WESTERN EUROPE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

1. **January 11, 1962:** NAR used the **Common Market** as an example of a first step towards implementing his idea of regional confederations: "I think what we have got to do is to understand their problems, their hopes, their aspirations, through consultations. That is the whole history of the relations of the Western Hemisphere -- consultation, common agreement -- and then the formation, as Europe has done, of an economic region leading to regional confederations. You have the Western Hemisphere, the European Atlantic Confederation, Common Market." (Hartford, Connecticut)

2. **July 11, 1962:** Asked whether the Common Market is helping build toward his idea of regional confederations, NAR replied: "I do; I do. I think that the Common Market is demonstrating the viability of this from an economic point of view, just as the 50 states in the United States have demonstrated it. We have the biggest free trade area in the world. Now we have been surpassed in size and weight and strength by the Common Market in Europe, and this has changed our whole exterior relations with the rest of the world because we no longer have the bargaining power that we used to with other nations. To get admittance to the United States free market was the treasured goal of all nations, and therefore they were willing to make concessions. Now to get into the Common Market is even greater, is an even greater enticement. There is a competitive factor there which we never had before. (Press Conference, July 11, 1962)

3. **February 9, 1963 on the Common Market:** "For all of us who have admired Great Britain's historic role, it was a source of regret that its entry into the Common Market was thwarted -- even if only temporarily. I disagree that Britain would have been a lukewarm member of the European community. On the contrary, I believe that it would have entered Europe wholeheartedly, and that Europe would have benefitted from its wisdom and courage.

Nevertheless, I have serious doubts about the administration's reaction to this event. I do not discover the specifically American interest that leads us to encourage groupings in Europe designed to isolate France or to present Franco-German amity as dangerous to NATO. It is not in the interest of

Britain; it is not in the interest of Europe; and above all
it is not in our interest to fragment Europe still further.

It is not in the long-term interest of Britain to be pushed
into the Common Market by United States pressure. This will
reinforce suspicions of Britain's role. It will in the long
run embarrass Britain! It may split Europe into pro-and
anti-American camps on an issue which is most properly a
European concern.

To organize or encourage rival blocs in Europe, to imply that
there is a choice between France and United States, is to
jeopardize still further all the achievements of the past
decade and a half toward European and Atlantic unity. The
result may be a resurgence of nationalism throughout Europe.
Such an event would be against our national interests.

Instead of a strong partner, we will have to deal with scores
of competing rivalries. The Communists would be tempted to
exploit our divisions -- and the new nations would lose a
vital source of strength.

The temporary failure of Britain's entry into the Common
Market must not produce a paralysis in our Atlantic policy.
There are a number of things we can do immediately.

We should propose a comprehensive trade agreement with Britain
and the Commonwealth to increase free world trade.

The US Trade Expansion Act of last year granted part of its
tariff-cutting power to the President on the assumption of
Britain's admission to the Common Market. Now there will be
far less use for that power unless the Trade Act is amended --
something which the President said last Thursday he "had not
planned" to seek but "would support" if the Congress "shows
any disposition to favor it."

It seems to me that this is a point on which the President should
take vigorous leadership, rather than await Congressional
initiative.

It is high time for the Alliance to create a political body
to set common goals and to develop common policies. Bilateralism
is dangerous by whomever practiced.

The leadership of a coalition of free countries is of course always far more exacting than the direction of an empire. But we should always remember that the power and purpose generated by the voluntary cooperation of free societies can never by equalled by the reluctant compliance of nations treated like subjects." (statement)

4. April 25, 1963 on Western Europe political and economics:

"We must not lose sight of the fact that military security can never be an end in itself.

The ultimate hope for the free world resides in the development of a political and economic structure which permits all free peoples to live in dignity and freedom.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic have a special responsibility in this respect. These countries enjoy a high and rising standard of living.

Most of them share democratic values and institutions. They have a unique opportunity to demonstrate that the deepest and most lasting unity grows out of the voluntary agreement of free peoples.

They must forge unity while respecting diversity -- and they should create a structure which is to the ultimate benefit of all the peoples of the world and not simply of a single regional grouping.

The ultimate goal is an expanding economy within a vital free world structure. Essential immediate steps are the strengthening of the cohesion and vitality of Europe and of the political unity of the Western Alliance...

I would therefore urge the creation of a permanent body at the highest level charged with exploring the means of strengthening the cohesion of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Such a body should, of course, cooperate to the fullest with whatever European institutions emerge out of the process of European integration.

The US representative to this Body should have the same status
as our representative to the United Nations -- that is he
should be of cabinet rank.

The permanent group should be charged with exploring areas
of common action. It should work on a common policy for relations
with the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to negotiations.

It should address itself to a long-term projection of NATO
strategy (while the NATO Council deals with immediate problems).
One of its most important tasks should be to devise policies
which enable other regions, such as Latin America, Japan and
the other Pacific nations, Southeast Asia and Africa, to part-
icipate in the progress of the Atlantic area on a basis of
equality and mutual respect.

In pursuing this course we would do well to keep in mind that
men are moved by ideals and values and not simply by cold
calculation. There is nothing automatic about the shape of
the future. It is compounded of the vision and the daring and
the courage of the present."

the courage of the present.
the future. It is compounded of the vocation and the during and
calculation. There is nothing automatic about the rules of
men are moved by ideas and aims and not simply by cold
in basing the course we would do well to keep in mind that
equality and mutual respect.

The other Pacific nations, Southeast Asia and Africa, to bar-
which couple other regions, and as Latin America, Japan and
One of its most important tasks should be to devise policies
strategy (while the NATO Comitie deals with immediate problems).
It should address itself to a long-term projection of NATO
with the Soviet Union, barterily with respect to negotiations,
of common action. It should work on a common policy for relations
This permanent group should be charged with exploring areas
should be of capital rank.

The U2 representative to the body should have the same status
as our representative to the United Nations -- that is the
should be of capital rank.

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