerns, to gear themselves to each other, without being burdened by the danger that they will suddenly confront something that could be very embarrassing or extraordinarily difficult."

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have two brief questions. You spoke of trust, the measure of trust.

DR. KISSINGER: As I defined it in relation to Peter's.

Q. Yes. I would like to relate that to an earlier remark when you said there was discussion, whether it was possible for both sides to bring a rapid end to the war. The question is: As of now, is there any measure of encouragement or optimism that we are -- that is an emotional question, I realize, but I ask it anyway. That is my first question.

DR. KISSINGER: I applied the word trust to the relations between us and the Soviet leaders. I applied "The attempt to bring about a negotiation towards a rapid end of the war," to our relations with Hanoi. So we are talking here about two separate problems. Are we more optimistic about a rapid end of the war as a result of these discussions? I just do not want to speculate about what the impact will be, how Hanoi will interpret this situation. What other things may be done by us, by Hanoi and others just has to be seen as one has seen so many predictions on the issue of Vietnam that we would really now rather concentrate on the results.

Q. The other question is a separate question. I am pursuing an earlier question. We know, of course, that the problem of the Soviet Jews is an internal problem. We know that. But you did say in Salzburg that the President would seek an opportunity to bring it up. And my question is, did he find an opportunity to bring it up?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, he mentioned the problem.

Q. A procedural question. Does this end the President's overseas travel this year?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not aware of any others, but then Mr. Ziegler has not briefed me on that issue.

Q. May I quickly follow up this last question. You said he brought up the Jewish question. Did he bring it up with Brezhnev?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into anything further on that question. The Soviet leaders are aware of our position on the problem.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have one announcement to make. We will have the schedule, which will take you through Warsaw, available in about ten minutes. The baggage call is about 8:30 in the morning.

The President will lay the wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at 9:55 and the schedule will show the bus departures.

One final thing. In the pool report that was prepared from the Soviet aircraft today, there is a little confusion in the first paragraph. It says, "The pilot's name is" and states the name, and then goes on to state "He is the best pilot in the country." I was making remarks about remarks made to me of the Minister of Aviation, whose name is Bugayev, who is the Minister of Aviation. The pilot who flew the plane is a very good pilot, but the remarks referred to in the first paragraph referred to the Minister of Aviation.

Murray Mardar asked how many hours the leaders spent together. In formal sessions, they spent 20 hours and 22 minutes together; 16 of

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THIS MATERIAL TOTALLY EMBARGOED
UNTIL 3:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME

MAY 29, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

INTOURIST HOTEL

1:18 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, the statement you have, the Declaration of Principles, is embargoed, as it indicates, until 3:00 p.m. for all transmission.

Also, the communique which is now being run off and will be provided to you at the conclusion of this session is also for release and embargoed until 3:00 p.m. Moscow time.

We will have a general briefing with Mr. Zamyatin where both sides will make statements at about 2:30, and make general distribution of the materials the American press will receive in this room, so I will ask you to consider the documents that were given to you now as your own personal copies, not to be shared.

Dr. Kissinger's remarks this morning will be on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I realize you have not had too much of an opportunity to read this Declaration of Principles and you have not seen the communique at all, but we have a number of functions this afternoon that we have to attend, so what Ron thought was that I would do some preliminary briefing now and answer your immediate questions, and then I will be prepared to meet in a more relaxed atmosphere with this group in Kiev at a time to be mutually agreed to.

Two documents are being promulgated today. One is a communique. The other is a Declaration of Principles. The Declaration, which states the basic principles which should govern the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, will be signed at 2:00 o'clock by General Secretary Brezhnev and by the President. The communique will be in the usual communique form.

Let me first say a word about the communique, which you have not seen. It basically summarizes the agreements that were signed this week. It states in rather strong and positive language the expectations that both sides have with respect to the further evolution of their discussions on strategic arms and on disarmament in general, and the contribution which they believe that the agreements that have been signed this week have made to a general improvement of the international climate. This is in the first part of the communique, which lists the agreements that were reached during the week.

In the second part of the communique there is a discussion of the negotiations and deliberations that went on this week with respect to various areas of the world. There is a somewhat lengthy section about Europe, in which the two sides express their satisfaction with the general relaxation of tensions that has developed in Europe, and express also the

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view that with the ratification of the German treaties, the imminent signing of the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, conditions now exist in which exploratory conversations with respect to the European Security Conference can begin between the parties concerned, and express their readiness to participate in a European security conference as soon as these preparatory discussions, which should be carefully conducted, will be concluded.

The two sides also express their view that a reduction of arms and armed forces, to begin with in Central Europe, could make a contribution to this general process, and they have agreed to begin immediate explorations of the procedure which could most effectively bring this about, the general idea being that simultaneous negotiations would take place on European security and what we called mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe in two forums, the European security conference, of course, being the larger one, and the mutual balanced force reductions forum being confined to the countries primarily concerned or directly affected.

There is a section on the Middle East which calls on both sides to contribute what they can to bringing about a general settlement, and indicating that such a settlement would also contribute to a relaxation of the armaments race in that area.

There is a section on Vietnam in which both sides state their views, which are not exactly identical, but I would say that the issue between us on Vietnam is not whether we have identical views, and it would be an insult to anybody to pretend that we do not have completely different conceptions of the nature of the problem, but the issue before us is whether, given these different conceptions, it is possible for both sides to work to bring about a rapid end to the war on a basis that is fair to all sides, and with respect to that last issue, I believe it is events which will determine what have or have not been achieved, and not a formal statement of the formal points of view in the communique.

With respect to disarmament, we affirm our continued willingness to participate in measures, in disarmament negotiations in addition to the one on strategic arms. And the communique confirms what the statement of principles maintains, that regular consultations between the two sides should continue.

I would like, with respect to the communique, to make two points, one concerning the section on trade, which expands on the proposition that an Economic Commission will be created, part of whose functions will be the establishment of the negotiation of a trade agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that the related issues of lend lease, extension of credit facilities and most favored nations will be dealt with as a joint package in the subsequent negotiations.

Now I have seen a great deal of speculation in the press about the alleged deadlock in trade negotiations. I want to assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that the basic intention with which we came here was to set up the Economic Commission which would then, in turn, settle most of these issues. And all these speculations that I have seen about the linkages between trade and other political problems happen to be quite wrong.

The section in the communique on trade is about what the tentative draft contained before we came here. Therefore, in our negotiations we are about on the schedule that we had set for ourselves.

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Secondly, I think it is fair to point out that many of the agreements, for example, those on space, health, and environment that were signed in the early part of the week, were obviously not negotiated in detail here. Nevertheless, it is equally a fact that the imminence of the summit gave those negotiations an impetus which they would otherwise not have had. And many of the technical problems that developed in all of these negotiations could be pushed to a level which would normally not concern itself with the refinements of such issues as how you measured distances in an incident at sea negotiation, and therefore, in the very real sense the summit, even those of these

negotiations that were not in detail covered in the discussions among the leaders here, received a tremendous impetus from the imminence of the summit.

Now let me turn to the Declaration of Principles. The whole post-war period has been characterized by the seemingly unbridgeable conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, a conflict enshrined doctrinally on both sides of what came to be called the Iron Curtain. The foreign policy of most countries in the world has been characterized by this consciousness.

Now, what we have attempted to do, as some of you will remember we stressed to you before, is to attempt to move forward in our relations with the Soviet Union on a very broad front on many issues, some of which were related and some of which were not related, partly because of the intrinsic merit of these negotiations and of these issues, but also partly because we thought that this would create on both sides so many vested interests in a continuation of a more formal relationship that apart from any of the policy considerations there would henceforth be a different attitude in the conduct of the foreign policy of both sides.

Now, we have no illusions. We recognize that Soviet ideology still proclaims a considerable hostility to some of our most basic values. We also recognize that if any of these principles is flouted, we will not be able to wave a piece of paper and insist that the illegality of the procedure will, in itself, prevent its being carried out.

As in every document, this document indicates an aspiration and an attitude, and if either the aspiration or the attitude changes, then, of course, as sovereign countries, either side can change its course. Nothing in this document entitles us to give up our alliances or would justify lowering the efforts that have brought us to this point, but at the same time, it is an event of considerable significance that the country whose seemingly irreconcilable hostilities has characterized the entire postwar period, and the two countries which, between themselves, or, indeed, individually have the capacity to destroy humanity are making an effort which would state some principles which would reduce the dangers of war and which would enable them to promote a more stable international system.

Of course, these principles have to be implemented. If there is bad faith on either side, the aspirations expressed here cannot be realized. Speaking for our side, I can say we will attempt to implement these principles in the spirit in which they were promulgated. We have no reason to suppose that this will not be done by the leaders of the Soviet Union, but if events should prove these hopes on either side to be incorrect, then we will, of course, both of us, have to draw the appropriate conclusion.

I believe that most of these principles are self-explanatory. They call attention to the need for peaceful coexistence. They state that both sides will attempt to their utmost to avoid military confrontation, and that neither will

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attempt to take unilateral advantage in situations, recognizing
that the great nuclear powers cannot be pushed in a position
that jeopardizes their basic survival without noting it and
therefore recognizing that the attempt of traditional diplomacy
to accumulate marginal advantages is bound to lead to disastrous
consequences in the nuclear age.

The two countries have also said they will try to prevent
situations in other parts of the world that will involve them
in direct confrontation, and the two countries have said in no
part of the world do either of them claim special privileges,
and that neither of them is prepared to give up its existing
friends for this period of relaxation, or, to put it in a more
constructive way, that this relaxation of tensions is in the
interests of all people and is not directed and will not be
implemented against the interests of any other country.

These are the general observations that I wanted to make.
I have time to answer questions for another 15 or 20 minutes,
and in the language of the communique, as appropriate, I will
be glad to meet with you in Kiev.

Q Henry, you said something about events determining
the courses of affairs in Vietnam, leaving the impression that
there were understandings reached which you cannot talk about.
Is that what you intended?

DR. KISSINGER: There were long, sometimes difficult and
very detailed discussions of this subject. Whether the two
sides understand each other better or whether what they have
understood provides the basis for a constructive evolution,
only the future can say and I wouldn't want to speculate on
that.

Q Henry, three months ago the President said in the
State of the World that he regarded the use of tensions as a
permanent feature of Soviet foreign policy. Is the signing
of this statement a recognition that this was a wrong judgment?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have the precise text ---

Q I read it last night.

DR. KISSINGER: --- of the State of the World with me
this morning. And I am touched by the attention that is
given to it.

I think it is a correct judgment to say that in the period
covered by the report and, indeed, in most of the post-war
period, it is difficult to point to any extended length of
time in which tension was not a feature of the foreign policy
or which did not result from the foreign policy that was
conducted by the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, we do not consider this document as
characterizing the past foreign policies. We consider this
document as indicating a direction for the future. And if
this document leads to what it may, then one would have to
say that both countries should act with greater restraint in
both their direct relations towards each other and in their
involvement in other areas of the world from which tension
might result.

So I don't consider this document inconsistent with the
retroactive judgments expressed in the world report. This
document is supposed to characterize relationships for the
future.

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Now, again, I do not want to give the impression here
that we have suddenly gone soft-minded. We do not exclude
that one could return to this previous period. This reflects
our goal. We assume that the Soviet leaders are serious people
and that they would not sign such a document in a rather solemn
ceremony unless they had some serious intention.

If this judgment should turn out to be incorrect, we can
always return to the patterns which have, after all, been well
tried in the last 20 years. So we don't consider this in any
sense inconsistent with past statements. This is a statement
about the future.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if this document had been signed two
months ago, would the mining of Haiphong be considered anti-
thetical, against the spirit of the document?

DR. KISSINGER: No set of principles can be used like a
cookbook that can be applied to every situation. And, of
course, I have a professional interest not to admit that in
any crisis now we just have to look up the appropriate -- what
would I do with the option?

The fact of the matter is that there are many situations
in the world in which both sides are now directly involved
and in which they feel that vital interests are at stake. In
those situations they will naturally have to act in considerable
extent in the light of the circumstances that exist.

Clearly, however, what this document says is that in new
situations that develop, both sides will take each other's
concerns seriously, as indeed we have. We also did in the
anticipation of these actions. After all, these principles
were not totally unknown to us when the action was taken.

So I think we are talking here about a general spirit
which regulates the overall direction of the policy, a spirit
that is reflected in the fact that we are here despite the
tensions that have occured in this or that part of the world.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on this matter of no linkage between
Vietnam and trade, a member of the White House staff used the
word "leverage" with regard to that at one point, that trade
was our "leverage" in Vietnam and if we don't have one agree-
ment we would not have one on the other. Are you denying that
that is the situation?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I frankly don't know who said
it, in what context and whether it was said on the record or
as his own personal speculation. I am denying that we ever said
to the Soviet leaders, "If you do this for us in Vietnam, we
will do that for you on trade."

You have to recognize that these are serious people and
that we didn't come here to buy them. On the other hand, it has
always been clear, not in any formal discussions here, that
to the degree that the overall relationship, leaving aside any
particular problem, improves, it is easier to get, for example,
those Congressional actions or those actions that require
Congressional approval than they would otherwise be.

So, I can say it is not correct that we used trade, that
we linked trade to Vietnam. It is correct that it has always
been understood, which you could say about any one of these
problems, that as our general relationships improve, we can
accelerate progress in every area, but this is no more true of
trade than it is of anything else and there was never any direct
linkage.

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6

Q Did the United States side come to Moscow hoping to
sign a declaration of general principles or was that suggested
to us by the Soviets and how different is the language here
than it would have been in a nonaggression pact with the Soviet
Union?

DR. KISSINGER: The evolution of these principles was
as follows: As all of you, I think, recognize, I think it is
safe to say that nothing was raised at the summit that had not
been the subject of extensive preliminary conversation. Neither
side surprised the other by making any proposals that the other
side had not had an opportunity to think about.

When heads of state meet one is not interested in the
spectacular, at least we were not interested in spectaculars.
We wanted something that provided the basis of a firm relation-
ship. So therefore, the idea that there might be some general
principles expressed has been discussed between us for some
months. There was some discussion of it when I was here in
April, including some of the basic texts. But it was decided
that while we could talk about them and what they might look
like and contain, their final versions should be reserved for
the discussions between the President and Secretary Brezhnev
and his colleagues because we did not want to sign an empty
declaration. We wanted something that reflected at least a
conceivable reality in our relationship.

So the final decision to go ahead with these principles
was not made until after several of the conversations between
the President and the General Secretary and his colleagues,
even though the outline of what such a Declaration might
consist of, were it to be made, had existed prior to the summit.
So this was not something that was presented to us when we got
here. This was something that had been the subject of long
discussion, in the content of which it is very difficult to say
which is the Soviet contribution and which is the American
contribution.

Secondly, with respect to how it might differ from a
traditional non-aggression pact, I would have to look at the
text of it. Usually, non-aggression pacts deal with primarily
military considerations. This is an attempt to state a positive
direction of how these two nuclear superpowers, in a period
which is marked both by ideological difference and by funda-
mentally different perspectives, but nevertheless by the reality
that the two of them hold literally the survival of mankind in
their hands, can regulate their relationships in a way that not
only reduces war, but can do some positive good for mankind.

Therefore, you will find many provisions in here which
have nothing to do with non-aggression treaties in the past, but
have to do with how relations could be.

Q There have been some expectations and some expression,
indeed, by people on the other side this week here informally
that there would be at least a minimal agreement on the second
sale of grain by the United States. There appears not to have
been. What was the hang-up? Did it relate to shipping costs,
and what is the situation on that particular subject?

DR. KISSINGER: The hang-up in the sale of grains is
entirely related to shipping problems, and not to any policy
problems, and to shipping problems in which our side has faced
the greater difficulties. Since this is a subject that is still

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7

being negotiated, I do not want to go into any greater detail about it, except to say that we consider this a soluble problem and that we expect during the course of the summer to have it solved.

Q In December, at the time of the last agreement, it was indicated at the White House that the agreement of the unions to waive the 50/50 situation was not a one-time thing, but a longer commitment on their part. Has that changed?

DR. KISSINGER: This is one of the subjects that we are still in the process of discussing.

Q In connection with the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations here, can you reduce this in any way to numbers that you might expect in any kind of a time frame for reduction of forces in Europe?

DR. KISSINGER: I cannot at this point, but I can tell you this: We will use the same general approach to the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions as we did with SALT. When we started the SALT negotiations, we were overwhelmed with all sorts of quick-fix solutions, percentage cuts, and so forth. We decided to make a very detailed study of the real strategic implications, plus the verification possibilities of various schemes.

These studies have been in progress with respect to the mutual balanced force reduction for the last year and a half, and we are, therefore, in a reasonably good position to work out with our allies various schemes. I do not want to pre-judge what these schemes might look like except to say that the most obvious answers are not necessarily the correct ones, and that when you have on the two sides very different weapons systems, contrary to what you have in strategic arms, you also have to look at reinforcement capabilities, and such factors as the offensive capability of some weapons as against their defensive capabilities.

Then you have a high incentive to come up with a proposal that represents the best mix which is calculated to reduce the fear of either side of an aggressive move, and maximizes the defensive possibilities. So I do not want to indicate that there will be a particular percentage cut. The proposal may take a different form, depending on different categories of weapons. This is something we are still discussing with our allies. But we will approach it in the same sober spirit that we did the SALT negotiations.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you please give us a clearer view of what the United States expected that the Soviets might be able to do with regard to the Vietnam problem?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not believe that it is useful at this point to speculate about what anybody might do about this topic. Our views are clearly different, as they are in many parts of the world. The practical issue is to what extent it is possible to find a reconciliation of these differences in the greater interest of peace.

We certainly could not have spent all this time with the Soviet leaders without gaining a clearer awareness of their thinking. But what might follow I do not want to speculate on.

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8

Q To follow that up, do we have any feeling now that we have a clearer and better understanding of what North Vietnam's intentions are?

DR. KISSINGER: We always have had a pretty good idea of what North Vietnam's position is.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you plan to go back to Paris any time soon?

DR. KISSINGER: I would stop being one of the great bores in Washington if I stopped these secret trips.

Q I can understand your reluctance to go into detail on the Vietnam question, but could you say within those limitations whether the United States side or the two sides at this point have any early expectations of early negotiations resuming?

DR. KISSINGER: Our view toward negotiations, in fact, is expressed in the communique. We have always been ready, and we are reaffirming it, to engage in serious negotiations. There is also enormous impetus on procedural questions: when will negotiations start, whether negotiations start. That is not the issue. It is easy enough to get a negotiation started. What we want is a negotiation that produces a prospect of an early end of the war.

Nobody could be more interested in an early end of the war than the President and this Administration. So, the significant question is not whether negotiations start, but what the negotiations will bring when they start. This is what we are working on with the North Vietnamese and in the general context. It is our intention to bring about a framework that permits a resumption of fruitful negotiations. How soon that will be accomplished, I don't want to speculate on.

Q Has Brezhnev been invited to the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. This is in the communique. The three Soviet leaders have been invited and they have accepted the invitation.

Q When?

DR. KISSINGER: The date hasn't been fixed. It will be by mutual agreement.

Q Was the issue of Soviet Jews raised at this summit conference?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, of course, you have to remember the problem of discussing in international forums what one party is bound to consider an internal issue. But we have done what I said we would do in Salsburg.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how extensive were the discussions on the Middle East, and were there any proposals made by either side, and was there any progress?

DR. KISSINGER: There were discussions between the General Secretary and the President concerning the Middle East. They were, as the communique says, frank and thorough. Of course, this is a subject in which a great deal depends on the parties concerned, and in which the possibility of outside countries is limited, but of course, both sides favor progress toward a peaceful settlement.

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Q Was there discussion about China and the President's trip to China between the General Secretary and the President, or yourself and the Soviet delegation?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, there were no discussions in this sense, but we have made clear throughout that our policies toward either of these countries is not directed against the other. We did not discuss the Soviet Union in Peking and we did not discuss the People's Republic in Moscow. We have sufficient bilateral problems.

Q Will the visit come before the elections? Would that be the foreseeable future?

DR. KISSINGER: My own estimate would be -- and this is strictly on my own -- that they will not come before the election. I think the nervous system of foreigners is not quite up to that experience.

Q The President said in his speech that he had no choice but to mine harbors and bomb the rail lines. Can you give us any idea of the degree to which the Soviet leaders understand that vested interest?

DR. KISSINGER: We did not ask for the approval of the Soviet leaders and had we asked it, my instinct is that there would not have been a unanimity of views. (Laughter.)

MR. ZIEGLER: We have the communique here which we are going to issue to you at this time. If you will remain in your seats, the girls will distribute them to you.

I want to emphasize that this is embargoed until 3:00 p.m., and please consider the material your own personal copies. Obviously you can transmit to your bureaus, but don't move it out on your wires until 3 o'clock.

We will try to have another session in Kiev about 7:30.

THE PRESS: Thank you, gentlemen.

END (AT 2:00 P.M.)

# # #

Page 6

[10]

The problem of ending the Vietnam war, which engages the hopes of all Americans, was one of the most extensively discussed subjects on our agenda. It would only jeopardize the search for peace if I were to review here all that was said on the subject. I will simply say this: each side obviously has its own point of view and its own approach to this very difficult issue. But at the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union share an overriding desire to achieve a more stable peace in the world. I emphasize to you once again that this Administration has no higher goal, a goal I know all of you share, to bring the war in Vietnam to an end. We are ending the war in Vietnam, but we shall end it in a way which will not betray our friends, risk the lives of the courageous Americans still serving in Vietnam, break faith with those held prisoner by the enemy, or stain the honor of the United States.

Another area where we had very full, frank and extensive discussions was the Middle East. I reiterated the American people's commitment to the survival of the state of Israel and to a settlement just to all peoples of the earth. Both sides stated in the communique their intention to support the Jarring peace mission and other appropriate efforts to achieve this objective.

The final achievement of the Moscow conference was the signing of a landmark declaration entitled "basic principles of mutual relations between the United States and the USSR". As these twelve basic principles are put into practice, they can provide a solid framework for the future development of better American-Soviet relations.

They begin with the recognition that two nuclear nations, each of which has the power to destroy humanity, have no alternative but to coexist peacefully -- because in a nuclear war there would be no winners, only losers.

The basic principles commit both sides to avoid direct military confrontation and to exercise constructive leadership and restraint with respect to smaller conflicts in other parts of the world which could drag the major powers into war.

They disavow any intention to create spheres of influence or to conspire against the interests of any other nation -- a point I would underscore by saying once again tonight that America values its ties with all nations -- from our oldest allies in Europe and Asia, as I emphasized by my visit to Iran, to our good friends in the third world, to our new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

The improvement of relations depends not only on words, of course, but far more on actions. The principles to which we agreed in Moscow are like a seed man Now that the seed is born

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The improvement of relations depends not only on words, of course, but far more on actions. The principles to which we agreed in Moscow are as good men now that the world has been

FBIS 37

THIRD AND LAST ADD 22 (SOVIET-U.S. COMMUNIQUE)

XXX AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

(TEXT) FINALLY SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE DRV AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM, WHICH PROVIDE A REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS FOR SETTLING THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, THE SOVIET UNION STANDS FOR A CESSION OF BOMBINGS OF THE DRV, FOR A COMPLETE AND UNEQUIVOCAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS OF THE USA AND ITS ALLIES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, SO THAT THE PEOPLE'S OF INDOCHINA WOULD HAVE THE POSSIBILITY TO DETERMINE FOR THEMSELVES THEIR FATE WITHOUT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

THE U.S. SIDE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO BRING AN END TO THE MILITARY CONFLICT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD BE LEFT FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

THE U.S. SIDE EXPLAINED ITS VIEW THAT THE QUICKEST AND MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ATTAIN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED OBJECTIVES IS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE RETURN OF ALL AMERICANS HELD CAPTIVE IN THE REGION, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED INDOCHINA-WIDE CEASEFIRE AND THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN FORCES STATIONED IN SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN FOUR MONTHS, LEAVING THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED BY THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE'S THEMSELVES.

THE UNITED STATES REITERATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE TO SETTLE THE WAR IN INDOCHINA ON A BASIS JUST TO ALL.

## DISARMAMENT ISSUES

THE TWO SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR POSITIONS ON ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES. THE TWO SIDES NOTE THAT IN RECENT YEARS THEIR JOINT AND PARALLEL ACTIONS HAVE FACILITATED THE WORKING OUT AND CONCLUSION OF TREATIES WHICH CURB THE ARMS RACE OR BAN SOME OF THE MOST DANGEROUS TYPES OF WEAPONS.

THEY NOTE FURTHER THAT THESE TREATIES WERE WELCOMED BY A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE STATES IN THE WORLD, WHICH BECAME PARTIES TO THEM.

BOTH SIDES REGARD THE CONVENTION OF THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIC WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, AS AN ESSENTIAL DISARMAMENT MEASURE. ALONG WITH GREAT BRITAIN, THEY ARE THE DEPOSITORIES FOR THE CONVENTION WHICH WAS RECENTLY OPENED FOR SIGNATURE BY ALL STATES. THE USSR AND THE USA WILL CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT REGARDING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

THE USSR AND THE USA, PROCEEDING FROM THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THIRD COUNTRIES, WILL ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT WORKING OUT NEW MEASURES DESIGNED TO CURB AND END THE ARMS RACE.

THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE IS GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, UNDER STRICT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN THIS PROCESS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

## STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

BOTH SIDES WILL STRIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE BASIS OF STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE UN CHARTER. THEY REGARD THE UNITED NATIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY, DISCOURAGING CONFLICTS, AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST TO SUPPORT UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS IN THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

BOTH SIDES EMPHASIZED THAT AGREEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW, AS WELL AS THE CONTENTS AND NATURE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, ARE NOT IN ANY WAY DIRECTED AGAINST ANY OTHER COUNTRY, BOTH SIDES PROCEED FROM THE RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE, THE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PREROGATIVES OF OTHER INTERESTED STATES, EXISTING INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND AGREEMENTS, AND THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE UN CHARTER.

BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THAT POSITIVE RESULTS WERE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THESE RESULTS INDICATE THAT DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS, IDEOLOGIES, AND POLICY PRINCIPLES, IT IS POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS COOPERATION BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S OF BOTH COUNTRIES, IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED THE DESIRE TO CONTINUE CLOSE CONTACT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT WERE UNDER DISCUSSION. THEY AGREED THAT REGULAR CONSULTATIONS ON QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING MEETINGS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, WOULD BE USEFUL.

IN EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE HOSPITALITY ACCORDED HIM IN THE SOVIET UNION, U.S. PRESIDENT R. NIXON INVITED GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE L.I. BREZHNEV, PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDIO OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET N.V. PODGORNYY, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS A.N. KOSYGIN TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME. THIS INVITATION WAS ACCEPTED.

ALL)

1535Z 0'D/CAJ

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 1, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS

AT 9:30 P.M. EDT

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

Your welcome in this great chamber tonight has special
meaning to Mrs. Nixon and to me. We feel very fortunate to have
traveled abroad so often representing the United States of America.
But we both agree after each journey that the best part of any
trip abroad is coming home to America again.

During the past 13 days we have flown more than 16,000
miles and we visited four countries. Everywhere we went -- to
Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran, Poland -- we could feel the
quickening pace of change in old international relationships, and
the people's genuine desire for friendship for the American people.
Everywhere new hopes are rising for a world no longer shadowed
by fear and want and war, and as Americans we can be proud that
we have an historic opportunity to play a great role in helping
to achieve man's oldest dream -- a world in which all nations
can enjoy the blessings of peace.

On this journey we saw many memorable sights; but one
picture will always remain indelible in our memory -- the flag
of the United States of America flying high in the spring breeze
above Moscow's ancient Kremlin fortress.

To millions of Americans for the past quarter century
the Kremlin has stood for implacable hostility toward all that we
cherish, and to millions of Russians, the American flag has long
been held up as a symbol of evil. No one would have believed,
even a short time ago, that these two apparently irreconcilable
symbols would be seen together as we saw them for those few days.

But this does not mean that we bring back from Moscow
the promise of instant peace, but we do bring the beginning of
a process that can lead to a lasting peace, and that is why I
have taken the extraordinary action of requesting this special
Joint Session of the Congress -- because we have before us an
extraordinary opportunity.

I have not come here this evening to make new announce-
ments in a dramatic setting. This summit has already made its
news. It has barely begun, however, to make its mark on our
world, and I ask you to join me tonight -- while events are
fresh, while the iron is hot -- in starting to consider how we
can help to make that mark what we want it to be.

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Page 2

The foundation has been laid for a new relationship
between the two most powerful nations in the world. Now it is
up to us -- to all of us here in this chamber, to all of us
across America -- to join with other nations in building a new
house upon that foundation -- one that can be a home for the
hopes of mankind and a shelter against the storms of conflict.

As a preliminary, therefore, to requesting your
concurrence in some of the agreements we reached and your approval
of funds to carry out others, and also as a keynote for the unity
in which this government and this nation must go forward from
here, I am rendering this immediate report to the Congress on the
results of the Moscow summit.

The pattern of U.S.-Soviet summit diplomacy in the cold
war era is well known to all those in this chamber. One meeting
after another produced a brief euphoric mood -- the spirit of
Geneva, the spirit of Camp David, the spirit of Vienna, the
spirit of Glassboro -- but without producing significant progress
on the really difficult issues.

And so early in this Administration I stated that the
prospect of concrete results, not atmospherics, would be our
criterion for meetings at the highest level. I also announced
our intention to pursue negotiations with the Soviet Union across
a broad front of related issues, with the purpose of creating
a momentum of achievement in which progress in one area could
contribute to progress in others.

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This is the basis on which we prepared for and conducted last week's talks. This was a working summit. We sought to establish not a superficial spirit of Moscow, but a solid record of progress on solving the difficult issues which for so long have divided our two nations and the world. Reviewing the number and scope of the agreements that emerged, I think we have accomplished that goal.

Recognizing the responsibility of the advanced industrial nations to set an example in combatting mankind's common enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to cooperate in efforts to reduce pollution and enhance environmental quality. We have agreed to work together in the field of medical science and public health, particularly in the conquest of cancer and heart disease.

Recognizing that the quest for useful knowledge transcends the differences between ideologies and social systems, we have agreed to expand United States-Soviet cooperation in many areas of science and technology.

We have joined in plans for an exciting new adventure, a new adventure in the cooperative exploration of space, which will begin -- subject to Congressional approval of funding -- with a joint orbital mission of an Apollo vehicle and a Soviet spacecraft in 1975.

By forming habits of cooperation and strengthening institutional ties in areas of peaceful enterprise, these four agreements, to which I have referred, will create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our two countries.

Expanded United States-Soviet trade will also yield advantages to both of our nations. When the two largest economies in the world start trading with each other on a much larger scale, living standards in both nations will rise, and the stake which both have in peace will increase.

Progress in this area is proceeding on schedule. At the summit, we established a Joint Commercial Commission which will complete the negotiations for a comprehensive trade agreement between the United States and the USSR.

And we expect the final terms of such an agreement to be settled, later this year.

Two further accords which were reached last week have a much more direct bearing on the search for peace and security in the world.

One is the agreement between the American and Soviet navies aimed at significantly reducing the chances of dangerous incidents between our ships and aircraft at sea.

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And second, and most important, there is the treaty
and the related executive agreement which will limit, for
the first time, both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear
weapons in the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet
Union.

Three-fifths of all the people alive in the world
today have spent their whole lifetimes under the shadow of
a nuclear war which could be touched off by the arms race
among the great powers. Last Friday in Moscow we witnessed
the beginning of the end of that era which began in 1945.
We took the first step toward a new era of mutually agreed
restraint and arms limitation between the two principal
nuclear powers.

With this step we have enhanced the security of
both nations. We have begun to check the wasteful and
dangerous spiral of nuclear arms which has dominated relations
between our two countries for a generation. We have begun
to reduce the level of fear by reducing the causes of fear,
for our two peoples and for all peoples in the world.

The ABM Treaty will be submitted promptly for the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification and the interim
agreement limiting certain offensive weapons will be sub-
mitted to both Houses for concurrence. We can understand
take agreements as important as these only on a basis of
full partnership between the Executive and Legislative
Branches of our government.

I ask from this Congress and I ask from the nation
the fullest scrutiny of these accords. I am confident such
examination will underscore the truth of what I told the
Soviet people on television just a few nights ago -- that this
is an agreement in the interest of both nations. From the
standpoint of the United States, when we consider what the
strategic balance would have looked like later in the
Seventies, if there had been no arms limitation, it is
clear that the agreements forestall a major spiralling of
the arms race -- one which would have worked to our dis-
advantage, since we have no current building programs for
the categories of weapons which have been frozen, and since no
new building program could have produced any new weapons in
those categories during the period of the freeze.

My colleagues in the Congress, I have studied the
strategic balance in great detail with my senior advisers
for more than three years. I can assure you, the Members
of the Congress and the American people tonight that the
present and planned strategic forces of the United States are
without question sufficient for the maintenance of our
security and the protection of our vital interests.

No power on earth is stronger than the United States
of America today. And none will be stronger than the United
States of America in the future.

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This is the only national defense posture which can
ever be acceptable to the United States. This is the posture
I ask the Senate and the Congress to protect by approving
the arms limitation agreements to which I have referred.
This is the posture which, with the responsible cooperation
of the Congress, I will take all necessary steps to maintain
in our future defense programs.

In addition to the talks which led to the specific
agreements I have listed, I also had full, very frank
and extensive discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev
and his colleagues about several parts of the world where
American and Soviet interests have come in conflict.

With regard to the reduction of tensions in Europe,
we recorded our intention of proceeding later this year with
multilateral consultations looking toward a conference on
security and cooperation in all of Europe. We have also
jointly agreed to move forward with negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions in central Europe.

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The improvement of relations depends not only on words, of course, but far more on actions. The principles to which we agreed in Moscow are like a road map. Now that the map has been laid out, it is up to each country to follow it. The United States intends to adhere to these principles. The leaders of the USSR have indicated a similar intention.

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However, we must remember that Soviet ideology still proclaims hostility to some of America's most basic values. The Soviet leaders remain committed to that ideology. Like the nation they lead, they are and will continue to be totally dedicated competitors of the United States of America.

As we shape our policies for the period ahead, therefore, we must maintain our defenses at an adequate level until there is mutual agreement to limit forces. The time-tested policies of vigilance and firmness which brought us to the summit are the only ones that can safely carry us forward to further progress in reaching agreements to reduce the danger of war.

Our successes in the strategic arms talks and in the Berlin negotiations, which opened the road to Moscow, came about because over the past three years we have consistently refused proposals for unilaterally abandoning the ABM, unilaterally pulling back our forces from Europe, and drastically cutting the defense budget. The Congress deserves the appreciation of the American people for having the courage to vote such proposals down and to maintain the strength America needs to protect its interests.

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As we continue the strategic arms talks, seeking
a permanent offensive weapons treaty, we must bear the
lessons of the earlier talks well in mind.

By the same token, we must stand steadfastly with
our NATO partners if negotiations leading to a new detente
and a mutual reduction of forces in Europe are to be
productive. Maintaining the strength, integrity and stead-
fastness of our free world alliances is the foundation on
which all of our other initiatives for peace and security
in the world must rest. As we seek better relations with
those who have been our adversaries, we will not let down our
friends and allies around the world.

And in this period we must keep our economy vigorous
and competitive if the opening for greater East-West trade
is to mean anything at all, and if we do not wish to be
shouldered aside in world markets by the growing potential
of the economies of Japan, Western Europe, the Soviet Union,
and the People's Republic of China. For America to continue
its role of helping to build a more peaceful world, we must
keep America number one economically in the world.

We must maintain our own momentum of domestic
innovation, growth and reform if the opportunities for joint
action with the Soviets are to fulfill their promise. As we
seek agreements to build peace abroad, we must keep America
moving forward at home.

Most importantly, if the new age we seek is ever to
become a reality, we must keep America strong in spirit --
a nation proud of its greatness as a free society and
confident of its mission in the world. Let us be committed
to our way of life as wholeheartedly as the Communist
leaders with whom we seek a new relationship are committed
to their system. Let us always be proud to show in our
words and actions what we know in our hearts -- that we
believe in America.

These are just some of the challenges of peace. They
are in some ways even more difficult than the challenges
of war. But we are equal to them. As we meet them, we
will be able to go forward and explore the sweeping
possibilities for peace which this season of summits has now
opened up for the world.

For decades, America has been locked in hostile
confrontation with the two great Communist powers, the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China. We were engaged
with the one at many points and almost totally isolated from
the other, but our relationships with both have reached
a deadly impasse. All three countries were victims of
the kind of bondage about which George Washington long ago warned
in these words: "The nation which indulges toward another
in habitual hatred is a slave to its own animosity."

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But now in the brief space of four months, these
journeys to Peking and to Moscow have begun to free us from
perpetual confrontation. We have moved toward better under-
standing, mutual respect, and point-by-point settlement of
differences with both the major Communist powers.

This one series of meetings has not rendered an
imperfect world suddenly perfect. There still are deep
philosophical differences, there still are parts of the world in
which age-old hatreds persist. The threat of war has not been
eliminated -- it has been reduced. We are making progress
toward a world in which leaders of nations will settle their
differences by negotiation, not by force; and in which they
learn to live with their differences so that their sons will
not have to die for those differences.

It was particularly fitting that this trip, aimed
at building such a world, should have concluded in Poland.

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No country in the world has suffered more from war than Poland has --and no country has more to gain from peace. The faces of the people who gave us such a heartwarming welcome in Warsaw yesterday, and again this morning and this afternoon, told an eloquent story of suffering in the past and of hope for peace in the future. One could see it in their faces. It made me more determined than ever that America must do all in its power to help that hope come true for all people.

As we continue that effort, our unity of purpose and action will be all-important.

For the summits of 1972 have not belonged just to one person or to one party or to one branch of our government alone. Rather they are part of a great national journey for peace. Every American can claim a share in the credit for the success of that journey so far; and every American has a major stake in its success for the future.

An unparalleled opportunity has been placed in America's hands. Never has there been a time when hope was more justified or when complacency was more dangerous. We have made a good beginning. And because we have begun, history now lays upon us a special obligation to see it through. We can seize this moment or we can lose it; we can make good this opportunity to build a new structure of peace in the world, or let it slip away. Together, therefore, let us seize the moment so that our children and the world's children, live free of the fears and free of the hatreds that have been the lot of mankind through the centuries.

Then the historians of some future age will write of the year 1972, not that this was the year America went up to the summit and then down to the depths of the valley again -- but that this was the year when America helped to lead the world up out of the lowlands of constant war, and onto the high plateau of lasting peace.

END

(AT 10:14 P.M. EDT)