34 Third Infantry Rd
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

23 December 1965

JAN 1 1966

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I don't know if you remember me, I am a former student of yours, one of "Abe" Lincoln's people who was with you in the old Defense Studies seminar, 1957-1959.

What prompts me to write you is a recent newspaper column on your mission to Saigon, as well as the inclosed letter from a Vietnamese student friend of mine, which I wish to share with you. Knowing you, I am assuming that you would be glad to have the opportunity to confirm your impressions of the South Vietnamese political situation, especially your judgment that it is possible to do a great deal more to achieve a domestic political settlement that will pave the way to stable institutions.

I understand that you have recommended an urgent political effort, comparable to that made in the military field. To this I can only say "Amen!". From my experience in Saigon last year I came to the conclusion that the most significant missed opportunities were in the field of practical political evangelism. We just weren't organized for it. We dealt with the government at the top, but the political actors behind the scenes were contacted for the most part by intelligence agents. We cultivated them for their "views", seldom urging the constructive use of their power. And we were totally lacking in grass-roots contacts beneath the top circle of leaders in each group; this was especially true among the civil servants, the students, and the military. Among the military, with the advisory system, we missed a golden opportunity, for the younger officers are a power in themselves, thoroughly enmeshed in political matters. But our own tradition is "Stay out of politics", and most of our military people were glad to do just that; they seldom inquired into the politics of their counterparts and, I suspect, they didn't even do a little bit of proselytizing for democracy.

As for the students, the future leaders, a power of concern to any government---they thirsted for contacts with Americans, but just weren't cultivated for their politics. The group with whom I used to meet would chuckle as they told me that occasionally a USIS man would come by to offer them books. I hope you will note that the most revealing thing about the inclosed letter is the openness, the confidence, the willingness to tell all. Implicit, of course, is the expectation that my own opinions and advice will follow. Now, this student is the leader of a Catholic group in the orbit of the refugee leader, Father Hoang Quynh. As I'm sure you know, all the "groups" in Vietnam are fragmented, and it is the fragments that from time to time, with remarkable fluidity, coalesce into "blocs"--somewhat like French politics under the Fourth Republic. But suppose we had contacts, like the one represented by our letter, with each of these fragments; suppose we had a master plan, say, for a constitutional settlement, and coordinated the views laid before each group. Just think of the potential for influence here, as well as the balance-of-power variations that become possible. My purpose, however, is not to suggest a formula. It is, simply, that many will argue that it is not possible to make a "more supreme" effort in the political field; they will suggest palliatives. They are dead wrong, I can assure you.

I would not be so bold to lay these views before you if I were not confident of my ground. My year in Saigon was a year of intimate study and contact with Vietnamese politics. I saw the picture from within MACV, and I amplified it through my own probing about. I could get to places, like refugee villages, where my seniors could not; and I could meet with outlawed coup-makers. (Surely you must have heard of Col. Pham Ngoc Thao, whose demise is reported to me in the letter--not without embellishment, of course.) The politics of the personalities mentioned in the letter are well known to me, and I'm sure I could write you a better history of the six coups of last year than you could find elsewhere.

As for the substance of the inclosed letter. You will detect, I am sure, the unsettling effect on this particular group, and apparently on the military leaders of the present government, of our present overtures looking to a stable civilian regime. This is one of the paradoxes of our present situation: we want a stable regime, but each time we raise the question of the future we threaten to unseat the present one. The politics of personalities, with its attendant suspicion and intrigue, makes it much easier to rupture an existing consensus than to fashion a new one. On one thing, however, all groups are agreed: the question of the political order is a life-and-death question for all of them. It is for this reason that I believe we must re-examine the conventional wisdom of nation-building, with all of its emphasis on strengthening the formal structure, the apparatus, and all of its hostility to concessions to the religious and ethnic groups with organic ties to the people: the Catholics, IED, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Cham, Khmer, and montagnard tribes. Traditional bonds of authority tie the leaders of these groups to their people in a system of organic representation that formal elections will not be able to replace in a hundred years, and if an equilibrium could be established among these groups, in a constitutional system that was less national and more functional, why then I would say the result would be the nearest approximation to democracy that we can hope for at present.

I would request that you protect the Vietnamese source of the letter, and please see that the detailed contents are not divulged to official channels or to any Vietnamese. Otherwise, I would be breaking a trust, and may lose a friend. Another factor is that I have applied to return to Vietnam this June. I would further request that you return the letter, after making a copy for your files if you wish.

With high regard and best holiday wishes,

Sincerely,

Henry V. Kieatinger

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards.

Do let us stay in touch.

I appreciated it very much.
all the unclassified material you sent me.

I do not know whether I acknowledged

Dear Dick:

San Francisco, California
APO 96343
Saigon
American Embassy
Mr. William M. Smyーer

November 12, 1962

January 17, 1966

Mr. William M. Smyser
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Dick:

The Happy House arrived completely battered. What
do your Montagnard experts tell you about that. If you
ever find another one and would like to send it to me,
I would be grateful.

Another reason for writing you is to introduce
a very good friend of mine Countess Marion Dünhoff,
the Political Editor of DIE ZEIT. She is a little soft-
headed but very well meaning and DIE ZEIT is, of course,
a very enlightened paper.

Countess Dünhoff will be in Saigon in February and
has asked me to suggest some people whom she might see.
I am going to give her letters to some of the brass.
However, my experience has been that she will learn more
from the provincial reporters and from people like yourself.

I wondered whether you might on an informal and impersonal
basis see to it that she does not waste her trip to Saigon
completely. Incidentally, she is absolutely Honorable. You
can be sure that she will not quote you directly or indirectly
and that she will stay within whatever restrictions you put on
her.

Warm regards.

EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

William R. Smyser, Esq.,
APO San Francisco, 96243,
January 8, 1966.

JAN 1 4 1966

Dear Henry:

Things have been rather hectic around here since my return
from leave, what with the bombing "pause" and related developments.
I trust you are able to get current briefings on all of those sub-
jects in Washington. If you have not done so, I would strongly
suggest you try to do it, since I think you would find the traffic
very interesting although not particularly startling.

I am terribly sorry to hear that the "Happy House" has not
reached you. My Montagnard experts tell me that you should not
attach particularly ominous significance to this, and they are pre-
pared to try to get another house if the first one has not reached
you by now.

I hope you will accept my belated best wishes for a very happy
new year, and I look forward to seeing you in the spring whenever
you can return. I now expect myself to return to Washington during
the summer. There seems to be some prospect that I may work on
Vietnamese rather than Political-Military affairs, but this is not
yet certain and I would be grateful if you would not, for the time
being, pass it on. In either event, I hope we shall be able to
keep in touch.

Professor Henry Kissinger,
Defense Studies Seminar,
Harvard University Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

July 7, 1966

Mr. Peer deSilva
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 3 E 30
Langley, Virginia

Dear Peer:

Some weeks ago I talked to you about the paper
which were stolen from me in Saigon on November 1st.
I reported the fact that my pockets were picked to
Jorgensen and the Vietnam police at that time.

My present concern is not to recover the document
as to prevent myself from being embarrassed by some
intelligence operation if these papers got into the wrong
hands.

Here is a particular list of what was missing: 1961 White
House pass, Harvard University identification card, 1965
telephone credit cards--(a) 582-7030K-038 and (b) 152-0719-
K008, Air Travel Card #EA Q 111724WEA253747, Hertz
Rent-a-Car card #3509-536-10095 NA.

I think a shrewd operator could raise havoc with me
particularly if he knew I were in a given town at a given
moment.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaander

With kind regards.

particularly if he knew I were in a given town at a given
time.
I think a friend operator could state his case with me

Rent-a-Car card #2309-236-10092 NA.
K008, Air Travel Card #EA G 111754WEA53747, Hermit
telephone credit cards--(s) 283-4030K-038 and (p) 123-0419-
Home base, Harvard University identification card, 1965
Here is a passport of what was missing: 1967 White
panda.

Intelligence operation if these papers dot into the wrong
as to prevent myself from being embarrassed by some
My present concern is not to recover the document

Jordana and the Vietnam police at that time.
I reported the fact that my pockets were picked to
which were stolen from me in Sialon on November 1st.
Some weeks ago I talked to you about the paper.

Dear Peer:

Landley, Airdrieus
Room 3 E 30
Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Peer qe2ilivs

July 7, 1966

January 18, 1966

Mr. John R. Burke
Embassy of the United States of America
Saigon, Vietnam

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of
January 3rd.

I read the letter which brought
me the sad news of the assassination
of Tu Chung.. I am afraid that my
colleagues would not get very excited
about that.

I still remember your kindnesses
to me with the greatest warmth and
I hope we will stay in touch.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaeinger

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

I hope we will stay in touch.
to me with the greatest warmth and
I still remember your kindnessness
about that.
colleagues would not get very excited
of Tu Chung... I am afraid that my
me the sad news of the assassination
I read the letter which brought

January 3rd.

Thank you for your letter of

Dear John:

Saigon, Vietnam
Embassy of the United States of America
Mr. John R. Burke

January 18, 1969

Saigon, Vietnam,

January 3, 1966.

JAN 6 1966

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I'm sending along a couple of clippings which might interest you. You may recall that one of your last appointments here was with Dr. Dang Van Sung, the publisher of CHINH LUAN, the most influential vernacular daily in Saigon. You may also recall Sung telling us that he and his editor had just received a letter from the Saigon-Gia Dinh Committee of the National Liberation Front, threatening their lives if they did not change the paper's policy of being anti-communist and pro-American.

On Thursday last Tu Chung, the editor, was shot in the back by assassins in front of his home. The funeral was yesterday. I enclose a photograph of the funeral taken from the *Saigon Daily News*. You will note Dr. Sung at the extreme right of the photograph, delivering the funeral oration. The second clipping is an obituary which appeared in the same issue of the *News*. It struck me as being a very well-stated tribute.

I don't suppose that that portion of the academic community that seems always prepared to become exercised over small martyrs to hated regimes would be interested in the case of Tu Chung.

Professor Henry Kissinger
Defense Studies Seminar,
Harvard University Center for
International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

NEWS

Monday, Janu

US Air Force Secretary here on observation tour

SAIGON, Jan. 2 (VP)— Mr. Arnold Brown, Secretary of the U.S. Air Force, arrived here yesterday afternoon, gain first-hand knowledge the situation in Vietaam three or four days, » The Vietnam trip is the first ofiteres to be made by the secretary to U.S. Force units in Southeast Asia, according to U.S.A. F. spokesman.

While here Secretary Brown expected to meet with Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky who is an Air Vice Marshal and Commander of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. the U.S. Secretary also scheduled to meet with William C. Westmoreland, Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. He will also tour US Air Force facilities at Bien Hoa, Cam Rina Bay, Nha Trang, Da Nang and Pleiku addition to Tan Son Nhut. Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Commissioner of the Second Air Division and deputy Com- mander for Air, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, appointed Secretary Brown at the airport.

Departing Vietnam, Secretary Brown will visit US Air Force units in Thailand and will confer with the head of the Royal Thai Air Force, the spokesman said.

Secretary Brown's nine-member party includes Surgeon Keeny, a member of the National Security Council; Ralph Hardy, Air Force Special Assistant, for Public and Legislative Affairs; Lt. Gen. James Fershchon, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development; and Maj. Gen. Harry D. Goldsworthy, Director of Production and Programming, Deputy Chief of Staff, System and Logistics.

480 get exit visas in week

SAIGON, Jan. 2 (VP).—Visas for travel abroad were issued to 480 people during the two-week period ending Dec. 21, sources from the National Police Directorate General disclosed.

The travellers including militarymen, students, public and private servants, religious aignitaries, newsmen, artists, businessmen, workers and housewives went to Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Canada, Belgium, Australia, the Uni-

HERE AND

When the Cat's Away, the Mouse Will Play

SAIGON, Jan. 2 - An armed foreigner early yesterday morning chased his girl friend along alley 221, Truong Minh Giang st. in an attempt to capture her and force her to hand back to him 10,000 plastres he had just paid her to enjoy her company for the month of January. The patrolling police intervened upon hearing calls for help from the girl, Tran Thi S., 32, and took the couple to the police station for an interro- gation.

There the foreigner, only identified as D.G.S. 28, complained that the girl had%/cokolded him during his absence from home since he had found a pipe and a tin of tobacco inside the drawer of their bedside table. He was based in Bien Hoa and could only come to Saigon every other day. So he wanted to break with her and decided to take back his money.

The girl, in the contrary, said that she could not support herself with so small a

refugees from Ohio

ere received arrangements ere made with local Viet- emese officials for a pre- entation ceremony at the age church.

Present at the ceremony ere the Mayor of Vung Tau, Lt. Col. Ho

Monday, January 3, 1936

UPSIDE DOWN

By NGUYEN VAN TAO

TU CHUNG, our confrere of the Chinh Luan is no more. Two VC terrorist fired point-blank at his back and killed him. That, under the very eyes of his twelve-year old son. The mark of killers : to make sure they kill. They don't deserve a bit of indignation. For we can't blame vipers for being venomous and tigers for eating men. We just destroy them if we can, and reserve our indignation for humans with a conscience and a heart.

I knew him only by name. I never saw him, though I wished I could have. Now, it is too late, and I shall live to regret it. But I read him, and much. That's one consolation.

My wife looks at his portrait, thoughtfully. «He looks so gentle,» she said as if to herself. «Strange enough, I even remember his signature.» And she signs it with her index in the air. It is unlike her to remember people's signatures. And it is the first time she is apparently shocked by the death of some one who is not even an acquaintance.

For we sense that he is a good man, and we always love and esteem a good man. In a country where university degrees can easily find sinecures, he preferred the risky life of a journalist. Here, a pen hardly keeps its man. Here, a penman lives from day to day. In a time when ideas are considered even more dangerous than H-bombs, when people try to disguise theirs and talk commonplaces for better security, he preferred the risks of making mortal foes and speaking out his deep convictions and living up to them. He knew how to be great in a small way.

TU CHUNG, we will long remember for you.

Monday, January 2, 1966

NEWS IN BRIEF

Fanfani's cable to Thant

ROME — United Nations General Assembly President Amintore Fanfani Friday sent a telegram to U.N. Secretary U Thant expressing hope the peace aims not achieved in 1965 might be fulfilled in the coming year.

Both Indian, Pak. troops ordered to cease-fire

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.— Indian and Pakistan Army Commands have issued orders to their troops not to open fire on the ceasefire line, U. N. Secretary General U Thant reported today.

In a report to the Security Council, U Thant said the Chief of Staff of the Indian Army on December 15 informed the United Nations observers of his intention to order a unilateral cessation of firing by all formations effective December 26, unless actually under attack.

The Pakistani Chtef of Gen-
eral Staff later signified his
intention to take similar ac-
tion.

ther with Malaysia in the
coming year.

The Tunku, in his New
Year's Day message to Ma-
laysia, said «I think the time
is now necessary to get the
Association of Southeast Asia
(ASA) on the move again...»

Sukarno, Ayub discuss
Tashkent meeting

DJAKARTA — President Sukarno and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan discussed by long distance radio telephone Friday the forthcoming Tashkent meeting, the Kashmir issue between the Pakistani President and the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the official All India news agency reported.

Rahman rejects
Maphilindo concept

KUALA KUMPUR.— Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman formally rejected Friday the concept of Maphilindo and said it was racist in nature.

In his annual New Year's

October 1, 1965

Mr. William Bundy
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

This is just a note, before leaving,
to tell you how very much I appreciated
your helpfulness on my rather nebulous
assignment.

I will do whatever I can to be
helpful. If you have any ideas of what
you might find useful while I am there
please feel free to let me know.

Let me take this opportunity also
to tell you how exceptionally helpful
Jonathan Moore has been.

I look forward to seeing you
when I return.

With warm regards.

Henry V. Klaeujer

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

when I return.

I look forward to seeing you

Jonathan Moore has been.
to tell you how exceptionally helpful
Let me take this opportunity also

please feel free to let me know.
you might find useful while I am there
helpful. It you have any ideas of what
I will do whatever I can to be

assignment.

your helpfulness on my rather nepotistic
to tell you how very much I appreciated
This is just a note, before leaving.

Dear Bill:

Washington, D.C.
Department of State
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Assistant Secretary
Mr. William Bundy

October 1, 1962

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

With best regards.

It was good to see you.

regret.

The version has been sent to Komer at his

To Lodge. A much blunder and shorter

am sending you a copy of a letter I wrote

For your personal information. I

Dear Bill:

Washington, D.C.
Department of State
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Assistant Secretary
Mr. William Bandy

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

August 19, 1966

5 April 1968

Memorandum for the record

The attached story is, as far as I can tell, essentially accurate in
its details. The authors are "unclear" about the link between Kissinger
and Marcovich, although they hint at the Sopot Pugwash Conference (September
1966).

The link was definitely Pugwash, through a meeting in mid-June 1967 in Paris, arranged by Bauer, Marcovich, and me, and attended, in addition, by Doty, Kissinger, Perrin, Rotblat, Millionschikov and another Russian (an Armenian, whose last name escapes me -- Andreysian? -- but who was universally addressed as Reuben Napolionovich). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the crisis in the Middle East, but at the end of the meeting Marcovich also proposed a Pugwash initiative in which the French would attempt to establish direct contacts between Washington and Hanoi in order to explore the conditions for peace. Kissinger responded positively and the formula which emerged after some discussion (and undoubtedly consultation) was not very far from what finally became known as the San Antonio formula.

Aubrac was brought into the picture by Bauer (they are old friends from
the Resistance) in July when it became clear through Kissinger that the US was
anxious to establish this communications link with Hanoi. Although Aubrac
was skeptical, and had previously refused to become involved in a number of
private initiatives, he was apparently sufficiently impressed with the credentials
and integrity of Pugwash to feel that this was an auspice under which it might be
worth expending the capital provided by his old friendship with Ho.

The Russians were completely aware of developments, first through
Millionschikov, who was present at the initial discussions in June, and then through
Artsimovich, who was in Paris during the developmental stage and who returned to
Moscow somewhat before Marcovich and Aubrac left for Hanoi. The original plan was
for them to pass through Moscow on the way (possibly picking up the visas for N. Vietnam
there), but, after his return to Moscow, Artsimovich informed us that this was not a
good idea, so instead they flew directly to Cambodia.

During the developmental stage in June, contacts with the U.S. were handled by
me, and Bauer played a very important role in all organizational matters and matters of
personal and governmental contacts. (The Elysée Palace was, of course, kept fully
informed of what was going on.) As soon as it was clear that Marcovich and Aubrac
were probably going, all contacts from that point were made directly with Kissinger
(middlemen only muddle things).

The project finally collapsed sometime in October. Kissinger seems to think it
all hinged on the difference between the meaning of "could take place", which the North
Vietnamese used, and "would take place" which we wanted them to use in reference to
the peace talks. Our French colleagues were (as of last December, at least) somewhat
bitter and inclined to ascribe the failure to the lack of (overt acts of) good faith on the
part of our government.

Whether, as the article implies, this was the important first step toward
peace, is something we will probably never know.