Japan has been a more or less introverted, insular nation
during the last twenty-five years, a period when she found it
difficult to recover from the shock of defeat and the ensuing
occupation. Economic rehabilitation and growth became the prime,
indeed single, national objective in the face of disillusionment
with power politics.

This economic growth has now reached a level at which
Japan must--whether or not she likes it--become an extrovert.
It can thus be anticipated that Japan will confront difficulties
in attempting to coordinate her international relations with her
domestic politics. Japanese policy-makers will find this coordi-
nation to be the most crucial task in the coming decade.

A prerequisite for an effective and timely coordination
will be, first of all, to see complex international relations
in proper perspective. In my view, international relations
today--and for the foreseeable future--will be influenced by three
major factors: US-Soviet relations, the Sino-Soviet relationship
and Japanese policy towards both.

In an oversimplified form, the first might be called a
"curious" and the second a "delicate" relationship. And the third?
I have no correct modifier for it. Perhaps you could devise one
for me tonight.

US-Soviet relations are indeed curious, to say the least,
in that a democracy under capitalism maintains a curiously long-
lasting dialogue with a totalitarian government under communism.
Their ideologies are poles apart but their mutual national interests
coincide in many respects. Whether their interests will coincide
with Japan's is extremely doubtful.

Sino-Soviet relations are delicate in that their governments--
both of which are totalitarian and communist--are entangled in
a delicate dispute over their national interests and, interestingly
enough, which shall enjoy ideological hegemony. These two factors

of the dispute are so delicately interrelated that it is almost
impossible to tell exactly where one ends and the other begins.
In a sense this complexity makes Japan's relationship with the two
communist regimes very delicate and difficult. When viewed from
another perspective, however, Japan might be able to enjoy an
advantage--always providing that discretion, wisdom and tact are
utilized.

Finally it is extremely important, I believe, that Japanese
policy-makers, and the public as well, clearly see where and in what
fashion the US-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relationships interact.

Japan must never forget the realities of power politics to
understand that interaction. To dream of an ideal, peace-oriented
world is one thing. It is quite another to face squarely certain
facts of international life.

One of the facts is that the US and the Soviet Union have
shared the politico-strategic hegemony of the world since 1945.
We must live with that hegemony as it will not collapse unless
a catastrophic "flood" of political-military contingencies washes
away all the hope of the world to live in peace.

We do not believe the catastrophe will ever occur and our
peace-oriented diplomacy is indeed based on that hope. World
leaders, who cannot ignore world opinions, I believe, will remain
rational and wise enough not to betray our hope.

Another fact that Japan should always remember is that a
mutual agreement--tacit, if not overt--exists between the US and
the Soviet Union on how to share the trophies of World War 11.
For instance, they have never tried to violate their respective
spheres of influence. Witness US action--or rather inaction--
to Soviet moves in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia; or, the

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Soviet attitude toward the 38th parallel in Korea and the 17th parallel in Vietnam.

Even in the forum of the United Nations, the two superpowers are not willing either to change the structure of the Security Council or to modify anachronistic clauses in the Charter; in particular, the so-called "enemy clause".

Also remember, if you will, that the two superpowers seem determined to maintain their dominance in nuclear technology in general and its military application in particular. It is difficult to contradict the contention that both the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty and the current nuclear nonproliferation pact are primarily designed--even if covertly--to preempt, or rather deter, both Japan and West Germany from acquiring nuclear arms and thereby undermining the basis of US-Soviet nuclear hegemony.

In fact, it was the nuclear issue which was a catalyst in bringing about the long-lasting Sino-Soviet dispute. China opted for "going nuclear without pants." On the other hand, Japan has remained nonnuclear. Only historians will be able to determine who was wiser. Whether wise or foolish, Japan should not forget the implicit circumstance that nuclear arms policies tacitly are a reflection of a US-Soviet agreement regarding their respective share of war trophies.

A war of a type that involves the world has not taken place for a quarter of a century. This is a fact understood by everyone. Few seem to bother to probe why and how this has been the case.

In my view, there have been and are three basic elements that have kept the world in a condition of relative peace or, at least so far, have precluded the outbreak of a global conflict.

First, the absence of a world-wide depression. Now that the

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world economy has become closely and globally interwoven across and beyond national boundaries, there exists a kind of an agreement among the nations of the world not to destroy the contemporary economic structure. Witness the actions taken during the pound and dollar crises.

Second, the difference between fascism and communism. The former lacked a philosophy and historical perspective. The latter has, as its underpinning, a basic philosophy.

As a corollary, fascism chose a quick decisive war and failed. Communism has opted for a lasting--and more often than not--indirect strategy. Hence no decisive, global conflict but an endless, mostly covert series of crises has been taking place.

Thirdly, the existence of the nuclear deterrent. As China develops its nuclear arsenal, the world--sooner or later--may well witness a nuclear trio deterring each other. If any two should fight, the third will have a bonanza. At a minimum, this should certainly deter any two from fighting each other.

Remember, I am not saying this is an ideal situation. It is simply a fact or will become one within this decade. Thereafter, nuclear global war will be a most unlikely event. This means two things. One, other kinds of wars and conflicts will be with us. Two, Japan's joining this nuclear trio will simply complicate the world's nuclear deterrence pattern and contribute virtually nothing to stability.

This is the lesson we are now learning. What about those that we had learned from World War II? There are three: First, Japan should not strive beyond her national potential. Second, Japan should never misjudge the currents of world politics. Third, but not less importantly, Japan should never again gamble with its external affairs.

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From these four lessons, three from the past and one from the present, you can readily deduce a limited role for military power. It is apolitical. It is secondary to diplomatic efforts. It serves the nation only as the last resort--only the last, in our situation, when and if our peaceful intentions are misunderstood.

By that, I do not mean to suggest that an aggressive country might not misinterpret Japan's peaceful posture and launch a full-scale invasion by sea and air. What I wish to stress is the likelihood that our peaceful posture might be misunderstood in such a way as to provoke what we may term "indirect aggression", or an external attempt to undermine our socio-political structure by means short of a direct invasion.

Tonight, ladies and gentlemen, some of you might have come here to listen to me blowing the noisy trumpet of war cries.

I am the last one to subscribe to the concept that the bigger a nation's military might, the safer it is. Such a concept reveals naivete in understanding Japan's predicament.

Japan's national security is least likely to be threatened by an all-out, destructive attack but rather by an indirect aggression which can be dealt with less by means of counterviolence than by preemption. I can never over-emphasize the need (a) to see national security in a wider perspective than in a defense by strength and, (b) to maintain an economically prosperous, politically stable and morally solid national foundation.

This will preempt any aggressive nation from trying to undermine Japan's present socio-political system which is substantially supported by a majority of the people.

Thus, I define Japan's basic national security policy as a "defense of the people, by the people and for the people". This may sound a bit cliché-ridden. Seriously, I am convinced an insular nation like Japan has no alternative but to deal with threats,

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both external and internal, by relying on the people for their own defense.

Naturally in physical terms, our self-defense forces will be the nucleus of our defense. National security, however, is too comprehensive and apolitical to be left only to the self-defense forces. It needs, first of all, popular understanding that defense is also their own business. It requires, above all, the willingness on their part to join spiritually in peace-time and physically in times of crisis with the self-defense forces to keep this country intact, if possible, or to limit the damage to a minimum, if necessary.

You are here, I presume, not to hear what a defense minister has to say but to listen, if you are not yet tired, to a Harvard alumnus speak his mind. I have spoken long enough. I have deliberately refrained from referring to my five basic defense principles and other related issues which I have repeatedly explained through various mass media of communication. Some of you might have heard about them. Some might not be interested in them. I therefore propose that those who are interested in what the defense minister thinks, should be allowed, with the gracious permission of the Chairman, to ask me questions. I will try to be candid in my answers.

Clemenceau once said, "War is too important to be left to the generals," Albert Wohlstetter paraphrased it: "Peace is too important to be left to the generals." I would say: "Peace is too important to be left to anybody but the people."

Thank you

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11151

INFORMATION/ACTION

June 19, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM : John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: Letter from Takeshi Sakurauchi

Mr. Sakurauchi, evidently a member of your 1955 summer seminar, has surfaced after fifteen years. He is now an executive with Mitsui.

The tone of the letter at Tab B suggest that Mr. Sakurauchi's renewed interest in you is strictly commercial. I should think that this one could well go unanswered, unless you believe in principle that all letters must be answered, in which case there is a reply at Tab A.