Citibank, N.A.
399 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y.

10043

CITIBANK+

April 7, 1978

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman
International Committee
The Humphrey Institute
P.O. Box HHH
Minneapolis, MN 55440

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Norbert Anschutz, Vice President, has asked me to reply to
your recent letter describing and seeking support for the
Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at the University
of Minnesota. We regret that we will be unable to make a
direct grant to its funding efforts.

Citibank, under its Matching Gift Program, has already matched
gifts totaling $2,500 from one or more eligible participants
and anticipates that one or more of these will be repeated this
year and next. Under these circumstances, our appropriate
contributions committee here has agreed not to make any
further specific grant at this time.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 22, 1978

Dear Mr. Barclay:

I will see you in September at the meeting of the Council, and I am very much looking forward to it.

As an example of the kind of thing the Center is doing, I thought you might be interested in seeing an account of the National Coal Policy Project. I have enclosed a couple of newspaper clips.

I will be in touch soon about an agenda for the meeting, now set for September 7 and 8, but I would in the meantime welcome any thoughts or suggestions you might have.

I look forward to seeing you then,

Mr. Clifford Henry Barclay
Chairman
Beau Brummel, Ltd.
42 Upper Berkeley Street
London W1
England

HENRY A. KISSINGER

AUG 4 1978

Dear Mr. Barclay:

This note is to bring you up to date on plans
for the September 7-8 meeting of the Center's
International Councillors. We will focus on
three tasks: analyzing the problem of declin-
ing economic growth rates; studying the inter-
national energy situation, particularly as it
applies to oil; and advising the Center on the
overall Future of Business program. I will be
leading the discussion on both days and doing
the summation.

I am enclosing a list of Councillors, who have
so far indicated they will attend, and an agenda
which lists the speakers and the subjects to be
discussed.

The meeting should be an interesting one and
I look forward to seeing you.

Mr. Clifford H. Barclay
Chairman
Beau Brummel, Ltd.
42 Upper Berkeley Street
London W1, England

The Promise of Peace in the Middle East
An AEI Project

The purposes of this project on "The Promise of Peace in the Middle East," to be sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in Washington, D.C., are twofold.

First, the idea of this project is to mobilize leading Americans behind the idea that peace in the Middle East will have enormous practical dividends for the regional parties directly affected as well as for the United States, and that these dividends should be explored now, in the course of peace settlement efforts, so that inducements for a settlement can be provided. These inducements will be especially important should compromise by Israel and the Arabs of their maximal demands be required for there to be any settlement at all. This project will take no position on what kind of settlement plan is best, nor will it try to determine what interests should be compromised. It is felt, however, that work in the private sector of policy research in this country may have some impact on whether the warring parties in the Middle East adopt minimalist rather than maximalist positions when it comes to the question of what incentives are available for compromise. These incentives should be carefully thought out in advance, and related directly to national interest criteria.

Second, this project will work to articulate a range of positive dividends from peace in the Middle East to the regional parties themselves. The project will face two ways: in one direction it will look toward American foreign policy and public opinion, and in the other at the foreign policy and public opinion of Israel and the Arabs. Methods adopted in this project for analyzing and discussing peace dividends will take into account both American and regional audiences, ranging from those in responsible policy-making positions to those in the public who are vitally interested in the outcome of current peace settlement efforts.

The two purposes of mobilizing Americans and providing incentives for the key actors in the Middle East conflict are inextricably connected. It is widely acknowledged that American domestic politics plays a significant, even decisive, role in United States policy toward the Middle East and thus affects directly decisions and events in the region. Yet, whereas the lobbies for weapons are both ingenious and effective in this country, the forces for conciliation are handicapped by their lack of tangible objectives in contrast to ideal aims. Security assistance seemingly builds national power, while lofty peace plans are often seen as utopian if not dangerous for the objectives of security. The Brookings Institution effort to coalesce a fairly broad American constituency behind a settlement plan in 1975, for example, produced a proposal distinguished by its attempt to find common ground rather than its discovery of tangible rewards that could move the warring parties toward such a settlement. In a sense, the Brookings plan codified the obvious: one could argue that the broad outline of a desirable peace, from the standpoint of American interests as well as the interests of the regional actors, have been accepted for some time in the requirement that a fair or just barter of basic goods held by the combatants occur--territories captured by Israel in 1967 exchanged for the de facto and de jure recognition of Israel so far withheld by the Arabs, with basic security needs on both sides also taken into account.

2

The problem remains, even after the Sadat initiatives, of how to
induce the Arabs and Israel to exchange recognition and territory in such
a manner that each considers the bargain just from the standpoint of vital
national interests. While a good deal has been said about possible Ameri-
can "pressure" to force such an exchange, most would agree that such pres-
sure would not necessarily be acceptable to the idea of national interest
as perceived by various of the regional parties. This project will explore
in breadth and depth the kinds of incentives for peace might be offered so
as to appeal to the interests of the parties in the Middle East, even to
the point where they would consider compromising maximalist positions.
Some of these incentives are developments that would flow rather naturally
from a peace settlement, others would need cultivation by outside powers
including the United States. It remains to examine the full range of such
dividends from peace in the Middle East--"the promise of peace in the
Middle East"--and this project will do this. American domestic interest
in these incentives is obviously acute. Yet, the national interests of
the Arabs and Israel are likewise highly sensitive to possible political/
military, economic, cultural and social advantages in making peace, even
to the point of compromising hardline positions to achieve such dividends.
This project is designed to alert foreign policy and public opinion in the
United States and Middle East to the manifold promises, from the standpoint
of tangible national interests, of peace in the Middle East.

The remainder of this prospectus will cover three dimensions critical
to this project: (1) the substantive areas of the project's work; (2) the
methods of project work; and (3) the advisory council for the project.

4

## 2. Methods of Project Work

The AEI project on "The Promise of Peace in the Middle East" would use the entire range of methods now employed by other American Enterprise Institute projects, with perhaps a few novel twists. Each of these methods will be discussed.

### I. Study Monographs.
American Enterprise Institute publishes annually a large number of formal monographs on various public policy issues including foreign and defense policy matters. Each year, some portion of this study effort deals with the Middle East from a variety of perspectives. The project on "The Promise of Peace in the Middle East" would commission studies on key topics covered by the project, studies written by persons competent to write them. This aspect of the project's work would more likely deal with long-term issues. Americans and experts from the Middle East would be involved, and these publications would be made available in the Middle East as well as in this country. Translation of certain studies into Arabic, French and Hebrew would be considered, as well as joint publishing arrangements with regional publishers.

### II. Conferences and Symposia.
This would be a very important aspect of the project's work. Conferences and symposia would be held abroad as well as in the United States. Efforts would be made to hold some of these activities in various parts of this country and in a number of different contexts. Some would operate in the form of dialogue arrangements, where various points of view would be expressed on the same topic, while in other cases more attention would be devoted to academic approaches. As with the study monographs, the topics will determine the method here. Certain kinds of topics lend themselves better to conferences than others, and within these topics some for dialogue and others for academic discourse.

### III. Television.
As part of the annual AEI Public Policy Forum series certain issues connected with this project would be discussed in videotaped roundtable and rational debate formats for distribution around the United States and abroad. American Enterprise Institute has produced two hours on Japanese-American relations in collaboration with the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), and this same type of approach will be used with Middle East broadcasting corporations. This effort will involve radio as well as television.

### IV. Advisory Council Reports, Reports from the Chairman, Occasional Papers.
A very important feature of this project might be periodic (regular or irregular) published reports from the advisory council--either as a whole or under the authorship of its chairman. These reports would concern immediate and pressing issues connected with topics covered by the project, or they would even deal with longer term questions. These reports--or perhaps occasional papers--would allow the project a real-time capability, as well as giving the Council and/or Chairman an opportunity to keep a certain visibility on major issues relevant to the project. This would

(lc)

5

#### IV. (continued)

be the one point in the project's work where the matter of actual settlement options could be addressed in a very explicit way, even if they did not relate directly to specific aspects of the project's ongoing work.
It should be noted that there is no real way of avoiding the actual progress (or lack of it) of the settlement itself in any of this project's work, but it is not intended that this project interject itself on any wide scale into the process of settlement. Instead attention will be focused on post-settlement prospects. Nonetheless, this area of project work could deal rather directly with current as well as future matters in the Middle East, and this would most surely involve the peace process itself.

#### V. Public Relations.
The project would have a very active public relations effort through a number of procedures already used at American Enterprise Institute. These procedures ranging from our AEI Public Policy Reports (a service furnished the media where our study work is distilled into article-length items) to press lunches and so on. Continuous contact with Middle East embassies and press representatives in Washington would be maintained, as well as such contact with governments and media abroad.

[L.C.]

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Document:

ADDRESS BY FOREIGN MINISTER MOSHE DAYAN TO THE KNESSET

JULY 24, 1978--Edited Excerpts

The Leeds Castle Talks

At the Leeds Conference on the 18th and 19th of this month, the Israeli peace plan and the Egyptian withdrawal plan regarding Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip were discussed. The discussions dealt with the clarification of the programs and the positions held by the various governments. None of the parties . . . proposed a discussion of a declaration of principles. All three participants wanted . . . to concentrate on the issues themselves, and . . . the tendency, in regard to the future, was to continue discussion of the issues themselves, and search for ways to attain a peace agreement acceptable to the parties, and not general formulations.

Declarations of Principle are not a Substitute for Practical Talks

I wish to comment on the subject of . . . "The Vienna Declaration of Principles." According to Chancellor Kreisky's testimony, this declaration was intentionally vague, so that each side may read into it whatever it wishes. But, a time comes when things have to be interpreted and implemented--for the declaration of principles is meant to serve as a framework for a practical peace agreement, for an arrangement. The Egyptian side was quick to make clear its understanding of the Vienna Declaration: Total withdrawal while outlining security arrangements relating to all parties in a manner that would not damage sovereignty, and . . . recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, and this as a fundamental principle which can not be conceded.

The Egyptian position in the Leeds talks did not differ in any meaningful way from their public statements. In any event, even had the interpretations of a declaration of principle been close, there is no escaping . . . the need, even when the interpretations are identical, to arrive at practical talks about how to implement these very principles in practice, except in the event that one wants to avoid direct talks and negotiations meant to attain a peace agreement. In the Leeds talks, we reached that very stage, in which we discussed matters in practical terms, both with the Egyptians and the Americans.

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## A National Consensus in Israel

There exists--in Israel--a national consensus, and that national consensus does not necessarily have to cover all the positions, and the differences among the positions held by the various parties. It is sufficient that it be based on the principles common to all.

## A Difference with the U.S.

It would be unjust on my part not to state my assessment of the position held by the United States, even though the discussions were held between ourselves and the Egyptians: simply put, I must say that we have had, and have at present, a difficult argument with the United States, which is not, in my opinion, near its end--and that is over the position held consistently by President Carter on the matter of withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. This does not imply that there are no issues on which the United States has changed its position and come closer to our position, and that is why I mentioned only this one.

## Meeting Points Between Israel and Egypt

There do exist, in my opinion, meeting points in the programs, and primarily in the understanding and the concepts of both the governments as they were expressed in the Leeds talks. These meeting points do not compensate for the points of difference. Nevertheless, these meeting points may possibly provide an opening for attaining an agreement between ourselves and the Egyptians, and I will enumerate several of these:

1. Abolition of the military administration.

2. The establishment of an administration of the Arabs of the territories which will serve the function of administering their lives in the framework of the peace proposals (from our point of view, of our peace proposal).

3. A period of five years, which according to the Egyptian point of view is a transitional period, while from our point of view it is the period after which the principles upon which our program is based may be reexamined. In both cases there exists a period of five years during which the common way of life must be shaped, and after which the various issues are to be determined in a final manner.

4. The discussion concerning the solution to the refugee problem--which in practice consists of three groups, the Palestinian 1948 refugees, the Palestinian refugees of 1967, and the Jewish refugees of 1948, who were forced to leave the Arab countries. On this subject as well, although a decision was not reached, and the points of departure are fundamentally different from one another--in particular the Egyptian demand to base the solution on the U.N. resolution which is not at

-5-

This would be realized upon the departure of the last Israeli soldier from the area. They are not requesting in advance that the I.D.F. evacuate the areas. What they demand in advance is consent in principle that Israel declare now that it accepts the Egyptian program to remove all Israeli forces and settlements, and all Israelis from Judea Samaria and the Gaza area, but they are prepared to accept the gradual implementation of all this.

According to a mutually agreed-upon timetable, when the evacuation will be complete, a peace agreement would be signed, possibly some agreement about the agreement would be signed prior to this--but a full peace agreement concerning the normalization of relations is conditional upon Israel's withdrawal from the areas--military personnel and civilians--and this is determined, as we've mentioned, by a timetable that would extend over a long time.

Concerning the Palestinian issue, the Egyptian position is that the Palestinians are entitled to self-determination and to an independent state, but under the circumstances the Egyptians are willing to concede on the question of an independent state and accept an "entity," a Palestinian political entity, an entity linked to Jordan. As to Palestinian representation at the peace talks and the administration which is to replace the Israeli military government, this representation must include not only residents of the West Bank and Gaza, but those residing outside the West Bank and Gaza as well, who would settle there in the future. That is, those Palestinians intending to return--and let us say it is agreed that they do return--must also send their representatives to the negotiations because they too may join the permanent residents there.

On the subject of withdrawal and settlements, the Egyptian position is that the withdrawal must be absolute. They will not consent to the presence of a single Israeli soldier following the transition period. Their position on this issue is determined. They will accept only the presence of U.N. forces--no Israeli forces whatsoever. On the subject of settlements: all settlements must be removed. They will agree to no Israeli presence or any Israeli settlers.

## The Refugee Issue

The Egyptians hold that all the refugees—including those of 1948—were fully entitled to return to Israel. Those who had previously resided in Gaza or the West Bank are entitled to return to Gaza or the West Bank, or to be adequately compensated in accordance with the U.N. Resolution. The Egyptians emphasized that the original 1949 U.N. Resolution was intimated by the U.S. and that the General Assembly had since 1949 accepted the resolution anew.

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At this juncture I wish to say that we have rejected--in this matter of refugees--first of all the view that the right to choose between repatriation and compensation is that of the refugees exclusively. We have stated that Israel had at no time agreed to this view; that is on the question of choice. But we did not reject the fact that the need for compensation does exist. We agreed that in part they should settle in those countries which they inhabit now. If there are some who economically or in other respects could be absorbed in Judea and Samaria by mutual agreement--as noted in our administrative autonomy plan--the matter could be discussed by a joint committee.

## The Territorial Question

As far as the territorial question is concerned, Egypt's position is: Egypt does not agree to any territorial compromise. In her opinion Israel cannot demand both security and land. Egypt will not agree to giving up any territory. Israel must withdraw to the borders of June '67.

When we asked them regarding a territorial compromise--are you prepared for a peace agreement between us and the Arab side on the basis of small compromise, let us say, according to the Allon Plan? They said: absolutely not. Obviously not. Of course not. When we asked: what do you mean when you speak of modifications? They said that Egypt would be ready to support making small revisions: for example, when there is a field belonging to a certain village, part of it lying in Israeli territory and the other part in West Bank territory, it will be possible to make a change whereby the field or village will not be split in two. These topics must also be discussed and decided in a common committee and with the consent of the Palestinians and Jordan.

## The Question of Sovereignty

I would like to read a short passage from my remarks on this matter on the 19th of June 1978, which were delivered in the Knesset on behalf of the government. I said the following:

"Also the matter of sovereignty--which according to the plan of administrative autonomy does not apply to these territories--will be open, and if the parties wish to raise this matter, then the subject will be discussed at the end of five years. At the end of five years if someone wishes to raise the question, in principle, of sovereignty, he may do so. Moreover, it is the basic position of the Government of Israel that every subject is open to negotiation and that our proposal regarding administrative autonomy has not yet begun to be discussed. It still has not been placed on the negotiating table in the negotiations between us and the

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Arab parties. Therefore, if there are other proposals or counter-proposals, or different proposals which contain other clauses--we shall discuss them. But today, before this matter has been discussed--and before it has been agreed to accept our plan--we have not yet found it proper to obligate ourselves to a discussion and final resolution of the question of the permanent status at the end of five years."

What I wanted to say is that we did not think it possible that anyone would want us to commit ourselves ahead of time, and we are not prepared to do so. But this thing is open as I said before.

At Leeds the Israeli plan and the Arab plan were put on the table and discussed. These decisions were raised and the question of the future of the territories from the point of view of their status, was a central question, and it was made clear that there is a gap between the Egyptian position and ours.

On the 18th of July in Leeds I presented the following announcement to the Secretary of State, Mr. Vance. At the time I presented it on my own behalf, and now I can say here in the Knesset that I am authorised to present it on behalf of the Government.

The first clause states: "A proposal for a peace settlement which is based on an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, with minor changes, and which calls for Arab sovereignty over the vacated territories will not be accepted by Israel even if the proposal is accompanied by a promise of security arrangements. Israeli opposition to such a proposal derives from security considerations both practical and in principle."

The second clause states: "Were a concrete proposal for a contractual peace agreement based on territorial compromise put forward, Israel would be prepared to discuss it, in accordance with what has been stated on previous occasions."

The third clause: "If the Israeli peace proposal for administrative autonomy is accepted, Israel will be prepared, based on clauses 24 and 26, to discuss after five years the question of the sovereignty of Judea-Samaria and the Gaza district. In fact the content of these clauses does not demand a decision on the matter. But on this question too, it will be possible to find a solution."

[L.C.]

THE MID-EAST SECTIONS OF THE "NON-ALIGNED" FOREIGN MINISTER'S
CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS, BELGRADE, JULY 30, 1978

POSITIONS AND ACTIONS ON PARTICULAR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

46. The conference emphasizes that the non-aligned countries must work energetically towards finding solutions to key international problems. The Ministers consider that the following problems merit their special attention and emphasize the need for urgent and joint actions by non-aligned countries towards that end.

THE MIDDLE EAST

47. The Foreign Ministers call the attention of the international community to the grave development in the Middle East problem posing a serious danger which may lead to the outbreak of a new war. The Ministers examined the situation in this region and concluded that the reason behind the increasingly troubled situation in the region still lies in Israel's persistence in pursuing a policy of aggression, occupation and expansion, its refusal to withdraw from Palestinian and Arab occupied territories and its continued refusal to adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the United Nations Resolutions, particularly those concerning the Palestinian problem and recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

48. The Foreign Ministers, having examined the recent developments in the Middle East situation, affirmed that the question of Palestine is the core of the Middle East problem and the solution of one problem without the other was not possible. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministers affirmed their insistence to maintain the unity between the question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East.

49. The Foreign Ministers believed that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East definitely requires Israel's withdrawal from all the territories it occupies and the recognition of the national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as affirmed by General Assembly Resolution 3236. The Foreign Ministers expressed their conviction that any solution which does not take into account these two basic conditions cannot serve peace, but on the contrary will only serve to pave the way to attempts by the United States to liquidate the Palestinian cause, help Israel in achieving its objectives and maintain the existing situation resulting from occupation, thus enabling Israel to carry out its colonialist, imperialist and racist function in the region.

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50. The Foreign Ministers affirmed their countries' adherence to these principles and considered that any attempt at weakening the struggle to apply the above mentioned principles is a deviation from the insistence of the non aligned states to end Israel occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories and help the Palestinian people in achieving their national and inalienable rights. The Foreign Ministers affirmed the right of the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization to foil with all possible means any solutions or settlements laid down at the expense of the national and inalienable rights of Palestinian and Arab territories.

51. The Foreign Ministers affirmed that the United States continued hostile position towards the Palestinian peoples' rights and total withdrawal from all occupied territories is contrary to the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions concerning the Palestinian problem and the Middle East and constitutes an obstacle to the establishment of a just peace in the region. The Ministers condemned the policies which the United States seeks to impose on the region at the expense of the national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the liberation of all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories.

52. The Foreign Ministers considered that Israel was still maintaining its expansionist policy aimed at the annexation of Palestinian territory as well as other Arab territories, while multiplying measures to expel the inhabitants and carry out collective arrests and adopting a policy of illegal plunder and exploitation of the Arab inhabitants in the territories it occupies.

53. The Foreign Minister strongly deplored Israel's exploitation of the natural wealth and resources in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, thus violating the Hague provisions and the Geneva agreements. They called upon all states to take the necessary measures to prevent any cooperation with Israel which could pave the way for the illegal exploitation carried out by the Israeli occupation authorities.

54. The Foreign Ministers noted with deep concern the statements issued by colonialist and imperialist circles which threaten the resort to using force against oil-producing countries, particularly those lying in the Arab region. They also condemn any preparations made to implement such threats.

55. The Foreign Ministers considered that the Arab inhabitants in the occupied territories are still deprived of fundamental rights and freedoms and that religious freedom is exposed to violations. Israel is strengthening its colonialist policy by reinforcing and increasing its settlements in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories to consolidate occupation, hinder the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and change the natural political, cultural, religious and demographic conditions in these territories. Israel does not only exploit Arab manpower illegally and deliberately but, furthermore, violates their human rights and deliberately resorted to the torture and killing of Arab prisoners.

56. The Foreign Ministers expressed their deep concern over Israel's continued violation of the human rights of the Arab inhabitants of all the Palestinian and Arab territories it occupies and condemned the Israeli authorities for refusing to allow the special committee of the United Nations to investigate Israeli practices, which affect the human rights of the inhabitants of the occupied territories. They also condemned Israel's policy of annexing Palestinian and Arab territories.

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57. The Foreign Ministers expressed their full support for United Nations General Assembly Resolution 91/32 which reaffirmed that the Geneva Agreement for the protection of civilians during war, concluded on August 12, 1948, is applicable to all Arab territories occupied by Israel, including Jerusalem.

58. The Foreign Ministers affirmed that a just peace in the region cannot be established except within the framework of a solution based on total Israel withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and on the basis of restoring to the Palestinian people their national, legal and inalienable rights and to practice these rights, including the right to return, self determination and setting up their national and independent state in Palestine, independent and equal participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole representative of the Palestinian people, in all conferences and international activities and spheres concerned with the Palestinian problem and offering all forms of support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab states in their struggle to end Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories.

59. The Ministers affirmed that in view of Israel's expansionist policy and attempts at procrastination which aim at continuing its illegal occupation of Palestine and Arab territories, and taking into account the political, economic and military support extended to Israel by the United States and other states, the issue calls for deep concern.

60. The Foreign Ministers renewed their call for rejecting the changes which the Zionist entity attempts to introduce in the region to alter its natural, demographic and economic conditions.

61. The Conference strongly condemned Israel for its aggression on Lebanon and its procrastination in withdrawing from some areas which it continues to occupy, it affirmed its keenness to maintain the security, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and the unity of its land and people.

62. The Ministers denounced the escalation of Israeli armament in the field of conventional weapons, and condemned Israel's intention to possess nuclear weapons, which constitute a grave threat to international peace and security. The Ministers agreed on supporting a proposal to be submitted to the thirty third session of the United Nations General Assembly stipulating the following:

(I) To call on all countries, and in particular the United States of America to cooperate completely in undertaking effective measures, in accordance with the seventh chapter of the United Nations Charter, to avoid this perilous threat to international peace and security.

(II) To appeal to the Security Council in particular, to call upon all countries to undertake the following, in keeping with the seventh chapter of the United Nations Charter, regardless of any prevailing contracts.

(A) To refrain from supplying Israel with any kind of weapons, ammunition, equipment, military vehicles and necessary spare parts, without exception.

(B) To guarantee that such supplies do not reach Israel through parties.

(C) To terminate all transfer of nuclear equipment and fissionable material or its technologies to Israel.

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(III) To appeal to the security council to establish an organ to supervise the implementation of the preceding measures of paragraph 2.

(IV) To call upon all governments and organizations to undertake all suitable measures to reinforce support of the Palestine cause.

## PALESTINE QUESTION

63. The Foreign Ministers reaffirmed that the question of Palestine is the core of the present conflict in the Middle East, and denounced all policies of the United States of America that aim at ignoring the legitimate, national and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, the non-recognition of the Palestine Liberation organization, as being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and imposing partial or bilateral solutions.

64. The Ministers reiterated their grave concern over Israel's persistence to usurp Palestine, its blatant rejection of recognizing the Palestinian people's national, inalienable rights, and the racial expansionist policy adopted by the Zionist State. Such matters are persistently increasing, and representing an overt challenge to the international community, and constant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and resolutions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

65. The Ministers confirmed the necessity of strengthening co-ordination between the non-aligned countries and the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on both bilateral and international levels, with a view to laying down a strategy for the liberation of Palestine and for the Palestinian people to exercise their national and inalienable rights. The conference also stressed the necessity of undertaking necessary measures for accepting the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the capitals of the non-aligned countries, as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and granting it all rights, privileges and immunities of diplomatic missions.

66. The Ministers recalled all the previous non-alignment conferences which stressed the necessity of the role of member countries to exert more pressure on Israel in the United Nations and all its specialized agencies. They also appealed in particular to the Security Council to undertake effective measures, some of which are stipulated in chapter 7 of the charter, to compel Israel to abide by the resolutions adopted by the United Nations. The Ministers noted with grave concern, that despite such measures, the Zionist entity is still committing violations and aggressions, which were internationally condemned. The ministers were of the view that they must stress the danger of this situation and call for the adoption of stronger and more decisive measures to put an end to the aggressive policy followed by Israel.

67. The Conference affirmed that the attempts and endeavours of the United States of America to liquidate the Palestine issue and its assistance to Israel in realizing its expansionist, imperialistic and racist policy in occupied Palestine, through encouragement of bilateral and partial solutions, will not lead to a just solution of the problem. Therefore, the conference condemned such policies, attempts and endeavours and called for resisting them. The conference also stressed the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization to reject all forms of settlements, projects and solutions aiming at the liquidation of the Palestine question and denying the national rights of the Palestine people.

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68. The Foreign Ministers called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution that embodies the principles and resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly relevant to the Palestine question and the Middle East, and in particular, resolution no. 3236 (D-29). In this context, the ministers referred to the contribution granted by "The United Nations Special Committee on the exercising of the Palestinian people-of their legitimate rights" to the Palestinian question. The Ministers affirmed that Israel's continued refusal to co-operate with this committee reaffirms Israel's persistence in defying the will of the international community and international legitimacy, and preventing the Palestinian people from practicing their national and inalienable rights, a matter which makes the situation more explosive in the region, and poses a threat to international peace and security.

69. The Ministers recalled that the Colombo conference reaffirmed that Zionism represents a form of racism and racial discrimination, and that it appealed to the non-aligned countries to bear this fact in mind at its meeting in the international conference for condemning racism and racial discrimination to be convened in Geneva in August, 1978.

70. The Ministers called for work during the thirty third session of the United Nations General Assembly, to call for the convening of a special session to be consecrated to the study of the Palestine question, with a view to adopting measures leading to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relevant to the withdrawal from Palestine and Arab occupied lands, and the realization of the national, and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

71. The Foreign Ministers called for an annual commemoration of the 29th of November, as of 1978, as an international day for solidarity with the Palestinian people.

ISRAEL AND THE FRENCH LEFT:
THIRTY YEARS OF MISUNDERSTANDING

by François Furet

*Le Nouvel Observateur, 15 May 1978*

As long as Israel projected no more than the traditional image of Jewish destiny - that is, of Jewish misfortune - it was not difficult for the Left to like it. The Left recognized, embodied in the new state, its traditional view of the Jewish problem as an expression of capitalist injustice; the Jews as classical victims of a system; and Jewish particularity as the counterpart of persecution. Sartre has been the theorist of the feeling, carried to its extreme by World War II and the Holocaust, that the crystallization of the Jewish problem was the outcome of Christian Europe's hatred; that the men and women who then populated their new homeland could not have been colonizers because they were wanderers - survivors of the tragedy of concentration camps which, with all the dignity this bestowed upon them, was not sufficient to protect them from further misfortune, since they were repelled by their new English persecutors all along the shores of Israel. Moreover, the French Left had not yet learned to hate the colonizers whom it saw as exporting its own values overseas. It felt guiltier about Jewish adversity than about Arab or Vietnamese misery.

This democratic universalism, both so flourishing and sectarian since the post war period, was struck a harsh blow by the colonial wars of liberation, which revealed the power and legitimacy of national achievement in its elementary, yet hardly comprehended, character. A new Left, which started defining itself in relation to this struggle, contributed to putting an end to Jacobin European Centralism. It brought increasing pressure to bear on the two large traditional parties by leading an intellectual battle against the outer circles of the Communist Party and split the S.F.I.O.¹ by creating the P.S.U.² in 1959.

Israel is not only excluded from this anti-colonialist split, but was also a logical scape-

1. the French Section of the Workers International

2. the United Socialist Party

- 2 -

goat, as illustrated by the Suez crisis when Ben Gurion's army came to support Mollet and Eden's parachutists against Nasser's Egypt. The short war of 1956, which, in the course of time, I still consider to be the major error of Israeli foreign policy, introduces, with a kind of miraculous malevolence, the new image of the Jewish people in the eyes of the outside world - a political image that actually makes it an ally and an accomplice of the old colonial powers. But it also introduces a moral image, which destroys the stereo-type of humiliation and invents the victorious Jew.

This intellectual and emotional shift is not always an easy one for the French Left, which, in order to sympathize with Jewish particularity, requires misfortune and, if not misfortune, at least the threat of misfortune.

That is the secret of the outburst of sympathy, and even of affection, of French public opinion towards Israel on the eve of the Six-Day War: The Jewish state is threatened with annihilation and Shoukeiri's words have revived Hitler's ghost. On the other hand, however, the image of Israel since Suez is also that of a nation of warriors, strong and victorious. Now, in the same way as in the nineteenth century the French Left had great difficulty in conceiving of the Jew as rich, or only *arrivé*, without succumbing to antisemitism or simply denying the problem, so is it devoid of the intellectual tools with which to view Israel detached from the tragedies of European history and from its own guilt for these tragedies.

It is even possible that, on the contrary, those intellectual tools it has acquired in its struggle prevent the Left from perceiving the destiny not of the Jewish people but of the Israeli one. Having ignored colonial reality, it has made anti-colonialism a dominating element of its ideology; having been obsessed by Jacobin narcissism, it has made anti-imperialism the central interpretative concept of a universalized history. Through this prism, Zionism appears as a counter-current to this history, "objectively" colonial at a time of general decolonization, "objectively" imperialist when the struggle against imperialism is a universal watchword. Exodus' passengers have - in spite of themselves perhaps - become colonizers again, but colonizers all the same. And the Chicago Jew who contributes his yearly donation to his second homeland recreates, unawares, one of the oldest images of antisemitism - the absolute power of international finance against the freedom of nations.

In order to discourage this type of analysis, I have a tendency to caricaturize it, for I think its strength is not drawn from conceptual precision. To me, it seems rather to be a rearrangement of old material of French political culture, most of which is common to

- 3 -

both the Right and the Left. To begin with, there is a latent antisemitism, which is never
so widespread as when it is applied to the Jew who has "succeeded," the triumphant Israeli
who, in the new configuration, replaces the Jewish plutocrat in the mind of the Right or
the Left in the nineteenth century. Even more, it includes the hostility towards the USA
which has been one of the greatest passions of the French Left since the end of the war,
and which can be redirected to Israel, as a substitute, to the facile benefit of France,
as the spokesman of the Third World.

Thus, the Jewish state can assume the role traditionally played by Jews in our political
life, and can demonstrate our national greatness in its own way. The best expression of
this amalgam of feelings and ideas can be found in what has been called "Leftist Gaullism,"
precisely at the confluence of Right and Left. However, it would not be difficult to find
traces of it in the P.C.C., the P.S.U., and in the left wing of the Socialist Party.

In viewing and understanding Israel, the Left continues to adhere only to the sense of
atonement which drove it, thirty years ago, to unanimously acclaim the birth of the new
state. It has never attempted to elaborate this feeling into a doctrine, as if it only
consisted of a powerful guilt, irreducible to a rational scheme. In fact, it has not re-
lated much to the two elements which should be analyzed and integrated in any attempt at
interpreting Israel's history - the national and the religious.

In all its forms, Marxism ignores them, or rather exorcises more than explains them. The
almost irresistible reaction of the French Left is to transform the national element into
universalism, thus integrating it into the great epos of human history (and the "right"
structure). Any tribal conflict thus finds itself elevated to the dignity of universal
democracy, and the Frolinat fighters become the successors of the Spanish Republicans.
But Israel is excluded from this universality precisely because it is the product of a
late European national movement, and cannot possibly be included in the dialectic of col-
onial liberation; and if this frame of reference is absolutely adhered to (which would
largely prejudge the analysis) it would even be contradictory to this dialectic.

With regard to the religious aspect of Israel's history, it obviously contributes to the
Left's incomprehension, since European tradition has always viewed national emancipation
and the secularization of the state as inter-related. Moreover, once the debate on Israel
has been freed from a certain false metaphysic, it follows that the recreation of the
Jewish state in the middle of the twentieth century, in biblical Palestine, is an event

3 the Communist Party

- 4 -

not easily understood if one believes in a materialistic interpretation of history. One
can be well aware of the given circumstances, above all the Holocaust, but these do not
explain the nature of the phenomenon, which is inseparable from Jewish Messianism. In
this realm, Gershom Scholem<sup>4</sup> is a better guide than Marx, but the Left is not culturally
prepared to read his great writings! When secular it is Marxist, and when not secular
it is Catholic. In both cases it perceives Jewish history through the intellectual tra-
ditions that deny it.

That is why, ever since Israel has acquired the traits of a victorious and powerful country, the Left continues to vacillate between the tremor of its memories and the thought of Israel being "a country like any other." When the Jewish state is threatened, the spectre of final extermination reappears. After Israel's victory, the cards are reshuffled and it is back to haggling over "legitimate boundaries." None of these attitudes helps in promoting an understanding of the problem: neither that of guilty identification nor of "rational" diplomatic arbitration. The first, which will blur with time except in Israel's memory, is not understandable by the Arab world. The second attributes a kind of "normality" to the Israel-Arab issue, which eludes the norms of international politics precisely because it is an issue of exceptional depth and complexity.

Actually, there is no conceptual or emotional shortcut that can fully explain the essence of a country which combines mankind's oldest written records with modern Europe's miracle and tragedies and which has synthesized religion, nation, and socialism within its being. Thirty years after the birth of the State of Israel, nothing in its history is yet clear, except to the simpleminded. There is still only one way to approach the particular "chosen" nature of Jewish history without trying to avoid it: to confront what is particular to it, which alone explains what makes it universal.

4 Gershom Scholem is the greatest living authority on the study of Jewish history. One of Scholem's few books available in French translation is *Le Messianisme juif* (Calmann-Levy)

IIC/213/July 1978.

JERUSALEM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1978

PRESS CONFERENCE (HEBREW-LANGUAGE PORTION) WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
MOSHE DAYAN AND DEFENCE MINISTER EZER WEIZMAN, UPON THEIR RETURN
FROM THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT CONFERENCE - EEN-GURION AIRPORT,
19.9.78

DAYAN: TWO AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN ATTAINED AND SIGNED: ONE
CONCERNING SINAI - A FRAMEWORK PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
OURSELVES AND EGYPT REGARDING THE TERRITORY BETWEEN OURSELVES
AND EGYPT. AND THE SECOND PEACE AGREEMENT SPEAKS OF JUDEA AND
SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP, AND THIS AGREEMENT IS MORE COMPLEX.

THE FIRST PEACE AGREEMENT IS TO BE SIGNED IN ANOTHER THREE
MONTHS, WITH THOSE THREE MONTHS TO BE DEVOTED TO NEGOTIATIONS
ON THE DETAILS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ARTICLES OF THE FRAMEWORK
WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED UPON. EUT, AS YOU KNOW, EOTH THE
SIGNING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ACTUAL CONDUCTING OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THREE MONTHS IS CONTINGENT UPON ISRAEL
COMMITTING ITSELF TO EVACUATE THE SETTLERS, THE CIVILIAANS - IN
SHORT, THE SETTLEMENTS - FROM ALL OF SINAI. THE PRIME MINISTER
HAS PROMISED THAT THIS MATTER WOULD BE BROUGHT FOR DEBATE AND
DECISION IN THE KNESSET WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF TODAY.

SO THAT IF THE KNESSET DECIDES AFFIRMATIVELY, NAMELY, THAT IF
AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON ALL THE OTHER ISSUES - AND ALSO
REGARDING SPECIFIC MATTERS HAVING TO DO WITH THE EVACUATION OF
THE CIVILIAN SETTLERS - IF THE KNESSET TAKES SUCH A DECISION
WHICH FOR PRESENT PURPOSES MAY BE CALLED A POSITIVE DECISION,
WITHOUT ANY OBLIGATION AS REGARDS THE SYMEOUC ASPECT OF THAT
TERM), THEN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE EGYPTIANS
WILL OPEN, WHICH ARE TO GO ON FOR THREE MONTHS, AND AT WHOSE
TERMINATION THE PEACE AGREEMENT IS TO BE SIGNED, IF AGREEMENT IS
REACHED ON THE VARIOUS ARTICLES - AND ASIDE FROM THIS ISSUE I SEE
NO OTHER PROBLEMATIC ARTICLES. AND AFTER THESE THREE MONTHS
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT IS TO BEGIN.

REGARDING ITS IMPLEMENTATION, I WANT TO SAY THAT THIS IS TO BE
DIVIDED INTO TWO STAGES: TO THE WESTERN HALF OF SINAI, UP TO THE
EL ARISH-RAS MUHAMMAD LINE - AND WHEN THE EVACUATION FROM THAT
AREA IS COMPLETED, THEN, IN ADDITION TO THE PEACE AGREEMENT TO
BE SIGNED AFTER THE THREE MONTHS, THOSE PORTIONS (OF THE
AGREEMENT) WILL ALSO BE IMPLEMENTED WHICH WILL LEAD TO FULL
NORMALIZATION AND RELATIONS,, THAT IS: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS,
ESTABLISHMENT OF EMERGIES, OPEN EORDERS, TOURISM, ECONOMIC
RELATIONS, ETC.

THE PEACE AGREEMENT OTHER THAN THESE THINGS WILL COME INTO EFFECT
IMMEDIATELY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT - IF THE NEGOTIATIONS
IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS ENDS IN AGREEMENT - IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THESE THREE MONTHS.

Western Union International, Inc.

X

(Lc)

International, Inc.

WHERE THE EVACUATION, OR LEAVING OF THE SETTLERS IS CONCERNED, Lhat IS INVOLVED - BY THE EGYPTIAN DEMAND - IS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, THAT IS: WILL THEY BE EVACUATED, AND NOT ANY TIMETALE. THE QUESTION OF THE TIMETALE IS TO BE DECIDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AS IS THE CASE WITH OTHER ARTICLES, WHICH ARE TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE QUESTION HERE IS ONE OF PRINCIPLE: "IF," AND NOT "WHEN."

THE SECOND AGREEMENT IS MORE COMPLEX, TECHNICALLY. FIRST OF ALL, THERE IS NO SET TIME FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS I SAID EARLIER, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN ISSUE ARE TO GO ON FOR NO LONGER THAN THREE MONTHS. AS REGGGARDS JUDEA AND SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP - WE MAY CALL IT BY A COMPREHENSIVE NAME: THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN ISSUE - NO SET TIME WAS LAID DOWN FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THE ASSUMPTION S THAT THE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS CERTAINLY NEED NOT CONTINUE FOR A LONGER PERIOD THAN THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS, AND PERHAPS LESS.

UPON CONCLUSION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS - THAT IS, WHEN A DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THE VARIOUS DETAILS CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD: AND THAT IS THE CONTENT OF THE SECOND AGREEMENT: A FIVE-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD IN WHICH THE MAIN ELEMENTS ARE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AUTONOMY, SELF-ADMINISTRATION, FOR THE PALESTINIAN AREAS, WITH MANY MMORE THINGS IN ADDITION, SOME OF WHICH WILL BECOME CLEAR WHEN YOU ASK QUESTIONS AND OTHERS OF WHICH YOU NO DOUBT KNOW FROM THE PRESS.

SOEEEBUT IN GENERAL, I WANT TO SAY THAT WHAT IS INVOLVED IS FIRST AND FOOFFOREMOST A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, WHICH IS TO BEGIN WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, THE ELECTION, THE SETTING UP OF THE-PALESTINIAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THEN, TOWARDS THE END OF THE FIVE YEARS, AT A CERTAIN TIME WITHIN THESE FIVE YEARS, NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO BEGIN ON A PEACE AGREEMENT. BUT THIS PEACE AGREEMENT IS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN, WHILE THE FIRST PART OF THE AGREEMENT, CONCERNING THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD, IS BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THREE EODIES ON THE OTHER SIDE: REPRESENTATIVES OF EGYPT AND OF JORDAN, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN AREAS. WHEREAS THE PEACE TREATY IS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN ONLY. JORDAN TAKES PART TWICE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS: ONCE AS ONE MEMBER OF THE QUARTET WHICH IS TO DECIDE ON THE ARRANGEMENT FOR THE FIVE-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD, AND THE SECOND TIME AS THE NEIGHEOURING STATE, ON OUR EASTERN BORDER, PARALLEL TO THE NEIGHEOURING STATE ON OUR SOUTHERN BORDER, EGYPT. EGYPT WILL NOT SIGN TWO PEACE AGREEMENTS WITH US. EGYPT WILL SIGN ONE PEACE AGREEMENT - AFTER THREE MONTHS - AND JORDAN WILL SIGN THE SECOND AGREEMENT, WHICH IS TO BE SIGNED FIVE YEARS AFTER THE START OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD. AND UNTIL THEN, EOTH EGYPT AND JORDAN ARE INVOLVED IN CERTAIN WAYS, BUT THE MAIN BODY WITH WHICH WE ARE TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AND WITH WHOM THE AGREEMENT IS TO BE IMPLEMENTED IS, OF COURSE, THE PALESTINIAN AREAS, WHO WILL BE THE ONES TO RUN THEIR OWN SELF-RULE REGIME.

AS REGARDS THIS AGREEMENT, I WANT TO SAY THAT ON TWO OF THE THREE MAIN POINTS THERE IS PRIOR AGREEMENT, AS A BASIS FOR THIS AGREEMENT. THESE TWO POINTS ARE: FIRST, THE I.D.F.'S REMAINING IN JUDEA AND SAMARIA AND THE GAZA STRIP AT THE ESSENTIAL PLACES ACCORDING TO THE I.D.F.'S CONSIDERATIONS, AND IN THE REQUISITE NUMBERS, IN ORDER TO DEFEND ISRAEL. THE SECOND THING IS: THE RECIPROCAL FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND GOODS BETWEEN THE AREAS OF THE AREAS AND ISRAEL AS IT EXISTS TODAY, OR IN ANOTHER FORM, TO BE DETERMINED - BUT IN ANY CASE THE BASIS OF THIS AGREEMENT IS THAT THERE IS TO BE NO PARTITION IN ANY MANNER SO THAT WE WILL BE CONSIDERED FOREIGNERS WHEN WE ARE IN THOSE AREAS IN WHICH THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE ARAB AUTONOMY WILL BE LOCATED, WILL TAKE DECISIONS AND WILL GOVERN.

THE THIRD PART, WHICH IS MORE COMPLEX, HAS TO DO WITH FURTHER ISRAELI SETTLEMENT - NOT WITH THAT WHICH ALREADY EXISTS, CONCERNING WHICH THERE ARE NO NAY-SAYERS - IN THESE AREAS. I ASSUME THAT THIS SUBJECT WILL COME UP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE OTHER SIDE WHEN THEY HOLD THEIR DISCUSSIONS,

["Western Union", "Western Union International, Inc.", "(L)", "International Telex International

DAYAN: NO. THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT'S DEMAND HAS TO DO WITH THE SETTLERS, NOT THE BUILDINGS: HE DID NOT EMPLOY NEGATIVE EXPRESSIONS - ''TO DESTROY THE BUILDINGS,'' ''TO DISMANTLE THEM'' - AND HIS DEMAND IS THAT THE ISRAELI CIVILIANS EVACUATE THE RAFIAH SALIENT.

Q: AS REGARDS THE SECOND AGREEMENT, TO WHAT EXTENT DOES IT CONTAIN THE SEED OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN ENTITY?

DAYAN: YOU ARE ASKING A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WHICH CAN HAVE VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS. IN MY ASSESSMENT, IT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SEED OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. IT CONTAINS - AND IN MY VIEW, IN A VERY POSITIVE MANNER - THE SEED OF LIFE TOGETHER BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE ARABS OF THE AREAS WITHOUT THEIR SETTING UP A PALESTINIAN STATE. I JUST WANT TO NOTE THAT THE AGREEMENT SAYS THAT THE PEACE TREATY WHICH IS TO BE SIGNED IN ANOTHER FIVE YEARS WILL BE SIGNED WITH JORDAN. THAT IS: SUEJECTS SUCH AS BORDERS, SUCH AS THE I.D.F.'S STATUS, AND THE VERY PEACE TREATY ITSELF - NOT ONLY DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD BUT THEREAFTER AS WELL - HAVE JUST ONE ADDRESSEE AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, NAMELY: THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN CAN ITS DELEGATION, WHICH WILL SIGN THE PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN AND ISRAEL, INCLUDE ALSO PALESTINIAN AREAS. BUT THERE ARE NO ELEMENTS IN THIS AGREEMENT WHICH HINT AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ARABS OF THE AREAS WILL BECOME A COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO, EVEN AFTER FIVE YEARS, SIGN A PEACE TREATY, OR DETERMINE A BORDER, OR MAKE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

Q: WILL THERE BE ANOTHER ISRAELI MILITARY DELEGATION TO EGYPT?

WEIZMAN: ... WHAT HAS TO HAPPEN NOW IS THAT WE HAVE TO WAIT FOR DECISIONS TO BE MADE IN ISRAEL. IF THERE IS THIS OR THAT DECISION, THEN THERE WILL ALSO BE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON WORKING PROCEDURES. I DO NOT SUPPOSE THERE WILL BE A MILITARY DELEGATION, BUT AN ISRAELI COMMITTEE FOR CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS - WHICH WILL INCLUDE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ELEMENTS, AND ALL THE ELEMENTS SUCH A DELEGATION HAS TO HAVE. IT WILL ALSO HAVE TO BE DECIDED WHERE IT WILL SIT. SO I THINK THAT THERE WILL BE PLENTY OF QUESTION-MARKS IN THE COMING TWO WEEKS.

Q: WILL PREPARATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE EL ARISH-RAS MUHAMMAD LINE BEGIN EVEN BEFORE THE AGREEMENT IS SIGNED?

WEIZMAN: FIRST OF ALL, ONE ''REDEPLOYES FOR PEACE'' - AND DON'T USE THE WORD ''WITHDRAW,'' AS IT EURNS MY EAR, WHICH HURTS EVEN WITHOUT THAT. SOME PREPARATIONS CAN DEFINITELY BE EARN NOW, PREPARATIONS OF STAFF WORK, OF PLANNING. AND IF THINGS SPEED AHEAD, THE WORK WILL BE READY - AND IF NOT, WE'LL FILE IT AWAY IN A DRAWER AND WAIT FOR EETTER DAYS.

DAYAN: I WOULD JUST LIKE TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT AS REGARDS THE SINAI SETTLEMENTS, THE DELEGATION NOT ONLY UNDEROOK, OR HINTED IN ANY WAY THAT IT SUPPORTS THE REMOVAL OF THE SETTLEMENTS OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT - YOU CAN IMAGINE WHAT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN SAID ON THIS MATTER WHEN HE WAS ASKED, OR WHEN HE WAS CALLED ON TO GIVE AN ANSWER. BUT WITH OUR UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT, AND WITH NO QUALIFICATION OR RESERVATIONS AT ALL, WE DECIDED TO BRING THIS MATTER FOR CLARIFICATION AND DECISION BEFORE THE PUBLIC IN ISRAEL, AND NOT HAVE THE DELEGATION DECIDE. AND WHETHER THE ISRAELI PUBLIC LIKES THIS AND FINDS IT CONVENIENT, OR WHETHER IT DOES NOT LIKE IT - OR PARTS OF IT DO NOT LIKE IT, OR CERTAIN PARTIES DO NOT LIKE IT - EACH MEMBER OF THAT PUBLIC AND EVERY KNESSET MEMBER WILL HAVE TO TAKE HIS OWN DECISION - AND WHATEVER THE KNESSET DECIDES WILL BE.

RM/AL

22.19 HOURS

International

International

International, Inc.

EMBASSY OF CHILE

1732 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

- 2 -

<table><tr><td>1951-1955</td><td>Embassy of Chile in Washington<br/>Third Secretary (promoted to Second Secretary)</td></tr><tr><td>1958</td><td>Delegate to Conference on the Law of the Sea</td></tr><tr><td>1958-1959</td><td>Embassy of Chile in Rome<br/>First Secretary</td></tr><tr><td>1959-1963</td><td>Embassy of Chile in The Hague<br/>First Secretary (promoted to Counselor)</td></tr><tr><td>1963-1964</td><td>Embassy of Chile in Washington, D.C.<br/>Minister Counselor</td></tr><tr><td>1965-1967</td><td>Ambassador on Special Mission as Representative of<br/>Chile before the British Arbitration Court<br/>on the boundary controversy of the Palena<br/>River.</td></tr><tr><td>1967-1970</td><td>Embassy of Chile in Copenhagen<br/>Chargé d'Affaires</td></tr><tr><td>1968</td><td>Delegate of Chile to the Conference on the Law<br/>of Treaties, in Vienna.</td></tr><tr><td>1971 to present</td><td>Agent for Arbitration with rank of Ambassador on<br/>Special Mission, in London.</td></tr><tr><td>1971</td><td>Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<br/>of Chile</td></tr><tr><td>1973 to present</td><td>Agent for Arbitration with rank of Ambassador on<br/>Special Mission, in Geneva.</td></tr><tr><td>1976-1978</td><td>Ambassador of Chile to The Netherlands</td></tr><tr><td>1978</td><td>Ambassador of Chile to the United States</td></tr></table>

OTHER ACTIVITIES:

Works and publications:

El Caso del Baltimore (The Baltimore Case)
Published in 1950.

Various monographs, which have appeared in the
Bulletin of the Chilean Academy of History.

EMBASSY OF CHILE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

- 3 -

Author of a work on a purported "History of Chile" by Isaac Yáñez.

Author (1970) of a book on the Palena boundary controversy, to be published.

Talks:

Various talks on boundary matters at the Military and Naval Academies, as well as at the "Academia Superior de Seguridad Nacional" (National Security Academy).

SPECIAL DISTINCTION:

Unanimously elected member of the Chilean Academy of History in 1977.

DECORATIONS:

Officer of the Legion of Honor (France)

Grand Cross of the Order of Oranje-Nassau (The Netherlands)

Commander of the Danebrød Order (Denmark)

HARRY Z. BAU

USA CORRESPONDENT
EL ECONOMISTA, BUENOS AIRES

OFFICE,
410 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022
PLAZA 2-3900 Ext. 401

HOME,
288 LEXINGTON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016
LEXINGTON 2-8158

October 12, 1978

Dr.Henry Kissinger
435 East 52 Street
New York City , N.Y. 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger :

As U.S. correspondent of the Argentine weekly journal El Economista, which is a widely read and respected independent voice on political and economic affairs not only in Argentina but throughout Latin America, I am taking the liberty of asking you to grant us an interview.

In this particular moment it would be of great interest
to hear your opinion on several US-Argentine issues.

Your visit in Buenos Aires during Mundial 78 is still
remembered and few foreign statemen have captured the
affection of the Argentine people as you did.

I would like to stress that El Economista -founded 28 years ago - is an independent journal which criticizes the Videla Government when there is something to criticize and commends it when there is something to commend.

Hoping to hear soon from you,

HENRY KISSINGER:
¿NO AL MUNDIAL?

Por ahora, parece que no.
Kissinger había anunciado que
venía. Lo dijo en octubre del año
pasado. Pero como la invitación
que recibió no habría sido del
todo formal para su gusto, se ha
enojado y se queda en su país.
"Me siento un poco desatendido", le dijo a su gran amigo el
embajador argentino en Washington, Jorge Aja Espil. Al menos, esto es lo que se cuenta en
los medios diplomáticos. También se dice que Kissinger se

queja de que nadie lo ha informado sobre la forma y fecha más convenientes para viajar a la Argentina, ni sobre las reservas de alojamiento, la manera de reunirse con las entradas correspondientes a cada uno de los partidos del Mundial, o los detalles de las medidas que se tomarían para su seguridad personal.
¿Será posible? Da la impresión

de que no todo el mundo sigue la
campaña televisiva que nos en-
seña cómo debemos comportar-
nos con los extranjeros que nos
visitarán a partir de junio. Sin
embargo, las quejas del hombre
que fue secretario de Estado de
Richard Nixon todavía pueden
ser atendidas como corres-
ponde. El embajador Aja Espil
está seguro de que, finalmente,

PAGINA TRES

Henry Kissinger quiere que lo inviten muy formalmente.

Kissinger estará entre los miles
de espectadores que asistan al
partido inaugural entre Alema-
nia y Polonia. Y mientras espera
que le faciliten su viaje y su es-
tada entre nosotros, termina sus
memorias y prepara su próximo
programa de TV por el que co-
brará un millón de dólares.

Translation:

(Says) NO to the World Cup ?

For now, it seems NO. Kissinger had said he would come. He said it in
October last year. But since the invitation he received was not as formal as
he would have liked, he is upset and staying in his country.

"I feel a bit ignored" he told his great friend, the Argentinian Ambassador in Washington Jorge Aja Espil. At least this is what is being said in diplomatic circles. It is also said that Kissinger objected that nobody had informed him about the most convenient ways and dates to go to Argentina, nor about lodging reservations, the way to get tickets to the various games or the details about security measures.

Is it possible? It seems that not everybody is following the television
campaign which tells us how we should behave with the foreigners that
will visit us in June.

However, complaints of the statesman who was Richard Nixon's Secretary of
State, can still be taken care off as they should. Ambassador Aja Espil is
sure that at the end Kissinger will be among the thousands of spectators who
will attend the inaugural game between Germany and Poland.

And while he waits for them to straighten out his trip and his stay among us,
he is finishing his memoirs and preparing his next TV program for which he
will get a million dollars.

THE EDWARD WEINTAL JOURNALISM PRIZE

SELECTION COMMITTEE

CHARLES BARTLETT
CHAIRMAN
MARVIN KALB
PETER KROGH
HUGH SIDEY

EDMUND A. WALSH
SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20057

February 15, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
CSIS
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

I am writing in behalf of the selection committee of the Weintal Prize to ask if you can give us nominations for the annual award for "initiative, hard digging, and bold thinking in the coverage of American diplomacy and foreign policy." Mr. Weintal's will created a trust which furnishes $5,000 in prize money as well as $5,000 in scholarships for students of diplomacy.

The award was split last year among a trio of distinguished foreigners: Adalbert de Segonzac of France-Soir; Werner Imhoof of Neue Zuercher Zeitung; and John Midgley of The Economist. Winners in previous two years were Peter Lisagor of The Chicago Daily News and Chalmers Roberts of The Washington Post.

We have asked that entries be submitted before April 1. We will be grateful for your ideas because we want the prize to represent the best in diplomatic reporting. You will receive an invitation to the awards ceremony at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service on May 2 and we hope very much you will be able to come.

The Edward Weintal Journalism Prize, established in memory of Edward Weintal, former diplomatic correspondent for Newsweek Magazine, is awarded annually to recognize and encourage distinguished journalism in the field of American foreign policy and diplomacy.

SALT POSITIONS

The last US proposal to the Soviets in the Moscow negotiations of January 1976 is presented by major categories of weapons, together with comments on the Soviet position at the time, as well as some comparison with what is known from the public record of the present state of the negotiations.

I. Overall Ceilings: (Through 1985)

At the Vladivostok summit of November 1974, it was agreed that both sides would be limited to no more than 2400 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers;

-- it was agreed also, that there would be subsequent reductions, and that such reduction would take place before the expiration of the treaty in December 1985;

-- in January 1976, the US proposed a reduction down from 2400 to 2300 or lower, to begin about 18 months after the conclusion of an agreement, and to be completed in about 6 months thereafter;

-- the Soviets indicated that subject to a settlement of other issues, there could be reduction to 2300 or even lower; (at present there is an agreement to make reductions down to about 2250, but the date for achieving this further reduction is still in dispute.)

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## II. Sub Ceiling on MIRVed Missiles

It was agreed at Vladivostok that both sides would be limited to no more than 1320 MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, with freedom to substitute and no further sub-ceilings;

(The US program at the time was 550 Minuteman III MIRVed ICBMs, plus 496 Poseidon MIRVed SLBMs; assuming an addition of 240 new Trident I SLBMs the US would have reached 1286 MIRVed missiles during the treaty period, although some slippage of Trident was probable);

(The present negotiation includes two new sub-ceilings:
(1) a limit of 820 on the number of MIRVed ICBMs, and (2) a ceiling of 1200 on the number of MIRVed ICBMs plus SLBMs, thus allowing an implicit 380 SLBMs for the Soviets, if they do in fact go up to the full 820 land based ICBMs with MIRVs; the effect of the 1200 ceiling will be that when the sixth Trident submarine goes to sea trials the US will have to begin reducing other MIRVed systems, either Minuteman ICBMs or the Poseidon submarines in order to stay below 1200).

## III. Heavy Bombers Armed with Air Launched Cruise Missiles

After considerable debate over cruise missiles in general, in January 1976 the US proposed that each heavy bomber, B-52 or B-1, armed with ALCMs with a range between 600 and 2500 kms would be counted as equivalent to a MIRVed missile and fall within the ceiling of 1320; the Soviets accepted this:

- it was also agreed that no cruise missile with a range over 600 km would be deployed on any aircraft