East-West Relations and the Future of Germany

203

by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popu-
lar Front for the first time in thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in
the new countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders
were restrained from joining the Communist camp because
this action reduced them to the status of satellites. With the
growing disarray in the Communist world it will seem in-
creasingly possible to combine nationalism and Communism.
Many in the West draw a comfort from this. But it is impor-
tant to distinguish between a national Communist govern-
ment in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example,
Latin America or Africa. A national Communist regime in
Eastern Europe is an improvement over the previous condi-
tion of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin
America or Africa would inevitably become a center of anti-
Western policy.

If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it must
develop a common policy and a specific program. The temp-
tation for bilateral approaches is great. Each national leader,
depending on his temperament, has visions of appearing as
the arbiter of a final settlement or of adding Communist
pressures to his own as a bargaining device within the Alli-
ance. This sets up a vicious circle. Since leaders generally do
not reach eminence without a touch of vanity and since some
stake their prestige on their ability to woo their Soviet coun-
terparts, they tend to present their contacts with the Soviets as
a considerable accomplishment. But the real issues have gone
unresolved because they are genuinely difficult; hence they are
usually avoided during summit diplomacy in favor of showy
but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer the East-West
discourse, the greater will be the confusion in the West.
Moreover, each leader faces two different audiences: toward
his own people he will be tempted to leave the impression
that he has made a unique contribution to peace; toward his
allies he will be forced to insist that he will make no settle-
ment in which they do not participate. Excessive claims are

204 *The Strategic Issues*

coupled with reassurances to uneasy allies which are in turn
tempted to pursue bilateral diplomacy.

Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate
distrust within the Alliance. The traditional Western balance
of power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Krem-
lin. Any Soviet incentive to be responsible will vanish. The
Soviet leaders will be able to overcome their difficulties with
the assistance of the West and without settling any of the
outstanding issues. Since in the Kremlin—as in the West—
there must be many who consider the status quo preferable to
change, the result is likely to be diplomatic paralysis ob-
scured by abstract declarations about peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies:
(1) the willingness of the members of the Alliance to sub-
ordinate short-term advantages to a long-term conception
of the future and (2) their ability to develop a concrete and
common program. A united West would have unusual op-
portunities for negotiation. The disarray in Eastern Europe
should permit the West to adjust its policies to the degree of
autonomy shown by the various East European countries.
Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered in a
new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy
urgently requires a comprehensive solution. All these ap-
proaches presuppose some consensus in the West about the
shape of international affairs over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the
future of Germany. No other issue illustrates so dramatically
the need for unity and for purpose, for an agreed Allied
policy as well as for concrete proposals.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's
press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-
German Treaty of Collaboration has become increasingly
complicated. After the initial period of shock, the United

205

States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Repub-

205

States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Repub-
lic. One motive behind the MLF was to prevent West Ger-
many from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear
cooperation—an offer which has not yet been made and,
given De Gaulle's awareness of the European equilibrium,
might never have been extended. In order to tie Germany to
us, successful efforts were made to have German arms pur-
chases funneled to the United States. The culmination of this
process was an agreement between Secretary McNamara and
Defense Minister von Hassel signed on November 14, 1964,
which in effect made the German armed forces dependent on
the United States for their military equipment.

In the political field the United States, while welcoming Franco-German rapprochement, has made clear that it does so only as long as this does not lead to a new power grouping —a condition inherently impossible of fulfillment. Thus, George McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, has said:

... It is true that the signature of the Franco-German Treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been accomplished without a formal treaty.... Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle... for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.¹¹

American pressure and high-handed French actions have
placed the Federal Republic in an extremely uncomfortable
position. Germany, though courted on all sides, runs the risk
of finding itself isolated. Every gesture by the Federal Repub-
lic toward one of the protagonists evokes so much pressure by
the other that a compensatory move must then be made. In
order to assuage American outrage over the Franco-German
treaty, Chancellor Adenauer agreed in principle to the MLF.
When the negotiations over the MLF threatened a Franco-

¹¹George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues," July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), pp. 140-141.

206 *The Strategic Issues*

German rift, Chancellor Erhard felt obliged to recement Franco-German ties. Because of its understandable insecurities, Germany requires, above all, a calm and steady senior partner. The frequent changes in American policy on strategic doctrine, nuclear control and the emphasis to be given to various partners must radicalize German political life, whatever the merit of individual United States positions. French policy has been consistent but it has confronted the Federal Republic with choices which it is unprepared to handle. As a result, the Franco-German rivalry threatens to split the pro-Western elements in Germany into pro-American and pro-French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists. Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry between France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations.

Thus Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet cajolery or Communist blackmail—a trend further magnified by American hints that Germany should be more flexible toward the East. As long as Germany could avoid a direct confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other relationship—the Western Alliance or the Franco-German Treaty—these dangers were minimized. The combination of De Gaulle's abruptness and America's short-sighted reaction to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly absorbed in its own unfulfilled national aims and aware of the bargaining position conferred on it by its central position and growing power.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, 17 million of whose people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the con-

207

207

flict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Demo-
cratic Union, which largely forged the pro-Western orienta-
tion of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies in
the other parties that are now restrained by their desire to
present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-
established consensus. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-
German Treaty by which it has sought to limit the Federal
Republic's freedom of action has had the practical conse-
quence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be
tempted to seek reinsurance by improving its relations in
Eastern Europe. Thus the current situation contains a series
of time bombs.

The most serious potential conflict between the Federal
Republic and its Allies—and the lever which the Communist
countries may hope to use to pry Germany loose from its
Atlantic ties—concerns reactions to the division of Germany.
The problem is complicated by three factors: (1) NATO is
an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal
members seeks a basic change in the status quo. (2) None of
Germany's allies shares her national aspirations with equal
intensity. (3) Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust
that creates special obstacles to its international role. These
divergences would be difficult enough for a cohesive Alliance
to reconcile; the rivalry between France and the United
States threatens to make them insoluble.

These problems become particularly severe whenever
there appears to be some relaxation in East-West tensions. To
most of the members of NATO, detente comes as a welcome
respite. To the Federal Republic, it implies the danger of a
tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most of the Allies do not
find the status quo intolerable, whereas the Federal Republic
considers consolidation of the East German regime a sacrifice
of basic national aspirations.

This is why German leaders are always extraordinarily
ambivalent during periods of detente. They welcome relief
from pressures against Berlin; but they are uneasy lest all

208 *The Strategic Issues*

other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between “peripheral” settlements which they welcome and “central” agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. If this progress is delayed too long, there will be increasing pressures for purely German initiatives. The Alliance may soon have to choose between developing a common, active policy on German reunification or seeing the Federal Republic pursue the goal independently.

Many in the West find both possibilities disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy about the prospect of having international tensions focus on Germany for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to restore Germany to a respected place in the international community, it is unfair to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the 17 million people in East Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept their country's division as permanent. Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic tends to magnify the uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called Rapallo policy—a change of fronts toward

209

the East—is extremely unlikely; but the consequences for the West would be serious enough if Germany thought that its

209

the East—is extremely unlikely; but the consequences for the West would be serious enough if Germany thought that its national aspirations were being thwarted by the Alliance. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use a national appeal to Germany and an appeal based on the fear of Germany to the other Western countries.

Any policy on Germany must deal with three problems: (1) relations with the Soviet Union, including the complex of issues involved in any relaxation of tensions, (2) relations with the East German satellite regime and (3) relations with the East European governments. In all three respects the interests of the Western Allies and of the Federal Republic are potentially divergent; at the very least they must be carefully synchronized.

With respect to the detente, German concerns are often met with the argument that almost any measure that eases tensions also promotes German unification. According to this theory, once a policy of co-existence is firmly established, Eastern Germany may grow dispensable in Soviet eyes. As the Soviet Union begins to pursue more national policies, the ideological impetus for maintaining a Communist regime in Eastern Germany may decline.

However, it is dangerous to arouse German expectations that are not likely to be fulfilled. Arguments that a detente automatically furthers the cause of German unity must be balanced against others which, on the whole, seem more likely. A statesman can always escape his dilemmas by making the most favorable assumptions about the future. A wise policymaker will also consider the consequences if his hypothesis should turn out to be wrong. The Soviet Union, even if it becomes less committed ideologically, is unlikely to relinquish its hold on Eastern Germany simply as a result of an improvement in the international atmosphere. On the contrary, to the degree that a detente with the West exists, Soviet leaders may well calculate that concessions on the uni-

210 The Strategic Issues

fication of Germany become unnecessary. The German con-
cern that a detente may freeze the status quo in Germany is,
therefore, not wholly unjustified.

Granting that the problem of German unification cannot
be left to the more or less automatic operation of a detente',
the question becomes how German unity is to be promoted:
Is it a task for the Alliance as a whole or should the primary
initiative come from the Federal Republic? Many leaders in
both Washington and London seem to favor a more active
role for the Federal Republic. They wish to avoid constant
criticisms and to induce the Federal Republic to assume
greater responsibility for its future.

But toward whom is the Federal Republic to assume these
responsibilities? It would be highly desirable for the Federal
Republic to participate more actively within the Alliance in
formulating common policies on Germany's future. Some
Western officials go further, however. They argue that
the Federal Republic should take the lead in dealing with
the East, principally with the East German satellite. They
are convinced that increased contacts between the two Ger-
manys will promote the erosion of the East German re-
gime. According to this school of thought, the superior co-
hesiveness and strength of the Federal Republic will give it
by far the stronger bargaining position. At a minimum,
such negotiations may make life more bearable for the East
German population. In time, the East German regime would
become more humane, comparable perhaps to the Kadar gov-
ernment in Hungary.

Such reasoning has caused Western proposals for reunifi-
cation gradually to move toward enhancing the status of the
East German regime. In 1955, the Western plan still called
for unification through free election. In 1959, a new plan
called for a technical commission composed of twenty-five
West and fifteen East Germans to engage in preliminary ne-
gotiations for a year. Decisions were to be taken by a majority
of three-fourths, giving East Germany an effective veto. In

211

the schemes of 1962, the composition of these commissions

211

the schemes of 1962, the composition of these commissions had become equal and the time limit of one year had been removed. Also in 1962, the West proposed an International Access Authority to Berlin, in which the East German regime was given equal status with the Federal Republic.

This policy has in recent years found support even in the Federal Republic. The West German government has accepted—albeit reluctantly—the principle of technical commissions in which East and West Germany would enjoy parity. Others in Germany have begun advocating a "policy of little steps" toward the East German regime. By this they mean agreements between the two German states leading to expanding cultural and perhaps economic ties. They argue that contacts between the two Germanys will carry the "bacillus of freedom" into the East and thus "infect" the East German satellite with Western values.

But enhancing the status of Eastern Germany is a dangerous course. It could lead to a situation where two German states will be competing for adherents all over the world; it could defer indefinitely any hope for unification. It is risky also because the bargaining position of the Federal Republic is precarious. In all such contacts, humanitarian concerns will outweigh political considerations. Even if these negotiations do not succeed in luring Germany out of its formal Western ties, they may produce a serious political split in the Federal Republic.

Germany's allies should not contribute to the already considerable confusion between three partly incompatible objectives: improvement of conditions in Eastern Germany, consolidation of the East German regime and progress toward German unification. Ameliorating conditions in Eastern Germany is desirable for humanitarian reasons. At the same time, it is likely to help the East German regime consolidate itself and thus make unification more remote except on East German terms. As the respectability of the East German regime grows, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining

212 The Strategic Issues

ing the division of Germany is diminished. As the East German regime gains stature, its pressure on the Federal Republic will almost surely mount.

This process is likely to be gradual. While the East German regime is striving to establish its international status, its demands may be moderate. But once it is recognized—or even if its international status is substantially enhanced—it will have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Republic. It will, in fact, be driven to do so by its precarious position. National feelings in Eastern Germany, unlike those in Eastern Europe, are hostile to the existing government. In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia patriotism can lead to the conclusion that the national interest is best served by liberalizing the existing governments. They seem to have become permanent; no focus for alternative loyalties exists. In East Germany, by contrast, national aspirations clash with the existence of a Communist regime. A prosperous, democratic West Germany acts as a powerful magnet. Thus the East German regime has every incentive to seek to weaken the Federal Republic, and it can use its own population as a hostage.

The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position—which is postulated by some American policymakers—may, therefore, be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at what point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn, every West German concession to the German Democratic Republic will strengthen those in the West who favor recognition of that satellite regime. The result is more likely to be that two hostile, competing German states will become permanent than progress toward unification.

213

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it.

213

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it. But we should make certain that the West cannot be blamed for the probable consequences. And we should do nothing to promote policies that may lead to a growing demoralization of the Federal Republic. In 1962, the United States encouraged an "opening to the Left" in Italy that was supposed to isolate the Communist Party. Instead it has undermined the center and opened the way to respectability for the Communists. The same role could be played in Germany by the policy of "technical contacts" or of "little steps" and with much more dangerous results.

Those in Washington and London who believe that the so-called "flexible" Germans will always follow their lead may, moreover, be in for some unpleasant surprises. The Germany version of flexibility could become indistinguishable from traditional nationalism. This mood was expressed by Berlin's Senator Hoppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party. Criticizing the Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives in West Berlin, Senator Hoppe said:

> Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. Faith in the strength of the West, in its political superiority, in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests.¹²

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP Minister for all-German affairs, later supported Hoppe. Unless relations are handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic, such an attitude carries within it the seeds of serious misunderstandings.

Finally, as German activity toward the East increases, the

¹² Spandauer Volkszeitung, September 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany, for calling my attention to this quotation.

214 *The Strategic Issues*

fear of another Rapallo may create a vicious circle. Germany's Western neighbors will draw closer together; they may also seek to anticipate the Federal Republic by speeding up their own contacts with Moscow. This cannot be in the interest of either Atlantic or European cohesion; in the long run it will prove disastrous for the Federal Republic as well, because it may lead to its eventual isolation.

Only a united Atlantic Community facing jointly the issue of Germany's future can minimize the danger of a sharp conflict between Germany's national goals and its Atlantic ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essential not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance, but also for the peace of Europe as well. It is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as two German states exist, they are bound to interact with each other. If they consider that their social and political systems are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the other. Since they contain the same basic population and a similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will move beyond the control of either East or West—and perhaps of the Germans themselves. The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own interests, they will realize that the present course may have the gravest long-term consequences.

If German unification is to be a central concern of the Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East, it should be given every encouragement to make a major contribution to the formulation of an *Allied* position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder

215

proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and December 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplo-

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 215

proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and December 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification, he deserved a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the Western Allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. If we can discuss only those items which the Soviets have declared negotiable, the agenda of any conference will be determined by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that, if no progress toward unification is made, the onus for it rests on the Soviets.

While the Allies should show greater understanding for the anguish of a divided country, the Federal Republic has to face the fact that German unity can become an active policy only if it is embodied in a concrete program. Heretofore Bonn has demanded support for German unification, but it has re-coiled from encouraging a specific scheme to achieve it. It has feared that any proposals might involve provisions about Germany's frontiers and about limitations on German arms which would amount to unilateral concessions. Understandable as these concerns are, they run the risk of turning the issue of German unity into a largely rhetorical enterprise. Serious negotiations on German unity presuppose the willingness of the Alliance to develop a specific set of proposals.

A precondition of any negotiating program is an agreed strategy toward Eastern Germany. Specifically, should the West seek to ameliorate conditions in the so-called German Democratic Republic by increasing contacts with it or by isolating it? The latter course seems the most promising and the one most consistent with a long-term policy on German unification. This presupposes, however, an orchestration of the policy of the Allies with those of the Federal Republic toward the countries of Eastern Europe. Today the East German re-

216 The Strategic Issues.

gime is being widely supported in Eastern Europe at least in part because of the historical fear of Germany and the memory of the Nazi occupation. The East European countries are much less committed to the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany than to a divided Germany, which may seem to them the best guarantee of their security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified Communist Germany might worry the East European states hardly less than any other powerful unified German state. There is reason to believe that the East German regime is despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot be fully exploited so long as the Federal Republic is not able to pursue a more active policy in Eastern Europe.

Heretofore, the Federal Republic has refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. One possible method for ameliorating the Hallstein Doctrine with respect to Eastern Europe would be for the Federal Republic to announce that in order to promote a final settlement it would establish diplomatic relations with all of Germany's neighbors, enabling it to bring about direct contact with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a policy will not in itself lead to unification. Nor will it make the East European countries abandon their preference for a divided Germany. It will, however, contribute to the isolation of East Germany and hence promote its demoralization. It is likely to reduce the already small East European incentive to support Soviet or East German pressures against exposed Western positions such as Berlin.

Regardless of how successful the West is in coordinating its approach to Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, a specific plan for the unification of Germany will have to be developed. Any new approach to the problem of German unification should seek to escape the process whereby every succeeding Western plan has moved closer to the Soviet position. If every new Western proposal incorporates additional fea-

217

tures of the Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any particular program exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet frame-

217

tures of the Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any
particular program exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet frame-
work for German unity becomes established: that it be ne-
gotiated directly by the two German states, which is another
way of saying that the East German satellite would be con-
solidated.

But it is important that all concerned recognize that no
plan on German unity can avoid a consideration of the difficult
and sensitive issue of Germany's frontiers. This tragic issue
has its origin in 1945, when the Potsdam Agreement placed
the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which had been
German for centuries, under Polish administration pending a
final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland then proceeded to
expel the 13 million Germans living there and to replace them
with Polish settlers, mostly from Polish territories taken over
by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to ac-
cept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a
bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly be-
cause of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed terri-
tories, most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the
human tragedies of our time. The reluctance of the Federal
Republic to renounce territories which had been German for
centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something
cynical about the insistent East European demand that the
Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East Ger-
man satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East
European countries. The Eastern European countries obvi-
ously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany
divided along the Elbe; but they also insist that the Federal
Republic recognize the eastern frontier of the Soviet puppet
regime on the Oder-Neisse. These inconsistencies complicate
a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these obstacles, the per-
petuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-
Neisse line complicates progress on the issue of unification. It

218 The Strategic Issues

provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintain-
ing their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements Soviet rela-
tions with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to
territories that no longer contain any German settlers con-
tributes to perpetuating foreign rule over 17 million Germans
between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line. The refusal to
face the issue of the Polish border guarantees that the frontier
of free Germany will remain on the Elbe.

To be sure, it is an important tactical question at what
point the Federal Republic should renounce its claims. It is
possible to sympathize with the reluctance to offer such a
painful sacrifice gratuitously. But it is essential to recognize
that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have
to be part of any responsible program for unification. Unifi-
cation is impossible so long as it is considered an inevitable
prelude to a new set of pressures in Eastern Europe.

Thus three factors must be reconciled in any plan for
Germany's future: (1) the German desire for self-determina-
tion, (2) the East European concern for security and (3) the
Soviet concern lest a unified Germany impair its own security
and shake its international position. These objectives are, of
course, incompatible to some extent. A great deal depends on
whether it proves possible to convince those most concerned
that to strive for absolutes will lead first to stagnation and
ultimately to crisis.

For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a detailed
program; rather, the primary need is to agree on a new con-
cept. One possible course would be to separate the issue of
self-determination from that of unification for an interim
period, say fifteen years. Pressure for immediate unification
consolidates all opponents of Germany in Eastern Europe
and *sub rosa* in Western Europe as well. Self-determination,
on the other hand, is a moral imperative commanding wide
consensus. If rejected by the Communists, it would place
them at least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: The

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 219

219

Western countries, including the Federal Republic, could declare that, while the unification of Germany remains the ultimate goal, their immediate aim is to enable the population of East Germany to choose the form of government it prefers. The Western Allies could, therefore, declare their willingness to acquiesce in the existence of an East German state provided its government emerges from a process of free elections. For a period of fifteen years the territory now called the German Democratic Republic would have a status similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A commission composed of the European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps Finland, would monitor the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebiscite supervised by the same commission to determine whether East Germany wanted to continue as a separate state in loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral commission certified that the government of East Germany was freely elected, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist.

Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany. Within the Federal Republic foreign troops would retire an average distance of 100 kilometers from the Western borders

[Lc]

220 The Strategic Issues

of the new East German state, and the number of West Ger-
man troops in that belt would be limited. The Federal Re-
public would renounce access to the ownership of strategic
nuclear weapons.

Even if there were agreement in principle, many details
would remain to be worked out: for example, the precise
definition of demilitarization or what international under-
takings would be consistent with the neutral status of the
new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution
for East Germany is taken, the advantages would be plain:
while Germany would have to defer full unification for
fifteen years, the German states that emerged would no
longer be antagonistic. There would be opportunity for con-
ditions within Germany to be equalized gradually. A foreign
regime detested by the population would be removed. The
East European states would gain the security of a divided
Germany for fifteen years and a demilitarized belt along their
borders for the indefinite future. The East European econo-
mies could adjust to the loss of the East German partner over
a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Ger-
many's frontiers would be settled both juridically and psy-
chologically because the generation that was expelled from
Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time
Germany was unified. Arms control schemes for Europe
could be considered in a new atmosphere.

The price, of course, would be high. The Federal Repub-
lic would have to defer its hopes for immediate unification in
return for agreement on a terminal date to the division of
Germany. The Soviet Union would have to be prepared to
give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East Euro-
pean governments would have to change their policy of
acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior
partner. The Western Allies would have to overcome inertia
and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

But the rewards would be great. Such a program would
end a situation that is bound to become more dangerous the

221

longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of

221

longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of
arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could
be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program
rejected initially by the Soviets, it would change the frame-
work of negotiations. Rather than begin with enhancing the
status of the East German regime, as is the case with current
schemes, the new program would focus attention on its op-
pressiveness as the principal obstacle to unification. By taking
a stand on the issue of self-determination, the West would
have a platform most likely to command international sup-
port. By separating self-determination from unification, an
interim period for adjustments and a framework for meeting
legitimate security concerns of Germany's neighbors are
provided.

Nevertheless, it is improbable that any negotiating
formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasona-
ble program is likely to be rejected by the East. The long-
term hope for German unity therefore resides in the unity of
Europe. As nations lose their former significance, the fear of
any one state will diminish. A united Western Europe more-
over will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern
Europe. If an all-embracing European structure ever comes
to pass, the existing dividing lines may seem less crucial.

This is why the existing rift in the West is so unfortunate.
The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that
each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by
holding out vague hopes and grandiose schemes for the
achievement of Germany's maximum objectives. German
leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies
and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so
often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of
repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by
committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special
friendship it was braking temptations of nationalism and
providing for the construction of Europe. Washington's atti-
tude toward the Treaty of Collaboration was motivated by a

CHAPTER EIGHT

What Kind of Atlantic
Partnership?

Two solutions are usually offered for enhancing Allied cohesion: (1) an improvement in the process of consultation and (2) the development of a united Europe with federal, supranational institutions as the precondition for an Atlantic partnership.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified under present conditions by three factors:

1. The firm commitment of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the existing balance of power provides their allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

2. The internal workings of modern government are so

224 The Strategic Issues

complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterward in international forums. The American tendency to confine consultation to an elaboration of its own blueprints often reflects a desire to avoid complicating still further our own increasingly complex decision-making process.

3. As governments have found in their own domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, differences are almost certain to arise. And they are likely to be intensified because the histories of the states vary widely and because of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

The American historical experience causes our policymakers to be reluctant to admit that the process of consultation may have objective limits. United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise. A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that agreement is sure to emerge if the interested parties gather around a table. This creates a temptation to conduct Alliance diplomacy as if it were analogous to the domestic policy of stable societies.

However, the most difficult issues of coalition diplomacy are more complicated. Differences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. The analogy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled generally consider maintenance of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if they do not, domestic policy acquires some of the characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy and, in extreme cases, leads to civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 225

hope of winning another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists

225

hope of winning another round later or of influencing the
implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists
the possibility of changing the government with the next
election.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves are
not available. Legitimacy resides in the individual govern-
ments. Decisions require their consent—this is the essence of
sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by majority
vote—a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with
NATO—their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the
treaty. In short, those who dissent and are prepared to insist
on their sovereignty cannot be bound indefinitely.

If fundamental differences among sovereign allies persist,
the partners are torn between the desire to maintain the ap-
pearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate their views.
The need to present a facade of harmony has at least three
consequences: (1) It puts a limit on the sanctions that can
be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (2) One of the few pres-
sures available is to mobilize domestic pressures against an
obstructive partner, thus multiplying resentments. (3) Be-
cause misgivings are sometimes subordinated to an appear-
ance of amity, the real views of the governments cannot
always be deduced from their formal statements. Simul-
taneously—and somewhat contradictorily—a premium is
placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use their part-
ners' desire for harmony to impose a desired course. But if
this happens too frequently, there is a dangerous build-up of
frustration that cannot be smothered indefinitely by declara-
tions of friendship. This has been happening in the Atlantic
Alliance.

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least
effective when it is most needed: when there exist basic
differences of assessment or of interest. It works best in
*implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it. Never-
theless, an improvement in the consultative process should be
one of the primary objectives of the Alliance.

226 The Strategic Issues

Many American schemes for strengthening NATO have taken the form of making our predominant position psychologically more acceptable; we try to create a structure which physically prevents any ally (except the United States) from acting autonomously. This tends to turn our Allies into advisors in an American decision-making process. It then becomes relevant to inquire whether such a system serves the long-term political vitality of the Alliance.

The effectiveness of any process of consultation is tested by the answers to the following questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has technical competence? These three questions do not necessarily have identical answers. Many agencies in our own government have a right to be heard, but not all have the same influence. When some Europeans ask for a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up some of their military autonomy, the issue they raise is: compared to whose voice *within* the United States government? That of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, the outcome is clearly affected by the constituency that the agency or department represents. The weight given to advice is related to the competence that it reflects and this in turn depends on how seriously a given department takes its role.

These considerations apply even more strongly in an alliance of sovereign states. The challenge is not only to provide a forum for the expression of a point of view—important as this is—but also to bring about a framework which encourages the emergence of responsible attitudes. Setting up lines of communication without paying corresponding attention to what flows through them is to evade the key problem. If the United States insists on retaining a dominant position and complete freedom of action—if integration becomes in practice an exegesis of American schemes—we will probably find

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 227

that the political will of Europe will eventually be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view,

that the political will of Europe will eventually be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view, it must be convinced that its views matter not only by the grace of a senior ally but also because of structural necessities.

American policy has not always been sensitive to the psychological prerequisites for effective consultation. It generally holds that influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company: the partner with the largest number of shares in a common enterprise is supposed to have the greatest influence.

Influence is, of course, an intangible quality. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle, with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality, has put his finger on the fact that as long as NATO is an alliance of sovereign states, a too literal conception of "integration" can easily lead to an evasion of responsibility. Difficult decisions can be avoided, and failure can be blamed on other allies. Even a major effort may not result in a corresponding increase in influence. In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real—as opposed to his formal—role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement. To combine technical integration with insistence on sovereignty can in time erode the moral basis of joint action.

Heretofore, American policy has assumed that the chief obstacle to close United States-European cooperation on a global scale is that the resources of the European nation-state are inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. According to this school of thought, the political integration of Europe will solve the problem of Allied consultation. A united Europe will be prepared to share world-wide burdens

228 The Strategic Issues

which a Europe of national states is reluctant to assume.
Under Secretary of State Ball has expressed the American
view as follows:

The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on fur-
ther with the achievement of its own unity—until it organizes itself
on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of
world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of
such responsibility under post-colonial conditions must be based
on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid—
and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more
than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently
mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.¹

The nature of world responsibility is rarely defined; it is
assumed to be self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador
to Germany, George McGhee, spoke as follows:

This [Atlantic partnership] entails increasing contributions in
formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from
countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the
ability to contribute.²

American policy seems to consider that its goals in these areas
are in the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge;
what it desires is a sharing of the cost.

But is it really true that willingness to assume global re-
sponsibilities is related to availability of resources? The
American national experience would seem to contradict this
assumption. Through the greatest part of its history, the
United States possessed the resources but not the inclination
to play a global role. Conversely many European states main-
tained overseas commitments when their resources were
much smaller than they are today.

For many European countries, the combination of de-

¹ George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 216.

² George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), p. 138.

229

colonization and two World Wars has been traumatic. Hav-
ing been forced to侖

229

colonization and two World Wars has been traumatic. Hav-
ing been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they
no longer consider that their security is *directly* affected by
what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than
run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area
from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to
shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably
sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten
the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the
fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European
concerns in much the same way that the United States looked
at Europe's quarrels until 1941.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions—
often moralistic in tone—between “responsibility” and “in-
terest.” Under Secretary Ball, echoing similar statements by
Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

We Americans have few national interests—in the narrow sense
—outside our own territory but we have assumed vast world re-
sponsibility. . . . The willingness to accept world responsibility—
as distinct from the preservation of national interests—is, in our
observation and experience, not universal among the NATO mem-
bership.³

Aside from the fact that our European Allies are likely to
consider a "disinterested" foreign policy as both mercurial
and unsteady, the distinction misses the central point. The
chief reason for the reluctance of most of our Allies to assume
world responsibility is precisely that in the past decade they
have been obliged to give up their global interests. Sharing
our burdens would give impetus to Atlantic cooperation only
if our Allies have the same view as we of what is at stake
outside of Europe and if they believe that the United States
would curtail its commitments but for their assistance.
Neither condition is met today. The very commitment of the
United States to a global role—our often-invoked sense of
world responsibility—reduces the incentive of our Allies to

³Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *op. cit.*, p. 215.

230 The Strategic Issues

share in it, much as the commitment of Britain and France to
the European balance of power permitted the United States
to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941.

Thus, European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic
disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than
reduce differences. As Europe gains structure, it will be in a
better position to assert divergent perspectives whose ulti-
mate cause is structural rather than personal. Phrases like
"indivisible interest" are correct when applied to the defense
of Europe or East-West relations; they come close to being
platitudes in other parts of the world. A wise Alliance policy
will not gear everything to the expectation that common
positions can be developed on a global basis; it will also take
account of the fact that the interests of Europe and America
are not identical everywhere.

This fact is relevant to any assessment of the degree of
integration of Atlantic policy which it is in our interest to
promote. Over the next decades the United States is likely to
find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast
Asia and in Latin America. Our European Allies will almost
certainly consider that their vital interests are not at stake in
these areas. If Atlantic policy is completely centralized, it
may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only
on doing nothing. Or else, it will engage in a series of pre-
tenses. The behavior of our Allies toward American requests
for assistance in Vietnam is a good example. The Soviets may
use our involvements in other continents as a pretext to
blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest
among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alli-
ance beyond the breaking point.

Looking beyond the immediate future, it is not difficult
to visualize an increasingly powerful China fomenting the
already strong tendencies toward turmoil in other parts of
the world. If we insist on remaining the sole trustee of global
policy, the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be
too great. The day will come when we will consider a meas-

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 231

ure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant.

231

ure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least-responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny.

If we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence. Each partner will regain a measure of flexibility. The temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Europe could assume greater responsibility for its defense and its future. Put positively, the Atlantic Alliance will have to decide whether to emphasize immediate convenience or long-term political vitality. At any given point of time, centralization of decisions guarantees the greatest degree of coordination. Critics of such schemes can always be put on the defensive by being accused of fomenting distrust. In the long term, however, excessive concentration of decision-making in the hands of the senior partner may deprive out Allies of the incentive to be responsible and it may create profound fissures when a conflict of interest becomes apparent.

This suggests that the vitality of the Alliance would be served by an Allied structure which makes possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues. For responsible attitudes to emerge, participants in a consultative process must do more than simply advise. Influencing another country's actions—however benevolent the dominant partner may be—will be demoralizing in the long run. If coalition diplomacy becomes largely an exercise in affecting essentially American decisions, most of our Allies will lose the incentive to make responsible judgments. The type of leader comfortable with such a relationship may be only too ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders; this very quality may make him unreliable when he is most needed in

232 The Strategic Issues

times of crisis. For decisions to be meaningful, our Allies
must consider them their own, not ours.

Paradoxically, some autonomy in political decision for
Europe is psychologically important for the cohesion of the
Alliance. Though this proposition will be granted by most
American policymakers in the abstract, they tend to resist
independence when it takes the form of challenging our
judgments. A decade and a half of hegemony have accus-
tomed us to believing that our views represent the general
interest. The difficulty with which decisions are reached in
our government produces temptations to turn Allied consul-
tation into an attempt to implement essentially American
conceptions.

Nevertheless, the future well-being of the Alliance de-
pends on our willingness to adjust the pattern of relation-
ships which grew up after the war. Though historically we
are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolu-
tion, we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a
grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since
their interests are identical, he will continue to control all
the resources. He can challenge the son to name circum-
stances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him
that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an
attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if
accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then
protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in
handling the transition from tutelage to equality. Grandiose
schemes of great technical complexity may magnify inward
insecurities. What is needed is a recognition that it is in the
long-term interest of the United States to share responsibili-
ties even more than burdens. This will involve a painful loss
of some of our former pre-eminence—a process to which no
nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of European
self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 233

pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is

233

pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is
important for us as well.

In too much of the current dialogue we offer our good
intentions as a guarantee of the validity of our actions. But
the nature of our intentions is not at issue. It is important for
us to realize that our style and our commitment which have
been responsible for so many constructive measures can also
dissolve the identity of others. Our optimism makes us press
for final answers to any problem. These often take the form
of abstract models in which other nations are considered
interchangeable entities. Our pragmatism produces a willing-
ness to try everything once and a restless quest for ever "new"
remedies. Thus, sudden changes in our policy are not
uncommon-witness the checkered career of the MLF. Deci-
sions within our government are influenced by a combina-
tion of bureaucratic pressures in which the immediate often
predominates over the long-term.

All of this can make our impact undermine the sense of
responsibility of even close allies. Most societies lack the co-
hesiveness for the restless quest for novelty which seems
natural to us. The constant adjustment of policies to differ-
ing pressures can be demoralizing for countries whose margin
for maneuver is more limited. What appears as open-
mindedness to us may be seen as unsteadiness by others. The
fluctuations in our German policy from impatient aloofness
in 1961 to ardent wooing in 1963 to a more distant policy in
1965; the changes in the MLF from indifference to passionate
advocacy to aloof goodwill in the space of three years; the
frequent alterations of our strategic doctrine; the tendency of
our bureaucracy to conduct their internal battles by lining
up support in foreign capitals-all suggest that it is necessary
even for the stability of our own policy to have self-confident
partners with a strongly developed sense of identity. Reluc-
tant as we may be to admit it, we could benefit from a
counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and

Ld

234 The Strategic Issues

to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract
and “final” solutions. The real case for European autonomy
is not burden-sharing but the establishing of a psychological
balance between us and Europe.

For centuries one of the most difficult problems of West-
ern political thought has been how to reconcile unity with
respect for diversity. Overemphasis on either unity or di-
versity destroys the delicate balance of creativity. Excessive
stress on unity leads to a deadening conformism; exalting
diversity as an end produces a relativism hostile to great con-
ceptions and, on the political level, an overconcern with na-
tional peculiarities. To strike this balance is the big unsolved
problem before the Western Alliance.

THE GRAND DESIGN
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961,
the United States has argued that the most effective structure
for Atlantic cooperation is a partnership between the United
States and a united, supranational Europe. "When one part-
ner possesses over 50 per cent of the resources of an enterprise
and the balance is distributed among sixteen or seventeen
others, the relationship is unlikely to work very well." ⁴ Real
partnership, according to American spokesmen, is possible
only among equals.

As a result, American pronouncements have often as-
sumed that before Europe could be an effective partner of
the United States it would have to unify. This concept of
Atlantic partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Euro-
peans as Jean Monnet, has been described by the image of
"twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary of State
Herter has written:

⁴George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962), p. 366.

235

235

I believe the present Administration [the Kennedy Administra-
tion]... holds the... view, which has come to be termed the
"dumbbell" concept—meaning that an economic and political
alliance is stronger if it has been agreed to by partners of equal
weight on both sides.⁵

The European side of this partnership is to be a United
States of Europe organized on federal lines with suprana-
tional institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents
one form of Atlantic partnership. But an excessive, almost
doctrinaire commitment to it runs the risk of treating a
symbol as the only possible reality. This may cause us to beg
the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept
has been pursued obscures three questions: Is it true that
partnership is possible only among equals? What has been the
real progress toward European political integration? To what
extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of
European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of
the world, it seems strange that partnership should be said to
be possible only among equals. The assertion that we can
deal effectively only with countries of equal strength is not
conducive to inspiring confidence among the great majority
of the nations of the world which are weak.

Granting that a strong and united Europe is on balance
in our best interest, we must nevertheless inquire whether it
is wise—either from the point of view of Europe or of the
United States—to insist that there is only one reliable method
of bringing about that unity: that of federal, supranational
institutions. In the aftermath of De Gaulle's abrupt rejection
of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it has be-
come almost a commonplace that the willful act of a single
individual interrupted what would otherwise have been a

⁵ Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1963), p. 301.

236 The Strategic Issues

smooth advance toward political integration. According to this view, once Britain would have entered the Common Market, an "outward-looking" Europe would have emerged. Progress toward supranational political institutions would have been continuous. In the opinion of the "integrationists" in Europe and in the State Department, European unity would have been promoted by a "community spirit," which in turn was to be fostered by supranational commissions. Expert judgment unaffected by considerations of national interest was to move European political integration forward, step-by-step, toward a final culmination in which the supranational authorities would be dominant. All this is said to have been destroyed by De Gaulle's abrupt exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences ascribed to De Gaulle. Significant underlying factors must have been operating to obstruct the idealized progression envisaged by the European integrationists on both sides of the Atlantic. It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which economic integration had been achieved could be applied automatically to the political arena. The "community" approach—which equates method and purpose—works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in *defining* this objective.

In the aftermath of World War II, this was obscured because Europe had been so shattered by the war that immediate needs were overwhelming. Leaders did not think that their problem was to choose among different objectives; on the contrary, the task of meeting minimum necessities absorbed all their energies. Most countries on the Continent had governments so weak or were so eager to overcome a past—or both—that an abdication of some of their sovereignty seemed a respite from overwhelming uncertainties. For many in Europe, economic activity became a means to avoid

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 237

facing nearly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that the governments were

facing nearly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that the governments were only too glad to turn them over to supranational experts.⁶

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the national state, the traditional repository of European loyalties. This process took place with varying intensity in each country. Germany and Italy, partly to escape their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a federal Europe than Britain and France. Smaller countries accustomed to the protection of some major power had less difficulty with the supranational concept than those that had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain—with the longest history as national states—have consistently aimed for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution; that is, a structure that preserves the identity of the states and in which decisions will be made, at least initially, on the basis of agreement among governments. Four years before De Gaulle came to power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated the obstacles faced by a supranational approach to political integration.

But if De Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for confusing the debate about the future of Europe in at least two ways: (1) The controversy between the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes toward De Gaulle. The line-up is not a reliable guide to the real views of the participants because many who strongly oppose De Gaulle's style and domestic policy are in agreement with him about the organization of Europe. (2) Some of the most ardent advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents of a federal Europe, which is as unacceptable in London as in

⁶ For a splendid discussion of the problem of Europe's identity see Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Fall 1964).

238 The Strategic Issues

Paris. Thus opponents of European integration have often
combined forces with dedicated advocates of it to advance
sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the French
President.

This confusion has been magnified by the role of the
United States. Our strong support of supranational, federal
institutions has contributed to the stalemate in European dis-
cussions. While not sufficient to bring about our preferred
solution, our influence is strong enough to block approaches
with which we disagree. Moreover, despite our ardent sup-
port for European unity, our impact has often been the con-
trary of what was intended. While affirming the need for
European integration, we have unintentionally tended to
undermine a European sense of identity.

During the long period of American predominance, a
group of experts comfortable with the existing relationship
has grown up on both sides of the Atlantic. Having worked
well together for many years, they tend to see problems from
the same perspective. Though they generally favor European
integration, they consider the quest for European autonomy
inherently divisive. According to them, if United States
policy is wise, European autonomy will be unnecessary. If
United States policy is mistaken, an independent European
policy would only magnify the problem. Thus, both in Eu-
rope and the United States, many who urge European inte-
gration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European
policy—which is one of the likely results of European
integration.

This attitude is particularly noticeable in the field of de-
fense. Were Europe thrown on itself, it would probably unite
sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to
do so. But, having been sheltered by American power for
nearly two decades, many Europeans are concerned that the
emergence of an autonomous Europe in the area of defense
will undermine the American guarantee and force them into
assuming direct responsibilities. American pronouncements

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 239

sometimes encourage this concern. The threat to withdraw American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic preferences. Proposals such as the MLF have the practical consequence of preventing the emergence of a European point of view on nuclear matters. These American attitudes have inhibited a European quest for autonomy; they have also caused some advocates of European identity in the defense field to give their case an anti-American cast.

These tendencies are reinforced by the fact that some Europeans prefer an Atlantic structure based on the existing NATO states to a united Europe. The smaller countries in particular fear that European integration will result in the hegemony of powerful neighbors. They see no advantage in European autonomy. Since they must follow the lead of a dominant country in any event, they prefer the hegemony of an ally 3,000 miles away and with a tradition of using its power with restraint. Consequently, these countries are a ready-made constituency for schemes to perpetuate the relationship between Europe and the United States that developed after the war.

In short, American policy has been extremely ambivalent: it has urged European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences. We have sought to combine a supra-national Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Community under American leadership. These objectives are likely to prove incompatible. Indeed, the United States will have to reconcile itself to the fact that no matter what structure emerges in Europe, a difference in perspective with the United States is probable, particularly about policies outside of Europe. A wise policy will try to mitigate the impact of this difference; it will not be able to remove it.

This latent difference could well be accentuated by the manner in which European unity is achieved. History teaches that the more abrupt the political transitions, the more drastic have to be the efforts to reestablish some sort of co-

La

240 The Strategic Issues

hesion. A Europe that grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties must have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to European unity could produce either a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *patries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity could be what distinguished it from America.

It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the European national parliaments has been apparent for decades. In no European country—not even Great Britain—does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. Party discipline has become so pervasive that in European parliaments the majority almost always ratifies the decisions of the cabinet. And where the party system is ineffective—either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them—the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals. A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely unrelated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to reexamine American priorities. The mechanical notion that one particular form of European integration automatically will solve the problem of Atlantic partnership should be abandoned. The United States should leave the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity and influence in devising new forms of *Atlantic* cooperation. The passionate commitment

241

of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form and function. It could in fact bring about results quite con-

241

of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form and substance. It could in fact bring about results quite contrary to those intended. Many European federalists have been devoted adherents of Atlantic partnership; Jean Monnet, their most significant figure, has been a staunch and remarkable friend of the United States. By contrast, President de Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt and uni-lateral tactics designed to exalt the status of France, occasion-ally at our expense. It would be one of history's frequent ironies if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy generally described as Gaullist, while the structure advocated by De Gaulle turned out to be best suited for flexible At-lantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies some-times blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum, which cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any unified Europe that reflects the desires of Europeans, it is doubtful that either our national or Atlantic interests require our passion-ate commitment to a supranational structure for Europe. A very schematic and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is each European country always inherently closer to its European neighbors than to the United States? If we separate the ques-tion into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility?

There may be various roads to European unity. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan—calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and subcabinet officials—is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future

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242 The Strategic Issues

and thus would put an end to the process of demanding the
desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also
permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than
the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe
would enable the United States to maintain an influence at
many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake every-
thing on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.

Every European state was formed through some process of integration during the past four centuries, and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than 100 years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to build unity. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness. History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates also that stability in Eu-
rope is unattainable except through the cooperation of Brit-
ain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resur-
rect old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The
United States should not single out one ally as its special
partner. The attempt to force allies to choose between us and
France—a tendency which, despite all disavowals, is real—
must magnify the European nationalism that French policy
has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale
figure of President de Gaulle. Conceivably he is as petty and
as animated by remembered slights as some of our com-
mentators suggest. It is also possible that a man so conscious
of his historic role has larger purposes. In a period of detente
with the Soviet Union, it should not be impossible to conduct
a serious conversation with a traditional ally. President de

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 243

Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coordinate

243

Gaulle has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coordinate strategy rather than to integrate it. It is a welcome sign of progress that, at the NATO meeting of December 1964, Secretary McNamara and French Defense Minister Messmer agreed on a procedure to begin exploring what this means with respect to strategic nuclear forces.

But a more fundamental dialogue is needed. Irritation with De Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposal of 1958 for a Directorate he pointed out what has remained the key problem of NATO: If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy—or at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to devise a common military strategy is likely to prove futile. As long as the Alliance cannot agree even on a common trade policy toward the East, it will be impossible to convince the Allies to relinquish their freedom of action over decisions affecting their very survival. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Organizational devices should never be confused with substantive solutions. Nevertheless the following outline could serve as an illustration of a desirable direction if not as a detailed blueprint for action. The political body could be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. It could be composed of six members: five permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic and Italy) and one rotating member representing the smaller NATO countries. The rotating member could be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members are excluded, thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The Allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape clauses to be described. In order to give this Executive Committee appropriate status, membership should be no lower than Deputy

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244 The Strategic Issues

Foreign Ministers meeting at least bi-monthly. In the inter-
val between meetings, the NATO ambassadors could act as
deputies.

The Executive Committee should formulate common At-
lantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action
where interests diverge. It should give political guidance for
the military arrangements described in the previous chapters.
It should be the political authority for the proposed Allied
Nuclear Force. It should be charged with developing a com-
mon strategic doctrine.

As long as the Alliance is composed of sovereign states,
the delegation of authority will clearly have to be limited.
Each Ally, whether or not a member of the Executive Com-
mittee, would have to be given the right to appeal its deci-
sions to the NATO Council, where a two-thirds majority would
carry. Each Ally should have the right, for an interim period
at least, to refuse to be bound by such a vote. However, it
should be required to make a formal declaration to that effect
within a given time. A negative vote either in the Executive
Committee or in the NATO Council would not be taken as an
indication of non-compliance. Instead, a formal notification
that a country refuses to carry out the common decision
would be required. The purpose of separating the two stages
would be to enable the Allies to record their disagreement
and yet to carry out the majority's decision for the sake of
unity.

Within this framework, the European countries could, if
they wished, form a closer association. For example, the
Western European Union might well be given responsibility
for the European component of the Allied Nuclear Force
and, indeed, the European contribution to joint NATO
plans. As Europe gains structure, the Executive Committee
could draw nearer to the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic
partnership, in this approach, could become operative even if
European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and in-
creased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultane-

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 245

ously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to
either course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on

ously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to
either course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on
a two-pronged basis.

Conceivably such a policy could end the sterile debate over
the relative benefits of integration and coordination. It might
heal a rift that, if continued, is bound to hazard everything
that has been painfully built up over fifteen years. It would
leave the internal evolution of Europe to the European
countries and concentrate our efforts where we can be most
constructive: in the elaboration of Atlantic relationships.

This requires that we become clear about the notion of
Europe as a Third Force which is used so often in a pejora-
tive sense in our discussions. In the sense of being powerful
Europe is bound to be a Third Force, partly because
we ourselves have made it so. Whether Europe will use
its strength for a narrow or a wider conception depends in
large part on the ability of leaders on both sides of the Atlan-
tic to develop common purposes and a structure to give them
effect. We can best counteract Third Force tendencies based
on a form of neutrality by conducting ourselves so that most
of our Allies will always consider the advantages of an At-
lantic partnership greater than those which could be gained
by a more parochial approach.

For this purpose steadiness and reliability are more im-
portant assets than an erratic quest for ever-more refined
formulae. Confidence presupposes that the leaders of other
countries can gear their actions to ours over a period of time.
The United States should use its ingenuity to forge a variety
of Atlantic institutions not only in the political realm but also
in the spheres of economics, scholarship and the arts.

But institutions based on present concepts of national
sovereignty are not enough. The West requires a larger goal:
the constitution of an Atlantic Commonwealth in which all
the peoples bordering the North Atlantic can fulfill their aspi-
rations. Clearly, it will not come quickly; many intermediate
stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too

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246 The Strategic Issues

early, however, to prepare ourselves now for this step beyond
the nation-state.

A FINAL WORD

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949, no one would have thought it possible that within fifteen years its pervasive problem would turn out to be the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe. In the face of what was believed to be the imminent threat of Soviet aggression, it would have seemed absurd to predict that fissures would open because the fear of Communist invasion had largely vanished. When Europe dreaded the return of America's traditional isolationism, it would have been incredible that some day our Allies would feel so confident of our support that they would consider it safe to disagree with our policies or even to oppose them.

In a way, then, many of the difficulties in the Atlantic Alliance could be a source of pride for the United States. They are the result of the success of policies ushered in by the Marshall Plan and consistently pursued through four postwar administrations. The West today is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance.

Yet it is easy to draw too much comfort from this. History is the tale of civilizations that sought their future in their past. There are no plateaus in international affairs; what is not a stepping stone soon becomes the beginning of a decline. Succeeding generations will not be able to draw comfort from the fact that an unmet challenge was produced by great achievement.

In the life of societies and international systems there comes a time when the question arises whether all the possibilities of innovation inherent in a given structure have been exhausted. At this point, symptoms are taken for causes; immediate problems absorb the attention that should be devoted to determining their significance. Events are not

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 247

shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-

shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-
intrusive. However impressive such a structure may still ap-
pear to outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever
more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had
centuries of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic
upheaval. Its propensity for disaster has been high; but here-
tofore each tragedy was followed by a new burst of creativity.
Are the stresses of today a sign of consolidation or the first
symptoms of decay? Will they lead to renewal or to disinte-
gration?

For a while longer the West can continue along familiar
routes. The traditional machinery of the Atlantic Alliance is
well designed to produce the appearance of amity. But if the
Alliance continues to confuse form and substance, energy
will increasingly have to be spent in reconciling illusion with
reality. Each nation will be thrown on its own resources and
will emphasize policies that magnify divisions. At each previ-
ous critical juncture the West—though with much travail—
found political forms adequate for its needs. It made the
transition from feudalism to the nation-state. Its challenge
now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger
community and draw from this effort the strength for another
period of innovation.

Its ability to master this problem will largely determine
whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world.
Confronted by turmoil and hatred in the former colonial
areas, the West desperately searches for means to demonstrate
its good faith to its erstwhile subjects. But every satisfied de-
mand spawns new pressures. The inward insecurity produced
by centuries of subordination is not allayed by dealing with
its manifestations any more than a tidal wave is understood
by studying the surface of the ocean. In many of the new
nations, popularity is unattainable partly because of the
memory of colonial rule, partly because these nations often
do not know what they really want. Their greatest need is a

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248 The Strategic Issues

sense of purpose. But this can be conveyed only by example, not by preachments or by efforts to ingratiate that compound the new nations' sense of insecurity with our own.

What the West can mean to others depends therefore in great part on what it means to itself. In the heyday of colonialism, Western political forms were widely imitated. The leaders of independence movements fought their oppressors in the name of principles they had acquired from them. The reason was that for all the wrongs it committed, the West appeared dynamic, creative and vital. If the West is still to contribute to the rest of the world, it will have to begin by demonstrating in its internal relationships that its wellsprings of creativity have not run dry.

The opportunity is great. The dynamic periods of Western history occurred when unity was forged from diversity. This is the task once again. The struggles for prestige and influence can be salutary if at some point they lead to a heightened sense of community. Conversely, fifty years from now no one will care who was "right" with respect to the issues that form the headlines of the day if in the process the West has torn itself to pieces.

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength. Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened by the European sense of tragedy. And the European consciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bureaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recognized. The solution of immediate issues has priority over the shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 249

existing framework: doing the familiar very well has, after

249

existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

In the decades ahead, the West will have to lift its sights. When technique becomes exalted over purpose, men become the victims of their complexities. They forget that every great achievement in every field was a vision before it became a reality. Both sides of the Atlantic would do well to keep in mind that there are two kinds of realists: those who use facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements of the West with rifts in the Communist world. But this comparison fails to do justice to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist world schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer because at their best they have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great service by demonstrating that whatever meaning history has is derived from the convictions and purpose of the generation which shapes it.

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Troubled-Kissinger—9731

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective be-
tween the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of
many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength.
Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened
by the European sense of tragedy. And the European con-
sciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by
our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what
kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bu-
reaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is
a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or
the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with
considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recog-
nized. The solution of immediate issues has priority over the
shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the
existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after
all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse
creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He
respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted
to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements
of the West with rifts in the Communist world. But this
comparison fails to do justice to the possibilities of the Atlan-
tic area. In the Communist world schisms are inevitable and
unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate.
Their evolution has been richer because at their best they
have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from
the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the na-
tions of the West can render a great service by demonstrating
that whatever meaning history has is derived from the con-
ictions and purpose of the generation which shapes it.