Not for Publication

Notes on a Theory of International Leadership
by
Lyman Bryson

January 15, 1957

The following statements of basic principles are intended
only to show how we might undertake to construct a rational
analysis of the processes of leadership among nations; they
must be dogmatic, for the sake of brevity, and the whole
structure of theory of leadership among persons which supports
these principles must be taken for granted. We assume that
it is now the policy of the United States to bring small
nations within our own system of ideas and that we are looking
for efficient means to force these contacts to develop more
rapidly than they are likely to do from routine contact of
commerce and culture exchange.

Without being explicitly aware of our basic method, we
appear to understand that the leadership of smaller nations
by a powerful one is exemplary by nature; that is, we, as the
great power, expect smaller nations to support us in inter-
national politics, reject overtures from our enemies and to
favor our trade, because they want "to be like us."

A realistic psychology would probably indicate that such
behavior would produce sentiments of friendship rather than
be the result of sentiment, and it should not be thought of
as possible between our country and any other nation strong
enough to be our rival or even a necessary element in any
likely rival combination. Nations that are potential rivals
may be conciliated and cooperated with, not led,

- 2 -

[LC]

Leadership by example is possible only when leader and the
led exist in a system of communication when at least some of
their commonly held ideals are expressed in mutually intelligible
terms. We can assume that the ideals of different cultural
groups and nations are similar or harmonious; conflicts arise
because of encounters between material interests which may
be justified by the same ideals on both sides, and by many
kinds of misunderstandings. For leadership to be possible,
some basic understanding must be possible.

What then are the efficient means of forcing contact
with smaller nations: The two chief means are force and
bounty. The United States has, in its brief history, tried
both. In the hope of avoiding an argument, I would avoid
saying that we had failed with both, but I think it is
necessary to point out that we have not had enough signif-
icant experience with either one to provide us with guidance.
We have recently done most with bounty. We can give money and
goods and technical help, even arms, to a small nation with
good conscience. We do not think of this as a form of coercion.
We are certain that force, even when used in what we are sure
is a good cause, does too much spiritual damage to ourselves
as well as to our victims. As a matter of practical judgment,
bounty, even if oppressive, is the more efficient means of
bringing small nations within our influence because it is
most quickly forgotten.

- 3 -

[lc]

Influence, however, is not leadership. To suppose that we can lead smaller nations when we have done no more than bring them and ourselves partly into a common system of ideas has led us into disappointments. Even to have them "want to be like us" is only the first step. Such emulation between two countries has little practical importance, of course, except when one nation, the more powerful, is technologically advanced. This gives the influential nation a centripetal force; it draws into its service, and into its educational institutions, the gifted and the ambitious from the smaller nation. They learn what is "useful to their own people." They learn how to make use of the bounty of the power. Even if passionately patriotic and unwilling to become absorbed in the more advanced ways of the power, they cannot help being spokesmen, when they go home again, for a more modern way of life in the mode of the influential power. Publications, travellers, investments, all kinds of commercial and cultural exchanges follow and accumulate, unless checked by disappointment.

It should be noted briefly in passing that gratitude is not an important component in the sentiment and habit of influence which are being built up. The quicker the exchanges cease to be thought of as bounty, the better. Persons can be endlessly and happily grateful although it is a rare achievement; no nation can be. It is always to the advantage of some aspiring politician to suggest that our benefits were given for selfish reasons if indeed they are not traps for freedom.

- 4 -

[LC]

The leading nation must, however, maintain its own prestige. In a country in which the United States had built up influence in the way I have so sketchily indicated, there would be a network of local leaders whose own position would depend not only on their domestic successes but also on the continuing international prestige of the United States, the country which serves more or less as model for their policies. Prestige depends on a clear and consistent set of principles in international relations and a capacity for decisive action. It is always tempting to suppose that prestige is simply equated with power, but our own history shows that the facts are more complicated. We have sometimes lost prestige when we were most powerful and, on the other hand, our prestige has often been highest when our power was only latent or hoped for.

When we waver, or threaten, or unaccountably shift our intentions, our friends in the country we have hoped to lead, have a hard time explaining us. When we fail to meet a crisis with firmness and strength, they find it difficult to defend us and their loyalty is damaged. When the network of our influence in this other country, whose elements are our more or less professional friends and admirers, begins to break up, our influence will swiftly decline. Even a government in office committed to our friendship can do very little to help; bounty at that time may be only a weapon handed to our enemies.

- 5 -

[LC]

It will be noted that I am taking it for granted that we believe our ways are good for other men to live by. On a rational basis we can defend this cultural aggressiveness because we believe, democratically, that our ultimate social and political and economic purposes can be achieved in more than one fashion, even in ways we never thought of. Otherwise the whole enterprise of leadership among nations is a self-deluding kind of imperialism, grandiose in scope and less bloody than the standard kind, but ethically vulgar nevertheless and unworthy of a mature country.

The chief reason for trying to understand the process of leadership is to make sure that we know, with reasonable completeness, what we can do and what we are trying to do. The most important of the many aspects of this problem which I am obliged to ignore is this: where do we locate, among our institutions and members, the responsibility for understanding the processes of international leadership and for keeping clear our purpose? With the best of good will we can still fail in responsibility.