PR #390

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Q How?

A How?

Q Yes. You said we were discussing participation and forum. I wondered if you could give us more details.

A I think we should wait until the parties are prepared to announce this.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you any indication of how the Soviet Union will vote on the resolution today?

A I think the debate is still in process.
And once we know the result of that vote --

Q Is there any indication of how they might vote?

A We are hopeful that the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution.

Q If the resolution is passed, Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the alert would be taken off?

A The alert will not last one minute longer than we believe is necessary.

Q Dr. Kissinger --

A And it would be taken off as soon as any danger of unilateral action is removed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, concerning the role that the

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United States may play in obtaining conditions for an
enduring peace, several months ago you were reported as
saying that you were supportive of an American policy
that supports Israel but not Israeli conquests. What
is your view on that now?

A I think I was quoted to that effect
four-and-a-half years ago, before I understood the
special nomenclature that is attached to the various
ground rules.

Our position is -- as I have stated publicly --
that the conditions that produced this war were clearly
intolerable to the Arab nations, and that in a process
of negotiations, it will be necessary to make substantial
concessions.

The problem will be to relate the Arab concern
for the sovereignty over territories to the Israeli
concern for secure boundaries.

We believe that the process of negotiations
between the parties is an essential component of this.
And as the President has stated to the four Arab Foreign
Ministers, and as we have stated repeatedly, we will
make a major effort to bring about a solution that is

PR #390

considered just by all parties. But I think no purpose
would be served by my trying to delimit the exact nature
of all of these provisions.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

(Whereupon at 1:00 p.m. the press conference
was concluded.)

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 210714

THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION. WE ARE OPPOSED TO A JOINT US-SOVIET FORCE SINCE THIS WOULD INTRODUCE GREAT POWER RIVALRIES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO THE IMPOSITION OF A MILITARY "CONDOMINIUM" BY THE GREAT POWERS.

4. THE US IS EVEN MORE OPPOSED TO THE UNILATERAL INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY FORCE BY A NUCLEAR POWER UNDER WHAT EVER GUISE. RECENT SOVIET MILITARY ACTIONS ARE AMBIGUOUS AND THUS THE PRESIDENT ORDERED A PRECAUTIONARY ALERT OF US FORCES AT 0300, EDT. WE DO NOT CONSIDER OURSELVES IN CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR AND DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY AT THIS MOMENT TO HAVE CONFRONTATION.

5. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE US POSITION:

(A) THE US STANDS FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 22;

(B) THE US WILL SUPPORT AND GIVE ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL) TO A TRUCE OBSERVER FORCE WHICH REPORTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL;

(C) THE US IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AS LONG AS NO PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS A MEMBER OF IT;

(D) THE US IS PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT AND LEND ITS DIPLOMATIC WEIGHT TO THE SEARCH FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, RECOGNIZING THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PRODUCED THE OCTOBER HOSTILITIES MUST BE CHANGED. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-1652

NEWS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
AT THE PENTAGON

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1973

11:00 A. M.

Secretary Schlesinger: I thought that it was possible that you might have some questions that you would like to raise this morning and I'm prepared to take them.

Q: Most of our NATO Allies have apparently taken the position that they're not going to allow the United States to use their airspaces or their facilities for our effort to resupply Israel and we can understand the individual reasons for doing that; it's not a NATO operation. Can you comment on reports that some of our NATO Allies, particularly Turkey, has allowed overflights of Soviet aircraft to resupply the Arabs?

A: I won't comment on the particular issue that you indicate.

Q: Can you repeat that. There is microphone trouble.

A: I think we have had a demonstration in recent days of the importance of readiness. I wish that it were reflected better in this room. The question referred to the suggestion that Turkey had permitted overflights by the Soviet Union. My response was that I would not comment on that particular allegation, but we will investigate all aspects of the responsiveness of various countries in this crisis and will take them into consideration in the future.

Q: Can you tell us what steps the Soviet Union was taking that led us to a military alert?

A: I'll mention a number of them, but there were a plethora of indicators. We were aware that the Soviets had alerted comprehensively their airborne forces. In addition, the Soviet air was stood down, I believe, starting on Monday, and diminished to zero flights on Tuesday. The standing down, along with the alerting with airborne units, plus certain ambiguous developments to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday, suggested the possibility of a movement that was unilateral on the part of the Soviet Union and we took the normal precautions under those circumstances; adjusting our DEFCON status.

Q: You said that we took the normal circumstances -- normal adjustments -- it has been suggested and I wonder if you'd comment, that in fact we took extra firm, extra quick reaction, in order to leave no misunderstanding or no possibility of no misunderstanding on the part of the Soviets that the President is still able to act despite his domestic difficulties. Would you comment on that?

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A: I wouldn't say that our reaction was timely, but that it was not extra quick. Given the indicators that existed, the reaction was taken at the appropriate time. On the question of comprehensiveness or firmness, opinions may differ with regard to that. I think that it's quibbling about details, however. I think that it was important in view of the circumstances that has raised a question or may have raised a question about the ability of the United States to react appropriately, firmly, and quickly, that this certainly scotched whatever myths may have developed with regard to that possibility.

Q: Can you tell us how long the alert is going to go on -- U.S. alert?

A: We have begun to phasedown the alert; CINCSOUTH, the Southern Command, and the Alaskan Command went back to normal DEFCON status at 12:00 o'clock midnight last night. We will be making other adjustments as the circumstances warrant; as the President directs. I would expect that there may be some adjustments in the near term, but it will depend on the circumstances and the views of the President.

Q: Are there any other adjustments today, sir?

A: It is certainly possible that there will be other adjustments made.

Q: Secretary General Brezhnev has said that Soviet representatives have already gone into the war zone. Do we have any indications of what they are, the numbers, types, etc.?

A: The Soviet representatives, I assume, would be associated with the observation teams to which Dr. Kissinger referred yesterday. They would not be Soviet combat forces. The need for small numbers of people and any indications we have suggest that they would be in small numbers.

Q: Wasn't he talking about observers under the U.N. auspices where the Russians evidently are talking about sending representatives to Egypt on request of Sadat?

A: I'm not sure just what the Russian suggestion is. In the judgment of the U.S. Government, there should be no combat forces; major combat forces introduced by any of the permanent members of the Security Council. Now, there may be small numbers of forces, of individuals rather than forces, who would be moving into the combat area or recently the combat area since at the present time all is quiet out there and hopefully they would be associated with the UN controlled observation teams.

Q: Has the airlift been resumed by the Soviet Union?

A: The airlift of the Soviet Union is going on at the present time, much diminished from the prior level.

Q: Mr. Secretary, being an expert in the intelligence field, could you comment on the fact that we are spending $3 billion a year on this and we

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come up with a big fat zero. Mr. Kissinger has to be waked out of a sound sleep to find out that this happened; he said that the other countries were caught flat-footed also. Could you comment on the efficacy of our intelligence effort in this area?

A: As a general comment, intelligence with regard to the intentions as opposed to capabilities is a very difficult task and one cannot expect to have to bat 1,000 in that area. The purpose of our intelligence expenditures is to improve and substantially, and we believe it has substantially improved, the intelligence available to the United States. We had indications of the movements of forces. In the estimating process, of course, one must make that decision or come to a conclusion whether or not the forces will be utilized. I think that the technical performance, the technical performance of the intelligence agencies cannot be criticized; in fact, it must be highly commended. There are always limitations in the performance, in the estimating process. I think that the technical performance of the intelligence community with regard to the indicators of the possibility of Soviet movement rather than being a flat zero as your question implied was extraordinarily good.

Q: Is it the Administration view now that, because the Administration took a strong stand by declaring this alert, it turned the Russians around?

A: I think that I would refrain from making so generalized a comment. I think that what we would say is that it was necessary to go on alert because of the possibility, the possibility of the movement of forces in a certain region of the world; that the alert was necessitated by that movement of forces. The alert also had the function of demonstrating the strong belief of the United States Government that the movement that was being speculated on would be disadvantageous to the world's peace. Consequently, to that extent that that message was conveyed, I think that this has been a success. But I should stress that the selection of DEFCON III was a normal procedure under those circumstances.

Q: I would like to go into that a little bit. When you used the phrase earlier that the Soviet air was stood down -- I don't understand what that means -- I guess it's a technical military term. What does that mean, the Soviet air was stood down and what are the implications of that?

A: The implications of any standing down are that one must consider the possibility that those equipments are being mobilized for a new purpose.

Q: So the reading here was that the Soviets might be putting themselves in a position to move troops into the Middle East and you wanted to warn them not to do it. Is that correct?

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A: I think the first part of it is the correct reading. The second part is your inference and you're welcome to it. I wouldn't confirm that.

Q: They wouldn't move a lot of airborne troops without some kind of air cover; fighter planes and things like that. Were there indications of that kind of alert as well? Did that tend to soften the concern any or was it just felt that they didn't need that?

A: As one will recognize there has been major air transportation into the Middle East during the last three weeks. All of it has gone through unimpeded So it was not judged that fighter cover would be a necessity.

Q: Once more for the fourth time. Is there anything that the Russians are now doing that prevents us from calling off the alert now? Why do we have to space out this call-up or alert or stage it out?

A: I think that the answer to that is that we do not know at this stage whether the Soviets have reduced their alert status. We are carefully watching the circumstances and that we are adjusting downward as the circumstances permit. Is that a complete answer to that question?

Q: You say we are carefully watching their alert status. Have they begun to adjust downward?

A: As I indicated a moment ago, it is easier to determine when forces have been put on the alert than when that alert status has been terminated.

Q: What's the status of the American airlift to Israel right now?

A: The American airlift is continuing.

Q: At what stage? Are we still at 20 flights a day?

A: Approximately 20 flights a day. There has been no adjustment of the American airlift. It will continue until such time as sea transportation permits the discontinuation of the airlift. Because of the geographic proximity, Soviet sealift which is now in high gear has taken over in large measure from the airlift.

Q: Nothing that you have said, or Mr. Kissinger said yesterday, has indicated that Soviet nuclear or strategic forces were alerted. Why was it necessary to alert our SAC forces in connection with this Mideast crisis, given the nature of the fighting that has gone in recent days and the type of troops--airborne troops--that were alerted by the Soviets? Why did we have to apparently from what we can tell escalate it into terms of nuclear forces?

A: That is a precautionary measure as I indicated. We chose a DEFCON status that is an intermediate status. Under circumstances that existed at that time one wishes to have one's forces in enhanced readiness posture. This was, of course, not the highest readiness posture. We have had circumstances in the last 15 years in which we have gone into a higher readiness posture than was decided upon the other evening. The Soviet buildup of naval forces, in

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the Mediterranean, associated with the possibility of actions taking place that might have involved U.S. naval forces, leads one to take precautionary steps involved in putting all U.S. forces that could be involved in a higher state of readiness.

Q: Certain moves were taken during this alert which gave the implication that we were prepared to move paratroopers on our own side to the Middle East. This would indicate also a possible confrontation with paratroopers coming from Russia. Dr. Kissinger indicated that he was not ever thinking of such a confrontation. Why would you then alert the 82nd Airborne for that purpose?

A: A lot is tied up in your word prepared. The increase in the readiness condition of U.S. forces may have been misunderstood by some in recent days. To increase the readiness condition, does not mean that one is prepared to move those forces or even more strongly, commit them to battle. We were, of course, in a position in which, if the circumstances required, we would have been prepared to move the 82nd Airborne, but we were only putting ourselves in a readiness posture and it is important to be in a readiness posture because frequently that removes the necessity of taking actions that might have to be considered if one were not in a readiness posture.

Q: (Inaudible) raise the possibility for the point that you know of that prior to their alert we had sent an additional helicopter carrier with Marines into the Mediterranean and that you had attended a maneuver of the 82nd Airborne down in Fort Bragg. Did they say that those actions by the United States precipitated their alert?

A: Not to my knowledge, but I would indicate that I would not care to comment upon the extent of diplomatic communications, that is a prerogative of Dr. Kissinger. The movement of the Marines was a normal replacement of the Marines in the Mediterranean. It was accelerated by a few days, I don't remember whether it was five days or so. There is a long voyage between here and the Mediterranean. One might regard that as a precautionary measure, but the basic answer to that, I think, is that this was part of a normal replacement. Similar activities have gone on with regard to the Soviet fleet. My visit to Brass Key II to which you referred had been laid on for some months.

Q: Can you give us to some degree the scenario leading up to this alert? The group here says that it was started at 12:00 o'clock (midnight); Dr. Kissinger said 3:00 o'clock (AM). I realize that there's a three hour housekeeping maneuver but did you make the decision by yourself or were you acting on the orders of the President or what?

A: The meeting, and one is a little vague on times, started about 11:00 o'clock (PM); it may have been a little bit later than that.

Q: What meeting is this you are referring to?

A: This was the meeting of the abbreviated National Security Council.

Q: Could you start by telling us who was there?

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A: I think most of the people who were there have been mentioned in their normal statutory capacities. Dr. Kissinger was there, Mr. Colby, Admiral Moorer and myself. The meeting started at approximately 11 o'clock (PM) as I recall it. The decision to notify the Commands of an enhanced readiness status was taken at approximately 11:30 (PM). There's a whole series of decisions that went on between approximately 11:30 (PM) and about 3:30 in the morning; somewhere around 2:00 o'clock (AM) -- I don't remember the precise time -- Admiral Moorer and I returned to the Pentagon in which further action was taken to complete the package of measures that were undertaken at that time. The initial decision was made by myself, however, at approximately 11:30 (PM) and I instructed Admiral Moorer to go ahead with the enhanced readiness condition.

Q: Had you talked with the President at this time?

A: I had not talked with the President at that moment. Dr. Kissinger had, I believe, just spoken with the President. The President was in complete command at all times during the course of that evening.

Q: Was he aware that you had alerted the troops?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did he approve that?

A: Yes, indeed. As Dr. Kissinger indicated, he approved the entire package about 3:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q: Could you tell us what it was, according to our assessment, that led the Russians to make a move towards moving troops into the Middle East?

A: I would be inclined not to speculate on motives regarding events that did not take place. The Soviets did not move any forces. There were, as I indicated, some actions that increased our wariness and some ambiguous diplomatic signals to which Dr. Kissinger referred, but those events did not take place. You can speculate for yourself with regard to the kinds of discussions that might have been ongoing in the Kremlin during that period of time.

Q: Would you tell us how many Soviet troops were alerted and characterized their state of alert? Also, outside of those troops and the potential for a Soviet airlift of troops, were there any other indicators that caused us to go on our own alert?

A: Yes, sir, there were additional indicators, some of them as I have indicated in the diplomatic area, but there were also additional military indicators in this area.

Q: What were they?

A: I believe I mentioned the enhancement of the Soviet naval forces. They are now up to about 85 ships in the Mediterranean, which is approximately

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double the normal level of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. In addition, there were a number of other indicators; military intelligence nature into which I shan't go.

Q: What about the number of men involved?

Q: And troops in state of readiness?

A: It was a comprehensive alerting of the Soviet airborne.

Q: Where?

A: I will refrain from answering that at the present time.

Q: How many divisions?

A: I'm not going to go into the Soviet force structure.

Q: It wasn't a comprehensive alert of all their forces--

A: No, the airborne.

Q: There are some reports that roughly 50,000 airborne were alerted, the Soviets. Is that a rough approximation?

A: As a matter of fact, I'm not sure of the precise number but that number is in about the right ballpark.

Q: One other question, their (Soviet) two helicopter carriers, did they go into the Mediterranean?

A: I don't believe so; I can check on that.

Q: Are they still moving around the Black Sea?

A: I've indicated, I think, the full extent of the activities.

Q: Could you tell us why the United States Government viewed the apparent decision or tentative decision of the Soviets to send forces in as a peace-keeping measure when they combined that with an appeal to us to send troops in? I mean, why did we think this was such a dangerous thing? They've had 15,000 troops there before and they said they were going just to secure peace.

A: You are dealing with a hypothetical question, once again. I think that the movement of Soviet forces, the postulated movement of Soviet forces which is designed, ostensibly designed to restrain the behavior of one of thenations engaged in military hostilities, with the possible long run implications of such stationing of forces, is not something that would be conducive to the development of what is the fundamental objective of U. S. foreign policy which is a stable and permanent settlement in the Middle East.

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Q: If you could just clarify, earlier you said I think that the CINCSOUTH was making adjustment. Now why would a NATO command be involved in this type of thing? Did you misspeak?

A: SOUTHCOM.

Q: Both you and Secretary Kissinger have gone to great lengths to indicate that we were not at the brink of war at any time. There are many questions still left unanswered regarding your intelligence estimates as to Russian moves. Is there any way you could help us clear some of this up. It's still ambiguous. I myself am not clear how close we were to actually coming to a confrontation.

A: I think we were very far away from a confrontation--

Q: I couldn't hear the question.

A: The questioner wished to obtain some assurance with regard to the issue of how close we were to a confrontation and I indicated that we were very far away from a confrontation. If the question refers to a military confrontation, under the circumstances, I think that we were taking the actions that were necessary to preclude the development of a military confrontation. Now there were, of course, some elements of confrontation in the sense of political adversaries. They were I think, as Dr. Kissinger indicated the other day, a normal development that occurs between great powers which have considerations in which they are in conflict and also considerations which force them toward a common approach to problems.

I think that this whole episode indicates the limitations in a sense of detente but it also indicates the strength of detente. The fact that Dr. Kissinger, with considerable skill, I must say; a great deal of energy, was able to work out in collaboration with the Soviets the arrangement for two ceasefires, is I think a tribute to the strength of detente -- the communications that existed between the two so-called superpowers. However, of course, there were some elements of conflict but that the overall episode did indicate some of the strengths of detente and some of the advantages to both sides, and to the world at large, in this relaxation of tension. I should underscore that detente refers to mutual relaxation of tension and that detente must be a two-way street, as in the close of this episode it turned out to be.

Q: Was part of the formula, as it existed around 11:00 to 11:30 (PM), that there were Soviet transports enroute and we didn't know whether they had troops, but given all the other circumstances we felt we couldn't take the chance that there were troops aboard those planes?

A: I think that there were mixed reactions and different assessments of the probability. I think that the probability of Soviet forces being enroute was considered by some to be quite low but that the probability might rise was a matter of concern universally.

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Q: (inaudible) thought those planes that were enroute might have troops on them?

A: Yes, indeed, as I indicated that there is a different assessment of probabilities by different individuals. So that when you say that they might have troops aboard, nobody under those circumstances could dismiss that as a possibility no matter how low he placed the probability.

Q: Could you tell us when exactly you first learned that the seven Soviet airborne divisions, or whatever the force may have been, had been placed in an alert status? Wasn't that some time back about the time Kosygin was in Cairo -- quite a way back?

A: It was in an earlier point; I don't remember the precise day. I think that one must recognize that in these assessments it's a pulling together of a number of strands. While the airlift is fully preoccupied, quite obviously, that is of lesser importance than when there is a stand-down. Simultaneously, if there are diplomatic signals that cause wariness that adds to the total picture, but you are quite right.

Q: Is he right, was it several days before that when you first learned about it?

A: I don't remember precisely the number of days or even whether it was days rather than a day, but it had occurred earlier.

Q: Let me jog your memory on that, our colleague Joe Alsop reported that on either the 19th or 20th of this month that an airborne division was alerted.

A: I would not raise any question about the authenticity on the comments of any of your colleagues. I don't remember the precise day. I think that the statement is correct; we can probably check on that for you.

Q: We've had a situation over the past two weeks where our client state got into trouble. We sent in nearly a billion dollars worth of military equipment to help it out. We then got a ceasefire; our client state took advantage of the ceasefire to strengthen its position on the West Bank, to encircle the III Corps. It plunged us into a one-day crisis with our major adversary. What does this all say about our future relations with Israel and specifically, what are we telling Israel now as to what it should do on that Third Army?

A: I think that the answer to your final question will be eminently satisfactory but I cannot give it to you now. With regard to our posture in general, I would not use the term client state, particularly in an exclusive sense. Our purpose has been to restore peace to the area and to maintain a balance so that there can be some stabilization in an area which over the past 25 years has had a notably tragic history. I think that it is evident that in order to have a long-term settlement, that the relationship between Israel and

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her neighbors must be based on something far broader than a military preponderance by the State of Israel. In the working out of that relationship, which we hope has been fostered by the total resolution of the United Nations, that the agreement of the parties to negotiate one with another for the first time in many years; for the first time since 1948 in effect, will be instrumental in bringing about the kinds of stable relationships, or increased stability in those relationships, the United States desires stability in the area; equity for all parties in the area; protection of the security of all parties and consequently, I would tend to adapt the assumptions that underlay your question. The United States has sought to achieve a degree of balance, sometimes the phrase even-handedness is employed with regard to the countries in the area.

Long run stability, however, would not have been achieved if Israel had been inundated after the war started on October 6. The United States delayed deliberately delayed, the start of its resupply operations hoping that a ceasefire could be implemented quickly. Soviet resupply operations started on the 10th of October, if I remember correctly. We hoped that we could discourage that activity on the part of the Soviets and that once again that we could bring an immediate ceasefire. By the morning of the 13th, it was evident, I think, that without resupply there would be extreme difficulty in maintaining a balance. There were some who believed that the existence of the State of Israel was seriously compromised and therefore in order to achieve what is our objective -- a long-run settlement with equity for all parties -- that that action was necessitated on the part of the United States. But the United States, I think, seeks to have in the Middle East a condition of stability and a condition in which the rights of all parties are respected. I hope that many of the nations in the Middle East, without regarding themselves as our clients, regard themselves to a high degree, friends and partners of the United States.

Q: How much equipment have we sent to Israel and how much will we send?

A: At the present time, I think we have delivered approximately 10,000 tons directly.

Q: What is that in terms of dollars?

A: About $850 million at this stage.

Q: You mean we stopped since last Friday? The White House said it was $825 million then.

A: You can get the precise number; I think it's about $850 million.

Q: How much will we deliver in terms of dollars before we stopped the resupply?

A: There is a tendency in these kinds of deliveries for high value items to be delivered at an earlier point in time so that the value per ton tends to decline with the passage of time. I'm sorry I did not answer your full question. What was the rest of the question?

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Q: What will be the total value?

A: The President has asked for a supplemental of 2.2 billion; we do not know whether that is the precise requirement.

Q: Does your remark just now indicate that we have completed delivery of expensive items such as planes, tanks? There'll be no more?

A: No, what my remark suggested was that in the immediate environment after the 13th of October, that certain high value consummables and subsequently certain replacement items were delivered, for the time being there is a reduction in the flow of such items and there is more of a flow of consumables.

Q: Is there a tentative cutoff date for the American airlift? Do you have a date in mind by which you can complete it?

A: For the airlift? I can't give you a precise date, but it could go on. I gave you an imprecise date, at the point that the sealift begins to take over which should be in about two to three weeks time.

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Q: How are we going to create this condition of stability that you talked about in that area if we pump in $2 billion worth of arms and rearmed the Israelis and Russia pumps in numbers of rubles of arms and rearms the Egyptians and Syrians and equips them to fight all over again? What kind of a fruitful policy is that?

A: I think that it's quite obvious from your question that if that were the sole basis of policy on our part or on the part of the recipient states or the supplier states, that it would be difficult to obtain the kind of longrun settlement to which we have both referred. The settlement must be based upon restraint and balance on the part of the supplier nations, but most fundamentally in the development of a political relationship that can only come from direct negotiations and for the beginning of the appreciation of both parties in the conflict of the requirements that the other party sees which are fundamental and those that can be compromised.

Q: Mr. Secretary, one point about the timing, I hadn't known before our meeting here that you had known for sometime about the Soviet alert of its airborne forces. In the light of that, what specific thing caused this 11 o'clock meeting of the National Security Council; what was the immediate precipitating factor; what had been learned that led to that late night meeting?

A: I think that the direct precipitating cause falls in that area that we have not discussed and I do not wish to go into which relates to ambiguous signals that caused increased wariness. These were not of a military nature.

Q: Are our deliveries of sea and air going to proceed more or less with those of the Russians?

A: Our deliveries are based upon our assessment of what the requirements are to maintain a balance in the area. As you are aware, the American airlift was based upon that premise as was the provision of certain equipments. In tonnage, this is less than the tonnage that was carried initially by the Soviet airlift. In addition, the Soviets are moving about 60,000 tons at the present time by sea. We have moved little by sea ourselves, at this stage. There have been a number of Israeli vessels that have begun to move certain equipments by sea, but I believe that the total movement is about 10,000 tons. So once again it's much smaller.

Q: Mr. Secretary, with respect to Southern and Alaskan Commands, can you say what portion of U.S. forces they represent; does that mean nuclear forces are still on alert?

A: Nuclear forces; let me underscore once again that we have a scaled set of postures ranging from DEFCONFIVE to DEFCONONE. We have chosen an intermediate readiness posture. As a matter of fact for most of the forces concerned, we regard it as a minimum or the lowest degree of readiness that was required by those circumstances. So when you use the phrase alert, all we are referring to is enhanced readiness of a moderate degree. That

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has not as yet been changed. As I indicated earlier, we will begin, I think, to make selective adjustments in the readiness posture of all of our forces, including the Strategic Air Command, as the circumstances warrant and in response to the directives of the President.

Q: You've gone through an elaborate discussion of all the military reasons for the alert and then you say, however, none of these reasons was the precipitating cause of the alert and you're not going to tell us what that reason was. I think you owe us an obligation to give us some idea about those ambiguous statements that the other ...

A: I do not think that that would be in the interest of the American public at that time or the question of world peace. As my response to an earlier question indicated, the episode has underscored the strengths of detente, it has also underscored its limitations and consequently in a matter so delicate it would seem to me to be inappropriate at this time to go any further into the kinds of matters to which you refer. I indicated that it was of a non-military nature.

Q: I gather from what you said in answer to your first question that we are disappointed with the behavior or the actions of most of our NATO allies and that this may influence us in things like military aid, etc., in the future. Is that a correct interpretation? You said we would take this into account in planning our future actions.

A: I think that obviously that the circumstances force one, any new set of circumstances forces one to consider established notions; established doctrine. We maintain our forces in Germany, to cite one example, because it provides us with enhanced readiness. The reactions of the foreign ministry of Germany raised some questions about whether they view readiness in the same way that we review readiness and consequently we will have to reflect on that matter.

- END -

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973

In my view, the proper way for the Congress to make known its will on such foreign policy questions is through a positive action, with full debate on the merits of the issue and with each member taking the responsibility of casting a yes or no vote after considering those merits. The authorization and appropriations process represents one of the ways in which such influence can be exercised. I do not, however, believe that the Congress can responsibly contribute its considered, collective judgment on such grave questions without full debate and without a yes or no vote. Yet this is precisely what the joint resolution would allow. It would give every future Congress the ability to handcuff every future President merely by doing nothing and sitting still. In my view, one cannot become a responsible partner unless one is prepared to take responsible action.

## Strengthening Cooperation Between the Congress and the Executive Branches

The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires the fullest cooperation between the Congress and the Executive and the prudent fulfillment by each branch of its constitutional responsibilities. House Joint Resolution 542 includes certain constructive measures which would foster this process by enhancing the flow of information from the executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example, calls for consultations with the Congress before and during the involvement of the United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision is consistent with the desire of this Administration for regular-

ized consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.

I believe that full and cooperative participation in foreign policy matters by both the executive and the legislative branches could be enhanced by a careful and dispassionate study of their constitutional roles. Helpful proposals for such a study have already been made in the Congress. I would welcome the establishment of a non-partisan commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. This commission could make a thorough review of the principal constitutional issues in Executive-Congressional relations, including the war powers, the international agreement powers, and the question of Executive privilege, and then submit its recommendations to the President and the Congress. The members of such a commission could be drawn from both parties—and could represent many perspectives including those of the Congress, the executive branch, the legal profession, and the academic community.

This Administration is dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs and to preserving the constitutional prerogatives of both branches of our Government. I know that the Congress shares that goal. A commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President would provide a useful opportunity for both branches to work together toward that common objective.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
October 24, 1973.

# THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26, 1973

## OPENING STATEMENT

### THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE PRESIDENT. Ladies and gentlemen, before going to your questions, I have a statement with regard to the Mideast which I think will anticipate some of the questions, because this will update the information which is breaking rather fast in that area, as you know, for the past 2 days.

The cease-fire is holding. There have been some violations, but generally speaking it can be said that it is holding at this time. As you know, as a result of the U.N. resolution which was agreed to yesterday by a vote of 14 to 0, a peacekeeping force will go to the Mideast, and this force, however, will not include any forces from the major powers, including, of course, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The question, however, has arisen as to whether observers from major powers could go to the Mideast. My up-to-the-minute report on that, and I just talked to Dr. Kissinger 5 minutes before coming down, is this: We will send observers to the Mideast if requested by the Secretary

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General of the United Nations, and we have reason to expect that we will receive such a request.

With regard to the peacekeeping force, I think it is important for all of you ladies and gentlemen, and particularly for those listening on radio and television, to know why the United States has insisted that major powers not be part of the peacekeeping force, and that major powers not introduce military forces into the Mideast. A very significant and potentially explosive crisis developed on Wednesday of this week. We obtained information which led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force into the Mideast, a military force.

When I received that information, I ordered, shortly after midnight on Thursday morning, an alert for all American forces around the world. This was a precautionary alert. The purpose of that was to indicate to the Soviet Union that we could not accept any unilateral move on their part to move military forces into the Mideast. At the same time, in the early morning hours, I also proceeded on the diplomatic front. In a message to Mr. Brezhnev, an urgent message, I indicated to him our reasoning, and I urged that we not proceed along that course, and that, instead, that we join in the United Nations in supporting a resolution which would exclude any major powers from participating in a peacekeeping force.

As a result of that communication, and the return that I received from Mr. Brezhnev—we had several exchanges, I should say—we reached the conclusion that we would jointly support the resolution which was adopted in the United Nations.

We now come, of course, to the critical time in terms of the future of the Mideast. And here, the outlook is far more hopeful than what we have been through this past week. I think I could safely say that the chances for not just a cease-fire—which we presently have and which, of course, we have had in the Mideast for some time—but the outlook for a permanent peace is the best that it has been in 20 years.

The reason for this is that the two major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have agreed—this was one of the results of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Moscow—have agreed that we would participate in trying to expedite the talks between the parties involved. That does not mean that the two major powers will impose a settlement. It does mean, however, that we will use our influence with the nations in the area to expedite a settlement.

The reason we feel this is important is that first, from the standpoint of the nations in the Mideast, none of them, Israel, Egypt, Syria, none of them can or should go through the agony of another war.

The losses in this war on both sides have been very, very high. And the tragedy must not occur again. There have been four of these wars, as you ladies and gentlemen know, over the past 20 years. But beyond that, it is vitally important to the peace of the world that this potential trouble-spot, which is really one of the most potentially explosive areas in the world, that it not become an area in which the major powers come together in confrontation.

What the developments of this week should indicate to all of us is that the United States and the Soviet Union, who admittedly have very differ-

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ent objectives in the Mideast, have now agreed that it is not in their interest to have a confrontation there, a confrontation which might lead to a nuclear confrontation and neither of the two major powers wants that.

We have agreed, also, that if we are to avoid that, it is necessary for us to use our influence more than we have in the past, to get the negotiating track moving again, but this time, moving to a conclusion—not simply a temporary truce, but a permanent peace.

I do not mean to suggest that it is going to come quickly because the parties involved are still rather far apart. But I do say that now there are greater incentives within the area to find a peaceful solution, and there are enormous incentives as far as the United States is concerned, and the Soviet Union and other major powers, to find such a solution.

Turning now to the subject of our attempts to get a cease-fire on the home front, that is a bit more difficult.

## PRESIDENTIAL TAPES

Today White House counsel contacted Judge Sirica—we tried yesterday, but he was in Boston, as you know—and arrangements were made to meet with Judge Sirica on Tuesday to work out the delivery of the tapes to Judge Sirica.

## WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Also, in consultations that we have had in the White House today, we have decided that next week the Acting Attorney General, Mr. Bork, will appoint a new special prosecutor for what is called the Watergate matter. The special prosecutor will have independence. He will have total cooperation from the executive branch, and he will have as a primary responsibility to bring this matter which has so long concerned the American people, bring it to an expeditious conclusion, because we have to remember that under our Constitution it has always been held that justice delayed is justice denied. It is time for those who are guilty to be prosecuted, and for those who are innocent to be cleared. And I can assure you ladies and gentlemen, and all of our listeners tonight, that I have no greater interest than to see that the new special prosecutor has the cooperation from the executive branch and the independence that he needs to bring about that conclusion.

And now I will go to Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

## QUESTIONS

### THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Q. Mr. President, would the new special prosecutor have your go-ahead to go to court if necessary to obtain evidence from your files that he felt were vital?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. Cormier, I would anticipate that that would not be necessary. I believe that as we look at the events which led to the dismissal of Mr. Cox, we find that these are matters that can be worked out and should be worked out in cooperation and not by

having a suit filed by a special prosecutor within the executive branch against the President of the United States.

This, incidentally, is not a new attitude on the part of a President. Every President since George Washington has tried to protect the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, and you remember the famous case involving Thomas Jefferson where Chief Justice Marshall, then sitting as a trial judge, subpoenaed the letter which Jefferson had written which Marshall thought or felt was necessary evidence in the trial of Aaron Burr. Jeffer-

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son refused to do so but it did not result in a suit. What happened was, of course, a compromise in which a summary of the contents of the letter which was relevant to the trial was produced by Jefferson, and the Chief Justice of the United States, acting in his capacity as Chief Justice, accepted that.

That is exactly, of course, what we tried to do in this instant case.

I think it would be well if I could take just a moment, Mr. Cormier, in answering your question to point out what we tried to do and why we feel it was the proper solution to a very aggravating and difficult problem.

The matter of the tapes has been one that has concerned me because of my feeling that I have a constitutional responsibility to defend the Office of the Presidency from any encroachments on confidentiality which might affect future Presidents in their abilities to conduct the kind of conversations and discussions they need to conduct to carry on the responsibilities of this Office. And, of course, the special prosecutor felt that he needed the tapes for the purpose of his prosecution.

That was why, working with the Attorney General, we worked out what we thought was an acceptable compromise, one in which Judge Stennis, now Senator Stennis, would hear the tapes and would provide a complete and full disclosure, not only to Judge Sirica, but also to the Senate Committee.

Attorney General Richardson approved of this proposition. Senator Baker, Senator Ervin approved of the proposition. Mr. Cox was the only one that rejected it.

Under the circumstances, when he rejected it and indicated that despite the approval of the Attorney General, of course, of the President, and of the two major Senators on the Ervin Committee, when he rejected the proposal, I had no choice but to dismiss him.

Under those circumstances, Mr. Richardson, Mr. Ruckelshaus felt that because of the nature of their confirmation that their commitment to Mr. Cox had to take precedence over any commitment they might have to carry out an order from the President.

Under those circumstances, I accepted with regret the resignations of two fine public servants.

Now we come to a new special prosecutor. We will cooperate with him, and I do not anticipate that we will come to the time when he would consider it necessary to take the President to court. I think our cooperation will be adequate.

Q. This is perhaps another way of asking Frank's question, but if the special prosecutor considers that information contained in Presidential documents is needed to prosecute the Watergate case, will you give him the documents, beyond the nine tapes which you have already given him?

THE PRESIDENT. I have answered that question before. We will not provide Presidential documents to a special

prosecutor. We will provide, as we have in great numbers, all kinds of documents from the White House, but if it is a document involving a conversation with the President, I would have to stand on the principle of confidentiality. However, information that is needed from such documents would be provided. That is what we have been trying to do.

Q. Mr. President, you know in the Congress there is a great deal of suspicion over any arrangement which will permit the executive branch to investigate itself or which will establish a special prosecutor which you may fire again. And 53 Senators, a majority, have now cosponsored a resolution which would permit Judge Sirica to establish and name an independent prosecutor, separate and apart from the White House and the executive branch. Do you believe this arrangement would be constitutional, and would you go along with it?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would suggest that the action that we are going to take, appointing a special prosecutor, would be satisfactory to the Congress, and that they would not proceed with that particular matter.

Mr. Rather [Dan Rather, CBS News].

### QUESTIONS OF IMPEACHMENT OR RESIGNATION

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if you could share with us your thoughts, tell us what goes through your mind when you hear people, people who love this country, and people who believe in you, say reluctantly that perhaps you should resign or be impeached.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I am glad we don't take the vote of this room, let me say. And I understand the feelings of people with regard to impeachment and resignation. As a matter of fact, Mr. Rather, you may remember that when I made the rather difficult decision—I thought the most difficult decision of my first term—on December 18, the bombing by B-52's of North Vietnam—that exactly the same words were used on the networks, I don't mean by you, but they were quoted on the networks—that were used now: tyrant, dictator, he has lost his senses, he should resign, he should be impeached.

But I stuck it out, and as a result of that, we not only got our prisoners of war home, as I have often said, on their feet rather than on their knees, but we brought peace to Vietnam, something we haven't had and didn't for over 12 years.

It was a hard decision, and it was one that many of my friends in the press who had consistently supported me on the war up to that time disagreed with. Now, in this instance I realize there are people who feel that the actions that I have taken with regard to the dismissal of Mr. Cox are grounds for impeachment.

I would respectfully suggest that even Mr. Cox and Mr. Richardson have agreed that the President had the right, constitutional right, to dismiss anybody in the Federal Government, and second, I should also point out that as

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far as the tapes are concerned, rather than being in defiance of the law, I am in compliance with the law.

As far as what goes through my mind, I would simply say that I intend to continue to carry out, to the best of my ability, the responsibilities I was elected to carry out last November. The events of this past week—I know, for example, in your head office in New York, some thought that it was simply a blown-up exercise; there wasn't a real crisis. I wish it had been that. It was a real crisis. It was the most difficult crisis we have had since the Cuban confrontation of 1962.

But because we had had our initiative with the Soviet Union, because I had a basis of communication with Mr. Brezhnev, we not only avoided a confrontation, but we moved a great step forward toward real peace in the Mideast.

Now, as long as I can carry out that kind of responsibility, I am going to continue to do this job.

Q. Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

## MOTIVES OF MR. COX

Q. There have been reports that you felt that Mr. Cox was somehow out to get you. I would like to ask you if you did feel that, and if so, what evidence did you have?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Lisagor, I understand Mr. Cox is going to testify next week under oath before the Judiciary Committee, and I would suggest that he perhaps would be better qualified to answer that question.

As far as I am concerned, we had cooperated with the Special Prosecutor. We tried to work out in a cooperative way this matter of the production of the tapes. He seemed to be more interested in the issue than he was in a settlement, and under the circumstances, I had no choice but to dismiss him. But I am not going to question his motives as to whether or not he was out to get me. Perhaps the Senators would like to ask that question.

## THE NATION'S CONFIDENCE

Q. Mr. President, in 1968, before you were elected, you wrote that too many shocks can drain a nation of its energy and even cause a rebellion against creative change and progress. Do you think America is at that point now?

THE PRESIDENT. I think that many would speculate—I have noted a lot on the networks particularly and sometimes even in the newspapers. But this is a very strong country, and the American people, I think, can ride through the shocks that they have—.

The difference now from what it was in the days of shocks, even when Mr. Lisagor and I first met 25 years ago, is the electronic media. I have never heard or seen such outrageous, vicious, distorted reporting in 27 years of public life. I am not blaming anybody for that.

Perhaps what happened is that what we did brought it about, and therefore, the media decided that they would have to take that particular line.

But when people are pounded night after night with that kind of frantic, hysterical reporting, it naturally shakes their confidence. And yet, I should point out that even in this week, when many thought that the President was shell-shocked, unable to act, the President acted decisively in the interests of peace, in the interests of the country, and I can assure you that whatever shocks gentlemen of the press may have, or others, political people, these shocks will not affect me in my doing my job.

## THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Q. Mr. President, getting back to the Middle East crisis for a moment, do you consider that the crisis is over now, and how much longer will the American forces be kept on alert around the world?

THE PRESIDENT. With regard to the alert, the alert has already been discontinued with regard to NORAD, that is the North American Command, and with regard to SAC [Strategic Air Command]. As far as other forces are concerned, they are being maintained in a state of readiness, and, obviously, Soviet Union forces are being maintained in a state of readiness.

Now, as far as the crisis in the Mideast is concerned, I don't want to leave any impression that we aren't going to continue to have problems with regard to the cease-fire. There will be outbreaks because of the proximity of the antagonistic forces, and there will be some very, very tough negotiating in attempting to reach a diplomatic settlement. But I think now that all parties are going to approach this problem of trying to reach a settlement with a more sober and a more determined attitude than ever before, because the Mideast can't afford—Israel can't afford, Egypt can't afford, Syria can't afford—another war. The world cannot afford a war in that part of the world. And because the Soviet Union and the United States have potentially conflicting interests there, we both now realize that we cannot allow our differences in the Mideast to jeopardize even greater interests that we have, for example, in continuing a détente in Europe, in continuing the negotiations which can lead to a limitation of nuclear arms and eventually reducing the burden of nuclear arms, and in continuing in other ways that can contribute to the peace of the world.

As a matter of fact, I would suggest that, with all of the criticism of détente, that without détente, we might have had a major conflict in the Middle East. With détente, we avoided it.

## OIL AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Q. Mr. President, a question from the electronic media related to the Middle East—

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THE PRESIDENT. Radio.

Q. [Forrest J. Boyd, Mutual Broadcasting System] Radio. I have heard that there was a meeting at the State Department this afternoon of major oil company executives on the fuel shortage.

Whether or not you confirm that, has this confrontation in the Middle East caused a still more severe oil problem, and is there any thinking now of gasoline rationing?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have contingency plans for gasoline rationing and so forth which I hope never have to be put into place.

But, with regard to the oil shortage, which you referred to, one of the major factors which gave enormous urgency to our efforts to settle this particular crisis was the potential of an oil cutoff.

Let me say that I have also noted that in the State Department or from the State Department today a statement raised a little difficulty in Europe to the effect that our European friends hadn't been as cooperative as they might have been in attempting to help us work out the Middle East settlement or at least the settlement to the extent that we have worked it out as of the resolution of yesterday.

I can only say on that score that Europe which gets 80 percent of its oil from the Mideast would have frozen to death this winter unless there had been a settlement, and Japan, of course, is in that same position.

The United States, of course, gets only approximately 10 percent of its oil from the Mideast.

What I am simply suggesting is this: that with regard to the fuel shortage potentially in the United States and in the world, it is indispensable at this time that we avoid any further Mideast crisis so that the flow of oil to Europe, to Japan, and to the United States can continue.

## EXCHANGES WITH GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV

Q. Mr. President, against this background of détente, Mr. Brezhnev's note to you has been described as rough or perhaps brutal by one Senator. Can you characterize it for us and for history in any way?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I could characterize it, but, Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, Hearst Newspapers and Hearst Headline Service], it wouldn't be in the national interest to do so. My notes to him he might characterize as being rather rough. However, I would rather—perhaps it would be best to characterize it. Rather than saying, Mr. Theis, that his note to me was rough and brutal, I would say that it was very firm, and it left very little to the imagination as to what he intended.

And my response was also very firm and left little to the imagination of how we would react. And it is because he and I know each other and it is because we have had this personal contact, that notes exchanged in that way result in a settlement rather than a confrontation.

Q. Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Deakin [James Deakin, St. Louis Post-Dispatch].

## MR. REBOZO AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

Q. Yes, Mr. Deakin. Is it credible, can the American people believe that your close friend, Mr. Rebozo, for 3 years, during which time you saw him weekly sometimes, kept from you the fact that he had $100,000 in cash from Mr. Howard Hughes?

Is that credible? Is it credible that your personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach, knew about this money for at least a year and never told you about it?

And if this was a campaign contribution, as your press secretaries say, who authorized Mr. Rebozo to collect campaign contributions for your reelection or for the Republican Party?

What campaign committee was he an official of?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it is obviously not credible to you, and I suppose that it would sound incredible to many people who did not know how I operate. In terms of campaign contributions, I have had a rule, Mr. Deakin, which Mr. Stans and Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Rebozo and every contributor will agree has been the rule—I have refused always to accept contributions myself. I have refused to have any discussion of contributions. As a matter of fact, my orders to Mr. Stans were that after the campaign was over, I would then send notes of appreciation to those that contributed, but before the election, I did not want to have any information from anybody with regard to campaign contributions.

Now, with regard to Mr. Rebozo, let me say that he showed, I think, very good judgment in doing what he did. He received a contribution. He was prepared to turn it over to the Finance Chairman when the Finance Chairman was appointed. But in that interlude, after he received the contribution, and before the Finance Chairman was appointed, the Hughes company, as you all know, had an internal fight of massive proportions, and he felt that such a contribution to the campaign might prove to be embarrassing.

At the conclusion of the campaign, he decided that it would be in the best interests of everybody concerned rather than to turn the money over then, to be used in the '74 campaigns, to return it intact. And I would say that any individual, and particularly a banker who would have a contribution of $100,000 and not touch it—because it was turned back in exactly the form it was received—I think that is a pretty good indication that he is a totally honest man, which he is.

## PRESIDENTIAL TAPES

Q. Mr. President, after the tapes are presented to Judge Sirica and they are processed under the procedure out-

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lined by the U.S. Court of Appeals, who make those tapes public?

THE PRESIDENT. No, that is not the procedure that the court has ordered, and it would not be proper. Judge Sirica, under the Circuit Court's order, is to listen to the tapes, and then is to present to the grand jury the pertinent evidence with regard to its investigation. Publication of the tapes has not been ordered by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and Judge Sirica, of course, would not do anything that would be in contravention of what the Circuit Court of Appeals has ordered.

Q. Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. terHorst [J. F. terHorst, Detroit News].

PRESIDENTIAL STRESS

Q. Mr. President, Harry Truman used to talk about the heat in the kitchen—

THE PRESIDENT. I know what he meant. [Laughter]

Q. — and a lot of people have been wondering how you are bearing up emotionally under the stress of recent events. Can you discuss that?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, those who saw me during the Middle East crisis thought I bore up rather well, and, Mr. terHorst, I have a quality which is—I guess I must have inherited it from my Midwestern mother and father—which is that the tougher it gets, the cooler I get. Of course, it isn't pleasant to get criticism. Some of it is justified, of course. It isn't pleasant to find your honesty questioned. It isn't pleasant to find, for example, that, speaking of my friend, Mr. Rebozo, that despite the fact that those who printed it, and those who said it, knew it was untrue—said that he had a million-dollar trust fund for me that he was handling—it was nevertheless put on one of the networks, knowing it was untrue. It isn't pleasant, for example, to hear or read that a million dollars in campaign funds went into my San Clemente property, and even after we had a complete audit, to have it repeated.

Those are things which, of course, do tend to get under the skin of the man who holds this office. But as far as I am concerned, I have learned to expect it. It has been my lot throughout my political life, and I suppose because I have been through so much, that may be one of the reasons that when I have to face an international crisis, I have what it takes.

WATERGATE INFLUENCE ON MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you a question about the Mideast. To what extent do you think your Watergate troubles influenced Soviet thinking about your ability to respond in the Mideast, and did your Watergate problems convince you that the U.S. needed a strong response in the Mideast to convince other nations that you have not been weakened?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I have noted speculation to the effect that the Watergate problems may have led the

Soviet Union to miscalculate. I tend to disagree with that, however.

I think Mr. Brezhnev probably can't quite understand how the President of the United States wouldn't be able to handle the Watergate problems. He would be able to handle it all right, if he had them. [Laughter] But I think what happens is that what Mr. Brezhnev does understand is the power of the United States. What he does know is the President of the United States.

What he also knows is that the President of the United States, when he was under unmerciful assault at the time of Cambodia, at the time of May 8, when I ordered the bombing and the mining of North Vietnam at the time of December 18, still went ahead and did what he thought was right; the fact that Mr. Brezhnev knew that regardless of the pressures at home, regardless of what people see and hear on television night after night, he would do what was right. That is what made Mr. Brezhnev act as he did.

PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS ON TELEVISION COVERAGE

Q. Mr. President, you have lambasted the television networks pretty well. Could I ask you, at the risk of reopening an obvious wound, you say after you have put on a lot of heat that you don't blame anyone. I find that a little puzzling. What is it about the television coverage of you in these past weeks and months that has so aroused your anger?

THE PRESIDENT. Don't get the impression that you arouse my anger. [Laughter]

Q. [Robert C. Pierpoint, CBS News] I'm afraid, sir, that I have that impression. [Laughter]

THE PRESIDENT. You see, one can only be angry with those he respects.

REGAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE

Q. Mr. President, businessmen increasingly are saying that many chief executive officers of corporations do not get the latitude you have had, if they have the personnel problems that you have had, to stay in the job and correct them. You have said you are going to stay. Do you have any plan set out to regain confidence of people across the country, and these businessmen who are beginning to talk about this matter? Do you have any plans, besides the special prosecutor, which looks backward, do you have any plan that looks forward for regaining confidence of people?

THE PRESIDENT. I certainly have. First, to move forward in building a structure of peace in the world, in which we have made enormous progress in the past and which we are going to make more progress in in the future: our European initiative, our continued initiative with the Soviet Union, with the People's Republic of China. That will be the major legacy of this Administration.

Moving forward at home in our continuing battle against the high cost of living, in which we are now finally

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Digest of Other
White House Announcements

[LC]

Following is a listing of items of general interest which were announced to the press during the period covered by this issue but which are not carried elsewhere in the issue. Appointments requiring Senate approval are not included since they appear in the list of nominations submitted to the Senate, below.

October 22

Former Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson met with the President at the White House.

October 23

The President announced the appointment of Walter S. Gubelman, of Palm Beach, Fla., as a member of the Library of Congress Trust Fund Board for a term of 5 years from March 9, 1973.

The President announced the appointment of W. Hughes Brockbank, of Salt Lake City, Utah, as a member of the National Advisory Council on Vocational Education for a term expiring January 17, 1976.

October 24

On behalf of the President, Counsellor Anne Armstrong accepted a set of 13 stamps presented by Nicaraguan Ambassador Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa at a special ceremony in the Roosevelt Room at the White House. The stamps were issued by Nicaragua to commemorate the American Revolution Bicentennial.

October 25

Members of the bipartisan Congressional leadership met with the President at the White House. During the meeting, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger briefed the leaders on the situation in the Middle East.

October 26

The President announced the designation of the delegation which will represent him at ceremonies marking the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Turkey to be held at Ankara on October 29 and at Istanbul on October 30 and 31. The members of the delegation are:

CLAUDE S. BRINEGAR, Secretary of Transportation—Personal Representative of the President, with the rank of Special Ambassador.

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR., U.S. Ambassador to Turkey—Representative of the President, with the rank of Special Ambassador.

beginning to make some progress, and moving forward also on the matters that you referred to, it is true that what happened in Watergate, the campaign abuses, were deplorable. They have been very damaging to this Administration; they have been damaging certainly to the country as well.

Let me say, too, I didn't want to leave an impression with my good friend from CBS over here that I don't respect the reporters. What I was simply saying was this: that when a commentator takes a bit of news and then, with knowledge of what the facts are, distorts it, viciously, I have no respect for that individual.

Q. Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. You are so loud, I will have to take you.

Q. [Clark R. Mollenhoff, Des Moines Register and Tribune]. I have to be, because you happen to dodge my questions all of the time.

THE PRESIDENT. You had three last time.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Q. Last May you went before the American people and you said executive privilege will not be invoked as to any testimony concerning possible criminal conduct or discussing of possible criminal conduct, including the Watergate affair and the alleged coverup.

If you have revised or modified this position, as you seem to have done, could you explain the rationale of a law-and-order Administration covering up evidence, prima facie evidence, of high crimes and misdemeanors?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I should point out that perhaps all of the other reporters in the room are aware of the fact that we have waived executive privilege on all individuals within the Administration. It has been the greatest waiver of executive privilege in the whole history of this Nation.

And as far as any other matters are concerned, the matters of the tapes, the matters of Presidential conversations, those are matters in which the President has a responsibility to defend this office, which I shall continue to do.

MR. CORMIER. Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: President Nixon's thirty-fifth news conference was held at 7:01 p.m. on Friday, October 26, 1973, in the East Room at the White House. It was broadcast live on radio and television.

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This Copy For file Pgs. 2, 3, 4, 5,

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1845

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

11:36 A.M. EDT

OCTOBER 26, 1973

FRIDAY

MR. WARREN: Excuse the delay, but there were some
last-minute things I had to check on, as I am sure you will
understand as we go along.

The President returned from Camp David at about
9:10 this morning. He is in his EOB office where he has
been working this morning. He met with Al Haig and Ron
Ziegler, and has been in phone contact with Henry Kissinger.

The President will hold his press conference this evening at 7:00 p.m. in the East Room, which will be available for live television and radio.

That is the extent of the President's schedule
for today. We have just a few announcements this morning,
and then I know you will all want to go back and prepare
yourselves for the press conference.

The President has asked Secretary of Transportation
Brinegar to be his Personal Representative with the rank of
Special Ambassador at the celebration of the 50th Anniversary
of the founding of the Republic of Turkey. The United States
Ambassador to Turkey, William B. Macomber, Jr., will be the
Representative of the President also with the rank of Special
Ambassador. Ceremonies are scheduled for October 29th at
Ankara, and October 30th and 31st at Istanbul. We will post
details on this.

The President also is announcing this morning that
he will nominate eight United States Marshals for reappoint-
ment. We will post full information on these eight nomi-
nations, but to help those of you who have particular inter-
ests, I will go down the districts they now serve: the
Northern District of West Virginia, the Central District of
California, the Middle District of Tennessee, the Middle
District of Alabama, the Eastern District of Tennessee, the
Western District of Tennessee, the Northern District of
Indiana and the District of South Carolina.

Those are all the announcements we have. We will
post at 3:00 p.m., but I do not expect anything at 3:00 p.m.

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Q Western Union has indicated that over the fire storm weekend, 10,000 telegrams were dispatched to the White House. Do you have a firm figure on how those read?

MR. WARREN: No, I do not have a firm figure, but I do not know whether that would be an accurate count or not, because we don't have many more than that since Saturday night now, as of this morning.

Q I assume that Western Union would have some idea of the number they transmitted. Do you have any firm idea now of how they break down?

MR. WARREN: No. I think the reaction to the weekend activities was described to you previously, and it was described accurately. I wouldn't have any elaboration today.

Q Jerry, was the President aware that Secretary Brezhnev was making a statement in which Mr. Brezhnev said -- I believe it is a direct quote -- referred to "artificial heightening of passions through dissemination of various fantastic inventions by NATO countries," and this was not helpful to cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East? Was he aware Mr. Brezhnev made such a statement, and if so, what is the reaction?

MR. WARREN: Is that the speech at the World Congress in Moscow that you are referring to, Dan?

Q Yes.

MR. WARREN: We were aware that he had canceled that speech yesterday, but we were not aware of what he would say today.

Q Jerry, has the President lifted the military alert? He is the only one who can do it.

MR. WARREN: The Secretary of Defense is briefing at this very moment on the status of the alert, and I would defer to him.

Q Jerry, is there any indication that we knew or had any comment on the sending of Soviet representatives to the Middle East?

MR. WARREN: I would have this to say to your question: I would not comment on whether we knew or not, but as to the action taken, the Security Council took actions yesterday with respect to the character and composition of a United Nations emergency force.

Now, with respect to the United Nations observer force, the United States position is that the same principles on composition should apply. In other words, the same principles should apply to the observer force as apply to the U.N. emergency force as spelled out in the U.N. resolution yesterday.

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Q Jerry, does the President have confirmation that Soviet representatives are, in fact, in the Middle East right now?

MR. WARREN: Well, I am in a position to tell you that we are studying the wire reports on that matter. I am not in a position to go beyond that.

Q Does your answer to the previous question mean that the U.S. will not send observers, even if the Soviets send some?

MR. WARREN: We are willing to entertain a request from the Secretary General for a small number of observers, provided that the distinction between the U.S. observer force and the U.N. emergency force is strictly maintained. But our position is as I previously stated it.

Q Jerry, that confuses me a little, because you said in your first statement that the principles applying to non-big power participation emergency forces should also apply to the observer force, and then you say you are, in fact, prepared to send some observers on request.

MR. WARREN: No, I don't think that is what I said, Ralph, in all deference. I stated the U.S. position, which is that the same principle of composition should be strictly maintained with the observer force as spelled out in the resolution relating to the emergency force.

In answer to the follow-up question, I said we were willing to entertain a request from the Secretary General.

Q Did not Secretary Kissinger say yesterday that the United States would support, with personnel and by other means, a U.N. observer team reporting to the United Nations?

MR. WARREN: As I said, we are willing to entertain a request from the Secretary General for a small number of observers, provided that the distinction between the observers and the emergency force is strictly maintained.

Q What about your statement that you think that the U.N. observer force should be the same -- the same principle should apply as applies to the security force?

MR. WARREN: That is the position of this Government, and I so stated it. In answer to a follow-up question --

Q In other words, these observers, then, would be, if requested by the Secretary General, sent over separately from the U.N. observer force?

MR. WARREN: We would entertain a request from the Secretary General of the United Nations, but again, the distinction between the two forces should, in our view, be strictly maintained.

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Q How could that distinction be strictly maintained other than just in name only?

MR. WARREN: You are leading me into a path that I should not really get into, except to tell you that the United Nations has spelled out the roles of the two forces, and the distinction should be maintained.

Q Jerry, I am still confused by this. Are you telling us that the United States will participate in a U.N. observer force, but would prefer such a force to be of the same composition as the security force?

MR. WARREN: Our position is that the same principles should apply to the observer force that apply to the emergency force.

Q But we are willing to make an exception --

MR. WARREN: We are willing to entertain a request from the Secretary General; that is correct.

Q Could you tell me a little bit about the composition of this observer force that we are willing to send if this request is --

MR. WARREN: There is an observer force intact now. The State Department could give you a rundown of the countries.

Q Is it military or civilian, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: The State Department could give you an exact rundown of the countries and the composition of that force.

Q I am talking about our U.S. representatives.

MR. WARREN: I am saying that we would be willing to entertain a request --

Q For military people or civilian?

MR. WARREN: -- for observers.

Q Have you had, or do you anticipate such a request from the Secretary General?

MR. WARREN: As far as I know, we have not had, and I would not speak --

Q What is meant by "a small number"? Can you define a small number?

MR. WARREN: I wouldn't be able to do that, no.

Q In the dozens or hundreds?

MR. WARREN: I wouldn't be able to refine it, no.

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Q Would our willingness to send a small number of observers depend upon whether the Soviet observers were in this force? Is that the condition?

MR. WARREN: Let me go back to what I said earlier about conditions in saying we would be willing to entertain a request, Pete, and leave it at that.

Q Can I, therefore, assume that these representatives are present in the Middle East now from the Soviet Union as observers, and the second question is, in talking about observers, are you referring to the organization known as UNTSO, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization?

MR. WARREN: As to your first question, I could not respond to that, and to the second part of your question, I am talking about the U.N. observer force which is in effect.

Q Jerry, I think Jerry Landay just asked this question, but I would like to ask it again. Does the President consider that the representatives the Soviet Union is sending to the Mideast now, according to Mr. Brezhnev, are to join the observer team or a security force?

MR. WARREN: It is my understanding that Mr. Brezhnev has said that they are being sent as observers, but that is just my understanding. For elaboration, I think that we should wait and see how this develops, and perhaps Ambassador McCloskey would have more elaboration at his briefing.

Q Jerry, I will go back, if I may, to the question I was trying to ask before. I will put it two ways: Number 1, do we have any information as to the nature of the Soviet so-called observers that have been sent to the Middle East? Are they military or civilian people, and just what will their function be as observers? And Number 2, how about these we are willing to send? Are they military or civilian?

MR. WARREN: I must remind you that we are willing to entertain a request from the Secretary General, and I would not define them.

Q Is this a calculated ambiguity on the part of the United States Government so that the Soviet Union can achieve a slight propaganda victory in the United Nations?

MR. WARREN: No, I would not leave you with that impression.

Q You have drawn the distinction between an observer force and emergency force. Now, to help us, would you explain the difference between the two?

MR. WARREN: Well, I think the difference between the two has been fully explained at the United Nations, and I would not do that from here.

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Q Is it this Government's position that only observers requested by the Secretary General should be in place in the Middle East?

MR. WARREN: I have given you our position to the best of my ability, Bernie.

Q Do we object to the Soviet Union sending representatives to the Middle East?

MR. WARREN: I have stated our position.

Q You haven't addressed that.

MR. WARREN: But I have stated our position.

Q Why will you not address that question?

Q Could you tell us whether there might be a preliminary announcement before the press conference tonight, such as possibly a new Special Prosecutor?

MR. WARREN: I have no guidance for you on that.

Q Getting back to one of the earliest questions which had to do with the breakdown of the 10,000 telegrams at the White House, I have a two part question. I seem to recall that in a recent speech of the President, right after that you had a very precise breakdown of support for the President, and so forth. My first part of the question is: Why is there no breakdown here?

And secondly, what is your regard, we have surveyed the congressional delegations of five Western States and find that support for the impeachment of the President runs from 10 to 20 to one, with no appreciable change as a result of the tapes.

MR. WARREN: Is that a question?

Q Yes.

MR. WARREN: What is it?

Q I wonder if you have a comment on that?

MR. WARREN: No, I certainly would not comment.

Q How about the first one, as to why there is no breakdown on the 10,000 telegrams?

MR. WARREN: You learn a little bit if you stand up here almost every day. (Laughter)

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Q That is my word. It is a simple question.
Is it a common practice to --

MR. WARREN: I wouldn't embrace the word solicit.
We wouldn't dissuade it.

Q Did he ask them to send an expression of
support, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: I don't know. I really don't.

Q Do you think those organizations need a
reminder, Jerry, that the President might well have a press
conference; is that what you are suggesting?

MR. WARREN: No, that is not what I am suggesting.

Q Jerry, in stating the U.S. position on the
observers, did you rule out the possibility that U.S.
observers might not be sent unless they are specifically
requested by the U.N.?

MR. WARREN: I stated the provision that the
distinction between the observers and the emergency force
should be strictly maintained in our view, yes.

Q Jerry, was the President surprised by the
Soviet Union's decision to send representatives to the
Middle East?

MR. WARREN: In seven hours and seven minutes,
you will have a change to ask him that question.

Q Can you tell us now whether this is the case?

MR. WARREN: I think you should ask the President
that question, if you want to. I am not planting questions
here. I am not suggesting what questions you should ask.

Q The time we will have to address questions
to the President tonight will probably be on other areas.

MR. WARREN: That, too, is your choice, sir.

Q Can we assume if we are prepared to entertain a request from the Secretary General that the Russian representatives were sent to the Middle East on the basis of an invitation --

MR. WARREN: I am not leading you --

Q What would be the basis of the double standard?

MR. WARREN: I am not leading you to that assumption
and I don't know what you mean by double standard.

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Q Is the United States aware of whether or not the Secretary General sent a request to Mr. Brezhnev for an observation force?

MR. WARREN: No, we are not.

Q I asked you yesterday if in view of the complexity of the issues we are going to address with the President, if this press conference could be allowed to run longer than the ordinary half hour, and I wonder if you have an answer to that?

MR. WARREN: No, I don't.

Q How long, then, do you expect it to run?

MR. WARREN: I just don't know at this point.

Q May we ask you to get a breakdown of the pros and cons on the telegrams?

MR. WARREN: That has been asked.

Q It was asked several days ago and you said you would try. Have you failed?

Q Or have you tried?

MR. WARREN: Go ahead.

Q Do you think that the peace and stability in the Middle East will survive until 7:00? Do you think there are any events that could force cancellation of this press conference?

MR. WARREN: We feel that the cease-fire appears to be holding in most areas of the conflict, Marty.

You note I choose to treat your question seriously. I hope you note that.

We are hopeful that as the U.N. personnel take up their positions, the cease-fire will be fully observed by all parties.

Q Jerry, will the President name a new Special Prosecutor?

MR. WARREN: Listen, I am not going to pre-empt the President.

Q Is he going to announce a decision on that tonight?

MR. WARREN: I am not going to predict or speculate on what the President might say at the press conference.

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On what the President might say at the press conference.

MR. WARREN: I am not going to predict or anticipate

further.

It is the going to announce a decision on that

the President.

MR. WARREN: Citizen, I am not going to pre-empt

broader.

JERRY: Will the President name a new Special

by all battles.

Mr. their baronies, the cease-fire will be fully observed
We are helping that an end to the U.N. personnel take

I hope you note that.

To be held in most areas of the conflict, partly.

MR. WARREN: We fear that the cease-fire appears

press conference?
where are any events that could force cancellation of this
in the immediate near future until 1980. Do you think
Do you think that the peace and stability

MR. WARREN: Go along.

Or have you said?

You would try. Have you failed?

It was selected neverlast day so far and you said

MR. WARREN: That he had asked.

And can you on the telephone?

May we ask you to get a pre-notice of the

How long, then, so you expect it to run?

MR. WARREN: No, I don't.

Have an answer to this?

longer than the ordinary half hour, and I wonder if you
President, if this press conference could be allowed to run
complexity of the range we are going to address with the
I asked you yesterday if in addition to the

MR. WARREN: No, we are not.

An operation force?

The Secretary general sent a request to Mr. Brezden for

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Q Is it the view of the United States that all observers in the Middle East under the current resolution should be U.N. observers and not independent separate country observers?

MR. WARREN: The position on that was clearly stated by the Secretary of State yesterday.

Q Any travel plans for the President?

MR. WARREN: No.

Q Jerry, in at least two foreign capitals it is being said that the inescapable conclusion of the Kissinger news conference of yesterday, considering the importance of what he had to say, and considering the way that President Nixon has handled himself in the past, is that the President himself wanted to handle that had it not been for Watergate.

Do you think that is a fair conclusion?

MR. WARREN: No, I do not.

Q Why?

MR. WARREN: I think it is eminently reasonable, and I would hope that observers in this capital would not need to be reminded of this, that the Secretary of State handled questions along this line because of the participation that he has had in this matter over the last few days and weeks.

Q Jerry, just to get it straight -- the President has been in close communication with Brezhnev all along -- are you saying we were unaware they were sending observers to the Middle East?

MR. WARREN: I think the question came another way, Helen. I have not addressed that question, and would prefer not to at this point.

Q Why, Jerry? It seems to me it is a critical question.

MR. WARREN: I would prefer not to address it at this time.

Q With regard to the Soviet moves that Dr. Kissinger reported toward sending a peace-keeping force to the Middle East, is there any feeling in the White House that the Kremlin was testing the President's resolve in this period of what some people look on as a crisis of confidence in his leadership?

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MR. WARREN: Ted, I understand that you are
asking for a White House response, and in all deference,
I am going to decline to give you that because I think
the Secretary of State handled questions along that line
very well yesterday.

Q Jerry, has the President been in direct
communication with Brezhnev in the past 36 hours?

MR. WARREN: I just have nothing to give you beyond
what I have on the matter, and there will be a press
conference this evening.

Q Jerry, you said that it is your understanding
that Brezhnev was sending his representatives as observers --

MR. WARREN: I read that on the wires this morning,
yes.

Q Do you have any understanding as to how many
there are?

MR. WARREN: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Jerry.

END

(AT 11:59 A.M. EDT)

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

[LC]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USUN N 04270 280657Z

OF VOTE ON SYG'S REPORT TO THE SC CONTAINED IN S/11052-REV 1

QUOTE

MR. PRESIDENT

THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES WITH GREAT SATISFACTION THE ACTION OF THE COUNCIL IN APPROVING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT. WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED INFEED THAT THIS ORGAN CAN ACT EFFECTIVELY TO FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INT'L PEACE AND SECURITY.

EVEN AS WE REJOICE IN OUR AGREEMENT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULT TASK CONFRONTING THE EMERGENCY FORCE. SUPERVISING CEASE FIRE LINES IN THE AREA IN THE WAKE OF WAR WILL NOT BE EASY. THE FORCE FROM ITS INCEPTION WILL REQUIRE THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED--AS THE SECRETARY'S REPORT STATES. FINALLY IT MUST OPERATE AS AN INTEGRATED AND MILITARY UNIT WITH SPECIAL PRIVILEGES FOR NONE.

WE CONSIDER THE LANGUAGE OF THE REPORT CAREFULLY DRAWN. FOR INSTANCE THE STATEMENT, "ALL MATTERS WHICH MAY AFFECT THE NATURE OR THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THE FORCE WILL BE REFERRED TO THE COUNCIL FOR DECISION" ASSURES AN ORDERLY, AGREED WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCE, BUT ONLY WHEN THE COUNCIL SO DECIDES. WE ARE ALSO SATISFIED THAT THE PHRASE "BEARING IN MIND THE ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION" IS CONSISTENT WITH ART 101 OF THE CHARTER AND ASSURES THAT ALL THE OTHER OBVIOUS AND NECESSARY CRITERIA WILL BE GIVEN APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, WE HOPE THAT THE SEC-GEN CAN MOVE AS SWIFTLY AS POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION WE HAVE JUST APPROVED. THE UNITED STATES, AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT OF OCT 25, IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE TO THIS END.

FINALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL SATISFACTION THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS HELPED TO ARRANGE FOR A MEETING ON THE GROUND OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY REPS UNDER UN AUSPICES TO DISCUSS THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT PRACTICAL RESULT OF THE THOROUGH DELIVERATIONS IN THIS CHAMBER. I REGARD IT AS ESPECIALLY NOTE-WORTHY THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOW BEING MADE TO PROVIDE NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR THE THIRD ARMY AREA. FOR US THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF THE UN EFFORT IS A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS PEACEKEEPING MISSION.

MR. PRESIDENT, MAY I ONCE AGAIN EXPRESS MY DELEGATIONS

UNCLASSIFIED

CITLINA & DEPART

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1847

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

10:50 A.M. EST

OCTOBER 30, 1973

TUESDAY

MR. WARREN: I have an announcement which is embargoed for 11:00 o'clock, which I will give to you now, after which we will break and then come back for the regular briefing.

Before I give you the announcement, let me tell you that the President has been working at Camp David this morning, concentrating on the Middle East situation, the ceasefire in the Middle East, and has been conferring with the Secretary of State by telephone.

Now the announcement.

The Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, will be coming to Washington for a working visit. Mrs. Meir will be meeting the President on Thursday, November 1st. The Prime Minister will also confer with the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

That is the announcement. Now I will give you a little bit more before you break to file on this.

The precise time for that meeting has not been set, but it will probably be about noon on Thursday. In addition to that, this evening at 6:00 p.m. the President will meet with the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dobrynin at Camp David.

Tomorrow at 3:00 p.m., here at the White House, the President will be meeting with Acting Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi of Egypt. The Fahmi meeting will be at 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday. The meeting with Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin will be today at 6:00 p.m. at Camp David.

These meetings are all part of the President's effort to bring a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Q Who initiated the visit?

MR. WARREN: I am in a position to tell you that all of these meetings are a continuation of our diplomatic consultations to establish a framework for a durable settlement of the Israeli conflict.

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I can refer you to the State Department as to the
meeting with the Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt, but the
meeting with Prime Minister Meir was arranged by mutual agree-
ment.

Q Is there any chance Mrs. Meir might get together
with the Acting Foreign Minister of Egypt in Washington?

MR. WARREN: I wouldn't have any information on that.
That would be between the parties.

Q When is she arriving?

MR. WARREN: I do not have that information.

Q How long will she be here?

MR. WARREN: I do not have her itinerary at this time.

Q Was this meeting with Mrs. Moir arranged by
any chance when Secretary Kissinger flew through Tel Aviv the
other day?

MR. WARREN: As I said, the meeting was arranged by
mutual agreement, and I have no details on when it was arranged.

Q Any briefing after tonight's meeting at Camp
David?

MR. WARREN: No.

Q When does the President plan to return?

MR. WARREN: I do not have a precise return time
for you.

We will reconvene here in a few moments.

END

(AT 10:55 A.M. EST)

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This Copy For
NEWS CONFERENCE #1848

Public Statements
x Meir Visit
x Fahmy Visit

NEWS CONFERENCE

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

12:16 P.M. EST

OCTOBER 30, 1973

TUESDAY

MR. WARREN: I announced this morning that the President will meet with Prime Minister Golda Meir of Israel on Thursday. The Prime Minister also will meet with the Secretary of State while she is in Washington. I do not have details of her itinerary to provide you this morning.

The President is working at Camp David this morn-
ing, and has been in telephone contact with Dr. Kissinger,
discussing the Middle East situation, the cease-fire, and
other activities in the Middle East.

The President will be remaining at Camp David
throughout today. He has also been in contact with other
staff on legislative matters.

At 6:00 p.m. today the President will meet -- we
announced this previously, too, this morning -- with the
Secretary of State and Ambassador Dobrynin. That will be at
Camp David.

Tomorrow at 3:00 p.m. the President will see Act-
ing Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi of Egypt, here at the
White House.

As I stated earlier to some of you who were here
prior to 11:00 o'clock, these three meetings are all part of
the President's efforts to bring a lasting peace to the
Middle East, and are a part of the diplomatic consultations
that this Government has undertaken to help establish a frame-
work for a durable settlement of the conflict in the Middle
East.

For your information, the last meeting the Presi-
dent held with Prime Minister Meir was March 1st of this year.
He has met with her on three previous occasions. The Presi-
dent has not met previously with Acting Foreign Minister Fahmi.

That completes the schedule information that I have
at this time.

Q You mean a total of four times he has met
with Mrs. Meir?

MR. WARREN: Yes, since he has been President.

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Q Is the President staying overnight at Camp David tonight?

MR. WARREN: I expect him to do that, yes.

Q Who asked for this meeting between Mrs. Meir and the President, and the meeting today -- tonight --

MR. WARREN: I said earlier that the meeting with the Prime Minister of Israel was arranged by mutual agreement and that is the way I would characterize it. I would not go into details on how the meetings were arranged, but they are all within the framework of this Government's attempts to assist and be of assistance in establishing a framework for a durable settlement of the conflict in the area.

Q When was the last time the President met with Dobrynin?

MR. WARREN: I believe it was September 28th, during the visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Q Do you contemplate press events at Camp David?

MR. WARREN: I do not; no briefing or pictures at Camp David.

Q Can I follow that up and ask you whether it would be the United States' hope, if not intent, but hope that Fahmi and Prime Minister Golda Meir might, perhaps, have consultations here on American soil?

MR. WARREN: I would not offer you a hope on behalf of this Government in response to that question. We are attempting to work within the framework of the United Nations Security Council resolution, and we are playing an active role or effective role, but I really would not want to speculate on that matter. I think that would be something the individual parties should speak to, and not me.

Q Jerry, on that, can you say whether the initiative for Mrs. Meir and President Nixon meeting came after the President's press conference?

MR. WARREN: I cannot give you the timing on it, no.

I have a few other announcements this morning.

The President is announcing that he will nominate Don S. Smith, of Little Rock, Arkansas, to be a member of the Federal Power Commission for the term expiring June 2, 1978. He will succeed John A. Carver, Jr., who resigned from the Federal Power Commission in June of last year. Mr. Smith currently is a member of the Arkansas Public Service Commission. Compensation for this position is $38,000. Mr. Smith is a Democrat.

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