DETERRENCE

Deterrence is the process by which a threat to use one's power in
a given way on the happening of a given event has the purpose of inducing
the opponent to refrain from bringing about that event.

Deterrence regardless of the scale on which it is practised requires:

(1) That the opponent actually understands that the threat has been made

(2) that the opponent is rational

i.e. that he will respond to self-interest in a manner that is predictable

(3) that in weighing his self-interest as affected by the threat, the opponent will reach the conclusion the deterrer has attempted to induce

i.e. the penalties of non-compliance must outweigh the benefits of non-compliance

(4) that the implementation of the threat is sufficiently credible to preclude its being taken as a bluff.

Type I Deterrence - use of all-out capability against a direct threat to the survival of the United States

i.e. against a threat of a magnitude that if not reacted to would lead immediately to the collapse of the United States.

Type II Deterrence - is the use of all-out war capability against a lesser threat defined as jeopardizing the security of the United States ultimately, but in the reasonably near future.

Major difficulty with all-out deterrent is that it becomes increasingly
difficult to satisfy requirements.

As to (1):

- 6 months warning time on Berlin

- Psychological balance shifts as soon as opponent has made a threat. Because this proves that he _must_ have discounted all-out deterrent at least to some extent. Then we face the problem of convincing him we "mean" it.

This

(a) involves a great risk if pre-emptive strike

(b) forces us into an essentially irrational posture - inconsistent with our political and domestic myth. Our temptation is always to indicate that we are "calm" "rational" and "calculating".

Type II deterrence and perhaps even Type I deterrence (say an attack on San Francisco) must cause us to transform ourselves as much into natural force as we can.

As to (2):

- Problem of "rational" opponent - four phases of deterrence.

Growing threshold. The more rational he is, the more he may be tempted to adventure. (Again unless one transforms oneself into an essentially unpredictable force.)

As to (3):

Depends on purpose of war and nature of strategy.

- Need to retain counterforce capability. Ask himself what purpose chairman of JCS will tell the President it will have. Asymmetries: willingness to run risks; importance he attaches to area.

(a) leave no doubt of alignment of forces - could be equally well achieved by unilateral declaration - because multiplicity of sovereignties actually may weaken will.

(b) assemble superior power - again not use - may in fact have paradoxical consequence, etc.

As to (4):

Low credibility of both capacity and intention.

3

The consequences of reliance on Type I and Type II deterrence are:

(1) Danger of miscalculation

(2) Decreasing credibility

(3) Enormous psychological burden

Can be overcome in part by reducing the inhibitions of all-out strategy:
- invulnerability
- counterforce strategy
- civil defense.

Also becomes particular problem with respect to alliances. With the above, traditional purpose of alliances becomes meaningless. These are strategic facts:

(1) Soviet Union can threaten most of peripheral areas from its own territory - does not require alliances.

(2) No threatened country is capable of resisting alone.

(3) Soviet Union can threaten allies - split alliance by different capabilities, assessment of risks and political aims.

(4) We must threaten her. - And the requirement to commit suicide on behalf of a foreign territory however closely allied is likely to produce very great inhibitions, or so an aggressor might calculate.

Then unequal distribution of risks encourages either
irresponsibility or
unwise use of resources.

Either transform any war as much into a US-Soviet war as possible or
duplicate our strongest category.

To the extent that latter course is followed, will actually undermine
alliance. Always the belief can invoke deterrent as a last resort and again
problem of suicide for foreign territory. Encourages Soviets to split
alliance.

Therefore problem of local defense. It is said that Europe is too vital
for us to defend locally. But importance of area does not mean we have to
begin with suicidal strategy.

Limited war is a misnomer. Should think of it in terms of stages towards
all-out war. If opponent is willing to run all risks war will become all-out.

(a) Will local defense weaken deterrent?

- In a sense, yes. Must make clear that it is not a result of lower
valuation of area.

- We cannot say sensibly that we will defend only unimportant areas.

(b) Will it lead to American psychological withdrawal?

- Should not, because only we can enforce same rules.

(c) Still there is serious problem of allies construing strategic
decisions as attempt to shift risks on each other.

(d) Will it encourage the Soviets to fight a "limited" war and impose
their rules as to the conduct of it?

- In that case three possibilities:

(1) Surrender in the hope of obtaining favorable terms -
if this is produced by threat of limited war, it may also
be produced by threat of all-out war.

(2) Fight on opponent's terms to make good showing.

(3) Fight on our terms (depends on complicated bargaining situation)

Nuclear weapons:

Credibility

Allied cohesion

Non-destructive alternative

Atlantic institutions.

De Gaulle press conference November 10, 1959, quoted N.Y.T. Nov. 11

No doubt the sort of equilibrium that exists between the atomic powers of the two camps is for the moment a factor of world peace. But who can say what will happen tomorrow? Whocan say that, for example, some sudden advances in development, esp. for space rockets, will not provide one of the camps with so great an advantage that its peaceful inflinations will not be able to resist it?

Who can say that if in the future, the political background having changed completely--that is something that has already happened on earth--the two powers having the nuclear monopoly will not agree to divide the world?

Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? .... In truth, France in equipping herself with a nuclear weapon, will render a service to world equilibrium.