## Hunter

issues, its failure to understand Soviet history, its misplaced criticism of European defense efforts, and its economic mismanagement. Secretary Schlesinger countered with details of the preponderant military role in allied security played by the United States—especially as contrasted with West Germany—and a pointed lecture about the psychological, not national interest, basis of the American people's commitment to Western Europe. He stressed also the need to work through NATO's problems and to deal with ferment in the alliance in a way that will preserve at least a minimal political consensus for action.

The gauntlet thrown down by Helmut Schmidt was not only a reflection of his noted candor—itself a source of some difficulty for U.S.-German relations from 1977 to 1982. Its substance if not its tone earned appreciative remarks from many other West Europeans present, while the comments of James Schlesinger rang true for most of the Americans.

Less important than the fact of the Schmidt-Schlesinger exchange was what it symbolized. Indeed, this largely explains the high degree of attention and commentary that it received in the media and in allied chancelleries. This reaction indicated in part that some of the underlying factors at issue within the alliance are beginning to emerge with full force—factors so often subsumed in, and thereby muted by, debate about the details of force postures, the role of nuclear arms, and economic management. The former chancellor's remarks also drew not just upon widespread European concerns, but also upon the new West German assertiveness, noted above. They were the harbinger of a “gloves off” approach to U.S.-German discussion reminiscent in milder form of (now largely silent) discussion between Washington and Paris a generation ago—at least in contrast with earlier West German reluctance to be “at point” in European salaries against U.S. positions.

In itself, this is not added cause for worry. While the future of West Germany within the alliance will be a key preoccupation dur-

ing the next several years, the new candor in U.S.-German relations should be welcomed for its new openness in debate. The growth of West Germany's self-awareness can also in time provide a more solid basis upon which that country can plan its future and its relations with its European and Atlantic partners. In sum, provided acrimony does not drive out a sensible search for accommodation, the basic shift in the style of U.S.-German dialogue can assist in ameliorating if not resolving alliance difficulties.

Yet, as outlined above, the difficulties remain—stretching from debates about the appropriate level of conventional forces and the role of the two-way street, to angst about the role of nuclear weapons, to European political self-confidence, to the basic management of East-West and allied economic relations, and to the intensification of outside-of-area problems. These matters will indeed need to be worked through in their own terms, but with a clearer awareness of the underlying, systemic, and to a large degree psychological factors that are the mainspring of a slow but by no means immutable drifting apart of the United States and Western Europe.

Robert E. Hunter
Director of European Studies
CSIS.

## ISSUES BEFORE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

There are two conventional ways of speaking about NATO. The first is to praise its achievements: the peace that has been maintained for thirty-five years; the cooperation between 16 sovereign nations that has been sustained for longer than any modern alliance; the crises that have been overcome; and most recently the decision that was upheld to redress the nuclear balance in Europe.

Alternatively, it is also possible to deplore the unresolved issues: the gap between the announced military strategy and what is being implemented; the imbalance between

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132

new candor
would be well-w
-debate. The
-awareness
solid basis
in its future
an and At-
trium
arch for ac-
the style of
ist in am-
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難-
fficulties re-
about the ap-
forces and
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o European
basic man-
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ation of out-
atters will in-
in their own
ness of the
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and Western

E. Hunter
CSIS.

ALANTIC

I ways of
is to praise
at has been
the cooper-
ions that has
any modern
overcome;
that was up-
ance in Eu-

le to deplore
between the
and what is
nce between

Kissinger

détente and defense; the pace and direction
of arms control; and the growing mistrust—
nurtured by the Soviets—between a gener-
ation of Americans and Europeans who have
lived their entire lives sheltered by the alli-
ance they assault.

Both interpretations offer elements of the
truth. NATO is one of the most successful
alliances in history. It has also increasingly
maintained the appearance of unity by evad-
ing some fundamental issues. The newly
elected secretary general of NATO, Peter
Carrington, walked the fine line between op-
timism and despair with elegance and wit in
a seminal speech at the Institute of Strategic
Studies last April. He will no doubt lead
NATO with vigor, intelligence, vision and
humanity; he is in fact one cause for opti-
mism. I tend to be—let us be frank—some-
what apocalyptic. I hope that what I say
reflects the spirit of his remarks; but freed
of the responsibilities that inhere in a dip-
lomat, I am more explicit about some of the
unsolved problems of NATO as I see them.

There is no immediate crisis. Yet the dem-
onstrations in the streets and the timidity of
some governments bring home to us that
there is no cause for complacency. Sooner
or later a price must be paid for evading key
problems-unless one is very lucky. And
luck usually comes only to those who do not
rely on it; luck, it has been said, is the
residue of design.

In this spirit I shall deal with three issues:
the perennial nuclear problem-especially
the growing trend towards the no first-use
doctrine; INF negotiations; and East-West
relations.

THE STRATEGIC ISSUES—THE NO
FIRST-USE DOCTRINE

The dilemma posed by nuclear weapons
has been repeated so often over the past three
decades that it scarcely requires even a brief
summary. In the late 1940s and the 1950s
the leaders of the West thought they could
compensate by the destructiveness of nuclear
weapons for what they believed to be Soviet
superiority in manpower. But nuclear weap-

ons could fill the gap—real or postulated—
only so long as leaders and public opinion
were convinced that they had the capacity to
reduce a Soviet counterblow to tolerable pro-
portions, and even then only if a Western
first strike would involve Soviet casualties
compatible with our moral convictions.

These conditions began to evaporate in the
1960s. Technology tended towards equality
at least in the sense that a strategic exchange
was certain to produce casualties on both
sides such that any additional capacity to
cause damage would lose all relationships to
conceivable objectives.

That trend was accelerated by the Vietnam
trauma. Western military budgets came un-
der increasing public scrutiny and assault.
Since the early 1970s no strategic weapons
system has been deployed in the United
States without debilitating controversy and
protracted delay. Parity became fashionable
even before it became inevitable-arms con-
trol theory and practice institutionalized it.

The premises of NATO strategy have thus
been systematically eroded partly by choice,
largely by inevitable trends. But NATO doc-
trine did not change. Lip service was paid
to increased conventional defense; some in-
creases in fact did take place though never
enough to catch up with the massive Soviet
rearmament effort. Flexible response based
on the gradual though systematic escalation
up the nuclear ladder has remained the
NATO doctrine.

The result is the anomalous nature of the
strategic debate. NATO's defense rests ul-
timately on nuclear weapons. Yet public
uneasiness about nuclear war is growing;
stirred to near irrationality by groups, some
well-meaning, who believe that engendering
panic is the best means of accomplishing
their purpose of preventing nuclear conflict.
Governments afraid to fight for their opera-
tional policies have compounded the confu-
sion.

No leader of the West today dares to af-
firm what his strategy dictates: that to avoid
defeat he would be obliged to resort to nu-
clear weapons. President Reagan and De-
fense Secretary Weinberger were widely

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Kissinger

condemned in Europe when they referred to
the possibility of "winning" a nuclear war.
The idea of "winning" a nuclear war was
hardly felicitous. But the verbal formulation
probed for an elemental truth: unless some
rational military objective can be assigned to
nuclear strategy, both leaders and publics
will become increasingly demoralized by the
still firmly enshrined NATO doctrine.

Since then both the president and his cab-
inet have not only retreated; they have ex-
plicitly disavowed their claim that nuclear
war is winnable. It is a tragic symptom of
the gap in understanding between our ad-
ministration and its European critics that
these fervent affirmations are disregarded
and disbelieved; that most of our critics insist
on holding President Reagan and Secretary
Weinberger to their original declarations.

What political leaders hint, private citi-
zens make explicit. In 1982 four distin-
guished Americans, all having held high of-
fice—Robert McNamara, Gerald Smith,
McGeorge Bundy, and George Kennan—
proposed the unilateral renunciation of the
first-use of nuclear weapons. Mr. McNamara
reinforced that statement later by asserting
that as secretary of defense in the early 1960s
and originator of the concept of flexible re-
sponse, he had urged his presidents never to
use nuclear weapons under any circum-
stances. That view has since spread; public
opinion is in fact tacitly sliding towards a
no-first-use doctrine.

There can be no question that NATO
should be in a position where it is not forced
to resort to use nuclear weapons at an early
stage of a conflict. Hopefully it will become
strong enough so that it can repel any level
of conventional attack by conventional
means. The need to build up NATO's con-
ventional capability has been passionately
affirmed for a long time; for an equal period
the target has proved elusive. The United
States will not reintroduce the draft; its allies
will give priority to domestic concerns over
a serious defense build-up.

Thus it is one thing to advocate a strength-
ened conventional defense—as I have con-
sistently done with many others here. It is

quite another to renounce the first-use of
nuclear weapons. If history teachers any-
thing, it is that deterrence with conventional
weapons is a chancy enterprise. Europeans
have seen wars break out for hundreds of
years between armies that were thought to
be evenly matched. (Even at the outset of
World War II the French army was consid-
ered to be—and in fact was—superior in
numbers and equipment to the German
army.) In conventional war, leadership, con-
centration of force, and tactics, play a role
which make comparative systems analysis
calculations a hazardous guide to deterrence.
It can be no accident that all wars in the
postwar period have occurred where there
were no American forces and no nuclear
weapons; during that period Europe under
U.S. nuclear protection has enjoyed the
longest period of peace in its history.

The tenuousness of conventional deter-
rence does not go to the heart of my concern
over the spread of the "no-first-use" doc-
trine, however. For paradoxically, the grow-
ing acceptance of the concept may well in-
vite nuclear blackmail or even nuclear war.
If the no-first-use doctrine makes any sense
it must mean that we and our allies would
rather be defeated with conventional weap-
ons than to resort to nuclear weapons. But
once the readiness to accept defeat is
granted, why should it matter with what
weapons it is accomplished? Why should
one make the readiness to submit depend on
the weapons used to impose an adversary's
will? If an aggressor analyzes the implica-
tions of the no first-use doctrine in this man-
ner, he would have an incentive to warn that
any war will quickly become nuclear. This
would face the West with the choice of sur-
render or the kind of war of which our coun-
tries will then be incapable as a result of
years of stigmatizing the weapons around
which their defenses are built and with which
our adversary's arsenal is replete.

But if we are prepared to use nuclear
weapons rather than see Europe overrun, we
are back to our original problem: the proper
mix between conventional and nuclear forces
and the appropriate strategy for the use of

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Kissinger

nuclear weapons albeit as a last resort. The question of how nuclear weapons should be used without destroying mankind remains unavoidable.

A rational treatment of this reality has yet to occur. Some experts—though declining in numbers and shell-shocked by the assault of the peace movement—still want to treat nuclear weapons as “conventional.” This is clearly absurd. Another, larger group—ironically composed in its majority by individuals generally advocating humane and “progressive” domestic policies—have insisted that nuclear war must necessarily involve the deliberate extermination of civilians; they are convinced that governments can be kept from nuclear adventures only by committing them to the most gruesome strategy.

Politics and morality both demand that so long as nuclear weapons exist and nuclear war is at least conceivable, governments seek ways to limit their use and to terminate such a war before it turns into a world holocaust. In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, it is reckless to teach that any nuclear incident must automatically escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst happens—for whatever reason—governments have an obligation to humanity and to history to limit the consequences. Only nihilists or abstract ideologues can shirk that duty.

At the heart of the problem is that in nearly every country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has broken down. As a result, national security policy is too often overwhelmed by domestic politics. This could not happen but for two comforting illusions. Europe chooses to believe that in the end the United States will either prevent aggression or resist it with its ultimate weapon if it has no other choice. The United States chooses the illusion that with intensive consultations Europe will be induced to increase its defense contribution in the conventional field. Neither expectation is realistic—the European one slightly more so than the American.

If present trends continue we run the risk that we are left with a precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of flexible

response which, however, now—unlike when it was first developed—has to be applied under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism and continued inadequacies in conventional forces. Left with no coherent defense policy we will ourselves have crippled our capacity for military response while sitting on the most destructive stockpile of weapons the world has seen and against an adversary whose political and economic system seems to have lost all viability.

## ARMS CONTROL AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS

Not surprisingly, public bewilderment has turned into anxiety evoking an increasing clamor for agreements to end the so-called arms race. Arms control is being asked to banish the danger of nuclear war and to reverse the trend in East-West relations. This places a greater burden on these negotiations than they can possibly carry; it is no accident that the Geneva negotiations have frozen at the precise moment that governments and public opinion in the West more fervently insist on them. Arms control is in danger of being transformed from a technical quest for strategic stability into *deus ex machina*. Indeed it is in danger of turning into a tool of Soviet political warfare—and both the West's strategic incoherence and its anxiety are principal contributors to that development.

The very idea of arms control is of course novel, if not revolutionary. Developed in its present form in the 1950s, it strove explicitly for stability by reducing the incentive for surprise attack not through arms but through agreement. The historically extraordinary notion emerged that a country's vulnerability was a strategic asset; with the civil populations of both sides at risk, the argument ran, neither side would dare to launch its weapons. Arms control theory contributed—in the West—to an aversion to defensive weapons such as the ABM; it also caused every offensive system to be subjected to extended scrutiny lest it somehow “destabilize” the

first-use of researchers any-conventional European hundreds of years ago, it was considered superior in the German leadership, could play a role in the analysis and deterrence of wars in the future where there is no nuclear Europe under enjoyed the history.

In the first half of the 1950s, the U.S. national determy concern with “use” policy, the growing military power of the nuclear war. But any sense of allies would be destroyed by the national weapons. But it defeat is with what? Why should it depend on an adversary's the implica in this man to warn that nuclear. This choice of sur- which our country is a result of is around with which it

use nuclear weapons, we can end the nuclear forces for the use of

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Kissinger

military equation. Never before in history had military policy been judged by such criteria; but then of course never before had weapons posed such risks.

Arms control, to be effective, requires an unusually delicate understanding of the elements of strategy. Nations had often suffered catastrophe in the past even when they fancied themselves superior; negotiating equality with an adversary calls for an unprecedentedly sophisticated analysis. The measurement of equality has been maddeningly complicated by the novelty of the weapons, by the asymmetry in the design of the weapons system of the two sides and in their geostrategic positions. Thus even were the Soviets more ready for a serious study than they appear to be, negotiations would be difficult because the weapons of the two sides are designed by different criteria and serve different strategic ends.

The near chaos in Western strategic and political thought has magnified obstacles to arms control just when a definition of "progress" has grown elusive, and when Western governments consider progress in arms control a requirement of political survival.

The history of the INF negotiations illustrates these points. In response to the massive deployment of Soviet intermediate range missiles, the United States in 1979 encouraged its NATO allies to invite it to station similar weapons in Europe. The vast majority of these intermediate range missiles was in categories—such as cruise missiles—less threatening than their Soviet counterparts, which being all ballistic required much less time to reach European targets. But even in 1979 NATO did not dare to announce its decision in military terms, subject as all deployments—to subsequent arms control negotiations. The deployment became political with the so-called "dual track" approach which called for prior negotiations to ban the weapons altogether and make their ultimate deployment dependent on a failure of the negotiations.

The decision was fateful. Experience with arms control negotiations—or Soviet diplomatic practice—should have warned that an

unambiguous outcome of such talks was nearly impossible. In its absence the deadline guaranteed a domestic crisis in almost all countries slated to receive missiles as the time for deployment approached. Indeed it almost surely supplied an incentive for the Soviets to procrastinate in the negotiations to test the resolve of the Western governments.

More important, the NATO decision evoked a debate about the reasons for deploying the intermediate range missiles—a debate which soon became bogged down either in domestic politics or in all the evasions and contradictions of the general NATO controversy. Opponents, appealing both to fears and nationalism—especially in the Federal Republic of Germany—invented the argument that the intermediate range missiles reflected our desire to confine a possible war to European territory. This was an absurd argument. We already had thousands of short-range tactical weapons in Europe. Intermediate range missiles added nothing to our capacity to devastate Europe; their distinguishing feature was, after all, the ability to reach beyond Europe into the Soviet Union.

The real justification for deployment was quite the opposite of what our critics alleged: to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking the strategic defense of Europe with that of the United States. With intermediate range U.S. weapons in Europe the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European installations. The Soviets would have to calculate even in case of conventional attack that we would use our missiles before they were overrun. Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger our strategic forces.

In that sense the U.S. offer of intermediate range missiles was a selfless act. If we needed intermediate range weapons for purely American purposes—which is doubtful—we could have deployed them more

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Kissinger

easily and with much less controversy on
ships.

Not surprisingly, the Soviets grasped the
significance of the new deployment imme-
diately; they had no difficulty understanding
that a "linkage" was thereby established be-
tween the defense of Europe and the strategic
nuclear forces of the United States. The So-
viet chief of staff, Marshall Orgakov, has
repeatedly warned us publicly that the use
of European based intermediate range weap-
ons would trigger an immediate Soviet re-
talianty blow against the United States it-
self.

Instead of welcoming this linkage with
strengthened deterrence by facing the Sovi-
ets with risks they were almost surely un-
prepared to run, our European allies used it
to press us to pursue the dual track approach
as an alternative to deployment. We in turn
confused matters by putting forward the so-
called zero option: the readiness to abandon
our European deployment if the Soviets gave
up their own intermediate range missiles. In
fact the offer reflected a characteristic Wash-
ington compromise. It brought together three
disparate groups: those who opposed the de-
ployment of strategic weapons in Europe be-
cause they preferred a more purely American
decision whether to initiate strategic nuclear
war; those who were opposed to any agree-
ment but supported the zero option con-
vinced that the Soviet Union would never
accept it; and lastly, genuine devotees of
arms control who considered any reduction,
whatever its rationale, a step forward.

Had the Soviets snapped up the offer—or
even made a counter proposal limiting the
zero option to Europe—the United States
would have been permanently barred from
any new deployments. At the same time, the
Soviet capacity to blackmail Europe would
have remained unimpaired either through
new tactical weapons or the redundant war-
heads in their long-range strategic forces.

Symptomatic of the confusion in allied
strategic thought, many of our European al-
lies interpreted our offer as intransigence.
The Soviets having declared that they would
never accept our offer, we were being urged

to come up with a new position—that is, to
abandon the zero option. In practice this
meant being asked to propose an agreed,
reduced level of weapons. For reasons of
European internal politics, not strategic as-
sessment, we were being pressed to reestab-
lish the linkage between the nuclear defense
of Europe and the United States which our
offer had abandoned: to deploy some inter-
mediate range missiles in Europe; this time
in the name of arms control.

The lack of clarity about strategic and
political objectives continued to bedevil al-
lied policy. Yielding to allied entreaties we
did abandon the zero option for an interim
agreement on a reduced level of missiles for
both sides. But no sooner had we accepted
their advice than some European govern-
ments sought to mollify an increasingly res-
tive public opinion by pressing for more
concessions. This required lowering the pro-
posed ceiling and indeed to permit some
disparity in Moscow's favor. And when in
effect we went along with that approach we
were still being blamed for the deadlock.
The intransigence of the Reagan administra-
tion having achieved an almost folkloric
character in European critical literature, the
myth developed that the United States had
missed a great opportunity by not following
up sufficiently rapidly on results of the so-
called "walk in the woods" between Soviet
and American negotiators at Geneva in July
1982. On that occasion, U.S. Ambassador
Paul Nitze had proposed a ceiling of inter-
mediate range missiles on both sides and the
abandonment of Pershing II missiles; the So-
viet either had or had not—depending on
whose version one heard—participated in
drafting the document before agreeing to
transmit it to Moscow.

This is not the occasion to analyze what
actually occurred. It is undisputed that our
decision-making process reacted to the Nitze
formula in its usual cumbersome way—but
then it had had no advance notice. This was
neither surprising nor particularly signifi-
cant. Nor does it sustain the charge of a
missed opportunity. For the Soviets rejected
the Nitze formula in September 1982 and

It talks was
e the dead-
is in almost
cessiles as the
d. Indeed it
utitive for the
negotiations
gern govern-

TO decision
sons for de-
m Missiles—a
ged down ei-
the evasions
NATO con-
both to fears
the Federal
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missiles re-
possible war
as an absurd
housands of
Europe. In-
and nothing to
pe; their dis-
ill, the ability
to the Soviet

ployment was
critics alleged:
ail of Europe
se of Europe
. With inter-
n Europe the
Europe selec-
any successful
ger an Amer-
ean installa-
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attack that we
are they were
could have to
even conven-
turn would

f intermediate
s act. If we
weapons for
which is doubt-
d them more

137

Summer 1984

## Kissinger

did so again in October 1983 when they dismissed the latest American offer which was very close to the original Nitze concept. The sole difference in the current U.S. proposal of a ceiling of 100 intermediate range missiles is the retention of 36 Pershing IIs, a number not even the most paranoid Soviet leader could—given the thousands of Soviet warheads aimed at Europe—consider a threat of surprise attack.

The Soviets rejected the offer not because of the inclusion of the Pershings or the inadequacy of the ceiling, but because in the INF talks their strategy has been consistently offensive. Their objective has never wavered; they were bent on ejecting U.S. intermediate range missiles from Europe altogether—showing that they at least grasped the strategic and political issues involved. And all of this agitation occurred when the Soviets had already deployed over 200 SS-20s in Europe and the first U.S. missile had yet to arrive in Europe.

The Soviets understand very well from our current proposal—and many public statements—that the United States is willing to settle for a relatively small number of missiles stationed in Europe. Their argument about the shortened warning time caused by Pershing II is for the gullible. What decisive impact could 36 Pershings have? A Pershing takes 8-10 minutes to reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe. An ICBM takes 25-30 minutes from the United States; a submarine-launched missile, depending on its location, requires 15-20 minutes. Were the Pershings to be removed, what would the Soviets do with the extra few minutes of warning time? And since our offer does not require counting the SS-20s deployed in Asia, the Soviets have a numerical advantage even in Europe, for two-thirds of their Asian deployment can cover most of Europe. (I say this not as a criticism of our offer, for the essential element of our deployment is the linkage of the nuclear defense of Europe and the United States, which our offer retains.)

The Soviets again dismissed our proposal and walked out of the talks because contrary

to the arguments of our critics and the ambivalence of many governments, they are at present conducting the negotiations as a political maneuver. They have so far refused to settle for less than expelling U.S. intermediate range missiles from Europe because they are striving for a larger objective than stability. It is nothing less than changing the political complexion of NATO.

If they were to succeed, for the second time in ten years, the Soviets would stop a NATO deployment to which governments had committed themselves for many years—the neutron bomb in 1978 and now the intermediate range missiles. The practical effect would be to give the Soviet Union a veto over future NATO deployments—at least in the nuclear field. And the way would be open for the selective nuclear blackmail of Europe. After a brief period of relief the NATO countries would recognize the weakening of the U.S. nuclear shield. This would be especially true in the non-member countries. They would realize their special danger; neutralism or a resentful kind of nationalism could develop. The Soviets would be close to achieving what they first proposed to the United States during the negotiations for the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War in 1974: that in case of a European war the use of nuclear weapons be restricted to the countries of Europe excluding the Soviet Union and the United States. We rejected that proposal at the time. It would be ironic to create the objective conditions for it now in the guise of arms control.

The argument that the British and French forces can balance the Soviet SS-20s is either sophistry or a misunderstanding. Given the huge disparity in warheads between France and Great Britain on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other, it is self-evident that British and French nuclear forces can deter only a nuclear attack on these countries—if that. They can offer no protection to other NATO allies; they create no threat of a first use—whatever the extremity in which NATO conventional forces might find themselves. At some point, when the number of their warheads increases, the British

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Kissinger

and French forces should be included in the START talks. At present unless linked to the U.S. deterrent, they are nearly irrelevant to the defense of Europe.

The fundamental INF problem is quite simple. If the Soviets' objective is truly to prevent a surprise attack from our European deployments, an agreement on numbers and composition will be easy and rapid. What we should not do is to abandon the deployment of missiles in Europe altogether. And if the Soviets insist on that, it will be clear proof that their objective will be to destroy the Western alliance. If our allies cannot bring themselves to say this clearly to their publics, they will only have themselves to blame when they are engulfed by creeping pacifism and neutralism. And in that case, the psychological basis for keeping the missiles in Europe will erode first in Europe but eventually also in the United States.

To be sure, it is highly desirable for the INF talks to resume. But the very plaintiveness of Western appeals gives the Soviets an incentive to continue on the political offensive. And if and when the talks resume, it is essential that the Western countries show more fortitude and unity than heretofore. The attitude of too many allied governments towards deployment is like that of a host to an unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it would be too embarrassing to withdraw. So long as there exists a nearly desperate longing for a negotiating gimmick, so long as the United States is automatically blamed for any impasse, Soviet intransigence is likely to be spurred by the hope that persistence in their present course will unravel the alliance.

When and if negotiations start again, our allies, in the interest of the very progress they seek, should cease to demand new concessions before the Soviets have agreed even to the principle of equivalence. There have been three major and two minor adjustments in our INF position in one year, in large part to placate allied public opinion. But when positions succeed each other at a dizzying pace none is understood any longer. Fuel is given to the argument that we are

cynical, that we do not know what we are doing, that our basic position is flawed. The Soviets will have no incentive to change course if they perceive the alliance engaged in competitive gimmickry. The United States has made its share of mistakes but the root cause of the difficulty in INF negotiations is a Soviet assault on the existing political equilibrium in Europe.

There are many technical means to overcome the impasse. If the Soviets require a facesaving formula to renew talks, the START and INF talks could be merged—though I suspect it would prolong and complicate both sets of negotiations. It will not solve the root problem, however. Progress is not possible until the Soviets accept the principle that U.S. intermediate range missiles must be included in any agreed levels for the intermediate range forces of both sides. Once that principle is accepted, progress will be rapid.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

In the public debate within the alliance it has become nearly axiomatic that East-West relations have never been worse. Many Europeans profess to be convinced that U.S. unpredictability and changeability have combined with confrontational and bellicose rhetoric to drive the Soviets into resentful hostility. Many Americans are of the opinion that European irresolution and domestic weakness encourage the Soviet assault on the post-war political balance in Europe.

As in all family quarrels there has been an element of truth on both sides.

Since the collapse of the post-war consensus during the Vietnam War, U.S. policy has been extraordinarily changeable. The détente of the early 1970s was assaulted by an odd and unprecedented coalition of liberals and conservatives who could never have been united but for the collapse of executive authority caused by Watergate. The liberals attacked détente for being too concerned with the balance of power while conservatives damned it for being insufficiently ideological or “moral.” That coalition succeeded

and the Americans are at odds as to how far refused U.S. intervention because objective than changing the

the second would stop a government in any years—now the impractical effect of the Union and its payments—at the way would be to stir blackmail of relief the weak-

It would be conditions for control.

and French 20s is either wrong. Given the war between France and the Soviet Union, it is self-evident that forces can be used to these country protection no threat of extremity in these states might find the British

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Kissinger

on the one hand in destroying both the incentives and the penalties on which détente was based; on the other hand still in the thrall of the Vietnam trauma it was not prepared to face the consequences of renewed Soviet intransigence.

The critics of détente had a point when they pointed out that the American public was unused to power politic; that there is no tradition in the United States for conducting relationships simultaneously cooperative and adversary. But that is precisely the challenge before our leaders. Any other course loses public and allied support and enables the Soviets to capture the global yearning for peace—as the Reagan administration has painfully learned.

The Carter administration announced a "new approach" which criticized the Nixon and Ford administrations for their alleged preoccupation with resisting communism. After at first rejecting the structure of SALT II inherited from the Ford administration, the Carter team embraced it; but delayed so long that the invasion of Afghanistan defeated all prospects of ratification. The current administration arrived in office rejecting the position of *all* its predecessors. It derided détente, refused to ratify SALT II even while observing its provisions, only to turn in the past year towards an obvious desire to improve East-West relations, even a summit.

The issue here is not what incarnation of U.S. policy was right. Each was professed by reasonable people pursuing reasonable arguments. The trouble has been that each new administration has felt no responsibility to the legacy of its predecessor; indeed has prided itself on starting all over. Each reassessment of American policy left victims among European leaders who—trusting American representations and briefings—had committed themselves to the previous dispensation. Each reassessment shook confidence and encouraged European neutralism to become less dependent on our restless quest for novelty.

Nor has the United States been alone in changing its view. Our allies have changed

with us though in a contrapuntal manner. When President Nixon came into office he had a reputation as a hardliner. This triggered a succession of eminent European visitors to urge him into a rapid dialogue with Moscow—even though the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not yet a year old. A few years later some of the same Europeans warned against "excessive" détente. During the Carter administration it was European leaders who first called attention to the need to counterbalance the Soviet build-up of SS-20s. And the Reagan administration has become almost legendary if one reads the allegation of bellicosity, insensitivity and major responsibility for the current East-West impasse.

And yet, amazingly, while it is easy to compile a record of ill-considered remarks of the Reagan administration it is difficult to point to much in the way of rash actions. Beyond muscular rhetoric the Reagan administration has actually behaved with considerable restraint. What has it actually *done* to earn such opprobium among our European critics? Why should intelligent leaders feel impelled to base internal politics on their ability to domesticate, as it were, the Reagan administration? Why has the recent change of tone of the Reagan administration—sometimes verging on the repentant—been largely ignored by critics and most allied leaders? Is it because the critics seek an excuse for a barely disguised neutralism and the leaders require—or believe they require—at least the pretense of "moderating" American obtuse ness and intransigence as a unifying element in their domestic politics?

- European critics should remember that the wider the gulf between Europe and the United States, the more difficult an East-West dialogue becomes. And the East-West dialogue urgently needs a fresh impetus. In a world of thousands of nuclear weapons the two sides cannot risk staring each other down or seeking to drown each other's proposals in invective or propaganda. The minimum requirement is that both sides understand each other's thought processes so that crises do not escalate by inadvertence.

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["Kissinger", "For crises are almost inherent in the current structure of international politics. Both superpowers are associated with countries more concerned with their local rivalries than with the global equilibrium much less with global peace. Our period should not be compared with the period preceding World War II when an aggressor launched himself into a quest for world domination—nuclear weapons are likely to inspire great hesitation, even among the reckless. Rather the appropriate model is the period prior to World War I when client states pursuing regional rivalries drew their protectors into a holocaust by gradual increments, the full significance of which was not understood until it was too late. Which of the statesmen who entered war in 1914 thinking that the issue would be settled quickly would not have recoiled in horror had he had an inkling of the shape of the world in 1917?", "Theoretically there are as well what the Soviets would call \"objective reasons\" for a constructive dialogue. The Soviet system is in trouble. It must deal with a leadership in transition, a decrepit economy and restive allies. By any rational calculation the Soviet Union should seek a respite. It should know that a continuation of its present course runs a large risk of confrontation. Its leaders cannot be so encapsulated in their prejudices as to believe that they can defeat America without our noticing it sooner or later. The longer the process lasts, the more \"successful\" as it were current Soviet strategy, the greater is the risk of some escalation. It is even possible that whatever the current invective Soviet leaders when convinced that the current administration is likely to be reelected may well make some agreement by the summer. A reelected administration, hence unconstrained, may be a prospect they would prefer to avoid.", "But it is also possible that the Soviet leaders are under domestic pressures which prevent any policy adaptation or any farsighted policy for that matter. Before we yield to this proposition, however, we must test the possibilities of a dialogue systematically and persistently.", "A number of principles ought to govern Western approaches:", "1. Democracies have no reason to fear negotiations with a stagnant and brittle dictatorship. But neither should talk become an end in itself. The importance of a dialogue should therefore not be the subject of debate either within the countries of the alliance or between them. The debate should concern the subjects appropriate to an East-West dialogue, not the fact of it.", "2. There is need for calm in the domestic discourse of the various allies. There is a tendency to adjust the assessment of Soviet strength to preconceived notions of the Soviet Union rather than the other way around. The Soviets are neither as powerful or cunning as the opponents of détente claimed; nor are they as close to disintegration as some self-proclaimed apostles of peace allege. History will not do our work for us; but neither will liturgical rhetoric.", "3. If we want to avoid that the East-West dialogue divides the alliance or becomes an end in itself, the United States and its allies must agree on a long-term East-West strategy. This will have to include the whole gamut of East-West relations including East-West trade in its opportunities as well as its perils.", "4. Arms control cannot possibly carry the entire or even the principal burden of the East-West dialogue. If too much weight is put on arms control, it is more likely—in Peter Carrington's words—to expose the raw nuclear nerve of the alliance than to resolve it. Were Moscow to make a political decision to settle for the presence of some American nuclear intermediate range weapons in Western Europe, the INF issue could be settled rapidly. As for START, I have stated elsewhere my conviction that we have not thought the problem through adequately—but at least we have tried to think while the Soviets have engaged in sterile repetitions of shopworn slogans. Still even if attitudes should change, it will lead to a prolonged technical haggle; the subject is simply too difficult to permit a rapid resolution. And the best foreseeable outcome would be pri-", "al manner. The office he has held for 13 years has not office he has held for 13 years has not This trig- European vis-à-vis European vis-à-vis European vis-à-vis European vis-

Kissinger

marily symbolic. Some twenty thousand
strategic warheads are in the arsenals of both
sides. Even were the Soviets to accept our
proposal to cut this total in half, the remain-
ing warheads would be more than sufficient
for catastrophe.

In short, arms control separated from a
political dialogue cannot end the current ten-
sions or even significantly ease them. Indeed
if the quest for arms control becomes too
frantic it will turn into a weapon of Soviet
political warfare. Or else it will become a
safety valve which the Soviets turn off to
increase Western nervousness and on to re-
duce the impact of a new act of aggression.

5. The urgent need is for a serious polit-
ical dialogue at the highest levels. The so-
called confidence-building measures so be-
loved by professional diplomats cannot ad-
vance us very far. The opening of consulates
of cultural exchange programs—even the
prenotification of maneuvers—have at best
a peripheral significance. In my experience,
every real breakthrough was engineered by
principals or their key aides who then gave
marching orders to subordinates.

The problem is how to define the highest
level. A premature summit meeting would
involve exorbitant risks. Heads of state can-
not talk freely at the summit; their constitu-
encies are always with them mentally;
sometimes they are even in the room. Sum-
mit meetings, moreover, leave little time for
real discussion. There is an inevitable time
limit imposed by the schedules of the prin-
cipals; there is an unavoidable protocol;
there is the time wasted on translation. The
possibilities of a breakthrough are usually
outweighed by the penalties of failure. When
heads of state disagree, there is no appeal to
a higher authority; they would hardly have
reached their eminence without a strong
ego; abandoning a firmly held position
would run counter to psychological as well
as political imperatives. Summits can put the
finishing touches on agreements reached pre-
viously; they are not well suited to break the
ice.

One way to avoid this dilemma would be

for each side to designate a special represen-
tative enjoying the full confidence of its head
of government and foreign minister. He
should be authorized to conduct private, ex-
ploratory conversations on their behalf, pref-
erably without publicity. Each of these spe-
cial representatives should have access to the
head of state of the other side. Both parties
would commit themselves to a global review
of their entire relationship. As soon as the
conversation between the special represen-
tatives demonstrates hope for progress, prep-
arations would begin for a summit meeting
which would then approve a full-scale work
program for coexistence. But the method is
less important—there are several approaches
possible—than to decide on the direction.

6. So far, attempts to discuss political problems systematically have been dismissed as "linkage" and linkage is supposed to be bad because it is alleged to be an obstacle to arms control. By now we should have learned that the opposite is true. Arms control separated from any political context is likely to run into a deadend. The danger of war after all, resides less in the existence of the weapons of mass destruction than in the minds of the men who are in a position to order their use. And such men will be driven by political conflicts, not systems analyses.

A serious dialogue must come to grips
with how coexistence is to be defined. Ab-
stract though this may sound, it is at the
heart of the problem. No détente can be
sustained if all it does is to give rise to a
political offensive designed to unhinge the
global balance of power. One can cite sev-
eral Western failures of omission and com-
mission. But no spurious objectivity, no ef-
fort to find both sides equally guilty can
overlook the provocations that accelerated
the hardening of American attitudes. The
dispatch of proxy troops to Angola and
Ethiopia; the revolutions in Aden and Af-
ghanistan followed by the occupation of Af-
ghanistan; the Vietnamese invasion of Cam-
bodia; the encouragement of terrorist groups;
the massive delivery of arms to Cuba and

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142

I represent of its head minister. He is private, except, therefore, these species to the other parties global review soon as the representation, preparatory meeting scale work method is approaches in direction.

Is political been discussed supposed to be an true. Arms technical context. The danger the existence than in a position will be not systems

able to grips defined. About is at the point can be discussed to a reasonable rise to a合理izing the in cite several and com- pletely, no ef- fective guilty can be accelerated studies. The arguments and Af- fication of Af- fion of Cam- paign groups; Cuba and

## Kissinger

thence to Central America mark a foreign policy that at least since 1976 has missed no opportunity to undermine Western positions.

I say this not to sabotage hopes for a dialogue but to define its essence. The Soviet Union must decide whether it is a country or a cause. It must be willing to define security in terms other than the impotence of potential adversaries. Some ground rules for coexistence are essential. Once that bridge is crossed, opportunities for increased co-operation in trade and culture would be high on the agenda. And out of such an exchange, progress on arms control would flow naturally, almost inevitably.

7. Such a process requires the restoration of bipartisanship in the United States and an end to the constant "reassessments" thatquiet our friends and confuse when they do not embolden our adversaries. The national interest does not change every four or eight years; at some point it must be fixed in the public mind if we are not to become an element of instability through our endless quest for ever new dispensations. It is time for our European allies to abandon the charade that their principal foreign policy goal is to moderate an intransigent America—a role more appropriate for neutrals, than allies. Those committed to the proposition that the precondition for peace is to insist on the moral equivalence of the two superpowers are in fact tempting a continuation of tensions by abdicating their judgment. The same will be the impact of those who confuse foreign policy with the liturgical condemnation of our adversary. The Soviets are realists. Sentimentality on the left tempts them into aggression; sentimentality on the right tempts them to exploit domestic and allied divisions.

8. Finally, we in the West must be prepared to face the fact that even with our best efforts, a thaw in East-West relations simply may not be in the cards. It is possible that the Kremlin is too preoccupied with succession issues to change its intransigent course. Perhaps the emergence of the secret policy in leadership positions means that the Sovi-

ets are applying intelligence methods to the conduct of foreign policy. They may have come to the conclusion that a relentless political and psychological offensive will wear down the democracies and they may be far from discouraged when they study some Western pronouncements. Or perhaps the whole Soviet system is frozen in inertia.

If any of these hypotheses turns out to be accurate we have no choice except to stand on our best proposals, thoughtfully devised. The West need not panic at a period of deadlock. Its economy for all its shortcomings is more vital; its governmental structure more stable and its overall power greater. The alliance can thus face a period of holding firm with confidence—provided it preserves its unity.

It has become ritualistic to speak of the need for allied unity. It is indeed periodically reaffirmed. But it exhausts itself in tactical agreement. Too rarely—if ever—is there a real attempt to project a strategy for the rest of this century.

And yet that is the single most important problem before the alliance. I do not believe the present structure of NATO lends itself easily to such an effort. And I do not have much confidence in "wise men" exercises. Still, a way must be found to deal with the unsolved issues before us. We must reexamine strategic doctrine without blinking. An approach to arms control must logically parallel this effort. It will be time also to look at the question whether every NATO deployment decided a generation ago must be sacrosanct for all eternity. East-West relations in all their manifold aspects need a sense of direction. The Reagan administration has in practice abandoned its confrontational style. Our allies need now to avoid using the past as an alibi to avoid difficult choices.

The process is overdue and since it depends on the members of a democratic alliance it provides no excuse for failure. The greatest encouragement to Soviet foreign policy in the West is the lack of clarity of the alliance about its purposes. But that

143

Summer 1984

Kissinger

problem, being self-made, can be undone by
our own efforts. Since the democracies have
this possibility, it is also their duty.

Henry A. Kissinger

## Recent CSIS Publications

### THE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES SERIES

*The Planetary Product in 1982 (World Economic Output, 1970–1982)*

by Herbert Block and Ray S. Cline

The bedrock factors in strategic analysis in international affairs are the growth of the number of people in the world and their economic product in terms of goods and services. Dr. Block's calculations for comparisons and compilation are uniquely useful indicators of world power relations. The five tables presented are Country Data, Economic Product Levels, Politically Important Groups, Developed and Less Developed Countries with Third World Suplements, and Politically Important Groups with Third World Supplements. 31 pages.

### Ethanol: National Security Implications

A Report of the Energy and Strategic Resources Staff by Adela M. Bolet, Richard J. Kessler, Francis X. Murray, Jonathan B. Stein, Program Director Charles K. Ebinger

Contains chapters on Energy and National Security: Policy Dangers, the U.S. Fuel Ethanol Industry, Energy and Agriculture, and Agriculture and Trade. In conclusion, policymakers are urged to investigate questions affecting the long-term development of the ethanol industry. Though not a cure-all for the U.S. energy situation, ethanol could prove invaluable to the nation's agricultural security during an oil supply disruption. 64 pages.

### *Egypt and Nuclear Technology: "The Peace Dividend"*

by G. Henry M. Schuler

The transfer of American nuclear technology to Egypt is the focus of this publication in the CSIS *Significant Issues Series*. Egyptian expectations that the U.S. government would facilitate the transfer originate in the Sinai Accord of 1974. Following the Camp David agreements, such anticipated advantages became known as the "peace dividend." Egypt continues to have growing energy needs that must be met from nonfossil sources so that its limited oil supply can be used to earn hard currency. CSIS researcher G. Henry M. Schuler, who is Dewey F. Bartlett senior fellow and director of the Bartlett Council on Energy and National Security, covers the origins of the "peace dividend," its role in Sadat's liberalism, the relationship between Egypt's oil production and its nuclear aspirations, the technical and financial viability of its nuclear project, and the potential "fallout" of failure to facilitate the nuclear transfer.

Schuler, who has been involved with Middle Eastern energy and geopolitics for more than 25 years as a naval officer, diplomat, and oil industry executive, focuses on the energy, economic, and historical political issues. 18 pages.

### *Technological Advances and Consequent Dangers: Growing Threats to Civilization*

by Robert H. Kupperman

For almost ten thousand years, the threats to life have been inherently self-contained and self-extinguishing. The historic record is rife with evidence of natural cataclysms: vulcanism, seismic convulsions, climatic excursions, and epidemics are all commonplace occurrences in the short span of the history of civilization. Man-made disasters such as wars and their aftermath are so common as to provide a natural framework around which political and social history has been constructed and taught for centuries. The nuclear exchange, of course, is the most dramatic symbol of man's ability to elimi-

The Washington Quarterly

144