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## Rogers' Promises

The second State Secretary was William Rogers who visited Cairo on May 4, 1971, under totally different circumstances.

Egyptian-U.S. relations had been cut off since the 1967 aggression in which many thousands of Egypt's soldiers and civilians were killed by American phantoms and sky-hawks,

Nevertheless, Egypt welcomed the American diplomat, and stopped its successful war of attrition in response to the so-called Rogers initiative.

Following his Cairo visit Rogers said the United States will spare itself no effort to achieve a just and lasting Middle East peace, based on the Security Council's 1967 resolution in all its clauses.

At a press conference in June 1971 following his tour of the Arab capitals, Rogers said the peace agreement would be a reality before the middle of 1971. But peace never came with Israel rejecting all peaceful efforts on any terms.

The United States instead of bringing pressure on Israel to abide by the Rogers initiative and of showing appreciation for the Egyptian favourable response, re-opened its arms arsenal for Israel to destroy all possibilities of peace.

The death of the Rogers initiative pinpointed the way to the October 6, 1973 war which created a new situation in the area, as well as on the international parties to the Middle East problem.

## The Third Messenger ...

Today is the turn of Kissinger, the third U.S. envoy to Cairo.

It goes without saying that the U.S. strategy in the Middle East area and the world at large, its close relationship with business interests, and long opposition to social transformation, democracy, Arab unity and cooperation with the socialist camp, coupled with the role of Israeli strategy in all this, would cast much doubt on Henry Kissinger's mission.

However, the road before Kissinger is not totally closed if the U.S. policy learns a good lesson from the October 6, war and its impact on Egypt and the entire Arab world.

Al-Gomhuria, P.3 & 7.
Comp.Summary

AH/GFH.

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Not the Real Thing......

The British Guardian Exposes Israel's Failure
To Seize SAM Missiles.....

On October 23rd, 1973, General Ausi Narkis boast-
fully told a group of Western newsmen and photographers
some where in Sinai that Israel's Defence Army would
"give you a big surprise... Our forces which crossed to
the Western Bank of the Suez Canal will soon possess the
deadliest weapon used by the Egyptians in this war."

Whereupon the Israeli command took some of the
newsmen and photographers by helicopters to the Western
Bank's Deversoir area through which the Israelis managed
to infiltrate.

As often happens on film locations and in line
with the Israeli Command's habitually pompous performance,
cameras were placed in strategic positions to film the big
feat.

At this very moment, the Western photographers
realised the nature of the surprise in store for them,
and said it was worth their pains and enterprise.

For there loomed at the horizon two Egyptian SAM
missile launchers perched on their pads, ready to strike.

The Israeli spokesman briefing the journalists said
the Egyptians had abandoned two two missile launchers and
filed the area. Israeli tanks advanced to the launchers'
site while thick waves of Israeli planes flew overhead.

The photographers worked on their cameras with
enthusiasm to get the most thrilling film of their life...,
Israeli tanks closed in at the sites, eager to seize the
precious booty when the stunning fact came to light....
There were actually two missile launchers in sight... with
perfect SAM missiles on them... of the type which the
Pentagon described as a deadly weapon which wrecked 200
Israeli planes on the Egyptian front... but all turned
out to be accurate models of the real thing plywood dummies.

AH/EGF

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NOVEMBER 6, 1973

The Western photographers broke into laughter...
The amazed Israelis tried to stop the filming but in vain...

European papers came out with sarcastic reports.

The British Guardian printed a 3-column picture of the launchers on its front page with the caption:

"NOT THE REAL THING: This plywood dummy of an anti-craft missile launcher was found by the Israeli forces yesterday as they fought on Egyptian territory!"

GOUMHOURIA, p. 3
Summary

Israel And Return To War

By Hatem Sadek

Urgent study of the internal political situation map in Israel indicates that her next step will be return to the battlefield as soon as possible, with achievement of specific aims in mind.

There may be many angles for approaching the task of analyzing probable contingencies in the explosive Middle East situation, for instance the Arab potential or the will of the superpowers whose representatives are now touring the region.

But the internal political situation in Israel will remain as the most important angle of approach, because it reflects the general climate in which the Israeli leadership is adopting her decisions under formidable elements of pressure.

NM/EGF

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The principal centers of gravity on the present Israeli political scene are two. First there is the ruling coalition, with 72 Knesset seats out of 120, led by the parliamentary majority-holder Labour party. Secondly there are the rightist opposition groups with 32 seats. Gahal, with 26 seats, is leading the whole opposition wing and is even gradually turning into the spokesman of angry public opinion in Israel.

Other political forces represented in the Knesset, who have more or less the role of chair, are being weighed carefully nonetheless by the ruling party which lacks a decisive majority.

## Explosive Issues

Meantime the most explosive issues capable of detonating internal conflict are:

1. The responsibility for what happened in the battlefield. This is being used by opposition groups who realize demonstrations which marched on the Knesset comprised families of dead soldiers inclusive of Labour and Dayan supporters.

2. Israel's forced acceptance of the pledge to withdraw from occupied Arab territories. The attitude of opposition groups towards this is reflected in a statement of reply to Golda Meir's knesset statement by Dr. Rimalt, a Gahal leader. He said the government's decision to accept the Soviet-American ceasefire resolution was "frightening" because this resolution stipulated implementation of the Security Council 242 resolution, which in turn provided for withdrawal from Arab territories. "Even according to the liberal interpretation of our American friends," he added, the resolution means implementation of the Rogers plan which also meant return to June 4, 1967 lines.

NM/EGF

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3. The Size of American pressure behind the Ceasefire pledge. Gahal leader Menahem Begin reflects the opposition group attitude towards this by stating that the manner in which the Americans imposed the ceasefire resolution on Israel was more dangerous than the resolution itself. "This is the beginning of the end for Israel. The Americans may have their logic, and they may tell us many things about the international situation, Soviet pressures and measures, and a Soviet attitude which never exhibited such determination in years. But we realize what all this means for us. Submitting to a solution imposed on us is delivering the fate of Israel to non-Israeli hands," Begin added.

The labour party realizes there are two specific dates on which all these issues can turn into exploding bombs overnight. These are the day Israel begins implementation of the 2+2 resolution and the day Israeli political parties begin alignments among themselves in preparation for elections. The latter represents a vicious political power struggle which the labour party is waging from a position of weakness and self-defense. As soon as any of these dates is reached, the labour party knows the three issues mentioned above can turn into explosive charges attached to its political future. It has to move before such a possibility arises.

## Range of Movement

Options available for the ruling party are consequently:

1. Sacrificing Moshe Dayan, something which may absorb much of public opinion anger in addition to satisfying many of his political opponents. But this is a two-edge weapon because Dayan may then succeed in taking the whole party ship down with him, not to mention the fact that he will automatically shift his Rafi group (nearly 25% of the Labour Party) to the ranks of the opposition -- for long striving to make him switch allegiance.

2. Forming a coalition with the opposition similar to that created on the eve of the 1967 war. But the opposition will not accept a coalition except on her own terms-war.

3. Return to War. This is a decision which we have no doubt is favoured by strong pressures within the party led by Dayan. Further, it is the only move which meets with the pressure of the opposition.

NM/EGF

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