Beardsley Ruml

GO EAST 50TH STREET • NEW YORK 22
PLAZA 1-3411

May 9, 1958

Personal and Confidential

Dear Nelson:

This note is with respect to The Pursuit of Excellence
document as a whole.

I am sorry to say that I do not find this report well
written; nor is the thinking as deep as seems to me
important. The best I can suggest is that you get
either John Hershey or John Fischer of Harper's, or
someone else equally talented, to do the writing, and
that you take any three of your excellent panel and
make them responsible for the editorial content
subject to footnotes that any member of the panel
wants to add.

The other two reports are so very good that my feeling
is that a report on this phase of educational problems
should compare favorably with the other two even if
only to make perfectly clear that you are equally
concerned with education.

I made a lot of detailed notes on my copy but they
mean nothing except in terms of a general re-write,
and I will hold this report and give it to anyone
that you may suggest.

I am writing separately about the financing problems.

Best wishes,

Mr. Nelson A. Rockefeller
30 Rockefeller Plaza, Room 5600
New York 20, N. Y.

Beardsley Ruml

60 EAST 50TH STREET • NEW YORK 22

PLAZA 1-3411

May 9, 1958

Personal and Confidential

Dear Nelson:

Best wishes,

The Rockefeller Center Luncheon Club
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, N. Y.

NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING

To The Members Of

THE ROCKEFELLER CENTER LUNCHEON CLUB, INC.

In accordance with Article IV, Section 1 of the By-Laws, the Annual Meeting of The Rockefeller Center Luncheon Club, Inc. will be held in the Club Lounge on the 65th Floor, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y. on Tuesday, October 21, 1958 at 2:00 p.m. for the purpose of electing governors to succeed those whose terms may expire, and for such other business which may properly come before the meeting.

The Nominating Committee, consisting of Messrs. Roger W. Burman, Chairman, Harold L. Behlke, John M. Clifford, Randolph E. DuMont and Harry F. Vickers, was appointed by the Board of Governors in accordance with Article I, Section 3 of the By-Laws, and this committee has selected the following candidates for membership on the Board of Governors for the two year term to expire in October 1960 and to be voted upon at the Annual Meeting:

Francis T. Christy
John Hauerwaas

Attorney
President, U.S. Steel
Products Company

Philip F. Keebler

Associated with
Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

Joseph M. Walsh

Vice President,
Chase Manhattan Bank

each to succeed himself, and

Fletcher D. Richards

Chairman of Board,
Fletcher D. Richards Co.

By Order of the President

RUDOLPH A. TRAVERS,
Secretary.

October 1, 1958

Comments from Edward Teller on Panel I Report dated October 1, 1959
(Dictated by his secretary on the telephone 10/6/59)

Page 43, line 14, after NATO insert "which started as a military alliance".

Page 46, line 7, cancel out "it is our conviction" all the way down to line 12, "Atlantic Community" and insert: "And above all, by a strong and versatile defensive organization prepared to fight for freedom in the face of aggression. Such an organization and the determination to use it in the case of the ultimate emergency is the best insurance of peace and the only hope for the survival of the western way of life.

Page 54, line 2, cancel "negotiations" and insert "operations".

Cancel "disarmaments" and insert "arbitration, disarmament or the support of peace and order by authority or if necessary, by force.

Page 67, line 7, cancel "the possibility cannot be ruled out" and insert: "there is increasing technical reason for the apprehension."

Lines 15-16, cancel sentence beginning with "conventional forces...also be maintained".

Page 69, line 19, insert before "nuclear war" the word "total".

Page 97, the portion that is marked "C. The Control of Arms"

The following comments by Dr. Edward Teller were dictated by his secretary on October 6, 1959, on the telephone:

I - Report

October 1, 1959

C. The Control of Arms (page 97)

The U.S. has, since World War II, taken the lead in international efforts to reduce the risk of war through mutual disarmament. While maintaining the strength and readiness of all the new nuclear strike forces which have served as the shield of the free world, the U.S. has unremittingly sought at every opportunity to find means to reduce the ever-growing likelihood of large-scale war through disarmament.

Let us not forget that the U.S. almost totally disarmed itself at the conclusion of World War II and only rebuilt its arms when the invasion of Korea brought unmistakable evidence of the aggressive intent of our adversaries, who were becoming equipped for the first time with the armaments necessary to wage a jet-age nuclear war.

The first effort of the U.S. -- to achieve international control of nuclear energy -- was brusquely rejected in 1946. Each successive effort has met a little more receptive and realistic response. Only today, the U.S. and the United Nations can point with some pride to agreements on some basic principles of disarmament, such as the recognition of the need for adequate inspection and control; and to establishment of direct negotiations between nations on essential problems in the Geneva Conference on prevention of surprise attack and the cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

I - Report

October 1, 1959

(Edward Teller)

- 2 -

As the increasing threat of wholesale destruction grows with the advent of ever-more effective weapons, the desire for a better solution to international problems grows correspondingly. Disarmament is playing a crucial role in diminishing the hazard. The U.S. has learned, however, that disarmament is not automatically good. Remembering how disarmament by the then great powers facilitated the rise of Hitler and Tojo, and envisaging the disasterous consequences of unilateral disarmament by the U.S. now, we have sought to discern those checks and balances which are necessary for disarmament is to ease rather than aggravate the problems of the world.

The U.S. and the United Nations have arrived at a basic plan for world-wide disarmament, and a substantial measure of agreement has been obtained from the Soviet Union. This plan calls for a stepwise reduction in armaments, coupled with similar steps of increasing degrees of disclosure and inspection. The cardinal principal which the U.S. and the United Nations have followed is that we reduce armaments, make disclosures, and establish inspection in stages, beginning with the least critical stage and progressing to demobilization of our most effective arms and disclosure of our most sensitive secrets only after confidence has been gained through experience in the least

- 3 -

critical preceding stages. The difficulty in reaching agreement with the Russians has been that they propose sweeping disarmaments in such a short-time scale that it seems impossible to establish inspection adequate to verify compliance with such rapid demobilization. Hence, the nightmare of the U.S. disarming according to treaty without similar disarmament on the other side has plagued the conference table.

Recently, a complete abolition of arms and of all military services has been once more proposed by the Soviets. This is an objective of the U.S. national policy, provided it can be accomplished with real assurance that the security of the world will be improved in the process. The recent Russian proposal calls for complete disarmament in four years. Previous Soviet proposals were to disarm in two years. The recent proposal places more emphasis on inspection and control then did their early proposals. The Russians yield slowly but significantly, suggesting that it may be possible ultimately to arrive at a mutually agreeable plan for disarmament.

It seems important to point out that there are significant and perhaps crucial differences between the Soviet approach to disarm and that of the U.S. The Soviet maintains that the way to reduce tensions and enmities is through disarmament. The U.S. maintains on the contrary that

I - Report

October 1, 1959

(Edward Teller)

- 4 -

effective disarmament measures can only come about as a concomitant
of political settlement which reduce the tension. Since the Soviets
seem to believe that only when nations no longer have the means to
fight wars will they lose the incentive to fight, they are suspicious
of systems of inspection and control which would cause them to lose
during the interim period of disarmament, the strategic advantages of
secrecy. It must be admitted that they possess this advantage to a
far larger degree than the free countries of the West.

Even when disarmament with inspection will be established, a
most serious worry will persist because of the necessarily different
meanings of disarmament in different countries. That is, the meaning
of an internal police force in Russia or any other dictatorship is quite
different from a police force in a democratic country. Any regime
which holds a people in subjugation will need and will have a greater
number of organized agents to impose its will on the population. This
internal police force then will automatically become a threat to internal
security as soon as military forces are eliminated.

It is necessary to recognize this difficulty. It also should be
possible to find ways of solving it. One possibility might be increased
reliance on an international security organization. In a period where
supra-national structures will become increasingly more important, such

I - Report

October 1, 1959

(Edward Teller)

- 5 -

a security organization might appear appropriate.

In order to arrive at a realistic and satisfactorily inspected disarmament, a considerable number of complex technological factors must be clarified. The amount of effort that has gone into this kind of a study in our country has been so far insufficient. As a result, the U.S. has tended to go into international negotiations and agreements without adequate separation to deal with the complexity and subtleties bound to be encountered. The undesirable consequences of such a procedure may be illustrated by a reminder of the fact that at present, we have stopped nuclear testing for a considerable period even though we have no way of verifying in a technical manner whether or not the Russians continue to test underground or with the help of interplanetary rockets.

The panel, therefore, urges that studies of the technical possibilities of disarmament should be pursued with considerably increased intensity. Furthermore, experiments are required to improve our capacity to detect, to monitor, and to inspect, including studies in techniques of hiding and concealing. A group within the government should be in a position to give thoroughgoing attention to such problems under a directive to explore every alternative, uninhibited by any special interest. It is important that such studies be made public for without

I - Report

October 1, 1959

(Edward Teller)

-6-

them, debates on disarmament would become meaningless.

There is an additional issue related to disarmament: the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them. Such spread would continue to introduce further complications and dangers into a situation which even at present seems to be fraught with extraordinary dangers. It is therefore the universal desire in our country to prevent such further spread.

At the present time, it must be realized that this aim is as difficult to achieve as procedure aiming at disarmament which has been discussed above. In order to prevent further nations from obtaining nuclear bombs, a multilateral treaty is necessary. The enforcement of such a treaty will be more difficult in totalitarian countries which are better prepared to impose internal secrecy and to conceal the preparation and execution of tests.

a

Such concealment may well be the matter of relative ease as long as small nuclear explosives are under consideration. Even such small nuclear explosives, for instance, explosives limited to one kiloton TNT equivalent, could be of the greatest importance for the military posture of any country.

This panel urges that the studies of methods of disarming
specifically include the question, how easy or how difficult it is for

I - Report
October 1, 1959

(Edward Teller)

additional countries to acquire a nuclear capability either without testing or with limited testing. The past development of nuclear bombs shows that any country which acquired a sufficient amount of nuclear material shortly afterward succeeded in performing a nuclear explosion. This fact should raise a serious question concerning the possibility of preventing the spread of nuclear arms.

It appears necessary to give early consideration to the question, how to handle a situation in which additional nations will acquire a nuclear capability. If, indeed, it should turn out that the spread of nuclear arms cannot be prevented, we should at least be prepared to find methods by which to guide this development. The difficulty of doing so are apparent. In fact, there seems to exist only one obvious method whereby a solution might be attempted. This is to establish appropriate supra-national agencies which are charged with the control and limitation of the use of nuclear weapons so that the supra national agency can act as a single unit. If the availability of nuclear weapons will go hand in hand with clearcut and realistic limitations on the use of these weapons, then the spread of nuclear arms may lose its quality of a deeply unsettling influence.

The problems of disarmament and the spread of nuclear bomb technology are obviously among the most urgent and disquieting problems

I - Report
October 1, 1959

(Edward Teller)

in a world in which rapid technological progress has upset all standards
of national security. Itx most significant that in dealing with these
difficult problems, we are let back to the equally difficult question of
erecting appropriate supra-national structures. We submit that it is
necessary to approach all these three problems: disarmament, limitation
of nuclear arms, and international control in a stepwise and parallel
fashion. To postulate that these problems must be solved by a single
and comprehensive act would increase the difficulties beyond any hope
of a solution.

ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Special Studies Project
Room 922, 50 Rockefeller Plaza

October 28, 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR OVERALL PANEL AND PANEL I

We will be pleased to have from you the names and addresses
of those persons to whom you wish to send copies of the I Report
directly from this office.

If you send us your personal cards or a letter, we will attach
them as you direct.

I. Advance copies -- Although "advance copies" of this report
will be printed rather than mimeographed, we would still
like to strictly limit the number because of the press
release problem.

II. Copies to be mailed on date of publication -- If your list is
lengthy, it would help us tremendously to have the names
and addresses typed directly on mailing labels.

III. Number of copies to be sent directly to you --

PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

MH

bcc: Dr. Klaasen
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska
Headquarters Strategic Air Command
United States Air Force
Colonel Donald C. Foster

Sincerely,

Thank you again for thinking of us.

that you can contact them if you wish.
You of the names of any individuals who express interest so
the whole panel. I will induite at our next meeting and advise
making such a visit, there would not be interest on the part of
panel members as individuals might possibly be interested in
American democracy. Therefore, although some of the overall
with the exception of our study on the moral framework of

The work of our study groups has been largely completed

Studies panels might be interested in a SAC briefing.
December eighteenth to Dr. Klaasen whether the Special

You were thoughtful to induite again in your letter of

Dear Colonel Foster

January 30, 1960

Overall Panel Volume

January 28, 1960

Overall Panel Volume

There follows a summary of preliminary comments made by
Adam Yarmolinsky (former Public Affairs Editor, Doubleday) concerning
handling the published Special Studies Reports in a hard cover volume.

1. General Evaluation

A. Mr. Yarmolinsky is very impressed with how well each
report stands up in the light of the two years since publication
of the first report.

B. As pointed out below, he feels the IV-Report is the only one which needs any substantive attention. (He suggests that the Defense report be reviewed by military experts since his knowledge is only very general in that area.)

II. Problems

A. References that date the reports, such as "Now," "This year"

1. Simple editing changes should be made to delete.

2. This can be done without consultation with the panels.

B. Reference to other reports in the series as being "previously published," or "about to be published"

1. Should be deleted or:

2. Reference changed. If numbers are carried, the reports should be renumbered to either coincide with chronological publishing or order in the hard cover volume. Present numbering would be confusing to the reader.

1. Reference changed. If numbers are carried, the report should be renumbered to either coincide with chronological publishing or order in the hard cover volume. Present

2. Should be deleted or:

    published," or "about to be published."

5. This can be done without consultation with the panels.

V. References that date the reports, such as "Now," "This Year"

## II. Problems

1. The knowledge is only very general in that area.)
2. The Defense report is reviewed by military experts since which needs any substantive attention. (He suggests that

B. Was pointed out below, he feels the IV-Report is the only one of the that report.

V. Mr. Yarimovsky is very impressed with how well each report stands up in the light of the two years since publication

## J. General Evaluation

handling the published Special Studies Reports in a hard cover volume.
Adam Yarimovsky (former Public Affairs Editor, Doubleday) concerning
There follows a summary of preliminary comments made by

## Overall Panel Volume

January 28, 1960

Overall Panel Volume

Overall Panel Volume

January 28, 1960

- 2 -

C. Events not mentioned which indicate incompleteness.
(For example Khrushchev visit)

1. Tentatively suggests a few brief footnotes to handle this.

2. The drawback is that this procedure would underline any datedness.

D. Sections written for a Particular Situation that no longer seem applicable in the light of changed conditions.

1. There is, in Mr. Yarmolinsky's judgment, only one such passage in the entire five books, and this is the Recession - Inflation treatment in the IV-Report.

2. He feels that the balance is enough off to merit some action being taken, such as:

a. Footnotes

b. Delete sections of the Recession section to give balance with the Inflation.

c. Completely rewrite these sections of the report.

d. Include comment in a Foreword to the report.

3. If handled by methods a., b., c., the material would have to be resubmitted to the panel. If comment included in a Foreword, review could be made by the Overall Panel.

["Overall Panel.", "3. If handled by methods a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h), i), j), k), l), m), n), o), p), q), r), s), t), u), v), w), x), y), z), the material would have to be reapproved to the panel. If comments are received by methods a), b), c), d), e), f), g), h), i), j), k), l), m),

Nancy Hanks

4. Comment on W-report file done elsewhere

world when the reports were published

a. Historical setting of what was happening in the

b. Brief history of the Project and how it operated

c. Purpose of the Project

3. Such a Forward might contain:

Fund would be important.

Foreword by Mr. Rockefeller on behalf of the
integrate the substance of the reports, that a
Introduction was done to be philosophical and
Mr. Yerzimansky asserted that it John Gardner's

6. The Foreword

2. There was another purpose,

it stands up with time) or
because one of the values is to prove how well
of view (could leave almost completely as is
1. It was being published from an earlier point

the Overall Volume is intended, treatment would vary if:
A. There should be additional discussion of the purpose for which

III. Make-Up of the Overall Volume

- 3 -

January 28, 1960

**Overall Panel Volume**

February 29, 1960

Major General Lionel C. McGarr
Commandant
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Dear General McGarr:

It was very kind of you to send
the "Special Report" of January 1, 1959 which
I found very interesting. Your work in revising
the curriculum of the College and reorganizing
the program it offers has my admiration.

As I am no longer associated with
the Special Studies Project, I am taking the
liberty of forwarding a copy of your letter and
the report to Miss Nancy Hanks, Executive
Secretary, who I am sure will be very interested
in it.

U. S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

12 February 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director, The Special Studies Project
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am taking the liberty of writing you because of your distinguished contributions to American higher education and a mutual concern with the crucial problem facing higher education today - the challenging task of producing graduates able to cope with the ever increasing complexities of twentieth century civilization.

Much has been and is being written on this subject and many imaginative and ambitious educational programs have been instituted. Within the professional educational fraternity to include the Army Education System there is general awareness that certain facets of our traditional educational patterns are not entirely adequate for the "space age."

The challenge of designing an adequate educational program for today's and tomorrow's requirements is especially acute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College for this is the institution responsible for producing the professional officers to command and staff our future combined arms forces at the all important level of the Army in the Field. As you know, our task has been made increasingly challenging by unparalleled advances in welfare technology coupled with the necessary sweeping changes in army organizational structure.

It was my good fortune to be appointed Commandant of the College in the summer of 1956 at a time when these technological advances and organisational changes dictated a complete revision of our curriculum content. Concomitant with the rewrite of the curriculum and the re-orientation of the educational philosophy, it was necessary to completely reorganize the College in order to fully support the very substantial modernization of our educational methods and procedures. The result was that one year later when the College opened its doors an entirely new course of instruction had been prepared, a course especially designed to meet the needs of professional military education for both the present and the future.