TAPE Telecon
Henry A. Kissinger/The President

April 15, 1972

K: Oh, yes, yes, that we can do.

P: Shows what Vietnamization is doing -- for information here is a memorandum that after the Leaders meeting, the questions they raised that I dictated and sent to them I thought he might find them useful for background.

K: Absolutely.

all the types of invasion

P: And particularly because it hits you know /and also hits and he will inevitably be asked the question about what to say about withdrawals. Well that covers that rather well.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: I'm -- I don't know what he will get into it is just too damn bad he has to testify but I suppose you can't delay it any longer -- the withdrawal thing is a very touchy one. He'll probably just have to say that -- shouldn't there be a paragraph indicating what he should say about withdrawal.

K: Right, he should just say with respect to withdrawal--he should say that by May 1 the President will announce

P: Make an announcement and it will depend on the conditions of that time. But then he should go on to say what we have in that fact sheet that withdrawal is continuing at the present level--you know what I mean--and one of the purposes of this is to do this and that--but I think he ought to have that information too--so those two points can be added.

HAK: Now withdrawals--my mind slipped here-what was the second one

P: The second one is withdrawal--the first one with regard to private meetings

HAK: Oh yes, I'll put that one in there.

P: I think that both of those points they will undoubtedly press them on it. Whether or not this jeopardizes our withdrawal--the fact that we having to do all this and that--well so no, the purpose of this is to try to assure--

HAK: Ill get that to him tomorrow. I'll get it put into the memo. Right Mr. President.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/72

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 15/16 (?), 1972

P: ... you said you had a report from Haig, huh?

K: Yes. Let me run it down for you. First, he reports that from all he has been able to learn these strikes yesterday were enormously successful and he said multiple fires highly successful; ___________ secondaries; and so forth. But this isn't anything he can tell from firsthand, it's just talking out there.

P: Sure, sure.

K: He discussed our general scheme with Bunker because he has to be informed in case anything blows and he is enthusiastic about the prospects. Then he said he spent an afternoon in III Corps with General Hollingsworth, who's been holding together a most tenuous situation along the whole Route 13 from Loc Ninh to Lai Khe. The principal factor which has prevented a major de facto has been U.S. air, especially B-52s. The situation in and around An Loc was far worse than I had anticipated -- three enemy main force units reinforced by tanks and artillery have been deployed against one of the ARVN's weakest division. Yesterday -- that's Sunday -- the situation stabilized in and around An Loc -- no, it was Saturday -- due to massive U.S. air strikes and ARVN reinforcements. And then he goes a little more into the tactical situation saying that the enemy has now attacked the 21st ARVN division also. This division has been performing well and is inflicting considerable punishment on the enemy. I spoke to their Commander who is very aggressive and impressive. General Minh, the III Corps Commander, is a disaster; slow, unsure and definitely not out to do the task. There is some very tough days ahead in III Corps but I believe ARVN will hold and that by the end of this month, the enemy will be driven out of III Corps with great losses. As of now, Hollingsworth estimates that the enemy has lost up to 50 tanks; there are many T-54s in this ___________; these are big tanks. Yesterday beleaguered forces in An Loc started destroying tanks with infantry anti-tank weapons. As a result, the morale of the garrison has materially improved. Then instant impressions confirm my overall air of confidence that ARVN with our help will weather what is very evidently the major North Vietnamese effort of the war. There are only a few signs of VC infra-structure viability and all serious threats are coming from main force units. There is a surge of nationalist spirit evident. But I am sure this is fragile and could be easily upset by setbacks. And he goes into the fact that tomorrow he'll visit I Corps and then a report on IV Corps where he had sent one of our assistants, which is not -- and he says despite the heavy fighting, this is IV Corps -- has brought confidence that the situation is under

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/72

TELCONE
The President /Mr. Kissinger

April 15/16 (?), 1972

K: (cont'd) control. An interesting side light of Vietnamese survey team, I was in Chuong Thien when the recent attacks began. They found the public attitude was initially very pessimistic in part because of the absence of any overhead U.S. support. Once U.S. aircraft began to be seen, the attitude shifted markedly. All the Vietnamese interviewed were encouraged about the massive U.S. naval and air reinforcements. While I believe the enemy has defined-- As of now, I believe we have a good basis for confidence the situation will hold together but there may be some tough moments between now and the end of the month. Following this, we will have some rebuilding to do before new enemy efforts, perhaps in July. But the subsequent effort should be _________ and should be easily contained. While the enemy has definitely erred, I believe your project offers the best long-term hope of the situation and so on and so forth.

P: Right.

K: At the same time, I am convinced that you should proceed from a posture of confidence that the situation here will hold together for a long time. Events will improve during this next year with the greatest danger coming after that. Well, that's not our immediate worry. So I think we are in a good -- in a rather good position. At that christening which I attended, there were a large number of the Liberal Establishment here. Well, some of them are pretty emotional but on the whole they are -- they don't know what to do. There isn't that variance that we had after Cambodia.

P: They may be afraid that we know something.

K: That's right. David Bruce was there and he said, "God, tell the President God Bless Him; this has been the most courageous and tenacious thing he has seen in public life."

P: Arthur Burns was over, Rose said; she saw him. She said that -- you know he didn't get into these things very often but he says he knew this was a terribly tough thing that he was in, which was risk, but he personally felt and he thought that an awful lot of people felt that it was the right thing and the people admired the fact that it was done. You know, we may get some benefit from that.

K: I have no question, especially if it works.

P: Of course.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD E0 12958
By NARA Date 6/10/72

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 15/16 (?), 1972

K: The Russians have already sent their navigator and pilot over here. They certainly are not wasting any time; he's arriving tonight. Of course he was dispatched after they knew about these attacks.

P: Yeah. I think the Liberal Establishment -- now, look, all that matters is winning.

K: Exactly.

P: And we know one way or the other we're going to win; it isn't a question of losing at all. If the ARVN collapses, then we will still blockade, you know. We don't give a damn.

K: Right. I don't think the ARVN will collapse.

P: I think based on Haig's thing that it's going to be rough and that they aren't -- apparently we've been telling them III Corps was no good. But that based on that, we've got to realize that the other side also is having some rough times. That's what I think --

K: Fantastic!

P: Think that we've got to -- we don't know and I assume as I have often said that Abrams is using all that power over there that he can. Now --

[End of Tape]

MJD E0 12958
Authority
By ____ NARA Date 6/1/04

11:30 -- April 15, 1972

K: ... about 50 % of ours so they are getting it.

P: So certainly, Henry, they must be hitting something.

K: Well, Mr. President, they claimed to have counted 10,000 bodies up to now and if you cut it in half, there must be another 5,000 that they have killed that we don't find.

P: Sure, sure.

K: In B-52 attacks.

P: Well, I'll tell you they are being punished and they are taking heavy casualties. The bastards are --

K: Mr. President, if they don't make it this time, they are not going to come back for two years.

P: If they don't make it this time, we're out of the woods but the point is that we have to realize though that our hold card is the blockade. However, that's why you've got to get it settled with the Russians now. I don't want a meeting -- you see, when you meet with them it's either got to be on the way to settlement or we blockade. You see that's the one thing I'm concerned about, these bastards, that they will filibuster us.

K: They can't filibuster you beyond the 25th of April.

P: Right.

K: And on the other hand, Mr. President, the major thing now is to beat down these North Vietnamese. I told them that you could not have a reasonable summit meeting if there were major action going on in Vietnam.

P: Right. He understands that, doesn't he?

K: Oh, yes.

P: Good, God, we can't go there with Russian tanks and Russian guns killing South Vietnamese and Americans. Hell, no, we're not going to go! We won't go. It isn't just a reasonable summit; it means there ain't going to be no meeting, that's what he's got to understand.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 01 1972

By NARA Date 6/10/72

April 15, 1972 -- 11:30

- 2 -

K: Right.

P: And you can -- so you've got a few cards to play yourself on your trip.

K: Well, I think when I say if we keep our nerves, I don't mean you. I mean if as a country we keep our nerves, we are going to make it. Assuming the South Vietnamese don't collapse on us but there is no sign of this.

P: They may be stronger than we think.

K: Well, so far, Mr. President --

P: It's been three weeks now.

K: Actions have been going on three weeks; they have not achieved one major objective. When it started, we said to ourselves if they take 3 or 4 provincial towns, we are not doing badly. They've not yet taken one.

P: Yeah; pretty good, isn't it?

K: That's right.

P: Well, in any event, you would be going under present plans Wednesday night.

K: Yes. I suggested moving it a day but he said there is a meeting of the Politburo on Sunday and so it would be very inconvenient if they had to change.

P: Move it back a day, which way?

K: To Thursday night.

P: Hell, no, go Wednesday. The sooner, the better for us.

K: Right. Well, we're going Wednesday night now.

P: Yeah, yeah; get it over with.

K: Right.

P: In the meantime though, you mean our hands are tied now for a week?

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
 Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/01

DECLASSIFIED
MFD E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/4/04

April 15, 1972 -- 11:30

K: Well, no, we can bomb the bejesus out of them all over North Vietnam except in the Hanoi and Haiphong area.

P: You would not -- because you in effect had said we would not bomb there, is that what you told them?

K: That's right.

P: What about naval action?

K: We can go up and down the coast but not beyond the 20th parallel in effect.

P: That's all right too.

K: But, Mr. President, that gets every port of North Vietnam except Haiphong.

P: Yeah. But on the other hand, that allows Abrams to do what he wants to do and concentrate his air power in the battle area and we've given them quite a shock up in that area for a while.

K: That's right, Mr. President. They know what the situation is.

P: Why do you think though they will interpret, Henry -- what do you think they will interpret our stopping hitting the North, protests or something? You see, that's what worries me.

K: No, no, no; they know we are talking to the Russians. And after all, we are only stopping something that we have only done one day. We are continuing everything else.

P: They might expect we might come back another day.

K: Exactly.

P: Has it been carried in the news yet?

K: Yeah. Heavily.

P: [Laughter] What are they saying about it? Squealing?

K: Well, they are just reporting it -- it's just the first wave there. It's wave after wave of planes. You see, they can't see the B-52 and they dropped a million pounds of bombs.

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 15, 1972 -- 11:30

P: What? A million pounds of bombs.

K: A million pounds of bombs.

P: In the Haiphong area?

K: In the Haiphong area.

P: Did they have their calibrators fit?

K: Yeah, they are fixed now.

P: You think they really hit something this time, don't you?

K: Well, actually, we now have the photographs; they hit something last time too.

P: Yeah. But this time they probably hit a hell of a lot though, don't you think?

K: Oh, God, yes. And this time they did it visually, Mr. President.

P: Oh, the weather was good enough?

K: Yes, they did it with radar visually.

P: Goddamn, that must have been a good strike!

K: Yeah.

P: Of course, you want to remember Johnson bombed them for years and it didn't do any good.

K: But, Mr. President, Johnson never had a strategy; he was sort of picking away at them. He would go in with 50 planes, 20 planes; I bet you we will have had more planes over there in one day than Johnson had in a month.

P: Really?

K: Yeah.

P: Well, that has more impact too.

K: That's right.

DECLASSIFIED

- 4 -

TELCONE
The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 15, 1972 -- 11:30

P: That shock treatment of cracking them. The only thing I regret is that when we made this plan, we didn't take out the power plants. The power plants, that can really demoralize a person.

K: Well, they have a power plant that they can hit south of the 20th parallel.

P: I meant the ones in Hanoi; put out the lights.

K: Well, it may be on there.

P: Really?

K: I have to check that list. What they gave them was 10 targets of which they were supposed to hit 6.

P: I see. Well, it's probably a pretty good strike, Henry, isn't it?

K: Well, 196 airplanes, Mr. President, that's pretty serious.

P: Well, in World War I -- II though, we used to have a thousand plane raid.

K: Yeah, but these planes can carry -- each plane can carry about 10 times the load of World War II plane could carry.

P: Yeah. Well, anyway, we will hold on and see what happens.

K: Well, we've got a few hold cards.

P: I think we've got Bill on salvo; he'll take a hard line. I think he knows it.

K: I mean, Mr. President, even if some protests start next week, we've got a big hold card.

P: Well, the fact that you've been to Russia.

K: Exactly.

P: When we blow that one, that's going to really -- of course, if we blow that one, you realize we will say then that we are not going to the summit. But that's --

DECLASSIFIED
MJE FO 12958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/4/04

April 15, 1972 -- 11:30

K: Well, no, but there may be conditions which we may blow it --

P: And still go, huh?

K: And still go to the summit. For example, supposing we get a
settlement which the Russians guarantee.

P: Oh, that! Oh, any settlement.

K: My assessment is that the chances are 50-50 that we may want to
blow it at some point. But at any rate, it is a good hold care to
have.

P: Well, we shall see. Oh, yes, that's the reason why you are going.
It's a good thing to do. As I said, after reversing earlier the
decision, I think it's right; you've just got to go. Whether they come
or not, the Vietnamese --

K: You could even make a case if they come a week later, it gives
them a better chance to work them over.

P: Yeah, yeah. Well, also, we've got a chance to work them over
too. You understand if they don't show -- I mean, after you meet
the Russians --

K: Oh, we go right back to him.

P: Don't you agree?

K: Oh, yeah.

And

P: The Russians have got to damn well understand that. And, also,
they've got to understand -- Well, I don't know, I just have a feeling,
Henry, that the strategy, which you and I both agree on, is the right
one.

K: No question.

P: Everybody thinks it's too Hawkish; too unreasonable and so forth
but what the hell else can you do?

K: Mr. President, if we had pursued the Laird strategy, we might have
won in the South but the war would have dragged on and on and on and
winning in the South is no -- doesn't bring the Russians in.
What brings the Russians in -- I mean, we wouldn't have won in the

MAY 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Autbor:
By NARA Date 6/4/04

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F.O. 12958

By NARA Date 6/10/72

April 15, 1972 -- 11:30

K: (con'td) South, we could have held in the South and what brings the Russians in is the fact that the situation may get out of hand. Pouring that Fleet in there has made more of an impact on the Russians than the defense of An Loc which they don't understand.

P: Yeah. The Fleet shakes them because they think it's a blockade.

K: Of course.

P: And they're right. This time we aren't fooling; we've got enough to do it with, haven't we? We have Morris and Bill Cumin (?) out there --

K: Two carriers on the way. One of them is going to be there on Monday and operational on Wednesday. That immediately gives us 96 sorties more.

P: I tell you the thing to do is to pour it in there every place we can; just pour it down wherever the weather is and just bomb the hell out of them. I would think they'd be tearing the hell out of the I Corps now, shouldn't they? The weather's pretty good.

K: Oh, God --

P: Are they hitting some things?

K: Oh, yes. And they are tearing up the Panhandle. I don't even report this stuff to you; 26 secondaries, warehouses destroyed and stuff like that.

P: In the Panhandle?

K: Yeah. And the cumulative effect of that is going to be quite a lot.

P: Oh, Abrams has got the horses now. He can't blame it on anybody but himself.

K: Exactly.

P: Okay. Well, we finished one Pan American one again. I tell you there is sure not a damn thing to say to these folks.

K: That's the truth.

11:30, April 15, 1972

P: They've been at it a week and -- God, I love them but Jesus Christ it's -- the Organization, I mean they are just lovely people but they just haven't got it, have they?

K: No. Well, there's something missing.

P: Except for Brazil.

K: Yeah. There's something missing.

P: Well, anyway, we'll see. In the morning you will give me --

K: I'm going over to the Pentagon to get a full wrap-up on today's operations and then I will give you a call.

P: Yeah. On the Rogers' thing, I told him to give me a call if he had any thoughts or anything he wanted to ask about. But he's all set for the hard line. Is there anything more you think we want to feed him, why, let's give it to him.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: You know, let's let him go --

K: Well, I don't think we should overdo it now; I think we are in good shape.

P: He won't overdo it, you know that. What I meant is, whatever he says won't sound near as hard as if Laird says it. That's the reason his saying it is good.

K: Oh, yes; it's a great asset.

P: Yeah. Okay, thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

MJD F.O. 12958
 Authority
By. NARA Date 6/10/72

The New York Times and the government of
the United States of America

Publicity Statement

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L. W. NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

4/15/72 11:50

HAK: I saw the cable from Abrams saying the risks were too great
for this strike and under these conditions the President can't go
through with it.

ML: We can't call if off now, Henry..... do you want me to?

HAK: We will be struck in Region 3. (from the cable)

ML: We had a similar cable that you knew about yesterday.

HAK: You said that by scaling down the effort you would have him
aboard.

ML: He is going to do it.

HAK: I want two names to replace Abrams--who should replace Abrams?

ML: As far as I think--Fred Wyan and I will give you the other later--
it will be a mistake, though Henry.

HAK: I will check again with the President to make sure he doesn't
want to go ahead. Hold off for 10 minutes and I will talk to him.

ML: As far as going to go, this is the time to go, but if you want, it
will be called off.

HAK: What is this, the Field Commander should do as the Commander
in-Chief says. What about the news stories?

ML: I don't know where that came from--probably from--I don't
know. It came out in the New York Times under Beacher's name. I
have an investigation going on now on people talking about 52's in this
building and I have shut them off.

HAK: In every crisis, the President is left by his people.

ML: Not by me, Henry. I think that story is Frankle, Beacher and
the whole NYTimes staff in town.

The President's Office is open 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. every day, except on Federal holidays.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By KHLW NASA Date 5/12/84

TELCOM

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

4/15/72 11:50 a.m.

Page 2

HAK: I will be back to you in 15 minutes.

ML: We are going at 3 o'clock.

HAK: Well, it is a heavy responsibility to overrule his Commander.

ML: Al will explain this to Abrams the best he can. Abrams wants to use the assets in the battle and he thinks that going now doesn't affect the battle for six months.

HAK: He will blame us for his failures.

ML: This won't cause a failure.

HAK: How is AnLoc--

ML: They are doing well at An Loc--We have the briefers over there for you now, you know....

HAK: Yes. You said by scaling down, everyone will be happy

ML: I didn't say that Henry. Henry that is the position historically of the Commanders -- not to use his assets in battle.

TELCOM 12:05

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

ML: These assets have been stood down anyway.

HAK: We have gone through too many crises that people have stuck the White House with.

ML: I will go out in front if you want me to.

HAK: I will talk to the President first.

ML: We have stood down the assets. For the next 7 hours you can't put them on the line anyway.

HAK: I will call you back.-- He is extremely displeased. ..... about McVee. MACV

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, Sect. 3.6

The President has just spoken to the prime minister.
Please hear what he has to say.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

4/15/72 1:52pm

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/72

R: What I wanted to talk about. . . I wanted to be sure we don't have our signals crossed and to be sure I know everything going on so I don't get into a Cambodia situation. Do you remember the date. . . ?

K: Yes, April 1 the message was sent from here and April 2 it was delivered.

R: And what's the answer to the question. . .

K: Because Porter was here.

R: When we say "private sources" what do we mean?

K: Our Military Attache there, but we don't want to say that.

R: No.

K: And he gives it to their man.

R: And why do we say that's private?

K: That's the wrong word to use -- "non-delegation sources."

R: But Moorer said "private" didn't he?

K: Yes.

R: I think I will be questioned about that.

K: I will. . . I don't have the text here now, but I can get it over to you by tomorrow.

R: Okay, do that. I would appreciate it.

K: I will give you the exact text so you will know what the situation is. The President was working last night and he is working now on something he will send to you and Mel to make sure both of you follow the same line. It was two or three pages the last time I saw it, but he is still scribbling it.

R: Is anything about to happen. . . I don't want to be in a position. . .

K: Mel told you what's happening today. . . he was supposed to.

R: He is going to come to see me; we don't have to talk on the phone about it.

September 15, 1972, 1:52pm

U.S. Air Force

Reproducible Copy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

4/15/72 1:52pm p. 2

K: But that is a one-shot affair. But the President is bloodily determined and wants to keep an ominous set of options open, including blockade.

R: What do you think about the SALT talks discontinuance?

K: I don't think that's connected.

R: Any reason to think the signals we are giving the world and the Russians have any effect?

K: Not yet.

R: Did you convey something to Dobrynin on it?

K: No, I have not conveyed anything.

R: Did you see him last week?

K: I saw him for an odd thing. He wanted to see my films on China and he saw one of them, but my parents were here. He came over -- it was before the Gridiron thing. It was for all intents and purposes social.

R: But no discussion about this ________ thing.

K: No.

R: The downs will use this occasion to hit us hard. I'm not concerned, but I want to be sure we all say the same thing.

K: I won't say anything. I won't see press and I will keep you fully informed of anything here.

R: Okay, well fine Henry. Thank you.

Re: question about call log entry
Re: phone call of 1/15/72
Re: President's call

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KMLW NAVAQ Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird

4/15/72 3:00pm

L: You looking for me?

K: I was calling you at the request of the President.

L: I went out to brief Bill Rogers.

K: He wanted to make sure you understood that he is writing a memorandum to both of you about your testimony next week which supports you, and he wants you to hard-line it.

L: I would like to.

K: That's what he wants. We have nothing to lose now by being ferocious.

L: I have got to talk to you. We have got to keep calm. I can't go 15 different directions.

K: You're not. No one is asking you to. We want you to go the direction the President wants.

L: That's what I thought I was doing until I got that call from you at noon.

K: We got a bleeding message from Abe and the Chairman . . . .

L: The Chairman has nothing to do with you; you knew Abe's position all along.

K: What was Bill's reaction to your briefing?

L: He asked a few questions. Everything is fine, no problem on that. He was okay. He wanted to know whether it could be spared and I said it could.

K: Will you let me know when it's done, or under way?

L: They are already there with some now. In five minutes you will have more. Then it follows up with other stuff.

K: Right.

L: We got to keep calm around here. I think I am following the President's instructions then I get a call like that one and it screws it up.

Re: [g]uide to the open line
is the one on the left
President's Desk

TELECON
Secretary Laird

4/15/72 3:00pm p. 2

K: The President's point of view is he hasn't gotten it into Abe's head what he wants.

L: He wants Abe's assessment, doesn't he?

K: Yes, but...

L: He got that _______ ed out yesterday but can I tell him?

K: I thought when you scaled it down he went along with it.

L: I will talk to you about it some time.

K: Are you going to be there in the morning?

L: Yes, are you going to be there tonight?

K: No. You want to have breakfast like we did last week?

L: K: Yes.

K: You, Rush, Moorer and I can meet at 8:15, or is that too early?

L: No, that's fine.

K: I will come over there then. We can review where we stand.

September 13, 1969, at 10:00 a.m. Central Time

Admiral Moorer or Dr. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Secl. 3.6

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/69

TELCONE

Admiral Moorer/Dr. Kissinger

3:10 p.m. 4/15/72

HAK: I can tell you when I showed Abrams message to the President he almost went into orbit.

AM: I thought he should see it. He has got 364 tac air.

HAK: The President wants Abrams to know that this is how much he had two weeks ago.

AM: And he has 45 B-52's and 150 sortees will not lose the war-- he has had 3800 (?) already to win it. I didn't concern myself with this message 'cause we were not laying on a back tac air strike up there and no flare up.

HAK: How is An Loc?

AM: There is no large hand-to-hand combat. I think they have backed of a little bit--they are softening the thing up before making another ground effort. They will have a lot of air fighting. Actually they will be there only 12 hours if the weather permits Tac Air going in.

HAK: How does the weather look.

AM: 50/50. There is fog and drizzle--helps us with the 52's, but not the others. The first phase of the strike which is over now, I guess, --the conditions are fine for that.

HAK: Would it have been better tomorrow?

AM: No, we gave them a choice--Abrams said tomorrow, and then changed his mind. He had the choice of today or tomorrow. He had every consideration. I told him if the weather was not suitable, they could work in ______ package ______.

HAK: I bet that is what he is going to do.

AM: No, I am talking about McCain. Abrams does not have ordering for this operation. Tac air was going 8:30 tonight--they have only 150 air craft and these could be in in 1/2 day.

HAK: How many targets?

AM: They have eight or 10 targets--good targets and they are concentrated in Haiphong.

Re: [goddesses,] what are we doing here?

Is that a real document?

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Secr. 3.6

By: KML V NASA Date: 5/13/04

Adm. Moorer/Dr. Kissinger

Page 2

AM: The operation is well planned -- and don't worry about what Abrams said in the message--it never occurred to me to cancell on the basis of that cable.

HAK: Really? Maybe I just over-reacted.

AM: He recommended slipping it a week when you were in Canada. I found out about that 2:00 that night. I said continue operations and he would use ______ for the immediate ground battle. We were giving 200 tac airs and 36 B-52's-- now they have 356 Tac airs and 45 B-52's. So there was no significant degradation of his capability when you get down to it.

HAK: How does the military situation look to you?

AM: Generally, as I expected these initiatives moved forward in number one Region--positions in Guay just partially committed. Not much has happened in Region 2--they are working on that road. Don't worry about the logistics--we can take care of them through ______. North Vietnamese have come to the conclusion that the most likely success is at Than Luc and this is where all there effort is. They have pulled in part 9 and now part 7. They have taken all airborne brigades in there. That air lift was done by the South Vietnamese themselves. I think they are on top of it. There will be some real heavy battle there. They are suffering some real severe casualties.

HAK: (Asks about person-name inaudible)

AM: He wants to move out to the highland and turn out to the east, north of the river. .....San Whey and other operations you asked for. Went up to the Haiphong harbor and turned around and came back. They are working on the whole area. They think the 121st Division (?) will go by rail then roads because of the harrassment by the destroyers. The North Vietnamese are putting maximum effort into this.

HAK: I suggested we all have breakfast again tomorrow with Laird in his office. Those pictures were interesting.

AM: The drone photos were not good.

HAK: I hope they get the tac air up there today.

The President's Office reports to
the Vice President for Academic Affairs

TELCORN

Adm. Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

Page 3

AM: They will do their best. The weather tomorrow will be
about the same as today.

HAK: Then, it wouldn't have made any difference.

AM: They will do the best they can.

HAK: When are you getting other destroyers in there.

AM: Let me give you a table in the morning--

HAK: And any other reinforcements you can get for the President.

A. P. Pressler, III, USAF, Ret.
Retired Air Force General
Posthumous Medal?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

3:25 p.m. 4/15/72

AM: The B-52's are all heading home. The big planes got in there and cleared it out and the A 6's helped them on instrument too. They are home free.

HAK: How many did we fly?

AM: 18 with 1200 bombs--targets were storage targets--the aircraft are out safely.

HAK: How many A 6's?

AM: 14---

HAK: They didn't got after the storage tanks?

AM: They were disrupting the missiles. They went after some of the trucks--that is open storage.

HAK: Good.

AM: The others will go at 8:30 weather permitting--otherwise before dawn. No losses.

HAK: Delighted.

AM: There can't be any propaganda claims--they got the message with 1200 bombs--about 66 bombs in each airplane.

HAK: How many were the F-4's carrying?

AM: About 12--the F 4's are more accurate.

HAK: Congratulations.

["H. E. S. I. W. A. R. E. I. C. A. R. E. I. C. A. R

Re: phone tree from the open line
in the office at 6:00pm
Operations Staff

By: KHLW NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Laird

4/15/72 4:00pm

L: We are sending reports from time to time -- you're getting them, aren't you?

K: Yes, it seems to be going very well.

L: Dan is staying there; he will get in touch with your people and let them know from time to time.

K: There won't be anything now until 8:30, right?

L: Right.

K: Good.

L: Very good, thank you.

Re: [insert telephone number]

11:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time

Publicity Staff

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L. W. NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

4/15/72 4:50 p.m.

HAK: One question I have with respect to shelling in Haiphong-- you can't hit Haiphong with your ships without danger. Can you shell the harber entrances.

AM: Oh, hell yes.

HAK: Can you get that done tonight.

AM: It is beginning to be day. I can have them shell that point--day light or night.

HAK: Doesn't matter--at night for all I care

AM: When.

HAK: I think I would like it all together so that they will get a firm message.

AM: Should the weather preclude the one, do it anyway?

HAK: Yes. What do you think: That would be a good warning that we might want to come in there. You will, now, make every effort to get Tac air in there?

AM: Yes. The only thing that might stop it, (doesn't mention what, but probably weather) because we want results from this. When we get our daylight report, we'll know. I am coming here at 7:30 tonight to take a look at the report.

HAK: Tell Laird the President wants that done during the tac air operation and I will call him too.

Re: [insert time zone code]
[insert day of week]
[insert month]
[insert year]
[insert day of the week]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL V NASA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird
4/15/72 4:53 p.m.

K: One other thing the President wanted done and wanted me to call Moorer. It's not major but while the tac air is going on he wants shells dropped on a few ships in fortifications in the estuary.

L: You mean up there by Haiphong?

K: Yes, where the thing juts out.

KL: Against the fortifications?

K: It doesn't have to be at the exact time, but in the same 24-hour period.

L: This will be over in seven or eight hours.

K: Good, you can have 24 hours for it.

L: This can be done. . . . We'll get at that. . . . All right.

K: All right?

L: Yes, let me get at that, all right.

["H. E. T. I. S. T. U. S. A. U. S. A. U. S. A. U. S. A. U. S

Re: [insert telephone number here]

TELECON
Secretary Laird

4/15/72 6:10 p.m. p. 2

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/72

L: That is my privilege. . . I'll talk to you about it in the morning. . . . . . . . . He knew how his field commander started and Al knew that *ik* too. And if the President didn't know it's because you weren't briefing him properly. He knew that *all* *il*ong.

K: . . . . . he suffered from the misapprehension that . . .

L: We were told by that group that came back over that the Commander-in-Chief made the decision and that takes precedence . . .

K: What group?

L: Tom and Ken.

K: Right, but *then* the thought was then that the scaling down had brought everybody aboard.

L: Who told you that? I didn't tell you that.

K: It must have been a misinterpretation of what you told me when I was in Canada.

L: I didn't tell you that. I just said things were go. I am not going to talk about things like that on the open phone anyway.

Page 2
Mel Laird/Mr. Kissinger

ML: Well, we don't know what they are. But the first couple of reports you see-I am going down there right now and try to track it out--The first reports are sometimes wrong, the second report is sometimes all right, the third report is sometimes wrong, but we are watching it very closely, and I have got them down there checking and--but you may have--there may be a couple of --we don't know what they are now.

HAK: Look, that is not the sort of thing to get uptight about--

ML: And right now, there is a cloud cover all over the Haiphong area.

HAK: Well, I have only been told that there is a possibility of it.

ML: We are in a hold right now for--

HAK: I understand.

ML: I was going down to the MMCC right now.

HAK: Could you call me with a report on that when you know?

ML: Yes, when I know.

DECLASSIFIED

MMD E012958
Author

By NARA Date 6/1/68

TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Laird

April 15, 1972 7:30 p.m

HAK: Mel, I wanted to call you. You and I shouldn't be yelling at each other, because I have great faith in you.

ML: I know that Henry.

HAK: Look the President was up the good part of the night--he is under great strain, this is a political year, you know, I am talking to you as a friend now and he feels that for him to override the field commander

ML: He knew that all the time.

HAK: Well, he hadn't fully understood that--maybe I had given him the wrong impression or had gotten the wrong impression yesterday--I thought he had been rather reconciled to it--and he also having read all these Canadian headlines to make it look as though we are getting run out of MR 3 read this as if Abrams was setting up an alibi--

ML Well, that wasn't the case at all. I think that we have got to help him.

HAK: I understand, the think I ought to have done was call you first. But the trouble--you know on the airplane and by mistake someone handed him the envelop before I got to it.

ML: We are sending all of those "Rawl" cables over that have to do with

HAK: Well, 99 out of 100, he never sees. Now this one he did see, because--you know, I will sit down with you during the week sometime and explain to you way he sees the overall thing and this has been a particularly tense day for him.

ML: Well, you know things are going to work out all right here and I am down at the AMCC and I wanted you know that we have these first reports--they're preliminary--but we have a report now on the possibility of a couple of aircraft down--

HAK: Of ours? I thought they were all clear.

ML: You see, what we are getting are these reports, via telephone--there may be two down....

HAK: I won't call it--B-52's?

MJD E0 12558
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/64

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer

April 15, 1972 7:30 p. m.

HAK: Tom, how are you?

AM: Fine.

HAK: I was just talking to Laird who was scolding me all evening--he
tells me we may have lost two B-52's.

AM: Not that I know of--we have got a report here that they are all out.
Will check again--I'm right in the office here. No, absolutely not.

HAK: Well, he is just trying to spook me.

AM: Not only do we have our own info, we have got infor from the othe r
side that they got out--

HAK: The opponent?

AM: Yes.

HAK: Do you think we did any damage?

AM: Well, we will have to take a look.

HAK: The tac air--doesn't look like they can go.

AM: We are still on a hold and I am seeing McCain right now, when
you called. And the other thing you wanted done, off running.

HAK: Good, that will be done tomorrow night do you think?

AM: It will be done pretty soon--they will have the damnest storm they
every saw--

HAK: Damnest what?

AM: Hail strom--iron hail storm.

HAK:Fine, that is not going to do a hell of a lot of damage, but

AM: It will be effective and they'll be having it pretty soon.

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/1/64

TELCONE

Mel Laird/Mr. Kissinger

April 15, 1972

7:40 p. m.

ML: I hope I didn't get you out of the shower.

HAK: I was wiser than you, I got out of this dinner.

ML: I wished that I had gotten out of it. I don't like to get out of all of them. I have to go once in a while.

HAK: Well, you are a good sport.

ML: Everything is going along all right. The weather closed in there but they think it will move out perhaps in a hour. As far as the radio transmission on the downed aircraft--the only thing that it could possible be is a 105--

HAK: Oh, an iron hand

ML: and we are not sure of that either, because it is just a radio transmission, but all of those 52's are accounted for a home free.

HAK: Terrific.

ML: And all A-6's --they went in a took that big truck part--

HAK: With the 600 trucks

ML: They hit there and also they hit one other target in the --just ahead of the 52's you see

HAK: I understand--

ML: So

HAK Well, we are relaxed about--I think the message will get across whether or not the other one gets off.

ML: The barracks area was hit and the truck storage and the big POL thing that they put in over a million pounds--

HAK: You mean the A-6's?

ML: No the 52's on the POL's.

HAK: Oh really, good--you don't know whether they hit the target.

MFD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/64

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/A Dobrynin

April 15, 1972 8:15 p.m.

HAK: A--Did (Aryimen)(?) let you go finally?

AD: Well, he is here--I couldn't give you a chance to stay alone.
So you immediately ______ to make a crisis.

HAK: I tell you, this is the adventure of letting you out of town or
wherever you were.

AD: Yes, how dangerous to let you go any place.

HAK: You read the message that I dic.........

AD: Yes, I gave a reply--not reply on your matters, but reply
on our previous.

HAK: Oh you have?

AD: Where are you now, far from Washington?

HAK: No, I am in my apartment.

AD: Well, if you like, I could go there, or you come any place to me
or to--if you like, I could come to your apartment.

HAK: Hold on a second, or could you call back--say in two minutes.
Why don't you come here.

AD: This is your apartment where I was three years ago--or have
you now changed?

HAK: No, its 2527 Waterside Drive--do you want me to have you picked
up in a White House car--

AD: Well, it doesn't matter

HAK: I will have my secret service agent and a W<sub>h</sub>ite House car pick you
up--

AD: Right now or in 20 minutes, I should say.

HAK: Well, it takes at least that long to get there.

DECLASSIFIED

MFD EO 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/President
April 15, 1972 10:25 p.m.

HAK: I am sorry to bother you, but we got some pretty quick action
out of our Soviet friends--Dobrynin was in slobbering over me--first
of all he had a message from the North Vietnamese for us which was
a lot more conciliatory than the one that they gave us in Paris--was
also dated a day later and it sort of left the day opened to that proposal
you and I discussed this afternoon--if they come on the 24th, we go
to the Plenary on the 27th. And they had an alternative suggestion,
that maybe they will send their foreign minister to Moscow and it was
the softest message that I have ever seen.

RN: And it is dated a day later. Does Dobrynin know that we hit
them tonight?

HAK: Oh yes. I had told this to Vorontsov. And that was the second
interesting thing, he said, of course, could we ask you this, could
we ask you not to escalate the war, because that would make it very
difficult--I said all right. As long as there is some prospect, we will
wait until we have heard from the North Vietnamese. And he said, what
did you mean when you said you are prepared to come to Moscow, but
you wanted to have some assurances of complete results. He said all
we can promise you is that we can try, we can't promise you the results
because we don't know yet what you are going to propose. So he said
also Breshnev is the leading man in our country; what if he wants to
put something else on the agenda first? I said he may be the leading
man in your country, but I have instructions from the President from
which I cannot digress. In other words, he said they are very anxious
for me to come any way, that Vietnam will be the first agenda item,
that they recognize the urgency and considering that in the past they
had even refused to pass messages, much less take sides.

RN: Now what is the situation regarding--is there still a possibility
that they might do the meeting on the 24th?

HAK: Yes, definitely. Or maybe as a face saver they will say the 25th.

RN: Well, that is fine.

HAK: I also told them, I figured that I might as well go for broke, I
told them, look if the meeting doesn't take place by May 1, it isn't
worth having it, because then time has run out.

RN: Well, also we are prepared to go, I told you the Russians if they
decided not to have you come, then we blockade, you can't play the
game any other way.

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E0 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/President

HAK: Mr. President, you brought it to this point and no one else
w ould have had the courage to do it.

RN: Well, we are ready to play it out too. Incidentally, if they're
meeting is disappointing, we'll blockade too, and through the summit
right down the sink too. I don't think they will let that happen.

HAK: He was slobbering so much. Here we are bombing the capitol
and near the capitol of one of their close allies according to the
peacenik textbook, he should be yelling and screaming. He came
to my apartment with a written message for me.

RN: Incidentally, I got Bill before the dinner and he is set to go
Monday, hard-lined. He said I understand what we have got to do
and I think he realizes the inevitability. I didn't tell him anything
except I said look, Bill if this doesn't work, we may have to flush
the summit. That shook him. So he'll be hard lined.

HAK: That is also what I told Dobrynin. I said you people completely
misunderstood the President--He is a patriot first and he is not looking
at political considerations, and he thinks that he is not going to go to
Moscow with this thing hanging over his head--and he said of listen
we must use restraint, we are great powers. It was really

RN: You think your trip is on.

HAK: The only question is whether we want them to send a special plane--
I'm kidding--I mean almost anything.

RN: They won't change their minds, because of the bombing.

HAK: Absolutely not. He said, well, must we promise results--you
know that is hard to ask of the Soviet government to promise results
we can promise to make an effort and that we will promise--all right
it is settled, Vietnam is agenda item one and nothing will be discussed
until it is fully covered and you are satisfied. And you can't ask for
much more than that. And if they screw us Mr. President, and we then
go hard lined when I get back, we'll have done everything -- if we are
honest about it, they are helping us a hell of a lot more than we are helping
them.

RN: Okay--I have to get back to the Latins.

MJD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/01

TELCORN

Mel Laird/Mr. Kissinger

April 15, 1972 11:05 p. m.

ML: I went back to the Pentagon after the dinner for a little while.
I just wanted you to know that they are going again.

HAK: Oh good, what are those targets incidentally.

ML: POL, that army barracks and barracks complex, they are
going after the two truck parks again, and they are at it and it is cleared
and the second group is in there now.

HAK: Terrific. How many are we using--

ML: Well, we will give you the dope-- there's over 100 in there now.

HAK: Tell me, when is that operation going to be condl uded?

ML: In about 3-1/2 or 3 hours.

HAK: With both ways?

ML: Yes:

HAK: The shelling also? So the whole thing will be over by 7:00
tomorrow morning.

M:L: Yes, by 7:00 tomorrow morning. When you get over here
to have breakfast, we'll be all through.

HAK: I can't stop biting my nails.

ML: No, this was the thing to do. And things are quiet in country
right now.

HAK: Oh good, so it was a good day to do it. Are we getting a little
flack from the press?

ML: Oh I don't know, I haven't watched the press.

HAK: I understand they are calling like crazy--I have switched them
all to Defense.

ML: Well, we are staying with the Saigon statement.

HAK: Well, thank you Mel, you were a great trooper.

DECLASSIFIED

Mg. F.O. 12558
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/72

MSS DIV LIB CONG.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

April 15, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin

I. Telephone Conversation at 11:10 a.m. April 14, 1972:

After informing Ambassador Dobrynin that he had been able to hold up announcement of the third stop on the President's trip to the Soviet Union, General Haig stated that the President had asked him to convey a concern he has which he hoped Ambassador Dobrynin will pass on to the Secretary General. The demonstrations which are occurring in the Soviet Union are a very difficult matter. Ambassador Dobrynin interrupted and asked what demonstrations? Is it about Vietnam? General Haig indicated he thought they were in the Soviet Union and said they were a source of great concern to the President. The President viewed them with extreme gravity and they could not help but seriously complicate the matter which had been discussed on the previous day.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if General Haig had any information, indicating that he, the Ambassador, had no information himself and questioning whether the report came from the United States Embassy in Moscow. General Haig replied that he would try to get additional information. The reports had been carried in the press in Canada and he speculated that the Presidential party might have additional information. Ambassador Dobrynin stated that he would pass the message on, but reiterated that he did not know anything about it. He again speculated that it must be from our Embassy there. General Haig responded that he would call right back and would check on the precise source of this report.

II. Telephone Conversation at 11:15 a.m. April 14, 1972:

General Haig initiated another call to Ambassador Dobrynin to inform him that the demonstrations in the Soviet Union had been reported in a press ticker item, UPI 45. He reported that the UPI dispatch described workers' demonstrations and reported that placards were being carried. Ambassador

SECRET/SENSITIVE

IV LIB CONG.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

Dobrynin thanked General Haig for calling and said that he would look at
the UPI dispatch immediately.

III. Telephone Conversation at 11:30 a.m. April 14, 1972:

Ambassador Dobrynin called General Haig and informed him that he had just read the UPI dispatch. It was really something new and not as in the past. It was not a demonstration. From time to time, they had meetings of workers in Soviet factories. There were some 3, 5 and 10 weeks ago. Western diplomats have said, as stated in the UPI report, they thought the reaction in the Soviet Union to the Vietnam warfare was mild compared to the past. Even U.S. colleagues were surprised it was so mild. These are meetings of factory workers and nothing new. The Ambassador continued that he didn't specifically understand why the President had become so concerned. His first impression in talking to General Haig was that there were demonstrations on the streets. He was surprised at General Haig's message. He didn't quite understand the nervous reaction coming from Canada. It was really mild and restrained according to the diplomats and UPI. From time to time they have meetings in factories. It was simply a natural reaction -- they were just showing the war was going on and the Soviets didn't forget about it. It was nothing else. The war was intensifying so they had some meetings. It was not only not unusual but milder.

General Haig replied that he was trying to check up in Ottawa but had not been able to get through. He indicated that there may have been other sources. Ambassador Dobrynin stated that if he referred to the UPI item, the Secretary General would be surprised. He indicated that the Western diplomats understood that the protest was mild. Ambassador Dobrynin stated that it was not quite clear to him why the President was concerned, and after reading the source of information he was further puzzled and disturbed. General Haig stated that Mr. Kissinger and the President were in a meeting so he was having difficulty reaching them. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that he understood it was a serious matter when the President directed a message to the Secretary General. He asked General Haig to check for other sources. If he went with this one, he said, they would be puzzled. He then asked if General Haig would look into it when he was in touch with Canada. He repeated when General Haig had called he had been disturbed; he thought it was a demonstration in the streets. He observed that these things happened from time to time to take notice that the war was still going on. It was nothing against the United States.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folsom
By CNARA Date 04-14-72

IV LIB CONG.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

General Haig then commented that the party in Canada might have some local reports that were not available in Washington. Ambassador Dobrynin reiterated that it would be useful to him to have additional information on the sources. He noted that the Secretary General would ask where the information came from. They would ask him why the President was taking note of this special article, UPI 45, where it specifically reported that Western diplomats said it was mild compared to the past. General Haig said that he would call Ambassador Dobrynin and Ambassador Dobrynin asked that General Haig mention it to Mr. Kissinger; he repeated that he would like to clarify it before passing the message to the Secretary General.

IV. Telephone Conversation at 12:00 noon April 14, 1972:

Just prior to initiating this telephone call, General Haig had talked to Mr. Kissinger and obtained his agreement that the President's concern could be expressed unofficially, and that it could be specified that the concern was primarily that the demonstrations might escalate.

General Haig opened the conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin by reporting that he had just talked with Mr. Kissinger and brought the Ambassador's concerns to Mr. Kissinger's attention. Mr. Kissinger in turn had discussed the matter with the President. Their concern was based in terms of an escalation that might build up. The President hoped that this would not happen and that this was not the beginning of something. Secondly, rather than reporting the President's message as an official communication of his views, it could be reported that the sentiments expressed the mood here. Ambassador Dobrynin asked if "here" was a reference to the White House or to the President. General Haig indicated the Ambassador should say, "the White House."

Attached is a copy of UPI 45 which was referred to in these conversations.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01287
By CNARA Date Stato

TELCOM

Mr. Kennedy/Henry Kissinger

April 15, 1972

K: I just spoke to the President. In that memo we are sending out to Laird and Rogers, in the section on negotiations--will you add another paragraph that says when asked about private meetings, you should say that we are prepared to negotiate in any forum that offers a prospect of a businesslike negotiation and the other side understands this very clearly. Now then add another section about withdrawal--you know after the negotiations--if you asked about withdrawals, you should say that we will reduce to the announced level by May 1 and the President will make an announcement before May 1 of his future plans, depending on the conditions existing at that time. You should not elaborate.

DK: Okay?

K: You should send that over to Laird in the morning--or maybe even give it to me to take to him

DK: Well, I am going to have trouble getting signed unless you want me to give it to Alex Butterfield to have the President sign it tonight.

HAK: Why, isn't there a machine signing?

DK: No, not tonight.

HAK: When can you get it signed.

DK: Tomorrow morning.

HAK: Machine signed?

DK: Yes.

HAK: Get it machine signed or hell start fiddling with it again.
Then send it to both of them in the morning. He wants to include in it
in the cover note, signed by me saying that the President wanted me
to send you this directive. He has also asked me to send the enclosed
fact shett which he dictated after a meeting with congressional leaders
the other day any which reflects his general approach to this issue.

DK: Will do.

HAK: D. hasn't called yet?

DK: No.

MJD 012958
DECLASSIFIED

Autumn
By NARA Date 6/1/67

TELCON
Mr. President/Mr. Kissinger

April 15, 1972

RN: Hello, I got away from the dinner--I just wanted to get a more
complete report on your reactions.

HAK: The first thing he did was to come in like a Cheshire cat--
he had a message from the other side.

RN: After he had seen your message to Vorontsov?

HAK: Oh yes, and that message was in reply to what I had told them
at noon on the 13th--what I had told them at noon on the 13th was
in effect, nothing--it was just conciliatory garbage--which said we
are willing to find a compromise between their position and ours
providing there is a complete cessation of military operation. So well,
their reply was sort of--a day later than the one they sent to Paris

RN: This is the Russian reply?

HAK: No Hanoi replied to Russia, which they transmitted to us. And
that in effect was a sort of a veiling thing--saying that they had always
believed that private meetings and Plenary meetings had to occur side
by side so that they could reinforce each other--all they want to do is
make sure that these two are reinforcing--the only point to us they
were very aggressive--but here they are really wailing. So in effect
they left themselves wide open to saying all right, if you come on the
24th privately, we come on the 27th publicly and we will announce the
public meeting before the private one takes place which is the proposition
we had worked out anyway. So that was no concession.

RN: Did you tell Dobrynin that?

HAK: Yes. And he thought that was reasonable. But frankly, Mr. President
I don't talk to Dobrynin any more as if it were reasonable--I am telling
him that the President has made the following decisions. I said that this
miserable little country is not going to destroy two American presidents

RN: We'll destroy this country first.

HAK: I said that, before this country does that, we will destroy it. That
is a fact of life, Anoytol, let's not argue about it.

MAY 12 1972
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/72

TELCON

Mr. President/Mr. Kissinger

April 15, 1972

RN: And he doesn't know how true it is.

HAK: And he doesn't argue about it--that is the fascinating thing. So I said also if the private meeting doesn't take place by May 1 I must tell you honestly, it will never take place and we will act. So he said, what if you had the plenary meeting on the 20th. I said Anatoliy, let's not play games--it is the private meeting the 24th, the plenary on the 27th, but if they wanted to send somebody--that was also in their message--they are now debating in the Politburo whether perhaps their foreign minister could come to Moscow to meet me. They do have a problem about travelling to Paris, while there are no meetings. All right, this went on. Then he said about these attacks, I hope to God you are not going to continue them all week long--he said can you give me a promise: that there won't be any further escalation until after you get the reply from Hanoi? I said until after we get the reply from Hanoi, but after that it depends on the reply. But I said we are going to continue bombing within the limits that have been established in North Vietnam--I didn't say what those limits were and oh, he said we will move and do this--then he said well, are you coming to Moscow. I said I have the following instructions from the President: Vietnam is first and there must be some constructive progress and then we can turn to other issues. And we would like to have some assurance that this will take place. He said, what if the chairman of the communist party wants to have another issue first--he said you have to be courteous to him. I said, no I don't because I work for the President of the United States. And he has giving me absolute firm instructions--I have never known him to be firmer--this thing is now going to end and we must discuss it conclusively. Of course, Mr. President, I think it helps us if you determined yourself--the mere fact that we are doing this puts us into a better position either to quell our critics which are now going to spring up or to move into a tougher posture. And he said all right, we have now agreed on this agenda item one which will be Vietnam and we will discuss it first and in great detail. We can't force them into a hell of a lot more than that. Particularly as at this very moment we are bombing them again.

RN: Yeah, are we?

HAK: Yeah.

RN: What are we hitting this time? The other strike got off, huh?

HAK: The second strike got off and the third will get off in a couple of hours.

RN: That's the truck parks we are going for?

DECLASSIFIED

MVD EO 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/04

April 15, 1972 --

K: Yeah.

P: Some trucks there I hope.

K: There's supposed to be 600 trucks there.

P: That's worth hitting.

K: Well, that's more than we get in a month on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

P: Sure, sure.

K: And I think the shock to them -- Mr. President, I think the mere fact that on a day while attacks on Haiphong are still going on, he comes slobbering in pleading for a meeting and pleading with me to come to Moscow indicates that these people are a lot more eager for the summit than we are.

P: Well, the Russians are. You just don't know though whether he is still reflecting what they in Moscow think of the strikes we've made. I think we have to be quite honest with ourselves. I believe they should be. Because I tell you, you may think I'm kidding about it but I will call Strauz over myself, he's a good friend of mine. I'll tell him to break up this goddamn thing and use my name if necessary. We'll do anything to destroy ___________, anything.

K: Mr. President, there is one thing I am sure of, that Dobrynin, a member of the Central Committee, does not act without instructions.

P: Yeah, but do you think he would have had instructions by this time?

K: Yeah, it was 9 o'clock when he came over and I'm sure they can flash back and forth. And he must know what they want anyway even if he doesn't have detail instructions. But leaving that one aside, Mr. President the mere fact that for the first time in eight years Johnson was slobbering over them to try to get them to pass messages, this is the first time they have interjected themselves.

P: I see, yeah.

K: I mean, this is the first time they are urging these maniacs in Hanoi to do something.

P: Yeah. Okay. Well, anyway, as it turned out it is a damn good thing, Hen we got the strikes off, isn't it?

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12 58
Author

By NARA Date 6/1/67

April 15, 1972

- 4 -

K: Mr. President, for once things are breaking right. It is a good thing that they gave us the message this morning so that we could use that as a pretext.

P: Yeah. You mean the message saying they were going to break off talks?

K: That's right; that they were delaying the talks.

P: That's the same thing. Yeah.

K: And the second thing, is lucky that we got the strikes off today and not tomorrow as we had at first thought.

P: That's right. And that Laird stood up and so forth. Incidentally, on Rogers, I haven't talked to him long but just as we were waiting for about 10 minutes. We were just sitting in there and I said, "Now, look, I've got this stuff I'm working on all day." And he said, "Well, I realize that"and he says"I think I'm going to take on the critics." I said, "Fine, that's just what we need."

K: Good, terrific.

P: Now, so I'm going to take that whole thing -- that whole batch of mine -- I want to see the letter you prepared plus the talking points and I may sort of rewrite it and strengthen it a little. You know what I mean?

K: It may have already -- be on the way.

P: Oh, is it?

K: They may have just initialled it for you.

P: Well, would you see if it could be held, or if it hasn't gone -- well, if it's gone, it's gone.

K: Yeah, yeah. I think it's in very strong shape.

P: It's in good shape?

K: It's in very good shape. It really --

P: The only thing, you got in the stuff about the -- talks?

DECLASSIFIED

MJE 012958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/72

- 5 -

K: I got in all the stuff you dictated to me and I included your own -- the stuff you dictated after the Leaders meeting. I really think it covers the whole thing.

P: That probably is enough, right.

K: I think it is, Mr. President.

P: But I think -- I don't know for whatever reason but probably because he realizes there's no choice but Bill says he had gotten in his State Department, to my great surprise, and he said he had asked them, "Now, what the hell would you do?" He said they talked about "We'll, we should have done this two or three years ago." He said, "Now, look, what would you do now?" He said they all said, "Well, you've got to do what you're doing."

K: Yeah.

P: So maybe some people, Henry, just realize that we're up against the heart ______.

K: That's what I noticed at these WSAG meetings. We do have everyone pulling together at that level.

P: Right.

K: I think now we are going to pull it out if the South Vietnamese don't collapse on us. There was quiet all over South Vietnam today.

P: Quiet? That's strange.

K: Yeah. No attacks in Anloc. Well, we may have scared them, Mr. President.

P: You mean, with this strike?

K: At any rate, whether we scared them or not, I can't really judge that but I do know ...

[End of Tape]

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12958
 Authority

NARA Date 6/1/01
By

Надежды Троицкого
вторая леди российского
председателя

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.V. NASA Date 5/12/72

TELCONE
Vorontsov/Kissinger
11:40 a.m. - 4/16/72

V: He is walking outside the Embassy but he will be back by 1:00 o'clock.

K: He ought to be in good condition.

V: I hope so.

K: I have three things. We would appreciate it if you would send the text over of what the Ambassador read to me and could you deliver this to Colonel Kennedy. He is sitting in Haig's office.

V: I will do that.

K: Second, I wanted to confirm what I told the Ambassador last night, and what I also told you, that this operation is now completed.

V: I see. That's good.

K: And the assurance I gave is now in effect until we get a reply from the other side.

V: Good.

K: And finally just as he advised me yesterday about our actions - I do not think that it would be very conducive to the success of what you and I are planning. If your reactions could be as calm as the circumstances make possible. It would be very difficult for me to be there while protests and demonstrations are going on.

V: I understand your point.

K: Now, one final thing. Commander Howe will be ready to discuss technical things with you.

V: All right.

K: Should he call you?

V: Yes, he can call me. I will be here in the Embassy and he can come here or I will come to his office.

K: We will use your interpreters, is that all right?

Hanoi, 12 June 1976

Re: Kissinger's reply to North Vietnam's request for a meeting.

By: K.M.L. NARA Date: 5/12/76

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

3:10 p.m. - 4/16/76

K: Hello, Bill.

R: Listen, I got your message we sent over to the North Vietnamese
April 2 but there was another one we gave to them on the 6th.

K: I will send that right over.

R: Did they give us a written reply?

K: No, they did not. . . .

R: Well, at that time they agreed to meet on April 13.

K: They did not reply to that. It was just assumed. They did not
reply to that.

R: Well, as I understand it what they did was delay meeting for two
days, then when we gave them the withdrawal notice they agreed
to meet on April 13.

K: Oh yes, yes, on the day we gave them the withdrawal notice they
said orally they would meet on April 13.

R: How does the date April 20th get into the picture?

K: What we said was we would be prepared to resume on the 13th
which did imply the 20th.

R: On a _________?

K: Yes, _________ at that. But I will get that right over.

R: But on the business of Russia situation, if anyone has any word
from Dobrynin let me know.

K: If we get any word here we will send them over to you. I think the
way to handle it we should make a formal protest, admit it and
apologize.

R: I can do it at State.

The President of the Republic of the Philippines

Executive Branch

By: KVL

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 32938, Sect. 3.5

By: KVL
NWSA Date: 5/12/04
- 2 -

K: Investigate it?

R: No __________.

K: I am open to that.

R: My present inclination is to say we have no idea; we didn't know what hit your ship whether it was __________ aircraft. . . . . in SAM. They had __________ or schrapnel but that is our risks that we have to take, but this is a pretty tough position.

K: I think we can say it was unintentional but we want to point out. . .

R: We can also say we weren't sure what it was that hit you but if it was through anything we were involved in that hit you, we regret it. But this is a risk we take.

K: Let us agree on this. If Dobrynin comes and attempts to deliver a note we will send him to you. Second, on these talking points for the Congressional leaders that the President __________. The one I mentioned to you - maybe we should say we won't have a volatile foreign policy.

R: I don't like that and I don't like singling out President Kennedy.

K: It isn't in our interest to get a huge human outcry. I talked to the President and he agreed to mute them.

R: The one thing he doesn't mention was whether we would reintroduce ground troops. I talked to him last night and he said we should say that was one of the questions of further bombing we just leave open.

K: Absolutely.

R: Well, I don't think there is much else. They are going to make as much as they can politically out of it so I will be under attack. The one thing we have not done is whether we will have a public briefing on what the North Vietnamese have done in South Vietnam.

K: You mean in terms of what?

R: I am thinking about giving this committee, in public, a report on what the enemy has done.

K: Well, maybe Mel ought to do it if it is on the. . . .

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F.O. 12958
Authority

NARA Date 6/1/67
By ---

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 p.m., April 16, 1972

K: ... and they are going to 800 sorties a day. They were at 367 when you started reinforcing.

P: It's bound to have effect; just bound too, goddammit.

K: And it also gives them a hell of a lot more flexibility.

P: Yeah. And also the air just can't be that bad. We know it's not very good but as we know they hit something.

K: Well, the B-52s must have a massive effect and even the tactical air, Mr. President, are bound to hit something as you say.

P: Sure. Well, goddammit, the Israelis hit things with their Phantoms.

K: They sure did.

P: We got plenty of Phantoms, haven't we?

K: We have three times the Phantoms in Vietnam that the Israelis have in their whole Air Force.

P: Sure.

K: So far there hasn't been much of a campaign out of Hanoi -- we got the note delivered to the Chinese.

P: Oh, you did, huh? What did you say in that in effect?

K: In effect, we just said, "As the President pointed out to the Prime Minister, we could not have a military solution imposed on us; we are prepared to negotiate but not under duress and it was not by our choice that this was expanded and we hope that friends of Hanoi will keep this in mind." Something like that.

P: That's good; that's good. And that is precisely what was said to him.

K: That's right. I checked the record, Mr. President; you couldn't have been more explicit.

P: Well, whatever they do, the Chinese, they've got to -- and the Russians -- have got to support their ally but I think for different reasons neither of them wants us to -- wants Hanoi to kick us out of there.

3:30 p.m., April 16, 1972

K: That's right.

P: What do you think?

K: Oh, no question about it. Actually, for the business that Russia
wants to do with us, it really isn't in their interests to have us too
extended there now.

P: Right. What is the situation? You really feel that they are -- just
trying to see what our chips are -- that they are really that interested
in the German treaty or maybe they would --

K: Oh, yeah.

P: They are?

K: Mr. President, leaving aside the fact now of this last two days, the
mere fact that they want me to go there while we are at least sub-
stantially bombing the North -- I mean, we weren't exactly playing
Diddley winks last week. Last week at this time we were worrying
whether one B-52 strike would be more than the traffic could bear.

P: Yeah, just one, I remember

K: And Dick Helms was telling me this is just about the toughest
message you can send to the Russians. I mean, it isn't that we
were playing softly then.

P: Yeah. Well, I'll tell you that was one decision I was very comfortable
with. Remember we talked about it.

K: Oh, yes.

P: You came in and told me about Helms' concern. But you see, that
was the trouble with Johnson all along; he'd say well, I can't do this
or that or the other thing but if you prick somebody, the thing to do
is to get a sword out and cut his heart out.

K: No question.

P: Why screw around?

K: There's no question.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/10/72

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 p.m., April 16, 1972

- 3 -

P: Believe me, -- well, we're doing that. After your meeting, you'll know. I'm pretty sure -- well, God, I don't know.

K: They won't cancel it.

P: I don't mean to cancel it. No, no, no; what I meant, I just hope that it is not too indecisive. You see, that's the only that would concern me about it.

K: Well, that's up to us. If it's indecisive; it's also decisive.

P: Yeah, yeah. Let me ask one last thing, how -- and we can talk about this -- I have two things in mind. First, I think that we ought to have -- I need two or three hours to go over that whole thing with them -- with you before you go.

K: Oh, essential.

P: Now, let's look at schedules in terms of when that can be done. I personally would like to do it -- maybe go up to Camp David and spend the evening going over the thing if that's all right; if that fits in. What is the situation? What do you have on Monday and Tuesday, do you know?

K: Monday night I was going to have --

P: What about Tuesday?

K: Tuesday I was going to go up and deliver a message to the Chinese; pardon my going but --

P: Yeah. Well, we'll do it then -- let's just save time during the day. I'm going to be quite busy on domestic matters tomorrow.

K: I'd rather, Mr. President -- I'm working like mad to get these things together. I've got my whole team drilling.

P: Right.

K: And I think it would be more worthwhile for you if I saw you any time from Tuesday noon on.

P: Yeah.

K: Cause then I'd have something I could show you. And I will have all

DECLASSIFIED

MJD 12958
Authority

NARA Date 6/1/04
By

3:30 p.m., April 16, 1972

K: (cont'd) the decisions listed that need to be made.

P: Well, let me put it this way --

K: Or Tuesday morning.

P: Suppose -- I may go to Camp David on Tuesday evening anyway. Suppose then you could come up Wednesday.

K: Right. As I come back from New York go straight up to Camp David and sleep there.

P: Spend the night and then the next day we will just sit there in the quiet of that place because I think we need to be totally by ourselves and go over these things. Right?

K: I think that would be very good.

P: Let's plan it -- shall I plan it for Wednesday morning?

K: Wednesday morning would be excellent.

P: Let's hold it for Wednesday morning. The other thing we've got to be thinking about is how to inform Rogers. I don't know what -- do you have any thoughts on it?

K: My strong suggestion, Mr. President, is to let Haig and Haldeman do it on Thursday morning.

P: What will they tell him?

K: Just tell him that we got the suggestion and you sent me.

P: Well, is there any possibility that it could be handled in terms of the Russians -- of your going there for the purpose of a meeting with the North Vietnamese?

K: Well, we will have to bring it into the Vietnamese context.

P: You see what I am getting at?

K: By Wednesday, we will know whether it is going to be there or in Paris or anywhere.

P: Uh-humm. Well, but Thursday -- you would wait till you left before he was told.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCOM
The President/Mr. Kissinger
3:30 p.m., April 16, 1972

- 5 -

K: Yes, because he is going to drive you crazy if it is done before and he will go to Dobrynin before.

P: Yeah.

K: He will call him in. This way he can't reach Dobrynin and he will be no madder one way or another.

P: We will simply handle it on the basis that we got this message from Brezhnev saying that he wanted to talk about Vietnam.

K: And Haldeman can handle it much better with Haig than alone because Haig will know the details.

P: That's right. And I think that's what they do and he has to know in case anything blows that we don't expect to blow.

K: Exactly.

P: And that it may be followed by a meeting -- but by that time we will know whether you are going to have a meeting in Paris or not.

K: Exactly.

P: The way I would fuzz the thing up -- I'm just thinking of simply saying that the Russians have decided to get into the act; they've asked you to come there to discuss this matter and that the North Vietnamese may be there. You see my point?

K: Exactly.

P: That's the way I would fuzz it up, you see what I mean?

K: Exactly.

P: It's really just a secret meeting like your Paris meetings. We don't have to be totally forthright, you see my point?

K: Exactly.

P: How does that sound to you as a device?

K: I think that's fine.

P: It may be true. It may be that they will show up.

DECLASSIFIED

My F.O. 12958
Authorized

By NARA Date 6/10/72

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12 1958

By NARA Date 6/10/10

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 16, 1972 -- 3:30 p.m.

K: By that time we may even know.

P: But even assuming you don't know, they could still show up.

K: Oh, definitely. If we don't know; if we haven't had an answer by Wednesday, then it was still open.

P: Right. We can just say that the Russians flashed they wanted to talk about Vietnam prior to the summit.

K: Right.

P: And privately, I sent you there and the North Vietnamese may well be there also.

K: And I think then Haig should give him a rundown on this whole private meeting thing, then he will understand how we got into this position.

P: Private meeting, what do you mean?

K: That we were trying to set up in Paris.

P: Oh, he doesn't know that?

K: No. Because if you remember, you had suggested we wait until we have it locked.

P: Yeah. But that we tried to set that up through our usual channels.

K: That's right.

P: But nothing had come of it so far but that he --

K: And then the Russians --

P: I mean, I have told -- that memorandum talking paper that we sent over to him as I recall does have some -- remember I told the Leaders, "You can be confident that we have a good negotiating record since the 25th ..."and that will sort of bear that out.

K: That's right.

P: Okay.

K: Good. He's in a good frame of mind. I talked to him twice today.

3:30 p.m., April 16, 1972

P: Yeah, yeah. Did he get the paper yet?

K: Yes, he got the paper and he says he can follow it very good.

P: Yeah, well, good. Now I will -- as far as you are concerned now just remember -- when will Haig get back?

K: Wednesday afternoon.

P: Then you would be leaving. Do you think it's better for us to talk then Wednesday afternoon rather than Wednesday morning? Let me ask you this, where do you want to leave from?

K: Well, I thought that I would go -- there is a dinner party here in town to which I thought I would go because -- that's for some newspaper editors.

P: Right.

K: And I thought it would be good if they saw me. Then I will leave that dinner party, get dressed and go to the airport about midnight.

P: Good, good.

K: Then people will have seen me Wednesday night.

P: That's right. Thursday and Friday everybody is out of town.

K: Well, if you could go to Key Biscayne Thursday night.

P: Well, I'll do one of the -- I'll either go to Key Biscayne or I will go to Camp David.

K: Right. Well, if you at any rate could leave town, then I will cancel whatever I am doing on Thursday night saying I am with you. In fact, Camp David is even better; it has a certain advantage.

P: Well, Camp David has a certain advantage because I feel I should be a little closer to the battle, you see. And nobody ever expects to see you outside of Camp David, see. At Key Biscayne --

K: Well, if you could say you are going to Camp David Thursday night --

P: To do some work.

MJA F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

4:25 p.m., April 16, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: I wondered if you would mind having your office -- get hold of your office and have them send those talking points that we gave to the Leaders -- a copy to Billy Graham.

K: Certainly.

P: He's going out to Illinois. Send one copy in case -- it should go out this afternoon if possible -- send one copy to his home in North Carolina and send another in care of Governor Ogilvie, Springfield, Illinois, where he will be.

K: Right.

P: But you see he goes on television programs and he wants to stand up for what we are saying and doing.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Yeah. He was telling me an interesting thing. He said he had been talking to the Chancellor of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and he said that the fellow said, "Well, this is quite different from Cambodia and Laos because there is a feeling that the North Vietnamese attacked at a time that President Nixon was trying to withdraw and all that sort of thing." And that's a very interesting point, isn't it?

K: Absolutely.

P: He may be right.

K: I think you will come out of this -- I mean, the public do not like the United States to be kicked around.

P: Well, we've got to start talking that way. When I say, we've got to, I think it's just as well. I can't do anything with the press this week; you still agree, don't you?

K: Fully; totally.

P: You've got to go over and make your run in Moscow and then after that I will have to go out and say something to the press.

K: Right. TASS has put out a very mild statement up til now.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 01 1975
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/4/75

4:25 p.m., April 16, 1972

- 2 -

P: Yeah. I don't care what they put out.

K: No, no; but that just shows they are not --

P: No. But my point is that -- the more I've been sitting around here thinking about today, Henry, I am convinced first, that we have done the right thing but second -- three things -- second, that we just can't -- I've told Haldeman and the rest I don't give a goddamn about the public opinion, we'll do the best we can to keep it with us for foreign policy reasons -- but the third thing is that now that we've turned this screw, we've got to continue to turn it if they don't talk. In other words, the blockade has just got to go. In other words, we're going to crush these people now. They've asked for it and that's the way we're going to do it.

K: That's absolutely right, Mr. President.

P: Don't you feel that way?

K: I couldn't agree more.

P: And starve them out if necessary.

K: I couldn't agree more.

P: One thing, I do think -- In talking to Graham, he urged that -- send the missionaries out there. He said that if the South Vietnamese could just step over into North Vietnam one of these days, they just might find it pretty easy going, you know.

K: Well, --

P: I don't know if they will ever get the strength to do it.

K: Well, if the North Vietnamese Army ever collapses, there's a new ball game.

P: Yeah. It's not likely to collapse but I do think this, I still can't believe -- they are not supermen, they are not supermen and they are taking one hell of a -- I think ______ has to be convinced that they are running into reactions that they didn't anticipate.

K: Oh, that must be true.

P: Don't you get that from Haig's thing?

DECLASSIFIED
MJO E0 2958
Authority
By --- NARA Date 6/10/72

April 16, 1972 -- 4:25 p.m.

K: Oh, no question.

P: I don't mean just popping Hanoi but just this movement of fleet and all this air power in there and everything. I think they just figured with election year and everything; with the summit coming up; I think they figured that too; that I'd pay any price and just bug right out of there.

K: No question about that.

P: And I think the Russians may have figured that too. No

K: No, the Russians figured that too. They all thought you might use the assets you had there but they wouldn't have been enough.

P: Yeah.

K: It's that reinforcement that's getting them off.

P: That's right, right. Okay, Henry.

K: Mr. President, just for your information, if you should be talking to Rogers, I have sent him the two private messages which refer to the cancellation of the meeting of the 13th but they did not refer to the private meeting.

P: Yeah.

K: He asked for them so I gave them to him.

P: Right, right. That's the cancellation of the public meeting.

K: Of the public meeting.

P: Right, right. That's right; that was messages from them, yeah.

K: No, no; messages we sent them.

P: I see.

K: Because they put out their record of these messages yesterday.

P: Right.

K: But not any that refer to private meetings.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD E0 12958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/10/72

4:25 p.m., April 16, 1972

P: Oh.

K: So when he asked for them, I couldn't very well say I don't have them.

P: Yeah.

K: But I just wanted you to know that he has nothing that refers to a private meeting. He has private messages that refer to public meeting.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, you haven't told him about any private meetings.

K: No, no; I have not.

P: .. don't want to at this point.

K: I think at this point the less turmoil --

P: On the other hand, we can just indicate that they are very much aware of the fact that we are ready for private meetings.

K: Well, that's fine. But I don't think, Mr. President, we should go into it now because he will just get it all screwed up and they will just take it wrong tomorrow.

P: Right.

K: They know where we stand. The Russians -- between what the Russians gave him and what we put into private channels, they know exactly what is wanted.

P: What the Russians gave him?

K: What the Russians gave Hanoi; gave them.

P: Oh, yeah. Well, I don't know what the hell he's seen. Well, I am just going --

K: No, no; I just wanted to tell you --

P: I don't know anything; I haven't talked to him yet, see?

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

MD E0 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/1/64

Re: possible T-Rex DNA sample in a
small, but not 'catastrophic' area
(possible T-Rex?)

By: KMLW NASA Date 5/12/94

TELECON (tape)
Secretary Rogers
4/16/72, 4:30 p.m.

K: Bill.

R: You've seen this protest I guess that was delivered to Beam.

K: No, I haven't.

R: Yeah, well, they've made a protest and they say that four of their ships were hit. They do not make any claim that there were dead or wounded among the Soviet employees; they say there were dead and wounded among the workers of the Port.

K: Yes, that's what intercepts indicate, yes.

R: The tone of the protest seems to me to be milder than the ones that they made in '67 and '68, and it's a lower level. In that case the protest was made to Rusk himself, I guess in both of those cases.

K: Yeah.

R: And this is a protest to Beam by their Deputy Foreign Minister, Gobolev (?).

K: That's pretty mild so we shouldn't be too provocative in our reply

R: No, I think we've got to tone down our answer.

K: Right, I agree.

R: And I'm preparing one now to send over; I don't know as we have to rush getting it back.

K: I don't think we should reply until tomorrow Bill.

R: I think that's right.

K: That's pretty encouraging, don't you think.

R: I think so, yeah. Just a minute here. TASS has also put out a statement. The statement TASS puts out is a little tougher; it says the Soviet people rathfully condemn these U. S. acts of aggression, and so forth.

K: Yeah well of course they've got to do something like that.

R: But I think in reading, comparing this protest with the others it doesn't accuse us of intentionally and deliberately doing this as far as they're concerned. And the general rhetoric is somewhat softer, so . . .

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

H. E. T. Román, 1. císa. 10-1
1. környék, 1. csoport
1. környék, 1. csoport

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

By: JML, NASA Date: 5/12/04

K: I think we should give a fairly low-key reply Bill. I don't think we should confront them that way when we are after all somewhat in the wrong in the actual act.

R: I agree. Well, I think what we can do is do is pretty much along the lines of the last one. We don't want to be more apologetic than the last time because I think that last time was a direct hit. I think we can . . . we're not sure of course whether those were hits by American planes or whether it was misfiring on the part of the North Vietnamese.

K: Yeah.

R: Well anyway, we'll have something drafted to send over.

K: Good, thank you Bill.

R: Right, bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Erolseer
By: CNARA Date: Stet

TELECON

(tape)

Amb. D

4/16/72 p.m.

K: Anatol?

B: No, this is Yuri; Henry; he will be here in a second.

K: Okay, what a team you are.

B: Yes, here he is.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, you do more walking than anyone I know.

D: Well I try to gather strength I need to talk to you.

K: I'll bet.

D: Well, was it boy or girl you today christened.

K: It was a girl,

D: A girl. Oh, that was my idea.

K: It was a Christian service and there were 90 percent Jewish people in attendance.

D: Oh, but 10 percent was Christian.

K: 10 percent were Christians.

D: But who was really the . . . what name was involved?

K: It was . . . you know Hnery Brandon, the . . .

D: Of course, I know him very well.

K: And his baby was christened.

D: Oh it was his baby christened?

K: Yeah.

D: Oh, I thought he the proud father has with him three or four other I should say five ______ s. Have you seen them?

K: Yes, yes.

TELECON

Amb. D

4/16/72

D: He always took . . . . . . . . .

K: But this is a new baby.

D: What do you mean new baby? ________ than last year's baby.

K: Well it's about eight months . . . I forget, a year, eight months old.

D: Last year.

K: Yeah.

D: I thought he managed to have another in five months.

K: No, no, no, no.

D: No? All right. Well, Henry, where are you now?

K: I'm in my apartment.

D: Oh, I see. Well you see I received some oral message or al statement, message . . . . President to you. It involves all the developments the reason, not any specific . . . . . . . . . in the sense of when . . . . . date or something. But what I really would like . . .

K: Would you like to come by again?

D: Or maybe I would just give it to your people. You would send somebody here; I will put in envelope and seal it; you will look *then* and then tomorrow we will discuss.

K: Well do you want to give me the essence on the telephone?

D: No, no, I will give you the text, but it's strictly oral.

K: I understand.

D: It's only oral. But if you have some *question*, well I will be . . . . . . . . you may give me a call. If you *would* like me to come to you I will come. I am in today. It is no . . . nothing Henry. You will just read it. But you . . . . . . . oral remarks I should say.

K: My trouble is that on Sunday night is the one night my office is not functioning/ very completely.

D: You rather *please* I will come. All right, I will come then.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01285

By CHNARA Date 05/01/82

CLASSIFIED
Authority
By
Date
EX-12368
CASA
Sgt-

TELECON
Amb. D

4/16/72

p. 3

K: Oh no, look I can send somebody by to pick it up and call you if . . .

D: If you could do it I think it would be quite all right. Could you send somebody from the White House?

K: I will send a White House driver . . .

D: All right. He will come to my office and he will be given the envelope. Right?

K: Right. And so just put it in the envelope.

D: Yes, envelope with your name and I will say "personal."

K: And then send it to me. He won't . . . he'll be all right. He won't do anything with it.

D: So just give a call and he will deliver it and then I will be at home if you would like to make an immediate comment or you would like to speak with me by telephone I'm available. If you would like me to come I will come; if not we will discuss with you tomorrow or you name a date.

K: You think it will require some decision tonight?

D: No, no, no, no, no.

K: It just expresses a general attitude?

D: Yes, general attitude, nothing specific to decide today, no. It's rather general attitude and any comment you would like or President make I am sure it will be tomorrow.

K: Okay, well in that case I will send somebody by.

D: Yes, just send . . . . . . knock at the door of the Embassy and the officer on duty will have a envelope for him to give to you.

K: Incidentally, what number should I call in case I do want to talk to you?

D: Okay, there is two numbers. You have my number at my private house?

K: Well I have it at the office. What is it?

D: Well, I will check. I don't know myself. I will just tell you . . . I will give you my office: it is National 8-8549. This is my secretary but today

TELECON
Amb. D
4/16/72

p. 4

is nobody here, I mean on my personal ______ exactly.

K: All right.

D: But if I will go upstairs I mean in my ______, another telephone
... just a minute Henry, I don't know my own telephone, 783-2217.

K: Now which one should I call?

D: Both of them . . . . . . . . . . 783-2217

K: Or National 8-8549.

D: On 49 nobody will answer; there will be officer on duty, then he
will probably tell you that I am in my house and you please call on a different
telephone.

K: Okay.

D: Okay?

K: Well I will . . . I guess I'll have that message in half an hour.

You just send because

D: I have already written so give him any time. Mr. Vorontsov
will wait for your man downstairs and he will meet him when he arrives.

K: The problem Anatol is I'm not used to dealing with you in &crises.

D: (Laughs) Well I think we will handle it after all.

K: We certainly should. We've got too much we ought to do together.

D: This is a point. So you will call ______. In about 10 minutes he
will be here.

K: 10-15 minutes.

D: Huh?

K: 10-15 minutes, as soon as I can get a car.

D: Okay, this is good. So Mr. Vorontsov will meet him . . .

K: Good. I'll get one of my assistants to call the dispatcher cause
if I do it they'll get too nosey.