Reform: A Beginning

The reforms outlined here, while wide-rang-
ing and profound in their effect, do not consti-
tute a drastic reorganization of the Department
of State. Rather they are practical measures in-
tended not to change the structure, which is
basically sound, but to change attitudes and
practices to make that structure work more
effectively.

Nor can it be claimed that the program of
management reform itself is now concluded.
For modernization is obviously a process that
is never concluded. The changes now being
adopted and those planned for the immediate
future are, however, significant steps in this
continuing and critically important process.

Post Offices Throughout U.S.
To Accept Passport Applications

Press release 138 dated June 22

Secretary Rogers and Postmaster General Winton M. Blount on June 22 signed an agreement for a nationwide expansion of the use of post offices for acceptance of applications for U.S. passports.

According to Postmaster General Blount,
post offices in every State will be accepting U.S.
passport applications by the spring of next year
and in time for the 1972 travel season.

Last month, after a successful 10-month test
in 19 selected locations, President Nixon signed
legislation authorizing the State Department
to pay the $2 execution fee to the U.S. Postal
Service for each passport application handled
by post offices.

The expanded program is designed to pro-
vide faster service, greater convenience, and
reduction of the application workload at the
Department of State's Passport Office and field
agencies, as well as the Federal and State courts.

The use of post offices was first proposed in
March of 1970 by Secretary Rogers' Advisory
Committee To Facilitate Travel, a panel of
prominent Americans under the chairmanship
of former U.S. Senator Leverett Saltonstall.

Post offices in 80 cities in California, Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New York, and Texas are presently accepting
passport applications.

Commenting on the new service, Secretary
Rogers said: "International travel has in-
creased markedly, and the volume of passport
applications is steadily increasing. It is clear
that we must provide more ways for citizens
to apply for a U.S. passport. I am pleased
to join with the Postmaster General in our joint
program providing more convenient passport
services for the public-not just for this travel
season but for many years to come."

Postmaster General Blount said: "Our pro-
gram with the State Department to provide
passport application facilities at U.S. post of-
fices has demonstrated to the American public
that two large Government organizations can
use their own distinctive capabilities in a co-
operative venture. The passport application
service which we began as a test last July has
been successful and will be available by this
time next year in post offices in every State
throughout the country."

The Department of State announced that the
average time required to issue a passport in May
of this year was generally half as long as 1
year ago.

Refugee-Related Assistance to India
 outlined by Department

Following is an announcement made to news
correspondents on July 6 by Charles W. Bray
III, Director, Office of Press Relations, outlin-
ing the composition of the $70 million com-
mitted to India on June 24 to assist in meeting
the burden of refugees from East Pakistan.

In the Secretary's name, I announced here
on June 24 the commitment of $70 million to
refugee relief and related programs on the sub-
continent. I said at that time that I would be
giving you further details on the composition of
this, and have them here.

July 26, 1971

109

Fifty million dollars will be in the form of direct refugee relief assistance to be channeled through the international focal point for relief efforts; that is, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Half of this amount, or $25 million, will be a Food for Peace grant under title II of P.L. 480. The provision of this in food commodities will enable the United States to meet about one-half of the Government of India's requirement for feeding refugees, who are now estimated in India to number more than 6 million, for about 3 months. The remaining $25 million, which will be contributed through the UNHCR, will take the form of dollar grants to procure relief supplies and services, such as shelter materials, medicines, and transport.

Taken together with the $20.5 million in cash and food assistance which we had previously contributed through the U.N. relief effort, total direct American refugee relief assistance has now reached $70.5 million. The remaining $20 million will go to the Government of India in the form of an additional development loan intended to maintain the momentum of Indian economic development despite the strain imposed by the refugees.

## World Law Day, 1971

### A PROCLAMATION¹

From the time more than 25 centuries ago when a Hebrew prophet wrote, "The Lord is our judge . . . our lawgiver . . . our king; he will save us," Western civilization's sense of salvation has been intimately related to its vision of the universal rule of law in the affairs of men. We in the United States have special reason to cherish this vision, for the freedom, the order, and the abundance which we enjoy are fruits of its application. The great principle that the people are sovereign, and that the law they make is supreme, has operated with such signal success in our country's history that Americans are turning increasingly to the compelling logic of putting it to work

in the world community as well. People of many other nations and cultures are doing likewise.

At the same time technology is shrinking the globe so that the sense of common destiny and common danger, the sense that "my country is the world; and my countrymen are mankind," is no longer fancy but compelling fact for the whole human race. More and more, it becomes a matter of prime importance that principle and not mere power should govern in this country called Earth.

We can see many heartening evidences that law is becoming stronger and more just around the world under the pressures which reason and necessity exert. Within the nations, human rights and ecological wisdom continue to gain stature in the law. Among the nations, security and cooperation—on every front from space to the seabeds—are being enhanced through negotiations, treaties, and conventions. The United Nations is entering its second quarter of a century, and many other international organizations are working effectively through and for world law.

Also playing a constructive role are those organizations which are made up not of countries but of individual men and women. joined together in the interest of the law as citizens of their countries and of the world. One of the most important of these is the World Peace Through Law Center, founded in 1963, which this summer will hold its Fifth World Conference on World Peace Through Law at Belgrade, Yugoslavia. July 21, the date when thousands of lawyers and jurists from around the world will convene for this conference, will be observed in many nations as World Law Day—an observance in which I know the American people, a people who love the law, will want to join.

Now, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NIXON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim July 21, 1971, as World Law Day. I call on every American to reflect that day on the sacredness of the law in American tradition. And I urge each American to join with millions of his fellow men around the world in heightened recognition of the importance of the rule of law in international affairs to our goal of a stable peace.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 17th day of June, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-one, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-fifth.

¹ No. 4060; 36 Fed. Reg. 11791.

110

Department of State Bulletin

NEWS CONFERENCE

This Copy For

#1095

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

10:50 A.M. PDT

JULY 10, 1971

SATURDAY

(Laguna Beach, California)

MR. WARREN: We have very little this Saturday for you.

We are posting that the President is working in the office. He has been there since 8:00 o'clock, talking with John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman, and has been in touch with other staff members by telephone.

Evidently there was some problem yesterday with the posting on the fact that the President has not yet acted on S. 31, the Emergency Employment Act. He will act on that. We expect an announcement early next week.

I indicated yesterday that it would come today, and it has not. For your BACKGROUND: That should not lead you to think that there is something wrong; that there is any hitch in the President's position on that bill, because there is not.

You have one release: The President is announcing the appointment of Richard B. Allen to be Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. He will join the staff of Pete Peterson and the staff of the Council on International Economic Policy.

I am sure a lot of you remember Dick when he was with the White House previously. He was on the National Security Council staff.

Q Wasn't he in a California college?

MR. WARREN: Stanford. He was at the Hoover Institution at Stanford.

Q When did he leave the staff, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: In November of 1969.

Q He went to Stanford?

MR. WARREN: He went to King Resources, which is now called National Resources, Limited.

Q When was he at Stanford?

MR. WARREN: Prior to that. He left us and went back to Stanford briefly, and then joined King Resources.

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Q What does King Resources do?

MR. WARREN: I think they are in a lot of different things; oil development, that sort of thing.

Q Salary?

MR. WARREN: I don't have that.

Also today, and we will post this later -- I apologize for not having it prepared right now -- the President is announcing that he will declare excess two parcels of land in San Diego.

One is a 14.24 portion of the Linda Vista Housing Project within the city limits of San Diego. This is in an area that used to be an active housing project of the Federal Government and has not been utilized as such for some time. It is four miles north of the center city area of San Diego. It is adjacent, as I understand it, to the Canyon Park.

Q That is a city park?

MR. WARREN: Yes. So this will be conveyed to the City of San Diego for use as a park area.

Q How do they use a housing development for a park area?

MR. WARREN: This is an area that does not have buildings on it.

Q Was it a public housing project?

MR. WARREN: It was Navy housing some time ago.

Q Is there housing still on it, or has it been demolished?

MR. WARREN: As I understand it, there is no housing on this particular part, but it was at one time.

Q You mean there was housing on it at one time?

MR. WARREN: Yes. The housing area did become public housing after the need by the Navy no longer existed. It then became public housing. It is now being conveyed to the city.

The second parcel is approximately 21 acres in the vicinity of the Naval Training Center and Marine Corps Recruit Depot. If you are familiar at all with San Diego, these two facilities are adjacent to each other, and the Marine Corps Recruit Depot is adjacent to Lindbergh Field.

This is, as I said, 21 acres. This will be conveyed to the San Diego Unified Port District, which operates Lindbergh Field. It runs the Port of San Diego and Municipal Field, which is the airport on the bay. This is land that is on the bay which runs along Harbor Drive. 16 acres of this 21 acres are submerged. (Laughter) This makes it rather attractive, because it is on the bay. (Laughter)

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Q Did you say that the first one was only worth $34,000?

MR. WARREN: That is correct.

Q Fourteen acres in San Diego only worth $34,000?

MR. WARREN: Yes. The location of land in Southern California, as you know, affects its value.

Q Is this a slum area?

MR. WARREN: I would not call it a slum area.

Q Do you mean the expensive area is under water? (Laughter.)

MR. WARREN: You know the potential of tidelands in San Diego. This is not tidelands because it is on the bay, but there is a potential of filling this land in.

Q It seems to me that there might have been a zero left off the evaluation, because 14 acres anywhere within 50 miles of the coast would be worth more than $1,000 an acre. This is in an urban area.

MR. WARREN: I will check it for you, if you wish. However, I don't question it.

Q There are buildings on it; aren't there?

MR. WARREN: On parts of it.

Q Are people living in these buildings?

MR. WARREN: I don't think they are anymore. I think this housing project has been closed down.

That's it, folks.

Q That's what? (Laughter)

Q When is Dr. Kissinger coming back?

MR. WARREN: I don't have the schedule.

Q What is the President going to be doing the balance of the day as we write about these things for Sunday?

MR. WARREN: I expect him to be in the office through the forenoon and into the afternoon, and possibly go back to the residence this afternoon. There is no schedule.

Q Will he have a motor trip?

MR. WARREN: There is no schedule for one.

Q Do you know anything about Dr. Kissinger's well-being?

MR. WARREN: No. All I know is what I have read.

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Q Is this stomach upset likely to delay his return by a day or so?

MR. WARREN: I don't have any elaboration on his schedule. As soon as I do, we will let you know.

Q Is he due in Monday?

MR. WARREN: It was Sunday or Monday.

Q He is going to be at least a day delayed; isn't he?

MR. WARREN: It appears that way, but I don't know.

Q There was a story carried by UPI that said Kissinger would meet with a high representative of the Hanoi delegation in Paris.

MR. WARREN: I saw that story. We have nothing to add to what Ron has said or what Henry himself said in Delhi when he was there; that he had no plans to do so.

Q I don't know what Henry said, but Ron said he would not seek a meeting.

MR. WARREN: Right. Dr. Kissinger said in Delhi--and I don't have the text of his remarks in front of me, obviously that he had no plans for such a meeting.

Q Is the President about to make a decision on moving nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan?

MR. WARREN: First, I can tell you that we make it a habit not to discuss the deployment of nuclear weapons, and secondly, I will leave it at that. (Laughter.)

Q Can you move nuclear weapons without anybody noticing it?

MR. WARREN: That is a question you will have to ask the Defense Department.

Q We were told when you moved nuclear weapons off Okinawa.

MR. WARREN: I have nothing to give you on the deployment of weapons.

Q Is President Nixon going to the new convention center in Los Angeles in the next four days?

MR. WARREN: He has no plans for that.

Q Is anyone coming in on Monday?

MR. WARREN: I believe so. I will get you a list of those.

Q Could you give us a preview of next week?

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LY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, [July 19, 1971]

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

*The President's Remarks to the Nation Announcing His Acceptance of an Invitation From Premier Chou En-lai To Visit China.*

July 15, 1971

Good evening:

I have requested this television time tonight to announce a major
development in our efforts to build a lasting peace in the world.

As I have pointed out on a number of occasions over the past
3 years, there can be no stable and enduring peace without the partic-
ipation of the People's Republic of China and its 750 million people.
That is why I have undertaken initiatives in several areas to open the
door for more normal relations between our two countries.

In pursuance of that goal, I sent Dr. Kissinger, my Assistant for
National Security Affairs, to Peking during his recent world tour for
the purpose of having talks with Premier Chou En-lai.

The announcement I shall now read is being issued simultaneously
in Peking and in the United States:

"Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972.

"President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.

"The meeting between the leaders of China and the United States is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

In anticipation of the inevitable speculation which will follow this
announcement, I want to put our policy in the clearest possible context.
Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of
China will not be at the expense of our old friends.

It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly rela-
tions with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any
other nation's enemy.

I have taken this action because of my profound conviction that all
nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship
between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I deeply hope will
become a journey for peace, peace not just for our generation but for
future generations on this earth we share together.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 7:31 p.m., P.d.t., at NBC studios, Burbank, Calif. His remarks were broadcast on radio and television.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1099

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

12:20 P.M. PDT

JULY 15, 1971

THURSDAY

(San Clemente, California)

MR. WARREN: I wish to apologize for the delay. Ron has been in meetings all morning and is still in meetings. He left the President's office long enough to ask me to come over and give you the information that we have at this time.

I have a few announcements to give you now, and then we will have an information opportunity at the San Clemente Inn at 2:30 today. Ron will be here at that time.

The President has been meeting this morning with members of the staff and with Henry Kissinger, Mr. Haldeman and others, including Ron.

Tomorrow's schedule: There will be a meeting at 10:00 a.m. with Ambassador David Kennedy and Peter G. Peterson, Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

Ambassador Kennedy returns from the Far East today and will be meeting tomorrow with the President to review developments on a variety of international economic issues on which he has been consulting on his trip. He will review the progress of negotiations with Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong on the voluntary textile restraints, and also will be discussing the announcement by Italy last week of the establishment of a visa-system on its footwear exports to the United States. They made this announcement recently.

You will recall Ambassador Kennedy visited Rome in May, so we feel that this announcement by the Italian footwear industry is a positive response to that visit.

Q. Do you have David Kennedy's full itinerary on his trip, please?

MR. WARREN: Yes. He left the last of May and visited Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and then he returned to Japan on June 28th and is coming in to San Clemente from Japan.

Q. Jerry, you said he will review the negotiations that he held in Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong on voluntary textile restraints. Did he hold any in Japan?

MR. WARREN: In Japan also, but one of the purposes of his trip was to discuss voluntary restraints with the other three countries.

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MR. WARREN: No, we are just trying to put into context the steps taken to reach the agreement with the Italian shoe industry.

Q Do you think he is taking undue credit?

MR. WARREN: I would not want to say that, Helen.

Q What is a visa system?

MR. WARREN: That is a self-imposed system of restraints on exporting shoes to the United States. I don't really have the particulars on that.

Q I am not sure I got the quote in answer to my question as to why you found Chairman Mills' approach to the Italian situation somewhat better. Could you either repeat it or have the transcript read back?

(The record was read by the reporter.)

MR. WARREN: I have a couple of announcements.

I told you that the President met with his staff this morning. I neglected to tell you that the Secretary of State also met with the President and Henry Kissinger this morning.

Q For how long?

MR. WARREN: I don't have a time on that, Gene. He was in for a brief period, and Henry was in and out, similar to yesterday.

Q Did Ron sit in on the meetings this morning?

MR. WARREN: Some of them, yes.

Q The Kissinger and Rogers meeting?

MR. WARREN: I am not sure he was in at that particular time. Ron will be here at 2:30.

Q Does the scheduling of the meeting tomorrow with Ambassador Kennedy and Mr. Peterson mean that the conferences on Vietnam or foreign policy, or whatever you want to call them, have now been concluded?

MR. WARREN: No, it does not. As a matter of fact, there will be an NSC meeting tomorrow at 10:30, attended by the Secretary of State, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary Joe Sisco, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director Richard Helms and, of course, Henry Kissinger and General Haig will sit in on that meeting.

Q What will that be on?

MR. WARREN: I don't have a subject to give you.

Q We would normally think, with the other conferences going on, it would be on Vietnam, but Sisco is there and he is the Middle East man. Can you tell us whether it is going to be on Vietnam or the Middle East?

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MR. WARREN: We normally don't announce subjects of NSC meetings.

Q You do sometimes.

MR. WARREN: I have nothing to give you.

Q When is Sisco going to the Middle East?

MR. WARREN: I don't have a schedule to announce for Mr. Sisco.

Q Where is Sisco today?

MR. WARREN: I assume he is on his way to California.

Q He is not scheduled to see the President today?

MR. WARREN: No.

Q Have you ever had NSC meetings here before?

MR. WARREN: I believe we have, yes.

Q Is this something urgent that can't wait until
Washington on Monday?

MR. WARREN: This is a meeting of the NSC which
is scheduled and will take place here tomorrow. I have
nothing more to give you.

Q Is it a normally scheduled meeting or is it
specially scheduled?

MR. WARREN: It is scheduled for tomorrow and will
be held.

Q When was it scheduled?

MR. WARREN: I don't have the exact time.

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We will post that the President today announced the retirement of two District judges: William G. Juergens of the Eastern District of Illinois. Judge Juergens lives in Chester, Illinois. Also, Judge R. Dorsey Watkins of Baltimore, Maryland, who represents the District of Maryland. Both of these judges were nominated to the Federal Bench by President Eisenhower. They will both assume the status of senior judge.

Those are all the announcements we have this morning.

Q Jerry, Senator Jackson says the Soviet Union is involved in an extremely grave build-up in the Middle East, 600 supersonic military jets in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

Does this NSC meeting concern this?

MR. WARREN: Again, Gene, I have to tell you I have no characterization of the NSC meeting. I believe State addressed that comment by Senator Jackson this morning.

Q What did they say?

MR. WARREN: I'm sorry, I don't have a transcript of their remarks.

Q Secretary Sisco was due here at 11:00 o'clock. Can you confirm whether he is actually here?

MR. WARREN: I can check into that and see if he is here. I just don't know what his itinerary is.

Q What is his title?

MR. WARREN: He is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

Q How long did the President meet with Dr. Kissinger and Rogers?

MR. WARREN: I was not able to determine the length of that meeting, but it was relatively brief.

Q Secretary Connally says today that the economy will not meet the $1065 billion GNP figure this year. As the chief spokesman for the Administration giving those remarks, is it safe to say that that is no longer a goal of this Administration?

MR. WARREN: I think the Secretary of the Treasury covered that this morning and the Chairman of the Economic Advisers discussed it last week. I would rest with what those gentlemen said. Secretary Connally is the chief economic spokesman and Chairman McCracken also speaks for the Administration.

Q Is the President going to meet with Jaffe and Bud Krogh out here?

MR. WARREN: He will, but I don't have the time.

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS;
AND RON ZIEGLER, PRESS
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT

9:15 A.M. PDT

JULY 16, 1971

FRIDAY

(San Clemente, California)

MR. ZIEGLER: We are going to do the session this morning on a background basis. You can attribute it to "White House officials." You can directly quote "White House officials," unless Dr. Kissinger says to you that it is on deep background, and then you should not quote him directly.

We will have a transcript for you to read after the briefing.

There are two announcements before we go to Dr. Kissinger. I have stated the ground rules to you and know you will abide by them.

On Monday, President Nixon will have a meeting with the bipartisan leadership at 8:30 in the morning. Then at 10:00 o'clock on Monday, President Nixon will meet with his full Cabinet. The purpose of the meeting with bipartisan leadership and the Cabinet is to discuss the recent events which were announced last night.

With that, I think we can go directly to Dr. Kissinger. I believe he would like to go directly to your questions.

Let me again repeat the ground rules. Dr. Kissinger's remarks this morning will be on BACKGROUND, as I indicated to you.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say one thing, and then we will go right to questions.

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I will not be able to go into substance other than some of the
surrounding circumstances, and I hope you will be patient with me if
I don't speak as fully as I would like to.

With that, let me take your questions.

Q: Could you give us some chronological report on how you went into China and came out?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I went in by airplane. I will not go into the details of how the trip was arranged, but I went in by airplane on Friday, the 9th, arriving in Peking around noon, Peking time; in fact, at exactly noon Peking time. I left Peking on July 11th at 1:00 p.m. Peking time. So I was there for 49 hours.

Q: What kind of airplane did you go on, Henry? Whose airplane, and what kind?

DR. KISSINGER: I have said that I don't want to go into the details of how the trip was arranged and how I got in there.

Q: Did you leave and return from the same place?

DR. KISSINGER: I arrived at an airfield near Peking and left from the place at which I had arrived.

Q: Can you tell us where you went in from and came out to?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have been looking at my schedule, and it is fairly obvious that it must have been from Pakistan.

Q: Did you ever see Islamabad?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I saw Islamabad. I saw it and was in there.

Q: When is the President going to China?

DR. KISSINGER: The date for going to China has not yet been set. It will be before May 1972. The exact date depends on some preparatory work that has to be done, and on some of the technical arrangements that need to be made, but it will be well before May 1972.

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Q: Henry, why was May set as the outside date?

DR. KISSINGER: May was set as the outside date because the President directed that a step of such importance for world peace and for long-term relationships between our country and the Peoples Republic of China should not get mixed up in any partisan considerations in this country.

Of course, our hosts are working on a different timetable and are not so tied to this timetable and, therefore, we said May is the absolute outside limit beyond which the partisan aspects might raise too many problems.

But this does not mean that we will delay it until the last minute. We will have it as soon as it can be arranged with a prospect of success.

Q: Would that be this year?

DR. KISSINGER: I just don't want to speculate. It is not excluded, but we really have to see what the preparatory work will bring. It would have to be in the very last part, but we really have to engage in some exchanges before we can form a judgment. I would think that by early fall we will have a pretty good fix on it.

Q: Where will these exchanges take place? Are we sending more people to Peking or are we going to meet them in Warsaw, or what?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we have well established procedures for this now.

Q: What did you talk to Premier Chou about?

DR. KISSINGER: We had rather lengthy talks. Of course, we have been preparing this for three months. It was a trip that had culminated two years of overtures by the President, and then three months of preparation. So we covered many topics, but we have a mutual understanding that they would not be discussed.

Q: Can you say about how much time altogether you did talk?

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DR. KISSINGER: Of the 49 hours I spent there, I would say the greater part of the waking hours were spent in conversations.

Q: Do you mean something like 20 hours?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, approaching that.

Q: Can you say where you talked?

DR. KISSINGER: The talks took place in two places: One was a State Guest House where we were staying, and the other set of talks took place in a place called the Great Hall of the People, which is used by Premier Chou En-lai for receptions and dinners. I think some newsmen have been received there.

Q: How many were in your party? Who went with you?

DR. KISSINGER: Three members of my staff.

Q: Who were they?

DR. KISSINGER: John Holdridge, Winston Lord and Richard Smyser.

Q: Who did the Chinese have in on the talks besides Chou En-lai?

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DR. KISSINGER: Very candidly, I forgot to ask them if I could give the names of the people who participated. Therefore, I can't do it, but they had at least four senior officials participating each time, representing the Foreign Office and other aspects of their structure.

Q. What language were the talks in?

DR. KISSINGER: I talked in English, with the verbs more carefully placed than usual. (Laughter)

They talked in Chinese. Premier Chou En-lai, as some of you may know, understands English, so he occasionally has a tendency to correct the interpreter. He has the advantage that he can think about what one has said while the interpretation is made to him.

Q. Henry, can you describe the mood of the sessions?

DR. KISSINGER: The reception was enormously gracious and polite. On the human level, we were treated extraordinarily well.

The mood of the session was very businesslike, very precise; no rhetoric on either side. These are two countries that have had major disagreements for a long time, that have been in isolation from each other, and this was the first tentative step along the road that the President started 2-1/2 years ago, the first direct contact along the road the President started 2-1/2 years ago through indirect communication. We spoke frankly and directly, and I believe usefully.

Q. Does this constitute recognition of Red China?

DR. KISSINGER: Not at this stage in any formal way.

Q. Why did you go to London before, that short trip to London? Was that connected with this?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q. What other countries were informed of this?

DR. KISSINGER: In this whole enterprise? Let me give you some explanation.

As I have told some of you before, within 10 days of coming into office, the President directed that steps be taken to see whether we could get into contact with the Peoples Republic of China and to try to bring them into a more civilized discourse with the rest of the world. You know the series of steps that have been taken.

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[tc]

The Secretary of State made a major speech in Canberra in the summer of 1969. Throughout this, the three policy people who have been involved in everything have been the President, the Secretary of State and myself. Of course, there have been a very few senior White House staff members who knew the general framework and most of the details.

The division of labor during the last week has been that the Secretary of State would take care of the diplomatic scenario. Therefore, yesterday he spent the better part of the afternoon and evening while the President was traveling to Los Angeles on the telephone calling about 19 Ambassadors to inform them ahead of time of the impending announcement. This required some rather careful timing, so that it could be accomplished before the announcement was completed.

As I understand it, the Secretary of State expects to continue these discussions on Monday when we get back, for more elaborate conversations with those Ambassadors, as well as others. But there were about 20 countries notified prior to the announcement.

Q. How about Taiwan?

DR. KISSINGER: They were the first country to be notified by the Secretary of State.

Q. How about the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet Union was also notified ahead of time.

Q. Henry, a few months ago the President publicly cautioned against expecting the improvement in relations to move along rapidly; and here, in a relatively short period of time, a major step has been taken. What happened?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, we have had a difficult problem with maintaining a public posture on this issue. The relationships with the Peoples Republic have gone in essentially two phases: (1) In the first year and a half of the Administration, there was a general attempt on our part to communicate to Peking that we were prepared to have a serious dialogue, and that we were not prisoners of history.

We also took, in addition, a series of unilateral steps that were public that symbolized this. Then, starting this spring, about concurrently with the visible manifestation of the ping-pong diplomacy, the manifestations having been in a general framework of trying to express a general attitude, both sides moved into a more concrete phase.

MORE

On the other hand, there are a number of really interesting aspects. When you have not been in touch with a country for 25 years, it is amazing how technically difficult it is to simply find out where you should talk, and with whom. That is something that we don't teach in textbooks on diplomacy.

When you are nursing a rather tenuous dialogue, you don't want to create excessive expectations of how it might go. Even after we knew, for example, that a visit by the American envoy in Peking would be welcome, there still remained a lot to be discussed about how to work it out; what should be discussed; what the objectives should be.

The President felt that until we knew that, it would be best not to raise undue expectations, excessive speculation, for each side to take a public position that it might then regret, and if it turned out that a later moment would be more propitious, we could then do it without embarrassment or without a sense of failure.

We have moved on a schedule that was essentially set in April, and we have not deviated from this schedule, nor has the other side. There has been no acceleration of that process from that time on.

Q. Do you mean your trip was set in April?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, a trip was set in April, and then who and so forth, this became clear during May essentially.

Q. Why do they want this breakthrough?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate about their motives, but these are serious people, and this is a major step for them. I am certain that they have thought about it deeply, and that they consider it as significant as we do.

Q. Do you expect that we will formally establish diplomatic relations before the President goes there?

DR. KISSINGER: The answer to that is no. The major problem we now have is that the United States and Mainland China have been cut off from each other for a long time. The People's Republic of China has not, in recent years, participated actively in international affairs in any way.

The major problem is to make sure that we talk seriously; that we respect each other's point of view; and that we understand that there are major differences. There was no pretense on either side in Peking

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[L.C.]

that there are no major differences, but that we will see what both can
do to promote better relations in the world and thereby contribute to
the peace of all nations.

Q. How do you communicate if you do not have diplomatic relations?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we know how to solve that problem.

Q. Henry, how does the Vietnam problem fit into all of this?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, obviously when countries of the magnitude and world concerns of the United States and the People's Republic of China alter their relationship, it must affect other parts of the world. I don't want to speculate on what impact it will have on any specific area.

I will, of course, have to say that in a quest for peace in the world, peace in Southeast Asia has to be a foremost, immediate objective.

Q. What effect has this acceptance to visit China have for membership for Mainland China in the U.N. in October of this year?

DR. KISSINGER: The Department of State is going to announce our formal position on that within the very near future. It obviously has some effect on it, but the Department of State will announce our formal position before too long.

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[10]

Q: May I follow up on that? The President is expected to announce a policy, an Administration policy toward Red China. Now, the State Department handling this aspect of what was anticipated, do we still expect the President very shortly to make a public announcement of his policy toward Mainland China? This was stated in June.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't believe that the President will make a formal announcement. I believe that the present plan is that the Department of State, which will have to handle the negotiations and details, will announce it. They have been working on it for many months in a rather complex situation and will state our position in the reasonably near future.

Q: So this announcement that the President was going to have, is this part of the confidentiality that was mentioned?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't believe that the President ever said he would make the announcement. My recollection is that the President said he would make the decision sometime in the latter part of this month. That timetable still exists.

The present plan is that the Department of State will make the announcement, and that was always the plan. There has been no change in that.

Q: About 11 or 12 years ago a President promised that he was going to make a visit to the Soviet Union. That visit was announced in a somewhat dramatic manner and then was shot down along with the U-2 fighter over Russia. In view of the fact that the United States has been sending at least drone planes over Mainland China, did you make any assurances to Chou En-lai that this type of operation would cease in order not to jeopardize the President's visit?

DR. KISSINGER: As I told you, I will not discuss the substance of my conversation with Premier Chou En-lai. The visit of the President is a serious attempt to contribute to world peace, and is carrying out a policy that he has long felt was one of the cardinal aspects of his general approach to international affairs.

On the Chinese side, one has the impression also of great seriousness of purpose. I believe that both sides will behave in a responsible manner, keeping in mind the long-term objectives. But I don't want to go into any details.

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[lc]

Also, I want to say that it was not a conversation in which either side was trying to hold the other one up.

Q: What are the prospects now of a return visit from Chou En-lai?

DR. KISSINGER: That issue has not yet been raised.

Q: Will there be one eventually? That is customary.

DR. KISSINGER: As you all know, we invited a return visit of the table tennis team, but quite honestly, the issue has never been raised by either side. Therefore, I don't want to speculate on that.

Q: Why didn't you see Le Duc Tho or Madame Binh in the pursuit of the policy of peace?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not going to discuss the individual moves in the Vietnam negotiations. Let me say one thing generally: You ladies and gentlemen have heard me talk about Vietnam negotiations on behalf of the President. You will remember that I have insisted through all periods that in our judgment the surest, most reliable and most desirable way of ending the war in Vietnam was through negotiations.

I think you will also remember that I maintained this position when it was being ridiculed and when people said that there was absolutely no possibility of negotiations.

I simply would like to ask you whether you really believe that now, when everybody starts talking about negotiations, we would suddenly lose our interest in negotiations.

So, if you want to debate with us about the substance of this or that position, that is, of course, what has to happen. But the President, who has been dedicated to this negotiating process from the beginning, against all odds, is not going to be found wanting when the whole record is plain of pursuing avenues for peace.

Q: Is it likely that the President's journey will include a visit to the Soviet Union on the same trip as China?

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DR. KISSINGER: The President's view on a meeting with the Soviet leaders has been frequently stated. It is one that, of course, he has always been, in principle, willing to undertake. It would seem to me that the occasion of a visit to Peking is not the best to also visit Moscow. The issues to be discussed between the two countries are too various. But in principle, we are prepared to meet with the Soviet leaders whenever our negotiations have reached a point where something fruitful can be accomplished.

Let me make one other point: Nothing that has been done in our relations with the Peoples Republic of China has any purpose or is in any way directed against any other countries, and especially not against the Soviet Union. We are taking these steps because we cannot imagine a stable, international peace in which a country of 750 million people is kept in isolation. We believe that by improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China we are contributing to peace in the world, and therefore are contributing to all nations.

Q: Can you tell me if you knew about the invitation for President Nixon to visit Peking when you went there? Did you know it was going to be forthcoming?

DR. KISSINGER: Essentially, yes. I knew, and of course the President knew that there was an interest, a mutual interest in a visit. What remained to be determined was whether it would be useful, whether it would contribute to conditions in the world, peaceful conditions in the world.

The President had given me detailed instructions before I left. He personally had gone over, contrary to the normal procedures where the instructions are more general, he had gone in great detail over a voluminous book that had been prepared. He went over it for several weeks and had prepared a good part of it himself.

This was one of the things which we felt would come up and he had given me detailed instructions in which way I was authorized to react to it, depending on the general framework.

Q: Did you see Chairman Mao while you were there? Why was he not mentioned in the statement last night?

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DR. KISSINGER: I will answer this question, but I will not comment on whom I saw other than Prime Minister Chou En-lai. I did not see Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao does not hold an official government position. He is Chairman of the Communist Party.

I think you will know from your acquaintance with other Communist countries that the formal invitations are government to government, not Communist Party to government. Therefore, Premier Chou En-lai who is head of the government of the People's Republic of China, would be the official who, by protocol, extends the invitation. However, it is expected that the President will meet with Chairman Mao while he is there.

Q: Shall we assume that the visit to Peking was the primary reason for the entire trip? Would you have made the trip if it had not been for that?

DR. KISSINGER: The President wanted me to go on a fact-finding trip in general at some convenient opportunity. But the particular timing was certainly influenced by the decision to go to Peking.

Q: You mentioned earlier a trip in April or May. Could you give us any more details of the various moves that led up to your trip? Did Edgar Snow play a role in this?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is about a trip in April or May. Do you mean the preparations for the trip which took place in April and May?

Q: Yes. Who made the trip in April or May?

DR. KISSINGER: Nobody made a trip in April or May. Edgar Snow played no role, except that he conveyed in his article in Life, which is the only thing we saw, a general attitude which we had received already in other ways and it simply confirmed a general attitude which we had already become aware of.

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[LC]

I was saying that there were two phases in our relationship with the Peoples Republic of China: One, a period in which a general framework was established, first through a series of communications in various ways on our part that indicated that we were not bound by previous history and that expressed general philosophy. That also was expressed in the President's annual foreign policy report and was expressed in the first public use of the phrase, "Peoples Republic of China" last October in a toast of President Nixon to President Ceausescu, and was repeated in February in the President's World Report, even in the middle of the Laotian operation. There was also a series of steps which the Department of State took to indicate a general willingness to open relations as well as public statements by the Secretary of State and others.

The second phase started in April when we moved from this general framework to a more specific exploration of where we might go from here. Then in April, May, and June this meeting was set up through a series of exchanges and very detailed preparations which were made. The preparations had been somewhat handicapped by the fact that the only senior officials who knew about it were the President, the Secretary of State and myself.

Q. Throughout your trip, only three people knew?

DR. KISSINGER: Plus a very few senior White House staff members who had to know for various reasons. For example, the President did not work on the substance of this in his office for fear that papers would be left behind and people might walk in and see us working on the papers. So we usually met in the Lincoln Sitting Room in the evening, often after dinner, to go over the possible agenda and the possible substance of these meetings.

That is what I was talking about that took place in April, May and June. But there were no emissaries in that period.

Q. Do you expect the President might go to the Soviet Union before he goes to China?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate about any prospective trips. It would seem to me more logical that the trips would be taken in the order that they are announced, if indeed there is a trip.

Q. Was President Ceausescu of Romania helpful in making the arrangements?

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DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to discuss who participated in the preliminary exchanges, except to say that the President, from his earliest travels on, made special efforts to convey personal views to the leaders of the Peoples Republic of China. But I do not want to say through whom.

Q. Is there a risk in the time gap between the announcement and the time when the trip may come off?

DR. KISSINGER: First, of course, we have not announced when the trip will occur. I must repeat that May 1, 1972, give or take a day or two, sets the absolute outside limits and not the target date. Therefore, you should not think that this is building up now to something that will come off at the end of April or the beginning of May.

Secondly, of course, there is a certain risk, but also we are very serious in this policy and based on my visit to Peking, I believe that the Chinese leaders appeared as very serious and thoughtful people. We will both make every effort to manage our relationships in the interval, with all due regard, of course, to the obligations each of us have, in such a way that the benefits that we hope can come to mankind and to peace by a visit will be realized.

I am certain that neither of us will knowingly do something that would undermine the prospects of something that it took so long to prepare and that it took such painful decisions to reach.

Q. Why did it have to be secret and were you surprised that it remained a secret?

DR. KISSINGER: It was thought that it was best to keep it secret until it was completed in order not to raise excessive hopes and excessive speculation until there was something concrete to announce. If the trip had taken place without any results then we could have avoided a setback to the hopes of everybody that would have been implicit in announcing a visit that then had not brought any progress.

As I have told you before, we have consistently taken the position since we made our first overtures, we tried to couch them in terms that could be accepted or noted, but did not have to be rejected.

So, the plan always was to keep the trip secret until we knew what would result.

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Was I surprised that it remained a secret? Well, it took some
work to keep it secret, and there were some anxious moments. We
had some people in command capsules orbiting the moon while we were
there. (Laughter)

Q. Without going into the substance of your talks, with Chou En-lai, can you tell us whether you came away from your meeting with him with any improved hopes or greater optimism about the Vietnam peace negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I simply don't want to discuss any particular issue that may or may not have been raised there. In general, I came away with increased hope for peace in the world and with a conviction that both sides are going to make serious efforts to bring about an improvement of relations.

Q. What were the painful aspects of this decision?

DR. KISSINGER: We knew that making this decision would hurt some old friends. It is always difficult to break away from a well established pattern, which at least has the advantage that its framework has become very familiar. It forced us to rethink the whole nature of the world in which policy had been conducted more or less as if the Peoples Republic of China did not exist.

I don't want to speak for the Peoples Republic of China, but I don't doubt that for their leaders there were some enormously complex decisions to be made, given their image of the United States and given the fact of this long-time hostility and, indeed, confrontation in so many parts of the world, sometimes physically and always ideologically.

So it was a complex, and I am frank to say, in many respects a
moving occasion to have the privilege of seeing the beginning of this and
dealing with what are no doubt very dedicated and very serious people,
and we both recognized that we were engaged on a very difficult path
which had many pitfalls and which would take an enormous sense of
restraint and responsibility on both sides.

Q. In drawing on your knowledge of diplomatic history, has a head
of state ever visited a country with whom he had no diplomatic violations?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know why we recognize foreigners in this
questioning period. (Laughter)

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[1c]

I will put a researcher to work on that problem. But this Administration is not reluctant to innovate.

Q. Didn't you people explain that one of the reasons President Nixon didn't go to President Nasser's funeral was that a President couldn't go to a country with which his country didn't have diplomatic relations?

DR. KISSINGER: It is one thing to go to an essentially ceremonial occasion in which there is no possibility of beginning a serious dialogue and which is primarily a state occasion. It is another thing to find means of beginning a discussion with a country of the magnitude, importance and tradition of the People's Republic of China, and there one had to decide at what level this could be most usefully done.

We have a whole host of technical issues between us, but we don't believe that those technical issues can be resolved until there is some -- I don't want to say philosophical -- but at least some conceptual understanding of where we are trying to go.

This requires the participation of people at the highest level, of people who have authority and who can talk with sufficient sweep. So I would say there is an enormous distinction between going to a state funeral and going to what is a serious working visit related to the general policy of bringing about peace in the world.

Q. Do you think recognition will come out of the meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on what is going to come out of the meeting. We are both, I think, mature enough to recognize what is possible and what is not. There are no present plans along that line.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, even if you are not establishing full diplomatic relations, isn't there a chance that you might compromise and establish, say, a trade mission or some half-way relation?

DR. KISSINGER: We really have taken the position all along that the techniques by which we establish contact are not so important. What is important is that we have the ability to accomplish those things which both sides, in their mutual interest, and for their mutual purposes, consider essential.

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We believe that we know how to do this, and the formal way in which
this is going to be accomplished is really a very subsidiary issue. There
is no present plan to establish a trade mission. Our major emphasis
right emphasis right now is on having a serious dialogue rather than a
particular commercial possibility.

Q. Wouldn't you expect that the establishment of diplomatic relations
would be something that would be announced by the President and Chou
in their meeting, and that is the reason you are not doing it now?

DR. KISSINGER: I would not want to speculate on anything that could
come out of the meeting between the President and Premier Chou En-lai.
My impression -- and this is simply my impression -- and at this stage
we don't have even the beginning of an agreement -- my impression is
that the Chinese leaders are not so concerned with the specific mechanics
of this or that problem, but, rather, with the longer term or medium term
problem of what we expressed in the communique as normalizing relations.

So I would not speculate that anything that concrete is envisaged.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for just a few more questions.

Q. Is Secretary Rogers still going to make his London speech, and
will this possibly be the vehicle for the China statement? You said he
was going to be making phone calls Monday, and I wondered if he cancelled
that speech.

DR. KISSINGER: I will have to let the Secretary of State speak about
his own plans. I would not expect, however, that the Secretary of State
is going to speak next week on the issue of the U.N.

Q. Can you confirm the Australian Opposition Party leader's statement on the fact that China is willing to participate in a conference on Indochina?

DR. KISSINGER: I regret having to be so evasive, but I don't want
to talk about any of the specifics that grew out of this meeting. We will
have to let events speak for themselves.

Q. Were there any conditions put on this trip by Chou En-lai?

DR. KISSINGER: No conditions whatever were put on the trip, nor
would they have been accepted. But this was not the mood in which the
meeting was conducted, and the issue never arose.

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[Lc]

Q. Are you talking about the President's trip or your trip?

DR. KISSINGER: On either trip.

Q. You have put almost impossible ground rules on this. Henry said he spoke to Chou En-lai "and I did not speak to Mao." It seems to me we have to put this on the record.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will get back to that in a second.

Q. How do you quote direct quotes, that this was a complex and moving occasion? Who else would know that?

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, the ground rules are as stated. You can quote "White House officials said." Obviously when Henry said "I", you can quote "White House officials."

Q. We have pictures of Henry and he is saying "My impressions of my meeting."

MR. ZIEGLER: Then all you have to do is say "White House officials said his impressions were."

Q. You cannot use the first person?

MR. ZIEGLER: The ground rules as we have established them are the existing ground rules which we have followed many times. You can quote "White House officials said" on anything that Dr. Kissinger has told you today. Those are the ground rules, as we said at the outset.

Q. Can we say "I"?

MR. ZIEGLER: You can say "White House officials said." You can can say "White House officials say this is the feeling," but you cannot quote Dr. Kissinger by name directly.

END

(AT 10:10 A.M. PDT)

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1104

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:45 A.M. EDT

JULY 20, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We have several announcements to make. The President has approved Senate Joint Resolution 101 which authorizes the President to designate July 20, 1971 as National Moon Walk Day. You have that proclamation.

Also, we are announcing today the fact that the President is announcing his intention to nominate Rush Moody, Jr. to be a member of the Federal Power Commission. Mr. Moody will succeed Lawrence J. O'Connor, Jr., to serve a five-year term, expiring June 22, 1976. Mr. Moody is a Democrat. He will receive $38,000 in this position.

The President today is transmitting to the Congress two annual reports: the Annual Report for Fiscal 1970 of the National Capital Housing Authority and the Third Annual Report of the Secretary of Transportation on the administration of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.

The copies of the reports are available in the Press Office. Notice to the press will be posted after the briefing which contains the letters of transmittal. You will notice, they are blue-covered reports. They will be in the Press Office.

The President today is also announcing his intention to nominate Frank P. Sanders to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management. We will post the details of that.

After the leadership meeting today, President Nixon met for about a half an hour with Senator Dole. He meets with Senator Dole, as you know, on a periodic basis. He did so this morning, so you should add that to the President's schedule today.

Q Was Senator Dole able to find out where the President would like to have the fconvention?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have not talked to the President or Senator Dole about what they talked about.

Q Where do you think the convention will be held, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will have to wait and see.

Q Has the President told you where he would like to have it? Have you heard him say where he would like to have it?

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MR. ZIEGLER: Well, we had a discussion about that in California. I would refer you to the transcript. We are going to continue to probe the other side in Paris regarding their negotiating position. There will be another meeting this Thursday.

Q In California there was some question about when Ambassador Bruce would leave his post and it was more or less speculated that it would be in mid-August. Has there been a firm date set?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I have nothing to add to what I have already said on that subject.

Q Will Secretary Sisco take a U. S. response to Israel's request for more arms when he goes there this week?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, the State Department has addressed the subject of Mr. Sisco's trip to the Middle East and I have nothing to add to what they have said.

Q There is a report out in the Israeli newspapers today saying that the President has made a decision. Can you comment on that?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q What will the President be doing the rest of the day?

MR. ZIEGLER: He has no further public schedule, but he will be meeting with members of the staff, primarily from the domestic staff, John Ehrlichman and others.

Q Is he still meeting with Mr. Kissinger in the Lincoln Room or has he moved those discussions to the office? (Laughter)

MR. ZIEGLER: He still uses the Lincoln Room occasionally.

Q To meet with Kissinger?

MR. ZIEGLER: Occasionally.

Q Was the Vice President informed of the forthcoming China visit before the announcement was publicly made?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think that subject has been covered quite thoroughly. I said the other day that the Vice President is familiar with the foreign policy of this country and I can tell you that the announcement came as no surprise to the Vice President.

Q That is not the answer you gave us the other day.

MR. ZIEGLER: I think it is close to it.

Q Did Dr. Kissinger inform Ambassador Bruce when he paused in Paris that this announcement was coming?

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #1113

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

AT 4:13 P.M. EDT

JULY 26, 1971

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: Ron is in a meeting. He called me to come out and give you some of the things we have.

The President arrived back at the White House at about 3:05 this afternoon, and will be meeting later on, as the schedule shows, with Senator Tower.

I would like to call your attention to a statement released earlier having to do with the successful launch of Apollo 15. It should be in the bins for you.

The schedule for tomorrow:

Staff meetings in the morning.

We will post this schedule, by the way.

At 11 a.m., the President will meet with Ambassador Soedjatmoko of Indonesia. This is a farewell call. The Ambassador is returning to Jakarta. The President has valued the Ambassador's counsel in the three years he has been here. The President will be meeting him to thank him for that counsel and to wish him well.

Q How many times has he met with him, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: I can't give you that. I haven't looked it up.

Q Is there an agenda?

MR. WARREN: There is none.

At 11:45 the President will present the first strike of the Eisenhower silver dollar to Mrs. Mamie Eisenhower. This will be in the Oval Office. There will be a brief ceremony and we will have silent pictures and pool coverage of that.

At 5:00 p.m. the President will host a reception in honor of representatives of the American Society of Association Executives. There will be about 250 on hand.

They will have attended a briefing beginning at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow in the East Room on the President's domestic initiatives and legislative programs.

Among those briefing at the three o'clock session will be Secretary Romney, and Clark MacGregor will be there

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MR. WARREN: I don't know.

Q Is that the ex-House Un-American Activities Committee?

MR. WARREN: This is Chairman Ichord's Committee.

Q Have they had this authority in the past?

MR. WARREN: They have had the authority in the past and it is similar to the authority in the 91st Congress.

Q Is this an extension of it?

MR. WARREN: It is an authority that has to be granted in each new Congress if it is to be granted at all.

Q Income taxes and what else?

MR. WARREN: Excess profits, estate and gift tax returns. This, obviously, has to do with whatever investigations this Committee is empowered to conduct.

Q But not personal income tax returns?

MR. WARREN: I said income, excess profits, estate and gift tax returns.

Also, you have a Proclamation designating Monday, October 11, 1971, as General Pulaski's Memorial Day. That is self-explanatory.

We will post a sign-up list for the Saturday trip after this briefing.

Also, I should point out to you that there was a luncheon meeting in the White House today where Congressman Steele of Connecticut was here for a luncheon meeting with Dr. Jerome Jaffe, the Special Consultant to the President on Narcotics. Also at that luncheon meeting were Donald Rumsfeld, Counsellor to the President; John Ehrlichman, Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President; Clark MacGregor and Bill Timmons. I am told it was a very constructive meeting. It lasted for two hours.

As you know, Congressman Steele has been instrumental in alerting the public to the scope of the problem of heroin usage overseas, particularly in the United States military services overseas.

This meeting was held to discuss that particular problem, to discuss Congressman Steele's trip in April, and Dr. Jaffe's: trip in late June. Congressman Steele told Dr. Jaffe and the others at the luncheon that he recognized that the President's program had resulted in progress being made in reducing the heroin usage among U. S. servicemen in Vietnam, and pointed to the figures that Dr. Jaffe reported to some of you out in San Clemente when he briefed on this recent trip. His survey taken during his trip showed heroin usage at less than five percent -- I think 4.5 was the percentage he gave -- in comparison with figures given Congressman Steele in April, which were 10 to 15 percent.

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Q Do you think the difference represents a change in the degree of heroin usage or a different statistical base?

MR. WARREN: I am not expert in this, but I would think that the statistical base certainly would have something to do with it. I think Dr. Jaffe said as much when he briefed in San Clemente. Obviously, the time difference between the two trips has a great deal to do with it.

After Congressman Steele's trip the President announced his program of urinalysis for returning service-men and the treatment plans. That was on June 18. The program of urinalysis and checking of outgoing service-men from Vietnam does provide a statistical base that was not provided before.

Q Jerry, what do you mean when you said that Congressman Steele pointed to Dr. Jaffe's figures? Did he point to them in the same way that he did publicly last week when he said they were far too low?

MR. WARREN: As I said, it was a very constructive meeting. He pointed to them in discussing the progress that has been made since the President announced his program for servicemen.

Q Jerry, Congressman Steele also publicly named some South Vietnamese officials as being involved in illicit drug traffic. Did he discuss that?

MR. WARREN: To the best of my knowledge, that did not come up at this meeting.

Q Has the White House pursued the information that Congressman Steele has gotten in this matter?

MR. WARREN: Ron has responded to questions on that, Gene, and I have nothing to add to what he said.

Q Jerry, in late May and in early June Congressman Steele was distinctly and publicly unhappy with the White House reaction to his findings. Today we seem to have a different atmosphere. Has there been some understanding reached between Congressman Steele, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Krogh and the other people he dealt with earlier?

MR. WARREN: I think this luncheon today was evidence of an understanding between the White House and Congressman Steele. The White House certainly appreciates the work that Congressman Steele has done in alerting the public to this problem. Dr. Jaffe looks forward to working with Congressman Steele and to cooperating in moving the President's legislative program through Congress.

Those are all the announcements we have of this afternoon.

Q Jerry, there is a report that the Administration is preparing legislation to send to Congress to end the rail strike. Can you tell us about that?

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MR. WARREN: No. I have no information to give you on that from here. I understand from the Labor Department that meetings went on until a late hour last night and will continue.

Q Jerry, what sort of meeting is Ron in?

MR. WARREN: He is in a staff meeting at the present, Gene. He is going to try to get down and talk to you about some of the activities of the President at Camp David. But he was tied up in this meeting and asked me to come down.

Q When?

MR. WARREN: I just don't know.

Q Today?

MR. WARREN: Yes.

Q Jerry, back on this lunch with Steele. When you say that Congressman Steele pointed to Dr. Jaffe's figures, did he specifically accept those figures as being reliable, or did he continue to question them?

MR. WARREN: I don't know that he continued to question them, but I think both Dr. Jaffe and Congressman Steele recognized the need to work harder on the problem and to get more statistics to feed into this statistical base. There was not a disagreement about the figures at the luncheon.

Q Jerry, what was the understanding, then? You say the meeting was an understanding.

MR. WARREN: They understand the scope of the problem and the needs that the country faces in meeting this problem.

Q But do you say that Steele accepted Dr. Jaffe's figures?

MR. WARREN: I think he accepts the figures based on the statistics that we have now. You must remember that Congressman Steele was given his figures in April by military officials in Vietnam. As we said earlier, obviously there was not the statistical base at that time that there is now.

Q Did the Labor Department also say that as a contingency, if the meetings don't bring a settlement, they are preparing legislation which they will send up?

MR. WARREN: No, they didn't say that. We didn't discuss that.

Q Jerry, you indicated this morning that this afternoon might be a better time to ask whether the President planned any public appearances between now and his Saturday trip.

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1114

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:15 A.M. EDT

JULY 27, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The schedule for today has been posted. The President, I believe, is still meeting with Alfred P. Chamie, the Commander of the American Legion.

The Commander has recently returned from the Middle East and Europe, and earlier he took a trip to Vietnam, so he is reporting to the President on his visits to those parts of the world.

As most of you may know from reading the papers, Commander Chamie supported the President's initiative in relation to his announcement regarding the People's Republic of China, so I would call that to your attention also.

The President will meet with Ambassador Soedjatmoko of Indonesia. He is returning to Indonesia from his post as Ambassador here.

At 11:45 the President will present the first strike of the silver Eisenhower Dollar to Mrs. Mamie Eisenhower. There will be a photo opportunity and press coverage of that.

Tomorrow the President will go to Capitol Hill to participate in the ceremony unveiling portraits of Congressman Taber and Congressman Cannon.

John Taber was the 22nd Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, and Clarence Cannon was the 23rd Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

The President is participating in the ceremony unveiling the portraits of these two chairmen at the invitation of Congressman Mahon, who is the 24th Chairman of the Appropriations Committee. Portraits of all previous chairmen of the committee, with the exception of Congressmen Taber and Cannon, hang in the committee room. These two portraits will be added to the collection.

We will take a pool from here, and there will be full press coverage. The ceremony will take place in Statuary Hall on the House side.

The President will have brief remarks and there will also be remarks by Congressman Mahon and Congressman Bow, the ranking Republican on the committee. Speaker Albert and Congressman Ford will also be there. The President will return to the White House at about 2:30.

Q What time will he go?

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1115

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

4:30 P.M. EDT

JULY 27, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. WARREN: The President has had a series of appointments with Members of Congress and some of their constituents this afternoon, and we will post a list of those appointments. The appointments are over now.

We will post tomorrow's schedule following this session.

At 10:00 a.m. the President will deliver greetings to participants in the Boys' Nation of the American Legion, who will be gathered in the State Dining Room. The boys will have completed a tour of the White House at that time.

The Boys' Nation, which, of course, is sponsored by the American Legion, is being held at American University. It is a week-long event. It began last Friday and ends this next Friday.

Then, as Ron announced, at about 1:30 tomorrow the President will go to the Capitol where he will participate in the ceremony unveiling portraits of Congressmen Tauber and Cannon, both former chairmen of the House Appropriations Committee. He will return to the White House at about 2:30.

At 2:45 the President will meet with the Vice President and Secretary Rogers. Vice President Agnew returns to Andrews about 2:05 tomorrow, where he will be met by Secretary Rogers. The President will meet with the Vice President as soon as the President returns from the Capitol.

At 3:30 the President will meet with the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph S. Farland, who is home on consultations.

You have one release, which has been corrected. The President today announced his intention to nominate Richard Schubert to be Solicitor for the Labor Department, to succeed Peter G. Nash. The position pays $38,000.

We will post the delegation accompanying Counsellor Finch to the funeral services for President Tubman of Liberia. The delegation will include Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Congressman from Michigan, Chairman of the Black Caucus; Mr. Raymond C. Firestone, President of the Firestone Company; Assistant Secretary Samuel C. Jackson, Department of Housing and Urban Development; W. Beverly Carter, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; and Mr. Roy Wilkins, Director of the NAACP.

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Ambassador and Mrs. Peal from Liberia will accom-
pany the delegation. That is Edward Peal, Liberian Ambas-
sador to the United States.

Q When do they leave?

MR. WARREN: They leave this evening from Andrews.
The services are at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday in Monrovia.

Those are all of the announcements we have.

Q Is the 10:00 o'clock talk by the President
going to be open for coverage tomorrow?

MR. WARREN: I will check that. I think so.

Q Is he going to see the Vice President?

MR. WARREN: We will have a picture of it.

Q Will there be a ceremony at the airport?

MR. WARREN: I do not know of any ceremony, as such,
but Secretary Rogers will be there to greet him, and other
Members of the Cabinet. There will be some of the Diplomatic
Corps.

Q You don't expect them to have remarks?

MR. WARREN: I really do not know.

Q Was Ambassador Farland recalled to discuss
the Bengali situation?

MR. WARREN: No, he is just home on normal con-
sultations. I am sure he will be discussing the matters
there, but he is home on consultation. You can check the
State Department for further information on that, though.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 4:37 P.M. EDT)

#1115

## TEXT OF THE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

In dealing with the problem of the representation of China, the United Nations should take cognizance of the existence of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China and reflect that incontestable reality in the manner by which it makes provision for China's representation. In so doing the United Nations should not be required to take a position on the respective conflicting claims of the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China pending a peaceful resolution of the matter as called for by the Charter.

Thus the People's Republic of China should be represented and at the same time provision should be made that the Republic of China is not deprived of its representation. If it is to succeed in its peacekeeping role and in advancing the well-being of mankind, the United Nations should deal with the question of the representation of China in a just and realistic manner.

## Mr. Williams Named Coordinator of U.S. Relief to East Pakistan

Press release 179 dated August 13

Secretary Rogers announced on August 13 that Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, had been designated to coordinate all United States Government relief assistance to East Pakistan.

Worldwide efforts to avert major famine in East Pakistan and to create conditions which will facilitate the return to East Pakistan of refugees now in India are being directed by the United Nations. United States assistance is being provided through the United Nations.

Last fall, Mr. Williams was appointed head of an Interdepartmental Working Group on East Pakistan Disaster Relief to coordinate relief measures for the areas in East Pakistan stricken by the cyclone disaster of November 1970. The responsibilities of this group are being expanded.

President Nixon on August 11 charged Mr. Williams to give the highest priority to the humanitarian relief program in a massive and all-out effort.

Mr. Williams accompanied Secretary Rogers to New York on August 9 for extensive meetings with United Nations Secretary General U Thant and senior U.N. and specialized agency officials.

The Departments of State and Agriculture and other interested agencies are represented on the interdepartmental working group, as well as AID.

## Assistant Secretary Sisco Concludes Visit to Israel

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco visited Israel July 23-August 6. Following is a statement by Mr. Sisco made at Tel Aviv August 5.

I first want to thank the Israeli Government and the Israeli people for the warm welcome I have received throughout my visit. I have enjoyed this unhurried stay. I leave early tomorrow morning to report to my Government on my talks here on all aspects of Israeli-American relations with your Prime Minister and other officials of the Israeli Government. The talks were practical and concrete in nature and were held in the spirit of openness and friendship.

In particular, I explored with your Government a number of ideas relevant to an interim Suez Canal agreement. This was an in-depth discussion, exploratory in nature. I expected no decisive breakthroughs; none were achieved. We each know more clearly the limits, the possibilities, the perils, and the opportunities which exist in the present situation in the area. While there are differences between the sides still to be resolved, we believe that a practical basis for future progress on an interim Suez Canal agreement can be achieved.

Saturday, August 7, will mark 1 year of ceasefire resulting from an American initiative last year. In this connection, there is one simple

September 6, 1971

259

message that I wish to leave with the Israeli Government and with the Israeli people: An interim Suez Canal settlement continues to be the best way to assure that relative quiet will continue and spare people of the area the anguish and heartbreak of loss of lives. The United States will continue its effort to achieve an interim Suez Canal agreement also because it would constitute a practical test of peace that in time could help move matters toward an overall settlement in accordance with the November 1967 resolution of the U.N. Security Council. Thank you very much.

## Senator Baker Studies Environment Attitudes of Developing Countries

The Department of State announced on August 11 (press release 173) that Senator Howard H. Baker, of Tennessee, was to make an 18-day fact-finding tour from August 20 to September 6 of several European, African, and Asian nations to discuss preparations for the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment to be held in Stockholm next June. Senator Baker is Chairman of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on the U.N. conference and a delegate to the meeting. He planned to visit several developing nations to discuss environmental problems shared by them with developed countries of the world.

Senator Baker said: "The 1972 U.N. conference has the potential to be a landmark in achievement, but such goals can only be attained if the developing member nations of the U.N. choose to participate to the fullest extent in this collective effort to save man's environment. The contention that an environmental agreement of any significance would directly or indirectly retard the economic growth of the developing nations must be dispelled prior to Stockholm if the meeting is to produce the agreements hoped for."

Maurice Strong, Secretary General of the conference, has worked diligently to enable the less developed countries to air their views on this subject by scheduling four regional economic seminars, in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Following briefings by the U.N. Conference Secretariat in Geneva, Senator Baker was to travel to Addis Ababa, where he expected to meet with members of the Ethiopian Government and delegates to a seminar convened by the Economic Commission for Africa. He then planned to travel to India to meet with officials concerned with environmental matters, before proceeding to Bangkok, where he hoped to meet with delegates to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which recently concluded 2 weeks of meetings. Then Senator Baker was to return to Washington to report to Secretary Rogers on the trip and make recommendations regarding U.S. policy on development and the environment.

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FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT NIXON AT
OPENING OF PRESS CONFERENCE MORNING AUGUST 4

QUOTE

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I WANTED TO BEGIN THIS WITH A BRIEF RESUME OF THE CONVERSATION I HAVE JUST HAD WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, BECAUSE I KNOW THE SUBJECT WILL PROBABLY COME UP IN ANY EVENT.

THIS IS IN REGARD TO THE PAKISTAN REFUGEE SITUATION,
TO RECAP WHAT WE HAVE DONE. INSOFAR AS THE REFUGEES,
WHO ARE IN INDIA ARE CONFERRED, WE HAVE PROVIDED DOLS 70

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PAGE 02 STATE 141616

MILLION TO DATE FOR THE REFUGEES, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO PROVIDE MORE. THAT, INCIDENTALLY, IS MORE THAN ALL THE REST OF THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD PUT TOGETHER, SO IT IS: A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT.

AS FAR AS THOSE IN EAST PAKISTAN THEMSELVES ARE CONCERNED, WHEREAS YOU KNOW THERE ARE PROSPECTS OF FAMINE, IN THE EVENT THAT THE CROP REPORTS ARE AS BAD AS THEY SEEM TO BE, AT THIS TIME WE HAVE 360,000 TONS OF GRAIN READY FOR SHIPMENT THERE. WE HAVE ALSO ALLOTTED DOLS 3 MILLION FOR THE CHARTERING OF SHIPS FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING THE GRAIN INTO THE OVERCROWDED PORTS.

AS A FURTHER STEP, THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS WORKED OUT WITH MY VERY STRONG APPROVAL A PLAN TO GO TO THE UNITED NATIONS NEXT WEEK TO TALK TO THE RESPONSIBLE AND APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING THE U. N. HIGH COMMISSIONER IN THAT OFFICE, TO SEE WHAT ADDITIONAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN ON BOTH FRONTS TO HELP THE REFUGEES IN INDIA FROM EAST PAKISTAN, AND ALSO TO HELP THOSE WHO ARE IN EAST PAKISTAN AND ARE PRESENTLY CONFRONTING FAMINE SITUATIONS.

WITH REGARD TO A PROBLEM THAT WAS ADDRESSED BY THE HOUSE YESTERDAY, WE DO NOT FAVOR THE IDEA THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CUT OFF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. TO DO SO WOULD SIMPLY AGGRAVATE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE ABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN TO WORK WITH THE U.N., AS IT PRESENTLY HAS INDICATED IT IS WILLING TO DO SO IN DISTRIBUTING THE FOOD SUPPLIES, ITS ABILITY TO CREATE SOME STABILITY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED.

WE FEEL THAT THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WE CAN PLAY IS TO CONTINUE OUR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO WEST PAKISTAN AND, THEREBY TO BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN A WAY THAT WILL DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF HUNGER IN EAST PAKISTAN WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE REFUGEE FLOW INTO INDIA, AND WHICH WILL, WE TRUST, IN THE FUTURE LOOK TOWARD A VIABLE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

WE ARE NOT GOING TO ENGAGE IN PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THE

UNCLASSIFIED

1118

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, AUGUST 9, 1971

and Services to which Tradem are Applied as revised
at Stockholm July 14, 1967.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable
consideration to this Agreement.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House

August 3, 1971

Busing of Schoolchildren

Statement by the President. August 3, 1971

The Justice Department is today announcing the Gov-
ernment's decision to take an appeal on limited constitu-
tional grounds in the case of the *United States* v.
*Austin Independent School District*, involving school
desegregation.

The Attorney General advises me that he must appeal
the District Court's decision that the school board's plan
to bus children periodically for interracial experiences

eliminates the school system, because that decision
is inconsistent with recent rulings of the United States
Supreme Court. The Justice Department is not appealing
to impose the HEW plan. In the process of the appeal, the
Justice Department will disavow that plan on behalf of
the Government.

I would also like to restate my position as it relates to
busing. I am against busing as that term is commonly used
in school desegregation cases. I have consistently opposed
the busing of our Nation's schoolchildren to achieve a
racial balance, and I am opposed to the busing of chil-
dren simply for the sake of busing. Further, while the exec-
utive branch will continue to enforce the orders of the
court, including court-ordered busing, I have instructed
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare that they are to work with individual
school districts to hold busing to the minimum required
by law.

Finally, I have today instructed the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare to draft and submit today to the
Congress an amendment to the proposed Emergency
School Assistance Act that will expressly prohibit the ex-
penditure of any of those funds for busing.

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
AUGUST 4, 1971

PAKISTANI REFUGEES

THE PRESIDENT. Ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to begin this with a
brief résumé of the conversation I have just had with the Secretary of
State because I know the subject will probably come up in any event.

This is in regard to the Pakistan refugee situation, to recap what
we have done. Insofar as the refugees, who are in India are concerned,
we have provided $70 million to date for the refugees and we are pre-
pared to provide more. That, incidentally, is more than all the rest of
the nations of the world put together, so it is a substantial amount.

As far as those in East Pakistan themselves are concerned, whereas
you know there are prospects of famine, in the event that the crop reports
are as bad as they seem to be, at this time we have 360,000 tons of grain
ready for shipment there. We have also allotted $3 million for the char-
tering of ships for the purpose of getting the grain into the overcrowded
ports.

As a further step, the Secretary of State has worked out with my
very strong approval a plan to go to the United Nations next week to
talk to the responsible and appropriate members of the United Nations,
including the U.N. High Commissioner in that office, to see what addi-
tional steps can be taken on both fronts to help the refugees in India
from East Pakistan and also to help those who are in East Pakistan and
are presently confronting famine situations.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, AUGUST 1971

1119

With regard to a problem that was addressed by the House yesterday, we do not favor the idea that the United States should cut off economic assistance to Pakistan. To do so would simply aggravate the refugee problem because it would mean that the ability of the Government of Pakistan to work with the U.N., as it presently has indicated it is willing to do so in distributing the food supplies, its ability to create some stability would be seriously jeopardized.

We feel that the most constructive role we can play is to continue our economic assistance to West Pakistan [Government of Pakistan] and thereby to be able to influence the course of events in a way that will deal with the problem of hunger in East Pakistan which would reduce the refugee flow into India and which will, we trust, in the future look toward a viable political settlement.

We are not going to engage in public pressure on the Government of West Pakistan. That would be totally counterproductive. These are matters that we will discuss only in private channels.

## QUESTIONS

### THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us any more about your forthcoming trip to China, when it is likely to occur, and can you give us your assessment of what effect you think this will have on ending the war in Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT. As far as the timing is concerned, I cannot add to what I said in the original announcement. It will be before May 1. The time will be worked out sometime within the next 2 to 3 months, I would assume, and a considerable amount of preparatory activity must take place, setting up the agenda, setting up the numbers in the official party.

These are matters, of course, that must be discussed and worked out before the time of the visit is finally announced.

Second, and I know a number of you are interested in who is going, that is a matter still to be decided. It was raised by Dr. Kissinger and by Premier Chou En-lai in their conversations, and will be worked out by mutual agreement.

As far as our party is concerned, it will be a small working party. The only ones that presently are definitely going are, of course, the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger and myself. Beyond that, whatever others will be added will be determined by mutual agreement between the parties concerned.

Now, as to the effect the visit will have and the conversations will have on Vietnam, I will not speculate on that subject. I will only say that as the joint announcement indicated, this will be a wide-ranging discussion of issues concerning both governments. It is not a discussion that is going to lead to instant detente.

What it really is, is moving, as we have moved, I believe, in the situation with regard to the Soviet Union, from an era of confrontation without communication to an era of negotiations with discussion. It does not mean that we go into these meetings on either side with any illusions about

the wide differences that we have. Our interests are very different, and both sides recognize this, in the talks that Dr. Kissinger had, very extended talks he had with Premier Chou En-lai. We do not expect that these talks will settle all of those differences.

What is important is that we will have opened communication to see where our differences are irreconcilable to see that they can be settled peacefully, and to find those areas where the United States, which today is the most powerful nation in the world, can find an agreement with the most populous nation in the world which potentially in the future could become the most powerful nation in the world.

As we look at the peace in the world for the balance of this century, and for that matter the next century, we must recognize that there cannot be world peace on which all the peoples in the world can rely, and in which they have such a great stake, unless there is communication between and some negotiation between these two great superpowers, the People's Republic and the United States.

I have put this in general terms because that is the understanding of the People's Republic, Premier Chou En-lai, and it is our understanding that our agenda will be worked out at a later point; before the trip it will be very carefully worked out so that the discussions will deal with the hard problems as well as the easy ones.

We expect to make some progress, but to speculate about what progress will be made on any particular issue, to speculate, for example, as to what effect this might have on Vietnam, would not serve the interests of constructive talks.

### ALL-ASIAN CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM?

Q. Can I ask a related policy question on Vietnam?
THE PRESIDENT. Sure.

Q. There have been some suggestions, including some indirect hints from China, that a negotiating forum involving an Asian conference to be held in Asia, primarily with Asian participants but the United States as well,

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might be a better forum for negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. Can you speak to that?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Bailey, the question of whether there should be an all-Asian conference, with the Government of the People's Republic participating, as you know, has risen several times over the past few months, and was raised before our announcement was made.

As far as we are concerned, we will consider any proposal that might contribute to a more peaceful situation in the Pacific and in the world. However, at this point there is no understanding between the United States and the People's Republic as to whether or not out of this meeting should come that kind of proposal.

Let me say on that score, there were no conditions asked for on either side, and none accepted. There were no deals made on either side or accepted, none offered and none accepted. This is a discussion which will take place with both sides knowing in advance that there are problems, but with both sides well prepared. This is the secret of any successful summit meeting.

As you know, parenthetically, I have always taken somewhat of a dim view of summitry when it comes in an unprepared form. But both sides will be well prepared, well in advance, on all points of major difference, and we will discuss any points of difference that could affect the peace of the world.

## THE SOVIET UNION

Q. Mr. President, is there any diplomatic reason you might not visit the Soviet Union before going to Peking? That was suggested.

THE PRESIDENT. In view of the announcement we have made on our visit to Peking, that will be the first visit that I will make. Obviously, it takes a great deal of time to prepare a visit and to attempt now to visit—and the Soviet Union, I am sure, feels exactly the same way— to attempt to rush around and have a summit meeting in Moscow before we go to Peking would not be in the interest of either country.

I would add this point, too: When Foreign Minister Gromyko was here, we discussed the possibility of a possible summit meeting, and we had a very candid discussion. He agreed and said that his government leaders agreed with my position, which was that a meeting at the highest level should take place and would be useful only when there was something substantive to discuss that could not be handled in other channels.

With regard to the Soviets, I should also point out that we are making very significant progress on Berlin. We are making good progress on SALT. Discussions are still continuing on the Mideast, although there I will not speculate about what the prospects for success are in view of the fact that Mr. Sisco is presently in the area exploring with the governments concerned what the possibilities of some interim settlement looking toward a final settlement may be.

Having mentioned these three areas in which we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, I will add that if the time comes, as it may come, and both sides realize this, then the final breakthrough in any of these areas can take place only at the highest level, and then there will be a meeting. But as far as the timing of the meeting before the visit to Peking, that would not be an appropriate thing to do.

## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Q. I was thinking of such a thing as a settlement on the SALT talks.

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Theis, when I said there was good progress being made on SALT, it is still a very technical and sticky problem for both sides because it involves our vital interests. Let me emphasize that in SALT, both sides are asked to make an agreement which limits that. This is not unilateral. We, on our part, will be having very severe limitations with regard to our defensive capability, the ABM. They, on their part, will have limitations on their offensive capability, their buildup of offensive missiles.

Neither side can make those decisions lightly, without very, very basic discussions, but the fact that we have at the highest level committed ourselves to working toward an agreement simultaneously this year on both those issues, and the fact that since the talks at Helsinki began that we have made progress, gives hope that we are going to make an arrangement.

But to speculate that maybe we are going to get that done before we go to Peking, I think, would be ill-advised.

## PARIS PEACE TALKS

Q. Mr. President, why have you not accepted the Vietcong proposals after all these weeks of probing, or given some formal reply?

THE PRESIDENT. I have noted some criticism in the press about the fact that Ambassador Bruce had to leave August 1st. Incidentally, I am most grateful that he stayed an extra month, because his doctor got hold of me and said he should have left July 1st. In any event, his having left August 1st, and Mr. Porter not being able to arrive until the latter part of August, there has been some speculation and, I understand this, criticism in the press and the Senate and the House that the administration is not interested in negotiating a settlement, that we are not considering the various proposals that have been made by the VC and North Vietnamese.

Now, just so the members of the press will not get out on a limb with regard to predicting what we are or are not doing, let me make one statement and then I will go no further.

We are very actively pursuing negotiations on Vietnam in established channels. The record, when it finally comes out, will answer all the critics as far as the activity of this Government in pursuing negotiations in established channels. It would not be useful to negotiate in the newspapers if we want to have those negotiations succeed.

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I am not predicting that the negotiations will succeed. I am saying, however, that as far as the United States is concerned, we have gone and are going the extra mile on negotiations in established channels. You can interpret that any way you want, but do not interpret it in a way that indicates that the United States is missing this opportunity or that opportunity or another one, to negotiate.

## SOUTH VIETNAM ELECTION

Q. Mr. President, one of the points being mentioned in the comments on the negotiations is the election in South Vietnam this fall. Is that a factor that does have some bearing on the pace of the negotiations?

THE PRESIDENT. It has certainly in terms of the North Vietnamese. As you know, the stumbling block for them in negotiations really is the political settlement. As they look at the election this fall, they feel that unless that election comes out in a way that a candidate they can support, or at least that they are not as much against as they are President Thieu, but unless it comes out that way, it will be very difficult for them to have a negotiated settlement.

With regard to the elections, let me emphasize our position. Our position is one of complete neutrality in these elections. Under Ambassador Bunker's skillful direction, we have made it clear to all parties concerned that we are not supporting any candidate, that we will accept the verdict of the people of South Vietnam.

I have noted, for example, that President Thieu has invited observers to come from other nations to witness the election. I hope observers do go. I think they will find, I hope they will find, as they did when they observed previous elections in Vietnam, that by most standards they were fair.

As far as observers from this country are concerned, we have, of course, several Members of the Senate and others that have indicated a desire to go. We, of course, have no objection to that. We want a fair election and we, of course, have some observers on the scene in the person of the Ambassador and his staff who will watch that election.

## THE STOCK MARKET AND THE ECONOMY

Q. Mr. President, the last time you gave some stock market advice to us, it turned out pretty well. What would you do now, buy or sell?

THE PRESIDENT. With regard to the stock market, I suppose my advice should not be given much weight because I am not in the market. It is so easy to make predictions where your own assets are not involved.

I will say this: I would not sell the United States economy short at this point. And long term, I would not be selling my investments in the American economy whether it is in stocks or real estate or what have you, selling them in a panicky way.

The stock market has come up, even at its present level of 850, 230 points since I made that prediction. I can

only say that my long-range prediction for this economy is still what I said at the first of this year.

At the first of this year, when the very same people had written—and I have read the news magazines and business magazines—and not, of course, any of the columns you had written this week—but I heard all the rest this week, and the gloomy predictions about the economy and it is going down and there is nothing good about it. I read them also for November of last year, exactly the same gloominess and same words, and so forth.

I said then, and I think all of you were present then, I thought 1971 would be a good year for the economy, and 1972 would be a very good year. I stand by that. When we look at the first half of this year, it is not what people say about the economy, it is what they do about it that counts.

GNP is up a record $52 billion. Retail sales now in June—and the first indications as far as July are concerned, it will stay at this level—are at record highs. Consumer spending is at a record high. Construction, particularly in housing, are near record highs. Inventories—and this is another indication of what will happen to the future for those who may be thinking of investing their money in businesses—inventories are abnormally low in view of the high level of retail sales.

What this tells me is that there is a lot of steam in the boiler in this economy, and you cannot continue to have high retail sales and low inventories without eventually starting to rebuild. Therefore, my projection for the balance of this year is that the economy will continue to move up as it has moved up in the first half.

That doesn't mean that there will not be aberrations in the monthly figures. It does mean, however, that the economy has a great deal of strength in it. This is a period when it is absorbing almost 2 million people who have been let out of defense plants and the Armed Forces and is absorbing that with a lower rate of unemployment than was the case in 1961, 1962, 1963, which were the last three peacetime years before Vietnam when the unemployment rate, as you recall, averaged 6 percent.

## ECONOMIC POLICY

Q. Mr. President, in that connection, to continue that, does that mean that you are still resolutely opposed to any incomes policy or, specifically, wage-price controls?

THE PRESIDENT. I think, Peter, it is well to identify incomes policies and wage-price controls for what they are and what they are not, because, as a matter of fact—and this gives me an opportunity to set the record straight with regard to some greatly blown up differences that I am supposed to have with my very good friend Arthur Burns, and perhaps you were too polite to ask that direct question—

Q. Well, I will ask it.

THE PRESIDENT. I thought that would be the followup, so I anticipated it. Let me get at it this way:

Arthur Burns, in terms of monetary policy and in terms of fiscal policy, has followed a course that I think is the

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most responsible and statesmanlike of any Chairman of the Federal Reserve in my memory. In other words, you have seen an expansionary monetary policy, and that is one of the reasons we have had an expansionary economy in the first 6 months of this year.

He has also stood firmly with this administration in its responsible fiscal policy, resisting, for example, spending above what the economy would produce at full capacity. He has strongly supported me in those efforts.

That brings me to an area where he has taken a very unfair shot. Within this administration, the Office of Budget and Management, on a reorganization plan 2 months ago, recommended that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, because he basically is our central banker, should be raised to the same status of the central bankers abroad. I enthusiastically approved the idea. However, when the matter was raised with Dr. Burns by my associates, he indicated that neither he nor any other individual in a high position in Government should take a salary increase at a time that the President was going to have to take some strong measures, as I am going to take to limit salary increases in other areas of Government, including, for example, blue collar workers.

So, consequently, while there is not any question but that the Federal Reserve position will eventually be raised to the Level I position that was recommended, Arthur Burns and, incidentally, George Shultz, who is also on this list as a recommendation of the Ash Council, Arthur Burns and George Shultz being the responsible men that they were, asked that there not be an example set by them of a pay increase which would make it very difficult for us to deal effectively and responsibly with pay increases in other sectors of the Government. So we find that Burns agrees—that I agree with Burns, let's put it that way, very strongly on his monetary policy, on his fiscal policy, the question he has raised with regard to an incomes policy.

When we talk about an incomes policy, let's see what he is not for. He is unalterably opposed, as I am, to the Galbraith scheme, which is supported by many of our Democratic Senators, I understand, of permanent wage and price controls. Permanent wage and price controls in America would stifle the American economy, its dynamism, its productivity, and would be, I think, a mortal blow to the United States as a first-class economic power.

On the other hand, it is essential that Government use its power where it can be effective to stop the escalation or at least temper the escalation in the wage-price spiral. That is why we moved on construction, and we have been somewhat successful, from 16 down to 9 percent. That is why we moved to roll back an oil price recently.

As far as the two recent settlements, the one in railroads and the one in steel, on the plus side, the fact that they were settled was positive; the fact, too, that in the case of railroads, they spoke to the problem of productivity by modification of work rules, and the fact that the steel settlement also spoke to the problem of produc-

tivity by setting up productivity councils, that was constructive.

On the other hand, I would be less than candid if I were not to say, and I know the leaders of the steel and railroad industry know this, that this kind of settlement where a wage increase leads to a price increase, and particularly in steel, where the industry is already noncompetitive with foreign imports, is not in the interest of America, not in the interest of labor, and not in the interest of industry.

Dr. Burns, without being completely specific, has only suggested the idea should be considered. That is why Secretary Connally said we welcome the move by several Republican Senators to hold hearings concerning wage and price supports. That is why Dr. Burns said we should move to attempt to temper these increases.

The problem here is, how can we move without putting the American economy in a straightjacket? In other words, as Secretary Connally raised the question in his statement this morning, "Are we to have criminal penalties?" Are, for example, the wage-price guidelines to affect all the industries down to the neighborhood filling station or the grocery store or the meat market, as the case might be, or will they affect only major industries?

As far as this administration is concerned, I can say this: I have asked the Secretary of Labor to bring to my attention every major wage-price negotiation which may be coming up in the future, and I will use the power of this office to the extent it can be effective to see that those negotiations are as responsible as possible.

On September 21st, we will have a meeting of our Productivity Commission, and subject A in that meeting will be this same problem because as we look at America's trade balances, which have deteriorated over the past 10 years, but as we look at America's competitive position, it is essential that American industry and American labor sit down together and determine whether, at a time when we are in a race, we no longer can be number one simply because we were that big and that strong after World War I, whether we determine we are going to get out of the race or whether we are going to tighten our belts and be responsible in wage-price decisions so that we can continue to be competitive in the world.

That speaks to the problem of an incomes policy, this meeting that we will have. The only question of difference between Arthur Burns, and some Senators have raised this question, is the degree to which, in tackling these individual wage settlements, we have compulsion, we have criminal penalties. I don't think they want compulsion or criminal penalties.

Then the question is: How far will persuasion go? Our record shows that in most countries abroad that have tried it, except for very small countries that are tightly controlled, persuasion alone will work for only 3 to 4 months.

So as far as we are concerned, I am glad to consider recommendations for tackling the problem. I will tackle them, and I am serving notice now that we are going to take up the problem with the Productivity Commission.

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We are going to look at each individual settlement in major industries where there is going to be wage-price negotiations, and use the influence we can to keep them in line, and in addition to that, we will consider a recommendation on wage-price boards. But I will reject it if I find, and I have yet to find any recommendation that did not have this ingredient in it, if I find that it would impose a new bureaucracy with enormous criminal powers, to fasten itself on the American economy. That, I think, would do far more harm than good.

## THE STEEL INDUSTRY

Q. In the same line to follow up that question, if the settlement in the steel industry and particularly the raise in prices which was recently announced is not good for the country and not good for labor and management, why do you not call in the leaders of the steel industry and use your influence to get them to change the increase in prices and then if necessary other parts of the settlement which are so inimical to the country?

THE PRESIDENT. Calling in the steel industry and getting them to change would not be effective. As you may recall, in one instance earlier this year, we were able to get a steel rollback. That had a temporary beneficial effect. But at a time that the steel industry has negotiated a settlement of this nature, at a time when its profits at 2½ percent are the lowest of any major industry, to tell the steel industry that after they have negotiated a settlement they must roll back their price and run at a loss is simply unrealistic. They are not going to do it.

The longer term answer here is for the steel industry—and this is what we have addressed ourselves to—and the labor to recognize that now that they have had their settlement, now that labor has gotten a good increase, an increase consistent with aluminum and others, now that steel found it necessary to raise prices that this may be good temporarily for both but in the long run it will simply mean less steel sold and less jobs and that is why we are zeroing in on the productivity side because increases in productivity can be the only answer where a wage increase of this kind takes place.

## WAGES FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Q. Mr. President, a minute ago you mentioned something about doing something about wages for Government employees.

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, one of the problems, difficult problems, I confronted last year and that I will confront again this year, is a recommendation to increase the wages for blue collar workers within the Government. I have examined that situation and I have determined that an increase in the blue collar wage scale would not be in the interests of our fighting the inflation battle.

Speaking to the same point, we have a situation with regard to the Congress and some of its appropriations bills. We are trying to keep our budget within the full employment limits for 1972.

The Congress already has exceeded our budget by $5.4 billion. That includes mandatory spending which they have imposed upon us and additions to the appropriations bills. Before they get through with the appropriations process I hope that comes down.

But that will be highly inflationary unless the Congress speaks to that problem more effectively. What I was indicating, in other words, Herb, I am indicating in advance the decision that I do not intend to approve the wage increase relative to the blue collar workers in the Government. Under those circumstances, I could not, of course, approve an increase in salaries for people as underpaid basically as Dr. Burns is, considering what he could get on the outside or Dr. Shultz is, considering what he could get on the outside.

Q. How many people are there in the blue collar area?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't have that but it is a significant number. Incidentally, I think it is an equitable decision because they have had some substantial increases in the past. It is a question of whether we just continue for a short time.

## WAGE-PRICE GUIDELINES

Q. Sir, you also mentioned guidelines in a manner that suggested that you might accept the concept of numerical guidelines, did you mean to suggest that?

THE PRESIDENT. No. What I meant to say was that my study of the situation indicates that guidelines in this country have always failed. They have never worked. Guidelines in other industrial countries including Canada, for example, and Britain, have worked only for a short time and then have fallen because guidelines basically connote voluntary compliance and voluntary compliance goes on only for a brief time.

Now, as far as what I am saying, it is that our approach at this time is a selective one to take those particular industries that are coming up for bargaining and to use our influence as effectively as we can to see that those settlements are responsible.

Secondly, that as far as a wage-price board is concerned, that it would be considered favorably only if the hearings that are going to be taken in this field, only if the hearings can convince me that enforcing an incomes policy could be accomplished without stifling the economy.

It is the problem, in other words, of enforcement, because I come back to this fundamental proposition: I have yet to find except for the extremists on the left—and I don't say this in a condemning way; it is only an observation—but the extremists on the left of the economy spectrum have always favored a totally government-controlled economy.

They believe that. I don't believe it. They believe that we should have permanent wage and price controls and that government should determine what wages should be and what prices should be. I don't believe that. Dr. Burns does not believe that if you have read his speeches over the years. He is a strong opponent of that.

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The question is, how can we address ourselves to the problem of wages and prices without having those mandatory criminal penalty features which would lead us to something we all are trying to avoid. This is why this is a matter for discussion.

It is not one yet for decision but I will continue to work on individual settlements as I have said.

Q. Mr. President, would it be fair to say, then, that in view of what you said there and what you said earlier that you will consider recommendations of the wage and price board, that you are giving renewed and perhaps more favorable consideration to some form of wage-price board, assuming that they don't have penalties?

THE PRESIDENT. No. I am saying that I shall continue the policy of moving aggressively on individual settlements on a case-by-case basis. Secondly, I will address this particular problem in a meeting with the major leaders of American industry and American labor at the Productivity Commission meeting on September 21. Third, with regard to wage-price boards, I have still not been convinced that we can move in that direction and be effective. However, Secretary Connally, in his statement this morning, raised all the questions that should be raised on that. As far as we are concerned, we have an open mind in terms of examining the various proposals to see if there is a new approach which we may not have thought of.

I have serious doubts that they will find such a new approach, but I do want to indicate that we will examine it because we all agree that the wage-price spiral is a significant danger to this expanding economy. The question is, what do we do about it, without going all the way to a totally controlled economy.

## PROGRESS AGAINST INFLATION

Q. Mr. President, Dr. Burns, before the Joint Economic Committee, said he didn't think we were making much progress against inflation. Do you think we are?

THE PRESIDENT. I read Dr. Burns statement quite carefully. What he was saying is what I would say. I would say it with regard to inflation and unemployment. I am never satisfied and never will be satisfied, and anybody in the free economy is never satisfied and should never be satisfied with anything except perfection.

That doesn't mean that we are going to reach perfection. With regard to inflation, I will just point to the numbers. Inflation, which, of course, was boiling along when we came into office in January of 1969, reached its peak in 1970, 6 percent. Then the CPI dropped to 4 percent in the first 6 months of 1969. Now, 4 percent is still too high, but that is progress.

The GNP deflator, which of course goes far beyond the consumer price index, as you know, the GNP deflator covers all, the whole spectrum of the economy, in the first 6 months of 1971 it was the lowest in 3 years. That is progress, not enough, but it is progress.

In the last month the CPI was higher than the average it has been for the first 5 months. We all know that these

month-to-month variations are not what count. My view is that we are making progress against inflation, but it is going to require continued strong policies on the part of the administration with the cooperation of the Congress in limiting our budget expenditures to full capacity or full employment revenues. That is the battle we will continue to wage and it will also need cooperation from labor and management on limiting the wage-price spiral.

On the unemployment front, we have a somewhat similar problem. In the last 3 peacetime years before the Korean [Vietnam] War expenditures began to hypo the economy, 1961, 1962, and 1963, unemployment in those years averaged 6 percent. We, at this point, have brought unemployment below 6 percent, not as much as we would like. It reached its peak in January. It was 6.2. What the figures will be for this month you will know on Friday. I don't know what they are myself. I will read this as you do and that is the way it should be.

But in any event, the unemployment curve is down; 6.2 was the high and we are now below 6 percent. I believe that it will continue, with monthly aberrations, on a downward course through the balance of the year.

I believe that as we go into 1972, I still stick with my prediction that we shall see unemployment continue to move downward and that 1972, for that year, will be a very good year.

I would point out one final thing on the unemployment facts. As I have often pointed out, as of this morning I looked at the numbers, over 2 million Americans have been let out of the armed services and out of defense plants since we started to wind down the war in Vietnam.

If they were in the services or in the defense plants at the present time, unemployment would be 4.3. But the other side of that coin is that casualties when we came in were 300 a week. This week, last week, they were 12.

I just think the price is too high to pay. We believe that our goal of a new prosperity of low unemployment but with peace and not at the cost of war is one that Americans are willing to work toward.

We are going to achieve that goal. Getting back to the stock market question, I will simply say this: Everybody else has been prophetic about the future. I think the prophets who presently say that the American economy is on the skids, that we have made no progress on inflation, that the economy is not moving up, who ignore the $52 billion increase in GNP, who ignore the increase in retail sales, who ignore the strong, positive elements in the economy, I think by the end of this year that they are going to look bad so I will go out on the limb to that effect but by the end of this year I might look bad.

Let's just hope that they do rather than myself because all of us are involved.

## CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Q. On the casualties, Mr. President, do you think that the figures of 12 per week in that category, are they an

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aberration or does your policy envision them to continue to decline during this year?

THE PRESIDENT. No, they are not an aberration. They are the result, frankly, of first an American withdrawal. American forces in Vietnam today, as you can tell from reading the reports, are in defensive positions. We are frankly just defending the area in which we have responsibility and there are less of them.

Consequently, our casualties go down for that reason. Secondly, they are down for another reason. The enemy doesn't have the punch it had because another point to look at is that South Vietnamese casualties are also substantially down from what they were. What has happened is that the two operations, Cambodia and Laos, so very severely disrupted the enemy's ability to wage offensive actions that for both Americans and South Vietnamese the level of fighting is down.

There again will be aberrations up and down, I would assume. Nobody can predict that. But the war is being wound down and as far as Americans are concerned, we trust it will continue to go down.

Reporter. Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: President Nixon's eighteenth news conference was held at 11:36 a.m. on Wednesday, August 4, 1971 in his office at the White House.

As printed above, this item follows the text of the White House press release.

## Committee for Purchase of Products and Services of the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped

### Announcement of Appointment of 10 Members of the Committee. August 4, 1971

The President today announced the appointment of 10 persons as members of the Committee for Purchase of Products and Services of the Blind and Other Severely Handicapped. The appointees are:

TONY M. BALDAUF, of Virginia, Acting Director, Plant and Operations, representing the Department of Agriculture.

LT. GEN. WALLACE H. ROBINSON, JR., USMC, of Virginia, Director, Defense Supply Agency, representing the Department of Defense.

COL. MARCO J. CARACCIA, of Virginia, Director of Troop Support, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, representing the Department of the Army.

REAR ADM. K. R. WHEELER, SC, USN, of California, Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, representing the Department of the Navy.

BRIG. GEN. JONAS L. BLANK, USAF, of Tennessee, Director of Supply and Services, HQ USAF, representing the Department of the Air Force.

WILLIAM M. USDANE, of the District of Columbia, Assistant Commissioner for Program Development, Rehabilitation Services Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service, representing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

ANTHONY A. BERTSCH, of Virginia, Director, Office of Industrial Mobilization, representing the Department of Commerce.

DONALD P. WHITWORTH, JR., of Maryland, Director, Supply Service, representing the Veterans Administration.

J. J. CLARK, of Virginia, Associate Commissioner of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., representing the Department of Justice.

HORACE E. MENASCO, of Maryland, Administrator, Employment Standards Administration, representing the Department of Labor.

These members will be joined in the near future by a member from the General Services Administration and three members who are not officers or employees of the Government. The total membership of the Committee will be 14 persons.

This Committee, formerly known as the Committee on Purchases of Blind-Made Products, was first established by law on June 25, 1938. On June 23, 1971 the President signed into law (P.L. 92-28) an amendment to the original act which increased the membership from 9 to 14 members and provided that the Committee extend its concerns from the blind only to other severely handicapped individuals. Groups considered as severely handicapped would include paraplegics, epileptics, and victims of cerebral palsy.

The purpose of the Committee is to determine the fair market price of suitable products manufactured by the blind and other severely handicapped and offered for sale to the Federal Government by nonprofit agencies for the blind and severely handicapped. The Committee shall report to the President and the Congress not later than September 30 of each year.

## Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People

### Announcement of Intention To Nominate Henry M. Ramirez as Chairman. August 5, 1971

The President today announced his intention to nominate Henry M. Ramirez to be Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-Speaking People. He will succeed Martin G. Castillo, who resigned effective January 1, 1971.

Ramirez is currently serving as Chief, Mexican American Studies Division, United States Commission on Civil Rights. In this capacity he has had the responsibility for research and investigatory functions of public school education, its program implementation, achievements and national goals, and has supervised the preparation of sev-

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FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY'S REMARKS TO PRESS
AFTER MORNING MEETING WITH SYG AUGUST 9:

"THE SECRETARY: LADIES AND GENTLEMENT, WE HAVE JUST
COMPLETED A MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND MEMBERS
OF HIS STAFF ABOUT THE VERY SERIOUS SITUATION THAT EXISTS
IN PAKISTAN.

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ANDERSON

BEHR

BERGSTEN

CHAPIN

HOLDRIDGE

KENNEDY

LEHMAN

NACHMANOFF

ROBINSON

RONDON

SAUNDERS

SMITH

SMYSER

SONNENFELDT

WRIGHT

OUR PURPOSE IN COMING HERE TODAY WAS TO GIVE EMPHASIS TO THE
VERY IMPORTANT ROLE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IS PLAYING
IN THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS OF THIS CRISIS, AND WE WANTED
ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES TO ASSURE THE SECRETARY
GENERAL AND HIS ASSOCIATES THAT WE WOULD DO ALL WE COULD
TO SUPPORT THAT EFFORT.

THE PLANNING THAT IS GOING ON BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL
AND OTHERS IS VERY REASSURING. THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
ARE WELL EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS THAT WE SEE
AHEAD, AND CERTAINLY THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO CON-
TRIBUTE WHATEVER WE CAN TO THAT EFFORT.

IT WAS EMPHASIZED IN THE MEETING THAT THIS IS A
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE

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UNITED NATIONS OF COURSE IS A PROPER FORUM FOR EMPHASIS
IN THAT REGARD. AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT ALL NATIONS WILL
RESPOND TO THE GREAT HUMANITARIAN NEED THAT IS PRESENT,
AND THAT MAY EVEN ACCELERATE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

WE HAVE NOT COMPLETED OUR MEETING. WE ARE GOING TO MEET
AGAIN WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL THIS AFTERNOON AT THREE
O'CLOCK AND I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEE YOU AT THAT
TIME.

Q. MR. ROGERS, IS IT POSSIBLE TO -- I SEE MR.

SISCO IS WITH YOU -- SINCE THERE WAS A REPORT TODAY ABOUT
A PROPOSAL THAT HE CAME UP WITH IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THAT
WE COULD ASK YOU OR HIM TO ELABORATE BRIEFLY ON THAT?
IS THE REPORT TRUE?

THE SECRETARY: YES, YOU CAN ASK ME.

Q. IS THE REPORT TRUE?

THE SECRETARY: WELL, AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE ARE NOT
GOING TO GET INVOLVED NOW IN ANY PUBLICITY OR PUBLIC
STATESMENTS ABOUT OUR EFFORTS, BEYOND THE FACT THAT WE
ARE MAKING EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO WORK OUT WITH THOSE
CONCERNED AN INTERIM SETTLEMENT.

WE DID HAVE A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT THIS MORNING,
BUT OUR PRINCIPAL EMPHASIS WAS ON THE SITUATION IN EAST
PAKISTAN.

Q. IS THE CLEARING OF THE CANAL AN ISSUE?

THE SECRETARY: NO, IT IS MORE COMPLICATED THAT THAT.

MISS FREDERICK?

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHEN YOU MEET US THIS AFTERNOON, WILL
YOU BE ABLE TO GIVE US SOMETHING SPECIFIC ABOUT THE
UN'S PLANS AND AMERICAN COOPERATION WITH REGARD TO PAKISTAN?

THE SECRETARY: WELL, I AM NOT SURE THAT I WILL GIVE YOU
ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE U.N. PLANS. I THINK THAT'S UP

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TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

AS I SAID, THIS IS A MATTER OF TREMENDOUS IMPORTANCE, NOT ONLY TO THE WORLD BUT TO THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AND WE THINK THIS IS THE KIND OF ROLE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD PLAY AND I AM SURE THAT THEY WILL HAVE SOME ANNOUNCEMENTS TO MAKE LATER ON.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, MAY I ASK ALSO WHETHER OR NOT IN YOUR VIEW THE NEW SOVIET-INDIA PACT WILL HAVE ANY EFFECT WHAT-SOEVER ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN?

THE SECRETARY: WELL, WE HOPE SO. WE HOPE IT WILL HAVE AN EFFECT FOR THE GOOD. WE HOPE THAT ALL NATIONS WILL WORK TOGETHER TO DEAL WITH THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM.

WE DID NOT, THIS MORNING, DISCUSS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS WHICH OBVIOUSLY ARE VERY IMPORTANT. WE PUT ALL OF OUR EMPHASIS ON THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT BECAUSE WE THINK THAT'S A MATTER OF FIRST IMPORTANCE.

MR. HOTTELET?

Q. (INAUDIBLE) -- WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS COULD OR WHAT MIGHT BE DONE BILATERALLY?

THE SECRETARY: WELL, I AM SURE WE WILL EVENTUALLY, BUT THAT'S NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING THIS MORNING.

Q. SIR, DID YOU DISCUSS INDIA'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW U.N. PERSONNEL ON THE INDIAN SIDE OF THE FRONTIER IN THIS REFUGEE SITUATION?

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THE SECRETARY: NO, NOT IN THAT WAY. WE DISCUSSED THE FACTUAL SITUATION AS IT EXISTS TODAY AND WE TALKED ABOUT WAHT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT DO THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL. BUT IT WAS IN THE NATURE OF OFFERING TO DO ANYTHING THAT WE FELT WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AND, AS I SAY, WE ARE VERY PLEASED ABOUT THE REACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PARTICULARLY THE INITIATIVES THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS TAKEN AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES HAVE WORKED VERY DILIGENTLY. THEY HAVE HAD PEOPLE IN THE AREA AND WE THINK THAT THEIR PLANNING IS SUCH THAT THEY ARE GOING TO COPE WITH THE CRISIS WHEN IT ARISES.

I HAVE TO GO TO LUNCH NOW. I WILL SEE YOU THIS AFTERNOON.

WELL, ALL RIGHT, ONE MORE.

Q. THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS SAID THAT HIS PROPOSAL FOR A U.N. PRESENCE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER WAS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. THE U.S. SPOKESMAN IN WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY HAS SAID, AND I QUOTE HIM "AS FAR AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IT HAS MORE TO DO WITH THE SECURITY SITUATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER THAN WITH REFUGEES." DID YOU DISCUSS IT WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TODAY?

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

[lc]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USUN N 02173 02 OF 02 092051Z

A. WE DID NOT DISCUSS WHAT YOU JUST MENTIONED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD DO --

THE SECRETARY: MR. MCCLOSKEY SAID SOMETHING ABOUT THE GENTLEMAN'S QUESTION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD CORRECTED THAT STATEMENT ON THE RECORD. I AM NOT FAMILIAR WITH THAT.

(NOTE: CORRESPONDENTS WERE INFORMED IN WASHINGTON FRIDAY THAT THE SYG'S PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WAS INTENDED TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO EAST PAKISTAN. THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT RELATED TO SECURITY AS STATED IN THURSDAY'S PRESS BRIEFING.)

ONE MORE, GO AHEAD.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD DO ABOUT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT SAYING THERE IS A THREAT TO PEACE AND SECURITY INVOLVED IN THE SITUATION?

THE SECRETARY: I DON'T WANT TO COMMENT ON THAT NOW. WE DIDN'T DISCUSS THAT AT ALL THIS MORNING.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH."ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:04 A.M. EDT

AUGUST 10, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: Consistent with our policy of briefing on time when we have no information to provide you, we are conducting this briefing as close to starting time as possible.

You know that the President is meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff today, talking about the fiscal '73 budget. That meeting is still going on. The President, as you know, has been reviewing the fiscal '73 budget, and this meeting is being held to talk to the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about their views regarding the fiscal '73 budget.

The President will meet later in the week with the service Secretaries to discuss the same subject.

Then at 11:30 today, as we have announced, the President will meet with Sirik Matak, the acting Prime Minister of Cambodia. The purpose of this visit is to discuss the relationships between the two countries. Sirik Matak is on a 10-day visit to the United States. During that visit he will visit Los Angeles and New York City.

When Sirik Matak's plans to visit the United States became known to the President, the President invited him to visit Washington, and invited him to meet here at the White House, in view of the fact that Prime Minister Lom Nol's poor health led him to cancel a planned official visit. Dr. Kissinger, as I mentioned yesterday, will also sit in the meeting.

Then at 12:30 today the Catholic War Veterans will present the President with the Catholic War Veterans Humanitarian and Peace Award. We will provide those details to you.

At four o'clock President Nixon will meet with the Council of Economic Advisers. This will be the first Council meeting in which Dr. Ezra Solomon will participate. He replaced Dr. Houthakker, who has returned to Harvard.

Q Do you expect anything on that, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't.

These are all the announcements that we have. We will take your questions.

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MR. ZIEGLER: -- and was covered in that way; that
is correct.

Q Ron, does that mean the taxpayers paid for it?

MR. ZIEGLER: It means that the Government assumed
the expense, yes, and it was a nonpolitical trip.

The President, as you know, made an announcement,
a major announcement, regarding nursing homes in New Hampshire
and also spent the weekend in Maine.

Q Is this 12:30 ceremony to be on the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: There will be a photo opportunity and
a pool.

Q In line with that, then, when the President
makes a trip and it is clearly labeled as political, it
is picked up by the Republican National Committee, and only
then?

MR. ZIEGLER: That was the case in 1970, when the
President was out actively campaigning for the Republican
Party. Then the expenses were assumed by the Republican
National Committee.

Q Ron, what is the reaction to the devaluation
of the dollar abroad?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Department of the Treasury has
issued a statement on that and I have nothing to add to it.

Q Are you talking about the one yesterday?

MR. ZIEGLER: The one the day before yesterday.

Q Ron, who pays for the advance work prior to
a Presidential trip?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is the normal advancing that
has to take place. A good deal of that, of course, relates to
press facilities. The press cover much of that in your
prorated bills.

Q Was the White House taken by surprise on the
Delhi pact with the Soviet Union, and do you have any reaction?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't.

Q Ron, are we telling the Government of South
Vietnam, as a UPI item today suggests, that if there is only
one candidate in the election it will be very difficult to
keep Congress from imposing a troop withdrawal deadline by
the end of this year?

MR. ZIEGLER: That was a report attributed to sources.
It did not indicate who the source was, what government the

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Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Joseph J. Sisco visited Israel July 28-August 6. Following is a statement by Mr. Sisco made at Tel Aviv August 5.

September 6, 1971

259

# President Names Advisory Panel on South Asian Relief Assistance

White House press release dated August 21

President Nixon today [August 21] announced that he is creating an Advisory Panel on South Asian Relief Assistance comprised of a number of prominent American citizens to help direct U.S. Government relief assistance efforts for those who are suffering from the dislocations in East Pakistan. They will assist Maurice J. Williams, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, who was recently named to coordinate all such relief activities in East Pakistan, and Francis L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs, who is directing U.S. Government refugee assistance for East Pakistan refugees in India.

The new panel has been asked to review all steps already taken by the administration and to suggest further actions which will help avert famine in East Pakistan and assist in the relief of East Pakistan refugees in India. President Nixon has asked the members of the panel to provide continuing practical suggestions to help assure that U.S. support of United Nations efforts in these areas is both timely and effective.

Administrator Williams is presently in Pakistan consulting with Government officials there pursuant to President Nixon's direction that the United States give the highest priority to this humanitarian long-range relief program. Mr. Kellogg, who has already visited the area and will continue to have responsibility for U.S. support to the refugees as they return to East Pakistan, will work closely with Mr. Williams' Interdepartmental Working Group.

The members of the new Advisory Relief Panel are as follows:

JAMES PERKINS, former president, Cornell University

GEORGE ELSEY, president, American Red Cross

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, former president, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

GLENN HAYDON, St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital in Cedar Rapids, Iowa (expert on disaster relief with experience in Nigeria, Peru, and East Pakistan)

MAXWELL RABB, attorney, former member executive committee, U.S. Committee for UNESCO, and former president, U.S. Committee for Refugees

MRS. JEANNE R. FERST, civic leader active in organizations at both local level in Atlanta, Ga., and national level, public member of U.S. delegation to Eighth Governing Council of U.N. Development Program

The members of the panel will meet with Messrs. Williams and Kellogg after Mr. Williams returns from Pakistan.

# U.S. To Consult Latin Americans on Effects of New Economic Policy

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, AUGUST 19

Press release 183 dated August 19

The United States will hold consultations soon to explain the implications of the new economic policy for the countries of Latin America.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Charles A. Meyer advised Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Chairman, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), that some of the measures to be taken under the new policy would affect Latin American trade to the United States.

Mr. Meyer said the consultations would be held at the earliest date possible after adequate preparation made necessary by the global implications of the changes.

The U.S. notice of consultation was sent Dr. Sanz de Santamaria in fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to consult with the Latin American countries on changes in U.S. policy that could affect them, as provided by a resolution adopted at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at its annual meeting in Caracas in 1970.

## TEXT OF LETTER TO CHAIRMAN OF CIAP

AUGUST 16, 1971.

His Excellency

Dr. CARLOS SANZ DE SANTAMARIA

DEAR CARLOS: I am enclosing copies of President Nixon's statement of last night concerning a new economic policy for the United States,¹ together with some background notes explanatory of that process.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 6, 1971, p. 253.

278

Department of State Bulletin

MR. ZIEGLER: I just used that language since the date has not been set.

Q What he is really asking is did Dr. Kissinger make a secret trip to Ottawa?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Regarding the trip to Canada, do you know if the President will go to the Province of Quebec?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have not determined his schedule for the trip to Canada.

Q How long will be there?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know how many days he will be there.

Q There is a story out of Cairo saying that President Nixon is going to meet Egypt's President Sadat at the United Nations next month. Is that true?

MR. ZIEGLER: I cannot confirm that story, Bob.

Q. Do you know if the President is going to go to the U.N. next month?

MR. ZIEGLER: He does not plan at this time to go to the U.N. General Assembly.

Q Are the troop withdrawals from Vietnam now running appreciably ahead of schedule by more than 10,000?

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe our withdrawal rate is running ahead of schedule. I think the troop level in South Vietnam at this time is around 218,000; maybe slightly above 218,000. The U. S. forces last week were down another 1,000 or so. So the withdrawal of U. S. forces, based on the President's last announcement, is running somewhat above the schedule, yes. We will reach the withdrawal level which the President has announced for November very comfortably.

Q Really, the sense of the question is, hasn't the withdrawal level, although unannounced, been changed, this 184,000? You now are shooting for 160,000 by December?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. We are shooting for 184,000. Historically, Bill, you know there has been a fluctuation in that level in previous announcements, but we have not changed the level.

Q What is the President's response to the elections in South Vietnam in terms of their fairness and freeness?

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#1163

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

AT 11:20 A.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 13, 1971

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: Good morning. Ron is in the meeting with the President and the business leaders and asked me to give you what we have this morning. I don't know how long that meeting will last, but I don't look for a formal report out of it.

You have two releases. The President today declared a major disaster for the State of New York, which will enable the use of federal funds to help local resources in relief and recovery measures after flooding from tropical storm Doria.

You have a release wherein the President today announced his intention to nominate Harold B. Scott to be Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business. This area of responsibility has been left out of the release, but that is what it will be, Domestic and International Business.

He also is being appointed to succeed former Assistant Secretary McLellan as one of the three government members on the Board of Overseas Private Investment Cooperation.

So you have that. Also, we will post following this, that the President has announced the retirement of three judges, two Circuit Court judges and one District Court judge. We will post that information, but one of them is Judge Albert V. Bryan of Alexandria, who is retiring from active service as United States Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit. He will continue to serve as Senior Judge.

And also Judge John F. Kilkenny of Portland, Oregon, who serves on the Ninth Circuit, and Judge Gus J. Solomon, who is the United States District judge for the District of Oregon.

Q Is there an effective date on Judge Bryan?

MR. WARREN: Upon the qualification of his successor.

Also, the President is announcing today that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India, has accepted the President's invitation to pay an official visit to the United States. Prime Minister Gandhi will meet with the President in Washington on November 4th and will be the guest of honor at a White House dinner that evening. Mrs. Gandhi also will visit New York following her visit to Washington.

Q How long will she be in this country?

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MR. WARREN: I don't know that the details are firm on that. I think she is arriving on the 3rd, but I think the State Department will have an itinerary on her trip when it is firm.

Q Jerry, is there a date for Tito's visit?

MR. WARREN: No, none has been announced.

Q Is there going to be a Tito visit?

MR. WARREN: I know that the President has invited Tito and that Tito has accepted, but I don't believe the dates have been worked out yet.

Q Jerry, what did you mean by no formal report on the meeting with the business leaders? Will Ron come out and give us a briefing?

MR. WARREN: That, of course, depends on timing, Jack. I don't know when the meeting will be over. But Ron will be able to give you a fill on it, I am sure, for those who are interested.

Those are all the announcements we have.

The Cabinet meeting this morning lasted from a little after 8:30 to 10:40. It was a two hour meeting and the Cabinet Members and their wives heard discussions by Secretary Connally and Director George Shultz and Arnold Weber, the Executive Director of the Cost of Living Council, on the economic programs.

I believe this was the second formal Cabinet meeting with wives, although there have been other briefings where wives have been invited.

Q Why were they invited this morning?

MR. WARREN: The President said early in his Administration that he wanted to invite wives to Cabinet meetings and he wanted to involve the wives of the Cabinet officers in their husbands' work, and this is one of those meeting. Obviously the economy is vitally important to the wives.

Q Wasn't there one other one here and one in California?

MR. WARREN: There was one other one here and then there was a briefing in the East Room for Cabinet wives and wives of White House staff members and sub-Cabinet officers on the domestic proposals early this year. I am not sure about one in California. We can check on that.

Q Jerry, Mrs. Gandhi, can you tell us when the last Indian Prime Minister was here on an official visit? Do you happen to know, offhand?

MR. WARREN: Mrs. Gandhi paid an official visit to the United States in April of 1966, just after becoming Prime Minister that same year.

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WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, NOVEMBER 4, 1971

you here in the first place. This is a goal we can all work for.

And so with that, may I say thank you again for a very warm welcome. We look forward to coming back again.

NOTE: The President spoke at 3:10 p.m., P.d.t.

Portland, Oregon

Question-and-Answer Session at a Media Briefing for Northwest Editors, Publishers, and Broadcast Executives. September 25, 1971

THE WEST COAST DOCK STRIKE

THE PRESIDENT. Ladies and gentlemen, I have just finished a meeting with Mr. Bridges and Mr. Flynn,¹ along with Mr. Counts of the Mediation Service, and the Secretary of Labor, and Mr. Shultz. That meeting was for the purpose of my bringing to their attention the urgency of reaching a settlement of the dock strike.

I pointed out what is actually the fact, that not only is there great interest in that strike on the West Coast, but that, for example, when I stopped in Montana today, the primary subject of interest as I went down the fence and shook hands with people, among the farmers there, "What can you do about the dock strike?"

I indicated that the national interest was very deeply involved; that many people were being hurt, not just big business, but small farmers as well as large farmers, and that I considered it imperative that management and labor work with a new sense of urgency toward a settlement.

After the meeting was concluded, the two agreed that they would begin again their discussions on Monday morning at 9 o'clock; that they would have in mind the sense of urgency that I had tried to communicate to them, and that they would set, as a goal, reaching a settlement by the end of next week.

I say they said they would set that as a goal. They also pointed out that they were still far apart on some issues. I will simply close my comments with regard to the dock strike by saying that in this particular area, as you have already been informed in the media briefing this morning, I understand, we have made recommendations to the Congress for new legislation dealing with transportation generally.

I think what has happened in this dispute, coupled with what happened in the railroad dispute, indicates the urgency for consideration of that legislation, because the country cannot continue to afford stoppages in these key

areas which do not reach, in the case of the dock strike, at times, the requirements for imposition of Taft-Hartley—although Taft-Hartley is a possibility here if the situation goes on—but which nevertheless cause very great injury to many people in our society.

Now, having said all these things, I can only add that I am convinced that the two men that I met with recognize the sense of urgency; that they are going to negotiate as well as they possibly can; that they have to, of course, represent their principals and convince them in the process.

I trust that the presidential intervention at least will help them in conveying to their principals, the ones that they represent, the need to reach a hasty settlement for the strike.

Now, I understand that during the course of the day you have had rather long sessions on domestic policy, and have asked a great number of questions. Normally on these media briefings I have wound them up by talking on the same subject and trying to summarize the views that I understand have been touched upon by various speakers earlier.

Today, since you have had such a long session, it has occurred to me that in view of the fact that I am on my way, as you know, for a meeting with the Emperor of Japan in Alaska, the first meeting in history with the President of the United States and the Emperor of Japan participating, that it might be of greater interest and value to the members of the press that are here if I would have questions from you on any subject that you like.

You can cover, of course, the subjects that have been touched upon in the briefing. I will be glad to respond to those in the event you would like additional information on those subjects, but I will be glad to also take questions in the foreign policy field or other areas of interest to the extent that our time permits.

So with that we will go to the questions. And if each of you—while we are not on television—maybe stand up, I think, so that I can get recognition, and speak up, please.

DEVELOPMENTS IN MAINLAND CHINA

Q. What's happening in Red China?

THE PRESIDENT. It would be presumptuous for me to contend that we knew what was happening on the mainland of China at this time. I will only say, however, that whatever is happening, we are proceeding with the plans for the trip that I will be taking to the People's Republic of China.

Those plans will be announced at an appropriate time, and in that context you can surmise anything you want as to what is happening.

MEETING WITH CHINESE LEADERS

Q. Mr. President, you said in Detroit you would meet with the leader of Red China. Do you expect that to be Mao Tse-tung?

¹ Harry Bridges, president of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, and Edmund J. Flynn, president of the Pacific Maritime Association.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, OCTOBER 1971

1343

## QUALIFICATIONS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

Q. Mr. President, referring to the Supreme Court appointments, the AP quotes Mrs. Nixon this morning as saying, "The trouble is, the best qualified women are too old." Do you share her thinking, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. As Secretary Morton knows, any politician that says a woman is too old is nuts.

Could I just add one thing to this, because somebody may feel that I don't want to comment more on the qualifications for the Supreme Court judge. First the two Justice that I will appoint, as I indicated in Detroit, will be men—or individuals [Laughter], who first—and this is the most important qualification—share the general judicial philosophy and approach of the two men on the Court whom I previously have appointed. That gives you an indication of my direction. That is the most important qualification, in addition, of course, to the basic qualification that the man must be one who is schooled in the law and particularly in Constitutional law.

I should also point out that that means that the individual can come from any section of the country. It means that he can come from a court. He can come from the bar, be a practicing lawyer. He can come from a law school. He can be, for example, a law professor, as was Mr. Justice Frankfurter, or he can come from the Congress or the Senate, provided his specialty in the Congress and the Senate has given him the equivalent of experience in the legal field that either active practice of the law, or serving on a court, or teaching law would give.

So, you see, I will not rule out, as some want me to do, anybody who has not served on the circuit court of appeals. My other two appointees, that I just mentioned, both had served on the circuit court of appeals, and the appointments may be from the circuit court of appeals. But I am not limiting it to that because here we have to go for the best qualified people who have the judicial philosophy that I think is needed in the Court today.

And even an old woman could have that philosophy!

## DEFENSE CAPABILITY

Q. Mr. President, in view of the report on comparative missile capabilities on the reduction of our armed forces, both as to Army and fleets, do you care to comment, sir, on our present or future defensive capability at this time?

THE PRESIDENT. This is Ferd Mendenhall?

Q. Yes.

THE PRESIDENT. I thought so. There are no old men, incidentally, either. [Laughter] I have known Ferd Mendenhall for 20 years, too.

Let's look at that relative balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. There is a tendency to point out that because the Soviet Union has been moving ahead during the past 10 years, at a time when the United States has been somewhat limited to the numbers, as far at least as the number of missiles are concerned, that we had back in 1962, that because of that fact that the United States has become already inferior.

Now, I would answer your question by saying, first, that what the Soviet Union needs to have a sufficient military establishment to carry out its foreign policy is different from what the United States needs. The Soviet Union is primarily a land power, and it needs, therefore, a different mix than we have.

The United States is a combination of a land and a sea power. Consequently, whereas the United States must have, in order to have an effective foreign policy to meet our needs around the world, superiority on the sea, what the United States may need in terms of divisions on land may be much less as compared with what the Soviet Union would have to have.

So, when somebody says the Soviet Union has three, or four, or five times as many divisions as the United States has, that doesn't mean that what they have makes them, therefore, automatically superior.

I would say at this point that in terms of strategic missiles, there is basically a balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and that neither power at this time is going to be able to gain a clear enough superiority that either would launch a preemptive attack upon the other.

That is the reason why the possibilities of success in the SALT talks, the strategic arms limitation talks, are, in my opinion, good. I think an announcement was made this morning that a significant step has already been taken with regard to accidental war and a more improved hot line. That took a lot of negotiating, but it is important and it will be signed next week in Washington when Mr. Gromyko is here.

That also is an indication that progress is being made on limitations of offensive and defensive weapons, which I announced on May 20th—and at the same time it was announced in Moscow—would be the goal for this year.

Now, whether we achieve it by the end of this year, no one can say at this point. We have made progress. And I believe the goal will be achieved. I believe that we will reach an agreement and the reason we will reach an agreement is this fundamental point that I make: Neither power at this time could if it wanted to, gain that superiority which would enable it to, frankly, black-mail the other one.

## THE MIDDLE EAST

Q. Mr. President, Senator Jackson, on the floor of the Senate, stated that the imbalance in the Middle East, as far as military weapons are concerned, is widening to the detriment of Israel. He suggested that there be immediate implementation of at least $500 million worth of jets and other weaponry. Does the administration support this thinking, or are there facts different from what Senator Jackson suggests?

THE PRESIDENT. Let me respond to the question not simply in terms of Senator Jackson's recommendations, and I have great respect for him in this field, because he is an expert, but in terms of what the policy of the administration is.

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WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, OCTOBER 4, 1971

First, we support the truce.

Second, it would not be in the interest of either Israel or the U.A.R. to break that truce. I think that we, therefore, have a pretty good idea that the truce may be maintained.

But third, however, neither side should assume, neither Israel nor the U.A.R., that the truce can go on indefinitely, because unless there is progress made toward a permanent settlement, there is inevitably going to develop an imbalance from one side to the other.

Now, having stated those general propositions, let me state the position of the United States toward Israel. I have stated over and over again that the United States will do what is necessary to see that the balance of power in the region is not altered. That commitment we have kept in the past; that commitment we will keep in the future with regard to Israel. Israel knows it and Israel's neighbors know it.

But, on the other hand, while at the same time we keep the commitment, and we will keep it in this general context of seeing that the balance does not shift, and we watch it closely week by week, I can assure you, at the same time we are, of course, trying to influence the negotiations along the line of pointing up that simply maintaining the balance of power is not a policy that can survive; it is not viable because in the end it will blow, and that is why we are pushing for a permanent settlement.

## A MEETING WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN?

Q. Premier Kosygin will be in Canada next month. There is some talk that he will go on down to New York during that same trip. Is it possible that you will meet with him on that occasion?

THE PRESIDENT. I do have plans to meet with Mr. Gromyko next week, the Soviet Foreign Minister, but I have no plans to meet with Mr. Kosygin on his visit to the United States, if he makes such a visit, and I think that is still in a speculative position.

## VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS

Q. Mr. President, will the posture of the unopposed ballot in Vietnam have any effect on your winding down the war? Will it speed it up at all?

THE PRESIDENT. With regard to the unopposed ballot, we, as I have stated on other occasions, would prefer that Vietnam could have an election in which there was a contest. We, of course, noted with approval the fact that the parliamentary elections were very, very vigorously contested, and that over one-third of the Parliament in the National Assembly were elected in what most observers agreed was a very fair, impartial election. Over one-third of them were members of the parties opposing President Thieu, which, indicates there was a very active opposition.

It is also to be noted that in the Senate of South Vietnam, there is a very active opposition which is able to assert itself. We, however, cannot get people to run for

office unless we are willing to run, and under these circumstances, therefore, the problem which confronts us is whether, because South Vietnam has elections but has not yet had elections which we consider to be satisfactory in terms of our standards, whether under those circumstances we, in effect, throw up our hands and say that it makes no difference what happens, let the Communists take it over.

The choice, quite frankly, is not between a South Vietnam and perfect elections, or elections meeting our standard, but the choice is between South Vietnam and no elections, which is what would be the case if the Communists were to come in.

So, as far as our plan is concerned, I would simply summarize it this way: Our plan for ending the American involvement in Vietnam is proceeding. I will have another announcement to make in November with regard to that plan. It is significant to note that over 300,000 Americans have come out of Vietnam. It is significant to note that as far as our casualties are concerned, the casualties for the entire summer were not as great as they were each week when we came into office in 1968—and they will continue to go down.

Our goal of ending the American involvement, of preventing a Communist take-over, of obtaining the return of our POW's, can be attained, in my opinion, and will be attained, and the complete American withdrawal, consistent with that goal, will occur.

In the event, however, that as a result of a change of policy, a change of policy that might be brought upon the administration by Congressional action—I don't anticipate this, but it has been speculated about—we move more precipitately, everything that we have fought for in Vietnam could be lost.

So, I would simply say that we feel that our policy of ending American involvement in a way that would prevent a Communist take-over and give the people of South Vietnam a chance to develop a democratic system which more closely meets our standards—that goal can be reached.

I would also point this out: I know many Americans are concerned about the failure of other countries that we aid around the world, people like the people of South Vietnam, to move as swiftly as we think they should toward the democratic society that we have here or that the British have, for example.

I note, for example, a very well-intentioned resolution that some Congressmen have put in, saying we should cut off aid to South Vietnam unless they have a leader elected in a contested, democratic election. Let me say that if we adopted that procedure and that policy, the United States would have to cut off aid to 61 countries in the world today that we are giving it to because only 30 of the 91 countries to which we give aid have leaders that were elected in a contested election.

That doesn't mean that we like it that way, but it does mean that the road toward democracy and contested elections is a long and hard one. But the main thing is to be on

President Nixon Briefs Western Media Executives

Following are excerpts from the transcript of
a question-and-answer session at a media brief-
ing President Nixon held at Portland, Oreg., on
September 25 for editors, publishers, and broad-
cast executives from 13 Western States.¹

The President: It would be presumptuous for me to contend that we knew what was happening on the mainland of China at this time. I will only say, however, that whatever is happening, we are proceeding with the plans for the trip that I will be taking to the People's Republic of China.

Those plans will be announced at an appro-
priate time, and in that context you can surmise
anything you want as to what is happening.

The President: In any meeting that occurs with a leader of a Communist country, a meeting must occur not only with the head of government, which in this case, of course, would be Chou En-lai, the Premier, but it must also occur with the Chairman of the Communist Party in that country.

Putting it in another context, if a meeting
were to be held in the Soviet Union, the meeting
would be between the President of the United
States and Mr. Kosygin and also a meeting be-
tween the President of the United States and
Mr. Brezhnev.

Now, as far as the meetings in China are con-
cerned, they will be announced and those who
participate in them at an appropriate time. It

would be naturally assumed that when the trip
is planned that a meeting would be planned, a
meeting or meetings with the head of govern-
ment and with the Chairman of the Communist
Party of the People's Republic.

Q. Mr. President, in view of the report on
comparative missile capabilities on the reduo-
tion of our armed forces, both as to army and
fleets, do you care to comment, sir, on our present
or future defensive capability at this time?

The President: Let's look at that relative bal-
ance between the Soviet Union and the United
States. There is a tendency to point out that be-
cause the Soviet Union has been moving ahead
during the past 10 years, at a time when the
United States has been somewhat limited to the
numbers, as far at least as the number of mis-
siles are concerned that we had back in 1962,
that because of that fact that the United States
has become already inferior.

Now, I would answer your question by saying,
first, that what the Soviet Union needs to have
a sufficient military establishment to carry out
its foreign policy is different from what the
United States needs. The Soviet Union is pri-
marily a land power, and it needs, therefore, a
different mix than we have.

The United States is a combination of a land
and a sea power. Consequently, whereas the
United States must have—in order to have an
effective foreign policy to meet our needs around
the world—superiority on the sea, what the
United States may need in terms of divisions on

¹For the complete transcript of President Nixon's remarks, see White House press release (Portland, Oreg.) dated Sept. 25.

406

Department of State Bulletin

So, when somebody says the Soviet Union has
three or four or five times as many divisions as
the United States has, that doesn't mean that
what they have makes them therefore automati-
cally superior.

I would say at this point that in terms of
strategic missiles there is basically a balance be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union
and that neither power at this time is going to
be able to gain a clear enough superiority that
either would launch a preemptive attack upon
the other.

That is the reason why the possibilities of
success in the SALT talks, the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, are, in my opinion, good. I
think an announcement was made this morning
that a significant step has already been taken
with regard to accidental war and a more im-
proved "hot line."² That took a lot of negotiat-
ing, but it is important, and it will be signed
next week in Washington when Mr. Gromyko
is here.

That also is an indication that progress is
being made on limitations of offensive and de-
fensive weapons, which I announced on May 20,
and at the same time it was announced in Mos-
cow, would be the goal for this year.³

Now, whether we achieve it by the end of this
year, no one can say at this point. We have
made progress. And I believe the goal will be
achieved. I believe that we will reach an agree-
ment, and the reason we will reach an agree-
ment is this fundamental point that I make:
Neither power at this time could, if it wanted
to, gain that superiority which would enable it
to, frankly, blackmail the other one.

Q. Mr. President, Senator Jackson, on the
floor of the Senate, stated that the imbalance in
the Middle East as far as military weapons are
concerned is widening to the detriment of
Israel. He suggested that there be immediate
implementation of at least $500 million worth

² See p. 399.

³ For President Nixon's statement on May 20, see
BULLETIN of June 7, 1971, p. 741.

of jets and other weaponry. Does the adminis-
tration support this thinking, or are there facts
different from what Senator Jackson suggests?

The President: Let me respond to the ques-
tion not simply in terms of Senator Jackson's
recommendations—and I have great respect for
him in this field because he is an expert—but in
terms of what the policy of the administration
is.

First, we support the truce.

Second, it would not be in the interest of
either Israel or the U.A.R. to break that truce.
I think that we therefore have a pretty good
idea that the truce may be maintained.

But third, however, neither side should as-
sume—neither Israel nor the U.A.R.—that the
truce can go on indefinitely, because unless there
is progress made toward a permanent settle-
ment, there is inevitably going to develop an
imbalance from one side to the other.

Now, having stated those general proposi-
tions, let me state the position of the United
States toward Israel. I have stated over and
over again that the United States will do what
is necessary to see that the balance of power in
the region is not altered. That commitment we
have kept in the past; that commitment we
will keep in the future with regard to Israel.
Israel knows it, and Israel's neighbors know it.

But, on the other hand, while at the same time
we keep the commitment—and we will keep it
in this general context of seeing that the balance
does not shift, and we watch it closely week by
week—I can assure you, at the same time we
are, of course, trying to influence the negotia-
tions along the line of pointing up that simply
maintaining the balance of power is not a policy
that can survive; it is not viable because in the
end it will blow, and that is why we are pushing
for a permanent settlement.

The President: I do have plans to meet with
Mr. Gromyko next week, the Soviet Foreign

October 18, 1971

407

1369

## Assistance for East Pakistan

Statement by the President Upon Requesting Appropriation for Relief and Rehabilitation of Refugees and for Humanitarian Relief.

October 1, 1971

I am today requesting the Congress to appropriate additional funds to meet human needs in South Asia. The United States has been deeply concerned over the situation in South Asia, both on humanitarian grounds and because of the implications for peace.

Recent events in East Pakistan, compounding the destruction on natural disasters, have led to widespread human suffering. Unchecked, this situation could drift toward greater disaster in the form of famine or even war. It is a primary objective of the administration to relieve suffering and help avert such a situation.

Acting on its mandate as the conscience of the world community, the United Nations, under the leadership of the Secretary General, has focused concern on the plight of those who are caught in this situation. Through its special missions in Dacca and New Delhi, the United Nations has also provided the operational framework for channeling relief supplies to the millions who need them both in India and in East Pakistan.

Many countries and private donors are responding to this enormous challenge. The United States has already provided substantial amounts of food and foreign exchange to support the programs of the United Nations in aid of the millions of refugees in India and the millions who could face starvation in East Pakistan.

But more needs to be done by the United States and by other donors. The costs of dealing with this problem through this fiscal year are expected to be over a billion dollars. Far beyond the means of India and Pakistan. The House of Representatives early recognized the need for unusual humanitarian relief for South Asia and on August 3, 1971, authorized $100 million in additional funds under the Foreign Assistance Act. Since that time, however, the magnitude of the need has grown. It is also important that we be able to play our proper role promptly if contingencies in the relief operation arise.

I therefore urge that, in addition to completing action on the House initiative, the Congress authorize and appropriate an additional sum of $150 million for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees from East Pakistan and for humanitarian relief in East Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act. Together with food supplied under Public Law 480, these funds will enable us to do our share in mitigating the effects of this human crisis, and thus help avert the deeper tragedies that all too easily could follow.

NOTE: The statement was released at Key Biscayne, Fla.

## United States Ambassador to Upper Volta

Announcement of Intention To Nominate Donald B. Easum of Virginia. October 1, 1971

The President announced today his intention to nominate Donald B. Easum to be United States Ambassador to Upper Volta. Easum, a career Foreign Service officer, has been Staff Director of the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs since 1970. In Ouagadougou he will succeed Ambassador William E. Schaufele, Jr., who has been reassigned as Senior Adviser to the Permanent Representative, United States Mission to the United Nations.

Easum was born on August 27, 1923, in Culver, Ind. He graduated from the University of Wisconsin in 1947 with a B.A. degree and earned M.P.A. (1950) and P.A.D. (1953) degrees at Princeton University. From 1950 to 1951 he studied at London University as a Fulbright Scholar.

Following his service in the United States Army Air Force from 1942 to 1946, Easum taught secondary school and then joined the New York Times as a reporter in 1947. He entered the Foreign Service in 1955.

Overseas, Easum served in Nicaragua, Indonesia, Senegal, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Niamey, Niger. In Washington, he has served in the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State and as Executive Secretary of the Agency for International Development.

Easum is married and the father of four children. He and his family reside in Alexandria, Va.

NOTE: The announcement was released at Key Biscayne, Fla.

## United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia

Announcement of Intention To Nominate Malcolm Toon of Maryland. October 1, 1971

The President today announced his intention to nominate Malcolm Toon, of Bethesda, Md., as United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia. A career officer of Class 1, Mr. Toon has been United States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia since July 1969. In Belgrade, he will succeed Ambassador William Leonhart, who is being reassigned as Deputy Commandant at the National War College.

Ambassador Toon was born on July 4, 1916, at Troy, N.Y. He was a graduate of Tufts University in 1937, with an A.B. degree, and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy with an M.A. degree in 1938. During 1942-46, he served in the United States Navy as a PT boat commander and was a lieutenant commander.

The realistic and hopeful alternatives to peace; but the greater risk unwillingness to face up to the hard

step now—an interim agreement make the next step toward peace for all the parties to take.

would restore the use of the Suez Canal waterway for international shipping.

would reestablish Egypt's authority over major national asset.

It would separate the combatants.

It would produce the first Israeli withdrawal.

It would extend the cease-fire.

It would diminish the risk of major-power involvement.

It would be an important step toward the complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.

I submit that the logic for such an agreement is overwhelming. If the leaders of the area would grasp this opportunity, they would give new hope to their peoples for tranquillity, for progress, and for peace.

In all of our efforts, both in the United Nations and elsewhere, we should recall that nothing we do matters so much as the legacy we leave to those who follow, the bridge that we build between the past and the future. There is a tendency, especially when tensions are high and tempers short, to regard the present as the focal point of all of man's history. But ours is only the latest generation, not the last generation; and nothing we leave to future generations will matter so much as a structure of enduring peace.

Peace must be achieved and maintained not by the decree of a few but by accommodation among many.

Each government, in upholding its people's particular interests, must also advance the world interest in a peace which will endure.

To that interest the United Nations, from its creation, has been dedicated.

To that interest the United States pledges anew its best efforts.

444

## President Requests Additional Funds for South Asian Relief

*Statement by President Nixon¹*

Recent events in East Pakistan, compounding the destruction from natural disasters, have led to widespread human suffering. Unchecked, this situation could drift toward greater disaster in the form of famine or even war. It is a primary objective of the administration to relieve suffering and help avert such a situation.

But more needs to be done by the United States and by other donors. The costs of dealing with this problem through this fiscal year are expected to be over a billion dollars, far beyond the means of India and Pakistan. The House of Representatives early recognized the need for unusual humanitarian relief for South Asia and on August 3, 1971, authorized

¹Issued at Key Biscayne, Fla., on Oct. 1 (White House press release, Key Biscayne, Fla.).

Department of State Bulletin

["$100 million in additional funds under the For-
eign Assistance Act. Since that time, however,
the magnitude of the need has grown. It is also
important that we be able to play our proper
role promptly if contingencies in the relief
operation arise.", "I therefore urge that, in addition to complet-\ning action on the House initiative, the Con-\ngress authorize and appropriate an additional\nsum of $150 million for the relief and rehabilita-\ntion of refugees from East Pakistan and for\nhumanitarian relief in East Pakistan under\nthe Foreign Assistance Act. Together with\nfood supplied under Public Law 480, these\nfunds will enable us to do our share in mitigat-\ning the effects of this human crisis and thus\nhelp avert the deeper tragedies that all too\neasily could follow.", "131st Plenary Session on Viet-Nam\nHeld at Paris", "Following are remarks made by Ambassador\nWilliam J. Porter, head of the U.S. delegation,\nat the 131st plenary session of the meetings on\nViet-Nam at Paris on October 7.", "Press release 232 dated October 7", "PRELIMINARY REMARKS", "Ladies and gentlemen: Preliminary to my\npresentation, let me inform you that last Mon-\nday the United States House of Representatives\npassed unanimously, by a vote of 369 to 0, a\nresolution regarding humane treatment and re-\nlease of prisoners of war. The resolution\nstrongly protests the treatment of United\nStates servicemen held prisoner by you and\nyour allies in Southeast Asia. It calls on you to\ncomply with the requirements of the Geneva\nConvention Relative to the Treatment of\nPrisoners of War. It also expresses approval\nand support of efforts by the people and Gov-\nernment of the United States, the United Na-\ntions, the International Red Cross, and other", "leaders and peoples of the world to obtain hu-\nmane treatment for prisoners of war and im-\nmediate repatriation of the sick and wounded.", "As you are constantly advancing your views\non American opinion, I trust that you will give\nthis unanimous resolution of the House of Rep-\nresentatives your most careful consideration. I\ncite it and recall to your attention the question\nI asked you last week. In addition to the infor-\nmation I requested then, surely you can provide\nwithout harm to yourselves information con-\ncerning those of our men you know to be dead.\nAre you disposed now to say how providing this\nkind of information could possibly harm you?", "OPENING REMARKS", "Ladies and gentlemen: Last week I com-\nmented on your use of unusual and unsuitable\nlanguage in the proposals you present, which\nseem to have little relationship to your lack of\nmilitary success in South Viet-Nam. Your\nstatements wherein you pretend to speak for the\nSouth Vietnamese people prompt me now to\nexamine your political record in South Viet-\nNam.", "In considering the many ways one can ex-\namine South Vietnamese society—whether by\nreligious groupings, geographic groupings,\ndemographic groupings, or in particular by po-\nlitical groupings—I search in vain for any\norganized category of South Vietnamese which\nsupports overtly or covertly the Viet Cong or\nits program. I also fail to recall any prominent\nSouth Vietnamese political figure who has ever\njoined your group.", "When I first arrived in Saigon, I remember\nvery well the general strikes that were ordered\nby your organization. The response was so\nslight as to be barely noticeable, and you lost a\ngreat deal of face. You have never tried that\nmaneuver since. I was very impressed by this\nbecause I had just come to Viet-Nam from\nanother country, where the original FLN was\nthe authentic and recognized spokesman for\ntheir community. You preempted the name of\nthat movement, but the resemblance between", "October 25, 1971", "445"]

U.S. Support for Relief Efforts
in South Asia

Statement by Maurice J. Williams ¹

The United States remains deeply concerned over the situation in South Asia. We are disturbed by the widespread human suffering of the people of East Pakistan and the serious implications the large-scale movement of refugees has for peace in the subcontinent. If unchecked, the situation may drift toward still greater disaster in the form of famine and war. Included in this broad concern for people is a very specific one for the fate of millions of children caught up in this angry swirl of history. The U.S. Government is placing the highest priority on doing all it can to relieve the suffering and to avert broader disaster; a massive all-out relief effort is needed and has begun.

To conduct this unprecedentedly large and complex relief effort, contributions on a worldwide scale are needed, and international sponsorship is required to mobilize worldwide participation. The Secretary General of the United Nations has moved to fill these humanitarian needs and has focused world concern on the human suffering in South Asia. He has, through emergency missions in India and East Pakistan, created a working channel through which relief supplies can reach the people in

need in East Pakistan and the refugees in nearby areas in India.

East Pakistan is disaster-ridden. Millions of people—it is one of the most densely populated rural areas on earth—work hard for a precarious existence. Our AID programs and Pakistan's rural development efforts have concentrated on improving conditions and building hope for a less bleak tomorrow, but disaster threatens even the thin margin of life.

Thus, recent disruptions of cyclones, floods, and civil disturbances have affected crops, commerce, and transport and could add perilously to hunger and suffering. This prospect has been a live concern to us since late March.

It was quickly apparent that transport was the critical factor. Rail and road transport from the two ocean ports has been largely disrupted. These normally carried 70 percent of imports needed to meet the annual food deficits. Now even greater food imports are needed to avoid famine.

Only by water transport, not a well-developed sector of the economy, is it possible to meet the urgent need for food. Failure to move the food, arriving in large quantities from friendly countries, upcountry from East Pakistan's ocean ports would have led to widespread hunger and would drive more thousands, in a desperate search for food, to flee across the border and further increase tensions and complicate the problems. Thus, food transport became the prime means to avoid famine and its terrible consequences.

We can now say that the means are being successfully provided. Transport of food in East Pakistan in September is substantially higher than it was in August. And the trend is upward. Anticipated performance in October should mean that the dangers of wide-scale famine will have been avoided.

How has this dramatic result been achieved? In the first place, Pakistani energies have been applied to the urgent task of moving grain to feed the people of East Pakistan. And by providing riverboats, the United States has tipped the scales upward. AID-financed boats carried nearly 20 percent of the inland grain transport in September and will provide a larger capability in October and after.

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapages of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Oct. 4, 1954. Mr. Williams is Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development and U.S. Coordinator for Relief to East Pakistan.

The 26 vessels we are providing range in capacity from 600 to 3,000 tons and can make three to five trips a month to the principal inland waterway ports. Their total capacity, effectively used, can exceed 100,000 tons, about half the overall need.

By the end of August, seven of these AID boats were in East Pakistan. At this moment, 11 are there and six more are due this week. All 26 will be in service in a few weeks.

Thus, the critical food transport problem can be met, provided food and other relief is devoted purely and solely to the welfare of the people of East Pakistan; in other words, that food is kept above the battle. "U.N. Relief" is being boldly marked on boats, trucks, and warehouses which carry or store food or other relief. There can be no mixed cargoes, lest someone think that humanitarian grain is mixed with something else. Return trips of boats and trucks do not carry jute, since it could be construed by the guerrillas as being foreign exchange support to the Government. The U.N. Relief Mission in East Pakistan insists on these rules. We insist on them. Only by clear-cut separation can food and other relief be kept above the battle.

The U.N. has moved to build up an on-the-ground capability in East Pakistan. Some 70 experienced personnel have already been stationed there. Their range of skills will permit them to assist in the whole gamut of relief from the ports to the people. Voluntary agencies—both American, such as CARE and the Catholic Relief Services, and international—are helping. The League of Red Cross Societies has sent 21 relief officers to East Pakistan to work on distribution.

In support of this effort, the United States has provided thus far:

- Over a million tons of food grain, in part consistent with our traditional contribution to help fill East Pakistan's food gap.

- $9 million for chartering vessels, U.N. operating costs, and other relief supplies (and $3.5 million equivalent in rupees for U.N. use for similar purposes).

- $10 million equivalent in rupees for work programs that will generate employment and income.

The resource requirements for relief of the huge numbers of Pakistani refugees now in India are so great that they threaten India's own development. Over $350 million has been budgeted, and hundreds of millions more will be required in the coming months. The international community has thus far contributed $180 million, and this is now having a significant impact as large quantities of food, trucks, shelter materials, medical supplies, and other relief goods arrive in the ports and airfields and are moved to the refugee camps themselves.

However, up to now India has borne the major share of the burden. The Government of India, aided by thousands of relief workers from voluntary agencies, has literally performed miracles in feeding, sheltering, and providing health care to these millions of refugees.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the focal point of the international assistance effort, and the other United Nations agencies associated with him, have performed with notable effectiveness in the unfamiliar role of mobilizing world resources for this gigantic task.

What has the United States done? Up to now our Government has provided $83.2 million in assistance, of which $35.5 million has been in cash to meet nonfood needs and $47.7 has been in P.L. 480 foods. In addition to making substantial direct grants to the United Nations High Commissioner, we have concentrated on doing some of the things we do best, such as providing foods, operating an airlift at the request of the Indian Government to move refugees to less crowded areas within India, flying critically needed shelter materials and medical supplies to Calcutta. We are now procuring blankets for the coming winter and last week authorized an additional $5 million to expand our orders for blankets as it became clear that other sources could not supply enough as quickly. We are prepared to do more as additional needs are identified in cooperation with the United Nations focal point.

It is worthy of note that the people of this country have contributed almost $5 million directly to voluntary agencies for refugee relief. These contributions have been quickly trans-

lated into goods and services and delivered in
India.

Both for humanitarian reasons and in order
to lessen the strain on the Indian economy, the
United States and the rest of the world must
do much more to assist in the relief of the Paki-
stani refugees. President Nixon has directed
that an all-out effort be undertaken in coopera-
tion with other countries in full support of the
United Nations emergency humanitarian relief
efforts.

As you know, Frank Kellogg, who is coordi-
nating U.S. assistance for the Pakistani refu-
gees, is at this moment attending an Executive
Committee meeting of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees to review the overall
effectiveness of the operation.

Of special note is the plight of the children,
millions of them in East Pakistan's unsettled
areas of poverty and hunger and in the refugee
camps in India. I can report they have begun to
receive nutritious food in a concerted U.S.-
supported effort to sustain their health and in
many cases to save their lives.

High-protein food is being provided—enough
to supply each of some 3½ million children in
both countries with almost all diet essentials for
the next 6-8 months. Each child is to receive
3½ ounces of the concentrated food supplement
each day. Nursing mothers will also receive this
supplement.

The U.S. grant of this food will total 155 mil-
lion pounds of Food for Peace blends—instant
corn-soya-milk (CSM) and wheat-soya-blend
(WSB). The foods are granted to the United
Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), which
will administer the program in both India and
in East Pakistan. Shipments began in June and
are expected to continue well into next year.
These special children's foods are flowing from
processors operating at capacity in the Middle
West, California, and Texas.

In East Pakistan, UNICEF personnel are
distributing the food through the local schools.
The program has been initiated with the supply
of over 10 million pounds already delivered, and
first operations are to be in six districts in the
area of the November 1970 cyclone disaster.
UNICEF has rushed personnel to East Paki-

stan, including experienced personnel loaned to
it by CARE. UNICEF international staff there
now totals 19, and more are planned.

In India, the Indian Red Cross, assisted by
UNICEF and the League of Red Cross Societies,
has for some time operated milk feeding
stations for those unfortunate refugee children.
This program, now called "Operation Lifeline,"
is being greatly expanded. The Secretary General
of the League of Red Cross Societies informed
us last week that the feeding program
was then operating in 850 of the 950 refugee
camps and feeding 935,000 small children and
lactating mothers. It is planned to expand the
program further until it provides this supplementary
nourishment to all the refugee children
and nursing mothers who can be reached.

The second part of the operation, hospital
care and feeding of the most seriously under-
nourished children, is in an earlier stage of de-
velopment, but the first hospital stations are
now operating.

We are assisting "Operation Lifeline" with
supplies of high-protein blended foods. Almost
4 million pounds are already in India. During
this month some 25 million pounds will be there.

A Legacy of Peace: Our Responsibility to Future Generations

Address by Secretary Rogers ¹

The United Nations is an important instrument of peace. It is also the repository of many of the world's hopes. We must insure that it is true to those hopes: that we here assembled, the representatives of 130 nations, meet our high responsibilities not only to our own world but to the world of the future.

Building a structure of peace—a structure that will stand—requires patience, dedication and realism. Working at peace, working at it seriously, means more than long hours of careful deliberation. It means putting aside preconceptions; it means weighing carefully what our real interests are, not only as citizens of our own country but also as citizens of the world. It means proceeding with urgency but without impatience, steadfastly but not stubbornly. And it means recognizing that differences exist and will continue to exist—differences of view, differences of interests, different systems, and different values—and that one of the functions of a structure of peace is to protect and accommodate those differences, not to destroy them.

It is appropriate, I think, to take note of the fact that by any objective standard the world is a more peaceful place than it was just a few years ago.

In Africa, the conflict in Nigeria is now long over. Because of recent developments, prospects in the Far East seem more hopeful. Fighting in Indochina, though it continues, has been substantially reduced. The cease-fire still holds in the Middle East. The division of Europe is less threatening because the first stage of agreement has been reached on Berlin. Concrete agree-

ments have been achieved on the periphery of the arms race, and encouraging progress is being made at its center.

Yet there are areas—above all, in South Asia—where political instability has tipped the balance toward greater tension. There man's ancient enemies—poverty, hunger, and disease—gain headway, nurturing within themselves seeds of further unrest. And even in areas where recent progress has been made, tensions remain and the threat of renewed or increased hostilities continues.

That is why we must accelerate our efforts for peace. The achievement of a peaceful world will depend not just on the efforts of a handful of powers but on the efforts of all governments.

In recent years we have seen a new diversification of power and influence among the nations of the world. Most colonial states have won their independence and now exert a marked impact on world affairs. Japan has found remarkable new strength. The movement toward cohesion in Western Europe has quickened. This diversified and interdependent world is clearly preferable to the bipolar world which emerged from the Second World War. Nevertheless, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States—both large, continental states, both nuclear states, and both dynamic states—are of fundamental importance.

Nothing could better serve the cause of peace than further relaxation of tension between our two countries and the elimination of its by-product—the arms race.

The foreseeable future cannot, of course, be expected to bring an end to the differences between the Soviet and American political systems or to the competition between us. But it can

¹ Made before the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 4 (press release 227).

October 25, 1971

437

bring important and beneficial changes in our relations. Many agreements have been achieved in recent years between us. The success of those agreements has stimulated the efforts to negotiate still others. Collectively they could promote not just "coexistence" but—if we proceed to build on durable foundations—"cooperation" as well.

Our desire to lay the foundations for such co-operation is in no way lessened by our policy of seeking to improve relations with the People's Republic of China. And we have taken due note of the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement that the Soviet Union regards the normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China as a natural development.

Though efforts at improvement in Soviet-American and in Soviet-European relations have assumed many forms, the two most important have been the negotiations on strategic arms and on Berlin.

## Negotiations on Strategic Arms and on Berlin

A Berlin agreement will be a milestone along the road to a more peaceful and cooperative Europe. Pivotal in the portion already agreed to is the firm commitment to unrestricted transit traffic of civilian persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin.² Particularly significant is the obligation the Soviet Union has undertaken to insure that this traffic will be unimpeded, that it will be facilitated, and that it will receive preferential treatment.

The value of this agreement will depend not on how the obligations have been formulated on paper, but on how they will be carried out on the ground. Truly unhindered movement to and from Berlin would greatly reduce tensions and remove one of Europe's most dangerous flashpoints. Halfhearted or grudging implementation of the agreement would only perpetuate fears and suspicions. The willingness of the German Democratic Republic, in its discussions with the Federal Republic of Germany,

to translate general obligations into specific commitments and subsequently to put those commitments into actual practice will be the crucial test.

Achievement of a final Berlin agreement and its effective implementation could lead to broader progress. It would, for example, make more realistic the prospects of a European conference with United States and Canadian participation. It would accelerate the movement—desired by the people of Eastern as well as of Western Europe—toward the reduction of tensions on the Continent.

It is to this end that the United States is pursuing the possibilities of negotiation on a mutual and balanced reduction of military forces in Europe.

Two years ago President Nixon pledged to the General Assembly that the United States was determined to limit, and then reverse, the buildup of strategic arms. He said we intended to conduct our negotiations with the Soviet Union "soberly and seriously . . . seeking to reach agreement, rather than to make propaganda."³

In May of this year, the United States and the Soviet Union announced their intention to achieve agreement on both defensive and offensive strategic arms, initiating a new stage of intensive work. As a result, although no agreement has yet been reached, we have come closer together on the concepts and details of an agreement to limit antiballistic missile systems. On May 20 we made an announcement which contemplates that agreements to limit defensive and offensive weapons will be reached "together."⁴ When talks resume in Vienna next month, it is therefore agreed that discussions in greater detail will be undertaken on the limitation of offensive weapons.

Meanwhile, these negotiations have already produced two valuable agreements, one on preventing nuclear accidents from leading to war and the other on improving "Hot Line" commu-

² For background and text of the quadripartite agreement signed at Berlin on Sept. 3, see BULLETIN of Sept. 27, 1971, p. 317.

³ For President Nixon's address before the General Assembly on Sept. 18, 1969, see BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1969, p. 297.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of June 7, 1971, p. 741.

438

Department of State Bulletin

events in East Pakistan are internal events with
which the Government and people of Pakistan
must deal. But their consequences—the flight
of refugees into India, the danger of famine,
the threat to peace in South Asia—are of grave
concern to all nations.

To restore peaceful conditions and to save
human lives it is clear that:

—Restraint must be exercised in the subcon-
tinent;

—The international assistance program must
be expanded to avert famine and to create con-
ditions to encourage the return of refugees;
and

—Efforts toward an effective political set-
tlement in East Pakistan must be actively
pursued.

We are working to those ends.

The United States strongly supports the ef-
forts of the United Nations to organize an
effective international relief program. We have
made available over $200 million for relief in
East Pakistan and for emergency assistance for
the refugees in India—well over 50 percent of
the total contributions from all foreign con-
tributors, public and private. Last week Presi-
dent Nixon asked Congress to appropriate an
additional $250 million to sustain a high level
of relief assistance. A much wider response
from other countries is clearly required. We
urge the major powers and others with substan-
tial financial resources to contribute generously.

Interim Suez Canal Agreement

The other place where progress is urgently
required is in the Middle East. Over several
years, the United Nations has made determined
and persistent efforts to achieve a lasting peace
in that critical area. Nonetheless, the oppor-
tunities for success and the risks of failure re-
main in precarious balance.

Security Council Resolution 242,⁷ establishing
the principles for a durable peace, was the first
major step toward reason after 18 years of

belligerency and a fragile, often violated
armistice.

The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, now near-
ing its 15th month, was the second major step
away from war.

It is time for a third major step toward peace.

For 4 years Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Spe-
cial Representative Gunnar Jarring] has
worked diligently to secure the agreement called
for in Security Council Resolution 242. We
support his efforts. We believe his mission re-
mains the best path to an overall settlement and
to lasting peace. Our views on such a final peace
settlement remain those expressed in President
Nixon's foreign policy report earlier this year
and in my statement of December 9, 1969.⁸

Both sides to the conflict are committed to the
fundamental and reciprocal principles to which
the Jarring Mission is dedicated: living in peace
with each other and withdrawal from territories
occupied in the 1967 conflict as set forth in Se-
curity Council Resolution 242. Despite those
commitments, a deep gulf of suspicion and dis-
trust remains.

Each side is convinced of the justice of its
cause. Each is concerned about its future se-
curity. A political settlement based on mutual
accommodation could assure both. An attempt
to achieve these ends by force will destroy all
possibilities for either.

This is why we believe a third major step
toward peace is essential:

—A step which can be taken now;

—A step that is practical;

—A step that could help create the confidence
and trust which are now lacking;

—A step toward full and complete implemen-
tation of Resolution 242.

That step is an interim Suez Canal agree-
ment. That is why the United States has wel-
comed the interest of both Egypt and Israel in
such an agreement. That is why, at the request

⁸ The complete text of President Nixon's foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 appears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971; for Secretary Rogers' address at Washington on Dec. 9, 1969, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1970, p. 7.

⁷ For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

442

Department of State Bulletin

of the parties, the United States has undertaken
to play a constructive role in the process of ar-
riving at an agreement.

In order to explore the positions of each side, we have discussed concrete and specific ideas designed to meet the legitimate needs and concerns of both sides. Those ideas, given willingness and good intentions on both sides, could become the basis for a breakthrough. They require further quiet discussions with the parties, an undertaking we now hope can be expedited along the following lines:

*A first point is the relationship between an interim agreement and an overall settlement. A fair approach should be founded on two basic principles:*

- That a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step toward complete and full implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself. That has to be clearly established in any agreement.

- That neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim agreement, complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an overall settlement. If it could, there would be no necessity for an interim agreement. Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out through negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agreement is reached, active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices could be renewed.

*A second point is the matter of the cease-fire. Its maintenance is in the interest of all of us, of everyone concerned, of everyone in this room—in fact, in the interest of the whole world. The ultimate objective, of course, is a permanent end to belligerency as part of a final binding peace agreement. But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a cease-fire of short duration be realistic. With good will on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.*

*Third is the zone of withdrawal. There are,*

of course, very important strategic considerations involved in this k... point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides. Without going into the details, I would merely say that I believe that in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an overall settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.

*Fourth is the nature of the supervisory arrangements. Both sides must have confidence that the agreement will not be violated and that adequate machinery will be provided for prompt detection of any infractions. We are confident that ways reassuring to both Israel and Egypt can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms that have existed in the area for the past two decades.*

*Fifth is the question of an Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal.* The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the canal. It is understandable, too, that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible. The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here, too, based on our discussion, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise on this issue.

*Sixth is the use of the Suez Canal.* The United States has long held that the canal should be open to passage for all nations without discrimination. This principle is clear in the Security Council resolution of November 1967. What is at present at issue in considering an interim agreement is principally the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe an accommodation on this point is quite possible.

With those six points in mind let me say this: Because the parties have asked us, we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim agreement. This effort, we believe, is imperative because—and I think it is important to keep this in mind—

October 25, 1971

443

there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue.

There are risks to peace; but the greater risk is inaction, unwillingness to face up to the hard decisions.

A practical step now—an interim agreement—would make the next step toward peace less difficult for all the parties to take.

It would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a waterway for international shipping.

It would reestablish Egypt's authority over a major national asset.

444

Department of State Bulletin

file

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1195

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

10:05 A.M. EDT

OCTOBER 5, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We have an announcement to make this morning, and then following this announcement, which I will give to you, Dr. Kissinger will be able to expand on it a little bit and take a few of your questions.

The Government of the Peoples Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America have agreed that Dr. Kissinger will visit Peking in the latter part of October for talks with the Chinese Government to make concrete arrangements for President Nixon's visit to China.

That completes the announcement, which is being made jointly with the Peoples Republic of China at this time, and now Dr. Kissinger will expand on this.

Q Ground rules?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger is on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: I will just take your questions, but let me make one general observation.

There is nothing unusual or unforeseen that has produced this announcement. It had always been planned that, at the appropriate stage in the preparations for the President's visit, there would be another interim visit to the Peoples Republic of China to make concrete, technical arrangements and to begin a preliminary outline of the sort of schedule that might be followed.

I will take with me a senior official from the Department of State, Mr. Al Jenkins, who is from the Bureau of East Asian Affairs; two members of my staff, Mr. Holdridge and Mr. Lord; and I will take with me also a member of the advance teams from the White House, a member of Ron's staff, Ron being in charge of the press arrangements, a member of the White House Communications Agency, and a member of the Secret Service.

So, you can see that over half of my party will be concerned with the technical arrangements of the trip.

That is all that I want to say; but, of course, I will be delighted to answer questions.

Q Can you tell us who these people are that are going with you, Henry?

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- 2 -

DR. KISSINGER: First, there will be Mr. Jenkins from the Department of State; John Holdridge, who is the East Asia expert on my staff; Winston Lord, who was with me in Peking in July, as was John Holdridge.

There will be a member of the advance group, which will be Dwight Chapin. The others have not been designated yet, but we will announce them as soon as they have been-- White House Communications, Secret Service, and a member of Ron's staff.

Q A total of how many?

DR. KISSINGER: Ten, maybe.

Q Will you be seeing Chou En-lai or Mao Tse-tung?

DR. KISSINGER: I expect to see Prime Minister Chou En-lai. I have no idea who else from the Government of the People's Republic I will be seeing.

Q When does this indicate that the President will be going?

Q Are you going in Air Force One?

DR. KISSINGER: I am going in a Government plane. I do not think I will go in Air Force One, but I will go in one of the Presidential planes.

Q Can you give us the route?

DR. KISSINGER: I plan to go via Hawaii.

Q Can you give us the dates?

DR. KISSINGER: The dates have not been finally fixed, but they are more likely to be in the earlier part of that period than in the latter. As soon as we have the precise dates, we will announce them, and that should not be too long.

Q Approximately how many days?

DR. KISSINGER: We will be in Peking up to four days.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when does this indicate that the President will be going to Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: Actually, it doesn't indicate anything about when the President will go, one way or the other. We will, of course, discuss that while I am in Peking, and I think we should zero in on a date while I am there and, therefore, should have an announcement within a reasonable period after that.

Q Will you be discussing the agenda?

DR. KISSINGER: Only in the general way that is necessary to plan a schedule. Obviously, there will be some

MORE

- 3 -

general discussions when you talk at this level, but not in
any final way.

Q Do you have any idea, or can you tell us anything about what has been going on in China in the last few days?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a comment about this.

We do not have any reliable information except for
the facts that are generally known about what is going on
in the Peoples Republic of China.

Secondly, we do not believe that a Presidential
visit entitles us, as a government, to speculate about the
internal developments in the country that we are visiting.

Thirdly, in terms of our dealings with the Peoples
Republic of China, the preparations for the visit have been
handled meticulously, correctly, and carefully, and there has
been no impact of whatever developments may be occurring on
these preparations.

Fourthly, we believe that the Peoples Republic of
China, as the United States, has made a serious decision to
attempt to improve their relationships, recognizing differ-
ences in ideology, and that these are decisions that are not
going to be lightly reversed on either side. If such a
reversal should occur, then it is time for us to address it.

But, as the Secretary of State said, we hope this
will not arise, and above all, I want to stress that we have
no evidence whatever that such a reversal is taking place, and
we have a great deal of evidence that the preparations on the
side of the Peoples Republic of China have gone forward
seriously and, as I said, carefully. In these circumstances,
it would be highly inappropriate for us to make any comments
on internal developments in the Peoples Republic of China, and
that is the policy of the United States Government and all its
agencies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you in direct contact with
Peking, or is this through third parties?

DR. KISSINGER: We are in direct contact with Peking,
but obviously, in the absence of formal diplomatic relations,
the procedure is somewhat more cumbersome than it is when you
have diplomatic establishments in both capitals, and this is
one reason why this trip is useful.

Q Dr. Kissinger, have you been assured by Peking
that whatever is happening in China will not affect the visit,
or is this just an assumption made by the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: We would not presume to ask the
Peoples Republic of China to explain to us what presumed in-
ternal developments in Peking would do to common plans, any
more than we would look with favor on a question by them on
whether American domestic developments affect their plans. To
answer your question, we have not raised the issue with the
Peoples Republic of China. They have not volunteered any infor-
mation, but their performance has made perfectly clear that if
anything is happening, it is not related to the visit, because
our communications have been unchanged.

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- 4 -

Q Henry, in your direct contacts with the Peoples Republic since your return from Peking, have you dealt in any great detail with the matter of the agenda for the Presidential meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: We have discussed it in a general way. At this point we are mostly concerned with the framework of the visit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you expect to be anywhere besides Peking on this trip?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no plans at this moment, but we do expect to release a detailed itinerary before departure. At this moment we expect to go to Peking and return from Peking.

Q Are your four days in Peking and if there are other stops there will be additional days?

DR. KISSINGER: I will be in the Peoples Republic of China for a maximum of four days. I do not expect to spend any time in any other town in the Peoples Republic of China. If there should be any change in this, which we do not anticipate at this moment, we will release it before my departure. I do not expect any stomach aches to develop on this trip. (Laughter)

Q Do you expect any other members of your party to visit any other cities besides Peking in the Peoples Republic?

DR. KISSINGER: We expect that all the members of the party will stay together. I don't exclude that a member of the advance team may visit a place that may be considered for a Presidential visit, but frankly, we have not reached that point and I say it only so that there are not any surprises. That is not excluded. I do not expect to visit any other place.

Q How are you going to approach the press coverage to your trip now and to the President's trip and what are you going to discuss with the Chinese in principle about press coverage?

DR. KISSINGER: On my trip I don't intend to take any press. On the President's trip, Ron is in charge of the press and a member of his staff is going to come along. He is going to have an exploratory conversation with whatever Chinese counterpart there may be about what is possible in terms of press coverage; that is, what facilities the Chinese have available or could make available. We will then get their ideas. This will be examined when we get back here. There will be no final decisions made on this trip. We will get their ideas, examine them here, and, of course, there will have to be much more detailed technical preparations. This is a preliminary survey. This is not for the final decision.

Q Are you saying this is the first time the question of press coverage has been raised?

DR. KISSINGER: No. It has been raised in a general way before. It is the first time it is being raised in a concrete, specific way, where one actually can talk about facilities. One problem is that I am not competent to discuss press coverage and I believe that the Chinese, in their long and distinguished history, have never encountered anything like a Presidential press party. This is something that will take a little getting used to. (Laughter)

MORE

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rogers on the Columbia Broadcast-
ing System's television and radio program
"Face the Nation" on October 10. Interviewing
the Secretary were CBS News diplomatic cor-
respondent Marvin Kalb, George Sherman,
diplomatic correspondent of the Washington
Evening Star, and CBS News correspondent
George Herman, moderator.

Mr. Herman: Secretary Rogers, Egyptian President Sadat, before leaving for Moscow this morning, proposed a new Suez Canal settlement which would have Egyptian troops crossing the canal immediately, a concept previously rejected by Israel. Does this run counter to indications you've been getting from Arab leaders that a settlement is now possible and could be worked out?

Secretary Rogers: No, Mr. Herman, it does not run counter to those suggestions, because President Sadat has proposed this before. This is one of the things that he thinks is very important from his point of view. As you know, Israel at the moment rejects that-rejects the concept of Egyptian troops crossing the canal-and this is one of the things that would have to be worked out before an interim agreement could be achieved.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, your Depart-
ment has given some indications of being more
encouraged recently about the possibility of an
Arab-Israeli settlement, and yet this seems like
the two sides are as nose to nose as ever before,
no sign of give. What is encouraging?

Secretary Rogers: I think you have to recog-
nize, Mr. Herman, that in all negotiations, when
they seem to be stalled, each side states its maxi-
mum position and publicly it doesn't concede
anything until there is a settlement. Now, in this

case the United States at the request of both
Israel and Egypt has played a role of mediator,
if you will, at least a good-offices role, attempt-
ing to find out the positions of each side, to de-
termine the parameters, and to see if we could
play a useful role in reaching an agreement.
Now, as a result of the discussions that we've had
with both Israel and Egypt, we believe that the
parameters are fairly clearly set forth. We be-
lieve it is possible to work out a settlement. I am
convinced myself that both sides want a settle-
ment, and furthermore it's the only viable alter-
native. Everyone at the United Nations that I've
talked to-and I've talked to 70 foreign minis-
ters during the last 10 days on an individual
private basis-acknowledges that the United
States initiative, under the leadership of Presi-
dent Nixon, is the only viable alternative at the
moment, so we are going to do everything
we can to play a useful role to bring about an
interim agreement. And I am cautiously opti-
mistic that that is possible.

Mr. Sherman: But, Mr. Secretary, in practi-
cal terms, Israel has had a very hostile reaction
to your putting forward the six-point approach
to the interim agreement. They suggest, in fact,
that your doing that had undermined your role
as the middleman in reaching this. Can you tell
us what you hope to achieve from putting for-
ward those six points?

Secretary Rogers: Well, Mr. Sherman, you'll
understand that the six points that we put forth
are really the parameters of an agreement, they
are not proposals by the United States. It is true
that Israel has reacted, I noticed publicly,
adversely in some instances, but there has been
no criticism of my speech as such; and I talked
to Mr. Eban [Israeli Foreign Minister Abba
Eban] after I had made my speech, and he

November 1, 1971

479

didn't make any mention of any criticism or
object to any particular portion of my speech.¹
And I think the position of the United States in
the United Nations, as a result of this statement,
which is President Nixon's position, has been
very favorably received. Now, obviously if
either side agrees publicly with what we have
stated, it might appear that they are making
concessions, but I think that both Egypt and
Israel have responded in a fairly positive way.

**Mr. Kalb:** Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians and the Russians have a formal relationship with one another, the 15-year treaty of friendship. Do you feel that one way of breaking out of the impasse on the Suez effort is to have a long-term formal association with Israel that could perhaps take the form of a congressional resolution?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, we are open to any
possible suggestion that would lead to peace in
the area, and we have indicated that we support
Israel, we support its sovereignty, we support
its right to exist as a nation, and we have, as
you know, have been very helpful to Israel, and
the Prime Minister of Israel has said that Presi-
dent Nixon has done more for Israel in these
last 2 years, in 2½ years, than any other Presi-
dent has done. I don't think it's necessary to
have that kind of an arrangement in order to
work out a peaceful settlement, but we would
not preclude it.

**Mr. Sherman:** Well, would you be in favor of an exchange of letters, perhaps, or some sort of written document stating American security guarantees for Israel if they make concessions on this withdrawal?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I don't, Mr. Sherman, want to be involved in hypothetical discussions of what we might do.

**Mr. Sherman:** Have you discussed this with Israel?

**Secretary Rogers:** No, we have not in the
terms that you've mentioned.

**Mr. Herman:** The other big power in this situation is the Soviet Union, and Mr. Sadat is now on his way to Moscow. Do you have any indications as to what the Soviet Union might urge toward a settlement in the Middle East?

**Secretary Rogers:** No, I do not. I had a long discussion with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] on this subject. I am convinced that they do not want an outbreak of war in the area because they've realized that it might result in a confrontation with the United States, so to that extent I think they would like to have the cease-fire continue. What their ultimate objective is, I'm not sure.

**Mr. Sherman:** Mr. Secretary, in your speech, one of your points, you said it's possible for a compromise on this issue of the Egyptian troops crossing the canal. The Israelis say flatly they will not compromise on this. Can you give us some indication of where you see the compromise developing?

**Secretary Rogers:** No, I can't, Mr. Sherman, for the reasons that I've mentioned. Obviously both sides say they are not going to compromise. If they say they are going to compromise, that would undercut their position. So in any negotiation, whether it's this or the Berlin talks, or even a labor negotiation, both sides say, "We won't make any further concessions." All I'm saying is that based on our discussions, we think, given the good will and good intentions of both nations, that an interim agreement is possible.

**Mr. Kalb:** Mr. Secretary, getting back to these security guarantees for Israel, the topic anyway, there was a story that was published earlier last week, and it was not only not denied by U.S. officials, but it was basically confirmed, that there have been discussions of security arrangements with Israel that—I believe Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs], when he was in Israel during the summer, discussed some of these arrangements. What form would they take, if it would not take the form of some kind of congressional resolution or something more formal than the ad hoc arrangement that now exists?

¹ For Secretary Rogers' address before the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 4, see BULLETIN of Oct. 25, 1971, p. 337.

480

Department of State Bulletin

*Secretary Rogers:* Mr. Kalb, one of the reasons that it's necessary to have quiet diplomacy is because every answer that you make to one question relates to another question. Now, what the form of guarantee would take would depend upon what kind of arrangement was made. Obviously if Israel makes an interim agreement, to some extent its military position is changed. Now, if it has changed as a result of that interim agreement to its detriment, then some provision would have to be made to reassure Israel that its security was not impaired as a result of that agreement, and we are prepared to consider that, but we are absolutely convinced that it is vital to the peace in the area and to peace in the world, for that matter, to work out this problem, and we don't think the time has ever been more favorable than now. Everyone accepts the idea that the cease-fire has been very fortunate, everyone accepts the idea that there should be an interim agreement—this was President Sadat's idea—and Israel has responded favorably to the idea—now it's a matter of working out the terms and conditions so that it's clear to Egypt that this is not a final step, that this is merely a step toward an overall settlement under the Security Council resolution, and to satisfy Israel that its security is not in peril.

*Mr. Herman:* Do you take President Sadat's deadline at the end of this year seriously? Do you think that's hard and fast?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I take what President Sadat says seriously. I think he very much wants to do the things that he can do to bring about an interim settlement. I think he wants to create a sense of urgency, and that's understandable. I naturally dislike any threats about renewed hostilities. I think it's of great importance that all parties, as much as possible, desist from statements that make the situation even more tense.

*Mr. Herman:* A little over a week ago, Mr. Secretary, you said that you hoped that events inside the mainland Chinese Republic would not affect the possibility of President Nixon's making a trip there. What do you think now?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, as I said at that time,

I have no reason—none of us have any reason in this administration + think that the events, whatever they have been in the People's Republic of China, will adversely affect the President's visit to Peking. We are proceeding on the theory that it is going to take place, Dr. Kissinger's [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] trip is consistent with that belief, and we have no reason to think it won't work out just as planned.

*Mr. Kalb:* Do you have any hard information, as reported this morning, that Lin Piao, the designated successor to Mao Tse-tung, is ill?

*Secretary Rogers:* No, we do not, Mr. Kalb, have any hard information.

*Mr. Sherman:* Mr. Secretary, it's been almost 3 months now since the President announced he was going to Peking. Can you tell us this morning in any way what he hopes to achieve there specifically?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, not beyond what has been said, Mr. Sherman. The President has pointed out that he wants to improve our relations with the People's Republic of China, it represents 700 million people in the world, it should not be isolated from the world, we're prepared to do our part to improve those relations. We would expect that our prospects for increased trade, cultural exchange, scientific exchanges, exchanges of journalists, and so forth. Now, beyond that we can't be sure; but whatever we can do to improve our relations, as long as it's not at the expense of our friends and allies, we will certainly seriously consider.

## Chinese Representation in the U.N.

*Mr. Kalb:* That gets right to the heart of the issue now with the United Nations, trying not to have Nationalist China expelled. How do you think that American effort is going?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I think it's going reasonably well. As you know, I've had a lot of meetings recently on—I've talked with a lot of foreign ministers on this subject. At the moment I think the vote would be very close. It's a horse race, but I think we're going to be successful; I am reasonably optimistic that we will succeed.

November 1, 1971

481

Now, let me say, Mr. Kalb, that our position is
that the Republic of China should not be
expelled from the United Nations, and if it hap-
pens, I think it's a very dangerous precedent
indeed to expel a nation by a majority vote.
Regardless of how you justify it, whether you
justify it on the grounds of representation or
what, it's a very dangerous precedent and will
be very, I think, detrimental to the future of the
United Nations, because I can think of 10 other
nations that would be on the list in the future.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, a number of dele-
gates up at the U.N. feel that the United States
really is going through the motions up at the
U.N., trying to build up a good, credible pub-
lic defense of Nationalist China's interests, but
basically, given even the announcement this
week of the Kissinger visit to Peking, you've got
your eye on Peking, not Taiwan.

Secretary Rogers: Well, that just is not true, Mr. Kalb. We're doing everything that we possibly can to prevent the expulsion of the Republic of China. In addition to the point that I just made about the precedent that would be created, let me say, too, that if the Republic of China is expelled I can imagine that nations like Albania and others might claim that because of that action, expelling the Republic of China, all the actions taken by the Security Council in the United Nations since its beginning were illegal. In other words, if the United Nations is going to take that position, that after all these years in dealing with the Republic of China, it should be expelled and thereby be an international outlaw and its presence was never appropriate in the first place, I could imagine an attack on the United Nations that would be very serious indeed, so I can't tell you how serious the United States is about doing everything we can to fight to prevent the expulsion of China. And I think that when nations start analyzing it carefully and thinking about the consequences that might result from this action by the United Nations, they may change their view. I might also say that some of the newspaper reports that I've seen to the effect that some of these nations are going to vote against us, I do not believe are correct. They've assured

us otherwise in private discussions, and I
believe—

Mr. Herman: Which ones?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I'm not going to say,
but I can tell you that in several cases, I have
been assured privately that they are going to
support us on the important question resolution.
As you know, that important question resolu-
tion says that Taiwan will not be expelled except
by two-thirds vote.

Mr. Sherman: Given the nature of your com-
mitment, very deep commitment, the fight you're
waging in the General Assembly, the feeling in
Congress evidently, about this issue, do you
foresee that if the Nationalists are expelled
from the United Nations, that the executive
branch will have a difficult time gaining the
financing from Congress for the United
Nations?

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Sherman, I have not
said that in my discussions, because President
Nixon has not so indicated. He has not indi-
cated he would himself back away from any
support of the United Nations—

Mr. Sherman: No, but I asked whether you think you'll have difficulty—

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I think we will have
difficulty, and I pointed that out. It's clear that
many Senators already have expressed them-
selves to that effect, that they would hesitate
to give the United Nations the same financial
support that they have in the past, and also
many Members of the House of Representatives.

Mr. Kalb: Would the administration throw
its weight and support behind an effort on
behalf of Congress to cut funds for the U.N.?

Secretary Rogers: Why, we haven't faced up
to that, Marvin. No, I wouldn't want to say
anything like that, because that would appear
to be a threat, and we are not approaching this
problem that way at all. We are approaching it
as a matter of principle. The principle is very
important. If you expel a member of the United
Nations—

Mr. Herman: Let me pick you up on that one

482

Department of State Bulletin

word—we haven't faced up to that, is what you said.

Secretary Rogers: Yes.

Mr. Herman: You mean that when that happens, then you will have to consider what you will do about the support—American support—

Secretary Rogers: No, I haven't faced up to it, because I think we're going to win the vote.

Mr. Herman: But on the—on the—if you should not, will that then be a time to face up to it and make a decision?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we'll have to decide what the congressional attitude is on the subject. President Nixon strongly supports the United Nations and always has and will continue to, and that's why we feel very strongly on this question of the expulsion of the Republic of China. I can't think of anything that would be more destructive to the United Nations than expelling a government that is in existence and has been a good member all these years, representing 14 million people. I can't—at a time when most of the speakers in the United Nations are talking about universality, which means that all governments should be represented, so it's quite inconsistent with the whole trend of the United Nations.

Mr. Sherman: If Nationalist China should be expelled, would you see that its isolation from the world community might convince Peking that it could use force to take back Formosa?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think so. We have no reason to think that, but of course if the Republic of China is expelled from the United Nations, as I say, it suggests that it's a non-fact-of-life, that it's a nonentity. The fact of the matter is that the Republic of China is a government in existence and will continue to be in existence for some time to come unless the evolutionary process somehow brings about a reconciliation between mainland China and the Republic of China.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, one wrinkle of this new China policy is that it appears, anyway, that there is a rather strong sentiment, even in the State Department, that the effort to improve

relations with China I certainly led to a deterioration in our relations with Japan, which is certainly a fulcrum of the whole Nixon doctrine in Asia, if it is to succeed. How badly, to ask you a leading question, do you think those relations have been damaged?

## Relations With Japan

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think they've been damaged, Mr. Kalb, by the President's initiative to visit Peking. We have problems with them—

Mr. Kalb: The economic problems?

Secretary Rogers: —economic problems, but I don't believe it's been a problem. I think it's a problem temporarily with Japan, because we were not in a position to give them any notice in advance, because we didn't notify other nations either. We had an agreement with the People's Republic of China that we would make the announcement simultaneously, and we felt if there was any leak about that it would look as if we had doublecrossed them. But I think Japan realizes that.

Mr. Sherman: But, Mr. Secretary, aren't we in fact setting up a double standard of alliances? It's an article of faith in this administration that in all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we have very close consultations with our West European allies, yet on the other side of the world, ever since July 15, with this sudden announcement, the United States Government seems to have done everything possible to dissociate itself from the Government of Japan in its dealings with Peking, to the point where reports from Tokyo are that Premier Sato may fall very shortly, and I'm just wondering whether in our rush for a dialogue with Peking we're not really undermining our relationship with the real power in Asia, which is Japan.

Secretary Rogers: Well, we aren't, Mr. Sherman. Of course, the first part of your question is not quite accurate either. We certainly didn't consult with the Soviet Union about the President's visit to Peking.

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Mr. Sherman: No, no, but I mean, in dealing—in our dealings with the Soviet Union, we consult with West European allies, yet in our dealings with Communist China, we don't seem to consult with Japan, which is our main ally in Asia.

Secretary Rogers: No, that isn't true. We consult with Japan very closely on almost everything. As a matter of fact, in the ministerial meeting, I sent Japan the draft of the statement that I was going to make at the meeting, so that they could give us their suggestions. The only thing we haven't done—

Mr. Kalb: It leaked.

Secretary Rogers: It leaked. [Laughter.]

## Elections in South Viet-Nam

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, I seem to be the one who always likes to throw up quotations from the past to our guests, and I noticed that you said in June of 1969 that the administration was not wedded to any government in Saigon, only to the idea of a free choice for the people of South Viet-Nam.² Have they now had a free choice?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think—you're speaking about the presidential election—I think that it's quite clear that we're disappointed that there wasn't a contested election. I have pointed out, though, there was a contested election as far as the parliament was concerned and there was a fairly well conducted election, and the opposition gained 20 seats in the Assembly.

Mr. Herman: I guess my point is, do they have a government of their own choice, do you think?

Secretary Rogers: What's that?

Mr. Herman: Do they have a government of their own choice, do you think?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think the parliament does, and I think that probably President Thieu does, represent the will of the people;

but you can't tell, because there wasn't a contested election. It is, I think, fair to say, though, Mr. Herman, that both the candidates who were proposed as possibilities, Minh and Ky, did have the opportunity to run and decided against it. Now, I think there is a good deal of debate about the circumstances that provided the opportunity, but you know, it's one of those facts of life. We have said publicly that we're disappointed that there wasn't a contest in Viet-Nam.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, there have always been so many shifting rationalizations offered by your administration and others, too, about why the United States is in Viet-Nam, and one of the major ones has always been self-determination. There are a lot of people who feel, and you yourself have just expressed disappointment, that that did not happen last Sunday. What now is the basic rationalization for the continued presence of American forces in Viet-Nam? What is—what is beneficial to the United States?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we have made a tremendous national commitment. We have had roughly 50,000 Americans killed, we've had 2 million men serve in the armed forces there, because we believe that they have the right to determine their own future. Now, that doesn't necessarily—"determine their own future"—mean free election as we know it. As a matter of fact, as President Nixon pointed out in his press conference,³ about 60 out of the 90 nations in the world that we help do not have the elective process as we know it, and we think that Viet-Nam is—South Viet-Nam—has come along well. Its economy is fairly stable. We think that the Vietnamization program has worked; and we think that they will manage to work out an elective process, just as South Korea has, that will be satisfactory. We don't think that just because this one election happened to be one that we were not entirely satisfied with, the events in the future are not going to be satisfactory. We had the same criticism made in the case of South Korea.

² For Secretary Rogers' news conference of June 5, 1969, see BULLETIN of June 23, 1969, p. 529.

³ For excerpts from the transcript of President Nixon's news conference of Sept. 16, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1971, p. 341.

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Mr. Kalb: But why make the comparison with Korea? Excuse me, I just want to pursue this. Why is what happened in Korea relevant to what is happening in Viet-Nam or even could happen there?

Secretary Rogers: Well, because, at first the system was criticized because it wasn't the elective system as we know it, and I think in South Viet-Nam, if things go well—and I'm inclined to think they will in the future—I think South Viet-Nam will be a free, independent nation, and I think they will manage to have an elective system that we can be proud of. They certainly did in the parliamentary elections.

Mr. Herman: To sum up, I think, what we're after, do you think that the elections will have any impact on the speed of withdrawal of our troops or America's tie to South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Rogers: I don't think so. Let me say this: President Nixon started out with a program of getting American forces out of Viet-Nam. It's progressed just as he predicted it would; we are going to continue that process. Our casualties, as you know, are way down; we're going to continue that process, and President Nixon is living up to his commitment to get American forces out of that war. Furthermore, he's taken the lead throughout the world in the cause of peace. We brought about a ceasefire in the Middle East; everyone acknowledges that. We have had very active discussions with the Russians in Europe, in the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] talks, in Berlin, and so forth, which appear to be succeeding. He now is talking with the People's Republic of China. In other words, President Nixon is a world leader for peace, and I think that people throughout the world realize that.

Mr. Sherman: Mr. Secretary, do you have any information that the North Vietnamese, in fact, are building up for a new offensive in South Viet-Nam at a time when the President is about to make a new announcement on further troop withdrawals?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we never know for sure, of course, but the indications are that they are not. There always is a possibility; as you know, there was a great deal of speculation

about the fact that they might launch a major offensive just prior to the election, which they didn't do. So there's no indication based on our current intelligence which would suggest that.

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, if I could swing you around to Greece and the upcoming visit there of the Vice President, is this something that you, the State Department, support, and how is it justified?

Secretary Rogers: Well, yes, we support it. As you know, Vice President Agnew has Greek ancestors. He has wanted very much to go to Greece for some time for obvious reasons. We have good relations with Greece. We're members of an alliance. Greece is a very important nation to the United States in terms of that whole part of the world and the Mediterranean in particular, so we want to continue to have good relations with Greece. We have, of course, expressed some disappointment that they haven't moved more quickly to representative government, but we have to keep in mind that there is a limit to what we can do to affect other governments and we—in the past we've been much too anxious to criticize other governments.

Mr. Herman: We have one minute. Doesn't this affect us? Are we not somehow affecting the Greek Government by sending our Vice President there, somehow?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we—it's always a question—it's always a question whether we have greater influence when we're closer to a government or when we're more hostile to a government. My own view is that we'll have a better opportunity to—as a result of consultations—to affect the events in the way that we hope they'll be affected.

Mr. Herman: Let's sneak you one in the last 30 seconds. Did you turn down a nomination to the Supreme Court at the hands of the President?

Secretary Rogers: No, I have not. I would never have to turn him down, turn down that suggestion, because he knows how I feel about the Court. We've been good friends for a long time, and he knows exactly how I feel.

Mr. Herman: How do you feel?

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Secretary Rogers: Oh, I feel that he will select an outstanding man for the Court, and I've made it clear over the years that I have no interest in any such assignment.

Mr. Herman: Thank you very much, Secretary Rogers, for being with us today on "Face the Nation."

## 132d Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador William J. Porter, head of the U.S. delegation, at the 132d plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on October 14.

Press release 235 dated October 14

Ladies and gentlemen: It is apparent that certain facts we have presented here during recent weeks have caused you some annoyance. I can understand that you do not like comparisons of your apparatus in the South with authentic national movements nor descriptions of your real military and political situation in South Viet-Nam. Yet such statements result from the functioning of this forum as you have desired it. In my first statement here I said that there would be many things to say which you might wish to take time to consider without feeling the necessity for public response, but you did not react well to that thought. What I have to say here is not polemical in nature. It is a simple and methodical presentation of facts and views, any of which you are free to challenge.

It seems to me that your difficulties arise from a combination of three matters. The first was your original decision to take up arms against the people of South Viet-Nam in order to bring them under North Viet-Nam's control instead of choosing the path of peaceful political competition; the second is the unreal positions and fantasies your first decision forced you to develop; and the third arises from the rigidity of your instructions, which is apparently caused by the inability of your leadership to respond to events and changed situations as the leaders of other divided states are endeavoring to do. I will discuss each of these in turn.

I spoke of your original decision to take up arms against the people of South Viet-Nam instead of choosing political competition. This decision turned out to be exceedingly costly, as well as unproductive, because it meant death and injury to many of your own kind and resulted in a stiffening resistance to your cause. Thus your military tactics hindered your political progress, until today your political influence in South Viet-Nam is, like your military position, at an alltime low. You know this to be true. Otherwise you would quickly seize the opportunity to participate in internationally supervised elections which has been offered to your group in South Viet-Nam.

In the realm of fantasy there is of course your pretension that there are no North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam, in Cambodia, or in Laos; your statements about "liberated" areas in South Viet-Nam which you cannot identify; and your claim to be able to speak for the people of South Viet-Nam. Such pretensions cannot stand up under examination, and thus they tend to undermine your credibility. Another example of how your policy works against your best interest is of course your handling of the prisoner problem.

Your third major problem is that you have not been able to develop sufficient flexibility to probe the possibilities that are available to you or even to explain and defend your own proposals. I am against rigidity as a tactic, and in your case it has produced no useful result and there is no prospect that it will do so. Therefore any group with responsibilities such as yours, after rigidity has proved itself a destructive rather than a constructive tactic, would do well to reconsider how best to make progress—like many others who have learned that negotiation is the art of achieving the possible.

I think I can discern some of the very difficult decisions which lie ahead of you, including the matter of putting still more of your young men into a conflict from which many will never emerge. I profoundly hope that you will make the decision not to do so and that you will take the other path, that of negotiations.

All of this has been general in nature, though there is a great deal of detail connected with the various aspects of this presentation which I will

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## President Nixon's News Conference of October 12

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the White House press briefing room on October 12.

**The President:** Ladies and gentlemen, I have an announcement which is embargoed till 12 noon Washington time and 7 o'clock Moscow time. In order for you to have a chance to file before the 12 o'clock deadline, I have asked Mr. Kempster [Norman Kempster, United Press International], who has the right to end the conference, to break it off at 5 minutes till 12. Between that time and the time that I read this announcement, of course, I will take questions on this announcement or any other subject that you would like to have covered. The announcement is as follows:

"The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, in their exchanges during the past year, have agreed that a meeting between them would be desirable once sufficient progress had been made in negotiations at lower levels.

"In light of the recent advances in bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving the two countries, it has been agreed that such a meeting will take place in Moscow in the latter part of May, 1972.

"President Nixon and the Soviet leaders will review all major issues, with a view towards further improving their bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects of world peace."

We will go to your questions.

*Q. Mr. President, what relationship does this have to your visit to China?*

**The President:** The two are independent trips. We are going to Peking for the purpose

of discussing matters of bilateral concern there, and I will be going to the Soviet Union for the purpose of discussing matters that involve the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither trip is being taken for the purpose of exploiting what differences may exist between the two nations. Neither is being taken at the expense of any other nation.

The trips are being taken for the purpose of better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and better relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. And any speculation to the effect that one has been planned for the purpose of affecting the other would be entirely inaccurate.

*Q. Mr. President, why announce a trip of this nature so far in advance?*

**The President:** It is vitally important, both in the case of this trip and the trip to the People's Republic of China—which, as you know, we announced far in advance, the date yet to be selected. Mr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] will work out that date on his trip, which will take place within the next 2 or 3 weeks.

But it is vitally important that the meeting accomplish something. It is therefore important that the preparation for the meeting be adequate in every respect, and in the discussion that I had with Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs] when he was here and at discussions prior to that time that were had at other levels with regard to the setting up of this trip, it was felt that May of 1972 would be the time when progress on a number of fronts in which we are presently involved

November 1, 1971

473

with the Soviet Union would have reached the
point that a meeting at the highest level could
be effective.

*Q. Mr. President, do you expect to be able to sign an agreement on strategic arms when you go to Moscow next May?*

*The President:* As you will recall, we, at the highest level in May, indicated that our goal would be to try to achieve an agreement on strategic arms this year. We are making progress toward that goal. We will continue to move toward achieving that goal, either at the end of this year or as soon thereafter as we possibly can.

If the goal can be achieved before May of
1972, we will achieve it, and that, incidentally,
is also the view of the Soviet Union.

I will not speculate as to failing to achieve
that goal. If it is not achieved, certainly that
would be one of the subjects that would come up.

*Q. Mr. President, what would you expect other items on the agenda to be in addition to anything that is concluded at the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] talks?*

*The President:* I have already indicated that we will review all major issues. Now, to indicate what the issues will be is quite premature. For example, the question that has just been raised with regard to the SALT talks is one that may be behind us at that point.

Both governments are working toward that
end. And then the question would be, what do
we do in arms control going beyond simply the
limitation of strategic weapons at this point,
and the same would be true of the Mideast,
which is a possible subject. The same is true in
a number of other areas where presently the
Soviet Union and the United States are having
negotiations.

The fact that we are going to have a meeting
in May does not mean that the negotiating
tracks that we are engaged on with the Soviet
Union in a number of areas are now closed or
that we are going to slow down.

We are going to go forward in all the other
areas so that in May we can deal with unfin-
ished business.

*Q. Mr. President, would this include Cuba?*

*The President:* The questions as to whether
peripheral areas—and I mean by "peripheral
areas," areas that do not directly involve the
Soviet Union and the United States—would be
involved would depend upon the situation at
that time.

For example, Cuba is one possibility. The
question of Southeast Asia is another. As far as
Southeast Asia is concerned, I would emphasize
there again, however, that, completely without
regard to this meeting and completely without
regard to the meeting that will take place with
the Chinese leaders at an earlier date, we are
proceeding both on the negotiating track and on
the Vietnamization track to end American in-
volvement in Viet-Nam. We trust that we will
have accomplished that goal or at least have
made significant progress toward accomplish-
ing that goal by the time this meeting takes
place.

*Q. Can you tell us the mechanics, sir? How
did the meeting come about? Did their Ambas-
sador come here? Was it "hot-lined," and can
you tell us, sir, when the ball started rolling
toward this meeting?*

*The President:* The ball started rolling
toward this meeting, I think, in my first press
conference when, you recall, the inevitable
question came up—are we going to have a sum-
mit with the Soviet Union?

I pointed out then that I did not believe a
summit would serve a useful purpose unless
something was to come out of it. I do not be-
lieve in having summit meetings simply for the
purpose of having a meeting. I think that tends
to create euphoria. It raises high hopes that are
then dashed, as was the case with Glassboro. We
are not making that mistake.

Both in our meeting with the Chinese, which
is being very carefully planned, as evidenced by
Dr. Kissinger's visit to help prepare the agenda
and the final arrangements, and in our meeting
with the Soviet Union, we have agreed to sum-
mit meetings only on the basis that we would
have an agenda in which there was a possibility
of making significant progress and also on which
items would be on the agenda on which progress
could best be made, and in some instances might
only be made, by decisions at the highest level.

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Now, I stated that, or at least made that point, in several press conferences, including my first one. In the spring of last year there was some discussion with the Soviet Union at lower levels with regard to the possibility of a summit. There was further discussion of the possibility of a summit when I met with Mr. Gromyko in the fall of last year when he was here to the United Nations.

Those discussions have continued on and off, not at my level but at other levels, until Mr. Gromyko arrived for his visit with me on this occasion. On this occasion he brought a formal invitation.

Let me say on the Soviet side that they agreed basically with my principle, which is also theirs, that a summit meeting should be held only when both sides are prepared to discuss matters of substance, and it is because both of us have been waiting for the time that we felt there were matters on which major progress could be made that the summit meeting is being held at this time, rather than at an earlier time.

I should also point out the very significant areas in which we have made progress in Soviet-American relations, both on our part and on their part. We have felt unless we were able to make progress in this era of negotiation rather than confrontation and other areas, that a meeting at the summit might mean simply an impasse; but when we look back over the record of the last 2 years, 2½ years, significant progress has been made.

We have had a treaty with regard to the sea-beds. We have had one with regard to biological weapons. We have had an agreement coming out of the SALT talks with regard to the "hot line" and accidental war and, of course, most important of all—and I think this is the item that, for both us and for them, led us to conclude that now was the time for a summit meeting—we have had an agreement on Berlin. The Berlin negotiations, of course, are not completely wrapped up; but on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States and, of course, the other two powers involved, this agreement had historic significance.

In view of the progress that we have made, Mr. Gromyko speaking for his Government, I speaking for ours, agreed on the occasion of his

visit that this was the time for a summit meeting.

Q. Mr. President, this, then, was the reason you announced you would go to Peking before May? You had this May date in mind at that time?

The President: No, Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, Hearst Newspapers], when we announced that we would be going to Peking, we did not have an understanding with the Soviet Union that we were going to have a visit to the Soviet Union. However, I should point out that as far as the announcement with regard to the Soviet summit is concerned, that the Government of the People's Republic of China was informed that this announcement would be made today and is aware of the date of the Soviet visit that I have mentioned, the latter part of May.

I should also point out that the Government in Peking is aware of the fact that we will be working toward agreement on a date with them, which will be prior to the meeting with the Soviet leaders.

Q. Mr. President.

The President: Mr. Horner [Garnett D. Horner, Washington Evening Star].

Q. Mr. President, with which Soviet leader do you expect to have your most significant talks, Kosygin, Brezhnev, Podgorny, or with all three of them or any two of them?

The President: Generally speaking, in the Soviet system, the talks that take place will, of course, cover all three, but the Chairman, in this case Mr. Brezhnev, is the man with whom I would expect to have very significant talks. I would expect certainly to have significant talks also with Kosygin and perhaps Mr. Podgorny.

But in the Soviet system, as I pointed out— the same is also true of the People's Republic system—in any Communist system, the chairman of the Communist Party is the man who is the major center of power.

Q. Mr. President, at the time that the Red China trip was announced, sir, I believe we were told that it was going to be before May 1 because you didn't want to get it involved in domestic political politics. I wonder how this differs,

November 1, 1971

475

*since this is after May 1, as far as domestic political politics is concerned?*

*The President:* We have this just as close to May 1 as we possibly could. This was the best date that the Soviet Union and we could agree upon, and it will come, as I said, in the latter part of May.

We both deliberately agreed that it should not come—which would generally have been their first choice, because June or July is a better time to go to Moscow than May, I understand—we agreed for the reasons that we have mentioned that it should be in May.

*Q. Mr. President, you said that it is your goal to end the American involvement in South Viet-Nam or at least make significant progress toward that by the time you meet in Moscow. Is it your goal that you can end at least the American ground combat involvement by that time?*

*The President:* I will have another announcement on Viet-Nam in November. That announcement will speak to that question, and other announcements after that will also speak to that question.

I will not speculate further on that. The American presence in Viet-Nam, both in terms of our residual forces, the ground combat forces to which you refer, and the use of our airpower, will be maintained to meet the objectives that I have oftentimes spelled out, including among others, the return of our POW's and the ability of the South Vietnamese to take over the responsibility themselves. But I would strongly urge the members of the press not to speculate as to what I am going to say in November.

*Q. Mr. President could you tell us what consultations were made with the NATO allies or Japan on these two visits?*

*The President:* All were informed.

*Q. Mr. President, to clarify your expectations on the Moscow visit, it would be equally your expectation to have significant talks with Chairman Mao in Peking rather than meetings with Chou En-lai or ceremonial meetings with the Chairman?*

*The President:* The question as to what kind of meetings will take place in Peking will be worked out by Dr. Kissinger when he is there. There will, of course, be meetings with Chou En-lai. I would assume that there would be meetings with the Chairman. However, in each system, the Soviet system and the Chinese system, the question as to which individual should cover which subject varies and, of course, I will be prepared to meet with whatever leader in the Soviet Union or whatever leader in the People's Republic of China has the responsibility for the particular subjects that we have in mind.

For example, take the Soviet. It may well be that Chairman Brezhnev may have the responsibility in certain political or foreign policy areas. It might be that Prime Minister Kosygin would have responsibility in trade areas. I am not trying to say what they have decided, but we are prepared, and both governments know that we are prepared, for me to meet with the head of government or the chairman of the party or any other that they designate who has responsibility.

I should also point out that the Secretary of State will accompany me to both Moscow and Peking. Dr. Kissinger will accompany me, and it will be a small working group, and meetings will take place not only between the President and various leaders on their side but between the Secretary of State and their people designated by them on their side.

We expect to have a very busy working visit, not a ceremonial visit. Ceremony, I should indicate, will be at an absolute minimum in both the Soviet Union and in the People's Republic.

I emphasize again, the purpose of both visits is not simply cosmetics. We are not taking a trip for the sake of taking a trip. The purpose of these visits is at the very highest level to attempt to make progress in negotiating in areas where there are very significant differences—differences between us and the People's Republic, differences between us and the Soviet Union.

I should emphasize, too, that in pointing out the progress we have made with the Soviet Union, that Mr. Gromyko and I agreed that we still have very great differences. We do not expect all those differences to be resolved, but

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there is one thing in which we agree at this
point and that is that the interests of neither
country would be served by war.

If there is another world war, if there is a
war between the superpowers, there will be no
winners. There will be only losers.

Also, I think we can both agree that neither
major power can get a decisive advantage over
the other, an advantage which would enable it
to launch a preemptive strike or an advantage
because it was able to launch a preemptive strike
which might enable it to engage in international
blackmail.

It is because we have reached the point that
the competition in terms of escalating arms
race cannot gain an advantage, and both of us
emphasized this in our meeting. It is for that
reason that now the time has come to negotiate
our differences, negotiate with regard to our
differences, recognizing that they are still very
deep, recognizing that, however, there is no al-
ternative to negotiation at this point.

*Q. Mr. President, are we going to have textile agreements this week in advance of the October 15 deadline which, reportedly, the administration has set down for mandatory quotas?*

*The President:* At the present time very inten-
sive talks are going on with the Japanese
on the textile question. We are hopeful that
those talks will produce a mutual agreement.
In the event that there is not a mutual agree-
ment and in the event by October 15 there is
either not an agreement or a process underway
which points to the negotiating of an agreement,
then the United States will move unilaterally.

*Q. In connection with the agenda for the Moscow talks, what is the position of the United States at present on the question of a European security conference, and specifically, is it the U.S. position that we will not agree to a European security conference until there is a final agreement on Berlin and a first-stage agreement on SALT?*

*The President:* The European security con-
ference is a matter that has been very widely
discussed between our two governments. As a
matter of fact, it was one of the subjects for

discussion, I think it is proper to reveal, when
I met with Mr. Gromyko. I have noted that the
press has so speculated, and the press, in this
case, is correct.

With regard to the European security con-
ference, you are correct in saying that until the
Berlin matter is wrapped up, the discussions
with regard to the possibility of a European se-
curity conference would not serve a useful pur-
pose. After it is wrapped up, then we shall go
forward with preliminary discussions to see
whether or not a European security conference
could serve a useful purpose.

Both governments agree, with regard to a
European security conference, that it, like a
summit conference, should not be held unless
there are areas where there can be substantial
chances for agreement. The Secretary of State
will have the primary responsibility, after the
Berlin settlement is totally wrapped up, to ex-
plore with our allies, as the Soviet Union will
be exploring with theirs, whether or not the
European security conference should be held,
and if it should be held, when it should be held.

I should also point out, because it does raise
the other question, I mentioned in answer to an
earlier question that our allies had been in-
formed and that Japan had been informed.
Prior to the visit to the Soviet Union, there will,
of course, be extensive consultations with our
allies on matters which may affect them. For
example, mutual balanced force reductions,
European security conference, and matters of
this sort, if they are to come up at a summit con-
ference, will, of course, be discussed with our
allies, just as we expect the Soviet Union to
discuss those matters with their allies.

*Q. Now that the South Vietnamese election returns are official, will you be sending your congratulations to the winner, and do you have any comments on those elections?*

*The President:* On September 16 I indicated
my view about the elections, and I stand by
that view.¹ I believe that, as the Secretary of
State pointed out in his television appearance
Sunday, that we have to keep this matter in

¹ For excerpts from President Nixon's news conference of Sept. 16, see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1971, p. 341.

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perspective. We would have preferred, just as we would prefer in all countries of the world, a contested election somewhat along the lines that would meet our standard.

On the other hand, the situation in South Viet-Nam has been that they have made great progress toward representative government there. They have a very lively opposition in both the National Assembly and in the Senate.

As far as President Thieu is concerned, he is aware of my statement of September 16, and I will be sending a representative, of course, to his inauguration. Let me say in that respect that if the United States followed the practice of not sending representatives to inaugurations unless the President or the Prime Minister was there as a result of a contested election, we would only have one-third as many delegations to send, and we wouldn't want to do that.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

## U.S. Responds to Chilean Decision on Compensation for Expropriation

*Statement by Secretary Rogers* ¹

The Controller General of Chile announced his findings on October 11 that no compensation would be paid for the U.S. copper mining investments expropriated on July 16 except for modest amounts in the cases of two smaller properties.

The United States Government is deeply disappointed and disturbed at this serious departure from accepted standards of international

law. Under established principles of international law, the expropriation must be accompanied by reasonable provision for payment of just compensation. The United States had made clear to the Government of Chile its hope that a solution could be found on a reasonable and pragmatic basis consistent with international law.

It appears that the major factor in the Controller General's decision with respect to the larger producers was the determination on September 28 of alleged "excess profits." The unprecedented retroactive application of the excess profits concept, which was not obligatory under the expropriation legislation adopted by the Chilean Congress, is particularly disquieting. The U.S. companies which are affected by this determination of the Chilean Government earned their profits in Chile in accordance with Chilean law and under specific contractual agreements made directly with the Government of Chile. The excess profits deductions punish the companies today for acts that were legal and approved by the Government of Chile at the time. No claim is being made that these excess profits deductions are based on violations of Chilean law. This retroactive determination has serious implications for the rule of law.

Should Chile fail to meet its international obligations, it could jeopardize flows of private funds and erode the base of support for foreign assistance, with possible adverse effects on other developing countries. The course of action which the Chilean Government appears to have chosen, therefore, could have an adverse effect on the international development process.

The United States hopes that the Government of Chile, in accordance with its obligations under international law, will give further careful consideration to this matter.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Oct. 13 by Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations (also issued as press release 234).

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

10:15 A.M. EDT

OCTOBER 14, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: I am going to read an agreed statement, and then I will take questions and talk about it.

The White House announced today the itinerary for Dr. Kissinger's forthcoming visit to Peking to work out arrangements for President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China.

Dr. Kissinger and his party will leave Washington on Saturday afternoon, October 16. They will make stops in Hawaii and Guam enroute, and arrive in Peking on Wednesday, October 20. That is Tuesday, October 19, Washington time.

Dr. Kissinger will spend about four days in Peking and will return directly to the United States by way of Anchorage, Alaska. The party will travel aboard a Presidential aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger's party will be composed of the following:

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Brig. Gen. James D. Hughes, Military Assistant to the President.

Dwight L. Chapin, Deputy Assistant to the President.

Brig. Gen. Albert Redman, White House Communications Agency.

Timothy G. Elbourne, White House Press Assistant.

Robert F. Taylor, United States Secret Service.

Alfred Jenkins, Department of State.

John F. Holdridge, NSC Staff.

Winston Lord, NSC Staff.

Cmdr. Jonathan Howe, NSC Staff.

Let me now give you a little rundown on what the itinerary for the advance party going to the People's Republic of China will be.

Dr. Kissinger and his group will leave Andrews Air Force Base for Travis Air Force Base at 12:00 Noon, Eastern time this Saturday.

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They will fly from Andrews to Travis Air Force Base in California for fuel. They will then depart Travis at about 3:00 in the afternoon Pacific time, and fly to Hilo, Hawaii. They will arrive on Hilo at about 5:15 local time, which is 11:15 Eastern time. They will stay at the Mauna Kea Hotel, which is on the big island of Hawaii.

Then they will leave there on Monday, October 18, at about 5:30 in the afternoon, departing from Hilo for Guam, arriving in Guam at 9:00 p.m. local time in Guam and will overnight in Guam.

They will depart Guam at about 6:30 a.m. Wednesday, the 20th. They arrive in Guam at 9:00 p.m. Guam time on Tuesday, and they will depart Guam at 6:30 a.m. Wednesday.

Q But really Tuesday by our time zone?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. They will depart Guam at 6:30 a.m. for Shanghai. That is about four hours flying time. They will arrive at Shanghai at 8:30 a.m., Wednesday, October 20th, where they will be met by a Chinese delegation and, I believe, a navigator. They will refuel there and depart Shanghai, after about an hour's stay there, for Peking. They will arrive in Peking at about 11:15 a.m. their time.

I think you have already noted that the party plans to spend about four days in Peking. They will be returning to the United States on or about the 25th of October.

Q You indicated on the return that they would stop in Alaska?

MR. ZIEGLER: On the return they will stop in Anchorage for refueling.

Q Is this checking out the most feasible route for the President, going one way and coming back another?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not want to suggest to you that this will be the route that the President will take, but they are taking the two different routes on this particular advance.

I should tell you that we do not mind pictures out at Andrews when they leave, but the advance party will not be having any sessions with the press or making any statements at all on this entire trip. The purpose of the trip, as we have previously announced, is for the advance arrangements to be made.

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Q Does this stop in Anchorage on the way back indicate a Polar flight on the return?

MR. ZIEGLER: I'm sorry, I am not familiar enough with navigational routes to answer that, but I think that may be correct. Incidentally, we have said this before, the President announced this when we were in West Virginia, that Ralph Albertazzie will be piloting the advance party plane.

I think that is all I have to tell you.

Q Is this a complete list of those going with him? It seems a little skimpy for a full advance.

MR. ZIEGLER: This is the complete list. This does not include the full crew on #970.

Q None of the party will be going elsewhere in China besides just what you mentioned?

MR. ZIEGLER: This is where they plan to go.

Q Is Dr. Kissinger taking an interpreter?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think Mr. Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge are well versed in the language.

Q Did you have something you wanted to add to that last question?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q About where they will go in China?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Does this indicate that the President himself will go nowhere other than Peking internally in China?

MR. ZIEGLER: This should not indicate to you anything about the President's trip other than he will go to Peking. This is the advance party's itinerary. They will stop in Shanghai to pick up a navigator and to refuel before going to Peking. I don't want to suggest to you anything regarding the President's itinerary.

Q They would not necessarily advance side trips inside China?

MR. ZIEGLER: This is the plan for their trip as it now stands.

Q Ron, is this the only trip that this advance party is going to take or is there a possibility of another one before the President goes?

MR. ZIEGLER: I presume that that will be one of the things that Dr. Kissinger will discuss during this trip.

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

4:10 P.M. EDT

OCTOBER 18, 1971

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: The President has been working in his EOB office since about 3:00 o'clock, in discussion with staff members on various matters.

Before the President went over to the EOB, at about 2:30 he greeted briefly in his office three members of the Washington Redskins football team who had been touring the White House with their families. When the President learned that they were in the White House on a tour, he asked that they be brought into his office. They are Maxie Baughan and Jack Pardee, linebackers, and George Burman, who is a center for the Redskins. They discussed the Redskins.

Q Did he have any predictions?

MR. WARREN: No, he did not have any predictions; but he was, of course, very pleased with the performance of the Redskin team. He told them what he told Mayor Washington the other day: that he felt the Redskin football team and their success, and the way individual members of the team have conducted themselves, has contributed greatly to a building and growing spirit; their performance both on and off the field has contributed to this spirit in Washington. He wished them well, win or lose.

Q That is not exactly in the spirit of things around here this week. (Laughter)

MR. WARREN: Some of you may have missed an announcement that moved on the wires yesterday, so I will bring it up at this point.

The President will meet on November 2nd with Prime Minister William McMahon of Australia.

Q There? (Laughter)

MR. WARREN: Here. The Prime Minister has accepted an invitation from the President to visit Washington.

Q Is this a State visit?

MR. WARREN: This is an unofficial visit.

This evening at about 7:45 or 7:50 the President and Mrs. Nixon will drive to the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts to attend the opening performance in the Eisenhower Theater.

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:50 A.M. EDT

OCTOBER 19, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We posted the President's schedule for today. There are no additions to that.

The President met this morning briefly with the Attorney General, also.

The President today is announcing his intention to nominate Earl E. O'Connor of Topeka, Kansas, to be the United States District Judge for the District of Kansas. The biographical information will be posted after the briefing.

We have a final release which announces the appointment of 25 persons to serve as the first members of the new National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere. I believe that release is self-explanatory. Compensation for these appointments is not to exceed $100 per day, including travel time, while serving on business relating to the Advisory Committee.

The President is now meeting with Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Ceylon. That meeting should be over in about 15 or 20 minutes, and we will post that time for you.

Those are all the announcements that we have.

Q Did a couple of vacancies on the Supreme Court come up as a topic of conversation when the President met with the Attorney General?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am sure that is why they met, yes.

Q Will the President still announce the nominations this week?

MR. ZIEGLER: As he said in his press conference, he expected to do that this week, and there is no change in that now.

Q When do you expect them?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not have a day to give you. I just do not know.

Q How many names are under consideration?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have gone all through that.

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They expressed the conviction that relations
between the US and Yugoslavia, characterized
by equality and complete mutual respect, repre-
sent an important factor for the peace and sta-
bility of Europe and the world in general, and
serve the aims of broad international under-
standing. Guided by these goals, and in the in-
terest of the further development of friendly
relations between the two countries, the two
Presidents resolved to continue the useful prac-
tice of the exchange of mutual contacts.

The two sides will base their cooperation and
relations on lasting foundations in accordance
with the understanding achieved and in the
spirit of the principles reflected in this joint
statement.

Secretary Rogers Interviewed
for Yugoslav Television

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rogers which was conducted at
Washington on October 20 by Mrs. Veroslava
Tadic of Belgrade television and broadcast
from Belgrade on October 22.

Press release 243 dated October 22

Mrs. Tadic: Well, Mr. State Secretary, Presi-
dent Tito is paying an official visit to the United
States of America in a short time. Considering
that the United States is a major power, one of
the major powers, and Yugoslavia is a small
and unaligned country, how do you see the sig-
nificance of that visit and the main topics to be
discussed?

Secretary Rogers: Well, of course, nations
are not necessarily judged in terms of size in
the world community. They are judged more in
terms of the importance of the nation. And in
the case of Yugoslavia, because of its history,
its geographic position, and particularly be-
cause of the leadership of President Tito, it
plays a very important role in the world, par-
ticularly in the nonaligned world. So we think
it is a very important visit that President Tito
is going to make to this country.

It's a return visit. As you know, President
Nixon was in Yugoslavia last year, and we
think it has very great significance, and we are
looking forward to his visit.

Q. What would be the main brief, or topic?

A. Well, because of President Tito's position
in the world, I am sure that President Nixon
will talk to him about most of the major prob-
lems in the world.

For example, there will be discussions, I am
sure, about the recent Berlin talks and about
the possibility of a European security con-
ference. I am sure that President Nixon will
want to review progress that has been made in
the SALT talks—the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks—and undoubtedly will talk about
the Middle East situation. President Tito has
always had a great interest in the Middle East
and has played a very active role in discussions
about the Middle East, so that's one of the sub-
jects that I'm sure will be discussed.

Then, too, of course, the President will want
to talk to President Tito about his upcoming
visit to Peking, about his subsequent visit to
Moscow, and how he sees them and what he
hopes to accomplish by those visits.

Q. And we will go into more details on those
later.

Yugoslavia, as you probably know, has been
making strong efforts for better bilateral ex-
change agreements between the United States
of America. We think that $100 million is not
a sufficient amount, considering that the U.S.A.
is a very large potential market, and that is a
place we should come in.

We know that your main concern is not eco-
nomics of the United States, but do you see any
political and practical reasons and possibility of
bettering that exchange?

A. Yes, I think we do see such possibilities.
As you know, Yugoslavia has a lot of friends in
this country—a lot of Americans came from
Yugoslavia initially—and we don't think that
the trade is sufficient. So we would hope that
trade can increase in the years ahead, and we
would hope that tourism would increase, both
ways. We'd like to have more Americans go to

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Yugoslavia, and we hope that Yugoslavs would
come to America.

Q. Well, to get back to the field of foreign affairs, your own field: Yugoslavia as one of the Mediterranean countries is very much concerned over what is going on in this part of the world. However, we feel that as long as big powers are involved so deeply in that part of the world, you could hardly speak of any chance of having a peaceful zone. What do you think are the prospects for peace, concerning the Middle East?

A. Well, as you know, the United States has taken a very active role in trying to bring about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and for about 15 months now there has been no fighting, as a result of the initiative the United States undertook. There has been a cease-fire in effect during that period of time.

We, as you know, are working very actively to see if it's possible to bring about an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel; because we think if that could be achieved and the Suez Canal could be opened and there was a withdrawal of Israeli forces away from the canal and the cease-fire could be extended for a reasonable period of time, that the prospects for working out a final peace agreement would be greatly enhanced.

So we think there is some reasonable possibility of an interim agreement. It's a very difficult problem to handle because of the history of the area, because of the hostilities that have existed, because there have been three wars there in recent years. But we do think there is some possibility of an interim agreement, and we feel that President Tito can play a very important role in helping the parties in that connection.

When I saw President Tito in Ethiopia, I talked to him—this was when President Nasser was alive—I talked to him about the American initiative at that time. Subsequent to that, he talked to President Nasser, and I think it was quite helpful in really helping to bring about the climate that caused the acceptance of our peace initiative. And I would think that President Tito could play a very active role in the

months ahead in helping to achieve an interim agreement.

Q. Another matter of great interest in the world today is the upcoming visits of President Nixon to Moscow and Peking, as you mentioned yourself. What do you think might be the effect of those visits on the relationships among the main powers themselves, and what the effects on the rest of the world?

A. Well, President Nixon is doing everything he can to bring about a more peaceful climate in the world. He has had a very comprehensive policy to create peaceful conditions in the world, and he has said from the beginning of his administration that he would do everything that he could to help in that regard.

Now, he is going to Peking with the thought in mind that we can improve our relations with the Chinese on the mainland—with the thought that contact, communication, maybe some increased trade, will be helpful in reducing the tensions in that part of the world.

Now, he is not doing that at the expense of any other nation. He has made it clear that this is not done in the game of power politics or anything of that kind. He is doing it because he sincerely believes that that is the way to bring about a more peaceful climate in the world.

The same thing goes for his attitude toward the Soviet Union. He thinks that a summit meeting—now that progress has been made in the Berlin talks and there has been progress made in the SALT talks—that the climate is right for discussion with the Soviet leaders about a more peaceful climate in Europe.

And we will talk about the prospects for a European security conference, about the prospects of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe—matters which have caused great tension in the world—and we think that if we have such a conference and there is a reduction of forces in Europe, these tensions might be reduced.

Q. To turn to a subject that is becoming even more interesting for the world today: What-ever happens in world economics affects the less developed countries more than the others—so

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

12:06 P.M. EDT

OCTOBER 27, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President's schedule for today has been posted.

The President had breakfast this morning with Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger gave a report on his trip to the Peoples Republic of China to make concrete arrangements, as we have said, for the President's upcoming trip to the Peoples Republic of China.

The President has met a good deal this morning with members of his staff: Dr. Kissinger, Bob Haldeman, myself, and others.

Other than that, we have no announcements today except to tell you that the President's personal representative to the inauguration of President Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam, as you know, is Treasury Secretary John B. Connally.

Secretary Connally will leave Washington for Saigon on the evening of October 28th. That is this Thursday. The inauguration will be in Saigon on October 31st. We had originally announced that Secretary Connally would leave on the 29th, but he will now leave the evening of the 28th, which will give him more travel time.

The other members of the official United States delegation to the inauguration will be Deputy Assistant Secretary of State William H. Sullivan, who will travel to Vietnam with Secretary Connally, and also the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker.

After the inauguration, at the request of the President, Secretary Connally will travel to Thailand on November 1st, and to Indonesia on November 4th, briefly to the Philippines on November 9th, and then to Japan on the same day, for bilateral discussions. Secretary Connally will return to Washington on about November 14th.

I should tell you that Mrs. Connally will also go, as will Mrs. Sullivan.

Q Are there no private citizens in this delegation?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. This is the delegation.

Q Why Indonesia, Ron? Can you give us a little on that?

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in the Assembly the night that the vote was taken.

Q Ron, how many would you actually say were involved? How many delegates? Could you give us some estimate of the numbers involved?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I think your men on the scene would be able to give you that.

Q How many countries?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think those representing you at the United Nations could describe that to you.

Q What we are talking about is the Presidential sensitivity to other countries. I think it is fair to ask if the President is similarly worried about the continuing actions of the West Pakistani army in East Pakistan and whether he feels that the continuing activity there and the outflow of refugees is also going to reduce support for the United States with the continuation of the support there. May we anticipate a Presidential statement on West Pakistan?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have talked a substantial amount about what our view is in terms of the Pakistan situation at the State Department. I think you are aware, or you should be aware, of the extensive assistance we have given to deal with the humanitarian aspect involved with that situation. What I am referring to here, I think I have been quite clear on.

As the Secretary of State said yesterday, it is not our intention to retali ate. We don't, as I said earlier, deal with these issues on matters of personality, but we, as a Government, feel that we should make this expression and candidly say what impact this undignified activity on the part of some of the delegates could have in this country.

Q You said, and it was perfectly clear, that you were expressing a view that the President had expressed. Can you tell us specifically whether the words you used were his exact words, the words "shocking demonstration," the word "undignified"?

MR. ZIEGLER: They are my words, but I think you should take them as an expression of this Government.

Q How many telephone calls and telegrams expressing shock and dismay have come into the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: A good number. I don't have a count.

Q Hundreds?

MR. ZIEGLER: At least, if not more.

Q Your reference to American generosity seems to raise the question of whether acceptance of American foreign aid imposes an obligation on the receiving country to vote with the United States, or at least not to anger them on major occasions.

MR. ZIEGLER: No. As I said in my earlier comments to you, the United States was seeking support and fighting for a matter of principle. We understand that there are differences on a matter and would be differences on a matter such as the

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

1:08 P.M. EDT

OCTOBER 28, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The meeting between President Nixon and President Tito ended at 12:45. It began at 11:30, so they met for an hour and 15 minutes today.

I do not have a detailed report to give you on the talks at this time. We will provide to you a joint statement covering the talks after the final meeting between President Nixon and President Tito, which will take place, as you know, Saturday morning.

Q Will that be here?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, it will be here in the President's office. That is prior to President Tito leaving Washington and proceeding with his visit to other parts of the country.

Q Is this a communique or a joint statement?

MR. ZIEGLER: It is a joint statement. You can refer to it either way, but we are referring to it as a joint statement, so let's use that word.

Q What time is the meeting Saturday morning?

MR. ZIEGLER: 10:00 o'clock, here at the White House.

Q Is the reason because you do not have the information about what they talked about yet, or are you saying there will not be any information until the joint statement?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am going to give you a general rundown, but it will not be a detailed discussion of their talks.

The President, as you know, met with President Tito in September 1970 in Yugoslavia. The President indicated to me after the talks that he felt the two Presidents had developed a good relationship at that time, and that enabled them to have a very good talk today.

The President said that he had a great deal of respect for President Tito. He felt that President Tito was very well informed on all world matters and, therefore, he

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valued the time that he spent with President Tito. He also valued the fact that President Tito, as you know, has just recently met with leaders of other countries, and the President was particularly interested in receiving from President Tito his impressions of those meetings.

As has been reported, President Tito has recently met with Prime Minister Gandhi, Yahya Khan, President Sadat, and also Chairman Brezhnev.

So they talked about many subjects in what could be described as a far-ranging conversation which was conducted, as I have described to you, in a very warm atmosphere.

Before going on to cover some of the subjects, I also would say that the President again told President Tito, as he stated in his remarks, this Government and the President respect the independence and the independent position of Yugoslavia.

They talked about general questions of mutual interest in Europe, in the Middle East, and in South Asia. As I said, the President listened with interest as President Tito offered his impressions gained during his several recent meetings with world leaders.

The President also discussed with President Tito his plans for his forthcoming trip to China and the Soviet Union.

The two Presidents touched briefly on bilateral relations, but they will very likely focus their discussions on Saturday more on bilateral matters. They will also have an opportunity for further discussions tonight.

While the President and President Tito were meeting, Secretary Rogers met with the Foreign Minister in the Cabinet Room. Also present at that meeting were Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand and Malcolm Toon, the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Granfil, the new Ambassador to the United States from Yugoslavia, was also there, together with other members representing the two governments.

We will post that information for you.

Q Was Dr. Kissinger in that meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger was not in the session in the Cabinet Room. I believe he spent some time in the meeting in the President's office.

Q Did they speak all the time through an interpreter?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, there were two interpreters present, and they used the interpreters.

One observation that the President did make in talking to me after the meeting -- and I think I told you that the President valued the time spent with President Tito because of his wide knowledge of world affairs -- but also he said that he has spent now probably as much time with

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