The **RAND** Corporation

1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA 90406

3 January 1966

L-7

JAN 7 1966

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

I am sending you under separate cover a New Year's present, namely, two copies of the French collection of essays to which you are a contributor.

I had not heard from the French publishers for about a year and thought they had abandoned the project, when suddenly the books arrived.

I trust I will see you again before too long.

With best wishes,

BB:pd

P.S. -- One copy has already gone out to you, but I shall send you the additional copy separately.

Henry V. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards.

Don't you ever come back?
since we have had a chance to talk.
It has been much too long

which has not yet appeared here.
the French collection of essays
I look forward to receiving

January 3rd.

Thank you for your letter of

Dear Bernard:

Santa Monica, California 90406
1500 Main Street
The RAND Corporation
Mr. Bernard Brodie

January 11, 1966

March 18, 1966

Professor Richard P. Longaker
Chairman
Department of Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024

Dear Dick:

The attached is a somewhat formal
letter since I am assuming that it will
become part of the official record.

Let me take this occasion to tell
you how much I enjoyed seeing you at
dinner and how very much I hope we
can stay in contact.

With warm regards and every
good wish.

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

good wish.
With warm regards and every

can stay in contact.
dinner and how very much I hope me
you how much I enjoyed seeing you at

become part of the official record.
letter since I am saaming that it will

Dear Dick:

Los Angeles, California 90034
University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Political Science
Chairman
Professor Richard P. Londsker

March 18, 1966

March 18, 1968

Dear Professor Longaker:

I understand that the Department of Political Science
is considering appointing Bernard Brodie to a tenure position.
I would like to support this possibility with the utmost enthusiasm.

I have followed Bernard Brodie's writings since the middle
1940's, long before I ever met him. I know no one who has made
a greater contribution to the complex problem of the relationship
between political and military thought and very few indeed who
have done anything comparable.

What I find most attractive about Mr. Brodie is that to him
strategic problems never become purely technical concerns,
rather he treats them in the widest political and historical context.

In recent years I have invited him on a number of occasions
to speak at Harvard. I found him an outstanding teacher.

In short, I believe that Mr. Brodie would add great luster
to the Department of Political Science at UCLA. Indeed, my
chief regret is that we could not move fast enough at Harvard to
anticipate you.

Henry V. Klaander

Sincerely yours,

anticipate you.
chief regret is that we could not move that enough at Harvard to
to the Department of Political Science at UCLA. Indeed, my
In addition, I believe that Mr. Brodie would add great later
to a desk at Harvard. I found him an outstanding teacher.

In recent years I have invited him on a number of occasions
father he treats them in the widest political and historical context.
strategic problems never become purely technical concerns.

What I find most attractive about Mr. Brodie is that to him
have done anything comparable.

between political and military thought and very few indeed who
a greater contribution to the complex problem of the relationship
1940's, long before I ever met him. I know no one who has made
I have followed Bernard Brodie's writings since the middle

I would like to support this possibility with the utmost enthusiasm.
is considering appointing Bernard Brodie to a tenure position.

Dear Professor Longsker:

Los Angeles, California 90034
University of California, Los Angeles
Department of Political Science
Chairman
Professor Richard P. Longsker

March 18, 1966

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

My very best to Bernard.

again soon.

duly and I hope that we will meet

It was good to see you the other

it doubly significant.
me your book and the inscription made
It was so thoughtful of you to send

My dear Aunt:

California 90313
Pacific Palisades
619 Realesno Drive
Mrs. Bernard Brodie

April 7, 1968

The RAND Corporation

MAY 16 1966

11 May 1966

L-9302

Dear Henry:

Thank you very much for granting approval to Burt Klein to
let me read your (Secret) paper, "Some Reflections on NATO."
I am full of admiration for what is a wholly brilliant and
exceedingly well-argued piece of analysis, and I congratulate
you most sincerely for it.

I am also pleased that it so well complements and supports
the comparable memorandum by Burt Klein, which I thought was
also a superb job. Both these memoranda together should,
and I hope will, have considerable impact on our national
policy.

Incidentally, apart from the fact that your memorandum had
a special addressee, I hope you will agree that there is very
little of it that needs to be classified. I therefore look
forward to your publishing soon a suitably (and minimally)
expurgated version. Among other things, I want to be able
to quote and cite it.

On another matter, I think I have reason to thank you for your
remarks to Dick Longaker at UCLA concerning me. At least
he told me he consulted you during your visit, and their re-
sulting action was all I could have wished for. The matter
is not "finalized" (to use that horrible, bureaucratic word),

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

11 May 1966

L-9302

but things seem to be moving at a normal pace towards that end, and I am very glad of it.

Incidentally, I reviewed your book also for *The Annals*, and I am enclosing herewith a copy of my review. As you can see, it is mostly a condensed and slightly revised version of the longer review I wrote for *The Reporter*. Perhaps the last sentence of my first paragraph is impolitic, but it cannot do much harm either.

Which reminds me: Robert Magill mentioned in his letter to me, approving of my *Reporter* review of your book, that he had sent a copy also to you. I noticed with interest that he is now on the Policy Planning Council. This is an interesting fissure in the hitherto ideologically monolithic character of that body. The fact that he should have taken the trouble to write to me on the subject (and to you) suggests to me the release of some emotional strain. I have in mind among other things that I especially praised your book, as I do again in the enclosed *Annals* review, for its chapter on the "fantastic story" of the MLF.

With warm best wishes,

BB:pd

Enclosure:

Review of *The Troubled Partnership:*
*A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*

Enclosure to L-9302, 11 May 1966

# THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

By Henry A. Kissinger

McGraw-Hill, 1965, 266 pp. $5.95

This is probably Henry Kissinger's best book thus far, and the best book I know of on the subject of its title. It was of course written before President de Gaulle began to deliver, following his re-election, his heaviest blows against the integrity of the NATO structure by essentially withdrawing France from the Organization--even if not, as de Gaulle insists, from the alliance itself. Anyway, the book remains an excellent guide to understanding *why* this happened (though I am not myself quite in accord with Kissinger's interpretation of de Gaulle's motivation), and it is also an extremely useful basis from which to formulate plans about what is now to be done. Unfortunately, it will probably not be taken as seriously by the people responsible for our NATO policies as it deserves to be, not *because* it criticizes their methods but because those in command happen to be of a persuasion that so richly deserves his criticism.

There is quite properly much less space and consideration given in this book to strategic matters than is true of some of Kissinger's earlier works. The troubles of this "troubled partnership" are for the most part not questions of strategy at all, though many of them can hide too easily behind the pretense of being so. Anyway, Part Three of the book, which comprises only three chapters, is assigned to "the strategic issues," and of these only Chapter 4 really has much to do with the strictly military side of the problem. It is an

with the strictly military side of the problem. It is an
issue", and of these only Chapter 4 really has much to do
comprise only three chapters, is assigned to "the strategic
bretense of being so. Anyway, Part Three of the book, which
at all, though many of them can hide too easily behind the
partnership, are for the most part not questions of strategy
of Klaesinger's earlier works. The troubles of this "troubled
Given in this book to strategic matters than is true of some
there is quite properly much less space and consideration
the criticism.

command happen to be of a persuasion that so richly deserves
because it criticizes their methods but because those in
reasonable for our NATO policies as it deserves to be, not
will properly not be taken as seriously by the people
fate plans apart what is now to be done. Unfortunately, it
it is also an extremely useful plan from which to formu-
Klaesinger's interpretation of de Gaulle's motivation, and
happened (though I am not myself quite in accord with
book remains an excellent guide to understanding why this
de Gaulle instates, from the alliance itself. Anyway, the
withdrawing France from the Organisation--even if not, as
against the integrity of the NATO structure by essentially
to deliver, following his re-election, his heaviest blows
It was of course written before President de Gaulle began
and the best book I know of on the subject of its title.

This is properly Henry Klaesinger's best book thus far.
McGraw-Hill, 1962, 250 pp. $2.92
By Henry V. Klaesinger

OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP: A RE-ARRIVEMENT

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excellent chapter, and it is sufficient in proportion to
its context. The following chapter in that same section
deals with the proposed multilateral force (MLF), which
has been from beginning to end a political and not a
strategic issue. Kissinger's chapter on the MLF is, I think,
far and away the best summary and statement of the compli-
cated issues in this fantastic story that I have seen
anywhere.

On the subject of the dissatisfactions of Germany and
of the other members with the Alliance as it now stands,
or at least as it stood before March 1966, Kissinger is
superb. No doubt something is owing to his background,
which may assist him in achieving appropriate intellectual
detachment and which enables him to converse easily in their
own tongues with various European leaders. With these goes
a considerable reputation in Europe, especially as one
close to the highest councils of the United States leader-
ship and yet detached from and critical of their views,
that undoubtedly gives him access under conditions of unusual
candor to the important personages on the Continent and in
the United Kingdom.

Others may, however, enjoy a comparable access and even
linguistic skill, but relatively few others have the remain-
ing necessary equipment. There is no substitute for insight,
perception, sensitivity, empathy—all of which are essential
to the gift of "political sense." These Kissinger has in
abundance. So many articulate people study international
politics; so few of them grasp so well its essence, espe-
cially where issues of military significance are involved.

clearly where issues of military significance are involved. Politics: so few of them grasp so well its essence, especially. So many articulate people study international affairs. So many articulate people study international affairs. These Kießinger pass in perception, sensitivity, empathy--all of which are essential to the gift of "political essence."

close to the highest councils of the United States leader-a considerable reputation in Europe, especially as one own tongues with various European leaders. With these goes detachment and which enables him to converse easily in their which mayчат him in achieving appropriate intellectual rapport. No doubt something is owing to his background, or at least as it stood before March 1966, Kießinger is of the other members with the Alliance as it now stands. On the subject of the disattitudes of Germany and anywhere.

cated issues in this fantastic story that I have seen far and away the beat summary and statement of the complicit strategic issue. Kießinger's chapter on the MLP is, I think, has been from beginning to end a political and not a deals with the proposed multilateral force (MLF), which its context. The following chapter in that same section excellent chapter, and it is sufficient in proportion to

-5-

-3-

With Kissinger's knowledge of military affairs goes, however,
a sense for the implications of power, its potentialities
and also its limitations.

Finally, I should like to say that in this book
Kissinger has achieved a clarity and a terseness of style
that he has not always possessed in the past. He has always
been capable of turning a very good phrase now and then, but
with it often went some pretty turgid writing. The latter
he has now rid himself of, and he emerges as no mean stylist,
certainly as one of the most readable as well as insightful
of the American commentators on the international scene.

Bernard Brodie
The University of California
at Los Angeles

4 April 1966

4 April 1966

at Los Angeles
The University of California
Bernard Brodie

of the American commentators on the international scene.
certainly as one of the most readable as well as insightful
he has now rid himself of, and he emerges as no mean stylist,
with it often went some pretty turgid writing. The latter
been capable of turning a very good phrase now and then, but
that he has not always possessed in the best. He has always
Klaeinger has achieved a clarity and a terseness of style
Finally, I should like to say that in this book
and also its limitations.

a sense for the implications of power, its potentialities
With Klaeinger's knowledge of military affairs goes, however,

-3-

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

AUG 2 9 1966

SECURITY STUDIES CENTER
SOCIAL SCIENCES BUILDING
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

August 26, 1966

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Henry:

If I have been tardy in replying to your note of July 27, with the reprint copy of the article you kindly enclosed with it, it is partly because I have been engaged in moving my office across town, with time out for a trip to the East (I was actually in Cambridge for one evening with Fawn, but you were apparently out-of-town at the time).

So far as your article "For a New Atlantic Alliance" is concerned, I of course read it when it first appeared in *The Reporter*, and re-read it only this morning. Both times it was with the admiration and full agreement that have now become habitual to me in reading your work. Your insights are both novel and penetrating, and though it would be presumptious of me to say my own thinking has moved along the same lines, I can yet find nowhere in your article any point I am disposed to question or challenge. ✶

So much for that. Let me now ask a favor of you. I am planning to go to Europe for four weeks just after Labor Day. Though the termination of the trip will be at the I.S.S. conference in Vienna (where I hope I may see you) most of the time I shall be carrying out interviews connected with my University research project on the subject of "American leadership in NATO as seen through European eyes." The Europeans I have in mind are primarily the officials and to a lesser extent the politicians who have had direct contact with our people in NATO.

I of course already have a list of acquaintances that I want to look up in Paris, London, and Bonn, but perhaps you can think of several, especially in Bonn but perhaps also in the smaller capitals, whom I ought particularly to try to see. If so, I hope you will write me, however briefly, to mention their names. For the

/2

sake of speed I suggest you write me at my home address given
below, and if your letter is not likely to reach me before Labor
Day, I shall be at the International Inn on Thomas Circle in
Washington from September 8th to 9th. I shall appreciate your
help.

I reviewed your book once again, this time with two others,
in the *Journal of Politics*. I think it will appear in the
January issue. Anyway, I am enclosing a copy of the review.

I hope I shall see you again soon. And, by the way, I am
tremendously happy to be back in university life.

As ever,

Bernard Brodie
619 Resolano Drive
Pacific Palisades
California 90272

BB:nb
Encl.

*NATO in Quest of Cohesion.* Edited by Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs, with a Foreword by General Lauris Norstad. A Hoover Institution Publication (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 476. $8.00.)

*NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance*. By Timothy W. Stanley. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, Pp. xii, 417. $7.50.)

*The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*. By Henry A. Kissinger. Council on Foreign Relations Publication. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965, Pp. xiv, 266. $5.95.)

Inasmuch as all the three books here reviewed were published before President de Gaulle had manifested the full dimensions of his attack upon the NATO structure, one would expect them to be considerably out-of-date. However, in reading them one is much more conscious of other elements, such as the differences in outlook and depth of insight between the various authors and contributors concerned, than in any absence of direct relevance of their remarks to the present crisis. This can be only because many of their observations are indeed pertinent to the present, in which NATO, though stricken, is far from dead, and must in some wise be reorganized and reconstituted.

The first of the volumes we shall take up, that edited by Profs. Cerny and Briefs, is not really a book, which to

by Prof. Cerny and Briefs, is not really a book, which to
The first of the volumes we shall take up, that edited
reconciliated.

from dead, and must in some wise be reorganized and
to the present, in which NATO, though stricken, is far
because many of their observations are indeed pertinent
of their remarks to the present crisis. This can be only
tributors concerned, than in any absence of direct relevance
depth of insight between the various authors and con-
other elements, such as the differences in outlook and
However, in reading them one is much more conscious of
one would expect them to be considerably out-of-date.
full dimensions of his attack upon the NATO structure,
brought up before President de Gaulle had manifested the
Insamen as all the three books here reviewed were

Co., 1962, Pp. xiv, 36c. $2.95.)

Relations Publication. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Villiance. By Henry A. Klausinger. Council on Foreign

1962, Pp. xii, 411. $1.20.)

NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance.

Frederick A. Praeger, 196. Pp. 47c. $8.00.)

Moratad. A Hoover Institution Publication (New York:
Henry W. Briefs, with a Foreword by General Lanterna

NATO in Quest of Cohesion. Edited by Karl H. Cerny and

-2-

me implies a direct dialogue between an author or
(small number of) authors and the reader, but rather
a compilation of the papers delivered, and the discussion
that followed each of them, at a conference in May 1964
at the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown
University. It has the usual weaknesses of such a com-
pilation, especially that everything old and trite will
somehow be repeated and therefore included. On the other
hand, in this case one also catches, besides snatches of
domestic wisdom, the distinctive views of persons repre-
senting other nations in the Alliance, some of them of
considerable stature in their own countries, like Sir John
Slessor and General André Beaufre. The American contingent
is naturally the largest, and it includes the names of some
exceptionally able as well as widely known scholars.

The short introduction by the editors is also impres-
sive, but that is followed by an opening address by Under-
Secretary of State George W. Ball which is useful mainly
because it portrays in short compass most of the shortcomings
of American leadership in NATO. With heavy-handed humor it
wags a finger at Europeans for not seeing what we Americans
understand so much better--the real quality of the Soviet

understand so much better...the real quality of the Soviet
wage a finger at Europeans for not seeing what we Americans
of American leadership in NATO. With heavy-handed humor it
because it portrays in short compass most of the shortcomings
Secretary of State George W. Bush which is useful mainly
alive, but that is followed by an opening address by Under-
The short introduction by the editors is also impres-
exceptionally able as well as widely known scholars.
is naturally the largest, and it includes the names of some
Slessor and General André Beaure. The American contingent
considerable stature in their own countries, like Sir John
senting other nations in the Alliance, some of them of
domestic wisdom, the distinctive views of perceptive repre-
hand, in this case one also catches, besides snatches of
somehow be repeated and therefore included. On the other
bulation, especially that everything old and trite will
University. It has the usual weaknesses of such a com-
at the Center for Strategic Studies at Georgetown
that followed each of them, at a conference in May 1964
a compilation of the papers delivered, and the discussion
(small number of) authors and the reader, put rather
me implies a direct dialogue between an author or

-5-

-3-

threat, much more sinister and persistent than our
European friends have led themselves to believe. In doing
so it leaves once again the unfortunate impression that the
United States has a greater stake than its allies in the
continuance of NATO. It then goes on to single out as the
primary problem of the Alliance the question of the control
of nuclear weapons--which I submit is probably the most
overblown of the problems that have actually plagued the
NATO Alliance and which has served to divert attention from
others of much greater moment, such as the question of the
real value, and cost, of the attempted far-reaching
integration of military planning and command at SHAPE. One
might also mention that none of the books here reviewed
really goes into that latter problem in any depth.

In the next volume, that by Mr. Stanley (who has
recently replaced Dr. Burton Klein of The RAND Corporation
as the leader of the American contingent to the Stikker
Exercise in Paris), a single author has gathered and organized
what he conceives to be the important facts and thoughts
about NATO. Mr. Stanley is extremely diligent. I am not
aware of anything of importance among openly published
materials available at the time of his writing which he missed.
On the contrary, I am struck with the out-of-the-way pieces

On the contrary, I am struck with the out-of-the-way pieces
materials available at the time of his writing which he missed.
aware of anything of importance among obviously duped
about NATO. Mr. Stanley is extremely diligent. I am not
what he conceives to be the important facts and thoughts
Exercise in Paris), a single author has gathered and organized
as the leader of the American contingent to the Stikker
recently replaced Dr. Burton Klein of The RAND Corporation
In the next volume, that by Mr. Stanley (who has
really goes into that latter problem in any depth.
might also mention that none of the books here reviewed
integration of military planning and command at SHAPE. One
real value, and cost, of the attempted far-reaching
others of much greater moment, such as the question of the
NATO Alliance and which has served to divert attention from
overplay of the problems that have actually blazed the
of nuclear weapons--which I submit is properly the most
primary problem of the Alliance the question of the control
continuance of NATO. It then goes on to single out as the
United States has a greater stake than its allies in the
so it never once again the unfortunate impression that the
European friends have fed themselves to believe. In doing
threat, much more sinister and baleful than our

-3-

-4-

he managed to notice and which he seems also to have
read.

However, the book has a few qualities which enormously
diminish its value except perhaps for a very few specialists.
In the first place it presents from beginning to end _the_
party line of the United States State Department, _It is_
hard to believe that an organization so large could be as
nearly monolithic in its thinking as is so often alleged,
but of course we have other evidences besides this book to
indicate that these allegations are generally correct. _It_
is to his credit but not necessarily our satisfaction that
Mr. Stanley appears to
express the views he does not because it advan-
tages him to do so but because he really believes them.
Another possibly related quality is that the book is _deadly_[
_dull._ Because I must be aware of some problem of objectivity
in my attitude towards this book (which I shall clarify in
a moment) I took the trouble to consult several of my friends
who had also looked at it, and all of them volunteered the
view that it was indeed dull and a mostly unrewarding chore
to read.

On page 266 of the book my interest was suddenly
alerted by a reference to a paper by myself in which,

-5-

according to the author, I had "deliberately distorted" the implications of the "new American doctrine" concerning the military defense of Europe. Mr. Stanley could presumably have revealed--though he does not trouble to do so--the "implications" he is talking about and how I had distorted them. How he could have proved that I had deliberately distorted them is another matter. It is rather an unscholarly expression to use; and it is interesting mainly for showing the degree of emotional involvement of the author in official government policy, for in the paper he cites I had indeed severely criticized that policy. However, I will forgive Mr. Stanley his libel, because he thereby gratuitously presents me with at least presumptive proof that I had got through some two-thirds of his book (my name is not in the index).

A far superior book, precisely because it is immeasurably more incisive and therefore critical of U.S. policy, is that by Professor Henry A. Kissinger. As I have said elsewhere, this is undoubtedly Kissinger's best book thus far. Only a relatively small part of it is devoted to the military or strategic problems of the Alliance, which is appropriate. The major problems are and have been political.

this is undoubtedly Krasinger's best book thus far. Only

by Professor Henry V. Krasinger. As I have said elsewhere,

more inclusive and therefore critical of U.S. policy, is that

A far superior book, precisely because it is unnecessarily

name is not in the index).

-2-

-6-

In this book Professor Kissinger demonstrates once again his rare and remarkable gift for what might be called "political sense" on the international scene. Combined with his industry, his detachment, his powers of expression, and his access (because of his reputation and fluency in the major European tongues) to the leading politicians and bureaucrats of the NATO Alliance, it enables him to present what is the most readable, interesting, and helpful of the published commentaries on the NATO Alliance known to this reviewer. It is especially good in revealing to us the characteristically European views. If space permitted it would be desirable to explore some of the points Kissinger makes, but instead I can only recommend this short volume to the reader, who will profit much from the brief time it takes him to read it. It helps that it is also uncommonly well written.

BERNARD BRODIE

at Los Angeles
University of California

BERNARD BRODIE

uncommonly well written.

> time it takes him to read it. It helps [that it is also]
> short volume to the reader, who will profit much from the prief
> Klaasinger makes, but instead I can only recommend this
> it would be desirable to explore some of the points
> the characteristically European views. It abscuse permitted
> this reviewer. It is especially good in revealing to us
> of the published commentaries on the NATO Alliance known to
> present what is the most readable, interesting, and helpful
> purveyors of the NATO Alliance, it enables him to
> major European tongues] to the leading politicians and
> and his access (because of reputation and influence in the
> with his industry, his detachment, his powers of expression,
> "political sense", on the international scene. Comprised
> again his rare and remarkable gift for what might be called
> in this book Professor Klaasinger demonstrates once

-6-

August 31, 1966

Mr. Bernard Brodie
619 Resolano Drive
Pacific Palisades
California 90272

Dear Bernard:

This is just a note to reply to your friendly letter
of August 26th.

Let me suggest the following people for you to see,
if you do not already know them. In Bonn--Birrenbach,
an Atlanticist member of the CU, Helmut Schmidt and
Minister Krone who is in charge of the National Security
Council. In London--if you do not know Michael Cary, the
Permanent Head of the Navy, you should. In the Hague--
I suggest my friend, Ernst van der Beugel, with whom I do
not agree but who is most charming. Enclosed is a list
of their addresses.

I look forward very much to seeing you at the ISS
meeting.

Best wishes.

OCT 21 1956

THE REPORTER

660 Madison Avenue
New York City 21
TE 2 8800

Max Ascoli

October 18, 1966

Dear Bernard:

Thank you for your two letters, one about your book, the other on Bailey's piece, which we are rushing to press. I am very glad to have it, for too many crackpots have their say in our Correspondence columns; for once, we can publish a letter from a man of your distinction and wisdom.

Of course, I will be delighted if you would send me a follow-up to the Bailey story. And, please, don't start playing that modest tune: your background in political and military affairs lets you outrank with ease any one of my staff who deals with similar matters. Let me know when I can have the article.

As to the book, what kind of review can you expect from the New York Times, especially one written by Amitai Etzioni? I would like to bring out a review, but Henry is away somewhere, maybe Vietnam. Anyway, I have not heard from him. One thing, however, is certain: I would not give your book to him. You two are good friends of mine, and I would hate to have in The Reporter anything that could even remotely be called a back-scratching club. I am now looking for a reviewer. Any suggestion you can give me, other than Henry, would be welcome.

All the best,

Dr. Bernard Brodie
Social Sciences Building
University of California
Los Angeles, California 90024

cc: Dr. Henry Kissinger

Warren Rodgers,

I hope you are enjoying U.C.I.A.

I'm hoping to review your book for the *Air Force Quarterly*. Review section. Also if I can possibly clear my schedule enough, I'll be back. I am thinking of writing a letter to the editor of the book. Outrageous was the fact that the *New York Times* gave it to him in the I thought Eton's review was outrageous, but perhaps even more (I sayecd sup兵antist only to indicate a degree of academic objectivity.) Eton's. As you know I am in sup兵antist agreement with your book. I have since read both your book and the review article by a quick trip to Vietnam. This is why I can only swear it today.

You exchange with Max reached my office while I was out on a quick trip to Vietnam. This is why I can only swear it today.

Dear Bernard:

Los Angeles, California, 30034
University of California
Department of Political Science
Mr. Bernard Brodie

November 3, 1968

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

NOV 18 1966

November 14, 1966

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your kind note of November 9. I am in complete
agreement with you that the real scandal in the New York Times review
lay less in the review itself than in the fact that my book--and Knorr's
very important one, too--was given to Etzioni in the first place. Etzioni
had previously demonstrated his incapacity for the job, most recently by
writing a messy and biased review of Bruce Smith's The RAND Corporation.

However, I must say that Francis Brown, the editor of the New York
Times Book Review, has tried to make amends. After I wrote him a second
letter, which I told him I did not expect to see published but which I
wanted him to have for his own information, he wrote me a letter reflecting
real regret and said he did want to publish my second letter as well--a
condensed version of which will appear in next Sunday's issue. It reveals
the further and deliberate distortions in Etzioni's reply to my first letter.
Nevertheless, I still think that a letter to Brown from yourself would do
no harm and might do additional good. Brown obviously means well, but the
area in which we write is foreign to him and he clearly needs some guidance.

Concerning my exchange with Max in which I recommended you as a reviewer
of my book, I got a reply from him in which he said he was opposed to anything
that might look like mutual back-scratching and asked me to recommend one or
two others. He was, of course, right, at least for his own journal, and I
made the requested recommendations. However, that consideration should have
nothing to do with the Virginia Quarterly.

With best regards,

BB:sp

April 17, 1967

Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Brodie
619 Resolano Drive
Pacific Palisades
California 90272

Dear Bernard and Fawn:

This is just a note upon my return
to Cambridge to tell you how much I enjoyed
the evening with you.

I liked the conversation and the
dinner was fun too.

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

dinner was fun too.

I liked the conversation and the
dinner with you.

to Cambridge to tell you how much I enjoyed
This is just a note upon my return

Dear Bernard and Fawn:

California 90343
Pacific Palisades
619 Resolvo Drive
Mr. and Mrs. Bernard Brodie

April 17, 1967

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

September 29, 1967

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Henry:

We are looking, with a certain degree of urgency, for a top flight man in International Relations who can be persuaded to move out to this area and join us. For someone with sufficient distinction, we are prepared to offer among the highest ranks in our schedule. The urgency stems partly from the fact that if we don't move fast we are very likely to lose the slot--at least for a high level appointment.

As you know, I have very high confidence in your judgment about ideas in this field, and therefore about the people who originate them.

I would trust your opinion on the quality of a candidate more than that of any one else that I know. This is not simply to butter you up. It is a plain fact.

I hope you will find it possible to give me one or more suggestions at your earliest convenience. We are not, of course, restricting ourselves to choices among the very top rank, but we do want someone who has already proved his ability to do a substantial amount of good work--which is the best indication that I know of that he will do more.

It looks like Governor Rockefeller's star is rising rapidly again, and probably higher than ever before. I am very glad of this, despite the fact that I am not usually Republican in my sentiments. But the right kind of change in Washington is very much needed. However, if you ever get the chance to get the point across, a connection with Reagan is sheer poison for Rockefeller. If the latter really wants the nomination, he can get it, I am sure, without making a deal with our "favorite son." Believe me, I am not speaking

/2

NOV 10 1967

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

November 7, 1967

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Here is the article I promised to send you. You may
remember that I also sent you recently a reprint of the
article I published a few weeks ago in the _Los Angeles Times_
having to do with the "BMD against China" idea. I should
appreciate your dropping me a little note suggesting what
fields I ought to emphasize, or perhaps confine myself to,
in my remarks to the Governor. You said something about it
over the phone, but if you could amplify it with a paragraph
or so it would be most helpful.

Incidentally, if you can recommend a hotel in New York,
I should be most grateful. I don't remember one that I have
been to that I particularly care for. I saw a quite new one,
which I think was called the Americana, when I was last in
New York, but maybe you have other ideas.

I hope that by now you have come to some kind of conclusion
--and even more hopefully a favorable one--concerning the proposal
I made to you the other week. I feel our chairman wants to move
fast, while the administration's offer to support such a high-
salary post remains good.

By the way, my wife has just finished preparing an article
on what Reagan has done to the mental health program in California.
I shall have a carbon copy along with me when I see the Governor,
just in case he brings up the subject of Reagan.

With best regards.

BB:nb

November 28, 1967

Professor Bernard Brodie
Department of Political Science
University of California
Los Angeles, California

Dear Bernard:

I feel very remiss about not having answered your letter of November 7 before now. The reason was partly to give me a chance to think about your proposal. Very reluctantly I have come to the conclusion that I must say no, though I was very tempted; but I do not want to separate myself from my children at this stage.

As for our meeting on December 7 I suggest that you cover some of the material of your splendid article in *The Reporter*. We shall make your hotel reservations and I shall let you know about it as soon as we have made them.

Do bring the article on Reagan along, but I would suggest that you let me give it to the Governor. He may feel a little reluctant to discuss Reagan in the presence of several others.

With best regards.

APR 19 1968

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

April 16, 1968

Dear Henry:

Thanks for your very nice note, and thank you especially for giving us the time to present that superb seminar.

The latch is always hanging out for you. Whenever you are in this area and feel in the mood for another seminar (and for another dinner with us) the invitation is always wide open.

With warmest regards.

BB:nb

P.S. I am enclosing a clipping from the *Daily Bruin* reporting your seminar. It seems to me more than usually accurate, and I hope you find nothing embarrassing in it.

# The Impact of Bureaucracy on Policy Making: The Relationship of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process, Why the Process Affects Policy the Way it Does

by Henry Kissinger

The most frequent question that one is asked when abroad, or by people who are concerned with international affairs and have not seen policy made, is "What is American policy?". Foreign policy is so complicated in the contemporary period by the fact that the actual decision-making process leads to a fragmentation of the decisions. Also, research and intelligence organizations, either foreign or national, attempt to give a rationality and consistency to foreign policy which simply does not exist. I have found it next to impossible to convince eminent Frenchmen that there is no such thing as an American foreign policy, and that a series of moves that have produced a certain result may have not been planned to produce that result.

Foreigners looking at American policy have a tendency to assume that anything that happened was intended, and that there is a deep, complicated purpose behind our actions. I wish this were true, but I don't believe that it is. In fact, I think that in any large bureaucracy it probably cannot be true and this is probably the case with the Soviet Union also. We probably ascribe more consistency to Soviet foreign policy than really exists. The only foreign country which I believe has understood American policy making at all well is Great Britain. Most foreign countries that deal with us wait until we have done something, and then try to prove to us that what we have done is either illegal or undesirable. (This is the thing in which the Germans specialize.)

Once the American decision-making process has disgorged an answer, it becomes technically very difficult to change the policy because even those who have serious doubts about it become reluctant to hazard its use in an international forum, since there is no telling what would come out of a re-evaluation of existing measures. If one wishes to influence American foreign policy, the time to do so is in the formative period, and the level is the middle level of the bureaucracy--that of the assistant secretary and his immediate advisors. That is the highest level in which people can still think. Above that, the day to day operation of the machine absorbs most of the energy, and the decisions that are made depend very much on internal pressures of the bureaucracy. Great Britain seems to me to have correctly identified this, and attempts to influence us through a whole set of personal relationships. This doesn't prevent such things as the Skybolt Affair and others, so it is not an infallible process, but it works better than that of any other foreign country.

Why is it so difficult to change policy? Part of the reason is mechanical, and part of it seems to me to be psychological. The mechanical reason is that as the bureaucracy becomes large and complex, more time is devoted to running its internal management than in divining the purpose of which it is supposed to serve. The two things tend to merge in the minds of the top decision makers.

When I first started advising at high levels of the government in the early days of the Kennedy Administration, I suffered from the illusion that all I had to do was walk into the President's office, convince him I was right, and he would then naturally do what I had recommended. There were a number of things wrong with this view. The vast majority of people who get to see the President are plausible,

so he constantly sees individuals who sound very convincing. His time
is so budgeted and the pressures on him are so great, that it is almost
impossible for him to know whether he should listen to one convincing
individual or the other.

Also, even if by chance, I persuaded him that his whole bureaucracy was wrong and I was right, he would then have the next problem of going about ~~how to~~ implementing what had been suggested. And that ~~is not a negligible issue. There are only so many things~~ that even the President can do against the wishes of the bureaucracy, not because ~~EVER~~ the Bureaucracy would deliberately sabotage him, but because

The easy decisions are made at subordinate levels. every difficult issue is a closed one. A closed issue is characterized by the fact that the pros and cons seem fairly evenly divided and/or because the execution really depends on certain nuances of application. Unless you can get the willing support of your subordinates, simply giving an order does not get very far.

I have reason to believe, for example, that after the Nassau meeting President Kennedy intended to extend to France the same sort of consideration that had been given to Britain at Nassau. Indeed, he was prepared to put France into the same position, with some nuclear assistance as well, since that formal offer wouldn't have meant anything unless France had some help on its nuclear warheads. It is also clear that the State Department and certain groups in the Defense Department were opposed to this. In order not to force this issue, President Kennedy kept the intention relatively vague, because why fight the State Department ~~if you don't~~ even know what de Gaulle will accept? There existed a wide margin within which the State Department people could operate in interpreting their directives, not because they

they were deliberately trying to undermine the President's intentions, because they sincerely didn't understand his intention. Certainly, one of the contributing factors to the failure of our post-Nassau diplomacy was the fact that while presidential emmissaries were saying one thing to the French, State Department embassies were saying something else to other European countries. Leaving aside the question of whether Kennedy's intention was correct, one can nevertheless that illustrate the difficulty even a president can encounter when moving in a certain direction without the willing, and perhaps even enthusiastic support of most of his bureaucracy.

When the bureaucracy is large and fragmented as it is, decisions do not get made until they appear as an administrative issue. One cannot convince a high level official that he has a problem until it appears unambiguously in the form of an administrative conflict. There is no such thing, in my view, as Vietnam policy; there is a series of programs of individual agencies concerned with Vietnam, which are reconciled or not, as the case may be, if there is a conflict between the operating agencies. In the areas where there is no conflict between agencies, it would be very rare to get a high level consideration. When conflict exists, there is a problem, and the environment becomes more receptive. For example, Westmoreland asked for 20,000 troops, that forced a high level review. But the day to day operations of a war or of an alliance diplomacy will not generally engage the President and the Secretary of State.

In the late 1950s it was axiomatic among my colleagues that the United States was lacking a sense of national purpose, though in the early 1960s this was remedied. The top officials are too busy to deal with anything except the several thousand cables that arrive in

Washington every day. Typically, they are too busy to plan ahead. Planning involves conjectures about the future and hypothetical cases. They are so busy with actual cases that they are reluctant to take on theoretical ones. In an illustration I made in 1963 or 1964 the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department produced a long document about American national purposes which somebody leaked to the Senate Foreign Committee, which subsequently called Secretary of State Rusk to testify about this document. That was the first time that Rusk had ever read the document. This is the typical fate of policy planning in the State Department. In my experience I do not recall a single instance in which, when a decision had to be made at a high level, a policy planning paper was discussed or a member of the policy planning staff was asked to join. I report this as an empirical fact. I don't believe it has happened in the Vietnam War at all.

I think most policy planning staffs in our government are created as sops to administrative theory and spend their time projecting the familiar into the future, but are not used for real innovation or even for developing criteria by which one can judge progress properly. This creates considerable rigidities. The executives become extremely conscious of the morale of their staffs.

Modern policy makers face a problem which is quite unique. I recently wrote an article about the foreign policy of Bismarck and discovered in the process that the German Foreign Officer in the 1870s had exactly four permanent officials, roughly the scale at which all foreign officers operated at the turn of the century. It would never have occurred to any Cabinet Minister as late as the outbreak of World War II that he knew less about his problems than his subordinates. Yet, in the contemporary world, policy makers have to make decisions on a range of issues in which they may not give many

hours to the same problems that their experts have spent years studying. This creates a congenital insecurity and a quest for administrative consensus behind which executives take refuge. It also leads to a situation in which rather than the executives using the bureaucracy, the opposite may be true; the bureaucracy often tries to use the executives. I think the history of the MLF is a good example.

Our governmental process works reasonably well in relation to specific technical issues when there is an adversary procedure. If one department is strongly for something and another department opposed, then the President or cabinet officer has a chance of elaborating an overall purpose. The system goes awry if you have a small, dedicated, unopposed group. I would argue that the MLF was put over by a highly motivated, highly intelligent individuals, in a government where a considerable number of people were indifferent and nobody was really opposed. The process in which it was done involved, at least in its early phases, a fairly deliberate manipulation by the bureaucracy of the senior executives.

For example, sentences were put into a Presidential speech which in themselves were perfectly sensible, but the full import of which was perhaps not understood. These were then used to start study groups which were subsequently used to present a new claim for a little more progress, and so on until the point where the prestige of the United States had become heavily committed to something the implications of which, in my judgment, had never been submitted to the adversary procedure. No systematic case was made for the opposition to the MLF during the most formative period of the relevant v. S. policy.

Because of this gap between expertise and decision making, a great deal of communication occurs by means of a briefing. Now, briefings reward theatrical qualities. They put a premium on the ability to package information and to present a fore-ordained result. Every briefer worth his salt says, "Interrupt me at any point with a question." Usually the victim of the briefing is very proud of the fact that he can formulate a question. The briefer has heard the question a thousand times before, and it is like throwing a fast ball across the middle of the plate to Mickey Mantle, and so he gives an overwhelmingly glib response. All of this creates a state of mind where the policy maker may have the uneasy feeling of knowing he is being taken, even though he doesn't quite know how, and this magnifies the sense of insecurity. Precisely because the management of the

This notion that foreign policy consists in constantly sparking new ideas, as if constant endless originality is the essence of foreign policy, is in itself open to question. I don't believe that de Gaulle is a considerable statesman because he comes wixx up with a new thought every Thursday. Most ideas that masquerade as new ideas in Washington have been around for quite a long time. The utility of the outsider is that he can inject at a higher level certain ideas that have been around. He is not part of the bureaucratic battle. He is not a problem because it is not the decision-maker has to placate, there he can be listened to without the implications that are almost inseparable from listening to the bureaucracy. One corollary conclusion I would draw is that the outside adviser should never advise unless his opinion is asked, and he should get out as soon as it is delivered. When he himself becomes an advocate of his policies, as soon as he becomes a bureaucratic problem, he loses his effectiveness, and he is gradually degraded to the level of other bureaucrats.

The tendencies which seem to me to be inherent in the nature of modern bureaucracy tend to be compounded in the United States by the particular cast of mind of our top policy makers, many of whom come from the legal profession. Lawyers are notoriously reluctant to take on hypothetical cases. All planning involves hypothetical cases and therefore there is a tendency among the legal professionals to deal with problems on their merits.

Secondly, the lawyer and some of our business executives are comfortable only with adversary proceedings; without them, they don't know how to guide policy. In the areas where I have seen American negotiations being carried out, I do not recall a detailed negotiating position ever existing before a date for the conference was set. And this reluctance to spell out what we were after is due to the fact that professional negotiators want to see what the other side has to offer

before they commit themselves. Therefore, in periods of preliminary
diplomacy, our position is very rigid and tough, but this changes ra-
pidly when a negotiator has been appointed because he acts as spokes-
man for the other side. It is not his problem to worry about the
overall picture. He worries about the success of the negotiations,
and you make the negotiations succeed by taking very seriously into
account what the other side has to say. Therefore, one can notice a
tendency in American foreign policy to spasms of rigidity and spasms
of tactical flexibility, which I think can be related rather closely to
the administrative process.

Another group that deserves mention are the business executives, ~~whom~~ Secretary McNamara excluded to some extent who have the conviction that their special skill consists in making decisions between administra- tively produced proposals on the basis of some general rule of thumb or a strong will. Within the government, they lack the familiar frame- work of the experience they have accumulated over a long period with their businesses. They (as often) become prisoners of the bureaucracy as its leaders.

In all of these observations I have excluded Secretary McNamara a man of unusual intelligence, toughness of mind, and long range concep- tion. In his case, however, a number of very serious problems existed. One was a very curious bent for theoretical combat which would not allow him leave no stupid argument go unchallenged, even if no prac- tical conclusion followed from it. Secondly, a tendency to want to be right at all times and to be so far superior to most people with whom he was arguing that he would win even without fully convincing them. I feel that Secretary McNamara gained control over procurement in the Pentagon and over procurement-type decisions in the Pentagon at the eventual cost of losing control over policy decisions. He lost control

Questions

Comment: I think your indictment of Mr. McNamara is correct but too narrow. The problem with Mr. McNamara is that he lacks an appreciation of the unifying influence of theory (be it political or mathematical or economic) and he deals too much in the concrete. This is his flaw, but let us give him his due. What he did in one year was change the war plan of the United States, communicate this unequivocally to our allies, who found it a magnificent reinforcement of our commitment abroad, and assert command over the most stubborn parts of the military bureaucracy.

Mr. Kissinger: Let me comment briefly. I did not mean to say that McNamara addressed himself only to procurement. McNamara, in the specific nature of the decisions that had to be taken during the first four years of his being in office, addressed himself primarily to general doctrinal issues, and to putting some sense and order into the problem of force levels of the various services. He did this with extraordinary ability. In the process, whether avoidably or unavoidably, and largely unavoidably, he made so many enemies that in the actual conduct of policy he then had to pick his objectives. I disagree with you when you say that the doctrine he developed was considered by our allies as a magnificent reinforcement of the American commitment. I consider it a taking on of a theoretical argument that had no great consequence and produced considerable difficulty. However, that is a question of judgment that any defense secretary has a right to make and has nothing to do with the bureaucratic process. I feel that political sensitivity was not included among McNamara's great qualities and therefore he would not always be conscious of the political impact abroad of theoretical arguments he was making. I often felt he was doing things with which I agreed but in such a way as to be counterproductive. However, that was a question of personality rather than of structure.

Question: Could you comment on the ways in which a new president may or may not be able to shake the inertia of the system in regard to the problem of Vietnam?

Mr. Kissinger: I have the impression that much of Vietnam is going to be shaken up before a new President comes in. As a general rule I believe a new President,

in the areas where he wants to effect change, must do so within the first four months. He need not complete it within this time, but he must give enough of a shake to the bureaucracy to indicate that he wants a new direction and he must be brutal enough to demonstrate that he means it. Xk

It was easy under the Eisenhower administration to ridicule the formalism of the decision-making process. In effect, it was somewhat ridiculous-- there were many documents which were really diplomatic treaties between the various departments, and which enabled each department to do what it had wanted to do in the first place. But it had the great advantage that there was a regular procedure for getting decisions made. Under Kennedy this procedure was dismantled, and he substituted for it a sort of nervous energy and great intellectual activity, which worked well because he was an enormously intelligent man, surrounded by a very lively group of people, so that all sorts of ideas were floating into the very receptive White House.

The drawback under the Kennedy Administration was that there really was no regular procedure to getting things done, except on crisis issues, because you never could be sure who was being heard in addition to the constituted people, who did not always present their cases in the presence of the others who disagreed with them. It was a somewhat amorphous process. Under Johnson you had the disorganization of Kennedy without the intellectual excitement, and with somewhat of a fear of the President superimposed on it. The organizational problem seems to be to combine the procedural regularity of Eisenhower with the intellectual excitement of Kennedy. Whether that is possible, I do not know.

Eisenhower tended to operate almost exclusively with the NSC machinery, and he had divided the responsibility so that the current NSC business would be conducted by the staff secretary, while the planning side was conducted by the chief of the NSC staff. The operations coordinating board was the undersecretary's and was supposed to implement the planning decisions of the National Security Council. The drawback of the NSC as it was run under Eisenhower was that it was terribly formalistic. One way to tell they really weren't doing anything was to take their papers, write down the opposite of what they had said, and see that this involved no policy choice. You are not

saying anything that is in the American interest to have a pro-American
government in country X. No one would argue that it is in our interest
to have an anti-American government there. It turned into a series of
abstract platitudes which were not too effective.

Kennedy used the NSC primarily as a sounding board; it rarely made
important decisions. He had something called the Committee of Principals
which met when concrete decisions had to be made--such as the Berlin crisis.
There was no regular staff work for these meetings, it was all done on an
ad hoc basis, on a very substantial intellectual level.

Johnson is compulsively secretive and will not say what he thinks, so
it is very hard to discover people who think they know what he wants.
There is less of a premium on coming up with new ideas under him. I think
something like the Committee of Principals, or the National Security Council
with a staff of McGeorge Bundy qualities is needed. There is a staff which
keeps groping and is not primarily a diplomatic instrument.

Probably what is needed is something similar to what McNamara did in the
Defense Department, that is, to try to establish some criteria by which to
judge success and failure. McNamara got control of the Defense Department
by flooding the various agencies with questions which they had
to answer and which gave him good information. It took several years to bring
home to them that the usual bureaucratic double-talk wouldn't go. Something
like that is needed in the national security area, where it is much more difficult
to establish, because the criteria are more elusive. There isn't any clear
notion of what the American national interest is, and this presents a great
problem. Most of the traditional concepts of balance of power just don't
apply to the contemporary theory of national interest. How to develop
criteria in this sort of intellectual vacuum is very difficult.

All the thinking of balance of power has been related to territorial
control. You could judge whether there was an equilibrium by what country
changed allegiance. We live in a curious period in which territorial control
may not be that important. We have good categories for resisting what

we call aggression. Leaving the issue of whether we are correct in our
assessment that the Vietnamese War was Chinese instigated--which I don't
happen to believe--one would still be able to argue that no conceivable territorial
gain of Communist China in Vietnam, or for that matter in Southeast Asia,
could compare in terms of augmentation of its strength with the acquisition of
nuclear weapons so far as concerned its impact on the international situation.
We have some criteria for judging one, and none for the other.

It is hard to argue that any area is essential for American survival from
the purely physical point of view, but there is such a thing as a psychological,
moral balance. What would it do to the U.S. to be completely isolated,
irrelevant to the rest of the world, even if we had enough of a nuclear
arsenal to prevent a physical attack? This is an area in which I have not
seen any very systematic thinking, although it is a chief problem in international
equilibrium to which we have to address ourselves.

Question: This is really on a broader scale. Mr. Kissinger, must we worry
about neutralization until the time and place has been set? Don't we have
within the bureaucracy some kind of planning for negotiations?

Answer: There are two parts to plans: one is to get them, second is to
have to take them seriously. We have more plans than we have plans that are
taken seriously. We have more plans than we have taken seriously. Take the problem of negotiations
on an issue that is highly controversial and may even have political implications.
No doubt some planning paper gets prepared, maybe even an interagency one.
Yet the people involved have in the back of their minds the question: why
should they fight with that issue now? It will be just as bloody later on,
but at least they will be paying the price then for a possible result. Why
fight it as a purely theoretical issue? And therefore my experience with
sort of negotiating plan shows that usually we'll get a multiplication of
tough positions. Nobody wants to take on the unpleasant role of advocating
major changes; nobody wants to be called before a Congressional committee.

Therefore, that sort of plan, if you're talking about a negotiating plan, is
very abstract and theoretical. Secondly, in my experience, which is limited,
it rarely receives the serious attention of the principals. Either the

-5-

principals won't look at it at all or they will look at it in a way that requires
no practical consequence; but they won't do it in a way that requires implementa-
tion to follow, and this is especially true if there is no one who has a primary
responsibility for it--if it is simply said that it would be a good thing to
have a negotiating position but there is no one whose own bureaucratic
success depends on having a negotiating position.

Question: Do you feel that negotiation is good in and of itself?

Answer: Do I think so? Don't apply what I said to Vietnam, although some
aspects of it would apply. The tendency is to say that something is either a
military problem or a diplomatic problem--and if it's a diplomatic problem,
then it's the State Department's job. The State Department, probably for
reasons of the background of its personnel that one could go into, tends to
approach it on a largely tactical level. That is, they'll develop a position,
they want to see what the other position is, then they'll see what is negotiable.
The difference between what is negotiable and what is desirable may be very wide.
And if you don't know what is desirable and operate only on the basis of what
is negotiable, you really encourage the other side to take a very extreme position.
If the other side knows that you're going to compromise considerably,
they are encouraged to take an extreme rather than a conciliatory position.
So the problem with the State Department approach to most negotiations is
that it's entirely tactical.

Question: Could you comment, please, on the seizing of the Pueblo by
North Korea?

Answer: It was quite an intelligence coup for the other side to get the
equipment and all of these people. I think it also shows the extent to which
we have become overextended by the Vietnamese war. It would have been incon-
ceivable five years ago that North Korea could capture an American ship,
tow it into Wonsan, and that absolutely nothing would happen. In our public
discussion we say we must get it through diplomacy--well, diplomacy unrelated
to other things can't achieve a great deal, and we can't do many other things
because of Vietnam. Another thing the Pueblo incident illustrates or highlights

to me is the following: I always thought it was a mistake to get South
Korea involved in Vietnam for many reasons, one of which was the fact that at
any level the outcome of the Vietnamese war was not likely to be very
agreeable to S eoul, even before the Tet offensive. Besides, it created additional
additional incentives to what is already a very tough regime in North Korea
to get itself involved. But I have no brilliant solution on how to get
these people back.

Question: I have a double-barrelled question. Would we do better without a monumental State Department? It seems we do better if we have a small number of chairmen and officials than a huge array, or are they necessary? State Department is habitually accused of being tedious and of not producing anything. Is that a plausible accusation?

Answer: I must say I w hold the view that we are so overstaffed that it makes thinking almost impossible. When you have in embassies abroad individuals XXXXING assigned to particular small groups, each of them filing endless reports, the result is that no senior official can possibly read everything that comes in--no new official in turn will say that he has nothing to report, so the machine keeps churning on. I've often been struck by the fact that when a U.S. embassy would use me to get people in that weren't easily accessible, there would be about twelve Americans hanging over these people taking down practically every word, so that they could include it in their reports the next day rather than to let it develop in a more normal way. I think the handling of all of this material does make it more difficult to reflect. Which part you cut out is a big problem, because the world has become more complicated and you have to know more things. On the whole, if we could get rid of the bottom half of the Foreign Service we might be better off.

Now about the State Department. There is a definite problem in the State
Department, and it consists of many factors. One is that State Department
training is in the direction of reporting and negotiation, not of thinking in
terms of national policy. They are trained to give a very good account of
what somebody said to them. They can give a much less good account of what
this means. Also, if an officer works on the Iran desk, he can tell you every
detail about Iran. Then he gets transferred to another job, and you can
never get him to talk about Iran again, and he will know everything about
Austria or whatever.

Another quality that is rewarded is a certain negotiation skill. But what is not encouraged in the State Department hierarchy, though it is in a military hierarchy, is an assumption of responsibility and the tendency to think of problems from the vantage point of a higher level. I think the first eight to ten years of a State Department man's career tend to be such as to drive the more imaginative and more purpose-oriented people out of it. When I look at people that I see engaged in it at lower levels, I think this is probably true that they are the least adventurous.

Question: Can you make some comment on the role of intellectuals in the bureaucracy?

Answer: I don't think you relate intellectuals to the bureaucracy as one undifferentiated group. For example, in the preparation of the strategic posture document it was the practice--at least on some occasions--to call in outside intellectuals to help in the preparation. And there they were useful on their merits, just as if they had been in the bureaucracy. They were not being called in just because they could referee the disputes but because of their expertise in a particular field. Other intellectuals are called in not because any one cares about their opinion but because they are judged to be useful in defending the policy elsewhere. This has the risk that if the policy changes, you have made yourself a critic. Other intellectuals are called in in order to give some moral reinforcement to the decision maker who really has heard all arguments already, but would like to hear an outsider say the same thing. Thus there are many different roles that outsiders play. Sometimes outsiders are called in because it is the only way of keeping knowledge of certain things from getting too widely diffused in the bureaucracy.

Question: There is in your presentation a kind of pessimistic historical inevitability in American government process. One almost has the impression that policy making by lottery might be almost as good if not better. What then do you feel is rational and correct about the policy process as you have known it, and do you think there are improvements to be made?

Answer: I don't think policy by lottery would be better, but I think that if one wants to understand what the government is likely to do, one has to understand what the bureaucracies of the problems. The ways in which

intellectuals from the outside often go wrong are several: one is that they judge a policy by its plausibility to them without taking into account that the policy maker is responsible not only for the best thing that can happen but also for the worst thing, and that many ideas cannot be implemented not because they are bad but because the consequences of their failure would be too great. Another is what for the policy maker the most difficult problem is the problem of conjecture. That is, when the scope for action is great, the knowledge on which to base this action is relatively small. When the knowledge is great, the scope for action has often already disappeared. So you have to act on the basis of an assessment which you cannot prove true when you make it. It involves a moral and psychological act as much as an intellectual act.

And finally, there is the inherent dynamism of the political and bureaucratic process itself. In that sense, there is a certain necessity about this. If you do not know how this process operates, it is very difficult to predict on the basis of abstract rationality how it is going to come out. The reason why this particular problem is magnified is that it seems to me that only in the rarest cases is there a relationship between high position and great substantive knowledge. Most of our elective officials had to spend so much of their energy getting elected that they can give relatively little attention to the substance of what they are going to do when they get elected. And therefore you get the curious phenomenon of people deciding to run for high office first and then scrambling around for some intellectuals to tell them what their positions ought to be. In many cases it is not that the intellectuals are used merely as speech writers for positions that the policy-makers already have; it is literally the case that you are starting with a tabula rasa, and that the position the political leader takes is much influenced by the type of intellectual that sometimes quite accidentally winds up in his entourage.

The top policy makers usually do not know that they have a problem until they have an administrative issue. They often show enormous reluctance to guide the project, because they are not really sure in what direction they want to guide it. Now de Gaulle has a conception of policy, and I would

therefore *not* say that he is the prisoner of his administrative apparatus.
The opposite may be the problem there: that his policy verges on the capricious.
But still, the typical political leader of the contemporary managerial society
is a man with a strong will, a high capacity to get himself elected, but no
very great conception of what he is going to do when he gets into office.
This is true of many of the Cabinet officials as well, and in this sense,
although I don't accept your notion of inevitability, I am pessemistic about
the ability of modern bureaucratic society to manage a world which is quite
discontinuous with its previous experience, and especially to do so with
generosity and vision. I am not saying it's technically impossible, but
the challenges are so much greater.