The Zimbabwe Settlement

**Historical Framework.** British efforts to resolve the conflict in Rhodesia* (fn- The nation with which this paper is concerned went through a progression of names from Southern Rhodesia to Rhodesia to Rhodesia-Zimbabwe to Zimbabwe. It will be referred to by the name given it by the governing authority during the period discussed.) between its minority white government and black majority population stretch back to the period before the colony's "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" in November, 1965. Fruitless independence negotiations between the British and Rhodesian governments continued from 1963 up to UDI. Settlement proposals made during talks on HMS Tiger (1966), HMS Fearless (1968) and the Home-Smith Agreement (1971) all came to naught.

While some may disagree, the effort which finally resulted in a settlement agreement at the Lancaster House talks in December, 1979 can truly be said to have begun in the spring of 1976. Prime Minister Callahan's March statement in Parliament followed by Secretary Kissinger's Lusaka speech the next month, marked the initiation of a new effort which continued through various stages to its ultimately successful conclusion. These stages can be described as: Kissinger - Richards (April, 1976 - February, 1977), Owen-Vance (April, 1977 - May, 1979), and Thatcher - Carrington (May, 1979 - December, 1979).

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Although the US took the lead during the first period and the British and their Commonwealth partners carried on the final stage, the US and UK jointly conducted the middle period negotiations and cooperated closely during the first and third. In first stage, Kissinger kept the British informed of his progress through local ambassadors, but did not include a British member in his negotiating party. The US played an important role in the Lancaster House talks, providing incentives in the form of promises of financial assistance and pressures by maintaining sanctions on Rhodesia Zimbabwe until the arrival of a British Governor. From the beginning the essential outline of the proposals were the same. There was to be an agreement followed by a cease-fire, restoration of British authority, free elections, and prompt turn-over of independence to the resulting government. There were, of course, significant modifications made in the plan as it progressed. The independence constitution changed somewhat; the idea of a UN peacekeeping force was dropped; the transition period was reduced from two years to two months. The important thing was, however, that the basic concept remained the same and the continuity of the negotiating effort was never significantly interrupted.

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Initiation of The Mediation Effort

<u>Why</u>? By the spring of 1976 violence in Rhodesia had reached a level of almost daily incidents and significant casualties. Efforts by the British, South Africans, Zambians and the Front Line (Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola) to encourage a settlement had all failed; and there was little prospect of success of a new effort. Nevertheless, no British Prime Minister or Foreign Minister could afford to be seen not to be trying to come to grips with a problem which increasingly strained Britain's relations within the Commonwealth, embarrassed it in the UN, and created growing hardship and suffering to its citizens in the UK and nationals in Africa. Prime Minister Callahan's offer was, therefore, simply the latest effort to move things towards a settlement. At the time, it seemed to have little chance of success.

It was Kissinger's Lusaka speech which really got things started.
In the spring of 1976, The US found itself in a similar position to
that of Britain. The Portuguese coup in April, 1974 and resultant
installation of radical regimes in Mozambique and Angola ended the
likelihood that white-minority regimes could long survive in southern
Africa. The end of the Vietnam war enabled the foreign policy
leadership in the US to turn its attention to other areas, and
Kissinger's decision to travel to Africa led to a reexamination of

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southern African policy. Kissinger's speech, which squeezed out ten points on Rhodesia, supported the Callahan proposals (thus declaring US support for majority rule and independence for the first time), warned the Rhodesians that they could not depend upon US assistance, offered assistance to Front Line nations and an independent Zimbabwe, and, most important, committed the US to participate actively in an effort to find a "rapid, just and African solution to the issue of Rhodesia".*

It is often said that Kissinger was singlemindedly bent on opposing Soviet expansion in southern Africa; that he realized white rule was doomed in Rhodesia and that the longer the conflict continued the more radical would be the government which resulted and the closer its relations with the Soviet Union. Having failed at direct, covert intervention in Angola, he now recognized he would have to depend on overt diplomacy. While there is undoubtedly truth to this, it is important to note that the Carter administration, which considered that local African concerns should play a greater role in the rivalry with the Soviets, nevertheless maintained the same commitment to an active effort to bring a settlement to Rhodisia. It seems arguable that even without Soviet involvement, circumstances would have led to direct US involvement in the mediation effort - though it might have received a lower priority. Suffice to say, in the spring of 1976, both the US and UK were impelled for their own reasons of self interest to commit themselves to an active mediation effort.

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The African nationalist leaders, who at this point had not yet split into external, violent and internal, cooperative wings, and Rhodesian leader Ian Smith accepted the mediation offer for different reasons. They had met a few months before* (fn- All the leaders met Smith with Vorster and Kaunda in attendance in August, 1975 and Smith and Nkomo med in Salisbury in January, 1976.) in an effort to find agreement, so they could not claim indifference to good faith settlement efforts. Nor would it be so difficult to convince their followers to engage in a new attempt. It is unlikely that either side was particularly impressed with the "impartiality" of the volunteer mediators. On the contrary, each side constantly claimed during the negotiations, and mostly believed, that the US and UK were strongly partial to the other side. What chiefly motivated each side to accept the mediation was the belief that the US and UK had influence they could bring to bear on the other side to force concessions; influence either in the form of negative pressures through sanctions or positive financial and political incentives. The so-called "linear attributes" of trustworthiness, credibility, empathy, impartiality and rapport* (Rubin, 40) of the mediators probably played a relatively minor, if any, role in the decision by the parties to the conflict to accept mediation. Each saw it principally as a means of exerting more pressure on the other. Or, to put it another way, each saw the mediation as a possible, though unlikely, means of acheiving its aims by negotiation rather than warfare.

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When The actual timing of the mediation was much more a function of the mediators' interests than of the conflict itself. Coming as the intervention did so soon after the failure to the last effort, its acceptance did not involve a difficult decision on the part of the parties to the conflict. Though each would have welcomed a settlement, both were confident of ultimate victory and neither felt a great need for relief from the warfare. There was therefore a certain indifference to the offer from both participants. Each recognized that, at least at that point the mediators wanted a settlement at least as much, if not more, than they did. Throughout the negotiation this recognition seriously detracted from the leverage available to the mediators. The participants often adopted the posture that they were doing the mediators a favor by consenting to allow them to try to solve the conflict, and sometimes actually threatened to deny them the opportunity to continue.

If one considers the British as a third party to the conflict - and there is a good basis to do so although some, including ZANU leader Robert Mugabe, made a point of insisting to the end that his opponent was Britain with Smith as its instrument - then mediation in one form or another was almost constantly in progress. In a sense, it was important for all parties that it continue. The US and UK for political reasons involving their relations with the rest of Africa and members of the UN had to be seen to be making an active and good

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faith effort to find a solution. The parties probably saw an
advantage to continuing the negotiations. It gave the leaders an
international recognition and political forum which they might not
otherwise have had. This was particularly important to the African
nationalist leaders who needed to assert their authority over their
military commanders. Continuing negotiations was an important means
of doing so. Another advantage to their continuation may have been
the recognition that crossing the threshold into negotiations can be a
traumatic step to participants in military action particularly on the
African nationalist side. Once having done it, it may have seemed
better to their leaders to continue that state of affairs.

It is evident that in every successful negotiation of a conflict
involving mediators, there is a crucial point when settlement becomes
possible. The experience in the Zimbabwean negotiations would seem to
indicate that the process must be in train when this crucial moment
occurs. Since it is very difficult to judge when this point will
arrive, the best thing is to start the mediation and keep it going
until it is successful. There were a number of moments when the
negotiations seemed on the point of success. In retrospect these
moments may have been more apparent than real. In fact the break
through came as a result of many factors to be discussed at a later
point. The lesson seems to be that there are advantages to beginning
a mediating effort as soon as there are parties which can influence
the situation willing to do so. In spite of the frequent admonition

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that each effort was the "Last Chance in Rhodesia"* there is no
evidence that the repeated near misses ever damaged the chances of the
successor effort.

There are certainly many circumstances when unsuccessful mediation
can prejudice the chances of ultimate resolution of a conflict. There
are others such the Zimbabwe process where this does not appear to
have happened. There is a widely held assumption that mediation must
be initiated at the moment when the prospects for settlement appear
most propitious. One must ask whether anyone is wise enough to
determine this point. Few people thought the Lancaster House talks
had better than a one in ten chance of success. One is always working
against the odds in a mediation effort. It would appear that an
important lesson of the Zimbabwe settlement is that perhaps more
attention than should be has been given to when the mediation is
initiated. The important thing is get it going and keep working on
it.

**Basis** Each of the three stages of the mediation effort we are concerned with began with a declaration of the basis of the mediator's participation in the negotiation. To begin with the public statements by Callahan and Kissinger constituted a sort of charter for further discussion. While not initially public, the Anglo-American effort of the second stage was based on a set of principals and a working procedure declared to both sides by the mediators from the beginning.

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In substance, the mediators established that a settlement had to be based on restoration of British authority, an election based on one-man-one-vote, and turn over of independence to the government so elected within two years. Procedurally it was proposed to start off discussing an independence constitution since it was believed that subject might be an easier one to reach agreement on. The third stage negotiations were based on the Agreement reached at the Lusaka Commonwealth agreement in July, 1979 between the British and a committee of interested Commonwealth countries including OAS and Front Line representatives, Zambia and Tanzania.

These declared bases for negotiation, while not always accepted by both parties from the beginning, provided a basis for discussion and negotiation. They were the platform on which the structure of a settlement was to be built; a minimum basis of agreement which the mediators believed would be both acceptable to themselves and the parties. They seemed to be a sine qua non for the initiation of negotiations.

**Mediator Goals.** The motivations of the US and the UK, mentioned above, determined their goals. They intervened in the conflict more because its continued existence damaged their self-interest than because of their desire to influence the result. Continuation of the conflict created an embarrassment to their relations with Africa and the third world and an opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its influence. It was already clear that white rule could not last. While the mediators had

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preferences as between the black nationalist leaders, and the US and
UK were constantly being accused of manipulation in favor of one or
the other, in fact, it did not make that much difference to them which
one emerged as victor. At least this was true of the two
governments. Popular opinion in the two countries was much more
partisan. It favored Nkomo at one point and the "moderate," internal
leaders at another. This weakened the US/UK's leverage to bring
pressures on the parties. One of their considerable strengths lay in
the position that it was up to the people of the country to decide its
leadership, the US/UK interest was in a settlement acceptable to the
parties.

Inevitably, this goal led to problems. Depending on which way you looked at it, it provided an excuse for rejection of Smith's attempted internal settlement in collaboration with two of the African nationalist leaders, Muzorewa and Sithole, or, as the governments looked at it, it required such rejection. What became clear by May of 1958 and certainly a year later was that the internal settlement was not going to settle the conflict. Were the mediators to throw their support behind it they would have contributed to the prolongation of conflict. By doing so they would have committed themselves, Smith and Muzorewa to an all out struggle to maintain the internal

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settlement, which, they were convinced, could not be won.

The validity of this position was in part based on the answer to the question of whether the US/UK would have supported an internal settlement had it shown signs of succeeding. Hypothetical though it is, there is considerable evidence to indicate that they would have done so. The statements from both governments after announcement of the intention to form an internal settlement in November, 1977, agreement on a constitution in March, 1978, and the elections the next month were relatively cautious and guarded. Public support for the internal settlement in both the US and UK was so broad that neither government could have done otherwise. Had Muzorewa been able to consolidate his leadership and the fighting significantly decreased, the US and UK would have had no choice but lift sanctions and recognize the new government.

Similarly evidence exists of dominance of the goal of settling the conflict over affecting its results in the actions chiefly of the British, as well as the US, during the transition period which followed the last stage of the mediation effort - the two month British restoration of authority in Zimbabwe during the election period. Though no one can be under any illusions that ZANU leader, Robert Mugabe was not the favored candidate of the West, it was clear that the British wanted a settlement above everything else. They were unwilling to threaten it by tampering with the results.

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## Means of Operation

The Zimbabwe mediation, like Namibia, was somewhat unusual in that one of the parties accepted his own "defeat" and replacement early in the negotiations. When Ian Smith agreed to Kissinger's proposals in a speech on October 24, 1976, he acknowledged the end of his own and the white population's formal control of government. On the other side, the African nationalist leaders were deeply divided; not only between internal leaders Muzorewa and Sithole and the external liberation forces of the Patriotic Front (PF), but also within the PF between Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Each had very much in mind that they were in a winner-take-all situation. Fortunately, such was the lack of any kind of national consensus and internal communication that each genuinely believed that he commanded majority popular support. The important point is that while one level of negotiation went on between the primary parties - white Rhodesians and black nationalists - another existed among factions of each party. The success or failure of the effort depended as much if not more on this level than the primary.

**Role** At all three stages of the effort, the mediators had made declarations concerning the basis of their participation in terms of the nature of the settlement. It was, therefore, always clear that the function and role they realized they must play was not just to

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provide good offices but through conciliation to urge a solution on
the parties through persuasion and application of leverage.

While procedurally important, communication between the parties
was not going to provide a settlement. As a matter of fact the US/UK
were aware of, though sometimes surprised by the degree of
communication which was constantly going on between the parties. Such
contact was carried on through well established covert relationships,
through a number of private mediators and through frequent normal
social and commercial intercourse. The parties often knew better what
each other was thinking and doing than did the US/UK.

The primary role of the mediators was to find a formula for
settlement _and get it accepted_. The nature of that formula was not
central to the US/UK. True during the second, Vance-Owen stage they
made clear from the beginning that an election had to be held based on
one-man-one-vote if they were to participate. They did so because
they had to protect their intervention from political opponents at home
and because they did not think anything less had a chance of being
accepted. All through the negotiations they were aware that a deal
might be cut behind their backs which would have led to imposition of
a government without popular approval. Gradually, popular approval
became synonymous in their minds with ending the violence. Thus it is
likely that had a formula for power-sharing been found which
essentially ended the conflict, the US/UK would have accepted it, even

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in the absense of a test of popular approval. They would have made
clear, however, that it was not a product of their efforts, and that
they were not responsible for it.

Almost four years were spent hammering out a formula acceptable to both sides. During the first, Kissinger - Richards period, concentration was exclusively on the most difficult part of the agreement, organization of the transition period. The parties recognized all too well that it was upon the nature of this formula that the choice of which one of them achieved power would be decided. It was not until the beginning of the second stage that the second element of the formula entered the picture - the independence constitution. During the entire period there was hardly a week and certainly not a month that went by without some kind of a meeting taking place between a mediator and one or another of the elements of the parties on one of these two subjects.

## Techniques

**Process** During the first and second stages the process was carried on by means of consultations by the mediators. It was hoped that by consulting closely with the parties on each subject a proposal could be built up which taken together would be acceptable to all. No attempt was made to get a commitment from any of the parties on the individual provisions as they were discussed. It was recognized that

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this was a bargaining process and that parties would only accept
particular provisions in the context of the whole agreement. When
substantial agreement had been achieved on the major points, a meeting
of all parties would be convened, chaired by the mediators, to clean
up smaller points and put the final approval on the document.

The first two stages were unable to stick to this format, and the
third did not try. Though both the first two periods achieved
substantial progress. Kissinger's proposals were formally accepted by
Smith, though not by the PF. As the going towards agreement of both
sides got tougher both attempts sought refuge in moving towards
meetings of all parties hoping that outstanding matters could be
cleared up there.

In the first period Kissinger himself met with most of the parties
during his first trip to Africa in April, 1976. This was followed by
a meeting in Europe with South African Foreign Minister Botha and then
a second lengthy trip to Africa in September. The negotiations were
continued during a marathon trip around Africa by Assistant Secretary
Schaufele. Following Smith's acceptance of Kissinger's proposals the
US and UK decided to move to a conference of all the parties in
Geneva. It met from October until December of 1976 and was presided
over by Ivor Richards, UK Permanent Representative to the Security
Council but ended in failure by the end of the year. Richards took up
the traveling consultation road again early in 1977 but was forced to
abandone the effort in Salisbury shortly thereafter.

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The second stage began with the same procedures. First the new British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, visited Africa in April (?) 1977 and talked to most of the parties. Then an Anglo-American Consultative Committee was created which met with all the parties during July of that year. After a second round of meetings, a draft proposal was drawn up which was presented to the parties in September. Without going into all the details, further consultations in Africa were undertaken by Field Marshall Lord Carver and others. Foreign Minister Owen and Ambassador Young met the PF leaders with Front Line representatives in attendance in Malta, and, three months later together with Secretary Vance, in Dar es Salaam. The mediators then traveled to Pretoria and Salisbury, but neither that nor any other effort brought the parties any closer together during this stage. The third stage abandoned the consultative method, and moved directly from the declaration of principles made in Lusaka to the Lancaster House talks.

**Priorities.** The Kissinger - Richards proposals left the structure of the independent government to the transition period to decide. At the suggestion of Joshua Nkomo the next attempt started out to concentrate on a constitution for the independent country. It was thought that agreement on such a constitution would not be difficult to achieve, and the progress made would provide an incentive for agreement on the organization of the transition period. On several

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occasions, days and days were spent by the Consultative Committee
(Ghaham for the UK and Low for the US) in endless debate with the
Smith government about the provisions of the constitution, and some
progress was made. The two were unable, however, to engage the
Africans in similar discussion. The latter's entire focus was on the
struggle for power inherent in the structure of the transition
period. Gradually the focus of negotiation shifted to the transition
structure until it entirely dominated the discussions at Malta and
Dar.

There may be a great deal to be said about starting with the
easier subjects and building momentum and a stake in an agreement -
provided it can be done. In this case, although the governmental
structure of the independent government was of great importance to the
white population of Rhodesia, it was not to the Africans and therefore
simply unsuitable as a basis for discussion without great pressure
being applied.

**The Interloquators.** From the beginning and through all three
stages the mediators adopted the principle that they must be free to
meet with and talk to all parties on both sides. Each side tried to
inhibit mediator contact with elements of the other. The principle of
uninhibited access was not unfailingly respected. On at least one
occasion on each side the mediators passed up meetings with an
element of the parties.* (Kissinger never met with Mugabe or a ZANU

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representative, and the Consultative Group once failed to see one of
the internal leaders, Chief Chirau.) The rule was so well and
generally understood, however, that free movement and contact with all
the parties never became an issue during the negotiations.

**A Cease Fire.** Each side tried to use the mediators to limit the military activities of the other. More than the Africans, Smith tried to get the US/UK to call for a cease fire in order for discussions to be carried on. The mediators always made clear, however, that they understood the war would continue until an agreement had been reached. Thus they resisted efforts by either side to allow themselves to be used to its military advantage. They insisted, however, that a cease fire must be part of the agreement and that it had to be in place before the transition period began and the elections were held. The mediators also did what they could to contain the level of hostilities by discouraging escalation. They publicly condemned Rhodesian military excursions into neighboring countries which involved not only foreign territory but lives. They equally condemned use of SAM - 7's by Nkomo's ZAPU against Rhodesian civilian airliners, and criticised atrocities against non-combatants like missionaries.

## Factors in Ultimate Success

The ultimate success of the settlement was achieved by a
combination of the mediation effort and a "hurting stalemate" arrived
at by the parties. The contribution of the mediation effort can be

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divided into three factors: an acceptable basis for settlement worked out by the mediators, application of significant outside influence or leverage and, to a much less important extent, the application of mediation techniques.

**The Formula.** As long as both sides were directly disputing power, the zero sum game allowed inadequate compromise. Even after Smith accepted the Kissinger proposals and thus took himself out of the game, he continued to dispute power with the Patriotic Front. An internal settlement based on an alliance between the Rhodesian Front (Smith's white political party) and African leaders who had no military forces, a constitution with an amendment procedure the whites could block, and domination of the armed forces, civil service and judiciary by whites, did not constitute a surrender of power in the eyes of the PF or its Front Line supporters. Smith hung on to this form of disguised power as long as he could.

Once Smith had abandoned insistence on maintaining the trappings of power through acceptance of the Kissinger proposals, however, the white community began to separate its conditions of life from that power. As long as it was respected, a constitution which assured the white community a political voice and economic security could compensate for loss of power. The catch was, how long would a constitution be respected without power. Some white confidence of the whites could be based on agreement and support of a constitution by

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all the African leaders (i.e. an end of the war), and some on the involvement by the mediators. As time went on, however, they simply became more willing to take a chance rather than continue the war. External leverage played a role too as we shall see. Once the point was accepted, the differences between the white community and the African leadership broke out of its zero sum balance. The white's demands could be satisfied by an adequate constitution and the African leaders by a transition period which they were confident would provide a truly free and fair election which each believed he had a chance of winning.

It took some time for the mediators to come to this understanding. For a while they were insisting on concessions from the whites on the independence constitutions which the Africans did not value as highly as expected. This was particularly the case with the proposal that the army of the independent country be "based on the liberation forces". Similarly, they did not altogether understand the importance of the transition arrangements to the African leaders.

Lord Carrington stretched this point as far as he could by demanding acceptance of the constitutional arrangements agreed to first at the Lancaster House talks before the transitional arrangements had been considered.

**Outside leverage.** Kissinger had convinced Smith in 1976 to seek a settlement on the basis of majority rule. That meant preserving for

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the white population the most iron clad constitutional guarantees of
position and rights possible and the maximum amount of political
strength to protect the constitution. Smith had tried to work out
unilateral settlements with the "moderates" or weaker, non armed
nationalists (Muzorewa, Sithole and Chief Chirau) through the internal
settlement and with the armed Patriotic Front (at the secret meeting
arranged by Zambia's president, Kenneth Kaunda in Lusaka in August of
1978.) The first gave him the power he wanted but not an end to the
war and the second ended the war but left him with insufficient
authority. Thus by late 1978 he decided he would have to seek outside
help to get his way with one or the other of the nationalist groups.

Smith's first gambit was to appeal over the heads of the mediators
directly to the American people. His trip to the US along with
Muzorewa and the other black African members of the Executive Council
in the fall of 1978 initiated this effort. It was an effort which
very nearly succeeded. The US Senate voted in June, 1979 to lift
sanctions but the House refused to go along and in July insisted on
leaving the decision to President Carter. It is almost certain that,
had the House supported the Senate and required the President to lift
sanctions, Prime Minister Thatcher, who had come into office in May
would have been forced by her back-benchers to do likewise and she
would have been deprived of the flexibility to make a new attempt at
an agreed settlement when she went to the Commonwealth Conference in
Lusaka in the middle of the month.

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When the Lusaka Commonwealth Conference agreed on a new set of guidelines for a further attempt at an agreed settlement along the lines of the second stage Anglo-American proposal but substituting Commonwealth supervision of the transition period for the UN, Smith realized that his attempt to seek outside support for the imposition of the internal settlement had failed, in both the US and the UK. Both countries had accepted the judgement that outside support for the internal settlement would not end the war. Their intervention in support of it would only prolong the conflict, lead to a more radical result and damage their relations with the rest of the world to an unacceptable degree. At this point Smith realized that he must turn to outside help in reaching a settlement with the Patriotic Front. This meant to seek the best terms he could get through the mediation at the Lancaster House talks.

The Patriotic Front still had not abandoned its maximum position of taking over power without negotiations or previous elections. It was perfectly willing to discuss a constitution and schedule elections afterwards. It recognized, however, that it was still a long way from achieving this goal through unilateral military action and that too inflexible a position at the Lancaster House talks could shift opinion in the UK and US back to support for the internal settlement which would be a major set back for it. Since the PF (as well as each of its component parts ZANU and ZAPU) was confident that it could win

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a genuinely free and fair election promised by the mediators, it had
an interest in exploring a solution through the talks and an incentive
for compromise.

Thus the mediators leverage was considerable. Smith had tried
unilateral settlements with each of the nationalist groups and failed.
He had tried to appeal over the heads of the mediators and failed. He
now had no choice but deal with them. The PF could get part of their
objectives through the mediators and feared failure of the talks. The
mediators had to use every bit of their leverage and more to bring off
a settlement.

Mediator leverage was of many kinds. On the internal settlement
side it was chiefly the ability to bring an end to the war through an
internationally agreed settlement which commited the UK (and the US),
the PF, the Front Line and the world community to its support. It
could offer financial support to the settlement. This added both to
its leverage with the PF and the internal settlement. On the PF side
the mediator's leverage could help bring the PF what it wanted. The
mediator threatened severe sanctions in the event of failure. It
offered financial support. It maintained significant influence with
the PF's most important allies and supporters, the Front Line. (By
this time both Zambia and Mozambique were anxious for a settlement.
They felt close enough to ultimate success not to settle for less than
a genuinely free and fair election. But their suffering was
sufficient

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that they would accept a settlement that recognized any victor of a
free and fair election, not just the PF.) The British government, as
the principal mediator, was assisted by others besides the Front
Line. The Commonwealth secretariat through its Secretary General,
Sonny Ramphal and the US also played important roles. Throughout all
the mediators were in contact with the parties to modify positions or
accept provisions they had been resisting. No one would doubt that at
this stage in the negotiations every bit of this leverage was
necessary for achievement of the ultimate settlement.

**Mediation Techniques.** How much did the personality of the mediators count? How important was good communication? There can be no doubt that personalities played a role at moments during the various efforts. Kissinger's personal role in obtaining Smith's first acknowledgement of majority rule and independence was extremely important. His personal prestige was probably a necessary ingredient to securing South African support for pressing Smith to take the step. Nor can anyone detract from the skill and profound understanding with which Lord Carrington conducted the Lancaster House talks. In these two cases personality probably played an important role.

The level of the mediation probably was significant. Had it not
been for the personal involvement of British Foreign Minister David

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Owen, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, UN Ambassador Andrew Young, and Parliamentary leader Cledwyn Hughes during the second stage, the negotiations would probably have broken down along the way. Their stature and level was such that the parties simply could not refuse to see them and take their efforts seriously. It is arguable that a lengthy break in the mediation effort at any point would have concentrated so much attention on military activity that the negotiation threshold would have been significantly heightened.

Communication played a role, but probably not a crucial one. As has been stated, the parties were in regular contact. Each party heard the other. Whether they understood each other is another question. Assessments by various participants varied wildly. Popularity, strength, ideological commitment, the impact of ethnicity were judged very differently. It is doubtful that the mediators played much of a role in influencing these matters.

## Conclusion.

The Zimbabwe settlement constitutes one of the few examples of successful settlement in which mediation played a major role. It is therefore of particular importance to study its lessons. There are many and they are perceived very differently by different observers. Perhaps the most important lesson, and the one which would seem to cause

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the least dispute would be that no outside mediator in this conflict
was in a position to impose a settlement. The British, the Americans,
the South Africans, the Front Line, not to mention the Soviets and
Chinese all would have liked to have been able to do so. Everyone had
his favorite solution. Not only were none able, but each had
significantly less leverage than it appeared from the outside. In the
final analysis it was the people of the country who finally decided
they had more to lose than gain from continuing the war.

The mediation effort played an important role in the achievement
of settlement. The broad acceptance which the effort had developed
for an agreement based on majority rule and independence shearded by
a restoration of British authority, influenced many within the
country, the Front Line and the West. Thus the continuity of effort
was important. The influence exerted by the mediators was limited but
significant in the final analysis. It was aimed at keeping the
negotiations going during almost four years, as well as at achieving
an acceptable settlement. The techniques adopted were the product of
survival: communication with all parties, separating the constitution
and transition agreements, accepting the existence of the war as the
talks progressed, keeping the talks going. And yet few really
expected the settlement when it came, or would be willing to put
weight on ascribing it to anything but a true miracle!