TELECON (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

7:30 a.m., November 23, 1970 (?)

Y: Hello.

K: Hello. How are you?

Y: I'm all right, thank you. And you?

K: Okay. You want to know what happened.

Y: Yes, please.

K: Well, your representative came in today and presented something that is closer to what we want, but he said that was his own idea and what did we think of it. So, we said he should check with Tokyo and if they could say it is their idea, then we'll give him our answer.

Y: Oh, I see.

K: So, that's where we stand.

Y: Could you tell me how close it was?

K: Well, he gave a formula for a growth of 3% which is higher than, of course, what we had said, but which, perhaps with a lot of persuasion, I could get Mr. Flanigan to accept.

Y: What does the situation include?

K: Yes, but then he didn't really seem to accept the idea of groups. He seems now to want no groups and just categories.

Y: Oh, I see.

K: So, we are now completely confused again. I think he only wants 12 categories and no groups.

Y: Oh, I see -- 12 categories, and no groups. That must be really his own idea.

K: Well, I tell you, if you can come back with six groups and those 17 categories, I think we could probably accept your growth rate.

DECLASSIFIED
MAY 22 1970
Authority
By NARA Date 5/1/70

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Under Sec. Johnson

11/23/70 8:55 a.m.

J: I just heard on the radio this morning that DOD is doing a briefing on these raids.

K: I heard that on the radio too. I don't see any sense in it.

J: No, that's what I was wondering about. What I had in mind was about Thailand. Under is coming in with a cry of anguish that we have to tell the Thais something because we are using their bases.

K: I think we should tell the Thais something.

J: Before they read it in the papers.

K: I am going to get after Laird.

J: If he could call me or I call him about what he's going to do.

K: Let me call him first and get back to you.

J: I think the stories came out well. Tad Szulc saying the Secretary of State was involved.

K: Yes, they came out well, if we can all just keep our mouths shut now. I don't mean you. I will get back to you.

By

NARA, Date

5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/23/70 8:57 a.m.

K: How is the resident hawk of the Administration? I noticed Joe Kraft went after you yesterday.

L: Just raising a little hell. Henry, I just finished breakfast with these men and I think this is a positive operation.

K: I do too for Christ's sake.

L: And I believe we are making a great mistake by not coming out and saying we had a reasonable doubt as to <u>how</u> whether there were any people there but there was a chance to go <u>in</u> and we took it.

K: And that's what happened near Hanoi.

L: And we may do it again because we are concerned about out POWs. We hear they are being killed and we want to save them. These are nice looking, clean-cut fellows. I'd like to take them down there and let them answer questions. They will not disappoint you. They fired 35 SAM missiles at us. Everyone there heard them and will be asking questions. This was a daring mission. You'd be proud of these men.

K: I have met some of them. I think they are tremendous.

L: And they'd do it again tomorrow. They say they can go anyplace they want in Hanoi.

K: There was another thing I was calling you about. I had an anguished call from State about your briefing this morning and what the point of it is.

L: About what?

K: About the bombing.

L: We are just giving a report that there were no planes lost.

K: But you won't give any details?

L: Of what was hit?

K: Yes.

L: Tell them we were after anti-aircraft, missile sites

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11/23/70 8:45 a.m. page 2

K: They are worried about what the Thais will say.

L: Why don't they tell the Thais we took some planes off from Thailand?

K: Okay, but the thing is winding down and I think we should let it.

L: There is no briefing on it. We will say there were no SAR xmk operations, there were none necessary as far as protective reaction and no planes lost.

k: But you won't go into a long explanation of where we hit.

L: We will say there were strikes authorized for 18 hours but terminated in 16 hours due to bad weather. There were no planes lost; all the planes returned to their bases. No pilots lost; all strikes were below the 19th parallel. Period. I am keeping these boys here in the hopes that . . . I will let you see the statement that's going to be made.

K: Could you get it over as soon as possible?

L: Yes. I saw the cables from Unger. He makes a loud cry any time we fly something against the enemy.

K: Oh yes, he's a pain.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ambassador Freeman

11/23/70 9:05 a.m.

F: I don't know whether he will ask you anything at all about the
Soviet naval installations in the Caribbean . . .

K: Who?

F: Carrington. But you should know that he will not be aware of
our conversation on this recently. Anything you choose to say to him is
fine, but herpahs you will not refer to that conversation or expect him to.

K: If there is any requent I understand it's a request like this one.
I had to know what he would know about. Thank you. Are you coming
along?

F: Yes.

K: Good. See you later.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Yoshida

11/23/70 9:10 a.m.

Y: I am sorry for the delay. I was just talking with my friend on the phone twice, and I met him earlier today. I would like to reassure you that the ______ idea the representative put forward to your expert yesterday afternoon was ______. Please just ignore it. It was not official policy.

K: But when are we going to hear something official?

Y: It is still the same basic position I explained to you.

K: But no official has said that. We can't operate on the assumption of a channel nobody knows about.

Y: Exactly. My friend is under very strong pressure from both sides and is in a very difficult position at this moment. He is still working with Mr. M[?] who will be in charge of implementing it.

K: But we can't have an agreement unless there is first a proposition.

Y: Apparently he is having very serious political problems with his own able [?] and that is why now things are being delayed. Hoping that by this time I would be able to talk to you. . . then this would be sent formally to be proposed to your expert within three hours. At this moment my own friend needs a little bit more time. He has to implement it in such a way. . . and on that very question he is having very serious problems.

K: I understand the problem. I am keeping people waiting now. I have to go to a meeting. I will have to talk to you after you have a very concrete proposal. You call me and let me know.

Y: I understand and am sorry to keep you waiting. I was talking with my own friend and couldn't cut it off. But the basic position hasn't been changed and my friend has a very real problem. A real crisis of his government. He is working very hard at this moment.

K: I understand. I will expect to hear from you later.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger

10:22 am

11/23/70

K: Mel feels very strongly that if he does it in a low key way he can make a plus of that Friday evening thing. What's your reaction? He would just say that all the noise was that they have one helicopter -- just say it was a mission based on a report we had to check out. Not build it up.

R: I haven't been in touch with it in the news so whatever you decide is all right with me.

K: What's your judgment?

R: We will keep it alive for a long time I don't see how we can make it a plus. It's an explanation for something that didn't work.

K: But it explains the noise people hear,rd.

R: I am inclined to do it the way we have done it but I have no strong feeling. I don't see how we can gain.

K: Shall I tell this to the President?

R: Yes and if you decide the other way, it's okay.

K: When I couldn't reach you I called Alex and he feels the same way -- slightly against it. We will put it off until tomorrow and I may have a chance to discuss it with you later this afternoon.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

10:27 am

11/23/70

S: Phil Habib just called from Paris. The DRV in a press conference stated that they will not attend the session Wed. and have postponed it to the 3rd of Dec. The PRG telephoned to our delegation saying the same thing. The DRV is coming to the mission in ____ minutes. Habib feels we should accept it without a comment. I wanted to make sure there are no other views.

K: That's good. That's a rather mild reaction.

S: Especially under the circumstances.

K: They didn't keep us guessing for over a week.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon (IO)

Bob Haldeman
11/23/70 10:45 a.m.

[Didn't hear beginning of conversation]

K: You don't think they should say it at all.

H: No, if we had gotten them, fine. But I don't think it has much appeal. It makes us look ineffective. We tried it and there wasn't anybody there.

K: I'll check with Rogers, but basically I don't think there is any reason to be so nervous about it.

H: No, it's come off fine. The people in Hanoi heard something -- just say it was SAMs, not bombs. I don't think you have enough of a story in that prisoner thing.

K: Laird thinks he does.

H: Maybe he's right, if you'd said it right at the beginning. Now it looks like the other story went sour and you're trying to find something to talk about. The other thing is to wait a week and say this is one of the untold stories. You might want to do that just to embarrass the Senators.

K: Yes, there is a certain sense of pride...

H: There is on the part of the people who are with us and think the bombing was great. But those against us, it just gives them another chance to find fault.

K: Okay. Another question, is he still planning to go the West Coast between Christmas and New Years?

H: No. And he's not going to Key Biscayne this weekend.

K: I was going to try to get my children.

H: You can go ahead, but he's not going to California.

K: I don't see why he's so concerned.

H: I don't either. I think he nuts. But Mrs. Nixon grinds away at him saying you can't go away again; people will think you're not being President. So then he just sits here and gets into trouble and becomes less effective. But he's not planning to go now.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

11/23/70 11:22 a.m.

P: I've got the ______ of the Baptist World Alliance coming in. If you want to bring him by to shake hands that will be okay. Have you got him with you now?

K: Yes.

P: And about that colonel. How about bring him by at 4:30, or no, 5:00?

K: I think that would be a very nice gesture.

P: At 5:00... with Laird and Moorer and whoever they want to bring, two or three others.

K: Good.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

1:15 pm

11/23/70

L: Having lunch and talking things over with Tom and Dave.

K: I have been talking with the President. ____ statement.

L: We maintained the embargo all the way. We will have to go with something soon. He has so many people up there that saw the firings. Most of the damage was done by SAMs at low altitude. They must have exploded in population areas.

K: We probably should have gone this morning.

L: I wanted to.

K: If you have the statement the President would like to see it as soon as possible.

L: I have one right here.

K: The President wants to say -- down-play it -- say the only activity north of the ____ parallel was a rescue mission. When asked the size of the force, we answer that we will not go into it for security reasons. We will not give further details. No bombing or attacks.

L: There was bombing. We don't have to get into that. Most of the activity was SAM missile fire in the country.

K: Our xmas operation was strictly ____.

L: I will send a statement right over. I guarantee you --

K: I have to run to the President.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger
Brian McDonnell
1:55 pm, 11-23-70

K: How are you?

M: I am sorry to bother you. Is there any chance that you can help get me in to see Daniel Berrigan?

K: Oh yes, he is in prison.

M: Would that have to go through the Justice Department?

K: I will see what I can do and call you but it will probably not be until tomorrow.

Note: Missed some of telcon because had to drop off and answer other phones.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/23/70 2:00 p.m.

K: I have just talked to the President and gone over your statement. He is willing to let you go with some editing he did himself.

L: Good.

K: In fact my recommendation now -- you know what the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army said in 1914, 'now that I have made up my mind I will rip the phones out of the walls so no one will try to change it.'' He personally worked on it.

L: That's good. So now if all hell breaks loose he can fire me on Wednesday.

K: He's not going to fire you. He just said when the chips are down Laird has never let me down yet.

L: And I won't either. It's always nice to have a fall guy and I'm glad to be one for the President.

K: I will have Haig give the changes to Pursely. My only question now is should we put these two guys on. I don't want the exact number of people and training place and other details given.

L: When we got the word we could go we thought we'd go at 3:30.

K: The President wants to take the rap partly himself.

L: Is he sure?

K: Yes, he feels he was behind it and he isn't going to let you take the rap alone. He changes it to ''The President on my recommendation gave the green light.'' And at the beginning of the statement he wants to say ''I want to give you now the details of the only operation that took place north of the 19th parallel.''

L: Okay.

K: And again at the end he says it was the only operation north of it.

L: Does he want to say he's going to see these two?

K: You can say that.

L: I'll just work that in someplace.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11/23/70 2:00 p.m. page 2

K: Are you going to be at the briefing?

L: Yes. I think I should, and Moorer thinks I should, be there in case these guys get rough.

K: Just cut them off.

L: I'll knock it off. I can be a little tougher than they can/

11/23/70 2:38 p.m.

K: Two things. One, the President doesn't want to mention the name of the operation.

L: Okay.

K: We are getting to you all the changes in the next 10 minutes. My only question is that Ron Ziegler thinks we ought to mention the ordnance expended. I think once we mention that all hell will break loose.

L: I would rather not get into what ordnance was expended.

K: Okay, but can you get into it in the questionn period.

L: Yes.

K: Just say very little was expended. Most of it was theirs.

L: That's what I plan to do.

K: Say they fired a large number of SAMs in response to this operation.

L: Are you sending that over now?

K: Yes, you'll have it in 10 minutes.

L: Good. Minor and Simons and I are just going over it now. This will work out. Don't worry about it Henry. We'll make the best out of it.

K: That's what you have to do.

By NARA, Dale 5/20

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

November 23, 1970 2:45 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

H: I just wanted to tell you not to say anything about the Gallup Poll, it won't be released until Sunday. We would get into trouble if we say anything about it before that.

K: You can be absolutely sure I won't say anything. It is a useful caution though, I could have said something thinking it had already been released. I think it is good.

H: I think it is extraordinarily good. I thought it would be between 52 and 54 but that was before DeGaulle. I think going over there was helpful to us.

K: You told me before you thought it would be around 53. I do not think we are in such bad shape.

H: That trip to De Gaulle put Richard Nixon right back into being President.

K: I do not think he should stay here on weekends. I think that just staying around Washington would drive him crazy. I will talk to him about it.

H: Do not wait too long, the sooner the better. He says his mind is made up.

K: It makes no difference to me but I think it is good for him to get away. Who objects to his going to Florida or California?

H: His wife. She says that the people expect him to stay in Washington. He is starting to fit a pattern and do what his enemies want him to do. He should not do that.

K: She is wrong. California helps him with our real supporters. It will look like he is afraid to go back to California.

H: People expect him to be away. It is the holiday season between Christmas and New Years.

K: People will feel guilty if they go away and he stays here.

H: He does not seem to get the picture. Says he is going to stay here. WXXX6X Says he won't go back.

K: I will talk to him in the next few days. He has said that before. I will talk to him.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Pat Moynihan

11/23/70 4x 2:45 p.m.

M: I have been in Mexico while all this was breaking out; just came back over the weekend. Can you give me some details?

K: Yes, but do you mind doing it at the end of the day? I am in the middle of getting some press statements out which will help to explain things.

M: Any kind of explanation will be appreciated. I am going out to see Harriman at 7:00 but other than that I am pretty free.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

November 23, 1970 2:55 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

K: Mel, the thing is on the LDX as the President worked on it. It is 90% of yours. What release are you going to read before the statement? The message that the President sent to them?

L: Do you want me to read it to me. We are in pretty good shape, Henry.

K: The President wants to down play the size. Don't give large numbers or large ordinances.

L: (Laird talking to people in his office to bring him text) I am getting it for you.

K: I do not know how long this LDX takes but otherwise it should be over there in a matter of minutes.

L: It should be showing up here right soon. I don't think it is a good idea for us to down play this understandings thing.

K: I agree with you. Who is doing it?

L: Sullivan called us over here and said we should take it easy because we have no record of understandings. But Henry, we have a good dialogue. We have Clark Clifford's backgrounder and Averill Harriman sat across from this desk and told me about the understanding and Vance's statement in November in Paris. They don't want us to talk about it.

K: We should put out the record if they press us too hard. We will not do it here in the White House. The President agrees with you.

L: I think we should hit them on it hard. They are typing up the large copy for me. It will be in in a minute. I think you should hear it now in this context. It is a good wire.

K: It was a good wire. I just want to make damn sure.

L: I have it now. I'll read it to you. "Paraphrased reading" President asked that I express his deepest appreciation for your daring and courageous . . . . This should be an inspiration to all of us and we are proud of your courage and . . . . The Secretary of Defense and I share fully the President's sentiments . . . willingness to sacrifice ones life for others." and it is signed by Adm. Moorer, Chairman, JCS.

K: Excellent. You do that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Haldeman/KWsinger
3:25 pm 11/23/70

H: ? ? ? ? talking to the Secy. about the UN problem and he reised the conversation about Laird's testimony and he thinks he should testify tomorrow on supplemental because Rogers is testifying Wed. because he will be back then from Canada then and Laird will loose 10 days.

K: He just wants Laird on first. How come -- oh, because of Thanksgiving.

H: They close down Thurs. and Friday.

K: It puts Laird up first before his committees.

H: I don't know whether he was talking about the House or the Senate.

K: I dont object to it.

H: I am just raising the point with you.

K: I will call Laird later. He has that statment he is making in about 5 mins.

H: OK.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger
November 23, 1970 4:30 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

I: Henry, the other question about the Lord Carrington visit which I wanted to ask was whether you gave any indication to him about our holding our forces over in Europe.

K: No

I: A while back Nair (phonetic) asked one of our people and in effect said this would be right after the meeting.

K: I have a memorandum here. He did most of the talking because I was consistently called out of the office to talk with the President. . . . any financial contributions to the infra structure (re forces in Europe) and about NATO the only way we could see it was if it was using the service in a rational strategy and that this would be our effort. I did not make any commitment to him.

I: What was the general direction that we took at the meeting the other day?

K: That we will maintain them.

I: Good

K: That is what I got out of it. That is what the President thinks was decided. . . . I didn't think I should announce it to him before we have sent it out to the agencies.

I: It depends on the atmosphere. The President made that statement in Limerick so . . .

K: The President saw Carrington for 3 minutes but it was entirely social.

I: Did Bob Anderson, former Treasury Bob Anderson, talk to you about a deputy?

K: Oh, Max He did not talk to me about a deputy. He talked to me about his executive secretary of his commission. He wanted him put on some sort of payroll after his term at the commission expired.

I: He didn't talk to you about a deputy to negotiate with Panama, Marko? John Sheffy, phone in xxx Talked to you about John Sheffy (phonetic). He is very knowledgable about these things.

K: Can you help out on that?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Scali/Kissinger
4:37 pm 11/23/70

S: I just heard the news conference by Laird. It strikes me that the intelligence was a least inadequate.

K: We don't have agents in each camp.

S: But to risk so much on an operation that is brave but that lands someone at a camp where no one has been for 2 or 3 weeks and knowing in advance that if you don't do it the remaining xxx prisoners will lead a difficult life --

K: You don't know that at all.

S: Don't you suspect that the NVN seeing one operation mounted will keep them less exposed?

K: It's hard to keep them less exposed then they are.

S: I don't think they shouldn't have launched the invasion but the intelligence needed was good intelligence and it must have been thought it would work. Is anyone asking questions about the intelligence?

K: We are analyzing the operation.

S: Do you think it will have an impact on the diplomacy end? Will they be off?

K: They settle on the basis that if they think we are capable of doing the unexpected things they are equally cautious. And to a people who precede every peace movement with an offensive they cannot be outraged. And if we succeeded we would have been heroes.

S: But people thought there were people in this camp.

K: That there was a chance and it was worth a risk. Very serious problem after we found the camp not to try. If they had been tipped off we would have been in a buz saw. They moved them kobviously in the last 3-4 weeks and moved them when we were afraid to fly over in preparation to this.

S: But this other thing is a shock.

K: I am speaking to you as a friend -- it was a terrible disappointment. It was an attempt to help those people.

S: It adds up as a massive intelligence failure.

K: No, just bad luch, It was good intelligence to find it at all.

By ____ NARA, Date 5/26

Scali/Kissinger

4:37 pm 11/23/70

-2-

S: We are made to look like a strong country that labored and came out with *mengx* nothin

K: But they didn't look good either that we land 20 miles from Hanoi and get out.

S: I am just terribly disappointed.

K: Believe me, we were too. To work *mx* so hard and hope for the best -- think of the guys who did it. But it's the sort of operation where factors are out of our control. It *mx* looked like ______ work. They may have moved them to one camp and will move them back in two weeks.

S: Life will get more difficult for those prisoners.

K: I'm not sure about that. Now that we focus that much attention on it I don't think so.

S: I hope not.

K: But imagine if we had gotten 80-90 of them. And if in our shoes would you have said not to take a 30% chance?

S: The percentage must have been higher.

K: 50-50.

S: You sat up and monitored whole thing.

K: Biggest human disappointment. I don't think it will make the negotiations harder. Probably won't have any effect.

S: Your *mean* in predictability taking a part.

By NARA, Dato 5/20

Telecon
John Scalli

11/23/70 4:55 p.m.

K: I wanted to give you one piece of information which you shouldn't use but I thought you might want to know. The only time we could do it was during a quarter moon. The only time before that we could have done it was October 21. We didn't do it then because the President didn't want to be accused of endangering the lives of our prisoners during the campaign.

S: Why can't I use that? I don't see any harm in it. It would indicate that this man they accuse of resorting to all sorts of gimmicks has some other considerations in mind.

K: I am talking about this in terms of the intelligence failure. Let me check it with him. I'll call you between 5:30 and 6:00.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Scali/Kissinger
6:35 pm 11/23/70

K: I just left the President. We cannot let you go with that. We don't want politics in that.

S: Can I mention an earlier date had been considered without mentioning the time?

K: I would rather not. The weather wasn't good. We had rejected it before.

S: The weather was a factor later.

K: That's right. It's not right to get it into it. I just wanted to tell you.

S: I understand.

K: Our intelligence on these camps is always a few weeks out of date because of the nature of it. It's heartbreaking, believe me. We just met with the men who did it.

S: I will respect your judgement.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Marty Schramm, Newsday

6:59 p.m., November 23, 1970

K: Nothing to do with electronics. I don't want to get into that.

S: Same day as the other, as part of the other? Which came first?

K: The operation to do this.

S: Search and rescue?

K: The other was planned after the reconnaissance plane was shot down.

S: Which was done first?

K: Don't want to go into that, was done almost simultaneously.

By [機] NARA, Date 5/26
[paraphrased]

TELCORN

6:59 p.m., November 23, 1970

K: I read your articles, I noticed you quote my jokes as anti ______.

S: Oh yes, that wasn't such a bad joke.

K: I've got to run, what's your problem?

S: Picked up Fulbright and some others on the wires, the rescue operation in North Vietnam opens the door, amounts to secret (?) invasion. What I'm getting at -- two things: (1) Do we consider this to be any kind of precedent....

K: This operation was designed to save American lives. I can't understand how anybody can take this view. ???? Goddammit, I literally won't believe how many ______. Why would we land men there, we could do more damage by dropping bombs.

S: Risk lives going into POW camp ????

K: If they want to risk their lives to save their fellow soldiers. We always knew the intelligence was several weeks old but for the sake of prisoners who had been there for 5 years ????

S: The other area I wanted to ask about, the matter of intelligence. Do you learn anything you didn't know before?

K: We knew exactly how much lag time we had. You don't think a camp would be abandoned, we knew some people would be moved but we hoped to save some. Can't tell you any more than that.

S: How do we know that people were dying in POW camps?

K: I think we were notified about that.

S: How long has the President considered doing this?

K: Started in August. Final okay wasn't given until later.

S: Why this time, obviously a companion to the other?

K: We had to wait for certain weather conditions to do it. Certain conditions either to be done now or at the end of January when the probability of rain was most.

S: Had something to do with electronics?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Senator Dole
11/23/70; 7:00 p.m.

K: The President wanted me to call you to talk about the prisoner thing, knowing your interest.

D: We just finished an hour and half debate on the floor.

K: We are going to arrange a Pentagon briefing for you. What would Kennedy have done if he would have been President?

D: We pointed out to him that saving a single life was important. I found it hard to believe -- they kept pressing me -- Kennedy was really -- I could not believe it. I think we should be on the offensive. We should really get behind our servicemen.

K: That's what the President feels.

D: The fact that we did not rescue prisoners was unfortunate -- but it was a successful mission.

K: I think it is an inspiring thing that they went in. We will give you the ammunition.

D: You might want to read the record -- we were talking without any information. Fulbright got into the act.

K: We will get you a briefing tomorrow. I will have the Pentagon get in touch with you.

feg

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President
7:06 p.m., November 23, 1970

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to tell you I talked to Senator Dole who was locked in tough debate with Kennedy and Fulbright.

P: Kennedy in it too. Good, get him in it!

K: I just had a call from Marty Schramm who is on the liberal side. He said he couldn't believe my eyes when I saw what Fulbright said.

P: What about Dole?

K: He is going to rally the troops.

P: How about getting Laird to get those two guys down there and give them a briefing. Get Alex Johnson in on it too. And State Department has to stand up and be counted too. No excuses and no apologies of any kind.

K: I just saw Dan Rather on TV, he was very positive.

P: How was it?

K: It was a daring operation and thought it was a gutsy try but agreed with it. I think this thing is coming out fine, Mr. President.

P: We owe it to these men to try and it has to come out right. We have to get Haldeman, Ehrlichman -- at the staff meeting tomorrow morning -- if one of those sons-of-bitches sticks his head up, knock it off! People have got to start being proud to be Americans!

K: Right, Mr. President. Had pride in it. Senate (?) said it was a gutsy thing to do. I haven't seen the other news but I have heard it played very well.

P: Dole realize what a gutsy move it was? Was he in the debate? Laird probably didn't prepare him for the goddamm debate!

K: He is going to rally the troops tomorrow.

P: Rally Percy and ______ and others like that. Two guys from New York and New Jersey, can't count on Goodell but colonels from New Jersey and generals from New York.

K: It should turn into a plus.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:06 p.m., November 23, 1970 -- page 2

P: I don't give a damm. Got to turn it into a plus. Give me a call as soon as you talk to Laird. Members of the House should be ________. McCormick and others should press it. Let the Democrats appear to be the guys who don't go along with ???? Push it on the Senate side. Tell Mel he has got to get Jackson and Dole briefed. Get Muskie on the other side of this one. Teddy is on the other side, trying to get the vote. Otherwise the press will play this up the wrong way. Do you comprehend me now?

K: Right, Mr. President.

TELECON (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

12:00 a.m., November 24, 1970

K: Hello.

Y: Hello.

K: How are you?

Y: I'm all right, thank you, and I'm sorry to disturb you at this late hour.

K: That's all right.

Y: I would like to explain to you the present situation here for your own information. My friend has just had another special meeting with his top advisors on the subject. My friend is determined more than ever to have an agreement and, as a matter of fact, wanted to make a final identi political decision today. However, I'll be very frank and suggest __________. Mr. M...

K: Hold on a second. Go ahead.

Y: Mr. M in the way undesirably made a plea to use him for about 6 hours or so to devise a new formula using the framework of our basic policy.

K: Of whose basic policy?

Y: Which I already explained to you earlier. And so the new instructions are going to be sent to our representative later today of our time.

K: Right.

Y: I do not know the technical details of the new formula yet but I'll probably let you know something more about it as soon as I have it. We do hope that your expert will consider it. Mr. M is now apparently raising the question __________ to my friend. If my friend was to make a political decision to have an agreement which is acceptable to you, Mr. M feels he cannot bear the responsibility of implementing it effectively as long

DECLASSIFIED
MWO EO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/70

MJD 12958
 Authority
By: NARA Date 6/4/04

-2-

the
as/subject is called voluntary ____________. Now the political climate
here as I see it as an outside observer is ____________ so serious that his
__friend__ might resign. I don't know. __getting__

K: That who might resign? Who might resign, M?

Y: Yes, Mr. M might resign.

should

K: Well maybe we __should__ forget the whole thing. We didn't want to start
it again.

well

Y: Just let me finish. It may/lead to a political crisis to my friend but my
friend still does wish to have an agreement at an earliest occasion out of
__________ his firm conviction that this will serve the long range national interests
of both countries. So in any case, ____________ there is another expert meeting
tomorrow of your time.

K: Yes.

Y: So would you please let me know your __reaction to our new__
instructions which I do not know at all. I fear that they may not __get__
to your expert __but if you can give a final try then my friend will
probably make a political decision. On that occasion my friend feels that
he will __ask your friend through you political consideration by your friend
as well__, so that __we could have an agreement.

I don't know.

K: Well, I want to talk to my friend tomorrow. /We don't want to undermine
your friend's position and if it doesn't work out we should just forget it.

Y: But my friend does wish to have an agreement and for instance let me
be very frank with you that he yesterday, __of our time__, I told you this
morning how __I__ told you this morning,
of your time. I had. I met __him__ and had a long talk twice over the phone.
He expressed his personal regret for such a delay in making the agreement
as __he meant to__ __get__ it much earlier __when__
he visited your place about a month ago. Read that press communique but
due to the extremely difficult and highly technical nature of the program
and the very limited scope of what he and his __governments__ on
gentlemen can do to impose __voluntary__ regulations on
the industry. Which is true __necessary__ at home but outside all that he does wish to have an agreement
and so he hasn't given up his hope yet at all but in order to give Mr. M
(this is a very personal conversation between you and I) give him one
more chance with a time limit of 6 hours.

K: OK well we could talk after our experts have met and then let's see
where we stand.

Y: Don't raise this matter to your friend yet because then your friend may
worry about this. This is a very honest and frank conversation between you

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

1:00 a.m., November 24, 1970

- 2 -

Y: Yes.

K: That is, 3%.

Y: 3%?

K: Yes.

Y: Within the group?

K: Yes. You know, I can't be absolutely sure, but I think there would be a chance.

Y: Fine, fine. I think we're much better to stick to our original conversation which is the official stance now approved by my friend with his two top aides. As I told you, I am absolutely certain and correct in saying this. So, if we could stick to the last conversation I had with you, our original official proposal of six groups over 17 items and if you could give us 3% of shift within a group.

K: Well, I will do my best. I can't guarantee it, but at least, they didn't reject it completely. I proposed it today on the basis of our conversation...

Y: That's right.

K: ...recognizing your friend's particular problem and, of course, our people are extremely reluctant, but I think we can... I'm giving you my impression that if you accept six groups and 17 categories, and one of the other three is an essential. I don't know which it is.

Y: I beg your pardon -- what...

K: Of the remaining three categories, we must have one under some formula. I don't know which of the three.

Y: I see, but one item.

K: Yes.

Y: So that will be 18 items.

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By. NARA Date 6/9/1970

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

1:00 a.m., November 24, 1970

- 3 -

Y: I see. All right. You have to have one more item.

K: That's right.

Y: So, six groups over 18 items.

K: Right.

Y: And would you think you could perceive your exports to accept 3% shift?

K: I think so. You know, I hope so. But if you show some flexibility, I think I can.

Y: Yes, yes. Then, I would immediately get in touch with my friend. He's really anxious and...

K: Well, you can tell him I will undertake to get... I think I can get the three per cent.

Y: I see. And, you are really not an expert nor I am, but this 3% shift is within a group.

K: That's right.

Y: If there is another shift between groups...

K: Yes, I don't know what the rule there is.

Y: And also the question of the carry-in and the carry-over, and we had some idea of 5% for this shift on the carry-in/carry-over. Also, the growth rate; that is, about 5% which is in substance very similar to your growth formula. I was told by our top expert that this could be acceptable to you basically. The real question is the shift percentage within a group. And your expert, Mr. Flanigan, suggested to our representative 1%.

K: That's right.

Y: So, if you could allow us 3%, I think this would be a tremendous help. The very strong argument -- for instance, Mr. M is putting to my friend is that if we go ahead with this proposal of yours, then it would be a cutback of our shipment. Not the gradual, ordinary growth,

MWO EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Authorized
By ____ NARA Date 6/4/04

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

1:00 a.m., November 24, 1970

- 4 -

but the cutback in absolute terms of shift-backs. That is his main argument, and this then tells you that could not force our industry to accept.

K: But I think we can probably deal with that.

Y: So, my own friend -- he is not an expert either. All he needs is now political help from you.

K: Well, I have done what I could today.

Y: So that we could dramatize and propagandize that we have reached an agreement as a result of the... in good faith, the mutual conditions.

K: Well, will you call me tomorrow morning.

Y: Yes, certainly. What time could I call you?

K: Around 8:30 my time.

Y: Around 8:30 of your time? At your office?

K: Yes.

Y: And would you please... I know you are extremely presently busy -- the schedule you have, but since now...

K: Yes, I will do the best I can.

Y: Could it hurry so that in the way this states, in the light of our forthcoming Diet session, before that session my friend and all his advisors agree that we must settle the matter. Otherwise, there is not much purpose of reaching any agreement from our point of view. So would you please give your time the proper priority to this matter?

K: I will. Okay, I'll hear from you at 8:30.

Y: Yes, and please, even though it is a private proposal of our representative, which it is purely of his own -- I'm certain of that.

K: All right, fine. I will then wait to hear from you tomorrow morning.

Y: That's right.

K: Good. Good night.

Y: Good night and thank you.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Flanigan/Kissinger

11:25 am

11/24/70

K: I had another call and if these bastards don't stop waking me up at 1:00 in the morning I will be irrascible.

F: More so than just usual?

K: Yoshida hissed at me for an hour from 1:00-2:00 last night. I am sending you the tape but I don't think I figure out the Prime Minister believes he is accepting our proposition. Miazawa wants a 6 hour respite to present a new proposal. If that's not acceptable the PM may or may not make a political decision to overrule Miazawa and then Miazawa will resign and they will have a first-class Cabinet crisis. I'm not sure it's worth that. The one you get today is neither the one the Ambassador surfaced Sunday afternoon or the one my contact surfaced. It's Miazawa's idea.

F: The one your contact surfaced was ours.

K: That's the one he says Sato will enforce if you reject the one that comes in at noon.

F: We will have to review it and then decide the priorities. I think this meeting will clear over the approach without giving anything away.

K: Shall I work out the oil problem too? Of course I can't do what I am supposed to be doing.

F: You just couldn't find the prisoners. It was probably a camp for women.

K: Just think about the village elder. We land into the camp and blow up a helicopter.

F: No room to leave from up there?

K: That's right so we destroyed it. We hear there's a babbling village elder.

F: Just bad advice?

K: They are adding pits for the water buffalo because the think that's what we were after. They will be worshipping those guys for years to come.

F: What about the article in the Post this morning saying we have applied it to all right for the Portuguese to invade Guinea?

K: I don't read the editorials in the Post.

F: I have to go. The boss is calling.

K: Keep him waiting. It's good for him.

F: I know that's your tactic.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Zeigler/Kissinger

11:45 am

11/24/70

Z: Anything I should say about your meeting with KY?

K: He identified a few more areas for helicopters.

Z: I heard he identified them for the NVN.

K: He ______ the two water buffaloes we took out for cross breeding.

Z: I am afraid he will give out a very detailed briefing at the press group today.

K: He promised he wouldn't and you know that the Vietnamese never lie.

Z: B__ S__! Really, what can I say?

K: We went over the situation in VN and Paris and reviewed ______ in VN.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Barbara Walters/Kissinger

12:10 pm

11/24/70

K: You want an answer from me.

W: I hope so.

K: You sound very mellow.

W: That's because I'm in Philadelphia.

K: I spoke with the President and he says in principle it's okay.

W: What's in principle?

K: I will do it.

W: Good! When will be best for you?

K: Can we deal with that problem later?

W: Will it be in Washington when I am there?

K: That week will be fine.

W: I just finished reading about you in TIME. You cannot be that much of a swinger. I will be in town on the 5th.

K: We are going to be at two dinners together that week.

W: The Bradens and the ______? We will be bored with each other.

K: Let's think about Tues. and Wed. while you are here.

W: Tues. will be best. Can you give me a tentative time?

K: I will decide that later. What time is best for you?

W: Anytime. I have a breakfast first thing in the morning on Tues. that I must attend.

K: You are filming it.

W: Yes.

K: You must be gentle.

W: I will be.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Barbara Walters/KIIssinger

12:10 pm

11/24/70

d-2-

K: I don't know how to handle tough women on TV.

W: I see why they write about you that way. I need 15 minutes on Monday too.

K: And nothing substantive.

W: The flowers and birds and dinner parties.

K: Nothing personal.

W: That leaves nothing. No, what your job consists of and how you spend your days.

K: And what the President does.

W: That's right. I will talk to you towards the end of the week about a time and see you at the dinners. Perhaps we can talk at the dinner.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Moorer/Kissinger

12:18 pm

11/24/70

M: I am speaking to the Calvin Byllock Forum and won't be at the DPRC. Look on it as informative and now make any decision. This will impact on next summer.

K: I want to use this meeting to stop using the draft calls as ______.

M: That's right. They are backing us into a corner.

K: I will not make any positive decisions.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
D. Kraslow/Kissinger
1:01 p.m. d1/24/70

K: Give me a couple of minutes. I have to do this interpretive piece. Where do we go in Cambodia? I have been re-reading your backgrounders; and the President's statements and I cannot get a clear picture.

HAK: What is your question?

K: What do you see down the road? Assuming --

HAK: I think it's possible there's an offensive and we believe that they can hold within the present framework with the present level of assistance from us and SVN.

K: Your timing is still Feb. a or March of next year?

HAK: That's a reasonable guess.

K: How significant is their build up in Cambodia -- not the panhandle?

HAK: They are just beginning it.

K: There was a question put to the President. May 8. What our policy is in Cambodia. "After American troops removed from Cambodia =- what is your policy?" President replied we are interested in both Laos and Cambodia.
"? ? ? ?? ? ? " Diplomatic ______ which we are doing through the Soviet Union. "? ? ? ? ? ? "

HAK: My problem is right now I am late for lunch and you have a long set of questions. What is your deadline?

K: Could you call this afternoon?

HAK: I will try. I will do my best.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Nick Timmisch/Kissinger
4:06 pm 11/24/70

T: Your 6000 phone call today. I am writing a column about the attempt to get the prisoners out. My personal view is that I don't think it was a provocative as a rescue thing.

K: One plane could have done more destruction then these men did.

T? It's only said that it didn't work. The only question is that on planning of it was it a matter of months?

K: planning started in August. The men trained in Sept. and Oct. and did it in Nov. It was done at this time because of special weather considerations. It had to be done during the quarter moon so they could see something but not enough light for them to see the helioopters.

T: So the holidays had nothing to do with it.

K: No. Either now or the end of Jan. but then the monsoon season would have started. We moved it up one day because of the typhoon.

T: Why did Secy. Laird feel it was necessary to publicize this?

K: So much speculation on what had gone on near Hanoi. The second was that these people were locked up in training base and going home on leave so it would have leaked anyway.

T: I see, My immediate reaction was that it was good.

K: We thought there was a 50-50-chance and we felt we had to take it. If it had worked we might have gotten 100 prisoners.

T: And great reaction from the American people. The prisoners have been a problem anyway.

K: We have offered several thousand of theirs for 300 of ours but they refuse. We have done everything.

T: I will use some of this in the story. We are talking for background?

K: Yes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

H. Sidey/Kissinger
4:10 pm 11/24/70

S: I haven't seen you for awhile. Gather you are holding up.

K: Foaming at the mouth frequently and eat pieces of rug every so often but they are good with butter.

S: I wonder if anything can be put together on this thing. My point is that if there's a run down available on this, on the decision being made and why and enough that the emotion that went into it I would like to try a piece.

K: I will talk with the President and see if I can get together tomorrow.

S: I go to press tomorrow but If there was a possibility I would.

K: I will talk with the President and try for 20 minutes.

S: Thank you.

TELECON (tape)
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
Late evening, November 24, 1970

L: Henry.

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Say, I think we better go ahead. Dave, after he talked with you, got in touch with ADM Murphy in my office, and on Dave's call, Murphy went ahead and alerted these people, so I think we can't do anything about it now, so we might as well forget about it.

K: That's good. Now, Mel, if you think we ought to bring them all up here, let's bring them all up.

L: I think that probably it's good to stretch this thing out for a few days. I felt that we had today, we've got tomorrow with two hearings up on the Hill, and I figured we'd keep the thing going for a week or 10 days. I think that this is a good thing to gameplan over a longer period of time and not use everything up right away. I think it's good to keep the POW thing going for a little while, and that's why I've had Henken and Baroody over in my office lay out a regular game-plan of things to do.

K: Yeah, well, you got the President so steamed up now, he just pre-empted you. That's really what it came down to.

L: Well, that's all right with me. It's all for the good of the Administration, but I think on these things it's always well to plan these public affairs things, and not just off the back of our head. We can get longer sustained...

K: Well, tomorrow's hearings, though, are the supplemental. They are not on this, are they?

L: Those hearings will only be on this, Henry.

K: Really?

L: Whenever I go up there on the Hill now for the next week...

K: But didn't you already have the Foreign Relations Committee going crazy today? You were terrific.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
By ____ NARA Date 6/4/1970

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

- 2 -

L: Well, it was a long hearing.

K: Well, you were terrific. Even Aiken, whom I saw ... who was at that Ky dinner was full of admiration.

L: Well, that's good.

K: And, you know, he started out being negative.

L: Yeah, well, I think we got... I wish you could have seen the confrontation I had with Kennedy this morning, though.

K: I understand you really took him to the cleaners.

L: And that was one of the best... I really enjoyed that, you know.

K: Tell me, Mel, you are up before what Committees tomorrow?

L: Appropriations Committee in the morning, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the afternoon.

K: Well, we might as well, if you can't help being raped, you might as well enjoy it. So we better schedule this thing for about 5:00 in the afternoon, don't you think?

L: Yeah, that'd be good.

K: So that you can leave?

L: I'm trying to do my homework tonight. I'm working on all these supplemental requests and the Israeli thing and all these packages. I know I'm not going to get a damned question about them, but I still have to study it.

K: You don't think you are going to get a question about...

L: I don't think I'll get a question, but I still have to study the damned stuff tonight.

K: Besides, no matter what they ask you -- if I'm any judge of you -- you'll get in that POW thing anyhow.

L: Well, no, I'll let them do that.

K: Well, I'm sure it's going to work that way anyhow. You haven't been wrong yet on these things.

L: Well, take care. The good thing is that in the House, they

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/4/04

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

don't have television, so you don't get the damned thing you had today.
That's kind of lousy with an unfriendly committee.

R: You did marvelously.

L: I tell you, the only way I'll ever appear before Fulbright is
in public because if you let him control it, and you let him come out
and say what went on, then you get screwed.

K: Hell, you had them on the defensive. Everyone of these guys
led with the statement that they really were in favor of the objective
and of the operation, and then they started making little nitpicks. You
can't win that way.

L: You know, we've been calling these gals and mothers all over
the country.

K: And apparently they've been speaking on television.

L: They've been coming through great, Henry. And we got all the
national organizations lined up now -- you know, out making statements
and when you hear from the people in the countryside, this will be good.

K: Well, Reagan called and, of course you'd expect that, but he's
been blasting Fulbright. I told him to go on after Kennedy, too. Your
instinct was absolutely right. By the time we are through, that's going
to be a great plus.

L: Yeah, I think so. They were giving us the business on the
intelligence a little bit today.

K: Yeah, but you made... I saw that great line of yours where
you said we haven't got cameras here that can see through roofs.

L: But I did try to tell them what great intelligence we had to be
able to penetrate that sophisticated air defense system and to know
exactly where every building and where the locks were. You know,
this was pretty good. Well, we kind of turned that into a plus, too.

K: Okay, Mel. It's a pleasure to work with you.

L: Take care. Good night.

K: Good night.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (tape)

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

Y: I'm sorry to disturb you. Have you...

K: Well, I've had a very preliminary talk and we haven't had a final talk yet which we'll have in the morning. But I can tell you what my recommendation is going to be. I think we should break off the negotiations. It isn't worth it. I don't think this is an acceptable proposal and I don't think we want to undermine the domestic position of your friend any further. I don't see... I don't the proposal does us any good, and it won't do him any good.

Y: Yes, I understand that this is your recommendation, but also I'm thinking of the prestige of your friend.

K: Well, that's all right now, but this proposal won't help the prestige of my friend, and the alternative proposal is going to over-throw your friend, so there isn't any sense in it.

Y: Yes.

K: So I think... Well, I will see, maybe my colleagues believe we should accept your proposal. I think it's a mistake but...

Y: I am going to see my friend probably for the very, very final decision whether we should, from our side, make major concessions to meet your needs on how you feel. At any rate, I share your feeling to break off with minimum

K: I think at this point all the negotiations do is irritate both sides and weaken the domestic position of both sides.

Y: That's right.

K: And I don't see any sense in it, myself, any more. So I'm going to see, maybe, if my colleagues would accept it (which I doubt) but that still is not going to help my friend any.

Y: That's right.

K: If they objected, it would be to have an excuse to do something about the trade bill for the wrong reasons. But I will decide that tomorrow and why don't you call me at the end of the morning tomorrow.

MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/9/70
DECLASSIFIED

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Yoshida

Y: Yes, and also before you make a decision and make a recommendation to your own friend. Could we have the final decision...

K: My problem is also quite honestly, I'm spending too much of my time on this problem now. I have so many things to do.

Y: I'm sure you do.

K: But we can try to talk about 9:15. Will you call me at 9:15?

Y: 9:15 tomorrow morning?

K: Yes.
the last time

Y: And/I must apologize to you, but tomorrow morning of your time, I'll be very much on time 9:15 and, too, we discuss this matter for the last conversation. Please hold not your ______ matter to your friend.

K: Yes, but I'm seeing my friend about 9:30.

Y: You meet your friend at 9:30?

K: Yes. Okay.

Y: I'm sorry but would it not be possible if we are to make the final proposal along the lines we discussed; that is, you had suggested a 3% shifting within a group...

K: Yeah, and 5% among groups.

Y: That's right.

K: Yeah, that's all right. But you can't accept that.

Y: My friend may decide...

K: But if he accepts it and then it's a result that his whole Cabinet resigns -- which is what your representative said to us today -- we don't want that.

Y: I will meet my friend and discuss it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/4/04

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Yoshida/Kissingox Haig

9:27 am

11/25/70

Y: Mr. Haig, I am sorry on the delay of my call.

H: Dr. Jones is with his friend at the moment. He should be back shortly.
Can I have him call you? Are you in your office?

Y: That's right. As soon as he gets back could I have a word? I will have
him call you when he gets back.

Y: In the meantime is there anything you can tell me about our problem?

H: I had better let Dr. Jones talk to you about it. He has just finished meeting with the experts. I was not in the meeting. I think he should talk to you.

Y: I was meaning to get to him before he gets to his friend.

H: We will call you shortly. As soon as he gets back and he can bring you abreast of where things stand here.

Y: I know he is extremely busy but my friend is giving top priority to this issue. Please have him call me as soon as he gets back.

H: It should be within 15 minutes.

Y: Please see to that. My friend is also waiting. Please.

H: I will do that.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Hobart Lewis/Kissinger

10:41 a.m.

11/25/70

L: I am sorry to interrupt. You may know that I talked to the President last evening. He feels there's a story to be told on the raid into the prisoner of war camp. I would like to assign John Hubble to do it. How can we do it without pain to you?

K: Tell them to get in touch with Gen. Haig. We will work something out.

L: I asked the President if we should go to VN. He said it wasn't necessary.

K: It wasn't done out of VN. They don't know anything about it.

L: Some of the participants are in Washington?

K: They are reachable here. We better establish ground rules first.

L: You must give us permission -- we did a condensation of the briefing you gave the press in San Clemente last summer. Could we print some?

K: I would like to see it and edit it.

L: We will send it right down.

K: Did you discuss it with anyone?

L: Earl Mazo sent it to me. It reads well to us but you may want to change it.

K: So you did this on your own.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Governor Connally
11/25/70 11:35 a.m.

K: I have been talking to the President about the problem of how to keep you more currently informed and also get the benefit of your thinking on some matters. If you are willing the President would be pleased for you to join the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Perhaps you know this group from the Johnson Administration. This is almost the only board in the foreign field that does any serious work. They meet about once a month, well they average meeting about every six weeks. They have access to a great deal of classified stuff and they give us a chance to get more. Our intelligence system is in a mess and we need some tough minds working on it.

C: I'd be delighted to do it.

K: Marvelous. The next meeting of the Board is on December 2 and 3. If you are able to come, the President is anxious to have an appointment with you to talk to you alone.

C: It will be difficult for me, if not impossible, to make it. I have a speech in Boca Raton and then a black tie dinner in New York that night and then the next morning I have a board meeting of U.S. Trust that I must attend.

K: No, it's the 3rd and 4th.

C: Oh! Then I can certainly make part of it. I could come in the afternoon of the third and be there the fourth.

K: Good. Let's plan on that. You can't come for lunch on the 3rd? I am meeting with the Board then and expressing our concerns about the intelligence community.

C: No, I cannot. This is a very critical meeting of U.S. Trust. I deeply regret it.

K: Okay. We can fill you in on it.

C: I'll see what I can do, but I can't really hold out hope for lunch on the third. We are restructuring some of the offices of the Board and I ought to be there.

K: We'll schedule an appointment with the President for you on the fourth. But just if you will not tell your colleagues on the Board about your appointment with the President because he is not seeing any of them.

C: Very good. I understand and will do that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Yoshida/Kissinger

5:15 pm

11/25/70

Y: I have been waiting to hear from you all night.

K: I thought the next move was up to you. Let me say the following: I think I will get out of this discussion all together. I don't see enough coming back through this channel to make it worth your while or mine to add to what the experts are discussing. I think it should be discussed by the experts. If they agree, we will be delighted. I don't want to produce an cabinet crisis in your country. I don't think this will get us very far. I think Mr. Flanigan will make a proposal to your representative and take what your representative said and try to fit it to our objectives. I don't know if it will work. He will try to get some of our proposals and we will trigger the action instead of you. But nothing comes back from your representative that is at all close to what you and I discuss. So there's no sense in our making propositions and then your man acting as if this has not happened. I understand that your friend made a commitment that your political situation would not permit. We have no interest in bringing about his downfall. That would be opposite of what we did last year to promote ____.
There's no sense in keeping a promise to us when the whole point is the opposite.

Y: I am sure he appreciates this.

K: I believe and so does my friend that the experts should handle it. Then the responsibility will be diffused on each side and it will be the responsibility of your Cabinet as well as your friend. I will watch the discussions.

Y: I know you are not very expert on the subject. I spent so much -- I did everything --

K: Everything you could do and there's no bad feeling on my side.

Y: And I feel very sad.

K: These things happen.

Y: How do you see the prospect of an agreement?

K: We cannot accept your proposition, that's clear. We are thinking of a counter proposal which gives your objective and our ______. We have gone over and over and it's never worked yet. We might make a proposal which may trigger things if the imports in a category go above the percentage you agreed. And you have your promise not to retaliate.

Y: I see.

K: I don't want to get into the details. I didn't see -- I wasn't in favor of resuming these discussion. Your friend was so determined.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Yoshida/Kissinger

5:15 pm

11/25/70

Y: I would like to see my friend for the last time.

K: You should make clear we are not asking for anything and not risk his political position and we will make a proposal which he will get in due course.

W: For this matter you don't want to be involved any longer in this channel.

K: If your friend has a specific thing in which he wants a yes or no I can get it for him. We have worked for a year and nothing has come from your officials which we agree to. On Sunday we agreed on something and it's never come. I enjoy talking to you but on a subject we both understand.

Y: I understand.

K: Maybe you understand the subject but I don't.

Y: I don't either but I was doing my utmost.

K: I have no doubt of your goodwill and I know you have a tough political situation and it will not affect your relationship with me.

Y: I hope not. When I come to see you at your place sometime I will tell you in detail what I have done.

K: No question about it. Give my high personal regards to your friend and I hope agreement will be reached through channels and for the time I will no longer deal with this issue.

Y: I will.

K: I hope when you come here you will let me know and we can talk. I am always delighted to hear from you.

Y: When I talk to my friend in any case I am grateful for what you have done.

K: I know we have both tried to do what is possible.

Y: I hope to see you soon. Excuse my bad English.

K: Your English! -- I didn't understand I was to call back and that it would wait until morning.

Y: I hope we will reach an agreement in time.

K: I think it's possible but your officials have to do it.

Y: Thank you.

K: Good to talk to you. Good bye.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

7:15 p.m., November 25, 1970

K: Mel, I am sorry.

L: How are you doing?

K: I just talked to the President. If you don't stop romancing him, I am
going to get mad. He just raved on and on about how great you were.

L: I didn't even see the citations (laughter). Lost my place and added a
sentence ...

K: Don't you think it went all right.

L: Didn't even see the damn things.

K: Your memo here, the message you want to sent to Bruce. Suggest
eliminating the part about Bruce is going to meet with you and Rogers
next week, we can announce that later. The State Department -- they
don't want to order Bruce around like that.

L: You can knock the James thing out too if you want.

K: What?

L: The James thing in the last message part of the memo. He is the
black Air Force General that has been working on POWs. He is an
attractive black officer.

K: ??? Think we should omit the momentum that we have ______ there.

L: That's not what I called you about. Next time I ought to at least see the
citations (laughter). The thing I called you about, I just wanted to check
with you on my memo on the 18th -- DPRC due on the 30th. Never got
much of a response to the memo which I wrote personally to the
President. Do you think we should work that in too or separate?

K: Turn that into a separate thing. You can also put it into the DPRC
if you want to.

L: Some of it maybe.

K: Sure you can do that. Don't say where it came from.

L: I'm meeting with Gardiner Tucker tomorrow.

K: I would do that.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:37 p.m., November 25, 1970

K: Mr. President

P: Henry, one other thing that occurred to me, we should have covered earlier the thing today with Bruce.

K: No, no, he was briefed on the whole operation. I talked to him, I backchanneled him when it went off. He has been fully informed Mr. President.

P: In the morning call him and say look here, this is something we should be very proud. I am sure Bruce would agree.

K: The Friday or next Monday, a briefing by a team -- a press conference in Paris on the efforts we have made on the PW issue and all the attempts we have made and Bruce will preside.

P: That we have 30,000 North Vietnamese....

K: No, 8,000 North Vietnamese.

P: That is enough. We are willing to trade 8,000 for 400 this ???
But I want Bruce on our side, State will be working on him the
other way.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

(paraphrased)

November 27, 1970 10:20 a.m.

jlj

Z: XXXXX I am going to announce this morning that Moynihan is not going to the UN.

K: Jesus! Is that definite? Are you sure? We are making fools of ourselves.

Z: He wants it done. It will get rid of the columns and the press stories, etc.

K: What is he going to do?

Z: He is going to return to Harvard as originally intended.

K: I think it is a great mistake.

Z: Why?

K: One you offer someone a job you should let him stay with it. Is he in the city?

Z: No. He is up at Harvard. What do you think we should do?

K: I would try to get him to take the job. This is only showing the State Department that if they donewall enough or put up a fight they can get their own way. It's not my business. I didn't offer him the job.

Z: I have talked to Pat and Haldeman and I wanted to talk to you and then call Bill and tell him I was going to annouce it but if you do not think we should . . .

K: I think it is a mistake.

Z: He has talked to the President.

K: He has talked to Haldeman . . .

Z: I am going to go ahead with this . . . Should I tell Bob what your view is.

K: Yes. Just mention to him that you talked to me and that from a private citizen's point of view I think it is a mistake. I am not appealing this.

Z: You're not appealing it. Just your view that we should try to talk him into taking the job.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: I do not even particularly want to talk to him about it. Just mention it to him. Are you going to announce my engagement to Jill St. John?

Z: She is not going to let you... take her off the market.

K: Being married 4 times has done nothing to take her off the market.

Z: I am also going to announce the water buffalo thing. About the village chief...

K: He now believes in God.

Z: Saying that he now has his sight restored because *ik* he lost it... our helicopters in there.

K: The real screw up is that we brought back two water buffalo because we wanted to breed them but found we had two males. So we have to go back and exchange one.

Z: We found one was sterile and so we can't guarantee that we won't go back to find another one.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EOLASER
By: CHYARA Date: 03/27/70

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., November 27, 1970

D: How are you? How was your Thanksgiving Day?

K: I was with my children.

D: Were you here?

K: No, I was in Boston. Are you checking up on your intelligence personnel?

D: Exactly. They said you were out of town but didn't know where you were. I would like to give you an answer on a certain gentleman. We agree with your proposal. I am authorized to tell you we accept with the expectation you will do as you said.

K: I will give you the exact date; it will be probably the week of the 7th.

D: As you mentioned before.

K: There's been no change. I find we had a luncheon date for December 4. I can't do it on the 4th.

D: What date is acceptable to you.

K: The 7th or earlier in the week -- December 2?

D: The 7th will be better.

K: I prefer it, too.

D: At 1:00?

K: At 1:00; go to the usual place and we will arrange lunch there.

D: Thank you very much.

Ids

By

NARA

Date 5/26

TELECON

10:30 a.m., November 27, 1970

K: I was with my children.

D: Were you here?

D: As you mentioned before.

D: The 7th will be better.

K: I prefer it, too.

D: At 1:00?

D: Thank you very much.

lds

Patrick Moynihan/Mr. Kissinger

November 27, 1970 11:09 a.m.

jlj

By NARA, Date 5/26

(paraphrased)

K: Pat, how are you?

M: Fine. I am just sitting here watching Dan Bell go by laiden down
with the worries of all sociology.

K: That means he must be on his belly.

M: And there is Simon C

K: I didn't know that Dan Bell was at Harvard now?

M: Yes. He is a Professor of Sociology here and lives right next
door to me on ______ Street. He got a years leave of absence
and was at Columbia but did not want to stay at Columbia. Now
is back here.

K: That is rather clever. Pat, I am astonished about the UN appointment.
I do want to clear up one point. You told Bob Haldeman that I
was against your appointment and that simply is not true.

M: Bob Haldeman told me.

K: It is totally wrong.

M: Bob Haldeman told me it was totally wrong. What I said to him was
that neither you nor Rogers was enthusiastic about the appointment
and it would be better . . .

K: Well, you're not wrong about Rogers.

M: It is perfectly understandable. Any Secretary of State would want
a foreign service officer in New York.

K: Not I. I would not want a foreign service officer anywhere. I just want
clear that you did not make this decision based on any false assumptions
on my part. I know that I am usually so busy that I never have good
conversations. But I did call you to bring you up to date on what
happened over the weekend. You were out and then I was out. This
appointment could not have been made if I were against it.

M: I accept that and stand corrected.

K: I didn't want this to be a factor in what I believe is a wrong decision.

By NARA, Date 5/26

M: I have talked with Charlie Yost today. It was intolerable that he was put in such a position.

K: It's not your fault.

M: Yes it was my fault. I told the Dean of Harvard that this was happening. Indirectly it was my fault.

K: What will you do.

KX M: I will come back here and scratch a living from selling articles to the Atlantic Monthly. I told the President that I was still available for anything he cared to have me do. Mentioned several interesting things. I told him that I would be willing to do anything he wanted me to. Henry, there is one matter I want to take up with you in the next month or so and that is how we are going to keep this NATO enterprise going? It seems to be just getting started. . .

K: Why could you do that . . . My recommendation would be we will make you a consultant or whatever status you need to make it go.

M: I will think about that and talk to you again about it. I will drop you a note after I have thought about it for awhile.

K: Ok Pat. I am glad that you were told.

M: No question about it. . . . one ambiguous statement in the last two years. . . .

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

11/27/70 ca. 11:45 a.m.

Z: This Hoover testimony is moving.

K: What are you talking about?

Z: The plan to kidnap a highly placed government official and demand an end to the bombing. The name of a White House staff member has been mentioned.

K: What do you want me to do about it?

Z: All I am going to say is that we were aware of this but have nothing to say.

K: Say you notice the twitch in Kissinger's face.

Z: You may get some calls, because people have noticed that you have a Secret Service man with you. You should just say you know nothing about this.

K: You are trying to deprive me of a little publicity.

Z: I just don't want to escalate it to the point of naming anybody on the White House staff. That just puts some ideas in peoples' minds.

K: You're just jealous because nobody thinks you are important enough to kidnap. Don't worry, I won't confirm or deny. I'll just twitch.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

4:22 p.m., November 27, 1970

J: I was with Yost this morning over at the UN and he had word that some announcement was going to be made about Moynihan's going back to Harvard. You know when this noise came out about Moynihan came out, Yost was caught short and embarrassed. In connection with anything said about Moynihan or in the President's press conference, I think something should be said to the effect, 'I think highly of the Ambassador; he is a wonderful public servant; when the session is over, the Secretary will talk to him about his future.' Something nice like that.

K: Sure; if the occasion arises, this is exactly what he will say. I will make that recommendation urgently, and I see no reason he wouldn't follow it.

J: I'm following up on things here which I haven't bothered you with, but if you see anything I am doing that you want to talk about, do. I am urging them to make something of a demarche about the World Court. The U.S. Resolution was better than the one adopted. This shows we are out in front of everybody.

K: That doesn't cause any pain. It's constructive.

J: We brought Mitchell more in today on the UNRA. There is terrible dissatisfaction in Congress over the Agency -- all the commandos were found in refugee camps. We helped him to see what he could do about it in terms of the profile in Congress. I have talked to McGee about the possibility of appropriating this money to the President rather than to UNRA. It's coming up Monday. If you have any thoughts, let me know. We don't want to cut it off. Perhaps the thing is to appropriate it to the President.

K: Let me see what we can do.

J: I would like to see you soon.

K: In the next week or two, let's have our breakfast.

J: Fine.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Chalmers Roberts/Mr. Kissinger

6:20, November 27, 1970

R: There is a UPI story that on the 18th the Sontay thing was arranged at a meeting among the President, Laird, Rogers, Moorer and yourself. Did you see that story?

K: That is when the final approval was given.

R: This story said the President first discussed the raid on that date, but he must have long before that.

K: That's not true; it was long before that.

R: How long?

K: There were two levels. The level of planning was discussed in August with the President

R: And he said go ahead?

K: Yes. On the implementation, he discussed it with Laird on the Thursday before the 18th, then Rogers over that weekend, and with the whole group on the 18th.

R: And it was kept in that group?

K: It was kept in that group, but not by any direct order of ours. No one was told he could not tell anyone else, but in the nature of it, there was considerable sensitivity.

R: It didn't get into the NSC machinery or the WSAG?

K: No.

at the meeting

R: I understand that on the 19th/on NSSM 84, the President slipped Laird a note that, regardless, the mission had his complete backing and no second-guessing. How much worry was there about the place possibly being empty.

K: We knew that there were any number of hazards -- the helicopters could be shot down; there could have been more forces on the ground than anticipated; and they periodically move prisoners. I don't know how many camps they have -- I have an idea -- but it's bad luck if they just moved out of the camp that you are raiding. But in the nature of things (and I can't get into that), you can't get the intelligence fast enough.

By NARA, Date 5/26

6:20 p.m., November 27, 1970

R: And you wouldn't want to overfly too much or they wouldn't be surprised.

K: It was a problem.

R: Did you pick up some prisoners?

K: You should ask Defense the operational questions.

R: You certainly had the tactical surprise when you hit the place.

K: We certainly did. I jokingly told a newsman today that we got a male water buffalo. He wanted to know why.

R: The President said at dinner yesterday that some diversionary stuff had been put on. Did you drop anything?

K: We didn't drop anything in the diversionary flights. A lot of planes were needed to occupy the air defense system. In the immediate operation, in order to draw away any troops that might be there, a number of noise-maker bombs were dropped, but not many of them. What Hanoi put out yesterday was balderdash. If these many casualties were suffered, they came from North Vietnamese anti-aircraft that exploded low.

R: They said you were flying air cover for choppers in case of MIG's.

K: There were very few of those. The whole point was not to draw attention to Sontay. There was no interest whatever in simulating a mass raid in that area.

R: You wanted to make it sound like you were hitting Haiphong. Was there any shooting up there? Did you shoot out radars?

K: They fired like crazy, but you should get that from Defense. There were three Shrike missiles fired at SAM's when the planes drew fire.

R: Was it diversionary off the east coast? or a cover force for the choppers?

K: I believe it was the latter.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Chalmers Roberts/Mr. Kissinger
6:20 p.m., November 27, 1970

R: Those strikes they seem to have been found a piece of...

K: The diversionary force didn't do much in the way of ammunition.

R: They must have been fired at off Haiphong.

K: They were fired on like crazy.

R: The North Vietnamese record telling what we did in the past
has always had an element of truth in it.

K: They never have been as rattled.

R: When they said they downed a chopper?

K: We blew up the chopper that crash-landed.

R: They didn't know that was your plan. They saw it and thought
they did it, and that was their first report.

K: And there were some Shrikes, but there was no bombing.

R: They say you did a helicopter rescue on the way out in Laos.

K: That was one of the diversionary planes that was shot down, and so we stopped on the way out and picked up the pilots.

R: Was it anti-aircraft or SAM's?

K: I really don't know.

R: What do you think the effect in Hanoi is?

K: The reaction on substance has been pretty mild. They have
done a number of things -- one or two things, not of major significance,
but which nevertheless show concern at being painted into the position
of being barbaric about the POW's.

R: They said it?

K: Yes, indirectly. But don't use that. It will come out in the
next days.

By

NARA, Dato 5/20

- 4 -

R: Here or there? I hear your ~~ favorite tender is back~~ in Cienfuegos. What are you going to do when the first submarine shows up there?

K: Look, I have to keep a margin of ambiguity.

R: Do you want me to say you are taking Yost's job, too? It seems to be the way to get back to ~~Kab Harvard.~~ It thought maybe it was because it was intimated by that article in the Star that Moynihan was a terrible choice.

K: Okay.

R: Thank you.

lds