[Y]

August 15, 1966

Mr. Robert Komer
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bob:

I would like to invite you to come up to Cambridge to talk to a session of the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar. As in past years, the Seminar comprises a body of students from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Law School and the School of Public Administration seriously interested in military policy and administration, who would benefit significantly from an opportunity to hear your views.

One of the most important parts of the program is to invite a number of distinguished individuals to talk about their special field. As we will be discussing executive policy making at that time, Monday November 14 would be our ideal date for your visit, but November 21 would be an alternative date almost equally desirable from our point of view. The seminar meets from 4:10 to 6 p.m., with the speaker normally taking the first 45 minutes to an hour, and then leaving himself open to questions for the remaining time. The Seminar has funds to reimburse you for your travel expenses.

I do hope you can come.

HAK:ewj

HAK:ewj

Henry V. Klaasinger

I do hope you can come.

you for your travel expenses.
for the remaining time. The Seminar has funds to reimburse
42 minutes to an hour, and then leaving himself open to questions
from 4:10 to 6 p.m., with the speaker normally taking the first
editionally desirable from our point of view. The seminar meets
visually, put November 31 would be an alternative date almost
time, Monday November 14 would be our ideal date for your
field. Vs we will be discussing executive policy making at that
a number of distinguished individuals to talk about their special
One of the most important parts of the program is to invite
an opportunity to hear your views.

policy and administration, who would benefit significantly from
School of Public Administration seasonally interested in military
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Law School and the
beat years, the Seminar comprises a body of students from the
to a season of the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar. Vs in
I would like to invite you to come up to Cambridge to talk

Dear Bob:

Washington, D.C.
The White House
Mr. Robert Komer

August 12, 1966

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19 August 1966

AUG 21 1966

Dear Henry:

Happy to come on 14 November, so long as it's
understood that I may have to back out at last minute if
urgent business compels.

You might also tell our colleague Schelling that
my advance price is an autographed copy of his new book
delivered pronto.

Your letter was read in the proper quarters and
even cited to visitors. Many thanks, and hope you make
the same noises to Saigon. My only modest dissent would
be that the Mission management side, while better, is a
long way from good enough yet. Indeed, I find the civilians
(aside from Cabot himself--with whom I sense a full rapport
on pacification) rather slower to get off their haunches than
the well disciplined military--who now have the word.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
Cambridge, Massachusetts - 02138

November 2, 1966

Mr. Robert Komer
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bob:

This is just a note to tell you how much I am looking forward to your visit with the National Security Policy Seminar on November 14. There will be as many as 75 people in attendance--as you can see a nice intimate setting. The group will be composed of graduate students in arts and sciences, members of the Graduate School of Public Administration, highly selected third-year law school students, and Fellows of the Center for International Affairs. I was hoping that you might address yourself to the role of the White House staff in general and to decision making in the executive branch, illustrating your conclusions from your extraordinarily wide experience. You can be sure that your remarks will be treated as off the record. We have never had a leak in the twelve-year existence of the Seminar.

In talking to Tom Schelling about your visit and about planning to have a small dinner for you afterwards, he conceived another plot for you. A group of interested faculty members from Harvard and MIT meet twice a month on the vague subject of arms control. It was his hope that you might meet with this group to talk about Vietnam, which has been the main focus of our discussions this fall. Tom will be writing to you further about this.

It was a great pleasure to see you so unexpectedly in Tokyo. May I take this opportunity to tell you how much I admire the energy and imagination with which you carry out your present assignment.

and imagination with which you carry out your present assignment.
May I take this opportunity to tell you how much I admire the energy

which has been the main focus of our diocesan this fall. Tom will
his hope that you might meet with this group to talk about Vietnam,
MIT meet twice a month on the same subject of arms control. It was
for you. A group of interested faculty members from Harvard and
have a small dinner for you afterwards, he conceived another bit

In talking to Tom Schelling about your visit and spont planning

never had a seat in the twelve-year existence of the Seminar.
ensure that your remarks will be treated as off the record. We have
conclusions from your extraordinarily wide experience. You can be
and to decision making in the executive branch, illustrating how
might address yourself to the role of the White House staff in general
B fellow of the Center for International Affairs. I was hoping that your
Administration, highly selected third-year law school students, and
in arts and sciences, members of the Graduate School of Public
nice intimate setting. The group will be composed of graduate students
There will be as many as 10 people in attendance--so you can see a
to your visit with the National Security Policy Seminar on November 14.

Dear Bob:

Washington, D.C.
White House
Mr. Robert Komer

November 5, 1966

NOV 8 1966

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1966

Dear Henry:

Am looking forward to the session with your group on 14 November. I hope this can be scheduled for early afternoon, because I have to get to New York before 7:30 for a meeting of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies. If this is not possible, do let me know pronto. I'd have to catch a very early shuttle to get up there in the morning.

On substance, I'd much rather talk Vietnam (which I recall was the original topic you proposed) than the role of the White House staff. The latter is, as you are so well aware, a terribly sensitive subject--and even classified remarks have a way of getting back via State or DOD participants, etc.

It was good to see you in Tokyo, and to find our views are still so parallel. I followed through on national reconciliation in Saigon, but seem to be the only one still pushing. More of this when I see you.

Do let me know soonest whether the above is satisfactory for 14 November.

Warmly,

R. W. Komer

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

McNamara - 7th

morning - tentative - meeting with CIA associates (I don't know if he meant CFIA)

lunch with undergraduates 1:00 - 2:30

few hours sitting around Junior Common room

6:30 Kennedy Inst. dinner

Frank thought anything more would make his day too busy

December 13, 1966

Mr. John McNaughton
Assistant Deputy of Defense for International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C.

Dear John:

Once again I would like to invite you to come up to Cambridge to talk to a session of the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar. As in past years, the Seminar comprises a body of students from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Law School and the Kennedy School of Government, students seriously interested in military policy and administration, who would benefit significantly from an opportunity to hear your views.

One of the most important parts of the program is to invite a number of distinguished individuals to talk about their special field. As we will be discussing counterinsurgency at that time, Monday, April 17 would be our ideal date for your visit, but April 24 would be an alternative date almost equally desirable from our point of view. The Seminar meets from 4:10 to 6 P.M., with the speaker normally taking the first 45 minutes to an hour, and then leaving himself open to questions for the remaining time. The Seminar has funds to reimburse you for your travel expenses.

I do hope you can come.

HAK:lb

HAK:ip

Henry V. Klauder

I go hope you can come.

The Seminar has funds to reimburse you for your travel expenses, and then leaving himself open to questions for the remaining time. with the absence normally taking the first 42 minutes to an hour, from our point of view. The Seminar meets from 4:10 to 6 P.M., April 24 would be an alternative date almost equally desirable Monday. April 17 would be our ideal date for your visit, put field. As we will be discussing counterterrorism at that time, a number of distinguished individuals to talk about their special One of the most important parts of the program is to invite from an opportunity to hear your view.

military policy and administration, who would benefit significantly Kennedy School of Government, students seriously interested in Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Law School and the in past years, the Seminar comprises a body of students from the to talk to a session of the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar. We Once again I would like to invite you to come up to Cambridge

Dear John:

Washington, D.C.
The Pentagon
Department of Defense
Assistant Deputy of Defense for International Security Affairs
Mr. John McNaughton

December 13, 1969

HK:j

Henry V. Klauder

Sincerely yours,

Best regards,

you again.

It will be a great pleasure to see

as 3:20 and still make the Seminar. Proves impractical. You can come as late as 3:30. This would give us a come to my office at Divinity Avenue Seminar on April 17. I understand you coming to the National Security Policy I am delighted that you will be

Dear John:

Washington, D.C.
The Pentsdon
Department of Defense
International Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Mr. John McNaughton

March 38, 1967

Secretary
Aldrich Collins

Sincerely yours,

Please accept my apologies.

Letter to McNamara from your letter.

I omitted the copy of Mr. Klaarner's

In my Friday afternoon rush,

Dear Mr. McNaughton:

Washington, D.C.
The Pentagon - Room 4E806
for International Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Honorable John T. McNaughton

April 24, 1967

Henry A. Klaariker

With warm regards.

mance in your present job.
I have admired the thoughtfulness and skill of your perfor-
Let me take this opportunity to tell you how much I
I saw and say that you had to be the victim.
the Seminar that this has happened and I regret more than
This is the first time in the 10-year history of
especially broke. I cannot tell you how sorry I am.
performance at the Seminar on Monday when all the news
I had dictated a letter thanking you for your appreciation

Dear John:

Washington, D.C.
The Pentagon - Room 4200E
Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
The Honorsple John T. McNaughton

April 31, 1967

NOV 1 1966

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

November 1, 1966

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs

Dear Henry:

I suggest that you ask
Thane Minor, our Air Force Fellow,
to speak to your National Security
Policy Seminar on the cold war
simulations that he has done. He
spoke to the Fellows recently and
they found what he had to say of
great interest. I think it would
be useful and pertinent for your
students. Tom Schelling agrees
and plans to speak to you about it,
if he has not done so already.
Enclosed is a draft article by
Minor.

Enclosure

NOV 10 1966

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

November 8, 1966

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs

Dear Henry:

If you have a blank Monday for your Defense Policy Seminar, it might be a good idea to ask Thane Minor to talk about "cold war games" as a mechanism for contingency planning in the field of political-military affairs. He has put together a nineteen page draft article that you might look at to see what he has in mind. You might be able to get Linc Bloomfield to share the program with him. If it falls on a good day for me, I would be happy to show up as a member of the seminar. Since you have participated in these games, there would be quite a little group of us who could talk about them. I think we would want to give a little bit more emphasis to substantive results than just to the mechanism, but maybe you could get Thane to hold his remarks to twenty to thirty minutes and we could all then talk about some actual game "experiences."

Anyhow, I know Thane would like to do this, I think it is a good idea if you have an opening, and Thane knows that I am mentioning it to you. Don't hesitate to say no. I will ask Thane to see that Ann Mostoller has a copy of his paper.

TCS:ac

available.
Thus Minor will be but in on the first Monday
free in December, but you can be sure that
It doesn't look so if I will have a Monday

From: H.A. Klaasen
to: T.C. Schelling

November 16, 1966

COLD WAR GAMES

During the Cuban Missile Crisis national policy advisors to the President stayed in almost continuous session. Many courses of action were considered, evaluated, revised and some finally recommended. During the consideration of a somewhat unique ploy one of the advisors, it is rumored, turned to another and said, "Isn't it striking how much this 'real world' crisis is like those Cold War Games we have been playing?"

To which the other is said to have replied, "On the contrary, to me, it shows how 'unreal' this crisis is!"

As that crisis developed and the "eyeball-to-eyeball" positions were taken, it became very apparent that there was, indeed, a real crisis involved.

Only a few months preceding the Cuban Missile Crisis a technique was begun in the Pentagon to help evaluate future potential problems of international affairs. This technique was called, Cold War Gaming. Its primary values lay in the degree to which contingencies and alternative courses of action could be identified, the high degree of involvement by the participants and their resultant heuristic experience.

While the organization which brought this technique to operational status was under the aegis of the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, it was developed (in the U.S.) by academicians. Lest one erroneously generalize from the title, "Cold War Games"; and the

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sponsoring organization, the JCS, that these analyses were primarily
military in nature, it should be pointed out that Cold War Games
generally have had more civilian representation than military.
This is due to the need for participants from all government
departments and agencies which have a primary role in the advice,
formation and execution of national policy.

This discussion will briefly summarize the history of the
Joint War Games Agency of the JCS, and review the origin and
development of Cold War Games which have been called by various
terms such as: political games, political exercise, POL-EX,
political/military game, politico-military game (currently an
"in" term in Washington) desk exercises, international simulations,
ad infinitum. . . !

A short document of this type does not allow the luxury of
identifying all the many individuals who contributed to the develop-
ment of this analytical process. However, a few of the pioneers
are mentioned in order to recognize their early significant contri-
butions. Following the brief history is a description of the
manual techniques of Cold War Gaming as used by the Cold War
Division of the Joint War Games Agency during its first five years.

The contents of this discussion are being incorporated in
a film documentary whose primary purpose is to orient government
officials at all levels who participate in Cold War Division games.

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An equally important purpose is to provide background information for both governmental and academic communities concerned with simulation of international affairs as a tool of problem solving techniques. Another most important result will be additional contributions for improving the state of this gaming art.

To some, 'Cold' War is a conflict in terms. Webster defines cold war as "a conflict characterized by the use of means short of sustained overt military action." The JCS Joint Dictionary defines it as "A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives."

It is interesting to research the origin of the term "Cold War." American Sayings attributes Bernard Baruch with being the first American to coin the statement. Baruch himself in *The Public Years* (N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1960) states that it was "a phrase I introduced in a speech before the South Carolina legislature in April, 1947." He continues as follows: "I was indebted to Herbert Swope for this graphic expression, which caught the public imagination and became a part of the language. Swope had suggested the phrase a year before, but I was reluctant then--when I was serving on the United Nations

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Atomic Energy Commission--to characterize the United States-Soviet relationship in such a fashion; I was anxious not to excite Russia's almost pathological suspicion and fear of us. Indeed, I still hoped that we could establish amicable relations with the Russians." (op. cit., p. 367).

Many have also attributed the coinage of the phrase to Walter Lippman because he published a book entitled *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy in 1947*. His statement regarding the popularizing of this term was as follows: "I don't believe anyone knows who coined the phrase 'cold war'. It was current in France during the 1930's and probably elsewhere in Europe and was used as a name for Hitler's war of nerves. For this two terms were commonly used: *la guerre blanche* (the white war) and *la guerre froide* (the cold war). I am afraid I am responsible for giving it current usage in recent years as a result of using it recently in *The Cold War* where I was merely picking up a phrase which had been used many times previously."

In the context of these definitions and the background known to the originators of the term its continued usage appears valid notwithstanding a few opinions to the contrary.

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THE JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY was established in 1961 as the JOINT WAR GAMES CONTROL GROUP. Due, however, to its broad responsibilities with other agencies it was reorganized and officially named the JOINT WAR GAMES AGENCY (JWGA) in early 1963.

The agency maintains a world-wide cognizance of war gaming matters which concern the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, the Senior Military Organization of the United States. The JCS is made up of the Chiefs of our Services, and a Chairman appointed by the President. Each member is four star rank during peacetime.

The Chief of the Joint War Games Agency is responsible for planning, organizing and performing Joint War Gaming.

Duty tours for this responsible position are rotated among General or Admiral ranks of the three services--Army, Navy and Air Force.

The Agency Deputy Chief and the subordinate division chiefs are colone's or Navy captains. There is one civilian research analyst to advise on technical matters. The divisions are organized functionally, fully responsible in their respective areas of COLD, LIMITED and GENERAL War Games.

The Cold War Division is the antithesis of Parkinson's Law, with only ten officers assigned. Even with a small organization, it was found advantageous to have two branches in order to develop expertise in each of two different techniques applicable to Cold War Games.

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The oldest of these techniques relies on individuals who are organized into teams. They examine the relevant factors in a simulated environment of international conflict--often a crisis. This is sometimes referred to as "manual" Cold War Gaming. Initially, the branch which used this technique was called the Manual Games Branch. It was subsequently renamed the Politico-Military Branch.

The other branch is also charged with conducting politico-military simulations but is concerned with the use of high speed electronic computers to assist in the analysis of international conflict. It is, therefore, called the Computer Games Branch.

Cold War Games of either technique are about equally balanced between political and military input data and participants. Both political and military factors are influenced by relevant economic, psychological, social and technological considerations.

Political gaming has antecedents prior to World War II both in Europe and Asia. Political gaming was applied to questions of foreign policy as early as 1929 in Germany. In 1940 Japan included political factors in simulations of aggression. RAND's Doctors Goldhamer and Speier writing for *World Politics* in 1959 state: "Before Hitler assumed power, the leaders of the German Reichswehr were much concerned about Polish military strength and political designs. In 1929, a young staff officer, who later became General

Erich von Manstein, charged with the responsibility for the organization of a war game involving German defense against a Polish attack on East Prussia or Upper Silesia, realized that the outbreak of war would be preceded by mounting political conflict. Manstein proposed that the strictly military exercise be introduced by a political game in order to let political and military leaders learn from each other.

"We had the impression also Manstein reports, that the gentlemen from the Foreign Office, to whom such a playing-through of possible conflicts seemed to be completely novel, were thoroughly convinced later of the value of the game."

"According to exhibits offered in evidence at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, the Japanese Total War Research Institute, established in 1940, engaged in games of aggression that involved having teams of high ranking specialists in the Japanese Government play the political and military roles of leading powers in the Pacific area. Some of the moves in these games anticipated actual measures taken by the Japanese Government after Pearl Harbor.

"From an article in the London Sunday Times, it appears that the Soviets may have made use of a similar procedure. Alexandre Metaxas, who is identified as a Russian-speaking French journalist, reports that Soviet political specialists try to anticipate the

-8-

results of international political moves by putting themselves in
the role of each interested party in turn. It is not clear from
his account whether actual gaming procedures are involved."

Considering all available data, it appears that RAND
originated political gaming techniques for this nation in the
early fifties while conducting limited war games for the Air Force.
The early attempt there was to assign numerical values to a few
political and economic factors but it soon became clear that this
simplification made the game of doubtful value. Dr. Herbert
Goldhamer then proposed a political game that avoided schematic
simplifications and attempted to simulate the complexity of real
life. In this suggested technique the government of each country
was represented by a player or group of players. Nature, or "Acts
of God," was represented by an individual, or team, and there was
a team of referees who ruled on the feasibility of each move. The
early games started with the historical present as a backdrop. This
often created confusion in that the game could be overtaken with
real world developments.

In the course of 1955/56 four political games were played at
RAND gradually developing additional refinements. Scenarios were
used for the first time in 1956 in order to extrapolate into the
future and avoid game differences with real world events. The
1956 game moves lasted three weeks, and 150 papers were written

A-9

[LW]

by game participants. Papers were dated in game time and numbered sequentially. Upon termination of play, the complete set of records was thrown open to all participants for study prior to final meetings to assess and evaluate the game.

During the summer of 1956 and for three years thereafter, Herbert Goldhamer, Hans Speir and others summarized the RAND political games at important gatherings of social scientists throughout the country. These lectures served to motivate other scientists to undertake improvements to the techniques of Cold War Games.

In 1957/58 Professor Harold Guetzkow, then a Fellow at the Center for Advance Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University was motivated by Speir's lecture to develop the INTER-NATION SIMULATION Model which has had widespread utilization in the academic community. INS has more formalized game rules, quantified data and is more abstract than the RAND Model since it uses fictitious nations and players.

During this period two key individuals emerged--Professor Thomas C. Schelling of the Harvard Center for International Affairs and Professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield with the MIT Center for International Studies. Schelling was at RAND during the summer of 1957 and again for a year during 58 and 59. Beginning in 1958, Bloomfield spearheaded the MIT effort and along with others organized an improved type of Cold War Game (which he first called POL-EX (Political Exercise)).

-/0-
10

In the fall of 1939 Schelling and Bloomfield met, resulting
in the Harvard and MIT centers collaborating in discussions which
lead to the invention of some "new" game techniques which were as
follows:

1. The main game would be between two teams monitored
by "Control." Earlier games had many teams sometimes one-man
teams.

2. No real-time interplay between teams. The game would proceed in "policy planning stages" with time standing still during team deliberations.

3. Teams would be corporate groups with no member designated as Secretary of State, Premier, and so forth, but would as a unit represent the total government.

4. Teams would not play roles, that is, not mimic the government they represented but would assume themselves to be that government and make their own decisions.

5. An opening scenario would describe the crisis and bring
events to a point when hard decisions were necessary by both teams.

6. Control would "project" game time after team deliberations.

7. Game end would not be event constrained, but would end
with the designated number of cycles.

While Professor Schelling was most responsible for planning
the "character" of the Cold War Game, Professor Bloomfield was

responsible for taking these basic ideas and putting them into
operation.

The first game took place in 1961 at Endicott House near
Boston. The game director was Bloomfield and Schelling was
co-chairman of the control team. Walt Rostow was a game
participant as well as Air Force Colonel William C. Jones, who
had been a liaison officer at RAND earlier and who was later to
become an original assignee to the Joint War Games Control Group.

In early 1962 the leadership of the Joint War Games Control
Group was convinced that JWGCG was obligated to develop techniques
which could analyze the entire spectrum of war. Since "Cold War"
was a fact of life, Cold War Gaming was undertaken for the first
time by the services.

The JCS pioneers who developed the Cold War Gaming techniques
were: James Y. Adams, Colonel, US Army; William C. Jones, mentioned
earlier; and Kenneth S. Field, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army.

Adams was the first Chief of the Cold War Division and wrote
the scenarios for the first few games with originality and
thoroughness which contributed much to their early success and
appreciation by high-level officials, both political and military.

Jones used his experience gained at RAND and Endicott House,
with the significant modification of dividing each red and blue
team into two groups: one for action players and another group of
senior policy advisors. This appeared at the time, and has later

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proven to be, the most effective approach to obtaining participation
by the highest level national policy advisors. This technique has
made the JCS Cold War Games unique. Ken Field made a lasting
contribution by organizing specific sequential actions for the
competing teams. His organizational "blue print" continues to
provide basic guidance for team activities and will be explained
later.

The major effort in planning Politico-Military Games involves
problem identification. The scenario which describes the opening
situation is carefully drawn to focus attention along the most
thought provoking and challenging lines of the problem to be gamed.
Some games, however, have been played successfully starting with
real world intelligence.

There is no shortage of problems for analysis--the challenge
is to determine which are most important. This was usually accomplished
with the assistance and cooperation of Executive Assistants from the
White House, State Department, The Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Joint Chiefs of Staff and others.

Potential problems are sometimes of such an urgent nature
that events overtake preparations. For example, preparations were
being made to play a Cuban Game when that problem became reality
in the Fall of 1962. One of the now amusing aspects of that effort
was a scenario which *appeared to be* turned down as being implausible. It had

13

LQ

hypothesized that the Soviets had given Castro IRBMs!

The average Cold War Division game lasts six days and includes three moves with scenario updates following each move. One game move plus a scenario update is described as a game cycle. Three-cycle games, including the game review have been played in as little as three days and over as long a period as four weeks. Two cycle and four cycle games have been played but three seems to be optimum.

The relevant factors which influence the length of time between cycles are: availability of participants, the game problem, and control's capability to project the scenario.

Each game has a Control Team plus a minimum of two competing teams, usually Blue and Red. (Games have been played with as many as five competing teams which approaches maximum for one Control Team.) For ease of understanding the Cold War Division's techniques in Cold War Gaming, only two competing teams (Red and Blue) and a Control Team will be illustrated.

The following will describe one game cycle: Background material is consolidated and made available to participants during the few days immediately preceding the game. This has been called the FACT BOOK. It normally includes a condensation of game procedures, country summaries, relevant tensions of the past decade, current as well as future issues, problems and questions, both pro and con. When the action teams meet they have this material available

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[Lg]

for reference, as well as appropriate maps and charts of the areas
and resources concerned. Red and Blue teams are given respective
climatic scenarios which are written from the particular perspective,
or ideology, which the team represents. The scenarios present the
same basic problem about which each team must take specific action.
The scenario presented is not intended to be predictive. It should,
however, be reasonably plausible.

After the action teams have had time to study the scenario
(usually thirty minutes) they are asked to consider and record five
specific points.

1. Their estimate of the situation.

2. Their goals (national objectives).

3. The broad strategies which will be used to attain these
goals.

4. Specific courses of action which they will now take as
a result of the problem with which they have been confronted.

5. Major contingencies which they perceive as deterrents to
their planned courses of action, and alternatives for each contingency.

Each of these points, the estimate, goals, strategies, courses of
action, contingencies and alternatives should consider the political,
military, economic and psychological relevance for each. Deliberations
on these five points are performed without the knowledge of the other
team's actions.

15

Action teams¹ usually have about four hours to discuss and draft these five activities. Participants are Lt Colonels and GS-13s through Major Generals, Rear Admirals and GS-17s. They come from eight to fourteen different agencies as well as the Services, the OJCS and Unified and Specified commands. Action participants are experts on the area, or the problem, and therefore require minimum pregame preparation. The game data and their experience allow full participation quickly.

Senior officials; that is, Executive Assistants from the White House Staff, Cabinet members, Under Secretaries and four-star service personnel; are briefed by the action teams on their estimate of the situation, recommended goals, strategies, courses of action and contingencies. Then, for approximately one and one-half hours the Seniors discuss and give policy guidance to their respective Action Team.

An attempt is made to adhere to this brief time in order, among other things, to simulate the press of time in a real-world crisis. Not infrequently the Seniors are in disagreement, in which case the entire time may be spent in debate. When the Seniors depart, however, the action teams are required to complete their messages to Control.

When each team forwards its five-point message to Control, that completes a game move or the first half of a game cycle. The

second half of each cycle involves the control team whose membership
includes Red and Blue expertise as well as all functions of each
team.

Control takes all required actions for nations not represented
by Red and Blue, allows or denies teams' actions in accordance
with Control's best judgment, injects relevant acts of nature,
fuses the timing of actions taken by the competing teams, and
advances game time for the next move. This may be hours, days
or weeks (occasionally several months) depending upon the nature
of the crisis and the team's courses of action or contingencies.

Control's deliberations result in an updated scenario which
will be presented to both Red and Blue in separate game messages.
That completes a game cycle. When these control messages are
delivered (usually the next day) to the Action Teams, the next
move is begun and the cycle repeats. Normally, the games are
"free wheeling" and not affected by suasion from higher authority.

It is not the purpose of the games to be predictive though
it is sometimes later learned that predictive potential existed.

"Polymetric" methods of analysis have not been applied to
these manual simulations. However, the potential to develop a
degree of predictability may lie within the grasp of mathematicians
and statisticians.

The games are intended to cross-educate participants and
provide a stimulating environment for surfacing otherwise unseen

16
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potential problems relevant to the simulated situation.

One of the Cold War Division's support techniques is the use of video tape in closed circuit TV. By summarizing team moves and Control's updating of scenarios; game communication is improved, time conserved and a valuable visual/aural record accrued. It is, therefore, now possible to brief past games on a broader and more effective basis. Video tapes have been shown to Cabinet members as well as to Department and agency personnel who for various reasons were absent; thus, providing them with game assets even though they could not participate. Frequently, such reviews have resulted in additional studies which otherwise would not have been initiated.

Written reports prepared during the course of these games have served an important purpose by providing a record of the many alternatives discussed during the course of the game, a transcript of Senior discussions during the game review, and the Game Director's commentary. These reports have played a significant role in the day-to-day DECISION MAKING PROCESS, during the interim which follows a game, and the time when real world events may be similar. In other words, these games have not been used as "decision makers," but rather as contributors to that process.

Sometimes these simulations dealt with problem areas which had not yet been explored in detail on an inter-agency basis. On

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occasion the games parallelled searching examinations of policy
being conducted at the highest level. Often they addressed problems
which had been thoroughly studied and debated--in the hope of
deriving new insights or perspectives. Frequently, they resulted
in complementary studies which produced detailed actions whose
necessity was made apparent in the game. Scholarly studies and
Cold War Games are therefore not competitive, they are complementary.

No team member plays a personality or generic role. That is, no individual simulates the President of the United States. The team may take actions simulating those of its national leader, but only as team "action." Each participant is expected to take a broad objective view of the national interest for the country his team represents, thus minimizing agency and departmental parochialism.

Senior and Action participants inter-relate in an informal
atmosphere. All have equal game status and adjust readily to a
high level of involvement. Sometimes, officials who have previously
known each other only by reputation, find personal and verbal
exchanges, within the freedom of the game, contributing to mutually
beneficial understanding. Diplomats may leave with improved
understanding of military capabilities; and conversely, militarists
sometimes gain new insights regarding political constraints on their
proposed courses of action.

Actions and discussions in the game reports are never
attributed to individuals, only to teams. This provides participant

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anonymity, thus eliminating any psychological necessity for
"face-saving" should an unusual alternative not be successful;
thus, stimulating ingenuity and creativity.

The games are intended to allow great freedom for national
policy planners to examine potential future problems in a less-hurried
and not-for-keeps environment. Problems, concerning which, the
NORMAL decision making process may later take action.

Thus, just as Manstein's goal was to let political and
military leaders learn from each other; JWGA, in its first
five years, conducted Cold War Games, which provided an effective
heuristic device for the higher levels of political and military
national policy planners, and, perhaps just as important, these
games surfaced a shopping list of relevant alternatives for
potential future problems.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

JAN 4 1966

January 4, 1967

Professor Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs

Dear Henry:

It was a pinnacle of pleasure to speak to your
Defense Policy Seminar on the 19th of December.

That elation was exceeded only by your letter
of 3 January containing your generous remarks regarding
my presentation. You may rest assured it is one of my
prized possessions.

OUTLINE

THE ROLE OF WAR GAMING IN NATIONAL SECURITY

(Outline for Col. Minor's remarks as guest of Professor Henry Kissinger)
Govt. 259, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
December 19, 1966.)

I. Definitions.

**WAR GAME:** A war game is the purposeful representation of relevant segments or aggregates (sometimes both) of military reality.

**PURPOSEFUL:** With intention - not accidental, though serendipity may obtain.

**DYNAMIC:** Time or event sequenced steps. . . phases.

**REPRESENTATION:** Replica, model, pattern, blueprint, replication, simulation, theory, hypothesis or speculation.

**RELEVANT:** Germane to the purpose.
(H. Kahn asks two questions: Does one know; and if so, does one care?)

**SEGMENTS:** The identifiable parts of interest, relevance or significance.

**AGGREGATION:** Bringing together, summing or compounding of multiples to represent a whole - or, a percent of unity.

**MILITARY:** Should include economic, political and cultural relevances.

Game may be one-sided or two-sided or multi-sided.

A model may be thought of as a static representation of reality. If model is compared to game, movie film is analogous - each frame is like the model; run through a projector they become a simulation of dynamism.

WAR GAME:

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Modern War Games are not: CPX (Command Post Exercise - communications tests), FIELD EXERCISE or MANEUVERS (forces in action less live ammunition) nor GAME THEORY ("formal study of rational decision-making" T. C. Schelling - "A method for the study of decision-making in situations of conflict" - Martin Shubik).

Modern War Games do, however, take advantage of empirical and statistical accruing from the above.

## II. Types of War Games.

**COLD WAR GAMES:** The political, military, economic and psychological interactions of nations short of overt military conflict.

**LIMITED WAR GAMES:** Military conflict limited in geographic area or force application to include types of weapons.

**GENERAL WAR GAMES:** Global thermonuclear war - may involve degrees of force application ("controlled response").

## III. Purposes.

May be as prolific as one's imagination.

"How does one make a list of all the things he can't think of" (Prof. T. C. Schelling)

Answer: War game it! (Stimulates new ideas and surfaces unrecognized problems.)

Two primary purposes are: 1) INSIGHTFUL RESEARCH and 2) HEURISTIC.

Insightful research:

1. What are future situations likely to be? (Intelligence)

2. What weapon systems for future environments?

3. What strategies?

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4. What tactics?

5. What plans?

6. What contingencies?

7. What alternatives?

Heuristic (educational)

1. Training for inexperienced.

2. Learning for the experienced.

3. Semantic reducing.

4. Understanding other people.

PARADOXICALLY, THE PURPOSE OF ALL WAR GAMES IS PEACE! (Perhaps PEACE GAMES might be better.)

"Game is an unfortunate connotation - not for pleasure-slaughter and destruction. . . not subjects for enjoyment, but (for today and the future) they cry for better understanding through analysis for PEACEFUL PURPOSES."

The term WAR GAME is probably with us to stay.

IV. Methodology.

**Operations Analysis:** The analytical study of military problems undertaken to provide responsible commanders and staff agencies with a scientific basis for decisions on action to improve military operations.

**Systems Analysis:** "A more distant future environment, with greater flexibility of choice; more inter-dependent variables; greater uncertainties, and, less obvious objectives and rules of choice." Wohlstetter.

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## V. Techniques.

**Manual:** The model, assumptions, ground-rules, capabilities, degradation factors and force application are all performed by individuals usually using maps and machine calculators (not automatic data processing) to simulate dynamism.

**Computerized:** The model is wholly mathematized and quantified to include an explicit data base of forces, capabilities, basing, targeting, application, timing, tactics, degradation factors and an EXECUTIVE ROUTINE (handling system) which tells the computer what to do when, how and where while maintaining a complete record of all activities and results. It will also contain a random number generator (properly called pseudo random numbers) for the STOCHASTIC (choice under conditions of probability) routines.

## VI. History of War Games.

India originated chess. (CHATURANGA in Sanskrit - means four bodies; i.e., elephants, horses, chariots and infantry.)

Chess passed to Persia in the 7th century.
(Used to teach common principles of warfare.)

1644: Prussia adapted chess to "King's Game"

1700's: France used cards and expanded to include "maneuver"

late 1800's: U.S. Army and Navy.

WW II: Adm Nimitz "... nothing happened in WW II that we hadn't gamed - except the Kamikaze attacks."
(I doubt that the Navy had gamed Pearl Harbor or Hiroshima.)

1940: British used operations analysis techniques and methods.
Interest by Air Corps mostly after WW II.

1953: Air War College and GEORGE COMMITTEE with SAC help in 1954.

1954: Dalkey at RAND began first computerization of global air war.

Personal experience began in 1953 at Air War College (Ac & SS)

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Air Force - Air Battle Analysis Group - 1957 (later called Division and then Center. Now the Directorate for Studies and Analysis.)

Navy - Operations 06 - C - 1958

Army - Strategy and Tactics Group (STAG) - 1960

Marines - Landing Force War Games Group (LFWGG) - 1960

JCS - Joint War Games Control Group (JWGCG) - 1961 (now called the Joint War Games Agency (JWGA).

## Limited War.

Limitations in area and weapons. Difficult to define rigid dividing line between Cold and Limited War Games. Actually overlap at times.

## Cold War.

(text)