Fritz ERLER

Bonn, October 28, 1958

Bundeshaus

Mr. Henry A. KISSINGER,
Associated Director of the
Havard Center for International
Affairs,

58 East 68th Street,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thank you very much for the kindness to send me your study on
Missiles and the Western Alliance.

I have carefully studied what you have written. As you will certainly know, I am not in agreement with all of your views.

Instead of arguing, I like to send you my article, you may have
already seen in WORLD POLITICS. It may be partly an answer to your
statements.

With my best regards

November 12, 1958

Mr. Fritz Erler
Bundeshaus
Bonn, Germany

Dear Mr. Erler:

Thank you for your very nice letter of October 28th, and for sending me the reprint of your article. I had already read it in WORLD POLITICS but I am particularly glad to have the reprint for my files.

Actually, on the political level you and I have very little disagreement. If it is true that the Soviet Union will not accept any kind of unified Germany then it would seem to me to be the task of our diplomacy to demonstrate this by making much more flexible proposals. Where you and I disagree is on the military implications of that. I frankly cannot imagine a security system in which the Eastern European states would be combined with a unified Germany since I believe that a unified Germany would almost inevitably drive the Eastern European states closer to Russia. Be that as it may, I think your statement is a good one.

As you may know, I shall be visiting Germany in January and I hope very much we may have an opportunity for some personal conversations for which I have long felt a need.

Kind regards.

March 5, 1959

Mr. Fritz Erler
Bundestag
Bonn, Germany

Dear Mr. Erler:

A friend sent me your interview with the Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst. I want to tell you how fair I thought it was. Though we may not agree on methods, we do agree that the paramount objective is to preserve the peace. My great fear is that Europe will be overrun by be made impotent as a result of our reluctance to risk ourselves in an all-out war and the growing Soviet confidence. You are afraid that the necessary military measures may prevent unification. I share your anguish on this problem, though my impression of the recent Soviet notes is that they create a situation in which the division of Germany is legally perpetuated while at the same time the possibilities of defense for the West are destroyed. I was a little puzzled by your statement that the capability of a local defense of Europe would involve an American withdrawal. First of all I have always insisted that a local defense without American assistance is impossible. And second, I cannot quite reconcile it with your own advocacy of disengagement which is based on the withdrawal of American troops at least from Germany.

But this was not the point of my letter. My primary point was to thank you for keeping the debate on so serious a level and to express the hope that we may have a chance to meet again soon.

Fritz ERLER
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages

Bonn, May 19, 1959

Fernruf 206...2681.

Die Wahl dieser Rufnummer vermittelt den gewünschten Hausanschluß.

Kommt ein Anschluß nicht zustande, bitte
Nr. 2681 (Bundeshaus-Vermittlung) anrufen.

Bundeshaus

Mr. Henry A. KISSINGER,
Associate Director of Harvard
University - Center for Inter-
national Affairs -

6, Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissing er,

A few days around Whitsuntide give me the opportunity to look into
my private correspondence and to send answers, even with some delay,
to some of the good messages I got during the last months.

I thank you very much for your letters of February 2 and March 5 and
of course also for your different contributions which have always
found my deepest interest.

I said already during my stay in the United States last January in
my first comments to the Soviet proposals for a peace-treaty with Ger-
many and for a new status for Berlin, that the Soviet aim was to lega-
lize the existing status quo in Europe and in the same time to bring
Berlin sooner or later into the orbit of the Soviet economic and poli-
tical empire. In the same time the Soviet-Union tried to limit the
military capacity of the Federal Republic and to cut the links bet-
ween the Federal Republic and NATO. Having qualified the Soviet aims
in this way, I have expressed my conviction that no Western power
would play into the hands of the Soviets and accept those conditions.
I am in favour of a serious discussion upon the future military status
of Germany but under the condition that possible changes to the actual
situation work both ways and should not involve a unilateral disad-
advantage to the West. There must be an equivalent change on both
sides of the iron curtain. I know that this is very hard to achieve
and I doubt seriously if the actual series of conferences will come
to that end. But as long as this problem is not clearly seen on both
sides, that is to say also on our side, no possibility of a political
solution in Central Europe is visible.

I thank you once more for the kindness you have shown to me - and
also for the spirit of your anser to the "Hamburger Echo".

I hope that your child did arrive safely and that you and your wife
enjoy this newcomer.

With kindest respect
yours sincerely,

(Fritz Erler)

Bonn, den 15. Februar 1960

Fernruf 206...2681...

Die Wahl dieser Rufnummer vermittelt den gewünschten Hausanschluß.
Kommt ein Anschluß nicht zustande, bitte
Nr. 2061 (Bundeshaus-Vermittlung) anrufen.

Bundeshaus

Herrn
Professor Henry A. KISSINGER,
Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs,

Lieber Herr Kissinger,

meine Reise nach Kanada scheint nun festzustehen. Ich werde mit meiner Frau vom 18. April bis 6. Mai in Kanda sein und am 7. Mai mit dem Flugzeug aus Winnipeg in New York ankommen. Am 12. Mai verlassen wir New York mit der "Bremen".

Da ich in New York eine Reihe von alten Freunden sehen muss und auch Gespräche verschiedener Art zu führen habe, hängt die Möglichkeit eines Vortrages in Harvard ganz davon ab, ob er ohne allzu grossen Zeitverlust bewerkstelligt werden kann. Ich könnte mir denken, dass ich z. B. am Sonntag, dem 8. Mai, abends, oder Montag, den 9., früh, mit dem Flugzeug von New York nach Cambridge gelangen könnte, um dort Vortrag und Aussprache zu haben, um dann noch am gleichen Tag gegen Abend in New York zu sein. Das wäre die beste Lösung. Ich weiss nicht, ob die Verkehrsverhältnisse sie zulassen.

Darüber hinaus weiss ich natürlich auch nicht, wie Ihr Semester ausläuft und Ihr Studienplan aussieht. Lassen Sie mich doch bitte wissen, ob es unter diesen Umständen sinnvoll ist, nach Harvard zu kommen, und ob sich das zeitlich so einrichten lässt.

Auf jeden Fall würde ich mich aber freuen, in der genannten Zeit wenigstens Sie sprechen zu können, falls es nicht zu einer Reise nach Harvard kommt. Sehen Sie eine Möglichkeit, in jenen Tagen mit Nelson Rockefeller zusammenzutreffen? Dass ich mich darüber freuen würde, brauche ich wohl nicht besonders zu betonen.

In der Erwartung Ihrer Mitteilungen verbleibe ich mit den besten Grüssen und Wünschen

Ihr ergebener
Fern

March 1, 1960

Mr. Fritz Erler
Bundeshaus
Bonn/Rhein, Germany

Dear Mr. Erler:

It was good to hear from you and learn that you will be in America. Your hectic schedule reminds me of those that I have had in Germany. Travel between New York and Boston is very easy--about an hour by airplane--and it would be quite feasible for you to come here in the evening of Sunday the 9th and then stay part of the 9th with us.

We have here at the Center for International Affairs a group of senior civil servants in addition to many faculty members, who would be eager to meet with you. I would suggest your coming up on Sunday evening. We could then have a session in the morning followed by a lunch or lunch followed by a seminar. It would be easy for you to return to New York by the evening of the 9th.

As for Nelson Rockefeller, I am certain that I can arrange a meeting, unless he should happen to be away from New York during that week. In general, he spends Thursday and Friday of each week in New York City. I would suggest that you write me as soon as your plans are absolutely firm, both about your visit to Cambridge and about your schedule in New York, and I will then let you know about the appointment with Mr. Rockefeller. (It might be helpful if you would also let me have your Canadian itinerary so that I can get in touch with you there if I should need to.)

I am looking forward very much to your visit.

With kind regards.

Bonn, den 14. März 1960

Fernruf 206...2681...

Kommt ein Anschluß nicht zustande, bitte
Nr. 2061 (Bundeshaus-Vermittlung) anrufen.

Bundeshaus

6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Lieber Herr Kissinger,

für Ihren Brief vom 1. d. M. danke ich Ihnen sehr. Ich möchte es tatsächlich so einrichten, dass ich am Sonntag, dem 8. Mai, abends, nach Harvard komme und entsprechend Ihren Vorschlägen bei Ihnen bleibe, um am Nachmittag des 9. Mai nach New York zurückzufliegen.

Ich wäre Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie für eine Unterkunft in Harvard sorgen könnten und die Adresse dieser Unterkunft meinem Freunde Garvy mitteilten, dessen Büro es übernommen hat, meinen Fahrplan für den kurzen Aufenthalt in New York zusammenzustellen: George GARVY, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 33 Liberty Street, New York 7, N.Y. - Tel. REctor 2-5700 Ex. 329. Ich habe Herrn Garvy gebeten, durch sein Büro die Flugzeugreservierungen vorzunehmen.

Ich danke Ihnen für die Bereitschaft, ein Gespräch mit Nelson Rockefellerer zu vermitteln. Es steht nun fest, dass ich erst am 7. Mai, nachmittags, in New York ankomme und am 12., morgens, abreise. Das einfachste wäre es, wenn Sie den Zeitpunkt eines Treffens mit Herrn Rockefellerer gleichfalls mit der genannten Adresse abstimmten.

Ich freue mich sehr auf unser Wiedersehen und verbleibe mit den besten Grüssen und Wünschen

Ihr

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

kind regards.

With all good wishes and

count on meeting with him.
the state at the time, I think you can
for you with him. Unless he is out of
to Governor Rockefeller about a meeting
your trip up here, and I have also written
make arrangements with Mr. Garvey about
your nice letter of the 14th. I will
Thank you very much for

Dear Mr. Eler:

Bonn, Germany
Bundesanstalt
Mr. Fritz Eler

March 23, 1960

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK 45, N.Y.

RECTOR 2-5700

March 23, 1960

Mrs. Norris
Secretary to Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Mrs. Norris:

In confirmation of our telephone conversation
today, Mr. Garvy feels Mr. Erler would be most pleased to
accept Professor Kissinger's invitation for dinner on
Sunday, May 8, and we shall arrange for an early evening
flight for Mr. Erler.

I shall be in touch with you again to advise you
of Mr. Erler's flight number and arrival time, so you may
arrange to have someone at the airport to meet him.

Amer. 652

April 18, 1960

Dear Arthur,

I am giving a small stag dinner
for Fritz Erler on Sunday, May 8th at 7:30,
and I hope very much that you will be able
to come. Erler is Deputy Chairman of the
Socialist Democratic Party of Germany and
their chief spokesman on foreign policy and
defense.

I would appreciate it if you will
let my secretary know whether you can make
it.

Best regards.

April 18, 1960

Dear Mac,

Best regards.

October 6, 1960

Mr. Fritz Erler
Friedenstrasse 8
Pforsheim, Germany

Dear Mr. Erler:

I thought you might like to see the enclosed reprint of an article I did recently for *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, on "Limited War: Convantional or Nuclear?" It represents some revision of my thinking on the relative emphasis to be placed on nuclear and conventional forces, and I hope you will find it of intemst.

With kind regards.

February 28, 1961

Mr. Fritz Erler
Friedenstrasse 8
Pforzheim, Germany

Dear Mr. Erler:

It was good to see you at the recent German-American
Conference in Washington, though I am sorry that we did not
have more time for conversation.

I am sorry also that the Conference did not seem more
fruitful. Many of our German friends were no doubt disappointed
by the kind of Americans who participated and by the lack of
real information they conveyed. Of course the two problems
are closely connected.

I believe that one of the difficulties was that the
conference was held in Washington, where everyone who has any
governmental connection finds it almost impossible not to bombine
his visit with some other duties. I am convinced, for example,
that our Congressional delegation would have attended much more
regularly had the meeting been held in Miami or some other place
which presented no opportunity for their regular pursuits.

Another problem is that during the Eisenhower Administration
our first team was out of office and consequently highly available
for conferences. At present our first team is in office and there-
fore often unavailable. If I were a German, however, I would be
more reassured to have people like Acheson or McCloy too busy to
attend a conference than otherwise.

Finally, as someone who has some acquaintance with the
thinking of the new Administration, I am confident about our
firmness with respect to Berlin. We will all be facing a difficult
time this year, but I am sure we will face it together and also
that this is not my private opinion only.

With kind regards.

Bong den 2. März 1962

Fernruf 206...2681...

Bundeshaus

Herrn
Professor Henry A. KISSINGER,
Harvard University,
International Seminar,

Lieber Herr Kissinger,

anbei übersende ich Ihnen den Durchschlag meines Briefes an Christopher EMMET mit meinem bisherigen Reiseplan. Ich wäre Ihnen sehr verbunden, wenn Sie schon vorführen könnten, ob Rostow, Schlesinger, Wiesner, Neustadt und MacGeorge Bundy für Gespräche zu haben wären.

Das allerwichtigste Gespräch wäre natürlich das von Ihnen als besonders erwünscht bezeichnete. Ich habe darüber hier nichts verlauten lassen und würde zu diesem Gespräch, wenn es nicht anders geht, sogar andere Verabredungen ausserhalb Washingtons auch ändern. Am liebsten wäre es mir natürlich, wenn man auch dieses wichtige Gespräch in die für Washington vorgesehenen Tage einbauen könnte.

Vielleicht können Sie mit Christopher Emmet den endgültigen Zeitplan klären bzw. ihm schon mitteilen, was Sie mit Beschlag belegen und diese Zeiten meinem Freunde Dr. BEERMANN (c/o. German Military Representative to MC/NATO, 3215 Cathedral Avenue, N.W., Washington 8, D.C.) durchgeben, damit er den Rest meines Washingtoner Kalenders festlegen kann.

Es würde mir ein Vergnügen sein, Ihrer freundlichen Einladung, während meiner Zeit in Harvard bei Ihnen wohnen zu können, nachzukommen. Ich möchte natürlich nicht etwa geplante Familienreisen durch meine Anweisenheit stören. Lassen Sie mich doch bitte wissen, ob wir nach dem jetzt vorliegenden Zeitplan dabei bleiben können.

Für Harvard steht jetzt schon fest, dass ich am 17. April mit "faculty members and Fellows of the Center" zum Dinner und zu einem persönlichen Gespräch zusammenkomme. Am 18. soll ich von 4 bis 6.30 p.m. in Ihrem Defense-Seminar sein und auch zum Dinner verfügbar bleiben. Vorher hat Friedrich eine Luncheon-Rede beim Boston Council on Foreign Relations organisiert.

Mit herzlichen Grüssen
Ihr

Anlage

March 26, 1962

Dr. Jerome Wiesner
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jerry:

Mr. Fritz Erler, Deputy Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and the Party's leading foreign affairs and defense expert, is going to be in this country in April and May. He plans to be in Washington from April 20th to 23rd, and then again on May 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th and would like very much to meet you.

This is simply to introduce Mr. Erler. Colonel Beermann, German military representative to NATO in Washington, is arranging Mr. Erler's schedule, and may be getting in touch with you soon. I think you would enjoy meeting him, as he is one of the most intelligent and thoughtful members of the German political life today.

Kind regards.

March 26, 1962

Mr. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Arthur:

When I was in Washington the last time, I spoke to you about
Fritz Erler, the Deputy Chairman of the German Social Democrats and their
leading foreign affairs and defense expert. He is going to be in Washington
from April 20th to 23rd, and then again on May 3rd, 4th, 5th and 7th.

As I mentioned to you, Erler would very much like to meet the
President. My own view is that if the President could see Mende, he
would find Erler infinitely more rewarding. I would be extremely grateful
if there is anything you can do about it.

Colonel Beermann, who is the German military representative to
NATO in Washington, is arranging Erler's schedule and may be getting in
touch with you soon. I hope there will also be an opportunity for you to
meet Erler. He is one of the most intelligent and thoughtful people in
German political life today, and I think you would enjoy meeting him.

Kindest regards and many thanks.

P.S. Don Brennan keeps appealing to me to appeal to you to interest the
President and Robert Kennedy in his proposal, which I am herewith
does.

March 26, 1962

Mr. Carl Kaysen
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Carl:

Kind regards.

C]

March 26, 1962

The Honorable Roswell Gilpatric
Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ros:

Kind regards.

March 26, 1962

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mac:

Bonn, den 12. Juni 1962

Fernruf 206 2681

Kommt ein Anschluß nicht zustande, bitte
Nr. 261 (Bundeshaus-Vermittlungs) anrufen.

Bundeshaus

Lieber Herr Kissinger,

Vorbereitung und Durchführung unseres Parteitages und verschiedene
Reisen haben diesen Dankbrief erheblich verzögert. Ich möchte Ihnen
sehr herzlich dafür danken, wie Sie meine Veranstaltungen an der Har-
vard Universität und vor allem auch die Besprechungen in Washington
vorbereitet haben. Ich glaube sicher, dass manches Gespräch nicht so
ausführlich und manches andere vielleicht gar nicht stattgefunden hät-
te, wenn Sie nicht einen entsprechenden Hinweis gegeben hätten. Ich
hoffe, dass wir unseren freundschaftlichen Kontakt in Bälde bei er-
neuter persönlicher Begegnung vertiefen können.

Es freut mich, dass mein junger Fraktionskollege Dr. Eppler zur Har-
vard Summer School kommt. Ich habe volles Verständnis dafür, dass Sie
nicht aus der gleichen Firma zwei Herren nehmen konnten, und deshalb
Herrn Dingels auf das nächste Mal vertröstet. Ich werde mich für das
nächste Jahr infolgedessen auf diesen einen Vorschlag beschränken, den
ich nach wie vor für gut halte. Das scheint ja auch Ihr Eindruck zu
sein.

Inzwischen ist das neue Buch von Dr. Jäger und mir "Sicherheit und
Rüstung" erschienen. Ich sorge dafür, dass Sie sobald wie möglich ein
Exemplar erhalten.

Einen besonders herzlichen Dank bitte ich Ihrer Frau für die gewähnte
Gastfreundschaft auszurichten. Bei Fräulein Kissinger hatte ich offen-
bar einen Stein im Brett. Sie hat sich bei Tisch sehr nett um den
Gast gekümmert.

Mit den besten Grüssen und Wünschen in freundschaftlicher Verbunden-
heit

Ihr

27. März 1963

53 Bonn, den 26.3.1963

Fernruf 206

Die Wahl dieser Aufnummer vermittelt den gewünschten Hausanschluß.

Rudolf Kaffka, Pfarrer i.W.

Herrn
Fritz Erler
MdB

im Hause

Lieber Genosse Erler,

da ich gleich abreisen muss, wende ich mich mit meiner Bitte
schriftlich an Dich. Es bietet sich für mich die Gelegenheit,
das Internationale Seminar an der Harvard University vom
1. Juli bis 23. August ds.Jrs. zu besuchen. Zwar ist der
Anmeldetermin schon überschritten, aber ich hoffe, dass mein
Antrag noch durchkommt. Jedenfalls habe ich diesen schon abge-
sandt. Ich benötige dazu allerdings noch einen kurzen letter of
recommendation und bitte Dich, mir ein kurzes Empfehlungs-
schreiben, dass Du mich kennst und für geeignet hälst, dieses
Seminar zu besuchen, auszufertigen.

Mit freundlichem Gruss
Dein

gez. Rudolf Kaffka

Nach Diktat verreist.
i.d.R.

(G.Friese)

Fritz Erler, z.Zt.

Generalkonsulat
der

Bundesrepublik Deutschland
New York

New York 22, N. Y.,

460 Park Avenue

Tel.: Murray Hill 8-3523

11. April 1963

Herrn

Prof. Henry Kissinger

Harvard University

6 Divinity Drive

Cambridge, Mass.

Lieber Herr Kissinger!

Wie immer war der Tag an der Harvard Universität für mich ein grosser Gewinn. Zwar habe ich erklärlich cherweise den Ausfall der Besprechung mit der Fakultät am Nachmittag bedauert, bin aber doch dadurch entschädigt worden, dass wir wenigstens Zeit für ein freundliches Gespräch miteinander gefunden haben. Meine Frau hat sich gleichfalls in Harvard sehr wohl gefühlt. Wir möchten Ihnen herzlich danken und Sie bitten, diesen Dank auch Professor Bowie und den anderen Kollegen zu übermitteln.

In der Hoffnung auf ein gesundes Wiedersehen in Harvard - oder elsewhere - grusst Sie herzlich

Ihr

Fritz Erler

91
36
21

53 Bonn den 29. Mai 1963

Fernruf 206 2681

Fritz Erler

6, Divinity Avenue,

Cambridge 38, Mass.

Lieber Herr Kissinger,

mit gleicher Post übersende ich Ihnen wunschgemäss ein Exemplar meiner
Rede zum Verteidigungshaushalt.

Ausserdem erlaube ich mir, an unser Gespräch zu erinnern: Sie wollten
einmal feststellen, welche Möglichkeiten es nach Ihrer Meinung gibt,
das Buch, das Jaeger und ich zusammen über "Sicherheit und Rüstung"
geschrieben haben (oder eventuell auch meinen Teil allein) in Amerika
herauszubringen.

Mit herzlichen Grüssen
Ihr

53 Bonn, July 9, 1963
Fernruf 206...2681

Bundeshaus

Professor Henry A. KISSINGER,
Harvard University -
Center for International Affairs -
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thank you so much for your letter of July 2. The participants of the meeting at Cologne understood that you had been obliged to return earlier to the United States. Of course we hope to see you again at another occasion.

We discussed the problems. The Europa-Union issued later a statement based on the discussion of that night. I think that this statement does not coincide entirely with your views - but this could have happened even with your presence.

It is a great favor indeed that you are willing to write a foreword to my book. I send you three copies by air mail immediately. The German editor understands that perhaps an American edition can more easily be achieved if only my part of the book would be translated. The editor would agree to such a separation, if necessary. But of course we should welcome an edition of the whole book in America.

If really an English version could be produced, I am ready to review the text in order to bring the chapter on American and European co-operation up to date.

With many thanks for your help and my best wishes also to your wife

SPEZIAL-POST

12 July 1963

Dear Cass:

A good friend of mine in Germany, Mr. Fritz Erler, Deputy Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, has written a little book on national defense. It is in the same volume with another little pamphlet by his opposite number in the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Erler has asked me whether I can see any possibility of obtaining an American publisher, either for his part or for the joint product. I think particularly well of Mr. Erler's portion even though I do not agree with every point he makes. Would Harpers be interested? I would be willing to write a foreword if this would make it more attractive.

As for my own work, I will probably put together some of the articles I have written over the past year into a little booklet on NATO.

Do let me know what you think of the Erler idea.

Warm regards,

Mr. Cass Canfield
Chairman of the Editorial Board
Harper and Row
49 East 33rd Street
New York 16, New York

New York 10, New York
49 East 32nd Street
Harper and Row
Chairman of the Editorial Board
Mr. Cass Canfield

Henry V. Klaasinger.

Warm regards,

MVTO.

articles I have written over the past year into a little booklet on
it for my own work. I will properly but together some of the
work for my own use.

to write another if this would make it more attractive.
every point he makes. Would Harper be interested? I would be willing
to write another if this would make it more attractive.
I think particularly well of Mr. Erler's bortion even though I do not agree with
his opposite number in the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Erler has
detoxify. It is in the same volume with another little booklet by
the Social Democratic Party, has written a little book on national
A good friend of mine in Germany, Mr. Fritz Erler, Deputy Chairman

Dear Cazs:

15 July 1963

[1c]

# THE CURRENT STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL STATE OF THE ALLIANCE

By Fritz Erler

(In Cooperation with the Research Institute of the
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik)

## Changes in the World Situation

In the months after the British and American elections and before those for the German parliament and for a new French president, who will be chosen for a seven year term at the end of 1965, the partners in the western Alliance will once again have to consider questions which have long been on the Nato agenda. Essentially, these basic issues were first raised in the December, 1956, report of the three wise men - Martino, Pearson and Lange - on non-military cooperation within Nato. The answers will also be given with 1969 in mind, the year, not as is often falsely asserted, when the treaty must be "renewed" by its members, but rather when members for the first time will have the opportunity to take the momentous step of renouncing their membership.

The North Atlantic Pact must be maintained as the cornerstone of the Alliance of the free world for the conceivable future. Still, it seems justified to ask what improvements must take place in the next three or four years, in order that no government will have cause to consider seriously the case for giving notice to the organization.

The most important structural questions can no longer be put off. In order to adjust the Alliance to the changed world situation, it is necessary, in the next few months, to achieve a proper statement of the issues, since experience shows that the time immediately following American presidential elections is of particular importance for the long-term orientation of a new administration. We see already that not only meetings between western heads of state, but also conferences with the Soviet Premier are being considered for this immediate post-election period.

Before we turn to the problems within the western world, it will be useful to gain an accurate view of the changes in the eastern bloc. Because even if the meaning and value of the western Alliance do not lie solely in warding off the communist threat, it is nevertheless true that the Alliance has developed its current character in the process of fulfilling this task since the years of the Berlin blockade and the Korean war.

- p.t.o. -

- 2 -

Thus, all too often considerations about crisis management and Nato's
institutional problems proceed on the basis of conceptions developed
in the era of Stalinism and monolithic unity of the eastern bloc. In
spite of this, we must ask ourselves what chances and dangers are
presented by the possibilities for development and change in communism
in the 1960's, and then ask how the alliance must look that would
assert itself successfully in the changed world situation. It is al-
ways difficult for those in positions of responsibility to marshall
their thoughts on the future in this systematic manner; thus it is
all the more important that this exchange of opinion between indepen-
dent people from both sides of the Atlantic should take place.

If we keep these various possibilities for further development in the
Soviet sphere of influence in mind, it is clear, with reference to the
probable development of communism, that in spite of all the industry
of the experts we are groping in the dark. No one would any longer
deny that significant philosophical and intellectual changes are
currently under way in Soviet Communism, changes that go hand in hand
with the unlocking of the atom, the development of modern means of
communication and automation. We can, however, by no means be sure
at present that these alternatives will in the long run lead to a
weakening of the expansionistic forces, to a "domestication" of
Soviet Communism, or work in favor of a stabilized world situation.
A more radical ideological stance is always possible, expressed per-
haps in foreign policy adventures begun as a consequence of domestic
tensions, or in the form of a purely power-political "rounding-off"
of the Soviet sphere of influence at those places where the disunity
and weakness of the West might allow locally limited aggression to
appear well worth the risk. Even if the dominating opinion today is
that the Cuba crisis of 1962 marked a final turning point in Soviet
policy, exactly the fact that this event is but two years behind us
gives occasion for caution and skepticism in the face of interpreta-
tions which are too confident.

If the current inclination among Europeans is to overestimate the
significance of the ideological factors in Soviet Communism, there
seems in the United States to be the tendency to look upon the
Soviet Union as a saturated power and to concentrate radical uncom-
promising anticommunism solely on Red China. Here, too, we are grop-
ing in the dark in our estimations of probable developments. What

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can be said with certainty, however, is that Peking, both for reasons of power politics and ideology, has arrived at a judgement of the world situation in complete independence of the Soviet Union, and that she intends to be self-reliant in looking after her interests in this new situation. One can no longer, therefore, speak of political and strategic unity within the eastern bloc.

These Chinese interpretations of the new world setting proceed from the assumption of a common aspiration toward world hegemony on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States, an aspiration which the middle powers must oppose. Therefore the atomic monopoly of the two giants must be broken. Without question this interpretation overestimates the degree of cooperation which can be reached between the USA and the USSR during a period of world politics in which, most probably, the ideological tension between Soviet Communism and the western world will continue. Further, the Chinese miscalculate the measure of political freedom which the nations "between the blocs" can achieve in these circumstances. Nevertheless, there are currents in Europe sympathetic to this Chinese explanation of the world situation, above all in Gaullist France; but also in the Federal Republic and other places there is the notion that the development toward "polycentrism" has already replaced the bipolar system of the post-war period, or is at least on the verge of replacing it.

Concerning these questions of fundamental importance for world politics in the coming years there exists in the western world no unified opinion, even regarding main lines. Here lie the main roots of the many differences between America and Europe and also between America and Germany. Probably in the present moment there is no greater task than to reach once again the largest possible degree of unanimity. Only after we have achieved common judgements on the central elements of the world situation will we be able to talk sensibly about the essence and goal of "detente" and "stability".

A basic error, to which the Chinese and many Gaullists are subject, is the identification of American efforts to stabilize the arms race, initiated because of the danger of nuclear war, with certain similar tendencies of the Soviets. In so doing, one compares incomparable things and fails to see that polycentrism can only function if the political conceptions of the various centers that have mutual contact can be left basically unaltered: one cannot initiate a detente

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- 4 -

by first of all wishing to force one's partner to change all his opinions. One cannot postulate that the Soviet conception of coexistence and the American conception of stabilizing the peace are fundamentally the same, and then proceed to offer suggestions for a solution of the German question, "as if" the views on world politics of the two powers, if not identical, were nevertheless in an inevitable process of approximation.

In the current circumstances of world politics there can be no real solution to the German question under the assumption that the American ideas about stability and the Soviet idea of coexistence are identical. A "muddling through" on the basis of the two conceptions is impossible. The Federal Republic has accepted the American rationale for stabilizing the military environment, both because this should effectively work to preserve peace and because it reaffirms the commitment to use neither force nor threats of force in seeking a solution to the German question. The Soviet conception of coexistence, on the other hand, is a most dynamic one. It signifies not only competition, but struggle, in all areas except the military one. The declared objective is that all peoples should have the chance to convince themselves of the superiority of the Soviet way of life, excepting, however, that those who at present find themselves under the Soviet order shall not have the opposite opportunity to judge for themselves the superiority of non-communist ways of life. Also the status quo is in Soviet eyes a dynamic order: Every man must have the chance to become Communist, but no man may have the opportunity to cease being one. This is the situation today. The question which the West must answer is, therefore, how can Soviet policy be induced to proceed from coexistence to cooperation? Certainly this involves the considerable changes now taking place in world power relations, wherein the tendencies toward polycentrism in the eastern bloc will play a not unimportant role. Political determination and cohesion in the West, however, will play at least as great a part. But it is exactly these instruments that have in recent time been in such ill-repair.

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Current Problems of European Defense

In recent years the debate within the Alliance has centered geographically on European defense and functionally on problems of the control and use of nuclear weapons. All military considerations have thus been overshadowed by the question of the credibility of the American commitment to Europe under the changing nuclear balance, that is, by an essentially political question that allows every type of speculation into the discussion. Nato's actual strategy during these years has remained essentially that of 1956. The call for greater conventional contributions from the European nations, made by the Americans for well-considered reasons, went unanswered. The unilaterial development of French defense planning on the basis of a national striking force, and the French resistance against the American concept of a flexible response caused consultations within Nato to mark time. Britain, due to her extra-European engagements, was constantly faced with the possibility that she might have to reduce still further her conventional contribution to Europe. The one positive aspect of this period, in spite of all the structural difficulties, was the continuing buildup of the Bundeswehr. This alone could not fill the gaps in European conventional capabilities, however, which in American eyes still persist.

It is not surprising that under the circumstances the initial elan of the Kennedy administration was followed by a spreading disappointment and resignation about the future of the Alliance. The widespread European opinion of today, which holds that the idea of a conventional option, so important during the Kennedy administration, has now lost its practical significance, is probably not unjustified.

It should surprise no one in Europa that now, after the experience of recent years, suggestions for a reduction of defense expenses and a corresponding reduction of American troops in Europe are once again being discussed in the United States. Such a development should not be excluded, however, because at the same time it would open new possibilities for arms control agreements. And these developments in turn might make possible a more flexible eastern policy, a course which, as was mentioned, is increasingly considered.

Conversely, it will not surprise our American friends that many such theoretical proposals which aim in this direction have begun to cause

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unrest in Europe. Granted, we Europeans have in recent years learned
to understand the style of discussion in America and to distinguish
between official suggestions of the government and studies developed
in research institutes. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that
the same research institutes, which earlier concerned themselves with
the favorable reappraisal of a conventional defense, are now seeking
alternative solutions which give a lesser weight to conventional
forces and place the "forward strategy" in question. This at least
indicates that strategic thinking in the United States has entered a
new phase, the political consequences of which must be carefully
examined.

Europeans, specifically the Germans, will have to understand that the current level of American forces is neither sacrosanct for all time nor rigidly identical with the American commitment to Europe. All the same, every reduction, however small, of American forces in Europe, even if militarily defensible, creates political and psychological problems of considerable weight. These must be thoroughly discussed in an atmosphere of mutual trust. In this context, one can scarcely expect that the Europeans will be particularly impressed in the future by arguments about balance-of payments difficulties, in view of recent American studies that have shown that the effects of troops costs on the payments situation have been considerably overestimated and are largely counteracted by the German-American offset agreement anyway.

The Atlantic Partnership

We should go no further here into the particular problems of the
military development in Europe. They can only be solved if we con-
stantly keep a total picture of the world political situation in
mind. The circumstances demand:

1. The maintenance of the Western defense community in general.

2. The lasting involvement of the United States in the security of Europe.

3. The appropriate participation of the Europeans in the provision of their own security within the union of the Alliance and

4. the nuclear education of the non-American members of the Alliance.

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Even a united Europe, although it would be more productive than its members taken separately, would need a partnership with the United States if it were not to endanger its economic and social, and therefore political future through excessive defense efforts. Further, the Soviet Union is deterred from attacking Europe by the certainty that such an attack involves not only the Europeans but also the world power of the United States.

While the Nato alliance does commit its members to mutual support in case of an attack, the choice of means is left free, and these extend from letters of sympathy to hydrogen bombs. Only genuine integration, which means the merging of definite units in peacetime and the creation of common command structures and common planning, can assure an automatic military answer to an action of a conceivable opponent.

It is for these reasons that integration is so crucial for European security and that the disintegration produced by French policy is so dangerous. Similarly the MLF, which goes beyond the current treaty text by committing definite portions of the American atomic potential to permanent involvement with European forces, represents an especially valuable reinforcement of the American engagement in Europe and thus of the general credibility of the deterrent. It must, however, enclose a community and not become a special American-German undertaking.

Naturally the MLF does not solve all the problems of deterrence, which is only credible when the defender is capable of reacting appropriately to every conceivable threat. The defender must be able to render unattractive such border incidents and lesser actions as might serve to establish hostages, without, however, being forced to enter into a suicidal atomic duel.

Naturally deterrence also requires that the enemy be aware that any attack which cannot be nipped in the bud without the use of atomic weapons carries with it the high probability that the atomic spiral will be set in motion. Such credible deterrence is only possible when the United States remains convinced of the permanent solidarity of its interests with Europe. A policy of anti-Americanism only serves to drive the United States away from Europe thus destroying our security.

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Problems of a Common Arms Control Policy in Europe

- Progress in the matter of regional arms control measures in Europe would be significantly easier to attain if there were a common Nato strategy. The problem is reversed, however, as efforts to develop such a common strategy in recent years have from time to time been extraordinarily burdened by the parallel arms control effort. It is not mere coincidence that the timing of Soviet arms control initiatives has been calculated to make progress in matters of Nato strategy, armament and the setting of priorities exceedingly difficult.

It is useful to bring oneself up to date about possible Western arms control suggestions, with reference to the varying effects they may have on the current military situation in Europe. One can identify essentially five categories:

1. Old suggestions, which in a different (military or otherwise) situation are reactivated for tactical reasons,

2. Measures which allow one to make political capital out of changes in arms policy, either with regard to surpluses of armament (obtained through obsolescence, changes in strategic doctrine and subsequent military requirements, or an altered defence situation) or, with regard to the sacrifice of specific programs (on the basis of the functional perfection of one's arsenal, in view of scant efforts by the other side, etc.),

3. Measures which attempt to balance out new instabilities caused by technical and strategic developments,

4. Measures which do not directly affect the military situation and

5. Measures which, although independent of the strategy and requirements of Nato, have as their result an influence on the military situation in Europe.

Obviously the majority of the suggestions made to date belong either to the first or second categories, although many would have indirect effects in the sense of the last category as well.

In this a noteworthy reversal becomes evident that can be followed through the last few years: Whereas the original purpose of arms control agreements in Europe was to create additional security by means of agreements with the opposite side, one occasionally gets the impression today that the still unsolved security problems serve instead to facilitate agreements, tacit or formal, whereby the common

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interest of both sides in stabilizing the status quo is underlined.
On the Soviet side this political interest in arms control was pro-
bably dominant even from the very beginning: The Soviet Union has
always used regional arms control suggestions as vehicles of their
European policy, not only with the goal of influencing Nato's defense
efforts, but above all to harrass plans for integration within the
Alliance, to isolate individual members, and to anticipate elements
of the Soviet peace settlement for Europe. This estimation of Soviet
policy is shared by leading American experts on the Soviet Union.

The Federal Republic finds itself here in an extraordinarily difficult situation. Progress in the German question can probably only take place in connection with regional arms control agreements. Consequently, the Federal Republic must be interested in a continuation of the negotiations with the Soviets. On the other hand, German reunification policy can be seriously endangered by arms control agreements that further solidify the division of the nation. It is certainly not useful to German interests to greet Western efforts in this matter with fundamental distrust. But it is just as certain that the Federal Republic has to safeguard her crucial interests here, and that the experience of recent years does show that German apprehensions are not groundless. Stress and strain could doubtlessly be avoided if, in addition to consultation on arms control questions in the Nato council, there could follow extensive coordination between Washington and Bonn. This would above all increase the willingness for constructive cooperation on the part of the Germans. And on the American side it should contribute to a certain peace of mind with regard to European relationships, by removing one of the main motives the Germans have for a closer relation with France. Certainly the Federal Republic should equip itself better for productive participation in these matters and draw lessons from the experiences of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Consultation and Common Planning

The central problem of the western Alliance has been expressed as
follows: How much unity do we need and how much pluralism can we
stand. Every detailed answer at the present time would be academic.
One can, however, proceed from the assumption that the solution for
the coming years should not be sought, as it was in the past, prima-

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rily with relation to procedure during extreme crises. Rather, the answer should be sought with reference to the degree of diplomatic leeway remaining to each partner of a functioning alliance. One need not yet abandon a bi-polar model of the world power situation in order to see that the variety of foreign policy interests in the next few years will sooner grow as decline.

The answer to the signs of a loosening in the Soviet bloc should not be a progressive dissolution of Nato but rather a better synchronization of policy among the partners. The West was never a monolithic bloc; its diversity is at once its weakness and strength. If this diversity could now be brought together into a community, there would exist greater opportunities to achieve western goals in a world recently brought into motion.

Many reasonable suggestions have been made in recent years in an attempt to find ways of more effective military and political cooperation within the Alliance. The developments inside the Alliance and on the level of East-West relations have both made continuing agreement on the content of Western policy necessary. For this task new or improved institutions and organizational arrangements can be quite useful. Such improvements have often been regarded in the recent past as ends in themselves, however, which causes one to forget that these suggestions are only a method whereby the partners hope to gain greater influence.

There is a tendency to envisage solutions resulting from the simple creation of obligations to consult, and to regard common planning as a guarantee of commitment. In practice, however, consultation often means little more than the identification of disagreements, and common planning is predominantly a procedure whereby the United States informs her partners. Nevertheless the progress of the past few years, above all with regard to more specialized questions, is too easily overlooked.

The necessity for more extensive consultation is certainly not disputed. It arises, firstly, from the fact that because far-reaching national decisions - this holds true especially for the USA - come about as the result of a complex process, the doubts and suggestions of allies should be made clear as far as possible before such decisions are taken. Secondly, a series of precarious decisions has demonstrated that the Alliance has at times been subjected to burdens that

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to some degree could have been headed off by prior consultation.
(Examples are McNamara's speech in Athens, the French recognition of
Red China and the Testban Treaty.) Still it has proved rather unrea-
listic to seek an assured influence on allies primarily through a
formalization of the consultative process. The German-French experience
of the past summer indicates the strains such a formalization can cause.
In addition, consultation involves complicity: whoever wants to belong
undertakes co-responsibility, unless the action is taken against his
counsel.

On the other hand, there exists in the sphere of military cooperation
a great number of really pressing organizational measures, which lie
below the level of political structure and could thus be carried out
in independence of it. They concern primarily the question of coope-
ration between the Standing Group and the Nato Council, and the parti-
cipation of Europeans in American military planning and in the con-
struction at various levels of a planning apparatus Central here are
questions of efficiency, not of political structure. One should,
therefore, expect them to be subject to less political stress in the
future; conversely one should not see their decisive importance in
terms of possible political side-effects. This improvement of military
cooperation should by all means be synchronized with the planning
efforts within the individual countries of the Alliance; the experienc-
es of the Force Planning Working Group in Paris show what strict limits
are set to this kind of cooperation if this is not the case.

If the organizational problems of the Alliance could be freed of poli-
tical strains in this way, and some progress achieved, the results
would in the long run undoubtedly be wholesome in the area of politic-
al cooperation as well. That this path is a promising one after all
is shown by the German-American cooperation in logistics, in the
Force Planning Working Group in Paris, in the DRD Committee and other
similar efforts. Also *within* the western Alliance a policy of small
steps will lead to success sooner than any other.

That in the meantime we will have to deal constantly with a certain
degree of dissent within the Alliance should surprise only those with
the most mechanistic conception of the western grouping. It would fly
in the face of all political philosophy if there were less differences
between the partners of the Alliance than there are within the indi-
vidual states. Nato has developed its current form by means of a

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laborious process of adjustment, and the result is a proven demonstration of the vitality which the Alliance will need in the coming years.
It is also true for Nato that democracy is government by discussion.
But decisions should then follow in the wake of the discussion.

Bonn, 13 October, 1964.

SOZIALDEMOKRATISCHE PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS

DER PARTEIVORSTAND

Herrn
Prof. Henry A. KISSINGER
419, Beacon St.
Boston/Mass. USA

53 BONN, ERICH-OLLENHAUER-HAUS
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-ALLEE 170

8. Januar 1965 E/schw.-

Lieber Freund Kissinger,

von Helmut SCHMIDT habe ich gehört, daß Sie beabsichtigen im
Laufe des Frühjahrs, also vor der nächsten Zusammenkunft mit
sowjetischen Gesprächspartnern, in kleiner Besetzung mit deut-
schen Sachverständigen über Rüstungskontrollfragen unter dem
Aspekt der deutschen Interessen zu sprechen.

Ich freue mich über dieses Vorhaben sehr und bin bereit, eine
entsprechend sachverständige Gruppe aus der von mir geleiteten
Studiengruppe für Abrüstung und Sicherheit der Deutschen Gesell-
schaft für Auswärtige Politik zusammenzustellen. Lassen Sie mich
doch bitte wissen, wann Sie mit Ihren Freunden nach Europa kom-
men, damit wir die genauen Verabredungen treffen können.

Mit den besten Grüßen und Wünschen in alter Freundschaft
Ihr

(Fritz Erler)

Fernsprecher 21901-09 - Fernschreiber-Nummer 0886890 - Telegramm-Adresse Sopade Bonn
Postscheckkonto: 113684 Köln, Alfred Nau - Bankhaus v. Schulz, Tegtmeyer & Co., Bonn, Nr. 1401, Alfred Nau

January 19, 1965

Mr. Fritz Erler
53 Bonn, Erich-Ollenhauer-Haus
Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 170
Germany

My dear Mr. Erler:

Thank you for your nice note of January 8th. I
have been occupied most of the Fall with finishing a book
on European-American relations. This has prevented me from
keeping you informed as I should have about our plans with
respect to the East-West study group.

After consultation with our colleagues, we decided
to hold a preliminary meeting in the United States instead
of in Europe and to invite participants from various countries
rather than make it a German-American bilateral conference.
This conference is taking place from February 18th to February
21st.

Helmut Schmidt has been invited as one of the parti-
cipants. Rather foolishly I assumed that you were not
available and I had not explored the possibility of your
coming. Since there is no CDU representative at all, it
seems to me that we cannot have two SPD participants.

Of course, I do not know whether you could have come.
But, in any event, I am very unhappy because we should have
asked you first. I need hardly tell you that no discourtesy
was intended, and that all of us admire your work and what you
stand for. In the future, we will keep in close touch with you.

....

February 11, 1965

2681

Bundeshaus

Fritz ERLER

Professor Robert R. BOWIE,
Harvard University,
Center for International
Affairs,

6, Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Bob,

You have made an obligation a visit to Harvard whenever I come to the United States. This will happen in April.

I plan to arrive 7 around noon. I have to leave April 9 in the morning for the Hudson Institute of which I am one of the public members.

I leave it to you if you and Henry Kissinger prefer again a larger audience or if I should just have talks with the Institute for International Affairs and with Henry's seminar. Probably our Consulate will try to arrange a larger meeting at Boston, perhaps at Karl Friedrich's association. Please, look over that schedule and try to arrange with our Consulate a timetable which covers your needs and secures my survival.

You will be interested in hearing that I sent back the masterproof of my little book with the last few corrections. I hope that it can now come out shortly. The German version is in the make. I have already here the first chapters. It seems as if a French and Italian edition will bemade too. You see that your initiative in arranging the Jodidi Lectures has had far reaching effects. Many thanks again.

Ihr

53 Bonn, den 19. Febr. 1966
Fernruf 2 06.2681

Bundeshaus

FEB 23 1966

Herrn
Professor Henry A. KISSINGER
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs

6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

file

Lieber Herr Kissinger,

recht herzlich danke ich Ihnen für Ihren Brief vom 11. Februar und die guten Wünsche, über die ich mich sehr gefreut habe.

Die Medizinische Universitätsklinik habe ich nach erfolgreichem
Abschluss der sechswöchigen Behandlung am 7. Februar verlassen.
Z. Zt. befinde ich mich für ein paar Wochen zur Erholung im
Schwarzwald. Anfang März werde ich meine Arbeit wieder aufnehmen.

Ende März werde ich eine Reise in die Vereinigten Staaten an-
treten. Mein Aufenthalt dort beginnt mit einem Vortrag und
einem Seminar an der Universität von Texas. Dann werde ich in
Houston einen Vortrag halten. Von dort geht es direkt nach
Washington, wo ich mehrere Gespräche verabredet habe. Auf dem
Rückweg werde ich vor dem Council on Foreign Relations sprechen.
7.N.Y.

Leider ist meine Zeit in den Vereinigten Staaten nur knapp be-
messen; sie reicht nicht für einen Abstecher nach Cambridge.
Ich hoffe aber, meinen Besuch bei Ihnen gelegentlich eines spä-
teren Aufenthalts in den Staaten nachholen zu können.

Mit den besten Grüßen
Ihr

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

FRITZ ERLER

Floor Leader of SPD in the German Bundestag
Deputy Chairman of Social Democratic Party

Born July, 14, 1913 in Berlin. Married, three children.
Went to school in Berlin until 1932. Since 1928 Fritz
Erler was a member of the Socialist Workers' Youth
Organization.

Member of the Social Democratic Party since 1931. Became
a civil servant in Berlin after finishing school. Did
some free-lance writing. After 1933 he did some "illegal"
work to keep some socialist organizations going in "under-
ground-operations" against the Hitler Regime. Quit civil
service in 1938 for political reasons, and subsequently
joined a chemical company as commercial manager.

Arrested in November 1938. On September 15, 1939 the
"Volksgerichtshof" sentenced him to ten years at hard
labor. In April 1945 he managed to escape from prison.

Since 1945 Mr. Erler held several posts in civil service.
He also became member of the State parliament of Württem-
berg-Hohenzollern. In 1949 he was elected member of the
"Bundestag".

Erler holds the posts of Deputy Chairman and Member of the
Board of the Social Democratic Party. Besides being the
floor leader in the German Parliament, he is considered the
foreign policy expert of his party.

He is vice president of the "German Council of the European Movement" and of the "German Society on Foreign Policy", and he is also member of the "Assembly of the Council of Europe" and of the "Assembly of the Western European Union".

53 Bonn, den 27. April 1966
Fernruf 206 2681

Bundeshaus
z. Zt. Berlin, Reichstag

MAY 3 1966

6 Divinity Avenue

Cambridge 38, Mass.

Lieber Freund Kissinger,

es hat mir sehr viel Freude bereitet, wie Sie die Zusammenkunft
des Council on Foreign Relations mit mir zu einer Diskussion ge-
macht haben, bei der nicht nur der Gast ausgefragt wurde, sondern
auch die Teilnehmer ihre Meinung sagten. Ohne Ihre sachkundige
und gleichzeitig warmherzige Steuerung wäre das nicht möglich ge-
wesen. Darüber hinaus war es für mich eine Freude, wieder einmal
einige Gedanken mit Ihnen austauschen zu können.

Ich hoffe auf ein gesundes Wiedersehen bei passender Gelegenheit.

Mit den besten Grüssen und Wünschen
Ihr