Sunday, Dec. 22, 1957

Dear Henry:

I. Thinking of Friday's meeting, it seems to me you have quite a
spread in views:

1) It is unwise to talk real cold turkey to the Kremlin because
of possible adverse effects on:

a) Allies, especially NATO

b) Neutrals

c) Russians

d) Americans

2) The opposite, with variants according to the taste of the
individual, for instance as to retaining freedom of action to use or not to
use atomic weapons.

Of course the hard-nosed crowd has a majority, when you add
absentees to those of us who were present. But it does seem to me that you
can well afford a sincere gesture toward the troubled. This is the basis
of my suggestions to you and Nelson last night that you:

1) Run the report once again through a fine meshed sieve. I suggest
three really smart gents one of whom is willing to make a determined attack
on each questionable sentence.

2) Ask the approval of the Panel for the resulting product as
a realistic statement of the military problem, but don't discourage anyone
from writing you a letter about his worries if that will reduce his tensions.

It seems to me that this process can be completed in a couple of
weeks, but Jan. 2 is a little early.

[y]

(McCormack)

12/22/57

- 2 -

II. Another suggestion for Title: "The Security of the United States: Military Aspects"

III. On reflection, I think Mr. Berle exaggerates the amount of ground lost in NATO specifically during this last conference. I think our chapter needs cautious revision but not elimination. In particular, I think we should emphasize the need for a common understanding (15-partite) of the danger to all, but I would talk of the sharing of weapons and weapons information in accordance with willingness, desire, desirability, possibilities, strategic advantage, or what not, in the case of each nation. Contrary to some opinions, I believe NATO may some day really be something. At least, I would not like to contribute to its difficulties either by writing it off in a public document or by suggesting that one conference has done or could do it irreparable damage. This chapter is a tough one. Only you could write it properly.

IV. On reflection, I recommend that the chapter on disarmament not be much changed. Its title could be "Control of Armaments; The military Problem" or some such, but I feel that someone needs to say that: the Kremlin has no slightest idea of permitting the development of the real peace we have yearned for, and disarmament is therefore doubly distant, but it is a derivative, not a cause of peace, especially since technology plans

EYJ

(McCormack)

12/22/57

- 3 -

places mass destruction potentially available on short notice to any
nation having a high level of scientific and industrial development.

V. In some section of the report (I forget which) there is heavy emphasis on the need for special forces for limited war. This is one of those funny cases where the thesis is both true and all too easy to exaggerate.

1) The ground element has to be light of movement, trained for the job, and ready to go. It has to be atomically armed, both to have a real punch when needed and to be light of movement in the first instance. In my opinion, the present army and marine forces are plenty big enough in total, but we all know how short they are of meeting these straightforward requirements.

2) Combat air support must meet the same requirements, and it also now fails to do so. Again, I think the failing is more a matter of attitudes and organization than of total resources in TAC and Naval Aviation.

3) Modern, ready air and sea transport are prime requisites, and do not exist in adequate amount.

4) A coherent national policy and a coordinated military strategy for limited war are equally absent. The Air Force does not really pretend the problem is non-existent, but the TAC faction is hardly predominant in the high councils. The Navy also is more interested in readiness for the Big War. Actually, the resources in tactical air power of the Navy and the Air Force, if they were coordinated, could even now give powerful

(McCormack)

12/22/57

support to the Army and Marines in any part of the world -- if the Army
and Marines were coordinated and ready to go. Of course the aircraft
and missiles can be better designed for the purpose, and the units can
be more effectively trained and oriented -- and they will be if the country
says that is what it wants. But air power is inherently flexible, even
SAC, and is right now at least as ready for limited war as are our ground
forces. What is not ready for limited war is the United States. And what
the Army seems most interested in is the Milky Way.

CyJ

(McCormack, December 22, 1957)

- 5 -

VI. You have my note somewhere about the relative importance of readiness for limited war and all-out war. I am profoundly concerned now with regard to our neglect of the former; I would be terrified if we came to neglect the latter.

VII. Nelson apparently threw out the "Threads of Conviction" because they confused the beginning of the document. I suggest that the trouble was in the writing and not in the idea, and recommend serious consideration to putting them back somewhere in some form. Especially I would like to see a ringing statement of credo: "We have no doubt as to the adequacy of our resources - it is the spirit and the skill with which we organize and apply them."

VIII. I said I would like a copy of the transcript of my remarks on the subject before the transcript could have been prepared. So disregard the request. However, would you have these scribbles typed and send me a copy, and one to Gordon Dean.

IX. Speaking of Gordon, I would like to reinforce my remark of yesterday that the report should include his point on the military effect of *non-military* actions. To me it is not less important than the reverse, which formed the basis of so much of the worry expressed around the table yesterday.

(How is it Kruschev can be so much smarter than we educated people?)

X. I strongly recommend a note on Frank Nash in the listing of Panel II. Nelson agrees I think.

- 6 -

(McCormack, Dec. 23, 1957)

XI. If Jack Floberg is willing, I would like to see his name listed with an*, and a note below saying "Withdrew in August 1957. Now a Member of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission."

XII. Please also * my name and say "Served as Chairman until
October 1957, when continued ill health forced withdrawal to the status
of occasional advisor." Besides being true, it will help explain why
I never returned to consult again with an appallingly large number of
people to whom I had made such a commitment.

Good fortune,

s/ Jim McC.

James McCormack

MR. CHARLES PERCY:

(By telephone, December 20, 1957)

I am sorry to get in so late with my comments. I've been at home
with flu and not able to read for the last couple of days.

My reaction to this final draft is exceptionally good. I believe
that it will make an invaluable contribution to the strategic defense
planning of this country and also toward influencing public opinion in the
right direction.

The following comments are not changes in substance but only
intend to emphasize certain phases of the report:

1 - The Political Problem. The danger pointed out on pgs. 23 and 24 is in my opinion one of the most important, as I feel that it is actually the major route that will be relied upon by Russia to advance its cause in the foreseeable future. (i.e. the Middle East and Indonesia are only the most recent examples). The report points out the problem but, unlike other sections, does not offer suggested solutions. If solutions are being offered in other subpanels, cross reference to these should be made.

2 - Organizational Changes in Defense Establishment. The defense
establishment is today the biggest single business in the world. Authority
for the excellent reorganization suggestions made in the report can be cited
as comparable to reorganizations made in almost all major U.S. corporations
in recent years to enable them to better cope with their own increasingly
complex problems of product and size.

3 - Chemical and Biological Warfare (page 67). It might be appropriate to comment that in an age when atomic and hydrogen warfare is an acceptable form of defense, chemical and biological warfare heretofore ≈ banned has more likelihood of being resorted to in the future. Defense against this type of warfare must therefore be sharpened.

4 - Cost of Defense. The report appropriately points out that the size of defense appropriations must be dramatically increased. Would it not be advisable at this point to comment that it does not necessarily follow that the amount of this increase must be a total net addition to the federal budget? Now more than ever before Americans must re-assess their sense of values and shift in emphasis is indicated. It is imperative that we now place maximum emphasis on increasing the efficiency of our military services;

Page Two
Mr. Percy

recommendations at the Hoover Commission for improving all other phases of government should take on renewed urgency; our program of shifting responsibility from the federal government to state and local governments wherever possible should be accelerated; we should re-evaluate the cost of farm subsidies, veterans benefits and the usual "pork barrel" appropriations. Americans today are asking for elimination of interservice rivalries and overlapping. We must at the same time be self-critical enough to resist pressure for federal appropriations of a self-serving nature.

## 5 - Public Opinion.
More than ever it should be emphasized to the Administration the importance of public opinion and the need for more candor. Necessary intelligence must have been available to the Administration following World War II forewarning us of the dangers of dismantling our defense structure. The same situation must have been true following the Korean War. Certainly a reduction of 10% in research projects for the Defense Department just two months before Sputnik in retrospect is costly and would have seemed unnecessary. Unfortunately it was business leadership that brought about pressure for reduction in the defense budget. If complete public disclosure of inherent dangers could not be made, at least briefing could have been carried out for a more limited number of business leaders advocating defense budget cutting. The dedication to country of such men could not be questioned. They acted in this way only because they lacked knowledge of the seriousness of the situation.

As Americans, we pride ourselves on our ability to sell products. But we continue to fail dismally in selling concepts. For instance, civil defense. Emphasis must be placed on the necessity of dramatizing our needs for civil defense which, after all, appeals to a basic psychological urge for self-preservation. A few appearances of Edward Teller on national television would do more than ten million printed pamphlets to alert the nation.

## 6 - Weapons.
I had the feeling that more emphasis could be placed in the report upon development of the ICBM as our ultimate defense weapon should have the effect of our intermediate range missiles based in Europe be neutralized by either Russian political or military steps. The report could also place more emphasis on the necessity for developing anti-missiles missiles.

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Mr. Percy

7 - Implementation. I presume that considerable thought will be given during the subpanel meeting to the effective use of this important subpanel report. I would suggest that the report be reviewed with Charles Thomas, former Secretary of the Navy and now Republican National Finance Chairman. For instance, on January 20th every Administration leader, including the President, Vice President, cabinet officers, Republican Governors and members of Congress will be speaking at Republican dinners throughout the country before audiences including most of the Republican leaders (approximately sixty major dinners tied together by national television). Material from this report would make excellent speech material if properly parcelled out by Charles Thomas.

My overall reaction to the report is that it could be released without revision and serve as a landmark for the future plans with respect to our strategic defense. An excellent job has been done by all members of the subpanel and the staff. I deeply regret that I cannot be with you.

December 19, 1957

Dear Nelson:

Sunday's discussions were indeed stimulating for me and I deeply appreciated the opportunity of exchanging views on the vital subjects of our mutual interest. To you and your excellent staff my deep gratitude again for the excellent arrangements and for your gracious hospitality.

You have thoughtfully asked for my comments on the December 14 draft of the proposed report of Sub-panel II. I have several. In putting them forward it will not be my purpose to attempt to lay before you a re-draft of the proposed report as I do not conceive this to be the function of the Panel members. It would be presumptuous if I were to try anyway. I cannot strike off prose approaching the incomparable level which Henry so fluently creates. My comments are therefore, suggestions on the basis of which portions of the report might be recast if you agree with them. Naturally it is my earnest hope that you will not only agree with them but that you will also feel as strongly about them as I do.

My comments are these:

1. I should like to see much more emphasis on the affirmative steps which should be taken to deal with our security problems. In the pre-Sputnik days I conceived our primary purpose that of persuading our fellow citizens to believe the facts of life. The swift advances of Soviet Russia's scientific and military technology, were as formidable six months ago as they are today. Although we of the Panel knew this to be the case, there were entirely too few of our fellow citizens who either knew it or who

tow of our fellow citizens who either know it or who
know this to be the case, there were entirely too
ago as they are today. Although we of the Panel
military technology, were a formidable six months
awful advances of Soviet Russia's scientific and
our fellow citizens to believe the facts of life. The
I conceived our primary purpose that of persuading
with our security problems. In the pre-Soviet days
instilutive steps which should be taken to deal
I should like to see much more emphasis on the

My comments are these:

them as I do.
not only agree with them but that you will also feel as strongly apart
it you agree with them. Naturally it is my earnest hope that you will
suggestions on the parts of which portions of the report might be recast
level which Henry so fluently creates. My comments are therefore,
try anyway. I cannot strike off those approaching the incomparable
function of the Panel members. It would be breakfasttime if I were to
you a re-draft of the proposed report so I do not conceive this to be the
putting them forward it will not be my business to attempt to say before
14 draft of the proposed report of Sop-Buel II. I have several. In
You have thoughtfully asked for my comments on the December

our mutual interest. To you and your excellent staff my deep gratitude
appreciated the opportunity of exchanging views on the vital aspects of
Sunday's discussions were indeed stimulating for me and I deeply

Dear Nelson:

December 19, 1957

December 19, 1957

were willing to face reality. Pre-Sputnik, a major portion of our task was to create a climate of realistic understanding. To some extent, Sputnik has performed this service already. Today I think it is fair to say that a significant majority of our fellow citizens have been awakened to the existing realities, -- both at the grass roots level and among some of those in high places in Washington. That portion of the proposed report which aims to accomplish that awakening which two Sputniks have already brought about might well be eliminated and the space otherwise employed. The job now is to capitalize on this metamorphosis in attitude by making affirmative proposals rather than to create the essential climate for adopting remedies later to be proposed. The "What to do about it?" should now be the dominant theme. The report should accept what increased numbers of our fellow citizens now accept, -- that the situation is bad, -- and having accepted this be devoted more fully than now to a discussion of what specific steps should be taken.

2. The onrushing advances of Soviet scientific and military technology make it imperative that our nation compress its lead-times. Too little has been said about this. I think the report needs to stress this in a dynamic and vital way. Sub-Panel No. II has among its members those who are particularly well qualified to discuss and to deal with how we should achieve this lead-time compression.

3. To my way of thinking the report does not strike a balance in dealing with the inter-related subjects of passive defense on the one hand and active defense on the other.

Passive defense gets down to a question of people saved versus dollars spent. This may sound heartless. It is nevertheless true. We might establish passive defenses against radiation and fall-out for an expenditure of something in the order of $3 billion to $5 billion annually for a period of say 5 years. The defenses thus provided would not save our cities from destruction by blast and shock wave. At most, defenses of this nature would provide but modest protection against blast and shock wave.

modest protection against blast and shock wave.
wave. At most, defenses of the nature would provide put
not save our cities from destruction by blast and shock
period of say 5 years. The defenses thus provided would
thing in the order of $3 billion annually for a
against radiation and fall-out for an expenditure of some-
nevertheless true. We might estimate passive defense
various dollars apert. This may sound仁seerest. It is
passive defense gets down to a question of people saved
other.

passive defense on the one hand and active defense on the
balance in dealing with the inter-related subjects of

3.

precession.

to deal with how we should achieve this lead-time com-
those who are particularly well qualified to discuss and
vital way. Sup-Panel No. II has among its mempere
think the report needs to stress this in a dynamic and
its lead-time. Too little has been said about this. I
technology make it imperative that our nation compreas
The enrouhing advances of Soviet scientific and military

3.

to a discussion of what specific steps should be taken.
and having accepted this be devdaimore fully than now
fellow citizens now accept, -- that the situation is bad, --
The report should accept what increased numbers of our
"What to do about it?" should now be the dominant theme.
climate for adopting remedies later to be proposed. The
aximistic proposals rather than to create the essential
talk on the metazoophora in attitude by making
the space otherwise employed. The top now is to capi-
sume already brought about might well be eliminated and
simply to accomplish that awakening which two Sputniks
in Washington. That portion of the proposed report which
the grass root level and among some of those in high places
been awakened to the existing realities, -- both at
that a significant majority of our fellow citizens have
this service already. Today I think it is fair to say
understanding. To some extent, Sputnik has performed
portion of our task was to create a climate of realistic
were willing to face reality. Pre-Sputnik, a major

December 19, 1957

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Page 3.

December 21, 1957

at points sufficiently distant from ground zero. While such passive defense measures would retain their limited effectiveness regardless of changes in military technology, in the event of major nuclear attack upon us, they would still leave us prostrate and reduce the number of people killed from around 90,000,000 to 80,000,000. Having saved 10,000,000 lives, the question would be to face what future and what chance for later survival against pestilence and starvation? Defenses of this kind against such attack would destroy almost completely the entire fabric of our national logistics, (food, water, power, transportation, distribution, medical facilities, heat, shelter). Such a defense would not be against attack itself, and standing alone would provide but limited cushion against the consequences. The degree of physical destruction would be undiminished. I can see but little or no deterrent value. To protect major cities against nuclear attack, vast shelters (cities) would have to be constructed 5,000 feet below the surface. This is a task beyond our capabilities.

However, an adequate active defense coupled with passive defense against fall-out and radiation would change matters enormously. Together, they could reduce the number killed in the event of nuclear attack from 90,000,000 to say 20,000,000, and at the same time preserve a significant part of the national fabric. Both are within our resource capabilities. More importantly, if we are willing to devote enough effort to active defense we can begin to price the Soviets "out of the market". We can also shift the advantage from the offense to the defense. As we are philosophically committed as a nation to conceding the first blow to the enemy, our most vitally necessary task is to create conditions which would establish enough doubt in the enemy's mind regarding the success of a first blow that he would be deterred. Moreover, as the enemy's active defense capabilities increase, our retaliatory capacity accrues diminishing deterrent value.

increase diminishing deterrent value.
deterrence capabilities increase, our retaliatory capacity
would be deterred. Moreover, as the enemy's active
attack increases, our most vitally necessary task is to
broadly philosophically committed as a nation to conceiving the first
advantage from the offense to the defense. We are price the Supreme "out of the market". We can also shift
devote enough effort to active defense we can begin to
 capabilities. More importantly, if we are willing to
put at the national fabric. Both are within our resource
$20,000,000, and at the same time preserve a significant
filled in the event of nuclear attack from $20,000,000 to say
enormously. Together, they could reduce the number
defense against tail-on and radiation would change matters
however, an adequate active defense coupled with passive
policies.

test below the enemy. This is a task beyond our capa-
ventories (citizens) would have to be constructed $2,000
value. To protect major cities against nuclear attack,
be diminished. I can see put little or no deterrent
consequences. The degree of physical destruction would
surely would provide put limited damage against the
defense would not be against attack itself, and standing
distribution, medical facilities, health, airfield. Such a
national logistics (load, water, power, transportation,
would destroy almost completely the entire fabric of our
and starvation? Defense of this kind against such attack
future and what chance for later survival against hostilities
saved 10,000,000 lives, the question would be to trace what
filled from around $20,000,000 to $80,000,000. Having
still leave us breathless and reduce the number of beacons
in the event of major nuclear attack upon us, they would
effectiveness regardless of change in military technology,
and passive defense measure would retain their limited
at points sufficiently distant from ground zero. While

December 21, 1927

[Lc]

December 19, 1957

I have a feeling that there are those who might allow their concern for the preservation of SAC to lead them to fear that a dynamic effort toward the development of an adequate active defense might impair the existence of SAC. I do not believe this. The manned bomber will be with us for the unforeseeable future. It is the most accurate and inexpensive means of retaliation, -- IF IT CAN GET THROUGH. If the Soviets were not devoting a major and an effective effort toward the creation of an active defense then I would not be as gravely concerned as I am. But they are. The more effective the active defense of the Soviets becomes the less competitive SAC becomes, -- the less of a deterrent it becomes. We are painting ourselves into a corner.

I therefore feel it is our urgent obligation vigorously to emphasize the vital need for a massive, intelligent, well coordinated effort to create for our country an adequate active defense. This will not only require that it be established here but in a multiplicity of places beyond our frontiers. It means not only the continuation of a major drive on production of retaliatory missiles, deployed as are manned bombers around the perimeter of the Soviet, but also the priority development of anti-missile missiles. It means establishment of retaliatory bases and other retaliatory means in increasing numbers so that the Soviets could not launch a nuclear offensive without being faced with the reality that to do so at all they must move in all directions at once. What we must do is to make our active defense so effective that the Soviet will sufficiently doubt the success of an offense, -- so that the Soviets will be priced out of the offense market. The report does not make this sufficiently clear. Neither does it clearly say that this is feasible, which it is.

3. I am inclined to believe that the report does not adequately establish that scientific advances make war and the paraphrernalia required for conducting it ever more costly, -- never cheaper, -- even for doing the same things we did in World War II and Korea. Our fellow citizens must face up to this fact. While they have been more fully awakened by the accident of Sputnik to Soviet capabilities, they have not yet been fully awakened to the costs with which we are

yet been fully awakened to the costs with which we are
the accident of Spainik to Soviet capabilities, they have not
to this fact. While they have been more fully awakened by
World War II and Korea. Our fellow citizens must face up
never cheaper, -- even for doing the same things we did in
Germany required for conducting it ever more costly, --
captalize that scientific advance make war and the bar-
eles to the effort so much more costly.

be taxable, which it is.

this sufficiently clear. Neither does it clearly say that this
priced out of the offense market. The report does not make
the success of an offense, -- so that the Soviets will be
defense so effective that the Soviet will sufficiently doubt
directions at once. What we must do is to make our active
with the reality that to do so at all they must move in all
could not launch a nuclear offensive without being faced
retalitory means in increasing numbers so that the Soviets
It means establishment of retaliatory bases and other
but also the priority development of anti-missile missiles.

are manned pompers around the perimeter of the Soviet,
drives on production of retaliatory missiles, deployed as
frontiers. It means not only the continuation of a major
itself here put in a multiplicity of places beyond our
active defense. This will not only require that it be estab-
coordinated effort to create for our country an adequate
emphasize the vital need for a massive, intelligent, well
I therefore feel it is our urgent obligation vigorously to

becomes. We are painting ourselves into a corner.
competitive SAC becomes, -- the less of a deterrent it
effective the active defense of the Soviet becomes the less
as bravely concerned as I am. But they are. The more
toward the creation of an active defense then I would not be
Soviets were not devoting a major and an effective effort
means of retaliation, -- IF IT CAN GET THROUGH. If the
unbearable future. It is the most accurate and inexpensive
believe this. The manned bomber will be with us for the
active defense might impair the existence of SAC. I do not
that a dynamic effort toward the development of an adequate
concern for the preservation of SAC to lead them to fear
I have a feeling that there are those who might allow their

December 19, 1957

[cc]

[LC]

Page 5

December 19, 1957

confronted if we would close the gap sufficiently to warrant even the level of expenditures we are now making. Frankly, it seems to me we ought to make it far more clear than we have, that unless we are willing to lay a great deal more on the barrell-head than we are laying on it today, then within the next 3 to 7 years we will have neither the conventional capabilities to deal with or deter border forays nor the preponderant retaliatory capabilities to deter a major offense or to compromise at the bargaining table. It takes strength to compromise. Without it, the realities could force concessions, not negotiations.

4. With the preceding paragraph in mind I should like to see the report lay greater emphasis on the fact that we are indeed engaged in a battle of budgets. At some point both sides will come up against a fiscal limitation. Everybody is in favor of spending our money more intelligently and more effectively just as nearly everybody is against sin and in favor of a cure for cancer. We do not say enough about how we may more effectively gather our strength, shorten our lead-times. Neither do we make it clear enough that the fiscal policies of the United States will determine the outcome of the struggle.

All of us know that all military costs double nearly every 3 to 6 years for doing the same thing, let alone creating the new. As a nation we have to be more specific in our determination of how much we really can afford; we must determine now the maximum amount per year we can spend and are willing to spend to preserve the Republic. There is in fact a limit on this. What is it? Are we willing to spend it for an indeterminate period? In making this determination our fellow citizens must realize in advance that when we reach such a limit the consequences may be catastrophic and the Republic may disappear. It strikes me then that this panel must avow as one of its purposes, conditioning the thinking that will necessarily have to enter into the making of such a determination.

The vital importance of this must be made manifest. If the lead-time entering into such a determination is too long it will have been as fatal as using the bow and arrow against the rifle. And, the most costly waste and extravagance of

the rule. And the most costly waste and extra-suffice of
it will have been as total as using the bow and arrow against
the lead-time entering into such a determination is too long
The vital importance of this must be made manifest. It

into the making of such a determination,
conditioning the thinking that will necessarily have to enter
into them that the panel must move as one of its bases,
catastrophic and the Republic must disappear. If strike
that when we reach such a limit the coördination may be
determination our fellow citizens must realise in advance
to spend it for an indeterminate period. In making this

There is in fact a limit on this. What is it? Are we willing
abend and are willing to abend to preserve the Republic.
determine now the maximum amount per year we can
determination of how much we really can afford; we must
the new. As a station we have to be more specific in our
3 to 6 years for doing the same thing, let alone creating
All of us know that all military costs double nearly every

determine the outcome of the struggle,
enough that the fiscal policies of the United States will
affect our lead-times. Neither do we make it clear
apart how we may more effectually father our struggle,
and in favor of a cure for cancer. We do not say enough
more effectively just as nearly everybody is against him
is in favor of abending our money more intelligently and
sides will come up against a fiscal limitation. Everybody
indeed engaged in a settle of budgets. At some point both
the report lay greater emphasis on the fact that we are
with the preceding paragraph in mind I should like to see
4.

it, the realities could force concessions, not negotiations.
persuading table. It takes strength to compromise. Without
tie to deter a major offense or to compromise at the
border forces nor the preponderant retaliatory capabilities
either the conventional capabilities to deal with or deter
it today, then within the next 3 to 5 years we will have
great deal more on the parallel-head than we are laying on
clear than we have, that unless we are willing to lay a
frankly, it seems to me we ought to make it far more
warrant even the level of expenditures we are now making,
contrasted if we would close the gap sufficiently to

December 19, 1927

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December 19, 1957

all is the stop and go of our defense effort. We cannot afford to create our own obstacle course. We must drive the highway at a steady pre-determined pace. Our own "traffic department" must not set up a series of uncoordinated traffic lights along the annual intersections of our national budgetway. We will burn out our bearings and our brakes, strip our gears, wear out our tires, get ulcers, wind-up with an old model headed for the scrap heap. And we will have wasted more time and money than we can possible afford with the likelihood strong that our ulcers will be treated in a Soviet hospital.

5. Editorially speaking I think great care should be taken to make certain that the report could not be reasonably or plausibly attacked on the ground that it draws invidious distinctions between the military arms and services.

6. While I am under some severe security limitations as to the extent of my comment in this regard I would be most fearful if the report could be viewed as underrating the importance of the aircraft carrier. Bases and cities are both strategically and tactically immobile. They are geometrically fixed. This is not true of the carrier or of the submarine. I should like to add that the "fashionable" concept concerning the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier is not supported by the facts of life.

7. My concern is great over what seems to me to be the complete omission from the report of any mention of the vital need to shore up and preserve the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. Your own close attention to the affairs both of Central and South America will have long since convinced you that all is not well in this family of nations.

8. Finally concerning organization of the defense establishment, I should like to comment on the Single Chief of Staff arrangement which the report recommends. This is a subject to which I have been extensively exposed over many years.

I have the greatest admiration, respect and confidence in the competence of our senior professional military leaders. They are among my closest friends. Nothing I write here should be construed as implying any lack of confidence in, or respect for these well selected, highly integrated, capable, intellectually strong and loyal people.

respect for these well selected, highly integrated, capable,
should be considered as implying any lack of confidence in, or
They are among my closest friends. Nothing I write here
the competence of our senior professional military leaders.
I have the greatest admiration, respect and confidence in

8. Usually concerning organization of the defense establishment, not well in this family of nations.

South America will have long since convinced you that all is your own close attention to the affairs both of Central and Asia up and preserve the solidarity of the Western Hemisphere. Commission from the report of any mention of the vital need to my concern is great over what seems to me to be the complete

9. the facts of life.

I should like to add that the "fashionable" concept concerning fixed. This is not true of the carrier or of the submarine. I should like to add that the "fashionable" concept concerning the vulnerability of the aircraft carrier is not supported by the facts of life.

10. the facts of life.

11. While I am under some severe security limitations as to the distinctions between the military arm and services. I should like to add that the report could not be reasonably made certain that the report could not be reasonably or plausibly attacked on the ground that it draws invasions.

12. Editorially speaking I think great care should be taken to
will be treated in a Soviet hospital.

possible afford with the likelihood strong that our siclera
we will have wasted more time and money than we can
wind-up with an old model headed for the scrap heap. And
prizea' strip our gear' wear out our tires' get nice's,
national budget. We will run out our bearings and our
sted traffic lights along the annual interactions of our
traffic department" must not set up a series of uncoordin-
ated highway at a steady pre-determined pace. Our own
afford to create our own obstacle course. We must drive
will be the stop and go of our defense effort. We cannot

December 19, 1923

December 19, 1957

Notwithstanding, I would be uneasy if we were to adopt a remedy for the existing deficiencies of our defense establishment which would inevitably extinguish or substantially impair civilian control. A Single Chief of Staff reporting to the Commander in Chief, bypassing the Secretary of Defense and having cognizance over the entire establishment would inevitably bring such a result. I do not believe our military leaders either seek or want such a result. But it would be sure to come out of the stresses and strains of the republican form, especially during a long protracted struggle to preserve the Republic. I agreed with, and strongly supported the concept so elegantly and competently presented at our last meeting by General Clay. I did so, however, because of three very specific limitations which I understood were inherent in the proposal. The report does not make these vital limitations and conditions clear as I believe it must.

The limitations I have in mind are these: First, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief would not have cognizance over either strategic planning and the determination of military requirements; or over the logistic establishments of the three military services. He would preside over the operational forces only, -- the operational commands only. Second; The Commander in Chief, as a practical matter would normally expect this Single Chief of Staff to report to the President's alter-ego, -- The Secretary of Defense, although direct communication would not be barred. Third; under the Secretary of Defense and the four Deputy Secretaries of Defense (for strategic planning, Army, Navy and Air, respectively) would be three professional bodies corporate, namely, the Joints Chiefs of Staff (logistics); The Single Chief of Staff and the Operational Commands Headquarters Staff (the OPD of World War II); and a separate strategic policy and planning staff who would formulate and recommend to the Secretary of Defense thru the Deputy for strategic planning, strategic plans, policies and the Concomitant force requirements, operational command compositions and deployments. Naturally, there would need to be consultation between these three professional bodies corporate, -- the same lateral coordination which must characterize any multi-functional Staff effort.

Staff effort.

coordination which must characterize any multi-functional
three professional bodies corporate, -- the same lateral
Naturally, there would need to be consultation between these
ments, operational command, combatants and deployments.
strategic plans, policies and the Concomitant force require
Secretary of Defense through the Deputy for strategic planning,
planning staff who would formulate and recommend to the
OPD of World War II; and a separate strategic policy and
of Staff and the Operational Command Headquarters Staff (the
namely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (logistics); The Single Chief
respectively) would be three professional bodies corporate,
of Defense (for strategic planning, Army, Navy and Air,
under the Secretary of Defense and the four Deputy Secretaries
although direct communication would not be parrled. Third,
to the President's after-effect, -- The Secretary of Defense,
would normally expect this Single Chief of Staff to report
Second; The Commander in Chief, as a practical matter
operational forces only, -- the operational commands only,
of the three military services. He would breathe over the
military requirements; or over the logistic eat expenditures
over either strategic planning and the determination of
of Staff to the Commander in Chief would not have coexistence
The limitation I have in mind are these: First, the Chief
believe it must.

not make these vital limitations and conditions clear as I
understood were inherent in the proposals. The report does
however, because of three very specific limitations which I
presented at our last meeting by General Clay. I did so,
strongly supported the concept so elegantly and competently
struggle to preserve the Republican. I agreed with, and
of the republican form, especially during a long debate.
But it would be sure to come out of the streaes and strains
our military leaders either seek or want such a result.
ment would inevitably bring such a result. I do not believe
Defense and having coexistence over the entire eat expenditure
the Commander in Chief, by assuring the Secretary of
minister civilian control. A Single Chief of Staff reporting
ment which would inevitably extinguish or substantially
remedy for the existing deficiencies of our defense eat expenditure
Notwithstanding, I would be messy if we were to adopt a

December 19, 1927

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