# The Realities of Security

## Henry A. Kissinger

IN our democracy there are officials who use up, by definition, their intellectual capital, and there must be others who venture forward against not only the frontiers of knowledge but to the limits of our imagination. This function has turned out to be a crucial one for the health of our society.

All of modern policy making in the democracies is affected by four major problems:

* First is the relation of men to events; the dis jointed nature of the experience that forms individuals in relation to the problems they have to deal with when they reach higher office.

* Second is the problem that often expertise consists of management of the familiar, while the society needs a vision of a future that no one has yet experienced. That requires above all the moral fortitude to risk oneself on an assessment that one cannot prove true.

* Third is the complexity of the domestic struc ture, in which management of the bureaucra cies often takes as much, if not more, energy than dealing with the problems they are sup posed to solve. The process of getting elected bears little relation to the purpose of the elec tion.

* Finally, there is in too many democracies a breakdown of the domestic consensus, without which no major policy can be sustained and especially no foreign policy can be sustained.

It may be possible to segment domestic decisions into a series of individual actions, but it is not pos sible to conduct a foreign policy without a vision of the world that one wants to bring about, some

definition of what one means by peace and by justice and by order and by stability and by prog ress. If one does not have that vision, one runs the risk of a series of unrelated tactical decisions.

I have made these general observations because the main thrust of my remarks here concerns rela tions within the Atlantic alliance.

I do not want to create the impression that I am speaking of particular difficulties of individual poli cies. I am, first of all, in substantial support of the direction that this administration is taking. And secondly, I believe that the problems we face have been a long time in developing and cannot be solved in a few months, maybe not even in one or two years, and that it will require precisely the fortitude and the determination that President Ford spoke about with respect to our domestic policy.

The difficulty in the Atlantic alliance is perhaps best expressed in the current debate. It is an amaz ing phenomenon, less than two years after Afghan istan, less than four years after Cuban troops under a Soviet general appeared in Ethiopia, six years after the same thing happened in Angola and while thirty-plus Soviet divisions are constantly bringing pressure on Poland, that at this moment there should be mass demonstrations all over Europe—affirming what?—the desirability of peace and implying that it is the United States which is the obstacle.

And I must say that too many governments, while not condoning these demonstrations, seek to pull their teeth by adopting at least part of their programs and at least part of their efforts.

I was born in Europe. It is the area to which I am emotionally most attached. And close Atlantic relations have been the aspect of foreign policy that has always attracted most of my attention.

But it is a painful phenomenon when we hear the argument that the danger of war is growing because of the *rhetoric* of this administration; that it is our fault because of certain weapons decisions or a

HENRY A. KISSINGER is the former secretary of state. These remarks were delivered as the 1981 Francis Boyer Lecture on Public Policy, in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 1981.

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THE REALITIES OF SECURITY

certain slowness in responding to Soviet overtures; that, even in the brief period since the Soviet actions I have described, one cannot separate the essential from the tactical.

For over a decade, it has been clear that there has been a reluctance to deal with the realities of security. The inevitable corollary is disagreement about the nature of East-West relations, expressing itself particularly about the nature of arms control negotiations. There is wide disagreement about what the obligation of alliance cooperation is outside the treaty area and occasionally within it.

These disputes have rent every administration since the 1960s, so that we are not talking about an individual phenomenon. We are talking about a fundamental problem.

In 1973, in a speech delivered to the Pilgrims Society in London, I said:

> The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada, and America will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders. Even today, a majority on both sides of the Atlantic did not experience the threat that produced the alliance's creation or the sense of achievement associated with its growth. Even today, in the United States over forty senators consistently vote to make massive unilateral reductions of American forces in Europe. Even today, some Europeans have come to believe that their identity should be measured by its distance from the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, we are faced with the anomalous—and dangerous—situation in which the public mind identifies foreign policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries while relations with allies seem to be characterized by bickering and drift.

I think now, almost a decade later, it is possible to say that very little has changed in this situation. I would add that another decade of not facing the fundamental issues will threaten to turn the Atlantic alliance into a hollow shell.

We have heard all the arguments that counsel that one should not press the issues:

* that the governments of Europe have to concentrate on building their own identity;

* that we should strengthen weak governments and wait for a better day to face the problems;

* that Europe cannot afford the extra burden of adding to its own defense budgets;

* that détente in Europe has to be preserved no matter what happens anywhere else;

* that Angola was an aberration, Ethiopia was unique, Yemen and Afghanistan temporary setbacks.

But we have seen in this period that disassociation, dissent, and public protest have increased, not diminished; that the alliance as a whole, even though it agrees periodically on common statements, does not have a common philosophy or a common platform from which to resist Soviet blandishments or the pressures from its own constituents; and that to pretend otherwise only guarantees the perpetuation of current conditions.

Yes, the problems are objectively difficult, and the domestic situation in many countries for dealing with them is very complicated. But the problems will not get easier and the domestic situation will not improve unless one makes a deliberate, determined effort to establish a new basis for cooperation.

With respect to security, there are two harsh facts that Americans as well as our allies must face.

First, the strategic superiority that we enjoyed after World War II has ended. When it ended, why it ended, whether it was avoidable, or deferrable—that can be debated indefinitely by historians and politicians. The fact is, however, that this strategy of relying on American strategic superiority to offset Soviet conventional superiority cannot be the strategy of the 1980s. The issue we face is how to conduct American and alliance foreign policy in this new environment in which the Soviet Union is at least equal to the United States in its strategic forces. The credibility of the threat of general war must, therefore, diminish, and the invocation of the threat must, therefore, be demoralizing on both sides of the Atlantic.

The second fact is that the ability of the United States to protect its interests simply by extending the deterrence of our strategic forces to other parts of the world is also ending. We have vital interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf and in the Far East. We have solemn treaty commitments and moral obligations; we have a national interest to defend. But the gap between our commitments and our ability to fulfill them will inevitably grow, on any foreseeable projections of strategic power. And it will be accelerated by the commitment to strategic arms reduction talks—which I favor, but which will make it obvious, as the Strategic Arms Limitations

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HENRY A. KISSINGER

Talks already did, that there exists a balance of strategic power. This will make it psychologically and practically very difficult to invoke the traditional guarantees.

I called attention to this fact two years ago and was accused of undermining alliance credibility. But the credibility of the alliance is not assured by repeating interminably things that common sense demonstrates are implausible. The credibility of the alliance consists in our willingness to face reality and to take the steps that are necessary.

Here the domestic debate in every country is an inhibiting factor. It is a strange phenomenon that on both sides of the Atlantic the groups that consider themselves humane and progressive and pacific are also the groups that advocate the most blood-thirsty strategies. It is taken as an example of warringering tendencies to imply or to assert that it is the duty of governments to try to avoid a nuclear holocaust and to resist aggression, if it should take place, by means other than the most cataclysmic measures. On our side, it leads to opposition to any weapon that might extend, if only for a brief period, our counterforce capabilities, as if forcing our government into attacking civilian targets were the only means by which we can pursue peaceful policies.

And the corollary in Europe is that any attempt to define a use of nuclear weapons other than blind mass destruction of civilians is greeted with hoots of derision and howls of outrage. It evokes the argument that America is ready to dissociate its defense from that of Europe, or that America wants Europe to be devastated while it stands on the sidelines. When has it ever happened in history that threatened countries would make their own defense conditional on the guaranteed destruction of their strongest and distant allies?

There is a weird debate when the president affirms that "no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack," and is ignored or derided. When he affirms the accepted NATO doctrine that we should seek to pause before plunging into a nuclear holocaust by not escalating automatically after the first exchange, he is accused of being a warmonger, even though this view has been expressed by every president since Eisenhower. But then Brezhnev gives an interview, greeted with wide approval or acceptance as a conclusive statement,

to the effect that if one nuclear weapon is used, then "unavoidably" the conflict will assume a "global character."

Who is the more dangerous participant in this debate? What is the real menace? Can we really want to be in the position where we can protect our friends or our vital interests only by the indiscriminate destruction of hundreds of millions? Whenever has a political leader had to face such a responsibility?

Nobody needs instruction in the desirability of peace. The problem of any president is how to combine peace with justice and how to use strength for conciliation. If peace becomes the only objective of our country or of the Atlantic alliance, the world will be taken over by those who are prepared to threaten war. And if we say that there is something, whatever it is, that we will defend, we have an obligation to elaborate a theory of defense that a responsible leader can execute and that serious people can support—not a nihilistic orgy of mass destruction imposed on us by a sterile domestic debate.

If we look at the present debate, there is the great danger that the Atlantic nations will disarm themselves in both strategy and diplomacy. Arthur Burns, in what I consider a very profound speech about American-German relations, made the following observations:

> The debate is becoming a battle for the soul of Europe with clear alternatives. On the one hand, the West can reaffirm unequivocally its determination to achieve sufficient collective security to deter Soviet aggression even as the United States seeks through negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve major reductions of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if such reaffirmation is long postponed or becomes uncertain, there may well be a growing sentiment in America to turn back upon itself and let Europe depend for its security and freedom upon its own resources or upon Soviet good will.

I would like strongly to endorse these observations.

If the American strategic arsenal is designed to avoid any counterforce capability; if the Europeans resist the concept of limited nuclear war for regional defense; and if both sides of the Atlantic refuse to build up the conventional defense that

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THE REALITIES OF SECURITY

could be a substitute, how then are we going to avoid blackmail or demoralization? If one is serious about reducing the danger of nuclear war, then one should be committed to building up conventional forces on both sides of the Atlantic. We cannot have everything. We cannot have a volunteer army here, reduced terms of service in Europe, and no strategy for the use of the thousands of nuclear weapons that exist, and yet make ourselves believe that we are secure for the indefinite future.

The second question is the one raised by Arthur Burns. In these circumstances when there is no clear-cut theory for the common defense, how long will our Congress permit us to maintain 350,000 troops in Europe? For what purpose? Are they a tripwire, or are they a fighting force? Are they there to defend our allies, or are they there to trigger our retaliatory force?

If we cannot answer these questions, sooner or later somebody in this country is going to ask why we must have our largest force in an area that does not believe in local defense, and why we cannot have local forces in regions that *do* believe in local defense, or at least where local defense is essential, such as the Persian Gulf and other threatened areas.

That is our fundamental problem. I do not think anyone doubts the answers that I would give to this question, and it is why the debate about theater nuclear forces has taken such odd turns.

It has been forgotten in the demonstrations and in the maneuvers and in the proposals for various negotiating options that it was European leaders who, starting in 1977, called the attention of American statesmen to the gap that existed as a result of the Soviet deployment of the SS-20. It was Chancellor Schmidt in a major speech at the International Institute of Strategic Studies who pointed out that American arms control policy was being directed only at strategic weapons. We were producing a balance in the strategic field and an imbalance in regional defense. The great danger, we were told then, was that this would decouple the defense of Europe from the defense of the United States.

No sooner had the United States responded to this proposal by offering the deployment of theater nuclear forces into Europe, when the debate developed as if this were done for the defense of the United States. It became totally confused that, in fact, whatever one can say about these deployments,

the one thing they inevitably do is to *link* the defense of Europe to the defense of the United States. They inevitably bring about a situation where the Soviet Union cannot blackmail Europe selectively, because it can only blackmail Europe with nuclear weapons by attacking American strategic forces; no Soviet leader would attack American forces in Europe without also attacking American forces in the United States. Therefore, what the Europeans seemed most to want is certainly assured by this deployment.

The irony is that if there should be any demonstrations, they should be in the United States, not in Europe. If we want intermediate-range weapons for an American conflict with the Soviet Union, we can deploy them at sea. We do not have to deploy them in Europe for American purposes. And therefore, I think it is time that we abandon the position of supplicant on this issue and ask the Europeans to tell us what they want and redesign our strategy accordingly. The most disastrous course is one in which Europeans accept weapons in which they no longer believe and we are pushed into negotiations whose primary purpose is to please allies.

And we have seen with respect to these theater nuclear forces the same ambiguities as with respect to the design of our own strategy. There is an agreement now to engage in negotiations on theater nuclear forces. But if one were to group the arguments that have led to it within the alliance, I think it is safe to say that there are some who want these negotiations as a pretext to avoid deploying these weapons; there are others who want these negotiations in order to deploy these weapons. There are some who want it as a bridge to strategic arms limitations or arms reductions, and there are others who want it to forestall such talks.

I do not believe that consensus yet exists. What is really wanted is an alliance-wide consensus; I would not dare to imply that our government lacks consensus on any issue.

All these tendencies, therefore, have merged in a general agreement to negotiate, but not yet in a direction toward which to steer these negotiations. And part of the problem is that there is no real agreement within the alliance, and maybe among ourselves, as to what exactly the purpose of negotiations is. There are some who look at negotiations almost as a psychiatric problem, to establish an

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HENRY A. KISSINGER

atmosphere of good will. There are others who see
in them a theological issue, in order to show up our
adversaries.

My own view has been that it would be a sign
of weakness for us to be afraid of the fact of nego-
tiations. We always wind up in the wrong position.
If we permit a long debate to arise about whether
we are willing to negotiate, the end result inevitably
is that the opening of negotiations will be taken
as a victory for our adversaries, or for self-appointed
mediators, and that we are then driven to extreme
substantive positions we might not have taken other-
wise in order to prove our good intentions in the
first place.

We cannot avoid certain facts: The United States
and the Soviet Union are ideological and geopoliti-
cal adversaries. No negotiations can change that
fact. But the nuclear age compels us to strive for
some rules of coexistence, and no rhetorical crusade
can change that fact either. And the obligation of
our statesmanship is to navigate between these posi-
tions, not to believe that a negotiation is the end of
a process, or to want to substitute negotiation for
strength.

There is no way around a defense budget along
the lines that has been proposed by this administra-
tion. And it cannot be compared to domestic pro-
grams, if what I have described here is even roughly
accurate.

Now let me make one other point. There is with-
in the alliance also a serious problem about what is
implied by the obligations of the alliance. What
degree of coordination, what aspect of unity is
essential? Very often the issue is debated in strictly
legal terms: Do the treaty obligations of NATO
apply to the Middle East, for example?

But I have always believed that if allies, faced
with a common problem, have to call in their legal
advisers to find out what their juridical obligations
are, the alliance is already in desperate straits. An
alliance is held together by a perception of the
common interest, and it, therefore, requires some
definition of what is a common interest. It is almost
inconceivable that something that threatens the vital
interest of a major partner cannot affect the funda-
mental interest of other partners, no matter what the
documents say.

It is not plausible to believe that what happens
in the Middle East, for example, can be dealt with
totally separately as between Europe and the United

States. And yet we have had for quite a while now
two totally different philosophical approaches: one
that attempts to rely on negotiation through exist-
ing states by an already agreed procedure, and an-
other that attempts to bring in a radical group as
the key element of the negotiating process—a group
that has heretofore rejected even the existence of a
potential negotiating partner and in the process has
threatened even the existing Arab states at various
times. This is a fundamental philosophical differ-
ence, and to pursue both policies simultaneously is
to run the risk of thwarting both in an area that
each of them, each party, considers vital.

And how is one to deal with the notion so wide-
spread in Europe that Europeans can be "interpre-
ters" between the United States and the Soviet
Union? That they can be mediators, as if they were
not themselves involved, as if somehow or other
they had a more profound insight. Why is it not
possible that we, who are presumably on the same
side, if we differ, settle these differences in negotia-
tions with each other rather than in a three-cornered
negotiation that makes our adversary the referee?

Of course, an alliance cannot always have a total
unity of views, nor do I say that our view is inevi-
tably the correct one, nor have we always practiced
what I am preaching here. In many administra-
tions—it does not change—the fundamental prob-
lem is that the alliance cannot be a liturgical formal-
ism that is invoked every six months at meetings.
Some of the questions that I have raised here must
be answered, even if they are given a different con-
tent than what I have implied.

It cannot be healthy that allies attempt to rene-
gotiate their membership in an organization for the
common security. Why should we pay a price for
their defense beyond what already exists? It can-
not go on that weapons technology develops, and
arms control negotiations imply parity, while the
rhetoric presents a defense doctrine hard to distin-
guish from that of the early years of the alliance.
Somehow or other we need to tell the truth to each
other and to develop an agreed strategic doctrine.

Our own obligation in negotiations is to be pre-
cise and to explain the direction of what we have in
mind and its implications. The European obligation
is to identify foreign policy as something other than
pushing us from concession to concession and giving
the impression that Europe is inherently more con-
ciliatory than is our side.

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THE REALITIES OF SECURITY

We need some definition of the necessities of
common policies and of the range of permissible
deviation. Whether this can be done inside the
government or whether one should create an outside
group, the experience has not been, in the past,
brilliant either way. Whatever is done, the assign-
ment should be to define the alternatives and not
to struggle for some mealy-mouthed consensus
which permits everyone to continue doing what got
us to this state of affairs to begin with.

I do not think I need to repeat that I would pre-
fer a positive, decisive, constructive answer to all
of these questions. But we also have to be honest

with ourselves. If that 'is not possible, then we
have to look for other measures and other arrange-
ments.

Again, there is no reason why the first course
should not succeed. We mesmerize ourselves with
Soviet military capabilities, but they are in the
hands of a country with a stagnant political struc-
ture, of an economy stretched to the utmost, of a
system that cannot avoid structural changes.

What I have presented are all issues of policy,
not issues of structure. In other words, we know
what we have to do. So let us just see whether we
can do it.

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Donald C. Hellmann, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, University of Washington

D. Gale Johnson, Eliakim Hastings Moore Distinguished Service Professor of Economics and Chairman, Department of Economics, University of Chicago

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PROCEEDINGS

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, first let me express my appreciation to you for sitting down rather quickly because I have difficult looking humble for extended periods of time. (Laughter.)

I know the problem that Paul McCracken labor under, to have to summarize my accomplishments in five minutes.

(Laughter.) I'm glad he managed to get in my similar role in economic policy, upon which Bill Simon once commented that it was the best argument against universal suffrage he had ever seen.

(Laughter.)

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This awards ceremony, as you all know, began several years ago with the presentation to President Ford, and now am I honored to be the recipient. It is obvious that AEI believes in the trickle-down theory. (Laughter.)

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I was very moved by President Ford's account of his journeys through 80 universities. I will bet he did not produce the same emotion in his 80 places as I did in one visit to Brazilia University.--(laughter)--where I understand that they are now instituting the Henry Kissinger Memorial Lecture, whose first speaker will be Senator Jesse Helms.

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Bill Baroody has been making dark:allusions all

1 of our society.

2 All of modern policymaking in democracies is

3 affected by four major problems: the relation of men to events;

4 the disjointed nature of the experience that forms individuals

5 in relation to the problems they have to deal with when they

6 reach higher, ~~by~~ the problem that often expertise consists

7 of management of the familiar, while the society needs a

8 vision of a future that no one has yet experienced, and

9 requires above all the moral fortitude to risk one's self on

10 an assessment that one cannot prove true.

11 ~~9 - Third~~ there is the complexity of the domestic structure,

12 in which the management of the bureaucracies often takes as

13 much, if not more, energy than dealing with the problems they

14 are supposed to solve, ~~and~~ The process of getting elected

15 bears little relation to the purpose of the election, ~~and~~

16 there is in too many democracies a breakdown of the domestic

17 consensus, without which no major policy can be sustained and

18 especially no foreign policy can be sustained.

19 It may be possible to segment domestic decisions

20 into a series of individual actions, but it is not possible

21 to conduct a foreign policy without a vision of the world

22 that one wants to bring about, some definition of what one

1 means by peace and by justice and by order and by stability
2 and by progress, ~~and~~ If one does not have that, one runs the
3 risk of a series of unrelated tactical decisions.

4 I have made these general observations because the
5 main thrust of my remarks tonight concerns the relations with-
6 in the Atlantic alliance. I do not want to create the
7 ~~I am~~ impression that I am speaking of particular difficulties of
8 individual policies. I am,

9 I am, first of all, in substantial support of the
10 direction that this Administration is taking, and secondly,
11 I believe that the problems we face have been a long time in
12 developing and cannot be solved in a few months, maybe not
13 even in one or two years, and that it will require precisely
14 the fortitude and the determination that President Ford spoke
15 about with respect to our domestic policy.

16 The difficulty in the Atlantic alliance is perhaps
17 best expressed in the current debate. It is an amazing
18 phenomenon, that less than two years after Afghanistan, less
19 than four years after Cuban troops under a Soviet general
20 appeared in Ethiopia, six years after the same thing happened
21 in Angola and while 30-plus Soviet divisions are constantly
22 bring pressure on Poland, that at this moment there should be

mass demonstrations all over Europe, affirming what? The desirability of peace and implying that it is the United States which is the obstacle.

And I must say that too many governments, while not condoning these policies, these demonstrations, seek to pull their teeth by adopting at least part of the their programs and at least part of their efforts.

I was born in Europe, as Paul McCracken revealed, and you would never have known otherwise. (Laughter.) And it is the area to which I am emotionally most attached. And close Atlantic relations have been the aspect of foreign policy that has always attracted most of my attention.

But it is a painful phenomenon when we hear the argument that the danger of war is growing because of the rhetoric of this Administration, that it is our fault because of certain weapons decisions or a certain slowness in responding to Soviet overtures; that, even in the brief period after the events that I have described, one cannot separate the essential from the tactical.

There is wide disagreement about what the obligation of alliance cooperation is outside the treaty area and occasionally within it, and these disputes have rent every Administration since the 1960s, so that we are not talking about an individual phenomenon. We are talking about a fundamental problem.

In 1973, my favorite author delivered a speech to the Pilgrim's Society in London, and I will not quote from my remarks. (Laughter.)

"The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada, and America will have neither the person's memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders. Even today, a majority on both sides of the Atlantic did not experience the threat that produced the alliance's creation or the sense of achievement associated with its growth. Even today, over 40 Senators in the United States, consistently vote to make massive unilateral reduction of American forces in Europe. Even today, some Europeans have come to believe that their identity should be measured by its distance from the United States.

1 on common statements, does not have a common philosophy or a
2 common platform from which to resist Soviet blandishments or
3 the pressures from its own constituents; and that to pretend
4 otherwise only guarantees the perpetuation of current
5 conditions.

6 Yes, the problems are objectively difficult, and
7 the domestic situation in many countries for dealing with
8 them is very complicated, But the problems will not get easier
9 and the domestic situation will not improve unless one makes
10 a deliberate, determined effort to establish a new basis for
11 cooperation.

12 With respect to security, there are two harsh facts
13 that Americans as well as our allies must face. First, the
14 strategic superiority that we enjoyed after World War II has
15 ended.

16 When it ended, why it ended, whether it was avoid-
17 able, or deferable, that can be debated indefinitely by
18 historians and politicians. The fact is, however, that this
19 strategy of relying on American strategic superiority to
20 offset Soviet conventional superiority cannot be the strategy
21 of the '80s.

22 The issue we face is how to conduct American and

1. alliance foreign policy in this new environment in which the
2. Soviet Union is at least equal to the United States in its
3. strategic forces.

4. The credibility of the threat of general war must,
5. therefore, diminish and the invocation of the threat must,
6. therefore, be demoralizing on both sides of the Atlantic.

7. The second fact is that the ability of the United
8. States to protect its interests simply by extending the
9. deterrence of our strategic forces to other parts of the world
10. is also ending.

11. We have vital interests in the Middle East and
12. the Persian Gulf and in the Far East. We have solemn treaty
13. commitments and moral obligations; we have a national inter-
14. est to defend, but the gap between our commitments and our
15. ability to fulfil them will inevitably grow, on any foreseeable
16. projections of strategic power. And it will be accelerated
17. by the commitment to strategic arms reduction talks, which I
18. favor, but which will make it obvious, as the Strategic Arms
19. Limitations Talks already did, that there exists a balance
20. of strategic power, which will make it psychologically and
21. practically very difficult to invoke the traditional guarantees.

22. I called attention to this fact several years ago.

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It evokes the argument that America is ready to dissociate its defense from that of Europe, or that America wants Europe to be deviated while it stands on the sideline.

There is a weird debate when the President affirms that "no NATO weapon, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack," It is ignored or derided.

When he affirms the accepted NATO doctrine that we should seek to pause before plunging into a nuclear holocaust by not escalating automatically after the first exchange, He is accused of being a warmonger, even though this view has been expressed by every President since Eisenhower.

But then Brezhnev gives an interview, greeted with wide if not approval, as a conclusive statement, to the effect that if one nuclear weapon is used, then "unavoidably"

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made the following observations.

"The debate is becoming a battle for the soul of Europe with clear alternatives. On the one hand, the West can reaffirm unequivocally its determination to achieve sufficient collective security to deter Soviet aggression even as the United States seeks through negotiations to achieve major reduction<sup>3</sup> of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, if such reaffirmation is long postponed or becomes uncertain, there may well be a growing sentiment in America to turn back upon itself and let Europe depend for its security and freedom upon its own resources or upon Soviet goodwill."

If the American strategic arsenal is designed to avoid any counterforce capability; if the Europeans resist the concept of limited nuclear war for regional defense; and if both sides of the Atlantic refuse to build up the conventional defense that could be a substitute, how then are we going to avoid blackmail or demoralization?

If one is serious about reducing the danger of nuclear war, then one should be committed to build up conventional forces on both sides of the Atlantic, and we cannot

1 have everything.

2 We cannot have a volunteer Army here, reduced terms
3 of service in Europe, no strategy for the use of the thousands
4 of nuclear weapons that exist, and yet make ourselves believed to be
5 that we are secure for the indefinite future.

6 The second question is the one raised by Arthur
7 Burns. In these circumstances when there is no clearcut
8 theory for the common defense, how long will our Congress
9 permit us to maintain 350,000 troops in Europe? For what
10 purpose?

11 Are they a tripwire or are they a fighting force?
12 Are they there to defend our allies, or are they there to
13 trigger our retaliatory force?

14 If we cannot answer these questions, sooner or later
15 ~~we are going to ask ourselves~~ or somebody is going to ask in
16 this country why we must have our largest force in an area
17 that does not believe in local defense, and why we cannot have
18 local forces in regions that **do** believe in local defense, or
19 at least where local defense is essential, such as the Persian
20 Gulf and other threatened areas.

21 That is our fundamental problem. I do not think
22 anyone in this room doubts the answers that I would give to

1 this question, and it is why the debate about theater nuclear
2 forces has taken such odd turns.

3 It has been forgotten in the demonstrations and
4 in the maneuvers and in the proposals for various negotiating
5 options that it was European leaders who, starting in 1977,
6 called the attention of American statesmen to the gap that
7 existed as a result of the Soviet deployment of the SS20.

8 It was Chancellor Schmidt in a major speech at the
9 International Institute of Strategic Studies who pointed out that American
10 arms control policy was being directed only at strategic
11 weapons.

12 We are producing a balance in the strategic field
13 and an imbalance in regional defense. The great danger, we
14 were told then, was that this would decouple the defense of
15 Europe from the defense of the United States.

16 No sooner had the United States responded to this
17 proposal by offering the deployment of theater nuclear forces
18 into Europe, when the debate developed in the direction as
19 if this were done for the defense of the United States. It
20 became totally confused that, in fact, whatever one can say
21 about these deployments, the one thing they inevitably do is
22 to link the defense of Europe to the defense of the United

1 States.

2 They inevitably bring about a situation where the

3 Soviet Union cannot blackmail Europe selectively, because

4 they can only blackmail Europe with nuclear weapons by

5 attacking American strategic forces; and no Soviet leader

6 would attack American forces in Europe without also attacking

7 American forces in the United States, and therefore, what

8 the Europeans seem most to want is certainly assured by this

9 deployment.

10 The irony is that if there should be any demonstrations, they should be in the United States, not in Europe.

11 If we want intermediate-range weapons for an American conflict
12 with the Soviet Union, we can deploy them at sea. We don't
13 have to deploy them in Europe for American purposes.

14 And therefore, I think it is time that we abandon
15 the position of supplicant on this issue and ask the Europeans
16 to tell us what they want and redesign our strategy according-
17 to the words of General George Marshall: "We shall deploy our forces to protect our interests and to defend our自由.

18 The most disastrous course is one in which Europeans
19 accept weapons in which they no longer believe and we are
20 pushed into negotiations whose primary purpose is to please
21 allies.
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V

And we have seen with respect to these theater
nuclear forces the same ambiguities as with respect to the
design of our own strategy. There is an agreement now to
engage in negotiations on theater nuclear forces, but if one
were to group the arguments that have led to it within the
alliance, I think it is safe to say that there are some who
want these negotiations as a pretext to avoid deploying these
weapons;

There are others who want these negotiations in
order not to have to deploy these weapons. There are some who
want it as a bridge to arms limitations, to strategic arms
limitations, or arms reductions, and there are others who want
a

I do not believe the consensus yet exists. What is
really wanted is an alliance-wide consensus; I would not
dare to imply that our government lacks consensus on any
issue.

All these tendencies, therefore, have merged in a
general agreement to negotiate, but not yet in a direction
towards which to steer these negotiations. And part of the
problem is that there is no real agreement within the
alliance, and maybe among ourselves, as to what exactly the

1 purpose of negotiations is.

2 There are some who look at negotiations almost as a
3 psychiatric problem, to establish an atmosphere of goodwill.

4 There are others who see in them a theological issue, in order
5 to show up our adversaries.

6 My own view has been that it would be a sign of
7 weakness for us to be afraid of the fact of negotiations.

8 We always wind up in the wrong position. If we permit a long

9 debate to arise about whether we are willing to negotiate,
10 ~~because~~ the end result inevitably is that the opening of

11 negotiations will be taken as a victory for our adversaries,

12 or for self-appointed mediators, and that we are then driven
13 to extreme substantive positions we might not have taken

14 ~~otherwise in order to prove our good intentions in the first
15 place.~~

16 We cannot avoid certain facts: The United States
17 and the Soviet Union are ideological and geopolitical

18 adversaries. No negotiations can change that fact. But the

19 nuclear age compels us to strive for some rules of coexistence,
20 and no rhetorical crusade can change that fact either.

21 And the obligation for our statesmanship is to
22 navigate between these positions, not to believe that a

1. negotiation is the end of a process, or we cannot want to substitute
2. negotiation for strength.

3. There is no way around a defense budget along the
4. lines that has been proposed by this Administration, and it
5. cannot be compared with domestic programs, if what I have
6. described here is even roughly accurate.

7. Now, at the risk of being scolded afterwards by
8. Bill Baroody, let me make one other point.

9. There is a serious problem within the alliance about what is implied by the obligations of the alliance.
10.
11. What degree of coordination, what aspect of unity is
12. essential? Very often the issue is debated in strictly legal
terms: Do the treaty obligations of NATO apply to the
13.
14. Middle East, for example?

15. But I have always believed that if allies, faced
16. with a common problem, have to call in their legal advisors
17. to find out what their juridical obligations are, the alliance
18. is already in disparate straits.

19. An alliance is held together by a perception of the
20. common interest and it, therefore, requires some definition
21. of what is a common interest, and it is almost inconceivable
22. that something that threatens the vital interest of a major

M1

1. presumably on the same side, if we differ, settle these
2. differences in negotiations with each other rather in a three-
3. cornered negotiation that makes our adversary the referee.²

4. Of course, an alliance cannot always have a total
5. unity of views, nor do I say that our view is inevitably the
6. correct one, nor have we always practiced what I am preaching
7. here.

8. In many Administrations, it does not change, the
9. fundamental problem (which) is that the alliance cannot be
10. a liturgical formalism that is invoked every six months at
11. meetings.

12. Some of the questions that I have raised here
13. must be answered, even if they are given a different content
14. than what I have implied. It cannot be healthy that allies
15. attempt to renegotiate their membership in an organization
16. for the common security. Why should we pay a price for their
defense beyond what already exists? It cannot go on that
17. weapons technology develops, arms control negotiations imply
18. parity, and the rhetoric speaks of a defense doctrine (how) to
19. distinguish from that of the early years of the alliance.

21. Somehow or another we need to tell the truth to each
22. other and to develop an agreed strategic doctrine.⁹ Our own

Y

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obligation in negotiations is to be precise and to explain
the direction of what we have in mind and its implications.

The European obligation is to identify foreign
policy as something other than <u>and</u> push us from concession to
concession and <u>so</u> give the impression that there is an
inherently greater conciliatoriness in Europe than on our
side.

Whatever is done, the assignment should be to define
the alternatives and not to struggle for some mealy-mouthed
consensus which permits everyone to continue doing what
got us to this state of affairs to begin with.

I do not think I need to repeat that I would prefer
a positive, decisive, constructive answer to all of these
questions. But we also have to be honest with ourselves. If
that is not possible, then we have to look for other measures
and other arrangements.

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should not succeed. We mesmerize ourselves with Soviet military capabilities, but they are in the hands of a country with a stagnant political structure, of an economy stretched to the utmost, of a system that cannot avoid structural changes.

What I have put before this distinguished group are all issues of policy, not issues of structure. In other words, we know what we have to do. So let us just see whether we can do it.

Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

AEI DINNER -- JOKES

DECEMBER 10, 1981

This award ceremony began several years ago with a presentation to President Ford, and now I am honored to be the recipient. It is obvious that AEI believes in the trickle down theory.

I am glad to see Bill Casey has recovered from his conversation with Al Haig last week. You see, before going to Mexico Haig called Casey and asked for a red wig and a disguise.

Poor Dick Allen has not been able to eat a bite tonight. Haig keeps asking him what time it is.

I saw Dave Stockman in the lobby. He asked me to introduce him to Oriana Fallaci.

Haig was really miffed when he heared that the President had given some awards for dramatic performance to Helen Hayes and Cary Grant, and Haig didn't get one.

The leaking in this administration is so bad, that you have to make an appointment to talk to reporters.

I heard Dave Stockman telling (Bob Dole) that he didn't understand Greek history. The Trojan Horse wasn't all that bad...

-2-

[x]

On his last trip, Al Haig was complaining about guerrilla warfare and the reporters were already filing their news flashes to the White House, when he explained he meant El Salvador.

I don't know what effect the new CIA regulations will have but several scenes were cut out of Warren Beatty's new movie, Reds. In fact, in the version I saw the revolution failed.

I have an announcement to make: you are all invited to the homecoming riot at the University of Brasilia.

I have an announcement to make: Al Haig has kindly agreed to deliver the Kissinger memorial lecture at the University of Brasilia.

Georgetown University is miffed at AEI for giving me an award, so they are planning a student riot in my honor.

The Governors were here to consult with President Reagan about the budget cuts and the deficit. Jay Rockefeller's advice was to pay it off, out of petty cash.

This award is in honor of a man who is no longer is public service. Next year they are going to give it to David Stockman....

-3-

One of the candidates for this year's AEI award
was George Bush but they decided to give it to someone
in public service.

The President called and offered me a choice of
two assignments: to talk Begin out of Jerusalem, or to
get Weinberger and Haig to agree on policy. So I am off
to Israel....

Brent Scowcroft was complaining about being called
a Kissinger clone, and I said what an honor....

AEI SPEECH

DECEMBER 10, 1981

This week we marked a tragic anniversary. It has been 40 years since this country entered World War II. The newspapers have been filled with stories of that fatal day in Hawaii. There has been intriguing speculation about what went wrong, why we were not warned, and so forth.

But a deeper question we might ask is how the United States permitted events to reach such a dangerous point. Could we have prevented the war given the popular isolationist sentiment of the 1930s?

It is a relevant question for several reasons. First, we hear in Europe and also in this country that the danger of war is growing. Second we hear that it is our fault, or the fault of certain weapons decisions, or of this Administration. Then, we hear of various facile solutions to propose this to the Soviets, to drop this weapon and, finally, to placate popular sentiment on Europe.

What we must understand is that the debate is masking the real issues.

-2-

There are three harsh facts that Americans must face. First, the strategic superiority that we enjoyed after World War II has ended. When it ended, why it ended, historians and politicians may debate endlessly. The issue we face, however, is how to conduct American foreign policy in this new environment in which the Soviet Union is at least equal to the United States in its strategic and other military forces.

that
The second fact is/the ability of the United States
to protect its interests simply by extending the deterrence
of our strategic predominance has also ended. We have vital
interests in Europe, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf
and in the Far East. We have solemn treaty commitments and
moral obligations. But the gap between our commitments
them
and our ability to fulfill/is once again growing.

Third, the structural basis for conducting foreign
policy is eroding dangerously. The Europeans are determined
to demonstrate their autonomy. The emotional commitment to

-3-

the Western Alliance in Europe and even in this country has
been significantly weakened by the passing of the older
generations that helped create NATO. Similar trends are
evident in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The popular
basis for supporting Israel has begun to shift. The
foundation of American post-war policy has been shaken
by the collapse of Iran. Our Middle East strategy is
jeopardized by the death of Anwar Sadat, and the weakening
of the moderate Arabs. The gap between North and South
is increasing.

But this evening I want to focus on only one--the
Atlantic Alliance.

* * * *

-4-

In Europe, we are paying a heavy price for the failure
over the past decade to develop a common Western strategy
to deal with the changing military balances and to deal
with Soviet expansion in areas outside of Europe.

During the 1970s we were confronted by a constant stream
of arguments over/difficulty of resolving fundamental problems
of Western defense:

-- first, the governments of Europe had to concentrate on
building their own identity;

-- then, Europe could not afford the extra burden of adding
to their own defense budgets;

-- then, we were told there was a detente in Europe that
had to be preserved regardless of the deterioration of
US-Soviet relations;

-- we were told Angola was an aberration, that Ethiopia
was unique, that Yemen and Afghanistan were temporary set-
backs;

-- We were warned about the Vietnam syndrome.

At each turn in these debates, the US chose not to
press disagreeable issues with our allies to a showdown.

-5-

[Y]

We compromised in the name of Alliance solidarity--a laudable objective. But now we are paying a price. To our great chagrin and amazement the result is not greater Alliance cohesion, but disarray, dissent and demonstrations. And the culprit of these demonstrations is the United States.

Once again we hear the cries that the US must compromise and must sacrifice for the sake of the Alliance, to save weak governments and to hold the line until opinion changes.

These have always been powerful and persuasive arguments, but now they will only prolong the Atlantic crisis.

The fundamental problem is that the Alliance has no common platform from which to resist the blandishments of the Soviets and the protestations of its own constituents.

Let us look at the bizarre debate over nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

-- In the late 1970s, the European governments complained that their security was jeopardized because the Soviets were permitted to build up their intermediate range SS-20

-6-

missiles outside of any arms control restraints, and
without any US counter-program.

-- The great danger, we were told, was that European security
was being decoupled from American security--a fatal prescrip-
tion for a military Alliance.

-- Thus it was that the US in coordination with its
allies adopted a common program, exactly two years ago this
week: We agreed to deploy 464 new cruise missiles in
Europe and to replace over 100 Pershing missiles in Germany.
But there was no strong supporting rationale, no clear strategy
for the decision.

-- Then a political revolution occurred: the very American
weapons designed to reinforce NATO and to link the US to
Europe were singled out as the target for public demonstra-
tions, because these weapons would supposedly make a limited
war in Europe possible, and the US would escape unscathed.

-- This is total nonsense. The demonstrations ought to be
in this country: for it is inconceivable that the US could
use its nuclear weapons in Europe against the Soviet Union

-7-

without risking Soviet retaliation against the continental United States. If the Europeans demonstrators are right in their accusations, then the last thing we should want is new weapons that tie the US to Europe.

Or, consider the weird situation regarding the US and Soviet position on a limited war in Europe.

-- The President of the United States speculated that perhaps the first exchange of nuclear weapons in Europe might not automatically escalate; maybe both sides would pause before plunging into the holocaust;

-- This is certainly what every American President since Eisenhower has believed was the purpose of US nuclear forces-- that is, to deter a nuclear war, to force a pause.

-- So Reagan is systematically denounced for being a warmonger, but then Brezhnev gives an interview in a German magazine and states flatly that if one nuclear weapons is used then "unavoidably" the conflict will assume a "global character"; in other words the USSR will attack the United States.

Now, who is the most dangerous in this debate?

-8-

All of this is simply to emphasize my major point:

Without a clear understanding of our strategy, we are open
to the most extreme charges and interpretations, and then
forced into the most self-serving defensiveness. In this
debate NATO is coming close to disarming itself in the nuclear
arena, in both strategy and weapons, simply to prove its
peaceful intentions.

Which leads me to the question of the negotiations that
recently began in Geneva. Two years ago the United States com-
mitted itself to these negotiations. It did so because several governments
were already apprehensive about carrying out the decision
to accept new American missiles. But by the time of the
first round of negotiations in the winter of 1980, it was clear
that this was not really a dual track, but primarily a
negotiating track, on which any further decision on deployment
was dependent. Thus we had come full circle: Having
decided to counter the Soviet build up with our own major
program, but without a clear strategy, we then offered that
very program as a bargaining chip.

-9-

We cannot have it both ways for very long. Either there
is a strategic gap, which must be covered by some American
weapons deployed somewhere--whether in Europe or at sea--
or that gap can be tolerated as long as Soviet level is
brought down, preferably to zero. In this situation,
how do we then compensate for the Soviet advantage in
conventional weapons?

The US, of course, must go the last mile in exploring
whether there is an accommodation at the lowest possible
level of missiles that is consistent with Western security.

Our public requires that we not treat these negotiations
as a cynical exercise to expose Soviet intransigence.

This means that we will have to consider counter offers.
That is the entry price of serious negotiations.

What deeply worries me is that without an agreed
strategy there are no criteria to judge whether any
particular outcome is favorable or not. If our weapons

-10-

in Europe are there for psychological compensation for
the Soviet weapons, then any number can play. But
will the American people support the stationing of
200,000 troops without the weapons to protect them? If,
on the other hand, we have decided on what level of
weapons is required to deter a Soviet attack and to
threaten escalation if deterrence should fail, then
the negotiations will take place in a context which
is understandable and defensible in this country and in
Europe as well.

Let me turn to the geopolitical aspect of this
negotiation. For much of the year we debated whether
these negotiations should start this year. Strangely,
in this debate, no one proposed that they might be
conditioned on Soviet conduct, say in Afghanistan, or
the Middle East, of the Persian Gulf, or in Nicaragua.
We have rationalized these negotiations on the grounds
that they are the price for maintaining western unity;
otherwise we risked a massive popular demonstration, perhaps

-11-

the fall of friendly governments.

I cannot quarrel with this decision. Had I been
in office I too would be sensitive to the pressures
from our allies.

But having compromised, we still have to use the
time confront the underlying issue: can we still pursue
a common policy outside of Europe? The answer is by no means
clear. Certainly on some critical issues such as the
recognition of the PLO, the Fahd plan, sanctions against
the USSR, or against Libya, there is no agreed Western
strategy.

Indeed, the Europeans pride themselves on their
independent positions. But a price will be paid for
these divisions. The ability of radical states, or of
the Soviet Union, to exploit transatlantic divisions
is already obvious.

* * *

-12-

I cannot entirely blame the Europeans. They have always been schizophrenic: on the one hand, they want the right to pursue an autonomous policy, and on the other hand, they want American leadership. As they survey our situation they must still be puzzled. Let us take the question of strategic weapons and arms control.

The M-X decision is now behind us. But clearly it is only a temporary compromise. Europeans must still wonder how we intend to deal with the vulnerability of our land-based missiles. We owe them an answer; and, indeed, we owe it to ourselves.

-- Moreover, the US is currently abiding by the provisions of a treaty signed two and one half years ago, but never ratified. It may well be in our interest to abide by these terms, but for how long?

-- Second, we seem obsessed by the idea that there can be major reductions in strategic arms. But it is by no means clear that this is not a very dangerous process. There

-13-

must be some point along the scale of reductions where
our vulnerabilities are maximized. It is by no means evident
to me that 30 nuclear submarines armed with 500 long-range
missiles is safer than 40 submarines armed with over
700 missiles; Why would 100 new B-1 bombers be safer
than, say 200 hundred, if there is no restraint on Soviet
air defense against our bombers?

In short, we are in danger of conducting our arms
control policy by slogans, when what is required is a
cold-blooded analysis. Perhaps government bureaucracies
are incapable of examining these issues dispassionately,
given the politics involved. That is why private institutions
such as AEI may have to provide a sounding board for new
ideas or dissent from the bureaucratic consensus.

Let me conclude by returning to the question of
the Alliance.

-14-

Two years ago, I was in Brussels for a conference celebrating the 30th anniversary of NATO. In my remarks to a group of scholars and officials I warned the Europeans against relying on an automatic American nuclear guarantee. I urged them to turn their attention to matters of common strategy, and I supported the adoption of the decision to deploy new American missiles. At the time there was an outcry that I was undermining the credibility of the American commitment. The previous administration hastened to reassure our allies. So we relaxed, and now we face the prospect of agreeing on a nuclear strategy while we face massive public demonstrations. Perhaps this was inevitable, but had we acted on the assumption that the public would support a nuclear policy that was clear and consistent with the protection of our common interests, at the very least we would have been able to resist the pressures for unconditional negotiations which can only benefit the Soviet Union.

-15-

What we needed then and still need is a precautionary policy.... etc., etc.

* * *

A year ago at this very gathering the President-elect appeared to honor the memory of Bill Baroody Sr. Then we all felt that we were on the threshhold of a new era. The Reagan administration has indeed inaugurated a new era in domestic policy.... The restructuring of our economy is a contentious issue. But there is an assumption of good will on the part of all the protagonists, Democrats and Republicans, right and left, conservative and liberal. But in foreign affairs we enjoy no such luxury. The assumptions are quite the reverse: In some parts of the world and on some issues we may face irreconcealable opponents. Therefore, we cannot expect to effect basic structural changes in a few months or perhaps even

AEI

Four Problems:

-- Relation of Men to Events

-- Vision of Future

-- Complexity of Domestic Structure

-- Breakdown of Domestic Consensus

All these factors are increasingly impeding the formulation of foreign policy in the industrial democracies. This is particularly illustrated by the controversies in the Atlantic Alliance. There is no subject closer to my heart. I was born in Europe; deep cultural and emotional bonds. Yet we must face certain realities. Deep concern.

Amazing phenomenon of European protests. It is less than two years since Afghanistan, four years since 20 thousand Cuban troops commanded by a Soviet general appeared in Ethiopia; six years since the same thing happened in Angola and while 30 Soviet divisions are massed around and constantly threatening Poland.

Yet what are the arguments we hear? First, we hear that the danger of war is growing because of the *rhetoric* of this Administration, that it is our fault, or the fault of certain weapons decisions, or of slowness in responding to Soviet overtures. Then, we hear of various facile solutions to propose this to the Soviets, to drop this

2

The real issue is that there are unsolved problems-- recognized for over a decade that have not been addressed much less solved because to do so would provoke profound dispute.

Foremost among them is the reluctance to deal with the realities of security.

The inevitable corollary is disagreement about the nature of East-West relations expressing itself particularly about the nature of arms control negotiation.

There is a wide disagreement about what the obligation of the Alliance cooperation is outside the Treaty area and occasionally within it.

Disputes have rent the alliance in every Administration since Kennedy's and split has been getting progressively worse. Thus neither is it accident nor the fault of one administration. Seven years ago my favorite author said in a speech to the Pilgrim's society:

[x]

3

alliance of its founders. Even today, a
majority on both sides of the Atlantic did
not experience the threat that produced the
alliance's creation or the sense of achievement
associated with its growth. Even today, in
the United States over 40 Senators consistently
vote to make massive unilateral reductions of
American forces in Europe. Even today, some
Europeans have come to believe that their
identity should be measured by its distance from
the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic
we are faced with the anomalous--and dangerous--
situation in which the public mind identifies
foreign policy success increasingly with relations
with adversaries while relations with allies seem
to be characterized by bickering and drift. There
exists, then, a real danger of a gradual erosion
of the Atlantic community which for 25 years has
insured peace to its nations and brought prosperity
to its peoples.

Now almost a decade later it is possible to say
that another such period will threaten NATO with becoming
a hollow shell. For nearly two decades we have heard
arguments why concern over fundamental issues of Western

4

defense and allied cohesion should not be pressed to a
conclusion:

- that, the governments of Europe had to
concentrate on building their own identity;

- that, Europe could not afford the extra
burden of adding to their own defense budgets;

- that detente in Europe had to be preserved
regardless of the deterioration of US-Soviet
relations over such issues as Afghanistan;

- that Angola was an aberration, that Ethiopia
was unique, that Yemen and Afghanistan were
temporary setbacks;

And once again we hear that for the sake of the Alliance
we must meet the demands and needs of weak governments
to save them and to hold the line until opinion changes.

But over this period there has been not greater
cohesion but growing dissociation, dissent and demonstrations,
a growing attitude by some allies that they can blackmail
us over their participation in the Alliance as if their
security were more important to us than to them. No sense
pretending otherwise. The Alliance as a whole has no
common platform from which to resist the blandishments of the
Soviets or the pressures from its constituents.

5

In domestic politics a problem deferres is often
a bullet dodged.

In foreign policy a problem deferred is a crisis
invited.

The problems are objectively difficult.

The domestic framework for dealing with them is
eroding dangerously in many allied countries.

To make the desirability of peace the issue is an
abdication of leadership. No one wants war. The problem
is to have both peace and justice; strength and willingness
to associate.

Let me deal with the problem of security first.

Two harsh facts that Americans as well as allies
must face: First the strategic superiority that we enjoyed
after World War II has ended. When it ended, why it
ended, historians and politicians may debate endlessly.
The issue we face, however, is how to conduct American
foreign policy in this new environment in which the Soviet
Union is at least equal to the United States in its
strategic and other military forces. The credibility
of the threat of general nuclear war must therefore
diminish, and threat demoralizing

6

deterrence of our strategic predominance has also
ended. We have vital interests in Europe, the Middle
East and the Persian Gulf and in the Far East. We have
solemn treaty commitments and moral obligations. But
the gap between our commitments and our ability to
fulfill them by general strategic war is growing.

I called attention to these facts several years
ago and was accused of undermining Alliance credibility.
The state of affairs has since become more obvious; the
inhibitions against resort to general nuclear war have
grown yet discussion of strategy is essentially proscribed
by passionate feelings on both sides of the Atlantic
resisting any attempt to give military purpose to the
accumulating stockpiles and to make an attempt to
mitigate the consequences of a nuclear war.

It is a strange phenomenon that the groups who
consider themselves humane and liberal also advocate the
most bloodthirsty strategies. It is a vestige of the
Vietnam period; the presumption of many well-meaning men
and women is that if their government is given any option
other than holocaust it will launch us into nuclear war.

The same phenomenon exists on the other side of the
Atlantic where any attempt to define a <u>hole</u> of nuclear
weapons other than the mass extermination of civilians is
greeted with hoots of derision or howls of outrage that

7

America is ready to dissociate its defense from that of Europe or let Europe be devastated while it stands on the sideline. It is a strange theory of security where the potential victim of aggression will accept the common defense only if assured that his territory will remain inviolate.

Weird debate. The President is ignored when he affirms that "no NATO weapons, nuclear or conventional, will ever be used in Europe except in response to attack." He is accused of being a warmonger when he restates accepted NATO doctrine believed that we should seek a pause before plunging into nuclear holocaust by not escalating automatically after the first exchange, even though this view has been expressed by every President since Eisenhower.

Then Brezhnev is quoted with approval when he gives an interview in a German magazine and states flatly that if one nuclear weapon is used then "unavoidably" the conflict will assume a "global character". Now, who is the most dangerous in this debate?

All of this is simply to emphasize my major point: Without a clear understanding of our strategy, we are open to the most extreme charges and interpretations, and then forced into the most self-serving defensiveness. In this debate NATO runs a grave danger of disarming itself in the nuclear arena, in both strategy and diplomacy.

8

But two questions are unavoidable. Ambassador Arthur Burns said in a speech in the fall of 1981:

If the American strategic arsenal tends to avoid counterforce capability, if the Europeans resist the concept of limited nuclear war for regional defense and if both sides of the Atlantic lag in conventional defense, how can we avoid blackmail or demoralization? The most effective means for preventing nuclear war is to build up conventional defenses. This is incompatible with a volunteer army here and shrinking terms of service in Europe.

Second, in these circumstances we have six

9

divisions deployed in a region that rejects local
defense while in areas where that must be our principal
reliance such as the Persian Gulf no U.S. forces are
stationed nearby.

The choice is up to us--we can reduce reliance on
nuclear war, but we should not pretend we can have the
benefit of every course of action.

The dilemmas have come to expression over the
Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe. There too the recent
debate tends to stand reality on its head. Let us
review the record.

-- Starting in 1977 major European governments
complained that their security was jeopardized because
the Soviets were permitted to build up their intermediate
range SS-20 missiles outside of any arms control
restraints, and without any US counter-program. Chancellor
Schmidt made this case strongly in a speech at the ISS
in London.

-- The great danger, we were told, was that
European security was being decoupled from American security--
a fatal prescription for a military Alliance.

10

— Then a political revolution occurred: the very American weapons designed to reinforce NATO and to link the US to Europe were singled out as the target for public demonstrations, because these weapons would supposedly make a limited war in Europe possible, and the US would escape unseathed.

— This is total nonsense. If the weapons do anything it is to couple the defense of Europe to that of the United States—it is inconceivable that the US could use its nuclear weapons in Europe against the Soviet Union without producing Soviet retaliation against the continental United States. And it is impossible for the Soviet Union to attack the weapons in Europe without risking nuclear retaliation from America. If the European demonstrators are right in their accusations, then the last thing we should want is new weapons that tie the US to Europe. The demonstrations in that case are on the wrong side of the Atlantic.

It suggests that we have no reason to be supplicants on this issue; we have many ways to station intermediate range weapons—on ships, for example. The decision must be made by Europeans.

Inevitably therefore the debate about negotiations on Theater Nuclear Forces arms control suffers from the same

11

ambiguities as that on strategy. No sooner had we offered
theater nuclear weapons that several European countries
insisted that it be coupled with a decision to negotiate first.
It was presented as a dual track but it soon turned into
a negotiating track--a precondition for deployment.

And just as in counterforce strategy there are many
unstated assumptions. In Europe negotiations have become
almost an end in itself; many advocate the dual track approach
as a means of avoiding ultimate deployment. In this country
the dominant tendency is to be leery of arms control talks;
to see in them a way station to deployment.

Several schools of thought: TNF in order to deploy;
as well as not to deploy; as a bridge to SALT; as an
alternative to SALT. All these tendencies merge in an
agreement to negotiate; they complicate the development of
a coherent alliance program. Somewhere along the line
one pays for this.

Nature of negotiations. Psychiatric and theological
approach.

Negotiations as an end in themselves. Must not
sacrifice detente to crisis.

Reluctance of confrontation.

I favored a detente based on defense of our security
interests and willingness to negotiate. Complement to defense,
not alternative. We need it because nuclear age requires it
and our people expect it.

12

The US and the Soviet Union are ideological and geopolitical rivals. Detente cannot change that. Nuclear age comples us to strive for coexistence. Rhetorical crusades cannot change that either.

It is important because if we make an issue of the fact of negotiations we undermine psychological framework to endure conflict.

But equally crucial that the issues be defined properly.

Need for precision in negotiations on our side.

Europeans must not drive us from compromise to compromise.

Let me return to TNF. Either there is a strategic gap, which must be covered by some American weapons deployed somewhere--whether in Europe or at sea--or that gap can be tolerated as long as Soviet level is brought down, preferably to zero. In this situation, how do we then compensate for the Soviet advantage in conventional weapons?

SALT - START. How long do we observe non-ratified agreement?

Impact of reduction on vulnerability of conventional forces. Reduction as end in themselves.

Coordination of policy.

Different approaches -- Middle East, East-West,

Camp David, Venice declaration.

"Interpret" both sides to each other.

Limits of autonomy for both sides.

If it goes too far--alliance will fail.

13

No alliance obligation.

To sum up:

Atlantic Alliance is drifting towards the danger of
irrelevance.

Needs to face facts.

First Step.

1. Stop renegotiating membership. Not a favor to us.

2. Theater nuclear forces not a favor to us.

3. Clear strategic doctrine.

4. Precise definition of arms control.

5. Range of derivation outside NATO.

Wise men or group of officials -- High priority.

But cannot continue to do business as usual.

Committed to start negotiations.

Up to us.

AEI

Four Problems:

- Relation of Men to Events

- Vision of Future

2

> The next generation of leaders in Europe,
> Canada, and America will have neither the personal
> memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic

3

4

5

Two harsh facts that Americans as well as allies
must face: First the strategic superiority that we enjoyed
after World War II has ended. When it ended, why it
ended, historians and politicians may debate endlessly.
The issue we face, however, is how to conduce American
foreign policy in this new environment in which the Soviet
Union is at least equal to the United States in its
strategic and other military forces. The credibility
of the threat of general nuclear war must therefore
diminish and threat demoralizing

6

The same phenomenon exists on the other side of the
Atlantic where any attempt to define a rise of nuclear
weapons other than the mass extermination of civilians is
greeted with hoots of derision or howls of outrage that

7

8

9

10

-- Then a political revolution occurred: the very
American weapons designed to reinforce NATO and to link
the US to Europe were singled out as the target for public
demonstrations, because these weapons would supposedly
make a limited war in Europe possible, and the US would
escape unseathed.

-- This is total nonsense. If the weapons do anything
it is to couple the defense of Europe to that of the United
States--it is inconceivable that the US could use its
nuclear weapons in Europe against the Soviet Union without
producing Soviet retaliation against the continental
United States. And it is impossible for the Soviet Union
to attack the weapons in Europe without risking nuclear
retaliation from America. If the European demonstrators are
right in their accusations, then the last thing we should
want is new weapons that tie the US to Europe. The demonstra-
tions in that case are on the wrong side of the Atlantic.

It suggests that we have no reason to be supplicants
on this issue; we have many ways to station intermediate
range weapons--on ships, for example. The decision must be
made by Europeans.

11

Several schools of thought: TNE in order to deploy;
as well as not to deploy; as a bridge to SALT; as an
alternative to SALT. All these tendencies merge in an
agreement to negotiate; they complicate the development of
a coherent alliance program. Somewhere along the line
one pays for this.

Reluctance of confrontation.

I favored a detente based on defense of our security
interests and willingness to negotiate. Complement to defense
not alternative. We need it because nuclear age requires it
and our people expect it.

12

Need for precision in negotiations on our side.
Europeans must not drive us from compromise to compromise.
Let me return to TNF. Either there is a strategic gap,
which must be covered by some American weapons deployed
somewhere--whether in Europe or at sea-or that gap can
be tolerated as long as Soviet level is brought down,
preferably to zero. In this situation, how do we then
compensate for the Soviet advantage in conventional weapons?

Impact of reduction on vulnerability on conventional
forces. Reduction as end in themselves.

Coordination of policy.

13

No alliance obligation.

To sum up:

Needs to face facts.

First Step.

3. Clear strategic doctrine.

Up to us.

B+ Draft

[Y]

AEI SPEECH

DECEMBER 10, 1981

It is a relevant question for several reasons. First, we hear in Europe and also in this country that the danger because of the electric ADMINISTRATION of war is growing. Second we hear that it is our fault, or the fault of certain weapons decisions, or of this ADMINISTRATION. Then, we hear of various facile solutions to propose this to the Soviets, to drop this weapon and, finally, to placate popular sentiment on Europe.

vergent paths only at the cost of their prosperity and their partnership.

These historic changes were occurring in a profoundly changed psychological climate in the West. The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada, and America will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders. Even today, a majority on both sides of the Atlantic did not experience the threat that produced the alliance's creation or the sense of achievement associated with its growth. Even today, in the United States over 40 Senators consistently vote to make massive unilateral reductions of American forces in Europe. Even today, some Europeans have come to believe that their identity should be measured by its distance from the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic we are faced with the anomalous—and dangerous—situation in which the public mind identifies foreign policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries while relations with allies seem to be characterized by bickering and drift.

> "There exists, then, a real danger of a gradual erosion of the Atlantic community which for 25 years has insured peace to its nations and brought prosperity to its peoples. A major effort to renew Atlantic relations and to anchor our friendship in a fresh act of creation seemed essential. We hoped that the drama of the great democracies engaging themselves once again in defining a common future would infuse our Atlantic partnership with new emotional and intellectual excitement. This was the origin of the initiative which came to be called the "Year of Europe."

Let me lay to rest certain misconceptions about American intentions:

—The President's initiative was launched after careful preparation. In all of our conversations with many European leaders during the winter and spring of 1972-73 there was agreement that Atlantic relations required urgent attention to arrest the potential for growing suspicion and alienation between Europe and America.

—We do not accept the proposition that

the strengthening of Atlantic unity and the defining of a European personality are incompatible. The two processes have reinforced each other from the outset and can continue to do so now. The United States has repeatedly and explicitly welcomed the European decision to create an independent identity in all dimensions, political and economic. Indeed, we have long—and more consistently than many Europeans—supported the goal of political cohesion.

—We have no intention of restricting Europe's international role to regional matters. From our perspective, European unification should enable Europe to take on broader responsibilities for global peace that ultimately can only contribute to the common interest. The American initiative was meant to mark Europe's new preeminence on the world scene as well as within the North Atlantic community.

A comprehensive reexamination of all aspects of our relationship, economic, political, and military, is imperative. It is a fact that our troops are in Europe as a vital component of mutual defense. It is also a fact—indeed, a truism—that political, military, and economic factors are each part of our relationship. In our view, the affirmation of the pervasive nature of our interdependence is not a device for blackmail. On the contrary, it is the justification for conciliatory solutions. For the specialized concerns of experts and technicians have a life of their own and a narrow national or sectarian bias. The purpose of our initiative was to override these divisive attitudes by committing the highest authority in each country to the principle that our common and paramount interest is in broadly conceived cooperation.

## The European Identity

Since last April Europe has made great strides toward unity—particularly in political coordination. The United States strongly supports that process. But as an old friend we are also sensitive to what this process does to traditional ties that, in our view, remain essential to the common interest.

Europe's unity must not be at the expense

778

Department of State Bulletin

-8-

Without a clear understanding of our strategy, we are open
to the most extreme charges and interpretations, and then
forced into the most self-serving defensiveness. In this
*runs a few charges of*
debate NATO ~~is coming close to~~ disarming itself in the nuclear
*diplomacy.*
arena, in both strategy and weapons, simply to prove its
peaceful intentions.

-8-

Burns Quote

IN THIS COUNTRY. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC UNDERSTAND THAT MUCH OF WHAT IS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESS AS ANTI-AMERICANISM IS SIMPLY A SEARCH ON THE PART OF SENSITIVE YOUNG PEOPLE FOR THEIR IDENTITY IN A TROUBLED WORLD, AND THAT EVEN WHERE ANTI-AMERICANISM ACTUALLY EXISTS IT CAN RARELY BE EQUATED WITH PRO-SOVIETISM.

MY GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE THE BASIS OF OUR OWN SECURITY AND THAT OF EUROPE. OUR COMMITMENTS TO THE ALLIANCE REMAIN STRONG AND STEADFAST. I WOULD, HOWEVER, BE REMISS IN MY RESPONSIBILITY AS MY COUNTRY'S REPRESENTATIVE IF I WERE NOT ALSO TO REPORT TO YOU THAT THE NUCLEAR DEBATE IN EUROPE IS BEING WATCHED IN THE UNITED STATES WITH INCREASING CONCERN. THE DEBATE IS BECOMING A BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF EUROPE WITH CLEAR ALTERNATIVES. ON THE ONE HAND, THE WEST CAN REAFFIRM UNEQUIVOCALLY ITS DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE SUFFICIENT COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION EVEN AS THE UNITED STATES SEEKS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO ACHIEVE MAJOR REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF SUCH REAFFIRMATION IS LONG POSTPONED OR BECOMES UNCERTAIN, THERE MAY WELL BE A GROWING SENTIMENT IN AMERICA TO TURN BACK UPON ITSELF AND LET EUROPE DEPEND FOR ITS SECURITY AND FREEDOM UPON ITS OWN RESOURCES OR UPON SOVIET GOOD WILL. ISOLATIONISM IS BY NO MEANS THE ALTERNATIVE THAT MY COUNTRY SEEKS, BUT MANY AMERICANS ARE NOW WONDERING

-5-

-6-

-- The great danger, we were told, was that European security was being decoupled from American security--a fatal prescription for a military Alliance.

-- Then a political revolution occurred: the very American weapons designed to reinforce NATO and to link the US to Europe were singled out as the target for public demonstrations, because these weapons would supposedly make a limited war in Europe possible, and the US would escape unscathed.

in this country: ~~for~~ it is inconceivable that the US could use its nuclear weapons in Europe against the Soviet Union

-7-

Or, consider the weird situation regarding the US and Soviet positions on a limited war in Europe.

-- This is certainly what every American President since Eisenhower has believed was the purpose of US nuclear forces--that is, to deter a nuclear war, to force a pause.

-- So Reagan is systematically denounced for being a warmonger, but then Brezhnev gives an interview in a German magazine and states flatly that if one nuclear weapons is used then "unavoidably" the conflict will assume a "global character" in other words the USSR will attack the United States.

-9-

We cannot have it both ways for very long. [ ] Either there is a strategic gap, which must be covered by some American weapons deployed somewhere--whether in Europe or at sea--or that gap can be tolerated as long as Soviet level is brought down, preferably to zero. In this situation, how do we then compensate for the Soviet advantage in conventional weapons?