Columbia University
in the City of New York

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10025

May 11, 1970

RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON COMMUNIST AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Box 1
622 WEST 113rd STREET

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry,

I am sorry I could not come on your
proposed alternative date, but we are having our
Ph. D. examinations. (Believe it or not, we are
actually holding them).

However, I expect to be in Washington
again on the evening of Friday, May 22, and through
Saturday, May 23. If you are free either the eve-
ning of the 22 or for breakfast or lunch on the
23rd, I will be more than glad to come over. *

At the same time let me enclose a copy
of an article which appeared recently in a major
Soviet military journal. It has some rather striking
things to say about the possibility of a surprise
attack, about the role of superiority in internat-
ional politics, and the like. I consider it to be
quite a striking contribution, quite revealing of
the internal Soviet debates and of the thinking
particularly of the Soviet military.

* Please see me
Mr. W.

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V. I. LENIN AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL Apr 70 pp 12-19 J

[Article by S. Ivanov, General of the Army]

[Text] V. I. Lenin, founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, performed the greatest service in the creation and strengthening of the Red Army and Navy and in elaborating the principles of military organization, and of the key questions in Soviet military science. In numerous works, he developed the theory of warfare and laid the foundations of Soviet military art and especially of its highest sphere -- strategy. Among the most important principles in strategy that have been substantiated in the Leninist legacy, the following can be listed: the principle of the interdependence of policy and strategy; the principle of the influence of the ratio of forces of warring sides on the course of and outcome of the war; the principle of the mode of warfare; the principle of the direction of the main strike and the basic principles of strategic leadership of the armed forces in time of war.

Soviet military strategy formed and developed together with the Armed Forces of our country. Its theoretical basis, like the basis for all Soviet military science, is the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

In the works of V. I. Lenin, the Marxist definition of war, the nature of war, and its interrelationship with policy has found concrete expression. In a number of his works, Vladimir Il'ich particularly emphasizes the interrelationship between policy and strategy. These works indicate the dependence between the mode of warfare and political aims. "As applied to warfare," V. I. Lenin wrote, "the basic tenet of dialectics... is that _war is simply the extension of policy by other_ (chiefly violent) _means_." Such was the formulation of Clausewitz, one of the greatest writers on problems in military history, whose ideas were enriched by Hegel. And this was precisely the point of view of Marx and Engels who regarded every war as the _continuation_ of the policies of given, interested powers -- and of _different classes_ within them -- at a given time (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol. 26, p 224).

V. I. Lenin demonstrated the continuous link between internal and external policy, emphasizing thereby, that the nature of the foreign policy of nations is generally determined by their domestic policies and depends on the nature of their social order. The cause of aggressive aspirations and of predatory war lies in the policies of imperialist countries and in the contradictions of the exploiter order -- imperialism. It was the teaching of the leader of the revolution that policy determines not only the nature of a given war but also influences the manner in which it is waged. "...The nature of war and the success of it," he said, "depends most of all on the internal order of the country entering the war... War is the reflection of the internal policy that a given country pursued before the war. And this is inevitably reflected on the conduct of the war" (Poln. sobr. soch.) (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 39, p 319). Strategy is concerned with matters pertaining to the direct preparation of the armed forces and of the nation

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as a whole for war, with the elaboration of plans and methods for waging war. Between policy and strategy there is not and cannot be a 'gap just as there is no gap between the higher political and military leadership.

In directing strategy, policy must set tasks for strategy -- tasks that are commensurate with strategy's abilities -- and in the course of the war, policy must consider the strategic results that influence policy -- that increase or decrease its potential. But the nature of the tasks themselves must be determined by the potential of the forces and resources used. Therein lies the essence of the Leninist teaching on the interrelationship between policy and strategy.

However, it is essential to bear in mind yet another aspect in the relationship between policy and strategy, to which V. I. Lenin referred. It consists in the fact that Soviet military strategy has developed in close contact with the political strategy of the Communist Party which, essentially, has been a part of political strategy: the concentration of the main revolutionary forces in the direction in which the enemy is most vulnerable at the decisive moment; the consistent implementation of the general line adopted by the party; the correct maneuvering of reserves; the use of different types of warfare depending on the situation, etc. These principles are common both to political as well as military strategy.

In proving the patterns in military strategy, V. I. Lenin frequently referred to the strategy and tactics of political struggle. At the same time, he used the principles of military strategy and tactics in substantiating the foundations for political struggle, and for the strategy and tactics of the communist party.

Under present conditions, the Leninist understanding of the interrelationship between military strategy and policy enables us to determine the nature of a future war accurately, the strong and weak sides of the probable enemy and the composition of his armed forces and to scientifically devise a military strategy corresponding to the general political conditions, to the demands of policy, and to the potential of the armed forces.

V. I. Lenin never indulged in unrealistic goals in policy or in strategy. A strategy that is not in keeping with existing potential, that overestimates ones own forces and means and that underestimates the forces of the enemy is doomed to defeat.

The principle of properly assessing the ratio of forces in war and of the influence of this ratio on the course of and outcome of the war occupies one of the central positions in Soviet military strategy. In one of his statements in 1920, while discussing the situation on the Polish front, V. I. Lenin noted: "The most dangerous thing in time of war is to underestimate the enemy and to take comfort in the belief that we are stronger. This is the most dangerous thing that can cause a defeat in the war" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 41, p 144). The under-evaluation of the enemy's forces and the overevaluation of ones own forces leads

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to complacency, to a gap between operational plans and the actual situation and, ultimately, to adventurism in military affairs.

It was V. I. Lenin's teaching that the problem of the ratio of forces of the warring sides should be studied comprehensively, as applied to the state of all elements in the army and navy, economy and ideology, and material and nonmaterial forces of the sides. While considering the amount and quality of weapons and combat materiel to be a most important element with respect to the might of the armed forces, V. I. Lenin assigned exceptionally great importance to the morale factor for determining the ratio of forces and in the attainment of victory. He wrote: "In any war, victory is ultimately determined by the morale of the masses that shed their blood on the battlefield" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 41, p 121). The stability of morale factor and the degree of its influence on the course and outcome of the war depends on objective and subjective conditions. The progressive social order and the just nature of the wars that the Soviet state has been forced to wage constitute the objective basis for the high morale of the Soviet people, of the army, of their capacity and readiness to give all their strength to defend the socialist Fatherland. During the years of the Civil War, for example, due to economic reasons, the imperialists unquestionable outstripped the forces of the young Soviet republic in terms of the number of troops and the amount of armaments. But the enemy had many weaknesses stemming from the very nature of imperialism, from the predatory, reactionary nature of the war that he waged against the country of workers and peasants. All these factors prevented the counterrevolution from making effective use of its forces in the fight against Soviet Russia.

V. I. Lenin also approached the assessment of the forces of internal counterrevolution in a similar fashion. The internal counterrevolution had many experienced officer cadres that enjoyed the extensive assistance of international imperialism. Its weakness lay in its reactionary policy and its antipopulus actions within the country.

Leninist principles on the comprehensive consideration and proper evaluation of the ratio of forces and on the potential of the warring sides in war as a whole as well as in each specific operation acquire enormous importance under present conditions. What with the existing menace that the imperialists will unleash a nuclear war, an error in evaluating the array of enemy forces and of his potential is fraught with especially dangerous consequences.

The Soviet government threatens no one with war. At the same time, we sacredly preserve and carry out the behests of the great Lenin with respect to unflagging political and military vigilance with respect to the aggressive intrigues of the imperialists and on the all-round strengthening of the defensive capability of the Soviet state. A. A. Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union, notes that the present state of the defensive might of our country and of countries in the socialist commonwealth is such that our armed forces possess such colossal fire power as would be entirely sufficient for the total destruction of any aggressor.

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V. I. Lenin devoted much attention to the use of various methods and forms of warfare and to the correct selection of them in each stage of military operations. For the successful conduct of warfare, he demanded the search for and the elaboration of new warfare methods based on the critical re-working and utilization of everything useful in Russian military art and in the military art of other countries. He pointed out the necessity for applying those methods and forms of warfare that most correspond to the situation, and the necessity of studying the methods and forms employed by the enemy.

These principles have been implemented in the Soviet Armed Forces throughout the entire period of their development. Guided by these principles, our military cadres have elaborated and employed various forms and methods of military operations that most correspond to new weapons and technology and to changes in the political and military situation.

V. I. Lenin considered a decisive offensive to be the basic means for crushing the enemy. He wrote: "If, in the face of such continuously hostile forces, we were to give the pledge -- as we are asked to do -- that we will never engage in certain operations which, in terms of military strategy could prove to be offensive, we would not only be stupid, we would be guilty of criminal action" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 42, p 173).

V. I. Lenin attached great importance to making careful and comprehensive preparations for offensive operations. He observed that "Any combat engagement involves the abstract possibility of defeat and there is no means like organized preparations for an engagement for diminishing this possibility" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 6, p 137). In directing the Republic's defenses, Vladimir Il'ich demanded that military leaders make comprehensive preparations for each major operation. At the same time, he taught us the importance of assessing the time factor and he was intolerant of inertia and sluggishness.

Lenin considered the development of a success and the matter of bringing complete victory out of this success to be a most important prerequisite to a successful offensive. Vladimir Il'ich emphasized that when an offensive has been launched, it must be carried out very actively; when the first success has been realized, without halting the offensive against the enemy, it is necessary to take advantage of his bewilderment, to seize and hold the strategic initiative. The strikes must be rapid and decisive. In his work entitled "Tasks of Detachments in the Revolutionary Army," Vladimir Il'ich stated: "Three-fourths of the success depend on resoluteness, on the onslaught" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 11, p 340).

In crushing the enemy in the course of the offensive, V. I. Lenin assigned exceptionally great importance to encirclement as a form of operational maneuvers. He pointed out that the encirclement should be according to the rules of military art. Lenin's demands for the resoluteness of strategic aims and for realizing these aims in the shortest possible time were brilliantly implemented in the most important operations of the Red Army against the armies of Kolchak, Denikin, the White Guard Poles [belopolyaki] and Wrangel.

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Under the specific conditions of the civil war, Soviet military strategy also resolved such a complex problem as that of breaching the enemy front in depth. This problem was resolved through the mass use of cavalry in the form of cavalry armies. Created at the initiative of V. I. Lenin, they were used to delivery powerful strikes against the enemy rear and to combat the enemy's operational reserves.

Lenin also repeatedly emphasized the great importance of surprise operations and taught us to seriously consider the possibility of surprise operations on the part of the enemy as well. Foreseeing the inevitability of imperialist attacks against our country, Vladimir Il'ich called for vigilance and constant combat readiness. He pointed out that the imperialists are capable of any adventure. He repeatedly warned the people of the possibility of perfidious attacks by them.

Under present conditions this warning of V. I. Lenin acquires particularly timely importance. The fact that the enemy has intercontinental ballistic missiles and atomic submarines with rockets means that he can make a surprise attack on countries in the socialist commonwealth. In view of this fact, Soviet military strategy has advanced the principle of constant combat readiness of strategic nuclear means and of the Armed Forces as a whole for immediate action to thwart the aggressive designs of imperialism. The Party Program specially points out the necessity for maintaining the defensive might of the Soviet state, and the combat readiness of its armed forces at a level that will ensure the decisive and complete annihilation of any enemy who dares to attack our Soviet Motherland.

The requirements for a constant high degree of combat readiness is at the basis of all military construction and preparation of the Armed Forces for warding off aggression. Soviet military strategy has elevated this principle to the rank of paramount importance.

As a convinced proponent of active offensive strategy, V. I. Lenin also recognized the necessity for defense when necessary, when the ratio of forces and the conditions for going on the offensive were unfavorable or disadvantageous. In 1921, Lenin said: "If an army, upon seeing that it was unable to take a fortress by storm, were to say that it did not agree to give up old positions, to occupy new positions, to adopt new approaches to the solution of the problem, the following would be said of such an army: Whoever knows only how to attack and does not learn how to retreat under certain difficult conditions, will not be victorious in a war. In the entire history of the world, there have been no wars that began and ended with an all-out victorious offensive or the wars that have been such were exceptions" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 44, p 209). One need only recall the time of the Great Peace, when Lenin taught the party that it is necessary to make an orderly retreat when the enemy's forces are clearly superior and that a new offensive must be prepared against the enemy with maximum energy. There are many statements by the leader concerning the very nature of defense and troop operations in the solution of defensive problems. In particular, he indicated the necessity of organizing defense in depth and demanded maximum staunchness, stubbornness, and activity in it.

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to do battle against it. The eastern front was declared to be the republic's main front. In his "Letter to Petrograd Workers Concerning Help to the Eastern Front," V. I. Lenin wrote: "We ask the Petersburg workers to mobilize all things and forces to help the eastern front... The fate of the resolution is being decided there" (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 38, p 263).

In the fall of 1919, the Entente organized a new campaign against the Soviet republic. At the time, Denikin's troops were becoming increasingly active in the south. The Soviet state was once more confronted with the complex strategic problem of correctly selecting the direction of the main strike. And this problem was also successfully resolved by the party's Central Committee headed by Lenin.

It should be particularly emphasized that Lenin's strategy in determining the main danger and in selecting the direction of the main strike was based on a strict assessment of the economic, morale, political, and military potential of our country and the potential of the enemy. Thereby, V. I. Lenin skillfully exploited class contradictions in the enemy camp and weak points in his strategy.

In addition to the successful solution of the basic strategic problem -- the determination of the main danger and the selection of the direction of the main strike -- another important feature of Leninist military leadership is the decisive concentration of forces and means in the direction selected. "The 'law' of military success is to have the overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive time in the decisive place..." (Complete Collected Works, Vol. 40, p 6).

What with the general shortage of forces and means, which was especially characteristic of the civil war period, the solution of this problem entailed great difficulties.

The experience in selecting the direction of the main strike and in decisively concentrating forces and means in this direction during the years of the civil war was extensively used by the Soviet Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War and this experience continues to be timely today as well. The essence of this experience is that in selecting the direction of the main strike, it is essential to bear in mind not only the purely military forces of the sides and the grouping of them but also the political situation as well. It is necessary to take economic considerations into account, to know how to determine the main enemy whose defeat will mean victory in the war.

One of the basic principles of Soviet military strategy is the recognition of the importance of the correct selection of regions and objects where the main efforts of the armed forces should be concentrated and of the necessity of gaining superiority over the enemy in forces and means in the decisive place at the decisive time. Moreover, the forces and means necessary to ward off aggression and to crush the aggressor are now chiefly created in peacetime. War against the Soviet Union could begin simultaneously in several or even in all theaters of military operations -- a situation which is promoted by the aggressive blocs surrounding the socialist countries. Nonetheless, the importance of each of these

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the Soviet Armed Forces. Among these principles are: unity of political and military leadership, correspondence of aims and plans of war to the actual potential of the nation and of the armed forces; a scientific approach to assessing the ratio of forces of the [combatant] sides; the combination of single command and collectiveness in the work of military executive organs; effectiveness of control; strict supervision over the implementation of plans, directives, orders, etc.

The Leninist principles of strategic leadership entirely support the leading role of the party in the army and navy. Unity of political and military leadership and the combination of single command and collectiveness are organically inherent in the activities of such executive organs as the revolutionary military councils during the years of the civil war, the military councils during the Great Patriotic War, and at the present time.

The predominance of policy over strategy and the close unity of political and military leadership are the unshakable foundation of today's system of control adopted in our Armed Forces. The Communist Party and its Central Committee direct the entire activity and life of the Soviet Armed Forces, provide them with equipment, and improve the combat readiness and the ideological-political temper of the personnel.

Under modern conditions, especially high demands are made on the system of leadership of the Armed Forces with respect to efficiency and precision in the work of headquarters in the control of troops, forces, and means. In a number of instances, the efficiency of leadership operations is evaluated in minutes and even seconds. This is only possible when the control organs are equipped with the means of automation, mechanization, and communication that make it possible to process vast bodies of information quickly, to make all operational calculations and to transmit the necessary orders and instructions in a short space of time. Our headquarters, especially the highest element of strategic leadership, is now equipped with such means.

V. I. Lenin's military-theoretical legacy and his practical activity in directing the army and navy during the civil war constitute a firm base for Soviet military strategy. As stated in the Thesis of the CC CPSU on the Centennial of the Birth of V. I. Lenin, "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, created by the party and by Lenin -- armed forces of a victorious people -- defended the attainments of the revolution during the civil war. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, our people performed a deathless feat in the name of socialism and demonstrated mass heroism during the Great Patriotic War. This war was both a severest test and a school of courage. It ended in complete victory because socialism created the invincible unity of all Soviet society, the might and unprecedented mobility of its economy, the high development of military science and because socialism had trained remarkable servicemen and military leaders."

Tested in the heat of battle, Soviet military strategy won out and proved its superiority over the strategy of imperialist interventionists and of internal

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counterrevolution during the civil war and was one of the factors in our victory over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan during the Great Patriotic War. Guided by Leninist principles and relying on Marxist-Leninist methodology, on the advantages of the socialist social and government structure, and on the constant and steady growth of the military-economic potential, it has always met the demands made upon it. Soviet military strategy is developing on the basis of the creative use of the deathless Leninist legacy in the field of military theory, on the basis of the strict observance of the Leninist principle of combining the best military experience with the existing level of development of the means of waging war, and on the basis of careful investigation of the enemy and the general political situation.