DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

The Quest for World
Order

Summer 1995

Issued as Volume 124, Number 3, of the
*Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*

[LC]

Summer 1995, "The Quest for World Order."

Issued as Volume 124, Number 3, of the Proceedings of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

© 1995 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
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[L.C.]

Henry A. Kissinger

We Live in an Age of Transition

MANY DECADES AGO, longer than I care to admit, as a young professor I went to hear a lecture by Harold Macmillan, then recently retired as Prime Minister. He began the presentation of his distilled wisdom by saying: "As they left the Garden of Eden, Adam turned to Eve and said, 'we live in an age of transition.'" That is also the theme of my remarks.

I grew up intellectually in the age of the "special relationship," which I believe to have been vital to the creation of the postwar international order. It was not a favor the United States granted to Britain; rather it was earned, first by conduct during the war and later by the enormous contribution in helping shape the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and what generally came to be identified as the Cold War pattern of international relations. Britain brought crucial qualities to that relationship: experience in a multipolar world, a global orientation of mind, an experienced leadership, a commitment to security, overseas ties of not insignificant proportions, and the English language—which today you hear practiced on American television by those who are genuine and those who engage in wishful thinking.

All of those were great assets. But we are facing a new environment, and I would argue that the qualities that had made the special relationship work—broadened now to a European-American relationship—may be even more essential than they were before. This is not sufficiently said, and even when the words are uttered they express little more than respectful deference to yesterday's

Henry A. Kissinger is Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc.

This essay is adapted from a speech given at the "Britain in the World" Conference in London on March 29, 1995.

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100 Henry A. Kissinger

liturgy. Yet if there is to be a European-American relationship in the twenty-first century that goes beyond occasional consultation and a very active commerce, it must be based on something more than a recollection of times past. It must address the common interests of the two worlds, interests that were not extinguished when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

The United States faces an unprecedented situation where historical roots need always to be recalled. It is the only major country in the world whose history can be precisely dated; populated almost exclusively by immigrants, it has never had a powerful neighbor along its borders, and has never had to face the problems of security confronted by less favored nations. The Americans' perception of their foreign policy was always one of nearly limitless choice and, above all, of having the ability to participate or to withdraw from international engagements at will. Every American initiative of the postwar period was presented to the American public as having a terminal date, after which America could again withdraw, allowing the underlying harmonious pattern to reassert itself.

This explains why almost all of America's foreign policy has traditionally been presented in alternately psychiatric and theoretical terms: either as a means by which relations among nations could be conducted as they might be if they were relations between individuals, and, when that did not seem possible, as a crusade to destroy or, even better, to convert antagonists to the American perception of international affairs. In that sense, the Cold War and victory in the Cold War were a culmination of the American approach to international affairs.

How many historical incidents, if any, can be recalled of a nation's leaders and allies stating goals that, some forty years later, were practically all achieved? That is the position in which we now find ourselves. And it is occurring at the precise moment when, in the United States, the now dominant leadership groups have altogether different geographic origins from those that shaped the postwar period. A comparable "generation gap," caused by other factors, exists in Europe, and both need to be understood in thinking about the future relations of the two sides of the Atlantic.

The foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War was formed largely by the so-called Northeastern "establishment."

101

Present-day leadership and foreign policy direction are drawn mostly from the West, the Southwest, or the South. America's relations with Europe are much less organic today than they were during the generation of Acheson, McCloy, and the other fathers of Cold War policy. This does not mean that the current group is hostile to internationalism; only that it is less identified with recent European history. The previous establishment drew from appeasement the lesson that the democracies around the Atlantic had to be unified; there is no comparable imperative for the new American leaders.

The present generation, with no personal experience of World War II, having never established the kinds of European ties that bound an earlier generation to the Old World, accepts the Vietnam War as its Epiphany. Very few of those who now hold major positions in Washington saw combat in Vietnam; a whole generation of university students stayed aloof, either openly resisting the war, or taking what they thought to be legitimate exemptions from compulsory military service. The Vietnam War, seen by them and by many others as a terrible mistake—the defining experience of their generation—guides much of their thinking about war and peace. Whether their experience in respect to Vietnam has inca-pacitated them for reflecting objectively about the new post-Cold War world, as many who deplored America's role in World War I used its injustices and cruelties as an excuse for the brands of nonintervention common in the 1920s and 1930s, is a proposition rarely considered. American policy, whether in the Balkans or the Carribbean, in Africa or Asia, can only be understood in the context of a generation that views the contemporary world through a lens largely provided by a local and unsuccessful conflict, Vietnam.

As a result, America is presently going through what I believe to be only the beginning of a national debate. And I really have no right to speak here of an American point of view because the American point of view is still being formed. The seminal debates have not yet taken place. For the first time in its history, America must conduct a global foreign policy without an overwhelming ideological enemy, without a clear-cut strategic plan, and in a world that it can neither dominate nor withdraw from. Thus, the classic maxims of American foreign policy—the invocation of an

102 Henry A. Kissinger

overwhelming ideological challenge in the face of which foreign policy can be transmuted into large-scale enterprises to remedy the immediate crisis—also do not apply.

It is said that the United States is the only superpower left. That is a simplistic description of the situation. It may be the only military superpower left, but the issues susceptible to solution by military action are in decline. The kind of power in which the United States excels is less and less relevant to most foreseeable international crises. On the other hand, in economics, even in technology, the world is becoming much more evenly balanced. Even a cursory glance at the condition of the dollar makes it clear that the relative economic position of the United States is not what it was even a few years ago. Indeed, we are now living in a world composed of six or seven major global players.

In such an international order, the United States faces the more or less traditional foreign policy problem of global players of operationally more or less equal strength. There are only two roads to stability: one is hegemony; the other is equilibrium. Hegemony may not be possible and in any case runs counter to the convictions and public morale of the American people; equilibrium, or the balance of power, is a concept passionately rejected by the American intellectual community as contributing to endless tensions—an attitude Americans have fortunately been able to transcend through much of their history. To say in America that we must define a national interest is considered a revolutionary, if not a reactionary, proposition. And even if one could formulate it as an acceptable formula, the national interest is almost always defined in sweeping, ideological terms. Still, the future of the world will have to be based on some concept of equilibrium or some balance among its various regions.

It is impossible for every participant in an international system to be always perfectly satisfied; that happy condition has never been achieved by humanity. Still, it may be possible for the major regions of the world to be not so dissatisfied that they seek to overthrow the international system by violence, terrorism, economic warfare, or certain other methods so well elaborated in our century, which have proved so destructive. This is the first requirement of the moment, transcending in importance any of the individual crises that so preoccupy the mass media and that occasion-

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103

ally prove useful to politicians who wish to demonstrate their resolve.

In the conduct of policy, I would define the American interest both negatively and positively. Negatively, it is against the American interest that any major region of the world, including either Europe or Asia—and surely both together—should be dominated by a country or group of countries that can then organize themselves to pursue objectives inimical to the United States. Second, the United States must accept to participate in a world community where global concerns, whether in respect to economics, communications, or technology, are acknowledged.

Theoretically, the United States could pursue policy on a global basis in the manner employed by Britain in Europe throughout most of the nineteenth century: adopting a posture of “splendid isolation,” maintaining good relations with everybody but throwing its weight to the side that confers certain advantages at a specific moment (which, in the British case, was generally the weaker side). This would be a latter-day version of balance-of-power diplomacy. While that is theoretically possible, I do not believe the United States has the philosophy, the personnel, or the resources to do this on consistently a global basis, or even to elaborate it as a philosophy. Therefore, the more realistic approach to America’s foreign policy problem in the post-Cold War world is to recognize that there are fundamental differences in America’s relations with Europe, with individual countries in the Old World, and with those that exist in Asia.

Within Europe, the conflicts, rivalries, and historic memories have not wholly evaporated. Still, a strategic conflict among the European powers is out of the question. Whatever the differences in approach among the core countries of the European Union and the so-called rim countries, they are not likely to lead to military conflict.

Such is not the case in Asia. We can talk—as we do periodically—about a Pacific Community, but anybody studying the relations of Japan, China, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, and even India must acknowledge that, at this stage, their relations are more like those that existed between nineteenth-century European states than between twentieth-century European states. And, if we move to the area to the south of Europe, the growth of fundamentalism

[LC]

104 Henry A. Kissinger

there poses not just an indirect but an explicit challenge to world order of a kind that does not exist in the heart of Europe. By linking religion and politics in a missionary concept that purports to be the only valid answer to contemporary political, social, and economic issues, in certain respects an explicit reaction to the material philosophies that have been dominant in the West, it challenges Western values across the board.

For this and many other reasons, just as at the end of World War II, the United States and the countries of Europe need to fashion a special kind of relation with each other. It is not so much that both have a common enemy, but that each is confronting comparable problems, both at home and abroad, and these can best be redressed by parallel approaches. It is not just a matter of deciding whether NATO ought to be extended into Central and Eastern Europe or how Russia's legitimate security concerns ought to be regarded, but how the old alliance, which contributed so much to the stability and prosperity of the Atlantic world for half a century, is to be made relevant to the political and economic requirements of the new era. Many parts of the world that drew few benefits from the Soviet-American "standoff" are legitimately demanding today that their interests be considered in something other than a purely military dimension.

At the end of World War II, Britain was the only major European country to have escaped occupation, to manage to preserve its institutions, and to be able to make the transition from power to influence in an extraordinary manner. It took exceptional self-discipline and skill for a nation that had been at the center of world affairs to shift its emphasis in the way that Britain did in the decades after 1945. While the Gaullist approach to the United States was to make disagreements extremely painful, the British approach was to make differences extremely embarrassing. In the long run, through a network of institutions and consultations, a general community of interests was engendered, with enormous benefit to both the United Kingdom and the United States.

Since then, many of the tacit bargains upon which Europe, America, and the European-American relationship were constructed have been altered. The end of the Cold War has been the capital event of recent years. When the division of Germany ended, the world in which France enjoyed a certain political leadership on the

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105

European continent, with Germany boasting a certain economic leadership, and America linked to both through its security role, could not be maintained in its old form. West Germany, organically linked to the United States by NATO and to the European Union by France, became an even more consequential European power after unification. Britain, extremely helpful in establishing the overall framework, remained ambivalent about the European Union.

But if a part of the international order is to free itself from reliance on largely strategic considerations, it must use the American relationship with Europe (and the Western hemisphere). This is less an institutional challenge than one of applying the principles of the special relationship between America and the United Kingdom to the North Atlantic area. I do not agree with those who say that America should shift its "special relationship" to Germany. That would not be helpful to Germany and it would not be meaningful for the United States. It is not in the American interest to seek a special continental partner. Nor do I know of a single German leader who aspires to such a relation. What is really needed today is for both the United States and the European Union, together with those democratic states who are not EU members to fashion together a global policy, geared not to enemies—the security danger linked to potential threats—but to global opportunities. These are still insufficiently perceived. Provincialism is not an American monopoly.

Historically, there have been two approaches to European-American relations. One was the Gaullist approach for which in its time I have had considerable sympathy. It reflected the necessities of a country that had passed through tremendous difficulties in the War and during decolonization, that desperately needed to reafirm its identity. The second approach was that of Great Britain, a nation more secure in its identity, which sought to establish a pattern of cooperation that would be difficult to challenge. Over time, it came to reflect the convictions of both sides that their common interests transcended all their minor differences. The British approach reflected a historic tradition of global foreign policy; the French approach was geared more to calculations of the margins on which stability depended in Central Europe—particularly so long as Germany was divided. The British approach

106 Henry A. Kissinger

was to establish its identity by explicitly postulating common
purposes; the French approach has been to emphasize distinctness.
During the Cold War, when the United States had the dominant
role in security, when there was only one visible international
challenge, it made some sense to define European identity by
trying to wrest it from the United States. Today, nothing is easier
than to induce America to turn away from Europe; nothing is
simpler than to convince Americans that they have no special
interest in Europe. The tasks before Europe are now so manifold
that they do not have to be granted by the United States. Issues
such as participation of the Central European countries in the
European Union will be resolved by the Europeans themselves.
There is no need for the United States to take a position or to
involve itself. Whether Europe follows a multiple geometry—which
I prefer—or becomes more closely integrated cannot and should
not be affected significantly by American pronouncements.

What is important today is that there not be too rigid separa-
tions between areas thought to be exclusively European and others
that are deemed exclusively American. What we ultimately require
is a dialogue between opinion as it has emerged in Europe and
what is beginning to emerge in America. The inventiveness of the
immediate post-World War II years needs to be looked for, but in
contexts very different from those that existed when Stalin and his
Communist successors ruled in the Kremlin. The Western civil war
that started in 1914 and ended in 1945 owes much to the fact that
the United States and its European allies and friends took counsel
together, were prepared to express their differences, but were able
in the end to collaborate, to act together.

In the United States, it is imperative that priority be given to
European relations. This has been lacking, not only in terms of
day-to-day policy, but also in the failure to take longer-range
perspectives and to act on them. Thus, for example, the debate
about NATO membership ought not to be permitted to fester
indefinitely. That issue ought to be resolved one way or the other,
everyone realizing that these are no longer the days of the Cold
War; hence it is no longer possible to build an Atlantic relationship
exclusively on security issues.

What we now need to do more urgently is create some goals for
the North Atlantic nations so that we are able to act again within

107

a common framework. We should seriously begin to examine
some form of North Atlantic free trade association, a free trade
agreement that would go beyond any that now exists. Whatever
America builds in the Western Hemisphere needs to be related to
this Atlantic enterprise, enabling us—in the foreseeable turmoil in
other parts of the world and in the shifts of emphasis that will
inevitably arise as new powers emerge—to act with purpose and
direction.

A succession of American leaders of both political parties, many
not known for excessive sentimentality (a trait not common to
those who rise to the Presidency), have over a period of more than
a generation considered it natural that, on major issues, Britain
and the United States should cooperate. The level of consultation,
though never formalized, was central to the formation of policy in
both parties in both countries. Now, the challenge is to see whether
this can be done in terms of European-American relations as well,
where Britain's experience can make a signal contribution. Europe
no longer needs to wrest its identity from the United States. In the
world of the 1990s, both know their strengths and their weak-
nesses. It serves no purpose to dwell endlessly on either. The more
imperative issue is whether they appreciate their common interests
and are seeking to foster new forms of cooperation to serve those
interests. The nations of the North Atlantic, representing a compa-
rable civilization in a world in which democracy and economic
progress remain our hope but not our guarantee, are required to
do again, this time on a global basis, what they attempted so
successfully to do a generation ago.

We must, of course, consider the integrating influence of
the industrial system of the latter part of our century. What-
ever the arguments in favor of the maintenance of the nation-
state, it is, economically speaking, becoming increasingly dif-
ficult for the latter to preserve its complete independence
unless it is very large or (paradoxically) very primitive. The
great "automated" factories of our age require huge "home
markets" if they are to sell their goods at a profit. In the long
run the maintenance of tariff barriers around medium-sized
states can produce only unemployment and economic dis-
tress. But if customs unions are formed then more and more
"integration" becomes inevitable. The nation-states concerned
may try to resist this process; but the only choice in front of
them, assuming the process of industrialization continues, is
between union among themselves or absorption by one of the
existing super-states.

Lord Gladwyn

From "World Order and the Nation-State—
A Regional Approach"

Dædalus 95 (2) (Spring 1966)

CHATHAM HOUSE
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

TRANSCRIPT OF SPEECH BY DR. HENRY KISSINGER
AT THE "BRITAIN IN THE WORLD" CONFERENCE
LONDON, WEDNESDAY, 29 MARCH 1995

Many decades ago, longer than I care to admit, as a young professor I went to hear a lecture by Harold Macmillan, then recently retired as Prime Minister. And he began the presentation of his distilled wisdom by saying: "As they left the Garden of Eden, Adam turned to Eve and said, 'we live in an age of transition'". That, 30 years later, is also the theme of my remarks.

I grew up intellectually in the age of the "special relationship", which I believe to have been vital to the creation of the post-war international order. It was not a favour the United States granted to Britain; rather it was earned, first by conduct during the war and later by the enormous contribution in the form of the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and what generally came to be identified with the Cold War pattern of international relations. The special qualities that Britain brought to that relationship have been discussed by previous speakers: experience in a multi-polar world, a global character of mind, an experienced leadership, a commitment to security, overseas ties of not insignificant proportions, and the English language - which today you hear practised on American television by those who are genuine and those who engage in wishful thinking.

All of those were great assets. But we are facing a new environment, and I would argue that the qualities that had made the special relationship work - broadened by now to a European-American relationship - may be even more essential than they were before.

To begin with, the United States faces an unprecedented situation. It is the only major country in the world whose history can be precisely dated, the only major country to have been populated almost exclusively by immigrants, that has never had a powerful neighbor along its borders, and that has never had to face the problems of security confronted by less favoured nations.

The Americans' perception of their foreign policy has always been one of nearly limitless choice and, above all, of having the ability to participate or to withdraw at will. Every American initiative of the post-war period has been presented to the American public as having a terminal date and as being designed to permit the underlying pattern - which was assumed to be harmonious throughout the world - to reassert itself; after which, America could again withdraw from its commitment to whatever enterprise had been under discussion.

1

[c]

This explains why almost all of America's foreign policy has been presented in alternately psychiatric and theological terms: either as a means by which relations among nations could be conducted like relations among people; or as a crusade to destroy, even better, to convert, antagonists to the uniquely American perception of international affairs. In that sense, the Cold War and victory in the Cold War was a culmination of the uniquely American perception of international affairs.

How many historical incidents, if any, can be recalled of a nation's leaders and allies making claims which, some 40 years later, were practically all achieved? For that is the position in which we now find ourselves. And it is occurring at the precise moment when, in the United States, the leadership groups which are now dominant have altogether different geographic origins from those which had shaped the post-war period.

For the period of the Cold War was formed by the so-called Northeastern "establishment". Present-day leadership and foreign policy direction are drawn mostly from the West, the Southwest or the South. Its relations with Europe are much less organic than were those of the generation of Acheson or McCloy or of all the fathers of Cold War policy. That does not mean that the current group is hostile, rather that internationalism is identified with European struggles; while the previous establishment drew from appeasement the lesson that the democracies around the Atlantic must be unified.

As a result, America is presently going through what I believe to be only the beginning of a national debate. And I really have no right to speak here of an American point of view because the American point of view is still in the process of being formed. The seminal debates have not yet taken place. For the first time in its history, America must conduct a global foreign policy without an overwhelming ideological enemy, without a clear-cut strategic plan, and in a world which it can neither dominate nor from which it can withdraw. Thus the classic maxims of American foreign policy - the invocation of an overwhelming ideological challenge in the face of which foreign policy can be transmuted into large-scale enterprises to remedy the immediate crisis - also do not apply.

It is crucial to understand that we are now living in a world composed of six or seven major global players. It is said that the United States is the only superpower left. But that is a simplistic description of the problem. We may be the only military superpower left, but the issues susceptible to solution by military action are declining. The kind of power in which we excel is less and less relevant to most foreseeable international crises. On the other hand, in economics, even in technology, the world is becoming much more evenly balanced. And even a cursory glance at the dollar makes it clear that the relative economic

2

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position of the United States is surely not growing.

In such a world, the United States faces the more or less traditional foreign policy problem of global players of operationally more or less equal strength permitting only two roads to stability: one is hegemony, and the other is equilibrium. Hegemony may not be possible and is in any case against the convictions and public morale of the American people; and equilibrium, or the balance of power, is a concept passionately rejected by the American intellectual community as contributing to endless tensions - an attitude which Americans have fortunately transcended through much of their history. To say in America that we must define a national interest - the theme of this conference - is considered a revolutionary, if not a reactionary, proposition. And even if one could elicit it as an acceptable proposition, the national interest is almost always defined in sweeping ideological terms. Nevertheless, the future of the world will have to be based on some concept of the equilibrium or some balance among its various regions, which I define as follows.

It cannot be that everybody is always perfectly satisfied, nor has that ever been achieved by humanity. But it can perhaps be achieved that the major regions of the world be not so dissatisfied that they seek to overthrow the international system by violence, by terrorism, by economic warfare or some of the other methods so well elaborated in our century.

In the conduct of policy, I would define the American interest both negatively and positively. Negatively, it is against the American interest that any major region of the world, including any continental region in either Europe or Asia - and surely both together - be dominated by a country or a group of countries which by doing so can then organise themselves to pursue inimical objectives. Secondly, it is necessary for the United States to participate in a world community that takes into account the global nature of our societies in terms of economics, communications and technology.

Theoretically, the United States could pursue policy on a global basis in the manner by which Britain conducted itself towards Europe through most of the 19th Century: from a posture of "splendid isolation", maintaining good relations with everybody but throwing its weight to the side that seems most advantageous at the moment (which, in the British case, was generally the weaker side in European forums). And while that is theoretically possible, I do not believe we have the philosophy, the personnel or the resources to do it on any consistent basis, or even to elaborate it as a philosophy. Therefore the most realistic approach to America's foreign policy problem would be to recognise the fundamental differences in our relations with Europe, within Europe, and with Asia.

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[L.C]

Now within Europe, there are many conflicts, rivalries and historic memories. Nevertheless, a strategic conflict among the European powers is out of the question. And whatever the differences in approach among the core countries of the European Union and the rim countries, that must remain the dominant consideration.

Which is not the case in Asia. We can talk - as we do periodically - about a Pacific Community. But anybody studying the relations of Japan, China, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, and even India to each other must come to the view that, at this stage, their relations are more like the relations of 19th century European states to each other than of the 20th century European states. And if we go to the area south of Europe, the growth of fundamentalism poses not just an indirect but an explicit challenge by linking religion and politics in a missionary concept that purports to be the only valid answer to contemporary issues and is in some respects a reaction to the material philosophies which have been dominating Western civilisation.

Therefore, I conclude that, at this moment just as at the end of World War II, the United States and the countries of Europe need a special kind of relationship with each other. Not in the sense that we necessarily have a common enemy but that we have comparable problems in need of being redressed by parallel approaches.

At the end of the Second World War, Britain was the only country not to have been occupied at one stage or another, that had preserved its institutions and inward strength, and that had, therefore, made the transition from power to influence in an extraordinary manner. It took exceptional self-discipline and skill for a nation which had been at the centre of world affairs to shift its emphasis in this manner. And while the Gaullist approach to America was to make disagreements extremely painful, the British approach was to make disagreements extremely embarrassing. In the long run, through a network of institutions and consultations, a general community of interests was engendered.

Since then, many of the tacit bargains upon which Europe, America and the European/American relationship were constructed have been altered. The Cold War has obviously ended. And when the division of Germany ended, so too did a world in which France had a certain political leadership on the Continent, Germany a certain economic leadership, and America performed the security role whereby West Germany was organically linked to it via NATO and to the European Union via France. Britain was extremely helpful in establishing this overall framework, but that framework has to be redefined.

4

[Lc]

I do not agree with those who say that America should shift its "special relationship" to Germany. That would not be helpful to Germany and it would not be meaningful for the United States because we should not have a special Continental partner. Nor do I know of any German leader who aspires to that. It is moreover not meaningful because, what is really needed is to give America help and cooperation with Europe in the transition I have described towards its conduct of a global policy [geared not to enemies or the security danger of potential threats, but to global opportunities.]

There have been, as I said, two approaches to European/American relations. One was the Gaullist approach for which, in my writings, I have shown great sympathy because it reflected the necessities of a country which had gone through tremendous difficulties in the War and in the colonial period and which thus needed to reaffirm its identity. The second approach was the British approach which reflected a nation more secure in its identity and hence sought to establish a pattern of cooperation that was quite difficult to challenge because, over time, it came to reflect the convictions of both sides and was based on common interests. The British approach also reflected a historic tradition of global foreign policy whereas the French approach was more geared to calculations of the margins on which stability depended in central Europe, particularly as long as Germany was divided.

My basic argument is this:

In the period of the Cold War, when the United States had the dominant role in security and when there was only one visible international challenge, it made some sense to define European identity by trying to wrest it from the United States. In the current period, nothing is easier than to have America turn away from Europe; nothing is simpler than to convince Americans that they have no special interest in Europe. The tasks which Europe has before it now are so manifold that they don't have to be granted by the United States - such issues as the participation of the Central European countries in the European Union. There is no need for the United States to take a position or to involve itself. Whether Europe should follow a multiple geometry or be more closely integrated makes a difference in the relations between Europe and the United States but it cannot and should not be affected significantly by American pronouncements. As Europe expands, a more flexible approach will probably be the more effective. But that is my personal conviction, on which I would not insist.

What is important is not to make rigid separations between areas that are exclusively European and areas that are exclusively American. What we ultimately need is a dialogue

5

[LC]

between what has emerged in Europe and what is beginning to
emerge in America similar to the one that had characterised the
post-War period. [I think it would be a continuation of the
Western civil war that started in 1914 if Europe and America were
now to concern themselves in the kind of debate which is not at
all impossible.]

In America, we need to give a priority to European
relations. This has frankly been lacking, not just in terms of
day-to-day policy but actions that at times seem quite
unnecessary. Thus I believe that the debate about NATO
membership ought not to be permitted to fester indefinitely. It
does not mean the end of foreign policy, just putting this issue
out of the way. Unlike the days of the Cold War, it is no longer
possible to build an Atlantic relationship exclusively on
security issues.

There was a period in which I thought that the next phase of
American foreign policy should be to concentrate on building a
Western Hemisphere Community. I still think that is an important
enterprise but I believe more and more that what we now need to
do is to create some goal for the North Atlantic nations so that,
in the challenges which I have tried to describe, we can again
act within a common framework. We should seriously begin to
examine the idea of some form of North Atlantic free trade
association, or free trade agreement, to which whatever America
builds in the Western Hemisphere could be related and which would
enable us - in the foreseeable turmoil in other parts of the
world and in the shifts of emphasis and conflicts that will
inevitably arise as new powers emerge - to act with some purpose
and direction.

I am back to where I started. A succession of American
leaders of both political parties, many of them not known for
excessive sentimentality (which is anyway not a trait that
enables one to rise easily to the Presidency), have over a period
of more than a generation considered it natural that, on major
issues, Britain and the United States would seek to cooperate;
and would have a level of consultation which, though never
formalised, was central to the formation of policy in both
parties in both countries. Now, the challenge is whether this
can be done in terms of European/American relations as well, and
that is where Britain's experience can make a seminal
contribution. Europe no longer needs to wrest its identity from
the United States - we are back to 1947 in that respect.
Therefore my hope is - whether our intellectual community agrees
with it or not - that the nations of the North Atlantic
representing a comparable civilisation in a world in which
democracy and economic progress are our hope but not our
guarantee, can again, this time on a global basis, do what they
attempted so successfully a generation ago.

6

# HOW DO PEOPLE OUTSIDE BRITAIN VIEW OUR ROLE IN THE WORLD?

## - THE VIEW FROM EUROPE

### DR JOSEF JOFFE

Foreign Editor
Süddeutsche Zeitung

It is quite remarkable that this conference should have picked somebody like Henry Kissinger and me to provide the view from the outside: both of Germanic origin, both from Bavaria, both ex-Harvard, neither exactly of the Anglican faith. Indeed, the only difference between us is that Henry has the more perfect American accent.

Luckily, later on today, we'll have somebody from Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glucksburg to balance the Bavarian ascendancy.

It is not easy to be sandwiched between Henry Kissinger and the Prince of Wales. There is only one way to trump this lineup: by bringing Lady Thatcher onstage.

Let me quote her: "Chin up. You have to be more optimistic. You are a strong country with a great leader, a great people and a great future."

That was in 1987, and she was praising neither herself nor Britain, but the United States - on NBC TV. I wish that the BBC would reciprocate by having one foreign leader a week to deliver a similar message to the British people.

Why? The other day, I attended a London dinner party of the great and the good. I was sitting between two great ladies, neither exactly an exemplar of the downtrodden and

dejected of this world. Yet both told me essentially the same: "Britain is washed up. We don't want to compete with you Continentals. We just want to be left alone with our rosegardens, our hedgerows and our Westminster."

You don't hear this kind of self-doubt in Paris, Bonn or Rome, and that is, one reason why we should have a weekly pep talk on the Beeb. (For a fee, I will gladly start the series, but only if paid in Deutschmarks.)

Nor would I have to engage in puffery. For there is no reason for this Weltschmerz, for this weariness of the world.

So what is so great about Britain? Its haute cuisine, its sunny weather, or its southern temperament? With cars that have the steering on the wrong side, with coins that get heavier as their face-value declines, and a parliament that has more members than seats?

Some think that this is the very essence of Britain's greatness. This speaker, though, being a picky eater and a rightside driver, has come here to praise other things.

Let's start with the Magna Carta, and all that. Much of what the Articles of the Barons contained is hardly understandable to post-modern man. But the heart is the essence of democratic governance: that the ruler is beneath, and not above the law, that the state's power is limited. It took the continent almost 800 years, until the Velvet Revolution of 1989, to assert this "civil religion" against the totalitarians of the right and the left, in Western and Eastern Europe.

Yet in England, the idea of a parliament, another giant step towards

22

[L.C]

cannot be affected significantly and should not be by American pronouncements. As Europe expands, I personally believe that a more flexible approach is probably the more effective. But that is my personal conviction on which I would not insist.

What I would think is important is not to make rigid separations between areas that are exclusively European and areas that are exclusively American. What we really need is the kind of dialogue between what emerges in Europe and what is beginning to emerge in America that characterised the post-war period. I think it would be a continuation of the Western civil war that started in 1914 if Europe and America now concern themselves in the kind of debate which is not at all impossible.

In America, we need to give priority to European relations that frankly has been lacking, not just in day-to-day policy but in some acts that seem quite unnecessary. Therefore, I believe that the debate about NATO membership ought not to be permitted to fester indefinitely. It is not the end of foreign policy, it is just to put this issue out of the way, but unlike the Cold War, it is no longer possible to build an Atlantic relationship exclusively on security issues.

There was a period in which I thought that the next phase of American foreign policy should be to concentrate on building western hemisphere community. I still think that that is an important enterprise but I believe more and more that what we now need to do is to create some goal for the North Atlantic nations so that in the challenges that I have tried to describe we can act again in a common framework. Therefore I believe that we

should seriously begin to examine the idea of some form of North Atlantic free trade association, or free trade agreement, to which whatever America builds in the western hemisphere could then be related and which would enable us - in the foreseeable turmoil in other parts of the world and in the shifts of emphasis and in the conflicts that will inevitably arise as new powers emerge - to act with some purpose and some direction.

I am back to where I started. A succession of American leaders of both political parties, many of them not known for excessive sentimentality, which is anyway not a trait which enables one to rise easily to the Presidency, have over a period of more than a generation considered it natural that on major issues Britain and the United States would seek to cooperate. And would have a level of consultation that was never formalised but was central to the formation of policy in both parties in both countries. Now, the challenge is whether this can be done on European/American relations, and this is where Britain's experience can make a seminal contribution. Europe does not need to wrest its identity any longer from the United States - we are back to 1947 in that respect.

So my hope is that the nations of the North Atlantic representing - whether our intellectual community agrees with that or not - a comparable civilisation in a world in which democracy and progress economically are our hope, but not our guarantee, can do again, this time on a global basis, what they attempted so successfully a generation ago.

21

[ic]

the transition from power to influence
in an extraordinary manner. It took
exceptional self-discipline and skill for a
country that had been at the centre of
world affairs to shift its emphasis in this
manner. And while the Gaullist
approach to America was to make
disagreements extremely painful, the
British approach was to make
disagreements extremely embarrassing.
And in the long run that reflected the
fact that through a network of
institutions and consultations a general
community of interests was generated.

Since then, many of the tacit bargains
by which Europe and America and the
European/American relationship were
constructed have been altered. The
Cold War has obviously ended. The
division of Germany has also ended and
thereby the position in which France
had a certain kind of political leadership
on the continent, and Germany a
certain kind of economic leadership,
and America performed the security
role in which Germany was linked to
America through NATO, through
France to the European Union, and in
which Britain was extremely helpful in
establishing an overall framework. Now
that relationship has to be redefined.

I do not agree with those who believe
that America should now shift this
special relationship to Germany. It is
not helpful to Germany and it is not
meaningful for the United States
because we should not have a special
continental partner and I do not know
any German leader who aspires to such
a position. It is not meaningful either,
because what is needed is help to
America and cooperation with Europe
in the transition that I have described to
the conduct of a global policy without
enemies, without a security danger
gear ed to potential threats and geared
to global opportunities.

There have been, as I said, two
approaches to European/American
relations. One was the Gaullist
approach for which in my writings I
have had great sympathy because it
reflected the necessities of a country
that had gone through tremendous
difficulties in the war and in the
colonial period and that needed to
reaffirm its identity. The second was
the British approach which, more
secure in its identity, sought to establish
a pattern of cooperation, very difficult
to challenge because it reflected over
time the convictions on both sides of
common interests. The British
approach also reflected a historic
tradition of a global foreign policy
while the French approach was more
nearly geared to the calculations of the
margins on which stability in central
Europe, particularly as long as
Germany was divided, depended.

My basic argument is this. In the
period of the Cold War, when the
United States had the dominant role in
security and when there was only one
visible international challenge, it made
some sense to define European identity
by trying to wrest it from the United
States. In the present period, nothing is
easier to achieve than to have America
turn away from Europe, nothing is
simpler than to convince Americans
that they have no special interest in
Europe. The tasks that Europe has are
now so manifold that they don't have
to be granted by the United States - on
such issues as the participation of each
of the Central European countries in
the European Union. There is no need
for the United States to take a position
or to involve itself. Whether Europe
should follow a multiple geometry or
be more closely integrated makes a
difference in the relations between
Europe and the United States but it

20

various regions in the world which I will define as follows. It cannot be that everybody is perfectly satisfied - that has never been achieved by humanity. But it can perhaps be achieved that the major regions of the world are not so dissatisfied that they will seek to overthrow the international system by violence, by terrorism, by economic warfare or some of the other methods so well elaborated in our century.

In conducting such a policy I would define the American interest both negatively and positively. Negatively it is against the American interest that any major region of the world, any continental region, either Europe or Asia, and surely both of them together, be dominated by a country or a group of countries that can dominate it and then organise it to pursue inimical objectives. And secondly, it is necessary for the United States to participate in a world community that takes into account the global nature of our societies in economics, communications and technology.

Theoretically, the United States could pursue this on a global basis in a manner in which Britain conducted itself towards Europe through most of the 19th century, from a posture of splendid isolation, maintaining good relations with everybody, and throwing its weight to the side that seemed most advantageous at the moment, which in the British case was generally the weaker side in European forums. This is theoretically possible. I do not believe we have the philosophy, the personnel or the resources to do this on any consistent basis, or even to elaborate it as a philosophy.

I believe that the realistic approach of American foreign policy is to recognise a fundamental difference in the relations

between Europe, within Europe and in the relations in Asia.

Within Europe, there are many conflicts and many rivalries and many historic memories. Nevertheless, a strategic conflict between European powers is out of the question. In that sense, whatever the differences in approach between the core countries of the European Union and the rim countries, this is the dominant factor of Europe.

That is not the case in Asia. We can talk - as we do talk periodically - about a Pacific community but anybody studying the relations of Japan, China, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, even India to each other must come to the view that at this stage their relations to each other are more similar to the relations of 19th century European states to each other than of 20th century European states and if we go to the area south of Europe, the growth of fundamentalism poses not just an indirect but an explicit challenge by linking religion and politics in a missionary concept that purports to be the only valid answer to contemporary issues and is in some respects a reaction to the material philosophies that have been dominant in Western civilisation.

Therefore, I conclude that the United States and Europe at this moment, just as at the end of World War II, have the need for a special kind of relationship with each other. It is not in the sense that we have necessarily a common enemy but that we have comparable problems that need to be dealt with by parallel approaches.

At the end of the World War II, Britain was the only country that had not been occupied at one stage or another, that had preserved its institutions and its inward strength and had therefore made

19

that practically everything they set out to do had been achieved? And yet that is the position in which we now find ourselves. And that is occurring moreover at the moment when in the United States the leadership groups that now dominate are of a different origin geographically than those who formed the post-war period. The period of the Cold War was shaped by the north-east establishment. The present foreign policy and the present leadership is drawn mostly from the west, the south-west or the south. Their organic relations with Europe are much less than those of the generation of Acheson or all the fathers of the Cold War period. It does not mean that they are hostile, but their intellectual formation is different from that in which internationalism was identified with European struggles and when the lesson of appeasement seemed to be that the democracies around the Atlantic had to be unified.

So America is now going through what I believe is only the beginning of a national debate. And I really have no right to speak here of an American point of view because the American point of view is still in the process of being formed. The seminal debates have not yet taken place. For the first time in its history America has to conduct a global foreign policy without an ideological enemy, without a clear cut strategic plan in a world which it can neither dominate nor from which it can withdraw. And therefore the classic maxims of American foreign policy are almost impossible to apply. It is not impossible to evoke an overwhelming ideological challenge, it is not feasible to transmute foreign policy into large scale enterprises to remedy an immediate crisis.

What is necessary is to understand that we are living now in a world of six, or seven major global players. It is said that the United States is the only super power left. That is a simplistic description of the problem. We may be the only military super power left, but the issues susceptible to solution by military action are declining. The kind of power in which we excel is less and less relevant to most of the foreseeable international crises.

On the other hand, on economics, even in technology, the world is becoming much more evenly balanced and a look at the dollar makes clear that the relative economic position of the United States is surely not growing.

In such a world the United States faces a more or less traditional foreign policy problem, which is that in a world of players of operationally more or less equal strength, there are only two roads to stability. One is hegemony and the other is equilibrium. Hegemony may not be possible and is in any case against the convictions and the public morale of the American people, but equilibrium, or balance of power, is a concept passionately rejected in the American intellectual community as a contribution to endless tensions and is an attitude that Americans have fortunately transcended through much of their history. To say in America what is the theme of this conference that we must define a national interest is considered a revolutionary, if not a reactionary, proposition. And even if one can elicit it as an acceptable proposition, the national interest is almost always then defined in sweeping ideological terms.

Nevertheless, the future of the world will have to be based on some notion of equilibrium, some balance between the

18

[L]

[Lc]

## - THE VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

DR HENRY KISSINGER
Chairman
Kissinger Associates Inc

As a young professor I went to hear a lecture by Harold Macmillan, recently retired as Prime Minister. And he began his presentation of his distilled wisdom by saying: "As they left the Garden of Eden, Adam turned to Eve and said: We live in an age of transition." That, 30 years later, is also the theme of my remarks.

I grew up intellectually in the age of the special relationship. I believe it was vital for the creation of the post-war international system. It was not a favour that the United States granted to Britain; it was earned first in the conduct during the war and secondly in the enormous contribution in the construction of the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and what generally was identified with the Cold War pattern of international relations. The special qualities that Britain brought to that relationship have been discussed by previous speakers, experience in a multi-polar world, a global character of mind, an experienced leadership, a commitment to security, overseas ties of not insignificant proportions, and the English language which you can hear today practised on American television by those who are genuine and by those who engage in wishful thinking.

All of those were great assets. But we are now facing a new environment. And I would argue that the qualities

that made the special relationship work, broadened now to a European/American relationship, may be even more essential than before.

The United States, to begin with, faces an unprecedented situation. It is the only major country in the world whose history can be precisely dated. It is the only major country in the world populated largely, almost exclusively, by immigrants. The only major country that has never had a powerful neighbour and that has never had to face the problem of security that less favoured nations have had to confront.

The American perception of its foreign policy has always been as one of almost unlimited choice and above all of the ability to participate or to withdraw at its own discretion. Every American initiative of the post-war period has been presented to the American public as having a terminal date and designed to permit the underlying pattern, which is assumed to be harmonious in the world, to reassert itself, after which America could again withdraw from its commitment to whatever the enterprise was that was under discussion.

This is why almost all American foreign policy has been presented alternately in psychiatric or theological terms, either as a means by which relations among nations could be conducted like relations among people, or as a crusade to destroy or, even better, to convert antagonists to the American perception of international affairs. In that sense the Cold War and the victory in the Cold War was a culmination of the American perception of international affairs.

How many incidents can be recalled, if any, in history where a nation could compare what its leaders and its allies proclaimed 40 years earlier and claim

17

As printed - with correction

Henry A. Kissinger

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We Live in an Age of Transition 101

The present generation, with no personal experience of World War II, having never established the kinds of European ties that bound an earlier generation to the Old World, accepts the Vietnam War as its Epiphany. Very few of those who now hold major positions in Washington saw combat in Vietnam; a whole generation of university students stayed aloof, either openly resisting the war, or taking what they thought to be legitimate exemptions from compulsory military service. The Vietnam War, seen by them and by many others as a terrible mistake—the defining experience of their generation—guides much of their thinking about war and peace. Whether their experience in respect to Vietnam has inapacitated them for reflecting objectively about the new post-Cold War world, as many who deplored America's role in World War I used its injustices and cruelties as an excuse for the brands of nonintervention common in the 1920s and 1930s, is a proposition rarely considered. American policy, whether in the Balkans or the Caribbean, in Africa or Asia, can only be understood in the context of a generation that views the contemporary world through a lens largely provided by a local and unsuccessful conflict, Vietnam.

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We Live in an Age of Transition 103

Theoretically, the United States could pursue policy on a global basis in the manner employed by Britain in Europe throughout most of the nineteenth century: adopting a posture of "splendid isolation," maintaining good relations with everybody but throwing its weight to the side that confers certain advantages at a specific moment (which, in the British case, was generally the weaker side). This would be a latter-day version of balance-of-power diplomacy. While that is theoretically possible, I do not believe the United States has the philosophy, the personnel, or the resources to do this on consistently a global basis, or even to elaborate it as a philosophy. Therefore, the more realistic approach to America's foreign policy problem in the post-Cold War world is to recognize that there are fundamental differences in America's relations with Europe, with individual countries in the Old World, and with those that exist in Asia.

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HENRY A. KISSINGER

AUTHOR-PUBLISHER AGREEMENT

The Author, Henry A. Kissinger, grants permission to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences to publish in its journal, DAEDALUS, his essay entitled "We Live in an Age of Transition", adapted from his speech at the "Britain in the World" conference of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Author shall be the exclusive owner of all rights in said essay. Any requests to republish or reprint said essay in whole or in part must be sent to the Author for his prior written consent.

For the Author

Date

AUTHOR-PUBLISHER AGREEMENT

Agreement made this 22nd day of May, 1995, by and
between the American Academy of Arts and Sciences ("Publisher") and
Henry A. Kissinger ("Author"). In consideration of their mutual
promises, Publisher and Author agree as follows:

1. Publisher hereby specially commissions Author to write an essay on "We Live in an Age of Transition" suitable for publication as a contribution to a collective work in one or more issues of its Journal, *Dædalus*, or in such other magazine or book form as Publisher may choose in its sole discretion (the "Work").

2. Author agrees that the Work shall constitute a work made for hire under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, as amended. Author specifically agrees that Publisher shall be the exclusive owner of copyright of the Work, and that Publisher shall have, as copyright owner, without limitation, the exclusive worldwide rights to publish and republish the Work in magazine and book form as part of a collective work, to distribute copies of the Work for sale to the public, and to license others to publish or republish the Work in book or magazine form.

3. Author retains the right to publish the Work in a collection of his own authorship provided that prior to publication of said collection, Author will notify Publisher of republication, and, in a credit line, Author will cite *Dædalus* as the Work's original publisher.

-1-

4. The Author represents and warrants to Publisher that the Work shall be original, that the Work has not been published in whole or in part, that the Author has not entered into or become subject to any contract or agreement with respect to the Work other than this Agreement, and that, if published, the Work will not infringe any proprietary right at common law or any statutory copyright or other right.

5. Author agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Publisher and any of Publisher's licensees against any final judgment for damages or amount of settlement, and Publisher's attorney's fees, incurred in any action arising out of facts which would constitute a breach of Author's representations and warranties to Publisher in this agreement.

For the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Author

rej

Introduction | 01

# Introduction

## What does the Foreign Office do?

There is a popular joke that the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) exists to look after the interests of foreigners. In fact, the FCO is responsible for conducting Britain's foreign policy under the direction of the Foreign Secretary. The fundamental aims of that policy are:

* To enhance the security and prosperity of the United Kingdom and the Dependent Territories

* To promote and protect British interests and influence overseas, including the welfare of British nationals

We provide some services directly to the public, such as consular protection and commercial work (our single largest overseas activity). But for the most part, our work takes place within the FCO's offices in King Charles Street off Whitehall, in the 183 countries with which Britain has diplomatic relations, or in international bodies, such as the UN or NATO. Much of that work is therefore less visible to the public at home.

We do have plenty of successes to display – international treaties, big

foreign contracts, inward investment deals, high profile visits and Summit diplomacy. But, in common with foreign services around the world, we are more likely to hit the headlines when things go wrong. As the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, puts it:

> **'We are to some extent fair game. If a British subject ends up in a foreign jail, if a British firm is in danger of losing a contract, if abuse of human rights is not checked, if a cruel war rages and is carried on our television screens, then the foreign service is expected to act.'**

This booklet aims to present the full picture. It describes the day-to-day work of the FCO, at home and abroad. It gives information about the FCO's budget, our staff, the properties we own and manage, and the resources allocated to the different aspects of Britain's foreign policy.

Our aim is to increase understanding of our activities by explaining who we are, what we do and why and how we do it.

02 | Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad

# Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad

Breakdown of Consular resources
overseas by geographical area
(1993-94)

Inside the cover of every British passport is this message:

In former days, this carried an implicit threat that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs might send a gun-boat if his warning was not heeded. These days, it is really a simple request that this person, for whose status he takes responsibility, be treated decently.

The job of looking after British passport-holders is given to a Consul, a term which means an agent of a State who lives in a foreign country and looks after its subjects residing there.

Consular staff look after certain specific needs of all British people abroad as well as helping those who get into trouble. Most Embassies have Consular sections. Additionally, Consulates are often set up in cities like Milan or New York which, though not capitals, are of importance to British business or to tourists; they often carry out commercial as well as consular functions. More than 200 Honorary Consuls help extend the coverage offered by our Posts.

With over 8 million of our nationals (all those people eligible for a British passport) living abroad and 34 million travelling each year, the number and range of problems faced are enormous. In some countries we also help Commonwealth and European Union (EU) nationals who have no Consular representatives there, in return for the same help in countries where we have no Posts.

British holidaymakers at Gatwick Airport. Every year about 34 million British nationals travel abroad.

[L.C.]

Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad | 03

Kim Housego, kidnapped in Kashmir, thanks Sir David Gillmore (then Permanent Under-Secretary) for the FCO's help in securing his release.

## Whom do Consular staff help?

At a rough estimate, around 1.5% of British travellers need Consular help or advice abroad. In 1993, on relatively minor matters like money worries, overseas staff talked on the telephone to 354,430 people and saw 141,041 in person. They dealt with 15,408 major cases like arrests, illness, death and convictions. During the same period, the Protection Section of the Consular Department in London dealt with 10,575 cases.

There are also the 8.6 million British nationals living overseas to consider. Through advertising, mailshots and the issue of Registration Cards with passport application forms, the FCO encourages people in areas prone to civil unrest and natural disasters to register their presence with the Consulate, which will have contingency plans for evacuation in emergencies. In the last five years, such plans have had to be activated in the Gulf, Angola, Rwanda and Yemen.

## Why do we need Consular services in the EU?

Travellers can get into trouble anywhere. A visitor who has been mugged in Spain, has had a fight in a bar in Italy, or has been accused of football hooliganism in Holland, needs Consular protection just as much as he would in many other parts of the world.

However, because of our close cooperation with our European partners, we are able to make manpower economies in the EU.

## The EU accounts for:

Yet it uses only 38% of Consular resources

## What Consuls do

Consular work cost £39 million in 1993 – just over £1 per head for every British traveller abroad. Apart from such statutory activities as passport issue, birth and death registration and the certification of various legal documents, Consular staff deal with many human problems.

Consular protection can involve helping people who have fallen ill, been robbed, beaten-up, injured, arrested (rightly or wrongly), or even gone mad, often in a country where they are friendless and whose language and customs they do not understand. Our staff deal with football hooligans, drunks, drug smugglers – even – murderers – and they are required to visit regularly all prisoners who want them to do so.

Consular staff see people at their most vulnerable or their worst; they may have to deal with child abduction, with sudden death, with suicides, emergencies, major disasters and with grieving relatives. They have been called on to identify the dead or visit prisoners sentenced to be executed.

04 | Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad

Devastation caused by the Great Hanshin earthquake, Kobe, Japan. The British Consulate-General in Osaka remained operational throughout the emergency. Our staff, with the British Consular agent in Kobe, assisted British nationals and maintained contact with Japanese authorities in their efforts to identify and trace the 700 British and Hong Kong citizens resident in the area.

## When Disasters Strike

Disasters strike randomly and often in remote places. In September 1992, for instance, a plane carrying 37 British citizens crashed in Nepal, killing everyone aboard. For days all 27 Embassy staff, along with their spouses, were involved not only in practical arrangements, but in looking after the 50 grieving relatives who flew in to collect the bodies. Shortly afterwards, one of the diplomats' wives

described in the magazine of the FCO spouses' association how the tragedy had affected everyone at the Embassy. 'We are suffering from the symptoms of bereavement', she wrote, 'even though they were not our relatives on that plane.'

Early in 1993 came the long-drawn-out catastrophe at Mount Carmel, the Branch Davidian headquarters in Waco, Texas, in which 32 British nationals were involved. The nearest FCO outpost was the Consulate at Houston, staffed by just

one UK-based and three locally-engaged employees.

Waco began with a shootout: during the 51-day siege that followed, Embassy officials in Washington and in Houston, worked long hours to provide what help they could. Having identified the Britons in the compound, they made contact with their relatives and, with FBI cooperation, relayed their messages to those inside Mount Carmel. Through close liaison with the US law-enforcement agencies, staff were able to keep relatives informed of developments ahead of the Press and to transport to them swiftly and safely British children released from the besieged building.

When the siege ended in the devastation of the fire, staff helped with the business of identifying bodies, notifying families, helping with funeral arrangements or the return of bodies to the UK, looking after bereaved relatives who came to Waco—including, in some instances, arranging for visits to hospitals or to prison. Consular staff were exposed to considerable stress on top of the sleepless nights.

Waco siege.

Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad | 05

## Cause of death of British nationals and others for whom we are responsible overseas

## What people want and what we can give

There are many unrealistic expectations of what a Consul can do. The rise in tourism has vastly increased the number of Consular problems. At the same time, there is constant pressure to manage the increased demand within existing resources and to improve public services at no extra cost to the taxpayer.

British nationals often complain, for instance, at the fees for such routine services as birth or death registration and passport issue. But fees have to help with costs. In 1993-94, fee income covered over 80% of the cost of overseas Consular services.

Taxpayers' money is made available only in exceptional circumstances and then only against an undertaking to repay. Backpackers who take off abroad without worrying about financing their return home are in for a disappointment when they apply to the Consulate for a loan or repatriation.

A practice session in Consular Department's Emergency Unit

Staff will help to contact relatives, friends, employers and bankers in order to secure funds. In emergencies they will help with the transfer of money. But only when every other avenue is exhausted will a repayable loan be made or will repatriation be made at public expense. In 1994, only 994 citizens were given any financial

assistance and only 78 people repatriated; and all were required to promise repayment. Consular staff like to be helpful: an unwelcome part of their work is having to disappoint people who want services that are not available.

## Citizen's Charter

In June 1992, a Consular Action Plan was introduced at Posts. Its aim was to implement the principles of the Citizen's Charter so as to improve public services. Here are a few of the specific targets the Consular service aims to achieve:

<table><thead><tr><td>Service</td><td>Issuing Time</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Passports:</td><td>Issued within 5 working days</td></tr><tr><td>Birth registrations:</td><td>Issued within 3 working days</td></tr><tr><td>Death registrations:</td><td>3 working days issuing time</td></tr><tr><td>Notarial acts:</td><td>The requested document produced in 1 working day</td></tr><tr><td>Waiting times</td><td>15 minutes maximum</td></tr></tbody></table>

Other specific promises concern action in the event of the arrest, serious illness or death of British nationals. Each Post must publish and monitor targets, offer a clear complaints procedure and establish a mechanism for assessing customer satisfaction.

06 | Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad

The FCO's Legalisation Office in Victoria Street where UK documents are authenticated for use abroad.

## 1994: Some Key Consular Statistics

<table><tr><td>Visits abroad by UK residents</td><td>33,600,000</td></tr><tr><td>Passports issued overseas</td><td>278,995</td></tr><tr><td>Registration of births and deaths</td><td>10,877</td></tr><tr><td>British nationals taken into custody</td><td>4,358</td></tr><tr><td>British citizens charged with criminal offences</td><td>2,836</td></tr><tr><td>Reported deaths overseas of British citizens</td><td>1,450</td></tr><tr><td>Consular staff overseas (man years)</td><td>534</td></tr><tr><td>Honorary Consul Posts</td><td>220</td></tr></table>

## What we can do for prisoners

Prisoners and their relatives are often distressed to discover that, as the Foreign Secretary observed recently, 'Consular officers are not issued with keys to cell doors'. As foreigners arrested in the UK have to come under local law, so do our nationals abroad. Consular staff will visit, give advice on local procedures, liaise with local authorities where necessary, communicate with relatives and try to ensure that prisoners are treated in a civilised fashion and are not discriminated against; but they cannot interfere with local legal procedures.

For humanitarian reasons, the FCO tries to alleviate some of the worst problems by encouraging other countries to agree to the repatriation

of prisoners. By the end of 1993, 30 countries had such agreements; that year, 12 British prisoners were returned to the UK and nine foreigners in UK jails were sent home.

A leaflet designed to help those imprisoned abroad and their relatives.

Consular Work: Helping Britons abroad | 07

Drug convictions of British nationals overseas (as a percentage of British convictions in selected countries)

## Preventive action

A major recent emphasis is on making travellers aware of how to avoid trouble abroad. About 400 travel Advice Notices relating to 100 countries were issued in 1993 – cautioning travellers about civil unrest, natural disasters or epidemics. The aim is to strike a balance between warning and not nannying.

Travel agents and tour operators cooperate in passing FCO advice to their customers. The Travel Advice Unit operates a telephone helpline for the public which receives up to 600 calls a day in times of emergency. And millions of copies of Get it Right Before You Go and Consular Assistance Abroad – a checklist for travellers – are reducing the number of avoidable problems Consular staff have to deal with.

Travel advice public enquiry
telephone number:

0171 270 4129/4179

## A few unpleasant, but typical, happenings in the life of a Consul

**Injury:** A British lorry driver has been seriously injured in an accident 40 miles from the Consulate: the Consul goes to the scene and then to the hospital. She talks to the doctors, the police and the injured man, who is being well looked after but has no medical insurance.

When she talks on the telephone to the driver's next-of-kin and to his employer, she finds neither is prepared to pay the medical expenses. After an hour's negotiation, the Consul persuades them to share the costs.

**Arrest:** A police contact reports that a British national has been arrested for possessing drugs. The Consul arranges a visit for the following afternoon, speaks by telephone to the detainee and reports the arrest to Consular Department, which – at the detainee's request – notifies his family. On being visited, the prisoner is furious to find that the British Government will not pay his legal expenses.

**Mental illness:** A dishevelled and confused person arrives saying he has lost his passport. His companion says his friend urgently needs proper medical treatment in the UK, but they have not enough money even to pay the bill for their accommodation.

The Consul makes an appointment for the following day, and faxes Consular Department the necessary information. If the disturbed man's family is not prepared to send money, and all other avenues are exhausted, it may be necessary to organise his repatriation, which, given his condition, may be very difficult.

**Death:** The Consul has to identify from photographs the decomposed body of a man, believed to be British.

Commercial Work: Helping British business | 09

## How does the FCO help British business?

Through its network of 205 commercial offices in 134 countries, the FCO offers British firms a wide range of services geared to modern business needs. The services available – many of which are free of charge – depend on the specific needs identified in the market but typically include:

* expert briefing for the business visitor on the local political and economic situation, and practical advice on the sector of the market of interest to the visitor

* providing information to UK firms in answer to specific questions about the market

* help and advice on how to find a local representative

* support for British firms participating in trade fairs or trade missions

These services are delivered primarily by full-time commercial staff who are trained in languages and in commercial work as necessary before taking up their posts; most senior staff have previously done commercial work overseas or have direct experience of business, through secondment or company directorships. Drawing on their business background, senior locally-engaged staff provide in-depth expertise in their local market, as well as continuity in the staffing of our commercial sections.

### Britain's Main Markets 1994

<table><thead><tr><td>Main Markets</td><td>Value (£million)</td><td>Share (per cent)</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Germany</td><td>17,704</td><td>13.10</td></tr><tr><td>United States</td><td>16,783</td><td>12.42</td></tr><tr><td>France</td><td>13,684</td><td>10.13</td></tr><tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>9,777</td><td>7.23</td></tr><tr><td>Belgium/Luxembourg</td><td>7,727</td><td>5.72</td></tr><tr><td>Italy</td><td>6,966</td><td>5.15</td></tr><tr><td>Irish Republic</td><td>6,730</td><td>4.98</td></tr><tr><td>Spain</td><td>5,087</td><td>3.76</td></tr><tr><td>Sweden</td><td>3,348</td><td>2.48</td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>2,991</td><td>2.21</td></tr></tbody></table>

All the staff in overseas Posts are required to focus as much as possible on commercial opportunities. Many Ambassadors and High Commissioners spend over a third of their time helping British firms penetrate overseas markets. These are some of the questions which they may find themselves answering:

* is it worth our while to make the considerable investment necessary to tender for this contract? Or is it sewn up by domestic competition?

* whose influence will be brought to bear when awarding this contract? Is it with the Minister of Finance or the Minister for Energy? And why?

* will the Ambassador make a personal approach to the Minister, with whom he has a good relationship? Can he arrange an introduction, or host a reception to show-off the British product to best advantage?

With large contracts, particularly where the buyer is the Government, an Ambassador or High Commissioner can often discreetly play a vital part in winning business. Ambassadors' Residences are often used to promote British goods and services in local markets.

The British Embassy was chosen as the site to stage Paul Smith's fashion show during the Paris Designer Menswear Week in July 94, when major designers launched their collections to the world media and top accounts. Paul Smith is one of 30 menswear designers featured on the official calendar of the Chambre Syndicale de la Couture et des Créateurs. The prestigious premises of the Embassy contributed to the unusually high turnout of international buyers and Press and to the success of the event, as Paul Smith readily acknowledges: "Six months' hard work for 30 minutes of perfection."

Commercial Work: Helping British business | 11

### Some typical cases

* **Egypt:** A small manufacturer of 'bouncy castles', which had exported only to Europe, took part in a trade mission to Egypt. With the leads suggested by FCO commercial staff, an order worth £10,000 was signed on the spot.

* **Norway:** Our Ambassador hosted in his Residence a major presentation by British Steel Track Products to Norwegian State Railways. Their successful bid is worth £10 million with the possibility of a £50 million second stage.

* **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:** Following a lead from the commercial section in Belgrade, a Glasgow distillery dispatched 1,100 cases of whisky, worth £66,734, to a distributor.

* **Republic of Korea:** During a trade mission from Wolverhampton to South Korea, organised with the help of the British Embassy in Seoul, orders to the value of £2.4 million were signed.

* **Brazil:** Following the issue of an Export Intelligence Notice, a London company has won a first order for dental floss and toothbrushes worth US $70,000 from a Brazilian pharmaceutical company.

* **India:** The Bombay Commercial Section organised a major three-day energy seminar and a series of Power Workshops to raise Indian awareness of British expertise in the power sector. Rolls Royce believe that the effect of these events, coupled with the contacts made there, directly helped them to win a £275 million contract to build a coal-fired power station.

### Feedback

In consultation with industry, we constantly look for ways to meet our customers' needs more fully. We listen very carefully to the views expressed by our customers, in the feed-back that we ask for regularly.

An independent market research company monitors the reactions of exporters who use charged export services. This formal system of feed-back on business perceptions of the value of these and other export promotion services is known as the Quality Management System. It has now been running since 1989 and shows generally high levels of satisfaction with the services provided. An important benchmark of customer satisfaction is the number of our customers who would use our services again – 88% in the last survey.

British Minister of Trade, Richard Needham with Indian Surface Transport Minister, Jagdish Tytler, during the seminar on 'Indo-British Infrastructure – a Partnership Approach'.

12 | Commercial Work: Helping British business

Tom Young (third from left) Ambassador at Baku, during a visit to a factory run by a British firm, Eurotech.

## An expanding network of Commercial Posts geared to the needs of the market

Posts vary greatly in size, depending on the scale and diversity of the work to be done. In Baku, for instance, we opened up in 1992 with a one-man trade office to support a BP-led consortium in bidding for a £5 billion oil deal (signed in 1994) and to identify and develop related export opportunities. In Japan, a 33-man team deals with hundreds of enquiries across an enormous range of products and markets.

On 1 March 1995, the Foreign Secretary announced a significant strengthening of the FCO's commercial effort. Thanks to efficiency savings and reductions in work of lower priority, over 100 extra staff will be allocated to commercial work overseas, and 14 new Posts will

open in the former Soviet Union and in the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America. Overall, this represents a 9% increase in the number of front-line commercial staff abroad. It means that commercial work, which already accounts for some 30% of front-line staff overseas, is set to grow further in importance.

## What other help does the FCO provide to meet the needs of British business?

Apart from the specific help and advice mentioned above, the FCO assists British business in two other main ways:
Firstly, we work to promote the right trading environment. Within the EU, for instance, Britain has been a champion of a more open approach to international trade. The FCO and the DTI worked hard together to ensure

Commercial Work: Helping British business | 13

the success of the recent Uruguay round of GATT trade-liberalisation talks. Our largest Posts abroad include specialists in trade policy - who report, advise and negotiate on multilateral and bilateral trade matters. Another typical trade issue is the devising and monitoring of rules to prevent countries outbidding each other to subsidise exports.

Secondly, the FCO plays a major role in helping to protect the interests of British investors overseas through bilateral agreements that promise fair treatment. Over the last two decades, for instance, we have negotiated with around 70 countries Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (IPPs): key provisions include independent settlement of disputes and compensation in the event of property being seized. Important IPPAs concluded by the UK in 1994

included agreements with South Africa, Brazil and India.

Finally, a key aim of all our work is to encourage global stability and the international rule of law to create the essential conditions in which trade can flourish.

## Where to go for help

Commercial advice about specific markets can be obtained from the DTI, and advice about the political situation in these markets is available from FCO desks in London. Companies seeking commercial advice should contact their nearest regional Government Office or Business Link in England, the Industrial Development Board for Northern Ireland, Scottish Trade International or the Welsh Office Industry Department in Cardiff.

## Why do we need commercial representation in the EU?

This is a question commonly asked by sophisticated exporters. It is difficult for those with long experience to understand what a leap can be involved in trying to export for the first time to a new market with a strange culture, even if it is nearby.

Not that export services in the EU are needed only by the newcomer. Our commercial staff are always alert to opportunities that might not otherwise become known to British companies. A Midlands garment manufacturer with good links to French and German retailers

may have no idea about the market potential in Spain and Portugal.

In the six months from March 1994, the tiny commercial team in Lille played a vital part in helping British firms win over two million pounds worth of orders. Products they helped to sell were as diverse as paper from Solihull, whisky from Scotland, bird houses from Hampshire, waxed cotton-cloth from Chorley, paving bricks from Wakefield and a Channel Tunnel electro-mechanical equipment maintenance service from a Glasgow firm.

In 1994, the EU accounted for 56% of our exports, but only 22% of expenditure on our commercial work overseas.

## Key telephone numbers

In each case, please make it clear which markets you are interested in.

Foreign & Commonwealth Office:
0171 270 1500

Department of
Trade & Industry:

0171 215 5000

Industrial Development Board
for Northern Ireland:

01232 233 233

Scottish Trade International:
0141 228 2869

Welsh Office:

01222 825 111

Invest in Britain Bureau:

0171 215 2501

Contact details for local Government Offices are published in the telephone directory. They should be able to provide you with the contact number of your local Business Link.

14 Commercial Work: Helping British business

## Inward Investment

As an outward-looking nation, we were very early in welcoming investors from overseas to create jobs in Britain: foreign investment has made a significant impact on the prosperity of the UK and its people.

These days, there is intense international competition for foreign money, so we attach high priority to identifying potential investors overseas and encouraging them to look seriously at the UK as a rewarding prospect.

Our effort is focused on those countries like Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US, who have traditionally invested abroad, and on those, such as Japan, Korea and Taiwan, whose overseas trade is expanding rapidly. In these countries

almost 40 full-time diplomatic and locally engaged staff are engaged on inward investment work.

We cooperate closely with the Invest in Britain Bureau in arranging seminars and inward missions, advertising campaigns, mailshots and other promotional activities to encourage a wider awareness of the UK's attractions for foreign investors. We pursue individually those companies which are considering investing overseas and offer information, advice and practical assistance to encourage companies to establish operations here. Our Posts also help indirectly by promoting around the world knowledge of Britain's many advantages as a trading partner and a place in which to do business.

## Facts about inward investment

In 1994, foreign investment in the UK accounted for:

* around 40% of manufactured exports

* 17% of all manufacturing jobs

* 23% of net output

* 33% of net capital expenditure

* 41 of our top 100 exporters

The top investors were the US (183 projects), Germany (45), Japan (30), France (25) and Switzerland (16).

US companies have invested a total of $96.4 billion in Britain – almost 43% of all US investment in the EU.

Our Posts overseas help to promote understanding of Britain's strengths as a leading industrial nation. A wide range of information material is produced. Here are examples of brochures in Japanese and Korean on British industry and design.

Bilateral Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's interests around the world | 15

# Bilateral Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's interests around the world

FCO operating costs overseas by geographical area (1993-94)

FCO operating costs overseas by function (1993-94)

Britain maintains diplomatic relations with 183 countries, up from 136 in 1968. In response to international changes since 1990, we have opened 21 new Posts, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and Asia - where expanding our commercial presence is a major priority. We plan to open more.

At present we have 215 Posts overseas - fewer than France, Germany or Italy - of which all but nine are dedicated to the promotion of British interests through bilateral diplomacy.

All bilateral Posts are heavily concerned with commercial, consular or entry clearance work. Most also give a high priority to political and economic work. In each country, our Ambassador is the United Kingdom's official representative, providing with his or her staff the channel of communication between the two Governments.

To promote British interests and enable them to do their political,

commercial and consular work efficiently, our Posts need:

* to understand how government works in the country concerned, know the right people and have enough access to them to get our business done

* to supplement this with the widest knowledge of others, such as the opposition, leaders of industry or the media, whose views and actions may matter to Britain

* to have a thorough grasp of economic, political and social developments and of the language and culture in which they are operating

* to be alive to a whole range of opportunities for Britain - and warn of threats

* to explain British policies and promote understanding of Britain's strengths

* to identify and cultivate future leaders

* to act, where appropriate, as representatives of Britain

* to foster self-sustaining cultural and other links

The structure of an Embassy

This structure would be typical of a medium to large Embassy. In a small Embassy some of these functions would be combined. 46% of Posts now have fewer than five UK-based staff members and 9% have only one.

The larger Posts overseas may have specialists such as military, cultural, agricultural, scientific or drugs liaison officers. Over 50% of the work of some of our largest Embassies is on behalf of other Government Departments.

16 | Bilateral Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's interests around the world

Ambassador Maeve Fort at the ceremonial handover of ex-British Coastal cutters to the Lebanese Navy.

In the case of Lebanon, for instance, our Ambassador, Maeve Fort, has developed relationships with the new generation of leaders who seek to resolve differences through dialogue rather than war. With Lebanese officials and politicians, she discusses how Britain can help in developing the public service, fiscal restructuring, and revenue collection. In the process, she has identified opportunities for British invisible exports in the reopened Beirut Stock Exchange and has promoted British involvement in the rebuilding of Beirut.

Under direction from London, Embassies help to strengthen our hand in multilateral negotiations through lobbying and dialogue with individual Governments. It is crucial in an international forum to understand the position of other parties and to be able to identify potential allies and win them over. In the EU, for instance, each of our Embassies is required to keep close contact with the officials in

charge of all relevant policies. Additionally, Britain has distinct political objectives in every region, which Embassies are expected to further.

For years, for instance, the UK worked within South Africa and internationally to achieve the balance of carrots and sticks that would help topple apartheid and bring about a

peaceful transition to full democracy. Among the ingredients for success were first-class reporting and analysis from our diplomats in South Africa and in neighbouring countries, and active support for individuals and organisations working towards the same objective.

Baroness Chalker with schoolchildren at the ceremony outside London's Commonwealth Institute to welcome South Africa back into the Commonwealth.

## The Commonwealth

The 51 members of the Commonwealth value it for what it is: a network of equal nations that for good or ill have been connected for—in some cases — centuries. The new South Africa took the first possible opportunity to rejoin.

The Commonwealth includes some of the world's fastest growing economies. Its members have both trading and political ties. The book value of UK investment in Commonwealth countries was £36.8bn at the end of 1993.

Commonwealth members have a unique inter-racial and inter-continental forum for constructive political dialogue. It is to Britain that many

Commonwealth members come for briefing on UN Security Council activities or on relations with the EU.

Like all institutions, the Commonwealth has had to adapt to changing times. It has become a growing force for promoting democratic government, in recent years, for instance, sending teams of observers to 11 elections.

Our Missions in the Commonwealth are called 'High Commissions', not Embassies — a symbol of the special links between Commonwealth countries.

The UK's commitment to the Commonwealth is demonstrated by the pattern of its aid distribution: almost 60% of our bilateral aid goes to Commonwealth countries.

Bilateral Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's interests around the world | 17

Here are a few examples of the political issues that our Embassies or High Commissions deal with. All have implications for global stability or specific British interests:

* **Saudi Arabia:** how to deal with threats to stability in the Gulf, e.g. from Iraq

* **India:** encouraging economic liberalisation and the development of bilateral trade; cooperation against the threat

of terrorism; non-proliferation issues; encouraging dialogue with neighbouring countries; reducing tension over Kashmir

* **Turkey:** Iraq; the Kurdish problem; Turkey's relations with the EU; Cyprus; human rights.

The work of our Embassies and High Commissions is backed from London not only by policy-makers but by research staff, who help maintain a corporate memory and a body of expertise on problems which can suddenly flare up and affect British interests.

## Languages

We place a high priority on fluency in speaking foreign languages: FCO staff are trained to operate in some 50 languages, from Arabic to Zulu. Our proficiency in languages is recognised as being amongst the highest of any foreign service.

Arabic has traditionally been the difficult language most in demand, as we have Posts in 20 Arabic-speaking countries. In recent years the need for Russian speakers has risen sharply, not only in the Russian Federation itself, but also in the newly independent States where Russian is the second language. Where possible, training in the first language of these States is also being provided.

## Why entertain?

Entertaining is everywhere a tool of the diplomatic trade, as it is of business, journalism and other areas of life. It is easier to get to know someone over a drink or dinner than formally in an office, and conversations for which there is no time during the day can be held at length after hours. It is, as FCO guidelines point out, 'work with a very thin disguise'.

All staff abroad in what are called representational grades – that is, those who are required to represent the Embassy at social functions – are expected to provide hospitality, often in their own homes. Spouses usually play a vital – though unpaid – role in entertaining.

Guidelines for those new to this explain that the main purposes of entertainment are to build and maintain a wide range of friends and contacts among officials, 'opinion-formers' and private citizens of your host country and to introduce British visitors to an appropriate selection of the above.

A successful host needs such social skills as a good memory for names, an ability to make small talk with shy people, punctiliousness in ensuring that no-one is neglected, an instinct for who will get on well with whom and an ability to deflect rows before they occur. Most important, the hosts must never lose sight of the reason why they are entertaining these people in the first place.

Attending social functions provides an opportunity to meet new contacts and do business with existing ones. The more senior the diplomats, the greater the representational duties and the more their presence is required.

Less than 1% of the FCO budget is spent on hospitality. It is all tied to specific commercial, political or other objectives. All our staff have to account for any money spent on entertaining. British diplomats aim to be focused, generous, but not lavish, hosts.

Language training.

18 Bilateral Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's interests around the world

LC

## Overseas Posts

<table><tr><td>Embassies/High Commissions</td><td>1995<br>140</td></tr><tr><td>Subordinate Posts</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>Missions to international organisations and conferences</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>British Interests Sections</td><td>5</td></tr></table>

Subordinate Posts are Consulates (Deputy High Commissions in Commonwealth countries), usually in important cities outside the capital, i.e. Milan or New York. They deliver consular, commercial, and entry clearance services and do information work. There are British Interests Sections in certain countries with which, for whatever reason, Britain does not have diplomatic relations.

## High-level Visits

One important function of our Posts overseas is to prepare high-level visits, in both directions. Royal, ministerial and parliamentary visits generate goodwill for Britain abroad. Modern travel enables Ministers to acquire first-hand experience of their opposite numbers in other countries and of problems on the ground, in a way unthinkable even a generation ago. Senior officials and specialists can do business face-to-face with their opposites. Posts ensure such visits are used to full advantage. Who should the visitor see? What are the key

points to discuss? What are the sensitive points for the other side? And visits have to be followed up.

The Prime Minister, John Major, in Washington for talks with US leaders.

## What a Head of Mission does

Before high-speed and secure communications, Ambassadors and Heads of Mission often made policy because it took too long to obtain instructions from London.

Then, as the telegram system developed, they came under tighter control from London.

Nowadays, modern communications enable our Posts to contribute actively to day-to-day policy-making. A typical example is the way our High Commission in Canberra provides key input on the pursuit of British interests in Australia – a major export market, and the third largest foreign investor in Britain.

The High Commissioner, Roger Carrick, is in daily contact with Australian Ministers, senior officials and top businessmen. He reports to London on Australian politics, foreign and defence policy and the economy, and so provides

essential background for policy-makers in Government Departments. Recent subjects of advice involving UK interests include the clean-up of a nuclear test site, marketing aircraft to the Australian Forces and privatisation.

Roger Carrick has a central role in promoting British exports and investments in Australia. With the advice of the Director of Trade Promotion and four Consulates-General in state capitals (and, soon, a small new Consulate in Adelaide), he visits many companies, and addresses large (sometimes 200 plus) gatherings about the modern relationship.

One of the biggest ever British commercial and cultural promotions, 'New Images', is being co-ordinated by the High Commission with the British Council for 1997. And the largest British passport issuing office outside the UK is part of the High Commission.

The High Commissioner also pursues Britain's continuing strategic, political and commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific, conducting and reporting discussions with Australian experts and officials. His staff work with numerous British companies, including household names like Glaxo-Wellcome and British Airways, who are increasingly using Australia as a springboard for regional operations.

Overall, Roger Carrick's job closely resembles that of the managing-director of a major overseas subsidiary of a multinational British company.

High Commissioner Roger Carrick in Canberra.

Multilateral Diplomacy: Britain's voice in the international community | 19

# Multilateral Diplomacy: Britain's voice in the international community

Breakdown of political operating costs by region overseas (1993-94)

We can all see the value of protecting our citizens abroad or of helping British firms to export. It may be harder to see how political and economic work serves British interests. Why should a medium-sized country like the UK have a global diplomatic presence? Why, for instance, should we send permanent delegations to international bodies like the UN?

The answer is that as the world has become more complicated, so has the formulation of foreign policy, which has extended into many new fields such as international terrorism, environmental policy, rules for international trade, financial policy, drugs and much besides.

At the same time, the response to these and other challenges increasingly involves international cooperation. Multilateral diplomacy, whether in the UN, the EU, the Commonwealth or NATO, has become ever more important. The FCO has nine missions to international organisations and conferences.
Back in London, subjects like the EU or security and defence (as opposed to

geographic regions) account for a high and growing proportion of the FCO's work. Our records list some 2,500 multilateral treaties to which Britain is a party – just one sign of the extent of our multilateral links.

## International Security

The first duty of any Government is to ensure the security of the nation. For Britain, this depends on a network of collective security agreements and international partnerships. Ultimately, the best prospect of national security is through international security – the promotion of a safer world for all. But that cannot be expected to evolve of its own accord. It has to be worked for.

There is still a long way to go. Suffering and violence in places like Afghanistan, Bosnia or Rwanda demonstrate the continuing threat to stability. They are also an affront to civilised values. The international community as a whole thus has an interest, and a duty, in trying to fashion an environment in which such tragedies are less likely to occur.

The Berlin wall comes down symbolising the end of the Cold War.

20

## The Post-Cold War World

The world around us is changing rapidly, throwing up new challenges and opportunities: the proliferation of new nation States released from Soviet domination; the rise of new tensions, in the Balkans for example; new markets entering the global economy for the first time, shaking up our old map of the world as surely as the economic rise of Asia has done. New challenges face the international institutions of the post-war settlement – NATO, the European Union, the UN and the international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank.

The job of promoting a stable and peaceful international environment is in some ways harder than ever. Experience, good judgement, strength of purpose and diplomatic skills are very much needed.

## The British Role

Britain brings a range of assets to bear to meet these challenges. We are one of the most stable countries in the world, with a long history of peaceful democratic change. We have a distinguished diplomatic and military record. We have historical ties with a wide range of nations through the Commonwealth, and access to the most important decision-making bodies through, for example, the G7 and our permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Hence we are well placed to help manage the difficult process of transition beyond the Cold War. It is one of the key aims of our foreign policy that we should do so in a way which promotes a more open economy, respect for international law, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These are aims which are clearly in Britain's interests.

But no one country can hope to deliver these benefits alone. We have to work with allies, and through the existing international system.

### The FCO's key long-term objectives in the international community are to:

* develop the European Union and Transatlantic Partnership to advance UK interests

* maintain NATO as an effective Alliance with a significant US presence in Europe, and to build up European defence and security arrangements which are compatible with the Alliance

* work for a stable and peaceful international order characterised by:
  - an effective United Nations
  - the peaceful settlement of disputes
  - the international rule of law
  - non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
  - good government and respect for human rights

### Britain has a unique set of political assets:

* a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council

* membership of the EU

* membership of NATO

* membership of the Commonwealth

* membership of G7 (Group of Seven largest industrialised countries)

* a diplomatic network matched in scope by only a handful of countries

* the skill of our armed forces

* the City of London and our many companies with worldwide assets and trading links

* the English language

* the British Council

* the BBC World Service

United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia helping civilians.

Multilateral Diplomacy: Britain's voice in the international community | 21

## The United Nations

The UN exists to preserve international peace and to promote the rule of international law, without which the world would be a jungle.

In the Gulf Crisis in 1990-91, for instance, the UN provided the authority for the decisive international stand that forced Iraq out of Kuwait. Other recent successes include Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique.

Yet there have been obvious setbacks, as in Somalia and Bosnia, where the UN has done much to contain the conflict and provide humanitarian aid, but the parties have not had the will to reach a peace settlement. The UN is struggling to cope with the huge burdens now being placed on it. Our specific objective is to strengthen the UN's capacity to deal with the prevention and resolution of conflicts.

## Why is our permanent seat on the Security Council in Britain's interests?

It is in the Council's interests, and ours, for us to remain permanent members of the Council. In the Council's interests because, with our worldwide interests and our breadth of expertise and experience, we make a distinctive and important contribution to a whole range of international issues, and particularly peace and security. In our national interest because our permanent membership is an extremely cost-effective multiplier of our prestige and influence throughout the world. During the current debate on Security Council enlargement,

In 1989 the UN Security Council passed 18 Resolutions; in 1993 it passed 93. The number of troops deployed in UN peacekeeping missions worldwide grew between 1992 and 1994 from 12,000 to 76,000.

Through our mission in New York, we are represented at all Security Council meetings, and at meetings of its subsidiary committees, such as those administering sanctions; at working groups devising Resolutions on peacekeeping activities; and at meetings of countries providing troops. In one form or another, the Security Council meets almost every day, so the workload is relentless. The outcome of each meeting has to be reported to London regardless of the time of the day or night at which it finishes, in order that instructions can be sent for the following day's work.

There is much more to UN work than the Security Council. Many of our staff work on the economic,

our contribution to international security – in terms of manpower, material and ideas – has been widely recognised. The additional costs of UK permanent membership – an extra 1.3% share of the UN peacekeeping budget – are not excessive when weighed against the benefit. The ever-growing demand from developed and developing countries alike to be granted permanent membership testifies to that.

Casting Britain's vote in the Security Council.

financial and social side of its activities, pressing in numerous committees for the development of Resolutions which reflect the UK's views on subjects as diverse as budgetary control, streamlining the bureaucratic structure, the environment, human rights in Iran, assistance for mine-clearing programmes, disaster relief and the treatment of refugees.

Successful British or British-supported initiatives in the General Assembly in recent years have included a register for conventional arms transfers, the establishment of a United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs and the appointment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

22

## North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), security and disarmament

The core functions of NATO are to:

* underpin European security

* defend members against any major external threat

* provide a forum for Allied Trans-Atlantic consultation on security and defence issues

For 40 years, NATO stood for the collective security of the Western world against the forces of the Warsaw Pact. Today, in the face of new and complex challenges, it remains the ultimate guarantee of our security. Trans-Atlantic partnership is as vital as ever for our own protection, but also as the framework for developing new policies, based on the enduring values Allies share: policies to prevent conflicts, manage crises and build a stable, cooperative new security order.

NATO has a unique contribution to make. It offers support for democratic defence and reform through practical cooperation with a wide range of States to the East, including Russia, with whom we can now aim at active partnership in European and world security. Thanks to its integrated military structure, NATO also offers an unparalleled source of military strength and expertise in the service of peacekeeping, peace-making and humanitarian missions worldwide.

It is an important aim of UK policy to maintain NATO's strengths but also spread their benefits more

widely through the development of new, flexible Alliance policies and practices to meet the wide range of today's needs.

Among the objectives of our political/military work are:

* **Maintaining the vitality and strength of the NATO Alliance,** which remains at the heart of Britain's defence arrangements. FCO and Ministry of Defence experts maintain a continuous dialogue with other Alliance partners, both bilaterally and at NATO's Brussels headquarters

* **Building up other components of the European security structure.**

These include:

The Western European Union (WEU), which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO; and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which includes all the nations of Europe (except Macedonia and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, suspended in 1992) and the former Soviet Union as well as Canada and the US. The OSCE aims to enhance security through confidence-building measures, conflict-prevention and resolution, and arms control agreements.

* **Non-proliferation.** A major UK objective for 1995 is to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons. Our delegation to the NPT Review Conference will be at the centre of negotiations, while our Embassies around the world will lobby to gain support for our position.

The Royal Navy Aircraft Carrier Ark Royal taking part in a NATO operation to enforce UN Resolutions in the Adriatic.

Multilateral Diplomacy: Britain's voice in the international community 23

The European Union

The European Union is central to Britain's foreign policy and to our place in the world. It involves most areas of Government, from trade, transport and agriculture to matters such as immigration and the prevention of international crime.

The end of the Cold War has ushered in a period of profound change for the EU. There are further candidates for membership in Central and Southern Europe – an EU of over 20 member States is a real possibility. Further change in both institutions and policies (like the Common Agricultural Policy) is likely to be necessary in consequence.

The EU faces new economic challenges, not least from Asia. Britain is at the forefront of those arguing for a deregulated, flexible, open-market response in order to restore European competitiveness.

Contrary to the popular view, disagreements in Europe do not amount to the UK versus the rest. On most issues, we have allies. But whether alone or in partnership

with others, what is vital is that British interests are fully represented at every stage of the debate.

At one end of the spectrum, major negotiations like those on the Maastricht Treaty are led by the Prime Minister. At the other, in numerous Brussels committees and working groups, middle-ranking officials take part in painstaking negotiations to ensure that Directives help rather than hinder UK industry and the interests of consumers. An eye for detail, assiduousness, negotiating skills and exceptional patience are needed. Agreements may be reached at the end of a 15-hour day, so stamina matters too.

Essen Summit, Germany, December 1994. Heads of State and their Foreign Ministers of the countries of the European Union pose for a photo with leaders of former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the second day of an EU Summit.

FCO publications on the EU including 'Facts and Fairytales' which explains the difference between euromyths, euroscares and 'eurolunacies'.

24 Multilateral Diplomacy: Britain's voice in the international community

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) came into force with the Maastricht Treaty. Its aim is to enable EU member states to adopt common positions and take joint action on foreign policy, thereby providing the EU with the diplomatic muscle to match its economic strength.

This is a natural and important step forward in the development of EU political cooperation and offers significant benefits for member States. A Union which speaks with one voice will be more influential internationally and better able to advance the global interests of its members. CFSP operates by consensus among the Governments of the 15 states. It complements but is not a substitute for national foreign policy: members states are free to act unilaterally where their own special interests are concerned.

CFSP is relatively new, but it is already making an impact. Common positions have been adopted and joint actions implemented on a range of international issues, including election-monitoring in South Africa and Russia; the Middle East Peace Process; humanitarian relief in Bosnia; support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a Stability Pact to promote good neighbourly relations among prospective members of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe.

The UK has played an active and central role in all these initiatives and is determined to see CFSP further developed and strengthened. As a global diplomatic player, Britain welcomes the additional weight in world affairs CFSP gives to both the EU and its individual member States.

Our team of negotiators in Brussels working under the UK's Permanent Representative are drawn from the FCO and from relevant home Departments. They cover many areas of Government business. Policy is co-ordinated by the FCO and the Cabinet Office and involves a cooperative effort between many Government Departments.

Our negotiators are in close and regular contact with the Council Secretariat, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Permanent Representations of other member states.

Our Embassies in other member states lobby their host Governments

The British Ambassador (now High Commissioner) Sir Anthony Reeve, acting as EU Election Monitor during South African election.

on a wide range of EU business, reporting not just to the FCO but to other Government Departments. Among the FCO's particular responsibilities are:

* the institutional development of the EU; how it should function; sensitive issues such as the role of the European Parliament or the future size and powers of the Commission

* enlargement – the detailed negotiation of accession treaties with new members

* relations between the EU and non-EU countries; association or cooperation agreements with countries such as Israel, Poland and Turkey; relations with the developing world

* the development of an EU foreign and security policy, where that makes sense and is in the interests of all member States

25

## Transnational problems

### Terrorism

The FCO devotes considerable effort to fostering international cooperation over common problems like terrorism, drugs and organised crime.

All EU member States, for instance, have agreed

* to ban exports of arms or other military equipment to countries implicated in supporting terrorism

* to make no concessions to terrorists or their sponsors

* to show solidarity in the prevention of terrorism

### Drugs

FCO involvement in international initiatives in this area has included:

* playing a leading role in preparing and implementing the 1988 UN Convention against drug-trafficking

* helping countries affected by drug-trafficking by providing law-enforcement training and equipment

* taking a lead in associating Central and East European countries with EU work on drugs and organised crime

* making bilateral arrangements with other countries to seize and confiscate the proceeds of serious crime

## The Environment

The UK plays a leading role in developing multilateral agreements on the protection of the environment. As a member of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, we are pushing forward the implementation of the action programme agreed in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro.

The FCO is working to encourage and assist the UK Dependent Territories to give priority to environmental protection. This has included:

* carrying out a review of environmental activity

* funding projects aimed at strengthening conservation

Dogs for use in the fight against narcotics are handed over to Ecuador's Policia Nacional by the Embassy's Information Officer.

## Other areas of international cooperation

The FCO is also involved in other areas of international cooperation, including aviation and maritime issues, space, telecommunications, scientific collaboration and the drive to achieve agreement on closing down or making safe potentially dangerous nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe.

We also play a major part in international economic diplomacy, working closely with the Treasury, the DTI, the Bank of England and others. This includes the UK's activities as a member of the G7 leading industrialised nations and of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which seeks to establish a common approach to economic issues among the countries of the industrialised world.

26 Public Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's image

# Public Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's image

## Breakdown of information resources overseas by region (1993-94)

Dr Samir Mourad, Director of the Saleh Kamel Centre, Al-Azhar University of Cairo, at the opening of the 'Muslims in Britain' touring exhibition. The Centre hosted the first showing of the exhibition, which is scheduled to visit 15 venues in six countries throughout 1995.

## Public Diplomacy

UK objectives are more easily achieved when Britain's policies are understood and her image is positive. It is the job of Ambassadors, supported particularly by their information staff, to explain our policies to local opinion-formers and to promote a better understanding of the UK, our society, our values, the strengths of our economy and our excellence in such fields as design, research, technology and financial services.

Priorities vary from country to country. In the Middle East, it might be necessary to explain the position of the Muslim community in Britain; Scandinavian countries might need to be told of our environmental policies and record; in the US, there has been a consistent need to put across an accurate picture of developments in Northern Ireland.

On the commercial side, the objective is to match products to markets. In one year, for instance, the British Embassy in Madrid placed an estimated 3,640 articles in the Spanish press; to buy a similar spread of advertising space would have cost £1 million.

Information staff overseas conduct public diplomacy primarily through the local media; they brief journalists and arrange press releases, press conferences and media facilities for visiting delegations and exhibitors at trade fairs. They are supported by a wide range of press and information services from the FCO in London, including:

* News Department, which responds to queries from the press – British and international – and tries to ensure that the Government's foreign policy is understood by the media. There are 1,200 foreign journalists from 80 countries working in London

* The Overseas Visits Section, which arranges programmes for important visitors from abroad sponsored by the FCO. These visits are tied to specific objectives and often have a commercial focus

* broadcasting services, which provide a wide range of radio and TV material, used by some 250 stations overseas

* enquiry services run by the FCO Library in London, which handles requests for information from Posts

* publications and other material, translated where necessary, to help get our message across

Examples of FCO publications explaining aspects of Britain to an overseas readership.

Public Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's image | 27

## Cultural Diplomacy

The British Council and the BBC World Service are two widely respected Ambassadors for Britain in the field of cultural diplomacy.

Editing at the British Information Services studio, New York.

## Teamwork: Seoul 600

In October 1994, the British Embassy in South Korea provided a classic example of a successful bilateral initiative, requiring prolonged and highly-focussed teamwork.

The occasion was the 600th anniversary of the establishment of Seoul as the country's capital. With the help of the British Council and the DTI the Embassy organised a two-week programme of events. Under the banner 'Britain Salutes Seoul 600', the purpose was to emphasise the theme of commercial and political partnership and cooperation between the UK and Korea. A major effort secured wide publicity in the Press and on radio and television.

Events included

* 'Future Visions from Britain'

* a showcase for world-beating design innovations from Britain

* commercially focused seminars on British innovation, high technology, new materials and inward investment

* a special promotion of British consumer goods in two Seoul shops from Korea's leading department store chain

* seminars on British electoral law, journalism and urban strategies

* two concerts by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra under Yehudi Menuhin, with Korean soloists and choirs

The fortnight was launched by the President of the Board of Trade who, with the 24 members of his high-level trade mission, attended the events and talked business. Last-minute negotiations made it possible for the Korean industrial conglomerate Samsung to announce a $700 million, 3,000-job, investment in North-East England.

As well as boosting Britain's image in an important Asian market, this unique British contribution to the festivities has already paid dividends in the form of increased orders for the participating companies.

Young Koreans admiring a Triumph Daytona motorbike in the Design Museum exhibition, one of a series of events organised by the British Embassy as part of Seoul 600.

## British Council

The British Council has an important role in promoting British and British culture overseas. It encourages scientific, technological and educational cooperation with other countries. The Council is an independent body whose objectives and priorities are set in close consultation with the FCO and its other sponsor, the ODA.

All the Council's activities are facets of a single strategic thrust: to enhance the respect in which the UK is held all round the world by political leaders, officials, businessmen, teachers, writers and private citizens. In achieving this it has the priceless asset of the English language.

People all over the world want to learn English.

* One person in five speaks some English

* It is an official language in over 70 countries

Improving English in Azerbaijan at one of 39 British Council resource centres in Central and Eastern Europe.

28 Public Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's image

Cheek by Jowl performed As you like it in Russia during The Queen's visit in October 1994. The tour, organised by the Council, was supported by British business.

English 2000 is a collaborative venture between the British Council and the private sector, focussing on the resources of the British English language teaching industry and profession on the need to respond adventurously and creatively to changing patterns of overseas demand.

A knowledge of the language leads to an interest in our culture, which in turn can lead to a desire to study in or visit Britain. Introducing foreigners to our culture and values, while being scrupulous about respecting theirs, encourages them to value Britain, its products and its services.

UK education and training exports amount to more than £4 billion annually. Foreign students in Britain contribute significantly to invisible earnings—as well as benefiting themselves, their countries and the academic institutions they attend in the UK.

In 1994 the British Council

* operated in 228 towns in 108 countries to promote bilateral cultural, educational and technical cooperation

* answered over 600,000 queries world-wide about British education

* administered more than 270,000 examinations overseas on behalf of British educational institutions

* taught English to about 100,000 people in 83 centres in 40 countries

* had 34 resource centres giving support to more than 27,000 local teachers of English in Central and Eastern Europe alone

* ran 169 library and information centres, from which 10 million British books and audio-visual items were borrowed

* arranged more than 50,000 visits to and from Britain

* organised more than 1,400 arts events overseas to promote aspects of British culture and society

The Council is financed partly by a grant from the FCO and partly by money earned from those who can afford to pay for English language teaching, from joint research programmes run with national agencies in the EU, from business sponsorship, and from the provision of services in education and training for bilateral and multilateral agencies,

national Governments and other organisations. For instance, it carries out aid programmes under contract to the ODA.

Cultural diplomacy depends on flair, imagination and local partnerships. The British Council's representative in Prague, for instance, succeeded in building up a network of teaching and information centres in nine major cities in the former Czechoslovakia by persuading local authorities to let him have prime sites at minimal cost.

18,000 people each year benefit from British Council-managed training programmes.

Over £700,000 worth of business to Britain has been generated by the Council-managed primary text-book project in Sierra Leone.

Public Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's image 29

FCO Scholarships

The Government attaches great
importance to winning long-term
friends for Britain by attracting the
brightest and best students to study
and train in the UK. The FCO funds:

* the British Chevening Scholarships

* the Marshall Scholarships for American students, founded in gratitude for Marshall Aid

* the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan

The British Chevening Scholarships
are targeted on the emerging leader-
ships in areas of rapid political and

economic change – especially Central
and Eastern Europe, the Far East,
Latin America and southern Africa.
Our aim is to help those students who
seem most likely to benefit not only
themselves and their countries, but
also Britain's long-term interests.

A recent survey showed that many
of the Scholars selected in 1985 were
already in, or rising to, positions of
commercial or political influence in
their countries.

A particular feature of the
programme are schemes co-founded
with business, academic and other
organisations equally convinced of the
value of sponsoring overseas students.

As Honorary Patron of the Association of Marshall Scholars, His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales recently hosted a reception at St James's Palace, London, for the 86 Marshall Scholars currently studying in the UK.

The scholarships, which finance young
Americans of high academic ability to
study for a degree in the UK, were
instituted by the British Parliament in
1953 as a practical and enduring gesture
of thanks for assistance received from the
United States in the aftermath of the
Second World War.

Since the scheme's inception, the number
of scholarships awarded each year has
grown. In the first year there were only 12
Scholars, but now up to 40 new awards
are offered every year, and each one is

tenable for two years, possibly extending to
a third. Since 1954 more than 1,000
Marshall Scholarships have been awarded.

30 Public Diplomacy: Promoting Britain's image

BBC World Service global regular audience in any language (April 1994) 130 million

The BBC World Service

The BBC World Service is funded by the FCO (£175 million in 1994-95). It has complete editorial independence, working as it sees best to achieve strategic targets for audience size and distribution agreed with the FCO.

Some 130 million people listen to the BBC World Service, more than to its five closest competitors added together. It broadcasts in over 40 languages, through direct transmissions and some 900 local AM and FM stations around the world.

Listeners trust the Service to be accurate, reliable and objective: at times of international crisis, listenership increases sharply. The Service also has the flexibility to meet specific information needs swiftly. In Afghanistan, for instance, there was a pressing need to get across to ordinary Afghans basic messages about health, safety and the dangers posed by mines planted during the Afghan war.

The BBC contribution has been an Afghani equivalent of The Archers, which mixes entertainment with practical advice and is broadcast three times a week to an estimated 20 million Pashto speakers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Big improvements to reception quality have been made since the early 1980s. A new relay station under construction in Thailand will offer 46 million listeners in Asia a much better signal from the end of 1996.

Apart from the publicly funded World Service, the BBC is aiming to expand its commercial activities in overseas markets. It hopes to establish BBC World, its news and current affairs satellite television channel, as a global service without cost to the taxpayer. BBC World is being developed through joint ventures with private sector partners and is already available in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Arabic and Japanese services were also launched in 1994.

A selection of BBC World Service publicity material illustrating the range of subjects and languages carried in World Service programmes.

Entry Clearance Work: Applying the rules 31

Breakdown of entry clearance resources by region overseas (1993-94)

Except for citizens of the European Economic Area (EU members and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), anyone wishing to settle in the UK has to obtain a settlement visa before they travel here; over 80 nationalities require a visa to visit the UK. More than 160 of our Posts offer an entry clearance service.

Entry clearance work has two objectives: to evaluate applications in accordance with the UK's Immigration Rules and to provide a quick, efficient and courteous service. It does Britain no good if foreign businessmen and women, students and tourists are made to feel unwelcome: our job is to use our experience, knowledge and judgement to facilitate entry for those eligible for a visa, while keeping out those who do not intend to respect our laws or the rules governing entry to our country.

Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) are required to treat all applicants with respect, sensitivity and consideration. They are given vital help in making correct decisions by knowledge of the local languages, culture and conditions provided by locally-engaged staff.

We aim to issue visit visas within 24 hours of application. Where cases are not clear-cut, in-depth second interviews are held. Settlement applications naturally take longer.

There are millions of people in this increasingly unstable world who

are desperate to reach the West, so entry clearance work is a demanding and stressful job. Every day ECOs, often young people, have to take difficult decisions with potentially crucial personal consequences for the applicants.

The global refusal rate is only around 7% per year. Whilst the right to an appeal against refusal of a visit visa was removed in July 1993, refusals are now scrutinised annually by an Independent Monitor. Right of appeal against settlement refusal remains.

The judgements that have to be made are often finely balanced, particularly in marriage cases. British law requires ECOs to refuse a settlement visa to an applicant who has married a British resident for the 'primary purpose' of emigrating to the UK. This can often be determined only by a lengthy interview with both parties. It is a heavy responsibility to have to decide if a pretty girl from the Far East really loves the middle-aged British businessman she met only a few weeks earlier, or if marriage is merely a way of getting round the Immigration Rules.

32 Entry Clearance Work: Applying the rules

## A day in the life of an Entry Clearance Officer in Islamabad

**Here are some typical cases.**

**Applicant A** says he wants to buy second-hand machinery from a company in Bradford and has documents showing that his business in Pakistan is flourishing. But because false documents are very easy to acquire, the ECO checks with the Commercial Section in the High Commission; they know and vouch for him. **Visa issued**

**Applicant B** is an elderly widow who says she wants to visit her children, all of whom live in the UK. The ECO asks whether she really intends only to visit, or whether she wishes to settle. She is uncertain. The son accompanying her loses his temper and accuses the ECO of anti-Pakistani discrimination. The ECO continues the interview, but cannot be satisfied that only a visit is intended. The son storms off shouting that he will complain to his MP. **Visa refused.**

**Applicant C** wants to go to university in the UK; a British degree would earn him a top job in Pakistan. His English is excellent, his qualifications are good and his papers are in order. **Visa issued**

**Applicant D** says his parents and siblings are in the UK and he wants to visit his sister whom he has not seen for 12 years. He produces a bank statement to prove he is financially sound. Since it comes from a Lahore bank from which bogus statements have come before, the ECO asks a locally-engaged member of staff to check it out.

The applicant now produces a letter from a UK hospital stating that his sister wants to see him because she is dying of cancer. He proves so ignorant of his sister's

condition that the ECO suspects the hospital letter may be a forgery. Just then the bank statement is returned and pronounced a fake.

With a view to refusing him a visa, the ECO consults her Entry Clearance Manager. At his suggestion and with some difficulty she gets through to the UK hospital and finds that the sister really is ill. She and the Manager agree that compassion must overrule their misgivings.

### Visa issued

**Applicant E** is 20 and is seeking settlement in the UK. He is married to a 30-year old British woman. They claim that at their first meeting, when she was on a two-day visit to Pakistan, they fell instantly in love and decided to marry. Since then she has visited Pakistan briefly twice, once for the marriage ceremony and once for the visa interview. After more than an hour, the ECO establishes that the couple seem totally ignorant and incurious about each other and have nothing in common, so the marriage is a 'primary purpose' case.

### Visa refused

Overseas Aid: Helping people to help themselves | 33

# Overseas Aid: Helping people to help themselves

Britain's aid programme is managed by the ODA, which is the Aid Wing of the FCO. The Minister for Overseas Development is an FCO Minister of State responsible to the Foreign Secretary. A full description of the work of the ODA is beyond the scope of this brochure, whose main focus is British diplomacy.

Further details about the British aid programme are provided in the ODA section of the 1995 Departmental Report, and the ODA 1994 Annual Review. Copies of these and other ODA documents may be obtained from the ODA's Information Department, 94 Victoria Street, London SW1E 5JL (tel: 0171 917 0503)

Every major industrialised country gives a part of its wealth in development aid. Britain's aid programme is the world's sixth largest (at £2.2bn) and it is recognised as very effective. As the Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, put it in a recent speech:

> 'Overseas aid is one of the things we are good at. It is also good for us.'

> 'Everyone stands to gain from open international financial and trading systems, when developed and developing countries can both trade to their strengths. Everyone stands to gain from economic progress and political stability in other countries.'

> 'Twenty years ago, the Asian tigers were heavily dependent on international aid. Now, South-East Asia buys some £5 billion of British exports each year, and contains some of our fastest growing trading partners.'

> 'Aid must be an integral part of our foreign policy. The purpose of aid – to promote development – is not in question. Nor is the moral imperative to use some of our wealth to help others. But in the longer term it is in our own self-interest too.'

There are two main reasons why Britain provides aid to other countries: first, the Government believes it is right to use part of the nation's wealth to help poorer countries and their peoples to improve their lives; and second, to support the UK's broader foreign policy objectives aimed at preserving and enhancing the UK's overseas interests.

The purpose of the aid programme is to promote long-term, lasting economic and social development. Poverty reduction is at the heart of the UK's assistance to low-income countries. Assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is aimed at helping those countries in their transition to democratic and pluralist market economies.

The ODA is responsible for both bilateral aid, which is provided on a country-to-country basis, and multilateral aid, which is channelled through the EC, the World Bank and regional banks, and the United Nations agencies.

Kamala's parents in Andhra Pradesh cannot help with her homework. Like almost half the people in this part of India they are illiterate. But six-year-old Kamala has opportunities her parents never had. She goes to school regularly now thanks to the ODA's largest education project - the Andhra Primary Education Project. So far over 3,000 classrooms have been built and over 165,000 teachers have been trained and there are signs that fewer children are dropping out of school.

34 Overseas Aid: Helping people to help themselves

Sustainable agriculture. Abdul tends his crop of
chilli peppers. Aid has made it possible for him to
earn a living and support his family. Under its
sustainable agriculture strategy, the ODA supports
projects that work with farmers like Abdul to
maintain or enhance the productivity of the land,
sea, rivers and lakes, while improving long-term
food security. Over the last three years, the ODA
has spent over £100 million on sustainable
agriculture projects.

The pattern of development which
the UK seeks, through both bilateral
and multilateral aid, is one where the
poor share in the fruits of growth.
The aid programme supports:

**economic growth** based on sound policies, without which the sustained improvement of people's material well-being is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve;

**good government,** which safeguards human rights, promotes the rule of law, encourages greater participation in development, and makes public institutions more accountable and competent;

**social programmes** and direct poverty reduction, which help people improve their lives and living standards by providing basic services such as health, education and family planning. These programmes target those who are unable to share in the

benefits of growth (especially women),
and help to make them better able to
do so; and

**environmental sustainability,** which
is essential to maintain the natural
resources on which many developing
countries rely.

The aid programme also provides **emergency aid** to help those suffering the consequences of disasters, whether natural or man-made. In 1993-94, the ODA spent around £179 million in providing relief from 135 emergencies worldwide, particularly in Africa, Asia and the former Yugoslavia.

Britain provides Aid That Works

The **Igawilo Clinic** is part of the ODA's Health and Nutrition District Support project (HANDS) in Mbeya, Tanzania. It has around 20 full-time members of staff, working in the clinic

British Dependent Territories:
honouring our obligations

Our 14 Dependent Territories, scattered
around the globe, are a significant
historical legacy. They have a total
population of over 6 million, of which 97%
live in Hong Kong. In 50 years, Hong
Kong has been transformed from a war-torn
refugee community into the world's eighth
largest trading economy with a higher per
capita GDP than Britain's. It owes much
of its success to the rule of law and the
quality and impartiality of the colonial
administration. A smooth transfer of
sovereignty over Hong Kong, which returns
to China at midnight on 30 June 1997, is

one of Britain's highest foreign policy
priorities.

Most of the Dependent Territories are
largely self-governed, but leave Britain
responsible for defence, foreign policy and
security. Few have the resources to be self-
sufficient and most rely heavily on our aid
programme. We maintain garrisons in
Gibraltar, Hong Kong and in the Falkland
Islands and neighbouring South Georgia.
Each territory is administered by a
Governor, Administrator or Commissioner
who acts on the authority of the Foreign
Secretary.

One of the primary objectives of the
FCO is to ensure the long-term stability
and prosperity of our Dependent Territories.

Our aim is to promote good governance
within the Territories, helping them to
develop further their administrative
systems.

Additionally, we provide, where
possible, practical assistance in the war
against the spread of drugs, in tackling
environmental issues and in the
development of local industry. We work
closely with other Government Departments
in fields such as education and health. A
detailed environmental review is in progress
to help ensure the survival of wildlife and
nature sites. One early development is the
designation of a large area of the Cayman
Islands as a nature reserve.

Overseas Aid: Helping people to help themselves | 35

and outside, serving a community of 20,000 people. It treats over 200 people a day, mostly women and children. Family planning, sexually transmitted diseases and nutritional issues all feature strongly in monthly awareness campaigns. These messages are conveyed through the novel medium of a drama group, formed and performed by local people.

With the introduction of electricity, stall-holders in New Market, Dhaka, Bangladesh, can now stay open all hours. They get their electricity from the **Greater Dhaka Power Project** for which the ODA has provided £63 million. Electricity has made many other people in the area better off. Growing industries such as garment manufacture, brick-making, printing and steel are benefiting from improved services. And strengthening the city's industry should mean thousands of new jobs and training opportunities, desperately needed in an area where most people live on or below the poverty line.

Created in 1989, the **Know How**

**Fund (KHF)** is an important part of Britain's response to the changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In Central and Eastern Europe, management training is an important component: managers in the region were ill-equipped to cope with new concepts such as supply and demand, consumer choice and energy-efficient or environmentally sound production. To train people to put new systems and policies into action, the ODA has set up a range of projects, including four regional management centres in Poland. These centres focus on training and business advice for small and medium enterprises.

With help from the Know How Fund, Russian companies have been shown how to raise capital through new share issues – the first time this has been done to Western standards. Other pioneering activities include the privatisation of Russian farm land. The Know How Fund-supported approach has been recommended by the Russian Government as a national model.

The Know How Fund has been widely acclaimed – both at home and by recipients – as a highly successful programme tackling the key issues of reform; other countries are copying it.

Know How Fund activities are run by two joint Diplomatic Wing/ODA departments, backed up by a team of professional advisers. Embassies play a key role in identifying, assessing and monitoring suitable projects.

Igawilo Clinic, part of the ODA's Health and Nutrition District Support (HANDS) project in Mbeya, Tanzania.

New Market, Dhaka, Bangladesh, one of many businesses to benefit from the Greater Dhaka Power Project to which the ODA has given over £63 million.

One of 300 KHF projects in Russia is the Marshall Plan of the Mind, a collaborative venture between the BBC, Radio Russia and other Russian broadcasters, which uses radio to promote the values of democratic pluralism and the market and to transmit entrepreneurial skills. One highly popular programme, combining information with entertainment, is a soap opera featuring residents of a Moscow block of flats.