DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Prof. Graubard/Kissinger
2:35 p.m. 4/16/71

G: I have had a good trip thanks to you and have you two minutes?

K: Yeah.

G: I called to ask you two small things. Any chance you will be in NY sometime soon so I can see you?

K: I may be in Boston a week from Sunday.

G: Any chance then?

K: I am planning to see my children but maybe in the afternoon.

G: I will be in NY Sat. and I would come back.

K: Check with me.

G: The second thing is sometime ago I asked about but you may not remember. We have tried to get the Soviets involved in research. I have gotten no where. Contacts in Paris are powerful but no on the scene. They are Soviets but no attachments. Anybody in the Soviet embassy?

K: Write me a letter and tell me exactly and I will raise it with the Ambassador some time.

G: I will do that and call about the Sunday.

K: You enjoyed Israel.

G: Not only enjoyed. They tired me out. The army is unbelievable. A group of charismatic? ? ? ? . The foreign office no different then foreign offices of another country. I met a fair number of high officials and they are a group of fantastic people. I would like to tell you about it before it dims in my memory.

K: Was Allon behaved?

G: He looked tired and I don't predict for him the highest xx post in Israel.
The civilians are energetic but the army is incomparable. I thought they
might ape the British but it's not true. They have no military bearing but in
intellectuality and about ours and themselves its the most striking group I met.

K: I have to run. Will see you a week from Sun.

G: I will check to see if you are coming and whether it will be possible at that day.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Marshall Green/Kissinger

4:23 p.m.

4/16/71

G: Do you think I should send out a message to Walter McConaughy on our friend going out there or are you doing that?

K: I haven't done it.

G: I could get it out on a Roger channel basis.

K: Why don't you. I have talked with Jack about it but it's essential it be no leak. It will be counter-productive. I think things are moving towards what you and I favor and I think Bob is helpful but our principals will be most reassured to get it from the horses mouth. I think you should do it and I will not do it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Otis Chandler/Kissinger

12:20 p. m. 4/17/71

K: I tried to call last night. I wanted to tell you that I thought the questions
you asked, especially about youth, were particularly sensitive. I told the
President and he asked me to tell you he felt that way too and it's the most
important question of our time.

C: Did you hear it at Kay's?

K: I did. I listened to the whole thing.

C: What did you think of the questions?

K: I thought they were better than I thought they would be. Did you?

C: I wasn't too satisfied.

K: Some questions not all that good. 70% of the questions -- strangely, you
probably think the Cormier/Richards questions were good.

C: no.

K: They were what you can get out a ball park. But the Dickinson question on
what he thinks might -- you might think it's banal -- he couldn't have prepared and
that --

C: I think so also tried to get him on the ? ? ? question.

K: Less than an endorsement of Agnew. Not an endorsement of the charges.

C: There's getting to be a deep void of the press and Agnew. I have had Agnew
in and we had a nice luncheon.

K: The poor were no poorer than at a press conference. Some dealt with
profound problems and others were offbeat so that he couldn't have prepared
answers.

C: We didn't prepare in advance the questions. He did a good job. The only
ting ? ? ? ? J. Edgar Hoover.

K: That was less than all out support.

C: Editors and publishers, it's not our business to ask questions of the President.

K: I thought -- I was at Kay's and the President called and asked what I thought.
I told him and said the question on youth was especially sensitive. I didn't know

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
Ron Ziegler/HAK
17 April 71; 12:25 p.m.

overriding

Z: John (Osborne) is going to be asking you about /State Department on the China decisions. I said they handled it diplomatically.

K: He hasn't raised it yet.

Z: You know how I handled it in the briefing yesterday.

K: I am not going that far.

Z: It was agreed that is the way to handle it.

K: Yes.

Z: Haldeman came to me about it. I said I couldn't tell the press the President overrode State.

K: No. You did the right thing.

Z: John talked to me afterward and I said there are always various views expressed by the President. He said he has taken the lead in the initiative from the very outset.

ms

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Sen. Mansfield/Kissinger
12:30 p. m. 4/17/81

M: I forgot to tell you that when I came into the SW gate I saw Peter Lisagore and he waved at me. They are calling the toher office and the staff said they didn't know a thing about it.

K: I think it's probably better that you say you were here.

M: The story I had when I saw the President a week ago Tuesday, I said it was to discuss his trip to Montana and the Northwest. He is thinking of doing that in the fall.

K: That's what we will say and if you say that we will stick to it.

M: Trip to Montana and Northwest to look at natural resources areas.

K: We will tell Zeigler to say that.

M: I am also sending a letter to Chou En-lai with a copy of the cable in case it doesn't reach him.

K: I will make that call this afternoon. You can be sure of that.

TELCONE (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

10:00 a.m., April 18, 1971

L: Henry.

K: Yes, Mel.

L: That movement into the Baltic takes place early in May.

K: Okay.

L: But they will be operating in the North Sea on an ASW mission.
Now what it -- the task force is made up of 4 destroyers and an
ASW carrier.

K: That's great, that's what we want.

L: And they will be operating this month in the North Sea, ASW exercises
and so forth, then they will move in the Baltic on the -- early in May.

K: That's terrific. I wouldn't worry about that, if there are any changes,
I will be in touch with you.

L: Yeah, let me know so I can back up from it if there are any.

K: Right, but I am up to -- just continue it as it is.

L: Yeah, okay. And we'll get together this week, there are a couple
of things we ought to talk over there, not time urgent but --

K: You and I, or the President too.

L: Well, maybe it would be all right for him on the use of air power
North that I want to talk about a little bit.

K: Maybe you and I should talk about it first. I will definitely set up a
meeting --

L: Yeah, all right.

K: Between you and the President anyway, regardless.

L: Yeah, fine.

K: Okay.

L: We'll talk about that, but it isn't time urgent right now.

K: Good.

L: All right.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD E0 12958
Authorit

By NARA Date 6/4/04

(tapes brought in 4/19/71)
continuation of the President with Mr. Kissinger

[typed 5/7/7]

jlj]

K: I'll call Ziegler immediately.

P: Well, he will probably have had a query on it. Tell him not to take any press calls today. Tell the whole office not to take any. This is Sunday and there are no press calls and just say that he can't be reached. Leave it a little bit dumb for awhile. Maybe that is the best way to handle it. Maybe they will wonder - I don't know whether they will max or not.

K: Let me find out first whether it has made any waves and if it has I will get it dampened quick.

P: I'll tell you what you do. You better give Ziegler a call to see what the situation is and you better call me back and we'll have to develop some - And what about the rest of the news, I have only see that. How did they - China things go very well?

K: Very good. And I saw last night on television Martin O'Granski had a panel of newsmen - Sidy and Kilpatrick and

P: His usual group.

K: His usual group and Sidy was just raving on about how your great initiative and even Carl Rowan had to say some gudgingly favorable things.

P: How did Kilpatrick handle it.

K: Oh, very favorably, strangely enough.

P: He usually does anyway.

K: No he was very favorable. Then they talked about Hoover and there Kilpatrick was the only one who stood up for him.

P: Well, that's true, that's true. Well I have to stand up for him.

K: That didn't touch you. They didn't attack you on that.

P: Right. Did they use some of the news summary on the news cast and stuff, from the night before.

K: I frankly did not see the news.

P: But looking at the papers today what did they, did they

K: They are carrying a lot of your stuff in the weeklies.

P: Balance is pretty good is it?

DECLASSIFIED

MD F.O. 12958
Author's
By NARA Date 6/7/7

-2-

K: Very Very good. I mean all of your stuff is exceptionally good.

P: In the weekly news summary you mean.

K: yes. The China story of course if very big and very favorable to you - everywhere.

P: The thing I feel is this. You will probably see Dobrynin Tuesday, right, maybe Monday.

K: If he comes back. He comes back either tonight or Wednesday night. Those are the only two flights they have this week. It's just barely conceivable that this China thing kept him back a few days for reassessment. But I will see him either tomorrow or Tuesday -

P: What I was thinking is this. I don't know just quite how it would work. I would delay your meeting with Bogdan until after you see him.

K: All right.

P: Or have you already set it up.

K: No, No.

P: Let me tell you why. After you see him we may want to play a very different game. Let's suppose, for example, running it out - let us suppose that we get a straight cutoff. You see what I mean. Then instead of diddling around with this sort of thing we might go immediately to the highest level. Do you see what I am getting at.

K: Oh yes.

P: I don't mean on the - this time we would have to play that kind of a game and knowing the Asians the way they operate - well they will go like molasses on things of this sort. In a moment like this they will just might bite for the whole thing. Do you see what I mean?

K: Right.

P: So rather than wasting anything with telling Chou-en-lai that we would like to have thexxx Mansfield and Scott received and the rest. Let's just wait.

K: I think that is a good idea.

P: Now he is our best contact isn't he, the Bogdan?

K: We would have to think about that.

P: I was thinking -

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
Author's
By NARA Date 6/1/67

-3-

K: Bogdan is better than Pakistan right now.

P: What I was thinking was - well - are we sure of that?

K: Yes.

P: What I was thinking of was how secure are their lines?

K: They always send a messanger.

P: OK, that's fine. I was going to say if they will send a messanger that's good. They will send a messanger to Bucharest?

K: Right.

P: Good. Otherwise we could send somebody to Bucharest.

K: Another way of doing it is when I go to talk to the North Vietnamese I talk to the Chinese Ambassador in Paris.

P: Yes.

K: And get it set up that way.

P: You see what I am getting at. We may as well play our little games. So just forget what I told you to do about Bogdan right now, OK.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: I don't think it is going to play that way. I think that the Russians -

K: No, No they are going to come.

P: They are going to come. But you know what I mean is if we now have got - we are playing for very high stakes and we have very little time left and we can't diddle around, with the Russians or with anybody else. OK

K: Right Mr. President

MVD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

XHKEF President/Mr. Kissinger

April 18, 1971 jlj/tape

K: Mr. President, Ziegler is out of town and I have talked to Jerry Warren. He hasn't had a single press question yet. And the line I have tentatively established subject to your approval is that he was talking about South Vietnamese capabilities, not any particular plans. And he was just talking about abstract capabilities.

P: Good. That's very good. Hypoth. . .

K: Hypothetical things.

P: And not about American activities.

K: That's right. And if that is agreeable, that's what we are going to stick with.

P: Fine. Laird will probably be asked.

K: No, I got word to Defense already too.

P: How will Laird handle it then?

K: Laird would say he was - essentially the same thing. They haven't had many queries either.

P: Well what this is Henry. It's the devilish press again just trying to take one little old word and hypo this thing. I think Henry it is pretty much a defensive thing on their part. They must really be up the walls. Don't you think so?

K: Oh, Mr. President. Here they have been going saying everything, that we are bringing the Chinese in, that Laos would lead to a worsening of the situation, now they see that they got beaten back from Fire Base 6, military activity is dropping again just as we said it would and the China thing breaks. They are just out of their minds.

P: Don't you sense that in talking to them?

K: Oh yeh, they are just completely confused.

P: Now the line they will probably take it seems to me to come back at it in terms of saying this is really just the Chinese people - I mean that we'll get along with the American people and that sort of thing but I don't think the Chicomos - the government - will play it that way. I think the Chicom government knows that the American people can't do one damn thing for them.

K: They are playing for the big stakes, Mr. President.

P: You think so.

DECLASSIFIED

MD 90 2958
Author

By NARA Date 6/1/04

DECLASSIFIED

MFO 12958
Autbority

By NARA Date 6/4/67

K: And I have two books full of initiatives we have taken and if they press us we will just leak them all out.

P: Oh sure. They try to say that this all happened because of their initiative and so forth but it is really amusing to me though because while Mike is honorable these other Democrats are not - the way they're all pandering around and trying to run over there to China and so forth.

K: But the problem is they never recommended any of this Mr. President, they can say whatever they want. This is yours.

P: And neither did the State Department.

K: That's right. The scope of it the State Department was sort of crying around with recognition and that sort of thing.

P: That's right. They were all talking about what was really what you call a tactical abstract thing which was really unfeasible.

Osborne

K: I showed that little note you sent me on February 1st '69 and his mouth really dropped way open.

P: Too bad that wasn't in my handwriting. It was but they copy it off apparently at that point.

K: It's a tape usually.

P: Oh yes. I may have dictated it. On the tape. But it came on - was it to you from RN.

K: Said to Kissinger from the President.

P: That's enough.

K: Oh, they know this isn't a fake.

P: He knows -

K: He knows that we wouldn't fake that.

P: It indicated that we ought to what was that one - Was that the first one

K: Well it said, I want you to explore on a highly confidential basis how we can improve our relations with Communist China and above all how we can establish reliable private channels to them.

P: Good.

K: It couldn't be more explicit. You said I want no publicity whatsoever.

P: That must have really killed him.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/04

K: Oh God, his mouth really dropped about 6 inches.

P: Because I suppose he could see there some of his mythology is knocked out and when he writes something else -

K: They know damned well that on February 1, 1969 no State Department had gotten -

P: February '69 no State Department had even talked to me.

K: That's right. This was February 1st 69.

P: Basically 10 days after I took office.

K: 10 days - that's right.

P: That's very interesting.

K: I think on this one. Sure the democrats are going to start yelling now. They are going to come up with 50 hot gimmicks but we have so far ahead...

P: What they will come up with now is why don't we admit them to the UN? Why don't we recognize them and so forth. Well, that's all premature.

... debate.

K: Also Mr. President, it helps us with the Russian game.

P: I think so.

K: Because if the Russian's see that the Democrats are more hawk-wild than you are vis a vis China then -

P: I hadn't thought of that, actually, but it's true.

K: then they have much less of an incentive to bring them in. They already don't trust them on the Middle East, then why then with China they also turn out to be a disaster. So I think - my major worry is that if we get too eager that the Chinese will start going back into a shell. And that's why the way you have played it and that's where the democrats could do damage.

P: I sure as hell don't expect to get eager at all with the Chinese. Unless the Russian thing drops. Then the Chinese may want to be eager and we will too.

K: That's right.

P: We can't just assume we will wait until 1974.

K: Oh no, oh God no.

- 4 -

P: This is one of those things where I don't believe, I think - I think our Chinese game Henry should be played exactly as it is being played. Very cool and aloof and yet the door is open now you * walk in kids. It's your -

K: Mr. President, I must tell you honestly I believe that we have a 30% chance even if we played the Russian game, of having a high level Chinese one next year. That may not have to wait until '74.

P: We want to use it. We want it at the highest level too.

K: That's what I mean. That's not at all excluded.

P: Let me say that the more I think about the envoy thing. If we are going to go I think we ought to go at the highest level.

K: Well, I think the envoy could prepare for it.

P: It might, but it might take a lot of the zip out of it too. You know what I me
Henry. You just can't tell. I don't know if there is anybody we trust to send
over there. That's -

K: That's a bit down the road yet. First we need a reliable channel.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958

Authority

By - NARA Date 6/9/1969

TELCOM (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 14, 1971

K: Mr. President.

P: Hello, Henry. I was wondering how the -- have you checked in to see
how they played the Chinese thing today.

K: Oh, yeah. It was tremendous, it was the lead item on every -- I didn't
see it myself, I was with Bob Griffin, but I talked to Haig.

P: Yeah.

K: But he says it has been a tremendous thing on television, it has been
the lead item on every television thing and on --

P: You mean rather than Vietnam for a change.

K: (laughter) Yeah, it's gone on, and on and on. And I found it helpful
also with these Michigan Editors.

P: How did it go with them?

K: Well, they asked the usual questions about Vietnam and I just said,
look, we know what we are doing and there are always more things
going on and they were very intrigued with China. They asked the
usual questions about Vietnam -- do we think the South Vietnamese
can stand on their feet? But they were not hostile.

P: Yeah.

K: They just had heard so much stuff about the Vietnamese not being
able to make it and so on and so forth.

P: Yeah. Well, this is one thing we are sure -- well, we are not as
competent about the Vietnamese as some may be; we're a hell of a
lot competent than the press has lead them to believe, you see?

K: That's right, and these -- many of them were small town newsmen,
Muskegon and Kalamazoo and Flint and stuff like that. And they were
on the whole very eager to -- they weren't asking hostile questions,
they were asking informational questions.

P: Right.

K: Because we spent about 1/3 of the time on Vietnam, 1/3 on China and a
1/3 was miscellaneous stuff.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MD E0 12958
 By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 14, 1971

P: Now on the China thing what we have to realize, Henry, is that in terms of the American public opinion, it is still against Communist China you know.

K: Right.

P: So we are not making any votes with this.

K: No, but we are quieting the intellectuals and the newsmen.

P: The intellectuals will worry, they will worry about something, but as we know as we move from the October 7 thing, that doesn't mean that we get much from them, it will just worry them.

K: That's right.

P: They will think something else is up and the whole thing has got to be played in terms of -- how about the Taiwan thing, that's sort of worrisome, not a damn thing we can do about though is there?

K: What Taiwan thing?

P: Well, I mean their concern about what we have said.

K: Right, but they haven't expressed it yet, have they, I don't think so.

P: Oh, I think there was something in the paper indicating that Taiwan was -- [complaining].

K: Oh, but that's inevitable, they have to say that. And Bob Murphy going out there I think will -- of course they will be concerned, it is bound to be a worrisome thing to them.

P: Well, Henry, the thing is the story change is going to take place, it has to take place, it better take place when they've got a friend here rather than when they've got an enemy here.

K: That's right. No, it's a tragedy that it has to happen to Chiang at the end of his life but we have to be cold about it.

P: We have to do what's best for us.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD 502958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/14/71

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 14, 1971

K: And in the long term it is essential for the values that he represents that there be continuity in our government here.

P: Yes, and that he has here an Administration that is not going to just stand by and let Taiwan go down the drain; we're trying to hold their position as best we can.

K: Exactly. For every reason we have got to have a diversion from Vietnam in this country for a while.

P: That's the point isn't it, yeah.

K: And we need it for our game with the Soviets.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: I mean it would be absolutely impossible -- we would be doing the Soviets the greatest favor if we rejected this overture and we would get nothing for it, it would lead to tougher relations between us and the Soviets, rather than easier.

P: That's right, that's right. That's what they would like for us to do, they would like for us to sort of slap the Chinese in the face but we're not going to. We're not going overboard but we're saying well, if they open the door, we'll open the door.

K: That's right. And actually now one would have to expect the Hyades (?) of a few weeks.

P: Oh, of course, nothing is going to happen for a while but that's all right, just let this rest awhile. You know, mutter around about it for a while.

K: And of course with some luck, we will get some nibble on the Soviet front now.

P: Yes, we might.

K: Well, it isn't even luck so much, it really logically ought to happen.

P: Ought to happen logically, that's right. If they are at all logical, it damn well better or they are a lot more rigid and stupid.

K: I mean there is nothing new they are going to learn about SALT, they are either going to move on that or not. And the other one, the Summit, we have been kicking around for a year.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

April 14, 1971

P: I talked to Colson and I told him to -- Dole was in and said that both Case and Brooke were making speeches on the floor today about it. Essentially to set a date and all that sort of thing and I said get hold of Brooke and tell him to keep shut for a month. You know, that's all you can ask of Brooke.

K: Right.

P: And without promising a thing, you see. Just wait a month and then wait, you know what I mean, you can't expect him to do more than that.

K: Right. Actually it doesn't make any difference what Case and Brooke say because they have been saying that for a year.

P: True, but if we could just get a few of our own to quiet down --

K: Right.

P: It's very important and the other thing that I said is to -- got to talk about this too is that the whole thing that Dole expressed is that the POW wives, we must not let them go off on a tangent here.

K: That's why we've got to keep that residual force thing alive.

P: I know that but I meant they've got to not fight on one of these withdrawal programs or something like that, you see.

K: I don't think they will.

P: Well, don't be too sure. Remember everybody is working on them.

K: Yeah.

P: And we've got to watch that as closely as we can.

K: Well, I am seeing them again in the middle of May and if there are any danger signs, I'll see them before.

P: Yeah, but we don't want them to move before then, you think --

K: Well, but what makes anyone think they are moving?

P: Well, Dole was concerned about it. You know he sees and hears from them and so forth and boy, we just don't want these gals who have so much at stake --

DECLASSIFIED

MJO F0 2958

Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCOM (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 14, 1971

K: Yeah.

P: Their husbands and so forth. They just can't throw it down the drain, just for that.

K: That's right. Well, McGovern has been after them, I know that and I wouldn't be surprised also if Clifford also were.

P: He's working on them, that's right. Well, let's keep our eyes very closely peeled on that and in the meantime, we'll work the other thing as well as we can.

K: Yeah.

P: Okay, Henry, thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

Further conversation.

K: Mr. President.

P: The thing I forgot to mention was that the DOW went to 9.32 today so that's --

K: Oh, isn't that grand!

P: Well, it's a good thing. That means that 300 points now, the low, but also it's now -- it's above what it was when we came into office, it was 9.30 when we came into office.

K: Oh, really. I didn't realize that.

P: That's right. So, it's come a long way and I think you ought to get your friend Howard Stein --

K: Yeah, I'm going to call him tomorrow.

P: Yeah, just say, now look here, Howard, things are moving -- cause he talks to a lot of people.

DECLASSIFIED

MD F0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCONE (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman

Brought in April 19, 1971

April 18, 1971

K: Bob, I've just had several talks with our leader and while I admire him in adversity, good things tend to go to his head.

H: What's got to him now?

K: Well, he had Colson and Dole in to tell them to tell Brooke and Case not to -- to shut up for a month, things might happen about speeches on deadlines. Now, first of all I consider Colson an idiot. You know he may be great at organizing these groups but the less he knows, the better off we are.

H: He doesn't know anything.

K: Well, you know -- secondly, what does it hurt us if Brooke says we should set a deadline, he's been saying that for years.

H: I don't know, I was with Dole when he was in there and Dole told him that Brooke had come out with that. The President started in on Dole on just try to get your guys to cool it for a while and they should just turn it off because they don't know what we are doing.

K: Yeah, but I really think we ought to keep things quiet now, let them hit us for a month, I don't give a damn.

H: Well, maybe you don't but it isn't going to help us any.

K: No, but nothing is going to matter as much as what we are playing with the Soviets.

H: That's right.

K: And if they find that we are counting on the thing too much, we are never going to get it.

H: He isn't in any way implying that that's what they are counting on.

K: Yeah, but even that other play we are making.

H: He hasn't given them any clues on any of that. The impression if I were Dole in there on that would be that -- just that he has a lot of things in mind.

K: Well, I think our biggest weakness is that in order to get a week's respite, we mortgage ourselves a month or two from now.

DECLASSIFIED

MD 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger / Bob Haldeman

Brought in April 19, 1971

H: Could be.

K: And I just think we are not badly positioned now, if we can just ride it out for a bit -- all the guys, the more guys that are out of the woodwork......

H: Yeah, except we have had a week with no problems because the Senate's been home but I think he's concerned about what's going to hit when the Senate gets back.

K: Yeah. Well, I don't doubt that but --

H: The key would be that we have got to tread a terrible track on with our people is the ABM fight.

K: Yeah, but that he set up rather nicely. That he has arranged won't come to a vote until August.

H: Well, he hasn't arranged it, he couldn't anyway. But the problem is our people are all set to go on an all out fight and he has got to make them think they've got to do it.

K: Oh, yeah, they've got to do it.

H: Well, yeah, except they can't get into the thing of starting to trade stuff off. If they start giving things away like judgeships and contracts and things like that, we're paying a price we don't need to pay.

K: Oh, yes, we need it anyway. Even in case of an agreement, we need that vote. Listen, you people have a totally wrong conception of what that agreement is about.

H: Well,

H: Okay, but if you get the agreement, you will get the vote.

K: Yeah, well, I don't want to handle the strategy with you but that we will know by the end of next week, Bob, anyway.

H: Yeah. All I am saying is they were talking this morning about -- you know Finch was rattling around about starting to put up the goodie packages and stuff, and they don't need to do that at this point. They don't need to do for a couple of months, then we know where we stand. We shouldn't do it anyway, I mean it's a ridiculous time to start buying people off now.

DECLASSIFIED

MD F.O. 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELCONE (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman

Brought in April 19, 1971

Page 3

K: That's right. Well, just as long as they don't think anything is happening.

H: That's the point.

K: As long as they don't think anything is happening, that's all I want.

H: We've got to stay with the line that we have to have it for SALT.

K: Right.

H: Cause that's the line we used before.

K: Right.

H: And we've got to keep pushing hard that we've got to have it.

K: Right. I know but he's so elated right now that he drops little nuggets of hints.

H: Yeah, I know.

K: To which I may be more sensitive knowing it.

H: I think you are because I was listening -- I was worried when he got started with Dole today ---

K: No, no; well, all I know is what he told me and he may have made it sound more mysterious to me than he did to him.

H: Could be. He's all excited cause the Dow-Jones is back up now, did he tell you that?

K: Yeah, oh, God, yeah. Yeah.

H: Well, that's kind of a big thing for him.

K: Oh, look, he --

H: He really went through the wringer on that damn stock market and now it's back -- it's above where it was when he came in.

K: He's been a cold-blooded gambler.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELCONE (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman

Brought in April 19, 1971

H: He's had a rough two years, he's had to sweat that one out.

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. Well, Bob, we'll know in another month, we may be having it way higher than that if some of these other things work.

H: You know, we've kept saying all along, we got to get a good brea k now and then and we just may.

K: Well, if we get one more, then the others are bound to come.

H: You didn't get any clues from your friend when you called him and congratulated him, he wouldn't say anything on the phone.

K: Oh, I had the clue that -- yeah, no, he said he was coming with some new instructions.

H: Did he?

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, he was very effusive, oh, yes.

H: Was he?

K: Oh, yes.

H: Huh. God, it really would be fun if some of that falls together.

K: Well, if it falls, part of it could fall next week.

H: Yeah.

K: God, we'd have those guys.

H: Wouldn't that be something.

K: Well, it would take another week to get the paperwork done.

H: Yeah.

K: (laughter) Jesus Christ, and announce it on May Day.

H: (laughter).

DECLASSIFIED

MJD FEO 12958

Author
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCONE (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman

Brought in April 19, 1971

K: What is he planning about Pendleton, is he going out there?

H: Yeah. He is going to go out on the 30th.

K: Good. Well, I'll be out there on vacation then, I hope.

H: Well, we'll pick you up.

K: Yeah.

H: We're not going to come back till the 5th.

K: Oh, good, well, then I'll come back with you. I'll stay over in Palm Springs.

H:

H: You can extend your stay.

K: Yeah, I was going to go on the 27th and stay till the 6th.

H: Oh, you were going to stay till the 6th anyway.

K: Yeah.

H: Okay.

K: Okay.

H: See you out there.

K: It's actually a waste of good California time to go to Palm Springs when I could be in -- well, I guess I won't work but if I get bored, I'll come over to you.

H: Stay over in Palm Springs a while longer.

K: Okay.

H: Okay.

K: Good, Bob.

H: Right-o.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD EO 2958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/4/04

Mr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer

TELECON

[typed 5/7/71 - jlj]

K: Tom, OK. Where are you?

M: I'm at home.

K: Oh, Tom, I don't know whether Haig got to you.

M: Yes he did.

K: But the President was having absolute fits about that Abrams thing.

M: You mean what's in the paper this morning.

K: Yeh. Now my problem is - you know they have all gone through hell for a few weeks and we finally got Vietnam off the front pages and we don't want to get it there again if we can avoid it.

M: Right.

K: On the other hand we want these operations to go forward. And you know what is going to happen if this draws too much flack and we give a directive to Laird to cool it, how he will interpret it.

M: Yeh.

K: Now I don't know what possessed Abrams to tell you the truth. I mean when I read the *Post* account he actually walked up to these newsmen.

M: Yeh, that is what it said. I mean after having been . . .

K: After having been clear of them.

M: That's the way they presented it but I don't know if that is actually what happened or not. Yeh, I don't know why he did that either other than of course this is more the idea - get across the idea that the South Vietnamese are still there active.

K: But the demonstrations are coming up this week. I think at this stage of the game as long as people think we know what we are doing, it isn't in our interest to get a big debate started as long as we continue doing what we are doing.

M: I couldn't agree with you more.

K: Don't you think?

M: Of course. Well I will get the word out there to him. I guess the damage is done now although I think that the least said about it the better right now

DECLASSIFIED

MDF E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

-2-

K: But can't we keep them - it also mentioned somebody, the 101st Airborne - can't they just shut up for awhile out there?

M: I will get that word out. Don't worry.

K: Because believe me we're doing our best to try to keep operations going.

M: I will get that through to everybody, Henry. [everyone's asleep] now but I will see that they get it first thing in the morning. Their morning.

K: OK. Not to stop what they are doing. Just to stop talking.

M: Absolutely, I understand.

K: Tom, have a good Sunday.

M: Right. They'll get the word. Tell the President that they will get the word.

K: Right. Oh Tom, Zumwalt was over the other day on a few - on a social call. And there were a few Navy things he raised which I told him to take up with you too. And I just want you to know that he said he would. It wasn't - it was just he had been very nice to me so I had him over for lunch. It wasn't anything official.

M: All right. I'll see him tomorrow.

K: Right

M: Thank you. Good by

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 18, 1971

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, are you in New York or here.

K: No, I'm here.

P: What's new? Anything this morning?

K: Nothing of very great consequence. In fact, there's nothing really going on. The Chinese keep needling the Russians where they put indications that they were easing their terms and diplomatic relations with us, half implying that maybe Taiwan wasn't a complete obstacle.

P: Yeah, I saw that.

K: And in Vietnam, activity is light at the moment. Abrams made an injudicious comment. Somebody asked him whether that...

P: Yeah, I saw that. I was wondering...

K: But basically they tricked him into it. They said, 'Is it possible that this drive will go into Laos?' Well, actually, they are under strict orders, Mr. President, there will not be any of these horror stories coming out because we won't use many helicopters. And it has the advantage of tying down the North Vietnamese.

P: Yeah, I know. That's true, but the orders have got to go out there that I want Abrams and Bunker to pipe down.

K: Well, I called Laird...

P: The thing is that this is what the press is trying to do. They want a story. It doesn't make any difference what he does. I don't care if he goes in and bombs the hell out of them, but don't say it. The press wants to put Vietnam back on the front pages. This one little story, God-damn it, is in two papers on the front page. Right.

K: That's right. I talked to Laird about it an hour ago.

P: Did he understand it.

K: Oh, yeah. And he's getting... he said he'd get right on the phone with Abrams and, you know, when we wanted him to talk, he didn't and now...

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/10/71

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 18, 1971

- 2 -

P: Well, he didn't...

K: But he didn't really do anything.

P: He just got sucked into it. Some God-damned newspaper guy wanted to get a story to the effect we were going back in Laos, because the news guys out there are dying. Laos is over and the South Vietnamese hold the hill and now they are moving around and they are having their award ceremony. And I think they are just trying to suck poor old Abrams into ... He just feels so compelled to be so God-damned honest all the time. Why doesn't he just shut up.

K: That's right.

P: He should just say, Jesus Christ, do what I say. Don't comment on that sort of thing, dodge it.

K: That's what I told Laird. I said there is no law against saying "no comment". I don't speculate on operation or anything like that, instead of if he says I don't rule it out, and by the time they get through writing it, they're back in. Although, if one reads the actual stories, they are not written in a particularly inflammatory way.

P: Yes, but Henry, most of them will see the little blip on television generally that says that we may go back into Laos. You must understand that it doesn't make any difference what the actual story says--it's what hits at that minute when people see on television.

K: You are absolutely right.

P: What that see on television that says the Al Abrams in Laos--when everybody was beginning to calm down about Laos they get all stirred up again. I don't every mind people getting stirred up if we are going to do something, but goddamn it, I don't what to do it....

K: Besides, he has had his shot. This is the time now when the military gains on that are not going to be that crucial. T

P: There aren't any more left to play, as he well knows.

K: Well, I think he will get the point.

P: If Ziegler gets anything on that--he can't say "No comment". If he does it will build up the Abrahms story, but if he simply says there are no plans. Don't get the impression that by Abrahms saying a silly thing like this that that is going to hold down the North Vietnamese. It isn't.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/9/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 18, 1971

P: He should nail the thing down--(Ziegler)

K: They are going to go over with raids, but there are no plans of anything of that scale before.

P: What I mean was that it is important to get across that there is no large scale operations in Laos are planned. See, they only have two weeks left to do it anyway.

K: I will work something out along those lines Mr. President, and check it with you.

P: Just get it down to a and you don't have to check with me--just cool it down--what I mean is that I don't want Ziegler to make another story out of it. Say as little as he possibly can without making another story out of it.

(End of Tape)

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/10/71

Mr. Kissinger/Jerry Warren (HAK asked for Ron Ziegler)

April 18, 1971

jlj

K: Hello Jerry, the President is having conniptions about this Goddamn Abrams quote. Are you getting a lot of press queries?

W: I haven't gotten any yet.

K: OK, well just play it very cool. Just say that that was purely - that we are planning nothing of the scale of - how can you play it to keep it down?

W: Well, wasn't he talking about their capability? Rather than what they were going to do? I don't know if that is the case or now. Maybe youxx he wasn't.

K: Well, he said it isn't ruled out.

W: Isn't ruled out. But he didn't say that we were planning such a thing.

K: Well, but there may be raids in there you see.

W: Can we play it that what he was not ruling out that we - was the type of cross border operations that we had prior to the Laos incursion.

K: No, it's going to be larger than that. Can we just say he was talking about capabilities and not about any massive new - I don't want to give away so much.

W: I know it. The way I read it was that he was talking about capabilities. He couldn't rule out because the South Vietnamese have the capability of going in there? On a limited basis.

K: WAAK MAAK Why don't you put it that way. Just say he was talking about capabilities. He was not projecting any specific plans.

W: (writing) he wasn't projecting any specific plans.

K: And otherwise shift everything to Defense.

W: OK

K: And will you tell Defense to low key it too?

W: I am on my way down to the office now. I'll be over to the church services That's where they will start to hit us.

K: Well just play it cool and don't say any more than that.
And will you make sure that Defense does the same?

W: You bet. Sure.

MJD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Under Secretary Irwin/Kissinger

4/19/71 9:04 a.m.

I: This noon Ambassador Jha is coming to lunch with me. The question will come up whether or not I am going out there on this trip. We querried both our embassies -- you may have seen the cables -- in Islama-bad and Delhi, and both Ambassadors came back with the answer that it should be postponed. I wanted your view.

K: That's my view also.

I: All right, thank you. I'll see you this afternoon. Do you have any further comments on it?

K: I think there would be nothing but trouble if you go. Going there but not going to Islamabad is bad and going to Islamabad is bad. If you go and not go to Islamabad and condemn Pakistan the Indians would be mad and if you condemn Pakistan the President would be beside himself.

I: That's what everyone has thought; I'm glad to have your view.

TELECON

Kissinger/Marshall Green

4/19/71 10:18 a.m.

NARA, Dato 5/26

K: I was not clear whether that Rogers channel thing . . .

G: That's going out.

K: Yeah, but whether that asked the Ambassador to tell Chung or we would do that.

G: Bob would prefer to go there and just have it be known. He thinks he will get a request right away.

K: And we need do nothing?

G: That's right, and he will do his own transportation and everything. I think he should and he will before and after talk with Waller, but I have told him in any case not to attrack any attention to it.

K: Good. Thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Ernst van der Beugel/Kissinger

4/19/71 10:30 a.m.

V: Why are you so early in your office?

K: Because I have to work long hours so I can go to Bilderberg.

V: How are you?

K: Fine, how are you?

V: Fine.

K: Are you in New York now?

V: Yes. I leave for Bilderberg on Wednesday to prepare your welcome.

K: If I get one more recommendation from senior Bilderberg people that I not talk to the press I'm going to cancel out on it.

V: Your compatriots are neurotic on two things: this kind of thing and on food.

K: On food? I haven't noticed that.

V: Yes.

K: It doesn't make any difference in the quality.

V: When are you coming?

K: Friday night or at the latest Saturday morning. Friday is just business meetings, isn't it?

V: That's right. But Saturday is foreign policy.

K: What time do the sessions start?

V: 9:30 or 10:00 Saturday morning.

K: I will be there by 10:00 but I will try to make it Friday night.

V: Good, then we could relax and have a chat. Henry, what do you want -- if you want to say something I will leave it up to you.

K: Why don't we wait to decide.

TELECON

Van der Beugal/Kissinger

4/19/71 10:39 a.m. page 2

By.

NARA, Dato

5/20

V: But in principle you would be ready?

K: Yes. I don't want to do it at the start. I don't want to be there as a defender of the Administration. But I suppose that there will be enough critical comments or at least enough questions raised that later on I could straighten things out or make some positive statements.

V: But everyone understands that you want to relax.

K: I will make some positive comments for, what do you think, 10 minutes or so? Do I have to decide now?

V: No, I only want to know if in principle you will talk.

K: I will certainly say something.

V: Good, and if you decide to hell with it you want to relax, we will understand.

K: No, I will talk.

V: And we will have half an hour or breakfast together. It has been so long since we have talked.

K: I am counting on that. But I leave it to you. I haven't made any appointments with anyone there.

V: And then we can fix . . . In June I will come to Washington so we can have a quiet evening . . . he is coming the week after Bilderberg.

K: I may be on the West coast then.

V: We'll see.

K: But anything I can do for him here I will be eager to do.

V: We'll discuss that this weekend.

K: Good.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Kermit Gordon/Kissinger

10:50 a.m.

4/19/71

G: I called to see if I could nail you down on the question of your willingness to talk informally without preparation --

K: for a big fee.

G: Any book you want to a value of $25.00. The tax reform act. Thurs. May 13. We assemble the trustees --

K: That's a Wed.?

G: No, Thurs. 6:30 for a drink and dinner at 7:15. You could be confident of getting away by 9:30. I hope you would be willing to talk informally about any of your concerns to get the mental juices flowing.

K: I will be happy to do that.

G: I will send you a note confirming that.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

10:54 a.m.

4/19/71

K: I just wanted to welcome you back. I think things went along well last week. We kept in touch with Irwin and Green and cooperation couldn't have been better.

R: The McCloskey thing isn't worth a damn.

That guy kax must be nuts to say no villages left in Laos.

R: I talked with McGregor and we should answer in a low level. Sullivan and those people. Not angry. Just say it's not so. Then later on we say it's been answered and too bad he doesn't have the facts.

K: If you or the President answer it it's building him up. His actions have been outrageous.

R: Not a village --

K: And Godly changed the bombing policy! That's not true or we didn't hear about it. He said the worst happened before the end of '69 and Godly only got there at the end of July. You know about Murphy's trip to Taiwan. He is going and Marshall had lunch with him and the President wants him to report to him. I think President is coming around to your position and Murphy will make it easier to do.

R: Timing couldn't be better. We have a little time.

K: He will be back before the 30th. The President will make a decision soon after that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Walt Rostow/Mr. Kissinger

12:01 p.m., April 19, 1971

R: How are you, friend?

K: Walt, how are you?

R: I have to do a little thing this Thursday -- a television show in Dallas -- and a bigger thing, which I am beginning to prepare, -- a talk at Newport in about six weeks, like the one I gave last year that got circulated. Do you remember?

K: Very well and very favorably.

R: I need to know the kinds of things on your minds that might be helpful. The media and newspapers of this country are going mad. What kind of thing would be most helpful to you and your boss?

K: The major thing -- and I'm sure you will agree -- is that it is important to give us time to work the damn thing down. We are winding down the war, but we have to achieve some objectives to contribute to our longer term security.

R: I assume the President has not altered his basic stance as articulated in his State of the World message -- that he wants an honorable and stable peace.

K: Absolutely. There are a lot of unauthorized interpreters around, and I constantly see leaks. I can assure you I know what he is thinking; the leakers don't.

R: What troubles me, aside from that, is the kind of emotionalism being seen every moment, every day at a time when there a number of issues in the balance which could go bad. For example, SALT -- there is a margin between sufficiency of nuclear materials and an attempt by them to try another Cuban missile crisis. Their assessment of our will is as important as the hardware. On the Chinese thing, I will say this has promise if we don't go nuts. If we open up Southeast Asia, it will push the other way. That is my general feeling about the world.

K: If our Cabinet had your sense of the national interest, my job would be a hell of a lot easier.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

Walt Rostow/Mr. Kissinger

12:01 p.m., April 19, 1971

R: As long as your boss sees it lucidly that we must appeal to the sense of responsibility of the nation. The sense of responsibility is still there despite the misleading polls. There is a terrific irresponsibility in the media.

K: The inhumanity of the bombing -- the fact that has gone down is never mentioned. Now it has become an absolute article of faith that Americans invaded Laos and Cambodia. The fact that others were there to begin with was never mentioned. But you went through it for eight years.

R: You got my note about Bill Jordan?

K: Yes; I will do my damndest to make it possible.

R: He is absolutely on the Johnson/Nixon policy; he has a deep knowledge of Asia; and he has done a most remarkable job here. He has a deep sense of public service. If you have a place for a guy like that, you would be lucky to have him.

K: I will do my damndest to make it possible, and I think I can make it possible.

R: Thank you.

K: Right. Good-bye.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

FELCON

Amb. Mosbacher/Kissinger

12:13 p.m.

4/19/71

K: Are you still offering hockey games? Thursday?

M: That would be great. We sure they are in NY?

K: Chicago playing them there.

M: Let's count on Thurs night. Do you want to have dinner up there and then the game?

K: Yeah. If I can get away. Can I bring Miss Maginnes?

M: Of course.

K: Let me see if I can work my schedule out. Let's tentatively plan on it. Is Pat coming?

M: I expect she will. She probably will be going to NY then anyway because we are going the middle of the week to Australia.

K: We will count on it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Gerard Smith/Kissinger (secure phone)

12:45 p.m.

4/19/71

S: I spoke with Phil Farley a few minutes after the backstopping meeting and he ? ? ? ? ? felt that he should be instructed on Wed. to go to ? ? ? ? and we fell it should be ? ? ? ? I hope before the government makes this decision that they would give more time so I can point out the mistake. Wed. is a bad time. It will be considered ? ? ? . I urge that any guidance we get today would not instruct us on this course on Wed.

K: I am sympathetic on that. That's what President has in mind so your actions accordingly so Russians can't say they have been mislead. But the theory doesn't have to be done at this time.

S: We can help the President better if ? ? ? ? right now.

K: We don't want a big legislative record on NCA.

A: We can talk on things common to all 3.

K: What we also should do is get off the theory of sites as such and talk more about capabilities.

S: OK. I am urging that ? ? ? declare that we are against NCA at this time.

K: I will discuss it with the President and recommend it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Helsm/Kissinger

3:05 p.m.

4/19/71

K: 3 minor things. The President read your study on post-Franco Spain. He wrote "excellent analysis" on it.

H: That's great. What are the other 2? They are rough, I'm sure.

K: On this article on you -- is that my technique? Tell you a good thing and then kill you? That's true. The article says I filter the intelligence material. You know I don't do that.

H: No one here (worries) about that. Some of that stuff makes no sense. That and 2 or 3 others are awful.

K: On the whole I thought it was a good article. I think your old deputy is a source of these articles. Who's at State now?

H: I think you are right.

K: Because he comes off well.

H: On that point it was never any thought and never will be.

K: The CBS people who did that thing on me 6 months ago are going to approach you.

H: I am not going to do it.

K: I will just tell you they are responsible people.

H: I will tell them you called but I am not going to do it. I am going back into my bomb shelter unless the President wants me out.

K: The article wasn't bad.

H: It can always be worse.

K: You and I might find things not quite right but the general impression is positive.

H: I was concerned about that. It's on the publis that it makes a difference and not you and me.

K: Didn't I let you off easy?

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Ehrlichman/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., April 19, 1971

E: I was calling you up early this morning to advise you of a
little move by United Airlines amending a pending application before
the CAB to request a route to China.

K: Okay -- to Peking?

E: All over the place -- Shanghai, Canton, and Peking.

K: The lack of dignity -- the cheap combination of naivety; we are
behaving in a way to bring the absolute worst out in them.

E: Well, it's old stuff now. It will be in the newspapers, and it's
in the public domain by now.

K: Oh, well. Okay.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Marianne Means/Kissinger

4:32 p. m.

4/19/71

M: I will be very brief. I have a silly question. Was the Nixon remark at the
ASNE a deliberate attempt for an invitation to China for Tricia for her honeymoon?

K: I doubt it.

M: Any possibility?

K: One should be able to begin life without having his room bugged. Especially that week. We are speaking off the record.

M: Is it _______?

K: I have heard him say before that he would like his children to go to Asia.

M: But not the same as going to China when _______ are being made. No suggestions

K: No. I don't know what the President talks about with Chou En-lai when he has a nightly wrap up session. Now I have given you a scoop.

M: What kind of wrap-up session.

K: I am pulling your leg.

M: You never know when I will use what you say. I just wanted to check with you.

K: And now you will use it anyway.

M: No, probably not.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Klein/Kissinger

6:40 p. m. 4/19/71

(on I. O. -- missed first part of conversation)

K: guys who were there on an off the record basis so they won't write a story but one talked to the L. A. Times and Post Dispatch and I know the Times is running a story on wire services. I don't know if there was a difference and what they are reporting. I talked with Haldeman and I think it would be important for you to talk about China diplomacy on it.

HAK: OK, fine.

K: I don't think the story will be active because it will be a second time story but it indicates splinter. I think you should know.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

9:20 p.m., April 19, 1971

K: You asked me to call you earlier.

L: No, I was returning your call. I had a note that you called this morning. I was at the International Red Cross thing and when I returned I had a note that you had called.

K: Be damned, I forgot what I called about.

L: I am just returning your call, no problems?

K: It must have been something minor.

L: That was a lousy article in *Time Magazine*. Somebody planted that damned thing.

K: Who would have an interest in doing that?

L: That business about how about that "yes, but" but a "yes, sir". I don't know who could have done that.

K: Mel, you can be sure of one thing, nobody in this office would do such a thing.

L: I know that -- no, no, I know that Henry. I just don't think the damned thing helps anybody.

K: Let me have a talk with Haldeman about it and see if we can put a stop to it.

L: Somebody has to stop it. I have been trying to support as much as I possibly can.

K: Mel, you have been a patriot and a loyal supporter.

L: I understand that.

K: That was one by petty people, I know that it is not the President's view.

L: People just trying to plant that kind of thing but that's not why I called, I just returned your call.

K: Think that was still from Saturday -- I left a message on Saturday.

L: If you think about it, give me a call, I am at home.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Joseph Sisco

9:38 p.m., April 19, 1971

S: I had asked Hal to tell you but I thought I would call you directly. We are going out with a telegram tonight asking our Embassy as to what their reaction would be to a trip to the Middle East by the Secretary. I got the word indirectly -- the Secretary had some kind of discussion with the President over the phone today.

K: But where would he go?

S: We are going out to Israel, Cairo, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.

K: What dates?

S: After he is scheduled to go to SENTO and CENTO and it would be hooked onto the end of that. He is scheduled to be at CENTO on the 30th so it would be near the end of the month -- roughly in there, I don't know the exact date. If we have a meeting tomorrow or the next day, whenever it is scheduled, on the Indian Ocean, bear in mind -- I don't know your views but I continue to feel that it has been produced in terms of the overall Soviet potential there. That is, the Department has produced it -- I believe it is under estimated what the Soviet capacity politically is. In other words, it is in the business as usual kind of way. That's about it, Henry.

K: All right, thank you.