Excerpt from Letter dated 20 November 1951

However I should like to make a few observations in connection with the
outline you showed me. In principle I agree with your goals for U.S. strategy.
But politics, as Bismarck so well said, is "the art of the possible," and the reali-
ties of the present situation will prevent the achievement of the requisite equilib-
rium for a balance of power. A balance of power depends, in my opinion, on the
following factors: (a) a geographically determinate area, (b) an equilibrium of
strength within that area, (c) an outside balancer with a profound conception of
national strategy and unencumbered by ideological considerations, (d) a large measure
of agreement on basic values within that "concert of powers."

It requires no extended argument to show that the present situation
meets none of these conditions. The classic balance of power presupposed a
subtlety of conception and a determinacy of calculations made almost impossible
by the world-wide scale of the present conflict. The second and third condi-
tions imply that before you can have a balance of power there must be power
to be balanced. The balancer must not himself be part of the equilibrium, except
to tip the scale. Above all, policy has to be conceived as a continuing process,
with war as merely an instrument for the achievement of determinate objectives.
The balance of power is incompatible with an assertion of absolute values. There
is a beautiful quote by Churchill on this, but I cannot lay my hands on it at the
moment.

I quite agree with you that the balance of power is a doctrine of limited
objectives. This limitation was not achieved within the concert of powers, however,
but through the national strategy of a country which controlled the balance. More-
over the balance of power did not prevent wars; it only limited their scope by the
consciousness that the balancer would never permit a single power or group of powers
to become so much stronger that a shift of sides could not restore the equilibrium.
But in relation to the USSR we play the role of a nation within the balance, not of
a balancer, and moreover, on a world-wide scale. Therefore any limitations must be
self-limitations, not even achieved by the classic balance of power and, indeed,
contradicting the reason for its existence. It would be strain enough on U.S. wisdom
to be suddenly projected into Britain's traditional role. But a more awful responsi-
bility awaits us. The injection of an ideological element into policy makes self-
limitation an almost unattainable ideal. Policy begins to be conceived as the means
of an absolute attitude, not as the definition of continuing relation. In the inev-
itable atmosphere of distrust each side tends to play for absolute security, which
means absolute insecurity (i.e., neutralization) for its opponent. This would be
true even if only one side were to introduce the ideological element.

Maybe Europe will recover its morale and provide an independent force.
Possibly the emergent East will furnish another center of power. If so, the United
States should play in relation to Eurasia the traditional role of an island power
towards a land-mass - to prevent the consolidation of that continent under a single
rule.

- 2 - Excerpt Ltr. dated 20 Nov. 1951

I know also that there is a tendency to point to the religious toleration
following the wars of the Reformation as a possible substitute for ideological
conflict. But surely the significant point is that this balance was achieved only
after a Thirty-Year's War.

But I do not think this period will follow the pattern of the 17th century. I believe we will rather find ourselves in the role of Rome after the Carthaginian wars, and this is why I used the adjective "awful" to describe our future. The contest with the Soviet Union is not the only national problem. Equally important from a long-range view is the fact that we may within a generation find ourselves in a world in which we must supply our challenges from within ourselves. This is a real issue for long-range thinking, and its solution requires a profound doctrine.

Any book addressing itself to these questions will be a major contribution.

This whole problem, it seems to me, has been approached too much from
the point of view of "American values." Most of the schemes of this order
I know about were concerned with converting the European to the American
point of view and with attempting to set up American society as a model to
follow. I think this is the wrong way of going about it. American values,
after all, can have a curative or stimulating value only for Americans.
Europeans can act only from their own inner dynamics, as we can act only
from ours. It is as foolish to expect an Italian to fight Communism on the
basis of American values as it would be to expect an American to fight
Communism on the basis of Italian values. Neo-Americans, even if they could
be created, would be of no value to anyone anywhere. What we need is not a
reluctantly Americanized Europe but a vitally Europeanized one, looking not
to us or to the Russians but to its own superb and continuing inheritance
for a stimulus to action. Neutralism, about which some of our commentators
are so concerned, is a negative and passive assertion of faith in the
vitality and worth of European values and culture. What we want is an
affirmative and active assertion of that same faith, not of our own. After
all, it is from the European inheritance that our own values have emerged
and it is to emphasize that ultimate identity that the Seminar would be held.
Its aim would be the realization by the European students that our reliance
is on that identity rather than on our own individuality. Certainly it's
desirable that Europeans should like and admire us but only if at the same
time they like and admire themselves. A European declaration of faith in
America would have little foundation in reality and psychologically would
not be much different from and therefore no healthier than a European
declaration of faith in Europe. That, it seems to me, should be the main
object of the Seminar.

The spectre of a war between East and West is the most important single element in the German reality of today. Germans who still have something-to-lose live in deadly fear of such a clash. The other who feel that they have lost everything already and that things cannot get worse, look forward to it hoping vaguely that strife among their conquerors will lead to a resurrection of Germany. Many young men, ex-soldiers in particular, would welcome outright so unique a chance to utilize their one indisputable asset: military prowess and experience. They also feel that a new war and military life with its possibilities and adventures will be preferable to the drab miserable, and hopeless existence they lead now.

As early as the summer of 1945, the present writer, then an Intelligence Officer with one of our Infantry Divisions in Europe, had to turn back a steady trickle of German ex-service men reporting to division headquarters for enlistment in the U.S. Army. When local rumor had it, some time ago, that the British were accepting Germans into their Armed Forces, a majority of the able bodied male undergraduates of a certain University volunteered, in vain of course, within 24 hours. Nor is it a secret that eight out of every ten enlisted men in the French Foreign Legion are at present Germans. In Hanoi (French Indo China) where Legion Units have been committed to fight indigenous rebels, the Legionnaires could be heard chanting the Horst Wessel song, the official Nazi hymn.

Some, it is true, deserted to the guerrillas. In the whole, however, these refugees from a defeated Germany proved quite valuable to their French masters.

Such undeniable eagerness on the part of many Germans to bear arms once more is all too frequently an indication of a burning German desire to fight with the West against the East. The fact is being overlooked that a considerable number of Germans have shown the same willingness to serve on the other side of the fence.

When shortly after the German defeat at Stalingrad the Russians came out with a proclamation, allegedly signed by over 20 captured German generals, to the effect that Hitler was wrong and Stalin, if not right, at least more acceptable to those generals, the document was generally considered a Russian propaganda hoax. It had never happened in Prussian and German military history before that generals captured by the enemy had turned against their own commander-in-chief in a public declaration, enjoining their comrades in arms not yet captured to rise against their master and liberate the nation from his yoke. In the meantime, however, many things have happened that make it appear that the aforementioned proclamation was more than a propaganda trick. Field Marshal Paulus, leader of the German armies taken prisoner at Stalingrad, took the stand as a state witness in the Nuremberg Trial of the Nazi leaders (Goering, Ribbentrop, etc.). Not only what he testified, but even more the manner in which he did it, the very vocabulary he used, must have shaken the belief of whoever considered it unlikely that a German general could ever turn to

the Russians for salvation. The Field Marshal now lives in a suburban house near Moscow and his name is frequently mentioned in connection with the so-called Free German Army, the Russians have been able to form of German PW's. Ex-German officers, known as wearers of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, one of the highest German war decorations, have publicly addressed mass meetings of Communist workers, fanatically explaining to the assembled crowds in Ruhr valley cities that just because they happened to be German officers and nationalists they had become Communists, the hope for a German resurrection lying with the East. Among the top leaders of Bavarian Communists we find one Scheringer, expelled from the German Army for Nazi propaganda activities shortly before Hitler came into power.

This ex-professional officer and ex-Nazi martyr not only embraced Communism, but became one of its most active proponents. A better-known and less recent case is that of an ex-officer of the Prussian Royal Guards who hid his aristocratic title under the pseudonym Ludwig Renn, became famous under that name as the author of a Communist novel ("Krieg") on World War I and, during the Spanish Civil War, led one of the so-called International Brigades against Franco.

These examples of German military men, including high-ranking officers, turning to Communism are by no means as surprising as they might seem to those not familiar with German military thought and tradition.

For 150 years before World War I, the Russian and Prussian armies were on very friendly terms indeed, the Russian Army in general and the Russian General Staff in particular being modeled closely on the Prussian Army

and General Staff. German military men after World War I and II considered it the main mistake of their political leaders that they had involved the country in a war of <u>two fronts</u> (West and East), instead of securing Russian neutrality and thereby a "free back" for Germany. Between the two World Wars it was in Soviet Russia that the officers of the small German Army were allowed to try out certain heavy weapons which, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the Germans were not allowed to possess. This writer remembers having seen a picture of Lenin in the house of General Von Hammerstein, Commander-in-Chief of the "Reichswehr" (name of the German Army between 1918 and 1935). The idea that the <u>combination of Russian manpower and German military experience and knowledge</u> would prove "unbeatable" is an old one. It is, in fact, not generally realized, because it was not publicized at the time, that a few months after they had come to power, the <u>Nazi Government renewed the treaty with Russia</u> that had been entered into by the Weimar Republic (regime preceding the Nazis). The terms of this Treaty of Friendship were such that, at the time of its conclusion, it was considered as "virtually an alliance" by political observers.

The foregoing is not, of course, intended to show that all German military or even the majority among them are likely to be Communists. It might show, however, that in the light of past experience and present developments, it would be unwise and decidedly naive to imagine that German military manpower must necessarily be on our side in any possible conflict between the USSR and the US and that ex-officers and men of the German armed forces are just burning to fight as our allies. They may be quite willing to take up arms again and many, indeed, might <u>prefer</u> by far

to be on our side. Many others, however, will be quite willing to join
up with the East. Many Germans are certainly convinced that in the event
of war, Germany should get into the battle and be active instead of being
a mere object. On whose side they should fight is not equally clear to
them, though.

Americans on occupation duty are frequently over-impressed in their estimate of the situation by the very strong expression of anti-Russian sentiment encountered all over US occupied Germany. Now, there can be no doubt that the majority of the Germans hate the Russians while, at most, they dislike Americans. But Germans are also afraid of the Soviets and just because they consider the Russians less civilized, less humane and less human than Americans they are much more afraid of the former than of the latter. There is a very widespread conviction in all of Europe that whatever the final outcome of a Russo-American conflict, the Russians at first would roll over not only western Germany, but France, Italy and the rest of the Continent as well. Many Europeans are inclined, therefore, to feel that, at least for some time, they will have to live under Russian domination. The Communist Party everywhere does nothing, of course, to dispel this impression, which makes many an anti-Communist somewhat more cautious and pusillanimous than he might be otherwise.

The ex-soldiers of Germany, in particular, are watching the
scene with experienced and skeptical eyes. It is a psychological fact
which, unreasonable as it may be, must be taken into consideration that
German ex-service men do not have a very high opinion of American soldierly

qualities. Four-fifths of the Germans are sincerely convinced today that our success in the war was due exclusively to our technical, especially air, superiority. Man for man, the German considers himself a better fighter than the individual American soldier. They were impressed with our armored and mechanized might at the time of VE day, but now they see few American war planes and fewer tanks and they know enough of what is being written in American newspapers and popular magazines to be aware of the fact that the overall numbers of tanks and planes at our disposal at present are not impressive. Thus they doubt our military strength as a whole.

Looking at our occupation troops they are not particularly impressed, either. Many of our men are, indeed, extremely young and, to say the least, not very military in their bearing. In a nation where the uniform actually is a "symbol", where every man and boy has been in a military or paramilitary organization, the unmilitary looks of our soldiers are a factor of no mean importance. The opinion is frequently heard that it is not our task to display "militarism" before German eyes and that, for this reason, the non-military attitude of American soldiers is, on the whole, a good object lesson for German admirers of snappiness. This argument under present conditions is unsound, because it overlooks the fact that we don't live in a harmonious world faced only with the task of making Germans forget how a soldier should look. Americans in Europe are being followed by the scrutinizing eyes of men eternally asking the question: "Is the United States strong and determined or careless and without spirit?"

It is true, of course, that Russian troops too, do not look and
act in the manner the Germans expect of a soldier, but the average German
is convinced of Soviet toughness, ruthlessness and will to power. He con-
siders Russian leadership as inferior to German General Staff work, in
spite of Stalingrad, but has heard innumerable stories of the "barbaric
stubbornness and toughness" of the Russian infantry which, according to
a version generally accepted in Germany, is practically insensitive to
losses "because human life in the East is not regarded as possessing any
particular value". The German fear of Russia is partly, too, a result of
many years of Nazi propaganda which depicted Soviet soldiers as devils with
human faces and habitually referred to them as "sub-human" (Untermenschen).
Actual misconduct of Russian troops in Berlin and elsewhere has done
nothing to lessen this fear. The reaction, however, is by no means an
automatic desire to turn to the US -- if and as long as our power to offer
protection seems more than doubtful.

This, in fact, is the tragic result of our present policy of
reconciliation and leniency toward Germans: Almost every one of them
knows an American by now, whose kindness and human qualities he eulogizes,
but it does not require too much time before he will confess that it is
exactly this almost naive attitude of our men in uniform or Military
Government civilians which makes him doubt our capacity to deal with
realities. Our policy at first was exaggeratedly stern. The present
writer remembers vividly that for many months after VE-Day he could not
even talk to Heidelberg University professors with spotless political

records. At that time, when millions of Germans under the shock of the war were still moldable and more than willing to listen to us, soldiers were almost encouraged to adopt toward them the "God damn Kraut" attitude. Now that their souls have hardened once more we are suddenly, and without too much discrimination, falling into the other extreme of praising, in orientation lectures to dependents and otherwise, the virtues of the German nation.

Bewildered by such 180° shifts of policy the Germans feel that we have no clearly defined program and no real understanding of men and situations. Our prestige, as everyone who has been on occupation duty from the beginning will confirm, has declined enormously since VE day. It is a fateful mistake to believe that we are going to gain respect by being soft and by permitting Germans, with their sincere love of order and discipline, to challenge our authority openly or surreptitiously.

It has become increasingly clear in the last year or so that our "new policy" of catering to the Germans is considered a sign of weakness by even the most pro-American elements of the population. Germans naturally seek for the motives behind this policy and they conclude that we sorely need them as allies. This discovery makes them more doubtful than ever regarding our power to protect them and increases their feeling of insecurity and their fear of the future.

The question, however, is not merely one of power pure and simple. Even if American and Russian actual strength were perfectly

balanced in German eyes, we would have to struggle for the German soul
against Soviet propaganda. That it is the German soul and not merely
their brains and stomachs we must try to win cannot be emphasized too
strongly. The notion that man is driven chiefly, if not exclusively, by
economic and rationalistic motives is the basis of Marxist and therefore,
Communist doctrine. The so-called materialistic concept of history which
explains all history as a mere result of underlying economic causes is
the cornerstone of Merxian teachings. It is slightly amazing, therefore,
to find that many Americans, especially the technical experts and ad-
visers, act and talk as if they, too, were true disciples of Marx in this
respect. Listening to them one gains the impression that all that
necessary to win over a nation is to provide it with food and help its
sailing industries. That man does not live on bread alone, that there are
intangible, spiritual factors as well, is largely forgotten.

It cannot be denied, of course, that while people are starving
it is important to feed them, nor can there be any question that econo-
mic misery is a fertile ground for Communism. The phenomenon of drawing-
room Communists and titled Oxford (England) students embracing the Red
religion is too well known, however, to allow any mistake regarding the
fact that even well-fed people in search of a creed may become convinced
disciples of Lenin and Stalin if--nothing else worthwhile to believe in
is offered to them. Considering that even in the U.S., most prosperous
of all countries, Communism has been able to make considerable inroads
among students and intellectuals, it should not be necessary to elaborate
this point any further.

If it were only a question of material aid (food, loans, etc.) there could be no doubt, it is true, that the US would win the battle for German sympathies, because we could always outdo the Russians and their somewhat battered economy, in that field. It is clear even today that, as regards material conditions, Germans in the US occupied zone are infinitely better off than those in the Soviet zone. But, as pointed out above, man is not exclusively determined in his reactions by economic factors, quite apart from the fact that in the case of Germany the best we could do would be to improve material conditions somewhat. To give her people economic security in the American sense would be entirely impossible under present circumstances. Thus the struggle for the hearts and souls of Germany with other than economic weapons remains of particular importance. And on this psychological battlefield the picture is not reassuring. Examining closely Russian and American chances to win active and convinced followers for their respective political creeds one will find, in fact, that the Soviets enjoy certain initial advantages.

Looking merely at the number of Communist voters (approximately 10% of the US Zone electorate) and considering the hatred for Russia felt by most Germans, Soviet chances of success in the psychological warfare waged on German soil may not seem great. But the intensity of purpose and ardent fanaticism of German Communists cannot be matched in any sense by a similarly strong faith on the part of non-Communists. The Communist Party can count on the unquestioning loyalty of a well disciplined, inspired group of fanatics united by a quasi-religious ardor and forming a community

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of faith. All other parties merely have adherents whose efforts, in general, will be limited to casting their vote and who seldom, if ever, are willing to sacrifice themselves for the "idea", if necessary. When, in July 1945, the present writer had arrested a little Communist in a small German town he was impressed by the insolent and provocative, but certainly sincere insistence of the local Communist leader that, as the responsible chief, he be thrown in jail instead. His attitude was particularly remarkable since, at that time, Germans were subservient and obsequious and not given to arguing with or gainstaying American authorities.

It must be remembered, moreover, that Communists in Germany as elsewhere, see in the Soviet Union their spiritual fatherland, the fountain-head of all progress and wisdom, the paradise of the worker, the land of the future, and most important, the country that is always right. The German conservative or liberal, on the other hand, is hardly ever as unconditionally pro-Western as his Red counterpart is pro-Russian. Non-Communists are for us only because they consider the Western solution as the lesser of two evils.

Even the briefest conversation with any number of Germans will quickly reveal that their admiration for the US and Great Britain is limited, to put it mildly. The most striking but by no means the only example of this distrust is the very little credit given to the US for the material help Germany has actually received from this country. Innumerable jokes ridiculing official import figures were told and retold in many versions. The

following is one of the most frequently heard: Standing on a pier in Bremen, two Germans look across the water, where not a ship is in sight. Says Fritz to Hans: "Look at the big boats from America carrying food for Germany!" His companion retorts: "But there are no boats!" Where upon Fritz replies: "But don't you read the papers?" Many American officers have been asked by their German servants whether it was not true that butter from Germany could be bought in American grocery stores, and the story that food containers with American labels actually contain German food had to be denied by this writer in conversations with even the most well meaning among Germans. German conservatives and liberals, generally more friendly disposed toward the States than individuals holding different political opinions, nevertheless consider our civilization (Zivilisation), "superficial", "mechanized", "materialistic" and, in comparison to European or German culture (Kultur), inferior. Most Germans are naively amazed to find that many Americans prefer classical music to jazz or a good book to the comics.

The above facts are so well known that to mention them might seem superfluous. They nevertheless are symptoms of a very important trend and may help to show that we cannot count in Germany on an unconditionally pro-American group comparable in size or intensity of faith to the pro-Russian group. The fact is that non-Communists work, at best, with us, while the Communists work for Russia. There is in Germany no "American" party fighting for American ideologies and following American directives in the same sense as there is a Russian party inspired by and directed from Moscow.

In the psychological battle, in other words, Soviet Russia has already succeeded in organizing a sizable group of utterly convinced propaganda agents who preach the Red doctrine with a spark in their eyes. We have no similar group of propagandists at our disposal. Optimists may be inclined to feel that the recently inaugurated propaganda drive by Military Government, US Zone might, in the course of time, remedy this situation.

Actually such optimism seems hardly warranted, for to counteract Russian propaganda in Germany with American methods will be a desperate task. While Americans will be chiefly concerned with publicizing facts which, if known, will increase our and damage Russian prestige, the Soviets, in their propaganda efforts, are unscrupulous and not hampered by too great a respect for truth. This, however, is only a relatively minor point. It might even be held that, in the long run, truth is a better weapon than untruth in the battle to win friends and influence people. Ironically enough the real stumbling block in the way of our propaganda results from some excellent qualities in the American national character. Believing in facts and figures the American is distrustful of emotions, mysticism, and missionary zeal in the field of politics as elsewhere. Internal politics at home are considered not as a battlefield of clashing philosophies but as an arena of conflicts between down-to-earth, tangible interests. One chooses one's party, Republican or Democratic, not according to pre-conceived more or less theoretical notions of life, but on the basis of practical, homespun considerations.

As an individual, the American is not generally inclined to speak with impressive if slightly unbalanced fervor of his spiritual values, his ideas and ideals. Having been involved, actively and passively, in troop orientation lectures on "Why we must win the war", "The American way of life", etc., the writer recollects that, even at the height of the war, ideas were set forth in a calm, measured, and sometimes decidedly uninspired manner. We feel embarrassed by what is derisively described as flag-waving. We are inclined to smile--somewhat unjustly though--at the emotional shudder aroused by the tunes of a military band, and we certainly do not consider highly the psychological value of political signs or symbols. If I remember correctly it is not even the habit among our undergraduates to write love poems for their sweethearts, an inveterate custom of self-respecting young Europeans. We are, moreover, tolerant by education, tradition, and frequently temperament, and almost physically incapable, therefore, of imposing our views on others. The art of discussion so fervently, not to say madly, practiced by Russians and Germans, Frenchmen and Italians, is not one of our favorite pastimes.

It is very difficult, therefore, to imagine our occupation personnel, including those officially in charge of publicizing our side of the picture, as torchbearers of ideas, or fiery missionaries and inspired priests of our political philosophies. It is interesting to note that the best German language paper now published in the US Zone, the "Neue Zeitung", is an American (Mil.Govt.) undertaking! The paper is first class in every respect, its standards are high, its information unusually well presented;

the articles on new developments in art and literature are not inferior
to those in the New York Times. Educated Germans express their unstinted
enthusiasm for the "Neue Zeitung" and read it eagerly. They all seem to
agree that the occupation authorities deserve nothing but praise for
publishing and sponsoring so excellent a paper. They also agree, however,
that its effects politically are almost nil, since it supplies facts and
information splendidly, but does not stir people's hearts nor change
their convictions. The latter criticism proffered by Germans misses the
point, of course, since the paper is meant to be a model of unbiased,
objective newspaper writing and editing rather than a propaganda weapon.

It is, nevertheless, true that after three years of occupation
we have not stirred the hearts of even a small minority of Germans or
imbued them with the conviction that our philosophy is the one showing a
way to a more meaningful life, while the Russians, obviously, have suc-
ceeded in making a number of Germans believe that the light cometh from
the East and that they know the answers to the problems of mankind. The
simple fact is that it needs enthusiasm to generate enthusiasm. Not even
a traveling salesman can sell his merchandise if he is not genuinely
enthusiastic about the goods he wants to sell. The only man who can con-
vince others is the one who is deeply convinced himself and who, moreover,
in actions and attitude even more than in words eradiates conviction.
According to this writer's observation this basic psychological truism
is frequently overlooked in our official and unofficial dealings with
Germans. Many a German will comment very favorably on the honesty,

kindliness, and humanity of individual Americans, but seldom, if ever, will you hear that he has been impressed by an American's strength of faith or that he has gained a new outlook on life from close contacts with American personnel.

Having acted as German Youth Activities (GYA) officer first for the entire region (NAAA) of North Baden and later for a Bavarian mountain district, this writer was able to watch closely the extremely limited psychological effects of this our most laudable and greatest effort actually to establish contact with the younger generation in Germany. In spite of all the publicity given to the Youth Program, in spite also of the self-sacrificing efforts of single individuals among whom former YMCA leaders in uniform deserve to be mentioned, what it amounts to in actual fact is: sports and some candy. Serious conversations and any exchange of views between American GYA personnel (officers and NCO's) and German boys and girls are an exception, not the rule. This is partly due to the extreme scarcity of personnel--particularly, qualified personnel--available for the Youth Program. Even the commanders most interested in GYA and thoroughly convinced of its importance find it physically impossible, in most cases, to assign full-time Youth officers or NCO's. As a rule the task has to be given to some harassed lieutenant or sergeant in addition to his other duties, regardless of European Command orders and regulations to the contrary. In part, however, the virtually exclusive emphasis on sports and candy is the result of the general unwillingness to recognize the importance of more subtle methods of influencing people.

To accept the often repeated phrase that "by learning how to play baseball the kids will learn the American way" and to distribute candy to a group of boys and girls is, moreover, decidedly easier than a painstaking and intense effort to get really acquainted with the youngsters and gain with them a position of spiritual leadership. The habit of distributing small quantities of candy on frequent occasions actually backfired on us, because the churches consider it a practice of unfair competition as regards their own youth groups. It has aroused resentment in many other quarters, too, and the bitter remark can often be heard: "Mice are caught with lard and with chocolate, they try to catch the souls of our children." (Mit Speck faengt man Maeuse, und mit Schokolade wollen sie die Seelen unserer Kinder fangen.) Children from upper-class families, particularly those with a traditionalist-conversative background, where the concept of honor is still cherished, have confided to this writer that they would not have come to his meetings, discussion groups, etc., had he tried to use food as an incentive to bring them in. This, needless to say, is not the attitude of all the children, who naturally are fond of candy, but those with a strong feeling of pride, which generally means the most valuable elements, were obviously grateful not to be treated as poor relatives. It must be said, indeed, that if one cannot hold the children's interest by what one has to say, it is rather useless to try to obtain their loyalty and attention by dealing out a few candy bars. They may take the sweets gladly, as crumbs from a very rich man's table, but they will neither be particularly impressed nor very grateful.

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GYA is one of our most concerted and, on the face of it, most promising propaganda efforts. If even this program, less easy to assail by hostile groups than almost any other action we might take, is nevertheless producing few political results, the magnitude of our overall task may be more easily imagined. The fact that, due to our lack of interest in psychological factors, some of the main features of the program even tend to backfire, is a warning against easy optimism regarding the possible results of our psychological warfare effort in general.

Lack of inner fire, over emphasis on the so-called "practical" approach, and disbelief in the importance of intangibles and imponderables are chiefly responsible for our difficulties in winning influence on German souls. In addition we are faced with a language problem, since only an infinitesimal fraction of Americans now in Germany know more than a few words of German, while the number of English-speaking Germans is limited. The problem is a serious one, because it is difficult to convince people by the most effective man-to-man method, if one neither speaks nor understands their language. Except for the presence of an unusually able interpreter the language barrier prevents, in effect, any more intimate exchange of ideas. As a result most occupation personnel live in an almost colonial atmosphere of isolation from the natives. They are so completely separated from the local population that rare attempts actually to convey ideas and to proselytize are virtually bound to fail, because such attempts are not based on any knowledge of German problems or mentality. The local people, figuretively speaking, live on the other

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side of a river which has few bridges. This situation prevails even, and perhaps more so, with regard to Army and Military Government higher echelons which, nevertheless, are duty bound to dictate policies.

Intelligence agencies providing the information on which commanders base their decisions are understaffed now and dangerously short of qualified personnel, with the unavoidable result that even our intelligence agencies are not fully aware, sometimes, of currents or undercurrents in the country we occupy.

The foregoing must not be interpreted to mean that contacts between Germans and Americans in Germany are non-existent. It should be understood, however, that such contacts as do occur are rather limited in scope and number. Many Americans know just one or two girls, or else those few Germans who work for them (drivers, domestic servants, etc.) or with whom they have to deal officially. There are, moreover, the black market activities which result in some intercourse between occupation and population. Purely social contacts with German civilians outside the above categories are rare, although, in many cases, Americans have developed a sincere liking for Germans with whom they have had to deal in an official capacity.

It is unfortunate, though, that, generally speaking, the very best elements among the population either do not seek or else do not find many opportunities to associate with occupation personnel. One day, in connection with his official duties this writer had to call on a very well-known German professor of English literature. In the latter's house,

19

somewhere in Bavaria, he met a German scientist and Nobel prize winner, also the president of a famous university, and a lady physician. It turned out that during over two years of American occupation none of this rather select and certainly very worthwhile group had ever exchanged more than a few words with an American officer. It is, indeed, true that people of culture, those who might be described as the social and spiritual leaders, are not likely to be found among the individuals frequented by US personnel. Representatives of the old upper class as well as members of the professions, clergymen, college professors, writers, top-ranking businessmen, etc., seem to hide away to some extent. It cannot be said, as a rule, that they are particularly hostile, but somehow there appears to be no bridge. Ambitious small merchants, people without any clearly defined occupation, girls and busybodies of variegated types, seem to find it much easier to strike up an acquaintance with our people. The writer was sometimes shocked to find that Germans introduced to him by American friends as particularly delightful individuals were nothing of the kind, but people who had either proved useful because of their knowledge of English or had gained confidence by flattery and shrewdness. This may be one reason why, in many cases, Germans closely associated with Americans are looked down upon or even shunned by the rest of the population. This is not always due to more or less natural resentment against "collaborators" or to jealousy, but a result of the not uncommon observation that such individuals, quite frequently, do not represent an elite in any sense of the word.

Even more serious are the cases where an American has met and, to a certain extent, befriended a German, a government official perhaps,

who is really an outstanding and influential personality fully deserving
such friendship, but where the net result of such a relationship is never-
theless a resigned disappointment on the German side. Intelligence and well-
educated pro-American Germans have openly confessed or tactfully hinted, in
fact, that their American friends had shown "no real interest or understanding
for the political and other problems of the occupied territory." In part,
of course, such remarks merely indicate that, in their despair, even intelligent and realistic Germans simply expect miracles which we cannot possibly
produce. Their disappointment, in other words, may be due to their dissatisfaction with the overall situation rather than with the individual U.S.
officer or official who, perhaps, feigns lack of understanding because
there is nothing else he could do. It must be admitted, however, that the
most well meaning and likeable American is often the one, who, in his conversations with Germans shows a superficiality that cannot but disillusion
the latter. If Americans, ranking personnel in particular, become well
acquainted with Germans of some standing, the moment invariably arrives
when the German is no longer content with exhibitions of mere sympathy
and good will. In the typically European manner and in accordance with
the German inclination to look at things notmerely from a pragmatic point
of view, he will want to "deepen" the conversation. Seeing his efforts
fail he feels more isolated, misunderstood and disappointed than ever.

[x]

21

[Y]

It would be decidedly wrong, of course, to express agreement with everything a "nice" German has to say or to pity his nation uncon- ditionally for its plight. Now would it be advisable merely to listen in sympathy and then conclude the session with a number of cheerful and shoulder-clapping remarks. Feeling bitter, desperate and forsaken by God and man, Germans are certainly hungry for sympathy and understanding, but being weak now they also, and even more so, look for strength. Living in a spiritual vacuum they search for a new meaning of life; having lost belief in old ideals they long to find faith again, and the spark having gone from their own existence they want to be warmed by the flame that might still burn in others. Saying yes and superficial pep talks are of no avail under such circumstances. The situation may be compared to the one between patient and doctor or, more specifically, between neurotic and psychiatrist. A physically or mentally sick man will not be reassured by a physician who bewails with him the sadness of his case or who seems uncertain about the diagnosis and the remedies to be applied.

It is difficult to describe in full the shoulder shrugging, cynical and nihilistic attitude prevalent among Germans of today, especially among the young. "The psychological state of nihilism," says the German philosopher Nietzsche, "emerges when one has sought for some sense in life that was not there." The very impressive leader of the Christian Democratic (conservative) party in Germany admitted to the writer that the number of active young adherents in his party was exceedingly small. Exactly the same complaint can be heard among the

22

ceasingly small. Executively the same complaint can be heard amount the
writer that the number of social loans adherents in his party was ex-
Christian Democratic (conscionative) party in Germany admitted to the
same in life that was not there. The very impressive leader of the
the German philosopher Nietzsche, "emerges when one has sought for some
benefit among the young." "The biographical state of Nihilism," says
critical andphilosophic attitude prevalent among Germans of today, "is
If it is difficult to describe in full the anponder strutting,
be abbristed.

his case or who seems uncertain about the diagnosis and the remedies to
aff not be reasoned by a hygienist who propagates with him the science of
between neurotic and bakteriatic. A hygienist or mentally sick man
compared to the one between patient and doctor or, more specifically,
does take are of no avail under circumstances. The situation may be
by the flame that might still burn in others. Staying free and arbitrary
the stark fact that might still burn in others. Staying free and arbitrary
peaking lost power in old ideas they took to find their way, and
living in a spiritual absence they search for a new meaning of life!
put being weak now they are, and even more so, look for strength.

God and man, Germans are certainly hungry for ambassad and understanding,
emperger-emitting remarks. Feeling bitter, generous and logical, he
in ambassad and then conclude the session with a number of cheerful and
difficultly for its brief. Now would it be advisable merely to listen
with everything a nice German has to say or to give his nation moan-
It would be decidedly wrong, of course, to express agreement

MD

leaders of the other moderate parties including the Social Democrats.

The relatively tame programs and methods of these groups fail to arouse and enthuse the young who, surrounded by drabness and with their senses dulled by an overdose of excitement supplied by Nazism and war, look for something more inspiring and more radical.

Here lies the point of leverage for Communism and this is why Russian chances of propagandistic success, not at the present perhaps, but in the long run are greater than they might appear to the outside observer. It may be true that Russian personnel does not necessarily have greater psychological insight in German matters than Americans, although they have in common with many Germans an inclination toward mysticism and radicalism and a deeply ingrained love for everlasting discussions. But whatever the difficulties and problems on the Russian side of the fence, they do have the missionary spirit and the fanatic zeal to make converts, the unshakeable conviction to be 100% right, and a suggestive gleam in their eyes. They do have clear concepts of their aims, unquestioned driving power in their policies, and a combative, ruthless spirit of activism very apt to drag into its orbit those empty German hearts that long for an escape from the state of passivism activity in which they live.

The Russian propaganda language, moreover, is the same in pitch and tone as the one heard by Germans during the 12 years of Nazi indemnization. It is an "injustice" to the Nazis and a superficial misinterpretation of their doctrine to assume that the official name of the party

23

pretext of their doctrine to assume that the official name of the party
is an 

in which they live.

German hears that long for an escape from the state of passivity
ruthless spirit of activism very sad to that info its credit those empty
sims, unmeasured driving power in their policies, and a competitive,
a subjective sense in their eyes. They do have clear concepts of their
side of the fence, they do have the stationary spirit and the dynamic
disciplines. But whatever the difficulties and problems on the Russian
matlab and radicalism and a chiefly intrusted love for over-fighting
strongly they have in common with many Germans an inclination toward
have greater bayonets, insight in German matters than Americans,
optimum. It may be true that Russian personnel does not necessarily
put in the long run are greater than they might appear to the outside
Germans once as of probabilistic success, not at the present stage,
Here lies the point of levitation for Communists and this is why
something more insidious and more radical.

quiled by an overture of excitement sublimed by Hitzem and war, look for
and encircle the bound foe, unsummoned by deathless and with their sense
The relatively same programs and methods of these groups left to some
feyers of the other moderate parties including the Social Democrats.

53

"National Socialist German Workers Party" was merely a trick to lure the crowds. Nazism was a truly--one might say, sincerely-revolutionary movement. As early as 1933 the new Gauleiter (Nazi Governor) of East Prussia referred to the landed aristocracy of East Germany as "robber barons" in a public address, swearing at the same time that he would never set foot over the threshold of any of their castles. Goering's fanatical speech against "those blue-blooded (i.e. aristocratic) swine" in July 1944 was an outburst of genuine feeling. And Hitler not only spoke, but as his "Mein Kampf" shows, actually thought of himself as the man who had arisen from the people, the little corporal of World War I who understood and loved the German masses far better than the titled dignitaries of the Kaiser, moneymaking businessmen, or star-covered general.

It is a myth, naively or deliberately spread by oversymplifying
writers and reporters that Hitler was brought into power as a strawman of
big business and mainly as a result of help from these quarters. Indi-
vidual industrialists who did believe in him, like many Germans who were
decidedly less well off, subsidized the party, but most of them backed
the "Nationalists" (conservative), while the big banking interests,
largely in Jewish hands, were closely connected with the Democratic
Party (liberal). It is noteworthy that Hitler's two main friends among
industrialists were Kirdorff, born in 1847(!) and known as a "character",
and Thysen, who fled Germany after the Nazis had come to power and whose
wealth, as a result, was confiscated! It has been forgotten, moreover,
that under legislation enacted by National Socialism every factory or
business owner was to lose his rights over his property, if he did not

24

27

businessmen were to lose his rights over his property, it he did not
that under federation allowed by National Socialism every factory or
wealth, as a result, was defeated! It has been forgotten, moreover,
and Third Party who tied Germany after the war had come to power and abuse
industrialists were Kirdorff, born in 1847(1) and known as a "character",
party (fifth party). It is no longer that Hitler's two main friends among
frequently in tussles with, were closely connected with the Democratic
the "Nationalist" (conservative), while the third banking interest,
decidedly less well off, успaided the party, but most of them backed
vital industries who did believe in him, like many Germans who were
pik business and mainly as a result of help from these quarters. Inti-
writers and reporters, but Hitler was brought into power as a result of
If it is a party, not really or deliberately named by overzealous
moneymaking businessmen, or at least covered general.

[A]

manage it "in the interest of the common good of the nation", a principle fully in accordance with the best known of all Nazi slogans: "The common good before personal profits" (Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz).

Better remembered than the aforementioned events and policies is the fact that the Nazi Party could recruit an incomparably greater number of youthful followers than any other German party at the time. In all countries, however, it is never the young men who are particularly interested in "capitalism"; if anything youth has a certain contempt for the conservative idea of property and a vague aversion against financial interests. The youthful stormtroopers who willingly died for their leader streetfighting - which incidentally is again not the habit of more bourgeois types--declared loudly and, beyond any doubt, sincerely, that they fought for a new era, for a true community of the German people (wahre Volksgemeinschaft) and not for moneybag interests (Geldsackinteressen). In official German writings and speeches the Nazi rise to power was continuously and pointedly referred to as a "revolution".

If Hitler was merely using the revolutionary and proletarian vocabulary to pay lip service to what he himself described as the "socialist longing" (socialistische Sehnsucht) of the nation, such tactics applied by the past master of mass psychology would still prove that he knew this to be the proper way to obtain votes and followers. Anyone who ever witnessed Nazi meetings or demonstrations during their struggle for power will agree that the general atmosphere, the tone and contents of the speeches, the slogans and posters displayed were not only in the character of a religious revival meeting but also revolutionary. Hitler

25

character of a religion reviving meeting put also revolutionarily. Higher
the abscents, the affiliates and followers智ated were not only in the
power will arise that the general atmosphere, the tone and contents of
ever witnessed the meeting or demonstrations during their struggle for
knew this to be the proper way to obtain votes and followers. Anyone who
subscribed to the best manner of mass印刷 would still prove that he
"acquiesced long ago" (socialist newspaper) of the nation, such fanatics
according to the best service to what he meant described as the

It Hoffer was merely using the revolutionarily and professional

was continuously and continuously referred to as a "revolution".

In official German writings and abscents the Nazi rise to power
(Imme Aufgeregtemoment) and not for money's sake interests (Geldsackin-
ter that such thought for a new era, for a true community of the German people
more pounds of fumes—declared loudly and, perhaps and doubt, sincerely,
feeler after feeling — which incidentally is again not the point of
interest). The thoughtful atomistic who willingly died for their
the conservative ideas of brotherhood and a sane evolution against financial
interested in "capitalism"? It adorning himself has a certain consent for
It all countries, however, if it is never the bound men who are bartered
number of thoughtful followers than any other German party at the time.
It the feet that the Nazi party could recruit an innumerable party.

Good before personal profits" (Gemeinschaftsлен vor Einkommen).

Fully in accordance with the past known of all Nazi slogans: "The common

EN

became the leader of the by far largest of Germany's major parties not because he had money or was backed by money interests, but because his sensational propaganda and his appeal to emotions, his ruthlessness and fanatic insistence that he was right, gave a new stimulus and a new religion to the people who then, as today, were desperately and avidly looking for a new faith and for the strength they did no longer found within themselves.

Equally important to remember is the half-forgotten fact that *after* he had come into power, and to the very end of his rule, the conservative forces in Germany, i.e., the churches and the remnants of the old upper class, were to be found among his opponents. The Army and the churches resisted longer and a little bit more effectively than any other organized group. The most outspoken critic of the National Socialist regime in Germany was the Catholic Bishop of Muenster(Westphalia) Count von Galen. The story of the anti-Nazi Protestant church leader, Pastor Niemoeller, is too well known to be retold here. The man who actually placed the bomb in the famous attempt on Hitler's life, on July 20, 1944, was a German General Staff Officer, Count von Stauffenberg, and the list of General Staff officers and Prussian aristocrats hanged, shot, imprisoned or expelled from the army because of their opposition to the Nazi regime, is a long one. Regular Army officers of the old school, university professors, leading civil servants and the very rich were seldom found among the true Nazis for the very reason that, although in agreement with Hitler's nationalism and militarism, they were utterly unable to accept his anti-conservative ideologies and his proletarian taste and manners.

26

The often heard statement that Stalinist Communism and National Socialism are very much alike, can only be understood in its frightening implications, if the aforementioned developments and trends are clearly remembered. Communism as well as Nazism is highly dynamic. Both despise the bourgeois and extol, above all else, the willingness of the individual to subordinate himself completely to the all-powerful state. Both believe in brute force, despise Christian meekness and religion, and consider peaceful enjoyment of private wealth a contemptible occupation. Their tactics and methods are virtually identical. Street fighting, utter lack of restraint, all-out hatred for the internal and external enemy, the promise of a "New Order", parades, flags, uniforms, the use of the word "comrade" (Genosse) for and among party members, and innumerable other traits they have in common. As a result it is easier, sometimes, for a Nazi activist to understand and, subsequently, sympathize with the Communist wolves than with the democratic sheep.

The similarity of Soviet and Nazi anti-U.S. propaganda is a particularly striking example of this kinship. While he was head of the Research Department of a US Military establishment in Europe this writer collected a large number of Nazi anti-American books and leaflets significantly entitled: "Americanism, the Ruin of Europe", "Dollar Imperialism" etc. Form and tenor of these publications are such that entire paragraphs seem to have been taken directly from Soviet writings and leaflets of today. The style, exaggerations and willful misinterpretations, the hatred, the accusations hurled against the United States are

27

["tions, the hatred, the accusations and the hatred against the United States are\nand feelings of today. The state, exactions and willful malinger-\nentire baronesses seem to have been taken directly from Soviet writings\nbarbarism etc. From and tenor of these publications are much that\ninfinitely enriched: \"Americanism\", the Rule of Europe\", \"Dollar Is-\ncollected a large number of West anti-American books and magazines alt-\nResearch Department of a US Military establishment in Europe this writer\nparticularly striking example of this mindless. While he was reading of the\nThe similarity of Soviet and West anti-U.S. propaganda is a\nmumat wolves than with the democratic needs.\nWest activists to underlie and, subsequently, subdue with the Com-\ntrast they have in common. As a result it is easier, sometimes, for a\n"corvette" (Corvette) for and amount barely nepedate, and immovable other\nbrowne of a \"New Order\", banquets, fairs, uniforms, the use of the word\nof restraint, all-out hatred for the internal and external enemy, the\ntactice and methods are virtually identical. Street lighting, after Jack\nbeautiful enhancement of private wealth a consummate occupation. Their\nin pure force, capable Chivalrous侠me and effusion, and consider\nfor incorrupt themselves completely to the all-pervasive state. Both believe\nthe pompeia and exalt, above all else, the willingness of the individual\nremembered. Communism as well as Nazism is a firmly dynamic. Both share\nindications, if the aforementioned developments and trends are clearly\nSocialism are very much alike, can only be understood in its trifling\nThe often heard statement that Stalinist Communism and National", "[H]", "27"]

the same, the only difference being this, that where Nazi writers refer
to the "capitalistic", "monopolistic", "exploiting", "imperialistic",
"Jewish" American system, the Soviets omit the adjective "Jewish".

This is the background against which we ought to see the results of the municipal elections held in the US Zone several months ago.
The overall picture, when all votes were finally counted showed clearcut
gains for the extreme right as well as for the extreme left. If there is
any inclination on the part of superficial observers to view this development without misgivings on the ground that the rightist and leftist radicalism will outbalance and even check each other, they are bound to be disappointed. Bourgeois anti-communists in Germany who, under the Weimar Republic, had welcomed the beginning of the Nazi movement with a knowing smile, for similar reasons, found out, in the course of time, that the extremists from the so-called right were just as contemptuous of bourgeois and conservative tenets as their red brothers. And it is well known that in the years preceding the Nazi rise to power they and the Communists combined their forces of negation most effectively. In the end Parliamentary Government became impossible because of the very fact that the two radical parties continuously voted together, in the Reichstag, against each and every more moderate Cabinet formed by the parties of the political center.

Whether the dissatisfied and disillusioned younger turns to
the Hitler or Stalin type of totalitarian and revolutionary ideology depends,
all too frequently on pure coincidence. Decisive is the fact that in joining
either he disassociates himself clearly and violently from the existing order.

[Y]

28

either he dissociated himself clearly and violently from the existing order, or too frequently on pure coincidence. Decisive is the fact that in totalling the Hitler or Stalin type of totalization and revolution theory degends, whether the disassociated and disintegrated younger turns to every more moderate Capital formed by the battles of the political center, parties continuously voted together, in the Republic, against each and Government become impossible because of the very fact that the two radical parties their forces of negotiation must effectively. In the end parliamentary in the years proceeding the East rise to power they and the Communists combined, conservative forces as their red brothers. And it is well known that extreme left from the so-called right were just as consequences of Bourgeois smile, for similar reasons, found out, in the course of time, that the Republic, had welcomed the beginning of the East movement with a knowing disinterested. Bourgeois anti-communists in Germany who, under the Weimar caliban will outbalance and even check each other, that are bound to be ment without misleading on the ground that the rightist and leftist radicalism and inclination on the part of unorthodox observers to view this development for the extreme right as well as for the extreme left. It there is the overall picture, when all votes were literally counted showed evident signs of the municipal elections held in the US Zone several months ago.

This is the background against which we ought to see the re-

"Taliban" American statesman, the Soviet omit the adjective "Taliban". To the "capitalist", "monopolist", "exploitant", "imperialist", the same, the only difference being this, that where Soviet writers refer

[x]

[Y]

The mentality of the extremists is such, moreover, that, after some time, the two antibourgeois religious become, to a certain extent, interchangeable. Less than three (3) months before Hitler seized power, the Communists had obtained six (6) million ballots in the national elections, their all time peak in voting strength. Since there was but a very small communist underground and since the Nazi industrial and military effort was never seriously hampered by sabotage, we are compelled to assume that the indisputable radicalism of these millions was successfully deviated into Nazi channels. If communists deny this, it should be pointed out to them that, in contrast to France and Italy, the communist groups that reformed in Germany immediately after Hitler's fall were exceedingly small in numbers. Nor should it be forgotten that Hitler's stormtroopers were commonly referred to as "beefsteaks": Brown (shirts) on the outside, but red inside, to indicate their revolutionary spirit to which former communists could, indeed, adhere quite easily. A few days ago there occurred in Stuttgart, Germany the first clash between Germans and the US Military since the end of the war. It proved necessary to use a column ofammunition to quell the riot. The day after the NYT quoted the following statement by the US Brawest Marshal in Stuttgart: "Squads of teen age youths had whipped the crowd into a fury at the end of the demonstration. I do not know whether they were Communists or leftovers from the Nazi regime." The paradox truth probably is this that those squads of fanatic youths were both at the same time: leftovers from the Nazi regime and communists.

29

We should learn from the past to understand more clearly and to counteract more effectively certain very disquieting developments of today. Serious doubts regarding the nature of these developments are hardly permissible. Like a landscape illuminated by lightning that strikes in a dark night the political scene of Germany is revealed to even the most casual observer by two new items that appeared in a recent issue of the New York Times. The first reports Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Military Governor of the US Zone as having called attention to the "many evidences that Nazi minded groups, including former Nazis would rise again in German politics." According to the paper the General, at the same time, expressed a hope "that the German people would prove alert to the danger of an incipient totalitarianism of the right." The second report is even more significant. It deserves to be quoted in some detail: "BERLIN... The Soviet political arm appears to have taken over the direction of resurgent Nazism in Germany and to be trying to collect former Nazis into one 'progressive' NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC Party..... At a 14 hour session yesterday the Western deputy commanders strongly protested against the licensing of the party in the Soviet Zone on the ground that by its own admission it was designed to lure former Nazis and that the founding committee contained former Nazis. Until recently the Russians have been 'denazifying' the Germans in their zone by enrolling them in the Soviet sponsored Socialist Unity party and with placing into key positions individuals who, regardless of their political or economic philosophies, were willing to further the cause of Stalinism. Such a person is the notorious Berlin police president, Herr Markgraf, a well known German Army officer whom the

Russians appointed.... Obviously 'the new "National Democratic" party'
will be fully dominated by the Russians, but by no stretch of the imagina-
tion can it be said to be liberal, progressive, or anything else but Fascist
and nationalistic. The type of members it avowedly seeks guarantees that."

That Russian maneuvers of this kind are not necessarily doomed to
failure is pointedly illustrated by a book written, by a German refugee in
the United States: Heinrich Hauser, Neither a Nazi nor a Communist this
grandson of a Prussian General had volunteered, after World War I, to fight
the Communist rebellion in Germany. He actually was a member of the very
brigade that "liquidated" the captured Communist leaders Liebknecht and
Luxemburg. Written on the eve of Hauser's return to his "defeated but be-
loved fatherland" the book "Germany Talks Back," although an avowed and
candid apology of Germany, was published in this country, with a violently
disagreeing preface by Henry Morgenthau, as "a fair representation of the
German argument."

On page 200 of Herr Hauser's book we find the following passage:

"Tomorrow the desperate (German) people may reason thus:
We have been damned fools ever since 1918. We have been damned
fools to reject the Russian offer (to join up with them). Damned
fools to dream in our political kindergartens that Hitler would
let us have our little cake of private property and eat it too.
Now look at us after the blunders of a dozen years; could any
revolution possibly have done worse than Hitler? Where are they
today, our forty million little bourgeois who shaking in their

31

boots with fear....chose Hitler? Either they have already lost
their property or they stand to lose what is left of it, and they
know it. Forty millions of us have ceased to be bourgeois, there's
nobody left who has a stake in capitalistic society. Within one
generation German faith in monarchy, in democracy, in Fascism has
been shattered. What faith is left to us? Miraculously the
Communist offer of 1918 still holds good. What can we do this
time? Why, grab the coffer, grab it with both hands. The men
in the Kremlin have been consistently right ever since 1918.
The Communist revolution is the road for the liberation of Germany."

Herr Hauser certainly errs, if he sincerely believes that the
majority of fully adult Germans today argue in the above manner.
Whether, however, the desperate and urging youth of today may not
follow the above line of reasoning tomorrow, is a very different question.
They avidly long for a new faith, for a way out, any way out, of their
present misery. Many feel that they have nothing to lose and much to
gain by throwing themselves into the arms of the strong, loud-voiced fanatics
who preach destruction of the present order as the only way to a better
world of the future. That the destructive phase of this program might easily
spell their own doom is not necessarily a deterring thought for a lost
generation indulging in nihilism. Once again many Germans are repeating
a phrase that was heard twice before--1918 and 1932--in critical periods
of German history: "Better a frightful end than no end of frightfulness."
(Besser ein Ende mit Schrecken, als Schrecken ohne Ende.)

35

(Becker ein Ende mit Schrecken, era Schrecken ohne Ende.)

of German priority: "Better a thoughtful end than no end of turbulence." a phrase that was heard twice before—1918 and 1935—in critical periods of generation啟iting in William. Once again many Germans are rebelling against their own door is not necessarily a determining thought for a lost world of the future. That the destructive phase of this program might easily who breach destruction of the present order as the only way to a better gain by throwing themselves into the arms of the front, long-voiced trenchant present mixedly. Many feel that they have nothing to lose and much to lose safely long for a new lease, for a way out, any way out, of their follow the above line of reasoning tomorrow, is a very difficult question. Whichever, however, the degeneracy and straining north of today may not majority of fully adult Germans today alive in the above manner.

Herr Huser, certainly err, if he sincerely believes that the

*The Communist revolution is the road for the liberation of Germany.*

in the Kratin have been consistently right ever since 1918.

Time? Why? Step the celler, Step it with both hands. The men

Communist celler of 1918 still holds good. What can we do this

been shattered. Step this in left to me? Miraculously the

*Reformation German left in monogram, in democracy. In Communism has

nobody left who has a stake in capitalistic society. With one

know it. Forty millions of us have ceased to be parrasols, there's

their property or they afford so loose what if left of it, and they

poets with talent....choose Hilter? Either they have already lost

MD

In the relative security of our utterly non-hysterical American lives we can hardly believe that much reasoning is even possible. Europe, however, is not America, and it is this very fact which makes it so difficult for us to gauge the situation correctly. Even in Europe Americans, as a rule, live in the occupation army's sheltered atmosphere, hardly conscious of underground rumblings. They observe, and in most cases with regret, the German economic misery, but are much less aware of the spiritual despair that has gripped even those Germans who, for some reason, still have enough to eat or enjoy relative economic security. They big-heartedly distribute candy to German kids who smile in gratitude, but they do not know how bewildered these children feel in a world in which their parents and teachers have lost all bearings. Looking at the young men of Germany, who are sometimes friendly and sometimes insolent, but who quite obviously are not intent on throwing bombs or killing lonely troopers, the occupation soldier is unable to fathom the overpowering urge in these men to be part again of a wave of the future, any future, because the present is unbearably dull and drab.

US personnel in Europe, virtually without exception, are cognizant of the dark shadow falling in from the East. The number of those, however, who are aware of the full implications of the problem is exceedingly limited. Reassured by the manifest dislike of most Germans for the Soviets the latter are generally considered by the average US military or civilian observer as a military threat rather than as possible competitors in the struggle for the soul of a lost generation in Germany. Many are also inclined

[Y]

33

aspirants for the seat of a lost generation in Germany. Many are also included
as operators as a military presence rather than as possible competitors in the
time they are generally considered by the average US soldier or civilian
limited. Reassured by the mostliberal view of most Germans for the Government
who are aware of the full implications of the problem is exceedingly
of the dark shadow falling in from the West. The number of those, however,
US personnel in Europe, airily without exception, are enough
quill and drag.

again of a wave of the future, and future, because the present issupposedly
sailor is unable to站from the overpowering morn in these seas to be bent
are not intent on throwing pence or kiffiint formerly troopers, the occupation
who are sometimes friendly and sometimes inoffensive, but who duffe evically
and teachers have lost all bearing. Looking at the homestead of Germany,
powderised these children feel in a world in which their parents
tribute献 to German kids, who smile in tritium, put them do not know
enough to eat or enjoy relative economic security. They pithily display dis-
desire that has gripped even those Germans who, for some reason, still have
regret, the German economic misery, but are much less aware of the strictness
connections of underbrownd trimlines. They operate, and in most cases with
as a rule, live in the occupation army's sheltered atmosphere, hardly
cuff them to go against the atustion correctly. Even in Europe Americans,
however, is not America, and it is this work which makes it no duller-
ives we can hardly believe that such reasoning is even possible. Europe,
in the relative security of our afterglow non-platonic American

33