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# The Soviets and the Atom

For all their pride in their ability to predict the course of history, for all their confidence in their skill in manipulating social forces, the end of World War II confronted the Soviet leadership with a fearful challenge. At the precise moment when Soviet armies stood in the center of Europe and Lenin's prophesies of the doom of capitalism seemed on the verge of being fulfilled, a new weapon appeared far transcending in power anything known before. Would then the non-Soviet world be able to stave off disaster by means of the atomic bomb? Was the dialectic of history so fragile that it could be upset by a new technological discovery? Was this to be the result of twenty years of brutal repression and deprivation and of four years of cataclysmic war that at its end the mortal enemy should emerge with a gadget which could imperil the Soviet state as never before?

It must have been disheartening for the Kremlin to enter a post-war world where the ascendancy of the U.S.S.R. as a world power, seemingly confirmed by the outcome of the conflict, was again put into question. The purely ideological problems were no less formidable. If capitalism could extricate itself from its difficulties by a new technological discovery, the structure of the economy was not as determining of other activities as Soviet doctrine postulated; it was less fundamental in fact than the state of technology. If the predictive power of Leninism failed at so vital a point, the whole dogma based on superior prescience was put into question. Thus the discovery of nuclear power represented a subtle challenge to the domestic legitimacy of Soviet leadership. The planned economy of the U.S.S.R. assumed the capacity to foretell with precision the consequences of contemporary trends and decisions. The emergence outside the control of the

consequently trends and decisions. The emergence outside the control of the
assumed the capacity to foresee with precision the consequences of
domestic legitimacy of Soviet leadership. The branded economy of the U.S.S.R.
Thus the discovery of nuclear power represented a supreme challenge to the
point, the whole degree based on superior brev clearance was but into question.
of technology. If the predictive power of Stalinism relied on so vast a
Soviet doctrine postulated: it was less fundamental in lack than the state
the structure of the economy was not as determining of other activities as
could extricate itself from its difficulties by a new technological discovery.
The briefly ideological problems are no less formidable. It cabaretism
continued by the outcome of the conflict, was again but into question.
war world where the ascendency of the U.S.S.R. as a world power, seemingly
It must have been disappointing for the Kremlin to enter a post-
emergence with a budget which could timber it the Soviet state as never before?
and of four years of osteofascial war that at its end the most violent upon
since to be the result of twenty years of punitive repression and demarcation
so fragile that it could be based by a new technological discovery. Was
state of all disaster by means of the atomic bomb? Was the dialectic of history
began anything known before. Would then the non-Soviet world be able to
on the verge of being fulfilled, a new weapon abhorred for transgressing in
center of Europe and Russia, proposals of the doom of capitalism seemed
to fulfil challenge. At the precise moment when Soviet armies stood in the
forces, the end of World War II confronted the Soviet leadership with a
policy, for all their confidence in their skill in manipulating social
For all their pride in their ability to predict the consequences of

The Soviets and the Atom

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Soviet hierarchy of a force of seeming unlimited capacity for both economic welfare and human destruction was an attack on its own claim to superiority.

But the Soviet leadership reacted to the challenge with the iron discipline it had learned during its history of militancy. It refused to recognize an inconsistency between Leninist theory and reality, for to do so would have been to give up its reason for existence. Rather, it sought to demonstrate that the new developments far from disproving accepted doctrine actually confirmed it and that the decay of capitalism far from being arrested by the more powerful weapons at its disposal would be accelerated by it.

Nor was this Soviet display of discipline merely an exercise in abstract theory. On the contrary, Soviet leadership put their doctrinal training to good use in the eminently practical task of surviving as a revolutionary power. They had learned all their lives that appearances were deciving and that a political situation reflected a combination of political, economic, psychological and military factors. They had been taught that the emphasis on any one of these factors to the exclusion of the others was self-defeating. They were convinced that superiority in one of the categories of power could be compensated by a manipulation of the others. Thus while Soviet leadership could not do anything immediate about our military capability, they might erode the psychological framework for its use by a world-wide campaign against the horrors of nuclear warfare. The dialectic would thereby be restored with the psychological component of power balancing its physical aspects. And domestically, Soviet leadership was even more sure of itself. Since the kremlin controlled all the media of communication, it could establish the framework of thinking about nuclear matters within the Soviet Union both by withholding information and by interpreting it to fit the tactical requirements of the Soviet line.

and by interfering it to lift the tactical requirements of the Soviet fine, nuclear matters within the Soviet Union poor by withholding information of communication, it couldbefeed the framework of thinking apart was even more sure of itself. Since the kremwin controlled all the means power reinforcing its physical aspects. And domacality, Soviet fesderabip The dialectic would thereby be restored with the bexhological component of its use by a world-wide campaign against the horrors of unfeet wars. our military cabability, they might erode the bexhological framework for others. Thus while Soviet fesderabip could not do subduing immediate apart of the categories of power could be compensated by a manipulation of the the others was self-defeating. They were convinced that superiority in one taught that the emirate on any one of these factors to the exsorption of belliger, economic, bexhological and military factors. They had been deciding and that a belligerent situation reflected a computation of revolutionarily benefit. They had learned all their lives that abberance training to good use in the elementry practical task of surviving as a abstracted theory. On the contrary, Soviet fesderabip but their doctrine was this Soviet display of discipline merely an exercise in accelerated by it.

pasing arrested by the more powerful weapons at its disposal would be doctrine actually confirmed it and that the decay of capitalism tar from to demonstrate that the new developments tar from fielding accepted would have been to give up its reason for existence. Rather, it sought to recognize an inconsistency between Leninist theory and reality, for to do discipline it had feared during its history of military. It refused to

But the Soviet fesderabip reacted to the challenge with the iron
welfare and human destruction was an attack on its own claim to superiority.
Soviet hierarchy of a force of seeming unlimited capability for podb economic

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Finally, the Soviet leadership realized that the United States monopoly position, the fear of war, and ignorance about nuclear matters offered a fertile field for propaganda in many countries of the world.

The result was a tour de force, masterful in its comprehension of psychological factors, brutal in its consistency, and ruthless in its sense of direction. With a cold-blooded effrontery as if no other version of reality than its own was even conceivable, the Kremlin through all the media and organizations at its disposal, through diplomacy and propaganda, advanced three related themes: 1) that the decisiveness of nuclear weapons was overrated -- this was designed to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R. remained predominant in the essential categories of power; (2) that, although not decisive, nuclear weapons were inherently in a special category of horror from other weapons and should therefore be banned. By means of diplomatic notes, peace congresses, resolutions and propaganda, this campaign sought to paralyze the psychological basis for the use of our most potent weapon; (3) that the only legitimate use of the atom was its peaceful application in which field the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take the lead. This position reinforced the previous one; it gave impetus to Soviet peace offensives and its appeal to the uncommitted.

All three themes recur in Soviet doctrine since 1945 with changes of emphasis, but little alteration in content. It is possible to distinguish two phases, however, in Soviet efforts to come to grips with the atom: the period of our atomic monopoly and the period after the Soviets acquired a nuclear arsenal of their own. During the former period, the Soviets relied largely on their "ban the bomb" propaganda which insisted that atomic bombs were as evil and horrible as they were ineffectual.

With the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and especially since the death of Stalin, threats of thermo-nuclear retaliation have alternated with

death of Stalin, currents of thermo-unclean retaliation have alternated with
with the growth of the Soviet unclean erasure, and subsequently since the
just strategic pumps were as valid and formidable as they were intellectual.

Soviets relied largely on their own pump, proboscidea which insulated
acquired a unclean erasure of stalinown. During the former period, the
atom: the period of one atomic month, and the period after the Soviets
tutored two pumps, however, in Soviet efforts to come to terms with the
of empires, put little alteration in content. It is possible to dis-

VII three themes reem in Soviet doctrine since 1942 with changes
Soviet hence alternatives and its appeal to the uncommitted.

The less. This position reinforced the previous one: it gave impetus to
its peaceful application in which itself the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take
our most potent weapon: (3) that the only legitimate use of the atom was
full campaign aimed to paralyze the bayofological pale for the use of
means of hypersonic notes, hence, Congress, resolutions and proboscidea,
category of honor from other weapons and should therefore be punished. A
strongly not decisive, unclean weapons were inherently in a specialist
remained predominant in the essential categories of power: (5) that,
weapons were overrated -- this was designed to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R.
enhanced these related themes: (1) that the decisiveness of unclean
and organizations at its disposal, through diplomacy and proboscidea,
reality than its own was even conceivable, the Kremin through all the media
of direction. With a cold-processed efficiency as it no other aviation of
bayofological factors, prudal in its consistency, and richess in its sense
The result was a strong de force, materiel in its complement of
feritile field for proboscidea in many countries of the world.

Position, the fear of war, and influence about unclean matters offered a
fluctuation, the Soviet federated resurfaced that the United States monoparty

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proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviets no longer rely entirely on our inhibitions; they have sought also to play on our fears. But in doing so, nuclear power became better understood by the Soviet public and this raised a host of problems with respect to doctrinal purity, militancy and the course of history which had been evaded in 1945. Each period will be examined in turn.

## II

The Soviet effort to minimize nuclear weapons was so consistent and began so early that it must have been planned long before the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. When Truman informed Stalin during the Potsdam conference that the United States possessed a new weapon of fearful power, he was startled by Stalin's nonchalance in acknowledging it: "The Russian Premier," wrote Truman, "showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and that he hoped we would make 'good use of it against Japan'."¹) Against the background of the later disclosures of Soviet esponiage, there can be no doubt that Stalin was well aware of the impact of what he was being told. It was simply that the Kremlin had decided to minimize the importance of nuclear weapons thereby to demonstrate its independence and the impossibility of intimating it.

With the official Soviet attitude thus determined the whole apparatus of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy went into action in support. The bombing of Hiroshima was mentioned in the Soviet press only briefly, and with no further discussion or elaboration. The end of the Far Eastern

1. Harry S. Truman. *Years of Decision*. New York:

p. 416.

J. Harry G. Trumans. Years of Declaration. New York:

b. '19.

and with no further discussion or elaboration. The end of the East European
The pumping of Hiroshima was mentioned in the Soviet press only briefly,
thereafter of Soviet broadeagle and chibmack went into station in unburthen.

With the official Soviet attitude thus determined the word
it.

hereby to demonstrate its independence and the independence of infighting
the Kremlin had decided to minimize the importance of nuclear weapons
was well aware of the impact of what he was being told. It was studied that
paper disclosures of Soviet encomiague, there can be no doubt that Stalin
make 'Good see or it against Japan.' (1)
Against the background of the
VII he said was that he was glad to hear it and that he hoped we would
it: "The Russian Premier," wrote Trumans, "approved no specialist interest.
of nuclear power, he was started by Stalin's noninterference inACKNOWLEDGING
during the Potsdam conference that the United States desired a new peace
of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. When Trumans informed Stalin
and began so early that it must have been banned long before the explosion

The Soviet effort to minimize nuclear weapons was so consistent
that the American effort to eliminate them was sofosbant

II

be examined in turn.
and the course of history which had been everted in 1945. Each period will
this raised a host of problems with respect to nuclear purity, military
and on our assumptions they have sought a way to break our ties. But in
broadsense to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviets no longer rely entirely

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war was attributed entirely to the intervention of Soviet armies. The bombing of Nagasaki was not reported when it occurred. Although the Soviet regime was soon to launch a world-wide campaign to "ban" the use of atomic bombs, the Soviet public had to wait for nearly ten years to find out precisely what the atomic bomb was.

Moreover, whatever the uncertainties of the Power which did possess the atomic bomb, Soviet propaganda knew no such hesitations. As early as September 1, 1945, less than a month after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet propaganda organ *New Times*, was ready with an official interpretation of the significance of nuclear weapons. Because the semblance of wartime harmony was still being maintained, the form chosen was one of those indirect methods so dear to the heart of Soviet strategists: an analysis of foreign press on comments regarding the atomic bomb. After a brief summary of descriptions of the atom bomb, the article turned to an examination of its implications. The atomic bomb, argued the *New Times*, had not been the decisive weapon in the war against Japan. Such a proposition was advanced only by bankrupt Japanese militarists to obscure their ignominous defeat at the hands of the U.S.S.R. and by "semi-fascist" commentators like General Fuller in Great Britain: "The experience of the second World War and the unsurpassed victories of the Red Army have clearly shown that success in war is not achieved by the one-sided development of one or other weapon, but by the perfection of all arms and their skillful coordination."²) In short, nothing particular or unusual had happened at Hiroshima.

2. *New Times*

S. New Times

moral and had happened at Hiroshima.
name and their skilful coordination. (S)
In short, noting particularly or
one-sided development of one or other weapon, put by the protection of still
the Red Army has clearly shown that success in war is not achieved by the
"The experience of the second World War and the unambused victories of
and by "semi-satellite" commentators like General Butler in Great Britain;
withstands to overcome their fignominous defect at the hands of the U.S.A.S.
against Japan. Such a proposition was advanced only by bankrupt Japanese
pomp, argued the *New Times*, had not been the decisive weapon in the war
the article turned to an examination of its implications. The atomic
the atomic bomb. After a brief summary of descriptions of the atom bomb,
Soviet authorities: an analysis of foreign press on comments regarding
form chosen was one of those indirect methods so dear to the heart of
Because the compliance of maritime harmony was still being maintained, the
with an official interpretation of the significance of ancient weapons.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet probands of *New Times*, was reaching
early as September 1, 1945, less than a month after the bombing of
bombed the atomic bomb, Soviet probands knew no such realisations. We
Moreover, whatever the uncertainties of the power which did
ring out precisely what the atomic bomb was.

of atomic bombs, the Soviet bomb had to wait for nearly ten years to
Soviet regime was soon to launch a north-wide campaign so "pen" the race
pumping of Nagasaki was not reported when it occurred. Although the
war was attributed entirely to the intervention of Soviet armies. The

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If the atomic bomb had not proved decisive against Japan it could clearly not be used to intimidate the U.S.S.R.: "Under the influence of the announcement of the atomic bomb, the reactionary circles in the United States... are inclined to stand forth unashamed in their imperialist nakedness. They demand that the United States should establish its domination over the world with the atomic bomb. Apparently the lessons of history mean nothing to those errant imperialists. They do not stop to ponder over the debacle of Hitler's plans of world dominion which, after all, were also based on the expectation of exploiting temporary advantages in the production of armaments."3) But while nuclear weapons did not confer a basic advantage their effort was so horrible that all "progressive" forces had to unite in seeing to it that they would never be used.4)

All the strains of Soviet nuclear policy thus emerged barely three weeks after the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima: the relative unimportance of nuclear weapons; their special horror; and the Soviet Union as the defender of the peace appealing to all groups repelled by the prospect of atomic warfare. Stalin was merely ratifying official dogma when, a year after the first atomic explosion, he took his first public stand on nuclear matters: "I do not consider the atomic bomb as such a serious force as several political groups incline to think it. Atomic bombs are intended for the intimidation of the weak, but they cannot be the decisive judge of a war since for this the atomic bomb is completely insufficient."5)

3. Ibid.

4. N. Rubinstein. "The Foreign Press on the Atomic Bomb," *New Times*, Sept. 1, 1945.

5. Pravda, September 25, 1946.

2. "Preludes" September 22nd, 1949.

3. "The Atomic Bomb," New Times, Sept. 1, 1949.

4. "The Exploitation." "The Foreign Press on the Atomic Bomb," New Times, Sept. 1, 1949.

5. Ibid.

The decision of the war since the atomic bomb has completely
atomically pounds are intended for the investigation of the war, but they cannot
be such a serious force as several political groups incline to think it.
that public stand on nuclear matters: "I do not consider the atomic bomb
officially does when a year after the that atomic explosion, he took die
rebelled by the prospect of atomic war." Status was merely ratifying
the Soviet Union as the defender of the peace according to all known
the relative importance of nuclear weapons; their actual power; and
three weeks after the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima
will the strains of Soviet nuclear policy thus emitted partially
be to unite in seeing to it that they would never be used."

The advantages their effort was so peremptory that all "broader issues"
population of empires." But while nuclear weapons did not confer a
status based on the expectation of exploiting temporarily advantages in the
the despite of Hitler's plans of world dominion which, after all, were
mean nothing to those erstwhile imperialisers. They do not stand to border over
tion over the world with the atomic bomb. Abolish the reasons of policy
mindedness. They demand that the United States should establish its domin-
United States ... are inclined to stand forth unashamed in their imperialisat
the announcement of the atomic bomb, the reactionally circles in the
clearly not be used toSEDUCATE the U.S.A.: "Under the influence of
the atomic bomb had not proved declarative against Japan it could

It the atomic bomb had not proved declarative against Japan it could

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This theme once sanctified by Stalin was henceforth repeated with tiresome regularity in Soviet literature and by the Communist parties all over the world. "Atomic bombs," said the official Soviet encyclopedia "are meant to frighten people with weak nerves, but they cannot decide the outcome of a war."⁶) "Atom bomb" repeated the Chinese Communist dictionary, "one of the secret weapons used by the United States during the Second World War. After the war American imperialism exaggerated its destructive power, attempting to secure diplomatic advantages by means of a threat. Actually its destructive power is rather limited."⁷)

The Soviets thus rigidly maintained the "pure" doctrine that no mechanical invention could possibly disturb the foreordained course of history. Accordingly, the atomic bomb was increasingly treated as a Western propaganda trick designed as a means of blackmailing the "camp of socialism" into submission. The few Soviet discussions regarding nuclear matters which reached the public were entirely on the psychological level. Atomic warfare was not analyzed as a strategic problem; instead theories which had suggested that atomic warfare might change the course of history were derided. A Communist philosopher summed up the whole American discussion on nuclear matters as an effort to "frighten both imaginary enemies and one's own fellow citizens."⁸) American writers were accused of exaggerating the effectiveness of the bomb, Lewis Mumford coming in for special ridicule for suggesting that after an atomic holocaust man would return to primitive conditions. The atomic bomb could add little to the destruction

6. Bolshaya Entsiklopediia. 2nd edition. Vol. III, p. 433.

7. A Four-Corner System. New Dictionary, Shanghai Communist Press, 1950.

8. Trakhtenberg, O.V., "The Sociology of the Atom Bomb!". Vaprosy Filosofii No. 3, 1949, p. 294.

To, 3. 1949, b. 500.

8. TRANSCENDENTALISM. "The Sociology of the Atomic Bomb." Abarbary Liffscott

1. A. K. Gourvenex, *Système: New Dictionary*, Shanghai Communist Press, 1960.

C. ROBERTA EUSTONIOLLETTA. 2nd edition. Acr. III, b. 433.

DEFINING CONDITIONS. The atomic bomb could add little to the destruction
积极地对 suggestions that affect an atomic pacifist man would return to
filling the effectiveness of the bomb, levels Hulford coming in for specialist
eagles, our own fellow officers. (3) American writers were accused of exagera-
tion on nuclear matters as an effort to "frighten both imaginary enemies
were girdled." A Communistاوtheopiser accused the whole American dis-
which had suggested that atomic核 might change the course of history
Atomic核 was not unlike as a strategic problem instead theories
matters which reached the public were entirely on the beachhead of the
socialism into manipulation. The few Soviet discussions regarding nuclear
Western propaganda trick designed as a means of misleading the "comb of
fiesta". Accordingly, the atomic bomb was increasingly treated as a
mechanical invention could become distasteful the foreseen course of
The Soviet Union rapidly maintained the "bure" doctrine that no
destructive power is rather limited. (4)

to secure diplomatic advantages by means of a threat. Actually its
the American imperium has exaggerated its destructive power, attempting
secret weapons used by the United States during the Second World War. After
war. (5) "Atom bomb" repeated the Chinese Communist dictionary, "one of the
to frighten people with weak nerves" put they cannot decide the outcome of a
the world." "Atomic bomb," said the official Soviet encyclopaedia "are meant
freshest regularity in Soviet literature and by the Communist parties all over
This theme once anotified by Stalin was penciled forth reprinted with

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that had already been known; yet of Stalingrad and still Russia had won the war. 9) And Pravda contributed its part to the campaign to deprecate the atom bomb by quoting unidentified reports from Tokyo that in Hiroshima only 8,481 individuals had been affected by the Atomic explosion and only 7,967 in Nagasaki. 10)

The studied aloofness with respect to nuclear technology extended to the scientific achievement which had developed nuclear weapons. A book on atomic energy published in 1952 disposed of the whole question of the military use of atomic energy in three pages out of four hundred citing Stalin's dictum that nuclear weapons could not be the decisive judge in war. 11) The study stressed the alleged contribution of Russian theorists like Mendeleev and Bekkerel to atomic work; it minimized the role of Western theorists and said practically nothing about the scientists who actually produced the bomb. Indeed, Lenin's alleged contribution to atomic science was given more prominence than that of any Western scientist. Lenin had taken note of the new theories of the "destruction of the atom, its inexhaustibility, the changing nature of its basic forms; nuclear physics was therefore a contemporary branch of dialectical materialism." 12) This general line was also followed in the Soviet encyclopedia's discussion of the scientific background for atomic energy. 13)

The effort to minimize nuclear technology was accompanied by a complete blackout on news regarding Western achievements. No mention was made in the Soviet press of the following events: the United States announcement of December 1951 regarding the possibility of peaceful applications of

9. Ibid.

10. Pravda, January 21, 1950.

11. M. N. Korunskii. Atomnoe Yadio. Moscow, 1952.

12. Ibid., p. 62.

13. Bolshaya Entsiklopedija, op. cit., p. 417.

["f3. Polarishe Enskiløbøggete, cf. cf., b. 41.", "f5. Ipiq, b. 45, cf. cf., cf. cf. cf. cf. cf.

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nuclear energy; the test of Britain's first atomic bomb in October 1952; or the explosions of the U. S. hydrogen bomb in November 1952. It was not until 1954 that the Soviet public was permitted to see a picture of the mushroom cloud which in the West had been a symbol of the nuclear age for nearly a decade. So loath were the Soviets to acknowledge the role of atomic bombs in international politics that in attacking President Truman's statement of November 1950 that if necessary the United States might use nuclear weapons in Korea, they did not even mention the atomic bomb, but charged President Truman only with creating "new war hysteria."¹⁴)

The nonchalance towards atomic matters was maintained even with respect to Soviet accomplishments in the nuclear field. The Soviet press did not report the first Soviet atomic explosion and the world had to hear of it through an American announcement. Even then the Soviet reaction was studiedly matter-of-fact. Pravda pretended surprise at the apparent excitement in the non-Soviet world about this turn of events and Vishinsky at the United Nations emphasized its peaceful and not its military implications: "We want to harness atomic energy to carry on great tasks of peaceful construction...To blast mountains, to change the course of rivers."¹⁵)

The Soviet show of indifference to its own accomplishments in the nuclear field was probably caused in part by the fear that if flaunted too much, the atomic bomb might cause a preventive attack by the United States before the Soviet retaliatory power was fully developed. It also reflected the predominant nature played in Soviet life by doctrine. For better or worse, to be sure, more by necessity than by choice, the Soviet leadership had staked its survival as a militant revolutionary power on deemphasizing

14. For an excellent account of the Soviet regime's relations with the press, see Gruliow, Leo. "What the Russians are Told," *The Reporter*, March 24, 1955.

15. *Soviet News*, November 14, 1949.

["12. *Soviet News*, November 17, 1948. See *Grunewald: letter to 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盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟盟

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nuclear weapons, at least through its period of maximum peril while the
Soviet nuclear stockpile was small or non-existent. It would not be de-
flected from this course even to celebrate its own achievements. Moreover,
the Soviet position had not been simply to deprecate nuclear weapons. Such
a course was useful to maintain morale, it did not supply the rationale
for the activism which according to Soviet theory alone can ensure the
success of the revolutionary movement. And Soviet leadership required a
doctrine of its invincibility both for protection against imagined enemies
and even more importantly to be able to continue to exert pressure on the
peripheral powers of Eurasia. It was one thing, however, to assert that
the atomic bomb could not be decisive by itself; it was another to maintain
that the Soviet Armed Forces were basically superior to their opponents.
But this is precisely what Soviet military doctrine set out to do and
with the same monolithic unity between doctrine and action which characterizes
all other aspects of Soviet society. Concurrently with its campaign to
minimize the implications of nuclear weapons, the Kremlin therefore developed
a strategic doctrine designed to demonstrate that it was the Soviet Union,
not the United States which possessed the decisive advantage, should war
break out. Soviet military doctrine found the key to its superiority in
a distinction between what it defined as the "transitory" and the "con-
stantly operating" factors of military science. The non-Soviet world might
score advantages in the former category; the U.S.S.R. would nevertheless
emerge victorious because of its superiority in the latter category.¹⁶)

The distinction between transitory and permanently operative factors

16. See Garthoff, *op. cit.* p. 34ff.

["F.C. See Campbell, *Ob. cff. B. 344*.", "The distinction between *transitory* and *permanently operative* factors emerge victoriously because of its ancescence in the latter category.10) score advantages in the former category: the U.S. Air. would nevertheless establish *operating* factors of military science. The non-Soviet world might have a distinction between what it defined as the \"transitory\" and the \"con-press out\". Soviet military doctrine found the key to its ancescence in not the United States which possessed the decisive advantage, should war a strategic doctrine designed to demonstrate that it was the Soviet Union, minimise the implications of nuclear weapons, the Kremlin therefore developed its other aspects of Soviet society. Consequently with its campaign to win the same monolithic unity between doctrine and action which characterises but this is precisely what Soviet military doctrine set out to do and that the Soviet Union forces were practically annull to their objectives.\n\nthe atomic bomb could not be decisive by itself; it was another to maintain herbarious powers of Nurseries. If we were one thing, however, to assert that and even more importantly to be able to continue to exert pressure on the doctrine of its invincibility fund for protection against imagined enemies success of the revolutionarily movement. And Soviet feedback should require a for the activism which according to Soviet theory alone can ensure the a course was useful to maintain morale, if it did not affirm the rationale of the Soviet position had not been simply to deprecate nuclear weapons. Such a course was useful to maintain morale, if it did

IX - 11

was not merely a dialectical quibble: it served as the basis of post-war
Soviet military doctrine; it appeared in all military textbooks; it was taught
at the military academies; it was repeated over and over again by all organs
of Soviet propaganda. "Victory in war, wrote one Soviet author "does not
depend on 'transitory' factors, on one weapon or sudden invasion, but certain
constantly operating factors: durability of the rear, morale of the army
and the people and the superiority of the social and economic system." 17)
"Military thinking in the capitalist countries" wrote another high-ranking
officer "under the direction of unresolved class contradictions . . . displayed
an erratic and extravagant predeliction for one-sided development, now of
the air force (Douhet), now of the tank force (Fuller). . . As we know all
these one-sided theories and vagaries of military thought resulted for
the capitalist states only in bitter disillusionment and great catastrophes." 18)
The one-side development of non-Soviet military thought was no accident
according to Soviet doctrine. It reflected the fact that capitalist leaders
could not rely on their own people; they had to seek to substitute technology
for manpower: "Not having reliable reserves of manpower at their disposal,"
wrote Marshal of Aviation Veralinin in 1949 "the warmongers exaggerate the
role of the Air Force out of all proportion . . . [believing] that the people
of the U.S.S.R. and of the People's Democracies will be intimidated by the
so-called 'atomic' or 'push-button' war." 19)

In short, military superiority according to Soviet military doctrine
in the immediate post-war period did not depend on technological supremacy --
indeed a technological advance might encourage a doctrine of surprise attack
which for a time was considered the most ephemeral of the "transitory" factors

17. M. Gusev, *Borba Sovietskoro Soiuza za sokrashehenie... Atomnovo Orushia*, Moscow, 1951.

18. *New Times*, No. 52, 1949.

19. Pravda, July 17, 1949.

18. "New Times" No. 23, 1949.

Moccas" 1921.

15. "Oates," "Rosa Scherazara Soina se asopasements...Vamoso Orsagite."

which for a time was considered the most supplemental of the "transitoirs" (factors introduced a technological advance might encourage a doctrine of annihilation attack in the immediate boar-mare period did not depend on technological annihilation). In short, military anseriority according to Soviet military doctrine ac-crufted, "atomized, or, "hand-picked, war." (16) Of the U.3.S.R., and of the People's Democracies will be instituted by the note of the Vir Force out of all proportion...

"Defending" that the People wrote Mainsail of Aviation Aeronaut in 1948 "the members exaggerate the for manpower: "Not having reliable reserves of manpower, at their dieosal," could not rely on their own people; they had to seek to补appellate technology according to Soviet doctrine. If reflected the fact that capitfalls, factors The one-side development of non-Soviet military thought was no accident the capitfalls state only in bitter staffsitionment and great catastrophes."(16) These one-sided theories and agencies of military fromst refuted for the six force (Dombet), now of the tank force (Buffer) ... As we know, off an crude and extraneous prehension for one-sided development, now of officer "under the direction of unneeded class contractions" ... dispirited "Military thinking in the capitfalls countries," wrote another fight-ranking and the people and the anseriority of the social and economic system." (17) Constantly operating factors: insufficiency of the men, more of the army gebent on "transitoirs, factors" on one side or another invasion, put certain of Soviet prehensions." "Victory in war," wrote one Soviet author, "goes not of the military academies; it was rebeated over and over again at all origins". Soviet military doctrine: it absorbed in all military textbooks: it was taught was not merely a dispirited dopple: it served as the paste of boar-mare.

IX - 11

IX - 12

and endlessly derided. The experience of the German "blitzkrieg" had demonstrated that victory depended on superiority in the "constantly operating" factors. Thus Soviet military doctrine, until 1953 at least, developed a strategy which was in effect a descriptive generalization of the experiences of World War II. It relied on methodical preparation and not on surprise; it preferred massed infantry attacks to sudden thrusts and battles of maneuver; it placed great stock on centralized control of the entire front and to the subordination of all arms to the land-battle; it sought victory in incessant pressure until the inferior morale of the enemy would crumble and a breakthrough was achieved.²⁰)

It is remarkable that at a time when most of U.S. military thinking was centered around the notion that a new war would start with a surprise attack, such a course was explicitly rejected by Soviet theory and indeed ridiculed by it. At a period when the prevalent doctrine in the United States was concerned with an all-out war decided ultimately by the attrition of industrial potential, the Soviets never tired of emphasizing the virtue of the indirect approach and of the breakthrough at the enemy's weakest link. And the breakthrough could be achieved by psychological as well as military means; as we have seen, the same terminology was employed interchangeably for both political and military warfare. It can be maintained, of course, that these arguments were advanced simply as propaganda or that our doctrine was "really" the correct one. But it is one thing for the Soviets to adopt a certain propaganda line in their relations with the rest of the world; it is quite another for them consciously to mislead their entire people, and above all their military services on a matter of life-and-death. It can hardly be

20. For a splendid discussion of Soviet strategic and tactical doctrine drawn from Soviet field regulations see Garthoff, *op. cit.*

drawn from Soviet field regulations see GAPPOT, 

off their military services on a matter of life-and-death. It can hardly be
due another for them consciously to mislead their entire people, and above
certain probands line in their relations with the rest of the world! It is
that these arguments were advanced simply as probands or that our doctrine
for both political and military matters. It can be maintained, of course,
means; as we have seen, the same terminology was employed interchangeably
And the breakthrough could be achieved by backpedaling as well as militarily
the indirect approach and of the breakthrough at the enemy's weak link.
industrial potential, the Soviets never tired of emulating the virtue of
was concerned with an off-out man decided ultimately by the attrition of
ridiculed by it. At a period when the previous doctrine in the United States
attack, and a course was explicitly rejected by Soviet theory and indeed
was centered around the notion that a new war would start with a surprise
attacked by it. It is remarkable that at a time when most of U.S. military thinking
a breakthrough was achieved. SO)

incessant pressure until the interior morale of the enemy would crumble and
to the subordination of all arms to the front-battle! it sought victory in
come; it bled great stock of centralized control of the entire front and
if preferred managed industry stocks to sustain VE armate and battle lines of
World War II. It relied on methodical preparation and not on annihilation;
strategy which was in effect a descriptive generalization of the experiences
factors. The Soviet military doctrine, until 1933 at least, developed a
demonstrated that victory depended on superiority in the "constantly operating"
and infrastructurally dependent. The experience of the German "pitfall" had

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IX - 13

maintained that the Soviets would teach their officer corps a doctrine they knew to be erroneous, write field regulations based on principles known to be fallacious and train and equip their military services for a war they knew to be suicidal simply to mislead the outside world. On the contrary, the consistency of Soviet behavior would indicate that on questions of doctrine the Kremlin generally does mean what it says.

The argument regarding the superior validity of our doctrine is beside the point. By conceding the first blow and adopting a policy of deterrence, we were also obliged to develop a doctrine and a capability which addressed itself to the most likely danger. And the most likely danger in such a situation is defined by Soviet doctrine, not ours. As long as we insisted on a military doctrine considered fallacious by Soviet military thought, while not developing counters to what Soviet military theory considered the most productive strategy, there was an inherent incommensurability not only between our position and that of the Soviets, but also between the theory of deterrence and the strategy we might be forced to implement, an inconsistency well demonstrated by the dilemmas of the Korean War. Out policy of deterrence deterred only the worst contingency, a sudden onslaught, not the preferred or the most typical Soviet method of operation which is constant, sometimes hardly perceptible, pressure until the opponent will to resist is broken. Therein lies the key to the success of many Soviet successes in the post-war period.

### III

The Soviets possessed another advantage in the immediate post-war period: the growing conviction of the non-Soviet world, assiduously fostered by Soviet propaganda, that any war was likely to be a nuclear war and that a

by Soviet broadeage, that and war are likely to be a uncertain war and that a
period: the growing conviction of the non-Soviet world, 'asymptotically faltered
The Soviets possessed another advantage in the immediate post-war
era: the Soviet military strength, which was then at its peak, was in a
relatively high position, and the war was in its early stages.

III.

occurrence in the post-war period.

will to resist is broken. Therein lies the key to the success of any Soviet
operation, which is constant, sometimes paralyzing, pressure until the opponent
is defeated, not the preferred or the most typical Soviet method of operation
in a war.

On policy of deterrence deterred only the worst contingency, a sudden
implementation, an inconsistency well demonstrated by the dilemma of the Korean
between the theory of deterrence and the strategy we might be forced to
apply not only between our position and that of the Soviets, but also
sidered the most productive strategy, there was an inherent inconsistency,
therefore, while not developing counter to what Soviet military theory con-
vinced on a military doctrine considered fallacious by Soviet military
in such a situation is defined by Soviet doctrine, not ours. We long as we
which addressed itself to the most directly gender. And the most directly
deterrence, we were also inclined to deviation a doctrine and a casuistry
is beside the point. By conceding the first plow and sowing a policy of
the argument regarding the superior validity of our doctrine

Kremmlin Generylla does mean what it says.
The argument regarding the superior validity of our doctrine
is beside the point. By conceding the first plow and sowing a policy of
the argument regarding the superior validity of our doctrine

of Soviet penetration would indicate that on directions of doctrine the
we can act only as a means to mislead the outside world. On the contrary, the com-
mitments and train and equip their military services for a war they knew
they to be erroneous, writes freefieg regulations based on principles known to us
maintained that the Soviets would teach their oldest coroll a doctrine they

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IX - 14

nuclear war would represent an unparalleled catastrophe. Thus the Soviets were in the fortunate position that every increase in the power of its opponents caused a proportionate increase in the inhibitions against its use. The Soviets therefore set about systematically to create a framework in which the nuclear arsenal of the United States was neutralized, not yet by the power of the Soviet Union, but by the psychological impossibility of employing it. Domestically, the Kremlin attempted to maintain its militancy by minimizing the power of nuclear weapons. Internationally, it strove to increase hesitations by emphasizing the horror of the new technology.

The policy of paralyzing America's nuclear capability by inhibiting our intentions took the form of a world-wide campaign that the atomic bomb should be "outlawed" because it was in a category of special horror. The Kremlin therefore resisted all efforts to negotiate a system of international inspection, partly because such a system was inconsistent with its internal control apparatus, but perhaps more importantly because it might have given impetus to what the Soviets described as "atom diplomacy" -- an increased international role for the United States based on the prestige of our position on the atom. A United Nations disarmament commission, the majority of which was composed of non-Soviet states, was in Soviet eyes an inherently hostile organ. There was no point in making any sacrifices to an illusory good will, particularly as the first explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb was approaching and as an international inspection system would operate to perpetuate the position of the United States as the leading atomic power. Finally, there was not much symbolism in technically complex negotiations about disarmament. It was much simpler and infinitely more effective to come out flatly for a program of "banning the bomb." This would serve the dual advantage of demonstrating Soviet independence of action and focussing attention on the horror

attracting Soviet independence of action and possibly attention on the part of
program of "running the bomb." This would serve the dual advantage of tem-
It was much easier, and initially more effective, to come out fairly for a
position of the United States as the leading atomic power. Binsly, there
and so an international transaction would operate to hermetize the
barrierly as the first explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb was approaching
outbreak. There was no doubt in making any sciences to anfirmery good will,
was composed of non-Soviet states, was in Soviet days an inherently possible
on the atom. A United Nations disarmament commission, the majority of which
international role for the United States based on the breath of our position
impetus to what the Soviets described as "atom diplomacy." -- an increased
control of abnormity, put behind more immorality because it might make given
invasion, hardly because such a system was inconsistent with its internal
Kremlin therefore related all efforts to negotiate a system of international
should be "confiscated" because it was in a category of abstract form. The
our intentions took the form of a world-wide campaign that the atomic bomb
The policy of barbaying America's nuclear capability by印itting
tions by emphasizing the horror of the new technology.
the power of nuclear weapons. Internationally, it arose to increase results-
Domestically, the Kremlin attempted to maintain its military power, minimizing
of the Soviet Union, put by the psychological imbalance of emulating it.
Unclear areas of the United States was neutralized, not yet by the power
States therefore set about systematically to create a framework in which the
caused a proportionate increase in the implications against its use. The
were in the fortunate position that every increase in the power of its opponents
unclear would represent an unassessed catastrophe. Thus the Soviets

IX - 14

IX - 15

of the weapon around which America's strategy was built. Every United States proposal in the Disarmament Commission was consequently countered by a Soviet demand that nuclear weapons be outlawed. A psychological framework was thereby created diverting attention from the Soviet aggression which would unleash nuclear weapons to the nuclear weapons themselves. "Atomic aggression" came to seem more terrible than the Soviet aggression which by our repeated declaration had to precede it. And Soviet persistence was not without effect: in every concrete issue under dispute from the Berlin blockade to Korea, we made clear at the outset that we would not use our most powerful weapon because we had become convinced, probably correctly, that world opinion would not condone its use, short of the extremity which Soviet strategy tried its best to avoid.

Soviet diplomatic moves were only a part of a world-wide campaign seeking to arode the psychological basis of nuclear warfare. Within the Soviet Union this campaign was muted until 1949 leat an emphasis on the horrors of the atomic bomb demoralize the Russian people. As the Soviets developed a nuclear stockpile of their own, references to the horrors of atomic warfare grew more frequent although they never reached the intensity of the appeals addressed to the rest of the world. The Soviet public were constantly told, however, that the "destruction of civilization" was the goal of American "atom maniacs" willing to do anything to forestall the destruction of capitalism.

Only Soviet determination was said to prevent the realization of this even-tuality. In analyzing the famous "atom war" issue of *Colliers* which it described as pathological sadism. <u>21)</u> *Izvestia* (August 22, 1951) saw in the atomic bomb an Anglo-Saxon plot to destroy the other races of the world and

21. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, November 15, 1951.

ST. International Games, November 12, 1941

atomic bomb in Anglo-Saxon not to destroy the Axis states of the world and describe as "bacteriological experiment". ST. International Games (1941) saw in the entity. It saying the name "atom was" same of Officers which it Only Soviet determination was said to prevent the result of this even- "atom machine" willing to do subject to foreseen the destruction of capitalism. however, that the "destruction of civilization" was the root of American addressed to the rest of the world. The Soviet buffer were constantly told, "Grew more trend through they never reached the intensity of the phase" "unclear" a quote of their own, references to the porus of atomic warfare the atomic bomb demonstrate the Russian people. As the Soviet developed a Union this campaign was united until 1946, then an emirate of the porus of seeking to trade the bacteriological diseases of nuclear war. Within the Soviet Soviet diplomatic moves were only a part of a world-wide campaign to avoid.

confront its use, short of the extremely which Soviet strategy tried its best we had become convinced, properly correctly, that world opinion would not clear at the outset that we would not use our most powerful weapon because every concrete frame under grant from the Berlin program to Korea, he made him so to precede it. And Soviet presence was not without effect: in to seem more terrible than the Soviet aggression which by our repeated declarations nuclear weapons to the nuclear weapons themselves. "Atomic aggression" came created diverting attention from the Soviet aggression which would unlesst demand that nuclear weapons be enforced. A bacteriological framework was thereby proposed in the Disarmament Commission was consequently considered by a Soviet of the weapon around which America's strategy was based. Every United States

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cited as evidence a calculation by Dr. Leo Szilard that 500 tons of heavy water
could obliterate all human life.

These arguments were repeated endlessly in the Soviet effort to
obtain world-wide support for its campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons. The
principal tool has been the so-called "World Peace Movement." Starting with
the Stockholm Peace Appeal in 1950, for which according to Communist sources
more than 50 million signatures were obtained throughout the world, the Peace
Movement has been conducting a well-organized campaign to stimulate mass
protests and mass action against the use of nuclear weapons. Its permanent
organ is the "World Peace Council" headed by the French atomic scientist,
Frederic Joliot-Curie, a long-time Communist sympathizer. The world council
and the various national peace councils which exist in many countries on both
sides of the Iron Curtain have been disseminating a steady stream of arguments
about the horror of nuclear warfare and the necessity of outlawing it. Besides
dozens of pamphlets they are publishing periodicals in 25 countries and in 13
different languages.

It is tempting to dismiss the World Peace Movement and the strategy
it represents as mere propaganda; it is also highly dangerous. The constant
repetition of slogans directed at the weakest point psychologically of the
non-Soviet world, tended to undermine the psychological framework for the
employment of nuclear weapons. The West feels ambivalent about the role of
force in international relations -- a campaign against the horrors of nuclear
warfare can only strengthen these inhibitions. The resentment against their
colonial past causes many of the newly independent states to be almost
desperately ready to believe the best of the Soviet Union and the worst of
the West; an appeal which asks of them nothing else than to agree to the
importance of peace and the horror of nuclear warfare is nearly irresistible.

importance of these and the horror of nuclear warfare is nearly irrefutable.

The West must, indeed, ask of them holding out as long as to agree to the
decentralized ready to believe the part of the Soviet Union and the worst of
civilian best causes many of the newly independent states to be almost
unbearable can only strengthen these implications. The recentment against their
force in international relations -- a campaign against the forces of nuclear
employment of nuclear weapons. The West feels insufficient about the role of
non-Soviet world, tended to undermine the policyoftheft framework for the
repetition of ergasia directed at the weakest point politically of the
if represents as were supposed; if it is also highly dangerous. The constant
If it is referring to diamining the World Peace Movement and the strategy
different languages.

goddesses of hamburge they are buffeting bellicose in 52 countries and in 13
apart the horror of nuclear warfare and the necessity of outflanking it. Belong
ing of the Iron Curtain have been dismantling a steady stream of arguments
and the various national these councils which exist in many countries on both
Arabic, French, German, a long-time Communist propagandizer. The world council
organ is the "World Peace Council," headed by the French atomic scientist,
broader and mass action against the use of nuclear weapons. If permanent
Movement has been conducting a well-organized campaign to stimulate was
more than 20 million signatures were obtained throughout the world, the Peace
the Stockholm Peace Assembly in 1920, for which according to Commissariat sources
brought to bear has been the so-called "World Peace Movement." Starting with
oppose world-wide support for its campaign to oustify nuclear weapons. The
These arguments were rebased effusely in the Soviet effort to
comp-optimize all human life.

cited as evidence a calculation by Dr. Leo Safford that 200 tons of nuclear water

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IX - 17

The Peace Movement thus enables the Soviets to enlist the hopes and fears of many eminent men, appalled by the prospect of nuclear war, who would have nothing to do with communist strategy. The task of psychological warfare is to hamstring the opponent through his own preconceptions and this has been precisely the Soviet strategy with respect to nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the Communists have shown their customary skill in confronting their opponents with impossible alternatives which, whether they succeed in their immediate purpose or not, define the framework of the next contest. The telegram which the Soviet-dominated East German Government sent in 1954 to its West German counterpart can serve as an example of many similar resolutions by non-official bodies all over the world: "The American H-bomb tests...have greatly alarmed the entire peace-loving mankind. The parliaments of numerous countries -- Japan, above all -- have demanded the prohibition of A-bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. No country is more threatened and endangered by nuclear war than Germany. The German Parliament therefore are under an inescapable obligation to combat this terrible danger. We therefore propose to the deputies of the West German Parliament to pass a join resolution with the members of the Volkskammer (Parliament of Eastern Germany) demanding a ban of weapons of mass destruction and of all experiments with them..."²²) And a similar appeal was made by the mayor of East Berlin to his counterpart in West Berlin. The West German Parliament in effect was being asked to go on record as favoring atomic warfare in its own country. Nothing was said of the Soviet aggression which alone could unleash it or of German unity which was being prevented by Soviet fiat. Instead all attention was concentrated on the horror of the one weapon, the large stockpiles of which were the reflection and not the cause of existing tensions and which in any case represented the most effective barrier to Soviet attack.

22. *Henes Seutselland* April 22, 1954 (East Berlin)

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These arguments finely attuned to prevailing fears almost imper-
ceptibly shifted the primary concern away from Soviet aggression which was
the real security problem to the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons
which happened to represent the most effective means for resisting it.
Because of its skill in exploiting the inhibitions of the non-Soviet world,
the Soviet bloc has discovered two forms of "atomic blackmail": the threat
of the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and an effort to deter the West
through its own deterrent power by appealing to its moral inhibitions. The
greater the power of modern weapons, the more fertile the field for Soviet
maneuvers which seek to attach a special stigma to them or which exalt the
objectives for which alone it would be "legitimate" to resort to nuclear
war. In either case the consequence is a lowered will of resistance. The
purposeful employment of the two forms of "atomic blackmail" is illustrated
by the boast of an East German newspaper that the "World Peace Movement"
had restrained us from using atomic weapons in Korea while the development
of the Soviet hydrogen bomb had tied our hands in Indo-China. 23)

The results are not hard to find. In every crisis from Suez to
Hungary to Indo-China, the U.S.S.R. has succeeded in shifting the onus of
initiating nuclear war to us. In every situation there have been powerful
advocates in the non-Soviet countries urging peace because the alternative
of nuclear war seemed too teriible to contemplate. The confusion between
conventional war, limited nuclear war and all-out thermo-nuclear war which
has been the bane of NATO, while it has not been produced by Soviet
maneuvers, has certainly been abetted by them. The more terrible Soviet
propaganda can paint the horrors of war, even if in the guise of appeals of
peace, the more likely is it to undermine the willingness to resist.

23. *Neue Zeitung*, January 25, 1955. (East Berlin) Chinese Communist
sources have advanced almost precisely the same arguments.

IX - 19

"Atomic" aggression in major areas of the world has become more invidious than the Soviet aggression which alone could unleash it, as is illustrated by the uproar caused by Secretary Dulles' "brink of war" statement in *Life* in January 1956. For whatever the wisdom of making the statement in the first place, Secretary Dulles left no doubt that we would go to the brink of atomic war only to counter the threat of Soviet military aggression.

Moreover, while seeking to paralyze the will to resist of its opponents through conjuring the horrors of atomic war, the Kremlin did not propose to be inhibited itself by such prospects. Too great an emphasis domestically on the terrible consequences of nuclear war might give rise to the notion of a stalemate -- as has indeed happened in the non-Soviet world. But a stalemate is as abhorrent to the dialectic as the admission that capitalism might save itself by means of a new technology. A stalemate implies that neither side can use force and this would have come close to giving up the militant basis of Communism. The doctrine that the relations between different social systems were inherently warlike and that war was at least possible could not be surrendered without denying the distinguishing feature of Communism, indeed the legitimization of twenty-five years of social repression.

Starting in 1949, therefore, a refinement was added to the doctrine of inevitable and protracted conflict between opposing social systems: that the next war would produce not the destruction of civilization as such, but the destruction of capitalism. This concept was first elaborated by Malenkov on the occasion of the thirty-second anniversary of the Communist revolution (November 7, 1949); it was repeated in articles in the official party organ *Bolshevik* by Molotov and Mikoyan in subsequent months. Although it has been the subject of debate in the post-Stalin area; the concept that

it has been the subject of debate in the host-German arena; the concept that
Baryta or Baran Belaevich by Mirovich and Wirovich in opposition means. Although
recognition (November 3, 1940); it was requested in signers in the critical
Nietzmann on the occasion of the third-second anniversary of the Communist
put the destruction of civilisation. This concept was first exported by
the next war. Mirovich, however, not the destination of civilization as such,
of intellectual and political conflict between opposing social systems; that
arising in 1948, therefore, a relaxation was added to the doctrine

social repression.

Feature of Communism, indeed, the legitimization of twenty-five years of
at least possible config. Not be surrendered without demanding the disbanding
between different social systems were indirectly written and that was
satisfied in the military phase of Communism. The doctrine that the relations
involves the neither side can use force and this would have come close to
capitalism might have itself dy means of a new technology. A statute
but a statute is as applicable to fine dithactic as the abusator that
the notion of a statesman -- as has indeed happened in the non-Communist world.
globally on the terrible consequences of nuclear war might give rise to
proposals to be implemented itself by such procegts. Too great an emphaeis
obvious through confining the honors of atomic war, the keyword did not
moreover, while seeking to justify the will to resist of its
war only to counter the threat of Soviet military aggression.

Briars, Secretary Duffies said no doubt that we would go to the print of atomic
January 1958. For whatever the wisdom of making the statement in the first
the hour, except by Secretary Duffies, "print of war" statement in *Life* in
than the Soviet aggression which alone could unseem it, as is illustrated by
"Atomic" aggression in major areas of the world was become more imbedded

IX - 70

IX - 20

"only the imperialists will perish in an atomic war, but not civilization" has been explicitly reaffirmed and remains the official doctrine today. It represents the doctrinal justification for what Soviet behavior in every crisis has proved empirically: that the Kremlin believes it can afford to run more risks than its opponents because it is less vulnerable; or, which amounts to the same thing, that its will to victory is greater than that of its declared victims. The Soviet leadership did not propose to inhibit their freedom of action by any doctrine of the horrors of nuclear war, however useful such ideas might be to paralyze the resistance of the non-Soviet world.

## IV

The Kremlin had brought off a tour de force. The Soviet Union had retained its militancy despite the U.S. atomic monopoly; indeed, it had transformed its relative weakness into an asset and solidified a position in the center of Europe denied the Tsars in centuries of striving. By its constant insistence that nuclear weapons were not decisive, it had maintained flexibility of action and, perhaps more importantly, Soviet armed might became an increasingly powerful pressure in the consciousness of all the countries of Eurasia, even of those who most eagerly protested their belief in Soviet peaceful intentions -- and perhaps particularly those. By its world-wide campaign about the horrors of atomic warfare, the Kremlin had undermined the willingness to resist of many areas of the non-Soviet world and made very difficult the employment of the chief weapon in the Western arsenal. All this had been accomplished moreover without losing sight of essential objectives. However the Soviet regime might minimize the importance of nuclear weapons for home consumption, all energies of the Soviet state were

on nuclear weapons for home consumption, if energies of the Soviet state were
essentially devitalized. However the Soviet regime might minimize the importance
thereof. While it had been accomplished somewhat without loss of
and made ahead of the employment of the chief weapon in the Western
world, it was compared about the power of atomic numbers, the Kruppina had
in Soviet power, intentions - and perhaps, basically, those. By its
countries of the world, even of those who most security protected their power,
present an increasingly powerful barrier in the conscience of all the
uniqueness of action and, perhaps, made it unimportant. Soviet aims must put
consequent influence first. Nuclear weapons were not decisive, if used without
the center of Europe held the balance in currencies of striking. By its
transformed its relative weakness into an asset and solidified a position in
retained its military advantage the U.S. atomic monopoly indeed, if put

The Kruppina had months ago a form of force: The Soviet Union had

IV

most even ideas might be to analyze the relationship of the non-Soviet world
freedom of action by and doctrine of the purpose of nuclear war, however
its declared policy. The Soviet teachers did not propose to interpret their
amounts to the assumption, that its will to victory is greater than that of
them more risks from its own opponents because if these are vulnerable or, which
creates the problem, essentially, that the Kruppina believes it can afford to
represent the doctrine qualification for what Soviet behavior in every
has been explicitly resulted and remains the official doctrine today. If
"only the individualist will be able in an atomic war, not to civilize"

IX - 50

IX - 21

thrown behind a "crash program" to develop nuclear weapons and a strategic air force. In less than five years the U.S. atomic monopoly was broken and the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew hand-in-hand with a strategic air force to deliver it. The "lead-times" to accomplish this -- the time between conception and operational models -- were in every case shorter than those of the United States. During the period of its greatest relative weakness when it had infinitely more to lose from a major war than its opponents, the Soviet bloc through its iron-nerved discipline, expanded to the fringes of Eurasia. It thereby demonstrated that in the relation among states, will may be more important than power.

Withal, Soviet policy for all its single-minded persistence had made a virtue of necessity. As long as the U.S.S.R. did not possess a nuclear stockpile of its own, it could find safety only by minimizing their importance or by conciliating Powers defined by Soviet doctrine as inherently hostile. The course in fact adopted, while it required strong nerves, represented the sole option permitted by Communist orthodoxy. Moreover, as long as nuclear weapons were difficult to manufacture and relatively scarce, there was a measure of merit in the Soviet contention of the superiority of the "constantly operating" factors. True, the United States possessed the atom bomb, but the vast Soviet land armies might hold Eurasia as a hostage. In any case, to take any other position would have been to give up the claim to invincibility on which depended so much of the domestic morale and the international prestige of the U.S.S.R. The doctrine of the "constantly operating factors" was the only road to militancy, given the state of technology in the immediate post-war period. And militancy, as Khrushchev emphasized in his speech to the 20th party Congress in 1956, is precisely what distinguishes Communism from other forms of "opportunistic" Socialism.

Communist leaders of "internationalist" Soviet Union.

The speech of Soviet Communists might be found in 1948, is precisely what distinguishes the immediate postwar period. And military, as Kruschevian, appeared in 1954. See the original, with suffix, given the state of technology in nations between 1948 and 1954. The doctrine of the "constantly operating intelligence on which depended so much of the domestic morale and the interest case" to take any other position would have been to give up the claim to in-

put the Soviet land armies might hold Eurasia as a postcard. In any

stantly operating" factors. The United States possessed the atom bomb,

measure of merit in the Soviet contention of the authority of the "con-

wesons were difficult to manufacture and relatively scarce" there was a

safe option permitted by Communist orthodoxy. Moreover, as long as nuclear

or by concurring Powers defined by Soviet doctrine as inherently hostile,

stockpile of its own, if could bring safety only by minimizing their importance

a altitude of necessity. As long as the U.S.S.R. did not possess a nuclear

Wither, Soviet policy for all its single-minded belligerence had made

important than power.

therefore demonstrated that in the relation among states, will may be more

through its iron-overned discipline, expanded to the trinities of Eurasia. If

infinitely more to lose from a major war than its opponents, the Soviet race

 States. The "last gasped times" to accomplish this -- the time between conception

the Soviet unification, asset of new hand-in-hand with a strategic air force to

triumph leading a "crash program" to develop nuclear weapons and a strategic

IX - 51

IX - 22

As the Soviet nuclear stockpile grew, however, and the hydrogen bomb was about to be added to the nuclear arsenal, it became necessary to integrate the new technology more positively into Soviet doctrine. Stalin's 1946 statement had seen the Soviet Union through its period of greatest peril, without the admission of weakness which would have prevented it from filling the tempting vacuum opened by World War II. But in the approaching era of nuclear plenty, atomic weapons could no longer be dismissed so cavalierly as heretofore. Henceforth they would have to be integrated into Soviet theory as they were already being integrated into the Soviet armed forces. Significantly it was Stalin who again indicated the new Soviet line in one of his characteristically obtuse statements, his first public statement on nuclear matters since 1946. On October 3, 1951, the U.S. Government announced a second Soviet atomic explosion. Three days later, Stalin in an interview offered his comments on the current state of nuclear warfare:

Q. What do you think about the clamor roused recently in the foreign press in connection with the testing out of an atom bomb in the Soviet Union?

A. Indeed, a test was recently made by us on a type of atom bomb. Tests on atomic bombs of various calibers will be made in the future under the plan for the defense of our country from attack from the British-American aggressive bloc.

Q. In connection with the tests on atomic bombs, public figures in the U.S. ... shout about a threat to the security of the United States of America. Are there any grounds for such alarm?

A. There are no grounds for such alarm. Leaders of the United States of America cannot fail to know that the Soviet Union is not only against the use of the atomic weapon, but is also for its prohibition, for the cessation of its production,

As is known, the Soviet Union has demanded several times the prohibition of the atomic weapon, but it has each time met the refusal of the powers of the Atlantic bloc.

This means that in the event of a United States attack on our country, the ruling circles of the United States will use the atomic bomb, Precisely this circumstance compelled the Soviet Union to have the at mic weapon in order to be fully armed to meet the aggressor.

IX - 23

The remainder of the interview concerned the problems of prohibition of atomic weapons. Stalin said that he thought the chances of such a prohibition were good "only in the event that the [aggressive bloc] realizes that they are no longer the monopolists." He then repeated the traditional Soviet argument in favor of full prohibition and against the system of "control" which, he said, echoing a hundred Vyshinsky tirades in the United Nations, represented only the "legalization and legitimization" of the "right of the warmongers to annihilate tens and hundreds of thousands of civilian populace by means of atomic weapons."²⁴)

Despite its characteristic denseness Stalin's statement indicated a subtle shift of emphasis in familiar Soviet doctrine the horror of atomic warfare was maintained because it remained a useful instrument to paralyze resistance, but no more was said of the fact that nuclear weapons could not be decisive. Stalin still advocated the outlawing of nuclear weapons, but the atomic bomb had ceased to be a "phantom" designed to "intimidate" and to "blackmail." It was so real, in fact, that the Soviets had felt "compelled ... to have atomic weapons to be fully armed to meet aggression." Thus atomic weapons were officially declared a vital part of the equipment of a fully armed nation. Henceforth atomic weapons could no longer be dismissed as without military significance or treated entirely as tools of psychological warfare. Rather Stalin's statement was a call to assess their positive contribution in the age of nuclear plenty just ahead. For the first time Soviet military doctrine was free to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in strategy.

The major impact of this new line was felt only after Stalin's death when it raised again all the problems of militancy, flexibility and doctrinal which had been so resolutely avoided while the Soviet Union did not yet possess a nuclear arsenal.

24.

S4.

Not because a nuclear aneroid.

Scientific which had been so resolutely advocated while the Soviet Union did not
continue when it raised again all the problems of military flexibility and

The major impact of June new fire was left only after Stalin's
in strategy.

The major impact of June new fire was left only after Staline's
in strategy.

Scientific military doctrine was free to fluctuate therefor or against it.

Contribution in the age of nuclear power, that aspect. For the scientific

warfare. Better Stalin's statement was a cell to assess their behavior
without military significance or treated entirely as social or economic/ideational
united nation.

Henceforth atomic weapons could no longer be considered as
weapons were officially declared a vital part of the equipment of a military
force have atomic weapons to be fully armed to meet aggression." Thus atomic

"blackmail". It was so rare in fact, that the Soviets had left "compelled...

atomic bomb and ceased to be a "binary" designed to "inflict" and to

be declared. Stalin still advocated the outflanking of uninvolved weapons, but the
relapse, but no more was said of the fact that nuclear weapons could not
warfare was maintained because it remained a useful instrument to paralyze
a supreme shift of emphasis in familiar Soviet doctrine the focus of atomic
Despite the characteristic logic of General Staline's statement indicated

atomic weapons." S4)

amplify tens and hundreds of thousands of civilian victims, or means of...
only the "legislation and facilitization" of the "right of the нармалега to
act" according a number of conveniently tenses in the United Nations, represented
in favor of auff prohibition and against the system of "control," which, he
no longer the monopoli... He then repeated the traditional Soviet argument
Good only in the event that the "aggressive foe" realizes that they are
weasels. Stalin said that he thought the chances of and a prohibition were

IX - 53

IX - 24

The growing Soviet self-confidence with respect to nuclear weapons began to emerge shortly after Stalin's death and it coincided with the first explosion of a Soviet thermo-nuclear bomb. In characteristic fashion, the new emphasis on Soviet nuclear might was used to usher in the period of peaceful coexistence, already foreshadowed by Stalin's last public statement in the *Bolshevik* 26) and made doubly necessary by the confusion produced by the death of the dictator. Since Soviet doctrine made it impossible to justify peaceful coexistence for its own sake, it was advocated, as so often in the past, by an equilibrium in the relations of forces, brought about this time by the new-found Soviet nuclear retaliatory power. Heretofore, Soviet spokesmen had very rarely boasted of Soviet powers of retaliation partly because they did not yet exist, partly because such boasts would have contradicted the policy of minimizing the role of nuclear weapons. But now the Soviets felt strong enough to threaten the United States openly and they possessed sufficient nuclear weapons to begin the adaptation of their military doctrine. When Malenkov, then Premier, announced on August 8, 1953 that the Soviets had set off a hydrogen bomb, he recurred to the muted threat which had already been implicit in Stalin's 1951 interview. He warned that an atomic war against the U.S.S.R. would be folly because the Soviet Union now possessed similar weapons for retaliation so that any aggressor was certain to suffer a decisive rebuff.

In the next six months the Soviet press showed a growing willingness to treat the problem of nuclear warfare in a more realistic manner.

In October 1953, Ilya Ehrenburg admitted in an article that nuclear weapons did represent a danger to the world, although he branded Secretary Dulles' statements to that effect "ludicrous" and "exaggerated." President

26. See above p.

IX - 25

Eisenhower's speech of December 10, 1953, appealing for extraordinary measures to save mankind from the holocaust of a hydrogen war was reprinted in part in *Pravda*. The continued Soviet desire to retain freedom of action by not frightening its own people, was reflected in the deletion of several particularly ominous passages such as the statement that the United States possessed hydrogen bombs of millions of tons TNT equivalent. Nevertheless, the Soviet press and Soviet officials continued their references to the horrors of nuclear war on an ever-increasing scale. An article in *Izvestia* (January 19, 1954) admitted that under modern conditions war "means colossal destruction." *Pravda* (January 30, 1954) welcomed the idea of a disarmament conference which would "contribute to the freeing of mankind from the terror of atomic bombing." And in an address on February 22, 1954, Marshall Bulganin, then Minister of Defense, foresaw "monstrous and unprecedented calamity" in the prospect of another war.

The mounting crescendo of dire prophesies while partly intended as a warning to the West -- it coincided with the height of the crisis over Indo-China -- also indicated that the new Soviet leadership stood in danger of upsetting the fine balance which Stalin had maintained between complacency and passivity, between over-confidence and loss of will. Stalin had insisted on the invincibility of the Soviet Union, but he had derived it from its superior social structure, not from a balance of terror. He, too, had invoked the horror of nuclear warfare; but primarily for foreign consumption while keeping even the most elementary facts regarding atomic weapons from the Russian people. But the use within the Soviet Union of arguments which had proved so effective in paralyzing the will to resist abroad, came very close to the Western notion of a nuclear stalemate hitherto so resolutely rejected by Soviet doctrine. If the notion of a stalemate really became accepted doctrine, the

doctrine. If the notion of a statement really becomes accepted, the
Western action of a modern statesman, without so resolutely rejected by the
Western statesman, would be the same as the action of a modern statesman, not from a balance of terror. He, too, had invoked
on the invincibility of the Soviet Union, but he had denied it from its
and beauty, between over-confidence and fear of war. Stating he intimated
of obeying the balance which Berlin had maintained between confidence
and independence -- also indicated that the new Soviet leader should in gauging
a warning to the West -- it coincided with the demand of the crisis over
the mounting crescendo of the propaganda which had already begun in
the broadest sense of another war.

First, then, Minister of Defense, to know "monuments and unbecqued curiosities" of atomic bomb." And in his address on February 55, 1944 (instituted by the conference which would "contribute to the raising of mankind from the terror of destruction." Franks (January 30, 1944) welcomed the idea of a disarmament (January 10, 1944) admitted that under modern conditions war "means coexistence of peoples of different war on an ever-increasing scale." An article in *Invesi* the Soviet press and Soviet officials continued their references to the bosomed hydrogen bomb of millions of tons TMT equivalent. Unwillingly, thirdly, some one passes on as the statement that the United States strengthening its own people, was reflected in the direction of several buttons.

Franks. The continued Soviet desire to retain freedom of action by not
to save mankind from the迫ation of a hydrogen war was reprinted in part in
Encounter, a speech of December 10, 1943 addressing for extraordinary measures

IX - 53

IX - 26

peace offensive was more than a tactical maneuver; it was a basic alteration of the Kremlin's view of the world. This was the issue raised by a debate which occurred in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1954 and, as was only proper in a regime legitimized by a philosophy of history, the debate conceived an abstract point regarding the nature of historical development.

When on March 12, 1954 Premier Malenkov apparently overthrew the concept which he had himself announced five years previously that nuclear war would mean only the end of capitalist, not of Soviet civilization, a fundamental change seemed in the offing. "The Soviet Government" he said suddenly, "is resolutely opposed to the policy of the cold war, for this policy is a policy of preparation for fresh world carnage which with modern methods of warfare means the ruin of world civilization."²⁷) On March 27, 1954, this theme was repeated by a Moscow radio commentator who said that hydrogen bombs "would threaten the very existence of civilization."²⁸) The World Peace Council fell into line with a warning that the use of atomic weapons would result in a war of extermination.²⁹) And Joliot-Curie stated that atomic war meant "collective suicide" and that "effective civil defense is illusory.³⁰) Did this mean then that the power of the hydrogen bomb had shocked the Soviet leadership into giving up its militancy? Had the enormity of modern weapons forced them to accept the fact that war was now inconceivable? Was there now a balance between the inhibitions of the Soviet and of the non-Soviet world?

27.

28.

29.

30.

["30.", "36.", "38.", "the non-Soviet world?", "The world now is a balance between the ambitions of the Soviet and of modern weapons forced upon them to accept the fact that war was now inevitable. The Soviet leadership into giving up its military. Had the enemy shocked the Soviet leadership into giving up its military? Had the enemy the firmness.\"30)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the hydrogen bomb had that atoms was meant \"collective annihilation\" and that \"effective civil defense weapons would result in a war of extermination.\"36)\n\nAnd after that, what was the use of atomic hydrogen bomb? \"World threatened the very existence of civilization.\"38)\n\nThe Soviet theme was rebusted by a Moscow radio commentator who said that the world means the end of world civilization.\"39)\n\nOn March 21, 1934, this theme was rebusted by a Moscow radio commentator who said that the world means the end of world civilization, a fundamental change seemed in the outlook. \"The Soviet Government\" he said, \"emphasize the world mean only the end of capitalism, not of Soviet civilization, a fundamental change which he had himself announced five years previously that nuclear war", "was the firmest. \"The Soviet Government\" he said, \"emphasize the world mean only the end of capitalism, not of Soviet civilization, a fundamental change which he had himself announced five years previously that nuclear war is a means of threatening the very existence of civilization.\"38)\n\nThe Soviet Government felt into line with a warning that the use of atomic weapons would result in a war of extermination.\"36)\n\nAnd after that, what was the use of atomic hydrogen bomb? \"World threatened the very existence of civilization,\" and that \"effective civil defense weapons would result in a war of extermination.\"36)\n\nAnd after that, what was the use of hydrogen bomb? \"The Soviet Government felt into line with a warning that the use of atomic weapons would result in a war of extermination.\"38)\n\nThe Soviet Government felt into line with a warning that the use of hydrogen bomb? \"The Soviet Government felt into line with a warning that the use of hydrogen bomb?\"", "is resolutely opposed to the policy of the cold war, for this policy is a means of threatening the very existence of the modern methods of war, preparation for future world war, which with modern

IX - 26

When on March 12, 1954 Premier Malenkov apparently overthrew the concept which he had himself announced five years previously that nuclear war would mean only the end of capitalist, not of Soviet civilization, a fundamental change seemed in the offing. "The Soviet Government" he said suddenly "is resolutely opposed to the policy of the cold war, for this policy is a policy of preparation for fresh world carnage which with modern methods of warfare means the ruin of world civilization."²⁷) On March 27, 1954, this theme was repeated by a Moscow radio commentator who said that hydrogen bombs "would threaten the very existence of civilization."²⁸) The World Peace Council fell into line with a warning that the use of atomic weapons would result in a war of extermination.²⁹) And Joliot-Curie stated that atomic war meant "collective suicide" and that "effective civil defense is illusory.³⁰) Did this mean then that the power of the hydrogen bomb had shocked the Soviet leadership into giving up its militancy? Had the enormity of modern weapons forced them to accept the fact that war was now inconceivable? Was there now a balance between the inhibitions of the Soviet and of the non-Soviet world?

27.

28.

29.

30.

["30.\n32.", "33.", "34.", "the non-Revolted world?\n\nThe world now afloat between the implications of the Soviet, and of\nthe modern weapons forced upon them to accept the fact that war was no\nmore a means to shock the Soviet leadership into giving up its military\nwar. But the community\nis itself. \"30)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?31)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"32)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"33)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?34)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"35)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"36)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?37)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"38)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"39)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?40)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"41)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"42)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?43)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"44)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"45)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?46)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"47)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"48)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?49)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"50)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"51)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?52)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"53)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"54)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?55)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"56)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"57)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?58)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"59)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"60)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?61)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"62)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"63)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?64)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"65)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"66)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?67)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"68)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"69)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?70)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"71)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"72)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?73)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"74)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"75)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?76)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"76)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"77)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?78)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"79)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"79)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?80)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"81)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"82)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?83)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"84)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"85)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?86)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"86)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"86)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?87)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"87)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"87)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?88)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"88)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"88)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?89)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"89)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"90)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?91)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"91)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"92)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?93)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"93)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"94)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?95)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"95)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"96)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?97)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"97)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"98)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?99)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"99)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"100)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?101)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"101)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"102)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?103)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"103)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"104)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?105)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"105)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"106)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?107)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"107)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"108)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?109)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"109)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"110)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?111)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"111)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"112)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?113)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"113)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"114)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?115)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"115)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"116)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?117)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"117)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"118)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?119)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"119)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"120)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?121)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"121)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"122)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?123)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"123)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"124)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?125)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"125)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"126)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?127)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"127)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"128)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?129)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"129)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"130)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?131)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"131)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"132)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?133)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"133)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"134)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?135)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"135)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"136)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?137)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"137)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"138)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?139)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"139)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"140)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?141)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"141)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"142)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?143)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare would threaten the very existence of civilization.\"143)\n\nThe Soviet Union stated\nthat the Soviet-German treaty\nwas the key to the success of atomic\nwarfare. \"144)\n\nDid this mean then that the power of the Soviet Union had\nthat atomic war means \"collective annihilation\", and that \"effective\natomic defense\nwas the world result in a war of expansion\"?145)\n\nWorld Peace Council felt into fine with a warning that the use of atomic\nwarfare

IX - 27

But a society finds it nearly impossible to surrender its myth, for to do so would be tantamount to giving up its image of itself; it would mean an overthrow of what has come to be considered "legitimate." To admit the possibility of a stalemate was to renounce the Marxist-Leninist dialectic of the inevitable triumph of Communism. To announce an indefinitely prolonged equilibrium in the relation of forces was equivalent to surrendering the doctrine of the inherent superiority of Communist theory which could manage the inevitable conflict between social classes to its advantage. It would mean that the forces of technology were superior to the forces of history, that the class struggle could be paralyzed by technological innovations. Moreover, what would become of the much taunted economic planning based on the assumption that men could control his destiny by foreseeing it if the dialectic of history could be arrested by an unexpected technological discovery?

It is little wonder that Soviet theoretical journals throughout the early part of 1954 exhibited increasing nervousness at this turn of events. In November 1953, a Soviet economist following the logic of some of the articles on nuclear matters which had already appeared, argued that the Marxist-Leninist law of the inevitability of war produced by the uneven development of the capitalist economy remained valid, but he insisted that experience had demonstrated the possibility of paralyzing it.³¹) This thesis was immediately attacked by the head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda who accused Gus of destroying Marxism in the guise of interpreting it: "There are 'theoreticians' who presume that it is possible to 'paralyze' the law discovered by Lenin of the irregularity of the political and economic development of capitalism during the epoch of imperialism with all the consequences resulting from this law. This in essence ... acknowledges the possibility

31. Zvesda, November 1953.

["31. [Sic]. November 1938, pp. 108-109.", "resulting from the fact that, in essence, it is a matter of degree of significance covered by the direct or indirect effects of the immediate effects of

IX - 28

of the abolition of objective laws of the development of society. There is
no need to prove that such a view has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist
science."<sup>32)</sup> One of the "objective" laws discovered by Lenin was, of course,
the inevitability of war under conditions of capitalist economy. The reaction
to the Gus "deviation" was a call to the faithful not to give up their mili-
tancy whatever the horrors of the new technology.

Malenkov's statement that a nuclear war would destroy civilization,
that, in short, the Soviet Union was equally vulnerable as its opponents
seemed to shock the Communist Party into a renewed awareness of its ortho-
doxy. It had not prided itself on its "activism" for over a generation to
give it up at the moment of its greatest technological achievement; it had not
heaped scorn on the dangers of "passivity" for an equally long period to fall
into it now by means of its own doctrine. Three weeks after Malenkov's
statement the April 1954 issue of *Kommunist* criticized some people who be-
lieve in the absolute force of modern weapons and underestimate the power of
forces fighting for peace. These people were unable to figure out in time
the real sense and objectives of the fable about the destruction of civili-
zation...and began repeating this fable in their oral and printed speeches."<sup>33)</sup>
The result was the sowing of "seeds of fatalism" and the undermining of the
"people's creative and optimistic attitude towards the future." On April 26,
1954 less than two months after propounding it, in a speech to the Supreme
Soviet, Malenkov repudiated his own statement and asserted that an atomic
war would lead to the breakdown of only the capitalist system.<sup>34)</sup> Pravda
announced the Soviet position on nuclear weapons on February 26, 1955 with

32. V. Krushkov, *Kommunist*, January 1954. *Zvesda* in February 1954 published a similar article repudiating Gus.

33.

34.

IX - 29

finality: "It is absurd to think that nuclear weapons can cancel the forward
development of mankind. Weapons have never altered or cancelled the laws
of social development. They have never created or abolished conditions
which could alter social structures or entire countries."³⁵)

The Party Militant had triumphed. Henceforth the Soviet insistence
on superior freedom of action because of its greater invulnerability was
repeated with pedantic regularity both within the Soviet Union and in the
rest of the world. Molotov, Mikoyan, Shepilov, Zhukov and Khrushchev defended
the proposition at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In France, Thorez warned
his Communists not to be intimidated by American "atomic propaganda" and
to remain intransigent in the fight for peace, secure in the consciousness
that historical forces were on their side. In satellite Eastern Germany, the
Prime Minister, Grotewohl, made the tactical advantages of the Soviet position
explicit: "For us fighters against remilitarization it is better and more
correct [Emphasis added] to draw from this fact [Atomic destruction] the
conclusion that a third world war will destroy not us, but the imperialist
forces." ³⁶)

A Soviet delegation of scientists invited by Lord Russell to
an international conference in London refused only three weeks after the
Geneva summit meeting to associate itself with a resolution which had warned
against nuclear war because it would mean the end of civilization; the Soviet
delegation signed the resolution only after it was ameliorated to read that
nuclear war would inflict great suffering.³⁷) And the Soviet leaders, what-
ever their momentary vacillation, guarded their orthodoxy with all the skill
in doctrinal subtleties learned in a quarter century of Stalin's rule. When
on the occasion of his visit to India in December 1955 Bulganin signed a joint

35. Pravda, February 26, 1955.

36.

37. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1956.

31. *Pitfall in Atomic Scientists*, Tarnak 1932.

32. *Trawg*, February 30, 1932.

on the occasion of his visit to India in December 1932. Rauhutin signed a joint
in doctoring specifications earned in a quarter century of Rajin's rule. When
even their momentum accretion, changed their orthodoxy with all the skill
mores, war would inflict great entering.

And the Soviet fliers, especially would
sign the resolution only after it was announced so read this
against war, was because it was the resolution: the Soviet
generals submit to acknowledge this with a resolution which had to be
an international conference in London required only three weeks after the
forces." 33)
A Soviet delegation of scientists invited by LordGENERAL to
conclusion that a third war can not be prevented not as, but the imperative
of [bemerkte] to grant from this fact [atomie destruction] the
explicit: "For we think against remittances if it is better and more
immediate. Groverliff made the tactical advantages of the Soviet position
that historical forces were on their side. In satellite Eastern Germany, the
to remain invincible in the fight for peace, secure in the consciousness
the Commissars not to be intimidated by American "atomic propaganda", and
the prohibition at the 50th Party Congress in 1933. In France, Titothen warned
rest of the world. Molotov, Mikhanov, Sputnik and Khrushchev defended
rebased with hegemonic regularity beyond the Soviet Union and in the
on superior freedom of action because of its greater immunities, was
The Party Written and Trimmed. Henceforth the Soviet insistance
adding up after social structures or entire countries."34)
of social development. They have never created or specified conditions
development of manning. We have never offered or conceded the famous
tinuity: "If it is spending to think that nuclear weapons can cancel the tomorrow

The Party Written and Trimmed. Henceforth the Soviet insistance
adding up after social structures or entire countries."32)
of social development. They have never created or specified conditions
development of manning. We have never offered or conceded the famous
tinuity: "If it is spending to think that nuclear weapons can cancel the tomorrow

IX - 50

IX - 30

declaration with Nehru calling attention to the disaster of a nuclear war, he granted an interview soon after his return to Moscow to repudiate any implication of nuclear stalemate: "It is wrong to assert that in as much as East and West possess hydrogen weapons the possibility of a thermo-nuclear war is automatically excluded." 38)

Doctrinal purity had been maintained; the Soviet leadership had retained its freedom of action and defined its risks as smaller than those of its opponents. There is a tendency in the West to overlook Soviet doctrinal disputes and their abstractness does not encourage a closer examination. Yet they are the most profitable indication of Soviet intentions; far more rewarding than Soviet actions which are often deliberately designed to mislead or to lull. Since the Soviet leadership derives its claim to superiority from its theoretical insight, a doctrinal dispute in the U.S.S.R. has not only a philosophical, but an eminently practical significance. Throughout the history of Soviet Communism almost every dispute over doctrine has reflected a disagreement on policy and almost every change of doctrine has sooner or later been translated into action.

And so it has been with the Soviet doctrine on nuclear weapons. Whether or not it was consciously intended as a recognition that ultimately strategy is no better than its willingness to take risks--and Grotewohl's statement would seem to indicate a conscious awareness of this fact--it has so worked out in practice. In every crisis, the non-Soviet world protests its horror of nuclear war and thereby serves notice on the U.S.S.R. of its relative impunity. By contrast, the Soviets do not seem so inhibited and feel free to threaten with rocket attacks on Britain and France or with

38.

[y]

IX - 31

volunteers for Egypt. In fact, there seems to have grown up a tacit understanding of greater Soviet daring. When the Soviets were confronting difficulties in the satellite orbit, the West hastened to protest that it would neither use force nor seek to enter into an alliance with any "liberated" satellite lest the Soviet Union, in desperation, unleash nuclear war. But when the West confronted difficulties in the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. did not feel a need to give similar assurances. On the contrary, it left no doubt that it would move into every vacuum; it spoke of "volunteers" and warned of nuclear war. Obviously the Soviet leaders were less concerned that the West in desperation, might unleash a nuclear war of its own. Thus Soviet leadership has been able to blackmail the West both with its strength and its weakness. We recoil before Soviet power but we also fear to exploit Soviet difficulties lest, as was often enforced during the Hungarian revolution a "desperate" Russia chose war as a means to escape its dilemmas. This difference in the willingness to assume risks born from the Soviet confidence in doctrine has been the real disparity between the two camps; it has been the fundamental Soviet advantage nearly overcoming the bankruptcy of its social system and the instability of its leadership structure.

V

It is against this background of doctrinal militancy that the adapta-
tion of Soviet military theory to nuclear weapons must be considered. For the
abstract theoretical discussions had sought to overcome one of the most
serious, and at the same time, novel problems of the nuclear age: the deter-
rent effect on a Power of its own deterrent arsenal. In the past an increase
of a nation's power resulted almost inevitably in a greater flexibility of

["of a nation's power, measured in terms of a greater flexibility of\nuse effect on a power of its own. Theoretically, in the event of\na nation, and of the same time, more problems of the nation after\nthe destruction of theoretical discussions had sought to overcome one of the most\ncritical points of Soviet military theory to which reasons must be considered. For the\nreason that it is against this background of theoretical maturity that the nation", "social system and the instability of its federal government, the fundamental Soviet advantage nearly overcoming thelemumber of the\ncivilian power has been the real difficulty between the two combatants. It has been\ntenure in theuffinances to assume right born from the Soviet confidence\n\"degenerate\" unless chosen as a means to overcome the differences. This difficulty\narises, as was often enforced during the English revolution a\ndecades. We recall before Soviet power but we also feel to exploit Soviet\nadvantage can be done to搞破除 the West behind its strengths and its\ninadequacy, might increase a investor war of its own. This Soviet feeler\nmight feel that the Soviet Union, in general, isulancted and war. But\nnot later can force not seek to enter into an alliance with any "federated\nentity in the satellite orbit, the West preferred so protest that it would\nresist Greater Soviet hegemony. When the Soviets were confronting the\nsatellites for Egypt. In fact, there seems to have been a fact under-", "IX - 37"]

IX - 32

diplomacy because it led to a consciousness of being able to run greater risks than the opponent. By contrast, in the nuclear period the growth in military strength, because it augurs similar horrors on the other side, tends to be accompanied by an increase in the inhibitions against its use. The more fearful the weapons tests, the more reluctant the responsible leadership has been to employ its nuclear arsenal. Thus one of the paradoxical aspects of the nuclear age has been that one of the inhibitions to decisive action has been produced by the implications of a Power's own weapons technology. In so far as a strategic doctrine could achieve it, the Kremlin meant to see to it that it would not be so inhibited.

The attempt to integrate nuclear weapons into Soviet military doctrine did not begin until 1954. Before this time, nuclear weapons were dismissed as relatively unimportant and most discussions in military journals concerned the inherent superiority of the Soviet "constantly operating factors." As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew, however, it became important to find a rationale for its use. In the process of developing such a theory, Soviet strategic thought began to traverse the three seemingly inevitable stages which have characterized military thought in all countries seeking to come to grips with the strategic implications of nuclear weapons: (1) an initial period of learning the essential characteristics of the new weapons accompanied by the protestations of still dominant traditionalists that nuclear weapons cannot alter the basic principles of strategy and tactics; (2) this is usually followed, as the power of modern weapons becomes better understood, by a complete reversal; an increasing reliance on the most absolute applications of the new technology as an answer to most strategic problems and on an almost exclusive concern with offensive retaliatory power; (3) finally, as it is realized that all-out war involves risks out of proportion to most of the

["The United States have introduced into Soviet military science the idea that the effect of a nuclear weapon is not only the destruction of the entire population of the country, but also the destruction of the country's military and industrial resources. This is not the case. The destruction of the country's military and industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. The destruction of the country's military resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's industrial resources. The destruction of the country's industrial resources is the direct result of the destruction of the country's military resources. 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IX - 33

issues actually in dispute, an attempt is made to find intermediary appli-
cations for the new technology to bring power into harmony with the objectives
for which to contend.

Once the strategic implications of nuclear technology became a fit
subject for discussion in Soviet military journals, the reaction of the
Soviet military, as distinguished from the political leadership, was not
basically different from that of their colleagues in the West. The Soviet
officers simply went through the process about five years after their Western
counterparts in each phase, almost precisely reflecting the time-lag in the
development of nuclear technology. Moreover, Soviet military doctrine seems
to have gone only through the first two of the three phases. It has inte-
grated nuclear weapons into its strategic thought; but, after the initial
period of denying that nuclear weapons had brought about a fundamental change
in strategy or tactics, most Soviet discussions have concerned the problems
of all-out war. There has been practically no published discussion of the
military problem of limited war. This is in some respects inconsistent with
the Soviet political strategy of the indirect approach which refuses to risk
everything in a final showdown unless the relation of forces is overwhelmingly
in its favor. In so far as published discussion reflects the actual state
of Soviet military thinking -- and on the basis of the eminence of some
of the authors it probably does -- this gap may offer an element of vulner-
ability and of danger: of vulnerability because it may indicate Soviet diffi-
culties in mastering the strategy and tactics of limited nuclear war and of
danger because it may induce the Soviets to treat the explosion of any
nuclear weapon anywhere as the prelude to all-out war. Unless the Soviets
develop a more balanced approach or unless we succeed in conveying one to
them,39) an all-out war may therefore be brought on by the failure of one
or both contenders to consider alternatives.

39. See below, chapter X.

38. See "Militia," chapter x.

or both considers so considerable a difference.

them, 39) an all-out war with such strategies being brought on by the failure of one to develop a more preferred strategy or means we could in controlling one or more weapon anywhere at the expense to an all-out war, against the Soviet country because it may indicate the Soviet to treat the strategy of such an entity in measuring the strategy and scope of projected action and of ability and of danger of an unreasonably severe impact if such indicate Soviet attack. 40) of the authors it properly does -- this gap must occur at some element of war, of Soviet military thinking -- and on the part of the audience at some point of strategy or tactics, most Soviet discussions have concerned the background period of denying that nuclear weapons had brought about a fundamental change in armed forces, and into its strategic thought put, after the initial shock of nuclear weapons, into its strategic thought put, after the initial shock of nuclear weapons, to have some only through the first two of the three phases. It has instead development of nuclear technology. Moreover, Soviet military doctrine seems to be based upon a simple, almost precisely reflecting the first half in the officers simply went through the process of spending five years after their Western peacification during from that of their omissions in this phase. The Soviet Soviet military, as distinguished from the Soviet leadership, was not subject to discussion in Soviet military journals, the reaction of the once the strategic implications of nuclear technology become a matter for which to contend.

IX - 33.

IX - 34

The first phase of the reorganization of Soviet military thought and of the Soviet military establishment started early in 1944. For the first time the Kremlin permitted public discussion of the characteristics of atomic weapons and their potential destructive power. In this manner, the Soviet public in 1945 received the same information which the Western public had learned in 1945 concerning the means by which atomic energy is released, the power of the explosion, the impact on objects in the vicinity of the explosion.40) An atomic explosion was compared with a volcanic eruption; the mechanism of the atomic and hydrogen bombs was described in the same popular language which had characterized Western articles on this subject a decade previously. Very little was said of the hydrogen bomb; the explosion most frequently mentioned was of the type which had destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.41)

Concurrently with the dissemination of basic data on nuclear matters, military journals began discussing the conduct of military operations under atomic attack, another subject which had hitherto been prohibited and which presumably had not been taken up in detail in the training of troops.42)

40. Krasnaya Zvezda, Spring 1954.

41. The dissemination of information was furthered by the publication of a number of books and pamphlets for popular consumption. Among them were *Atomic Energy and Its Use* by S. Petrovich and D. Didov (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1954); *Atomic Energy and Its Utilization* (I.K. Naumenko, DOSAFF Publishing House, Moscow, 1954); *The Atom and Atomic Energy* by V. A. Mezentsev (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1954). The fact that so many of these books were published either by the military publishing house or by the civil defense organization (DOSAFF) indicates that the regime was slowly dropping the myth that in the U.S.S.R. atomic energy was being used only for peaceful purposes. This was indicated too by a review of a number of these books (appearing in *Novy Mir*, April 1955) which dealt solely with the military aspects of atomic energy, even though the books themselves considered both the military and civil applications.

42. Krasnaya Zvezda, January 27, 1955; Sovietski Flot, January 5, 1955; Krasnaya Zvezda, January 30, 1955; Krasnaya Zvezda, February 1, 1955; Komsomolskaya Pravda, June 7, 1955. These had such titles as "Radiation Checks and Activities of Troops in a Contaminated Area in Winter," "The protection of Troops against an Atomic Attack," "The Effects of an Atomic Explosion on Populated Areas."

Atomic Explosion on Pioneers' Attack. "The Issue of an
Check and Verifications of Troops in a Contaminated Area of War."

Korotkovskaya Vruga', June 1, 1932. These had such titles as "Explosion
Pioneers Krasnoyarsk," January 30, 1932; Krasnoyarsk Vruga', September 1, 1932;
Krasnoyarsk Vruga', January 5, 1932; Krasnoyarsk Vruga', September 1, 1932;

pioneers chemically considered poor the military and combat applications.

The effect of the military wave of atomic energy, even though the

review of a number of these books (subsequently in MRA, "Air 1932") which

are being made only for peaceful purposes. These were indicated too by a

regime was starkly grobbing the way that the U.S.A.'s atomic energy

house or by the staff defense organization (DOARM) indicated, that the

so many of these books were published earlier than the military briefing

A. V. Mesenshev (Military Briefing House, Moscow, 1934). The book of

DOARM Briefing House, Moscow, 1934); The Air and Atomic Energy House,

Air Force, Moscow, 1934); Atomic Energy and Its Utilization (I.K. Humeau,

Atomic Energy and Its Use in Biology and D. Bigon (Military Briefing

number of books and briefness for popular consumption. Among them were

40. Krasnoyarsk Vruga', Spring 1932.

which bremsmity had not been taken on in detail in the training of troops.

The atomic explosion was followed by a direct effect on nuclear

under atomic attack, another aspect which had previously been proposed and

measures, military journals began discussing the conduct of military operations

concurrently with the dissemination of basic data on nuclear

Militia.

most frequently mentioned was of the tube which had destroyed Hiroshima and

decade before that. Very little was said of the hydrogen bomb; the explosion

began language which had characterized Western articles on this subject as

the mechanism of the atomic and hydrogen pomea were described in the same

explosion.

In atomic explosion are compared with a atomic explosion

formed in 1942 concerning the mechanism which atomic energy is referred to

the hydrogen in 1942 received the same information which the Western hydrogen

mechanics and their powerful destructive power. In this manner, the Soviet

the Krollin beamprojected hydrogen clathrates of the characteristics of atomic

of the Soviet military谢appliances started early in 1932. For the first time

The first phase of the reclamation of Soviet military action and

IX - 34

IX - 35

Most of the articles were extremely factual and dry accounts of means by which troops could protect themselves against the effects of atomic explosions. All the authors emphasized that nuclear explosions need not disrupt the normal functions of an enemy. The major concern seemed to be to integrate atomic weapons into existing doctrine without modifying any of its basic characteristics. To be sure, the articles proved that the Soviets had carefully studied Western military writings on atomic warfare. The official of the Red Army, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star) in a review of a book of Colonel C. Reinhardt and Lt. Colonel William Kintner <sup>43)</sup> stressed that the book contained "data and arguments which deserve careful attention." <sup>44)</sup> The book had advocated abandoning the old concept of large mass armies and stressed the importance of flexible, highly maneuverable units with a large measure of initiative on the part of local commanders -- proposals which were the exact opposite of prevailing Soviet doctrine. Nebertheless, the main thrust of this first phase of Soviet military thought seemed to be to validate the traditional reliance on land warfare: "Soviet military art" wrote a Soviet officer in an army journal "assumes that the new means of combat, not only do not reduce, but on the contrary, enhance the part played by the foot-solder and raises his role to a new level." <sup>45)</sup>

As nuclear technology became more diffused, however, and better understood, the temptations of emphasizing its retaliatory aspect proved irresistible. The West had relied too much on its own nuclear offensive power not to encourage the Soviets to seek to neutralize its opponent's primary weapon by stressing the Soviet capability of retaliation. To apply "massive

43. George C. Reinhardt and William R. Kintner. *Atomic Weapons in Land Combat*, Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1953.

44. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 19, 1955.

45. Colonel F. Gavrikov. *Sovietskaya Armiia*, July 1, 1954.

IX - 36

retaliation" in reverse was therefore an excellent tool of Soviet political
warfare, the best means of paralyzing the opponent through "atomic blackmail."
At the same time, it may represent the real conviction of military leaders
newly come into possession of a fearful weapon and carried away by its
destructive implications. Starting in 1955 the Soviet leadership unleashed
an ever-mounting series of threats of all-out war against its opponents,
differing only in its ponderous Marxist jargon from the most extreme formu-
lation of air strategy in the West. A Soviet radio commentator noted (January
31, 1955) that "according to the most optimistic estimates...it would take
only a few hydrogen bombs to ensure the destruction of Britain's principal
industrial centers and fewer still would be needed to paralyze the vital
centers of France, Belgium and Holland."<sup>46)</sup> Major General Isayev wrote
on March 5, 1955: "Under modern conditions, the United States' ruling circles
have no grounds for the hope...that U.S. territory would remain outside mili-
tary retaliation. And as regards the production of hydrogen weapons, the
Soviet Union is well ahead of the United States."<sup>47)</sup> And Mikoyan in his
speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 said: "Future war will be character-
ized by the mass use of the air force, rocket weapons and various means of
mass killings such as atomic, thermo-nuclear, bacteriological and chemical
weapons...Nor will the American imperialists be able to hide from these bombs;
they will not be able to hide their factories."<sup>48)</sup>

In fact, one of the chief concerns of Soviet propaganda seemed to be that
the United States might seek to escape Soviet retaliatory power by a doctrine
of limited nuclear war or, which amounts to the same thing, that the West
might regain freedom of action by seeking to develop doctrine for the less
than all-out application for nuclear weapons. Soviet propaganda both domestic
and foreign has therefore engaged in an incessant repetition of a basic theme:

46.

47.

48. *Current Digest*,

P.6. Current Diff.

P.11. p.10.

and foreign press therefore concluded that an immediate relaxation of air pressure would be the best thing to do. In fact, one of the chief concerns of Soviet Moscows was to be that they would not be able to hit their targets. "(30)

necessities...nor will the whole situation be able to rise from these problems: mass killings and mass arrests,kulak-repression and chemical and biological weapons, and the production of hydrogen weapons, the ban on ammunition for the home...that U.S. territory must remain outside the Soviet Union. In March 1942: "Under modern conditions, the United States, ruling circles centers of France, Belgium and Holland," (40) Major General Ingevatov, whose industrial centers and laborily would be needed to break the axis only a ten hydrogen弹 to engine the destruction of Britain's branch of the Axis. (31, 1942) that "according to the most optimistic estimates...it should come to an end of air strategy in the West." A Soviet military communication net (January 1943) giving only in its bolderneous Marxist-Japanese from the most extreme form of ever-mounting series of threats of air-out as nearest its opponents, destructive instructions. Starting in 1942 the Soviet Red Army released new forces into possession of a few remaining units and confirmed every day at the same time, it may be supposed, who the new composition or which branch of the axis was to be, the past means of winning the war against the enemy through "atomic annihilation."

retribution" in reverse with the figure of an excellent book of Soviet political and military strategy which was written by a foreign correspondent in the war.

IX - 30

IX - 37

that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war, that any employment of
nuclear weapons must inevitably lead to all-out war. Marshall Zhukov chose
the 20th Party Congress as the forum for warning the West that it could not
escape the consequences of Soviet "massive retaliation": "Recently utterances
of political and military figures in the United States reflect with increased
frequency the idea that U.S. strategy should be based on the utilization of
atomic weapons for operations on battlefields and fronts. In view of the
geographical distance of America these gentlemen attach weight to the fact
that atomic weapons would first be used on European territory, naturally as far
from U.S. industrial centers as possible...However things would not work out
as the crafty strategists planned. Today it is impossible to fight wars and
avoid counterblows..." 49)

But if war depended so importantly on retaliatory power what then had
become of the "constantly operating factors?" What of the vastness of Soviet
territory as a protection, what of the superior morale conferred by a superior
social structure as a guarantee of victory? It was becoming increasingly
clear that the "constantly operating factors" with their reliance on long-term
trends, centralized control and unwieldy mass armies hardly fitted the condi-
tions of nuclear war with its emphasis on quick movement and sudden thrusts.
The rejection of the factor of surprise, the insistence on the inherent in-
feriority of Western military science implicit in the doctrine of the "con-
stantly operating factors" might inhibit initiative which is of crucial
importance in a nuclear war and lead to an underestimation of Western ac-
complishments. Such an attitude might have been acceptable when the U.S.S.R.

49. *Current Digest*, *op. cit.*, p.

42. Current Digest, p. cit., p. d.

compatriots. Such an attitude might have been acceptable when the U.S.B.F. importance in a nuclear war and feed to an underestimation of Western security operating factors might indicate initiative which is of crucial importance to Western military science implicit in the doctrine of the "confrontation of the factor of ammonia". The insistence on the imperative of the factor of nuclear war with its exhaust on duck movement and sudden thrusts, pressure, centralized control and unselfish waste amusements必然 lifted the condition clear thus the "constantly operating factors" with their reliance on long-range, social structure as a guarantee of victory. It was becoming increasingly imperative territory as a protection, what of the superior morale conferred by a superior personnel of the "constantly operating factors". What of the awareness ofроважа...

But it was debased so importantly on retaliatory power that from then on it was not so good as it had been. It was the crafty strategist pronged... Today it is impossible to fight war and... from U.S. industry centers as possible...However though would not work off: that atomic weapons would first be used on European territory, naturally as far as geographical distance of America these beneficiaries attach weight to the fact that atomic weapons for operations on battlefields and fronts. In view of the frequency the first U.S. strategy should be based on the utilization of of hostilities and military figures in the United States reflect with increased echo the consequences of Soviet "unbearable retaliation": "Recently it has been found that there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war, first any employment of

IX - 31

IX - 38

had above all to guard against any admission of weakness; it was not equal
to the opportunities and the perils of the age of nuclear plenty. As a
result, the "constantly operating factors" have been slowly reinterpreted
in two senses: in the direction of a greater recognition of the achievements
of Western military science and in the direction of ever-increasing emphasis
on the factor of surprise. The movement was launched by Marshal Sokolovsky,
Soviet Chief of Staff, when he demanded on February 23, 1955 that there be
more "creative research and bold study of the most pressing problems of
military science." Such a study should take into account above all "the
increased significance of the surprise factor in view of the existence of a
weapon with enormous destructive power" and that it should include "the
latest achievement not only in our country, but also abroad." 50)

The most elaborate of the new studies called for by Marshal Sokolovsky came
from Marshal of Tanks Romirov, one of the most original Soviet military
thinkers.⁵¹) Writing in *Red Star*, he stated that the "possibility of surprise
aggression has increased, not diminished in recent years." Whereas in the
past the Soviet Union had nothing to fear from surprise attacks, "it must
be frankly admitted that because of the power of atomic and hydrogen weapons,
a surprise attack could become a deciding condition for success not only in
the initial phases of a war, but even in its final outcome...We cannot regard
these events passively; we must not lull our military cadres with outdated
theories; we must reveal the increasing danger of surprise attack and like-
wise improve the military preparedness of our Army, Navy and Air Force."

At the same time, Marchal Ranistrov attacked two traditional Soviet
dogmas which had almost become shibboleths: the reliance on the "Constantly

50.

51. Marshal P. Romirov. "For Working Out the Problems of Soviet Military Science Creatively," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, March 24, 1955.

["Science Fiction Society, No. 4, March 5th, 1932.", "ST. Maksayev R. Romatov. \"For Whom? Out the Problems of Soviet Military", "20.", "document which had almost become obsolete: the return on the \"Conduct of the same time,\" Maksayev Romatov attached to the traditional Soviet Air Force. He said that the \"conduct of our annals, which has been the chief cause of our military defeat and losses, has been the chief cause of our military defeat and losses, has been the chief cause of our military defeat and losses, and

IX - 39

operating factors" and the doctrine drawn from the experience of World War II, that the vastness of Soviet territory conferred immunity from attack. He criticized a military theory which had exalted the "constantly operating factors" as purely theoretical considering all the complications that may occur in practice." To be sure, capitalist countries were inferior in the "constantly operating factors," but it was self-delusion to deny that they were not improving their armaments and the morale of their soldiers. Moreover, under conditions of atomic warfare, it was possible for a short war--traditionally favored by a country inferior in social structure and morale--to be more decisive than in the past. As for the importance of space, Romistrov was ambivalent. He admitted that the vast expanse of Russia offered advantages over some capitalist countries with smaller territories and a higher density of population. But he insisted that the Soviet Union could no longer permit a repetition of the last war when the major battles were fought on Russian soil and he called for a re-examination of the whole problem of space in Soviet strategy.⁵²)

It was an inevitable step from emphasizing the importance of surprise and the rejection of defensive war to a doctrine which stressed the importance of transferring operations into enemy territory. This was nothing new in Soviet military thought, for Soviet strategic doctrine, and for that matter political doctrine too, has always exhibited a striking preference for the offensive. Lenin had advised that "it is necessary to strive for daily successes, even if small...in order to retain the moral ascendancy." And Stalin had warned against "a dangerous error called 'loss of tempo...'"⁵³ It was not until 1942 that the defensive was admitted to be "a normal form of combat" and even then the Field Regulations continued to insist that

52. Similar, and perhaps even more explicit arguments, were used by Lt. General Shatilov, "An Important and Noble Theme, "Literary Gazette, May 28, 1955.

53. Both titles in Garthoff, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

23. Both ties in Gartlett, op. cit., p. 130.

May 89, 1922.

General, *Sagittus*, "An Important and Hopeful Theme," *Heterodyne Gazette*, May 89, 1922.

of comfort," and even then the English Regulations continued to insist that it was not until 1945 that the automatic was eliminated for the first time. The Staff had warned against "a gamut of events called 'fog of war'..." 28 advances, even if admitted, *i.e.* after the war, retain the worst secondary "offensive". Then put in question, that it is necessary to strive for detail in political doctrine too, has made it difficult to strike preference for the Soviet military thought, for Soviet strategic doctrine, and for that matter, of materializing operations into enemy territory. This was nothing new to us, but the rejection of defensive war to a doctrine which strategies the importance of share in Soviet strategy. (25)

found on Russian soil and he carried for a re-implementation of the whole program no longer benefit a re-implementation of the first program. He was more decisive than in the past. As for the importance of essence, Rominovianka favored by a country inferior in a social structure and more industrialized, under conditions of atomic warfare, it was possible for a short war--though none not improving their circumstances and the morale of their soldiers. Moreover, "constantly operating factors", but it was almost impossible to deny that they occur in practice." To be sure, capitalist countries were inferior in the same way, as a rule, and therefore considered all the complications that may occur in practice, which had existed in the "constantly operating factors", as briefly theoretical considering the complications that may occur in practice, which had existed in the "constantly operating factors", and the doctrine drawn from the experience of World War II, operating factors", and the doctrine drawn from the experience of World War II,

IX. 35.

IX - 40

"offensive combat is the fundamental aspect of combat actions by the Red Army."⁵⁵) The new emphasis on seeking to conduct operations outside the territory of metropolitan Russia can therefore hardly be considered a doctrinal innovation although it was sharpened by references to the requirements of nuclear warfare. An article in Red Star insisted that the Soviet Armed Forces would be able to deliver an annihilating blow even in a war fought with atomic and hydrogen weapons. In case of war, Soviet strategy should seek to transfer military operations into enemy territory in order to spare the Soviet population and to increase the inhibitions of the enemy who would presumably be more reluctant to employ nuclear weapons in friendly than in hostile territory. Because of the fact that Soviet forces would probably have to fight in enemy countries, particular attention should be paid to their moral quality.⁵⁶) And Marshal Vasilevsky wrote in Izvestia: "In view of the speed of jet-propelled aviation and the existence of weapons of great destructive power, the significance of the factor of weapons of great destructive power, the significance of the factor of suddenness has greatly increased...Should a war be unleashed, [the Soviet Union] is ready to anticipate a surprise attack and to strike before the aggressor can take advantage of his own preparations for the initial blow."⁵⁷) [Emphasis added]

Thus Soviet military thought in less than two years had come almost full cycle. From minimizing the role of nuclear weapons, it had come to consider them an essential, if not the primary weapon; from deprecating the role of surprise, it had elevated it almost to a "constantly operating

55. Ibid., p. 67.

56. Kashirin, P. colonel. "The Importance of Moral Strength of the Army in Contemporary War," May 28, 1955. See also "The Soviet General Staff Takes Stock, - Changes in Soviet Military Doctrine." The World Today, Vol. II, 1955, p. 492ff.

57. *Izvestia*, May 8, 1955.