This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1751

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 1:20 P.M. IST

MAY 31, 1973

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: I will give you a very brief comment relating to this morning's session.

The meetings between President Nixon and President Pompidou began at about 10:15 and lasted until 12:50. I don't have, of course, a detailed report to provide you on the meeting, the first meeting between the two Presidents. They resume this afternoon, as you know, at 3:00 and will meet again tomorrow morning.

However, in general terms, I can tell you that the two Presidents had a wide-ranging review of world relations and discussions relating to international matters. They reviewed the evolution and future of the Atlantic alliance in a very useful and constructive way.

In the course of the discussion, President Pompidou underlined the importance of maintaining United States forces in Europe and cautioned against unilateral reduction of forces.

Of course, all of you know the United States position. We have often said that we had no intention to proceed with unilateral reduction of forces in Europe.

Q Did the President reiterate that position to him?

MR. ZIEGLER: That was not specifically said to me, but I am sure as they talked about it, the United States position was spelled out, yes.

Dr. Kissinger participated in a good portion of the meeting this morning, in fact, almost all of it.

At the same time the two Presidents were meeting, Secretary Rogers and the Foreign Minister met. Their meeting began also at about 10:15 and ended at 12 o'clock. They talked about the Middle East, discussed Indochina and the upcoming NATO meeting which is scheduled to be held in Copenhagen in a short time.

MORE

#1751

- 2 -

#1751

Also, as I mentioned to you last night, Secretary Shultz and the Finance Minister of France met from about 10:20 until 12 noon also. I don't have a report out of the Finance Minister's meeting, except to tell you that they dwelt mostly on matters relating to the monetary structure and not so much on the trade subject this morning. In their two remaining meetings, I am sure they will be touching on the subject of trade in more detail.

We don't have a briefing scheduled as of yet for this evening. The meetings begin at 3:00 and should end at about 5:00 or 5:30. We will let you know in this room what the briefing plans are and we will brief here, not at the museum this evening and will provide what information we have at this location.

Q What did Kissinger and Jobert talk about last night?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know, I was not there.

Q You had no part in it?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I did not.

Q What do you mean "world conditions?"

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't think I used the words "world conditions." I said "world relations."

Q This was then essentially a discussion of international matters rather than bilateral?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, it was.

Q When will bilateral matters be taken up?

MR. ZIEGLER: As I mentioned last night, there is no specific agenda the two Presidents follow, but they have a number of hours of discussion time left and I can't be quite specific as to when they will get into specific bilateral discussions.

Q When you say they reviewed the evolution and future of the Atlantic alliance, did the President describe to President Pompidou the new Atlantic charter that Kissinger referred to in his New York speech; in other words, did he present it to Pompidou, outline it and describe it and urge his consideration of it?

MR. ZIEGLER: Here again, Jim, I was not in the meeting, so I can't convey the thrust of the discussion beyond what I have given you at this time. In terms of a more thorough discussion of the meeting between the two Presidents, that will have to wait for a later briefing until I can have more time to discuss it with the President or until we can put someone before you who did participate in the meeting.

MORE

#1751

- 3 -

#1751

[L.C.]

Q As far as the President's view of the future of the Atlantic alliance, it goes along with what Dr. Kissinger discussed in briefings and in speeches and things like that?

MR. ZIEGLER: As you know, Dr. Kissinger briefed you before we left Washington and discussed that. In terms of the content of this morning's discussion, I can only be as complete as I have been.

Q Did they talk about the negotiations coming up with Brezhnev?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do know that President Pompidou would be very interested in discussing that matter with the President, as the President would be interested in reviewing those upcoming discussions with him.

It is my understanding that they did not have a chance to dwell at any length this morning on the upcoming summit meeting with Mr. Brezhnev, but they will be talking about it, I know, over the next two days.

Q The only specific issue you mentioned is the presence of American troops in Europe, continued presence. Is that because that is the only thing they could agree on?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't think that is suggested in what I said at all. This is information that was supplied to me by those who participated in the meeting, which is an indication at this early stage of the talks as to what they talked about this morning.

It would be incorrect for you -- even though I do understand your deadline -- to draw any conclusions about what I have said to you. I tried to convey to you what the general discussions were this morning and this is all I can provide to you.

Q I passed my deadline.

MR. ZIEGLER: You passed your deadline. I thought it was 1:00.

Q Are you saying you will have another briefing after 3:00?

MR. ZIEGLER: I already mentioned that we will provide any further information in this room this afternoon following the meeting.

Q On the discussion of troops, have you any feeling whether the President discussed with President Pompidou the outlook for Congressional action or lack of Congressional action on this particular question?

MORE

#1751

- 4 -

#1751

MR. ZIEGLER: Here again, this is one of the reasons I hesitated in coming here and just not posting this. As I told you, now for the final time, I did not participate in the meeting and we can't make something up here in an exchange of Q's and A's. This is what was given to me to provide to you and we will provide you a more thorough briefing at the appropriate time. This is not the appropriate time.

Q Who discussed this?

MR. ZIEGLER: I discussed it with the President and Dr. Kissinger in the car returning from the meeting.

Q The French said Dr. Kissinger had participated in the whole of the Nixon-Pompidou meeting. You comment was "in almost all."

MR. ZIEGLER: I suppose I was trying to be just precisely accurate. He was not in the photo session and the period just after the photo session. He was standing in the hall, as a matter of fact. There is no difference in what we have said. It was just for --

Q For the talks?

MR. ZIEGLER: For the talks, he was virtually in all of them.

Q In the context of the American military contribution to European defense, was there any discussion of the French military contribution to NATO or did the President desire that it be enhanced?

MR. ZIEGLER: Here again, having not participated in the meeting, I find myself unable to respond to that.

Q What are the plans for tomorrow as they now stand?

MR. ZIEGLER: In other words, is there going to be a briefing after tomorrow's meeting, I assume is your question. We will have to determine that later on today. I hope to be able to provide you a detailed briefing this afternoon. This is simply a general feeling as to what took place this morning.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 1:30 P.M. IST)

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 105587

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USINT BAGHDAD BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY SANAA BY POUCH

UNCLAS STATE 105587

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT PRESS BRIEFING

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING IS PARTIAL
EXCERPT FROM DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN'S PRESS BRIEFING JUNE 1,
1973:

QUOTE: IS THE UNITED STATES GOING TO SELL PHANTOM JET
FIGHTERS TO SAUDI ARABIA?

A. I INDICATED YESTERDAY, I BELIEVE, THAT THERE WAS A WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO DISCUSS THE SALE OF A LIMITED NUMBER OF F-4'S; YES.

Q. WHAT IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW OF A "LIMITED NUMBER"?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO ELABORATE BEYOND --

Q. IS 140 A "LIMITED NUMBER"?

A. -- I'M NOT GOING TO ELABORATE BEYOND THE FACT THAT I SAID A "LIMITED NUMBER."

Q. WOULD YOU LIKE TO GIVE US A REASON FOR THIS SUDDEN UNWILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER?

A. I DON'T CARE, PARTICULARLY, TO RETRACT EVERYTHING THAT WAS SAID YESTERDAY. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, I EXPECT-- ANTICIPATE -- THAT AN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL WILL BE TESTIFYING BEFORE THE CONGRESS, AND WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO, ON THE WHOLE INTERRELATED SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. (NOTE: ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO IS SCHEDULED TO APPEAR BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 84-1057

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 105587

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA JUNE 6.)

Q. PAUL, DOES THE STATE DEPARTMENT ANTICIPATE THAT THE SALE OF PHANTOM JETS TO SAUDI ARABIA WILL INFLUENCE ISRAEL'S POSITION IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES? DO YOU EXPECT IT TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION?

A. I WOULDN'T WANT TO PUT THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PERSIAN GULF INTO THAT CONTEXT.

Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT -- FRANKLY, I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU'VE JUST SAID.

A. I'M SAYING THAT THE QUESTION OF OUR ARMS RELATIONSHIP -- AS I TRIED TO POINT OUT YESTERDAY -- IS ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.

Q. AND 'ESSENTIALLY," "PRIMARY" -- YOU'VE USED THOSE WORDS. MY QUESTION WAS: DO WE EXPECT THE SALE TO HAVE ANY IMPACT ON ISRAEL'S STANCE REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES -- ANY IMPACT AT ALL?

A. I DON'T SEE HOW I CAN BE EXPECTED TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

Q. WELL, IN CONSIDERING THE WILLINGNESS TO SELL PHANTOM JETS TO SAUDI ARABIA, DID WE CONSIDER THE POSSIBLE IMPACT ON ISRAEL'S NEGOTIATING POSITION?

A. I THINK THAT WHAT I SAID YESTERDAY WOULD STILL HOLD, IN TERMS OF WHAT OUR BASIC CONSIDERATIONS WERE. AND I WOULD POINT YOU BACK AGAIN TO WHAT I SAID ABOUT THE ISRAELI CONCERN, AND ALSO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THAT CONCERN AND THE FACT THAT WE WOULD NOT DO ANYTHING TO JEOPARDIZE ISRAELI SECURITY.

Q. MRS. MEIR HAS BEEN QUOTED AS SAYING THAT THE RECENT SALES AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR SALES WOULD COMPEL ISRAEL TO REASSESS HER DEFINITION OF SECURE, DEFENSIBLE BORDERS. DON'T YOU THINK THAT THAT IS A SPECIFIC REACTION TO THIS

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 105587

MATTER, AND DO YOU SEE THAT IT'S POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE TO
KEEP THIS ARMS RELATIONSHIP IN THE PERSIAN GULF OUT OF THE
ISRAEL-ARAB CONSTELLATION?

A. WELL, I JUST MADE WHAT I CONSIDERED TO BE A STATEMENT
OF OUR POINT OF VIEW ON THIS PARTICULAR MATTER IN CON-
NECTION WITH ISRAELI SECURITY. I REALLY CAN'T SAY ANYTHING
FURTHER ABOUT WHAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MAY FEEL ABOUT
DEVELOPMENTS. I JUST REALLY CAN'T SPEAK FOR THEM.

Q. IF YOU SELL F-4'S TO SAUDI ARABIA, WOULD YOU ASK THE
SAUDIS TO KEEP THEM IN THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY OR WOULD
YOU PERMIT THEM TO HAVE THEM IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY
FAR FROM THE PERSIAN GULF?

A. I'M NOT PREPARED TO GET INTO THAT SORT OF DETAIL. END
QUOTE. RUSH

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED BAGHDAD, SANAA.

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-1653

This Copy For

#1752

NEWS CONFERENCE

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

11:40 A.M. EDT

JUNE 4, 1973

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: We have some information to distribute at this time and then we will go straight into the morning briefing.

Q: Is Ron at a meeting, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: He is.

I think you all have the material now. There is a local story for everybody, as was pointed out down here.

There was a question over here about what the position of a member of the Council of Economic Advisers pays. It is $38,000.

The President is working in his EOB office across the street this morning. He has been meeting with staff members. He met with General Haig this morning, Ron Ziegler, and Steve Bull. Ron is in a meeting and asked me to give you the information that we have today.

Tomorrow morning the President will meet with the Republican leadership of the House and Senate. That meeting will begin at 8:30 a.m. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the recent visit to Iceland and the meetings with President Pompidou, and also to take up a discussion of the various legislative matters that are before the Congress.

Senator Scott and Congressman Ford will be in this room to brief you at the conclusion of that meeting. I expect that to be sometime between 9:30 and 10 tomorrow morning.

At 11:00 a.m. tomorrow the President will meet with President William Tolbert of Liberia, as we have previously announced. This will be the first meeting between the two Presidents since President Tolbert took office in July 1971. This meeting will afford the two Presidents an opportunity to renew their personal friendship and to review bilateral relations which have reflected unique and historic ties which have extended over the past quarter of a century.

President Tolbert came to the U.S. from the annual meeting of the Organization of African Unity in which he participated as one of the Vice Presidents. President Nixon will be interested in discussing with President Tolbert the discussions that took place at that meeting, and also matters of common interest internationally.

To give you a little background, the President has met Mr. Tolbert on four previous occasions: In 1957 as Vice President and in 1967 as a private citizen in Monrovia; and in 1969

MORE

#1752

- 7 -

#1752

Q You mention potential evidence. Can you at least spell that out? Why potential evidence?

MR. WARREN: Allegations are being made in the press relating to this matter. I am just not going to debate that nor discuss the merits of it from here.

Q Jerry, during the time that John Dean had the title of Counsel to the President did the President consider that he and Dean had an attorney-client relationship? Was that his definition of the job of White House Counsel during the time that Dean was counsel?

MR. WARREN: The White House Counsel, of course, was acting as Counsel to the President and in that regard there would have been a counsel-client relationship. However, because of the current proceedings I am not in a position to discuss that with you at this time.

Q Does Dean have access to those logs?

MR. WARREN: I don't know.

Q Did those logs come under the responsibility of Dwight Chapin before his departure?

MR. WARREN: Perhaps. I am not sure about that.

Q Has the United States agreed to sell Phantoms to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia? Can you tell us what Ambassador Dinitz and Kissinger discussed Saturday?

MR. WARREN: On the first question I am not in a position to discuss the matter from here. The State Department has in considerable detail, I am told, and I am sure would again.

Now as to the meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dinitz, the meeting did take place but I am not in a position to discuss the subject.

Q Even the subject?

MR. WARREN: No.

Q Jerry, has John Dean attempted to gain access to the EOB in the past several days to check records?

MR. WARREN: I don't know the answer to that.

Q Does John Dean have a continuing right to his files at this time?

MR. WARREN: I don't know the answer to that question. Let me check that.

Q Jerry, has the President met with Mr. Ehrlichman or Mr. Haldeman since he accepted their resignations?

MR. WARREN: To my knowledge, he has not. He has not.

Q Does Mr. Haldeman have access to an office in the EOB?

MORE

#1752

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 14, 1973

No. 208

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE
OF THE 20TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION (CENTO)
TEHRAN, IRAN

JUNE 11, 1973

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was inaugurated by the message of His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr, read by His Excellency Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, held their 20th Session in Tehran on June 10 and 11, 1973.

The Delegations were led by:

His Excellency Mr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Iran

His Excellency Mr. Aziz Ahmed, H. PK., HQA., S. PK.
Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs
Pakistan

His Excellency Mr. Umit Haluk Bayulken
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Turkey

The Right Honorable Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K. T., M. P.
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
The United Kingdom

The Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
The United States

Following an address by the Prime Minister of Iran, opening statements were made by the leaders of the Delegations and the Secretary General of CENTO, expressing their appreciation of the Shahanshah's gracious message and the warm hospitality of the host country.

His Excellency Mr. A. A. Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, presided at the session.

The Council of Ministers conducted a comprehensive review of the international situation, paying particular attention to the matters of interest to the CENTO area.

For further information contact:

PR #208

-2-

The Ministers recognized the strength and vitality of political and economic development achieved by the member countries, the importance of peaceful and just settlement of disputes, and the need to maintain vigilance in the region.

The Ministers affirmed the vital importance they attach to the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of each of the member states in this region.

The Ministers noted the success with which Pakistan was meeting the problems which faced her, following the conflict with India. They expressed the hope that lasting peace on the Subcontinent could be secured through a just settlement of differences between Pakistan and India and they reaffirmed their support for Security Council Resolution No. 307 of 21 December 1971. In particular the Ministers urged the early release of prisoners of war.

The Ministers viewed with concern the continuing critical situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed their support of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 22 November 1967, and welcomed efforts being made to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute along the lines of the Resolution.

Considering the continuing subversive threats in the region, the Ministers expressed the determination of their Governments to meet such efforts with all the means at their disposal.

The Ministers viewed with favor current negotiations for the purpose of reducing armaments and fostering conditions for peace and stability in Europe. They expressed the hope that these negotiations would not fail to take into consideration the interests of the CENTO region.

In approving the report of the Military Committee, the Ministers noted the continuing improvement in cooperation among the armed forces of their countries.

The Ministers expressed satisfaction with the rapid economic development of the regional countries. In reviewing the report of the Economic Committee, they directed the Committee to consider ways of expanding its work with a view to strengthening and promoting economic cooperation in CENTO.

In concluding their review of the activities over the past year, the Ministers noted with satisfaction the annual report of the Secretary General. They reiterated their determination to continue to cooperate for peace, security and stability to promote further social and economic development in the CENTO region.

The Ministers accepted the invitation of the Government of the United States to hold the next session of the Council in May 1974 in Washington.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 12, 1973

No. 205

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE SECRETARY'S EXCHANGE OF REMARKS
WITH MEMBERS OF THE PRESS
UPON DEPARTURE FROM TEHRAN, IRAN

JUNE 11, 1973

Public Statements

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I wanted to take this opportunity just before I left to meet with you briefly. When I arrived, I said that I would try to have a short meeting with you, and I am happy to do it.

I think it has been a very useful, short stay which I had in Iran. As you know, I was able to meet with His Imperial Majesty and had a very satisfactory discussion for almost two hours. I had meetings with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and I merely want to say that as far as relations between the United States and Iran are concerned, they have never been better. They are excellent.

President Nixon is looking forward to the visit of the Shahanshah to Washington. They have been good friends for a long time, and President Nixon holds His Imperial Majesty in the highest esteem. So I consider on the bilateral basis that this has been a very successful visit. I am very privileged myself to have had the opportunity to be here again, and I want to express my thanks to all of the members of the Iranian Government for their hospitality.

As far as the CENTO meeting was concerned, it gave me an opportunity first to meet with all of the Foreign Ministers represented in CENTO on a bilateral basis. We had, I think, very useful discussions. The meeting itself, on the basis of a consensus that was expressed at the conclusion of the meeting, was the best one I have attended. This is my fifth CENTO meeting. The discussions were very direct and frank, and we had an exchange of views which in some respects was quite unusual for an international conference. I think that the Communique will reflect the satisfactory nature of the meeting, and particularly it will stress, as the conversations themselves stressed, the importance that is attached to the sovereignty of all the member states. We believe in the United States. And I think it was generally concluded that this is a very valuable alliance. It is an alliance that is valuable not only for itself but because it is one of a number of alliances that we have throughout the world which we believe has laid the foundation for improvement of the relations that have occurred between the East and the West. It provides a continuation of the stability that we think is necessary for improved relations.

PR #205

-2-

So I am very pleased indeed that the meeting went so well. I think that CENTO is going to continue to be a very important alliance, and it will deal especially with the problems that exist today in the world.

I also would like to say that I have been very much impressed with the developments in the Persian Gulf area. I think the cooperation that exists, the growing cooperation among the nations in the area, is of greatest importance. Certainly the Persian Gulf is going to assume greater and greater importance as the years go by. And Iran is playing a major role in that area. It is essential, we believe in the United States, that the nations in the area cooperate together, provide regional cooperation; that they put aside their differences — and there are a lot of differences that have existed for a long time, but in the overall they are fairly minor. The overriding considerations are for peace and stability in the area and the ability of the nations in the area to get along with each other, to be sure that there is no outside interference, that there is no subversion that upsets the stability of the area. I am very pleased to see the developments in the area since I was last here.

I want to again thank all the members of the Government who are here. I appreciate their coming to the airport, and I will be glad to answer some questions, if you have some.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said the exchange of views was, in some respects, quite unusual for an international conference. Could you tell us what you mean by that?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Yes. Usually at international conferences every Minister has a set speech that has been written for him by somebody, and he reads it. And it is pretty dull. This time there were no set speeches. Everyone spoke the things that were on his mind. After each Minister had the opportunity to say what was on his mind and to speak quite frankly, there was an exchange of views. Questions were asked, and we had a lively exchange of opinion. The result was, I think, that there was quite a different climate. In fact, the Foreign Minister of Iran, who said that he had attended meetings in CENTO for ten years, said this was by far the most interesting, the most satisfactory, meeting that he had ever been to. I think that was reflected by the comments of the Secretary General. Certainly it is true, as far as I am concerned. This was the fifth year that I have attended.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Rogers, to what will you ascribe the success of this meeting of an alliance which some years ago the regional countries were tending to write off as a paper alliance?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Well, I think that there is a tendency, when the world is moving in the direction to detente, to feel that somehow alliances are not important and to say [each nation to say to itself], "well, now things are going very well in the world; let's just put aside these organizations that have served us well in the past." This [meeting] was a realistic assessment, it seemed to me, of the necessity of continuing the alliances that have made it possible for the East and West to improve relations. We also recognize that as the world moves away from active conflict and nuclear confrontation, and hopefully away from any major conflicts among the nations, there are other dangers that occur, dangers of subversion, things of that kind. And also, you

PR #205

-3-

realize the necessity of equilibrium, stability if you will, in an area. That can only be brought about by regional cooperation. This Organization consists of nations in the region that work well together. I am speaking about Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. It also includes the United Kingdom and the United States. You put those nations together; it serves a very useful purpose. The discussions focused on what I think is a realistic appraisal of the value of this kind of alliance. Not an old-fashioned appraisal, not an appraisal that might have been relevant 20 years ago or 15 years ago or 10 years ago, but an appraisal that is relevant today. Therefore, I believe we left the meeting with a sort of renewed inspiration, a renewed spirit about the necessity of CENTO.

**QUESTION:** You mentioned or you stressed the importance of stability in the Persian Gulf. Does the United States consider the arms build-up in all these states or the richer states along the Gulf to be part of this stability?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** That really depends upon what is meant by arms build-up. If arms build-up means an arms race, so that everyone is madly attempting to get a tremendous amount of arms, that is an undesirable situation. On the other hand, it is history that certainly teaches us that if there are nations which are strong in an area — or the nations that have ulterior purposes in an area are strong and there are week nations nearby — that is an invitation to trouble. So a reasonable development of military strength vis-a-vis the military strength of possible adversaries is not a bad situation; it is a stabilizing situation. In a sense that is what has happened between the United States and the Soviet Union or, to put it differently, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. So we do not think that the strengthening of the armed forces in Iran, the desire on the part of Saudi Arabia to be stronger militarily causes any danger. We think it is stabilizing to that extent.

**QUESTION:** Were the Soviet Union to supply arms, say, at the same level to the Iraqis, would this not cause the arms race which you say would be a bad thing?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** It depends upon the extent. But what about the converse? Suppose you have a situation where the Soviet Union is supplying tremendous amounts of arms to one country and the neighbor country does not have any. That is a dangerous situation. In other words, if you have a strong nation, strong militarily, that has aggressive designs and a very weak nation next to it, that is an invitation to trouble.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, a document distributed by the public relations division of CENTO defines the purpose of CENTO in the beginning as to guarantee protection against the Soviet Union if it should threaten the territorial integrity of the region after World War II. Does that continue to be the purpose of CENTO?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Well, I am sure you would have to read the whole pamphlet to get its thrust. Certainly that was one of the purposes that was behind CENTO at its inception. But, as I say, I do not think it is necessary anytime we have a meeting to restate the purposes. We think this alliance, our alliance with the NATO countries and our alliance with SEATO are important aspects of the policy we developed after World War II of mutual security. We think the development of strength in these areas, the ability to work together closely as we are doing, provides an equilibrium, if you will, which makes for stability in the world. That is why we think

PR #205

-4-

the alliances are important. That is why we wanted, at a time when we are entering into much better relations with the Soviet Union, much better diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, that we not forget that the alliances have contributed to the very success that we are now seeing in the world. And we want to continue to maintain those alliances.

**QUESTION:** Are we correct to assume that Pakistan has agreed to continue the alliance? There was some thought that the Pakistanis are not too happy with the alliance.

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** I would not want to speak for Pakistan. I will merely say that we're very pleased about the level of representation at this meeting.

**QUESTION:** Let me put it another way. Have all the members of the alliance agreed to continue it?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Well, as I say, there is no change in the alliance as a result of this meeting. It was a very successful meeting, and we are very happy at the level of representation of Pakistan.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, some of the regional members, in fact, all of the regional members, seemed quite concerned if not alarmed about the threat of subversion. Now, you have not mentioned this yourself. Are you --

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Oh, yes. I mentioned it. I mentioned subversion.

**QUESTION:** Is it serious?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Certainly subversion is a matter of concern to the nations in the region. Certainly subversion occurs in many parts of the world. It is one of the things that has to be guarded against, as I said a little earlier. As the threat of nuclear war diminishes -- and I believe it has -- and the threat of war between the major powers is lessened, subversion is a natural way to spread ideology. It is not unexpected, and I think it is important for nations in the region to consider it, to guard against it and to be sure it does not cause instability. The answer to your question is yes.

**QUESTION:** Do you think, Mr. Secretary, it is particularly important to watch out for subversion at this time when the Soviet Union appears to be moving toward detente or at least following the policies of detente?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Here again I want to be sure we understand definitions. We are convinced in the United States that the Soviet Union seriously desires to improve its relations with us. And we are inclined to think that the Soviet Union is serious about improving its relations with the western European countries. People refer to that as detente, if you will, and we are very pleased about that. We are going to do everything we can to move in that direction. But that does not suggest that they have changed their ideology. It does not suggest that they are not going to attempt to extend their influence in other parts of the world. And it does not suggest that military strength is no longer necessary.

PR #205

-5-

As a matter of fact, it suggests just the opposite to us. The fact that we have been able to improve our relations with them is because we have been strong as a nation and because we have alliances that are strong. So we think that it is necessary to maintain our military strength. It is necessary to maintain our military alliances, if you will, and to guard against subversion.

If we see, as time goes on, that the improved relations that we are witnessing throughout the world mean that subversion is not going to be an instrument of extending influence throughout the world. If the world, all of a sudden, is going to be a place of high ideals, and Governments are not going to have conflict, and there is going to be no attempt to extend ideologies by one means or another, fine. But until that time comes, we want to be sure that we move sensibly in the direction of improved relations, not being euphoric about it but being realistic about it and doing the things I have suggested. I will take one or two more questions.

**QUESTION:** The Secretary General, in a press conference just before yours, speaking about the dangers of subversion and ranging from Oman, the Persian Gulf — how far does this area go; the Arabian Peninsula — I mean, how far does this overlap with the CENTO, how far does this come within CENTO's orbit or --- ?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** I do not know if we have ever attempted to make such specific delineations. Obviously if the Persian Gulf became an area of serious conflict, it would have serious repercussions in the CENTO regions. So yes, we are concerned about it; I guess you can say we are more immediately concerned about action in the member states. But certainly the conditions that occur, the situations that develop in the region, affect the member states. So we are concerned.

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**SECRETARY ROGERS:** Well, did I understand your question? Do I think that CENTO should concern itself with development in the region? Yes, and I think that we are. I think that we are pleased to see the development in the region. Since I was here last, I think there has been tremendous development and it is very favorable.

Thank you very much.

********

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 3:30 P.M., EDT

JUNE 21, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The President of the United States of America, Richard Nixon, and
the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev,

Having thoroughly considered the question of the further limitation of
strategic arms, and the progress already achieved in the current negotiations,

Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adoption of further
limitations of strategic arms would be a major contribution in reducing the
danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening international peace
and security,

Have agreed as follows:

**First.** The two Sides will continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction, proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, and from the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 26, 1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious
efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more
complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the
objective of signing it in 1974.

**Second.** New agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments will be based on the principles of the American-Soviet documents adopted in Moscow in May 1972 and the agreements reached in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

**Third.** The limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can
apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative
improvement.

**Fourth.** Limitations on strategic offensive arms must be subject to
adequate verification by national technical means.

**Fifth.** The modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms
would be permitted under conditions which will be formulated in the
agreements to be concluded.

**Sixth.** Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more
complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are
prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the
existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972.

**Seventh.** Each Side will continue to take necessary organizational and
technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear

(MORE)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE

UNTIL 3:30 P. M., EDT

JUNE 21, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET

In today's agreement the President and General Secretary Brezhnev reinforced their commitment to permanent limits on strategic armaments and to an intensification of the negotiations. The two leaders signed a document of seven principles that provide fresh guidance to the negotiating teams, instructing them to work out a permanent agreement over the course of the next year, with the objective of concluding it in 1974. The principles contain the basic outline of a new agreement, that will now be filled in at the talks in Geneva.

## Background

The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms began in Helsinki in November 1969, dealing with both offensive and defensive strategic arms. The negotiations continued until May 1971, when the President and General Secretary Brezhnev reached an agreement that broke a deadlock over the scope of the agreement and the priorities to be followed. Negotiations resumed and continued through the summit meetings in Moscow last May. On May 26, 1972 the President and General Secretary signed the first two agreements limiting strategic weapons: a treaty restricting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, and an Interim Agreement limiting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Interim Agreement has a duration of five years. The two agreements came into force officially on October 3, 1972 with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM treaty in a ceremony in the White House, with the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko participating.

The negotiations resumed in November 1972 in Geneva, and recessed on June 12 to await the outcome of the discussions at the summit. The negotiations have been thorough and the progress in the talks thus far was noted in the preamble of the Basic Principles signed today.

## OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES

### The First Principle:

Sets a target date of 1974 for completing a new agreement;

Affirms the intention of both sides to continue active negotiations over the course of the next year and to make a serious effort to work out a permanent agreement that is more complete in its limitations and that provides for subsequent reductions in strategic offensive arms.

### The Second Principle:

Establishes that the fundamental guidelines for a permanent agreement will be a mutual recognition of the equal security interests of each side and a recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage would be inconsistent with strengthening U.S.-Soviet relations; these guidelines are drawn from the Basic Principles signed in Moscow in May 1972; in effect they direct the negotiators to deal with each other's security interest, broadly defined, and not only with limits on individual weapons; agreements that effect or harm the interests of other countries would be ruled out by the Basic Principles of last May and by this principle.

(MORE)

- 2 -

### The Third Principle:

Allows for limits on both the numbers of strategic weapons as well as on the qualitative characteristics of these weapons; whereas the first agreement dealt with limiting the number of ICBMs, including limits on heavy ICBMs and a ceiling on SLBMs, the permanent agreement will be broader in nature and involve limits on certain technical capabilities, such as multiple independently targetted reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

### The Fourth Principle:

Records the agreement that any limitation must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means; this confirms the basic approach to verification taken in the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement.

### The Fifth Principle:

Allows for modernization of individual weapons systems as well as their replacement; thus, both sides, over time, can retain confidence in their capabilities, but the conditions for introducing more modern systems and replacing old ones will be carefully negotiated.

### The Sixth Principle:

Permits supplementary agreements that might be concluded immediately or in the very near term, even before the negotiations on the permanent agreement are completed; under this principle a specific area of competition could be temporarily halted, in order to hold open the possibility of permanent limits.

### The Seventh Principle:

Reaffirms that both sides will continue to implement the agreement of September 30, 1971 that was designed to reduce the dangers of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; its reaffirmation is intended to stress that this agreement remains part of the continuing process of strategic arms limitation.

In sum, this agreement on Basic Principles is a solemn commitment at the highest political level:

- to limit strategic offensive arms permanently;

- to complete an agreement in 1974;

- to broaden the scope of an agreement to include limits on qualitative improvements as well as numbers of weapons, and to provide for subsequent reductions;

- to allow for immediate agreements in areas where limiting competition may be urgent.

# # #

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE

UNTIL 12:30 P. M., EDT

EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION

UNTIL 11:30 A. M., EDT

JUNE 22, 1973

FACT SHEET

Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of
Nuclear War

Background

This agreement is an outgrowth of the Basic Principles of Relations, signed in Moscow by the President and the General Secretary on May 29, 1972; the second of those principles is particularly relevant. It states that: "The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war."

It was on this basis that the two leaders have discussed what further steps might be possible to reduce the danger of war, and of nuclear war in particular. The result of their discussions is the agreement signed today, an agreement that is a significant step not only in improving US-Soviet relations but in strengthening the stability of international relations.

Outline of the Agreement

Preamble:

This highlights the general context of the agreement: the desire of both sides to create conditions in the world in which the outbreak of nuclear war anywhere would be reduced and ultimately eliminated.

Article I:

sets forth the main purposes of the agreement: (a) that an objective of the policies of the US and of the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons; (b) that in accordance with this objective both sides will act in such a manner

- as to avoid the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations,

- as to avoid military confrontations, and

- as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them, and between either of them and other countries.

Thus, each side accepts in this Article both a general aim and a mode of conduct that applies not only to their mutual relations, but to their relations with other countries.

Article II:

defines conditions which must be realized in order to achieve the purposes of the agreement as described in the first Article. These conditions are that each party, the US and the USSR, will refrain from the threat or use

(MORE)

-2-

of force (a) against each other, (b) against the allies of the other party, and (c) against other countries. Moreover, these considerations will be the guide for both the US and the USSR in formulating their foreign policies.

### Article III:

Both parties undertake to develop their relations with each other and with other countries in a way consistent with this agreement. The obligations and rights of third countries are not infringed, and the same standards and obligations in US-Soviet relations, as defined in this agreement, also apply to the conduct of the US and the USSR toward other countries.

### Article IV:

deals with situations in which both sides would undertake consultation to avert the risk of nuclear war; these situations are defined: (1) if there is a risk of nuclear war between the US and the USSR; (2) if there is a risk of nuclear war between either of them and other countries.

Consultations would not be called for under this Article in the event of a risk of nuclear war between two countries not party to the agreement, unless the situation in question created simultaneously a risk of nuclear war involving either the US or the USSR or both.

### Article V:

permits each side to inform its allies, other countries, the UN Security Council and the Secretary General of the progress and the outcome of the consultations initiated under Article IV of this agreement.

The US is thus free to consult simultaneously with its allies, or with other countries, while consultations with the USSR are in progress; secret bilateral consultations are thereby not involved.

### Article VI:

states that nothing in this agreement affects or impairs: (a) our inherent right of self-defense, as envisaged by Article 51 of the UN Charter, (b) the provision of the Charter relating to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, and (c) the obligations by either party towards its allies or other countries in treaties, agreements and other appropriate documents.

The Alliance and other commitments of the US are thus untouched, as is our right of self-defense.

### Articles VII, VIII:

state that the agreement is of unlimited duration and enters into force upon signature.

### In sum, this agreement:

-- is a further step toward reducing the dangers of nuclear war building on the Basic Principles of May, 1972;

-- prescribes a manner of conduct for the US and the USSR to achieve the aim of removing the danger of nuclear war;

-- applies this standard of behavior to relations with other countries;

-- protects the rights of third countries;

-- conforms to our commitments and obligations as allies;

-- reinforces the UN Charter provisions on the non-use of force or the threat of force.

#

#

#

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 22, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ROOM

10:42 A.M., EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: While we are waiting for Henry, I think you have had a chance to read the agreement. Just let me give you this very quickly, because we are asked this, from time to time, a rundown on the amount of time that the President and the Secretary have spent together, according to our calculations.

Total time spent together is 26 hours and 15 minutes. This includes all of the time together in the cars, helicopter and dinners and meetings and so forth. Formal meetings, 11 hours and 57 minutes. They have spent, during this time together, about five or six hours in head-to-head private discussions.

They, of course, will have an opportunity to meet further on the plane to California, later this afternoon, about 4 or 4:15, and then will spend the weekend in California together.

Q Is the five to six hours included in the 11 hours?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, that is included. The question is were there any meetings this morning, and no, there were not.

Q Do they intend to meet in California?

MR. ZIEGLER: They are due to meet only at the signing ceremony today and then they will have five hours on the plane together.

Q Could you clarify what the five and six hours are included in? I didn't hear the question.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is the time the two leaders have spent together.

Q Is that included in the 11 hours and 57 minutes?

MR. ZIELGER: Yes, it is.

Q Can you tell us anything about the schedule?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me do that later, Jim.

MORE

- 2 -

I think all of you know that the President and
General Secretary will sign an agreement between the United
States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear
war at 12:30. You have that material, and Dr. Kissinger
is here to discuss the agreement with you.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me put
this agreement first in its context, describe what it is
seeking to achieve, and then go through its specific
provisions, a little bit of its history, and then I will
take your questions.

The principal course of the foreign policy of
this Administration ever since 1969 has been to set up
what the President has called a structure of peace, by
which we mean an international system less geared to the
management of crises, less conscious of constant eruptions
of conflict, in which the principal participants operate
with a consciousness of stability and permanence.

This requires that all of the nations operate
with a sense of responsibility, and it puts a particular
obligation on the two great nuclear powers that have the
capacity to destroy mankind and whose conflicts have
produced so many of the crises of the post-war period.

In achieving this objective, the United States
has operated on many levels. We have always believed
that it required adequate strength to deter aggression.
But we also have believed that we have to move from the
period of military confrontation to a period which is
characterized more by restraint, and eventually cooper-
ation in our dealings with the other great nuclear super-
power. The President, from the day of his first Inauguration,
has emphasized that we wanted to move from confrontation
to negotiation.

In those negotiations we have operated on many
levels. We have attempted to remove specific causes of
tension. We have attempted to forge specific instruments
of cooperation. And finally, we have attempted to develop
certain principles of conduct by which the two great
nuclear countries could guide their expectations and by
which both relations to each other and in their relations
to third countries, they could calm the atmosphere and
replace purely military measures by a new attitude
of a cooperative international system.

It is in this spirit that last year in Moscow
the United States and the Soviet Union signed certain
principles of conduct which were described then as a
roadmap on a road that no one was forced to travel, but
that they wanted to travel, and was there for the two
major countries.

I believe we have traveled on this road in the
last year, and, therefore, it was decided to formalize
some of these principles in an agreement, to extend them
in some respects, particularly concerning consultation.
The origin of the negotiation, as it turned out, was at
the last session of the Moscow Summit meeting when there
were some general exchanges with respect to how to control
nuclear weapons in a political and diplomatic sense, beyond
the negotiations going on in strategic arms limitations.

MORE

- 3 -

These discussions were continued between the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko on the occasion of Gromyko's visit to the United States last October. They were continued in exchanges between the two leaders. There was some discussion when I visited the Soviet Union in September of last year, and the discussions continued this spring and were extensively pursued in Zavidovo and finally concluded here.

Throughout, the United States has held the view that any obligations with respect to international conduct that applied to the two great nuclear powers, also had to apply to their relations to other countries, and we have held the view which was shared by the Soviet leaders that the principal problem was how to prevent a war and not how to conduct it.

Therefore, this is an agreement which is designed to regulate the relations of the two nuclear powers to each other and to other countries in time of peace. It is an attempt to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war, and to the extent that it contributes to this task, it can be a significant landmark in the relationships of the United States to the Soviet Union and in the relationships of the two great nuclear countries towards all other countries of the world.

Now, let me run through the articles, which are largely self-explanatory. Article I states that it is an objective of both the policy of the United States and the policy of the Soviet Union to remove the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. This has been a consistent goal of American foreign policy, and is a goal shared by all of mankind.

Article II applies this objective to the general conduct of both sides; that is to say, the prevention of nuclear war presupposes the avoidance of situations capable of an **exacerbation** of relations, avoidance of military confrontation, and it is in that context that the outbreak of nuclear war can be excluded.

The second article states this more concretely, by elaborating that the prevention of nuclear war presupposes the avoidance of force, for us, or threat of force by the two nuclear countries to each other and to the other countries.

Article III is a general article that simply states that the two nuclear countries have to develop their relations with each other and with third countries in a way consistent with the purposes of this agreement, and it makes it clear that while it is a bilateral agreement, the obligations are multinational.

Article IV states that in any situation in which the two great nuclear countries might find themselves in a nuclear confrontation, or in which either as a result of their policies toward each other or as the result of developments elsewhere in the world, there is a danger of a nuclear confrontation between them, or between them or any other country, they are obligated to consult with each other in order to avoid this risk.

MORE

Article V permits the consultation, that these consultations be communicated to the United Nations, and to other countries, a clause which we would, of course, apply to our allies.

Article VI makes clear that this agreement deals with the prevention of war, and that if it fails the existing obligations in existing documents, treaties and alliances will be maintained.

Now we see the basic significance of this agreement as a step, a significant step toward the prevention of nuclear war, and the prevention of military conflict. It is a formal obligation that the two nuclear superpowers have taken towards each other, and equally importantly with all other countries, to practice restraint in their diplomacy, to build a peace that is permanent, to pursue a policy whose dedication to stability and peace will become, as General Secretary Brezhnev said last night at the banquet, irreversible.

Of course, anyone who has studied the history of the last 30 years must recognize that agreements are not always maintained, and that there is nothing self-enforcing about this document. However, if the two great nuclear countries continue to be animated by the spirit in which they have conducted their policy of the last two years, then this document could mark a landmark on the record toward the structure of peace of which the President has been speaking and can be seen as a step towards a new era of cooperation in the relations of all nations and of lifting from them increasingly the fear of nuclear war and of war in general.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, please, does Article II have any relation to our bombing of Cambodia and does Article II have any relation to the supply of the belligerents by both the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries, of military support?

Q What is the question?

Q Does Article II have any bearing or any relation to our bombing in Cambodia or to the military supply of the Indochina belligerents by both the United States and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, in interpreting this agreement we could go around the world and see how it specifically applies to each individual country and to each conceivable situation.

Let me answer first as to Cambodia. The military operations now going on in Cambodia were in process when this agreement was being negotiated, and it was not raised as applying to that particular situation. Now, I don't want to go into the relationship of particular articles to particular events. I don't think it would be appropriate at this point.

MORE

- 5 -

Let me say as a general proposition this: It
is not possible under this agreement for either side, and
I was specifically ex mpting Cambodia for the reason that
this is an operation that was in progress at the time,
but it is not possible for either side to use force in
circumstances that can threaten international peace and
stability, as is said in Article II, without breaching
the letter and the spirit of this agreement.

Now, one then has to decide to what extent
the clauses of Article VI apply and to what extent
particular operations threaten international peace
and stability, and I don't think this is the appropriate
time to discuss it.

The purpose of this agreement is to legalize,
to symbolize and to bring about restraint on the part
of the two nuclear superpowers in their international
relationship so as to produce, at least contribute, to
the preservation of peace, and it cannot be approached
from the point of view of a sharp lawyer pushing against
the limits of every clause because if that is going to
be the attitude, the agreement will not have any
significance.

Q I would like to ask a naive question, if
I could. It seems to me that we agreed on the desirability
of motherhood here. I don't see why it took so long to
reach this agreement and what the disputes were. I wonder
if you could outline some of the negotiations that went
on and what were the issues in this discussion.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't agree, first of all, with your premise because this agreement was made by two countries whose conflicts and confrontations have characterized the entire postwar period. For them to formalize these series of restraints, the willingness to consult, was a very major step.

Secondly, I don't think it is useful at the
conclusion of the negotiation to go through all of the
debates and provide a scorecard. I have indicated the
general approach that we took, which was to extend the
applications to the international system in general and
not just of them applying to the United States and to the
Soviet Union, and to put the emphasis on the prevention
of war rather than on how wars might be conducted.

But I don't think any useful purpose is served
by going through all of the complexities.

Q I have a two-part question. According
to Article II, would China be regarded as an ally of
the Soviet Union. And secondly, to what degree would
this document be conceived as an effort to forestall any
kind of military action against China?

DR. KISSINGER: What Article II says is that
force and the threat of force cannot be used against the
ally of another country, and it doesn't say anything abut
about one'sown allies, but it also says force and the
threat of force cannot be used against any other country,
so clearly under this agreement the use of force against
any country under circumstances that would have wide
international repercussions would be precluded.

MORE

It was not conceived as a protection for
any particular country, but I think its practical con-
sequences that if it were observed, as we, of course,
expect it will be, it will have the practical conse-
quence of applying both to the situation you described
as well as to many other conceivable situations.

Q May I follow that up, Dr. Kissinger, please?
Did you have prior consultations when you met with the
Chinese representatives several days ago about any form
of this document, and would you at some point this year
or next like to broaden the document to include China
as a signatory?

DR. KISSINGER: The United States consulted
several countries prior to the completion of this
document, but I don't want to go into an enumeration
of which countries were consulted. I do not discuss my
conversations with the head of the Chinese liaison office,
but I have no particular reason to suppose that they
will necessarily approve a bilateral agreement between
the United States and the Soviet Union, whatever its
consequences. I will let them speak for themselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there is one qualifier in
Article II, where it says that both parties will refrain
from the use or threat of force in circumstances which
may endanger international security. When the Soviets
went into Czechoslovakia, they obviously thought it didn't
endanger international peace and when the United States
went into North Vietnam, they felt it didn't endanger
international peace. Isn't that a large hole for a truck
to go through?

DR. KISSINGER: If either of the two signatories
wants to find an excuse to go to war, it will find an excuse
to go to war. This has been the history of the postwar
period. We are talking here restraint on significant
military actions, and what endangers international peace
and security is not determined by the unilateral declara-
tion of the country going to war but also by the reactions
of other members of the international system, because this
is what produces the threat to international peace and
security.

Therefore, again, I can only repeat, if any of
the signatories deal with this like sharp lawyers pushing
against the edges of the agreement, they will, of
course, then find ways of doing so.

On the other hand, the movement into sovereign
countries of large forces would not be in our view
consistent with the spirit of this agreement, but I really
do not want to go into a detailed analysis of every
conceivable situation.

MORE

Q Dr. Kissinger, while realizing you cannot go into specific circumstances, could you discuss in a general way what your expectations are for applying this principle, for example, to the Middle East area or Asia to reduce the dangers of nuclear war in either of those areas?

DR. KISSINGER: I really do not want to go into specific places. Obviously, if we did not believe that this agreement could make a contribution to bringing about international restraint in areas which have been demonstrable sources of international tension, we did not believe it could make a major contribution to this, we would not have agreed to proceed with it.

So, as a general answer to your question, I would say that it is our intention to proceed on the basis that the restraints foreseen by this agreement will become an increasingly vital factor in international affairs. But I think that you can understand why one cannot at this moment give a precise description of every situation which might arise.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I have two questions. You have said it would be impossible to indicate in every situation what this might tend to prohibit or inhibit. Could you give us an example looking back over the past 20 or 25 years of any situation in which force has been applied which you think it would be inhibited in the future? That is the first question.

The second question is, this is the kind of agreement which the Russians have been inclined to sign with a number of countries, and I wonder whether or not it was they who were the ones who originally raised the idea back in Moscow last May?

DR. KISSINGER: As to the agreement as it has now emerged, it would be difficult to say who raised the particular nature of this agreement. When the discussions were first raised in Moscow last year, it was indeed by the Soviet Union, but in a different context.

The original discussion that gave the impetus to this has been transformed into an agreement in which I think the contribution of both sides can be said to be equal.

Q You are particularly talking about the broadening aspect to other countries?

DR. KISSINGER: And the emphasis on the prevention of war in general. But again, on the approach, I think at this point it can be said that both parties made a substantially equal contribution to this agreement.

Now, secondly, with respect to situations that might be prevented, I can think of several crises in this Administration, and I would have thought in previous periods, the Cuban missile crisis would be one example.

Several Berlin crises that we have had would be other examples that would have been avoided. I can think of some in this Administration, but again we are talking about restraint. We are talking about things that do not happen.

MORE

- 8 -

It is never very easy to demonstrate why something
has not happened. I think it reflects the changes that have
occurred in the international environment. Such an agreement
which would have been inconceivable, say the visit 15 years
ago of Khrushchev can now be described in answer to one question,
as simply affirming the motherhood that was referred to. It is
not the virtues of motherhood or desirability of motherhood.

Q Dr. Kissinger, this agreement obviously will have a long-term effect within the United States and other countries. I wonder why this was not written in a treaty form so that the Senate could get a chance to discuss it in its entirety and question you about it. And two, has there really been discussion with the NATO allies? I know you didn't want to discuss that, but obviously in Europe there will be concern about the American credibility in case of large-scale conventional attacks in central Europe.

DR. KISSINGER: There can be no concern because Article VI fully covers existing NATO obligations, and because if war is not prevented, there is no particular restraint then about how it is conducted.

Secondly, several NATO allies were closely consulted
over an extended period of time, but I don't want to go into
details.

Q As to the first part of the question, on the
treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: Excuse me. With respect to why it was not made in treaty form, it does not involve any particular positive actions that the United States has to take, and it is a general statement of policy.

The President, however, is meeting with the Congres-
sional leaders at 11:30, and he will discuss with them ways
in which possible Congress can register its support if it
wishes to do so.

Q You have now signed a new document of detente,
and yesterday you pledged to go for new strategic arms agree-
ments by 1974. Can you explain how the Administration will
then be able to ask Congress for more arms in the strategic
arms field, and will you discuss some idea how you will argue
your case?

DR. KISSINGER: We have believed that the limitation of strategic arms should be achieved by agreement, and of course, we will scrupulously observe the limitations that the agreement we hope to sign in 1974 will be carried out.

However, it would be destructive of the negotiations
if we now unilaterally imposed on ourselves the limitations
that we are attempting to negotiate. We believe that one of
the elements that has brought about the present situation is
the military balance that exists between us and the Soviet Union.

MORE

However, we believe that this document can contribute
to an atmosphere that will accelerate the discussions on
strategic arms limitations, and as I said yesterday, we
consider the reduction of arms an important element of the
strategic arms limitation talks. And it has been so expressed
in the principles that were signed yesterday.

But we cannot anticipate what may be negotiated
by unilateral actions on our part.

Q Dr. Kissinger, --

DR. KISSINGER: Haven't you asked a question already?

Q I reminded you of part of Burnie's question.

DR. KISSINGER: You are only entitled to short
versions.

Q My question, your explanation of not putting
it in treaty form is based in part on it not involving any
positive obligations on the United State's part.

How is it different from alimited nuclear test ban
treaty in that respect? Could you expand on why it didn't
need to be a treaty or shouldn't be one?

DR. KISSINGER: The limited nuclear test ban reflected
a significant change in our arms policy that has been carried
out until this time. This is really a statement of policies
that we intend to pursue and have to be applied in individual
cases.

It is, therefore, more in the nature of a formalization
of a declaration of principles rather than of a specific
set of obligations that can be applied automatically to create
specific circumstances.

Q In your expose today, you used the word, "super
power". Ambassador Zamyatin spoke to him about this. He said the
Soviet Union is not a super power, and they are only big powers.
He said this was invented by the Chinese.

My other question is about Isreal. When we come to
the agreement, we are concerned that Isreal has so far not
signed a partial nuclear treaty. There was an article by
Flora Lewis, which referred to you, saying you had a study
made by the Rand Corporation on how we can protect Isreal with
the atomic bomb. Within Articles IV and VI, will you as an
ally of Isreal, plan to try to bring Zamyatin to sign this
treaty, or a partial treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, with respect to the
comments of Ambassador Zamyatin, I welcome the humility that he
has expressed, and it was not adequately reflected due to certain
personality problems in my own comment.

MORE

- 10 -

[Lc]

With respect to the Rand study, I have never seen such a study, and I know it has been written about although this is a big government and there are many studies floating around in it. They don't necessarily mean, however, that they have any connection with American foreign policy.

Thirdly, the implications of the agreement on the actions of other countries with respect to existing multilateral agreements, I do not want to speculate about. We could not assume that this agreement imposes on the United States a particular additional obligation with respect to treaties whose obligations are already clear.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you interpret this document as one that supercedes the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine?

DR. KISSINGER: This document makes no distinction in its application between the domestic structure of various forms of countries.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is this document a renunciation of atomic war, and if not, why not?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I will take you along on future negotiations to fill in gaps that we leave. But this document is designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by imposing restraints on the major countries with respect to nuclear war, and with respect to the use of force in general.

Therefore, it does not address the question of what happens if war cannot be prevented, because that is not its purpose. Its purpose is to prevent wars. It is not a renunciation of a particular form of war if war cannot be prevented, but we hope that it will make a major contribution to the prevention of war, and therefore, your question will not have to be addressed.

Q Did you discuss the concept of not using nuclear force first against each other, and why wasn't that included?

DR. KISSINGER: We cannot discuss many things that individual members of the press corps would like to have as part of other agreements.

Q That is a recognized international concept, how to prevent nuclear war, isn't it, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: There are two ways you can look at how to prevent nuclear war. One is first by preventing war, and the second is by imposing upon ourselves on specific restraints with respect to particular categories of weapons if war cannot be avoided.

We choose to go the road of attempting to prevent war, and thereby nuclear war, because many other countries depend upon what actions will be taken in case an aggression occurs. Therefore, we did not believe it would contribute to peace if we made particular distinctions as to categories of weapons in case of war.

MORE

- 11 -

The overriding problem is to preserve the peace,
and to prevent war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does Article IV oblige the United States to act as sort of an arbiter or mediator of the Sino-Soviet conflict if it should get worse?

DR. KISSINGER: What Article IV provides that if either of the two countries contemplates nuclear war with any other country, or, of course, with the other nuclear country, it has an obligation to consult the other signatory with the purpose of avoiding the situation that would produce such a war.

We have no intention of being an arbiter between
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and we
look at this consultation as a mutual restraint rather than
as one that creates a right of intervention all over the
world.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END (AT 11:30 A.M., EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 25, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

SAN CLEMENTE INN

9:15 A.M. PDT

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the communique, which is
embargoed until 1:00 o'clock Eastern time and 10:00 o'clock
Pacific time. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss that with you
and take your questions on the communique and also on the sum-
mit between the President and General Secretary.

For the statistics buffers in the Press Corps, the
President and General Secretary spent a total of 47 hours
together. They met in formal sessions with advisors or
alone for 18-1/4 hours. In addition, the President and
General Secretary were together 28-3/4 hours at informal
gatherings, social functions and signing ceremonies, and
events of that sort.

Q How much alone, face to face?

MR. ZIEGLER: Almost 10 hours. 9-1/2 hours.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: I will not go
through the communique because I understand you have already
had a chance to read it. Let me make a few general observa-
tions about the summit and how it fits into the general develop-
ment of our foreign policy, and then I will take questions
about the communique or any other part of the summit which
you may wish to raise.

One good way of assessing the results of the summit
is to compare last year's communique with this year's communi-
que. Last year's communique spoke about the desirability of
peaceful coexistence. It said:

"Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S.-
Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improve-
ment in relations is possible and desirable."

This year we say that: "Both Sides are convinced
that the discussions they have just held represent a
further milestone in the constructive development of
their relations.

"Convinced that such a development of American-
Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their
peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further
major steps to give these relations maximum stability and
to turn the development of friendship and cooperation
between their peoples into a permanent factor for world-
wide peace."

MORE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 25, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

SAN CLEMENTE INN

9:15 A.M. PDT

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the communique, which is embargoed until 1:00 o'clock Eastern time and 10:00 o'clock Pacific time. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss that with you and take your questions on the communique and also on the summit between the President and General Secretary.

For the statistics buffs in the Press Corps, the President and General Secretary spent a total of 47 hours together. They met in formal sessions with advisors or alone for 18-1/4 hours. In addition, the President and General Secretary were together 28-3/4 hours at informal gatherings, social functions and signing ceremonies, and events of that sort.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: I will not go through the communique because I understand you have already had a chance to read it. Let me make a few general observations about the summit and how it fits into the general development of our foreign policy, and then I will take questions about the communique or any other part of the summit which you may wish to raise.

One good way of assessing the results of the summit is to compare last year's communique with this year's communique. Last year's communique spoke about the desirability of peaceful coexistence. It said:

"Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement in relations is possible and desirable."

This year we say that: "Both Sides are convinced that the discussions they have just held represent a further milestone in the constructive development of their relations,

"Convinced that such a development of American-Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further major steps to give these relations maximum stability and to turn the development of friendship and cooperation between their peoples into a permanent factor for worldwide peace."

MORE

[L]

-2-

In other words, what marks the turning point last year, in which the fact of peaceful coexistence required special affirmation and possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, was thought deserving of special note, and this year we are speaking of a continuing relationship.

As a result, as relations between the Soviet Union and the United States proceed along the course that was charted last May, and accelerated this June, we cannot expect that these meetings, which we have affirmed should become a regular part of U.S.-Soviet relationships, will produce a dramatic new departure. It is the strength of this relationship as it develops that the road is charted and that what we expect to see is a further evolution along a path which will be increasingly free of confrontations, and which will become increasingly a part of a stable international system. This is the context in which we see the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

If you look back over previous summit meetings between Soviet and American leaders, they almost invariably occurred in the shadow of some crisis, and they were inevitably directed to removing some source of tension and some cause of confrontation.

In May 1972 we still met in this shadow of the Vietnamese war, and the recent decisions that had led to an expansion of military operations in Indochina, but even then, before the first talk, enunciated some common principles of conduct and affirmed the desirability of a long-term evolution toward a peaceful and ultimately cooperative relationship between the two States and the two peoples. These expectations were fulfilled over the course of the year and, therefore, what this summit intended to do was to strengthen the cooperative bonds that had developed in particular areas, to give a new impetus to the key areas of negotiations, especially strategic arms limitations and mutual force reductions, and thirdly, to take the joint principles one step further by embodying them in a formal agreement designed to prevent war, and especially nuclear war.

There is nothing I can add to the particular agreements that are enumerated in the communique that deal with the cooperative relationships in various fields and that represent a continuation of a process that started last year.

I can only say from my personal experience in participating in many of these negotiations that what I told you ladies and gentlemen before the summit has been reinforced by the experience of the summit. Many of these agreements do not themselves take the attention and time of the top leaders, and it would be absurd to pretend to you that the General Secretary and the President sit down and discuss the details of the civil aviation agreements, but it is also true that the imminence of their meetings, and the fact that they have determined to give a symbolic expression to this relationship gives an impetus to negotiations that otherwise would drag on for months, and permits the quick resolution of particular issues which, if left to the expert level, could produce extended stalemate and there is some significance in having the relationship develop on such a broad front, developing on both sides a commitment that is becoming increasingly difficult to reverse.

MORE

-3-

With respect to the other areas, I have talked to you at some length about the decisions with respect to strategic arms limitation talks. I think you can assume that in addition to what has been stated formally in the agreement on principles, that the two leaders had extensive discussions as to how the process can be accelerated so that a meaningful agreement can be achieved consistent with the deadline that they have set themselves. Therefore, we believe, with considerable hope, that a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms, which would be one of the historic achievements in the field of arms control, can and will be negotiated during the course of 1974.

With respect to the mutual balanced force reductions, we told you before this summit conference that this was not the forum in which to negotiate the specifics. This is a matter of the profoundest concern to our allies, and it had never been intended to discuss the specifics, the specific schemes, at this meeting.

However, as those who have followed the discussions realize, there had been some uncertainty about when these discussions would begin. Prior to the meeting, in the preparatory conferences in Vienna, the Soviet position had tied the opening of the MBFR conference to the ending of the European Security Conference. At this meeting, it was decided that the MBFR conference would begin unconditionally on October 30th, and, of course, both leaders agreed that they would make a serious effort to deal with the question of armaments in Central Europe.

MORE

The Indochina problem, which last year was a source of contention, has received a common expression in this document.

And finally, there has been the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I have seen several comments to the effect that it is non-binding, that it is not self-enforcing, and no doubt I have contributed to this by comments that reflect my former professional profession, so let me state our position: That no agreement in history has ever enforced itself. Every agreement in history that has been observed has depended either on the willingness of the parties to observe it or on the willingness of one or the other parties to enforce it, or on the rewards for compliance and the risks of non-compliance.

This agreement is no different from any other agreement in that respect. When great powers make an agreement with each other, they, of course, have the capability of not observing it unless the other side is prepared to draw extreme consequences. But the violation of this agreement would have serious consequences for the whole context of U.S.-Soviet relations and, conversely, the observance of this agreement can mark, as I said on Friday, a milestone in the achievement of self-restraint by the major countries, a self-restraint which is by definition the essence of peace and which we intend to observe, which we expect the Soviet Union to observe, and which can therefore provide the foundation for a new international relationship.

Of course, history is replete with changes of course and we must be vigilant and prepared for such an occurrence, unique opportunity to create a new and more peaceful system. It is an opportunity that has come about partly as a result of the enormity of the weapons that would be used in case of a conflict: partly by the depth of human aspiration towards peace: partly as a result of the complexities of a world in which the ideological expectations of any side have not been fully met.

But whatever the reasons, we consider the summit as a further advance along that road, that as these meetings become a regular feature of international life, and as we come to take them more and more for granted, the results will follow paths that will come to seem more and more natural and we would consider that one of the best signs that a peaceful world is coming into being.

So this is our assessment of the summit and I will be glad to answer any questions on this, or on what I have said, or on the communique, or anything else related to the summit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the communique says positive trends are developing in international relations toward the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of cooperative relations in the interest of peace. I wonder if you would apply that sentence specifically to the Middle East situation and what transpired on it in the summit?

MORE

-5-

DR. KISSINGER: As you can see from the communique, the Middle East is one of the most complex areas and it is one in which one has to separate tow problems: One, the local tensions; that is, the tensions between the Arab states and Israel, from the so-called great power rivalry in that area. When this Administration came into office, they were inextricably linked. In 1970, the world came close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps was realized generally at the time, over the invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at that time, every conflict in the Middle East became immediately and inextricably a part of the great rivalry. Even the selection of words by White House briefers was picked up by local newspapers and became a matter of attention in the context of East-West relationships.

Now, I think it is safe to say not that the Soviet Union and we agree on the evolution of the Middle East and how it should be resolved, as the communique makes clear, but I think both sides will make an effort not to become inextricably involved in its conflict with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict.

The communique states that both sides recognize the importance of the solution and that both sides will make efforts to help promote it and therefore, we hope that some progress will be made over the course of the year.

Q Is there any significance in the dropping of the word balance from mutual balanced force reduction in the communique and I notice that you used it once and didn't use it another time.

DR. KISSINGER: That is because I usually speak extemporaneously. No, there is no significance in the dropping of the word "balance".

In the preparatory discussions in Vienna, there was some discussion about it, but since it concerned entirely procedural matters, it has no substantive significance. The United States' position with respect to the mutual balanced force reduction negotiations has been submitted to our allies. We think that is has received substantial support from our allies. We will enter the negotiations, we are convinced, with a reasonable and united position.

What particular adjective one gives to describe it is really less important, but the substance of it will be that it must be balanced, and that it must reflect the principles of this communique and of May 29th last year, that no negotiation can succeed that attempts to give a unilateral advantage to one side or another.

Q Is there any significance in the brief material on the Middle East to the omissions of the word "security" in the phrase "be consistent with their independence and sovereignty"?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I think it is safe to say that both sides recognize that no solution is possible that does not assure the security of the countries concerned. And there is no dispute about this.

MORE

-6-

Why didn't the communique then say so?

DR. KISSINGER: The truth is that I don't remember any discussion about the world "security," if somebody there thought of it, it almost certainly would have said so.

Dr. Kissinger, do you plan soon to go to China or do you plan to invite a Chinese leader to visit the United States in order to assure them that what they witnessed this past week was not the beginning of some kind of super power condominium?

DR. KISSINGER: We are, of course, always in touch with all interested countries, and it is a fixed element of our policy not to participate in any condominium directed either at our allies or at other interested parties.

We believe that we have a common interest with the Soviet Union in promoting a peaceful order. We believe also that to the extent that a more peaceful conduct emerges by all parties, emerges from our discussions, that all nations benefit.

We have not agreed and we shall not agree nor were we asked to agree, to anything that smacks of super power condominium and our views on this are well known to all interested countries.

We have no specific plans at this moment for any of the visits that you have described and if any should develop, we will, of course, announce them immediately. But we don't have to have such a visit to make that particular point clear.

Dr. Kissinger, there has been a considerable amount of confusion in connection with the SALT agreement about MIRVs. In the agreement it states that national means of inspection will be the only possible means. Is it possible to control MIRV through only national means of inspection or should we read into the wording there that in effect, you have abandoned the notion of being able to control MIRVs?

DR. KISSINGER: First, the agreement does not say national means are the only possible means. It says that both sides agree that they must be verifiable by national means. If both sides should decide to have other than national means that wouldn't be precluded, but I think that is extremely unlikely.

So, the realistic assumption has to be that any agreement that will be made is one that will be monitored by national means. Now then, the question is, does that principle really exclude any control of MIRVs.

First, let me say that we believe that MIRVs are an important part of this negotiation and therefore, we believe that it is possible to have some restraints on MIRVs that can be monitored by national means, and therefore a great deal depends on what restraints we are talking about.

(MORE)

- 7 -

If you are talking about bans on production, those
would be next to impossible to monitor by national means.
If you are talking about deployment, then they are possible
to monitor within a margin of error which is larger than is
the base in more quantities, than if you are monitoring
quantities, but that is finite. If you are talking about a
combination of deployment and improvements in accuracy and
so forth, so that you could add certain testing restraints,
then you have ever greater possibilities of inspection.

I am not saying that these are our specific
proposals. I am saying that you cannot just look at this
in terms of one category of restraints and assess the relationship
of national means to that one category. You have to do
it in the whole complex of MIRV technology and of the kinds
of restraints you want to employ and we think it is possible
to put together a package by combining several restraints
verifiable by national means.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 12 of the communique,
it says they set the goal for trade over the next three years
$2 to $3 billion. This is the figure for the entire 3-year
period, as I understand it; is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Since the current trade is running at, I think,
$1.3 billion annually now, '73, would not this be --

DR. KISSINGER: The $1.3 billion includes agricultural.
This is excluding agricultural commodities.

Q Do you have any figure including agricultural
commodities?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not have it including agricultural.
I think excluding agricultural, it runs at about $600 million
now, and I think this envisages an increase of about 50 percent.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the communique hint, or
more than hint, at an East-West summit at the end of the
European Security Conference?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it obviously mentions it.
The position of the communique with respect to the East-West
summit is one that we have taken before; that is to say, that
the level of the concluding phase of the European Security Conference
will be determined by progress that is made in the first two phases,
the first of which begins on July 3rd at the Foreign Minister level.
Then there will be commission meetings, and upon the conclusion of the
commission meetings, one can determine first the final phase of the
conference, and secondly, the appropriate level of participation.

We are, in principle, prepared to consider a summit
if the results of the first two phases warrant it.

Q May I ask you to enumerate as briefly as possible
the total package of benefits that will accrue to the United States
as a result of the past few days' activities?

DR. KISSINGER: I can see this is not somebody who has
attended previous briefings or he wouldn't have made a demand for
brevity. (Laughter)

(MORE)

[L]

- 8 -

The benefits that accrue to the United States are the benefits that will accrue to all participants in the international system from an improvement in the prospects of peace. To the extent that we live in an atmosphere of confrontation, the United States, as the strongest country in the non-Communist world, and as the one on which the security of most others depends, is immediately drawn closer to the brink of war than almost any other participant.

Secondly, we expect that as a result of many of these cooperative efforts, both peoples will benefit in a concrete way.

With respect to the economic relationships, about which this question is often asked, they have to be seen in the whole context of the web of relations that is developing between the two countries. Most of the large deals that are being talked about will have to be made by private American industry, and they would presumably not be made unless they were thought to be made unless they were thought to be of mutual benefit.

We have taken the view, from the beginning of this Administration first that negotiations with the Soviet Union should not be conducted on the basis of atmospherics, but on the basis of very concrete negotiation; and secondly, that the economic and political matters should be linked together so that the progress would take place on a broad front, and I must say it is a little ironic that early in the Administration we were all accused of delaying the progress of negotiations, and now many of the same people who accused us then of being too slow are discovering that the benefits may be too one-sided.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the reason for including a proposal for a world disarmament conference to be held at an appropriate time? What is your definition of an appropriate time? Does it mean after the treaties on the strategic arms, or what?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you know that the proposal for a world disarmament conference is one that the Soviet Union has repeatedly made. It was included in last year's communique, and it was repeated in this year's communique, and I think it is safe to say that if our Soviet colleagues and we were pressed to the wall, our definition of the appropriate time might differ. (Laughter)

Q Dr. Kissinger, what we have been listening to is an anthology of the positive results of the summit. Were not there some things that you had hoped to achieve at this particular summit that you have not?

DR. KISSINGER: Either due to lack of imagination or magalomania, I can't really tell you anything that we were hoping to achieve that we didn't. These summits are prepared over a long period of time. This particular summit is the result of many exchanges with the Soviet Union: Secretary Peterson's trip in July, my trip in September, Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to the United States in October, Secretary Shultz's trip in March, my trip in May, many exchanges between the two leaders.

So it really is organically almost impossible for those summits to occur with a long agenda in which you will say we will try this and see what happens. It is impossible, and also undesirable, because when you have the two leaders of the most powerful nations in the world confronting each other, you do not want to have a situation in which a totally unpredictable clash can occur.

(MORE)

[L.C.]

- 9 -

So in this meeting, the range of what was attainable was clearly understood by April or May, and the results were within the range that had been previously agreed to.

Now, at the end of each summit, there is always a very extensive meeting between the two leaders in which they decide the sort of problems they can be working on over the next year. We had such a meeting in the Kremlin on the day of the President's departure in 1972, and that was the third time that this agreement on the prevention of nuclear war in a slightly different context was raised.

As you all know, the President and the General Secretary met for three hours on Saturday night, and there was a discussion of the sort of problems that could be worked on in preparation for next year's summit, and, of course, there is an unfinished agenda. Obviously, the Middle East is part of the unfinished agenda, but we didn't expect to settle it at this meeting. SALT is part of it. MBFR is part of it. This is where we stand now in relation to next year's summit.

Q General Secretary Brezhnev said, as he was departing, that he believed that President Nixon could be returning to the Soviet Union as early as six to eight months. He also said that he expects that there will be more important agreements, or equally important agreements, signed there, indicating to some that he was possibly projecting perhaps an interim agreement on SALT.

On those two points, could you give us the United States view on the timing of a visit, and also on possibilities of an interim agreement on SALT which was referred to in an earlier statement by the principals?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, as you saw, the General Secretary was speaking without notes, and in the exuberance of the moment. (Laughter)

We don't foreclose a meeting earlier than 12 months, that has been customary between the two recent summits, but if we had been asked on that occasion to give our estimate, we would have been somewhat more cautious. So if it is more rapid, then this would indicate a more rapid pace of negotiation than we have foreseen, which we do not exclude, but which we think is unlikely.

Now, it is not at all excluded, as the principals made clear, that there would be an interim agreement on SALT in a period less than the 12 to 14 months that I would have given you as an estimate, and this is one of the matters to which we will now turn.

Q A follow-up on Mr. Kalb's question. Was chemical weapons control one of the things that had been dropped by April or May, or was that actively under consideration at this summit?

(MORE)

- 10 -

[LC]

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q You suggested that most things had been decided on the agenda by April or May. I wondered if this matter had been excluded at that point for possible agreement, or was under active consideration for agreement here?

DR. KISSINGER: When I say "had been decided by April or May," let me make clear what I mean. By the end of my visit to Zavidovo, it was not that everything had been decided, but that the range within which the negotiations between the two leaders would take place had been essentially determined, and, therefore the shape of probable agreements had become fairly clear. By that time it was clear that there would be no agreement on chemical warfare.

Q It used to be a theory that it would be a good idea for the top Soviet leaders to come to this country to get an idea of our strength; that is, the size of the country, what the people are like, the size and scope of our production, that kind of thing. This summit conference could have been held on a rock in the Atlantic Ocean for as much or as little that Mr. Brezhnev saw of America and Americans. Did he have at any time any desire to see anything of us and our country outside of the Presidential Compound?

DR. KISSINGER: The nature of the travel of the General Secretary was left to him. We made it clear that he could go anywhere he chose and for as long as he wished, so the General Secretary's itinerary was not determined by us. However, it seemed logical to us, as well, that the General Secretary wanted to follow the summit in Moscow, that had been devoted entirely to work with just two very brief side trips, with another summit in the United States of a more or less similar nature, in which the two leaders would spend most of their time in accelerating the momentum of their previous conversations.

I think, however, it is safe to say that now that the basic course has been established, and many of the major agreements have been achieved, that the purpose to which you referred will be realized in future summits. For example, the General Secretary has pointed out to the President that when he reurtrns to the Soviet Union in 1974, the Soviet Union would like it very much if we would agree to a greater exposure to various aspects of Soviet life, and also to see more of the Soveit Union than proved to be the case last year. We have agreed to this.

If these summits become annual events, and the General Secretary returns here in 1975, it can be taken for granted that much more extensive travel would be included in his program.

Q Dr. Kissinger, concerning Indochina on page 8, the last sentence on page 8 says that the leaders may also reaffirm their stand that the political futures of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free of outside interference.

(MORE)

- 11 -

Have you detected any change, perhaps, in the Soviet attitude concerning the current fighting in Cambodia, and particularly, do the Soviets disapprove at all of any activities that Hanoi may be undertaking in Cambodia, either supply or military?

DR. KISSINGER: First, let us get the Cambodian problem into perspective. We are talking here of the very last phase of a very prolonged war. We are not talking here of the beginning of another Indochina conflict. I don't want to characterize the Soviet attitude toward Cambodia. I think the Soviet Union should speak for itself.

I think that this sentence here states our view exactly: that we agreed that the future of Cambodia should be left to the Cambodian people, and that peace should come consistent with the sovereignty and the rights of self-determination of the Cambodians. We are actively engaged in attempting to bring this about at this moment, and we believe, as I said previously, that as the realrelationships among the great powers fall into clearer focus, as one looks at these areas less from their symbolic aspect of either being the spearhead of wars of national liberation or of being a conspiracy directed, it was thought once, from Peking, I think that all countries can adopt a more responsible attitude toward the conflict in Indochina and a more diassociated attitude than was the case in the 1960s.

Q My impression is that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, whether or not it is granted is no longer a serious obstacle to the development of long-term trade. Is that the case?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we believe that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union is important for the development of large-scale trade, and it is extremely important to the development of Soviet-American relations. This was part of the series of understandings in a whole complex of relationships between us and the Soviet Union last year, and it would cast serious doubt on our ability to perform our side of understandings and agreements if, in each case, that part of an agreement that is carried out later by one side or the other is then made the subject of additional conditions that were not part of the original negotiation and, therefore, I would say that for both symbolic and substantive reasons, and substantively both economic and political, it would be very unfortunate if the request to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, which means nondiscriminatory status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were not granted.

Q Can you address yourself to two impressions?

DR. KISSINGER: Impressions or questions?

Q However you like; impressions and a question. First, is there here a signal to the Russians that they have a free hand where China is concerned, as a follow-up to an earlier question; and the second impression, Dr. Kissinger, in the 89 words devoted to the Middle East, one gets the impression that the Soviet Union and the United States are as far apart as before?

(MORE)

- 12 -

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, as I said on Friday, I do not want to go into hypothetical cases addressed to particular countries. However, since you raised the question, let me say this: I don't know what a free hand vis-a-vis China means. The Soviet Union has declared officially that it has no military intentions vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive a military attack by anybody on the People's Republic of China that would not endanger international peace and security and, therefore, it would be thought to be, from whatever direction it came, not consistent with our view of this treaty, but I repeat: This does not imply that we have any reason to believe that any such attack is contemplated or that any of this subject was discussed at all between them.

With respect to the Middle East, the communique makes clear that there is no unanimity of views. Whether that is as wide as before or narrower, I think we should let the future decide, but obviously the subject was discussed at some length.

Q The glowing manner in which the two leaders have described their past weeks --

DR. KISSINGER: What manner?

Q Glowing manner, the euphoric manner.

DR. KISSINGER: Don't top yourself. (Laughter)

Q -- carries with it the impression that we can now expect an acceleration of demands or requests or proposals, at least within our own country, for the reduction of armaments. A moment ago you talked about the necessity of maintaining vigilance. Would you discuss that in context with the summit meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: This period requires great sophistication on the part of the American people. We have reached this point because we have proceeded from the basis of adequate strength, and because we have consistently taken the position that we would reduce our strength only by agreement with the other side in some agreed relation to the reductions by the other side.

This must remain an essential part of our policy, and we cannot do, as a result of this agreement, unilaterally those things that the Soviet Union will not do. We have made it clear in the communique and we have made it clear in the conduct of our policy that the principal goal of this Administration in the field of foreign policy is to leave behind it a world that can be said to be safer, more peaceful, and more permanently free of crisis than the one we found.

But we, in our view, cannot achieve this by unilateral reductions of American strength, and we believe that the course on which we are, which has made, in our judgment, significant progress, can be maintained only if we were to continue to pursue it on the basis of strict reciprocity.

(MORE)

-13-

[LC]

Q If I may, I would like to come back to this not so important adjective balance. Isn't it true that the Soviets have quite a different interpretation of balance than you have, and is this one of the reasons why not even the formal title of MBFR talks was spelled out in the communique?

DR. KISSINGER: What was spelled out in the communique is, I believe, consistent with what was agreed to in Vienna. The future of force reductions in Europe will not be determined by adjectives. It will be determined by concrete programs. It will not be determined by constant insinuations of some dark American design.

The United States has taken the view and has stated publicly that our security is integrally linked to the security of our Eurpean allies. Therefore, we are prepared to work with our European allies on working out a concrete program that reflects the common conception of security. We have invited our European allies to participate with us in developing this program, and we think the time has come to discuss the program, rather that the adjectives of a title of a conference.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did they give us to understand that they would play a useful role in seeking a cease-fire in Cambodia, and did we give them to understand that we will be winding down our bombing there in the meantime ?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think any useful purpose is served if I go into the details of these discussions with respect to Cambodia. The primary problem with respect to Cambodia now is whether it is possible in a finite period of time to bring about a negotiation that leads toward a political settlement and produces a rapid cease-fire. The particular tactics of particular operations are subsidiary to that overriding issue which was the subject of discussions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the agreement to prevent nuclear war mean that we would have to enter into consultations with the Russians before we would come to the defense of an ally under attack?

DR. KISSINGER: The agreement for the prevention of nuclear war, in Article 6, makes clear that allied obligations are unaffected. Secondly, the significance of Article 4 is that in case of situations that might produce the danger of nuclear war in general, consultations have to be undertaken. It should, therefore, be seen as a restraint on the diplomacy of both sides, and as I pointed out on Friday, not a guide to action in case those restraints break down and war occurs.

Q Dr. Kissinger: on the economic front, here you talk about that serious and sympathetic consideration should be given by the U.S. Government. Earlier you stressed in your discussion --

MORE

-14-

DR. KISSINGER: Consideration to what?

Q To proposals that are in the interests of both sides. These are business proposals, presumably. Earlier you stressed the importance of the private corporations in the negotiations. What happens when they conflict, and a corporation says this is in our mutual best interest, but perhaps you do not? A case in point right now is the natural gas deals. There are two of them that were discussed before. One corporation went out and made a deal. How do you resolve this question?

DR. KISSINGER: To the extent that corporations can implement their deals without the aid of the Government, we can do no more than express our views to their directive. To the extent that the corporations require the assistance of the Government, or the guarantee of the Government of their investment, we have the possibility of gearing the decisions to our national policy.

Now, with respect to the natural gas deal, we are not under the impression that these companies have the resources to do them entirely on their own and, therefore, we can relate them to national policy, but as the commune says, we are looking on them favorably, but it is hard to discuss in the abstract.

Q There is a reference in the commune to a meeting at the highest level to complete the ESC. What sort of time frame do you have in mind?

DR. KISSINGER: As you notice, the commune makes no particular reference to a specific time frame and, therefore, this question will be easier to answer after the Foreign Ministers have met, and particularly after the commissions have started their work. It will depend to some extent on whether the European participants will decide to take a summer vacation and the commissions will decide to take a summer vacation in August or not. The time frame is, as the commune says, the quickest possible time, but there is no particular time limit.

MORE

-15-

Q We are talking about some period within less
than a year, aren't we?

DR. KISSINGER: That would be a reasonable assump-
tion. But it depends on the progress of the conference, but
that is a good working hypothesis.

Q On the Watergate, the inevitable question as to
whether Watergate in any way was discussed between the President
and the General Secretary, and would you, Dr. Kissinger, be
prepared to comment on published speculation that the pressures
of Watergate applied a more modest negotiating technique
on the part of the President in his expectations on the Summit?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question,
Watergate was not discussed. And I don't think the point has
yet been reached where our domestic travails are discussed
with foreign leaders.

Second, the negotiating frame for the Simmit was
established last year and was in no way affected by Watergate.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet side, coming back
to the natural gas deals, ask for a more specific, more
categorical American endorsement of these particularly
the latest Occidental Petroleum deal, and a promise of
guarantees on the credits than is in the communique?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the specific status of the gas
deals is now that they have to be moved from these abstract
declarations of intent to some concrete propositions. These
concrete propositions have to be developed, in the first
instance, by the companies concerned that have to make a
judgment of the degree of investment that is required and also
on whether it is an economic proposition.

At that point, one will have to determine whether
this can be done entirely by private capital or if it requires,
at least in some of its aspects, some U.S. governmental
guarantees. That point has not yet been reached because the
projects have not yet been formulated into precise economic
propositions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in what way are the documents
and agreements signed by the General Secretary of the Soviet
Communist Party binding in any respect on the Soviet Government
and another rather petty question, is there any connection
between the timing of this week's events or at least the
communique, this press conference this morning and your press
conference Wednesday, if you have one -- is there any connection
between that timing and the Watergate events going on in
Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question,
whenever the General Secretary of the Communist Party signs
a document, we are given -- it is actually legally a very
good question -- we are given a document by the Soviet
Foreign Ministry pointing out that he has full powers to sign
that document because, as you know, Mr. Brezhnev has no
official governmental position, so that legally the documents which
he signed this year and the documents which he signed last year
are fully within Soviet constitutional processes and we have also
an official Soviet statement that he has full governmental powers
to sign the document.

MORE

[Lc]

-16-

Secondly, with respect to my briefings, our view here has always been that the necessities that produce foreign policies are of a permanent nature, and that our objective is what I described at the beginning, to bring about a more peaceful world. They are not geared in any respect to any of the domestic situations.

This schedule was determined at a time when it was believed that Dean would testify last week and it was agreed then that in view of the fact that the General Secretary's speech was on television yesterday, that his departure statement would be on television yesterday, and in view of the fact that it is more appropriate to release communiques at a time he is leaving the country, that the release of the communique would be on Monday and therefore, the briefing of the communique would be on Monday. That is a schedule that was determined, I repeat, at a time when we did not know that the hearings would be postponed.

If I have another briefing on Wednesday, it is in response to the repeated request of many of you ladies and gentlemen that we have a more informal session, less geared to the words of the communique, to set this in better perspective.

But, since you have raised the issue, I will say now, I will move you to Thursday, to remove any question about it. The thought had never crossed our mind and we will now, if there is one, have it on Thursday.

Q Could I suggest that the day is less important than it be sometime later in the afternoon, California time.

DR. KISSINGER: Work it out with Ron. If there is another briefing, the purpose is to permit a somewhat more philosophical discussion of where we are going. The timing should be left to what produces the best philosophical discussion.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the proposal for a world disarmament conference has been mentioned many times over the years and has not been a subject necessarily of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States as to its usefulness. I wonder whether the mention of it here in the communique, whether you would characterize it as one of the accomplishments of the summit?

DR. KISSINGER: The world disarmament conference was mentioned in last year's communique and therefore, to have it mentioned again cannot be considered a radical departure and one of the principal accomplishments of the conference.

We have said that we would be prepared to discuss it at an appropriate time, and I suspect that this will lead to several exchanges on that subject.

MORE

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1766

AT THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

12:10 P.M. PDT

JUNE 28, 1973

THURSDAY

MR. WARREN: The President worked at his study in the residence, as has been his habit this week, until about 9:25 when he arrived at the office at the Western White House. He met with General Haig and Ron Ziegler, this morning. At 10:30, he met with Charles S. Thomas, Chairman of the National Tourism Review Commission. We posted information on that Commission and on Mr. Thomas yesterday.

The Commission report, which has been two years in the planning, was released in Washington yesterday. Mr. Thomas, as you know, is a former Secretary of the Navy and was named Chairman of the National Tourism Resources Review Commission in February, 1971. We will have information over here on the history of the Commission's work. We will have a statement by the President thanking the Commission and Mr. Thomas on its work. That will be available for you following the briefing.

The mandate of that Commission was to determine the travel needs of Americans in this country today and of those from other countries who visit the United States, and to project those views and those needs into 1980 and to investigate the resources available to meet those needs between now and 1980.

Also, it was asked to come up with recommendations and to assess the need for Federal aid to the states in promoting domestic travel. We will have, as I said, a statement by the President on this Commission available after the briefing.

Following that meeting, the President met with Roy Ash, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Al Haig sat in on that meeting. As I told you yesterday, they are discussing fiscal 1974, the need for budget restraints, and other Office of Management and Budget departmental matters.

At this time, starting about 12:05, the President began a meeting with Dr. Kissinger and with Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, the United States Ambassador to India. Ambassador Moynihan arrived at Los Angeles International last evening and is here for this meeting today. He is home on consultations. I do not know precisely how long he will stay.

MORE

#1766

- 3 -

#1766

Ziegler will continue to brief the National Press Corps and the White House Press Corps. Ron Ziegler is Press Secretary and will continue to be, as the President announced.

Q May I ask, did Ron Ziegler call Mr. Laird to clear that point up with him this morning?

MR. WARREN: No, I think they talked in the general course of their duties. They chatted on the phone.

On Saturday -- we have some times I don't believe we have given you previously -- the President will meet with the permanent representatives of the North Atlantic Council at 10 a.m. There will be a photo at the beginning of that meeting.

At 11 a.m., the President will meet with members of the congressional delegation who will be making the trip to the People's Republic of China.

That takes you through the schedule for the rest of the week.

I do have some announcements this morning. The President today is announcing with deep appreciation for her contributions to the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States, the resignation of Carol C. Laise as Ambassador to Nepal. Ambassador Laise, as you know, is the wife of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who has returned from his position as Ambassador to Vietnam. Carol Laise will be returning to Washington for further reassignment, and I feel constrained at this point, because there are some here who may not understand the refinements of the terms when we are talking about Ambassadors, Ambassadors "resign" their positions. I am not intimating that Carol Laise is retiring from the Foreign Service. As a matter of fact, she will be returning to Washington for further assignment.

She has served in the post in Nepal since her appointment by President Johnson in September, 1966. I think you recall that at the time we announced that Ambassador Bunker was leaving Vietnam, we said that Ambassador Bunker would be receiving an assignment to another high-level position. I have nothing to announce on that at this time, but when that is determined, we will announce it.

Replacing Ambassador Laise in Nepal will be William I. Cargo. Mr. Cargo is a career Foreign Service Officer, currently serving in the Department of State as Director of Planning and Coordination Staff.

The President also today is announcing his intention to nominate Robert A. Hurwitch, of Chicago, as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. He will replace Francis E. Meloy, Jr., who will be reassigned upon his return to Washington.

Since 1969, Mr. Hurwitch has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

MORE

#1766

- 5 -

#1766

Those are all of the announcements we have.

Q Jerry, why is Ambassador Moynihan here?

MR. WARREN: He is here for regular consultations.
He is in the United States and came out to talk to Dr. Kissinger
and the President.

Q Have they considered bringing him back on the
White House staff?

MR. WARREN: I have nothing that would lead me to
indicate that. They are having general discussions which the
President tries to have when Ambassadors from important
positions return to the United States for consultation.

Q Did you talk to the President this morning?

MR. WARREN: Jim, I did not talk to the President
this morning. This was a rather busy morning for both the
President and me. I have talked to a great number of
other people this morning.

Q Did you ask them that specific question, whether
Moynihan might be coming back on the staff, whoever you talked
to?

MR. WARREN: I have talked to some people about that
and I would stand on the answer I just gave you, Jim.

Q Jerry, is he back to discuss any matters other
than American-Indian relations, like, for example, family
assistance?

MR. WARREN: I would imagine, while Mr. Moynihan
is back that others on the White House staff would be seeking
his advice on a number of matters, but I have nothing to
give you today on that family assistance plan.

Q Jerry, could you tell us the degree of the
President's involvement in the preparation of Mr. Buzhardt's
statement and questions?

MR. WARREN: Mr. Buzhardt put out a statement in
Washington which we have available for you here, Bob. If you
don't have it, we will get it to you right after this briefing.

It is available over on the ledge over there. In
that statement, Mr. Buzhardt said it was not reviewed by the
President.

Q That doesn't quite answer my question, Jerry.
I asked you if you would explain to us the degree of the
President's involvement in the preparation of the questions and
the statement?

MORE

#1766

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 2:00 P.M.,

June 29, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXECUTIVE ORDER

ENERGY POLICY OFFICE

By virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States of America, it is
hereby ordered as follows:

Energy Policy Office

Section 1. There is hereby established in the Executive Office of the President an Energy Policy Office. The office shall be under the immediate supervision and direction of a Director of the Energy Policy Office who shall be designated or appointed by the President.

Functions of the Director

Sec. 2(a). The Director shall be the Administration's chief policy officer with respect to energy matters, and shall be the President's principal adviser concerning those matters.

(b) The Director shall also be responsible for --

(1) identifying major problems, present and prospective, in the energy areas;

(2) making policy recommendations to the President with respect to energy matters;

(3) working with executive branch agencies and outside groups in reviewing policy alternatives with respect to energy matters;

(4) reviewing, commenting on, and making separate recommendations on all other energy-related matters which require Presidential attention;

(5) insuring that executive branch agencies develop short- and long-range plans for dealing with energy matters;

(6) monitoring the implementation of approved energy policies with the assistance of the Office of Management and Budget;

(7) providing guidance and direction to the Oil Policy Committee and its Chairman in the performance of its functions;

(8) providing advice to the Cost of Living Council concerning energy matters;

more

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 2:00 P.M., EDT

June 29, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

One of the most critical problems on America's agenda today is to meet our vital energy needs.

Two months ago I announced a comprehensive program to move us forward in that effort. Today I am taking the following additional measures:

First, I am appointing John A. Love, Governor of Colorado, to direct a new energy office that will be responsible for formulating and coordinating energy policies at the Presidential level.

Second, I am asking the Congress to create a new Cabinet-level department devoted to energy and natural resources and a new independent Energy Research and Development Administration.

Third, I am initiating a $10 billion program for research and development in the energy field, which will extend over the next five years.

Finally, I am launching a conservation drive to reduce anticipated personal consumption of energy resources across the Nation by 5 percent over the next twelve months. The Federal Government will take the lead in this effort, by reducing its anticipated consumption by 7 percent during this same period.

America faces a serious energy problem. While we have only 6 percent of the world's population, we consume one-third of the world's energy output. The supply of domestic energy resources available to us is not keeping pace with our ever-growing demand, and unless we act swiftly and effectively, we could face a genuine energy crisis in the foreseeable future.

Progress Since April

On April 18, I submitted a message to the Congress discussing the energy challenge and the steps necessary to meet it. That message emphasized that as we work to conserve our energy demands, we must also undertake an intensive effort to expand our energy supplies. I am happy to report that many of these steps are already underway, and that they are proving effective.

-- At least eight oil companies have made firm decisions to undertake significant refinery construction projects. Within the next three years these projects will increase refinery capacity by more than 1.5 million barrels daily -- a 10 percent increase over existing capacity.

-- We have announced and carried out a voluntary oil allocation program to help provide farmers and essential government and health services, as well as independent refiners and marketers, with an equitable share of available petroleum.

more

2

[LC]

-- A great deal of oil from the Outer Continental Shelf and other Federal lands, which has traditionally been retained by the producers, has been allocated to small independent refiners to augment their present supplies. That figure has already reached 100 thousand barrels of oil per day and will increase to 160 thousand by mid-August.

-- The Council on Environmental Quality has begun a study of the environmental impact of drilling on the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf and in the Gulf of Alaska. The study is scheduled for completion by next spring.

-- The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs has reported out legislation which would finally permit the construction of an Alaskan pipeline. Legislation will shortly be reported out in the House of Representatives. Since construction of that pipeline would provide two million barrels of domestic oil a day, I again urge that the Congress give swift approval to this legislation.

-- The Office of Energy Conservation and the Office of Energy Data and Analysis have been established at the Department of the Interior. Although not yet fully staffed, they are now beginning to provide information we must have to proceed with our developing energy policy.

-- The Commerce Department has proposed regulations covering the labeling of household appliances so that consumers can make comparisons of the efficiency with which the appliances consume energy.

-- The Environmental Protection Agency has published information on gasoline mileage for 1973 automobiles.

-- The Department of State is taking steps to consult with the major oil-producing nations to develop the cooperative arrangements needed to ensure adequate and stable sources of oil in the future. We are also working closely with the other major oil-consuming nations in studying ways of meeting growing world demand for energy supplies. These include emergency sharing arrangements, as well as stockpile and rationing programs which might lead to more coordinated policies for meeting oil supply shortages should they occur in the future.

Several of the steps which I announced in April were in the form of legislative proposals which will help to increase energy supplies. They called for the Alaskan pipeline, competitive pricing of natural gas, licensing of deepwater ports, streamlining of powerplant siting, and a rational framework for controls over surface mining. Only the pipeline request has been finally acted on in committee. I hope the Congress will now act quickly and favorably on my other requests.

These steps are a beginning. But they are only a beginning.

## REORGANIZATION

The acquisition, distribution, and consumption of energy resources have become increasingly complex and increasingly critical to the functioning of our economy and our society. But the organization of the Federal Government to meet its

more

responsibilities for energy and other natural resource policies
has not changed to meet the new demands. The Federal Government
cannot effectively meet its obligations in these areas under
the present organizational structures, and the time has come
to change them.

## Energy Policy Office

Effective immediately, the duties of the Special Energy
Committee and National Energy Office which I set up 2 months
ago to advise and assist in the preliminary organizational
phases of the Federal response to the energy challenge will
be combined in an expanded Energy Policy Office within the
Executive Office of the President. This office will be
responsible for the formulation and coordination of energy
policies at the Presidential level.

This office will be headed by Governor Love, who will be
an Assistant to the President as well as Director of the
Energy Policy Office. He will spend full time on this assign-
ment and will report directly to me. My Special Consultant on
energy matters, Charles DiBona, will continue in his present
advisory capacity, working within the new office.

## Department of Energy and Natural Resources

Two years ago I sent to the Congress my proposals for a
sweeping reorganization of executive departments and indepen-
dent agencies to provide an executive branch structure more
responsive to the basic goals of public policy. One of those
proposals called for a Department of Natural Resources.

During the time these proposals have been receiving the
consideration of the Congress, my Administration has continued
to refine and improve them. It has become increasingly obvious
that reorganization is imperative, and nowhere more clearly so
than in the areas of natural resources and related energy
matters.

I am therefore proposing today the establishment of a new
Cabinet-level Department of Energy and Natural Resources,
responsible for the balanced utilization and conservation of
America's energy and natural resources.

The Department of Energy and Natural Resources would take
charge of all of the present activities of the Department of
the Interior, except the Office of Coal Research and certain
other energy research and development programs, which would
be transferred to a new Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration. It would also assume the responsibilities of the
Forest Service and certain water resources activities of the
Soil Conservation Service from the Department of Agriculture;
the planning and funding of the civil functions of the Army
Corps of Engineers; the duties of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce, the
uranium and thorium assessment functions of the Atomic Energy
Commission, the functions of the interagency Water Resources
Council, and gas pipeline safety functions of the Department
of Transportation.

more

# Energy Research and Development Administration

I am further proposing to the Congress that we create an Energy Research and Development Administration.

The new Administration would have central responsibility for the planning, management and conduct of the Government's energy research and development and for working with industry so that promising new technologies can be developed and put promptly to work. The new Administration would be organized to give significant new emphasis to fossil fuels and potential new forms of energy, while also assuring continued progress in developing nuclear power.

In order to create the new Administration, the present functions of the Atomic Energy Commission, except those pertaining to licensing and related regulatory responsibilities, would be transferred to it as would most of the energy research and development programs of the Department of Interior. The scientific and technological resources of the AEC should provide a solid foundation for building a well-conceived and well-executed effort.

Under my proposal, the five-member organization of the AEC would be retained to provide direction for a separate and renamed Nuclear Energy Commission which would carry on the important licensing and regulatory activities now within the AEC. In addition, I have asked that a comprehensive study be undertaken, in full consultation with the Congress, to determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the Government.

## RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

While we must rely on conventional forms of fuel to meet our immediate energy needs, it is clear that the answer to our long-term needs lies in developing new forms of energy.

With this necessity in mind, I am taking three steps immediately to enlarge our Federal energy research and development efforts.

First, I am initiating a Federal energy research and development effort of $10 billion over a five-year period, beginning in fiscal year 1975. To give impetus to this drive, I am directing that an additional $100 million in fiscal year 1974 be devoted to the acceleration of certain existing projects and the initiation of new projects in a number of critical research and development areas. At least one-half of the funding for the new initiatives for this coming fiscal year will be devoted to coal research and development with emphasis on producing clean liquid fuels from coal, improving mining techniques to increase coal mining safety and productivity, accelerating our coal gasification program and developing improved combustion systems. The remainder of the $100 million will be for research and development projects on advanced energy conversion systems, environmental control, geothermal steam, conservation, and gas-cooled nuclear reactors. While it is essential that we maintain the present budget ceiling for fiscal year 1974, these vital programs must and can be funded within that ceiling.

more

Second, I am directing the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to undertake an immediate review of Federal and private energy research and development activities, under the general direction of the Energy Policy Office, and to recommend an integrated energy research and development program for the Nation. This program should encourage and actively involve industry in cooperative efforts to develop and demonstrate new technologies that will permit better use of our energy resources. I am also directing the Chairman, in consultation with the Department of the Interior and other agencies, to recommend by September 1 of this year specific projects to which the additional $100 million would be allocated during fiscal year 1974. By December 1 of this year, I am asking for her recommendations for energy research and development programs which should be included in my fiscal year 1975 budget.

Third, I am establishing an Energy Research and Development Advisory Council reporting to the Energy Policy Office, to be composed of leading experts in various areas of energy research and development from outside the Government.

I feel that these steps will greatly improve and expand our current energy research and development effort and will ensure the development of technologies vital to meeting our future energy needs.

## CONSERVATION

### The Federal Effort

In my Energy Message of April 18, I announced preliminary steps to conserve America's fuel supplies. I said at that time that while energy conservation is a national necessity, conservation efforts could be undertaken on a voluntary basis. I still believe this.

However, public persuasion alone is not sufficient to the challenge confronting us. The Federal Government is the largest consumer of energy in the country and, as such, it has its own unique role to play in reducing energy consumption and thus setting an example for all consumers.

Effective today, I am therefore ordering the Federal Government to achieve a seven percent reduction in its anticipated energy consumption over the next 12 months.

I have directed the heads of all Cabinet departments and other Federal agencies to report by July 31 on the specific steps they will take to meet this target. Secretary Morton will be responsible for monitoring agency efforts and reporting their progress to me.

These conservation measures are to be designed to ensure that no vital services are impaired nor the proper functioning of these departments and agencies curtailed. Exceptions will be permitted only in unique circumstances,

more

6

such as the program of uranium enrichment at the AEC where a substantial reduction in energy consumption would have a detrimental effect on our efforts to provide new forms of energy.

While the precise means of conserving energy will be left to the discretion of Cabinet and agency heads, I am directing that conservation efforts include the following measures:

- Reduction in the level of air conditioning of all Federal office buildings throughout the summer.

- Reduction in the number of official trips taken by Federal employees.

- Purchase or leasing of automobiles and other vehicles which provide good gasoline mileage.

Each department and agency is expected to review all of its activities to determine how its own demands might be reduced. The Department of Defense, the largest single consumer of energy within the executive branch, has already examined its activities and has taken steps to reduce its energy demands by 10 percent over last year -- steps which will in no way jeopardize our military preparedness.

## Conservation in the Private Sector

I am also directing all departments and agencies to work closely with Secretary Morton and the Office of Energy Conservation in the development of long-term energy conservation plans and recommendations for both the private and the public sector.

At my request, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Commerce and Governor Love are to meet with representatives of American industry to discuss ways of cutting back on unnecessary consumption of energy and to urge their active participation in the conservation effort.

Further, I have directed the Secretary of Transportation to work with the Nation's airlines, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal Aviation Administration to reduce flight speeds, and, where possible, the frequency of commercial airline flights. This effort is now underway. By effecting only a small reduction in speeds and flights, it is possible to achieve significant reductions in energy consumption.

## Placing the Challenge in Perspective

As these measures cover a broad range of activities in the public and private sectors, I want to put both the problem and the proposed conservation measures into perspective. We all need to understand the dimensions of the challenge, as well as the significance of the role every single American has to play in meeting it.

The Department of the Interior estimates that under the conditions of current usage, our available supply of gasoline this summer could fall short of demand by one or two percent and possibly as much as five percent should the most adverse conditions prevail. To overcome this

more

7

potential shortage, and to reduce pressure on supplies of other energy resources, I am suggesting that a reasonable and attainable national goal is to reduce anticipated energy use by individual consumers by five percent.

We can achieve this goal by making very small alterations in our present living habits, for steps such as those we are taking at the Federal level can be taken with equal effectiveness by private individuals. We need not sacrifice any activities vital to our economy or to our well-being as a people.

Raising the thermostat of an air conditioner by just 4 degrees, for instance, will result in a saving of an estimated 15-20 percent in its use of electricity.

Just as the Government can obtain energy efficient automobiles, private citizens can do the same. Nearly three-quarters of the gasoline used in America is consumed by automobiles.

Those who drive automobiles can also assist by driving more slowly. A car travelling 50 miles per hour uses 20 to 25 percent less gasoline per mile than the same car travelling 70 miles per hour. Carpooling and using public transportation will result in further fuel savings.

In order to help reduce driving speeds, I am today taking the additional step of writing to each of the Nation's Governors, asking them to work with their State legislatures to reduce highway speed limits in a manner consistent with safety and efficiency, as well as with energy needs.

I also continue to urge the Congress to pass highway-mass transit legislation which would provide States and localities flexibility to choose between capital investment in highways or mass transit. Diversion of some commuter traffic from single occupant automobiles to mass transit will result in significant energy and environmental benefits, and at the same time, permit the highways to be operated in the efficient manner for which they were designed.

Energy conservation is not just sound policy for the country, it is also good economics for the consumer.

Changing to a more efficient automobile, for example, could produce savings of as much as one thousand gallons of gas in the course of a year. A savings of one thousand gallons of gas equals a personal savings of approximately $400.

Cutting down on air conditioning and heating, of course, also cuts down on the family gas or electric or oil bill.

Actions to reduce the rate of growth in energy demands will also improve our ability to protect and improve the quality of our environment.

more

8

The conservation of existing energy resources is not a proposal; it is a necessity. It is a requirement that will remain with us indefinitely, and it is for this reason that I believe that the American people must develop an energy conservation ethic.

As a matter of simple prudence and common sense, we must not waste our resources, however abundant they may seem. To do otherwise, in a world of finite resources, reflects adversely upon what we are as a people and a Nation.

## CONCLUSION

We face a challenge in meeting our energy needs. In the past, the American people have viewed challenges as an opportunity to improve our Nation, and to move forward. The steps I have outlined above are not meant to be conclusive. They are part of the ongoing process.

I urge the Congress to act with due concern for our energy needs by rapid consideration of all of my legislative proposals in this field, especially my request to clear the way for the Alaskan pipeline.

Over the coming years it is essential that we increase our supplies of energy.

I urge the members of the Federal Government to play their role in meeting the spirit and the letter of my energy-conservation directives.

I urge private industry to respond with all the imagination and resourcefulness that has made this Nation the richest on earth.

But the final question of whether we can avoid an energy crisis will be determined by the response of the American people to their country's needs. In the past, whenever we have been faced with real challenges, the American people have joined together to share in the common interest.

I am confident we will do so now.

# # # #

June 29, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON ENERGY

SUMMARY OUTLINE - FACT SHEET

Page

- Background .................................................. 1

- President's April 18, 1973 Energy Message to the Congress

- Major energy legislation proposed by the Administration

- Significant developments since April 18 .................... 1

- New refinery capacity

- Voluntary oil allocation program

- Offices of Energy Conservation and Energy Data and Analysis in the Department of the Interior

- Allocation of royalty oil

- Senate Committee action on Alaska Pipeline legislation

- CEQ Study of environmental impact of drilling on the Atlantic OCS and Gulf of Alaska

- Labelling of household appliances to show energy efficiency

- Published information on gasoline mileage for all 1973 autos

- Consultations with other Nations

- Organization of Federal Energy and Natural Resource Activities ........................................ 2

- Summary .................................................... 2

- Energy Policy Office (EPO) ................................ 2

- The Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR). ........................................ 3

- Function and resource transfers to DENR .................... 3

- DENR Organization and management................................ 4

- Energy and Minerals Administration .......................... 4

- Land and Recreation Resources Administration ................ 4

- Water Resources Administration ................................ 4

- Oceanic, Atmospheric, and Earth Sciences Admin .................................................... 5

- Indian and Territorial Affairs .................................... 5

- Energy policy information and analysis functions of the Secretary .................................... 5

- The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) .................................... 5

- Function and Resources Transfers to ERDA .................... 5

- ERDA Organization and management ............................ 6

- Nuclear Energy Commission (NEC) .................................... 6

- Study of Energy Regulatory Activities ............................ 6

more

[LC]

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Energy Research and Development</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Increased Funding for Energy R&D</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Study by the Chairman of AEC</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Energy R&D Advisory Council</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Energy Conservation</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>National Goal</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Reduce Federal Government Energy Use</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Action to be taken by all agencies</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>More efficient automobiles in Federal activities</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Department of Defense actions</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Reduce Airline Fuel Requirements</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>State and local governments and industry</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Actions by the public to conserve energy</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Conserving gasoline</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Conserving energy in the home</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Congressional Action on Highways - Mass Transit Legislation</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Long-Term Conservation</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Other Federal Actions</td><td>12</td></tr></tbody></table>

more

2

-- The Council on Environmental Quality has begun a study of the environmental impact of drilling on the Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf and the Gulf of Alaska; the study is to be completed next spring.

-- The Commerce Department has issued proposed regulations covering the labelling of household appliances to show energy efficiency.

-- The Environmental Protection Agency has published information on gasoline mileage for all 1973 automobiles.

-- The Department of State is taking steps to consult with the major oil producing and consuming nations to develop cooperative arrangements to provide adequate and stable ways to meet the world's growing energy demands.

ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL ENERGY
AND NATURAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES

Summary

The President upgraded and strengthened White House arrangements for energy policy by appointing an Assistant to the President for Energy who will head the Energy Policy Office.

The President is proposing legislation which would:

-- Establish a Department of Energy and Natural Resources consisting of functions transferred from the Department of the Interior and several other agencies.

-- Establish a new independent agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), to focus all Federal energy R&D.

-- Retain the five-member commission organization of the AEC to carry on the licensing, regulatory and related environmental and safety functions of that agency but under a new name, Nuclear Energy Commission.

The President has directed that a comprehensive study be undertaken of Federal energy regulatory activities, looking to possible reorganization of these activities.

Energy Policy Office (EPO)

The President has created an Energy Policy Office in the Executive Office of the President. The EPO will replace the Special Committee on Energy. It will also expand upon the role of the National Energy Office (created by Executive Order 11712) which helped guide the development of the Administration's energy policies including the new government-wide organizational arrangements. The Office will be headed by a Director who will also serve as Assistant to the President for Energy. The Director will serve as the President's principal energy advisor and be responsible for identifying major problems, reviewing alternatives, making policy recommendations, assuring that agencies develop short and long range plans, and for monitoring the implementation of approved energy policies.

more

4

| | FY 73 Budget Outlay Estimates (in millions) | FY 73 Full-Time Permanent Employment |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **From Department of Commerce** | | |
| National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) | 322 | 12,450 |
| **From Department of the Army** | | |
| Corps of Engineers, Civil Functions (Planning, evaluation, policy and funding only) | 1,643 | 360 |
| **From Water Resources Council** | | |
| All functions | 8 | 45 |
| | **$5,385** | **91,149** |

## DENR Organization and Management

The Department would be managed by a Secretary, a Deputy Secretary, an Under Secretary for Policy and an Under Secretary for Management, having cross-cutting department-wide responsibilities. The Department's missions would be carried out largely through five Administrations, each containing programs grouped on the basis of common major purposes. The assignment of functions among Administrations would be the responsibility of the Secretary. Currently it is expected that the primary functions of each Administration would be as follows:

- **Energy and Minerals Administration.** This Administration would include those DENR functions primarily concerned with energy and minerals including Interior's Office of Energy Conservation, Office of Energy Data and Analysis, Office of Oil and Gas, Office of Research and Development, Bureau of Mines (except energy research centers), Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration, and Bonneville, Southeastern, Southwestern and Alaska Power Administrations. It would also include the Uranium and Thorium Assessment Program from AEC and Office of Pipeline Safety from DOT.

- **Land and Recreation Resources Administration.** This Administration would be composed of most functions and resources of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife from the Department of Interior, the Forest Service from the Department of Agriculture.

- **Water Resources Administration.** This Administration would provide a single management framework for the integration and coordination of national water resources policy and planning. The organizational functions and resources to be included in this Administration include the Bureau of Reclamation, Office of Saline Water, and Office of Water Resources Research from Interior; the policy, planning and funding of the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers; the River Basin Surveys and Investigations Program and Planning and Funding for large Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention projects from the Soil Conservation Service, Department of Agriculture; and the Water Resources Council.

more

5

- Oceanic, Atmospheric, and Earth Sciences Administration. This Administration would include the functions and responsibilities of the Geological Survey of the Interior Department and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department of Commerce.

- Indian and Territorial Affairs. This Administration would combine Interior's Office of Territories and Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Indian and Territorial Affairs Programs are included in DENR because of their historical association with natural resources and the Department of the Interior. Most Indians in the past have rejected proposals for transfer of Indian programs to other departments and, pending further study, are included in DENR.

In addition to the functions located in DENR's Energy and Minerals Administration, the Secretary would be responsible for and have resources to assemble information with respect to energy resources and demands in all sectors, perform analyses and identify energy policy and program options that would provide guidance to other operating agencies and assistance to the Energy Policy Office and other agencies of the Executive Office of the President.

### The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA).

This new independent agency would bring together and direct research and development programs on all forms of energy. The agency's objective would be the development in cooperation with industry of new energy sources to meet the energy needs of present and future generations in a manner which protects or enhances the quality of our environment. ERDA would conduct or sponsor nearly all the Federal Government's research and development programs involving all forms of energy.

### -- Function and Resource Transfers to ERDA

ERDA would at the outset be composed principally of the following functions:

- All of the functions, authorities and resources of the Atomic Energy Commission, except the uranium and thorium assessment program which will be transferred to DENR, and the AEC's licensing, regulatory and related environment and safety functions. Functions transferred to ERDA from AEC would include nuclear materials production, reactor development, military applications, physical research, biomedical and environmental research, controlled thermonuclear research, non-nuclear energy R&D and other non-regulatory functions.

- Most of Interior's fossil fuels R&D, namely the Office of Coal Research and the energy research centers of the Bureau of Mines, the synthane pilot plant for high BTU coal conversion which is under construction in Bruceton, Pa., and underground power transmission R&D.

This agency would be the focal point for the new accelerated energy R&D programs. It is also contemplated that the bulk of the $25 million central fund for energy R&D that was requested in the 1974 budget of the Interior Department would be transferred to ERDA. The principal resources identified thus far for transfer to ERDA are estimated to be:

more

| | FY 1973 Budget Outlays (in millions) | 1973 Employment (Full-Time Permanent) |
|:---|:---:|:---:|
| **From AEC** | | |
| - All functions except uranium and thorium assessment program, and licensing, regulatory and related environment and safety. | $2,250 | 5,800 |
| **From Interior** | | |
| - Office of Coal Research | 58 | 37 |
| - Bureau of Mines Energy Research Centers and Synthane Plant | 13 | 728 |
| - Underground Power Transmission R&D | 1 | 5 |
| **TOTAL** | **$2,322** | **6,570** |

## ERDA Organization and Management

The creation of ERDA contemplates building upon the scientific and technical base of the Atomic Energy Commission and making use of the laboratories and technical management capabilities now located in that agency. ERDA would be headed by an Administrator, Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrators responsible for major programs and supporting functions. Specific proposals for the internal organization of ERDA will be made at a later date, following a study of R&D and production functions that would be transferred from AEC, functions to be transferred from other agencies and new programs. The internal organization would reflect clearly ERDA's role in non-nuclear energy R&D while assuring continued progress on the nuclear energy functions transferred from AEC.

## Nuclear Energy Commission (NEC)

The five-member Commission form of organization would be retained to head the licensing, regulatory and related functions of the Atomic Energy Commission. The name of the agency would be changed to the Nuclear Energy Commission.

Resources now directly associated with the AEC's licensing and regulatory functions include approximately $40 million in net 1973 Budget outlays and about 1275 full-time permanent employees. Studies will begin immediately to ascertain which of the functions and resources now under the General Manager of the AEC or directly under the Commission should be transferred to the NEC in support of that agency's licensing and regulatory functions. In addition, it is expected that ERDA would be available to perform work in support of NEC on a reimbursable basis.

## Study of Energy Regulatory Activities

The President has directed that a comprehensive study of Federal energy regulatory activities be undertaken to see whether reorganization is desirable. A number of Federal agencies are engaged in such activities, including the Atomic Energy Commission, Federal Power Commission, and

more

others that carry out energy regulatory functions as a part of broader missions such as the Departments of Interior and Transportation, Corps of Engineers, EPA, and Interstate Commerce Commission. A wide variety of interests and objectives are involved, including economic, public health and safety, environment, and adequacy and reliability of energy supply. The study will be undertaken over the next year to determine whether existing organizational arrangements are most efficient and effective for balancing the interests and objectives involved. The interface with State and local regulatory activities will also be considered and opportunity for Congressional and public participation in the study will be provided. OMB will be responsible for assuring that the study is completed.

ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

In addition to the major legislative proposals to improve energy and natural resources organization, the President announced three major steps to accelerate and to improve coordination of our Federal energy R&D efforts:

-- The President has concluded that:

- Federal funding for energy R&D should be $10 billion over the next 5 years beginning in FY 1975.

- As a start on this program, funding of $100 million would be devoted to new or accelerated high priority energy R&D projects in FY 1974. This amount is in addition to the $25 million energy R&D fund requested in the Department of the Interior's FY 1974 budget.

- At least half of the $100 million funding would be used for coal R&D, including programs on clean liquid fuels from coal, improved mining techniques to increase safety and productivity, accelerated coal gasification and improved combustion.

- The remainder would be for projects in:

  -- advanced energy conversion R&D to achieve greater efficiencies in energy utilization and less waste heat, including work on high temperature conversion cycles, low temperature conversion cycles, magnetohydrodynamics, alternate gas cycles and advanced automotive power systems.

  -- a new program on energy conservation R&D to improve efficiency and reduce energy consumption in transportation, residential, commercial and industrial sectors.

  -- additional environmental control R&D to accelerate work on power plant SOₓ removal, including work on improved processes resulting in useful byproducts and reduced wastes.

more

8

-- geothermal R&D with emphasis on resource appraisal and exploration, developing and demonstrating technology for utilizing hot brine and hot dry rock resources, and examining environmental and systems problems.

-- gas-cooled nuclear reactor R&D, including funds for a program to permit use of thorium as an additional nuclear fuel and funds for additional high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) safety and fuel research.

-- The President has directed the Chairman of the AEC, with assistance of the Department of the Interior and other Federal agencies to:

- Conduct a comprehensive review to provide the detailed elements of our high priority FY 1974 energy R&D program. The review will be under the general direction of the Energy Policy Office and is to be completed by September 1, 1973.

- Organize immediately a review of Federal and private energy R&D activities for the purpose of recommending an integrated R&D program for the Nation. Industry is to be involved actively in a number of cooperative efforts to develop and demonstrate new technologies. Recommendations for future increases in R&D programs are due from the AEC chairman by December 1 of this year so that the President's FY 1975 budget can adequately reflect such recommendations.

-- The President also directed that a high-level energy R&D Advisory Council composed of leading experts from outside the Federal Government in various areas of energy technology be established to advise the Energy Policy Office. The Council will provide technical advice on major directions and the substance of an integrated R&D energy program.

## ENERGY CONSERVATION

Several energy conservation actions were announced in the President's April 18 message. Since then additional steps have been announced by industry, Government agencies and other groups. The measures announced today are major new actions to reduce the rate of growth in demand for energy -- focusing particularly on gasoline and electricity.

Actions to reduce the rate of growth in energy demands will improve our ability to meet the important objectives of protecting and improving the quality of our environment.

The most immediate energy problem facing the Nation is a shortage of gasoline. The Department of the Interior estimates that, unless we take actions to conserve fuel, the summer gasoline shortage nation wide over the next three months under expected conditions may be 1-2 percent of total demand. Under less favorable conditions, these shortages could reach the neighborhood of 5 percent of demand.

Even a 1-2 percent shortage nation wide could cause significant problems in some areas. Shortages may be more severe in the last few weeks of the summer when many Americans take their annual vacations.

more

9

[LC]

The Nation uses approximately 294 million gallons of gasoline per day (or 7 million barrels). 95 percent of all gasoline is used for transportation, over 70 percent of which is used for automobiles. The rate of gasoline consumption is over 5 percent higher than last year. Production and imports are not keeping pace with increased demand. Gasoline inventories currently are about 5 percent below last year.

The removal of all quantitative restrictions on petroleum imports announced in the President's April 18 Energy Message is allowing domestic suppliers to import increased amounts of gasoline from abroad. In addition, the voluntary allocation program and the allocation by the Interior Department of the Federal Government's royalty oil to small refiners will ease the summer gasoline shortage by creating a more equitable distribution of gasoline and crude oil among all consuming segments with special attention to high priority users. However, conservation measures are essential if the shortfall in gasoline is to be minimized.

Gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, heating fuel, and residual oil used by the electric utility industry are all made from petroleum. The modern refinery can be adjusted to vary the amount of each kind of product produced from a barrel of oil, and this is done each year to maximize gasoline production for the summer and heating fuel production for the winter. In short, each gallon of gasoline and kilowatt of electricity we save this summer will increase our heating fuel supply next winter.

The steps being announced are a beginning in the process of slowing growth in the total demand for energy.

## National goal

The President has indicated that a reasonable and attainable goal is to reduce anticipated personal consumption of energy by 5 percent over the next 12 months.

## Reduce Federal Government energy use

The President has directed each executive department and agency to participate in a government-wide program to reduce anticipated energy consumption by 7 percent over the next 12 months.

- All Federal departments and agencies are being instructed to report through Secretary Morton to the President, and to:

  - Review the activities of the agencies and their contractors which place demands on our energy resources and determine how demand can be reduced.

  - Report by July 31, 1973 on their energy consumption and specific actions and time-tables to reduce demands.

  - Consider such steps as:

    - Reduce air conditioning and encourage appropriate relaxation of dress standards in offices this summer. (A 4 degree increase in temperature saves 15-20 percent of energy required to run an air conditioner. For all Federal buildings combined this will amount to an annual savings of 113 million kilowatt hours or 270,000 barrels of fuel per year.)

more

10

- Use more energy efficient automobiles in Federal activities.

- Reduce business trips. (Federal employees travel 250 million miles per year. A 10 percent reduction in travel would save 25 million miles per year or 1.7 million gallons annually, assuming 15 passenger miles per gallon.)

- Reduce unnecessary lighting in Federal buildings and offices.

- Encourage employees to use carpools and mass transit.

- Reduce demand in Government-owned laboratories and industrial-type facilities operated by the Government for contractors.

- The President has directed the General Services Administration to establish new regulations to require the use of more efficient automobiles in Federal activities, i.e., to reduce substantially the size of cars and engines to be purchased and used by the Government, and require Federal agencies to purchase and lease more energy efficient automobiles when feasible.

- The Department of Defense has already taken steps to reduce their fuel consumption in FY 1974 by 10 percent.

## Reduce airline fuel requirements

The Secretary of Transportation has asked the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Aviation Administration and the Air Transport Association representing scheduled airlines to consider immediate reductions in flight frequencies and aircraft cruising speeds. The idea for this action came from the airline industry. A 3 percent reduction in aircraft speeds adds only 12 minutes to a transcontinental flight, but saves 200 million gallons of jet fuel per year. Raising the national average aircraft load factor from 52 percent to 60 percent by reducing flight frequencies can save 1.3 billion gallons of jet fuel per year.

## State and Local Governments and Industry

State and local governments and industry are being urged to follow the Federal Government's lead in finding ways to conserve energy.

- The President has sent a letter to each Governor asking for his support and cooperation.

- The President has directed the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce, and his Assistant for Energy to meet with representatives of American industry to encourage their strong participation in energy conservation efforts.

more

11

## Actions by the Public to Conserve Energy

- The President is asking the public to reduce voluntarily speed on highways. (The potential fuel savings nationwide from a 10 mph reduction would be 2 percent. Miles per gallon of gasoline vary significantly with speed; e.g., a car consumes 20-25 percent less fuel per mile at 50 mph than at 70 mph.)

- The President asked Governors to support this request and to work with State legislatures as soon as possible to reduce highway speed limits, taking into account the objectives of mobility, safety and energy conservation.

- The President has urged motorists to reduce gasoline consumption in additional ways:

  - Reduce non-essential driving.

  - Use carpools and mass transit more frequently.

  - Consider taking the bus or train on long trips.

  - Keep cars well-tuned and tires properly inflated.

  - Consider energy efficiency when purchasing a new car. If more than one is owned, use the most efficient car.

- The President has also urged conservation of energy at home by:

  - Raising thermostat settings on air conditioning by 4 degrees, thus saving 15 to 20 percent of the energy required for air conditioning.

  - Lowering winter home heating temperatures as much as 5 degrees, thereby saving up to 10 percent of the energy required for home heating.

## Congressional Action on Highways - Mass Transit Legislation

The President has again urged the Congress to pass highway-mass transit legislation which provides states and localities flexibility to choose between capital investment in highways or mass transit.

- Key legislation on this matter is now being considered in a Senate-House conference committee.

- Diversion of some commuter traffic from single occupant autos to mass transit would result in significant savings of gasoline.

## Long-Term Conservation

The President has directed other departments and agencies to work closely with Interior Secretary Morton's new Office of Energy Conservation in the development of long-term energy conservation plans. The Secretary has identified the following items for further study:

- Incentives to encourage use of carpools and mass transit.

more

12

- Horsepower, weight or other taxes on automobiles to encourage more energy efficient automobiles.

- Incentives to encourage recycling of waste materials.

- More energy efficient commercial and residential building construction and operation. (Has potential to reduce nationwide space heating and cooling energy requirements 10 percent by 1985.)

- Methods and exchange of ideas for conservation in industrial and commercial uses of energy.

- An awards program for industrial energy conservers, and for manufacturers whose products are efficient.

-- Other Federal Actions

- The Environmental Protection Agency will soon publish proposed procedures for voluntary labeling of automobiles and accessories to show fuel consumption. This will permit consumers to compare similar cars to determine their relative efficiency.

- Major departments and agencies have designated energy conservation coordinators who will work with the Department of the Interior in the Federal effort.

- Interior's Office of Energy Conservation, in cooperation with the President's Adviser on Consumer Affairs and other agencies, will develop and implement a consumer information program on energy conservation.

# # # #

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1775

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

3:30 P.M. EDT

JULY 16, 1973

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: We will have, after this session, the medical report, which is being dictated now. It has not been released at Bethesda yet, but it will be very shortly.

The schedule for tomorrow is as Ron stated. There will be another medical report at 7:45 in the morning and a briefing at Bethesda at 11:15.

You have the letter, which was delivered to Chairman Ervin this afternoon, and, I believe, has been read by Chairman Ervin into the committee records. Beyond telling you that the President, of course, is aware of the letter, I must tell you at the outset that I will have no further comment on the letter nor on Mr. Butterfield's testimony this morning and early afternoon.

That is all we have here this afternoon.

Q Is Mr. Butterfield still head of the FAA?

MR. WARREN: Yes, I would have no reason to believe he would not be.

Q Why do you have no comment?

MR. WARREN: Because testimony is underway before the Senate Select Committee. The letter, I think, states to you that a more detailed statement concerning these procedures will be furnished to the committee shortly, and so pending that, I would have nothing further.

Q When will that letter be ready? Mr. Buzhardt says that this practice was similar to that employed in the last Administration, and which had been discontinued, and he says a more detailed statement concerning these procedures.

I have asked two questions: What details can you give us on the last Administration, and when will this letter from Mr. Buzhardt be ready?

MR. WARREN: Well, the more detailed statement will, I am sure, go into the answer to the first of your questions, Carroll. Therefore, I could not comment on that. As to when the more detailed statement concerning these procedures will be furnished to the committee, I cannot say at this point. It will be in the letter from Mr. Buzhardt pretty shortly. If there is any information in that in the morning, that will be provided at Bethesda.

MORE

#1775

- 5 -

#1775

Q Do you have any more information before us on the Phase IV statement? Ron indicated that there might be some guidance later on.

MR. WARREN: No.

Q Did Mr. Shultz see the President?

MR. WARREN: Today?

Q Yes, Ron indicated he might.

MR. WARREN: I would have to wait until the bulletin came out, Carroll. I am unbriefed. I do not believe he did. I will have to keep that off the record because I am saying what I think.

Q Ron said he would see him Tuesday.

MR. WARREN: That would be announced at Bethesda, and I have nothing more on Phase IV.

Q Do you expect it to be announced this week?

MR. WARREN: I have no reason to change what Ron said this morning.

Q To put the question a little more forthrightly, can you tell us if the President plans to make the tapes available to the committee, and if he doesn't, can you tell us what his rationale for not doing so is?

MR. WARREN: Gene, on the basis of what I have said before, and on the basis of Mr. Buzhardt's letter, I would not be able to comment on that question.

Q Jerry, would there be a chance to follow up, I think, on Jim McManus, when the more detailed statement is furnished to us as well as to the committee, can we have access to Mr. Buzhardt and/or Mr. Garment?

MR. WARREN: I just have no way of predicting what the procedure will be. We will just have to wait and see.

Q Can you give us a time when that statement is likely to be ready?

MR. WARREN: No, I can't.

Q What about some of the other people on the schedule, like the Shah of Iran and Tanaka and Whitlam. What about them?

MR. WARREN: As Ron said this morning, they are still scheduled, and if there is a change, you will be notified, but there is nothing at this moment. They are still on the schedule.

MORE

#1775

ASSISTANT SECRETARY JOSEPH J. SISCO'S INTERVIEW
WITH ISRAELI TELEVISION AUGUST 1, 1973

Q. Mr. Secretary are you satisfied by the present status quo in the Middle East?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I can't say that we're satisfied with the present status quo in the Middle East. There are both positive and less positive elements in it. Obviously, here we are in August, it will be just a few days and this will be three years of the cease-fire as tenuous as it has been along the Egyptian-Israeli front. Now this is obviously a good thing. Moreover, I believe the situation in Jordan is stable. I'm glad to say that the situation along the Israeli-Lebanese border is reasonably quiet as well as other borders. I think in that sense the present status quo is very good indeed. On the other hand, there's been an obvious lack of progress toward a political solution and as long as the no-war no-peace situation exists in the area instability is there and therefore there are risks. We've just concluded the Summit in Washington a few weeks ago, and certainly the risks of confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union have been reduced. I think the key is still to find a way to get a negotiating process started because from the point of view of the

-2-

United States what we want is to try to help get such
a process started because regardless of the cease-fire
the no-war no-peace situation is still too unstable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have new proposals for the Israelis and the Egyptians to get out of this stalemate?

MR SISCO:

No, we don't. We don't have any new proposals. I met,
for example, just yesterday with the Israeli Ambassador.
I made no new proposals. We've just completed a round
in the UN Security Council. I would hope that in the
aftermath of this Council both sides would take a look
at their positions to see whether there's anything more
that can be done in order to get a negotiating process
started. Certainly, if the Secretary General, Mr. Waldheim,
decides to come to the area in the foreseeable future
this too will afford a new opportunity.

Q. Mr. Sisco, how do you rate the chances of the Dr. Kurt Waldheim visit to the Middle East in view of the fact that Dr. Jarring didn't succeed in the past?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I think as I say, there's a new opportunity but
whether one is talking about Ambassador Jarring or Dr.
Waldheim or efforts by the United States the fact of

-3-

the matter is that each faces basically the same diffi-
culty. There are serious differences with respect to
the elements of an overall settlement. President Sadat
has said, as you know, not an inch of territory. From
the Israeli point of view Israel attaches considerable
importance to territorial adjustments in order to meet
what it considers to be its crucial security needs and
as of right now I would say that the chasm on this
particular issue continues to be a very wide one.

Q. You mentioned the Security Council's debate on the Middle East just recently and there the Americans put again the veto on the resolution. How do you regard this veto in view of the fact that there was a lot of criticism in the Arab countries concerning this veto and apparently the United States found itself in some way isolated from traditional allies like Great Britain and others?

MR. SISCO:

Our approach to the Security Council was two-fold. First,
we made it very clear that we were prepared and are pre-
pared to support a UN involvement whether it would have
been in the form of another Jarring Mission or a mission
by the Secretary General. Secondly, we made very clear
that we could not support and would actively oppose any
propositions, any proposals which would distort or under-
mine the delicate balance in the November 1967 resolution.
It's true, of course, that each side has a different

-4-

interpretation of that resolution. But, nevertheless,
it still remains the basic framework, in our judgment,
within which any political solution has to be achieved.
It is still accepted by both sides regardless of the
different interpretation each has and therefore while
we would quite frankly have preferred an outcome whereby
there was a broad consensus in the Council that the
Secretary General should get on with his mission based
on Security Council Resolution 242, nevertheless we
felt that the proposition that was before the Council
would have undermined 242 and we feel that our veto,
hopefully, has kept open the doors of diplomacy. We
realize that there's been some criticism; we regret
the veto in that regard but we felt in these circumstances
that the course of statesmanship was to take that very
difficult decision, and having done this, it is one
reason why we would hope that the parties would look
at the situation in the aftermath of the Security Council
to see whether in the context of the Secretary General's
trip to the area or in other ways some new opportunity
can be developed.

-5-

Q. Do you feel that Israel should do something to get out of this stalemate in the Middle East?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I would hope that both sides would look at the situation. I think that Israel could look at the situation to see whether there is something more that it could do to be helpful in getting a negotiating process started. I think, equally, the other side has an equal responsibility in this regard. I don't have any precise, specific suggestions to make but all that I'm saying here is that the Middle East has been a history of lost opportunities. I think we may very well have a new opportunity before us, and I hope that each side will avail itself of the opportunity.

Q. I wonder Mr. Secretary if you can enumerate opportunities which were lost because of Israel?

MR SISCO:

Well, I don't think its particularly beneficial to begin to make value judgments as it related to either side. I think that if you look over the history of the last four or five years, frankly, I think there's enough blame to spread around. I think on occasions Israel might have lost an opportunity, on other occasions I think Egypt might have lost an opportunity but I don't

-6-

really think it's very fruitful for me, or for any
official really to focus on the difficulties of the
past. I think it's better to look ahead.

Q. Mr. Sisco, from time to time we read in official American policy statements about the Palestinians. How would you define this problem?

MR. SISCO:

Well, you undoubtedly noted that there was reference to
the legitimate interests, and here I'm quoting, of the
Palestinians in the recent Soviet-American communique.
This is intended to express what has been our long-held
view that obviously for any durable peace to be achieved
in the area it not only has to meet the interests and
the aspirations of each of the states, of Israel, of
Egypt, of Syria, of Lebanon, of Jordan, but it also has
to meet the legitimate interests, the aspirations of the
Palestinian people and, it means just that, no more, no
less. It doesn't mean that the United States has opted
for one form of solution as against another. We think,
for example, that this is something for the Arab people
themselves to decide and so that, we've not, on the
basis of anything that we have ever either said publicly
or any substantive ideas that we've ever developed over

[LC]

-7-

the last four or five years, chosen any one solution
as against another. But we do think that if you're going
to have a peace that really means anything and lasts that
it's obviously going to have to meet their concerns as
well.

Q. You're probably aware of the controversy among the Israeli leadership on this question --

MR. SISCO:
Oh, yes.

Q. --the Palestinians. Do you think there is room for another Palestinian state between the sea and the desert?

MR. SISCO:
Well, again, as I say we have not adopted any kind of a
position as it relates to either the federal type
solution which King Hussein talked about about a year ago,
or a so-called Palestine entity that some Palestinian
leaders talk about, or for that matter, a Palestinian state
which has appeared rather frequently in recent public
statements of the Egyptian Foreign Minister inside and
outside of the UN Security Council. We have no specific
substantive position in this regard. What we have said
is that the interests of the Palestinian people need to
be taken into account in any solution. In what form, I
think is something for the Arab people to work out.

-8-

Q. I have the feeling that this is one of the subjects that were (sic) not discussed very much between the Israelis and the United States, and there was no serious dialogue between the two countries on this question of the Palestinians. Do you think there is room for such a dialogue?

MR. SISCO:

You mean between the United States and Israel?

A. Yes.

MR. SISCO:

Well, I don't think it is entirely accurate to say that we haven't discussed this. Over the years I think we have had the fullest kind of an exchange, on all the various substantive elements of a possible solution with the Israeli Government. As I say, we have not adopted any substantive position as such, but certainly there have been regular exchanges, and if you go back, for example, to the 1967 resolution there, of course, it only talks in terms that there must be a solution to the so-called refugee question. Obviously, this whole matter has become much more politicized in the last four or five years. But, I don't see any particular advantage to single out this element as against any others. I don't think there is any lack of substantive exchange on any of these questions.

Q. How do you see the future American policy towards the Middle East in the very immediate future?

MR. SISCO:

Well, I think obviously, our efforts are going to continue in the direction of trying to be helpful in getting a negotiating process started. The very fact that you've had a cease-fire continuing, of course, is a helpful element. The very fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States have adopted a non-confrontation policy is helpful. On the other hand, the longer there is no solution, the more difficult it is to try to achieve a solution, and therefore the protracted period in which there has been no serious, practical progress toward an overall settlement makes it more complicated. Moreover, as you well know, while our interests in many respects are parallel to the interests of Israel, they are not synonymous with the State of Israel. The interests of the United States go beyond any one nation in the area. We have important political, economic and strategic interests in the entire area, whether you are talking about the Middle East as well as the area of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. There is increasing

concern in our country, for example, over the energy
question, and I think it is foolhardy to believe that
this is not a factor in the situation. It's a factor
in the situation as are a good many others, so that
in any one action that the United States has to weigh,
it has to take all of these variegated interests into
account. We have long ago concluded that there's
really only one satisfactory answer, and that satisfactory
answer is a peace in which both sides have established
a vital interest, and I think you can assume that the
United States will remain engaged in trying to get a
serious diplomatic process started. We feel that what-
ever influence the United States can exercise, that it
should be exercised within the context of ongoing nego-
tiations, not in the abstract.

Q. You have mentioned naturally the energy crisis and the obvious question is do you think the Arab oil-producing countries will use the oil as a political weapon against the United States in the future, in the 1980's?

MR. SISCO:

Well, of course I'm in no position to be clairvoyant
and to predict it. My hope is that the mutual interest
that has existed between producer and consumer will
continue. There are obvious voices in the Arab world

[LC]

-11-

who are pressing for a linking of oil and politics,
if I can put it this way. I would hope that these
questions can be viewed by all concerned in their own
proper perspective, because as I say, I think there
is a mutual interest between the countries that use
this oil and market this oil and so on, and those
that have it in the ground and produce it.

Dr. Kissinger's News Conference of August 23

Following is the transcript of a news conference held at San Clemente, Calif., on August 23 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State-designate.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated August 27

Mr. Warren [Gerald L. Warren, Deputy Press Secretary to President Nixon]: Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, the President yesterday announced his intention to nominate Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State. Dr. Kissinger is here to take your questions this morning. He will have a few observations for you and then open it up for questions. Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger: First, I wanted to say that the President has done me great honor to nominate me for a position that was held by such great Americans as Secretary Stimson, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles—all of whom were united in one basic approach: that the foreign policy of the United States is not a partisan matter, it concerns the whole nation; that the future of our country transcends any particular administration. That is the spirit in which, if the Senate confirms me, I will attempt to conduct the office of Secretary of State.

I would also like to say a few words about the outgoing Secretary of State, William Rogers. Many of you, for 4½ years, have commented about the difficult relationship between the White House staff and the Secretary of State. And it is of course true—you wouldn't believe me if I said anything else—that there is an institutional problem when there is a strong White House operation and a strong Secretary of State, which is one reason why we have combined these positions now.

I would like to say on this occasion that these difficulties which are inherent in the

arrangement were at an absolute minimum. The Secretary of State has conducted his affairs with enormous dignity, grace, wisdom, and, above all, humanity.

I had a long talk with him on the telephone yesterday, and I look forward to his continued advice and participation in a policy in which he played such a large role, in which he was perhaps more instrumental in shaping than he often received credit.

Now let me say a few things about what is ahead. Any administration wants to leave the world better than it found it, and the most important challenge before our country in the field of foreign policy is to bring about a stable peace.

In the first term of the President, many important and some revolutionary changes were made. These required, to considerable extent, secret diplomacy, and they were conducted on a rather restricted basis. But now we are in a different phase. The foundations that have been laid must now lead to the building of a more permanent structure. What has been started is still very tender.

If you think back, it is only three years that we had simultaneous crises in the Caribbean, in the Middle East, and on Berlin. It is only two years that we first opened relations with the People's Republic of China. And in the same period, relations with our traditional friends have undergone enormous transformation.

So what we are going to try to do is to solidify what has been started, to put more emphasis on our relationship with Europe and with Japan, and to conclude during the term of the President the building of a structure that we can pass on to succeeding administrations so that the world will be a safer place when they take over.

Now, this requires that there will be a

368

Department of State Bulletin

greater institutionalization of foreign policy than has been the case to date. One of the challenges in going to the State Department will be the ability now to work with the great professionals in the Foreign Service who will be here after this administration has left and who, hopefully, will carry on the traditions that are valid that will by then have been established.

It is worthwhile remembering that about 70 percent of my staff has been composed of Foreign Service officers to begin with, and therefore now that the entire Foreign Service can be brought more closely into the operation, we should get even more momentum behind our foreign policy.

Those who are worried whether the existing bureaucracy will be used should consult the members of my staff, and my advice to them will be to get to know their wives very well before the confirmation because afterward they may not see as much of them as until now.

The role of the National Security Council's staff will continue to be interdepartmental. There will be a greater exchange between the State Department and the National Security Council staff personnel than has been possible up to now, but the details of this I would like to defer until after the confirmation.

Another important aspect in the institutionalization of foreign policy will be to bring the Congress into a close partnership in the development, planning, and execution of our foreign policy.

Yesterday I called every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and key members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I told them all what I am saying to you ladies and gentlemen today.

The foreign policy of this administration is designed not on a partisan basis but on a national basis, and it is essential that the Congress fully understand what we are attempting to do. Even in my present position as Assistant to the President, I met regularly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at first in Chairman Fulbright's house and later in a committee room in the Senate, at first on a very informal basis but later

with very full notes being taken by the committee staff. I therefore welcome the opportunity of being able to testify regularly and as frequently as the chairman and the members of the committee consider desirable about the purposes and policies of the President and the administration.

There has been some question about whether the dual position of Assistant to the President and Secretary of State may cause me to invoke executive privilege. Let me answer this now: The purpose of combining the two positions is, as the President pointed out yesterday, an attempt to move policy-making from the White House into the Department and therefore to make it more accessible to congressional and public scrutiny.

I would therefore expect to testify about all matters that Secretaries of State have traditionally testified. In addition, I would feel it appropriate to testify about those interdepartmental matters with respect to which I spoke informally previously to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I would not be able to testify about personal conversations between the President and myself or about direct advice I gave to the President, but I could not testify with respect to this in any event and no Cabinet member is ever asked to testify with respect to conversations he has with the President. So, I know the President's intention in combining these two positions is to increase the information available to the Congress.

And the President, whom I have seen only a few minutes ago, has asked me to say that executive privilege will not be invoked except with respect to the range of issues that I have mentioned. The practical consequence of it will be that more information will be available to the congressional committees than before.

I am certain that I will be able to work out with the chairmen of the appropriate committees and with the leadership of the Senate and the House a division between the testimony that should be in executive session and that which should be public, but this is an inevitable arrangement that will have to

September 17, 1973

369

be made between Cabinet members and congressional committees.

The intention of the President and my intention is to establish a new and full partnership with the Congress in developing policies which are in the national interest; and now that the Vietnamese war is behind us, and therefore the major source of division in the country about foreign policy, we know that we will be able to work out such an arrangement with the members of the congressional committees, all of whom I know personally and have worked with in the past.

Now a word about the relationship of the Department and of our foreign policy to the public. If we are going to achieve the lasting peace which we seek, and if we are going to leave behind a foreign policy tradition that will be carried on on a nonpartisan basis in succeeding administrations, we have an obligation to explain our philosophy and purposes and policies to the public; and after my confirmation I intend to invite leaders of various opinion-forming elements in this country to the State Department to advise us on how we can most effectively discharge this responsibility.

We will do our best to conduct foreign policy in as open a manner as is consistent with the goal which we all share, which is to bring about a lasting peace. The overriding goal, as I have said at the beginning, of any administration must be to distinguish the fluctuations of the day-to-day headlines from the more lasting achievements, and any serious person will remember and will keep in mind that what any administration will be remembered for will be the things that last and that are of benefit to our children; and all I can say is that we will make a major effort to leave behind a more peaceful world and a better America. And that is all that I wanted to say.

Now I will take a few questions, but I would like to have you understand that I will have to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation. I don't think it would be appropriate to go into detail about questions that the Senators will want to ask me and to create the impression

that I want to take a public position before they have an opportunity to formulate their stand, so I hope you will excuse me if I do not go into detail on some of the questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary-designate, you will excuse us if we try to go into detail on some questions in any case.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly. I expect that.

Q. Prince Sihanouk has said in Peking recently that President Nixon was not telling the truth about the secret bombing of Cambodia, that in fact Prince Sihanouk did not approve of or condone in any way the secret bombing. Could you clarify that for us?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, Prince Sihanouk has a rather difficult position right now in the sense that the people that are now supporting him inside Cambodia he had sentenced to death for treason a few years previously, and therefore we have to understand the delicacy of his position.

Prince Sihanouk always took the view that he would protest any air operations that involved Cambodians. He also took the position that the bombing of areas in which there were no Cambodians he would not protest. I think if you look at the record over the year that we are talking about that there was no Cambodian protest about the B-52 bombing. There were Cambodian protests when tactical air strayed across the border and got outside of the zone in which the B-52 operations took place.

Q. On that point, doctor, was there a zone 10 miles, or were there not fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Penh and other operations in Cambodia during this 14 months?

Dr. Kissinger: The question is whether there were fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Penh than the 10 to 15 miles. I will take this question, but I am sure that the Senate will also want to ask about it, and therefore I don't want to go into all the details and also I have not consulted all the records.

The B-52 operations were confined to an area within 10 miles. Occasionally, and I think very rarely, there were some tactical

370

Department of State Bulletin

air operations when there were military activities on one side of the border that continued—in which the sequence of military operations continued across the border. The tactical air operations were not initiated unless there were North Vietnamese units that came across the border, and in the pursuit of them occasionally, but very rarely, some tactical air operations took place. They could have been deeper than 10 miles, but I doubt that they were very much deeper.

**Q. Doctor, when are you going to Peking, and are you going to Peking?**

**Dr. Kissinger:** The question is when am I going to Peking and am I going to Peking.

I plan to go to Peking, and the date now has to be subject to Senate confirmation, because I don't think it would be appropriate for me to go before I have been confirmed by the Senate. We expect to set a date soon after my confirmation has been achieved.

**Q. Dr. Kissinger, a clarifying question about your opening statement. You left out Dean Rusk. Did you do that through inadvertence?**

**Dr. Kissinger:** Dean Rusk is a man I admire greatly and a good personal friend of mine. I just gave a few examples, and he was a distinguished Secretary of State.

**Q. Dr. Kissinger, a spokesman for the President of France said yesterday firstly that while he would welcome a visit he really thought that it was more of an exchange of information, that there was really no agreement worked out and he was specifically opposed to the Atlantic summit that you sought, particularly, you spoke about it in Reykjavik. How does this bode for your year of Europe, as you see it?**

**Dr. Kissinger:** The European Foreign Ministers are meeting in September to develop a European response to our proposal, and I don't think I should make a comment until we see what their response will be, because there are many points of view in Europe.

**Q. Mr. Secretary, [inaudible] or now called off Cambodian negotiations, to remain**

stalled until your trip to Peking, or do you think they might be underway? I am referring to the secret negotiations. Do you think they might get underway again before the trip to Peking?

**Dr. Kissinger:** The Cambodian negotiations now inevitably, with the end of American bombing, will depend more on the decisions of the Cambodian parties than on American decisions, and if the congressional intent means anything, it is that the United States should not play the principal role in these activities.

I would therefore not tie any possible negotiations in Cambodia inevitably to my trip to Peking, and it will depend to a very great extent on the decisions of the Cambodian parties.

**Q. Dr. Kissinger, if I may, can you forecast on a scale of optimism and pessimism as to whether these things can be begun again?**

**Dr. Kissinger:** The discussion? I think it is too early to tell.

Helen and then Murrey [Helen Thomas, United Press International; Murrey Marder, Washington Post].

**Q. Has Watergate severely damaged foreign policy, and also, since you submitted names to be wiretapped and you were tapped yourself, do you think this country, or the White House, is obsessed with national security?**

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, I am certain that the question of the measures that were taken to protect the security of the office which, after all, had the most sensitive information in the government will be discussed at the Senate hearing, and on that occasion, I will answer questions with respect to that.

Any government has to strike a balance between the requirements of national security and the requirements of individual freedom, and that balance should be very carefully drawn, and one would hope that one could justify individual decisions on the ground of their necessity.

In those activities of which I was aware, which were conducted by processes that were

September 17, 1973

371