tending with the official one. The intellectual diet is altered; so are the controls. Education needs always to be studied in a context larger than itself.

Section IV is the one part that I feel does not quite come off. For reasons that I am not able to determine, you seem to be on less familiar ground here than elsewhere. The section impresses me as being less original than any other. I am not certain that I know what is lacking, but I do feel that you are too distant from your materials. Perhaps, the whole section is too general, and too much like other treatments I have read.

CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON

1530 P STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON 5, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

December 15, 1958.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

Dear Henry:

I have read the new draft of the paper with intense interest and pleasure. It is, I am quite convinced, going to be a great piece.

This edition, it seems to me, is both wider and deeper than the earlier one. It is also—and for precisely this reason—at present more in need of rearrangement and tightening in some of its parts. It is going to be a larger adult—and therefore needs a somewhat longer adolescence!

Let me list—in the old fashioned way—some of the detailed comments which occurred to me on reading—and especially on re-reading—it!

p. 2, 1.3—I would omit the sentence beginning "It has been a long time." It seems to me to add rather little to the general point, already forcefully made, and to detract by repetition.

p. 2, last sentence, Part I—"...embraced too enthusiastically and for the wrong reasons." Can he really be embraced too enthusiastically if it is for the *right* reasons? Is it not rather "his true function is too often misunderstood; he is too often considered as an endorser of fixed position rather than as an architect of new ones," or something of that sort?

p. 3, 1.1—I think two disparate ideas are joined here. I don't think it is the striving for *objectivity* which makes the qualities rewarded in the rise to eminence less and less. ... The The fetish of objectivity has other consequences which you have detailed powerfully. But is this effect not rather a consequence of early specialization and the various other characteristics of organization (in industry and commerce, for example) that we have often discussed? I.e., the guiding head of an enterprise must have a fundamentally different outlook from the subordinate in such an enterprise; and yet the former must normally be recruited from the

-2-

ranks of the latter. I think the "...manship" factor that we discussed also enters here.

Similarly, I am not sure that **specialization** is what encourages coordinating skill (it certainly does a kind of technical ability). There is a specialization to co-ordinating skill in some of its members that large and fairly static organizations demand.

p. 3, last sentence - "...in civilian pursuits should also be generally rewarded by high governmental office." The situation here seems to me, in fact, more complex than this and it may be that the statement should either be expanded or omitted. For example, are qualities (and persons) who have achieved the highest eminence in private pursuits commonly called to government office (in "non-crisis" times); or is there a rather strong tendency on the part of industry, at least, to keep its strongest and ablest and (in local opinion, at least) most effective men at home, while encouraging the "second-best" (in its opinion), to enter government on long leaves? I am sure, for instance, that on average the individuals administering government military research and development contracts in industry are at present basically more able than those letting them. It is a very old U.S. attitude that except in a shooting war the place for the ablest is in non-government enterprise, and despite the highly dangerous anachronism of the notion today, I am perfectly sure that we still live with it, for a complex variety of reasons.

p. 4, 1.7 - "...partly because of the effort." - This seems to me something of a non-sequiteur. Is not *general unfamiliarity* with the problems of government against which he is thrown the real cause, rather than his earlier struggle to attain eminence? (i.e. I doubt that, if he had come from a background in which eminence had been accorded him very early in his career and without much personal struggle—heir to a family firm, for example—he would be likely to be much more familiar with the problems into which he is thrown in Washington. Washington and his home city are just different worlds, in a great majority of cases, I think.

In the next sentence—which is deeply true, should it not be "our *public* executives?"

-3-

p.5, last sentence - "Though there is undoubtedly..." to the last paragraph on p.6. I don't like this discussion of of positivism, and I'm not quite sure why. I think it is another case where the matter either needs further expansion or is better omitted. The situation is very true, of course, but I think the condition can be attributed quite as much to the eighteenth-nineteenth century concept of science and scientific "accuracy" and "certitude" as anything else. Within the sciences, of course, such notions of "objectivity," "certainty" and "accuracy" are now completely outmoded in most quarters. I have a feeling that, just as the biological sciences long lagged because they tried to make literal applications of Newtonian physical methods to their problems—a mark of "social lag"—so there is an even more severe social lag here. I am sure that "logical positivism" is itself a part of this complex—in part its cause, in part its consequence—but I wonder whether so complex an issue as this is really profitable to raise here. It is fascinating, but seems to me to dull the keen edge of the primary issues in the discussion.

p.7 - "The corollary is an enormous..." I'm by no means sure about this. Sometimes I think it is merely a form, like parts of Japanese courtesy. Sometimes I think it can actually be correlated with a _greater_ internal security than when it is omitted—and can indeed be taken as a criterion of greater inward strength sometimes.

Line 1 from bottom "...to make approbation one of their chief..." —is not "concurrence" better?

p.8, last paragraph - "The debilitating tendency of this approach..." Is it not also that the goals are, really, theoretically very _limited_ — i.e. that of economic success—more than primarily that they are _stable_. The goal is both limited and obvious, _and does not involve creating a policy framework_— _only successfully operating within one_—_itself primarily a conciliatory procedure_.

p.15, 1.11 - "Committees are consumers and sometimes _sterilizers_..." —_stabilizers_?

-4-

p. 17, second paragraph, line 2 — "Policies developed with great inward doubt," et seq. Another reason here, I think, is the American tradition from politics of "no holds barred" in the conflict before elections but unanimity in swinging behind the elected candidate once the issue is settled. The principle can be expanded from politics and persons to include policies as well, the committee becoming equated with the electorate.

p. 26, 1.5 — "After all, the onesidedness with which the 'independent' research one. . ." Meaning? Sentence needs repeating?

p. 31, 1.1 — ". . . and to ignore the tragic aspect of policy making which lies. . ." It is fascinating to notice that this uncertainty, which great makers of policy of course recognize intuitively, is of course far wider than this—it lies precisely at the base of all life itself—considering life as inherently a predictor rather than a recorder or follower of events—and of all contingent affairs of life. This is a concept quite contrary to all seventeenth-eighteenth-nineteenth century scientism, but one now gradually being appreciated, I think. It is one of the concepts which will absolutely bind the sciences and the humanities to one common framework of values and norms and aspirations—within our own lifetimes, I think. By the same token, the static, abstract, formal moralism belongs essentially to the outworn "scientism"—it is applicable, if at all, only to entities that are already dead.

"The technicians who act. . ." both these groups may be unconsciously strongly motivated in their attitudes by a deep and abiding sense of personal impotence.

p. 32, 1.11 — ". . . run into a salesman. . ." — become? "Salesman" — "Promoter?"

Last paragraph: Here I would like to omit the sentences after the first, also omitting ". . . in the abstract, " and ending the first sentence with "define," then continuing on p. 33 with the sentence beginning "One of the tasks of the intellectual. . ." The material from here on seems to me excellent, but the intervening sentences are less focussed, I think.

1.8 — ". . . The Intellectual must not refuse. . .?" It seems to me so.

-5-

p. 34, first 4 lines — I would prefer to see these omitted, — simply in order not to expand this possibility. Many intellectuals will refuse, and it is a perfectly good choice—but not one to be encouraged, probably, and in any case these these problems then do not arise for them. If they develop protest as a cult, then they have entered the public policy arena—and should be dealt with in that context.

1.9 — "...our executives must set themselves more modest. ..." — is it not, rather, more comprehensive and understanding goals, actually, which they must set?

The last paragraphs of p. 34, and pp. 35 and 36 seem to me most powerful and excellent.

These are terribly picayune comments on a most excellent paper. But I did want to make them as they occurred.

Personally, I am deeply convinced that, in the very near future, the American people have got to be vigorously rallied to a standard of work and sacrifice—I don't care how unpopular it may look superficially. I think they would respond enthusiastically to a call that told them that we have all got to pay for the priceless privilege of being Americans, in work and money, on a scale that we have not known since colonial times, if we are going to go on having that privilege. I think the country will understand this, and I think it will respond if someone tries it in a clarion fashion. In any case, I am positive that our long-term survival depends on it. Our own strength and capability—and the image of that strength—is more important now, both for us and our international relations, than any amount of purely altruistic goodwill that we can create abroad.

Forgive the peroration—but just at this juncture I cannot help it!

As always,

Sunday, May 24.

Dear Henry,

I shan't even *begin* to try to apologize for the terribly long delay in reading the manuscript, because no apology can be adequate. During the last few weeks I have been nearer to swamped than at any recent time that I can remember, mechanically and intellectually. The result is that I emerge (partially) now with *everything* in debt - but most especially this, which it has been such a privilege to read and with which I agree so heartily!

My first reading was done when it first arrived, but then it lay for the weeks in between, and I have in this last week completed another two readings, with intense pleasure.

There are several general reactions which strike me quite forcibly, which I think I mentioned on the phone when we talked, but let me reiterate.

First, I think the paper is *definitely* worth publishing, even though some of its points are now being recognized and more may possibly be as time goes on. Exactly for this reason, however, it is exceedingly important to have them reiterated as matters progress - and there are a number that will not be recognized in any case. I think, unless it is published. By the same token, it ought to come out rather soon, as you said. Again, such general principles as that the cause of tension in our world is indeed the Soviet offensive, that this tension cannot possibly be relieved by any attempt to alleviate it, that to imagine that, in the larger sense, concessions to our enemy will limit the discomfort and danger - rather than exacerbating it - and that we are not perpetually, apologetically, in the wrong cannot possibly be said too often - nor more forcefully than this article does so. They cannot be reiterated enough. I'm reminded of the Soviet notion of the *status quo* as the condition in which the present *rate* of Soviet overshadowing of the Free World continues unchanged. This pattern that a nation has a grievance, and has been abused, or deprived, whenever its particular will of conquest in any area has been thwarted, even temporarily, and that we ought to feel guilty about it, has had and has a dangerous amount of credence.

The discussion of the division of Germany in II seems to me extremely important, and I would agree with it completely. The signing of separate peace treaties with East and West would indeed represent a fatal Soviet gain - I hope we see this thoroughly now. Similarly, it would be fatal not to put all our weight behind the reunification of Germany on terms which will bind all Germany to the west, *but on these terms only*. My own feeling, with yours, is that we should build our stand here firmly on a set of postulates that can clearly yield these results, and equate these postulates and the unification of Germany indissolubly. Thus any Soviet proposition which does not include these postulates does not merely differ acceptably from our own notions about unification - it is not, basically, a proposal for unification at all.

The division and the conflict of interest between East and West here seems to me nearly absolute, and I do not see much, if any, room for compromise. When one considers all your evidence, (as in III-12-13) and adds to it the point that East Germany is, as I gather, productively the most important satellite or ally that the Soviet has in absolute terms outside of China (and presumably by considerably the most valuable *per capita*) I just can't

(and dreamingly by considerably the most ardent heretics). I know can't
satisfy or satisfy that the Soviet has in absolute terms outside of China
point that East Germany is, so I gather, productively the most important
When one considers all your evidence, (as in III-18-18) and adds to it the
to me nearly spurious, and I do not see much, if any, room for compromise.
The division and the conflict of interest between East and West here seems

tion at all.

own notions about multiplication - it is not, practically, a proposal for multi-
not include these postulates does not merely differ acceptably from on
multiplication of Germany inordinately. Thus any Soviet proposition which does
that can clearly yield these results, and educate these postulates and the
hours, if that we should build our armada here firmly on a set of postulates
proud all Germany to the meat, put on these terms only. In our feeling, with
but all our weight behind the multiplication of Germany on terms which will
I hope we see this thoroughly now. Similarly, it would be fatal not to
because treaties with East and West would indeed represent a total Soviet era -
portant, and I would agree with it completely. The signing ofuce

The discussion of the division of Germany in II seems to me extremely im-

it, was bad and has a dangerous amount of credence.

has been charted, even temporarily, and that we ought to feel fully spent
been spent, or deprived, whenever its particular will of combat in and use
continues changed. This pattern that a nation has a trivium, and has
dition in which the present rate of Soviet overaggrandizement of the Free World
enough. I'm reminded of the Soviet notion of the status quo as the con-
nor more forcefully than this article does so. They cannot be reiterated
permanently, snobotectically, in the wrong cannot be properly said too often -
discomfort and danger - rather than exacerbating it - and that we are not
to imagine that, in the larger sense, concession to our enemy will lift the
this tension cannot be properly relieved by any attempt to alleviate it, that
as that the cause of tension in our world is indeed the Soviet offensive, that
it ought to come our rather soon, so you said. Usually, such general principles
be recognized in any case. I think, unless it is published. By the same token,
them reiterated as matters brokes - and there are a number that will not
on. Exactly for this reason, however, it is exceedingly important to have
of its points are now being recognized and more may be properly be as time goes
First, I think the bader is definitely worth expounding, even though some
I think I mentioned on the phone when we talked, but let me reiterate.

There are several general reactions which strike me quite forcibly, which
with intense pleasure.

weeks in between, and I have in this last week completed another two readings.
My first reading was done when it first arrived, but then it lay for the
it has been such a privilege to read and with which I agree so heartily!
(particularly) now with everything in mind - put most especially this, which
can remember, mechanically and intellectually. The result is that I emerge
from ten weeks I have been nearer to ambedded than of any recent time that I
in reading the manuscript, because no apologet can be adequate. But think the
I haven't even begun to try to apologize for the terrific long delay

Dear Henry,

Sunday, May 24.

- 2 -

imagine the U.S.S.R. relinquishing one iota of power over East Germany for any pur-
pose unless there was almost a certainty of substantial gains from the West with very
little chance of any loss in the East - as from the separate treaty proposal.
The fact that the Soviets, in actuality, may be dealing with a pawn very precious to
them in East Germany may limit their manoeuverability and their willingness to take long
risks here substantially, and could allow us, if we are imaginative, to be unusually
bold in the conditions which we equate irrevocably with German unification.
In actual fact, of course, I do believe, as we said over the telephone, that any
proposal for German unification involving at all substantial risk of the loss of
West Germany, however tenuous or gradual, is inadmissable. The present situation,
bad as it is, is not the worst that we could be in. And the Soviets, I am sure, will
relinquish nothing in this situation. The discussion of this question in the first
pages of Part II I think absolutely vital.

The discussion of the role of NATO and of the strategic deterrence concepts in III I of course agree with most emphatically, as always. The point on III-3 that American troops in Europe perform a political as well as a military function in symbolizing our commitment is highly important. Even more is the following discussion of the effects of parity - or essential parity - in all-out war. I wonder, indeed, whether this is not essentially the Soviet goal in respect of all-out capability - the maintenance of sufficient parity in striking power so that behind this shield the wealth and talent of the complex can be directed most actively to all the other forms of agression - the limited military, but more especially, of course, all the political and other non-strictly military avenues.

The discussion of the concept of neutralization in IV is extraordinarily ranging and subtle, and involved a number of notions wholly new to me. The concept of offering unification in exchange for neutralization as a cold war propaganda move - since the Soviet would never accept it - is a breathtaking one - it may be right, considering the narrow margin of ground on which the Soviet can move here - but it would need to be looked at very carefully!

Finally, I think that Part V is absolutely splendid - the climax of the paper!
Indeed, the section from V-8 ("Our central problem . . .") is really magnificent.

Now let me go, if I may, to some very picayune particular comments that I jotted
down as I was reading, in the old pattern:

I. II-3. Sentence beginning "And whatever the self-restraint . . . ."
Something seems to be missing here, and even with the sentence complete
it seems a bit diffuse.

2. II-6. "While we can offer formulae that will permit the Soviets not to lose face, the West cannot surrender the goal of German unity".
Would it be worth while to emphasize the point here, on clearly Western terms?

3. II-7. Flexible, but not infinitely so. This discussion seems to me a little diffuse, especially as to the precise meaning of self-determination - where, and how achieved? (East Germany and by plebiscite?)

4. II-8 First line (a) Exactly! (b) This is surely a goal, but will be lengthy and difficult. The notion of "legitimate" will undoubtedly be expanded progressively as discussions proceed.

5. II-8, second paragraph. Should not this be expanded and made more specific?
For example, as you said on the telephone, free elections would certainly not
be practical at once, and perhaps not reliable for a long time. What would
be some of the conceivable interim steps? etc.

be some of the conceivable interim acts? etc.

5. II-8' second paragraph. Should not this be expanded and made more specific?
be expended progressively as discussions proceed.

4. II-8 First line (a) Exactly! (b) This is surely a goal, but will be where, and how achieved? (Erat Germany and by pleiacites.)

3. II-7. Flexible, but not infinitely so. This discussion seems to me a little Western terminology.

Would it be worth while to emphasize the point here, on clearly face, the Weat cannot annender the goal of German unity.

3. II-6. "While we can offer formulae that will permit the Soviet not to lose it seems a pit diffuse.

Something seems to be missing here, and even with the sentence complete I. II-3. Sentence beginning "And whatever the self-referent" . . . ."

Now let me go, if I may, to some very picaume particular comments that I jotted

Indeed, the section from A-8 ("Our central problem . . .") is really magnificent. Eiusfli, I think that Part V is apolitely adliend - the climax of the paper!

looked at very carefully!

narrow margin of ground on which the Soviet can move here - but it would need to be
Soviet would never accept it - is a breathtaking one - it may be right, considering the
mitigation in exchange for neutralization as a cold war propaganda move - since the
and subtle, and involved a number of notions wholly new to me. The concept of offering
The discussion of the concept of neutralization in IV is extraordinarily ranking
non-agrically military avenues.

- the limited military, put more e specifically, of course, all the political and other
and talent of the complex can be directed most actively to all the other forms of aggression
maintenance of antifluent parity in striking power so that behind this anield the mesft
whether this is not essentially the Soviet goal if respect of all-out capability - the
of the effects of parity - or essential parity - in all-out war. I wonder, indeed,
amplifying our commitment is highly important. Even more is the following discussion
American troops in Europe perform a political as well as a military function in
III I of course agree with most emphatically, as far as. The point on III-3 that

The discussion of the role of NATO and of the strategic deterrence concepts in
pages of Part II I think apolitely vital.

relief that nothing in this situation. The discussion of this question in the first
had so it is, is not the worst that we could be in. And the Soviet, I am sure, will
Weat Germany, however tenous or gradual, is insurmountable. The present situation,
proposal for German mitigation involving at all apolitist risk of the loss of
In actual fact, of course, I do believe, as we said over the telephone, that any
pold in the conditions which we educate irrevocably with German mitigation.
Riska here apolitistly, and could allow na, if we are imaginative, to be munifically
them in East Germany may limit their unenversatility and their willingness to take long
The fact that the Soviet, in actuality, may be dealing with a brown aerd precions to
little chance of any loss in the East - as from the separate treaty proposal.

bope unless there was almost a certainty of apolitist gains from the Weat with aard
imagine the U.2.2.9. relinducing one lot of power over East Germany for and but -

- 5 -

- 3 -

6. II-9. Where marked, from "The key problem is whether . . . ." I agree thoroughly with the general tenor of this, but somehow it seems to lack edge and force. Needs tightening and pointing, I think.

7. II-13, top of page. This idea was completely new to me - and a most interesting one!

8. III-4-5-6. I agree thoroughly with the discussion of the changing nature of the deterrent, but think that some of it is now well understood. I believe that the discussion of Phases (I), (2), (3), and (4), for example, on pp. 5 and 6 can be shortened and sharpened somewhat.

9. III-8. The sentence marked, beginning "But it is surely inconsistent to argue . . . ." This does not quite fit for me into the general argument of the paragraph.

10. III-10. Last sentence first paragraph: "The liberalization of satellite regimes promised for disengagement hardly applies to this situation" - Connection with preceding not immediately clear - sentence requires expanding I think.

11. III-II. The marked sentence beginning "It can be maintained . . ." and continuing to the end of the paragraph seem to me better omitted. The proposition in the first sentence seems to me so undesirable as not to be useful even as a "straw man", weakening the context, even with its refutation.

12. III-12. Middle paragraph. A most important thesis!

13. III-13. This is a most powerful and important discussion! I wonder whether the bottom of this page might be a good place to insert the point about the economic indispensibility of East Germany to the Soviet?

14. III-14. Most important discussion!

15. IV-2. Just to reiterate - The discussion of unification in exchange for neutralization as a propaganda move in the Cold War was, for me, completely novel and very arresting. I wonder, however, whether it might be worth while to canvas in some detail the various acceptance proposals which the Soviet *might* make of German reunification under these circumstances - since the prize might be high enough to stimulate a good deal of Soviet ingenuity in devising ways of defining reunification that could ultimately be to their advantage, and this might well represent the highest risk in such a situation.

16. IV-9. Second paragraph, second sentence, beginning "It may be thought necessary . . . . ." This sentence does not seem clear to me. This alone, at least, would not seem to me at all an adequate reason for a proposal of a neutral belt - but I may read the sentence in completely. It does need clarification, however, I think.

These are the most inadequate and small-scale comments on an intensely interesting paper! Just two final general comments: Part V seems to me magnificent essentially as it stands. The plethora of ideas in Parts I - IV need, I think, some rearranging, and I believe there are points where some

need, I think, some rearranging, and I believe there are points where some
magnificent effectiveness as it stands. Theelebrity of ideas in Barte I - IA
interesting paper. Just two final general comments: Part A seems to me
These are the most inadequate and smell-a-sle comments on any internally

for a proposal of a neutral point - but I may read the sentence in-
This alone, at least, would not seem to me at all an adequate reason
necessarily . . . ." This sentence does not seem clear to me.

a good deal of Soviet ingenuity in devising ways of defining remit-

proposals which the Soviet might make of German remobilization under

completely novel and very appealing. I wonder, however, whether it

for neutralisation as a propaganda move in the Cold War may, for me,

19. IV-5. Just to reiterate - The diacriation of miticication in exchange

14. III-14. Most important diacriation!

Soviets?

point out the economic inadmissibility of East Germany to the

13. III-13. This is a most powerful and important diacriation! I wonder

15. III-15. Middle paragraph. A most important thesis!

its reposition.

to be naive even as a "atremum", weakening the context, even with

The probability in the first sentence seems to come so undesirable as not

11. III-11. The marked sentence beginning "It can be maintained . . ." and

expanding I think.

regime promised for demobilization hardly applies to this situation" -

10. III-19. Last sentence that paragraph: "The liberalization of satellite

argument of the paragraph.

to argue . . . ." This does not quite fit for me into the General

3. III-8. The sentence marked, beginning "But it is surely incoherent

example, on db. 2 and 6 can be shortened and shortened somewhat.

I believe that the diacriation of phrase (1), (5), (3), and (4), for

of the deferent, put think that some of it is now well understood.

8. III-4-2-6. I agree thoroughly with the diacriation of the chunking nature

interesting one!

7. II-13. tab of bake. This idea was completely new to me - and a most

seems to lack edge and force. Needs tightening and pointing. I think.

I agree thoroughly with the General tenor of this, but somehow it

6. II-9. Where marked, from "The key problem is whether . . ."

- 3 -

- 4 -

condensing is in order. This has undoubtedly already happened - what with my long and inexcusable delay!

It has been the very greatest privilege to read the paper, as always. I only hope that the unpardonable delay will be taken as a prognostication of like delays in the future - when, as I hope so much, I will have further ms. 's to read! This really was a local - and I devoutly hope a non-recurrent - crisis!

Now I look forward intently to June 16 - but I hope to a date earlier than that!

With our love to Ann, (and Elizabeth!),

As always,

P.S. And forgive the homemade typing - homemade Olivetti - but I did want the ms. to come to you on Monday!

C.

C.

ma. to come to you on Monday!

P.2. And forgive the homemade tiding - homemade Olivetti - put I did want the

Ya always!

that?

Now I look forward intently to June 16 - put I hope to a date earlier than

critics!

ma.'a to read! This really was a local - and I devoutly hope a non-recurrent -
like delay in the future - when, as I hope so much, I will have further
I only hope that the unbarquable delay will be taken as a promotionstication of
It has been the very greatest privilege to read the paper, as always.

long and inexhaustible delay!

condensing ie in order. This has undoubtedly already happened - what with my

- 4 -

Caryl P. Haskins
The Hay-Adams House
800 Sixteenth Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

September 8, 1959

Dear Henry,

I can't resist bothering you with just a line of comment on the New York Times Magazine article (even in the middle of the much-needed vacation!) because I think it is perhaps the finest piece that you have written, and so extraordinarily timely.

I have always been impressed with the similarity of the Communist core representation of the world with the most skillful of symbolic art, involving first the acquisition of extraordinarily keen and detailed knowledge of the "real" world — both material and human — to a point far surpassing that of their opponents, as a prerequisite; then, for the development of skills probably unequalled in history for the symbolic representation of that world in terms delicately and appropriately adjusted to the power ends. I am sure that these were the skills that played an immense part in bringing the core group to power in their own country and that have been so expanded and perfected since that, in the view of the U.S.S.R., their edge is now ready for trying in the larger and tougher, global world.

In a way these techniques of revolution are remarkably similar in their functional pattern to the metabolic subversions of cell viruses — the task is to so subvert the normal processes of the "host" so that the "host" itself will accomplish the aim of the invader — the technique, in Mao's philosophy, of making the enemy forge for you the tools with which you will destroy him. Hence I think that your first listed risk, that of euphoria, is perhaps the greatest of all and the one that should perhaps be most vigilantly guarded. In a curious way, our proneness to euphoria is one of the prices we have paid for our long period of cultural expansion, lacking, in general, the disheartening (and also realism-producing and emotionally toughening) setbacks so usual elsewhere.

In a way, I wonder whether the whole terrible conflict involving basic interpretations of the world which we face does not, in some sense, represent a culmination of the final clashing of the separate lines of thought that have, in general, characterized the East and the West (to use those terms loosely and inclusively) since the Renaissance. We are perhaps more deeply committed than we realize to the notion that the real world, as we think of it, is a function of events external to the observer, of which he is

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

December 9, 1959

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
The Harvard Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts,

Dear Henry,

Once again (and as always) it has been a major privilege to see the
manuscript of the first installment of _The Dilemma of Deterrence_ — I — VI —
which I have just now laid down after the third reading. First of all, let
me say that it seems to me of the same great novelty and the same order
of originality as _Nuclear Weapons_. Further, it has, I think, the same
kind of penetrating relevance to precisely the present scene that _Nuclear
Weapons_ had to the times in which it appeared. Indeed, it represents a
natural evolution of that thinking. I believe it not only of comparable
quality (quite the highest praise that could be given it) but of equal impor-
tance. I think, therefore, that it is just as urgent that it be completed and
published as soon as practicable.

There are a number of points in the argument which seem to me to
represent particularly high peaks and to have brilliant penetrance. The
discussion on page 4, for example, and again on page 9, especially the
last paragraph which struck me especially forcibly, again on pp. 13 and 14,
especially the second paragraph on p. 14, the final (and truly epigrammatic)
sentence on p. 19, the emphasis on mobility in the last paragraph on p. 23,
the discussion on p. 25, the exposition of vulnerability-invulnerability
relationships on pp. 28-IV-5 (a perfect model of clarity and force, and
in many respects, for me, really the core of the matter), the natural and
forceful transition from the vulnerability-invulnerability discussion into
the question of limited-war capability on p. V-2 and of arms control on
V-4, and the whole argument in VI, all came home to me in particularly
"glancing" lights. These are extremely forceful expositions. Many of
them carried, for me at least, quite novel insights of the kind that, once
started, developed spontaneously very much further — like the great poetry
in which the ordinary reader at once finds, looking almost familiar, what
he knows he had nearly thought right along — and yet somehow never had quite
thought — the surest sign of genius! In addition, a large part of the argument
represents a thoroughly novel extension of the older base into the age of
weapons parity, or of actual U.S. weapons disadvantage. So I cannot
emphasize too much how important I feel it is that the work be completed
and issued as soon as may be. It is badly needed, I am sure.

- 2 -

Now let me, once again, inflict on you, on a page-by-page basis, the few trivial text-comments that I had, most of which are of little or no importance, and a number, obviously, no more than typewriting or dictation slips.

## Sections I - III

P. 2, final paragraph. "... by removing the incentives for attack or by eliminating the possibility of gain from it." Are not these the same?

P. 3, line 4. "... have become peaceful after this design has been defeated." Is the sense "after their desires for conquest have been frustrated?"

P. 4, last sentence, first paragraph "Is playing Russian roulette a well-calculated risk if the odds on any one attempt are in favor of the player?" will this be strengthened by "... simply because the odds ...?"

P. 11, line 3. "... many factors that produce deterrence more or less during the period ..." Insert automatically after "more or less?"

P. 14, line 5. "... only through numbers and generally through a combination of both." Both what?

P. 18, line 3. "This ..." Thus?

P. 19, line 10. "It does not yet mean, however ..." Eliminate not yet? The part of the preceding sentence-but-one "... it becomes close to a task for a mechanical computer to determine ..." worries me a little. In essence, of course, it is true, and the "becomes close" makes it perhaps adequately cautious. And yet, C.E.P.'s being what they are, I think I would feel a bit more comfortable with just a shade more qualification here. I have no doubt that this will become true in a quite literal sense and perhaps it is already. But I am thinking of this less from the fact that from the standpoint of the need to "conserve" the "credit of attention" of the reader for later much stronger and less probable-sounding statements which it is most important that he absorb and accept without reservation.

Let me repeat how impressive the last sentence on this page seems to me!

- 3 -

## Sections I – III (Continued)

P. 20, second paragraph, line 3. "The real worry is caused . . ." Think I'd prefer "The greater worry . . ."

P. 22, line 10-11. "For such a force would represent an overwhelming first-strike capability." I'd like to add "on our own part" for clarity.

P. 23, First paragraph, final sentence "And extreme dispersal may complicate the problems of control and raise additional dangers of accidental war." I think I comprehend this sentence fully and get the whole force of it. Yet it is rather condensed. It seems to me that the connection between dispersal and complication of control and additional danger of accidental war (which I take to refer to communications and command difficulties with attendant dangers of false alarm or the fatal lack of real alarm) could with advantage be spelled out a bit further for the general reader.

P. 24, First paragraph. I wonder if this reopens the whole moot matter of ANP (about which I have been something less than enthusiastic) in a new light?

P. 26, line 3. "It may be argued that this destruction between . . ." What should be substituted for "destruction?"

P. 28, last sentence. I was puzzled about this, of course, until I tumbled to the obvious fact that **can** should be **cannot**. This is the case, undoubtedly?

P. 31, lines 1 and 2. "This theory always placed an undue reliance on the efficiency of the intelligence system in a police state; . . ." Not clear how this follows from the argument.

P. 33, line 10. " . . . as a counter to anything but a direct attack on the United States . . . (becomes?) not only ineffective . . .?" line 11. " . . . and this fail or—" " . . . and **thus** fail . . .?"

## Section IV.

P. 3, line 8. "It therefore has the option to destroy its opponent once and for all — in this respect its position is not improved by its invulnerability." I think I understand this, but believe it needs a bit more expansion for clarity.

- 4 -

## Section IV. (continued)

P. 4, second paragraph, second sentence. "The act of seeking to overcome it may be the incentive required for a sudden strike." Add "by its opponent" for clarity?

## Section V.

P. 2, lines 2-3. "Regardless of who strikes first, each side is capable of inflicting unacceptable losses on the other." It is not clear to me from the sentence why they are necessarily unacceptable in this situation in a material sense, though they may well be so in a moral or morale one.

P. 3, Table, Situation I, U.S.S.R. — obviously *Vulnerable* rather than *Invulnerable* (I think you said this at table) The discussion of the vulnerability-invulnerability situation leads masterfully into the matter of limited-war capability and the real objectives of arms control!

## Section VI.

P. 1, final paragraph, first sentence. "The difficulty with this view is that it is less a doctrine of deterrence than a strategy for fighting a war." Would it add clarity and emphasis to say "... for fighting a total war?"

As you can see, these are the most picayune specific comments — but they are all that I can muster! I think the argument is provocative, extremely cogent to this moment of our history, clear, and generally superb.

Now after reluctantly coming to the end of VI, I am impatient for the chance to follow the argument into the arena of policy. This cannot fail to be most significant!

It was wonderful for us both to have the chance to see you last week in an environment at least a little more quiet and stable than the airport restaurant. We must repeat it very soon!

With every best wish,

As always

P.S. I am returning the ms. herewith, with my various more or less meaningless pencil marks still on it, if you don't mind !

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

January 13, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry,

The trip to Australia was magnificent! It contained all that we had hoped and a good deal more - including a trip from Sydney to Western Australia, and some 1300 miles or more of driving in the "back country" of the Southwest. It is still possible to drive for somewhat over two hundred miles on gravel tracks in the Esperance Plains without meeting a car or seeing a house, person, farm or building of any kind. This frontier, however, is rapidly vanishing, for the introduction of trace elements appropriately tied to chelating compounds on a grand scale is transforming that part of the nation, and hundreds of square miles which five years ago were sterile desert, supporting essentially no population except wandering Aborigine nomads, are now quite prosperous wheat farms. The effect on the total Australian economy (already itself somewhere near W. R.'s "Takeoff", I should think,) must be large and very stimulating. And the social changes which it is bringing in the "Outback" towns are fascinating to see - and very like what one visualizes our own to have been a century ago. Manjimup, for instance, was an extremely primitive frontier lumber town, with about one hundred inhabitants and a single very elementary hotel when we left it. Now it is almost urban, extremely (indeed exaggeratedly and painfully) cultured, and with a large (though half-empty) metropolitan hotel. Other, somewhat deeper changes are fascinating to see.

When we returned to Perth, a high point for me was the arrival of the ms., which was there waiting. It received a first reading well up over the Nullarbor Plain between Kalgoorlie and Adelaide, a second on the way home (though 707 travel doesn't leave much time) and a third which is just completed. As always, reading it has been an enormous privilege!

Dilemma of Deterrence - II develops the earlier thesis, I think, quite magnificently. Because I am, as you know, enthusiastic about that thesis, I have no general comments on the line of reasoning. The only ones I have are of the usual detailed, picayune type! Let me, however, list them in any event. They are very trivial indeed.

Page I - 3, Paragraph 2, 1. 4. "If it did, it was deterred."
I think I comprehend the meaning, but it is not immediately

- 2 -

clear. (It could be translated "If it engaged in aggression it was deterred," which seems a paradox). Perhaps rephrasing would be helpful.

Pages I - 3, 4, 5. May I express a prejudice here? I completely agree with the whole tenor of the discussion. The only thing I don't like is "uncertainty principle", simply because the inevitable reminder of the physical one seems to me confusing. Can it be "uncertainty effect" or something like that? (A trivial comment for sure — and yet I think it *does* affect the "flavor").

Page I - 6. Second Paragraph, 1. 8. "An aggressor could therefore . . ." Here again the meaning of this sentence in the context of the preceding discussion is, for me, a bit obscure. Perhaps it should be spelled out further in that context.

Page II - 1. Second sentence: "In order to be effective . . . ." This sentence troubles me as to meaning. I have difficulty in reconciling (1) and (2) as "effective" calculations in the same sense. I think I see the place of (3), though somewhat marginally. Perhaps I am missing the general tenor of this bit of reasoning. But I do think it needs some clarification for the general reader.

Page II - 4. First sentence. "Theoretically, the psychological balance should favor. . ." I can imagine the opposite reasoning here, however - i. e. the aggressor may well have deeper and more poignant psychological incentives *exactly for these reasons*. Hence I think a contrary conclusion, *well illustrated by the Soviet Union, is possible*.

Page II - 8. L. 3. "Were it otherwise, an alliance. . ." This conclusion seems to me fairly obvious - perhaps sufficiently so that this sentence might be omitted to strengthen the rest of the discussion, which is *very important*, I think.

Page III - 2. This whole thesis seems to me most powerful, important, and effective. The current Russian warnings about missile tests in the Pacific are of course a major case in point, and such incidents may be expected to increase and sharpen rapidly.

Pages IV - 1, 2, 8. Here again I would prefer "uncertainty theory", or something of this sort, to "uncertainty principle".

- 3 -

Page V - 1. Paragraph 2, third sentence. "If one side is invulnerable, the same condition prevails, if to a lesser extent: . . ." Why cannot the invulnerable side threaten with impunity - and effectively? Perhaps this thought needs some further spelling out. This seems to me otherwise rather to contravene some of the earlier discussion.

Page V - 2. First paragraph, line 8. "It could only guarantee mutual destruction, not victory . . ." If both sides have developed invulnerable retaliatory forces? Without further exposition, this sentence, I think, is likely to be puzzling. Suggest simply omitting it. The next sentence then follows naturally.

Page V - 4. Paragraph (3), second sentence - (This does not take into consideration . . .") I have made one or two penciled changes on the copy here which seem to me to "smooth out" the logic a bit.

This letter has been written on planes and trains and in airports, more or less alternating between Washington, New York, and Boston, so forgive the resultant effect! This paragraph is being typed at Logan Field at 6 A.M. after having missed your call yesterday, because I couldn't get in in time to take it! But Edna has told me about the impending European trip, and I am eager to hear more of it. With luck, I shall be talking to you from Schenectady later this morning. Meantime, once again thanks for the privilege of seeing the ms!

As always,

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

February 15, 1960.

Dear Henry,

It was wonderful to have your telephone call yesterday, and to get at least a brief chance to hear about the European visit. This, of course, has heightened yet further our desire to see you both as soon as may be. As I said, it does not look as though Boston was on the possible schedule for some time, but New York seems much better. At present, it looks as though the evenings of Monday, February 29, Tuesday, March 1, Wednesday, March 16, and Thursday, March 17 will all be in New York. Is there any chance of capturing you (and hopefully Anne) on any one of these days?

Now let me turn to Chapters I - VI of the manuscript, (beginning with "Limited War - A Reappraisal") which I have been reading with intense pleasure. First of all let me repeat my comment over the telephone - I think these chapters introduce important new ideas and important current variants of the older ones (especially in relation to the psychology of deterrence and the role of conventional vs. nuclear forces) which need saying badly, and that they set these ideas out compellingly and well. It is therefore most important, I think, that the work be continued and published. Reading the table of contents which came with the chapters, I am looking forward most particularly to some of the later chapters also, if I may read them!

You recall that it seemed to me that some of the earlier chapters, as a general comment, needed some tightening and condensing. This is much less true in the present text, I feel, though obviously some of it can be a bit further condensed in future revision. But this time I had only a very few minor specific comments, largely concerned with clarity for the "uninitiated" reader in following the highly compelling - but sometimes, necessarily, unfamiliar - argument. Let me list them, as usual!

I - 8. Second paragraph. I can't resist just a word of enthusiasm here! This seems to me a _most_ important discussion, especially the sentence beginning "In fact, in the nuclear . . . "

II - 3. I had a question in this context of limited strategic war in its retaliatory aspect, purely of a general nature. How widely can a retaliatory strike be removed from any fairly specific military relevance to the situation in hand? Obviously, this will vary widely with the situation, but could it, for example, extend to very distant "reprisal" blockades, and even to economic reprisals if these can be made genuinely effective (itself, of course, a dubious matter). Is this worth a little further elaboration?

II - 6. Line 9. I can't resist a word of enthusiasm about the stark realism and immense effectiveness of this hypothetical conversation.

-2-

IV - 4. Line 9. "But the quest for credibility must . . ." I think that the meaning of this sentence - one of those difficult ones which must express the balance between two opposing ideas - needs some clarification. I think I see it, but am not sure that the reader "impinging" on these ideas for the first time will do so.

IV - 5. Line 5. "No country fights a war simply because . . ." I think this sentence needs clarification. I am not sure that it is a strict sequiteur from what precedes it.

IV - 19. Line 9. "Even an opportunity to avoid . . ." This sentence seems to have a hiatus. Meaning?

IV - 20. Line 5. "The alternative to local defense is all-out war or surrender." Are not other alternatives involved, however - including all of those previously discussed?

IV - 22. Last paragraph. What is missing?

V - 14. Line 3. "A target that may not have been "worth" a nuclear weapon . . ." But this _does_ take the cost of the weapon into account, does it not?

V - 30. Second paragraph. Excellent discussion of priorities!

V - 31-33. Can't resist unconstructive comment - _Most_ important discussion! Powerful arguments and exposition!

VI - 4. Line 10. "It is not necessary to decide which view is correct." And, of course, no one of them can be, standing alone.

VI - 6. Line 14. "At any rate, they claim that military expansion . . ." I'm not quite sure of the meaning of this sentence. Can it be clarified somewhat?

VI - 6-8. It seems to me that the discussion on pages 6, 7, and 8 of VI, practically alone in this text, can be clarified, sharpened, and tightened.

As you can see, I have practically _no_ comments this time, and what there are are minor and picayune in the extreme. But it has been a major privilege, as always, to read - and I am more sure than ever that the work represents another long step in the discussion!

With every best wish to you both, and the hope to see you soon,

As always,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
The Harvard Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, 38, Massachusetts.

- 3 -

## Chapter IV. (Continued)

P. 9. Lines 12 et seq. "Thus in order to safeguard . . ." What about the case of coalitions among small powers, with a coordinated - if primitive - nuclear force - an interesting perturbation?

P. 10. Line 11. And, of course, (d) Simple prestige.

P. 14. Lines 16-17. "In some respects, this . . ." The meaning of this sentence is not wholly clear. Clarify?

P. 19. Line 13, Should the *not* come out here? Otherwise it appears to be a *non sequitur* - or have I misunderstood it?

P. 34. Line 11. Does the "and" come out?

## Chapter V.

P. 2. Lines 11, 12. The near certainty that the genetic dangers . . ." I think this is an overstatement. What about something like "The likelihood that the genetic dagers will be considerably less than many earlier estimates?"

P. 3. Line 3. A *very* minor comment - "test ban" is meant here?

P. 12. Lines 8-9. "The validity of the uncertainty principle . . ." I continue to be prejudiced against this term! Perhaps the sentence should be expanded a bit for clarity?

P. 20. Lines 11-14. "In any case, it would be an ironic turn of . . ." It would indeed - and think of the British situation, and the Woomera range, etc.!

Pp. 27-28. I can't resist one comment on how *extremely* important - and brilliant - these two pages are!

## Chapter VI.

P. 3. Lines 4-6. "Mr. Krushkov's proposal may be a subtle answer . . ." Indeed, it almost certainly *is*, I think.!

## Chapter VII.

P. 7 Lines 11-13. "Partly this may be due to . . ." and could one add at the end " . . . partly to deliberate skill in negotiating by innuendo" - or something to that effect?

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

March 21, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The Harvard Center for International Studies
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry,

Now I have had the immense privilege of two readings of the chapters on the United States and Europe, Nato, and the Problems of Germany. I had thought that it would be hard to exceed the chapters on Negotiation, but after a second and careful reading, I truly believe that these do. They are extraordinary in their insights and their penetration, and those dealing with Germany represent, I think, the peak of the book that I have read so far. The subtlety and the sensitiveness (as well as the ever-present depth, of course) of these chapters is, I think, absolutely extraordinary.

In view of my enthusiasm, it is most embarrassing not to be able to make a *single* detailed comment on Chapters I or II. But on both these all that I can do is to register agreement - and admiration. From Chapter III on, I had a very few detailed comments, as usual of the most minor character, which let me tabulate in the usual fashion:

P. III-6. Line 15. "Indeed, until retaliatory forces become mobile ..." Is it worth inserting here one or two sentences about the special situations raised by submarine warfare and sub-sea interdiction, which may conceivably ignore land assault or damage? Also, the special situations resulting from possible heavy reliance on air, both offensively and defensively?

Pp. III-20,21. This seems to me a most important discussion.

- 2 -

P. III-28. The suggestions (a) to (e) on this page form an extremely impressive policy framework.

Pp. III-29, 30. Line 17. "The provocation can be placed high depending...." (Is something omitted on p. 29a?)

Pp. IV-24-27. I have the impression that the discussion in these pages would be improved by some shortening and tightening. There is some repetition, and I think that the discussion on pp. IV-26-27 especially needs some clarification.

P. V-5. Line 1. "In short, arms control is not an alternative to security policy, <u>but its reverse side.</u>" I think the last phrase needs some expansion for clarity.

P. V-9. Line 8. "But the reason is not that they fail...." This seems to me an extraordinarily pertinent and important discussion. Is there not also virtue in pressing such a position in any case as an important "advance base" in our own argument? If it is rejected out of hand - as seems likely - it will constitute a positive position thrust aside by the opposition.

P. V-14. Line 12 _et._ _seq._ ("One of the difficulties...") A most important discussion!

P. V-19-21. This seems to me an especially fine argument.

P. V-23. Line 11. E.D.C. worth spelling out? (This probably establishes a new record for picayune comment!)

P. V-25. A very important discussion.

P. V-26. Line 10. "The lesson from the experience of Finland is not...." I believe that this sentence could quite properly be re-phrased to give more positive support to the important argument that precedes it. It would seem to me that the lesson is not so much that the location is _negotiable_, as that it can lie almost within the jaws of the enemy and still be at least partially maintained

- 3 -

P. V-26. Line 10 (Continued).

by the power of the presence of American troops on European
soil. Suppose that the sentence were to read something in this
fashion: "The lesson from the experience of Finland is not
that a military establishment on the Continent is dispensable,
but rather quite the opposite - that if it is present, nations within
the geographic sphere of the U.S.S.R., which otherwise might
long since have been swept within it, can yet maintain their
identities."

P. VI-13. Paragraph beginning "A neutral belt, then, is conceivable only ..." It should be emphasized that these are indeed large hazards!

This, of course, is equally clear in the discussion on p. 14,
but perhaps worth emphasizing.

P. VI-15. Line 2. "One of the factors inhibiting a ...." This is an _enormously_ subtle and important observation! The whole discussion to the end of page 16 is simply splendid!

P. VII-1. Line 10. "The great challenge of our time ...." This profound sociological point is, of course, the key to essentially all our desperate political concerns in the modern world. It is of almost prophetic character. For I am sure that it is not only the _forms_ of the self-sufficient nation-state that are passing. Concomitantly, the whole basis of the psychology of human relationships, and the human view of the human world is under-going a profound change in kind, with revolutionary alterations in the individual's self-image, his view of his role in his own society and in the world at large, and in the pattern of his allegiances to human groupings. This subject, I think, would profoundly reward a full study of your own, if you ever had the time. You would bring altogether new insights to it, and I am sure it lies close to the base of the problems of the new nation-states that we have discussed so often and that so badly need understanding.

As you see, there is almost _nothing_ in the way of contribution in these comments. But, all through the reading of these chapters, I have been in the

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

March 21, 1960

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The Center for International Studies
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry,

Once again I have been disgracefully long in returning to you
the magnificent series of chapters on Negotiations. They have been
read, as always, with the most intense interest. For my delay in re-
turning them I can plead only two things: I wanted to read them through
twice with some interval between (which I have now done); and - plain
procrastination in writing!

As always, it has been a truly great privilege to read them, and,
as always, they continue to open wholly new worlds - this time, perhaps,
more than ever. Once again, all that I can add are a few very picayune
and very specific comments, of the most minor importance. But let me
append them in any event, in the usual tabular form.

P. II-7. How wonderful to recall this statement of Churchill's -
and how extraordinarily and deadly pertinent - then and now!

Pp. II-8,9,10. The entire analysis on these pages seems to me
exceedingly important, and deserves some very special
emphasis, in the format or otherwise.

P. II-18. Again, the paragraph beginning "The fact remains ..."
seems to me so overridingly important as to deserve some
special "setting out" procedure. It is clearly key - and too
little recognized, or at all event, acted upon.

- 2 -

P. II-22. The last sentence on this page, beginning "Pragmatism is not an unmixed blessing if ..." confuses me a little. I think I see the meaning - i.e., Pragmatism in viewpoint is not of any great concrete assistance (to us) if we are so confused and inchoate that we cannot take real advantage of any situation that does arise (?). But I am not sure of this, and I think the whole sentence carries somewhat more meaning than there is "room" for as it is written. Perhaps it should be clarified somewhat?

Chapter III I think one of the most telling in the whole discussion!

Pp. IV-1,2. This is a most penetrating discussion of the historical matrix for the American hierarchy of values and for the American outlook on the kinds of problems that are so traditional for the rest of the world but which we, in our long isolation, have forgotten and must now - and painfully - come again to know. It is exceedingly telling. Perhaps there is one more dimension that might be added. Throughout our early national history - from the point when we turned our predominant attention inward toward domestic development - we met very few obstacles that were really insuperable. We were almost uniquely blessed with the kind of environment in which the problems that were presented - those, at least, that we really wanted to solve - were difficult, but not impossible of solution. Nearly all of them were of the fairly straightforward, material kind that will yield to human energy and talent, if only sufficient are applied. So, almost from our colonial infancy onward, we have been deeply trained to measure a man, a government, an era, by the degree of energy with which they attacked their contemporary problems - _and hence, in our reckoning, by the success in their final, definite solution_. If they were not solved definitely, if they were left hanging into our own time, or, similarly, if an individual, faced with humanly insuperable personal obstacles, failed - this was because not enough energy, not enough resolution, not enough "stick-to-it-iveness" had been applied to the problem. The man, or the government, was clearly at fault. A better man or a better government would have met and solved the issue - better men and a better government, when we provide them, _will_ solve all the issues, today.

- 3 -

Pp. IV-1,2 (Continued).

I think we are now past the point of really believing this.
But the idea of a world in which the majority of problems are
insoluble in any immediate sense, regardless of the ability or
the address of those who deal with them, a world in which it is
shifts of equilibria with which one deals and which one must
learn to manipulate skillfully is exactly contrary to all of
traditional American training, and it comes hard. It has not
really come yet, even as a vaguely formulated concept. What
*has* come is a growing doubt that good enough men *can* be found
to deal with this world in the old-fashioned way (without a
corresponding recognition that the world itself is not the
old-fashioned one and requires a different approach) and a
tendency, consequently, to confusion and discouragement, to
faith in old formulas now devoid of their once Considerable
pragmatic substance, and a strong (though now I think receding)
impulse to cultivate one's own garden, in the hope that so
improbable and inherently unjust a set of problems may prove
to be shibboleths and go away, as they ought to, in all good
conscience. I believe that this phase is temporary, and we
may now be approaching the far side. But, leading as it can
only do to confused inaction, the impact came at about the most
dangerous possible time in our history. Possibly this is another
dimension deserving a word here.

Pp. IV-13, line 2. "... possesses the capacity to..." (to what?)

P. V-4. This is a _most_ important and telling discussion!

P. V-11. This method of negotiation, of course, is also a particularly easy, practical, and profitable one for the totalitarian state.

P. V-13. Paragraph (d). From this it is clear that _acting_ as if we saw the other side's point of view (or not so acting) is also an important dimension that we have at our disposal, and should properly use.

P. VI-3. Last paragraph, beginning "If our military establishment is too one-sided..." The meaning of this first sentence is not

- 4 -

P. VI-3 (Continued).

entirely clear to me. Is the sense that our military establishment
is too unbalanced for this purpose, (thus being gravely deficient,
for example, in the ability to handle local wars successfully) or
too generally weak vis-a-vis the Soviet position, or both? Of
course the clearly coming intensive Soviet drive for de facto
control of the seas, especially those of the tropical southeastern
areas, is a potent element here, at once a component and a
deadly illustration. * Perhaps the sentence itself might be
pointed a little.

* Probably more apposite in the discussion of alliances.

P. VI-5. Line 11. "It is quite possible that the Soviet leaders...."
This extraordinarily important point deserved great emphasis
for the reader, I think!

P. VI-15. The concluding arguments on this and the following page
are extremely powerful, and deserve all the emphasis they can
possibly get. As a small mechanical device to assist this, I
suggest omitting the sentence (line 6) beginning "The ultimate
problem thus ..." and the phrase "On the contrary" in the
following line, in the interest of direct emphasis. These thoughts
are so fundamental to all our coming national life that I am eager
to see the direct chain as simple and "unimpeded" as possible!

These are powerful chapters, Henry - as powerful as any that I have
read so far in the whole manuscript. * These comments are of virtually no
value - they are mere surface details.

But once again, I cannot tell you how much of a privilege it is to see
them at this formative stage, nor how grateful I am for it.

As always

* Though now, after a first reading, I think that the chapters on
Europe, Germany and Nato Strategy may rival, if not exceed, them.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

April 21, 1960

Dear Henry,

The Japanese visit was really highly successful, and extremely interesting in many ways. But one of its greatest assets was that the trip out and back provided a magnificent opportunity to read and re-read the two sets of chapters. And this reading was one of the most rewarding experiences that I have had in recent years, and I think the most rewarding of all the times that I have had with this book or its predecessors.

These are deeply impressive chapters. As I cabled you, I think the chapters on the Challenge to the Free World, on the questions of the new nations in Africa and Asia and on evolutionary patterns are by far the best material on these subjects that I have read anywhere. They are thoroughly extraordinary — as much for their implied insights as for their explicit reasoning. And the chapters on arms control problems are perhaps equally impressive in a somewhat different way. The very subject demands a quite different approach, lending a high premium to the development of experimental patterns, but not allowing the sweeps of vision, of course, which are a chief glory — and a very high glory — of the others.

Because I agree so fully with so much of this material — and in so many cases have been provided by it with insights which were wholly new to me and which I was literally meeting for the first time — it is more than usually difficult to make any effective detailed comments. For detailed comments, especially in the first group of chapters, really seem a sacrilege to the whole and may act, not to improve it, but rather to reduce its sweep. Neither the subject nor its treatment should be abused by dissection! Nevertheless, I did make some comments of detail as I proceeded, and I would like to include them *provided* they are not taken too seriously. For to do that might well damage the whole by detailed shifts which could bring little improvement. With that caution let me list the comments for the chapters on the Free World in this letter if I may, leaving those on the problems of

- 2 -

disarmament for another one. Most of the detailed comments are going, by force of circumstance, to be encomiums in any case and hence of no assistance whatsoever! It is really a magnificent manuscript. Here is all that I can find to say about it:

I.

P. I-2. Last sentence in first paragraph, "They differ less in their assumptions than in ...." should, I think, be expanded for greater clarity.

Pp. I-2,3,4. This is an extremely important discussion, I think.

P. I-4, line 7. "... will no longer *mock* ..." Meaning?

Pp. I-5,6,7, *et seq.* This discussion of political vs. economic "shaping forces" is, I think, most brilliant and original.

P. I-9, lines 7-11. This is a most striking observation about the time relationships between political and economic development. It is certainly highly significant.

P. I-12, lines 8-9. "Industrialization rather than producing ..." I tend rather to agree with the following sentence, and question whether there is *any* necessary relationship here.

P. I-13. The discussion on this page is central to the whole structure of Communism, and the whole discussion of Communism to p. 16, I think is truly excellent.

P. I-15, line 15. "In Communist countries ...." This, of course, is a key point in the discussion. Indeed, I think it is not only a legitimacy, but a pivotal position which accrues to the managerial group.

P. I-16, line 10. "The irony of Communism ...." This is a fundamental insight — and a very new one to me. The following insight on p. 17 — "What happened in effect was ..." is equally crucial. These are most brilliant conceptions!

P. I-18, first paragraph. "When the circle of those entitled ..." Yet

- 3 -

consider the evolution of the linkage of concepts of property and
suffrage in eighteenth-century America, with the aristocratic
tradition.

P. I-24, line 13. "It is doubtful that the same impetus can be given ..."
I agree with the statement, given the conditions. However, I think
I'm a little more optimistic, remembering how very Edwardian
our own current American society is in certain ways — often to
its detriment, but here, perhaps, to its at least partial advantage.

II.

P. II-4. Furthermore, such governments may _themselves_ misconceive
the arbiter's role as one of unaccustomed power opportunity – and
be tempted accordingly.

P. II-20, line 11. "Thus a government which can impose ..." This, of course, is a general point, in Western democracies as well as in Soviet society.

P. II-21, line 3. "... a means of enriching (and entrenching) those in control ..."

P. II-36, last sentence. "This is the only meaning that can be given ...."
Yet of course the economic aspect is a _necessary_, though very far
from a _sufficient_ one.

P. II-41. Entire discussion. This is very characteristic — a most
subtle and important point!

P. II-44. The discussion on this page seems to me a little diversionary.
Better omitted?

P. II-45, lines 11-12. "Or are we to assert ..." Omit. This sentence
is on a different plane from the rest of the discussion, and I think
detracts from it. Last paragraph: And I'm not sure that this is even
the most _technically_ complex — in general, of course, it is by far the
simplest and easiest — and shallowest!

P. II-47, lines 3-4. "... and descriptive of the well-being of all nations." Meaning of this phrase? Lines 9-11. "This is all the more important since..." an important practical point, and one not commonly raised.

- 4 -

P. II-48, line 12. "risk"? Meaning?

P. II-50, line 1. "If," not "as," *please*!

P. II-51, lines 16-18. Suggest omitting this sentence. I'm not sure that this *is* the most important reason — think it may be subtler.

P. II-52, line 11. "however self-righteous these may appear in retrospect." Suggest omitting this phrase — it detracts from the power of the whole.

III. On this section I have only a general comment. It contains some important items, but on the whole I think they should be incorporated into the main body of the essay, and this section discarded.

P. III-3, lines 13-16. "Cynicism implies the disregard or exploitation ...." *Extremely* important — must not be lost!

P. III-4, lines 8-9. "a leader, either an individual ..." — or a nation? The point, of course, is fundamental.

IV.

P. IV-2, lines 15-19. "This in the ultimate view ..." This excursion, I think, interrupts the main argument. Suggest omitting.

P. IV-3, lines 12-13. "Resignation is a possible attitude. It is, however ..." Omit.

P. IV-4, lines 3-9. "Those in the West who identify ..." Absolutely right! But this of course does not preclude using an analysis of evolution as a *guide* to action — a process, of course, which I enjoy and believe in.

Lines 13-18. "Furthermore, the trend is almost invariably ...." No — at least as often it is in the reverse direction — i.e., social parasites, or in the great majority of "late" forms, where the environment *itself* may take up the "slack" of complexity. The Victorians simply didn't see this "devolutionary" aspect of social evolution, by and large — no doubt because they were so absorbed in their own ever-complicating environment.

- 5 -

P. IV-6, lines 17-19. "A (relatively simple) biological unit ...."
Of course this effect is basically a function of the _total_ complexity —
and hence of the choice-range — of the unit — whether biological
or social.

P. IV-7, lines 10-15. "It is determined in the sense that the span of ..."
But today it is fixed (for human evolution) largely by the limita-
tions — often self-imposed — of those involved.

P. IV-8,9,10. Most _excellent_ discussion of _practical_ evolution!

P. IV-10, lines 16-19. The confirmation of political framework by
industrial development set out here absolutely brilliant!

P. IV-11-18. All absolutely brilliant and vital.

P. IV-18, lines 6-9. "To be sure, we may not succeed ...." This
seems to me unnecessary, diverting, and weakening. Omit.

P. IV-20, lines 1-9. Probably, basically, _more_ than a decade. But
note also the fact that science and technology, which have channeled
creativity to a considerable extent, have narrowed it and put it into
a derived terminology and reference frame, but have not _eliminated_
it — quite the contrary. The creativity may be in many respects
less relevant to pertinent questions, but the _fact_ of it, I think, is
there to be salvaged.

P. IV-20, lines 9-14. "In the past some disaster — a depression or
a war — usually ..." This, of course, is the very core of the
challenge.

Once again, Henry, it has been a thrilling experience to read these
chapters. This will be a very great tract. I have read the other set of
chapters a first and second time, but still have to cover the third reading
and list the comments. It will be coming to you in a very few days.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

May 2, 1960

Dear Henry,

Now at long last (and I fear much too late) comes the manuscript of
<u>The Problem of Control of Arms.</u> I have kept it far too long, and I hope you will
forgive me!

Part of the delay lay in my difficulty in making any really constructive comments about it. I have given it three rather full readings now, and like it <u>very</u> much. The very nature of the subject makes it, of course, hard to comment at all firmly, because so many of the courses which are so imaginative – and so imaginatively explored – are in themselves researches – extremely revealing and extremely provocative for both discussion and action, but all that one can say of them at this juncture is that they offer one of the best "galaxies" of positive thinking on the subject that I have seen. It is possible to comment, however, on the framework in which the present scene is laid out, and this I think really excellent. I agree very much with the estimate of the time and the situation to which the chapters are addressed and the insights concerning them are, as always, extraordinarily brilliant. So I think the chapters have done an outstanding job – in providing those insights, and in providing a "scaffolding" for the very hard and very massive thinking which absolutely <u>must</u> be done – and quickly – if the 1960's are not to prove extremely dangerous and treacherous waters for us. This is almost all that I can say of the chapters in general terms – except to cheer them! – for it will take many hours of conversation to cover these leads and to explore others – conversations which I hope we shall have soon!

Meantime, I had a very few detailed comments, as usual, and let me list them
in the usual form:

## Chapter I:

P. 17. Lines 4-6. Is not this, indeed, almost inherently impossible?

P. 18. Line 15. The meaning of this phrase is not quite clear to me.
Is it worth a bit of expansion?

P. 22 Line 4. "It is not obvious, however . . ." I think I see the
sense of this and the following sentence as I re-read it —
and of course agree with it completely. But it <u>is</u> confusing
at first reading, and suggests the opposite to what I think
is its meaning. Suspect that the remainder of this page
can be clarified and simplified a bit.

- 2 -

the mere recorder- the more accurate the better. Indeed, this was the theme of the whole Newtonian revolution until very recent years. I wonder, on the other hand, whether other cultures which escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking, have not further expanded, refined, and developed the essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer - that the filter not only determines but in large measure makes the product. On the debit side this approach has long been a cross to the Eastern world, since, having it, that world was largely debarred from developing the resources of technology (and consumer goods) that the West has enjoyed. This, I think, may have been one of the sources of the bitter specific resentments against the material gods of the Western world. Because, of course, the reasoning which makes the world internal to the observer is basically the intellectually richer, and it must have seemed a particular injustice that the shallower, often essentially anti-intellectual technical line of reasoning should have been, materially, so much more richly rewarded.

Three centuries of commitment to the view of the world external from and uninfluenced by the observer have left their mark, I think, on the West. Although that notion is now discarded in the West by its most sensitive thinkers, it is firmly ingrained in the cultural mode. And it leads, I think, to a gross underestimation of the power that lies in distorting the real world through distorting the observer in systematic and skillful fashion.

Now this feature, which for so many centuries was a liability, has become a tool of immense power in the hands of our enemies, which we are almost completely unequipped, at present, to perceive or to handle properly - and what wonder if the transformation of this long-term liability into an immensely powerful asset, however ruthlessly and dangerously used, causes gratification among those who so long suffered under it - whether in the long run they will benefit from it, or disastrously lose all that they have.

It may well be, I should think, that Kruschev, consonant with the requisite that the actual world must be well learned before sufficiently artistic and functional distortions of it are possible, is actually extremely well informed about American society, at least in an academic sense. This of course will simply increase the dangers and the extreme precautions against euphoria that appropriate combinations of toughness, apparent earnestness, obvious penetration, and the seasoning of personal amiability will pose.

- 2 -

## Chapter II.

P. 29. Lines 10-14. "And it is likely to be ridiculed . . ." — "who sometimes give the impression . . ." This is remarkably true! But I don't think it adds to the text to put it in here. It is on a different level, and is distracting. Suggest omitting that entire sentence.

P. 33. Line 3, 4. "How can one count . . ." This sentence seems to me a bit obscure, though of course I get its meaning, and in need of clarification, especially for the general reader.

P. 34. Lines 7-14. Would not this arrangement, however, require that the "interval-inventory inspection" should cover the entire territory with a very great degree of thoroughness each time made?

P. 39. Lines 8 et seq. "If the location of a submarine . . ." But of course this situation grows explosively more difficult as the fleets of nuclear submarines grow and they are able to remain on continuous duty in the oceans for long periods, possibly occasionally serviced by master subs or surface ships — say a year at a time or so.

P. 40. Lines 1-5. The same point — they would of course return to port only at very long intervals — perhaps long enough in terms of the total duration of conflict so that one could say "not at all".

## Chapter III.

P. 6. Lines 3 et seq. "It is rather the inability . . ." Very true! And yet it could be built up, with adequate conviction and determination, perhaps. (I believe this, but only time, of course, can tell.)

## Chapter IV.

P. 8. Lines 1-3. This, however, as set out, strikes me as a some what "thin" argument, if I understand it correctly. The meaning of the following paragraph is a little obscure to me — possibly it should be clarified. I have added some "substantive" marginal comments.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HENRY A. KISSINGER, Associate Director
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38
MASSACHUSETTS

April 25, 1960

To: Henry Kissinger

The Problem of Arms Control

This should be a major contribution to understanding of the problem. I hope that its intention was not to prescribe because I see its value as negative - a deflating of dangerous misconceptions and exposure of complexities of the problem. The section on the test ban is brilliant.

I regret not having read first the chapter on Europe - and what must be another chapter on the nature of the Soviet threat.

My detailed comment below will indicate that I do not accept the desirability of an independent European nuclear capability. In fact, I suggest that the highest priority should be accorded to *Bringing European countries - including both UK and France - into some kind of integrated possession and control of the US capability - in order to preserve the bipolarity of nuclear impasse*. If this requires compromise of US sovereignty, that is cheap price for stability. If it require unusual imaginativeness in working out decision making processes, I would suggest we use it, and focus on that problem rather than many others which exist because the US has not, so far, formulated its problems in these terms.

I also doubt that I agree that Nth power nuclear capability has so low catalytic potentialities as the essay suggests.

These potentialities would be low only if there were an extremely high degree of understanding and agreement between the bipolarized Big Nuclear Powers - and arrangements to assure very complete knowledge of what could be seen at once as irresponsible departures from an accepted impasse.

Marengo's essay on Peaceful Coexistence leads me to believe that one need not be absolutely agnostic about probabilities of Soviet devotion to "peace" - at least at the strategic level. I believe that one can be too ready to accept the notion that theological convictions of the enemy are so profound as to render suicide and racial extermination profitable to stalemate or even rollback resulting from non-military activity and developments. There must be a small core of "good faith" in arrangements for arms control.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

EDWARD S. MASON

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE

CAMBRIDGE 38

MASSACHUSETTS

This chapter brilliantly defines areas in which there is much to be lost and little gained by relying on faith: science, technology, procedure, understanding must be combined to make program self-enforcing.

These are some offhand general comments.

Following are incidental observations:

I note the use of the word "hazarded" - a variation might be jeopardized or endangered.

I-4 Fifth line from bottom might be "It might therefore will call forth efforts for similar capability by the opponent."

On III-1 - Does not accident-miscalculation possibly contribute as much?

III-5 -line 8 - I do not understand the implication of "interpretation" here. Line 10: "is" or "is equivalent to"

I would like to see in introduction and conclusion the convincing way you develop the thought - "An arms control scheme must have a built-in incentive to observe it." III-9 - line 11. Also III-10 - "It is more worthwhile to seek to reduce the incentive to attack than the capability for it."

III-13 is excellent.

III - 15 is "retaliatory" a noun?

III-19 The thought that continuous surveillance benefits aggressors is another one that might go in introduction and conclusion as shock to conventional wisdom. Also III-20 lines 5-6. And III-23-lines 11-12.

I think your concepts of negative evidence, positive evidence, and inventory inspection are extremely fruitful. I can see how hostile critics could tear into their use in your armed and unarmed regions. But your formulae strike me as most original and constructive.

III-39 I am not sure that I understand why the USSR should necessarily find this unacceptable.

IV-4 I would like to see the first full sentence in introduction too.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, *Director*

HENRY A. KISSINGER, *Associate Director*

EDWARD S. MASON

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE

CAMBRIDGE 38

MASSACHUSETTS

If arms control is not a substitute for military effort
what is it for? Do you mean military readiness? IV-4 line 12.

IV-9 - Troop reductions in Communist China *could* be meaningful.
They could indicate abandonment of offensive capability -
transfer of resources from military to economic growth, etc..

V-9 It is hard for me to see how diffusion could "even stabilize dterrence among themajor powers". Stability is not, as I see it, a mere matter of equations of destructive potentiality; it is communication between collective minds of equal understanding and sophistication. Newcomers with less understanding or sophistiction could easily, I fear, louse up what must, at best, be uneasy impasse between oldtimers. V-10 lines 5-6 may be true, but is unconvincing to me.

V-12 lines 8-9 - "The major powers sooner or later would
probably have to step in to prevent chaos." How?

I observe throughout that you make no mention of the UN
International Atomic Energy Agency at Vienna. This exists.
It has inspection and control procedures, etc... This could
be beefed up for much of what you argue for elsewhere, rather
than new institutions created. China's membership in it -
consistently vetoed by US and advocated by USSR might be
a possible first step to seeing if Peking will accept any
responsibilities in nuclear field. V-14 might be place
to introduce reader to IAEA.

V-16 A nuclear China is not a direct tactival threat to
Europe perhaps - yet nor was N. Korea's attack on South Korea.
Yet, NATO acted as though it were a strategic one.

V-19 - I see the testing negotiations as primarily Big Power
efforts to agree on Nth Power. I see only France and China
not now hoping for success. I am not sure I agree with your
seeming assumption that many countries affirmatively want the
nuclear weapon capability

V-21 I like "Arms control must not become a device to polarize our options between surrender and suicide."

V-22 I do not like the alternative of a European Atomic
Community because I, personally, cannot envisage UK and Germany
or even France, with its recently acquired nuclear capability,
merging in a unitary decision making arrangement.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

EDWARD S. MASON

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE

CAMBRIDGE 38

MASSACHUSETTS

V 23 line 10 - "verify command _decision_ arrangements"

V 24 Here are reasons why I want a _NATO_ nuclear deterrent and not any others.

V-30 seems to argue at bottom of page that there is a worldwide longing to get hands on nuclear weapons. I do not agree.

V 35 I attach greater weight to danger of catalytic war than you do.

VI 13 - line 1 It may be too categorical to say USSR would be wholly uninhibited in evasion.

VI 14 line 1 - What are your thoughts about sanctions?

VI 20 I was not aware that advocates of test ban opposed conventional force buildup.

VI 21 What basis do we have for thinking USSR would want to use China for tests?

VI 28 This is excellent approach to understanding nature of problem, I think.

VIII 3 - Your comment about Presidential leadership vs. Dept of Peace goes right to heart of the problem.

VIII -4 I am inclined to think economic development programs from savings belongs in some other chapter.

VIII 6 Middle paragraph might go in introduction as well.

VIII -8 Re Soviet acceptance mutuality interest - 6 line from bottom - Is this true?

HARPER & BROTHERS

Publishers Since 1817

49 EAST 33D ST., NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

March 28, 1960

Dear Henry,

As I promised earlier, I read the second section of the manuscript over the weekend. I think it's full of wonderful perceptions and necessary and important caveats but it reads a lot looser to me than the other section did and seems to want tightening and shortening. Of course, it will immediately seem tighter if it's followed by a chapter or chapters of more specific recommendation.

I'm going to ask a lady here to type out the marked passages, sub-chapter by sub-chapter, and pass them on to you since it occurs to me that you may be curious as to which passages seem to me to have a special insight or felicity of phrasing. In other words, whatever tightening you may do in revising, let's not lose these.

Now for some minor criticisms:

Sub-chapter 1, page 7, line 8: Sentence unclear

Sub-chapter 4, page 1: This sub-chapter badly needs an over-simplified topic statement at the front to show the reader what he's dealing with here.

page 17: Watch out for dating on Berlin.

Sub-chapter 5, page 17, line 14: I wish you'd add a sentence to the effect: "which is not to say that critical self-examination is not useful."

page 18: You say, "The quest for novelty implies that the Cold War is due essentially to lack of imagination." I'd argue that this quest *sometimes* has to do with a sense that we must articulate better-and I'm sure you'd agree.

Sub-chapter 6, page 5, last three lines: "No progress...". None whatever? In other words, no conference until we have recast our military establishment?

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.
Evan W. Thomas...rm

## Sub-chapter 1, page 2: starting with line 9:

To begin with, it is not an accident that the destructiveness of weapons technology has been accompanied by a diplomatic stalemate. Rather than facilitate settlement, the increasing horror of war contributes to the intractability of the process of negotiations. The more "unthinkable" war has become, the more one of the traditional pressures of diplomacy has been removed. Negotiations, historically, have rarely relied exclusively on the persuasiveness of the argument.

## page 7, starting with line 17:

The reference often made to the coexistence achieved by Mohammedanism and Christianity or Protestantism and Catholicism are not fully relevant to the contemporary problem. In both cases, coexistence was the result of an equilibrium established by protected, often ruinous, warfare—the very contingency diplomacy is now asked to avoid.

### Sub-chapter 2, page 4, starting with line 7:

As Soviet pressure grew more subtle, the overconcern with the purely military aspect of containment made it increasingly difficult to rally the people of the West for the effort to insure their security. The longer we deferred negotiations the easier it became for the Soviet leaders to maneuver us into the position of being the intransigent party. The closer we approached the theoretical point at which, according to the containment theory, fruitful negotiations should have been possible the more elusive they seemed.

### page 6, line 1:

By deferring negotiations until we had developed actual power, we in fact gave the Soviet Union tome—

### page 14, starting with line 6:

The view that the free world required tensions to do its duty was really a way of saying that the free world was incapable of developing positive goals.

### page 14, starting with line 13:

Mr. Dulles failed to consider that the tension he thought so essential was supportable only if the people understood that every effort was being made to end it. If the Soviet leadership was really as intransigent as Mr. Dulles thought, negotiations were particularly essential to define the issues for which to contend. A democracy which has no confidence in its people will fail, however subtle its leadership.

### page 18, starting with line 15:

The difficulty with Mr. Dulles' policy was not that he was wrong about Communism but that he was right about so little else.

### page 21, starting with line 5:

It is, after all, possible that Khrushchev's liberal domestic policy is precisely the condition for obtaining domestic support for a more venturesome foreign policy.

## Sub-chapter 2, page 23, starting with line 11:

Khrushchev's domestic success was due to his ability to isolate all potential opponents and to convince his colleagues of the sincerity of his desire for collective leadership. Is it not possible that the man who caused the leaders of the Hungarian revolution to be arrested while negotiating an armistice with them and who had them killed despite a promise of safe conduct may now attempt to apply similar methods to weaken the cohesion of the free world and then to destroy its members piecemeal?

## page 25, starting with line 2:

For we should be prepared to negotiate whatever Soviet motivations. Our task is essentially the same whatever assessment we make of their purposes.

If the Soviet Union really wants a settlement, negotiations must settle its fraem-work. If Soviet overtures to end the Cold War are a tactical maneuver, a purposeful diplomacy should be able to make Soviet bad faith evident.

## page 27, starting with line 14:

The formalism of our approach to negotiations enables the Soviet leaders to obtain a dual advantage from intransigence. They can increase the uneasiness of the West by an extreme statement and then gain a reputation for being conciliatory by retreating to a position still considerably in advance of their starting point.

### Sub-chapter 4, page 6, starting with line 13:

A revolutionary movement always starts from a position of inferior strength. It owes its survival to the reluctance of its declared victims to accept its professions at face value.

### page 7, starting with line 9:

However weak at the beginning, a revolutionary state is often able to substitute psychological strength for physical power. It can use the very enormity of its goals to defeat an opponent who cannot come to grips with a policy of unlimited objectives.

If peace is the "normal" pattern of relations among states, it follows that tensions must be due to misunderstandings or to bad motives. Hence the enormous attention paid to personalities in our thinking about diplomacy. Therefore, too, the excessive expectations which attach to summit conferences and to personal diplomacy.

### page 14, starting with line 11:

A summit conference may contribute to clarifying the opposing points of view. But this is helpful only if tension is caused by misunderstanding. Otherwise, clarifying the opposing points of view may deepen the schism. In short, the same factors which make for speed of decision also increase the risks of war when the negotiators are the highest officials and when each controls a nuclear arsenal.

### page 17, starting with line 14:

But the Soviet Union could have made a greater contribution to peace by never provoking the Berlin crisis than by calling a summit meeting over it. It is a curious program in which we give up some of our rights while the Soviet Union gives up a menace.

### Sub-chapter 5, page 5, starting with line 1:

Because peace is the natural condition, we believe that it need not be defined; it need only be wanted. Because the essence of trade is that both sides gain, we believe that irreconcilable differences do not exist—that all problems can be solved by compromise.

### page 7, starting with line 4:

In such a situation, bargaining rules of thumb which are extremely effective is commercial negotiations or in dealings with friendly states can become useless or self-defeating or dangerous.

### page 7, starting with line 14:

Clearly there is no particular merit in making 'unacceptable' proposals. But if we can make only proposals which the Soviet leaders will accept, the framework of every conference will be established by the other side and the terms of settlement will be Soviet terms.

### page 9, starting with line 13:

However reasonable our proposals the Soviet leaders will be tempted to reject them in the hope that an impasse will elicit ever more favorable offers.

### page 15, starting with line 2:

The Revolutionary quality of the Soviet system may reside, after all, not in the feeling threatened but in the fact that nothing can reassure the Communist leaders. Only the complete neutralization of the United States, our expulsion from Europe, Asia and Africa, may be considered by them. Unless we are prepared to accept impotence as the price of a settlement, simply understanding the Soviet psychosis may only define the cause of our disputes, not an area of agreement.

### page 19, starting with line 1:

For if we can negotiate only on issues that the Soviet leaders have declared as soluble, it is not surprising that the attention of the world is focussed on the symptoms rather than the causes of the difficulties: on NATO but not the Soviet hostility which produced it; on the all-too-inadequate Western defense effort,

### Sub-chapter 6, page 2, starting with line 11:

Our adoption of the defensive makes it inevitable that many of the traditional pressures available to diplomacy no longer exist. This is a necessary price we have to pay for the convictions of our people; no one would advocate a change in these attitudes.

### page 3, starting with line 3:

We are relatively stronger in a category of power which it is totally incredible that we will use, even in the defense of many free countries.

### page 12, starting with line 1:

They must face the fact that the policy of applying relentless pressures on the West creates untold perils for all the peoples of the world. On the other hand, they must be convinced that they can increase their security through negotiation, that we will be flexible and conciliatory in working out reassurances for them against attack.

### page 16, starting with line 4:

Our task, as that of every generation, is to make our belief in freedom and human dignity relevant to our times. To do this, it is necessary to end the session with Soviet intentions and to seek to become clear about our own.

CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF NEW YORK

589 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

JAMES A. PERKINS
Vice President

February 10, 1960

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry

I have just finished reading the chapters you have sent me. I am afraid I have not had the time to give them the careful study they require, not the least reason for which is my involvement in this RBF exercise. However, I have some general comments to make.

The first is that the opening chapter is weak. I had a feeling that *The Dilemmas of Deterrence* - I took a long time to get under way and involved a point that could have been made in far less space and time. As a matter of fact it was not until I got up to your chart on vulnerability on V-3 that I felt you were dealing with anything you really wanted to say that was fresh and new. Wouldn't it somehow be possible to start with that chart and then talk about the various problems arising through the various combinations? My general impression was of old material being gone over by you in a fairly mechanical way.

I began to pick up steam with your *Deterrence - II*. Here it seemed to me that you began to talk about things that you really wanted to say. I think your sections on blackmail and bluff represent steps forward in our understanding in the way in which the political and military equation comes together. I very much liked your four points. (I cannot find the pages on which you put them but they strike me as being solid analytical tools and the rest of the discussion bears that out.) I thought your "willingness to run risk" section was particularly useful. I am afraid this also includes in the end the willingness to risk suicide.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

February 10, 1960

2

The man who says that I am prepared to pull the world down
around my ears rather than give up an essential objective has
a tremendous bargaining position.

However, I think your *Limited War* section is the most interesting of the three. I have only one general suggestion and that has to do with the concept itself. First, the fact that limited war involves essentially (a) U. S. allies versus Russian allies, or (b) limited USSR against U. S. allies, has come into focus. Most of our talk of limited war capability continuously ignores the fact that in all probability the U. S. would be in support of a member of our coalition or in support of a neutral against either a Russian ally or Russia itself. The very concept itself troubles me. I have often wondered whether our difficulties in dealing with it arise from the fact that the term has come into being because of the idea of massive retaliation. In short, I am beginning to wonder whether the central war-limited war juxtaposition hasn't complicated our understanding of the military diplomatic problem. Reading your excellent chapter on this still leaves me wondering.

I must say these chapters, particularly the last two, gave
me a taste for what is to come. I shall be away for three weeks
but if you have more that I can read after March 7 I shall be de-
lighted to do so when I have some more time. I am returning your
manuscript under separate cover.

JAP:df

MEMORANDUM

August 3, 1960

FROM: Max Hall
TO: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Chapter 1 of THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE

Chapter 1, it seems to me, is vigorously and effectively written. The sentences, except for a handful which I will list, are well constructed and clear. I have three main sets of comments: on the conclusion, on the organization, and on the sentences.

1. The conclusion. Page 25 is by far the weakest part of the chapter. I assume you won't be offended if I say just what I think, since I could scarcely be expected to be helpful by pussy footing. Page 25, giving "the measure of the task before us," is a big letdown to a reader after 24 pages of powerful hammering at the theme that new departures are needed and that there is a "necessity for choice." A sentence like "While standing firm in the face of Communist pressure we must be prepared to keep the door open for a settlement should it prove possible" could be said by anyone at all; even Styles Bridges might use such language if a TV panelist asked him where he stood. (Incidentally the sentence contains a couple of cliches.) At the close of Chapter 1, the reader doesn't know how far you are going in the other chapters to spell out your recommendations or views. If you plan to elaborate all this anyhow, perhaps you could omit this description of "the task before us." If you don't, then this passage needs to be much more specific and meaningful. (I gather from your secretary that you are far from satisfied with this chapter, and plan to improve it; so I realize that you already may have your hatchet out for p. 25; but since I have no way of knowing what portions of the chapter you intend to change, I must take it as I find it.)

2. The organization. It would help to make a general tightening, in order to take the reader in a straighter line from point to point. The reader occasionally has the sensation that he has circled round to terrain that he has traversed before. For example, the point that we should not think of "peace" as static tranquil normalcy is well made on p. 10; it is well made again on 18 just as though it were being presented for the first time. For another repetition see my comment (below) concerning p. 19, line 1. Naturally you will wish to repeat ideas for emphasis or other reasons, but it ought to seem to the reader that you have made the revisititation on purpose, for a solid reason, and not because of planlessness, forgetfulness, or fondness for the phrasing.

.../..

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger - page 2 - August 3, 1960

The following example is slightly different, being not a case of repetition but one of emphasizing *unlike* things without reconciliation. After writing a good deal about the need for boldness, innovation, and willingness to stand alone and take risks, you come to a point (pp. 20, 22-23) when you caution that results cannot be immediate or dramatic but must be long-term, that the quest for novelty for its own sake is pernicious, and that our role in the world is infinitely complicated. *My point* is not that these two emphases are basically incompatible but that they involve mental attitudes that are at least dissimilar and may need reconciling in order to save the reader either from an impression of riding off in several directions or from wasting time constructing the reconciliation himself. As it is, each emphasis is made absolutely--not relatively to the other. If the *boldness* point and the *patience* point were next-door to each other with a proper transition, the apparent contradiction would likely disappear. But even if the two points remained separated physically, they could be related by a reference.

3. The sentences. Your style is to smite the reader with a stream of short, ringing pronouncements, bordering sometimes on the peremptory. In view of the sense of urgency and challenge that you wish to convey, perhaps this style is well suited to the subject matter. Indeed, my own opinion is that it is. Nonetheless, I find occasionally that an assertion, even one which I happen to think is ever so true, sounds just a bit too ringing, and I wonder if you cannot reduce this distracting effect without reducing your forcefulness.

Especially in the first eight pages of the chapter, many of the sentences read like apothegmgs. This is good, if they are also fresh-sounding and hang together. But they must be watched lest they get out of control and take on too much independent existence. Several small questions, some of them illustrating the comment just made, occur to me with respect to the paragraph running from bottom of p. 7 to top of p. 9. Is the paragraph closely integrated or does it ramble from one main idea to another? specifically, does some of the last part really belong with the material on pp. 11-12? Does a sentence like "Advice cannot replace knowledge" add anything? Actually, that maxim seems a bit inconsistent, superficially at least, with one near top of p. 7 that says disapprovingly, "More energy is expended on determining how things are /knowledge, I presume/ than which things matter"? Do some of the expressions occasionally border on the cliché ("need of inward strength," "seeds of failure," "age of rapid change")? Isn't it true (this is a different kind of thought) that innovation might, on occasion, mean abandoning an existing *unsafe* course, not

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger - page 3 - August 3, 1960

just safe ones? In other words, is creativity equated too flatly with taking risks?

Obviously, none of these little questions constitutes an important criticism of the chapter; in general its style is clear and forceful; my only purpose is to make you aware of the possibility that some readers may get a slight impression of sententiousness and that this impression may interfere in the line of communication. Perhaps you will want to look again at each apothegm-type statement to be sure it makes a fresh, necessary point, fitting cohesively in your developing argument.

Following are some very small sentence-by-sentence comments:

Page 1, fourth line, from bottom--"Fortress" misspelled.

Page 2, line 8--Suggest "earlier" instead of "historical" (Marshall Plan, etc., can also be considered as part of our history).

lines 13-14--"Inextricable" seems wrong word.

Page 3, lines 9-10--Suggest moving "to grasp the measure of our task" to beginning of sentence.

second line from bottom--Two misspellings (but I will not indicate any more typing errors, since they will surely be caught by others).

Page 5, lines 4-5--Move "to ourselves" immediately after "admit." next to last line--Move "relevant" after "accomplishments".

Page 6, line 10--"determining" is ambiguous here.

Page 7, lines 6-7--tenses.

lines 7-8-9--meaning not very sharp; do you wish to say "not only because of the ineptness of our policies but because of the . . ."?

line 9--"national leaders"? Governmental, non-governmental, or both?

fourth line from bottom--words omitted from my copy.

(Y)

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger - page 4 - August 3, 1960

Page 9, line 4--Suggest "rigidly pursued."

lines 9-10--Suggest avid "impelled by the impetus
of the initiative."

Page 10, line 11--"As worrisome . . ." is an awkward sen-
tence, ambiguous on first reading.

Page 11--Start of new paragraph--"comes to expression
. . . come to a concern."

Page 13, line 3 from bottom--Suggest insert "of 1960"
after "summit conference."

Page 14, line 5 from bottom "opposite numbers" (should
be plural).

Page 18, line 5 from bottom--"The ability to stand apart
from world affairs ended with our invulnerability." It ended be-
fore that, if you mean our loss of nuclear monopoly. If you mean
something else, this something isn't clear. Is the sentence needed?

Page 19, line 1--"We must be willing to face complexity."
Sounds familiar. See p. 3, line 7. You may have repeated deliberately.
I'm not sure it's a good idea here. The next sentence on 19 is
repetitive too.

line 9--"prisoners of events." This is a cliché.
The same cliché was used on p. 3, line 4.

Page 23, line 2--"pose . . . imposes."

Page 24, near bottom--"inject more dynamism into our
overall performance." Seems to me resounding but not sharply
meaningful. I've already commented on the next paragraph, begin-
ning at bottom of 24.

MEMORANDUM

August 10, 1960

from: Max Hall

to: Henry A. Kissinger

subject: Chapter II of THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE

Chapter II, it seems to me, is excellently written. It is certainly forceful, and most of it is clear and easy to follow. Certain sentences that I think might be unclear, or need altering for other reasons, have been indicated in the list starting on the next page.

Incidentally, I found in this chapter none of the aphoristic character that I commented on concerning the first chapter.

Numbers on the typed list correspond to pencil numbers in the left-hand margin of the text.

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 2 -- August 10, 1960

1. Punctuation.

2. "with will will." Suggest change to "willingness," as in preceding sentence.

3. Your objection to phrase "calculated risk" is unclear to me. "Calculated" doesn't have to mean that one calculates the effects of the penalty; can't it mean that one calculates the degree of likelihood that the penalty must be paid? (To tell the truth I'm not sure I understand "calculated risk" much better than I understand your objection.)

4. "should deterrence fail." How fail? Fail to deter the USSR from limited war or from an attack on the US? "The option of a strategy which reduces our risks" is not clear to me, since I get no clear picture of what "failure" means.

5. Punctuation?

6. "Embark on it." What does "it" mean? "deterrence" or "all-out war"? (Not until the next sentence is clear you mean all-out war.)

7. "these motives." "Considerations" involved are not necessarily the same as "motives."

7a. "Surprise attack" has the defect of implying that a pre-emptive attack is _not_ a surprise attack. I'm sure you want to keep the terms, but perhaps you could show they are terms of convenience rather than logic. How about saying, "For convenience, the former is called. . . ." and then putting "surprise attack" and "pre-emptive strike" in quotation marks? The next sentence could say "A surprise attack, as the term is used here, is . . . ." Incidentally, if by using "strike" with "pre-emptive" you do not mean to differentiate a "strike" from an "attack," then I suggest using "attack" in both instances. To change the word implies an intended differentiation and draws attention from the _real_ difference you wish to stress.

8. "too high" for the aggressor to pay or higher than the opponent would be willing to pay?

9. Whose retaliatory force? Since two attacks are being discussed--the pre-emptive one and the imminent one that is feared--each force can be thought of as retaliatory.

10. Same question. Suggest clarifying by: "Hence, the less vulnerable a country's retaliatory force, the less incentive the same country will have for a pre-emptive blow."

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 3 -- August 10, 1960

11. Suggest starting sentence: "To a country deciding whether to attack, retaliatory casualties which" etc., and then delete parenthetical matter.

12. "between . . . or" won't work. How about "But they may seem to be the lesser of two evils if the country believes it must either launch the attack or receive a blow that may eliminate its striking force and kill a hundred million people."

13. "meeting two requirements." This sounds as though you mean that *both* requirements must be met simultaneously; the logic, however, suggests you may mean that either measure alone may serve as a deterrent. (Point No. 2 contains the language "even if he should feel threatened." Needs clarifying.)

14. Maybe I ought to grasp this, but I don't. Whose first strike? Whose second strike? What does "gap" mean--gap in time, or gap between the first and second strike capability of a single country, or gap between the capability of one country and that of another country?

15. Suggest changing "the striking" to "these." As it is now, the word "stationary" confused me for a moment, since I couldn't visualize a striking force of stationary missiles. By the way, does "stationary" go with "airplanes" as well as missiles? Perhaps not, but it can be so interpreted,

16. Suggest delete "with modern weapons" as unnecessary and cluttering. Also suggest changing "superior" to "superiority in the" (if this is your meaning), on the ground that "superior" might be taken loosely to mean merely "exceptional," "great," "greater than ever before."

17. Someone has already made pencil marks. My own suggestion is to substitute "deterrence" for "invulnerability."

18. Suggest more logical to state it thus: "less important than the size of the force that can be held safe from the aggressor."

19. Does "Overall" add anything?

20. "Here" is momentarily misleading. The reader thinks it refers to the last part of the preceding sentence. But apparently not.

21. I assume the Russians must have this information or of course it wouldn't be appearing here (maybe our own generals have so testified)--but can *we* be certain that the *Russians* are certain of its accuracy?

(Y)

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 4 -- August 10, 1960

22. Is something omitted from this sentence?

23. See comment 14. This about the "gap" is clearer here, but it's still a puzzling way to say it. I suppose you must mean the discrepancy between our great ability to strike first and our poor ability to strike back. But "first and second" sound as though both attacks are launched by the same party.

24 and 26. Repetition. You make the same points about not supplying motive for pre-emptive attacks in both paragraphs (1) and (2). The argument is clearly and excellently made, but being in both places weakens it. Why not shorten paragraph (1) by holding it to the *invulnerability* point and deferring the *defensive intent* point until paragraph (2)?

25 and 27. "hardening of bases" is evidently a technical term; I am sure many of your readers won't be familiar with it. I am aware that you give a partial explanation of "soft" on p. II-11, but still think "hardening" is too bald here. (I now see the definition on II-19 but think it ought to accompany the *first* mention of the term.)

28. First and second strike. See my comment 23.

29. If "attrition" means destruction by an enemy, perhaps you should say so. "Attrition" didn't mean anything precise to me (it suggested the wind and the waves) until I read the next sentence, and even then I first took "less risky" to mean less risky to US lives and property. Could you insert "for the attacker" after "less risky" (assuming that's your meaning)? Also, it seems to me a footnote that says no more than "See below" is of little use.

30. "these"?

31. The second danger emerges more clearly on the next page, but there's one trouble in understanding it--particularly as stated here. This trouble is that it seems impossible to achieve "present readiness" without having resorted to "long-term procurement" some years before. And this being true, we can't achieve what will be "present readiness" in 1965 without long-term procurement now.

32. You are saying "in the absence of controlled control."

33. "we have adopted in strategic defensive." Odd language; typist must have omitted some words.

34. The following may be a quibble; ignore it if your language was deliberate. The use of the USSR as an example, together with the preceding sentence, practically calls the USSR a nuclear

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 5 -- August 10, 1960

aggressor. Though we have to treat her as a potential one, I wonder if it's consonant with the tone of your present discussion to say it quite this way. You yourself on II-27 mention the possibility that the Soviets might believe a pre-emptive attack necessary. Are we sure the Soviet Union sees itself as a nuclear "surprise attack" aggressor? The discussion of a decision to skip a family of weapons, etc., implies that the decision-maker is a nuclear aggressor in its own eyes, not simply in ours, because we didn't make the decision.

35. "it" is too far from its antecedent. How about "only ameliorate the gap but not prevent it."

36. I've had my say about "first and second strike capability."

37. This sentence now contains some awkward wording.

38. "Will remain"?

39. Do we deter "threats" or do we deter governments from taking certain actions?

40. Suggest new paragraph.

41. In this instance aren't we the "retaliatory" force? How about dropping "retaliatory" here?

42. Suggest "ours has to," not "would have to." (Tenses are mixed.)

43. See comment 41. It's not his "retaliatory" force, for if he had such a force at the bases, their destruction would be relevant.

44. This sentence doesn't seem relevant to rest of paragraph--seems a non-sequitur.

45. "categories"? Meaning?

46. Sentence doesn't read. Are some commas or some words omitted?

47. Suggest "and those of the Soviet Union."

48. Suggest "Either side can," etc. Also, "by striking second" doesn't seem logical because there wouldn't be any second strike. On the next sentence, my earlier opinion of "first and second" still holds.

49. Gratuitously let me say that the five paragraphs beginning here are especially well written--excellent. But so is this whole chapter so far.

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 6 -- August 10, 1960

50. "As for the vulnerable side. . . ." Puzzling, because you've just been discussing the vulnerable side. Furthermore this seems repetitious.

51. Suggest "whatever for what we have called a 'surprise attack'" [in quotes]. Even with all you've said, I am afraid that if you don't again call attention to the arbitrary technical term, some reader here might unconsciously equate "pre-emptive" with "non-surprise."

52. Suggest insert "vulnerable country's" before "threat."

53. What is "it"? The word must refer to vulnerability in the antepenultimate sentence but may be taken momentarily to refer to something in the penultimate one.

54. Another ambiguous "it!"

55. "Struck" not "strikes" (to harmonize in tense with "would come about").

56. "Mutual suicide" is so much stronger than "stalemate" (which suggests something less than final) that I suggest you may want to go back and substitute the stronger for the weaker term in the next-to-last line of p. III-12.

57. "vast" is ambiguous as to the noun it modifies ("failure" or "damage"?).

58. Re this ingenious and interesting table: (1) I must refer to "second strike" again. It occurs to me that this must have been used so often in the literature of deterrence that you take it for granted the reader will understand it as you do. But there are still difficulties. Even if it is perfectly understood you are never talking about two strikes by the _same_ country, the reader still may be confused by the dual meaning of "second strike": sometimes it's a strike that's really made; sometimes it can't be made because the retaliatory force is no more. Do we need terms that make this distinction?

(2) The two right-hand columns could be clarified a bit. Whose retaliatory force? Do you mean the retaliatory force of the country least likely to strike first, or do you mean either retaliatory force?

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 7 -- August 10, 1960

59. "both ... as well as" is redundant.

60. The impression given in this paragraph is that Russia wanted to attack us and would have done so if possible. I don't argue against this, but only wonder if you want to say it in this casual and "taken-for-granted" manner. Some readers may not take this for granted.

60a. semicolon, not comma.

61. Wouldn't "would" be better than "will"?

62. Ditto.

63. Perhaps could be sharpened. Reader may not differentiate clearly between this "extreme version" and the earlier description of Finite Deterrence. Reader may pause to try to figure whether you are saying this disapprovingly or acknowledging a defect of a policy with which you agree. And what about the word "deliberate"--do you mean it literally?

64. Are you still describing the "extreme version"? Would be clearer if you related these two sentences better to the concept of "Finite Deterrence" you've already given the reader (p. III-3).

65. Tenses don't go together ("succeeded," "may fail").

66. I assume that "to risk all-out war" does not mean simply "to threaten all-out war" (for I can't imagine our hesitating to threaten), but it might be so taken by a reader; would you wish to say plainly "to start an all-out war" rather than "to risk"? But isn't there a logical difficulty here? If it comes to the point of our refusing to launch an attack to resist local aggression, presumably the local aggression will have already occurred; therefore wouldn't we have already failed to deter? in which case our unwillingness to attack could not be said to be the "reason" for our failure to deter. Besides, I wonder if the only conceivable reason for our refusal to attack is lack of confidence in our superiority; even if we possessed such confidence, wouldn't there be strong voices arguing against starting an all-out war over a case of local aggression?

67. Repeat "may" before "assume," to prevent the reader from mentally momentarily repeating "may not" there.

68. "disaster buildup"?

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 8 -- August 10, 1960

69. "attack pre-emptively"? Is it "pre-emptive" because limited aggression has occurred? I thought it was only pre-emptive if meant to forestall a "surprise attack"--in which case it wouldn't be "in response to limited aggression."

70. "between" takes "and," not "or."

71. I got the earlier impression that our missiles were in soft bases, etc., and that it was by no means sure we would develop an invulnerable force. Somewhere between there and here it has been assumed that we will surely do so. I must have missed, or forgotten, the reasoning that produced the assumption.

72. Punctuation.

73. "four requirements." I think the reader should understand from what point of view these conclusions are reached and presented. From that of the US explicitly? From that of either side (since both are invulnerable)? From that of the party least likely to be the aggressor? From that of the social scientist, developing a general theory of deterrence? Point 1 refers to the "potential aggressor." That, of course, suggests the USSR, whose image in US eyes is that of an aggressor. Do you mean for it to mean Russia, or (speaking abstractly) any potential aggressor? Point 2 mentions the "deterrent threat." Whose? Ours only? Either side's? Or the party least likely to be the aggressor? (Perhaps neither side's image of itself is that of an aggressor.) These may seem to be unimportant questions--there is no doubt an element of quibble there, since everybody (every American, anyway) knows how pure our intentions are and how wicked the other side's. I think what I am getting at is a matter of clarity: the vigorous points you are making will be more effective if there is no ambiguity about the kind of platform you are standing on. I don't mean exactly, "Are you writing from the American policy-maker's point of view or an international point of view?" I think my question comes closer to being, "Are you writing from an American policy-maker's point of view or a political scientist's point of view?" Even that doesn't say it.

74. What's "this task"? To act like madmen? Antecedent of "this" not immediately clear. Maybe some other word than "task" would be better ("feat"?).

75. "either . . . or" belong in same sentence.

76. Don't you mean to say "if the benefits of aggression seem to outweigh the penalties only once, deterrence will fail"? The present way doesn't seem to make sense.

MEMORANDUM

August 11, 1960

FROM: Max Hall
TO: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Chapter III of THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE

Another excellent chapter--even better written, I think, than Chapter II.

I make no claim to spotting every little thing that might need smoothing, for I have read some of the chapter a good deal faster than other parts. But whenever I spotted something, I noted it, even though some of the defects were mighty small.

Again the numbers correspond to numbers I have put in margins.

1. This important sentence seems too cryptic for maximum effectiveness. "Risk" is apparently used in a specialized sense as a substitute for "the threatened retaliatory action." If this is the correct meaning, I certainly advise against using "risk." First, the reader may stumble briefly while asking himself "whose risk?" If he can answer this correctly, he still has a difficulty if he takes "risk" in the common meaning--for then "likelihood of the risk" makes no sense. If you are going to use "risk" as a technical term, having a specialized meaning in the language of deterrence (and I now have the uneasy feeling you did so in Chapter II), the reader should be given a definition he can remember-- as in the case of "harden" and "surprise attack." Otherwise every time you say "risk" you may interfere with the reader's grasp of what you're telling him. This comment applies to any other terms you might use in other than their ordinary nontechnical meanings.

2. Awkward unclear wording.

3. Meaning unclear. Even aside from the word "risk"-- that is, even if we substitute what I take to be its meaning, "the threatened retaliatory action"--why should the deterring party "overemphasize the acceptability of the risk"? That would seem to be the last thing it would wish to do. "Acceptability" to whom? "Risk" to whom? I assume to the potential aggressor. The sentence is so puzzling that it's obvious that there is a serious gap in my understanding of your terminology and hence a failure of communication.

Chapter III

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 2 -- August 11, 1960

4. The word "not" robs the sentence of its meaning. No
doubt a typing error.

5. "options"? (The word becomes clear in the *next* paragraph, not here.)

6. These and some of the following sentences may be erroneously taken to be what *you* are saying. I would make sure the reader understands these are only claims, along with the first sentence; also that he can immediately recognize where the claims end and the author resumes. As it is now, this paragraph lacks clarity until the *next* paragraph is reached.

7. "then" seems out of place; in fact it seems misleading because it implies you have *already* discussed the two categories of criticism, when actually you're about to. Also, you mention two categories but name only one here. Clearer if you briefly give both categories together--one sentence apiece--and elaborate them subsequently.

8. Reader should be told date of utterance or publication.

9. The sudden switch to "we" after posing the first two propositions objectively is another illustration of the uncertainty over *point of view* which I tried to articulate re Chapter II. The first sentence (a) doesn't say "*Our* limited forces," and in fact the first 5 lines of the paragraph read like an analysis of any country's prerequisites. I find this kind of switching somewhat disconcerting. How are your British readers supposed to interpret "we"? As the Free World? As U.S. only? But I am not necessarily challenging the use of "we," since the book is so conspicuously a discussion by an *American* of what *America* should do. What I do challenge is any ambiguity as to whether the book--or a particular passage--constitutes a "we" analysis or an "it-and-they" analysis.

9a. "complete victory" in the limited war or through all-out destruction of the aggressor country?

10. "concepts" not "concept."

11. "bases" may be mistaken at first for a noun.

12. Sentence doesn't read. Assume part of it is omitted.

13. Suggest inserting "of the Communist aggression" after "protect the victim," in order to preclude a momentary nonsensical interpretation of "victim" to mean victim of the conflict we would initiate.

Chapter III

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 3 -- August 11, 1960

14. Suggest "would almost guarantee."

15. "face," I suppose. (But I am overlooking typing errors that are obvious and sure to be caught.)

16. The "fate of the embargo." Meaning? I believe that the U.S. still embargoes all goods and that our allies still embargo important strategic ones. Perhaps you refer here to the fact that the international embargo lists were reduced by agreement. In any case clarification is needed here.

17. "cause" of action?

18. "Two facts . . .:" but only one is given after the colon. Suggest period after "at the outset" and start next sentence, "The first is that no war. . . ."

19. Easier to read if you can omit "at least."

20. Some readers will quickly say: "Well, it is worse isn't it? In a nuclear war defeat means we'll all be dead. The fallout etc. etc." The rest of the paragraph then may be lost on such readers. Do you mean that casualties being assumed equal a nuclear defeat is no worse than a conventional one?

21. Maybe "The," because "This" seems to refer only to the specific difference last mentioned.

22. Suggest throwing "so the argument runs" in here somewhere.

23. Suggest avoiding the barbarous jargon word "opt," as it irritates many readers and after all is not needed in the language.

24. Suggest beginning sentence with "The Allies' victory" or "Germany's defeat."

25. "combination . . . coupled with" is redundant.

26. "All these risks," etc., just a bit cryptic (again we find "risk" apparently used in the sense of "loss" rather than in its more common meaning of "a chance of loss"). How about "The risk of these dire events, however, would be run . . . ."

27. Suggest "The nuclear age has not repealed the principle (truism) that actions speak louder than words."

28. This sentence, beginning "What we tell," stresses words rather than actions, and seems to be an intrusion. Suggest either deleting it or relating better to the sentences fore and aft.

Chapter III

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger -- page 4 -- August 11, 1960

29. Ambiguous. Suggest insert "merely" before "because."

30. Awkward sentence. Reader must read it twice to detect where the subject begins, for "analysis," "problems," and "requirements," at first reading, could be additional objects of the preposition "Against." I think the difficulty would be overcome by bringing "analysis" closer to its verb. Could you delete "the nature of" and ", its problems, and its requirements" without losing anything much? It would then read, "an analysis of limited war must remain. . . ."

31. Awkward sentence. Also, was this sentence written before the recent increase of tensions?

32. Sentence awkward and unclear.

33. "But"? Relation to preceding paragraph illogical. Sounds almost as if you are saying (as of course you do not mean to do), "Despite the fact that we are in deep trouble, we are militarily unprepared."

34. "and" not "or"

35. I like your concluding section very much, except for this final page. Here, as in parts of Chapter I, the ringing declarations seem to get out of control. "Injecting a greater sense of purpose into our over-all performance" sounds pretty hackneyed (also, I remember it from Chapter I). The final paragraph is well said, but is it an apt conclusion to this chapter? Is it especially relevant to limited war? As a matter of fact, I'm almost sure that you said some of this paragraph in Chapter I, in almost the same words. I urge that you eliminate everything after the sentences at the top of the page, where you are still writing about limited war and conventional forces, and supply a concluding sentence or two of the kind that will be appropriate to this chapter and no other.