## THEMES FOR MEET THE PRESS

Following are the themes:

1. First requirement is to understand where we are and how we got here: national election campaign not necessarily best time for reflection but perhaps have to go through a debate to clarify issues and alternatives.

-- there are clear differences in philosophy: Carter sees international affairs in terms of human relations, good will, cordiality, friendship, etc., opposite is more nearly true: struggle for power, but this is a theme which Americans don't like: result however is that we encourage turmoil in Iran, in Nicaragua, and Korea; may not be intention but objective result;

-- then Soveits exploit and accelerate crises; have to understand consequences of success for Soviet aims and clients;

-- then we are finally driven to extreme measures: take defense, constant attacks by Congress, then by Carter, and now requirements are huge.

-- take Iran: we push out the Shah to form coalition; typical liberal solution to every crisis; now we see consequences, we say no policeman required then have to hold straits with our forces;

-- Basic choice between different views of the world.

2. Second question is what to do about it:

-- no quick fix, no easy answer; things have progressed too far; somewhat similar to 1940s, need longer term programs and determination to stick with them; this has to be understood by public.

-- immediate problem is to ensure that our geopolitical strategy is supported by allies--end bickering over whether Afghanistan is 'accident on road to detente', or "watershed"; establish relationship between detente-arms control and containment; fix common price willing to impose on Soviets for further adventures; discuss division of labor: what Europe will do;

-- discuss military strategy for European nuclear weapons and strategic weapons.

-- as sub issue, discuss Chines policy: how far to go in rearming, also role of Japan;

-- discuss international economic policies; summits becoming routine, losing meaning.

3. Finally, ask ourselves whether we can begin reconstructing national consensus, after elections, whoever wins:

look at issues that will face next president, take Middle East, cannot conduct diplomacy without domestic base.

Take defense, cannot impose higher budgets without consensus; or take Soviet negotiations; can't have agreements without Senate support, need to avoid left-right split; optional: situation is such that may have to think about national coalition whomever is elected.

"TRIGON"

Q. A controversy is now raging about a conversation you had with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in April 1977, in which you allegedly told the Russians to ignore the Carter Administration's SALT proposals. This was apparently reported to Washington by a spy we had in the Kremlin who has since been arrested.

A. First of all, I have never seen such a report, or been informed of its existence. In any case, I said nothing of this sort to Dobrynin, and on its face it is wrong. The report is now judged by most experts familiar with it as Soviet disinformation, that is, false.

Beyond this I fell it is completely inappropriate to speculate about the operational detail of spy cases. This is the function of the CIA, and the Intelligence Oversight Committees.

THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Q. Secretary Muski and Foreign Minister Gromyko have agreed that the US and Soviet Union will begin preparatory talks on controlling theater nuclear weapons on October 13; do you support these talks, and if so, what do you believe can be achieved, and if not, why do you oppose them?

A. We are committed to these talks as a result of the NATO decision of December, 1979. I believe that the timing is unfortunate. In the same week that a Soviet client uses Soviet arms to attack its neighbor, what will the countries of the area conclude if they see us proceeding to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union. After all, it is less than a year since the invasion of Afghanistan, and the repeated statements that we could not continue business as usual. The Soviets already have held two summit meetings with Schmidt and Giscard, two meetings between Muskie and Gromyko, the preliminary conference on CSCE in Madrid, and now the TNF negotiations. They clearly are not suffering from diplomatic isolation.

As for the talks themselves, what is the likely outcome; The Soviets will stall; because the Belgian and Dutch governments will not accept American weapons so long as negotiations are proceeding. This means the Germans probably will not proceed. So that the pressures will grow to reach some compromise and if the Soviet continue their deployments during the talks, we are in a worse position.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Q. Governor Reagan has blamed the Iran-Iraq war on President Carter's weakness. How can this be true?

A. We have to recognize, first, that the fighting in the Persian Gulf is a disaster for the West. We lose whichever side wins. Iraq is a Soviet client bidding for dominance of the Gulf; Iran is violently anti-American; and the war itself is going to wreck the oil fields, shrink world supplies, and drive up the price.

It is a dramatic proof of America's helplessness and impotence, which can only add to the demoralization of our friends and to the radicalization of the area. The Carter Doctrine correctly declared that we had a vital stake in the security of the Persian Gulf, and yet we have done nothing. It dramatizes our military weakness, and the security vacuum in the area that is the inevitable result of the overthrow of the Shah.

REAGAN "RISKING WAR"

Q. The President has charged that Governor Reagan's policies risk a war. Do you disagree?

A. The danger of war comes not from a President pushing a button, but from a President losing control over events. An Administration that is congenitally unable to wield American influence to shape events is going to stumble into crisis after crisis, each crisis more dangerous than the one before. This is now happening.

We have now seen a series of crises in the Persian Gulf area--the overthrow of the Shah, the invasion of Afghanistan, and now Iraq's invasion of Iran. An area of the world on which Western Europe and the world economy are dependent for oil supplies has now slid into chaos. It is inconceivable that American power could not have influenced the course of events over the past four years.

It is American weakness that produces the danger of war, not American strength.

A JOB

Q. Is there a job for Henry Kissinger in a Reagan Administration?

A. I am supporting Governor Reagan because he is the best choice for the country, without any expectation of any position.

Governor Reagan has made clear his intention that there be a new Secretary of State -- although I would not hold him to all the campaign promises made in the heat of a difficult campaign!

My efforts to start a James G. Blaine fan club have gotten nowhere. (FYI: James G. Blaine was the last man to have been Secretary of State twice, in two nonconsecutive terms: briefly, in 1881, under James Garfield; and 1889-92 under Benjamin Harrison. Daniel Webster also did it, in 1841-43 under William Henry Harrison and John Tyler; and 1850-52 under Millard Fillmore.)

THE REAGAN-FORD TICKET

Q. Do you regret your effort, at the Republican Convention in Detroit, to negotiate a "Co-Presidency" for Gerald Ford on the Reagan ticket?

A. I have described my role in this before and I do not want to continue the debate.

There were several hours of discussions in Detroit, in good faith, involving matters such as staffing and paperflow that were far less earthshaking than what has been labeled a "co-Presidency". The idea didn't work out, and as far as I know there are no hard feelings on either side. As for my role in the Reagan Administration, this was not a main subject of our Detroit discussions.

THE HOSTAGES

Q. Do you expect the hostages to be released before our election?
Will President Carter gain from this?

A. I think every American prays that the hostages will be released as soon as possible, before our election, regardless of the political consequences here. This is why Governor Reagan has said that he would not second-guess any negotiations that President Carter undertook to secure their release in the next months -- and why he pledged to abide by any agreement reached if he should become President.

Whether they will be released soon, no one knows. The Iraqi invasion unfortunately will probably delay it further.

The political fallout of an early release would be unpredictable. Some Iranians, such as Ghotzbzadeh, have said that Iran has an incentive to release the hostages before our election in order to prevent Governor Reagan's victory. If that happens -- if they are more afraid of Governor Reagan than of President Carter -- then perhaps Governor Reagan will deserve some of the credit for their release.

STEALTH

Q. Is this really a serious breach of security by the Administration?

A. First of all, the editor of *Aviation Week* believes that the leak was made for political motives, which is part of the problem.

Secondly, While the Soviets had undoubtedly heard of it before, it is not clear that they had enough information to warrant devoting significant resources to countering it or emulating it. We have now probably guaranteed a decision on their part to devote these resources--by announcing, at the most authoritative level, that (a) we are going all-out, (b) we have achieved enormous success, and (c) we regard it as a change in the balance of power.

Q. The Defense Department has said that the system was not even classified in the Ford Administration. Is this true?

A. You would have to ask Secretary Rumsfeld about that, but as far as President Ford and I were concerned, it was one of the most important military secrets we had. We certainly managed to keep it secret a lot better than the Carter Administration. (FYI: There was a story in *Aviation Week* in July 1976.)

SULLIVAN'S ARTICLE

Q. Do you agree with Ambassador William Sullivan's recent article on the Administration's mishandling of the crisis surrounding the fall of the Shah?

A. First of all, I believe objectively that the overthrow of the pro-Western government of the Shah was one of the biggest disasters for the Western world since World War II-- whether or not we could have prevented it. We are now seeing an example of the chaos in the Persian Gulf which is the inevitable result of the loss of Iran.

Ambassador Sullivan's article confirms other accounts that the Administration never made up its mind on a coherent policy, and never seems to have understood the strategic consequences of what was happening. This can only have accelerated the disastrous trend of events and helped assure the worst possible outcome.

However, I think Sullivan's preferred scheme--removing the Shah and striking a deal between the army and the Khomeini forces for a coalition government -- is totally naive. It would never had worked, and our efforts to bring it about can only have accelerated the disastrous trend of events that took place.

MEET THE PRESS

MR. MONROE: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger, the Iraqi Army seems to be in the process of taking over Iranian oil installations and territory at the head of the Persian Gulf. What dangers and what opportunities, if any, does this present to the U.S. and to the West?

DR. KISSINGER: The most immediate problem is that the major oil resources at the head of the Persian Gulf now will be in the hands of the most radical of the OPEC countries, in terms of pricing, so it will have an effect on the energy situation.

Secondly, it will be one other example where Soviet arms, Soviet friendship treaties, have brought about a change in the military and political situation in the area.

Third, it is going to have a very serious impact on the moderate Arab nations in the Persian Gulf who see Iraq emerging as the hegemonial country in that area.

And fourth, I think it is going to have serious effects inside Iran which are not necessarily all bad from our point of view, because it's hard to imagine a government much more hostile to us than the current one.

MR. MONROE: Would you elaborate a little bit on the possible effects inside Iran which you say might not be all bad?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that this war, which I suspect will be unsuccessful, will force some consideration of what the present regime has done to Iran in terms of international isolation, economic impoverishment, and it may bring about either a change in the regime or a change in orientation of the regime.

But then we come to the second question: Supposing they want to change orientation, what do they believe the United States will be able to do for them, given our performance in that area in recent years, and so that even if there's a change, they may for reasons of prudence feel that they have to rely on the Soviets for military support, rather than on us as they had in the past.

MR. MONROE: Do you agree with President Carter's policy of neutrality?

DR. KISSINGER: I agree with President Carter's policy that in the immediate situation there is nothing we can do. I regret the sequence of events that got us into a position where those are the only choices left for the United States.

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MR. ROWAN: Dr. Kissinger, you say you regret the sequence of events that got us into this position in the Persian Gulf area. That reminds me that some Republicans are saying that we wouldn't be in this mess if the Carter administration had done what it needed to do to prop up the Shah of Iran, instead of undermining him. Do you subscribe to the thesis that this is what got us into this mess?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the collapse of the pro-American government in Iran headed by the Shah is one of the geopolitical disasters of the post-war period. He had the largest army in the Persian Gulf, and he was in foreign policy matters unconditionally on our side. The reason that we had sold him arms was to balance the large influx of Soviet arms into Iraq, so I believe that without the collapse of the Shah of Iran, it would have been absolutely inconceivable that this would happen. But one has to look at this from an even wider perspective.

In the last three years, there have been Cuban expeditionary forces in Ethiopia. There has been a Communist coup in South Yemen that put in—a pro-Soviet government into that strategic area. There have been two coups in Afghanistan, followed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the collapse of Iran. All of these together have created the image in the Persian Gulf that all changes occur either by Soviet troops or by Soviet coups or by Soviet proxy forces and that the United States is an impotent bystander, and has therefore pushed even the more moderate regimes in that area in the direction of the radicals. In this sense, I agree with the criticism, yes.

MR. ROWAN: Now, we know that by mid '78, the Shah was a sick man, a man who had virtually given up the fight. Do you really think there is some way we could have kept that man in power, given the magnitude of the revolution that was arising around him?

DR. KISSINGER: When you don't have access to all the details, it is extremely difficult to say what one should have done tactically in a very complicated situation, but one thing is clear: If one reads the article of Ambassador Sullivan, what concerns me is not that his particular recommendation was rejected, because I frankly believe his particular recommendation was naive, but what concerns me is that there were three different policies being pursued simultaneously, according to his own account, one of them involving the transfer of the army from the Shah to Bakhtiar, another transferring the army to Barzagan, a third just to overthrow the Shah on human rights grounds. When you have three different policies pursued by the United States and the president not choosing between them in a revolutionary situation, the least you can say is that our actions accelerated an extremely difficult situation. To what extent the Shah had given up, which you correctly say, cannot be judged except in

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reference to the American performance, which must have been extremely demoralizing for him.

MR. ROWAN: You have written that a president brings to office everything you're going to get in the field of foreign policy, that he can't do on-the-job-training.

DR. KISSINGER: That's right.

MR. ROWAN: Do you think Ronald Reagan will bring enough to the office of the presidency, that he will handle these problems more effectively than Mr. Carter has?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that Ronald Reagan will bring to the office a willingness to bring in senior advisors and a sense of responsibility, which I think will produce a more measured, a more careful, and a less idiosyncratic foreign policy than the one that has been carried out in the last few years, one less geared to the personal prejudices of individuals. For that reason I believe it will be a safer foreign policy and a more mature foreign policy.

MR. BURT: Dr. Kissinger, I want to return to this earlier point you made about the possibility that there could be this conflict in the Persian Gulf—could lead to changes in Iran that would not be entirely bad for the United States. Would you support, or at least support the study in the U.S. government of taking advantage of this conflict to perhaps foster the overthrow of the current government?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we are now in a position where anything that we would do directly would work against our interests, and of course, the United States government has an obligation to look at all possibilities, even those that it has no intention of carrying out, simply to prepare itself intellectually.

In terms of American geopolitical interests in that area, our normal relationship would be with Iran, because Iraq is the most radical of the Arab countries. Despite occasional flirtation with the West, it attempts to achieve a leadership over the rest of the Arab countries that is more or less aimed against our interests. On the other hand, the experience of the Iranians with the United States is such that I think it is unlikely that they will believe that we can protect any friend in that area, having seen how we conducted ourselves toward the Shah and our inability to protect the hostages, so that even if there's a change of government and even if they should become convinced that they should go back to their more traditional posture, it is not at all clear to me that they will have enough confidence to do that.

But I think the best we can do under the present circumstances is to let this drama work itself out without our mixing into it. The important problem is to build a firebreak so that it cannot happen again.

MR. BURT: In order to build up our credibility in the region,

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do you think President Carter should have ordered American naval vessels at least into the southern part of the Gulf to protect the shipping lanes through the Straits of Hormuz?

DR. KISSINGER: I'm very reluctant to give tactical prescriptions in the middle of a crisis. Leaving aside the immediate crisis, I believe it is important for countries to understand that the industrial democracies cannot permit themselves to be strangled in general, and certainly not by the conflict of local powers, and that we and our allies must get together and come to an understanding about how we are going to protect the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world's oil supplies is moving.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, you talked earlier about Soviet proxies and Soviet coups. Do you believe that the Soviet Union is behind Iraq in this war?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviet Union is in the position of somebody who throws a rock down a mountainside that is covered with boulders, and then claims that it is not responsible for a passerby being killed, because the rock that killed him is not the rock he threw.

When you introduce large quantities of arms into an area as volatile as the Persian Gulf and give them to a government that avows aspirations to dominance in that area, you then are responsible for the consequences even if the particular event was not urged by you.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union particularly urged this individual event. On the other hand, the Soviet Union cannot be surprised if, after the collapse of Iran, which tended to checkmate Iraq, and which was the reason why we tended to support Iran, with the collapse of Iran, Iraq had an option either toward the Arab world or toward Iran. It chose, for a variety of reasons, to attack Iran also as a warning to the other moderate Arab countries of what could happen to them if they crossed Iraqi purposes. So in a geopolitical strategic sense, I hold the Soviets responsible, and it's interesting that on the second day of the war one of the Iraqi top leadership visited Moscow.

MR. KALB: How do you think the Soviet Union regards the United States at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviet Union regards the United States with bafflement. They see us unwilling to protect fundamental geopolitical interests. They see us oscillate between verbal condemnations and eagerness to resume negotiations on limited topics. I think they see a strategic opportunity, but they are slightly worried that if they push this strategic opportunity too far, public opinion, the unpredictability of Americans, will suddenly force us to draw a line where they hadn't expected it, and so they have a mixture of seeing great opportunities tem-

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pered by the fear that America may suddenly reverse course, contrary to all performance.

**MR. KALB:** Don't you think the administration is now trying to draw a line somewhere in the Persian Gulf?

**DR. KISSINGER:** The administration is trying to draw a verbal line, but it finds it extremely difficult to think in terms of balance of power and of articulating a clear-cut conception of the limitations that it wishes to insist on. It finds it extremely difficult to strike a balance between its negotiations and its military strategy and puts each of them into watertight compartments where they cannot support each other, so that in the week of Iraqi invasion with Soviet arms of Iran, you have the announcement of the resumption of talks on theatre nuclear forces in Europe, at the very moment when the upheaval in the Persian Gulf, which was at least partly instigated by the Soviets, is threatening the very survival of Europe.

**MR. MONROE:** Dr. Kissinger, what about the possible argument that the whole situation in the Persian Gulf is a reaction against mistaken American policies in the past in which you and others participated, the anti-Americanism of the Khomeini regime, a reaction against American domination of Iran and backing of the Shah, the Iraqi attack, the results of settlements imposed by Iran, backed by American arms, on Iraq some years ago, which the Iraqis regarded as humiliating?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Of course, I find it very difficult to grant your premise that mistakes were made in administrations in which I participated, but leaving aside that particular point, there is a nearly inexhaustible American masochism according to which whatever goes wrong anywhere in the world must somehow be our fault, and if you just look carefully enough through the documents, you will find one that proves that the United States is at fault.

The anti-American radicalism of people like Khomeini is not so much the result of American mistakes, but it is a reaction of Islamic fundamentalists to the modern world, to the process of modernization, to the process of secularization, which represented some of the best advice in our terms that the United States gave. It was the result of the process of economic development as much as anything else.

And as for American domination of Iran, our relationship with Iran was based on reciprocity. We supplied the weapons by which they maintained a balance of power that was also in our interest. It is the collapse of that that I think has led to the current situation, and I wouldn't be surprised if many Iranians now look back with some nostalgia to that period when human rights were, bad as they might have been, much less threatened as now, and Iran was militarily secure.

**MR. ROWAN:** Dr. Kissinger, Governor Reagan has around

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him numerous advisers who have been very hostile toward you, because of your role in forging the opening to the People's Republic of China, your support of detente with the Soviet Union, your support of the original arms limitation agreement. Given the fact that these men will be coming to power, don't you have any reservations about supporting Governor Reagan?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I've said before that Governor Reagan has not always expressed himself with the same admiration for me that I feel, and therefore many of his advisers have been even more articulate on that subject.

I believe that Governor Reagan, as a presidential candidate, faced with the imminence of assuming the responsibilities for the future of this country, has a broader view than as a candidate for one faction of the Republican Party. I have had several opportunities for extended talks with him, and while neither he nor I would wish to maintain that we agree on every detail, I am convinced that the mainline of the foreign policy he would pursue is compatible with my convictions.

And then one has to look at it in terms of alternatives. I am genuinely convinced, and not for partisan reasons, that the present trend of our foreign policy will lead to disaster and will lead to a multiplication of crises that we cannot manage, and this is the reason I'm supporting Governor Reagan.

**MR. ROWAN:** Are you personally convinced that this house of good relationship with China that you helped build will be safe in a Reagan administration?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I'm convinced that the relationship with China will be safe in a Reagan administration. It depends fundamentally on two elements: One, on the American ability to maintain the overall balance of power; second, on the willingness of both sides—that is, of the People's Republic and of the United States—to respect each other's fundamental principles. I think after the initial flareup in the campaign that both of these principles are now clearly understood, and that we will not see a repetition on either side of some of the attacks on the sensitivities of the other.

**MR. BURT:** Dr. Kissinger, I'd like to ask you a question about your own role in the foreign policy debate. About this time last year, you gave several speeches and interviews talking about the need for a new consensus in American foreign policy, but last month when the Carter administration announced a new nuclear targeting strategy, you criticized that strategy as being mis-timed; you said that it would confuse our allies. Are you allowing your own partisanship to get in the way of the creation of a new bipartisan consensus in foreign policy?

**DR. KISSINGER:** No, I—first of all, let me say that I'm convinced that after the election, whoever wins, the new president

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is going to face—or the new administration is going to face the most serious crisis in American post-war foreign policy, and maybe in this country. At that time, all serious Americans have to rally behind the administration in office, and I would certainly do my utmost in that sense.

Secondly, with respect to the targeting strategy, I objected to introducing an issue of such extraordinary sensitivity in the middle of an election campaign, where it was subject to severe misinterpretation. I have opposed the strategy of relying on the destruction of civilian populations, and therefore I generally favor more discriminating targeting, but I think a subject of such sensitivity, having been neglected for three-and-a-half years, could have waited another six months where it could have been introduced in an atmosphere where it was less subject to misinterpretation. It was not an attack on the substance of it, which really continues something that had been started in previous administrations. It was an attack on the timing, and you will remember that a year-and-a-half ago when I questioned the premises of the then targeting doctrine, I was severely criticized by the administration for undermining Allied confidence. How much more must it do so if similar views are suddenly announced without warning in the middle of an election campaign.

**MR. MONROE:** We have about one-and-a-half minutes.

**MR. KALB:** Dr. Kissinger, President Carter paints a choice for the American electorate in this election as a war or peace choice, and he suggests that if he were re-elected it would be peace, and if Governor Reagan were elected it would be war. In general terms, what do you think of that kind of a description?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think it is very unfair to conduct an electoral campaign with these slogans. No president would lightly go to war. The danger of war, however, in my view is not a rash president pressing a button in a particular crisis. The danger of war is a foreign policy that permits a multiplication of crises where the question of war and peace has constantly to be faced. My worry is that our current policy is making us crisis prone, and it continually will face the president with the choice of either permitting events that are totally contrary to our interests, or having to address the question of peace and war. So I think the tactic is unfair, and the argument is wrong and nearly the opposite of the truth.

**MR. MONROE:** Do you see any openings in the present situation that might help us get the hostages back?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think that the present situation will make the release of the hostages more certain, although by preoccupying the Iranian government, it may slow it down a little bit. I have expected the hostages to come out in the near future.

**MR. MONROE:** Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with us today on MEET THE PRESS.

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MR. MCNROE: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

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Dr. Kissinger, the Iraqi Army seems to be in the process of taking over Iranian oil installations and territory at the head of the Persian Gulf. What dangers and what opportunities, if any, does this present to the U. S. and to the West?

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DR. KUSSINGER: Well, the most immediate problem is that the major oil resources at the head of the Persian Gulf now will be in the hands of the most radical of the OPEC countries, in terms of pricing, so it will have an effect on the energy situation.

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Secondly, it will be one other example where Soviet arms, Soviet friendship treaties, have brought about a change in the military -- in the military and political situation in the area.

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And, fourth, I think it is going to have serious effects inside Iran which are not necessarily all bad from our point of view, because it's hard to imagine a government much more hostile to us than the current one.

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MR. MCNROE: Would you elaborate a little bit on the possible effects inside Iran which you say might not be all

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1 bad?

2 DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that this war, which I
3 suspect will be unsuccessful, will force some consideration of
4 what the present regime has done to Iran in terms of inter-
5 national isolation, economic impoverishment, and it may bring
6 about either a change in the regime or a change in orienta-
7 tion of the regime. But then we come to the second question:
8 Supposing they want to change orientation, what do they
9 believe the United States will be able to do for them, given
10 our performance in that area in recent years, and so that even
11 if there's a change, they may for reasons of prudence feel
12 that they have to rely on the Soviets for military support,
13 rather than on us as they had in the past.

14 MR. MONROE: Do you agree with President Carter's policy
15 of neutrality?

16 DR. KISSINGER: I agree with President Carter's policy
17 that in the immediate situation there is nothing we can do.
18 I regret the sequence of events that got us into a position
19 where that is -- where those are the only choices left for the
20 United States.

21 MR. MONROE: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Our reporters on
22 MEET THE PRESS today are Carl T. Rowan of the Chicago Sun-Times,
23 Richard Burt of The New York Times, and Marvin Kalb of NBC
24 News, permanent member of the MEET THE PRESS panel. We'll be
25 back with our questions in a minute.

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-- ANNOUNCEMENTS --

2 MR. MONROE: We'll continue the questions for Henry
3 Kissinger with Mr. Rowan.

4 MR. ROWAN: Dr. Kissinger, you say you regret the sequence
5 of events that got us into this position in the Persian Gulf
6 area. That reminds me that some Republicans are saying that
7 we wouldn't be in this mess if the Carter Administration had
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8 done what it needed to do to prop up the Shah of Iran, instead
9 of undermining him. Do you subscribe to the thesis that this
10 is what got us into this mess?

11 DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that the collapse of the
12 pro-American government in Iran headed by the Shah is one of
13 the geopolitical disasters of the post-war period. He had
14 the largest army in the Persian Gulf, and he was in foreign
15 policy matters unconditionally on our side, and the reason
16 that we had sold him arms was to balance the large influx of
17 Soviet arms into Iraq, so I believe that without the collapse
18 of the Shah of Iran, it would have been absolutely inconceiv-
19 able that this would happen, but one has to go look at this
20 from an even wider perspective.

21 In the last three years, there have been Cuban expedi-
22 tionary forces in Ethiopia. There has been a Communist coup
23 in South Yemen that put in a pro-Soviet government into that
24 strategic area. There have been two coups in Afghanistan,
25 followed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and now -- and

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the collapse of Iran. All of these together have created the image in the Persian Gulf that this has happened either by Soviet troops, or by Soviet coups or by Soviet proxy forces, and that the United States is an impotent bystander, and has therefore pushed even the more moderate regimes in that area in the direction -- in the direction of the radicals, and in this sense, I agree with the criticism, yes.

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MR. ROWAN: Now, we know that by mid '78, the Shah was a sick man, a man who'd virtually given up the fight. Do you really think there is some way we could have kept that man in power, given the magnitude of the revolution that was arising around him?

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DR. KISSINGER: When you don't have access to all the details, it is extremely difficult to say what one should have done tactically in a very complicated situation, but one thing is clear: If one reads the article of Ambassador Sullivan, what concerns me is not that his particular recommendation was rejected, because I frankly believe his particular recommendation was naive, but what concerns me is that there were three different policies being pursued simultaneously, according to his own account, one of them involving the transfer of the army from the Shah to Bakhtiar, another transferring the army to Barzigan, a third just to overthrow the Shah on human rights grounds. When you have three different policies pursued by the United States, and the President not choosing between

1. In Iran that would not be entirely bad for the United States.

2. Would you support, or at least support the study in the U. S.

3. Government of taking advantage of this conflict to perhaps foster the overthrow of the current government?

5. DR. KISSINGER: I think we are now in a position where anything that we would do directly would work against our interests, and of course, the United States Government has an obligation to look at all possibilities, even those that it has no intention of carrying out, simply to prepare itself intellectually.

11. In terms of American geopolitical interests in that area, our normal relationship would be with Iran, because Iraq is the most radical of the Arab countries. Despite occasional flirtations with the West, it attempts to achieve a leadership over the rest of the Arab countries that is more or less aimed against our interests. On the other hand, the experience of the Iranians with the United States is such that I think it is unlikely that they will believe that we can protect any friend in that area, having seen how we conducted ourselves towards the Shah and our inability to protect the hostages, so that even if there's a change of government and even if they should become convinced that they should go back to their more traditional posture, it is not at all clear to me that they'll have enough confidence to do so.

25. But I think the best we can do under the present

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MR. BURT: Well, in order to build up our credibility in the region, do you think President Carter should have ordered American naval vessels at least into the southern part of the Gulf to protect the shipping lanes through the Straits of Hormuz?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I'm very reluctant to give tactical prescriptions in the middle of a crisis. Leaving aside the immediate crisis, I believe it is important for countries to understand that the industrial democracies cannot permit themselves to be strangled in general, and certainly not by the conflicts of local powers, and that we and our allies must get together and come to an understanding about how we are going to protect the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world's oil supplies is moving.

MR. MONROE: Mr. Kalb?

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killed them is not the rock they threw.

When you introduce large quantities of arms into an area as volatile as the Persian Gulf and give them to a government that avows aspirations to dominance in that area, you then are responsible for the consequences, even if the particular event was not urged by you.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union particularly urged this individual event. On the other hand, the Soviet Union cannot be surprised if, after the collapse of Iran, which tended to checkmate Iraq and which was the reason why we tended to support Iran, with the collapse of Iraq -- Iran -- Iraq had an option either towards the Arab world or towards Iran. It chose, for a variety of reasons, to attack Iran also as a warning to the other moderate Arab countries of what could happen to them if they crossed Iraqi purposes. So in a geopolitical strategic sense, I hold the Soviets responsible, and it's interesting that on the second day of the war one of the Iraqi top leadership visited Moscow.

1 Khomeini regime, a reaction against American domination of
2 Iran and backing of the Shah, the Iraqi attack the result of
3 settlements imposed by Iran backed by American arms on Iraq
4 some years ago, which the Iraqis regarded as humiliating?

5 DR. KISSINGER: Well, of course, I find it very difficult
to grant your premise that mistakes were made in administra-
tions in which I participated, but leaving aside that particular
point, there is a nearly inexhaustible American masochism
according to which whatever goes wrong anywhere in the world
must somehow be our fault, and if you just look carefully
enough through the documents, you will find one that proves
that the United States is at fault.

13 The anti-American radicalism of people like Khomeini is
14 the result of -- is not so much the result of American mistakes,
15 but it is a reaction of Islamic fundamentalists to the modern
16 world, to the process of modernization, to the process of
17 secularization, which represented some of the best advice in
18 our terms that the United States gave. It was the result of the
19 process of economic development as much as anything else.

20 And as for American domination of Iran, our relationship
21 with Iran was based on reciprocity. We supplied the weapons
22 by which they maintained a balance of power, that was also in
23 our interests, and it is the collapse of that that I think has
24 led to the current situation, and I wouldn't be surprised if
25 many Iranians now look back with some nostalgia to that period

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MR. MONROE: Mr. Rowan?

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MR. ROWAN: Dr. Kissinger, Governor Reagan has around him numerous advisers who have been very hostile toward you, because of your role in forging the opening to the People's Republic of China, your support of detente with the Soviet Union, your support of the original arms limitation agreement.

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Now, given the fact that these men will be coming to power,
don't you have any reservations about supporting Governor
Reagan?

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DR. KISSINGER: Well, I've said before that Governor
Reagan has not always expressed himself with the same admira-
tion for me that I feel, and therefore many of his advisers
have been even more articulate on that subject.

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I believe that Governor Reagan, as a Presidential
candidate, faced with the imminence of assuming the responsi-
bilities for the future of this country, has a broader view
than as a candidate for one faction of the Republican Party.
I have had several opportunities for extended talks with him,
and while neither he nor I would wish to maintain that we
agree on every detail, I am convinced that the mainlines of
the foreign policy he would pursue is compatible with my
convictions.

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MR. MONROE: We have about one-and-a-half minutes. Mr.
Kalb?

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, President Carter paints a
choice for the American electorate in this election as a war
or peace choice, and he suggests that if he were re-elected it
would be peace, and if Governor Reagan were elected it would
be war. In general terms, what do you think of that kind of
a description?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is very unfair to conduct an
electoral campaign with these slogans. No President would
lightly go to war. The danger of war, however, in my view is
not a rash President pressing a button in a particular crisis.
The danger of war is a foreign policy that permits a multiplica-
tion of crises where the question of war and peace has
constantly to be faced. My worry is that our current policy is
making us crisis prone, and it continually will face the
President with the choice of either permitting events that are
totally contrary to our interests, or having to address the
question of peace and war, so I think the tactic is unfair and
the argument is wrong and nearly the opposite of the truth.

MR. MONROE: Do you see any openings in the present
situation that might help us get the hostages back?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the present situation will