Lecture, Armed Forces Staff College
Norfolk, Virginia, 7 January 1960

By: Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, USAF
(Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense, Special Operations)

# MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

## I.

In our brief time together today, I plan to introduce you to the oldest weapon known to man outside of bare hands -- psychological warfare. As bright and bushy-tailed staff officers, you will need to know what psychological warfare is, how it fits into the scheme of military affairs today, and how to use it most wisely.

## II.

First of all, then, what is psychological warfare? It is an action, usually propaganda, which you take to influence the will of other people, usually the enemy, to support the gaining of your military objective in war.

Some examples will illustrate this definition: Joshua's use of noise at Jericho -- and modern usage, such as bugle-blowing by the Chinese Communists in Korea. Tamerlane's piling up the bones of the slain into a huge pyramid at one conquered city to show the envoys from other cities and frightening them into surrender -- and the blackmail of nations by Hitler with his newsreel movies of Stuka-Panzer teams in action. The tatooing of the arms of his soldiers by Tran Hung Dao to stiffen their will to defeat Kublai Khan -- and such modern concepts as, "make the world safe for Democracy" or "the Four Freedoms."

Now, hardly a day goes by without a military officer suddenly discovering "psychological warfare" -- most often by discovering some clever attack by the Communists -- and then becoming enthusiastic over this "wonder weapon," believing that if we adopted it strongly, we would have little need of anything else. Also, hardly a day goes by without some military officer dismissing psychological warfare as a non-military item invented on Madison Avenue and belonging in the category of, say, PX officers or the school for cooks and bakers. As staff officers, you must be wary and not fall into either trap.

Think of psychological warfare as a weapon. . . not as propaganda posters, or as surrender leaflets, or as radio programs beamed at foreigners. . . but as a weapon, like artillery, or torpedoes, or guided missiles. Our military staffs have learned to integrate these other weapons into our operational plans. So it is, also, with psychological warfare. The proper use of

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this weapon should be included in every combat plan you make -- as an important,
<u>supporting</u> weapon that will help achieve military victory.

III.

In what has been said so far, note that psychological warfare has been
identified with <u>war</u> and with actual <u>combat</u>. In the U. S. Armed Forces, this is
how we associate psychological warfare.

What then about today, when we are not in combat -- but when the
military has so significant a role in implementing national policy? Certainly,
there is need for psychological support of today's military activities.

Well, we _do_ have psychological operations today. We have built a
familiar American structure to carry them out -- complex organizations,
civilian groups to carry the main burden in peace-time, and different names
so that the work can be fractionalized to suit the jurisdictional gremlins.
However, the important thing for you to remember is this: some place in the
combined or unified staff where you will serve some day, you will find a staff
group charged with planning today's psychological _operations_ and the future's
possible psychological _warfare_. Let's see where this staff section fits into
today's U. S. structure.

As do the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, as do our British
friends, as our French friends are starting to do -- so too do we have a
marriage of the civil-political and the military for top direction of psycho-
logical operations. This is logical, because we must have a political basis
for our actions if our psychological operations are to be successful. National
objectives dictate psychological objectives.

National policy, and thus the policy for psychological operations, comes
from topside -- the President, as our political leader and as our Commander-
in-Chief, aided by the National Security Council. In wartime, for theaters of
war, the direction would come simply down the chain-of-command. In today's
peacetime, direction for foreign operations comes through the State Depart-
ment to Defense, either directly or by its chairing and steering the OCB and
the OCB committees. It is often misunderstood, but the decisive voice today
in our national foreign operations is that of the State Department, not that of
Defense, the JCS, the Services or Commands. Under State Department
guidance, the U. S. Information Agency is charged with carrying out psycholo-
gical operations abroad. In wartime, most of USIA's people and resources
abroad would come under military direction.

In Defense, top guidance comes from the Secretary of Defense --
meaning Secretary Gates who is personally interested, Deputy Secretary
Douglas who has decisive responsibilities, and their immediate staff. On

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this immediate staff, the Assistant to the Secretary for Special Operations has
the main burden for this task.

In the Joint Staff, the planning and staff work of psychological operations is carried out by the Joint Subsidiary Activities Division of J-5. Each of the Armed Services has a staff section for psychological warfare, as part of operations. In the Military Commands, the J-3 or the G-3 has a staff section for psychological warfare.

Remember these military psychological planners when you start working on operational plans. Always include a section in your planning for psychological support. We have paid a costly price since 1945 for neglecting the psychological part of our operations until recently and let the Communists get way ahead of us. We cannot afford any more neglect.

IV.

Now, let's have a brief time with some of today's psychological operations.

Although, as staff officers, you will be concerned mostly with strategic planning, it will be more useful to you today if I deal with tactical operations. This should help give you a more basic understanding of the weapon. It's not much good to plan the strategic use of a weapon, if you don't know what is can do.

Several weeks ago, Leon Delbecque visited Washington and we had a chance to talk with each other. He is the French Deputy who sparked the formation of the Fifth Bureau in the French Army and the operations of its Revolutionary Warfare in Algeria. We agreed that there were many fine technicians in Psychological Warfare today, that many of the staff officers in both Armed Forces were long on book theory but short on practical application, and that the best psychological operator is born rather than trained to the job.

M. Delbecque said that he picked his best operators in Algeria by looking over personal history statements, and selecting officers and men who had had to work with their hands for a living at one time in their civilian life. It gave them an instinctive empathy for the people whom they had to influence.

This reminded me of a similar problem in the Tonkin Delta of Indo-China in 1953. General Cogny was strengthening his psychological warfare organization then and invited my comment. I recommended that he fill the organization with officers and men with good combat records, those who knew the enemy best through fighting him and who were rotating out of the

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line -- and with, I hoped, a ribald sense of humor. Humor -- bawdy humor, slapstick, the practical joke, and Olympian humor -- all can add the final touch of practical effectiveness to a psychological operation.

Not long ago, in England, the Communists inspired an anti-American campaign. Painted letters saying "Go Home Yank" started appearing on walls. A bright individual visited these signs and painted in the addition, "via TWA." The British were highly amused and the campaign stopped.

The Agit-Prop folks of the Viet Cong Communist Party in North Vietnam have a macabre sense of humor. About this time last year, they sent an agent in to poison the food at the prison camp of Phu Loi in South Vietnam. At the deadline time they had given the agent for his operation, before he had a chance to report, Radio Hanoi went on the air with simulated outrage against the Americans in MAAG-Vietnam for poisoning a thousand prisoners at Phu Loi. Later, it was changed to ten thousand. It didn't matter that no American had visited the prison at Phu Loi. It didn't matter that their agent had cold-feet at the last moment and failed to carry out his assignment. Nobody was poisoned at Phu Loi. Yet, it was a joke with a pay-off. The workers of North Vietnam contributed days of free labor, the school students collected funds -- for the highly publicized "victims" -- funds the Party could use. The Americans in MAAG and the Free Vietnamese have hardly found this funny. But then, the victims of bad jokes seldom do. Perhaps, some day, the people in North Vietnam will also catch on. This is part of mankind's hope today.

In 1950, I found myself serving as an adviser to the Philippine Armed Forces on various aspects, including psychological warfare, of their campaign against Communist Huk guerrillas. This was in the lull after World War II. We had no Psywar organizations or training in our Services, so as a substitute I talked to everyone I could find who had had psywar experience in World War II. I will pass along to you the most useful lesson I learned from them -- a combat concept which they called "The Eye of God." It has many variations. Maybe, some day, you will remember this in an hour of need and it will help you.

The "Eye of God" technique, properly used, makes the target soldier feel that he is the helpless victim of an all-seeing and all-powerful enemy. This was the basic idea behind the broadcasts of Berlin Sally and Toyko Rose, when they would specify units by name and tell them the contents of their secret orders. This was the basic idea, also, of the examples given me. One was the siege of Caen in the Normandy Invasion, where the French Maquis kept the British well informed of the exact whereabouts of key German officers. The psywar team, through loud-speakers, would warn a German general by name that if his forces didn't surrender immediately, he would die. A little later, as he sat in his headquarters office, an artillery

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shell would zero in and get him. This was team-work between Maquis intelligence, the psywarriors, and the artillery. It paid off in the surrender of Caen.

This team-work was later adapted by Americans to an air-armor team. Loud-speakers were mounted on tanks. The tanks were in communication with a liaison aircraft overhead. German infantry, dug-in in hidden positions which could be seen from the air, would be surprised when a tank would appear and speak to them: "You twenty soldiers on the hill -- Yes, you sergeant crawling over to the left -- all you soldiers -- You stay there and we will kill you." This made the war personal. This made the threat personal. Faced with talking armor, most troops thus singled out would run or surrender.

In the Philippines, in 1950 and 1951, we used many variations. In one -- to encourage the growing intelligence nets on our side, who often were dealt with savagely by the Huks, and to throw fear into the Huks and their sympathizers that they were being watched continuously -- troops would sneak into a barrio at night and paint big, staring eyes on the sides of houses. This increased tensions for the already tense Huk guerrilla enemy. Constant tension brought fatigue. A fatigued soldier makes mistakes, particularly when he faces constant, aggressive patrol action against him.

A more direct application of the technique was used against small, hit-and-run Huk squadrons. Their presence in an area would be reported by the Army intelligence net. When troops would move against them, enemy intelligence nets would warn the Huk squadrons - and they would take off fast before contact could be made. The problem was how to make contact and inflict casualties on a wary, hit-and-run enemy.

The Philippine Army put the only available P. A. systems -- they were Navy loud-hailers intended for beach masters, with hand-carried electric megaphones -- into liaison aircraft, L-5's. When one of the hit-and-run Huk squadrons was reported, the psywar and intelligence officers of the battalion in the area would go over all the Order of Battle information they had on the Huk squadron. Armed with this information and his loud-hailer, the battalion psywar officer would be flown by the liaison aircraft to the spot where the Huk squadron was hiding.

Circling over them, the psywar officer would talk to the hidden Huks by name with his amplified voice: "You hiding down there . . . we see you. Yes, I mean you in Squadron 17. I mean you, Commander Sol. I mean you, Juan Santos. And you, Bulacan Boy. And you, Pepe. We are coming to kill you. We know all about you. Stay there. We will kill you. And now, I must go while our troops are coming. To our secret friend in your ranks, I say thank you -- run and hide so you won't be killed. Sorry, I can't call

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you by name -- but thank you and good-bye."

Of course, there was no "friend in the ranks." The Order of Battle
information had come from many sources, carefully put together over the
weeks. But, the broadcast from the air usually stampeded the Huk squadron.
They would leave their hiding place on the run. And then suspicion would
start working. Who was this "friend in the ranks?" Which one of the com-
rades was a secret enemy spy? One or more of the comrades looked sus-
picious. A quick kangaroo court would be held -- the suspected judged guilty
and executed. Thus, some information adroitly used, would bring about the
same number of casualties as could a company of troops in a running fight.

V.

Now, it is time to close this little talk. I hope it has awakened your
interest in military psychological operations. If it has, there are many
books on the subject from which you can learn more. One is readily avail-
able to you and is well worth reading. It is the Army Field Manual on
"Psychological Warfare Operations," FM 33-5, and contains many ideas
and descriptions of techniques.

But, if you don't have time to read, then please remember something
from the talk this morning. You and every other military man in the Free
World is the target of some of the most skilled psychological attack the
world has ever seen. If the Communists deem this attack worth so very
much of their resources -- in talented manpower and huge budgets -- then
don't be ignorant of this powerful weapon when you plan the use of resources
on our side. Be alert to the fact that it exists. Include it in the plans you
work on as staff officers. On the staff with you will be a section devoted to
psychological warfare. Let them in on your planning, to come up with
specific plans for the psychological support of the operation. In this way,
you can help us use a fine weapon which we have overlooked too often -- a
weapon we need today to help us achieve our national objectives.

Thank you.

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Lecture - Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia

29 March 1960

Office of the Secretary of Defense

# MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: PART TWO

## I.

I have been told that each of you has been given a copy of the talk I gave to the last class in January. The talk was really an introduction to the subject of "military psychological operations", sketching in some definitions, some history, how we are organized to operate, and describing one successful operating technique for combat.

Questions by the class after the last talk led me to conclude that perhaps the most helpful thing I could do in our brief time together today would be to discuss "how to operate", rather than the organizational side of the operations. So, I will talk to you as potential operators. Then, as bright and bushy-tailed staff officers in the future, you might remember what a psychological operation actually is--and be better able to fit it in with your staff planning.

Today, I will sketch in the basic operational rules. Then, I will give you some case histories of operations against the Communists. The one should help you remember the other.

## II.

Psychological warfare is probably man's oldest weapon, aside from bare hands. In using it in today's dirty, little, secretive wars, or in the future, the important thing to remember is that it is a weapon--and that a weapon has its own unique use and its own effect.

I have observed a bad trend in too many of our psychological operations today. We have advanced technically in making this weapon more effective and have attracted some very bright technicians to work with this psychological weapon. In turn, they become bemused with the technical side and seem to forget that what they have is a weapon--a weapon that is meant to cause desired results. They remind me of artillerymen toiling for long hours to perfect the firing of salutes. We can applaud their precision in the firing of blank ammunition, but they and we must not forget that artillery has a more practical task in war.

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So, let's get down to the fundamentals of using the psychological weapon. As fundamentals, these are simple things. Being simple, they are overlooked at times when operators strive to be sophisticated, "big picture" artists. When firing for effect, we cannot afford such fancies. We must insist upon following the basic rules.

The rules are these:

First, be sure of your command's politico-military *objective* and stick with it in your operations.

Second, know exactly what you want to cause people to *do* as a result of each of your operations.

Third, put across your activating idea in a way that these people will *understand*.

### III.

Now, for the first rule. Our ultimate objective is always a political one--whether the immediate objective is that of destroying an enemy's armed force as *his* instrument for reaching his political objective, or something else. Know what your command's real goal is, know it thoroughly--and don't waste your energy, skill, and material resources in going elsewhere.

You need a clear appreciation of the moment of history in which you live, how our policy believes it must be guided to history's next moment for the good of the country, and just what part your command plays in this. It is known that the Communist enemy, right down through his command to small units, has *his* clear idea of this. To fight him successfully, you must have yours.

### IV.

Now, the second rule.

The psychological weapon is used to make people *do* something. So, you have to think out very clearly just what it is, exactly, that you want to cause people to *do*. This step is all-important. Make your objective realistic, "bite-size", something you can bring about definitely. Do you want the enemy to hesitate before squeezing a trigger, to disobey orders of his commander, to move to an area of your choice, to desert, to do what--exactly? The more clearly you know what you want him to do, the more effective will be your use of this weapon. Be fuzzy about this, and your results will be fuzzy--no matter how beautifully you print leaflets, no matter how skillfully you use electronic equipment.

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V.

So, in waging psychological warfare, you must be sure of your objective since you are on the scene with a weapon which can be very powerful, you must know exactly what result you want, and then you must obey the third rule.

The third rule is to put across your idea in an understandable way to the people you want to have react. What they will react to is not necessarily what you react to. There is no sense in printing leaflets for people who cannot read, in using precocious ideas which might be diverting at a cocktail party but which shrink to nothing under primal needs, in assaying the terroristic superstitions of jungle or rice paddy in terms of a Pennsylvania farmyard, regardless of how close these seem to you as a foreigner. Get your activating idea across in terms and in a way that the receivers will understand, accept, and react in the way you desire.

VI.

As a footnote to these three basic rules, remember humor--even if it is a grim practical joke that only you can afford to smile at. Humor is often the test of a good psychological operation, since humor is constructed on the frailties of mankind--and skilled playing on these frailties increases the effectiveness of the psychological weapon. Those of you who knew Admiral Miles' operations in China should recall the risks his Chinese agents took to wall-paint slogans poking fun at the Japanese. In some instances, the main motivation of volunteers who risked death doing this was the appeal of playing a prank.

VII.

As a second footnote to these three basic rules, remember and honor the old adage that "actions speak louder than words". Psychological operations aren't much good if you say one thing earnestly, and then prove that you didn't really mean it by acting otherwise. There are times when troop behavior, military courtesy, true discipline, will speak far more loudly than any leaflets or broadcasts. There is no substitute for living your beliefs.

In other words, pay attention to actions. About this time a year ago, the Royal Lao Government was vying with the Communist-controlled Neo Lao Hoc Xat for the support of villagers in the muongs. Part of the government's program was to bring pure water to the villages--and to this end set about digging wells industriously. I heard of one village, not far from Vientiane, which had one of these wells dug--and had been waiting patiently for the government to install a pump. When it wasn't forthcoming, the local Neo Lao Hoc Xat started digging another well right next to this one. You can be sure that the Communists had a pump ready for this well. So, what good would government

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speakers, leaflets, and broadcasts do in telling these villagers that the government was their friend--when the other side proved its friendship by its action?

Now, here I am, starting to illustrate already. So, it's time to give you some case histories. These will be necessarily brief. They all concern operations against the Communist enemy by military men of the Free World.

VIII.

The first two are dated in the fall of 1954. The place is the Tonkin delta in the north of Vietnam.

**The Background.** An armistice, known to us as the Geneva Agreement of 1954, had ended the 8-year Franco-Vietminh war. The Agreement split Vietnam into two countries at the 17th Parallel, the northern going to the Communist Vietminh, the southern to the Free Vietnamese. Armed forces, which have been in conflict throughout the country, were to be evacuated to their respective areas according to a detailed plan, ending in 300 days, in May 1955. In June 1956, the Vietnamese would hold a plebiscite to vote on the future of their country.

**The Problem:** Reflective thought was given to what the Communists had in mind when they dictated this armistice. One conclusion was that they expected to win the proposed plebiscite in 1956. The 17th Parallel split Vietnam to give the Communists the majority of the population, and Communist control methods could assure that voting would be favorable to them. As the Free Vietnamese said, "In June 1956, we commit suicide." Thus, it was imperative to shift the majority vote from the Communist controls in the North to the Free South. To do this conclusively, nearly 2-million people would have to move. The problem was: to make people whose families had been on the same land for generations leave it for an unknown land among strangers many hundreds of miles to the south.

**The Action:** Many psychological operations were carried out, to give these people who desired freedom, but who loved their native soil, a last push to leave it before the Communists--whom they had cause to fear--took over. Two examples, selected from many, will illustrate psywar techniques. The first is a rumor campaign. The second is black, or seemingly done by the enemy.

The Vietnamese Army G-5, or "Morale Action", had an armed propaganda company in the Hanoi area. They were trained in methods of spreading rumors in markets and other public places. A story was given, broken into a series of anecdotes which the listeners would put together for themselves and thus come to their own conclusion. The anecdotes included hints of the presence of Chinese soldiers in a village, the public execution of some of the men of the

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village, hints of sexual relations imposed on the women, and finally, a Chinese unit name. The end conclusion would be that the hated Chinese, in this case the Communist Chinese, really controlled the puppet Vietminh and had already moved a ChiCom division into a village north of Hanoi, and were acting like just the brutes the people expected them to be. Memories of Chinese occupation in 1945 were fresh. The rumors took hold because they were just what the people expected. Several weeks afterwards, Hanoi, Hai Duong, and Haiphong were buzzing with reports of the presence of 3 to 5 ChiCom divisions in Vietnam. People had simply embellished the G-5 rumor operation in the re-telling.

The black operation was based upon a fake Vietminh leaflet. The leaflet was most convincing. It appeared to be from the secret Vietminh security organization in Hanoi--in language, in local printing, in local paper, in tone. It asked the local inhabitants to remain in Hanoi, reassured that there would be an orderly take-over by the Vietminh, asked residents and shopkeepers to inventory all personal belongings, told how to list these properly, including money, and then became overly reassuring that the Communist would respect these personal belongings. Of course, this reassurance sparked the recollection that the Communists sure as hell didn't respect personal property. The effectiveness of this black leaflet, and similar ones, was such that the Vietminh used radio broadcasts to denounce them as fakes. However, the leaflets were so true to style that most of the Communists inside Hanoi laughed at these broadcasts, thinking they were secret French or Vietnamese efforts to discredit the Party's work, and the leaflets remained effective for weeks.

The third example is dated in late 1954. The place is Cochin-China, hundreds of miles south of Hanoi.

The background is much the same as given in the first two examples. Only, this time, it concerns the Vietminh forces which were in the South or Free Vietnam, and who would have to be evacuated by Communist shipping to Vietminh territory north of the 17th Parallel. Polish ships were used for this, embarking the Vietminh initially at Cap St. Jacques. A look at these ships revealed that they were American Liberty ships given to the Soviets in World War II and apparently not painted since they left U. S. shipyards originally. . . . They had a rusty, trampish look. And, at the same time, the Communists had just heard that the U. S. Navy, and other Free World Navies, were coming in to give a sea lift to refugees from the North. The initial Communist propaganda to counter this was to charge that these Naval forces were going to be used to block the Communist transports. Let me remark here that this Communist tactic was impulsive and amateurish--and just begged to be clobbered.

The problem, of course, was to cause as many of the non-Party followers of the Communist Vietminh to remain south of the 17th Parallel

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in Free Vietnam, as possible. There had to be an upset of Communist calculations at Geneva on how many people they would have under their control for the planned 1956 Plebiscite.

**The Action.** Among a number of psychological operations taken to keep the followers pegged down in the South where they could be educated later, one was outstanding. This was a black leaflet which purported to be instructions from the Evacuation Organization of the Communist Party. It was done in authentic Communist style. Paper, printing, and language all rang true. It was distributed in all Vietminh evacuation areas in Cochin-China by G-6, the clandestine Service of the Vietnamese Army, whose agents travelled widely in enemy-held zones. It listed the personal gear that people could bring with them, urging that warm clothes be brought along, not only for the notably cold winters of Tonkin, but also warm clothes would be useful to those who naturally would volunteer to join the patriots building the railroad in China. As a footnote at the bottom, there was an angry denial that evacuees would be unsafe on the voyage north. The Red Navy would see to that. Not only that, but all evacuees would be kept safe, well below deck, so that Imperialist fighter aircraft couldn't strafe them. This scary picture, which previous Communist propaganda had helped, really came into sharp focus when the evacuees reached Cap St. Jacques and saw the rusty, raffish transports awaiting them, and pictured themselves trapped below deck in what looked like floating coffins, Word spread quickly. There was a really significant refusal to go North, including sizeable units of Vietminh combat forces.

## IX.

The fourth example is dated in late 1950. The place is in Central Luzon, in the Philippines.

**The Background.** The Communist Huks were reaching the climax of their savage and bloody attempt to overthrow the Philippine Government by force. Terroristic raids on towns were frightening to government officials-- and rightly so, as proved by the numbers of officials pulled out of their houses at night and executed in the street by the Huks, and the wanton butchery of unarmed civilians. It was a time of frightening cruelty. The provincial governors demanded that the Philippine Army garrison all the towns in the trouble area. The governors, and the votes they represented, had a big say with the President. So, the Philippine Army was under immense political pressure to keep spread out in necessarily small garrisons all over the map. Yet, the situation demanded that the Army concentrate into striking forces that could hit the enemy in real effective strength. This meant pulling garrisons out of the towns to get the troops with which to build such forces.

**The Problem.** Among the many measures being taken at the time, it was decided to see if some psychological interdiction would work. The problem was:

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to make the Huks move away from an area where they were threatening a town,
and thus free the Army troops garrisoning the town to be concentrated with
other troops into a Combat Team.

**The Action.** It was known that the Huks were coming into town secretly at night, from their hillside camp in the nearby jungle. They would visit townspeople, who had a secret Communist government--the real government to the people was this secret night one--court trials, punishments, taxes, even for marriages. Thus, it was known that the Huks and the people talked to each other.

The psychological operation was based upon these known facts, plus
known Filipino superstitions. Selected Philippine Army officers and men
carried out the operation.

Rumors were spread, in markets, barber-shops, and other public
places--in segmented anecdotes which a listener would finally put together
for himself. The stories were based upon the reputed sayings of a noted
soothsayer in Ilocos Norte, an old lady who had predicted the death of
President Roxas. She was now predicting that men with evil in their hearts
would be the victims of the local and terrifying vampire. The Huk jungle
area was named as the locale in the noted soothsayer's prediction. A man
would be foolish to believe this--but then, who knows? Roxas hadn't believed
her and look what happened to him.

This story was planted all one day. The first night the Army stayed put, to permit the Huks to come to town, and hear this superstitious story from the townspeople. The next night, an Army patrol was staked out on the trail to town. When the Huks came down it, cautiously, the last man was silently grabbed by the patrol. When the Huks were out of the vicinity, the captured Huk was held down, two holes punched in his throat, held up by the heels, and drained of blood. The body was carefully placed back on the trail. The returning Huks found the body. The vampire evidence was compelling. The Huks deserted their strongly held jungle area before dawn.

With the departure of this Huk threat, the troops could leave town--
without political repercussions.

X.

The last example is in mid-1951. Again, the place is Luzon, the
Philippines.

**The Background.** By mid-1951, the Philippine Army under the personal,
direct, and dynamic leadership of the Secretary of National Defense, Ramon
Magsaysay, had wrested the military initiative from the Huks. Until then, it

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had all been a crash emergency, with time for little more than patchwork
measures on constructing the political base required for victory over the
Communists. It's not enough to be against Communism; you have to be
for something.

The Huks had recruited much of their strength and their huge, sym-
pathetic following by exploiting the 1949 President Election in the
Philippines. The overwhelming majority of Filipinos, fanned by Communist
propaganda, believed that it had been a crooked election, that the elected
Administration had come to power through cheating at the ballot box. In
effect, this made a fine Constitution and an enlightened Electoral Code just
scraps of paper instead of the firm political tenets in which a man could
believe. The Huk said: your ballot isn't counted; join us and use a gun to
get a new government; it's the only way.

Magsaysay saw the situation clearly as one in which the military could
make no further gains, would simply be forced to continue the killing of its
brother Filipinos, unless the Philippines Constitution and the Electoral Code
were brought back to life for all Filipinos. The General Staff and the Commis-
sion on Elections agreed with him. A number of the key members of the
Administration, including the President, were out of the country. The
Electoral Commissioners, quietly but legally, asked the Armed Forces for
help in making the November 1951 election a clean one. This was a by-
election, for a third of the Senators and for local officials. Plans were made
to use troops, reinforced by ROTC students, to insure protection of candidates
and electorate, truly secret balloting, and an honest count.

**The Problem.** In this atmosphere of a pending proof of which is the
better way to change a government--with the bullet or with the ballot--there
was the opportunity to strongly discredit the Communist leaders who advocated
armed rebellion as the only way. The problem, then, was to discredit them
effectively among their large following.

**The Action.** A number of actions were carried out successfully during
the 1951 Election period. Perhaps the key one, however, was a black psycho-
logical operation which was closely keyed to the plans of the Commission on
Elections and the Armed Forces. Incidentally, this psychological operation
was done so skillfully that it took the Politburo a year and a half of careful,
dogmatic analysis to figure out what had happened in this particular attack on
it.

A small Communist propaganda cell, on the northern outskirts of Manila,
had been penetrated by a special Intelligence unit. A leaflet was carefully
prepared, using Communist typewriter, mimeograph and paper. It was so
introduced that the cell believed it was its own. The leaflet called for a
boycott of the election, pointing out in strong terms the cheating in the 1949

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election, and predicting that a disgusted electorate would join the Huks' "armed struggle" after the election and that the best way to ensure this was to maintain aloofness from the corrupt election practices of the capitalists. The leaflet reached the Politburo in the hills, who rebuked the Agitprop cell for independent action in propaganda, but then adopted the line itself. Communist leaders, including Huk regional and squadron commanders, pushed this line hard throughout the provinces and became closely identified with it. It looked like a golden opportunity to them in the bleak days of the turn of military fortune.

Then came Election Day. The 1951 election was remarkably honest-- the plan of the Armed Forces and the Commission on Elections had worked. In fact, the opposition candidates won overwhelmingly against Administration candidates--a fact which the electorate took as open proof of a clean election. While the Philippines electorate was awakening to the fact that its Constitution and its Electoral Code were live, working documents for patriots to live by, the rank and file of the Communist Huk movement were awakening to the fact that their leaders had been dead wrong about a political fact. It was entirely possible, as the Army was pointing out in its intensive psychological campaign, that the Communist leaders were wrong in all their political thinking. Thousands of Huk military and civilian supporters left the Huk Movement. This major defeat marked the beginning of the end for the Huks.

XI.

Now, to sum up.

Note that the case histories given you were thumb-nail sketches of psychological operations conducted by national armed forces against an armed enemy. They were selected to give you a taste of the variety of actions which can be taken against the Communist enemy, who not only fights "with no holds barred", but who makes coordinated use of political, economic, and military weapons when he fights us.

Note that each action was a necessary one--that it fitted in solidly with what had to be done at that historic moment. This seeing of the important necessities of the moment, recognizing them, understanding them--and not frittering away energy and resources on side issues which look so attractive to the many who only see the surface--this is a fundamental "must" for success.

Secondly, note that in each of these examples, it was first determined exactly what each operation should cause people to do. The desired end result was clearly thought out first.

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And thirdly, note that each operation fitted into local acceptance--in tone, in its message, and in the medium used.

One final point should be made. The Asian men who carried out these operations were dedicated patriots. They had to be, because in these and similar operations, they pledged their lives towards the success of what they did--without expectation of reward other than having a country in which their children could grow up as free men. This, too, is our bond of brotherhood with them. It prompts me to conclude this talk with a personal observation: the best American psychological operators I have known have had a deep spiritual kinship with our unpaid Continental troops at Valley Forge, with the men on both sides in the Sunday morning woods at Shiloh, and, yes, with the "Thomasites" of this century, the teachers sent by the War Department to start free public schools throughout the Philippines, often at risk of life. This kinship carries them past the pitfalls of the pragmatism which is merely shallow selfishness--and keeps them atune to the far deeper, moving, true objectives of the American people. These are the objectives which warmly bond together the freedom loving people throughout the world and are the great strength which gives meaning to all of our actions bringing the eventual defeat of the Communists.

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