Telcon
Amb. Sullivan-Dr. Kissinger

Monday, June 11, 1973

7:55 a.m.

S: [Opening of conversation not taped.] If we've got to go back to them with another letter as Whitehouse is expecting, I think we can get the word "territory" changed to "area". There is no problem on that. It's merely a translation question. But these other two demands they make are totally impossible.

K: You think it's totally impossible.

S: Those two yes. I certainly think that dropping 10 and 11 and putting in that one sentence - that's out the window. Then the business of military control is contrary to the wording of the agreement.

K: Why is that?

S: It uses the words'area under control" or "Area controlled by."

K: All right. We'll find that.

S: Now what do I do with my friend, just tell him the straight facts?

K: I'd tell him the straight facts, ask for another 24 hours and say you are prepared to announce a meeting with me for Wednesday.

S: And if they say, hell no, that tears it?

K: I think they'll accept it. It's impossible to get anything done now. It's 8 o'clock at night.

S: Well, yeah, you'd have to go immediately through. That's why I'm calling, suggesting that you want to send something out straight from there. Charlie proposes and assumes that you're going to be giving him an answer tonight.

K: OK, well look, why don't you move your meeting for a couple of hours. Well let's wait. Let me call Charlie.

S: See what you can get out on the other end, if you can dictate one to him over the phone that he can hand over.

K: Right. Okay.

S: All right, we'll just keep everything on track here then, as it

TELCOM

President/Kissinger

8:30 a.m. - 6/11/73

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President

P: Hi, Henry.

K: I just want you to know we have heard from Saigon and they have caved about 2/3 of the way. So now we need another 24 hours to make them come the rest of the way. Whitehouse thinks I should go over tonight as long as we told them that I am going to sign tomorrow and then they will have to yield by the time I get there.

P: Well, that sounds all right. In other words, just launch it out.

K: They have already given in on most of the way. Another possibility is to ask for 24 hours, but I am afraid Hanoi will break off.

P: You can ask for that when you are over there better than here.

K: We would have to ask for the 24 hour delay today.

P: Oh, I meant - well, you know the situation better than I. But I think going over is a good idea then if the darn thing doesn't come through just handle it from there.

K: There is an 80% - 90% chance that it will come through. I just talked to Charlie Whitehouse and he thinks it is as good as done.

P: You are coming in to see me?

K: I think at 11.

P: Anytime is all right, whatever is convenient for you. I am working on economics right now.

K: It is at 11, Mr. President and you don't mind if we do go through with signing tomorrow if that is possible, even if you speak.

P: No, no, no. I will talk to Haig. There will be two separate stories. Yours will be earlier; mine will be at night.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958

Dated: NARA ID: 6/2/73

2

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Tell me, one thing you might do -- this thing of the ______ was rather disturbing. Of course, it has to do with an Israeli group. We are inviting Farland and some of the leading J______ people to the dinner.

K: _______

P: Do you think you could give Jackson a call?

K: Absolutely, I will see him this week.

P: Before. I don't want him to set something up. What do you think?

K: That you put it off.

P: They should put the hearings off because of this. Peace is too important for politics, but Jackson is pretty to do so.

K: First of all, I think it is a major disgrace that the hearings go on while Brezhnev is here. Secondly, to cancel a summit because of the domestic disputes would be a sign of weakness.

P: Let alone what it would do to the Chinese and other allies.

K: It is impossible then, Mr. President, for other countries to rely on us.

P: What do you think of it?

K: It will help us if they head off on that one.

P: Do you think if you talk to them?

K: I don't think on that issue. What the matter is, Mr. President, is the Democrats knowing foreign policy is your strong point, they are bringing on everything they can . . . .

P: The French Foreign Minister had already achieved that in Rejkavik 'and . . . . the American side about our achievements, I endorse in advance' (indicates the gist of what the Foreign Minister said in Reykavik) and that I think they will try to do . . . The achievements will speak for themselves.

K: Well, the main thing is, let us just get this thing going. You are going to have Lunch with Dobrynin.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01298
Dated 6/2/87

3

K: Yes, I am.

P: I just hope I can get Haig and Laird and Timmons to get some backbone in our

K: The line will be we give away too much.

P: I am giving a report on TV. What I will do is, instead of going to Congress, I will go right on TV and tell the people.

K: There was good news from Saigon. We better play the string out.

P: What time are you going back to Paris?

K: About 10:30 tonight.

P: And I will just tell the White House that you are going over.

K: Yes, we have now changed the thing three times so we are running the risk of doing it again.

P: The more I think of the San Clemente thing, I am not so sure that it is not so much -- it could be that he is wanting to insure that he has no incidents while he is here. They have been advancing it. There is a very strong John Birch Society there and then there are a lot of nuts in Orange County. Here in Washington we can control everything. He won't see it. But you still think there is a fair chance he will go to San Clemente?

K: I will find out today or tomorrow.

P: If not, let us get our gameplan.

K: We extended our talks here because of very substantive discussions, we decided to have them here and at Camp David.

P: That's right. That's what we could say and we could plan some little trip out of here.

K: I think it is possible Dobrynin thinks it is all right and when Dobrynin takes your side against Brezhnev there's a chance.

P: OK, Henry.

Telcon

Amb. Sullivan/Dr. Kissinger

Monday, June 11, 1973

9:11 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, I've talked to Whitehouse, and he thinks we should proceed with our schedule and he thinks he can get a positive answer by the time I get there.

S: That's good. What do I say then to my friends? I think I should still tell them the truth in case it -- tell them the facts, in case it erupts.

K: That's right. You tell them I'm coming, that I'm prepared to meet at 12:30 at Kleber to initial.

S: Right.

K: That they should make that one change on area. We are rejecting all others.

S:] Right.

K: And that almost certainly we are going to be willing to proceed then to signature that afternoon.

S: Right. And you have sent something out to Charlie?

K: Well, I will send something out to Charlie as soon as Peter, Steaman, Cam and Eagleburger put together all the paragraphs over which they are now fighting.

S: All right. Incidentally, on the question of Brent Scowcroft calling to say what ____ draft are we using, George Aldrich gave to Peter Rodman the last and latest Vietnamese text and asked him to have it transmitted from here.

K: Yeah, but you don't expect that to have happened, do you?

S: Well, George thinks that he heard Peter give it to Ralph Sigler and that he therefore thinks that it went. We have no record here that it went but we must assume that it did. However, even if it didn't go there was no change in the text. There was only a change in the numbering of paragraphs.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

Dated NARA Ref 6/2/73

-2-

K: Okay, it went, I am just told. Tell me, on this schedule, do you think we can get these sons of bitches to instruct their guy to sign tomorrow just technically?

S: I have their man standing by and I will have him informed that this is the latent possibility and I think, yes, it can be done.

K: Do you agree that that's the right way to proceed?

S: I think it's the only way.

K: I'm just afraid of another 24-hour delay.

S: I think that would -- could possibly be the thing that would rupture it.

K: And we might find ourselves in exactly the same spot tomorrow.

S: Well that's possible, but if Charlie has that much optimism, then I think we ought to proceed on that basis.

K: Okay. Fine. Good, thank you.

S: They've written quite an insolent letter, when you think of everything, despite the way the first several paragraphs read.

K: Well, all of this is done by Nha.

S: I know, your friend.

K: But we are now concerned with the results.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Well, I'm going to give you a summary of the situation.

S: All Right. I'll move ahead then as you suggest.

K: Good. Thank you. Goodbye.

DECEMBER

Authority E012958

DATE 6/2/04

Telcon
Senator Jackson/Dr. Kissinger

Monday, June 11, 1973

9:16 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Henry?

K: Yes, Scoop.

J: You're back all in one piece?

K: Yeah, but I have to go over again.

J: When do you go back?

K: Probably tonight.

J: Tonight?

K: Yeah.

J: Could you have one of your people arrange...

K: Late tonight.

J: Yeah, I know it's uh... You notice that I was one of three democrats in the entire Senate on the bombing on Cambodia.

K: Yes.

J: We're down to even McClelland -- all of them -- left, you know.

K: It's a disgrace.

J: Yeah, it's just Eastland (?)....myself. The damdest reactionary that ever walked the pike.

K: You'll look awfully good in another year or so.

J: Well, it's a sad thing. Henry, just a little request. Could you have one of your people arrange so that I can see the head of the Chinese Mission.

K: Of course.

J: About my trip and so on, just to go over and talk with them. I want

CLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12958

Dated: NARA Dated: 6/2/73

-2-

to go through channels and I understood we ought to go through your shop.

K: No, no.

J: We started, and I don't want to be going off...

K: No, not only will I do it, but I'll endorse it.

J: Well, that will be good. And if you could just open that and then have your secretary, preferably in the morning, you know, on a morning meeting, if we can.

K: Okay.

J: Because of all of our votes here in the Senate.

K: Well, why don't we leave it that you will call him after I give you the word.

J: All right.

K: After you get a call from us, you should call.

J: Right. Could you do that today, because the Senate Commerce Committee, all these characters are meeting and doing something. I don't know, they're all going over.

K: Yes. I'll do it today.

J: Very good.

K: Now, Scoop, as long as I've got you on the phone, one other thing. There will be no SALT agreement, no matter what's in the Washington Post.

J: They're not going to. This fellow Spence went off. I've been relying on what you and I have talked about.

K: And I give you my word, there will be some general principles that are so general -- I will go over them with you this week -- but you know, they are really totally meaningless. We have eliminated from them any concreteness.

J: Well, they've got this MIRV story all over town, you know.

DECEMBER 5, 1988

Authority: E012958
DATE: 6/2/88
DISTRIBUTION: N/A

K: Well, our MIRV position is the one we've given to you, and there's nothing else.

J: Is that going to be...

K: There will be no agreement on that either. Besides the Soviets, I have the impression, are working so frenetically on MIRVs that they are not willing to agree on anything.

J: Right. Well, I'll get to you when you get back from Paris then.

K: Right. Goodbye.

DCT ASSIGNED

Authority EO 12958

P. AH N/A DUE 6/2/67

Telcon

Ron Ziegler/Dr. Kissinger

Monday, June 11, 1973; 9:20 a.m.

K: Yes, Ron.

Z: Oh, Henry, good.

K: Actually that reply from Saigon wasn't as good as these told me.

Z: Oh, really?

K: But I think we'll track them anyway.

Z: All righty. Listen, on the Brezhnev thing in the briefing today -- you know Jackson is calling for a delay. Our line is we intend to proceed with the summit and...

K: Say the summit has been planned for a year. We cannot...say the negotiations have been planned conducted over the period of a year. As you know, we never have a summit unless it has been carefully prepared, and we are conducting the foreign policy of the United States and we will not be affected by domestic pressures, and we are therefore proceeding. Just do it very disdainfully.

Z: Yeah. We won't be pressured by...

K: domestic considerations. We are not affected...we are not doing it on the basis of domestic considerations.

Z: Yeah. Okay. Now what line should we take on the Paris thing? Just what we took in Paris, obviously. We will return for a day.

K: I am going back there tonight, and I plan to meet with Le Duc Tho tomorrow, and we still expect to get things straightened out.

Z: Uh, huh. Okay. Tomorrow we expect to get things straightened out. What are the problems? We can't discuss them gentlemen. We have an agreement not to. Right?

K: Exactly.

Z: Worked out is better than straightened. Okay, Henry. We expect to get things worked out. Good.

K: Good.

DELEGATED

Authority E012958

DATE 6/2/73
PART 6

Telcon

Amb. Rabin/Dr. Kissinger

Monday, June 11, 1973; 9:35 a.m.

K: Hello.

R: Hello.

K: Where are you?

R: In New York.

K: How nice to hear from you.

R: How are you?

K: Okay. I just read that John Braden thinks you were too friendly to me.

R: What?

K: John Braden wrote a column saying you were too friendly to me.

R: I was too friendly? I didn't see that.

K: Are you coming down here?

R: Yes, I will come tomorrow. Joe Alsop invited me to come to a dinner.

K: Oh, God dammit I won't be here. I'll be in Paris. Will you still be here Wednesday?

R: No, Wednesday evening I am leaving back to Israel.

K: Yeah, but you'll be here Wednesday morning.

R: Yeah.

K: Well, let's meet. Do you want to have breakfast Wednesday?

R: I'm afraid that Alon is intending to have breakfast on Wednesday.

K: Oh, God dammit, that's right.

R: And I don't want, you know, to interfere.

K: Well, then, let's meet in the morning.

R: All right, whenever your girl can arrange it with my former secretary,

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1298

Dated NARA Ref 6/24/73

-2-

the secretary at the Embassy.

K: Good. You come to my office. Any time Wednesday? Is that the situation?

R: Yeah, til the afternoon.

K: I would love to see you.

R: I will enjoy seeing you.

K: You are one of the few Ambassadors I like.

R: Well, I hope that everything is fine.

K: [laughing] It's an unbelievable period.

R: Under the circumstances.

K: You know, there's no help for stupidity.

R: I think so. I have tried to acquaint myself. I had a long talk with Teddy White and yesterday with Max Franckel here in New York.

K: What do they think?

R: Well, now it's very dangerous to talk on the phone in the United States. Therefore I prefer not to do so. [laughter]

K: Okay, well, we'll talk about it Wednesday.

R: All right. All the best to you.

K: Look forward to seeing you.

R: Bye.

K: Bye.

Telcon
Kenneth Freed (AP)/Dr. Kissinger

Monday, June 11, 1973; 9:55 a.m.

F: Dr. Kissinger.

K: Yes.

F: This is Kenneth Freed of the Associated Press. How are you, sir?

K: Okay.

F: I wondered if there is anything you could talk about before you go back to Paris. I'm doing a story on the shape of the peace talks.

K: No, I think I'd better not until I, uh, we have an agreement with the North Vietnamese.

F: Well, can we talk in general terms about the optimism or pessimism. Do things look pretty good? Do you expect this to wrap it up?

K: Well, I've always gotten myself into trouble by being optimistic. I'm reasonably confident that we can wrap it up.

F: During this next run? In this next round?

K: Yeah.

F: How long do you expect that to take? Be back by the end of the week?

K: Oh, certainly.

F: Okay. Very good. Well I think I understand your situation with the North. Thank you very much.

K: Right, Mr. Freed. Thank you for calling.

F: Uh, huh.

DECT ASSIGNED

Authority EO 1298

DATE 6/2/73

TELCONE

Amb. Whitehouse/Kissinger

10:13 a.m. 6/11/73

K: Hello.

W: Hello, Henry. Charlie Whitehouse.

K: Yes, Charlie, the message is coming.

W: I just talked to my friend and explained our conversation and while he was cautious, I think that he thought it was a very good idea. I explained that a statement would be made either by you or the President to have just the sort of press conferences that you've given after these kinds of performances to attempt to ... with regard to the political solution and that you would also explain what we understood by zones, areas, control, military control and so forth. After thinking that over for a moment he said, "Well, what about their signing or making some statement of reservations ahead of time." I said, "No, I didn't think that that was to acceptable. It would create a hassle or could raise the unaccepted and that what you and I had discussed on the phone was your making and their making at an opportune moment a similar kind of a statement." And he says, "Well, he thought that was a pretty reasonable and interesting proposition and he would talk to the President." And I undertook to have from him at 8 o'clock tomorrow morning, Saigon time, a message from President Nixon which I thought I said, after talking to you would make a suggestion along these lines.

K: That's exactly correct. And the President will say that I will make such a statement tomorrow after the signing.

W: Very good. I said I couldn't tell him now whether you would do something at Orley when you got on the plane or whether it would be

K: Well, I will have to give a press conference explaining the bloody document and that's the time to make it.

W: Very good. I didn't know what your schedule was and how that would work with you so I didn't want to tell

K: Well, you better not, but you better make clear that we will make the statement this week, you can promise them that flatly.

W: Very good. I did think it would be within probably two or three days because once it was public I was confident that you would be making an explanation of it to the television and radio and press people.

DELEGATED
Authority E012958
Dated N/A

6/2/73

2

K: Exactly.

W: So I think that this is the solution and I think that we're out of the woods.

K: Terrific and do you think I can have word by 8 o'clock Paris time.

W: I expect that you can have word by 1 o'clock Saigon time which would be very early in the morning Paris time.

K: That would be marvelous. Now one other thing - I will have to have Sullivan get in touch with you so that the ceasefire order be worked out at the proper moment.

W: That's right. I'm confident that once - we can't arrange that until we've got this other thing tacked down, but that can be arranged very, very quickly after that.

K: Charlie, you're terrific! And you will get that letter within 2 hours.

W: That's perfect and I'm going to let him sleep and get it to him at daylight tomorrow morning and they'll have some kind of a clambake in the morning for a couple of hours. I'll put into it that we need a reply by 2 o'clock in the afternoon here so as to get it to Paris first thing in the morning.

K: Yeh, well make it as early as you dare. If you say 2, you'll get it by

W: I think we ought to just shoot for daylight in Paris and early afternoon here.

K: Exactly. Thank you, Charlie.

W: Not a bit, Henry, I really think this is going to be OK.

K: Good. Marvelous. Excellent.

W: I'll concern this in writing to you in the course of the night.

K: Good and you'll get my letter, as I said, within the next few hours.

W: That's wonderful.

K: Good. Thank you.

W: Good, Henry, thank you every so much.

CLASSIFIED

DELEGATED
Authority E0 12958
DATE NARRATED 6/2/04

TELCONE

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

10:48 a.m. - 6/11/73

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Where are you?

S: I'm out at Desinee (apr. 2) le Vesinet.

K: Oh, well I had another talk with Charlie.

S: Yes?

K: And he has put the - have you seen the President's letter yet?

S: No, I have not.

K: Well, you've seen his proposal.

S: Charlie's proposal?

K: Yeh.

S: Yes, I've seen Charlie's proposal.

K: Well, he ran that by Lam and he thinks that's the solution and we will know by early in the morning.

S: All right. Then I will go ahead and confirm your arrival, confirm the time of meeting but leave the place open.

K: Right, now the meeting is what - 12:30?

S: 12:30.

K: Yeh, I think that's right. Although what am I going to do in that hour and a half?

S: Well, if you get in at 11, it will take you a half hour - it'll take you an hour to get organized.

K: That's all right, that's fine. We can worry about that afterwards. I'll be glad to call on the South Vietnamese after the meeting.

S: I thought I'd get one of them at the airport anyway.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA DRE 6/2/73

2

K: Right. And then, well, what time do you have the next event?
Four or three?

S: Four, it's now ten minutes of four, they'll be here in 10 minutes.

K: No, no, what I mean is for tomorrow's schedule?

S: Yeh, for the schedule you told me three.

K: Three for the first signing.

S: That's right.

K: And then four thirty for a press conference.

S: That's right.

K: OK, fine. Can we make all of this?

S: I think so.

K: If you want to play around half an hour right away or an hour that's up
to you.

S: Fine. I checked with our darlings and their man

K: Because I'm prepared for everything.

S: I checked with our darlings and their man who will have the pen is in
town and will be available if he gets an instruction.

K: OK, because we can go either way.

S: Yeh, because I've had a great deal of experience with you.

K: (Laughs) OK. But don't you think that's the way to proceed.

S: I think so if Charlie's got some optimism on this.

K: I don't think what we gain by another delay, we'll just be up against the
same situation Wednesday.

S: That's right. They'll play it to the end. Good.

K: OK, thank you. Call me flash as soon as the meeting is over.

S: Call you as soon as it's over, all right. K: Thank you.

DECE ASSIGNED

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Senator Javits
6/11/73; 11:52 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Henry.

K: Yes, Jack, how are you?

J: It's not easy to talk with you over in Europe. Here is the situation. There is this strong feeling in the Committee and the kinda given me the ____ that the four appointments to wit Sullivan, Godley, Martin and one other -- I forget now who it was -- represented you know kind of an old boy network and that if the Committee really wanted to assert itself in respect of Aitken policy, this couldn't go as it was presented to us. I have since had quite a few talks with members of the Committee and with Fulbright about singling out Martin -- taking him out. You know I don't expect you to agree with us on the first thing I stated.

K: No, no, I understand.

J: I don't ask for any such thing. But I am only giving you our reason. I think I've pretty well -- you see the relied kind of on me to hold it up even though they passed it out. I know how those things happen.

K: Of course.

J: And I don't want to in any way interfere with the, you know, the progress of our country. However, I may disagree with the basic policy. So, I would like to ask you now again in view of what took place in Paris is there any change in the situation although I . . .

K: I really think it is essential to get Graham Martin out there. I still have every hope that we will conclude this and what we need is some old(?) tough guy out there who can make these guys tow the line.

J: Well now if we should approve Martin tomorrow or Wednesday when would he go?

K: He would go -- I think it has to lay over for three days.

J: No, one day -- I think. Well maybe XIX three but I think we can get that waived.

K: Well whatever it is, he would go next week.

J: He would go next week.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority E012858
D.HT NARA Dts 6/2/73

-2-

K: He would go on the earliest possible day after it is all right for the President to sign his commission. I was told there are two three-day periods but I may be wrong.

J: Well I don't know that either -- that's a detail which I am not aware of but none the less I told Bill I'll see him finally tomorrow and based Upon your representation my present disposition isn't clear (?)

K: Well I would appreciate it Jack and he isn't going out there as part of an old-boy network. I understand your reasoning. But he's a professional and he is going to take orders.

J: Uh-huh.

K: And his orders are to make our views on implementation very clear. That's why we had him sitting in on all these sessions.

J: Right. Henry, look, you know how much I trust you and the fact that you feel this is essential to the country -- not a personal matter -- is critically important to me.

K: I didn't even know Graham Martin except, you know, in a very vague way as Ambassador in Italy. We have no personal interest in him.

J: If we do clear him, it will be understood that it is not just the dislodging in Salami tactics from one of these at a time -- I just wanted you to know that.

K: No, no, I understand that you are going to raise . . .

J: Very considerable difficult about the others -- it's a matter for the Department of State, not you but . . .

K: No, no, we understand. We disagree with you on this -- both on substance and on the whole precedent that Foreign Service officers retroactively have to consider whether they should be punished for carrying out national policy.

J: Right.

K: But -- so even if we disagree with you we understand that you are going to deal with the others as a unit.

J: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA No. 6/2/94
Page 1 of 2

J: Very good. I will look after this first tomorrow.

K: Right.

J: Henry, I wrote you a letter about China because I...

K: I just got it and I will look into it the next time I see the Chinese.

J: My intelligence was that something was stirring about putting together a Congressional group and I wanted to be sure to make it clear that I was very interested.

K: Well I will put in a word and if you should go, I will be able to be helpful to you while you are there.

J: Wonderfrul. Great.

K: Thank you, Jack. I appreciate your -- you are wonderful and considerate.

J: I know you are working very hard but I hope we will see you soon.

K: Good.

J: Thanks.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

Dated NARA Dated 6/2/04

TELCONE
Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 p.m., June 11, 1973

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes. I have great difficulty hearing you.

S: The [goal] is fixed for tomorrow.

K: All right.

S: With one minor change were we acceptable but you will not officially hear that until tomorrow.

K: All right.

S: We have just broken up and I have just told the French that you will be returning tomorrow.

K: And that we will meet tomorrow.

S: And that we will meet tomorrow and we will need the place afterwards.

K: Right.

S: The timing danger that we expected has been accepted.

K: What changes?

S: The changes on timing in the document.

K: What time?

S: Order. The effective date of the order.

K: Oh, has been accepted?

S: Yes.

K: Now will you get a cable to me quickly so that we can get it to Saigon?

S: Right. As soon as I get back to the office, I will put all this detail in a cable.

K: Right.

S: You should have that within an hour.

DECE 15 1973

Amendment to 6/2/73

P.O. Box 6244

TelCon

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

3:20, June 11, 1973

K: Hello.

MK: How are you sir.

K: How nice to hear from you. I've been wanting to talk to you every since all this stuff broke.

MK: I assume that you had and I knew that when you had a moment you would, and

K: And as soon as I'm back from Paris I'd like to talk to you for five minutes.

MK: Whenever you get a chance you just call me. But I wanted to ask you something on the fly right now.

K: Because I wanted you to know I've considered you a friend and that nothing has happened that is inconsistent with that.

MK: Well, you know have those feelings about you too.

K: And you just have to believe that no matter what rumors are being spread.

MK: I assumed that, and I know that when you had a moment you'd call. I just wanted to catch you before you left and ask directly something that I heard this afternoon from a Senate source, and that is that you are hoping at the end of the Summit to come up with roughly the equivalent of a May 20, 1971 declaration for new guidelines on SALT II stressing an effort at a reduction on ICBM and a freeze on MERV. Does any part of that commend itself with reality.

K: Well, the spirit of it commends itself, the precision is perhaps excessive.

MK: I understand.

K: You see what I mean.

MK: Yes. I understand.

K: But don't use that as a--

MK: I'm not, I'm just interested for my own benefit at this point, because I didn't think they were doing anything on the Summit. Everybody are all tied up in a thousand loose ends and we're not focusing on the story which is kind of large I think.

DEC. AGREE?

Authority E.O. 12958

Dated NARA Dkt. 6/2/73

*

2

K: Precisely. And which has been planned for a year and has been worked on for a year.

MK: Sure. Will you be back in time to brief any of us on this

K: Yes

MK: You will, good. When should we expect you back, by the weekend?

K: Oh, I hope by Friday.

MK: Think you can do it?

K: Listen, I tell you one thing, Marvin, if I tried to explain what's holding us up now. The only people who could possibly understand it is some rabbinical students in Jerusalem. You need several years study of the Talmud to have a chance at it and no other nationality can comprehend it.

MK: Well, it gives me a chance.

K: You have a chance.

MK: That's right. Well, okay, I'll wait to hear from you when I get back. you

K: Right.

MK: Have a good trip Henry.

K: Bye.

MK: Bye.

TelCon

Frank Yablans/Mr. Kissinger

5:15 pm, June 11, 1973

K: Hello.

Y: Henry.

K: Yes, Frank, how are you.

Y: How are you.

K: How nice of you to call me. I have a problem which is probably
insolvable. We have Brezhnev in Camp David over the weekend
and he's a nut on cowboy movies and I've got some cowboy movies
but now I've found out he doesn't speak a word of English.

Y: How about Hebrew?

K: Hebrew, I think he would love, particularly given the Russian fondness with Jews.

Y: It has to be Western. I have some--first of all, we don't subtitle Russian, we dub them.

K: That's even better. What do you have.

Y: I have Romeo and Juliet, it's a magnificent picture. I have Roman Holiday with Audrey Hepburn, it's an old film.

K: Yeah, that's a nice one.

Y: But that's a film that in the international market is a perennial. You might love it.

K: Why don't you let me have those.

Y: I'll tell you what, I think I have four films in Russian.

K: What are they?

Y: These two for sure, I don't know what the other two are. They are pictures that the Russians bought for distribution, so apparently it appeals to their taste.

K: That'd be terrific.

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority E012958
D/A

AREA DRE 6/2/84

2

Y: And I'll have those sent up to you.

K: You have them in 16 mm?

Y: Either in 16, you don't have 35 up there.

K: I don't know frankly what the hell they

Y: Let me see what I have, and I'll have my girl let your girl know.

K: That would be nice.

Y: Also I'm going to try to subtitle "True Grit" which is the John Wayne
western.

K: Oh, aren't you nice.

Y: But I don't know if we'll have it ready in time, Henry. It's an awful
problem.

it

K: Well, if you can get/done even during the week it would be good.

Y: Do you need it for what, Saturday.

K: Well, he's arriving Saturday, if I can have it Saturday and Sunday,
and then he's going to stay for the rest of the week, so we could keep
him amused.

Y: All right, let me get into it and let me see what we can do. We might
even be able to get that picture subtitled for you. In any event, I'll
have some dubbed films in Russian and I'll let you know what the titles
are.

K: Terrific.

Y: Very good; Henry.

K: Hope tosee you soon.

Y: Bye bye.

K: Bye.

DECEMBER 1958

AMONG OTHER THOUGHTS

TELCONE
Secretary George Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

5:35 p.m., June 11, 1973

K: George.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: You sound discouraged.

S: (laughter) No, I'm just been meeting all day long and I'm rushing off.

K: So I think I know which option is being chosen.

S: You never know, you never know.

K: Look, could our people see any paragraph in the speech about export controls on ....

S: Certainly, certainly. Scowcroft is my man?

K: Yeah. Just so that we know what consultations may be required.

S: Well, I think -- You see, the heart of the problem is food prices.

K: Yeah.

S: The only way you can really do anything about it, if you mean to do something other than cosmetics, is to get some hand on the exports and it's a shame. It's ruinous to our foreign policy and our economic policy abroad.

K: Yeah, but you see the thing that worries me, George, is take the Japanese situation. We've been telling them they would always have access to our ...

S: Right. Exactly. It's a terrifying thing to do.

K: Take the European situation, we run fight against the common agricultural policy. Now they'll be relieved.

S: Right.

K: Take the Soviet Union and China.

S: Right. I think if you can spend three minutes with the President and register your personal concerns with him, it would be a constructive thing to do. The poor man is torn in all directions, you know. What he's down to is a situation where everything is tough and really the right thing is to stick with your program and he doesn't feel he can, that's the trouble.

CLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
PARK NARA No 6/2/73

TelCon
Secretary Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

5:40 pm, June 11, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: Are you hanging up on me now.

S: It must have been three people bugging the line and they all got confused at the last minute.

K: What I was saying when you hung up on me was that it shows greater strength to stick to your program, than to panic and do totally opposite. I don't have to convince you.

S: Henry, on a different subject entirely, on the Brezhnev visit, you are familiar with this request from them that there be a businessman's meeting---I write the invitations for. I think it's a good thing. There is a lack of ability apparently to decide when that would be.

K: Because we are not absolutely sure yet, Goerge, what our schedule is.

S: Yeah. Well I think--bare in mind that that has to get decided soon because we have to get out letters. And in order to get attendance we need to

K: We will know by Wednesday morning.

S: All right. Well you have that on your mind.

K: Yes.

S: Okay. Thank you. Good luck to you tomorrow. I hope it works.

K: Thank you.

S: Yep.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 12958

Dated: NARA File 6/2/74

TelCon

Gen. Haig/Mr. Kissinger

7:35 pm, June 11, 1973

K: Hello.

H: Henry!

K: Yes, Al.

H: Henry, we were just talking about, you know Edward Teller would like very much to come in and join the administration in some function.

K: Yeah.

H: Well, what do you think about making him energy czar?

K: That's a God damned interesting idea.

H: I think he's ____ made.

K: He'd tear up the beet patch which is good.

H:Damn right.

K: You know, you'd get unbelievable flack for a while, but so what?

H: Well, you know, in energy, it's all peaceful use.

K: Oh yeah, I think it's a spectacular idea. He'd be imaginative.

H: Would it be a problem in the Middle East in any way. I can't think so. But I wanted to know what you think about that.

K: But he wouldn't handle the foreign policy part anyway, would he?

K: No.

K: I mean, he'd do the research, the programs--

H: Strong on research development and --

K: I think it's damned imaginative. Very imaginative.

H: Okay. I think we'd then really have a supurb mentality here, to put to work on this problem.

K: I think that's right. And you know, I don't think the energy czar

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARA Date 6/2/04

2

should be the negotiator anyway.

H: Oh, never.

K: I mean, his major role would be to look for energy sources of energy, research programs, and the relation with the Arab countries wouldn't be primarily under his--

H: Oh, no, no, no. Never, in fact, the way I've got this thing arranged is that he's got to get his policies from you, and you handle

K: I think that's excellent.

H: Good. Okay.

K: Al, you see to it that he doesn't exceed the talking points tomorrow.

H: Oh, amen. That's why I wanted to be sure that you all did them.

K: I've got them. One other thing, that Agricultural export thing, you know, is really dynamite. I mean you have to look at how the Russians may view it as a pressure play against them, how the Japanese will view it.

H: Well, I know, and I've got to see the language because I told them

K: And we also have to work out a consultation scheme so that these nations don't panic.

H: That's right. And I told that to the President. We've got to get with them right away that this is--we intend--

K: Let Chuck Cooper work a consultation scenario.

H: Good, okay.

K: After we've seen the language.

H: Right. Okay Henry.

K: Okay, well I'll see you when I get back.

H: Best of luck to you.

K: Thank you Al. Bye.

H: Bye.

DECE ASSIGNED

TelCon

Hal Sonnenfeldt/Mr. Kissinger

7:50 pm, June 11, 1973

K: Hello.

S: You called me just before I was leaving for the Sans Souci.

K: Hal, I haven't had a chance to read your book yet. But is that thing detailed enough.

S: Fifty questions--you know, it's all there, and I'm going to work some more on it tomorrow, but you know, it's got--infact we have to find some ways psychologically to break it up so he'll read it.

K: Well, but could you put tabs on it for example, on each subject.

S: We will. This is the basic memo that lays out the whole thing for him and then I was going to have some additional tabs with--on individual subjects, supplementing...the stuff that's in that basic memo.

K: Okay. I'll have to read it to see how it breaks down.

S: It's over fifty pages now.

K: Yeah, I've seen that, which is too long. On the other hand, it's too short to keep him busy for two weeks.

S: Well, there will be supplementary sections on SALT and our project on the commercial stuff, maybe depending on how you see it maybe on your ups.

K: Absolutely.

S: And maybe a little extra on the Middle East, and the Vietnam we already the tabs.

K: Okay, good. But remember, he knows nothing about any subject. You've got to give him something on CSCE, MBFR issues.

S: Well, it's in the memo, but I'll do another separate annex to it.

K: Good.

S: Okay, bye.

K: Bye.

DECE. ASSOCIATED

Authority E.O. 12958

DATE N.A.A. DUE 6/20/73

telcon

Len Garment/Mr. Kissinger

7:55 p.m., June 11, 1973

K: ... I just want to know who the White House guy was they bugged in '69?

G: (laughter) In '69?

K: Yeah.

G: I have no idea. I seem to hear a few such hairy tales but I think all of that is -- I think that the public is scandal saturated.

K: I think it makes no difference any more.

G: At this point it doesn't unless there are things that come out in a different area altogether. And that isn't anything that you know about or have to worry about. If it happens, it's like being hit by a truck.

K: Yeah. Well, Len, that's not what I'm calling you about. I'm getting an award. There's a new thing of public service awards of which Senator Taft is the Chairman and Jackie Kennedy is the Vice Chairman.

G: (laughter) Unlikely....

K: Unlikely and it's a Board of 50 very respectable people. You know, Terry Sanford and so forth who were selecting them. One is for the most distinguished elected or appointed official. The other is for -- You know, there are four categories. There is a $5,000 award with that. Can one accept that?

G: I think so. But I will confirm that. You don't need an answer -- a from the hip answer on that do you? When do you have to let them know?

K: No, no; you know, I can accept it and turn the money over to charity.

G: Oh, sure. I think you can do what you want with it but I'll check that out for you.

K: Would you?

G: Yeah.

K: Good.

G: When is this?

K: July 4th.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958
Date: 6/2/73
Dated: NARA ID: 6704

TELCONE

Amb. Whitehouse/Mr. Kissinger

8:03 p. m., June 11, 1973

K: Hello, Charlie.

W: Yes, hello, Henry.

K: Charlie, I've got your cables and I'm flashing one back to you but because of the timing in Paris, is there any chance of your getting an answer within the next three hours?

W: I think so. I think that the only thing that we can do in terms of timing here is to ride through the mush here, face them with this is the absolute positive end in the morning and sign off tomorrow afternoon.

K: Sign off tomorrow after noon, which is what time there?
Oh,

W: I mean, sign off Paris time in the afternoon. I think that we'll have to meet one more time tomorrow morning. They may reply the way they did today -- 4 o'clock in the afternoon, which is 10 o'clock in the morning Paris time.

K: Well, that means we have to push things off 24 hours.

W: Well, the tough decision for you is whether to tell Bill to go ahead and initial with some feeling of confidence that they are going to --

K: They won't do that.

W: ... drop into line in the morning.

K: They won't do that.

W: I think they will.

K: What do you mean, they will? Are you talking for my clients now? You think your guys will come along.

W: Yeah, I think they will.

K: No, no, my problem is that we are running out of time.

W: Well, I thought that he could initial some kind of a relatively qualified way today -- now when Bill has to -- and by the time you get there, he would have been able to punch in one more opportunity from my clients here.

DELEGATED
AUTHORITY E012858
DATE 6/29/87

["Amb. Whitehouse/Mr. Kissinger", "2", "K: Oh, I get your recommendation. I get your recommendation. You think I should just go over there and that by the time I get there -- say around Noon, Paris time -- I'll have your answer.", "W: That's right.", "K: I get it. Okay.", "W: I do hope you like my suggestion. . . . .", "K: I like your suggestion and we are proceeding on it. And I talked to the President and he's -- his irritation is beginning to know no bounds.", "W: I can well imagine.", "K: And there should be no doubt at your end about the consequences here.", "W: Well, there hasn't been from the beginning.", "K: Well, no, there isn't any doubt in your mind but I hope that your clients understand that they are risking everything.", "W: That's right. They understand it perfectly. And this is, as I put in my message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

K: OK, we'll draft a message now and you can adapt it - if you have any comments just call us back.

W: I will.

K: You'll have it within the next two or three hours. You didn't want to sleep anyway.

W: I'm getting used to going without it. I'm just. . . . that I get along with less sleep than you do.

K: (Laugs) OK, Charlie, you've done a superb job.

W: Well, thank you Henry.

K: You can tell Lam that you will have a message during the night - within the next 3 hours.

W: OK, I'll call him now.

K: You can give him the jist of it.

W: Which is parallel to what I suggested.

K: Exactly.

W: Very good.

K: That you've talked to me and that we're drafting - that the President is going to get it off to you immediately.

W: OK, will do.

K: Thank you, Charlie

W: Good Henry, good luck.

K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958

Dated 6/2/04

TELCONE
The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:38 p.m., June 11, 1973

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, anything to report before you take off?

K: No. I told you I had a good talk with Dobrynin.

P: Yes.

K: And everything is really all set now. We have three agreements which you and Brezhnev will sign. Of course, you're free to sign any of them.

P: Right.

K: But we thought you should sign the agreements in the nuclear field.

P: Of course.

K: Peaceful Uses, SALT, and that other agreement.

P: Right.

K: And we've got the Communique practically all done with a sentence or two here and there. And we've got six other agreements.

P: Right.

K: And all I can do now is wait for Saigon to -- not to let us sit in Paris with egg on our face.

P: Well, if they do, we'll wipe the egg off.

K: Exactly. It won't happen. I've left some talking points for you with Haig for the Leadership meeting tomorrow.

P: Yes, yes, yes. If we have it, right.

K: And we'll have the book for you on the Soviet Union on Wednesday morning.

P: No great hurry. I mean, no, I don't need it Wednesday morning. Make it Thursday morning because --

K: Because of the speech.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
Dated NARADY 6/2/73

The President/Mr. Kissinger

2

P: That's right. The speech is Wednesday night so I will not work on it. So make it Thursday morning which gives them an extra day.

K: Right, Mr. President. I don't know whether I've had a chance to tell you -- Actually the Chinese seem to come through for us when the North Vietnamese were in Peking because there was a big difference in the speeches which the two sides gave. The Chinese constantly stressed the independence and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia. And constantly kept saying the war in Vietnam is over while the North Vietnamese kept saying the struggle is continuing.

P: I see.

K: And they put military aid last in the order of priorities of what they were going to do for North Vietnam.

P: Good, good, good. I saw a little of that in the morning report but that's very interesting.

K: That's right.

P: Right. As far as the San Clemente thing, let's not be concerned either way. I think they're really concerned about --

K: It's 99% -- I am now fully persuaded that it's almost entirely security, Mr. President. I've just read an account of Brezhnev's trip to Germany and there his security people kept him also from traveling out of Bonn.

P: Right. I don't blame him in a way. Why does he want to have an incident in the United States. He doesn't want to have his trip spoiled as Kosygin's was.

K: Exactly, exactly.

P: This will be all right. We can field it.

K: But we'll know by Wednesday.

P: Well, whatever it is. I'm not worried about it. I mean, either way we'll field it. I'll field it on the basis that we have much to do; we just can't get out there.

K: Well, Mr. President, this summit will be known for its achievements as all the other summits have been.

P: Right, right, right. Okay, well, have a good trip. . . . . . . . . Are you going to sleep all night, I guess.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Date NARA Dkt 6/2/84
Page 1 of 2

The President/Mr. Kissinger

3

K: Well, I'll sleep on the plane and then I have a really hectic schedule -- At least I hope I have a hectic schedule ahead of me.

P: I'll say. When do you hear from Saigon?

K: Well, we'll hear from Saigon about 4 o'clock in the morning our time.
4:00 or 5:00.

P: Well, don't let it bother you if they say no. We'll just field it, you know.

K: Well, I think the probability is that they'll come through.

P: Well, the way you put it in terms of putting out three unilateral declarations I think good God, if they want any more, I don't know what more they could want.

K: Exactly, exactly. So I think we're going to bring it off tomorrow and then on Wednesday you have your speech and next week there will be some agreements announced every single day.

P: Good, good, good. Okay, fine, Henry, have a good trip.

K: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you for calling.

P: Thank you.

wgh

DECE ASSIGNED

Authority EO 12958

P.O. H.A. N.A.A. D.O. 6/2/98

TELCONE

Robert Evans/Kissinger

Late afternoon - 6/1/73

K: Hello.

E: My boy.

K: Robert, I have to call you back in a few minutes but I have one problem. Brezhnev likes cowboy movies - you follow me.

E: Right. You need a good cowboy movie?

K: We need some cowboy movies, but are there any with Russian subtitles?

E: With Russian subtitles?

K: Or can they be subtitled in a week - one or two movies?

E: I don't know who would be able to -- You mean a subtitle on --

K: On the dialogue.

E: In other words, subtitles would be good enough.

K: Yeah.

E: When would you want to show it to them?

K: In Camp David -- we've got him there for two days next weekend. And the guy's crazy about cowboy movies.

E: Cowboy movies -- I wonder who's Russian will get subtitled -- in Russian.

K: Hugh Wasserman (sp?) is dying to get -- Remember all that stuff he has about getting into the Russian market?

E: Yeah.

K: I mean, quite seriously, this would be a good way to build up some credit with him.

E: May I have Frank Yablans, the President of my company; he's in New York -- could have a subtitle man call you.

K: Could you?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EOU/2958
Dated: 6/2/73
Name: D. H.

Robert Evans/Mr. Kissinger

2

E: I'll have him call you immediately.

K: Good. Of course, I have some much more important matters to discuss with you, Bob.

E: I realize that. May I have Frank call you within 15-20 minutes?

K: Right. And where are you now?

E: In the studio.

K: Okay. I'll call you -- Can I call you within the hour on a personal problem?

E: You met Frank Yablans.

K: Yes, I met Frank.

E: Good. Let me have him call you and see what he can arrange.

K: Okay, terrific. And then I'll call you within the hour.

E: Good. I'll wait for your call.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

D喞 NARA DRE 6/2/04

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/General Scowcroft

8:55 p.m., June 12, 1973

D: Hello.

S: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Hello, General, how are you?

S: Fine. How are you this evening?

D: Well, you are again in the full power.

S: I am again in full power.

D: I'm glad to hear and you have a different kind of voice, you see.

S: What do you mean, a different kind of voice?

D: Stronger and surer.

S: Oh, I see.

D: But it is understandable because when you are really in chair, so it's a possibility and all others being . .

S: (laughter)

D: . . . together.

S: You mean maybe I shouldn't let Henry come back?

D: What an idea. (laughter) All right. Don't quote me but they are saying around Washington -- this is a saying that is going on.

S: (laughter)

D: . . . . . if you like.

S: Is that right?

D: Yeah. Just say that you get this information from reliable sources.

S: From a reliable source. (laughter)

D: . . . . . . . . . . he will be about this sort of thing.

CLASSIFIED

Authority: EO 12958

Dated: June 6, 1973

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

2

S: Very good.

D: When do you expect Henry back, tomorrow evening?

S: I hope so, yes.

D: He had no time today yet.

S: No, no.

D: He just wants to prolong the pleasure of being in Paris.

S: I was going to say, he likes Paris.

D: Yes, this is my impression too. You shouldn't send him really there.
You have to have in Iceland.

S: We'll have to get a new -- that's right, that's right. Then he'll come back.

D: Very clear. He will come back that very day he arrive.

S: That's right.

D: ... negotiations. You really have to give this good advice to the President.

S: I'll tell him that.

D: That it will help these negotiations.

S: Very good.

D: Well, I just wanted you -- I received a message directly from the Secretary General, Brezhnev. And he asked me to come into the President his oral message. This I will give you as before.
This is in connection with his visit. You remember about his problem.

S: Yes, um-humm.

D: Here are just two points. One he covers about his visit to San Clemente and about his family. You remember you raised this question and then Henry called me to --

S: That's right.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

P.O. Box 67404

*

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen Scowcroft

3

D: Yes.

S: About San Clemente.

D: Yes, about San Clemente. He told me frankly, off-the-record but of course I even mention because he said okay with me to tell it to the Secretary General the kind of things that if he will not go, this makes certain kinds of rumors and he understands this quite well, really.

S: Yes.

D: So I just would like -- So he really accepts the kind invitation of the President to go to San Clemente.

S: Oh, that's very good.

D: So he will be going and he's hoping because I think you or Henry mentioned -- I think Henry mentioned it -- the President maybe he will follow him in the same plane. I mean, they will go in the same plane from here.

S: Oh, sure. Yes, I think so.
as

D: Yes. And you have it there, your expression . . . . . . . . . . directly flight from Washington. As it was planned on Friday but directly to San Clemente without Houston.

S: Yes, I think -- Although I heard today that the astronauts will come back at 8:30 in the morning.

D: But Henry yesterday mentioned to me I hope that Secretary General will understand that they are pretty busy by planes. He told me I hope he will not be angry with us if we will not have this. I said there is no problem. So I already mentioned to Brezhnev this one and he has no trouble with it really.

S: Fine. Well, no, all I was going to say is it looks as if they will be coming back so early in the morning, the astronauts, that it probably would be possible to stop there if the Secretary General wanted but I don't think it matters.

D: Well, I think really we will not raise it. When he will come here, the President wants him . . . . . but as of now, I just explaining what Henry mentioned to me yesterday.

a

S: So as of now, you're just saying just / direct flight out?

DELEGATED
Authority E.O.12958
DATE 6/2/04
P.O. BOX 614

*

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

4

D: Yes. He just oral -- he asked me to tell to you to the President the following things. Could you put down just following things? Do you have a paper?

S: Yes, I have a paper.

D: I will then dictate to you if you don't mind, of course.

S: No, I don't mind. That's fine.

D: Okay, go ahead. This is oral remarks.

S: Okay.

D: It goes: "Mr. President, unfortunately my wife, Vikoriya Petrovna, for the reasons of health will not be able to come with me to the United States."

S: Oh, that's too bad.

D: Yes. But Henry knows. When he was in Moscow, already Brezhnev said I doubt very much whether she will come and his relatives, his only daughter, was really present but this was very ____.

S: Yes.

D: "Up to the last moment, there was some hope that she can go but now the doctors are flatly against that." She really had -- she was in the hospital for two months before. But it's not in the message.

S: No, no; I understand.

D: "As for the daughter and the son, they have their own compelling reasons, after some hesitation, preventing them to make such a trip now."

S: I see.

D: "But since we have an understanding with you, Mr. President, to exchange visits regularly, there will be consequently an opportunity to make at least one more visit for both of us (the President to Soviet Union and Brezhnev once again to the United States) before the end of the President's term in the White House.

So I repeat: "But since we have an understanding with you, Mr. President, to exchange visits regularly there will be consequently an opportunity to make one more visit for both of us (the four of us). And I explained to

CLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT
Authority: E012958
DATE: MAR 26 1978

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

5

D: (cont'd) you that until the end of the President's term, he has it in his mind. He didn't say that but --

S: No, I understand.

D: He has it in mind. 'To make at least one more visit for both of us, for me to the United States and for you to Soviet Union. I hope that at that time my wife will be able to come along with me and maybe someone else from my family. We will be glad to welcome again your wife, Mr. President, and other members of your family in our country.' And then he jokingly: 'There is hardly a need to count whose members of their family more often visited the others.'

"Now about San Clemente, I really had some doubts after the advice of doctors who argue (and in fact I know it myself by experience) that this time difference (it is 7 hours between Moscow and Washington and it will increase to 10 hours in case of flight to California) is connected with additional physical threats. There are no other motives here, especially political motives."

S: Right.

D: In this certain connection because when Henry called me, he said: Well, you know, if you cancel, there could be some press speculations who will say something about our internal events and so on. This Henry mentioned to me.

S: Right.

D: So he didn't refer to Henry but he is answering this kind of anticipation which Henry said it could be. So please understand why he is using this phrase.

S: No, I understand. That's right.

D: So there are no other motives here, especially political motives. "And if somebody speculates that my suggestion not to fly to California is somehow connected with the internal events in the United States, this is absolutely not true, Mr. President. There is no basis for such an interpretation. The President knows full well that from the outset that we have unhesitatingly followed a consistent line in personal relationship with him and our respect of him has not diminished a bit. And my persona respect for him has not diminished a bit. All this notwithstanding after having once more -- All this notwithstanding means about this rumors and speculations.

S: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
P. Att. NARA Dkt 6/204

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen Scowcroft

6

D: All this notwithstanding, he has in mind the doctors' advice.

S: All right.

D: "All this notwithstanding after having once more weighted all factors and taken into account position of the President, I decided, frankly speaking, to go against the doctors' advice and took a decision to fly to San Clemente. And if the President has in mind " -- this he refers to remarks I sent him on behalf of -- were given by Kissinger on behalf of the President.

S: Right.

D: He added jokingly for the President: "And if the President has in mind to make the flight together with me, then we will have one more opportunity not only to drink coffee in the plane but, as we say in my country, to have an additional talk on something else.

S: Very good.

D: But actually in Russian it sounds much more funny than in English. I try to do it but it's missing but still --

S: No, I understand.

D: You understand. In Russian it's rather [proper] which means really they will have a nice time together.

S: That's right. No, I understand. That's good.

D: So this is all.

S: ... been very generous.

D: Yes. And if there are any additional changes in the problem, we will give you -- Because I give it to you and the problem I give to Henry.

S: Yes.

D: You remember. So ... in connection with San Clemente, I will give you tomorrow.

S: Oh, very good.

D: Okay?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
DATE NARA Doc 6/2/09

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

7

S: Okay.

D: So I will if you don't mind, I could read it again or if there's no need --

S: No, this is fine. I have it down.

D: Okay. Oh, I will just read it . . . . . . . okay?

S: Okay.

D: Repeats Oral Message: "

"Mr. President, unfortunately my wife, Viktoriya Petrovna, for the reasons of health will not be able to come with me to the United States. Up to the last moment, there was some hope that she can go but now the doctors are flatly against that. As for the daughter and the son, they have their own compelling reasons preventing them to make such a trip now. But since we have an understanding with you, Mr. President, to exchange visits regularly, there will be consequently an opportunity to make at least one more visit for both of us (you to the Soviet Union and me to the United States). I hope that at that time my wife will be able to come along with me and maybe someone else from my family. We will be glad to welcome again your wife, Mr. President, and other members of your family in our country. There is hardly a need to count whose members of their family more often visited the others.

"Now about San Clemente, I really had some doubts after the advice of doctors who argue (and in fact I know it myself by experience) that this time difference (it is 7 hours between Moscow and Washington and it will increase to 10 hours in case of flight to California) is connected with additional physical threats. There are no other motives here, especially political motives. And if somebody speculates that my suggestion not to fly to California is somehow connected with the internal events in the United States, this is absolutely not true, Mr. President. There is no basis for such an interpretation. The President knows full well that from the outset we have unhesitatingly followed a consistent line in relations with him and our respect and my personal respect has not diminished a bit. All this notwithstanding after having once more weighted all factors and taken into account position of the President, I decided, frankly speaking, to go against the doctors' advice and took a decision to fly to San Clemente. And if the President has in mind to make the flight together with me, then we will have one more opportunity not only to drink coffee in the plane but, as we say in my country, to have an additional talk on something else."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01288
Date 6/29/89
Title NARA Dkt 6204

*

8

S: Very good, very good.

D: Is President here or is he now in Camp David?

S: No, he's here.

D: Oh, here.

S: Yes.

D: Brezhnev really asked me to deliver it immediately. If you will be and he says all right, fine. So I will be gladly to repeat to the President, okay?

S: I'll make sure that he gets it right away.

D: Okay. . . . . .

S: Well, I'm sure he would be interested.

D: Just in case he maybe have some remarks on this understanding. So I will just mention to Brezhnev that I delivered message, that's all.

S: Sure.

D: Okay?

S: Sure. Very good. Thank you very much. This is very generous of the Secretary General.

D: So I think it's everything now all right and I think we will have the whole affair really on a ______ level and really a good visit.

S: Yes.

D: And they will really ..... with some other things but have a nice talk on visits or something else as he put himself.

S: Precisely. Very good.

D: Okay.

S: Okay. Thank you very much.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ED 12958
Dated NARA Refs 6/2/04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAPR 50-00304

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

2

S: Very good.

S: I hope so, yes.

D: He had no time today yet.

S: No, no.

S: That's right.

S: I'll tell him that.

S: Very good.

S: Yes, um-humm.

S: That's right.

Amb. Dobrynin / Gen Scowcroft

3

D: Yes.

S: About San Clemente.

S: Yes.

S: Oh, that's very good.

S: Oh, sure. Yes, I think so.

D: Yes. And you have it there, your expression ... as ... directly flight from Washington. As it was planned on Friday but directly to San Clemente without Houston.

D: Well, I think really we will not raise it. When he will come here, the President wants him ... but as of now, I just explaining what Henry mentioned to me yesterday.

S: So as of now, you're just saying just a direct flight out?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By: W.W. Paine

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E01205X

Date: 06 Mar 1965

By: WW

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

S: Yes, I have a paper.

S: Okay.

D: It goes: "Mr. President, unfortunately my wife, Viktoriya Petrovna, for the reasons of health will not be able to come with me to the United States."

S: Oh, that's too bad.

S: Yes.

S: No, no; I understand.

S: I see.

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

5

S: No, I understand.

S: Right.

S: Right.

D: So there are no other motives here, especially political motives. "And if somebody speculates that my suggestion not to fly to California is somehow connected with the internal events in the United States, this is absolutely not true, Mr. President. There is no basis for such an interpretation. The President knows full well that from the outset that we have unhesitatingly followed a consistent line in personal relationship with him and our respect of him has not diminished a bit. And my personal respect for him has not diminished a bit. All this notwithstanding after having once more -- All this notwithstanding means about this rumors and speculations.

S: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055
By: WW
Date: 10/25/80

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen Scowcroft

6

S: All right.

S: Right.

S: Very good.

S: No, I understand.

D: So this is all.

S: . . . . been very generous.

S: Yes.

D: You remember. So . . . . . . . in connection with San Clemente, I will give you tomorrow.

S: Oh, very good.

D: Okay?

Amb. Dobrynin/Gen. Scowcroft

7

S: Okay.

D: Okay. Oh, I will just read it . . . . . . . . okay?

S: Okay.

D: Repeats Oral Message: "

"Now about San Clemente, I really had some doubts after the advice of doctors who argue (and in fact I know it myself by experience) that this time difference (it is 7 hours between Moscow and Washington and it will increase to 10 hours in case of flight to California) is connected with additional physical threats. There are no other motives here, especially political motives. And if somebody speculates that my suggestion not to fly to California is somehow connected with the internal events in the United States, this is absolutely not true, Mr. President. There is no basis for such an interpretation. The President knows full well that from the outset we have unhesitatingly followed a consistent line in relations with him and our respect and my personal respect has not diminished a bit. All this notwithstanding after having once more weighted all factors and taken into account position of the President, I decided, frankly speaking, to go against the doctors' advice and took a decision to fly to San Clemente. And if the President has in mind to make the flight together with me, then we will have one more opportunity not only to drink coffee in the plane, but, as we say in my country, to have an additional talk on something else."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By M.N. Baranov

Amb. Dobrynin / General Scowcroft

8

S: Very good, very good.

S: No, he's here.

D: Oh, here.

S: Yes.

D: Brezhnev really asked me to deliver it immediately. If you will be
... and he says all right, fine. So I will be gladly to
repeat to the President, okay?

D: Okay. . . . .

S: Sure.

D: Okay?

D: So I think its everything now all right and I think we will have the whole
affair really on a ______ level and really a good visit.

S: Yes.

S: Precisely. Very good.

D: Okay.

S: Okay. Thank you very much.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By: WW. PAPAS 5004

*

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

8:57 am, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Anatol, I have to run up to the Congress to--

D: I have one question, simply could

K: Four o'clock today.

D: What o'clock today.

K: Four o'clock.

D: It's quite all right because

K: Or, would you like to do it a 6:00, which do you prefer.

D: Four or six, what is better for you.

K: Let's do it at 4:00.

D: 4:00 o'clock, okay. At usual place.

K: At the usual place. I'd like to go over the schedule with you.

D: What do you mean--Oh, the schedule.

K: You know, when we will announce what.

D: Okay. Four o'clock then.

K: Four o'clock. I think we've got most problems solved.

D: I think there is some other more organizational points, and a little left on communique.

K: I know, I've got all of that.

D: Okay. The communique and some organizational points--where and what and how.

K: And when we will announce what.

D: Okay, four o'clock then. Okay. Bye bye.

K: Thank you. bye.

D: CLASSIFIED

Authority: E012858
Date: 6/2/73
D: NARAD:

TelCon
Amb. Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger

9:20 am, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger, and welcome back.

K: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

D: How are you?

K: Now I can take my old time to settle the Arab/Israeli dispute. Can you start by going back to your 1967 borders. We'll have another settlement. And then settle with the Palestinians.

D: And then '47. I called these days the 47 geography and 48 genography.

K: That's about right.

D: How've you been Dr. Kissinger?

K: I've been fine. I'm so sorry I missed [signature]. Is he anywhere around. My idiots here didn't tell you you asked him to stay.

D: Well, I did not know when you will be coming althojgh I had a hint that you are going to be back. He left yesterday morning at 10:00. I told him--he understood it completely--but he would have probably waited. He went to London you see, and he thought that maybe he could see you in Europe.

K: I'm just mortified. I wanted to ask my people to ask him to wait, and I thought they knew he was an old friend of mine. I take it Rabin has also left.

D: Rabin has also left, yes, he was in Washington for another day. Last night he had a dinner with Joe Alsop and he thought that--spending another night here. Is it possible Dr. Kissinger that some time we have a few minutes together.

K: I'll do my best.

D: I will tell you why I say this. I got some reaction from home with regard to the big meetings that you are having. In essence, if I may say so, it has nothing of relation of you, Prime Minister

DELEGATED
Authority ED 12858

NARA Dts 6/2/73

*

2

repeats some of our basic points, but if you could come by and
see me before the

K: Yes, now that I will do. I can't do it today, I'll do it tomorrow.

D: That's fine.

K: But until tomorrow, could you think about the following problems--
you know the strategy that I've been pursuing, and so far it has not
been totally unsuccessful. But you will now face this problem--
should I discuss it within the framework which you know with
Gromyko.

D: Yeah.

K: Or should it be left to Brezhnev and the President. In that case,
the consequences are somewhat more unpredictable. On the other
hand, in my case, the consequences are more certain though you
may not like them. You see what I mean.

D: Of course.

K: But this is the choice you have to make. If I talk to Gromyko
it will be in the framework of what you know, perhaps slightly
improved. But you may not be wild about them. If it goes into
the other forum, well you--so, can you think about that, and
maybe ask the Prime Minister before tomorrow.

D: Can I ask you a clarification question? I was thinking along
exactly this line, that this is really the choice that is confronting
us.

K: Because you have no other choice if I can be honest with you.

D: Well, at least I knew what I think will be that either it's continuous
on the '72 paper, on the lines of the '72 paper between the two of
you, and it goes up. And that is like a gamble. It can be either
better in the sense that the paper that we don't like, as you know,
will disappear, or something else worse--

K: It will not disappear. What could happen is something worse, or
maybe they can't agree.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: But it's a chancey proposition. I have to be honest with you.

D: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01288
Date NARA Dkt 62-74
Hlt

3

K: Particularly if there's a spirit of comradeship.

D: Let me ask you then, you know to inform my Prime Minister more intelligently, can I tell her that if you negotiate with Gromyko on the basis of the '72, is there a chance for improvement of the text, especially those particularly irritating points that we have.

K: That is what I would put my major effort on.

D: Yes. As you recall, there was one point in which they did not accept your position.

K: Yeah, there was two disagreed points. One had to do with refugees, and one had to do with direct negotiations.

D: That is correct. And

K: Now, we will certainly--we will insist on direct negotiations. We will rewrite the refugee point. In fact, when I see you tomorrow I will show you some playing I have done with these things which I have never shown to the other side.

D: I understand.

K: But it really comes down to that. In my view.

D: Yes. I understand. And of course the question of stationing of UN forces in Sharm el-Sharakh, which is something that the Prime Minister, even in our previous meeting, particularly was concerned about because it sort of goes even beyond any formal proposal that we had on the ________. Negates the control of ________ Sharm el-Sharakh /

K: I'll tell you, Mr. Ambassador, if the meeting ends next week without a reference I will not feel that I need to apologize to anybody. So you do not face the problem of my seeking opportunities to raise this issue.

D: I understand, I understand.

K: But I think, if you want to be realistic, now I have--look we'd better talk--but if you are going to consult with the Prime Minister again, another think you ought to know--I have no reason to believe that the Egyptians will accept anything like this. In all their messages to me I've asked them what their reaction would be to some general principles, and they are dancing all over the lot. They don't say no, but they certainly stay far away from saying yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01298
Date NARA Dkt 6/2/94
HHT

4

D: One more question. If this is accepted, would

K: You don't have to accept it, you just have to accept the process.

D: I understand, I mean, I want to know what the next step is. The
next step is simultaneous negotiation that is also of

K: Well, if the President and Brezhnev agree on something that you
and we can live with, and I understand that you can live only with
something that leaves you margins for negotiation. Then the next
step would be negotiation between you and the Egyptians.

D: But not necessarily simultaneous ones which particularly upset
my prime Minister.

K: I now have the impression that they are not at all interested in
the partial settlement, so that what it would lead to would be a
general negotiation.

D: That was my impression.

K: And I don't have the impression that your military are insisting
that you withdraw the canal.

D: No, we don't put it as precondition for the negotiation.

K: Not a precondition for your negotiation, but you first withdraw
from the canal.

D: Right, that's correct.

K: Now, my impression, and again from exchanges with the Egyptians,
is that linkage which you proposed to me, they are not interested in.
So that the only result--I mean, the result of this would not be an
interim and general negotiation but only a general negotiation.

D: Right. Okay, I will communicate this today, and I will ask for
reaction before tomorrow.

K: Good, and I'll meet you tomorrow.

D: Right.

K: And think about it in terms that I sent to you.

D: I will tell you, Dr. Kissinger,

K: There is no way to avoid a discussion from all the communications
we've had.

DEC 15 1978
Amendment E.O. 12858
P.O. BOX 617
NARAD, INDIA 62001

5

*

D: Yesterday I cabled home hoping for a meeting between us and I wanted some instruction. And I said in my cable that basically what I see is that pivot question now is exactly what you stated. Either they use negotiation on the paper, or leaving it to them.

K: You see, I had made some changes in the '72 text. I don't want to change it too radically because I don't think we need to change it too radically. But where it says "agreement", I'm trying to put in plural, "agreements".

D: But you recall, of course, Dr. Kissinger that have given you another paper.

K: That I've already rejected.

D: I know, but, in other words, they did try to change it very radically in their favor.

K: Yeah, but when I totally rejected that--

D: It doesn't become an instrument for negotiation.

K: That will not be discussed. That I can assure you flatly. But the '73 paper will not be the object for discussion. The point of departure will be the '72 plus those changes I can make with it without triggering them into tabling the '73 paper. You see what I mean.

D: Yes. I see what you mean exactly.

K: I will show you the changes that I have in mind.

D: And maybe by then I will have some instructions, I'm sure I will, as to the approach in general and in particular.

K: Good. And can you tell both Allon and Rabin how distraught I am that I missed them.

D: I will do this. I will send a cable to Israel and tell them.

K: Good. Thank you.

D: Thank you very much, and we'll see you tomorrow. Bye bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.12858
Dated: 6/2/89
DRAFT

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:57 am, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry.

K: Four o'clock today.

D: What o'clock today.

K: Four b'clock.

K: Let's do it at 4:00.

D: Okay. Four b'clock then.

K: Thank you, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By N.W. Deaton 5-67

TelCon

Sen. Kennedy/Mr. Kissinger

4:16 pm, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

TK: Hello, Henry, how are you. I appreciate your calling. I'm sorry I missed the briefing. There were a number of us who did, they had other kinds of

HK: I know, you all have a full schedule.

TK: I'll tell you -- what I was interested in getting some reaction. The Foreign Relations Committee passed that resolution yesterday on the comprehensive test ban.

HK: Right.

TK: We had talked to Mike about the possibility of bringing it up, which would take a waiving of the rules, and he was going to talk to Hugh Scott, and he has talked. And Hugh evidently has talked to General Haig down at the White House. We're in the process now of --Mike is --of checking the list to find out where we'd be in any kind of a vote on it. I didn't know whether you had any reaction--there's a sentiment among most of ones that had supported which included Case and Mathias and myself, and Humphrey, Muskie and Hart, to see if we could bring it up next week. But obviously we wouldn't if the Republicans were going to object to do it, and I don't realistically have much of a feel.

K: The fact is that we are reviewing that whole issue right now. And I must tell you candidly speaking for myself only because I can have some impact on the outcome in our bureaucratic discussions. I haven't really made up my mind. We are looking at the whole verification problem again and also of what we might stand to lose in the way of military developments in any meaningful way. So we would probably have to oppose it on the ground that we haven't really made up our mind, now have the Russians pushed it.

TK: I dee.

HK: I think --they advocated but they are not pushing it. So I don't really think if would do a great deal of good to force through next week.

TK: Yeah. Right.

HK: But I don't know what formal position we would take on it.
This is my view on it.

TK: I see, yeah. All right, well that's helpful. I think probably
they'd take some soundings around and just get some kind of a
feel as to what the sentiments would be in the Senate. I'm sure
a number of them are going to be checking out obviously with
you people.

HK: Right.

TK: But--

HK: I don't preclude it. Quite honestly it has not been on the front
burner in the last few weeks.

TK: Okay.

HK: Well, I appreciate your calling. If you ever want to get together
I'm always at your disposal.

TK: You are very, very Kind, Henry, and it's good to talk to you.

HK: How nice to talk to you. Bye.

TK: Bye.

DEC 1 CLASSIFIED

Authority ED12958

DAN NARA Dye 6/2/04

TelCon
Paul Ziffrin/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 pm, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

Z: Henry!

K: Paul, how are you.

Z: I'm fine, and I wanted to call and congratulate you. You did it again.

K: Aren't you nice.

Z: It's wonderful. And also to tell you that I hope you don't let all this outrageous nonsense bother you at all because it's just so nonsensical. Anybody with any good judgment and any decency passes the thing off for the garbage that it is.

K: Well, aren't you nice. That really means a lot to me because you know how much I value your friendship.

Z: Well, I can just tell you that this garbage doesn't--cannot possibly influence anybody that's worthwhile worrying about. Anybody that pays any attention to it, I think, doesn't deserve to get one second of your time. As far as I am concerned, all your friends think you've done an extraordinary job and we deeply resent all this nonsense.

K: Well, I greatly appreciate your saying this.

Z: How are you feeling?

K: I feel fine.

Z: Good.

K: I'll actually be out on the coast from after the Brezhnev visit to--for about a week or two.

Z: Where are you going to be staying, at San Clemente.

K: At San Clemente. And I hope very much to see something of you.

Z: We'd love it Henry. Any time at all because it looks as though we are going to be here for the rest of the month.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
D# A11 NARRATE 6/2/84

2

K: So, I'll be out from about I think the 24th on.

Z: From the 24th.

K: Actually, from the 27th on.

Z: From June 22nd. And, let's see, that's a week from Friday isn't it.

K: That's right. We'll have Brezhnev in tow for a couple of days, but
after that--

Z: You'll be through with him on about the 26th.

K: About the 24th or so.

Z: Sunday.

K: Yeah, after that.

Z: Well, we would love to see you Henry, and why don't I talk to
you and see if we can't set up a time and place so we can work
everything out.

K: Good, and I greatly appreciate your calling.

Z: I tell you, we just think you've done an extraordinary job and we are
so proud of what you've done and I just wanted you to know it.

K: Well, I very much appreciate this, Paul.

Z: We'll look forward to seeing you out here.

K: Marvelous.

Z: Thank you.

K: ] Bye.

DELEGATED
Authority E012958
P. A. Dated 6/2/68

TelCon
Sen. Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

7:45 pm, June 14, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Henry!

K: Hello, Senator, how are you?

M: How are you. Did you get through the day?

K: I managed to get through the day.

M: The reason I called you, I got a package today from Sihanouk.

K: Oh, you did.

M: It contained some films, I assume of his trip into the other part of Cambodia, and some literature. It came through Manet, the French Ambassador to Peking, and the French Embassy here, and the Consular brought it up, and I'd like to send it down to your office tomorrow to look over.

K: Well, that would be very courteous of you.

M: And, so I wanted to call you ahead of time before I leave with the President tomorrow to go to Peking for D______

K: Right. And I will call you early next week about the other matters.

M: Fine.

K: How did your lunch go today?

M: Very well. We missed you, but we understood.

K: Well, I was sorry I couldn't

M: I know, it couldn't be helped. But, you will probably hear from my office tomorrow as to how you want it sent down there, and then you can look it over and see what you want to do with it.

K: Good.

M: Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you very much.

M: Fine, Henry, bye. K: Bye.

DELEGATED
Authority E012858
D: NARA Dkt 6/2/73