For Release upon delivery
8:00 P.M., October 10, 1969

Address
by
Dean Acheson
at the Inauguration of
The Milwaukee Journal-World Affairs Council of Milwaukee
Annual Award for Distinguished Service in Foreign Affairs

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

October 10, 1969

Friends and Benefactors:

You have honored me greatly this evening by the warmth
of your reception of a warrior long since retired from the
fray, by the munificence and generosity of your award, and
by the kindness that you have lavished upon my wife and my-
self. May I confess that I find myself in agreement with
some of the dissidents from this evening's program who
thought the honor beyond my desserts. They are quite
right -- which makes me all the more appreciative of it.
Perhaps the very essence of feeling honored is the knowl-
edge that the accolade is undeserved. One must be assured,
indeed, to believe that one has ever acted above and beyond
what was reasonably to be expected of one -- in other words,
the call of duty. For while many may exaggerate the value
of their contribution, few can honestly exaggerate the call
of duty. I am grateful and deeply touched that you should
have inaugurated this award by selecting me as its first
recipient.

In discussion with so cosmopolitan an audience as
this, which has blood and cultural ties all over the world,
it is natural that one's thoughts should turn to that
"vast external realm," as the Supreme Court has described
the world beyond our borders, and to our relations with it.
Just having finished a book on our foreign relations over
a good part of my life, which is published this very day,
I shall not now look backward at the past. Instead we
might peer together into the future, not to attempt to
predict it -- a form of hubris that invites rebuke from
the gods -- but to see whether presently visible trends
and conditions throw light on the nature of problems that
may arise and the quality of governments throughout the
world which will have to deal with them. Knowing this much
should help us toward some notions of what to expect.

2

Starting at home, what sort of mood possesses us and is likely to continue for some time? Certainly not the buoyant courage that led the country to meet the near panic brought by the depression with the belief that all we had to fear was fear itself. Not the grim determination that met the attack at Pearl Harbor and smashed enemies on both sides of the world bent on our destruction. Not the mood of vigorous and inspired leadership that brought restoration to war-torn countries, help and guidance to new ones, and protection to the free portion of the world from the aggression of a new ideologically inspired imperialism.

No; today the mood is not one of buoyancy in the face of challenge but of disillusionment that "the labor naught availeth," and weariness of well-doing and leadership. This is not because the tasks of leadership are beyond the capacity and strength of this country; but because some tasks chosen were ill-chosen, because all are difficult, and because thinking about them makes us tired. Nevertheless, the mood is real and will continue until changed by time, luck, and a new gift of strong leadership.

At home our problems in a way come from success, not failure. In the past forty years the material welfare of all sections of our people and the justice and humanity with which the needs and condition of the weak and heavy-laden have been met have exceeded all promise of our preceding history. Yet, domestic tranquility, one of the principal purposes of organized society, has rarely been more disturbed. This disturbance comes from the impact of various minority groups upon the rest of us - the black minority protesting with violence against discriminations; the adolescent-juvenile minority protesting against the war in Vietnam and also against things as they are, as rising generations have done with varying degrees of trouble for their elders since the beginning of recorded history; the criminal minority in its historic effort to redistribute property; and so on.

These troubles, painful as they are, should not surprise us. The first two have historically accompanied periods of social improvement, not those of social stagnation and depression. Explanation of the third was given by my son when, as District Attorney, he was asked by a congressional committee to what he attributed the growth of crime in our District. "To people," he answered, "and especially to large and sudden increases of them."

3

Our present domestic discontents and, hence, the domestic problems of government, stem from three sources -- the Vietnam War, internal disorder, and the inflation caused by the expense of these troubles plus that of national defense. The rest are subsidiary. Problems are difficult but not impossible to solve. Indeed, the chief difficulty comes not from determining what to do, but from summoning the resolution to do it and rallying support for the attempt.

For instance, internal disorder has long-term causes and cures about which innumerable commissions have written interminably. It also has immediate and painful impacts that call for immediate and strong preventive measures. An end to long-term causes of disorder may well require a solution in Vietnam, more and better education, and the end of poverty and racial discrimination; but a government that tolerates disorder until these goals are achieved will not survive. Disorder can be drastically reduced before its causes are altogether removed. To do so will require federal initiative and cooperation with local authorities.

Disorder, whether from extensive rioting or individual crimes of violence, will not occur in the presence of alert and overwhelming power. The Congress can direct the President when domestic tranquility is threatened by violence national in scope and nature, such as race rioting, to send federal armed forces into a threatened community to support local forces, without waiting for invitation or violence. These forces should be instructed to make their presence known and be prepared to preserve order and protect persons and property whenever preventive or corrective action might be necessary. Among the purposes for which "We the people of the United States . . . [did] . . . ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America" was to "insure domestic tranquility." Only force in being and in timely position can insure domestic tranquility against the dangers that have harassed us for too long and are still harassing us.

Similarly, to bring us relief from crime on the streets, which in my own community makes it hazardous to mail a letter or walk a dog after dark, a well-tested method is at hand in federal aid in the financing and

... 4 ...

training of considerable increments to local police forces. The best insurance of safety on the streets is more policemen patrolling them. A great deal of heat can be generated in debating the treatment of persons apprehended for crime during and after their arrest, trial, and conviction. Everything that makes for virtue is desirable, but clearly the way to bring about the largest and fastest reduction in crime is to reduce the opportunity to commit it. To do that we need more and better policemen. As already stated, the difficulty in stopping internal disorder, as in dealing with other domestic problems, is not in knowing what to do, but in getting on with it.

Why is it harder for governments to act than to know how to act? Because, I suggest, all governments in power today everywhere in the world are weak governments. Sometimes because they are made up of weak or inexperienced men; sometimes because their support in the society is weak. The latter is the source of our own government's weakness. It was a minority government when elected and has not been able to forge adequate new support. Consequently, it has been hesitant, indecisive, over-responsive to criticism from country and Congress. Perhaps the United States Senate would do well to ponder the proposition that the separation of powers like matrimony presupposes a nice balance between mutual support and mutual criticism. If the latter too greatly overbalances the former, the result is likely to be disastrous to the union. Broadly, the President has shown good initial judgment. All of us should do all we can to help him and nothing to make his road harder. I have been doing so and will keep on doing so. Too many believe that to warrant support a President should deserve it by being one of those rare leaders who dominate and determine the nature of their times as Charlemagne did his, or as the great Elizabeth did hers, or as FDR did in our own time. Try as you will, you cannot find in this continent, South America, or Europe or Asia or Africa -- in the free world or in the communist -- a better than average government, black, white, or yellow. Those who have been eager for the century of the common man should be happy, for we are now certainly well into one.

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What does it mean for us all, this rule everywhere by
median men? What sort of problems will it raise? What
sort of responses will be made to them? Almost everywhere
the cause and effect of change will not be understood, for
both will be complex; hence change will be regarded with
apprehension, if not with fear. But responses will differ.
In authoritarian regimes an almost reflexive reaction may
try to repress change, as the communist alliance is attempt-
ing to do in Czechoslovakia; in liberal democracies, to
appease it, as some liberal religious organizations are
attempting to appease black nationalist demands for repara-
tions. Both repression and appeasement are traditional,
almost instinctive responses to fear. "Nice doggie!" we
say to the vicious mongrel growling at our heels; or, if
we dare, fetch him a clout with a stout walking stick.
Neither is likely to be the result of careful thought.

Turning from general to more specific considerations,
what we may expect from both enemies and friends seems
unlikely to make for stability and easier relations. The
Soviet Government over the past decade has doubled its
expenditures for strategic nuclear power, developing a
military force second to none. At the same time our own
expenditure on these weapons has been reduced by half.
We are approaching, if we have not reached, a parity. To
the chronically hopeful among us this suggests an approach
also to easier relations between us, a period of détente
in which discussion might lead to a reduction or end to
rival arming. They hail Foreign Minister Gromyko's
statement that "The Soviet Union has always proceeded on
the assumption that the USSR and the USA can find a common
language" and wanted good and friendly relations. The
first half of the statement was false historically; the
second half was negatived at the same international communist
meeting at the Kremlin in June by Gromyko's and the
Communist Party's boss, Mr. Brezhnev. "The United States
of America," he said, "the chief imperialist power has
grown more aggressive . . . . Global in scale, the basic
contradiction between imperialism and socialism is growing
deeper . . . the struggle between the two world systems is
becoming sharper . . . ."

6

Nevertheless, according to Party doctrine, the great
growth of Soviet military power had prevented an attack
by the United States in an effort to preserve the im-
perialist system. Soviet power had also made possible
prevention of defections from its own system -- i.e.,
Czechoslovakia -- and the support of wars of national
liberation against "capitalist imperialism." Both forms
of military action are wholly consistent with "peaceful
coexistence" since they are forms of self-defense against
counter-revolutionary reaction. For those interested in
communist logic -- dialectical materialism -- the Gromyko
and Brezhnev statements are quite reconcilable and both
Soviet aid to the Viet Minh and the attempt to place nuclear
missiles in Cuba were in pursuit of good and friendly rela-
tions with the United States through peaceful coexistence.

However, for those more interested in Soviet conduct
than in verbal agility, the forthcoming nuclear arms limi-
tation talks offer a more promising field for speculation.
One can easily see the advantage to the Soviet Union and
the lethal danger to the United States in an agreement that
would bind the open and public American society to nuclear
parity with the Soviet Union without opening the closed
and secret Soviet society to far more inspection and over-
sight than it has ever been willing to grant in twenty
years of discussion of the subject. The chances of success
in these discussions stated numerically must be almost in-
finitesimal, yet the lure of them to negotiators and the
danger of falling into their own bear trap is substantial.
Until communist society becomes more civilized and reliable,
the risks of improvident agreement, like those of continu-
ous Russian roulette, are uninsurable, and perhaps greater
than those created by no agreement at all.

They seem even greater when we add another considera-
tion. At present the Soviet Union greatly surpasses
Western Europe in intermediate-range ballistic missiles
and conventional forces. The threat that this superior
power might impose Soviet demands on Western Europe, as
it has on Eastern Europe, has been offset by the provisions
of the North Atlantic Treaty and the presence in Europe of
substantial United States conventional forces as a practi-
cal guarantee of U.S. strategic nuclear support. If, how-
ever, Soviet and American intercontinental nuclear power

7

were neutralized by agreement to maintain parity leaving
Soviet intermediate-range and conventional power unchal-
lengeable, the balance of power in Europe would be so
openly and notoriously upset that the imbalance might be
as great and could be as decisive as it was after Munich.
Not that war would be inevitable, but Soviet domination
would be if American intervention should be foreclosed.

One does not need to suppose a Soviet attack on
Western Europe to bring this result about. More likely,
growing tension in Eastern Europe and Soviet demands upon
Germany, like those of Hitler upon Czechoslovakia
would find weak and plausible politicians to grant them
in the name of maintaining "peace in our time."

The way to this result could well be paved by the
consequences within the Western alliance of weak govern-
ments there. Leadership is needed not only to move people
forward but to restrain them. The common tendency is to
follow short range narrowly conceived interests. That is
why we pollute our environment, not only physical environ-
ment but political as well. The long-range interests of
the western world require increasing unity within Europe
and between Europe and North America. To accomplish this
requires strong leadership to control nationalist inter-
ests making for disunity and mutual irritation. Weak
governments yield to centrifugal forces. These we see
operating today. General de Gaulle's folie de grandeur
and German pride in the strength of the mark prevented
monetary adjustments in Europe until the forced devalua-
tion of the franc precipitated a suspension of the unified
agricultural policy in Europe and necessitated new trade
restrictions. These can harm others, including the United
States, and stimulate reciprocal protective measures.

Furthermore, de Gaulle's nationalist separatism
weakened NATO, gave rise to irritated frustration with
our allies, and led to the Mansfield-Symington proposal
cighteen months ago for a withdrawal of American forces
from Europe. From this folly we were saved by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Saved may be too
strong a word. More likely the agitation has only been
postponed. One does not need a crystal ball to foresee

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how these actions and reactions, each popular and hard
to resist in its own locality, could so loosen the bonds
of the Atlantic Alliance as to open the way for Soviet
prying into the cracks.

I am not predicting that these evils will come to
pass or that signs portend the decline of the West. One
cannot see so far, but far enough to warn of the direction
of the wind and tide, to warn also that various ships of
state lack experienced and wise captains in command,
strong hands at the oars, and appointed destinations.
Some appear to be on collision courses. The intervention
of human will, ability, and courage could prevent disaster,
but whence it will come is not shown by my crystal-gazing.

One can speak with more assurance of what to expect
and what not to expect in our relations with the Southern
hemisphere. There, on the whole, governments are weaker
and less competent than elsewhere and our response to them
is apt to be more doctrinaire and unwise. Government, as
Plato taught, is an art and the most difficult of all of
them both to practice and to endure. Of all its forms
democracy is the most baffling and parliamentary democracy
well-nigh impossible. Even peoples of ancient culture
such as the French, Italians, and Greeks find it beyond
them. Yet this is the form that the European colonial
powers bequeathed to Africa and Asia, where it has largely
broken down. The same is generally true of that democratic
obstacle race, known as the separation of powers, which
Latin America copied from the United States.

Lapses from the practice of these difficult procedures
our press and public treat as falls from grace, scolding
the newer countries in sorrow but those who should really
know better, like the Greek colonels, in anger. In doing
so they forget, what our founding fathers did not, that
domestic tranquility is essential to development of a new
country. Only under conditions of domestic order is capital
formation possible. In South America, Africa, and Asia
the pressure of populations makes development a necessity.
The cultural blessings of civilization must await an
equilibrium between population and sustenance.

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In some cases extreme zeal for democratic practices unknown in our own country twenty years ago, such as "one man-one vote" has led us to adopt hostile attitudes towards countries in southern Africa which are eager for good relations with us. In one instance, that of Rhodesia, we have gone so far as to join in economic warfare against her in the vain effort to impose changes in her internal franchise laws. Here our passion for democratic orthodoxy has overcome our belief in material development, for the countries of southern Africa have developed economies more beneficial to their black as well as white citizens than any other in the continent. They can help the development of their black neighbor states -- and are willing to do so -- more than is possible for us. Moreover, their good will and the use of their ports is important to us as the Russian navy moves into the Indian Ocean.

So again in dealings with the southern hemisphere, as in our relations with the northern, we may expect to find weakness of governments leading to the triumph of unwise pressures and the neglect of common sense and national interests.

At present our relations with Peru furnish a lurid example. The military junta, seeking popularity, nationalized Standard of New Jersey's interest in a long-disputed oil concession. The United States Congress has imposed rigid restrictions on the President's freedom of negotiation in such cases. Nevertheless, with admirable restraint, the President has been seeking a solution, while Peru arrests fishing boats within two hundred miles of her coast.

All this may not be fatal but is unlikely to be beneficial.

Now that I am and have been for some time a private citizen, I am frequently asked what we citizens can do about these complex questions of our foreign relations. Here again the approach to the problem is simpler than the execution of it. As in every problem of private or business life, there is one fundamental primary rule: Try to understand the problem before devising an answer. Do this, and see how alone you are! Everyone -- but everyone -- knows answers, most of them conflicting.

10

Politicians, commentators, and columnists are ready with answers to any question. Clergymen, professors, labor leaders, and students are overflowing with them. But if you go about like Diogenes with his lantern seeking, in this case, an understanding mind, you can discard most of the answers as no more meaningful than the shrill noises made by cicadas vibrating their abdominal membranes.

The facts are often hard to come by and open minds are rare. Fortunately, organizations exist to bring them together, of which the World Affairs Council movement stands in the forefront. Here the light of information and that of analysis are brought to bear upon problems. Time and again one discovers how often these converging lights show us the way, if not to the specific answer, at least to the area where an acceptable one may be found. To provide this enlightenment to citizens is a basic and invaluable part of the democratic process. That process consists of far more than counting heads. If they are not also filled and weighed, we hasten toward what Brooks Adams called the degradation of the democratic dogma.

I should also say to my inquiring fellow citizen that if knowledge and understanding of the problems is a sound way to begin private participation in foreign policy, opposition to government, for its own sake, is a poor way. We have inherited from colonial times a skepticism of government. The British were always restraining the colonists from lumbering masts -- reserved for the royal navy -- and from pushing into French and Indian territory. In our time, however, skepticism has progressed to instant opposition to any government proposal. To read and listen to public and private opinions would lead one to believe that we elect to public office the most zealous imbeciles bent upon every imaginable folly, extravagance, and disastrous adventure, determined to blight the hopes of the young, poor, and disadvantaged, and probably venal into the bargain. Even from the vantage point of the opposition, this strikes me as an extreme view.

It is also a damaging and foolish one. The choices open to any responsible government here and now in dealing with the vast external realm are narrow ones. However

- 11 -

much they may differ from our individual hopes and be-
liefs or from those of public pundits, they are not
likely to be very different from what any person in
public office might be able to do. Professional, even
cantankerous, criticism is desirable to keep both the
government and the governed alive to error and opportunity.
However, as an attitude for the informed private citizen
anxious to play a constructive role in policy making, sup-
port of the responsible leader is a sound role.

As we noted earlier, his function in foreign policy
is not only to lead in wise action but to restrain from
foolish action. For both he need support. Even a don-
key responds to a carrot as well as a stick. In CANDIDE
Voltaire has an Englishman explain the execution of an
English admiral on his own quarter deck as an effort
"pour encourager les autres." Indeed, to fall back on
a more earthy saying of our own, it is "a hell of a way
to run a railroad." Better ways are available right
here in your own community. They require the hardest
kind of work, which is thought. "The mode by which the
inevitable comes to pass," it has been said, "is effort."

8167

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1972

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I wish to thank you for your gracious letter of November 21 and for the fine commemorative medal honoring the 2500th Anniversary of the Founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great and the First Declaration of Human Rights. I am pleased to have it as a reminder of that historic occasion and of the friendly cooperation between the United States and Iran in its celebration.

With very best wishes,

His Excellency
Dr. A. Aslan Afshar
Ambassador of Iran
Imperial Embassy of Iran
3005 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED
DEC 9 1972

CENTRAL OFFICE

Dispatched 12/15/72 (rb)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 8167

December 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Medal from Iranian 2500th Celebration

You will recall that last year Iran celebrated its 2500th anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire; Vice President Agnew attended the Shah's monumental party at Persepolis in the fall. Along with other world nations, the US had a "US Committee" for the event, chaired by Mrs. Nixon, which orchestrated parallel commemorative activities of the anniversary here. One such activity was the striking of a commemorative medal, with symbols of the Iranian celebration on one side and Iranian-US friendship (profile of the President and the Shah) on the other. Each medal is of a limited serialized numbered edition.

You have now received such a medal from Iranian Ambassador Afshar and Ralph Becker, Executive Director of the US Committee who worked closely with the Iranians last year. At Tab D is a letter of transmittal from Mr. Becker and at Tab C is a letter of transmittal from Ambassador Afshar. As far as we can tell (and we checked back through White House mail), both letters came together in a single envelope forwarding only one medal for you.

You will want to thank both Afshar and Becker. At Tab B and Tab A are proposed letters of reply from you, thanking each.

**Recommendation:** That you sign the letter to Ambassador Afshar at Tab B and to Ralph Becker at Tab A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Just a short and, I regret, belated note to
thank you for your kind holiday gift and greet-
ing to me. Caviar is my most favorite sub-
stance and I shall enjoy the vodka and think
of your thoughtfulness to me.

With every godd wish to you and Mrs. Afshar,

Best regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

His Excellency
Dr. Amir-Aslan Afshar
Ambassador of Iran
3005 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

jlp:1/26/73

RECEIVED

FEB 2 1973

CENTRAL FILES