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Sub-Group #2: *The USSR-US Equation*

A discussion of the USSR-US power equation today, and what it
may be five, ten and twenty years from now is obviously of basic
importance. For example, the case for a "showdown" or using a
limited war as an occasion for extreme pressure to reach a general
settlement is relevant only if available American power, generally
speaking, is greater than available Soviet power or if, within a
certain period, a situation will arise when available Soviet power,
as a result of internal or external developments, will be greater.

There are certain aspects of national "power" which are par-
ticularly relevant to a study of nuclear weapons:

1. <u>American strategic nuclear air power</u>

"Constants," which may be assumed, are an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons, qualitative and quantitative superiority in strategic aircraft (manned). Uncertain is the future availability of and usefulness of the ring of SAC overseas bases. Today they give us an incomparable advantage; tomorrow, as a result of technical advantages or shifts in our alliances, we may lose our position. Uncertain also is the position of the U.S., relative to the USSR, in IBM developments and in other technological efforts.

2. <u>Soviet strategic air power</u>

"Constants," which may be assumed, are an adequate stockpile of nuclear weapons, a large strategic air force capable of annihilating centers in West Europe, the Middle and Far East and with capabilities of major strikes against the US. The USSR may also be

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better able to "paralyze" certain areas by the threat of nuclear
attack. Very importantly related to Soviet power is their advantage
in man-power and conventional arms. If nuclear "parity" or "stabmate"
results in strategic nuclear air power, or if the US is not prepared
to fight a non-nuclear war, then the Soviets, in effect, emerge as a
vastly formidable opponent.

3. Key questions to be asked relate to the short and long-range prospects in the USSR-US equation. Within the next five years will present relative nuclear air advantage of the US be progressively diminished? Are the powers so equal that the Soviets will avoid at all costs a hydrogen war but be willing to test us in probing, limited operations? What if they or their satellites do not use nuclear weapons but restrict themselves to conventional arms? Finally, if the general picture is one of "parity" does that estimate call for any important shifts in US policy? If the estimate is one of an eventual Soviet lead in key areas, what should our response be?