09/29/2003 17:43

FAX 202 518 3431

Council on For. Rel.

09/19/2003 09:04

FAX 212 434 9880

EXECUTIVE CFR

1002

0027.uus

September 19, 2003

TO: Henry Kissinger
Larry Summers
Charlie Kupchan

FROM: Richard Haass

RE: Latest Transatlantic Task Force Draft

Sirs: I have read what I believe to be the most recent draft, and while improved, I would suggest it still has a ways to go before it is likely to have the impact we all seek. I will get some line in/line out comments directly to Charlie, but here are some broader reactions:

- I believe the draft exaggerates the risk of U.S.-European rivalry and a return of traditional great power politics a la previous centuries. The real danger for the next few decades at least is less that and more a lack of cooperation/partnership. If this comes about, the two sides will be much less able to deal with the regional and transnational issues that define this era. Said differently, I am worried less about growing rivalry across the Atlantic than I am about diminishing relevance and effectiveness of the transatlantic relationship.

- Some of the language is too "wonky" for my taste. Here I would single out the talk of "other" and "self" on page 4. A bigger problem throughout is the lack of clarity. For example, the call for the United States to "remain engaged in Europe" on page 10. Or what you mean by NATO expanding its peacekeeping role in Afghanistan on page 25. Or the call for the United States and EU to make the G-8 a more effective forum for managing the global economy on page 26. Such statements are not useful absent specifics for what you have in mind.

- I agree with not getting into which side is to blame more for the current problems. But to suggest the current situation is 100% structural, i.e., inevitable, wont persuade many. You at least need to posit that statements and actions by leaders on both sides have exacerbated the situation even if you do not get into the specifics.

- More needs to be said re the cause and impact of trade differences post-Cancun.

- The draft could be more direct in making clear to Europeans that they have as much to lose as does the United States if we fail to cooperate.

09/20/2003 17:43 FAX 202 518 3431
09/19/2003 09:05 FAX 212 434 9880

Council on For. Rel.
EXECUTIVE CPR

003

003/000

2

-- The discussion of the United States and European integration needs to be more explicit. (I have attached a copy of an article by Gerry Baker of the FT. Agree or not, the report should take on what he writes about, especially his recommendations on the last page.)

-- Why isn't genocide (a la Kosovo) a trigger for the potential use of force (page 17)?

-- I disagree strongly with the assertion on page 20 that the current institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship is obsolete. (Ironically, the draft seems to as well in it is discussion of NATO's role on page 22.) I am also unpersuaded of the need for a new "oversight body" as suggested on page 21, which seems to put forward a mechanical fix to a political problem, but this is obviously your call. But if you do go this way, you should make a stronger case for it, explain why the task can't be accomplished just as well or better by existing institutions and better consultations, and explain how this new body would affect existing institutions, such as NATO. Also, you might want to opine on whether the quad should be maintained/revised.

-- Why such a division of labor, where the United States does warfighting and the Europeans emphasize peace operations and nation building? Why not have both do both?

-- I would think the discussion of the new Iraq UNSC resolution (page 25) will be overtaken by events.

-- Why fudge the discussion on page 25 of voting within NATO? If you think the veto is obsolete or undesirable given NATO's increase in size and the reality that it will mostly be dealing with challenges that will not fall under Article V, then there is a case for revising its decision-making.

-- I would not conflate your suggestions for the United States and Europe to promote economic growth and political reform in the developing world with a call for the two to actively promote political, economic, educational, etc reform in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The latter requires a different set of programs. I also question the need for a section on East Asia and, if you include it, the absence of a section on Africa.

-- You may want to sharpen the back end of the report by breaking out recommendations to the United States, those for Europe, and those for both.

I hope some of the above is useful. Over to you.

Cc: Jim Lindsay
Lee Feinstein

09/20/2003 17:44 FAX 202 518 3431
09/19/2003 09:13 FAX 212 454 9880

Council on For. Rel.
EXECUTIVE CFR

0006
0008/008

(L.C.)

turn itself into a single state expose a fundamental decep-
tion in the European project. The Europeans are not mul-
tilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn
Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a sin-
gle nation—with real power. It's true that even the French
have no grand design to take on the United States in some
new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The
kind of multilateralism they do believe in is the one that
uses institutions to hold American power in check.

Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of
Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign
policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult
enough over the Iraq war; it could make life in post-Sad-
dam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could
cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imag-
ing a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line
against the United States in the councils of NATO. Or
throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin
America or Africa.

And one other longstanding goal of U.S. policy could
also make European awkwardness more of a constraint for
America. It has long been an axiom of U.S. policy that
Europe should develop military capabilities of its own—
genuine ones that would enable Europe to fight hot wars
in difficult places and take some of the burden off the
Americans. This too has always been dubious policy. If a
united Europe really does develop enhanced capabilities,
it is inconceivable that it will not demand a bigger say in
the decision-making in new international crises.

Finally, there are those who accept all these premises,
but still say, What can the United States do about it? U.S.
intervention in a private debate won't help—and will
probably make matters worse. The one thing that would
make Europeans more determined to press ahead with
their project is the idea that the United States was trying
to stop it.

But this does not mean Washington is powerless. It
can do a number of useful things. Above all, it can
stop spouting the outdated Cold War idea that an
integrated Europe is in the best interests of the United
States. Can anyone now seriously believe that a single E.U.
foreign policy will be more helpful to the United States
than a British, a Polish, and a Spanish one?

Second, it should strengthen its political and military
ties with Eastern Europeans. Moving troops out of Ger-
many to Bulgaria, Romania, and perhaps other countries
is a smart move, as was offering the Poles a leading role in
postwar Iraq.

Third, it should temper its enthusiasm for the devel-
opment of stronger European military capabilities. Fran-

co-German-Belgian-Luxembourg plans for a core E.U.
military alliance can easily be laughed off. But in these
testing times, the United States should be extra careful
about a separate European identity within NATO.

Fourth, it should oppose any plans to change the mem-
bership of multilateral institutions to reflect a single
"European" identity. There should be no talk of a U.N.
Security Council seat for Europe, or the creation of a Unit-
ed States-Japan-Europe Group of Three in internadonal
economics to replace the G7.

Fifth, it should refrain from doing anything that
might help push Britain into the euro. Nothing would
represent a more fateful step for European integration
than Britain's joining this ill-starred project. U.S. officials
sometimes argue that the U.K.'s membership in the single
currency would help American businesses. There is scant
evidence for this, and the impetus such a British decision
would give to European superstatehood cannot. be
overstated.

In the end, U.S. policymakers should know that the
biggest threat posed for the United States by European
ambitions comes from inside Europe. Most ordinary
Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has already
been handed over to Brussels. The dynamic of European
integration is not a popular one, but one driven by politi-
cal elites, and there is already evidence of mounting
unease among the general public. The euro, the biggest
leap yet towards European statehood—and the monetary
and fiscal policies required to make it work—are causing
real stresses for Europeans.

There are signs of broader political unrest—of a grow-
ing mood of popular disenfranchisement, with increasing
support for extreme-right parties in France, Italy, Ger-
many, and even Britain, as voters react with irritation to
the growing gap between the governing institutions and
the governed. In the last three years, voters in Ireland and
Denmark have rejected grandiose E.U. integration plans
in referendums. Polls going into Sweden's September 14
referendum on joining the euro suggest the Swedes could
deliver another rebuke to the Euro-federalists.

But still the European creators press on, continuing to
shift power away from communities, regions, and nations
in favor of the emerging supranation in Brussels.

This is the ultimate irony. The Europeanists see them-
selves as latter-day Thomas Jeffersons and George Wash-
ingtons, creating a new state and a new continental global
power. But they are closer in spirit to George III and Gen-
eral Cornwallis—imposing a remote, burdensome, and
ultimately undemocratic authority on a reluctant people.
The risks for stability in Europe are obvious. It is not too
late for the United States to help stop the European super-
state from becoming a reality.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

THE WEEKLY STANDARD / 25

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The future of the trans-Atlantic relationship is more uncertain today than it has been at any point in the last half century. While there have been previous moments when American and European leaders disagreed on key issues, and where public opinions diverged sharply across the Atlantic, the current situation is, in important respects, unique.

Disagreements go not just to means towards shared ends but also to questions of ultimate purposes in a world where defense against the Soviet Union is no longer an imperative and where peaceful coexistence within Europe been achieved. The events of the last year surrounding the Iraq War have demonstrated dramatically the difficulty in finding common ground on matters of fundamental importance. Indeed, there is an increasing tendency in Europe to see containing American power as a primary objective of policy, and an increasing tendency in the United States to regard Europe as an irrelevance at best and an impediment at worst in the achievement of key national security objectives.

Given these circumstances, the Task Force believes that a fundamental reconsideration of the trans-Atlantic relationship is necessary. It will not be sufficient to acknowledge historic ties, note the enormity of global problems, highlight common democratic values, and commit to more conciliatory diplomacy in the future. Without a clear and newly grounded commitment to the relationship on the parts of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, and without a compelling shared vision for the alliance, we believe that current cleavages between the United States and Europe are only likely to increase.

Establishing a compelling vision for the trans-Atlantic relationship and sustaining a commitment to it will be a great challenge for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. The Soviet threat that acted as glue, holding the alliance together in the face of subsidiary disagreements, is no longer a factor, and there is an increasing tendency for the United States and Europe to compete for influence with Russia and the nations of the former Soviet Union. Substantial progress with respect to European integration reduces dependence on the United States and absorbs large amounts of political energy inward, at the same time encouraging the formation of a distinctively European identity. Inevitably, that European identity is defined in part in contrast to the United States positions on cultural, political, and

[LC]

security issues. An ironic consequence of the increased integration of ordinary life across the Atlantic is intensification of commercial rivalries and increased salience of cultural differences. Elites today are much less likely to look naturally and favorably across the Atlantic than was the case in the previous generation.

Despite these difficulties, the Task Force is convinced that the renewal of the trans-Atlantic relationship is essential. We categorically reject the idea put forth by some that with the Cold War won and European integration well advanced the alliance is no longer necessary nor sustainable. Failure to renew the relationship effectively in the years ahead carries with it a number of major risks:

* The United States will find itself alone or nearly alone as it confronts major security challenges. Without partners, American legitimacy will be reduced and its necessary resource commitments will be increased.

* European integration will inevitably suffer as some in Europe seek to make common cause with the United States while others do not.

* Over time there will be a tendency towards a return to great power politics reminiscent of the pre-World War I period, this time on a global scale as the United States and Europe seek separately to form alliances with other major powers.

* The opportunity for nations with half the world's wealth to cooperate in addressing global problems ranging from nuclear proliferation to global warming to achieving stability in the Muslim world will be put at risk.

* Without effective cooperation between the United States and Europe, the ability of international institutions ranging from the United Nations to the international financial institutions to the World Trade Organization to advance their objectives will be imperiled.

[LC]

It is noteworthy that all of these risks have been illustrated by events of the last year. The international legitimacy of the Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation has surely been diminished and its cost to the United States increased by the lack of full cooperation with Europe. Important fissures have emerged within Europe over the Iraq War. France and Germany have joined with Russia and China in seeking to use the United Nations to contain American power. And confidence in the United Nations and other international institutions has not been enhanced.

## Reestablishing the Relationship

One important part of the foundation for the trans-Atlantic alliance must be a common awareness of the costs of its dissolution. But this is surely insufficient as a basis for its continuing strength. The Task Force believes that the transatlantic relationship should be renewed on the basis of mutual respect for global agendas. The United States after, and even before, September 11 sees major global challenges as coming from terrorism, rogue states, and nuclear proliferation and sees the promotion of democracy and the market system as global priorities. For reasons that largely relate to historical experience, most European nations place much greater emphasis on a different set of problems—strengthening international law and institutions, meeting human needs, and building an integrated Europe.

In reality, both agendas will be fundamentally important for the United States and Europe over the next several decades. It would be tragic if cooperation were only possible in areas of highest priority on both sides of the Atlantic. Far better would be an approach in which there was mutual respect of others' priorities. This does not mean that nations would ever commit to do what they judged not in their interest. But it does mean that as a consequence of their common commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, the United States and Europe would commit to cooperating as much as possible on matters of priority to each other and would commit to not making common cause with adversaries of each other, and to not seeking to thwart others in achieving their primary objectives.

*****

(Contrast this approach with recent experience—European efforts to thwart US on Iraq, US disdain for treaty efforts on environment, criminal court...) Then move to policy agenda.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET • NEW YORK • NEW YORK 10021
Tel 212 434 9400 Fax 212 434 9880 www.cfr.org

September 30 Agenda

1:00-2:00 Working Lunch

Opening Remarks by Kissinger and Summers

Discussion of Structure, Thrust, and Tone of the Report

Chaired by Kissinger and Summers

2:00-3:00 Discussion of “Diagnosis” and “Implications” (pp. 1-10)

Chaired by Kissinger

3:00-4:00 Discussion of “Terms of a New Atlantic Partnership”

(pp. 10-17)

Chaired by Summers

4:00-5:00 Discussion of “New Rules of the Road” (pp. 17-23)

Chaired by Kissinger

5:00-6:00 Discussion of “Common Tasks and the New Agenda for

Cooperation” (pp. 23-31)

Chaired by Summers

Concluding Remarks by Kissinger and Summers

INDEX OF CFR TASK
FORCE MATERIAL

Session 4 - Tuesday, September 30, 2003

1 - Agenda

2 - Executive Summary from Larry Summers

3 - Draft Report version # 4 as of 9/22/03
(LATEST VERSION)

4 - Draft Report version #3 as of 9/17/03
with your edits

5 - Draft Report version # 2 as of 9/9/03

6 - Draft Report version # 1 as of 8/26/03
with your edits

7 - Version I & II of Draft Outline and
Summary of Findings 8/14/03

8 - Comments from Richard Haass

9 - Comments from Harold Brown

10 - Comments from Giuliano Amato

11 - Additional Reading

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

September 30 Agenda

1:00-2:00 **Working Lunch**
Opening Remarks by Kissinger and Summers
Discussion of Structure, Thrust, and Tone of the Report
Chaired by Kissinger and Summers

2:00-3:00 **Discussion of "Diagnosis" and "Implications" (pp. 1-10)**
Chaired by Kissinger

3:00-4:00 **Discussion of "Terms of a New Atlantic Partnership"**
(pp. 10-17)
Chaired by Summers

4:00-5:00 **Discussion of "New Rules of the Road" (pp. 17-23)**
Chaired by Kissinger

5:00-6:00 **Discussion of "Common Tasks and the New Agenda for Cooperation" (pp. 23-31)**
Chaired by Summers
Concluding Remarks by Kissinger and Summers

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*****

Jessee Incao

From: ckupchan@cfr.org
Sent: Monday, September 22, 2003 6:59 PM
Subject: CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations -- Draft Report

tfreport2.doc (131 KB)

To Task Force Participants:

Attached please find a draft of the Task Force Report, which we will discuss at our meeting on September 30. Please keep in mind that this document is very much a work-in-progress. Although I have consulted Henry and Larry while preparing this draft, they are not yet comfortable with it in its current form. The draft provides a basis for discussion and significant revisions will be made after the September 30 meeting. In addition, Henry and Larry plan to prepare an executive summary, which they will share with the group when we gather in New York next week.

For those of you able to attend the September 30 meeting, please come armed with constructive feedback. For those of you unable to attend, please email me your comments, preferably by September 29 so that I can share them with the group on September 30.

To remind, the meeting on September 30 will take place from 1:00-6:00 pm at the Council's New York office.

Many thanks in advance for your efforts.

Best,

Charlie

(See attached file: tfreport2.doc)

Jessee Incao

From: ckupchan@cfr.org
Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2003 7:59 PM
To: julia_topalian@harvard.edu; beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; lawrence_summers@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: cover memo and revised draft of Task Force report

To Task Force Participants.doc... tfreport2.doc (131 KB)

Dear Henry and Larry:

As we discussed earlier today, I am sending along 2 documents:

1. The cover memo that will accompany the draft report that I will be sending to Task Force members on Monday.

2. A revised version of the Task Force Report.

If you would like to make any changes to the cover memo or draft report before I circulate it to the group, please contact me by 5pm on Monday. I can be reached by phone at home tonight and tomorrow morning: 202 518-7021. During the afternoon on Monday, I will be at Georgetown: 202 687-3998. Later in the afternoon, I will be at the CFR: 202 518-3402.

My email is ckupchan@cfr.org and the best fax is 202 986-2984. If you try to reach me and I am in class (3-5pm), you can also contact my assistant, Jamie Fly at 202 518-3404 or jfly@cfr.org.

If I have not heard from you by 5pm, I will proceed to circulate the cover memo and draft report in their current versions.

I will be spending the second half of this week in Germany. Should you need to contact me between Wednesday and Sunday, please contact Jamie and he will track me down in Berlin.

I look forward to seeing you both on September 30.

Best,

Charlie

(See attached file: To Task Force Participants.doc) (See attached file: tfreport2.doc)

To Task Force Participants:

Attached please find a draft of the Task Force Report, which we will discuss at our
meeting on September 30. Please keep in mind that this document is very much a work-
in-progress. Although I have consulted Henry and Larry while preparing this draft, there
are still sections with which they are not yet comfortable. Accordingly, significant
revisions will be made after the September 30 meeting. In addition, Henry and Larry plan
to prepare an executive summary, which they will share with the group when we gather in
New York next week.

Best,

Charlie

Jessee Incao

From: Lawrence Summers [Lawrence_Summers@harvard.edu]
Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2003 11:10 PM
To: ckupchan@cfr.org; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Re: cover memo and revised draft of Task Force report

Charlie--I think given our problems on tone/style...you need to say something like, Henry and Larry are not yet comfortable with the draft in its current form but it provides a basis for discussion...don't imply that our problems are limited to certain sections. LarryAt 07:59 PM 9/21/2003 -0400, ckupchan@cfr.org wrote:

>Dear Henry and Larry:

>As we discussed earlier today, I am sending along 2 documents:

>1. The cover memo that will accompany the draft report that I will be sending to Task Force members on Monday.

>2. A revised version of the Task Force Report.

>If you would like to make any changes to the cover memo or draft report

>before I circulate it to the group, please contact me by 5pm on Monday.

>I can be reached by phone at home tonight and tomorrow morning: 202
>518-7021. During the afternoon on Monday, I will be at Georgetown: 202
>687-3998. Later in the afternoon, I will be at the CFR: 202 518-3402.

>My email is ckupchan@cfr.org and the best fax is 202 986-2984. If you
>try to reach me and I am in class (3-5pm), you can also contact my
>assistant, Jamie Fly at 202 518-3404 or jfly@cfr.org.

>If I have not heard from you by 5pm, I will proceed to circulate the
>cover memo and draft report in their current versions.

>I will be spending the second half of this week in Germany. Should you
>need to contact me between Wednesday and Sunday, please contact Jamie
>and he will track me down in Berlin.

>I look forward to seeing you both on September 30.

>Best,

>Charlie

>(See attached file: To Task Force Participants.doc) (See attached file:
>tfreport2.doc)

Page 1 of 2

Jessee Incao

From: CKupchan@cfr.org

Sent: Monday, September 22, 2003 3:08 PM

To: Lawrence Summers

Cc: jincao@kmaglobal.com

Larry:

Ok, I will make the suggested change in the cover memo before it goes out.

Charlie

-----Lawrence Summers <Lawrence_Summers@harvard.edu> wrote: -----

To: ckupchan@cfr.org, julia_topalian@harvard.edu, beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu, jincao@kmaglobal.com, tcimino@kmaglobal.com

From: Lawrence Summers <Lawrence_Summers@harvard.edu>

Date: 09/21/2003 11:10PM

>Dear Henry and Larry:

>

>

>

>

>If you would like to make any changes to the cover memo or draft report before I circulate it to the group, please contact me by 5pm on Monday. I can be reached by phone at home tonight and tomorrow morning: 202 518-7021. During the afternoon on Monday, I will be at Georgetown: 202 687-3998. Later in the afternoon, I will be at the CFR: 202 518-3402.

>

>My email is ckupchan@cfr.org and the best fax is 202 986-2984. If you try to reach me and I am in class (3-5pm), you can also contact my assistant, Jamie Fly at 202 518-3404 or jfly@cfr.org.

>

>If I have not heard from you by 5pm, I will proceed to circulate the cover memo and draft report in their current versions.

>

>I will be spending the second half of this week in Germany. Should you need to contact me between Wednesday and Sunday, please contact Jamie and he will track me down in Berlin.

>

>

9/26/2003

CFR TASK FORCE ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

DRAFT REPORT

# I. The Transatlantic Rift: Causes and Consequences

The transatlantic partnership, the anchor of the international system since World
War II, is at risk. America and Europe have recently clashed over a series of major issues
– the Iraq war, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, and the International Criminal
Court most prominent among them – raising the prospect that successive decades of
transatlantic cooperation could give way to mounting competition. Indeed, the divide
that opened over the Iraq war was a stark affirmation of the degree to which the Atlantic
Alliance has already corroded. That traditional allies like France and Germany
campaigned against the United States on a matter Washington deemed to be of vital
interest made clear the serious and unprecedented nature of the ongoing crisis in Atlantic
relations.

The current sense of estrangement should not be dismissed as just another friendly
quarrel. Relations between the United States and Europe have reached a historical
turning point. If, on the one hand, the present rift between America and Europe is left
unattended, it has the potential to erode the foundation of mutual trust and sense of
common destiny on which the transatlantic partnership rests. If, on the other hand,
America and Europe address the transatlantic divide with urgency and foresight, they
have the potential to rejuvenate their partnership and make it relevant to a changed world,
in the process ensuring that comity prevails over rivalry.

The stakes could not be higher. The rebuilding of an Atlantic partnership is a matter of the utmost importance. The transatlantic alliance was the foundation for the towering achievements of the twentieth century – the preservation and enlargement of democracy and capitalism and the establishment of an Atlantic zone of peace. The erosion of this partnership has the potential to jeopardize these historic accomplishments, risking the return of balance-of-power rivalry across the Atlantic, jeopardizing the effectiveness of international institutions, and unsettling the global economy.

Transatlantic cooperation also remains essential to meeting the new challenges of the twenty-first century – combating terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and poverty and instability in the developing world. As both sides of the Atlantic confront the current divide and formulate strategies for dealing with it, they must begin by realizing that a revitalized partnership is in the vital interests of America, Europe, and the broader international community.

This Task Force Report first examines the causes and consequences of the transatlantic rift. It then lays out a strategy for bridging the transatlantic divide, specifying the terms of a new Atlantic relationship and a policy agenda for forging a redefined partnership between the United States and Europe.

## Diagnosis

The principal causes of the new strains in Atlantic relations are structural in nature. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the threat that bound America and Europe together. A Europe at peace no longer depends upon the United States for its security and the maturing institutions of the European Union (EU) give its citizens a greater sense of self-reliance. As a result, Europe is more frequently developing its own

2

stance on major international issues and, on a growing number of fronts, is no longer
willing to follow Washington's lead. Meanwhile, America's role as Europe's pacifier
and protector has come to an end as the strategic priorities of the United States have
shifted to the Middle East and East Asia. The U.S. military presence in Europe will
shrink accordingly, with the forces that remain tasked primarily with rapid deployment to
non-European missions.

With their common aims in the Atlantic zone largely attained, much of the
transatlantic security agenda now focuses on the greater Middle East – where U.S. and
European approaches have traditionally diverged. The most acute threats to Atlantic
solidarity have historically emerged outside Europe – the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the pressing mission in Europe
prevented these differences from threatening alliance cohesion. Today, the geopolitical
landscape no longer ensures such solidarity. After the attacks of September 11, observers
on both sides of the Atlantic ventured that terrorism could potentially serve as the new
unifying threat. But as has since become clear, America and Europe have different
perceptions of the terrorist threat as well as different strategies for dealing with it, setting
the stage for the divide that opened wide during the war against Iraq.

Changes in the geopolitical landscape have further affected Atlantic relations by
elevating the impact of domestic politics on the conduct of foreign policy. During the
Cold War, geopolitical imperative disciplined politics on both sides of the Atlantic,
keeping at bay differences of both substance and style. This constraint no longer operates,
providing the latitude for a more contentious diplomacy to take hold. As a result, the
tensions arising from structural change have been exacerbated by political missteps in the

3

United States and Europe. Specific policy choices as well as provocative rhetoric have
made a clear contribution to the polarization of Atlantic relations.

Europeans complain regularly that American officials have too often opted for a
unilateralist and confrontational tone, costing Washington much good will across Europe.
Americans contend that European policymakers have too often embraced anti-American
sentiment for political gain, urging that the EU emerge as a counterweight to the United
States. Such matters of tone and style have politicized the rift and intensified the
acrimony on both sides, complicating the task of shoring up an Atlantic partnership
already buffeted by potent structural forces.

These clashes over substance and style have also isolated and weakened the
centrist political constituencies that traditionally kept Atlantic relations on track. Voices
of moderation and restraint have often been lost in the heated dialogue, leaving
unchecked the political forces in both the United States and Europe that are skeptical of,
if not averse to, efforts to sustain a strong Atlantic link. So too is generational change
taking a toll on the traditional Atlanticist constituencies. A new generation of leaders is
now in power on both sides of the Atlantic, one animated by different concerns than the
first and second post-war generations. Moreover, younger Americans and Europeans —
those coming of age after the fall of the Berlin Wall — will not embrace the same
Atlanticist spirit as those who lived through World War II, the rebuilding of Europe, and
the Cold War.

A final challenge to the integrity of the Atlantic partnership arises from the
ongoing changes in political identity taking place in America and Europe. During the
Cold War, the Atlantic democracies enjoyed a shared identity and sense of belonging to a

4

shared community, fostered to a large degree by the presence of the Soviet "other." That communal identity is in the midst of breaking down, in part because of the collapse of communism, but also because the political rift across the Atlantic is having broader social implications.

Especially after the Iraq war, Americans and Europeans have begun to see each other more as "other" than as "self." In today's charged atmosphere, differences in political culture that have existed for decades — over the death penalty, the penchant for using military force, or the appropriate scope of the welfare state, for example — are gaining saliency. This politicization of cultural difference is tearing at the Atlantic community's social fabric. The ethnic dimension of the Atlantic bond is poised to diminish as well, with Americans of European extraction expected to fall below fifty percent of the population by mid-century. The passage of time is thus likely to make even more challenging the maintenance of a communal identity that spans the Atlantic.

## Implications

The deterioration of relations between the United States and Europe has induced policymakers and opinion leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to question whether the preservation of a transatlantic partnership is desirable, even if it is feasible. Some Americans have become openly dismissive of Europe, portraying it primarily as a hindrance to U.S. efforts to provide global leadership. Some Europeans have become openly hostile toward the United States, portraying it as the main threat to international stability. Extremist voices on both sides of the Atlantic tend to provoke and strengthen extremist voices on the other. This dynamic risks fueling a broad-based attitudinal shift in which Americans and Europeans no longer sense that they share a common destiny.

5

If this unwelcome outcome is to be avoided, the transatlantic dialogue must shift away from the specific disagreements at hand and refocus on the common interests that are currently at risk. America and Europe over the second half of the twentieth century were able to accomplish a rare feat – the establishment of a zone of stable peace in which war became unthinkable and balance-of-power dynamics muted, if not eliminated. The success of the Atlantic democracies in setting aside great power politics represented a dramatic advance in the international system, replacing suspicion and endemic competition with trust and regularized cooperation.

After five steady decades, transatlantic comity is taken for granted. It would be a dangerous illusion, however, to presume that an Atlantic zone of peace is irreversible or to underestimate its importance to Americans and Europeans alike. The standoff over Iraq has already demonstrated the potential for the United States and key European allies to part company on matters of war and peace – with telling consequences. The U.S.-led military campaign was denied UN authorization, making it more difficult for the United States to legitimate the war among the world's electorates, even in countries such as Britain whose governments backed military action. The pre-war diplomatic stalemate then hampered post-war reconstruction efforts, imperiling coalition forces in Iraq.

Europe itself was dealt a serious setback, with the Franco-German coalition, the anchor of integration, finding itself at odds with many of its neighbors.

Should rivalry across the Atlantic come to prove the rule rather than the exception, geopolitical disagreement could well jeopardize collaboration on all fronts – with quite adverse effects. A primary source of stability in the current international system is the absence of great-power competition, relieving today's statesmen of the difficult challenge

6

of managing relations among competing poles of power. If the United States and Europe
more regularly find themselves as opponents than partners, the Atlantic zone of peace
could unravel, constituting a major historical setback and potentially clearing the way for
the onset of a balance-of-power system reminiscent of the pre-World War I era. It is not
just the Atlantic community that would suffer. A balance-of-power logic would likely
spread throughout the global system, providing incentives for Russia, China, Japan and
other major countries to engage in renewed jockeying for position and status. Less
developed areas would not remain immune, but instead again become the objects of
great-power rivalry.

Even if the United States and Europe were able to prevent their differences from
reawakening balance-of-power dynamics, the erosion of regularized U.S.-European
cooperation would likely imperil the global system's institutional infrastructure. Most
international institutions quietly depend on the Atlantic partnership to function effectively.
Whether at the UN, WTO, World Bank, or IMF, agreement across the Atlantic is usually
a prerequisite for effective action. Whether the challenge at hand is fighting disease and
poverty in Africa or averting bloodshed in the Balkans, Atlantic cooperation is the
essential ingredient. Should the United States and Europe go their separate ways,
international institutions may well become focal points of transatlantic tension rather than
tools for solving collective problems – as the recent disputes over the Kyoto Protocol and
International Criminal Court made clear. On a day-to-day basis, an interdependent
international community has come to rely on a thick and growing network of
international institutions – many of which would be compromised if the two sides of the
Atlantic no longer work in unison.

7

The erosion of the Atlantic partnership would also jeopardize the stability of the international economy. Although transatlantic commerce has thus far suffered few negative consequences as a result of ongoing diplomatic strains, political tensions do have the potential to spill over into the economic realm. Recent talk of transatlantic boycotts fortunately did not gather sustained momentum, but the calls for action were themselves alarming. Furthermore, looming challenges suggest a growing, not diminishing, need for economic cooperation across the Atlantic. The recent failure of the trade talks at Cancun puts particular pressure on the United States and Europe to tackle the problem of agricultural subsidies. The potential emergence of the euro as a global reserve currency may require greater transatlantic coordination on monetary policy. With America and Europe together representing over fifty percent of global output, the stability of the international economy remains heavily dependent on Atlantic cooperation.

The spread of democracy and interdependence may well ensure that entrenched geopolitical competition between America and Europe never returns. Even so, both sides of the Atlantic have compelling reasons for preserving more than just amity. American primacy may be uncontested, but the United States still needs allies. America required little help in its recent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it found itself very much in need of international assistance to bring stability to both countries. Much of America's global effort to combat terrorism relies on close cooperation among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of many countries. Promoting political and economic reform in the Islamic world, a top priority over the longer term, can be effectively addressed only if Washington works in union with others.

In similar fashion, Europeans are deluding themselves if they believe that the European Union will be better off if it steers clear of the United States and charts its own course. Within Europe itself, many critical tasks still require U.S. engagement, including preserving peace in the Balkans and consolidating reform among Europe's new democracies. In other quarters of the globe, where the EU's military and diplomatic muscle remains limited, Europeans depend on the United States to keep the peace. The burdens shouldered by the United States often serve Europe's interests as well as America's – and afford Europe the luxury of focusing its attention on the deepening and widening of the EU. Europe continues to need America at least as much as America continues to need Europe.

Despite their recent differences, the Atlantic partners still need each other. As America and Europe look for consistent and loyal allies, they will find no better option than one another. The two sides of the Atlantic have a long and successful history as partners, share democratic traditions, and still have common interests even if they at times differ as to how best to pursue those interests. Whatever the objective, it will be more easily attained if America and Europe work together. Both parties have every reason for making the rejuvenation of their partnership a top political and diplomatic priority.

The repair of Atlantic relations will not occur of its own accord. America and Europe do share common values and enjoy robust and mutually beneficial economic ties. But neither concerned citizens nor policymakers should place false confidence in the ability of common values or commercial linkages to preserve a healthy transatlantic relationship. The recent series of disputes across the Atlantic makes clear that America

9

and Europe can see each other as strategic competitors despite democratic traditions.

And history provides numerous examples of the ease with which geopolitical rivalry can overwhelm the cooperative incentives stemming from economic interdependence.

## II. Bridging the Transatlantic Divide

If the Atlantic partnership is to be reclaimed, Americans and Europeans must recognize that the old order is gone for good and that a fundamental reorientation of Atlantic relations is needed. Articulating a new vision of the transatlantic community and mapping out a strategy for bringing that vision to fruition entails addressing three main questions. First, what are the terms of a new Atlantic partnership? What policy adjustments do both sides of the Atlantic need to make to put their relationship on a cooperative trajectory? Second, what should be the guiding principles of a new Atlantic order? On what core issues do America and Europe need to fashion new rules of the road? Third, what are the common tasks that the United States and Europe must address together? What is the agenda for concrete cooperation?

### The Terms of a New Atlantic Partnership

The original Atlantic partnership arose in response to the Soviet threat. Its core principles were the indivisibility of transatlantic security and the shared commitment to collective defense. To translate these principles into practice and avoid decoupling, the United States codified its strategic commitment to Europe through Article V of the NATO Treaty and deployed U.S. troops along the central front in Germany. The U.S. security umbrella afforded Europe's democracies the opportunity to pursue economic and political integration. The United States strongly supported such integration, viewing

10

Europe's economic strength and political stability as essential to containing the Soviet threat.

This traditional bargain is now obsolete. Geopolitical change has made some degree of decoupling inevitable, challenging not just the viability of formal alliance, but also America's unconditional support for European unity. Especially since the standoff over Iraq, U.S. policy-makers have begun to question whether a stronger and more collective EU is indeed in America's interests. If the United States and Europe are to build a new relationship, they must therefore forge a common understanding of the terms of a new partnership and address how to adapt that partnership to the evolution of European integration.

## Forging a Looser but Broader Partnership

The Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is looser, but also broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, American and European security are no longer indivisible. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, WMD, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

The new strategic landscape will mean not just a looser partnership, but also one in which transatlantic unity will be strained by the geopolitical forces pushing America and Europe toward a geographic and functional division of labor. In geographic terms, Europe is focusing its primary attention and core military assets on consolidating peace on the European continent while America is increasingly concentrating its capabilities on promoting stability and meeting threats in other parts of the world. Primary

11

responsibility for managing European security is likely to shift, albeit gradually, from the United States to the EU. In functional terms, the size and quality of the U.S. military give America a unique war-fighting capability, while Europe's main contributions to international peace fall in the areas of economic assistance, nation-building, and peacekeeping.

Although this division of labor takes advantage of the complementary nature of American and European strengths, it does represent a strategic separation between the United States and Europe. This strategic separation is to some extent unavoidable; it is a logical consequence of the changing threat environment and Europe's limited ability to project power beyond its own neighborhood. Nonetheless, such a division of labor could prove politically divisive over time, with Americans complaining that they shoulder far greater risks and burdens than their European counterparts, and Europeans feeling as if they have been relegated to an ancillary "clean-up" role.

It is precisely because transatlantic unity will no longer be driven by geopolitical imperative that both America and Europe must now work harder to sustain their partnership. The United States should ensure that it remains engaged in Europe even as it focuses its attention on other quarters. The EU should shoulder increased international responsibilities by increasing its involvement in war-fighting, nation-building, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention in areas outside Europe. As Europe's institutional and military capacities evolve over time, the EU could down the road become a more complete partner of the United States on a global basis.

If a new transatlantic bargain is to emerge along these lines, the United States must reassure Europe of its commitment to the habits of consultation and cooperation that

12

are the foundation of partnership. America's international dominance remains unchallenged, making it possible – and necessary – for the United States to wield its power with restraint and to share leadership with others in order to win their consent. In the words of Tony Blair, the United States should lead through persuasion rather than command, building coalitions on the basis of its moral authority and legitimacy rather than its coercive potential. Otherwise, the United States may well find potential partners more likely to rally against, rather than behind, American leadership.

In return, even as Europe focuses on consolidating a peaceful continent, it must do more to recognize the new strategic environment and help address new threats. In particular, the EU should seek to forge with the United States a common approach to the new security agenda, updating both practice and principle to the challenges posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the potential need for preventive war. It should also acquire the means to make a greater contribution to joint efforts to meet these challenges.

By granting Europe more voice, America is likely to find in Europe a partner more willing to share the burdens associated with international stability. By more readily working with Washington to meet new international threats, Europe is likely to find in America a brand of leadership more to its liking. Building a new foundation for Atlantic solidarity requires that America offer Europe a greater role in addressing the challenges of the day and that Europe succeed in taking up that greater role.

## Adapting to the Evolution of European Unification

As they seek to define the terms of a new Atlantic partnership, the United States and Europe need to address how to adjust their relationship to the ongoing process of

European integration. The United States has generally supported European unification as it has evolved over the past five decades. Washington has viewed integration as a vehicle for democratizing and pacifying Europe, for expanding international trade and investment, and for creating a more effective partner on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States has reaped considerable benefit from the success of European integration.

Americans no longer need to stand guard on the continent to keep Europe's great powers at bay. They share in Europe's prosperity, with transatlantic commerce reaching $2.5 trillion per year and employing directly or indirectly some 12 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic.¹ And a more unified Europe has often supported U.S. efforts to liberalize the global economy and provide effective international leadership.

Amid its steady support for European unity, however, the United States has maintained quiet reservations about a Europe that could become too strong, challenging U.S. leadership as its growing power leads to a desire for more autonomy. This concern became more pronounced over the course of the past decade due to Europe's diminished strategic dependence on the United States and the EU's efforts both to build its own Rapid Reaction Force and to further centralize decision-making on matters of foreign and security policy.

The Iraq war turned the potential for a strategic rift between the United States and Europe into reality. It also divided Europe itself, with France and Germany finding themselves facing a broad coalition of current and prospective EU members that supported the United States. In the aftermath of the war, those countries that backed U.S. policy have enjoyed much closer relations with the United States than those that did not.

¹ Joseph Quinlan, *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), p. 3.

They have also been more willing to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts, with Poland assuming command of one of the military sectors in Iraq. The ability of the United States to benefit from internal divisions within Europe has understandably prompted Washington to reconsider the desirability of further European unity, particularly in the realm of defense.

The pace and scope of European integration are matters that are the domain primarily of Europe's own citizens. How the United States deals with Europe will to a significant degree depend upon how the EU's leaders and electorates guide the union's evolution. Nonetheless, developments inside Europe affect U.S. interests and U.S. policy can have a direct impact on the trajectory of European integration. Both sides of the Atlantic would thus benefit from a common understanding of U.S. policy toward the evolution of the EU. The Task Force recommends the following guidelines.

As it has for the past five decades, the United States should continue to back European integration. Unlike during the Cold War, however, such support should be premised upon an EU that uses its increasing power and collective character to work with, rather than against, the United States. Should the EU cast itself as a counterweight to the United States, Washington would be justified to withhold support for deeper integration. Should the EU, as it has done historically, instead pursue a common agenda with the United States, Washington should view deepening and widening as in America's interest – and thus welcome greater European unity. A deeper Europe ensures the irreversibility of union and could potentially lead to a more collective and militarily able EU – one capable of becoming a more effective partner of the United States. A wider Europe helps to ensure that peace, democracy, and prosperity will continue to spread eastward.

15

Both sides of the Atlantic have an important role to play in channeling the EU's power and purpose in the appropriate direction. Europe's leaders must cease adopting anti-American positions and defining the EU's identity in opposition to the United States, which they have been doing with increasing frequency both to win votes and to build popular support for European integration. Touting the EU as a counterweight to America, even if more rhetoric than reality, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy by fueling transatlantic tension and ensuring that Washington looks askance at deeper union.

Instead, centrist voices across the continent need to call for a Europe that remains a steady partner of the United States even as the EU deepens its collective character and broadens its influence.

For its part, Washington needs to recognize that its policies as well as its tone are leading to adverse changes in perceptions of the United States among European publics. Opinion surveys reveal a sharp upturn in anti-American sentiment in many European countries – one of the reasons politicians have embraced it for political gain.²

Washington thus needs to adopt a more pliant and responsive brand of leadership if younger Europeans are to retain the affinity for America that helped maintain decades of partnership across the Atlantic. The political mainstream needs to assert its influence

²For the results of public opinion surveys, see The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties," March 18, 2003. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=175; The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," April 17, 2002. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=153; The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen as Unilateralist," August 15, 2001. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=5; German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, "Transatlantic Trends 2003," September 4, 2003. Available at: http://www.transatlantictrends.org/; and German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "Worldviews 2002," September 4, 2002. Available at: http://www.worldviews.org/. See also Thomas Crampton, "Europeans' doubt over U.S. policy rises," *The International Herald Tribune*, September 4, 2003.

16

over the transatlantic dialogue, ensuring that relations with Europe receive the sustained
and constructive diplomatic efforts that they deserve.

It is also the case that the United States can afford to be relatively relaxed about
the challenge posed by a rising Europe; for the foreseeable future European weakness
will present more of a threat to the transatlantic relationship than European strength. The
EU falls far short of speaking with a single voice on matters of foreign policy and its
military capability, despite recent reforms, remains quite limited. The impending entry of
ten new members will absorb considerable attention and resources in the next few years,
making it unlikely that the EU will make substantial progress on forging a common
security policy and acquiring the assets needed to back it up. Europe's shortcomings on
this front are one of the main reasons that a strategic separation is taking place across the
Atlantic.

From this perspective, a more collective and capable Europe, provided that the
EU throws its weight behind rather than against U.S. leadership, could help put the
Atlantic link on a more sound foundation. So too could the planned appointment of a
single foreign minister for the EU go at least part way toward providing Washington the
single point of contact for which it has often asked. The key issue for now is not whether
the U.S. should welcome such developments, but whether Europe will in fact follow
through with its plans. If it does, the United States will at least have the opportunity to
look to Europe as a more mature partner.

## New Rules of the Road

As the United States and Europe seek to preserve an Atlantic zone of peace and
prevent backsliding toward balance-of-power competition, they must sustain adherence to

17

a common set of legitimating norms and procedures. Doing so entails revisiting the
principles and institutional architecture that have guided the Atlantic democracies since
World War II. As the tortured diplomacy over the Iraq war made amply clear, the end of
the Cold War and the events of September 11 have called into question the international
system's guiding norms and the institutions that embody them. In this sense, the
international community has arrived at a historical intersection every bit as fundamental
as the turning points that emerged after World War I and World War II. The rules of the
road that guide U.S.-European relations need to be revised and international institutions
updated accordingly.

Although redefining the parameters of international legitimacy will ultimately
require wide-ranging deliberations, a U.S.-European dialogue is an appropriate starting
point. A broader revision of guiding norms will be much easier to achieve at the UN –
perhaps through the formation of an informal “Caucus of the Democracies” – if
agreement is first reached among the Atlantic democracies. The agenda for a
transatlantic dialogue on revising the rules of the road and reforming institutions should
include, but not be restricted to, the following issues:

*The Legitimate Use of Force.* Prevailing international norms, as enshrined in the UN Charter, generally treat the use of force as legitimate only when such action takes the form of self-defense against aggression or is approved by the UN Security Council. Recent violations of these norms, as well as the emergence of new threats to international peace, necessitate their reconsideration. The threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of WMD to rogue nations, as well as the need to avert humanitarian emergencies and stop crimes against humanity, may under some circumstances require

18

preventive war or preemptive action. And as the Atlantic democracies recently found in Yugoslavia, they may at times feel compelled to take military action despite the absence of UN authorization.

Europe and the United States should engage in a constructive dialogue about preventive war, preemptive action, and the appropriate role of international institutions in authorizing the use of force. Recent planning documents adopted by the EU call for a more robust strategy of intervention to address threats from terrorism and WMD, suggesting that the two parties might find more common ground than initially presumed.³ Amity across the Atlantic is far more likely to be preserved if both parties search for a common understanding than if they simply tolerate the continued divergence of practice from principle.

*The Role of Institutions and Multilateralism.* Different views of the efficacy and desirability of specific international institutions have been one of the main sources of transatlantic tension. Opposing positions on the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court contributed substantially to the polarization that characterized Atlantic relations well before the falling out over Iraq. Divergent approaches to the UN's role in Iraq and the utility of the ABM Treaty and other arms control agreements have reinforced the perception that Americans have become diehard unilateralists while Europeans are stalwart multilateralists.

This perception overstates the nature of the problem. The United States and the EU have clashed over the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC, the ABM Treaty, and the UN's role in Iraq mainly because of substantive disagreements on policy, not theological

³ See, for example, “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Council of Ministers, June 2003, 10352/03; and Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” Council of Ministers, June 2003, S0138/03.

19

differences over the appropriate role of international institutions. Had the United States
and Europe been able to forge a consensus on the underlying issues at hand, disputes over
procedure would have been significantly moderated. To be sure, Americans and
Europeans do have somewhat different proclivities. Europe's greater enthusiasm for
multilateralism arises from its own success in using institutions and attenuated
sovereignty to build a continent at peace. America's more ambivalent approach stems
from its primacy as well as from a political culture that has historically attached great
weight to sovereignty and freedom from external constraint. Nonetheless, as the Cold
War era made clear, when the United States and Europe agree on the substantive policy
issues, an appropriate institutional framework for implementing policy usually follows.

Both sides of the Atlantic have compelling reasons to strike new institutional
bargains. Europe will find international institutions much less effective if the world's
only superpower steps away from them. And even though the United States might at
times prefer to wield its primacy in unfettered fashion, it suffers a loss of popular support
abroad when it is seen as acting unilaterally, making it harder for Washington to find
willing allies and achieve its objectives.⁴ In addition, many U.S. goals — fighting
terrorism, stemming the proliferation of WMD, managing the global economy — can be
effectively pursued only through multilateral efforts.

The outlines of a new bargain may well emerge amid a transatlantic dialogue
about adapting institutions to geopolitical realities. Should Europe agree to craft
institutions that better meet the challenges of the day, the United States would be more
likely to work within those institutions, reaping the benefits of their enhanced utility and
restoring confidence abroad in the character of U.S. leadership.

⁴See, for example, question 7\g, p. 21, "Transatlantic Trends 2003."

20

*The Containment of Disagreements.* In the absence of the Soviet threat and in the face of a wide array of new challenges, America and Europe will disagree more frequently than during the Cold War. They must therefore map out new rules of the road to ensure that such disagreements do not undermine transatlantic solidarity. It is particularly important that the United States and Europe avoid directly blocking or undermining each other's initiatives. Opting out of joint military action, rather than directly opposing such action, provides one potential option. The nineteenth-century Concert of Europe offers a useful model in this respect.⁵ More effective public diplomacy can also help contain the corrosive political effects of substantive policy differences.

*Updating Transatlantic Institutions.* The institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship has become obsolete. NATO remains an important institution, but its centrality and cohesion have been diminished by the end of the Cold War, the changing security agenda, and the unwieldiness that comes with a growing membership. Moreover, many of the new issues requiring transatlantic cooperation fall outside the traditional realm of defense. Accordingly, NATO is not suited to continue serving as the primary institutional bond between America and Europe. Nor are other institutions picking up the slack. Official contacts through the U.S. mission to the EU and the EU mission to the United States remain quite circumscribed and are largely commercial in nature. Regular U.S.-EU summits continue, but they remain more ceremonial than

⁵ Concert members often used abstention from participation in joint action as a way of containing disagreements. In 1820, for example, following a liberal uprising in Naples, Austria, Prussia, and Russia wanted to intervene to squash the uprising and reverse the threat it posed to conservative political forces. The British opposed intervention and refused Metternich's suggestion that they participate in suppressing the revolt. Rather than risk comity among the great powers, however, Castlereagh ultimately assented to the operation even though Britain opted out of participation.

21

substantive. Meanwhile, high-level U.S. diplomats have been traveling to Europe much less frequently than during the 1990s, contributing to a thinning out of the transatlantic dialogue.

The Task Force recommends establishing a new oversight body for the Atlantic community. This body would take the form of a small standing council of high-level U.S. and European officials. It would have a broad purview, covering diplomatic, defense, and commercial matters. In design and function, it might resemble the EU Commission, seeking to provide the same oversight and initiative for the transatlantic community that the Commission has provided for Europe. The council would help coordinate U.S. and European policy on a day-to-day basis. It would serve as a vehicle for improving joint management of emerging crises and provide a regular forum for a continuing dialogue about updating the rules of the road and reforming international institutions.

The council's composition and procedures would emerge through transatlantic negotiations. A variable geometry might prove most effective. For example, a core staff could handle routine matters while contact groups – similar to those that have recently proved valuable in dealing with conflict in the Balkans and Middle East – could be convened to deal with specific issues. The council might also include congressional and parliamentary representatives in order to deepen contact between U.S. and European legislators.

The overriding goal of this new council and the broader dialogue that it would oversee would be to help build a stable floor beneath the success of the United States and Europe in carving out an Atlantic zone of peace. That success may well be jeopardized

22

unless the two parties jointly map out common understandings and update the
international system's guiding principles and institutions to a changed world.

As they seek to redefine the Atlantic relationship, the United States and Europe
must not just forge a new understanding of guiding norms, but also identify the tasks
upon which a new partnership will be based. Concrete cooperation in the pursuit of
common aims, by demonstrating the merits of restored partnership, will breathe new life
into the Atlantic community. These common tasks fall into two main areas: recasting the
traditional defense partnership, and defining a new agenda for global cooperation.

Recasting the Traditional Defense Partnership

NATO's Continuing Relevance. A Europe at peace and America's shifting strategic priorities have deprived NATO of its former centrality. Nonetheless, NATO continues to fulfill important functions and the interests of America and Europe alike would suffer if the alliance unravels. As this Task Force recommends, a new transatlantic institution with a broader mandate is needed and should be high on the agenda. In the meantime, however, NATO remains the primary institutional linkage across the Atlantic and the most appropriate forum for U.S.-European consultation on the full range of security matters. Unless and until a new institution emerges, it would be prudent to preserve NATO's role as the Atlantic community's main deliberative body.

It is also the case that NATO continues to perform essential military tasks.
Although the bloodshed has ended in the Balkans, there remains much unfinished
business in the region and the alliance continues to preserve an uneasy peace. Even as
the EU gradually assumes from NATO increased responsibility for peacekeeping in

23

Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, the alliance must stay engaged to prevent backsliding and help address residual political and territorial issues.

Although Europe's lack of power projection capability has diminished NATO's relevance to America's new security concerns outside Europe, the EU's capacities in peacekeeping and nation-building have proved crucial to backing up America's war-fighting capacity. NATO's integrated military structure provides a valuable vehicle for making the most of the complementary nature of European and American capabilities.

NATO is now in command of peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, may well become more involved in Iraq, and could potentially play a major role in facilitating a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Finally, NATO remains an important institution for encouraging reform and integration in Europe's periphery, particularly in Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine. Turkish membership in NATO has helped strengthen Turkey's westward orientation. The NATO-Russia Council has given Moscow a sought-after voice in the alliance and contributed to a new level of concrete cooperation between Russia and the United States.

The allure of potential NATO membership as well as activities carried out under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace program have helped promote reform in Central Europe, Ukraine, and other countries in Eastern Europe. As the United States focuses its primary attention on the struggle against terrorism, NATO continues to facilitate the quiet consolidation of peace in Europe's east and south.

*Adapting NATO to New Conditions.* As NATO continues to fulfill these essential functions, it should also seek to increase its relevance by pursuing several key reforms. First, as mentioned above, an undeniable strategic separation is taking place across the

24

Atlantic, with Europe no longer enjoying its pride of place among America's strategic priorities. As primary responsibility for managing European security shifts to the EU and as Europe's defense responsibilities evolve, NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized to ensure transparency and prevent institutional rivalry. And the United States, even as it draws down the number of troops deployed on the continent, should maintain a presence sufficient to preserve both interoperability and the sense of collective purpose that arises from the integrated military structure. The opening of new U.S. bases in Central Europe should not come at the expense of the quality of military-to-military contacts with traditional allies in Western Europe.

Second, NATO must find the appropriate balance between a new emphasis on out-of-area missions and its traditional focus on European security. NATO's continued relevance to the United States will in part depend on its engagement in areas outside Europe. On the other hand, seeking to turn the alliance into a vehicle for global force projection would likely be its death-knell, confronting Europe with demands for which it has neither the military resources nor the political appetite. To fashion an appropriate compromise, Washington should agree to keep a hand in the management of European security and traditional NATO missions – particularly in southeast Europe. In return, Europe should agree to maximize NATO's involvement in peacemaking and peacekeeping out-of-area. NATO members would be wise to adapt force capabilities accordingly, investing in strategic lift as well as in training for nation-building tasks such as peacekeeping and policing. They should also expand alliance activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, areas of growing interest to both the United States and Europe due to the struggle against terrorism and NATO and EU enlargement.

25

In the context of NATO's broadening role outside Europe, it is essential for both the United States and EU members to secure the alliance's involvement in stabilizing Iraq. Bringing peace and order to Iraq is now at the top of America's strategic priorities. Washington's future assessments of how much to invest in NATO may well turn on the ability of the alliance to contribute to the mission in Iraq. Both the United States and the EU thus have an overriding interest in securing NATO's engagement on the ground. NATO should also expand its peacekeeping role in Afghanistan to areas outside Kabul. Stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan, although progressing, require additional resources.

Third, NATO must face the reality that many future missions are likely to be carried out by coalitions of the willing, not the alliance as a whole. As a result, NATO should consider changing its unanimity rule and more regularly relying on smaller contact groups to facilitate effective decision-making, especially with membership growing to twenty-six. The alliance should standardize procedures for allowing individual members to opt out of specific missions, reducing the likelihood that disagreement cause paralysis. NATO members should also put a premium on pre-war consultation as a means of avoiding open and acrimonious stand-offs of the type that occurred over the Iraq war. Even if the alliance chooses not to engage in a specific operation, a respectful and judicious deliberation prior to conflict will make it more likely that NATO engage in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

## Defining a New Agenda for Global Cooperation

With Europe enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many of the challenges which America and Europe must address together lie outside both the

26

traditional realm of security and the Atlantic zone. Formulating a joint strategy for
dealing with these challenges will enhance global stability, help reduce the socio-
economic divide between richer and poorer nations, and serve as a pragmatic means of
breathing new life into the transatlantic partnership.

*The Global Economy.* The United States and the EU remain the engines of global growth and the stewards of the international economy. Their commercial relationship remains healthy and mutually beneficial. Although commercial ties alone are insufficient to serve as the foundation of a broader strategic partnership, they certainly provide strong incentives for both sides of the Atlantic to resolve their political differences. The United States and the EU should develop a new agenda for economic cooperation consisting of the following steps.

* Help stimulate the global economy by stimulating growth at home. For the United States, this entails implementing a fiscal stimulus while taking responsible steps to avoid a ballooning budget deficit over the long term. For Europe, this means liberalizing its financial services and labor markets, reforming pension systems, and easing fiscal constraints.

* Further liberalize U.S.-EU trade and work toward successful completion of the Doha round of world trade negotiations. As the recent failure of trade talks in Cancun make clear, eliminating tariffs on and subsidies of textiles and agricultural goods is of particular importance because of the benefit to developing countries.

* Take steps to insulate U.S.-EU commercial relations from political rivalry. Political tensions have affected trade only at the margins, but they do have the potential to spill over into the commercial realm. Both sides should avoid the talk of boycotts that emerged amid the Iraq war and pursue gestures of good will, such as settling differences over U.S. tax subsidies for U.S. firms operating abroad and European restrictions on imports of genetically modified foods.

* Enhance U.S.-EU efforts to make the G-8 a more effective forum for managing the global economy.

*Non-Military Aspects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation.* Much of the struggle against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction entails

27

political cooperation rather than military action. The United States and Europe should
address a number of fronts.

* Deepen intelligence, law enforcement, and financial cooperation on disrupting and dismantling terrorist networks.

* Tighten and make more intrusive counter-proliferation regimes, both to make them more effective and to build U.S. support for multilateral efforts.

* Close ranks on dealing with Iran, the next potential source of transatlantic discord in the Middle East. The notion of contingent engagement could provide considerable common ground. The United States should agree to soften its policy of isolation, provided that Iran agrees to cease its nuclear weapons program. Europe in turn should agree that its strategy of engagement would be ended if Iranian cooperation is not forthcoming.

*The Middle East Peace Process.* The greater Middle East will continue to present the most pressing and imminent threats to the common interests of the United States and Europe. Bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict is a critical component of addressing these threats. With violence imperiling the road map, the United States and Europe must step up efforts to coordinate their diplomacy.

* Expand the use of the Quartet to develop and monitor joint initiatives.

* Work to diminish European claims that the United States is too pro-Israel and Europe too pro-Palestinian by developing a common set of standards by which to judge Israeli and Palestinian adherence to the road map.

* More effectively use EU financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority to promote political reform and enhance its ability to crack down on militant groups.

*Economic Growth and Political Reform in the Developing World.* The United States and Europe need to develop a long-term strategy for fostering economic development and political liberalization in the developing world. Otherwise, they will continue to find themselves struggling against the adverse symptoms of illiberal regimes and failed states rather than attacking their root causes. Specific elements of a U.S.-European development program should include the following:

28

* Eliminate trade barriers with developing regions in order to promote growth.

* Build on the Bush administration's Millennium Challenge Account and secure better coordination among U.S. and EU programs; expand U.S. efforts to tie aid to good governance and harmonize conditionality with the EU.

* Improve coordination among the assistance programs of individual countries, NGOs, and major international institutions in order to increase efficiency and minimize waste.

* Increase available funding for HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.

* Deepen cooperation to improve education and health care systems. At relatively low cost, the U.S. and Europe have the potential to markedly expand access to education and basic health care, both of which are critical to social and economic development.

* Map out new rules of the road for humanitarian intervention in Africa and help develop indigenous African peacekeeping capabilities to prevent and halt civil wars and ethnic conflict.

* Work toward a new regime for meeting environmental challenges that encompasses both the industrialized and the developing world.

*East Asia.* The United States remains the dominant extra-regional actor in East Asia. Nonetheless, through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and less regularized channels, the EU is enlarging its diplomatic and economic engagement in the region. This development provides an opportunity for enhanced U.S.-European cooperation in the region, but also a new arena for competition. Guidelines for facilitating transatlantic cooperation in East Asia include:

* Trade liberalization in the region should move forward multilaterally and not favor either the United States or the EU.

* Although the EU is not represented in the six-party talks aimed at dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the EU should be consulted and encouraged to backstop the negotiations and contribute to prospective aid packages.

* As they did in clearing the way for China's entry into the WTO, the United States and Europe should map out a joint strategy for promoting political reform in China and drawing the country more fully into international markets and institutions.

## Conclusions

29

This report makes three main contributions to ongoing deliberations about the state of the transatlantic relationship. First, the Task Force concludes that the U.S.-European partnership faces grave challenges to its relevance arising from fundamental geopolitical changes. The resulting tensions have been exacerbated by political missteps and provocative rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic. As they seek to repair their relationship, Americans and Europeans will be best served if they acknowledge the gravity of the crisis in Atlantic relations, understand its deeper structural origins, and appreciate that more than cosmetic efforts are required to sustain their partnership.

Second, the Task Force concludes that preserving a strong Atlantic partnership is in the vital interests of Americans and Europeans alike and is a matter of the greatest import to the broader international community. Should cooperation between the United States and Europe give way to competition, an Atlantic zone of peace could unravel, the international system could witness the return of balance-of-power dynamics, the global economy could fall prey to protectionism and go-it-alone policies reminiscent of the 1930s, and efforts to combat terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and other pressing challenges would be dealt a serious blow. Reclaiming the U.S.-Europe partnership should be a top priority for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic.

Third, the Task Force lays out a policy strategy for bridging the transatlantic divide. This report identifies the terms of a recast Atlantic bargain, encourages the United States and Europe to map out new rules of the road and update Atlantic institutions, and specifies the common tasks upon which a new partnership would be based. Should America and Europe together pursue this agenda, they have the potential to ensure that a

Jessee Incao

From: ckupchan@cfr.org
Sent: Wednesday, September 17, 2003 4:57 PM
To: beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; lawrence_summers@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com; jfly@cfr.org

tfreport2.doc (127 KB)

Dear Henry and Larry,

Attached please find a new draft of the CFR Task Force Report. As I noted in an email sent at the end of last week, I would like to suggest a repackaging of the main sections of the report to make it more straightforward and accessible. I have gone ahead and made these changes in the attached draft. I believe these changes significantly moderate the "academic tone" of the report ? which both of you recommended when we last spoke ? and will enhance its impact.

The new section headings are as follows: The Terms of a New Atlantic Bargain, New Rules of the Road, Common Tasks and the New Agenda for Cooperation.

The main changes in this draft are at the beginning of each section: pp. 8-9, 16, and 21. I have also folded the discussion of European integration into the New Bargain section (pp. 14-15) and slightly revised this section. I also revised the conclusion (pp. 28-29).

I would like to send out a draft of the report to the Task Force this Monday, September 22, to ensure that the members have time to go over it carefully before our meeting on September 30. I am going to try to arrange a conference call for either Friday or Saturday to discuss this draft. Any desired changes not made by Monday can of course be made later as we revise the document in response to feedback from the Task Force members.

Best,

Charlie(See attached file: tfreport2.doc)

DRAFT REPORT

The transatlantic partnership, the anchor of the international system since World
War II, is currently at risk. America and Europe have recently clashed over a series of
major issues – the Iraq war, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, and the International
Criminal Court most prominent among them – raising the prospect that successive
decades of transatlantic cooperation could give way to mounting competition. Indeed,
the divide that opened over the Iraq war was a stark affirmation of the degree to which
the Atlantic Alliance has already corroded. That traditional allies like France and
Germany campaigned against the United States on a matter Washington deemed to be of
vital interest made clear the serious and unprecedented nature of the ongoing crisis in
Atlantic relations.

The current sense of estrangement should not be dismissed as just another friendly
quarrel. Relations between the United States and Europe have reached a historical
turning point. If, on the one hand, the present rift between America and Europe is left
unattended, it has the potential to erode the foundation of mutual trust and sense of
common destiny on which the transatlantic partnership rests. If, on the other hand,
America and Europe address the transatlantic divide with urgency and foresight, they
have the potential to rejuvenate their partnership and ensure that comity prevails over
rivalry.

The stakes could not be higher. The transatlantic partnership was the foundation for the towering achievements of the twentieth century – the preservation and enlargement of democracy and capitalism and the establishment of an Atlantic zone of peace. The erosion of this partnership has the potential to jeopardize these historic accomplishments, risking the return of balance-of-power rivalry across the Atlantic, jeopardizing the effectiveness of international institutions, and unsettling the global economy. Transatlantic cooperation also remains essential to meeting the new challenges of the twenty-first century – combating terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and poverty and instability in the developing world. As both sides of the Atlantic confront the current divide and formulate strategies for dealing with it, they must begin by realizing that a revitalized partnership is in the vital interests of America, Europe, and the broader international community.

This Task Force Report first examines the causes and consequences of the transatlantic rift. It then lays out a strategy for bridging the transatlantic divide, specifying the terms of a new Atlantic bargain and a policy agenda for forging a redefined partnership between the United States and Europe.

Diagnosis

The underlying causes of the new strains in Atlantic relations are structural in nature. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the principal threat that bound America and Europe together. A Europe at peace no longer depends upon the United States for its security and the maturing institutions of the European Union (EU) give its citizens a greater sense of self-reliance. As a result, Europe is more frequently developing its own stance on major international issues and is no longer willing to always

With their common aims in the Atlantic zone largely attained, much of the transatlantic security agenda now focuses on the Middle East – where U.S. and European approaches have traditionally diverged. The most acute threats to Atlantic solidarity have historically emerged from the developing world – the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the pressing mission in Europe prevented these differences from threatening alliance cohesion. Today, the geopolitical landscape no longer ensures such solidarity. After the attacks of September 11, observers on both sides of the Atlantic ventured that terrorism could potentially serve as the new unifying threat. But as has since become clear, America and Europe have different perceptions of the terrorist threat as well as different strategies for dealing with it, setting the stage for the divide that opened over the war against Iraq.

Changes in the geopolitical landscape have further affected Atlantic relations by elevating the impact of domestic politics on the conduct of foreign policy. During the Cold War, geopolitical imperative disciplined politics on both sides of the Atlantic, keeping at bay differences of both substance and style. This constraint no longer operates, providing the latitude for a more contentious diplomacy to take hold. Europeans complain that American officials have too often opted for a unilateralist and confrontational tone, costing Washington much good will across Europe. Americans

A final challenge to the integrity of the Atlantic partnership arises from the ongoing changes in political identity taking place in America and Europe. During the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies enjoyed a shared identity and sense of belonging to a shared community, fostered to a large degree by the presence of the Soviet "other." That communal identity is in the midst of breaking down, in part because of the collapse of communism, but also because the political rift across the Atlantic is having broader social implications. Especially after the Iraq war, Americans and Europeans have begun to see each other more as "other" than as "self." In today's charged atmosphere, differences in political culture that have existed for decades – over the death penalty, the penchant for using military force, or the appropriate scope of the welfare state, for example – are gaining salience. The politicization of cultural difference is tearing at the Atlantic community's social fabric.

Demographic change is contributing to the transformation of communal identities. Younger Americans and Europeans – those who are coming of age after the fall of the Berlin Wall – will not embrace the same Atlanticist spirit as those who lived through World War II, the rebuilding of Europe, and the Cold War. The ethnic dimension of the Atlantic bond is also poised to diminish. Americans of European extraction will fall below fifty percent of the population by mid-century, with the country's Hispanic

4

population growing rapidly. Meanwhile, the percentage of Moslems in Europe's population will steadily increase.¹ The passage of time is thus likely to make even more challenging the maintenance of a communal identity that spans the Atlantic.

## Implications

If this outcome is to be avoided, the transatlantic dialogue must shift away from the specific disagreements at hand and refocus on the common interests that are currently at risk. America and Europe over the second half of the twentieth century were able to accomplish a rare feat – the establishment of a zone of stable peace in which war became unthinkable and balance-of-power dynamics muted, if not eliminated. The success of the Atlantic democracies in setting aside great power politics represents a dramatic advance in the international system, replacing suspicion and endemic competition with trust and regularized cooperation. If the United States and Europe

¹ Hispanics will represent one-quarter of the U.S. population by mid-century, and one-third by the end of the century. The percentage of Moslems in Europe's population will be affected by future decisions on immigration policy and enlargement. Estimates suggest that Europe will be twenty percent Moslem by 2050.

5

return to being competitors, this Atlantic zone of peace could unravel, constituting a major historical setback and potentially clearing the way for the onset of a balance-of-power system reminiscent of the pre-World War I era.

Should rivalry across the Atlantic come to prove the rule rather than the exception, geopolitical disagreement could well jeopardize collaboration on all fronts – with quite adverse effects. Most international institutions depend on U.S.-European cooperation to function effectively. They would be compromised if the two sides of the Atlantic no longer work in unison. Although transatlantic commerce has thus far suffered few negative consequences as a result of ongoing diplomatic strains, political tensions do have the potential to spill over into the economic realm. With America and Europe together representing over fifty percent of global output, the stability of the global economy would be imperiled should they clash over matters of trade and finance.

The spread of democracy and interdependence may well ensure that entrenched geopolitical competition between America and Europe never returns. Even so, both sides of the Atlantic have compelling reasons for preserving more than just amity. American primacy may be uncontested, but the United States still needs allies. America required little help in its recent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it found itself very much in need of international assistance to bring stability to both countries. Much of America's global effort to combat terrorism relies on close cooperation among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of many countries. Washington also faces a host of challenges – stemming the proliferation of WMD, stabilizing and liberalizing the world economy, promoting political and economic reform in the Islamic world, fighting the AIDS crisis in Africa – that can be effectively addressed only if the United States works in union with others.

In similar fashion, Europeans are deluding themselves if they believe that the European Union will be better off if it steers clear of the United States and charts its own course. Within Europe itself, many critical tasks still require U.S. engagement, including preserving peace in the Balkans and consolidating reform among Europe's new democracies. In other quarters of the globe, where the EU's military and diplomatic muscle remains limited, Europeans continue to look to the United States to keep the peace.

7

The repair of Atlantic relations will not occur of its own accord. America and
Europe do share common values and enjoy robust and mutually beneficial economic ties.
But neither concerned citizens nor policymakers should place false confidence in the
ability of common values or commercial linkages to preserve a healthy transatlantic
relationship. The recent series of disputes across the Atlantic makes clear that America
and Europe can go their separate ways despite democratic traditions. And history
provides numerous examples of the ease with which the competitive instincts of strategic
rivalry can overwhelm the cooperative incentives stemming from economic
interdependence.

Also need
common
purpose

If the Atlantic partnership is to be reclaimed, Americans and Europeans must
recognize that the old order is gone for good and that a fundamental reorientation of
Atlantic relations is needed. Articulating a new vision of the transatlantic community and
mapping out a strategy for bringing that vision to fruition entails addressing three main
questions. First, what are the terms of a new Atlantic bargain? What policy adjustments
do both sides of the Atlantic need to make to put their relationship on a cooperative
trajectory? Second, what should be the guiding principles of a new Atlantic order? On
what core issues do America and Europe need to fashion new rules of the road? Third,

8

The original Atlantic bargain arose in response to the Soviet threat. Its core principles were the indivisibility of transatlantic security and the shared commitment to collective defense. To translate these principles into practice and avoid decoupling, the United States codified its strategic commitment to Europe through Article V of the NATO Treaty and deployed U.S. troops along the central front in Germany. The U.S. security umbrella afforded Europe's democracies the opportunity to pursue economic and political integration. The United States strongly supported such integration, viewing Europe's economic strength and political stability as essential to containing the Soviet threat.

This traditional bargain is now obsolete. Geopolitical change has made decoupling inevitable, challenging not just the viability of formal alliance, but also America's unconditional support for European unity. Especially since the standoff over Iraq, U.S. policy-makers have begun to question whether a stronger and more collective EU is indeed in America's interests. If the United States and Europe are to build a new relationship, they must therefore forge a common understanding of the terms of a new partnership and address how to adapt that partnership to the evolution of European integration.

The Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because

The new strategic landscape will mean not just a looser partnership, but also one
in which transatlantic unity will be strained by the geopolitical forces pushing America
and Europe toward a geographic and functional division of labor. In geographic terms,
Europe is focusing its primary attention and core military assets on consolidating peace
on the European continent while America is increasingly concentrating its capabilities on
promoting stability and meeting threats in other parts of the world. In functional terms,
America brings to the table its war-fighting capability, while Europe's main contributions
to international peace fall in the areas of nation-building and peacekeeping.

focuses its attention on other quarters. The EU should more regularly backstop America's global engagement by increasing its involvement in war-fighting, nation-building, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention in areas outside Europe. As Europe's institutional and military capacities evolve over time, the EU could down the road become a more complete partner of the United States on a global basis. The risk of strategic separation also reinforces the need for America and Europe to cooperate closely on a host of non-military fronts, including managing the global economy, disrupting terrorist networks, expanding democracy, and promoting health and economic growth in the developing world.

If a new transatlantic bargain is to emerge along these lines, the United States must reassure Europe of its commitment to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. America's international dominance remains unchallenged, making it possible – and necessary – for the United States to wield its power with restraint and to share leadership with others in order to win their consent. In the words of Tony Blair, the United States should lead through persuasion rather than command, building coalitions on the basis of its moral authority and legitimacy rather than its coercive potential. Otherwise, the United States may well find potential partners more likely to rally against, rather than behind, American leadership.

11

By granting Europe more voice, America is likely to find in Europe a partner more willing to share the burdens associated with international stability. By more readily working with Washington to meet new international threats, Europe is likely to find in America a brand of leadership more to its liking. Nonetheless, differences of approach will no doubt continue to emerge, necessitating that both parties learn how to tolerate disagreement more effectively and prevent it from compromising a broader sense of amity and common purpose.

As they seek to define the terms of a new Atlantic bargain, the United States and Europe need to address how to adjust their relationship to the ongoing process of European integration. The United States has generally supported European unification as it has evolved over the past five decades. Washington has viewed integration as a vehicle for democratizing and pacifying Europe, for expanding international trade and investment, and for creating a more effective partner on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States has reaped considerable benefit from the success of European integration. Americans no longer need to stand guard on the continent to keep Europe's great powers at bay. They share in Europe's prosperity, with transatlantic commerce reaching $2.5 trillion per year and employing directly or indirectly some 12 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic.² And a more unified Europe has more often than not backstopped

² Joseph Quinlan, *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), p. 3.

12

In the weeks preceding the Iraq war, the potential for a strategic divide between the United States and Europe turned into reality, with France and Germany taking the lead in opposing U.S. policy. The Bush administration then looked to other European countries to side with Washington. It succeeded in building a supporting coalition led by Britain, Spain, and Italy, and joined by a host of smaller EU members as well as most Central European countries.

In the aftermath of the war, those countries that backed U.S. policy have enjoyed much closer relations with the United States than those that did not. They have also been more willing to contribute to post-war reconstruction efforts, with Poland assuming command of one of the military sectors in Iraq. The ability of the United States to benefit from internal divisions within Europe has understandably prompted Washington to reconsider the desirability of further European unity, particularly in the realm of defense.

13

American support for continued European integration should no longer be unconditional – as it was during the Cold War. Rather, such support should be contingent on the purposes to which the EU directs its increasing power and collective character. Should the EU cast itself as a counterweight to the United States, Washington would be justified to withhold support for deeper integration. Should the EU, as it has done historically, instead work with the United States in pursuit of a common agenda, Washington should welcome deeper union for Europe. A deeper Europe ensures the irreversibility of union and could potentially lead to a more collective and militarily able EU – one capable of becoming a more effective partner of the United States. A wider Europe ensures that peace, democracy, and prosperity will continue to spread eastward. As long as the EU works with rather than against the United States, deepening and widening are both in America's interest.

Both sides of the Atlantic have an important role to play in channeling the EU's power and purpose in the appropriate direction. Europe's leaders must cease adopting anti-American positions, which they have been doing with increasing frequency both to win votes and to build popular support for European integration. Touting the EU as a counterweight to America, even if more rhetoric than reality, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy by fueling transatlantic tension and ensuring that Washington looks

14

askance at deeper union. For its part, Washington needs to recognize that its policies as well as its tone are leading to adverse changes in perceptions of the United States among European publics. Opinion surveys reveal a sharp upturn in anti-American sentiment in many European countries – one of the reasons politicians have embraced it for political gain.³ Washington thus needs to adopt a more pliant brand of leadership if younger Europeans are to retain the *affinity* for America that has helped sustain decades of partnership across the Atlantic.

³For the results of public opinion surveys, see The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties," March 18, 2003. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=175; The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues," April 17, 2002. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=153; The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen as Unilateralist," August 15, 2001. Available at: http://people-press.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=5; German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo, "Transatlantic Trends 2003," September 4, 2003. Available at: http://www.transatlantictrends.org/; and German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "Worldviews 2002," September 4, 2002. Available at: http://www.worldviews.org/. See also Thomas Crampton, "Europeans' doubt over U.S. policy rises," *The International Herald Tribune*, September 4, 2003.

15

## New Rules of the Road

As the United States and Europe seek to preserve an Atlantic zone of peace and prevent backsliding toward balance-of-power competition, they must sustain adherence to a common set of legitimating norms and procedures. Doing so entails revisiting the principles and ordering architecture that have guided the Atlantic democracies since World War II. As the tortured diplomacy over the Iraq war made amply clear, the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11 have called into question the international system's guiding norms and the institutions that embody them. In this sense, the international community has arrived at a historical intersection every bit as fundamental as the turning points that emerged after World War I and World War II. The rules of the road that guide U.S.-European relations need to be revised and international institutions updated accordingly.

16

perhaps through the formation of an informal "Caucus of the Democracies" - if agreement is first reached among the Atlantic democracies. The agenda for a transatlantic dialogue on revising the rules of the road and reforming institutions should include, but not be restricted to, the following issues:

*The Legitimate Use of Force.* Prevailing international norms, as enshrined in the UN Charter, generally treat the use of force as legitimate only when such action takes the form of self-defense against aggression or is approved by the UN Security Council. Recent violations of these norms, as well as the emergence of new threats to international peace, necessitate their reconsideration. The threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of WMD to rogue nations may under some circumstances require preventive war or preemptive action. And as the Atlantic democracies recently found in Yugoslavia, they may feel compelled to take military action despite the absence of UN authorization.

Europe and the United States should engage in a constructive dialogue about preventive war, preemptive action, and the appropriate role of international institutions in authorizing the use of force. Recent planning documents adopted by the EU call for a more robust strategy of intervention to address threats from terrorism and WMD, suggesting that the two parties might find more common ground than initially presumed.⁴ Amity across the Atlantic is far more likely to be preserved if both parties search for a common understanding than if they simply tolerate the continued divergence of practice from principle.

⁴ See, for example, "Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Weapons of Mass Destruction," Council of Ministers, June 2003, 10352/03; and Javier Solana, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," Council of Ministers, June 2003, S0138/03.

This perception overstates the nature of the problem. The United States and the EU have clashed over the Kyoto Protocol, the ICC, the ABM Treaty, and the UN's role in Iraq mainly because of substantive disagreements on policy, not theological differences over the appropriate role of international institutions. Had the United States and Europe been able to forge a consensus on the underlying issues at hand, disputes over procedure would have been significantly moderated. To be sure, Americans and Europeans do have somewhat different proclivities. Europe's greater enthusiasm for multilateralism arises from its own success in using institutions and attenuated sovereignty to build a continent at peace. America's more ambivalent approach stems from its primacy as well as from a political culture that has historically attached great weight to sovereignty and freedom from external constraint. Nonetheless, as the Cold War era made clear, when the United States and Europe agree on the substantive policy issues, an appropriate institutional framework for implementing policy usually follows.

18

abroad when it is seen as acting unilaterally, making it harder for Washington to find
willing allies and achieve its objectives.⁵ In addition, many U.S. goals – fighting
terrorism, stemming the proliferation of WMD, managing the global economy – can be
effectively pursued only through multilateral efforts.

*The Containment of Disagreements.* In the absence of the Soviet threat and in the face of a wide array of new challenges, America and Europe will disagree more frequently than during the Cold War. They must therefore map out new rules of the road to ensure that such disagreements do not undermine transatlantic solidarity. It is particularly important that the United States and Europe avoid directly blocking or undermining each other's initiatives. Opting out of joint military action, rather than directly opposing such action, provides one potential option. The nineteenth-century Concert of Europe offers a useful model in this respect.⁶ Some disagreements, such as those surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, might be effectively addressed through the establishment of working groups containing both officials and outside experts.

⁵See, for example, question 7(g, p. 21, "Transatlantic Trends 2003."

⁶Concert members often used abstention from participation in joint action as a way of containing disagreements. In 1820, for example, following a liberal uprising in Naples, Austria, Prussia, and Russia wanted to intervene to squash the uprising and reverse the threat it posed to conservative political forces. The British opposed intervention and refused Metternich's suggestion that they participate in suppressing the revolt. Rather than risk comity among the great powers, however, Castlereagh ultimately assented to the operation even though Britain opted out of participation.

19

Effective public diplomacy can also help contain the corrosive political effects of substantive policy differences. On the question of war against Iraq, fundamental differences of opinion stood between the United States and the Franco-German coalition. Nonetheless, the gravity of the ensuing discord was significantly magnified by the caustic rhetoric coming from both sides of the Atlantic. Rather than allowing substantive differences to become politicized, only exacerbating tensions, leaders should seek to inform their respective publics of the need for continuing cooperation. Placing greater stress on the economic benefits of U.S.-EU commerce could help enhance public awareness of the need for transatlantic goodwill.

*Updating Transatlantic Institutions.* The institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship has become obsolete. NATO remains an important institution, but its centrality and cohesion have been diminished by the end of the Cold War, the changing security agenda, and the unwieldiness that comes with a growing membership. Moreover, many of the new issues requiring transatlantic cooperation fall outside the traditional realm of defense. Accordingly, NATO is not suited to continue serving as the primary institutional bond between America and Europe. Nor are other institutions picking up the slack. Official contacts through the U.S. mission to the EU and the EU mission to the United States remain quite circumscribed and are largely commercial in nature. Regular U.S.-EU summits continue, but they remain more ceremonial than substantive. Meanwhile, high-level U.S. diplomats have been traveling to Europe much less frequently than during the 1990s, contributing to a thinning out of the transatlantic dialogue.

20

The overriding goal of this new council and the broader dialogue that it would oversee would be to help build a stable floor beneath the success of the United States and Europe in carving out an Atlantic zone of peace. That success may well be jeopardized unless the two parties jointly map out common understandings and update the international system's guiding principles and institutions to a changed world.

## Recasting the Traditional Defense Partnership

**NATO's Continuing Relevance.** A Europe at peace and America's shifting strategic priorities have deprived NATO of its former centrality. Nonetheless, NATO continues to fulfill important functions and the interests of America and Europe alike would suffer if the alliance unravels. As this Task Force recommends, a new transatlantic institution with a broader mandate is needed and should be high on the agenda. In the meantime, however, NATO remains the primary institutional linkage across the Atlantic and the most appropriate forum for U.S.-European consultation on the full range of security matters. Unless and until a new institution emerges, it would be prudent to preserve NATO's role as the Atlantic community's main deliberative body.

It is also the case that NATO continues to perform essential military tasks. Although the bloodshed has ended in the Balkans, there remains much unfinished business in the region and the alliance continues to preserve an uneasy peace. Even as the EU gradually assumes from NATO increased responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, the alliance must stay engaged to prevent backsliding and help address residual political and territorial issues.

22

*Adapting NATO to New Conditions.* As NATO continues to fulfill these essential functions, it should also seek to increase its relevance by pursuing several key reforms. First, as mentioned above, an undeniable strategic separation is taking place across the Atlantic, with Europe no longer enjoying its pride of place among America's strategic priorities. As a result, primary responsibility for managing European security is likely to

23

shift, albeit gradually, from the United States to the EU. As Europe's defense
responsibilities evolve, NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized to ensure
transparency and prevent institutional rivalry. And the United States, even as it draws
down the number of troops deployed on the continent, should maintain a presence
sufficient to preserve both interoperability and the sense of collective purpose that arises
from the integrated military structure. The opening of new U.S. bases in Central Europe
should not come at the expense of the quality of military-to-military contacts with
traditional allies in Western Europe.

Second, NATO must find the appropriate balance between a new emphasis on out-of-area missions and its traditional focus on European security. NATO's continued relevance to the United States will in part depend on its engagement in areas outside Europe. On the other hand, seeking to turn the alliance into a vehicle for global force projection would likely be its death-knell, confronting Europe with demands for which it has neither the military resources nor the political appetite. To fashion an appropriate compromise, Washington should agree to keep a hand in the management of European security and traditional NATO missions – particularly in southeast Europe. In return, Europe should agree to maximize NATO's involvement in peacekeeping out-of-area. NATO members would be wise to adapt force capabilities accordingly, investing in strategic lift as well as in training for nation-building tasks such as peacekeeping and policing. They should also expand alliance activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, areas of growing interest to both the United States and Europe due to the struggle against terrorism and NATO and EU enlargement.

24

In the context of NATO's broadening role outside Europe, it is essential for both the United States and EU members to secure the alliance's involvement in stabilizing Iraq. Bringing peace and order to Iraq is now at the top of America's strategic priorities. Washington's future assessments of how much to invest in NATO may well turn on the ability of the alliance to contribute to the mission in Iraq. Both the United States and the EU thus have an overriding interest in brokering a compromise at the UN, one would that preserve unity of command but also enhance the UN's authority to a degree sufficient to clear the way for NATO's engagement on the ground. NATO should also expand its peacekeeping role in Afghanistan, where stabilization and reconstruction, although progressing, require additional resources.

25

With Europe enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many of the challenges which America and Europe must address together lie outside both the traditional realm of security and the Atlantic zone. Formulating a joint strategy for dealing with these challenges will enhance global stability, help reduce the socio-economic divide between richer and poorer nations, and serve as a pragmatic means of breathing new life into the transatlantic partnership.

EYJ

26

*Non-Military Aspects of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation.* Much of the struggle against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction entails political cooperation rather than military action. The United States and Europe should address a number of fronts.

*Economic Growth and Political Reform in the Developing World.* The United States and Europe need to develop a long-term strategy for fostering economic development and political liberalization in the Middle East and Africa. Otherwise, they will continue to find themselves struggling against the adverse symptoms of illiberal

27

28

## Conclusions

This report makes three main contributions to ongoing deliberations about the state of the transatlantic relationship. First, the Task Force concludes that the U.S.-European partnership faces grave challenges to its viability arising from fundamental geopolitical changes. As they seek to repair their relationship, Americans and Europeans will be best served if they acknowledge the gravity of the crisis in Atlantic relations, understand its deeper structural origins, and appreciate that more than cosmetic efforts are required to sustain their partnership.

Second, the Task Force concludes that preserving a strong Atlantic partnership is in the vital interests of Americans and Europeans alike. Should cooperation between the United States and Europe give way to competition, an Atlantic zone of peace could witness the return of balance-of-power dynamics, the international economy could fall prey to protectionism and go-it-alone policies reminiscent of the 1930s, and efforts to combat terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and other pressing challenges would be dealt a serious blow. Reclaiming the U.S.-Europe partnership should be a top priority for citizens on both sides of the Atlantic.

29

Jesee Incao

From: kupchanc@georgetown.edu
Sent: Tuesday, September 09, 2003 11:35 PM
To: beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; lawrence_summers@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Cc: jfly@cfr.org
Subject: second draft of CFR Task Force Report

tfreport.doc (121 KB)

Dear Henry and Larry,

Attached please fine a second draft of the Task Force Report. I have a
bit more work to do to incorporate fully the comments you passed along
in our conversation last week. But I have made the bulk of the
suggested changes - and wanted to get a new draft to Henry before his
Wednesday departure.

Here is a summary of the main changes:

The document now has two main sections. Section one assesses the current state of transatlantic affairs and examines the causes and consequences of the rift. Section two addresses how to bridge the transatlantic divide. It has 3 main sub-sections: one on European unity, one on broader security relations and the need to preserve comity, and one on the agenda for renewing partnership.

I have added a few paragraphs in the introduction to stress the import
of the transatlantic relationship and raise the tone of the report.
Later in section one I have beefed up the discussion of the potential
adverse consequences of the further deterioration of Atlantic relations.

The text now takes no position on whether the EU should increase
military spending and clearly predicates US support for European unity
on Europe's willingness to work with the United States in pursuing
common aims. I have also reworked the description of the Bush
administration's success in garnering a coalition within Europe that
supported the war against Iraq.

In the section on preserving comity, the discussion of revising the
rules of the road now comes before the discussion of the need for a new
Atlantic institution. I have also reformulated the description of this
new institution.

The section on multilateralism and institutions has been revised to
stress the importance of substantive policy differences rather than
differing positions on the role of institutions.

The section on managing disagreements has been expanded.

I have also sought to address your comments about specific word choice
and phraseology.

I intend to make further changes to make the tone more "Olympian." I
will also attempt to reduce the number of instances in which the report
exhorts Europe to pursue specific steps and direct the policy
discussion more toward the United States. But I do think that the

DRAFT REPORT

This Task Force Report first examines the causes and consequences of the transatlantic rift. It then lays out a vision for renewing the transatlantic partnership and develops a policy strategy for realizing that vision.

Diagnosis

The underlying causes of the new strains in Atlantic relations are structural in nature. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the principal threat that bound America and Europe together. A Europe at peace no longer depends upon the United States for its security and the maturing institutions of the European Union (EU) give its citizens a greater sense of self-reliance. As a result, Europe is more frequently developing its own stance on major international issues and is no longer willing to always follow Washington's lead. Meanwhile, America's role as Europe's pacifier and protector

2

Changes in the geopolitical landscape have further affected Atlantic relations by
elevating the impact of domestic politics on the conduct of foreign policy. During the
Cold War, geopolitical imperative disciplined politics on both sides of the Atlantic,
keeping at bay differences of both substance and style. This constraint no longer operates,
providing the latitude for a more contentious diplomacy to take hold. Europeans
complain that American officials have too often opted for a unilateralist and
confrontational tone, costing Washington much good will across Europe. Americans
contend that European policymakers have too often embraced anti-American sentiment

A final challenge to the integrity of the Atlantic partnership arises from the ongoing changes in political identity taking place in America and Europe. During the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies enjoyed a shared identity and sense of belonging to a shared community, fostered to a large degree by the presence of the Soviet "other." That communal identity is in the midst of breaking down, in part because of the collapse of communism, but also because the political rift across the Atlantic is having broader social implications. Especially after the Iraq war, Americans and Europeans have begun to see each other more as "other" than as "self." In today's charged atmosphere, differences in political culture that have existed for decades — over the death penalty, the penchant for using military force, or the appropriate scope of the welfare state, for example — are gaining saliency. Seeking to contrast U.S. militarism with European pacifism, one observer has popularized the notion that, "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus."¹

Demographic change is contributing to the transformation of communal identities. Younger Americans and Europeans — those who are coming of age after the fall of the Berlin Wall — will not embrace the same Atlanticist spirit as those who lived through World War II, the rebuilding of Europe, and the Cold War. The ethnic dimension of the Atlantic bond is also poised to diminish. Americans of European extraction will fall

¹ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 3.

[LC]

4

below fifty percent of the population by mid-century, with the country's Hispanic
population growing rapidly. Meanwhile, the percentage of Moslems in Europe's
population will steadily increase.² The passage of time is thus likely to make even more
challenging the maintenance of a communal identity that spans the Atlantic.

Implications

If this unwelcome outcome is to be avoided, the transatlantic dialogue must shift
away from the specific disagreements at hand and refocus on the common interests that
are currently at risk. America and Europe over the second half of the twentieth century
were able to accomplish a rare feat - the establishment of a zone of stable peace in which
war became unthinkable and balance-of-power dynamics muted, if not eliminated. The
success of the Atlantic democracies in setting aside great power politics represents a
dramatic advance in the international system, replacing suspicion and endemic
competition with trust and regularized cooperation. If the United States and Europe

² Hispanics will represent one-quarter of the U.S. population by mid-century, and one-third by the end of the century. The percentage of Moslems in Europe's population will be affected by future decisions on immigration policy. Estimates suggest that Europe will be twenty percent Moslem by 2050.

LC

5

return to being competitors, this Atlantic zone of peace could unravel, constituting a
major historical setback and potentially clearing the way for the onset of a balance-of-
power system reminiscent of the pre-World War I era.

After five steady decades, transatlantic comity has a taken-for-granted quality. It
would be a dangerous illusion, however, to presume that such comity is irreversible or to
underestimate its importance to Americans and Europeans alike. The standoff over Iraq
has already demonstrated the potential for the United States and key European allies to
part company on matters of war and peace – with telling consequences. The U.S.-led war
was denied UN authorization, making it more difficult for the United States to legitimate
the war among the world's electorates, even in countries such as Britain whose
governments backed military action. The pre-war diplomatic stalemate then hampered
post-war reconstruction efforts, imperiling coalition forces in Iraq. Europe itself was
dealt a serious setback, with the Franco-German coalition, the anchor of integration,
finding itself at odds with many of its neighbors.

6

7

If the Atlantic partnership is to be rejuvenated, Americans and Europeans must
establish a new foundation for cooperation. To do so, they must recognize that the old
order is gone for good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic community, and map
out a strategy for bringing that vision to fruition.

A vision of a transatlantic partnership for the future must aim at locking in the
three historic achievements of the post-World War II era: 1) the establishment of a
democratic and integrated Europe; 2) the creation of a zone of stable peace between
North America and Europe; and 3) the forging of a transatlantic partnership aimed at
promoting global stability and managing an open international economy.

8

The first objective is proceeding apace; democracy and prosperity have taken root in Europe's west and, in step with NATO and EU enlargement, are in the midst of doing so in Europe's east. The second objective has been attained for now, but both the United States and Europe must ensure that an Atlantic zone of peace does not unravel and give way to geopolitical rivalry. The third objective – continued Atlantic partnership – will be the hardest to sustain and is the one that will require the most innovation and determination.

In pursuing these objectives, the Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, American and European security are no longer indivisible. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, WMD, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

9

It is precisely because transatlantic unity will no longer be driven by geopolitical imperative that both America and Europe must now work harder to sustain their partnership. The United States should ensure that it remains engaged in Europe even as it focuses its attention on other quarters. The EU should more regularly backstop America's global engagement by increasing its involvement in war-fighting, nation-building, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention in areas outside Europe. As Europe's institutional and military capacities evolve over time, the EU could down the road become a more complete partner of the United States on a global basis. The risk of strategic separation also reinforces the need for America and Europe to cooperate closely on a host of non-military fronts, including managing the global economy, disrupting terrorist networks, expanding democracy, and promoting health and economic growth in the developing world.

10

unchallenged, making it both possible and necessary for the United States to wield its
power with restraint and to share leadership with others in order to win their consent. In
the words of Tony Blair, the United States should lead through persuasion rather than
command, building coalitions on the basis of its moral authority and legitimacy rather
than its coercive potential.

To realize this vision and preserve the three historic achievements of the post-
World War II era – a democratic and integrated Europe, an Atlantic zone of peace, and a
transatlantic partnership – the Task Force recommends a three-pronged strategy aimed at
*adapting the U.S.-European relationship to the evolution of European unification,*
*preserving transatlantic comity, and renewing the transatlantic partnership.*

The United States has generally supported European unification as it has evolved
over the past five decades. Washington has viewed the process of integration as a vehicle
for democratizing and pacifying Europe, for expanding international trade and investment,
and for creating a more effective partner on the other side of the Atlantic. The United
States has reaped considerable benefit from the success of European integration.
Americans no longer need to stand guard on the continent to keep Europe's great powers
at bay. They share in Europe's prosperity, with transatlantic commerce reaching $2.5
trillion per year and employing directly or indirectly some 12 million workers on both
sides of the Atlantic.³ And a more unified Europe has more often than not backstopped
U.S. efforts to liberalize the global economy and provide effective international
leadership.

³ Joseph Quinlan, *Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2003), p. 3.

12

The United States should as a matter of principle support both a deeper and a wider Europe. A deeper Europe ensures the irreversibility of union and could potentially lead to a more collective and militarily able EU – one capable of becoming a more effective partner of the United States. A wider Europe ensures that peace, democracy, and prosperity will continue to spread eastward. Deepening and widening are thus both in America's interest.

13

U.S. support for continued European integration should be contingent, however, on the purposes to which the EU directs its increasing power and collective character. Should the EU cast itself as a counterweight to the United States, Washington would be justified to withhold support for deeper integration. Should the EU, as it has done historically, instead apply its energies toward working with the United States on a common agenda, Washington should welcome deeper union for Europe.

Both sides of the Atlantic have an important role to play in channeling the EU's power and purpose in the appropriate direction. Europe's leaders must cease adopting anti-American positions, which they have been doing with increasing frequency both to win votes and to build popular support for European integration. Touting the EU as a counterweight to America, even if more rhetoric than reality, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy by fueling transatlantic tension and ensuring that Washington looks askance at deeper union. For its part, Washington needs to show greater sensitivity to adverse changes in perceptions of the United States among European publics. Opinion surveys reveal a sharp upturn in anti-American sentiment in many European countries – one of the reasons politicians have embraced it for political gain.⁴ Washington thus needs to pay more attention to how its leadership is viewed abroad if younger Europeans are to retain the affinity for America that has helped sustain decades of partnership across the Atlantic.

The United States can also afford to be relatively relaxed about the challenge posed by a rising Europe; for the foreseeable future European weakness will present more of a threat to the transatlantic relationship than European strength. The EU falls far short

⁴Thomas Crampton, "Europeans' doubt over U.S. policy rises," The International Herald Tribune, September 4, 2003.

14

## Preserving Comity

As the United States and Europe seek to put their relationship on a new foundation, they must first ensure the preservation of an Atlantic zone of peace and prevent backsliding toward balance-of-power competition. Indeed, Americans and Europeans need to take urgent measures to arrest the tearing of the Atlantic community's fabric and build barriers against the return of geopolitical rivalry. Reclaiming comity is a necessary step on the way to renewing partnership.

Meeting this challenge entails revisiting the principles and ordering architecture that have guided the Atlantic democracies since World War II. If transatlantic comity is

15

[LC]

to be preserved, the United States and Europe must sustain adherence to a common set of
legitimating norms and procedures. This objective can by no means be taken for granted,
as the tortured diplomacy over the Iraq war made amply clear. Indeed, the end of the
Cold War and the events of September 11 have called into question the international
system's guiding principles and the institutions that embody them. In this sense, the
international community has arrived at a historical intersection every bit as fundamental
as the turning points that emerged after World War I and World War II. The rules of the
road that guide U.S.-European relations need to be revised and international institutions
updated accordingly.

*The Legitimate Use of Force.* Prevailing international norms, as enshrined in the UN Charter, generally treat the use of force as legitimate only when such action takes the form of self-defense against aggression or is approved by the UN Security Council. In practice, such norms have become obsolete. The threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of WMD to rogue nations may under some circumstances necessitate preventive war or preemptive action. And as the Atlantic democracies recently found in Yugoslavia, they may feel compelled to take military action despite the absence of UN

16

authorization. Europe and the United States should engage in a constructive dialogue about preventive war, preemptive action, and the appropriate role of international institutions in authorizing the use of force. Recent planning documents adopted by the EU call for a more robust strategy of intervention to address threats from terrorism and WMD, suggesting that the two parties might find more common ground than initially presumed.⁵ Amity across the Atlantic is far more likely to be preserved if both parties search for a common understanding than if they simply tolerate the continued divergence of practice from principle.

⁵ See, for example, “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Council on Ministers, June 2003, 10352/03; and Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” Council of Ministers, June 2003, SO138/03.

17

[lc]

Europeans do have somewhat different proclivities. Europe's greater enthusiasm for multilateralism arises from its own success in using institutions and attenuated sovereignty to build a continent at peace. America's more ambivalent approach stems from its primacy as well as from a political culture that has historically attached great weight to sovereignty and freedom from external constraint. Nonetheless, as the Cold War decades made clear, when the United States and Europe agree on the substantive policy issues, an appropriate institutional framework for implementing policy usually follows.

Both sides of the Atlantic have compelling reasons for seeking to strike new institutional bargains. Europe will find international institutions much less effective if the world's only superpower steps away from them. And even though the United States might at times prefer to wield its primacy in unfettered fashion, it suffers a loss of popular support abroad when it is seen as acting unilaterally, making it harder for Washington to find willing allies and achieve its objectives.⁶ In addition, many U.S. goals — fighting terrorism, stemming the proliferation of WMD, managing the global economy — can be effectively pursued only through multilateral efforts.

⁶See note 4 above.

18

*Dealing with Disagreements.* In the absence of the Soviet threat and in the face of a wide array of new challenges, America and Europe will disagree more frequently than they did during the Cold War. They must therefore map out new rules of the road to ensure that such disagreements do not undermine transatlantic comity. It is particularly important that the United States and Europe avoid directly blocking or undermining each other's initiatives. Opting out of joint military action, rather than directly opposing such action, provides one potential option. The nineteenth-century Concert of Europe offers a useful model in this respect.⁷ Some disagreements, such as those surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court, might be effectively addressed through the establishment of working groups containing both officials and outside experts.

Effective public diplomacy can also help contain the corrosive political effects of substantive policy differences. On the question of war against Iraq, fundamental differences of opinion stood between the United States and the Franco-German coalition. Nonetheless, the gravity of the ensuing discord was significantly magnified by the caustic rhetoric coming from both sides of the Atlantic. Rather than allowing substantive differences to become politicized, only exacerbating tensions, leaders should seek to inform their respective publics of the need for continuing cooperation. Placing greater stress on the economic benefits of U.S.-EU commerce could help enhance public awareness of the need for transatlantic comity.

⁷ Concert members often used abstention from participation in joint action as a way of containing disagreements. In 1820, for example, following a liberal uprising in Naples, Austria, Prussia, and Russia wanted to intervene to squash the uprising and reverse the threat it posed to conservative political forces. The British opposed intervention and refused Metternich's suggestion that they participate in suppressing the revolt. Rather than risk comity among the great powers, however, Castlereagh ultimately assented to the operation even though Britain opted out of participation.

19

*Updating Transatlantic Institutions.* The institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship has become obsolete. NATO remains an important institution, but its centrality and cohesion have been diminished by the end of the Cold War, the changing security agenda, and the unwieldiness that comes with a growing membership. Moreover, many of the new issues requiring transatlantic cooperation fall outside the traditional realm of defense. Accordingly, NATO is not suited to continue serving as the primary institutional bond between America and Europe. Nor are other institutions picking up the slack. Official contacts through the U.S. mission to the EU and the EU mission to the United States remain quite circumscribed and are largely commercial in nature. Regular U.S.-EU summits continue, but they remain more ceremonial than substantive. Meanwhile, high-level contacts have fallen off precipitously. During the 1990s, the U.S. Secretary of State on average traveled to Europe once a month. In contrast, Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Europe six times in 2001 and only three times in 2002.⁸

⁸ Ivo Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 153-154.

20

## Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership

Locking in a democratic and integrated Europe and ensuring comity between the EU and the United States – the top two priorities of a new Atlantic dialogue – are well within grasp. If attained, these two objectives would then provide the foundation for pursuing the more ambitious goal of reestablishing a close Atlantic partnership as the anchor of the international system. The Task Force's recommendations for renewing the Atlantic partnership fall into two areas: *recasting the traditional defense partnership, and defining a new agenda for global cooperation*.

*NATO's Continuing Relevance.* A Europe at peace and America's shifting strategic priorities have deprived NATO of its former centrality. Nonetheless, NATO

21

[LC]

22

*Adapting NATO to New Conditions.* As NATO continues to fulfill these essential functions, it should also seek to increase its relevance by pursuing several key reforms. First, as mentioned above, an undeniable strategic separation is taking place across the Atlantic, with Europe no longer enjoying its pride of place among America's strategic priorities. As a result, primary responsibility for managing European security is likely to shift, albeit gradually, from the United States to the EU. As Europe's defense responsibilities evolve, NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized to ensure transparency and prevent institutional rivalry. And the United States, even as it draws down the number of troops deployed on the continent, should maintain a presence sufficient to preserve both interoperability and the sense of collective purpose that arises from the integrated military structure. The opening of new U.S. bases in Central Europe should not come at the expense of the quality of military-to-military contacts with traditional allies in Western Europe.

24

[LC]

**The Global Economy.** The United States and the EU remain the engines of global growth and the stewards of the international economy. Their commercial relationship remains healthy and mutually beneficial. Although commercial ties alone are insufficient to serve as the foundation of a broader strategic partnership, they certainly provide strong incentives for both sides of the Atlantic to resolve their political differences. The United

25

* Further liberalize U.S.-EU trade and work toward successful completion of the Doha round of world trade negotiations. Eliminating tariffs on and subsidies of textiles and agricultural goods is of particular importance because of the benefit to developing countries.

26

Europe. Bringing about a peaceful settlement of the Israel-Palestine conflict is a critical component of addressing these threats. With violence threatening to imperil the road map, the United States and Europe must step up efforts to coordinate their diplomacy.

*Economic Growth and Political Reform in the Developing World.* The United States and Europe need to develop a long-term strategy for fostering economic development and political liberalization in the Middle East and Africa. Otherwise, they will continue to find themselves struggling against the adverse symptoms of illiberal regimes and failed states rather than attacking their root causes. Specific elements of a U.S.-European development program should include the following:

27

## Conclusions

In issuing this report, the Task Force hopes to make two main contributions to ongoing deliberations about the state of the transatlantic relationship. First, the group concludes that the U.S.-European partnership faces grave challenges to its viability arising from fundamental geopolitical changes. As they seek to repair their relationship, Americans and Europeans will be best served if they acknowledge the gravity of the crisis in Atlantic relations, understand its deeper structural origins, and appreciate that more than cosmetic efforts are required to adapt their partnership to new realities.

Second, the Task Force offers both a conceptual framework and a concrete agenda for putting Atlantic relations on a more sound foundation. It identifies three main objectives for the Atlantic community – locking in a democratic and integrated Europe,

28

preserving comity between the United States and the EU, and renewing the transatlantic partnership. It endorses a vision of a new transatlantic relationship that is looser but broader than that of the past, and lays out a set of policy recommendations for realizing this vision. The Task Force exhorts policymakers and concerned citizens in the United States and in Europe to give urgent attention to the task of renewing the transatlantic partnership.

DRAFT REPORT

Diagnosis

The transatlantic partnership, the anchor of the international system since World
War II, is currently at risk. America and Europe have recently parted company on a
series of issues – the Iraq war, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, and the
International Criminal Court most prominent among them – raising the prospect that
successive decades of transatlantic cooperation could give way to mounting rivalry.

Indeed, the divide that opened over the Iraq war was a stark affirmation of the degree to
which the Atlantic Alliance has already corroded. That traditional allies like France and
Germany sought to thwart the United States on a matter Washington deemed to be of
vital interest made clear the serious and unprecedented nature of the ongoing crisis in
Atlantic relations. The current sense of estrangement should not be dismissed as just
another friendly quarrel. On the contrary, the rift runs deep and, if left unattended, has
the potential to erode the foundation of mutual trust and sense of common destiny on
which the transatlantic partnership rests.

The underlying causes of these strains in Atlantic relations are structural in nature.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed the principal threat that bound America and
Europe together. A Europe at peace no longer depends upon the United States for its
security and the maturing institutions of the European Union (EU) give its citizens a
greater sense of self-reliance. As a result, Europe is no longer willing to assume the role
of junior partner and always follow Washington's lead. Meanwhile, America's role as
Europe's pacifier and protector has come to an end as the strategic priorities of the United

[With their common aims in the Atlantic zone largely attained, much of the transatlantic security agenda now focuses on the Middle East – where U.S. and European approaches have traditionally diverged.] The most acute threats to Atlantic solidarity have historically emerged from the developing world – the Suez Crisis, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the pressing mission in Europe prevented these differences from threatening alliance cohesion. Today, there is no ready glue to provide this function. After the attacks of September 11, observers on both sides of the Atlantic ventured that terrorism could potentially serve as the new unifying threat. But as has since become clear, America and Europe have different perceptions of the terrorist threat as well as different strategies for dealing with it, setting the stage for the split that opened over the war against Iraq.

Changes in the geopolitical landscape have also affected Atlantic relations by elevating the impact of domestic politics on the conduct of foreign policy. During the Cold War, geopolitical imperative disciplined politics on both sides of the Atlantic, keeping at bay differences of both substance and style. This constraint no longer operates, *are confined in Europe* providing the latitude for a more contentious diplomacy to take hold. American officials have too often opted for a unilateralist and confrontational tone, costing Washington much good will across Europe. European policymakers have too often embraced anti-American sentiment for political gain, urging that the EU emerge as a counterweight to the United States. Such matters of tone and style have politicized the rift and intensified

A final challenge to the integrity of the Atlantic partnership arises from the ongoing changes in political identity taking place in America and Europe. During the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies enjoyed a shared identity, fostered to a large degree by the presence of the Soviet "other." That communal identity is in the midst of breaking down, in part because of the collapse of communism, but also because the political rift across the Atlantic is having broader social implications. Especially after the Iraq war, Americans and Europeans have begun to see each other more as "other" than as "self." In today's charged atmosphere, differences in political culture that have existed for decades — over the death penalty, the penchant for using military force, or the appropriate scope of the welfare state, for example — are gaining saliency. Seeking to contrast U.S. militarism with European pacifism, one observer has popularized the notion that, "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus."¹

Demographic change is contributing to the transformation of communal identities. Younger Americans and Europeans — those who are coming of age after the fall of the Berlin Wall — will not embrace the same Atlanticist spirit as those who lived through World War II, the rebuilding of Europe, and the Cold War. As America's population becomes more Hispanic and Europe's more Moslem, the ethnic dimension of the Atlantic bond will diminish as well.² The passage of time is thus likely to make even more challenging the maintenance of a communal identity that spans the Atlantic.

¹ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 3.
² Americans of European extraction will fall below fifty percent of the population by mid-century. Hispanics will represent one-quarter of the U.S. population by mid-century, and one-third by the end of the

Stakes

If this unwelcome outcome is to be avoided, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic need to step back from their specific disagreements and rediscover the common interests that are currently at risk. America and Europe over the second half of the twentieth century were able to accomplish a rare feat – the establishment of a zone of stable peace in which war became unthinkable and balance-of-power dynamics muted, if not eliminated. The success of the Atlantic democracies in setting aside great power politics represents a dramatic advance in the international system, replacing suspicion and endemic competition with trust and regularized cooperation. To allow this Atlantic zone of peace to unravel would constitute a major historical setback and potentially clear the way for the return of a balance-of-power system reminiscent of the pre-World War I era.

With America and Europe together representing over fifty percent of global output, the return of geopolitical rivalry across the Atlantic would also imperil the global economy.

4

The spread of democracy and interdependence may well ensure that geopolitical competition between America and Europe never returns. Even so, both sides of the Atlantic have compelling reasons for preserving more than just amity. American primacy may be uncontested, but the United States still needs allies. America required little help in its recent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it is very much in need of international assistance to bring stability to both countries. Much of America's global effort to combat terrorism relies on close cooperation among the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of many countries. Washington also faces a host of longer term challenges - stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), stabilizing and liberalizing the world economy, promoting political and economic reform in the Islamic world, fighting the AIDS crisis in Africa - that can be effectively addressed only if the United States works in union with others.

[LY]

If the Atlantic partnership is to be rejuvenated, Americans and Europeans must
establish a new foundation for cooperation. To do so, they must recognize that the old
order is gone for good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic community, and map
out a strategy for realizing that vision.

## Objectives and Vision

6

In pursuing these objectives, the Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, America and Europe will no longer move in lock-step on matters of security. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

unchallenged, making it both possible and necessary for the United States to wield its power with restraint, adhering to the practice and spirit of multilateralism in order to win the consent of others. In the words of Tony Blair, the United States should lead through persuasion rather than command, building coalitions on the basis of its moral authority and legitimacy rather than its coercive potential. Washington should also resist efforts to exacerbate intra-European divisions, instead welcoming a more unified Europe – provided that the EU does not adopt an anti-American identity and cast itself as a counterweight to America.

## Strategy

[Y]

9

<u>Adapting to the Evolution of European Unification</u>

The United States has generally supported European unification as it has evolved over the past five decades. Washington has viewed the process of integration as a vehicle for democratizing and pacifying Europe, for expanding international trade and investment, and for creating a more effective partner on the other side of the Atlantic. The United States has reaped considerable benefit from the success of European integration.

Americans no longer need to stand guard on the continent to keep Europe's great powers at bay. They benefit from Europe's prosperity, with transatlantic commerce reaching $2.5 trillion per year and employing directly or indirectly some 12 million workers on both sides of the Atlantic.³ And a more unified Europe has more often than not backstopped U.S. efforts to liberalize the global economy and provide effective international leadership.

In the weeks preceding the Iraq war, the potential for a strategic divide between the United States and Europe turned into reality, with France and Germany taking the lead in opposing U.S. policy. The Bush administration reacted by seeking to capitalize on differences of opinion within Europe. It succeeded in building a supporting coalition led by Britain, Spain, and Italy, and joined by a host of smaller EU members as well as most Central European countries. In the aftermath of the war, those countries that backed U.S. policy have enjoyed much closer relations with the United States than those that did not. The rift over Iraq has understandably prompted Washington to reconsider the desirability of further European unity, particularly in the realm of defense.

The pace and scope of European integration are matters that are the domain primarily of Europe's own citizens. Nonetheless, developments inside Europe affect U.S. interests and U.S. policy can have a direct impact on the trajectory of European integration. Both sides of the Atlantic would thus benefit from a common understanding of U.S. policy toward the evolution of the EU. The Task Force recommends the following guidelines.

The United States should as a matter of principle support both a deeper and a wider Europe. A deeper Europe ensures the irreversibility of union and could potentially lead to an EU that becomes a more effective partner of the United States. A wider Europe ensures that peace, democracy, and prosperity will continue to spread eastward. Deepening and widening are thus both in America's interest.

U.S. support for continued European integration should be contingent, however, on the purposes to which the EU directs its increasing power and collective character. Should the EU cast itself as a counterweight to the United States, Washington would be justified to withhold support for deeper integration – and indeed to seek to dilute the union. Should the EU, as it has done historically, instead apply its energies toward working with the United States on a common agenda, Washington should welcome deeper union for Europe.

Both sides of the Atlantic have an important role to play in channeling the EU's power and purpose in the appropriate direction. Europe's leaders must cease adopting anti-American positions, which they have been doing with increasing frequency both to win votes and to build popular support for European integration. Touting the EU as a counterweight to America, even if more rhetoric than reality, risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy by fueling transatlantic tension and ensuring that Washington looks askance at deeper union. For its part, Washington needs to show greater sensitivity to adverse changes in perceptions of the United States among European publics. Opinion surveys reveal a sharp upturn in anti-American sentiment in many European countries – one of the reasons politicians have embraced it for political gain. More effective U.S. diplomacy is needed if younger Europeans are to retain the affinity for America that has helped sustain decades of partnership across the Atlantic.

Washington can also afford to be relatively relaxed about the challenge posed by a rising Europe; for the foreseeable future European weakness will present more of a threat to the transatlantic relationship than European strength. The EU falls far short of speaking with a single voice on matters of foreign policy and its military capability,

[Y]

12

From this perspective, a more collective and capable Europe, provided that the EU throws its weight behind rather than against U.S. leadership, is an important ingredient to putting the Atlantic link on a more sound foundation. So too should the planned appointment of a single foreign minister for the EU go at least part way toward providing Washington the single point of contact for which it has often asked. The key issue for now is not whether the U.S. should welcome such developments, but whether Europe will in fact follow through with its plans for a more common and capable defense program, putting in place the building blocks of what could become a more mature and effective partnership with the United States.

## Preserving Comity

Meeting this challenge entails revisiting the founding principles and ordering architecture that have guided the Atlantic democracies since World War II. The end of

13

[Y]

the Cold War and the events of September 11 have compromised the relevance of certain principles and the institutions that embody them. In this sense, the international community has arrived at a historical intersection every bit as fundamental as the turning points that emerged after World War I and World War II. International norms and institutions need to be adapted accordingly. The Task Force recommends two key initiatives in this respect: 1) Update transatlantic institutions to reflect new conditions; 2) Revise the rules of the road that guide U.S.-European relations.

*Updating Transatlantic Institutions.* The institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship has become obsolete. NATO remains an important institution, but its centrality and cohesion have been diminished by the end of the Cold War and the changing security agenda. Many of the new issues requiring transatlantic cooperation fall outside the traditional realm of defense. Accordingly, NATO is not suited to continue serving as the primary institutional bond between America and Europe. Nor are other institutions picking up the slack. Official contacts through the U.S. mission to the EU and the EU mission to the United States remain quite circumscribed and are largely commercial in nature. Regular U.S.-EU summits continue, but they remain more ceremonial than substantive. Meanwhile, high-level contacts have fallen off precipitously. During the 1990s, the U.S. Secretary of State on average traveled to Europe once a month. In contrast, Secretary of State Colin Powell traveled to Europe six times in 2001 and only three times in 2002.⁴

The Task Force recommends establishing a Transatlantic Cooperation Council (TCC) to serve as a new oversight body for the Atlantic community. The TCC would be a small standing council of high-level U.S. and European officials. It would have a broad

⁴ Ivo Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," *Survival*, vol. 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 153-154.

Membership

14

[Y]

purview, covering diplomatic, defense, and commercial matters. In design and function, it might resemble the EU Commission, seeking to provide the same oversight and initiative for the transatlantic community that the Commission has provided for Europe. The TCC would help coordinate U.S. and European policy on a day-to-day basis. It would serve as a vehicle for improving joint management of emerging crises, perhaps convening contact groups similar to those that have recently proved valuable in dealing with conflict in the Balkans and Middle East. The TCC would also provide a regular forum for a longer term dialogue about updating the norms that are meant to define what constitutes legitimate action in the international arena.

Although this last function could prove to be the TCC's most challenging, it would perhaps be its most important. If transatlantic comity is to be preserved, the United States and Europe must sustain adherence to a common set of legitimating principles and procedures. This objective can by no means be taken for granted, as the tortured diplomacy over the Iraq war made amply clear. Although defining the parameters of legitimate action is a matter for the entire international community, a U.S.-European dialogue is an appropriate starting point. A broader revision of guiding norms will be much easier to achieve at the UN – perhaps through the formation of an informal "Caucus of the Democracies" – if agreement is first reached among the Atlantic democracies.

The agenda for a transatlantic dialogue on revising the rules of the road should include, but not be restricted to, the following issues:

15

form of self-defense against aggression or is approved by the UN Security Council. In practice, such norms have become obsolete. The threats posed by terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations may under some circumstances necessitate preventive war or preemptive action. And as the Atlantic democracies recently found in Yugoslavia, they may feel compelled to take military action despite the absence of UN authorization. Europe and the United States should engage in a constructive dialogue about preventive war, preemptive action, and the appropriate role of international institutions in authorizing the use of force. Recent planning documents adopted by the EU call for a more robust strategy of intervention to address threats from terrorism and WMD, suggesting that the two parties might find more common ground than initially presumed.⁵ Amity across the Atlantic is far more likely to be preserved if both parties search for a common understanding than if they simply tolerate the continued divergence of practice from principle.

*The Role of Institutions and Multilateralism.* Different approaches to the appropriate role of international institutions have been one of the main sources of transatlantic tension. Opposing positions on the Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court contributed substantially to the polarization that characterized Atlantic relations well before the falling out over Iraq. Europe's embrace of multilateralism arises from its own success in using institutions and attenuated sovereignty to build a continent at peace. America's ambivalence toward multilateralism stems from its primacy as well as from a political culture that has historically attached great weight to sovereignty and freedom from external constraint.

LYJ

substantive
disagreement

16

Despite these contrasting approaches, both parties have compelling reasons for reclaiming common ground. Europe will find international institutions much less effective if the world's only superpower steps away from them. And even though the United States might prefer to wield its primacy in unfettered fashion, it suffers a loss of popular support abroad when it is seen as acting unilaterally, making it harder for Washington to find willing allies and achieve its objectives. In addition, many U.S. goals — fighting terrorism, stemming the proliferation of WMD, managing the global economy — can be effectively pursued only through multilateral efforts.

*Dealing with Disagreements.* In the absence of the Soviet threat and in the face of a wide array of new challenges, America and Europe will disagree more frequently than they did during the Cold War. They must therefore map out new rules of the road to ensure that such disagreements do not undermine transatlantic comity. It is particularly important that the United States and Europe avoid directly blocking or undermining each other's initiatives. Opting out of joint military action, rather than directly opposing such action, provides one potential option. The nineteenth-century Concert of Europe offers a useful model in this respect.⁶ The TCC would also provide a valuable forum for

⁶ Concert members often used abstention from participation in joint action as a way of containing disagreements. In 1820, for example, following a liberal uprising in Naples, Austria, Prussia, and Russia wanted to intervene to squash the uprising and reverse the threat it posed to conservative political forces. The British opposed intervention and refused Metternich's suggestion that they participate in suppressing

17

addressing how to handle longer term disagreements, such as those surrounding the
Kyoto Protocol and the International Criminal Court.

The overriding goal of this broad dialogue would be to build a stable floor
beneath the success of the United States and Europe in carving out an Atlantic zone of
peace. That success may well be jeopardized unless the two parties jointly map out
common understandings and update the international system's guiding principles to a
changed world.

Locking in a democratic and integrated Europe and ensuring comity between the
EU and the United States – the top two priorities of a new Atlantic dialogue – are well
within grasp. If attained, these two objectives would then provide the foundation for
pursuing the more ambitious goal of reestablishing a close Atlantic partnership as the
anchor of the international system. The Task Force's recommendations for renewing the
Atlantic partnership fall into two areas: *recasting the traditional defense partnership,*
*and defining a new agenda for global cooperation.*

NATO's *Continuing Relevance*. A Europe at peace and America's shifting strategic priorities have deprived NATO of its former centrality. Nonetheless, NATO continues to fulfill important functions and the interests of America and Europe alike would suffer if the alliance unravels. As this Task Force recommends, a new transatlantic institution with a broader mandate is needed and should be high on the transatlantic agenda. In the meantime, however, NATO remains the primary institutional

18

19

*Adapting NATO to New Conditions.* As NATO continues to fulfill these essential functions, it should also seek to increase its relevance by pursuing several key reforms. First, as mentioned above, an undeniable strategic separation is taking place across the Atlantic, with Europe no longer enjoying its pride of place among America's strategic priorities. As a result, primary responsibility for managing European security is likely to shift, albeit gradually, from NATO to the EU. This shift necessitates that Europe step up its defense reforms and its defense expenditure, with 2.5 percent of GDP (the current level of spending in the UK and France) a reasonable spending target. As Europe's defense responsibilities evolve, NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized to ensure transparency and prevent institutional rivalry. And the United States, even as it draws down the number of troops deployed on the continent, should maintain a presence sufficient to preserve both interoperability and the sense of collective purpose that arises from the integrated military structure. The opening of new U.S. bases in Central Europe should not come at the expense of the quality of military-to-military contacts with traditional allies in Western Europe.

Europe. On the other hand, seeking to turn the alliance into a vehicle for global force projection would likely be its death-knell, confronting Europe with demands for which it has neither the military resources nor the political appetite. To fashion an appropriate compromise, Washington should agree to keep a hand in the management of European security and traditional NATO missions. In return, Europe should agree to maximize NATO's involvement in peacekeeping out-of-area. NATO members would be wise to adapt force capabilities accordingly, investing in strategic lift as well as in training for nation-building tasks such as peacekeeping and policing. They should also expand alliance activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, areas of growing interest to both the United States and Europe due to the struggle against terrorism and NATO and EU enlargement.

In the context of NATO's broadening role outside Europe, it is essential for both the United States and EU members to secure the alliance's involvement in stabilizing Iraq. Bringing peace and order to Iraq is now at the top of America's strategic priorities. Washington's future assessments of how much to invest in NATO's well-being may well turn on the ability of the alliance to contribute to the mission in Iraq. Both the United States and the EU thus have an overriding interest in brokering a compromise at the UN, one would that preserve unity of command but also enhance the UN's authority to a degree sufficient to clear the way for NATO's engagement on the ground. NATO should also expand its peacekeeping role in Afghanistan, where stabilization and reconstruction, although progressing, require additional resources.

LYJ

21