The New York Times, Wednesday, August 1, 1979

As of Old, the Star Is Kissinger
And Senators Are Deferential

By MARJORIE HUNTER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 31 — Still a star attraction, Henry A. Kissinger played to a standing-room-only audience today on Capitol Hill.

Long before he left his Georgetown house at 7:30 A.M., crowds had already started lining up in the Russell Senate Office Building, angling for seats in the caucus room where the former Secretary of State was to testify on the arms treaty.

And they were still waiting patiently in line while Mr. Kissinger was eating breakfast in the Capitol with the Senate minority leader, Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee.

Fortunately for him, Mr. Kissinger had a hearty breakfast — bacon and eggs, biscuits and fruit cup — for it was midafternoon when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ended its session of more than four and a half hours in which he was the sole witness.

Slimmer and More Gray

Slimmer and with just a touch more gray in his hair, Mr. Kissinger sat alone at a witness table, hunched over the microphone as he read his 31-page prepared statement in his familiar monotone and later answered questions.

It was not his first appearance before Congress since leaving office with the Ford Administration; he has testified on Middle East arms sales. But seldom before, even in his days as chief foreign policy adviser to Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford, has he drawn such large crowds.

The Capitol police estimated that nearly 1,000 people filed into the mar-

ble-columned caucus room, some staying the full time, others for only a few minutes. At times, more than 100 people waited outside to get in.

There were tourists with cameras slung over their shoulders. There were youngsters in shorts and baseball caps. One woman wore a large sign pinned to her dress: "Freedom Begins in Love."

Unflustered during even the sharpest questioning, Mr. Kissinger was a commanding center of attention. Some senators who have occasionally berated witnesses seemed subdued, even deferential.

"If I may ask your advice," Senator Richard G. Lugar, Republican of Indiana, said earnestly.

'If You Were a Senator'

"Mr. Secretary," said Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware. He grinned and quickly corrected himself by saying, "I mean, Dr. Kissinger."

At another point, Mr. Kissinger smiled broadly when Senator Biden said: "If you were a senator, and I'm sure you've never entertained that thought...." There have been reports that Mr. Kissinger has considered running for the Senate in New York if Senator Jacob K. Javits retires.

Aides said today that Mr. Kissinger did not use a speechwriter to prepare his formal testimony today. He wrote it himself, sometimes at his home and office here in Washington, sometimes in New York and even while flying to other countries, including a recent trip to Jordan, Israel and Egypt.

[LC]

K

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1979

KISSINGER WILL BACK PACT ONLY IF CARTER RAISES ARMS OUTLAY

APPEARS AT SENATE HEARING

He Urges That Future Treaty Talks
Be Linked to Soviet Behavior
in World's Trouble Spots

By CHARLES MOHR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 31 — Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger told senators today that they should approve the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union only if President Carter makes a binding and urgent commitment to increase military spending.

Mr. Kissinger also recommended that the Senate make the continuation of arms control negotiations conditional on "acceptable international behavior" by the

*Excerpts from testimony on page A6.*

Excerpts From Kissinger's Testimony on Arms Pact

WASHINGTON, July 31 (AP) — Following are excerpts from the statement by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at hearings on the strategic arms limitation treaty.

How to strive for both peace and our moral principles; how to avoid nuclear war without succumbing to nuclear blackmail — this is the overwhelming problem of our period.

The United States must proceed simultaneously on three fronts:

First, we must maintain a military balance that does not tempt aggression against our friends or allies, against our vital interests, or in the extreme case against ourselves.

Secondly, beyond resisting naked aggression, we have a stake in the principle that political or economic pressure, or military or terrorist blackmail, not become the arbiter of the world's political disputes. The geopolitical equilibrium must be maintained lest radical forces hostile to the West gain such momentum that they appear as the irresistible wave of the future.

And thirdly, on the basis of a balance thus achieved and preserved, we must be ready to explore routes to genuine peaceful coexistence. The great powers, having learned that they cannot dominate each other, must practice moderation and ultimately cooperation.

Military Balance Starting to Tilt

The military balance is beginning to
minuously against the United States
in too many significant categories of
weaponry.

The unprecedented Soviet use of proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and the turmoil caused by radical forces and terrorist organizations sponsored by Moscow's friends, mark ours as a time of profound upheaval.

As the United States nurses its
wounds after Vietnam, radical forces
are threatening regional stability and
attempting the violent overthrow of
moderate governments friendly to the
West.

If the present trends continue, we
face the chilling prospect of a world
sliding gradually out of control, with
our relative military power declining,
with our economic lifeline vulnerable
to blackmail, with hostile forces grow-
ing more rapidly than our ability to
deal with them, and with fewer and
fewer nations friendly to us surviving.

Soviet Advantage Said to Grow

The Soviet advantage in conven-
tional forces has grown, and the reach
of Soviet power has been extended
enormously by the rapid development
of the Soviet Navy, an expanding long-
range airlift capability, the acquisition
of Soviet bases in countries like South
Yemen and Vietnam, and the establish-
ment of vast Soviet arms depots in such
countries as Libya and Ethiopia, which
will enable the Soviet Union to move its
own or proxy troops rapidly to their
prepositioned weapons.

At the same time our Navy declines
and our access to overseas bases
shrinks.

Rarely in history has a nation so pas-
sively accepted such a radical change
in the military balance.

This is not the result of SALT: it is the consequence of unilateral decisions exceeding over a decade and a half; of a strategic doctrine adopted in the 1960's, of the bitter domestic divisions growing out of the war in Vietnam, and

United Press International

Henry A. Kissinger chatting with Senator Frank Church, Idaho Democrat and chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, before start of the hearing.

of choices of the present Administra-
tion.

After the end of our involvement in
Vietnam, new strategic programs
could at last be funded: the B-1 manned
strategic bomber, to become opera-
tional in 1979; the MX ICBM, to become
operational in 1983; the Trident subma-
rine and missile, expected to become
operational in 1978; various kinds of
cruise missiles for the 1980's — all of
which would give the United States
greater options and some of which
would bring about a new counterforce
capability.

Every one of these programs has
been canceled, delayed or stretched out
by the current Administration, so that
we are at a point where only the Tri-
dent — with only the most limited coun-
terforce capability — can be opera-
tional during the period of the
projected SALT treaty.

We now face the challenge of the
early 1980's with forces designed in the
1960's.

Nothing in the Vienna treaty diminishes the need for a substantial military build-up by the United States. In fact, the situation which SALT reflects makes such a build-up imperative.

Recent Developments Are Listed

In fairness, it must be pointed out
that the same was true of the SALT II
aggregates worked out in the previous
Administration.

There are nevertheless three essen-
tial differences:

First, the rate of advance of Soviet
technology, which has been unexpected
rapid (the estimate at Vladivostok
was that Minuteman would not become
vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce
strike until after 1985);

Second, the unilateral abandonment
or stretch-out of almost every Ameri-
can strategic program inherited by the

Carter Administration, which makes
the Soviet threat even more ominous;

And third, the Soviet geopolitical of-
fensive in Africa, the Middle East and
Southeast Asia, which has gained
momentum since.

Failure to ratify an agreement ne-
gotiated over seven years would com-
promise international confidence in our
ability to perceive our own interests or
to harmonize the various branches of
our government.

Comprehensive Approach

But it is equally true that if the custo-
dian of free-world security neglects its
task, sooner or later panic will become
inevitable. The Senate in considering
ratification needs urgently to address
our dangers in a comprehensive way:
First, how the Senate can take con-
crete steps to begin redressing the mili-
tary balance;

Second, how to deal with the specific
problems in the treaty and protocol;
and

Third, how the Senate can put the
Soviet Union on notice that continued
attempts to upset the global equilib-
rium will not be tolerated.

After much reflection I have con-
cluded that I can support ratification
only with the following conditions:

First, if it is coupled with a defense
program representing an obligatory
understanding between the Congress
and the President which overcomes on
an urgent basis the grave peril posed
by the current military balance.

Second, if it is accompanied by
amendments — not requiring renegotia-
tion — clearing up ambiguities in the
treaty, defining the status of the proto-
col, the meaning of noncircumvention,
and setting guidelines for follow-on ne-
gotiations.

And third, if it is accompanied by a
vigorous expression of the Senate's

view of the linkage between SALT and
Soviet geopolitical conduct.

Supplemental Budget Is the Key

With respect to the military pro-
grams, I respectfully recommend that
the Senate give its advice and consent
to ratification of the Vienna treaty only
after the Administration has submit-
ted, and the Congress has authorized
and begun appropriating, a supplemen-
tal defense budget and a revised five-
year defense program that will begin
rectifying some of the shortcomings I
have identified.

If the Administration is unable to put
forward such a program to this session
of Congress, I recommend that the Sen-
ate delay its advice and consent until a
new military program has been sub-
mitted to and authorized by the next
session of Congress.

I would be open-minded about other
methods to achieve this end, provided
they are unambiguous, and represent
an obligatory commitment by both
branches of our Government.

The program must include acceler-
ated development of a counterforce
capability through the MX and Trident
II, air defense against Backfire, im-
mediate steps to restore the theater nu-
clear balance and urgent measures to
beef up our capacity for regional de-
fense, including accelerated moderni-
zation and expansion of our Navy.

Present Program Held Deficient

Our current five-year program is
deficient in all these categories.

My support for ratification is entirely
conditional on the development of a
new program and doctorate given some
binding form by the Congress.

Finally, I respectfully urge the Sen-
ate to use the ratification process to put
the Soviet Union on notice that this
country is prepared, may eager, for
peaceful coexistence that reflects true
stability and equality in arms, and also
political restraint.

The Senate should attach to its in-
strument of advice and consent an ex-
pression of the following principles:

The absence of political re-
straint will seriously jeopardize contin-
uation of the SALT process.

That the Senate understands this to
include Soviet supply or encourage-
ment of intervention by proxy military
forces; the use of Soviet forces on the
territory of its allies such as Cuba to
free Cuban forces to fight in Africa; the
support, financing or encouragement
by any member of the Warsaw Pact of
groups and activities seeking to under-
mine governments friendly to the
United States; or the exacerbation of
regional conflicts.

That the Administration be required
to submit an annual report to the Sen-
ate on the degree to which the Soviet
Union is living up to these criteria.

That the Senate vote every two years
its judgment whether the Soviet Union
has lived up to these criteria. If the
judgment is negative, the Senate
should then vote whether whatever
SALT negotiations are taking place
should be continued.

I recommend the approach outlined
here because it gives this country an
opportunity to address its dangers
without abandoning an important ne-
gotiation that has already extended
over seven years.

If the Administration rejects this ap-
proach, the Senate will have no alterna-
tive except to go the route of further-
reaching amendments, either holding
the treaty in abeyance or forcing a
renegotiation.