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## Introduction

By Henry A. Kissinger

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in full swing. But this week, the campaign that has mesmerized America for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the opinion poll on talk shows—with their combination of eagerness to please and congenital insecurity—will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

What will remain are the challenges that gave rise to this battle and the responsibility of dealing with them.

And these challenges are formidable. No president has faced an agenda of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to conduct a war with neither from lines nor geographic definition and, at the same time, to rebuild fundamental principles of world order to replace the traditional ones which went up in the smoke of the World Trade Center.

The newly elected president's task is perhaps most analogous to that inherited by President Truman at the end of the Second World War. In 1945, a vacuum had been left in Central Europe and the Soviet Union had emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. Today's principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington. In the 1940s, the solution to the crisis was straightforward, albeit difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe.

surrogates/

occasionally frenzied/

and the Pentagon

was emerging/

while the war had left a vacuum in Central Europe

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rope and an economic program to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of shortages that threatened domestic stability.

The contemporary security challenge arises from two unprecedented sources: terror caused by acts until recently considered a matter from internal police forces rather than international policy; and scientific advances and proliferation that allow the survival of countries to be threatened by developments entirely within another state's territory. Truman could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the Atlantic alliance emerged fulfilled from the Second World War. The newly elected president will have to bring about an effort to define and then maintain

---------- End of column ----------

an international system that reflects the new circumstances.

I supported President Bush during the campaign and hope for his success. But whatever the results, the United States cannot tackle this agenda except in the context of a commitment by all sides to healing partisan wounds. All those concerned with the future of the country must find ways to cooperate so that the world will again see Americans working toward a common destiny. It is to such an effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

No issue has caused more controversy than the concept of preemption, too often presented as if were the personal invention of President Bush. In fact, it is inherent in the structure of the new international order, regardless of who serves as president. The international system of the twentieth century was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Seeking to avoid a rep

Preemption

¶ In its first months in office, the Bush administration challenged conventional wisdom when it proclaimed the concept of preemption as if it were an American invention.

preemption/

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lateral, unconstrained determination of a
single state. When implemented by a pow-
er with the overwhelming military prepon-
derance of the United States, the doctrine
of preemption prompts claims of hegemo-
ny by some on the American side and in-
creasing resistance, by others, particularly
members of traditional alliances.

No greater challenge awaits the new
president than to make a distinction be-
tween power and the claims made on its be-
half. No nation, no matter how powerful,
can organize the international system; over
an historical period it is beyond the psycho-
logical and political capacity of even the
most dominant state. It is not a task the
United States should undertake without the
cooperation of others. The goal of Amcri-
can foreign policy must be to turn domi-
nant power into shared responsibility—to
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar
Coral Bell has written, as if the internation-
al order were composed of many centers of
power, even while we are aware of our
strategic preeminence. It implies the need
for a style of consultation less focused on
imposing immediate policy prescriptions
than on achieving a common definition of
long-range purposes.

It is not in America's interest to encour-
age every state to define preemption in
purely national terms. The newly elected
president could contribute greatly to a new
global order by indicating a willingness to
discuss international principles of preemp-
tion—even while reserving the right of to
defend its national security alone as a last
resort.

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IRAQ. No issue has been raised to date. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is the radical, fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, which aims to overthrow both moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad-because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism-the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

Today the U.S. acts as the trustee of global stability, while domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many countries. But such a one-sided arrangement cannot continue much longer. Other nations should find it in their interest to participate at least in the tasks of political and economic reconstruction. There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the restoration of security in Iraq, especially in areas that have become terrorist

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No issue requires bipartisanship more urgently than the next phase of
Iraq policy. If President Bush prevails, it is important that America's
adversaries not confuse the passion of an election period with lack of unity
regarding ultimate goals. The disagreements between the candidates
concerned primarily the decision to enter the war; there was little apparent
disagreement over the need to bring it to a responsible conclusion. If
Senator Kerry prevails, there is an overwhelming need for immediate
cooperation between the incoming and the outgoing administration lest the
hiatus imposed by the months of transition undermine the confidence of the
Iraqi authorities and cause a collapse before the new team can even begin to
chart a course.

The seeming agreement on at least immediate objectives between the
two candidates had its expression in their endorsement of/

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cannot be engineered as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty.

It is particularly important to understand the obstacles to democracy in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West, democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no institutional impediment to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral defeat was considered a temporary setback that could be reversed. But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority status has often meant permanent discrimination and the constant fear of political extinction.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent each. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality. Thus in Iraq, elections, if confined to majority rule, imply a radical upheaval in the relative power and status of the three communities. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurdistan means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy. The Shiites tolerate the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve the goal of reversing the historic

--------- End of column---------

patter of Sunni rule and as a first step to replacing it with Shiite dominance. It remains to be seen to what extent they will continue to support our role as the transfer of power progresses.

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In the campaign there has been much talk of beginning this process by
an effort to induce our European allies to increase their military participation
and to lure recalcitrant allies into joining the security effort. Such a course
cannot succeed in a time frame relevant to the immediate necessities.

Germany and France - the two most difficult allies on Iraq - will not reverse their stand in sending troops to Iraq at the beginning of a process of reconciliation. (The German Foreign Minister has said so explicitly.) And countries that have sent troops have enough domestic difficulties maintaining their participation and little, if any, scope for increasing it. Such a policy is therefore more likely to rekindle old disputes than to overcome them.

Meaningful internationalization requires a subject other than security
and the participation of countries other than - or in addition to - NATO.

Internationalization should therefore begin with/

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United States, and Britain. This is not an
abdication to consensus. The United
States, by virtue of its military presence and
financial institutions, would retain a signif-
icant role. The issue of military contribu-
tion by other nations, including NATO, can
be raised again at a later stage in a more fa-
vorable political environment.

and other European states

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Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

While militant Islam is the most immediate and obvious
challenge to international order, nuclear proliferation is the most long-
range and insidious threat to survival. Heretofore nuclear weapons
have spread relatively slowly and into the hands of countries with
everything to lose and nothing to gain from assaulting the
international order. But the international system is now confronted by
the imminent spread of nuclear weapons into the possession of two
countries with a ~~less restrained~~ agenda: the odd, isolated regime in
North Korea responsible for multiple assassinations and kidnappings
and meeting every definition of a rogue regime; and Iran, which

started its current regime by holding American diplomats as hostages

2

and has since supported a variety of terrorist groups in the Middle
East, while declaring America as its principal enemy.

The possession of nuclear weapons by these countries would constitute a momentous step towards an international order devoid of the remaining restraints of the Westphalian system. In these circumstances deterrence will change its character even with respect to state-to-state relations. With such a variety of nuclear powers, it is no longer clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can serve as a shield behind which to step up other challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called "private" distribution of Pakistan's nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control. North Korea is so short of foreign

exchange that its diplomats often revert to counterfeit currency; it
might find the temptation to trade nuclear material for foreign
exchange irresistible. In Iran, extremist elements have frequently
demonstrated their ability to find specious Islamic justification for
unconscionable acts in support of terrorism.

The international community has been slow to recognize its peril.

It is torn between its premonition of its catastrophic implications and the escapism of treating the proliferation issue as an example of American bellicosity. In some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic, proliferation is presented as a test case of whether pressure or diplomacy should be the principal tool. There is a debate as well about the appropriate forum, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear program; the issue there is whether the negotiations should be conducted bilaterally between the US and North Korea or in the existing six-party

4

forum in Beijing, comprised of North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

If progress is to be made, the newly elected president will have to cut through these disputes to establish a unified policy. The distinction between diplomacy and pressure is always academic since diplomacy is never abstract; it inevitably involves an amalgam of both. The challenge is to determine the proper mix.

This is particularly complicated with respect to proliferation. The issue invariably emerges as technical, as a claim by the proliferating country that it seeks merely to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to enhance its electricity production or both. The countries seeking to prevent proliferation are therefore tempted to provide incentives in the form of guaranteed alternative sources of energy or of nuclear fuel for power plants.

5

The reason that this approach generally fails is that the real motives of the proliferating country are political and strategic, not economic. Iran, an oil producing country, has no economic need for nuclear power plants. What it seeks, as does North Korea, is a shield behind which it can conduct the revolutionary aspects of its foreign policy while reducing the risk of intervention by great powers.

A policy of offering material incentives in return for denuclearization is therefore likely to fail however desirable it may be in the abstract. For the incentives in one way or another increase the dependence of the proliferating country on the states against which the proliferation is really directed, because they are supposed to deliver the economic substitutes for proliferation over a period of time.

Since progress is unlikely unless it involves, at the least, the implication of pressures and a goal that meets the security concerns of the proliferating country and its neighbors, a multilateral forum,

6

including the proliferating country, is essential. The political goal of
the proliferating country is to enhance its political and strategic
security - a task unachievable without the cooperation of the countries
composing the Beijing six-party talks in the case of North Korea. An
appropriate forum for such an effort with respect to Iran does not even
exist.

With respect to North Korea, each of the Beijing parties has
special political and strategic concerns in the back of its mind: China,
the concern over nuclear weapons in all of Korea and the deployment
of forces in North Korea in case of unification; Japan, its position as a
non-nuclear country in an increasingly nuclear environment; South
Korea, its aspirations to unification and the balance it seeks between
China and the United States. Thus the technicalities of
nonproliferation pale compared to the objectives of elaborating a

7

security system for Northeast Asia. A similar analysis could be made
for the case of Iran.

In this manner, the question of whether and how the US should
deal with the proliferating countries receives a context. It goes
without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be resolved
diplomatically without the direct participation of the interested parties,
including the proliferating country. But care must be taken lest
proliferation assume a symbolic character in which the fact of the
dialogue becomes the sole substance, enhancing the prestige of the
proliferating country without enhancing its cooperation. In any event,
the solution cannot be left to bilateral US talks with the proliferators.
The insistence on US-North Korea bilateralism would leave America as
the sole enforcer of any agreement at the borders of China. And it
would invite Pyongyang to use the new agreement yet again for future

8

blackmail on the pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of
1994. The same applies in a different context to relations with Iran.

All of this is an academic exercise, however, if the concerned
nations do not recognize that time is short, that the stately process of
arms control negotiations is on the verge of being overwhelmed by
events. To impart a sense of urgency, an answer must be found to
these questions:

a) How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation in North Korea and Iran has become irreversible?

b) What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer?

c) What pressures are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work?

d) How do we prevent the process of negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

9

If we cannot answer these questions in a relevant time period
and to take action based on the answers, the newly elected president
is likely, by the end of his term, to leave an awesome legacy. The all-
consuming queries then will be: how does a society react to a nuclear
explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world react to a
nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear
weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear
adversaries? At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that
a world of unrestrained nuclear proliferation is too dangerous and that
they must impose nonproliferation for the survival of humanity? A
world in which such questions are dominant must be avoided at all
costs.

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## THE LONG-RANGE CHALLENGE.

For all their importance, the regional crises—Iraq, North Korea—are dwarfed by the fundamental transfer of power within the international system. Historians agree that the emergence of a unified Germany over a century ago unbalanced the European system by introducing a state stronger than each of its neighbors. Disraeli called the event of greater significance than the French Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging structure would either imply German hegemony or else that balance could be restored only by an increasingly rigid alliance system depriving diplomacy of maneuvering room.

In our age, the rise of China as a potential superpower is of even greater historical significance, marking as it does a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development: establishing a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe while meeting the needs of an interior population of perhaps 900 million, some of it subsisting at a level now significantly better than the least developed nations.

The impact of China and, a little later on, of India on the international system will be deeper, wider and more rapid than the diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure, unlike Germany, China is unlikely to seek to assert itself using military power. For one thing, China's leaders are (or at least have been) more careful, more deliberate, more prone to accumulate

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In a world of jihad, transformation of the balance of power, demographic change, mass migration and economic globalization, the ultimate challenge to the alliance must be the quest for some common purpose.

The dialogue over Iraq and Iran described earlier must be supplemented by a new approach to the Palestine-Israeli problem. For decades the diplomatic stalemate has been deepened because Europe was perceived to champion the Palestinian claims and America the goals of Israel. But new circumstances permit envisaging how the two positions can be brought closer. Israel has implied that settlements beyond the security wall are negotiable, the security wall is being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers and some compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been discussed in Camp David Tabba. At the same time, a few moderate Arab leaders have called for new initiatives. An effort to develop a common European/American position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might encourage reluctant parties to break the deadlock./

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## Introduction

By Henry A. Kissinger

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in full swing. But this week, the campaign that has mer merized America for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the opinion leaders on talk shows—with their combination of eagerness to please and congenital insecurity—will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

And these challenges are formidable. No president has faced an agenda of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to conduct a war with neither front lines nor geographic definition and, at the same time, to rebuild fundamental principles of world order to replace the traditional ones which went up in the smoke of the World Trade Center.

The newly elected president's task is perhaps most analogous to that inherited by President Truman at the end of the Second World War. In 1945, a vacuum had been left a vacuum in Central Europe and the Soviet Union had emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. Today's principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington. In the 1940s, the solution to the crisis was straightforward, albeit difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe.

surrogates/

occasionally frenzied/

and the Pentagon/

was emerging/

while the war had left a vacuum in Central Europe/

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IRAQ. No issue has been raised to date, but the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime, is supported by an objective, but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task at hand. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is the radical, fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, which aims to overthrow both moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad-because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism-the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

INSERT A

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The seeming agreement on at least immediate objectives between the
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sanctuaries, and the holding of elections.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching the security effort in too mechanical a manner. In Vietnam, it took far longer to make units ready for combat than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training manual. The effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only on their military training but on the degree to which the emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenary bands that will be least reliable when most needed.

The first national elections are only the first and perhaps least complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democratic

witnessed/

scheduled for the end of January

----- End of columna -----

racy in the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed pluralism of religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on competition and the market. None of these conditions exists in the Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has come about only in Turkey and there paradoxically by the imposition of democratic forms by an autocratic leader. This is not to say that individually Muslims in the Middle East are incapable of operating democratic institutions, only that the emergence of such institutions and of the arrangements which hold them together will take time and faces great cultural and traditional obstacles. It

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This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent each. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality. Thus in Iraq, elections, if confined to majority rule, imply a radical upheaval in the relative power and status of the three communities. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy. The Shiites tolerate the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve the goal of reversing the historic

tr/End of column

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Germany and France - the two most difficult allies on Iraq - will not reverse their stand in sending troops to Iraq at the beginning of a process of reconciliation. (The German Foreign Minister has said so explicitly.) And countries that have sent troops have enough domestic difficulties maintaining their participation and little, if any, scope for increasing it. Such a policy is therefore more likely to rekindle disputes than to overcome them.

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United States and Britain, This is not an
abdication to consensus. The United
States, by virtue of its military presence and
financial institutions, would retain a signif-
icant role. The issue of military contribu-
tion by other nations, including NATO, can
be raised again at a later stage in a more fa-
vorable political environment.

DEPT:

PAGE:

and other European states

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1175 WORDS

10/25/04

KISS3

While militant Islam is the most immediate and obvious
challenge to international order, nuclear proliferation is the most long-
range and insidious threat to survival. Heretofore nuclear weapons
have spread relatively slowly and into the hands of countries with
everything to lose and nothing to gain from assaulting the
international order. But the international system is now confronted by
the imminent spread of nuclear weapons into the possession of two
countries with a less restrained agenda: the odd, isolated regime in
North Korea responsible for multiple assassinations and kidnappings
and meeting every definition of a rogue regime; and Iran, which
started its current regime by holding American diplomats as hostages

2

The possession of nuclear weapons by these countries would
initiate an international order devoid of the remaining restraints of the
Westphalian system. Deterrence will change its character even with
respect to state-to-state relations. With such a variety of nuclear
powers, it is no longer clear who is responsible for deterring whom and
by what means. Second order issues can escalate into nuclear
conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new
nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can serve as a shield
behind which to step up other challenges. And the experience with the
so-called "private" distribution of Pakistan's nuclear technology to
other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep
proliferation from spinning out of control.

3

It is torn between its premonition of its catastrophic implications and the escapism of treating the proliferation issue as an example of American bellicosity. In some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic, it is treated as a test case for the American, as against the European, conception of international politics, whether pressure or diplomacy should be the principal tool. There is a debate as well about the appropriate forum, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear program; the issue there is whether the negotiations should be conducted bilaterally between the US and North Korea or in the existing six-power forum in Beijing, comprised of North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

4

This is particularly complicated with respect to proliferation. The issue invariably emerges as technical, as a claim by the proliferating country that it seeks merely to participate in peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to enhance its power production or both. The countries seeking to prevent proliferation are therefore tempted to provide incentives in the form of guaranteed alternative sources of energy or of nuclear fuel for power plants.

5

A policy to accumulate incentives is therefore likely to fail

over a period of time.

Since progress is unlikely unless it involves, at the least, the
implication of pressures and a goal that meets the security concerns of
the proliferating country and its neighbors, a multilateral forum,
including the proliferating country, is essential. The political goal of
the proliferating country is to enhance its political and strategic
security - a task unachievable without the cooperation of the countries
composing the Beijing forum in the case of North Korea. An
appropriate forum for such an effort with respect to Iran does not even
exist.

6

With respect to North Korea, each of the Beijing parties has special political and strategic concerns in the back of its mind: China, the concern over nuclear weapons in all of Korea and the deployment of forces in North Korea in case of unification; Japan, its position as a non-nuclear country in an increasingly nuclear environment; South Korea, its aspirations to unification and the balance it seeks between China and Japan. Thus the technicalities of nonproliferation pale compared to the objectives of elaborating a security system for Northeast Asia. A similar analysis could be made for the case of Iran.

In this manner, the question of whether the US should deal with the proliferating country receives a context. It goes without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be resolved diplomatically without the direct participation of the interested parties, including the proliferating country. But care must be taken lest proliferation assume a symbolic character in which the fact of the dialogue consumes its

7

substance. In any event, the solution cannot be left to bilateral US
talks with the proliferators. The insistence on US-North Korea
bilateralism would leave America as the sole enforcer of any
agreement at the borders of China. And it would invite Pyongyang to
use the new agreement yet again for future bouts of blackmail on the
pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of 1994. The same
applies in a different context to relations with Iran.

All of this is an academic exercise, however, if the concerned
nations do not recognize that time is short, that the stately process of
arms control negotiations will be overcome by events. To impart a
sense of urgency, an answer must be found to these questions:

8

d) How do we prevent that the process of negotiation and implementation becomes a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

If we cannot answer these questions in a relevant time period and to take action based on the answers, the newly elected president is likely, by the end of his term, to leave a legacy in which the all-consuming query will be: how does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world react to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries? At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that

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## THE LONG-RANGE CHALLENGE.

(PRIVATE Agile:Full Name)

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advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Today heads of every major country, and especially the prudent leaders of China—have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it only to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest.

But the long-term relationship with China should not be driven by expectations of a strategic showdown. China will not conduct as imprudent a policy as the Soviet

America should maintain its traditional opposition to hegemonial aspirations over Asia.

(No A)

## End of column

Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United States to a contest of survival. But it will seek the diplomatic and political role to which its growth entitles it.

An interesting recent article described the difference in the diplomatic style of China and the United States as the difference in the major intellectual games, between the West's chess and Chinese go. Chess has only two outcomes: draw and checkmate. The objective of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the center of the board. The aim of go is relative advantage; the game is played all over the board, and the purpose is to increase one's options and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than strategic progress.

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades from now. But leaders in both Beijing and Washington have a

influence commensurate with its growth. Taiwan is a special case.

neither better known by the Japanese name of, that is to say, total victory or defeat.

head-on/

persistent/

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America's international debt (now some-
thing like two and half trillion dollars) can-
be sustained indefinitely. These initial
annuities together with the issues of currency
miscalignment and trade policy, must be ad-
dressed with great seriousness by the new
administration—not in isolation, but in
concert with our trading and financial part-
ners who are as directly affected.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic re-
lations. The political campaign has cast At-
lantic disagreements in terms of American
short-term tactical errors. This is a mis-
reading of reality. Tact has not always dis-
tinguished every U.S. statement. But the
problem goes deeper than personalities.

The impasse is partly due to the fact
that the generation that formed the Atlantic
relationship is passing from the scene. In
the United States, the new leadership
group is preoccupied with the challenge of
radical Islam; our European allies either do
not share America's assessment of that
threat or, to the extent that they do, believe
themselves capable of dealing with it out-
side the Atlantic framework. In the United
States, the political center of gravity has
shifted to parts of the country whose repre-
sentatives have fewer personal connections
with Europe and less experience with its in-
ternal challenges than their predecessors
who created the postwar structure.

Across the Atlantic, leaders have been
concentrating on transferring national sov-
erignty to new European institutions. The
host of technicalities and legal issues this
involves is a subject both arcane and elusive
for most Americans, including our leaders.
More fundamentally, the United States
conducts its policies as the sovereign states
of Europe did in the nineteenth and first
half of the twentieth centuries. The Euro-

issues,

urgency / cly elected /
president /

has passed /

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958 WORDS

10/25/04

For **NEWSWEEK** article

## Kim 3 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

While militant Islam is the most immediate and obvious challenge to international order, nuclear proliferation is the most long-range and insidious threat to survival. Heretofore nuclear weapons have spread relatively slowly and into the hands of countries with everything to lose and nothing to gain from assaulting the international order. But the international system is now confronted by the imminent spread of nuclear weapons into the possession of two countries with a less restrained agenda: the odd, isolated regime in North Korea responsible for multiple assassinations and kidnappings and meeting every definition of a rogue regime; and Iran, which started its current regime by holding American diplomats as hostages

Backup for KISS3
on nuclear prolif.

Oct 25 04 01:58p

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p. 2

The possession of nuclear weapons by these countries would spell an international order voiding the remaining restraints of the

Westphalian system. Deterrence will change its character even with respect to state-to-state relations. Since they consider a variety of

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r--P.3
[✓]

The international community has been slow to recognize its peril. The international community has been heating up and the escalation of heating up the proliferation issue as an example of American bellicosity, and its premonition of its catastrophic implications. The international debate - especially with respect to Iran - focuses on whether to apply diplomacy or pressure. In some quarters, it is treated as a test case for the American, as against the European, conception of international politics, whether pressure or diplomacy should be the principal tool. There is a debate as well about the appropriate forum, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear program; the issue there is whether the negotiations should be conducted bilaterally between the US and North Korea or in the existing six-power forum in Beijing, comprised of North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

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This is particularly complicated with respect to proliferation. The
issue invariably emerges as technical, as a claim by the proliferating
country ~~to~~ seek to participate in peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to
enhance its power production or both. The countries seeking to
prevent proliferation are therefore tempted to provide incentives in the
form of guaranteed alternative sources of energy or of nuclear fuel for
power plants.

Oct 25 04 01:59p

p. 8

outcome. With respect to North Korea, the insistence on US-North Korea bilateralism would leave America as the sole enforcer of any agreement at the borders of China. And it would invite Pyongyang to use the new agreement yet again for future bouts of blackmail on the pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of 1994.

in a different context & relations with China

The same applies

The most urgent task for the United States is to clarify together
with other interested parties an answer to the following questions:

(a) How much time is left before the process of proliferation in North Korea and India becomes irreversible?

(b) If negotiations make progress, what precisely do we insist on, and what concessions or assurances are we prepared to offer in return?

Oct 25 04 01:59p

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p. 6

6

policed - a task that cannot be left to the United States alone for
matters at the borders of Russia in the case of Iran and of China and
Japan in the case of North Korea.

Oct 25 04 02:09P

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7

If we cannot answer these questions in a relevant time period
and to take action based on the answers, the newly elected
president is likely, by the end of his term, to leave a legacy in which
the all-consuming query will be: how does a society react to a nuclear
explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world react to a
nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear
weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear
adversaries? At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that
a world of unrestrained nuclear proliferation is too dangerous and that
they must impose nonproliferation for the survival of humanity?

Stape's Comments

958 WORDS

10/25/04

Stape

For NEWSWEEK article

Comment: Page: 1

Rather than putting this in terms of a
"less restrained agenda," which implies
an intention to use nuclear weapons, an
alternative would be to link the concern
to their past behavior, e.g., "... into the
possession of two countries whose past
behavior provides cause for the gravest
alarm over how such weapons might be
used:..."

2

> constitute a momentous step towards an international order eroding

Since they consider a variety of states as their adversaries, it is no
longer clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what
means. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new
nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can serve as a shield

Deleted: spell

Comment: Page: 2
Key point. Exactly right.

Comment: Page: 2
Additional points that could be made leading up to the Pakistan example might include: North Korea is so desperate for income that it could find irresistible the temptation clandestinely to trade nuclear technology for cash. In the case of Iran, extremist elements have already demonstrated their ability to find specious Islamic justifications for unconscionable actions in support of terrorism.

3

It is torn between the proliferation issue as an example of American bellicosity and its premonition of its catastrophic implications. The international debate – especially with respect to Iran – focuses on whether to apply diplomacy or pressure. In some quarters it is treated as a test case for the American, as against the European, conception of international politics, whether pressure or diplomacy should be the principal tool. There is a debate as well about the appropriate forum, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear program; the issue there is whether the negotiations should be conducted bilaterally between the US and North Korea or in the existing six-party forum in Beijing, comprised of North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

Deleted: power

4

Comment: Page: 4

Exactly right.

This is particularly complicated with respect to proliferation. The
issue invariably emerges as technical, as a claim by the proliferating
country to seek to participate in peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to
enhance its power production or both. The countries seeking to
prevent proliferation are therefore tempted to provide incentives in the
form of guaranteed alternative sources of energy or of nuclear fuel for
power plants.

5

Comment: Page: 5

Exactly right.

Deleted: to accumulate

A policy of offering incentives in exchange for denuclearization is therefore likely to fail however desirable it may be in the abstract. For the incentives in one way or another increase the dependence of the proliferating country on the states against which the proliferation is really directed, because they are supposed to deliver the economic substitutes for proliferation over a period of time.

Since progress is unlikely unless it involves, at the least, the implication of pressures, a multilateral forum, including the proliferating country, is essential. The political goal of the proliferating country is to enhance its political and strategic security - a task unachievable without the cooperation of Russia in the case of Iran and of the countries composing the Beijing six-party forum in the case of North Korea. Also, any agreement to be reached must be enforced

6

and policed - a task that cannot be left to the United States alone for
matters at the borders of Russia in the case of Iran and of China and
Japan in the case of North Korea.

Deleted: that

Deleted: becomes

7

If we cannot answer these questions in a relevant time period
and take action based on the answers, the newly elected president is
likely, by the end of his term, to leave a legacy in which the all-
consuming query will be: how does a society react to a nuclear
explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world react to a
nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear
weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear
adversaries? At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that
a world of unrestrained nuclear proliferation is too dangerous and that
they must impose nonproliferation for the survival of humanity?

Deleted: to

Deleted: see

Comment: Page: 7

In my view, this way of putting the issue
is too apocalyptic. While the possibility
of a nuclear explosion of undetermined
origin in the United States is certainly
conceivable, I consider it unlikely, if only
because the principal reason for
acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran
and North Korea is almost certainly
defensive. While nuclear terrorism would
certainly have horrendous consequences,
and could be nation-threatening in the
case of a small country like Israel, for a
large country like the United States, it
could not remotely destroy our national
power or ability to retaliate. If North
Korea and Iran became acknowledged
nuclear-weapon states, they could not be
unaware that nuclear terrorism against the
United States, even if not directly linked
to them, would entail a high likelihood of
destructive retaliation against them. An
alternative way of phrasing this might be:
"If we cannot answer these questions in a
relevant time period and take action
based on the answers, the newly elected
president and his successors, along with
the international community, will face
even more difficult questions, such as:

958 WORDS

10/25/04

For NEWSWEEK article

2

CYI

The possession of nuclear weapons by these countries would
spell an international order eroding the remaining restraints of the
Westphalian system. Deterrence will change its character even with
respect to state-to-state relations. Since they consider a variety of
states as their adversaries, it is no longer clear who is responsible for
deterring whom and by what means. The possibilities of
miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use
their weapons, they can serve as a shield behind which to step up
other challenges. And the experience with the so-called "private"
distribution of Pakistan's nuclear technology to other countries shows
that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning
out of control.

3

It is torn between the proliferation issue as an example of American bellicosity and its premonition of its catastrophic implications. The international debate – especially with respect to Iran – focuses on whether to apply diplomacy or pressure. In some quarters it is treated as a test case for the American, as against the European, conception of international politics, whether pressure or diplomacy should be the principal tool. There is a debate as well about the appropriate forum, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear program; the issue there is whether the negotiations should be conducted bilaterally between the US and North Korea or in the existing six-power forum in Beijing, comprised of North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

4

5

over a period of time.

Since progress is unlikely unless it involves, at the least, the
implication of pressures, a multilateral forum, including the
proliferating country, is essential. The political goal of the proliferating
country is to enhance its political and strategic security - a task
unachievable without the cooperation of Russia in the case of Iran and
of the countries composing the Beijing forum in the case of North
Korea. Also, any agreement to be reached must be enforced and

6

7

If we cannot answer these questions in a relevant time period
and to take action based on these answers, the newly elected
president is likely, by the end of his term, to leave a legacy in which
the all-consuming query will be: how does a society react to a nuclear
explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world react to a
nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear
weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear
adversaries? At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that
a world of unrestrained nuclear proliferation is too dangerous and that
they must impose nonproliferation for the survival of humanity?

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In the campaign there has been much talk of beginning this process by an effort to induce our European allies to increase their military participation and to lure recalcitrant allies into joining the security effort. Such a course cannot succeed in a time frame relevant to the immediate necessities. Germany and France - the two most difficult allies on Iraq - will not reverse their stand in sending troops to Iraq at the beginning of a process of reconciliation. (The German Foreign Minister has said so explicitly.) And countries that have sent troops have enough domestic difficulties maintaining their participation and little, if any, scope for increasing it. Such a policy is therefore more likely to rekindle disputes than to overcome them.

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2

North Korea is also a threat. So is the Middle East. The US should act now to counteract this danger. It may be useful to start a counterproductive war on the Temptation & Trade axis. In turn, for foreign excellence we should frequently demand the ability to find species/allelic pairs for unconsionable acts in support of unconsionable acts.

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It is torn between its premonition of its catastrophic implications and the escapism of treating the proliferation issue as an example of American bellicosity. In some quarters on both sides of the Atlantic, it is treated as a test case for the American, as against the European, conception of international policies, whether pressure or diplomacy should be the principal tool. There is a debate as well about the appropriate forum, especially with respect to the North Korean nuclear program; the issue there is whether the negotiations should be conducted bilaterally between the US and North Korea or in the existing six-power forum in Beijing, comprised of North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the United States.

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A policy to accumulate incentives is therefore likely to fail if in striking contrast to however desirable it may be in the abstract. For the incentives in one way or another increase the dependence of the proliferating country on the states against which the proliferation is really directed, because they are supposed to deliver the economic substitutes for proliferation over a period of time.

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With respect to North Korea, each of the Beijing parties has special political and strategic concerns in the back of its mind: China, the concern over nuclear weapons in all of Korea and the deployment of forces in North Korea in case of unification; Japan, its position as a non-nuclear country in an increasingly nuclear environment; South Korea, its aspirations to unification and the balance it seeks between the United States, China and Japan. Thus the technicalities of nonproliferation pale compared to the objectives of elaborating a security system for Northeast Asia. A similar analysis could be made for the case of Iran.

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substance In any event, the solution cannot be left to bilateral US
talks with the proliferators. The insistence on US-North Korea
bilateralism would leave America as the sole enforcer of any
agreement at the borders of China. And it would invite Pyongyang to
use the new agreement yet again for future bouts of blackmail on the
pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of 1994. The same
applies in a different context to relations with Iran.

All of this is an academic exercise, however, if the concerned
nations do not recognize that time is short, that the stately process of
is on the way if negotiations can be overcome by events. To impart a
arms control negotiations will be
sense of urgency, an answer must be found to these questions:

OCT-25-2004 17:07

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If we cannot answer these questions in a relevant time period and to take action based on the answers, the newly elected president is likely, by the end of his term, to leave a legacy that the all-consuming query will be: how does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world react to a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries? At what point do the existing nuclear powers decide that

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(Noth)

American's international debt (now $2.6 trillion) is the largest in the world and half of all dollars can be sustained indefinitely. These numbers - about 1/3 of the world's GDP - cannot, together with the rest of the world, sustain an agricultural and trade policy, must be addressed with great sensitivity by the new administration - not in isolation, but in concert with our trading and financial partners who are as directly affected.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic relations. The political current has cast Atlantic disagreements in terms of American short-term tactical errors. This is a misresulting of reality. Fact has not always distinguished every U.S. statement. But the problem goes deeper than personalities.

The impasse is partly due to the fact that the generation that formed the Atlantic relationship is passing from the scene. In the United States, the new leadership group is preoccupied with the challenge of radical Islam; our European allies either do not share America's assessment of that threat or, to the extent that they do, believe themselves capable of dealing with it outside the Atlantic framework. In the United States, the political center of gravity has shifted to parts of the country whose representatives have fewer personal connections with Europe and less experience with its internal challenges than their predecessors who created the postwar structure.

Across the Atlantic, leaders have been concentrating on transferring national sovereignty to new European institutions. The host of technicalities and legal issues this involves is a subject both arcane and elusive for most Americans, including our leaders. More fundamentally, the United States conducts its policies as the sovereign state of Europe did in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. The Euro-

issues/

urgency / cly elected / president/

has passed/

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These conditions cannot be removed by consultation on any one
individual issue. They require a fundamental change of attitude on both
sides of the Atlantic - but especially Europe -/

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Like a policy is thus far more likely to招cause disputes than to overcome them.

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victims should not be required to wait until the threat has been
implemented; the damage could be catastrophically beyond repair.

Preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-
century international system.

At the same time, its implementation should not be left to a
single country, however powerful or well-meaning. Nor can it be in
America's interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in
purely national terms. German and American leaders should therefore
make a major effort together with other allies to see whether some
common principles of preemption can be developed to be discussed
afterward with the larger international community.

Another area calling out for a breakthrough is the Palestinian...

Israeli issue. For decades the diplomatic stalemate has been

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side and America that of Israel. But new circumstances permit envisaging how the two positions can be brought closer. Israel has implied that settlements beyond the security wall are negotiable, the security wall is being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some compensatory territory from present-day Israel can be in Camp David Table. discussed. At the same time, moderate Arab leaders have called for a new initiative, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has stated a willingness in principle to recognize the Israeli state. An effort to develop a common European/American position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might break the deadlock.

Beyond these components of traditional diplomacy, a host of other issues is waiting: the implications of demographic changes; the relationship of economic to political globalization; the relationship of developed to developing nations.

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## Introduction

By Henry A. Kissinger

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in full swing. But this week, the campaign that has mer merized America for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the spin meed on talk shows—with their combina tion of eagerness to please and congenital insecurity—will vanish until another elec tion cycle calls them forth again.

What will remain are the challenges that gave rise to this battle and the responsibili ty of dealing with them.

And these challenges are formidable. No president has faced an agenda of compara ble scope. Never before has it been neces sary to conduct a war with neither front lines nor geographic definition and, at the same time, to rebuild fundamental princi ples of world order to replace the tradition al ones which went up in the smoke of the World Trade Center.

The newly elected president's task is perhaps most analogous to that inherited by President Truman at the end of the Sec ond World War. In 1945, a vacuum had been left without power in Central Europe and the Soviet Union had emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But the Soviet chal lenge was concrete and geographically de finable. Today's principal threats are ab stract and mobile. Terror has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singa pore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington. In the 1940s, the solution to the crisis was straightforward, albeit difficult: to con struct a defensive line in the center of Eu

surrogates/

occasionally frenzied/

and the Pentagon/

was emerging/

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The contemporary security challenge arises from two unprecedented sources: terror caused by acts until recently considered a matter from internal police forces rather than international policy; and scientific advances and proliferation that allow the survival of countries to be threatened by developments entirely within another state's territory. Truman could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the Atlantic alliance emerged full-fledged from the Second World War. The newly elected president will have to bring about an effort to define and then maintain

## End of column

No issue has caused more controversy than the concept of preemption, the often-presented as if it were the personal invention of President Bush. In fact, it is inherent in the structure of the new international order, regardless of who serves as president. The international system of the twentieth century was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Seeking to avoid a rep

¶ The Bush administration got off on the wrong foot internationally in its first months in office when it proclaimed the concept of preemption as if it were an idiosyncratic American invention!

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IRAQ. No issue has been raised to date, quently raised in the campaign than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported that objective, but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task at hand. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is the radical, fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, which aims to overthrow both moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad-because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary exerts, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism-the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

INSERT A

terrorist chaos/

or Russia,

¹⁄₂m and perhaps even the recognition¹⁄₂m

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TO PAGE 1 OF KISS2

No issue requires bipartisanship more urgently than the next phase of Iraq policy. If President Bush prevails, it is important that our adversaries not confuse the passion of an election period with lack of unity regarding ultimate goals. The disagreements between the candidates concerned primarily the decision to enter the war; there was little apparent disagreement over the need to bring it to a responsible conclusion.

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In the campaign there has been much talk of beginning this
process by an effort to induce our European allies to increase their
military participation and to lure recalcitrant allies into joining the
security effort. Such a cause cannot succeed in a time frame relevant
to the immediate necessities. Germany and France - the two most
difficult allies on Iraq - will not reverse their stand in sending troops to
Iraq at the beginning of a process of reconciliation. (The German
Foreign Minister has said so explicitly.) And countries that have sent
troops have enough domestic difficulties maintaining their participation
and little, if any, scope for increasing it.

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United States and Britain. This is not an
abdication to consensus. The United
States, by virtue of its military presence and
financial institutions, would retain a signif-
icant role. The issue of military contribu-
tion by other nations, including NATO, can
be raised again at a later stage in a more fa-
vorable political environment.

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## THE LONG-RANGE CHALLENGE.

In our age, the rise of China as a potential superpower is of even greater historical significance, marking as it does a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development: establishing a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe while meeting the needs of an interior population of perhaps 900 million, some of it subsisting at a level even significantly better than the least developed nations.

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as its principal instrument/

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America's international debt (now some-
thing like two and half trillion dollars) can
he sustained indefinitely, These imhal-
ances together with the issues of currency
misalignment and trade policy, must be ad-
dressed with great seriousness by the new
administration, not in isolation, but in
concert with our trading and financial part-
ners who are as directly affected.

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has passed /

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These conditions cannot be removed by consultation on any one
individual issue. They require a fundamental decision on both sides of
the Atlantic - but especially Europe -/

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----- End of column -----

~~A issue has caused more controversy than the concept of preemption, too often presented as if it were the personal invention of President Bush. In fact, it is inherent in the structure of the new international order, regardless of who serves as president. The international system of the twentieth century was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Seeking to avoid a rep-

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America's international debt (now something like two and a half trillion dollars) can be sustained indefinitely. These jabs are made together with the issues of currency malalignment and trade policy, must be addressed with great seriousness by the present administration—not in isolation, but in concert with our trading and financial partners who are as directly affected.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic relations. The political campaign has cast Atlantic disagreements in terms of American short-term tactical errors. This is a misreading of reality. Tact has not always distinguished every U.S. statement. But the problem goes deeper than personalities.

Across the Atlantic, leaders have been concentrating on transferring national sovereignty to new European institutions. The host of technicalities and legal issues this involves is a subject both arcane and elusive for most Americans, including our leaders. More fundamentally, the United States conducts its policies as the sovereign states of Europe did in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. The Euro-

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