KISSINGER, HENRY A. /R+

November 17, 1971

Dear Mr. Robbie:

Thank you very much for your efforts on my behalf before the Dolphins game against Buffalo. I certainly regret that things turned out as they did and that it was not possible for me to come to the stadium. I hope you were not too inconvenienced.

Perhaps we can work something out again in the future with better end results.

Mr. Joseph Robbie
330 Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33132

CH:mb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

For Julie in Key Biscayne

Mr. Warren Robbins of the Museum of African Arts called to find out whether Mr. Kissinger plans to attend the function in honor of Walter Posen Bello, America's foremost African artist. He wishes someone to call him to let him know whether or not to expect Mr. Kissinger.

His number: 547-0324

Dotty Curlee

11/10

regretful

11/13/75

PRESS -- 3/15/71

Type of Request & Date

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Roberts -- Week of March 15th

(Last name and pending date)

Name: Chalmers Roberts -- 223-6000

Request: Mr. Roberts said he had seen Mr. Kissinger at the Gridiron dinner on Saturday, and Mr. Kissinger had told him to call the office today in order to set a time for him to come in to see HAK sometime this week.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: yes - 3/17

Date and Time: 5:30 3/22

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

CIRCUS SAINTS & SINNERS CLUB [illegible]

P. T. BARNUM TENT

Suite 402, Transportation Building, 815 - 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20006-638-2040

Reply to: Holiday Office Center, Suite 192, Cocoa Beach, Fla. 32931

OFFICERS

HARRY HERSHFIELD
Honorary President

HAROLD R. ROBINSON
President
514 Brightwater Drive
Cocoa Beach, Fla. 32931

CHARLES R. VAN HORN
Executive Vice President

HOWARD C. ADAMS
Vice President

RALPH T. MONAHAN
Vice President

WILLIAM GRAY OBEAR
Secretary

WILLIAM J. McMANUS
Assistant Secretary

CLIFFORD G. NEEDHAM
Treasurer

GLEN E. MORROW
Assistant Treasurer

WILLIAM E. MILLER
General Counsel

FRANCIS P. NOONAN
Assistant General Counsel

MARTIN LEVY
Activities Director

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

PHILIP M. TALBOTT
Chairman qw

DAVID B. ABRAMSON

RUSSELL B. ADAMS

EARLE C. CLEMENTS

BENJAMIN H. COOPER

DONALD S. DAWSON

STEPHEN F. DUNN

WILLIAM E. FREDENBERGER

MILTON S. KRONHEIM, SR

ROBERT N. McFARLANE

J. WILLARD MARRIOTT, JR.

C. WILLIAM MARTIN, JR.

HARRY L. MERRICK, JR.

RICHARD A. NORRIS

ANGELO A. PUGLISI

LAWRENCE WOOD ROBERT, JR.

JOHN ROLFE TRIBLE

PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY BOARD

JOHN C. McCORMACK
Chairman

F. GIBSON DARRISON, JR.

GEORGE M. EWING, JR.

GEORGE R. HANNAWAY

CRESTON E. KITE

ELLIS W. MEEKER

STANLEY H. ROSENSWEIG

ARTHUR CLARENDON SMITH, JR.

July 12, 1972

Dear Dr. Kissinger;

The Woman's Club of Cocoa Beach, Florida, in which my wife Betsey is taking an active part, is assembling a "Space Coast Cook Book" the proceeds from which will be used for the construction of a much needed Civic Community Center here. Their aim is to "launch" their cookbook at the same time as Apollo 17, December 7.

Betsey would very much like to have you contribute your favorite recipe, autographed of course. The book will have recipes from some of the astronauts wives and others connected with the Apollo program, all of which will help make this the cook book of the year, the most talked about in any housewife's collection. Your contribution will definitely be coveted.

Please have the recipe mailed to me at the above address as soon as possible...I'll be very grateful, Betsey will be happy and the Cocoa Beach Woman's Club captivated. You can see I'm up to my old tricks again, helping the girls do their thing.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUITE 300, 1225 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON D. C. 20036

FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND
President

AREA CODE (202)
296-0903

March 12, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We greatly appreciate the time and trouble you took to be with us the other night at the Industry-Government Seminar on "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade." Your presentation and the discussion it sparked were highly useful and I know from the participants' feedback that this was clearly one of our most interesting and stimulating sessions.

Few questions are as complex or raise as much emotion as the shaping of our national security policy, but few are as important. Therefore, if you feel, as we do, that the education of key industry and government executives in this area is a worthwhile task, I think you will agree that your efforts were well spent and that they will continue to be pondered in the coming months. Still, how we can increase communication and raise the public's confidence and understanding of the Government's policies and processes remains a matter of great concern to many.

Dr. Kissinger, thank you, in both the name of the Institute and the Seminar participants.

JBR/pw

BOARD OF TRUSTEES: John D. Millett, Chairman James E. Webb, Treasurer Frederic N. Cleaveland, Secretary and President
William T. Golden Roger W. Jones Ronald B. Lee Matthias E. Lukens Kent Mathewson William W. Parsons
Nathan W. Pearson John A. Perkins Elmer B. Staats Charles B. Stauffacher York Wilbern Robert C. Wood

AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

FROM KING FEATURES SYNDICATE, 235 EAST 45TH ST., NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
FOR RELEASE TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1970

GENERAL

ND/18/0165

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

A WORD EDGEWISE...

BY JOHN P. ROCHE

THE PRESIDENT MAKES THE DECISIONS

President Nixon's decision on limited intervention in Cambodia has touched off a familiar Washington sequence. Pick up a newspaper, any newspaper, and you will find an "inside" story of how the President made the decision. What distinguishes the Republican regime from that of Lyndon Johnson is that Mr. Nixon announced an "open administration," with the consequence that everyone above the rank of GS-15 feels free to comment on the wisdom of the President's actions.

So far, by my count, four Cabinet ministers have ventilated their sentiments. Secretary Finch put on the most remarkable performance, Vice President suggesting that/Agnew was indirectly involved in the tragedy at Kent State University. (Finch later denied this.) Whether employed by Democrats such as Senator Edward Kennedy or Republicans such as Finch, this is a morally reprehensible position. The principle of collective responsibility is the cornerstone of totalitarian systems, highlighted in Stalin's purge trials, and has no place in a society built around the concept of individual guilt or innocence.

Secretary George Romney simply used the Cambodian episode to register his longstanding complaint that the President does not talk to him, and Secretary Hickel put in a plug for more Cabinet meetings. Secretary Rogers, on the other hand, appeared to be indicating to reporters that Nixon listens, but doesn't pay any attention. (Rogers did not go on the record, but when one sees a story stating "sources close to the Secretary of State's thinking indicate..., he can suspect an off-the-record background interview.)

By the time energetic reporters got through, you had a rather good idea of what happened. In Washington, when a high official tells a journalist "the President has received bad advice", or "the President has allowed himself to become insulated", the translation runs: "Nobody talked to me"; or, "the President did not follow my advice." The number of people in government who think the Constitution requires the President to consult them is astronomical.

RECEIVED

JUN 6 1970

BY JOHN P. ROCHE

xx astronomical.

The problem with the American system is that one man, and one man only, is elected by the sovereign people to make executive decisions. The Cabinet, as Abraham Lincoln told his advisers when they opposed the Emancipation Proclamation, has no standing as a decision-making body. ("One vote FOR, six against," Lincoln reputedly announced, "the ayes have it.") A shrewd President obviously does a great deal of pulse-feeling, but he has to cut the cord.

On important decisions this is never easy -- that's why they end up on the President's desk -- and, invariably, advisers divide into two schools of thought. One group says "yes"; the other "no". It would be nice if the Chief Executive could split the difference, but a yes/no decision to, say, defend Israel against direct Soviet intervention is not a decision. Worse, it is a non-decision that amounts to taking a dive.

Confronting the issue of Cambodia, Mr. Nixon had this kind of choice. The real question was: Will cleaning out the Communist supply depots be worth more to our national interest than the trouble it will create? He could have talked to everybody in the Greater Washington telephone directory without learning more than he already knew, namely that there were two answers, "yes" and "no".

Nixon was elected to make a choice and he made it. One can attack it on the merits if he so chooses, that is, say it was mistaken. Or one can support his actions (as I do). But under the Constitution no one has the right to impeach his decision because he did not consult Senator Fulbright, Secretary Finch, Pat Moynihan or the International Security Affairs section of the Pentagon. It is vital to recall that not once in our history has anyone been elected Secretary of State, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or, for that matter, Special Assistant to the President.

Distributed by King Features Syndicate

(MK)

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

WALTHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 02154

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS

April 18, 1971

Dear Henry:

I just returned from a visit with the former Leader of the Free World and would like to talk to you for a few minutes about some impressions I have. Since I have learned from experience that penetrating your bureaucratic defenses is equivalent to storming Carcassonne in the 13th century (and I have no credentials as a would-be kidnapper), it seemed pointless to call.

However, if you have a few minutes some evening soon, you might give me a ring at home. (617-899-5085). Enclosed is a column the *Post* didn't run that might be useful in dealing with that *schmuck* McCloskey.

RECEIVED

MAY 25 1971

CENTRAL FILES

'FROM KING FEATURES SYNDICATE, 235 EAST 45th ST.,NEW YORK,N.Y.10017

FOR RELEASE THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1971

A WORD EDGEWISE...

BY JOHN P. ROCHE

IT IS NOT GENOCIDE IN INDOCHINA

Anyone who listened to Radio Tokyo (in English) during World War II soon learned that American bombardiers were unbelievably bad at hitting military targets, but were real specialists at taking out hospitals, orphanages, schools, TB sanatoria, etc., and particularly expert at killing "innocent women and children." Heaven knows, many civilians were killed in our bombing of the home islands, with the fire bombing of Tokyo actually a worse shambles than either nuclear attack. A number of Americans have probably thought of the bombing in Indochina as comparable to that of Japan, or Germany.

In point of fact, while our expenditure of ordnance in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia has been enormous -- and civilians have been killed -- the comparison with World War II simply will not hold. Bombing Tokyo or Dresden was like hitting New York City or Philadelphia. In contrast, most of the attacks in Indochina have been out in the wilds where virtually nobody lives. About 90 per cent of the population of the Republic of Vietnam lives in approximately 15 per cent of the land area, a figure that also holds for North Vietnam. There has been no saturation raiding in those areas.

The heaviest bombing has been along the line of the Ho Chi Minh trail, which goes through some of the most God-forsaken terrain in the world. Take the Laotian province of Savannakhet, where the South Vietnamese have been operating against the Communist line of communication. Pre-war French demographic maps of Vietnam indicate that in the area of current fighting the population then was less than 10 persons per square kilometer, i.e., less than 25 per square mile. Most of them have long since left, contributing to the refugee problem but also largely eliminating "innocent civilians" from the line of fire.

(MORE)

BY JOHN P. ROCHE

xx fire.

What has occurred over the last decade is the establishment of one vast military installation that runs all the way from North Vietnam through Central and Southern Laos (the Panhandle) and on down into Eastern Cambodia. At least six Laotian and four or five Cambodian provinces have been functionally annexed by the Hanoi regime. This did not involve any large-scale occupation, because there was nobody home -- the Cambodian province of Ratanakiri, which sits where Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam meet (according to the same French map), had a population which varied from less than one person per square kilometer all the way up to 10.

This lack of population accounts in part for the strange notion that we have "enlarged" the war. Both Souvanna Phouma of Laos and Sihanouk of Cambodia simply wrote off those provinces because they were completely marginal to the existence of either state. To the extent that this wasteland was populated, the inhabitants were wandering Montagnards whom both the Lao and the Khmer considered "moi," or barbarians.

This is not to justify bombing innocent civilians, even "moi" (whose lives are as precious to them as ours are to us), nor is it a defense of what appears as an unbelievable expenditure of bombs on the Ho Chi Minh trail. It is rather designed to suggest that the accusation that we are killing off the population of Indochina in a "genocidal" fashion is palpable nonsense. And that when someone turns up with a headline story about civilian casualties, it be checked out very carefully. One recent figure alleged that we have killed more civilians along the trail, and created more refugees, than demographic surveys suggest ever lived in the entire Panhandle.

(fk)

KISSINGER, HENRY A. / RT

JUN 1 1 1971

Dear John:

Many thanks for your note of June 7 and the
enclosed paper. It is an excellent paper, and
certainly will be useful. My staff will probably
crib ideas from it mercilessly.

It was good to see you.

Professor John P. Roche
† Brandeis University
Department of Politics
Waltham, Massachusetts 02154

PWR:nm:6/10/71

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York, N.Y. 10020

Room 5600

June 13, 1972

Dear Henry:

Your Japan trip sounded as if it had been
most successful and worthwhile. I am so pleased
that you went out.

As a result of John Foster Dulles' peace
treaty mission I was involved in the creation of
the International House in Tokyo, a Japanese
organization established to foster international
understanding, particularly with the U.S.A. From
the beginning Shigeharu Matsumoto has been its
head and has made an important position for him-
self in Japan.

Mr. Matsumoto spent this past weekend with
me and asked if I thought it would be possible
for him to see you briefly. Incidentally he
mentioned several years ago he had presided when
you spoke at the International House.

Mr. Matsumoto is close to the leadership in
Japan and a brief talk with him might be a useful
follow-up to your visit. I mention the possibility
to you but would not press it since you have so
recently seen the leaders themselves.

Mr. Matsumoto will be in Washington from the
18th to the 22nd of this month attending the U.S.-
Japanese Cultural and Educational Conference. Am-
bassador Uchiba is handling his program there and

FEB 21 1969
RECEIVED

Henry V. Kissinger

Warm regards,

I look forward to seeing you.

and I'll see what can be done.
If you decide to come here, please get in touch with me
unfortunately I cannot hire non-citizens on my staff,
can regarding a job here in Washington for you, but
San Francisco. I would be very happy to do whatever I
team didn't turn out and that you are disenchanted with
I'm sorry to hear that the job with the hockey
much pleasant.

from you. I remember our all-to-toil-priest association with
It was so nice to receive a Christmas card

Dear Halley:

San Francisco, California
692 Pine Street, Apt. 103
Miss Halley Rodwell

January 27, 1969

KISSINGER, HENRY V. [Signature]