U. S. - JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS

Mr. Kamiya: For the past decade, international situations have remarkably changed, especially in the regions of Asia and Africa. But on the other hand I think that there are some elements and factors which have not changed so far and which should not change in the future. That is, for example, the friendly alliance between the United States and Japan. And the core part of the alliance is, I think, security relations between the countries, so let me begin by asking about U. S. - Japan security relations.

There still persist American discontent about Japan's "free ride" and Japanese uncertainty about America's "firmness of commitment". What would be a new creative approach to deal with this discontent and uncertainty and to strengthen the U. S. - Japanese alliance.

Dr. Kissinger: I think in foreign policy it is important always to understand the fundamental realities -- I don't think that only countries continue to cooperate because there exists a formal document that spells out that obligation. And I think it is important to realize that Japan in the 80's is different from Japan in the 50's. It is more powerful. It is economically more developed. Conditions have changed. So I think when people talk about the "free ride", what they mean is that Japan's defense

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expenditure is disproportionately small to its economic capaci-
ties.

I think in the 80's, inevitably, Japan is going to play a larger role internationally, ~~and it also believed~~arily, I think then, our relationship will have to be redefined.

As for the American commitment, it cannot change because we are not doing it as a favor to Japan. We are doing it as a necessity for us. And we cannot permit Japan to be physically attacked by stronger neighbors. ~~But we will have to adjust~~ the relationship to new conditions, (but the fundamentals, I think, will remain)

Mr. Kamiya: When would you say ~~that~~ Japan evitably be a greater military power in the 80's, do you mean that Japan will go nuclear or...?

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, let me explain, when I say inevitably. I don't say, because, as you know, Japanese Prime Ministers do not ask me every day what they should do. (Laughter) So, I'm not saying that this is an advice that I give to the Japanese.

I am saying that from my assessment of friends in Japan, I think a country as economically strong as Japan and as politically vital as Japan, will not indefinitely be completely dependent for its defense on a foreign country. This I predict, I don't recommend it.

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When will that happen? During the course of
the 80's. I think, as the generation comes into office
~~Nakasone, Miyazawa, that generation~~, it will be less willing to
entrust its fate entirely to the United States. It will still
be an ally of the United States.

And I've expressed the view before I'm impressed with the way Japan makes decisions. I don't quite understand how you do it, but the result is impressive. Does it include nuclear capability? My judgment is you are giving yourself the option, but you have not yet made the decision. That is my judgment.

Mr. Kamiya: However, as you know, Japan is surrounded by many countries from the big countries like the U. S. to the tiny country in Asia, where almost all of the countries have very bitter memory of the militaristic Japan in the 30's and 40's and...

Dr. Kissinger: It means you have to act with great restraint and with great care and you have to be very careful about

Mr. Kamiya: And we have to be very dependent on good relations with outside countries.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why you will move very slowly. I'm talking about the trend. I do not think we will wake up one

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morning and hear that Japan has developed fifty divisions.

And that Japan will ~~3~~ It will be gradual. [Like everything you do, ~~But~~ I speak of what will happen over ten years, not will happen over ten months.

Mr. Kamiya: Even though Japan would not ~~become~~ to the heavily re-armed?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, as I have said previously, I think Japan will be more armed in the 80's than in the 70's. Whether that's heavy or less heavy, I expect this to happen. Now, understand, I'm not recommending it. I'm predicting it.

Mr. Kamiya: Yes, I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: And I think Japan will play a more national foreign policy, still as a friend of the United States.

Mr. Ishihara: You say national--nationalistic?

Dr. Kissinger: Not nationalistic; No, but more national. A more -- maybe you'd call it a little higher posture. More active foreign policy.

Mr. Ishihara: I see.

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Mr. Kamiya: I think that the United States government will welcome the more active foreign policy of Japan, but on the other hand, they are very dubious about heavily re-armed Japan. Not only today, but also five or ten years hence.
Don't you think so?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we may be dubious, but it will happen. We cannot have both a more active Japanese foreign policy and a disarmed Japan. We have to choose one or the other. But it's also important in foreign policy to know what you can choose. And I think the Japanese government is now in a position where it does not necessarily always carry out what we want.

(the following optional)

Mr. Kamiya: Looking at Japanese situation, what kind of difference did you find between the governmental and opposition powers?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, I have not been in Japan [now] for over two years. I'm going next April. But I have not had any contacts with Japanese opposition people. I thought in the past, in my previous contacts, the Japanese opposition was more doctrinaire. More anti-U.S. on ideological grounds. More neutralist.

CHINA

Mr. Kamiya: Some detect the emergence of a U. S. - China -
Japan triple-entente in view of closer U. S. - China relations
since your first visit to China and especially since the recent
conclusion of Sino-Japanese friendship treaty.

Can I have your comments first, on the treaty
itself, and secondly, on any possibility and probability of the
triple-entente.

Dr. Kissinger: I favor the treaty between Japan and China.
I think it's a positive development. As for a triple-entente,
I think the United States and China have improved their relations.
I believe Japan and China have also improved their relations.
These have not necessarily been coordinated. They have been
parallel efforts. In some things we have similar purposes, and
in some things we have different purposes in this relationship
with China. I think both of us -- Japan and the United States --
have an interest that China remain united and strong, and at any
rate not subject to military pressure from the outside.

But I don't think there's any formal triple-
entente. And on many issues we will not agree; I think, in the
United Nations, for example, China speaks of us not always in
the most friendly fashion. Less unfriendly than about the Soviet
Union, but not what you would call friendly.

So, in some respects we have a parallel interest with China and in some respects we don't. And nor do our interests with China exactly parallel your interests with China. But on the issue of security in Asia, we have similar views.

Mr. Kamiya: But even though we don't have any intention to be against the Soviet Union, they presume we have something like that kind of intention.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, some of it is a question of national style. You don't have any intention to be against the Soviet Union. We don't have any intention to be against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, I think that if the Soviet Union were to engage in what the Chinese call a hegemonial policy, I think certainly the United States would be against that. And I think even Japan would probably be against hegemonial aspirations. Without a doubt, without expansion

So if the Soviet Union is prepared to live in peace, then neither the United States nor Japan has any reason to be against it. And we should not base our policy on being against the Soviet Union, but we should base our policy on being against military expansion.

Mr. Kamiya: Probably the crucial point is that the fundamental posture of the Chinese government, is quite anti-Russian. Am I right?

Dr. Kissinger: But that's their problem. Our policy is not anti-Russian. Whether our policy is anti-Russian depends on Russian behavior. And if the Russians conduct a restrained foreign policy, if they do not put military pressure upon their neighbors, then we have no reason to be anti-Russian. So the Russians can control the conduct of the United States in that sense.

And I suppose Japan.

But maybe if China became convinced that the Soviet Union has no expansionist aims, then China, too, might not be so anti-Russian.

Mr. Kamiya: Well, I hope that China becomes that way. Incidentally, Dr. Kissinger, as one of the world's foremost Sinologists, please enlighten us with your brief observation on the political and domestic stability of the current Chinese regime.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I wouldn't call myself a Sinologist. I dealt a lot with the Chinese, but I was not a student before that of Chinese affairs. I think that the present government in Peking is trying to make a very rapid progress in economic development. That is always a very complicated process.

And I think that the present leadership is quite stable. Of course, some of them are in an age bracket where changes will be brought about by the natural biological evolution,

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and one therefore cannot tell what necessarily will follow them.

But I think the government has shown its stability through many upheavals, and I think that their dedication to industrial development is clear and will probably succeed.

Mr. Kamiya: So you think that China is already through the turmoil started by the Cultural Revolution?

Dr. Kissinger: I think they are trying very hard to overcome that turmoil and I think they have succeeded.

Mr. Ishihara: So... they are very stable. Or the dust is settling down?...

Dr. Kissinger: Well, no communist state you can say is totally stable in the sense that you are never sure who emerges in a succession.

Mr. Ishihara: I see.

Dr. Kissinger: Because outsiders have never guessed right as to who emerges, either in the Soviet Union or in China. Maybe they are stable from their point of view, but from an outsider's point of view, it is hard to predict who emerges.

But I think they are stable in their present structure.

Mr. Kamiya: All right, Dr. Kissinger. The political posture of China has remarkably changed and their foreign policy, for example, vis a vis the United States and Japan, has also remarkably been changed. How about the relationship with the Soviet Union? What would you envisage in the future of the Sino-Soviet relations?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, of course, there are always certain geo-political realities that cannot be changed. For example, any Japanese government is concerned about Korea, simply because of the proximity. And, therefore, when you have a country which have a border of 4,000 miles with another, like the Soviet Union and China have--on one side there are 800 million people; on the other there are 30 million people on the Asian part of Russia--that's a geopolitical problem.

Secondly, you have the ideological problem that the Chinese do not accept the preeminence of Moscow in ideological affairs.

So I would think that the relations between the two countries are inherently unstable. But if you ask me to look ahead five years, we cannot exclude that they will come to a better understanding at some point.

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Mr. Ishihara: We cannot?

Dr. Kissinger: We cannot.

Mr. Kamiya: What are your prospects for full-fledged U.S. -
Chinese normalization, possibly through the revised "Japan
formula"?

Dr. Kissinger: I was one of the authors of the Shanghai Communique. And the Shanghai Communique commits us to normalization, so I favor normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States. We could probably live with it, but there is one big difference: We have a defense treaty with Taiwan. You do not have a defense treaty with Taiwan.

For us, the manner in which China settles its
problems with Taiwan is of a great importance. And there has
not yet been a solution found to this particular issue. If a
solution can be found to this issue, I think there will be very
rapid normalization.

Mr. Kamiya: What you mean by very rapid?

Dr. Kissinger: I think the only obstacle to normalization is
the reluctance of the American people to see Taiwan occupied

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by force from the mainland. If that can be done, if some solution can be found to this difficulty, Then it could be settled within weeks, whenever that solution is found.

I think, you know, if you look at the history of negotiations with the Chinese, it always goes for years and then suddenly there is a solution. I think it's capable of solution.

Mr. Ishihara: It is, for example, through some declaration to the effect they are not going to <u>using</u> force, that kind of thing?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think it is possible to find a formula, some declaration, some understanding...what the precise formula is I don't want to suggest now. But the Chinese are a very intelligent people. They know it, too. They will find a means of doing it.

Mr. Kamiya: Any time reference?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, I think it can be done...within the next few years. [couple of years]

###

RUSSIA

Mr. Kamiya: I understand that the Soviet threat is something tactically to be feared but strategically not to be feared so much even though the Union because, of course, everybody knows that Soviet is accumulating a military build-up in recent years. But, it may mean that they don't have the competence in the areas other than the military area. This is the reason I said that I don't necessarily fear the Soviet threat strategically. What is your assessment of the Soviet threat around the world in general, and the western Pacific, in particular. And briefly, what should be the new rules of conduct under the circumstances now developing?

Dr. Kissinger: If I understand your question, I agree with one of its implications, that is, the Soviet Union is militarily strong but historically and economically not so strong. And, therefore, while they will have great strength at the short term, the historical evolution is not so favorable to them. That I agree with. I think they have accumulated a great deal of military power and I think the basic trends are not all that favorable to them.

They have difficulty changing leadership. They have difficulty running their economy. They have a nationality problem. They have a youth problem. And they have chief political problems in the sense that all the major countries of the world are really against their expansion--Japan, China,

Europe...United States.

On the other hand, military power counts for something. And they are militarily very strong. And it is no consolation to say that history is against them if in the meantime they become so strong that they can dictate events. In fact, if an imbalance developes that is too great, then the fact that history is against them may actually accelerate the process of pressure as they try to improve their position while they are still strong. Because many of the weapons they now have will be obsolescent in another ten years. So paradoxically, if we can get to 1990 without a massive Soviet expansion, then after that I think trends will favor us.

But [you know] for all we know, Carthage might have said the same thing vis-a-vis Rome, but it wasn't around to enjoy it.

Mr. Kamiya: So by that you are going to say that we put more emphasis on our military strength?

Dr. Kissinger: I think we cannot permit a balance of power to turn against us.

Mr. Kamiya: Well, I think this is the proper opportunity to ask you about detente. Some people said that United States oversold detente, even though I don't believe so. But,,,

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you see, you have to remember detente was carried out by a Republican administration and our opposition were the very people who had been urging us to do detente and a much more extreme detente than we did. So as soon as we did it, they suddenly moved to the right of us and said we oversold detente.

Our view of detente was as follows: We have a paradox in this world: One is ~~Soviet Union and we are ideologically opposed~~; but at the same time, we both have nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have an obligation to try to spare mankind nuclear catastrophe. It doesn't do any good to make tough speeches. We have that obligation.

So we have to keep both in mind--the ideological hostility and the necessity of coexistence. Our policy was to attempt to work out rules of mutual restraint. And then, if the Soviet Union broke these rules of mutual restraint, such as in Angola, we ~~had~~ tried to resist them. Some of our domestic opposition opposed the rules of mutual restraint, but also opposed the resistance. So (laughter)...so I don't think we oversold detente. There are some people who pretended that detente could solve all problems. We never pretended. And you have to remember, President Nixon used to be accused of two things: One, that he was a war monger, and secondly, that he oversold detente. One of them has to be wrong.

(laughter)

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Mr. Ishihara: He can't be a war monger and a peace monger at the same time.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly.

Mr. Kamiya: Let me next ask about the Soviet regime. In the case of China, the new Chinese regime after Mao and Chou, has remarkably changed. I am just wondering whether we can expect something similar in the case of the Soviet Union. What would you think of the coming regime of the Soviet Union in comparison with the current regime?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, one of the characteristics of the Soviet system and of any communist system is that you can never tell who will emerge. Two years ago no one would have recognized or would have guessed who would become the new chairman in China. I never saw him mentioned in any speculation and I don't think anybody in Japan ever mentioned him.

Nobody guessed that Khruschev would emerge after Stalin, and nobody really guessed that Brezhnev would emerge after Khruschev. So, none of us really know who will emerge.

I remember in 1969, just before I came into the government, I made a list for a seminar in an answer to this question of possible successors to Brezhnev. (Every one of them) And I must have been right, because every one of them has since been eliminated from the Politburo.

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Mr. Ishihara: When they are listed, they are blacklisted!
(laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: [that's right] But that list wasn't published but I guess that those are the people of the younger generation. I don't think anybody knows today, but the history indicates that the new rulers always try to make distinction between themselves and the old one.

Mr. Kamiya: So, we can just say the general tendency of the younger generation...less cautious or less conservative...

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the younger generation will at least be different. The present generation of Soviet leaders grew up in the twenties and thirties, when Russia was very weak. And I think they still have in their bones the conviction of western superiority. Whether it is true or not, they were brought up this way.

Then they went through the purges, through the war, through the post-war purges, through the insecurity of the fifties and sixties, and I don't think that they really believe that Russia is so strong. Even though they know it. It's a whole upbringing.

The new generation will not remember the war as a personal experience. They will understand Soviet power better

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than the present generation. And at any rate, they will be
different.

That is inevitable.

Mr. Ishihara: Would you say the coming Soviet regime will be less cautious or a little more adventuresome in terms of foreign ventures?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we know we shouldn't kid ourselves. The Soviet Union has not been all that cautious when I was in office in 1970, they put combat troops into Egypt. They were building a nuclear naval base in Cuba. In 1971 they encouraged the war between India and Pakistan. In 1975, they put Cubans into Angola.

In 1977 they put Cubans into Ethiopia. So we cannot say that they have been all that cautious in the past.

Mr. Ishihara: Then Doctor, what's going to happen with the more younger generation?

Dr. Kissinger: I think it is imperative for the Soviet Union to become more restrained. If they do not, international tensions will become very severe.

###

SALT II AND BEYOND

Mr. Kamiya: We understand that you changed, Dr. Kissinger, the target of the United States, vis a vis Soviet Union from superiority to parity. Do you think that the people in Kremlin, believed in it?

Dr. Kissinger: No. My point was something else. When we came into office, the technological trends and the decisions of the sixties inevitably were going to produce parity. It isn't that we changed it. It's that we accepted it. In any event, it is in the nature of nuclear technology that in the strategic field, parity is likely to develop.

My responsibility was to adapt American foreign policy to that reality. We could maintain and can still maintain and will still maintain a certain amount of superiority, but its significance will be less than it was in the 50's and 60's.

Mr. Kamiya: And you think that the coming regime of the Soviet Union ~~will~~ would become much more realistic on that point?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you have to remember, even parity gives them greater opportunities, because ~~they can~~ give # greater emphasis to regional pressures at less overall risk. (Risk)

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Mr. Ishihara: This arms control business, sir, we have to do it. But I feel sometimes it is an exercise in futility, with the escalating speed of military technology...

Dr. Kissinger: Well, this is always the question whether the controls catch up with technology. We'll have to see. I haven't decided yet. I want to see what the treaty looks like.

Mr. Ishihara: In the meantime, maybe we should learn to live with the bomb.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we have in any event to live with the bomb.

Mr. Ishihara: With a cool head.

Dr. Kissinger: Even if this agreement is signed and ratified, it only puts a ceiling on it. It doesn't abolish it.

Mr. Kamiya: Suppose both U. S. and Soviet Union will go to the third phase of SALT, what would be the central topics to be discussed?

Dr. Kissinger: It will have to have actual reduction in the most worrisome categories.

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Mr. Ishihara: Are you optimistic or pessimistic on that?

Dr. Kissinger: I'm optimistic.

Mr. Kamiya: Are you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. But I'm not sure...the trouble is, you can, even if you reduce it quite a bit, it doesn't really change the problem because you take the proposal that President Carter made in 1977 that the Russians rejected. That called for a ceiling of 1800 missiles and bombers on missiles and bombers *permitted* on multiple warheads. Well even that ceiling was multiple warheads.

It's about eight times larger than this [this] what existed in 1964 without a ceiling. [Well,] it's better than what exists, but it's worse than what we had.

Mr. Kamiya: The contemporary world consists of, as you know, the economy and politics and military arena, but in the field of economy, interdependence has become quite paramount, whereas in the field of politics and especially in the military arena, no country can take that degree of interdependence.

Dr. Kissinger: I think that's right.

Mr. Kamiya: That's probably the fundamental dilemma we have to face for the coming decades.

KOREA

Mr. Kamiya: Of the divided countries in postwar history, Vietnam has been unified by force and Germany remains divided by negotiation.

I have had for a very long time the theory that Korea should be the German type. I wrote that kind of an article as early as in 1970. But what do you foresee for the future of Korea in either context?

Dr. Kissinger: I think any attempt to unify Korea by force would lead to war. I don't think we can accept it. I don't think you can accept it. If we tried to unify it by force, Russia and China couldn't accept it. So, I think it will have to remain divided by negotiation and maybe unified by negotiation someday. But it cannot be unified by force.

Mr. Kamiya: No, I agree. Probably there is the possibility of the unification by negotiation.

Dr. Kissinger: I think in the next five years that is impossible.

Mr. Kamiya: No, impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe in fifteen years, as part of a general arrangement, it is again conceivable. But I see no immediate

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prospect for it and we shouldn't pretend that there is.

Mr. Kamiya: With the North-South Korean dialogue stalemated, can you suggest a measure to start it moving again?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think it's a great mistake for western countries, including Japan, to negotiate with North Korea as long as the communist countries refuse to negotiate with South Korea. I think that North and South Korea should be treated exactly the same.

If the communist countries deal with South Korea, then I think we should deal with North Korea. But what cannot be is that North Korea deals with everybody while South Korea becomes a pariah. That, I think, would be very dangerous. I have always favored negotiations between North and South Korea in which Japan, the United States, the People's Republic, Soviet Union, participate. Or separate negotiations between the United States, ... between South and North Korea. I am against negotiations only with North Korea.

Mr. Kamiya: I think that when you dealt with the Vietnam war, you must have thought that your endeavor should be via Peking or Moscow or both.

Dr. Kissinger: Partly.

Mr. Kamiya: Yes, partly. In comparison with your ex-
perience of that kind, what do you think about the situation
in Korea? To get somehow better results on the peninsula, we
should approach via what, would you say?

Dr. Kissinger: No, when we negotiated with Vietnam, I don't think that Peking and Moscow helped us a lot directly. But Peking and Moscow helped us indirectly in the sense that they continued their negotiations with us even while the war was going on in Vietnam, that showed to the Vietnamese that whatever they did would not stand in the way of improvement of relations between the United States and China and Russia.

So, in this sense, it was a great psychological
help to us. Now, with respect to North Korea and South Korea,
I think the same thing could develop if the North Koreans see
that they will not get support for their policy of unification
from Peking and Moscow. Then maybe sooner or later they are
willing to talk about unification.

That sort of help we can get. Maybe later on
we can get some more, but not immediately.

Mr. Kamiya: Recently we can see ~~that~~ some contact between
the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea...whereas it is very
rigid and tough -- for instance, between Pyongyang and Peking.
What would you think of these new developments?

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Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think that Peking is above all, interested that the part of Korea that borders China remains friendly to it. And it will therefore be more reluctant to risk its relationship with Pyongyang than Moscow. Moreover, to the extent that Moscow moves even slightly to Seoul, Peking sees in that a new opportunity to cement its ties with Pyongyang. But that is not against our interest. When we don't have to push Korean into unification.

Mr. Kamiya: I understand. The last question on Korea is, what do you think the United States and Japan can contribute toward the peaceful solution of the Korean question?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the first thing they have to contribute is to make absolutely clear that we will not tolerate any circumstances a military solution to the problem. Secondly, we ought to indicate that we are prepared for a peaceful solution of the problem. Third, we have to make every effort to make sure that the status of the North and the South Korean government internationally remains the same because this is the condition for negotiation. Fourth, of course, I'm in favor of keeping American troops in Korea. That really diminishes temptation.

Mr. Kamiya: Is there any possibility for example...Japan to deal with some problems with Seoul and, if necessary, with

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Pyongyang. On the other hand, the United States would deal
with some questions with either Peking and/or Moscow?

Dr. Kissinger: I really don't think you can have such a
precise division of labor because I think that Seoul will
always look to the United States at least as much as it does
to Japan. But I don't think it's possible to say Japan handle
Seoul and we handle Peking. And it's also not in your interest,
because if we make Japan the predominant country in Korea, --
assuming we don't have the capacity, but if we did, then you
also would have the defense problem. And you should certainly
not be the exclusively concerned country with the defense of
South Korea. So, I don't think this division of labor will
work.

###

JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

(PART I)

Mr. Kamiya: As you know, the Japanese government, since the end of the war has been quite hesitant to play games in power politics. Probably because of that in the case of a conflict between the Soviet Union and China or a conflict between North and South Korea, the Japanese government favor equidistance diplomacy. But I understand that you once criticized this kind of equidistance diplomacy as a myth because it is impossible to treat allies and adversaries alike. I quite agree with your criticism at that time.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think I applied it to Japan. I applied it in...

Mr. Ishihara: A general sense.

Dr. Kissinger: A general sense.

Mr. Kamiya: Would you elaborate a little bit on that to enlighten the many Japanese obsessed with its practicabilities.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think it's impossible to be an ally and to be equidistant. You cannot have both all the advantages of alliance and all the advantages of non-alignment. You have

to give up one or the other. Which choice Japan makes is, of course, up to it. But you cannot say you must be defended by the United States ~~But~~ you must also be perfectly free in every other respect.

So, either a country is non-aligned or a country is allied. Which it is up to the country to decide and I would not prescribe that to Japan.

It doesn't mean that Japan or any other country has to support the United States on everything just because ~~it is an ally.~~ It just cannot have as a principle that on every issue it is exactly in the middle.

Mr. Kamiya: Then ~~after equidistant~~ ce diplomacy has lost some ~~of its~~ popularity, the Japanese government seems to be ~~tending towards~~ what they call all-directional diplomacy. It's used, for example, in this kind of suggestion made when we concluded the treaty with China, they say that it is now time to practice all-directional diplomacy to probe some concrete developments in our relations with the Soviet Union.

I think, however, that the order of priority and the constraint on resources made difficult the successful conduct of that kind of all-directional diplomacy for Japan. What would be your view on that?

Dr. Kissinger: I think, as a general objective, it is certainly reasonable for Japan to try to have good relations with both

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Peking and Moscow. And we should attempt to have good relations with both Peking and Moscow. At the same time, it is also true that you always pay a price for whatever step you may take. And before you take this step, you have to know whether you are willing to pay the price.

What you mustn't do is kid yourself that there is no price. But I think that over a period of time, in fact, you can have good relations with Peking and better relations with Moscow, if you don't get too nervous when people start shouting. (laughter)

Mr. Ishihara: So it has to be cool, I gather.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right.

Mr. Kamiya: One of my Russian friends, a couple of years ago, told me that there are two important things which can be solved in this century. One is the unification of the Korean peninsula and another is the northern territorial question between Japan and the Soviet Union.

What do you think about these remarks in the context of Japan's all-directional foreign policy?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have to tell you honestly. I am not one hundred percent sure I understand the phrase "all-directional foreign policy" which is lack of imagination on my part.

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I think a country as important as Japan is bound to have a global foreign policy and in that sense it's inherent in Japan's strength to have a global foreign policy. The northern territorial question...I've always thought that someday the Soviets would get clever to settle it. There is nothing they'd gain compared to what they lose by keeping it open.

Mr. Kamiya: But by retaining that territory, they can make better resistance to the other countries' requests to themselves.

Dr. Kissinger: The big problem for them is, once they start giving up territory, there are so many claimants around that it complicates their problem. That is their one problem. Vis-a-vis Japan, they don't need the northern territories. And it is an irritant beyond all out of all proportion to what they gain, except for the fact that it creates Chinese and even territorial Romania and another problem.

Dr. Kamiya: Do you imagine the Soviet Union will do so in exchange for what?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you know, I don't consider it totally impossible that someday the Soviets will settle their border question with China. And in that general context, it might also settle it with you.

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Mr. Kamiya: I see.

Dr. Kissinger: The best thing that Soviet will get out of
settling the territorial question is to remove an irritant
and a focal point for anti-Soviet activity.

They won't get anything very positive out of it.

This is more or less what we got out of Okinawa.

We didn't get anything positive from Japan out of returning
Okinawa to Japanese control, but if we had not done it, our
relations would constantly have deteriorated.

###

JAPANESE DIPLOMACY

(PART II)

Mr. Kamiya: I remember that you once criticized Japanese diplomacy by observing its excessive politeness led others to miss the point and its consensus mode of operation consumed too much time; later you became, however, more receptive to it after understanding Japan's diplomatic style. Do you still have other major criticisms or comments about Japanese diplomacy or Japanese negotiation style?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think it's fair to say that I criticized Japanese diplomacy. I have to say frankly, it took me quite some time to understand the Japanese method of thinking. This is no criticism of Japan. And you have had an independent country for several thousand years. And we only for two hundred years, so for us, your method of operation is a little complicated to understand right away.

At first I dealt with Japanese, I thought you needed to get the approval of one Japanese who could make decisions like a Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. And that led to misunderstandings because your leaders do not operate this way; and that was a lack of comprehension on my part.

I'm not saying this is a criticism. It's as much of...it's more of a criticism of me than to Japan. Then later I became fascinated by how you make decisions. It is

(M)

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to me a fascinating phenomenon because it makes for great continuity and I also think that if you look at the post-war period among the industrial democracies, Japanese has made the best decisions over the longest term without having any dominant personality.

Mr. Ishihara: No Adenauer or anybody.

Dr. Kissinger: No Adenauer, no De Gaulle, no Mao...and I think this is a remarkable phenomenon. Even in my period, how you came back from the increase in oil prices, so that at that time everyone was speaking of a permanent Japanese deficit and now we are worried again about a permanent surplus.

(laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think that's fascinating. So...this took me some time to understand. I must be quite frank.

And after I understood it, I changed my style in dealing with the Japanese and you may have noticed, I think if you add up my visits, I visited Tokyo more than any other capital. We didn't make much publicity over it because I learned that with Japanese leaders, there is never a point where you can say, "Now we have made this decision." It has to grow out of a long conversation that goes on forever.

And a consensus has to develop. I find that
fascinating. I learned a great deal from it. The criticism
is inherent in your national character. Most other societies,
certainly most western societies, like to be able to say,
"I talked to the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister and he
told me the following... and now I know what he thinks."
You know as well as I do that you cannot do this with the Japanese.
You cannot leave a conversation with a Japanese and report that
he told you exactly black or white... after several
conversations, you will understand. But it has to be by a process
of osmosis. So your style lends itself to misunderstanding
by people who are less subtle than you are.

And I repeat, I don't want this to be taken
critically.

Mr. Ishihara: Yours is more of praise rather than that of criticism.

Dr. Kissinger: [It is] I consider it praise. I think once
you take your consensus system, it may take longer to get
a decision than with us, but once you have a decision, every-
body can carry it out.

With us, we may make a decision and nobody
understands it so we don't carry it out very well. I feel
that if you take the trouble of listening to Japanese, once
you understand it, you can rely on them. But you have to
take the trouble of letting Japanese talk in their cultural

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style, which is different from ours.

Mr. Ishihara: Is there any other praiseworthy point?

Dr. Kissinger: No, this is what I find, and then, I think, also, that in your way, which is different from ours, Japan has a very good understanding of the necessities of survival. You don't express it in the theoretical way (we do, and maybe not in the slightly skeptical way we do, which sounds a little crude to you, but in practice, you may understand it better than we do.)

If I look at Japanese history, you have always done what was needed for the survival of Japanese society, with great decisiveness.

Mr. Kamiya: Incidentally, Dr. Kissinger, the consensus mechanism is sometimes used even in this country. I am now teaching at Columbia, and when nominating the next dean of the political science department, they never vote, whereas in Japan we sometimes vote.

Dr. Kissinger: Except we don't have the cultural style to do it well. But you are quite right. At university faculties, we use sometimes consensus.

Mr. Kamiya: In recent months some Japanese and Americans have argued that Japan should discard the low posture and adopt a more assertive, if not high posture, diplomacy, not only in style, but also in substance. What would you think of that?

Dr. Kissinger: I think one of your troubles in the thirties was that you were trying to imitate the high posture style of other countries, which does not come naturally to you. And if you do it high posture, there is a great danger that you exaggerate and scare everybody after that.

I think the Japanese policy will be more effective if it is restrained, than if it is extremely assertive, because that will unite all the people who were afraid of the previous policy.

Mr. Ishihara: I take it you are referring to Hitler.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I'm referring not so much to Hitler.

I don't think the Japanese phenomenon was at all similar to the Hitler phenomenon. But I think some of your people tried to imitate what they saw in Europe.

Mr. Ishihara: That's what I'm getting at.

Dr. Kissinger: Yeah.

Mr. Kamiya: We understand what you mean, but even so, there are many voices to the effect that Japan should have a more assertive posture or policy or greater contribution to at least some regional programs.

Dr. Kissinger: It is inevitable in my view, that Japan will play a larger role in the 80's than in the 70's, just as it played a larger role in the 70's than in the 60's. So, Japan will conduct in my view a more national policy. Whatever we may recommend, it is inherent in the situation.

A hundred million people cannot be out of
international politics forever.

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U. S. - JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Mr. Kamiya: Do you think the U. S. and Japanese economies are structurally on a collision course? Can you conceive of any effective measures, both short- and long-terms?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think, first of all, all of the industrial democracies have a problem of how they can have high growth without doing it at the expense of each other.

And ~~if~~ how to solve this problem, and how to do long range planning together-- this is at the heart of the political stability of the industrial democracies. Now, Japan happens to be the country that makes decisions best ~~for~~ the industrial democracies. You know, not any one, ~~but any one~~ decision, but the totality of decisions. So it gets a certain advantage.

It shifts its resources more effectively than others. So, that is a structural problem.

On the other hand, [if] it is a problem that must be solved. We cannot beat up on Japan every year to do restraints. For two reasons. It creates political resentment. And secondly, it never works because what you agree ~~to restrain~~, you have already decided to shift away from ~~and we never catch you in the~~ new phase that you are going into. We always catch you on the phase that you have already decided to abandon.

(laughter)

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So, it is a futile exercise, or has been a
futile exercise. You restrain television sets, partly because
you are going to computers. (laughter) Isn't that true?

Mr. Kamiya: Well, yes and no. (laughter)

Mr. Ishihara: I think there's a little <u>tr</u>uism in it.

Dr. Kissinger: So what we need is a five-year plan between us, not worked out with pressure, rather than a year-by-year agreement which creates bad feelings.

Mr. Kamiya: We have now prediction that the trade surplus of Japan vis-a-vis United States this year will be more than $20 billion.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Kamiya: We can <u>may be able to</u> decrease it probably to $15 or $10 billion in some years. But if the surplus stems from some structural problem, it <u>might be difficult</u>.

Dr. Kissinger: It's a delicate problem because it cannot continue at $20 billion every year. On the other hand, we need not be in balance with every country; it is sufficient to be in overall balance. We cannot so limit your economic growth that you develop political instability. So, we have to find a position involving all the industrial democracies; only in this manner can you achieve overall balance.

Then thirdly, the European countries have to
be involved in this, ~~because we cannot be in exact balance.~~
If we can be in balance with all of the industrial democracies,
then we can be in imbalance with some industrial democracies.
So, I think this is where the negotiations should be.

Now, I'm beginning to think that the economic
summits are useful but they cannot settle these issues because
they are too short, and we need some permanent group that address-
es these problems...some permanent group of very senior officials
that meet at least three months every year to address this pro-
blem.

Mr. Ishihara: More expertise and more continuity...

Dr. Kissinger: Yeah, but they have to have enough political power, too.

Mr. Kamiya: So it has nothing to do with the organizations
like the Trilateral Commission.

Mr. Ishihara: That is governmental, I presume.

Dr. Kissinger: Governmental.

Mr. Ishihara: In short, would you say we are on a collision course.

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Dr. Kissinger: No, I think we have a common problem. This cannot be dealt with as a collision course problem. And I don't like the idea that every year there is a negotiation in which we threaten you and you yield...Also, it never works because you are cleverer than we are.

Mr. Ishihara: Thank you...or I don't know how to reply or what I should say.

Dr. Kissinger: Modern economy is too complicated. If we can get you to restrain one export, since your labor is very disciplined you shift it into another category. Then you get a tremendous increase in that other category. Then we go to that category, you go to another one. So what we need is a comprehensive approach.

Mr. Kamiya: Let me ask, Dr. Kissinger, another question on U. S. - Japan relations. My question is related to the energy problem.

I remember that you made a brief remark at the Trilateral Commission last June in Washington and we got the impression that you are rather favorable to the Japanese point to go ahead with the processing.

Dr. Kissinger: I made this point. Let me apply it to nonproliferation. I think we have to make a distinction between countries that already have an advanced technology and countries that

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do not. I think that Japan has the capacity to develop a
nuclear technology and I'm a realist. And I think that our
rhetoric will not keep Japan from developing nuclear energy
because it is in your interest. So if we get into a position
of conflict with Japan, we only lose influence. Therefore,
the problem is, can we work together with Japan to prevent the
spread of weapons technology to other countries. Now, I
think that Japan does not want weapons technology to spread
to other countries, either. So I would work with Japan within
that context and not go to extreme lengths to inhibit Japanese
technology. Then we have the tendency that some of our scien-
tists like to invent theories that prove that something another
country has decided is scientifically undesirable.

I think that you people are intelligent enough
to figure out what is scientifically desirable. You are not a
backward country. I know people say reprocessing is a bad
idea. That may be, but...nobody else thinks so. So, it's for
these reasons that I would work cooperatively with Japan on the
nuclear problem and make it an equal partner and concentrate
on preventing the spread to countries that have now a low
technology.

Mr. Kamiya: Was U. S. nuclear energy policy toward Japan
changed at the last stage of your secretaryship, or after you
resigned?

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Dr. Kissinger: I think after I resigned, it became a little stricter, more assertive and more heard & pressive.

Mr. Kamiya: I see. So...now, you can say that we can have some harmonious relations between us. If...U. S. changes their policy a little bit.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, you think our policy when I was in office was against Japan?

Mr. Kamiya: No, It's Carter's.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but now I think they should go back more to what we had, and I think they probably will.

Mr. Kamiya: And are you optimistic as to the way to find the integral policy among U. S. - European countries and Japan on this.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, It's a little bit like the economic question. I think we have to do it. It's our big unsolved problem.

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NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER/ASIA/CARTER'S DIPLOMACY

Mr. Kamiya: I believe our bilateral economic programs must be dealt with interdependently and globally for improvement, if not solution.

Therefore, in a much broader context, what is your vision of what you call a New International Order? Or a New World Order? And what are the roles for the United States and Japan in it?

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean economically or generally?

Mr. Kamiya: Well, generally. Including economies.

Dr. Kissinger: ~~Well, one of the problems of the present international system is that it is not before the Second World War, military, economic and political power were more or less closely related.~~

~~Now~~, Countries were strong usually in all three categories or not strong in all three categories.

Now, you really have different international systems coexisting simultaneously. Militarily, there are very few superpowers. Economically, there are many more superpowers. There is no question that Japan is an economic superpower. Even Saudi Arabia is, in some respects, an economic superpower.

Then, politically, it's mixed. In between, Japan is still a very strong country politically, even though it is

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not a very strong country militarily. Saudi Arabia is not
as strong politically as it is economically. So, what you
need is a much more complicated system where economic decisions
become more diffused, political decisions already a little more
concentrated and military ones even more concentrated.

It seems to me to be the essence of the present
system. The fact that Japan is not now a great military power
is not all that decisive because everyone knows Japan could be
a great military power very quickly. And has in fact structured
its development to give itself that option. Don't you think?

Mr. Kamiya: Yes, I agree with you. Well, then, as to the Asia...what is in your opinion a more creating U. S. policy for Asia? For the past years people so frequently talk about U. S. disengagement from Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: The United States cannot disengage from Asia. That's a total illusion. People always say we should not be engaged in Asia. I don't understand it.

The probability is, looked at as an historian,
that world affairs are more likely to move from Europe to
Asia, just as the Atlantic was the center of world affairs in
the nineteenth century, I think the Pacific will be the center
of world affairs in the late twentieth and twenty-first century.
All wars of the post-war periods have occurred in Asia, which
at least indicates that this is an area of tension and adjustment.

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Many of the big adjustments today occurred
in Asia. The most dynamic countries are in Asia--Japan, China,
Korea. In southeast Asia, the eight countries...so how can
the United States disengage from Asia? It isn't possible.
It isn't even conceivable.

We have made our mistakes in Asia because it
is a new area for us to understand. So, I think we ought to
STAN? < ASEAN
ACTU? strengthen the ASEAN. I think we have to maintain a strong defense posture in the rest of the Pacific. We have to adjust to
a greater role for Japan after China becomes technologically
more advanced.

It will become a very major factor.

I don't know whether you've seen these studies
which prove that Japanese and Chinese on the whole have higher
IQs than Westerners, which is probably true. So the combination
of this will -- Koreans, I think, too.

I'm serious. Have you see these studies?

Mr. Ishihara: No, I don't see it. But I believe there is an
expression
used by Columnist William Safire..."Chijap Axis."

Mr. Kamiya: In any case, that's a kind of illusion. I mean
the American disengagement from Asia.

Dr. Kissinger: It cannot happen.

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Mr. Kamiya: But it at least partly stems from the Carter's policy to withdraw U. S. troops from Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: I have disagreed with this, but I think Carter has changed so many other policies and after his election, in 1980, if he gets reelected, I expect him to change this one, too.

In fact, I think he has already changed his policy towards Korea. He has now put off the withdrawal into 1981 and after, so I think he'll take another look at it.

Mr. Kayima: How about his policy on human rights? Will that also change?

Dr. Kissinger: I think his policy on human rights is much less vocal than it was before. Now it is only directed against allies and pretty soon he will stop that. (laughter)

Mr. Kayima: And so he...we shall say that he may be a fast learner.

Dr. Kissinger: Yeah.

Mr. Ishihara: Dr., may I interject here that...you know, about this secret diplomacy business. There are some cartoonists said that Carter out-Kissingered Kissinger at Camp David.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think what he did at Camp David is in the direction of what I tried to do before. It was a shuttle diplomacy with the two parties in the same place.

Mr. Ishihara: In secrecy.

Dr. Kissinger: And it was done in secrecy. And it was a step-by-step approach. All of which I agree with because I did it too when I was in office.

I think ~~what~~ any new president thinks, ~~that~~
he can change everything. I once said in a public speech, every
new administration thinks it can change the world. It was the
peculiarity of the Carter Administration that it thought it had
created the world. And so they started with trying to do every-
thing all over. But usually, if you have an effective foreign
policy, it is because it reflects reality.

It isn't because you are so smart. The great
statesmen or the ability—the essence of statesmanship is to
understand reality. It's not to invent it.

And so, I think now the Administration is moving
in most areas to a position ~~purely~~ similar to the one we had.

Mr. Kayima: I think this is a good opportunity to get your
evaluation of the Camp David summit.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it was a big success.

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Mr. Kamiya: Are you supportive and affirmative on this?

Dr. Kissinger: I am both affirmative and supportive and I have been supporting it publicly.

Mr. Kamiya: What would you think about the attitudes of countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and others?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think, after an Egyptian peace agreement, I believe that in one way or another, King Hussein of Jordan will participate, ~~make it~~ why ~~be~~ at least de facto, if not in the formal negotiation.

In the Middle East, you mustn't try to do everything very formally. I think it is certain the West Bank will become more autonomous and Saudi Arabia, I think, in its own interest, will try to keep good relations with all the Arab countries, and I think they are right to do this. But they will not sabotage the agreement, and that's all we can expect.

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FUTURE PLAN

Mr. Ishihara: Sir, I will not ask about Senator Javits' seat because a lot about it has been written. But, I should like to ask you how can you best contribute to United States foreign policy in the years ahead?

In what capacity or in what forms? Educator, or governmental official again, or...

Dr. Kissinger: It's a very good question. I have found that if you try to plan your life, then you will always be surprised and sometimes disappointed. What I do is I try to keep informed on foreign policy. I stay in touch with the leaders of this country on foreign policy.

Almost every foreign leader who comes to Washington pays me the honor of talking to me. So that way I am rather well informed on foreign affairs.

Now, what contribution I can make in any one period depends on many factors. In principle, I think foreign policy is not a partisan enterprise. Now, in government service, it depends who's president, it depends what the need is, and if it's not something I can influence, elective office, I really would have to decide whether right now, as you know, if I say something on foreign policy, it gets wide attention. Will it get more attention if I have an elective office? [not necessarily] I doubt it. I don't know.

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(N)

So, I have no fixed program. I like to make a
contribution to our national thinking. On the other hand, I
have seriously no specific ambition. I've been in high office
for eight years and I don't have to do it to prove anything.

Mr. Ishihara: Well, then, only thing maybe an elective office
and there are many possibilities.

Dr. Kissinger: First of all, Senator Javits has not said what
he will do. Second, I have no great interest in going through
a long campaign in which I have to show that I will maybe diminish my
opponents.

I have a rather unique position in this country now.

So, I'm not going to be very eager to go into
this.

Mr. Ishihara: Do you rule out the government...appointive
posts.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't rule that out.

Mr. Ishihara: It depends on who is president.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends on who the president, what his policy is
and what I can do. I will not take a position just to have a
position or a mission just to have a mission.

Mr. Ishihara: Any comment on Time Magazine Washington Bureau
Chief Hugh Sidey's proposal to amend the Constitution to open

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Dr. Kissinger: I always said he had a good chance to be reelected even before Camp David because it's almost impossible to defeat an incumbent President, especially when the incumbent is elected.

Even Ford with his unique circumstances nearly won reelection.

Mr. Ishihara: Sir, can you make any progress report, to the extent revealable, since my paper is of your Memoir's serialization.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, here it is. That's what I've already written. I have written about 2700 pages. It will have to be two volumes. One for the period until January, 1973, and then the other afterwards.

I have the first volume nearly finished. About 4/5th finished. This is where we stand.

Mr. Ishihara: So it will be two volumes and by 1979 or 1980?

Dr. Kissinger: No. The first volume in 1979, the second in 1980. And then they have to decide whether they want to publish both together or the first one next year. I think they'll probably decide to do the first one next year.

Mr. Ishihara: Next fall?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Next summer or fall.