WASHINGTON POST 11 February 1973

[LC]

# Gen. Haig—Nixon's Man in the Pentagon

By JOY BILLINGTON
Star-News Staff Writer

In the libraries of World War I buffs, there is a thick volume entitled "Haig." It is an indispensable work for research into the strategies of the British general who is remembered for sending "the flower of British youth" to die in the trenches in France and in suicidal assaults against the German lines. That was Douglas Haig.

Some 55 years later, an American Gen. Haig has become famous enough to warrant a lengthy book, though less for his role as a military man than as a presidential emissary who helped negotiate a Vietnam peace.

Gen. Alexander Haig's missions to Saigon and other Southeast Asian capitals brought him so many headlines that towards the end of the negotiations he was almost as jumpy as his boss, Henry Kissinger, about being misinterpreted.

ON A PERFECTLY innocent trip to Philadelphia Jan. 23, he hunched down in an aircraft leaving Andrews Air Force Base 20 minutes before Kissinger's plane arrived from Paris, scared that if the press caught sight of him, new headlines "WHERE GOETH HAIG?" would materialize.

As Kissinger's deputy until Jan. 4, 48-year-old Alexander Haig has spent the past four years in the White House (two longer than he was invited for, because the President wouldn't let him go) and the past four months helping search out and pin down the elusive peace settlement.

He was rewarded by the President with a fourth star to wear on the uniform he had laid aside for four years of wearing dark suits and impeccable shirts, and an impressive leapfrogging over 243 other generals to the job of Army vice chief of staff.

THE NIGHT Haig got his fourth star, he went home in uniform for the first time in years, and his elderly dog, Duncan, went crazy barking at the "intruder." A few weeks later, the dog hardly raises an eyebrow. Neither do the bypassed generals in the Pentagon — "I've experienced no difficulty at all and don't anticipate any," Haig says.

For Haig, everyone in the know predicts, is on his way to the top, up the last rungs of the long, long ladder to the top step, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In a modest three-bedroom, green-shuttered North Arlington house, Haig submits to an interview while admitting that "for the professional in a life-

time career, publicity tends to distort the role you play on a long-term basis."

THE CONTRIBUTIONS one makes, he says, should stand on their own merits, "and when you are involved in sensitive national security work, it's helpful to let results speak for themselves."

Also, after participating in the notorious Kissinger-Hunabelle interviews by talking with the French producer-writer, "one would be inclined to develop a suspicion" of women reporters, he laughs.

Haig immediately contradicts the notion that he is to be the bright light of the new volunteer army who will be able to nurse the Army through the transition, the budget cuts and the anti-militarism.

"I don't look at myself as having that kind of a role. I look at myself as moving into a position where I support the chief of staff and do all that I can to make him as effective as possible. I don't have any gimmickry, any particular role to play at all, and I would hope just the opposite."

ASKED IF as a result of anti-militarism a great public relations drive would be necessary to "re-sell" the military, Haig emphatically says he does not think so.

"I think the American people are incredibly smart about such things. I think they draw their impressions and make their assessments based upon results, what they see.

"That takes time, and it takes accomplishment, and not a lot of words or public relations salesmanship. And there's a dialectic involved, of popular attitudes, and when there've been waves of doubts or concern about the military they are frequently followed by improving trends. You don't want to have extremes on either end of the spectrum.

"But I really think that the problem of the military in America today is a problem of producing, and providing to the people what they want and must have in the way of national security and performance."

DO THE PEOPLE know what they want? "I'm not sure, and to generalize on it is difficult. But if there is such a

thing as a popular mood or popular attitude, it generally gets fairly close to the truth, every time . . . with extremes and wavering up and down."

Citing 1969 as "a year when we had a terrible problem in this country, a massive credibility gap if you will, which circumstances brought about (and there were a number of factors — the war, a challenge to authority in general)," he believes that "the way to work out of that problem, and I think we are working out of it, is through accomplishment.

"In the case of the President, people began to realize that the man in that oval office, whoever he might be, might have a design, might know a little more about a situation than a particular scribe or editorialist or reporter or critic."

"Certainly over the past four years there have been a number of accomplishments, in the national security area, which I think have added to a growing new credibility. Now, that's based on accomplishments, not on someone out trying to sell a package."

Here he lists the opening to China (Haig flew to Peking to help prepare for President Nixon); being "on the thresh hold of greatly improved relations with the Soviet Union;" a successful conclusion ("not the way many impatient people wanted it, but a successful conclusion") to the Vietnam

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

3-F

S. I. HAYAKAWA

WASHINGTON STAR & NEWS 10 February 1973

# Why the Republic of Vietnam Is Still There

It was a little more than a year ago that I visited Vietnam. Saigon was peaceful at the time.

The bazaars were crowded with merchandise: Rugs, handbags, fruit, dried fish — and colorful ornaments for the Tet celebrations. The streets were full of motorcycles. The countryside was equally busy, whole families at work gathering rice, or taking care of little produce farms of cabbages and onions and cucumbers. It must be like that still.

But there was then a big question on everyone's mind. Would the South be able to resist another Tet offensive like that of 1968? Would the Thieu government be able to elicit enough loyalty and support to put up a fight? Not much had been heard of the Viet Cong late. It was possible then to travel by civilian car in all directions from Saigon without much fear of ambush.

But the question remained. Were the Viet Cong really subdued? Or would they rise again?

I talked with many people in Vietnam: American and Vietnamese officials, members of the Chinese (Taiwan) Agricultural Technical Group, Australians and ordinary Vietnamese citizens, both in English and through interpreters. Curiously those most completely sure that South Vietnam was done for in the event

of another Communist offensive were, in my experience, American newsmen.

Well, the expected offensive began on March 29. What a lot of manpower the North Vietnamese threw into it! It is estimated that 13 divisions were sent into combat — almost all their fighting forces. Many districts in North Vietnam were stripped of all able-bodied men between 14 and 45.

At first the Communists scored quick victories, such as the capture of Quang Tri (since recaptured). They made massive attacks on An Loc, Hue and Kontum. These cities repeatedly were given up for lost by American newsmen, but not by the South Vietnamese army or by American airmen.

North Vietnamese casualties were huge, but their progress was minimal. Saigon itself never was in danger.

And where were the Viet Cong? By 1972 they had been greatly reduced in number, first, by the enormous casualties they suffered in the Tet offensive of 1968; secondly, by their defection by the tens of thousands to the South Vietnamese side, which welcomed them through an "open arms" policy forgiving them for their past enmity.

Furthermore, the village leadership program of the National Center for Revolutionary Development Cadres

at Vung Tau, under the direction of Col. Nguyen Be, seems to have had its effect. It had long been a Viet Cong tactic to execute village leaders as they took over an area. Col. Be believed in training village people, not just the army, into leadership and defense forces against takeover and subversion. The graduates of his training center are all over the country. The villages and hamlets where they have assumed leadership have been in the forefront of resistance to the Communists.

Then, there is the land-to-tiller program, instituted by President Thieu in 1970, which by this time had distributed nearly 2 million acres of rice land to some 700,000 farmers, who are tenants no more, but owners. (Former owners are being compensated.) Farmers, formerly easily recruited by the Viet Cong against their landlords and their government, now are ready to fight for their land against collectivization!

So up to now the Republic of Vietnam has survived, with the help, to be sure, of American armed power, but with a courage and determination of its own, reflecting its own resources as a culture and as a nation.

I am especially glad that the ancient capital of Hue survived the assault. Once the intellectual center of the coun-

try, aloof both from the commercialism of Saigon and the communism of Hanoi, it cherishes ancient Confucian culture and erudition.

The 8 miles from the airport to the city are dotted with tiny pagodas and god shelves and rickety old shacks. The roads are crowded with 10-passenger, three-wheeled minibuses, crammed full of people and their belongings, including chickens and ducks which fluster wildly as they bounce along.

Outside the city are the palaces of former rulers; partly damaged and decayed by time and war, but still magnificently evocative of an imperial past. Then there is the tomb of the emperor, built into the side of a hill, approached through a courtyard of great statues of warriors and mandarins, while huge dragons line the magnificent steps.

I have in my office a precious souvenir — a flag of arts, law, science, education and medicine, and some 3,000 students.

When the city was under attack, the university had to be closed. There was fighting to be done. I understand it is open for instruction again.

Good wishes to the University of Hue! Good wishes to the Republic of Vietnam! Some day I'll see you again.

NEW YORK NEWS 10 February 1973 P2

## Travis Closed to Public

Travis Air Force Base, Calif., Feb. 9 (UPI)—The Air Force said today that the public would not be allowed access to Travis Air Force Base to greet returning prisoners of war.

Travis will be the first stop for the released prisoners when

they return to the continental United States.

The Military Airlift Command at Travis said the PWs' return would be televised live and covered extensively by the press "to provide the public with firsthand knowledge and visual contact which would otherwise be inhibited, due to physical limitations."

GEN. HAIG...

Continued

the battle of An Loc. He received the Distinguished Service Cross, and on return from Vietnam was made deputy commandant of cadets at West Point.

In 1968, the Pentagon's Dr. Fritz Kraemer (who first recognized the potentialities of Henry Kissinger years earlier) put forward Haig's name for the job of military assistant to the National Security Council. Many other names were being advanced for the job by various top-level mentors, but after a New York meeting with Kissinger, Haig got it.

"AT THE start, it was by no means clear that he'd be made deputy (to Kissinger), but by the summer of '70 Haig was handling more and more

as Henry started to travel," recalls a National Security Council (NSC) staffer.

"Haig became the final filter, and most instructions came from him. He spent hours talking with Henry, and was given direct access to the President in Henry's absence, and later in his own right.

"He and Henry complemented each other in working styles, although Henry is less even in temper.

"Haig has inner certitude, a strong control over what he's analyzing. He's systematic but not dogmatic, and has a good mind. But perhaps his common sense is more helpful in terms of policymaking," continues this staffer, who has traveled with Haig on many missions to Vietnam.

"HE HAS A profound set of values, an ethical sense which is evident. He really is con-

cerned about right and wrong, which is a rare quality among people who are given to sticking their fingers in the air to see which way the wind is blowing. He has a much longer sense of history than to respond to the opinion polls of the bureaucrats.

"These metaphysical anchors are so rare nowadays among people who get to the top, who've lost them or who never had them," the White House aide concludes.

Haig's anti-communism is said to be implicit rather than explicit. Despite his awareness of the grays in politics, he still is a military man with absolute certainties about America's need to keep up its guard.

NOW, HE HAS ceased being Henry Kissinger's alter ego — as the State Department top hierarchy always

regarded him, even while respecting his qualities as a short-term diplomat.

Apart from the possibility of some future presidential mission, Haig is expected to stay in uniform. Says a member of Kissinger's staff, "The President feels he has a man in the Pentagon whom he knows and can count on. He's gone to a place where they don't have many good generals...

"There was a direct correlation between the achievement of the Vietnam accord and the President's willingness to release him. The way he's leapfrogged all those other generals will put him to some very quick litmus tests. A few people will be puzzled about his promotion and attribute it to the wrong reasons, but he'll do very well, though it won't be any bed of roses."

5-F

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 9 FEBRUARY 1973 (11)

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS - 9 FEBRUARY 1973 (11)
# Sorry saga of Pentagon waste continues in Air Force, Navy contracts for steel dodo birds

By William McGaffin

Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — You may recall that old French proverb about how the more things change the more they remain the same. Critics of the Pentagon are convinced it is an api description of how aircraft procurement is carried out in the five-sided "puzzle palace" across the Potomac.

The Pentagon management changes from time to time and the names of the aircraft change, too. But the Pentagon keeps on blowing the taxpayers' money on aircraft that are often of questionable value, in the judgment of the critics, and that invariably end up costing far more than the defense contractors said they would at the start.

After what happened with the F-111, for example, you would think the Pentagon would be more careful about controlling cost overruns. It was originally estimated in 1962 that 1,700 of these could be purchased for less than $4 million each. Over the years, however, the cost of the plane has climbed until each one now costs $15 million.

AND, INSTEAD OF 1,700, the number produced has dropped to 543. Then the Air Force announced last week that it will order no more of the planes. Unless Congress intervenes again as it did last year, the production line will close at the General Dynamics Corp. plant in Fort Worth, Tex., in December, 1974.

The plane, a swept-wing fighter bomber, has been plagued by mechanical problems and been surrounded by controversy from the start.

It was the subject of a congressional investigation conducted by Sen. John L. McClellan (D-Ark.). It has been described as one of former Defense Sec. Robert S. McNamara's "biggest mistakes" and as a classic example of the lobbying and political infighting that often goes on in connection with the award of a huge defense contract.

It was McNamara who conceived the project. He was convinced that billions could be saved by producing a plane that would serve both the Air Force and the Navy. He also decided that the contract should go to General Dynamics rather than the Boeing Aircraft Co., which gave promise of building a better plane. General Dynamics got the award, apparently, because it needed the business more than Boeing.

The first time the F-111 was sent into combat in Southeast Asia in 1968 three were lost in rapid order and it was pulled out of action for four years. In 1972, when it returned to combat over North Vietnam, six were lost.

THE AIR FORCE SAYS IT does not know why the planes were lost and it denies that the losses had anything to do with its ending of procurement. But Rep. Otis Pike (D-N.Y.) has a suspicion of what may be happening. "I think the F-111 has so many complicated gadgets on it that some one thing may go wrong on a mission and that will cause the plane to crash," he said.

One reason why more of the F-111s were not produced is that, after huge sums had been spent on the Navy version of it, this finally was dropped as a failure and the Navy was permitted to go ahead with a new plane tailored exclusively for it, which it had wanted to do in the first place.

The Navy, however, has been no more successful than the Air Force in controlling the problem of the cost overrun. Its new plane, the F-14, costs even more than the F-111. Instead of $15 million, the F-14 so far has cost $16.8 million a copy — and Grumman Aircraft Corp. says it cannot afford to make any more at this price or it will go broke. It says it will have to get another $2 million per plane bringing the cost to $18.8 million each.

The Navy and Grumman are at an impasse at the moment. The Navy, under orders from Congress, is telling Grumman it must stick to its contract. If Grumman should, in the end, be threatened with bankruptcy, it is a safe bet that Congress would bail it out as it did the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. with a $250 million "loan" guarantee.

GRUMMAN'S CRITICS CONTEND it got into trouble partly by perpetrating a "buy in" to get the contract for the F-14

— that is, by making an unrealistically low bid to shut out its competitors and counting on the Pentagon to “make it well” by letting the price go up if it got into trouble. Grumman denies this.

At least, the F-14 and the Phoenix missile it carries is considered to be a good weapons system for the mission the Navy has assigned them — protecting our giant nuclear powered aircraft carriers from enemy attack. Some non-Pentagon weapons analysts, however, question whether so much money should be invested in a plane to protect a carrier that would cost $1 billion and would be a sitting duck in any direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, they say.

ANOTHER PLANE, AS TROUBLE-PRONE as the F-111 that has cost the taxpayers a bundle is the giant Air Force cargo plane known as the C-5A. By May of last year, 61 of the reduced order of 81 had been delivered.

The Air Force had planned to have 120 of them, but Congress cut off funds for it at the 81 point after it was disclosed that each plane, instead of costing $28 million was going to cost nearly $60 million.

A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a civilian efficiency expert employed by the Air Force, was fired from his $33,000-a-year post after he confided to a Senate subcommittee that the total cost of the C-5As was going to be $2 billion more than the original estimate of $3.4 billion.

Lockheed, the company making it, got the bail-out "loan" guarantee of $250 million from Congress so it could keep afloat to continue producing the C-5A and other military procurement orders on its books.

The problems the C-5A has encountered have been as embarrassing as its cost. Wings have cracked. Engines have fallen off. Landing gears have collapsed. Fitzgerald calls the C-5A project "the great plane robbery."

ONE OF THE PENTAGON'S problems, as seen by its critics, is that it keeps on making the same mistakes.

The Army, for example, gave Lockheed $401 million over a six-year period in an attempt to develop a new helicopter gunship, the Cheyenne, to provide close support for its ground troops.

Last Aug. 9, after the crash of a test model, the Army decided to give up. But only on the Cheyenne. It asked — and got from Congress — $20 million to start research on a new helicopter gunship.

THE AIR FORCE IS ANOTHER example of a service that pursues its objectives with a never-say-die spirit. It wants a new manned bomber to succeed the aging B-52, even though its critics say that a manned bomber is destined to become increasingly obsolete in a missile age. The first time the Air Force tried, Defense Sec. McNamara killed the project after $1.5 billion had been spent on two prototypes. One of the two planes crashed and the other ended up in the Air Force museum in Dayton, O.

Undissuaded by this setback, the Air Force has kept pushing until now it is well on the way with a new manned bomber project, the B-1. Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) estimates in his book, "Uncle Sam, The Last of the Bigtime Spenders," that a fleet of the new bombers will cost at least $12 billion.

Fitzgerald, who got fired for spilling the beans on the Air Force, says one reason why prices are high is that the services are "deliberately wasteful." He writes in his book, "The High Priests of Waste," that the programs "are managed in ways that ensure ever increasing costs with little if any incentive to excel in quality of product."

ANOTHER REASON THE United States finds itself stuck with expensive weapons, according to the critics, is that Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird gave the military too free a hand during the four years he has just concluded at the Pentagon. They were never required to offer an adequate rationale for the high-priced, ultra-sophisticated weapons.

Even the Senate Armed Services Committee, which is dominated by pro-Pentagon hawks, has begun to worry about the runaway weapons costs.

6-F

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1973

Dear Henry:

Welcome home!

I wanted you to know that you have, in my view, again
performed superbly for the country. I don't think
anyone knows better than I what it must have taken by
sheer weight of intelligence and energy to accomplish
what you have.

Things in your absence have become considerably
clearer to me. We are obviously confronting the
point of no return in the Watergate matter. I be-
lieve this is true for the country, for the President
and, without any doubt, for me.

I am going to discuss this with the President over the
weekend and will hope to call you on the phone some-
time Saturday when I am sure you have had an oppor-
tunity for some rest. Your counsel will as always be
essential.

Again, we are all indebted to you for your unending
contributions.

Warm personal regards,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
General, U.S. Army (Retired)
Assistant to the President

Back at
White House
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State

HAK TALKING POINTS

Farewell to General Haig - January 5, 1973

1. Four years ago, in December 1968, Kraemer [a friend] wrote me a letter describing the qualifications of a promising young man called Colonel Haig. If the author will forgive me, let me read some of this to you. [Tab A: Read portions in brackets.]

Everything in that letter is an understatement -- even though that is not the writer's usual style.

2. I consider this new assignment of Haig's to be my most unselfish act. He is literally irreplaceable. But it is an honor which is richly earned. It would have been a crime to hold him here any longer and risk jeopardizing his career. (I think we have overcome the jeopardy to his career.)

3. As it is, there is no way I can repay my debt to him. For four years, he held this operation together and kept it going. Few men have served their country and their President with greater loyalty, decision and ability. It is one of the truly extraordinary performances. We have been through much history together. It will never be the same without him.

4. Your colleagues on the NSC staff have a small gift for you [an engraved silver wine cooler]

5. Some of my other colleagues here may want to add a few words [Rogers, Laird, Moorer, Helms]

4319 Fessenden St., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

9 December 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Office of the President-Elect
Hotel Pierre
5th Avenue & 61st St.
New York, N. Y.

My dear Henry,

The enclosed official description of Colonel Haig's qualifications and achievements is good and correct but, of course, it does not tell you anything, since such bureaucratic resumes can never depict the man.

I have observed Haig over very many years. He is, above all, a man of exceptional strength of character, who happens to be also very intelligent and endowed with an innate grasp of politico-psychological intangibles.

Haig came to my attention about 8 years ago, when he was a young lieutenant colonel in the International Plans and Policy Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (G-3). Since he was writing the Army comments on all JCS papers pertaining to Western Europe, I thought it desirable to give him my private advice regarding European reality. I noticed immediately that such advice was unnecessary. By knowledge as well as by instinct Haig understood everything on his own. We very soon worked together -- although that was by no means my official mission -- in order to thwart certain unrealistic JCS gimmick-concepts. The lieutenant colonel (and this really means something in a hierarchical world) stood his ground with absolutely extraordinary courage and presented his counter-arguments tirelessly in writing and in informal conversations with his superiors. Because of his unaggressive, quiet manners he was, surprisingly enough, able to do so without arousing anybody's antagonism. The latter feat is perhaps even more remarkable than his independence in thought and action.

Due to his unusual qualities Haig was pulled out of the International Plans and Policy Division and attached to lawyer Califano, then the hard-driving General Counsel of the Army who was very close to Vance and clearly destined for a rather spectacular career in government. Although Haig knew nothing at all about Cuba, he was supposed to serve Califano exclusively on Cuban affairs, which Califano handled, not in

his capacity of General Counsel, but as an ad hoc trouble shooter for
the Secretary of Defense. Califano, of course, had never heard of Haig
before, and I remember telling him that he was getting one of the very
best officers in the Army and that, for God's sake, he should not use
so gifted a man only for Cuban matters.

Actually Califano discovered the extreme overall-usefulness of
Haig very soon. Rising steadily through the Pentagon hierarchy, he
kept the lieutenant colonel with him, although for the latter it was a
tough rather than a friendly assignment. In the end Haig sat in McNamara's
inner office and very often was the only military person to accompany the
Secretary to White House and NSC meetings. In this position, peculiarly
tempting for a young officer, Haig retained his utter integrity to an
extent which even aroused the admiration of McNamara himself, whose
general capability for admiring others is decidedly underdeveloped. When
Haig left OSD to attend the Army War College, he received McNamara's
photo with an inscription expressing the Secretary's respect and admi-
ration in astonishingly strong terms. Califano explained to me that
McNamara had remarked, while signing the photo, "This is one of only
two Army officers who dare to contradict me to my face." Again Haig had
succeeded in making his points fearlessly and yet, at the same time,
gaining the respect and trust of a most difficult, near-dictatorial man.

Individuals of Haig's characteristics have become very rare. Our
mass age is not conducive to producing the type. In your fearsomely
responsible new position you will be a lonely man and you need at least
a very few on whose unshakeable human reliability, integrity, and profound
understanding you can rely. I have known you for some time and I am con-
vinced that you will be more than well served by this man.

At this moment everybody is trying to obtain something from you,
because you have risen so high. My interest in Haig is not a personal
one. In fact, he and I are not close friends but merely respect each other.
He addresses me most formally as "Dr. Kraemer" and I call him "Colonel Haig."

The country, however, is in a very difficult and dangerous situa-
tion, and it is necessary that the few talents we have get into positions
where they can be objectively most useful, and where they can be loyal and
effective helpers of men like yourself on whose performance so very much
depends.

As ever,

Kraemer

2

CAREER RESUME OF

COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., 050790, ARMOR

Colonel Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 050790, Armor, was born on 2 December 1924 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is married and has three children. He entered on active duty as a Second Lieutenant on 3 June 1947.

Colonel Haig graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York in 1947 and received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Military Science. He also received a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations from Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., in 1962.

In his early assignments from 1947 to 1949, Colonel Haig attended the normal Basic Officer Courses and served as a Platoon Leader and Regimental Staff Officer. He served as Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Far East Command (Japan) from June 1949 to September 1950. In September 1950, he was assigned as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, X Corps, Far East Command (Korea). He remained in this position until June 1951, at which time, he returned to Fort Knox, Kentucky and served in additional troop and staff positions until September 1952.

Following attendance at the Armored Officer Advanced Class at Fort Knox, Colonel Haig was assigned to the United States Military Academy where he served as a Tactics Instructor and Tactical Officer until June 1955. His next assignment was as a Tactical Officer at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, where he remained for one year.

Colonel Haig was assigned to Europe from August 1956 to June 1959. During this tour he served as a Tank Battalion S3 and later as a Logistics Staff Officer at Headquarters, United States Army Europe.

Upon graduating from the Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College in June 1960, Colonel Haig attended Georgetown University, receiving his MA in 1962. He was then assigned to the International and Policy Planning Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Washington, D. C. In July 1963, he became Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Colonel Haig remained in this position until January 1964 when he was appointed as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Cuban Affairs. In April 1964, Colonel Haig became Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. He remained in this key position until June 1965 when he became a student at the Army War College.

Following graduation from the Army War College in 1966, Colonel Haig was assigned to Vietnam. In combat with the 1st Infantry Division from July 1966 until May 1967, he served successively in the positions of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Battalion Commander, and finally Brigade Commander. In July 1967, Colonel Haig returned to the United States and was assigned to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. At West Point he has served successively to date as Commanding Officer, 3d Regiment, United States Corps of Cadets and as Deputy Commandant, United States Corps of Cadets.

During his distinguished career, Colonel Haig has participated in six military campaigns in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Distinguished Flying Cross with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal with 23 Oak Leaf Clusters, the Purple Heart, and the Combat Infantry Badge.

2

TALKING POINTS FOR GENERAL HAIG'S AWARD
CEREMONY

-- No award could adequately cover General Haig's devotion and
contribution during his service as Deputy Assistant for National Security
Affairs. Haig has really earned a Distinguished Service Medal for each
of his four years in the White House.

-- General Haig has worked tirelessly day and night, seven days
a week on the most important and critical problems of this country.
Seldom has one man given so much; seldom has this nation received so
much as the result of one individual's performance.

-- You know that his selfless dedication has meant a great sacrifice
on the part of his loved ones and you are grateful to them, particularly
Mrs. Haig, for making it possible for him to give himself so completely.

-- You have relied upon Haig's exceptional judgment in dealing with
your most difficult decisions of the past four years.

-- During this period you and Dr. Kissinger have sent Haig on ten
important trips to Southeast Asia and one to China. He has carried out
these diplomatic missions with extraordinary skill.

-- It is very difficult for you and Dr. Kissinger to let General Haig
leave the White House. He has truly been indispensable to the success
of your Administration.

-- You know that he will officially be made a four-star General
this afternoon and you are confident that as Vice Chief of the Army he
will continue to make a significant contribution to the nation.

JTH:nm:1/3/73

THE NEW
REPUBLIC

[lc]

A Journal of Politics and the Arts—May 19, 1973, 50 cents

## The Nixon Watch

### Living With Henry

Henry Kissinger's return from his latest journey to Moscow was awaited by his staff with an interest that had nothing to do with the delay in arranging a firm date for Leonid Brezhnev's promised visit to Washington. The 132 people who comprise Kissinger's National Security Council establishment assumed that he would soon get around to telling them what some changes in the NSC staff structure that were announced last April 6 and decided upon well before then are going to mean to them and to their relationship with him and the President.

The patient acceptance of Kissinger's failure to tell even the senior members of his staff, including those who are directly affected, what he had in mind with the changes before or when they were announced, is a good indicator of how it is to work and live with Henry in the fifth year of that extraordinary experience. Sadly for reporters and commentators who in the past have made much of the horrors of working for Henry Kissinger, the horror stories are no longer told with horror. His secretive ways, his relentless demands for unattainable perfection, his occasional flashes of cutting anger have come to be taken for granted and dismissed with rather humorous pleas for understanding that it's Henry being Henry and doesn't really matter. Most of his 50 professional assistants are trained specialists with trained minds—career diplomats, economists, systems analysts, political scientists, a few lawyers and generalists. The plain fact, corny when baldly stated but nonetheless a fact, is that they perceive in Kissinger the possessor of a superlative mind who stretches their minds and capabilities to the utmost and, along with the pains and passing resentments, gives them a profound sense of satisfaction and reward when he does it.

The changes in staff structure reflect Kissinger's

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evolution in the job since he became Mr. Nixon's assistant for national security affairs in 1969. It took him 18 months to come around to acceptance of one subordinate with the title and status of deputy assistant to the President. Now he is to have four subordinates with that title and a fifth with the status but not the title. Kissinger's mix of reasons for such a generous expansion of a rank that confers upon the holders, in theory though not necessarily in fact, the prestige of responsibility to the President rather than to him provides an interesting insight into his evolving view of his job and of the NSC function.

The reason of greatest general interest, though not the most immediate and important reason to be stated in forthcoming explanations to the staff, is that Kissinger is preparing the NSC structure for his departure. He is aware that his associates are basing their own plans on the assumption that he will be around for two years and probably no more than two years of the second Nixon term. He neither questions nor discourages the assumption. But his present intention could change for one or more of several reasons. The President could lose confidence in him; he could lose confidence in the President; or an impossible situation for him could be created by the replacement of the docile and cooperative William P. Rogers with a secretary of State, John Connally for instance, who would not tolerate Kissinger's ascendancy in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. One thing that certainly will not happen, I am assured and believe, is Kissinger's departure because of the Watergate scandal and the imputations of involvement that now crowd upon the President. The consensus around Kissinger is that, all other considerations apart, he will not desert the President at a time when his departure would be interpreted as a show of distrust. If it ever comes to a matter of non-confidence on either man's part, it will be over issues of policy principle and that is extremely improbable. Eventual departure is a factor in the structural changes only in the sense that Kissinger wants to leave behind him, when and if he goes, an NSC system and NSC procedures that are not as dependent upon him as they have been and that a successor can operate with until he rearranges the setup to suit himself.

Kissinger's principal purpose, as it will be explained to the staff, is to make it easier to work with him and for him to work with his assistants. As I get the story, he realized many months ago that he had become a bottleneck in the system and that the single deputy assistant, originally General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and now Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, had become another bottleneck. In the intensely personalized procedure that Kissinger started with in 1969 and has dominated since then, policy business that he didn't have the time to handle was supposed to be handled by the deputy and neither of them had enough time

to do it. This became acutely obvious at the height of the negotiations for an Indochina and Vietnam settlement last year, when both Kissinger and General Haig were frequently abroad, and Kissinger finally brought himself to do something about it with the designation of a "deputy for operations." His choice for the job is Lawrence S. Eagleburger, aged 43, a career foreign service officer who worked himself into physical breakdown as a personal assistant to Kissinger in 1969 and lately has been acting assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs. Kissinger's theory is that a few hours a week with Eagleburger, imparting to him Kissinger's and the President's views and wishes, will qualify the new deputy to act for Kissinger on marginal matters and serve as a buffer between him and senior members of the staff. The hope is that this will allow Kissinger ample time, more time than he has had in the past, for personal discussion with his senior associates and their juniors on critical matters. Such is the theory. One of Kissinger's oldest and most loyal associates advised me to assume that the theory won't work out. Henry's insistence upon personal and minute supervision of everything that concerns him and the President will never change, this fellow said, adding that the demands of the staff for personal contact with Henry will never change, either.

The two other new deputies (for "planning" and for international economic affairs) are to be Colonel Richard T. Kennedy, a retired army officer who since 1969 has been the staff planning director, and Charles A. Cooper, a former Rand Corporation economist who since 1970 has been the chief economics officer at the US Embassy in Saigon. The "planning" in Colonel Kennedy's old and new titles is something of a euphemism. A quiet man with a passion for orderly labor, he keeps the otherwise frantic NSC pace and procedure in a condition bearably short of chaos and, in simple justice, had to be accorded the higher title and status if anybody was. Charles Cooper, an eminent economist in his own right, gets the rank because he probably couldn't have been recruited without it. His advent signals Kissinger's determination to have the NSC staff play a larger and more effective role in international economic policy than it previously has. Philip Odeen, the NSC staff's chief systems analyst, gets the status without the title for one of those curious reasons that often operate in officialdom. His opposite number at the Department of Defense was recently downgraded, and Kissinger figured that he couldn't formally upgrade Odeen without offending the powers at DOD.

A victim and beneficiary of the same sort of official quirkery is Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who since 1969 has been Kissinger's senior specialist on Soviet and East European affairs. Sonnenfeldt, a foreign service officer, is credited with immense contributions to the President's Moscow summit, strategic arms negotiations, the whole range of widening accommodation with the Soviet Union. By acknowledged right, he should have

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been designated Kissinger's senior deputy. But – and here I repeat what I'm told – many of Hal Sonnenfeldt's associates find him impossibly difficult to work for. Kissinger concluded that he would have a staff revolt and unmanageable chaos on his hands if he gave Sonnenfeldt the promotion he had earned. The department of State didn't want him back. Elliot Richardson, who thought he was staying at the Defense Department and instead has been named attorney general in the forlorn hope that he can clear up and sanitize the Watergate scandal, rejected Kissinger's urgent recommendation that Sonnenfeldt be appointed assistant secretary for international security affairs. Ostensibly Richardson refused on the mentioned personality grounds. Actually, as Richardson saw it, the issue was whether the White House should or shouldn't dictate DOD appointments. So Kissinger worked the prob-

lem out with Treasury Secretary George Shultz and Hal Sonnenfeldt is to be an under secretary of the Treasury, specializing in international economic affairs. He's happy and Kissinger is happy.

This is one of the few occasions for happiness at the beleaguered White House. Another one, in NSC quarters, is the fact that General Haig has temporarily replaced H. R. Haldeman as Mr. Nixon's chief of staff. Haldeman detested Kissinger and Kissinger detested Haldeman. Grave and growing concern that Watergate is eroding the President's authority abroad as well as at home outweighs all other considerations in Henry Kissinger's vicinity. But one hears it said in that vicinity, though not by Kissinger, that if any good could come of Watergate it was the removal of Bob Haldeman and his California crowd from power at the White House.

John Osborne

PERSONAL

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING

900 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

March 26, 1973

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

John Newhouse called me recently to report that his five-part series on SALT will begin appearing in the *New Yorker* the last week in April. (Advance copies of his book, which will be an expansion of the articles, will be available in May.) John said that the editor of the *New Yorker* wanted to have a few people read the galleys for factual accuracy, and John asked if I would be one of those readers. This presents certain problems.

As you know, members of the Program Analysis staff had talked with John regarding SALT. You had apparently told Wayne Smith to provide some limited assistance, Jack Merritt had helped Wayne, and, when I became the principal Program Analysis staff person on SALT in late 1972, I took over from Merritt. In performing my task, I was careful to adhere to your wishes; I consulted often with Merritt about his instructions and discussed some questions with Phil Odeen. Phil and I even sent you a memorandum once regarding some questions of confidentiality. In addition, it's my impression that Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland also talked to Newhouse.

Newhouse's comments then and now suggest that he has an excellent knowledge and understanding of events at SALT, including a good appreciation of the White House position. So far, so good.

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However, Newhouse apparently also received considerable information somewhere about sensitive matters -- including the existence of the back-up letter to the May 20th (1971) announcement and the confusion with Gerard Smith at the Moscow Summit. Presumably he obtained this information from outside the NSC staff since he industriously interviewed many other people -- from both the Nixon and Johnson Administrations. Since I have not seen the galleys, I do not know how John treats these and other issues. While I believe that John's understanding and judgment are good, there is the chance that there will be some discomforting materials in his articles.

Hence, there is the problem of how to proceed. In response to John's request that I be a reader, I tentatively accepted on the conditions that:

-- Because I no longer had access to the NSC files, I would simply look for egregious errors of fact.

-- Moreover, because my knowledge was limited and because of confidences, I would not comment at all on sensitive issues such as events in Moscow and the back-channel negotiations leading to the May 20th announcement.

I agreed to be a reader in this limited sense to protect against John having made some serious error in fact or opinion. However, I bring this to your attention in case you might think there are better ways to proceed. And, since I respect your judgment and view this activity as a carryover from my NSC days, I am most willing to adhere to your decisions. For instance, on the theory that at some point an author must be on his own, you might think it better to terminate now all assistance to Newhouse -- even attenuated assistance like mine. Or, if you think a closer scrutiny of the galleys is desirable, you might want me to refer to my old NSC files. Or, apart from my efforts, you might have Hal Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland, or anyone else more familiar than me with sensitive matters volunteer to read Newhouse's articles.

Let me address briefly one peripheral point which might affect your decision. Shortly after I left your staff, an article in *Human Events* charged that at a Brookings dinner on June 19 I had strongly attacked the Administration's

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decision to accelerate deployment of the Trident submarine. As I explained then to Phil Odeen who was planning to report to you, I was appalled by the article. First, the dinner had been off-the-record, though I recognized this was of little significance in this town. More important, the article misrepresented my statements. I spoke twice at the dinner. I first defended strongly the substance of the SALT agreements against an attack by Richard Perle. I later said that the Trident acceleration was a separable issue from SALT; on this point, I believed I was echoing your position of a few days before that the SALT agreements and the weapons requests should each be examined "on their merits" and were not "conditional" on one another. (Press conference on June 15.) I did not, as the article alleged, viciously attack Trident.

There's little protection against informal statements being misquoted. However, I did make a serious mistake of trying to explain my statements to the Human Events reporter since he was out to write a critical story and twisted my explanation. The experience was very frustrating -- not only because of the specific facts, but also because I had tried to avoid the press during my NSC days and because the double-cross is not my style. I apologized to Phil Odeen for the whole incident, and I apologize to you now. I do not expect any similar incident in my dealings with Newhouse -- I followed my instructions, I've learned some lessons, and I've checked to make sure Newhouse is reasonably objective.

Anyway, unless I hear otherwise from you or someone on your staff, I will proceed with Newhouse in the limited fashion outlined above. If you have any alternative suggestions, I will be happy to heed them.

Incidentally, as I wrote you when leaving your staff, I greatly admired the President's and your handling of the SALT negotiations, and felt it a privilege to be involved.