DRAFT

REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION

DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM, 1957 - 1958,
HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION: MILITARY POLICY AS A FIELD OF STUDY

II. STAFF

III. CURRICULUM

A. Defense Policy and Administration in the United States

B. Comparative Defense Policy and Administration

IV. RESEARCH, TEACHING AND WRITING BY THE STAFF

List of Publications

V. WORKING LIBRARY AND SPECIAL COLLECTIONS

VI. OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

VII. TOWARD THE FUTURE

VIII. APPENDICES

Appendix I. Recipients of Defense Policy Seminar Materials to 1 July 1958

Appendix II. Defense Policy and Administration in the United States -- Seminar Sessions -- 1957 - 1958

Appendix III. Defense Policy Seminar, Syllabus, 1958-59

Appendix IV. Comparative Defense Policy and Administration in the United States -- Bibliography

Appendix V. List of Mimeographed Materials Prepared for Student Use (Serials)

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# I. INTRODUCTION: MILITARY POLICY AS A FIELD OF STUDY

I think it is not going too far to say that given the nature of modern arms and modern warfare, the major institutional aspect of the whole problem of democratic foreign policy has come to be that of the relations between the civilian and military components of government.*

Three years ago when the Harvard Defense Studies Program was founded, warfare was still generally considered within the pre-rogative of the military, requiring at once a particular background and a security clearance. In the teaching of history it was the fashion to bracket wars as irrelevant parentheses in time with causes at the beginning and results at the end. The study of political thought was still divorced from its concomitant, military thought, and amongst political scientists, military policy was treated as a minor aspect of foreign policy. Thus in a sense military policy has been excluded from serious consideration because of its semi-inclusion in other fields. Before military affairs could be fully appreciated the intellectual content had to be developed on its own in an atmosphere of full freedom and unlimited scope. This was the challenge which the Ford Foundation Grant presented.

Certainly it cannot yet be contended that the study of military affairs is given the serious academic consideration which the concept of civilian control, the large responsibilities of Congress, the persistence of certain Constitutional debates, and the perennial problem of the budget both as to size and allocation

*Max Beloff, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, Baltimore, 1955, pp. 84-84.

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would all suggest.* It is, for example, discouraging to note
that in the image of the American Political Science Association,
as this is deliniated in convention programs, defense policy is
not yet an annually recurring subject for discussion. In 1957 it
was not discussed at all. In 1958 it will be a subject on only
one panel. However, on the brighter side of the academic ledger,
there is now a permanently established and enthusiastically supported
Program at Harvard, as well as at a number of other institutions.
Military Policy is becoming an area in which civilian scholarship,
recognized in the academic fraternity, is beginning to have an
effect on national thinking. Indeed the response to the need
which brought the Defense Studies Program into existence has been
greater than any of us imagined possible. After three years of
development it is encouraging to report that new approaches to
the subject are being tried elsewhere and the richness and variety
of present thinking show great promise for the future.

Perhaps, as Colonel George A. Lincoln of the United States
Military Academy suggests, the academic community shouldered their
responsibilities "a generation too late", but there is every

*It seems only proper, however, to cite the opinion of a respected scholar to the contrary who states: "A symptom of the barrenness of our collective attention to diplomacy has been the existence of nearly a dozen generously endowed research centers preoccupied with military problems and national security, while only a pitiful handful of our scholars have grappled with diplomatic problems." The opinion, however, we find inexplicable. See Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Kennan-Acheson Debate," *The Commonwealth* (April 4, 1958).

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indication that they have now been shouldered permanently. In
the future, given the quality of those who are teaching and
writing on military affairs and the interest of students in the
field, there will doubtless be a more general sharing of the
burden in the academic community.

There are, however, several very real problems which must be
met before the full potentiality of the field can be developed.
Basically, these can be solved only through the expenditure
of sums which, usual in the physical sciences, are larger than
customary in the established fields of the social sciences.

For example, since the field is a new one it is difficult
to bring together adequate raw materials for research and student
readings. Also there is immediate need for a society for the study
of defense policy, teaching and graduate fellowships, and a mag-
azine devoted to defense studies.

From a number of points of view the study of military affairs
can be conceived as a reasonably stable body of data susceptible
to academic analysis. The impact of the military on the social
structure of the United States offers one approach; the relation-
ship between military technology and the organization of government
for making various kinds of decisions offers another.

Organizational patterns change, however, new weapons bring
up new problems, and as some particular needs arise, the rel-
evance of others withers away. Thus there is an alternative as
to whether one should teach in terms of the immediate

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problems of the day, or give exclusive attention to the more
permanent aspects of the subject, given the undeniable fact that
students will not be policy makers during the period when most
current problems are still pending.

At the beginning of the Defense Policy Seminar it was decided
to make every effort to keep it as up-to-the-moment as possible.
The reasoning which lay behind this decision was a firm conviction
on our part that this would tend to emphasize what we considered,
the most important aspect in the making of defense policy -- namely
minimizing lead-time in terms of both changes in weapons systems
and modifications in policies which these necessitate. As a
policy decision this seems with the perspective of time to have
been sound. A remarkable number of the policy issues which
appeared to be serious in 1955-56 are equally as serious now. The
pressing problems of a reserve program, of retention of men in
service, of military transport -- were then, and are now, very much
with us. Our initial contention therefore that keeping a seminar
contemporary does not bring about a lessening of the intellectual
content, seems justified by experience. But it must be remembered
that keeping abreast of contemporary affairs is a relatively
expensive process.

As it was originally conceived, the Defense Policy Seminar
was to consider chiefly aspects of national policy which crossed
the desks of the civilians in the Pentagon. This concept has been
broadened, for military policy is made in the Office of Defense
Mobilization with respect to civil defense, to stockpiling etc.,
and is presently part and parcel of any number of other programs

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which are not controlled in the Pentagon. War must be conceived
broadly to include, among others, measures to be taken for passive
defense and foreign economic policy. For example, the Director of
the Defense Studies Program, if not all his colleagues, has been
of the opinion that military assistance programs should be ex-
amined far more closely than they have been in the past. He feels
that in the future the problem of arms control should be given
greater attention, and that the effects of an intensified war on
the international economic front must be studied with utmost care.
If the Seminar in "Defense Policy and Administration in the
United States" is to have this breadth it is clear that Research
Associates and Research assistants with different training and
interests must be brought into the program for periods of a year
or more to keep the permanent staff abreast of new problems in
international conflict.

The question of defining the most important aspects of the
field of Defense Studies must also be raised. After three years
of study we have defined in a syllabus, what we believe should be
the subject matter considered. Some changes from year to year,
however, can be expected -- differences in detail, the inclusion or
exclusion of the problem of civil defense, for example. Neverthe-
less, no differences exist among the staff as to the overall concept
of what a course in the public administration aspects of U.S.
Defense Policy should comprise.* We also believe that we now
understand at least one suggestive and enlightening approach to the

*See Appendix II.*

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study of comparative defense policy.** Finally we have experimented
with an undergraduate course in the history of Modern U.S. Military
Policy, as recounted in last year's report to the Ford Foundation.

Our experiments in teaching have convinced us that what is peculiar
about the study of military affairs is that it cannot be confined
within the context of any single academic discipline. The field
submits to independent study by the economist, the sociologist,
the political scientist and others, each from his own standpoint.
No single academic discipline is broad enough to contain military
policy, just as none is broad enough to satisfy the needs of a
study in foreign policy. What differentiates military policy from
other academic studies is that it devotes itself to study of the
methodology of violence. Because of its interdisciplinary character,
the Defense Studies Program should find a compatible atmosphere
within Harvard's new Center for International Affairs.

**See page 13.

II. THE STAFF

Four members of the staff have been continuously associated with the Defense Studies Program during the past three years. These are: W. Barton Leach, Story Professor of Law, founder* and first Director (1955-56) of the Defense Studies Program; Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., who served as Associate Director in 1955-56 and as Director for the past two years; Harry H. Ransom, Research Associate; and Maury D. Feld, Research Assistant in 1955-56 and Research Associate for the past two years.

In addition, a number of others have been associated on a full-time or part-time basis with the Defense Studies Program for limited periods over the past three years. These have included as Research Associate and Lecturer, William R. Emerson (on leave, 1956-57, from Yale University); as Research Associate, William Wiseley; as teaching fellows: Franklin G. Balch, John A. Ballard, Robert W. Berry, Bernard K. Gordon, Donald B. Keesing, Laurence Levine, Bayley F. Mason, Peter K. Ogloblin, and Timothy W. Stanley. Though not formal members of the staff, others who have been closely associated with the program at various periods at Harvard have included Arthur Smithies, Professor of Economics; Samuel P. Huntington, Assistant Professor of Government; Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, formerly Professor of Military Science and Tactics; and Robert Dorfman, Professor of Economics.

*Professor Leach conducted an experimental Defense Policy Seminar in 1954-55 on his own initiative and without outside financing. The success of this venture was the basis for a successful application to the Ford Foundation for a three year grant to continue the experiment with an expanded full-time staff and more adequate facilities.

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### III. CURRICULUM

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#### A. DEFENSE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

First priority over the past three years has been given the Seminar in "Defense Policy and Administration in the United States" by the Defense Studies Program staff. The Seminar, running the full academic year, has been a composite group of graduate students from Law, Business, Public Administration, and a few students from other schools. This year the student enrollment was 39.* During the past three years, 124 students have been enrolled in the Defense Policy Seminar.** Of these, approximately half have been officers of the armed services assigned to Harvard, enrolled mostly in the Business School. The other half of the total were civilians, largely from the Law School.

A pattern for instruction of the Seminar has been established. Elements of this pattern are as follows: (a) lectures, often by outside experts, on topics selected (b) student presentations on selected topics (c) discussion of lectures (d) extensive required readings (e) a long research paper and book review required of each student.

* **Breakdown of Students: 1957-58**

Business School 18
Law School 13
GSPA 6
GSAS 2
Total 39

Civilian 16
Military 23
Total 39

**Additionally some 60 students were enrolled in a Military History Course in 1957 and 27 students have taken the Advanced Seminar of the Defense Studies Program. For a detailed report on "History 138b" see the Report to the Ford Foundation for 1956-57, pp. 13-21.

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Lecturers have represented a wide range of backgrounds, interests and skills. The trend over the past three years has been to rely less upon outside guest lecturers and more upon the Defense Studies staff and the wealth of resources from the immediate academic community. Nevertheless, it is expected that, given the range of topics covered in the Seminar, guest lecturers with widely different skills will always be useful.

The normal pattern for the Seminar in its weekly meetings has been a one hour lecture and a one hour question and discussion period. In keeping with a precedent early established, subgroups have been assigned responsibility for particular sessions. At such sessions, designated groups have been expected to do intensive preparation on the chosen subject and to take the lead in raising questions in the general discussion during one session. Because of the size of the Seminar, this method has made possible a more active sense of participation by members of the Seminar than might have been possible had the entire group attempted to play a role in the question and discussion period. In addition to the committee or subgroup method, each of the four sub-groups of the Seminar during 1957-58 met bi-weekly with a member of the Defense Studies staff for an hour's discussion. In this way, each member of the Seminar has been given an opportunity to participate in a discussion. This has proved to be a most satisfactory way of meeting the problems resulting from the Seminar's unusually large size.

*See Appendix II; also Ford Report 1955-56, pp. 8-11; Ford Report 1956-57, Appendix III.

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In planning the Seminar for its first year of operation under
the Ford Foundation grant, staff members faced a perplexing problem
of providing students with adequate reading material on topics
chosen for discussions.

Since the Seminar began its operations in the fall of 1955,
a steady volume of writing on defense policy has been published.
The problem of 1958 in this regard is not the same as in 1955. In
the intervening years the Defense Studies Program has issued some
129 serials designed to fill the gaps in reading matter for
students enrolled in the Seminar, and for other universities under-
taking to teach similar courses. These serials have been widely
used, both in university courses elsewhere and in governmental
agencies.* Much of the energy of the Defense Studies staff, and
a considerable portion of the budget has been devoted over the past
three years to the production of these readings. These have, of
course, been supplemented by the increasing volume of published
material on topics dealt with in the Seminar. The increasing
numbers of very useful published materials more recently has some-
what freed the Defense Studies staff from the heavy burden of
producing weekly serials. This, in turn, has allowed staff members
more time to pursue their own research interests. In the three-year
period the Defense Studies staff has expended much effort in
providing its own basic textbook material, and this task is far
from completed. This aspect of the program will be described in
greater detail below.

*See Appendix I.

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A basic requirement of all students enrolled in the Seminar has been a research paper. The model for such requirement was a paper suitable for publication in an appropriate journal. Some have met this goal.

The staff of the Defense Studies Program are satisfied with the general format of the Seminar. The instructional techniques which have been developed over the past three years now seem well suited to the situation here. The teaching materials can, of course, stand improvement. Yet most encouraging of all is the fact that many students of the Seminar have put their study to good use. Some have seen to it that our methods and teaching materials were instituted in other academic institutions, others have gone into positions in the Pentagon where they have found that their instruction here has been invaluable to them. Still others write on defense policy. The measure of continued enthusiasm of former students has been, together with helping spread defense studies, a deep satisfaction.

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B. COMPARATIVE DEFENSE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION:

Each nation's defense policy is a reflection of the social values, the prejudices and aspirations which history, geography and wealth have molded. Military ideologies are not usually, after all, arrived at through thoughtful consideration, but because of the innate appeal to a set of social predispositions. Indeed war is a social response, and hence its preparation and conduct are governed by what would seem to be in the cold light of rational afterthought, an extremely large measure of irrational mythology.

It is only when there is broad understanding of the terms in which military doctrine is acceptable to a society that more reasoned though leading to more rational courses of action will be possible. The image of the future for which preparations have to be made can never be foretold with statistical accuracy. Probabilities, however, can be more accurately outlined if the thinking of other nations on their defense problems comes to be a matter of common understanding and the full range of their theoretical approaches to defense problems is laid out. Thinking on war has been in terms of opportunities lost or exploited rather than in terms of the breakdown of logical doctrine.

This year the seminar was broken down into five sections. The first had to do with the selection of weapons systems, and the effect of weapons systems on policy planning and strategic thought. Here we dealt with the motivation which goes into the selection of such weapons within a framework of military doctrine. Likewise, we discussed at some length the pattern of weapons rejection with

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a view to discovering what kinds of attitudes deter the acquisition of new weapons. Then, of course, we reversed the process by discussing the influence of weapons on national planning in the field of foreign policy. The fact that the French Army thought of the tank in primarily defensive terms while the German Army saw it as basically an offensive weapon had a great effect on the kinds of policy planning on which each nation insisted. A number of other such examples were discussed.

A second section of the seminar dealt with the relationship between political, economic and military thought. The fact that differing social values create opposite military ideologies was considered. For instance, the industrial state thinks of war essentially in terms of blockade, strategic bombing, and cutting lines of communication; the agricultural state thinks in terms of manpower attrition. We attempted to trace the influence on military strategy of revolution, of laissez-faire liberalism, and of doctrinaire national socialism, facts which have not to our knowledge been given much scholarly attention.

A third section of the seminar dealt with the general topic of the meaning of civilian control as defined in various types of governments. Considering the frequency with which this topic is discussed, and the convictions which it arouses, singularly little seems to be known about the attitudes toward civilian control in other nations. To illustrate: in the United States all Secretaries must be civilian. In France this need not be so. In the United States it is an almost sacred right of Congress to probe into each of the provisions of the military budget. In Great Britain

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the legislative body does not consider this delving within its prerogative. Again the point is that a comparative study illuminates the darkness of one's own preconceptions in a way in which no other approach can.

A fourth area of study has been comparative organization. This has been very broadly conceived to include concepts of leadership. Again the weaknesses, the vagaries, and the strengths of a variety of organizational patterns were studied, both with a view to discovering the limitations with which organization may shackle leadership on the one hand, and helps develop it on the other. We also became much interested with the ways in which organizational patterns reflect the many mutually exclusive objectives for which the organization was designed to attain.

The fifth section of the seminar was given by the students themselves. This consisted of student presentations of the topics on which their papers were written.

The format of the seminar this year proved most satisfactory. However, it attempted to cover too much ground. Perhaps this is necessary in so undeveloped a field. Suffice it to say, in summary, that for those on the staff who taught this subject for two years, the experience and achievement was most worthwhile. It should be continued when possible.

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As mentioned above the production of teaching materials has been a major function of the Defense Studies Program. In the issuance of some 129 serials over the three year period -- the mimeograph form ranging from a few pages to as many as 50 pages -- the Defense Studies Program has attempted to fulfill its principal mandate to stimulate teaching in this field. Some of the material appearing originally as Defense Studies serials has been developed into books or published as articles. In this category are Timothy W. Stanley's *American Defense and National Security*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1956; Harry Howe Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security*, Harvard University Press, 1958 (forthcoming); and W. Barton Leach's "The Job of the American Service Secretary," *Revue Militaire Générale*, Paris, March 1958. Likewise published articles have been made into serials, such as Edward L. Katzenbach's "Should Our Military Leaders Speak Up?" The New York *Times Magazine*, April 15, 1956, "The Military Lessons of Suez," *The Reporter*, November 29, 1956.

Although it has been primarily oriented to teaching, the production of reading materials, and experimentation in teaching methods, it has also been possible for members of the staff to engage in writing and research in the defense field. Such activity has, of course, been highly inter-related with the primary teaching objective of the program.

A list of some of the publications of members of the Defense

(The list of publications has been omitted from this draft.)

V. WORKING LIBRARY AND COLLECTIONS

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During the past three years the Defense Studies Program has
accumulated a small and unique working library which may be listed
as a major accomplishment of the Program. It comprises documents,
pamphlets, reports, hearings by Congressional committees, and
miscellaneous material relating to defense policy.

The library also has a systematically organized file of
periodical and newspaper clippings dating from July 1955. It in-
cludes also several score reference books and reserve copies of
recent books on national defense. The pamphlet-clipfile and mis-
cellaneous document collection, and the nucleus of an extensive
defense policy bibliography, constitute the collection's most
useful features.

The working library which has evolved with the Defense Studies
Program has, then, two characteristics: one, a rare collection of
fugitive materials essential for effective teaching and research
in defense policy; and two, a limited number of standard volumes
and reference works acquired as convenient working tools. The
collection has also been widely used by Harvard students enrolled
in other courses in the University. The groundwork has been laid
for the worthwhile long-range goal of a consolidated bibliography
in American defense policy, a badly-needed aid to the development
of the field.

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One of the tasks which the Defense Studies Program has felt to be important is that of maintaining working relations with the government in various ways as consultants, lecturers and conference participants. This gives the staff of the Defense Studies Program an opportunity to aid the government as do other Harvard groups in the area of their speciality, and at the same time to gain those intimate insights into Defense Department thinking which only personal contact can bring. Likewise because of the alarming lack of information and interest on the part of the general public on matters of national defense, the staff has felt a strong sense of obligation to make themselves available for public discussion of current issues. This is time consuming, but it is felt to be part of our academic responsibility. Presentation of lectures, talks and participation in radio and television programs, lectures at colleges and universities, at the service and war colleges, as well as to local civic groups have all been considered part of the Program's contribution to the better understanding of defense policy issues.

The following selected list of activities during this past year will indicate the kind of topics which members of the staff have been asked to speak on:

(The list of lectures, speeches, conferences and television broadcasts has not been included.)

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VII. TOWARD THE FUTURE.

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"In all that we do, whether in the struggle or after it, it is necessary that we should constantly have in our eye, the nature and character of the enemy we have to contend with . . . . What have they then to supply their numerous defects, and to make them terrible even to the firmest minds? One thing and one thing only . . . they have energy . . . . We must meet a vicious and distempered energy with a manly and rational vigour. As virtue is limited in its resources — we are doubly bound to use all that, in the circle drawn about us by our morals, we are able to command.""

The final section of this report is being written on June 16. The headlines of the newspapers are, if anything, slightly more grim than usual: "Tito says Peiping Counts on War to Rule Asia"; "Greeks Cut Military Links to Turks in Cyprus Dispute"; "Army Tanks Fire in Beirut Strife"; "Moscow's Economic Drive Held Chief Danger by U.S."; "Jakarta Forces Land in Celebes for Attack Upon Rebel Capital". The significance of these headlines is that they indicate no foreseeable point of termination. The study of defense policy would, therefore, seem to stand very little chance of slipping away into history.

U.S. history has, of course, its fair share of fighting slogans, from "Give me liberty or give me death" to "Remember Pearl Harbor". But despite the fact that so many of our slogans begin with the word "Remember", the first thing U.S. citizens have done is to forget the very existence of war once vengeance, or what passes for it, has been reaped. There are, of course, many

*Edmund Burke, *Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect to France*, Collected Works, vol. VII, J. Rivington, 1808, p. 166.

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contributing factors. Laissez-faire capitalism has been strongly anti-military, and the United States has been the refuge of strong waves of anti-militarist factions. Also the United States has had a frontier to develop and two great moats on either side to protect her from the great powers. All these factors have contributed to the national belief that war is a terminal social aberration. Now that the ocean barriers have lost their effectiveness and new weapons have been developed, the United States has moved into the very front of military crisis. It is the task of the universities to adapt teaching and research to this situation. Despite the growth of interest in the study of defense policy over the past several years, much remains to be done if a century and a half of neglect is to be overcome.

There is always the danger that writing or study on war will become second rate. Interest in matters of war, particularly in times of continuing crisis, creates a market for superficially sophisticated writing on the part of those willing to cater to the demands of an uneducated and hungry public. There are always opportunists who will take advantage of the lack of public information to present sensational information rather than scholarly and critical analysis. The advent of new weapons invites rash and irresponsible conjecture unless the public is sufficiently enlightened to reject it as false. Hence one of the roles of defense studies programs is to provide intellectual discipline in order to prevent an illogical public response to new technical developments and new techniques in the art of war.

Much has been written and said in recent months, since the

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unexpected departure of Sputnik I for outer space, about developments in Soviet education and the strength of the Soviet economy. Very little has been said about Soviet understanding of the ways of war. Yet were it not for the sophistication of the Communist image of war, both the Communist economic acceleration and educational developments would be interesting rather than serious. It would seem obvious that, if this country is to compete successfully as it must with the Soviet Union, the competition must be effective not only in weaponry and industrial resources but in our understanding of the policies through which these are used. Ideas must be tied to weapons if the latter are to be effective.

The future of war, its prevention, its forms, its possibilities will grow in complexity. As the balance of terror between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. becomes more infinitely adjusted, the problems not only of maintaining the peace from inadvertent war, but of judging the validity of threat and counter-threat will become more difficult.

To revert to the headlines mentioned above, military aid to forces in the Far and Middle East, the dimensions of the threat of economic warfare vis-a-vis military warfare, questions of readjustment of plans when allies fall out among themselves, all of these curiously complicated factors force one to the conclusion that the future of military policy presents an intellectual challenge even beyond that which exists today. As to the necessity of future study, there can be no doubt whatsoever.

One would hope that the academic approach to the analysis of military affairs would grow in breadth and imaginativeness. While

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the progress of the Harvard seminars in both "Defense Policy and Administration in the United States" and "Comparative Defense Policy and Administration" is generally satisfactory to the members of the Defense Studies Program, this does not mean that anything approaching perfection has been achieved or that the methods will not change over the years. Diversity of approach is a hopeful sign -- almost as hopeful as the increased interest.

There are two pitfalls into which a defense studies program could conceivably fall. The first is that defense policy may be conceived in such narrow terms as not to seem worth the expenditure of adequate time and human effort. The danger here lies in accepting for purposes of scholarly research the definition of war as a clash of military hardware. The other danger lies in defining the area of the program so broadly that it becomes no more than a study in power politics. The future of this program should be defined in terms of a study of the methodology of conflict. This leaves the way open for multiple approaches within a common framework.

Whatever the approach, however, defense studies groups must be performing two tasks. They must be providing long range thinking about long range defense problems; and they must be creating an awareness that these problems must be met by an understanding public which is prepared and able to make an intelligent political response. The first task is necessitated by the constant personnel changes which the military are always making, changes which mean that no one group has the opportunity to study a given problem for any length of time. The second task, that of educating the

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public, is necessary because one of the burdens of a democratic
form of government is a public reluctance in following unfamiliar
courses.

The fulfillment of the first task must be met by making
available, within the academic community at large, research facil-
ities, research assistance, and research time. Furthermore, these
three are inseparable; no one is of use without the others. Note
also that despite the many government research organizations which
combine many skills and attract men of outstanding ability, these
organizations cannot prepare the way for necessary changes in
policy along the broad front which is necessary in a democracy.
Useful as these government research agencies are, they are no sub-
stitute for the free research of the academic community. They
cannot place their findings before students or, through publications,
before their own profession and the public at large. This is why
independent university study is so necessary. Parenthetically it
must be said in this connection that the experience of the past
three years has shown that the restrictions on the flow of infor-
mation is not a serious drawback to this kind of research group.
Security classification has rarely closed off a profitable avenue
of research.

The task of creating an awareness of current defense issues
has been our primary task. We have devoted most of our attention
to developing the field so that others could join with us in its
intellectual cultivation. We have done everything in our power to
interest other academic institutions through lecturing, through
publication and through making teaching materials available.

Likewise we have made an effort to contact segments of the public directly. We are of the opinion that in the future every effort must be made to continue this endeavor; for the public does decide, both indirectly and directly, the strategy to be pursued, the kind of tactics which may be employed, and the risks which may be run in training.

There is just enough truth in De Tocqueville's contention that democracies cannot prepare for war in peace, so that the members of the Defense Studies Staff have felt a sense of urgency about creating that degree of understanding which makes necessary sacrifices politically possible. To date we as a nation have responded only to obvious challenges - a Korea, a Berlin Blockade, a Sputnik. The reason defense must be studied, taught and made a topic of popular discussion is to assure that policy may find its basis in a sustained initiative rather than occasional response to crisis.