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Rhodesian authorities as a government, and which has given support to it in one way or another. In other words, we are dealing with two different problems, five states, four liberation movements in black Africa and South Africa, plus the authorities of Rhodesia and the authorities within Namibia. Nevertheless, with all of these complexities, and while we must expect ups and downs, I believe that conditions for a negotiation exist on both issues. The United States will work for the objectives that I have described. The United States is opposed to violence and the United States is opposed to outside intervention. The United States does believe that the objectives of majority rule, minority rights and economic progress for all the peoples of the area are attainable with patience, with good will and with dedication. And the United States is prepared together with the United Kingdom to offer its good offices in the attainment of these objectives. And now I will be glad to answer your questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you say whether you made any progress here towards setting up a negotiating framework for resolving the Namibia question?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would like to say before I answer any questions that I hope you ladies and gentlemen will understand that at a time before we have had the opportunity to inform the leaders of black Africa of the details of the negotiations, something which we will do in the immediate future, you will understand that I cannot go into details on many of the questions that you may ask me. I believe -- just a minute, I have not answered him yet -- I believe that progress has been made towards setting up a negotiating framework but, of course, we will have to await also the reaction -- in Namibia, the reaction of other leaders.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did Prime Minister Vorster show any signs of a willingness to recognize SWAPO in Namibia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the United States has stated that it favors the participation of all groups in negotiations and clearly we include SWAPO in this. It is, of course, up to the Prime Minister to speak for his position. But it is our view that a negotiating process will have to include such groups as SWAPO.

**QUESTION:** Sir, do you envisage the possibility of your meeting with Mr. Smith?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have no present plans to meet with Mr. Smith and this would depend entirely on assurance that a successful outcome of the negotiations will occur. But at this moment there are no plans to meet with Mr. Smith and there are no -- it would be totally premature to speculate on it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if you had any communication with the leaders meeting in Dar es Salaam and what your plans are regarding your trip to Africa?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There has been a meeting of the leaders in Dar es Salaam which only began a few hours ago. We have been in touch over the weekend with some of the leaders, but that was prior to their assembling. My own plans are to return to the United States tomorrow. I am ready to continue the negotiations in Africa if the parties should desire. We will communicate the results of these meetings to the parties, and we believe that conditions exist for the continuation of these negotiations.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, I have a question in two parts. A), have you been in contact with black African leaders in Rhodesia; and B), how do you see the prospects of bringing these black leaders of Rhodesia together?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On my trip to Africa in April, I agreed with the presidents of the so-called front line states, that is presidents that border the -- that border Rhodesia, that a repetition of Angola should be avoided. By this we mean that the outside powers, and especially the super-powers, should avoid direct contact with the so-called liberation movements; and to let the liberation movements be dealt with by the black African states. We, therefore, have been in only -- very infrequent contacts with the black leaders of Rhodesia, and we have always informed the leaders of black Africa of these contacts. We believe that the unification of this leadership is a task not for the United States, but is a task for black Africa. We hope very much that other outside powers exercise similar restraint.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you get an invitation to visit South Africa? Are you in favor of going there?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Prime Minister Vorster did extend an invitation to visit South Africa. A visit by me to South Africa would depend on whether negotiations on the solution of problems to southern Africa are going forward. It would, in any event, be preceded by a visit to black Africa, and the program I would take to South Africa would reflect, as did all previous programs, the considerations of the black African leaders that I have met. In other words, a visit by me to South Africa would be in the interest of peace of southern Africa and would not be a protocol visit by a Secretary of State.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, as you well know, many of the Africans have said that the time for talk is passed and the time is now for fighting. Beyond the general expression of views that you have given here as to the United States and British intentions, are you now in a position to propose specific financial, political, and other suggestions that you have been able to agree with Prime Minister Vorster to the black leaders or were you essentially only holding open the possibility of good offices without any concrete offers?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are moving toward a position where we will be able to put to the leaders of black Africa a concrete program by which the objectives that I have described can be achieved for both Namibia and Rhodesia. We do not yet have all the details but we are moving in that direction. And the leaders of black Africa at that point will have to decide first whether the program meets those needs, which I would hope it does, and whether they are prepared to go the route of negotiations, or whether they prefer the route of armed struggle.

**QUESTION:** Just to follow that up, does that represent a joint US-South African position, or individual views which vary on the two subjects in some respect on Rhodesia and Namibia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have pointed out that there is no joint US-South African position. The proposals we have put to South Africa have emerged from our discussions with the leaders of black Africa. Of course, those that are then accepted by South Africa would tend to create a consensus. And in any negotiation a point must be reached where all parties agree, if they are to succeed. But the proposals we have put forward had been developed first in consultation with the leaders of Africa, and are now being discussed with leaders of South Africa.

**QUESTION:** In case that the African summit in Tanzania decides on black rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, what will be your next step?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to speculate on decisions that the summit in Dar es Salaam may make. If it recommends a majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States has already indicated its support for it. The issue is not what is the objective but how it is to be achieved--one, by what negotiating procedure, and second, under what concrete conditions. And there we have attempted to shape the proposals we have received from Africa and the views we have heard from South Africa into the program which we hope will be acceptable to all of the parties. But, of course, the solution can only come by the agreement of the parties concerned, and not by an imposition of the United States.

**QUESTION:** Does your program that you are drawing up involve changes in South Africa as well as Namibia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The negotiations, the international negotiations at this moment concern Rhodesia and Namibia. The United States has stated its view with respect to South Africa last week and has had a response from South Africa as well.

**QUESTION:** Does South Africa (inaudible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. It has been publicly stated. And I am certain that the Prime Minister of South Africa will speak for himself when he meets the press.

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**QUESTION:** Has South Africa agreed to help finance any guarantees program in Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There has been an extraordinary amount of speculation about this so-called guarantees program. Our concern is not simply to deal with the minority -- with the white minority in Rhodesia; our concern is an economic program that brings about the economic advancement of all of Rhodesia, and within that context to provide opportunities for all races and all communities to live side by side with some security and with some assurances against rapid changes in their position. This program is still in a state of evolution and its details will have to await the precise discussions, though progress has been made in these and previous talks.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, it has been reported this morning on the radio that if the Dar es Salaam people take the results of your talks quite well, it is thought that there may be a Namibia conference in Geneva quite shortly, by the beginning of October, say.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to go into specifics over negotiations that are still going on. But obviously, if independence for Namibia is to be achieved, there will have to be a conference. There has to be a location, and there will have to be an agreement as to participants. And you can safely assume that this is one of the subjects we are discussing right now. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you are to meet tomorrow President Giscard d'Estaing. Will you discuss with him about the selling to South Africa of its installations for treatment (inaudible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not commit suicide twice in a row. (Laughter) It's also physically impossible (laughter). And I will attempt to arrive in France for once without outraged statements in the French press. When I meet the President of France, my primary objective is to review with him the state of these negotiations, and the world situation, as we always do in a spirit of friendship and cooperation. I do not have on my agenda any specific French commercial transactions, but rather the general strategy that the United States and other countries are pursuing with respect to southern Africa, to get the benefits of the views of a leader whose opinion we value greatly and of whose friendship we are proud.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you used the term progress here and so did Mr. Vorster. Progress, of course, is a very rubbery term diplomatically. Is there any way under the limitations upon you, with your diplomatic requirements, that you can be in any way any more specific on *any one* of these spheres rather than telling us that progress has been made? Can you give us any kind of measurement or increment of progress?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Should I say progress is at hand?
(Laughter)

We change the noun every four years. I would say we have made progress both with respect to procedure and with respect to substance. I would want to repeat again that I measure this progress by the opinions we have previously collected from our various missions to Africa, and the objectives which we have stated for the United States and I believe for the United Kingdom. And we believe that progress is being made with respect both to the procedures and to the substance, though, of course, the many parties that I have described previously must make the final judgment on that.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, when will the proposals you have outlined here be presented to the (inaudible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Our tentative plan is to send Assistant Secretary Schaufele to Africa, but we may modify this. But this is our tentative plan and in any event, you can be sure that by one means or another they will be presented within the next forty-eight hours.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, before these negotiations started, before the talks here started, it was generally thought that the Namibian problem might be a little more tractable than the Rhodesian one. Is that still your view now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, anybody who makes estimates of the tractability of African problems is being very rash. I would think that the Namibian problem, having fewer parties, and being at an earlier phase in which procedure is as yet more dominant than substance, may lend itself to more rapid progress. I want to make clear that as far as the United States is concerned we are prepared to move at a pace as rapid as it is possible to achieve agreement among the parties on both of these issues.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how (inaudible) will the United Nations come into the negotiations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the United Nations has, of course, a role in South-West Africa which some of its representatives carry out very vocally. There will be a role for the United Nations and this is one of the subjects that is now under discussion. But the United States supports a role for the United Nations in these negotiations. I will take one more question.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how much further do you think your negotiations about Rhodesia can go on without contact or reference to what is the _de facto_ government?

[lc]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 7, 1976

NO. 419

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING
AT THE ELYSEE WITH
PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING

PARIS, FRANCE

SEPTEMBER 7, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am not used to this arrangement. I am used to a mob scene. Ladies and gentlemen, the President and I had a two-hour conversation which was very cordial and in which we reviewed the world situation. I informed the President about the initiatives that the United States has taken with the support of Great Britain in southern Africa and especially about my talks with the Prime Minister of South Africa, as well as what we are planning for the future. We discussed the situation in the Middle East, the general problems connected with the proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. The French Foreign Minister gave us his impressions of the state of the North-South dialogue, and of the prospects which he sees for it. As I said, the discussions were conducted in a very cordial atmosphere and were from our point of view extremely productive, and it is always a great privilege for me and a great benefit to have an opportunity to exchange ideas with the President.

I will be glad to take a few questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you receive any assurance from the French President on the nuclear sales to Pakistan you were concerned about?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We did not discuss the question of any particular sale. We discussed the general question of proliferation policy of our two countries. As you know, there is a national study going on in the United States about our policies. There is, as I understand it, a policy review going on in France about France's national policy, and as these reviews continue we will no doubt exchange ideas on it, but we did not discuss any one particular sale.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you discuss President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal for (inaudible) Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We discussed the French proposal for a fund to Africa. The United States has always welcomed this

For further information contact:

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initiative by President Giscard. The United States supports it, the United States is prepared to contribute to it, and it is awaiting French initiatives to implement it.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We discussed the situation in Lebanon and the general prospects for peace in the Middle East.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I'll do almost anything to get out of the United States during election time.

**QUESTION:** Are these prospects for peace any better, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States strongly supports movement toward peace in the Middle East, and of course, it hopes very much for a resolution in Lebanon which will permit that country to maintain its unity, integrity and sovereignty. We believe that the objective conditions to begin movement toward peace in the Middle East exist. And the United States will support them.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am awaiting the conclusion of the Conference of the African Presidents and liberation movements in Dar es Salaam. As I pointed out, some progress has been made in the discussions, and if the United States can be helpful in speeding the independence of Namibia and majority rule in Rhodesia, we are prepared to help but it is, of course, up to the parties concerned.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, according to you, what part could be played by France in South African problems?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** France has a distinguished and historic role in Africa. And France has great influence in the Francophone countries as well as in other parts of Africa. This is why the United States, in our initiatives, has always consulted closely with the President and the Foreign Minister of France, and we are confident that France will use its influence to promote peace and progress in southern Africa.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, is it likely that the United States will grant asylum to the Soviet pilot who flew his plane into Japan yesterday?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Frankly, this happened while I was traveling and without advance notification to me, so my assumption is that if he asked for asylum in the United States, that we will probably grant it. If we don't, you know I've been overruled.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, will there be a shift toward agreement in the North-South Conference that is coming up?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have the impression, based on the report given to me by the French Foreign Minister that he's hopeful that progress can be made. We certainly have, in our talks with the Canadian Foreign Minister, attempted to indicate bases on which we are prepared to move forward and my impression, based on the conversation this morning, is that progress is possible and if so, the United States will strongly support it.

Thank you.

* * * * * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 7, 1976

No. 420

STATEMENTS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER
FOREIGN MINISTER OF
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
UPON ARRIVAL AT HAMBURG AIRPORT
HAMBURG, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SEPTEMBER 7, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER (In German): I am glad to have the opportunity to report to the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor about my talks with the South African Ministers. We are trying to prevent the expansion of the war in Rhodesia and South-West Africa and to reach a peaceful solution by means of negotiations. Relations between Europe and Africa are of great importance, and, therefore, we discuss all our initiatives with our friends and allies in the Federal Republic. For me, it is a great personal pleasure to see the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister here and to consult with them.

(In English): I am coming here to report to the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister about my discussions with the South African Prime Minister about the initiatives the United States is undertaking in southern Africa to prevent an expansion of the conflict and to find a negotiated solution. The problems of Africa are not problems for the United States alone; they concern Europe deeply as well, and in Namibia, of course, the Federal Republic has a very special historic interest. It is always a pleasure for me to see my friends the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. We will exchange ideas on my trip and all other subjects, and I look forward very much to this opportunity to see them. Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER (In German): May I once again very cordially welcome you to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Government supports within its possibilities the efforts of the American Secretary of State for a peaceful solution of the problems in southern Africa.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[le]

September 7, 1976

No. 421

#109

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
HAMBURG, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
SEPTEMBER 7, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Mr. Chancellor and Mr. Foreign Minister, let me take this opportunity first of all to thank both of you for the characteristically warm and cordial reception that we had here. It is customary for American and German Ministers to consult with each other about international events. We are at this moment engaged in discussions with various African countries, and it was therefore considered very desirable by the President as well as myself to have this opportunity to exchange ideas and to obtain the views of the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister. We reviewed the negotiations with respect to southern Africa; we discussed the situation in the Middle East; we talked also about the Law of the Seas Conference and about East-West relations in general. Relations between our two countries are close; the coordination of policies is taking place on every level, including the higher level. The policies of both countries have shown great continuity and will continue to show this, and for all these reasons it has been a great pleasure for me to be here. I want to thank the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister for giving us this opportunity to exchange ideas.

**CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT:** I don't think I have to add much to this, ladies and gentlemen. We have touched upon just about all areas of foreign policy. Secretary Kissinger has already mentioned some of them. I should add that, of course, we have talked especially about East-West relations, the continuation of the policy of "relaxation of tensions," about the agreements to which both the United States of America and we are signatory parties, and the observance of which by ourselves and by the other treaty partners we both feel is of great importance. Maybe I should confine myself to this and leave room for questions, which, as I hope, will be directed mainly to Mr. Kissinger, who as the guest here will be the more interesting man to answer than the born Hamburger or the Wuppertaler who came to us via Bremen from Saxony to become Foreign Minister.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, since you both talked about Africa, may I talk about Africa? Can you make it official, sir, that you will be going to an African shuttle, when will you go, to which capitals will you go, and which parties will you negotiate between?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I cannot at this point make it official. We have had a communication from the Tanzanian Government that they would welcome a visit. I would like to wait, however, until Assistant Secretary Schaufele, who is now on his way to Tanzania, has had an opportunity to talk to President Nyere and maybe to other Presidents who have been at this meeting before we make the final decision whether to go.

**QUESTION:** What are the odds, in fact, sir, that you will go, and could you outline the kind of shuttle in which you would engage?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think it would depend very much on the decisions of the summit, of which we have not yet been formally informed. What we will attempt to do is to bring together the so-called front line presidents that are concerned with Rhodesia, as well as the liberation movements concerned with Rhodesia, on a negotiated program for majority rule and minority rights and an end of warfare in Rhodesia. We would also encourage the process of negotiation that may be possible with respect to Namibia. The United States' objective is to avoid violence. We cannot support violence, and we are bound to oppose foreign interventions. But we will support peaceful negotiations between the various parties. Which countries would be visited — I will want to wait until we have had the official communications from the summit.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, although you have not had formal notification from Dar [es Salaam], you know that they finished their deliberations with a brief statement that said that they intend to further intensify the armed struggle. What kind of an analysis do you make of that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I cannot make a judgment as to this. The United States' position is to encourage a peaceful solution, to bring about conditions in which majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress can be achieved without violence.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how soon could you be prepared to leave, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, it is difficult to speculate, but I would be prepared, if the conditions were right, I could leave perhaps next week sometime. But I want to repeat I would first want to await the report of Assistant Secretary Schaufele.

**QUESTION:** When would you expect to receive this?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would think that I would have heard from him by Thursday morning.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what do you think the domestic political impact of the mission would be whether you succeed or fail?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The mission has no domestic political implications. The situation in Rhodesia is such that an escalation of violence is probable, and at some point events may get beyond the control of negotiations. I think that the promotion of peace is a non-partisan effort which will be supported by both political parties and is not contentious between the political parties.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Chancellor, is Germany willing to participate in the new economic aid program in southern Africa, including a guarantee program for the white minority in Rhodesia?

**CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT:** German interests are foremost and, generally speaking, the same as those Secretary Kissinger has described for the United States of America: namely, the interest to avoid bloodshed and violence; the interest to avoid outside intervention; third, the interest to bring about democratic elections and governments in these countries for these two purposes. I want to add as a fourth point that we Germans are a little bit more interested in Namibia than Rhodesia because in Namibia there are about 25,000 people of German descent with whom we naturally have special links. We have spoken in a general way about the concepts that the American Government has in mind in order to reach these goals, which we have roughly outlined here. These include, too, as Secretary Kissinger has said, not only majority rule but also the rights of minorities. To achieve this, possibly economic aid will be needed. The states which are transforming themselves here need economic help in many respects. The Federal Republic of Germany as worldwide never refused such help. Whether there will be some special assistance and whether we will join in will have to be seen within some weeks or even months. But at the end of these remarks I want to accentuate again our special interest in Namibia.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Chancellor, you have also mentioned the topic "Ostpolitik"; could you go into a little more detail and be a little more concrete?

**CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT:** The three of us have not used the word "Ostpolitik", but we have, as I have mentioned already, used the expression "relaxation of tensions", but this is the same thing, and we have also discussed the status of the fulfillment of the treaties. In this connection, because of this summer's events, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has also played a role. But maybe it would be better if I would confine myself to saying that we were in complete agreement, and perhaps the American Secretary of State would like to make a few remarks about this subject.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I would say first of all that there was an

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identity of views between Chancellor Schmidt, the Foreign Minister, and ourselves on the issues of East-West relations. As far as the United States is concerned, we will consider the policy of relaxation of tension or detente, which has now been again legitimized by the Republican Platform (laughter), and because we believe that it is necessary for world peace and for the future of mankind. We also believe, however, that such a policy must be based on the strict fulfillment of the letter and the spirit of existing treaties, and we will insist on this, just as we are prepared to carry out the letter and spirit of the existing arrangements. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin is an important aspect of this policy and an important test of the sincerity of Soviet intentions. The United States attaches the greatest importance to the strict fulfillment of the provisions of this agreement and the greatest importance to the integrity and freedom of Berlin, and this is a constant policy of the United States which we shall continue to pursue.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what kind of possibility do you foresee concerning Namibia or SWAPO to join in? Is it possible (inaudible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not think it would be appropriate for me to give details of discussions that may be taking place. The United States position has been that all authentic groups, among whom we would include SWAPO, should participate in any talks that might be held on the future of Namibia. What the framework of these talks should be -- that remains to be discussed in any negotiations that could place over the next few weeks.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you been in contact with SWAPO leaders or Mr. Ian Smith in the lead-up to these discussions or during these discussions with Mr. Vorster?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Under Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Schaufele on their recent trip through Africa had a conversation with the head of SWAPO in addition to conversations with the presidents of African states.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Chancellor, while I recognize that your discussions with Mr. Kissinger may be preliminary on this point, could you clarify, sir, whether your conception would be of a German national contribution to financial guarantees for southern Africa, or are you speaking possibly in terms of a European Commission or contribution or support?

**CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT:** You were right in your introductory remark, that we were treating this matter in "preliminary talks," but I want in any case go go so far as to say that up to now we have not spoken about a common European contribution through the EEC.

**********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 9, 1976

NO. 423

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PC 110

September 9, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will just read a statement and then I will answer a few questions about Chairman Mao's death.

I will probably have a press conference tomorrow where we can take other questions.

I extend my sympathy to the people and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the occasion of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death.

Chairman Mao was an historic figure who changed the course of events in the world. He had a tremendous impact on the present and on the future of his country.

In the last years of his life, we worked closely with him on the improvement of relations between our two countries. His personal interest in that process was a vital factor in the Sino-American rapprochement

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which began in 1972.

We have since that time created a durable relationship based on mutual understanding and a perception of common interests, and we, for our part, will continue to cement our ties with the People's Republic of China in accordance with the Shanghai Communique.

This is the formal statement, and I will be glad to take a few questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you think the opening between Washington and Peking was the result of Mao's philosophy and work?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that during his lifetime all the major decisions in China were either made by him or followed guidelines laid down by him. In the case of the opening of relations between the People's Republic and the United States, it is clear that that relationship bore his personal stamp, and on many occasions in my conversations with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, he would interrupt the meeting to say that he would have to consult with Chairman Mao in order to get further instructions.

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Q Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you know about Chinese leaders now, can you say with any confidence that China will continue to follow a policy of open door toward the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When any historic figure disappears, it is extremely difficult to predict everything that his successors will do. The basis of the relationship between China and the United States is mutual interest. I believe that these mutual interests are to some extent independent of personalities, and that therefore the main lines of the policies are likely to be continued.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you at all personally regretful that the United States was not able to make more progress on the Taiwan issue while Chairman Mao was alive?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The specific issues that are involved in the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China cannot be tied to the lifetime of personalities. I had the occasion five times for extended conversations with Chairman Mao, and I believe he was a man of very great vision, but the relationship between our two countries cannot be given a timetable that is geared to individuals.

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Q Mr. Secretary, do you have any expectation of visiting China between now and January 20th, and has the death of Mao in any way affected those expectations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no expectation of visiting the People's Republic before the election. What travels I may undertake after the election could be affected by the outcome. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the prospects that China might move now to remove the straining relations with the Soviet Union, since Mao was considered to be personally hostile to the Russians?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the basic line of the Chinese policy towards the Soviet Union has been determined by the fundamental interests of China and not by the personal preferences of an individual. It is, therefore, likely, that the main lines of Chinese foreign policy will be continued, though there could be modifications of tactics.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've met with Mao, as you said, several times. Could you give us some flavor of those conversations -- what kind of things you talked about, how he looked upon history, or something more

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than just the fact that you met with him?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, Mao was an enormously forceful personality -- a man who tended to be the center of the room simply by the enormous willpower that he reflected. He preferred to conduct his conversations in the form of a dialogue in which he made brief, epigrammatic, rather pithy comments and invited the other party's reaction to his comments.

I found that nothing he said, even though it seemed totally unplanned, was ever without purpose; and, therefore, these conversations tended to be rather complex and extremely illuminating.

Q Mr. Secretary, if the President were to telephone Peking and say, "I want to talk to the leader," who'd talk to him?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think he would talk to the Prime Minister.

Q Do you think he's the man who's in control there now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He is the man who is in charge of the government, and he would certainly be the

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interlocutor for the President.

Q Mr. Secretary, recently there have been reports of internal strife in China. Do you think Mao's death will intensify this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, there have been reports of various factions, but these reports occur repeatedly. The United States deals with the government in Peking, and the internal affairs of China are matters for the Chinese and not for us.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think that normalization of relations will be easier or more difficult for yourself or your successor after Mao's death?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe, from our side, as I pointed out in my statement, normalization will continue; and I'm sure that from the Chinese side the basic lines of the policy, as we have known them, will continue to be pursued.

Q Well, that doesn't really answer the question though. Some people on the Chinese political scene seem to be a bit more antagonistic or hostile toward the United States. Now, if Mao's death gives them

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7

more power in the future, will this make it more
difficult to settle Taiwan with them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, obviously,
if people who are more hostile to the United States
should take power in China, this might complicate our
relationship. We have seen, as of now, no evidence
of it; but, of course, it is very early to tell.

I do not believe that Chinese policy is basically
influenced by the personal likes and dislikes of Chinese
leaders but by their assessment of what is in the long-
term interest of China.

We have to remember that when a towering figure
disappears from the scene not even his successors can know
exactly what the shape of events will be, and it is
premature to speculate as to what the future evolution
should be.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * *

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON THE DEATH OF
CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG

SEPTEMBER 9, 1976

In the last years of his life, we worked
closely with him on the improvement of relations
between our two countries. His personal interest
in that process was a vital factor in the Sino-
American rapprochement which began in 1972.

Remarks for Amb. McCloskey's Swearing-in

Bob:

For one who has spent so much time
trying to stay out of this town, I am not
overly impressed with your track record.
I recall Ann's resistance when I pulled
you back from Cyprus two years ago and
I consider it a tribute to my own charm that
now I have to force you to leave.

There are those here among your
former clients who fully appreciate your
ability to avoid saying what you don't want
to admit. (I have labored myself in that
same vineyard.) But today I must simply
make note of the sense of loss that I will
feel with your departure.

-2-

You all know Bob as well as I do and
recognize his unique talents.

1. He has served, at the most personal level, three Secretaries of State, becoming essential to each of them.

2. He has undertaken over the last decade the most difficult negotiation of all, the daily dialogue with the Fifth Estate.

(a) No one is perfect, even Bob. I understand he came close to the supreme sacrifice at least once when Lyndon Johnson called for his head on a pike.

(b) I point this out to underline the daily jeopardy in which our Spokesman finds himself.

-3-

3. He has carried out one of the most delicate diplomatic negotiations in the history of our relations with European nations, namely the Spanish Bases Agreement, and followed it up with an equally delicate (and a good deal more treacherous) negotiations with Congress to win their approval.

4. In many ways most crucial, he has provided me with daily counsel. He has been a steady reminder that infalability is not an integral part of the Office of the Secretary of State.

5. Now he has capped his record in the Department with a superb performance as my representative to the Congress.

Fortunately, I do not assess his performance

-4-

on the basis of my rating in the Congressional polls! But, with his advice and influence, we have, in fact, overcome many serious challenges.

Bob, I want to congratulate you on getting out with your good health intact and even your reputation reasonably sound.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 11, 1976

NO. 429

SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEPTEMBER 11, 1976
PC 111

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before I take questions I wanted to make a few points about the trip to Africa that I am undertaking, starting on Monday:

First, the American diplomatic effort is being undertaken with the support and with the encouragement of all of the parties involved.

Secondly, there is no "American plan." The solutions have to be found in Africa and have to be found by negotiations among the parties.

Third, the United States has agreed to offer its good offices because no other country was available to perform this role and because the risks to world peace of an escalating violence in southern Africa were very severe.

Fourth, war had already started in southern Africa. The danger of its expansion, the danger of foreign intervention, the impact on the national security

PR #429

2

of the United States and on world peace dictated that we make an effort to find a peaceful solution. The worst that can happen, if this effort fails, is what was certain to happen if the effort is not made.

We are dealing with three problems: Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa -- each having different aspects and each having different time tables.

On this trip we will deal primarily with the issues of Namibia and Rhodesia. It is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic final conclusions, because there are, in the case of Rhodesia, four states, four liberation movements, the Rhodesian settlers in South Africa involved; in the case of Namibia, several African states -- again South Africa -- the national movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity namely, SWAPO, and several internal groups assembled in a constitutional conference.

We are pursuing this policy which will not support violence and which stands opposed to foreign intervention, in the interest of world peace, in the national interest of the United States, and above all for the interests of the peoples of Africa.

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Now I will be glad to take questions.

Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think any arrangements you can help to make to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia can have any lasting relevance and stability in a region where the strongest nation, South Africa, is saying through Prime Minister Vorster that they intend to preserve their system of white rule?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The solutions to Rhodesia and Namibia, if they can be achieved, can have a lasting character.

The purpose is to enable a transition to independence in Namibia and to majority rule and protection of minority rights in Rhodesia under conditions that will enable all the communities to live together and in which the bloodshed is put to an end.

The conditions in South Africa are more complicated and require a much longer time span for their evolution.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you go into some detail on the apparent American-British incentive plan to help

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4

bring about a transition to black rule in Rhodesia?

There has been a lot of speculation about it.
I know you have spoken to people on the Hill about it.
Could you provide us with some details?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Obviously, any solution
in Rhodesia will have to have political components
and economic components. It should not be seen as an
effort to buy out the white settlers.

Rather, Rhodesia is a rich country that can
have a substantial economic rate of progress after full
independence is achieved.

What we have been discussing with the United
Kingdom and with other interested parties is a scheme
that can be used either for investment in Rhodesia
to spur economic progress, or as a safety net for those
settlers who want to leave -- or for both.

Some of the funds can come from private
sources that have economic interests there. Some can
come from governments.

The leadership in this effort will
have to be taken by the United Kingdom, which has the

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5

legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, with our support.
We have talked to other countries, and the Government of
France has already announced its support -- so
this plan is going to have a wide basis, but its exact
features cannot be discussed until it has evolved further.
But its basic philosophy is what I have outlined here.

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two
questions based on your statement:

You say that this is not a negotiation which
lends itself to final conclusions; therefore, what would
you expect to achieve on this, and when might you get a
final conclusion?

And then you also said that the worst that can happen
if the effort fails, is that what was certain to happen, will
happen, if the effort were not made. What is that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the
second question: We are facing a situation now in which
a so-called "armed struggle" is already taking place in
Rhodesia and is beginning in Namibia. The history of these
struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing
in more and more countries, and have the danger of

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6

foreign intervention and the probability of the radicali-
zation of the whole Continent of Africa, in which moderate
governments will find it less and less possible to
concentrate on the aspirations of their people, and
becoming more and more focused on events in southern
Africa.

For this reason, we want to provide a non-
violent alternative to this prospect.

Now this prospect is before us. This prospect
has a short time limit, and therefore it cannot wait for
our own electoral processes and this is what will
almost certainly happen if efforts of negotiation fail.

Now I have forgotten your first question.

Q The first question was that in your
statement you said: This is not a negotiation that will
lend itself to dramatic conclusions --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right.

Q What do you expect to achieve, and when
might you expect a final conclusion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, we are
dealing with about eight parties on the side of black Africa.

PR #420

7

In Rhodesia we are dealing with the white settlers; and
we are dealing with South Africa. And in Namibia also
we are dealing with many different groups.

Therefore, in both cases, an objective is to
establish a framework for negotiations in which, then,
the details will have to be worked out by the various
parties concerned. We cannot supply the details by
which transitions to independence are achieved.
What we can do is to bring the parties sufficiently close
so that they think a negotiating effort-- they believe in
a negotiating effort -- and perhaps establish some of
the basic conditions for the negotiations.

Whether this can be achieved in both cases in
one trip, I would question; but progress toward these
objectives can be made.

Q Mr. Secretary, how important is it to
end the guerrilla struggle that is already taking place
on Rhodesia's borders, and beginning in Namibia?
And will you seek any commitments from the front-line
nations to diminish their support of the guerrilla
struggle -- if you succeed in creating the conditions
for a majority rule in Rhodesia?

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8

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think everybody agrees that if a peaceful solution can be found, that then there is no purpose in a guerrilla struggle. So the problem is: Can one find conditions in which all parties can agree to this?

But as I pointed out, the United States does not support violent solutions when peaceful alternatives are available.

Bernie?

Q Mr. Secretary, why do you feel that you, yourself, should engage in a shuttle diplomacy? Why cannot this be done through more orthodox diplomatic channels?

While there has been widespread support on the Hill, one Congressman yesterday characterized this mission as "Lone Ranger" diplomacy, and I wonder if you would address yourself to why you feel you, yourself, must be involved.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That Congressman was not very original, it seems to me. He plagiarized a Southern Governor. [Laughter]

PR #429

9

We have had three
missions in Africa. The British have had two. And
a point has clearly been reached where, since the
Presidents of so many black African states are involved
as well as the leaders of southern Africa that matters
cannot be brought beyond this point by the exchanges of
notes, by referring documents back for detailed instructions,
and that what is needed now is an impetus in which
the negotiations can be conducted somewhat more flexibly.

This is true especially in South Africa, as well,
where some difficult decisions have to be taken.

So this is what led all of the parties concerned
to believe that this was the best way to proceed.

Q Mr. Secretary, there are reports that
you will be seeing some black African leaders within South
Africa itself.

Now you mentioned earlier that you didn't
expect to accomplish anything on the South African question
on this particular trip. What would be the purpose of
your meeting with black Africans within South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I expect to meet
representatives of all communities in South Africa, and
not only of the white community, primarily to inform

PR #429

10

myself on conditions there, so that I can form a
better judgment of what the right American policy might
be.

Q Mr. Secretary, many Americans believe that there is no U.S. interest in southern Africa, and that our national security is not concerned there. You, however have a contrary view, and I wonder if you can elaborate on that a bit more?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I pointed out, at issue is not only the future of two states in southern Africa, but the potential evolution of all of Africa with its profound impact on Europe and on the Middle East.

It is the fixed American policy that solutions to complicated international issues should not be sought by violence. And conversely, if the principle of violent solutions is established, it will have an impact on other areas of the world.

Secondly, all European countries recognize the interests that they have in a moderate evolution of events in Africa, and this is why we have received public support from the United Kingdom, with which we have been cooperating most closely; from the President of France; and from the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the

11

Federal Republic of Germany, together with diplomatic
support from all our other allies.

Therefore, the consequences of the radicalization of Africa would be serious in many other parts of the world.

We are now at a moment when we can still,
with relatively small effort, at least attempt to arrest
this.

We have been urged, not only by the states of
southern Africa but by all the moderate leaders in
Africa, to engage in this enterprise, because they
understand what is at stake for the future of their
countries. And therefore, we believe that the national
interest of the United States is involved.

Success is not guaranteed, but an effort must
be made.

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12

Q Mr. Secretary, do you expect the current situation to result possibly in any further currency devaluation such as in the South African rand and the British pound?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think I should be asked economic questions, since there are so many people here who will tell you that I am an argument against universal suffrage on these issues.

I have not even thought about this. I don't expect that it will have any impact on devaluation.

Q Mr. Secretary, what role do you think the West German Federal Republic can play being helpful in this African settlement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As Chancellor Schmidt said at a press conference in Hamburg, the Federal Republic has a historic relationship to some of the population in Namibia. I understand there are about 30,000 people of German origin that live in Namibia, and so the Federal Republic can be helpful, especially helpful in any efforts that may be made there, but it has indicated that it will give its general support to efforts in southern Africa generally.

Q Mr. Secretary, if this matter is so important

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13

to United States national security, why wasn't a great
deal more done long ago when the positions were not so
fixed, and when it was more possible to make progress in
the area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because the conditions for
making progress did not exist previously. Until the
collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the conditions
did not exist.

Secondly, the United States did not feel that it
had a primary responsibility in an area that had been
traditionally governed by European countries, and where
many European countries had a longer historical interest,
and therefore we wanted to give every opportunity to Great
Britain, which was engaged in a diplomatic effort with
respect to Rhodesia, for this effort to succeed.

It was the combination of a number of factors
which made it clear that these methods would not work and
that underlined the urgency of the situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence that
black Rhodesian unity is possible, and will you meet
with any black Rhodesians on this trip?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The meeting in Dar, which
was supposed to -- which

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14

brought together the so-called front-line presidents,
and the various liberation movements, was more successful
in bringing about unity among the front-line presidents
than among liberation movements. I would say that at
this moment there is little evidence of unity among
these movements.

With respect to whether I should meet them or
not, I will be guided by the recommendations of the African
presidents.

I have taken the position that in order to avoid
foreign intervention on the model of Angola, that the
United States would not deal directly with the liberation
movements, provided no other country would do this.

If any of the presidents think -- or if the
presidents think that it would be desirable for me to meet
with them, then I would be prepared to do it.

But I must stress that the solution of these
problems is primarily an African matter and of the parties
concerned. The United States can act as an intermediary.
The United States can offer suggestions. The United States
cannot bring about unity. The United States cannot by
itself bring about moderation, and the final outcome depends

PR #429

15

on the wisdom and the capacity to work together of
the African parties.

Q How critical is unity among the liberation
groups to your current effort?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is not for me to determine how a solution is to be achieved. If the African presidents and the various liberation movements feel that they can negotiate by having individual teams, then it is not for me to decide that they should use another method.

So I would say that the organization of the
negotiations on the black African side depends on the
African presidents, and it is not going to be prescribed
by the United States.

Q To change the subject to another area, does
the United States intend to block the admission of Viet-Nam
to the United Nations? And, if so, does this have any
domestic political implications here or reasons for doing
so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President stated publicly
this week that we considered the gesture of releasing the
names of twelve missing in action as insufficient. And
what we are considering is whether a government that is

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16

not fulfilling one of its basic obligations under an
international agreement would be able to fulfill its
obligations under the United Nations Charter, and this
is -- we will make our decision when the case actually
comes before the Security Council.

Q Mr. President, does -- [Laughter.]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Now you are forcing me
to resign.

Q Mr. Secretary, does President Ford feel
that there is any political gain in your embarking on this
diplomatic shuttle? And, secondly, you are talking about
the complexity of this issue. Is it possible for you to
complete the beginnings of success in this issue, assuming
you make progress, prior to the election, or in the period
prior to inauguration? Aren't you against some sort of
political deadline?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think first of all, with
respect to political benefits, it was accepted wisdom that the
trip to Africa in April was not a spectacular success in
many of the primary elections that were then taking place.

It was undertaken, and it was supported by the
President at the time, because he concluded that we could

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17

not, in the national interests of the United States, delay
any longer.

Whether progress is possible before the election,
I cannot say. But that progress needs to be made during
this year if the situation is not to get dangerously out
of control on at least some of the issues, I believe all
the students of the subject agree to.

The impact of this negotiation on the election
is impossible to determine. It should have no impact what-
soever. I was on the Hill yesterday meeting with 47
Senators, and I found that there was an essentially non-
partisan support.

What we are doing in the pursuit of peace in
Africa is not a party matter. It is a matter for all the
American people, and it will not be handled as a party
issue, and I believe it will not be handled as a partisan
issue by either side.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talk about a frame-
work of negotiations, does that mean that you need a
commitment from Rhodesia to transfer power to the black
majority within two years, and can you get that on this
trip? Can you get it without having someone to whom to
transfer power?

PR #429

18

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not want to predict what is possible within any particular time-frame.

What we are trying to do on this trip is to move matters forward towards the point where negotiations can start, and where some specific proposals may emerge.

I would not expect that this can be achieved with respect to Rhodesia on one trip.

With respect to Namibia, the issue is whether a framework of participants in possible negotiations can emerge. I am somewhat more hopeful on this. But even that issue involving so many parties, I would not want to predict until I had talked to them.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow up Don Oberdorfer's question, it has been alleged not only that U.S. policy before last April was indifferent to Africa, but that it actively aided the white minority regimes. Particularly as a token of this is the Byrd amendment.

Last April you promised that the Administration would take steps to repeal that amendment. That was almost five months ago. No steps have been made.

Are you going to be able to explain this to the African heads of state?

PR #429

19

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the African heads of state understand that if a negotiation can be arranged over Rhodesia, the issue of sanctions will then be substantially irrelevant. The issue of sanctions arises only under conditions when there is no progress in the negotiations and no prospect for a transition in the governmental structure.

Therefore, I have found that there is substantial understanding on the part of the black African presidents for the steps we have been taking.

Q Mr. Secretary, during the period that you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an important date in the transition of power from President Franjiyah to President Sarkis -- President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, there are reports that Syria is making intensive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated solution that will allow Sarkis to take power in normal conditions.

What are your expectations for Lebanon in the next two weeks, and what is your view of the Syrian efforts? Is the United States in favor of them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service Officers who just

PR #429

20

returned from the Christian part of Lebanon and who have
had an opportunity to talk to President Sarkis.

Also, I will be taking with me on this trip an
expert on the Middle East, so that I can be in close touch
with developments in Lebanon.

We favor a negotiated solution on the basis of
the formula that was worked out in Damascus earlier this
year, and we have generally supported the political efforts
based on that formula.

Whether the advent of a new President would lead
to a rapid solution is not yet clear.

We support the independence and territorial
integrity and unity of Lebanon. We will use our influence
in this direction. We have invited President Sarkis to
send a representative to the United States for further
talks soon after his installation, and we will use our
influence in the direction of the unity and integrity of
Lebanon.

Q I have a two-part question. One, what
is your evaluation of the aftermath of the Panmunjom
incident? And, two, there have been conflicting reports
about the role of the influence of the Soviet Union and

PR #429

21

China towards Kim Il Sung's role in this case. Will you
become a fair judge over this important issue (sic)?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that North Korea
realized that the United States and its allies in the
Korean peninsula would not tolerate such brutal behavior.
They in effect apologized for the incident.

As a result of the discussions, the guard posts that they
had on our side of the line in the Panmunjom area have
been removed, and I believe that conditions have been created
in which a repetition of such incidents are relatively
less likely.

We have also shown our capacity to reinforce
Korea very rapidly, and our determination not to permit
any transgressions in Korea.

As for the role of the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, we are not familiar with any
diplomatic initiatives that they may have taken. We
did not ask them to pass any messages. We noticed that
their press was not particularly vocal in support of
North Korea, and we consider this positive, since it was
a brutal act of murder.

PR #429

22

Q Mr. Secretary, will you or the President
or any senior member of the Administration be talking
with former Defense Secretary Schlesinger when he
returns from China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I had an extensive
talk with former Secretary Schlesinger before he went to
China. I expect to have an extensive talk with him after
he returns, and we have had reports of his -- we've had
some fragmentary reports of his conversations there,
and he's behaved himself with a great sense of responsibility.

Q Mr. Secretary, you're an old hand at being
a trouble-shooter in many parts of the world. I'm wondering
now, as you're about to leave, how would you rate your own
chances of succeeding?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was afraid you meant as I'm
about to leave office and I thought 1981 wasn't that imminent.
[Laughter]

This is the most complex negotiation procedurally
in which I've been engaged, and the chances of success are
very difficult to evaluate, because it depends on so many intangi-
bles and because, there isn't any one interlocutor
on each side.

Senator Clark estimated my chances at success

PR #429

23

at 1 in 20. I rate my chances higher than that,
but I don't want to give an exact percentage.

Q Mr. Secretary, twice this morning you've
mentioned that your mission has the support of all the
parties concerned in the area. By saying that, do you
mean the black liberation movements? Do you have any
word from them that they welcome the mission which you
are about to undertake?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have made clear that we
have not dealt directly with the black liberation movements.
So, when I speak of the parties I speak of the states in the
area, and the relationship of the liberation movements to
this process is being worked out by the so-called front-
line presidents. We have not had any direct discussion
with the liberation movements.

Q If I can follow that up, you said, as I
understood it, that you would not deal with them --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Excuse me. We've had a
discussion with SWAPO with respect to Namibia, and I would
apply my statement to them.

Q Well, that perhaps is the point I was

PR #429

24

making. Some of these movements, as I understand it, have had relations or have had contacts with other governments in the past. Where you said you would not deal with them as long as other governments did not, I wondered how you took that into account.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, clearly, if outside powers become very active in southern Africa, then the danger of Africa becoming an arena for superpower conflict is very great, and I have said that the United States stands opposed to outside intervention in African affairs.

Up to now we have the impression that in the last months the Rhodesian liberation movements have dealt with the outside world substantially through the various front-line presidents, which is the understanding that I have of the situation. Should that change, then the United States would also have to reexamine its position.

Q Mr. Secretary, back to Rhodesia again on the financial aspects, what was the reaction of the people on the Hill to the dimensions of the plan? And could you be clearer -- is it a case of the United States being asked to spend several hundred million dollars in allocations, or is it a kind of possibility; is it an insurance plan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are talking primarily

PR #429

25

of an insurance plan -- nor are we saying that the American part of this insurance plan has to come entirely from governmental sources. There are other sources that may also be available.

So we have not worked out a figure; we have not yet worked out a governmental participation. But we are talking of something that is essentially an insurance plan rather than a direct commitment, and we're talking of a consortium in which the United Kingdom will be the convoking country with our support and which will have the support, we expect, of most industrial democracies.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate being able to present this package to Prime Minister Smith during this trip?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not yet decided whether I will meet with Prime Minister Smith on this trip. This depends on the evolution of the discussions and on our estimate of his basic attitude.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

(Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Secretary's Press Conference was concluded.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 14, 1976

No. 435

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL IN DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA
SEPTEMBER 14, 1976

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I have come here at the direction of President Ford to talk with President Nyerere about the prospects for peace in southern Africa. This initiative started at the request of African leaders during my visit in April. Every step that has brought us here has been carefully discussed with leaders in Africa and especially with the front line presidents. Every step we will take in the future will be closely co-ordinated with the front line presidents. The United States wants nothing for itself except its interest in peace and in economic and social progress. The conflict that we are trying to end is a conflict which will affect most of all the peoples of Africa. The progress we are trying to bring will benefit above all the peoples of Africa. We will do what we are asked to do, we will do nothing that is not requested, we will take no initiatives that are not invited and whatever progress will occur depends on the attitude of the parties and the goodwill of the participants.

We are prepared to make the effort that is encouraged. And in this spirit I look forward very much to my talks with the distinguished leader of this country, President Nyerere, with whom we have had close communications over the recent months and who has encouraged us in our enterprise.

Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 15, 1976

No. 437

PC #112

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
HOTEL KILIMANJARO
DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA
SEPTEMBER 15, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I understand this is a day of press conferences. We will go right to the questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, we've just come from a press conference with President Nyerere which was, to say the least, not encouraging for your mission. On both the Namibian and the Rhodesian questions, he said he received nothing of encouragement. In fact, on the Namibian question he said he is now less hopeful than before. Does this reflect your views on the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have said from the beginning that whatever can be achieved depends on the attitude of the parties. All the United States can do is to enable the parties to deal with each other; to bring whatever ideas they have; occasionally to offer a suggestion, based on their knowledge of having talked to the parties, of what might be possible. But ultimately it is up to the parties to decide. Nothing has changed from what was known a week ago, and therefore I cannot make judgments based on fluctuating moods.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, isn't the fact alone that nothing has changed since last week an unhopeful sign?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, nothing could change since last week, since the positions of the parties — the purpose of my visit here was to get clear about the view of Tanzania. I will then take the views of the front line-presidents to Pretoria and then I will return to Lusaka and here. At that point we will be able to judge whether any progress has been made. But it is not possible to judge that on the first day.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, one of the other purposes of your visit here was to find out what decisions were taken at the five-nation African summit. Can you give us some idea as to what the consensus was at that summit?

PR #437

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have a rather clearer idea now of what the views were. I do not believe that it is up to me to discuss the decisions of the five-nation African summit. I think this is a question that should be addressed to President Nyerere.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what if the worst comes to the worst? Should the peaceful negotiations you are undertaking right now fail and the armed struggle is intensified, which side will the United States support?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We can give no blank checks in advance. We are here to find peaceful solutions. We have at this moment not given up expectations of peaceful solutions, and that is a question that can be addressed when we know the circumstances which made peaceful solutions impossible.

**QUESTION:** Will you clarify the four points put by the Tanzanian Government on fear of the American intervention in the present situation in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has made clear on many occasions that it has no intention of intervening in southern Africa. The United States pursues a policy that African development should be in the hands of Africans. We also oppose the intervention of any other outside powers. The United States has no intention by itself to initiate intervention in Africa.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere made clear that he thought only the South Africans and SWAPO should be represented at a constitutional conference on Namibia. Is it the American view that the tribal and ethnic groups that were represented at the Windhoek Conference should also participate?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States is putting forward no program of its own. The United States communicates the positions of the parties, each to the other, with the explanation that each party gives for its position. At the end of that process the parties will have to decide whether they can reconcile their differences. And in any negotiation each side has a tendency to state its optimum conditions at the outset, and if a solution is reached, it will depend on whether there is a willingness to compromise by one or both sides. That determination will have to be made later.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, both in the statement by the Tanzanian Government yesterday and in the press conference of President Nyerere, there was a strong implication and a fear expressed in a way that your approach, the American approach, towards the problems of southern Africa, is unduly obsessed with the fear of the spread of communism here. Since this does seem to be a rather important fear here, I wonder if you would address yourself to it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** They are two separate problems. We do not say that the liberation movements are communist, and we do not fear the liberation movements, either in their own right or because they are

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-3-

communist. On the other hand, we are concerned when there are inter-
ventions from outside the continent here. But, in themselves, our
concern here is to help bring a peaceful solution, to enable the
peoples of this area to make progress. We can only repeat that the
lives that will be saved will be African lives. The progress that
will be made will be African progress. It is not something from
which the United States benefits, and it is not a part of an anti-
communist crusade against any particular movement because it is pre-
cisely these movements that will untimately benefit from a peaceful
solution.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you heard here today, are you more or less hopeful about the possibilities of finding a peaceful solution?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My views are approximately those with which I came. That is to say, I have heard the views now explained in greater detail by the President of Tanzania. I am certain that, since this is the beginning of the process, they were not understated. These views have been expressed; they will be faithfully conveyed in Pretoria. The views of the other side will be equally faithfully repeated here. I found no surprises and nothing to change by basic view, which is that the chances are somewhat less than fifty-fifty; that the worst that can happen if this mission does not succeed is what is certain to happen without this mission; that no one else was available — no other country was available — to undertake it; that the effort has to be made, and if it should fail and conflict should prove unavoidable, at least we will know it is not because the United States failed to make a major effort.

**QUESTION:** Would you be able to confirm what President Nyerere said, and that was that Cuban intervention in Angola took place only after South African intervention?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First, I hope you all realize I have not seen a transcript of President Nyerere's press conference. Our understanding is that Cubans were in Angola before South Africans, and I seem to recall a speech by Fidel Castro in which he pointed out that the reason they reinforced the Cubans is because some of them had been killed by South Africans, from which one would assume they were there before the South Africans. But I would have to check this to make sure.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, another thing President Nyerere indicated was that — in fact, he said something to the effect — that he didn't understand how even intelligent people could be so preoccupied with the subject of Cuba. I think we might infer from that that there has been rather a difference of opinion between yourself and the President on the subject. Has it come up?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The subject of Cuba was not discussed between President Nyerere and myself.

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-4-

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Tanzanian Government asked that the United States declare its support for the freedom fighters in the event that negotiations fail. Have you given President Nyerere such assurances or are you prepared to make such a declaration of support?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I have indicated, we do not operate on the assumption that negotiations will fail, and until the negotiations have failed we cannot make any such commitment.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere put it slightly differently today. He said that because of an ambiguity it would be a good thing if the United States would say it will not help those who are fighting majority rule — in other words, the Smith regime — if the guerrilla war should become worse. Can you --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We stated our position in the Lusaka speech and this remains American policy. I am conducting my conversations with President Nyerere privately and not by commenting on his press conference.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you at this point clarify at all what you regard as the specific obstacles you are facing in trying to be helpful in both the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is clear that a conflict that has gone on for so many years and has such a long history has created profound distrust, and so many efforts have failed that the parties are becoming more and more committed to the process of struggle rather than to the process of negotiation. I think this is the basic underlying obstacle — the reluctance of anybody to admit that negotiations are possible before they know that negotiations will succeed. And of course they will never find out whether negotiations will succeed until they first admit that they are possible. This is the underlying difficulty. Then there are many specific issues: the composition of conferences, the basic agenda that conferences might address, what issues should be dealt with as preconditions, and which issues can be left to the conference. All of these are before the various parties and all of these will be explored over the next few days.

**QUESTION:** I'd like to follow that up. Have you made at this stage any advance in these procedural questions?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** An Advance has been made over the time that these discussions started. But it would be rash to say that a solution is in sight.

**QUESTION:** Would the process of negotiation in Rhodesia toward majority rule be hastened if the present government were to be removed or otherwise removed itself?

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-5-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are dealing with the issues and not with the personalities and structures. We are telling each side what we believe the requirements of a successful negotiation are. Which authorities carry this out is for the people concerned to determine.

**QUESTION:** Early this year the United States participated in the Security Council triple veto which saved South Africa from United Nations military and economic sanctions. With United States national investments and political interests in South Africa, do you really think the United States can be an impartial peace-maker in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On my visit to Africa in April, every African leader that I saw urged me to get in touch with Prime Minister Vorster since it was their belief that he held the key to a solution in southern Africa. We would not be engaged in this process if we did not believe that our influence can bring about peace, and in the direction that has been requested by black African leaders. Whether it will succeed or not is for the future to determine and depends on the attitude of all of the parties.

PR#437

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere spoke of the possibility of a proclamation between yourself and Ian Smith being drawn up. Can you tell us if this was in fact discussed? And secondly, was the question of compensation for white settlers in Rhodesia discussed today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There is absolutely no possibility of a joint proclamation between Ian Smith and the United States Government. The question of compensation -- the issue isn't compensation. The question of a financial guarantees plan was discussed and met with the approval of President Nyerere.

**QUESTION:** The President said that this did not happen. Do we take it from that that you rejected the question of a joint proclamation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The issue of a joint proclamation has never come up, was never discussed between President Nyerere and myself, has never been requested by the Rhodesians or anybody else. Indeed, we have not been in touch with the Rhodesians so it could not have come up. At any rate, that is not a possibility.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, one of the apparent issues of difference, though, is that President Nyerere said that it was his belief that the great majority of whites in Rhodesia would leave. Is that an African consensus and how does it square with your own views on the future of Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not know whether he said should or would. And our position has been that the communities should be enabled to live together, that there should be no discrimination of one side against the other, but that the final relationship between the communities is one that has to be settled by a constitutional conference or some other device, which is at this point premature.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your problem about measuring any degree of progress at this particular time. But after all, you've had a weekend of talks with Prime Minister Vorster; you've had today with President Nyerere. Do you find, even in a tentative way, the possibility of coinciding views that in fact makes you a touch more optimistic than you're prepared to concede today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are several coinciding views, and several sharply different views. The question which we face in the next week is whether the different views can be bridged. This I cannot judge until we have had further conversations. If there were not some possibility of bridging these views we would not have undertaken the journey.

**QUESTION:** On the question of guarantees to the white community in Rhodesia -- in addition to the perhaps billion dollars that is being talked about to safeguard the white minority in Rhodesia, there seems to be another element, an element concerning the relationship or some guarantees being given by a black majority government to the white

- 7 -

PR #437

community in Rhodesia. Now, would these guarantees include things
like the right to live, work and vote in Rhodesia like any other
citizen, or is there something else involved?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It has always been my understanding from the African Presidents that they want a society that is not based on any racial discrimination from either side. I have never been given any other indication. What specific guarantees will be worked out in this connection will depend on a conference, if there is a peaceful settlement, that will eventually have to take place between Rhodesian nationalists and the Rhodesian white settlers under British aegis. I am in no position to go into the precise details. The United States is not prescribing the details of the settlement. The United States indicates its general attitude on the kind of solution it favors, but it cannot compel the parties to accept that preference.

**QUESTION:** Certain circles have said that the sudden interest the United States has shown in the southern Africa problem is because of the fear of Communism. Would you subscribe to that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not know who these circles are. On my previous visit all of the leaders I met were very critical of the United States for not showing sufficient interest in Africa and urged us to show interest in Africa. Now we are showing interest in Africa. Why can you not ascribe it to the persuasiveness of your leaders?
(Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be logical for anybody, for an African in particular, to take the United States initiative suspiciously, particularly when you consider that it is the Americans who are propping up the Smith regime economically?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What we are seeking to achieve is what African leaders have been asking for. Every move we have made has been made in close consultations with the leaders of Africa. If the leaders of Africa are suspicious and if the leaders of Africa believe that the American initiative cannot be helpful, then we will of course stop this initiative. We will have to be judged by the results. And we have tried in good faith to prevent a conflict, the major impact of which will be on Africa. It is now up to Africans to decide whether they will wish to continue to cooperate with this or not. So far everything that has been done has been with the encouragement and with the approval of African leaders.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there are American troops in (inaudible)?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has no objection to the MPLA as a political force. The Frelimo in Mozambique, whose political views are nearly indistinguishable from MPLA, was recognized by the United States as soon as it took office, and we have established a reasonable relationship with Mozambique. Our objection to Angola was the massive

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infusion of Soviet military help to begin with, followed by the sending of an expeditionary force which was not, or could not, have happened on the part of so small a country as Cuba without Soviet support. Therefore, it seemed to us a massive outside intervention into the affairs of Africa. This is the view of the United States on that subject and it is a quite different matter whether an expeditionary force appears in a civil war or as part of a normal alliance relationship.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, last week the summit conference was attended by President Augustinho Neto. In view of the fact that your government does not recognize his government, do you expect you might have to meet with him at some point and how would you surmount this problem?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not believe that I will meet President Neto on this trip.

**QUESTION:** Last month the State Department had stated that the South African promise to grant Namibia independence did not go far enough. What would you find acceptable in terms of independence?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have stated that simply giving a date for independence did not go far enough. Our view is that there has to be a procedure by which all authentic groups can participate in the negotiations, and a conference which is acceptable to those parties most concerned.

**QUESTION:** On the question of South Africa, I understand that you did discuss this with President Nyerere today, but it was widely reported that during your talks with Prime Minister Vorster in Zurich you were seeking to find out whether or not Vorster was willing to detach or separate the future of South Africa from the futures of Namibia and Zimbabwe. You have yourself stated on several occasions that you see the necessity for the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. But the logical extension of ending apartheid in South Africa is black majority rule, and therefore it would seem that any detachment or separation of the issues of southern Africa would only be a matter of time. If it is correct to assume that eventually we would be looking for black majority rule in South Africa, then what kind of time period are we talking about? Are we talking about one year, ten years or maybe a hundred year?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would not want to speculate about the amount of time. You are quite right that time is what is implied by the phrase of separating the problem. But time is of the essence if a peaceful solution to so complex a problem as that of South Africa is to be found. We have no precise timetable. Some timetables were given publicly by African leaders. We have no timetable of our own.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 16, 1976

No. 439

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
HIS EXCELLENCY SITEKE MWALE
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ZAMBIA
UPON THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
SEPTEMBER 16, 1976

MINISTER MWALE: Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, Honorable Ministers, Your Excellencies, it is my great pleasure to welcome you, Mr. Secretary of State, once again to Zambia. I am particularly pleased that this time around you have come with your charming wife to visit us here. Although this is a business trip I hope you will find some time, and indeed I hope your distinguished delegation will find some time to see a bit of Zambia. The last time you were here, Mr. Secretary of State, you honored Zambia with a major statement on southern Africa. We have followed your travels, Mr. Secretary of State, we have been interested in what you have been doing as follow up on the major statement that you made from Lusaka. We know that the job is not easy. The best we can do, Mr. Secretary of State, is to wish you the best of luck in your difficult work. The stand of Zambia on the situation in southern Africa has already been made quite clear and indeed we have welcomed your initiatives, although we have indicated that having tried in our own way to negotiate for peace in southern Africa and having reached a point where we felt that we have failed, we have decided, in conjunction with the resolutions of the OAU, the Lusaka Manifesto and indeed the Dar es Salaam Declaration, that we will support intensified armed struggle. But we want to assure you, Mr. Secretary of State, that if your efforts, your genuine efforts, can bring about majority rule in Zimbabwe, in Namibia and indeed can lead to the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, today or tomorrow, we will cease to fight because the point of fighting won't be necessary once majority rule has been achieved. We are quite aware, sir, what you have done already. You have done quite some remarkable job and we can only hope that the diehards of the racist regimes in southern Africa will appreciate your very difficult task and respond favorably because time is against us. With those few words I once again want to welcome you to Zambia and as I was saying as we came I think we ought to set up a constituency here for you. Thank you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Foreign Minister, it is a great pleasure for me to return to Lusaka, the place where the United States announced its new Africa policy. It was no accident that we chose Lusaka. We have known and admired its humane and distinguished leader, President Kaunda. We know what efforts he has made to bring peace through negotiations. We know that Zambia, bordering on the troubled areas of southern Africa, understands better than many the importance of peace and the importance of the world in which the peoples of southern Africa can develop their aspirations for progress and human dignity. The United States is supporting these efforts. The United States is seeking

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 16, 1976

NO. 443

REMARKS OF
PRESIDENT KENNETH DAVID KAUNDA
OF ZAMBIA
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER

SECRETARY OF STATE
AT STATE HOUSE
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

SEPTEMBER 16, 1976

PRESIDENT KAUNDA:

Mr. Secretary of State, may I say first of all welcome to Zambia
again. We welcome you in the name of the party, Government and
people of Zambia because we like to believe, Mr. Secretary, that
your President, you yourself, and your Administration are inter-
ested in helping the peoples of southern Africa to find a peace-
ful solution to their problems. Indeed, we pray very hard that
you should succeed, because if you don't succeed, I can only
use Mr. Vorster's own words "the alternative will be too
ghastly to contemplate." On our part I can assure you that
we want to seek peace, but we want peace for every human being
in this part of the world. We want peace with honor, we want
peace with justice and freedom and independence. Less than
that is not peace at all. At least we would not contribute to
the type of peace that is simply the excess of war. We want
peace, Mr. Secretary of State, that means dignity and man's
honor, peace and freedom and independence and justice. These
are the principles for which your Governments stands and I
believe this is what has propelled your Administration to send
you out here once again. In the next few days we will be able
to know whether your mission will succeed or not. Fortunately
for us, our stand is very clear. Some few years back, leaders
of East and Central Africa met here in Lusaka and they worked
out what was being called the Lusaka Manifesto on southern
Africa. This manifesto became an OAU document. Later on it
became a UN document and both your great country and mine are
members of the UN and therefore we must subscribe to the con-
tents of this document. This document states very clearly
that Africa, black Africa, accepts men and women of all races.
We want them to make their homes there because not so much
because of their skills but that they are fellow human beings,
made by the same creator as the one who made us. This document
states very clearly that we accept a South Africa as independent,
but abhor and indeed, we will fight apartheid in any shape
or form. I would have thought, Mr. Secretary, that Mr. Vorster
would help us by accepting the sincerity, the honest purpose
behind this document and help you because, by the accident of
your birth, you happen to be white and where we failed because

PR #443

- 2 -

we carried the wrong color, have had the right passport and therefore, I hope that he will be able to see sense and accept the importance of your mission. Failing that, Mr. Secretary of State, I can only use his own words - "the alternative would be too ghastly to contemplate." We demand what's right and fair and just to all men over the question of Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe-to-be. Demand what is fair, just and fair to men, over the question of Namibia. We want majority rule immediately. We want complete destruction of the abominable policy, policy if it is at all of apartheid, philosophy if it is at all. If we fail to get that peacefully, the manifesto says, fight. We pray very strongly that Mr. Secretary of State has informed President Ford that this, that for us there can be no compromise over the issue of freedom, independence, peace and justice. Not only the peace, we don't accept that.

Mr. Secretary of State, we have no romantic views about armed struggle, none at all. We don't like to see lives wasted, but what alternative are we left with, except to fight, to help obtain for the people of Rhodesia what we have for ourselves. Yes, we will fight, until the last man if necessary. We feel strongly because there is no other reason why the black people of Rhodeisa and Namibia and South Africa should be treated any differently from how we treat ourselves here. God made them black; it is not a sin, Mr. Secretary, to be black. So we must fight. If the mission fails, we will fight. I have made it clear several times to your Ambassadors here and Ambassadors in western countries that the system they support, financial means, is not Christian. I have said on the personal bit, we can't understand those people, the white people of Rhodesia, white men in South Africa, white men in Namibia calling themselves Christian. I can't. I don't know that God they pray to. I don't understand him. The God I believe in is a God of love of human races as a whole. He does not discriminate. In short, what I am saying, Mr. Secretary of State, if you fail, if your mission fails, we will fight. We don't make arms here; no African country makes arms, so we have to get them from somewhere else. The West won't give them to us. We will get them from whoever is ready to give them to us. It is not a matter of being neglected. We hope your mission succeeds. You are here for the second time within a space of six months. We accept your sincerity but I am afraid your mission will need more than sincerity and honest purpose. You are dealing with people who don't live in this world. They live in a different world. I don't know what your Ambassadors have told you about South Africa, but I am sure you have read enough to know why we feel so strongly about this. Compromise, there is none, Mr. Secretary. Your mission has got to succeed. If it fails, we fight. The destruction of life and property that will follow is miserable. Those who have invested in Namibia will have to accept the dire responsibility for what happens. It's really incredible. I don't understand the West at all. I have met the Secretary

PR #443

- 3 -

of State and I hope that your ability to impress on your fellow men, in this case your fellow Westerners, will be able to impress them so much that they can act with you on this issue. In my opinion--it is humble-- I don't think the U.S. acting alone will succeed. You might have to call upon some of your colleagues, western countries to join you, but time is not with you. Who knew that I would ever meet Mr. Vorster, shake his hand -- all in the course of the manifesto on southern Africa I have to do that. Literally, I went to Cape Town. I did not go there physically, but I met Mr. Vorster here on Zambian soil. I have never dreamt of doing that. But I knew well that failure to negotiate with him -- I can't do more on behalf of the Zambian people to their party, other than to impress upon you, Mr. Secretary, that your mission is very important. You only have a few days, not weeks, to succeed. If you fail, we shall reach a point of no return. May God help you in your mission.

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. President, I appreciate very much the very moving words you have just spoken. I appreciate them all the more because in describing events they are often cast in cold political abstract terms. You, Mr. President, have described correctly what the fundamental issues are. They are the dignity of man of whatever color and of whatever race. They are the justice of the people to each other of whatever color and of whatever race. If truly spoken of peace, it must be a peace that all, the rich and the poor and whatever race, can participate in and can feel that it is their own. There is no stability in oppression and there is no permanence in injustice. I will never forget our meetings on the occasion of your visit to Washington when you foretold the prospects that were ahead for all of mankind in southern Africa. We realize that what you have said is only too true and the President has sent me on this mission despite the inevitable preoccupations of our national elections, because he shares your views that time is running out. And if it is running out we have an obligation to ourselves, to our values, and to the rest of humanity, to make the best effort of which we are capable. You can be sure that I am conscious of the responsibility we face. I don't know whether we can succeed in an effort that others have attempted for over a decade and have not brought to a conclusion, but we will receive impetus from the knowledge that if we bring peace many lives will be saved. Many aspirations can be fulfilled. And if it should be said some day that the people of southern Africa from some point on could live in justice, in mutual respect between the races, and in human dignity, I would like to believe that it may have started here six months ago in Lusaka and that it was continued here today in Lusaka.

I will return on Sunday evening or Monday morning to report to you, Mr. President, about the progress we have made, and I

PR #443

pray for all of us, for your people and for our people that I
can bring you encouraging news. Justice is not divisible,
peace cannot exist in only corners of the globe without leading
to grave dangers. The United States has now found itself in
the position where no one else was available to play this
role. We will play it with dedication, with conviction, inspired
by the values of human dignity that you have avowed here, and
as I said before I left the United States, it will never be
said that we failed for lack of effort. And if we succeed we
will know that those who had the courage to seek peace for
a decade, those who have the courage to make efforts at recon-
ciliation that must have been very painful, will have paved the
way and will have the ultimate responsibility for their execution.
We have moved together this far, Mr. President, and I look
forward to our further association. I want to thank you on
behalf of my colleagues for having given us this opportunity to
be of some service.

* * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

September 17, 1976

No. 447

PC #113

STATEMENT BY
AND PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON DEPARTURE FROM LUSAKA, ZAMBIA
SEPTEMBER 17, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Foreign Minister, on behalf of my whole delegation, I would like to thank you and President Kaunda for the warm reception we have received here. This was not a stop for negotiation. It was a stop to clarify the principles that will be taken to Pretoria and that we hope will form the basis for progress toward justice and peace in southern Africa.

We were encouraged by the spirit of the talks and by the moral support which we have received here, but it is of course clear that the serious negotiation lies ahead of us and that the decision on whether the objectives of peace — in human dignity — can be achieved are not going to be made in Lusaka. So Mr. Foreign Minister, I leave with the determination to make a major effort. I have been strengthened in this by my conversations with your President and his associates, and I want to thank you once again for the extraordinary reception we have had here.

Now I will be glad to take a few questions.

**QUESTION:** Will your stop in Pretoria be a negotiating stop?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My stop in Pretoria I hope will move matters forward, so that when I return to Lusaka we will have something more precise to work with than is the case today.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to see Smith?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I stated last Saturday before I left Washington that I would meet Smith only under the condition that this was the final element in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. I do not have this knowledge today, and therefore there is no basis for my meeting him at this time.

**QUESTION:** Could you spell that our for us, Mr. Secretary?

PR #447

-2-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have stated my view and the American position. There is no point in repeating it every day, since I have not heard anything yet about the discussions between Prime Minister Vorster and Mr. Smith. I will not see Mr. Smith to negotiate; I will see him if it helps to move matters to a conclusion and only if some clear result is in prospect. Since that is not the case today, there is nothing that I can add to what has already been said.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary of State, if your negotiations fail and other friends of Africa come to help with the only other alternative of armed struggle, will you still be talking about outside intervention?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States is opposed to outside intervention in Africa. All the African presidents with whom I have spoken mentioned their determination to deal with these questions as an African problem. There is no point in my speculating now about what may happen, since I have not come here to fail.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, what are your chances now that you have had two views from Tanzania and Zambia that the armed struggle should be intensified? What are your chances in the event of total rejection of your initiatives?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to speculate about what the United States will do in the case of the failure of a mission whose failure we do not anticipate. We stated our policy here in Lusaka as supporting the objectives of majority rule, minority rights, freedom and human dignity in southern Africa. These objectives we will support regardless of the success of one diplomatic mission.

**QUESTION:** With regard to your talks with John Vorster, how nearer is Namibia to independence?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that we have made some progress or I would not have come here. I thought that the progress that had been made warranted this effort because I agree with President Kaunda's statement of yesterday — that if we do not make this effort, and if peaceful efforts fail, the consequences for the southern part of Africa will be too ghastly to contemplate.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, are you worried about Communist influence in Namibia and Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have to separate two problems. One is the internal direction of African movements. We believe that African nationalism will take care of its own evolution and of its own direction. The second problem is outside military intervention from outside Africa, either from the Soviet Union or from other countries supported by the Soviet Union. That we oppose. The direction of the liberation movements is a matter for Africans to settle, and we will not intervene in this.

PR #447

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**QUESTION:** Has Britain got any special role to play in your initiatives?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Britain has the legal and historic responsibility for Rhodesia. Every initiative that we have taken has been taken in the closest coordination with Great Britain. And if my efforts either on this trip or later should succeed, Great Britain will have to provide the legal framework by which a further evolution takes place. This has been agreed to by all of the parties.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would share with us your feelings as you are about to embark on the South African trip?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that a combination of factors has produced a situation where the United States, alone in the world, is in a position to make a contribution to avoiding a conflagration. We have this responsibility which we did not seek. It is in the interest first of the peoples of southern Africa but eventually of all of the peoples of the world that the world not be divided between races, that there not be a race war and that outside powers not manipulate the aspirations of the people. If I can help on behalf of the United States, I believe that this reflects the values of human dignity and freedom and justice for which the United States has always stood.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you be a little more specific about what you hope to accomplish in South Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have stated the objectives repeatedly. We will try to move Rhodesia and Namibia toward independence, majority rule, minority rights and a constitutional framework in which, as President Kaunda said yesterday, all the races and all the people can live side by side in human dignity.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how do you explain America's late arrival on the scene?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has gone through a very difficult decade in which it was occupied with many problems in other parts of the world. Secondly, until the process of decolonization had reached a certain point, it was not possible for the United States to make its influence felt the way it is attempting to do now.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary of State, the front-line countries have discussed this type of negotiations before, but it failed. Now they have adopted that the only solution is to intensify armed struggle. Now America has arrived on the scene late. Are you genuinely shuttling diplomacy or are you simply displaying some kind of intellectual superiority?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not see how I can demonstrate intellectual superiority by failing. I am here. When I was in Africa in April, all of the African countries, including this, urged the United

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States to make an effort. I know all previous efforts have failed, and I told President Kaunda this morning that if we fail, we will join a distinguished company. But I also said I have not come here to fail. A just peace and a just solution must be one that the people of the area accept and believe in. It cannot be one that outsiders impose on them. And it has nothing to do with demonstrating any particular quality.

**FOREIGN MINISTER MWALE:** Members of the press, it is my duty as a host to ensure that my guests keep to their schedule. I am afraid that unless we have two more questions, I will have to ask that we close this session.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there are four front-line states; that is, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique. But the Secretary of State has only visited Tanzania and Zambia. Is there any special reason why he has not gone to Mozambique or Botswana?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Associates of mine have already visited Mozambique and other associates of mine will visit Botswana on Saturday. And in any event, we recognize that the decisions will be taken by the four front-line presidents. We count on their unity, and we will work with them cooperatively.

**QUESTION:** But precisely, has John Vorster indicated to you at any time that he is prepared to give independence to Namibia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope that when I return here, the principle of independence for Namibia will be beyond question.

**FOREIGN MINISTER MWALE:** Mr. Secretary of State, Madam Kissinger, once again on behalf of the Party, the Government and indeed the people of Zambia, we wish you all the success in your difficult task and wish you a safe trip to Pretoria and back to Zambia.

Thank you very much.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 19, 1976

No. 448

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION
AMERICAN EMBASSY
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
SEPTEMBER 19, 1976

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Rhodesian delegation and we have met for about four hours. I presented to the Rhodesian delegation the joint United States-British views on the subject of the political and economic future of Rhodesia. I presented also in detail the views of the presidents of black Africa as to the essentials of a settlement in Rhodesia. The Rhodesian delegation has now returned to their hotel to study and to reflect on these considerations. At five o'clock a smaller group of Rhodesians, the Prime Minister of South Africa, and some colleagues and I are going to meet at the residence of the Prime Minister of South Africa to receive the reactions of the Rhodesian delegation to the considerations that were put before them, which I repeat contain US-UK considerations and the considerations of the presidents of black Africa.

Thank you very much.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, would you characterize this in any way as progress at this stage?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** At this stage I would have to consider it clarification. We put forward all the views and answered questions.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 19, 1976

No. 449

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
HIS EXCELLENCY BALTHAZAR JOHANNES VORSTER
PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE RHODESIAN DELEGATION
AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE
PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA
SEPTEMBER 19, 1976

I reported to Mr. Smith the propositions developed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom in close consultation with the presidents of black Africa. Mr. Smith and his colleagues considered these propositions, and they have now returned to Salisbury. I am satisfied that Mr. Smith and his three close collaborators will report favorably to their other colleagues. After consultation with their colleagues, they will have to present these propositions to their party caucus. While the Rhodesian institutional processes are taking place, I will seek certain clarifications from the presidents of black Africa, particularly President Kaunda and President Nyerere. We expect that this process of clarification and consultation will be concluded towards the end of this week.

Thank you very much.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether you feel more hopeful about the possibility of a breakthrough towards majority rule in Rhodesia now that you've spent eight hours in conversation with Prime Minister Smith?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think my statement speaks for itself and obviously if progress had not been made there would be nothing to report to the Rhodesian cabinet.

**QUESTION:** Is it only progress, sir, or do you think you are nearing a breakthrough?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that my statement speaks for itself.

* * * * *

[10]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 22, 1976

No. 453

STATEMENTS BY
NGUZA KARL-I-BOND
COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE SECRETARY
KINSHASA, ZAIRE
SEPTEMBER 21, 1976

COMMISSIONER NGUZA:

Mr. Secretary and dear friends:

A few months ago you were in Zaire within the framework of a visit of friendship that you were making in a number of African countries. Here you are again today on another visit, a visit of a very special nature. In Zaire we believe that you are carrying out a mission of peace and goodwill and any man who loves peace and justice will acknowledge that you are engaged on a noble mission.

It is in this spirit that we welcome you and that I am entrusted by the President, founder of the Party of the Revolution, and President of the Republic and by the Executive Council as well, to welcome you most warmly in Zaire, this hospitable African land and to express our friendship to you because we welcome not only the Secretary of State of the United States, but a personal friend of our President and our country.

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Mr. Foreign Minister, it is a great pleasure for me to be here among my friends in Zaire. I have undertaken this journey in order to contribute whatever the United States can for peace in southern Africa and to contribute to the bringing of progress and justice to this area. There is no country whose views mean more to us in this respect, no country which has a greater stake in these efforts than Zaire, and I therefore look forward to my talks with our friends, the President and the Foreign Minister. While in Zaire I will also have the opportunity to stress again America's interest in the security and well-being and economic progress of this country with which we have been closely linked since its independence and especially in recent years. So I thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister, for your very warm welcome and I look forward to my stay which is all too brief in your country.

Thank you.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 22, 1976

No.

PC#114

SECRETARY OF STATE

KINSHASA, ZAIRE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

**QUESTION:** What did you discuss with our president?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We had a very friendly and cordial talk in which we reviewed primarily the situation in southern Africa. After this press conference we will have another meeting over lunch in which we will discuss primarily U.S.-Zairian bilateral relationships. I reported to the President about the diplomatic steps that have been taken to attempt to ease the situation in southern Africa and to bring progress towards independence and majority rule. Of course I had kept the President informed throughout, by letters and cables and we had a very good exchange of views on the situation in southern Africa and throughout Africa.

**QUESTION:** We will have a chance to ask President Mobutu later but do you now feel you have the support of the Zairian Government in your plan to set up negotiations in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course the President will have to answer for himself, but I had the impression of being given great encouragement.

**QUESTION:** One has the impression that your government attempts to avoid direct contact with African nationalists. What is your government doing for the African nationalists?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** This is not correct. Our position is that the problems of Africa should be dealt with by Africans and therefore we have asked all super powers to avoid contact with the African nationalist movements and to permit the African presidents to deal directly with the nationalist movements. On this basis and on this basis alone do we believe that the evolution of Africa can be in African hands. We will meet with African nationalist movements if the African presidents ask us, but we do not want super powers or anybody else to begin supporting one group against another because this will export the rivalries of the super powers into the continent and it will prevent these nationalist movements from pursuing nationalist objectives. So we have given the leadership of these various conflicts in Africa to the African presidents and we are working through the African presidents.

**QUESTION:** But still, Mr. Secretary, you do not hesitate to have direct contact with the holders of power of white rule in southern Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** When I was in south Africa I talked to a group of
**For further information contact:**

PR#459

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black leaders, many of whom were in strong opposition, in fact all of whom
were in strong opposition, to the governmental leaders, and members of
my party talked to other black leaders, so in South Africa I made it a
point to talk to the leaders of the black and colored community.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can you confirm that Ian Smith has accepted the principle of the accession of the majority to rule?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** For me to perform the function that I am trying to exercise it is important that I do not speak for the parties and permit the parties to speak for themselves. I have indicated that I believe considerable progress has been made. I think it is clear that majority rule is the objective, so I will wait until Mr. Smith has spoken for himself -- which I understand will take place on Friday -- but I have indicated that in my judgment considerable progress has been made.

**QUESTION:** The last time we were here, sir, there was great concern about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola which is a neighboring state. Could you tell us now what the situation is with respect to the situation is respect to the Cubans in Angola?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have no clear indications. We received reports of some having been withdrawn, maybe on the order of 2,000 to 3,000 but on the other hand we also have reports of many civilians coming into replace them. The withdrawal of the Cuban troops, if there has been any, has not been strategically significant because over 10,000 still remain and we remain concerned about an African country whose government can sustain itself only by the presence of an expeditionary force from across the ocean.

**QUESTION:** Since your talks with President Nyerere, have you communicated any further views of the black African presidents to the Smith regime in order to provide any further clarification which would produce a positive decision by the Rhodesian white minority?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As part of my efforts here I attempt to make sure that all of the parties know what the other parties are thinking. I have conveyed through the South Africans my understanding of the thinking of President Kaunda as well as of President Nyerere to the Rhodesian authorities so that they can take it into their consideration as they make their decisions this week.

**QUESTION:** You've talked about Rhodesia. Now I should like to know what you have resolved about Namibia.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The discussions about Namibia are still in progress. Everybody agrees that progress has been made. The United States is in favor of the participation of all the authentic groups, including SWAPO, in any discussions concerning Namibia. We are also in favor of a UN role in this and I believe that progress has been made towards achieving these objectives as well as South Africa's role in the discussions. The precise relationship of the various groups to each other in these negotiations still remains to be worked out but we are hopeful that in the weeks ahead we can make further progress towards the objective of setting up a conference about

PR#459

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the independence of Namibia. Before we end the press conference I want to say that in my discussions with President Mobutu he suggested that it would be important that the OAU be formally informed about the results of our efforts in southern Africa. I accepted his suggestions and I will send an emisarry to see the President of the OAU to inform him of the efforts that have taken place during the last week.

**QUESTION:** Who is the President of the OAU?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That's the Prime Minister of Mauritius.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L.C.]

September 22, 1976

No. 459

STATEMENTS BY
HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES OSOGO
MINISTER OF HEALTH AND ACTING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF KENYA
AND THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON THE SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL IN NAIROBI, KENYA
SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

**MINISTER OSOGO:** This evening we welcome his excellency, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for the United States of America. He has arrived here from wherever he is coming from, and he will be with us here a day or so, and I would like to welcome him to Nairobi once again — he has been here before — and present him to you members of the press so that he can greet Kenyans on his arrival.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is my third visit to Nairobi since April. It is here that I paid my first visit to Africa as Secretary of State and it is here that I indicated that the United States would make a major effort to promote peace, justice and progress in Africa, with special attention to southern Africa. I remember the very warm welcome I received the last time I was here and my very cordial and constructive conversations with your distinguished President Kenyatta. I look forward very much to seeing him tomorrow.

Since my last visit, Kenya has been much in the news. The United States believes strongly and supports strongly the independence, security and progress of our friends in Kenya, and I will underline this interest again tomorrow in my talks with President Kenyatta.

So let me say that I am here at the end of a trip which I hope has contributed to peace in Africa and to the conditions for progress. It is a great pleasure to be able to visit my friends in this great country, and I look forward to my too-short visit very much.

Thank you.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

No. 463

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

BY
O. R. T. F.

(OFFICE DE RADIO ET DE TELEVISION FRANCAIS)

KINSHASA, ZAIRE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1976

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you just tell us what the fundamental tenets of the new African policy that you are developing are?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States would like to see the developments in Africa be guided by African motives and by African nations, and therefore to prevent superpower intervention. We are supporting majority rule, minority rights and economic progress and therefore we are encouraging those African nations that are prepared to pursue this by peaceful means and using all our efforts to enable them to achieve it by peaceful means.

**QUESTION:** Does this extend also to the Republic of South Africa in the future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It applies to all African problems.

**QUESTION:** Why do you think all superpowers are interested in Africa today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the United States is primarily interested in letting Africans settle their own future. I believe that there are other superpowers that are pursuing their own strategic and ideological objectives here and I believe they would serve world peace better if they permitted African problems to be settled by Africans.

**QUESTION:** Neither the U. S. really, nor Russia, nor China were represented at the Berlin Conference when Africa was carved up the first time. Do you think that this is a new carving up?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States does not want any sphere of interest in Africa. The United States accepts the conclusions of

PR. #463

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African leaders. What the United States opposes is outside powers picking out their own spheres of influence and pouring in military equipment in order to achieve their own objectives. We want no American sphere of influence here.

**QUESTION:** Would the U. S. be as interested if Russian and Chinese influence had not been growing over the last few years on the African continent?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Who knows what a country would have done. The fact is our policy is as I have stated it and, for that matter, we support the French efforts which seem to me to go in the same direction.

*****

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

NO. 465

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT STATE HOUSE
NAKURU, KENYA

September 23, 1976

Mr. President, it is always a great joy for me to see our good friend President Kenyatta who has inspired the independence of all of East Africa. Our friend has done me the honor of inviting me here and let me watch your dancing. And those of you who have seen me dancing will recognize that as far as dancing is concerned we need a lot of technical assistance from President Kenyatta. I have been in Africa to work with its leaders on their aspirations for peace, for freedom, for justice and for progress. And there is no leader to whom we feel closer than your distinguished President. We believe in the security and integrity and progress of Kenya and we will work closely with its leaders to that objective. Your President and I have talked as friends and we will return now to the United States with a warm feeling because of the reception we have had here. Harambee, Kenya na America.

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 23, 1976

No. 467

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE JAMES CALLAGHAN
PRIME MINISTER
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THEIR MEETING
LONDON, ENGLAND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** I want to welcome Dr. Kissinger here after his very arduous journey. I want to emphasize that the British and the American Governments have a common perception that what is required in Rhodesia, namely the acceptance of the principles of majority rule; elections within two years in accordance with the statement I made on March 22 and in which Dr. Kissinger has emphasized that he has been working on during the last few days in Africa. I am naturally looking forward with great eagerness to hear an account of Dr. Kissinger's visit, but I suppose both of us are really waiting to hear what will come from the Rhodesian authorities tomorrow. The solution will have to come out of Africa and it is to Africa that we look and to the Africans and the Europeans in Rhodesia to provide that solution. I think that is all I wish to say now. Henry, do you want to add anything?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I agree we have been working within the framework of the proposal made by the Prime Minister, that a common perception of the issues and with the conviction that the final solution has to be an African solution worked out on the spot between the Europeans and the Africans involved.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there is no sort of firm news from Salisbury tonight. I assume you have been keeping in touch with the hopeful noises that have been coming out of there. Do you think that perhaps you have pulled it off once again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am hopeful that we will proceed, but I do not want to say that any one person pulled it off. We worked very closely with the British Government and, after all, on a British plan.

**QUESTION:** Have you received any leaks from the caucus meeting in Salisbury?

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PR 467

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not received any leaks from the caucus meeting, but I think matters have gone so far that it would be surprising if they turned it down.

**QUESTION:** So you are hopeful that when you are talking about pulling it off, you have indeed pulled it off, Dr. Kissinger?

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** Let me intervene here for a moment. What Dr. Kissinger has constantly said to me over the last few days is that he does not wish this to be regarded as a personal matter. He probably would want to say that himself, but it should come from me because he has been working within the personal framework of a common plan. But I want to emphasize once again that it is up to the Rhodesian authorities to say whether they themselves are willing to put forward this plan and whether they themselves are willing to enter into negotiations with the Africans to settle the matter there, and then we can proceed from that point onwards.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I agree.

**QUESTION:** Are you ready if necessary for a conference here in London to sort out the details.

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** I think they have got to get down first of all to settle any interim government that they have got to get into with the Africans. That is the question.

Thank you, gentlemen.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[1c]

September 23, 1976

No. 468

STATEMENTS BY
HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES CALLAGHAN
PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING
LONDON
SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** I think I said all I wanted to say before we went in, but clearly, if the proposals that have come up in Rhodesia are satisfactory, then both the United States and Britain would want to play a constructive role. And I am sure that the African countries, including President Nyerere, President Kaunda and President Sese Seko, would all wish to do the same.

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN:** At the moment I am awaiting a statement from Rhodesia, and it will depend upon that statement what will be the nature of any responses made by Britain and, I am sure, by the United States.

**QUESTION:** You mention the African leaders. Are you confident that any proposals and any acceptance by Dr. Smith would be acceptable also to the African leaders who seem to be quite divided at the moment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Based on my conversations with President Kaunda, President Nyerere and the public statements, President Nyerere believes said if Mr. Smith says what we hope he will say, that then will be considered the basis for negotiations.

**QUESTION:** And including the AMC as well?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has taken the position that the African presidents are responsible for producing a consensus among the liberation leaders and therefore we have done our best for the African presidents.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if the talks you have had in the last hour and a half have been merely a briefing or whether you have had some substantive contingency planning and discussing?

PR #468

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, throughout we have dealt in the closest cooperation with the British Government in attempting to get a full exchange of views which we hope to take tomorrow to the Foreign Office.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to the Foreign Office just to meet the Foreign Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** And his associates.

**QUESTION:** When any news comes from Rhodesia — which one would expect tomorrow — you will be at that time in consultation with the Foreign Secretary. Is that right?

**QUESTION:** But you are staying on for that meeting?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I would be on my way back, but I would expect that there will be a parallel [inaudible]. If you have any more questions, you will get only diplomatic answers. [Laughter]

**THE PRESS:** Thank you very much, indeed.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[1c]

September 23, 1976

No. 469

INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BY
WALTER CRONKITE
CBS-TV "EVENING NEWS"

SEPTEMBER 23, 1976

**MR. CRONKITE:** Dr. Kissinger ended his 11-day African shuttle today and flew to London to brief British officials. I was able to talk with Dr. Kissinger via satellite about the situation in southern Africa.

Dr. Kissinger, it appears that at this hour this evening congratulations are in order. Rhodesian sources say that Premier [sic] Smith's party has accepted your proposals to achieve racial peace there — proposals, I know, originally put forth by the British. Can you tell us now specifically what the proposals are?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. I think that we should wait until Mr. Smith speaks to his people tomorrow. But they follow in the main the basic proposals that were made by the British Government last March and which have now been worked out, with some modifications, with the Rhodesian authorities, apparently.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Do the modifications, may we ask, change the timetable? Does it still provide majority rule after two years?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The timetable has not been changed.

**MR. CRONKITE:** We've been led to believe that the proposals provide a cessation of black guerrilla activities during the transition period. Is that correct, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It has always been understood that at some point in this process guerrilla activity would cease. But again, we are at the beginning of a very delicate process. Mr. Smith has not yet spoken; the African states have not yet reacted; negotiations which will involve also Great Britain have yet to be conducted. So I don't think I should go into the details until the first step has as yet been taken.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Dr. Kissinger, the African ministers met at the UN today, and we understand that spokesmen for the neighboring nations — Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique — all said that they would continue

PR #469

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liberation activities — guerrilla activities, in other words — until
the transfer of power to majority rule actually was made. Now does
that surprise you? Does that throw a block into this process?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. This is consistent with the discussions that have been taking place. We have all been speaking to the authorities in Rhodesia, to the South African Government and to the black African states, and what is emerging hopefully is a consensus to which all parties agree.

**MR. CRONKITE:** What is the next step, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The next step is that Mr. Smith state the circumstances in which he is prepared to solve the constitutional crisis. Then Britain, as the country that has the constitutional responsibility, will probably seek to facilitate a conference between the black national movement and the settlers in Rhodesia and that this will bring about the negotiation which will produce a final settlement.

**MR. CRONKITE:** If this doesn't work, do you have any other plan to fall back on?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If we had not made this effort, there would have been a race war in southern Africa which was already escalating, which would have brought a great risk of foreign intervention, and which would have spread to neighboring countries. We hope that we have contributed to averting this; and, having brought it this far, we are not counting on it failing.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Dr. Kissinger, there was more rioting in Johannesburg today. When you saw Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, did you get any indication that there will be any change in South Africa's attitude toward apartheid at this time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The South African situation is extremely complicated. I made clear our views on the subject and our hope that there would be an evolution that would bring more harmony.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Any assurances from him to give you encouragement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is a complicated process that will take longer than the one that we have negotiated in the last few weeks.

**MR. CRONKITE:** Thank you very much, Secretary of State Kissinger, in London.

* * * * *

UNCLASSIFIED

Premier Smith's party has accepted your proposals to achieve racial peace there - proposals, I know, originally put forth by the British. Can you tell us now specifically what the proposals are?

KISSINGER: No, I think we should wait until Mr. Smith speaks to his people tomorrow. But they follow in the main the basic proposals that were made by the British Government last March, which have now been worked out with some modifications with the Rhodesian authorities, apparently.

Q: Do the modifications, can we ask, change the timetable? Do they still provide a majority rule after two years?

A: The timetable has not been changed.

Q: We have been led to believe that the proposals provide a cessation of black guerrilla activities during the transition period. Is that correct, sir?

UNCLASSIFIED

27340

UNCLASSIFIED

A: Well it has always been understood that at some point in this process guerrilla activity would cease, but again we are at the beginning of a very delicate process. Mr Smith has not yet spoken, the African states have not yet reacted, negotiations which will involve also Great Britain have yet to be conducted. So, I don't think I should go into the details before the first step has as yet been taken.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, the African ministers met at the UN today, and we understand that spokesmen for the neighbouring nations, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique, all said that they would continue liberation activities - guerrilla activities, in other words - until the transfer of power to majority rule actually was made. Now, does that surprise you? Does that throw a block into this process?

A: No, this is consistent with the discussions that have been taking place. We have all been speaking to the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

authorities in Rhodesia, to the South African Government
and to the black African states. And what is emerging,
hopefully, is a consensus to which all parties agree.

Q: What is the next step, sir?

A: The next step is that Mr. Smith states the circumstances in which he is prepared to solve the constitutional crises. Then Britain, as the country that has the constitutional responsibility, will probably seek to facilitate a conference between the black nationalist movements and the settlers in Rhodesia. And this will bring about the negotiations which will produce a final settlement.

Q: If this doesn't work, do you have any other plan to fall back on?

A: Well, if we had not made this effort, there would have been a race war in southern Africa which was already escalating which would have brought a great risk of

UNCLASSIFIED

5 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

foreign intervention, and which would have spread to
neighbouring countries. We hope that we have
contributed to averting this and having brought it this
far, we are not counting on it failing.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, there was more rioting in Johannesburg today. When you saw Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, did you get any indication that there will be any change in South Africa's attitude to apartheid at this time?

A: The South African situation is extremely complicated.
I made clear our views on the subject and our hope that
there would be an evolution that would bring more harmony.

Q: Any assurance from him to give you encouragement?

A: Well, it's a complicated process which will take
longer than the one that we have negotiated in the last
few weeks.

UNCLASSIFIED

[lc]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 24, 1976

No. 472

PC 115

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY ANTHONY CROSLAND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
U.S. EMBASSY
LONDON
SEPTEMBER 24, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, I wanted to thank Mr. Crosland for agreeing to come over here. After it had been set up as a press conference for me, he agreed to join me.

I wanted to make only one point before we go to questions — that I have seen many references that the Rhodesian authorities are now considering a Kissinger proposal. I think it is well to understand what is being considered in Salisbury, or what has been considered in Salisbury all week. First of all, the basis of the proposals is the plan put forward by Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. This has been elaborated in detailed consultations between the British and American Governments. There have been five missions to Africa — three American and two British — in which these ideas were discussed in great detail with the African presidents and refined in the light of their comment. So what is being considered in Salisbury is not the plan of an individual but what we hope reflects a consensus between the United States, the United Kingdom and the essential requirements of the leaders of Africa. It is on this basis that we hope to make our contribution to the solution of the future of southern Africa.

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I would like to underline that. The British Government for the last two or three weeks has deliberately remained in a not very visible position on the grounds that you couldn't have people trying to negotiate vicariously over a distance of 5,000 miles or whatever it is. But what Dr. Kissinger says is right. This has been very much of a joint plan. I think my first event as Foreign Secretary was to meet Dr. Kissinger on an airfield in Lincolnshire and since then we have met six times at least — with the Prime Minister very often —

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to discuss this. Respective officials — British officials — have been to Washington many times. State Department officials have been to London many times and, as Dr. Kissinger says, the missions to southern Africa have been, to some extent, shared between the two countries. So he's quite right to say — though I should add that this in no way diminishes the very high proportion of the total credit that he, Dr. Kissinger, deserves. He's quite right to say that the plan within the broad framework of which he's been operating in recent weeks, and indeed in recent months, has been to a very large extent a collective one.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up with a question to both of you gentlemen. Now that the shuttle is finished — I presume you are not going back — does the lead in the diplomatic process now pass to the British?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If the Rhodesian authorities decide favorably, the next step will have to be a discussion of legal and governmental coordination in Rhodesia. Britain has a historic and legal role in this respect and it would therefore seem to us natural that Britain would be in a position to be very helpful to the parties, if the parties requested it. But the United States will be prepared to back up whatever efforts Britain will make and to continue its interests in a peaceful solution of this problem.

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I think that's absolutely right. Britain has a constitutional and a legal responsibility which, of course, the United States does not have, and therefore it will fall to Britain in any event to carry through the required legislation to validate and legalize what hopefully will emerge in Rhodesia. But quite apart from that, if diplomatic help is wanted to bring the two sides together in the early stages in particular, Britain, I think, would have to take the lead in providing such diplomatic assistance as we could, which would help towards an agreed settlement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, assuming that there is a peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia, what steps have you taken, or what guarantees have you sought, that you won't end up with another Angola where the Russians come in and back one faction very heavily and there's a civil war and a radical regime takes over?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course, the major responsibility to prevent this will be with the presidents of Africa, and we would assume that they could not want Africa turned into an arena for great power competition. It is our understanding that once an interim government has been formed, guerrilla war would cease.

**QUESTION:** Two points, sir. Has a document of any kind been passed to the Smith government? Is there anything that has been signed, initialled or exchanged in the form of papers? And

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secondly, you started to say what happens if the operation goes
well in the hand-over to the British. What happens if it gets
sticky?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We'll get the blame. [Laughter]

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** That's right. [Laughter]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With respect to your first question, no document has been initialled or signed. Several points have been put forward as our best distillation of the consensus that I have earlier described, and it is those points which the Rhodesian authorities have been discussing all week. We do not know precisely what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight, although he knows precisely what we think the basis of a settlement would be.

**QUESTION:** Could you just follow up on that? Are those points oral or are they in writing so there can be less ambiguity about what's been said?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We gave him the points in writing.

**QUESTION:** Could you describe the arguments that you put to Mr. Smith when you talked to him in South Africa and which seem to have persuaded him to accept a deal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't believe I should go into it at this [inaudible].

**QUESTION:** Secretary Crosland, could you please tell us in view of the possible threat of outside intervention in Rhodesia or to one of the liberation groups, what is your feeling about how quickly the constitutional conference should be convened and an interim government should come into existence?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, generally as quickly as possible. It's impossible to lay down or foresee a precise time-table for this. But the last thing we want, assuming that Mr. Smith's response tonight is "yes," unequivocally "yes," the last thing we want then is a long delay in which everything would get muddled and other people would start poking their noses in and the rest of it. I can't set a time, but I would much rather that it was a matter of weeks at the most. Anyway, as soon as possible.

**QUESTION:** Before constitutional conference or before an interim government?

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**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, first of all, before talks take place between the whites and the blacks on the formation of an interim government, and secondly, before the formation of an interim government. And, as soon as an interim government is formed, then we will take, in London, the necessary legal and Parliamentary action to legalize it.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, have you any doubts at all as to whether Mr. Smith will accept the peace plan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am hopeful that he will. I have no doubt at the moment, but we just cannot be sure until he has spoken.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that the Rhodesia peace plan has removed the danger of a race war in southern Africa if it proceeds to plan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it has given us the possibility to avoid that danger, and it has already sharply reduced it.

**QUESTION:** Can you give any idea of the cost to Great Britain and the United States of the peace plan if it's carried out?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are going to be studying this next week jointly in Washington. We have not arrived at a figure yet.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that at some point that, as part of this process, Rhodesia will have to renounce UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence]?

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PR 472

[lc]

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, if this process goes well there are two constitutional acts that are involved. The first one is to legalize the interim government that will come, we hope, into being in a short space of time and the second is at the end of two years, when majority rule has been achieved within the conditions laid down by the Prime Minister on March 22nd. We shall then need final legislation which will confer total independence on what will then be a majority black government in Rhodesia.

**QUESTION:** Sir, did you mean to say "at the end of two years" as firmly as that?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, I can't say. Nobody has laid down the actual day, but Dr. Kissinger as I understand it, and the British Government, have been consistently talking within the phrase used by the Prime Minister on March 22nd, of eighteen months to two years.

**QUESTION:** Is that Dr. Kissinger's view too about the terms in which he has been conducting the talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is and has been my view.

**QUESTION:** You spoke of the talks within Rhodesia between black and white about the formation of an interim government before any United Kingdom legislation. Is there a possibility that those talks could break down in view of the divisions on the African side or do you have assurances from the African side that an interim government can be formed?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we have taken consistently the position that the African side is responsible for its representation and for its program. The African presidents seem to be confident that they can produce a delegation and we would expect that, after all the anguish that both sides have gone through, that they would conduct the discussions with a sense of responsibility and on that basis we believe a solution could be found.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, given the history of military dictatorships and so forth in Africa, what kind of future do you see for Rhodesia in the event that black majority rule is established?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think we should-- we have not even taken the first steps on that road yet and it is premature to speculate until we see how these discussions are going.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, this two years more or less--when does the clock start running-- today, at the point of Mr. Smith's announcement or at the beginning of a constitutional conference or when?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I can't give you a cut and dried answer on a particular day. Let's wait and see what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight. Let us wait and see what reaction there is to that from the black African states and then we shall be able to lay down the kind of timetable and program which we want to see fulfilled.

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PR 472

[L]

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, since you have been so concerned about the danger of the racial war in southern Africa, I wonder if you could explain once more how the establishment of black, and quite possibly militant regimes, on the borders of South Africa, will reduce the pressure leading to such confrontations in that country.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We now have a war going on in Rhodesia, and we have the danger of war in Namibia. What we are attempting to do is to demonstrate the possibility of peaceful solutions and of the utility of negotiations. Any step that is taken is not going to be a final step in that process. We believe that, if this process, that hopefully will start today, will be carried out to its conclusion, it will contribute to moderation in Africa and to create additional incentives for negotiated solutions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary--two questions. Is it your understanding that during the interim government Mr. Smith will remain as Prime Minister? Secondly, who do you now understand will share the constitutional talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You must understand that before Mr. Smith has spoken it would not be appropriate for me to go into the details of all the ideas that he may put forward for all of the negotiations that would ensue. The United States has generally taken the position that it is for each side to put forward its representatives and that the United States would not prescribe to either side who should represent it in any talks that might result and, so, let us wait until after Mr. Smith has spoken and then see what delegations are actually being produced by the two sides.

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PR #472

**QUESTION:** On the constitutional talks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On the constitutional talks. We haven't actually thought through the chairmanship. We believe that Britain has an important contribution to make.

How it will exercise this will obviously depend on the parties and on the decisions of the British Government.

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Could I just add one word to that? We can't see the nature of the constitutional talks at the moment. We don't know whether this will take the form of a standard regular type of conference or whether the talks will be very much more informal. So any discussions of who will take the chair is premature, but I repeat what I said earlier — that as far as diplomatic help and activity is concerned, the British Government will give all the assistance that it possibly can to whatever talks occur and to make sure they come to a successful conclusion.

**QUESTION:** Does that mean, Foreign Secretary, that you are opposed in principle to Britain taking the chair at such constitutional talks?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** No, I'm not opposed in principle, I'm not in favor in principle. I can't see the scenario and so I've got to keep all the options open until I can see the scenario more clearly.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, are you expecting Mr. Smith to come to London for the constitutional conference as part or as head of that delegation and would you be happy for that to take place?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I think it highly unlikely that the constitutional conference would take place in London to begin with. I think it would almost certainly take place in Africa.

**QUESTION:** And would the British Government be happy for Mr. Smith to be part or head of that Rhodesian delegation?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Well, we wouldn't be responsible. I've said we'd give what help we can to the constitutional conference but the people to answer that question would be the black negotiation team, not the British Government.

**QUESTION:** But you're still prepared for Mr. Smith to be the head of the interim government until the transfer of power takes place?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** I'm not either prepared nor unprepared. This is a matter which has got to be the subject of agreement between the white Rhodesians whoever they're led by in a week's time on the one hand and the black Rhodesians, or the black presidents behind them on the other hand and it's not for the British Government at this moment of time to say that we think should come out of that negotiating process.

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PR #472

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could we hear from both you and from Mr. Crosland, if you could, on your views as to what has produced what you hope will be a successful conclusion? What have been the factors which at this time, after eleven years, seemingly have brought the situation to this climax?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Personal charm (laughter). I think --

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** As soon as he said personal charm someone said Mr. Crosland. (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It was a combination of factors -- a continuation of the war; the assessment by the Rhodesian authorities of the likely trends; the participation of the South African Government in the negotiations and the commitment of the United States Government to a peaceful solution and its willingness to engage itself, together with the efforts that Great Britain has been making consistently, produced new factors in the situation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, could you tell us which will come first -- the constitutional conference or the interim government?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** No, I can't tell you.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Crosland, do I take it from your earlier reply of the two constitutional acts that are required, that it will be unnecessary for Mr. Smith to actually renounce UDI -- in a formal way?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND:** Let me make this absolutely clear -- that we have -- that Dr. Kissinger has been pushing, as a joint approach to both sides, a certain number of possibilities that form part of a plan which we hope will be broadly adopted and will lead to the two sides negotiating together. But if Mr. Smith says what we hope and if the American sides react favorably to that, then at that point it becomes for negotiations in Africa to answer the various questions that have been raised during the last two or three minutes. It is not for the United Kingdom Government, nor if it comes to that, for the United States Government, to say in advance they want this, they don't want that -- the other. This is for the whites and the blacks in Africa to agree amongst themselves.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere of Tanzania is quoted as saying that you put a lot of pressure on Rhodesia through South Africa. What kind of pressure did you put and what kind of ultimatum did you deliver?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We delivered no ultimatum and we reviewed the likely evolution of events and the alternatives that were available and we believe that this contributed to the decision. There were no addition -- there were no threats or pressure.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, may I bring you back to the question of money, please? There have been reports that in order to get this plan, a safety net in the amount of 1 1/2 to 2 billion dollars is being considered with

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PR#472

an American contribution that could run to 400-500 million dollars. Could you
now sort out the money figures for us please?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, none of the figures have any official status. Secondly, the idea of a safety net is a somewhat crude description of a complicated scheme that has been discussed among officials, that would be alternatively available for the investment or for an insurance scheme for those who might eventually wish to emigrate. There will be discussions next week in Washington between American, British and South African officials to try to refine this and come up with specific figures. At this point no specific figures have been agreed to.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You said just now that you assumed that there would be a cease-fire in the guerrilla war as soon as the basic settlement had been accepted by Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has used the device of saying that there has not been a cease-fire to wriggle out from previous obligations. Are you now confident --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I said when an interim government is formed. But I believe that this too should await Mr. Smith's speech and the negotiations that we hope will follow this speech.

**QUESTION:** Has Mr. Smith asked that the guerrilla cease-fire should be a condition of his implementing your suggestions?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Again, I believe that Mr. Smith will have to speak for himself but I -- my impression is that he will put forward whatever -- if he -- what he says without preconditions.

**QUESTION:** Is there any room for Mr. Smith today to say, "Yes, but " or does he have to say "yes" or "no" specifically to the total package? Is there any room for him to hedge on this?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I really am in no position to speak for Mr. Smith. Our impression is, as he has said himself, that his statement will be clear and unambiguous and will leave no room for evasion -- this I gather from his own public statements.

**QUESTION:** But does he have to accept the total or reject the total or can he accept most of it and say, "But I don't want this piece"?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We'll know in a few hours. We think the process would be helped most if the total package were put forward.

**QUESTION:** If there is any prospect of them not accepting the total package, would you consider returning or would you say that that's the end of negotiations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that the matter has gone so far that it must be concluded. But why speculate about what may happen tonight?

**QUESTION:** I just wondered what you think might happen if he didn't accept.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't operate on that assumption. I operate on the assumption that -- that the total package will be put forward.

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PR 472

[L]

**QUESTION:** Which do you think should come first -- the constitutional conference or the formation of a government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it extremely important that the solutions for southern Africa be seen to be African solutions, and that the United States and the United Kingdom, whose primary interest has been to produce peace in southern Africa, not appear to be dictating the precise outcome. Therefore, I believe that we should wait for, first, Mr. Smith's speech and then the African reaction. As my colleague has already stated, the United Kingdom is willing to be helpful; the United States is prepared to be supportive, but let us first get some other reactions on the table.

**QUESTION:** Have you spoken with Mr. Smith since leaving Africa or any representatives of his government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I have not.

**QUESTION:** Do you expect any trouble from the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger, because they have been kicking you rather hard over what you have been trying to do? Do you think that they can stir up diplomatic trouble in the UN or elsewhere in Africa to try and sabotage the whole plan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We believe that it should be in the interest of all countries to promote peace in southern Africa and we would hope that the Soviet Union would not, for the sake of ideology or great power rivalry, try to introduce an element of contention which must above all hurt the peoples of southern Africa and destroy an opportunity for peace.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Kissinger, it seems from both you gentlemen then, the U.S. and the UK do not want to take much responsibility for the actual solutions. Can you say how it would be possible for the blacks and whites in Rhodesia to work out an interim government by themselves?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, we did not say they should do it by themselves. I think we both said that we would be active, supportive, cooperative, in any way that we are asked and in any way that can be useful.

Thank you, gentlemen.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 24, 1976

No. 473

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE
SEPTEMBER 24, 1976

The mission to Africa which I undertook on behalf of the
President was aimed at the achievement of the most funda-
mental values in which all Americans believe — peace,
justice and human dignity. We have made encouraging
progress. We believe there is now a good opportunity for
settling the issue of Rhodesia and making progress toward
negotiations on Namibia. Much remains to be done that
depends on the goodwill of all the parties concerned.
The United States remains prepared to give its good offices
and to cooperate with Great Britain which, with respect to
Rhodesia, has a historic and constitutional role to play.

I would like to thank all of the governments whose cooperation
was so essential and whose representatives did me the courtesy
of coming out here, and all of my associates whose indefatigable
work made this possible.

I now will report to the President immediately, and early
next week I will report to the Congress.

Thank you.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This is a transcript of the remarks made
by the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of
State, in an interview by Tom Brokaw and Richard
Valeriani for the NBC Television TODAY Show, recorded
on Monday, September 27, 1976, in the John Quincy
Adams Room of the Department of State, Washington,
D.C.