Copy No. 4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1963

Meeting with M. Segers, Belgian Minister of Defense - May 16, 1963

Present: M. Tindemans, Secretary General of the Christian Social Party

The meeting was privately arranged. M. Segers is a plump man with a big Flemish head, a mouth that twists sideways when he talks, and a tendency to say "I" when he speaks of the Belgian armed forces.

I opened the conversation by asking Segers what he thought of the state of NATO. He replied by addressing himself first to the nuclear question. He said that in general Belgium was not much interested in nuclear matters. Its major concern was to make sure American troops remained in Europe. The natural tendency of Belgium was to agree to any American proposal in order to demonstrate NATO solidarity.

Belgium had assigned two squadrons of its F-104's to the NATO inter-allied force and had been happy to do so. M. Segers did not quite see what was accomplished by this act and he had the impression that General Lemaitzer was also indifferent. Still it was a political decision which he did not want to prejudice.

As for the NATO multilateral force, this was a different matter. M. Segers wanted me to understand that Belgium had no interest to be in the nuclear field at all. However, if we insisted that a certain solution was necessary so that Germany would not develop its own nuclear arms he was willing to go along. I asked what contribution Belgium was willing to make. He grinned slyly and said that so far Belgium's contribution had been to listen to U.S. technical briefings and Belgium was happy to oblige. He had been impressed by certain presentations about the technical feasibility of the multilateral force.

by certain presentations about the reciprocal sensitivity of the multilateral
commercial prieings and Belgium was ready to opt out. He had been induced
early and said that so for Belgium's contribution had been too little to U.S.
said. I said after contribution Belgium was willing to make. He tried
so that Germany would not develop its own nuclear arms he was willing to go
field at all. However, if we initiated that a certain solution was necessarily
Belgium wanted us to understand that Belgium had no interest to go in the nuclear
war for the NATO multilateral force, this was a different matter. M.

no pretence.

was also indicated. Still it was a political decision which he did not want
was accomplished by this act and he had the impression that General Formulaer
offered force and had been ready to do so. M. Sogere did not quite see what
Belgium had assigned two adjectives of its P-104's to the NATO later-
demonstrate NATO solidarity.

normal tendency of Belgium was to agree to any American proposal in order to
its major concern was to make sure American troops remained in Europe. The
He said that in General Belgium was not much interested in nuclear matters.

state of NATO. He replied by addressing himself directly to the nuclear question.
I opened the conversation by asking Sogere what he thought of the
to say "I" when he asked of the Belgian armed forces.

The meeting was privately arranged. M. Sogere is a blank when a
pilot member had, a month that quite otherwise when he said, and a tendency
to say "I" when he asked of the Belgian armed forces.

Present: M. Tindemans, Secretary General of the Christian Social Party
Meeting with M. Sogere, Belgian Minister of Defense - May 10, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1963

Copy No. 2

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

However, Belgium had no intention of paying the $40 million which we had indicated was its share of the multilateral force. I asked what Belgian agreement meant in these conditions. Segers replied that it was a political act of Atlantic solidarity.

$40 million represented a 10% increase in the Belgian defense budget. Belgium had already agreed to increase its expenditures by 10% to improve its conventional capabilities as a result of the Athens meeting. An additional increment was out of the question. He would resign rather than propose it. The United States had the choice of doing either without a forward strategy or without a Belgian contribution to the multilateral force. It could not have both. He hoped we would not press the issue.

I inquired whether anyone had explained this to U.S. officials. He said no because they had never asked. But he wanted to assure me that another 10% increase in the Belgian defense budget was absolutely out of the question whatever M. Spaak might say for political reasons.

We then turned to the conventional build-up. Segers said that he had agreed to modernize the Belgian army. This would cost about $40 million or an increase of the percentage of CHP from 3.5 to 4%. This was barely possible. However there was a political problem. The Socialists were very reluctant to engage in any defense budget increase. There was a general feeling of detente, symbolized by the Krushchev-Kennedy direct line. It would be possible to obtain even this increase in the Belgian defense budget only by cutting the number of Belgian brigades in NATO from six to five.

I said that it seemed paradoxical to me that in order to increase his defense budget, he had to decrease his army. He said it was a fact. To

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 3

re-equip six brigades would increase the budget by another five per cent and
the government would fall if he proposed this.

I asked what per cent of the GNP Belgium was devoting to defense. He said he understood the import of my question. Belgium was devoting only 4% but this was not the issue. Theoretically it should be more in line with our percentage spending. And American officials had pointed this out. Politically it was impossible. Belgium was much more likely to cut its armed forces to the bone than to increase them. Indeed an important group of Socialists was in favor of a professional army and conscription--if at all--for six months only.

I asked whether he had told his views about the conventional build-up
to out officials. Segers replied that he had told it to General Lemaitzer
but no one else had asked him. I could be sure, however, that it represented
a political fact. A lot of things were being said just to please us. What was
done was another matter. He turned to Tindemans to confirm this and Tindemans
agreed.

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Present: Mxx M. Tindemans, Secretary General of the Christian Social Party

The meeting was privately arranged. M. Segers is a plump man with a big Flemish head, Mxx a mouth that twists sideways when he talks, and a tendency to say "I" when he speaks of the Belgian armed forces.

Belgium had assigned two squadrons of its 104's to the NATO inter-allied force and had been happy to do so. M. Segers did not quite see what was accomplished by this act and he had the impression that General Lemnitzer was also indifferent. Still it was a political decision which he did not want to prejudice.

As for the multilateral forces, this was a different matter. M. Segers wanted me to understand that Belgium had no interest to be in the nuclear field at all. However, if we insisted that a certain solution was necessary so that Germany would not develop its own nuclear arms he was willing to go along. I asked what contribution Belgium was willing to make. He grinned slyly and said that so far Belgium's contribution had been to listen to U.S. technical briefings and Belgium was happy to oblige. He had been impressed by certain presentations about the technical feasibility of themultilateral force.

However, Belgium had no intention of paying $40 million which we had indicated was its share of the multilateral force. I asked what Belgian

2

[Y]

$40 million represented a 10% increase in the Belgian defense budget. Belgium had already agreed to increase its expenditures by 10% as a result of the Athens meeting. An additional increment was out of the question. He would have to resign for even proposing it. The United States had the choice of either doing without a new forward strategy or without a Belgian contribution to the multilateral force. It could not have both. He hoped we would not press the issue.

I inquired whether anyone had even explained this to U.S. officials. He said no because they had never asked. But he wanted to assure me that another 10% increase in the Belgian defense budget was absolutely out of the question as whatever M. Spaak might say for political reasons.

We then turned to the conventional build-up. Segers said that he had agreed to modernize the Belgian army. This would cost about $40 million or an increase of the percentage of GNP from 3.5 to 4%. This was barely possible. However there was a political problem. The Socialists were very reluctant to engage in any defense budget increase. There was a general feeling of unease, symbolized by the Krushchev-Kennedy direct line. It would be possible to obtain even this increase in the Belgian defense budget only by cutting the number of Belgian brigades in NATO from six to five.

I said that this seemed paradoxical to me that in order to increase his defense budget, he had to decrease his army. He said it was a fact. To reequip six brigades would increase the budget by another five per cent and the government would fall if he proposed this.

I asked what per cent of its GNP Belgium was devoting to defense. He said he understood the importance of my question. Belgium was devoting only 4% but this was not the issue. Theoretically it should be more in line with our American percentage spending. And American officials had pointed this to me at the last moment.

3

[N]

I asked whether he had told his views about the conventional build-up to our officials. Segers replied that he had told it to General Lemnitzer but no one else had asked him. I could be sure, however, that it represented a political fact. A lot of things were being said. What was done was another matter. He turned to Tindemans to confirm this and Tindemans agreed.