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1 RPTS STEIN

2 DCMN PARKER

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4 EXECUTIVE SESSION

5 DEPOSITION OF HENRY KISSINGER

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7 Monday, November 2, 1992

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9 U.S. House of Representatives

10 October Surprise Task Force

11 Washington, D.C.

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13

14 The deposition of Henry Kissinger commenced at 11:00

15 a.m., at 350 Park Avenue, New York City, New York.

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17 Present: On behalf of the October Surprise Task

18 Force: E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr., Chief Counsel and Richard

19 J. Leon, Chief Minority Counsel.

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1 [The witness was sworn.]

2 EXAMINATION.

3 BY MR. BARCELLA:

4 Q. We don't need to go into your background; we know
5 it. Let me direct your attention to 1979, recognizing that
6 we are talking, as you mentioned 12 or 13 years ago, and
7 recollections are dim on certain events.

8 Could you briefly recount for us efforts that you made
9 with the Carter administration to try to assist the Shah of
10 Iran as his regime was crumbling?

11 A. Well it wasn't a regime then, it was a government
12 to start with. At first I didn't do anything. I mean I
13 generally did not favor what I took to be the policy of
14 *Carter* and the Shah. That is a key principle with me. I do
15 not believe in weakening allies. But to the best of my
16 recollection I didn't get involved in any serious way until
17 after the Shah had already left and was in Morocco. Then it
18 turned out he couldn't go anywhere and we were refusing him
19 asylum.

20 I believe that a leader who had been a friend of the
21 United States, who was the only country adjoining the Soviet
22 Union in the Mid-East war of 1973 who did not permit over
23 flights into the Middle East, who entertained American
24 visitors and basically supported us on our major strategies,
25 should be entitled to seek refuge in the United States with

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1 the normal restrictions that he couldn't engage in political
2 activities.

3 When it became apparent that he had no place to go, I
4 made a public speech. I tacked it on at the end of a speech
5 to the Harvard Business School which was read by John
6 McCloy, and he called me. So he and I tried to find a place
7 for the Shah to go to. That was my major concern.

8 I called up Brzezinski. I think I called up Carter and
9 urged him to let the Shah into the United States, but they
10 refused to do that. And then failing that, I think the
11 Rockefeller office was generally helpful to him in the
12 Bahamas.

13 I spoke to Lopez Portillo in Mexico to let him into
14 Mexico.

15 Q. When he ended up in Panama?

16 A. When he ended up in Panama, I don't remember doing
17 anything. I was in general hostile to the conduct of the
18 Carter administration on that issue. I thought a great
19 country like the United States should be able to give refuge
20 to its friends without being blackmailed. But in Panama we
21 had the hostages already, and so I muted my public
22 statements at the time and I don't remember that I did
23 much. Everybody knew that I thought the Shah was being ill
24 treated, and --

25 Q. After I guess November 4, 1979, when the Iranians

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1 took over the U.S. Embassy and captured our embassy staff,

2 you indicated your public position -- it was well known.

3 Your public position sort of went more low key I guess.

4 A. I don't think I asked the Government to let him
5 into the country after that. But, again, you ought to check
6 that, and whatever the record says. I don't remember that I
did.
7

8 Q. Do you remember it was roughly in March of 1980
9 that the Iranians were attempting to extradite the Shah from
10 Panama and the Shah ended up going to Egypt?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you recall whether you had any conversations
13 with anybody either in the United States or in Egypt
14 regarding that travel?

15 A. I had nothing to do with his going to Egypt,
16 although I strongly approved it. I had heard a report that
17 we were working on some complicated deal where extradition
18 proceedings would be started but never carried out,
19 something like that. I remember violently objecting to
20 that. And I don't remember any specific conversation, but I
21 wouldn't be surprised if I called up Brzezinski. I just
22 don't remember it.

23 Q. Do you have any recollection --

24 A. I was not in touch with the Egyptians at the
25 time.

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LQ

1. Q. Were you in -- I guess I use the term regular

2. advisor -- were you in any kind of regular contact with

3. Brzezinski or Harold Brown or Cy Vance or any Carter

4. administration officials during the '80 time period with

5. regard to the situation over there?

6. A. I don't think so. Once the hostages were taken, I

7. moved into open opposition to the administration. In fact,

8. from the whole evolution of the Shah on, up to then I was

9. not in open opposition to foreign policy as such. Cy Vance

10. was my friend and is my friend, and it depends what you mean

11. by regular. I don't think I talked to him more than two or

12. three times in the whole period. Brzezinski, it was a

13. looser sort of relationship, looser in the sense -- calling

14. Vance was a big event. Calling Brzezinski was less formal.

15. I don't remember precisely.

16. They knew my view. But there were no action decisions

17. to be taken. I do not believe I called them on the issue of

18. the extradition of the Shah.

19. Q. Were you aware of any of the private efforts that

20. were being made on behalf of the Carter administration to

21. try to obtain the release of the hostages, any of the

22. activities that the State Department or the CIA was engaged

23. in?

24. A. Not in any formal way. I knew what one sort of

25. picked up.

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[L]

Q. During the '80 campaign did you have any formal or
informal advisory role with either the candidates prior to
the July convention or with the Reagan-Bush campaign after
the convention when those became the candidates?

A. No. After the convention I saw Reagan a few times
at his request. Mostly for eyewash purposes. And you know
he had to navigate between appealing to the few Rockefeller
Republicans left without antagonizing the right wing
Republicans too much. Every once in a while he might have
wanted to get my opinion. And I think at some point they
constituted some formal advisory panel that met once or
twice, but it was eyewash. Forgive me.

Q. Trust us, doctor, we have heard a lot --

A. It didn't mean a damned thing. I think it met
once during the campaign and once after the campaign.

BY MR. LEON:

Q. You knew Richard Allen who was the chief foreign
policy advisor to the campaign?

A. Yes.

Q. He had advisory groups working with him, I
believe.

A. I wasn't part of that. There was one that Casey
had and that I was part of.

BY MR. BARCELLA:

Q. That was a foreign policy advisory group?

[L]

1 A. National security -- it had a lot of big names on
2 it. I have forgotten. I am sure Haig was on it. A lot
3 of -- you must be able to get that list. I think it met
4 once during the campaign and once after the campaign.
5 Didn't mean a damned thing.

6 Q. Most of the people we have talked to recognize
7 that the hostage issue was a volatile issue during the '80
8 campaign. I met once or twice with Casey separately and
9 with Reagan. They were very worried about the sense of
10 surprise. I told them that in my estimation there would in
11 all likelihood be something, because by now we had a pattern
12 that these people in that sort of a conflict, they try to
13 commit both candidates to the maximum they can during the
14 campaign, so whatever concession they are going to make they
15 usually make just before the end of the campaign in order to
16 get bipartisan support for it.

17 Q. So your feeling was something was likely to happen
18 during October --

19 A. Yes, and I expressed that view on a number of
20 occasions.

21 Q. To Casey and to Reagan?

22 A. Yes.

23 BY MR. LEON:

24 Q. Would that have been in the late summer, early
25 fall?

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1 A. Early fall, late September, early October. I had
2 no knowledge of this.

3 Q. No. Were you following the Majlis and the
4 elections there at all through whatever sources you had in
5 Iran?

6 A. I thought that the thing will run its course and
7 that the hostages would in due course be released. The
8 question was would they more likely do it for a Democratic
9 or Republican administration. I thought they would more
10 likely do it for a new administration, but that they would
11 do enough at the end to get the basic framework
12 established.

13 BY MR. BARCELLA:

14 Q. In other words, to try to maximize their
15 negotiating leverage?

16 A. To tie us as much as they could while there were
17 two candidates in the deal.

18 Q. There was a period during September, and I don't
19 know whether you are aware of this, when Khomeini sent an
20 emissary, Sadegh Tabatabai, to meet basically with Warren
21 Christopher, but it was set up through Hans Dieter Gencher.

22 A. I wasn't aware of that.

23 Q. Do you recall whether during September and October
24 you were specifically asked by either Reagan or somebody on
25 the Reagan-Bush campaign or Casey to discuss again your

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feelings about the Iranian hostage issue and what impact

that may have or how it should be handled by then candidate

Reagan in debates or public statements?

A. I think I had one conversation with Reagan in

McLean at Governor Clement's house.

BY MR. LEON:

Q. During the debate preparation?

A. Yes. I was not part of the debate preparation,

but I had an input. But this was earlier. This must have

been late September. And then I -- I seem to recall there

was some Sunday morning meeting, a morning meeting out there

in which Casey was present; Haig was present. And this sort

of figured in the discussion.

BY MR. BARCELLA:

Q. Do you remember how it figured in the discussion,

doctor?

A. They were very worried that something would be

sprung on them, and when it was ... they asked me to

go on television, and whatever I said that weekend, was what

I probably told them before, but I frankly don't remember

what I said that weekend.

Q. You don't remember which weekend it was?

A. The weekend before the election.

Q. At the very end of October, there were still some

serious concerns as to the impact that a release of the

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[L]

1 hostages might have?

2 A. There was some announcement towards the end of the

3 campaign of some agreement in principle, if I remember

4 correctly.

5 Q. Okay. Do you recall -- I think I mentioned

6 earlier, one of Bill Casey's drivers recalled an incident in

7 the mid-to latter part of October where he was dispatched by

8 Casey to pick you up quite early in the morning to bring you

9 to a meeting about the hostage issue. He could not remember

10 precisely when it was, only that it was mid-to late October,

11 within a few weeks of the election, and he just recalled

12 picking you up quite early in the morning.

13 Mr. Leon. I think he thought it was a Sunday morning.

14 The Witness. I have a vague recollection there was a
15 meeting out in Virginia on a Sunday morning, because Moorer
16 was there; Haig was there. I don't seem to remember that it
17 was only about the hostages. I think it was some sort of
18 general thing. But the hostages figured in it.

19 BY MR. BARCELLA:

20 Q. In your perspective, doctor, at those meetings
21 where the hostage issue, among others, was discussed, did it
22 appear that the Reagan-Bush people had in-depth knowledge of
23 what was going on with the Carter administration and their
24 negotiations with the Iranians?

25 A. I couldn't tell.

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[d]

1 Q. Nobody indicated we have just learned from so and
2 so that this is happening or --

3 A. No. I just don't know. I am not saying they
didn't.

5 Q. One of the supposed quid pro quos for the October
6 Surprise, at least one of the allegations, is that U.S. arms
7 would be supplied to Iran particularly through the
8 Israelis. Were you aware --

9 A. I never heard anything like that. If I had heard
10 it, I would have been violently opposed.

11 Q. To an-arms-for-hostages deal, basically?

12 A. I have a very firm policy about hostages. I am
13 against negotiating on hostages. I am extreme. I am
14 against negotiating, in favor of using force or exacting
15 that there be a penalty. I think you only get more hostages
16 taken if you negotiate because you establish the principle
17 and once you have established the principle, then you are
18 haggling about price. So I would have been violently
19 opposed if I had known.

20 Q. Through your own contacts did you hear any
21 information during the basically very late '80-'81-'82 time
22 period that Israel was engaged in supplying arms to the
23 Iranians?

24 A. No. Well, no. I knew that the Israelis had a
25 proclivity to support the Iranians against the Iraqis, and

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1 that from my knowledge I wouldn't have been surprised if I

2 had heard this. And I had assumed that the Israelis were

3 friendly to the Iranians. But, again, I can only tell you,

4 I think this was one of the worst ideas ever.

5 Q. One of the things I had asked, and I don't know

6 whether Ambassador Bremer passed this on to you, whether you

7 had any calendars or date books --

8 A. Didn't they give it to you?

9 Q. No.

10 A. What I find frightening about that damned material

11 I have is if they hadn't gone through my files I would have

12 sworn to you that I have nothing. No, I will give you what

13 I have.

14 Q. One of the advantages and disadvantages of having

15 been a lawyer as long as I have and the kind of practice

16 that I have is I have had the unfortunate occurrence of

17 being on both sides of the microphone in terms of being a

18 witness, as well as questioning witnesses. It has given me

19 much greater sympathy for people who have to be witnesses.

20 It is much more fun to be on the questioning side than the

21 receiving side, and recalling things sometimes even a year

22 ago can be tremendously difficult.

23 A. I tell you, not with you, but I am developing the

24 most serious doubts about the way these investigations are

25 conducted because they don't make any allowance for the fact

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1 that I have 500 other things to do in a day.

2 Q. Before we get to the --

3 A. Let's make copies.

4 Q. One of the questions has to do with during that --

5 A. The frightening thing is I would have sworn under oath that I have no documents.

7 Q. Well, that is not surprising, again, when we are talking about something that happened 12 years ago. During the period of time of the transition do you recall being asked or consulted about whether or not the new administration coming in should go along with whatever deal the Carter administration was making, should renege on the deal that the Carter administration was making or should try to change it in any way?

15 A. I don't remember that. I don't remember that.

16 Q. Okay. I suppose as a summary, yes, that is easy enough to ask. Do you have any knowledge that you can recall at this time about efforts by anyone to try to delay the release of the hostages, the Americans that were then being held over in Tehran?

21 A. No.

22 Q. How about any knowledge of any contacts that Reagan-Bush campaign officials may have had with Iranians to effect it?

25 A. I never heard it. All I know is they were

[d]

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1 extremely nervous about being hit by a surprise.

2 Q. And up until the last week before the election?

3 A. Yes. I suspect that meeting for which I was
4 picked up was on the Sunday before the election or the
5 Sunday before then.

6 Q. When you said you went on television, was that a
talk show or an interview that played as a 30-second sound
byte on NBC?

9 A. I am sure I was on one of the talk shows. I might
10 also have done sound bytes.

11 Q. Was that about the hostage issue?

12 A. It was about the agreement on the hostage issue.

13 Q. So we should be able to find that then --

14 A. I hope so.

15 BY MR. LEON:

16 Q. Let me ask you this -- based on your experience in
17 international relations and Government service, what would
18 have been the impact of these alleged meetings having taken
19 place if it had ever become known to the public prior to the
20 election?

21 A. I think it would have ruined Reagan.

22 Q. Do you have any reason to believe that the Bill
23 Casey you knew in 1980 would have taken a risk of that kind
24 and exposed the campaign --

25 A. Bill Casey was a high roller with a conspiratorial

LC

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1. side, but he was also smart as hell. I can't imagine that
2. he would have run such a risk.

3. Q. After President Reagan took office, were you aware
4. of or did you observe any changes in the policy of the
5. Reagan administration with respect to its dealings with
6. Israel on sale of arms by Israel?

7. A. Well, I thought that Reagan was marginally
8. friendlier to Israel than Carter had been. But I think this
9. came in part from his background, that he had come out of
10. Hollywood, where he was more comfortable with Jewish people
11. than a born-again Christian out of Georgia. I remember
12. Hubert Humphrey said to me when Carter was elected, and he
13. was talking about a fellow Democrat -- he said he doesn't
14. believe anyone who reads the Christian Century could be
15. comfortable with Jews. This is a quote from Humphrey. And
16. I felt that the Reagan administration and Haig were both
17. more sympathetic to the Jewish point of view or to the
18. Israeli point of view. I won't even say Jewish point of
19. view.

20. Q. Do you have recollection whether or not during the
21. '81-'82 time frame the Israelis were playing more and more
22. of a role internationally in the sale of weapons in the
23. Middle East? Did you have any essential sense of that back
24. then?

25. A. No. I knew a lot of Israeli leaders. I still

[c]

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1 do. They never discussed this with me.

2 Q. Do you recall candidate Reagan's giving a speech
3 on the hostage crisis after the debate prior to the election
4 for the first time, speaking out on it early?

5 A. No. But I wouldn't be surprised if I had an
6 input. It is ridiculous to say I may have had an input. I
7 just don't remember it.

8 Q. Did you have any -- during 1980, --

9 A. You know they must have known my views. My views
10 were very hard line.

11 Q. You appeared on Ted Koppel many times, didn't you,
12 with your views in 1980?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you and the Rockefeller family or the liberal
15 wing of the Republican party play any role in dealing as an
16 intermediary in any way with Iran or Iranians in trying to
17 help solve the crisis?

18 A. Not after Khomeini came into power, no.

19 Q. During the hostage crisis?

20 A. No.

21 BY MR. BARCELLA:

22 Q. Did you maintain contact with the Shah's family
during the hostage crisis -- after he died, Princess
23 Ashraf.

25 A. Not Ashraf-- Shahapour. I did it as a point of

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1. honor. I didn't do anything for them, but I saw her. I saw

2. her son now and then.

3. Q. Last year --

4. A. Still see her.

5. Q. Last year Princess Ashraf --

6. A. No, Shahapour, Shabanou.

7. Q. Last summer or summer before last, summer of '91

8. President Reagan was out on a golf course and had a camera

9. stuck in his face and was asked if he knew anything about

10. the October Surprise allegations. He indicated that he

11. certainly knew of no attempts to delay the release of the

12. hostages, thought that was an outrageous suggestion, but

13. said that efforts were made in fact the other way, but he

14. couldn't discuss them because it was classified.

15. A. What do you mean the other way?

16. Q. That is what Reagan had said. That is what I was
17. asking you, if you had any idea what he meant. I presume he
18. meant to accelerate rather than to delay, to accelerate
19. release of the hostages.

20. A. I am not familiar with that.

21. BY MR. LEON:

22. Q. It has been reported by Warren Christopher that
23. the Reagan transition people were taking a hard line
24. position and it assisted them.

25. A. I wouldn't be surprised.

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[cc]

1 Q. Have you attended Bohemian Grove in California?

2 A. Every year.

3 Q. Can you recall whether you went in the summer of
4 '80?

5 A. Almost certainly.

6 Q. Do you recall seeing Bill Casey there that summer
7 as a guest of Darrell Trent?

8 A. I don't remember. I wouldn't be surprised.
9 Darrell Trent?

10 Q. He was a guest of Darrell Trent at Parsonage.

11 A. I stayed at Mandalay. To my knowledge I have
12 never been at Parsonage.

13 Q. There were functions that happen there at common
14 sites?

15 A. Yes. I would expect that if he were there and I
16 was there that we would have run into each other.

17 Q. You don't recall one way or another?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Could you tell from your diaries what weekend you
20 were there that summer?

21 A. It would always be the middle weekend.

22 Q. Is that considered to be the weekend where most
23 people --

24 A. Most of the visitors are there.

25 Q. Gerald Ford goes there that weekend doesn't he?

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1 A. Not lately, but at that time he would have been

2 there.

3 Q. That is the more high profile weekend?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. If we, after reviewing the documents, have

6 questions, can we send the questions to you in writing?

7 A. Yes.

8 [Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the deposition was

9 concluded.]

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