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the more discriminating applications of our military force presuppose an
adequate deterrent posture: limited war can be kept limited only if an
opponent must consider expansion of the war highly dangerous to himself.

But what is an adequate deterrent posture? No more difficult problem
confronts American strategic planning. In the early post-war period,
deterrence was thought to result from being able to pose an overpowering
offensive threat to the Soviet homeland. With the end of our invulnerability,
we have been forced to consider deterrents in terms of defensive capacities
as well as counter offensive strength. In the age of the long-range missile,
even the known ability of a society to withstand attack will become an
increasingly important deterrent.

Thus the capability for all-out war must be composed of a combination
of three factors. It must comprise a retaliatory force sufficiently powerful
and well protected so that no matter what the scale of the enemy attack,
it can return a blow which will inflict an unacceptable amount of damage
on the aggressor. Secondly, it requires an active defense which can
provide effective warning for the retaliatory force and which is able to
reduce the enemy blow to the smallest possible proportions. And
finally, it entails a passive defense which reduces the value of the enemy
offense and the incentive for it. The task of strategy is to decide on the
relative emphasis to be given to offensive and defensive capabilities and
the "mix" which will provide the greatest flexibility.

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But while all-out war represents the greatest danger it does not constitute the most likely threat. In fact, the necessity of maintaining the complex strategic balance for all-out war creates a psychological distortion. It transforms the mode of preparing for one kind of war into a doctrine for the only possible strategy; it gives rise to the illusion that protection against one danger exhausts the range of our possible perils. But as all-out war opens ever more terrible vistas and as the complexity of its strategy makes victory ever more difficult to calculate, a threshold is created below which a given provocation does not seem "worth" an all-out war. And with the increasing horror of the new weapons technology this threshold is constantly rising. As a result, we face the strategic problem of limited war.

The distinctive features of limited war are two-fold. On the one hand it necessitates an armamentarium different in quantity and kind from that required by all-out war. To a certain extent the forces designed to deter all-out war will also be useful in preventing or stifling limited war. It would be dangerous, however, to rely on them for the purpose of waging it. The deterrent force for all-out war should be designed to inflict maximum destruction in the shortest possible time. The weapons system for a limited war should be flexible and discriminating; it requires units of high mobility which can be moved to trouble spots at a moment's notice. Moreover, since the chief sanction against the expansion of a limited war

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resides in a crushing capability for retaliation, the main deterrent force must be kept at a particular state of readiness during periods of limited conflict. An aggressor who could tempt us to utilize our strategic striking force for limited war would gain an advantage however military operations ended. To consider our strategic striking force as a dual-purpose force would weaken the deterrent precisely when it should be strongest.

The second distinctive characteristic of limited war is perhaps even more important, but it is political rather than technological. This is the purpose of limited war. For unlike all-out war, limited war cannot involve or seem to involve national survival directly. A nation faced with the threat of a crucial defeat--a defeat which would jeopardize its political or social continuance or seriously impair its economic or military strength-- will not be able to afford to lose the struggle in which it is engaged. In such circumstances limited war could easily explode into all-out war. Hence the essential precondition for limited war is a tacit admission on both sides that a favorable outcome is not absolutely mandatory. Limited war implies the self-discipline to rest content with limited victories and to accept limited defeats. The effective conduct of limited war thus depends on the ability to relate power and policy. It requires forces graduated to the objective under dispute and a diplomacy which can show the opponent a way out short of unconditional surrender. It provides a test of our maturity; of our willingness

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to run circumscribed but real risks in the face of ill-defined but real challenges
and of our readiness to make peace on the basis of less than total victory.
In the past we have been ill-prepared for such a course of action. Our forces-
in-being were neither mobilized nor mobile. Our interpretation of each
challenge has tended to make it one involving Armageddon or defeat without
war. We have failed to appreciate that the military and political capability
for limited war may keep the peace by removing the motive for aggression.

Perhaps the most difficult military challenge we may have to face is one which
is made to appear, insofar as it is possible, to be no war at all. The
"obscure war" may break out in the form of internal revolution or civil war;
it may be instigated by outside forces or merely be exploited by them.
Greece has furnished one example; Vietnam another; the Middle East still
another. Whatever the degree of initial Soviet responsibility, one of the
greatest threats to the security of the Free World is gradual Soviet infiltration
and domination of vital areas through steps each of which is so small and
seemingly so "legitimate" that it does not seem to justify overt intervention.

Thus the "obscure" war represents the conflict with which in terms
of our preconceptions and the structure of our forces we are least prepared
to deal. It is the essence of the obscure war that its nature is ambiguous.
A civil war has not traditionally been thought to justify foreign intervention

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however much its outcome may affect the international equilibrium. The
gradual subversion of a government is difficult to deal with from the outside,
even though the fate of millions may depend on it. Any intrusion into the
domestic affairs of another nation is sure to bring charges of imperialism.

Even should we overcome these psychological obstacles and wish to
make our influence felt, we will not find it easy to do so. The typical form
of affecting the course of events of the obscure war is by assistance to
local forces with whom we share a community of interests. But our over-all
strength is extremely difficult to apply to this form of conflict. Superiority
in strategic striking power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, even if it could be
maintained, does not guarantee effective action in situations of great
delicacy. A multi-megaton weapon is not a fit instrument for a civil war.
A complicated nuclear establishment may be unnecessary for resisting a
revolutionary upheaval and the local forces on which we must so largely
depend may not be able to utilize it.

Of course our ultimate aim must be to prevent such situations from
arising. An effective and imaginative policy should be able to keep matters
from getting out of hand. But equally an effective ability to assist our
friends may be an important factor in their decision to resist and maintain
their freedom. There can be no minimizing the moral dilemma which such a
policy involves, at what point is it clear that infiltration is a clear and present

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danger? How shall we determine when a revolutionary movement is indigenous
and when it is guided and imposed from without? And if our course is
relatively clear in the latter instance, what of the former?

These misgivings and hesitations are the price we pay for our framework
of values. In this respect the obscure war is a touchstone of our national
morality. Force will never supply an answer to humanity's aspirations. But
timidity may endanger it equally. Our objective, however we may fall short
of attaining it, must be to use our force to bring about a framework of security
in which human aspirations may be worked out in freedom.

IV

It is against this background of the possible missions which may have
to be performed that we must examine the over-all strategic balance.

Let us begin with a prospectus of the modern means of war. Its out-
standing characteristic is a military technology in a state of spectacular
proliferation. Starting with World War II scientific research has produced
military equipment and new patterns of military operations at an ever
accelerating pace. During the war, trucks and tanks were developed which
were able to swim as well as to operate on land; rocket weapons and electronic
fuses became commonplace; new equipment and techniques of air support for
surface forces were introduced. Improvement in the means of land, sea and
air transportation considerably lessened the difficulty of achieving a

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will have to equip their forces for the strategic and tactical ends which they deem most vital. How successfully they do so--how imaginatively they match the choice of means to the ends which they will elect and which their opponents will force upon them--will determine the strategic balance of the next twenty years. But meanwhile, what of the balance today and in the immediate offing? Let us briefly examine the military capabilities and characteristics of the South and of our own nation.

In the past the United States has suffered from a tendency to underestimate the military technology of the USSR. When the Soviet Union produced their first long-range bomber we comforted ourselves with the thought that it was a copy of our B-29. When it developed jet fighters, we ascribed it to imitation of a British design. When our atomic monopoly was ended we took it as a reflection on our security methods rather than as an indication that our technological lead was inherently ephemeral.

In the meantime the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its achievements in the immediate post-war period were far from accidental. Today Soviet science is at least equal to our own in most strategically significant categories. Meanwhile the total Soviet technological capability is increasing at a pace faster than that of the United States.

This Soviet technological skill is matched by a high order of managerial ability, at least at the level of over-all national priorities. Several times in recent years the USSR has demonstrated a striking ability to surpass

["faced in Soviet years the U88B has demonstrated a striking ability to ambuscate\nenEMY eneminess, at least at the level of over-all national priorities. Soviet\n科技ability, at least at the level of over-all national priorities. Soviet\n

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the United States in reducing "lead times": the interval between drawing board and operational weapon. This seems to be due to two factors: first, the Kremlin's decisions on new weapons are made with firmness and prosecuted by a system of effective priorities. And second, the Soviet Union has placed a much greater emphasis on science, particularly on basic science, than the United States.

The result of the Soviet concentration on military technology is an impressive military establishment which already poses a mortal threat to the free world and which is growing larger. Its main features can be summarized as follows:

The U.S.S.R. has a preponderance of conventional ground forces compared to any similar forces around its periphery and well able to maintain political control inside the Soviet orbit.

The Soviet shipbuilding program has long concentrated on submarines. A fleet of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the German force which crippled Allied surface shipping during the early years of World War II. There is no doubt about the capability of the U.S.S.R. to develop atomic power plants for its navy or to adapt ships and submarines to launch short and medium-range missiles.

Soviet missiles are ahead of our own. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the Soviet Union has given high priority to guided missiles for at least 10 years and that during part of this period our own missile program

for at least 10 years, and that during the rest of this period our own missile program to the fact that the Soviet Union has given high priority to guided missiles. Soviet missiles are ahead of our own. This is due, at least, in part, to launch short and medium-range missiles.

to develop atomic power plants for its navy or to adopt ships and submarines of World War II. There is no doubt about the capability of the U.S. Air Force of the German force which crammed Allied surface shipping during the early 1940s of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the Soviet shipping program has long concentrated on submarines.

compared to any similar force around the world and well able to meet the U.S. Air Force, has a preponderance of conventional ground forces as follows:

Union has placed a much greater emphasis on science, particularly on brochures by a system of effective priorities. And second, the Soviet first, the Kremlin's decisions on new weapons are made with timeliness and prompt and operational speed. This seems to be due to two factors:

the United States in reducing "lead time"; the interval between drawing

Draft Chapter VI - Overall Report
December 5, 1947

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was dormant. As a result, the Soviet Union already possesses missiles capable of reaching all of Western Europe, Japan and Formosa from Russian or Chinese bases. Intercontinental ranges will soon follow. Launched from submarines, even short-range missiles could pose a serious threat to the continental United States.

Soviet airplane development has been impressive and in some respects at least as advanced as our own. Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor aircraft, an increasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are a major element in it and are likely to gain in effectiveness relative to the manned bomber. In short, Soviet military strength is already enormous and growing rapidly. As compared with the U.S.S.R., the United States now has three principal military advantages:

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range manned airplanes and geography favors our system of advanced bases.

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We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially surface
naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some aspects of these advantages must be qualified, and
others are only temporary. Thus our superiority in long-range bombers is
not static. It is always in competition with improving defenses, and in
any case its importance will decline as missiles increasingly take over
missions heretofore performed by manned planes. In the interval many U.S.
forward bases will be exposed to the political instability of the areas in
which they are located and all of our air bases are vulnerable to surprise
attack, particularly from Soviet missiles.

Nor can our present superiority at sea be assumed as a continuing
advantage. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval power is built, is
limited in its capability for sustained heavy action by the need for re-
fueling facilities, particularly for its aircraft complement. The value of its
freedom from the political uncertainties of foreign bases is therefore a
matter of degree. So also is the value of its mobility for escaping attack
since a large surface ship can be detected over great distances by airborne
radar. Moreover, our anti-submarine capability is not adequate to deal
with the growing Soviet underwater threat.

The third point of present U.S. military advantage is in the number

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and variety of atomic weapons. But the U.S.S.R. can make good any strategically meaningful advantage well within the 10-15 years under consideration here.

Thus it appears that the U.S. is losing its lead over the U.S.S.R. in the race of military technology. Unless the trend is altered, our margin of superiority in this respect will inevitably vanish. If that happens subsequent events may be harsh and unforgiving.

V

Yet another source of major concern is the organization of our Defense Department. For the threat of our diminishing technological advantage is compounded by a threat which that selfsame technology poses to the effective directors of our military effort. In a word, our existing technical strength is partly vitiated and dissipated by our failure to adapt our administrative organization to the new realities of military science.

Traditionally the organizational expression of our strategic doctrine has been the assignment of separate roles and missions to each of the services--Army, Air Force and the Navy. Each of these services has had the primary responsibility of defeating its enemy counterpart; the Army for the land battle, the Navy for control of the seas and the Air Force for the control of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of locomotion--everything moving by water being assigned to the Navy, every-

together with everything moving by water being assigned to the Navy, every
control of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of
the land battle, the Navy for control of the sea and the Air Force for the
primary responsibility of deterring its enemy counterpart, the Army for
services--Army, Air Force and the Navy. Each of these services had
been the assignment of separate roles and missions to each of the

Traditional the organizational expression of our strategic doctrine
administrative organization to the new realities of military science.

strength is a partly vitiated and distributed by our failure to adapt our
effective directors of our military effort. In a word, our existing technic
is compounded by a thrust which that self-same technology poses to the
Department. For the thrust of our diminishing technological advantage
yet another source of major concern is the organization of our Defense

V

subsequent events may be seen and unignoring.

of superiority in this respect will inevitably vanish. If that happens
in the race of military technology. Unless the trend is altered, our margin
Thus it appears that the U.S. is leading it ahead over the U.S. R.
ition here.

reasonably meaningful advantage well within the 10-12 years under considers-
ed and variety of atomic weapons. But the U.S. R. can make good any ansa-

December 2, 1947
Draft Chapter VI - Overall Report

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thing moving by land to the Army, and everything moving through the air
to the Air Force.

Originally this assignment of roles represented distinguishable
strategic tasks; the Army was powerless on the sea beyond the range of its
coastal artillery, and the Navy was unable to project itself far inland. The
Air Force was not yet independent, and the range of its planes was sufficient-
ly short to permit a division of functions between the Navy and Army air arms
to follow roughly that between the senior services. Each service was,
therefore, able to control all the weapons it considered essential for
achieving its mission. It could in effect develop its own strategy without
too much concern with that of the sister service or without too much
dependence on the interpretation of a sister service as to what constituted
an essential target.

But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the incom-
parable destructiveness of weapons have almost obliterated the traditional
boundaries among the services. Today, no service can achieve its
primary mission without either trespassing on the role of the other services
or calling on them for assistance. With modern weapons the distinction of
land, sea and air warfare has lost its meaning. The criteria by which any
future wars can be distinguished turn on the nature of the conflict, the
issues in dispute, the geographical area of hostilities rather than on means
of locomotion.

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It is this antiquated concept of missions which inhibits cooperation among the services. For so long as each service has the primary mission of defeating its enemy counterpart, and so long as there does not exist an agreed strategic doctrine, no service can afford to relinquish control over a weapon which it considers essential for the performance of its mission. The Navy's conception of what is essential to win control of the seas may involve a bombing of shipyards which is an Air Force "pre-rogative." The Army's notion of achieving its mission may require the aerial destruction of factories, and the Air Force requirement for air control may include the occupation and protection of advanced air bases. In view of the necessity for quick reaction imposed by the increasing speed and power of modern weapons, each service will seek to escape this dilemma by embracing as many weapons as possible.

A duplication of weapons systems and a proliferation of partially conflicting doctrines is inevitable. The division of functions which worked relatively smoothly for a century and a half has become a source of bitter rivalry in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a bitter wrangle as to which service should control it. It was thus with the A-bomb: it is now the case with missiles. And in each instance the doctrinal issue was evaded by permitting each service to develop its own weapon even if it duplicated the efforts of a sister service.

Such a solution is costly. It prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and in every crisis it confronts our policy

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makers with conflicting advice. It fosters a tendency to create doctrine
as a tool in the interservice battle for appropriations; the incentive it
provides is for the theoretical elaboration of a service view and not of an
overall-all approach to strategy.

The setting of force levels on the basis of each service's primary
mission, when this mission represents no clearly distinguishable strategic
task, inhibits the development of over-all doctrine and leads to an enormously
wasteful duplication of effort. The primary missions of the services become
ends in themselves; new weapons are placed into the strait jacket of
obsolescent missions instead of fitting missions to revolutionary departures
in technology. Given the range and power of modern weapons the attempt
by each service to hoard all weapons that can affect its own primary
mission must lead to a tendency for each service to develop a capability
for winning a war by itself. Its efforts will be directed toward reducing
its reliance on other services. And mastering the primary mission of each
service is becoming so difficult that it almost inevitably inhibits a con-
sideration of its relationship to an over-all mission; or, more accurately,
it leads to a psychological distortion in which over-all strategy tends to
be equated with a service's primary mission.

As a result our Joint Chiefs of Staff have become, with the best will
in the world, essentially advocates of a service point of view. The Joint
Chiefs have risen to their position through a lifetime of dedication to one

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service. They are a product of its problems, its training schools, its
environment. Maintaining the morale of their service can never be far
from their minds. The test of an organization is how naturally and spontaneously-
ly it enables its leadership to address itself to its most severe challenges.
There is little in the organization of our national defense establishment that
impels the service chiefs in a spontaneous fashion to consider over-all
strategic doctrine.

The difficulty of over-all planning by the military has its counterpart
in the office of the Secretary of Defense. At present, the Secretary of
Defense is at best an arbiter of doctrinal disputes. He possesses neither
the staff nor the organization to shape them. Because of the primary tasks of
the Office of the Secretary as now constituted are the adjudication of inter-
service rivalries, very few of the civilian assistants of the Secretary of
Defense have duties actually relevant to the conduct of a war. In the event
of large-scale hostilities, the bulk of the civilian echelon of the Department
of Defense could serve only by abdicating.

To be sure, a violent shift of mission of our military headquarters
when a war starts is part of our national history. But the speed and
destructiveness of modern weapons may cause our survival as a nation to
depend on a degree of instantaneous efficiency in our military commands
beyond the capacity of an organization in the process of changing gears.

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VI

What is the implication of these trends for United States strategy?

No more momentous question faces the non-communist world, for its security and freedom are inextricably bound up with U.S. strength and determination.

Without U.S. assistance, Greece and the Republic of Korea would have succumbed to communist aggression. Our firm resolve to defend Western Europe may have prevented a Soviet onslaught on our NATO allies. Our programs of economic and military aid have been a stabilizing factor in many other regions. To a world threatened by aggression and infiltration, American strength is a guarantee of security.

To be sure, this may not always be apparent in public declarations.

To many countries primarily concerned with domestic development, foreign aggression may seem unreal and the measures required to resist it may appear as irritating interruptions of more primary tasks. But while we should have full understanding for the psychology which produces these reactions, we would be wrong to gear our policy to it. Force will not solve the problems of this period but the willingness to use it may afford the breathing spell in which nations can work out their own destiny without foreign interference.

We must not forget that the neutrality, or the development of many regions is possible only as long as we are strong. Many of our most vocal critics would be deeply troubled were our military protection suddenly withdrawn.

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On the face of it, our overall strength has never been greater. We
have assumed the burden of an annual military expenditure in the neighbor-
hood of $40 billions and we have maintained almost three million men under
arms.

And yet as we have seen, our strength cannot be measured by
aggregate power alone. Even more critically it hinges on our willingness to
use power--not as a massive and retaliation-provoking blow, but in measured
amounts and in effective kind. The test is not one of our total strength.
It is more a test of our flexibility, our imagination, and most important, of
our conviction.

Heretofore our strength has tended to be nullified by the lack of a
clear conception of how it could be put to use. Our strategic striking power,
on which we have relied as the major element of our security, implies an
all-or-nothing kind of war which is the one conflict we must seek at all
odds to avoid. Meanwhile even the prima facie deterrence of our strategic
striking force is imperiled by Soviet missiles, and by an inadequate
dispersal of our own forces. Furthermore, as the Soviet capability to attack
American cities increases, it will raise the threshold of provocation which
would unleash our retaliatory force. Thus the Soviet Union will be enabled
to use its strategic striking force as a shield behind which to expand by
more limited methods.

The reliance on all-out war as the sole deterrent to Soviet aggression

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is pernicious not only for our own resolution but for that of our allies as well. Our allies realize that in an all-out conflict their major contribution will be to furnish bases; they therefore have little incentive to make a contribution of their own. They will either feel themselves already protected by our strategic striking force, or else they will be so appalled by the prospects of all-out war that they may seek peace almost at any price. A reliance on all-out strategy is ultimately demoralizing both for ourselves and for our allies.

The effectiveness of our power thus depends on our unmistakable ability and willingness to oppose force with force at whatever level of intensity may be required. The greatest point of concern about the U.S. strategic position is that our distaste for limited risks may ultimately lead us into the ultimate risk at a rate determined not by us but by communist policy.

The fundamental problem is as old as history but new to us as a nation. We have been on the small, though victorious, end of limited wars in 1776 and 1812 and on the controlling end of others in 1848 and 1898. But never before Korea has the U.S. been obliged to fight a war on the tacit admission that it was limited by other than logistic considerations. It is this conception which must change. The range and power of modern weapons have made it unrealistic to meet any but the most dire threat by all-out war. Hence, unless we are unwilling to become reconciled to piecemeal defeat

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of the non-communist world, we must face up to the consequences implicit in
the possibility that the U.S. may have to fight limited wars.

Thus the challenge to American national security comes at a double
level. At one level, it is a technical problem. We must seek the
technological impetus, the economic strength, the organizational flexibility
to enable us to adapt our overall might to the specific tasks of preserving
the international order against disruption. In turn this requires the
evolution of a strategic doctrine which will give point and effectiveness to
the diffuse and ineffective strength we now possess.

These will be major problems. And yet they are perhaps overshadowed
by another difficulty--a difficulty which, paradoxically enough, reflects
some of the most attractive qualities of American society. This is our
attitude to power itself. We like to believe that reasonable men can settle
all disputes through goodwill and compromise and that power should be
invoked only as a last resort. We therefore tend to think of diplomacy and
force as successive and discrete phases of national policy. Unfortunately
the position in which we find ourselves does not permit such absolute
distinctions. In a revolutionary period the ability and willingness to use force
is in itself a factor of stability.

Our power is a fact. Its existence cannot be undone by a refusal to
recognize it. The dilemmas which it imposes will not solve themselves by
shutting our eyes. The moral quandary which power brings is the manner

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in which it will be used, and the degree of responsibility which will
accompany its use. The moral problem will not vanish if we refrain from
applying our power. Abdication is a course involving responsibility just
as much as action. We will better show our national stature by our
willingness to expose our morality in the selection of the ends which we
avow, and in the constraint and wisdom with which our power will be applied
to achieve them.