notion of traditional warfare will have to be modified or abandoned. One of the cardinal principles of air strategy is that the air is indivisible -- that wars can be won only by dominating the airspace completely. But any attempt to deprive an enemy of his retaliatory force would inevitably bring on all-out war, because a major Power without a retaliatory force is at the mercy of its opponent. Thus the minimum condition of war limitation will be the immunity of the opposing retaliatory forces. The advent of missiles will impose this limitation in any case because it will be technically impossible to destroy all enemy launching sites. Another concept which will have to be modified is the elimination of enemy communication and industrial centers which was meaningful only so long as the major movement of armies was by road or rail. As the importance of air transport including helicopters and vertical take-off aircraft increases to the point where it will become the chief source of movement of troops and supplies, the interdiction of communication centers loses much of its significance. Finally in a war which will be largely fought by the forces-in-being, the destruction of industrial potential

8. Sir John Slessor, *Strategy for the West* (New York: Morrow, 1954), p. 105.

9. See above Chapter VI, p.

1-23

such as airbases or missile launching sites. The term military installation should be liberally defined and not extended to industrial plants. Cities at a greater distance from the battle zone would be immune altogether. The inspectors could be a commission of neutrals; it would be preferable if they were experts of the other side because this would give their reports a much higher credibility. The inspectors would have their own communication system and would operate even during hostilities.

Such a program would have several advantages over inspection schemes designed only to prevent surprise attack. It would accomplish most of the goals sought by the general inspection scheme: it would afford warning, insofar as an inspection system is able, but in addition it would also serve as an instrument of war limitation. Such a program moreover would be self-policing, Each of the protagonists would have a powerful incentive to observe it, because the penalty would be the catastrophe of an all-out war. For this reason both sides would probably be eager and not reluctant to overlook occasional violations. The inspectors could serve as points of political contact and thus the mechanics of arms limitation might also bring about the possibility of a rapid settlement should the contenders desire it. And by relating disarmament negotiations to military strategy it would force the opposing staffs to consider options other than the stark alternative of total peace or total war.

VII
X-44

The elimination of area targets will place an upper limit on the size of weapons it will be profitable to use. Since fall-out becomes a serious problem only with explosive power of 500 kilotons and above, it could be proposed that no weapon larger than 500 kilotons will be employed unless the enemy uses it first. Concurrently the United States could take advantage of a new development which significantly reduces fall-out by eliminating the last stage of the fission-11) fusion-fission process. We could therefore propose that all weapons above 500 kilotons should be "clean" bombs, and this too would be self-policing, since any significant fall-out would indicate a violation.

It may be objected that such a procedure would in effect neutralize cities and seriously interfere with military operations. But the neutralization of cities is inherent in modern technology quite apart from any arms limitation schemes. It would seem to make little difference whether a city is neutralized by the self-restraint of the protagonists, the presence of inspection teams or through the explosion of megaton weapons. As for impairing military operations, the handicap would be the same for both sides and the military will have to accept the fact that short of a thermo-nuclear holocaust, purely military decisions are no longer possible.

11) See above Chapter Three, p.

Since fusion produces very little radioactivity, the fall-out is confined to the radioactivity of the trigger mechanism and this is not a serious problem.

vii
2-44

The elimination of area targets will place an upper limit
on the size of weapons it will be profitable to use. Since
fall-out becomes a serious problem only in range of 500 kilotons
and above, itccould be proposed that no weapon larger than 500
kilotons will be employed unless the enemy uses it first. Con-
currently the United States could take advantage of a new develop-
ment which eliminates fall-out. The so-called "clean" bomb
eliminates the last stage of the fission-fusion-fission process.
Since fusion produces very little radioactivity, the fall-out is
confined to the radioactivity of the trigger mechanism and this
is not a serious problem. We could therefore propose that all
weapons above 500 kilotons should be "clean" bombs and
this too would be self-policing, since any significant fall-out
would indicate a violation.

11

It may be objected that such a procedure would in effect
neutralize cities and seriously interfere with military operations.
But the neutralization of cities is inherent in modern technology
quite apart from any arms limitation schemes. It would seem to
make little difference whether a city is neutralized by the
presence of inspection teams or through the explosion of megaton
weapons. As for impairing military operations, the handicap
would be the same for both sides and the military will have to
accept the fact that short of a thermo-nuclear holocaust, purely

11. See above Chapter IV, p.

[y]

x - 18

has turned from eliminating stockpiles of thermo-nuclear weapons to methods of restraining their use. And with the diffusion of nuclear technology, through the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, effective control of the development of nuclear weapons (by even the smaller Powers will be almost out of the question.) Moreover, once a weapon is developed its applications are so numerous and its uses until ever wider realms of strategy become dependent on it. A nation may be willing to forego the offensive uses of nuclear weapons, but it will be most reluctant to give up its defensive applications, such as anti-aircraft or anti-missile devices for example. But in advanced stages of their elaboration, weapons find a dual purpose: to kill and to damage. However, there will be a dual purpose: the launching site for ground-to-air missiles can be used as well for ground-to-ground weapons; a nuclear weapon launched from a plane against enemy bombers will be equally useful against enemy supply centers. In short, weapons can be kept from being added to stockpiles only at their inception when their implications are not yet fully understood. [X] Thus the only time to control the soon-to-be missiles would be within the next two years before they go into mass production. By the time their dangers are realized, the possibility of preventing their addition to existing arsenals by means of inspection or control has usually disappeared.

The difficulty of developing a meaningful control machinery to end the production and development of certain weapons has caused most disarmament negotiations since 1955 to concern themselves with means to prevent surprise attack. Since, so the argument goes, it is said that one of the causes for present tensions is the insecurity caused by the consciousness of imminent catastrophe and that consequently an inspection system which would reduce the danger of surprise attack would also remove some of the urgency from international relationships. This was the reasoning behind President Eisenhower's proposal.