Ilene J. Slater
221 East 66th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021

TELEPHONE: University 1-9694

EDUCATION:

LL.B., 1967, New York Law School, New York, N. Y.

B.A., 1947, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts. Major subject: economics and sociology.

1947-48: graduate student, Institute of International Relations, University of Geneva, Switzerland.

BUSINESS EXPERIENCE: November 1963-February 1965: office manager of group doing research for Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. New York City.

December 1960-October 1963: assistant to George L. Hinman, Republican National Committeeman from New York. New York City.

December 1958-November 1960: personal secretary to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. Albany and New York City.

June 1958-November 1958: assistant at Rockefeller for Governor Committee and then at New York State Republican Committee during Governor Rockefeller's first gubernatorial campaign. New York City.

February-May 1958: assistant at Special Studies Project of Rockefeller Brothers Fund during period when "Prospect for America" was published. New York City.

April 1957-January 1958: staff assistant at U. S. Commission for Brussels World's Fair.

January 1953-January 1957: principal secretary to Assistant to the President Sherman Adams, The White House, Washington, D. C.

January-December 1952: secretary to Walter Williams, Chairman of National Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon. New York City.

January-December 1951: secretary to John French, Executive Secretary of International Development Advisory Board. New York City.

October 1959-October 1950: secretary to Brigadier J. W. F. Treadwell, Vice President of English-Speaking Union, New York City.

October 1948-September 1949: statistical assistant, Corporate Bond Project, National Bureau of Economic Research. New York City.

- 2 -

Alastair Buchan, "Partners and Allies," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1963, pp. 621-38.

Robert R. Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1963, pp. 49-70.

## 2. The East-West Conflict

### DAEDALUS, Summer 1964:

Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World."

Roger Fisher, "Fractionating Conflict."

Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "Comments on Fractionating Conflict'."

Hedley Bull, THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE, Praeger, Introduction, Chs. 1-4, 9, Conclusion.

## 3. The New Entrants

George A. Carver, Jr., "The Faceless Viet Cong," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1966.

Bernard B. Fall, "Viet Nam in the Balance," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1966.

Barbara Ward, RICH NATIONS AND POOR NATIONS, Chapter 1 and the last chapter.

Walt. Rostow, STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, pp. 1-58, 106-144.

THE CHOICE TODAY

As it may look to the Government of North Vietnam

THE QUESTION: Shall we now indicate that we are willing to negotiate (and if so, on what terms, where, and how)?

THE PROS & CONS:

If we do

(benefits)

**Bombings.** A chance that bombings will stop. (but US may insist on continuing until there is a "verified end of infiltration").

**Casualties.** A chance of negotiating a ceasefire (but Saigon and US may insist on continued "pacification" in the South as talks go on).

**Negotiations.** A chance of real talks (but they may be frustrated by Saigon or by a dispute over representation of the Liberation Front).

(costs)

**Ruin morale.** To talk about talks now would undercut our fighting morale while the fighting continues.

**Giving in.** To negotiate now is to give in to US blackmail tactics.

**No victory.** To negotiate is to abandon the opportunity for an impressive victory over forces of imperialism.

**No unification.** To negotiate is almost certainly to abandon the unified Vietnam to which all agreed.

**No socialist South Vietnam.** US cannot be expected to agree to a socialist South Vietnam (cf. Dominican Rep.).

**Foreign-dominated South.** To negotiate means continued domination by neo-colonialists against which so many have fought for so long.

**Bad precedent.** Successful US blocking of a war of liberation will make such imperialist intervention more likely elsewhere.

If we do not

(costs)

**Bombings.** Will increase with a serious risk to Hanoi & Haiphong

**Casualties.** Our high losses may rise from X per week to Y per week unless we revert to more guerilla-like tactics.

**Negotiations** are postponed for at least one more day.

(benefits)

**Possible quick victory.** An excellent chance that Saigon government will completely fall apart or that US will quickly pull out because of criticism at home and abroad. Either would assure us a quick and complete victory.

**Certainty of eventual success.** This is a contest of will. The Vietnamese people fighting for their own country, for freedom from foreign domination, and for the socialist society of the future will certainly outlast alien, neo-colonialists who try to stop political forces with bombs. We will tolerate high casualty rates longer than they, and thus win.

**Loyalty to principle.** To fight on is to adhere to our values and principles.

**World-wide respect** for standing up to the American goliath.

**Option to negotiate later.** If at any time it seems wise to negotiate we can do so on terms no less favorable than now.

A POSSIBLE FUTURE CHOICE

Where the Government of North Vietnam might be willing to negotiate.

THE QUESTION: Shall we send a representative to the ____ Conference next week (and if so, who)?

THE PROS & CONS:

(benefits)

**If we do**

**Bombings.** Will resume and be increased with serious risk to Hanoi & Haiphong.

Pursuant to a third-party order, bombings have just stopped. Politically impossible for US to resume with us at a conference.

**Casualties.** A de facto ceasefire is now in effect. If we attend talks it can almost certainly be maintained, stopping our serious losses.

**Negotiations.** Certain to take place if we attend conference.

**Neutralist South Vietnam.** Highly likely that South will have a gov't that is neither pro-US nor anti-communist. (In 3 or 4 years we have a good chance of converting it into a pro-Hanoi gov't by political influence or coup d'état.)

**A substantial victory.** US puppet government will be replaced; US troops will leave; we stood up to US bombings.

**Economic rehabilitation.** US has demonstrated it is willing to help repair war damage through SE Asia Bank without US control. We are free to consider this as war reparations to which we are entitled.

(costs)

**No quick victory.** We give up chance for a quick and complete victory through Saigon collapse or US pull-out. There is always a chance that Saigon gov't will collapse. (US, now committed to an understandable strategy of on-the-ground interdiction, forcing us out of the war, is less likely to pull out)

**Left-wing criticism.** We subject ourselves to political attack from China and others who favor hard line.

**Success of sorts for imperialism.** US intervention will have postponed complete liberation of the South, but US is unlikely to try such intervention again.

(costs)

**If we do not**

**Casualties.** Fighting will resume and our high losses may increase from X per week to Y unless we revert to a more guerilla-like war.

**Negotiations.** If we do not attend this conference we may never get another chance to negotiate under such favorable conditions and without asking for it.

**Long-run military preclusion.** Unless fighting stops soon US forces will link up from Thailand across Laos to the sea physically cutting us off from South & risking our forces there. Contest is becoming one of capability, not will. Even with political changes in South we may become physically barred from exerting much influence.

**World public opinion.** Refusal to attend this conference would somewhat lessen our political support in Asia and Africa, and lessen attacks on US.

**Growing Chinese role.** If fighting goes on long, the risk of our being dominated by China increases.

(benefits)

**Chance of quick victory.** There is always a chance that Saigon gov't will collapse. (US, now committed to an understandable strategy of on-the-ground interdiction, forcing us out of the war, is less likely to pull out)

**Consistency.** Fighting on requires no change of position of any kind.

**Chance of negotiating under better conditions.** There is some chance we might get better circumstances later.

**Northern Laos.** With US troops in Laos communists might take over parts of North with less risk.

## FALLACIES AND OBSCLESCENCES OF THE FIFTIES

(Key: F+ fallacy, O = obsolescence (valid then, not now), D = did believe then, -D = did not believe it then)

### SCHELLING

1. That the foreign policy of allied countries and most other countries was more important to the US than their domestic politics. Some F, some O, largely D

2. That the underdeveloped world was the critical area to watch, to compete for, and to be concerned about. F, -D

3. That regionalism was the best approach to Europe, and a good one most everywhere. O or F in Europe; F elsewhere, -D much

4. That military strategy was more important than intra-alliance relations in NATO. O, D, perhaps slow to realize when it became F.

5. That the communist world was bound to remain unified and get more so. F, D.

6. That decolonized areas would be able to become governable countries. Lots of F, some -D, but not sure enough.

7. That quasi-communist, fellow-travelling countries would become more so, and quickly, forming part of the "bloc". F, D about '58-60.

8. That the main source of unrest, disorder, subversion, terror, dissidence and civil war in underdeveloped areas would be communist influence and support. F, D until about 5 years ago.

9. That the Red Guard couldn't happen. F, probably D.

10. That Britain would play the greatest leadership role among European countries. F, D.

11. That Europeans needed something "bigger" than the nation state, with circa 50 million people and 75 billion GNP to be loyal to, interested in, etc. F, -D

12. That a military adversary relation between the US and USSR would continue, reciprocated interests in arms control notwithstanding. F, D

### NEUSTADT

1. "The way to lead is to lead" -D

2. If the "communists" attack in Korea, they will try anything. -D

3. The "period of maximum danger" -D

4. The Lisbon force requirements. -D

5. The necessity for a German force on the central front. -D

6. The necessity for a recovering Europe to match American efforts in shares of GNP devoted to defense and aid to underdeveloped areas. -D

7. Capital development is the key to the foreign aid which stabilizes political development among the new states. D

8. Capital development has to be financed by government. Private sources are not usable in a major way. D

9. Monetization is the solution for the German problem and longer range transatlantic relations, i.e. "dumbell and interdependence". D

10. The need for containment. D

YARNOLINSKY

1. Substantial over-estimation of the aggressiveness of Soviet leaders vis-a-vis Western Europe.

2. Substantial under-estimation of Soviet fears - specifically of Germany, and generally of the spreading consequences of unrest, e.g., Hungary.

3. The notion that one could put together an EDC without thinking seriously about a nuclear component.

4. The notion that balance-of-payments difficulties would continue to run in the direction they were running then.

5. The notion that European integration would in some unspecified manner provide for the unification of Germany.

Draft

3/1/67

South Vietnam

Giving the local leaders a choice

It is desirable that local leaders in areas supporting the Viet Cong be given an alternative to continuing to support the Viet Cong. If we expect them to prefer a political solution to continuing the war and terror indefinitely, a political solution must look reasonably attractive. Even more important, local leaders should be presented with readily decidable questions; they should be given occasions for decision where the choices has been structured so that they can simply say "yes" or can suggest some particular changes which would make it possible for them to say "yes". This requires that there be an identified individual with whom a local leader can deal, some assurance that he has authority to undertake obligations which will be respected, and some substantive terms to the "deal" that is being proposed.

The following items suggest terms of the sort which might provide a basis for discussing local political settlements:

1. Amnesty for all past offenses committed within the designated area.

2. Assurance that there will be no further assassination, no terror, no laying of mines along the roads, etc.

3. Existing US and other foreign troops in the area will be withdrawn; no further deployment in the area of any US troops.

4. A general cease-fire throughout the area.

5. A military police post of not exceeding _ men may be stationed in the area and will be free to enforce law and order in the area with respect to any future offenses. Persons arrested shall be allowed a civil trial.

6. Should military forces hostile to the government enter the area, they will be opposed locally and government forces will be notified. If the cease-fire is not respected, larger government forces may enter as necessary to re-establish the cease-fire.

7. Taxes will be collected locally by local officials at a rate not to exceed ____. Of these one half shall be turned over to the central government and one half kept for local expenses.

8. For the next year a cash payment of ___ per month shall be turned over to local officials to be spent as they determine for reconstruction and development.

9. During the next year recovery projects financed by the central government to be undertaken in the area shall include: [school, road building, etc.] These projects shall be undertaken only with the approval of local officials.

10. Within the area there shall be a committee of three consisting of one man designated by the Central Government, one man designated by ___ and one man agreed upon by the other two, who in the first instance shall be ______. This committee shall, by majority vote, deal with the implementation of this agreement.