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October 1973

Dobrynin said I have a reply from Moscow in connection
with two or three talks with the President on the convocation of the
SC. Here is a summary:

We have a serious doubt about what kind of results could
be achieved by a hasty convocation of the SC meeting right now. As far
as we know not a single side asked for a convocation of the SC from
the conflicting parties'. Secondly, the circumstances are not quite clear
in a sense that there is not yet clear communications with the conflicting
parties. We presume, both we and you, have no circumstance to have
good communications with the parties of the conflict to find out what is
going on. Under these circumstances we feel it would be rather
undesirable to have the meeting because this meeting would lead to
open polemics between yours and ours. As is well known our position
in the middle East is known. And our position wouldn't change for
this particular meeting of the SC. We would be forced to state our
known position and open confrontation with you. Our position in the Middle
East for many years since 1967 -- is Israel who occupied our lands and
victims of aggression, the Arab countries whose territories are occupied.
We don't think this will lead anywhere. We will be forced to say already
there are good resolutions in the UN organization. The matter is to fulfill
them. We feel it is undesirable to convene the SC. At the same time in
the complicated and rather dangerous situation, the matter continues of close
consultation between us and how to settle the Middle East problem. This

It was received with surprise in Moscow what the Secretary of State said to the Soviet Ambassador concerning the reports about our messages to the leaders of some Arab states in connection with the renewal of hostilities in the Middle East.

Whether we did not say on numerous occasions - both publically, including the statement of the Soviet Government of October 7, and in confidential contacts with the President - that we support the just struggle of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression?

The President knows full well that we were not advocates of resumption of hostilities, but in the circumstances of a continuous occupation by Israel of the Arab lands it could have been expected at any moment, what we have also not once told the President.

And now, when it happened, when the war goes on, what shall we call for - may be for the support of the aggressor who seized and is keeping foreign lands during already six years, who ignores all the decisions of the United Nations and violates norms of the international law?

If Dr. Kissinger has touched upon this subject, then we
can also ask - and with much more reason - isn't there an
abundance of the US statements - including those on the high
level - in support of Israel who persists in its aggressive
strivings?

Moreover, it is not only statements in political support
of agressor that we have in mind. How, for example, should we
understand the demonstrative movements of the US Sixth fleet
these days in the eastern Mediterrqnqn? And this is being
done at a time when there is an exchange of views between the
Soviet leadership and the President on the cessation of hosti-
lities in the Middle East. But the US side itself did not say
a word in contacts with us about the actions of its fleet.

We would like to reiterate that we have been and remain
to be firm advocates of a political settlement in the Middle
East, the main, basic condition of which is the liberation of
all Arab territories occupied by Israel. Unfortunately despite
all our efforts up to this moment there is no progress in this
question. We have had a lot of talk on this subject between us,
but as you know the whole thing did not progress beyond talking

We continue to exert efforts to find common basis for
effective steps in establishing a lasting and just peace in
the Middle East.

We are of the opinion that with the degree of confidence,
which has been achieved between the Soviet leaders and the
President, it is necessary to exercise a more weighed approach
to the questions that arise.

As to the substance of our position on a cease-fire and
on turning to active steps towards a political settlement in
the Middle East, we have already informed the President on
these aspects. We repeat that it would be very good if our
countries acted jointly in this whole question until its
complete solution.

The Soviet leaders consider it necessary to draw in the most urgent way the attention of the President to the defiant, or to put it straight, gangster-type actions of Israel, which, if they are not stopped from the very beginning, can still more complicate the situation in the Middle East and around it, which is dangerous even without such actions.

The matter is, first of all, about the barbaric bombings by the Israeli aviation of peaceful population centers in Syria and Egypt, Damascus including, as a result of which there are numerous casualties among civilian population.

There are also Soviet citizens among those killed and wounded. The damage was also caused to the Soviet office buildings.

We have the information, and we want the President also to know it, that the other side has a capability to deliver retaliatory strikes against Israeli cities, the action from which it has refrained up till now, if the bombings of the Arab cities by Israel are not immediately stopped.

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under the disguise of "tourists". If those reports are also true, the US Government should realise that it is embarking upon a very risky path, leading to the involvement of the US in the military actions.

Thus there is an evident discrepancy between the Secretary's statement, made in his talk with the Soviet Ambassador, and the actual situation. Dr. Kissinger apparently realizes what kind of reaction that causes in Moscow. Moreover, the question is that of arms deliveries to the side which has committed aggression and which seeks not only to hold foreign lands, earlier seized by it, but also to occupy new territories.

Dear Mr. President,

The events in the Middle East become more and more
dangerous. Our two powers, as we both have agreed, must do
the utmost in order to keep the events from going beyond
the limits, when they could take even more dangerous turn.
If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm
could be done even to the immediate relations between the
Soviet Union and the United States. We believe that neither
you, nor we want to see it. If it is so then prompt and
effective political decisions are needed. We have conviction
that with due willingness our two powers can facilitate the
finding of such decisions.

Since time is essential and now not only every day but
every hour counts, my collagues and I suggest that the US Secre-
tary of State and your closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes
in an urgent manner to Moscow to conduct appropriate nego-
tiations with him as with your authorized personal represen-
tative. It would be good if he could come tomorrow, October 20.
I will appreciate your speedy reply.

October 19, 1973

The Soviet leaders exchanged views with the Prime Minister of Japan on a wide scope of questions both of bilateral and of international character. The substance of the talks and negotiations is covered by the Joint Soviet-Japanese statement, published on October 11.

At the same time, acting in the spirit of the established practice of exchanging confidential information, we would like to provide President Nixon with some additional information on the matter.

1. On the whole, as a result of the talks we gained the impression that Tanaka accords due importance to the Soviet-Japanese relations and intends to contribute to their development. We consider that as a positive factor, especially in the light of previously manifested tendency of Japan, which was noted by Dr. Kissinger in his talk with the Soviet Ambassador, to concentrate its main attention on the development of the relations with China which would not be in line with the interests of our two countries - the US and the USSR.

On our part, we positively evaluated the expansion of the Soviet-Japanese relations, that took place during the last years, and spoke in favor of ensuring their stable and mutually advantageous development over a long period of time.

We should, however, mention that the position taken by Tanaka on the so-called territorial issue could not in any way become a basis for agreement. We were even rather surprised that he came to us with such a position. At the outcome of that part of the talks the sides confirmed that the absence of a

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peace treaty should not be an obstacle to the development of
the Soviet-Japanese relations, and they agreed to continue
the negotiations on concluding a peace treaty in an appropriate
period of time in 1974. We have firmly stated that in solving
the question of completing the peaceful settlement it is
necessary to proceed from the existing reality, taking a due
account of the situation that arose as a result of the Second
world war and the post-war developments.

2. A discussion was also held, though not in a great detail, on the questions of the USSR-Japan trade and economic relations. We spoke in favor of expanding economic cooperation on the basis of mutual advantage, also in connection with the projects of natural resource development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The agreement was confirmed that the appropriate agencies and organizations of the USSR and Japan would continue negotiations on the specific projects of economic cooperation, and the Governments of both countries would facilitate such cooperation.

In reply to the Japanese side's sounding of our attitude
to the participation, along with Japan, of some third
countries as well in the implementation of long-term economic
projects in the USSR, we in principle agreed with such a
possibility. As is known, it is the American firms, first
of all, that are meant here. At the same time we also
proceeded from the premise that the realization of such
trilateral cooperation would contribute to securing Japan on
the multilateral orientation in policy, which Dr. Kissinger
told us about.

3. In discussing international problems we stated our
known to the US side evaluation of the international situation,

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emphasized the importance of joint efforts of all countries
in preserving and strengthening peace.

The Japanese side on the whole agreed with our evaluation
of the international situation and spoke for further develop-
ment of the process of international detente, for disarmament
under effective international control. It also agreed to
register in the Joint communique the satisfaction of the sides
with the progress in limiting strategic arms and with the
USSR-US agreement on the prevention of a nuclear war.

At the same time, as we expected and as it was earlier
noted by the American side, Tanaka, in his turn, emphasized
in every way possible the important place of Japan in the
modern world. He talked about the fact that Japan came to the
third place in the world as far as the overall industrial
production is concerned etc. It was felt that the Japanese
leaders would like to use that factor for supporting their
position on other issues.

4. We attach essential significance to the fact that in the course of the talks in Moscow Tanaka confirmed that Japan would not follow the way of militarism. We, however, believe it important, with due regard for the exchange of opinion that took place between ourselves on that matter, to keep up attentively, in future as well, with the evolution of the Japanese course, including that in military matters.

5. A conversation on the Chinese theme did not unfold
itself in the course of the talks with Tanaka. On our part,
we did not feel it expedient to raise it on our own initiative.
The Japanese did not raise it either.

6. The questions of how the relations of Japan develop
with the US, were not in any way touched upon in our talks
with Tanaka.

As a whole, the results of the talks with the Prime Minis-
ter of Japan are positively assessed in Moscow. They are, in
our view, to contribute to further strengthening of positive
tendencies in international relations.

In 1973 - 33,5 thousand Jews left the Soviet Union for Israel
and 645 - for the U.S.

- 95% out of the total number of people, who applied, received permission to leave the U.S.S.R. for Israel and the U.S.

Permission to depart is not granted to those persons who possess state secrets; recently served in the armed forces having a speciality connected with military secrets; and to those who serve prison sentences.

Only nominal procedural fees are paid by persons leaving the U.S.S.R. for permanent residence abroad.

In connection with the recent events in the Middle East, in October-December 1973 a number of applicants to leave for Israel has decreased by 28% in comparison with the same period in 1972.

The Soviet authorities have received more than one thousand appeals from former Soviet citizens who left the U.S.S.R. for Israel, asking for permission to come back.

In 1973 a number of members of the U.S. Congress petitioned
for 116 Soviet citizens concerning their departure from the
U.S.S.R. for Israel or the U.S.:

By January 1, 1974, 40 persons received permission to
leave the Soviet Union, 8 persons did not apply at all, 58
applications were not approved, 7 applications - under
consideration and 3 persons are under investigation for various
crimes.