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5. Whatever our differences with the Soviet leaders, we harbor no animosity toward the Soviet people. We should encourage contact between our two peoples and interchanges in the cultural, intellectual and scientific fields.

6. We must constantly urge the Soviet Union to meet expected standards of international conduct:

- It should meet its financial obligation to the U.N. -- as required by the U.N. Charter;

- It should meet its obligation under the International Fishing Conventions;

- It should sign the International Patent and Copyright Conventions;

- It should sign the Japanese Peace Treaty.

7. If the United States and the free world are to endure and prosper, we must build for the future -- we must begin to look beyond the edge of the desk over which current crises come.

As leaders of the Free World, we must accept the opportunities of this leadership.

We must summon the kind of political creativity which our forefathers demonstrated.

We must give proud allies an opportunity to share in the common efforts of free peoples.

We must offer a haven for the unsure and the uncommitted.

The United States must dedicate itself to those principles which unite free peoples and we must promote by policy and purpose the common cause of those who would have a better world.

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This nation must choose to lead in building a Union of
the Free which can serve as a mighty bulwark against the Com-
munist challenge.

The Rebuilding of NATO

The disarray which exists within the Atlantic Alliance
is one of the most pressing international problems which the
United States faces today. The cohesion and strength of NATO
have been dangerously sapped in recent years.

I urge the creation of a permanent body at the highest
level charged with exploring the means of strengthening cohe-
sion of the nations bordering the North Atlantic. Such a body
should cooperate to the fullest with whatever European insti-
tutions emerge out of the process of European integration. This
body would be charged with:

1. The formulation of common NATO negotiating positions toward the Soviet Union on any matter of common concern.

2. The formulation of a common NATO trading policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc;

3. The formulation of a common strategic doctrine among the countries of NATO;

4. The formulation of long-range goals of NATO policy;

5. The construction of policies which enable other regions of the world, such as Latin America, Japan and the other Pacific nations, Southeast Asia and Africa, to collaborate with the Atlantic community on a basis of equality and mutual respect.

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In proper recognition of the significance of these
subjects the American representative to this NATO body
should be of Cabinet rank.

Cuba

The time has long since come when the Democratic
Administration should take clear decisive and purposeful action
to meet the critical problem of imperialistic Communism in Cuba.

In seems almost incomprehensible to me that after four
years of Communist rule in Cuba, that after nineteen months of
the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, and that after repeated
instances of attempted subversion of other Latin governments,
this Administraton apparently has no policy at all on Cuba.

The United States government must clearly and firmly
enunciate the following policy objectives:

1. the removal of all Soviet troops and weapons
from Cuba;

2. the stopping of all Cuban-sponsored Communist
subversion, sabotage and guerrilla warefare
against other Latin American peoples;

3. the opportunity for the people of Cuba to
exercise freely the right of self-determination.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, the United States had
an opportunity to accomplish these goals unilaterally, but the
Administration tragically failed to supply air cover to the
invasion. And in October 1962 the Democratic Administration

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failed to press its obvious strategic advantage to secure
the removal of all Soviet weapons and men and on-site inspection
of the island.

In order to accomplish these policy objectives today
the United States must re-establish the unity of the Western
Hemisphere based on mutual trust, confidence and respect, and
must seek the cooperation of its NATO allies. Consultation
and the joint consideration and formulation of policy are vital
to the strength of NATO.

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States must also
move vigorously through the Organization of American States to
re-establish the principle of consultation and joint hemispheric
action in order to develop a truly hemispheric solution to a
hemispheric problem.

*In particular, the United States should urge the
following steps, all of which are consistent with the Rio
Treaty, the Act of Bogota, and the Punte del Este resolution:

a. An OAS quarantine on all shipments of weapons to Cuba, with OAS inspection of every vessel bound for the island;

b. The use of such a quarantine to prohibit the shipment to or from Cuba of any weapons;

c. A complete OAS embargo against trade, communications and travel between members states and Cuba;

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[L6]

d. A comprehensive system of sanctions by OAS members against all shipping lines which continue to trade with Cuba and use OAS ports;

e. An OAS policy to direct members states to institute a system of pre-emptive buying to prevent trade with the Cuban government;

f. Creation of an OAS Inter-American Subversion Control Board to indentify sources of Communist subversion, to enhance Inter-American communication concerning known Communist subversives, and to coordinate the activities of anti-Communist security agents;

g. Establishment of special Navy squadrons and air surveillance teams to patrol the Caribbean in order to prevent gun-running or the delivery of subversive materials from Cuba. These Naval squadrons could lead to an Inter-American Coast Guard.

The United States should immediately urge upon its NATO allies the following measures:

a. A complete NATO embargo against trade, communications and travel between member states and Cuba;

b. A system of sanctions by NATO members against all shipping lines which continue to trade with Cuba and use ports in any NATO country;

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c. A NATO policy to direct member states to institute
a system of pre-emptive buying to prevent trade
with the Cuban government;

d. A NATO policy to direct member states to curtail the sale of any goods to Communist countries which have shipped similar goods to Cuba.

******

In addition to his views on these three paramount
issues, Governor Rockefeller has taken firm, positive stands
on a number of other important foreign policy issues.

United Nations

On the United Nations he has said: The United Nations
is far from perfect. At times its inability to act is extremely
frustrating. But most of the peoples of the world, and most
of the peoples of this nation, do look to the future and do
have faith - and the U.N. is a symbol of that faith in the
future. The United Nations will continue to stand - and we will
stand in it, for our faith is strong and the future belongs to
the free. To walk out of the United Nations now, or to abandon
it to the Communists if Red China is admitted, would be to turn
our backs on the highest hopes and aspirations of mankind.

1. The U.S. should remain in the U.N. and should work to strengthen that organization, but should recognize two things:

a. The U.N. is not, and cannot be, a substitute for

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the strength of the United States.

b. Our influence in the U.N. depends on our ability to indentify ourselves with the aspirations of the majority of mankind.

2. The U.S. should oppose Communist Chinese admission to the U.N. and if Communist China were admitted to the U.N. we should not leave the U.N. for that reason alone.

3. If the Soviet Union continues to refuse to meet its financial obligations to the United Nations, the United States should move to withdraw the Soviet right to vote in the General Assembly.

4. The U.S. should work to make the U.N. more effective by urging the small nations of the world to make it more than a mere "debating society." It can do so only if it deals seriously with serious subjects.

5. The U.S. must use its influence and power to prevent a double standard from developing in the U.N.

6. The U.S. can serve the high purpose of the United Nations by giving new strength to the Western regional organizations for economic, political and military security which have been developed under Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter.

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It is in this sphere that we can give strength to
the U.N. and give hope to the peoples throughout
the world who look to the United Nations as the
symbol of their future.

Southeast Asia

On South Vietnam and Southeast Asia, Governor Rockefeller
has been highly critical of the vacillating and contradictory
policies of the Democratic Administration.

He has said:

South Vietnam is vital to all of Southeast Asia
-- and Southeast Asia is vital to the United States
and the West. When freedom, legitimacy, territorial
integrity and the right of self-determination are
attacked, our interests are involved.

Governor Rockefeller has proposed an 8-point plan
to strengthen the forces of freedom in Southeast Asia. Specifi
cally, he has proposed that:

1. Any policy toward Thailand, Cambodia, Laos or Vietnam must be part of a broader policy toward the area as a whole.

2. The war effort in South Vietnam itself should be stepped up.

3. The South Vietnamese should undertake a major psychological warfare campaign against the govern-

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ment of North Vietnam toward the end of convincing
it that it will not remain an inviolate sanctuary
if aggression continues.

4. South Vietnamese forces should undertake air strikes against the Vietcong supply sanctuaries in Laos.

5. The United States should insist on the enforcement of the neutralization agreement provisions for Laos.

6. The United States should under no circumstances participate in an international guarantee of Cambodian neutrality based on the daily-violated Laotian model.

7. The United States should make clear *now*, in advance of open guerrilla warfare within its borders, that it is totally and unequivocally committed to the integrity of Thailand.

8. Social reforms should be continuously sought by the South Vietnamese government.

## Indonesian - Malaysian Crisis

Discussing the disturbing Indonesian aggression against the newly established country of Malaysia, Governor Rockefeller has criticized the Democratic Administration's failure to act decisively in an effort to end such aggression.

Rockefeller has pointed out that "the Indonesian actions in Malaysia are the direct result of the Administration's action in siding with Indonesia in 1962 after Indonesia had

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used force to support her claims to Dutch New Guinia.

He has been particularly critical of Attorney General Robert Kennedy's recent trip to the area, charging that the Attorney General failed completely to distinguish between victim and aggressor.

Rockefeller has recommended that:

1. The U.S. must make clear that it will resist any further Indonesian aggression.

2. The United States should as a first step indicate firmly that we will stop all foreign aid to Indonesia unless President Sukarno halts all forms of aggressive action against Malaysia. Aid should be stopped under the terms of the foreign aid authorization act which requires that the President determine whether continued aid to Indonesia is "in the best interests of the United States."

3. The United States should support the Malaysian position in any U.N. consideration of the crisis.

4. British and American policies toward Indonesia should be coordinated so that, as the situation is aggravated, the United States will not run the risk of alienating a long-standing ally.

May 1, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Text of Proposed "Conscience of a Republican"

1. The introduction, pages 1-4:

a. is actually pretty well written;

b. The bottom paragraph on page 2 refers to two specific Goldwater positions: withdrawal from the U.N. and the use of marines over Guantanamo water. No where in the introduction are specifics mentioned and they seem singularly out of place here. The paragraph might better read: "-- We <u>cannot</u> indulge in self-deceptions, then encourage a flight from reality in world affairs -- in regard to the United Nations, the use of force, the need for foreign aid or any of the intensely difficult decisions of the contemporary world."

2. No comment on the section on domestic policy.

3. Foreign policy section on pages 19-29 (plus the section on the U.N.)

a. page 19. This is a sufficient but not enticing introduction. Khrushchev is spelled with two h's.

b. Section on "Meeting the Communist Challenge" is I think a good summary.

c. The section on "Rebuilding of the Atlantic Alliance" might include some of the proposals in our draft NATO speech dealing with a European deterrent and aid to the French Nuclear Force -- positions which the Governor has already taken.

d. Section on "The Rebuilding of Hemispheric Unity" is a contraction of the New Orleans speech:

1. Point 1 on page 23 deals with reorganization of the U.S. government and should be put to the rear of the proposals.

2. Point 5 on page 25, while consistent with NAR's position, is stated pretty boldly for the moderate or conservative elements in the Party to swallow. This proposal, in my view, should not be expressed unless there is room to explain in some detail why it is justified.

April 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson
Jerry Danzig
R. Mort Frayn
Lloyd Free
George L. Hinman
Henry A. Kissinger
Robert McManus
Charles Moore
Hugh Morrow
Harry O'Donnell

William J. Ronan (cc: Edward Kresky)
Richard A. Wiebe
John A. Wells
Richard Blades
William Roberts
Richard J. Turner
Mr. William Moshofsky
Honorable F.F. Montgomery
Honorable William E. Walsh

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: First Draft of Proposed Brochure, "Conscience of a Republican"

Attached is a first draft of a proposed brochure, "Conscience of a Republican."

A section on agriculture still has to be added.

Many of the positions have not actually been enunciated by the Governor as yet, and there is a delicate question as to timing.

I would greatly appreciate your comments as to the style, length, selection of subject matter, substantive positions and any other aspects of this proposed brochure.

Some of the addressees of this memorandum were given copies of this draft at the meeting in the Governor's Office on April 7. For them this is a duplicate copy.