Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KL V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

Atty. Gen./Kissinger

12:02 pm

3/19/70

AG: Some of our favorite Jewish ______ are getting the flavor of the forthcoming statement and they think it may have positive point. If this be so, it would be well for them to have information on it at the time of the issuance of it so that ______ they come out in favor of the Administration (?).

K: How far ahead do they want it.

AG: Not very.

K: We want to ______ target them away from the WH. We don't care who else they scream at.

AG: But if they can be positive instead of negative it would be helpful. I will leave it with you or you can call me this afternoon.

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

Telecon
The President
3/19/70 12:20 p.m.

[Didn't hear very beginning of conversation.]

K: We will get a recommendation from Wheeler today.

P: What about Helms?

[Kissinger asked Ghorayeb to step out.]

K: His deputy was there today. I think it is safe to say, Mr. President, that the overwhelming majority of the bureaucracy is extremely gun-shy about doing anything. They are gambling that it's going to stop.

P: On what grounds, I wonder.

K: I also think so, but I think the Meo forces are going to get smashed in the process.

P: Is the meeting still going on, or has it broken up?

K: It has broken up.

P: Just say they have got to do something immediately.

K: I was going to assemble them again tonight.

R: Cancel what you are doing. Call them over immediately and tell them the President wants an action plan on his desk by 3:00. Cancel all their luncheon plans; cancel yours. Get the fellow out of your office who's there. Tell them I want some action, because I've made the decision.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Under Secretary Richardson
3/19/70 12:25 p.m.

K: I just had a furious President on my hands. He wanted the x Laas contingency group to see what we might do. He said he wanted hard and soft options. We talked about hard options; everybody decided they couldn't do anything. He's given me an order to get that group back here and have a hard option by 3:00. I don't know what I can do.

R: You had better go ahead and do it. Are you going to delay that other meeting?

K: Yes. What I was wondering, are you free in the early evening for our meeting?

R: Yes, I would be.

K: Why don't I meet you at 6:30 in your office?

R: Okay.

K: Do you want to come over to the other meeting on Laos?

R: No, not really.

K: He wants me to get Wheeler and Helms.

R: When are you going to start?

K: At 1:00.

R: I could be there a little after that. I don't know that I would add much. Are Green and ______ going to be there?

K: I am going to call them. The President told me they have to cancel their lunch. I am escalating participation. For instance he wants Wheeler over here. I'll leave it to you. We have no problem with Johnson.

R: He represented us this morning?

K: Yes.

R: Better leave it at that.

K: Okay, I'll come to your office at 6:30 and move that other meeting to 3:00. It will be from 3:00 to 5:00.

*

TelCon
Secy Rogers (incoming)
3/19/70; 4:30 p.m.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

R: I just got a letter from the President about Laos. Are you familiar with it?

K: No.

R: He is dissatisfied with our Embassy people.

K: I didn't get this. I did' not know he was writing to you.

R: I will call him and find out what it is about, but I thought maybe you knew.

K: Is that about -- know he was furious earlier this week about a leak that came from Laos. Is this what it is?

R: This may have something to do with it. He says NEW recent news reports. What news reports?

K: That's the one. There was a news report from John McCartney had written an article which stated that the Embassy in Laos contests his statement of 67,000 people and that this was never, that they never got a hearing in Washington.

R: I didn't even see that story.

K: He put Ehrlichman in charge of checking it down. It was on Monday. Was told it came from Embassy sources in Vientiane. That is why he was extremely upset about that.

R: I will talk to Ehrlichman about it. I was shocked, because I think Godley and those people are quite hawkish.

K: I don't think this has to do with the policy views. I wasn't even in town when that broke and did not know about it until I came back. But I have seen the report -- well, I have seen the note and what it turned out was that Vientiane's assessment -- estimate -- did not take into account some of the personnel on the trails.

R: The Ho Chi Minh Trail, yes.

K: We reconciled the difference. I notice in Godley's estimate this week he has been hitting the higher figure.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

R: Maybe he wrote this note a day or two ago.

K: If he is referring to recent news reports then I am sure that's
what he is talking about.

R: One other thing - I have my African paper. It doesn't say a hell of a lot, but I would like to send it over for you to look over. Sometime next week we will have to make it public.

K: Which African -- your report? I am sure I wouldn't have any views, but I will look at it.

R: It doesn't say a hell of a lot.

K: If you send it over I will take a look at it.

R: OK.

ms

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

7:03 pm 3/19/70

K: I just read that Washington Star story. I didn't know anything about it. Haldeman didn't know anything about it and Mollenhof says he only has what was given him by the Ripon Society. I have never talked to Doyle nor Mollenhof.

R: That SOB will demoralize the Cabinet. I talked to John Mitchell about it and he said he had experience with him too.

K: I don't know if Doyle is State or WH

R: No, Sherman is State.

K: He called me and wanted to see me but I didn't see him.

R: It must have come from Mollenhof or someone.

K: I talked to Morris and he said he hadn't talked to him. I believe him.

R: This with the Moynihan memos -- that had to be a WH leak.

K: No, that was sent to all the Cabinet members. But the second wasn't.

R: The President has to be careful. The Ashe thing and Mollenhof running around loose.

K: It's against any conviction I have. Elliott Richardson and I worked together closely on this. Any differences were kept private.

R: This especially from the Ripon Society who has been attacking Nixon so much. Well, thank you Henry.

By KML NARA, Dale S/12/04

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
3/19/70 7:10 p.m.

K: On the list of items we discussed with the President . . . what is your understanding of what they are supposed to do?

L: Go ahead.

K: To hit it once, or knock it out?

L: We can knock it out with one.

K: Haig thinks the military would understand it to mean they can do it day after day.

L: No, we'll knock it out in one.

K: And how would you handle the other departments?

L: I wouldn't say anything to anybody. I will say it is protective reaction.

K: And you'll take the responsibility?

L: Right.

K: It was discussed at WSAG as a possibility.

L: Oh. Then they'll tie it up. I guess we'll have to tell them.

K: Or can you just stone-face it?

L: I can't do that with Bill Rogers. That would undermine any chance for cooperation in the future.

K: That's the thing that worries me.

L: That's what worries me. I've already drafted the messages. I have to try to hold them back. They'll get the word at State that they haven't hit out of those sites in a month(?).

K: How will they get that word?

L: They will know it was discussed at the meeting.

K: No. That wasn't.

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
3/19/70 7:10 p. m.
page 2

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

L: Well, let me hold it off till tomorrow morning. I'm afraid ... you have to keep a certain confidence with people who work together.

K: Why don't you let me raise it with the President too.

L: Okay.

K: Hold it up. Let me be the carrier of the news. He told me specifically not to raise it with Rogers.

L: I'll hold it over tonight.

K: Hold it till I can get to him.

L: All right.

*

Telecon
Marshall Green
3/19/70 7:25 p. m.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: On those measures we discussed today. My understanding is that the things I mentioned to the meeting should be done immediately. McCane to meet the ambassadors; 130 gunships and Cobras, and B-52 reconnaissance; letter for the President to Kosygin and others.

G: Good. I heard we are going ahead on the B-52 reconnaissance. I was upset to hear they are going to use Vientiane rather than U Dorn.

K: If he gets a target he's almost certain to use B-52s.

G: The Secretary hoped to review that one.

K: I promised that to the Secretary.

G: I briefed him along the lines you mentioned to me now. There will be messages going out accordingly.

K: Okay. If they don't get implemented immediately you are going to get an order to do the extreme things.

G: We have been waiting to get an okay on implementation. We will probably do it tomorrow.

K: That loses another day. Can we get McCane up there?

G: Yes.

K: I'll send the order over there now.

G: Thanks a lot.

K: Good.

*

By: KCLN NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Telecon
John Ryan (Australian Embassy)
3/19/70 7:50 p.m.

K: I'm sorry I couldn't see you before. I wanted to check on the status of the communication. Was I supposed to share it with the departments, or was it just for the President?

R: It was a communication from the Australian government to the United States Government. It was sent by the Australian Minister of Defense, acting on behalf of the Australian Government. He asked me to deliver it to the appropriate person, and I considered that to be you.

K: You don't mind if I share this with the Secretaries?

R: No, certainly not.

K: Our government doesn't work like yours.

R: That's within your judgment.

K: No, I mean . . . I just wanted to make clear whether it was for personal consideration by the President or for the Departments.

R: No, I think that some action and consideration needs to be taken on it in other parts of your government.

K: Okay, thank you.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Javits
3/19/70 8:00 p.m.

J: What's our situation?

K: I can't see you before 2:15 tomorrow.

J: Is that still time, or will it be after the fact?

K: No, the fact won't be tomorrow. It probably won't be until Monday.

J: I'll bring him in tomorrow.

K: I won't be able to tell you a lot.

J: No, I'm just doing this to satisfy the record. I've got a problem. . . I've got a speech in New York. Your situation is impossible in the morning?

K: Absolutely.

J: You can't do anything before noon?

K: No, I just can't. I might be able to do it at 12:15.

J: That's doesn't do me any good. Okay, put it down for 2:15. Nothing will happen on this until Monday?

K: No. I could do it early Monday.

J: Let me come back to you.

K: Okay.

By: KCLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Professor Yoshida
3/19/70; 11:20 p.m.

Y: In the past 12 hours I have had three conversations with my friend on your three conditions. My friend appreciates your three points and asked me to convey the following message to you. He feels he and his government is definitely prepared to __________ restrictions on the ten items which we proposed a few days ago [I could not understand him]. I know that is not satisfactory for you but as you understand in any diplomatic negotiations one has to start with a __________ line and will have to take an appearance of mutual concession. It is particularly true for us in view of the mounting pressures of our industry. Second, with regard to injury position my friend understands your position and although we have asked you about this we are not now seeking further substantial demonstration from you. However, it will be great help for us if you could show some form or some kind of __________ on this question, should this be possible on your side. Third, the question of separate aggregate ceilings on two materials is also in essence acceptable to my friend. The problem for us is how to make it look like selected for home consumption here. On this point my friend is hopeful that we can devise some formula through negotiations which could be mutually acceptable.

K: How could this happen?

Y: Our position is flexible. We will make your requirements through negotiations. Soon after I talked to my friend he summoned his two top associates -- and you know who I mean -- and advised them fresh instructions had been sent to Washington along the lines I just mentioned. My friend says we must avoid under any circumstances the breaking of the discussions, which would be disastrous to both of us. If your friend is willing, we would like to continue the talks and ask your negotiators to keep our __________ in mind and to press hard on our __________ to accommodate your minimum requirements and now they should be able to meet them on essential points. I believe may add that my friend and his associates will now have to talk to our industry to get their consent and cooperation. This is not an easy task. My friend and his aides are determined to accomplish this. Whatever decision our government makes, we must still discuss it with the industry.

*

By: KH V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Yoshida
3/19/70; 11:20 p.m.

-2-

K: We will not break off negotiations tomorrow then but you will have to make a proposal -- you start talking -- you have to give us something to work with. We can do it for another week or so and see what happens. It cannot be protracted.

Y: I will convey your message to my friend immediately.

K: I will talk to our people tomorrow.

Y: I would like to beg you again to do your utmost to continue talks toward successful negotiations.

K: Thank you and I hope we can work it out.

Y: Indeed, so do I.

K: It is nice to talk to you.

Y: I will be in touch with you again when and if necessary.

*

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
evening 3/19/70

K: What is Molenhof doing, investigating the State Dept.?

H: I though you had put him up to it. The story he gives me is that the Ripon group came in to him and said here are the particulars and asked him to look into it.

K: I have never talked to Mollenhof. This is a blow to Elliott Richardson. Some of the charges are true but not with Richardson. I was called about a letter from the Embassy in Laos. Is that what's bugging him?

H: I don't know. That's in his kick on getting rid of people in Laos.

K: Triggered by the McCartney story?

H: ? ? ? ? top 10 people. Generated from a session in his office.

K: I didn't know about the letter.

H: It didn't come through your people?

K: No.

H: I will do a little checking on that.

K: Will you? If it came through it came through Haig.

*

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
evening 3/19/70

K: I have just this minute been handed an article in the Washington Star. I hope you haven't read it yet.

R: I read it before the meeting.

K: I haven't talked to this man ever. He called early this week and said he wanted to talk about State Dept. tensions and I said he didn't talk about relationships. Second, Morris hasn't talked to him. Third, I have never talked to Mollenhof about Biafra or our relationship, and forth, Haldeman only knows that the Ripon Society left their list with Mollenhof and he would check on it.

R: I called Mollenhof yesterday when we heard about this report. He told me there was nothing he could do. Zeigler gave a good anser that there was good cooperation. Mollenhof also volunteered a briefing for Zeigler when he heard about this.

K: I wouldn't direct (?) an investigation of the Dept. of State. Any member of my staff talking to the press will be out.

R: I gathered it would be from Ripon. Any further indication on seabeds?

K: I will do my best to spring it loose tomorrow. It's not been possible yet.

R: I didn't know how he covers so much ground. I will see you in the morning.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TelCon

Secy Rogers (outgoing call)

March 20, 1970; 9:05 a.m.

K: Bill, yesterday when Laird was in with Pastore the President was talking to him about B-52's in northern Laos. Mel has come up with two targets and the President has ordered that they be hit. This can be recalled until Noon and I remember you were promised that you would be given a hearing.

R: If he has made up his mind I don't want to. Will you call Mansfield? My voice is about shot. He said he had some assurance. I don't know who he got it from. I think we had better tell him. Find out who it was that gave him that assurance.

K: Yes.

R: I would hate to have him think we have double-crossed him.

K: I don't know who could have given him the assurance.

R: In my testimony I did not say anything like that.

K: I wanted you to know that as of yesterday evening no such decision had been made.

R: I know he has been thinking about it.

K: It can be undone until Noon.

R: Does he feel the targets are good ones?

K: I frankly just got the word from Mel and passed it on.

R: I think it is all right. The only thing I have in mind is Mansfield.

K: Let me get Harlow to call Mansfield.

R: That is better.

K: My judgment is that it is none of my business, but the attitude you take is the wise one.

ms

By: K.L. U. NAHA, Dalo 5/12/94

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

9:12 pm am 3/20/70

K: The President wants to proceed and I have talked to Bill.

L: It's all right?

K: He's not dancing in the street. He has the flu. I told him he had to noon to protest. He said OK and he could see why the President would want to do it and he will let it go. Are these pretty good targets?

K: I will get you something over on it by 10:00.

K: You recommend them?

L: My only problem is that I have been told such and such the ______ is that they have found anything. When I find something, I will naturally let him know.

K: They are suitable?

L: They do contain elements of an enemy control. The intelligence is hedged.

K: Send me something but you go ahead. Have you any idea where Mansfield got that assurance? Bill said that worries him and he didn't give him the assurance.

L: I don't know. The President didn't say anything?" Bill will know.

K: Bill does say Mansfield thinks he has assurances. How can we find out when he got them? You don't know where he found out? Could you call Mansfield? That

L: They will be like a tip off.

K: I will get Harlow to call.

L: How will know something is brewing. You talk to Harlow before you make a call.

K: I won't get near a phone. I'll talk to Harlow.

(Harlow's people found out that Mansfield said he was misquoted)

By K.L. V. NAHA, Dale S/13/64

TELCOM

Haldeman (?)/Kissinger

9:15 am

3/20/70

H: Here's the thing of it. He says you have a problem on your bombing.

K: I've taken care of it.

K: The point is, don't let Rogers have a meeting. Just carry out your bombin

K: The only problem is that when you bomb in Laos is that it will get public. When it's public, you don't want State saying they didn't know anything about i I told Rogers it's ordered and if you want to object, you have untib noon but the President knows your views. He didn't object. I don't want them to cut the President up afterwards. We wouldn't want Rogers testyfing he didn't know. Anyway, Laird would have told him.

H: I wanted to be sure it was at the President's order. I don't want ? ? ? ?
He's in a charming mood. He's hung up on me about 7 times today. He forget
what he wants to say and then he has to call back.

K: He called and hung up on me too. When I got back last night he kex called and said over again how great he thought he was but when I asked him what he really thought, he said he thought was lousy. Actually I thought he was quite good, especially in the second half. It's a good idea and I think we should do it about twice a year. I think he just wanted reassurance that it was all right.

H: He spoke to me about it too. I don't think he liked it because he said he did
but he didn't think his guests understood it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

9:20 am

3/20/70

L: We have a piece of paper I will get to you. We are not changing any position on MIRV. Dave was talking out loud.

K: Good. Gerard Smith was salivating when he heard those things.

L: Before the meeting I will have a black and white piece of paper for you. But for our department, it will be k no.

K: I suspected something like that.

L: About that last call-- I had somebody with me but there was something I wanted to say. The message on the targets is hedged and they keep saying "believed". The Joint Chiefs might have over-reacted because it was my impression I was to find targets.

K: That was my understanding too. We will just take the hedging out when we go public.

L: I can't read from here whether they have overreacted on the pressure. In view of the President's strong pressuring, I thought we had to go all out.

K: Just so long as we are all together with the President.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TelCon

Mr. Rebozo

3/20/70; 12:45 p.m.

R: The weather is gorgeous here. Are you going to...

K: Can I let you know tomorrow morning. I am debating between
Dorado Beach and Paradise Island. Do you have any suggestion?

R: I have only been to Dorado. They are rather similar. I think the choice of restaurants is better at Paradise but Dorado must be very good. I have only been to Dorado and that was for a short visit.

K: I may go a few days to one and a few days to the other.

R: Let me know what you want to do. We are all set up in this
place I thought would be the best for you, but you decide for yourself.
No problem.

K: I will let you know first thing in the morning.

R: There is one other thing I wanted to talk to you about. You have
a man with you named Vaky. I understand there is some decision
about to be made about the placement of an Inter-American Social
Development Institute. The bill was introduced by our Congressman,
Purcell and it has been approved but they have not selected a site.
New Orleans has been mentioned, but I would be partial to Miami
and would like to present their case before any decision is made.

K: Let me look into it.

R: Just leave the door open -- that's all I ask. We have a lot of
Spanish speaking people here. I understand they would employ up
to 100 people. But for other selfish reasons I would like to see Miami
get it.

K: I will look into it. And I will let you know first thing in the
morning on the other.

ms

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON

President/Kissinger

3:06 pm

3/20/70

P: I had two thoughts -- One, I wondered if you would draft out a piece of paper on that SAM thing. What I had in mind was to indicate that on ______ and in a memo to the Secy. of Defense I recommended we should respond when SAM fired at us. At that time there was no site and the weather made strikes infeasible. Third, this authority still stands and a response is to be made when the weather makes it possible. I don't want it to be a new order but one that stands.

K: That's right. We can say that the authority to retaliat stands when bad weather makes it impossible.

P: I want to send it to Laird so he will have the authority.

K: I layed it into Dobrynin. I said the cease fire ? ? ? ? and SA-3 when the
President found out it cancelled all that and I said they couldn't deal with this
President the same way as they have dealt with past administrations. He said
he didn't know anything about SA-3. I believe him -- they wouldn't tell him.
He asked if we had other sources other than Israeli sources. The Israelis got
it from us -- the Pentagon.

P: What about the 1200 men.

K: The Birtish.

P: We have hard figures. I could say that

K: I wouldn't confirm that. We have some reports and we are studying them.
Then you would have trouble explaining why we are not giving them Phantoms.

P: If he doesn't admit it, we can play it that the story is open (?). Another
thing -- if I were they, I would have worried about the Brandt reception in E.
Germany. Anybody Anytime anybody from the West goes to the East/it's like
Romania.

K: They fear two Germanies may get together on nationalism. It should worr
them a hell of a lot. Heknow a little bit about my trip. He said he had heard
that progress is being made.

P: Who leaked it?

K: The NVN probably said something.

P: He might leak it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KLC NAHA, Dalo 5/13/04

President/Kissinger

3:06 pm

3/20/70

-2-

K: No, he knows but he wouldn't unless it would benefit them some how and right now it wouldn't. -- I said we had it all set and you cancelled it.

P: Because of their move.

K: And because it looked like they were using the cease fire to help their position. If they had a position that would ? ? ? ? ? ?

P: When Rabin went back, he was ready to sign.

K: On Tuesday.

P: When is Dobrynin going back?

K: Dobrynin's going back on the 12th.

P: I hope he doesn't think we were given anything.

K: Also, he wasn't sure they were telling him everything, for the first time.

P: Who?

K: The NVN. He asked me and I said you had better go to your friends and ask them.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

TelCon
Dean Acheson

3/20/70; 4:35 p.m.

By KLC NAHA, Dato 5/12/04

A: I had two thoughts. Just wanted to let you know that I am on that side too. One has to do with Cambodia. Eight years ago I represented his government at The Hague and spent some time there with him. He must have slipped a lot to get in this position. He had a firm hold on that government eight years ago. I think a lot of changes have gone on. What I was thinking about -- don't let's get drawn into this one.

K: Oh, no. We have no intention.

A: KIMEX I just wanted you to know that I am urging this too. I wouldn't bet much on this government's staying there.

K: We are saying nothing, and more important, doing nothing.

A: We don't need any more weak allies in Southeast Asia. In another field, the President said the other day that he thought the XENEX Russians might make some proposal and he feared the general rush toward that. Someone might say, grab it and he thought we ought to have a proposal of our own. I got hold of Paul the other day and talked to him about what went on, and Paul shares my worry about Gerry Smith. He thinks he would be the fellow who would say, oh, yes, let's get hold of this. Paul thinks the only way if a proposal is made is suggestion which seems very wise to me. We say, well whatever you say is very interesting. We would be interested in talking about possibility of regulating number of launches or number of manned bases. Nobody would really like to do this. But the point is not whether you do it but whether you suggest it. The thing that is good about it is that they would not.... The Army and the Air Force wouldn't like it at all. The Navy would think it is fine. It seems to me that if you are looking for a suggestion as a countermeasure here is one that is pre good.

K: I have been talking to Paul and let me talk to him again to get the details. He is very good.

A: That is all I have in mind.

K: The President is calling me. I will call you back in 15 minutes.

A: OK

By: K.L. W. NAHA, Dalo 5/12/84

TELCON
G. Smith/Kissinger
5:55 pm 3/20/70

K: Didn't I tell you that before the Verification Panel was over we would be on the same side?

S: No, you didn't; but ____ you will. I just learned that Alden Frye, Sen. Javits man, called a man in ACDA, Weisbrod, and said he saw a memo on a compendium on MIRV that he wants to get. That brings us to something else. I had a man of mine, Hubberman, do a study for me. Frye told Weisbrod that he had seen the Hubberman paper on how the Soviets view the American MIRV program. He said he had seen this from someone on the NSC. This is quite a document and I thought I should pass this on to you.

K: I find it hard to believe.

S: It sounds peculiar.

K: If that's true, the man is dead.

S: I should think so.

K: If you could find out who, I will guarantee he is fired.

S: I gave a copy to Helms and Nitze.

K: Who on my staff? I have never seen it.

S: I don't know. I sent it to you. I sent it just directly to you.

K: You are saying I leaked it?

S: No. You asked who I sent it to. I'm only reporting an allegation I thought disturbing.

K: I will look into that.

By KMLN NARA, Dato 5/12/94

TelCon
Governor Dewey
3/20/70; 6:05 p.m.

did not

D: I called you because the mails weren't working. We/dn't send out a reminder. The only way to settle it was to call you. We go to the Opera House, arrive 6:15 the Grand Tier Restaurant for dinner. Can I pick you up?

K: I have just run into a complication. There may be an NSC meeting Tuesday afternoon, and if there is, I am dead. It depends on when the President goes away.

D: I didn't know he was going away.

K: Wednesday morning or afternoon he is going to Key Biscayne. Just over Easter.

D: Well I hope he lets you come up. You let me know.

K: I have kept the afternoon and evening open on my calendar. I want to talk to you early next week about the other matter we spoke of.

D: I have a feeling we are doing pretty well on this business of sentimen
The recent events are pretty good. Those two women now are turning
out good pictures.

K: We may have a reason to keep you traveling so that you can do some
other things.

D: I will be here. What I was going to suggest was to give you our
place. I was going to suggest that we pick you up. And would you like
to have my car pick you up at the airport when you arrive?

K: Why don't I call your office Monday morning.

D: We are going to the country this weekend so don't call before
11:00 in the morning Monday.

ms

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
7:55 pm 3/20/70

P: What I was thinking about was that you should give Wheeler a call and make sure he knows what I said about this SAM decision directly and what I said privately to Laird about those generals. I will not let those guys fall for this. Laird may not want to talk to them but it has to get down the line to them I will not persecute them. McGovern says he is going to attack the Nixon doctrine. As far as I'm concerned we gain nothing by giving them anything. You were so excited about germ warfare and Biafra. Who has heard of Biar since that day you called me?

K: These bleeding hearts ?? Basically they like power and success.

P: Biafra will die.

K: And are they being starved.

P: We have the 52's in here and they will go. SAM's we will hit and hit fast. I want it done Sunday.

K: I will have that memo on your desk tomorrow morning.

P: I want Laird and Wheeler to know we want something done Sunday.

K: I was just talking to Laird to make sure he will keep the menu thing going.

P: Put it in writing and I will sign it.

K: I told him menu was coming.

P: Never send anything to Laird in the future without sending it to Wheeler. Send them a just memo on menu. Hit the SAM sites and send a memo signed my me. We will get this bureaucracy in shape.

K: I couldn't agree more.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TelCon
Gen Wheeler
3/20/70; 8:00 p.m.

K: The President wanted me to call you about three things. The first, he wanted you to know that he feels these generals should not be made the fall guys for My Lai and he will see to it that they don't get ruined. It is up to you if you want to convey that. He will not permit the military to be kicked around in this country. The second thing, he is sending over a memo to Mel to the effect that SAM sites that have been activated can be struck even if bad weather should interfere with retaliation after some time and he looks to you for implementation or to be told if for some reason it isn't being implemented within a brief period of time. He is also putting in that the Menu series is going forward and that he is to get weekly reports.

W: I see. I am glad he is sending this over because I got a memo back today from Dave want to hold off on this next week's package waiting for clarification of what goes on in Cambodia. This will supersede that I assume.

K: It damn well better and we will count on you to tell us if for any reason it doesn't. I was just told by the Secretary of Defense when I said this that you attacked today and you are due to attack again Tuesday.

W: I see. Yes sir.

K: OK by you?

W: Yes, indeed.

ms

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

8:10 am 3/20/70

K: The President called again and I told him that signing an authorization/and we are doing it as a memo and you will do it an authorization. He agrees.

L: I understand.

K: He wants those things executed Sun. mon, or Mon.

L: We will get that one

K: That's the one he wants. We will draft it as one at a time.

L: I will give you a report.

K: That's it.

L: We shouldn't run to the President every time. I will give you an report.

K: We don't want an unlimited authority to hit the same site 50 days in a row.

L: That's exactly it and we have to be careful.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TelCon
Secretary Laird
3/20/70; 9:50 p.m.

K: The President is really jumping tonight. He just had me call Wheeler to give him his feelings about these generals that he gave you yesterday.

L: Wheeler isn't even in the process. Its the Joint Chairman, the Joint Chief, the two of them.

K: He just wanted him to know on a personal basis. He wanted me to say he was sending a memo on the missile sites. I just didn't want to deal with Wheeler without telling you.

L: You shouldn't, Henry. I am sick and tired of that Joint Staff running around behind my back. They got us into trouble a couple of times.

K: Whenever I deal with Wheeler you know that.

L: I know this. That is true of Wheeler too. He is great. My problem is not Wheeler. He feels very badly about this. About the generals.

K: The President did not intend that as a directive. He had read something McGovern said and wanted Wheeler to know the generals wouldn't get kick around in his Administration. He just meant it as a friendly gesture.

L: Well, Wheeler knows how I feel on that too.

K: Well, and he made that clear. Wheeler and you as far as I can tell are always on the same wave length.

L: He is a great guy. It's too bad he is going to have to change. But we are going to have to go soon on that. I think we should go around the 15th of April with an announcement by the President. Then we can get the bill through Congress to make Wheeler a 4-Star general.

K: You mean a permanent one?

L: Yes. If they are going to make Hershey one they should Wheeler.

K: Does that get him any perquisites when he leaves?

L: Yes, it affects his retirement too.

K: I think the 15th is a good time for that. Good, Mel I won't bother you again tonight.

*

TELCON
Fisher/Kissinger
9:55 am 3/21/70

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

F: Where do we stand?

K: I said I could see you yesterday or Monday morning. I was told you couldn't make it Monday morning.

F: I got my reservations.

K: I would prefer to see you and explain on Monday morning.

F: I will be there at 10:30. When will the message be delivered by Rogers?

K: At noon.

F: We will talk about that Monday morning at 10:30.

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

3/21/70

Secretary Laird - Dr. Kissinger

(11:10 A. M)

HAK: ... I told him about this report and he was pleased.

Secretary: I think that's fine.

Our advice to you is to pass it to the Defense Department
for information.

Laird:

HAK: Yes. The situation is one of those where this spotter did locate this but was ... let the fighter pull the trigger. We have spotter planes on that border every now and then. We don't want to get into this.

HAK: Yes, I agree.

Laird: Because the patrol plane was not there when the fighting was taking place.

HAK: I have a note that you should hit something hard. No, it was on Vietnamization. I got a report that it wasn't working and that you would have a chance at a press conference to get it out.

HAK: ... It won't be on tv. He is calling them into his office. If anything happens that affects you, I'll call

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger

11:10 am 3/21/70

K: How do you feel?

R: I feel better.

K: All right on Monday?

R: I think so. My temperature is down today.

K: If you can get some rest over the weekend, I talked to Len Garment and he will talk to the Jewish Community on Monday. I have Javitts and Fisher coming in on Monday.

R: One of the best agreements to make if the Jewish Community sees this as undermining their position (is that there is no thought of undermining their position and they should emphasize the bright side) and then their position is strengthened.

K: I told Garment that we should watch the balance and say that we will watch the situation and pick up the commitment.

R: The nuances in the dispute because the Arabs are so unsophisticated that whatever the Israelis say they believe. That speech in the UN was really pro-Arab. In this situation they could express mild disappointment but pleasure in the support from which we are not deviating.

K: The President is bringing the press in in about 20 mins for a give and take.

R: On what?

K: Segregation maybe but I don't know where that stands.

R: a telegram from Pehom Penh says we cannot take a view on evetns in Cambodia but to say we respect Cambodian neutrality. He says Laird said we had to re-consider our situation ? ? ? . I hope the President doesn't say anything.

K: That was my recommendation to him. Only state our respect of neutrality.

R: He is apt to take pleasure on what has happened and express that. I don't think that would be good.

K: I couldn't agree more.

*

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON

Laird/Kissinger

1:40 pm 3/21/70

(Secure Voice Phone -- notetaker couldn't hear HAK's comments)

L: I wanted to check out. I wanted to get through to you so you could let the President know before he goes to Camp David. First I haven't gotten your memo yet. The B-52 recon has been accomplished and we have good ____ in that as far as Laos is concerned. The gunships are there and will be there through April. The ARDF is on and operating. The B-52 strikes went on schedule and last night we also ____ on Menio. This is a better target than last night. They were requested by Wheeler because they just told them to find targets and so they went in. You say Godley's message today. We can go until anything anytime until 2:00 tonight. Will you let Gen. Pursley know? This is a better target than the other two. This is a concentration of NVN and better than the other two. We can hit it with TacAir but if you want a philosophical impact we can go for this target. I'm going out to the basketball game but Purcell will stand by. Everything is accomplished

If we don't have it today we will have to do it Monday night, Of all the instructions that came in the memo we have not done Cobra. We thought MCVee would take that position but he feels it downgrades his position. I think we should stay with Abrams on that. Everything else has been done. We have one outstanding B-52 strike we can make. We will go ahead with Menio on Tues or Wed. We want to make sure Cambodians have not moved into that area. If you want to run it the target (exists). Our contingency plans are in order for the ____ service and I have just gone through the briefing and we have set up our center as an emergency center. It will take up to 24-48 hours to move in the ____ into place. We decided to wait until Monday.

*

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

1:40 pm

3/21/70

By: KLC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

R: I talked to Ron so I got the word on what the President said. It screws me up.

K: I had no idea. Originally he was going to talk about segregation. I asked him why he did it and he said he wanted to take the heat off you.

R: He said everything that I was going to say. He should do it if he wants to. But we had instructions all over the world how we were handling it.

K: I told everybody I couldn't see them until Monday morning. I told Len Garment not to move until Monday.

R: My business with the Congressional leaders might as well be cancelled.

K: My word -- there wasn't one minute of discussion here. He never gave me the slightest idea. When I called you about the pressing, it was just a courtesy. I thought he was going to go on segregation and then the postal strike.

R: I think I should call off the press conference.

K: I would have it. You can answer questions. He didn't leave it loose.

R: I have my doubts. I don't understand playing on a team when you don't understand the signals. We should get signals and play by the signal.

K: I thought he was being helpful to you and he thought he had left enough running room for me (or you ?)

R: He said he shouldn't do it and wanted me to do it and I said I would.

K: You were being generous. There's not much glory in that announcement.

R: This is something I would just as soon not do.

K: There's only going to be heat on that announcement.

R: It makes the announcement silly. I had Rabin coming in and the Congressional leaders.

K: He has said you would have a press conference and would make an announcement and I think you should go ahead with your plan.

R: You might tell him I have some doubts. I may call him. You saw the messages that went all over the world?

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

Rogers/Kissinger

1:40 pm 3/21/70

-2-

K: We saw them yesterday and it was all set.

R: I may just cancel the press conference.

K: I will tell him you are thinking about the whole thing.

By: KHLW NARA, Dale: 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
3/21/70; 7:55 p.m.

K: The President is bugging the daylights out of me about the authority and he wants to sign it himself.

L: He should never sign an authority.

K: Why?

L: Under the law for the national security act the President never signs the authority. The operational responsibility is assigned to me -- and not to the Joint Chiefs. I know what he wants done and I can do it. The Joint Chiefs came up with a set of authorities tonight which is not what the President wanted and I am not going to send it up.

K: We didn't talk to them.

L: I asked them for a draft -- Hell, it came up a little while ago and I have to redo it. It goes way beyond what the President wants.

K: He wants it presented in such a way that it does not give preemptive authority.

L: I understand that. Why doesn't he just send me a memo outlining the three points. I think you have to be careful with the authority.

K: We will get a memorandum to you.

L: I will send you a copy of the way it is actually issued to the Com.

K: Give me the three points as you understand them.

L: Any SAM sites that are activated against our aircraft, authority is granted to tick(?) those sites off -- even if the weather prevents an attack against an activated site we will have the authority to later hit it.

K: You see it as meaning to hit it once or forever after?

L: I would like them to come back after they hit it once and report.

K: I agree with you. I don't want to give them unlimited authority.

By: KLC NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

Mr. Kissinger/Laird
3/20/70; 7:55 p.m.

-2-

L: I want them to report back rather than have this openended.

K: I understand that and I agree. Okay, I will send that memo to you. Also, I don't know where the President got the idea, but he keeps asking to make sure the Menu series are still going forward.

L: I told you I delayed it for four days to see ... we will hit again next Tuesday. We are taking photographs and I want to get an update report.

K: But you will go ahead on Tuesday.

L: Tell the President we did one on ______ and will go forward again on Tuesday.

*

*

By: KL V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
G. Smith/Kissinger
morning 3/21/70

S: Monday morning I am to testify before the Fulbright Foreign Relations Committee on ACDA. They will ask what I think on the resolution passed yesterday. My disposition will be that I cannot speak on an official basis. On a personal matter I could say it shows how strongly the Congress takes ? ? ? ? ? Essential aspects of a freeze. Unilateral verification and other appropriate ____. If we point that out they may see it's serious business.

K: KX I just talked to the President about what he will say to the press. He will say that's what the negotiations are all about. He is mad at the Foreign Relations Committee in General. His reaction is negative. Be careful you don't get a headline of approbation with the President. That's not very helpful -- it's more psychological than substantive.

*

Telecon
Joseph Kraft

3/23/70 8:20 a.m.

JK: Two questions about today. I still don't understand the logic of having a public statement on the (Plans or planes). If you make the decision, you make it, who needs to play to a gallery?

HK: There had been so much talk about it.

JK: Well, the 30-day mistake . . .

HK: Those are your words, but that line forced it. And we want to call attention to other countries that this gets an arms embargo established. An equilibrium could be established by our sending arms in or . . . .

JK: That's a possibility?

HK: A very slight one.

JK: It's not a question of personal vanity. I had heard that the Secretary of State was pushing this.

HK: You mean the press conference?

JK: Yes,

HK: Well, he's been wanting to make a press conference. I wouldn't have that . . .

JK: I have also heard from high sources that you have been consistently opposed to the 125.

HK: The 125?

JK: The 100 Skyhawks and the 25 Phantoms.

HK: I don't provide a checklist of my views.

JK: I know you don't.

HK: Opposed to delivery of them?

JK: Opposed to granting Golda's request.

HK: Joe, the thing to remember is that I present my views to the President. I had better not comment on that. I wouldn't draw any conclusions from it. My views aren't that simply in any event. I better not

*

Telecon

Joesph Kraft

3/23/70 8:20 a.m.

page 2

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

JKK

talk about my views on it. But, you'd be wrong if you assigned any
pro and con view on it to me.

JK: Okay. Let me renew my request vis-a-vis seeing the
President. I hear he saw some foreign press.

HK; You mean Frank Giles?

JK: Well, Giles and Fontaine.

HK: Well, Giles was in my office and the President call me.
I told him Giles was there and he said bring him up. It was completely
fortuitous. Well, I'll see what I can do.

By: K.L. U. NARA, Dato

*

Telecon

U. Alexis Johnson

3/23/70 8:35 a.m.

J: Kabuki play. On Saturday night Shimoda told me that Don Kendall is going back to Tokyo under cover, and is having talks with Miazawa.

K: God Dam't it. Who the hell is he?

J: And some kind of moratorium proposal is coming out of it, though he didn't have anything firm.

K: It didn't come from us.

J: And then the Sig Harrison story in the Post yesterday.

K: I didn't see that.

J: I haven't heard anything from Armin Meyer about Kendall. Have you heard anything?

K: Nothing, except what I told Trezise. You know that don't you?

J: No . . . I just talked with Trezise. No, I don't.

K: I told my contact those three points. He called back and . . . you're coming to the WSAG Meeting, aren't you?

J: Yes, but I wanted some answers for the Secretary before that.

K: Yes, but I'll let you see the telecon when you come. They agreed to an aggregate ceiling provided we can figure out a way to make it look as if it were the comprehensive restraint. I don't know how we can do that, but . . .

J: Yes.

K: Secondly, they are willing to accept the restrains on those 10 items with only the most formal, face-saving demonstration of injury. They said we should be tough here, so it gets forced back to Tokyo. And they impried us not to break off negotiations. They are going to come in to talk to you.

J: As of Saturday night Shimoda had no instructions on that.

K: I told them Kendall has no standing.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
3/23/70 8:35 a.m.
page 2

J: I don't know what he's up to.

K: That guy's a menace. I don't see who he could have communicated with.

J: Maury hasn't heard anything from him?

K: Not that I know of.

J: Has Peter heard anything?

K: I'll have to check that.

K: He keeps contact with Flanigan doesn't he?

K: I hope he keeps contact with somebody. I can't stand him and I avoid him like the plague. That's my professional feeling. I think we should break off the talks if they don't come in in a day or two, don't you?

J: That in effect does break them off. If they don't come in, we don't have anything to talk about.

K: I will let you see the conversation. This fellow always seems informed. And I will send over to you a communication the President has had from Thanat.

J: This morning?

K: Yes.

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Peter Flanigan
3/23/70 8:45 a.m.

K: Kendall isn't negotiating textiles at our instructions it he?

F: I have no idea what instructions the President gave him. He may have talked to him at great length about it at the NAB dinner. Kendall called me.

K: When?

F: Saturday night. He said he thought he could get the plan Yoshino suggested to Mills (?). He said that is nothing new. He said I have asked McNeil, and we have been talking to textile people. McNeil talked to Trezise about this plan and talked to me. I said what our government wants is a good proposition from the Japanese government. We are not saying this plan is acceptable, but some proposal should come from them. He said he is going to try to get the Japanese to _______________.

K: Trezise has an overwhelming urge to give the ball game away. We have got one channel going. And before anything happens there, Kendall goes wild. This way they can deal with two Presidential emissaries.

F: Do you want me to call McNeil and say not to get back to them?

K: If Kendall can settle it, that's fine, but there should be only one guy talking, and each should be aware of what the other said.

F: I don't know with whom or with who's permission Kendall is talking. If Kendall is over there saying he is the quasi-official emissary. . . He want back to Taipei you know. He left Sunday morning our time. McNeil is going back to continue discussions.

K: With industry?

F: Yes.

K: Who is he?

F: He's chairman of the Emergency Committee for American Trade (?). He's soft for getting an agreement. He works for Kendall.

K: Kendall has been very soft.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

page 2

F: He wants free trade. He wants to knock off Japanese restrictions.

K: We don't want to make another proposal. It's their turn.

F: I understand that, and I understand our people aren't making any.

K: We heard from the Japs . . .

F: They say they are dealing with Kendall? Maybe we should call McNeil and say *don't* we don't know what authority you have, but you are screwing up the works. You should call them and say make a proposal, and you should not be involved in developing that proposal, because then you would have an equity in it.

K: That is right. I will call the Japs and tell them to deal here. I will talk with the President. It's inconceivable that the President would have said anything more than if you can settle it, fine.

F: I will call McNail and Kendall. Incidentally, in the Iranian oil thing with the British, I have had a chat with Derek Mitchell, and I will talk with him again later this week. There are rumors around that I am trying to use White House clout to get ________/ It may come up in a hearing.

K: I know the facts.

F: But we can't talk about them.

K: Well Peter, we have to throw an occasional White House aide to the wolves.

*

*

By KHC NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

9:15 am 3/23/70

L: There were two things that I wanted to talk about -- WSAG meeting. If any recommendations are going from that group directly to the President

K: I told you why last time

L: I think Bill and I should meet with (NSC?) before

K: The last time he got mad and called them together. The idea would be -- on this subject we would have a meeting with everybody to crystalize the issues.

L: I got the idea they wanted to (missed the rest because of an incoming call.)

*

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

9:18 am 3/23/70

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

R: On Laos. It occured to me that it would be a good idea to say the President has sent another letter to Kosygin to tell them to be more responsive ? ? ? and the Accords.

K: I think it's a good idea and the President would want that to be strong. The President approved your message to Beam?

R: Yes and it's been sent out. I'm going ahead and say it.

K: He would want that strong, I think.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Yoshida/Kissinger
9:20 am 3/24/70

K: I wanted to tell you that since our conversation on Thurs that nothing has happened. Our people are getting mad and they think you are playing with us. No one believes me any more. I have helped off on Friday, waiting for something.

Y: We have not made any formal proposal?

K: No. I heard you were going to deal with Kendall. I have told you he has no authority. We have stopped the trip of one of Kendall's associates.

Y: I am getting mad. I don't understand at all. I told my friend and he said he would take the steps.

K: The issue isn't worth the bad feeling that's being created. You should just tell us what you mean are going to do.

Y: That's right. I asked my friend to take the steps which I told you and he said he would.

K: We always presume on our side and nothing happens on yours.

Y: I don't understand. I am now getting mad.

K: You tell us exactly what you are going to do, no matter how bad. Then in the future we can work together. We are working ourselves into something.

Y: My people haven't made any formal

K: Since Thursday night we have not heard from your people. Since we talked last, no communication. I have given firm instructions on reliance of your promise.

Y: It's now almost 11:30 here. In about 10 hours time, early tomorrow morning, I will get in touch with my friend and see what he is going to do. According to our newspaper reports my friend and his associates are doing their best to talk to our interested people and plan a big step forward. You are receiving these newspaper reports.

K: Yes, but we cannot act on the newspaper reports. You call me.

Y: Certainly. You are now in the morning. Around 8:00 tonight at your time I shall be getting in touch with you definitely. Could you wait until tonight?

K: I will wait to hear from you. Unless something happens like you describe it, no one will believe in this channel any more.

Y: Unlike yourself, I am not in a position to check with my friend daily to see

By: KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

*

Yoshida/Kissinger

9:20 am 3/24/70

-2-

Y (oont.): what he is doing. Now I have a direct channel of communication with him so I can talk with him as soon as I can. About 8:00 your time.

K: I am always reachable. I will hear from you later.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

Dr. Kaysen/Kissinger

9:40 am 3/23/70

K: I had a thought -- about the postal strike. If you are contemplating using troops and this might be the occasion of an official confrontation between the SDS and other groups.

HK: That's a very good point. I will do something about it -- think about it.

K: as a consideration. I have a feeling this could be an extremely unpleasant confrontation. Another thought -- my belief is that the President has a fund of ______ dollars. Someone should give the thought that this is the responsibility of Congress, which he said on Friday, but adding to that that the funds that are available it would be useful to put some sum aside for someone with a view. The contending parties in the Congress, whatever social rule has been broken by the postal employees, the Congress is part of this. If you say you will have a no -strike obligation there is an obligation that economic ______ have to be met.

HK: I don't handle the postal strike. I will pass it on within the next half hour. We don't suffer from an excess of ideas on this. Any ideas on Laos?

K: No, and I'm scared to death that the Cambodians may be trying to help us.

HK: It's impossible to stop something you don't start. I don't consider this necessary if there's a favorable domestic situation but there are some noises we will have another Laos there.

K: The Russians and Chinese I hear are splitting up is pay.

HK: The Communist world is too dull for him.

*

TELCONE

FLANIGAN KISSINGER

10:20 am 3/23/70

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/70

F: I saw you at Kendall in Taiwan.

K: What did he do?

F: he was in Japan for the Pepsi Cola Co. and the opening of the Fair. He talked as a private citizen and as head of ECAP to the head of ECAP. He says that the textile people have 100 members of the Diet sewn up and unless they have Sato tied up. They will come up with something. The reason McNeil is going back is to present the textile people? I pointed out the dangers of appearing to negotiate. Trezise told them they had no reason to (negotiate?) for us. He says he is going back now to work out a further an aggrate moratorium which would apply if there was one area under the aggragate. It looks like he is back here and has orders.

K: We don't know if we will accept his proposal.

F: Kendall says the textile people. There are two levels -- us with the government and him with industry.

K: Stan says we have to have two -- one on wool and one on man-made.

F: Tell him to tell them to make a proposal.

K: Let me talk to Alex Johnson.

F: That's discouraging. There's a danger with two levels of negotiation but one level has not been fruitful. Sato cannot control textiles any more than we could.

K: I don't know enough about it to make that judgment. Let me get to you at 1:00.

F: He will be in Chicago in an hour.

K: Let me talk to Alex.

F: I think he should say ... and I want you to move now.

K: I shouldn't get involved with his proposal.

F: We can make sure that he and they understand that it's not official.

K: That's impossible. I will get Alex and call you back.

*

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
3/23/70 10:25 a.m.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/13/04

K: The only way to turn off Kendall is to get him in the next hour. He has talked to them. He is in Taipei not, but McNeil is talking again. They are trying to get something along the lines of the Yoshino proposal. The question is do we want them to do it or do we want McNeil to turn around and stop?

J: This is getting too deep for me. If they can work something out fine, and good. But I don't know how this works with our other channels.

K: I ought to tell him not to go on without getting our position.

J: I think he ought to be told our position. Have you heard from Maury? He was checking on a moratorium.

K: No, I haven't heard from him. I'll tell McNeil to check with Maury and you before he does anything.

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

TelCon

3/23/70

11:00 a. m.

Mr. Flanigan

F: Stans is very much against letting this guy go any further. He says you had some communication last week that was hopeful and much better than a moratorium. He doesn't trust the guy.

K: All right, let's stick with that. They have to deliver on that proposition of last week.

F: The argument against that is without some help from industry they can't. I don't believe that. The Japanese government has always controlled industry. I will tell him that we don't view this trip with favor and call it off.

K: That will be a message to them too.

ms

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

Ray Cline/Kissinger

2:55 pm

3/23/70

K: When did you get back?

C: A week ago Sat. night.

K: Last week was rough for me.

C: I have been inquiring about an appointment.

K: Elliott Richardson can't come tomorrow because we are not having an
NSC meeting and he is away. Do you want to come? At 1:00

C: Sure. Did you get my long message?

K: Yes and I found it intensely interesting.

C: I have talked to the Secy. and Elliot Richardson. They want me to put it
out in writing but I wanted to wait unless you wanted to show it to your boss.

K: I have shown it to him. I think you should go ahead.

C: I think I will but I'll change it a bit. I want to talk to you tomorrow about
Taiwan and China. I promised you something on that but I haven't written it
yet. I had a good visit with Chen Ho. I think there are not many people talking
to him these days. It's a pity. He is so shy and has so much power. And being
pro-American

K: We are not so tough on our enemies but we are murder on our friends.

C: That's one of our problems on VN. They need to be an independent national
leader and not called in like a school boy. On Taiwan it's important with regard
to the upcoming trip and the incidence (?) of upcoming events. You know -- the
plans for meetings. Any other problems?

K: I would like to talk to you about Laos.

C: The Cambodian this is good.

K: Your colleagues get depressed if we win or lose.

C: That's right. I will see you at 1:00.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

*

TELCON
G. Smith/Kissinger
3:25 pm 3/23/70

S: On that matter of the allegation that someone got information through your people. We have done a good investigation and I think he was just using the reference to the NSC as a diversionary tactic. He passed a paper that referred to that H ______ report but

K: They didn't pass the other report, did they?

S: No, your people are in the clear. Now I have a problem because it revolves around a staff member.

K: On your staff? I would get rid of him. Ease him out in stages. That's what I do.

S: (A) bad judgment and (B) lying after the event. He said he had good contacts with the NSC. It's a case where they thought we were not doing enough to get a MIRV ban

K: I think you agree closer than you ever were. I think we have the President ? ? ? ? . It doesn't give anyone the right to leak it.

S: I had three hours with Fulbright. He said the resolution left open the question of what is strategic weapons system. They fell silent.

K: You are a gentleman -- thank you for calling. I would get rid of him. But how you do it

S: I'm going to.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Gov. Dewey/Kissinger

4:05 pm 3/23/70

K: I'm still not sure about that situation.

D: How is the NSC?

K: That will be shifted because of the mail strike. I won't know until tomorrow and I don't know what that does to you.

D: Frances spoke to Ann, our daughter-in-law, and they will come if you can't do it.

K: I can call by 10:00 tomorrow morning and let you know. I'm sorry this has been such a project.

D: When you work for The President you cannot come when you can. I understand that.

K: Well, I wanted to make it, especially for your birthday.

D: The Darts aren't coming. He had a bad attack of the flu and now they must be in Fla. for a meeting. Don't give it another thought and we will see you when we can.

*

TELCON

Amb. Yost/Kissinger

4:30 pm

3/23/70

By: KML NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Y: Some days ago a memo was sent to the WH about the 23rd Anniversary. It had a list of names which came from us but went through a considerable political transformation in the Department. Some are OK but there are some that are very bad and some that are ommited which should be on. I don't like to bother you

K: That's ok. I was going over that this weekend. Who do you object to?

Y: Sen. Hickenlooper -- he's been the UN for years -- Lawrence, Brewery, Keller. None are appropriate, to say the least. Then those that should have been added -- most of the categories are strong. Particularly the media representatives, NGO's -- constituents from other (missions?) -- and Science. Can I send you a list?

K: Quickly and with recommendations. I at least can do something on the negative.

Y: It would be useful to have something positive too.

K: Who were you thinking of?

Y: Shirley Temple Black. Media -- then's a newspaper editor but somebody from the news magazines, broadcasting, and the wire services.

K: Have you any suggestions?

Y: Jim Haggerty. Let me send you a list of perhaps 12 you can draw on. Then if you would like somebody to talk in more detail, we can do that.

K: Good, let's do that.

Y: I was delighted with the news today. It was just right.

K: It gives us another crack at the negotiating route. If I am ever in NY during the working day, I would like to come in and see you. And if you are ever here come see me.

Y: I will try that again.

*

TelCon
Secy Laird

3/23/70; 5:55 p.m.

By KHU NARA, Dato 5/13/04

K: Have you been beating up any strikers yet?

L: No, but it's rather active around here. Say, Henry, I wanted to talk with you a minute about a little thing that came over here for clearance on various messages on troop withdrawals as far as the Australians are concerned. I should talk with you about it on secure voice perhaps.

K: Yes, may be so. Was that triggered by the communication the Australians sent us?

L: Yes. I haven't even told them at State yet what my augmentation figure is going to be on April 15th.

K: Have you told us?

L: No. I will call you right now on the secure phone.

ms