Attachment A

Status and Procedure on Reports

IV. Ask Bay Manning to work on rewriting.

1. There are some cleavages, minor, in report that have to be settled.

III. Dick Gardner writing a draft which is due January 15.

1. HAK to see him in ten days.

V. First half is good, second half less good.

1. Killian has latest draft now.

2. This report has third priority.

3. Should be ready by end of January.

VII. Is in final shape except for editing. Has panel clearance.

3. Should be ready released late -- third or fourth.

I. Berle Draft - he is working on conclusions.

1. Careful editing would help immensely.

2. This could be ready by March or April at latest.

VI. Dickey is redoing. Said would have it early December.

1. Cantril doing piece on Leadership.

2. HAK and OR to look around for person to write paper on succession.

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Nelson A. Rockefeller
President

Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

August 13, 1957

Dear Henry:

Attached are three very rough drafts. I will work on them later to smooth out but wanted to get them in the mail as we've had two more calls today re the September meeting.

Some questions:

Do you think that maybe we should try to get agreement from those asked about the editing committee, and then inform the other panel members about its existence. It might be better to do this at a later date rather than holding these letters. I do think it is important to tell all members about the procedure we are going to follow at some time.

How many days -- or part of a day -- do you think we should schedule for October. Need to know this before asking them when they can come.

I have not drafted letters from you to regular subpanel members but will try to do something along that line.

Bill's edited copy of Subpanel II will be sent to you tonight in case you want to use it in your own drafting.

Incidentally, don't forget NAR's points. I am thinking particularly of "we must be able to <u>prevent</u> general war and we must be able to <u>cope</u> with limited war."

P.S. Gov. Moore and Miss Baldwin will both be off out of town Aug. 23. However, Mr. Pant could see George Deming of their staff. It would be helpful if they could know in advance specifically what Mr. Pant has in mind so that they could collect material, etc.

Overall Panel members of II

Dear Gordon:

Henry is sending under separate cover the latest draft of
the Subpanel II report for your review and comment. I haven't
read this version but in going over the last few drafts have felt they
were coming nearer to what the group had in mind. As a matter of
fact I am quite enthusiastic.

We are sending this draft to the Overall panel members participating on Subpanel II to get their comments before submitting it to the entire subpanel for comment and approval. The time factor is causing major publication problems and we would appreciate having your reactions as quickly as possible.

(We would very much appreciate having your reactions as quickly as possible because we should like to make the necessary revisions and obtain your endorsement at the earliest possible date.)

The Overall report is now in the works. In discussing how to handle the manuscript with Henry we thought it might be best to send draft chapters as they come through to obtain technical comments in writing from the members before we met so that the discussion could focus on substantive questions. Therefore, we plan to cancel the session tentatively scheduled for the week of September sixteenth and would like to make definite plans for the week of October twenty-first. We would appreciate your returning the enclosed form indicating the most convenient time for you to attend during that period.

With many thanks and warm regards,

[lc]

Editing Committee

Dear _________________

Just a note to keep you informed of the progress of the Special
Studies Project and to ask your advice on handling the material.

(Put in an appropriate subpanel para, i.e.: The Subpanel IV
report draft is taking shape along the lines the group requested but
because of the workload on the staff due to the necessary first priority
of the Overall report, I doubt that we shall get it to your panel members
for review and comment before the middle of September.)

The Overall panel report is now in the works. In discussing how
to handle the manuscript with Henry we thought of the possibility of
setting up a small committee of six or eight from the overall panel who
might work with us in editing the chapters as they come through. When
this group is satisfied then the material can go to the panel as a whole
with the endorsement of the editing committee. I don't see how we can
try to go over the book with the whole panel without some intermediary
step of this kind. Do you think well of this idea? If so, would you
be willing to be one of the committee? The others we have in mind are
Mrs. Hobby, (Mrs. Rosenberg), Miss Hickey, Mr. Luce, Mr. Berle, Mr. Cowles
and Dr. Killian.

Because of the time necessary to complete this process, we plan
to cancel the session tentatively scheduled for the Overall panel the week
of September sixteenth. However, would it be possible for you to attend
a meeting of the editing committee on Wednesday, September 18th.? We
would like to make definiteplans for the whole panel to meet the week of
October 21st and would appreicate your returning the enclosed form......

[LC]

Overall Panel Members
I, III, IV, V, VI

Dear Justin:

Just a note to keep you informed of the progress of the
Special Studies Project.

The Overall report is now in the works, and ~~In~~ discussing how to handle the manuscript with Henry we thought it might be best to send draft chapters as they come through to obtain technical comments in writing from the members before we met so that the discussion ~~would~~ could focus on substantive questions. Therefore, we plan to cancel the session tentatively scheduled for the week of September sixteenth and would like to make definite plans for the week of October 21st. We would appreciate your returning the enclosed form indicating the most convenient time for you to attend during that period.

The Subpanel VI report draft is taking shape along the lines
the group requested but because of the workload on the staff due to
the necessary first priority of the Overall report, I doubt that we
shall get it to your panel members for review and comment before the
end of September. (Subpanels III, IV and V use "mid-September").
(Subpanel I use following paragraph: The workload on the staff due
to the necessary first priority of the Overall report has slowed the
drafting of the Subpanel I report. I doubt that we shall get it to your
panel members for review and comment before October.)

PANEL SCHEDULE

Thursday, August 25, 1955

<table><tr><td>9:30 - 10:00</td><td>Assemble. Administrative Information</td></tr><tr><td>10:00 - 12:30</td><td>Study of Reference Material</td></tr><tr><td>12:30 - 2:00</td><td>Lunch</td></tr><tr><td>2:00 - 2:30</td><td>Study of Reference Material</td></tr><tr><td>2:30 - 3:30</td><td>Welcome and Orientation by Mr. Rockefeller</td></tr><tr><td>3:30 - 4:15</td><td>Meet with Chairman</td></tr><tr><td>4:15 - 5:15</td><td>The Implications of the Post-Geneva Situation<br>Speaker: Mr. Douglas MacArthur II<br>Counselor, Department of State</td></tr><tr><td>7:00</td><td>Dinner with Mr. Rockefeller at Metropolitan Club</td></tr></table>

Friday, August 26, 1955

<table><tr><td>9:00 - 10:00</td><td>The Non-Military Foreign Aid Program - Its Relationship to U. S. Objectives<br>Speaker: Mr. John Hollister<br>Director, International Cooperation Administration</td></tr><tr><td>10:00 - 10:15</td><td>Break</td></tr><tr><td>10:15 - 11:15</td><td>A Survey of the World Situation<br>Speaker: Mr. Robert Amory, Jr.<br>Deputy Director for Intelligence<br>Central Intelligence Agency</td></tr><tr><td>11:15 - 11:30</td><td>Break</td></tr></table>

HK/2

6/11/56

Dear __________;

I am writing this letter to you as a person uniquely qualified to assist in what I believe to be an important project for defining the role of the United States in world society.

I think you will agree that the last ten years have seen unparalleled changes in the position of the United States, both international and domestic. The rapid rate of technological changes, the increases of productivity, the emergence of the United States as the principal power in the Free World and the Soviet challenge, all emphasize the need for re-examining many of the ideas we formed in more leisurely periods.

We all know that we are for such things as freedom, the independence of nations and human dignity, but we seem less clear about what these general purposes mean in the light of the problems that are likely to confront us over the next twenty years. It may well be that developments have outstripped our concepts and our ability to project our purposes.

It has, therefore, seemed to me uniquely important to attempt to start a series of studies which would look at the problems and opportunities of the United States over a fifteen to twenty year period. The advice and counsel of people such as yourself would be extremely important in this effort. I would be particularly grateful if you were to outline your views -- perhaps in the form of a memorandum -- regarding the problems and opportunities you see ahead for the United States over the next twenty years. I am

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HK/2

not thinking of specific policies to deal with these problems -- although,
of course, I would be delighted to have your suggestions -- but rather with
an identification of the problems and a set of attitudes or principles from
which conclusions may flow.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, I am delighted to say, has agreed to be the
Director of Studies for this research project. Dr. Kissinger will get in
touch with you in the near future to discuss our plans in more detail.

I earnestly hope that it will be possible for you to let me have the
benefit of your advice along the lines I have indicated. I know of no
one who can bring to bear a more refreshing or thoughtful mind to the
fundamental issues which we as a nation must be prepared to meet in
the foreseeable future.

Sincerely,

# THE "INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE"

The attached chart shows the persistent relationship of 26 individuals to ten "front" groups, projects, or organized proposals which, over the past 12 years, have urged, in one form or another:

* Creation of a centralized armed forces general staff over all the Services, on the model of the German OKW.

* Establishment of a single armed forces chief of staff to replace the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

* Eventual merger of the Services, or Defense reorganization so radical as to destroy the present entities of the Services.

* Major reduction in Congress's control over the Armed Forces, as now prescribed by the Constitution.

Every individual shown on the chart has served as a member of two or more of the ten front-groups listed. Of the 26, seven (Generals Bradley and McCormack, and Messrs. Rockefeller, McCloy, Foster, Kelly, and Lovett) have served on three or more of the key groups, and may thus perhaps be considered an "inner directorate".

In addition, four individuals on the chart comprise the total membership of the Secretary of State's Special Advisory Committee on Disarmament, which is the eleventh group shown. It is noteworthy that two out of four members of this important panel, which presumably exercises significant influence on U.S. foreign policy, are retired Army General Staff officers (Generals Gruenther and Smith).

(except Rockefeller now)

No individual on this chart has ever held elective office in the Government.

Eight are professional military officers, active or retired. Of these eight, seven are from the Army, and one from the Air Force. No officer or former officer of the Navy or Marine Corps is included.

It is not suggested that these 26 individuals constitute a "conspiracy" or anything like it. It is asserted that, operating from a multitude of convenient platforms, they have exercised an influence on Defense legislation, policy, and organization which is entirely disproportionate to their number and probably not recognized by Congress, the press, or the public.

MEMORANDUM

October 18, 1956

TO: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
FROM: Kendall Powell

Mr. Alton's office called with the
following message that they felt you would be
interested in immediately:

Re date for panel meeting in November-

November 13th

1) Ten members prefer as <u>first</u> choice

2) Two prefer as second choice

November 20th

1) Eleven prefer as <u>first</u> choice

2) Four prefer as second choice

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# MAJOR ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PANEL

## THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL PURPOSE:

**Introduction:** There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period. On the physical plane, the power of modern weapons is out of balance with the objectives for which they might be employed; as a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find ourselves inhibited by the implications of our own weapons technology. On the political plane, many of the newly independent powers continue to inject into their international policies the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence. On the ideological plane, the contemporary ferment is fed by the newly awakened hopes and expectations of hitherto inarticulate peoples and by the rapidity with which ideas can be communicated. And these factors, of themselves serious enough, are aggravated by the policies of the Soviet bloc, eager to exploit all doubts and dissatisfactions for its own ends.

Although the problems and opportunities of the next ten to fifteen years will present themselves as a series of individual cases, they cannot be solved in those terms. For the world situation is revolutionary precisely because concepts held for a long time no longer seem to fit new conditions and because millions are groping for a new definition of themselves and of society. A revolutionary period is distinguished by its dissatisfactions which join in protests against the existing order, but can propose no clear substitute. As long as these sentiments are

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unchannelled revolutionary ferment will continue, for a revolution cannot be mastered by understanding alone. A revolution can be constructive only to the extent that its hopes and resentments are given a sense of direction.

This emphasizes one of the basic problems of international relations: How to relate a nation's vision of itself to the vision of it as seen by others. To itself a nation is an expression of justice because people will accept laws voluntarily only if they believe them to be in the general interest. (Totalitarian states find themselves obliged to erect elaborate propaganda machines to achieve this agreement.) But the international experience of a people may be a challenge to the universality of its notion of justice because the international order depends on the reconciliation of different national purposes. If the objectives and the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order are sufficiently similar, this may not become apparent. When the national purpose is well understood and uncontested, foreign policy resolves into a series of technical problems. In a revolutionary situation, however, national purposes of different nations will clash and their conflict will underlie all relationships. In such a case, technical problems are insoluble unless we relate them to our image of ourselves and unless this image can be given a more general application.

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A framework of national policy therefore suggests the necessity of an attempt to define a national purpose. In this task, the U.S. confronts particular difficulties. Until the end of World War II, the primary concerns of our society were domestic. Because American society was sure of its values, they were rarely elaborated. Foreign policy, in turn, outside of Western Hemisphere relations, was conducted as a response to an unambiguous threat. Even then, the security conferred by two great oceans and the existence of the British Navy created the illusion that the nature of our foreign commitments was entirely up to us. The temptation of our history, then, is to treat most problems as primarily technical because the vision which formed America has been so much taken for granted that it was rarely made explicit. But the challenge of the present revolutionary period is that its problems are primarily moral in the sense that major portions of the world are in search of a purpose and a direction. We therefore cannot avoid a more explicit consideration of our values.

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Questions: This suggests some of the following problems:

1. What are the basic moral and philosophic beliefs which motivate the United States? What challenges do our moral values face from other competing systems? What degree of diversity of values can be encompassed in a more general system of purposes? What set of values can unite societies of different cultural patterns?

2. Does the U. S. possess a sense of mission which can and should motivate its policies? Can U. S. interests be defined in terms of a set of values of universal application? If so, how can these values and the policy concepts derived therefrom be related to day to day actions and decisions?

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# SECTION I - INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

**Introduction.** To a certain extent, the political problems confronting the United States derive from the existence of a hostile system of Communist countries, coupled with recent developments in military technology. The division of countries such as Korea and Viet Nam occurred as a result of war between parts of the Free World and parts of the Soviet bloc; action against the aggressor was in each case handicapped by fears lest the expansion of conflict should result in global conflict. Again, many other problems, such as the threat to the security of Taiwan, result directly from the combination of Soviet ideological hostility and growing military strength. Finally, the problems which we encounter in holding together a system of alliances, and in developing a workable program for disarmament, are all magnified, if they are not caused, by the existence of a hostile Soviet world.

Yet many problems would remain even if Communism suddenly disappeared. Although anti-colonialism is exploited by the Communists, colonialism is a manifestation of the revolutionary period through which we are now passing. The conflict in interests between industrialized and underdeveloped countries and between former colonial powers and erstwhile colonial peoples illustrated by the current dispute over Suez, may be expected to continue and perhaps even grow in time. To react rationally to situations such as these is in itself difficult; to manipulate and shape them,

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over a long period of time, in directions favorable to U. S. interests, is not
only more difficult but requires a clear understanding both of those interests
and of the basic issues confronting us. Before we can turn to an examina-
tion of specific policies, it is, therefore, important to be clear about such
problems as the nature of colonialism and our attitude towards it, the role
of power in international affairs, the function of alliances and indeed the
American interest in the rest of the world.

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## Questions: We may well ask ourselves:

1. What are the basic factors which determine American interests abroad and what are the nature of those interests? Do they derive largely from a desire for self-preservation? From a sense of mission? From a wish for isolation?

2. Is there an irreconcilable antagonism between the U. S. and the Communist bloc, or is a policy of accommodation both possible and feasible in terms of basic U. S. interests? What is the meaning and future possibility of recent developments within the Soviet orbit? What is the relationship between internal developments and foreign policy? What changes in policy may we expect once the Soviets have attained relative nuclear parity?

3. Considering both military and political factors, what should be the role and nature of alliances in which we engage? Can we, and to what extent should we, seek to establish with our allies common goals and objectives in foreign affairs? To what extent are alliances valuable for other than military reasons and how can this value be enhanced?

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4. Can the American values and institutions continue to flourish in a system of nation-states? Is a different vehicle both more desirable and more suitable for the attainment of American objectives? Specifically, should we seek truly to promote regional and international political and economic organizations in which the U. S. would be only "first among equals"?

5. What are the implications for the United States of the emergence into statehood of former colonial peoples? To what extent is it in the U. S. interests to support national independence movements? Is the attainment of statehood by colonial peoples a most desirable form of self-determination? What alternatives may be developed?

6. What specific problems and opportunities may confront us in Europe? In Asia? In Africa? In Latin America? To what extent can or should the United States temper its policies in one area to accord with those in another? Can the U. S. pursue divergent regional policies and still operate successfully?

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# SECTION II - INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

**Introduction:** In the space of less than ten years, the world has experienced two technological revolutions: the development of nuclear weapons and the discovery of thermo-nuclear processes. The speed with which discoveries have succeeded each other coupled with the power of modern weapons has posed dilemmas never before experienced.

In the past, a weapons system might be good for a generation at least; today, it is often outdated when it has barely left the blueprint stage.

Traditionally, there was a certain relationship between the cost of a weapon and the amount of damage it could inflict; today, a single weapon, relatively easy to manufacture, can destroy a whole city. For the first time, mankind has the possibility of destroying itself and this at a moment when the whole world is in ferment. Moreover, until World War II, the relatively stable weapons technology enabled policy makers to take for granted a matrix of power and seek to adjust policy to changing political and social conditions. Today, technology changes at a rate which sometimes outstrips comprehension of it.

Power is useless, however, without a doctrine for employing it. But except for the explosion of now obsolete weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, none of the new weapons have ever been used in war. There is, therefore, no body of experience on which to draw. Thus, at a moment of unparalleled strength, it is most difficult for the U. S. to

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Questions: This raises some of the following questions:

1. What is the role of force in the nuclear age? Is force a feasible solution for international differences in the nuclear age? For what kind of differences? If not, what are the alternatives? Disarmament? World Government?

2. What are the technological trends in weapons systems over ten to fifteen years? What is the relation between these technological trends and our political-military requirements? Are military alliances likely to add to U. S. security or to impose additional demands upon our strength? Are alliances compatible with the theory or actuality of all-out nuclear war?

3. What are the implications for U. S. strategy and military policy of an area of relative nuclear parity with the Soviet Union? What is the meaning of nuclear parity? What strategy or strategies will best serve U.S. interests during this period? To what extent must we be concerned with problems of limited war? Of guerrilla and civil war? What are the relations between these various strategies and the size and relative strength of the various elements of our Armed Services?

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# SECTION III - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

**Introduction:** The political objectives of many states are accompanied and in many cases motivated by corresponding economic aspirations. One of the major tenets of our period is the equation of economic improvement, especially industrialization, with political stability and social advance. Whatever the validity of this equation, the leaders of many states are convinced of its correctness. Their fierce nationalism and exaggerated fear of colonialism leads them to seek this economic improvement not through the classical methods of promoting increased trade and foreign investment, but through governmentally planned and directed economic autarchy. Yet they cannot simultaneously increase social services, improve the standard of living, and promote economic development without large amounts of outside capital, which in most instances is not available through private channels. Their problem is compounded by the fact that the already industrialized countries often restrict both trade and the flow of capital, and that they do not welcome new competitors for world markets.

One method of meeting the requirements of the under-developed countries is through economic assistance, either in the form of grants or through commodity and currency loans of such duration and rate of interest that they virtually become grants. Prior to 1939 it would have occurred to few citizens of advanced countries that their government had a moral obligation to extend

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economic assistance to less fortunate areas of the world, and even fewer
peoples claimed an intrinsic right to such assistance. Economic help,
such as the series of French loans to Russia in the period 1890-1914, was
motivated almost entirely by political considerations. Today there is no
clear consensus as to whether economic aid should be given for the attain-
ment of political objectives, for the purpose of economic development, or
for moral ends, nor is it clear that these aims can be reconciled. Moreover,
it is questionable whether the economic aid sporadically given by some in-
dustrialized countries is either of sufficient magnitude to meet the require-
ments of the under-developed areas, or of sufficient economic and political
validity to ensure its continuance.

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**Questions:** Questions which we might ask concerning U. S.

foreign economic policy include:

1. To what extent can economic aid and trade policy be used to implement national policy? What purposes do we want to achieve both with economic aid and with our trade policy? What can be done to mobilize and coordinate both government and private resources in pursuit of economic policy? To what extent do economic and political stability abroad depend upon U. S. trade policy?

2. What interests does the United States have in the maintenance or improvement of living conditions in foreign countries? To what extent do such improvements increase or decrease the chances for political stability? For resistance against Communism? For mutually profitable trade with the United States?

3. To what extent is economic, as distinct from military, aid required to achieve U. S. policy objectives? What can and cannot economic aid be expected to achieve? To what extent and under what circumstances can private capital or government loans be substituted for economic assistance?

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# SECTION IV - U.S. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

**Introduction.** Perhaps nowhere else is the relationship between concept and policy so difficult to define as in the field of U.S. economic and social policy. To begin, there is considerable disagreement within the U.S. on the respective roles of government and the individual in economic growth and stability, in the utilization and development of resources, or in social welfare programs. Secondly, many of the measures for the protection or subsidization of industries, professions or geographic areas adopted as a response to specific political or economic pressures have in the meantime become part of the national scene. Thirdly, our international and domestic economic objectives have often seemed to conflict, causing us to adopt contradictory or vaccinating positions on related issues. Finally, our domestic performance has had a greater international significance than that of most other countries because we are widely regarded, by others as by ourselves, as the chief exponents of democratic values and the aspirations of a free society.

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Questions: Questions which this subpanel might consider include:

1. What do we mean by economic growth? What are the factors which assist or hamper economic growth?
To what extent are these factors controllable or influenced by the government? By private enterprise?
What is the effect, for example, of taxation policy on economic growth and stability?

2. What are the trends in the American economy and to what extent do they differ from previous trends?
What is the impact of the new technological revolution on such problems as energy requirements? Demand for skilled manpower? Concentration of industry? What steps should we now take to best prepare for further technological change? To what extent do these trends in the American economy affect, or become affected by, the availability and use of various domestic resources?

3. To what extent should the government assume responsibility for social welfare programs such as education, health and hospitalization, social insurance, etc.?
How and to what extent can private enterprise and non-

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governmental organizations share in the promotion
of social welfare? To what extent have social
welfare programs become a political necessity?
What is likely to be the impact of expanded social
welfare programs in such fields as taxation? The budget?

4. What specific problems confront us with regard to farm policy? Uneven industrial growth? Utilities development? What concepts should govern the relative roles of government and private enterprise in these fields? What is the relationship between our policy and expenditures in these fields and our foreign policy? Our international economic objectives? The resources available for national security purposes?

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# SECTION V - UNITED STATES UTILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

**Introduction.** The political, social and technological changes of the last decade have raised ever more insistently grave questions concerning the education, training and utilization of manpower. An increasingly complex society requires constant improvement of human performance. The more complicated the machinery of society, both technical and organizational, the greater will be the premium on the proper utilization of human resources.

The test of a society is its ability to place into key positions individuals whose performance will make a maximum contribution to its survival and growth.

To take only one aspect of the problem, there has been a great deal of concern with the relative rate of training scientific manpower in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. It is obvious that when the pool of scientific manpower in the U.S.S.R. exceeds ours, the probability of being outstripped in the rate of technological change increases. But the problem is more fundamental; for the pool of trained manpower in any field depends to a large extent on the value society attaches to it. The German philosopher, Spengler, once wrote that Western civilization would collapse if its best people considered it more important to become scholars than engineers. While the choice of professions may be debatable, it illustrates the basic point: that one of the tasks of a society is to provide the inducement for its best men to enter those activities of greatest importance with respect to the challenges faced by that society. This is not only a question of technical manpower but also of

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producing "generalists" capable of relating various fields to each other.
Because of our penchant for specialization, we tend to consider problems as
primarily technical. But this solution tends very often to transcend the
consideration of individual cases and to depend on the ability to relate them
to a continuing process. The condition of great conception is the ability of
society to create a style of life which leads its ablest individuals to think
spontaneously about the challenges of its existence.

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# SECTION VI - UNITED STATES PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

**Introduction.** One of the problems of any bureaucracy is the need to strike a balance between the requirements of organization and the need for inspiration. Organization expresses the importance of continuity, the establishment of a routine which can operate on average performance; inspiration represents the mode of growth, the ability to transcend a framework which has come to be taken for granted. The danger of too much emphasis on organization is bureaucratization and lack of imagination. The peril in too much stress on inspiration is a tour de force exceeding the ability of a society to assimilate change. A vital society establishes a balance between the need for organization and the necessity of change. Its bureaucracy runs sufficiently smoothly to take care of ordinary problems as a matter of routine, but not so pervasive as to inhibit the grasping of new opportunities.

When the problems and opportunities a society confronts develop gradually, this distinction may not become apparent, for then they can be dealt with on the basis of the lessons of the past. When a society faces new challenges which are novel not only in their extent but in the rapidity with which they occur, a serious conflict may arise between the quest of bureaucracy for average performance and the need for great conceptions. This may be a particular problem in a government organized as ours is for the conduct of domestic affairs. There exists a temptation then to deal with policy problems administratively and to judge them by mistakes avoided rather than goals achieved. This is all the more true because of the success of American institutions in

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dealing with these problems heretofore. It therefore becomes important to
consider problems of American government, not so much from the point of view
of organization in its own right as from that of the fitness of the organization
to develop the concepts to deal with the problems and opportunities of the
next 10 - 15 years.

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1. Do any factors of our national heritage, governmental or social, handicap us in the organization and functioning of government? To what extent do the following assist or hamper our leadership in carrying out American policy? The separation of powers? The Federal structure? The type and nature of our political parties? Our attitude toward government?

2. What are the problems of the overall organization of the government with regard to producing and implementing long-range policy decisions? What are the relations between Congress and the Executive with regard to the decision-making process? How well suited to participate in long-range decision-making is the Department of Defense? The Department of State? What is the role of the budgetary process in the formulation of national policy?

3. How can non-governmental leadership be utilized to create public understanding of the possibilities and consequences of choice as to major American policies?

Copy

HARVARD CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES

R-511 Shurdut Building, Muralla St.
Manilla, Philippines

October 12, 1956

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Sometime last week some members of the Philippine group who are in Manila met to discuss the prospects of holding the Asian seminar in this city due to the indefinite postponement of the New Delhi meet. We agreed to request you to consider this offer.

Mr. Ceferino Padua, however, has just arrived from Harvard and he informed the group that you already inquired from him, while in Cambridge, of the prospect of holding the seminar in Manila. We would be very glad to undertake the meet here, preferably in the summer months of April and May, 1957.

We hasten to add that this action of ours should not be interpreted to mean that we are in any way jumping the gun, so to speak, on our Indian friends, in all fairness to them. We are presenting our proposal with the end in view of subordinating it to any change of plans on the New Delhi seminar which might conflict with it.

On the other hand, an early definite and favorable consideration of our proposal will stand to gain for us valuable time for preparation to guarantee expected success. It is hoped that we be forgiven for this enthusiasm in view of the fact that the move to hold Asian seminars was initiated by the Philippine group. Above this, however, is our desire to make our *ix* dream of having an Asian conference a living project.

A member of our group, Mr. Enrique M. Joaquin, emplaned for the United States last week on a two-month speaking tour. He promised to contact you on this matter. His UA mailing address is World University Service, 20 West 40th Street, New York.

If this is alright with you, maybe you can also inform us on the approximate number of delegates participating.

We look forward to hearing from you.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR

CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
HARVARD SUMMER SCHOOL
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES AND OF EDUCATION

WILLIAM Y. ELLIOTT, Director

10 WELD HALL
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

HENRY A. KISSINGER, Executive Director

October 16, 1956

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Just a line to go over the things we discussed
last Friday. The copies of Confluence you asked for were
sent off yesterday, and also a few copies of the new issue
which has now arrived.

I have written to Steve explaining the situation
to him and going into some of the difficulties, and I also
sent him the two articles you want him to edit. I hope we
hear from him before you come up here, and I am sure we will.
Ken Keniston is coming in today to pick up two articles for
the next issue, and, just for the record, I left with you the
articles by de Jouvenel, de Caprariis, Barth, Dexter, Heckscher,
and Bundy. The printing office wants half the copy by
November 11, another quarter by Nov. 19 and the last quarter
by November 23.

During the next two weeks you said you would give
some thought to the definition of the next topic - the impact
of the cold war on world thinking, or something to this effect.
You also said you would work on the Seminar report so that you
could leave it up here after your visit. Also, a reminder to
think about faculty for next year, and what is to be the fate
of the humanities group. Some of the Asian solicitation was
started in November last year, and we should therefore get the
announcements printed no later than the end of this month as
they take some time to set up the type.

As soon as I have worked through most of the dictation,
I'll get down to some interviewing. If you want to see the
people I line up, it would help if you could let me know as soon
as possible when you expect to be up in Cambridge. Good
secretaries won't hang around indefinitely unless we can give
them something fairly definite to go on.

Enclosed is a letter from a Herbert von Borch about your
*Foreign Affairs* article. Also, a Sidney D. Paley of the Samuel
J. Tilden High School in New York who would like a reprint. He
goes on to say, "I enjoyed this article greatly, especially the
remarks on the need for broader training of leadership groups in
political and strategic matters, and would like to use the reprint
in my educational and military work."

November 26, 1957

WORKING AGENDA

Publications Committee - Nov. 27

I Release of Subpanel Reports

A. Discussion of Pros and Cons on Release

B. If decision made to release:

1. Media - Papers and magazines?

2. Timing?

3. Clearance

a. Overall - notification

b. Subpanel - substantive clearance.

4. Press release

II. Overall Volume

A. Draft completed by end of January

B. Doubleday would like nearly simultaneous release with subpanel volumes. They suggest late August, early September as best time.

C. Title?

D. Authorship

III. Publisher

A. At the request of the Committee and on the basis of its suggestions concerning price, promotion, release dates and subsidiary right, further discussions were held with Harper & Brothers, McGraw-Hill and

- 2 -

## Pending

1. An article on the Council based on a considerable extent on the Kissinger book and group is being written for *Harper's Magazine* by Joseph Kraft of the *New York Times Magazine*. He should be checked with in a week or so to ascertain the status of this.

2. The book should be sent by you to those Directors and members of the Committee on Studies to whom Henry Kissinger is not sending it himself. I have sent it those members of the group who are not on either your list or Henry's. For those on Henry's list, see Exhibit C.

3. A two-page spread for TIME has been suggested in a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Luce. This letter and his answer is attached as Exhibit D.

4. Review copies should be sent with letters to the military publications and military men listed on the attached Exhibit E, after Frank Caruthers has checked to see whether Harper has already taken care of some of these. Possible draft letters are attached as Exhibit F.

5. The Book-of-the Month Club has turned us down, but Harper has sent the book to the other relevant book clubs.

6. Oxford University Press does not seem to me to be showing the proper interest in the book. I would like to have appropriate reviews and quotations sent to me in London to arrive just before July 20th so that I can take this up directly in England. Frank Caruthers has made a start on the question of publication in France, but this should also be gone into further. If you write me to do anything there, I'll be in Paris from July 24th to July 26th.

FOR DISCUSSION WITH MR. LUCE:

1. Publication

a. Dual publishers - Commercial plus University

b. Order of publication: Overall/or Subpanel Reports (separately)
Overall and finally reports
plus papers and transcripts

2. Overall Report

Review committee of the Overall panel (Messrs. Luce, Cowles, Berle, Killian, Mrs. Hobby, Mrs. Rosenberg, Miss Hickey)

Review by chapters.

3. Reader (or readers) of subpanel volumes to double check on continuity, coverage, etc.