2. The task of banning atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction whose use cannot be reconciled with the conscience of civilised mankind, is becoming increasingly urgent. The Soviet government, for its part, invariably strives to reach agreement with the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on renunciation of the use of these weapons. A pledge to this effect given by all the powers possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons would be of the utmost importance for establishing confidence in relations between the states and for ridding the peoples of the fear of atomic war. This measure, too, is entirely feasible, since it requires neither the establishment of any form of control nor any material outlay. The viability and practicability of such an agreement have already been proved by historical examples in which similar agreements concerning other weapons of mass destruction (chemical and bacteriological weapons, and others) have played no small part in the struggle of the peoples against aggressors.

3. The proposal by the government of the Polish People's Republic to create a zone free from atomic weapons in Central Europe is attracting the attention of many governments and wide public circles, particularly in Europe. By this proposal, as we know, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany would prohibit the deployment of all types of atomic or hydrogen weapons on their territories and renounce the manufacture of these weapons.

Establishment of such a zone would remove from the sphere of atomic war preparations an area in Central Europe covering about a million square kilometres¹ with a population of over 100 million. It can scarcely be doubted that the carrying out of this measure would not only remove the threat of atomic war from these countries, situated as they are in the area in which the two main opposing military groupings meet, but would also be received with relief by the peoples of other countries, for it would be an important landmark on the road to the total prohibition of atomic weapons and their removal from the armaments of the states.

It would thus be a big step in solving the great task of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes exclusively, for improving the wellbeing of men and women, for the further development of science and culture, making it possible to extend still further the boundaries of knowledge of the laws of nature and their employment for the good of mankind.

As is well known, the governments of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic have already agreed to take part in such a zone. It is also known that the government of the Federal Republic

¹ 386,000 square miles approx. [Footnote in cited text.]

544645—60—11

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of Germany, on signing the Paris agreements, undertook not to produce atomic weapons. The Soviet government has already declared its support for Poland's proposal and would be prepared, together with the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, to assume corresponding commitments concerning a zone free from atomic weapons and do all in its power, for its part, to help reach agreement among the states on this question.

All this goes to show that at the present time there exist the necessary prerequisites for making the proposal that a zone free from atomic weapons be established in Central Europe, even though it consists initially of only four countries, the subject of urgent consideration at a conference of leading statesmen.

4. It would be in keeping with the interests of ending the "cold war" and the arms race for the conference to examine the question of a non-aggression treaty, to be concluded, in one form or another, between the member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty member-states. Like all the other parties to the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the great significance of such a step, has repeatedly declared its readiness to conclude such a multilateral agreement. The Soviet government also proceeds from the view that neither agreement on this question, nor, especially, absence of agreement on it, in any way precludes the possibility of nonaggression pacts being concluded on a bilateral basis between individual members of these groupings, for which the Soviet Union expresses its readiness, since this, too, is fully in keeping with the need to lessen international tension and the need to strengthen peace.

The declaration adopted at the December session of the N.A.T.O. Council in Paris states that that organisation will not be used for aggressive purposes. Judging by this statement, the idea of a non-aggression agreement between the two military groupings should meet with no objection on the part of the member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance. The conclusion of such an agreement, or of similar agreements between individual countries, would have a tremendously favourable effect on the international situation and would exercise a great restraining influence on any possible aggressor who, if he were to unleash aggressive war, would find himself in a position of international isolation, with all the ensuing consequences.

5. It can scarcely be denied that a reduction in the foreign military forces stationed in Germany, and also in the other member-countries of both the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty, and even more so, the complete withdrawal of these forces, would be of tremendously great political importance for making healthier the situation in Europe, and not only in Europe. Bearing in mind that

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agreement on the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from these countries, as experience has shown, is meeting with serious difficulties, the need arises, in the Soviet government's view, for agreement to be reached between the interested states at least concerning a reduction in the strength of their forces on these territories, or on the territory of Germany as a beginning. Agreement on this question, particularly since it concerns an area situated in the heart of Europe, would be of great stabilising importance. Not only would it help in settling other questions on which there are at present differences among the powers, but it could also help to create conditions favouring a *rapprochement* of the two German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

6. One should not regard as exhausted the possibilities of an agreement on the questions connected with the prevention of a surprise attack and on the related questions of control as applicable to the nature of steps in the field of disarmament, on which an agreement could be reached in the near future provided that the countries concerned so desire. In this connection there arises a need to discuss the following measures:

(a) Bearing in mind the understandable desire of every state to safeguard itself against sudden attack, it would be important to take steps to prevent any secret concentration of troops or military equipment which might be used to prepare such a sudden attack. This purpose would be served by the establishment of control posts at railway junctions, in big ports and on main motor roads. The advisability of this measure, as we know, is also admitted by other countries which took part in the disarmament talks, and this indicates that there should be no special difficulty in reaching agreement on this question.

(b) Bearing in mind the importance attached by certain governments to aerial photographic inspection of the territories of states, it is proposed that agreement be reached on establishing an 800-kilometre¹ zone of aerial photography on either side of a line dividing the opposing military groupings in Europe, since in this area, at a relatively small distance from one another, are concentrated big armed forces of the N.A.T.O. member-states and the Warsaw Treaty member-states, and this in itself is fraught with great danger, especially for the situation in Europe. In view of the fact that on the territory of Germany there is a concentration of armed forces and military equipment abnormally large for peacetime, and in view of the fact that the main military groupings of states directly confront one another there, it appears advisable that agreement be reached between the appropriate states, including the German Democratic Republic and the Federal

¹ Nearly 500 miles. [Footnote in cited text.]

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Republic of Germany, concerning the implementation on German territory of wider forms of supervision over the measures on which there is a possibility of reaching agreement already at the present time. Such measures could be concerned, for instance, with a reduction in the strength of foreign forces on the territory of both parts of Germany, and subsequently with the complete withdrawal of these forces from Germany and also, by agreement between the states concerned, with an atom-free zone.

The Soviet government proceeds from the premise that the functions and scope of control, taking as our guide, not considerations of propaganda, but the real situation, are directly dependent on the state of relations between the states and the nature and significance of the disarmament measures being carried out. This means that the functions and scope of control, and also inspection, must be regarded in close connection with the realisation of steps to lessen tension in international relations and to strengthen confidence among the states, and particularly the great powers. To the extent that agreement is reached on disarmament questions, including agreement on a substantial reduction in armed forces and armaments and on the total prohibition of nuclear weapons, the ending of their manufacture, their withdrawal from the armaments of the states, and destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons, the obstacles to the extension of control and inspection will disappear. At the appropriate stage the Soviet government, for its part, will be prepared to regard such an extension with favour.

7. It would also be advisable for the conference to consider the question of possible measures for expanding international trade ties, which are the natural and most reliable basis for developing measures for peaceful relations among the states. The aim should be to create a situation in which the development of international trade is not impeded by artificially created legal obstacles whereby many countries are placed in an inequitable position as compared with other states. This, in turn, would help to develop broad exchanges and peaceful competition between the countries in the field of scientific thought, in the field of technical progress and the organisation of production processes. The strengthening of economic ties between the states would create a favourable basis for establishing genuine trust between them, and would thereby create the necessary conditions for improving political relations.

No one can deny the indisputable fact that the rupture in normal economic relations between many countries is a product of the "cold war" and the establishment of opposed military groupings. Hence it follows that it is impossible to talk of ending the "cold war" and lessening tension in relations between states without putting an end to the abnormal situation that has arisen in international trade.

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8. Although the United Nations Organisation, as far back as ten years ago, unanimously condemned war propaganda, in some western countries such propaganda continues to this day, and not only does it not abate, but it is assuming even greater proportions. It is common knowledge that in certain western countries the calls for a so-called preventive war have recently increased, and the advantages or striking the first blow are openly being discussed. It is not difficult to imagine what the situation would be were similar calls to be made in those countries against which certain western leaders now call for the first blow to be struck. Where is the judge to be found who can decide where to draw the line between the private opinion of individuals and an expression of the official attitude of any given government? It is sufficient to put this question for it to become clear that here is a case of playing with fire, to which an end must be put if we are to display, not pretended concern, but real concern for peace. Yet this propaganda for aggression, which in essence does not differ at all from the calls made by the Hitlerites in their day, meets with no rebuff in those countries, and many organs of the press readily offer their pages to spread this propaganda. All this is poisoning relations between the states; greatly intensifies suspicion in relations between them and thereby increases the danger of war.

In view of this, agreement should be reached at this conference regarding measures to put an end to the war propaganda which is being conducted in some countries at the present time. No statesman who is guided by a realisation of his responsibility for the fate of peace, and above all no government, can fail to raise their voice against such propaganda. It is impossible, at one and the same time, to talk of peace and yet not take measures against those who are calling for war.

9. A meeting of government leaders would provide the opportunity for exchanging views on ways for reducing tension in the Middle East and for attempting to reach agreement that the great powers will take no steps to violate the independence of the countries of that area, renouncing the use of force in the settlement of questions concerning the Middle East. It goes without saying that examination of this question should have one aim—to remove all outside interference in the domestic affairs of the countries of that area and to help to strengthen the sovereignty and national independence of the Middle East countries.

In the view of the Soviet government, the solution of the problems enumerated above is not only timely, but urgent. At the conference it would also be possible to discuss other constructive proposals conducive to ending the "cold war," which might be submitted by other participants in the conference, and the need for examining those proposals could be agreed on by the participants in the conference; it

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would also be possible to reach agreement on the procedure for examin-
ing outstanding issues the settlement of which encounters certain diffi-
culties at the present time in view of differences in the positions of the
states. An agreement could be reached on which questions should be
examined at a subsequent stage in the talks between the states, both at
similar conferences and also within the framework of the United
Nations.

It is well known, for instance, that the governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom are at the present time unwilling to
agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and to the withdrawal of
those weapons from the armament of the states, with the destruction
of stockpiles; this, in turn, leads to a deadlock on the question of end-
ing the production of fissile materials for military purposes. In such
circumstances nothing remains but to defer questions connected with
a radical solution to the problem of atomic disarmament to a later
stage in the talks, when agreement has been reached on less compli-
cated questions.

Nor, as official statements by the governments of the western
powers indicate, can one anticipate, apparently, that the countries
belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance will at the present time
agree to the proposals:

For a substantial reduction in armed forces and armaments and the
conclusion for an appropriate international agreement for this
purpose:

For the complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the
territories of N.A.T.O. member-states and Warsaw Treaty member-
states, and for the elimination of all foreign military bases;

For the replacement of the existing military groupings in Europe
by a system of collective security.

At the present time there is little basis for believing that discussion of these questions by the conference would lead to positive results. Later, after measures agreed at the proposed conference have been carried out, and a certain minimum of the necessary international confidence has thereby been created, the appropriate conditions will emerge for carrying out more radical measures, including disarmament measures.

It goes without saying that all questions directly relating to the
Chinese People's Republic can only be solved with its participation.
The Soviet government deems it necessary once again to declare that
the policy of preventing People's China from taking a direct part in
the consideration of outstanding international problems is gravely
detrimental to the international atmosphere as a whole and to the
work of the United Nations.

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The ending of the "cold war" and the extension of international co-operation would, undoubtedly, also facilitate a settlement of the German question on the basis of drawing the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—two sovereign German states—closer together. The Soviet government is convinced that the sooner the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany find a mutually acceptable way to the peaceful restoration of Germany's national unity, the sooner will be accomplished the process of uniting in a single whole the two parts of Germany which are today developing in different directions. As the Soviet government has already declared, it fully supports the German Democratic Republic's proposal for the establishment of a confederation of the two German states, as an important step towards the formation of a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany. Before we can talk of helping the unification of Germany from outside, it is necessary first of all to recognise the fact that two German states exist, and to respect the sovereignty of each of them. The Soviet Union will continue to try to facilitate the reaching of agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany on the ways and means for the reunification of Germany. Such agreement would create the prerequisites for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

At the present time, when it is necessary to take measures that will bring about a turn in the development of the international situation, what is needed in the interests of strengthening peace is the convening of a summit conference, with the participation of the heads of government. Bearing in mind the nature of the questions to be examined, it would be advisable for this conference to consist of representatives of all the member-states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty member-states. In view of the fact that N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation comprise the main opposing military groupings and also the fact that all the countries belonging to these groupings are deeply concerned in the results of the talks, and above all in questions concerning the situation in Europe, it would be advisable not to deprive any of these states of the possibility of taking a direct part in examining the appropriate problems.

If, for some reason, difficulties should be encountered in agreeing on this basis for participation in the conference, the government of the U.S.S.R. would not object to a narrower composition for the conference.

In view of the fact that it is proposed that the conference should consider such questions as the disarmament problem, the ending of war

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propaganda, encouragement of international trade, and certain other questions which concern a large number of countries which belong to neither of the groupings, the Soviet government considers it advisable that such countries as, for instance, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden, and Austria should take part in the conference. Participation in the conference by countries not bound by military commitments to either of the groupings could play only a positive rôle, for it is beyond doubt that countries which have proclaimed their political non-participation in military blocs, countries which have proved their allegiance to the cause of peace and international cooperation, could exert a beneficial influence on the adoption of decisions which would help to strengthen peace.

Finally, a situation could be allowed whereby there would take part in the talks, at least in the initial stage, two or three countries from each of the aforementioned groupings, or even one country from each, providing the necessary agreement is reached on this point.

In the Soviet government's view the conference could be held, by agreement with the Swiss government, in Geneva.

As for the proposal for convening a conference at the Foreign Ministers' level, there is no confidence that such talks would lead to positive results. Furthermore, pronouncements by certain statesmen, opposing the very idea of East-West talks, indicate that at the present time talks at such a level would meet with serious difficulties, creating further obstacles to convening a conference of heads of government.

The Soviet government believes that the ending of the "cold war," the ending of the arms race, the establishment of the necessary confidence in relations between states, the creation of conditions for firm and lasting peace—all this could best be achieved at a conference in which the heads of government take a direct part. It goes without saying that later it would be advisable to hold a Foreign Ministers' conference to discuss further, on the basis of the agreement, already reached, the appropriate questions, and to prepare the necessary agreements.

The Soviet Union is doing its utmost to help to strengthen peace and establish confidence among the peoples. During the last few years it has unilaterally carried out reductions in its armed forces of almost two million men. In fulfilment of the resolution of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of December 21, 1957, providing for further measures to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government has already taken a decision to carry out an additional reduction of the Soviet armed forces by a further 300,000 men, including more than 41,000 Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic, and more than 17,000 stationed in Hungary.

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The Soviet government expresses the hope that the United States, the United Kingdom and France will, in their turn, take steps to reduce their armed forces, thus contributing to the establishment of genuine international security, to the strengthening of world peace.

Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin,

January 12, 1958¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: When on December 10 I received your communication, I promptly acknowledged it with the promise that I would in due course give you a considered reply. I now do so.

Your communication seems to fall into three parts: the need for peace; your contention that peace is endangered by the collective self-defense efforts of free world nations; and your specific proposals. I shall respond in that same order and make my own proposals.

I.

Peace and good will among men have been the heartfelt desire of peoples since time immemorial. But professions of peace by governmental leaders have not always been a dependable guide to their actual intentions. Moreover, it seems to me to be profitless for us to debate the question of which of our two governments wants peace the more. Both of us have asserted that our respective peoples ardently desire peace and perhaps you and I feel this same urge equally. The heart of the matter becomes the determination of the terms on which the maintenance of peace can be assured, and the confidence that each of us can justifiably feel that these terms will be respected.

In the United States the people and their government desire peace and in this country the people exert such constitutional control over government that no government could possibly initiate aggressive war. Under authority already given by our Congress, the United States can and would respond at once if we or any of our allies were attacked. But the United States cannot initiate war without the prior approval of the peoples' representatives in the Congress. This process requires time and public debate. Not only would our people repudiate any effort to begin an attack, but the element of surprise, so important in any aggressive move, would be wholly lacking. Aggressive war by us is not only abhorrent; it is impractical and impossible.

¹ White House news release, Jan. 12, 1958.

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The past forty years provide an opportunity to judge the com-
parative peace records of our two systems. We gladly submit our
national record for respecting peace to the impartial judgment of
mankind. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that in the United States
the waging of peace has priority in every aspect, and every element,
of our national life.

II.

You argue that the danger of war is increased because the United
States and other free world nations seek security on a collective basis
and on the basis of military preparedness.

Three times in this century wars have occurred under circumstances
which strongly suggest, if indeed they do not prove, that war would
not have occurred had the United States been militarily strong and
committed in advance to the defense of nations that were attacked.

On each of these three occasions when war came, the United States
was militarily unprepared, or ill-prepared, and it was not known that
the United States would go to the aid of those subjected to armed
aggression. Yet now it appears, Mr. Chairman, that you contend
that weakness and disunity would make war less likely.

I may be permitted perhaps to recall that in March 1939, when the
Soviet Union felt relatively weak and threatened by Fascist aggres-
sion, it contended that aggression was rife because "the majority of
the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have
rejected the policy of collective security", and Stalin went on to say
that the policy of "Let each country defend itself as it likes and as
best it can . . . means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to
war."

Now the Soviet Union is no longer weak or confronted by powerful
aggressive forces. The vast Sino-Soviet bloc embraces nearly one
billion people and large resources. Such a bloc would of course be
dominant in the world were the free world nations to be disunited.

It is natural that any who want to impose their system on the
world should prefer that those outside that system should be weak
and divided. But that expansionist policy cannot be sanctified by
protestations of peace.

Of course the United States would greatly prefer it if collective
security could be obtained on a universal basis through the United
Nations.

This was the hope when in 1945 our two governments and others
signed the Charter of the United Nations, conferring upon its Security
Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Also, by that Charter we agreed to make avail-
able to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities so

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that the Council could maintain and restore international peace and security.

The Soviet Union has persistently prevented the establishment of such a universal collective security system and has, by its use of the veto—now 82 times—made the Security Council undependable as a protector of the peace.

The possibility that the Security Council might become undependable was feared at the San Francisco Conference on World Organization, and accordingly the Charter recognized that, in addition to reliance on the Security Council, the nations possessed and might exercise an inherent right of collective self-defense. It has therefore been found not only desirable but necessary, if the free nations are to be secure and safe, to concert their defensive measures.

I can and do give you, Mr. Chairman, two solemn and categorical assurances.

(1) *Never* will the United States lend its support to any aggressive action by any collective defense organization or any member thereof;

(2) *Always* will the United States be ready to move toward the development of effective United Nations collective security measures in replacement of regional collective defense measures.

I turn now to consider your specific proposals.

### III.

I am compelled to conclude after the most careful study of your proposals that they seem to be unfortunately inexact or incomplete in their meaning and inadequate as a program for productive negotiations for peace.

You first seem to assume that the obligations of the Charter are nonexistent and that the voice of the United Nations is nothing that we need to heed.

You suggest that we should agree to respect the independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East and renounce the use of force in the settlement of questions relating to the Near and Middle East. But by the Charter of the United Nations we have already taken precisely those obligations as regards all countries, including those of the Near and Middle East. Our profound hope is that the Soviets feel themselves as bound by the provisions of the Charter as, I assure you, we feel bound.

You also suggest submitting to the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact some form of non-aggression agreement. But all of the members of NATO are already bound to the United Nations Charter provision against aggression.

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You suggest that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should undertake not to use *nuclear* weapons. But our three nations and others have already undertaken, by the Charter, not to use *any* weapons against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Our profound hope is that no weapons will be used by any country for such an indefensible purpose and that the Soviet Union will feel a similar aversion to any kind of aggression.

You suggest that we should proclaim our intention to develop between us relations of friendship and peaceful cooperation. Such an intention is indeed already proclaimed as between ourselves and others by the Charter of the United Nations to which we have subscribed. The need is, not to repeat what we already proclaim, but, Mr. Chairman, to take concrete steps under the present terms of the Charter, that will bring about these relations of friendship and peaceful cooperation. As recently as last November, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union signed and proclaimed to the world a declaration which was designed to promote the triumph of Communism throughout the world by every means not excluding violence, and which contained many slanderous references to the United States. I am bound to point out that such a declaration is difficult to reconcile with professions of a desire for friendship or indeed of peaceful coexistence. This declaration makes clear where responsibility for the "Cold War" lies.

You propose that we broaden the ties between us of a "scientific cultural and athletic" character. But already our two countries are negotiating for peaceful contacts even broader than "scientific, cultural and athletic". We hope for a positive result, even though in 1955, after the Summit Conference, when negotiations for such contacts were pressed by our Foreign Ministers at Geneva, the accomplishments were zero. It is above all important that our peoples should learn the true facts about each other. An informed public opinion in both our countries is essential to the proper understanding of our discussions.

You propose that we develop "normal" trade relations as part of the "peaceful cooperation" of which you speak. We welcome trade that carries no political or warlike implications. We do have restrictions on dealings in goods which are of war significance, but we impose no obstacles to peaceful trade.

Your remaining proposals relate to armament. In this connection, I note with deep satisfaction that you opposed "competition in the production of ever newer types of weapons". When I read that statement I expected to go on to read proposals to stop such production. But I was disappointed.

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You renew the oft-repeated Soviet proposal that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should cease for two or three years to test nuclear weapons; and you suggest that nuclear weapons should not be stationed or produced in Germany. You add the possibility that Poland and Czechoslovakia might be added to this non-nuclear weapons area.

These proposals do not serve to meet the real problem of armament. The heart of that problem is, as you say, the mounting production, primarily by the Soviet Union and the United States, of new types of weapons.

Your proposal regarding Central Europe will of course be studied by NATO and the NATO countries directly involved from the standpoint of its military and political implications. But there cannot be great significance in de-nuclearizing a small area when, as you say, "the range of modern types of weapons does not know of any geographical limit", and when you defer to the indefinite future any measures to stop the production of such weapons.

I note, furthermore, that your proposal on Germany is in no way related to the ending of the division of that country but would, in fact, tend to perpetuate that division. It is unrealistic thus to ignore the basic link between political solutions and security arrangements.

Surely, Mr. Chairman, at a time when we share great responsibility for shaping the development of the international situation, we can and must do better than what you propose.

In this spirit, I submit some proposals of my own.

#### IV.

(1) I propose that we strengthen the United Nations.

This organization and the pledges of its members embodied in the Charter constitute man's best hope for peace and justice. The United States feels bound by its solemn undertaking to act in accordance with the Principles of the Charter. Will not the Soviet Union clear away the doubt that it also feels bound by its Charter undertakings? And may we not perhaps go further and build up the authority of the United Nations?

Too often its recommendations go unheeded.

I propose, Mr. Chairman, that we should rededicate ourselves to the United Nations, its Principles and Purposes and to our Charter obligations. But I would do more.

Too often the Security Council is prevented, by veto, from discharging the primary responsibility we have given it for the maintenance of international peace and security. This prevention even extends to proposing procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes.

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I propose that we should make it the policy of our two governments at least not to use veto power to prevent the Security Council from proposing methods for the pacific settlement of disputes pursuant to Chapter VI.

Nothing, I am convinced, would give the world more justifiable hope than the conviction that both of our governments are genuinely determined to make the United Nations the effective instrument of peace and justice that was the original design.

(2) If confidence is to be restored, there needs, above all, to be confidence in the pledged word. To us it appears that such confidence is lamentably lacking. That is conspicuously so in regard to two areas where the situation is a cause of grave international concern.

I refer first of all to Germany. This was the principal topic of our meeting of July 1955 and the only substantive agreement which was recorded in our agreed Directive¹ was this:

> "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

In spite of our urging, your government has, for now two and one half years, taken no steps to carry out that agreement or to discharge that recognized responsibility. Germany remains forcibly divided.

This constitutes a great error, incompatible with European security. It also undermines confidence in the sanctity of our international agreements.

I therefore urge that we now proceed vigorously to bring about the reunification of Germany by free elections, as we agreed, and as the situation urgently demands.

I assure you that this act of simple justice and of good faith need not lead to any increased jeopardy of your nation. The consequences would be just the opposite and would surely lead to greater security. In connection with the reunification of Germany, the United States is prepared, along with others, to negotiate specific arrangements regarding force levels and deployments, and broad treaty undertakings, not merely against aggression but assuring positive reaction should aggression occur in Europe.

The second situation to which I refer is that of the countries of Eastern Europe. The Heads of our two Governments, together with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, agreed in 1945 that the

¹ Dated July 23, 1955; text ante.

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peoples of these countries should have the right to choose the form of
government under which they would live, and that our three countries
had a responsibility in this respect. The three of us agreed to foster
the conditions under which these peoples could exercise their right of
free choice.¹

That agreement has not as yet been fulfilled.

I know that your government is reluctant to discuss these matters or
to treat them as a matter of international concern. But the Heads of
Governments did agree at Yalta in 1945 that these matters were of
international concern and we specifically agreed that there could
appropriately be international consultation with reference to them.

This was another matter taken up at our meeting in Geneva in 1955.
You then took the position that there were no grounds for discussing
this question at our conference and that it would involve interference
in the internal affairs of the Eastern European states.

But have not subsequent developments shown that I was justified
in my appeal to you for consideration of these matters? Surely the
Hungarian developments and the virtually unanimous action of the
United Nations General Assembly in relation thereto show that con-
ditions in Eastern Europe are regarded throughout the world as much
more than a matter of purely domestic scope.

I propose that we should now discuss this matter. There is an
intrinsic need of this in the interest of peace and justice, which seems
to me compelling.

(3) I now make, Mr. Chairman, a proposal to solve what I consider
to be the most important problem which faces the world today.

(a) I propose that we agree that outer space should be used only for
peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment in history in relation
to this matter. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are now
using outer space for the testing of missiles designed for military
purposes. The time to stop is now.

I recall to you that a decade ago, when the United States had a mo-
nopoly of atomic weapons and of atomic experience, we offered to
renounce the making of atomic weapons and to make the use of atomic
energy an international asset for peaceful purposes only. If only that
offer had been accepted by the Soviet Union, there would not now be
the danger from nuclear weapons which you describe.

The nations of the world face today another choice perhaps even
more momentous than that of 1948. That relates to the use of outer

¹ See "Declaration on Liberated Europe", approved at Yalta in Feb. 1945 by
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin;
*Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*
(Department of State publication 6199), pp. 971-973.

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space. Let us this time, and in time, make the right choice, the peace-
ful choice.

There are about to be perfected and produced powerful new weapons
which, availing of outer space, will greatly increase the capacity of
the human race to destroy itself. If indeed it be the view of the Soviet
Union that we should not go on producing ever newer types of
weapons, can we not stop the production of such weapons which would
use or, more accurately, misuse, outer space, now for the first time
opening up as a field for man's exploration? Should not outer space
be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the pur-
poses of war? That is my proposal.

(b) Let us also end the now unrestrained production of nuclear weapons. This too would be responsive to your urging against "the production of ever newer types of weapons". It is possible to assure that newly produced fissionable material should not be used for weapons purposes. Also existing weapons stocks can be steadily reduced by ascertainable transfers to peaceful purposes. Since our existing weapons stocks are doubtless larger than yours we would expect to make a greater transfer than you to peaceful purposes stocks. I should be glad to receive your suggestion as to what you consider to be an equitable ratio in this respect.

(c) I propose that, as part of such a program which will reliably check and reverse the accumulation of nuclear weapons, we stop the testing of nuclear weapons, not just for two or three years, but indefinitely. So long as the accumulation of these weapons continues unchecked, it is better that we should be able to devise weapons which will be primarily significant from a military and defensive standpoint and progressively eliminate weapons which could destroy, through fall-out, vast segments of human life. But if the production is to be stopped and the trend reversed, as I propose, then testing is no longer so necessary.

(d) Let us at the same time take steps to begin the controlled and progressive reduction of conventional weapons and military manpower.

(e) I also renew my proposal that we begin progressively to take measures to guarantee against the possibility of surprise attack. I recall, Mr. Chairman, that we began to discuss this at our personal meeting two and a half years ago, but nothing has happened although there is open a wide range of choices as to where to begin.

The capacity to verify the fulfillment of commitments is of the
essence in all these matters, including the reduction of conventional
forces and weapons, and it would surely be useful for us to study
together through technical groups what are the possibilities in this

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respect upon which we could build if we then decide to do so. These
technical studies could, if you wish, be undertaken without commit-
ment as to ultimate acceptance, or as to the interdependence, of the
propositions involved. It is such technical studies of the possibilities
of verification and supervision that the United Nations has proposed
as a first step.¹ I believe that this is a first step that would promote
hope in both of our countries and in the world. Therefore I urge
that this first step be undertaken.

V.

I have noted your conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that you attach great
importance to personal contact between statesmen and that you for
your part would be prepared to come to an agreement on a personal
meeting of state leaders to discuss both the problems mentioned in
your letter and other problems.

I too believe that such personal contacts can be of value. I showed
that by coming to Geneva in the summer of 1955. I have repeatedly
stated that there is nothing I would not do to advance the cause of a
just and durable peace.

But meetings between us do not automatically produce good results.
Preparatory work, with good will on both sides, is a prerequisite to
success. High level meetings, in which we both participate, create
great expectations and for that reason involve a danger of disillusionment, dejection and increased distrust if in fact the meetings
are ill-prepared, if they evade the root causes of danger, if they are
used primarily for propaganda, or if agreements arrived at are not
fulfilled.

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, this is my proposal:

I am ready to meet with the Soviet leaders to discuss the proposals
mentioned in your letter and the proposals which I make, with the
attendance as appropriate of leaders of other states which have recognized responsibilities in relation to one or another of the subjects we
are to discuss. It would be essential that prior to such a meeting
these complex matters should be worked on in advance through diplomatic channels and by our Foreign Ministers, so that the issues can be
presented in form suitable for our decisions and so that it can be
ascertained that such a top-level meeting would, in fact, hold good
hope of advancing the cause of peace and justice in the world. Arrangements should also be made for the appropriate inclusion, in the
preparatory work, of other governments to which I allude.

¹General Assembly resolution 1148 (XII), Nov. 14, 1957; General Assembly, *Official Records: Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 18* (A/3805), pp. 3-4.

544645—60—12

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I have made proposals which seem to me to be worthy of our attention and which correspond to the gravity of our times. They deal with the basic problems which press upon us and which if unresolved would make it ever more difficult to maintain the peace. The Soviet leaders by giving evidence of a genuine intention to resolve these basic problems can make an indispensable contribution to clearing away the obstacles to those friendly relations and peaceful pursuits which the peoples of all the world demand.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Address by Secretary of State Dulles Before the National Press Club, January 16, 1958¹

[Extract]

President Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Bulganin² should dissipate once and for all any impression that the United States does not want to negotiate, or is afraid to negotiate with the Soviet rulers. The truth is quite the contrary. We do want a Summit meeting, provided the proper conditions obtain.

We do not however want a "Summit" meeting which merely represents another episode in the cold war, and which would be held under circumstances that would carry great peril to the free world.

There are, I know, many who feel that the "cold war" could be ended and the need for sacrificial effort removed by a stroke of a pen at the "Summit". That is the kind of illusion that has plagued mankind for a long time. Actually, peace is never achieved in that way, and nothing could be more folly for us than to act on the belief that all our danger could be ended by peaceful platitudes proclaimed from the "Summit" by Heads of Government.

The expansionist goals of the Communist Parties, and the exploitation of the subject peoples for military and economic aggressive purposes, will not be altered by one iota by generalities uttered at a "Summit" conference. But with the free peoples it is different. Their governments cannot make the necessary efforts except as the people themselves feel the need to work and sacrifice for the security of their nations and of their ideals. A "Summit" conference which diverted

¹ For complete text, see Department of State press release 18, Jan. 16, 1958; also printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 3, 1958, pp. 159-163.

² *Supra*.

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the free nations from doing what is necessary for their security, without any comparable change in the Sino-Soviet bloc, could be a great, indeed a fatal, disaster.

Equally, it could be a disaster if the free world leaders at such a conference felt that, to avoid the danger inherent in a platitudinous declaration of peace, they had to go to the other extreme and break off in an atmosphere of hostility. That could intensify the cold war and make more likely that it would turn into a hot war.

For these reasons, it is essential, as President Eisenhower pointed out, and as Mr. Khrushchev once himself agreed, that any "Summit" meeting should be well prepared. There should be assurance that significant topics will be discussed, and that there is a good prospect of arriving at significant agreements which will be fulfilled.

The way to such a meeting was clearly pointed out by President Eisenhower in his last week's message ¹ to Chairman Bulganin. It is now for the Soviet rulers to make clear whether or not *they* want a "Summit" conference which will genuinely promote the cause of peace and justice in the world. We do.

*Remarks by Secretary of State Dulles: Replies to Questions*
*Asked at the National Press Club, January 16, 1958* ²

*Q. What does Khrushchev hope to gain from a "summit" conference?*

A. I hope that the remarks I already made throw light on what are probably, I fear, his intentions, although those intentions will be tested by what goes on in the coming weeks and months. But the great gain, as I pointed out, that they could get and which certainly they will try to get if we let them, the great gain is to have a meeting which, as I say, will utter platitudes about peace—"we are going to work together, we are all going to be friends, we are going to end all world tensions," with the implication that there is no need any more to have this military preparation, to pay taxes in order to have a mutual security program, and the like. If Khrushchev can get that, that would be the greatest triumph of his career or indeed the career of almost anyone because then we would come back here and the other free world

¹Actually dated Sunday, Jan. 12, of the same week; text *supra*.

²For complete text, see Department of State press release 19, Jan. 16, 1958; also printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 3, 1958, pp. 163-168.

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leaders would go back to countries where the people would no longer be willing to support the military programs, the economic assistance programs, the inconveniences of alliances which require people to co-ordinate their policies with each other. All those things, it would be believed, could be thrown away because peace has been proclaimed. But the Communist Parties will go right on.

One point that always needs to be borne in mind is that when you negotiate with the leaders of Communist-controlled states, you are not negotiating with the principals, you're negotiating with the second-class people, because the governments of these countries are all run by the Communist Party and unless you bind that Party you haven't got an agreement which, as to broad policy, has any significance at all. I recall very well the Litvinov Agreement¹ which we made at the time when we recognized the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government agreed that it would not tolerate the establishment on its soil of any group which was seeking to carry on subversive activities in the United States. Of course the subversive activities went on just the same, indeed were intensified. And we asked the Soviets "how come", and they said, "oh, those are being carried on by the Party. The State is not carrying those on. Therefore, what we are doing is entirely consistent with our agreement." That is the kind of thing you are up against.

> Q. Mr. Secretary, that leads to another question which says: What can be accomplished at a "summit" conference that can't be accomplished at a lower level conference?

A. I think that it is essential that at a lower level conference or through diplomatic channels which are equally, perhaps even more, useful in this connection, that it be found out, as I said, whether there can be a possibility of agreement on significant matters in ways which will assure performance. Now, sometimes in the course of these negotiations everything seems to be settled except one or two points, and the element of decision on these points is of course made by the Heads of State. And if there is going to be a worthwhile agreement, it may be useful to have it sanctified somewhat by a meeting of the Heads of Government. I won't say that there is inherently any possibility in a Heads of Government meeting that is not equally present in the diplomatic intercourse or meetings at a lower level, Foreign Ministers and the like. You have a choice of a whole lot of methods and it's impossible to say that you can achieve something by one method

¹ For the exchange of letters of Nov. 15, 1933 between President Roosevelt and Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, see *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939* (Department of State publication 4539), pp. 28-29.

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that you can't achieve by the other. They are different means that are employed. Sometimes it may be that a Heads of Government meeting is useful, although I would not say there is any inherent reason why you cannot also work at a lower level, because actually of course the Heads of Government direct what goes on. If negotiations are conducted through diplomacy, President Eisenhower has just as much a part in that as he would have if he were personally meeting with Chairman Bulganin. It's just a question of variety, choice, and I would not think there was inherently any advantage in one as against another.

*Q. Somebody asks: Isn't a "summit" conference worthwhile if only from the viewpoint of psychological warfare, that is, its impact on the public opinion of neutral countries?*

A. I suppose that a meeting of Heads of Government has a certain psychological advantage in the sense that it is probably interpreted, at least, as indicative of a greater desire, a greater effort to get together. And perhaps in that sense, I think, undoubtedly in that sense, there is a certain magic that seems to attach to it in the minds of many people, particularly in the non-committed countries. That is one of the advantages.

Of course there are other serious disadvantages of the kind I pointed out. When you get the Heads of Government together, you have either got to come out with something or have a break. And it puts a terrific pressure on the Heads of Government to do what may be improvident just to avoid the alternative of seeming to have a break. And that is the reason why, in my opinion, they ought not to put themselves in that position until it is pretty sure that some worthwhile agreement can be arrived at.

*Q. Will the United States insist that the problem of German unification be at least fully discussed at any future "summit" meeting, even if chances for real progress are dim?*

A. I can't conceive of there being another "summit" meeting which regarded as entirely washed out the agreements and decisions taken at the last "summit" conference. If that is going to happen, it would be much better not to have the conference at all, in my opinion. As the President pointed out in his letter¹ to Chairman Bulganin, the one agreement that was arrived at and expressed in terms of an agreement, and the only one, related to Germany. And if another "summit" conference is to be held and not even discuss the one subject that was agreed on at the last "summit" meeting and treat that as washed up,

¹ Ante, pp. 129-138.

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then I think that of itself showed that a subsequent meeting was a mis-
take. If we treat agreements at the "summit" as of no future sig-
nificance, and their only purpose is to have a meeting to seem to agree,
have the agreement violated and then start another meeting on another
topic, I can't imagine a worse course of procedure or one that would be
more disastrous.

Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin,
January 20, 1958¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of January 8.² I believe that I have dealt with the substantive matters which it contains in my message of January 12. Should further study of your letter indicate that additional response is appropriate, I shall communicate with you at a later date.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Address by the First Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev), Minsk, January
22, 1958 ³

[Extracts]

The Soviet Union has been consistently pursuing a peaceable for-
eign policy. The Soviet government, desirous of ensuring world
peace, has put forward new concrete proposals to ease international
tension. The Soviet government has sent messages to the President of
the United States of America Mr. Eisenhower, the Prime Minister of
Britain Mr. Macmillan, the Prime Minister of France M. Gaillard, the
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Herr Adenauer, to
all the heads of government of the N.A.T.O. member-states, and also

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 10, 1958, p. 211.

²The Bulganin letter of Jan. 8, not printed here, was the covering letter for the Soviet proposals of that date (see ante).

³Text from *Efforts of the Soviet Union towards Summit Talks; Documents January-May, 1958*; Soviet News Booklet No. 29 (London, no date), pp. 35-48.

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to the governments of all countries which are members of the United Nations.

As you are well aware, the Soviet Union has proposed that within the next two or three months a conference of representatives of a number of socialist and capitalist states be called at the highest level, that is to say, a conference of responsible statesmen of these countries to discuss the most important and urgent international problems. Why are we proposing such a conference? We have done this primarily because talks, a calm and reasonable settlement of the present contradictions dividing the great powers, or at least some of these contradictions, are the only way which we can all take if we want peace and if we do not want the alternative—war.

We consider it necessary to focus the attention of a conference of leading statesmen above all on the most urgent problems so as to initiate an improvement in the entire international climate. This is precisely our stand: A meeting must be organized to discuss issues that can be settled today, for there are such issues, some of them very important ones. We propose the convening of a conference, being guided by a desire to achieve positive results. This should lead to a relaxation of tension and create conditions for the complete elimination of the “cold war.” The examination of other problems could be postponed to a later stage in the talks. Such a stage-by-stage examination of existing international issues is what is most realistic and reasonable.

But, unfortunately, the ruling circles of the western countries, which do not want a relaxation of tension, the elimination of the “cold war” and the ending of the arms race, put forward for discussion above all issues on which it is more difficult or even impossible to reach agreement, and moreover do it in a form which is all but that of an ultimatum. They declare that if the questions they have put forward are not settled, it is useless to hold a meeting, since, they allege, it is impossible to come to terms with the Soviet Union. Why is this being done? People who approach the convening of a conference in this way not only do not want to ease international tension, but are doing everything to intensify that tension and to foment war hysteria so as to make it easier for themselves to use that tension and the peoples' fear of war for their own ends, for the purpose of making profits. As for us champions of peace, we want to hold a summit meeting without delay in order to solve all urgent problems—provided, of course, there is willingness on both sides—and thereby to create a certain atmosphere of warmth in relations between states. Such an atmosphere of warmth would help the light spring breezes to blow more strongly and steadily and thaw the ice, creating the conditions in which new shoots would spring up on the warmed soil with greater speed,

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so that there would be greater confidence among states and the cause
of peace would develop and grow stronger.

It can scarcely be doubted that it is not only the peoples of the Soviet
Union who are concerned to ease international tension, but the peoples
of the United States of America, Britain, France, Germany and all the
other countries as well. That is why world public opinion and the
governments of a number of countries have received with approval the
new peaceable proposals of the Soviet government.

In his reply to the message of the Soviet government dated December 10, 1957,¹ the President of the United States expressed agreement with the Soviet government's proposal that a conference of statesmen of the West and East be convened.

His message says:

"I am ready to meet with the Soviet leaders to discuss the proposals mentioned in your letter and the proposals which I make, with the attendance as appropriate of leaders of other states which have recognised responsibilities in relation to one or another of the subjects we are to discuss."

But Mr. Eisenhower puts forward a proposal that a conference of the Foreign Ministers be convened to discuss international problems on their merits before a summit conference is held. His message puts forward the proposal that "these complex matters should be worked on in advance through diplomatic channels and by our Foreign Ministers, so that the issues can be presented in a form suitable for our decisions and so that it can be ascertained that such a top-level meeting would, in fact, hold good hope of advancing the cause of peace and justice in the world."

It would appear that everything was going well. In his message Mr. Eisenhower gives the following "solemn and categorical assurances":

"1. *Never* will the United States lend its support to any aggressive action by any collective defence organisation or any member thereof;

"2. *Always* will the United States be ready to move toward the development of effective United Nations collective security measures in replacement of regional collective defence measures."

These pronouncements by Mr. Eisenhower cannot but be welcomed, but however, how are they to be made compatible with the President's demands that at such a conference there be discussed the question of the countries of Eastern Europe, that is to say, the people's democrac-

¹ For original language of the President's letter, dated Jan. 12, 1958, see *ante*.

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cies, and also that the problem of reunifying Germany be discussed
in order to do away with the German Democratic Republic?

The Soviet Union has repeatedly made clear its attitude both on the
question of the European people's democracies, whose peoples have
made a free choice of their path of development, and also on the
German problem.

The President of the United States is aware of the Soviet govern-
ment's attitude on these issues. Nevertheless, in his message in reply,
Mr. Eisenhower writes:

"I know that your government is reluctant to discuss these matters or treat them as a matter of international concern . . . You took the position that there were no grounds for discussing this question at our conference and that it involved interference in the internal affairs of Eastern European states.

"But have not subsequent developments shown that I was justified
in my appeal to you for a consideration of these matters? Surely, the
Hungarian developments and the virtually unanimous action of the
United Nations General Assembly in relation thereto show that con-
ditions in Eastern Europe are regarded throughout the world as much
more than a matter of purely domestic scope. I propose that we
should now discuss this matter. There is an intrinsic need of this in
the interests of peace and justice, which seems to me compelling."

What is it, then, that Messrs. Eisenhower and Dulles want? What
they want is apparently to meet us and talk about liquidating the
socialist system in the Soviet Union, and the people's democratic sys-
tem in the people's democracies. They apparently want to have us
abandon socialist construction and restore the capitalist system. Some
go so far as to demand a poll of the peoples of the socialist countries
on whether they are for socialism or for capitalism.

Why do you, Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles, believe that you can
raise the question of the socialist system in the European people's
democracies, and in the Soviet Union, yet you do not want to grant
other countries an equal right to raise the same question with regard
to the capitalist countries? But we do not raise, and are not going to
raise for discussion at international meetings the question of the social
system in one country or another, inasmuch as each people settles this
issue at its own discretion. We stand by the positions of non-inter-
vention by one state in the internal affairs of other states.

And we say to the representatives of the western powers: Let us
carry through a policy of peaceful co-existence and not interfere in
one another's internal affairs. Intervention by one state in the in-

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ternal affairs of other states, as the experience of history has shown, inevitably leads to conflicts, to military clashes. The experience of history also shows that the imperialists' attempts to impose their will upon the peoples that have liberated themselves from capitalist oppression have ended in shameful failure for the imperialists.

This is our opinion on the question.

Now let us pass over to the German question. As soon as the desirability of a summit conference is mentioned, leading circles of certain western powers consider it necessary to push into the foreground the so-called German question and demand that it is this issue that should be discussed by an international conference. But what is the German question in present-day conditions? It is, above all, the question of relations between the two sovereign states, with different social systems, now existing on German soil. It is the problem of contact, *rapprochement* and unification in one form or another of the two states, with the aim of restoring the national unity of Germany as a single, peace-loving and democratic state.

The Soviet Union has more than once put forward its views on this question, declaring that the German question can be solved only by the German people themselves. The Soviet Union, for its part, will do everything to help the reunification of Germany. On what basis must such reunification be effected? I think that the Germans themselves will decide this matter. Obviously Herr Adenauer will not want the economy of Western Germany to be reconstructed along socialist lines. It is also obvious that the working people of the German Democratic Republic will not want to liquidate their socialist gains and will not agree to restore capitalism. That is why one must recognise the historical fact that there are two states with different social systems existing in Germany—the socialist German Democratic Republic and the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany. The government of the German Democratic Republic has made a reasonable proposal, with the aim of peacefully unifying the country, to create first of all a German confederation, which would be a union by treaty of two sovereign states, in order to carry through a common policy on a definite range of external and internal questions.

Ignoring all previous declarations by the Soviet government on the German question and the very fact of the existence of two sovereign German states, Mr. Eisenhower in his message demands again "that we now proceed vigorously to bring about the reunification of Germany by free elections, as we agreed . . ."

But it is well known that there never was such agreement! . . .

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We have declared and declare now that both on the question of the people's democracies and on the German question we are not going to meet to discuss these questions in the way Messrs. Eisenhower, Dulles and Adenauer raise them. On these questions our position is clear-cut.

In his message Mr. Eisenhower puts forward, "as the most important problem which faces the world today," the demand to ban the use of outer (interplanetary) space for testing war missiles and to end the manufacture of such weapons which involve the use of outer space.

So that is the question they are interested in! We say: Let us ban the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons. These weapons are manufactured in the United States, in the United Kingdom, in the Soviet Union, and it is also said that France will soon be manufacturing them at home. Agreement on the prohibition of tests of these weapons would be reached on the basis of equality. To control the implementation of this agreement would not be difficult since, given the present level of techniques, it is not possible to keep secret the explosions of atom and hydrogen bombs.

But we are told: "Let us establish control." We have already expressed our willingness to accept reasonable control which would preclude the possibility of staging secret explosions. The western powers, however, obstructing a solution of the problems involving the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, now raise quite another question: the prohibition of the use of outer (interplanetary) space, that is to say, in fact, the banning of intercontinental ballistic rockets. But, pray, the Soviet Union has such rockets and the western powers have not. Thus, the United States government wants to single out from the general problem of disarmament only one question—the intercontinental rocket—without wishing to take any practical steps towards banning weapons for the mass extermination of human beings. What the United States means by such a proposal is to ban the weapons which can threaten the territory of the United States, but keep in its hands all the other types of weapons with the help of which the United States would like to terrorise all the world. That means it wants to ban what it has not got, while continuing to arm. No, Gentlemen, things are never like that!

Of course, one cannot deny the importance of the question of control over the use of outer space, but this question must be regarded as part of the general problem of disarmament, including the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In the interests of strengthening peace, with the object of reaching agreement on disarmament, the Soviet Union would be willing to discuss also the question of the intercontinental ballistic rocket, if the western powers consent to the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the discontinuation of their

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tests, the closing down of the military bases with which the United
States has ringed the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The imperialist circles of the United States want to retain their
military bases, to set up sites for launching rockets from the territories
of countries bordering on us and thus to threaten us daily, declaring
that they can wipe out the towns of the Soviet Union. For this is a
fact—it is not we who are threatening the United States with our
bases (in general, we have no military bases in any country), but it is
the western powers that are setting up many such bases. But we say:
If the American military bases lie near the frontiers of the Soviet
Union, then, *vice versa*, the Soviet Union lies near these bases. And
should the aggressors launch military operations, the Soviet Union
already has a tested and highly efficient weapon, not only to destroy
those bases but also to deal crushing retaliatory blows at more remote
objectives.

So let us not frighten one another, but show common sense and agree
on a mutually acceptable basis to end the "cold war" and the arms
race, to create conditions of peaceful co-existence between states, to
promote world peace.

Comrades, the Soviet government believes that the time is ripe to
convene a conference of leading statesmen on a high level with the
participation of the heads of government. We are ready to take part
in such a conference at any time.

Are there at present any definite international problems which
demand urgent solution and which can be solved today? There can
only be one answer: Yes, there are such questions and there are a great
many of them.

Can statesmen who have even the slightest concern for the destinies
of the peoples, remain indifferent and tolerate the present state of
affairs when the arms race, growing like an avalanche, increasingly
dangerous in its destructive power, creates the danger of a war
disaster?

Can one tolerate the fact that the "cold war" atmosphere brings
this danger increasingly close and makes it increasingly real?

The Soviet government has already officially informed all the powers
of its views on the questions which should be discussed first of all.
Here are a number of them:

What prevents agreement on the immediate ending of atomic and
hydrogen weapon tests, so as to put an end to the hazards to health
from experimental explosions? Is this question not ripe for the most
urgent discussion? It is!

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Is it not high time to come to terms, at last, on the ending of the so-called cold war? In the course of more than 10 years the world has been living in an atmosphere of "cold war," which is keeping the peoples at fever pitch. On this soil the foes of peace have been systematically cultivating enmity and hatred among the peoples and fanning war hysteria. The "cold war" and the arms race, plunging the world further and further down the slope to atomic war—all these are things that are closely interconnected. Is it not high time to put an end to the "cold war"? It is!

The same should be said of putting an end to the war propaganda which, in some western countries, is carried on day in and day out and is becoming increasingly unbridled. Who can deny that there are civilians and military men in the United States who make systematic and open calls for war, including atomic war? It is high time to recognise that propaganda exercises of this kind have become far too dangerous under present conditions for them to be allowed to continue!

We also believe that it is high time to reach agreement on the reduction of the foreign troops stationed in Germany and other European states. When we speak of the reduction of these forces, we mean that this must be only the beginning, only the first stage, because eventually all foreign troops must be withdrawn from the territories of other countries. Isn't this natural in peacetime? Has the question not matured of coming to agreement today, at least on the need for the powers concerned to take this important step?

Reality prompts the need for solving such an important problem as the setting up in Central Europe of a zone free from every type of nuclear weapon and embracing such states as the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany. It is common knowledge that three of these states have already expressed their consent to the setting up of such a zone. There is no need to prove the exceptional importance and benefit to the cause of peace of implementing this proposal made by the Polish government.

Some foreign leaders declare that appropriate controls are needed in the solution of the problem of setting up an atom-free zone in Europe. The Soviet Union is ready to examine this proposal and to accept the establishment of the necessary controls.

The question of the situation in the Middle East is also a pressing matter. All of us have witnessed in recent years how, now in one, now in another part of this region, dangerous hotbeds of war have emerged threatening to plunge all mankind into the abyss of war. That is precisely why we regard it as a duty of the great powers to come to terms as soon as possible on the renunciation of the use of

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force in settling Middle East issues and of intervention in the affairs
of the countries of that area.

Finally, who can deny the need for putting an end to such ugly
phenomena in international economic relations as discrimination, all
kinds of blacklists and similar artificial obstacles to international
trade? It can be confidently said that all these barriers—erected
under the “cold war”—in the way of the free development of inter-
national trade, do not benefit even those states which have created
them, but only poison the international atmosphere and are grist to
the mill of the enemies of peace.

In fact, trade discrimination has been created in order to poison
the atmosphere. If the ruling circles of some countries expected to
weaken the military potential of the Soviet Union in this way, they
have failed. Some probably thought that if sales of strategic goods
to the Soviet Union were permitted, this could help in some measure
to strengthen the military might, promote the advance of the military
science and technology of our country. But life has shown the utter
bankruptcy of such views. It is common knowledge that the Soviet
Union, under conditions of restrictions and discrimination in trade,
relying on the development of national science and technology and
the strength of its industry, has designed better types of armaments—
a fact which the western powers themselves have admitted.

We do not speak of trade in armaments—let the western powers not
sell arms, just as we do not intend to sell our arms. We do not count
on purchasing arms. The issue is quite different—it is a question of
normal trade between countries.

Who needs such restrictions and discrimination in international
trade? They are needed in order to keep the world in a state of tension,
to trouble the waters and to “fish in troubled waters,” as the saying
goes. It is clear that the ruling circles of the western powers are not
guided by business considerations, but by quite different ones.

I have cited as instances only some questions which in our opinion
can be regarded as ripe for immediate discussion at a conference of
the heads of government. We do not exclude other important ques-
tions which could be discussed at the summit meeting in order to
achieve certain positive results on them.

It goes without saying that agreement on many questions is possible
given the desire of both sides. But for a summit conference to yield
positive results the *status quo* should be recognised, that is to say, the
fact that there are two systems of states in the world—the capitalist
and the socialist systems. The principles of peaceful co-existence
should be recognised and there should be no interference in the affairs
of other states. If all this is recognised and the ruling circles of the
western countries do not seek to solve international problems by a

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war against the socialist countries, it will not be difficult to agree on urgent international problems in the interests of consolidating peace.

If the *status quo* is not recognised, if the socialist states are ignored, their sovereign rights violated, and their domestic affairs interfered in, then it is, of course, absolutely impossible to come to terms. Such a policy is nothing but the policy of "positions of strength," a policy of war. But this has already been tried against the Soviet Union and it is well known that the lovers of such a policy sustained utter defeat. Such was the case when the Soviet Union was the only socialist country. What can the imperialists expect now, when the Soviet Union is no longer the only socialist state, when with it in the powerful camp of socialism there are the great Chinese People's Republic and all the socialist countries of Europe and Asia, when this camp embraces about 1,000 million people? It is only madmen and adventurers who can ignore this and expect war to solve international problems. If the imperialists unleash another war it will inevitably lead to the destruction of those who start it. The peoples will do away for ever with a system which brings mankind untold suffering and bloody wars.

The Soviet government is ready to discuss any questions designed to strengthen peace and establish greater confidence among the states, to discuss these questions with its partners. Mr. Eisenhower, for instance, recently put forward in one of his speeches the idea of the need to pool the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States to combat such scourges of mankind as cancer, tuberculosis and malaria. We believe that one can agree with this. One could list many other questions, such as the struggle against poliomyelitis, locusts, glanders and foot and mouth disease. We are successfully co-operating with Iran and Afghanistan in combating locusts. There are many other questions in which, far from hindering co-operation, we are doing our utmost to extend this co-operation. Although not all of the problems are a menace in our country, we are nevertheless ready to co-operate with countries where such problems are particularly pressing. We shall be pleased to pool our efforts with those of other countries in solving such problems.

But I hope you will understand me correctly, Mr. President; it is not on those issues that mankind expects agreement between the great powers. It is with hope and anxiety that the peoples of all countries watch for the solution of the fundamental problems in the relations between states. They expect, above all, a relaxation in international tension, so that people are not threatened with a war of extermination, so that when they go to bed they need not fear lest they never wake up again, so that they need not fear losing in this war their husbands, fathers, children, wives and mothers.

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This must be borne in mind, above all, because people all over the
world, all mankind, are waiting with emotion and hope for a solution
to these vital problems.

Statement by the Department of State,
January 28, 1958¹

Mr. Khrushchev delivered a lengthy speech in Minsk last Wednesday [January 22] addressing himself, among other things, to the President's proposals for a summit meeting as set forth in his letter—that is, the President's letter—of January 12 to Chairman Bulganin. It is noteworthy that Foreign Minister Gromyko, when he received the United States Ambassador on the day following Khrushchev's speech, made no mention of the matters raised in that speech.

Mr. Khrushchev's distorted view of United States policies and motivations, and of the policies and motivations of some of our allies, emphasizes the difficulties which would beset a short, unprepared meeting of Heads of Government such as the Soviet Government has proposed. We presume the Soviet Union will reply to the serious proposals put forward by President Eisenhower in his reply of January 12.² We cannot believe that the Minsk speech of the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, or indeed his remarks at the cocktail party last night,³ is intended as an adequate reply. In the Minsk speech, Mr. Khrushchev makes the contentions that have repeatedly been set forth by the Soviet Government. He pointedly omits any mention of the long series of initiatives of the United States for peace, as well as its long, constant record of nonaggression. At the same time he ignores the deep concern with which the world views Soviet intentions and Soviet behavior.

The peoples of the world should be informed of all the facts in order
that they may reach sound conclusions of their own. It is also of
some interest to note that the President's reply, also the ones from
Prime Minister Macmillan and Premier Gaillard, to Marshal Bul-
ganin were not published in the Soviet Union until they appeared in
*Izvestia* this morning.

¹ Oral statement made to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Chief of the News Division. Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 17, 1958, pp. 249-250.

² For Bulganin's reply, dated Feb. 1, 1958, see *post*.

³ See report in *New York Times*, Jan. 28, 1958.

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Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower,
February 1, 1958¹

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I received your reply 2 to my message of De-
cember 10 last as well as your communication 3 to the effect that you
had received my message of January 8, 1958.4 While awaiting your
reply with regard to the substance of my message of January 8 and of
the proposals of the Soviet Government on matters pertaining to the
lessening of international tension, I shall take the liberty to present
certain considerations which have arisen in connection with your
message.

First of all, I should like to inform you that we in Moscow have re-
ceived with gratification your agreement with our opinion concerning
the usefulness of personal contacts between statesmen of various coun-
tries which you have expressed, as well as your readiness to meet with
Soviet leaders and the leaders of other appropriate states concerned
for the purpose of conducting negotiations.

We also note that you share our opinion that it is desirable that the
proposed summit meeting be successful. It is from these considera-
tions, as I have already informed you, that the Soviet Government
proceeded in developing concrete proposals to conduct the meeting.
We propose that the attention of participants at the top level be con-
centrated on the most urgent problems, with regard to which the known
positions of states provide a certain degree of assurance as to their
positive solution at this time. This is why the Soviet Government
proposes, as you know, that such problems as the following be dis-
cussed at the meeting:

Immediate suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests; re-
nunciation by the U.S.S.R., the United States, and the United King-
dom of the use of nuclear weapons;

Creation in Central Europe of a zone free of atomic weapons;

Conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the NATO member
states and states party to the Warsaw Treaty;

Reduction in the number of foreign troops stationed in the territory
of Germany and within the borders of other European states;

Development of an agreement on questions pertaining to the pre-
vention of sudden attack;

Measures to expand international trade ties;

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 10, 1958, pp. 376-380.

²Dated Jan. 12; text *ante*.

³Dated Jan. 20; text *ante*.

⁴The Bulganin letter of Jan. 8, not printed here, was the covering letter for the Soviet proposals of that date (see *ante*).

544645—60—13

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Discontinuation of propaganda for war; and

Ways and means for lessening the tension in the Near and Middle East area.

In addition, as is indicated in the proposals of the Soviet Government of January 8, the meeting could discuss other constructive proposals directed towards terminating the "cold war" which may be presented by other participants in the meeting. It is obvious that there must be unanimous agreement of all participants as to the necessity for considering such proposals.

As to problems with regard to which there is, at this time, little foundation for counting on their mutually acceptable solution, the meeting could agree on the procedure for their consideration at the next stage of negotiations between states. It is our profound conviction that such a method of gradually solving international problems is, under present conditions, where the necessary trust in the relations between states is still lacking, the most realistic and promising. There is no doubt that the reaching of agreements, initially at least on individual problems, would create favorable premises for settling other unsolved international problems also.

Let us take as an example the proposal for an immediate suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests even for a period of two or three years. The urgency of the solution of this matter is obvious. It was again most forcefully emphasized in the petition of 9,235 scientists from 44 countries, which was addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjold, a few days ago and which calls for an immediate suspension of nuclear weapons tests. This petition, which was signed, in particular, by 101 members of the National Academy of Science of the United States and 216 Soviet scientists, states that each nuclear bomb test increases the amount of radioactive particles which are harmful to the health of people on the entire globe.

At the same time it is known that the majority of states, including powers possessing nuclear weapons, recognize in principle the necessity of reaching agreement on this matter. If we take into account the fact that the implementation of control over the fulfillment by states of commitments undertaken by them with regard to a suspension of nuclear weapons tests is comparatively easy and that such a step gives none of the states possessing nuclear weapons any advantage which would prejudice the interests of other states, then it would become clear that the reaching of an agreement on this subject is fully possible at this time and depends exclusively on the states possessing nuclear weapons. As to the Soviet Union, it is, as has been repeatedly stated, prepared to suspend the testing of such weapons if other powers agree to do the same.

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Are the doubts as to the significance of such an agreement justified? In our opinion they are not. In this respect we fully share the opinion of scientists who state in the above-mentioned petition that an international agreement on suspension of nuclear bomb tests at this time could serve as a first step towards more extensive disarmament and towards an ultimate effective prohibition of nuclear weapons.

We also consider the other above-mentioned problems no less important and ripe to the same degree for consideration and successful solution at this time.

In your message, Mr. President, while expressing your agreement to discuss at a summit meeting the proposals of the Soviet Government, you, on your part, propose that a number of other matters be discussed.

It is obvious that in any negotiations, the more so in negotiations at the highest possible level, only those problems which all the participants are prepared to consider should be discussed. There is hardly anyone who would object to this. However, I cannot help noting the following circumstance. While expressing your agreement to discuss at the meeting the matters suggested by the Soviet Union, you make it understood in advance that from your point of view it is not useful or necessary to reach an agreement on such matters as the proposal for a renunciation by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. of the use of nuclear weapons, the proposal to conclude a nonaggression pact between NATO member states and the states party to the Warsaw Treaty, or the proposal to renounce the use of force in solving the problems connected with the Near and Middle East. In this connection references are made to the fact that the commitments envisaged in the said proposals are covered by the commitments which are imposed by the U.N. Charter on the members of that organization.

The same argument is advanced to provide the foundation for the negative attitude, expressed in your reply message, toward the Soviet proposal that our states proclaim their firm intention to develop between themselves relations of friendship and peaceful co-operation. If the United States Government does not consider it possible or desirable to accept such a proposal, then this fact can only cause our deep regret, since the Soviet Government, which is striving consistently for peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation with all countries, attaches in this connection an especially great significance to the improvement of relations between the USSR and the United States. In doing so we believe that the present unsatisfactory status of these relations is by no means dictated by necessity and that there are sufficient practical possibilities for a change for the better, which is in fact proven by the Agreement on Exchanges in the Fields of Culture, Technology and Education, signed by our representatives a few

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days ago.¹ We are convinced that an improvement in relations between our states requires active efforts by both sides and we cannot, of course, help experiencing disappointment that our proposal for making a new important step along this path is rejected by reference again to the Charter of the United Nations—a reference, the artificial nature of which is obvious.

I need not, Mr. President, put particular emphasis on the fact that the proposals of the Soviet Government advanced for the consideration of states are directed towards strengthening universal peace and are in full accord with the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter. The implementation of the measures proposed by us would contribute to the strengthening of the United Nations, would assist it in becoming a really effective organ, protecting the cause of peace. And so far the trouble has not been in the fact that such measures were taken but rather in the fact that, contrary to the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations, agreements were concluded and such organizations were created as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad bloc, which undermine the authority of the United Nations and in no way contribute to the lessening of international tension. If one wishes to be consistent and take the position of the United Nations Charter, then first of all it is necessary to liquidate such military groupings. However, since on the part of the Western powers there is no readiness to take such a step at this time, the Soviet Government proposes that joint decisions be made in which there would be confirmed our firm intention to support the United Nations Charter and to execute persistently such measures as would ensure the security of peoples.

We should like to emphasize that the U.N. Charter, as you well know, does not forbid and does not exclude agreements between states directed toward the realization of its principles. On the contrary, the U.N. Charter requires of all states that they strengthen and bring into existence through various acts the principles of maintaining and strengthening peace proclaimed in the Charter. As you know, with the Charter in existence, the U.N. itself adopts a number of resolutions, declarations, appeals, and other decisions, and this is very natural, as is also natural the presence of a whole series of interstate agreements directed toward guaranteeing various forms of peaceful co-operation among U.N. members.

In this connection I should like to refer also to your proposal regarding measures for strengthening the U.N. We, Mr. President, do not disagree with you that it is necessary to strengthen the U.N. and

¹ For text of the Agreement signed Jan. 27, 1958, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 17, 1958, pp. 243-247.

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make it an effective organ of international co-operation. In our opinion, much could be done in this respect through the joint efforts of all states, primarily the great powers which are permanent members of the Security Council.

But what does your message propose? It proposes, in essence, one thing: to depart from the principle of unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council, a unanimity which is the basic pivot on which hinges the very existence of the U.N. Twelve years' experience of the activity of the U.N. has shown with all certainty that this very right of unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council ("veto") makes possible the very existence of the U.N. as an international organization for the maintenance of universal peace and prevents the adoption of important political decisions in the Security Council which would not take into account the interests of states which find themselves in the minority. The U.N. is not some kind of world government which could enact laws and adopt decisions that would be binding on all states. In the creation of the U.N. it was kept in mind, and this has been stated with full clarity in the Charter, that states become members of it voluntarily and voluntarily assume obligations to execute the demands of the Charter, while fully maintaining their independence and integrity. The U.N. Charter provides that this organization must be a center for coordinating the actions of nations and for working out mutually acceptable decisions. These ends are also served by the rule of unanimity of the great powers. The abolition of this rule would lead to abuses, to the violation of the interests of the minority, and to attempts to use this organization to the advantage of some one power or group of powers. Is it possible to forget that states which are members of the U.N. are sovereign and independent states and cannot permit themselves to be saddled with decisions which are incompatible with their sovereignty?

It is absolutely obvious, Mr. President, that departure from the rule of unanimity of the great powers would not only fail to strengthen the U.N. but, on the contrary, such a step would weaken this organization and would in the last analysis lead to its disintegration. This cannot be permitted if we are really striving to transform the U.N. into an effective organ of international co-operation and not into an instrument in the hands of supporters of a policy "from out of a position of strength." To identify the U.N. with the interests of a group of states, and actually with those of a single power, means canceling the U.N. Charter for purposes which have nothing in common with those high principles and tasks for the sake of which this international organization was created.

In your message of January 12 you also touch on the German question and that of the situation in countries of Eastern Europe.

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Our position on the German question is generally known; the sub-
stance of it was set forth in my message to you of January 8, where
it is stressed that both at the Geneva Meeting of the Heads of Govern-
ment and also thereafter we have clearly and unambiguously stated
that in the light of the actual situation that has developed in Ger-
many its re-unification cannot be achieved without a rapprochement
and understanding between both sovereign German states. It is in
this very direction that the proposal is intended on the part of the
Government of the German Democratic Republic for a German con-
federation, and therefore we fully support it. One cannot fail to see
that under present conditions any approach which does not take all
this into account will not only fail to contribute to the solution of the
German problem but will also lead to an increase in tension in relations
between states.

As for the question of the situation in the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope, the position of the Soviet Government does not require any
kind of clarification, and I consider that any kind of polemics on this
question would not be of any benefit. However, is it permissible to
inquire how it is possible, while having normal diplomatic relations
with the people's democracies or with some of them and consequently
recognizing the sovereignty and the independence of these countries,
to propose to other states to discuss questions dealing with the internal
situation in these countries? The Soviet Union cannot be a party to
any such dealings which we can consider only as inadmissible inter-
ference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. I could also ask
another question: are there any grounds for any country to assume
the part of an arbiter and presume to decide as to what social and
economic regime should be established in any given country? It is
precisely for that reason that my colleagues and I declared with the
utmost firmness at the Meeting of the Heads of Government at Geneva
in 1955 that such questions cannot be the subject of international
negotiations.

In indicating the motives for your proposal for the discussion of
this question you refer, in particular, to the events in Hungary. But
is it not a fact that the events in Hungary have proven above all that
the Hungarian people knew how to properly resist those elements
which, acting on directives and with the support of certain circles
from abroad, made an assault against the social system chosen by
the people of Hungary?

For our part, we are firmly convinced that the cause of strengthening
universal peace demands of us all that we direct our energies toward
those problems the solution of which would create conditions for the
development of peaceful co-operation among nations and that we
not permit relations to be poisoned by raising such questions as might

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lead us away from questions of real importance for the preservation of peace. In this respect I think that you will agree that if we are to proceed from a sincere desire to carry out fruitful negotiations, then persistence in advancing, in fact imposing questions which do not meet the approval of other participants in the negotiations, will be of little benefit.

Your message, Mr. President, makes it clear that you, like ourselves, attach great importance to the consideration of the problem of disarmament at a summit meeting. We hope that agreement between us in this respect will allow us to find an element in the problem of disarmament, on which we can reach the same opinion and finally break the deadlock with regard to this entire problem, the solution of which is indispensable for the preservation of peace.

We think as before, that the proposals presented by us in respect to individual aspects of this problem take into consideration the situation as it exists in respect to disarmament and correspond to the needs of the present moment. I would like to make some remarks concerning the considerations presented on this question in your message. We, of course, do not deny the importance of the question of using outer space for peaceful purposes exclusively, i.e., first of all, of the question of the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. I hope, however, Mr. President, that you will agree that this question can be considered only as a part of the general problem of the prohibition of nuclear and rocket weapons. It is for that very reason that the Soviet Union, in the interest of strengthening peace and reaching agreement on questions of disarmament, is also prepared to discuss the question of intercontinental missiles, provided the Western powers are prepared to agree on the prohibition of nuclear and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of tests of such weapons and the liquidation of foreign military bases in the territories of other states. There can be no doubt that in such a case the reaching of an agreement on the use of cosmic space for peaceful purposes exclusively would not meet with any difficulties.

Is it necessary to argue that a realistic approach to the problem of disarmament requires that the interests of the security of all countries be taken into account rather than of a single country? It can be directly stated that if any of the participants in the negotiations on disarmament is concerned about his own security alone and strives to ensure for himself strategic or other advantages in the course of negotiations, then such negotiations can certainly not lead to any positive results.

I should also like to touch here upon another aspect of this question. Would it be right, Mr. President, if we were to start discussing the problems of cosmic space alone, while setting aside such "earthly"

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international problems requiring solution as, for instance, the question of the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons? What would be the reaction of the peoples now living in dire anxiety because of the "cold war", the intensification of the armaments race, and the threat of a new war? They would be justified in saying that we do not do what we should and that our first task and duty to mankind must be the elimination of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace among the peoples of the earth. Let us then use our joint efforts to achieve these noble goals.

Speaking of the danger of a new war, I must again bring to your attention the great harm done to the cause of peace by the unrestrained propaganda for war being conducted in several Western countries. After all, the situation is such that some rabid partisans of a policy of "positions of strength" openly utter the dangerous call for a preventive war. It is our deep conviction that it is necessary to put an end to this intolerable situation, and the sooner the better. As a matter of fact if we are all really striving to preserve peace, then why should we not unequivocally and decisively condemn propaganda for war and the attempts to cloak warmongering with hypocritical references to freedom of speech and of the press? I am convinced that if all the governments which are to participate in our negotiations take such a position, this alone will, without doubt, contribute to the establishment of a healthier international situation and will create more favorable conditions for the settlement of international problems, which now at times appear to be insoluble.

At the beginning of your message you said, Mr. President, that peace and good will among men have been the sincere desire of all peoples from time immemorial. This cannot be denied. That is precisely why we proposed to other governments to jointly take concrete steps which would show in action our common readiness to strive for the strengthening of peace and for an improvement in international relations. It is upon the statesmen of all nations, and primarily of the great powers, that now depends to a great extent the answer to the main question which so deeply agitates humanity: Will it be possible to avert the senseless drift toward the catastrophe of war and to reverse the trend of events in the direction of strengthening peace and friendly co-operation among nations?

Our responsibility for the fate of the present and the future generations is indeed great, but our opportunities are no less great. It is obvious that a readiness on the part of the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., as well as that of other great powers, to combine their efforts for ensuring peace throughout the world would be a reliable guarantee that the clouds hovering over the world would be dispersed, and that peoples will at last be able to breathe freely

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and turn without fear to the creative labors of peace. I do not doubt that a high-level meeting of leading statesmen, such as we propose, with the participating of the heads of government, may become an important step in this very direction, provided all of the participants display the necessary respect for the interest of one another and that they recognize as their principal and noble purpose the strengthening of universal peace.

In my message of January 8 I placed before you the motives by which the Soviet Government is guided in its opinion that the proposed negotiations should take place at the highest level with the participation of the heads of governments. Judging from your reply, you are of the opinion that a summit meeting should be preceded by a meeting of foreign ministers who would consider problems in substance, and thus the summit meeting is made contingent on the results of the meeting of ministers.

It is hardly necessary to repeat why we should like to avoid this. I merely wish to note that if we take into consideration the prejudiced position of some of the possible participants in a meeting of ministers, then we see that there is no assurance that a meeting with such participants would not erect additional obstacles to the preparation of a meeting at the highest level, thus destroying at the very outset this important and urgent undertaking.

It seems to me that the experiences of the past meetings of foreign ministers speak for themselves. Very recently the NATO members held a high-level conference, with the participation of the heads of government, devoted almost exclusively to the discussion of further military preparations within NATO. How should one interpret in this connection the position of those who oppose a meeting at the same high level, the purpose of which would be to discuss a program of peace, a program for the elimination of the threat of a new war, and easing of international tensions. As to the preparation of a summit meeting we are certain that if accord is reached on having such a meeting, then the procedural and other questions bearing on the practical implementation of such an accord could be solved, in our opinion, without any special difficulties. These questions could be agreed upon through the usual diplomatic channels.

Permit me to express the hope that you will give due attention to my remarks, which derive from a sincere desire to promote the earliest possible convening of a summit meeting, which would be an important step toward the liquidation of the "cold war" and toward the strengthening of universal peace.

The historical moment in which we live urgently demands that we all be imbued with a feeling of special responsibility and that we set aside all secondary considerations and all the prejudices which so often

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hinder successful work for strengthening peace. This is required
by the highest interests of our peoples and of all humanity. We are
deeply convinced that the joint efforts of our countries together with
the efforts of other governments, can mark the beginning of a new
chapter in the development of mankind, that of peaceful co-operation
and friendship among nations.

With sincere respect,

N. BULGANIN

Letter From President Eisenhower to
Chairman Bulganin, February 15, 1958¹

MY DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am in receipt of your communication
of February 1. I note that it is a slightly abbreviated and moderated
edition of the lengthy and rather bitter speech which Mr. Khrushchev
made at Minsk on January 22.

I begin to wonder, Mr. Chairman, whether we shall get anywhere
by continuing to write speeches to each other? As I read your suc-
cessive lengthy missives of December 10, January 8,² and February 1,
I cannot avoid the feeling that if our two countries are to move
ahead to the establishment of better relations, we must find some ways
other than mere prolongation of repetitive public debate. In this
connection, I have some thoughts to offer.

But first I comment briefly on your latest note.

II.

I tried in my letter to you of January 12 to put forward some new
ideas. For example, I proposed strengthening the United Nations
by rededication of our nations to its purposes and principles, with the
accompaniment of some reduction in the use of the veto power in
the Security Council.

That proposal you reject, alleging that it would give to the Security
Council a power to "adopt decisions that would be binding on all
States" and make it in effect a "world government". That argument
is directed to a misrepresentation of my proposal. I suggested that
our two nations should, as a matter of policy, avoid vetoing Security
Council recommendations as to how nations might proceed toward

¹ White House news release, Feb. 17, 1958. For Bulganin's reply, dated Mar. 3, see *post*.

² The Bulganin letter of Jan. 8, not printed here, was the covering letter for the Soviet proposals of that date (see *ante*).

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the peaceful solution of their disputes. Surely authority to *recom-
mend*, and that only as to *procedures*, is not to impose binding deci-
sions. Already, the General Assembly can, free of veto, recommend
procedures for peaceful settlement. Would it really be catastrophic
for the Security Council to exercise that same facility?

III.

Another new idea was that outer space should be perpetually dedicated to peaceful purposes. You belittle this proposal as one made to gain strategic advantages for the United States. Mr. Khrushchev in his Minsk speech said, "This means they want to prohibit that which they do not possess."

Since the record completely disproves that uncalled for statement,
may we now hope between us to consider and devise cooperative in-
ternational procedures to give reality to the idea of use of outer space
for peace only.

When the United States alone possessed atomic weapons and the
Soviet Union possessed none, the United States proposed to forego its
monopoly in the interest of world peace and security. We are pre-
pared to take the same attitude now in relation to outer space. If this
peaceful purpose is not realized, and the worse than useless race of
weapons goes on, the world will have only the Soviet Union to blame,
just as it has only the Soviet Union to blame for the fact that atomic
and nuclear power are now used increasingly for weapons purposes
instead of being dedicated wholly to peaceful uses as the United States
proposed a decade ago.

The Soviet Union refused to cooperate in tackling the problem of
international control of atomic energy when that problem was in its
infancy. Consequently, it has now become too late to achieve totally
effective control although there can be, as we propose, a controlled ces-
sation of further weapons testing and of the manufacture of fission-
able material for weapons purposes. But, as your Government said on
May 10, 1955, a total "ban" on atomic and hydrogen weapons could not
now be enforced because "the possibility would be open to a potential
aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a
surprise atomic attack on peace-loving states." ¹

A terrible new menace can be seen to be in the making. That menace
is to be found in the use of outer space for war purposes. The time to
deal with that menace is now. It would be tragic if the Soviet leaders
were blind or indifferent toward this menace as they were apparently

¹ For text, see United Nations document DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2, May 10, 1955
(also document DC/71, Annex 15), in Disarmament Commission, *Official Records: Supplement for April to December 1955*, pp. 17-25.

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blind or indifferent to the atomic and nuclear menace at its inception a decade ago.

If there is a genuine desire on the part of the Soviet leaders to do something more than merely to talk about the menace resulting from what you described as "the production of ever newer types of weapons", let us actually do what even now would importantly reduce the scope of nuclear warfare, both in terms of checking the use of fissionable material for weapons purposes and in wholly eliminating the newest types of weapons which use outer space for human destruction.

#### IV.

With respect to the meeting of Heads of Government, the cumulative effect of your last three missives is to leave considerable puzzlement as to what you think another such meeting could contribute to a genuine settlement of our problems.

You have proposed, and insisted on, about ten topics which you want to have discussed at such a meeting. I, in turn, suggested some eight topics which I thought should be discussed—strengthening the United Nations, dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes, the reunification of Germany, the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose the form of government under which they would live, and a number of specific proposals in the disarmament field.

I wrote that, if there were to be a top-level meeting, I would be willing to discuss your proposals in good faith if you would so discuss mine. Your answer is that I must be prepared to discuss your proposals but that as regards mine there must, you said, "be unanimous agreement of all participants as to the necessity for considering such proposals." In other words, you demand the right to veto discussion of the matters I believe to be vital to peace.

I noted that Mr. Khrushchev devoted a considerable part of his Minsk speech to a discussion of conditions in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. Does the Soviet Union claim such a proprietary interest in these lands and people that to discuss them is solely a matter of Soviet domestic concern? If not, and if these lands and people can be discussed by Soviet leaders as an international problem, why cannot we both discuss them?

If indeed a top-level conference were to apply the formula that no one is to say anything except what all the rest agree they would like to hear, we would, as I said in my last press conference, end up in the ludicrous posture of our just glaring silently at each other across the table.

Perhaps the impasse to which we seem to have come can be broken by less formal and less publicized contacts through which we would continue to seek to find out whether there can be a top-level meeting

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which, in the words of my letter to you of January 12, 1958, "would hold good hope of advancing the cause of peace and justice in the world". Exchanges of views effected through our Ambassadors or Foreign Ministers may serve better than what Mr. Khrushchev referred to at Minsk as "polemics" between Heads of Government. The United States is accordingly consulting with some other interested nations as to the desirability of exploring, through more normal channels, the prospects of a top-level meeting which would be adequate as to subjects, and as to which preliminary exchanges would indicate good prospect of an accord. You will understand, of course, that, whatever be the preparatory procedures, these would, as far as the United States was concerned, require the participation of our Secretary of State.

V.

"Polemics" will not, I fear, advance us along the path of better relations which is my nation's goal. Indeed, I deplore the constantly mounting accusations within the Soviet Union that the United States is a nation ruled by aggressive war-minded imperialists. Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 22 is an outstanding example of such charges and indeed they are to be found in your February 1 note.

What is the explanation of such charges? They seem to fly in the face of established history.

Until the end of the First World War, war was generally accepted as a lawful means of conducting foreign policy. But after World War I showed the terrible consequences of such toleration of war, the United States took the initiative in bringing about the Pact of Paris whereby the nations of the world renounced war as an instrument of national policy. An even broader renunciation of force is now found in the United Nations Charter. The United States, which initiated the concept of the international renunciation of force, has sought to adhere scrupulously to that concept.

I am really amazed now to be told by Soviet leaders, who have never even been near this country, that there are in the United States those who, in your words, "utter the dangerous call for preventive war"; and conduct "unrestrained propaganda for war". If any such persons exist in the United States, I do not know of them; nor do I know of any "imperialist ruling circles" that are supposedly eager to plunge the world into war in order to make financial gains.

These allegations do not provide the real facts of American life. The real facts are the intense longing of the American people for peace; the working of the American constitutional system which assures that government shall be responsive to the peaceful will of the people; our "built-in" guarantees against the possibility of any

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United States Government suddenly initiating war; our national dedication to the international renunciation of force as an instrument of national policy; the decisive influence for peace of American religious, labor, intellectual and political leaders and of their organizations.

It is, of course, quite true that our people are flatly opposed to regimes which hold people against their will and which deny the principle on which our nation was founded, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed and can never rightly deprive the governed of their inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Our people's rejection of many foreign and domestic aspects of Soviet methods and policies is, however, demonstrably not a moving cause to war. Otherwise we would have struck when we had atomic weapons and the Soviet Union had none; or when we had thermonuclear bombs and the Soviet Union had none.

## VI.

When I contrast the actual facts of American life with such portrayals as those of Mr. Khrushchev at Minsk, and indeed of your latest communication to me, I am impressed more than ever before with the enormous difficulties besetting us in attempting to move toward better relations and with the greater necessity than ever before of doing so.

It is possible that Soviet leadership feels it necessary deliberately to misrepresent the American viewpoint. If so, one effect would be to confuse their own people and the people of those Eastern European countries under their domination, who are denied access to world information except as the Soviet leaders permit. Another effect would be to make true cooperation more difficult. Possibly also these misrepresentations constitute blind adherence to what was one of the early tenets of orthodox Communism, namely, that capitalistic societies are by their very nature warlike.

I prefer, however, to assume that these misrepresentations are not willful but result from genuine misconceptions which could be done away with.

## VII.

Our two nations are both now exploring and seeking to learn the truth about outer space. But is it not more important to learn the truth about each other? The ambassadorial agreement concluded between our Governments on January 27, 1958,¹ points in this direction. It contemplates exchanges that, it is said, "will contribute

¹For text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 17, 1958, pp. 243-247.

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significantly to the betterment of relations between the two coun-
tries, thereby contributing to a lessening of international tension".
I hope that we shall make full use of that agreement. But, for the
most part, it deals with exchanges of technicians and specialists in
various fields. Would it not be well if, in addition, leaders of
thought and influential citizens within the Soviet Union should come
to visit the United States, not to acquire technical knowledge but
rather to learn at first hand the feeling of our people toward peace
and the working of our popular institutions as they affect our con-
duct of foreign relations. Most of the Soviet citizens who exert an
influence are strangers to this country with, I fear, totally false
conceptions. These misconceptions I should like to see corrected in
the interests of better relations. I can assure you that groups of
qualified citizens of the USSR coming here for the purpose I de-
scribe would receive every facility to learn about our country and
our people and the working of our political institutions.

I feel also that we need particularly to be thinking not only of
the present but also of the future and of those, now young, who in a
few years will be carrying heavy responsibilities that our generation
will pass on to them. I think our young people should get to know
more about each other. I strongly feel that the recent agreement for
the exchange of 20 to 30 students a year is a small step in the right
direction, but woefully inadequate. I may write you further on
this topic.

VIII.

In the meantime, I reaffirm what has been so often said by Secre-
tary Dulles and by myself. The American nation wants nothing
more than to cooperate wholeheartedly with any Soviet Government
which is genuinely dedicated to advancing, by peaceful means, the
welfare of the people of the Soviet Union. It should, however, be
appreciated how difficult it is to generate here the good will which
the Soviet leaders claim they want, so long as there remains between
our two countries the vast gulf of misunderstanding and misrepre-
sentation that is again revealed by both speeches and written com-
munications of Soviet leaders. If the Soviet leaders sincerely desire
better relations with us, can they truly think it helpful for the Soviet
Union to continue to pursue the objectives of International Com-
munism, which include the overthrow of other governments? The
Moscow Manifesto made last November by the representatives of
Communist Parties from 64 nations, and the Soviet Government's
official endorsement of the results of the recent Afro-Asian Confer-
ence in Cairo, could not fail to raise in the minds of our people the
question of the real purposes of the Soviet leaders.

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We shall nevertheless go on seeking such good relations. And I
hope that, if there is a positive response to the concrete suggestion
here made, we may perhaps do something toward ushering in a new
and better era.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the
United States, February 28, 1958 ¹

Unofficial translation

The Soviet Government attributes great importance to having take
place in the nearest future a conference on the highest level with the
participation of Heads of Governments for discussion of a number of
urgent international questions.

It is already possible to say definitely now that the proposal for con-
vening such a conference, which has been the subject of exchange of
opinions between governments of a number of states in recent months,
has met with the approval and support of governments and broad-
est circles of the public of many countries.

The peoples demand that effective measures be adopted for prevent-
ing the threat of outbreak of war with use of atomic and hydrogen
weapons, that a sharp break be made in the direction of improving the
whole international situation, of the creation of conditions for the
peaceful collaboration of all states. The peoples expect from the
forthcoming conference at the Summit the resolution of just this
historical task.

Exchange of messages between the Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States of
America which has taken place recently has shown that the govern-
ments of both countries stand for a meeting of leading personages
of states at highest level.

However there is still a number of questions connected with the
preparation of a conference at the Summit on which it is essential to
come to agreement without further delays so as to hasten the con-
vening of the conference.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government for bringing about such
agreement it is necessary to utilize all means and paths which will help
the most rapid achievement of understanding.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 24, 1958, pp. 459-461. The United States reply is dated Mar. 6, 1958 (*post*).

168

Several questions of preparation of the conference can be reviewed and decided without delay through diplomatic channels. On the other hand, the governments of a number of states, including the United States of America, have expressed the opinion that carrying out of preparation should not only be limited to diplomatic channels and that at a certain stage it would be expedient to convene a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Taking account of these wishes, the Soviet Government expresses agreement on holding a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to speed up the preparation of a meeting at the Summit with participation of Heads of Government. The Soviet Government proposes holding a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in April 1958.

Inasmuch as the goal of such a conference of Ministers must be the reduction to a minimum of the period of preparation of the meeting with participation of Heads of Governments, the scope of questions made subject to discussion of Ministers should be, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, strictly limited to questions relating to the organizational side of preparation for a meeting at the Summit.

The Soviet Government considers that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should be commissioned to work out the agenda of the conference at the Summit, to determine the composition of its participants, time and place of holding it.

Insofar as the composition of the participants of the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is concerned, approximately the same countries, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, should be represented at it as will take part in the meeting at highest level. For its part, the Soviet Government has already set forth ideas relating to the composition of such a conference. In it could take part representatives of all the states members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, as well as representatives of a number of states not participating in military blocs, such as, for example, India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Austria. If for one or another reason it is considered desirable to hold the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in a narrower composition, then, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, the following states could take part in it: United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, India, Yugoslavia, Sweden. In this regard, such a possible limitation of the composition of the participants of the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs should in no way predetermine the question of the composition of the forthcoming conference at the Summit.

The Soviet Government is agreeable to the convening of the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in a place which will be acceptable for the other participants of such a conference.

544645—60—14

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The ideas of the Soviet Government regarding the agenda of the conference at the highest level with the participation of Heads of Governments are already known to the Government of the United States of America. The Soviet Government proposes to discuss at this conference the following urgent international questions:

- the immediate cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons;

- the renunciation by the U.S.S.R., United States of America, and Great Britain of the use of nuclear weapons;

- the creation in Central Europe of a zone free from atomic weapons;

- the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement between states entering into the North Atlantic Alliance and states participating in the Warsaw Treaty;

- the reduction of numbers of foreign troops on the territory of Germany and within the borders of other European states; the working out of agreement on questions connected with the prevention of sudden attack;

- measures for the expansion of international trade ties; the cessation of war propaganda;

- ways for reducing tension in the area of the Near and Middle East.

Besides, the Soviet Government, as it has already pointed out several times, is ready also to discuss with general consent at the conference other constructive proposals directed to the cessation of the "cold war," which could be introduced by other participants of the conference.

Having carefully studied the ideas contained in messages of the President of the United States of America D. Eisenhower to Chairman of Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R. N. A. Bulganin, the Soviet Government expresses readiness also to discuss at the conference at the Summit the following questions:

- prohibition of use of cosmic space for military purposes and liquidation of foreign military bases on foreign territories. Reaching an agreement on this important question would much reduce the danger of sudden outbreak of war and would be a big step for guaranteeing conditions for the quiet and peaceful life of peoples;

- conclusion of a German peace treaty. For discussion of this question the Soviet Government proposes to draw in representation of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. Of course, the question of unification of German Democratic Republic and Federal German Republic into one state, wholly relating to the competence of these two German states, cannot be the subject of consideration at a forthcoming conference at the Summit;

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—the development of ties and contacts between countries. The Soviet Government has unalterably stood for the development of such contacts in every possible way. It shares the view of the importance of such type of contacts expressed in the message of President Eisenhower of February 15 of this year. For its part, the Soviet Government attributes great importance to the support of systematic personal contacts between leading personalities of states for the exchange of opinions on current international questions in the interests of strengthening mutual trust and the consolidation of general peace.

At the same time, the Soviet Government, as it has already pointed out several times, considers completely impossible the discussion at a conference at the Summit, and indeed at any international conference, of such questions as relate to the field of internal affairs of this or that state. The question brought up by the Government of the United States of America concerning the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe relates to just this category. The discussion of this type of question would mean the impermissible interference in internal affairs of sovereign states, a path on which Soviet Union will not tread in any circumstance. The Soviet Government in general cannot understand why it is addressed with proposals to discuss internal affairs of third countries which are sovereign states and with which both the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the United States of America maintain normal diplomatic relations. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, to bring up questions of this type means deliberately to lead matters to sharpening of relations between states, deliberately to subject to threat the achievement of understanding on urgent questions of liquidating the “cold war” and lessening international tension.

The Soviet Government thinks that for guaranteeing success of the conference at highest level, it is essential that the attention of the participants of the conference be concentrated on such questions, the resolution of which will actually help the detente of international tension, the strengthening of confidence between states, and the consolidation of peace.

The Soviet Government expresses hope that the Government of the United States of America will regard the considerations above set forth in a positive sense.

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March 3, 1958¹

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of February 15, and I deem it necessary to express some views regarding the questions touched upon in your message.

It has been almost three months since the Soviet Government, concerned about the development of the international situation, which development is dangerous to the cause of peace, made a proposal to convene a conference of top government officials to solve a number of problems of immediate urgency and to determine through joint efforts effective methods of easing international tension and of ending the "cold war" situation.

It is obvious even now that the idea of conducting negotiations at the highest level has met with approval and support on the part of governments and wide public circles in many countries. This is all the more understandable because the supreme interests of all peoples—the interests of the preservation and strengthening of peace—insistently demand that an end be put to a further drift toward war, that the atmosphere of suspicion, threats, and military preparations be dispelled, and that a path of peaceful coexistence and businesslike cooperation of all states be embarked upon.

In our letters to each other during recent months we have expressed views in regard to the holding of a summit conference, and I consider that this exchange of views has had a positive significance and has played a definite role in the preparation of such a meeting. Above all, our correspondence has shown that the governments of our two countries hold the general opinion that a conference of top government officials is desirable and that its successful outcome can exert a favorable influence on the entire international situation. Furthermore, we have had an opportunity to present in a preliminary way our views with regard to a number of specific problems, which is useful in itself, since it facilitates the search for a mutually acceptable basis of negotiations.

In your message of February 15 you state, Mr. President, that the Soviet Government insists that only its own proposals be discussed by the participants in the conference and that it refuses to consider the questions proposed for discussion by the Government of the United States. This is, however, an altogether erroneous interpretation of the position of the Soviet Government. Actually, the presentation of problems which we propose for discussion at a summit meeting has

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 21, 1958, pp. 648-652.

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by no means been dictated by any special interests of the Soviet Union. They are international problems which have not arisen just today, problems the solution of which has been long awaited and demanded by the peoples.

Are the American people less interested than the people of the Soviet Union or of other countries, for example, in a renunciation by states of the use of atomic and hydrogen bombs, in having nuclear weapons tests terminated at long last or in having the states take coordinated measures toward preventing a surprise attack? Are the British and French, the inhabitants of West Germany, or the Belgians less interested than the Russians, Poles, Czechs, or the inhabitants of East Germany in the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO member states and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty, or in the initiation by both sides, by mutual agreement, of a reduction in the number of foreign troops in Germany, or in creating in the center of Europe a wide zone which would be free of nuclear weapons and excluded from the sphere of the use of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons? Can one believe that only the Soviet Union of all the states is interested in the creation of a healthier international political atmosphere, to which end it is necessary to stop the war propaganda which is poisoning the minds of the people in a number of countries? It is also quite obvious that it would be in the interest of all states to have a free development of international trade based on the principle of mutual advantage without any artificial barriers, and to stabilize the situation in the Near and Middle East through a renunciation by the great powers of any interference in the internal affairs of the countries in that area, which more than once has already been a hotbed of dangerous conflicts.

We believe it is the duty of all statesmen who are really concerned over the fate of the world to contribute in every possible way toward achieving an agreement on these pressing problems. There are no insurmountable obstacles to the solution of all these problems. Only one thing is required—a willingness of the participants in the negotiations to display realism and a desire actually to achieve a relaxation of international tension, which things are so necessary under present conditions.

The only factor that motivates the Soviet Government in its proposal for consideration of these problems is the conviction that under present conditions it would be best to begin a general lessening of international tension by solving the most immediate problems, which could be completely solved even now without harm to the interests of any individual state. We see a confirmation of the correctness of this viewpoint in the fact that the Soviet Union's proposals have found a

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sympathetic response and support on the part of governments and
wide public circles in many countries, both in the East and in the West.

Furthermore, we by no means believe, nor have we ever stated, that
only the topics proposed for discussion by the Soviet Union can be
considered at a summit meeting. I should like to remind you that
in our proposals of January 8 there was a direct statement concerning
the willingness of the Soviet Government also to discuss, by mutual
agreement, such additional constructive proposals contributing to a
termination of the "cold war" as might be presented by the other
participants in the meeting.

However, this does not mean that we can agree to discuss matters
that are in the sphere of internal affairs of other states, the considera-
tion of which could have no results other than a still further aggravation of the relations between states. Precisely in this category belong
such matters as the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe and
the unification into a single state of the German Democratic Republic
and the Federal Republic of Germany. You, Mr. President, are
familiar with the viewpoint of the Soviet Government in this respect,
and it is hardly necessary to speak of this again in detail. A discussion of such questions would mean inadmissible interference in the
internal affairs of sovereign states, to which the Soviet Union will
never in any case agree. The legitimate question arises as to why
proposals are directed to the Soviet Government to discuss the internal
affairs of third countries that are sovereign states and with which both
the United States of America and the Soviet Union have normal diplomatic relations. In fact, if the Government of the U.S.A. has any
uncertainties with regard to the internal structure of this or that
country of Eastern Europe, there exists, as you are aware, a practice,
developed through the centuries, of clarifying such questions not by
interfering in the internal affairs of other countries but by making use
of ordinary diplomatic channels. We do not consider it possible to
assume the role of judges and decide questions pertaining to the
internal structure of other countries. We are likewise unable to
recognize such a right for any other state, and we consider inadmissible
not only the discussion but even the mere presentation of such
questions.

We have no doubt that if someone were to propose an international
conference for the discussion of the internal political situation in
France, Italy, Turkey, Canada, or in the United States itself, for
example, such a proposal would meet with the most emphatic objection on your part. To include questions of this kind in the agenda
of a summit conference would certainly mean foredooming this conference to failure, and this we do not desire at all.

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I should like to add that, if we, for our part, put forward a number of questions which in the opinion of the Soviet Government should be considered at the conference, we do not at all consider the list of these questions definitive. As I have already communicated to you, Mr. President, the Soviet Government has always been prepared to discuss also at a summit conference, by common consent, any other constructive proposals for ending the "cold war" that might be submitted by other participants at the conference.

My colleagues and I have closely studied the considerations contained in your messages. The Soviet Government agrees to discuss the following questions as well at a summit conference:

We are prepared to discuss the questions of prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes and the liquidation of alien military bases on foreign territories. I think you will agree that the reaching of an agreement on this important question would greatly reduce the danger of a sudden outbreak of war and would be an important step toward ensuring conditions for a tranquil and peaceful life among nations.

The Soviet Government also considers it possible to discuss the matter of concluding a German peace treaty. We propose that the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany be invited to participate in the discussion of this problem. Of course, the problem of uniting the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. in a single state, which falls completely within the competence of these two German states, cannot, as the Soviet Government has already stated repeatedly, be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming summit conference.

We agree that at a summit conference there should also be a discussion of the questions of developing ties and contacts among countries. The Soviet Government has invariably been in favor of every possible development of such contacts. It shares the views expressed in your message of February 15 concerning the importance of such contacts. I should like to emphasize that for its part the Soviet Government attaches great significance to the maintenance of systematic personal contacts between top government officials for the exchange of views concerning current international problems in the interests of improving relations between states and strengthening mutual trust and consolidating universal peace.

Likewise, we are not opposed to having an exchange of views regarding ways of strengthening the U.N.; we have merely expressed certain considerations of principle which we have in this respect.

I have already had occasion to explain why we consider unacceptable the proposal that our two governments renounce the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in

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deciding certain questions in that body. We cannot agree at all with the claim that the only thing in question is the procedural aspect of the matter, although, as is well known, this aspect also has important significance in settling great political problems. We are firmly convinced that the implementation of measures proposed by you would in practice lead to the use of the Security Council in the interests of one or several powers to the detriment of the interests of other states, to undermining the various principles of unanimity of the great powers which have the basic responsibility for maintaining international peace, that principle on which the U.N. is founded and which represents the basic guarantee for the normal activity and the very existence of the U.N. It is a well-known fact that in the development of this principle the Government of the U.S.A. itself played an active role. One cannot fail to see that at the present time the preservation of this principle is still more necessary than it was thirteen years ago, when the U.N. was created.

The Soviet Government has set forth its viewpoint, not only concerning problems subject to discussion but also regarding the participants, the time of convening, and certain other problems. Unfortunately, we do not yet know the viewpoint of the Government of the U.S.A. concerning these matters; there is no mention of this even in your message of February 15.

As to the method of preparation for the conference, the necessity for which has now been expressed by the heads of the governments of all the largest states, the Soviet government feels that all ways and means should be used that might expedite such preparations. It seems to us that an agreement can be reached through diplomatic channels on certain questions relating thereto, and these opportunities should, of course, be utilized. At the same time we take into account the fact that the Government of the United States and certain other governments have declared themselves in favor of calling a Foreign Ministers' conference as one of the preparatory measures for a summit conference. If you consider that a Foreign Ministers' conference would serve and would help to expedite the convening of a conference of top government officials with the participation of the heads of government, then we are prepared to comply with such a desire. We are proceeding on the premise that the convening of a summit conference as soon as possible fulfills the hopes of all peoples.

Since the parties agree on the desirability of expediting the preparation of a summit conference, we propose to call a Foreign Ministers' meeting in April, and we consider that it should prepare the agenda for a summit conference, determine who should participate in it, and decide when and where it should be held. It would be advisable to decide all these questions as soon as possible.

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I must say, Mr. President, that the present state of preparation of the summit conference causes us definite concern. The lack of a reply from the Government of the United States to a number of concrete proposals from the Soviet Government concerning preparations for the conference, and also the fact that the Government of the United States continues knowingly to submit unacceptable questions, all of this obviously delays the convening of the conference.

We are all the more alarmed since, in addition to delaying a decision on the question of convening the conference, the governments of the United States and of certain other NATO member states are stepping up the tempo of practical measures in the sphere of military preparations, which cannot but aggravate international tension. I have in mind particularly a recently signed agreement between the United States and Great Britain on the establishment of bases in the territory of the latter for launching American medium-range rockets,¹ and also the announcement of the convening in Paris, in April of this year, of a conference of Defense Ministers of the NATO nations for the purpose of studying such questions as setting up rocket bases in the territories of NATO member countries, stockpiling atomic weapons in those countries, and the transfer of atomic weapons to NATO members.

We note that the press of certain Western powers has recently stated openly that the United States will not consent to a summit conference until agreements have been reached concerning the establishment of American rocket bases in the territory of the West European NATO member countries.

All of this results in a very strange situation: on the one hand, assertions are being made regarding readiness to make efforts toward relaxing international tension and lessening the danger of war; on the other hand, military preparations are being made with feverish haste, which can only increase international tension and the danger of war.

How should we, Mr. President, under these conditions, evaluate the situation which has been created? Should we judge the true intentions of the Government of the United States and of certain other NATO nations by their words or by their deeds? It seems to us that if we are all agreed that it is necessary to hold a summit conference to study urgent international questions, then at least measures should not be taken that might only impede the convening of such a conference and render more complicated the solution of the problems facing it.

¹ Allusion is apparently to the "Agreement Relating to the Supply by the United States to the United Kingdom of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles," signed Feb. 22, 1958 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3990).

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I cannot, Mr. President, overlook certain statements, chiefly concerning questions of Soviet-American relations, contained in your communication of February 15. I do not wish to dwell on the tone in which certain passages of that communication were written, since a contest in sharp words cannot be useful in finding ways to relax international tension.

First of all, I must say that the statements concerning the Socialist order of society, the domestic and foreign policy of the Socialist states, and the mutual relations between them as contained in your communication are not in conformity with actual reality.

We are, of course, aware that you are opposed to the ideas of communism and the principles underlying the social system in the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. We do not expect our views on questions of social development to coincide. However, while you maintain that the proponents of the ideology which you also support have the right to criticize the Socialist system in every way, you construe the criticism of capitalist social orders made by Communists in the Soviet Union as proof that the Soviet Government is not endeavoring to improve relations with the United States of America.

This question deserves special consideration. We have more than once emphasized how dangerous it would be to the cause of peace to bring ideological disagreements into the sphere of relations between states. We cannot come into agreement in the ideological sphere. You prefer the capitalistic system while we have never concealed our negative attitude toward capitalism, and we are firmly convinced that only socialism can ensure true freedom and equality for all men and the most complete development of society, both materially and morally. The polemics between the adherents of the two ideologies is perfectly natural. But does that mean that between the Soviet Union and the United States of America there cannot exist normal or even good and friendly relations? Of course it does not. Otherwise, the prospects of preserving peace would be dark indeed. The experience of the Soviet Union, which maintains good relations with many states, based on mutual respect and trust, which states have a different social order from that of the Soviet Union, is sufficient proof that a difference in social systems is not an obstacle in such matters.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we not only consider an improvement in our relations with the U.S.A. possible and desirable, despite the difference in the social systems of our two countries, but on more than one occasion we have put forward concrete proposals to that end. We fully share your opinion on the desirability of taking steps to enable our peoples to become better acquainted.

We can only welcome your proposal that influential citizens of the Soviet Union visit the United States of America for the purpose of be-

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coming familiar with the life of the American people. For our part, we shall be glad if prominent Americans come to the Soviet Union to see how the Soviet people live. This can only be regarded as useful. It is well known, for example, that many Americans, including prominent public figures of the U.S.A., after a visit to the Soviet Union, have admitted publicly how erroneous was their previous opinion concerning the life of the Soviet people.

I shall recall in this connection that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. proposed to the Congress of the U.S.A. two years ago an exchange of their parliamentary delegations. It can hardly be denied that such an exchange would contribute to a mutual understanding of life in our two countries. Unfortunately, Mr. President, this proposal has not yet received any reply. The question arises as to how this can be reconciled with the desires expressed in your message regarding a development of mutual contacts. If the position of the American side in regard to this question has now changed, such a change can only be welcomed.

We also welcome your statement that the recently concluded Soviet-American agreement on exchanges in the fields of culture, technology, and education¹ should be fully utilized to improve the relations between our countries. As you know, we on our part are ready to go even further in this respect; it is precisely this desire that dictated our proposal to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

There is no doubt that the development of Soviet-American contacts and ties will facilitate a strengthening of mutual understanding between our two countries, in the interests of peace and international cooperation. On the other hand, it is obvious that any attempts deliberately to sow distrust and kindle animosity between the peoples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., as well as any endeavor to consign to oblivion the historical traditions of friendship between our peoples, may lead to consequences that would be dangerous, and not only for our two countries alone. It is precisely for that reason that we cannot fail to react when voices are heard in the United States preaching the idea of a "preventive war," an armed attack on the Soviet Union. You write that you know of no one in the United States that comes forth with such appeals. Unfortunately, there are such people, and such appeals are heard in the U.S.A.

For example, the idea of a "preventive war" against the U.S.S.R. has been discussed in the American press for several weeks, an idea

¹ "Agreement on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields," signed Jan. 27, 1958 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3975).

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which, as attested by such well-known American commentators as
Hanson Baldwin, Arthur Krock, and Drew Pearson, is contained in a
secret report presented to the National Security Council of the U.S.A.
by the so-called "Gaither Committee." Commenting on this report,
Baldwin, military commentator of the "New York Times," writes
that "since the launching of the Soviet sputniks one hears again in
Washington, though in muted tones, the old talk about a preventive
war, made easier to swallow by the new term of 'preventive retaliation',—that is to say, attacking the Soviet Union first."

How can all this be evaluated, Mr. President? We do not know
what precise recommendations are contained in the report of the
"Gaither Committee," but one thing is clear: this report provoked
a public discussion in the U.S.A. of the idea of a "preventive war."
Such persons as Lawrence, editor of the widely circulated magazine
"United States News and World Report," and Puleston, former Director
of American Naval Intelligence of the U.S.A., and others came
forth with open propaganda for aggression against the Soviet Union.

Of course, we do not confuse the statements of such persons with
the official policy of the U.S.A. But the security of the Soviet Union
does not allow us to ignore completely statements of this kind, especially
since the Government of the U.S.A. did not condemn the statements
in question. In our opinion there is danger and harm in the
very fact that such ideas are suggested to the American people on the
printed page, read by millions of Americans. It is hardly necessary
to emphasize the fact that propaganda of this kind runs counter to
any improvement in the relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

Lastly, I cannot fail to reject the unfounded assertions contained
in your message of February 15 to the effect that responsibility for the
fact that nuclear energy is being used at present primarily for military
rather than for peaceful purposes rests with the Soviet Union. In
reality it was not the Soviet Union that was the first to begin the production
of atomic weapons and it was not the Soviet Union that used
this weapon of mass destruction. From the very beginning the Soviet
Union has demanded that the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons
be prohibited and that existing stocks be destroyed. As early as June
19, 1946 the Soviet Government presented to the U.N. for consideration
a draft international convention which provided for these measures.¹ We have insisted on this for 12 years. However, the Government of the United States refuses even to this very day to agree to
the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

¹ For text, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-1945* (Committee print, 84th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 225-226.

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I solemnly declare, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union is prepared to sign even tomorrow an agreement on the total prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons, on the cessation of their manufacture, their elimination from armaments, and the destruction of all available stocks of such weapons under appropriate international control.

The peoples expect of their leaders, who are responsible for the
destiny of their countries, concrete action to avert the threat of atomic
war and to strengthen peace. Millions of people ardently hope that
our two countries will make a definite contribution to the establishment
of a healthier international situation, and that they will decisively
turn from the "cold war" and the armaments race toward peaceful
cooperation on the part of all states. We consider that a conference of
top government officials, with participation of heads of government,
can and must be an important step in that very direction. Now, when
there is agreement in principle between states on such a meeting, it is
especially necessary to concentrate our joint efforts on the practical
preparations for it, with a view to making such a meeting possible in
the very near future.

We hope, Mr. President, that the considerations of the Soviet Gov-
ernment concerning the preparation and the holding of a summit
meeting will meet with a favorable attitude on the part of the Govern-
ment of the U.S.A.

Respectfully,

N. BULGANIN

Aide Memoire Presented by the United States
to the Soviet Union, March 6, 1958 ¹

I.

The U.S. Government acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum
handed by the Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Gromyko to the U.S.
Ambassador to Moscow on February 28, 1958. The U.S. Government
has attentively studied this memorandum.

II.

The Government of the United States takes satisfaction from the
fact that the Soviet Union is now prepared "to utilize all means and
paths," including a meeting of Foreign Ministers, to bring about agree-
ment on a meeting at the highest level of government. On the other
hand, the U.S. Government regrets to find that the character of the

¹Text from Department of State press release 113, Mar. 6, 1958. The Soviet reply is dated Mar. 24, 1958 (post).

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preparation envisaged by the Soviet Government falls short of what
would be required, in the opinion of the Government of the United
States, to assure that such a meeting would actually serve to reduce
international tensions.

### III.

The Soviet Government memorandum, and the preceding letters of
December ¹ and January ² from Chairman Bulganin to President
Eisenhower, raise a basic question in relation to a "summit" meeting:

What is the purpose for which a "summit" meeting would be held?
Is it the purpose merely to stage a spectacle? Or is it the purpose to
take meaningful decisions?

The United States wants a meeting of Heads of Government to take
meaningful decisions which would begin seriously to resolve at least
some important political issues; inaugurate some significant steps to
limit armament, and, by such decisions, to create an atmosphere
conducive to further settlements. Anything less would not respond
to the hopes, and indeed to the legitimate demands, of mankind.

### IV.

If a meeting of Heads of Government is to take meaningful decisions, then the groundwork for these decisions would have to be prepared in advance.

The letter of Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower of
February 1, 1958, which is alluded to in the Soviets' memorandum of
February 28, states with reference to the agenda that it should concentrate on "the most urgent problems, with regard to which the known positions of states provide a certain degree of assurance as to their positive solution at this time."

The Government of the United States does not believe that the agenda should necessarily be limited to matters the solution of which now seems assured. Broader discussion may be desirable. But the Government of the United States agrees with the Government of the Soviet Union that the agenda surely should include some significant and urgent topics, as to which agreement seems probable.

What are these matters? The presently declared positions of the
Soviet Union and the United States do not as yet indicate the probability of agreement as to any matters of significance that have been proposed by either of our Governments in the course of the extensive

¹ *Ante*.

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correspondence between Chairman Bulganin and President
Eisenhower.

How shall areas of possible agreement be found, developed, and
defined?

The Soviet memorandum says that preparatory work of the For-
eign Ministers should be "strictly limited to questions relating to the
organizational side of preparation for a meeting at the summit."

The U.S. Government does not press for placing upon a meeting
of Foreign Ministers all of the preparatory work, provided there is
some other acceptable procedure. But the United States is convinced
that if there is to be a meeting of Heads of Government, substantive
preparatory work must take place in some way to ascertain whether
such a meeting would meet the criteria which both Governments
accept. The United States suggests, as an alternative or supplemen-
tary means, the use of diplomatic channels.

V.

With respect to Soviet statements as to a desirable composition of
the agenda, the position of the United States Government concerning
certain specific items is as follows:

(1) The United States believes that any new meeting of Heads of
Government should not ignore the preceding meeting but should
preferably begin where that meeting left off. Meetings of Heads of
Government will quickly lose the special significance and authority
which is now ascribed to them if a second meeting consigns to oblivion
the understandings and agreements of the first meeting.

(2) The Geneva "summit" meeting of 1955 dealt with three main
topics: (1) European Security and Germany; (2) Disarmament and
(3) Development of contacts between East and West.

As regards the third item, persistent efforts over the past 2½ years
have led to an agreement reached through diplomatic negotiations
at Washington. This agreement was concluded on January 27, 1958.¹
While that agreement is by no means all that we would desire, it does
mark what we hope will be concrete progress on the third item of the
1955 agenda.

With respect to the other two matters—European security and Ger-
many and disarmament—no progress has been made.

(3) At the Geneva Conference of 1955 it was agreed that there was
a "close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems
of European security." The Heads of the four Governments recog-

¹"Agreement on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and Educational Fields," signed Jan. 27, 1958 (Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3975).

183

nized "their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany." Furthermore, the four Heads of Government

"agreed that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

Yet the Soviet memorandum of February 28 is emphatic that the reunification of Germany "cannot be the subject of consideration at a forthcoming conference at the summit."

(4) At the Geneva meeting of Heads of Government, it was agreed that we would "work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission."

Yet the Soviet Union now declines to work through the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, or, indeed, the Disarmament Commission itself.

(5) With respect to the agenda in general, the Soviet Government seems to claim a veto power without according reciprocity in that respect. The Government of the United States suggests that there must be reasonable "give-and-take" in the selection of items for discussion. In any event the United States would not find it possible to enter a conference in which special privilege and authority were accorded in advance to any other state.

## VI.

The Soviet memorandum indicates that the "summit" meeting should mark a "sharp break" in the direction of improving the whole international situation, of "creation of conditions for the peaceful collaboration of all states." This greatly-to-be-desired result cannot, however, in the opinion of the United States, be achieved if there are excluded from consideration the principal causes of international tension.

A basic cause, perhaps the basic cause, of tension is the support by the Soviet State of the worldwide ambitions of international Communism. Other major causes of tension, which are perhaps manifestations of the above mentioned basic cause, are the enforced partition of Germany and external interference in countries of Eastern Europe which result in a denial to the peoples of their right freely to choose their own governments. The United States does not, as the Soviet Government suggests, seek interference in the internal affairs of other nations but rather the elimination of such interference.

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The United States also believes that there must be effective measures of disarmament including steps to curb the production of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Chairman Bulganin, in his communication to the President of December 10, deplored the "competition in the production of ever newer types of weapons." The Soviet memorandum does not suggest dealing with this problem. It seems to assume that the production of ever newer types of weapons will go on unchecked and uncontrolled.

## VII.

It is not necessary, as we see it, that all of the problems that confront and divide us should be resolved at one time. But we do believe that, if there is to be a meeting of Heads of Government, it should deal, more effectively than did the last such meeting, with essential issues, without excluding subsequently dealing with the others. A meeting of Heads of Government that was merely ceremonial or social, or which merely repeated promises already given or hopes already expressed, would not, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, be warranted.

## VIII.

There are a number of other matters raised by the Soviet memorandum, such as the composition of the Foreign Ministers and Heads-of-Government conferences, as to which the United States reserves its position pending further clarification of the views of the Soviet Union on the points raised above. An agreed concept of the nature and purpose of a meeting of Heads of Government seems needed before these other matters can be usefully considered at this juncture.

## IX.

The United States reaffirms its desire that, on the assumption that there will be a meeting of Heads of Government, it will be held not as a spectacle, not to reaffirm generalities, but to take serious decisions which will lead to an international atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill.

## Statement by the Department of State, March 20, 1958¹

We have consistently indicated our readiness to participate in a summit conference which could take decisions on important problems

¹ Read to news correspondents on Mar. 20 by Lincoln White, Chiefs of the News Division. Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 7, 1958, pp. 551-552.

544645-60-15

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affecting the peace of the world. Our view has been that careful preparation is needed to assure a successful outcome for such a conference. There has been an exchange of messages with the Soviet Government which have dealt with the attitudes of the two countries toward the problems at issue. Our aide memoire of March 6 made full comment on the matters of substance raised in the Soviet aide memoire of February 28, which were more or less repeated in Prime Minister Bulganin's letter of March 3 to President Eisenhower. We are now, therefore, awaiting a reply to our aide memoire of March 6. Under these circumstances it is premature to deal with such matters as time, place, and composition of either a foreign ministers' meeting or a summit conference.

## Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the United States, March 24, 1958¹

The Soviet Government has attentively examined the considerations set forth by the U.S. Government in its aide memoire of March 6, 1958, which is a reply to the aide memoire of the Soviet Government of February 28 on the question of preparing a meeting at the highest level.

As is known, the Soviet Government, concerned as it is over international developments which have taken a turn dangerous to the cause of peace, proposed at the close of 1957 to call a meeting of leading statesmen to solve a number of urgent problems and to define through joint efforts effective ways to reduce international tension and to end the state of "cold war."²

The Soviet Government notes that the U.S. Government, referring in its aide memoire to the purpose of a summit meeting, also proclaims that it desires this meeting to take meaningful decisions which would initiate the settlement of at least some important political problems and lead to the establishment of international climate of cooperation and good will.

However, one must admit that while the Soviet Government, after proposing to call a meeting of leading statesmen, has taken several concrete steps to meet the wishes of the U.S. Government and of other Western powers, both with regard to the questions which should be examined at a summit meeting and with regard to the procedure of preparing this meeting, the U.S. Government, as evident from its aide

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 21, 1958, pp. 652-655.

² *Ante*, p. 113.

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memoire, is trying in fact to bring the entire question of a summit
meeting back to the initial position.

The Soviet Government has proposed that the summit meeting
should discuss such pressing international problems, agreement on
which seems feasible at this meeting and the settlement of which could
lay the foundations for better mutual understanding among states and
for the settlement of other international problems.

It is the deep conviction of the Soviet Government that the follow-
ing are the questions of great international significance which must
be given priority: immediate ending of tests of atomic and hydrogen
weapons; renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.S.R.,
the United States and Great Britain; establishment of a zone free from
nuclear and rocket weapons in Central Europe; signing of a non-
aggression agreement between states belonging to the North Atlantic
alliance and the Warsaw treaty member states; reduction of the
numerical strength of foreign troops stationed on the territory of
Germany and in other European states; drafting of an agreement on
questions involved in the prevention of surprise attack; measures for
extending international trade; ending of war propaganda; ways to
reduce tension in the area of the Near and Middle East.

Are there any grounds to claim that only the Soviet Union is inter-
ested in a positive solution of the above questions and that for the
peoples of other countries, including the United States, these questions
are of a lesser importance? The questions listed above have been
posed by life itself, by the entire trend of development of international
relations in the past few years. If we are to be guided by the interests
of consolidating peace, there can be no other opinion but that it would
be equally to the benefit of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great
Britain, France, and other countries if agreed measures were adopted
to lessen the danger of rocket-nuclear war, to end the armament race,
to abolish tension in international relations caused by the "cold war,"
and to diminish the danger of conflicts in those areas of the world
where, in view of the tension existing there, such conflicts are especially
liable to break out.

The Soviet Government gave full consideration to the wishes of the
U.S. Government and the governments of other Western powers re-
garding the questions they would like to propose for discussion at a
summit meeting.

Guided by the desire to pave the way for a meeting at the highest
level and taking note of the considerations of the Western powers,
the Soviet Government announced its consent to discuss at a summit
meeting the problem of forbidding the use of outer space for warlike
purposes and of scrapping foreign military bases on the territories of
other countries. Moreover, the Soviet Government declared that it

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was prepared to discuss the problem of concluding a German peace treaty and of the development of ties and contacts among countries.

Thus, the problems which the Soviet Government proposes for discussion at the summit meeting also take into account those proposals of the U.S. Government on which useful negotiations could be conducted for the purpose of reducing the tension in the international climate. Therefore, one cannot agree with the contention made in the aide memoire of the U.S. Government that the Soviet Government claims a veto power in determining the range of problems to be examined at the summit meeting or special privilege and powers at the conference itself. Such an arbitrary interpretation of the Soviet Union's position with regard to the preparation of the international meeting has nothing to do with the actual state of affairs.

In its aide memoire the U.S. Government declares that it is guided by serious intentions in considering questions pertaining to preparations for a summit meeting. It goes without saying that such an intention is only commendable.

It is surprising, however, that the U.S. Government admits the possibility of the summit meeting being turned into a kind of theatrical show, a spectacle. It should be noted that such pronouncements about a summit conference, on which the peoples pin so much hope, are strange, to say the least. Even if some Western circles do have an intention to smear the idea of a meeting at the highest level, it is to be hoped that this does not reflect the position of the U.S. Government.

As to the Soviet Government, it has stated more than once that it attaches exceptionally great importance to the salutary effect on the entire international climate and to the important contribution to the cause of peace which a meeting with the participation of the heads of government would have.

Further, what constructive approach to a summit meeting on the part of the U.S. Government can we talk about if it continues insisting on the discussion of the so-called problem of the situation in East European countries. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. Government does not realize that such a proposal cannot but be resolutely condemned by the Soviet Union and those countries, the situation in which it would like to make the subject of discussion at an international conference. The very fact that this question is being posed is insulting to these states and impermissible in international relations.

No one has given the United States or any other country the power to appear in the role of judges who decide whether a given country should or should not have its social and state system chosen by its people. He who today, guided by his hostility to socialism, poses the question of changing the social system in East European countries,

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pushes the world into the road of kindling enmity among peoples, the road of war. But then it is pertinent to ask: What do international negotiations and a summit meeting for reducing international tension have to do with that?

The Soviet Government has already more than once pointed out how dangerous to the cause of peace it would be to carry ideological differences into the sphere of international relations. This viewpoint finds ever wider international recognition and was reflected in particular in the unanimous decision of the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly on the problem of peaceful coexistence of states. Nevertheless, the aide memoire of the U.S. Government lays stress on differences of an ideological nature and at the same time alleges that "international communism" is the main cause of tension.

Were we to discuss the irreconcilable, fundamental differences existing between social systems, the differences between capitalism and socialism, where would this lead us and what would be the chances of rapprochement between states? Unquestionably, in that case, the gap between the states of East and West would become even deeper, and the winners would be those who are sowing enmity and discord in international relations.

As to the real cause of tension in present-day international relations, it is an open secret that this cause is the policy of "cold war" conducted by the Western powers, the forming of aggressive military alignments and the continually increasing armament race which daily leads to an ever greater build-up in the armament of states and which has already created an enormous machinery of extermination. Who would deny today that were this machinery brought into action, it would spell untold disasters for mankind.

Neither can the problem of unifying the G.D.R. and the Federal German Republic into a single state be the subject of a summit discussion, because this matter is entirely within the competence of the two German states themselves. If an aggravation of relations between states were the aim, the proposal to discuss the question of [at?] an international conference would be understandable. However, the Soviet Government believes that the participants of the conference should proceed from the interests of its success and refrain from suggesting questions which would jeopardize the convocation of such a conference.

The Soviet Government considers it of great importance that an agreement on practical questions of preparing for a summit conference be reached in the nearest future. In his message of January 12, 1958, President Eisenhower said that he was also prepared to meet Soviet leaders to discuss proposals which were introduced by the Soviet Government for summit discussion. As has been noted above, the Soviet Government has also expressed its readiness to discuss at a top-

189

level conference a number of questions advanced by the American Government.

Unfortunately, the American aide memoire does not reply to the Soviet Government's proposal of February 28 concerning the summit agenda. The American Government confines itself to the statement that any new conference of the heads of government should not ignore the previous conference, that a new summit conference should begin where the Geneva Conference of the heads of government left off.

But it becomes obvious that such an approach completely ignores the fact that considerable time has elapsed since the Geneva Conference and the international situation has changed substantially. That is why the Soviet Government has proposed that, in line with the current world situation, a new approach should be made to the solution of pressing international problems.

The Soviet Government takes into account that under the present circumstances a summit conference would find it difficult to reach agreement on all pressing international problems. We have proposed that the conference focus its attention first and foremost on the most urgent problems whose solution would initiate an improvement of the international situation as a whole. The examination of other problems could be postponed until a subsequent stage of talks between the states. Thus, taking into account the lessons of the past and desirous of preventing the thwarting of the important cause of relaxing international tensions, we proposed that a new approach be made to the solution of unsettled international problems and that the method of gradual solution of these problems be adopted as the most realistic and justified.

The Soviet Government believes that the settlement of the question[s] it has proposed for summit discussion would be in complete accord with the desires of the peoples and would be an important start in radically changing the international situation and terminating the cold war.

Inasmuch as the aide memoire of the U.S. Government fails to give an impartial account of the state of affairs in connection with the discussion of the disarmament problem in the United Nations, it must be recalled that it was the Western powers which, at the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly, rejected the proposal for such a commission of the U.N. Disarmament Commission as would allow due consideration for the views of U.N. member countries.

Instead of patiently searching for mutually acceptable decisions, the session, under manifest pressure, adopted a resolution envisaging a composition of the Disarmament Commission in which the absolute majority belongs to proponents of the military alignments of the Western powers.

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Thus, the Western powers made use of their majority for obviously unreasonable purposes and have actually vetoed disarmament talks and made the achievement of fruitful results impossible.

Is it possible in fact to make progress in the disarmament problem by imposing decisions which are advantageous to one of the sides, to one alignment of powers, and infringe on the lawful interests of the other side? It is clear that no state can allow the infringement of its national interests, regardless of the number of unacceptable decisions the participants of the Western military alignment could wish to impose on it by using their majority.

Today, with the existence of two social systems, there can be no other policy but a reasonable policy of searching for mutually acceptable decisions which neither place anyone at an advantage nor infringe on the security interests of the others. There is no need in this case to dwell in detail on the disarmament problem, because the Soviet Government has already set forth its position with sufficient clarity in its messages to the U.S. Government.

The aide memoire of the U.S. Government cannot but disappoint anyone who regards summit talks as a dependable means of relaxing international tensions and terminating the cold war which the peoples have come to hate. The Soviet Government, proceeding from the need for the earliest completion of preparations for a summit conference, would like to have the U.S. Government set forth its views on the questions which the Soviet Union has proposed for discussion at the forthcoming summit conference, as the Soviet Government has done with respect to the American proposals.

The Soviet Government believes it equally necessary that the question of the composition of the summit conference, its date and place be agreed upon in the nearest future.

Guided by its desire to speed up the preparations for a summit conference and proceeding from the fact that all means and ways to bring about the earliest agreement should be used for this purpose, the Soviet Government has consented to a foreign ministers conference to prepare a top-level meeting of the heads of government and has suggested that the ministers conference be held in April 1958.

At the same time, it has proceeded from the fact that the range of issues subject to discussion by the ministers should be limited to problems relating to the organizational side of preparations for a summit meeting—agenda, composition of the summit meeting, time, and place.

A discussion of the substance of the questions advanced, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, should be left to the summit meeting with the participation of the heads of government. It can hardly be doubted that a meeting of the heads of government invested with the broadest powers and much less hindered by the instructions usual

191

in such cases, has better chances of success, particularly when its aim is to change the general trend in international relations and to turn them toward liquidation of existing tensions.

On the other hand, if the foreign ministers conference is entrusted with examination of the substance of the issues there is every reason to fear that this, far from facilitating, may on the contrary retard the convocation of a summit meeting and complicate the achievement of an agreement on the questions discussed. It is contrary to logic to recognize the need and usefulness of a summit conference and at the same time do everything to retard such a conference further and further or to make its very convocation doubtful on the pretext that at the preliminary stage the conference of foreign ministers came up against contradictions which can hardly be overcome.

The Soviet Government hopes that the U.S. Government will study with due attention the considerations set forth above concerning the need to start without further procrastination a concrete discussion of questions of preparing and convening both a ministers conference and a summit conference.

News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Dulles,
March 25, 1958¹

[Extracts]

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you read the exchange of notes on the subject of a summit conference over the last week or so, it's difficult to find anything particularly new in this whole situation. How do you estimate where we now stand on the problem of a summit conference?

A. It has not yet been possible for me to study thoroughly and in detail the Soviet note, which I only received last night. But it does seem as though the Soviets were seeking to exact a terribly high political price as a condition to having a summit meeting. Now, as you know, President Eisenhower has made perfectly clear that he wants to have a summit meeting if there is any reasonable chance of reaching substantial agreements which will ease the international situation and make peace more likely. But it's more and more apparent, and has been revealed, I think, by this exchange of correspondence, that the Soviets are demanding a very high political price as a condition to having such a meeting, and the question is whether there

¹ For complete news conference text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 14, 1958, pp. 602-607.

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is enough hope out of such a meeting to justify paying the political price which the Soviets seem to be exacting.

I have jotted down here, quite hurriedly, some of the price tags that they seem to be putting on it, and I would like to read those to you, if I may, to illustrate my points:

1. The equating of certain Eastern European governments, such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with such Western governments as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy;

2. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the East German puppet regime and acquiescence in the continued division of Germany;

3. Ending the agreed joint responsibility of the four former occupying powers of Germany for the reunification of Germany, a responsibility that was reaffirmed at Geneva in 1955;

4. Acceptance of the Soviet claim for numerical "parity" in bodies dealing with matters, such as disarmament, within the competence of the United Nations General Assembly—a "parity" which, if conceded, would give the Soviets a veto power in many functions of the General Assembly, enabling them to evade the will of the great majority and thus further to weaken the United Nations by, in important respects, importing into the General Assembly the same weaknesses that have crippled the Security Council;

5. The acceptance of an agenda so formulated that virtually every item—9 out of 11—implies acceptance of a basic Soviet thesis that the Western powers reject.

Now in making clear this price tag, I do not want to imply that I think that there will not be a summit conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if our view will continue to be that lower-level discussions which make progress in easing some of the existing disputes are indispensable in order to determine whether a summit conference will be worth while?

A. We believe that preparatory talks through ambassadors and/or foreign ministers are an indispensable prerequisite to a summit meeting. I do not see how otherwise it is possible to meet the test which the Soviets themselves laid down, namely, that any new summit meeting should deal with matters which seemed to be susceptible of solution. In our aide memoire we asked the Soviet Government to indicate the matters which they thought were susceptible of solution in the light of the known position of the United States and other allied powers. There was no particular response to that. They say—I think there is a statement there—that they regret that the United States has not made clear its position on some of these matters. One

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would think that they had not read the letters which President Eisenhower wrote to President Bulganin, which do make clear our position on these matters.

Tripartite Declaration Presented to the
Soviet Union, March 31, 1958¹

The present international situation requires that a serious attempt be made to reach agreement on the main problems affecting attainment of peace and stability in the world. In the circumstances a summit meeting is desirable if it would provide opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects.

It is clear that, before a summit meeting can meet in these conditions, preparatory work is required.

This preparatory work could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels leading to a meeting between foreign ministers.

The main purpose of this preparatory work should be to examine the position of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by heads of government. It would not be the purpose of these preparatory talks to reach decisions but to bring out, by general discussion, the possibilities of agreement.

The foreign ministers, assuming they have concluded the preparatory work to their satisfaction, would reach agreement on the date and place of the summit meeting and decide on its composition.

If this procedure is acceptable to the Soviet Government, it is suggested that diplomatic exchanges should start in Moscow in the second half of April.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648. The Declaration received the unanimous approval of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance, and was presented by the British, French, and American Ambassadors at Moscow.

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Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France,
April 11, 1958¹

The Government of the Soviet Union has examined with all attention the joint statement of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France of Mar. 31, made in connection with the Soviet Government's proposal regarding the speeding up of preparations for a summit conference, contained in the Soviet Government's aide memoire of Mar. 24, 1958.

The Soviet Government notes that although the governments of the three powers also state that the present day international situation demands the making of serious efforts with a view to reaching agreement on the fundamental international problems and the consolidation of general peace, and that it renders desirable the convocation of a high level conference, they, in essence, avoid replying to the Soviet Union's concrete proposals about the convocation of such a conference made as far back as December 1957.

As was pointed out in the Soviet Government's aide memoires of Feb. 28 and Mar. 24, 1958, the main task at present is the speediest completion of preparatory work for a summit conference. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to organize a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in April in order to carry out this work.

It is with regret that one is forced to admit that the governments of the three powers are causing delays over the talks to prepare a high level conference.

With a view to the speediest completion of preparatory work regarding the convocation of the summit conference the Soviet Government deems it necessary at present to reach agreement on, first of all, the question of holding the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs not later than the end of April or the middle of May 1958. In this connection it is borne in mind that all preparatory work through diplomatic channels must be completed by that time. For this reason, the Soviet Government deems it expedient to restrict the exchange of views through diplomatic channels to a minimum of questions relating directly to the organization of a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, that is, questions of the date and place of the ministers meeting and the composition of its participants.

¹ Text from Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1958, p. 728.

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Striving for a most rapid completion of preparatory work for the summit conference, the Soviet Union, as is known, long ago submitted for consideration by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, its proposals on the question of a summit conference agenda, the composition of its participants, and the place and date of holding it. The Soviet Government expects that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France will give in the near future a definite reply to these concrete proposals.

As regards the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, these ministers—in the opinion of the Soviet Government—must reach agreement on the question of date, venue, and composition of a high level conference, and determining the range of questions which will be considered at the conference.

In this connection it is not excluded that while attending to preparations for the high level conference, the ministers may if necessary and if generally agreed, exchange opinions on certain of the problems proposed by the parties for inclusion in the agenda of the summit conference, for the purpose of determining whether it is expedient to include a given question in the summit conference agenda.

It is self-evident that the question of the convocation of a high level conference cannot be linked with the results of the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs. The Soviet Government bases itself on the argument that all parties to the meeting will strive to achieve positive results. The Soviet Government, on its part, will do everything possible for this aim to be achieved. However, if the ministers are unable to reach the necessary agreement on questions of preparations for a summit conference, this would not signify in any way that the necessity of having such a conference has become less pressing.

The present tense international situation demands the speedy settlement of ripe international problems; in these conditions it would be incorrect to make the convocation of a high level conference depend on the results of a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs. It is perfectly obvious that difficulties which may appear during the ministers' conference can and must be overcome at a conference of statesmen invested with wider powers.

Guided by the aforesaid, the Soviet Government expresses readiness to begin in Moscow on Apr. 17 the exchange of views about preparations for a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs.

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News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Dulles,
April 15, 1958¹

[Extracts]

PROSPECTS FOR MEETING WITH U.S.S.R.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports from the Paris NATO meeting seem to indicate that the Western countries have agreed to meet the Russians on the diplomatic level provided the Russians will not have any prior conditions and in fact that we are not asking prior conditions with that level. Is that correct?

A. Well, it is partially correct but only partially correct. You say we are willing to meet the Russians at the diplomatic level. You may recall it is we who have been urging the Russians to meet at the diplomatic level. I recall that at my meeting before the Press Club last January 2 I urged that this preparatory work should be gotten away from the business of public exchanges between heads of government—gotten down to a lower level—and I said preferably the diplomatic level. It was our proposal, made some 2 weeks ago to the Soviet Union,³ that we should carry on these talks at the diplomatic level.

The Soviet Union indicated they were prepared to accept that, but they attached conditions which are unacceptable to the Western powers. Now I think it is likely—I hope it is likely—that talks will now be conducted at the diplomatic level, and I suppose the first thing they may talk about is what they are going to talk about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that mean the issue of whether or not you will talk about substantive matters is not now resolved and that you will go to this meeting to see if you can resolve them?

A. The latest Soviet memorandum,⁴ while agreeing to our proposal to talk at the diplomatic level, indicated they were not willing to talk at the diplomatic level, or indeed at any other meeting short of the summit meeting itself, about matters of substance. So that issue is not resolved.

Q. What is our position as of today on that point as to the talks at the diplomatic level?

¹ For complete news conference text, see Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1958, pp. 719-726.

² Jan. 16; extracts *ante*.

³ Mar. 31; text *ante*.

⁴ Dated Apr. 11; text *ante*.

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A. Our position is precisely what was set out in the three-power declaration handed in in Moscow 2 weeks ago.

*Q. In other words, we are still saying that at this diplomatic level there must be talks as to substance or we will not meet at this level?*

A. Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way. We are proposing to conduct the preparatory talks now at the diplomatic level. The Soviets agree they will talk at the diplomatic level, and we are not yet in agreement as to what we will talk about.

*Q. Is it clear, Mr. Secretary, the diplomatic talks at the diplomatic level, when, as, and if they occur, will be four-power talks?*

A. That is what we proposed, and, as far as that aspect of the matter is concerned, it is apparently what the Soviets accept.

### QUESTION OF AGENDA

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in practical terms what has been your experience about the ability to stick to any agenda set in the first place with the Russians? Is this a realistic procedure to believe that it can be kept to an agenda?*

A. Well, I don't think that we would ourselves want to have an agenda so rigid that we were precluded from talking about some of the matters which we believe are of vital importance for the peace of the world. Even though these were not accepted as a topic for agreed discussion in the sense there was preliminary agreement that they could be fruitfully discussed with a good prospect of agreement, we might still want to be able to talk about them.

You will recall at the last summit meeting there were opening statements of a general character which were made. In his opening statement President Eisenhower, among other things, spoke of the problem created by the situation in Eastern Europe and the inability of those nations there to have governments of their own choosing.¹ Now, Mr. Bulganin came back and said they were not willing to discuss it. But the President had made his point in his opening address. I would suppose that, following that pattern, if there were a summit meeting there would be an opportunity for the Heads of Governments there to open up, at least, by saying the things that were on their minds. But then the question is, are you going to get on to anything at all where there is a prospect of agreement?

¹Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 171; see also *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046, Oct. 1955), pp. 18-22.

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You will recall that Mr. Bulganin, when head of the Soviet state, said that the conference should concentrate on matters as to which the known positions of the states indicated a likelihood of agreement. There isn't yet a sufficient exploration to indicate what, if any, matters might lend themselves to agreement, given the "known position" of the states. I think there needs to be a further exploration of that matter before agreeing on those items of the agenda where we would presumably try to reach at least a framework of an agreement.

I doubt whether it is possible at a summit meeting to reach a detailed agreement about many of these matters. They are tremendously complicated, particularly the subjects of armaments and the like. But the outline of agreement—the basic positions—could perhaps be agreed to in some areas. I think that is a possibility which we need to explore because, as President Eisenhower said, if all that is going to happen at the summit meeting is that they sit around the table and glare at each other, that would not be a profitable operation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't what you are describing the same kind of summit meeting we had the last time with the icebreaking meeting at the summit followed by, I presume, the foreign ministers' meeting to fill in this outline you describe?*

A. Well, that would involve a considerable change in what now seems to be the agreed concept of such a meeting. The last summit meeting started out with an invitation from the three Western powers to meet, and they said it would not be expected that at that meeting any agreements would be reached but that they might agree upon topics as to which they would instruct their foreign ministers to try to reach an agreement.

Now, the Soviet proposal for a summit meeting is that the meeting should concentrate on matters as to which the known positions of the states indicate a likelihood of agreement at the summit meeting. In other words, whereas the first summit meeting did not purport to be a meeting to reach any agreement at all, but only to agree on areas which might be usefully explored, now the matter has been reversed making necessary some preparatory work. And, indeed, you have been having a measure of preparatory work in the exchanges of diplomatic notes that have been taking place and the exchange of letters between the Heads of Governments. But in further preparatory work we should try to discover whether or not there are important matters as to which the known positions of the states indicate a likelihood of agreement at the summit meeting.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you were asked, if the Soviets refused to enter into substantive discussions at a lower level, would the United*

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*States decline to go into a summit meeting, and you said you couldn't answer categorically. Now, sir, do you think it is possible to have lower-level meetings which do not go into substance and yet make an adequate preparation for a summit meeting?*

A. Well, I think that it is possible to have exploratory talks which would throw light at least upon whether or not it is likely that an agreement could be reached on some aspects of the so-called question. That could be done without necessarily getting into the details of such an agreement. A good deal in these matters depends upon the attitude, the approach, the temper of the Soviet Union. Clues can be obtained as to its probable attitude without necessarily probing into all aspects and having the i's dotted and the t's crossed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be necessary to obtain a reply from Russia to the note which will go forward later this week before the Western diplomats sit down to any talks in Moscow?*

A. Not as far as we are concerned. We have been ready, are ready, and will remain ready to talk at the diplomatic level. That is what we have been trying to do. You might say we have been trying as far as this preparatory work is concerned to get down from the summit and get down to rock bottom where perhaps we can do something more effective. This preparatory work for the summit meeting started in exchanges of letters between the Heads of Government. Then it was carried on by the exchanges of notes between the foreign ministries. Now it may be getting down to the diplomatic level, which is what I have always argued for. And as we get down from the summit, as far as the preparatory work is concerned, I think that there is more chance of doing some useful preparatory work. So we stand ready at all times to talk about this business at the diplomatic level.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are not the Russians likely to point to the bogging down of this preparatory work and say that this proves the futility of talking on a lower level and that these matters can therefore be solved only at the summit?*

A. Well, we haven't started talking on this level yet; so it is a little premature to say that it is futile.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on what topic is Ambassador Thompson and his two colleagues in Moscow—on what topics are they prepared to discuss in a preparatory nature? Are you thinking of disarmament, Germany, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or what?*

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A. The President in his January letter to Chairman Bulganin ¹ indicated a number of topics which the President put forward as possible topics for discussion. That letter had been submitted to and approved by NATO before it was sent. So that that probably constitutes at least a preliminary indication of the position we would take so far as the preparation of an agenda is concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you do not believe that we are going to be pushed into a summit conference against your will, could you not be more specific in explaining what our minimum terms are? This phrase "proper preparation" covers an awful lot of things.

A. I understand that. But I also ask you to understand that in this matter we are not just operating on our own. If we were operating on our own, we would be able to make our position quite clear, I think. But I believe and think that almost everybody believes that it is worth while to maintain our alliances, particularly, in this matter, our NATO alliance. You cannot have an alliance as between free nations if one nation is just attempting to go on its own and dictate to the others. Therefore, in this matter, which is of deep concern to the governments of our allies in Europe, we take some account of their views. We do not attempt just to impose our views upon them. And if I were to attempt here unilaterally, just for the United States, to lay down a firm line which we were going to take without regard to what their views were, I think I would not be faithful to the alliance and to the principles which we agreed upon last December.

Last December we had this summit meeting in NATO² and we agreed there among ourselves we would seek to avoid making statements or taking public positions which were of concern to others without prior consultation. We are trying faithfully to live up to that, and I think we have lived up to it faithfully. But, if I were here to make the statement that you call for, that would be a repudiation of what we agreed to last December.

## SOVIET MISUSE OF DIPLOMATIC MACHINERY

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal of talk, and especially in the newspapers, that we are not anywhere near keeping up with the power and influence of Russian propaganda. The inference of so-called nuclear testing, with people trembling on the edge—do you think that would presumably indicate that we should seek to improve our own propaganda?

¹ Ante, pp. 129-138.

² See ante, pp. 113-117.

544645—60—16

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A. I think that we are becoming more effective in this respect. I think it's important to bear in mind that up until recent days the United States has never thought, nor indeed have any of the so-called civilized nations of the world thought, that diplomatic communications were designed, or should be designed, primarily for propaganda purposes. We have always considered that these exchanges, and indeed most conspicuously exchanges between heads of government, were designed, generally on a highly confidential basis, sincerely to achieve some practical result. So you have a long tradition, not only of this country but of all of the countries which have shared in the development of diplomacy and international law, of carrying on diplomatic discussions not for purposes of propaganda but for the purposes of really achieving agreements.

For the first time that I know of in all history that process has been debauched and prostituted into purely an organ of propaganda. There seems to be no desire whatever to use this machinery really to get an agreement but merely to use it for propaganda purposes. Now it takes a little while to adjust our processes to meet that. Whether we should meet it fully or not, I am not entirely convinced. For I do believe that there should be honesty and integrity in terms of these diplomatic notes and exchanges if the nations of the world are ever going to get along together. I think that what has been going on here is most dangerous from the standpoint of peace. It's done, I know, in the name of peace. But when, for the sake of a temporary propaganda advantage, a nation uses the only way which nations have of really exchanging views and getting together—uses that not for the purpose of really getting together but only for propaganda purposes, you're destroying one of the frail reeds upon which the peace of the world often rests.

How far should we pursue that course? I'm not entirely clear. I am clear on the fact that in some way and in some manner we should find a more effective way to meet this propaganda. And I believe that we are going to be able to do it. And I believe that in the long run the nations of the world, including the neutrals, will listen more, and pay more heed, to what we do and a little less attention to just what is said.

I was talking here yesterday in this room to this meeting of an international group of editors [International Press Institute], and I recalled the fact that Hitler in the thirties used to make the most impassioned speeches about "peace." And he persuaded many people in the world of his dedication to peace. Now there are a good many people, particularly in the newly developing countries, the newly independent countries, who are just for the first time getting into the stream of international affairs, who haven't had the opportunity to

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become mature in these matters, and Soviet propaganda initially is
having a kind of a field day in those areas.

I don't think that this is anything permanent. I think we can deal
with it. But I don't know whether we should deal with it by match-
ing them in terms of debauching, debasing, the means whereby nations
which have differences of a critical nature may perhaps resolve those
differences. If we destroy that process, we will have destroyed some-
thing which is very vital to the world. And I say that nations which
profess to want peace, and which in the process of making these pro-
fessions destroy the mechanics by which peace is historically preserved,
may have to pay a heavy price for what they are doing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your earlier statement on propaganda and peacemaking, you use the words "debauched and prostituted" with respect to the meaning of peaceful processes. And at a later point you referred to Soviet propaganda. Are you saying in this statement that it is the Soviet propaganda techniques which have debauched and prostituted the peacemaking processes?

A. I meant to say that, when you use what historically had been
the established means whereby people communicate with each other
for vital purposes of trying to reach agreement and maintaining a
condition of peace, when you turn those processes into instruments of
propaganda, I think you're doing a great harm to the real machinery
whereby the world has historically endeavored, inadequately, to keep
the peace. Time after time those processes have served a very impor-
tant, indeed a vital, purpose. And I hate to see them converted just
into instruments of propaganda. Does that answer your question?

Q. Well, I'm trying to get at what agency is so converting them.

A. The Soviet Union is.

Tripartite Statement Presented to the
Soviet Union, April 16, 1958¹

The United States, British, and French Governments have studied
the aide memoire communicated to their ambassadors in Moscow

¹Text from Department of State press release 195, Apr. 16, 1958. The statement was presented by the British, French, and American Ambassadors at Moscow.

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on April 11. They note that the Soviet Government has accepted their proposal that the preparatory work for a summit meeting could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels leading to a meeting between Foreign Ministers. They also note that the Soviet Government agrees that these exchanges should begin in Moscow as soon as possible. The Western Powers for their part will be ready to begin on April 17.

It is clear from the Soviet Government's aide memoire that there are still substantial differences of opinion between the Soviet Government and the Western Governments as to the precise character and scope of the preparatory work.

In the first place, our Foreign Ministers cannot absent themselves from their countries for a prolonged period. Thus, it is essential that the diplomatic talks in Moscow should be concerned not only with plans for a meeting of Foreign Ministers but with examining the positions of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them and with carrying on discussions designed to bring out the possibilities of agreement on them. Even if such diplomatic talks do not result in complete agreement they would greatly facilitate the task of the Foreign Ministers.

As regards a summit meeting the Western Governments hold the view that such a meeting will not be fruitful unless the ground has been thoroughly prepared in advance and it is clear from this preparatory work that there is broad agreement on the nature and order of the agenda, and a real desire among all who participate in the meeting to make practical progress toward a settlement of the differences between us. There must be reasonable prospect of achieving concrete results on specific issues. Satisfactory completion of the preparatory work must therefore precede arrangements for such a meeting.

This approach is in consonance with the statement made by the Head of the Soviet Government on February 1, 1958 that a summit meeting should be "concentrated on most urgent problems, with regard to which the known positions of the states provide a certain degree of assurance as to their positive solution at this time." Up to the present, the exchange of views on this matter has been conducted solely through published correspondence and has not yet established any degree of assurance that agreement on urgent problems could be reached. Thus, there is plainly need for preparatory work beyond mere matters of organization.

It is the view of the Western Governments that the differences of opinion mentioned above should be the first subject of discussion between the Soviet Government and the Western Ambassadors in Moscow.

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cow. Such discussion may be more likely to lead to agreement than a further exchange of public communications. That is our hope.

The Western Ambassadors will, for this purpose, make themselves available to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 17.

Tripartite Statement Presented to the
Soviet Union, April 24, 1958¹

In their joint communication of March 31 the United States, French and United Kingdom Governments proposed to the Soviet Government, in connection with arrangements for a summit meeting, that the preparatory work could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels, leading to a meeting between Foreign Ministers.

The Soviet Government's reply, dated April 11, refers to the joint communication of the three powers and expresses readiness to begin an exchange of views in Moscow on the preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting. There is nothing in this reply which suggests that the Soviet Government had any other plan in view than dealing with the three powers jointly in making the necessary arrangements for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The three Governments were therefore surprised when, in his interviews with their respective Ambassadors, the Soviet Foreign Minister made it clear that he was not prepared to hold joint discussions with the three Ambassadors.

As the three powers have already stated, their view is that the main purpose of the preparatory work should be to examine the position of the various Governments on the major questions at issue between them and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by Heads of Government. It would not be the purpose of these preparatory talks to reach decisions, but to bring out by general discussion the possibilities of agreement.

The three powers consider that, as a matter of practical procedure, the necessary preparations can be advanced more rapidly by joint meetings rather than by a series of separate interviews. In this way unnecessary complications and delay would be avoided. They wish therefore to suggest to the Soviet Government that joint meetings between the three Ambassadors and the Soviet Foreign Minister should begin immediately in order to make the necessary preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, May 12, 1958, p. 759. The statement was presented by the British, French, and American Ambassadors at Moscow.

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The three Governments think that such joint meetings should first discuss the agenda for a summit meeting for the purposes described in the fourth paragraph of this message, and then, at the appropriate time, discuss the date and place of a Foreign Ministers' meeting and what countries should be invited to be represented at this meeting.

In conclusion, the three Governments wish to express their hope that the Soviet Government will feel able to give favorable consideration to the above proposal as offering a prospect of early progress by means of a simple and straight-forward procedure.

Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the
United States, April 26, 1958¹

Unofficial translation

The Soviet Government has studied the considerations of the Government of the United States set forth in its statements of Apr. 16 and 24 in connection with the Soviet Government's proposal for earliest completion of preparations for a summit meeting made in its aide-memoire of Apr. 11, 1958.

The aforementioned statements made it clear that the Government of the United States has agreed to the Soviet proposal to begin an exchange of opinion in Moscow on preparing a foreign ministers meeting. At the same time, a study of the statements leads to the conclusion that the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France are actually acting in such a way as to delay the convocation of a summit meeting indefinitely.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw attention to the fact that though more than four months have elapsed since the Soviet Union introduced its proposal to hold a summit conference, the Government of the United States, like the governments of Great Britain and France, has not yet replied to the questions pertaining to preparations for such a conference, namely, its date, place, and composition. The coordination of the range of questions to be discussed at the conference is in no better state.

The exchange of opinion which has so far taken place with the Western powers, including talks by the Soviet Foreign Minister with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France on Apr. 17 and 18, does not allow a determination of what questions, in their opinion, are ripe for discussion which could yield positive results.

¹ Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, May 26, 1958, pp. 852-853. The U.S. reply is dated May 5, 1958 (*post*).

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As is known, the Soviet Government, for its part, has not only introduced concrete proposals about a summit agenda as well as about other issues pertaining to the convocation of the conference, but has also met the desires of the Western powers half way by agreeing to carry out preparatory work for the conference through diplomatic channels and a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs.

At the moment the main task is the earliest completion of the preparatory work for a summit conference which should insure a decisive turn toward an improvement of the international climate as a whole. In this connection the Soviet Government reaffirms its considerations set forth in its aide-memoire of Apr. 11 on the question of speeding up the preparations for a summit meeting.

As for the exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels on the preparations for a foreign ministers meeting, it is intended that that exchange of opinion should concentrate on issues pertaining directly to the organization of that meeting, namely, the time and place of the foreign ministers meeting and its composition. It is not precluded that during the meeting at the ambassadorial level, and in the course of the foreign ministers conference, an exchange of opinion may be held, in case of necessity and by common agreement, on some of the issues which the sides propose to place on the summit agenda in order to explore the advisability of placing this or that question on the agenda of such a conference and the possibility of adopting mutually acceptable decisions on them.

As for the question touched upon in the statements of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France on Apr. 24 concerning joint talks between a Soviet representative and the three ambassadors, that statement makes it clear that the governments of the three powers are now proposing to hold joint meetings of the three ambassadors with the Soviet Foreign Minister to carry out the necessary preparations for a foreign ministers meeting.

That proposal, which, incidentally, the Western powers had not advanced in any of their previous documents, cannot be considered acceptable because such a conference would be tantamount to a four-power conference in which three states of the North Atlantic alliance and only one state of the Warsaw treaty organization would be taking part. This circumstance was already pointed out by the Foreign Minister in his talks with the three ambassadors. It was stressed that this might give rise to certain complications in the talks and therefore should be avoided.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that, as before, it regards a preliminary exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels by means of talks between the Soviet Foreign Minister

207

with [and] each of the ambassadors separately to be the most expedient and conforming to the standing practice of exchanging opinion through diplomatic channels in such cases.

If, however, the governments of the three powers should prefer to exchange opinions through diplomatic channels in some other form, in the form of a conference of ambassadors in Moscow with the Soviet Foreign Minister, in that case the parity principle should be adhered to as the basic principle in determining the composition of a summit conference with the participation of the heads of government, which would preclude any discrimination and would guarantee their equality.

Needless to say, at the summit conference, or in the course of its preparation, no questions may be solved by a vote, by an adoption of decisions by a formal majority vote.

But at the conference, at which an exchange of opinion will be held for the purpose of arriving at decisions acceptable to both sides, both sides should naturally be represented equally and only such an approach is objective and justified.

In this connection the Soviet Government proposes that a conference of ambassadors with the representative of the U.S.S.R., together with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France, should also be attended by the ambassadors of Poland and Czechoslovakia. This was announced by the Soviet Foreign Minister in his talks with the ambassadors of Great Britain and France on Apr. 18.

The conference of such composition would take due cognizance of the parity principle and guarantee the equality of the sides so necessary for a fruitful preparation of a summit meeting. The prestige of the sides would also be fully maintained.

The Soviet Government believes that the course of preparations it has proposed facilitates the convocation of a summit conference in the nearest future if, naturally, such a conference is sincerely desired.

The Soviet Government would like to hope that an exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels would help the earliest solution of that issue.

In conformity with the above, the Soviet Foreign Minister is prepared to meet the ambassadors as soon as they are ready.

208

Tripartite Statement Presented to the
Soviet Union, May 3, 1958¹

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have noted with regret that the Soviet Government, in its Aide Memoire of April 26, has rejected their proposal for joint meetings between the three Ambassadors and the Soviet Foreign Minister to begin the preparatory work for a Summit meeting and, in doing so, has raised an unnecessary obstacle in the task of carrying this work forward. As the Soviet Government points out in its Aide Memoire, no progress has been made toward agreement on the range of questions to be dealt with nor in determining what questions offer prospects for agreement.

The three powers have not changed their view that progress could be made more rapidly by joint meetings rather than by a series of separate interviews. Since they desire to move ahead with the work itself, however, and in view of the fact that the Soviet Government agrees that the Ambassadors will discuss substantive issues, they are prepared to meet the Soviet Government's preference for separate interviews. Their acceptance of this procedure, however, does not prejudice in any way the composition of any future meetings. Following the discussion of the agenda for a Summit meeting as proposed in the tripartite statement of April 24, the three Ambassadors will be prepared to discuss the matter of a date and place of a Foreign Ministers' meeting and what countries should be invited to be represented at this meeting.

The three Ambassadors, therefore, stand ready to meet the Soviet Foreign Minister for this purpose.

Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the
United States, May 5, 1958²

Unofficial translation

The Soviet Government, having studied the reply of the Government of the United States and also the replies of the Governments of Great Britain and France to the Aide Memoire of the Government of

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, May 26, 1958, p. 852. The statement was presented by the British, French, and American Ambassadors at Moscow.

²Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, July 7, 1958, p. 22. The note was presented to the American Ambassador at Moscow.

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the USSR dated April 26, notes that the governments of the three powers have agreed with the Soviet Government's proposal that preliminary exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels on necessary preparation for a foreign ministers meeting should be effected in accordance with the practice generally accepted in such cases, through conversations between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and each of the ambassadors. The Soviet Government, like the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, considers that the acceptance of such procedure in no way predetermines the composition of the future foreign ministers meeting and summit conference.

At the same time, the Soviet Government expresses regret that the governments of the three powers did not agree to the invitation, at the present stage of preparation for the summit conference, of representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose participation would undoubtedly help to produce positive results.

The Soviet Government does not share the opinion of the U.S. Government that the procedure for the exchange of opinions through diplomatic channels proposed by the Soviet Union was allegedly likely to hamper preparatory work for the summit conference. In its aide-memoire of April 26 the Soviet Government touched upon the causes of the delay in preparing for the summit conference and at the present time would merely like to point out that this delay hitherto occurred through no fault of the Soviet side and contrary to its desire.

Now that the question of the procedure for the exchange of opinions through diplomatic channels has at last been agreed upon, the Soviet Government expects all the sides to exert necessary efforts for the earliest accomplishment of this work. As for the nature of the exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels on the question of preparing for the foreign ministers meeting, the Soviet Government proceeds from the necessity of concluding as soon as possible the preparatory work for this meeting and sees no reasons for relegating to the background the discussion of questions connected with the organization of the ministers meeting.

It is envisaged that during the exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels the parties will also agree on the most expedient procedure for discussing the questions, including questions connected with the organization of a foreign ministers meeting. As already pointed out, the Soviet Government does not exclude the possibility that an exchange of opinion on some of the questions which the sides propose for the agenda of the summit conference can take place, in case of necessity and by common consent, during the meeting with the ambassadors and during the foreign ministers conference with the object of ascertaining the advisability of placing this or that question

210

on the agenda of this conference and the possibility of adopting mutually acceptable decisions on them.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will on its part exert efforts to reach agreement on a foreign ministers meeting in the nearest future, which in turn should insure the earliest convocation of a summit conference with the participation of the heads of government.

Identical aides-memoire have also been handed to the ambassadors of the United Kingdom and France in Moscow for transmission to their governments.

Memorandum From the Soviet Union to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May 5, 1958¹

Official translation

PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS TO QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPATION OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

On January 8, 1958, the Soviet Government presented for consideration by other Governments its concrete proposals on problems of easing international tension. These proposals provide for a high-level conference of top government officials with the participation of the Heads of Government to discuss issues the settlement of which would promote the easing of international tension and the creation of trust in relations between states.

As before, the Soviet Government considers that a series of pressing international problems can be solved even at the present time. Its position is that it is necessary and possible to achieve agreement among states on outstanding issues in international relations. The Soviet Union, for its part, has listed a number of such issues and is prepared to participate in the consideration of other problems which might be proposed by the participants in the conference at the summit provided, of course, that these questions are within the competence of the international meeting and are directed toward strengthening peace.

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, July 7, 1958, pp. 17-22. The memorandum was presented to the American, British, and French Ambassadors at Moscow. The tripartite reply is dated May 28, 1958 (post).

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The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that if the Heads of Government firmly resolve to devote their efforts to seeking mutually acceptable solutions for pressing international problems, then it is possible to say with certainty that the forthcoming conference at the summit will ensure the necessary turning point in the development of relations between states in the direction of improving the entire international situation and the liquidation of the "cold war."

Taking into account the exchange of views which has occurred on the question of convening a conference at the summit and seeking to facilitate the completion of the preparatory work for this conference in as short a period as possible, the Soviet Government for its part submits for consideration at the conference the following questions and at the same time sets forth some views on these questions:

1. *Immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests*

Cessation of tests of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons is a pressing problem for which it is possible to find a practical solution. Universal cessation of tests of such weapons would have beneficial results in strengthening the cause of peace and putting an end to the armaments race. Agreement on this question would be a definite barrier to the creation of new and still more destructive types of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would be a practical step on the road to complete prohibition of such weapons of mass destruction.

The necessity for an immediate solution of this question is dictated also by the fact that continued tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons are, according to the testimony of the most prominent scientists, increasing the concentration of atomic radiation in the atmosphere, the soil, and the water, which are already creating a serious danger to the health and life of people now living and threatening the normal development of future generations. This danger will increase still more in the future if an end is not put to experimental explosions of nuclear weapons.

At the present time, nuclear weapons are being produced by only three states—the USSR, the USA, and the United Kingdom,—and the cessation of tests of such weapons now depends, since the Soviet Union has already unilaterally ceased its tests, upon only two powers—the USA and the United Kingdom. The Soviet Government expects that the USA and the United Kingdom will cease without delay their testing of nuclear weapons, so that it may be possible to agree at the conference, with the participation of the Heads of Government, on the consolidation of such decisions by the three powers by means of appropriate agreements.

Although modern technical devices for detecting nuclear explosions can record any explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons, no matter

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where they are carried out, and each power concerned can itself determine whether the other parties are complying with the agreement to cease the tests, the Soviet Government reiterates its consent to the establishment of international control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests by means of international control posts, as it already proposed in June 1957.¹ It considers that it will not be difficult to agree on concrete measures for such control as soon as the Governments of the USA and the United Kingdom also cease testing such weapons. Otherwise, any negotiations concerning questions of control, whether they be on the level of experts or any other level, will inevitably become fruitless discussions and will, naturally, have no real results.

To make the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons contingent upon the solution of other disarmament questions, concerning which there are still serious differences of opinion and the solution of which is a more complex matter, would be tantamount to an actual refusal to cease the atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Although the immediate cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all the powers possessing such weapons would place the Warsaw Pact member nations in an unfavorable position in comparison with the NATO nations, since the Soviet Union has carried out considerably fewer experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons than the USA and the United Kingdom, nevertheless the Soviet Union has consented to this in the desire to make a practical beginning for the cessation of the atomic arms race. The acceptance of this proposal by the United States of America and the United Kingdom would put an end to tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons everywhere and forever.

## 2. Renunciation of the use of all types of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons

The Soviet Government considers that the achievement of agreement on the joint renunciation by the states possessing nuclear weapons—the USSR, the USA, and the United Kingdom—of the use of all types of such weapons, including air bombs, rockets, of any range, with atomic and hydrogen warheads, atomic artillery, etc., would be an important step toward eliminating the danger of atomic war and reducing tension in relations between states. In case agreement is reached to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, any government that would dare to violate such an agreement would reveal itself to the eyes of the peoples as an aggressor, as an enemy of peace.

¹ Soviet proposal in the Disarmament Subcommittee, June 14, 1957; U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/60, July 29, 1957, in *Fourth Report of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission* (DC/112), annex 12.

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The great significance of such an agreement is confirmed by histori-cal experience. As is known, the Geneva Protocol of 1925¹ on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons played an important role in the matter of preventing the utilization of such types of weapons during the Second World War. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the decision to renounce the use of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons could be legalized by means of ex-tending the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to nuclear and rocket weapons.

The Soviet Government considers that an agreement of the powers now, at this stage, to renounce the use of nuclear and rocket weapons would create an auspicious basis for the achievement, at the next stage, of such measures as the complete and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production, with their elimination from the armaments of states, and the liquidation of all stock-piles of such weapons.

### 3. Creation in Central Europe of a zone free of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons

At the present time, two groups of states oppose each other in Central Europe and armed forces and armaments of various types, in quantities abnormal for peacetime, are concentrated there. This one circumstance alone creates a serious threat to peace and it is impossible to ignore the fact that in such a situation, by evil intent or by chance, the fires of a new war can break out with the use of the most modern means of destruction, that is, nuclear and rocket weapons.

In order to preclude the danger of such a turn of events the Soviet Government deems it expedient to examine at the conference the proposal of the Government of the Polish People's Republic concerning the creation in Europe of a zone free of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons, which would include the territories of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Assumption by these states of the obligation not to produce or to permit the stationing on their territories of nuclear weapons of all possible types, and also the establishment of sites for the launching of rockets capable of carrying nuclear warheads, would undoubtedly help to prevent the possibility of military conflicts breaking out in the center of Europe. In as much as the Governments of the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, and the German Democratic Republic have already

¹94 League of Nations Treaty Series, p. 65; also printed in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55* (Committee print, 84th Cong., 23d sess.), pp. 169-170.

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declared their agreement to be included in a zone free of atomic weapons, the creation of such a zone now depends only on the agreement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Agreement among the Governments of the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom, and France on the advisability of creating a zone free of atomic weapons in this area of Europe would undoubtedly facilitate reaching an agreement with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany's joining this zone.

Agreement on the creation of a zone free of atomic weapons in Europe will be effective if, along with the corresponding obligations of the states included in the said zone, the powers that include nuclear and rocket weapons among the armaments of their forces would, for their part, assume an obligation to respect the status of this zone and consider the territory of the states included in it as excluded from the sphere of use of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons. As for the Soviet Union, it has already declared its readiness to assume the above-mentioned obligations if the Governments of the US, the United Kingdom, and France do the same.

The obligations of the states included within the zone and the obligations of the Great Powers could be legalized both in the form of an appropriate international treaty and also in the form of appropriate unilateral declarations.

For the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the obligations and their fulfillment, the states concerned would be obligated to establish in the territory of the zone free of atomic weapons a system of broad and effective control, both on land and in the air, with the establishment of control points by agreement of the states concerned. The creation in the center of Europe of a zone free of atomic weapons would be an important step on the road toward cessation of the dangerous arms race and removal of the threat of atomic war.

### 4. Non-aggression pact

Seeking to further the easing of international tension, the Soviet Government considers that it would be in the interests of cessation of the "cold war" and of the arms race to conclude in one or another form a non-aggression pact (or agreement) between the states members of NATO and the states participating in the Warsaw Pact. Conclusion of such a pact would be an important step on the road toward the creation of an all-European system of security and the strengthening of mutual trust and cooperation between states.

If the Western powers display a desire to conclude such a pact or agreement, then in the opinion of the Soviet Government it would not be difficult to come to an agreement on its form on the basis of

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a multilateral agreement among all countries included in the Warsaw Pact organization and the North Atlantic Alliance, or among certain countries belonging to these groups, or, lastly, in the form of non-aggression agreements on a bilateral basis between separate members of these groups.

The Soviet Government considers that the basis for such an agreement must be the mutual renunciation by the contracting parties of the use of force or threat of force and the obligation to settle disputes which may arise between the parties to the agreement by peaceful means alone. The desirability of mutual consultations among the parties to the agreement, in connection with the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by them under the agreement, should also be envisaged.

Such a pact could be open to accession by all the other states of Europe in order to facilitate the creation at a later stage of a system of all-European security and the gradual liquidation of existing military-political groups.

In proposing the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, the Soviet Government regards it as the first step toward a radical improvement in the relations among the states included in the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact organization and as a prerequisite for the conclusion at a later stage of a broader treaty on European security.

### 5. Prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes; liquidation of foreign military bases in foreign territories; international cooperation in the study of outer space

Scientific-technical progress in the realm of rocket technology has raised the question of what direction the use of the latest scientific achievements will take: Will they serve peaceful purposes or will they be used for furthering the arms race, increasing the danger of the outbreak of an atomic war?

An effective measure, which would completely exclude the possibility of using outer space for military purposes and which would ensure application of the tremendous achievements in the creation of rocket and artificial earth satellites exclusively for peaceful purposes, would be a complete and unconditional ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons, together with their exclusion from armaments and the destruction of stockpiles. Since this is difficult at the present time, owing to the position of the Western powers, and must obviously be realized at a later stage, the Soviet Government proposes that at the present stage agreement be reached on a ban on the use of outer space for military purposes with, at the same time, the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories, first of all in the territory of the countries of Europe, the Near and Middle East, and North

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Africa. Such a measure would be in the interest of the security of all states. As for the states in whose territory such military bases are situated, such a decision would only be to their advantage, as the liquidation of military bases would remove the threat to which they subject themselves by making their territory available for the establishment of foreign military bases.

Guided by these considerations, the Soviet Government proposes a discussion of the question of concluding an international agreement on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, which would include the following basic provisions:

A ban on the use of outer space for military purposes and an obligation on the part of states to launch rockets into outer space only in accordance with an agreed international program.

Liquidation of foreign military bases in the territory of other states, first of all in Europe, the Near and Middle East, and North Africa.

Establishment, within the framework of the UN, of appropriate international control of the fulfillment of the above obligations.

Creation of a UN agency for international cooperation in the field of the study of outer space.

Conclusion of such an agreement would lead toward broad international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space and would initiate joint research by scientists of all countries in problems connected with the cosmos.

## 6. Reduction in the number of foreign troops stationed in the territory of Germany and within the borders of other European states

Consistently seeking the necessary agreement with other powers, the Soviet Union more than once has introduced concrete proposals on disarmament, and has also carried out a series of unilateral measures for reducing its own armed forces and armaments, proceeding from the premise that the other Great Powers will, for their part, follow this example. The Soviet Union is an advocate of a radical solution of the disarmament problem, a substantial reduction in the armed forces and armaments of states, the complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territory of European states members of both military groups, including Germany, and the liquidation of all foreign military bases on foreign territories.

However, inasmuch as the Western powers have hitherto not displayed their readiness to come to an agreement on all these questions, the Soviet Union proposes, at this stage, that a start be made toward the solution of those questions on which there already exists a complete possibility of reaching an agreement. The Soviet Government pro-

544645—60—17

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poses a gradual reduction of foreign troops in foreign territories and submits the proposal, in the nature of a first step, to reduce during 1958 the armed forces of the USSR, the US, the United Kingdom, France, and other states having troops in the territory of Germany, by one-third or to any other agreed extent. The reduced contingents of these troops must be withdrawn from the territory of Germany inside their own national frontiers.

The question of a substantial reduction in the armed forces and armaments of states and the conclusion of an appropriate international agreement with this objective, as well as the complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from the territories of the states members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty could be discussed during the following stage of negotiations.

## 7. Conclusion of a German peace treaty

All the peoples of Europe, which were drawn into the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, have long been enjoying the fruits of a peaceful situation and have been building their life independently, whereas the German people are still deprived of the conditions for the peaceful development of their country and existence on equal terms with other peoples. The absence of a peace treaty also has a negative effect on the solution of its national task of unifying the country. Furthermore, the lack of a solution for questions connected with a peaceful settlement in Germany is used by those who do not value the fate of peace in Europe for drawing the Western part of Germany into preparation for atomic war.

Under these conditions the Soviet Government considers that the powers responsible for the development of Germany in a peaceful manner should strive to attain a peaceful settlement with Germany as soon as possible. Being an advocate of such a settlement, the Soviet Government reiterates its proposal for a discussion at a summit conference of the question concerning the preparation and conclusion of a German peace treaty.

However, taking into consideration the attitude of the Governments of the US and other Western powers toward this proposal, the Soviet Government would be ready at the forthcoming meeting to come to an agreement at least on the first steps toward the solution of this question, namely, to agree, at the present stage, on the basic principles of a German peace treaty and the manner of its preparation. In this, the Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that preparatory work toward conclusion of a German peace treaty, with the participation of German representatives from the GDR and the FRG, would give impetus to the unification of the efforts of the German Democratic

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Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany toward their rap-
prochement and restoration of the unity of the German people.

8. Prevention of surprise attack against one state by another

Inasmuch as it still does not appear possible at the present time to
resolve the problem of disarmament in full and there is talk of reach-
ing an agreement regarding partial measures of disarmament, the
Soviet Government proposes that the question of the prevention of
surprise attack be gradually resolved, according to the nature of the
measures, in the field of disarmament in the first stage. It would be
necessary to come to an understanding concerning the establishment of
control posts at railroad junctions, in large ports, and on main high-
ways, and concerning the taking of aerial photographs in the zones of
demarcation of the principal armed forces of the military groups in
Europe, at the present stage in definite limited areas, which will be
considered as the most important from the point of view of eliminating
the danger of surprise attack.

In proposing such an approach to the solution of this problem, the
Soviet Government proceeds from the premise that the Western powers
have recognized the practical value of the Soviet proposal concerning
the establishment of control posts as a means of preventing surprise
attack. This gives a basis for hope that the conference can come to an
agreement on this question.

The Soviet Government reiterates its proposal on the establishment
in Europe of a zone of aerial inspection to a distance of 800 kilometers
east and west of the line of demarcation of the armed forces of the
NATO and Warsaw Pact military groups.

As for the proposal for carrying out aerial photography of vast
regions or of the whole territory of the USSR and the USA, this
question cannot be considered apart from measures for easing inter-
national tension and strengthening trust between states, especially
between the Great Powers. In the present international situation,
with the continuing arms race, which causes international tension as
well as distrust and suspicion in the relations between states, with the
"cold war" casting its black shadow over the whole international situa-
tion, the proposal concerning reciprocal flights over the entire terri-
tories of both countries is unrealistic. The Soviet Government
considers, however, that this step can be carried out at the concluding
stage of the problem of disarmament, that is, when the question con-
cerning the complete ban on atomic and hydrogen weapons, with their
elimination from armaments, concerning the substantial reduction of
the armed forces and armaments of states, and concerning the liquida-
tion of military bases in foreign territories is settled, that is, when
relations of trust between states are actually established.

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## 9. Measures to expand international trade relations

The Soviet Government considers that at the present time there are real opportunities for taking a number of steps to expand international trade relations as the natural and most dependable basis for peaceful cooperation among all states independently of the differences in their social systems. For the restoration and expansion of the trade of the Western countries with the enormous market of the East, where about a billion people live, it is essential above all to remove the discrimination and barriers hitherto existing, which hinder the expansion of international trade.

At the present time, as a result of the industrial slump and the decline in trade, a number of Western countries are experiencing serious economic difficulties, the remedy for which should also be sought by means of the development of international trade and not by means of an armaments race, or the intensification of economic war and blockade.

As concrete measures for the expansion of international trade, the Soviet Government proposes the adoption of a declaration of the basic principles of international economic cooperation, in which it would be desirable to include clauses on the observance of full equality; mutual benefits; the inadmissibility of any sort of discrimination in economic and trade relations between states; respect for the sovereign right of each state to dispose of its own wealth and natural resources; mutual assistance and aid to underdeveloped countries in their economic growth without the presentation of any sort of demand for a political, military, or other character incompatible with the national sovereignty of those countries.

There is also an urgent need to hold an international economic conference at which it would be desirable to discuss the question of the further development of international trade on a long-term basis so as to establish confidence and stability among trading countries, and also to discuss the question of the creation, within the framework of the UN, of an international trade organization open to all countries.

It would likewise be necessary to discuss such urgent questions as the rational utilization of world economic resources and the granting of aid to underdeveloped countries. For such aid, it would be possible to find additional funds by means of the reduction of expenditures for armaments.

## 10. Development of ties and contacts between states

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the development of international contacts, and stands immutably for the development of contacts between East and West. The establishment of broader political, economic, and cultural ties between countries, inde-

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