62 Second Afternoon Session - Economic Relations

serves and with relief to those who are seeking to provide aid to the underdeveloped countries, is to expand the trade channels with the richer countries of Europe," he declared.

Dr. Gardner stressed, however, that applying different standards to underdeveloped countries did not mean that there should be no standards for these countries. He pointed out that the idea of one-way free trade was not really new, since Article XVIII of the G.A.T.T. already allowed the underdeveloped countries "to do almost every kind of monkeyshines in the way of quotas and preferences to shelter uneconomic industries against competition from the industrial countries."

Other aspects of Anglo-American economic relations were also brought up in the course of the discussion. One observer noted that, ironically, G.A.T.T., which the United States Congress refused to approve or disapprove explicitly, prevented the Six and the Seven from making an agreement which would not be in the interests of the United States. "In the most current negotiations between the Six and the Seven, one thing that is stopping them from making mutual concessions which would have the effect of substantially lowering tariffs between them is that under the most-favored-nation clause of G.A.T.T. any such mutual concessions between these two groups would be generalized," he explained. Unless the United States made larger cuts than presently possible, this would result in "unrequited concessions" for the United States, he concluded.

The conference also dealt with the comparative roles of the two Atlantic allies in the Bretton Woods institutions, the IBRD and the IMF. "The fact is that in both the Bank and the Fund these days, the British are clearly the second partner," one observer stated. Generally, this was reflected in the British contribution of both staff and ideas, although sometimes the United Kingdom had taken the lead. As an example of the latter point, this observer noted that, although the United States proposed the International Development Association, the British showed a "certain intellectual leadership" in the formulation of methods of procedure for IDA and were instrumental in removing from IDA the "notion of lending against repayment in local currencies, which tend to accumulate and present insuperable problems of administration." He also praised the British for their lead in the consortiums for underwriting the development efforts of India and Pakistan. He pointed out, however, that in providing finance "their performance has been disappointing." He suggested that a country with great political responsibilities in the world should "adapt its economic policies and financial policies, including balance of payments, to the needs that have emerged." Admitting that this might require more intervention on the part of the government, he claimed that the alternative would be "to let your responsibilities go because you say you cannot afford them."

Considering the methods of dealing with competition from the underdeveloped world, one participant proposed that the readjustment which was made possible in the British textile industry by an agreement with the Commonwealth should serve as an example. Under a temporary agreement, he explained, Pakistan, India, and Hong Kong put on voluntary export quotas for three years. In Britain there was a complicated arrangement involving the industry, the government and the unions. "A whole lot of mills were broken up and a lot of new money pumped in for making the specialty-type textiles in which Britain can still compete in the international market."

Second Afternoon Session - Economic Relations 63

In the field of trade in agricultural commodities, another participant suggested that the British should "take up the cudgels for some of their Dominions" and ask for inclusion of the American agricultural program in any discussion of trade relations. While admitting that heavy subsidization of agriculture in England would make that country reluctant to raise this issue, he pointed out that the two countries could produce better results "if they strive together than if they act separately."

Finally, one speaker noted that the British were in fact living off the American weakness in the balance of payments area. He explained that the drain of private capital from the United States in the second half of 1960 prevented the British from running a serious deficit and losing gold themselves.

Inevitably, the question of political feasibility of tariff cuts in the United States was raised. An observer of the American business scene noted that he could see nothing in either the balance of payments or in the mood of American business to support a move for lower tariffs such as that proposed by Dr. Gardner. "I think we would do very well in this country if we can hold our present level of liberalization, let alone think about trying to solve the regional problem of reducing our tariffs," he explained. The opposite view was taken by another participant, who pointed out that "what is politically feasible seems to be very difficult to estimate in advance and never warrants a slackening of efforts to achieve it." Stressing the need for action, he added that "we do not know what is feasible since nothing has really been tried since 1945."

In his summary Dr. Gardner agreed that there should not be undue pessimism over the political possibilities. He suggested that new American initiative would be possible if four conditions were fulfilled:

- First I think it has got to be part of a grand design.... I would suggest that a new administration might consider, for example, an omnibus economic bill which it would put before Congress, maybe tying together aid and finance and trade.... We would present this as a total program relating to some grand design, some overriding concept, some fairly well articulated set of objectives, and thus avoid the chipping away of particular parts of the program, which has been going on over the last decade in different Congressional committees.

- The second requirement is that it involve gradualism. No one is in favor of the abolition of tariffs or a 50 percent reduction in tariffs overnight. If you could say "we are going to commit ourselves to reduce tariffs across the board 5 percent a year for ten years" --that is sufficiently gradual so that no one could argue that it is going to involve a waste of invested capital or sudden hardship to large segments of our labor force.

- ... a third prerequisite.... is that we tie it to a trade adjustment program--that is to say, that there be a Federal program of assistance to workers, communities and producers injured by import competition....

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— ... the fourth requirement... is that it capitalize on some momentary political opportunity. ... I think that the new administration might take advantage of G.A.T.T. negotiations that will be going on this winter and spring. It might come back to the Congress and say, "Now look, you can choose. With our existing trade authority, the Six and Seven are going to start a system of preferences among themselves which would involve new discrimination against the United States, undermining the integrity of G.A.T.T. and working hardship on our economic and political interests. We can settle for that if you do not want to give us any new authority. Or, you could give us some new authority and then we can go back and get a settlement in our national interest."

Dr. Gardner also suggested that a new initiative of the industrial countries in the field of trade and aid might enable them to make an agreement with the less-developed countries as to the standards under which the latter would operate. As he explained it, this would involve saying to them, "In return for this additional assistance from the industrial world, would you subject yourselves to additional restraints in the field of commercial policy, restraints in your interests as well as ours?" Finally, he advanced the proposition that a special agreement might be reached as to the disposition of the repayments of the $7 billion of United States loans outstanding to Western Europe. Thus, "the Western European countries would agree to accelerate rather radically their repayment of interest and principal on these outstanding credits and the United States would assign its rights in these repayments to the International Development Association," he proposed. This would assure a flow of Western aid of the order of $300 to $400 million a year over the next decade, he concluded.

* * * * *

NOTE:

Dr. Gardner had prepared in advance a number of questions as a basis for discussion at the session, and these are included here for reference.

Trade

I.

Which of the following alternative trading patterns seems most desirable and feasible as an objective to be worked for by the U.S. and the U.K.:

(1) The pattern emerging from the present situation, i.e., a Six and Seven in Europe, a South American free trade area, and moderate tariff reductions between the regions through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade?

(2) Same as (1), but with settlement between the Six and Seven in which (a) the U.K. would join the Common Market, or (b) the

Second Afternoon Session - Economic Relations 65

Seven would be associated with the Common Market in a European free trade area, or (c) the Six and Seven would reduce (but not eliminate) trade barriers between themselves and thus discriminate against the U.S. and other outsiders in violation of G.A.T.T.?

(3) Some version of (1) or (2), but with deep inter-regional tariff cuts (e.g., 50%) on a new, across-the-board, basis?

(4) North Atlantic federation; i.e., free trade between the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Western Europe?

(5) The pattern suggested by Governor Rockefeller; i.e., a number of interlocking free trade "confederations" comprising (a) the U.S., Canada, the U.K., and Western Europe, (b) the entire Western Hemisphere, (c) Africa, and (d) other areas?

(6) Substantially free trade throughout the free world without regionalism?

## II.

What changes in the trade policies of the U.S. and U.K. will be necessary to promote the trading pattern preferred above? Specifically, what changes should be made in the U.S. trade-agreements legislation when it comes up for renewal in 1962? Are changes required before then?

## III.

Are present international institutions adequate to assure the adjustment of trade problems? Is there need for a further strengthening of G.A.T.T.? For O.E.C.D.?

### Finance

#### I.

Is the U.S. payments deficit a temporary or long-term phenomenon? Does it pose a serious threat to domestic or international financial stability? What further measures should be taken to reduce the deficit? To make it easier to live with?

#### II.

What are the prospects for equilibrium in the U.K. balance of payments? Is the U.K. position strengthened or weakened by the convertibility of sterling? By the sterling area? Is the U.K. adequately protected against future financial crises like those of 1947, 1949, 1951 and 1956?

66 Second Afternoon Session - Economic Relations

### III.

Is the International Monetary Fund as presently constituted an adequate vehicle for promoting the three Bretton Woods objectives of exchange rate stability, freedom of payments for current transactions, and domestic stability and expansion? If not, what changes in the Fund would be desirable?

### IV.

Is there a free world liquidity shortage? If so, does the remedy lie in (1) raising the price of gold, (2) further enlarging the I.M.F., (3) adopting supplementary stand-by arrangements between financial centers, (4) establishing a free world central bank <u>à la</u> Triffin?

#### <u>Aid</u>

##### I.

Should there be a further increase in the amount of government aid to less developed countries? If so, how much? What criteria do we have available (e.g., "absorptive capacity," target growth rates with capital-output ratios) to help us answer this question?

##### II.

What portion of the aid burden should be borne by the U.S. and the U.K.? What criteria do we have available (e.g., GNP, payments balance) to help us answer this question?

##### III.

Is the present distribution of U.S. and U.K. aid among recipient countries satisfactory? Should Britain be doing more outside the Commonwealth? Should the U.S. be doing more for "uncommitted nations"?

##### IV.

Should a greater share of U.S. and U.K. aid be provided through multi-lateral rather than bilateral arrangements? If so, should the primary vehicle be one or more of the following: (1) a "lenders club" of industrialized nations, (2) an expanded International Development Association, (3) an expanded U.N. Special Fund, (4) regional organizations established by the less-developed countries, (5) other institutions?

* * * * *

67

DINNER ADDRESS

Speaker

ERNEST A. GROSS

Former Member of the U. S. Delegation to the General Assembly
of the United Nations, Former Assistant Secretary of State.

There is no room to doubt that the peace of the world pivots on the Anglo-
American axis. Ever since the Monroe Doctrine was kept afloat by the British
Navy, down through the wars and to the present atomic age, that remains axio-
matic. On the premise of that axiom, I shall seek to deal with broad aspects of
Anglo-American diplomacy rather than with special areas or technical questions.

I shall consider, in turn, first, certain principles of the coalition diplomacy
and, second, certain of its processes.

First, regarding principles: I think it was Conrad who, speaking of the Brit-
ish seaman, said that he was easy to inspire but hard to manage. This may be
applied to free men as such. The common tradition of the two countries, of
course, is that the function of authority is to convince, rather than to coerce.

This tradition automatically extends itself into the international field. I
say "automatically", because it may be stated as a law of political behavior
that it is impossible for a society to reserve one set of standards for itself and
to apply a contrary set in its dealings abroad. So the projection of our nat-
ional traditions upon the world stage is a rather automatic and unconscious
process.

However, it does not follow that the mere existence of our common tradition
provides a solvent for all the common problems facing our coalition. To say
otherwise would beg the two big questions, which are: What problems are com-
mon? And, how is the common interest to be defined in a particular situation?

The function of coalition diplomacy, is to work and search for answers to
these two questions. That's the task of diplomacy, as I would summarize it
at any rate for the present discussion.

Common traditions obviously sanctify common principles. However, the
translation of common principles into programs of common action is the daily
work of diplomacy, and its reason for existence.

Dr. Arnold Wolfers has pointed out that "differences inevitably arise less
about political goals than about the method by which to pursue common political objectives."

Now, differences as to political method, of course, reflect differences in
national outlook, position and responsibility. Britain and the United States
respectively sit in the middle of concentric and overlapping circles. There
is no mathematical formula by which one could possibly reckon the area of

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Dinner Address

each overlapping segment of interest.

I think Dr. Wolfers would agree that it does not in any sense minimize the importance of differences to say that they relate to "method" rather than to "objective". On the contrary, the formally expressed goals of societies, including the totalitarian, are stated in such pious and unexceptionable language that the Man from Mars would have a hard job appraising their respective virtues merely by reading their stated goals. The contrast is precisely in the *methods* used to achieve peace, freedom and justice, which all profess to desire, but each according to his own definition.

For example, how is one to tell where "principle" ends and "method" begins with respect to issues involving the reach of international action in the field of nationalism and self-determination?

In 1955, the able former British delegate to the UN, Sir Pierson Dixon, said in a speech that he "deplored the use of the word 'colonialism' as a term of opprobrium and the tendency of the United Nations to accelerate the process of liberation."

At the same time, within a matter of weeks, 29 African and Asian states at Bandung declared, very opprobiously indeed, that "Colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end."

As for the United States, we weren't saying much of anything on the subject at that time for fear of offending both sides.

Now, when such abstractions as "colonialism" and "liberation" are applied to particular problems, such as Algeria, for example, the task of coalition diplomacy is to find common denominators on which common policy can be based. One such common denominator, it seems to me, is the objective of strengthening moderate elements on both sides of the dispute. In the case of Algeria, this would involve searching for practical measures to strengthen forces of moderation both in France and Algeria.

This is, of course, a most complex and painful task. It necessitates taking sides in certain situations or at certain times. It risks charges of "intervention in the affairs of France". Nevertheless, it seems to me the only sensible yardstick of common action for the United States and Britain in the face of a dilemma such as Algeria. With our common tradition we will, more often than not, agree as to the elements and forces of moderation in a particular situation. "Non-intervention" becomes an increasingly costly fiction. In the case of Indo-China, when we and the British stood aloof, it cost the United States something like a billion dollars a year to subsidize the French desire to "go it alone".

Hence, I venture the conclusion that in the face of the dilemmas of colonialism and nationalism, Anglo-American diplomacy could well be strengthened by candidly supporting forces of moderation, no matter how loudly the extremists -- whether French or Algerian -- protest.

To turn to quite a different problem, does not our China policy involve a

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unilateralism which tends to undermine the Anglo-American coalition? In an
atomic age, it seem inconceivable to contemplate the possibility of the United
States becoming involved in a major war without formal advance assurance, or
at any rate a secure assumption of the participation of our closest allies. Never-
theless, the precise opposite seems to be true.

In April of 1955 the late Secretary of State Dulles visited Canada to discuss
with the Canadian Government what would happen if war came out of Quemoy and
Matsu. On his return home, the Secretary publicly announced, "We have never
expected that if there were a war in the Formosa area, the Canadian Government
would be a participant in that war. They have no treaty arrangements of any
kind which relate to that part of the world, and that kind of support has never been
anticipated."

By thus absolving Canada--and of course, the same would hold true of Eng-
land--of the obligations which both have assumed under the United Nations Char-
ter to join in collective action against any aggression, we are punching a vast
hole in the Anglo-American alliance. It is a hole at least as big as the Taiwan
area, and possibly as large as China itself.

Problems such as I have cited—they might better be described as dilem-
mas—illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing between “differences of principle”
on the one hand, and “differences of method”, on the other. Inasmuch as both
principles and method interact, it is necessary to consider the methods, or tech-
niques, through which common policies must be sought.

Obviously, the quest for agreement decisively rests upon effective consultation,
on specific problems, on time and as a "continuous habit".

The Anglo-American alliance has sought in general to rely upon three major
diplomatic processes for consultation. Stated in the order of their greatest and
most effective use, these are: good, old-fashioned bilateral diplomacy; NATO; and
the United Nations; in that order of declining effectiveness.

One of the most serious deficiencies of method has resulted, it seems to me,
from failure to realize that these processes are mutually supporting and inter-
related. Problems of consultation and contact in the area of bilateral diplomacy
are as old as nation states themselves, and need only be mentioned here.

Turning to the newer, institutional forms of diplomacy, it seems to me that
the Anglo-American coalition has not successfully concerted policies or processes
for strengthening NATO or the United Nations or for using them effectively in
conjunction with each other.

One explanation for this shortcoming may be found in the divergent and often
inherently inconsistent appraisals which are made of the potential values of these
institutions. I refer to NATO and the United Nations.

As one looks back to the formation of NATO, it seems fair to say that there
has been a change in the chemistry of the coalition since its birth in 1949. At
that time, the United States thought we were helping Europe to defend itself in
our interest. Now we are seeking to help Europe defend us in their interest. I do
not think this distinction is a mere play on words.

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Ten years ago, Europe was the front line we were trying to bolster. Today, the ICBM has pushed Pittsburgh and Detroit into the front line as well. The change in the chemistry of the coalition results from a common and reciprocal interest in mutual survival under conditions unprecedented in history. These conditions create the need for consultation and sharing of confidence which is also unprecedented in the same terms.

Despite this necessity, and with occasional exceptions with respect to the question of Germany, and certain aspects of the problem of disarmament, the state of consultation within the NATO alliance, including the Anglo-American segment thereof, has not improved since 1956. I take 1956 because that was the year of the report of the "Three Wise Men", Messrs. Pearson, Lange and Martino. They warned at that time, "It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political or economic consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been shown impossible if the proper conviction is lacking to convert the profession into practice."

The NATO Ministerial Council 'that same year, on the basis of the report of the Three Wise Men, agreed on the need for injecting a new vigor or, in their words, to inject a "proper conviction" into the processes for consultation. Secretary General Spaak has ever since been pushing against a door that is unlocked but very seldom opened wide. We will all agree, I know, that without such "proper conviction" no mechanical changes or formulistic devices will accomplish much.

Turning to the UN, difficulties in the way of concerting Anglo-American views as to more effective use of the United Nations have, I think, been illustrated by two problems I have already referred to -- our neutralism with regard to colonial questions, such as Algeria, and our unilateralism with regard to Asian questions, particularly the China area. These postures have rendered the United Nations, for the most part, virtually unusable for any of the basic interests of the Anglo-American coalition.

It should be pointed out also that divergences have frequently existed between the United States and Britain as to the use of the United Nations as an instrument for facilitating or moderating changes in the *status quo*.

At the risk of oversimplifying, it can generally be said that after the first world war, British policy focused largely upon maintaining the *status quo*, particularly as it was anchored in the Treaty of Versailles. The League of Nations, despite some references to orderly change, embodied the principal objective of maintaining the *status quo*.

The United States has little right to criticize, inasmuch as we sought the best of both worlds, denying our support both to efforts to change the *status quo* and to efforts to maintain it. In contrast, it seems to me, in the post-World War II period -- "the world of change" -- major problems facing the Anglo-American coalition almost without exception involve the need to agree as to how and when we must work for -- or resist -- orderly changes in the *status quo*.

Certain problems involve political dilemmas inherent in the change from Colonialism; others, demands for economic betterment in the emerging societies; still others, strategic dilemmas, in the change to a safely disarmed world; and

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finally, demands for enlarged human rights, as, for example, in South Africa and Southwest Africa.

In general, I think it can be said that NATO, as a defensive alliance, has been viewed by us primarily as an important, but negative, medium for preserving the *status quo* against efforts to change it by force.

The United Nations, on the other hand, has been seen -- but not fully used -- as a mechanism for assuring orderly transition and just change. We would do well to remember that most of its members regard this as its highest function.

If there is any truth to this analysis, the Anglo-American coalition should seek programs of action whereby NATO could be endowed with more affirmative content and used for more positive ends in achieving necessary changes in the political, economic, and social *status quo*. At the same time, we should seek through common policies to nourish the United Nations into becoming a more effective instrument to resist efforts to change the *status quo* by force or other improper means. In other words, we should seek to bring somewhat closer together the objectives of NATO and the UN.

Now, this, of course, is a big order. I am simply suggesting a basic approach toward these two organizations which could lead to their closer juxtaposition, at least so far as it lies within the power of the Anglo-American coalition to effect such a result.

It seems to me wholly fitting for Anglo-American diplomacy to give a high priority to this twin effort. It was the breakdown of the UN's security function that gave birth to NATO as a bulwark of the United Nations Charter in the first place.

It would help restore the capacity of the United Nations to carry out its security function, if people were constantly reminded that it is precisely the shoring up of the UN security function which is the reason for NATO's existence and the objective to which NATO is dedicated. At the very least, such a renewed realization of the basic concept of NATO might revive the confidence -- and even the support -- of many who have been misled by the perennial Soviet assaults upon NATO into thinking of NATO as somehow incompatible with a universal security organization.

I should like now to conclude with several considerations relating to the process of our coalition diplomacy. Control over our foreign policy is, and must be, exclusive and plenary. Nevertheless there are those who fear that loyalty to a coalition risks dilution or even loss of sovereignty. Such fears reflect a confusion between the dividing of responsibility between members of an alliance and the sharing of confidence.

The common Anglo-American tradition, referred to at the outset, that free men are hard to manage but easy to inspire, is relevant to this point. "Consultation" is another word to describe negotiation among friends -- that is, among those making a common cause. In this respect, valuable lessons can be learned from the political processes which govern within democratic societies, as well as between them. I refer particularly to the often-praised, but little practiced,

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device of "bipartisan" formation of foreign policy within a democratic society.

The majority in power, just as is true of a sovereign state, cannot delegate its authority, which must remain plenary and exclusive. The President -- as the Supreme Court itself has held -- cannot delegate his responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. But both an Administration in power and a Government in a coalition can share confidence. The three elements of bipartisanship within a domestic society are: (1) willingness to collaborate; (2) timely consultation; and (3) free exchange of information.

These, it seems to me, are precisely the components of what the Three Wise Men called "proper conviction," without which, as they said, consultation is impossible. I don't think it disparages the Standing Group or the NATO Council, or any other organizational arrangement, to point out that there will always remain two vital instruments of coalition diplomacy: one is the telephone and the other is the taxicab.

Finally, perhaps the most important feature of coalition diplomacy is the ability to bind up old wounds, with the certain knowledge that there will always be new ones.

A cartoon in "Punch" recently showed a mother reading a fairy tale to her children. The caption read: "And so they remarried and lived happily ever after." One can draw a lesson from this, applicable to coalition diplomacy. Like matrimony, it involves a constant course of steering midway between the impossible and the inevitable.

* * * * *

## Discussion by Conference Members
## Following Address by Mr. Gross

The discussion following Ambassador Gross' speech focused on three points: Algeria, The United Nations, and British public opinion. To begin with, the speaker's "three major diplomatic processes" prompted consideration of the various routes which could be used in moving toward a solution in Algeria. Secondly, the conference took up the development of the United Nations, specifically looking at the relative roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly and at the position of the Secretary General. Finally, it discussed the opinions of the British public about the international organization.

In response to a question concerning Algeria, Ambassador Gross suggested that neither NATO nor the United Nations could deal competently with the crisis there. The problem with the United Nations, he said, was that it tended to adopt "over-general" resolutions calling for independence without suggesting the method by which true independence could be achieved. "Such resolutions are rather valueless. As recommendations, they have little moral compulsion because they are inherently ambiguous." He did not think NATO was a much better forum in which to deal with the Algerian problem, however. Noting that the North Atlantic Treaty defined Algeria as a department of France, Ambassador Gross pointed

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out that:

The French can at will rule out NATO discussion of Algeria, unless such discussion is based on the assumption that Algeria is by treaty considered a part of France. Even apart from that, NATO seems inadequate to deal with the Algerian question because, frankly, the British, Dutch and Belgians are quite unwilling to press France on colonial questions for fear of stirring up trouble in their own back yards.

Continuing, he explained that he mentioned appealing to the moderates in both Algeria and France in his speech, he was thinking of "the kind of quiet pressures which we tried, to some extent, in 1950 and 1951 with respect to the Moroccan and Tunisian problems." He concluded that "these are questions which cannot be solved in a debate, either in the NATO or the United Nations or any other institution."

From discussing the different ways of dealing with the Algerian problem, it was a logical step for the conference to consider the effectiveness of General Assembly resolutions in general. One speaker noted that it had been the United States which led the movement from the Security Council to the General Assembly via the Uniting for Peace resolution and questioned whether, therefore, it was not "a bit late" to criticize the General Assembly resolutions for not carrying any meaning. In reply, Ambassador Gross termed the Uniting for Peace resolutions a "dramatic piece of window dressing" although "as a matter of legal or political principle" it had not added to the powers of the General Assembly. He distinguished between the effect of General Assembly resolutions on collective security matters and on other matters:

> The moral power of General Assembly resolutions in the area of collective security, such as the Korean case, is very much greater than is usually assumed. For one thing, they frequently assign or imply tasks for the Secretary General or his Secretary. On the other hand, with respect to a problem such as Algeria, which does not involve the security functioning of the United Nations as such, General Assembly resolutions are morally valuable in direct proportion to how specific they are.

Later, Ambassador Gross returned to another aspect of the same problem in considering whether the Security Council was the place to deal with some matters in light of the possibility of a Soviet veto. "If you can help it, you do not want the Security Council to be the agency to deal with issues that are or might become cold-war issues. By reason of the Soviet veto power, they can reduce principles to the lowest common denominator by the threat or the use of the veto." As an example, he pointed to the Kashmir case:

> The India-Pakistan dispute for years was handled in the Security Council. Then, one day at a Security Council meeting in Paris in 1951, suddenly out of the blue the Russians converted it into a cold-war issue. The Soviet delegate to the Security Council called Frank Graham, the United Nations representative, a Wall Street spy and so forth. They made Kashmir a

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cold-war issue from that moment on. The Security Council became a dangerous forum in which to deal with the question.

Thus, he suggested that critics who called the General Assembly a wild or irresponsible forum, where Paraguay and Yemen each had one vote and the United States and Britain each had one vote, should remember that "it has advantages over the Security Council, particularly with respect to cold-war issues."

Turning to the role of the Secretary General in the United Nations, Ambassador Gross noted that even the Russians had begun to call that individual the "executive" of the international organization. He explained that as long as there was only one man in the office, that individual would either have a "purely housekeeping function," similar to that of the Secretary General of the League of Nations, or he would become an executive. "By reason of his role in the Congo particularly, Mr. Hammarskjold has taken on executive functions." Ambassador Gross pointed out that the Soviets, who had first begun to resist the increasing importance of the Secretary General in connection with the United Nations Emergency Force created in 1956, were attacking the Secretariat in 1960 because it had attained a status "approximating that of a foreign office." We thought that Khrushchev must have found it "an abhorrent state of affairs" to have the Secretariat acting as a foreign office with a "foreign minister" who was not responsible to the Soviets. He suggested that the problem facing the Secretary General was to reshape the Secretariat "so that it can act like a foreign office or an executive."

One speaker suggested that this problem of executive power was not restricted to the United Nations but occurred in every international organization. He maintained that, because of objections to a formal surrender of sovereignty, power was instead given over to an individual. "You do in practice surrender far more sovereignty in a less democratic way than if you had some supranational constitution." This observer argued that this had been done with NATO, where General Norstad was responsible to the NATO Council in the same way that Mr. Hammarskjold was responsible to the Security Council.

Another participant added his opinion that the attitude of the United Nations toward executive power had changed considerably since the time of Korea:

> There is a vast difference between the way people reacted when General MacArthur was going to cross the 38th parallel and the way people react against the Soviets for trying to interfere with what the Secretary General is trying to do in the Congo today. The whole public opinion today seems to be that you have to get behind the Secretary General and support him, and that you cannot indulge in any criticism of what he is doing in the Congo. That certainly was not prevalent when General MacArthur was there.

Finally, for the third time in the course of the day, British public opinion came up for discussion. One speaker noted that at one time he had felt that the British regarded the United Nations "as an institution to be tolerated rather

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than as one in which they had a deep sense of involvement." In taking up this question, another individual observed that British opinion about the international organization had gone through several stages. In the first stage, "Britain was in favor of the United Nations, much in the same way that America is in favor of motherhood." He explained that, although it "was not considered to be at all useful in itself," the United Nations was seen as important because it involved the United States in world affairs. "In Britain great astonishment was shown that anybody should regard the United Nations as controversial in any sense at all, since something so devoid of real meaning could hardly be a subject of controversy."

During the Korean war, he said, the British thought they "played a rather jolly prank on the Russians"--they caught the Russians out and were able to cover a conventional though justified intervention with the flag of the United Nations. "It was thought this jolly well served the Russians right for their having behaved in this unconscionable way and sulked in their tent like Achilles, and this was one-upmanship. But it was not very seriously thought of as being, in general terms, a great new venture in world government." (Later, another observer disagreed, stating that he thought the United Nations was taken seriously in Britain during the Korean War.)

Continuing with his description of British opinion about the United Nations, this individual declared that the change had come with the Suez incident. He noted that Conservative criticism of the United Nations at that time was similar to Khrushchev's objections to the international organization in 1960--that it was "ludicrous to have a vote of a country which has no connection at all with the situation."

While admitting that after Suez "there was a certain sourness in Britain towards the United Nations," he felt that this had been counteracted by a developing belief that the United Nations had a role to play in the newly independent areas. He noted that the Secretary General's actions in Africa had been welcomed as "innovations which were rather exciting and which were creative, and which really did appear to be leading to a new form of international endeavor." Although this observer of the British scene acknowledged that a contrary impression might have been given by the Scarborough Conference of the Labour Party, he said that Russian prestige had "suffered badly in Britain because of the attack on the Secretary General and on what he has been doing for the United Nations in the Congo."

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77

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
(as of October, 1960)

Richard N. Gardner

Richard N. Gardner, Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School, is a specialist in the legal and economic aspects of foreign policy. He is Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation of the American Bar Association and a consultant to the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Professor Gardner graduated from Harvard College and the Yale Law School and received his Ph. D. in Economics from Oxford where he was a Rhodes Scholar. After practicing law in New York City he joined the Columbia faculty in 1957. In 1958 he served as visiting professor to the University of Istanbul. He has also served as a press association correspondent and has written on international problems for a number of periodicals. Professor Gardner is the author of *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy*, and of *New Directions in U. S. Foreign Economic Policy*.

Ernest Arnold Gross

Mr. Gross, a partner of the New York law firm of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle since 1954, was a member of the U. S. Delegation to the 3rd, 5th, and 6th General Assemblies of the United Nations. A graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, he also studied at Oxford. After serving as counsel for a number of private groups and governmental agencies during the pre-war years, Mr. Gross spent World War II in the Army. He became a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, 1946-1947, Legal Adviser to the Department of State, Washington, in 1947 and Assistant Secretary of State in 1948. He was a U. S. Representative on the U. N. Peace Commission in 1953. Mr. Gross is a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a director of the International Resources Fund, and Chairman of the Department of International Relations of the National Council of Churches of Christ in America. He holds the Legion of Merit and the Order of the British Empire.

Milton Katz

Dr. Katz has been Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies at the Harvard Law School since 1953. A graduate of Harvard College and Law School, he held a number of posts in the federal government during the '30's. During World War II he served with the War Production Board and OSS before going on active duty with the U. S. Navy. In 1950-1951 Dr. Katz was U. S. Special Representative in Europe, with the rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, Chief of the United States Delegation Economic Commission for Europe, and Chairman of the Defense Financial and Economic Committee under the North Atlantic Treaty. From 1951 to 1954 he was Associate Director of the Ford Foundation. Dr. Katz is a trustee of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

78 Biographical Notes

Henry Alfred Kissinger

Dr. Kissinger is an associate professor in the Department of Government of Harvard, where he received his Bachelor's and Doctor's degrees. He has been Associate Director of the Harvard Center for International Affairs since 1957 and Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program since 1958. Dr. Kissinger was Study Director of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1955-56, and Director of the Special Studies Project from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1956-58. He received the Woodrow Wilson prize for the best book in the fields of government, politics, international affairs in 1958. Dr. Kissinger is the author of *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957) and of other books and articles.

Arnold Oscar Wolfers

Dr. Wolfers is Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of Johns Hopkins University. A native of Switzerland, he was graduated from the University of Zurich, following study at the Universities of Lausanne, Munich and Berlin. After service in the Swiss Army, 1917-19, he was admitted to the Swiss bar and practiced there, subsequently receiving his Ph. D. from the University of Giessen in Germany. Dr. Wolfers lectured in political science in the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin, becoming Director in 1930. In 1933 he joined the Yale faculty as Professor of International Relations. Dr. Wolfers stayed at Yale until 1957, serving as Master of Pierson College from 1935 to 1949. During World War II he was consultant to the Army and the Office of Strategic Services. Dr. Wolfers was President of the World Peace Foundation in 1953. He is the author of a number of books, both in German and English, on international affairs and in 1956 was editor, with L. Martin, of *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*. He was also editor and co-author of *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*, published in 1959.

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