[x]

C-26

Q Mr. Secretary, why do you assume that all the SS-11s are eventually going to be replaced by the bigger throw-weight missiles when your own point is that the greater throw-weight really is a phony issue?

A I'm not saying that all the SS-11s are being replaced. I just got through saying that not all the SS-11s would be replaced by the bigger throw-weight. It isn't a question of bigger throw-weight. The SS-11 is unMIRVed. The bigger throw-weight missile is MIRVed. Therefore, the Soviets have the capability, just as we have the capability of transforming every Minuteman into a MIRV missile, to transform every SS-11 silo into an SS-17 or SS-19.

Q But you don't think they'll do it?

A Under this constraint they can't do it -- under this 1320 constraint. Well, they can do it only -- they now have choices to make. Under the 1320 constraint it is impossible for them to convert all the SS-11s and also have a significant submarine program and also convert the SS-9s. So if you assume that they will do a mix, then we have certain estimates of how they are going to go about it. And even there, in our judgment, they are going to be a little bit strapped.

C-27

Q Mr. Secretary, when and how do you foresee this
coming before the Senate?

A Well, I don't know whether the Senate is going
to start, whether the Senate is going to be seized with this
in the form of hearing. Our expectation is that we can
conclude the negotiation of this agreement, the most
important elements of which have after all been negotiated.
Principally the verification issue is remaining. We
hope that we can finish it in time for a signature in May
or June when General Secretary Brezhnev comes here. It
would then go to the Congress. We haven't decided yet
whether to put it before the Congress like SALT I or in
the form of a treaty. More likely in the form of SALT I
showing action by both houses. I would think July or
August.

Q Would you think that hearings could be held
now, however, or with the new Congress?

A I have heard that hearings are very likely.
And I just hope that restraint will be exercised in not
turning this into a political issue. I mean there may be
serious differences of opinion, and those should be fully
aired.

Q Mr. Secretary, can a rational argument be

C-28

made now on dropping the Trident?

A Well, not in my view.

Q How do you justify the Trident now? What
do you need it for in this kind of agreement?

A Well, the question about the Trident is the
same now as it was before. The fact that you now have a
ceiling on MIRVs does not affect the composition of your
forces by which you reach that ceiling. And I think that
is an issue into which I will be delighted to go.

Unfortunately, I have to see Senator Byrd.

Can we agree that any figure I gave of an
intelligence nature, composition of Soviet forces, etc.,
the figures I gave you about the agreement you can put
ON BACKGROUND. Any other figures please use ON DEEP
BACKGROUND.

Q Thank you, sir.

(The briefing was terminated at 5:40 p.m.)

A-1

MR. McCLOSKEY: This will be FOR BACKGROUND, the usual ground rules. Anything used will be in paraphrase, may be attributed to State Department sources.

MR. MARDER: In view of the magnitude of this subject, Mr. Secretary, and in view of the controversy about an issue of this consequence, I would like to strongly urge you to reconsider putting it ON THE RECORD because the charges, as you well know, are coming and published and the defense is coming on an anonymous basis.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Murrey, the Secretary will have a press conference at some point -- hopefully, soon -- and there it will be ON THE RECORD.

It was my impression, and that of others, that a BACKGROUND briefing would be welcome on this subject.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just wanted to remind you I will try to have a press conference on Monday. I will be prepared to say some of these things ON THE RECORD. This gives us an opportunity to have a smaller group, and perhaps

A-2

to speak more freely. I will, however, at an early
opportunity be glad to say ON THE RECORD that I think
throw-weight is a phony issue. (Laughter.)

Q "Throw" what?

Q Throw-weight.

Q Oh, throw-weight.

Q Could you say that ON THE RECORD, Mr.

Secretary?

A (Secretary Kissinger) No. I will say it
on an occasion in which I can explain it.

But could I, perhaps -- I don't know how you
want to conduct this. I thought perhaps I would start with a
few minutes of what I believe to be the significance of
this agreement and then take questions on it. This
would be the most effective way of proceeding.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you start, perhaps,
by telling us what's in the agreement? Have we gotten
everything that's in the agreement?

A It's a secret agreement. (Laughter.)

It's not going to come out in Senator Jackson's hearings.

Well, let me sum up what can be said about the
agreement.

The President stated yesterday that the ceiling

A-3

on strategic delivery vehicles is 2400; the ceiling on MIRVs is 1320. The number of land-based silos will remain constant, though they are subject to the same modifications that are permitted in the interim agreement -- which is to say that their dimensions can be increased by 15 percent and that airborne missiles of a range of more than 600 miles will be counted as individual missiles, though not as MIRVs.

I think these are the essential elements of the agreement -- which means that each side is free to compose these 2400 in any way it wishes, except that it cannot add land-based silos. It can add land-based mobiles; it can move land-based missiles to sea.

The numerical limitations of the interim agreement with respect to submarines, as well as to the total numbers of submarine-based missiles, will not be in effect. The only number of the interim agreement that will remain in effect is that of the land-based silos; and those are, of course, the most vulnerable part of the strategic forces.

Those are the essential elements of the agreement.

Q What would be the limitation?

A-4

A 600 kilometers --

Q What?

A 600 kilometers -- or, roughly, four hundred miles.

Q What does that refer to?

A I said airborne missiles of a range of more than 600 kilometers, not 600 miles.

Q Mr. Secretary, do the silos remain so that they're limited to 15 percent in size, even though there's not anything specifically said?

A Well, that does not happen to be exactly true because the United States, either because of great foresight -- as the Russians believe -- or for other reasons -- as some others believe -- designed its silos in such a way that they can take a considerably larger missile than is presently in it, so that it's within our capability, even without increasing the size of the silo substantially, to reduce Soviet throw-weight advantage, and, if we increase the silos by 15 percent, to come close to eliminating Soviet throw-weight advantage -- if that's the decision that we want to take.

But -- I repeat -- I believe that the throw-weight issue has been vastly overstated and the decision of whether

(c)

A-5

we will attempt to close the throw-weight will be taken
by us for our reasons and not simply because the
Soviet Union has heavier missiles than we do.

Q Mr. Secretary, since the Soviet Union
has not deployed any MIRV missiles and since the United
States does not plan as many as 1320 MIRV missiles,
why couldn't you get a lower MIRV figure?

A We could have probably gotten a slightly
lower MIRV figure. 1320 is slightly above the American
MIRV plan and, therefore, gives us some degree of
flexibility. We could have gotten a slightly lower MIRV
figure; it wouldn't have made any real difference.

Q Where did you get the 1320? How did
you arrive at that figure?

A We arrived at the figure of 1320 by taking
some of the planned programs and, in effect, adding to it the
TRIDENT force -- which is 28 missiles.

Q Mr. Secretary, will the F-111 and the
Soviet BACKFIRE be included as launchers?

A I would not expect them to.

Q Neither of them?

A Neither of them.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President talked yesterday

A-6

about some ambiguities in the Soviet Union in connection
with verification. Could you go into that?

A Before I get into
all these technical questions, let me make a general
statement of what the significance of this agreement is
before we get lost in a lot of technicalities.

First, in terms of the negotiating history
of this agreement, there were the following items throughout
the negotiations:

- One, total aggregates.

- Second, limitations on MIRVs -- for which
the code name was "qualitative restraint,"...

- Third, there was the issue of forward-bases.

- Fourth, there was the issue of the British
and French nuclear forces.

- Fifth, there was the fact that the Soviet Union
claimed compensation for a more vulnerable geographic
position -- the fact that some of its potential enemies
were geographically closer to it than they were to us -- or,
to put it into less complicated language, that China
would have nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union.

A-7

Therefore, these were the parameters of the negotiations as they had been going on for several years until this summer.

What we attempted to do is approve immediately a comprehensive agreement that would take care of all of the issues simultaneously. Therefore, until this summer, we attempted to bring about an extension of the Interim Agreement, in which the Soviet Union had a differential in missiles and for which we wanted to compensate by obtaining a differential in MIRV vehicles. Even though we were prepared to give them a differential in total missiles until the end of 1979, the differential in missiles for which we asked was not to be negotiable during the time of the Summit.

Secondly, as we analyzed the problem at the time of the Summit, it became clear that this was really a very precarious agreement -- that you extended the Interim Agreement for a number of years at a time when the production program of both sides of MIRVs would reach a certain peak -- that, therefore, the breakout potential was very substantial -- and where the Soviet Union, or we, simply by deferring the deployment of one year's production, would have a massive breakout potential at the precise moment

A-8

that the agreement ended.

Therefore, it was decided at the Summit meeting -- as I pointed out to this group before -- that we would, in July, aim for a 10-year agreement, in which it would be more easy to catch several cycles of the program and to attempt to bring about a negotiation in this manner.

As far as the United States is concerned, we had a number of preparatory Verification Panel meetings, out of which emerged five to eight options which were presented to the President and to the NSC meeting which took place in October.

I was just trying to give you a history of how this evolved; and then I will talk briefly about the significance, as I see it, and then we can answer your questions.

These options range from some that were extraordinarily simple to others of great esoteric complexity. Out of these options, the President chose not one of the options but a combination of two of the simpler ones and asked me to present those in Moscow when I was there in October.

We had two days of very difficult and very

A-9

inconclusive meetings, which then led to a meeting of the Politburo on the last day that I was in Moscow -- it doesn't matter what it was; it was Saturday -- at which, apparently, some fundamental decisions were taken by the Soviet Union, because that evening they made a proposition to us, which I made clear afterwards brought the issue within negotiating range.

Now, what brought it within negotiating range was the Soviet Union accepted then the principle of equal aggregate at some stage of the 10-year problem. They, nevertheless, still insisted on compensation for the British and French nuclear forces and some compensation for forward-based missiles.

The reason why equal aggregates become more important in a 10-year agreement than a 5-year agreement was that if we gave up on the principle of equal aggregates in a 10-year agreement following a 5-year agreement, it would mean that from the period of 1972 through 1985 the United States would have accepted a position of numerical inferiority in strategic delivery vehicles, which whatever it actually invites strategically -- which I never thought was much -- nevertheless, symbolically, could have had some political impact on the potential of other countries.

(ce)

A-10

This was the situation when I left the Soviet Union at the end of October.

On the basis of the proposal that the Soviet Union made to us in October -- which they also put in writing to us -- we formulated a counter-proposal, in which equal aggregates were to be achieved earlier, sometime during the 1975 to 1985 period, and in the interval before the United States achieved total equal aggregate, there would be a MIRV differential in our favor.

I don't see that there's any point being served in going through all this back-and-forth of negotiations. This, more or less, was the situation in Vladivostok. I brought it out only to make clear that there was not a pre-cooked agreement that was simply ratified in Vladivostok. The negotiations were, roughly, as I had described it to you upon our arrival in Vladivostok.

Saturday evening, we had an extended negotiation on what differentials in total numbers and what differentials in MIRV numbers for what period of time might be acceptable; and this is where it stood about midnight, when we adjourned.

It was the next morning that General Secretary Brezhnev made his proposal on moving to equal aggregates

A-11

immediately -- not asking
for compensation for the British and French nuclear
forces. And out of this developed a more extended
discussion having to do with bomber armament and the
position of heavy missiles -- the limitation of heavy
missiles, the agreement which we have discussed.

Now, I have since read -- I have since
discussed -- with mounting amazement, I must say. For
example, let me deal with some of the arguments that I
have heard.

I have heard it said that the United States gave to
the Soviet Union rather large figures. Now, I think the
fact of the matter is quite the contrary. The overall total
is below the figures which the Soviet Union has today --
so that the only way that the Soviet Union can -- we hope that
the Soviet Union will be forced to reduce numbers to achieve
the agreed level by 1977.

Secondly, before we went to Vladivostok -- and
not necessarily connected with Vladivostok -- we asked the
intelligence community to give us three projections
of Soviet development, both in the MIRV field and in the
missile field -- and in the total strategic delivery field.
These estimates were made by people who had no idea of the
figures that we were debating.

B 1

The intelligence estimates were made in three estimates -- a low estimate, a medium estimate, and a high estimate.

All three estimates -- well, the lowest estimate, was considerably above the lowest estimate of what the Soviet Union would do without an agreement -- was considerably above the figures of both the MIRVs and the delivery systems. The medium estimate was substantially above, and the high estimate was out of range.

In our experience, our medium estimate is the one that is the most probable Soviet course.

So with all due respect, it is total nonsense to say that the United States "gave the Soviet Union figures that were granted to them by us."

The United States agreed with the Soviet Union on figures below their present figures in total numbers of missiles, and well below our estimate of where they would be -- well below their lowest estimate of where they would be without an agreement -- and substantially below our estimate, our most likely estimate of where they would be without an agreement.

And all of this was done without counting the

B 2

British and French nuclear forces, without counting the forward based systems, and without any of the other frills that used to be associated.

The second argument, as well, "all we are doing is continuing the race." That, too, is not true.

If the Soviet Union had built to the level that was what our intelligence estimate predicted -- and I repeat that our intelligence estimate projected without any knowledge of the figures we were discussing with the Soviet Union -- if the Soviet Union had built up to those figures, we would have been faced with the following problem:

We would have been faced with the problem of whether we wanted to match all those, or exceed all those figures or whether we were going to permit, as a result of an arms race -- a gap to exist -- which many in our countries considered intolerable, though it was ratified as part of a SALT Agreement.

In other words, the gap which we had permitted to arise without an agreement, before 1972 -- which we had frozen as a result of the interim agreement -- would have grown against us as of 1977.

Therefore, the only way the United States could

B 3

have responded. is either to let the gap grow or to make
a massive effort in order to close it.

So that our expenditures on the strategic forces
would have had to go up rapidly, and would have had to go
up now.

Now if we had permitted the gap to grow -- in
other words, if we had kept our strategic expenditures
down -- our capability of bringing the arms race under
control would have declined substantially, because what
arguments could we have used against the Soviet Union in
order to induce them to accept figures -- even roughly
comparable to the ones we have accepted. If we had
gone into an arms race of our own, the consequences would
have been quite unpredictable.

We had constantly felt that one of the primary
objectives of these negotiations would be, not to bring
about a level in which the destruction of human life
was not possible -- that is beyond our ability. -- but
rather, to get the perceptions of both sides into a framework
in which they are not a series of self-fulfilling prophecies
-- a fuel wasting arms race which can be sustained only
by the argument of "an imminent surprise attack" which

B 4

in turn, then makes political accommodations more and more
difficult.

Now whether the level of forces is 2400, 2200
or 2,000 has some financial difference. But in
terms of the capacity to destroy human life, it is almost
irrelevant.

Therefore, the arguments that the levels below
us are not uninteresting, but they do not go to the center
of the issues -- to reduce the strategic forces to a level
where they cannot destroy human life -- the reductions would
have had to be to the level that are inconceivable today.

Now I would like you all to remember that in 1962
at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was
at something like 1,500 warheads -- maybe 2,000 -- fifteen
hundred or two thousand warheads. The Soviet Union possessed
something like 70 ICBM warheads.

But in the records of the deliberations at that
time, the policy makers at that time had the perception to
see that the delivery of even a fraction of those Soviet
warheads on the United States would present quite un-
manageable problems for the United States.

We are now in a period where, with MIRVs and with

B 5

the proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons, the level at which human life could be substantially -- or at least civilized life as we now know it -- could be substantially reduced, is not affected by whether the total ceiling is 2400, 2200, 2,000, or any of the ceilings that anyone has talked about.

In fact, if you want to make a sophisticated argument you can make the argument that at certain levels of MIRV, the fewer the aimpoints, the more precarious the situation becomes. because if one of the risks of the contemporary situation is disparity between warheads and aiming points so that a first strike again becomes a possibility, then the fewer the number of aimpoints and the larger the number of warheads, the greater the disparity between the number of warheads and the aimpoints.

And therefore, from the point of view of either the destructiveness or the destruction of human life, I see no significant difference between the figure of 2,400 or any of the other figures that have been talked about -- even though we would have preferred lower figures.

The significance of this agreement is that a ceiling

B6

has been put on the total number for a ten-year period,
so that the argument can no longer be made
that the other side is racing into
newer and newer fields.

In this respect, incidentally, the argument that
"this isn't saving any money" is also incorrect, because
if the Soviet Union had built to our expectations of its
program, and our reactions would have had to be in terms
of our expectations of their program -- if indeed we were
going to make a reaction -- we would have had to expend
a substantial additional sum to that which we now face.

Now let me come to the throw-weight.

Q Dr. Kissinger.

A Yes.

Q Were these intelligence estimates based on
intentional capability?

A These intelligence estimates were based on the
best judgment -- well, on a combination of both, really.

We have some indications -- we know, for example,
that they have recently converted a certain number of their
SS-11 missiles to a newer type. We are, therefore, subtracting
those and we are assuming that they wouldn't go through

B7

the expense of converting those to a new, and non-MIRV type -- and then immediately replace them with MIRVs -- so we deducted those from the total number, and assume that the remaining number were candidates for MIRVs.

And similar estimates were made.

Also, we have some information about some other activities -- so it is a combination of capabilities and intentions.

But it is certain, all of these estimates were well within their capabilities. Indeed, if we are talking about total numbers, the Soviet Union is modernizing its force now because of the constraints of the Interim Agreement by rebuilding the existing silos. That process is at least as difficult and at least as costly as the building of new silos.

Therefore, the Soviet Union would have an almost infinite capability of expanding its force by leaving the existing missiles in the silos and building new silos -- and the expense to us of attempting to match this program would have been substantial.

Now let me say a word about the throw-weight.

I believe, as I have said before, that the throw-weight

B7

(lc)

B 8
is not an important part of the issue, because throw-weight
is not an entity in itself. Throw-weight is a means to an end.
Throw-weight is significant if it is translated into numbers
of warheads and accuracy -- and that, in turn, matters if
you have specific targets against which to use them.

As I pointed out earlier, to the extent that the
United States considers throw-weight significant, there is
nothing in the Agreement to prevent us from building things
a bit larger.

On the other hand, there is no point in building up
a larger throw-weight just for a theoretical quality.

The danger that is seen by us in the Soviet throw-
weight, is that it will enable them to multiply numbers of
warheads on their missiles, and thereby threaten our land
bases.

This danger is not very probable in the existing
generation of MIRVs which we are now testing, because the
numbers of warheads they have on theirs is not significantly
larger than the number of warheads we have on ours; and
in some categories, it is smaller than the numbers we have
now.

However, if you try to analyze throw-weight, you also

B 9

have to analyze the vulnerability of the target.

The Soviet Union has 85 percent of its throw-weight in the most vulnerable target, that is to say in its land-based missile.

The United States has only about 25 percent of its throw-weight in its most vulnerable targets -- i.e. our land-based missiles.

In the 1980s the greater flexibility of our force, and the greater vulnerability of their force, is very likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their forces is ... likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force -- regardless of what the weight of the individual warhead is.

So we believe that this agreement has, for the first time in the nuclear age, established a ceiling -- for the first time in the nuclear age, enabled both sides to plan without the fear of an escalating numerical arms race in both the overall numbers and in the numbers of those vehicles which have multiple warheads.

For the first time, it gives us the base from which to negotiate for our reduction and it has eliminated from the negotiations those items that were

B 1.0

most divisive within the Alliance.

So if we are worried about the arms race, not only about the numbers, but about the self-fulfilling properties about the perceptions by each side of the other -- and about the arguments that will have to be used to continue this -- then I believe that the achievements of this ceiling will turn out to have been of considerable historical importance.

Now this is particularly true if you look at the alternative:

The alternative to making this Agreement was for the United States to begin a substantial additional building program of its own.

Certainly, the Soviet Union was not likely to reduce its numbers, if the United States, perceiving its beginning of its MIRV program and its escalation of its own numbers, would do nothing more than maintain its presence. Therefore the realistic choice for the United States was either a substantial buildup now, beginning now, after which, perhaps, somewhat lower levels might have been possible -- or to settle for what was achieved.

Our judgment was that the risk

B 11

of this escalating to an arms race -- not to speak of the
probability of obtaining it from the Congress -- all combine
to argue for making this preliminary settlement now.

So let me stop here.

Q Mr. Secretary, how did it come to pass that
the Soviets became unconcerned about the matter of
compensation for the British and French and the Chinese
missile sites?

A Because -- recognize that somebody had to
come to the conclusion that some level of destructive power...

Q Was that a throw-weight point with them, in
the first place, or were they really --

A Well, I can only tell you that Alex Johnson
used to say to us that there are two points on which the
Soviet Union would never give ground:

One is equal aggregate.

And the other was forward based systems.

So I must say that we had all expended an enormous
amount of ingenuity, trying to figure out ways of bending
these issues, and we were unprepared for the position of
the Soviets.

B 12

Q They just made it -- huh?

A they just made it.

We had no advance warning and in Moscow, the last word I heard from the Soviet Union was that they were giving us theoretical equality, but they wanted us to deduct from that the British and the French and --

Q Is it thinkable that Brezhnev would have gone to Vladivostok to agree to something that had not been pre-approved by the Politiburo?

A No.

Q Then how could it be anything but "ratified" in Vladivostock on the Soviet part?

A Well on the Soviet side, I can only tell you visually what happened.

AND THIS I WOULD LIKE ON DEEP BACKGROUND This is just to give you a little feel for the situation:

The meeting started with two generals sitting behind Brezhnev -- and whenever we started getting concrete they started slipping little pieces of paper to him, or butting into the conversation one way or the other.

So, at the first break, Dobrynin came to me and asked whether we couldn't confine the meeting to

B 13

three people on each side -- which got rid of the two generals.

So after that, whenever numbers came up, we would explore the numbers, and then he would take about a forty-five minutes break, either to consult the two generals and, on at least two occasions, to consult Moscow.

So my estimate is that he had some basic guidelines to start with, which were within the framework of the total negotiations, and then during the night, they came up with the simplifying proposals, which was probably ratified, again, in Moscow -- at least by the Inner Group which could have included Podgorney, Kosygin and Grechko.

Q So that is to say that the Agreement was not fully negotiated in tough bargaining in Vladivostok?

A That is to say it was negotiated in tough bargaining in Vladivostok?

Q If he checked back for Politburo approval after the fact it -- I thought you said.

A I would have thought that he obeyed the guideline before he came to Vladivostok -- and then the evolution of the negotiations in Vladivostok was, in my

B 14

judgment checked back in Moscow overnight -- and the
new proposal he made on Sunday morning, almost certainly
resulted -- at least from a Politburo decision.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you speak of the 25 percent
of the U.S. throw-weight being land-based, are you speaking
of the present configuration or future configuration?

A That is the present configuration. That is
likely to be less.

Q Well, we have 1,054 land-based missiles --

A This includes our bombers.

Q This includes the bombers?

A Yes.

Q So if you take the 450 bombers, plus the
600 odd submarine missiles -- that amounts to 75 percent
of our throw-weight?

A Give or take a few percent, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President seemed to hint
last night that the forward based systems that you
mentioned a few moments ago might be entered into the MBFR
talks. Is that likely to --

A Well, this depends on the evolution of the
MBFR talks. They have received no such proposal up to now.

B 15

Q Mr. Secretary, are you defining as "bombers" in the agreement? Are "backfires" counted, or not counted?

A A lot of this is to be negotiated.

From the legislative record of these negotiations one would exclude the Backfires and the F-111 but would include the B-52 and B-1 and (inaudible).

Q From the legislative record of your negotiations -- are you referring to the Vladivostok negotiations?

A Well, October negotiations -- Vladivostok negotiations, and what has been discussed at Geneva.

Q That would exclude the Backfires?

A It would exclude the Backfires and the F-111 because the Backfires would be in a completely different category.

Q Mr. Kissinger, you indicated in Vladivostok that you felt that the Agreement would meet the approval of Senator Jackson. Had you had some previous discussion with him?

A I may have been a little bit hasty, because it seemed to me that since he criticized the previous Agreement for setting levels too low, that I was not quite

B 16

prepared for having disagreement attached for setting the
levels too high.

And secondly, since Senator Jackson had always
insisted that the major fault of the previous agreement was
the absence of equality -- and since this Agreement achieved
an equality in all of the categories and excluded all of
the items that he had always said should be excluded --
I got carried away by the heady atmosphere of Vladivostok.
It must have been the heat. [Laughter.]

Q You were dazzled.

Q Mr. Secretary, could I -- I am having a
little difficulty with your discussion about whether or not
there are permitted additional weapons and that sort of
thing.

And also, the whole thing of the intelligence
estimate, that you are suggesting that they may be going ahead
with future programs that we hadn't heard of yet.

A Just a minute, now just a minute, that just
isn't true.

In every NSC briefing, for a period of over a year
and a half, we have been presented intelligence estimates
of what the Soviets would be likely to do in the MIRV field

B 17

and what they were likely to do in the field of total numbers.
So that this is nothing new. These numbers were
substantially accepted by the whole intelligence community
but they were refined in the period before -- but they
didn't change much of the intelligence estimates that had
been basically accepted and never challenged.

Q Well all right --

A The fact that you may have not heard of them
before --

Q If I have the content of this straight,
if I understand it correctly, on the basis of generally
understood publications --

A Yes.

Q We have had about 800 deployed MIRVs.

We have had publicly announced plans for something
in the neighborhood of a thousand.

And this Agreement sets a level of 1,320.

The Soviets, at this point, as far as we know, don't
have any MIRVs.

A That is right.

Q So the Agreement in 10 years would permit
them to build up to this 1320. And each one of those

B 18

missiles would have a certain number of warheads.

Now the thing that I'm having difficulty with
here is, obviously, it would cost billions of dollars
for them to build up to the level where we are now,
and it would take a great period of time to do it, too.

A Yes.

Q And this is a catch-up for them, as far as
the MIRVs are concerned.

A Yes.

Q And what you are saying is that we have set
this number "high" if I understand correctly -- or the
number has been set high -- or we have been satisfied with
the number set this high -- because of our fears that
they might have wanted to go way beyond where we are now.

Is that right?

A Way beyond --

Q 1320?

A Way beyond the 1320, that is right.

Q So we actually believe that they not only
were prepared to spend the billions of dollars to catch up
with us, but to go way beyond?

A That we believe that this might well be the case,

B 19

yes.

Q How long have you had that conception?
About a year and a half?

A I think any of you who have heard me speak about this problem, have heard me speak with a great sense of urgency, that if the MIRV development were not brought under control, that it would drive both sides in a direction which would become unmanageable.

And it was based on these intelligence estimates plus the fact that if the Soviet Union had decided, after the expiration of the Interim Agreement to put its MIRVS into new holes, rather than into the old holes -- then if you assumed that they were aiming to give any number -- 1,500 missiles -- 1,500 MIRVs -- we might have faced a missile force of 4,000 rather than 2,500 -- if that had been their decision. I am not saying it would have been their decision, but it was certainly their option.

Now, it is not true that our program was only a thousand. Our program was well above a thousand.

Q Our program is publicly announced.

A Well our program is publicly announced, whatever it is -- we have set the level at roughly our program.

B 20

Q It speaks -- the intention of our program was "about 1320."

A Give or take --

Q And publicly announced -- we have about a thousand.

A I haven't followed what the publicly announced program is -- I think they have announced it for five years but I haven't seen what the publicly announced program is.

Q It was projected for 1286.

That is based on what -- on the TRIDENT?

A You had the TRIDENTS and the Poseidon the Minute men -- and you will come to the figure that Murrey said.

1

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Q Mr. Secretary, on the same question that he raised, how does one logically reconcile the fact that the Soviet Union, which you say was going to be far beyond any of these projections last October and previously, or last June, was talking with us about a figure half the size of the 1320? What is the logical rationale there?

A First of all, the Soviet Union did not accept the figure--which was a little higher than half -- for a five-year period. Here we are talking about a ten-year period. Since the Soviet Union did not accept the figure, which was somewhat larger than half of what we settled for for a five-year period, which was the beginning of their MIRV program, you have a rather good estimate that for the second five-year period they would have done at least as much again, and, therefore, in a ten-year period you would have been well above 1320.

Q Who wanted the 1320? Is that the Russian figure or the American figure?

A It's substantially our figure. I'm not saying we couldn't have had a hundred less.

Q Mr. Secretary, we could have had three or four hundred less would you say?

A I doubt it.

2

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Q Mr. Secretary, that raises a basic question --
and this is the last one I want to ask -- but essentially --

A We were told, incidentally, by the Defense
Department that once you got above 700 MIRVs we might just
as well [inaudible] our program.

Q Why is that, because the cost gets
phenomenal?

Q The MIRV deployment began since you became
advisor to President Nixon.

A That is right, but the development didn't
begin.

Q Not the development; the deployment.

A Yes.

Q Now, very seriously, as you look back at
it now are you sorry you went ahead with the MIRV?

A Well, that's a good question. And I think that
is the same question that people faced when the hydrogen
bomb was developed. And it raises the issue whether your
development of MIRVs or of a weapon produces the development
on the other side, or whether by not going ahead you then
simply give an advantage to the other side.

I would say in retrospect that I wish I had
thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more

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3

thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did. What conclusion I would then have come to I don't know. But I would like for you gentlemen to remember this, megalomaniac as I am, I do not claim that I made the basic weapons decision in 1969 and '70. But I still wish I had thought through the implications of the MIRVed world more fully in 1969 and 1970. But this was not the problem we faced from '72 on.

Q Mr. Secretary, it seems to me there is a basic conflict here I would like to get squared away. If I understand correctly --

A My relation to the various bureaus is that of the Queen of England and her Cabinet, each bureau gets two hours of my time. Go ahead.

Q I wanted to ask about what appears to be a conflict between what you and the President are saying about putting a cap on the growth of weapons development and what this agreement actually provides to the extent that I understand it.

A It puts a ceiling on the numbers of weapons, in certain categories.

Q Right. And you have always said, if I understood correctly, that warheads are in many respects a key figure simply because one is killed by warheads and

C-4

4

not by vehicles.

A That is true.

Q Now, since numbers of warheads are not limited and throw-weight is not limited -- indeed, we have said that we maintain the option to build up our throw-weight -- isn't it misleading to say that a ceiling has been put on the numbers of weapons?

A In the sense that you argue that the number of warheads can be increased.

Q Yes.

A Well, we have a good estimate -- in fact, we have a certain estimate -- of the number of warheads that the Soviet Union had deployed on their present missiles because we have some idea of their testing program. And they are not likely to deploy a warhead that they hadn't tested. That's axiomatic.

So to all practical purposes we have an estimate of the total number of warheads that are going to be deployed at that period. And they have a rather good estimate of the total number of warheads that we are likely to deploy in that period.

Now, it is, of course, possible that the two sides, within the total limit of 1320, could develop warheads which

5

C-5

have larger numbers -- could develop MIRVs which have
larger number of total warheads on them than the MIRVs
that are presently designed. The question will soon have
to be raised. In fact, it is a question that will have to
be raised now: What is the advantage in multiplying the
number of warheads beyond a certain point? As all of you
know, I have never taken the view of numerical equality
as seriously as some other people.

First of all, our estimate is that in the number
of warheads, we will remain ahead in this ten-year period,
for a variety of reasons, including the greater sophistication
of our MIRVs. But in any event, we will reach a total
number in which whether you build more warheads or not it
seems extremely unlikely to give you a decisive, or even
significant, superiority. You have that theoretical
capability within the 1320 limit.

And, moreover, I would like to point out that we
intend as soon as this agreement is ratified and begins
to operate to begin negotiations on the reduction.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions about the
reduction. One you have just answered. One, does this
agreement as it now stands commit both sides to enter into

C-6

negotiation for reduction at some point, and, if so,
at what point?

A It permits both sides to enter into
negotiations for reduction no later than 1980.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I follow that up, please, if I may? As I read it, you are not committing yourself to begin the negotiations before December of 1981.

A 1980 or 1981.

Q Right, but it could begin as late as December 1980 as I read the agreement. The question really is, realistically do you have any expectation that such arms reduction talks will begin seriously long before that?

A That will be our effort. And I think that once proposals on both sides have stabilized -- you see, the Soviet Union will have to reduce their forces to get to the level of 2400. If they deploy some of their new forces, some of the land-based mobiles that people are talking about, they will have to reduce even more forces. I think once the equal aggregates have been reached -- or put it another way, once the Soviets have gone down to the level that is required, I think we will certainly urge the beginning of talks on reduction. And I have great hopes

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that we will succeed.

Q Well, at what point -- how long will it take them to MIRV up to a point where they will be willing to enter into arms reduction talks?

A Well, supposing the arms reduction brings about a reduction in the number of MIRVs and they haven't yet reached that level. So what? Then they would just not build up to the presently permitted and only build up to the newly permitted levels. I think it will be easier to have reduction talks once you are not in an open-ended arms race in which both sides are watching production programs of the other, whose scope they cannot assess.

Q Mr. Secretary, you described here, if I get it correctly, a process over these last months in which the Soviet Union point by point gave in to us while we resolutely held our ground. I guess I have two questions. What did we give up to them? And if you did not yield at some point in the last month anything to them, what's your reasoning on why this came about?

A I believe that one of the difficulties of the previous negotiations was the uncertainty of our domestic situation. Conversely, I think that they confronted a new President as an individual with whom they might have

C-8

to deal for a six-year period. Secondly, they dealt with
a President unencumbered by past history, who, therefore,
if he failed to get an agreement could go back to his
original defense orientation and really pick up the arms
race. Thirdly, I believe that they probably attempted to
vindicate the significance of detente by getting off on
the right foot with a new President or with a new
Administration.

I think it was a combination of all, plus fourthly,
they probably analyzed what I believe any thoughtful
analyst of the strategic situation would have to do--that
the field of strategic forces superiority is an illusive
concept. And I think it was a combination of all of these
factors that produced rather significant movement between
July and December -- and I must tell you quite candidly,
rather unexpectedly.

Q How many warheads do you foresee on each
side in 1985?

A A very substantial number.

Q Well, we can multiply out and figure about
what we would have. And do you anticipate the Russians
about the same number.

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A Well, I would expect us to have somewhat
above 10,000, and I would expect the Soviets to have less.

Q Do your figures work out to about 11,000,
Mr. Secretary?

A That sounds reasonable to me. I haven't
multiplied it out. I expect the Soviets to be below that.

Q Somewhat less?

A Maybe 9,000. It depends how many warheads...

Q Mr. Secretary, you say the Soviets would
have to reduce their force level --

A Could we put all the figures ON DEEP
BACKGROUND. All the figures I give I would like
to put on DEEP BACKGROUND so that you multiply it out.

Q You mentioned the Soviets would have to
reduce their forces. You mean the forces they actually
have deployed?

A The Soviet Union under SALT I are permitted,
and would reach, something like 950 plus 1401. 2350.

Q But they are not at that level now?

A Well, it depends. If you count the SS-7,
they are at that level now because what they are doing now
is to trade in SS-7s and 8s for submarine-launched missiles.

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So if you count the 210 SS-7s and 8s, they are in the area between 2300 and 2400. And if you add the 150 bombers that they have, they are about at a total level of 2500 right now. So they will have to give up probably their bomber force.

Q Mr. Secretary, what's your estimate of the Chinese nuclear capacity five years from now at a time when the reduction talks are supposed to start between here and Moscow?

A Insignificant.

Q Still insignificant?

A Well, if you talk about strategic nuclear forces, I believe it will be insignificant.

Q Dr. Kissinger, just on the subject of throw-weight again, you conceded here this afternoon that, at least theoretically, the Soviets have the potential of increasing the number of warheads that a given missile could deliver given their greater throw-weight, theoretically.

A So do we. We could increase the number of warheads on our missiles at least as fast as the Soviet Union could, because you have to assume that the Soviet Union is going to deploy the warheads which they have recently tested. You cannot assume that they are going to deploy a larger number of warheads than those they have

C-11

tested. Therefore, you have to assume that this generation of Soviet MIRVs is going to use the number of warheads that they have tested. That number is comparable to the number of warheads that we carry on smaller missiles because of our superior technology.

If either side considers it more important, we could, if we wanted to, put more warheads even on our existing missiles. We have the additional option if we wanted, to to design a larger missile to put into the existing holes which could carry many more warheads. So if you are asking about who could expand the number of his warheads more rapidly, the Soviet Union or we, I would say that over the period of the agreement I would bet on us.

Q What I was really asking is what is to prevent there being, in effect, another arms race in that given area?

A The fact that it doesn't make a great deal of sense to increase the number.

Q Yes, but you have frequently told us that what is important is the perception that each side has of the other. And I can easily see this becoming a political football in this country.

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A The capacity of this country to develop political footballs seems to me to be unlimited. (Laughter) But I'll tell you what my recommendation to the President would be. It would be that we would not go into wild multiplication until we see the Soviets actually testing something.

Q On this question of policing the MIRVs, Mr. Secretary, would you dwell briefly on that? Isn't that an area we are going to have to go into now, and isn't it tough and intricate, a major issue?

A The major issue in the negotiations now is going to be the verification issue. And it is because of an accident of Soviet design, luckily not as difficult as it might easily be. Let me explain.

The Soviets have developed missiles to carry their MIRVs which do not fit into the existing silos; in other words, which require extensive modifications of the existing silos. Therefore, we will assume that any silo that is being substantially modified will be carrying a MIRV missile. Therefore, we will be able to count the number of their missiles by the number of silo modifications of that type, with which we are very familiar and which are undisputed.

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Or to put it in another way, any missile that has been tested in a MIRV mode successfully will be counted by us as being MIRVed. In other words, we will not permit the Soviet Union to claim that they are deploying an SS-17 or 19 with the argument that it will only have a single warhead since we believe that the testing program on the SS-17 and 19 has been substantially successfully concluded. Any silo that we see modified to take an SS-17 or 19 we would count as being MIRVed.

This is one of the issues that will have to be discussed in the verification. Otherwise, there is almost no other way of verifying because you could not accept the unsupported statement of the Soviet Union that certain silos have only single warheads.

Q How can they find out about ours, Mr. Secretary?

A Because they read *Aviation Weekly*.

Q But, Mr. Secretary, to get back to this question. Might it not come down to the need for on-site inspection.

A Dobrynin told me the other day about a weapon I didn't know we possessed, and his description of it was perfect. I checked in the Pentagon. It was exactly the right characteristics. It won't come along until 1980. He

C-14

had read it in a technical journal. It didn't help us
in the negotiations.

Q Can I ask this? Might we not have to go to
on-site inspection to make certain that they are obeying
the limit?

A No. There may have to be certain collateral
restraints, into which I do not want to go now. But I
believe that it is quite possible -- we have gone over this
in the Verification Panel on innumerable occasions -- that
if we can obtain the position that any silo that accepts
a 17 or 19 missile -- and we have already told the Soviets
that this is going to be our definition -- and after the 18
program is completed, which it is not yet, any silo that
accepts SS-18 missiles will be treated as MIRVed, I think
we have a largely fool-proof method of inspection, with a
few collateral restraints.

On submarines, the problem is going to be
somewhat more complicated because we have not yet seen
any tests of their submarine-based missiles. Therefore,
we don't know what the characteristics will be. But on
the whole we would have to again assume that any submarine
capable of carrying a MIRVed missile, once the missile has

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been tested, likely will have to be counted as
MIRVed, just as all of our submarines will have to be
counted as MIRVed.

Q Well, could they have 17s and 19s in silos
that haven't been modified?

A No.

Q All those that have the new missiles have
been modified?

A That's right. And on that we have no question.
And they have never --

Q You said they had never what?

A This is the argument that we have put to
them. They have never rejected it. They've also never
accepted it. But it's the only possible -- if that is
rejected, I see no other basis for inspection.

When you talk, Peter, of on-site inspection, we went through
that drill in '69 and '70 when we didn't understand the
MIRV problem well enough and thought you could simply screw
a MIRV warhead on an existing missile. And actually, on-site
inspection wouldn't help you very much because you would
have to have a random inspection, you couldn't inspect
every missile every day. With the time delays that would
be involved until you get to the site, they could easily take

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off the MIRV warhead and put on a single warhead, have a
MIRV storage, and when you leave put the MIRV back on the
missile.

Q Just like used car dealers? (Laughter)

A Really I would not know how you would run
on-site inspection.

Q Would it be fair to say that if they rejected
the verification formula there is no deal?

A If they reject the verification formula, unless
there is enormous ingenuity in which we come up with another
one, I really wouldn't know where to begin. I think if they
reject verification it will be very hard to conceive how
there can be a deal.

Q What is your feeling? Do you think they will
accept it?

A I think they will accept it. I cannot
conceive that they have gone this far in order to blow
up the agreement now when verification is used, when it was
very easy to blow it up on numbers.

Q Unless they are buying time.

A What time are they buying? Maybe one cycle
of the defense budget. If we find out by next April that
they are stalling on verification, and if they are worried

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about us going into a bigger defense program, I think we
would have a much better chance with Congress having in
good faith accepted these numbers and then finding that
the numbers evaporate because they won't agree to really
the only reasonable inspection system that can be designed.
And there is no alternative to this inspection.

Q What is your *aide memoire*? How detailed is
that?

A It is about what I have described.

Q Is it a very lengthy agreement?

A It's about a page. It has the numbers. I
gave you the numbers.

Q Mr. Secretary, given the psychology of the
arms race up to now, why do you think that pressures
won't develop to keep improving the weapons that are
agreed on?

A Well, but to say that you haven't got
anything because you haven't got everything is a very
dangerous course.

Q I'm saying for the future, spending for
example.

A Well, whether you are improving weapons
within an accepted ceiling or whether you are driving

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the ceiling while you are improving the weapons seems to
me two different problems. It's quite possible that some
improvements within the existing weapons would be possible.
Again you have to distinguish two categories. The improvement
in the Soviet force after they reach their ceiling will be
composed of 1320 MIRVs and 1080 unMIRVed
vehicles. My guess is that most of them will be ICBMs.
The improvements that you can make in single-warhead weapons
in relation to the strategic utility are relatively marginal.
So you are asking -- we have greater flexibility making
improvements because our force is going to be composed of
bombers and other elements. Now, the area of improvement
is likely to be, therefore, in MIRVs. Now, you can improve
accuracy, and you can improve yield. Then you have to
ask yourself again, why?

The strategically unsettling effect of improvement
in accuracy and yield is not as large when it is constricted
within fixed numerical limits as it is when it is also
driven by larger numbers. I find it conceptually very hard to
see how you could get a decisive advantage by technological
innovations that are now foreseeable in the offensive forces
over the period of this agreement. I may be wrong, but I

C-19

think that by limiting the numbers of both the qualitatively
worrisome and the overall figures you have put some very
significant constrictions on the arms race.

Q But the Pentagon will surely want to try
in the technological area to see if they can do this?

A Probably. But at some point I think the
futility of this -- it's one thing when you say the other
side is building at this curve and if you don't match them
they are going to get strategic superiority. That's one
argument. Another argument is when you say you have
relatively stable forces and they are going to get
marginal improvement in accuracy and marginal improvements
in yield against fixed forces where you cannot define how
you would use it. I think that's a more difficult problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say at this
stage that the agreement in Vladivostok rules out the
possibility that either side could achieve in the next
ten years a first-strike capability?

A I would say that yes. With the limitation you
can say that there is a first-strike capability against
certain categories of weapons. I would think that the
land-based missiles on both sides are going to become
increasingly vulnerable. And that is in any case going to

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happen, with or without this agreement. Then it is up
to each side to compose its forces so that the land-based
forces are not the most significant element in its force.
And this I must say is a bigger problem for the Soviets
than for us because over that ten-year period our land-
based force is not going to be the most significant element
in our force.

Q How are we going to verify that there is
not an increase in their land-based mobiles?

A The factor of
confidence we have with respect to land-based mobiles is,
of course, much less than it is with respect to land-based
fixed. Land-based fixed we have almost a hundred percent
confidence. Land-based mobile we could be off by some 25
percent.

You have to remember now that any land-based
mobile of any quantity will have to come out of either
the submarines or the land-based fixed. So if you talk
of a few hundred, we might be off by -- you know, it
depends -- 25 to 30 percent of the total number of land-based
mobiles. And we believe that our accuracy of verification --
we know that our accuracy of that will improve over ten
years.

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Q So we are depending on their good faith to take off of something what they add on to the land-based mobiles?

A We are not at all counting on their good faith. In our judgment, we will catch two-third to three-quarters of their land-based mobiles. They could hide the percentage which we think -- the percentage of inaccuracy. But since they don't know the percentage of our inaccuracy, it would be running a risk. But that margin exists.

Q Mr. Secretary, I got the impression from you in Moscow that the breakthrough on FBS was made in Moscow on your last trip there rather than Vladivostok.

A The breakthrough on FBS was substantially made in Moscow, but the breakthrough on the British and French nuclear forces was made at Vladivostok.

Q How can you say, Mr. Secretary, that the Joint Chiefs agreed to this proposal when you say it was not completed until Vladivostok?

A First of all, there are two separate issues. The main lines of our proposals were completed before Vladivostok. And the fact that we were willing to concede somewhat lower numbers in return for larger MIRVs than the

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Soviets were willing. We were in touch with Secretary Schlesinger on several occasions on Saturday. But I think one can always assume that if the Soviet Union gives you slightly larger numbers than you were prepared to accept that this would not be vetoed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were reasonably confident that the Joint Chiefs would approve, and we were not disappointed.

Q No, that part is clear. What about the other side of it though? You were saying by implication if you had tried to go down two or three hundred you would have had a battle on your hands from the Joint Chiefs.

A Not only with the Joint Chiefs. It depends in what category the going down would have taken place.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I go back to the reduction thing just once because of the importance that Senator Jackson, amongst others, at least professes to attach? From what level, at what point, do we hope again to negotiate reductions?

A From the level agreed in these numbers.

Q Before they are attained?

A We are perfectly prepared to discuss this before they are attained.

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I must say, to say that this agreement is inadequate because it doesn't reduce defense spending, and that what we should have done is to get lower numbers when the only way we could have even talked about lower numbers is to drastically increase defense spending and to hold the increase for a large number of years long enough to convince the Soviets that we were going to drive the race through the ceiling with them, at which point we would have got vested interests in this country to accept even the figures that we were going to talk about, seems to me an argument that I find very difficult to deal with. And when at this particular point in terms of the threat to civilization, the strategic stability or any other criteria you can think of, it does not make a great deal of difference whether you have 2400 or 2200, as long as you have a ceiling against which both sides can plan for a ten-year period, something that has never happened in the entire nuclear age when both sides were constantly driven by their fears of what the other side might do. Then I believe that we had an obligation to try to settle for this and not haggle about -- well, there was no possibility for haggling except by driving the arms race.

If we had gone back to Geneva when obviously the

C-24

Soviets attach great symbolic importance to the first meeting between Brezhnev and President Ford in light of all the pressures that had existed against detente -- and I must say one other thing, that if this agreement in which the Soviet Union made very major concessions should suffer the fate of some other negotiations, then we must ask ourselves whether on the other side the whole process of detente may not be drawn into the most serious question. Because here they met every point that all the critics of detente had consistently made, actually quite unexpectedly, in which equality is achieved in all significant categories, in which the arms race in terms of numbers is at least limited, and even qualitative improvements will have to be affected by the fact that they cannot be translated into quantity. I believe that really as a country we should not denigrate this thing.

Q For comparison purposes, could you give us the figures that the intelligence community came up with about Soviet intentions or capabilities?

A Well, it's not as simple as Soviet intentions. There are some pretty sophisticated analyses that go into it. If you look at it, analyze the number of Soviet submarines, for example, that are capable of taking the missile large

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enough to be a plausible candidate for a MIRV. They look at the number of SS-11 silos that have been recently modified. You know, we could easily claim that every SS-11 silo could take a 17 or a 19. And it probably could, and it probably will over a ten-year period. If the Soviet Union had converted every silo it has and every submarine it has, it could have gone well over 2,000 MIRV missiles.

We tried to make it a more realistic assessment on the basis of those silos that had recently been modernized to take another type of warhead which is not MIRVed but more similar to our Polaris warhead, deducted those from the total number of SS-11s, made some analysis of what a rational allocation would be between SS-9s and SS-18s, looked at the submarines to see the likely candidates for MIRVing, and came to the conclusion that the number of MIRVs would be substantially above the figure of 1320.

And the lowest intelligence projection was substantially above 1320. And I might add that at no time in the last ten years have the Soviets operated at our lowest intelligence projection. The median intelligence projection is more reasonably regarded as significant both in total numbers and in MIRVs.

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C-27

A Well, I don't know whether the Senate is going
to start, whether the Senate is going to be seized with this
in the form of hearing. Our expectation is that we can
conclude the negotiation of this agreement, the most
important elements of which have after all been negotiated.
Principally the verification issue is remaining. We
hope that we can finish it in time for a signa ture in May
or June when General Secretary Brezhnev comes here. It
would then go to the Congress. We haven't decided yet
whether to put it before the Congress like SALT I or in
the form of a treaty. More likely in the form of SALT I
showing action by both houses. I would think July or
August.

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A Well, not in my view.

Q Thank you, sir.

Darius Jhabvala

-- It was my privilege to know Darius. I read his writings with constant respect, and I knew him well as a traveling companion. There were other occasions when we exchanged views.

-- One such exchange was at the correspondents' Christmas party last year. You will remember that Darius proposed to me that, since I tend to put on weight during diplomatic negotiations, the press, instead of asking for my penetrating analyses of our international problems, should simply weigh me at the conclusion of a given diplomatic effort to see how we were doing.

-- Nor shall I forget that very shortly after I came to this Department Darius called those journalists covering State together for a discussion of how best to develop a mutually profitable relationship between the Secretary and the State Department press corps.

-- Some have suggested that the true purpose was to discover how best to tutor the new Secretary in the conduct of his office and the development, in him, of an adequate degree of respect for the press.

- 2 -

-- Seriously speaking, I shall always be grateful for Darius'
thoughtfulness toward me, his concern for a proper relation-
ship between the press corps and me, and his total dedication
to the highest ideals of his profession.

-- Others have already spoken of Darius' great warmth and humaneness, his unquestioned competence in his profession and his deep and abiding respect and love for his fellow man. I of course recognized and admired these qualities, both in our relationship while I have been at the State Department and before that when I was at the White House.

-- Perhaps I could relate what they meant in our relationship.
Some of you who went with me to China last year will recall
that when we got to Pakistan before flying to Peking we
encountered the usual problem of a shortage of seats on the
airplane. The problem was so acute we had to bump the physician
who had travelled with us up to that point. Faithful to his
obligation to guard the health of those of us going on without
him, he sought out the one man to whom he could entrust his
mission; he loaded him up with pills and other ministrations,
along with instructions on how they were to be used should they be
needed as we journeyed on. That man was Darius. While he

- 3 -

maintained his customary high standards of journalistic
performance, he carried on for the abandoned physician,
passing among his mates, inquiring of their health and
seeing what might be administered to help.

-- Then, just last month, my wife and I were deeply touched
when Darius told us on the flight from Moscow to New
Delhi that he had not been to India, the land of his
birth, for 26 years. He told us about the emotional
impact his return after so many years had on him, because
Darius was really a man of many cultures and loyalties.

-- Darius never lost his love for his homeland, nor his
family ties. Indeed, he retained his Indian passport
throughout the years of his residence in the U.S. and the
all-too-short period here in Washington. He told us he
was torn between his deep feeling that perhaps he should
return to India to help his people work out their destiny
and the equally strong roots he had established here over
more than a quarter century.

-- Darius had family ties in India that are especially strong
among his people, the Parsees. He told Nancy and me

The Secretary
of State

Press Conference

MAJOR TOPICS: SALT, Energy,
Aid to Turkey, Middle East

Bureau of
Public Affairs

Office of
Media Services

December 7, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, my apologies for having made you come in on Saturday. I had planned to do this on Monday, but forgot that I have a congressional appearance on Monday afternoon and Foreign Minister [of Israel Yigal] Allon on Monday morning.

I'd like to begin by reading a brief statement on military aid to Turkey, which I am doing on behalf of the President, as well as myself.

As you know, Congress in October enacted legislation which will cut off military assistance to Turkey on December 10. As you are also aware, the Senate has now acted to extend the period prior to such a cutoff. It is absolutely essential, and the President and I strongly urge, that the House take similar action immediately.

To begin with, the congressional decision to terminate military assistance to Turkey has not served the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Rather, it undermines the ability of the U.S. Government to assist in bringing about a just settlement of the tragic conflict on Cyprus.

We had made progress with the Turkish Government in the development of steps designed to make possible the initiation of negotiations. Congressional action in October setting a terminal date for military assistance contributed substantially to the difficulties that have prevented the beginning of negotiations. Unless the Congress acts now to permit the continued flow of military assistance, further efforts by the United States to assist in resolving the crisis will be thwarted and our ability to play a future useful role will be undermined.

The United States has made it clear that it does not approve of actions taken by Turkey on Cyprus. We have equally made clear that Turkey should display flexibility and a concern for the interests of the other parties in that dispute. The United States will continue to do all it can to assist the parties in arriving at an equitable and enduring resolution of the Cyprus problem. But if we are deprived of diplomatic flexibility, there will be little that we will be able to accomplish.

Even more important, the U.S. military assistance to Turkey is not, and has never been, granted as a favor. It has been the view of the U.S. Government since 1947 that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, to NATO Europe, and therefore to the security of the Atlantic community.

These are the reasons, and these alone, that we grant military assistance. They were compelling when we first decided to grant such aid; they are equally compelling today.

In 1947 our commitment to assist Greece and Turkey marked the turning point in the building of a security system which has contributed to Western security. Are we now to establish a new turning point which will mark the end of our commitment to a system which has served the free countries so well?

The security interests of the West may be irreparably damaged unless the Congress takes immediate action to permit military assistance to Turkey to continue.

This statement is made on behalf of the President, as well as myself.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would care to use this, what I assume is a first public opportunity to answer the critics of the Vladivostok agreement. I had in mind especially two points. One, the argument that the number you agreed upon in Vladivostok is too high and really wouldn't stop the nuclear arms race. And second, that the throw-weight issue, which a senior official called a phony issue, wouldn't be phony, that it would be more serious if the Soviets started MIRV-ing [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] their large missiles.

A: Let me make a few comments about the Vladivostok agreement.

Throughout the SALT Two negotiations, our negotiators strove for the following objectives:

PR 518/42

2

- First, to achieve a ceiling on the number of total delivery vehicles.

- Second, to achieve a ceiling on the number of MIRV-ed delivery vehicles.

- Third, to have these ceilings equal.

- Fourth, not to count forward-based systems.

- Fifth, not to count the British and French nuclear forces.

- Sixth, not to give compensation to any other geographic factors.

- And then we thought other technical objectives, such as the freedom to mix—which means that each side should be free to compose its strategic forces substantially according to its best judgment.

All of these objectives were achieved in the SALT Two negotiations.

Now, with respect to the total numbers. The significance of the numbers is that for the first time in the nuclear age a ceiling has been put on the strategic forces of both sides. For the first time in the nuclear age, for a 10-year period, the arms race will not be driven by the fear of what the other side might be able to do but only by the agreed ceilings that have been established. This can be justly described as a major breakthrough, and its significance becomes all the more clear if one compares the numbers not with some hypothetical model that one might have in mind but with what would have happened in the absence of this agreement.

In order to reach these numbers, the Soviet Union will have to reduce slightly its strategic forces by some 5 percent, I would guess. If this agreement had not been reached, all our intelligence estimates agreed that both with respect to MIRV's and with respect to total numbers of forces that the Soviet Union would build, would be considerably larger than those foreseen in the agreement, giving us the problem of whether we were to match these forces or whether we would permit a growing numerical gap against us to arise. So it is not a fair comparison to compare these figures with some abstract model but only with: One, the reality of existing strategic forces, and two, what would, according to the best judgment of our intelligence community, have happened in the absence of such an agreement.

With respect to the argument that at this level a substantial capacity for overkill exists, this would be true at almost any foreseeable level, or at any level that has been publicly suggested by any of the protagonists in this debate. This is a problem that is inherent in the nature of nuclear weapons and in the size of existing nuclear stockpiles.

So, I repeat, the significance of this agreement is that for a 10-year period, it means that the arms race will not be driven by the fear of each side of the building capabilities of the other side.

Now, the argument that it does not stop the qualitative arms race. It is of course extremely difficult to stop qualitative changes in the best of circumstances,

because it is very difficult to control what one is not able to describe, which is inherent in the nature of technological change. However, it reduces substantially the incentive of an unlimited qualitative arms race. The nightmare in qualitative changes has always been the linkage of qualitative change with quantity. And it is the combination of technological improvement with increases in numbers that has produced the various models for strategic superiority that people were concerned about.

It is extremely difficult to conceive how, under the provisions of this agreement, foreseeable technological changes—if either side acts with a moderate, with even a modicum of circumspection—can produce strategic superiority.

And this gets to the throw-weight point and to the adjective "phony" as applied to the throw-weight point. It is rather difficult to be drawn into a debate about an adjective, taken out of context from a deep background discussion. But let me sum up my views with respect to throw-weight.

Throw-weight is of course one measure of strategic power. Throw-weight is significant when it is converted into numbers of warheads and if these warheads are of sufficient accuracy to threaten a definable part of the opposing side's target system. It therefore is a function both of the power of the weapons and of the vulnerability of the targets. If one side acquires additional throw-weight, the other side has the choice either of increasing its throw-weight or reducing the vulnerability of the targets. For example, putting larger throw-weight missiles into our holes does not reduce the vulnerability of our silos. It increases the vulnerability of Soviet silos.

> "For the first time in the nuclear age ...the arms race will not be driven by the fear of what the other side might be able to do but only by the agreed ceilings that have been established."

The major target system that is threatened by increases of throw-weights are land-based silos. Over a period of 10 years these are likely to become vulnerable on both sides, regardless of the throw-weight that either side has, simply by improvement in accuracy and improvements in yield.

Under the agreement, the United States has the ability to increase its throw-weight substantially if it is judged in our interests to do so. Even though there is a limitation on building new silos, our existing silos can accommodate missiles of a throw-weight many times larger than the one we now have. And if we increase them by the permitted 15 percent, we can increase the throw-weight even more. So there is no effective limit on the increase in our throw-weight if we decide to match the Soviet throw-weight.

[to] 3

We must remember, moreover, that the decision to accept the differential in throw-weight was made six years ago, or 10 years ago, as a unilateral decision by the United States and has nothing to do with this agreement.

But the major point I want to make is this: We have the possibility of increasing our throw-weight. We have also the possibility of increasing the invulnerability of our forces by reducing reliance on land-based silos and increasing the number of our submarine-based missiles. We will not match throw-weight simply for the abstract purpose of being equal in every category. We will take whatever measures are necessary to assure the invulnerability of our forces and to maintain strategic equivalence. If we should determine that we need to increase our throw-weight, we will do so, and there is nothing in this agreement to constrain us from doing so. And therefore from this point of view, the throw-weight argument is an unreal issue.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, I am sure there may be more questions about SALT, but I can't think of them at the moment, so I would like to ask you whether—

**A:** I am able to answer without a specific question.

**Q:** Three weeks ago, in Chicago, you made a major speech calling for international cooperation to attack the energy problem and achieve a basis of consumer solidarity. Now, have you had any indications that this is going anywhere, that it is making an impression in Europe, and, in that connection, do you intend next week while you are over there in Brussels to work on this at all?

**A:** The history of the discussion with respect to consumer solidarity since the Washington Energy Conference has been that in fact there has always been more progress than has been generally apparent. For example, in the interval between the Washington Energy Conference last February and October of this year, there was set up the International Energy Agency, and the system of emergency sharing which creates at least a safety net in the case of some new embargo. Since then I have made specific proposals on how to take the next step in conservation and financial solidarity at Chicago.

We have had preliminary explorations with other consumers on that subject, specifically with the Federal Republic [of Germany] and with Japan and with others. And we are optimistic that the basic objectives of my Chicago speech can be realized and will be realized. There will be technical disagreements about the size of the fund and other matters of this kind, but I am basically optimistic that the objectives that we set ourselves will be achieved, perhaps in an undramatic fashion.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, to put another way the same question—why is it that the United States has not yet announced its own program of conservation measures?

**A:** The President, as he stated in his October speech to the Congress, wanted to give, and intends to give, the

system of voluntary restraints a maximum opportunity to work. The President went over my Chicago speech in great detail before I gave it. He is fully aware of the domestic implications of the international program we have set forth. And, based on extensive conversations I have had with him, I am certain that the United States will, in a measurable time, take the measures that are indicated by our program.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, to return to the SALT question again, a senior American official was quoted as saying that the figures agreed on MIRV levels could have been lower. What did he mean? If they could have been lower, why were they not lower?

**A:** There are too many senior officials speaking on background. [Laughter.]

**Q:** I would think so, also, sir.

**A:** I was saying that the MIRV limits resulted substantially from American proposals and not from Soviet proposals. Basically, the judgment of our Defense Department was that once the MIRV's went beyond the point where, over a period of time, the land-based missiles might become vulnerable, a difference of a few hundred was not decisive. And therefore we geared the MIRV limits to a minimum program that we had established as being in the interest of our own security and made the proposed number consistent with that program. No major attempt was made to see whether a hundred less would have worked.

**Q:** Well, isn't that one of the major points in which the agreement is being criticized; namely, that these differences amount to—for example, in the case of a Trident submarine a difference of 24 missiles can involve an expenditure of over a billion dollars per submarine. Is that not the basis for the criticism by Senator [Henry M.] Jackson, particularly, that the agreement can result in the expenditure of additional billions of dollars beyond which the United States originally planned its own program?

**A:** That is certainly incorrect. These levels do not involve expenditures beyond the levels that the United States had planned. But what the critics would also point out is that the levels at which we would have had to spend if the arms programs of both sides had gone on in an unconstrained manner—the very people who had insisted all along on numerical equality—are now accusing us of having too high levels of arms, at a level of equality below the existing Soviet forces and substantially below the foreseeable Soviet forces. Therefore the alternative to this agreement is an unconstrained situation, according to the very dicta of equality which would have been that we would have had to spend considerably more than we will have to spend under this agreement. And this agreement does not make us spend any more than we had planned to spend to begin with.

4

Q: I thought Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger yesterday indicated that it would, sir.

A: I think Secretary Schlesinger indicated yesterday that in composing our forces, some additional—I do not believe that he meant to indicate that it required additional expenditures beyond those planned; he may have meant to indicate that it might involve additional expenditures beyond those that are now being spent.

Q: Mr. Secretary, we have become so insured to catastrophe that the figures 2,400 and 1,320 have an almost reasonable sound. But the projection has been made that by 1985 under this agreement the United States will have about 11,000 warheads and the Soviet Union 8,000 or 9,000. What would the warhead figure have been without this agreement?

A: Well without this agreement, on the projections of Soviet forces, they could have ranged anywhere from 20,000—certainly above 11,000, even for the Soviet forces. And again, I repeat, one has to compare here what would have happened without the agreement.

Secondly, one has to analyze the significance of the fact that a ceiling exists so that now, as I said before, the arms race is not driven by the expectations of each side or the worst fears of each side.

Thirdly, when people say one should have held out for lower numbers, the operational significance of holding out for lower numbers would be a substantially increased budget for our strategic forces next year. The only way we could plausibly have achieved lower numbers is to begin building up our strategic forces dramatically in order to produce an incentive to reduce numbers on the other side. On the basis of existing trends, where the gap would be increasing against us if we didn't increase our numbers, the incentive to achieve ceilings would decline and not increase. And therefore, all these propositions must be seen in terms of the alternatives and not simply as abstract statements of desirable objectives.

Q: The projected figures I gave are ceiling figures, but do they not also represent the inherent and enormous overkill of which you spoke?

A: The word "overkill" is a figure of speech. If either side aims to exterminate the civilian population of the other, then it represents overkill. If you want strategic forces for specific military objectives, then whether it represents overkill gets you into complicated areas of strategic analysis. If the figure had been 200 less, this so-called overkill problem would not have been substantially affected.

Once you have achieved a ceiling on strategic forces and a ceiling on MIRV's, it is our judgment that the follow-on negotiations for reductions will be a lot easier than they will be under conditions where both sides are still increasing their forces. Because the very argument that I have made of why it was not decisively different whether the level was 2,400 or 2,200 or for that matter 2,000 will then work in favor of the reductions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on your last trip to China the announcement came that President Ford would be going there next year. And also he has mentioned that he wanted to maintain the momentum of development of relations. What effect will this have on our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, and what effect does it have toward establishing relations with the mainland?

A: We have stated constantly, since the signing of the Shanghai communique that our objective was to bring about over a period of time normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States. The visit of the President, following on the discussions that I have had in Peking, will be one further step along that route. The timing, the methods, and the forms remain to be determined as time goes on.

> "We will take whatever measures are necessary to assure the invulnerability of our forces, and to maintain strategic equivalence."

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you believe the Trudeau-Ford meetings last week did anything to alleviate a possible trade war between Canada and the United States, and could you give us your explanation for the rather cold reception given to Trudeau by the administration?

A: First of all, I think that the meetings between the Prime Minister and the President contributed substantially to the improvement of relations between the two countries. I read that Prime Minister Trudeau was given a cold reception; this was certainly not our intention. It was an unofficial visit. It was always understood to be an informal visit. We followed the protocol that is used for these visits. I attended all the meetings. And the relationship between the Prime Minister and the President was unusually cordial. And in fact, after the formal part was over—I don't know whether that was announced, but the President took Trudeau to the family quarters, and the Prime Minister and the President and the two Foreign Ministers sat around and had drinks for another hour. So I just don't agree that it was a cool reception. The meeting was extremely cordial. And insofar as good personal relations between leaders contribute to easing foreign policy decisions, I think it made a major contribution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on the back-down on the oil, will the United States retaliate in any way?

A: The back-down on the oil is a complicated problem, because it is a major domestic issue in Canada. And I think this is an issue that Canada and we will have an opportunity to discuss over many months.

Q: Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Scali [U.S. Representative to the U.N. John Scali] made a speech to the

5

United Nations yesterday that indicates we are taking a new tack, a new policy, toward that organization. Could you expand on that, please?

A: We have been disturbed by some of the trends in the United Nations. We believe that it is unfortunate that there is a bloc that votes automatically, regardless of the merits of the dispute. And we have some questions about the procedures that were adopted on various deliberations. We believe that if the United Nations is to fulfill its functions, it is essential for the debates in the General Assembly to be related at least to some extent to the merits of the dispute rather than to automatic voting patterns. And I think there must be a scrupulous observance of the charter and of the procedures. We thought it was desirable for Ambassador Scali to express our concerns.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there were two rather interesting developments in the Middle East in the last couple of days. One, Prime Minister [Yitzhak] Rabin's statement that Israel was prepared to make far-reaching territorial compromises; and, a day or so before that, a story in Haaretz in which Rabin was said to be willing to drop Israel's previous demand for a declaration of nonviolence from Egypt in return for demilitarization of the Sinai and creating a de facto situation. To what extent do you believe that these apparent concessions have made it easier for a new round of negotiations to begin with Egypt?

A: Well, as you know, Foreign Minister Allon is coming here tomorrow. And to put minds at ease, I will be meeting him at the airport. We will then have discussions as to what the next steps might be.

We have felt very strongly that this phase of Middle East diplomacy should be done with a minimum of public declarations. And I don't believe that I would be contributing to progress by adding my voice to all of the perhaps excessive speculations that have already been made. We hope that progress can be achieved.

Q: Mr. Secretary, this week you assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that through interested groups you would know whether the Russians were violating certain agreements they had reached with you.

A: Senate Finance Committee.

Q: Right, Finance—my accent. But at the same time, you testified that you could only speculate whether the decline by about 40 percent in 1974 was a result of decisions by applicants or whether it was affected by our administration's inability to live up to the terms of the trade agreement. Which statement is operative?

A: I said that we would know whether applicants would be restrained from applying, whether there would be harassment of applicants, whether visas would be granted in relation to the numbers of applications, through a variety of sources.

We are still operating under the old guidelines, where nobody is claiming that these three principles are being

rigidly observed. So we still are reasonably confident that what I said is achievable; that is, that we will know whether there is interference with applications.

Q: But you don't know yet.

A: Not that I would want to speculate publicly.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you talked before about the energy problem. I would like to go back to that. You said the United States will in the measurable period of time take certain steps. Is the administration now considering steps such as higher taxes on gasoline purchases or restrictions on gasoline purchases? Are those concrete steps you are considering? And is the measurable period of time you are talking about when the President has to address the Nation at the time of the State of the Union?

A: Well, I have some idea of the program the President is now considering. I think the announcement of such a program obviously has to be left to the President. I would be surprised if it were delayed much beyond the address to the Congress when it reassembles. And that this is the time period in which I think the decisions will be taken. What the specific measures are, I think I will have to leave for Presidential announcement.

Q: It goes beyond volunteer efforts.

A: That is my impression.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on the international aspects of that, you referred earlier to your belief that the program for financial assistance to deficit countries, the $25 billion program, would be achieved ultimately despite some technical objections to the form and the size of it. Could you be more explicit, sir? Prime Minister Trudeau has expressed publicly his preference to go the IMF [International Monetary Fund] route. So did West German Chancellor [Helmut] Schmidt. And could you also tell us what your hopes are for bringing France into a degree of cooperation with the industrial nations' policy?

A: With respect to the financial facility, the decision that the industrial nations have to make is whether they will finance their deficits at least to some extent by their own efforts or whether they want to put themselves into a position of being completely dependent on the producers for financing those deficits. This is an essentially political decision that they have to make.

We believe that it is important for the consuming nations to create at least some financial mechanisms to take care of at least some of the most difficult problems associated with the balance of payments.

We found in the initial discussions of the emergency sharing program that many technical objections were voiced which, as the program became refined were overcome. I still believe that when the problem of financial solidarity is viewed in its wider perspective, as something other than a purely technical financial problem, but something having to do with the political solidarity and in some respects the domestic tranquillity of the advanced consuming nations, that the advantages of doing it

6

initially through methods such as we proposed will
become overriding.

Now, with respect to France—we have always favored French participation in the efforts that we are proposing. The French have suggested a producer conference. We are not opposed to a producer conference in principle. But it is misleading to give the impression that there is no consumer-producer dialogue going on. The United States is engaged in an active consumer-producer dialogue through a number of commissions we have set up, such as with Saudi Arabia and Iran—through the frequent exchanges we have with Algeria. So we are engaged in a very active consumer-producer dialogue. The question we face is whether we want a consumer-producer conference in which all the consumers or most of the consumers meet most of the producers in a multilateral framework. The only advantage of a multilateral framework is if there is a degree of consumer solidarity and a degree of consumer agreement as to basic approaches. Otherwise, the producer conference will merely repeat the bilateral dialogues that are already going on.

Therefore the United States is prepared in principle to go along with a producer dialogue on a multilateral basis if it is preceded by consumer cooperation. And we are prepared to find mechanisms by which France can associate itself with this consumer cooperation.

It is our impression that this problem is soluble. It is certainly soluble from our side, because we have no interest at all to exclude France, and I think it is in the common interest of both consumers and producers that we proceed by the methods that I have outlined.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in connection with your opening statement on aid—the aid bill and the possible damage that would be done by the House turning down the aid bill, on the relationship with Turkey. You have said a number of times in the past that you have been on the verge of achieving a breakthrough on the Cyprus question.

Where does that stand now? Can you offer the House any hope that if they approve the bill that at some period before the cutoff date you will be able to achieve a breakthrough?

A: Let me make two separate points:

First, military aid to Turkey is not given primarily in the context of the Cyprus question. Military aid to Turkey is part of the overall defense of the free world. It has always been considered as an essential part of NATO and given the foreseeable crises in the eastern Mediterranean, it would seem to us axiomatic that one should not drive Turkey out of a defense relationship with the United States at this particularly crucial period.

So the fundamental point we are making is that military assistance to Turkey is not a favor we do to Turkey. It is a reflection of a basic relationship.

Secondly, on negotiations with respect to Cyprus, the United States has indicated on a number of occasions that, in our view, concessions should be made by Turkey—that we would use our influence in that direction. And

we have talked to the Greek, Cypriot, and Turkish Governments in that sense.

The congressional action in October provided a major setback to these efforts. The domestic crisis in Turkey was another principal factor.

We believe that over a period of the next few months, progress in getting negotiations started can be achieved. Indeed it was my intention, well known to the parties long before this issue came up and the appointments had been made, to talk to both the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers at some length, within the framework of the NATO meeting, to see whether matters could not be moved forward.

Now I would like to emphasize that the question of military aid to Turkey does not indicate any particular predilection toward Turkey, nor does it indicate any support for Turkey on the particular issues that are before us in Greek-Turkish negotiations or on the Cypriot issue. It is to be seen in the context of the overall security of the West.

I do believe that progress is possible in negotiations on Cyprus, and the United States is certainly prepared to use its influence in the direction that I have indicated.

> "It has been the view of the U.S. Government since 1947 that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, to NATO Europe, and therefore to the security of the Atlantic community."

Q: Mr. Secretary, last Tuesday, during your second session before the Senate Finance Committee, you were asked by Senator Byrd [Harry F. Byrd, Jr.] to confirm that Soviet action during the October war was a violation of the May 1972 U.S.—Soviet agreement on detente. And you candidly admitted that Soviet action was indeed in violation of that agreement. What has happened since the last war to indicate to you that Soviet action during another war, if another war would erupt in the Middle East, would not be a violation?

A: My answer—the question was a little more specific, and my answer was more precise.

The question was: If the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate in the war in the Middle East, that this would constitute a violation of the principles that have been established. And I would have to say that if the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate, this would be considered a violation of the principles.

We are seeking to produce the maximum incentives for Soviet restraint on a global basis, including the Middle East, through a variety of measures, including of course direct conversations on the subject. I would say that in

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fact the SALT agreement ought to provide incentives for restraint if it is viewed as it should be—as a political, and not only a military, decision.

What the Soviet Union will do in a specific crisis, I cannot now foretell. Our attitude, in any event, is clear: We do not believe that either of the superpowers should encourage a widening of any conflict that might arise.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, as you are aware, sir, the governments of the Middle Eastern countries and citizens of those countries are using their oil money to buy into Western industries—most recently in Germany, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to buy into Lockheed Aircraft in this country. Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense indicated some reservations about any third countries and their nationals buying into key American industries, particularly defense industries and particularly those which have access to classified information. What could you tell us is the official U.S. position on this, and have we made representations to other governments?

**A:** No, we have not made representations to other governments, partly because we are not absolutely clear what the nature of the representation is that we ought to be making since, on the one hand, we are trying to get them to spend oil income in this country.

What we are doing is to start a study on the implications of substantial investments, at least in the United States—how we can keep track of them and what the complete implications are—or at least to identify the dangers against which we should guard. We have just begun thinking about this, and it will take us several weeks to form a clear judgment.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, this morning the Venezuelan Government announced nationalization of U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel the first of the year. Now the companies apparently have agreed to the terms of the settlements, so that legalities don't arise—but I was wondering whether you, in general, have any attitude toward this, and whether you foresee any trend in Latin America along this line?

**A:** Well I have not yet seen the precise terms of the settlement. It is my understanding that the expropriation was negotiated with the companies, and my impression is that the companies are not dissatisfied by the terms.

The U.S. position is that while we do not recommend expropriation, and indeed, while it runs counter to the investment of private capital—which may be one of the best sources for the underdeveloped countries of capital—we do not, as a government, object to it if there is fair compensation and due legal process. And this seems to have been the case in Venezuela, though I want to study the precise terms.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, let's just get back to your Chicago speech. What kind of time scale do you envisage, and when do you think and how will you certify that the

consumers have made—in the main expressed—sufficient solidarity to the producers. And in that sense, how do you envisage bringing France into it?

**A:** We believe that substantial progress toward consumer solidarity can be made within the next three or four months. We will know when adequate consumer solidarity has been achieved. We have rather clear ideas. They are, after all, the yardsticks that we have laid down in the Chicago speech.

On the other hand, we won't pretend that there is consumer solidarity when there isn't, and if there isn't we will continue our own consumer-producer dialogue.

**Q:** Well at what point—I mean at what point do you think France can be persuaded that she has made the right gestures?

**A:** We are not interested in "gestures;" we are interested in reality. And we are not looking for excuses by which to pretend that solidarity has been achieved. There is a rather clear program—progress toward a program—that would enable us to proceed with a multilateral producer dialogue, and we think this can be settled amiably and with goodwill. I believe that the conversations between President Ford and the French President in Martinique are going to make major progress toward this objective—at least this is the attitude with which we will approach it.

> "We are seeking to produce the maximum incentives for Soviet restraint on a global basis, including the Middle East, through a variety of measures, including of course direct conversations on the subject."

**Q:** At Rabat—but before the Arafat [Yasir Arafat, Chairman Palestine Liberation Organization] visit to the General Assembly where he was hailed—President [Anwar] Sadat of Egypt promised you that he would continue along with your step-by-step strategy on the Middle East. Now that position of Egypt seems a good deal more awkward than it may have seemed at the time, and you are seeing Allon, and Mr. Brezhnev [Soviet General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev] is going to Cairo in January. Is Egypt still able to deliver on this promise, and what initiatives do you have with the Egyptians between now and the Brezhnev visit?

**A:** As I have pointed out, we believe that the next phase of Middle East diplomacy will be most effective if we don't speculate about the intentions of various parties. I have heard nothing so far to indicate that the positions that were publicly announced at the beginning of November have changed. Obviously, the Middle East is a volatile area in which conditions can change. I have not heard anything to this effect, nor do I have any

8

indication that it has happened, so we just have to
see what—

Q: To follow up—when are you going to see your
next Egyptian official? And where?

A: No plans exist right now for my seeing any
Egyptian official.

Q: Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson, in the memorandum he distributed yesterday, called on his colleagues to send back the SALT agreement, as it stands now, on the grounds that the numbers are too high.

What would be the effect on overall political relationships with the Soviet Union, if in fact you were not able to get approval of the agreement, if in fact it were signed with the numbers as they are now?

A: I would say two things: If the Senate or the
Congress wants to send back the agreement to us with
instructions to get lower numbers, they had better send
with it an authorization in the appropriations bill for
$5-$10 billion to increase our strategic forces. It doesn't
make any sense to instruct us to get better numbers
without, at the same time, being prepared to pay the
price of the arms buildup that will be the only possible
incentive by which an agreement for lower numbers
could be achieved.

Of course the point might then also be reached at
which 2,400 would represent a reduction of the overall
forces of both sides, and so some theoretical satisfaction
might be achieved politically.

One would have to say that the Soviet Union made
very major concessions in Vladivostock. Anybody famil-
iar with the negotiating record must know that the Soviet
Union gave up its position on a whole range of issues.

Now if this too leads to a divisive debate in the United
States, and if the pattern of the trade bill is repeated, I
think then the Soviet Union will only be able to conclude
that a political detente with us faces domestic difficulties
of an insuperable nature in the United States.

And therefore I believe that the consequences of such
an action would be extremely serious on the political
level. And the consequences in terms of the arms race
would be equally serious. To refuse this agreement with-
out being prepared for a massive increase in defense
spending, especially on strategic forces, would compound
all the difficulties that we confront.

Q: Mr. Secretary, when you were in South Korea
with President Ford, did you discuss with President Pak
[Pak Chong-hui] the release of the political prisoners and
the restoration of a democratic government, in view of
the strong congressional opposition to further military
aid to such a repressive regime?

A: The Presidential Press Secretary [Ron Nessen]
pointed out in Korea that the subject was discussed, but
it wouldn't be appropriate to go into detail.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much
for your time this morning.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

#42

December 7, 1974

No. 518

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

DECEMBER 7, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, my apologies for having made you come in on Saturday. I had planned to do this on Monday, but forgot that I have a Congressional appearance on Monday afternoon and Foreign Minister Allon on Monday morning.

As you know, Congress in October enacted legislation which will cut off military assistance to Turkey on December 10th. As you are also aware, the Senate has now acted to extend the period prior to such a cut-off. It is absolutely essential, and the President and I strongly urge, that the House take similar action immediately.

To begin with, the Congressional decision to terminate

For further information contact:

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2

military assistance to Turkey has not served the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Rather, it undermines the ability of the United States Government to assist in bringing about a just settlement of the tragic conflict on Cyprus.

Congressional action in October setting a terminal date for military assistance contributed substantially to the difficulties that have prevented the beginning of negotiations. Unless the Congress acts now to permit the continued flow of military assistance, further efforts by the United States to assist in resolving the crisis will be thwarted, and our ability to play a future useful role will be undermined.

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Even more important, the United States
military assistance to Turkey is not, and has never been,
granted as a favor. It has been the view of the United
States Government since 1947 that the security of Turkey
is vital to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, to
NATO Europe, and therefore to the security of the Atlantic
Community.

These are the reasons, and these alone, that we
grant military assistance. They were compelling when we
first decided to grant such aid. They are equally compelling
today.

In 1947, our commitment to assist Greece and
Turkey marked the turning point in the building of a
security system which has contributed to Western security.
Are we now to establish a new turning point which will
mark the end of our commitment to a system which has
served the free countries so well.

The security interests of the West may be irrepara-
bly damaged unless the Congress takes immediate action to

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This statement is made on behalf of the President
as well as myself.

Q Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would care
to use this, what I assume is a first public opportunity
to answer the critics of the Vladivostok Agreement. I
had in mind especially two points. One, the argument that
the number you agreed upon in Vladivostok is too high, and
really wouldn't stop the nuclear arms race. And, second,
that the throw-weight issue, which a senior official called
a phony issue, wouldn't be phony, would be more serious
if the Soviets started MIRV-ing their large missiles.

A Let me make a few comments about the
Vladivostok Agreement.

Throughout the SALT II negotiations, our negotiators strove for the following objectives:

One, to achieve a ceiling on the number of total
delivery vehicles.

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And then we thought other technical objectives, such as the freedom to mix, which means that each side should be free to compose its strategic forces substantially according to its best judgment.

All of these objectives were achieved in the SALT II negotiations.

Now, with respect to the total numbers. The significance of the numbers is that for the first time in the nuclear age, a ceiling has been put on the strategic forces of both sides.

For the first time in the nuclear age, for a ten-year period, the arms race will not be driven by the fear of what the other side might be able to do, but only by the agreed ceilings that have been established.

This can be justly described as a major breakthrough, and its significance becomes all the more clear if one compares the numbers not with some hypothetical model that one might have in mind, but with what would have happened

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In order to reach these numbers, the Soviet Union
will have slightly to reduce its strategic forces by some
five percent, I would guess. If this agreement had not
been reached, all our intelligence estimates agreed that
both with respect to MIRVs and with respect to total numbers
of forces that the Soviet Union would build, would be
considerably larger than those foreseen in the agreement,
giving us the problem of whether we were to match these
forces or whether we would permit a growing numerical
gap against us to arise. So it is not a fair comparison
to compare these figures with some abstract model but
only with, one, the reality of existing strategic forces,
and, second, what would, according to the best judgment
of our intelligence community, have happened in the absence
of such an agreement.

With respect to the argument that at this level
a substantial capacity for overkill exists, this would be
any
true at almost/foreseeable level, or at any level that
has been publicly suggested by any of the protagonists
in this debate.

This is a problem that is inherent in the nature
of nuclear weapons, and in the size of existing nuclear

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stockpiles.

So, I repeat, the significance of this agreement
is that for a ten-year period, it means that the arms
race will not be driven by the fear of each side of the
building capabilities of the other side.

Now the argument that it does not stop the
qualitative arms race. It is, of course, extremely diffi-
cult to stop qualitative changes in the best of circum-
stances, because it is very difficult to control what
one is not able to describe, which is inherent in the nature
of technological change.

However, it reduces substantially the incentive
of an unlimited qualitative arms race. The nightmare in
qualitative changes has always been the linkage of qualita-
tive change with quantity. And it is the combination of
technological improvement with increases in numbers that
has produced the various models for strategic superiority
that people were concerned about.

It is extremely difficult to conceive how, under
the provisions of this agreement, foreseeable technological
changes, if either side acts with a moderate--with even a
modicum of circumspection--can produce strategic superiority.

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It is rather difficult to be drawn into a debate about an adjective, taken out of context from a deep background discussion. But let me sum up my views with respect to throw weight.

Throw-weight is, of course, one measure of strategic power. Throw-weight is significant when it is converted into numbers of warheads, and if these warheads are of sufficient accuracy to threaten a definable part of the opposing side's target system. It therefore is a function, both of the power of the weapons and of the vulnerability of the targets. If one side acquires additional throw-weight, the other side has the choice either of increasing its throw-weight or reducing the vulnerability of the targets.

The major target system that is threatened by increases of throw-weights are land-based silos. Over a period of ten years, these are likely to become vulnerable

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Under the agreement, the United States has the ability to increase its throw-weight substantially if it is judged in our interests to do so. Even though there is a limitation on building new silos, our existing silos can accommodate missiles of a throw-weight many times larger than the one we now have. And if we increased them by the permitted 15 percent, we can increase the throw-weight even more. So there is no effective limit on the increase in our throw-weight if we decide to match the Soviet throw-weight.

We must remember, moreover, that the decision to accept the differential in throw-weight was made six years ago, or ten years ago, as a unilateral decision by the United States, and has nothing to do with this agreement.

But the major point I want to make is this: We have the possibility of increasing our throw-weight. We have also the possibility of increasing the invulnerability of our forces by reducing reliance on land-based silos,

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We will not match throw-weight simply for the abstract purpose of being equal in every category. We will take whatever measures are necessary to assure the invulnerability of our forces, and to maintain strategic equivalence. If we should determine that we need to increase our throw-weight, we will do so, and there is nothing in this agreement to constrain us from doing so. And therefore from this point of view, the throw-weight argument is an unreal issue.

Q Mr. Secretary, I am sure there may be more questions about SALT, but I can't think of them at the moment, so I would like to ask you whether --

A I am able to answer without a specific question. [Laughter.]

Q Three weeks ago, in Chicago, you made a major speech calling for international cooperation to attack the energy problem and achieve a basis of consumer solidarity.

Now, have you had any indications that this is going anywhere, that it is making an impression in Europe, and, in that connection, do you intend next week, while you are over there in Brussels, to work on this at all?

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A The history of the discussion with respect to consumer solidarity since the Washington Energy Conference, has been that in fact there has always been more progress than has been generally apparent.

For example, in the interval between the Washington Energy Conference last February and October of this year, there was set up the International Energy Agency and the system of emergency sharing, which creates at least a safety net in the case of some new embargo.

Since then, I have made specific proposals on how to take the next step in conservation and financial solidarity at Chicago.

We have had preliminary explorations with other consumers on that subject, specifically with the Federal Republic and with Japan and with others. And we are optimistic that the basic objectives of my Chicago speech can be realized and will be realized.

Q Mr. Secretary, to put another way the

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same question -- why is it that the United States has not
yet announced its own program of conservation measures?

A The President, as he stated in his October
speech to the Congress, wanted to give, and intends to
give, the system of voluntary restraints a maximum oppor-
tunity to work. The President went over my Chicago speech
in great detail before I gave it. He is fully aware of
the domestic implications of the international program
we have set forth. And, based on extensive conversations
I have had with him, I am certain that the United States
will, in a measurable time, take the measures that are
indicated by our program.

Q Mr. Secretary, to return to the SALT question
again, a senior American official was quoted as saying
that the figures agreed on MIRV levels could have been
lower. What did he mean? If they could have been lower,
why were they not lower?

A There are too many senior officials speaking
on background. (Laughter)

Q I would think so, also, sir.

A I was saying that the MIRV limits resulted
substantially from American proposals and not from Soviet

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proposals. Basically, the judgment of our Defense Department was that once the MIRVs went beyond the point where, over a period of time, the land-based missiles might become vulnerable, a difference of a few hundred was not decisive. And therefore we geared the MIRV limits to a minimum program that we had established as being in the interest of our own security and made the proposed number consistent with that program. No major attempt was made to see whether a hundred less would have worked.

Q Well, isn't that one of the major points in which the agreement is being criticized; namely that these differences amount to, for example, in the case of a Trident submarine, a difference of 24 missiles can involve an expenditure of over a billion dollars per submarine. Is that not the basis for the criticism by Senator Jackson, particularly, that the agreement can result in the expenditure of additional billions of dollars beyond which the United States originally planned its own program?

A That is certainly incorrect. These levels do not involve expenditures beyond the levels that the United States had planned. But what the critics would also point out is that the levels at which we would have

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had to spend if the arms programs of both sides had gone
on in an unconstrained manner --the very people who had
insisted all along on numerical equality -- are now accusing
us of having too high levels of arms, at a level of equality
below the existing Soviet forces, and substantially below
the foreseeable Soviet forces. Therefore the alternative
to this agreement in an unconstrained situation, according
to the very dicta of equality would have been that we would
have had to spend considerably more than we will
have to spend under this agreement. And this agreement
does not make us spend any more than we had planned
to spend to begin with.

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Q I thought Secretary Schlesinger yesterday indicated that it would, sir.

A I think Secretary Schlesinger indicated yesterday that in composing our forces, some additional -- I do not believe that he meant to indicate that it required additional expenditures beyond those planned. He may have meant to indicate that it might involve additional expenditures beyond those that are now being spent.

Q Mr. Secretary, we have become so inured to catastrophe that the figures 2400 and 1320 have an almost reasonable sound. But the projection has been made that by 1985 under this agreement the United States will have about 11,000 warheads and the Soviet Union 8,000 or 9,000. What would the warhead figure have been without this agreement?

A Well, without this agreement, on the projections of Soviet forces, they could have ranged anywhere from 20,000, certainly above 11,000 even for the Soviet forces. And again, I repeat, one has to compare here what would have happened without the agreement.

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Q The projected figures I gave are ceiling
figures, but do they not also represent the inherent
and enormous overkill of which you spoke?

A The word "overkill" is a figure of speech.
If either side aims to exterminate the civilian population
of the other, then it represents overkill. If you want
strategic forces for specific military objectives, then
whether it represents overkill gets you into complicated

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areas of strategic analysis.

Once you have achieved a ceiling on strategic
forces and a ceiling on MIRVs, it is our judgment that
the follow-on negotiations for reductions will be a lot
easier than they will be under conditions where both sides
are still increasing their forces. Because the very
argument that I have made of why it was not decisively
different whether the level was 2400 or 2200 or for that
matter 2000 will then work in favor of the reductions.

Q Mr. Secretary, on your last trip to China,
the announcement came that President Ford would be going
there next year. And also he has mentioned that he wanted
to maintain the momentum of development of relations.
What effect will this have on our relations with the
Republic of China on Taiwan, and what effect does it
have towards establishing relations with the mainland?

A We have stated constantly, since
the signing of the Shanghai Communique that our objective
was to bring about over a period of time normalization
of relations between the People's Republic of China
and the United States. The visit of the President,

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following on the discussions that I have had in Peking,
will be one further step along that route. The timing,
the methods and the forms remain to be determined as
time goes on.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe the Trudeau-Fo
meetings last week did anything to alleviate a possible
trade war between Canada and the U.S., and could you give
us your explanation for the rather cold reception given
to Trudeau by the Administration?

A First of all, I think that the
meetings between the Prime Minister and the President
contributed substantially to the improvement of relations
between the two countries and to the dialogue between
the two countries. I read that Prime Minister Trudeau was given a
cold reception: This was certainly not our intention.
It was an unofficial visit: It was always understood to
be an informal visit. We followed the protocol that is
used for these visits. I attended all the meetings. And
the relationship between the Prime Minister and the
President was unusually cordial. And in fact, after
the formal part was over -- I don't know whether that
was announced, but the President took Trudeau to the

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Q Mr. Secretary, on the back-down on the oil,
will the U.S. retaliate in any way?

A The back-down on the oil is a
complicated problem, because it is a major domestic
issue in Canada. And I think this is an issue that Canada
and we will have an opportunity to discuss over many
months.

Q Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Scali made a
speech to the United Nations yesterday that indicates we
are taking a new tack, a new policy towards that organization
Could you expand on that, please?

A We have been disturbed by some
of the trends in the United Nations. We believe that
it is unfortunate that there is a bloc that votes
automatically, regardless of the merits of the dispute.
And we have some questions about the procedures that

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Q Mr. Secretary, there were two rather interesting developments in the Middle East in the last couple of days. One -- Prime Minister Rabin's statement that Israel was prepared to make far-reaching territorial compromises. And a day or so before that, a story in Ha-aretz in which Rabin was said to be willing to drop Israel's previous demand for a declaration of non-belligerency from Egypt in return for demilitarization of the Sinai and creating a de facto situation. To what extent do you believe that these apparent concessions have made it easier for a new round of negotiations to begin with Egypt?

A Well, as you know, Foreign Minister Allon is coming here tomorrow. And to put minds at ease, I

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Foreign Minister Allon will be here tomorrow.
We will then have discussions as to what the next steps
might be.

We have felt very strongly that this phase of
Middle East diplomacy should be done with a minimum
of public declarations. And I don't believe that I
would be contributing to progress by adding my voice to
of
all/the perhaps excessive speculations that have already
been made.
We hope that progress can be achieved.

Q Mr. Secretary, this week you assured
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that through
interested groups you would know whether the Russians
were violating certain agreements they had reached with you.

A Senate Finance Committee.

Q Right -- Finance. My accent. But at
the same time, you testified that you could only speculate
whether the decline by about 40 percent in 1974 was a
result of decisions by applicants or whether it was
affected by our administration's inability to live up to
the terms of the trade agreement. Which statement is
operative?

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A I said that we would know whether applicants would be restrained from applying, whether there would be harassment of applicants, whether visas would be granted in relation to the numbers of applications, through a variety of sources.

We are still operating under the old guidelines, where nobody is claiming that these three principles are being rigidly observed. So we still are reasonably confident that what I said is achievable -- that is, that we will know whether there is interference with applications.

Q But you don't know yet.

A Not that I would want to speculate publicly.

Q Mr. Secretary, you talked before about the energy problem. I would like to go back to that.

You said the United States will in the measurable period of time take certain steps. Is the administration now considering steps such as higher taxes on gasoline purchases or restrictions on gasoline purchases? Are those concrete steps you are considering? And if the measurable period of time you are talking about when the President has to address the nation at the time of

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the State of the Union?

A Well, I have some idea of the program the President is now considering. I think the announcement of such a program obviously has to be left to the President. I would be surprised if it were delayed much beyond the address to the Congress when it reassembles. And that this is the time period in which I think the decisions will be taken. What the specific measures are, I think I will have to leave for Presidential announcement.

Q It goes beyond volunteer efforts.

A That is my impression.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the international aspects of that, you referred earlier to your belief that the program for financial assistance to deficit countries, the $25 billion program, would be achieved ultimately despite some technical objections to the form and the size of it. Could you be more explicit, sir? Prime Minister Trudeau has expressed publicly his preference to go the IMF route. So did West German Chancellor Schmidt. And could you also tell us what your hopes are for bringing France into a degree of cooperation with the industrial nations' policy?

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A With respect to the financial facility, the decision that the industrial nations have to make is whether they will finance their deficits at least to some extent by their own efforts, or whether they want to put themselves into a position of being completely dependent on the producers for financing those deficits. This is an essentially political decision that they have to make.

We found in the initial discussions of the emergency sharing program that many technical objections were voiced, which as the program became refined, were overcome.

I still believe that when the problem of financial solidarity is viewed in its wider perspective, as something other than a purely technical financial problem, but something having to do with the political solidarity and in some respects the domestic tranquillity of the advanced consuming nations, that the advantages of doing it initially through methods such as we proposed will become overriding.

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Now, with respect to France -- we have always favored French participation in the efforts that we are proposing. The French have suggested a producer conference. We are not opposed to a producer conference in principle. But it is misleading to give the impression that there is no consumer-producer dialogue going on now. The United States is engaged in an active consumer-producer dialogue through a number of commissions we have set up, such as with Saudi Arabia and Iran--through the frequent exchanges we have with Algeria. So we are engaged in a very active consumer-producer dialogue. The question we face is whether we want a consumer-producer conference in which all the consumers or most of the consumers meet most of the producers in a multilateral framework. The only advantage of a multilateral framework is if there is a degree of consumer solidarity and a degree of consumer agreement as to basic approaches. Otherwise, the producer conference will merely repeat the bilateral dialogues that are already going on.

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Q Mr. Secretary, in connection with your opening statement on aid, the aid bill and the possible damage that would be done by the House turning down the aid bill, on the relationship with Turkey. You have said a number of times in the past that you have been on the verge of achieving a breakthrough on the Cyprus question.

Where does that stand now? Can you offer the House any hope that if they approve the Bill that at some period before the cutoff date, you will be able to achieve a breakthrough?

A Let me make two separate points:

First, military aid to Turkey is not given primarily in the context of the Cyprus question. Military aid to Turkey is part of the overall defense of the free world. It has always been considered as an essential part of NATO and given the foreseeable crises in the Eastern Mediterranean, it would seem to us axiomatic that one should not drive Turkey out of a defense relationship with the United States at this particularly crucial period.