us to resist various forms of Soviet challenges.

VII of us have a stake in finding a spectrum of deterrence to enable countries have an interest in preventing the most fearful devastation. I support the statement of my friend Mr. Hler that all our

an adequately last resort not as the sole deterrent to Soviet aggression. We must go back to the strategy of the 1920s. They must be considered colleagues in the United States. However, these forces do not enable the national nuclear forces of Britain and France as some of my too. I do not believe to be feasible. I have not been as opposed to massive retaliation based entirely on national nuclear forces. That, Their solution for the changed situation is to conduct a policy of some European countries have developed another theory.

calculation to rely on the strategic forces as the sole deterrent. will be able to mater the necessary confidence in theoretical reason therefore likely to grow. I do not believe that any President vulnerable. Whatever the West does, the Soviet capacity to retaliatize a monopoly of invulnerable weapons while the Soviet weapons remain believe this is a realistic policy. The West cannot indefinitely maintain weapons the situation of the 1920s can be prolonged. I do not

believe it is that with a very sophisticated and flexible use of strategic old validity of strategic nuclear forces. One answer that has been Two general abrogations have been attempted to maintain the

Mr. Kieinger speaking

- 8 -

Mr. Kissinger speaking

The following facts seem to me basic: The Soviet Union can threaten most allied countries from its own territory. ② No European country is capable of resisting alone. ③ The Soviet Union can threaten our allies. ④ The West has to threaten a unitary state. We would only play into Soviet hands if we split up deterrence into different segments. Our response must be to make clear that response will be as united as our interests are indivisible.

This, then, raises two fundamental questions. The first concerns the *role* of nuclear weapons in a strategy of options and the second concerns the *control* of nuclear weapons.

As to the role of nuclear weapons, some people argue that the United States envisages a purely conventional defense of Europe. Some American statements have at times given this impression. However, this notion is not commonly held and is in any event rejected by me. I cannot conceive what would induce the Soviet Union to launch a full-scale conventional attack on central Europe with any expectation that the war could be kept conventional. It would be absolutely against our interest to give the Soviets the impression that this might be the case.

NATO must not give the Soviets a shopping list of risks which among which to choose. The various options should not be too neatly compartmentalized. At every level of risk the Soviets must fear the danger of escalation. And the danger of escalation is real. Once major forces are engaged no one can foresee the consequences.

danger of escalation. And the danger of escalation is real. Once compartmentalised. At every level of risk the Soviets must fear the
amount which to choose. The various options should not be too nearly
WTO must not give the Soviets a subbing list of risks which

interest to give the Soviets the impression that this might be the case.
the war could be kept conventional. It would be absolutely against our
scale conventional attack on central Europe with any expectation that
I cannot conceive what would induce the Soviet Union to launch a full-
this notion is not commonly held and it is in any event rejected by me.
Some American statements have at times given this impression. However,
the United States encourages a purely conventional detente of Europe.
As to the role of nuclear weapons, some people argue that

and the second concerns the control of nuclear weapons.

concerns the role of nuclear weapons in a strategy of options

will be as united as our interests are indivisible.
different segments. Our reasons must be to make clear that reason
We would only play into Soviet hands if we split up deterrence into
can threaten our allies. The West has to threaten a military state.
European country is capable of relating alone. The Soviet Union
can threaten most allied countries from its own territory. No

Mr. Krasinger asking

- 9 -

Mr. Kissinger speaking

- 10 -

Secondly, no matter how many conventional divisions there are in Europe the choice of weapons is no longer entirely up to us. It is not in our interest to adopt strategic theories which are made to order for Soviet nuclear blackmail. If we imply that tactical nuclear weapons can never be used the entire military establishment in Europe can be made irrelevant by a Soviet nuclear threat. Finally it is clear that we cannot accept a conventional defeat or a substantial withdrawal in Europe without resorting to larger means. For all these reasons I believe that one of the most urgent problems before NATO is to have an adequate concept of tactical nuclear defense.

Of course, the employment of even a portion of the present tactical nuclear capabilities would involve enormous devastation. Therefore, in both the design and the deployment of our tactical weapons we should keep in mind that our objective should be the minimum amount of destruction consistent with deterrence.

Whatever the balance between conventional and nuclear forces, I should like to stress the crucial importance of continuing to elaborate a military use for the military establishment on the Continent. Those who see in it a trip wire only, those who see in American forces on the Continent primarily hostages to make sure that the Strategic Air Command is used will--with the best intentions in the world--make a substantial reduction of American forces inevitable. For purposes of a trip wire, we do not need six divisions in Europe. Six divisions in Europe make sense

we do not need six divisions in Europe. Six divisions in Europe make sense reduction of American forces inevitable. For purposes of a trip wire, it is need will--with the best intentions in the world--make a substantial Continent primarily postages to make sure that the Strategic Air Command who see in it a trip wire only, those who see in American forces on the military use for the military establishment on the Continent. Those should like to stress the crucial importance of continuing to evaporate whatever the balance between conventional and nuclear forces. I

minimum amount of destruction consistent with deterrence. We should keep in mind that our objective should be the weapon we should keep in mind that our objective should be the tactical nuclear capabilities would involve enormous devastation. Of course, the employment of even a portion of the present

petroleum NATO is to have an adequate concept of tactical nuclear defense. All these reasons I believe that one of the most urgent problems at present withdrawal in Europe without resorting to larger means. Not it is clear that we cannot accept a conventional defeat or a sup- in Europe can be made irrelevant by a Soviet nuclear threat. Finally nuclear weapons can never be used the entire military establishment to order for Soviet nuclearershell. It we imply that tactical is not in our interest to adopt strategic theories which are made in Europe the choice of weapons is no longer entirely up to us. It

Mr. Kießinger speaking

- 10 -

Mr. Kissinger speaking

- 11 -

only in terms of an integrated defense looking towards a whole
spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.

Therefore, the U.S. effort to establish a spectrum of
capabilities in Europe represents the only way to maintain the
deepest U.S. commitment to Europe: namely the presence of sub-
stantial American forces on the Continent. It is inconceivable
that with substantial American forces on the Continent, backed by
the most solemn commitments any American Administration could
accept defeat in Europe.

Let me now turn to the strategic weapons. Over the past
years, some rather heated things have been said on both sides of the
Atlantic. We tell some of our European friends, "If you trust us,
why do you want nuclear weapons?" Our friends reply, "If you trust
us, why are you so worried about our possession of nuclear weapons?"

now, why are you so worried about our possession of nuclear weapons?"

why do you want nuclear weapons?" Our friends reply. "It you trust Atlantic. We tell some of our European friends, "It you trust me, here's some rather posted figures have been said on both sides of the issue, doesn't it?"

Let us now turn to the strategic weapons. Over the best results in Europe.

the most solemn commitments and American Administration confirm that with substantial American forces on the Continent, powered by substantial American forces on the Continent. It is inconceivable dodest U.S. commitment to Europe: namely the presence of substantial capabilities in Europe represents the only way to maintain the therefore, the U.S. effort to establish a spectrum of spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities.

Mr. Knaufner addressing

Mr. Kissinger speaking

In these terms the issue is almost insoluble. I have not been
as nervous about the existing European nuclear forces as some others
in the United States. We have worked closely with the British nuclear
force without the fear that Britain would suddenly trigger a nuclear
war. I would therefore place less emphasis on depriving the Europeans
of the independent nuclear force and greater emphasis on creating a
political framework in which joint action becomes more and more taken
for granted. Given such a framework, autonomous forces within the
Alliance can enhance partnership.

In this connection, I should like to raise some questions to
which I do not have an answer, but which I believe we have to solve if
we are to make such progress. One solution sometimes advanced is to
give Europeans an increased voice in our policy in return for their giving
up independent weapons. I am in favor of any scheme by which European of-
ficers can learn about the operation of the Strategic Air Command and
participate in its planning. However, targeting is not the heart of the
problem. It is relatively easy to agree on a target list.

The political problem is much more difficult. We should ask
ourselves at least three questions. The first is exactly what we mean
by common consultation. The simple answer is that our interests and
Europe's are absolutely identical. I should like to put the question
whether this is really true. Outside of Europe our interests are not
necessarily always identical. Are the European states prepared to assume

Mr. Kissinger speaking

responsibility for any action which the United States may have to take
in Latin America or in the Far East? Is it in the interests of peace
to transform any crisis which may arise anywhere immediately into a
European crisis through the structure of our system of consultation?
I do not know the answer. Can we combine systems of consultation where
there is a very tight structure in cases where our interests are more or
less identical, and some lesser forms of co-operation in other areas? I
believe that this is a question which requires a great deal of attention.

Secondly, even in the areas where interests are identical we know
from our domestic politics that such interests are often interpreted in
different ways. The question then is, how are such disputes to be
resolved? How will our allies obtain enough competence to make their
opinions felt? I have indicated that I have serious questions about
posing the issue entirely in terms of the targetting of strategic forces.
I am more than willing to concede this. But beyond it we should address
ourselves most anxiously to the question of how we can have a common policy
in day-to-day diplomacy, how we can come to common decisions in crisis
diplomacy, how we can jointly elaborate a *causus belli*, and how conduct
a war, if that becomes necessary, and terminate it on a common basis.

Thirdly, there is the problem of the competence to consult. The
*right* of consultation is not so important as the question of who is taken
seriously. When proposals are made about the right of consultation in

Mr. Kissinger speaking

Washington, I ask myself, like who? Like the Department of Agriculture? Like the Chiefs of Staff? A voice is effective only if it is taken seriously.

This is why I have been attracted to European solutions to the nuclear problem. It is not that I think that the Europeans cannot trust us. That would be a hopeless basis for partnership. It is not because I want to promote a new kind of American isolationism; that too is an impossibility. I do not accept the proposition that if Europe has the capability of autonomous action we must then withdraw into isolation. It can be our national policy that only people who are too weak to differ with us can be allies of the United States. The basic identity of interests between Europe and the United States is too deep not to permit equal, strong partners.

As some of you know, I have not thought that the NATO multilateral force was the best way of going in the direction which I consider most desirable. I do not believe that it is appropriate for me in a foreign country and before a group as this to go into my reasons which are available in public print. I do want to say that if the NATO multilateral force is accepted, we should keep in mind the objective of some European identity in the nuclear field, which requires a greater degree of political identity also.

the objective of some European identity in the nuclear field, which
it the NATO multilateral force is accepted, we should keep in mind
my reasons which are available in public print. I do want to say that
for me in a foreign country and before a group as this to go into
I consider most desirable. I do not believe that it is appropriate
multilateral force was the best way of going in the direction which
As some of you know, I have not thought that the NATO

the United States is too deep not to permit ednal, strong partners.
United States. The basic identity of interests between Europe and
people who are too weak to ditter with us can be allies of the
withdraw into isolation. It can be our national policy that only
it Europe has the capability of autonomous action we want then
that too is an impossibility. I do not accept the proposition that
not because I want to promote a new kind of American isolationism
trust us. That would be a useless basis for partnership. It is
unclear problem. It is not that I think that the Europeans cannot
This is why I have been attracted to European solutions to the
seriously.

Like the Chief of Staff? A voice is effective only if it is taken
Washington, I ask whether, like who? Like the Department of Agriculture?

Mr. Klaasen speaking

- 14 -

Mr. Kissinger speaking

I believe that such a group could then be a real partner to us in
the nuclear field. My preference would have been for a British
initiative or a British-French initiative. But the methods by
which a European identity comes about is not decisive.

The great problem before us then--to which I have not
supplied an answer--is how much unity we want and how much pluralism
we can stand. In many respects the disputes which form the headlines
of the day give a rather misleading impression. Basically our Alliance
is vital. The real debate in the United States is how to cement the
Alliance and not how to reduce U.S. commitments. I would be worried
if the West did not discuss changes at a time when technology and
politics are so volatile. I am convinced that the prospects in the
long run are very hopeful if we recognize, as most of us do, that
nothing happens automatically in history, but that the future depends
on the vision, the imagination and the courage of the present
generation.

Generation.

on the axis, the imagination and the courage of the present
nothing paces the automatically in history, but that the future depends
long run are very doubtful if we recognize, as most of us do, that
politics are so volatile. I am convinced that the prospects in the
it the West did not decline changes at a time when technology and
Villiance and not how to reduce U.S. commitments. I would be worried
is vital. The real debate in the United States is how to cement the
of the day give a rather misleading impression. Basically our Villiance
we can stand. In many respects the debate which form the nucleus
embodied an answer--to how much unity we want and how much blunder
The great problem before us then--to what I have not

which a European identity comes about is not decisive.
initiative on a British-French initiative. But the methods dy
the nuclear field. My preference would have been for a British
I believe that such a group could then be a real partner to us in

Mr. Klaasen speaking

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- 17 -

Mr. KISSINGER.- I agree, Mr. Kiesing, that structural changes will be necessary. In case I did not make it clear, I am in favour of unified strategy and the highest degree of common policy. I think it is absolutely essential. There are two problems in the NATO Council as it is now constituted. Firstly, the Secretary-General lacks independent military advice; it is difficult for him to conduct military studies on behalf of NATO. I think it would be desirable to have a military planning staff more directly responsible to the Secretary-General.

Secondly, I believe it to be very important either to charge the NATO Council--or to create a separate body--to deal with more long-range problems such as common negotiating positions or the structure of the West. Perhaps this can be done within the NATO Council. Experience seems to show, however, that the NATO Council tends to concentrate on day-to-day problems. I would favour creating a new body, or perhaps changing the NATO Council to this end. The members, to indicate the importance of the task, could be given Cabinet status in their countries just as our Ambassador to the United Nations. I am not absolutely clear whether that should be done within the NATO Council or whether a separate body should be created to this end. There are more experienced people here than myself who would have more valuable views on that.

Mr. BAUER (Federal Republic of Germany)

Mr. KISSINGER.- It is true that I said that I am not as worried about existing national forces as some of my colleagues. I would, however, be

apout existing usurious forces as some of my colleagues. I would, however, be
Mr. KIRRINGE.- It is true that I said that I am not as worried

views on that.

are more experienced people here (than myself who would have more valuable
WTO Council or whether a separate body should be created to this end). There
Nations. I am not absolutely clear whether that should be done within the
given Cabinet status in their countries just as our Ambassador to the United
this end). The members, to indicate the importance of the task, could be
I would favour creating a new body, or perhaps changing the WTO Council to
however, that the WTO Council tends to concentrate on day-to-day problems.
Perhaps this can be done within the WTO Council. Experience seems to show,
problems such as common negotiating positions or the structure of the world.
WTO Council--or to create a separate body--to deal with more long-range
Secondly, I believe it to be very important either to charge the
 staff more directly reasonable to the Secretary-General.

result of WTO. I think it would be desirable to have a military planning
military advice: it is difficult for him to conduct military studies on
it is now constituted. Firstly, the Secretary-General lacks independent
it is absolutely essential. There are two problems in the WTO Council so
of mitigated strategy and the highest degree of common policy. I think it
will be necessary. In case I did not make it clear, I am in favour

Mr. KIRRINGE.- I agree, Mr. KIRRINGE, that structural changes

- 11 -

- 18 -

worried if the justification for these national froces were to be that
each country can defend itself only alone, that no country would ever
defend another because then the logical consequence would be a proliferation
of nuclear weapons and a complete breakdown of the common effort.

I had hoped that there might take place joint British and French
leadership in the direction of some European entity in the nuclear field.
I would not think it helpful for every European country to attempt to
create national nuclear forces of its own. While I was not friendly towards
the NATO multilateral force, I must also say that there has been no European
counter-proposal which would be closer to what I would think responsive to
the long-term needs.

On the question of division of labour, I think it is true that there
must be a certain division of labour. But I think it is also true that it
should take place in a way that does not undermine the political will of the
partners. On a purely national basis, it is impossible to get any kind of
equivalence in competence, but I believe that on a European basis it would
be possible for Europe to participate in nuclear technology. Without such
knowledge it really does not seem to me possible to make a very sensible
contribution and a very responsible one.

As long as we cannot create one Atlantic state the solution that would
appeal to me most would be a degree of political union in Europe, a European
atomic programme, which would not have to be very huge but should be very
closely co-ordinated with ours.

Mr. MONTINI (Italy)

Mr. MONTINI (Italy)

closely co-ordinated with one another.

atomic programme, which would not have to be very late but should be very able to me. Most would be a degree of political union in Europe, a European Union as we cannot create one Atlantic state the solution that would contribute and a very reasonable one.

knowledge it really does not seem to me feasible to make a very sensible
peaceable for Europe to participate in nuclear technology. Without such
edivalence in competence, but I believe that on a European basis it would
barriers. On a barely national basis, it is impossible to get any kind of
should take place in a way that does not undermine the political will of the
must be a certain division of labour. But I think it is also true that it
On the nature of division of labour. I think it is true that there
the long-term needs.

computer-proposal which would be closer to what I would think reasonable to the NATO multilateral force. I must also say that there has been no European create national nuclear forces of its own. While I was not friendly towards I would not think it helpful for every European country to attempt to

I had hoped that there might take place joint British and French
of nuclear weapons and a complete breakdown of the common effort.

defend another because then the logical consequence would be a proliferation
each country can defend itself only alone, that no country would ever
worried if the justification for these national treaties were to be that

- 18 -

- 19 -

Mr. KISSINGER.- I believe that if the course I have indicated is followed it would have to lead to common political institutions in Europe, including common parliamentary institutions. However, we have here a problem of evolution. I think that there exists a tendency to write a blueprint of what the final result should be like and then insist that anything which does not meet that blueprint is not really worthwhile. My instinct would be that history is more complicated than the analysis of the moment. If one starts a process one does not have to have everything in order before one begins. It seems impossible for me to conceive how a Europe that has a common defence policy and a common economic policy could not have a common foreign policy. Soon this would lead to common parliamentary institutions, or maybe the transformation of institutions such as this into a less advisory body.

Of course in the ultimate perspective such a structure might include the United States, but any realistic appraisal immediately has to be seen against the fact that the United States is not ready for this degree of sharing of sovereignty. The perspective suggested is one I should strongly support with the one qualification that I would not insist on every institutional arrangement being completed before we go any step along the way.

The PRESIDENT called Mr. Jaeger.

Mr. JAEGER (Federal Republic of Germany)

Mr. KISSINGER.- I have favoured in the United States a modification of our legislation with respect to atomic assistance for Europeans. However, I do not believe that this is conceivable if European nuclear forces are

I do not believe that this is conceivable if European nuclear forces are
of our legislation with respect to atomic assistance for Europeans. However,
Mr. KIRRINGER.- I have favoured in the United States a modification

The PRESIDENT called Mr. JAEGER.

way.

Institutional arrangement being completed before we go to any step along the
strongly ambivalent with the one disqualification that I would not insist on every
sharing of sovereignty. The hermeneutic suggested is one I should
against the fact that the United States is not ready for this degree of
the United States, but any realistic appraisal immediately has to be seen
Of course in the ultimate hermeneutic such a structure might include
a less advisory body.

institutions, or maybe the transformation of institutions such as the one into
common foreign policy. Soon this would lead to common parliamentary
a common defence policy and a common economic policy could not have a
one begins. It seems impossible for me to conceive how a Europe that has
It one starts a process one does not have to have everything in order before
would be that policy is more complicated than the analysis of the moment.
which does not meet that blueprint is not really worthwhile. My instinct
blueprint of what the final result should be like and then input that anything
problem of evolution. I think that there exists a tendency to write a
including common parliamentary institutions. However, we have here a
followed it would have to lead to common political institutions in Europe,
Mr. KIRRINGER.- I believe that it the course I have indicated is

- 19 -

- 20 -

described as being made necessary by the tendency of the United States to betray its allies. It is impossible if European nuclear forces are conceived as trigger devices for the American nuclear force. Finally, it is not possible if European nuclear forces are justified as being necessary because no ally will protect any other ally and that therefore every individual country must be able to defend itself entirely with its own strategic weapons.

If that is the rationale for European nuclear efforts, I would oppose assisting them. It is too much to ask the American Congress to assist countries which (a) want to end the alliance, (b) consider it unreliable, and (c) want to trigger us into a war which we may not want to fight. Europeans should develop a concept of partnership in which they demonstrate--as I believe can be done--that they can be better partners if they share a wider spectrum of responsibilities, if they unify politically sufficiently so that we avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of more and more national states in Europe and if they unify genuinely so that sharing does not simply become a device for creating national nuclear forces.

The PRESIDENT called Mr. Duynstee.

Mr. DUYNSTEE (Netherlands): In the context of arms control the notion of the minimum deterrent level is often spoken of, that is to say to have roughly 200 or 300 missiles on the Russian side controlled by the NATO countries and, let us say, roughly the same number of missiles on the NATO side controlled by the Russian or Warsaw Pact countries. If we think of this theory as perhaps being workable in the long run, does it not mean that we should have a bi-polar structure, a unity of control of command on one side and on the other side, of

structure, a unity of control of command on one side and on the other side, of
being workable in the long run, does it not mean that we should have a plan-of-
plan of the Russian or Warsaw Pact countries. It we think of this theory at least
and, let me ask, roughly the same number of missiles on the NATO side controlled
roughly 300 or 300 missiles on the Russian side controlled by the NATO countries
of the minimum deterrent level is often abridged of, that is to say to have

MR. DUYNSHAE (Netherlands): In the context of some control the notion
THE PRESIDENT called Mr. Duynsmaat.

does not simply become a device for creating national nuclear forces.
more national states in Europe and it they must uniformly so that arising
we avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of more and
abuse of reasonableness, it they must politically efficiently so that
believe can be done--that they can be better partners if they share a wider
should develop a concept of partnership in which they demonstrate--as I

(c) want to trigger me into a war which we may not want to fight. Europeans
countries which (a) want to end the alliance, (b) consider it unrelievable, and
oppose violating them. It is too much to say the American Congress to insist
that that is the rationale for European nuclear efforts. I would

strategic weapons.
individual country must be able to defend itself entirely with its own
because no ally will protect any other ally and that therefore every
not possible if European nuclear forces are justified as being necessarily
conceived as trigger devices for the American nuclear force. Usually, it is
petray its allies. It is impossible if European nuclear forces are
described as being made necessarily by the tendency of the United States to

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- 21 -

which of course the unity of control on the NATO side could be shared among
a few countries by a small executive authority? Does not a sort of triangular,
quadrilateral or multi-polar set-up completely frustrate these developments
in the field of arms control in regard to this theory of the minimum
deterrent level?

I was very much struck by a statement by Mr. Kissinger--I was struck
by the whole speech, but particularly by this--when he said that we should restudy
in Europe our system of tactical nuclear defence. In this context I ask
does he think it advisable that a further miniaturisation of nuclear weapons
should be brought about below the stage of the smallest one, the Davy Crockett,
at present accepted?

Mr. KISSINGER- I answer the second question first because it is a
technical one. Yes, I am in favour of the study of development of more
miniaturised nuclear weapons than the smallest which now exists. However,
that is independent of the range of the weapons which deliver them. The
objection which some have to Davy Crockett is not its yield, but that it
has to be deployed so far forward that it is difficult to exercise political
control over it.

As to the first question I agree that any disarmament agreement is
likely to contain a minimum deterrent. What that level is it is difficult to
say.

There would be many ways of handling that problem. First whatever
the level of strategic forces, I do not believe that the European capability
would be sufficient to achieve a superiority on the Western side. Take the figure
suggested in the question of a minimum deterrent of 300 missiles. If European
had 75 one could count the European potential as part of the Western potential.
In that event the fact that the Soviets could attack 225 American missiles with

In that event the fact that the Soviets could attack 512 American missiles with
had 72 one could count the European potential at part of the Western potential.
argued in the discussion of a minimum deterrent of 200 missiles. It European
would be sufficient to achieve a superiority on the Western side. Take the figure
the level of strategic forces, I do not believe that the European capability
There would be many ways of handling that problem. First whatever
any.

likely to contain a minimum deterrent. What that level is it is difficult to
be to the first discussion I agree that any disarmament agreement is
control over it.

has to be deployed so far forward that it is difficult to exercise political
objection which some have so Davy Crockett is not its yield, but that it
that is independent of the range of the weapons which deliver them. The
ministerialized nuclear weapons tant the smallest which now exists. However,
technical one. Yes, I am in favour of the study of development of more
Mr. KISSINGER - I answer the second question first because it is a
at present accepted?

should be brought about below the stage of the smallest one, the Davy Crockett,
which he think it advisable that a further ministrization of nuclear weapons
in Europe our system of tactical nuclear defence. In this context I ask
by the whole speech, put briefly, what he said that we should restate
I was very much struck by a statement by Mr. Klaasen--I was struck
deterrent level?

in the field of arms control in regard to this theory of the minimum
declassifiers or multi-bolar set-up completely transcribe these developments
a few countries dy a small executive authority? Does not a sort of triangular,
which of course the utility of control on the NATO side could be shared among

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- 22 -

300 Soviet ones probably would not result in a margin on the basis of which the Soviets could launch a surprise attack. This is all the more so if some of these missiles are hardened and others are mobile. Moreover, if there were 75 European missiles left after such an exchange such a force would be absolutely decisive. Alternatively one could equalize the American and the Soviet forces and have a European one which is a marginal accretion of, let us say, 75-100. The same general argument would hold. In other words I do not believe that the arms control problem will present an insuperable obstacle to the kind of notion that I have developed.

The PRESIDENT (Summary) (please keep contributions short)

Mr. MOUTET (France) (Summary)

Mr. KISSINGER.- Let me take the middle question first. The middle question was that the tactical nuclear weapons should be in the hands of the military commander and whether I did not consider this a very dangerous situation. I have read statements advocating giving military commanders discretion in the use of tactical nuclear weapons. I am completely opposed to this. We have to distinguish very much the equipment of our troops from who orders their use.

I know that accounts have appeared in the newspapers about new technological developments which would make it impossible for the local commander to use nuclear weapons without a political order which is given to the weapon. If this is not possible I would favour having these weapons far enough back so that a high headquarters exercised control.

this is not possible I would favour having these weapons far enough back to
nuclear weapons without a political order which is given to the weapon. It
developments which would make it impossible for the local commander to use
I know that accounts have appeared in the newspapers about new technological
news.

have to distinguish very much the equipment of our troops from who orders their
in the case of tactical nuclear weapons. I am completely opposed to this. We
situation. I have read statements advocating giving military commanders discretion
military commander and whether I did not consider this a very dangerous
direction was that the tactical nuclear weapons should be in the hands of the
Mr. KISSIMLER.- Let me take the middle question first. The middle

MR. MONTET (France) (Summary)

THE PRESIDENT (Summary) (please keep contributions short)

to the kind of notion that I have developed.
believe that the same control problem will present an insurmountable obstacle
say, 32-100. The same General argument would hold. In other words I do not
Soviet forces and have a European one which is a marginal accretion of, let us
spareately decimate. Alternatively one could equalize the American and the
were 12 European missiles left after such an exchange such a force would be
it some of these missiles are hardened and others are mobile. Moreover, if there
the Soviets could launch a surprise attack, this is all the more so
200 Soviet ones properly would not result in a margin on the price of which

- 33 -

- 23 -

Next, is there a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons? Logically no easy distinctions are possible. There is a spectrum of weapons. Any aggressor will always have the capability of using very large weapons if he wishes. The assumption has to be that if there is aggression it is the result of miscalculation or misunderstanding; and we should then have the possibility of trying to stop it relatively early. If, however, somebody is determined to use every weapon in his arsenal there is no Western strategy that will prevent him.

All I am arguing for is that our strategy does not make this inevitable and that we try to find the most humane means possible to resist if resistance becomes necessary. I therefore agree that a clear line of distinction is not possible between weapons. More of a distinction is possible between targets.

In our military planning I should like very great emphasis to be placed on concentrating on military targets even in a combat area and to use just enough force to prevent the movement of units even recognising all the difficulties.

That also answers Mr. Moutet's last question of whether there is an inevitable process of escalation. There is of course a very great possibility of escalation. This possibility is one of the reasons why a substantial engagement is not very likely.

I should like us to have a substantial conventional capability. At the same time, I would not like us to guarantee any aggressor ahead of time that all he would ever face is conventional defence. I should like us to have the capability to resist in a tactical nuclear war and the capability for an effective conventional defence. I oppose compartmentalising it ahead of time and giving rather precise descriptions of what we will or will not do if a certain situation arises.

Mr. JANNUZZI (Italy) (Summary)

MR. JAVINZI (Italy) (Summary)

rather precise descriptions of what we will or will not do if a certain situation conventional defence. I observe compartmentalizing it ahead of time and giving capability to resist in a tactical nuclear war and the capability for an effective all he would ever face is conventional defence. I should like me to have the same time. I would not like me to guarantee any aggressor ahead of time that I should like me to have a substantial conventional capability. With engagement is not very likely.

The hospitality is one of the reasons why a substantial inevitable process of escalation. There is of course a very great hospitality that also exists Mr. Montet's last question of whether there is an difficulties.

Just enough force to prevent the movement of units even recognising all the places on concentrating on military targets even if a combat area and to use in our military planning I should like very great emphasis to be possible between targets.

Distinction is not possible between weapons. More of a distinction is it resistance becomes necessary. I therefore agree that a clear line of inevitable and that we try to find the most humane means possible to resist VII I am arguing for is that our strategy does not make this

is no Western strategy that will prevent him. However, somebody is determined to use every weapon in his arsenal there should then have the possibility of trying to stop it relatively early. If, aggression it is the result of mis calculation or misunderstanding; and we target weapons if he wishes. The assumption has to be that if there is of weapons. Any aggressor will always have the capability of using very weapons? Logically no easy distinctions are possible. There is a spectrum Next, is there a distinction between tactical and strategic

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Mr. KISSINGER.- You will hear this afternoon from my friend Mr. Robert Bowie who is a passionate believer in the NATO multilateral force. In fact very many intelligent people, the majority of those who have to deal with NATO problems in the government, are in favour of it. You should therefore accept my answer in its proper context. One of my concerns about the NATO multilateral force is that which you have raised. I do not think that it is possible for the United States to give up the veto in any realistic way. I may be wrong about this, and I would favor giving up the veto. It seems to me that the kind of debate which would be started in the United States by such a proposal would be so difficult and would raise so many questions that it would not seem to me to be worth it.

I have no doubt about the technical feasibility of the MLF proposal. But I have serious doubts about the political evolution of the next five years. Therefore in Europe, where there is a movement towards greater political integration, questions of giving up a degree of sovereignty may be more easily soluble. I do not know to what we should commit ourselves if we give up the veto. Does it mean that we go to war with only 200 missiles and leave the rest out? Therefore, if a NATO multilateral force is created I would wish to see it transformed into a European force as soon as possible.

see it transformed into a European force as seems possible.

rest out? Therefore, if a NATO multilateral force is created I would wish to
veto. Does it mean that we go to war with only 200 missiles and leave the
army. I do not know to what we should commit ourselves if we give up the
integration, directions of giving up a degree of sovereignty may be more easily
therefore in Europe, where there is a movement towards greater political
But I have serious doubts about the political evolution of the next five years.

I have no doubt about the technical feasibility of the WHE broadeast.

Many directions that it would not seem to me to be worth it.

the United States pay such a broadeast would be so difficult and would raise so
the veto. It seems to me that the kind of debate which would be started in
realistic way. I may be wrong about this, and I would favor giving up
that it is possible for the United States to give up the veto in any

the NATO multilateral force is that which you have raised. I do not think
therefore accept my answer in its broader context. One of my concerns about
with NATO problems in the government, are in favour of it. You should
fact very many intelligent people, the majority of those who have to deal
Robert Bowie who is a bazonate peevier in the NATO multilateral force. In

Mr. KIRRINGER.- You will hear this afternoon from my friend Mr.
who is a bazonate peevier in the NATO multilateral force. In

- 25 -

Mr. KISSINGER.- I am not absolutely sure that I have understood the question, but, if I have understood it correctly, I should be in favour of assisting a genuine European effort in the nuclear field under the conditions which I have already outlined to Mr. Jaeger. It should reflect the notion of Atlantic partnership and result in a co-ordinated strategic and political doctrine for the Atlantic alliance. I believe that on this basis a high degree of practical co-operation is possible, while if we debate the question of sovereignty in the American Congress in the abstract it is going to create enormous concern without immediate results. I am in favour of assistance to a genuine European effort on the basis which I have indicated.

Mr. KISSINGER.- Actually there will be four forces: an Atlantic force, a British force, a French force and an American force. The Atlantic force, of course, cannot really be fired without American approval, so that we are talking of three forces. I would think that in the concept which I have outlined one of the practical consequences could and should be a joint command for the two forces that would exist, which would enable them to act on a closely co-ordinated basis in the case of war. I am not so concerned with the details of the organisational arrangements as I am with the direction in which we want to go, but I can foresee on the basis which I have outlined that one result could be and probably should be an Atlantic command which relates these forces to each other.

that one result could be and properly should be an Atlantic command which in which we want to go, put I can foresee on the basis which I have outlined with the details of the organizational arrangements as I am with the direction closely co-ordinated basis in the case of war. I am not so concerned for the two forces that would exist, which would enable them to act on a outlined one of the practical consequences could and should be a joint command are talking of three forces. I would think that in the concept which I have force, of course, cannot really be tired without American approval, so that we a British force, a French force and an American force. The Atlantic

Mr. KISSIMGER.- Actually there will be four forces: an Atlantic force,

a Gennine European effort on the basis which I have indicated,
enormous concern without immediate results. I am in favour of assistance to
sovereignty in the American Congress in the abstract it is going to create
of practical co-operation is feasible, while it we debase the notion of
doctrine for the Atlantic alliance. I believe that on the basis a high degree
Atlantic partnership and result in a co-ordinated strategic and political
which I have already outlined to Mr. Jaeger. It should reflect the notion of
assisting a Gennine European effort in the nuclear field under the conditions
direction, put, if I have understood it correctly, I should be in favour of
the

Mr. KISSIMGER.- I am not specifically sure that I have understood the

A/WEU (9) CR.8

MR. KISSINGER (Professor of Political Science at Harvard University) - I appreciate the kind words that your President has expressed about my books. I think that in fairness I should point out something a British reviewer once wrote about me. He said that "he did not know whether Mr. Kissinger was a great writer but that anyone finishing his book was a great reader."

I am always a little uncertain when speaking before a dis-
tinguished group of parliamentary leaders where eloquence is so
much a part of the condition of the public career. I should like
to point out to you that at Harvard obtuseness is sometimes considered
a sign of profundity.

I speak to you at a somber moment in our history. The United
States has suffered a tragic and unexpected loss. Having worked
at one time with President Kennedy, the sadness is personal as well.
Naturally, there will be many questions in people's minds about the
continuity of American policy. The question will be asked whether
fundamental changes in U.S. policy might be considered.

I speak here, as you know, as an irresponsible Harvard professor.
Indeed, there is a school of thought in the United States which holds
that once a man has identified himself as a Harvard professor the
adjective is quite unnecessary. Therefore, I can tell you, without,
I hope, being suspected of following an "official" line, that I do not
see any possibility of change in the lines of American foreign
policy. There may be - indeed, there will be - changes in style.

bility. There may be - indeed, there will be - changes in style.
see any bessibility of change in the manner of American foreign
I do, being suspected of following an "official" line, that I do not
subjective to due unnecessary. Therefore, I can tell you, without,
that once a man has identified himself as a Harvard professor the
Indeed, there is a school of thought in the United States which holds
I ask here, as you know, as an irrevocable Harvard professor.

fondamental changes in U.S. policy might be considered.
continuity of American policy. The question will be asked whether
Naturally, there will be many questions in people's minds about the
at one time with President Kennedy, the question is bilateral as well.
States has altered a tragic and unexpected loss. Having worked

I ask to you at a somewhat moment in our history. The United

a sign of bad news.

to point out to you that at Harvard opulences is sometimes considered
much a hard life in the condition of the public career. I should like
tingulated group of parliamentary leaders where excellence is so
I am always a little uncertain when speaking before a die-

but that someone finishing his book was a great reader."
said that "he did not know whether Mr. Klaasen was a great writer
point out something a British reviewer once wrote about me. He
has expressed apout my pokes. I think that in fairness I should
universality) - I appreciate the kind words that your President
MR. KISSIMKER (Professor of Political Science at Harvard

V:\MEN (a) CR.8

Mr. Kissinger speaking

There are likely to be alterations in personnel over a period of time. But the main lines of American foreign policy will remain the same, at least for the time being. In my view, they are unchanged.

President Johnson was a close associate of President Kennedy. In terms of his background he is in the tradition of President Truman, who holds such an honored place in Atlantic relationships.

As for our imminent national election, one obvious result of the recent tragedy has been the strengthening of the moderate, internationalist wing in the Republican Party. I know some of their leaders, and I can assure you that regardless of the results of the election next Fall, the main lines of our European policy will be continued. Regardless of who will be President after November, the main categories of the discussion before this Assembly will remain unchanged, until after the election, when new ones may be evolved.

These categories as far as the U.S. is concerned are as follows: There is no dispute in the United States about the indivisibility of interests of the Atlantic area. As an old friend of many of you here and as an old friend of Europe, I must tell you that it does not advance our discussion very much to imply that the United States might be planning to withdraw from Europe, or betray Europe, or perhaps get itself into a position where it might make a settlement at the expense of Europe. Obviously on issues of the complexity which we know those before us serious people are going to differ within the Alliance and within each government. But I am convinced that the majority of both our political parties are dedicated to the notion of an Atlantic Community.

batties are dedicated to the notion of an Atlantic Community.
Government. But I am convinced that the majority of both our political
serious people are going to differ within the Alliance and within each
of Europe. Optionally on issue of the complexity whose before us
itself into a position where it might make a settlement at the expense
be planning to withdraw from Europe, or petrify Europe, or berate Europe
advance our discussion very much to imply that the United States might
and as an old friend of Europe, I must tell you that it does not
interests of the Atlantic area. As an old friend of many of you here
There is no debate in the United States about the indivisibility of
These categories as far as the U.S. is concerned are as follows:

Atlantic Alliance and the affected by the threat

will remain unfrustrated.
November, the main categories of the discussion before this Assembly
will be continued. Regardless of who will be President after
of the election next Fall, the main lines of our European policy
their leaders, and I can assure you that regardless of the results
internationalist wing in the Republican Party. I know some of
the recent tragedy has been the strengthening of the moderate,

As for our imminent national election, one obvious result of
Truman, who holds such a honored place in Atlantic relationships.

In terms of his background he is in the tradition of President
President Johnson was a close associate of President Kennedy.

my view, he unambivalent.

time. But the main lines of American foreign policy will in
There are likely to be alterations in personnel over a period of

Mr. Kießinger speaking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

It believes in the concept of a joint defence. The only worthwhile dispute in America, and, I hope, the only useful dispute within the Alliance, concerns how they can best organise a common policy and implement a common defence. We do not have a monopoly of wisdom, and sometimes our judgments about these common goals may be wrong. Certainly they should at all times be open to challenge, but the useful framework for discussion is in terms of community and not rivalry as between Europe and the United States.

Nevertheless, there have been differences of which we are all aware. I should like to mention a few, beginning with some psychological and political problems.

It is inevitable that American-European relations should change as Europe gains strength, vigor and self-confidence. At the end of World War II Europe was devastated and completely dependent on American material and military support. Partly as a result of the Marshall Plan, partly due to European efforts, economic conditions have greatly improved. It is natural and healthy that Europe should aspire to something closer to its traditional role in foreign affairs. This forces both sides of the Atlantic to overcome certain bad habits that may have developed over the past few years.

When America started the Marshall Plan it was above all conscious of Europe's economic weakness. Perhaps subconsciously many thought of a future Europe no longer in need of economic assistance, but which would more or less automatically accept our political lead.

would more or less automatically accept our political lead. It is
of a future Europe no longer in need of economic assistance, but which
of Europe's economic weakness. Perhaps subconsciously many thought
when America started the Marshall Plan it was above all conscious
that may have developed over the past few years.

These forces put aside of the Atlantic to overcome certain pad paps
abide to something closer to its traditional role in foreign affairs.
have greatly improved. It is natural and healthy that Europe should
Marshall Plan, partly due to European efforts, economic conditions
on American material and military support. Partially as a result of the
end of World War II Europe was devastated and completely dependent
change as Europe gains strength, vigor and self-confidence. At the
It is inevitable that American-European relations should

and political problems.

But the useful framework for discussion is in terms of community

of wisdom, and sometimes our judgments about these common roles may

be policy and influence a common defence. We do not have a monopoly

within the Alliance, concerns how they can post-evaluate a common

Mr. Kieinger speaking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

During the debate on the nuclear test moratorium last summer, there was a great deal of discussion about the testing of war-heads. But if one looks at the whole nuclear arsenal one is struck by the fact that never before has so much depended on weapons of war for which there is so little operational experience. You are familiar with the published figures of the number of weapons that we are planning. The inter-continental missiles alone approximate a thousand. I doubt that we shall have fired as many as fifty of them. Firing them in salvoes will have to be based on theoretical calculation for a long time. Much of the strategic debate is bound to have a somewhat esoteric, almost metaphysical, character.

Secondly, as Mr. Ehrler correctly pointed out, deterrence takes place in the mind of the opponent. A threat which is meant as a bluff but is taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a threat which is meant seriously but is interpreted as a bluff. Any military policy therefore, has to be designed in terms of its impact on Soviet calculations. There we are obviously in the realm of intangibles. We have to analyze how the Soviets will interpret our capability and we have to know how they will understand our strategy.

We face many problems of a similar nature. How do we threaten with solid fuel missiles? With conventional weapons armies could be mobilized as a sign that things were getting serious. Even airplanes could be put into a state of increased readiness. But how do you demonstrate additional resolve when your weapons are by this design-in a state of acute readiness? These problems were not invented by us

["in a state of acute readiness? These problems were not invented by us\ndemonstrate additional resolve when your weapons are put to use—\ncould be put into a state of increased readiness. But how do you\nmodified as a sign that things were getting serious. Even airplanes\nwith solid fuel missiles? With conventional weapons armies could be\nWe face many problems of a similar nature. How do we threaten\ncapability and we have to know how they will understand our strategy.\ntangibles. We have to analyze how the Soviets will interpret our\non Soviet calculations. There we are obviously in the realm of in-\nmilitary policy, therefore, has to be designed in terms of its impact\na threat which is meant seriously but is interpreted as a ploy. And\nput in this manner is more useful for purposes of deterrence than\nplace in the mind of the opponent. A threat which is meant as a ploy\nSecondly, as Mr. Ehrlich correctly pointed out, deterrence takes\necstatic, almost metaphysical, character.", "Much of the strategic debate is based on theoretical calculation for a long\ntime we shall have to be based on theoretical calculation for a long\ntime we

Mr. Kissinger speaking

of war that those areas immediately attacked would receive greater
devastation than those further away. Today the option exists, or
is thought to exist, that countries can use an alliance to elaborate
a casus belli but to shift the actual conduct of military operations
onto other territories. This is a very understandable tendency.
It is not, however, a good basis on which to found long-range policy.

In what way has military technology changed them-over these past
years? We have witnessed essentially four phases. First, there was
the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and a
monopoly on the means of delivery. This ended around 1955. Then there
was a period when we no longer had a monopoly in either weapons or
means of delivery but could probably have won a war by striking first.
This phase is now ending. We are entering a period during which the
notion of military superiority in the field of strategic weapons is
bound to change its meaning whether we like it or not.

During the first three periods it was sensible to rest the defence
of Europe largely on American strategic power. The Soviet Union could
not attack Europe alone because this would have lead to a crushing first
blow. It could not attack the United States simultaneously with Europe
because our superiority was too great. In the period ahead some degree
of effective parity is inevitable regardless of what we do and regardless
of what we intend. This is not our fault, this is not our design, and
neither we nor our allies can avoid it.

of what we intend. This is not our fault, this is not our design, and
of effective parity is inevitable regardless of what we do and regardless
because our superiority was too great. In the period ahead some degree
plow. It could not attack the United States simultaneously with Europe
not attack Europe alone because this would have lead to a crushing first
of Europe largely on American strategic power. The Soviet Union could
During the first three periods it was sensible to react the defence
pound to change its meaning whether we like it or not.

notion of military superiority in the field of strategic weapons is
This phase is now ending. We are entering a period during which the
means of delivery put could properly have won a war by striking first.
was a period when we no longer had a monopoly in either weapons or
monopoly on the means of delivery. This ended around 1922. Then there
the period when the United States broke up an atomic monopoly and a
years? We have witnessed essentially four phases. First, there was
In what way has military technology changed them over these past

It is not, however, a good base on which to found long-range bomb.
onto other territories. This is a very understandable tendency.

a cause pelting put to shift the actual conduct of military operations
is thought to exist, that countries can use an alliance to elaborate
devastation than those further away. Today the option exists, or
of war that those areas immediately attacked would receive greater

Mr. Kieising speaking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

Of course, even a portion of the present tactical nuclear capabilities would involve enormous devastation. Therefore, in both the design and the deployment of our tactical weapons we should keep in mind that our objective should be the minimum amount of destruction consistent with reasonable deterrence.

we do not need six divisions in Europe. Six divisions in Europe make sense reduction of American forces inevitable. For purposes of a trip wire, it is need will--with the best intentions in the world--make a substantial Continent primarily postages to make sure that the Strategic Air Command who see in it a trip wire only, those who see in American forces on the a military line for the military establishment on the Continent. Those I should like to stress the crucial importance of continuing to evaporate whatever the balance between conventional and nuclear forces.

consistent with maximum deterrence.

in mind that our objective should be the minimum amount of destruction the design and the deployment of our tactical weapons we should keep capabilities would involve enormous devastation. Therefore, in both Of course, even a portion of the present tactical nuclear

before NATO is to have an adequate concept of tactical nuclear defense. All these reasons I believe that one of the most urgent problems at present withdrawal in Europe without resorting to larger means. For it is clear that we cannot accept a conventional defeat or a sup-

in Europe can be made irrelevant by a Soviet nuclear threat. Similarly nuclear weapons can never be used to need the entire military establishment to order for Soviet nuclear BLACKMAIL. If we imply that tactical is not in our interest to adopt strategic theories which are made in Europe the choice of weapons is no longer entirely up to us. It

Mr. Klaasen speaking

Mr. Kissinger speaking

Therefore, the U.S. inquiry to establish a spectrum of
capabilities in Europe represents the only way to maintain the
deepest U.S. commitment to Europe: namely the presence of
substantial American forces on the Continent. It is inconceivable
that with substantial American forces on the Continent, backed by
the most solemn commitments that any American Administration
could accept defeat in Europe.

Let me now turn to the strategic weapons. Over the past years,
some rather heated things have been said on both sides of the
Atlantic. We tell some of our European friends, "If you trust us,
why are you so worried about our possession of nuclear weapons?"

Atlantic. We tell some of our European friends, "If you trust me, why some rather heated things have been said on both sides of the

Let us now turn to the strategic weapons. Over the best years,

by the most solemn commitments that any American Administration that with substantial American forces on the Continent, packed a substantial American force on the Continent. It is inconceivable defeat U.S. commitment to Europe: namely the presence of capabilities in Europe represents the only way to maintain the

Mr. Klaarner speaking

- 11 -

Mr. Kissinger speaking

Washington, I ask myself, like whom? Like the Department of Agriculture? Like the Chiefs of Staff? A voice is effective only if it is taken seriously.

This is why I have been attracted to European solutions of the nuclear problem. It is not that I think that the Europeans cannot trust us. That would be a hopeless basis for partnership. It is not because I want to promote a new kind of American isolationism; that too is an impossibility. I do not accept the proposition that if Europe has the capability of autonomous action we must then withdraw into isolation. ~~I do not believe that it can be an article of national policy that only people who are impotent to have different views from mine can be allies of the United States. The basic identity of interests between Europe and the United States is too deep not to permit equal, strong partners.~~

As some of you know, I have not thought that the NATO multilateral force was the best way of going in the direction which I consider most desirable. I do not believe that it is appropriate for me in a foreign country and before a group as this to go into my reasons which are available in public print. I do want to say that if the NATO multilateral force ~~is~~ accepted, we should keep in mind the objective of some European identity ~~in this field, which requires a greater degree of political identity~~ also.

131

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Mr. Kissinger speaking

Mr. BAUER (Federal Republic of Germany) (Summary)

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141

Mr. Kissinger speaking

It would not seem easy to conceive how that would not lead to common parliamentary institutions or maybe the transformation of institutions such as this into less advisory groups.

Of course in the ultimate perspective such a structure might include the United States, but any realistic appraisal immediately has to be that the United States is not ready for this degree of giving up of its sovereignty, even though one might wish it to be and I personally would wish that it should be.

Mr. JAEGER (Federal Republic of Germany) (Summary)

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149

Mr. DUYNSTEE (Netherlands): In the context of arms control often the notion is spoken of of the immediate deterrent level, that is to say to have roughly 200 or 300 missiles on the Russian side controlled by the NATO countries and, let us say, roughly the same number of missiles on the NATO side controlled by the Russian or Warsaw Pact countries. If we think this theory as perhaps being workable in the long run, does it not mean that we should have a bi-polar structure, a unity of control of command on one side and on the other side, of which of course the unity of control on the NATO side could be shared among a few countries by a small executive authority? Does not a sort of triangular, quadrilateral or multi-polar set-up completely frustrate these developments in the field of arms control in regard to this distillery of the immediate deterrent level?

I was very much struck by a statement by Mr. Kissinger - I was struck by the whole speech, but particularly by this - when he said that we should restudy in Europe our system of таксоманж tactical nuclear defence. In this context I ask does he think it advisable that a further miniaturisation of nuclear weapons should be brought about below the stage of the smallest one, the Davy Crockett, at present accepted?

A/WEU (9) CR.8

144 - 150

Mr. KISSINGER: I answer the second question first because it is a technical one. Yes, I am in favour of the study of development of more miniaturised nuclear weapons than the smallest which now exists. However, I think that is independent of the range of weapons which deliver them.

154 - 160

A/WEU (9) CR.8

In our military planning I should like very great emphasis to be
placed on concentrating on military targets even in a combat area and to use
just enough force to prevent the movement of units <u>recognising</u> all the
difficulties.

That also answers Mr. Moutet's last question of whether there is an
inevitable process of escalation. There is, of course a very great possibility
of escalation. This possibility of escalation is one of the reasons why a
substantial engagement is not very likely. If we can not say that we
should use nuclear weapons if we have other weapons available, it is a very
subtle problem.

I should like us to have a <u>substantial</u> capability. I would not like us
to guarantee any aggressor ahead of time that all he would ever face is
conventional defence. I should like us to have the capability to <u>resist</u>
in a tactical nuclear <u>mm</u> war and the capability for a <u>conventional</u> defence.
I oppose compartmentalising it ahead of time and giving rather precise
descriptions of what we will or will not do if a certain situation arises.

163.

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MR. KISSINGER.- I am not absolutely sure that I have understood the question, but, if I have understood it correctly, I should be in favour of assisting genuine European effort in the nuclear field under the conditions which I have already outlined to Mr. Jaeger, that is to reflect the notion of Atlantic partnership and co-ordinated strategic and political doctrine for the Atlantic alliance. I believe that on this basis a high degree of practical co-operation is possible, while if we debate the question of sovereignty in the American Congress in the abstract it is going to create enormous concern without immediate results. I am in favour of assistance to a genuine European effort on the basis which I have indicated.

165.

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