GENERAL JOHN GALVIN

Welcome ladies and gentlemen. *Herzliche Wilkommen, meine sehr geehrte Damen und Herren.* I would like to take this moment to welcome all of you and especially a few people. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, we are very happy to have you with us tonight. Minister Genscher, Ambassador Chrobog, Ambassador Eitel, Ambassador Holbrooke, Maestro Masur, Marion Countess Dönhoff, Senator Mac Mathias and Ambassador and Mrs. Stabreit. I would also like to congratulate Guido Goldman, who has been Chairman of the Steering Committee that has put this program together. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to you all!

And now a special welcome to the Kissinger family. Nancy Kissinger; Walter Kissinger, Henry's brother; and Paula, Mrs. Louis Kissinger, Henry's mother, who is here tonight; and, if I can ask him to stand, Secretary Henry Kissinger-- we are so glad that you could be with us tonight.

A standing ovation and grateful tribute to a man who has given so much to his country!

I will restrict my own words tonight and try to be an example to everyone else. But as a soldier, I recognize and admire Henry Kissinger's extraordinarily accurate understanding of the meaning of power, policy, and politics, and how they work in the international system. His brilliantly pragmatic articulation of that understanding over a long passage of time and a long series of events is something that I know you admire very much. It is therefore eminently fitting that the President of the United States has chosen to send a personal message to him. I will read that message now. From the White House, dated today:

President Bill Clinton

*I am delighted to join the members of the American Council on Germany in paying tribute to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.*

As one of America's foremost statesmen, Dr. Kissinger has played a vital role in shaping our nation's modern diplomatic history. His ability to negotiate effectively, along with his keen awareness of the concerns of America's allies, were pillars of the policy that ultimately led to democracy's triumph in the Cold War. Those of us who grapple with the complex foreign policy issues facing our country appreciate his continuing contributions to our national security and value his steadfast advocacy of American internationalism.

It is especially fitting that the American Council on Germany has chosen to honor Dr. Kissinger for his strong and productive support of U.S.-German ties. A close friend of the Council's founder, John J. McCloy, Dr. Kissinger understands the importance of the German-American relationship to world stability and has done much to reaffirm that relationship. I know that Dr. Kissinger, as a Board Member of the American Council on Germany, will continue to strengthen the friendship between our two countries, and I congratulate him on this great honor.

And now ladies and gentleman, may I introduce Jürgen Chrobog, the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States, who will also read a message. May I thank him for being a good friend to the American Council on Germany.

From left to right, Maestro Kurt Masur, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Ambassador Jürgen Chrobog, and Mrs. Tomoko Sakurai Masur

AMBASSADOR JÜRGEN CHROBOG

Ladies and gentlemen, I have the honor to read to you a personal message from Chancellor Kohl to Henry Kissinger.

Dear Friend,

During your long and successful political career, in particular as Secretary of State of the United States of America, you made a very personal contribution towards intensifying German-American relations.

The friendship between Germany and the United States of America, which developed anew after the Second World War, was a result of the generous assistance given by the citizens of the U.S.A. for the needy German people. The Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift were some of the crucial prerequisites for peace and freedom over the last few decades and for the attainment of German unity.

However, friendship is not an abstract term but, rather, must be revitalized regularly. Mr. Kissinger, as a statesman, you have enriched relations between our two countries and provided them with important impetus through your extraordinary commitment. We are deeply indebted to you for this, particularly in view of your own biography.

Yours sincerely,
Helmut Kohl

Dr. Kissinger, please allow me as German Ambassador to the United States to join Chancellor Kohl in thanking you for all you have done to strengthen German-American relations. Thank you.

GENERAL GALVIN

I have the great honor of saying a couple of words about a young man I have known for 28 years, since we worked together in Secretary of Defense McNamara's office on "The Pentagon Papers." I was a writer, and he was more a director, but I am very proud to have known him over these three decades. As you know, Dick Holbrooke has been the Ambassador to Germany in recent years. He has been a negotiator *par excellence* in all that he has done. I would like to remind you that it is precisely one year to the day since the Dayton Agreements were signed. In fact, Dick has come to us tonight directly from Dayton, where there was another meeting to discuss the furtherance of the Dayton Agreements. So it gives me the greatest pleasure and a great sense of honor to introduce at this time my old friend, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, one of the people with the highest profile in this country today. Thank you for being here.

Dr. Kissinger with George M. Steinbrenner, III

Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

AMBASSADOR RICHARD HOLBROOKE

Thank you so much General Galvin, Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, fellow Democrats. Paul Volcker recently asked Henry Kissinger if he thought the political elite was in decline. And he replied "No, but I am getting lonely." I am truly honored by Jack Galvin's invitation to join you tonight. It is true I came from Dayton, where we were commemorating the first anniversary of the Agreements and talking about where we go from here. But this was not a hard decision. I am a private citizen now, and the chance to honor Henry Kissinger, whom I have known for 30 years, was something I did not want to turn down.

We go back a long way. We first met in Vietnam, when I was a junior Foreign Service Officer, and he was already one of the most distinguished members of the American academic community and an advisor to the Johnson Administration. Our paths crossed many times--not always on the same side--but, I am glad to say, usually on the same side. Above all, in regard to two issues of central concern to both him and me: China and Germany. He and I and Nancy Kissinger have been together in both countries. I am particularly grateful to him for his help, when, quite unexpectedly, Secretary Christopher and President Clinton asked me to go to Germany as Ambassador in May of 1993. This was a job that I had never thought would be offered to me and had never even thought about. My first call, after I received the offer, was to my mother, who, as many of you know, was born in Germany, left in 1933, and never returned. Her answer, falling back in her native tongue, was "Ach, das noch" ("Oh, that too").

Then I called Henry Kissinger, and after a long pause, he absorbed the news and said "Ach, das noch." Henry was enormously supportive. First, he sent messages to the German government, as Ambassador Chrobog, then Political Director at the German Foreign Ministry, knows, saying that even though I knew nothing about Germany, Germany should give me a chance. He then sent messages to the Chancellor and to other Germans including Hans-Dietrich Genscher and gave me a great deal of advice. All of which--and I am not joking--I followed carefully. To be with Henry in Germany is an extraordinary experience. He speaks to the Germans as an American but with a special understanding, one that is so important to all of us. I think it is very fitting that this great organization, The American Council on Germany, with which I am proud to be associated, with its roots in the John McCloy era, but with its view to the future, honors Henry tonight. I am intensely grateful to him.

One of the many things we tried to do during my ambassadorship in Germany was to find ways to make the transition from the era of John McCloy to the post Cold War era--the era when there would be no more American troops in Berlin,

and the American troop presence in Germany would be reduced. On my last weekend in Germany--in Berlin--as the American, British and French troops left Berlin for the last time in a very solemn ceremony, we inaugurated an attempt to leave a legacy behind in Germany. The "American Academy in Berlin" is to be modeled after the American Academy of Rome. I was delighted that Henry Kissinger joined President Richard von Weizsäcker as Co-Chairman of this enterprise, which is still in the process of being formed and which has recently asked me to join its Board as Chairman. Many of you in this room have already supported this effort, and we will collect the rest of your names at the door. But this is an important effort, and the fact that Henry Kissinger is associated with it demonstrates that he is not only a living testament to the past German-American relationship but is, like all of us in this room, trying to look to the future. How do we build an enduring tie for a new generation of Americans and Germans who will soon only look back on the Cold War as a receding memory. You in this room do not need to be told about the relationship. But the next generation will need to be told, and so projects like this are very important.

So Henry, I thank you again for your support and your friendship, your advice, and Nancy's friendship. It is wonderful to see your mother here, and I am honored to be part of this wonderful evening. Thank you very much.

## GENERAL GALVIN

We are lucky enough, ladies and gentlemen, to have with us former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, someone that in my years in Germany I grew to admire greatly. He is a man who has established a record that no one can match in terms of service to his country in that position or, indeed, in comparison with anybody around the world. And so, without any further ado, I would like to ask Hans-Dietrich Genscher to come and take the podium. Thank you for being with us tonight, Minister Genscher.

HIS EXCELLENCY HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

Ladies and gentleman, dear Henry Kissinger, members of the Kissinger family. When the American Council on Germany asked me to write a speech and make remarks in honor of Henry Kissinger, I immediately agreed to this with great pleasure. I did so not only because I am among those who regard Henry Kissinger as an outstanding statesman, a brilliant historian, and a political analyst. Henry Kissinger is also an old and good friend of mine and, more importantly, he was my mentor. He introduced me to the art of diplomacy. Not many can claim this.

I met Henry Kissinger for the first time in Bad Reichenal after his famous press conference in Salzburg in summer 1974, shortly after I had been appointed Foreign Minister. At that time, America went through an extremely difficult period. During these months, Henry Kissinger rendered this country great service while the decision was being made for President Gerald Ford to take office in August 1974. In particular, he clearly indicated to the Soviet Union that any attempt to exploit this period of American weakness was doomed to failure. This was very important for us in Germany. Henry Kissinger's importance, however, extended far beyond foreign policy. In those days, I used to describe this as a circus tent, in which Kissinger performed the most daring artistic feats under the circus top high above the spectators. The public gazed spellbound upwards toward the unique artist and no longer saw the President below entangled in his fight for political survival.

Henry Kissinger not only impressed me with his outstanding professional skills at our first meeting. At that meeting, I was in the Chair of the European Community, and I had to explain to the American Secretary that we, Europeans, would start the so-called "European-Arab Dialogue." Henry was totally opposed to the idea. I had to explain to him that this was the best idea the Europeans had ever had. In order to give his young colleague a chance to tell his own colleagues of his success, Henry said finally, "Good, Mr. Minister, I agree, this dialogue is, of course, totally useless but fortunately not very dangerous." Although he was the undisputed star among the foreign ministers, he never exploited the reputation of the country he represented. From the very beginning, Henry tried to establish a good working personal relationship with his new German colleague. This good working relationship became a true and long lasting friendship.

Henry Kissinger's open and constructive attitude toward Germany was anything but self-evident. In 1938, Henry and his family had to leave their hometown of Fuerth in Germany under terrible circumstances. Seven years later, Henry Kissinger returned to a totally destroyed Germany as an American citizen and as a member of the American troops. Despite all that had happened to him and

his family, Henry played a major role within the strategic community of postwar America in explaining and analyzing the problems of Germany and European politics objectively and without any bitterness.

Almost exactly 30 years ago Henry Kissinger predicted, in one of his brilliant articles treating the "German question" as a problem of European and international security, that German unity would come as a result of a long process of fundamental change in East-West relations, including the diminishing roles of frontiers in Europe. Already at that time, Henry Kissinger was convinced that any progress toward German unity could only be achieved in a European context including the United States. Reading this article and comparing it with the events of 1989-1990, one can only admire the vision of the author. Due to his deep understanding of Germany and Europe, Henry Kissinger played a key role in shaping East/West relations during the formative period of the early '70s. During negotiations on the CSCE Final Act, he supported a particular German interest introducing a clause concerning the possibility of a peaceful change of existing borders in Europe. We owe it to Henry Kissinger's understanding and America's support that despite strong Soviet resistance, the principle of peaceful change was ultimately accepted by all CSCE states. Its consequences went far beyond Helsinki and Henry's term of office. Recognition of the principle of peaceful change became an essential precondition for overcoming the division of Germany. For me, as newly appointed Foreign Minister, the way in which Henry Kissinger handled the question of peaceful change proved how seriously the United States took the particular concerns of a divided German nation in the center of Europe. This experience was confirmed in the decisive years of 1989 and 1990. The strong support of the American people and the American government, in particular President Bush and Secretary of State Baker, were essential preconditions for German unity.

There are many examples of Henry Kissinger's firmness whenever vital German interests were at stake during the Cold War. I would only like to quote one: In July 1974, I went to San Clemente in order to meet President Nixon. When Henry Kissinger and I were waiting for the President, we were informed that transit on the motorway between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin had been stopped. In this dramatic situation, I witnessed the manner in which Henry Kissinger used the whole weight of the world power of the United States in order to safeguard our common interests. He immediately instructed his close collaborator, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, to stop the ongoing talks between the U.S. and the so-called G.D.R. on the establishment of diplomatic relations. Furthermore, through his collaborator Hartmann, he let the Soviets know that the United States would regard any further impediment of transit from the Federal Republic to Berlin as a matter between themselves and the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger's determined and clear reaction made a deep impression, and fortunately not only on me.

Henry Kissinger's attitude toward Germany and Europe has always been determined by his deep conviction that the fate of Europe is of vital importance for America. Already in his brilliant analysis of the troubled Atlantic partnership in 1965, Henry Kissinger had pointed out that the close relationship between America and Europe is an essential precondition for a stable world order based on the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. That remains true also after the end of the division of Germany and Europe. Again and again, Henry Kissinger has explained to Americans and Europeans that there are no partners in world politics who have more in common than Europe and America.

After the end of the Cold War and on the threshold of the 21st century, Europe and America are facing new challenges on a global scale. They will only meet them and contribute to a stable and cooperative world order by acting closely together. Henry Kissinger has taught us that there are no simple answers to complex questions. He never believed that "blueprints" or "master plans" are useful for foreign policy. That is also my conviction in this ever more complex world. For him, any success in foreign policy must rely on a sound balance between pursuit of our interests and respect for our common values--peace, democracy, and freedom for mankind. It applies to America, and it applies to Europe. At the end of his great book on diplomacy, Henry Kissinger quotes a Spanish proverb in order to highlight the particularly difficult character of diplomacy. "Traveler, there are no roads. Roads are made by walking." This is true, but the more complex our world becomes, the more we need personalities who know where we come from and the direction we should take. Henry Kissinger is such a personality.

Dear Henry, we have every reason to thank you for what you achieved, not only for your country, but also for Germany and Europe. We will need you and your advice also in the future, in America as well as in Europe. Thank you very much.

GENERAL GALVIN

Thank you Minister Genscher. I now have the great honor to introduce one of Henry Kissinger's closest friends and compatriots, a woman who helped to found and publish over the years the great weekly newspaper, *Die Zeit*, and who has been its guiding spirit for a long time, a woman we are very happy to have with us here tonight: Marion Countess Dönhoff.

MARION COUNTESS DÖNHOFF

Dear Henry, my thoughts go back forty years. It was in 1955 that we met for the first time in Harvard through Ham Armstrong, the editor of *Foreign Affairs*. You were then a young academician, who only a year before had gotten a PhD. I was fascinated by Henry's brilliant intellect and his world wide interests in politics. Hence, I felt this relationship absolutely must not vanish. We must continue it. He promised to let me know the next time he came to Germany. When he came, I invited him to lunch to the best restaurant that then existed. We had a delicious meal, drank a lot, and talked endlessly. I cannot quite remember what it was all about, but unforgettable was his answer to my question: "What kind of person is Mr. so and so?" Henry's answer: "He's one who knows everything and nothing else." Eventually we had to leave. But when I opened my purse in order to pay, I grew pale. There was nothing in my purse. Henry's deadpan reaction was "*den Trick werde ich merken*." ("I will make note of that trick.") And he paid the bill.

His first book, *A World Restored*, appeared in 1957. I was present when he gave his first speech in Berlin, the "Wallenberg Lecture," in which he referred to that book. He mentioned how impatiently he had waited for the first review. When it eventually appeared, the reviewer, according to Henry, had written, "I do not know whether this author is a great author. I only know that he who reads this book must be a great reader." I do not know anyone as quick in his reactions and as pertinent in his remarks as Henry Kissinger. In 1975, Bundespräsident Walter Scheel presented Jack McCloy, in honor of his 80th birthday, a donation which later became known as The John J. McCloy Fund. Kissinger gave a luncheon. He had just returned from one of his many journeys to the Near East and was, as usual, overburdened with problems. Everybody therefore waited with great attention when he began saying, "My most worrying problem has always been the act of the American Constitution which does not allow me to become a candidate for the U.S. presidency, because I was not born in this country." But, he went on, "Now I have found a solution. I propose that Bavaria (where Strauss was ruling) be attached to the United States as a 51st state." And looking at Walter Scheel, he said, "From what I hear, Mr. President I think that this might also solve some of your problems."

Of Henry Kissinger's many achievements, what I admire most is that he succeeded in changing America's intellectual approach to foreign policy. Until Kissinger, Kennedy's efforts notwithstanding, the rather simplistic ideology of John Foster Dulles, who divided the world into good and bad people, still prevailed. Remember that Dulles refused to shake hands with Chou En Lai because he was a communist. And Dean Rusk insisted that Taiwan, with 15 million people, was China and that mainland China, 1800 million Chinese, did not exist.

Last year, Fritz Stern and I were invited for a weekend to Henry's dacha. We spent an exciting evening together, discussing world affairs in all their aspects. This went on into next morning over breakfast. Somehow we eventually got to the question of whether an individual can influence the course of history. My argument: consider Hitler, who was badly wounded in the First World War; if he had been killed, there would have been no Nazism in Germany. Perhaps an authoritarian government as in Poland, Portugal, or Italy at the time, but no Nazism. If no Nazism, then the Second World War would not have taken place. If no Second World War, then no partition of Europe. I went on and on with my escalation. Suddenly one could hear Henry's voice: "And then I would be Oberlehrer (a schoolteacher) in Fürth!"

Ladies and gentlemen, my country has brought many disasters to many nations. But sometimes other countries have also profited from Germany. Austria got from us its most prominent statesman, Prince Metternich, England its famous musician, Georg Friedrich Handel, and America the greatest Foreign Secretary in this century, Henry Kissinger.

Marion Countess Dönhoff with Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Chairman Emeritus of the American Council on Germany

From left, Gustave and Rita Hauser, Dr. Kissinger, and ACG Director Guido Goldman

GENERAL GALVIN

I was once present when someone introduced Henry Kissinger. I think it was in Stuttgart. I learned something from that because that person said, "Everybody in the room knows Henry Kissinger, and so there is really no need for me to say anything." Henry got up. It was rather quiet, and he looked around and said "I suppose that was a good introduction, but a few superlatives would have been all right."

I was once in a distant, isolated place with him, when we landed in an airplane to get fuel. I never mentioned this anywhere, but it was something that affected me very much about Henry Kissinger. There are lots of things that are said about Henry Kissinger and his superb ego. In this instance, a television team there had heard that an important person was on this airplane, but they did not know who the important person was. As Henry and I were walking through the airport, they stopped us and said, "We know that there is an important person on this plane, and we would like to interview that person if possible." They were very polite people but unbelievably naive. "The important person," I said, "is Henry Kissinger, and here he is." They wanted to ask him some questions, but then they stumbled all over themselves. Finally, Henry said, "Well a good question would be this," and he gave them a question. And they said, "Thank you very much sir. Would you assume that we asked you that question?" And he said, "Yes and, as a matter of fact, I have an answer to that question." And it went on like that. He could have said that they didn't matter, as the place was very, very small. But it was so good of him--the way he handled it--and I gained a lot more respect for him for that. And so ladies and gentlemen, I would like to introduce to you tonight, the Oberlehrer von Fürth, Henry Kissinger.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

Mr. Chairman, Hans Dietrich, Marion and friends, Secretary General, so many distinguished guests. After all these brilliant remarks that have been attributed to me, including from my old friend, Dick Holbrooke -- and you would do him a great favor if you didn't spread the word that he and I were usually on the same side -- I find myself in the same position I was once in at a reception where a lady came up to me and said, "I understand you are a fascinating man. Fascinate me." It turned into one of the less successful conversations I have ever had.

I find this evening a very moving occasion: the fact that my mother can be here, and my brother, taking us back to our youth in Germany; that Hans-Dietrich Genscher, my colleague and friend, came across the Atlantic to make his speech; and Marion Dönhoff, with whom I have been meeting for forty years. I occasionally have an influence on her writings for about three weeks and then she backslides again, none of which has ever affected my affection for her. Indeed, on one of her birthday celebrations which I had the honor to attend, I began thinking about Marion. In Jewish mythology, there is a saying that this sinful world is being preserved by God because at any one time there are ten just men or women in the world that make it worth saving. Marion is certainly one of them.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, with whom I had the honor to work for a number of years and then observed for several decades thereafter, has made an extraordinary contribution. To be Foreign Minister of a divided country is a tremendously difficult task. On the one hand, Germany's position depended on close ties to the Alliance. On the other, any German Foreign Minister had to keep alive the principle of unification, for no matter what any of us might say and on whatever level, German unification had to be of greater concern to Germans than to Germany's friends. There was always the danger that a German Foreign Minister, pursuing the inevitable objectives of Germany, might be misunderstood to be conducting a largely nationalist policy. Hans-Dietrich conducted his policy with enormous delicacy--a friend of America devoted to the Alliance but never losing sight of the long range necessities of his own people.

About two years ago, I had the privilege of spending a weekend in Halle, Hans-Dietrich's birthplace. It came about in the following manner: Hans-Dietrich had the habit of asking all the ministers or heads of state he dealt with to promise him that they would go with him to Halle when Germany became unified. It was an easy promise for us to make because we thought it would never happen. At any rate, Hans-Dietrich asked me to make that promise, and he also asked Gorbachev to make the same promise - which, I must say, took some nerve considering that East Germany at that time was under communist rule. It was a triumph of faith over "cool analysis" that the day came when Hans-Dietrich called in his

promissory notes. And Gorbachev and I did visit Halle with him as his guests at a series of ceremonies marking the culmination of an evolution to which nobody contributed more than Hans-Dietrich Genscher. In addition, of course, I have greatly valued his friendship and loyalty and, if it does not ruin his reputation, I will say that I appreciate the sentimental side of his nature as much as I do his statesman-like side.

People often refer to my birth in Germany and to the ties that were formed then. But the Germany that I have been most closely associated with and feel most closely connected to is the postwar Germany. When I returned there with an American infantry division, it was to a country totally destroyed. The younger generation that did not live through it cannot imagine the rubble of those cities, the absence of any communications. I mention it only to point out the moral strength it took just to begin the process of rebuilding physically. Then, out of this rubble, grew a democratic society which at around 1949 made a heroic decision for which it has never received full credit. Namely, the leaders of democratic Germany, having been offered unification in return for neutrality, nevertheless decided they would rather keep the country divided and remain tied to the democratic West than embark again on an uncertain nationalist course. It was a heroic decision. Nobody could predict at that time whether or how it would ever end. It is in this period that a community of values and a community of interests grew up between Germany and America, and Germany and Europe. Without it, the Cold War would not have come to the conclusion that it did. Now the two sides of the Atlantic find themselves in the position of having achieved everything they set out to do forty years ago. And the question arises whether the unity that brought us so far was a necessity of one particular danger or whether it has a deeper purpose.

Both sides of the Atlantic are undergoing extraordinary changes. In the United States, the generation that formed the Marshall Plan, NATO and the architecture of the Cold War world -- the same generation that ended the Depression and went through World War II and the Korean War--was characterized by a deep faith in America and its role in the world. The generation that succeeded it was shaped by the Vietnam War, which was an unsuccessful enterprise. It grew more inward looking and more concerned with removing America's blemishes. Nor did it believe that foreign policy could be identified with the spread of American institutions on a global basis. In addition, the span of attention of that generation -- brought up on computers and television -- is shorter than of the generation brought up on books. So political leaders find it more difficult to form their own opinions and more difficult to lead their people. America needs above all to define its purpose in the world.

Europe, too, faces serious challenges. How is Europe to be constituted? Where does Europe begin and where does it end? How can one incorporate the new nations of Eastern Europe into the European system? Last week, I was in

Brussels and spoke to an eminent European about whether the Baltic states should enter NATO or not. I said, "Why can't they at a minimum be taken into the European Union quickly? What possible damage could 10 million Balts do if they were taken into the European Union now?" Well, this distinguished gentlemen said to me, "The schedule does not permit it. They are not scheduled for a discussion, and we must follow the procedures." The question, therefore, is this: how is Europe to be formed? And whether it is to be defined by the bureaucratic norms of existing institutions, or whether it can be given some longer-term vision. Then the next question is: What should be the relationship between Europe and America? It is a question that must be asked on both sides of the Atlantic.

In our country, one of the favorite parlor games of intellectuals and politicians is to debate the following: Should American foreign policy be informed by moral principles dedicated to democracy, or should it be conducted on the basis of *Realpolitik*? One usually associates the horrible example of *Realpolitik* with "somebody that reads Metternich and Bismarck by candlelight." But the fact is that pure *Realpolitik* is not possible because all the tough decisions are 51-49 decisions and the easier ones are the 50.1-49.9 and are without strong moral conviction. In some moral compass, statesmanship becomes a prescription for a nervous breakdown. And its real questions do not revolve around whether our animating principle ought to be commitment to democracy.

The issue with respect to the spread of democracy around the world is quite a different one. Democracy developed in Western societies as a result of 800 years of evolution and of very particular historical accidents and circumstances: the existence of an aristocracy independent of the kings, and the existence of a religion which, no matter how autocratic itself, had a separate line of authority so that pluralism became built into the system. None of this happened in any other society. The Reformation, the Age of Enlightenment, Capitalism, and the Age of Discovery produced a mix which, by the middle of the 20th century, created what we now call pluralistic democracy. In our dealings with other societies, we should show some understanding and patience and not ask them to adopt in the initial decades of their new dispensations the final results of 800 years of our own particular cultural evolution. This would be relevant to our relations with the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere.

There is one area in the world, however, in which the practice of our democratic values can be relevant today. This is in the relationship between Europe and the United States and, I would add, with the rest of the Hemisphere. In a world of growing "fundamentalism" in the emerging states which call themselves nations but are really classical empires, the Western democracies should affirm the bonds of their common destiny and parallel policies. In the next phase of Atlantic policies, that should be the objective on both sides of the Atlantic. Some Europeans say they must unify so that they can prevent American domination of

Europe. They need have no fear of this. It is easy to get America interested in Europe; but it is much harder to keep America committed, and that requires some sense of common destiny.

Therefore I would say that, on both sides of the Atlantic, the next phase of our foreign policy will require restoration of some of the dedication, attitudes and convictions of the common destiny that brought us to this point - though, of course, under totally new conditions. And in this the American-German relationship will be decisive. The unification of Europe could not occur without a major and significant contribution from Germany. And I am sure that history will record the role of Chancellor Kohl as having been as important for the unification of Europe as were the decisions of the Adenauer period for Atlantic relations.

Yet we have not cultivated common projects between Europe and America, having focused too much on the tactical issues. We have talked too much of technical command arrangements and too little of the purposes they are supposed to serve. That seems to me the challenge we have before us for the future.

Another reason this evening is so moving to me is because, when I look around this room, I see so many who have contributed to bringing us to this point: so many comrades in a common struggle. Marion and Hans-Dietrich are not foreigners as far as I am concerned. They are partners and friends in joint enterprises. And if one went around the room and started naming people and drawing lines among the relationships, there would be many who feel exactly the same. The task of organizations like this is to ensure that the next generation in the 21st century looks back and at some comparable period is able to say that our problem was that we accomplished everything we had set out to do - and provided that the task was worthy of those efforts.

Thank you very much.

GUIDO GOLDMAN

I want to first of all thank everybody who was part of this evening.

Three very quick points. First, I don't know Henry as long as Marion has known him. I met Henry when I was an undergraduate at Harvard. In thinking about this extraordinary man and his contribution to German-American understanding, you have to take into account that remarkable chapter in his life when he was an academic, a scholar, and a teacher. It made a huge impression on many people, including myself.

Secondly, Marion touched on something very profound regarding how great talent has left Germany to go elsewhere. Certainly Henry is an example of great talent. I think Kurt Masur is an example of great talent. But what Henry did in this country is really very remarkable. He essentially became someone who was able to project American values and American power. Very few people who come from one society to another, especially at the age in which he did, are able to do that. That puts him in a very small class of people who are remarkably gifted. They can take an opportunity and make of it something that extends beyond the normal dimensions of human endeavor.

Finally, I think Henry is a great example of what it is we try do at the Council. Among the founders of the Council, the person who I want to mention is Eric Warburg, because Eric represented a family that was both German and American very early in this century. He made a very big contribution on both sides of the Atlantic. He came here, helped found this organization with Jack McCloy, and went back to Germany. His daughter Maria is with us this evening. We are pleased to have had the opportunity to honor you. And in that spirit, I want to wish you all a very good evening.

Thank you.

Introduction by Dr. Marion Gräfin Dönhoff

American Council on Germany Dinner, November 20, 1996

Dear Henry,

My thoughts go back forty years: it was in 1955 when we met for the first time in Harvard through Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs. You were then a very young academician, who has received his Ph.D. only the year before.

I was fascinated by Henry's brilliant intellect and his world-wide interest in politics. Hence, I felt this relationship should absolutely be continued. He promised to let me know when next time he came to Germany.

Next time occurred very soon. Henry came to Bonn and I invited him for lunch to the best restaurant which then existed. We had a delicious meal, drank a lot and talked endlessly.

I can't quite remember what it was all about, but unforgettable was his answer to my question: "What kind of person is so and so?" Henry's answer: "He is one who knows everything, but nothing else (der alles weiß, und sonst nichts)." Eventually we had to leave, but when I opened my purse in order to pay, I grew pale: there was no money in it. Henry's dead-pan reaction: "Den Trick werd ich mir merken" - and he paid the bill.

His first book "A World Restored" appeared in 1957. I was present when he gave his first speech in Berlin - the Wallenberg-Lecture. There he referred to that book. He mentioned how impatient he had waited for the first review. When it eventually appeared, the reviewer, according to Henry, wrote: "I do not know whether this author is a great author - I only know that he who reads this book must be a great reader."

I don't know anyone as quick in his reactions and as pertinent in his remarks as Henry Kissinger. When in 1975 Walter Scheel as Bundespräsident presented Jack McCloy in honour of his 80th birthday with a donation which later became the McCloy Fund, Kissinger gave a luncheon.

He had just returned from one of his many journeys to the Near East - as usual overburdened with problems. Everybody therefore waited with great attention when he began saying:

"My most worrying problem has always been the Act of the American Constitution which does not allow me to become a candidate for the US presidency, because I was not

2

born in that country. But", he went on, "now I have found a solution: I propose that Bavaria, where Strauss ruled, be attached to the United States as the 51st state" - and looking at Walter Scheel he said, "From what I hear, I think, Mr. President, that this might also solve some of your problems."

Of Henry Kissinger's many achievements, I admire most that he succeeded in changing America's intellectual approach to foreign policy. Until Henry Kissinger (Kennedy's efforts not-withstanding), the rather simplistic ideology of John Foster Dulles, who divided the world into good and bad people, still prevailed. Remember that Dulles refused to shake hands with Tschou En-lai because he was a communist and ergo a scoundrel, and Dean Rusk insisted that Taiwan, with 15 million people, was China, while mainland China, with then 800 million Chinese, did not exist.

Last year Fritz Stern and I were invited for a weekend to Henry's datscha. We spent an exciting evening together, discussing world affairs in all their aspects. This went on next morning, over breakfast. Somehow, we eventually got to the question if an individual can influence the course of history.

My argument: take Hitler. He was badly wounded in the First World War. If he had been killed, there would have been no Nazism in Germany - perhaps an authoritarian Government as in Poland, Portugal, Italy at the time - but no Nazism; if no Nazism, then the Second World War would not have taken place; if no Second World War, then no partition of Europe ... I went on and on with my escalation. Suddenly one could hear Henry's voice: "And then I would be Oberlehrer in Fürth."

Ladies and gentlemen, my country has brought many disasters to many nations. But sometimes other countries have also profited from Germany: Österreich got from us its most prominent statesman, Prince Metternich; England its famous musician Georg Friedrich Händel; and America the greatest Foreign Secretary in this century: Henry A. Kissinger.

2

DR. KISSINGER: Chairmen. Ladies and gentlemen.

After such an introduction I must be permitted to reminiscent about my staff. When
they did these drafts they would, usually, at about page five, put in something totally
outrageous just to make sure that I was reading it (laughter); and they always had
someone in my outer office for me to see just when I would come charging out to
complain. (Laughter)

But one year I spoke at the United Nations, as the Secretary of State does annually. It is part of our tradition always to include a health program in need of funding to which the United States would contribute on behalf of the United Nations. One year I came out for the cure of schistosomiasis. Now you may well ask, why did we choose schistosomiasis? We chose it because my staff thought I could not pronounce it (laughter), and they put it into the first draft absolutely convinced that I would drop it out and put in something more familiar. But I was determined, for once, to defeat my staff.

And you have to remember, as some of the Foreign Service Officers here in the
room will happily testify, that most Foreign Service Officers believe that whoever the
Secretary of State is, he could not have passed the Foreign Service exam. (Laughter)

So, at any rate, I said okay, I'll learn to pronounce schistosomiasis, and you now
come out with a program to back it up. And that, should anybody want to write a history
of how the United States became identified with schistosomiasis, is the inside story.

It's a great privilege for me to address this group, which has done so much on
behalf of America's understanding of a region of the world that is developing so rapidly
and about which I should like to speak. It's presenting so many challenges at this moment

NATION-WIDE REPORTING COVERAGE

305 BROADWAY, SUITE 406, NYC 10007

P: (212) 227-7440 (800) 221-7242 FAX (212) 227-7524

3

and is so central to American foreign policy that the role of groups like this, especially
with respect to Asia, has never been more important. It is also the case that America is
changing fundamentally in nature and is undergoing huge changes.

Let me first say a few words about America. We face a number of challenges.
One, we have achieved practically everything we set out to do at the end of World War II.
It is very rare to find a nation so completely fulfilling its objectives, yet it poses the
problem described by George Bernard Shaw when he said: "There are two tragedies in
life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire. And the second is to fulfill your heart's
desire."

The United States is now in a world which it has never confronted before. We do
not have a clear-cut strategic enemy or ideological, global challenge. For the first time in
our history we have to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have always had to
conduct foreign policy: by the calculation of rewards and penalties; by the accumulation
of new answers; and by the significance of marginal changes to a nation.

America has never had a powerful neighbor. Until the end of World War II, it felt
immune from direct attack, and then, for another thirty years, had an atomic monopoly
and huge preponderance in economic power.

This has presented huge intellectual challenges as well. For much of its history the
United States was isolationist. And when it was not isolationist, it had a tendency to
believe that its role was that of a missionary. That if we could convince the whole rest of
the world to adopt democratic values, we would then have brought about universal peace
and reconciliation.

4

Now, we live in a world in which we have to make more subtle judgments. We
have to do it, moreover, at a time when there is a change in the generations.

The generation that created the post-war international order overcame the
depression, won World War II, and organized the international system that was later
identified with containment and the cold war. It created the Marshall Plan and
rehabilitated former enemies. It believed in the possibility of great achievement.

The generation that followed has had as its own most seminal experience an
unsuccessful war and critique of American society. It is also more focused on the so-
called soft issues: not the issues of international structure, but such issues as the
environment, human rights and many other important, indeed, crucial problems.

This represents a shift in emphasis that is occurring, moreover, at a time when, due
to the fact that much knowledge is now transmitted by computers and through visual
images, the attention span for reflection has shrunk.

These are some of the American challenges. And they are occurring at a moment
when China is entering the international system as a potential superpower; when all the
incentives in Asia propel Japan and its policies onto a more national approach; and when
India is emerging from its period of neutralism into a period of becoming an active player
on the world scene.

So how do we bring these strengths into relation with each other? Let me make a
few general observations.

First, within the United States, we have had a seemingly endless debate about
whether America should stand for democratic values or pursue Realpolitik. The issue is

5

almost always resolved in favor of saying the United States should pursue democratic values. I would like to make my own view clear.

Of course, the United States will avow the values that have made it great, and that are its distinguishing characteristic. And, of course, the United States will prefer societies in which human rights are practiced. But, equally, the United States owes it to itself to show some humility. Many of the Asian societies have existed for thousands of years and have managed to get along for most of that period without significant advice from the United States. (Laughter) It is, therefore, not self evident to them that we should prescribe their domestic institutions for them.

Secondly, democracy in the West evolved through 800 years of a complicated history, of a religion that was separated from the state organizationally (even when it wasn't particularly democratic), of an Age of Enlightenment, of Discovery, of a Reformation. At the end of this process and after many hundreds of years, stood our particular forms of government.

We should not insist that every new country, or even every old country, beginning to form itself into a modern state must adopt all our own institutions and principles at the beginning of its development. Even less should we make our preferences the cause of economic sanctions and of other forms of pressure.

We have already experienced with respect to China how these methods can backfire. And I hope that when we start to debate on other countries, like Indonesia, that we keep in mind the extent of complexity embodied in the formation of a nation out of thousands of islands and at just the beginning of that evolutionary process.

6

Yes, we have our preferences. And, yes, we can and should make clear where our sympathies lie. But we cannot make one strand of our policy the only objective. And this must be a key consideration in the conduct of our policy, especially in Asia.

Now, with respect to Asia, what we are facing is a sister, not a threat. We are facing the interplay of great societies: India, China, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, each with its own history and with its own culture. The American challenge is how to position ourselves in relation to that process, and to understand that much of what is going to happen in Asia will happen due to the interplay of these societies with each other and therefore cannot be prescribed by us.

Let me apply this to a few specific countries.

First, a few words about China. China has had the most extraordinary economic growth of any society over the last twenty years. And, without any doubt, if that process continues into the 21st Century, it will then have the largest economy in Asia and, in terms of gross national product, probably in the world as well. This will create a new reality in Asia, one that cannot be altered by phrases like "containment" or other facile slogans.

The key challenge for the United States is to keep in mind a number of realities. One, if China's economy is not integrated in some manner into an international economic system, trade wars of great magnitude will become inescapable.

Secondly, the political relationship of China and the United States will crucially determine the possibilities for stability and progress in Asia.

Over the last few years the United States and China have gone through a series of crises. First on the issue of human rights, then on the issue of Taiwan, and now on the

7

general issue of whether the two sides can find some common denominator on politics and
on trade.

My impression is that the experience of the last years has brought it home to both
sides that confrontation is not a course that will benefit either of them. What is called a
strategic dialogue is beginning to stir again between China and the United States.

We should keep in mind two things: one, that it is clearly in the short-term interest
of both China and the United States to conduct this dialogue no matter what the outcome.

It is in our short-term interest because the United States does not want to find itself in a
position where all its Asian friends are forced to choose between China and the United
States. China has an interest in this dialogue because it will not be able to continue at the
same rate of economic progress unless there is a tranquil environment; and because a
constructive relationship with the United States could contribute to balancing the overall
equation in Asia.

I would stress that starting the dialogue, crucial as it is, is no substitute for content.

And it is important that, in the years ahead, both sides pay special attention to seeing to it
that some relationship develops that goes beyond the immediate tactical requirements of
the moment and contributes to the stability in Asia.

On the part of the United States, this requires that we stop presenting every latest
proliferation of our bureaucracy as the ultimate moral insight into a given issue, that we
stop confronting the Chinese with solutions to such issues as non-proliferation, in the
preparation of which they have had no part, and that we adopt a policy of reciprocity.

8

On the other hand, China has to understand that, for example, unrestricted growth of trade surpluses on the Chinese side and the sense that the relationship in the economic field is primarily one-sided, will sooner or later evoke a reaction in the United States.

On such issues as non-proliferation, I'm very optimistic that a solution will be reached. It is clearly in the interest of both countries not to see the threat of nuclear weapons fall into increasingly irresponsible hands. There is also a whole range of issues, including the environment, in which I believe considerable progress can be made.

With respect to Taiwan, it is important that we remember first principles. The relationship between China and Taiwan has been addressed in a number of communiqués in which the United States asserted that it recognized only one China, and that it would not support a one China, one Taiwan or a two-China policy. The United States has also pointed out its great concern for the peaceful evolution of that situation. If both sides remember what has served them for the last twenty years, the issue of Taiwan can gradually return to where it should be, in a direct negotiation between the Chinese parties and without foreign intervention -- while maintaining America's previous commitment to the principle of one China that has spanned five administrations.

On the issue of Hong Kong, I'm personally extremely optimistic. I have the impression that the Chinese recognize that the survival and the continuation of Hong Kong under, more or less, the existing pattern will be a key to ultimate negotiations with Taiwan.

There are a number of problems. Nobody knows how Chinese civil servants, with the best intentions in the world, will react to the pluralistic society of Hong Kong. Nor is

9

it clear whether there are going to be efforts made that do produce some sort of confrontation. But with wisdom on all sides, I believe that the basic principles of the agreement can, and will, be maintained. On the whole I am fundamentally optimistic about the American-Chinese relationship. But we have to adjust to the reality that, as China grows, it could go in two directions: either into a cooperative world, or into a temptation for hegemony over the region.

The modern world has shown that territorial expansion is not necessary to economic and political growth. Germany and Japan have become major industrial countries and have absorbed tens of millions of refugees into their borders while, in fact, their territory was shrinking, because modern technology does not require expansion.

For all these reasons, the United States should devote the next decade to making the greatest possible effort to work out a cooperative relationship with China.

At the same time, of course, we have our alliance with Japan. It is a relationship that can be subject to much misunderstanding. I believe that we have had a tendency, following American tradition, to regard every foreigner as an incipient American, to think that the Japanese have totally converted to the American approach to international affairs.

We ought to remember that the Japanese have a 2,000-year history of fierce independence, 400 years of which was spent in total isolation from the rest of the world. The period after 1945 represents an extraordinary demonstration of self discipline in thus subordinating everything to the restoration of Japanese economic and, therefore, in the long run, also political strength. So long as there was only one military danger in the world, it was possible for Japan to nestle under the shelter of American military power,

10

and to subordinate everything to the American alliance, including its politics. I believe it is
inevitable that, in the next ten years, Japan will conduct a more assertive foreign policy,
and will become a more significant military power.

Our alliance with Japan is important, but we must take care to distinguish between
support for Japan's security and what might be interpreted in Asia as support for the
resurgence of a greater Japanese military role outside the area relevant to its own national
events. This is a particularly delicate problem in relation to Korea and China.

Secondly, we have to learn to conduct a political dialogue with Japan. In recent
decades we have gotten used to a series of economic crises focused on single issues in
which particular American industries challenged particular Japanese industries. It is, first
of all, a no-win proposition. And, secondly, it is not the key issue in our relationship
today.

Now a political dialogue is no simple matter for either side. We are characterized
by a missionary spirit; the Japanese negotiating style is to operate on the basis of
consensus in which the dialogue of the interlocutors at any one point is of secondary
importance. Many an American president has returned from meetings with Japanese prime
ministers believing that the Japanese prime minister agreed to his action program, when all
the Japanese prime minister said was "I've understood you, and I'll report this to my
colleagues."

So, this will be one significant challenge in front of us.

11

India as well will emerge as a major player in Asia - historically, it has been in the area extending from Singapore to Aden. But it, too, will interact with the societies that I have described in a way that it has not done in the previous period.

The point I want to make is that, for the United States, the crucial problem is to define what our long-term objectives in the region are; and to understand that we cannot guide a process that involves a billion people in India, a billion people in China, a new, emerging policy in Japan, the challenge of unification in Korea, or the unsolved problems in the South China Sea, by assertions of American preference. We have to be able to form constellations with the various countries, especially China, Japan and India, and to do so on a predictable and long-range basis.

This is not an approach in which we have excelled in the past. It is, however, the challenge of the next decade. It must be pursued on a bi-partisan basis, and carried out without the illusion that there is some magic formula by which all these governments will change according to our preferences -- and after that live together in an automatically blissful, self-regulating system. It must be carried out by demonstrating the extent of our cooperation, but also the limits beyond which we cannot go and the limits at which we will resist.

As I said, it has to be a bi-partisan program. But I do not believe that our political process can, by itself, generate the necessary approaches. Therefore, I congratulate the Asia Society and the many friends I know are here in dedicating themselves to bringing about an awareness of these needs.

12

And the many ambassadors who are here should have a sense, and I know will
have a sense, that America is dedicated to Asia; that America desires peace and progress
in Asia, and that it will do its part, without prescription, on the basis of close cooperation.

It is in this spirit that I wish to thank you all for giving me this opportunity to
speak to you.

(Applause)

[End of Dr. Kissinger's Speech]

REMARKS AT DINNER BY THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON GERMANY

November 20, 1996

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

Mr. Chairman, Hans Dietrich, Marion and friends, Secretary General, so many distinguished guests. After all these brilliant remarks that have been attributed to me, including from my old friend, Dick Holbrooke--and you would do him a great favor if you didn't spread the word that he and I were usually on the same side - I find myself in the same position I was once in at a reception where a lady came up to me and said, "I understand you are a fascinating man. Fascinate me." It turned into one of the less successful conversations I have ever had.

brought up on computers and television - is shorter than of the
generation brought up on books. So political leaders find it more
difficult to form their own opinions and more difficult to lead
their people. America needs above all to define its purpose in the
world.

In our country, one of the favorite parlor games of intellectuals
and politicians is to debate the following: Should American
foreign policy be informed by moral principles dedicated to
democracy, or should it be conducted on the basis of Realpolitik?
One usually associates the horrible example of Realpolitik with
"somebody that reads Metternich and Bismarck by candlelight." But
the fact is that pure Realpolitik is not possible because all the
tough decisions are 51-49 decisions and the easier ones are the
50.1-49.9 and are without strong moral conviction. In some moral
compass, statesmanship becomes a prescription for a nervous
breakdown. And its real questions do not revolve around whether our
animating principle ought to be commitment to democracy.

3

Thank you very much.

4

November 20, 1996

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

I find this evening a very moving occasion: the fact that my mother
can be here, and my brother, taking us back to our youth in Ger-
many; that Hans-Dietrich Genscher, my colleague and friend, came
across the Atlantic to make his speech; and Marion Dönhoff, with
whom I have been meeting for forty years. I occasionally have an
influence on her writings for about three weeks and then she
backslides again, none of which has ever affected my affection for
her. Indeed, on one of her birthday celebrations which I had the
honor to attend, I began thinking about Marion. In Jewish
mythology, there is a saying that this sinful world is being
preserved by God because at any one time there are ten just men or
women in the world that make it worth saving. Marion is certainly

AS I did before

1

one of them.

2

3

Both sides of the Atlantic are undergoing extraordinary changes.
In the United States, the generation that formed the Marshall Plan,
NATO and the architecture of the Cold War world -- the same
generation that ended the Depression and went through World War II
and the Korean War--was characterized by a deep faith in America
and its role in the world. The generation that succeeded it was
shaped by the Vietnam War, which was an unsuccessful enterprise.
It grew more inward looking and more concerned with removing
America's blemishes. Nor did it believe that foreign policy could
be identified with the spread of American institutions on a global
basis. In addition, the span of attention of that generation -
brought up on computers and television - is shorter than of the
generation brought up on books. So political leaders find it more

4