DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Roland Evans/Kissinger

11:10 am

5/1/70

E: I want to talk to you. My partner just came out of Cambodia and VN.

K: That will teach you to take a hawkish position.

E: When can I have 20 mins or half an hour. Could you possibly? Breakfast
Monday?

K: I will do my damndest. Monday. OK.

E: Will you do that for me?

K: OK I will do it for me.

E: I have a funny story for you about you and Teddy.

K: I can't wait until Monday. Let's do it at 8:00 Monday at the Metro. Club.
I want to talk to you but it wouldn't have worked this morning because the
President had me.

By. Ⓐ

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

H. Brandon/Kissinger

11:12 am

4/1/70

B: I want to interpret this Cambodian move. One question I would like to ask you --

K: Can it wait until tomorrow?

B: I can do it on the telephone if that's good enough.

K: I'm very occupied.

B: Why do you think 6 weeks to 2 months are needed? It seems perhaps
too long.

K: We have shorter estimates but if I gave them and we stay longer, we
will be accused.

B: What is the lower range?

K: Three weeks. The main problem is getting the bunkers bulldozed. The combat will take 2.

B: In the past the intelligence was very uncertain on how much there was
there. Is that intelligence now different?

K: It had better be.

B: What will be the criteria if the mission is fullfilled ?

K: We are primarily interested in the arms caches and other supplies.

B: Do you know about the disposition in the DMZ of NVN troops?

K: Several regiments.

B: There are enough force on this side to take care of them?

K: We think so. But in every war one commander has been wrong.

B: No country has yet recognized the new Cambodian regime.

K: It's ______ in a complicated way because Lon Nol was acting Prime Minister in the last government and Parliament did away with the Prince's rights.

B: That was the American interpretation. Was that everyone's?

By NARA, Date 5/26

H. Brandon/Kissinger

11:12 am 5/1/70

-2-

K: Every country has left their ambassador there which is all we did.

B: Why not have Americans do the whole thing which would be a short
and effectively done way?

K: It's important to give the Vietnamese some responsibility.

B: Will they withdraw?

K: Probably before us. They have the easier operation.

B: Is there anything else in reaction from Moscow?

K: Nothing. It's night there now. We don't expect anything until -- when it could be on the wires.

B: The Henry A. Kissinger on that side will not be being awakened at night.

K: The Henry Kissinger's here aren't either. What do you find here?

B: Apprehension. A felling that this has been done before and promised
before. The question is whether the risks that the President has taken with it --
he has been so successful in keeping public opinion on his side and whether
his credibility will have suffered on his commitment to withdraw.

K: That will be proved.

B: That old axiom -- we will support you if you win and if you loose --
That

K: They would have happened even if we lost. We would not have paid
a lesser price for failure for not taking the risks now.

B: Most people think that this could have been finessed. Failure of
Vietnamization can be finessed. In fact, Vietnamization really
succeed. If it cannot, is it worth taking the risk?

B: That's the arguement and we will have to see what happens now. I may
be able to give you a birthday party at Paduka State College.

B: You are taking thinks too personnaly. You havenot been in the firing
line personally as your predecessor.

K: No and I have no complaints about my treatment.

B: LBJ was known to know nothing about foreign affairs and Nixon is known
to have his own mind.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon

Joe Sisco

5/1/70 11:25 a.m.

S: You must be pooped.

K: It was quite an exercise.

S: I sure hope it works.

K: As I look at it, the State Department can't lose either way. If it works it's good for the country and if it fails you might be rid of me.

S: You are the tower of strength. Don't talk that way. I'm calling on the Jordenian arms thing. The King decided to send his assistant to Washington next Thursday. He wants to talk about the whole broad range of things. It's a golden opportunity for us.

K: It nearly quadruples the artillery.

S: But it's peanuts compared to what the Soviets are not selling but giving to them.

K: Could we have a meeting on this early next week?

K: Soviet pilots as well as the other? S: Yes.

S: Yes./ But this guy is coming Thursday. I need to know about the arms package. It has been in the offing for a long time. We can play the thing, but I need to be able to surface it. I don't want him to come and end up empty-handed. But if I tell him not to come it will be taken as a signal by the King.

K: He can get something, but we should do it as an integrated total.

S: I see your point. But the question of the pilots and the Israelis is going to be prolonged.

K: No it isn't, because we won't have it.

S: Well, our intelligence community can't make up its mind what it means.

K: But you know why that is.

S: Yes.

K: And the President has made up his mind. I would like for the President to have a chance, which he hasn't had yet, to focus on the artillery side of it. I think we've had to make too many tactical decisions there. This is a more dangerous area than Vietnam.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
5/1/70 & 3:00 p.m.

R: In the meantime I talked to the President and Haldeman, I am trying to work out a meeting with the President for the Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Service Committee.

K: You are going to sit in on that?

R: Yes.

K: Your prediction wasn't very wrong was it?

R: No. We can turn it around if the military results are good. Hasn't turned up a lot yet.

K: They claim to have turned up so much in the shallow operations.

R: I saw a film that just looked like they were turning up chicken coops.

K: The few pictures I've seen were inconclusive, but looked real.

R: I think it would be better to get out sooner than 6 to 8 weeks.

K: Right. We are hoping for 3 or 4. When we briefed the military the President said 3 weeks. But if you say three weeks to the public, after 22 days they begin to scream.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Atty. Gen./Kissinger
4:10 pm 5/1/70

AG: I thought if you had a moment you would give me some background.
How is it going?

K: On the military side they got in without opposition but these were airborne
fox troops behind the area. They are taking a position ? ? ? ? ?

AG: Have they trapped enough?

K: We won't know for 3 or 4 days. They are getting more supplies in
the Parrot's Beak. 500 rifles and 30 weapons and 60-70 tons of rice. The
bigger bases are getting ? ? ? ? ? ? which is what you would expect.
They clobbered the area north of the DMZ yesterday.

AG: Any word from the North?

K: Not a word. We will hit them again. We are so far in we might as
well give them a real jolt.

AG: What does the public reaction so far as you can evaluate it?

K: Haldeman thinks it's very good. The President is elated.

AG: I talked to him about 11:00 last night. He was good spirits.

K: We saw the Joint Chiefs today.

AG: Too early for much out of that.

K: We wanted to symbolize that things are serious. The Soviet Charge said
"you don't think you can win this way, do you?" I said, "we aren't doing it
for exercise." He said it would be doudy in Moscow. I said that was up to
them. Our offer still stands.

AG: The primary interest is to keep China out.

K: ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

AG: I recommend he have Rogers and Laird there to see what their posture
is. They could make or break the united front. Semple and Oberdorfer were
in and had a line up where people stood. It made Rogers look like the hero
with Laird right behind. You are the villain and me the semi-villain. Someone
at Defense said he had Yale in the speech but someone persuaded him to take
it out. I said that anyone who said that was a liar.

AG: Maybe it was my speech. I had that in until Agenw took care of it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
5/1/70 5:00 p.m.

P: How are you getting along with the interviews?

K: It's quite remarkable. I've seen John Scalli. He said he was praying for the President. He said this is courageous and I'm just afraid they will tear him to pieces, and I hope you have great success.

P: "They" being domestic critics?

K: Yes.

P: But they haven't been as bad as we expected xhave they?

K: No. I had Semple and Oberdorfer in.

P: Oh good God.

K: I didn't line this up. But they were extremely respectful.

P: Ziegler was wrong in that. I gave orders that nobody from the Post was ever to come in again. Semple was fine, but nobody from the Post.

K: Well, I'm just telling you they were very respectful. They ask the question isn't this just temporary; won't they be back?

P: You, say it buys us the time that we need to make decisive moves.

K: Yes. The operation is just starting up again.

PL: To go in with the enemy gone, that's damn good.

K: If we photograph caches and say all right, did you want Americans killed?

P: That's right.

K: Either way, even with a few casualties, we come out all right. They would be quite respectful this morning. It has touched a patriotic streak in these cynical men.

P: We must remind them that this was something that didn't have to be done.

K: I've been riding hell out of that story. We know what the Post and NYT will say in their editorials tomorrow morning.

P: We don't give a tinker's damn what they say. It doesn't matter. I'm not even going to read it. We got to the people. Good, get some rest this weekend.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

7:34 p.m., May 1, 1970

Z: Did you see the CBS news? The most dramatic part was when Herb Klein pointed out that John Mitchell played a key role in this decision.

K: Who in the name of God puts that idiotic stuff out? Who briefed him? Who pointed it out to You?

Z: I was watching it. I called Kronkite and told him that people like Rockefeller, Reagan, 16 Senators had made positive statements.

K: I understand NBC was terrific -- they showed pictures of the caches of supplies. I have been shoving out stuff, and they ran what I have been putting out. I'm making it pretty clear that Mitchell didn't have much to do with it.

Z: I'm following your line.

K: Say the first meeting of the NSC was on Wednesday.

Z: The decision was made on Tuesday on ARVN/Parrot's Beak.

K: The decision was made on Parrot's Beak in order to move ARVN. We let them move earlier in order to reserve the right to cancel. Don't get into too much detail.

Z: I'm not. And I'm playing Henry Kissinger low key

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

9:37 am

5/2/70

R: I gather that they still haven't made much progress.

K: You know as much as I do.

R: I noted that D. Oberdorfer story is pretty complete. No one here spoke to him.

K: That was put out over here on the President's orders.

R: First he says don't say anything and then he puts it all out.

K: The part of who stood where did not come from over here. That came out of Defense.

R: I feel silly as hell. I caution my people and try to play it (straight).

K: I have nothing to do with public relations. That's done by Haldeman, Klein, and Zeigler. Who does what is not my policy.

R: He calls the signals and you play by it and he goes the other way. I call him and ask if I misread the signals and they say "oh, no, we changed the signals and forgot to tell you."

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger

10:50 am

5/2/70

K: The President wanted me to call you.

H: What he wanted me to give you was the result of a poll we took yesterday by phone. 1025 interviews, which is an accurate sample on a national basis. On the question of whether they support the statement 64% support it, 22% oppose it, and 15% don't know.

K: That's higher than the withdrawal speech. The opposite are smaller.

H: It's 3 - 1 support. Very strong support.

K: He said if he got 52% he would be doing well.

H: What? The next question was the usual "Do you approve of the way the President is conducting his job?" Prior to the April 20 speech 59% approved, after the speech 62% approved, and now we are back to 59%. Statistically it means it's kept the same. The significant thing is a polarization between men and women. Men went up and women went down. We can't discuss -- we will use some of these figures but we shouldn't range them out too widely. Write this down:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>This Poll</th><th>Last Week</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Very favorable</td><td>30</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Somewhat favorable</td><td>31</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>Somewhat Unfavorable</td><td>17</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Unfavorable</td><td>14</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Don't know</td><td>8</td><td>7</td></tr></tbody></table>

That shows favorable went from 62% to 61%.

K: But the favorable went way up. When you drop from a withdrawal announcement to a troop commitment announcement in 8 points, that's damn good.

H: Favorable is still 2 - 1.

Men were:
V.F. 38 25
S.F. 27 44
S.U. 15 16
U. 14 9
D.K. 6 6

Women were:
V.F. 20 24
S.F. 36 45
S.U. 19 15
D.K. 14 9

By NARA, Date 5/26

Haldeman/Kissinger
10:40 am 5/2/70

-2-

H: (cont.) Women dropped 4 points and men were up 15.

K: There are a lot of mothers in that group -- if this operation goes off without any casualties and then casualties drop we will go out ok.

H: He wanted you to have those figures. Don't use them with anyone. We will use them for support.

K: He told me last night that he wants some statements from high State Dept. officials supporting him. I have informed the Executive Secretariat.

H: Rogers called this morning. He is upset about the Oberdorfer story.

K: He called me.

H: It helps us and him. You cover him on the timing of the committee.

K: And where people stood he got from Defense. I didn't give him that.

H: That's obvious.

K: Both newspapers cut it in such a way it looks much more percipitive then it is.

H: It comes out as a very thoughtful decision.

K: It does? Good.

H: It indicates they had a lot of meetings with very important people. I am going to call Bill back and shore him up.

K: He was says it's not being a success.

H: That's not true.

K: A. It's a success. B. You should say so if you don't think so. If we have no casualties in 6 weeks no one will care.

H: The Post headlines were good.

K: We are shaking Hanoi.

H: You are calling the President now?

K: Yes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger

12:55 pm 5/2/70

P: One thing I was going to tell you. Bill is going to be on the CBS special tomorrow. NBC is going to have one too. They will do a man in the street. They will load the question. That's why it's important to have our poll out. Can we get anything on these pictures? What have they found on COSVN?

K: None of the equipment. They found 100 bunkers and an extensive tunnel complex.

P: Make sure he has that. Let him put that out. They have found these bunkers and this is just the beginning. The casualties are low.

K: They could go up.

P: I know. But the enemy is retreating now.

K: They have run into some.

P: How many?

K: 183 of theirs killed and 5 of ours. The biggest artillery since WWII. Humphrey called in and wanted me to know that the statement he made yesterday was all he would say and he won't say anymore.

P: I hope you took a positive line with him.

K: He won't say anymore and will urge people to stay quiet. He knows what you have gone through.

P: We can't see him since he is a candidate. The doves are shooting at him. You have to scare our opponents. They might think it's going to work.

K: We have those pictures from the Parrot's Beak.

P: See if you can transmit anything. Find out when he goes on. The tunnel complex and so forth. In the meantime there's to be ruthless follow through. 704. We are not going to take any more heat. Since we are doing this then lets do it. I wonder if they are being aggressive enough in the Parrot's Beak area.

K: They are the ARVN. I am told they are doing well for an ARVN production. Looking at their casualties -- they have lost 60, which means they must be doing something. And they are not yet in the area where the largest numbers are.

P: They are cutting that access road.

K: So it will be hard to move the supplies out. They can wander the men out, They are moving the units out of the base area, so if we don't get in fast they will move the supplies out.

P: The Chiefs have to realize that they must move fast or there will be nothing left.

K: It can't be an accident that all action in Cambodia has stopped for three days. They have to figure out what's going on. They don't know how deep we will go after them.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By NARA, Dalo 5/26", "President/Kissinger\n12:55 pm 5/2/70", "-2-", "P: They only have 3-4 thousand people. Make them think we might go after them.", "K: The Psychological blow to them is already very considerable.", "P: It's considerable only for the American people. This cannot drag on for 3 or 4 months.", "K: By early June we will be out of there.", "P: Don't tell them that. This had to be done fast. The Chiefs are not thinking fast enough. Does Abrams understand? They have to take risks and jump in. Bomb whatever is necessary.", "K: I have made it clear and I will get another message out to them today.", "P: They have to have pictures of something. What's the word in the COSVN area?", "K: We can't expect too much yet because we are only in the initial areas. They are not in the main area. As I w explained when I showed you the plan.", "P: We have to leave that to Abrams.", "K: I will make the point.", "P: Rogers said -- I said that if this is to succeed we must not nitpick. He said if it doesn't we will have to fire a couple of people. He is sore because Abrams and Bunker advised us.", "K: We weren't pushed into this.", "P: That's not fair. We were for it. It must succeed. They have been asking for it.", "K: I recieved a letter from Mrs. Alsop: \"??- ?- ?- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

By NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

12:55 pm

5/2/70

K: We have to stress both. They thought that we have had it. I would not stress the withdrawal that much or they will think this is our parting shot. We have them sweating now. Your speech was properly balanced and that should be the theme.

P: We will have to leave that to the gods. He will do the best he can. The thing about Hanoi is they will take much comfort from the speech and we must bend what we can consistent with our goal. That's why the pictures are important. If they don't have it they don't have it.

K: I will do what I can.

P: Two days and they don't have much.

K: Not in COSVN. But the first 2 - 10 days they were not going to look for things but to get the enemy out of there.

P: Get that across to Rogers. The major major goal here is to get the equipment. I see your point about withdrawal. What about the meeting with Le Duc Tho? The purpose of that is diplomatic. It makes a good record.

K: Whenever we talk, they hit you. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

P: You had better go in before there's any more indication of American division.

K: I can go in Monday.

P: We can say this is your last chance. Get him in there Monday.

K: I will show you the message.

P: I don't want to see it. The line should be that now the balls on your side of the net. They can choose between peace and war. Be sure to get through to Rogers.

K: I will get him as much material as we can.

P. Agnew and E. Richardson too.

K: We are getting that big briefing book to him now.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

1:20 pm

5/2/70

K: You did a great briefing this morning.

L: We had quite a going at it. We went as far as we could go.

K: It's greatly appreciated.

L: We have some of the numbers on the afternoon report. The enemy kills on both operations is up to 907 now. It will be a couple of days before we get in. It takes a couple of days to get in.

K: Bill keeps calling the President about dry holes and firing people. We have to keep the President's morale up. We don't do anything by poor mouthing it. Right or wrong we have to go with this and succeed. If you could suggest to him that we have to give the President strength instead of --

L: Sure. He has asked me to play golf today. I wasn't going to but perhaps I will and see what I can do. We have to succeed with this and he shouldn't be saying that. I didn't like that Oberdorfer story. That was bad.

K: That was out of here at the President's direction. But that on how who took what position they said came from Defense.

L: They tell me it came from Herb Klein. I don't like that. And it's not fair to John Mitchell because it makes him the villain. I saw John on TV -- if we are going to coordinate public relations we had better do that instead of going in all directions.

K: Besides, it's not true. That other is as a friend and not as a Presidential assistant.

L: I understand and I will see what I can do.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
3:45 pm 5/2/70

K: Are you at a phone or on radio?

L: I'm on a radio but I can get to a phone.

K: Get to a phone.

L: Call you back right away?

K: Yes.

L: I'm here with Bill.

K: Call me. We have a public relations problem.

Further conversation: 4:00 pm

K: I just had a call from Beecher and Frankel. He has a full order on that 134 plan detail.

L: The 134 deal?

K: On the DMZ.

L: You mean last night?

K: And the night before. Hetalked to Haig. It's not protective reaction and was authorized at the same time as Fish Hook.

L: I don't know how he picks that up. Did you talk to Buz?

K: Just this minute. He said subject to my talking to you we should put a hold on the other 3.

L: I think we should say we had a plane shot down there. I had better let Hencken handle this.

K: We will not handle this here.

L: That was -- there must be -- are you sure everything is all right? I cannot believe it came out of the General Staff. I have not told Hencken.

K: That thought has crossed my mind. In my staff meeting it's me, Haig, and one other person. Did you tell Bill about it?

L: By telephone but not the messages.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

3:45 pm

5/2/70

-2-

Who

K: This is frankly a military type leak. How else would give a damn about planes?

L: Let me talk to Hencken. We will have to handle it in Saigon about it being north and a plane shot down. Tell Frankel that we lost an aircraft and we fired at our aircraft along the DMZ.

K: How about those other three things? Should we stick with them that were authorized yesterday?

L: I think we have got to. Don't you? I hate to back off right now. This is really a Public relations thing. Could Hencken talk to you? Dan handles it well but I've got to talk to him.

K: Will you call me back?

L: Yes.

Further conversation: 4:03 pm

L: That story is coming out Hanoi.

K: The first story came out of Hanoi. That's OK. We were just sending them over to Defense. Then Frankel called in and said he had hot poop from Beecher on 134 planes.

L: That's the story their newspaper is using. Their reporter was in the strike zone. We are using the protective reaction story.

K: I have the orders here. You should say it was made in accordance with protective reaction. They were authorized now.

L: I think we should slip the other 24 hours.

K: It's probably underway now.

L: One but we have two more going.

K: You're right.

L: We are going to have to put a closer -- there are ways this could have happened without the operations order. The 134 is the night newspaper story which the reporter said he observed. I will have Dan call you and put a hold on everything.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By

NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Hencken/Kissinger

4:12 pm

5/2/70

H: We have had some queries on the Reuters stories.

K: We had one from Frankel.

H: We had it from Beecher.

K: Frankel called in and said there were these reports and what's to them. I told Haig to tell him to go to Defense. Then Beecher said that the strike was authorized at the same time as Fish Hook, 134 aircraft. That's awfully close.

H: I told Beecher we contract protective reaction strikes whenever there are crew casualties and plane losses. And on background we told him that a plane was lost. We told him that. That's all. He, in talking with Freidheim, had that other stuff.

K: We will shift everything to you.

H: We told him that normally --

K: Ron is here. We didn't normally tell him these things.

H: We told Bill we don't generally tell him what other news guys are doing. Bill Boyd is in NVN for night newspapers and he said he saw 5 of our planes in the area of Dang Noi on the evening of May 12. The NVN told him that there were 12. We told Beecher that's what we understand is the facts. Beecher said we had to do something or we will confirm it.

K: We can only sit tight.

H: We will sit with our words that are hard if we can go (?).

K: Should I call Frankel? It's not normal for me not to return calls. I had better not because I will have to lie.

H: We never lie.

K: We are not that moral except for Zeigler.

H: We just don't say.

K: I will ask Ron's advice.

H: I will be home all the time. That's the word our duty officer has. We told MACV to get that word announced at our next briefing.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Frankel/Kissinger
4:22 pm 5/2/70

K: Can't you leave me alone on a weekend?

F: Can't you leave me along ? A pop shot a day?

K: What do you mean?

F: We were down on this raid with planes and civilians killed. We have sent a story on a raid over near the border with supply bases and 124 of our planes.

K: I think you should talk to Defense. Henken will give you the story on that.

F: They said they didn't characterize the raid. They wouldn't talk on the number of planes.

K: This is a Defense Dept. matter on which I should not get involved.

F: I will get his stuff. But we are now working on a 7 minute deadline.

K: We would prefer you didn't give numbers because they are always strongly conjectural.

F: You are not saying I should stop it or that's it's wrong.

K: I am saying you should talk to Defense.

Further conversation: 4:45 pm

K: I'm trying to get Laird to talk to you about this thing. He is on a golf course. Do you have people listening in on this?

F: I will check -- that's what's off the hook.

K: I will get Laird to talk to you. I simply want to say that in the light of a lot of things that if you blow up this story it will be strongly against our national interest. This is simply my personal judgment.

F: I will pass it on to my editors. Let me -- we are on minutes. What we have in print and heading for the presses is a story that the raid took place and the planes hit supply dumps. ______ it's officially protective reaction.

Further conversation: 4:55 pm

K: Henken is going to call you. He will give you as many of the facts as we can. The other comment I made to you is personal. I don't want to be written up in the

By

NARA, Dale 5/26

Frankel/Kissinger

4:22 pm

5/2/70

K (cont.): history of the NYTimes. I am not doing it in the name of the President.
To get our back broken on this will have consequences far beyond.

F: Hanoi is bouncing this around the night newspapers. The official NVN press says 100.

K: You may believe it but I haven't seen it.

F: Out of Tokyo it says more than 100.

K: I have asked Mel to have Henken give you as much as he can.

F: If the U.S. is changing its policy it's rather hard for a newspaper to get it.

K: If we were talking about daily occurrences here I wouldn't be talking to you. This is one of those things in which I am talking as Henry Kissinger.

F: It's a hell of a lot of weight on us.

K: I recognize that.

F: Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

4:48 pm

5/2/70

-2-

K: We are not saying anything here. They are saying flatly that we used 128 and it was aimed at logistics installations and it's not suppression.

L: That's what the night newspapers filed.

K: Hencken will tell you what there is.

L: Hencken said he didn't have authority from you and I said go ahead because we don't want to press a credibility thing. We have deadpaned it all day.

K: Henry Brandon called in and they were obviously fishing around.

L: How is everything else?

K: Fine.

L: OK

K: If you think we shouldn't

L: I guess that's right.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCONE

J. Reston/Kissinger

5:26 pm

5/2/70

K: All I can tell you is that I was on my way out of this building and if you left me alone I would be out shopping.

R: That would have added to inflation.

K: That's inside the three mile limit. I don't worry about those things.

R: What's this about knocking off the story?

K: The President doesn't know about this yet. I was doing this as a friend of Max's. I don't want to make this a tremendous event because no matter what people think about the system in Cambodia the back of our effort is now going to be broken which will have consequences outside the immediate area. I was probably out of line. I said I did try to get Defense to give him as much as I could. I also said if this was to be a daily occurance,(I wouldn't have bothered calling him about it.)

R: This is all over the world.

K: No, it was the precision he was trying to get.

R: I must say I don't understand. Let's talk on Monday. Maybe I'm totally wrong and misguided about the whole thing. Let's knock it off for the weekend and you should go shopping.

K: Now the stores are closed.

R: That's the way life is.

K: It was going to be my first Sat. evening off. So will you tell Max to take some Sat. afternoon off?

R: Not a chance -- not with the world going the way it is.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Gen. Wheeler/Kissinger

6:00 pm

5/2/70

K: I just had my skin taken off-on those flights. He says he will take the heat and it's non of my business on what heat he takes. The policy is that we have been fired at from these areas.

W: We lost a plane there yesterday.

K: SAM's?

W: No, they're down near Vinh.

K: You are not hitting there?

W: No.

K: Hit those three targets. Get your planes up there. Does that make you unhappy? He was pretty sore.

W: OK.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger
6:10 pm 5/2/70

K: I just talked to the President at length. You were right in your attitude. We should just hang tough. He also ordered three strikes to go forward. He was so insistent that I told Wheeler when I couldn't reach you right away and confirmed it with you. He said he will take some heat either way with COSVN. Make sure they go today. He wants you -- your instinct was right. Just stone wall it. We did what was necessary. He asked me again to tell you how proud he was of your briefing. Will you lay it on immediately?

L: I am glad of that. We might as well get this heat over with.

Further conversation: 6:17 pm

K: I forgot to tell you -- did they get the poll to you right after the speech? The President asked me to give it to you. They took a poll of 1200 (actually 1025, according to Haldeman) people across the country. The poll of favorable went from 24 to 30. Somewhat favorable was 31. Among men very favorable was ________. Women was less good. Women was ________. This is whether they favored the policy. Faavorable 30, somewhat favorable 29. On every case it was 2-1.

L: That's damn good.

K: They took that yesterday morning by telephone.

L: We are all set.

K: They are going on all three targets.

L: In the daytime if the weather is ok.

K: From now on we will not answer any questions over here.

L: Dan has good instincts.

K: He was right. We will not deal with that case here from now on.

L: I wanted to hardline this thing.

K: We didn't loose much.

L: Dan and Freidheim are both good guys on this thing.

K: You have pushed the whole thing very well.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
VEEP/Kissinger
6:30 pm 5/2/70

K: All hell is breaking loose on this exercise north of the DMZ. Someone leaked Figures. The President figures since he is taking heat he might as well continue. He wants to be sure that if they ask you tomorrow you don't know the details and Defense can give the details but our policy is protective. Anything that shoots at us we will fire back. We stone wall it coldly. It won't give you too much pain.

V: Not a bit.

K: The President feels he has crossed his Rubicon.

V: I'm glad you called me.

K: I knew it was not necessary but he asked me to call you.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
6:40 pm 5/8/70

L: I think the WH should play no comment on my press conference. Someone over there said that Laidr Does nto represent administration policy. NBC is carrying this thing.

K: I will get to this right away and have his skin.

L: You don't have to stand with my but no comment.

K: But the President does stand by you. We are all delighted with it.

L: We are not doing this for diplomatic purposes.

K: They should say no comment.

L: Maybe all the damage *ix* is done.

K: I will get Zeigler and tell him to spread the word around.

Further conversation: 6:45 pm

K: Ron is calling NBC and turning it off. He never said it. We think it came
from Nofsiger.

L: It' no skin off my tail but it detracts from what we are trying to do.

K: Once *ix* the decision was made you have been a great soldier. Even before
that -- you are obviously allowed to give your opinion.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger
6:45 pm 5/2/70

K: Mel Laird just blew his stack and he is right. Someone said his statements don't reflect administration policy.

Z: If anyone did, I don't know how it is. Wait a minute. (Ron asks several of the people in the room with him). We got one query from Newsweek. Jerry took one question and he was asked if we had any comment on Laird's statement. He said no.

K: Haig thinks it's Nofsiger.

H: Where did it come from?

K: NBC.

H: We didn't talk to NBC.

K: Will you get after Klein and tell him to no comment it.

H: What did NBC say?

K: That the WH immediately disowned him and it didn't reflect administration policy.

H: Should I call NBC and turn this around?

K: Yes, if you can.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

D. Rockefeller/Kissinger
afternoon 5/2/70

R: I'm coming to Washington on Monday and staying on Tuesday. Council on Latin America. I wondered if you would like to have dinner Monday night.

K: How about breakfast on Tuesday?

R: Nelson's or somewhere else?

K: Can I check what the problems will be here on Tues? There might be reason to be here near a phone.

R: I will be in touch on Monday.

K: Fine.

R: How are things going in Cambodia.

K: As we expected. We are picking up caches.

R: Making headway?

K: And very light casualties. We have a tank battalion that tried to bivouac and they fell into a cache.

R: It was courageous.

K: We had no choice. I will see you when you are down.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
12:40, 5-3-70

K: I just had a call from Bill saying that you have authorized an attack on Dong Hoi.

L: You mean the base area we are going to hit tonight. not

K: That is not Dong Hoi. That is an base area we were going to hit tonight. This will be in the middle tonight. You know where. It is 20 miles in from the border - not on the coast.

L: No. We don't allow them to go high. We limited them to 20 miles. I said the President said 20 miles. I knocked that authority out and they just have 20 miles. The area is opposite that area but limited to 20 miles.

K: I will explain that the President personally authorized it last night.

L: He was willing to go further but I limited it.¹

K: I understand fully.

L: I have a hard time getting through on that.

K: Alright Mel.

mlh

By ____ NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
12:40, 5-3-70

R: Henry, I am just concerned. I gathered that there is a raid at Dong Hoi which is quite a bit above the DMZ.

K: No, that would be absolutely against any authority. That is
on now?

R: Well, it is either on or scheduled.

K: They wanted to go over to Route 1 which that is an extension of I think but they cannot.

R: You might find out about that and let me know. I don't want to go out on a limb.

K: Alright Bill, I will call you back.

mlh.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Professor Winter
Mr. Kissinger
1:40 pm, 5-3-70

W: Henry, how are you?

K: How long are you going to be here?

W: I was going to leave now but an hour or two does not make any
difference.

K: Where are you? Can you give me an idea of what the
Chinese told you? In what context did they tell you?

W: You know of my contacts?

K: Through Austria?

W: They wanted to know essentially three things. What this
strategy really means in terms of the U.S.? Is this a tactical
move as it is announced or is it a big offensive vis-a-vis
a preventive strike. I said how would I know. The next
thing was an enormously intense attitude, mainly re
cultural people in the Embassy. Said the Ambassador
(Chinese) was quiet. They terms this to be an overall attack
on China. They shifted into the third point which is who really
in America should be gotten in touch with. There was intense
interest. A few hours afterwards I said to myself I will tell
Henry about it. I thought why don't you offer yourself.

K: Will you see them again?

W: I am not the one to give advice to the American Government.

K: Why don't you come on down here for a few minutes right
now?

W: Alright Henry, I will be right down.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

The President
Mr. Kissinger
1:50 pm, 5-3-70

K: Mr. President, I had a call about a half hour ago from someone who has been trying to get me all weekend. He is a naturalized American who has been running a seminar for east-west relations. He used to invite the Chinese to it. He is now working in UNESCO. On Friday, the Chinese Embassy called him over. He said they were in a state of high agitation. They wanted to know if it is a highly tactical move or intense campaign. They wanted to know who they should talk to here. What I think we should do is tell them that they can talk to us here and that if they want to they should call General Walters. It has two advantages. One, we can surface it if we want to and two, we can establish a channel which the Dutchman has never brought off. This man said he has never seen them in such a state of agitation. He said they called him in which is unheard of. I thought he wanted me to donate to his castle and was avoiding him.

P: That is very interesting and should be explored to the hilt.¹

K: I did not want to do anything without talking to you.

P: On the Walters thing, what will he say?

K: I think we should give them a note saying we have reviewed the conversations we have had and our analysis plus recent events indicate the need for continued negotiations and that I stand ready to see Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy any time.

P: I would add this. There is need for conversations and set a time to wind it up. Did you get a little of that in it? That we believe recent events show that failing to negotiate could lead to consequences neither of us want.

K: Going back to the domestic conflict, we can show we offered all these things and they rejected it and then ask them what would you have done in all these cases.

P: The answer will be we never should have gotten in and now we should get out. That is very good Henry on both points. I talked to Johnson and thanked him for his statement. He said he made

By

NARA, Dale 5/26

it in Chicago and the Democrats led the cheering for it.

K: I think you will come out in the strongest possible political position.

P: I had a letter from John Hannah. He said the address was a masterpiece in content, etc. Omar Bradley sent a nice letter.

K: I am convinced that most are with you.

P: Next week we have to see if we can put a little heat under the House and Senate. You will get up and have a talk with Bob?

K: Yes. I have already talked to John Ehrlichman. I think we in the White House have to get together and support each other.

P: No give. No hand ringing or simpering or whining. John Ehrlichman understands that kind of language.

K: Yes.

P: I just want you to let Bob know we think he is doing a good job. He needs to know he has done a good job.

K: Alright Mr. President.

mlh

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

1:36 pm

5/4/70

L: I think things worked out very well.

K: The President said you were doing a great job.

L: The AP, UP and everyone else is handling this well. It's great to get the jump on them and name(?) the press. I left a ? ? ? ? hanging in there.

K: On these other base areas. He is willing to go ahead when Abrams is ready.

L: One is going tonight.

K: Don't announce them to the press but when questions are raised tell them about them in context of your press conference and his speech.

L: Keep the WH out of it.

K: We won't say anything.

L: We don't have to make friends with the press. The people over there do. It's going along all right. I will get with the Joint Chiefs late today or early tomorrow morning.

K: How did the questioning go?

L: All right.

K: What's your sense of the Congressional mood?

L: We will win this thing in the House on Wed. They will insist that we cannot use ground troops in Laos. But not Cambodia. Are those meetings on tomorrow?

K: He wants you and Wheeler to give a 10 min. brief to start.

L: Breakfast and 5:00?

K: He wants you only at the Armed Services Committees.

L: Make sure because I changed plans. Bill called me to say I had to be at the other.

K: The President thinks you should be at the Armed Services and Bill at the Foreign Affairs.

L: Let me know because it was supposed to be in Pa. for Sen. Russell.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

1:42 pm

5/4/70

H: You are getting pretty snooty getting your secretary to place the call. I want to make sure you are on the track about tomorrow's meetings.

K: My understanding is Laid is not to be at the Foreign Affairs Committee.

(Rogers)

H: That's right. The President doesn't want him there. Let him/stand up and take the hit.

K: He didn't take a question on the Congressional briefing. You didn't either.

H: It's your war, you defend it.

K: I have good news for you. We are hitting another base area tonight and one a night this week.

H: I have news for you. 3 killed at Kent State College. One student and 2 national guard. They are using guns. That doesn't hurt us. Are you talking to Rogers tonight or we should I?

K: I will do it. The President will do the briefing and he will answer questions.

H: We must answer questions on the Constitution but the questions on what we are doing or why.

K: One other thing. Are we going on a trip?

H: You want to go too? We plan these trips and you want to be here all night. You should warn CINCPAC that he might be there Thurs. night.

K: We leave Thurs. night and arrive back here Sat. night?

H: Don't say anything about the SAC briefing. We will have the briefing on Friday probably. Tell them to be there Thurs. night.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
2:18 pm, 5-4-70

K: Bill, how are you?

R: Fine Henry.

K: About that briefing for the Foreign Relations people tomorrow. The President would appreciate it if you were there. He will be doing much of the briefing himself but if you could answer questions that came up with regard to constitutional basis, he would appreciate it. He thought you should be the only Cabinet member present. He will have Laird at the meeting in the morning and you at the meeting in the afternoon.

R: On Kosygin's statement, we are drafting a reply which I will submit to you and let the President look at. I am not sure it is a good idea but if we are going to have a reply from the President, he should not argue with them.

K: I think we should hit this notion. When he says aggression on Cambodia, we should hit that one. I thought you did very well yesterday. When did you tape it? I just saw the transcript.

R: I think the program on the whole came off well.

mlh

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Gov. EOX Dewey/Kissinger

2:28 pm

5/4/70

D: Quite a weekend. I guess you were right that all hell would break loose. It was quite a little more than you mentioned such as bombing in the north. I would have urged that be delayed a week.

K: We wanted them to get the message.

D: The question is whether the doves can get it over. I'm told that it's a bust.

K: We are discovering large caches.

D: The news says you aren't.

K: According to our plan we are not looking for caches for a few days and arranging a <u>PERMANENT</u> perimeter around it.

D: I was hoping that a lot could be discovered and announced in one operation.

K: We found 300 tons of rice. That will feed 1200 men.

D: They will laugh at that. You need something more (dramatic?). We need something people will buy as a great ______ up.

K: We have to be patient for a week or two.

D: We have to make and then defend a perimeter.

K: We have completely disrupted their base areas by blowing up their bunkers.

D: I haven't heard that on a news cast.

K: 800 bunkers, 1600 rifles, 150 mortars, 15 tons of rocket ammo. You will be hearing about it tonight.

D: How many rockets?

K: 30,000 lbs and <u>WHEN</u> they figure about 2 or 3 pounds a rocket.

D: 10,000 rockets. That's impressive.

K: We are discovering -- This <u>KNOWING</u> we have 500 prisoners and 2100 killed (subtract that by half) and that's just the first two days.

D: I wasn't going to call you today but I heard from McCloy who says he has a wire from John Codnolly who said it's time for all good men to stand up behind their

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE
Gov. Dewey/Kissinger
2:28 pm 5/4/70

-2-

D (cont): President. I wondered if it's according to plan. Is this a WH inspired?

K: It would be helpful.

D: It would only get one paragraph at the end of page 86 of the Times.

K: If 10 of you spoke up it would get some attention.

D: A group of well-known conservatives to say it's a wise more. My sense of public relations is too ______. I think it's the right thing to do and I tell everyone who asks me.

K: I have nothing to do with public relations. I will ask Haldeman and see what it means.

D: If 10 or 20 people suddenly run into print --

K: 10 or 20 liberals run into print.

D: They get the front page but not those for it. I was supposed to be left wing but *dx* at my age I'm probably the other side. If there's anything, I will advixe McCloy. I am worried from what I have heard that the President is loosing his cool. The second statement on Carswell was a mistake. It was a bitter blast. I heard so much reaction -- not from *xx* people who read the Times. He referred to the fellows in VN as boys. And he used the word bums -- in Britain it means your ass. It was an extemporaneous talk over the weekend.

K: The actions in the foreign policy area *are* well considered and not off the cuff. But I get your point. On the bombing, we want to shock them into excalating right away. These have been stopped today.

D: It seems to me that this said to Hanoi and China that we are not going to roll over for them and things are going to get tough.

K: China has been screaming but not done anything. Kosygin condemned us today but announced no action. The Chinese say they are the great rear for the Indochinese struggle for freedom. I get your point on the public utterances.

D: When they hear something they don't expect to hear from a President, they remember. If he *tak* *kax* takes what people think are rash actions, then they think he has lost his cool. I hope we will find monster supplies. In a short time withdraw our troops and leave the SVN there.

By NARA, Date 5/26

-3-

K: We will be out of there by June 15.

D: That's a long time. On the POW problem, we agreed that this isn't my dish of tea, didn't we?

K: We would be delighted if you would do it but as a friend I couldn't push you to do it.

D: I will discuss the Geneva thing on a rational basis but I don't think the POW. I have a letter from Nutter and Chapin. Since you took this up with me maybe it would be appropriate that you tell them it's not for me to do it. Then I will write the letter.

K: I will do it. Write the letter on Friday.

D: I'm seeing saying these things because his supporters are saying them to me. Do you know who Dwayne Andreas is? Arther Anderson Midland. He is an old friend of mine and raised most of HHH's money. Wherever H has gone, Dwayne has gone. They are close personal friends. I see him when I am in Fla. Dwayne has made a number of friends in Russia. There's one of them who is close to the top to the Embassy here. He says he wants to establish a relationship with someone close in the government. No secret about it. This would do me good because I could say I know because of our relationship. And he would tell ours. It's a means of communication who some say stay away from it. He will abuse it. He might go around his boss. He tells me he has direct access to the top. Dwayne asked me if I would talk to him.

K: I would like to know who he is.

D: Bubnov.

K: Bubnov. Here or NY?

D: Washington. It would be poison or useful. I have met with the Secy Gen. of the UN who was then the top spy of the U.S. If you give me an answer I will call it or arrange for you to meet him on not have any private contacts.

K: I will look into it. I will let you know within a week.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger

3:07 pm

5/4/70

R: I am following with the most tremendous interest what you are doing.

K: We have really clobbered them up there.

R: Where have they gone?

K: We're not after the men. We are getting great supplies. The men have gone back into the jungle. They never fight. We are hoping the men will melt away. Cut off from their supplies they don't bother us and if they fought they would kill our men. We have 500 tons of rice. By the count this morning we had 1700 rifles. There are 3 big caches we haven't gotten into. 3,000 rockets. Destroyed 900 bunkers.

R: What about those deep tunnels?

K: We haven't gotten into it. This is only a by-product of the military operation. We will not start digging for a week. In both operations we have captured 400 prisoners. And they have claimed to kill 2100. We cut that in half. If we can do this without a fight -- they only have 40,000 people there. If they fought us we would take that -- if we can push them in the jungle and keep them from fighting.

R: What are you doing in the north?

K: X Following your advice. We will stopp now for awhile. We used 200 plans. We bombed every road out of VN. Some of the gasoline fires went up to 20,000 feet.

R: How's the President holding up.

K: He goes up and down.

R: Does he have a meeting with Congress yet?

K: Tomorrow. There's so much -- they have captured so much stuff. They are getting it now and they are way behind they have so much. We don't care about the people. That's what the press is saying. I will send you my backgrounder. I said we wouldn't capture men. We prefer not to. We got about 60 trucks. As of this morning and this is way overtaken.

R: Will you let Henry Ford build trucks for them?

K: Not if we can help it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger

3:07 pm

5/4/70

R: Anything new in Egypt?

K: Not yet. The Russians made a statement that was mild -- said it has to be done by all peace loving people.

R: I hope the President will consider jets to Israel.

K: We have taken care of that. The Chinese have said they will not come in. They said they will be the great rear.

R: I told Happy son at Princeton -- he said everyone will be drafted at the Univ. who are on strike. If they go on strike they are out of school and they are subject to the draft.

K: We will probably go into some more base areas.

R: Now that you have started, you should go on a broad scale.

K: We are getting great support from State. We don't hear from them for days. They only say we can go forward.

R: Just go for Haiphong.

K: Not in this. We will try to do that diplomatically. I wanted to bring you up to date.

R: Tell the President he is doing great. I will call him anytime.

K: You really made the difference that night.

R: Let's keep in touch. Congratulations.

K: Let's wait a week or two.

By [signature] NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Gen. Vogt/Kissinger

3:20 pm

5/4/701

V: You know this report that had the figure in it. This was the summary for 1 May and it had the item in it.

K: Where did it go?

V: The WH, the Chairman, the Secy. of Defense, and my office. There's no question in my mind that it's based on that. It's a wrong figure so whoever has that memo that's where it was.

K: You will send the intelligence on the other stuff. You are doing a great job. Are you optimistic?

V: You will find it's the greatest thing you have ever done so long as we stand firm.

K: The thing that would help us is if we can conclude any one of these operations. But don't conclude it if there's one cache left.

V: It will be over soon. This will really set them back.

K: The President will brief the foreign relations committee so if any figures you can have by 3:00 tomorrow will help. If they have a cache that they can't count -- I have mentioned the figure of 10 tons of rockets but it was more meaningful to have it in terms of numbers of rockets.

By

NARA, Date

Telecon
Ambassador Yost

5/4/70 3:30 p.m.

Y: Three things I wanted to mention to you: I wonder, first, how
things stand at your end on the idea of sending a letter to the President...

K: I've just cleared it. I don't know whether a formal word has
reached the Department but it's been cleared. It's just a matter of a
phone call.

Y: Good. Thank you. Second, can you give a little more push
to this Presidential commission?

K: I've agreed to add the list you and Rogers worked out. Our
political people had to see it, as a formality, to see if there's anyone they
object to. They won't add anybody to it. I'll have it cleared by the end of
the week.

Y: Thank you. Will there be an NSC meeting on the Ptereson Report?

K: No, the President wants to do it on the basis of written comments.
So if you have any views, we'd appreciate your writing them.

Y: All right. I'll get them in.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Packard/Kissinger
4:20 pm 5/4/70

P: We go to a call this morning from a man named Davidson, an assistant of Hanna's (?). Hanna met with Arbotov and he expressed an interest in talking with me. Not Laird. I thought I should check with you.

K: I think you should. I know him. I would delay it for a few days to see how things gell.

P: I will delay it as long as you think. It may be in relations to SALT.

K: Let me talk to you before. I am going to see him on Wed. I know him well and he is close to Brezhnev.

R: I will get word back that I would be glad to see him after Wed.

K: Thank you for calling.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
The President
5/4/70 ca. 4:45 p.m.

P: On reports that stock of the kind of weapons picked up. In the future, use rounds instead of pounds or tons of ammunition.

K: Right. As a matter of fact, I've already given that order. 3,000 rounds is more impressive. 10 tons doesn't mean a lot. They've discovered 3 caches they haven't gone into yet. I've told them to do it so you can give it to the committee. They also discovered another ______ tons of rice.

P: At Kend State there were 4 or 5 killed today. But that place has been bad for quite some time--it has been rather violent.

K: It was all the last week before this. But now they'll blame it on us.

P: Oh, of course.

K: 33 university presidents are appealing to you . . .

P: To get out of Cambodia?

K: No, for a quick extraction from Vietnam.

P: That's fine. What about the student strike tomorrow? If it's peaceful, it doesn't bother me.

K: OK. You might want to consider a press conference this week.

P: We'll take a look.

K: Except for that, we have enough evidence to justify it. The Chinese have issued a statement, in effect saying they wouldn't do anything.

P: It's not new that the university presidents want us out is it?

K: No.

P: With regard to the student strike, we shall see how that develops. It's probably coming out of the . . . You don't know what will happen. If they're out of classes they'll be able to raise hell.

K: They may hold teach-ins.

P: That doesn't bother me.

K: And they may march on Washington.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

5/4/70 ea. 4:45 p.m.

page 2

P: Okay.

K: The Indonesian Ambassador was in--he seemed quite pleased.

P: You are going to get the material for me to look at?

K: It's being typed now. You'll have it in an hour. The only thing another not in there will be the tabulation--it changes every hour.

P: I'll call on Laird and Wheeler for that.

K: Good. They are prepared. They are bringing along a tot board which has all the details.

P: I hope we can get a few people of our own to speak out.

K: The university presidents are a disgrace.

P: Still they get an inordinate amount of the publicity, like the students. We have to stand as hard as a rock. Everybody's been through this: DeGaulle, Marcos. . . If countries begin to be run by the children, God help us.

K: That's right. Of course, student disorders don't hurt us politically.

P: They don't if it doesn't appear that we caused them. That the point here. Well, all right, fine. Incidentally, is Haig there?

K: Yes.

P: Could he come over in a few minutes? I have a few military terms I don't quite understand, he could explain to me.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Dato' 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
4:55 pm 5/4/70

R: I have looked this statement of Kosygin's over carefully and I don't think we should issue anything today. It's pretty comprehensive.

K: The bits and pieces I have seen I don't think we should firefix right back. It's a conciliatory a bit.

R: The talks in Paris. Subtleties about the SALT talks. It's a little far ranging.

K: It will probably come up in the briefing and McCloskey can head individual parts.

R: I have to speak at an/advisory council this weekend.

K: That might be a good occasion.

R: We will let it go tonight. Tomorrow is 5:00?

K: To the best of my knowledge. If it changes I will let you know.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
The President/Kissinger
5-4-70 8:20 p.m.

K: Mr. President

P: Henry

K: I just got back a little while ago from the Soviet Embassy and I think we have their attention. They were falling all over me. That fellow Arbatov, who is close to Brezhnev said, "What did you think of the Kosygin statement?" I said we expected criticism. He said, "We wouldn't break off SALT talks, we if you keep bombing, we may have to." I said we need some serious discussions. The atmosphere was very, very cordial and they wouldn't do that unless they were under instructions. Dobrynin will be back next week.

P: When he gets back, let's get going on this track now before it's too late.

K: I said you are a great country and what we do in Cambodia has nothing to do with you. It doesn't affect our relationship unless you want it to. They know this is cynical but they understand the message. If they had wanted to show dissatisfaction, I wouldn't have been invited and they wouldn't have fallen all over me. I think the old game plan can still work quite well.

P: We have to play the old game plan.

K: When the uproar is over the other side has shot its wad. We will have a rough two or three weeks. Even that channel active later this summer (?).

P: That's the channel we will use.

K: They wanted reassurance. . . they were worried. I was friendly and said everything we have said to you still goes. They understand.

P: Anybody from State there?

K: No one from State. They have now done what they are going to. May say a few things at the UN and Dobrynin may come back with some sort of nasty message.

P: We gave them a nasty message on Czechoslovakia. We can expect one on this. That shouldn't allow them to break off relations.

K: They wanted reassurance there wouldn't be toughening. When people say we scared Hanoi off negotiations. . . Hanoi started with military . . . right off. The mood there was one to keep relations. I am giving a lunch here for three Soviet characters on Wednesday. During Johnson they never accepted. There was a freeze on this.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President/Kissinger

5-4-70 8:20 p.m.

- 2 -

P: There are periods when they need us and we need them. In the meantime, we have got to get this ____ off of our platter in a way where we show some credibility.

K: We have that.

P: We go on our way with Vietnamization. I think that's fine. That's a good game plan. Have Haldeman check with Mitchell on the student thing. They are finding it difficult to get the strike mobilized.

K: Have you seen the front page of the *Star*? Favorable. Even Brinkley had pictures of caches.

P: We don't want to overplay it. When you have the cards, play poker hand softly. It will accomplish the purpose. Time will tell.

K: Did get 121 tons of rice. Altogether 800,000 lbs. of rice.

P: One million is a good figure.

K: All TV reports on that part of it are quite favorable. I haven't seen on TV and in the press what happened at Kent State.

P: They'd play it as an anti-war, anti-Cambodian action wouldn't they?

K: In the *Star* they didn't.

P: They will play it that way. Our people will have to have the guts to see it through. So be it! This is not the way policy is to be made.

K: Capturing vast amounts of equipment.;

P: The sophisticated ones will point out the amounts are not vast. In Fish Hook we have another couple of weeks. Parrot's Beak will pick up more than Fish Hook.

K: I think they are at them now. They have made a pincer movement. I think they will get prisoners there. As Haig said, it won't be decisive.

P: We were giving them the best we had under difficult circumstances. Thank God we had bombing strikes too. I think they will cool after several days. Tomorrow we will say there is no change in policy in this Administration. If anybody wants to question logistics around that area . . .

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

The President/Kissinger

5-4-70 8:20 p.m.

- 3 -

K: Don't think the average American thinks it sensible to sit and wait to get hit from these bases.

P: Anti-aircraft around installations. We will have to brazen that one right through. They have given us plenty of provocation.

K: Over a period of months it will pay off even with Hanoi.

P: They may have a death wish.

K: They don't have a death wish. Since we stopped bombinb they had three big offensives in "69 and if we deescalate on that road they would step up fighting.

P: We have at least prevented a big shellacking for the past few months. Abrams will be prepared. They could knock over Cambodia.

K: That was their decision anyway.

P: I am with you in thinking they will not.

K: Mr. President, at the time of Hungary and Czechoslovakia we said we wouldn't provoke them and they did it anyway. I think they are less likely now.

P: Rives has been very erratic.

K: I think we ought to get an Ambassador there.

P: When? Why wouldn't we see if we can hold it awhile? Wonder what Sihanouk thinks.

K: He has become a Chinese stooge. Lon Nol and Matak (sp) were his people.

P: I think he has a problem in terms of his position. If he comes back he is a Chinese-North Vietnamese ______. Too complicated for us to know what will happen.

K: If he comes back the right wing in his country will be destroyed and he will have to depend on the left. At the Soviet Embassy I ran into Ralph Lapp - a physicist. He presented a paper at the American Physicists Society and said the students were out of control. Violence on campus is really shocking.

By NARA, Date 5/26

P: Let me suggest when you talk to Bob, talk to John too. He is terribly concerned about the riots. Get to him the point that we can't cave to the radicals.

K: They are not ready to cave.

P: John is conservative on Vietnam. When I got through with that Pell I don't think he will forget that for a while.

K: I think you did fine. And I see why you called this fellow a bum. not

P: Get to John and Bob and buck them up. Say you can/do it by conciliating with them. Wasn't Fulbright an ass?

K: Yes, but his questions hit right out of the ball park.

P: We have got now - the main thing is the military have to come through better. They have come through reasonably well.

K: I think they are doing reasonably well.

P: One thing, I am pleased about, they have kept the casualties down. Nevertheless, right now can't they dig in and get those caches out?

K: I think they can and we are pushing them. When you make a report to the people, I think that will be a good time to appoint a negotiator. I would pick some foreign service guy. I would remove that issue. I thought it was superb today and I think we are going to make it.

P: Good, fine Henry.

mlh