discussing in this context...many of those regarding the
right to independence

in case of Soviet addression---the only contingency worth
choice put all-out war. The conclusion is almost inescapable
that we must rely on a military policy which gives us no other
notion of limited war because it might lead to general war
or all-out war. And it does not make sense to radicalize the
case of limited war our only options will be surrender
addression orALKO. In these circumstances, if we reject
proposals of limited war will arise only in case of Communists
resistible persons advocates initiating limited war. The
However, our alternatives are quite different. No
demonstrate the easy proposition that peace is preferable.
before we is peace or limited war and they then proceed to
print it spout. They give the impression that the choice
those who make a greater resistance on limited war wish to
of some of the other groups is puzzling. They pretend that
on the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism

is the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism
on the conduct of war. But the violence of the criticism
I - 10

I - 17

concept of limited war would prefer surrender to resistance.

Since surrender will not be our national policy it is
important to get our choices straight. Limited war is
palatable only when compared with other even starker
alternatives. It is preferable not to peace, only to surrender
or all-out war. It is, to be sure, a subtle and complex
task, and it presupposes a rare blend of psychological,
political and military skill. Yet facts cannot be evaded
by refusing to admit their existence. We do not have the
time to lament our condition. Our best thought is required
for adjusting to new conditions in a world where the truths
of one decade become the obstacles to understanding of
another.

another.

of one decade become the opatics to understanding of
for squating to new conditions in a world where the truce
time to isment our condition. Our past thought is reduced
by requiring to squint their existence. We go not have the
political and militay skill. Yet tacts cannot be evaded
task, and it breaboses a rare blend of bayonolical.

or sit-out war. It is, to be sure, a simple and complex
alternatives. It is preferable not to peace, only to surrender
betrayal only when comtacted with other even starker

important to det our choices straight. Limited war is

since surrender will not be our national boffid it is

concept of limited war which breeder surrender to resistance.

I - 17

II - Some Forms of Limitation

A. The Prerequisites of Limitation

There are three prerequisites for a strategy of limited war:
(a) The limited war forces must be able to prevent the _potential_ aggressor from creating a _fait accompli_; (b) They must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that their use, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it; (c) They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not the sole response to aggression and that there exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of unconditional surrender.

If the limited-war forces of the free world can be overrun
easily, aggression or blackmail will be encouraged and the dilem-
mas of massive retaliation will then confront us in even sharper
form. The danger of a _fait accompli_ must demoralize our allies,
whose major concern is not eventual liberation, but _the_ protection
of their territories from Communist occupation. If we resist by
measures which we intend to be limited but which an opponent in-
terprets as the prelude to all-out war, he may launch a

terpret as the bridle to all-out war, he may found a
messemp which we intend to be limited but which an opponent in-
of their territories from Communist occupation. If we react by
whose major concern is not eventual liberation, put my protection
form. The danger of a <u>last agreement</u> must demoralise our allies,
me of massive retaliation which then confront us in even sharper
easily, aggression or pstack will be encouraged and the effort-
ment short of unconditional surrender.

and that there exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement
in conveying that all-out war is not the sole recourse to agree-
to it; (c) They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds
an increased risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable bridle
nature to convince the aggressor that theirase, while involving
aggression from creating a <u>last agreement</u>; (d) They must be of a
(a) The limited war forces must be able to prevent the <u>potential</u>
there are three precedents for a strategy of limited war:

V. The precedents of limitation

II - Some forms of limitation

[x]

II - 2

pre-emptive attack. If our diplomacy cannot take advantage of pauses in military operations to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on "purely" military considerations, any is likely to conflict/will expand by stages into a conflagration.

Considered in the abstract, these requirements can be met in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force is also suitable for limited war because of its ability to engage in graduated retaliation or limited strategic warfare. Others advocate a strategy of indirect retaliation designed to punish an aggressor, though not necessarily at the place where aggression occurs. Still others would rely on guerilla activity. Finally, there is a school of though which stresses the importance of local defense.

All of these measures afford opportunities for resisting aggression short of all-out war. Each of them has uses in determining aggression and in furnishing alternatives to general war.

Yet their consequences for diplomacy, deterrence and strategy vary.

Let their consequences for diplomacy, deterrence and strategy vary.

Risk aggravation and inunciating alternatives to general war.

Eagerness about all-out war. End of them phase in deter-

VII of these measures afford opportunities for resisting ag-
dement.

there is a school of thought which stresses the importance of lost
occas. Still others would rely on sulfuric acidity. Linearity,
aggression, should not necessarily at the place where aggression
advocates a strategy of indirect retaliation designed to banish
in graduated retaliation or limited strategic warfare. Others
also neutude for limited war because of its affinity to engage
in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force is
considered in the spectrum, these requirements can be met
conflict\xiff expanding phase into a confrontation
is likely to

make the issue dependent on "beneath" military considerations, and
because in military operations to negotiate a settlement, if we
breast-empirical attack. If our diplomacy cannot take advantage of

II - 5

II-3

They will be discussed in turn.

### B. Limited Strategic War and Graduated Retaliation.

The concepts of "limited" strategic war and graduated retaliation are based on the premise that the retaliatory force can be used for objectives other than general war. Limited strategic war seeks to resist aggression by measures which are normally a prelude to all-out war without making an irrevocable commitment to a showdown. It strives for a military advantage but steps short of launching an all-out blow. For example, in response to Soviet occupation of West Berlin we could destroy part of the Soviet radar warning net or part of the Soviet retaliatory force. They would serve as a warning of the consequences of persisting in the aggressive course by increasing Soviet vulnerability to an all-out attack. If taken seriously and if the Soviet Union were unwilling to risk all-out war, such a course might lead to a restoration of the status quo ante.

Graduated retaliation would not strive for a military advantage as such. Rather an attempt would be made to inflict sufficient damage on the aggressor without impairing his retaliatory capability.

II - 5

lose the last vestiges of credibility. On the other hand, if we
do not make the attempt to communicate at least an outline of our
intentions to limit the employment of our retaliatory force, a
Soviet pre-emptive strike would seem inevitable, in short, the
threat of limited strategic war is either too convincing or not
convincing enough.

Reliance on either limited strategic war or graduated re-
taliation would in fact confront us with an almost hopeless
dilemma. In case of Communist aggression, an American President
would be faced with the decision of initiating a type of conflict
which could not protect the victim and which might expose the
United States to fearful devastation. This becomes clear if one
imagines a Communist note to the United States delivered concurrent-
ly with an attack on an ally somewhat along the following lines:
"We are very eager to avoid all-out war. Moreover, it is point-
less to retaliate against us since our retaliatory force is in-
vulnerable. To show our good intentions we will overlook attacks

anywhere. To show our good intentions we will overtake attacks
less to gratulate against us since our retaliatory force is in-
adequate to avoid all-out war. Moreover, it is being
with an attack on an ally consistent along the following lines:
introduce a Communist note to the United States delivered communique-
United States to tell the government. This becomes clear if one
which could not protect the victim and which might expose the
would be faced with the decision of initiating a type of conflict
dilemma. In case of Communist aggression, an American President
talking would in that context say with an almost圃less
relapse on either limited strategic war or graduated re-
confining enough.

threat of limited strategic war is either too convincing or not
Soviet pre-emptive strike would seem inevitable in short, the
intention to limit the employment of our retaliatory force, a
do not make the attempt to communicate at least an outline of our
to the fact that we are crediting. On the other hand, if we
II - 2

II - 2

II - 6

you make in the first few hours after this communication. From
then on, we will devastate the United States in precise proportion
to your attack but no more." Is it a foregone conclusion that a
President would use our retaliatory force in that case? Or that
it would be wise to do so?

a retaliatory strategy--however limited--
Even if we resorted to such a strategy, we would still
be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We would be
forced to engage in actions each of which, almost guarantees at
least similar destruction in the free world, and we would run
the constant risk of all-out war while the issue which produced
the conflict had already been settled in the aggressor's favor.
Every passing day would strengthen the Soviet hold on its prize
and bring home to us the futility of our course. The Communist
leaders may well calculate that skillful peace offensives would
cause us to weary of so unrewarding a strategy, unless complete
frustration were to induce us to launch an all-out war.

The problem vis-à-vis the invincible enemy, because of limited employment of

The American People are the only ones who can make the final decision.

The American people were to influence us to launch an air-out war. We cannot use the air out of our own country. The Communists and the fascists will calculate that air out war is the only alternative we have. We must calculate a strategy, since complete victory will not be achieved until we are able to launch an air-out war.

We would be at a fundamental biological disadvantage. We would be forced to engage in stations even though we could guarantee at least similar destruction in the free world, and we would run out of air.

Even if we recorded a resiliency strategy--however limited--we would be wise to go so!

President would use our resiliency force in that case? Or that force would attack us more? Is it a telephone conference that you are in, we will generate the United States in brief telephone会议? From now on, we will generate the United States in brief telephone会议.

II - 9

II - 7

From the strictly military point of view, a strategy of "limited" strategic war is extremely risky. If the aggressor's retaliatory force is vulnerable, he will have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive attack. For his vulnerability prevents him from waiting to determine the extent of the blow. If his force is invulnerable, however, the result may be a strategy of tit for tat leading to devastation approaching the scale of all-out war. In short we may find that we have to choose. . . . . .

since of all-out war. In short we may find that we have to choose. . . .

One may be a strategy of fit for that leading to deviation approaching the

extent of the flow. It is this force is transmissible, however, the

attack. For his adaptability prevents him from waiting to determine

the transmissible, he will have no choice but to launch a pre-emptive

strategic war in consequence of which. If the aggressor's respiratory force

break the attack will be further hampered by a strategy of "finished"

II - 3

II - 8

between ineffectualness or all-out war.

of a
Graduated retaliation might supply less/military incentive
to retaliate than limited strategic war. As long as his retaliatory force remains intact, he may be prepared to endure a measure of damage without retaliation, if only to demonstrate the futility of our military effort. On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the military compulsion to retaliates may be weaker than in the case of limited strategic war, the psychological compulsion will be greater. It will be difficult not to react when one's own civilian population is under attack. Moreover, the opponent may mistake what we intend as graduated retaliation for the prelude to an all-out attack — unless we behave with a self-defeating circumspection. Thus, whatever eventuality is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the retaliatory force is either defeat or all-out war.

To be effective, the limited employment of retaliatory forces must meet two requirements which in practice cancel each other out:

To be effective, the limited employment of retaliatory forces
of the retaliatory force is either defeat or all-out war.

It is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment
with a self-deleting operation. Thus, whatever eventuality
retaliation for the advance to an all-out attack — unless we pursue
over, the opponent may mistake what we intend as retaliated re-
result when one's own civilian population is under attack. Note-
to be weaker than in the case of limited strategic war, the behavior
to count on this. While the military competition to retell the war
of our military effort. On the other hand, it would be reckless
of damage without retaliation, it only to demonstrate the utility
of force remaining intact. How may be preferred to ensure a measure
of the aggressor
to retell if limited strategic war. As long as the retali-
ated retaliation might embolden Japan militarily incentive
between ineffectiveness or all-out war.

II - 8

II - 9

The aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited strategic war or graduated retaliation, while it increases the risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it, and (b) that we are prepared to resort to all-out war rather than accept defeat. If we fail to meet the first condition, the opponent will probably strike pre-emptively. If we fail to meet the second condition, the aggressor may be encouraged to outwait us or to engage in a test of nerves with a built-in escalator to all-out war.

Of course, the very riskiness of such a course may make the aggressor recoil, as the case with which matters could get out of hand might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether we can impose on ourselves so reckless a strategy. If deterrence should fail, would we be confronted at every turn by the alternative of defeat or all-out war. In most circumstances, limited strategic war will probably combine the disadvantages of limited and of all-out war.

The problem is even more serious for other countries of the free world. Communist blackmail against them is based importantly on the

to all-out war.

It is said to meet the second condition, the antagonist may be encouraged
the first condition, the opponent will probably take some initiative.

To meet to all-out war rather than accept defeat. It is said to meet
war, it is not an inevitable consequence to it, and (d) that we are precluded
not on geographical reasons, while it increases the risk of all-out
the antagonist must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited strategie

to all-out war.

The problem is even more serious on the other side of the line
since it is possible immediately on the
world. Commentaries against Japan are based on false information.

II - 9

II - 10

ability to overrun them and to expose them to all the problems of
Communist
foreign occupation and social upheaval. This danger is not reduced by using
our retaliatory force in a limited manner. The Communist leaders would
still be able to menace the Prime Minister of a free country somewhat
as follows: "If you do not disarm completely, our forces will move
in to dismantle your military establishment. To be sure, in that case
the Americans may retaliate against us. But this will only give us
an added incentive to remain and to restore our economy from your
country. Whether the American retaliation is limited or all-out we
will respond in kind. We shall see whose nerves snap first. Whatever
the outcome of a Soviet-United States war, your country as you now know
it will cease to exist." In the face of such a threat resistance may
well seem quiescent. For whether we retaliate or not, the threatened
country will be overrun. In these circumstances, many nations of the free
world may seek to obtain the most favorable terms possible. Thus the
limited employment of retaliatory forces confronts the free world with most
complex psychological and political problems, while at the same time com-
mitting us to a strategy peculiarly unsuitable to limitation.

[y]

II - 11

### C. Indirect Retaliation.

Advocates of a strategy of indirect retaliation address themselves to what they consider the basic dilemma of our defense policy: attacks on the Communist homeland and particularly on its retaliatory force are too risky, while it is impractical to defend the entire Communist perimeter locally. Accordingly they argue that resistance need not occur at the spot where aggression takes place. Rather we should utilize the special advantages of our strategic position, particularly our superior seapower. Aggression against Iran,⁹ could be resisted, so the argument goes, by such measures as closing the Dardanelles or a blockade of the Soviet Union. Pressure against Berlin could be countered by economic sanctions against Eastern Europe or perhaps closing the Straits of Denmark.

Such a strategy would avoid many of the risks of the limited use of our retaliatory force. It might enhance deterrence by emphasizing a threat which is plausible. The gap between deterrence and the strategy we are willing to implement would be smaller. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

["we are willing to implement such a measure. . . . . . . . . . . . .

II - 12

At the same time a strategy of indirect retaliation raises serious problems of its own. From the point of view of deterrence it may reduce the risk to the aggressor to the point where blackmail or military pressure become tempting. Where the limited use of the retaliatory force involves an undue danger of all-out war, most measures of indirect retaliation are too circumscribed and long-term in their effect to influence the immediate situation. Closing theurdanelles could not save Iran any more than a naval blockade could save Berlin, and the impact of these measures on the U.S.S.R. would be long delayed.

As a result, we would be forced to maintain over an indefinite period measures whose utility every passing day would cast in doubt, might they in fact supply an incentive to the Communists to demonstrate their immunity to American pressure and the impotence of our response. And, after a sufficient lapse of time, it would be difficult to resist Soviet suggestions urging us to adjust to facts. The fate of the embargo of strategic goods against Communist China after the invasion of Korea can serve as an example of the difficulty of persevering in a policy of indirect retaliation over a long period. The increasing

The increasing
of the ratio of indirect to direct
of the Soviet Union's share in
the world economy
in the post war period
caused a sharp rise in the price
of the Soviet Union's products
in the West.

After World War II, the price
of the Soviet Union's products
in the West fell significantly.
This led to a decrease in the
import of Western products by the
Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was the first
to develop an atomic bomb
and the first to develop a
hydrogen bomb.

We are now, however, in the
middle of a transition period.

The rapid development of
the atomic bomb in the U.S.A.

The development of the
atomic bomb was a major
factor in the development
of the nuclear weapons
of the United States.

At the same time a strategy of
indirect retaliation was being
introduced.

II - 15

II - 13

pressure to accept the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe is
another, a good case in point.

If such a strategy presents great complexities for the United
States, it is perhaps the least desirable course of action for our
allies. The blackmail situation described earlier will be even more
poignant when the American response is so indirect. With Soviet
occupation unavoidable in case of resistance, wide scope exists for
the gradual erosion of morale through steady Soviet pressure. A strategy
based entirely on indirect retaliation must lead eventually to a dis-
integration of the free world.

D. Guerilla Warfare.

Many thoughtful people, horrified by the risks of nuclear war,
have come to the conclusion that any conflict involving the great
powers would carry with it an intolerable risk of expanding into a
nuclear holocaust. They therefore urge that the aggression be deterred
by organizing the civilian population into guerilla groups and confronting
the Communists with the prospect of a long drawn-out campaign of
pacification.

5. Kennan'sxxxxxxSee for example, George Kennan, *Russia, The Atom and the West*, New York 1958, p. 63. "...I would suggest that as a general rule these [armed] forces might better be paramilitary ones...Their function should be primarily internal rather than external. It is on the front of police realities, not on regular military battlefields, that the threat of Russian Communism must primarily be met."

briarbrill' pe wet."

reguljer wiffisry battelfeldg, that the threat of Brazilian Communia wut
pugefasirigfierfien exfeml. If ie ou the front ol bojice realifes' not on
 forces wight pefter pe barmilliter' one... Their function onif pe briarbrill

B. Kesselsxxxxxx2ee for exsmje, Geerte Keunen, 'Graais', Tje Aftom and the West, beitification.

the Communia wif the broadeet ol a jent grum-out cembetan et
of orfours in the evifiaus bojefetion into Gruilfie Groome and confeutant
unferet pofeemt. Tuk fuberefore ngeet that the aggreelou pe defefefog

boners wogd oamk, wif it an indelepable tiek ol exdehending into a
pave come to the confeutant that each conflict involving the Gruet
Ment thoroughly bojef, porifled f the tieks ol nuclear met.

D. 'Graafflie Marke.'

infefefition ol the free worly.

pavee eufetly on inifretz reafelation wut fefh eufemnity to a cit-
tie the Gruafli eration ol morete ftrongly efefh Gruafie braseize. V eufefefh
ocafefition mufaidehefe in eene ol reletance, afge eofe eufefte fer.

befefent when the American reafonne is so inifret. wifh Gruafie
efefice. The ploefiaut atefation genefped eufefter wifl pe eovet more
efefes. If it beihepe the fefet deefible eene ol eefion fer om.

It eufch v euftrayl paves the Gruafie eombifice fer the United

bresenue to eofeet the Gruafie eonfetion over Western Europe is

11 - 13

II - 14

One difficulty with this view is that it oversimplifies the task. There is no known instance of large-scale sustained partisan activity in any Communist controlled territory. Those uprisings which have occurred were suppressed ruthlessly and quickly. Little in their experience would cause the Communist leaders to be overly impressed by the threat of popular resistance, and Communist theory would make them doubt even its possibility. Popular resistance in Hungary and Tibet did not prove an extended obstacle to Communist rule.

Moreover, whatever the effectiveness of guerilla warfare as a strategy, its utility as a threat for purposes of deterrence is highly questionable. A country relying on partisan warfare for deterrence would have to convince the potential aggressor that while it would offer no organized resistance, it would be able to train guerilla groups and would persevere in using them until the aggressor withdrew. These two requirements are to a large extent inconsistent with each other.

The decision not to resist with organized forces can only be interpreted by the aggressor as lack of will. The threat to resort to partisan warfare is more likely to be construed as bluster than as a real menace. It

It is more likely to be considered as further than as a real money. If
by the aggronor as fact of will. The thrust & resort to particular words
The obligation not to treat with organized forces can only be interpreted
two requirements are to a large extent inconsistent with each other.
and would therefore in fact from until the aggronor within.
These
often no organized resistance, it would be able to retain General force
would have to convince the potential aggronor that while it would
undertake. A country relating on particular words for deference
would, it will, utilize as a thrust for purchase of deference is highly
Moreover, whatever the objectivity of General force is a
Tide had not prove an sufficient adequate to Committee's case.
from doubt even its belittish. Logical resistance in Hungary and
by the thrust of political resistance, and Committee directly with more
experience which cause the Committee to judge to be overly imprecise
place counter were subordinated rapidly and quickly. Little in fact
activity in any Committee controlled territory. Those measures which
there is no known influence of large-scale autocratic partition
One difficulty with this view is that it overemphasizes the

II - 14

subordinate. It can beOTOT. And it is false, the pascualion of the
cf order and discipline of the administrative group and the governmental
~~group~~ group and a collective governmental apparatus. The administrative power
which Western society depends requires an efficient administrative
institute a feeling of subordination. The socialization of function on
a social intention to a common basis must be also likely to
organizational Western society. However, the measures required to prove
introduced
is likely to regard the direct of commonwealth as final. In highly
organized a society and the greater its discipline, the more an aggressor
tor those involves, most costly form of resistance. The more highly
invasion, if he has sufficient power to ask for the most difficult and,
concludes an aggressor that, while made to protect its people against
To make such a deterrent effective, a government would have to
of its ability to carry out its duties.
the resistance to common life must be for a somewhat more certain
it not easy to see what concrete action could be taken to demonstrate

II - 12

II - 16

subtle interrelationships of modern society is almost certain to have
much different consequences for the indigenous population than for the
occupying power.

Partisan activity has generally been most effective in primitive societies and precisely because of the absence of identifiable control. In these societies there exists no group with sufficient authority against which effective pressure can be brought. To propose such a strategy for Europe reveals a deep misunderstanding of the requirements of deterrence and of the psychology of Western societies.

Guerrilla warfare almost invariably requires special conditions to be possible at all, of terrain, as in Yugoslavia or Algeria, or of overwhelming numbers, as in China, or of vast expanse, such as in Russia. Even then it could be conducted generally only when there was outside support, both military and moral, giving some prospect of eventual victory. Partisan warfare can make a contribution to other forms of resistance, it cannot be substituted for them.

## E. The Requirement of Local Defense.

If the Free World is to avoid gradual erosion, it must be able to

It is the true world is to be a world of great creation, it must be able to

## II. The Requirement of Final Deeds.

recognition; it cannot be undisturbed for them.

Victory. Brazil must have a contribution to offer them of
armour,ship, military and more. Grant some broochet, etc.,
and then it could be conducted. If only when there are some
controlling numbers as in China, or at least some influence, and
so do become at all, etc. in China, etc.
Guerilla warlike must exist invaderly reduce special conditions
of determination and of the behavior of Western society.

Stratagems for Europe require a good understanding of the requirements
and that effective broadees can be brought. To produce such a
in force society there exists no branch at the moment sufficient endowment
society and precisely because of the absence of identical control.
Brazilian activity must generally be most effective in primitive
coexisting power.

The general-conclusion concerns the influence of the influence
of the general-conclusion on the influence of the general-conclusion
in the international relations of modern society, to which certain to be
supposed international relations of modern society is to be referred

II - 10

II - 19

by budgetary considerations. "More bang for the buck" became an axiom not only of strategic but also of fiscal wisdom. But whatever the merit of these views when they were first developed, the simple choices of our period of invulnerability are no longer open to us. Continued reliance on the military policy of the past decade will produce not deterrence but paralysis. Far from holding our alliances together, it will undermine them. Building up a greater capacity for local defense in no longer a question of choice, it has been imposed on the free world by the technological revolution of the past decade and a half.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of local defense are either fallacious or exaggerated. In total available manpower the free world still is superior and its industrial potential exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is no reason except lack of will why Western Europe and the United States cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of Soviet aggression. To be sure, in other areas the problem is more complicated.

In the so-called "grey areas" of the Middle East and South-East Asia,

See blow 'The United States and Europe,' Chapter P.

["See p. 1. The United States and Europe, 1 Chapter, p. 111.", "In the so-called "war" against the Hitlerites and South-Germanies, # the Communists won. To do so, in other ways the Communists had to work. The most important was the creation of local forces capable of arresting almost all Hitlerites and South-Germanies. The Communists had to work with Western Europe and the United States, and the Communists had to prevent the rise of Hitlerism in Germany and the industrialised countries of Western Europe. In this way the Communists could prevent the rise of Hitlerism in Germany and the industrialised countries of Western Europe and the industrialised countries of South-Germany. In this way the Communists could prevent the

II - 20

the Communist bloc can concentrate its manpower and material against
countries weaker, and less closely allied than those of the North Atlantic
Community. On the other hand, these are also the areas where the political
penalties for aggression would be greatest. An attack on a new
nation

would antagonize all the other uncommitted nations and it
would lead to an increased mobilization of Western resources. Moreover,
difficulties of terrain and communications place a ceiling on the
number of troops an aggressor could utilize effectively even there.

The inability to protect every area locally is no excuse for failing
to secure those where it is possible. The minimum goal of local defense
must be to prevent the possibility of cheap victories. The optimum
situation is when aggression can be defeated locally. The latter
situation is attainable in Europe. And the position of other areas can
be improved through their own forces and increases in the American limited-
war capability.

This is a complex but not insoluble task made all the more necessary
by the starkness of the alternatives. Building up a capability for
local defense will require much effort. But the rewards are high to

["local defense will require much effort, but the revenue are paid to\nby the states on the alternative. Building a capacity for", "This is a complex but not intractable task made all the more necessary\nby capacity.", "be improved through funds own finance and increase in the American finished\nsituation is attained in Europe. And the position of other states can\nsituation is being adjusted locally. The latter\nmust be to prevent the possibility of any victory. The aim\nis to come to some place where it is possible. The minimum goal of local defense\nthe ability to protect every area locally is to ensure for writing\nnumber of forces an aggressor could utilize effectively even in case\nsituation or terrain and communications place a ceiling on the\nwork itself to an increased modification of Western resources. Moreover,\nthe local authorities will be authorized to all the other uncommitted nations and it\nwill be necessary to increase the local uncommitted nations and it

II-21

Perhaps, as is often alleged, public opinion in the West would not support such an effort. But no one can know, for the issue has never been presented to it. If the democracies cannot muster a leadership willing to stake its political future on a program essential to survival, its political future is dim indeed. In that case, at least lack of courage should not be compounded by self-delusion. No technical gadget can substitute for sacrifice. No refinements or adaptations of retaliatory strategy can change the fact that opportunities for Communist blackmail will constantly increase. Not to build up a capacity for local defense in the name of maintaining living standards is to purchase a brief period of comfort at the risk of losing everything.

Building up a capability for local defense is a complex but not insoluble task, made all the more necessary by the starkness of the alternatives. The rewards are high. To .... .... ....

II-22

a considerable extent, a strategy of local defense will lift
from the West the impossible choices of current military policy.
It will increase the flexibility of Western diplomacy. It is the
prerequisite of effective arms control negotiations. For as
long as there is a wide disparity in local power, the Soviet Union
will not have an incentive for serious arms control. In devising
a strategy of local defense, however, we come up squarely against
one of the great unresolved issues of Western military policy:
the relative significance of nuclear and conventional weapons.

the relative significance of unclear and conventional weapons,
one of the great unresolved issues of Western military policy:
a strategy of local defense, however, we come to adversely affect
will not have an incentive for serious arms control. In devising
four as there is a wide discrepancy in local power, the Soviet Union
brinkmanship of effective arms control negotiations. For as
If will increase the flexibility of Western diplomacy. If it is due
from the West the unappeasable choices of current military policy.
a considerable extent, a strategy of local defense will title

II-55

# III - Limited War: Nuclear or Conventional

## A. The Nature of the Debate

Few issues have aroused more controversy than the relative role of conventional and nuclear weapons in Western strategy. Its resolution is of vital significance for our strategy, our alliance policy and the future of arms control negotiations.

Two facts need to be understood at the outset: *No war in the nuclear age can ever be completely free of the specter of nuclear weapons -- at least until arms control measures are much further advanced and much more reliable.* In a war between nuclear powers, even if no nuclear weapons are used, both sides would have to take account of the possibility that they *might* be. The tactics would necessarily differ from those of World War II; deployment would have to guard against the sudden introduction of nuclear weapons. Diplomats would have to negotiate with the knowledge that any prolonged conventional war may turn into a nuclear conflict; if not a final showdown. Every war henceforth will be nuclear to a greater or lesser extent, whether or not nuclear weapons are used.

111 - 2 -

A second fact is equally important: the choice between using conventional or nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to us. The Soviet nuclear arsenal is growing. Soviet military journals report tactical exercises with nuclear weapons. We cannot gear our strategy or stake our survival on the assumption that nuclear weapons will not be used against us. Even if we prefer to resist with conventional weapons, we have to be prepared for nuclear war as well. Only being ready for limited (in addition to general) nuclear war will give us the option of a conventional strategy.

With this background, we can summarize the arguments for both sides. Advocates of a nuclear strategy emphasize the disparity in mobilizable manpower between the Communist bloc and the free world, a disparity made even more acute by the Communist ability to concentrate their whole weight against such states much smaller and much less well-equipped. Nuclear weapons, it is claimed, can serve as a substitute for manpower. At the very least they will force an aggressor to

III - 3 -

disperse his forces. This will prevent breakthroughs
of established defensive positions and the consolidation
of occupied territory.

The proponents of a nuclear strategy admit that if
nuclear weapons were simply added to the tactics of World
War II the result would probably be the complete devastation
of the combat zone. They point out that such a course
would be senseless. The cost of a nuclear strategy must
be judged in terms of the tactics appropriate to
nuclear weapons. Since nuclear weapons are do destructive
and at the same time so easy to transport, large military
formations cannot be maintained in the field. And they are
unnecessary because fire power is no longer dependent on
massed armies. To concentrate is to court disaster. Safety
resides in mobility. Logistics must be simple. The traditional
supply system is too cumbersome and too vulnerable. Accordingly,
a great premium will be placed on small, self-contained units
of high mobility. In such circumstances, it is agreed,

III -4 -

damage would not be excessive; indeed it might be less
than that of a conventional war of the World War II variety
with a flankless front line rolling over the countryside.

A nuclear strategy according to its proponents would have
these advantages (a) The dispersal of troops would separate
the requirements of victory from those of controlling territory.
To prevail in a nuclear war, it is necessary to have small,
highly mobile units. To control territory, larger concentra-
tions are required, particularly in the key centers of
administration. For example, the Soviet army required some
twenty divisions to crush the Hungarian rebellion. Crushing
Such a concentration the rebellion, it is argued, would have been clearly impossible
if the Soviets had had to face nuclear weapons. (b) Nuclear
war would complicate the aggressor's calculations -- if only
because it is an unfamiliar mode of warfare. The Soviet Union
and Communist China possess many "experts" in conventional
warfare, but with respect to nuclear war, their calculations
are of necessity theoretical. There would always remain

III - 5

the inevitable uncertainty of embarking on a course in which no
experience is available. (c) Nuclear war would be an effective
device to weaken the Communist control of Soviet-dominated
areas. The small detachments which are appropriate for nuclear war
will be extremely vulnerable to a guerrilla activity and
can be handicapped severely by a hostile population. Since
the population on the Western side of the Iron Curtain is more
loyal to its governments than those under Communist rule,
a nuclear war is thought to be the best means of exploiting Soviet
political difficulties -- at least in Europe -- and therefore
the most effective means of deterring Soviet aggression. (d) Nuclear
weapons are our "best weapons", the result of our most advanced
technology. To forego using them is to deprive ourselves
of the advantages of a superior industrial potential. (e) Any
other course would impose impossible force requirements. It is
admittedly impossible to fight a conventional war against
a nuclear enemy without having a nuclear establishment in
the field -- otherwise, the temptation for the aggressor to
use nuclear weapons and sweep all before him, might become

III - 6

overwhelming. This means that we would need a well-protected retaliatory force, a capable limited-war force, and increasing conventional strength. Since the expense of maintaining each category even at present levels is multiplying, any attempt to build up conventional forces must result in a fundamental, perhaps fatal, weakness in each category.⁷

The advocates of a conventional strategy reply that the decision to use nuclear weapons is inconsistent with the very concept of limitation. Pointing to such military exercises with nuclear weapons as *Carte Blanche* in Europe and *Sax ebrush* in the United States, they stress that the inevitable consequence of nuclear war will be the desolation of the combat zone and the decimation of the population. No country would wish to be defended at that price. Even a "successful" nuclear

7. For a fuller discussion of limited nuclear war see the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Ch. VI - "Problems of Limited Nuclear War," p. 191 ff. N.Y., 1957

III - 7

war would provide a conclusive argument for future Soviet
blackmail.

Moreover, once nuclear weapons are used, so this
school thought reasons, all restraints may disappear. It will
be difficult enough to establish the limits of a conventional
war. Because of their very unfamiliarity, nuclear weapons
would make the task nearly impossible. The very fact that there
exists a continuous spectrum of destructiveness in nuclear
weapons, so often invoked by advocates of a nuclear strategy
in defense of their thesis, is used by their critics against
them. If the distinction between the low-yield and high-yield
weapons is so difficult, if so much depends on the manner of
employing them, any effort to set limits based on explosive
equivalent will be meaningless. The temptation to resort
to ever more destructive weapons will be overwhelming.

Proponents of a conventional strategy question not only the
possibility of limitation but also the efficacy of the tactics
thought to be appropriate for nuclear war. Small detachments,
they contend, whatever their nuclear firepower, would be extremely

III - 8

vulnerable to harassment and defeat by conventional forces.

When confronted by an opponent possessing both a nuclear and a conventional capability, they are almost certain to lose, for they would be largely defenseless against small conventional raiding parties. Nuclear weapons, it is argued, are not a substitute for manpower. On the contrary, nuclear war because of its high rate of attrition, would probably require more manpower, not leas.

So the argument goes, Finally, our industrial potential will be less significant in a nuclear war. Since nuclear weapons provide greater de-structiveness per unit cost than conventional explosives, reliance on them enables economically weaker nations to redress the strategic balance much more easily than they could with conventional forces. A point is likely to be reached for any given objective or area at which additional increments of explosive power are no longer strategically significant. When this "saturation point" is reached, superiority in nuclear weapons may be meaningless. And nuclear weapons place a premium on surprise attack and sudden thrusts to which the

III - 9

defender is much more vulnerable than the attacker. To rely
on a nuclear strategy, it is urged, would thus be adopting
a course of conduct which rewards the qualities in which
potential aggressors excel.

A conventional strategy according to its advocates would
have these advantages: (1) It would provide the best chance
to limit any conflict that might break out. (2) It would
use our industrial potential to best advantage. Since the
destructive power of individual conventional weapons is
relatively low, victory can be achieved only through a sub-
stantial production effort which puts a premium on our
special skills. At the same time, the relatively slow pace
of military operations -- at least compared to nuclear war--
and the need to build up supplies before each new engagement
give the maximum opportunity for attempting a political
settlement. (3) Conventional defense provides the best
means of preventing the occupation of threatened countries.

III - 10

The concept of a flankless line which advocates of a nuclear
strategy wish to abandon is likely to be considered by
threatened countries the best guarantee of their safety.
Liberation will always be a less attractive prospect than
protection. (4) If nuclear weapons were used, after all, the
onus of initiating such a war would be shifted to the Communist
states.

One of the difficulties in resolving these arguments is
that the moral fervor of the debaters sometimes obscures the
nature of the issues and often causes them to claim too
much; those who think that to forego nuclear weapons is an
offense against progress have as their counterpart those who
are passionately convinced that even to consider modalities
of nuclear warfare is to insult morality. As a result, arguments
that closer examination would reveal ... as imprecise
and sometimes as erroneous have been elevated into dogma.

III - 10 a

For example, it is often said that a nuclear war cannot be
limited because neither side would accept defeat without resorting
to ever larger weapons. Now there are many good reasons for ...

III-11

concern about the possibility of limiting nuclear war. But the argu-
ment that neither side will be prepared to accept a setback without
expanding the conflict implies that it is somehow politically more
unbearable to be defeated in a limited nuclear war than in a limited
conventional one. In this form, it is a criticism of every form of
limited war and not simply of the nuclear conflict. It is not clear
why a country should be more willing to acquiesce in a conventional
than in a nuclear defeat. On the contrary, the decision as to
whether a war is to be expanded is likely to depend more on the value
attached to the objective than to the weapons used to attain it. What-
ever the technical difficulties of limiting nuclear war, the political
argument that it makes defeat unacceptable does not bear scrutiny.

On the other side of the debate, a nuclear strategy is often jus-
tified by the spectrum of available weapons. The smallest nuclear wea-
pons, it is said, are less destructive than the most powerful conventional
devices. There is therefore no technical reason to recoil before nuclear
warfare, and if every reason to use our most "advanced" technology. How-
ever, the effort to base a nuclear strategy on the discrimination of
nuclear weapons surely .... .... .... ....

["nuclear weapons exactly\n\n....\n\n....\n\n....\n\n....

III - 12

technical reason to recall before nuclear warfare, and every reason to use our most "advanced" technology. However, the effort to base a nuclear strategy on the discrimination of nuclear weapons surely goes too far. The chief motive for using *nuclear weapons* is, after all, their greater destructive power and their lower weight per explosive equivalent. Nuclear weapons no more destructive than conventional ones would probably not be worth the increased risk of "escalation" inherent in an unfamiliar mode of warfare.

This controversy has produced frustration rather than clarity because, in so many respects, both the proponents and the opponents of a nuclear strategy are right: their disagreements arise from the perspective from which they consider the issue. Looking at the problem from the point of view of deterrence, the advocates of a nuclear strategy argue that nuclear weapons are the most effective sanction against the outbreak of a war.

Considering the actual conduct of a war, the opponents of a nuclear strategy are above all concerned with reducing the impact of military operations and increasing their predictability. The

III - 13

destructiveness of individual weapons and the uncertainties
of an unfamiliar mode of warfare which are unknown correctly
adduced as contributing to deterrence can, with equal justifi-
cation, be cited as working against effective limitation.

The issue therefore turns on the question of what should
be stressed: deterrence or the strategy for fighting a war.
Obviously an emphasis overemphasis on destructiveness
may paralyze the will. But an overconcern with developing
a tolerable strategy for the conduct of war may reduce the
risks of aggression to such a degree that it will be encouraged.
While the deterrent threat must be credible, the quest for
credibility must not lower the penalties to a point where
they are no longer unacceptable. The frequency of warfare
since the Middle Ages demonstrates the difficulty of achiev-
ing deterrence with conventional weapons alone. On the other
hand, A course of action that increases the opponent's
uncertainties about the nature of the conflict will generally
discourage aggression. If war should break out, however,

III - 14

through accident or miscalculation, it may make limitation
extremely difficult.

## B. A Direction for U.S. Strategy

Some years ago this author advocated a nuclear strategy. It seemed then that the most effective deterrent to any substantial Communist aggression was the knowledge that the United States would employ nuclear weapons from the very outset. A nuclear strategy appeared to be offer the best prospect of offsetting Sino-Soviet manpower and of using our superior industrial capacity to best advantage.

The need for forces capable of fighting limited nuclear war still exists. However, several developments have caused a shift in the view about the relative emphasis to be given conventional force as against nuclear forces. These are: (1) the disagreement within our military establishment and within the alliance about the nature of limited nuclear war; (2) the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the increased significance of long-range missiles; (3) the impact of arms

See the authors *Nuclear Weapons*, p. 174 ff.

III 15

control negotiations. The first of these considerations raises doubts as to whether we would know how to limit nuclear war. The second alters the strategic significance of nuclear war. The third influences the framework in which any strategy will have to be conducted and determines the political cost.

While it is feasible to design a theoretical model for limited nuclear war, the fact remains that fifteen years after the beginning of the nuclear age no such model has ever won general agreement. It would be next to impossible to obtain a coherent description of what is understood by "limited nuclear war" from our military establishment. The Air Force thinks of it as control over a defined air space. The Army considers it vital to destroy tactical targets which can affect ground operations, including centers of communications. The Navy is primarily concerned with eliminating port installations. Even within a given service, a detailed, coherent doctrine is often lacking. The Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Force almost

III - 16

surely interpret the nature of limited nuclear war differently.

Since disputes about targets are usually settled by addition--
by permitting each service to destroy what it considers
essential to its mission -- a limited nuclear war fought
in this manner may well become indistinguishable from
all-out war. At least it would diminish our self-assurance
and subtlety in an operation in which everything would
depend on the ability to remain in control of events.

The disagreements between our services are repeated
in relations with our allies. Few of our allies possess
nuclear weapons. Those that do have emphasized the retaliatory
and *th* not the tactical aspect of nuclear warfare. Public
opinion *in* most allied countries has been mobilized against
nuclear weapons by a variety of sources. And these attitudes
are reinforced by current trends in arms control negotiations.
In these circumstances, it will become increasingly difficult

III - 17

to construct a strategic and tactical doctrine which is
accepted by the alliance and maintained with conviction
in the face of Soviet pressure. This leads one to doubt
whether the West will possess either the knowledge or the daring
to impose the limitations. If it relies entirely on a nuclear
strategy, its vulnerability to nuclear blackmail both before
and during hostilities will be considerable.

To be sure, any limitation of war is to some extent
arbitrary. There is probably some disagreement even as to the
nature of limited conventional war. The problem of communicating
intentions to an opponent will be difficult regardless of
the mode of warfare. But this makes it all the more important
that the limitations which are attempted should be reasonably
familiar. Even with the best intentions on both sides, a
nuclear war will be more difficult to limit than a conventional
one. Since no country has had any experience with the <u>musk</u>
tactical use of nuclear weapons, the possibility of miscal-
culation is considerable. The temptation to use the same target
system as for conventional war and <u>the</u>

III - 18 18

thereby produce vast casualties will be overwhelming. The
pace of operations may outstrip the possibilities of negotiation.
Both sides would be operating in the dark with no precedents
to guide them and a necessarily inadequate understanding of
the purposes of the opponent, if not their own. The dividing
line between conventional and nuclear weapons is more familiar
and therefore easier to maintain -- assuming the will to do so --
than any distinction within the spectrum of nuclear weapons.
This uncertainty may increase deterrence. It will also magnify
the risks of conflict should deterrence fail.

These considerations are reinforced by the strategic
changes wrought by the advent of the age of nuclear plenty
and of the long-range missile. When nuclear material was
relatively scarce, it was possible to believe that tactical
nuclear weapons might give the West an advantage in limited
war. Under conditions of nuclear scarcity, the Soviet Union

III - 19

would have had to make a choice: it could not simultaneously
push the development of its retaliatory force and also equip
its ground forces for nuclear war. Whichever alternative
was chosen would produce a weakness in some category. Since the
logical decision for the Soviets seemed to be to give priority
to the retaliatory force, it was then held that tactical
nuclear weapons could be used to offset Soviet conventional
preponderance.

In the meantime, the Soviet nuclear stockpile has multiplied.
A nuclear strategy will now have to be conducted against an
equally well-equipped opponent. In these circumstances, numbers
become again important. Because of the destructiveness of
nuclear weapons, the casualty rate among combat units is
likely to be high. The side which has the more replacements
available therefore stands to gain the upper hand. The
notion that nuclear weapons can substitute for numerical
inferiority has lost a great deal of its validity.

The development of missiles has accentuated the strategic
 problems of limited nuclear war. As long as delivery

III - 20

systems were composed of airplanes, air domination over the
battle area on the model of our experience in the Korean
war was conceivable. And tactical skill in handling the
weapons *within* the combat zone might have led to victory
on the nuclear battlefield. However, as missile forces
grow on both sides, as even airplanes are equipped with
*medium-ranged* missiles, this possibility steadily diminishes.

For one thing, since nuclear weapons can be delivered
accurately at considerable distances, it seems unnecessary
to introduce major nuclear forces into the *combat* zone.

More importantly, the only way of achieving what used to be considered air superiority is to destroy most of the opponent's medium- and intermediate-range missiles. Such an operation is difficult to reconcile with an attempt to limit hostilities.

If, however, the areas where these missiles are located become
sanctuaries, it would appear that a stalemate will almost
inevitably be the outcome of a limited nuclear war.

III -21

Of course, such a result must not be minimized. An aggressor, certain that his attack would be checked, would presumably be deterred. The difficulty is the devastation of the combat zone, which would be the price of a stalemate. In some situations, it may be to the Communist advantage to settle for the *status quo ante* in a war that obliterates the disputed area. If a Soviet attack on Western Germany should lead to the desolation of the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union would score a major gain even if it offered at some point to withdraw to its starting point. The devastation of Germany could be a means of convincing all other threatened areas of the futility of resistance. An "unsuccessful" attack of this nature might insure the success of all future Soviet blackmail.

Finally, it would be idle to discount the impact on strategy of the pattern of arms control negotiations. At each conference, nuclear weapons have been placed in a separate category and stigmatized as weapons of mass destruction without any distinction as to type or device. The goal of

III - 22

eventual nuclear disarmament has been avowed by all
states. A moratorium on nuclear testing has been in
existence for two years and it is possible that a formal
agreement will be signed. Future negotiations will almost
inevitably reinforce this trend. The consequence will be
that the inhibitions against using the weapons around which
the West has built its whole military policy will multiply.
Whatever the other consequences of a nuclear test ban,
it will reinforce the already strong reluctance to use nuclear
weapons in limited war.

In any given crisis, the possibility that resort to
nuclear weapons would probably abrogate a test ban
would probably be considered as one of the factors against
using them. Similarly, we would have to weigh the tactical
advantage of nuclear weapons against the political cost.
Once nuclear weapons were used in limited war, it is possible
that the pressure of 7th countries to acquire nuclear
weapons of their own would grow irresistible. Or else

[Y]

III - 23

world opinion would impel a renunciation of a strategy
which might appear to have brought humanity to the brink
of catastrophe. Whatever the likely result, the concern
that use of nuclear weapons may have incalculable political
effects could outweigh all military considerations.

These factors will create an extremely precarious
situation if the free world continues to rely primarily
on a nuclear strategy. The more the pressure against
any use of nuclear weapons build up, the greater will
be the gap between our deterrent policy, our military
capability and our psychological readiness -- a gap which
must tempt aggression. The years ahead must therefore
see a substantial strengthening of the conventional forces
of the free world. If strong enough to halt Soviet con-
ventional attacks -- as in areas such as Europe they could be --
conventional forces would shift the onus and risk of initiating
nuclear war to the other side. Even where they cannot resist

III - 24

[Y]

every scale of attack, they should force the aggressor into military operations which leave no doubt as to his ultimate aim. They would thereby make ultimate recourse to nuclear weapons politically and psychologically simpler, while affording an opportunity for a settlement before this step is taken.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of conventional defense and of "hordes" of Communist manpower are either fallacious or exaggerated. Both in available manpower and in industrial potential the free world still is superior. And conventional warfare favors the defense.

It has been truly remarked that, but for the development of nuclear weapons, the defense would long since have achieved ascendancy over the offense. Even in World War II, the attacker generally required a superiority of three to one. And with improvements in conventional weapons technology -- far simpler than many of those already accomplished in other fields -- this ratio could be increased further still.

III - 25

At a minimum, the conventional capability of the free
world should be sufficiently powerful so that a nuclear
defense becomes the **last** and not the **only** recourse. The
best situation is one in which the conventional forces
of the free world can be overcome **only** by nuclear weapons.

There is no technical reason why this should not be possible
in Western Europe at least. Such forces would remove
many opportunities for Soviet blackmail. They would increase
the flexibility of our diplomacy. They would enable us
to negotiate about the control of nuclear weapons with confidence.

### C. Some Consequences.

While a substantial build-up of conventional forces
and a greater reliance on a conventional strategy is
essential, it is equally vital not to press the conclusions
too far. In their attempt to prove their case, many of the
proponents of a conventional strategy have thought it necessary
so to deride **any** reliance on nuclear weapons or to paint so

[Y]

III - 26

awful a picture of atomic war that they defeat their
own object. For against an opponent known to consider
nuclear war as the worst evil, nuclear blackmail is an
almost fool-proof strategy. Conventional forces will be
of no avail if an aggressor is convinced that he can
probably force surrender by threatening to use nuclear
weapons. A greater emphasis on conventional defense
presupposed that the aggressor cannot promise himself
an advantage either from the threat or the actuality
of nuclear war. However much conventional war may be
preferred to the use of nuclear weapons, limited nuclear
war is preferable to all-out war.

Conventional forces should not be considered a sub-
stitute for a limited nuclear war capability, but as
a complement to it. For against an opponent equipped with
nuclear weapons, it would be suicidal to rely entirely on

III - 27

[Y]

conventional arms. Such a course development would probably provide the precise incentive an aggressor needs to employ nuclear weapons and to sweep all before him. A conventional war can be kept within limits only if nuclear war seems more unattractive.

This becomes apparent when we analyze what options we have if, despite our best efforts in the conventional field, nuclear weapons are actually used against us. Three choices would then seem available: to accept defeat; to resort to general war; or to seek to conduct limited nuclear war.

If we are unwilling to accept defeat -- and to accept it under such circumstances would make us forever subject to nuclear blackmail -- our choice resolves itself into all-out war or limited nuclear war. All-out war will become increasingly senseless as the missile age develops. Hence, conventional war can be kept conventional only if we maintain, together with our retaliatory force, an adequate capability for limited nuclear war. The aggressor must understand that we are in a position to match any ...