PROPOSED BUDGET

Principal Research Associate (full time) $16,000
Marvin I. Kalkstein
Pension (at 15%) 2,400
Secretary (1/3 time at $5,000 per year) 1,667
Pension (at 9¼%) 154
Travel (includes a one-month trip to the Middle East) 3,000

Expenses:

Telephone 300
Postage 200
Materials and office supplies 500
Duplicating and copying 500
Meetings 200
Rental of office equipment 300
Casual research assistance 500
Miscellaneous expense total 2,500
Total $25,721
Overhead at 26% of total direct expenses 6,687
TOTAL $32,408

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

January 13, 1966

To: Messrs. Kissinger and Halperin

From: T. C. Schelling

I trust that Marvin Kalkstein's contract will be signed shortly retroactive to the date that he joined us, and if so he is financed for approximately a year. Marv has raised the question whether he can spend two years on his project. I have told him that he should not expect us to finance him for a second year, and he has asked whether he could seek his own financing for such an extension. I told him we were obliged to have him finish a proper study on schedule because we were responsible to the Defense Department for performance under his contract; he believes that what he does in one year can stand by itself, and that the second year would be a useful extension of his first year's work. If he seeks financing, he needs to know whether or not the Center will sponsor him for that additional period.

I told him I would try to give him a decision on that, but when I said "fairly soon" it was a month ago and I just haven't gotten around to talking to you about it.

Would you tell me what you think? I realize that most of us have little basis yet for knowing what to think but at least Mort can report whether Kalkstein is proving to be a useful person to have around and perhaps has some idea of how he is coming along with his work.

TCS:ac

cc: Z. Tomory

22 December 1965

PROPOSAL FOR EXTENSION OF PROLIFERATION STUDY

Marvin Kalkstein

This study was originally expected to require two years, involving a
considerable period of time to be spent in the Middle East. Initial support
for the study is a one-year contract from the Department of Defense (ISA).
As an aftermath of the Camelot affair, travel to the Middle East, under this
contract, is restricted. I still feel that a thorough study and analysis of
the proliferation question for the Middle East should take two years, including
some time spent in the area.

My intention for the first year is to prepare a report concerning the
political and strategic aspects of the security problem in the Middle East.
The feasibilities of various approaches to keeping nuclear weapons out of the
Middle East will be considered from the strategic, political, and technical
points of view. Possible new suggestions will be included.

With an extension of the present study for a second year, I would propose
to explore more fully the possibilities for a solution to the Middle East arms
race. Relatively objective judgments can be made of the technical feasibility
of the various possibilities, based on information available in this country.
However, particularly in the Middle East, it is the subjective judgments that
will finally determine what measures may be adopted. A table or questionnaire,
detailing the alternate suggestions and the various diplomatic means for
implementing them, will be used as a basis for discussions in the Middle East.
In this manner, it may be possible to find an approach on which some consensus
exists, and, perhaps, also to discover some new approaches.

-2-

A non-proliferation arrangement is less likely to be acceptable to Israel than to the Arab states. Therefore, special attention will be devoted to probing the underlying factors in Israel's position, including the psychological ones. Safran has suggested that these latter may be of considerable importance, and it would be of value to establish them more clearly than they are presently perceived.

I intend that part of the extended study be conducted by first-hand observation and discussion in the Middle East. Outside sources of funds for this study will be sought, if none are available from the Center.

November 21, 1966

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Marvin Kalkstein

An uneasy truce, interrupted briefly by the Sinai campaign
in 1956, has existed between Israel and the Arab nations since
1949. Rules have been tacitly formulated and adopted for living
with this situation and the perturbations upon it. Thus occasional
border harassments, attacks upon water diversions efforts, and
provocative political statements are accommodated. This truce
has been accompanied by, and perhaps to some degree maintained by,
an arms race which since 1956 has been characterized by generally
increasing levels of expenditure and weapons sophistication.

Now this truce is threatened by the possible introduction of
nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Possession of nuclear
weapons by Israel and the United Arab Republic would create a
much more explosive situation than has thus far existed. Perhaps

-2-

nowhere else in the world is the confrontation so sharply drawn.

For Israel, not only its national security but its very existence
is at stake. On the Arab side, a passionate people have been
harboring uncompromising feelings of injustice, humiliation,
fear, and hatred toward Israel. Many of the rules of restraint
that have been developed over the years would be invalidated or
greatly weakened by the presence of nuclear weapons. It has
taken close to two decades for the United States and the Soviet
Union to accommodate to a balance based upon mutual nuclear
deterrence and to reach a point where the strains on this relation-
ship are manageable, even when their vital interests are not at
issue so much as those of Israel and the United Arab Republic.

The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East would
usher into this area an even more precarious era for a comparable
period of time. (Estimates of the time required for a significant

-3-

cooling of Arab feelings are generally expressed in terms of a
generation or more). Already, the United Arab Republic has
threatened preventive strike if it should appear that Israel is
acquiring nuclear weapons. ¹

The possibilities for acquisition of nuclear weapons, the
arguments for and against their acquisition, the means by which
this spread can be prevented or inhibited, and the significance
of and the adjustments to their possible presence must all be
considered.

The basic technology of nuclear weapons production has
received extensive treatment,² so that, for the moment, only a
few general considerations will be mentioned. Both Israel and
the United Arab Republic would almost certainly start their pro-
grams with the production of plutonium-239, a product of nuclear
reactors. The amount of plutonium needed for a bomb is four-to-

-4-

seven kilograms.³ About 0.25 kg. of plutonium is produced per Megawatt-year (Mw/yr.) of thermal power in a reactor fueled with natural uranium. The figure is closer to 0.1 kg. for enriched uranium reactors. Thus Israel's Dimona reactor, 24 Mw(th), fueled with natural uranium,⁴ is capable of producing enough plutonium for about one bomb per year.

Reactors are more commonly rated in terms of electrical power $\sqrt{M_w(e)}$.⁷ As a general rule, the electrical power level is roughly a third of the thermal power for reactors whose primary purpose is the production of electricity. For multi-purpose reactors, such as desalinization and electricity producing reactors, the electrical power level is likely to be only about a sixth of the thermal power. More detailed and specific technical considerations will be presented later where relevant.

-5-

## Arguments For Nuclear Weapons

The present trends in the Middle East arms race are such that neither side is likely to acquire a significant military superiority, particularly since the major powers are less likely now (than in 1955) to contribute to an imbalance or to allow one to continue. Therefore, a next step might be to attempt to acquire a qualitative advantage by moving the arms race to a higher level, namely nuclear. Even if such a decision is not arrived at in a logical and well-thought-out manner, it may seem a likely enough one for either side so that they might both make it as a self-fulfilling prophesy. This may especially be true so long as the mutual fears and suspicions remain so high and the direct exchange of information is non-existent. To the extent that there is any communication, even indirect, on the subject, it is generally circumspect and hard to accept at face value. In

-6-

any event, the acquisition of nuclear weapons may appear as the
safest course to follow.

Israel

The main reasons for Israel to acquire nuclear weapons arise
from considerations of security. Of primary importance would be
the deterrent value of such weapons. If Israel were the only
Middle Eastern nation to possess nuclear weapons, they should serve
as a deterrent against Arab invasion and attack. Should other
nations in the Middle East also have nuclear weapons, they would
be a deterrent against nuclear attack and might still be a
creditable deterrent against a large-scale conventional attack. In
the event of an outbreak of hostility, there could be possibilities
for tactical use. Possession, perhaps unannounced, of nuclear
weapons might reasonably appear to be a worthwhile form of insurance.

Nuclear weapons might also appear valuable for bargaining

-7-

and blackmail purposes. They might be used to compel the Arab
states to make peace. Their anticipated or actual presence might
be used to obtain political concessions, and possibly a formal
security guarantee, from the major powers. They might even
pressure the major powers to add their weight to efforts for a
peace settlement in the area. They could be used as an implied
threat to influence Arab actions on vital questions, such as would
arise in the event of a deterioration of the situation in Jordan.
They might even be considered useful as threats to prevent inter-
ference with Israeli water projects or transit on the Red Sea.

Psychological factors will also influence the considerations.

The possession of nuclear weapons can be regarded as a means of establishing, as a hard fact, that Israel is here to stay. They might also be viewed as redressing the asymmetry in the consequences of a war, so that both sides would then have too much to lose.

-8-

Of less concern to Israel, but no doubt a possible argu-
ment is the matter of prestige and a greater voice in world
councils. Also, a nuclear weapons program may appear to be a
natural outlet to the technical community. Furthermore, in the
long run, it might be cheaper to maintain the balance of power
in the area with nuclear weapons than with conventional ones.
And some might develop the rationale that it will eventually be
desirable to exploit the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions for
excavation and underground engineering. Water conveyance projects
and the tapping of potential underground resources in a country
of limited natural resources could offer promise.

The United Arab Republic

Most statements by Arab spokesmen pertaining to obtaining
nuclear weapons are expressed as a reaction to the prospect of
Israeli nuclear weapons rather than as an independent objective

-9-

of their own. It is undoubtedly true that a major motivation of
a nuclear weapons program for the United Arab Republic would be
to enable the United Arab Republic to maintain the arms balance
in the event that Israel acquires nuclear weapons. A possible
argument, which would not be publicly stated, but which might be
attractive to more militant elements, would be the potential use
for aggressive purposes. Nuclear weapons, particularly if ac-
quired first, might appear to offer a final resolution of the
Israeli problem. A very few weapons used against the major cities
of Israel would kill a large fraction of the population and could
make almost the entire country uninhabitable.

The possibility that it might acquire nuclear weapons could
be used by the United Arab Republic for bargaining purposes also.
Here, the main application would be in dealings with the major
powers. A major objective would be greater military support. More

-10-

and longer-term economic assistance would be another consideration.

Finally, the development of a nuclear weapons capability would have important status significance on three levels. At present the economic picture of the United Arab Republic is dim. There are also signs of dissatisfaction within the military establishment. A successful nuclear weapons program could do much to enhance Nasser's charisma. Nuclear weapons would make the United Arab Republic the undisputed military leader in the Arab world and the attendant prestige might help to restore Nasser's political popularity. Nuclear weapons might even serve as a rallying point in attempts to achieve greater Arab unity. The prestige of possessing nuclear weapons might also be expected to heighten the United Arab Republic's status among the African nations and other developing countries.

-11-

## Argument Against Nuclear Weapons

The United States and the Soviet Union's interest in arms control and disarmament and the extreme caution and restraint that they have displayed in dealing with strategic problems are motivated largely by a mutual concern for survival. The nations of the Middle East should be no less concerned. Every step up the nuclear path is fraught with great danger. The first step by either side will, as has already been forewarned, raise the possibility of a preventive strike by the other side.

If the situation endures to the point where both sides have nuclear weapons, the danger will be no less great. Indeed, it may be all the more. In the initial stages of mutual nuclear deterrence, a great degree of instability can be expected. In the late 1950's, when neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could feel assured that it had a survivable second strike, the principal

-12-

dangers were of a pre-emptive first strike or accidental war.

The transition period to a stable deterrent was a trying one militarily and one which at times dictated ill-considered and politically motivated courses. The policies and actions of the major powers in the Middle East were thus affected to some extent.

The transition period for the nations of the Middle East would probably be much more difficult and of longer duration. From a technical point of view, with more limited capabilities and re-sources, it will be harder to achieve invulnerable second strike forces. The lower level of technical capability is also likely to be reflected in systems that are more prone to accidents. In the heated context of Middle East politics, one cannot expect the leaders always to act with reason and to exercise the restraint and judgment needed during this period. No analogous situation comes to mind in which tensions are higher and provocations more numerous

-13-

than in the Middle East. And these are exactly the psychological
factors leading to pre-emptive actions and compulsive responses.

Even if stable deterrence is achieved by both sides, the
danger remains high. It is too often forgotten that stable
deterrence is a logical system in which the determining elements
are identified or anticipated and the human factor controlled.
Again, the Middle East is an area in which unanticipated events
are more likely and in which the rationality and control of the
human factor can be less taken for granted. It is the emotional
context of the problems of the Middle East which makes their
solution so difficult.

The situation in the Middle East is further complicated by
the fact that the Arab bloc, as a whole, and a number of its indi-
vidual members are not homogeneous political entities. The political
instability within the area with its internal weaknesses and

-14-

stresses puts additional question upon the stability and value of
a balance system as explosive and final as a nuclear one. Even
a moderate leader may find himself forced to take drastic measures
against Israel in order to withstand pressures from within.

Once both sides have nuclear weapons, defense expenditures
will, in all probability, increase rather than decrease. Being
threatened by nuclear weapons, both sides will, at the very least,
want to make their position as secure as possible. In addition,
it would be no surprise if they were tempted to gain whatever
advantage they could. Thus, a nuclear arms race would be in pros-
pect with the only constraints being those imposed by the economies
of the nations involved. Again, there is another lesson to be
learned from the experience of the major powers. During the race,
each may gain the ability to destroy the other totally. Thus, as
the levels of armaments increase, there is likely to be a decrease

-15-

in security rather than an increase.

Another outcome of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East might be greater involvement of the major powers in the affairs of the area. The current strategic situation has, over the past few years, allowed the major powers to adopt a more relaxed and less self-concerned attitude toward Middle East developments. The presence of nuclear weapons is likely to cause each to exert more influence, particularly if each feels bound by commitments in the area. A major power's fulfillment of a commitment can not always be regarded by its recipient as an unmixed blessing. What these nations want is the assistance and support of the major powers, and not their interference. Nuclear weapons are more likely to bring forth the latter.

The experience of the major powers should hold some lessons for other nations contemplating acquisition of nuclear weapons.

-16-

Nuclear weapons impose definite limitations upon the freedom of
action that nations may exercise. Particularly for nations pur-
suing an aggressive policy, this would be a disadvantage.

The major powers themselves can be expected to have a
negative reaction to the introduction of nuclear weapons to the
area. They are likely to prefer to avoid involvement in situations
where nuclear weapons could be brought into use. To this end,
they may attempt to exert pressures to keep the area from going
nuclear. Once nuclear weapons are on the scene, the possibility
exists that instead of overinvolvement in the area the major powers
may decide to wash their hands of the whole mess. While it may
be less likely, they may adopt the attitude of "a plague on both
your houses." To the extent that they could play a constructive
role in the area, such an attitude would be unfortunate for the
nations of the area.

-17-

One of the fears of the major powers with regard to nuclear proliferation is that local conflicts might escalate into all-out major nuclear war involving themselves. The nations involved in a regional conflict should have a similar concern. Whereas border incidents can presently be tolerated and handled with a minimum of fuss, and even as major an event as the 1956 Sinai war could be kept from getting out of hand, almost any skirmish in the future would carry with it the potential of escalation into an all-out nuclear war in the area if nuclear weapons are present. Surely, all sides would be the losers in such an event.

## Israel

If nuclear weapons become part of the Middle East arsenal, Israel will be faced with a real threat to its physical survival. If only conventional weapons are involved, it is felt by political observers that Israel has sufficient strength to defend its homeland

-18-

against Arab attack, at present or in the foreseeable future. 6

This conclusion is based on the present relative military forces,
the rate of defense expenditures and the economic growth rates.

Nuclear weapons would pose the threat of virtual obliteration by
the detonation of a few of them over Israel.

An added source of security to Israel is the present dis-
array of the Arab world. Although Israel's defensive posture toward
the Arab world appears secure, it is made all the more so by the
lack of a unified, coordinated Arab threat. Were Israel to intro-
duce nuclear weapons to the Middle East, it would have to accept
the not unlikely possibility of an Arab world united, at least
temporarily, to deal with this emergency. The short and long-range
consequences of such an event could be most serious for Israel.

Budgetary considerations should also make Israel think again
before embarking upon a nuclear weapons program. Although the

-19-

initial expenditures may not look very great -- about 10 percent of the defense budget -- particularly with a reactor already going at Dimona, a continuing nuclear arms race would lead to much higher levels of expenditures. In addition to the nuclear weapons, more sophisticated delivery systems, more elaborate command and control arrangements, and more extensive defense measures would be required. Much of this would have to be obtained from abroad, thereby entailing an adverse effect on Israel's foreign exchange.

Israel, being the one interested in maintenance of the status quo in the area, would almost surely be less certain of outside assistance in that regard if she obtained nuclear weapons. One could argue that Israel's security and the status quo may be more likely maintained so long as she does not have nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons would surely introduce greater uncertainty with regard to the reaction of the major powers to local provocations in

-20-

the Middle East.

The United Arab Republic

On balance, the Arab states might have even less to gain from
the possession of nuclear weapons than Israel. This will be
particularly true if Israel, as well as the United Arab Republic,
possesses nuclear weapons. If a major objective of the Arab
states is the defeat and elimination of the state of Israel, they
should wish to avoid a frozen situation. The prospect of eventually
effecting the status quo, in terms of a long-range attainment of
goals, would be more promising with nuclear weapons eliminated from
the picture. Even if a military defeat of Israel is but a dream,
it is nice to be able to keep on dreaming and talking about such
an outcome. With nuclear weapons on both sides, one could not con-
template achieving victory without assuming unacceptable costs.
Nuclear weapons would spell the end of the dream if not its possible

-21-

conversion into a nightmare.

If the United Arab Republic had the sole nuclear capability
in the Middle East, they may find their freedom of action more
limited by greater restraints imposed by the major powers. Actions
which could eventually lead to the use of nuclear weapons might
be less tolerated. There would probably be greater pressures for
the Arab states to adopt a less belligerent attitude and to re-
duce the incidence of low-level provocations.

A nuclear weapons program would impose a serious strain on
the economy of the United Arab Republic. Engaging in a nuclear
arms race would be virtually impossible without becoming more de-
pendent on foreign economic assistance.

One possible source of financial support for a nuclear weapons
program might be the oil-rich Arab states. However, most of this
wealth is in the control of the traditionalist elements in the

-22-

Middle East, and they may be reluctant to aid the socialist United
Arab Republic to emerge as a nuclear nation since this would pro-
ject the United Arab Republic into a more dominant role of leader-
ship among the Arab states.

In view of recent threats from the military, Nasser must also
recognize the risk of developing a nuclear arsenal which could fall
into the hands of a dissident element. In the event of a shared
nuclear arsenal with other Arab nations that may have made financial
contributions toward its development, this risk would be greatly
multiplied.

There is already widespread African support for a nuclear-
free Africa. The introduction of nuclear weapons into Africa by
the United Arab Republic would not be without some negative reaction.
The net effect on the United Arab Republic's status among the
African nations is hard to evaluate and would probably be somewhat

-23-

dependent upon the course of action in South Africa. To the ex-
tent that the more militant leaders might regard a United Arab
Republic nuclear capability as being somehow in their service, its
introduction would certainly have a destabilizing effect on the
political situation in Africa.

The Present Situation

Since the change in leadership in Israel there has been a
perceptible change in the tone of Israeli statements on nuclear
weapons. In the past there had been a great deal of ambiguity
with regard to Israel's intentions and there was much room for sus-
picion that Israel might indeed be engaged in a nuclear weapons
program. To the extent that one is operating nuclear reactors,
it can be said that one is unavoidably on the path toward nuclear
weapons, but recent statements by Premier Eshkol and Foreign
Minister Eban contend that Israel is not now actively pursuing a

-24-

8
nuclear weapons program. It is perhaps significant that the
major nuclear protagonists in the Ben Gurion government, Shimon
Peres and Moshe Dayan, no longer have cabinet positions. More
recently, in addressing the Knesset, Premier Eshkol called for
arms limitations including the non-introduction of nuclear weapons
in the Middle East, saying further "that Israel has no atomic arms
and will not be the first to introduce them into our region." 9

Statements from the United Arab Republic have tended to
suggest that its actions would be primarily in reaction to Israeli
moves. 10
Unofficial Arab spokesmen have claimed that the Arabs
were not planning to produce nuclear weapons, but that if Israel
got nuclear weapons, they would get them soon thereafter. These
statements imply that these weapons would be supplied from the out-
side, but thus far there has been no indication of a basis for such
a belief. Indeed, there have been rumors to the contrary. The

-25-

lack of an obvious outside supplier may be the basis for a recent
report that Nasser has indicated that the United Arab Republic may
feel compelled to embark upon a program for the production of
il
nuclear weapons.

At present, the only nuclear reactors, operating in the Middle
East, capable of producing a meaningful quantity of plutonium, is
the Israeli reactor at Dimona. This reactor produces enough for
about one weapon a year. To have the plutonium in a usable form
for weapons, a chemical separation plant is required. If the
Israelis have not as yet built one, it would probably take almost
two years, as a minimum, before they could produce a nuclear weapon
within their own boundaries. There is no doubt that Israel has
the technological capability to do this if it wished. And, although
the United Arab Republic is not at Israel's scientific and technical
level, there is little doubt that the United Arab Republic could

-26-

probably produce its own nuclear weapon within five years.

Future nuclear developments in the Middle East will require close attention. Preliminary studies of dual-purpose electric power-water desalting plants for both Israel and the United Arab Republic have already been published. For Israel, a 100 million gallon per day, 200 Mw electrical power (1250 Mw thermal power), 3 percent enriched uranium reactor that could be operational in the early 1970's was considered. Using the figure of 0.1 kg. of plutonium per Mw yr. of thermal power for enriched uranium reactors, about 125 kg. or enough plutonium for roughly 20 nuclear weapons would be produced per year. The proposed Borg El-Arab Pilot Project at Sidi Kreir in the United Arab Republic calls for 5 million gallons per day of water and 150 megawatts of electricity. The quantity of plutonium that would thus become available would be comparable to that of the proposed plant in Israel. Plutonium production of

-27-

this magnitude would cast the potential nuclear arms picture in
the Middle East in a very different light from the present meager
Israeli potential of about one weapon per year. It should be
pointed out that there is considerable interest in controlling
the weapons potential of these developments and the probable
technological and economic considerations lend themselves to the
establishment of suitable means of control. This question will
be discussed more fully later.

Another route to nuclear weapons is by means of outside
assistance; either the direct transfer of weapons, or large-scale
technical assistance. For both sides, the outright transfer of
weapons is unlikely. Although France has assisted Israel with its
reactor and in its defense efforts, and although she publicly
justifies her own nuclear weapons in terms which suggest to others
the wisdom of their acquisition, she has given no indication that

-28-

she would give nuclear weapons to others. It seems unlikely that France would take such an initiative in an area where nuclear weapons had not already been introduced. It has been rumored that, even in the event that Israel obtained nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union would not give them to the United Arab Republic. 13

The Republic of China has been indicated as a possible source of nuclear weapons for the Arab nations. Although this possibility can not be ruled out, there has been no positive indication that China is ready to export nuclear weapons. Indeed, Chinese statements with regard to her own nuclear weapons have shown a considerable degree of restraint.

The other facet of outside assistance, large-scale technical aid and cooperation, is more difficult to evaluate. Undoubtedly, there is an indirect contribution through Atoms-for-Peace aid, scientific and technological training abroad, joint studies such

-29-

as the U.S.-Israeli desalinization studies, and French-Israeli
cooperative efforts. However, these should not be regarded as
major contributions to a nuclear weapons program. Even the French
assistance with Israel's reactor might be regarded, without further
detailed knowledge about it, as a borderline contribution. What
would be significant would be the transfer of nuclear weapons
designs and information. An interesting question is whether the
contributions of Israeli scientists to French nuclear efforts have
been valuable enough to give Israel some basis for requesting to
share French nuclear weapons information. On the Arab side, there
have been reports of the training of United Arab Republic tech-
nicians in China, although it has also been reported that this
effort has been curtailed. 14 This sort of assistance would have
the effect of shortening the scientific gap between Israel and the
United Arab Republic, but here again the important question deals

~30~

with the transfer of nuclear information.

Although there is room for considerable uncertainty with regard to the role of outside assistance in the nuclear area, there can be no doubt about its significance in the non-nuclear aspects of defense. In recent years major aid in heavy armaments, air defense, and air attack systems has been given by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States to Israel, and by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia to the United Arab Republic. Other Arab nations have received similar assistance from the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Both sides have received or will be receiving foreign assistance in missiles, most recently Israel from France. 15 Aircraft industries have developed in the United Arab Republic, with assistance of German and Spanish workers, and in Israel, with French assistance. The United Arab Republic also has its own missile facilities, aided

-31-

by German workers and more recently by American workers. 16 There
is liable to be a broadening of these indigenous activities, par-
ticularly if nuclear weapons enter the picture.

Non-proliferation

Negotiating approach

Although it would appear to be in the interest of the nations
of the Middle East to eschew nuclear weapons, any mutual agreement
to that effect seems out of the question. The best one could
realistically hope for would be that they accede to a non-prolifer-
ation agreement, arrived at by others. Such was the case with the
1963 partial test ban treaty. Thus, should a non-proliferation
treaty be agreed upon during the present Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee negotiations at Geneva (with the United Arab Republic
as a participant), Israel and the Arab states may subscribe to it.
A non-proliferation treaty will only be arrived at if the United

States and the Soviet Union agree on its desirability and its terms.

Basically then, the prospects for non-proliferation in the Middle East rest largely with the United States and the Soviet Union. A solution can be achieved at Geneva, the United Nations, or privately between the two major powers, and it could encompass the world, merely the Middle East, or some area of intermediate size.

Even before the present detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, the strategic considerations underlying the Cold War involvement in the Middle East had changed drastically from those of the late 1950's. No longer were Middle Eastern bases a vital concern in the Cold War. Moreover, it was the bitter experience of the United States and the Soviet Union during that period, that their interests were ill-served when they overlooked the interests of the nations of the area as a whole. Since it is in the interest of the major powers to avoid involvement in local outbreaks and

-33-

also to avoid the introduction of nuclear weapons into such out-
breaks, should they occur, the time may be ripe for the United
States and the Soviet Union to cooperate in playing a constructive
role in the Middle East.

The two basic ingredients of a non-proliferation agreement
are a non-dissemination agreement on the part of the nuclear
powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons tech-
nology to non-nuclear nations and a non-acquisition agreement on
the part of the non-nuclear nations not to produce or obtain
nuclear weapons. The stumbling block, thus far, to the conclusion
of a non-proliferation agreement at Geneva has been over the question
of nuclear sharing. If this question can be resolved or dismissed,
it should be possible to arrive at an agreement applicable on a
world-wide basis. Since the matter of nuclear sharing is of concern
primarily with regard to Europe, it may be possible at present to

-34-

arrive at agreements pertaining to regions other than Europe.

At various times there have been proposals for nuclear-free zones
in different parts of the world. 17 A number of African states

have gone on record as favoring a nuclear-free Africa. 18 This
could be accomplished, even without concurrent action on the part
of the major powers, by an agreement of the nations of Africa not
to acquire nuclear weapons. The two nations likely to have the
most reservations would be the Union of South Africa and the

United Arab Republic. It is recognized that it may be most
difficult to get the Union of South Africa's agreement, although
it should be apparent that its national security and well-being
would be greatly jeopardized by the wide-spread presence of nuclear
weapons on that continent. It is difficult to imagine that the
United Arab Republic would accede to such an agreement without
other nations of the Middle East being included. An agreement

-35-

establishing a nuclear-free Africa and Middle East may be an
attractive approach to the problem in the Middle East since both
the United Arab Republic and Israel are anxious to win favor
among the African nations. Whether other Arab nations of the
Middle East would join such an agreement is an open question,
although undoubtedly external and internal pressures could be
brought to bear in its favor.

While the approaches outlined above deserve consideration
and continued effort, the seriousness of the problem in the
Middle East merits direct attention and a purposeful endeavor
to affect a solution. For an agreement to be reached covering
the Middle East, and perhaps including North Africa, it will be
necessary for the United States and the Soviet Union to intervene
directly. If they were so disposed, it would not be difficult for
them to arrive at a satisfactory agreement to keep nuclear weapons

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out of the Middle East. The more difficult task will be to
obtain the concurrence of the nations involved. It may be that
the United States and the Soviet Union might arrive at an agree-
ment which will be so obviously in the interest of the Middle
East nations that there will be little hesitancy to accept it.
More likely, some persuasion would be necessary. The most obvious
pressures that could be employed would be political and economic.

Particularly if the United States and the Soviet Union were acting
in concert, they could not be played off against each other in
efforts to obtain their economic assistance. Foreign aid is
essential to many of the countries involved and the threat of its
being withheld would strongly influence a number of them. On the
other hand, economic and technical incentives could be offered as
inducements. (This point will be returned to later). Just the
open knowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union are

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interested in obtaining commitments to the agreement could be
helpful. Arab leaders, who on their own may feel duty bound not
to come to terms with Israel on such a matter, may welcome or at
least not be adverse to the opportunity (or excuse) of doing so
under pressure from the major powers.

An important respect in which the major powers can influence
other nations would be by down-playing the importance of their
own nuclear weapons. Support for measures such as a cut-off in
the production of weapons material, reductions in stockpiles, a
freeze in the number of delivery vehicles, moves toward a no-first-
use policy, and a comprehensive test ban would have a salutary
effect on the position of other nations. Serious attempts should
also be made to downgrade nuclear weapons as symbols of prestige
and political importance.

What should a non-proliferation agreement for the Middle East

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entail? To begin with, there should be the familiar non-
dissemination and non-acquisition clauses. For a non-proliferation
agreement to be acceptable and effective in the Middle East, it
will be necessary to go beyond such paper pledges. Assurances
must be included to guarantee that the pledges will be honored.
Assurances of two very different sorts need be considered --
inspection and control, and guarantees.

The first, inspection and control, is an essential ingredient
of an agreement. The noise level -- politically motivated pledges
and statements, propaganda, and the like -- in the Middle East is
high. A pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, even a written one,
by itself will have little value, particularly in the atmosphere
of extreme distrust prevailing there. Such a pledge must be
accompanied by a continuing flow of comforting information. For
this, means for the accumulation and exchange of physical evidence

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must be included. Inspection and control of authorized peaceful
nuclear facilities can be easily accomplished and need not even
involve adversary inspection. The methods that could be employed
and the records that must be balanced are such that the reports
of an international inspectorate should be generally acceptable
to even a highly suspicious nation. Undoubtedly, there may be
some instances where further verification would be desired. The
situation would not be so straightforward for inspection for clan-
destine production. Here, an anxious nation might be less than
satisfied with the zeal, alertness, and thoroughness of an inter-
national inspectorate, no matter how conscientious and competent
it may be. The clandestine transfer of nuclear weapons would be
even harder to detect and, therefore, the results obtained by an
international inspectorate would be even more dubious. Since it
is questionable if any degree of adversary inspection would be

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allowed by the nations concerned, it is impossible to imagine that
such inspection at the obtrusive and large-scale level required
against clandestine activities could be tolerated. Reliance
would have to be placed on national intelligence systems at least
for the procurement of preliminary evidence. The means for veri-
fying disclosures of this nature would have to be agreed upon.

Guarantees are likely to be a necessary feature for the
assurance of national securities in a non-nuclear Middle East.
Especially in view of the above-mentioned possibility for the
appearance of unauthorized nuclear weapons, no nation can con-
fidently enter a non-proliferation agreement without some
assurances that, at least, it will remain safe from possible
nuclear attack by hostile neighbors. Such guarantees need not
be a part of a non-proliferation agreement, but they must be
assumed as an obligation on the part of the major powers. Preferably

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these should be assumed jointly by the major powers and applied
equally to all the nations concerned. If, because of existing
differences between members of the Middle East community and a
traditional split in their sources of military support, it should
be difficult for the United States or the Soviet Union to come
out openly as the guarantor of certain nations, consideration
could be given in those cases to having one of them assume the
role of guarantor with the other simply agreeing to abide by such
a guarantee and its possible execution. Admittedly though, this
is not likely to be as satisfactory as joint guarantees and should
not be settled for unless there is little chance of arriving at
joint guarantees.

One drawback of guarantees is that making good on them appears
to be in the nature of shutting the barn door after the animals
have gotten out. If a nation receiving a guarantee has its doubts

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as to whether the guarantee would be redeemed, it is not en-
couraging to have to wait until it is too late to find out. A
guarantee that could be effectuated before-the-fact would ob-
viously be more desirable. This might be possible if the parties
involved had agreed to a non-acquisition clause in a treaty. A
condition of the treaty might call for removal of all illegally
obtained production facilities and weapons acquired during the
period that the treaty had been in force. This could be accom-
plished by the inspecting agency, if it were provided with police
powers within the treaty, or by a United Nations force or by the
major guaranteeing powers.

If guarantees are offered, some thought must be given to the
sanctions that would be invoked if a nuclear attack were to occur.
To be most effective, a guarantee must have a high credibility
coupled with sufficiently costly sanctions to deter any occurrence

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which would occasion its being invoked. The threat of a nuclear
attack upon a major city of the Middle East even in response to
a similar event would seem unduly harsh and therefore not too
credible. Lesser military actions, coupled with severe political
and economic sanctions would appear more likely.

Technical approach

As has been mentioned earlier, it has been suggested that
the United States might be willing to offer large-scale assistance
to both the United Arab Republic and Israel for the construction
of large nuclear power-desalination reactor stations, on the con-
dition that the recipients of such aid place all their nuclear
activities under international control. 19 Were this to come about,
all overt efforts to produce nuclear weapons would be forsworn.
It has been argued that the Atoms-for-Peace program has had a
negative effect on non-proliferation; that it whetted nuclear

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appetites and spread nuclear technology. It is doubtful if there
has been a significant effect to date. The nations that are
regarded as most likely to opt for nuclear weapons are those that
generally have a high level of technical capability. In the
Middle East the granting of the proposed aid would not contribute
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in those countries, nor is
it likely to markedly accelerate any future programs for their
production. The type of reactors proposed are designed to be
fueled with enriched uranium. None of the countries of the Middle
East can supply their own enriched uranium. Indeed, there are no
producers of enriched uranium outside the present nuclear powers.

Thus the reactors, to be run under international control, could
not be continued in use without the assistance of a nuclear power
if the control were to be terminated. Redesign and modification
of the reactors for use with natural uranium might well be about

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as costly and time-consuming as starting from scratch. Israel
already has the technical ability to make nuclear weapons, and if
the United Arab Republic was determined to make nuclear weapons
it would be able to manage it even without the sort of assistance
and training that would be gained in the use of this reactor.

The main point is that for whatever period such assistance
was in effect, with concomitant controls on all other overt
nuclear activities in those countries, there would be a non-
acquisition arrangement in effect. And this could be achieved
without the requirement that agreement be reached among outside
powers.

Another approach to limiting national nuclear programs to
peaceful activities would be by the extra-nationalization of
critical components of the programs. Thus, for economic reasons
as well, regional or international chemical processing plants

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would be a potentially attractive avenue toward avoiding the
establishment of a weapons material producing capability. Because
of the limited natural resources of the Middle East, it may be
possible to control the supply of reactor fuels. To make clan-
destine evasion of non-proliferation restrictions more difficult,
large extra-national reactor facilities might be considered, or
reactors and other nuclear facilities might be staffed by inter-
national teams. If there is a willingness to accept non-acquisition,
there should be no problem in technologically reinforcing such a
position.

## Conventional armaments

Many observers feel that a nuclear non-proliferation agree-
ment for the Middle East would have to be accompanied by limitations
on conventional armaments. 20 The May 18 statement of Premier
Eshkol suggests that this would certainly be desirable to Israel. 21

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Arab spokesmen often speak of a fear of Israeli attack, so that conventional arms limitations should be attractive to them too.

Here, again, is a matter on which the major powers could act in concert. Even if they might still wish to vie with each other for influence in the area, there should be saner and more productive means for doing this than large-scale military aid. The experience of 1955-1956 should have taught the countries of the area the possible consequences of a large-scale perturbation on the arms balance, so that they themselves should not be too anxious to have a repeat performance. The withholding of large amounts of military aid would help to maintain some stability in the area. If the major powers wished to take a more active role, consideration could be given to guarantees against large-scale aggression with conventional arms.

Achieving limitations on conventional arms is likely to prove

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difficult. It would probably be best to seek nuclear non-proliferation separately, rather than to couple the two measures.

Biological and chemical warfare

The question of biological and chemical warfare, as ominous as it may seem in general considerations of arms control, becomes even more serious in the context of local conflicts, as exemplified by the Middle East. While the use of biological or chemical weapons in a conflict between the major powers may seem unsuitable -- in terms of effectiveness, dependability, safety -- their use could be very inviting in smaller-scale conflicts. An added attraction, particularly to biological agents, is that they can be cheaply and inconspicuously produced. As uncertain as detection of clandestine nuclear activity may be, the inspection and control problems for these agents are far greater. So long as nuclear weapons may be on the scene, the added value of biological and

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chemical weapons may be marginal. In the absence of nuclear weapons, they could be very significant. Attention must be given to preventing the spread of these weapons.

## The future

By themselves, arms control measures have a strictly limited value. They can introduce some stability into the military aspect of the situation, and they do buy time for the solution of underlying political problems. Arms control should not be regarded as an end in itself. The basic problems in the Middle East are political, psychological, and economic, and they must be solved before the situation in the Middle East can be truly considered to be under control.

Since the differences are great and feelings run high, there is little hope that the problems can be peaceably resolved without outside assistance. Here, again, the principal roles are open to

the United States and the Soviet Union. Their determination to
arrive at a peaceful settlement in the Middle East could greatly
increase the stability in the area and improve the climate for its
attainment. Even in the absence of a non-proliferation agreement,
or, to go a step further, in the presence of nuclear weapons in
the area, the sense of United States and Soviet guarantees could
greatly reduce tensions and the likelihood of rash actions being
taken by either side. Beyond this, they could attempt to formulate
useful suggestions and even press for their acceptance.

There is no reason why political solutions must be preceded
by military ones. Ideally, the search for political and military
solutions should be pursued concurrently. However, so long as
political solutions are not forthcoming, the gains to be derived
from arms control measures, which may be more readily attainable,
should not be ignored.