copy

December 13

For Henry Kissinger

I have mad more interlineal suggestions than I realized, but please don't take the large number of them for disagreement. I think both papers are splendid. I merely read them with an editor's impulse to greater clarity, taking into account the probable lack of background on the part of the proposed audience - viz. the American people.

The most important suggestions are on page 8 of Chapter I, and on the page defining Limited War.

Is there any further assistance I can give you?

Tim

II- Report

December 9, 1957

# I - FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The world is living through a period of swift and far-reaching upheavals. Standards and institutions which have remained unchanged for centuries are breaking down. Millions who have hitherto accepted their place in life without question are clamoring for a new and meaningful existence. Western Europe, the fountainhead of our civilization, has lost its position of pre-eminence in world affairs. Across the great land-mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa new nations are rising in the place of colonial empires.

The world is yearning to realize its aspirations in peace. But it is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to exploit all dissatisfactions and to exacerbate all tensions; and the new weapons technology capable of obliterating civilization.

The United States has thus been placed into a fateful position. Our whole tradition impels us to desire peace. Relatively invulnerable behind two great oceans, we have in the past asked nothing of the world save to be free to work out our destiny undisturbed. But we have been forced to realize that our security is inextricably bound up with the safety of the rest of the non-Communist world and that freedom everywhere depends on our strength and resolution. Force will not supply the answer to the hopes of humanity. Yet our power can help bring about a framework of security in which these aspirations may be realized.

II - Report
December 9, 1957

- 2 -

Looking at the world from the perspective of our past isolation,
perhaps the most difficult thing for us is to accept the reality of our peril.
Other and more exposed nations have had to learn over a period of centuries
with the knowledge that their existence might be imperiled by foreign
attack. It is a new experience for us.

Still the difference is only one of degree. For all powers are
equally vulnerable to a technology of unprecedented power and destruct-
iveness. The largest "conventional" bomb of World War II - the famous
blockbuster - had an explosive power of 20 tons. The first atomic bomb
had an explosive equivalent of 20 thousand tons, a thousand fold increase.
Today weapons with an explosive equivalent of 20 million tons (20 megatons)
have been tested and there is no theoretical upper limit: it is possible to
construct weapons of almost any desired explosive power.

As the weapons have become more powerful, their speed of delivery
has grown ever faster. Soon missiles will be able to travel intercontinental
distances and wipe out whole cities in one blow. An attack on 50 of our
most important metropolitan areas would bring under fire 55 percent of our
population and 75 percent of our industry. Moreover if the fireball of a
megaton weapon touches the ground it sucks up particles of earth and
buildings and deposits them downwind as radioactive material. This
"fall-out" will depend on meteorological conditions. It may cover an

"Self-out," will depend on meteorological conditions. It may cover an
area and deplete them downwind as radioactive material. This
mégaton weapon touches the ground it takes up particle of earth and
population and 12 percent of our industry. Moreover it the fireball of a
most important metropolitan area would bring under fire 28 percent of our
distances and wipe out whole cities in one blow. An attack on 50 of our
have grown ever stronger. Some missiles will be able to travel intercontinental
As the weapons have become more powerful, their speed of delivery
construct weapons of almost any desired explosive power.

Today weapons with an explosive equivalent of 20 million tons (50 megatons)
had an explosive equivalent of 20 thousand tons, a thousand fold increase.
blockbuster - had an explosive power of 20 tons. The first atomic bomb
taken as the largest conventional bomb of World War II - the famous
edibility vulnerable to a technology of unprecedented power and destruction.
Still the difference is only one of degree. For all powers are
attack. It is a new experience for us.

with the consensus that their existence might be imperiled by foreign
Other and more exposed nations have had to leavover a period of centuries
to live
because the most difficult thing for us to accept the reality of our peril.

December 9, 1927
II - Report

II- Report

December 9, 1957

- 3 -

area ranging from 10 thousand square miles (or the size of the state of
New Jersey) to 100 thousand square miles (or the area of the states of New
York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania combined). An attack on 50 of our most
important urban centers would, in the absence of effective defensive measures,
be at least 15-20 million dead and 20 to 25 million injured.

And the military strength of our opponent is growing ominously
both absolutely and in relation to us. Should the U.S.S.R. and Communist
China attain a strategic superiority we can be certain that events will be
brutal and unforgiving. For over a generation now -- the last time in the
Moscow declaration of all Communist states on November 16, 1957 --
these powers have proclaimed the irreconcilability of their system with that
of the free world. Of course "peaceful co-existence" has reappeared
periodically as a Soviet slogan. But it has never had more than tactical
significance. After World War II, it did not stand in the way of Soviet
~~Eastern Europe~~
domination of the satellite orbit and the breaking of the most solemn wartime
pledges. After the Geneva "summit" conference it did not restrain the
Soviet Union from selling arms to Egypt, thereby inviting a crisis in the
Middle East that has not ended to this day. In 1957 it did not keep the
Soviet Union from threatening nuclear attacks on Norway, Denmark and
Turkey. Both their doctrine and their internal dynamism will impel the
Soviet Union and Communist China to try to fill every vacuum and to encourage
every dissatisfaction. The prospects of peace depend on the strength and
firmness of the United States, on our ability to relate our power to our

II - Report

December 9, 1957

II - THE NATURE OF OUR STRATEGIC PROBLEM

But the effort to harmonize our power and our policy is handicapped
by many factors including the nature of our historical experience. Tradition
impels us to believe that peace is the "normal" relation among states. As
a result we have conceived it to be the task of our military policy to assemble
overwhelming power to "punish" the disturber of the peace -- the aggressor.

Aggression has appeared to us an unambiguous and clear act, and we have
tended to identify it with a quest for world domination. Because we have
been geographically remote from the major centers of world affairs we
have been able to rely on relatively small forces-in-being and to mobilize
our resources only *after* a war had started. Because many other powers would
be threatened before the danger to our security became explicit, we could
count on allies to hold a forward line while we rallied both our physical
and psychological resources. And we could identify strategy with a
superior offensive effort because with conventional technology the side able

II - Report

December 9, 1957

to inflict more damage than its opponent generally would retain sufficient
resources at the end of a war to impose its will.

All of these ideas have been overthrown by the technological
developments since World War II and the emergence of the United States
in the forefront of world affairs. Soviet strategy, which can be described
as a strategy of deliberate ambiguity, has been so calculated that the risks
of resisting any given advance always seem out of proportion to the
it has been so conducted as
objective, or also it is designed to appeal to what the Free World has come
This Soviet strategy
to consider "legitimate." It has become clear that the recognition of
(made it clear)
aggression may prove as difficult as finding the means to resist it. A symptom
of the difficulty is that a United Nations committee charged with the task
of defining aggression was forced to give up.

At the same time that the forms of aggression have multiplied and
become more ambiguous, we have lost the safety indicators of a more secure
past. We can no longer think of our military effort as designed for a conflict.

- 9 -

II - Report

December 9, 1957

would be our
it is impossible to produce the spectrum of weapons to assure security.

Without a pool of scientific talent and a high level of scientific activity,

a favorable power wherein we shall not be able to maintain the strategic balance in a situation when the real armaments race is in the laboratories. There, for this reason, great importance attaches to our industrial base, to our policy with respect to science and education and to policies to promote long-term economic growth and stability.

(b) At the same time long-range programs and balance cannot become ends in themselves. However powerful we may be over the long pull, Our strategic effectiveness in any given crisis depends importantly on our forces-in-being at the outset. Given the power and destructiveness of modern weapons, we can not count on a period of mobilization. Our ready and our resoluteness will in any crisis that confronts us, in the face of pressure, determine the issue of any conflict and our resoluteness.

(c) But even total power is no index of actual strength if it cannot

II - Report
December 9, 1957

changed between 1919 and 1940. Today a weapons system begins to be obsolescent when it has barely gone into production. The B-17 "Flying Fortress" remained in operational use for a decade; the B-36 intercontinental bomber was obsolescent in less than seven years; and the B-52 jet bomber is beginning to be outdated even before all wings of our Strategic Air Command are fully equipped with it.

Moreover, all weapons are becoming increasingly costly. A new submarine costs ten times as much as its World War II counterpart. A B-52 wing is four times as expensive as the B-36 wings it replaces.

This technological race places an extraordinary premium on the ability to assess developing trends correctly and to back decisions firmly over a period of time. It also places the side which is on the defensive at special disadvantage. The aggressor needs prepare only for the war he proposes to fight. But the side which concedes the first blow must gear its planning and procurement to an indefinite period and in such a manner that no strategic

- 12 -

II - Report

December 9, 1957

weakness is created at any given point. And the side which is on the
Time
STRATEGIC thus
^ defensive^ requires a particularly effective intelligence system. The
basic problem of American strategy, then, is the ability to make effective
will be Tested by
choices. The test of our military policy is its relevance to the tasks our
military forces likely will be called on to perform. It is to these tasks
due to
^ that
we must now turn.

we must now turn.

military force likely will be called on to perform. It is to these forces military power of our military policy in its relevance to the tasks our forces of American strategy then is the ability to make effective

choice. The test of our military policy in its relevance to the tasks our forces of American strategy then is the ability to make effective

basic problem of American strategy then is the ability to make effective

defensive means a partially offensive intelligence system. The strategic means

weakness is created at any given point. The side which is on the strategic means is the side which is on the weak side which is on the strategic means.

December 9, 1927
II - Report

- 12 -

II - Report

December 9, 1957

IV - MISSIONS

The types of conflict by which we may be challenged pose particular problems because they tend to overlap the traditional boundaries between the military services. With modern weapons the distinction of land, sea and air warfare has lost a great deal of its validity. The criteria by which are likely to relate to any future wars can be distinguished turn on the nature of the conflict, the and issues in dispute, the geographical area of hostilities rather than on means of the means of locomotion - on land, sea or in locomotion. of the air.

Among the possible challenges we may confront, three stand out most starkly: all-out war, limited war and a kind of war new to the twentieth century -- the disguised or obscure war conceived as internal take-over or as civil war.

All-Out War

Of the threats to our security, all-out war is the most overwhelming.

It can be defined as an attack of such magnitude that our survival would be
directly and immediately at stake. It is therefore the ultimate war, in which

II - Report

December 9, 1957

can further ~~to undertake it.~~
which reduces the value of the enemy offense and the incentive for it.

The importance of defensive measures is that they force the enemy to increase his investment of resources in his & offensive effort without adding to its strategic effectiveness. The necessity of a crushing retaliatory lies in its ability to force is that it can deprive the aggressor of the fruits of a surprise attack.

The task of strategy is to decide on the relative emphasis to be given to offensive and defensive capabilities and the "mix" which will provide the greatest degree of deterrence.

In looking at the over-all strategic equation there is reason for serious concern. Our strategic striking power, on which we have heretofore relied as the major element of our security, is imperiled by Soviet missile developments and the inadequate dispersal of our Strategic Air Command. Our assumption that we could substitute technology for manpower has been exposed as tenuous. Soviet technological skill is growing rapidly and with it the capacity to deliver a mortal blow against the United States.

II- Report

December 9, 1957

by installments, any one of which does not seem to warrant a final
show-down.

The distinctive feature of limited war is that its outcome does not
involve or seem to involve national survival. It is for this precise reason
that we have had such difficulty in coming to grips with it. For any
peripheral Soviet move has raised doubts whether this particular encroach-
ment warranted a final show-down. Another difficulty has been caused by
our lack of mobile forces capable of intervening rapidly and decisively and-
of restoring a local situation before matters get out of hand. Thus we have
de
been forced into the position of choosing between Armageddon and/feat
without war. In each crisis our inhibitions have tended to exceed those
of the Soviet Union.

To a limited extent, the forces designed to deter all-out war
will also be useful in preventing or stifling limited war. It would be
dangerous, however, to rely too heavily on an all-purpose weapons
system. The deterrent force for all-out war should be designed to inflict
maximum destruction in the shortest possible time. The weapons system for
a limited war should be flexible and discriminating; it requires units
of high mobility which can be moved to trouble spots at a moment's notice.

Moreover, since the chief sanction against the expansion of a limited

II Report
December 9, 1957

war resides in a crushing capability for retaliation, the deterrent force must be kept at a state of the highest readiness particularly during periods of limited conflict. An aggressor who could tempt us to utilize our strategic striking force for limited war would gain an advantage however military operations ended. To consider our strategic striking force as a dual-purpose force would weaken the deterrent precisely when it should be strongest.

Another example of the difficulty raised by a dual purpose force is the problem of airlift. At the moment the Strategic Air Command has top priority on existing airlift. But any crisis severe enough to make us want to move combat units rapidly into a troubled area is also likely to be severe enough to cause S.A.C. to exercise its priority. The practical effect of a dual-purpose weapons system is to withdraw it from the availability for limited war.

It is imperative that we develop forces which can intervene rapidly and which are able to make their power felt with discrimination. We require more airlift to get them rapidly into troubled spots. These forces moreover must be tailored to the gamut of possible limited wars which may range from conflict involving several allies to police actions to the support of friendly forces in a civil war. At one end of the spectrum limited war may require a highly complicated weapons system including nuclear weapons. On the

II - Report

December 9, 1957

other end of the spectrum it may involve conventional forces capable
of acting in concert with friendly elements in a revolutionary situation.

The effectiveness of our power thus depends on our unmistakable
ability and willingness to oppose force with force at whatever level of
intensity may be required. We do not now possess that capability. The greatest-point of concern about the U.S. strategic position is that our ultimate risk at a rate determined not by us but by Communist policy. distaste for limited risks may ultimately lead us into surrender or into the-desperate acceptance of the ultimate risk in circumstances.

We must not make the mistake, however, of assuming that even
a diversified military establishment can protect us against the total range
of our dangers. To begin with, force by itself is useless without the
resolution to use it if need be. Everything therefore depends not only on
our physical but also on our psychological readiness. Moreover, an effective
strategy must not only find the means to resist transformations of the
strategic balance, it must also be able to determine what transformations
to resist. As events have proved, the latter may be our most difficult
problem. challenge and it depends on the wisdom and courage of our political-leadership.

For our security can be imperiled not only by overt aggression but
also by transformations which are made to appear, insofar as is possible,
to be no war at all. Those "concealed wars" may break out in the form

II - Report

December 9, 1957

of internal revolution or civil war; they may be instigated by outside forces or merely be exploited by them. Greece has furnished one example; Syria, Vietnam another; the Middle East still another. Whatever the degree of initial Soviet responsibility, one of the greatest threats to the security of the Free World is gradual Soviet infiltration and domination of vital areas through steps each of which is so small and seemingly so "legitimate" that it does not seem to justify overt intervention.

These conflicts raise issues with which, in terms of our preconceptions and the structure of our forces, we are least prepared to deal. A civil war has not traditionally been thought to justify foreign intervention however much its outcome may affect the international balance. The gradual subversion of a government is difficult to deal with from the outside, even though the fate of millions may depend on it.

As a result, unless we have a clear understanding of our national purpose we shall find ourselves paralyzed in the face of upheavals which may completely overturn the international equilibrium. We must also realize that it is the essence of these concealed conflicts that the issue they present is inherently unclear and ambiguous. To ask for certainty in such situations is a prescription for inaction. Our security and that of the rest of the non-Communist world will hinge importantly on our insight and our resolution.