International measures for barring the spread of destruc-
tive nuclear devices should be a concern of every responsible
government. If I urge the U.S. Senate to withhold ratification
from the present Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I do so be-
cause I have found that: (1) The present Treaty does not provide
effective safeguards against the spread of nuclear weapons; (2)
the present Treaty, if ratified by the U.S. Senate, will have
been concluded at a cost to U.S. national security far greater
than the worth of any of its foreseeable benefits to the United
States; (3) the present Treaty, if ratified by the U.S. Senate,
will commit U.S. foreign policy further and, perhaps irrevocably,
to a course which will alienate the allies of the United States,
encourage communist adventurism, and lead to the perilous isola-
tion of the United States in world politics.

In August 1963 I had the honor to give testimony before
your Committee on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban.* At that occasion,
my principal concerns were the political implications of the
Treaty. Specifically, I tried to project the likely effects of
the Treaty upon the posture of the United States in the Atlantic
Alliance. Then, I suggested that the political fallout of the
Treaty would damage the cohesiveness of the Alliance and that,
hence, the deleterious consequences of the Treaty would be more
dangerous to the security of the American people than the radio-

* My statements are contained in *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, 1963*; pp. 507-526.

-2-

active fallout from hypothetical future nuclear tests, which, incidentally, could be prevented by measures much simpler than those stipulated by the Treaty. I stated explicitly my views on the relevance of arms control and disarmament agreements to world peace: The danger of armed conflict is proportionate to the intensity of unresolved political conflicts and _not_ to the quantity of arms possessed by the parties to those unresolved conflicts.

During the intervening five years, I saw no reason to revise my views as stated to your Committee. The Treaty did not halt the arms race, for the unresolved political issues which then divided the two principal nuclear powers not only have remained unsettled but have also proliferated into several areas of the globe -- Southeast Asia, the Middle East and this hemisphere -- which, at the time of the signing of this Treaty, were relatively free of conflict. Certainly the Atlantic Alliance has not prospered during the last five years. For all practical purposes, France has withdrawn from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Several other European members have significantly diminished their commitments to the Alliance -- and this despite the fact that the Warsaw Pact forces have not been reduced proportionately. My principal objection to the ratification of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban was not so much addressed to the Treaty itself, unnecessary and unsatisfactory as it was, as to the turn of U.S. foreign policy which the Treaty appeared to mark. Ac-

-3-

cording to the communique issued by the United States and the
Soviet Union at the occasion of the signing ceremonies in Mos-
cow, the Treaty was to be followed by "next steps." Indeed, the
Treaty opened that era of bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations on
arms control and disarmament which not only were paced by signi-
ficant changes in the strategic doctrine and posture of the
United States but also engendered growing tensions within the
Atlantic Alliance.

Indeed, Mr. William Foster, Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, explicitly declared
the grave risk of Alliance crisis worth taking in order to com-
plete that latest "step" which the United States Senate has now
been asked to approve, namely, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. In the July 1965 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Mr. Foster
wrote as follows:

> A heavier cost could be the erosion of alliances
> resulting from the high degree of U.S.-Soviet co-
> operation which will be required if a non-proli-
> feration program is to be successful. Within NATO,
> there could be concern that the detente would lead
> to a weakening of our commitment to Western Europe.
> The problem will be particularly acute in Germany
> where there will be the added concern that the am-
> lioration of the East-West confrontation could lead
> to an increased acceptance of the status quo in
> Central Europe.

Not so surprisingly, Mr. Foster's estimate of the Treaty's cost-
effectiveness was received with incredulity and consternation by
some of our European allies, including some of our most import-
ant and avowedly most cherished ones. The present Treaty, if
ratified, will nail down the lid on the coffin of NATO.

-4-

I am far from asserting that NATO is about to perish because of an excess of arms control agreements. For a long time, NATO has suffered from a variety of diseases. By no means all of these are rooted in the ambiguities of U.S. foreign policy. Some of NATO's ills are rooted in the complacency and frivolity of our European allies; some of them are endemic in the West as a whole, incapable, so it seems, of putting collective security ahead of narrow national self-interest. Although the lesser powers of the Western Alliance have contributed their mite to the present disarray of NATO, the United States bears the heaviest share of the responsibility for the incipient lapse of the Western Alliance. The reason for this is simple: the United States initiated and led the Alliance, and U.S. power is its mainstay. When the leading, the most powerful member of an alliance falters, the lesser members cannot be expected to advance good order by themselves.

The thesis of revisionism -- the priority in U.S. foreign policy of bilaterally negotiated arms control and security agreements with the Soviet Union over the maintenance of the Western Alliance -- has won an ever increasing number of adherents among our academic experts on international politics and opinion makers. Indeed, one has to embrace this thesis in order to live happily with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In order to clinch the argument and to still residual doubts about the wisdom of reversing priorities, it is necessary and expedient to reap-

-5-

praise the uses and usefulness of NATO: If the usefulness of
NATO now resides in its serviceability as an instrument for
"building bridges" toward the Soviet Union -- the most important
and visible bridges being, thus far, arms control agreements
-- then, obviously, the usefulness of the Alliance's military-
strategic arrangements has diminished. In brief, there are
other ways for insuring national security and world peace, and
NATO, if it proves a hindrance to the "relaxation of tensions,"
should be scrapped. With this argument, the Soviets heartily
agree. As a matter of fact, they have made it their own for a
long time.

Ever since the founding of NATO, the destruction of the
Western military alliance has been a principal objective of Sovi-
et policy, next only in importance to the enfeeblement of U.S.
power. In the pursuit of this objective, Soviet policy has been
admirably patient, consistent and adroit. Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Gromyko, informing the Supreme Soviet on June 27, 1968, of
the successful negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Pact,
called for the "liquidation of foreign military bases," denounced
NATO as an obstacle to arms control and disarmament agreements,
and singled out the German Federal Republic as the would-be dis-
turber of the peace in Central Europe, haven of "the spirit of
the Cold War," and source of "threats to the peace."

Unfortunately, only excerpts from Mr. Gromyko's speech
to the Supreme Soviet, carefully selected by TASS, were published

-6-

in the American press. One has to read the full text of Mr. Gro-
myko's statement in order to savor its flavor. This disdainful
and menacing statement bears down hard upon the United States,
humbled by defeat in Vietnam; upon America's principal ally in
continental Europe, West Germany; and upon America's closest
friend in the Middle East, Israel. It throws virtually every
cliche of Marxist-Leninist ideology into the teeth of monopolist,
capitalist imperialism, equated explicitly with the United States.
Only brief passages are addressed to the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty, and even this scanty reference belittles the United
States and contradicts flatly statements made by United States
officials. The Soviet Union, not the United States -- as assert-
ed by a high official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
-- took the initiative which "has led to the drafting of an
agreement on Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation." Those parts
of this shocking statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister which
do not heap vituperation upon us and our own friends, are mainly
concerned with general and complete disarmament, "under strict
international control," the oldest prop of Soviet propaganda.

Let us note here in passing that, thus far, the Soviet Union has
indignantly rejected all American proposals for the effective
control and verification, made in the course of all U.S.-Soviet
negotiations on arms control to date, and that the control pro-
visions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty do not apply to
the existing nuclear powers. Consistent with previous practice,

-7-

the Soviet Foreign Minister urged "all states, above all, the
nuclear powers, to discontinue immediately underground tests of
nuclear weapons" and rejected the "necessity of some control [as
being] unfounded and farfetched."

Mr. Gromyko's statement, hailed by some of our news media
as a harbinger of "the relaxation of tension," need be placed next
to that of Chairman Brezhnev, made on April 25, 1967 to the Con-
ference of European Communist and Workers' Parties at Karlovy-
Vary. Mr. Brezhnev spoke as follows:

> In weighing the opportunities opened up by developments in Europe, we cannot by-pass the fact that within two years the governments of the NATO countries are to decide whether or not the North Atlantic Treaty is to be extended. In our opinion it is very right that Communists and all progressive forces are endeavoring to make use of this circumstance in order to develop on an ever wider scale the struggle against preserving this aggressive bloc.

As the attentive reader will note readily the two statements --
that of the Chairman of the Party and that of his Foreign Mini-
ster -- make a perfect fit: their common targets are the dissol-
ution of the Western Alliance; the isolation of our key European
allies; the removal of American influence from Europe and the
emasculation of American power. Within the context of Soviet for-
eign policy, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is simply a
means to this end.

The Soviet Union has nothing to lose and much to gain by
the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The

-8-

fact is that the United States, but for its collaboration with Britain dating back to World War II, has not shared its nuclear knowledge with anybody. The Soviets have assisted Red China in developing a nuclear arsenal. The Soviets have never had the intention of giving nuclear weapons to any other Communist state -- and this for the reason that (1) their strategic posture, especially their military presence in Eastern Europe, does not require such largesse, and (2) their mistrust of the satellite people rules out nuclear weapons in potentially hostile hands.

The United States, by contrast, could well afford to place nuclear weapons, especially defensive nuclear weapons, in the hands of some of our allies and friends. If we were to do so we need not fear a nuclear surprise attack by, let us say, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, the German Federal Republic, and India. Of course, the United States never proposed to make such a distribution. The United States did envisage, however, the possibility of a NATO nuclear force -- the modest proposal for a multilateral force (MLF) tried awkwardly to translate this vision into operational reality -- and, albeit vaguely, the creation of a European nuclear force. The original American draft of 1965 for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contained the following provisions:

> Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty undertakes . . . not to take any other action which would cause an increase in the total number of States and other organizations having independent power to use nuclear weapons (and) not

-9-

to assist any non-nuclear state in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons.

Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this Treaty
undertakes not to manufacture nuclear weapons . . .
not to take any other action which would cause an
increase in the total number of states and other or-
ganizations having independent power to use nuclear
weapons (and) not to seek or to receive assistance
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or itself to
grant such assistance.

Under this provision the United States could have assist-
ed a United Europe to build a joint nuclear force, for such a de-
velopment would not increase the "total" number of nuclear weap-
ons states. The Soviet objection prevailed, and the clauses were
dropped.

The present nuclear Treaty does not allow for the creation
of a European Defense Association and other intermediate steps
leading to the creation of a European Federal State, possessed
of effective nuclear defense. According to press reports, the
Government of the United States does not view the Treaty as deny-
ing a united Europe the right -- subject to transfer of all powers
over foreign and defense policy to the European Federal State --
to become a military nuclear power. Even if this interpretation
were valid -- and nothing in the present Treaty says it is -- a
United Europe would be blocked from all interim solutions lead-
ing to the establishment of a full-fledged European Federal State.
Even if a Federal European State would be established, the United
States would not be able to offer it any support in developing a
collective nuclear deterrent, for, according to Paragraph 3 of

-10-

Article IX, only States "which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1st, 1967," are to be regarded as being nuclear weapon States. This provision closes the door to the future with considerable finality.

Since the present Treaty does not differentiate between defensive and offensive nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear members of NATO will be unable to develop their own anti-ballistic missile systems. Although it might be possible in the future, to set up a purely defensive ABM system, it is highly doubtful that, under the provisions of the Treaty, these member states could acquire the needed technology. Some highly qualified experts believe that such a system could be devised. If it can be made operational, it will be as essential to the defense of Western Europe as it would be to the defense of U.S. territory, for 700 Soviet ballistic missiles are zeroed in upon West European targets. Thus, the constraints of the Treaty weigh heavily upon the future of Western Europe -- all the more heavily because no responsible Western statesman can now assert categorically that NATO can continue to guarantee the safety of Europe during the next twenty years as it has done during the past twenty years.

If anyone can be relied upon to understand the implications of the present Treaty for the security of Western Europe, it is surely the Soviets. More likely than not, Western Europe, during the last few years, has not been in danger of an all-out

-11-

Soviet armed assault. With a few notable exceptions, the Soviets have always preferred piecemeal conquest to a risky all-out challenge. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, because it hamstrings any European attempt at building a viable system of self-defense, supplies the Soviets with vast opportunities for exercising psychological pressures upon individual European states, notably the German Federal Republic.

No one knows better than do the Soviets that the German Federal Republic is the keystone of NATO's defense in Europe. To pry loose this keystone, this has been the principal objective of Soviet policy in Europe. In order to accomplish this purpose, the Soviet propagandists have sought to alienate the other Western democracies from Germany and the Germans from the West. In this endeavor the Soviets have tirelessly resorted to one and the same propaganda ploy, namely, the allegation that West Germany wants to develop its own nuclear force and, thus armed, re-fight the Second World War. The fact is that the German Federal Republic never voiced any desire for a national nuclear deterrent. West German public opinion has overwhelmingly endorsed the case for nuclear continence. And even if the West Germans harbored in their dark hearts the longing for nuclear weapons, the West European Union would make it its business to nip a West German nuclear deterrent in the bud. Under the agreement with the WEU, which ratified the German Federal Republic's access to NATO, West Germany renounced the possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weap-

-12-

ons. The agreement provides for a tight system of on-site inspection, far tighter than any system of inspection contemplated by arms control agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is necessary to expose and to squash the Soviet canard of German nuclear concupiscence. This baseless allegation has served the Soviets well in their successful resistance to the inclusion of the so-called European Clause in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

I said in my opening remarks that, deeply concerned as I had been about specific provisions of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban which I considered adverse to the best interests of the United States, I was even more disturbed by its foreseeable impact upon the overall environment of Western security. Today, I am as much concerned about the package in which the Treaty is being delivered to us as with the Treaty itself.

None of the basic political issues of the protracted conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves have been resolved. New conflicts loom on the horizon. All one needs to do in order to ascertain the true state of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, is to read Mr. Gromyko's statement of June 27th 1968. Since then, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, the real boss of the Soviet Union, speaking at a rally honoring the Hungarian Premier Kadar, liquidator of the Hungarian Rising in 1956, inveighed against the "rotten, degrading, decaying society" of the United States; denounced American "political gangsterism" (pace a myriad of political murders

-13-

in the Soviet Union); and called for a rising of the "working
class" and the "Civil Rights Movement" against "monopolist Ameri-
ca." Anxious to eradicate the unpleasant impression which Mr.
Brezhnev's remark might have engendered in American public opin-
ion, a metropolitan daily, eager to shield its readers' "good feel-
ings" against the icy blast of Mr. Brezhnev's rhetoric, wrote as
follows:

Mr. Brezhnev's denunciation of the United States
seems to have the purpose of proclaiming publicly
that the Soviet Union was not seeking an accommo-
dation with the United States to the detriment of
its basic Communist philosophy.

Of such statements is made the euphoria of American public
opinion -- the euphoria necessary to mask the true implications
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Two days before Mr. Brezhnev spoke, President Johnson,
at the occasion of the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty in Washington, advised the American people that another
step towards arms control was now in the offing. The President
said:

Now at this moment of achievement and great hope, I
am gratified to be able to report and to announce
to the world a significant agreement -- an agree-
ment that we've actively sought and worked for
since January, 1964.

Agreement has been reached between the Governments
of the Union of Socialist Republics and the United
States to enter in the nearest future into discus-
sions on the limitation and the reduction of both
offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery sys-
tems and systems of defense against ballistic mis-
siles.

-14-

The pre-history of President Johnson's Statement of July 1st 1968 bears closer examination. On January 27, 1967, President Johnson wrote to Premier Kosygin, suggesting measures to limit the missile competition before the United States would make a final decision to deploy anti-missile defenses. Five weeks later, the President announced that Premier Kosygin had "confirmed the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles." Now fifteen months later, the Soviet Union again expresses its readiness to hold an exchange of opinion on the limitation and reduction of strategic delivery system -- as one point in a nine-point memorandum on steps to reduce the arms race, linking this offer to proposals which have frequently been rejected by the United States in the past, and which cannot possibly be accepted now or in the foreseeable future.

If the Soviet Union insists on linking certain arms measures to other measures, as it has usually done in the past, nothing can be expected to come from the "significant agreement" announced by President Johnson. I, for one, cannot understand what is either new or significant about it. Certainly, it should not be taken as placing a premium on the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty should be ratified on its own merit and not because it is supposed to preface some other, yet-to-be-concluded agreement with the Soviets.

On its own merits, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not deserve the ratification of the United States Senate.

-15-

As I have attempted to show, its provisions hobble U.S. foreign policy, discriminate against America's friends, and in no way restrict the Soviet Union's freedom-of-action in world politics. More important still, the Traety, if ratified, would stand as another monument to the West's fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between a free society and a totalitarian society.

International agreement does not mean to a totalitarian government what it means to a democratic people. An arms control agreement has never meant and does not mean to a militant communist, steeped in the dialectic of conflict, what it means to a democratic statesman, steeped in the doctrine of international cooperation. There is no mystery as to why the Soviets' negotiators proved relatively pliable as regards the Treaty's provisions for control: a democratic, an open society controls itself and a free press can be relied upon to ferret out and to denounce any treaty violations by the national government. A totalitarian government need not worry about the disclosure of violations by its own well-muzzled citizens. The democratic government commits itself to an international treaty with considerable finality; the domestic opposition to the encumbent government would put a breach of the Treaty, solemnly signed and solemnly ratified, to its own political advantage. A totalitarian government can reverse course without having to bother about public opinion, and make and break treaties with the greatest of ease, as easily as the Soviet Union, in 1939, concluded a treaty of alliance with its arch-enemy, Nazi Germany.

-16-

A totalitarian government can confront the world and its own people with accomplished facts -- and then, at leisure, negotiate with democratic governments which have to abide by the measured pace of constitutional process. The Soviets acceded to the conclusion of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty *after* they had carried out a series of nuclear megaton tests in the atmosphere and *before* the United States was able to duplicate these tests -- incidentally, very "dirty" ones. In the wake of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Soviet Union might or might not be willing to discuss a "mutual limitation" on the deployment of anti-missile systems. The Soviet Union *has* deployed an advanced ABM system around several of its major cities; the United States *has not* as yet deployed its Sentinel system. There seems to be a fundamental asymmetry in negotiating arms control agreements -- and for that matter, any agreement -- between a representative government like the United States and a dictatorship like the Communist Party in Russia.

According to Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Soviet Union is eager to relieve mankind from the burden of the arms race. To be sure, the American taxpayer, too, would like to pay less for arms and, if pay he must, contribute to the cost of domestic welfare rather than to economically unrewarding undertakings. Implicit in the Administration's advocacy of the present Treaty's ratification is the promise of a reduced defense budget. To put it simply, the American people "want out" of costly international

-17-

commitments and put their money into pressing domestic business
as, for example, a higher standard of living, a better education
for all and the renovation of our cities. These are laudable in-
tentions. The fiscal policies of this Administration are supposed
to be directed toward this end. The ease the implementation of
these policies, it would be opportune to extract savings from
the Defense Budget and to allocate funds thus saved to domestic
projects. If it were possible to halt what is called the arms
race, it would be possible, so the argument runs, to enjoy nation-
al security as well as rising prosperity for all.

If the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could mark the
turning point of the arms race, then the American people could
do what they want to do and need to do at home without paying
additional taxes. But, at this point, the question need be asked
as to whether we have kept up in the arms race. The war in Viet-
nam obscured the most important features of our Defense Budget:
According to the Financial Summary of our Defense Budget in 1968,
the total defense outlay is $78 billion. Deducting the costs of
the war in Vietnam, less than $50 billion remains for the up-keep
of our defense establishments. Of this sum, 9.6 billion are al-
located to our Strategic Forces, the heart and center of our def-
ense against a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. This amount
represents a reduction by about 15% from the outlay for our Strat-
egic Forces in 1962. Although inflation has done its work, our
gross national product has risen more rapidly than our defense

-18-

budget, including the cost of the war in Vietnam. In brief, the American people are paying out a smaller share of their national income for national defense than they did in the early sixties -- years which, according to official statements, were years of rising national prosperity.

In the meanwhile, the defense budget of the Soviet Union, in spite of several agricultural crises and the alleged pressures of consumer demands, has been rising at an ever accelerating rate -- reflecting, according to former Defense Secretary McNamara, "the continual expansion of the Soviet defense effort." According to reliable estimates, available to your Committee, the Soviet defense budget allocated to strategic forces, especially missiley, space vehicles and Navy, equals our own. Who is racing whom? Is it reasonable to assume that the Soviet Union will fall voluntarily behind us in defense expenditure and that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will induce the Soviets to declare a moratorium on the "arms race" when they are just about to overtake us in the effectiveness of their strategic forces?

It is simply not true that, because we are supporting the commitments of the world's leading power, we cannot do at home what, as a civilized people, we ought to do. A people certain of its purpose and poised in its might has no trouble in ordering its priorities and will, if need be, submit itself to austerity in order to achieve those things which must come first. As Mr. Brezhnev's and Mr. Gromyko's fulminations and a series of barefaced

-19-

provocations from the Bering Straits to the Atlantic Ocean clearly show, the Soviets believe that they have us on the ropes. They believe -- there can be no other explanation for their conduct -- that the United States, a groggy giant tottering under the burden of Vietnam and the strains of domestic insurrection and mired in the sloth of affluence, cannot stand up to the challenge of political revolution abroad and technical revolution at home. They believe that our Government will sign anything -- even the most foolish of treaties -- in order to buy a temporary respite from public censure. In brief, the Soviets believe that we cannot act rationally and want to deceive ourselves.

I urge the United States Senate to reject the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The present document is riddled with ambiguities. The Treaty, if it were ratified, would tie our hands in world politics, the fact notwithstanding that critical political issues the world over may give rise to now unpredictable situations. The Treaty, if ratified, would discriminate against our friends and, for good, alienate some of the best among them. I urge the United States Senate not only to reject the present Treaty but also the package in which it and other measures of arms control have been offered to its scrutiny. Just as in the case of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban, the avowed purposes of the present Treaty could be accomplished more effectively by simpler arrangements than those stipulated by the present Treaty. In most real world cases, a bilateral understanding between the United

-20-

States and the two other nuclear weapons countries, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, would suffice to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. If France and Red China will not sign the present treaty and if they were to decide upon handing out nuclear weapons, there is nothing that the signatories of the Treaty -- as *signatories* -- can do about it. Of course, the nuclear weapon states of the present Treaty might take unilateral action against the uncommitted proliferators. But is this not where we came in in the first place?

The dangers of nuclear weapons falling into irresponsible or criminal hands is growing, and nowhere is this danger greater than in the world under Communist control or influence. The present Treaty does not supply an effective remedy to such a contingency. To the contrary, because of the propagandistic claims made on its behalf, the Treaty, if it were ratified, would lull the free peoples of the world into a false sense of security. This is precisely the reason why the Soviets want the United States to conclude the Treaty -- and during this critical period of debate, might even refrain from slapping us in the face. I urge you, Mr. Chairman and the United States Senate, to reject the present Treaty.

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

TO THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

23, avenue des arts
Brussels 4, Belgium
November 19, 1968

Mr. William R. Kintner
Deputy Director
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Room 102 - 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Dear Bill:

Thanks very much for your letters of November 8 and 15. It
goes without saying that Rubinstein, Kravis, Bloomfield, and
yourself will be added to our Mission mailing list.

I would like to take up the suggestion in your last letter to
make a few observations on where we might go from here in Europe.

The chaotic state of affairs within Europe and in trans-Atlantic
relations is both deeply troubling and dangerous. I have never
been the forces of inertia as strong as they are in contemporary
Europe, with mediocrity the standard for European political
figures. And yet the problems continue to well up without
solution:

1. The security threat from the East;

2. The dual problems of stagnation within the Communities
and the French veto of British entry;

3. The alienation of the oncoming generation;

4. European frustrations due to impotence in a world dominated by the two super-powers;

5. The buffeting and continued insecurity of the Germans.

The illusion continues to survive in the larger countries of
Western Europe that each can somehow compete with the superpowers.
Call it a revival of nationalism, or an unwillingness to embrace
supra-nationalism. What it boils down to basically is the French
and the British competing for hegemony over the Germans and the
Italians.

-3-

Friday, to see how many highly placed Frenchmen were concerned
about the way both de Gaulle and Couve appear to have lost
control of events in France.

Finally, I think in this question of a commercial "arrangement"
between the Community and the U.K. which the French and Germans
are pushing, we must continue to assert our objections. The
British don't like it but for understandable reasons don't want
to get out in front. But we must also begin to put the pressure
on the British, suggesting that for their own case and for
Europe they should be more forthcoming and positive in terms of
what kind of a Europe they want to help construct. As a
distinguished German told me the other day, "We have no interest
in exchanging French for British hegemony."

It is worth repeating the central point. We need early in 1969
a clear, firm statement of U.S. policy toward Western Europe.
Otherwise disintegration and the centrifugal forces now at work
will dominate leading our Congress to force the new President's
hand.

With best wishes,

J. Robert Schaetzel

November 29, 1968

Dear Charles:

Thank you for your letter of November 22 providing several names of younger persons qualified in the field of international affairs and defense problems. These will be passed to the competent people.

Looking forward to our next meeting, and
with warm regards.

Mr. Charles T. Mayer
4975 Rockwood Parkway, N.W.
Washington, 16, D.C.

bc: Mr. R. Haldeman
Nixon Headquarters (together with file)

4975 ROCKWOOD PARKWAY, N.W.
WASHINGTON 16, D. C.

22 November 1968

The Honourable
Robert D. Murphy
1701 Kalmia Road N.W.
Washington D.C.

Dear Bob,

In your present position you will certainly be
called upon to give advice on new blood to be brought into
the future Administration. Therefore I would like to take
the liberty of mentioning to you some younger persons who
have both experience and capacity in the field of inter-
national affairs and defense problems. I know that they
would all be very eager to work for Mr. Nixon's govern-
ment.

Christopher Russell
Rocky Hill Road
Plymouth, Mass. 02360

Originally in the Defense Department, then
White House Assistant under President Eisenhower and at pre-
sent Executive Director of the Center for Rural Development
in Cambridge, Mass. He is Yale class '50 and Harvard Law
School.

Raymond J. Albright
3609 Dunlop St.
Chevy Chase, Md. 20015

Yale class '51. Spent several years in the Defense
and State Departments and at present is the Assistant to the
Secretary of Treasury for National Security Affairs.

ORGANIZATION AND PEOPLE

2 December 1968

This paper is addressed to the organization and manning problems in the key areas of National Security and Foreign Policy, specifically, the White House, NSC structure, the President's Scientific Advisory Council, the Department of State, including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Aeronautic and Space Agency, and the United States Information Agency.

The crucial billets in these agencies must be filled by men who agree with the underlying assumptions of the new administration relating specifically to such questions as: 1) who are our foes, 2) who are our friends, and 3) what are our priorities abroad, and what are the priorities between foreign and domestic concerns.

I. The National Security Council

If this body is to provide competent and insightful advice to the President on major foreign policy and security issues, its key members must be individuals who are not overly burdened with the day-by-day nuts and bolts functioning of their departments. There must be a special assistant for National Security Affairs who has the President's confidence and who is au courant with the substantive functioning of the

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departments and agencies dealing with National Security matters. The Planning Board, wiped out by Kennedy, should be restored as the long-range planning instrument of the government. It is more and more imperative that we take a hard look at our long-term prospects and perspectives. There may be a division of labor between the special assistant for National Security Affairs and that of the executive secretary of the National Security Council. The latter could be responsible, primarily, for directing the small White House based NSC staff and the functioning of the Planning Board. Rather than restore the old OCB mechanism, it would probably be desirable to utilize the existing coordinating group for policy implementation, i.e., the SIG (Senior Interdepartmental Group) and its subordinate tool, the IRG (Interdepartmental Regional Groups).

A net evaluation group should be organized to work with, but not to be a part of the Planning Board complex. This would be a small group concerned with the net U.S.-Soviet balance with respect to technology, strategic weaponry, conventional deployment, economic capacity, propaganda effectiveness, etc.* An attempt to set up such a group took place when Nelson Rockefeller was Mr. Eisenhower's special assistant, and then was knocked down by the primary departments and agencies who did not wish to have anybody at the White House level competent to evaluate their

*A separate paper will follow.

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effectiveness. Subsequently, a net evaluation group concerned primarily with the strategic equation was set up but this was wiped out by McNamara in 1963. Subsequently, the President of the United States had no means of reviewing whether or not the Defense Department's strategic analyses were valid.

A check should be made of the orientation of the existing NSC White House staff. (We suggest that Dick Allen be the person to do this.) Possible new people for the White House NSC staff would include Melvin Conant, whose curriculum vitae is in the hands of Bryce Harlow.

A fundamental task confronting the NSC structure is to establish more order in our foreign policy without, at the same time, stultifying creativity.

## II. The President's Scientific Advisor and the Scientific Advisory Committee

The concept discussed on Friday, November 29, was an excellent one. If this is adopted, however, it is more important than ever that the PSAC is composed of objective, non-emotional, honest scientists who are not committed to pet schemes for saving the world. One such man is Dr. Chris Lambertson, University of Pennsylvania, who is one of the top authorities in the world in the field of space and undersea environment.

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Arrangements for science and technology must embrace DOD, AEC, NASA and the National Science Foundation, as well as the White House, State and the CIA.

### III. The Department of State

The requirements set forth for the new Secretary of State are most interesting; but, they may be very difficult to fill. There is also the possibility that the need for negotiations per se may be less important than presently visualized. In short, because we appear to be moving into an adverse power situation (which cannot be reversed in the immediate future) we may be dealing more with confrontation diplomacy than with negotiation diplomacy.

Leaving aside, for the moment, number one, what are the requirements for the Undersecretary? In more placid times, ideally, he should come from the Foreign Service as did Robert Murphy in the latter years of Eisenhower's administration. On the other hand, the range of obligations facing the Secretary of State, both in foreign representation and in dealing with Congress, are such that it might be desirable to have both number one and number two political appointees and make the permanent Undersecretary for Political Affairs the operating head of the State Department. For example, Secretary of State

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Rusk has devoted twenty-five percent of his time to Congressional relations, and has spent an almost equivalent amount of time in overseas travel. A further fact to consider is that any new orientation in our foreign and security policy will have to be "sold" to the American people -- particularly through their representatives in Congress. This "selling" function is very difficult for a professional Foreign Service officer to do well.

Whoever is named as Secretary, we strongly urge again the appointment of Adolph Schmidt as the Undersecretary of State. He is a strong, yet subtle and sophisticated person.

If the foregoing idea were adopted, then measures should be taken to strengthen the role of the permanent Undersecretary of State, who would be a career man selected from the Foreign Service. This man, for example, should be chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, the group responsible for the coordination of day-by-day operations in the U.S. government in the foreign policy and security fields. The Deputy Undersecretary for Administration should report to the permanent Undersecretary, as should the Director General of the Foreign Service. Likewise, the present Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs should report to the permanent Undersecretary. The offices which are now under the Undersecretary for Administration should remain there, except for the special assistant for

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Congressional Relations. This individual should be placed
under the Undersecretary of State who would be the number two
political appointee of the Department.

A great deal of effort has been made to plumb the
Foreign Service as well as people who are familiar with Foreign
Service personnel in order to come up with the ideal candidate
for the number three spot in the Department, i.e., the permanent
Undersecretary. The qualifications that we sought were:

1. General respect of the Foreign Service;

2. Empathy with its personnel;

3. Orientation conforming to that of the new administration.

Among those with whom we discussed this problem, it
was generally agreed that the upper levels of the Foreign Service
at this time are not too rich in individuals with the specifica-
tions as set forth. Furthermore, the Foreign Service suffers
a severe morale problem. Currently, over 60 percent of the
Ambassadors of the United States are political appointees. In
the past, prior to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, this figure
never ran more than 30 percent. As to the professional appointees,
a large number have been selected from the FSO-1 class and not
from the Career Minister Group who were supposed to provide the

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reservoir of personnel from whom Ambassadors, selected from
the Foreign Service, would be chosen. In recent years there
has been a rather rapid departure or pending departure of well-
known Foreign Service people, such as Foy Kohler, Chip Bohlen,
Thompson, etc. The foregoing notwithstanding, there is general
agreement within the Foreign Service that Alexis Johnson, our
Ambassador to Japan, has the required qualifications. He has
the respect of the Foreign Service, he is competent and realistic.
The only caveat we heard concerning him is that he tends to do
too much of his own work, but if the responsibilities we
suggested were placed upon him he might be forced to change
his working habits. John Tuthill, U.S. Ambassador to
Brazil, and Peter Hart, Chief NEA, are other men held in high
regard by their Foreign Service colleagues.

The legal advisor, Leonard C. Meeker, should go, and
a possible replacement should be given the title of Counsellor.
The name of Morris Leibman is suggested. Leibman is the senior
partner in a leading Chicago law firm, a liberal on domestic
issues, but a hard-nosed realist on international problems.
Among other things, he is a member of President Johnson's little-
used Advisory Committee on Foreign Policy and also a member of
the Committee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

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A new administrator is needed in State. Kenneth W. Gemmill, a member of the Philadelphia law firm of Dechert, Price and Rhodes, and a former assistant secretary of the Treasury under President Eisenhower, is a most attractive candidate for this post. He is about 58, very bright and loves to prune -- with skill.

#### IV. The Policy Planning Council

This mechanism, created by General Marshall when he was Secretary of State, has never lived up to its promise. Part of the problem is that Americans tend to be operators and consequently do not give sufficient attention to long-range planning. For this reason, many members of the Policy Planning staff tend to get into the operating business and lose their planning identity in the process. Walt Rostow, for one, prior to coming into public service, was a strong advocate of long-range planning, but in his tenure in the Policy Planning Council as well as Special Assistant to the President, he was never able to produce a basic long-term National Security plan. The failure of the Policy Planning Council thus far to do its job does not mean that the idea behind it should be discarded; rather, an effort should be made to find a person who will have intellectual rapport with the new secretary, who will keep his eyes on the

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present while at the same time concentrate his attention in
the wide range of futuristic problems that will confront this
country.

V. U.S. Ambassadors

There is no immediate requirement to replace the
present U.S. Ambassador list. On the other hand, a systematic
review should be made as soon as possible of the U.S. Ambassador
corps. As mentioned earlier, at least 60 percent of them are
political appointees of either Kennedy or Johnson. Most of
these should be eased out as soon as possible, with their
successors chosen from either the Foreign Service or the public
arena.

Perhaps the three key appointments will be a new
Ambassador to the UN, a new Ambassador to NATO, and a new
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it would be desirable
to upgrade the NATO Ambassadorship by making its designee a
member of the Cabinet as currently is the case with the UN
Ambassador. Perhaps John Cabot Lodge can be returned to his
old post at the UN as there is some evidence that he is not as
flexible as he might be at Bonn.

As to NATO, we have considered a number of people and
believe that Congressman Findley, who has devoted a good deal

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of his time to NATO affairs, will probably be the number one
candidate. There are others, including George Anderson, Larry
Norstad, and perhaps Livy Merchant, or John Leddy, who is the
present head of the State Department's Division on European
Affairs.

Regarding the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, we are about
at the end of the line of the old Russian hands. Walter
Stoessel, currently Ambassador to Warsaw, might fill-in in a
pinch, but he is not top caliber according to our informants.
Under these circumstances, it might be necessary to turn to
academic circles for that particularly important post. With
this in mind, Llewelyan Thompson should be urged to stay for
an appropriate period of time.

Additional names of competent Foreign Service Officers:
Roy Melbourne, with Foreign Service Institute; Clare Timberlake,
currently head of Foreign Service Review Board; Peter Hart,
former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and currently head of NEA;
Morris Bernbaum, currently U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela;
William Porter, currently U.S. Ambassador to Korea and formerly
in Algeria and Saigon; Marshall Green, currently U.S. Ambassador
to Indonesia; William Lenhart, currently in the State Department.

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VI. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

All of the top personnel in this Agency should be
replaced. Furthermore, the Agency should be taken out of the
negotiating role it now plays and confine its activities to
research on mutually desirable arms control propositions and
perhaps conduct "peace games" in order to more comprehensively
evaluate arms control proposals. The possible detriment to
national security of any arms agreement should be placed on
the balance scales opposite potential benefits when weighing
whether a particular arms proposal or treaty will serve the
interests of United States security. In the next administra-
tion, the director of ACDA should be directly subordinate to
the Secretary of State and should be taken out of the negotiating
arena. Some possible personnel for consideration in the re-
organized and restructured ACDA are the following: Addison
Lanier, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA
for arms control; Dr. James Dougherty, Executive Vice President
of St. Joseph's College, and one of the leading civilian
analysts in arms control measures; Dr. Thomas Schelling, pro-
fessor of economics at Harvard University, who has devoted a
good deal of effort to arms control studies; Amrom Katz of
the RAND Corporation, and Arnold Kramish, also of the RAND
Corporation.

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## VII. The Department of Defense

The Department of Defense suffers from massive con-
gestion and over-centralization. Under McNamara, a tremendous
civilian supergrade hierarchy was created in the Defense Depart-
ment. Despite the evolution of this bureaucratic Frankenstein,
the traditional service structures, the Departments of the Army,
Navy and Air Force have been kept more or less intact. The
unified command set-up, initiated by Secretary of Defense Tom
Gates, has been retained and developed. Whether to continue
the present order of monolithic centralization or attempt to
reverse the tide, need not be determined at the present. This
question would be one of the major problems confronting the
new Secretary of Defense. One measure, however, needs to be
taken now: the abolishment of the office of Assistant Secretary
of Defense for System Analysis. It is universally agreed that
this office must go, and that all its present officials should
also depart. There is a question as to whether the function it
performs should be carried on in the comptroller's office as
was originally the case, or, perhaps, be placed in the office
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
On November 29, we discussed possible candidates for the
Secretary of Defense and his deputy. We gave a list of sub-
ordinate personnel to Bryce Harlow, including the names of men

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who should be retained and those who should be removed.

A team of Henry Jackson and Karl Bendetsen still appears to be an excellent one. Further checking on the Senator indicates that he could function effectively in this office provided he has a top flight administrator at his right hand, a proviso which should not be ignored. On the other hand, if, for other reasons the Senator is not chosen, Glenn Lipscomb's name should not be ignored. Whoever is chosen for Defense, however, must be able to move into high gear from the start. We cannot afford to give on-the-job training to a captain from industry.

In addition to the names already suggested for the Department of Defense, the following are also recommended: Mr. Morris Leibman for Counsel, in the event he is not considered in that capacity for the State Department; Mr. Frank Barnett for Public Affairs Officer.

## VIII. The Central Intelligence Agency

There is no great enthusiasm in Washington over the manner in which this agency is carrying out its role in strategic analysis. Its current board of estimates is badly in need of new blood, particularly people familiar with modern analytical techniques and computer utilization, who can keep abreast of the

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dynamism inherent in modern technology. There are some
excellent in-house studies which point up some of the agency's
deficiencies in the intelligence area. In an important but
distinct field the Agency's capabilities for covert operations
are not very effective.

It is wise to retain the current number one until a
thorough review of the Agency's performance can be undertaken.
Meanwhile, a vigorous and sophisticated military deputy should
be chosen. A few candidates suggest themselves. One is Lt.
Gen. Cyrus Betts, who is currently Chief of R&D in the Depart-
ment of the Army. He has been involved in several major
strategic threat-analysis studies, through which he has
become exposed to the inner workings of the Agency. He is
intelligent, shrewd, and properly motivated. The other possi-
bility is Lt. Gen. Robert Smith, who is currently Chief of
Plans, Department of the Air Force. Smith was, for a number
of years, head of intelligence for the Strategic Air Command,
and did as much as anyone to pioneer its most advanced techniques
of intelligence gathering, analysis and utilization.

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## IX. The National Aeronautics and Space Agency

This agency suffers from a lack of public understanding of the relation of space to the future world position of the United States, and to the security of this country.
Our space program could be given a needed shot in the arm,
beyond restoration of some of its funding, by the appointment
of General Bernard Schriever as the new head of NASA.

## X. The United States Information Agency

There is a widespread conviction that, in the battle for
men's minds, the USIA tool has not been as sharp as it should be,
nor has it been employed too effectively. Some comments as to
what should be done and who might be found to breath new life
into USIA will be presented separately.

During the last twenty years the broad goals of U. S. foreign
policy have remained remarkably constant: All Administrations have
sought to achieve a genuine accommodation with the Soviet Union; meaning-
ful arms control agreements; liberalization in Eastern Europe; the unification
of Germany; increased economic cooperation between the nations of the
developed world and the modernization of the developing nations; strengthened
ties between the U. S. and Western Europe as well as Latin America; a
greater role for our allies in the Pacific area in the military defense and
economic development of the region; and, last but not least, peace in the
Middle East. Each successive Administration has kept these tasks on its
agenda. In this sense, each successive Administration has sought to carry
forward the policies of its predecessor. However, Administrations have
differed on the emphasis put on each of these goals and on the means
selected to achieve them. It is these judgments and choices which fall
legitimately within the purview of the critic.

Abroad and at home, the American people have been wedded
to the idea of peaceful change. Since the end of World War II, the purpose
of American foreign policy has been to insure the peaceful development of our
own country and of mankind. Certainly, no American statesman of this
epoch acclaimed force as the proper means of effecting change in international
relationships, not to speak as an end in itself.

The Western Alliance was created as an instrument of collective
defense against the threat of Soviet expansionism, but not as a tool of

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aggression. Neither the American people nor the peoples of Western Europe could have been persuaded by their respective governments to join in an aggressive war upon the Soviet Union. The Alliance as well as the American national defense establishment were designed to deter Soviet aggression -- and to buy time for the subsidence of Soviet expansionism and communist militancy.

The latter purpose found expression in the quest of American diplomacy for the peaceful settlement of the issues-in-conflict which divided East and West, notably the division of Europe. American diplomacy was predicated on the acceptance by the Soviet Union -- if not all at once, than at least through a gradual relaxation of its aggressive stance -- of the principle of peaceful change. In this sense, the purpose of NATO was to convince the Soviet leaders that they could not enforce a unilateral settlement of the issues-in-conflict -- and that they had nothing to gain by the use of force. Thus, American foreign policy can be viewed as a wager on Western solidarity-in-defense and Western capacity for social and economic progress: the one was to deter Soviet aggression, while the other was to challenge the Soviet Union to meet the Free World in peaceful competition.

The U. S., confident of the ability of modern democratic societies to outdo the communist system in the very sphere in which communism had staked its claim to superiority over any and all other doctrines, namely the satisfaction of human wants, anticipated -- and anticipated quite right