MAY-11-1992 14:48

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.06

6

parties exceeds 40% typically combines with the Free Democrats to form the government. An ideal situation for the Free Democrats arises when they can help either of the large parties to achieve a majority, that is, when both are in excess of 40%. Then the knowledge that they can bring in a new Chancellor magnifies the Free Democrats' bargaining position.

This has happened only once - in 1982. During the last election in 1990, the Christian Democrats polled about 46%, the Free Democrats about 10%, and the Social Democrats about 36%.

In the present Parliament, the Free Democrats can form a government only in combination with the Christian Democrats.

But Genscher may calculate that if his party stays in the current coalition through the 1994 elections, it would end up sharing the blame for the existing difficulties and suffer serious losses. Switching coalitions would be incapable of

MAY-11-1992 14:48

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.07

producing a change in government because a Social
Democrat/Free Democrat coalition nonetheless falls short of a
majority. On the other hand, as the most popular German
leader, Genscher may reason that his resignation will enable
his party to avoid the opprobrium for switching sides in the
middle of a crisis **and** yet increase its options for the
future: perhaps by a means of a coalition of all the major
parties to deal with the emergency - as is favored by many
leaders; or by a Social Democrat/Free Democrat coalition for
the 1994 election. Any of these combinations could bring
Genscher back as Federal President in the indirect elections
of 1993, or as the architect of a new coalition after the 1994
elections to the Parliament.

Genscher's foreign policy has been driven by similar
dynamics. Just as his party had to maneuver between the two
dominant political powers of German domestic politics, his

MAY-11-1992 14:48

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.08

country had to be navigated through the narrow passage between
two superpowers and a surfeit of suspicious neighbors. Being
born and raised in Halle, in former Communist East Germany,
Genscher was moreover initially an outsider in the Federal
Republic and perforce drawn into the German national question
with an intensity not shared by all West Germans, nor by any
of Germany's allies. Genscher managed these international
cross-currents with the same dexterity he applied to the
domestic ones, and with the same general result: achieving for
his country an influence and a prestige beyond calculations of
relative power, even before unification compounded Germany's
intrinsic weight.

Even without the legacy of the two world wars, the conduct
of German foreign policy would prove to be an unusually
formidable task. Germany is more powerful - and has been for
100 years - than any other European country and it has more

MAY-11-1992 14:49

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.09

9

neighbors than any other European state. Whenever Germany has attempted a purely national policy, it has frightened its neighbors and contributed to instability. Germany's military strength encouraged the formation of hostile coalitions comprised of neighbors aware that it was stronger than any one of them. And Germany's diplomatic attempts to achieve a global role isolated it because no one wanted to be junior partner to such a restless and ambitious country. These inherent difficulties were compounded by Germany's rather delayed unification in 1871 - later than any other major European state. Expending so much energy on achieving unity, Germany seemed to have too little left with which to define its national interest.

No wonder that this problem has been solved only twice in German history - at the start of German unity by Otto von Bismarck, and after World War II by Konrad Adenauer, Bismarck

MAY-11-1992 14:49

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.10

10

opted for dexterity, seeking to arrange relations among the nations of Europe in such a way that Germany would always have more options than any possible rival, thereby preventing the formation of hostile coalitions.

Adenauer opted for reliability. He reasoned that Germany's past had incurred too much distrust to allow for Bismarck's subtle combinations, and that the Germany tendency toward extremes inhibited the sense of proportion crucial to a free-wheeling Bismarckian approach. He sought to dissolve Germany's temptations in a rigid commitment to Atlantic cohesion - a policy that was especially necessary in the aftermath of the war to discourage the formation of a new international order based on controlling the former enemy.

Today, Chancellor Kohl represents the Adenauer tradition.

Genscher tried to combine a pro-Western orientation with Bismarckian flexibility. The question arises for how long such

MAY-11-1992 14:50 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.11

11

a policy can be sustained. For if flexibility is measured by
having an option to all sides, the charge of disguised
nationalism is bound to raise its head; hence the occasional
rumblings against Genscher in Allied capitals.

Fairness compels us to recognize the special challenge
Genscher has had to face as the foreign minster of a divided
country. If the junior partner in a coalition automatically
follows the senior partner, it runs the risk of losing its
identity. For a divided country, this can spell abandoning its
reason for existence. Atlantic orthodoxy might prescribe that
Germany should wait passively at the side of its allies for
the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. But a native of
East Germany could not be expected to wait passively while his
own people lived under foreign-imposed totalitarian rule.

In time, the majority of Germans came to insist on a
specifically West German response to their national

TO

759 0042 P.12

12
aspirations. Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Brandt and
pursued by Genscher under two Chancellors - Schmidt and Kohl.
And a German national response - however sensitive to Allied
concerns - inevitably required special assurances to the
Soviet Union to ease the fear of a resurgent Germany after
unification.

The Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage with
tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go major credit for
its day-to-day tactical handling - even if the final push to
unification was master-minded by Kohl. Genscher's subtle
tactics have at times caused twinges of uneasiness. The
ambivalence of some of Genscher's colleagues toward him was
paralleled by Germany's ambivalence toward its allies. After
all, Genscher has had to work with six American Secretaries of
State, each insisting on his distinctiveness from his
predecessor. There was an understandable temptation to take

MAY-11-1992 14:51

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.13

13

out reinsurance in the face of American gyrations that moved from deploying medium-range missiles to removing them entirely within the space of four years. Genscher saw few attractions in a residual nuclear deployment that left weapons with a range that covered only German territory even though this position annoyed Washington and London.

Through all these controversies, Genscher maneuvered with consummate skill. History will surely record as his monument the tour de force of unifying his country while sustaining Germany's Atlantic relationships. Post-German unification, Genscher found himself in a world for which no previous experience could have prepared him. The Cold War ended, and with it the option toward both superpowers. On the other hand, with Soviet armies 1000 miles further east and the former Soviet Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was bound to weaken; no European nation, Germany included, would

MAY-11-1992 14:51

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.14

14
henceforth submit to American priorities to the same degree,
or pay the same price for America's protection. The
dissolution of the East German Communist state made it seem
less necessary for Germany to legitimize itself by
subordinating itself to West European, especially French,
prescriptions. And even European unity began to seem less
urgent to many.

By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers, Genscher's
tactical skill and intelligence, reinforced by his country's
new bargaining position, gave him a prominence that - perhaps
unintentionally - emphasized Germany's national role. But to
what purpose and for what end? For a master diplomat applying
his by now well-established tactics of operating between
contending pressures, a new opportunity had opened up: to
maneuver among the multiplying international institutions such
as NATO, the European Security Conference, the Common Market,

MAY-11-1992 14:51

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.15

15

the West European Union - with partially overlapping, partially competing, purposes. Skillfully used, international machinery could be turned into a tool of national policy. For example, Genscher's analysis of the Yugoslav crisis was superior to that of most of his European partners. Still, he prevailed less by the force of his argument than by moving back and forth between the European Community, the European Security Conference, and the threat of unilateral action.

Genscher seemed to delight in adding to these institutions, for instance by introducing the notion of Europe from Vladivostok west to Vancouver - embracing three quarters of the globe. His desire not to isolate the former Soviet Union was laudable. But to group together so many states with no historic or geographic relations was bound to water down existing institutions, and to dilute the role of the United States. When everybody is allied with everybody, special

MAY-11-1992 14:52

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.16

16

obligations cease to exist toward anybody, and national
interest predominates.

In the end, tactical skill can obscure, but not change,
reality. And Germany's reality is a narrow margin for
maneuver: too passive, it runs the risk of being engulfed by
the storms swirling around the center of a Continent; too
active, it threatens to magnify those storms. For 18 years
Genscher used that narrow margin brilliantly. He did not widen
it, but then that may be inherent in Germany's position.

Genscher will surely go down in history as one of the most
important statesmen his country has produced. The democracies
can thank him for having maintained their alliance through
many storms; his country's adversaries can honor him for his
effort to build bridges. And his friends will not forget that
his personal loyalty matched his diplomatic skill.

TOTAL P.16

MAY-09-1992 10:11

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065

P.01

CYJ

1

2209 WORDS

Dr. Kissinger LA TIMES Article 5/7/92

On May 17, Hans-Dietrich Genscher will resign as German foreign minister after 18 years in office. This news produced in me a sense of almost personal loss - an odd reaction because, as much as I value Genscher as a friend, I have not always agreed with the foreign policies he conducted.

My first encounter with Genscher was on the ~~first~~ day he took office, in Bad Reichenhall at the southern tip of Bavaria. The location had been chosen because President Nixon was in near-by Salzburg before embarking on a trip to the Middle East. Though in those early days Genscher's grasp of foreign policy can be most charitably described as minimal, he conducted

X

MAY-09-1992 10:11

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.02

2
himself with extraordinary aplomb. He announced an end to a
lingering controversy over one of America's perennial efforts
to institutionalize Atlantic relationships. And he proved as
good as his word.

Over the next three years, we worked closely together.
Helmut Schmidt was then Chancellor, and dedicated to close
Atlantic relations. He and Genscher formed a smoothly
functioning team. There was no other foreign minister in whom
I had greater confidence. Genscher's grasp of foreign policy
grew at an astounding pace. As he developed into the dominant
foreign minister in Europe over the next decade and a half, we
saw each other frequently - though somewhat less in recent
years. Throughout, I maintained a special affection for this
clever, dedicated, vulnerable, man so confident of his
tactical skills, so sensitive to personal slights, so prone to
maneuvers inviting those slights.

MAY-09-1992 10:12 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.04

with the remark, "I wonder what his motive could have been," I began to analyze the impact of Genscher's resignation on the political situation in Germany, and even on the political future of Genscher. Was his resignation a withdrawal, or a move into a new role?

I do not pretend to know the answer. Perhaps Genscher does not know it yet either. Certainly, the resignation occurred at a moment of unprecedented turmoil in German domestic politics. Unification is exacting ever greater sacrifices; the support for economic policy in a natural discipline characteristic of the German labor movement is eroding in nation-wide strikes; austerity seems inevitable if inflation and stagnation are to be avoided; the political parties are in shock from gains by Right Wing parties in recent state elections.

For the last four decades, the German constitution has produced extraordinary political stability. The provision that

MAY-09-1992 10:13

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.05

5

a party must win at least 5% of the popular vote in order to be represented in Parliament prevents the emergence of small splinter parties. The requirement that the Chancellor can only be replaced by a majority vote for another person works against frequent government turn-over. In fact, a Chancellor has only once been overthrown in Parliament, and that was engineered nearly a decade ago by Genscher.

For the greatest part of Germany's post-war history, there have been three parties: two major parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, which in the past decade have each oscillated between 35% and 45%, and Genscher's Free Democrats, varying from 6% to 11%. Whichever of the major parties exceeds 40% typically combines with the Free Democrats to form the government. At the moment, the Christian Democrats have about 46%, the Free Democrats about 10%, and the Social Democrats about 36%. An ideal situation for the

MAY-09-1992 10:15

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.08

REpublic and perforce drawn into the German national question with an intensity not shared by all West Germans, nor by any of Germany's allies. Genscher managed to get the international cross-currents with the same dexterity he applied to the domestic ones, and with the same general result: achieving for his country an influence and a prestige beyond calculations of relative power, even before unification compounded Germany's intrinsic weight.

Apart from the legacy of the two world wars, the conduct of even without Donald German foreign policy has always proved to be an unusually formidable task. Germany is more powerful - and has been for 100 years - than any other European country and it has more neighbors than any other European state. Whenever Germany has attempted a purely national policy, it has frightened its neighbors and contributed to instability. Germany's military strength encouraged the formation of hostile coalitions

MAY-09-1992 10:15

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.09

comprised of neighbors aware that it was stronger than any one
of them. And Germany's diplomatic attempts to achieve a global
role isolated it because no one wanted to be junior partner to
such a restless and ambitious country. These inherent
difficulties were compounded by Germany's rather delayed
unification in 1871 - later than any other major European
state. Expending so much energy on achieving unity, Germany
seemed to have ~~one~~ left with which to define its national
interest.

No wonder that this problem has been solved only twice in
German history - at the start of German unity by Otto von
Bismarck, and after World War II by Konrad Adenauer. Bismarck
opted for dexterity, seeking to arrange relations among the
nations of Europe in such a way that Germany would always have
more options than any possible rival, thereby preventing the
formation of hostile coalitions.

MAY-09-1992 10:16

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.10

10

Today, Chancellor Kohl represents the Adenauer tradition. Genscher tried to combine a pro-Western orientation with Bismarckian flexibility. The question arises for how long such a policy can be sustained. For if flexibility is measured by having an option to all sides, the charge of disguised nationalism is bound to raise its head; hence the occasional rumblings against Genscher in Allied capitals.

MAY-09-1992 10:16

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.11

11

Fairness compels us to recognize the special challenge
Genscher has had to face as the foreign minister of a divided
country. The junior partner in any coalition must
automatically follows the senior partner, runs the risk of
losing its identity. For a divided country, this can spell
abandoning its reason for existence. Atlantic orthodoxy might
prescribe that Germany should wait passively at the side of
its allies for the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. But
a native of East Germany could not be expected to wait
passively while his own people lived under foreign rule.

In time, the majority of Germans came to insist on a
specifically West German response to their national
aspirations. Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Brandt and
pursued by Genscher under two Chancellors - Schmidt and Kohl.
And a German national response - however sensitive to Allied
concerns - inevitably required special assurances to the

X

MAY-09-1992 10:17

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.12

12

The Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage with tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go major credit for its day-to-day tactical handling - even if the final push to unification was master-minded by Kohl. Genscher's subtle tactics have at times caused twinges of uneasiness. The ambivalence of some of Genscher's colleagues toward him was paralleled by Germany's ambivalence toward its allies. After all, Genscher has had to work with six American Secretaries of State, each insisting on his distinctiveness from his predecessor. There was an understandable temptation to take out reinsurance in the face of American gyrations that moved from deploying medium-range missiles to removing them entirely within the space of four years. Genscher saw few attractions in a residual nuclear deployment that left weapons with a

MAY-09-1992 10:17

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065

range that covered only German territory even though this
position *infuriated* Washington. Through all these
controversies, Genscher maneuvered with consummate skill.
History will surely record as his monument the tour de force
of unifying his country while sustaining Germany's Atlantic
relationships. Post-German unification, Genscher found himself
in a world for which no previous experience could have
prepared him. The Cold War ended, and with it the *national*
option *of options* toward both superpowers. On the other hand,
with Soviet armies 1000 miles further east and the former
Soviet Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was
bound to weaken; no European nation, Germany included, would
henceforth submit to American priorities to the same degree,
or pay the same price for America's protection. The
dissolution of the East German Communist state made it seem
less necessary for Germany to legitimize itself by

X

MAY-09-1992 10:18

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065

14
subordinating itself to West European, especially French,
prescriptions. And even European unity began to seem less
urgent to many.

By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers, Genscher's
tactical skill and intelligence, reinforced by his country's
new bargaining position, gave him a prominence that - perhaps
unintentionally - emphasized Germany's national role. But to
what purpose and for what end? For a master diplomat applying
his by now well-established tactics of operating between
contending pressures to achieve his goals, a new opportunity
had opened up: to maneuver among the multiplying international
institutions such as NATO, the European Security Conference,
the Common Market, the West European Union - with partially
overlapping, partially competing, purposes. Skillfully used,
international machinery could be turned into a tool of
national policy. For example, Genscher's analysis of the

MAY-09-1992 10:18

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065

15

Genscher seemed to delight in adding to these institutions, for instance by introducing the notion of Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver - embracing three quarters of the globe. His desire not to isolate the former Soviet Union was laudable. But to group together so many states with no historic or geographic relations was bound to water down existing institutions, and to dilute the role of the United States. When everybody is allied with everybody, special obligations cease to exist toward anybody, and national interest predominates.

MAY-09-1992 10:19

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

1 203 927 0065 P.16

be silent until in Germany;
that may come beyond the capacity
But then, all Western statesmen are flying blind in the new
government.
world into which they have been catapulted so suddenly by
their own successes. The New World Order may need a new
perspective from a new generation. Genscher will go down in
history as one of the most important statesmen his country has
produced. The democracies can thank him for having maintained
their alliance through many storms; his country's adversaries
can honor him for his effort to build bridges. And his friends
will not forget that his human qualities and his personal
loyalty matched his diplomatic skill.

TOTAL P.16

MAY-07-1992 09:35 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.01

1

2209 WORDS

On May 17, Hans-Dietrich Genscher will resign as German foreign minister after 18 years in office. This news produced in me a sense of almost personal loss - an odd reaction because, as much as I value Genscher as a friend, I have not always agreed with the foreign policies he conducted, and have at times even been disquieted by them.

My first encounter with Genscher was on his first day in office, in Bad Reichenhall at the southern tip of Bavaria. The location had been chosen because President Nixon was in near-by Salzburg before embarking on a trip to the Middle East.

TO

759 0042 P.02

TO

759 0042 P.03

3

Passionate in his convictions, reluctant to engage in frontal battles, Genscher approached his goals so obliquely that his dazzling skills occasionally obscured the high purpose that animated them. In later years, some of his complex maneuvers began to worry me. Without them or its foreign minister, Germany would probably not have achieved such a high level of diplomatic influence. But there was a danger that, in less able hands, the Genscher style might prove indistinguishable from a nationalism inimical to Allied and European cohesion. That such ambivalence could be generated by a solitary individual who represented (and did not even lead) a small party, is in itself a tribute to an extraordinary personality.

The same ambivalence emerged in my second thoughts on Genscher's resignation. Like the diplomat at the Congress of Vienna who is said to have reacted to the death of a colleague

MAY-07-1992 09:36 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.04

4

I do not pretend to know the answer. Perhaps Genscher does not know it yet either. Certainly, the resignation occurs at a moment of unprecedented turmoil in German domestic politics. Unification is exacting ever greater sacrifices; the discipline characteristic of the German labor movement is eroding in nation-wide strikes; austerity seems inevitable if inflation and stagnation are to be avoided; the political parties are in shock from gains by Right wing parties in recent state elections.

TO

759 0042 P.05

For the greatest part of Germany's post-war history, there have been three parties: two major parties, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, which in the past decade have each oscillated between 35% and 45%, and Genscher's Free Democrats, varying from 6% to 11%. Whichever of the major parties exceeds 40% typically combines with the Free Democrats to form the new government. At the moment, the Christian Democrats have about 46%, the Free Democrats about 10%, and the Social Democrats about 36%. An ideal situation for the

MAY-07-1992 09:37 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.06

6

At this moment, the Free Democrats can form a government only in combination with the Christian Democrats. But Genscher may calculate that if his party stays in the current coalition through the 1994 elections, it would end up sharing the blame for the existing crisis and might fail to reach 5%, hence be excluded from parliament. Switching coalitions would fall short of a majority, and would be incapable of producing a change in government. On the other hand, as the most popular German leader, Genscher may reason that his resignation will enable his party to avoid the opprobrium for switching sides in the middle of a crisis and yet weaken Kohl enough to force

TO

759 0042 P.07

a governmental change in two stages: first, a coalition of all the major parties to deal with the emergency - as is favored by the German President, Richard von Weizsacker. This would almost surely be followed by a Social Democratic/Free Democratic coalition for the 1994 election - much as happened in 1969, the last time a Great Coalition was tried. Such a combination could bring Genscher back when the Parliament chooses a President in 1993, or as minister in a Social Democrat/Free Democrat coalition after 1994.

Genscher's foreign policy was driven by similar dynamics. Just as his party had to maneuver between the two dominant political powers of German domestic politics, his country had to be navigated through the narrow passage between two superpowers and a surfeit of suspicious neighbors. Being born and raised in Halle, in former Communist East Germany, Genscher was moreover initially an outsider in the Federal

MAY-07-1992 09:38 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.08

8

REpublic and perforce drawn into the German national question with an intensity not shared by all West Germans, nor by any of Germany's allies. Genscher managed the international cross-currents with the same dexterity he applied to the domestic ones, and with the same general result: achieving for his country an influence and a prestige beyond calculations of relative power, even before unification compounded Germany's intrinsic weight.

Apart from the legacy of the two world wars, the conduct of German foreign policy has always proved to be an unusually formidable task. Germany is more powerful - and has been for 100 years - than any other European country and it has more neighbors than any other European state. Whenever Germany has attempted a purely national policy, it frightened its neighbors and contributed to instability. Germany's military strength encouraged the formation of hostile coalitions

TO

759 0042 P.09

comprised of neighbors aware that it was stronger than any one
of them. And Germany's diplomatic attempts to achieve a global
role isolated it because no one wanted to be junior partner to
such a restless and ambitious country. These inherent
difficulties were compounded by Germany's rather delayed
unification in 1871 - later than any other major European
state. Expending so much energy on achieving unity, Germany
seemed to have none left with which to define its national
interest.

MAY-07-1992 09:39 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042

P.10

10

Today, Chancellor Kohl represents the Adenauer tradition. Genscher tried to combine a pro-Western orientation with Bismarckian flexibility. The question arises for how long such a policy can be sustained. For if flexibility is measured by having an option to all sides, the charge of disguised nationalism is bound to raise its head, hence the occasional rumblings against Genscher in Allied capitals.

TO

759 0042 P.11

11

Fairness compels us to recognize the special challenge Genscher has had to face as the foreign minister of a divided country. The junior partner in any coalition, if it automatically follows the senior partner, runs the risk of losing its identity. For a divided country, this can spell abandoning its reason for existence. Atlantic orthodoxy might prescribe that Germany should wait passively at the side of its allies for the ultimate collapse of the Soviet empire. But a native of East Germany could not be expected to wait passively while his own people lived under foreign oppression.

TO

759 0042

P.12

12

MAY-07-1992 09:40 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042

range that covered only German territory even though this
position infuriated Washington. Through all these
controversies, Genscher maneuvered with consummate skill.
History will surely record as his monument the tour de force
of unifying his country while sustaining Germany's Atlantic
relationships. Post-German unification, Genscher found himself
in a world for which no previous experience could have
prepared him. The Cold War ended, and with it the national
option of options toward both superpowers. On the other hand,
with Soviet armies 1000 miles further east and the former
Soviet Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was
bound to weaken; no European nation, Germany included, would
henceforth submit to American priorities to the same degree,
or pay the same price for America's protection. The
dissolution of the East German Communist state made it seem
less necessary for Germany to legitimize itself by

TO

759 0042 P.14

MAY-07-1992 09:41

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042

P. 15

15

MAY-07-1992 09:41

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.16

16

But then, all Western statesmen are flying blind in the new
world into which they have been catapulted so suddenly by
their own successes. The New World Order may need new
perspective from a new generation. Genscher will go down in
history as one of the most important statesmen his country has
produced. The democracies can thank him for having maintained
their alliance through many storms; his country's adversaries
can honor him for his effort to build bridges. And his friends
will not forget that his human qualities and his personal
loyalty matched his diplomatic skill.

TOTAL P.16

MAY-06-1992 10:01 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

18179672752 P.05

The same ambivalence emerged, too, in my second thoughts on
Genscher's resignation. Like the diplomat at the Congress of
Vienna who is said to have reacted to the death of a colleague
with the remark, "I wonder what his motive could have been," I
began to analyze the impact of Genscher's resignation on the
political situation in Germany, and ~~possibly~~ even
on the political
future of Genscher. Was his resignation a withdrawal from
~~politics~~ or a move into a new role?

I do not pretend to know the answer. Perhaps Genscher does
not know it yet either. Certainly, the resignation occurs at a
moment of unprecedented turmoil in German domestic politics.
Unification is exacting ever greater sacrifices; the
~~characteristic~~ in nationwide strikes
discipline of the labor movement is eroding; Austerity seems
easy
inevitable if inflation and stagnation are to be avoided; The

TO

18179672752 P.06

5

political parties are in shock from the gains of Right Wing parties in recent state elections.

produced

The German constitution has provided for extraordinary political stability, over the last four decades. The provision in order that a party must win at least 5% of the popular vote to be represented in Parliament prevents the emergence of small parties. The requirement that the Chancellor can only be replaced by a majority vote for another person in combination with the small number of parties works against frequent government changes. In fact, a Chancellor has only once been overthrown in Parliament, and that was engineered nearly a decade ago by Genscher.

MAY-06-1992 10:04 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

10179672752 P.13

(N)

12

be expected to wait passively while his own people live under
foreign oppression.

In as much as time went by, the majority of Germans came to insist on a specific West German response to their national aspirations. Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Brandt and pursued by Genscher under two Chancellors - Schmidt and Kohl. And a German national response - however sensitive to Allied concerns - inevitably required special assurances to the Soviet Union to ease the fear of a resurgent Germany after unification.

The Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage with tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go the major credit for the day-to-day tactical handling of it - even if the final push to unification was master-minded by Kohl. Genscher's subtle tactics, while at times caused twinges of uneasiness. The ambivalence of some of Genscher's colleagues toward him was paralleled by German ambivalence toward its allies. After all,

MAY-06-1992 10:04

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

18179672752 P.15

14

and the former Soviet Union in turmoil, the security component of NATO was bound to weaken; no European nation, Germany included, would henceforth submit to American priorities to the same degree, or pay the same price for America's protection. The dissolution of the East German Communist state made it seem less necessary for Germany to legitimize itself by adhering to West European, especially French, prescriptions. And even European unity began to seem less urgent to many.

By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers, Genscher's tactical skill and intelligence reinforced by his country's new bargaining position, gave him a prominence that - perhaps unintentionally - emphasized Germany's national role. But to what purpose and for what end? For a master diplomat, the major achieve his goal by the temptation was nearly irresistible to maneuver, among = multiplying a new opportunity opened up: to make a new opportunity = to maneuver = to make a new = international institutions = NATO, the European

MAY-06-1992 10:06

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759 0042 P.01

1

2226 WORDS

Dr. Kissinger LA TIMES Article 5/6/92

On May 17, Hans-Dietrich Genscher will resign as German foreign minister after 18 years in office. This news produced in me a sense of almost personal loss, as if a phase of my own life were ending - an odd reaction because, as much as I value Genscher as a friend, I have not always agreed with the foreign policies he conducted, and have occasionally been disquieted by them.

My first encounter with Genscher was on his first day in office. With characteristic self-confidence, he travelled to southern Germany for a face-to-face meeting. The location had been chosen because President Nixon was resting in Salzburg before embarking on a trip to the Middle East. Matters were

MAY-06-1992 10:07

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759 0042 P.02

further complicated because, on the morning of our meeting, I
had threatened to resign at an emotional press conference over
some domestic flare-up.

Genscher was nonplussed by both the occasion and by what had
preceded it. Though in those early days Genscher's grasp of
foreign policy can be most charitably described as minimal, he
conducted himself with extraordinary aplomb. He announced an
end to a lingering controversy over one of America's perennial
efforts to institutionalize Atlantic relationships. And he
proved as good as his word.

Over the next few years, we worked closely together. Schmidt
was Chancellor. Dedicated to closer Atlantic relations, he and
Genscher were a smoothly functioning team. There was no other
foreign minister in whom I had greater confidence. Genscher's
grasp of foreign policy grew at an astounding pace. During the
next decade and a half, as he developed into the dominant

MAY-06-1992 10:07

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759 0042 P.03

3

foreign minister in Europe, we saw each other frequently -
though somewhat less in recent years. Throughout, I maintained
a special affection for this clever, dedicated, vulnerable,
man so confident of his tactical skills, so sensitive to
personal slights, so prone to actions inviting those slights.

Passionate in his convictions, reluctant to engage in
frontal battles, Genscher approached his goals so obliquely
that his dazzling skills occasionally obscured the high
purpose that animated them. In later years, some of his
complex maneuvers began to worry me. They did give Germany a
diplomatic influence it could not have achieved without its
foreign minister but there was a danger that, in less able
hands, the Genscher style might become indistinguishable from
a nationalism inimical to Allied and European cohesion. That
such ambivalence could be generated by a solitary individual

MAY-06-1992 10:08

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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759 0042 P.04

The same ambivalence emerged, too, in my second thoughts on
Genscher's resignation. Like the diplomat at the Congress of
Vienna who is said to have reacted to the death of a colleague
with the remark, "I wonder what his motive could have been," I
began to analyze the impact of Genscher's resignation on the
political situation in Germany, and possibly on the political
future of Genscher. Was his resignation a withdrawal from
politics or a move into a new role?

I do not pretend to know the answer. Perhaps Genscher does
not know it yet either. Certainly, the resignation occurs at a
moment of unprecedented turmoil in German domestic politics.
Unification is exacting ever greater sacrifices; the
discipline of the labor movement is eroding. Austerity seems
inevitable if inflation and stagnation are to be avoided. The

MAY-06-1992 10:08

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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759 0042 P.05

5

The German constitution has provided for extraordinary political stability over the last four decades. The provision that a party must win at least 5% of the popular vote to be represented in Parliament prevents the emergence of splinter parties. The requirement that the Chancellor can only be replaced if a majority vote for another person in combination with the small number of parties works against frequent government changes. In fact, a Chancellor has only once been overthrown in Parliament, and that was engineered nearly a decade ago by Genscher.

MAY-06-1992 10:09

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6

Democrats, varying from 6% and 11%. Whichever of the major parties exceeds 40% typically combines with the Free Democrats to form the government. At the moment, the Christian Democrats have about 46%, the Free Democrats about 12%, and the Social Democrats about 36%. The ideal situation for the Free Democrats arises when either of the large parties is in a position to achieve a majority with their help, that is, when both are in excess of 40%. For then the knowledge that they can bring in a new Chancellor magnifies their bargaining position. This has happened only once - in 1982.

At this moment, the Free Democrats can form a government only in combination with the Christian Democrats for a? coalition with the Social Democrats. But Genscher may calculate that if his party stays in the current coalition until the 1994 elections, it would share the blame for the existing crisis; it could then fall below 5% in the 1994

X

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759 0042 P.07

election and be excluded from parliament. Switching coalitions
is not an alternative because it would still be incapable of
producing a change in government and would be blamed for
Germany's difficulties. On the other hand, Genscher, as the
most popular German leader, can avoid the opprobrium for
switching sides in the middle of a crisis and yet weaken Kohl
by resigning enough to suggest a possible governmental change
in two stages: first, a coalition of all the major parties to
deal with the emergency - reportedly favored by the German
President, Richard von Weizsacker. This would almost surely be
followed by a Social Democratic/Free Democratic coalition for
the 1994 election - much as happened in 1969, the last time a
Great Coalition was tried. Such a combination could bring
Genscher as President in the indirect elections to that office
to be held in 1993 or as part of a Social Democrat/Free
Democrat coalition after 1994.

MAY-06-1992 10:09

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8

Genscher's foreign policy exhibited some of the same complexities as his domestic politics. Just as his party sought maneuvering room between two dominant political powers of German domestic politics, his country needed to be navigated through the narrow passage between two superpowers and a surfeit of suspicious neighbors. Being born and raised in Halle, in former Communist East Germany, Genscher was moreover drawn into the German national question with an intensity not shared by many West Germans and certainly not by Germany's allies. Genscher managed these international cross-currents with the same dexterity as the domestic ones and with the same general result: he managed to achieve for his country an influence and a prestige beyond the calculations of relative power even before unification added to Germany's intrinsic weight.

MAY-06-1992 10:10 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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9

Apart from the legacy of two world wars, the conduct of German foreign policy has always proved to be an unusually formidable task. Germany is more powerful - and has been for 100 years - than any other European country and it has more neighbors than any other European state. Whenever Germany has attempted a purely national policy, it frightened its neighbors and contributed to instability. Germany's military powers produced hostile coalitions comprised of neighbors aware that it would prove stronger than any one of them. Germany's attempts at global influence isolated it because its geography endowed it with a permanent option of a change of sides. These inherent difficulties were compounded by Germany's rather delayed unification in 1871 - later than any other major European state. Germany expended so much energy on achieving unity that it had none left to define its national interest.

X

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10

No wonder that in German history the problem has been solved
only twice - at the very beginning by Otto von Bismarck, and
after World War II by Konrad Adenauer. Bismarck opted for
dexterity, seeking to arrange relations among the nations of
Europe in such a way that Germany always had more options than
any possible rival; hence it became impossible to form hostile
coalitions against it.

Adenauer opted for reliability. He reasoned that Germany's
past had incurred too much distrust to allow for Bismarck's
subtle combinations, and that Germany's tendencies toward
extremes inhibited the sense of proportion crucial to a free-
wheeling approach. He therefore sought to dissolve Germany's
temptations in a rigid commitment to Atlantic cohesion - a
policy that was especially necessary in the aftermath of the
war to discourage other nations from arranging the new
international order around controlling their former enemy.

X

MAY-06-1992 10:11

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759 0042 P. 11

11

Genscher would seem to try to combine a pro-Western orientation with Bismarckian flexibility. Therein lies his essential ambivalence. For if flexibility is translated into an option to all sides, it will not be long before the charge of disguised nationalism raises its head; hence the occasional rumblings against Genscher in all allied capitals.

Fairness compels a recognition of the special challenge faced by Genscher as the foreign minister of a divided country.

The junior partner in any coalition, if it automatically follows the senior partner, runs the risk of losing its identity and thereby abandons its reason for existence.

X

MAY-06-1992 10:11

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759 0042 P.12

12

be expected to wait passively when his own people live under
foreign oppression.

As time went by, the majority of Germans came to insist on
some specifically West German response to their national
aspirations. Ostpolitik was initiated by Chancellor Brandt and
pursued by Genscher under two Chancellors - Schmidt and Kohl.
And a German national response - however sensitive to Allied
concerns - inevitably required special assurances to the
Soviet Union to ease the fear of a resurgent Germany.

The Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage with
tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go the major credit
for the day-to-day tactical handling of it - even if the final
push to unification was master-minded by Kohl. Genscher's
subtle tactics sometimes caused twinges of uneasiness. The
ambivalence of some of Genscher's colleagues toward him was
matched by German ambivalence toward its allies. After all,

X

MAY-06-1992 10:12

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759 0042

P. 13

13

Genscher had to work with six American Secretaries of State, each insisting on their differences with their predecessors and with gyrations of policy that moved from deploying medium-range missiles to removing them totally within the space of four years. And, while I disagreed with his position on strategic grounds, I understood why Genscher saw few attractions in a residual nuclear deployment that left weapons with a range that could reach only German territory. Through all these disputes, Genscher maneuvered with consummate skill.

History will surely record as his monument the tour de force of undertaking to unify his people while sustaining Germany's Atlantic relationships. Following German unification, Genscher found himself in a world for which no previous experience could have prepared him. The Cold War ended, and with it the national option of eventual equidistance from the superpowers. On the other hand, with Soviet armies 1000 miles further east

X

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759 0042 P.14

14

By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers, Genscher's tactical skill and intelligence reinforced by his country's new bargaining position, gave him a prominence that - perhaps unintentionally - emphasized Germany's national role. But to what purpose and for what end? For a master diplomat, the temptation was nearly irresistible to maneuver among a plethora of international institutions - NATO, the European

MAY-06-1992 10:12

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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759 0042 P.15

15

Security Conference, the Common Market, the West European Union - with partially overlapping, hence competing, purposes. International machinery can thus sustain national purposes. For example, Genscher's analysis of the Yugoslav crisis was superior to that of most of his European partners. Still, he prevailed less by the force of his argument than by moving the issue back and forth between the European Community and the European Security Conference.

Genscher seemed to delight in adding to these institutions, for example in his notion of Europe from Vladivostok to Vancouver. I understood his desire not to isolate the former Soviet Union. But to introduce so many states with no historic or geographic relations to Europe into a concept is bound to water down existing relations, and to diminish the United States' role. When everybody is allied with everybody, no

MAY-06-1992 10:13

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16

special obligation exists to anybody and nationalism will
prevail.

But then, all statesmen are flying blind in the new world
into which they have been catapulted so suddenly. It may be
asking too much of any leader to continue to create new
patterns every decade. In this sense, Genscher left at a good
moment. He will certainly go down in history as one of the
most important statesmen his country has produced. The
democracies can thank him for his steady friendship; his
country's adversaries can honor him for his effort to build
bridges. And his friends will not forget that his human
qualities and his personal loyalty matched his enormous
diplomatic skill.

X

TOTAL P.16

FROM HYATT DALLAS

05.05.1992 22:35

NO. 16 P. 6

MAY-05-1992 10:30 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

IU

15845821662 P.05

4
individual who represented (and did not even lead) a small
party, is in itself a tribute to an extraordinary personality.

What ambivalence came to expression, too, in my second
thoughts on Genscher's resignation. Like the diplomat at the
Congress of Vienna who is said to have reacted to the death of
*will he mark*
a colleague by saying, "I wonder what his motive could have
been," I began to analyze the impact of Genscher's resignation
on the political situation in Germany, and possibly on the
political future of Genscher. Was his resignation a withdrawal
from politics or a move into a new role?

I do not pretend to know the answer, and perhaps Genscher
does not know it yet either. Certainly, the resignation
occurred at a moment of unprecedented turmoil in German
domestic politics. In two decades, unification is exacting ever
greater sacrifices; the discipline of the labor movement is
eroding. Austerity seems inevitable if inflation and

x

FROM HYATT DALLAS

05.05.1992 22:35

NO. 16 P. 7

IU

15845821662 P.06

stagnation are to be avoided. The political parties are in shock from the gains of Right Wing parties in recent state elections.

The German constitution has provided extraordinary political stability for over four decades. The provision that a party must win at least 5% of the popular vote to be represented in Parliament prevents the emergence of the many splinter parties of, for example, Italy. The requirement that the Chancellor can be replaced only if another person in combination with the small number of parties, works against frequent government changes. In fact, a Chancellor has been overthrown in Parliament only once, and that was engineered nearly a decade ago by Genscher.

⊗

FROM HYATT DALLAS

05.05.1992 22:39

NO. 16 P. 12

MAY-05-1992 10:40

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15845621bb2 P.11

10 **anory**
dexterity, seeking to arrange the relations of the nations of
Europe in such a way that Germany always had more options than
any possible rival; hence it became impossible to form hostile
coalitions against it.

**opted for**

Adenauer chose reliability. He reasoned that Germany's past had incurred too much distrust to allow for the fluidity of Bismarck's subtle combinations, and that Germany's tendencies toward romantic extremes in any event destroyed the sense of mutual trust. A free-wheeling approach. He therefore sought to tie Germany closely to the West and to overcome its in a rigid commitment German temptations to exploit its central position by an **whimsical** Atlantic policy. Adenauer's policy was all the more necessary in the aftermath of the war to discourage the other nations from organizing an **anary** order around controlling the former enemy.

X

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1

2289 WORDS

Dr. Kissinger LA TIMES Article 5/5/92

On May 17, Hans-Dietrich Genscher will resign as German foreign minister after 18 years in office. This news produced in me a sense of almost personal loss, as if a phase of my own life were ending. It was an odd reaction because, while I value Genscher as a friend, I have not always agreed with the foreign policies he conducted, and occasionally have been disquieted by them.

My first encounter with Genscher was on his first day in office. I was by then a veteran foreign minister and he a novice; indeed, Genscher's grasp of foreign policy in those days can be most charitably described as minimal. With characteristic self-confidence, he came to southern Germany

TO

759 0042 P.02

2

for a face-to-face meeting. The location was chosen because President Nixon was in Salzburg, where he was resting before starting on a trip to the Middle East. Matters were further complicated because, on the morning of our meeting, I had threatened to resign at an emotional press conference over some domestic flare-up.

Genscher was nonplussed by both the occasion and by what had preceded it, conducting himself with extraordinary aplomb. Without pretending to be yet on top of the subject, he promised to put an end to an ____ controversy between America and Europe over one of America's perennial efforts to institutionalize Atlantic relationships. And he proved as good as his word.

Over the next few years, we worked closely together. Schmidt was Chancellor and dedicated to closer Atlantic relations. He and Genscher were a smoothly working team. There was no other

TO

759 0042 P.03

3

foreign minister in whom I had greater confidence. In the next
decade and a half, while Genscher developed into the dominant
foreign minister in Europe, we saw each other frequently -
perhaps somewhat less in recent years. Throughout, I
maintained a special affection for this clever, dedicated,
vulnerable, man so confident in his tactical skills, so
sensitive to personal slights, so prone to actions inviting
those slights. Passionate in conviction, reluctant to engage
in frontal battles, he approached his goals so obliquely that
occasionally the dazzling skill obscured the commitment that
in fact animated them. In later years, I came to worry that
these complex maneuvers, which gave Germany a diplomatic
influence it could not have achieved without Genscher, set a
style that, in less able hands, could become indistinguishable
from a nationalism inimical to Allied and European cohesion.
Yet, that such ambivalence could be identified with a solitary

MAY-05-1992 10:31 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.04

That ambivalence came to expression, too, in my second
thoughts on Genscher's resignation. Like the diplomat at the
Congress of Vienna who is said to have reacted to the death of
a colleague by saying, "I wonder what his motive could have
been," I began to analyze the impact of Genscher's resignation
on the political situation in Germany, and possibly on the
political future of Genscher. Was his resignation a withdrawal
from politics or a move into a new role?

I do not pretend to know the answer, and perhaps Genscher
does not know it yet either. Certainly, the resignation
occurred at a moment of unprecedented turmoil in German
domestic politics in two decades. Unification is exacting ever
greater sacrifices; the discipline of the labor movement is
eroding. Austerity seems inevitable if inflation and

MAY-05-1992 10:31

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.05

5
stagnation are to be avoided. The political parties are in
shock from the gains of Right Wing parties in recent state
elections.

The German constitution has provided extraordinary political
stability for over four decades. The provision that a party
must win at least 5% of the popular vote to be represented in
Parliament prevents the emergence of the many splinter parties
of, for example, Italy. The requirement that the Chancellor
can be replaced only by a majority vote for an alternative in
combination with the small number of parties, works against
frequent government changes. In fact, a Chancellor has been
overthrown in Parliament only once, and that was engineered
nearly a decade ago by Genscher.

MAY-05-1992 10:31

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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759 0042 P.06

6

have each oscillated between 35% and 45% and Genscher's Free Democrats, varying from 6% and 11%. Whichever of the major parties exceeds 10% typically combines with the Free Democrats to form the government. At the moment, the Christian Democrats have about 46%, the Free Democrats about 12%, and the Social Democrats about 36%. The ideal situation for the Free Democrats is when either of the large parties is in a position to have a majority with their help, that is, when both are around 43%. For then they can bring in a new Chancellor. This has happened only once - in 1982.

At this moment, the Free Democrats can form a government
only in combination with the Christian Democrats. But Genscher
may calculate that if his party stays in the current coalition
until the 1994 elections, it would share the blame for the
existing crisis; it could then fall below 5% and thus be
excluded from parliament. Switching coalitions is no

MAY-05-1992 10:32

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759 0042 P.07

7

alternative because it would still leave the new coalition far short of a majority and hence incapable of producing a change in government. Kohl might decide to continue as a minority Chancellor and put the blame for Germany's difficulties on the Free Democrats. On the other hand, Genscher is the most popular German leader. His resignation avoids the stigma for his party of switching sides in the middle of a crisis. Yet it weakens Kohl sufficiently to bring about the possibility of a governmental change in two stages: first, a coalition of all the major parties to deal with the emergency - reportedly favored by the German President, Richard von Weizsacker. This would almost surely be followed by a Social Democratic/Free Democratic coalition after the 1994 election - much as happened in 1969, the last time a Great Coalition was implemented. That could bring Genscher back, if not necessarily as Foreign Minister then perhaps as President in

TO

759 0042 P.08

8

the indirect elections to that office to be held in 1993. All this may well be the result of Genscher's resignation, even if it is not his intention.

Genscher's foreign policy followed much the same pattern as his domestic politics. Just as his party sought maneuvering room between the political superpowers of German domestic politics, his country was always in danger of being suffocated between two superpowers and suspicious neighbors. Being born and raised in Halle, in former Communist East Germany, Genscher was moreover drawn into the German national question with an intensity not shared by many West Germans and certainly not by Germany's allies. Amidst these currents, Genscher strode with extraordinary dexterity.

Even before the legacy of two world wars, the conduct of German foreign policy proved to be unusually difficult. Germany is more powerful - and has been for 100 years - than

MAY-05-1992 10:33 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

759 0042 P.09

9

any other European country and it has more neighbors than any other European state. Whenever Germany has attempted a purely national policy, it has contributed to instability by frightening its neighbors. In the field of security, this produced hostile coalitions against Germany because they know it will be stronger than any one of them. In the diplomatic field, it disquiets its allies because its geography gives it the permanent option of a change of sides. These inherent difficulties have been compounded because Germany was only unified in 1871, later than any other major European state. Germany, it can be argued, expended so much energy on achieving unity that it had too little energy left to address the issue of its national interest.

MAY-05-1992 10:33

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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759 0042

10
dexterity, seeking to arrange the relations of the nations of
Europe in such a way that Germany always had more options than
any possible rival; hence it became impossible to form hostile
coalitions against it.

Adenauer chose reliability. He reasoned that Germany's past
had incurred too much distrust to allow for the fluidity of
Bismarck's subtle combinations, and that Germany's tendencies
toward Romantic extremes in any event destroyed the sense of
proportion needed for a free-wheeling approach. He therefore
sought to tie Germany closely to the West and to overcome
German temptations to exploit its central position by an
Atlantic policy. Adenauer's policy was all the more necessary
in the aftermath of the war to discourage the other nations
from organizing the international order around controlling the
former enemy.

TO

759 0042 P.11

11

Today, Chancellor Kohl represents the Adenauer tradition.
Genscher seems to try to combine a pro-Western orientation
with Bismarckian flexibility. Therein lay his essential
ambivalence. For Germany, flexibility spells equidistance to
all sides and that is incompatible with the passivity the
Adenauer policy gave to Atlantic relations and close ties with
America. Hence the occasional rumblings against Genscher in
all allied capitals.

On the other hand, the foreign minister of a divided country
had a special set of responsibilities. In any coalition, the
junior partner runs the risk of losing its identity if it
automatically follows the senior partner, and, if it loses its
identity, it abandons its reason for existence. For a divided
country, this was a particular psychological problem. Atlantic
orthodoxy might prescribe that Germany should wait passively
at the side of its allies for the collapse of Soviet

MAY-05-1992 10:34

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759 0042

P.12

12

Communism. On the other hand, no nation can be asked to wait passively for history or an alliance to bring about its unity. A native of East Germany was in any event not a man for a passive policy. As time went by, the majority of Germans insisted on some specifically West German response to the national question. It was initiated by Chancellor Brandt and pursued by Genscher under two Chancellors - Schmidt and Kohl.

But a German national response - however sensitive to Allied concerns - inevitably necessitated special reassurance to Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. For, unless these countries felt safe from a resurgent Germany, they would never agree to German unification.

On the whole, the Schmidt and Kohl governments navigated this passage with tenacity and skill. And to Genscher must go the major credit for the day-to-day handling of it - even if the final push was master-minded by Kohl. I did not always

MAY-05-1992 10:34 FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

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759 0042 P.13

13
agree with Genscher's policies. Yet, in all fairness, Germany
could not leave its national future entirely in foreign hands,
however friendly. The ambivalence of Genscher's colleagues
toward him was matched by German ambivalence toward its
allies. Germany needed some degree of dissociation from its
Atlantic partners even as it sought their clear protection.
Whether a slower evolution in the former Soviet Union would
have caused Genscher's policy to drift into nationalism cannot
be known. History will surely record as his monument a major
contribution to the unification of his people and for
achieving that goal while maintaining Germany's Atlantic
relationships. It was a tour de force.

In the next phase of foreign policy following German
unification, Genscher found himself in a world for which no
previous experience could have prepared him. The Cold War
ended and with it the option of partial equidistance from the

TO

759 0042 P.14

14
superpowers. With Soviet armies 1000 miles further east and
the former Soviet Union in turmoil, the security component of
NATO was bound to weaken; no European nation, Germany
included, would henceforth subordinate itself to the same
degree to American priorities or pay the same price for
America's protection. The disappearance of the East German
Communist state made it seem less necessary for Germany to
legitimize itself by adhering to West European, especially
French, prescriptions. European unity became less urgent.

Genscher continued to operate within the existing system,
now so ______ [rest of sentence cut off
page]. By now the dean of Atlantic foreign ministers, his
tactical skill and intelligence reinforced by his country's
new bargaining position, gave him a prominence that - perhaps
unintentionally - emphasized Germany's national role. The
realistic opportunity for it arose as well and, paradoxically,

MAY-05-1992 10:35

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759 0042 P.15

15

in a plethora of international institutions - NATO, the
European Security Conference, the Common Market, the West
European Union - with partially overlapping, hence competing,
purposes. A master diplomat is thus able to shop around and to
use international machinery. Genscher's analysis of the
Yugoslav crisis was superior to that of most of his European
partners. Still, the abruptness with which he dissociated from
the European Community mission - which had already been
approved by Germany - and moved the issue into the European
Security Conference where he had a better chance of
dominating. And I could never share Genscher's political
enthusiasm for the notion of a Europe from Vladivostok to
Vancouver. I understood his desire not to isolate the former
Soviet Union. But it is not possible to introduce so many
states with no historic or geographic relations to Europe into
a concept that seemed bound to exclude the United States

TO

759 0042 P.16

16

sooner or later - despite the standard lip service being paid.

When everybody is allied with everybody, no special obligation

exists to anybody and nationalism will reign supreme.

These doubts might well have been allayed as Genscher's
ultimate policy developed. It is in any event just as well
that he decided not to manage what he did so much to create.
Statesmen often destroy themselves by staying too long.
Genscher will certainly go down in history as one of the most
important statesmen his country has produced. The democracies
can thank him for his steady friendship; his country's
adversaries can honor him for his effort to build bridges. And
his friends will not forget that his human qualities and his
personal loyalty matched his enormous diplomatic skill.