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D. Some Consequence: A Cut-Off on Nuclear Production

As with every arms control agreement, it would be irresponsible to embark on this course without understanding its implications or being willing to face them. It will be impossible for us to insist at one and the same time that the diffusion of nuclear weapons should be prevented and that the defense of the free world depends on them. A corollary of arms control schemes which place a stigma on nuclear weapons must be a willingness to step up the conventional defense forces throughout the free world. Otherwise the military policy of the nuclear areas will furnish an incentive for the nuclear amendment of all regions. Or else it will produce paralysis in the face of nuclear blackmail. To undertake

a major program of controlling nuclear weapons without (substantial) conventional rearmament is (sheer irresponsibility).

anyone else does either. Would you settle for reductions in S.U. forces?
Moreover, if the nuclear stockpiles of the major powers continue

to grow, control of the N-th power problem may soon become illusory.

"The temptation to spread nuclear weapons from existing stockpiles will become irresistible. The demand for exponential expansion of the non-nuclear areas to possess nuclear weapons of their own will become ever more insistent. The nuclear regions should therefore seek ways to demonstrate

more inattentive. The unclean regions should therefore seek ways to demonstrate

unclean areas to base some unclean weapons of their own will become ever
become irretrievable.

The demand for unclean weapons from existing stockbiles will

to grow, control of the M-17 power problem will soon become impossible.

Moreover, if the unclean stockbiles of the major powers continue

be a major program of control of unclean weapons without (unpatented) con-

it will produce barbed wire in the face of unclean blackouts. To undertake
unfairly an incentive for the unclean segment of the barbed wire. Or else
free world. Otherwise the widely held view of the unclean areas will
willingness to step up the conventional defense forces throughout the
same control schemes which place a strain on unclean weapons must be a
and that the defense of the free world depends on them. A carefully worded
same time that the diffusion of unclean weapons should be prevented
willings to face them. It will be impossible for us to inattent at one and
one item on this front cannot without understanding its implications or being

We wish every arm control agreement, if would be irretrievable to

D. Some Consequence: V. Cuff-Ott on Unclean Production

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V - 31

their seriousness in reducing their own reliance on nuclear weapons.

Provided that they can devise appropriate controls, they should accept restrictions on the production of nuclear weapons and the size of their stockpiles. Concurrently with the agreement not to give or sell nuclear weapons (outside the NATO and Warsaw pact area) (including China), the nuclear powers should consider the following control scheme: (a) A cut-off of nuclear production -- if it can be inspected; (b) A reduction of nuclear stockpiles by turning over a substantial percentage of the existing inventory (say 30%) to the International Agency for peaceful uses. This reduction should be made on an over-all basis by the North Atlantic Community as a whole and not by individual countries.

A cut-off on nuclear production if it can be inspected would freeze stockpiles. Since most of the nuclear powers consider their present arsenal hardly adequate for their immediate needs, this alone will furnish a constraint against giving nuclear weapons to areas not covered by the alliance system. It will also complicate the elaboration of weapons which could upset the deterrent equation. For example, in case of a cut-off

V - 32

on nuclear weapons production a country will have the problem of
allocating its stockpiles between retaliatory weapons, air defense and
tactical weapons. Though an allocation can be made and though it need
not remain fixed once decided upon, it will be most difficult to achieve
an overwhelming advantage in a new category -- such as defense against
ballistic missiles. Assuming that the existing stockpiles enable both
sides to make their retaliatory force invulnerable -- the prerequisite
to any arms control scheme -- a cut-off on nuclear production would at
least reduce the possibility and therefore the fear that the security of
a country can be suddenly jeopardized by a dramatic new device.

These tendencies will be powerfully reinforced if both sides make
a substantial reduction of their nuclear stockpiles, turning over the
fissionable material to the International Atomic Energy Agency for peaceful uses. While
it is impossible to outline the size of the reduction without a careful
technical study, some general observations may be pertinent: The reduction
while substantial, should not upset the equilibrium between the retaliatory
(whichever might themselves be limited by agreement) forces described earlier. The reduction should stabilize stockpiles at

forces described earlier. The reduction should stabilize stockpiles at
(which might himself be limited by agreement)
while substantial, should not meet the equilibrium between the retaliatory
technical study, some general operations may be pertinent: The reduction
if it is impossible to outline the size of the reduction without a careful
unfavorable material to the International Agency for peaceful use. While
a substantial reduction of their nuclear stockpiles, turning over the
These tendencies will be powerfully reenforced if both sides make
a country can be suddenly jackalized by a dramatic new device.

least reduce the besacrility and therefore the fear that the security of
to any same control scheme -- a one-on-one nuclear production would be
sides to make their retaliatory force numerically -- the brerderate
palestic missiles. Assuming that the existing stockpiles ample both
an overwhelming advantage in a new category -- such as defense against
not remain fixed once decided upon, it will be most difficult to achieve
tactical weapons. Though an allocation can be made and though it need
allocate its stockpiles between retaliatory weapons, air defense and
on unclear weapons production a country will have the problem of

A - 35

V - 33

a level where the allocation between various uses can barely be maintained but where a sudden shift from one category to another would create a basic weakness somewhere. Such a reduction of nuclear stockpiles would minimize the incentive to nuclear sharing for no country could give up part of its nuclear capability without weakening itself. (a similar beneficial effects on tendency to use nuclear blunting, & on the escalation problem.)

From the point of view of inspection a reduction of nuclear stockpiles is reasonable easy to establish with respect to the amount of fissionable material actually turned over to an International Agency. The difficulty will arise in estimating the size of the stockpile and therefore in fixing the amount of material each side should relinquish. It would therefore be necessary to establish a control system at least as rigorous as that to deal with surprise attack described earlier -- indeed a cut-off on nuclear production should be joined to such a control scheme as a further means to remove an incentive for a sudden attack.

In that case, all nuclear diffusion plants could be required to be located in the areas open to unlimited inspection. Inventory inspection in the rest of the country, if useful to discover missile sites should also be

able to detect hidden nuclear production facilities. Once the nuclear

production fairly good
diffusion plants were known, a rough estimate of existing stockpiles
could be made and the amount of fissionable materials to be turned over
to the International Agency determined.

The details would have to await a technical study designed to
determine the feasibility of monitoring a cut-off on production and of
fixing the amount of nuclear material to be turned in. Though the two
steps can be taken separately, a cut-off on production could be fatal
if there is not an almost fool-proof inspection system. For the side
continuing production could overwhelm its opponent not only by numbers

but by refinements in technology. If it can also continue testing and also
continue the production and deployment of delivery systems and defense systems,
Everything would depend therefore on the ability to devise an

airtight system to monitor a cut-off on nuclear production. A study of
(it has been studied several times in a classified way, by different agencies,
this problem) should precede any proposal in this direction. It should

be considered conducted with a rigor and a lack of passion which has un-
fortunately not characterized our previous efforts in this field.

The effectiveness of an inspection system would have to be infinitely
superior to that devised for example for the nuclear test ban. Nothing

(The most recent such study preceded the inclusion of the cut-off proposal
included in the measures tabled at the current United Nations conference. This
is a private remark.)

V - 35

short of an opening up of Soviet society to the inspection system
described earlier would seem to offer an adequate guarantee.

The n-th power problem can therefore be summed up as follows:

(1) The risks of catalytic war are *often somewhat exaggerated* and the likelihood of an attack by a smaller country on a large nuclear power is *probably not substantially increased* by the spread of nuclear weapons.

(2) There is a real danger, however, that the diffusion of nuclear weapons to smaller countries will exacerbate their relations among each other because of the difficulty of protecting a small nuclear establishment against surprise attack.

(3) An agreement among the present nuclear powers to arrest the diffusion of nuclear weapons might lead either to their tutelage over the rest of the world or else it could serve to spur local production.

(4) An agreement among the present non-nuclear powers to forego the possession of nuclear weapons is likely to be ineffective because of the inequality in motive, power and possibility of enforcement among the members of the non-nuclear club.

the members of the non-unclear group.

of the inedibility in motive, power and beseepility of enforcement amount
the beseepifou of unclear mesebone is likely to be ineflective because

(4) An agreement among the present non-unclear bowers to forego
the rest of the world or else it could serve to aban locat production.
dilution of unclear mesebone might lead either to their tufelage over

(3) An agreement among the present unclear bowers to arrest the

ment against subhrie attack.

other because of the difficulty of protecting a small unclear satrapian-
mesebone to smaller countries will exacerbate their relations among even

(3) There is a real danger, however, that the dilution of nuclear

significantly increased by the ahead of unclear mesebone.

of an attack by a smaller country on a false unclear power (not

(1) The risks of catalytic war are [exaggerated and the likelihood

The n-th power problem can therefore be ammed nb as follows:

short of an opening up of Soviet society to the inattention system

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V - 36

(5) For this reason the two approaches should be combined: (a) the nuclear areas (for purposes of this agreement the NATO area and the Communist bloc) would agree not to sell or give nuclear weapons to any presently non-nuclear area. The non-nuclear areas would agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons of their own.

(6) All development for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the non-nuclear areas would be placed into the hands of an International Atomic Energy Agency which would account for all fissionable material, ~~the nuclear~~ countries would extend no aid to non-nuclear countries in this field except through an International Agency. the IAEA, is provided in the charter of that agency.

(7) To show their good faith, to reduce the pressures for the spread of nuclear weapons and to arrest the nuclear race the nuclear powers would negotiate a cut-off on nuclear production and a reduction of their stockpiles.

["stockbiles.", "negotiate a cut-off on nuclear production and a reduction of their\nof nuclear weapons and to arrest the nuclear race the uncleared核\n(3) To show their good faith, to reduce the pressure for the abdication\nof the British government.", "To show their good faith, to reduce the pressure for the abdication\n(3) To show their good faith, to reduce the pressure for the abdication\nexcept through an International Agency. The IAEA is provided in the\ncountries would extend no aid to non-unclear regions in this field\nnon-unclear areas would be placed into the hands of an International\n(4) VII development for beautiful areas of nuclear energy in the\nmanufacture of nuclear weapons of their own.", "A\n\nThe\n\nE\n\nn\n\no\n\nn\n\nu\n\nn\n\no\n\nn\n\no\n