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Chapter II - Continued

<table><tr><td>III - Enduring Objectives in American International Action</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>IV - American Capabilities</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>a - The Tensile Strength of American Internal Life</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>b - Economic Capabilities</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>c - Intellectual Capabilities</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>d - Military Capabilities</td><td>61</td></tr></table>

Chapter III - Twentieth Century Realignments in Power and Production:

<table><tr><td>Functional and Geographic Groupings of Nations</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>I - Introductory</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>a - New Bases of Grouping</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>b - "Private" (Non-Statist) Groupings:<br>The International Corporation</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>II - Regional Groups for Defense</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>III - Regional Groupings for Non-Military Ends</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>IV - The World Community</td><td>85</td></tr></table>

Chapter IV - Some Conclusions on Policy

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# CHAPTER I

## DEEP FORCES IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT

We are agreed that certain great and discernible currents are moving in the international scene, and that these are the primary cause of the present disturbed condition of world affairs. All of them are rooted in old ideas; the new element is that the forces set in motion have become vastly more powerful in the context of a remarkable expansion of technological resource (military and economic), unprecedented rapidity and scope of communication, and evergrowing pressure of population.

### I

#### THE "WORLD-WIDE" SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Until the nineteenth century, the modern world assumed that a great part of its inhabitants must live in permanent poverty and want; the best these could hope for was subsistence, possibly alleviated by occasional experiences of approximate satisfaction. In the pyramid of each society, of course, some would do better; a small group considerably better; a few would command resources affording luxury and power.

In the late eighteenth century the justice of such a social order was challenged, and with it the validity of political systems which maintained it. First the American (1776), then the French (1789) revolution proclaimed the theory of political equality for all men. In the ensuing century the

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governmental structure of most of the Western world (Russia being the notable exception) was changed to conform, more or less, to this theory. Its content did not include economic equality, or offer any very direct promise of improved economic well-being, except as it was thought that capacity of the governed to choose and influence their government would tend to assist their condition.

One result was acceptance of the principle of "free enterprise" in place of enterprise by privileged grant from government; but, as Barbara Ward has pointed out, liberty was not a product of free enterprise: rather, free enterprise was the product of liberty.

A generation later the current of early nineteenth century socialism squarely attacked the validity of any economic system which did not offer a greater measure of economic welfare or at least an approach to economic equality. This line of thought maintained that political equality without economic welfare was meaningless; that economic disparities were so great that a majority of people (workers, peasants and so forth) could make no real use of their right of political participation. As the Industrial Revolution increased productivity but in its earlier phases certainly did not distribute equitably (its mineteenth-century phase produced a new, privileged, quasi-feudal ownership group), private property in productive enterprise was assumed to be a buttress of economic privilege -- just as royalist and feudal institutions had been instruments opposed to doctrines of political liberty. Though the socialist movement failed to gain power in the "lost revolution"

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of 1848, its doctrine persisted as a continuing political force on the continent of Europe. It eventually found a philosopher-economist in Karl Marx, a political genius in Lenin, and an opportunity when World War II brought about collapse and revolution in the one great country, Tsarist Russia, which had effectively avoided any substantial liberal reform. This result was to bring about a dynamic Communist-Socialist movement throughout the world, backed by a huge country with vast resources, whose population was and is capable of great achievement but with limited experience of Western life.

In Russia this revolution proved capable, first, of organizing the country; second, of securing substantial economic advances in a single generation through forced industrialization, though at enormous human cost; third, of formulating a dogma which claimed to have universal validity for the depressed populations of the world; fourth, of attracting the support of certain intellectual groups (of varying strength) in a great many countries.

In this same period world economics had undergone marked change. After World War I, possibly due to its stimulus, came a notable spurt in technology, in accumulation of capital, and in productivity. Both the Eastern and the Western worlds began to see the possibility of an economic life in which no great part of the population needed to suffer the extreme want generally prevailing in all save Western European countries and the United States. The idea gained credence that political organization of a state could be so handled as to produce this desired result; and the

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Communist revolution in Soviet Russia claimed to have a formula and method for so doing. The fact that productivity and distribution involved many other factors besides political and economic organization (a basis of education, fiscal discipline, recognition of individual as well as collective motives, and so forth) was not appreciated; certainly it was not stressed. Under impetus of a world-wide economic depression (1929-1935) practically every government in the world undertook a substantial degree of responsibility for the economic life of its country and for the economic condition of its people. Probably in many countries this was little more than an intensification or enlargement of a degree of responsibility earlier assumed; nevertheless, at the outbreak of World War II few governments (and those usually in backward or underdeveloped areas) were not endeavoring to organize or reorganize their economic systems.

Modern war is socialized by necessity, and World War II compelled governmentalization -- socialization perhaps -- of the entire economic life of much of the earth's surface as a necessary incident of carrying on the war. At its end many of the patterns set up by war stress were carried over into peacetime life.

World War II again vastly stimulated the process of technology and production. Surprisingly, despite its waste and its destruction, the recent modern wars have proved forcing-beds for technology and productivity. The United States, for example, approximately doubled its national product from

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1940 to 1945. British lower classes were, literally, better fed and clothed
during World War II than in peacetime. Renewed demonstration had thus
been made that the problem of poverty and want might be conquered. World-
wide Communist propaganda naturally proclaimed this idea, adding that
modern industrial and technical plant and its generous yield could be obtained
within a measurable period of time if only Communist dictatorship under
Soviet leadership were accepted.

In result, almost everywhere throughout the world arose a demand
for a better standard of living, to be brought about by change in political
processes. Conditions accepted for centuries came to seem intolerable in
economics, and social life. Existing institutions were brought under attack;
dominant groups were held responsible for failure to have taken appropriate
measures earlier. This condition has been called "the revolution of rising
expectation." This is now a phenomenon of almost universal existence,
though understandably weakest in the United States where expectations have
more nearly been met than elsewhere.

No doubt it is true, as in all such situations, that the demands made,
the expectations engendered and the political and other movements brought
into being, are the work of relatively small militant groups, with the majority
of the population only mildly stimulated to action. Many, perhaps most, of
these groups were not Communist. Yet, the groups were large enough and
the followings they energized were activist enough to make impossible in