4

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER
SECRETARY OF STATE

In Western Europe, and in Western and Central Europe, we are united with countries that have similar values and that, on the whole, not always perfectly, have stood with us in almost all of the crises of the post-Cold War period. It is becoming increasingly apparent that an American participation in Europe is essential, lest the national rivalries, the fears of a too powerful Germany or an encroaching Russia, will lead to the disintegration of the common policies that have developed there. But at the same time, I am uneasy because with the movement of Russian troops east, with the collapse of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe, in Eastern and Central Europe, there has not been a unifying element and there has not been a significant American initiative with respect to the restoration of the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance.

I do not believe that the Partnership for Peace is such an initiative. The Atlantic Alliance is an alliance; that is, it has a clear definition of the area that it protects. The Partnership for Peace is a vague system of collective security like the United Nations, including all the territory from Vladivostok to Vancouver. And in my view, if everybody is allied with everybody, nobody is allied, really, in any meaningful way with anybody. It is a different concept. It is not an alliance concept. It is an alternative to an alliance concept, and was so presented by President Clinton.

In my view, the expansion of NATO is one of the key challenges before American politics, and think it is necessary to make an un-

ambiguous decision with respect to that. By expansion of NATO, I mean the inclusion of some of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, preferably Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, possibly Slovakia, in the NATO Alliance. And I believe this is important for the following reasons.

It makes no sense to have the border of NATO at the eastern border of Germany, which is not threatened and which has no plausible security threat, and to leave ambiguous the eastern border of Poland. I believe it is dangerous to have a vacuum between Russian and Germany which both of these nations will then try to fill by their national efforts. I believe that the security of the eastern border of the Atlantic Alliance should be an alliance problem, not a German national challenge. And for these reasons and for others which we might elaborate in the question period, in the discussion period, I believe that NATO expansion is essential.

I do not believe that it can be handled as a study project. It requires a decision, not a study. We know what is needed. And we know what the arguments against it are. And by keeping open the question of whether it is a part of the Partnership for Peace or a part of the Atlantic Alliance, we actually confuse both efforts. I am not clear what our official position is. If it is for expansion, I support it. If it is a mishmash in which Russia is supposed to join the Atlantic Alliance, then I believe it is going to lead to undermining the Atlantic Alliance, and thereby one of the major building blocks of the international system as I understand it.

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On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a need for projects we can do together. In the past, this was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to which, as I have said, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, should be added as quickly as possible. This is not a problem for reflection but a problem for decision-making. There's nothing we can learn by studying the problem; it can only confuse everybody. And it is not in our interest to create a gray area between Germany and Russia, which both nations will then be tempted -- not just tempted but obliged -- to fill with their national policies. Nor is it good for Europe, and in the end not even for Russia, to create a vacuum around its borders.

But for the long term, now is the time to create new institutions for the nations on both sides of the North Atlantic, to the building of which they can dedicate themselves. The European Union is a reality and America is beginning to build a North American Free Trade Association -- which may merge into a Western Hemisphere one later on. [It is time] to begin building a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, and to dedicating ourselves to it as an objective.

AFTER VICTORY:
DEFINING AN AMERICAN ROLE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE

PRESENTED BY
NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

AND
THE RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY AND BIRTHPLACE

LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

SPEAKER:

THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER

56TH SECRETARY OF STATE

MAYFLOWER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, DC

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1995

With the collapse not just of Soviet control of Central Europe but of the division of Germany, many of the previous assumptions in which French political dominance was traded for German economic dominance no longer apply. But there has to be a role for America in Europe if Europe is not to fragment into traditional rivalries. But there also has to be space for a European unity. And that, of course, raises the fundamental question of where does Europe begin - a question we have systematically fudged. Part of the reason is that the same people who thought the Cold War unnecessary really do not believe in alliances in the traditional sense. They believe in collective security, affirming that they don't want dividing lines; and they think in terms of a NATO which runs from Vladivostok to Vancouver.

But an alliance has a line of separation, by definition as it were. It has to have organized units, command systems, and specific obligations. Collective security is a legal concept which has to be negotiated from case to case. One cannot have both simultaneously, as we have been attempting to do, hence we have to choose. In addition, to declare we are for a policy but that the when, how, who and where remain to be decided merely means that we are evading the key issues.

The future of NATO is not some abstract seminar; one has to define where Europe begins and one has to recognize what Russia is. Russia is a great power which has expanded for 400 years. Now I do not know whether nations can ever change. Certainly, in America we have many movies in which some evil character has an automobile accident or undergoes a major transformation to emerge as a saint. (Laughter.) But one rarely sees this sort of thing in real life. All I'm saying is that 400 years of foreign policy indicate a certain proclivity. (Laughter.) Russia, which borders Europe, the Middle East, and Asia is in its scale not a European country -- nor is it in terms of its geography. It represents many European traditions but has always been torn.

Henry A. Kissinger

We Live in an Age of Transition

What we now need to do more urgently is create some goals for the North Atlantic nations so that we are able to act again within

a common framework. We should seriously begin to examine some form of North Atlantic free trade association, a free trade agreement that would go beyond any that now exists. Whatever America builds in the Western Hemisphere needs to be related to this Atlantic enterprise, enabling us—in the foreseeable turmoil in other parts of the world and in the shifts of emphasis that will inevitably arise as new powers emerge—to act with purpose and direction.

A succession of American leaders of both political parties, many not known for excessive sentimentality (a trait not common to those who rise to the Presidency), have over a period of more than a generation considered it natural that, on major issues, Britain and the United States should cooperate. The level of consultation, though never formalized, was central to the formation of policy in both parties in both countries. Now, the challenge is to see whether this can be done in terms of European-American relations as well, where Britain's experience can make a signal contribution. Europe no longer needs to wrest its identity from the United States. In the world of the 1990s, both know their strengths and their weaknesses. It serves no purpose to dwell endlessly on either. The more imperative issue is whether they appreciate their common interests and are seeking to foster new forms of cooperation to serve those interests. The nations of the North Atlantic, representing a comparable civilization in a world in which democracy and economic progress remain our hope but not our guarantee, are required to do again, this time on a global basis, what they attempted so successfully to do a generation ago.

The Washington Post
Friday, May 12, 1995

Henry Kissinger

# For U.S. Leadership, a Moment Missed

President Clinton's attendance at the V-E Day celebration in Moscow aroused ambivalent emotions. No doubt Soviet sacrifices contributed decisively to victory over the Nazi dictatorship. But it is also true that the Nazi-Soviet Pact had made the war possible; that Stalin had divided Eastern Europe with Hitler; that he then supplied the Nazi war machine until the Soviet Union was attacked; and that upon victory, he occupied Eastern Europe, launching four decades of Cold War.

The Yeltsin-Ch Clinton summit, moreover, took place at a moment of extraordinary uncertainty in U.S.-Russian relations. There are disagreements over Chechnya, nuclear sales to Iran and NATO expansion—all issues deserving high-level attention. The question remains whether V-E Day celebrations, with the presence of so many other heads of state, was the most auspicious occasion for addressing these controversies. Even more fundamentally, the visit to Moscow reveals the lack of balance in the priorities of the administration's foreign policy.

If any European city deserved to be singled out by America for an Allied remembrance, it was London. Capital of the nation that steadfastly resisted Nazi aggression from the beginning, it became America's most reliable ally, both in the war and in the Cold War that followed. No better occasion is likely to arise to celebrate Great Britain's unique contribution to the cause of freedom or to express America's appreciation for two generations of steadfast cooperation.

That the moment was not seized—even as a stop on the way to Moscow—was no mere oversight. One of the curious attributes of the leaders who grew up during the Vietnam protest movements is that their obsession with transcending the categories of the Cold War impositions them in the debates of the Cold War period. One of their articles of faith seems to be that the Communist (or Soviet) menace was overdrawn, indeed that the Cold War could have been most effectively ended—if it need ever have been waged—by reassuring Russia rather than confronting it.

In that spirit, Deputy Secretary of State Strobel Talmott, the principal architect of Washington's European policy, argued in Time magazine as late as 1990 that the doves had been right all along and that the Soviet Union had never been the threat it had been cracked up to. Western policy had been at best irrelevant when it had not actually delayed the Soviet collapse. Thus Cold War attitudes and institutions, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, needed to change their character.

This indeed has been the rationale behind the administration's Partnership for Peace proposal, which, whatever the rhetoric to the contrary, transforms NATO from an alliance into an instrument of collective security akin to the United Nations, thereby depriving North Atlantic relations of their special character.

While these attitudes are not uniformly held throughout the administration, they are sufficiently powerful to explain the solicitude shown to Yeltsin's personality and Moscow's sensitivities compared with the tone deafness exhibited toward West European—and especially British—concerns. Washington-Moscow relations are treated as the keystone of America's Europe, if not global, policy.

A good illustration is the administration's attitude toward NATO expansion. Senior officials have claimed that the issue is when to expand NATO, not whether to. They have also indicated that they would go along with Yeltsin's request that NATO expansion proceed slowly and that Russia's eventual membership in NATO not be foreclosed.

Briefings prior to Clinton's Moscow trip put the "when" at five years and left open the possibility of a "reformed" Russia joining the alliance. The long hiatus guarantees that the issue of NATO expansion will continue to fester, while Moscow will be encouraged to pressure the NATO allies and the nations of Eastern Europe. At the same time, there is not one of Russia's western neighbors seeking to join NATO that would not regard offering Russia membership as the wolf's being asked to guard the lambs.

So long as the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance is not given anything like the priority the administration attaches to placating Moscow, Russia will find ways to avoid the key challenge presented to it by the collapse of its empire: whether it can be satisfied to live as a normal state within

## Overly solicitous of Moscow, tone-deaf to Western Europe.

non-imperial borders—even though it comprises 11 time zones and huge resources. A country of such size and possessing some 20,000 nuclear weapons should not need additional territory to feel secure. A Russia that abandons imperial pretensions would soon deflect concerns from the field of security to political and economic cooperation, for example the European security conference or the G-7.

From this point of view, how much better it would have been for Clinton to stop in London—even on the way to Moscow—and use the occasion of its V-E Day celebration to outline a new vision of the North Atlantic relationship, something his administration has so far refused to do.

A new initiative is needed above all to restore a sense of direction to American foreign policy. It has become axiomatic that the next phase of international relations will be shaped by a limited number of power centers: the United States, Europe, Russia, Japan, China and possibly India and Brazil. Theoretically it is possible for the United States to conduct its policy purely on the basis of national interest, not unlike what Great Britain in the 19th century termed the policy of "splendid isolation." This would require a careful assessment of rewards and penalties for each region of the world and a balancing of them to produce actions most compatible with America's national interest. In the abstract, such a policy should be tenable because, on the face of it, all the major actors enumerated above have greater conflicts with each other than with the United States.

But in fact the United States lacks a tradition of a foreign policy based entirely on the national interest. There is little bureaucratic skill in so cold-bloodedly equilibrating rewards and penalties on a global basis. A country founded by peoples who had turned their backs on inherited tradition and who believed in the universal application of the values of their society cannot simply abandon the Wilsonianism that has dominated 20th-century American foreign policy.

Though I believe the time has come for America to develop a concept of the national interest and apply it in a balance-of-power context, this will work only if we reduce the regions for this kind of foreign policy as much as possible and extend the areas where a more cooperative—even Wilsonian—approach is feasible.

Russia is as yet too inchoate and unformed to function as the anchor of American foreign policy. The two regions where moral consensus can undergird cooperative relationships are the Western Hemisphere and the North Atlantic ar-

(over)

ea. In both, the key countries have, to all practical purposes, forsworn the use of force in their relations with each other. In each, institutions already exist capable of serving as building blocks of a cooperative world order: NAFTA and Merchosur in the Western Hemisphere, NATO and the European Union in the Atlantic region. But while the Clinton administration has put forward an imaginative vision for the Western Hemisphere, it has failed to do so for the North Atlantic area, in part because of the intellectual legacy described earlier.

Unless America assumes a real leadership role, the nations bordering the North Atlantic will gradually drift apart. America will become increasingly marginalized; the two sides of the Atlantic will grow more conscious of their rivalries than of their common purposes.

I strongly favor NATO expansion. The current policy of carrying water on both shoulders, of hinting at expansion to Western and Central Europe while trying to placate Russia with prospects of a protracted delay—of which the Moscow summit is a prime example—is likely to accelerate the disintegration of Western unity without reassuring Russia. NATO expansion requires a decision, not a study.

Nevertheless, by itself it will not create a new sense of Atlantic community. Security can no longer be the principal unifying bond of the Atlantic nations because, fortunately, there no longer exists a unifying threat. Common purposes, not common fears, must provide the cohesion in the new era in which economic and social issues are becoming dominant.

The time has come to put into effect a North Atlantic Free Trade Area for manufactured goods and services, with negotiations regarding agriculture to follow. Such a grouping would accelerate the movement toward the principle of free trade to which the members of the World Trade Organization have committed themselves. In the meantime, it would foster cooperation among the nations of the North Atlantic. In a world with massive growth in Asia, with ethnic conflicts and religious fundamentalism, the Western democracies cannot afford their historical proclivities to national or regional rivalries.

The conditions are propitious. Labor standards and wage scales on the two sides of the Atlantic and environmental concerns are comparable. Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of Germany have expressed their interest in such a project. A major American initiative would be received as was Gen. George Marshall's speech for European recovery and would almost surely produce a creative response.

In time, NAFTA and the North Atlantic Free Trade Area could be merged, and new consultative machinery in the political and social fields could emerge between the Western Hemisphere and the European Union. As Russia's economy develops and its policy becomes more national, associate membership for it in such a free trade area would be a distinct possibility—much more so than in NATO.

America should return as quickly as possible to what it has traditionally done best: to put forward its vision for how the nations of the North Atlantic can create a new world worthy of their democratic principles.

©1995, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

3.

Lecture for the Norwegian
Atlantic Committee
in Memory of Johan
Jørgen Holst
Friday, Jan. 13, 1995

LUX

Russia

Now let me say a few words about Russia. The history of Russia is an important part of the history of Europe. But the history of Europe does not exhaust the history of Russia. Russia is out of scale as far as the European countries are concerned. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. There is no nation in Europe of such dimensions. Russia includes Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Historically, Russian foreign policy has been equally of a scale unique unto itself. Now it is true that Russia has been invaded twice (or, if you include the Crimean War, three times) from Europe. It is also true that, if you look at history since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has fought more wars than any other country and against more of its neighbours, in the process acquiring more and more territory. And it did not acquire this territory by plebicite.

Thus Russia is presently living within borders unprecedented since the early 18th century. Yet many in the West think that the spread of democracy and market economics in Russia will "automatically produce a peaceful world. For that was the essence of the Wilsonian dream. Indeed, an American scholar wrote a text only three or four years ago called The End of History in which he professed that the spread of market economics and democracy had caused foreign policy to come to an end and that all history would henceforth consist of domestic economics. That sort of attitude tempted all the Western nations to identify foreign policy with the (still current) preoccupation with Russian domestic politics. It has moreover led, first to the view that Gorbachev was essential for peace and, subsequently, to the view that Yeltsin is essential for peace, together with a temptation to try to identify groups in Russia that we ought to back and encourage.

I believe this to be a grave mistake. The internal evolution of Russia is a Russian problem. We can encourage reform by economic assistance where that assistance genuinely brings about change. But we can not identify personally with Russian leaders or approach that country's historic evolution on the basis of our domestic preferences primarily. What we need to do is to identify the foreign policy problems that Russia creates as well as the foreign policy opportunities which cooperation with Russia can provide.

Historically, Russia has had a curious attitude towards foreign policy: in those issues beyond the reach of the Russian armies, or beyond the capabilities of the Russian armies, Russia conducted typically European policies in its international affairs. In other issues - Central Asia, the Far East, the Balkans - that is, areas where there was no balance of power - were the responsibility of the so-called Asiatic Department. There Russia refused to submit its policies to European or international conferences and acted unilaterally, just as we have been witnessing lately in Chechenya. This was true even in the post-World War II period when the Soviet Union would not discuss Eastern Europe as an international problem but simply occupied it, thus creating an altogether new geopolitical reality.

Russia

From the Russian point of view, one can argue that the tragedies of Russia were caused by overextension. Having so many foreign peoples under its rule imposed on Russia the requirement of maintaining an army much larger than any required by other European states. But, thereby, Russia also frightened its neighbours. And a seemingly endless expansionism ensued that had no specific goal other than eliminating vacuums.

I would therefore argue that there are two necessities in foreign policy: first, to discourage Russian military activities beyond its borders. A country of the vastness that I have described, larger than the United States and with huge resources, should not feel claustrophobic in the vast region between St. Petersburg and Vladivostok. Secondly, Russia must be given an honest opportunity to participate - as an equal - in the resolution of international problems. These seem to me the primary requirements of foreign policy, nor do they bring with them the necessity of dealing with Russia's internal problems as if they were our own or those of the world community.

Now what does all this signify for Eastern Europe? I believe that the most dangerous situation there would be to permit a vacuum to arise between the Eastern border of Germany and the Western border of Russia, threatening as it does stability in both directions. For it would oblige Germany over a period of time to try to take care of its security east of the Oder by its own national means. (One can not expect Germany to sit by and wait until a threat emerges fifty miles or so from its borders.) Such a vacuum would also tempt Russia to try to recreate Finnish conditions among its former satellites. And I say this as somebody who greatly admires Finland's heroic capacity for achieving independence.

Nevertheless, the temptation will be there for Russia to seek to influence the domestic situations of its neighbours. Therefore I believe that the countries of that region should be encouraged and permitted to join the European Union. I also think that the key countries should be invited or permitted to join NATO as soon as possible. I realize that many people out there would say that this will make things difficult but I would argue that a vacuum will make things even more difficult. Now I know this to be an issue that is being studied, and I know there is a standard phrase to the effect that the issue is not whether, but when. To this, my response is that it is not a problem for study but a problem that requires some decisions. Statesmen should not ask rhetorical questions; they should answer them. And these questions we can answer as soon as we want to. Hence every effort should be made, first, to reassure ourselves against, however absurd it may seem, the danger of a military invasion over land. Indeed, one could accept a German arrangement whereby no foreign troops are moved beyond the pre-unification dividing line in Europe.

Lecture for the Norwegian
Atlantic Committee
In memory of Johan
Jørgen Holst
Friday, Jan. 13, 1995

Secondly, Russia should be given every opportunity to participate on an equal basis in the resolution of international problems. If Russia in fact develops into a Western-style democracy and is, for the first time in its history, concerned above all with domestic development, then the NATO countries would surely be jubilant. There is no sense in an anti-Russian foreign policy. Quite the contrary. But the fundamental question, at least from an American point of view, is whether we can develop a new set of purposes among Europe -- Western and Central Europe -- and the United States. I do not believe it is possible to use NATO as an institution in which military representatives from all over the former Soviet Union show up in Brussels twice a year because Uzbekistan and Belgium are not likely to unite on any common program. But I do think the basic members of NATO have to decide what they mean by political cooperation, how they can exchange their views in a meaningful manner, and what their limits and attitudes are towards various countries.

The history of Russia is extraordinarily complex. It has interacted with Europe certainly since the 18th century, but it has also had interests in Asia, the Middle East, and at the borders of India that had nothing to do with Europe. In fact, Russia has been historically torn equally by the requirements of Europe and by the temptations of Asia. It is significant that, in the 19th century, Russian foreign policy was conducted by two departments: the Foreign Ministry, which dealt with Europe and which practiced more or less the balance of power; and the Asiatic Department, which included everything in Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Thus every area in which Russia could make territorial gains was under the Asiatic Department, which preferred to operate unilaterally and not by the rules of European diplomacy.

Russian policy today is viewed by many in the West as the equivalent of bringing
democracy to Russia; and that that will automatically solve the Russian problem.
But bringing democracy to Russia must inevitably take place against a different

backdrop than in the West. Church and State were always united in Russia. There was no Reformation, no Enlightenment, no capitalism, and there were no democratic institutions or national state; the Russian state has been an empire through most of its history, and its current crisis is not only due to the collapse of communism but to the collapse of imperialism. So I would argue that the problem of Russian's foreign policy is that it must learn, for the first time in its history, that expansionism does not produce security, and that to develop the resources of a country with eleven time zones ought not to produce claustrophobia.

In this interim period we should be receptive to Russia and cooperate with it, but it cannot as yet be an institutional part of Europe. Thus the issue of NATO expansion should be settled quickly; endless debate over it will only create needless tensions. But there is a second problem, which is the relationship of Europe to the United States.

SPEAKER:

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1995

But we also have to keep in mind that imperial Russia, whether Tsarist or Communist, has often been a menace to its neighbors. The independence of Ukraine is, for that reason, a key to European stability. With respect to other former republics of the Soviet Union and central Asia, we may have many common objectives -- especially with respect to resurgent Islam - provided they are recognized as independent nations and provided it does not become a normal feature of the international scene that Russian armies should be on the territory of member states of the United Nations who have not invited them but simply because they are there as remnants of the Soviet Union. Those seem to me the preconditions for good relations with Russia, and those are the conceptual issues at the heart of the current debate.

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Now, in a general sense, our foreign policy objective with Russia should be to induce Russia to stay within the borders accepted internationally. And if one considers that St. Petersburg is closer to New York than to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than to Moscow, they should not feel claustrophobic in staying in that territory.

In fact, as you pointed out, Senator, there are Russian troops on the territory of almost every former Republic. The civil wars are fo-mented or encouraged by these troops that distribute arms in order

to keep them going in Azerbaijan, in Georgia, and almost every-
where in the former Soviet Union.

This has not been opposed internationally. It is unprecedented
that a nation keeps its troops on foreign territory to that extent.
We cannot use military force to resist it. But I think it is important
for Russia—George Kennan once said that the czarist empire col-
lapsed because of overextension.

I believe, in the long run, one is doing Russia a favor by encour-
aging it, for the first time in its history, to stay at home and to de-
velop its own resources. On that basis, there is no possible area of
conflict between us and Russia.

GEIST: Germany is always tempted to say, ''We are the bridge between East and West.''

KISSINGER: Many Germans think this. I believe that Germany should build an Atlantic association and a European association. Within those, it should always advocate friendly relations with Russia.<

But the real problem of Russia is: Can Russia stay within its national borders? If we have a buffer area -- Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and so forth -- in which the Russian influence will be great and probably greater than ours -- but in which there is no Russian strategic deployment -- then Europe will be free of that danger. Europe would not have to arm against Russia so much. Then one could emphasize the political component of cooperation with Russia. This should be the German role. There are not that many German statesmen who I can imagine doing it. (Chancellor Helmut Kohl will do it.)

There are three questions: Where does Europe begin and where does it end? What is the relationship of Europe to America? What can Europe and America do together?

I believe that Europe must include most of the former Soviet satellites. I can imagine that Romania and Bulgaria might want to stay out, countries that were Russian Orthodox and had historical ties to Russia, but certainly Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia should be an organic part of Europe.<

It should be a two-tiered Europe, with a core Europe that moves faster toward integration than the rest. This core

should be France, Germany, the Low Countries, possibly Italy. I would be open to having Great Britain in it, but I think they will not want to be part of it. The core Europe should be more advanced in its internal organization than the rest of Europe.<

KISSINGER: I think they believe, as in fact some Germans believe, that salvation is in Russia. You make Russia democratic and market-oriented and it will suddenly become a normal international state. You cannot make Russia democratic from the outside. And what is a normal international state? Russian foreign policy for 400 years has followed a certain pattern. Can they change it completely? Not really, because it's dictated by geography. It's dictated by national convictions. I do not know a single Russian who accepts the independence of the Ukraine.<

Russia is part of Europe, but it's also different from Europe. It's a huge country. It has interests in Asia and the Middle East. I would not say that America should be part of Europe, because we have too many different interests, and I don't think Russia should be part of Europe. We can be friends with Europe. And the Russians should be friends with Europe. GEIST: One more question about Germany. Should Germany take part in out-of-area missions of NATO?<

KISSINGER: Absolutely. In military missions, I would keep in mind the impact of Germany. In the Gulf War, I would have had no problem. In Bosnia I would have big problem. But we Americans have to be compassionate about this.<

(c) 1994, Los Angeles Times Syndicate<

LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS

SPEAKER:

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1995

Asia is in many ways the most difficult problem for America because it is an almost classic 19th Century European situation. There are major countries which consider themselves competitive with each other not only economically but also strategically, which do not have a sense of community in the way the Europeans do, and which direct their policies in part against each other. America is in fact in a strong position vis-a-vis Asia because it has better relations with each of its players than they have with each other. So we should be able to achieve an equilibrium provided we understand this to be our objective.

Of course, we have sometimes made it difficult for ourselves to have better relations with each of them. There were some great moments when we were assaulting China and Japan simultaneously, first in human rights and then in the name of an equal playing field. This is the hard way of conducting Asian foreign policy since one of its basic axioms should be never to confront both at the same time. But if one agrees with that proposition, as I

basically do, one also has to admit that we have no great natural talent in conducting that sort of foreign policy, even though I believe that Asian relations and Korean relations cannot be understood except in such an analysis.

4

Moreover, all of them are emerging into a new set of national attitudes. During the Cold War, Japan could nestle under the American security guarantee because there was only one plausible strategic threat. In the period ahead of us, almost any foreseeable Japanese leader may well discover that with respect to many of the issues of Northeast Asia, Japan has at least shades of difference with the United States. And I therefore consider it highly likely that Japan will play a more assertive, more autonomous, and more self-reliant role. This is not, in itself, against the American interest. But it means that the single focus of our discussion with Japan has to be broadened from trade to political, strategic, and general issues of world order, which is not an easy assignment given the cultural differences between our two countries and the different way we conceive of the role of dialogue.

Anybody who has visited China must be struck by the extraordinary, almost unbelievable, economic change that has taken place in that country. Any comparison between China a decade ago and today—a country that has grown at an average rate of over 10 percent for over a decade—indicates that China will emerge as per-

haps the most powerful country in Asia over a 30-year period, and a country of growing significance economically, politically, and strategically. Many of the discussions about Chinese internal practices will be importantly altered by the very pace of industrialization, because while industrialization may not guarantee democracy, it does require as an initial step constitutionalism, a legal framework that can be expected and to which people, foreigners and domestically, can gear themselves.

For the United States, it is very difficult to imagine that we can play the decisive role in Asian stability that is achievable without constructive relations with the People's Republic of China. We are entitled to have our own view as to appropriate domestic practices, and the Chinese have dealt, in the 5000 years of their recorded history, with enough foreigners to know that they have to take account of strongly held convictions. But what we cannot do is to make one issue the single test of our relationship. And what we must do in a positive sense is to find a means for a dialogue with China on a continuing basis about the relationship between the key elements in Asia.

We have all been concerned in recent months with the situation on the Korean Peninsula and we have a number of problems. The most important, the most immediate, is the nuclear issue. The longer-term problem is the relationship of South and North Korea to each other. And the third which rarely gets talked about is the attitude of the surrounding countries to the future of Korea. Let me take the last one first.

Remarks by Henry Kissinger
B.C. Lee Lecture
Four Seasons Hotel

February 1, 1995

But in Asia, we are dealing with nations that in no sense consider themselves part of a single community. In Asia, we are dealing with societies each of which is in a process of fundamental transformation determined to an extraordinary extent by national and cultural characteristics. It may be possible to speak of an Asia-Pacific Community in the economic sense but, politically, the relationships of Japan, China, Korea, and Asian Russia to each other as well as the relationship of all these nations toward Southeast Asia is not defined primarily by a sense of living in a community. Many of them have closer relationships with the United States than they have with each other. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has affected all of us in very special ways.

February 1, 1995

In conclusion, what does all this mean for the United States? If you ask the nations I have mentioned to list their principal security threat, not one of them would name the United States. Not one. Each of them would refer to some other country of the region. The United States is an Asian power for a unique reason. It is the only major power that not only can afford to but has an obligation

to have friendly relations with all of the nations of Asia. It is the only power that can conduct simultaneous dialogue with China, Japan, and both Koreas and maintain a position in Southeast Asia.

So, in this sense, what goes on in Asia affects our perception of international affairs in general. One often hears that this sort of analysis is now outdated and that we should emphasize the environment, population issues, and drug abuse. Those of you who know Asia should ask yourselves this: if this were the only thing we could talk about, how would we handle what I have described in geopolitical terms? Yes, these are issues with some consequence and, in the decades ahead, they will undoubtedly become of still greater consequence. But, what is immediately required is to contribute to a structure of relationships in vital and crucial regions of Asia.

Four Seasons Hotel
February 1, 1995

Our relations with China, too, suffer from cultural shock. In China most provinces have a population larger than the largest European country. And if you ask a Chinese to date something, he will mention a dynasty whereas a Westerner would give you a date. But most dynasties have lasted longer than the entire history of the United States, which inevitably produces a difference in time perspective.

What China has wanted from the beginning of our dialogue in 1971 was to have a strategic relationship in the widest sense. They seek an understanding of our perception of the evolution that was going to take place in Asia and preferably in the world, and then to see whether we could come to an agreement - not in the way allies do, but in some fashion leading to a framework to enable us to comprehend their actions.

Having the longest uninterrupted history of any nation of the world, the Chinese have been obliged to deal with many idiosyncrasies, so I think the Chinese can understand, even if they don't agree, that we should have certain moral preferences which need to be taken into account, and that indeed we have every right and indeed need to make those clear. But the key issue in our relationship is how we can bring our various priorities into a relationship to each other that enables us to act on behalf of our mutual interests and in as coordinated a way as circumstances allow. I believe that in Asia stability requires a major effort of understanding between the United States and China and therefore, I have opposed efforts to sanction China even on issues where I have agreed with the objectives of those who recommend the sanctions. It is extraordinarily important the United States and China find a way toward a serious political dialogue which, at this moment, is not taking place adequately.

3.

Let me begin with Japan. Some Americans have the tendency to believe that all of history works automatically toward our preferred institutions and that conversion to these is the ultimate goal of foreign policy. Therefore, we had the conviction that, after its defeat in World War II, Japan would evolve into a society very similar to ours. In Japan, we thought we saw a permanent feature of the post-war international scene. But that could not be the case. Under the shock of defeat, Japan gave its priority to economics. After the trauma of World War II, it was natural for a country defeated for the first time in its history to attempt to emulate some of the methods of the victor. It was also the quickest way toward recovery. Moreover, with only one clear-cut enemy, the Soviet Union, strategic objectives of the United States and Japan were bound to run parallel.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new generation in Japan, it seems inevitable that Japanese foreign policy will take a more national turn. It is inherent in the politics of the region and accelerated by the single-focus approach of American foreign policy that has produced one trade crisis after another. To maintain the alliance, which is desirable, requires restoring political dialogue. Yet when it comes to Japanese culture, producing dialogues of any kind is not exactly an easy assignment. The Japanese communicate by creating a mood. We communicate by asking direct questions. When a Japanese Prime Minister says "yes," it only means that he has understood what has been said, not that he is going to do it. Conceptual discussions of strategic and political issues therefore do not come easily with the Japanese.

And yet the Japanese-American relationship will not prosper unless it is broadened beyond trade issues. Some common conception of the political evolution of at least Northeast Asia and probably all of Asia is needed. That dialogue remains yet to be conducted, and really needs to be conducted - not only on the governmental level, perhaps not even primarily on the governmental level, but in the many institutions that were so important in establishing some sort of common approach with the West European nations during the period of the Cold War.

Security alone is no longer sufficient to tie the two sides of the Atlantic together. We shouldn't conduct the NATO discussion entirely in terms of whether Russia is or is not a danger. History will determine that. What we do need is the moral equivalent of what was done in the late 1940s; some construction that corresponds to the necessities of the democracies working together on the industrial side. On both sides of the Atlantic, wage scales are more or less equivalent and social services comparable. Competition therefore depends on merit. There is no need for protectionism based on huge inequalities of social, environmental, and economic conditions. For these reasons, I think we should move towards the construction of such institutions.

TAFTA

5

THE SPANISH INSTITUTE

THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN-SPANISH AFFAIRS

684 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, NY 10021 • TEL: (212) 628-0420 • FAX: (212) 734-4177

June 21, 1995

Dr. and Mrs. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue, 26th floor
New York NY 10022

Dear Henry and Nancy:

We would like to invite you to join us as Co-Chairmen for the Gold Medal Gala of The Spanish Institute which will take place on Wednesday, November 29, in the presence of H.R.H. The Infanta Doña Pilar de Borbón, Duchess of Badajoz. We are asking a few prominent friends of The Institute to serve as Co-Chairmen of this event. David and Peggy Rockefeller have already accepted to serve.

As you are well aware, The Spanish Institute, an American, not-for-profit cultural and public affairs institution, annually presents its Gold Medals to two outstanding individuals, an American and a Spaniard, in recognition of their contribution to the betterment of relations between Spain, the United States and the Spanish speaking world.

We are pleased to honor this year Mr. John McGillicuddy, former Chairman and C.E.O. of Manufacturers Hanover Trust, one of the first and most important American banks to do business in Spain in the 1950's, and Mr. Ignacio Gómez-Acebo, partner of Gómez-Acebo y Pombo, a prominent international lawyer who has strong business and cultural ties with the United States.

The Gold Medal Gala is the main fund-raising event organized by The Institute. The proceeds help to assure the continuation and growth of our educational and cultural programs. Your generosity over the past years is greatly appreciated.

Your participation is most important to us and on behalf of the Board of the Institute, we very much hope that you will accept and will be able to attend the dinner and support The Spanish Institute by becoming a Golden Benefactor or a Benefactor to honor John McGillicuddy and Ignacio Gómez-Acebo.

I look forward to your response.

Fernando Aleu, M.D.
Chairman

Inmaculada de Habsburgo
President

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NOTE TO EDITOR: Please use this revised version of the KISSINGER column sent to you earlier.

CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.

### HENRY KISSINGER -- REVISED

For release Sunday, June 11, 1995

IN BOSNIA, FOR WHAT GOAL IS U.S. INVOLVEMENT WORTH THE PRICE?

By Henry A. Kissinger

(c) 1995, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

The crisis triggered by the taking of hostages in Bosnia may yet serve a useful purpose if it leads, at last, to a realization that Western policy has been adrift, proclaiming objectives whose cost it has been unwilling to bear and strategies for which it had no plausible end game. Mistakes of two U.S. Administrations and European evasions have landed the democracies in a situation that leaves them with only a choice among evils. The beginning of wisdom is to define these choices.

### THE HOSTAGE ISSUE

Direct U.S. support for its allies on this issue is morally and practically the least complex option. American recommendations over many months to escalate air strikes put the U.N. forces at risk in the first place -- a recommendation that does not seem to have been accompanied by planning for an all-too-likely Serbian retaliation. More importantly, if Bosnian Serbs achieve any gains, hostage-taking, which has mercifully abated in the Middle East and elsewhere, will come back into vogue. The United States has a significant interest in achieving the unconditional release of the hostages, including direct assistance to our allies in any rescue attempt.

### ASSIST NATO ALLIES

It is high time that a country that excludes the use of its own ground forces stops blaming allies who have committed more than 10,000 troops and suffered more than 100 casualties. Conventional wisdom to the contrary, the threat to Europe from the war in Bosnia is no greater than it is to the United States: Neither is in danger unless the war escalates; both are in peril in the unlikely event that the conflict becomes general. America's pledge to help extricate the forces that are also fighting our battle must be redeemed.

At the same time, the plan to use ground forces to reposition allied forces was mercifully abandoned -- after the loss of one airplane -- before its combination of frivolity and irrelevance could do more harm. The idea that American forces should escort allies to new combat positions only to leave them there to the tender mercies of the contestants was as dangerous to the cohesion of the alliance as it was on the ground.

### RESISTING AGGRESSION

This goal raises four questions:

(1) Does the United States have a vital interest in resisting

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aggression wherever it occurs?

(2) Should such resistance always include the use of American force?

(3) If the answer to that question is in the negative, is Bosnia a case where U.S. forces should be used?

(4) Is it appropriate to treat Bosnia as a pure instance of aggression in the first place?

Surely the United States has an interest in a lawful world order. And, in principle, it should oppose the use of force. But unless it makes itself the world's policeman, it cannot employ its military power regardless of the relevance of the issues to American interests. It was precisely the inability to differentiate threats to Europe from threats to Southeast Asia that produced the Vietnam tragedy.

A serious analysis of American foreign policy must therefore differentiate among three levels of military challenges: those that affect American interests so directly that they must be resisted alone, if necessary; those that should be resisted only if a coalition can be formed, and those that do not warrant risking American lives.

In my view, Bosnia does not meet the first two criteria. Indeed, it is questionable whether the conventional meaning of aggression applies to Bosnia at all.

There are few regions in which exhortation to peaceful change rings more hollow than in the Balkans where, historically, all border changes have resulted from force or the threat of force. In essence, the Bosnian war is the continuation of a centuries-old conflict between religions, Muslim conquerors and Serb and Croat subjects, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbian nationalists. There has never been a Bosnian nation; there exists no identifiable Bosnian culture or language. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the no man's land between all the Balkan passions and conflicts, as is reflected in its ethnic composition -- 30-35 percent Serbian, 25 percent Croatian and 40-45 percent Muslim. The ethnic balance is all the more precarious as the Muslims are considered turncoats, being former Serbs or Croats who assimilated into their conquerors during the five centuries of Turkish occupation -- a fact not conducive to a willingness to accept Muslim dominance in a unitary Bosnian state.

The Bush Administration erred grievously in recognizing Bosnia as a sovereign state. While Croatia and Slovenia met most of the criteria of historic European nation states, Bosnia met very few. For the various ethnic groups, the allocation of power was the continuation of an ancient feud, hence some kind of U.N., NATO or European trusteeship should have sought to create an acceptable federal structure or partition. Every international mediator has come to the same conclusion.

Outside powers must recognize that they are dealing with an ethnic and not a primarily international conflict. Outside powers seeking to impose a solution must be prepared to stay for a long time on the ground to enforce whatever they impose, and understand that the Serbs, Croats and Muslims will still be there with their mutual hatreds after the outside powers tire of their exertions --

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even if a temporary settlement is reached. Thus the more the United States and its allies seek to modify the status quo, the larger must be their military commitment and the longer they must be prepared to stay. Recommendations that ignore this reality are empty posturing.

Imposing a cease-fire along existing or slightly modified lines is the easiest of the options vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs but the most difficult in relation to the Muslims and Croats. Enforcing a retreat on the Serbs will become increasingly costly the further back they are pushed, with the added complication that the Muslims and Croats will not be satisfied with any partial outcome. Thus America and its allies could fall under fire -- politically and perhaps militarily -- from all the parties. (The Muslim president has already stated that he accepted the 51-49 split proposed by the United Nations only because he was certain the Serbs would reject it -- in other words, he considered even an addition of some 30 percent to the territory he now controls as unsatisfactory.) Given these realities, the Administration may come to regret -- or choose to reconsider -- its offer of American ground troops to police the settlement.

THE MORAL ISSUE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

This is usually expressed as the need to punish the Bosnian Serbs for their egregious ethnic cleansing and other barbarities. Though it is difficult, if not impossible, to think of any war fought to stop human rights abuses, for a nation with America's moral convictions, resisting inhumanity could well be turned into a plausible military commitment. Indeed, in the early stages of the conflict, it might well have been the most effective way to end the conflagration because it was independent of the territorial or political issues.

I remember a private lunch in September 1991 with the British Ambassador, Sir Robin Renwick, during which we agreed that the war would surely escalate and perhaps become uncontrollable if NATO did not stop the shelling of Dubrovnik and Zagreb. Since then, so many atrocities have been committed by all sides, and continue to be committed by whichever side is advancing, that punishing human rights violations would impose the necessity of punishing all the combatants practically all the time.

In short, the current American policy dilemma cannot be resolved until the Administration establishes a calculus between its goals and the costs it is willing to incur. President Clinton came into office having accused his predecessor of weakness in the face of Serbian aggression. This caused him to reject the Vance-Owen plan, which might have formed the basis of a settlement so long as the Bosnian Serbs were still afraid of the new Administration. As unwilling to run risks as it was to articulate more modest objectives, the Administration subsided into sullen dawdling while the continuing Serbian advance left the Muslims with much less territory than was envisaged in the Vance-Owen plan.

The half-measures adopted made a crisis inevitable. The urban Muslim population was to some extent protected by Western air power while, in the countryside, the battle raged, lately with Croatian and Bosnian military forces trying to retake territory occupied by

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PAGE 4

the Serbs, and the Bosnian Serbs shelling the vulnerable enclaves. At the end of this process, NATO forces under the command of the United Nations became hostages rather than peacemakers.

I have sympathy for Sen. Robert Dole's (R-Kan.) proposal to lift the arms embargo and to undertake massive air support for the rearmed Muslim, and presumably Croat, forces. No doubt the arms embargo has unjustly penalized the victim of aggression. At the same time, there are no free lunches in foreign policy, certainly not in Balkan wars. And any proposal to lift the arms embargo must deal with the near-certainty that it will trigger a major Serbian offensive before their adversaries' level of armaments is fully operational.

Since France and Britain have insisted that they would withdraw under those circumstances, such a course must imply an American readiness to fill the gap if it is not to make matters worse. If the assumptions about the combination of lifting the arms embargo and U.S. air support prove too optimistic, American ground forces will surely be called for. In such a conflict, Russia will undoubtedly help Serbia. I yield to no one in my readiness to face down Russia, for example on the issue of NATO expansion. But I have grave doubts about courting a confrontation over a matter peripheral to vital American interests.

A number of conclusions follows:

(1) To restore some credibility and political coherence, the absurd arrangement in which U.N. and NATO commands exist side by side must be ended. The United Nations must subcontract, as it were, to NATO or to a multinational force as suggested by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

(2) The United States should encourage Britain and France to reconfigure their forces into more defensible positions and buttress them with American air power.

(3) The United States and its allies must insist on the unconditional release of all hostages without any negotiations.

(4) The United States and its allies should urge an extended cease-fire after all the hostages are released, including an end to Serbian shelling and blockades as well as Muslim attempts to gain territory.

(5) During the cease-fire, a major effort should be made to negotiate a settlement. Such a settlement may be attainable due to pressures from a reconfigured NATO force, American air power, the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force and the pressures for lifting of the embargo.

(6) Realistically, the attainable solution will be somewhere between the U.N.-proposed 51-49 split and the present cease-fire line. The fact must be faced that no major country will endure a prolonged ground war on behalf of the percentages now in dispute.

(7) If a cease-fire is unattainable due to the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to accept or to honor it, the moment of truth will have arrived. The only recourse then will be to lift the arms embargo and to inhibit a Serb offensive by massive U.S. air strikes. Tactically, it will probably prove least incendiary if the embargo is lifted by relaxing its enforcement rather than by making a formal announcement.

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(8) Both the escalation and the American commitment will have to be increased if Britain and France withdraw, as they have repeatedly stated they will. Then, U.S. ground involvement may well become necessary. However, such a course can be adopted only if the United States -- President, Congress and public acting together -- is prepared to stick it out in the face of casualties, prisoners, hostages and Russian opposition.

If the United States is not prepared to run these risks, it must cool its rhetoric and settle for what is attainable -- which is the inevitable fate of those whose readiness to sacrifice does not match the passions of the parties. The worst outcome would be to slide into a confrontation that we would then abandon.

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A NATIONAL POLICY CONFERENCE

LUNCHEON KEYNOTE ADDRESS

SPEAKER:

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1995

So the issue is not freedom of maneuver with respect to the U.N. but whether the American interest and the general interest can be reconciled in the minds of the American people. And if that cannot be done, it simply cannot be expected that the American people will agree to sacrifices which are declared not to be in the national interest and only in the interest of the United Nations. This is the issue that seems to me to have been at the heart of the debate yesterday between Senator Dole and President Clinton. And it

cannot be ended by deferring to executive prerogative, whatever one thinks of this or that specific proposal which has originated in the conference.

If we could have had our own way, we would probably have preferred the original ABM program which we put forward, which was not so much aimed at the Soviet Union—although it would have raised the threshold even for Soviet Union—but would have made it much more difficult for third countries to attack the United States.

As the years went on, I became intellectually more and more dubious about the theory of mutual vulnerability, even under the conditions of the Cold War. It seemed to me unprecedented that a nation would say it would expose its entire population, when there was some means of protecting it, as a guarantee of peace. It has never been done before.

And while it was never easy to demonstrate that a perfect defense was possible, it was possible to demonstrate that the level—the entrance prize for attacking the United States could be raised. And that if, say, at that time, the Soviet Union had to calculate that to attack two American cities it had to launch 2,000 warheads, that was a different calculation than from just launching two warheads.

So I had become quite favorable to the SDI.

Now, in the present world, first of all, I believe that those of our allies who have the technological capability will build a missile defense for their own territories, and I believe that to be generally in our interest.

In a world in which nuclear weapons are likely to spread, however reluctant we are to see this, I believe that a minimum provision for the territorial defense of the United States is necessary so that we can raise the standard of our defense as the threat increases.

It simply seems to me something that will not be explicable to the American public of why it was that when there was a technological ability for some defense it was not taken. Now, what that means in relation to specific technologies and the relation of these technologies to specific treaties and how one would go about modifying these treaties, that is a different set of issues.

But I would believe that when conditions have changed so dramatically, one should reconsider even treaties that are 20 years old.

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of Cambodia, it tends to react neuralgically to any
perceived slight to its sovereign rights. Engaging in
actions that China views as an insult to its dignity can
therefore be a costly enterprise, even if the process also
does severe damage to China; in 1950--a year after ending
the exhausting civil war--China entered the Korean War
against the unchallenged American superpower in possession
of a nuclear monopoly; in 1959, it expelled all Russian
advisors at the cost of setting back its economic progress,
even though it had no diplomatic relations with America; in
1979, it "taught Vietnam a lesson," even though its army was
inferior in technology and suffered heavy casualties. If
China perceives that Taiwan is being eliminated, it would
prefer to fight even at the risk of a setback than to be
resist by force
perceived as acquiescing. Beijing and Washington seem now
on a collision course which, if continued, will prove

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alienation of Taiwan was an early stage in the process by
which Imperial Japan sought to dominate China. As China
proved in the Korean War, and in its reaction to the
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, it tends to react
neuralgically to any perceived slight to its perceived sovereign
rights. Engaging in actions that China views as an insult to
its dignity can therefore be a costly enterprise, even if the
process also does severe damage to China: in 1950--a year
after ending the exhausting civil war--China entered the
Korean War against the unchallenged American superpower in
possession of a nuclear monopoly; in 1959, it expelled all
Russian advisors at the cost of setting back its economic
progress for a decade and in the absence of diplomatic
relations with America; in 1979, it "taught Vietnam a lesson,"
even though its army was inferior in technology and suffered
heavy casualties. If China perceives that Washington is

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56

believe in the analogy, and I warn against playing chicken
with the fate of nations. I believe there must be a moratorium
on further unilateral steps in Washington by both the Congress
and the Executive Branch and an end to invective from
Beijing and pressures from Taiwan to permit a calm
reassessment.

On the verge of producing a reversal of the policies pursued by six presidents which have contributed to peace and stability in Asia, all parties should step back from the brink before it is too late and irreparable damage is done.

Specifically:

-- The Administration should at last define what it understands by the "one China" policy, proclaimed by six Presidents for 23 years and three formal agreements, as the prelude to resuming the political dialogue with Beijing.

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57

-- The Congress should stop ad hoc measures and work for a joint course with the Administration.

-- Taiwan should think again before pressing America on a course that, in the end, may isolate Taiwan totally and force it to take the blame for consequences some of its backers apparently do not foresee.

-- Beijing should end its invective and take seriously issues about which Americans feel deeply, such as the fate of Harry Wu, as a prelude to resumed negotiations with Washington.

-- The principle to be maintained is that the interests of China the Taiwan people should have peaceful negotiations between the Chinese parties.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I have attempted to describe the overall condition of American foreign policy, as well as two major problem areas.

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22

traditional alliances and its preference for multilateralism.

This is why the key issue has been fudged: how to define the Europe to which America should relate itself--especially over the issue of NATO expansion--and what should be Russia's relationship to that Europe. But unless America assumes a real leadership role, the nations bordering the North Atlantic will gradually drift apart; the two sides of the Atlantic will grow more conscious of their rivalries than of their common purposes.

With respect to NATO expansion, the Administration has been reluctant and ambivalent, torn between the alliance policy which it inherited and the multilateralism which it prefers. It is aware of the German distaste for having the border of NATO on the eastern border of Germany and of the pressures of the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to join NATO. But it really

51

appears as the sovereign American right to determine the
entry of visitors. Beijing perceives that American actions-
-starting with the sale of F-16s to Taiwan by President Bush
and accelerated in the present Administration--amount to a
"two China" policy to which six American presidents have
formally forsworn over a period of 25 years. To Beijing, it
is seen as a challenge to the territorial integrity of
China, a challenge to which it is particularly sensitive
because the alienation of Taiwan was an early stage in the
process by which Imperial Japan sought to dominate China. As
China proved in the Korean War and in its reaction to the
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, it tends to react
neuralgically to any perceived slight to its perceived
sovereign rights. Engaging in actions that China views as
an insult to its dignity can therefore be a costly
enterprise, even if the process also does severe damage to
China: in 1950--a year after ending the exhausting civil

[4]

52

war--China entered the Korean War against the unchallenged American superpower in possession of a nuclear monopoly; in 1959, it expelled all Russian advisors at the cost of setting back its economic progress for a decade and in the absence of diplomatic relations with America; in 1979, it "taught Vietnam a lesson," even though its army was inferior in technology and suffered heavy casualties. If China perceives that Washington is promoting a two-China solution, it would probably prefer to resist by force, even at the risk of a setback, than to be perceived as acquiescing.

Beijing and Washington seem now on a collision course which, if continued, will prove extremely costly to both sides and threatening to international stability.

The danger of the existing roller coaster towards confrontation to both China and the United States and to stability and progress in Asia is incalculable. A containment policy toward China under present circumstances

53

is a pipe dream. Unlike the containment policy of a
generation ago, it will have no takers except perhaps
Vietnam, turning the history of the last two decades on its
head. It will force every nation of Asia to take sides with
uncertain outcomes and with a guaranteed enhancement of
Asian nationalism. America's ability to influence Japan
will dramatically decline. Korea may turn into a tinderbox.
Nations with hegemonical aspirations--or even territorial
claims--will sense new opportunities.

China will try to organize the nations of Asia into a
grouping to oppose America--a process whose beginning can
already be noticed. The European nations will eagerly step
into the economic vacuum--a process whose outlines are also
already discernible. The economic damage to America will be
as horrendous as the political one.

To be sure, China may suffer even greater economic
damage, and it is even more vulnerable to unleashed Asian

54

nationalism. But this will prove little consolation in the
midst of the decline in restraints that collapsing
confidence in American leadership will produce. I am aware
that there is a school of thought holding that China will in
the end recoil or perhaps even collapse as the Soviet Union
did. I do not believe in the analogy, and I warn against
playing chicken with the fate of nations. I believe there
must be a moratorium on further unilateral steps in
Washington by both the Congress and the Executive Branch and
an end to invective from Beijing and pressures from Taiwan
to permit a calm reassessment.

55

-- The Administration should at last define what it
understands by the "one China" policy, proclaimed by six
presidents for 23 years and three formal agreements, as the
prelude to resuming the political dialogue with Beijing.

-- The Congress should stop ad hoc measures and seek a
joint course with the Administration.

56

## Conclusion

I have attempted to describe the overall condition of American foreign policy, as well as two major problem areas. I want to conclude with an appeal for bipartisanship. The national interest of the United States does not change every four years; foreign leaders judge our country by its insight and its constancy.

We have as a nation failed this test in recent years. The Administration has not given a conceptual lead and has too often subordinated foreign policy to domestic politics.

The Congress has sought to micromanage foreign policy-a task for which it is not organized.

At the end of the Second World War, it took America four years to develop the policies which saw us through the Cold War. Some of the current controversies are therefore the mechanism by which a free people shapes the vision of

[Y]

57

its future. Let us dedicate ourselves to accomplishing our
task with the same success that shaped the postwar world.
The American people deserve no less.

23

With respect to NATO expansion, the Administration has
been reluctant and ambivalent, torn between the alliance
policy which it inherited and the multilateralism which it
prefers. It is aware of the German distaste for having the
border of NATO on the eastern border of Germany and of the
pressures of the Visigrad countries (Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to join NATO. But it really
is not comfortable with traditional alliances; indeed, some of
its policymakers seem to believe that NATO may have
contributed to causing the Cold War rather than to ending it.
They would like to reverse what they consider the key error
of the Cold War which, in their view, was the exclusion of
Russia from Europe. They seek to build Europe from east to

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under extreme duress, is the implication that America bestows
its cooperation as a special favor without reciprocity to be
withdrawn at will.

But this is precisely what has been happening. At the
moment, Sino-American relations are in a free fall. The
immediate cause has been the granting of a US visa to
President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan - largely for domestic
political reasons. But the issue would not have taken on such
dimension had the visit not been the culmination of a series of
US actions perceived in Beijing as unilateral and high-handed
abrogations of existing agreements over recent years.

Similarly, Chinese actions taken for internal reasons, such as
the detention of Harry Wu, are interpreted in Washington as
deliberate challenges to US human rights concerns.

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The central issues now looming before the two governments are proliferation, human rights and, overshadowing everything else, Taiwan. A general review of post-Cold War foreign policy is not the occasion to go into detail on each of these issues. I will take another occasion to elaborate my views.

But I need to explain why the issue of Taiwan is so fraught with risks. To many Americans, the immediate issue appears as the sovereign American right to determine the entry of visitors. Beijing perceives that American actions--starting with the sale of F-16s to Taiwan by President Bush and accelerated in the present Administration--amount to a "two China" policy to which six American presidents have formally forsworn over a period of 25 years. To Beijing, it is seen as a challenge to the territorial integrity of China, a challenge to which it is particularly sensitive because the

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alienation of Taiwan was an early stage in the process by
which Imperial Japan sought to dominate China. As China
proved in the Korean War and in its reaction to the
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, it tends to react
neuralgically to any perceived slight to its perceived sovereign
rights. Engaging in actions that China views as an insult to
its dignity can therefore be a costly enterprise, even if the
process also does severe damage to China: in 1950--a year
after ending the exhausting civil war--China entered the
Korean War against the unchallenged American superpower in
possession of a nuclear monopoly; in 1959, it expelled all
Russian advisors at the cost of setting back its economic
progress for a decade and in the absence of diplomatic
relations with America; in 1979, it "taught Vietnam a lesson,"
even though its army was inferior in technology and suffered
heavy casualties. If China perceives that Washington is

M