TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INSTITUTE

OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

OUTLINE

ALLIANCES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

HENRY A. KISSINGER

I - TRADITIONAL NOTIONA OF BALANCE OF POWER

The concept of balance of power has played a central role in
international politics especially European politics. Typical
statements.

ROUSSEAU :

" The nations of Europe form among themselves a tacit nation...
The actual system of Europe has precisely the degree of solidity
which maintains it in a constant state of motion without upsetting
it. The balance existing between the power of these diverse
members of the European Society is more the work of nature than
of art. It maintains itself without effort, in such a manner
that it sinks on/side, it restablishes itself very soon on the
other ... This system of Europe is maintained by the constant
vigilance which observes each disturbance of the balance of power."

CHURCHILL :

" For four hundred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest power on the Continent, and particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a power. Viewed in the light of history these four centuries of consistent purpose amid so many changes of names and facts, of circumstances and conditions, must rank as one of the most remarkable episodes which the records of any race, nation, state or people can show. Moreover, on all occasions England took the more difficult course. Faced by Phillip II of Spain, against Louis XIV under Guillaume III and Marlborough, against Napoléon, against William II of Germany, it would have been easy and must have been very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest....

.../... 2

Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it is Spain, or the French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German Empire, or the Hitler regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely with whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant. Therefore we should not be afraid of being accused of being pro-French or anti-German. If the circumstances were reversed, we could equally be pro-German and anti-French. It is a law of public policy which are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by accidental circumstances, or likes and dislikes, or any other sentiment."

Pressuppositions of classical balance of power.

1) - Multiplicity of powers of roughly equal strength.

2) - No ideological conflict. A change of sides depends on considerations of equilibristm and not of ideology. This means commensurable domestic claims.

3) - Conventional technology

a) - Throughout history, statesmen considered the acquisition of increments of power to be an obvious and paramount objective. As late as twenty-five years ago, it would have been inconceivable that a country could possess too much strength for effective political use ; every increment of power was - at least theoretically - politically effective.

b) - Alliances were a reflection of this stat of affairs. When a major effort was required to achieve dominance, when there existed several countries of roughly equal strength, it was impossible for one country to achieve hegemony if the others combined against it.

## II - U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS BALANCE OF POWER AND ALLIANCES

1) - The balance of power contributes to conflict : WILSON.

" The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this : Is the present war struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power ? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement ? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community

.../... 3 of power ; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."

2) - Alliances do not preserve the peace - only system of collective security can do this :

**WILSON.**

" I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power; catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

3) - Therefore the purpose of alliances is to protect not against preponderant power, but against hostile intention.

5) - U.S. foreign engagements are not alliances strictly speaking but imperfect systems of collective security. In 1949, for example, a State Department memorandum justified NATO as follows : " (The Treaty) of the United Nations, the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the parties and their free institutions based upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the role of law. It obligates them to act in defense of peace and security. It is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting balance of power but to strengthen a balance of principle." Therefore U.S. Alliances are often expression of conviction that cooperation is good in itself.

### III - CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL SITUATIONS

1) - End of military multipolarity and emergency of military bipolarity. No only two powers - the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - possess the full panoply of military might. Over the next decade, no other country or groups of countries is capable of challenging their physical pre-eminence. Indeed, the gap in military strength between the two giant nuclear countries and the rest of the world is likely to increase rather than diminish over that period. Moreover, the two superpowers have the ideology, the self-confidences and technical resources to try to order affairs on a global scale.

2) - This military bipolarity is the result however of a new form of power which is difficult to translate into political utility. The major nuclear powers are capable of devasting each other. But they have great difficulty translating this power into policy except to prevent direct challenges to their survival - and this condition is interpreted with increasing strictness. The capacity to destroy is difficult to translate into a plausible threat even against countries with no capacity of retaliation. In the 19th Century, the European powers could engage in decades of colonial wars without effective opposition from public opinion either at home or internationally. To day, any developing country willing and able to resist an industrialized state for a number of years can count on domestic divisions and pressures of world opinion to assist it.

3) - The balance of power is no longer dependent on territorial acquisitions nor for that matter on territorial defense - at least militarily. The traditional criteria for the balance of power were territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only by conquest; hence, as long as territorial expansion was foreclosed, or severely limited, the equilibrium was likely to be preserved. In the contemporary period, this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power are possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state.

4) - This has produced political multipolarity in a militarily bipolar world.

5) - Psychological multipolarity and its significances

6) - Equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals and expectations and in a world where the requirements of the physical and the political equilibrium do not always coincide.

## IV - IMPACT ON ALLIANCES

1) - Alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions :

a) - a common objective - usually defense against a common danger ;

b) - a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the **casus belli** ;

5

c) - some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon;

d) - a penalty for non-cooperation: the power whose aid is sought must be believed to have some alternative to extending assistance; otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down. In the system of alliances developed by the United States after World War II, these conditions were never met outside the NATO Area.

2) - Even in NATO, the last condition has been difficult to fullfil.

3) - The changed nature of modern power has profoundly affected traditional notions of commitment. In the past, a country would carry out a commitment because it could plausibly be argued that the consequences of not doing so were worse than those of coming to the ally's assistance. This is no longer self-evident. In each of the last three annual statements of the U.S. defense posture, the estimate of dead in a general nuclear war, ranged from 40 to 120 million. This trend will, if anything, increase. It will become more and more difficult to demonstrate that anything is worth than the elimination of over half of a society in a matter of days. Basing the defense of NATO increasingly on a variant of the doctrine of massive retaliation complicates the problem even more.

4) - Command arrangements can no longer supply allied cohesion. A new form of politic creativity is needed.

5) - WHAT CAN BE DONE ?

1) - Improvement of existing procedures - the opportunities and limits of consultation

2) - The problems of global partnership.

3) - Alliances as instruments of detente.

a) - Is policy to be concerned with international structure or the opponent's intentions?

4) - The nature of commitment in the modern period.

5) - The creative use of multipolarity - Unity out of pluralism.

["The following are the following are the following are the following are the

### OXFORD: a short tour

(Shown in yellow on the map overleaf)

It is, of course, impossible to catch more than a glimpse of Oxford's historic buildings, gardens and rivers in a short time, but the following tour has been designed to help a visitor to see some of the chief places of interest in about two hours. The dates given after the names of the Colleges are of their foundation.

Begin at the Information Centre, **CARFAX**. Carfax is the name given to the central cross-roads in the City. The tower at Carfax, built in the 14th century, is all that remains of St. Martin's Church. Visitors may climb the tower in summer and get an excellent view of Oxford.

Turn left and walk down **ST. ALDATE'S STREET**, passing the Town Hall on the left. In the second turning on the right, **PEMBROKE SQUARE**, is Pembroke College (1624). Notice the new quadrangle created on the line of the now closed Beef Lane by the erection of the Bessé Building and the adaptation of old buildings on the south side of Pembroke Street.

Cross over **ST. ALDATE'S STREET** to Christ Church (1525) opposite, and walk under Tom Tower with its high dome into the largest College quadrangle in Oxford, Tom Quad, with a lily pond in the middle. Tom Tower houses a bell named Great Tom, weighing 18,000 lb., and at 9.5 p.m. every day it tolls 101 strokes. This was the signal for closing the College gates to the original 101 students. To the right is the beautiful Hall (1529) containing a fine collection of portraits, with a mediaeval kitchen below. Through an archway nearby is the entrance to the Cathedral which dates from the 12th century. This is the College Chapel as well as the Cathedral of the Diocese. A passage on the north side of the Quad leads to the Library, Peckwater Quad and the Canterbury Gate.

On leaving this gate, Oriel College (1326) is to the left, and, walking along **MERTON STREET**, Corpus Christi College (1517) on the right is one of the smaller Colleges, with an unusual sundial dating from 1581 in its front quadrangle. A brief version should be made along Merton Grove, the pathway between Corpus Christi and Merton Chapel; this leads to Merton Fields and Christ Church Meadow, a green and spacious oasis between the Thames, the Colleges and the busy High Street.

Merton College (1264). This is the College with the oldest statutes. Its varied buildings make an interesting group, but the visitor should note especially Mob Quad, Oxford's oldest quadrangle, and the Library on the south and west sides of Mob Quad. The Library is the oldest in England and still keeps some of its books chained. Beyond is the spacious Chapel (1290-1450).

Turn right at the end of **MERTON STREET**, and walk along **HIGH STREET as far as THE BOTANIC GARDEN** (1621), which is one of the oldest in the country. The rose garden in front was recently laid out as a memorial to research workers in Oxford who discovered the clinical importance of penicillin. Opposite is Magdalen College (1458) (pronounced 'Maudlen'), dominated by the Bell Tower, from the top of which the choristers sing a Latin hymn at 6 a.m. on every May 1st. This is the 'May Morning Ceremony' and is witnessed by hundreds of people in the roadway or in boats on the River Cherwell below. The Chapel, Cloisters and Hall at Magdalen, all built in the 15th century, should be seen, and beyond the Cloisters, the Deer Park and Addison's Walk through the meadows. These water-meadows are another of Oxford's precious green spaces and are noted for frittillaries in the spring.

Return up **HIGH STREET** to **QUEEN'S LANE**. From this point the curving High Street, with its varied buildings and single sycamore tree, provides one of the best known views in Oxford. On the right are Queen's College (1341), AllSouls (1437), St. Mary the Virgin Church, Brasenose College (1509), and the spire of All Saints' Church; on the left is University College (1249). This College claims an earlier origin than Merton College: some believe that King Alfred was the founder. Many of its buildings date from the 17th century. The Shelley Memorial (1894) is famous, and the Goodhart Quadrangle (1962) is a good example of a modern addition to the buildings of an ancient College.

Turn right along **QUEEN'S LANE** and continue along **NEW COLLEGE LANE**. This lane passes St. Edmund Hall, with its charming small quadrangle, then the ancient church of St. Peter-in-the-East and, after several sharp turns, reaches New College. This College was founded in 1379 by William of Wykeham who saw the first quadrangle, the Chapel, Hall, Cloisters and Bell Tower built before 1404. The Chapel is famous for its stained glass and contains a statue of Lazarus by Steinheim. The beautiful garden, reached through a wrought iron gate from the Garden Quad, is remarkable for the stretch of the old city wall on the north side, and the mound in the middle.

Follow **NEW COLLEGE LANE** to its end, go up the steps and through the gateway opposite. On three sides are University buildings: on the right is the Clarendon Building, home of the University Press from 1713 to 1830 and now containing University administrative offices. On the left is the Bodleian Library, and ahead is the Sheldonian Theatre built by Sir Christopher Wren in 1664-69. The Theatre is used mainly for University ceremonies and also for concerts. It has recently been restored and, if time permits, a visitor should see the interior. There is a good view of the spires of Oxford from its cupola.

Behind the Sheldonian is the Divinity School (c.1427-90), a perfect example of 15th century perpendicular gothic architecture, and beyond is the Old Ashmoleean Building (1683), housing the Museum of the History of Science.

Walk to the left along **BROAD STREET**. Blackwell's bookshop is across the road and next to it is Trinity College (1555) and then Balliol College (1263). A cross in the roadway opposite Balliol marks the spot where the Martyrs were burnt at the stake, Latimer and Ridley in 1555, and Archbishop Cranmer in 1556.

Turn left along **TURL STREET**. This is another ancient, narrow street, and has Colleges on both sides. Jesus College (1571) on the right has strong connections with Wales; Lawrence of Arabia was an undergraduate here. Opposite is Exeter College (1814) which has a fine Hall built in 1618 with a collar-beam roof and a Jacobean screen. The Chapel (Gilbert Scott, 1856-59) contains a William Morris tapestry. Beyond Brasenose Lane, which still has its mediaeval middle gutter, is Lincoln College (1427) where John Wesley was a Fellow for nine years.

Turn right at the end of **TURL STREET**, passing the Mitre Hotel, one of Oxford's oldest and most famous inns, dating mainly from the 17th century, and return along **HIGH STREET** to **CARFAX**.

## EXTENSION OF THE TOUR NORTHWARDS

Walk along **CORNMARKET STREET** which runs northwards from Carfax; most of the buildings in it are modern. On the 2nd floor of No. 3 Cornmarket Street is the 'Painted Room'. It is believed that Shakespeare slept here on his journeys to and from London. On the right, through an archway, is the Golden Cross, which has been an inn for over 700 years.

On the corner of Ship Street is the Church of St. Michael at the North Gate: the tower dates from the 11th century and is the oldest building in Oxford. Formerly it adjoined the North Gate of the City, above which was the Bocardo prison. From there the three Martyrs were taken to be burnt at the stake. The Martyrs' Memorial is further along beyond the next church on the right, St. Mary Magdalen.

### OXFORD INFORMATION CENTRE

Carfax, Oxford. Telephone 48707

Other publications available:

Official Handbook (1/- post free)

Car Parks Map (free)

List of Hotels, Guest Houses and Restaurants (free)

Civic, Commercial and Tourist Information

Guided tours arranged

THOMAS PHOTO
OXFORD

A map of central Oxford showing the colleges and some other important buildings open to visitors.

The yellow route shows the short tour recommended overleaf.

Issued by the Oxford Information Centre—Printed by the City of Oxford (offset-litho), 1968

KEY TO MAP

<table><thead><tr><th>No. on map</th><th>NORMAL TIMES OF OPENING</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. ALL SOULS COLLEGE, High Street</td><td>Weekdays 2-5<br>Sundays 2-5</td></tr><tr><td>2. ASHMOLEAN MUSEUM, Beaumont Street</td><td>10-4</td></tr><tr><td>3. BALLIOL COLLEGE, Broad Street</td><td>2-5</td></tr><tr><td>4. BODLEIAN LIBRARY, Broad Street</td><td>9-5<br>Sat. 9-12.30</td></tr><tr><td>5. BOTANIC GARDEN, High Street</td><td>10-12<br>2-4.30 or 6</td></tr><tr><td>6. BRASENOSE COLLEGE, Radcliffe Square</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>7. CARFAX TOWER, Carfax</td><td>Summer only<br>10.30-12.30<br>2.30-4.30</td></tr><tr><td>8. CASTLE, New Road</td><td>By special arrangement only</td></tr><tr><td>9. CHRIST CHURCH, St. Aldate's</td><td>7-5<br>7-6.15</td></tr><tr><td>10. CHRIST CHURCH MEADOW, Entrances from Merton Grove, Rose Lane and St. Aldate's</td><td>7-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>11. CLARENDON BUILDING, Broad Street</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>12. CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, Merton Street</td><td>Term 2-4<br>Vac. 10-6<br>10-1, 2-4</td></tr><tr><td>13. DIVINITY SCHOOL, Broad Street</td><td>Closed</td></tr><tr><td>14. ENGINEERING SCIENCE, Dept. of, etc., Banbury Road</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>15. EXAMINATION SCHOOLS, High Street</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>16. EXETER COLLEGE, Turl Street</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>17. GLOUCESTER GREEN, Coach and Bus Station</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>18. HERTFORD COLLEGE, Catte Street</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>19. INFORMATION CENTRE, Carfax</td><td>9-5.30</td></tr><tr><td>20. JESUS COLLEGE, Turl Street</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>21. KEBLE COLLEGE, Parks Road</td><td>10-4.45</td></tr><tr><td>22. LADY MARGARET HALL, Norham Gardens (Closed August)</td><td>2-dusk<br>10-4.45</td></tr><tr><td>23. LAW LIBRARY & FACULTY, St. Cross Road</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>24. LINACRE COLLEGE, St. Aldate's</td><td>2-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>25. LINCOLN COLLEGE, Turl Street</td><td>2-5</td></tr><tr><td>26. MAGDALEN COLLEGE, High Street</td><td>2-5<br>July & August 10-7 daily</td></tr><tr><td>27. MANSFIELD COLLEGE, Mansfield Road</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>28. MARTYR'S MEMORIAL, St. Giles' Street</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>29. MERTON COLLEGE, Merton Street</td><td>10-4.30</td></tr><tr><td>30. MUSEUM OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE, Broad Street</td><td>10.30-1<br>2.30-4</td></tr><tr><td>31. NEW COLLEGE, New College Lane</td><td>Mon.-Fri.<br>Term 2-5<br>Vac. 11-6</td></tr><tr><td>32. NEW THEATRE, George Street</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>33. NUFFIELD COLLEGE, New Road</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>34. ORIEL COLLEGE, Oriel Square</td><td>Term 2-5<br>Vac. 10-6<br>10-6.30</td></tr><tr><td>35. PEMBROKE COLLEGE, Pembroke Square</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>36. PLAYHOUSE THEATRE, Beaumont Street</td><td>9-5.30</td></tr><tr><td>37. POLICE HEADQUARTERS, St. Aldate's</td><td>Closed<br>Sat. closes 4.30</td></tr><tr><td>38. POST OFFICE (G.P.O.), St. Aldate's</td><td>Term 2-5<br>Vac. 10-5</td></tr><tr><td>39. QUEEN'S COLLEGE, High Street</td><td>2-5<br>10-5</td></tr><tr><td>40. RADCLIFFE CAMERA, Radcliffe Square</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>41. RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY, Woodstock Road</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>42. RAILWAY STATION, Park End Street</td><td>Mon.-Fri. 2.30-5.30</td></tr><tr><td>43. RHODES HOUSE, South Parks Road</td><td>—</td></tr><tr><td>44. ST. ANNE'S COLLEGE, Woodstock Road</td><td>Mon.-Fri. 2.30-5.30</td></tr><tr><td>45. ST. ANTONY'S COLLEGE, Woodstock Road</td><td>2-5</td></tr><tr><td>46. ST. CATHERINE'S COLLEGE, Manor Road</td><td>2-7</td></tr><tr><td>47. ST. EDMUND HALL, Queen's Lane</td><td>9-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>48. MARY'S COLLEGE, Cowley Place</td><td>Term only 2-5 daily</td></tr><tr><td>49. ST. HILDA'S COLLEGE, St. Margaret's Road</td><td>2-5</td></tr><tr><td>50. ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, St. Giles' Street</td><td>Term 1-5 or 7<br>Vac. 9-5 or 7<br>10-1</td></tr><tr><td>51. ST. MARY THE VIRGIN CHURCH, High Street</td><td>All day<br>All day</td></tr><tr><td>52. ST. PETER'S COLLEGE, New Inn Hall Street</td><td>Term 2-4<br>Vac. 10-4<br>10-1, 2-5</td></tr><tr><td>53. SHELDONIAN THEATRE, Broad Street</td><td>Closed<br>2-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>54. SOMERVILLE COLLEGE, Woodstock Road</td><td>2-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>55. TOWN HALL, Plate Room, St. Aldate's</td><td>Mon.-Fri. 10-5</td></tr><tr><td>56. TRINITY COLLEGE, Broad Street</td><td>2-7</td></tr><tr><td>57. UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, High Street</td><td>Term 2-4<br>Vac. 10-6<br>10-6</td></tr><tr><td>58. UNIVERSITY MUSEUM, Parks Road</td><td>10-4</td></tr><tr><td>59. UNIVERSITY PARKS, Entrances from Parks Road South Parks Road and Norham Gardens</td><td>7.30-dusk</td></tr><tr><td>60. WADHAM COLLEGE, Parks Road</td><td>11-5 or 7</td></tr><tr><td>61. WORCESTER COLLEGE, Worcester Street</td><td>Term 2-dusk 2-dusk<br>Vac. 9-12 2-dusk 9-12 2-dusk</td></tr></tbody></table>

HILL, SAMUEL & CO. LIMITED

100 Wood Street, London EC2

Telephone - 01-628 8011
Cables - HILLSAM London-EC2
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PERSONAL

11th September 1968

Prof. Henry Kissinger,
c/o the Hon. Alastair Buchan,
The Institute for Strategic Studies,
18 Adam Street, W. C. 2.

Dear Henry,

I have been making a special note to come to your
lecture on September 18th, but you have unfortunately chosen
the date on which my small son goes away to school for the
first time and, passionately interested though I am in Vietnam,
I am afraid domestic responsibilities must in this case take
precedence over public interest. So your audience will be
one smaller than it would have been, although I have no doubt that
there will be standing room only.

As I shall not see you lecture, is there any chance of
seeing you at any other time while you are here? I know that
Marie-Lou would much enjoy meeting you again. Do please
let me know.

Yours ever,

(Sir Philip de Zulueta)

copy to Professor Kissinger,
c/o Harvard.

Asia For Peace Society

Secretary General:
Nasim Ahmed.
Cablegrams:
Asiapeace, LondonPS4.

46, Kent Avenue,
London, W.13.

Tel: 01-997 0136
930 0445

14th September, 1968.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

I am glad to learn of your visit to
Britain and look forward to your lecture to the Institute
of Strategic Studies next Wednesday.

If you can spare some time on the 18th
September, before or after your talk, or before your return
to the United States on the 22nd September, I would like to
call on you briefly to acquaint you with our newly-formed
Asia for Peace Society, a non-Communist body dedicated to
these cause of genuine detente in Asia. Among those who have
welcomed and assisted its formation is the Rt. Hon. Philip
Noel-Baker, M.P., a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

As for myself, I am Pakistani journalist
of twenty years' standing and a past President of the Foreign
Press Association and the Commonwealth Correspondents Asso-
ciation in Britain. I am a co-founder of the Pakistan Society
of which the President of Pakistan and the Duke of Edinburgh
and Patrons. I had the pleasure and honour of meeting the
late President Kennedy in Washington and also President
Johnson when he was Vice-President. I have also visited
Moscow and Peking where I met Mr. Kosygin and other leaders.
I plan to pay another visit to the United States in the
near future.

With kind regards,

Professor Henry Kissinger,
c/o The Institute for Strategic Studies,
18, Adam Street,
London, W.C.2.

- 15 -

III. POLITICAL MULTIPOLARITY: THE CHANGED
NATURE OF ALLIANCES

During the post-war period, the United States identified security with alliances. A global network of relationships grew up based on the proposition that deterrence of aggression required the largest possible grouping of powers.

In the first decade and a half after World War II, this
system of alliances was in difficulty outside the Atlantic area
because it tried to apply principles essentially drawn from the
multipolar world of the 18th and 19th Century when several major
powers of roughly equal strength existed. Then indeed it was
impossible for one country to achieve dominance if several others
combined to prevent it. But this was not the case in the era of
the superpowers of the Forties and Fifties. Outside of Europe,
our allies added only marginally to our strength; they were in no
position to reinforce each other's capabilities.

Alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions:
(1) a common objective -- usually defense against a common
danger; (2) a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define
the *casus belli*; (3) some technical means of cooperation in case
common action is decided upon; (4) a penalty for non-cooperation:
the power whose aid is sought must be believed to have some alter-
native to extending assistance; otherwise protection will be taken
for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down.

In the system of alliances developed by the United States
after World War II, these conditions were never met outside the
NATO area. In SEATO or CENTO (to which we have belonged in all but

- 20 -

This situation has been especially difficult for those in
the United States who deserve most credit for forging existing
Atlantic relations. Two decades of hegemony have produced the
illusion that present Atlantic relationships are "natural," that
wise policy consists of making the existing framework more
tolerable. "Leadership" and "partnership" are invoked; but the
tendency is to apply globally the pattern heretofore confined to
the Atlantic area. European unity is advocated to enable
Europeans to share burdens on a world-wide scale.

Such a view fails to take into account the realities of
political multipolarity. The aim of returning to the "great days
of the Marshall Plan" is impossible. Nothing would sunder Atlantic
relationships so surely as the attempt to reassert the notions of
leadership appropriate to the early days of NATO. Events will no
longer conform to an American design. The challenge of the
Seventies will be to tap the energies of a pluralistic Atlantic
world.

It is not "natural" that the major decisions about the
defense of an area so potentially powerful as Western Europe should
be made 3,000 miles away. It is not "normal" that U.S. leadership
consist of gearing Atlantic policies to American conceptions. In
the Forties and Fifties, practicing unity -- through formal
resolutions and periodic reassurances -- was important. It was
useful as a reassurance for Europe and it was profoundly important
for us as a constant symbol of the end of our isolationism. In the
decade ahead, unity cannot be aimed at as an end in itself; it must
emerge from specific cooperation and common conception

- 22 -

Neither condition is met today. The traditional notion of American leadership tends to stifle European incentives for autonomy. Improved consultation -- the remedy usually proposed -- can only alleviate, not remove the difficulty.

The problem of consultation is complex, of course. No doubt unilateral American action has compounded the uneasiness produced by American predominance and European weakness. Whatever the merit of individual policies, the shift in the emphasis of American policy, from the NATO multilateral force to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the frequent unilateral changes in strategic doctrine have all tended to produce disquiet and to undermine the domestic position of ministers who had staked their futures on supporting the American viewpoint.

It is far from self-evident, however, that more extensive consultation within the existing framework can be more than a palliative. Any political process -- including consultation -- involves not only a problem of advice but also an issue of decision. Even within governments, the ultimate outcome usually requires the overruling of some group or interest. Indeed, in the modern bureaucratic state, the resolution of conflicting advice has proved much more difficult than obtaining it in the first place. There are inherent limits to consultation when policy is made so much on a case-by-case approach and when plans rarely influence crisis actions. No amount of consultation will remove the different perspective about extra-European involvements. The disagreement here is caused not by a failure of understanding but because the two sides understand each other only too well.

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Another problem concerns technical competence. In any large bureaucracy -- and an international consultative process has many similarities to domestic administrative procedures -- the weight given to advice bears some relation to the competence it reflects. If one partner possesses all technical competence, the process of consultation is likely to remain barren. The minimum requirement for effective consultation is that each ally have enough knowledge to give meaningful advice. The NATO nuclear committee has made a great contribution in this respect for the military problem.

But the final problems of consultation are not technical. The losing party in a domestic dispute has three choices: (a) it can accept the setback with the expectation of winning another battle later on -- this is the usual bureaucratic attitude and it is based on the knowledge of being able to force another hearing later on; (b) if advice is consistently ignored, the losing party or group can resign and go into opposition; (c) opposition can have the purpose either of inducing the existing government to change its course or to replace it. If all these avenues are closed, violence or mounting frustration are the consequences.

Only the first option is open to sovereign states bound together by an alliance. The partners cannot resign or go into opposition without wrecking the alliance. They cannot affect the process by which allied decisionmakers are chosen despite the fact that this may be crucial for their fate. Indeed, as long as the need to maintain the alliance overrides all other concerns, sustained disagreement is likely to be stifled. Advice without

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responsibility and disagreement without an outlet can turn consultation into a frustrating exercise which compounds rather than allieviates discord.

Even domestically, those departments which can act on their own -- such as the Department of Defense -- are likely to get a fuller hearing than those whose competence is primarily technical or advisory. This is even more true internationally. However abrupt his methods, de Gaulle has grasped that influence depends not only on intellectual qualities but also on the options available in case of disagreement.

Consultation is especially difficult when it lacks an integrating overall framework. The consultation about the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerned specific provisions but not the underlying general philosophy which was of the deepest concern to many of our allies, especially the Federal Republic and Italy. Each ally makes its own approach to Eastern Europe or the USSR without concept of a coherent Western enterprise. In these circumstances, consultation runs the risk of being irrelevant. The issues it "solves" are peripheral; the central issues are inadequately articulated. It deals haphazardly in answers to undefined questions.

This state of affairs is not healthy in the long run. Those in Europe most ready to accept American tutelage -- even in its modified form of improved consultation -- may not prove very steady allies in times of crises; their motive may be a form of abdication from international affairs, a psychological form of neutralism. Their opponents may become convinced that European

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autonomy must be seized from the United States; they may develop
a vested interest in anti-Americanism. Such a polarization of
European political life cannot be in our interest.

The problem is equally serious for the United States. If
the United States insists upon remaining the trustee of every
non-Communist area, it will exhaust its psychological resources.
No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the
globe at every moment of time. A more pluralistic world --
especially in relationships with friends -- is profoundly in our
long-term interest. Political multipolarity while difficult, is
the precondition for a new period of creativity. Painful as it may
be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight to discipline
our occasional impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to
our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions.

Involved here is the American conception of how nations
cooperate. A tradition of legalism and habits of predominance
have produced a tendency to multiply formal arrangements.
"Integration" has become identified with Atlanticism.

But the emerging political multipolarity forces us to learn
that nations cooperate less because they have a legal obligation
to do so than because they have common purposes. Command arrange-
ments cannot substitute for common interests. It is contradictory
to place so much emphasis on coordinated strategy and so little on
coordinated diplomacy.

It is in the American interest to encourage greater European
autonomy. The possibility of disagreements on peripheral issues

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may be the price for unity where it really matters. The memory
of European impotence and American tutelage should not delude us
into believing that we understand Europe's problems better than it
does itself. Third Force dangers are not avoided by legal formulae, but
they are in any event overdrawn. It is hard to visualize a "deal".
between the Soviet Union and Europe which would jeopardize our
interests without jeopardizing European interests first. Thus,
there are objective limits to Third Force policies. If Europeans
do not understand the requirements of their own survival without
pervasive American tutelage, American tutelage will not long be
able to substitute for lack of European understanding. In short,
our relations with Europeans are better founded on a balancing of
interests than on the elaboration of formal legal obligations. No
precise blueprint for such an arrangement is possible because
various fields of activity will imply different needs. In the military
field for example, modern technology will impose a greater degree of
centralization than is necessary in other areas. Whatever their formal
autonomy, it is almost inconceivable that our allies would _prefer_
to go to war _without_ the United States support given the relatively small
nuclear forces in prospect for them. Close coordination between
Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by
self-interest and Europe has more to gain from it than the United
States.

For this very reasons, it is in our interest that Europeans should
assume much greater responsibility for developing doctrine and force
levels in NATO, perhaps by vitalizing such institutions as the West
European Union (WEU), perhaps by creating new structures. The
Supreme Allied Commander should in time become European.

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Under current conditions, no statesman will risk a cataclysm simply to fulfill a legal obligation. The only motive for running the risk of nuclear war is likely to be a degree of political cooperation which links the fate of each partner with the survival of all the others. This requires an entirely new order of political creativity. Heretofore, Atlantic political cooperation concentrated on developing common policy. In the decade ahead, the problem will be to work out a philosophy which makes possible partly coordinated, partly divergent approaches.

Coordination is especially necessary in East-West relations. The traditional view is that NATO can be as useful an instrument for detente as for defense. This is doubtful -- at least in NATO's present form. A military alliance, one of the chief cohesive links of which is its integrated command arrangement, is not the best instrument for a flexible diplomacy. Turning NATO into an instrument of detente, may reduce its security contribution without achieving a relaxation of tensions.

Moreover, a diplomatic confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact has all the rigidities of a bipolar world. It will raise fears in Western Europe of a U.S.-Soviet condominium and it will tend to legitimize the Soviet hegemonial position in Eastern Europe. Above all, it will fail to take advantage of the flexibility afforded by greater West European unity and autonomy. As Europe gains structure, its attraction for Eastern Europe is bound to increase. The major initiatives for relations between Western and Eastern Europe should be originated in Europe with the United States in a reserve position.

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Such an approach can work only if there is a real consensus as to objectives. Philosophical agreement can make possible flexibility on method. This will require a form of consultation much more substantial than what now exists and a more effective European contribution.

To be sure, events in Czechoslovakia demonstrate the limits of East European autonomy that the Soviet Union is now prepared to tolerate. But the Soviet Union may not be willing indefinitely to continue to use the Red Army primarily against allies as it has done three times in a decade and a half. In any event, no Western policy can guarantee a more favorable evolution in Central Europe; all it can do is to take advantage of the opportunity if it arises.

Policy outside of Europe is likely to be divergent. Given the changed European perspective, an effort to bring about global burden sharing may only produce stagnation. The allies will be able to agree primarily on doing nothing. Any crisis occuring anywhere will turn automatically and organically world-wide.

American understanding for European autonomy implies also European understanding for a degree of American autonomy with respect to areas in which, for understandable reasons, European concern has lessened.

In addition, cooperative efforts in entirely new areas should be explored. For example, our space program need not be national. European participation in it could supply an effective answer to the "technological gap".

Finally, under present circumstances, an especially meaningful community of interests can be developed in the social sphere. All modern states face problems of bureaucratization, pollution, environmental control, urban growth. These problems know no national

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considerations. If the nations of the Atlantic work together on
these issues -- either through private or governmental channels
or both -- a new generation habituated to cooperative efforts
could develop similar to that spawned in different circumstances
by the Marshall Plan.

It is high time that the nations bordering the Atlantic
deal -- formally, systematically and at the highest level -- with
questions such as these: (a) what are the relative roles of
Europe and the United States in East-West contacts? (b) is a
division of functions conceivable in which Western Europe plays
the principal role in relation to Eastern Europe while the United
States concentrates on relationships with the USSR? (c) what
forms of political consultation does this require? (d) in what
areas of the world is common action possible? Where are divergent
courses indicated? How are differences to be handled?

Thus, we face the root question of a multipolar world. How
much unity should we want? How much diversity can we stand? These
questions never have a final answer within a pluralistic society.
Adjusting the balance between integration and autonomy will be the
key challenge of the emerging Atlantic relations.

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name) there has been no common conception of the threat. Pakistan's motive for obtaining U.S. arms was not security against a Communist attack, but protection against India. The Arab members of CENTO armed not against the USSR but against Israel. Lacking a conception of common interests, the members of these alliances were never able to develop common policies with respect to issues of war and peace. Had they been able to do so, these policies might well have been stillborn anyway, because the technical means of cooperation have been lacking. Most allies had neither the resources nor the will to render mutual support. A state which finds it difficult to maintain order or the coherence of policy at home, does not increase its strength by combining with states suffering similar disabilities.

In these circumstances, SEATO and CENTO have become moribund as instruments of collective action. Because the United States has often seemed more eager to engage in the defense of its allies than they themselves, America's SEATO and CENTO allies have become convinced that non-cooperation has no cost. Allies have been able to give the impression that it would be worse for us than for them if they fell to Communism. As a result, SEATO and CENTO have become, in effect, unilateral American guarantees. At best, they provide a legal basis for bilateral U.S. aid.

The case is different with NATO. Here we are united with countries of similar traditions and domestic structures. At the start, there was a common conception of the threat. The technical means for cooperation existed. Mechanisms for developing common policies came into being. Thus in its first decade and a half, NATO was a dynamic and creative institution.

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"Burden-sharing" will not supply that impetus. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair, only because it is necessary. While there are strong arguments for Atlantic partnership and European unity, enabling Europe to play a global role is not one of them. A nation assumes responsibilities not only because it has resources, but because it has a certain view of its own destiny. Through the greater part of its history -- until World War II -- the United States possessed the resources but not the philosophy for a global role. Today, the poorest West European country -- Portugal -- has the widest commitments outside of Europe because its historic image of itself has become bound up with its overseas possessions. This condition is unlikely to be met for any other European country -- with the partial exception of Great Britain -- no matter what their increase in power. Partially as the result of de-colonization, Europeans are unlikely to conduct a significant global policy whatever their resources or their degree of unity. Cooperation between the United States and Europe will have to take forms other than global partnership. A basic problem in Atlantic relationships will be to devise partly coordinated, partly divergent policies for the various portions of the world.

Even within the Atlantic area, a more equitable distribution of responsibilities has two prerequisites: (1) there must be some consensus in the analysis of the international situation, at least as it affects Europe; (2) there must be a conviction that the United States cannot or will not carry all burdens alone.