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Mr. Wallace (on tape): "With less than six months left in office, Ronald Reagan is trying to salvage his policy for Central America. He's making one more appeal to Congress to renew military aid to the contra rebels, to keep pressure on Nicaragua's communist government. And it was revealed this week that the president once again tried to oust Panama's Manuel Noriega, approving a new covert action plan to spur a revolt in Panama's defense forces. Today, we'll discuss Reagan in Central America with the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, David Boren; and Nancy Kassebaum of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And we'll also talk with former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger."

MR. WALLACE: And good morning. Secretary of State Shultz flies to Central America tomorrow launching a new diplomatic initiative to build support for U.S. policy in the region. But time is running out for this administration, and chances are that when President Reagan leaves office next January the Sandinistas will still be in power in Nicaragua and Noriega will still be running Panama. Joining me today to examine where we're headed in Central America, Robert Kaiser of *The Washington Post*; and NBC chief diplomatic correspondent, John Cochran. And we begin with Senators Kassebaum and Boren. Welcome to both of you.

Let's start with Nicaragua. The Senate may vote this week on a contra aid package, but even if you approve it, it's going to have a very tough time in the House which has traditionally opposed any military aid to the contras. Senator Boren, why has President Reagan, over the course of his two terms, had such trouble getting any consistent backing for his contra policy?

SENATOR BOREN: Well, it's been very frustrating to me. I think what we've seen is a polarization along party lines on the question of Nicaraguan policy, and this has been so bad for us, the stop and start policy, people in the region not really knowing what American policy is. I've had leaders in that part of the world say to me, "What do you Americans want, we can't really follow what you want."

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**MR. WALLACE:** But isn't that a president's job, to build support for an important policy, to get a majority, and he's failed to do that.

**SENATOR BOREN:** I think there's blame on both sides to be frank with you. I think both the president and the Congress have to share responsibility, and I'm one of those that hopes we can put together some sort of consensus now that will put some additional pressure on the Sandinistas to come to terms. Obviously, they've violated the peace accords. They've closed the papers, the radio stations. They've not released the political prisoners. The idea that if we removed all the pressure, they would somehow then move to peace and democracy has been proven false. I think what we need now is a strong vote to apply pressure again to let them know that even military aid might be resumed if they don't move, but give them a little window of time in which now to come to terms with the agreement and make the steps they promised to make.

**MR. WALLACE:** Senator Kassebaum, there's also a lack of support among U.S. allies in Central America. There's a story in today's *The New York Times* that Costa Rica and Guatemala have rejected a statement that Secretary Shultz is taking down to the region tomorrow, that according to one U.S. aide was going to be a virtual declaration of war against Nicaragua. Why traditionally has the U.S. had such trouble over these two terms in getting support from our own allies in the area?

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** Well, there's, I think, two sides to that. In many ways I think our allies in the region are more supportive, recognizing as President Arias said, after the peace talks collapsed in June, that the Sandinistas had been very intransigent. But they frequently will say this and, yet, behind the scenes want us to take the lead. And I think we have to now work very hard to encourage them to step forward. It's important to them in the entire region to work together, and as Senator Boren pointed out, not only sustain efforts here but sustain efforts in the region.

**MR. WALLACE:** In that sense, then, you say to get them to step forward. It is a mistake for Secretary of State Shultz to be coming down with a U.S. drafted statement to a meeting like this?

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** Well, we're not sure what that drafted statement will be or if, indeed, he already has a prepared statement. That is the report, and I think we'll have to wait and see.

**SENATOR BOREN:** Chris, go back to the fact—if you're sitting down in that region, you're president of a neighboring country and you don't know, is the United States simply going to pull out completely

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or are they going to leave a vacuum. If you stick your neck out, condemn the Sandinistas, are you going to turn around the next day and see the United States is nowhere to be seen. That's one of the reasons why they're so hesitant, because they don't know where we're going next.

**MR. WALLACE:** Senator Boren, this vote on contra aid could also be a big embarrassment for the Democrats. Senator Bentsen says he's going to continue to back military aid to the contras, while Michael Dukakis calls contra aid illegal and immoral. What are voters to think when the Democratic is so split on such an important issue?

**SENATOR BOREN:** Well, I think, first of all I'm not sure it's going to be as split as all that when everything is said and done. We're working very hard—

**MR. WALLACE:** Who's going to compromise? Is Dukakis going to compromise or Bentsen?

**SENATOR BOREN:** There's an effort right now going on among Senate Democrats to come forward with our own proposal. As I said, one that would be balanced, that would hold out the stick, the possibility of a resumption of military aid if the Sandinistas continue to violate the peace pledges they've made. I think it's a sign of security on the part of our presidential nominee that he would pick someone as his running mate who doesn't agree with him on everything. I think, you know, that's a sign of a good leader. It's like in my own staff, I like to have people on both sides of the issues, that are going to come in and argue it out and advise me. That's the sign of a secure leader, and I think he wants, he genuinely wants a strong vice president who will represent his own perspective and who will argue with him forcefully within the bounds of the administration. I think that's good for the country.

**MR. WALLACE:** Senator Kassebaum, why do I have the feeling you Republicans are going to have a field day with this?

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** Well, I just couldn't help but think when Senator Boren was speaking, he protesteth too much, you know. And it is going to be, I think, a difficult combination and we'll just have to see. But I think both of us share a desire at this point to make sure we can help forge a constructive policy for Central America.

**MR. KAISER:** Let me ask you both about the implications of the recent events down there. You mentioned closing *La Prensa*, closing the Catholic radio station and so on. The Sandinistas, one could argue, finally had to show their true colors and they're pretty unattractive. Does that mean to you, each of you, first Senator Boren,

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perhaps, that there's a bigger threat now in the region and to us
from the Sandinistas, or is this really a kind of desperate act of a
failing revolutionary movement that, in fact, poses less of a threat,
perhaps, than eight years ago?

**SENATOR BOREN:** Well, I think it's failing in terms of gaining popular support. It's failing in terms of its economic policy. It's not failing in terms of retrenching itself or entrenching itself in terms of holding control of the power levels. They have the police, they have the army. They can hang on there for a long time and have a repressive regime and be a threat to their neighbors. They've lost the popular support; they've failed in that sense. No, I think it's still a real danger in that region, and if I had to say what I think the next president will face and the next couple of presidents, I think the whole problem of potential chaos in Central America, all the way from the Panama Canal all the way up to the Rio Grande is going to be the most serious foreign policy threat we're going to face in this country in the next decade. So, I look at it as more showing of true colors. And I think it's very important that we admit that, that we see what they do when you take the leverage away. They show their true colors. They're not about to voluntarily give up power without pressure, and we better put some pressure back on. And I see a real shift in both houses of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, in the direction of thinking we need to apply pressure once again.

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** I thought President Arias had an interesting statement last week sometime when he said that previously the United States had been isolated. It was not Nicaragua who was standing alone. And I think that's an extremely interesting statement.

**MR. COCHRAN:** Senator Boren, there was a big flap this week over who, if anyone, leaked the story that President Reagan authorized covert action against General Noriega in Panama. Now, you suggested maybe the White House did this to make George Bush look tougher in relation to Noriega. The White House says there's no political mileage to be had out of this, that every time Noriega's name is mentioned it hurts George Bush in the polls.

**SENATOR BOREN:** Well, I think wherever that leak came from it's very unfortunate. One of the things that Senator Cohen and I and the bipartisan membership of the Intelligence Committee have made clear—we feel very strongly about keeping the secrets. I think making policy by well-placed leaks is the wrong thing for our country. It holds us up to ridicule.

**MR. COCHRAN:** Are you backing off your earlier allegation?

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**SENATOR BOREN:** No, I'm quite sure it didn't come from the Senate Intelligence Committee and—but—because, and it was very interesting, we were getting calls from the press before our meeting had even taken place, saying, "We have it on reliable authority that the Senate Intelligence Committee has just been briefed as follows." We hadn't even had our meeting yet. I said, you know, "If you're going to make an attempt to cast the blame on us, this was a pretty amateurish, heavy-handed attempt to do that." I don't know where the leak came—they briefed many other Congressional committees, which is unusual, committee staffs. If you wanted to hold this closely, you wouldn't do that. They've said now, the State Department has said there was a call to Mr. Delvalle, and I assume all of his advisers were informed about what the president wanted to do. And either someone, I think, in the administration who didn't like the policy, who wanted to leak it out, or perhaps someone for any other political reason making— wanted to make it look like the administration was getting tough on Noriega—may have leaked it. But we're going to be grown-ups, as one of my favorite columnists around town likes to say. We're not going to let this change our policy. We intend to keep the trust, try to build this relationship of trust between the two branches of government. We all serve the American people, and we're not going to act like children. We're going to hold up our end of not having leaks.

**MR. COCHRAN:** Well, let me ask your Republican colleague, is Noriega a big political minus for George Bush? The whole Panama fiasco?

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** I think he's a big political minus for us in the United States, I don't think just particularly George Bush. But I wonder why, for instance, we're doing this in a covert fashion. Why not overt?

**MR. WALLACE:** On the front page of *The Washington Post*, it seems pretty overt.

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** Well, that's what I think. And support the opposition in Panama and encourage again our allies in the region. It's to their interest as well.

**MR. WALLACE:** Senator, I can't let you go, and we only have about a minute left in this segment, without asking about the vice presidency and George Bush, because Mr. Bush has put you on a list with about a dozen other people as a possible running mate. Do you want the job?

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** No.

**MR. WALLACE:** That's it? "No." You're taking yourself out?

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**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** You like short, simple answers: yes.

**MR. WALLACE:** Are you ruling out—if he called and said, "Senator, Nancy, I need you"?

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** I don't expect him to call.

**MR. WALLACE:** And would you accept it—

**SENATOR KASSEBAUM:** And I have really indicated that I don't believe I'm the right balance on the ticket and that I don't wish to be considered.

**MR. WALLACE:** Well, that seems to leave it right there. Senators, thank you both very much for joining us today. We appreciate it. And in a moment we'll get another view of what President Reagan has and has not accomplished in Central America from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, when "Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

**MR. WALLACE:** Back now on "Meet the Press." We're joined by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is at station WVIT in West Hartford, Connecticut. Mr. Kissinger, welcome. Good to see you again.

**MR. KISSINGER:** Good to be here.

**MR. WALLACE:** This administration made Central America a top priority from the very start. I'm sure you remember Alexander Haig in the opening months talking about going to the source of communist subversion. And, yet, it surely looks now that when President Reagan leaves office next January the Nicaraguans will still—the Sandinistas will still be in Nicaragua, Castro will still be in Cuba and now Noriega will still be in Panama. How do you explain the fact that an administration that has accomplished so much around the world has had so many failures in its own backyard?

**MR. KISSINGER:** Well, with respect to Nicaragua, they never have been able to make up their mind, one, exactly what objective they wanted to achieve. Secondly, they have never been prepared to ask the Congress for what was required for some of the objectives that were implied, namely, the overthrow of the Sandinista government, and I believe there was an underestimation of Noriega. I don't consider the idea of overthrowing Castro with the framework that we had available a realistic objective. On the other hand, in fairness, I think the objectives of the administration were essentially correct, and the largest blame must be put on the Congress for constantly changing the policy and never permitting a coherent approach to be developed.

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**MR. WALLACE:** Well, you say that they couldn't make up their mind in the case of Nicaragua. Is it that you really think that literally Ronald Reagan couldn't decide whether he wanted to overthrow the Sandinistas or not or is it that he wanted to—

**MR. KISSINGER:** No, no, I think that they would have liked to overthrow the Sandinistas but they were not willing to make—to spend the resources that were needed to do this. There were two fundamental choices we had, one, to overthrow the Sandinistas, which would have required massive military support for the contras and some tacit American military help. And, secondly, the other objective might have been to bring enough pressure on the Sandinistas to deal with those issues that affect American national security: specifically, the presence of Cuban advisers, the presence of East European and Soviet advisers and military people, the large size of the Nicaraguan army, and the exclusive economic relationship of Nicaragua with the East—with the communist block, primarily Cuba. It is conceivable that we would have insisted on an end to those activities and then permitted the evolution of the Sandinista government to take care—take place by historical processes, since most communist governments are failing sooner or later anyway, to fulfill the needs of their people. That I think was one fundamental issue.

And I must say that I agreed with what the two senators said except on one point: the democratization of Nicaragua is a long process. The issues—because there's never been democracy in Nicaragua in all of its history. The achievement of the objectives that I have described can be measured, and that could have been achieved if we were willing to go the route in a more limited time. That is my substantive concern. But, again, I must say the Congress is more to blame by far than the administration.

**MR. KAISER:** I'd like to ask you a similar question to the one I asked to the senators. You were involved in your commission at the beginning of the Reagan years. You studied the problem down there carefully. What's your threat assessment now? Do the recent events show that there's greater threat to American interests and security from this region, or is this threat less than it seemed when you studied the problem?

**MR. KISSINGER:** First of all, one has to point out that that commission, which was a bipartisan commission, made a unanimous conclusion that the persistence of a communist government in Nicaragua with its current foreign policy does represent a threat to the security of the United States. It depends how you define threat. If one talks about attacking the United States, obviously, Nicaragua can't do that.

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If one talks about undermining the stability of all neighboring countries and in time even affecting countries further away like Mexico, Venezuela and so forth, then Nicaragua, as a center of communist intelligence activities and guerrilla activities, is a potential threat and the art of government is to deal with threats before they become overwhelming.

**MR. KAISER:** Has the threat gotten greater or less as the Communists have palpably failed in their own revolution?

**MR. KISSINGER:** Well, I think the threat has become less in the immediate sense, because we've been fairly successful in Salvador. In the long term, the—for the United States to make a major effort and fail undermines our prestige in Latin America and the willingness of those countries in Central America to gear their policies to ours. So, in that long-term sense, I think the threat has become worse.

**MR. COCHRAN:** Dr. Kissinger, may I switch now to the Gulf region. The prospect of peace in the Gulf, between Iran and Iraq, has raised hopes that the American hostages will be released. Given the background of the Iran/contra scandal, how far can this administration go in dealing with Iran to secure the release of the hostages? The matter, for example, of Iranian assets in the United States?

**MR. KISSINGER:** I think the administration ought to talk to Iran, but not about the hostages. It ought to talk about Iran—about the compatibility of American and Iranian interests in the region, which I think is considerable. I think they ought to make clear to Iran that the hostages have to be released unconditionally before we can have a normal dialogue, otherwise we will be just encouraging Iran, every time they have a grievance against us, to seize Americans around the world and blackmail us. I think the release of the hostages unconditionally is a pre-condition for everything else. I believe the other issues can then be settled because fundamentally we have an interest in the independence and even in the development of Iran provided it stays within its own territory and abandons terrorist approaches. And they have clearly failed. Otherwise, they wouldn't be asking for a ceasefire.

**MR. COCHRAN:** Dr. Kissinger, elsewhere in the Middle East, Jordan's King Hussein appears ready to just drop out of the peace process. Given that fact, given the fact that the Israelis are about to have an election in November, we're about to have an election in November, is it time for Secretary of State Shultz just to hang it up in the Middle East, to call a halt to his peace shuttle?

**MR. KISSINGER:** I think that Secretary Shultz has made a courageous effort and he has been persistent. He has been willing to

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go out and put himself on the line. I do not think anything can now
be accomplished before a new administration comes in, and we need
a reassessment of the whole situation in the light of the Israeli and the
American elections. Yes, I think Secretary Shultz should leave mat-
ters where they are.

**MR. COCHRAN:** And stay home. Not go back to the Middle East?

**MR. KISSINGER:** I would recommend that he not go back to the Middle East.

**MR. WALLACE:** Mr. Kissinger, I assume, and perhaps I'm faulty in this assumption, but I assume you watched some of the Democratic convention and I assume you've been following Governor Dukakis' speeches. What do you think of his foreign policy?

**MR. KISSINGER:** I think his foreign policy—first of all, he almost never says anything about foreign policy, but what he does say makes me extremely uneasy. He states alternatives that are no alternatives, between drugs and communism in Central America. We've got to fight both or we can't fight either. I'm concerned about his attitudes toward the Strategic Defense Initiative, toward Central America, and I wish that we had a real debate on the issues and that he would make clear where he really stands rather than try to fudge it and make one rely on things he said in the past, which are quite worrisome to me.

**MR. WALLACE:** Well, we only have about 30 seconds left. One of the things he has indicated, that he believes more in multilateral international efforts through the Organization of America States, the United Nations, less emphasis on going it alone, do you think that's a good idea or a bad idea?

**MR. KISSINGER:** No, as a matter of principle that's not a bad idea provided we understand that when the American national security is involved at the end of the day we may have to act alone if we cannot get multilateral support. But to begin with multilateral support, I have—that is certainly not—that's certainly an appropriate tactic.

**MR. WALLACE:** Well, Mr. Kissinger, we're going to have to leave it there. Thank you very much for joining us today. We appreciate it. And in a moment, my colleagues and I will take our own look at the situation in the Persian Gulf and ask what's become an old question: What will it take to get Iran to help release the American hostages? Coming up, when "Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

**MR. WALLACE:** Gentlemen, Iran seems to be headed, seems to be headed into a ceasefire with Iraq, perhaps this week, and Iranian officials began talking this week about freeing the American hostages

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or helping to get them freed under certain conditions. John, over at the State Department, how much of an opening do they see in terms of improving relations with Iran, and how much of a chance of getting the hostages back?

**MR. COCHRAN:** I think they feel that everything is open, everything is up for grabs at this point, that the Iranian collapse is so complete that the Iranians really are ready to do business. On the matter of the hostages, the State Department will always be cautious, of course, not wanting to damage American credibility, not wanting to go too far to make a deal. But, of course, the State Department was not involved in the Iran/contra scandal either. And the gentleman you cover at the White House, Ronald Reagan, very much wants to get those hostages back. Don't you think, Chris, he wants to have those hostages in the Rose Garden before he leaves the presidency?

**MR. WALLACE:** I suspect he and also George Bush as well, but, Bob, are they so gun shy, because of the fallout, the damage which continues to this day about Iran/contra—it's still one of Michael Dukakis' best lines on the campaign trail—are they so gun shy about that that they're unwilling or scared to take an opening if it should come?

**MR. KAISER:** I think they're very scared of that tar baby. I was intrigued with Kissinger's line today, which is a kind of—it isn't saying you won't bargain at all, it's just saying this is a pre-condition. Set them free and then we'll talk about everything else. That's probably politically from Bush's point of view a very appealing line. It may not produce results. But think of the risk if George Bush started to encourage secret dealings again with Iran, playing with these tricky characters who fooled us so often. I think it could really blow up in his face.

**MR. WALLACE:** What do you think about that, John, I mean, if it should come that finally, two years later, there are moderates in Iran, do you think that this administration is willing to open that door and go in and deal with them not knowing whether at the last minute, perhaps in mid-October, they'll pull the rug out from under you?

**MR. COCHRAN:** I think you have to go ahead and talk, yes. It will be cautious, and I think a lot of it may be—they'll go as public as they can so that there won't be these surprises. I think they'll try to keep the American public clued in to a certain degree, less secret diplomacy than possibly we've had in the past.

**MR. WALLACE:** We've been jumping all over the world today, and I'd like to finish up by discussing a survey that the National

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Geographic released this week that indicated that Americans are ignorant—I think that's the only way you can say it—about geography. I think that 75 percent couldn't locate the Persian Gulf on a map. One in seven couldn't locate the U.S. on the map. Does that surprise you?

**MR. KAISER:** I've always been a proponent of an Iranian-Nicaraguan entente in Central America myself. It's really appalling isn't it? It was quite hair raising, these numbers, and you see a kind of willful know-nothingism in America. We also come out very badly on comparisons of who knows foreign language. We know less foreign language almost than anyone.

**MR. WALLACE:** John, does it matter?

**MR. COCHRAN:** Well, we're all know-nothings about some things. I don't understand how computers work. I don't understand stocks and bonds and securities and all that stuff, because I don't have to in my line of work. Once the American people and young people think they've got to understand geography because they've got to compete with foreign markets—and we're going to have to certainly in the next 20 years—when people say, "I've got to know this to make a living, then they'll do it."

**MR. WALLACE:** Gentlemen, thank you both. Thank you very much for helping me out today. Our quotation of the week comes from that National Geographic survey and the reaction of Society President Gilbert Grosvenor. Looking at the dismal results, Grosvenor said, "There is a shocking lack of geographic knowledge throughout this country. If we don't understand place and location, then the consequence of events lose meaning."

And that's "Meet the Press" for this Sunday. I'm Chris Wallace. For all of us here at NBC News, have a good week.

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MEET THE PRESS - July 31, 1988

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Mr. Wallace (on tape): "With less than six months left in office Ronald Reagan is trying to salvage his policy for Central America. He's making one more appeal to Congress to renew military aid to the contra rebels, to keep pressure on Nicaragua's communist government. And it was revealed this week that the president once again to oust Panama's Manuel Noriega, approving a new covert action plan to spur a revolt in Panama's defense forces. Today, we'll discuss Reagan in Central America with the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, David Boren; and Nancy Kassebaum of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. And we'll also talk with former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger."

MR. WALLACE: And good morning. Secretary of State Shultz flies to Central America tomorrow launching a new diplomatic initiative, to build support for U.S. policy in the region. But time is running out for this administration and chances are that when President Reagan leaves office next January the Sandinistas will still be in power in Nicaragua and Noriega will still be running Panama. Joining me today to examine where we're headed in Central America, Robert Kaiser of The Washington Post; and NBC chief diplomatic correspondent, John Cochran. And we begin with Senators Kassebaum and Boren. Welcome to both of you.

Let's start with Nicaragua. The Senate may vote this week on a contra aid package, but even if you approve it, it's going to have a very tough time in the House which has traditionally opposed any military aid to the contras. Senator Boren, why has President Reagan, over the course of his two terms had such trouble getting any consistent backing for his contra policy?

SENATOR BOREN: Well, it's been very frustrating to me. I think what we've seen is a polarization along party lines on the question of Nicaraguan policy and this has been so bad for us, the stop and start policy, people in the region not really knowing what American policy is. I've had leaders in that part of the world say to me, "What do you Americans want, we can't really follow what you want."

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MR. WALLACE: But isn't that a president's job to build support for an important policy, to get a majority--and he's failed to do that.

SENATOR BOREN: I think there's blame on both sides to be frank with you. I think both the president and the Congress have to share responsibility and I'm one of those that hopes we can put together some sort of consensus now that will put some additional pressure on the Sandinistas to come to terms. Obviously, they've violated the peace accords. They've closed the papers, the radio stations. They've not released the political prisoners. The idea that if we removed all the pressure, they would somehow then move to peace and democracy has been proven false. I think what we need now is a strong vote to apply pressure again to let them know that even military aid might be resumed if they don't move, but give them a little window of time in which now to come to terms with the agreement and make the steps they promised to make.

MR. WALLACE: Senator Kassebaum, there's also a lack of support among U.S. allies in Central America. There's a story in today's *The New York Times* that Costa Rica and Guatemala have rejected a statement that Secretary Shultz is taking down to the region tomorrow that according to one U.S. aide was going to be a virtual declaration of war against Nicaragua. Why traditionally has the U.S. had such trouble over these two terms in getting support from our own allies in the area?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well, there's, I think, two sides to that. In many ways I think our allies in the region are more supportive, recognizing as President Arias said, after the peace talks collapsed in June, that the Sandinistas had been very intransigent. But they frequently will say this and, yet, behind the scenes want us to take the lead. And I think we have to now work very hard to encourage them to step forward. It's important to them in the entire region to work together and as Senator Boren pointed out, not only sustain efforts here but sustain efforts in the region.

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MR. WALLACE: In that sense, then, you say to get them to step forward. It is a mistake for Secretary of State Shultz to be coming down with a U.S. drafted statement to a meeting like this?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well, we're not sure what that drafted statement will be or if, indeed, he already has a prepared statement. That is the report and I think we'll have to wait and see.

SENATOR BOREN: Chris, go back to the fact--if you're sitting down in that region, you're president of a neighboring country and you don't know, is the United States simply going to pull out completely or are they going to leave a vacuum. If you stick your neck out, condemn the Sandinistas are you going to turn around the next day and see the United States is nowhere to be seen. That's one of the reasons why they're so hesitant, because they don't know where we're going next.

MR. WALLACE: Senator Boren, this vote on contra aid could also be a big embarrassment for the Democrats. Senator Bentsen says he's going to continue to back military aid to the contras while Michael Dukakis calls contra aid illegal and immoral. What are voters to think when the Democratic is so split on such an important issue?

SENATOR BOREN: Well, I think, first of all I'm not sure it's going to be as split as all that when everything is said and down. We're working very hard--

MR. WALLACE: Who's going to compromise? Is Dukakis going to compromise or Bentsen?

SENATOR BOREN: There's an effort right now going on among Senate Democrats to come forward with our own proposal. As I said, one that would be balanced, that would hold out the stick, the possibility of a resumption of military aid if the Sandinistas continue to violate the peace pledges they've made. I think it's a sign of security on the part of our presidential nominee that he would pick someone as his running mate who doesn't agree with him on everything. I think, you know, that's a sign of a good leader. It's like in my own staff, I like to have people on both sides of

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the issues that are going to come in and argue it out and advise me. That's the sign of a secure leader and I think he wants, he genuinely wants a strong vice president who will represent his own perspective and who will argue with him within the bounds of the administration. I think that's good for the country.

MR. WALLACE: Senator Kassebaum, why do I have the feeling you Republicans are going to have a field day with this?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well, I just couldn't help but think when Senator Boren was speaking, he protesteth too much, you know. And it is going to be, I think, a difficult combination and we'll just have to see. But I think both of us share a desire at this point to make sure we can help forge a constructive policy for Central America.

MR. KAISER: Let me ask you both about the implications of the recent events down there. You mentioned closing *La Prensa*, closing the Catholic radio station and so on. The Sandinistas, one could argue, finally had to show their true colors and they're pretty unattractive. Does that mean to you, each of you, first Senator Boren, perhaps, that there's a bigger threat now in the region and to us from the Sandinistas or is this really a kind of desperate of a failing revolutionary movement than, in fact, poses less of a threat, perhaps, than eight years ago?

SENATOR BOREN: Well, I think it's failing in terms of gaining popular support. It's failing in terms of its economic policy. It's not failing in terms of retrenching itself or entrenching itself in terms of holding control of the power levels. They have the police, they have the army. They can hang on there for a long time and have a repressive regime and be a threat to their neighbors. They've lost the popular support, they've failed in that sense. No, I think it's still a real danger in that region and if I had to say what I think the next president will face and the next couple of presidents, I think the whole problem of potential chaos in Central America, all the way from the Panama Canal all the way up to the Rio Grande is going to be the most serious foreign

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policy threat we're going to face in this country in the next decade. So, I look at it as more showing of true colors. And I think it's very important that we admit that, that we see what they do when you take the leverage away, they show their true colors, they're not about to voluntarily give up power without pressure and we better put some pressure back on. And I see a real shift in both Houses of Congress, on both sides of the aisle in the direction of thinking we need to apply pressure once again.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I thought President Arias had an interesting statement last week sometime when he said that previously the United States had been isolated. It was now Nicaragua who was standing alone. And I think that's an extremely interesting statement.

MR. COCHRAN: Senator Boren, there was a big flap this week over who, if anyone, leaked the story that President Reagan authorized covert action against General Noriega in Panama. Now, you suggested maybe the White House did this to make George Bush look tougher in relation to Noriega. The White House says there's no political mileage to be had out of this, that every time Noriega's name is mentioned it hurts George Bush in the polls.

SENATOR BOREN: Well, I think wherever that leak came from it's very unfortunate. One of the things that Senator Cohen and I and the bipartisan membership of the Intelligence Committee have made it clear we feel very strongly about keeping the secrets. I think making policy by well-placed leaks is the wrong thing for our country. It holds us up to ridicule.

MR. COCHRAN: Are you backing off your earlier allegation?

SENATOR BOREN: No, I'm quite sure it didn't come from the Senate Intelligence Committee and--but--because, and it was very interesting, we were getting calls from the press before our meeting had even taken place saying, "We have it on reliable authority that the Senate Intelligence Committee has just been briefed as follows," we hadn't even had our meeting yet. I said, you know, "If you're going to make an attempt to cast the blame on us, this was a pretty amateurish, heavy handed attempt to do

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that." I don't know where the leak came--they briefed many other Congressional committees, which is unusual, committee staffs. If you wanted to hold this closely, you wouldn't do that. They've said now, the State Department has said there was a call to Mr. Delvalle and I assume all of his advisers were informed about what the president wanted to do. And either someone, I think, in the administration who didn't like the policy, who wanted to leak it out, or perhaps someone for any other political reason making--wanted to make it look like the administration was getting tough on Noriega--may have leaked it. But we're going to be grown-ups, as one of my favorite columnists around town likes to say. We're not going to let this change our policy. We intend to keep the trust, try to build this relationship of trust between the two branches of government. We all serve the American people and we're not going to act like children. We're going to hold up our end of not having leaks.

MR. COCHRAN: Well, let me ask your Republican colleague, is Noriega a big political minus for George Bush? The whole Panama fiasco?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I think he's a big political minus for us in the United States, I don't think just particularly George Bush. But I wonder why, for instance, we're doing this in a covert fashion. Why not overt?

MR. WALLACE: On the front page of *The Washington Post*, it seems pretty overt.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Well, that's what I think. And support the opposition in Panama and encourage again our allies in the region. It's to their interest as well.

MR. WALLACE: Senator, I can't let you go, and we only have about a minute left in this segment, without asking about the vice presidency and George Bush, because Mr. Bush has put you on a list with about a dozen other people as a possible running mate. Do you want the job?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: No.

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MR. WALLACE: That's it? No, You're taking yourself out?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: You like short, simple answers. Yes.

MR. WALLACE: Are you ruling out--if he called and said, "Senator, Nancy, I need you?"

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I don't expect him to call.

MR. WALLACE: And would you accept it--

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: And I have really indicated that I don't believe I'm the right balance on the ticket and that I don't wish to be considered.

MR. WALLACE: Well, that seems to leave it right there. Senators, thank you both very much for joining us today. We appreciate it. And in a moment we'll get another view of what President Reagan has and has not accomplished in Central America from former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when "Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

MR. WALLACE: Back now on "Meet the Press." We're joined by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is at station WVIT in West Hartford, Connecticut. Mr. Kissinger, welcome. Good to see you again.

MR. KISSINGER: Good to be here.

MR. WALLACE: This administration made Central America a top priority from the very start. I'm sure you remember Alexander Haig in the opening months talking about going to the source of communist subversion. And, yet, it surely looks now that when President Reagan leaves office next January the Nicaraguans will still-- the Sandinistas will still be in Nicaragua, Castro will still be in Cuba and now Noriega will still be in Panama. How do you explain the fact that an administration that has accomplished so much around the world has had so many failures in its own backyard?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, with respect to Nicaragua, they never have been able to make up their mind, one, exactly what objective they wanted to achieve. Secondly, they have never been prepared to ask the Congress for what was required for some of the objectives that were implied, namely, the overthrow of the Sandinista government

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and I believe there was an underestimation of Noriega. I don't consider the idea of overthrowing Castro with the framework that we had available a realistic objective. On the other hand, in fairness, I think the objectives of the administration were essentially correct and the largest blame must be put on the Congress for constantly changing the policy and never permitting a coherent approach to be developed.

MR. WALLACE: Well, you say that they couldn't make up their mind in the case of Nicaragua. Is it that you really think that literally Ronald Reagan couldn't decide whether he wanted to overthrow the Sandinistas or not or is it that he wanted to--

MR. KISSINGER: No, no, I think that they would have liked to overthrow the Sandinistas but they were not willing to make--to spend the resources that were needed to do this. There were two fundamental choices we had, one, to overthrow the Sandinistas which would have required massive military support for the contras and some tacit American military help. And, secondly, the other objective might have been to bring enough pressure on the Sandinistas to deal with those issues that affect American national security; specifically, the presence of Cuban advisers, the presence of East European and Soviet advisers and military people, the large size of the Nicaraguan army and the exclusive economic relationship of Nicaragua with the East--with the communist bloc, primarily Cuba. It is conceivable that we would have insisted on an end to those activities and then permitted the evolution of the Sandinista government to take care--take place by historical processes since most communist governments are failing sooner or later any way, to fulfill the needs of their people. That I think was one fundamental issue.

And I must say that I agreed with what the two senators said except on one point: the democratization of Nicaragua is a long process. The issues--because there's never been democracy in Nicaragua in all of its history. The achievement of the objectives that I have described can be measured and that could have been

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MR. KAISER: I'd like to ask you a similar question to the one I asked to the senators. You were involved in your commission at the beginning of the Reagan years. You studied the problem down there carefully. What's your threat assessment now? Do the recent events show that there's greater threat to American interests and security from this region or is this threat less than it seemed when you studied the problem?

MR. KISSINGER: First of all, one has to point out that that commission, which was a bipartisan commission, made a unanimous conclusion that the persistence of a communist government in Nicaragua with its current foreign policy does represent a threat to the security of the United States. It depends how you define threat. If one talks about attacking the United States, obviously, Nicaragua can't do that. If one talks about undermining the stability of all neighboring countries and in time even affecting countries further away like Mexico, Venezuela and so forth, then Nicaragua, as a center of communist intelligence activities and guerrilla activities, is a potential threat is the art of government is to deal with threats before they become overwhelming.

MR. KAISER: Has the threat gotten greater or less as the Sandinistas has palpably failed in their own revolution?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I think the threat has become less in the immediate sense, because we've been fairly successful in Salvador. In the long term, the--for the United States to make a major effort and fail undermines our prestige in Latin America and the willingness of those countries in Central America to gear their policies to ours. So, in that long-term sense, I think the threat has become worse.

MR. COCHRAN: Dr. Kissinger, may I switch now to the Gulf region. The prospect of peace in the Gulf, between Iran and Iraq, has raised hopes that the American hostages will be released.

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Given the background of the Iran/contra scandal, how far can this administration go in dealing with Iran to secure the release of the hostages? The matter, for example, of Iranian in the United States?

MR. KISSINGER: I think the administration ought to talk to Iran, but not about the hostages. It ought to talk about Iran- about the compatibility of American and Iranian interests in the region, which I think is considerable. I think they ought to make clear to Iran that the hostages have to be released unconditionally before we can have a normal dialogue, otherwise we will be just encouraging Iran, every time they have a grievance against us, to seize Americans around the world and blackmail us. I think the release of the hostages unconditionally is a pre-condition for everything else. I believe the other issues can then be settled because fundamentally we have an interest in the independence and even in the development of Iran provided it stays within its own territory and abandons terrorist approaches. And they have clearly failed. Otherwise, they wouldn't be asking for a cease fire.

MR. COCHRAN: Dr. Kissinger, elsewhere in the Middle East, Jordan's King Hussein appears ready to just drop out of the peace process. Given that fact, given the fact that the Israelis are about to have an election in November, we're about to have an election in November, is it time for Secretary of State Shultz just to hang it up in the Middle East, to call a halt to his peace shuttle?

MR. KISSINGER: I think that Secretary Shultz has made a courageous effort and he's been persistent. He's been willing to go out and put himself on the line. I do not think anything can now be accomplished before a new administration comes in and we need a reassessment of the whole situation in the light of the Israeli and the American election. Yes, I think Secretary Shultz should leave matters where they are.

MR. COCHRAN: And stay home. Not go back to the Middle East.

MR. KISSINGER: I would recommend that he not go back to

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the Middle East.

MR. WALLACE: Mr. Kissinger, I assume, and perhaps I'm faulty in this assumption, but I assume you watched some of the Democratic convention and I assume you've been following Governor Dukakis' speeches. What do you think of his foreign policy?

MR. KISSINGER: I think his foreign policy--first of all, he almost never says anything about foreign policy, but what he does say makes me extremely uneasy. He states alternatives that are no alternatives, between drugs and communism in Central America. We've got to fight both or we can't fight either. I'm concerned about his attitude towards the Strategic Defense Initiative, towards Central America and I wish that we had a real debate on the issues and that he would make clear where he really stands rather than try to fudge it and make one rely on things he said in the past which are quite worrisome to me.

MR. WALLACE: Well, we only have about 30 seconds left. One of the things he's indicated that he believes more in multilateral international efforts through the Organization of America States, the United Nations, less emphasis on going it alone. Do you think that's a good idea or a bad idea?

MR. KISSINGER: No, as a matter if principle that's not a bad idea provided we understand that when the American national security is involved at the end of the day we may have to act alone if we cannot get multilateral support. But to begin with multilateral support, I have--that is certainly not--that's certainly an appropriate tactic.

MR. WALLACE: Well, Mr. Kissinger, we're going to have to leave it there. Thank you very much for joining us today. We appreciate it. And in a moment, my colleagues and I will take our own look at the situation in the Persian Gulf and ask what's become an old question: What will it take to get Iran to help release the America hostages? Coming up when "Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

MR. WALLACE: Gentlemen, Iran seems to be headed, seems

MEET THE PRESS - July 31, 1986

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to be headed into a cease fire with Iraq perhaps this week and Iranian officials began talking this week about freeing the American hostages or helping to get them freed under certain conditions. John, over at the State Department, how much of an opening do they see in terms of improving relations with Iran and how much of a chance of getting the hostages back?

MR. COCHRAN: I think they feel that everything is open, everything is up for grabs at this point, that the Iranian collapse is so complete that the Iranians really are ready to do business. On the matter of the hostages, the State Department will always be cautious, of course, not wanting to damage American credibility, not wanting to go too far to make a deal. But, of course, the State Department was not involved in the Iran/contra scandal either. And the gentleman you cover at the White House, Ronald Reagan, very much wants to get those hostages back. Don't you think, Chris, he wants to have those hostages in the Rose Garden before he leaves the presidency?

MR. WALLACE: I suspect he and also George Bush as well, but, Bob, are they so gun shy, because of the fallout, the damage which continues to this day about Iran/contra--it's still one of Michael Dukakis' best lines on the campaign trail--are they so gun shy about that they're unwilling or scared to take an opening if it should come?

MR. KAISER: I think they're very scared of that tar baby. I was intrigued with Kissinger's line today, which is a kind of--it isn't saying you won't bargain at all, it's just saying this is a pre-condition. Set them free and then we'll talk about everything else. That's probably politically from Bush's point of view a very appealing line. It may not produce results. But think of the risk if George Bush started to encourage secret dealings again with Iran, playing with these tricky characters who fooled us so often. I think it could really blow up in his face.

MR. WALLACE: What do you think about that, John, I mean, if it should come that finally, two years later, there are

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MR. COCHRAN: I think you have to go ahead and talk, yes. It will be cautious and I think a lot of it may be--they'll go as public as they can so that there won't be these surprises. I think they'll try to keep the American public clued in to a certain degree, less secret diplomacy than possibly we've had in the past.

MR. WALLACE: We've been jumping all over the world today and I'd like to finish up by discussing a survey that the National Geographic released this week that indicated that Americans are ignorant--I think that's the only way you can say it--about geography. I think that 75 percent couldn't locate the Persian Gulf on a map. One in seven couldn't locate the U.S. on the map. Does that surprise you?

MR. KAISER: I've always been a proponent of an Iranian-Nicaraguan entente in Central America myself. It's really appalling isn't it? It was quite hair raising these numbers and you see a kind of willful know-nothingism in America. We also come out very badly on comparisons of who knows foreign languages. We know less foreign language almost than anyone.

MR. WALLACE: John, does it matter?

MR. COCHRAN: Well, we're all know-nothings about some things. I don't understand how computers work. I don't understand stocks and bonds and securities and all that stuff, because I don't have to in my line of work. Once the American people and young people think they've got to understand geography because they've got to compete with foreign markets, and we're going to have to certainly in the next 20 years, when people say, "I've got to know this to make a living, then they'll do it."

MR. WALLACE: Gentlemen, thank you both. Thank you very much for helping me out today. Our quotation of the week comes

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