UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale

TELECON

Secretary Laird

9/16/71 8:40 a.m.

L: I hate to call pushing the panic button on you, but on these NSC papers that were handed out on the Hill, on the draft.

K: I don't know what you are talking about.

L: The talking paper on the Selective Service.

K: I didn't see it.

L: No, and it goes into draft cuts at $60. We might want to go more than that. Then it goes into China . . .

K: I've got to see this paper. What can we do?

L: We've got to kill it.

K: How.

L: I will call some of the people up there.

K: I talked to Buckley last night. He doesn't understand the parliamentary situation, but he says he will vote for recommittal only if _______________ is instructed to be _______________ pay scale. I don't know if that's possible. Is it?

L: No.

K: On that paper, I don't know what you are talking about. If it was prepared by my staff, they shouldn't have.

L: We want to keep it from one hundred to eighty. And on China to commit oursleves for months in advance is a mistake also.

K: I don't know anything about it.

L: It looks like it was done by your people.

K: Will you do me a favor and call me tomorrow morning with some good news. This is three days in a row. I'm a professor; I don't have your nerve.

L: Okay, Henry, tomorrow I'll call with good news.

By CEC NARA, Dated 5/27

TELECON

Senator Taft

9/16/71 9:50 a.m.

K: I'm calling about the draft bill. I don't know whether our intelligence is good on this.

T: It is.

K: On sending it back to conference. We feel very strongly that it would be very unfortunate if that were done. I don't know on what grounds you would be voting it tabled or sent back...

T: The motion is to table it first, probably followed by a motion to take it from the table and send it back in to conference.

K: That would open up all the Vietnam issues again.

T: I think the language isn't as harmful as it might be.

K: But if Mansfield gets it he will go in the direction of making it more harmful. It is hard to conduct foreign policy under this constant harrassment.

T: The problem is manifold. I supported the Allott amendment and ________. Since 1963 I have been saying that we ought to phase in voluntary service and get away from the draft. There are many men in the Congress -- in fact a majority -- who are against that, who don't believe it and are not going to give up with this bill or any other. What the conference committee did was to reverse the decision of both the House and the Senate without regard to the express desire of them, including the Allott Amendment. The decision being made on this is whether you plan to phase out ________ military or not.

K: But the most probable consequence of this is losing the draft at a most delicate time.

T: I don't think that will happen. The committee want the draft. If we phase it out, the desires of both of these bodies will have been defeated. ________ don't care what Les Arrends says, but the trouble is that the military affairs committees are such inside operations.

K: Knowing what trouble we've had getting it to a vote, I don't bet on anything.

T: I told Gene Cowan that I would do anything I could after voting to table this language with Allott. I will do anything to see the draft get extended. I'm not absolutely convinced that you couldn't do without it, but I think you need the pay increase, for which you will need a bill. I will do anything, but I can't back away from this at this point. I'm pretty well committed to it. I appreciate your views, and I appreciate the problem,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By

NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Senator Taft

9/16/71 9:50 a.m. p. 2

But I don't see the inevitability of the result everyone seems to see. I think it will be the opposite. It is much more likely to come out with a resolution that leads toward a sound resolution of it if we do table it. Your judgment weighs heavily.

K: If in these delicate six months we could get some unambiguous Senatorial support, it just might help though. I don't understand the parliamentary process, but I am a little concerned with how it looks abroad. . .

T: You can't tell how long it will be delayed anyway. If it doesn't pass, are Cranston and the others going to do?

K: That may be what will happen anyway. I'm coming to Cincinnati at some point in November.

T: Great. As Kay has indicated we would love to entertain you. It's a man's dinner, but we'll probably have a few people in afterward. I hope you can spend the night.

K: Yes, and go back the next morning. That would probably be easiest. How long does it take to fly back?

T: About an hour.

K: Oh, that's easy.

By

NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon:10:00-9/16/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Mr. Peterson

K: What is this god damn story about this pulling out. What is that crap?

P: Is that the story. I haven't seen it, are we pulling out.

K: We were on the verge of approving it.

P: Alright I will find out for you right away. Incidentally, I am having a group of outside experts tomorrow. Hormats has been invited and will keep you posted. I am writing a memo to the President right now . . . . . we are behaving a little bit like we have put the patient on the table and have cut him open.

K: If I were there I would do what they are doing.

P: Good. Incidentally, have you graduated from our morning group.

K: No, I am coming again, but they are a little boring.

P: We have not lost our status but our prestige without you being there.

K: OK - I will be there.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:40 a.m., September 16, 1971

P: Is there anything I can say with regard to what Porter said.

K: I haven't got the report yet, but he had the firmest instructions to...

P: In the news summary there was another statement with regard to POW's -- the 31st thing.

K: It's building. Some of our people are popping off.

P: Who?

K: MacGregor told a group we would establish a deadline in the next announcement -- the Sperling group. That fuels people to try to preempt you. MacGregor said he wouldn't be surprised if you would do it.

P: We better pull him off that.

K: I have.

P: Getting back to the POW thing. That is the only question on Vietnam that poses any problem. What do you propose -- how should we fudge it?

K: I don't know whether you want to say it, but the basic issue is 'do we want to hand the country over to the Communists?' It comes down to that.

P: Henry, I know what the truth is. I am just talking about the public relations aspect -- POW wives -- as to how we can make some indication that we are at least talking about the problems.

K: You could say we have been exploring all their proposals in many channels. The danger is that they are going to say flatly, 'we will let the prisoners go if you go out by December 31st.'

P: Will that danger be escalated if we say something.

K: It could be.

By: NARA, Date:

5/27

- 2 -

P: What would you say then? The critical question is what is the attitude about the POW issue.

K: You can say, first, that every proposal they have made so far -- as they confirmed to McGovern -- is designed to lead to a collapse of the situation. They have never made a clear proposal.

P: But if we say that, they will make a clear proposal.

K: Say they interpret the definitions of withdrawal as a practical consequence of wanting us to hand the thing over to them. They want a ceasefire with us but not with the South Vietnamese. In effect, they are asking us to turn the country over to the Communists.

P: I am quite aware of that. We are going to have to fight it out on that; I see no other choice. If worse comes to worst, we will put the responsibility on them.

K: When we have reached the point where these resolutions keep multiplying, we will have to take it to the country and say we have taken all this so far, but we can't keep going.

P: They will keep multiplying because they desire to be out front as we approach the elections.

K: They know we are getting out.

P: Like Mansfield -- what a waste of time that was with Mansfield. He said he would insist on a deadline but he is making it 2-1/2 months earlier because of the time already wasted.

K: I didn't realize he said that.

P: Our casualties are down 1/5 of any similar period in five years, and they are 1/16th of any similar period in 1968. They are saying let's get out and turn the country over to the Communists.

K: For cheap political purposes. The more these voices are heard here, the more unstable the situation becomes there.

P: I would like an analysis of what the situation really is -- I don't mean today but for study over the weekend.

K: I will get it immediately.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

- 3 -

P: Second, I do feel Bunker has to do the best he can with Thieu. We will stand by him, but he is to tell Thieu to make the referendum as clear as he can. We want him to win it.

K: We have told him.

P: But it doesn't get through.

K: Anything he does now will weaken his stand.

P: One thing I do want is Bunker's candid assessment of the political situation. Haig will give me his assessment of the military situation.

K: I asked Haig to look the whole situation over.

P: What about Thompson?

K: He is out there now.

P: I want Thompson to give me an assessment in 48 hours -- before the Monday meeting. Thompson can get us something back; he knows what the situation is. It would be very helpful. On the draft thing, what is your view? Shultz is saying, 'well, maybe we have to go all out for the Volun teer Army.'

K: We can't do that.

P: We can, but it involves an enormous amount of money. And it won't work.

K: It won't work. I understand they will lay it on the table and they say they will get back to a vote fairly quickly.

P: How will they get back to a vote. The problem is Hebert won't go to another conference.

K: I just talked to Taft who claims he doesn't mean it.

P: Okay.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

- 4 -

[Second call from the President at 10:50 a. m.]

P: My recollection from a few years back is that Japan, in terms of GNP, produces more than the rest of Asia combined. I am confident of that. They are 2-1/2 times greater than China; I would like to know if that statement is relatively correct.

K: I will get that right away.

P: Another figure I need -- the amount of U.S. Military budget compared with the military budgets of the rest of the world -- major nations such as Europe and Japan vs. the U.S. military budget.

K: I will get both within the hour. On the other issue that you raised before, I was just coming over.

P: Do you want to come over?

K: M Yes, let me drop over.

lds

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon:11:45-9/16/71
The President/
Mr. Kissinger

P: You are sure we are not at fault there.

K: Absolutely not.

P: Because it is a . . .

K: Mack is using that as a maneuver to get a higher deal from the Russians and I have continued to stay in . . . . . . approved $250 million. Now Satra Col. which is working with Mack has applied for a $320 million loan for export licenses for the Kama River which we are going to approve.

P: When it comes do it fast and do get a lot of publicity on it.

K: What they are doing now is that they have only withdrawn from the overall supervision part of it but not the individual part of it and there is a pressure negotiating ploy by Mack . . . . . . . they have never submitted a significant application . . . $320 million is going to be approved - I guess within two weeks.

P: I want to personally be present tomake sure it gets the public relations it should at the earliest possible time. What about Gromyko?

K: I wouldn't give the day. I would just say yes I expect to see him.

P: I wouldn't give the date. I don't even know the date.

K: The date is the 29th.

P: What about the Red China . . . that of course was inevitable.

K: And we have been in touch with Taiwan and find they will oppose it.

P: In other words we will just say we oppose it. Do you think I should say a whole lot on Taiwan.

K: No.

P: I will say we support one - oppose the other.

K: Exactly right.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CEC NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

John Ehrlichman

9/16/71 11:50 a.m.

E: You don't know the cosmic problem I'm calling you about: Sewer treatment plants.

K: I'm for them.

E: The question is who should build and plan them. Your Corps of Engineers has gotten support on the Hill for them to do it. I'm trying to get the Under Secretary of the Army to write to the Hill disclaiming interest in that. I wanted you to know that our environmental guys are mixed up in this. . . . . .

K: He didn't raise the question of sewage plants. He gave me some complicated story about some deal he had made in testimony that was looked over by you.

E: We want a letter from Thaddeus Beall. If there is any serious problem about getting the letter why doesn't your guy get with Whittaker on this because he's involved in it.

K: I'm against sewage -- you can quote me. And I'll do my best to dispose of it.

E: Quit that! Well, there you are, another typical Lairdism and if you can get the Corps of Engineers off of it it will help a lot.

K: I have no particular interest in it, but I will check with Haig.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon: 11:55-9/16/71
Mr. Kissinger/
Secretary Irwin

I: Good morning Henry.

K: Hello Jack.

I: I have a couple of items here. One is I spoke to Joe Sisco this morning and he said there was no deadline.

K: Well the Pakistanis thought there was a deadline and still think there is.

I: I will tell him not to have a deadline. It would be advantageous to clear it up as quickly as possible. Secondly, the timing of Korry's departure. Just exactly when it will go to the Senate I am not sure - maybe tomorrow or next week so theoretically we could get Nat down to Santiago by the 27th or 28th.

K: I will leave it up to you.

I: The General(?) is determined to make his final determination on the 14th of October. If there is any interest at all on Korry's "pragmatic" discussions . . . I would tend to hold Nat and send him down in mid-October.

K: Good, I think that is just fine.

I: Thanks Henry.

K: Good to talk to you.

By Ccs NARA, Date 5/21

TelCon:2:02-9/16/71

Ron Ziegler/
Mr. Kissinger

R: (Picked up IO phone late)

K: Well Ron I can't touch them. I let them handle it. It just screws us up. What did they say anything about keeping China . . .

R: (Quoting what he was saying - too fast). . . proposal was put before
by Bush presented an announcement draft . . .

K: That is alright. That has been in the works.

R: I didn't know it was going to be announced that way.

K: That is OK. I didn't know it was going to be announced this way either.

R: I said anyone who believes themselves to be an authority on this subject should not speculate because the President has not made an announcement.

K: Perfect.

R: If you want to check the record I think you will find that my guidance has been accurate and my guidance is to stay away and not speculate.

K: We will give you guidance tomorrow. We will go on the offensive tomorrow.

R: Do you know why I call you like this every now and then. I want to make sure the secretary on the other end

E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By CEC NARA, Dated 5/21

TelCon:5:02-9/16/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Governor Reagan

K: Hello, how are you.

R: I owe you an apology. When I couldn't get you on Sunday I said I would call you back.

K: I never got the message that you called.

R: I said please leave word that I received your call and would call back on Monday but I never got a chance to call back.

K: I never got your call. This just happens too often. The thing I was calling you on - I was just trying to continue that discussion where we were interrupted. I hear from John Holdridge that your trip is all on.

R: I understand that he told them that there will be messages and things I am suppose to do, etc.

K: I will be on the West Coast a week from this weekend. Will you be in Los Angeles the 24, 25 & 26?

R: Yes, I will be down there.

K: I thought if you wanted to we could get together.

R: I would love to - where will you be staying.

K: At Taft Schreiber's(?) house in Beverly Hills.

R: I have a ceremony that Saturday and a fund raising raleigh that night. What about on Sunday?

K: I have to catch up with the President on Sunday in Seattle/ It would depend upon when he leaves for Alaska.

R: I will call you at the Taft's and see if there is some time that we can work out.

K: Good.

R: Nancy asked if you were going to be in Los Angeles on Thursday, October 7th.

K: I don't think so.

By NARA, Date 5/27

R: We were going to have a little dinner for Princess ___? of England.

K: I am sorry - I would love to have come. Let me know if I can do anything to make your trip effective. I will keep my eyes on it.

R: There was a story going around today - some newsman was saying we had a one China policy.

K: Absolutely not. They are saying that it may be but if the Security Council seat may go if the People's Republic goes - but that is on the basis of a two China policy. . . . . If we can keep the People's Republic from being expelled the communists won't come in. That is the big thing - if we can keep Taiwan in we are willing to pay any price. Quite honestly the big thing is keeping Taiwan from being expelled from the UN. The other won't come in unless they are expelled.

R: Now I see. Alright, I will call you the weekend after next.

K: Give my best to Nancy.

By

NARA, Date

TELCOM

Mr. Peterson/Kissinger

9/17/71 - 6:15 p.m.

K: Hello.

P: Henry, I understand you talked to Dick Bator today. I don't know how much time you had with him but . . .

K: Well, they just gave me a 15 minute summary of what they told you.

P: I have something written here that I think is serious. I could get it typed up and over to you. Are you coming in tomorrow because I think this is a serious problem for us. We have some internal political problems.

K: Dick Cooper mentioned it. My instinct is I am not sure we should put a memo in there before we talk with Dick.

P: How long will you be there? Are you leaving now?

K: In a little while.

P: Are you coming in tomorrow?

K: Yes, I am.

P: When can I see you?

K: About 9 or 8:30.

P: Could you give us a little time to get it typed up?

K: I am leaving here about 11:30.

P: How about 10:00?

K: Alright, 10:00.

P: Let's not only think about the President but Connally.

K: Yes, but you know I am a great believer in the indirect approach.

P: The one thing everybody could agree on was to kick us in the rear.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon: 6:40-9/17/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Mr. R. William Hearst

K: I called you for two reasons. I heard about the editorial you are going to publish on Sunday, but I think the situation is much more complex. You of course heard only one side of the story.

H: I know that Ky(?) is a representative of ____ but than Ky and I are close personal friends.

K: I have high regards for Ky but it goes far beyond the maneuvering that is going on in Saigon.

H: I am in New York right now.

K: They told me they got you in Los Angeles - on the West Coast.

H: No they got me in New York - but I know they got my number from the office in Los Angeles and when they found out it was you calling they got me here.

K: I may be in New York on Wednesday. Maybe I could see you. There are

H: I would appreciate talking to you./ many people who have been for the principles of why we entered this war and a lot of the doves seem to have forgotten this. I don't think it is necessary to drop the ball.

K: What I would like to do is to explain this story to you. I couldn't agree with you more when you say we should not drop the ball. When my schedule is cleared up for next week - could I call you on Monday to see when we can get together.

H: Certainly. My number in New York is Columbus 5-7300. If I should be at home my office can connect you directly there. Or if you prefer my number there is area code 914/669-5200. It is not a hot just a number they gave us.

K: We will get you one way or the other.

H: Tell the President that if I have done him an injustice MX I will go

K: We are so close - we know where your heart is and I will call you Monday.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON

Prof. Kaysen/Kissingef

11:02 a.m.

9/23/71

HAK: Some of your emissaries were here last week.

K: My colleagues. One word, yesterday's statement of Ron Zeigler of textile quotas and story in TIMES' business section that all kinds of pressure on textiles coming from industry I feel the whole business of foreign policy can be undermined. That it's economics, not politics, and horse-trading.

HAK: On the general economic point, leaving aside textiles, the visit by Cooper and Bator has triggered me into action a month earlier than I planned. The prescription may not be what you want.

K: Only that it's a stale political issue and one cannot be handled otherwise.

HAK: In my position one must pick one's moments. By the end of the NXX IMF our town will be more forthcoming. On textiles it has mentioned irrationality that is impossible to work with. Japanese views incompatible.

K: I have worked in the past --

HAK: If they said this is what we can do and it were only half of what we asked for and in the next month or 3 months but on 3 different occasions they offered 98% and didn't give him 2%.

K: People in Europe are looking for evidence that we don't intend to work by the rules. If we abandon them we will be worse off. If you look back since the end of the war, you will see no good govt. in Europe fell or no in Japan has fallen on economic (?) issues. Some of what we are doing has some unnecessary ? ? ? ?. Makes decision impossible.

HAK: Is Japanese textile a two year story before we scared them.

K: Sensitivity of every piece of evidence that we don't intend to ? ? ? ? . IN CED meeting when I am amazed by how this group of businessmen are frightened by this situation. Don't know the rules.

HAK: Periodically I forget the issues because it's so complex and boring. Given play of political issue my ______ is not what it is on other issues.

K: I don't usually call you.

HAK: Not enough. You are one of (my favorite people).

K: ______ could not be more important.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Attorney General/Kissinger
12:12 p. m. 9/23/71

AG: You are about as slow getting on the line as coming to meetings.

K: They shouldn't get you on the line first. I have told them (a thousand
times but until I say it 50 more, it won't count.)

AG: Don't give me that crap.

K: I know who outranks me. I have told Rabin you will get in touch on
something. I have given him no details. I recommend you you ask to
see him Monday. Haig back and I will be in Alaska.

AG: Why doesn't Haig set this up.

K: OK. On Monday.

AG: Over there?

K: Whereever. Come to my office and Al will take you over to the Map
Room. We will set up a time with your office.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

12:15 p.m. 9/23/71

K: Bxx What's this crap about NY last night? Won't it die?

Z: People wouldn't put it past you to do a parachute drop into Bulgaria.

K: I didn't want to put out a name or a person who arranged the dinner because we are playing a game with him on behalf of the President.

Z: They thought you were meeting with Gromyko or the Chinese. I said this is mystery when there is no mystery. So I said you are with businessmen.

K: I don't want to say where I am or I would have done it three days ago. Now we are stuck with press inquiries.

Z: You are in NY.

K: I am seeing Reagan and the L.A. Times in L.A.

Z: I will say I don't give a damn. I am going to San Francisco tomorrow myself.

K: Why?

Z: I don't want to talk about it. Mission of the President. Don't worry about that.

K: I will get Janka under control.

Z: It wasn't him. I said to him, knowing how he'd respond, Les, what is Henry doing? He said he didn't know. I knew he would. They won't carry it further. On VN thing, I said MACV would ? ? ? ? ? and the President agreed.

K: Of course. 200 planes the President has to approve.

Z: ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: Mao had a heart attack when he heard. And Mao cried because he couldn't see me.

Z: I also said bombing didn't relate to Paris talks.

K: That's correct.

Z: I was correct in saying it?

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By

TELCONE
D. Frost/Kissinger

4:35 p.m. 9/23/71

F: Our names have been linked in a column I just read.

K: Yours and mine?

F: One of Barbara Walters 10 most sexy men in America.

K: I prefer the reputation to the truth because the reputation makes it come true.

F: Along with one of the Marx brothers so I don't know how true.

K: Groucho!

F: I don't know. That was such a delicious evening. Going to be in NY soon?

K: Not for 10 days.

F: Diahann and I in Washington Oct. 8 for her concert.

K: I just accepted an invitation to Averell Harriman. Just this morning.

F: What times are evenings at the JFK Center?

K: Maybe before or after.

F: I know Diahann adores you and she would adore if you could be at the concert.

K: What time does it start?

F: I will find out.

K: Let me call on Monday.

F: I will find out --

K: I will call on Tues. I will be in Alaska on Monday. All the swinging places

F: I will find out. Diahann would adore having you there. Talk on Tues.

K: And arrange getting together.

F: Have a wonderful time. Alaska will be fascinating.

K: I don't think so. I doubt it.

F: Seeing Walter Hickel I bet.

TELECON

Mr. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

11:10 a.m., September 28, 1971

P: On textiles, Rogers reviewed this with the President on the plane, and he has asked Johnson to chair a meeting this morning at 11:30 to which Kennedy and I are invited. Can you tell me what is going on on textiles?

K: I was not present at that meeting, so I cannot honestly tell you. The last I heard was Fukuda said they might do something but we don't know what.

P: The report we got was that Rogers talked to the President on the way back...

K: Yes, they had a long talk.

P: ...and got his agreement on something.

K: Probably to put him in charge. The President at one point was casting about on how to avoid the October 15 thing.

P: Yeah. Does State have any recommendations?

The President

K: They didn't make them to me -- and not to Fukuda, was weeping copiously about how awful to move on October 15 and 'can't you help?' Fukuda said yes but we want to act before we promise.

P: Did you ask if that is a new policy?

K: Then Rogers told me on the plane he thought Kishi was not coming because they had nothing on textiles. Would you tell me what is going on after the meeting?

P: You know what we were told emphatically at Camp David.

K: I mean after your talk with Rogers.

P: What we thought was another leak at State was a press briefing. They indicated Friday afternoon there is room for negotiations on textile terms. It appeared in the New York Times at which point Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong -- everybody said, 'what you told us on October 15 is no longer true.' You get the impression the President is trying to avoid the October 15 business?

Mr. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

- 2 -

K: Yes, but he would also like to implement it -- depending on
what time of day you talk to him.

P: That's very clear. Would you put it in a NSSM for me?

K: If you either cancel it or implement it WAX without anyone
noticing it, he will do it.

P: Okay, Henry.

lds

TELCORN

Colonel Kennedy/Mr. Kissinger/Dix Walles

7:51 p.m., September 24, 1971

HK: Is Walters with you?

K: Yes, he is. I also talked with Bush about a couple of things. One, the debate starts the 18th. The debate is a long series of speeches. He anticipates it will take to around November.

HK: Okay, fine, just let it go.

K: If you want to delay that vote, he can encourage more speeches. To delay the debate much longer is a bigger problem. Would have to insert something into the agenda which would suggest that we are weak and taking these tactics for that purpose. I can call him tomorrow and be sure that it carries on until the first of November.

HK: Yeah. If we can find a way to delay the debate that would be much better. If he can figure out a way his hand doesn't show.

K: Scheel wants to see the President.

HK: Impossible.

K: Okay I will hold it.

HK: Don't hold it, just say it can't be done.

K: Hilaly (?) and Yugoslav calls both turned down. I will put back in strongly if you agree.

HK: Right.

K: Did you ever call Mr. D?

HK: No, I will tell him next Wednesday when I see him.

K: Saunders did a piece at your request for inclusion in the ________. Win doesn't know what to do with it.

HK: It doesn't go into the Win part, it goes into the Hyland part.

K: We will fix it.

HK: By now everyone knows what everyone is doing.

TELCONE

Colonel Kennedy/Mr. Kissinger/On Walter

7:51 p.m., September 24, 1971 -- page 2

K: Nobody knows -- they are two separate pieces.

HK: Is Walters there?

K: Yes, he is.

HK: Let me speak to him quickly, I have to call the President.

**********

General Walters

W: Hello

HK: How are you?

W: Fine, I had a good trip.

HK: Can you read it to me?

W: They are just giving it to me. ..... gave me a scenario to read.
There were two rather exceptional phrases in it and they watched
me rather closely but I maintained impressively impassive throughout.

HK: Since Kennedy will not share it with me, maybe you will.

W: "In as much as you are doing this, we further proposition the early
part of the blank. Dates not acceptable to us, We,therefore, propose
5. It correspondes to ours."

HK: What two ______ propose?

W: The one that Bush is putting forward. You know, dual representation.

HK: How did they get that into -- I have tried for 48 hours to get it.

W: "In view of the fact that we will around September 23 put forward to
the Assembly --"

HK: Can not accept that date!

W: Press releases interim to that time.

HK: That's not bad. That's a rather nice tally.

TELCONE

Colonel Kennedy/General Walters/HAK

7:51 p.m., September 24, 1971 -- page 3

W: The agenda can be discussed after you get there.

HK: When we talked to them, only gave them side issues and never mentioned principle issues.

W: They went out of the way to be more cordial than before -- trying to tell me not to be too upset by the harshness of the words.

HK: When you consider what we are doing, it is rather mild.

W: I have what you wanted to convey.

HK: Not before the 30th! Is it your understanding that these advance people -- that they have agreed to technical people coming along.

W: No, I did ..., their side will give a ____.

HK: Yeah. What I meant -- you know, the communicator and so forth.

W: Haven't got anything -- unless you interpreted something they said.

HK: Actually from this you can not conclude either that they approve or disapprove.

W: I can not.

HK: Yeah.

W: I understand they are actually ...

HK: The mood was cordial though.

W: Fairly cordial.

HK: No, no; it is going to get tougher. We are doing some highly objectionable things. Can you stand by for 15 minutes, I have got to call the President.

TELCONE

General Walters/Colonel Kennedy/HAK

8:04 p.m., September 24, 1971 -- page 4

HK: On the basic thing, they are pretty tough. The beginning part, think it is just elegant. Answers a little ______.

W: I have little misgivings. About what they might do at a certain point I mentioned to you briefly.

HK: Hold it up.

W: They could do what they did to Sato -- don't deal with this guy. Will deal with successor. I will leave a paper for you.

HK: Might move them into a position where they will do something outrageous.

W: Within the realm of possibility.

HK: What can we do about it?

W: Keep our eyes open and find means to make sure they don't do it. ______ (get something on them). It's other proposal to do away with somebody.

HK: That's what I mean.

W: All I'm saying is that we need contingency plans for an extreme.

HK: I will draft a rather tough message. In addition, don't think you should give them the second one.

W: When you read it, consider when you read the scenario the atmosphere surrounding it. I could go out there tomorrow.

HK: That won't get you a message.

W: The relevant thing is to get the text of what they said to you.

HK: What time will you get here?

W: 2:00 pm. I don't think it is necessary. I will put a paper with it for you.

HK: I would have to send a messenger over to give you the text of a message.

W: Even if I come, you wouldn't have it in time.

TELCON

8:04 p.m., September 24, 1971 -- page 5

HK: Recognize that things are going to get tough. It is on the other hand quite amazing when we are doing all these other things, they are willing to discuss it.

W: After the visit.

HK: Might.

W: The other two ............ I will put down a little scenario for you to read.

HK: I agree with you straightly. Has to be exactly as in the other places.

W: You need strength in the other show. Should not be caught defenseless.

HK: Do you think you will get sufficiently clear answer that we can do our planning?

W: The agenda you will get when you get there.

HK: Then we can take technical people along?

W: Let them come along with them or a little before.

HK: That may be because they don't trust anyone.

W: They may not want to trust technicians [ahead of time].

HK: On the 30th, we must know which category can come.

W: I have memorized these three points in the message I have now. Instructions to give ........

HK: Just to say that --

W: It has perhaps escaped you attention but -- Yesterday's statement, probably regard it as an answer.

HK: Right.
I will

W: / Take the one that has been prepared. I plan to go back on Monday.

HK: You are?

TELCONE

8:04 p.m., September 24, 1971 -- page 6

W: I will go back tomorrow morning.

HK: You ought to be there in case they want to call you.

W: I told them I would be away for two days. I didn't tell them where I was going.

HK: Where can I reach you on Monday?

W: You can reach me Tuesday morning -- I will be flying back and you can't reach me on Monday.

HK: Can furnish message from Anchorage, they have facilities there.
Talk to Kennedy about it.

W: They are sending you tomorrow a copy of the instruction they have prepared for me and you can phone changes to that. If there are any substantial changes, you can send a message through that channel in code. I can break the code. It gives me status to be able to say I have come here and talked with you.

HK: You have done a marvelous job!

W: I don't mind being a messenger boy but I need status in their eyes. There are three things you will be getting -- the text, the scenario, and the proposed instruction to me.

HK: Terrific!

Colonel Kennedy

K: George Bush is going to be at that meeting this evening.

HK: Good.

K: He will let us know anything that comes up.

HK: Delay the debate to the 25th. A day or two can't make that much difference. I just hate to have this thing debated when I am there.

K: Both sides will be giving speeches.

HK: Our side will also speak just when I am there.

TELCORN
General Walters/Colonel Kennedy/HAK

8:04 p.m., September 24, 1971 -- page 7

K: Both sides will be speaking.

HK: I don't care about the opponent -- it's just a hell of a position to be in.

K: I will get to him tomorrow.

HK: Has Win prepared thing we have to show Secretary next week?

K: Yes, he has. Marvin Kalb tonight referring to some sensitive information as evidence of the fact that clearly something serious is going on in China -- Officials said could certainly have an affect on the President's trip.

HK: Must have come from the Department!

K: Not sure about that.

HK: Where could it have come from?

K: It could have come from some of the blabbermouths around here -- press types.

HK: Get Ted Eliot and tell him to shut it off and also Laird!

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
9/28/71 9:35 a.m.

R: How are you?

K: I'm find.

R: A little tired. But I think it worked out well.

K: Yes, the coverage was excellent.

R: We were talking this morning. Haig suggested to Thieu that he should bring Ky back to the government after the election and one of the places to use him was as Ambassador to the U.S. I am opposed to that.

K: I don't know anything about . . . I talked to Al about this part of it but . . .

R: Not the U.S. It would be a catastrophe. He would be very bad here.

K: And he wouldn't be all that popular. Now he is sort of a hero to some for having been squeezed out but . . .

R: No, he is looked down on in this country.

K: I have to talk to Al to find out exactly what he said.

R: But in the meantime we just have Bunker say we don't think it is desirable to have Thieu do this.

K: Let me find out what Al said. I think if anything he said it as an illustration.

R: But sometimes once you get these things into peoples' heads . . .

K: But unless there is something which eludes me, I agree with you.

TELCONE

Mac Bundy/Kissinger

9:47 a.m.

9/28/71

B: How was Alaska in October?

K: Cold!

B: Winter comes early.

K: Advance man's nightmare. The Emperor never out of his country. Lifting his trouser's leg coming down the steps of the aiplaine. ? ? ? ? .

B: The combination of Hirohito and Hickel is some interesting history. We are inducting Bator on Thurs. in _______. The 7th.

K: Let me look at my calendar. I like Francis very much.

B: I am off that Sat. to Indonesia, Thailand and ______ for a conference. It would be helpful to me to catch a half hour of your time. If you are not coming to NY I will come down on Thurs.

K: Let me check lunch. Yes. Lunch that Thurs. 1:00 in my office.

B: Art preoccupation is a mess in the subcontinent. (?)

K: They are so unhelpful.

B: We have trouble because we maintain a low posture in Pakistan. I need shape of their unhelpfulness.

K: I will have you what I know.

B: Also on Indonesia and Bangkok all my ______ hawklite instincts are up from the reporting from Saigon.

K: Hawklike against Thieu?

B: Although he hasn't handled it very well to make Ky and Minh symbols of democracy forxx is a little strong. What does Haig & tell you?

K: He thinks situation in the country is stable. Surface politics confined to Saigon and not particularly generated by their assessment that maybe we are getting ready to dump Thieu and when we are ending our own effort there and trying to get out with dignity, this ______ is a pax pity.

M Bundy/Kissinger
9:47 a.m. 9/28/71

-2-

B: Over a long period of time we have emphasized the election policy (and haven't stopped to realize it doesn't necessarily work in their situation).

K: They are pushing for struggle after we have left. In terms of internal struggle a democracy isn't as important as strength.

B: The other part is what it was last spring. When the President decides in Oct. what final phase is. But you are obviously hard at work on that already. I don't know if you saw the Hong Kong _xx_ correspondent in Newsweek last week. __________ is still in power and that's why you can go to Peking.

K: History will treat our total involvement there better than contemporaries.

B: That's not hard to do. I will come to lunch unless you can get up here.

K: I will let you know next week early.

B: We will just add an extra chair.

TELCOn
Jack Anderson/Kissinger

9:56 a.m.

9/28/71

A: I am sorry to bother you.

K: You are very meticulous.

A: We are doing a story on Micronesia.

K: That Hickel quote. It's not true. I cannot in good conscience say I
remember every meeting in detail. My general view is so inconsistent with that
that the issues of eminent domain is a legal problem with which I don't deal. I
have (rarely) participated in discussions on Micronesia because they are essentially
legal and my forces don't deal with that. So we have only discussed whether State
or Interior plays the dominant role. The only view I remember expressing was
that because of an accident that islands 3000 miles distant who have not had much
in common are now considered one unit. And now considering a political unit
that certainly wouldn't have happened. I expressed this only as a historian.

A: We have some quotes from documents that indicate concerns we withdraw
from Ex Far East using these islands as a base and concern over communist
activities and activities --

K: From my office?

A: No. Not particularly from your office. What it says is that this has not
been submitted to the NSC.

K: There has never been formal consideration.

A: It says below the level of the NSC.

K: My connection has been that every once in a while an issue would boil up. God knows what fragment of a sentence Hickel remembers but it isn't what we get engaged in. Hickel says no ______ unless compensation paid. Why would the President get involved? I can't remember what fragment someone takes out of context.

A: I understand. I will explain that. One other thing -- I have been told x from
a WH source. A friend over there called. He was cryptic. I gather you are
planning to go or planned to go to Peking in mid-Oct.

K: Nonsense.

A: At anytime consider it?

K: No.

TELCONE
Miss Shortman (PARADE Magazine)

10:30 a.m.

9/28/71

Miss Shortman

HAK indicated that he could not find a better copy of a picture that Shearer undoubtedly already had. He had however found a picutre of he and Nancy on a boat but it was in color. Could they use that in black and white. Miss S indicated they could.

HAK then said he would have to check with Nancy and call her back. After checking with Nancy he called Miss S back and said that Nancy did not want any more pictures floating around and therefore he would not send the new picture and as he could not find a better copy of the old picture, they would have to use that. Then he said that his good relations with Nancy meant more to him then his good relations with Parade and Miss S said she understood and would tell Mr. Gorkin (who apparently was the person waiting for the picture). HAK said he would call Mr. Shearer.

TELCONE
Gerard Smith/Kissinger

12:09 p.m.

9/28/71

K: Welcome back.

S: I hope to be able to take some leave but if you are interested in a short conversation I would be glad to accommodate myself to your time. I am planning on leaving Thursday. We have a formal report to the President that we will send him tomorrow.

K: My staff holds the view that the less I know the better off they are. You will be at the MBFR meeting on Thurs.?

S: I thought I would let Phil handle it.

K: That's fine.

S: Going to the signing?

K: I may.

S: Background the press.

K: No. Why?

S: Someone should. No mention in Sunday's papers about the announcement. Someone here should ginger them up.

K: Cut it out. Maybe we could do it this afternoon.

S: I am supposed to see Bill at 4:30.

K: I thought I was.

S: I was told he couldn't see me at 12:00 because he had to be at the WH but he would see me at 4:30.

K: Let's have our secretaries get together in the next 15 minutes and set it.

10:10 a.m.

9/29/71

K: I mentioned to the President your concern on accidental war that thing -- about no publicity. Hethought it would be appropriate to have you do some backgrounding or whatever is appropriate. Today it's apt to be swallowed in the Gromyko visit. Tomorrow might be a better time.

S: Just before or after the signing.

K: I still -- let me call you. When are you leaving?

S: Tomorrow afternoon.

K: The President -- This is the precise time that all the foreign ministers are descending on the President. Are you coming to the Brosio ceremony?

S: Yes.

K: How? Why don't you drop by after that?

S: OK.

Further conversation : 10:28 a.m.

K: It turns out I have to see the President after the Brosio ceremony.

S: 11:15. What time.

K: Do you a half hour?

S: I do.

K: Why don't you come in 20 mins.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012568
By CNAR Date 6/2/71

*

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:37 a.m. 9/29/71

K: Technical arrangements. You should come in at the NW gate that
leads to my office.

D: From Pennsylvania.

K: From Penn. Avenue. In front where it goes into the lobby.

D: Not usually your side where I go. Directly from --

K: Penn. Ave. and to the right where there's a small portico where
the marine stands. After the meeting the President will ask ~~fox~~ us to
leave and go to the Cabinet Room and he will speak with Gromyko for
half an hour. When that is finished he will take ~~fox~~ all of us to the
Map Room. Your cars come to the place where I said good-by this
morning. Want you to know the technical arrangements.

D: Gromyko will arrange in a more formal way that he mentioned it
in a speech at the UN.

K: Disarmament?

D: He will say he wants to draw your attention to this and it's more
then in the general assembly.

K: OK.

Amb. Dobry...n/Kissinger

10:37 a.m.

9/29/71

D: From Pennsylvania.

K: From I'enn. Avenue. In front where it goes into the lobby.

K: Penn. Ave. and to the right where there's a small portico where
the marine stands. After the meeting the President will ask if us to
leave and go to the Cabinet Room and he will speak with Gromyko for
half an hour. When that is finished he will take office all of us to the
Map Room. Your cars come to the place where I said good-by this
morning. Want you to know the technical arrangements.

K: Disarmament?

K: OK.

TELCON
Rabin/Kissinger

10:42 a. m.

9/29/71

K: I have talked with Mitchell and with all due respect to you I don't think you handled this with your usual skill. He wanted to make a commitment to make a general commitment with you on behalf of the President. He couldn't go into details. I know you have had that before but could be accepted for the time being and go into details later. Since he isn't asking for anything in return.

R: I came to the meeting and they started -- Al Haig started explaining that Max Fisher in the name of Dayan they ______ secret commitment. They asked what kind of commitment Dayan had in mind.

K: I think we need to go over it again. Some studies need to be made and then get you and Haig and John Mitchell together again.

R: You say once they get them.

K: He cannot commit to a schedule. He doesn't know enough. But I think that ______ technical ? ? ? ? .

R: If this is the maximum that can be achieved at present, I am not sure the Prime Minister will be especially happy about it.

K: It's a step that can be achieved now.

R: And not more?

K: Not for the next 2-3 weeks.

R: All right. He didn't say anything. Had the opportunity to say something.

K: We have every foreign minister in Christianity and some Moslems over here. Early next week I will get back to this issue. Nice to talk to you.

R: Nice to talk with you.

TELECON

John Scali

9/29/71 10:55am

S: The President is anxious for Rogers to take on Teddy Kennedy.

K: Rogers won't do it.

S: Just let me tell you. I talked to him twice; he said he is
going to talk to you with the President at 11:45. I understand he will
also see you.

K: I have gone through this with him a thousand times. He will not
do it.

S: I am doing this at the instruction of the President.

K: That's a beautiful statement. He will not do it.

S: Well, I hope you will reflect to the Secretary of State
the President's strong feeling that he should do it. I know what the
President will say.

K: No you don't. The President will let him slide off. I will
not talk against it, but I am not at all sure by the time he gets through
he won't have made it worse.

S: I know how determined the President is that he should do it...
He wants it done.

K: If you can get the President to order it, it will be done. But
it will be done in a half-assed way.

TELCON
Sen. Percy/Kissinger
2:55 p.m. 9/29/71

K: I am calling you about the Mansfield Amendment coming up again. We know you voted for it last time. It will probably pass again but we want to put to you some of the considerations you might want to consider. The issues have been voted on once before and it's dubious to put up the same amendment again and again. It's really a most delicate period of winding up the war. We don't need instructions on how to end and a time period. We need some support for confidence in the Administration. It would mean a great deal to us.

P: I talked with Korologos last night and said I was searching for justification. Since I voted for it before and time is Nov., it puts it into '72.

K: The question is throwing away all the negotiating chips by an act of Congress at a time when the basic course is pretty clear.

P: Anything happening in Paris?

K: We cannot talk about it.

P: That's the problem. We are trying everything to get movement there. No evidence of that. If any evidence that this would jeopardize I wouldn't think of jeopardizing the talks.

K: We are not talking about negotiations one way or the other.

P: Not on the telephone but who could I sit down face-to-face with to get some logical business. You have to share war making ______.

K: You have already voted for it so it's not a question of being on the record. It's a question of how many times a year the Senate votes for the same thing, thereby ruining any chance for negotiation.

P: Let me do some thinking about it. I appreciate your calling. I will labor on it.

K: I will see you no later then the 13th.

TELECON

Don McCloud

9/29/71 5:20 p.m.

K: Excuse me, I was with the President and Gromyko as you know.

M: No, I appreciate your calling. I will be as brief as possible. I explained this to General Haig.

K: He told me.

M: It have got a statement the wives have made. But out of proportion if you can't give your version.

K: I have been seeing the wives every two months. These are terribly emotional meetings for them. They cling to every straw. It's like what I say in my backgrounders. Why should I say anything to the wives that I don't say to the press? The meetings are strictly personal. I don't remember every word of what I say to be truthful. But I couldn't have said that our conversation with Peking will force Hanoi to negotiate. That would be very harmful to our dealings with them both. It simply isn't true. I didn't say it; it isn't my conviction; it is not our policy. Frankly, I don't remember what they are referring to. I could have said that for a general relaxation of tensions would help in the negotiations, but "force Hanoi to negotiate" is complete nonsense.

M: One other statement about the elections in Vietnam. This was a direct quote: Who's ever heard of free elections under a civil way anyway?

K: I know that quote. The same lady has tried to give it to a lot of newsmen. But when they check other wives they say it didn't occur in that context. I am frankly annoyed. I'm not making policy declarations; I'm trying to talk to ladies in distress. If you take these individual statements out of context they are totally misleading.

M: Only one other specific thing, about the China trip. . . . . . Same answer about U.S. -Russia relations - that they will help force Hanoi to negotiate.

K: Only in the general context that if prospects for peace anywhere in the world improve generally, it will help elsewhere.

M: I wanted to make sure to cover all of this.

K: I appreciate your meticulousness in checking this. I never said something is imminent; I said we are doing the best we can. I have said to newsmen that if there is a chance for negotiation it will be pursued before our troops are out of there.

M: Earlier today But this was the same day as the President spoke of private channels.

TELECON

Don McCloud

9/29/71 5:20 p.m. p. 2

K: But there are so many other . . . Private channels are non-governmental channels. We are not trying to fool these ladies; whenever I have a chance I try to explain it honestly. [Have to talk to President]

M:ex

M: Thank you for calling back. I looked back over what you said and I've gotten all the specifics. w One thing you said before -- I didn't get it all down.

K: I don't want to be quoted. You can use what I say but for background.

M: How can I do that? Should I name you or quote you indirectly? If I say this lady said thus-and-so . . .

K: Can you just say Dr. Kissinger denied this?

M: I could but . . .

K: I have a terrible problem here. When for reasons of compassion you see the wives and then it turns into a major foreign policy pro-nouncement . . .

M: The statement you made about general peace in the world. You said only in general . . .

K: Yes, you may quote that.

M: But I want to get it clear what you said.

K: Only in the general context that if prospects for peace improve in the world it could have a favorable effect for SEA also. You can quote that.

M: I don't want to use anything you don't want me to. You said that you had said nothing was imminent.

K: Yes, you can use that.

M: This is much more forceful than a glib denial.

K: You can also say I am seeing these ladies because of my deep feeling for w what they are suffering and I don't use them as a forum for foreign policy statements.

TELECON
Don McCloud

9/29/71 5:20 p.m. p. 3

M: Thank you very much Doctor. I appreciate this.

K: I appreciate your meticulousness.

M: I have to write a story, but the story I write will be more balanced
from having talked with you.

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
5:25 p. m. 9/29/71

K: I think this went very well.

P: It went all right with Bill.

K: Could not have been happier. He wants to see you tomorrow to call off my trip. This he said before he knew of the announcement.

P: We can't. What do we tell him?

K: If we call off the trip after you have seen Gromyko it's impossible (to resume
it).

P: I think you should come in too and we will talk it over.

K: You could say you will think it over and then let Haldeman tell him.

P: We will tell him. Announcement will be made on Tuesday. If we call off
the trip, he is aware it will be cut off entirely?

K: I am not sure he is aware of that.

P: As I understand we totally agreed with it.

K: Negotiating it for 6 weeks. That's how it got moved to that date.

P: Did you get Bush --

K: Comig in at 8:00.

P: I don't know how you can set it up on the other side. Do you think it's a
real thing?

K: I think he is making an issue of the UN. Acheson says he is appalled at the
way we are engaging our public prestige on that. You conducted your meeting
most masterfully.

P: He is a tough customer.

K: But you handled him well.

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

6:05 p. m.

9/29/71

R: I want to say if I get any more calls from Scali and Colson that the President not too anxious to do it right now. Maybe later. I don't want to be the hatchet man and I don't know how to take him on without it looking contrived.

K: Your strength is not to be too high (key). It will give him strength. Someone like Dole should do this.

R: Or Scott. If the President wants me to, I will.

K: He knows that. We have a lot of eager beavers trying to make brownie points. I think the appointment is set for 9:30. We will get in touch.

R: Textile thing could be the most screwed up on both sides. But when it's getting <u>cixx</u> critical, Kennedy is going to Europe. I don't know if it's good or bad.

K: I have ceased understanding it.

R: It's not possible.

K: I don't know who's doing what to whom. I get <u>information</u> from the foreign ministers from other countries.

R: I heard that John Connally said that I said in my statement that we thought as a matter of highest priority was the monetary matter. When John Connally saw the ______ minister he said the most important thing was textile. Rogers said he thought it was monetary. He said don't believe what you read in the papers. So they think they can get a trade. They understand he is going to Japan.

<u>______ said</u>
K: /If you apply trading with the enemy act you do it in the national interest, right? I said right. Then if you ? ? ? ? ? ? 3%. It's a good question. Why 7%? I said I would have to look into it.

R: It's just as screwed up on the Japanese side --

K: Except they will be the ones screwed up again.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
9/29/71; 6:45 p.m.

P: I thought you would be interested to know that Connally was delighted with what I told Paul S______ (?) He said it was just what he needed to hear -- this fellow was cutting us up all over. Connally said he was surprised because he thought I was going to do just the opposite. He did not think this would do any good. My God, just look at the attitude of Gromyko from a year ago. He went on and on about this personal message from Brezhnev. Brezhnev had talked at great length about me and our meeting.

K: This is not how they behave if they want to set somebody up.

P: Right. On the other thing with regard to Bill, do you think maybe that Haldeman ought to talk to him first.

K: I think he has to have a chance to raise his points. We are having a hell of a time finding time in your schedule.

P: I will just do it at Noon. He has to be seen. I wish we could set it up in a way -- I don't want the fact that you are going . . .

K: He won't raise that.

P: If we announce the Soviet visit now before the China thing . . .

K: As a practical matter they will think it is a result of Gromyko. You will remember we were pushing it to have it as early as possible.

P: We offered to have it sometime in February.

K: He knows about dates and he knows that this was to discuss . . . I tried to make it look like it was done more recently specific.

P: With regard to debate in General Assembly, I don't see how this will matter that much. They are just going to announce that you are going.

K: You can argue it both ways.

P: Speaking of Acheson -- he said he wants me to know he was supporting me all the way.

K: I had lunch with Acheson and he said newsmen asked whether the election was going to give him a problem with the Democrats. He said not at all. He said if Jackson runs he may vote for him otherwise he will vote for you.

9/29/71; 6:45 p.m.

-2-

P: Does he know what we are trying to accomplish?

K: Yes. He thinks the Berlin achievement is a master stroke.

P: I would love it if he could see my note about the Byrd Amendment. I hope you told him I am resisting this with State. Really, if Bill could only see . . .

K: He did say this is something if we could have the two -- to have both announcements in one week would really be earthshaking.

P: I said to Haldeman -- bad time (missed some of the sentence). Haldeman says there is never a good time. We have to make the trip. But it is you feeling that this is not the real reason -- you think the real reason is he doesn't want you to go.

K: Yes. He doesn't want me to get the publicity. I have not taken any of the publicity that I could have.

P: My point is that the publicity thing is just nuts. Who are we going to send -- Marshall Green? ? ? ? ? There is nobody else that can go. State always says let's just go in and talk. As a matter of fact if you talks indicate that they will fail, we just won't go through with it.

K: Absolutely! We now have more flexibility with the Soviet movement.

P: Before you see Gromyko I must talk to you because I must pass on to you what I said about the Mid-East.

K: I think that is essential.

P: I said I was prepared to have you talk about it. He started on the European Security thing but I said I wanted to have you and Dobrynin talk about it. I danced off it. I said you had something important to say on Vietnam.

K: He did not raise Vietnam?

P: No, No. He did not at all. He raised the Middle East. So, don't give him Middle East without giving him Vietnam.

K: Absolutely.