American Broadcasting Company

1124 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

EXECUTIVE 3-7700

30 December 1969

Dear Henry:

Be forewarned that one of the most resolute
of my New Year's resolutions is to see you and that
neither urgent conferences with gooney birds on Mid-
way nor soliloquies with seagulls on San Clemente
sands will be accepted as viable alibis for your
unavailability.

I knew long before John Pierson's piece in
yesterday's Wall Street Journal what a tight leash
the seadogs of the Ship of State were kept on.

But whereas the Ship is not even sinking--
even though some rats of rhetoric have deserted
to the dubious lifeboats of criticism--how am
I expected to invent a sufficiency of Kissinger-
isms (counterfeited as before) in which to frame
my question at the President's next news conference--
if any?

How can I be expected to do so, that is to say,
unless I see you before (to be impetuously impatient)
Washington's birthday, when the national attention
is directed reverently to Truth, as recounted in
the historic Hatchet Job case?

Otherwise my countless listeners, viewers and
column readers must, unconsciously, rely on my
plagiarisms of Pete Lisagor, Tom Wicker and Sarah
McClendon for their clues to the present state
and future course of Policy.

Happy New Year,

Hon. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington DC

A DIVISION OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.

telephone

(Type of request)

4/24/70

(Date received)

dcm

(By)

Name: Edw. P. Morgan, ABC-TV

Request: Doing a TV documentary on the Jap. role in Aisa in the 1970's and would like to do a taped interview of HAK on American Trade Problems with Japan. Their best taping dates are May 15-20. If HAK can't do it, they would like to know of someone else in govt. who might.

Contact Miss Goell: 212/LT 1-7777, x8091

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: NO 4/28

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: 4/28

Additional Information:

Resolution:

MORGAN

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /m*

To:

From:

RECEIVED
MAY 1 1970

CENTRAL FILES

NEWSMAN: 12/7/70, jlp

Type of Request & Date

MORGAN

(Last name and pending date)

Name: Ed Morgan, ABC

Request: Saw Mr. Kissinger the other day and they agreed that it has been a long time since they have talked. He would like to see Mr. Kissinger some time in this week or next for background on things in general, before the crush of the holidays. Mornings are slightly better for him but his broadcast time is flexible enough that he could arrange a time in the afternoon.

Contact his secretary, Mrs. Jacobs, on his direct line: EX3-7253
or through the switchboard: EX3-7700.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: YES - 12/29

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

111 morgan shake 26 jan 72

This is Edward P. Morgan, ABC News Washington, with the shape of One Man's Opinion. A look at the peace offensive after this word. (60)

It took him more than triple the time to do it, but Dr. Henry Kissinger did a better job this morning of explaining how the Nixon administration was trying to end the war in Indochina than thexxx president himself did on the tube last night.

For an hour and a quarter in the East Room of the White House, which is usually reserved for glittering state occasions, the pudgy, affable and powerful chief foreign policy adviser to the president, whose sense of humor rivals,xxx happily, his sense of history, told a large gaggle of reporters sitting on fragile tea-party chairs what he had been up to in the dozen secret meetings he has had with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris since August, 1969.

Kissinger left no doubt that for nearly three years the administra-
tion has been trying hard behind the scenes to do what many of its
critics changed publicly it was not doing, namely, terminate hostilities
by setting a terminal date for total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The

222

The president's envoy made this offer for the first time in Paris on May 31, 1971. Hanoi rejected it on grounds it was not coupled with satisfactory conditions of a political settlement. In the ensuing months, he indicated, it became increasingly plain that the North Vietnamese wanted not only a unilateral American military withdrawal--which is already underway—but a unilateral pledge, in effect, to dispose of President Thieu's government in Saigon, even to the extent of ceasing future military aid to South Vietnam.

"We are not prepared to end the war by turning over the government of South Vietnam as part of a political deal," Kissinger said—and there, largely, is where the matter is stymied. However he made clear that in the course of negotiations it was Washington, not Hanoi, that made the concessions—the major one being an offer to hold new, independently supervised elections in South Vietnam, with participation by all factions.

including

333

including the Communists and with a pregnant proviso that President Thieu
would resign a month before such elections were held. (Parenthetically,
s
Communist/Lamk don't understand—or maybe they understand too well—the
western concept of free elections.)

Kissinger joked about how his secret Paris trips put an aggressive
Washington society columnist on緊up-tight but he was far more con-
vincing and candid than President Nixon in conceding the domestic political
purpose of these efforts. To end domestic disharmony on the war has been
"a major objective of our entire policy," he said.

What about the timing of these revelations? It was decided in Dec-
ember to make them now if there was no go signal from Hanoi, because it
was unfair to keep Congress and the public longer in the dark.

Why believe Hanoi is more likely to come to terms now when the
military situation in Cambodia and Laos is deteriorating seriously,
which North Vietnam may exploit with an offensive? This could, paradoxically,
be a prelude to another round of serious negotiations but nobody knows.

What we do know is that though President Nixon has not ended
the war he has reduced it markedly an a political issue-unless he
elects to return to massive bombing, as if that were the way to reduce
the enemy's stubbornness. this is edward p. morgan abc news washington

PERSONAL

17 Campden Grove,
London, W.8.

17th April, 1972.

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

David, Lord Harlech, was kind enough to
write you on my behalf asking if I might call on you
to discuss your view - putting it generally - of the
world scene. And I gather you were equally kind in
relying.

To be brief, and as specific as I can, I
would like to call on you in Washington with a British
TV film crew in order to present an interview for a
weekly current affairs programme called "THIS WEEK."
It has the largest audience of any comparably serious
programme and is transmitted in many countries.

The areas of conversation would be more to do
with your view of the world balance of power in the next
decades, especially, to put it crudely, the role of ideology
in nationalist or self-preservative motives. This would
be the main emphasis rather than on U.S. domestic politics
- if you so preferred it. But this would, of course, be
open to discussion. What I'm trying to say, without, I
hope, sounding pompous is that I'd like to pitch it high.

Obviously you must get hundreds such applications
and, searching around for something to say on my behalf,
is that I'd be very excited if you'd agree; and that I
reviewed your study of Metternich in "THE OBSERVER" in 1957.

We would come to Washington, or wherever, any
time you would care to see us.

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.,
United States of America.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

February 3, 1969

Mr. Oskar Morgenstern
Princeton University
Department of Economics
207 Dickinson Hall
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Oskar:

Many thanks for your letter of December 18. I was sorry to hear you were hospitalized and hope that you will be sufficiently recovered to leave soon.

It was thoughtful of you to enclose the piece on military planning and I look forward to reading it. I would like very much to meet with you in February, so if you could call my office, my secretary should be able to arrange for a convenient time.

cc: Letter and attachment to Larry Lynn for summary and comment.

RECEIVED
FEB 2 1 1969
CENTRAL FILING

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

June 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.

SUBJECT: Reply on Oskar Morgenstern and Action on PSAC Nominations

Oskar Morgenstern has sent you two letters (Tab C) which discuss the ABM and our China policies and offers some nominations for PSAC.

He argues that first priority on strategic matters should be given to improving the reliability of existing missiles, both Minuteman and Polaris. He is certainly right in drawing attention to the reliability issue. He also suggests we consider more mobile deployments for our land-based missiles. His China policy suggestions include a proposal to explore the opportunities for scholarly exchanges and a U.S. policy favoring U.N. membership for Communist China.

At Tab A is a reply for your signature, the China portion of which has been coordinated with Lindsey Grant.

At Tab B is a memorandum to Dr. DuBridge for your signature which provides him with the list of nominees suggested by Morgenstern.

Enclosures

Tab A - Ltr for Mr. Morgenstern

Tab B - Memo for Dr. DuBridge

Tab C - Ltrs from Mr. Morgenstern

MATHEMATICA

one palmer square • princeton, n. j. 08540 • 924-2586-code 609

OSKAR MORGENSTERN
Chairman of the Board

May 21, 1969

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Here are the promised further comments, supplementing my
letter of May 19, 1969.

I. Discussion with China:

(1) I have carefully considered, though very little time was
available, as to what could be done in order to open contacts with China.
The obvious difficulties have been increased because in the field where
an expansion of conversations could most naturally take place, namely,
in the scientific area, all contacts have stopped for the last three years
on China's initiative. I am advised by Chinese scholars that no publications
are coming out of China, except propaganda sheets, and it seems difficult
to develop this important area. However, China has lately made a few
great discoveries in the medical-pharmaceutical field and it should not be
impossible, on the basis of international welfare and health, to organize
an international meeting and to invite China, specifically on American
initiative. This would mean giving a strong signal, even if they should
turn down such a request. This could be done via Canada since Canadian
scientists have had good contact in this area before.

(2) A political move would be to indicate publicly at some suitable occasion that the United States is opposed to all treaties anywhere that have been concluded under duress and pressure and that this is a universal policy of this country. Such a statement could then lead over to the specific statement that certain borders of China have been fixed under such conditions. This is indeed true and concerns particularly the Soviet-China border. The Soviet Union has in 1921 renounced voluntarily its extra-territorial rights *within* China, based on treaties made by the Czarist government. However, the Soviets have carefully avoided to include into those treaties which were abrogated any consideration of the border question. If we could find a way of expressing concern in this matter, it would be a very strong indication for the Soviet Union that we have alternatives.

There are also possibilities with recognition of Outer Mongolia
and one might study whether and how this problem could be attacked.

Dr. H. A. Kissinger

May 21, 1969

(3) A most apparent possibility is, of course, that we would drop our opposition to China's admission to the United Nations.

You may also want to know that for the first time quite recently the Chinese have sent an agent to Taiwan who is in active contact with the son of Chiang Kai-shek, who - as you might remember - was educated in Russia and has a Russian wife. This is an extremely interesting move and we should watch it very carefully.

(4) At present, there is in this country a Russian named Zenegin, who is here with specific instructions to inform the USSR on the state of United States studies of Communist China. He is not a secret agent, but a visiting scholar. I do not know where he is at this moment and how long he will remain, but surely your office could find him. It would not be difficult to let this man know that we are thinking of changing our policy in regard to China and there are many ways of bringing the proper kind of information, ideas, etc. to his attention. Though this is only a contact via a single person, it might be extremely effective in Moscow, and you might like to do something about it.

## II. President's Scientific Advisory Committee:

The following is a list of a few persons who in my view should be considered for possible appointment to PESAC. After careful consideration, I propose them on the basis of their competence but without consideration of whether or not they are politically acceptable:

(1) William J. Bowen, Provost of Princeton University. Bowen is one of the brightest young social scientists in the country. He is truly exceptional; he is an excellent economist with particular knowledge of the whole field of labor, labor relations, manpower, etc. He is a brilliant administrator, very articulate and has a lot of sense. I am quite sure he would accept and I think, from every point of view, it would be an excellent appointment, in particular also because he knows the university problems and urban problems very well.

(2) Martin Shubik, Professor of Economy of Organizations at Yale University. Shubik has, although still young, an international reputation. He is in my view one of the best analytical economists right in the forefront of modern problems and methods. He has a very good knowledge of many countries since he has traveled widely and has spent considerable time abroad. Shubik has great ingenuity in problem solving and a good sense for modern technology. He has been for many years a consultant to RAND and is also well acquainted with many military problems.

Dr. H. A. Kissinger

May 21, 1969

(3) Frederick Mosteller, Chairman of the Department of Statistics, Harvard University, whom you may know personally, is one of the country's leading statisticians who is completely at home in mathematical statistics but at the same time strongly oriented toward experimental data, etc. He is highly regarded by natural scientists also and speaks their language. Therefore, he would be a bridge between the social scientists and the others whenever this function is needed.

(4) Ernest Hilgard, Chairman of the Department of Psychology of Stanford University, is not known to me personally, but is a person very much involved in a leading manner in treating questions relating to the interplay of science and public policy. He is highly regarded and undoubtedly worth looking into.

There are surely many more persons who might be considered but if one or two of these were chosen, it would certainly make some difference. At present there is only one person in the Committee, H. A. Simon, who is a good social scientist and I understand he is very effective. But one man alone cannot be expected to make that much of a difference which is the reason why I have again suggested, as I did already years ago, that the Committee be reorganized.

I hope these remarks are of some use to you, and I am with kind personal regards,

OM:rbp

P.S. Boris Zenegin can be located through Mrs. Scott, Council on Learned Societies, (212) 752-9510.

LIST OF NOMINEES

1. William J. Bowen, Provost of Princeton University. Bowen is one of the brightest young social scientists in the country. He is truly exceptional; he is an excellent economist with particular knowledge of the whole field of labor, labor relations, manpower, etc. He is a brilliant administrator, very articulate and has a lot of sense. I am quite sure he would accept and I think, from every point of view, it would be an excellent appointment, in particular also because he knows the university problems and urban problems very well.

2. Martin Shubik, Professor of Economy of Organizations at Yale University. Shubik has, although still young, an international reputation. He is in my view one of the best analytical economists right in the forefront of modern problems and methods. He has a very good knowledge of many countries since he has traveled and has spent considerable time abroad. Shubik has great ingenuity in problem solving and a good sense for modern technology. He has been for many years a consultant to RAND and is also well acquainted with many military problems.

3. Frederick Mosteller, Chairman of the Department of Statistics, Harvard University, whom you may know personally, is one of the country's leading statisticians who is completely at home in mathematical statistics but at the same time strongly oriented toward experimental data, etc. He is highly regarded by natural scientists also and speaks their language. Therefore, he would be a bridge between the social scientists and the others whenever this function is needed.

4. Ernest Hilgard, Chairman of the Department of Psychology of Stanford University, is not known to me personally, but is a person very much involved in a leading manner in treating questions relating to the interplay of science and public policy. He is highly regarded and undoubtedly worth looking into.

MATHEMATICA

one palmer square · princeton, n. j. 08540 · 924-2586-code 609

May 19, 1969

Dear Henry:

I appreciate that you gave me some time last Friday to discuss a few matters with you. I would like in the following to summarize a few of the points that I tried to make:

(1) The *first priority* in the whole ABM matter ought to be given to the *reliability* question of existing missiles, both Minuteman and Polaris. We know that the reliability is far below what is tolerable and what might reasonably be expected. I think the greatest improvement of our deterrence is by improving the reliability. It must be clear to the Soviet Union that ours is not very good (possibly theirs is not either), and it would remain no secret and, in fact, could be announced that we have taken steps which guarantee a significant step-up in reliability. This objective can be attained by using superior methods for checking out missiles and determining the validity of the design and of operating procedures. As I told you, MATHEMATICA in Princeton has worked successfully for Sandia on the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons and has developed a fully computerized method which is superior by orders of magnitude to the mere checking of reliability of individual components presently used because it considers the interaction of all components with each other. I shall not go into details. As I told you, we have presented this matter quite some time ago to the DOD without success, but I am firmly convinced that what has been done successfully for nuclear weapons can be transferred, although with considerable effort but with positive expectations, to missiles, and this work ought to be done in the national interest. It should be started without delay.

If our present missiles are not as reliable as we must have them, then the same considerations apply to the missiles which make up an ABM system. It makes no sense to protect unreliable missiles with other unreliable missiles which are to be used in a system of an additionally complicated nature.

Dr. H. A. Kissinger

May 19, 1969

(2) I mentioned as the second most important issue to look for alternatives for making the deterrent safe, i. e., alternatives to ABM. As such, obviously, one might simply build more missiles of all categories. However, the real alternative consists of the following two:

(a) Increasing mobility of missiles rather than adding further hardened bases. More Polaris, for example, are a reasonable alternative to ABM, and in addition, I would like to remind you of the fact that several years ago land-based mobility was explored envisaging the placing of missiles on railroad cars. This system was abandoned because of the then prevailing state of technology, but it is, I think, still subject to re-examination. There may be other than railroad car based possibilities at the present, and I believe an investigation is indicated.

(b) Some years ago, proposals were made unknown to me of placing missiles into water. This could be done along seashores, in bays, and even in any of the thousands of lakes in the United States. These missiles would be very hard to discover, full operations control would be exercised over them and there is great ability for using decoys in order to confuse the enemy. There have also been proposals for placing missiles on surface ships. But this idea has not been acted on for a variety of reasons. I believe, one should look also into this possibility once more.

I left with you certain papers concerning basic research into arms control, in particular relating to the study of utilities to be attached to weapons systems during the course of negotiations, and to the question of the disclosure of these utilities while one is bargaining. This work, carried out for ACDA, has been of great importance and has led to real progress, but is not finished. It ought to be finished. I am confident that in spite of its present abstract character one will come up, if one is so asked, with rules which may be of practical value in negotiations. This would constitute a tremendous achievement which, of course, cannot be promised, but for which there is a reasonably good expectation. I believe that ACDA should continue the support of these researches in the national interest. This should be done without any delay because it will be impossible to hold the experts who have been working in this field so successfully together indefinitely. Persons of this high quality are very difficult to obtain and cannot be strung along indefinitely. Once they turn in other directions, it is almost impossible to bring them back again and the amounts of money involved are trivial.

Dr. H. A. Kissinger

May 19, 1969

(3) PESAC Committee. In a few days I shall write you again to give you a list of possible candidates for membership in PESAC, which you asked me to present to you. I am very glad that you consider including me; I still have active Q (AEC) and Top Secret clearances, but if this could be stepped up again to the necessary White House clearance which I once had, you and I could talk more freely. I shall also let you know soon my ideas about how to talk to China.

I can assure you that it is a privilege and pleasure to bring matters of concern to me to your attention, and I shall avail myself on the invitation which you extended to me to repeat this when necessary.

With all good wishes,

OM:rbp

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

NOV 22 1971

Dear Oskar:

Many thanks for your letter, written some
time ago, and please accept my apologies
for taking so long to get back to you. I have
delayed in the hopes that a slack time would
come in my work and I would have a chance
to plan on spending some time with old friends.

Unfortunately, it is beginning to look like such
a time never comes. I would like to be able to
talk with you; we haven't gotten together in too
long.

Why don't you let me know when you are next
planning to be in Washington? Perhaps that
is the best way for us to try to meet.

Please stay in touch.

Dr. Oskar Morgenstern
Chairman of the Board
Mathematica Incorporated
P.O. Box 92
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

jlp:11/19/71

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

KISSINGER, HARRY A

December 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR COLEMAN HICKS

FROM: Arthur T. Downey
SUBJECT: Professor Oskar Morgenstern

I met him yesterday at a conference at New York University. The Professor said he was an old friend of HAK's, and that HAK had phoned him recently and asked him to stop in to see him when the Professor was next in Washington. The Professor felt that this was sort of a hit and run approach, and so wanted to find out exactly how to go about arranging a meeting.

After making very clear that HAK's schedule for the next several months has become impossible, I gave him your name and number. You might expect a call from him.

The Professor has two general topics which he wishes to discuss:

- the folly of the US committing itself to build yet another aircraft carrier, in light of Soviet continuous targeting capability for its ICBM's and the advanced tracking from space of carrier deployments;

- the necessity to exchange information with the Soviets (or indeed do it unilaterally) relating to all aspects of nuclear weapon safety devices and programs.