06/05/96

WED 11:32 FAX 703 243 6814

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<table><tr><td>we have an infinite capacity for good, but alas and tragically, an infinite capacity for evil as well. And finally, he understands that to preserve peace and freedom takes hard work. It doesn't just happen. It takes hard work to respond correctly to circumstances, to help shape circumstances and institutions, preserve peace and freedom. Foreign policy is not an Oprah Winfrey Show. It is not just a series of photo opportunities. He understands that you just can't sincerely good intentions to make the thing work, that there is more than feel good to it. all we have to do is go back to the 20's, or back to the early part of the century. We had a Secretary of State years ago, William Jennings Bryan, back in 1913. Very eloquent like Bill Clinton. When it came to foreign policy, just about as deep. Sorry about that. But when he, not really. But when he became (LAUGHTER) But when he, when he became Secretary of State, one of his passions was negotiating arbitration treaties with nations. He thought this was going to create peace on earth forever, this literally months before the outbreak of World War I. Then in the 1920's, we got something called Kellogg-Brion. It's not a cereal. It's not a wine. But it was two individuals, a Secretary of State and his counterpart in France, that came up with something called the Kellogg-Brion Pact, that outlawed war. Outlawed war. Banned it. Made it illegal. All the nations solemnly signed it. Bill Clinton would love it, especially in an election year. Just see him on an afternoon show, puckered lip, wiping away the eye, saying, "My knowledge of history, I'm proud to say war will no longer exist. " This was in the late 1920's and we all know what happened after that. So it does take hard work. Human nature can be good and it can be evil. And so, it is especially fitting tonight at this juncture, where the opportunities are truly glittering, but the dangers are all too real, to be able to listen to somebody who in this town is unusual, and that he actually knows what he talks about. And so without further ado, let's get to the true dessert of the evening. A man that I've had the honor to know. And make all us feel that we come away enriched when we have the chance to hear him speak, Dr. Henry Kissinger.<br/>(APPLAUSE)<br/>KISSINGER: Steve, friends, I once at a reception, where a lady came up to me and said, "I understand you're a fascinating man", she said. "Fascinate me." (LAUGHTER) Turned into one of the less successful conversations that I.. I greatly appreciate what Steve has said. I admired his campaign. I thought he raised important issues and elevated the debate that was taking place. Unfortunately, it was not</td></tr></table>

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hard to do. But he...(LAUGHTER).. But he raised it objectively to an important level. And I know Steve, you will make a great contribution to this country in the years ahead. (APPLAUSE) I met Bob Tyrell when he was even younger than he is today. Before The American Spectator had been thought of and then when The American Spectator was a dream. And I know when he just had a few thousand subscribers, and he proved that every great achievement is somebody's dream before it becomes a reality. I want pay tribute to all of you who have contributed so much to making The American Spectator important and readable and such a crucial component in our national debate. (APPLAUSE) And I want to say one word about General Westmoreland, cause I met him when I was a young professor at a consultant to Ambassador Lodge and I had the honor of visiting the General in Vietnam. All of us who were touched by that tragedy, know how much dedication was left there. All of us who saw what America did there, need never apologize because it was our best...(APPLAUSE) And General Westmoreland was not defeated on the battlefield.

(APPLAUSE) Now let me talk about the international situation, as I see it. The United States finds itself in an unprecedented position. No nation has ever had such a preponderance of power as we possess today. And yet, I would say that the threat to America in the Colds War was defeat. The threat to America in the Post-Cold War period is irrelevant. It is a paradox. That the most powerful nation in the world does not contribute what it should and what it must to the real challenges of our period. It is said now that the administration has got the hang of foreign policy. And that the President has become very competent in the handling of foreign affairs. Foreign policy problems that are being dealt with are almost without exception second order problems, Under the pressure of events, solved on a tactical basis. Haiti was largely an American domestic issue and has not brought about a significant change in the structure of Haitian government. Although it has brought about a change in the conviction of the leaders of a semi-dictatorial society. And in Bosnia, the major achievement is of course the bring of peace. But the real issues will be faced after the election, when our troops and the NATO troops are leaving. But when we talk about an international structure, when we talk about this so called world order, the fact remains that in the principle areas of the world; in the western hemisphere, in Europe, in Russia, in Asia; the United States is not contributing to a structure. And what it does contribute is very often irrelevant to the

06/05/96 WED 11:33 FAX 703 243 6814

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<table><tr><td>problem. And that is in part because the convictions of those who shape our foreign policy, developed in the protest generation of the late 60's and 70'. My generation, for all its faults, grew up in the period that ended the depression, won the war, fought the Cold War, and was convinced that it made a big difference which side prevailed. The protest generation believed that it was America's failings that largely contributed to international tensions. And that America had no moral right to risk itself until it had first purified itself. My generation - and this is not a question of age, but people who hold the values of my generation - would not say at a NATO meeting that we should not just move the border of NATO further East, but that we should create a better world in which another words NATO is not necessary. And which would avoid the distinction. It makes a difference whether one believes that the Cold War was fought about important issues and won on important issues. Or whether it was a misunderstanding badly handled. It makes a difference whether we believe that our values matter. And that they must be preserved and extended. And those who believe that we, ourselves, are largely to blame for the ills of the world. Of course, I sometimes differ with some people in this room, because I believe we need both a liturgy and a strategy. I believe there is an element of conviction that is imperative. Anybody who has had to make major decisions of national policy knows, that when the chips are down, the pros and cons are very evenly divided - at least in the difficult decisions. One cannot prove the consequences of actions in the most difficult circumstances, and one therefore needs the moral strength to act on the basis of our values. But it is also true that there is a strategic component to international politics, which cannot be wished away in a fit a exultation. Any statesman knows that the occasions for finally victories are very rare, though we were lucky enough to celebrate one in our lifetime. But the danger of final defeat is always present. Let me make a few observations about various parts of the world. And about the relationships that we now value and our strategy. Between our convictions, that must now be absolute and our methods that which sometimes have to be related to circumstances. We all know, and I personally have often been subjected to the debate on whether power politics or moral convictions should dictate foreign policy. It is a false debate. Without convictions, we have defactious pragmatism that many of us see today. It was, it is, was Ronald Reagan's great threat that he had a few relatively simple values that served as a compass post. But it is also true that the occasions</td></tr></table>

06/05/96 WED 11:34 FAX 703 243 6814

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for applying them depends on a number of circumstances. No country can conduct a global foreign policy entirely on the basis of power politics. It is beyond the intellectual and physical resources of any society, even one as powerful as us. But equally it cannot ignore it. So let me separate the world in two parts -that part of the world not driven by ideologies claiming the right to dominate every aspect of their citizens, that has market economics, that is not conceivably likely to engage in military conflicts to achieve its objectives and where what ever threats exist to our security, will arise from the sort of competition of ideas and economics that we should be honored to undertake. I include in that part of the world the western hemisphere and the north Atlantic area. And especially the north Atlantic area has been totally neglected by this administration. It has been neglected because to them NATO is a vestige of the Cold War. It is something they inherited, but not a legacy on which they must build. Yet that is the part of the world in which our values survive. That is the part of the world in which we can demonstrate, together with the western hemisphere, what free peoples can achieve together. And one would think that the first task one undertakes is to define what one means by the north Atlantic area, which is, after all, the fundamental issue involved in the expansion of NATO. The key problem is whether those nations that for forty years we regretted as having been physically dominated by communism, now that they are liberated, can be built into the west and into the values with which they have been historically identified. Or whether they will be left in a gray area, a gray area that we po-potentially competing nationalism of Russia and what ever emerges in central Europe. How that expansion is conducted, what the technical solution is, is a secondary issue. The administration, at first, rejected the very concept of NATO expansion. It has now affirmed that it favors NATO expansion, but it has consigned it to studies that can have no solution. It is not a subject for study. It is a subject for decision. Every key decision in history is made in some 72 hour period. The question is when do you schedule the 72 hours?

(LAUGHTER) And that has been deliberately delayed. But it isn't only NATO expansion What do we want the Atlantic area to achieve? We face at least three challenges. We face some definition of a military challenge And I would say with respect to that only one thing. The theory of the assured mutual destruction on which the Cold War was based, always struck me as an immoral and highly objectionable theory. It has never happened in history that nation has made its own

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<table><tr><td>vulnerability an element of insecurity. But it has (APPLAUSE) But it had some aspect of plausibility as long as there were only two nuclear powers. But in the world ahead of us, there will be many and some, most of them quite small. And therefore the issue of missile is not a technical issue, It is a political and moral issue. And it is an element to tie together of at least the Atlantic area. Second problem is, how do we deal with the resurgence, especially in the economic field of the Asian nations, and the ideological challenge of the fundamentalist Islamic and other trends? And how can we achieve common objectives with relation to these challenges. Because if the nations of the Atlantic conduct competitive policies with respect to all of these, they will repeat the tragedies of the twenties, the history of ancient Greece, and of other societies that achieved a high level of culture, but could not give it a application to the new circumstances in which they found themselves. There was a conference this weekend in Prague, at which Margaret Thatcher, President Havel and other personalities spoke in this sense. Which has not received the attention it deserves. Because I believe that NATO was a military alliance, but a structure for the Atlantic area is necessity for our future. It cannot be only a military. I think we should look at the possibilities of creating an Atlantic Free Trade area, so that we can deal with some of the challenges I described in a more unified fashion. Let me say a few words about Russia. That issue is being defined almost entirely in terms of who will win the election in a few weeks from now. In my view, no matter who wins the election, we will face a significant series of decisions. The Soviet Union was an ideological challenge and imperial challenge. The ideological challenge represented its 70 years of Communist history. The imperial challenge represented its 400 years of a history that had an almost uninterrupted cycle of expansion.<br>END TAPE 3</td></tr></table>

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06/05/96 WED 11:35 FAX 703 243 6814

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TAPE 4 -

KISSINGER: (Cont.) Many democracies have gone through a nationalist period. And today both candidates in Russia are campaigning by appealing to an imperial tradition. Any of you who have traveled in eastern Europe, and I had the honor of traveling there with Steve Forbes a while ago, know how terrified all of Russia's neighbors are of the this imperial thrust. Of course I prefer Yeltsin to the communist alternative. But only because it will make the problem somewhat more manageable. Not because it makes the problem disappear. The strategic problem we have to solve, and be, it is a problem that cannot, that if it is not solved will also make it impossible for Russia to become a genuine democracy, is to see whether Russia can be convinced to stay within its national borders. If we remember that St. Petersburg is closer to New York than to Vladivostok, that Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than to Moscow, we can say that they should not feel claustrophobic (LAUGHTER) in that prospect. And uh it is a policy that we have not pursued. Russia refuses to demarcate the borders with Ukraine. It maintains troops in Georgia. It harasses Azerbaijan. It tries to get control of the energy reserves of central Asia and has again asserted this in the last few weeks. Its policy is not compatible with normal relations. And this policy will sooner or later produce a series of crises. And it is therefore essential that American policy makes clear two points. We have no conflicting business with a Russia that stays within its natural, national borders possessing some of the vastest resources of any nation in the world but we cannot condone as we have in official statements, this creeping expansionism. when we compare what Russia is doing in Azerbaijan and Georgia, with what we allegedly did in Grenada and Panama, as we did, as our President did. Then we had invited a continuation of pressures, whose ultimate result will be to spread insecurity all around the periphery. And what is more, it will tempt competition within Russia for the mantle of a historic policy; which in the end has been a disaster for the Russian people. A people that has had to bring more sacrifices for more futile military efforts than any other nation with which I'm familiar. So that is the challenge with Russia. Now let me say a few words about Asia in which it is quite possible that my views do not coincide with those of everybody in this room. first of all, I look at Asia not as an economic problem. Whether corporations or individuals benefit from trade, we can leave to our domestic debate. That is not a strategic problem. A strategic problem is to prevent any nation or

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<table><tr><td>group of nations from dominating all the resources of Eurasia. And it is from that point of view that the reason non-aggression treaty between China and Russia, signed in Shanghai, were Nixon signed the first American-Chinese communique, is an extremely worrisome thing. In Asia, we deal with a group of nations in the early phase of nationalism; nations that are not driven by our fundamental values, even when they have some of our institutions. And many of them don't even have, most of them don't even have our institutions. In that situation, the United States must not likely seek a confrontation with the country with the largest population, with the fastest rate of growth - without Asian allies on our side. You should keep in mind that somebody, who like myself, has written about the importance of equilibrium, is not going to be suddenly soft in the head about disturbance of the balance of power in Asia. What we must seek as a nation is a way to preserve the balance of power in Asia, in a way that doesn't tear us apart. And that does not preclude our creating the union of democracies that I spoke about. And that does not drive together the largest concenr. concentration of geopolitical territory in the world. We have managed to be both too soft and too tough. We have fought on peripheral issues and then we have begged for some concessions so that we do not have to carry out our own threats. But we have also made threats on issued that were not central to the problem that I have now discussed. I know there are serious people, whom I greatly respect, some of them no doubt in this room, who have a different view and who believe we can repeat in Asia the experience of the Cold War. Now if a challenge of that nature arises, I will be among those, and probably in the forefront of those, determined to resist it. But in Europe we had the advantage that all nations felt threatened and were willing to cooperate. That condition does not yet exist in Asia. And therefor e, I urge a really prayerful consideration before we launch ourselves into another enterprise in Asia that we will not sustain. And which analogies are not necessarily valid to the previous period. But be that as it may, the fundamentals I believe we can all agree on. What is needed in this country is a clear view of the kind of world we are going to try to bring about. A policy that does not beat its breast about American failings. A policy that is not ashamed to assert that we have embracing national interests. A policy that begins with uniting the democracies and creates a structure in the Atlantic area and in the western hemisphere from which we can contest, unilaterally, economic pressures and ideologic challenges, and that we can</td></tr></table>

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06/05/96

WED 11:36 FAX 703 243 6814

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then, with some unity, confront the problems of Russia and the problems of Asia. That seems to me our task and it is necessary. That especially the conservatives develop some kind of doctrine that can serve for our society what the theories with which the Cold War was contested, achieved for us. So that for an reasonably indefinite period, we can first explain to the American people what this is all about.

Secondly, put before them what our tasks our. And third, educate them on their necessities. This is a great society. I know nothing that has been defeated by the American people. Though I would not say that about the American universities. When I hear that the American people is not interested in foreign policy, I can only say - How can they be? Who is telling them what our challenge is? I blame the administration for failing in this duty. But some of us, all of us, should ask ourselves too, whether we're everything we can? Either because we don't believe there will be a receptivity or perhaps because we have a nostalgia in believing that somehow history can be brought to some dramatic short term culmination. We are now engaged at the very beginning of a process, not at the end of one. At the beginning of such a process, the deviation between the various positions may seem very small. Yet if you project that into the future, they can become very wide. So we owe our own people some leadership. And our people owe the world what our strength imposes on us. Because when all is said and done, it is all of the problems that I have described, whether you agree with all of my solutions or not. The fact remains, we are the only nation in the world that can plausibly say the shape of the future is still largely in its own hands. Thank you very much.

(APPLAUSE)

THOMPSON: What a treat. You know listening to uh Dr. Kissinger is like a seminar that every member of Congress ought to attend on a regular basis. I appreciate that opportunity. And I appreciate the chance to get back to introduce our main man here tonight. Briefly, just a quick report from the Hill. I just got back from voting on a Rockefeller amendment. It's really nice when you don't really have to know what's in an amendment before you vote for it. (LAUGHTER) The old Rockefeller rule... It's good.. good to get back off the Hill tonight. I want you tell you, you know, once you hear the lobbying up there really is a problem. It's ferocious. The begging, the pleading, the threats, the promise of campaign help. I finally had to say Fed Trent, lighten up, I mean.. (LAUGH) Only, on a little more serious note.. Uh, uh one thing I noticed up there tonight brought back a couple of

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