LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS

MANUSCRIPT DIVISION

CLASSIFIED ITEM(S) REMOVED

The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they contain security
classified information:

Collection: Henry A. Kissinger

Series: Part II

Folder Title: "Presidential File"

Item(s) and Security Classification:

<table><tr><td>1</td><td>Kissinger to Secretary of Defense, re. Memorandum from the President regarding the short term conduct of our military operations in Vietnam, 5 Feb 1969 (1 p.), with attachment.</td><td>2 pp</td><td>TS</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Kissinger to the President, re. your memorandum of February 1, 1969 on Peru (1 p.), with attachment.</td><td>2 pp</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>President to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, et. al., 14 Apr 1969</td><td>6 pp</td><td>TS</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Cable, Saigon 6915, re. Foreign Minister expresses concern, 11 Apr 1969</td><td>2 pp</td><td>S</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Viron P. Vaky to Kissinger, re. President's conversation with Diaz Ordaz, 29 Sep 1969</td><td>1 p</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>Alexander Butterfield to Kissinger, 6 Oct 1969</td><td>1 p</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>Larry Lynn to Haig, 24 Nov 1969</td><td>1 p</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>Bill Watts to Al Haig (1 p.), 24 Nov 1969, with attachment</td><td>1 pp</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>Haig to Kissinger, re. Reduction in Armed Services Public Relations Staffs in Vietnam, 4 Nov 1969, with attachments</td><td>4 pp</td><td>S</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>William Watts to John Holdridge, 21 Jan 1970</td><td>1 p</td><td>S</td></tr><tr><td>11</td><td>Kissinger to the Secretaries of State, 23 Jan 1970</td><td>1 p</td><td>S</td></tr><tr><td>12</td><td>Kissinger to the Secretaries of Defense, 23 Jan 1970</td><td>1 p</td><td>S</td></tr><tr><td>13</td><td>Haig to Dick Smyser, 17 Feb 1970</td><td>1 p</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>14</td><td>President to Kissinger, 2 Mar 1970, with attachment</td><td>2 pp</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>15</td><td>President to Kissinger, 2 Mar 1970, with cover memo</td><td>2 pp</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>16</td><td>President to Chairman, Defense Program Review Committee, 2 Apr 1970</td><td>2 pp</td><td>TS</td></tr></table>

(Reviewer)

July 17, 2013

(Date)

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger
FROM: The President

I received the new German Ambassador and he seems to be personally friendly as we might expect, but beyond that you might check his background and see if he might be a pretty good one to keep in contact with here in Washington. I knew him when he was the second man in the Embassy from 1956 to 1960, and I considered him to be reliable at that time.

I also received the Ambassador from Singapore. He is an M. D. -- Lee Kuan Yew's personal doctor. He had met me and Mrs. Nixon when we were in Singapore in 1953 and had been greatly impressed by the way Mrs. Nixon had visited hospitals and other charitable institutions, and the way that we both went out to meet people in the slum areas.

What is more important is that he has been Ambassador to Cambodia for four years and a close and intimate friend of Sihanouk. He said that Sihanouk had a very "warm feeling" toward RN based on the two times he had met him in 1953; once when he visited me as Vice President, and again when I made a state visit to Cambodia. He

[LC]

-2-

said that Sihanouk based a great number of his policies on purely
personal attitudes. I asked him to convey to Sihanouk the next time
he wrote him (which I can imagine would be almost immediately!)
my warm regards and the hope that at some time in the future we
would be able to communicate again.

I give you this background having in mind the fact that this
might be the opportunity for me to write a note to Sihanouk. The
State Department country desk man was there at the meeting. Check
it out and give me a recommendation -- preferably a personal letter
to Sihanouk -- if that does not cross wires with something else.

In the same connection, the Saudi Arabian, Jordanian, Moroccan,
Libyan, Tunisian, and other Mid-East Ambassadors were exceedingly
cordial at the Diplomatic Reception. It is quite obvious that we start
with a lot of good will in this group. We should exploit it to the full
at this time.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

In reading the news summaries, particularly the television coverage, the line is already developing that the negotiations in Paris are deadlocked. The next step we can anticipate is that the commentators will begin to demand that we change our position in order to make headway. I think it is important that you keep in close touch with Lodge -- probably by telephone -- so that (1) he does not become discouraged by this type of coverage, and (2) in his backgrounders and other press statements he can knock down the idea that we should expect any kind of progress at this early date. In fact, I think it would be helpful if he indicated that several months usually are required before parties on such basic substantive disagreements begin to make progress, but use your judgment as to how to handle it. Incidentally, our observers here said that, "Lodge comes across so well on TV, it might not be a bad idea to encourage him to do more of it. He just looks like a model

-2-

negotiator and certainly inspires more hope as a personality
than Harriman did. His appearance counts for much and it
may."

You might read this to Lodge when you talk to him on the
phone and indicate to him that he should find every opportunity
to say something on TV which reaches the United States --
forget what the Europeans, particularly the Parisians, may
see or write. He should aim everything he says toward the
United States indicating that the going is hard and that he does
not hold out any false optimism, but that he is convinced that
the negotiations will succeed, and that he is getting every
possible encouragement from RN.

[L.C.]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

I noted in your January 31 report the interesting comments from a Polish source. I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is "exploring possibilities of raprochement with the Chinese." This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints from this direction. However, in contacts with your friends, and particularly in any ways you might have to get to this Polish source, I would continue to plant that idea.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1969

The memorandum which you wrote to me, dated February 3, on "The Mid East -- Some Policy Considerations" should be must reading for the permanent members of the NSC. I think the substance should also be made available, on a very confidential and restricted basis, to others who are vitally interested in this subject.

On the same subject, it seems to me that we may have made a mistake in not waiting for Moscow to clarify the ambiguities in their December 30 note. In the future, where subjects of this type are on the agenda, I think we will proceed with a very brief CIA briefing and then go directly to the NSC Review Board analysis and let State put its input in at that point through the Secretary or somebody he wants to call into the room if he wants to bring one of their specialists in.

[L.C.]

February 5, 1969

TO: Bob Haldeman

cc: Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

I told Bob Murphy that I would like for him to have an office available in the EOB with a secretary also available in the event that he wanted one. I shall invite him at times to participate in foreign policy discussions or NSC discussions where his input would be useful.

Follow up on this immediately with a telephone call to Murphy to see what he would like. We owe this to him in view of his really splendid cooperation during the transition period.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 5, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

I still believe that I should be in a position
to discuss with the Pope the sending of a special repre-
sentative. I see no reason really to wait on this until
the Ambassador to Italy is appointed. Give me a report.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 5, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

Shortly before or shortly after our European trip I think it might be well to have an hour session with some foreign policy experts outside the government, particularly NATO experts. This will be helpful, not only in getting their thinking, but it will be immensely helpful in following up on what we have emphasized in the transition -- that we intend to get information outside the government as well as in.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1969

I note in a recent Sulzberger column the suggestion that this may be the time to have a European Commander of NATO. I wonder if we ought to consider this possibility? You might read the column and give me your thoughts after making a check with the people at the Pentagon. The column is attached.

I wonder too if Sulzberger really doesn't make the point that the "king has no clothes" when he says that "it is clear today that although its advocates argue flexible response gives the alliance broad options, this isn't really true." I think he's right and I wonder if we don't have to face up to this in our talks.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1969

I think you should follow up on a quick invitation to the Dutch Prime Minister to visit us in Washington so as to answer the criticism that we did not go there.

I also believe that we should resolve the time of the Canadian visit as soon as possible. You may have noted a column by Charlie Bartlett in the Star today (this is Thursday) raising this point. I might be able to have some influence on the Canadians on the Communist Chinese question. At least, it is worth a try.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1969

I had an interesting talk with Jim Linen with regard to his conversations with Conant Comand. In a nutshell, I think the Thais have now reached the position where they think an American withdrawal will inevitably come because of political pressures here. Conant Comand endorses the mutual withdrawal proposal and suggests that the police forces on each side of the border be fully Asian in make-up. According to Linen, Conant has talked to the Paks and they are willing to serve in such forces on the North Vietnamese side of the border. The Thais and Indonesians would be willing to serve in such forces on the southern side of the border.

If you think we What is perhaps more significant than this rather novel proposal is that the Thais, who have so much at stake in this war, are reluctantly beginning to recognize that we are not going to be able to hold out indefinitely and that some acceptable settlement is necessary, policies from time to time.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 14, 1969

TO: Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

Jim Linen also leaned hard on the fact that Graham Martin was now "in pasture" as Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. He says that Martin fell out of favor because of his opposition to McNamara's positions and because he was not in step with some of the State Department's Asia hands.

I have great personal confidence in Graham Martin and believe he should be brought back into the foreign service. I think he would be an excellent appointment for Tokyo, Bonn or Pakistan if he would accept one of these.

If you think well of this suggestion, put this in the form of a memo from me to Rogers. My purpose here, among others, is not to let the State Department play its usual game of promoting their favorites and kicking out those who may disagree with their policies from time to time.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 14, 1969

I think it might be well for you to call Nelson Rockefeller and tell him in a low-key way that Dr. Franklin Murphy was here for dinner with Brosio and indicated that he might be receptive to an invitation to accompany Rockefeller on his trip to Latin America. I think Murphy could render a significant service on this trip in the field of education as well as in some other fields.
And, more important, he might be a sobering influence on some of the more extravagant spending programs that may be forthcoming from the Rockefeller group.

I would think that Rockefeller would be delighted to know that Murphy, in view of his present prestigious position as Chief Executive Officer of the biggest paper in the West, and as a former Chancellor of UCLA, would be willing to go.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1969

Just to remind you that not for the near future but within the next three months I want to see a complete history of how the bombing pause came about from all the sources we have available. You will recall that I suggested that we needed this kind of a study made and I think it should be made. I think it will be useful to have it completed so that we may have this background in our minds as we deal with the negotiations in the critical period which might commence in three or four months.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Subject: Notes from the President (Action Item)

On the morning of February 10, Governor Claude Kirk called the office and asked Rose Mary Woods to relay to the President the fact that he (Kirk) would like very much to be part of Governor Nelson Rockefeller's tour of South America... because "Florida feels it should be the hemisphere center of things that go on in South America". Kirk also mentioned the fact that he has a beautiful Brazilian wife who can speak the language and "knows all of those people very well".

The President focused on this item only this morning and asked that you pass the information on to Governor Rockefeller. He advised that you let him (Rockefeller) handle Kirk, adding that he would guess that Rockefeller would not want to have another governor along.

Thank you.

[lc]

February 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Rogers
Dr. Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

I have noted in reading the papers prepared by the State Department and by the Security Council Review Board on the Mideast, references from time to time to domestic political considerations."

The purpose of this memorandum is two fold:

(1) Under no circumstances will domestic political considerations have any bearing on the decisions I make with regard to the Mideast.

(2) The only consideration which will effect my decision on this policy will be the security interests of the United States.

In the future, I want no reference to domestic political considerations to be included in any papers and I do not want the subject of domestic political considerations to be brought up in discussions of this subject.

Will you please circulate this memorandum among all those who are working on this problem.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1969

(dictated March 13, 1969)

Senator Hartke of Indiana has a scheme which he thinks I am familiar with on the apparent complete obstruction which seems to inhibit action on our part in the Minzenty case. There may be nothing to this but, on the other hand, there just might be a chance that he has something which could be helpful.

For these reasons, I think we ought to explore getting him away. And this is probably a small price that the Soviets and Hungarians would pay for a few other things we have that we might do for them.

Would you have people -- Dick Allen -- explore this situation with Hartke, with State, etc., and see if we might try to make a break-through.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 26, 1969

PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER (Info only)

After reading in his morning news summary that Congressman Paul Findley (R-Ill.) plans to enter the names of the more than 33,000 Americans killed in Vietnam in the Congressional Record " to focus public attention on the real price of the war", the President could only comment: "A great statesman!" (He thought you might share his opinion.)

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

MEMO

[LC]

T. WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

April 10, 1969

PLEASE TREAT AS VERY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. PETER FLANIGAN
DR. HENRY KISSINGER

The President has focused his attention on Adolph W. Schmidt (of T. Mellon and Sons, Mellon Square, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), having just read a personal letter from Schmidt dated March 24th. He (the President) says that he definitely wants Schmidt appointed as an ambassador. He suggests Canada as being the most appropriate post, adding that we _should not_ send a career man to that country.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Haldeman

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

The President is aware of some restlessness in the ranks, and would
like for you to give a good backgrounder (no later than early next week)
on the Vietnam war and the Safeguard System to a group of some 8-10
persons to be rounded up by Bryce Harlow. It is now planned that Hugh
Scott will be among those in your small audience ... plus at least one
person who is for us 100 percent. The remaining 6 or 7 will be people
like Senator Saxbe (R-Ohio), Congressman Ogden Reid (R-New York)
and others who recently have been voicing their impatience with the
Administration.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Bryce Harlow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HARLOW

As you know, current reading indicates clearly that there is a ripple of restlessness running through the Congress. For instance, Senator Saxbe has voiced his impatience with our "foot-dragging on the war", and is alleged to have said that he will speak up soon even if it means "flying in the face of the Administration". Similarly, Congressman Ogden Reid is saying that if the Administration can't end the war, "it will be open season on Nixon".

In view of these and other incidents, the President would like for you to get together with Henry Kissinger and help line up a group to which Henry can give a good backgrounder (no later than early next week) ... on both the war in Vietnam and the President's position with regard to the anti-missile Safeguard System. Your group should consist of some 8-10 persons. It should definitely include Scott plus someone who is for us 100 percent. The other half-dozen or so should be people who are "on the fence", like Saxbe and Reid.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Dr. Kissinger
Mr. BeLieu
Mr. Timmons

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1969

I would like a memorandum from you
setting forth your views on the reasons for student unrest
which we have discussed from time to time.

This is only for my own background purposes
and will not be the basis of any press conference or other
statement.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

In an analysis of recent news, the President read that the U. S. Army is seriously concerned about the rapid growth of aggressiveness in anti-war militancy within the enlisted ranks. The particular article on which he focused goes on to say that the "anti-war soldier may soon become the most disruptively effective peace activist in our society."

The President would like for you to query Secretary Laird on this matter. He wants to know specifically (1) if this is a really serious problem ... and (2) if so, what we can do about it.

Thank you.

Hst
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

[L]

April 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Request

In an analysis of recent news, the President send that the U.S. Army is seriously concerned about the rapid growth of aggressive-ness in anti-war militancy within the enlisted ranks. The particular article on which he focused goes on to say that the "anti-war soldier may soon become the most disruptively effective peace activist in our society."

The President would like your views on this matter. Specifically, he wishes to know (1) if this is really a serious problem, and (2) if so, what can be done about it.

Please provide the President with the latest information on the attached document.

Henry A. Kissinger

April 17, 1969

2:00 P.M.

Excerpt from Report of White House Staff Member's Conversation
with George Meany:

I found Mr. Meany to be sympathetic toward and in agreement with your policy. However, during the discussion, he made the following points:

a. He was appalled at the lack of discipline in the new Administration as evidenced by conflicting statements by principal members of the Cabinet on many of the key issues. He felt some of them undercut you.

b. He would be eager and willing to make, on behalf of the AFL-CIO, a strong combined statement in favor of our Vietnam policy and also of the ABM. However, he had to be sure that he would not be undercut subsequently by a statement by one of your Cabinet members which would leave him in an exposed, hard-line position. Meany agreed to make such a statement if you were to come out strongly in these areas. He would then support your position and get to work on his union members to line them up.

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1969

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

Your position on the ABM has been weakened and confused by conflicting statements of your top national security officials. In some cases, the officials appear to have been surprisingly careless in what they said, and just as surprisingly willing publicly to contradict one another. In other instances, it appears that these leaders have actually voiced their own ideas which they either knew -- or should have known -- were not in accord with your expressed policy. I deeply believe such conduct cannot be countenanced.

In human affairs at any level it is necessary, on occasion, to bring errors of subordinates to their attention and to demand unreserved loyalty and disciplined performance. I recommend that this action be taken in regard to the subject mentioned above.

If this is promptly done, future similar problems may be avoided. If not done, I strongly anticipate increasing incidents of this same kind in the future, especially in such troublesome areas as the budget reductions. Eventually, such conduct will force disciplinary action anyway. I urge the action in advance.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
Dr. James Allen
Dr. Arthur Burns
Dr. Daniel Moynihan
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Dr. Lee DuBridge

FROM: The President

cc: Dr. Paul McCracken

The most significant and I think perceptive analysis of what is wrong with our approach to higher education was made by Professor S. A. Tonsor of the University of Michigan in a speech in Washington on April 1. I am sure that "the establishment reaction" to this speech will be a "tut, tut, this is old hat." However, this happens to be my view. It will be a view that I will increasingly express very vigorously in the months ahead. I want everybody who has anything to do with education to read this speech carefully and to follow this line in their public announcements.

[LC]

ALIENATION AND RELEVANCE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

There is a striking parallel between the crisis in government at the national level in America and the crisis in the universities. In both cases the institutional structure has recently increased, gigantically in size and in the scale of operation. Along with this increase in size has gone a tremendous augmentation of power both real and potential. However, it is a characteristic of this power that it is diffuse and focused only with difficulty: that it is all but impossible to bring this power to bear effectively on the problems of the state and the university. The problems which bedevil both the state and the university are frequently not problems which can be solved by the application of power. Along with the augmentation of size and power has gone a singular inability to match commitments with resources so that the state and the universities in spite of megadollar budgets find themselves perennially impoverished. Finally, and most importantly, each finds itself alienated from its constituency. Each has discovered that it is increasingly difficult for it to project an objective which will move men to its single-minded pursuit. It is not that men no longer believe in government and education. Indeed, they believe passionately in both. It is rather that they no longer understand either the purposes or the designs of big government or big education. Even those who conform do so without enthusiasm and are reluctant to defend the institution from its enemies. While the power of both institutions has steadily increased their authority has declined. Ultimately authority is far more important to education than power and power without authority in the state soon gives way to tyranny.

The parallel between the state and the university is instructive. Both big government and big education face a crisis of confidence and they face this crisis for basically the same reason; they have done a good many of the right things in the wrong way and they have been doing a good many things they should never have attempted, things for which they were totally unequipped. What is necessary in order to restore the institutional authority of higher education? How can higher education regain the confidence of those over thirty and command the respect of those under thirty who listen with reluctance and dissent without debate?

It would be false to assume that all our difficulties are institutional in origin, that they arise from the fact that the university has either done too much or done too little. It must be said at the outset and the fact faced with candor and resolution, that the most important problem which higher education faces today is the growing wave of irrationality and anti-intellectualism which has caught up large numbers of both students and professors. Student and professor activists inside the university and certain ideological groups outside the university no longer believe that truth must be the essential consideration in the academy. Both the extreme right and the extreme

[L]

-2-

left hold the same destructive view. Both Mark Rudd of Columbia and Governor Wallace of Alabama stand in the schoolroom door, and seen from the vantage point of the academy they both hold the same low view of reasoned discourse. They believe that force ought to be substituted for sweet reason, that power ought to replace persuasion and that only "socially approved" voices and views should be heard. They believe that toleration is a weakness rather than a strength in intellectual enquiry and they are in the deepest sense of the word anti-intellectual. They aim at nothing less than the destruction of the life of reason. The university and the parent society have no alternative to repression. These groups cannot be permitted to disrupt and destroy the institutions they so obviously do not understand. They constitute a small minority and it is possible that had university administrations not been long accustomed by their faculties to bearing fools gladly these groups would already have disappeared from the campus scene. Their disappearance, however, will not restore the authority of the university.

If the institutional aspirations of education are once more to become credible, universities must regain a sense of modesty and a selectivity in the formulation of their objectives. They cannot be all things to all men. The notion of the multiversity is rejected with justice by students and by perceptive faculty. They reject it not simply because it is impossible to administer but because it is an institution without goals. It does not know its own mind. The able administrator in the setting of the multiversity is not a man characterized by unusual educational vision but someone whose social acoustical equipment is highly refined and who acutely senses all the many needs of his society. He is committed to servicing those needs and adjusting and compromising between these many conflicting interests. Modesty is unknown or is swept aside by megalomania and mediocrity. Little wonder that in such circumstances the teacher feels he is an unwanted encumbrance and the student senses that he is a forgotten man. To compound the problem now by expecting the university to become a court of last resort for the solution of the major social problems of our time will only deepen the crisis which the university faces.

Until there is a restoration of genuine educational purpose there will be no restoration of confidence by society in its institutions of higher education. That educational purpose does not lie in the first place in pure or applied research, in problem solving or in providing revolutionary change or defending traditional values in the society, though all of these may result from the legitimate endeavors of higher education. Higher education has as its chief goals the education of young men and women in such a way as to make them capable participants in our complicated technological civilization, sophisticated and creative members of our common culture and active and concerned citizens.

-3-

In order to ensure circumstances in which teaching rather than research or community service are the primary objectives of the university, government at all levels must forgo the temptation of easy recourse to the enormous resources of the university. Recently there has been a great deal of debate concerning the use of the talent and facilities available in the university for defense research. It is not inconsistent to argue that under very exceptional circumstances the university ought freely to use its talent in the defense of society, and still maintain that both the government and the university would be better served under most circumstances were both basic and applied research in the national defense area done in autonomous research institutes. The same case can be made against the use of the facilities of the university for the solution of social problems. Social tasks are better performed by institutions and facilities outside the university. Finally business and industry should increasingly look to sources than the university for their pure and applied research.

Much of the debate concerning university research at the present time misses the point. War research is no more illicit or licit than peace research. Nor is the test of the validity of research within the university context whether or not it has direct relevance to the social and political problems or the technical needs of the moment. The only sound test is whether or not research enhances or diminishes the primary teaching function of the university. And it must be confessed that in spite of the brave talk to the contrary and considerable administrative legerdemain, research has become the tail which in many instances wags the dog. Faculty members on fractional appointments who spend the greater part of their time in other than teaching activities distort and confuse the educational purposes of the university. Foundation grants for centers and programs which are often inconsistent with the needs and basic educational directions of the institution are as dangerous to the university as government, civic and business research for which there is no clear-cut teaching mandate.

The university cannot be all things to all men. There is a difference between being alma mater to generation after generation of students and being the not so well paid kept woman who does the bidding of the most recent and persuasive suitor.

"Where there is no vision the people perish," is an observation which is as true of institutions as it is of nations. In education, however, our pressing need is not for a single and unitary vision but rather for visions as different and as diverse as the pluralism of our society. Education cannot be genuinely relevant to our society and to its needs unless it is diverse both in objective and technique. The possibility for educational diversity in America is immense; but in reality American education is homogenous and uniform. The privately endowed colleges do poorly what the state universities do only a little better, and a handful of determinative major universities, as alike as

-1-

[LC]

peas in a pod, set the tone and direction for the whole educational enterprise. American education has become a single mechanism; its professors and students interchangable parts. Under these circumstances, even student riots are monotonously, repellently, alike. Among the most important functions of education is that of widening the options available to men in the solution of their problems and in the improvement of the quality of their lives, yet our universities steadily diminish and dilute the differences between themselves. Students are still able to choose the quality of their educations; they are unable, however, to do much through their own choices about the kind of education they receive. It is important that we reestablish a free market in education. It is important that the church-related school survive, not as a secularized ghost of its former self but as a school with a genuinely religious vision of the world, a school in which men learn to serve God and their fellow men rather than themselves. It is important that private humanistic colleges with their commitment to civilization and decorum and their quiet emphasis on freedom remain an important constituent of our educational system. It is essential that we have genuine experimentation in curriculum and method and not the psuedo experiments hatched by administrators and departmental chairmen who need an excuse for hitting the foundations or the legislators once again for funds.

We cannot have this diversity, however, until the federal and the state governments drastically alter the role they play in financing higher education. American education will become diverse and relevant to the needs of both the student and the nation when and only when the student is forced to pay a very substantial portion of the total costs of his education. Privilege without responsibility is a very dangerous condition; privilege without either responsibility or choice generates unbearable tensions in the society which makes such privilege possible. State schools which compete unfairly with private schools through discriminatory tuition rates have been the chief force in leveling and homogenizing American education. Indiscriminate federal grants on the basis of administrative judgment rather than student choice have only reinforced this movement toward uniformity. If we genuinely desire diversity we will do all in our power to encourage students to pay for their educations through a tax on future earnings. If we genuinely wish diversity we will insist that such educational grants as are made by the federal government will be made directly to the student rather than to institutions of higher education.

Only when there is a free market in education, with the student and his parents able to choose from among schools diverse in kind and quality, will we be able to say honestly to students: "We do not pretend to supply the sort of education you wish or need. If you really want a totally unstructured, ungraded course of study, segregated,

[LC]

-5-

revolutionary and socially relevant, you can get it at, let us say, Columbia, or Brandeis, or Rutgers, but you can't get it here." The growing sense of alienation among students arises in substantial measure from their inability to choose the quality and kind of education they believe relevant to their lives.

Not only should there be a diversification in the kind of college and university training available, but diversification should bring into existence a wide range of educational alternatives. Apprenticeship programs, proprietary schools, technical institutes operated by industry for the training of specific needed talents, a strengthening and broadening of the junior and community college programs are all of considerable importance in the problem of making education relevant to the needs of the student and the needs of society. The American public must be disabused of the notion that the AB degree holds some sort of magic. For some time it has not been a mark of status and certainly it is not a guaranteed pass to higher income. The right of entry into a craft union is often more difficult to achieve than entry into the most exclusive college. It strikes me as odd that the New Left which has been so concerned with the indiscriminate admission of all minority group students into our colleges irrespective of their qualifications has had little or nothing to say of the restrictive practices which deny the right of entry of many of these same minority groups into those favored unions which possess monopoly advantages in our economy and society. Someone should say clearly that the way to status and achievement in our society is not through learning Swahili but through learning English. Someone needs to say clearly that the way to affluence does not lie through an AB degree granted by yesterday's second rate normal college, but a marketable skill which will secure for its holder and his family the dignity of achievement.

Nearly every professor has in the past several years encountered, in what he thought a rather sober discussion of an academic question a sudden denunciation by a student member of his audience. The student does not challenge the professor's method or even question his data but simply rejects his position as immoral, as fascist or racist or as simply irrelevant. There is no debate or discussion, no attempt to identify the question or purposefully expose the issue. It is assumed that absolute right prevails on one side and that moral obtuseness, Marxian false consciousness, or plain wrong-doing characterizes the other side. The issue is not joined; it is not even discussed. Question periods at lectures are not occasions for refining the position of the lecturer but are seen as opportunities to present long, rambling denunciations and counter lectures. The student usually ends his harangue with a plea for relevance and the lecturer, if he is smart enough, gathers that the young man or young lady, (it is sometimes difficult to tell just which it is), is alienated.

-6-

Last fall the London Times reported an international meeting of
philosophers in Vienna in the following words: "While their elders
and betters solemnly discuss the epistemological significance of the
phrases 'Johnny has lost his pen. I have found a pen. I know Johnny
lost it,' the students are racing through the corridors, shouting
'What about the Soviet invasion (of Czechoslovakia), Russian and
American flags, and wrestling with their professors for microphones
during debates.

It is disgusting, say the students, that 3,000 of the wisest men
from every country of the world should have gathered together in the
largest philosophical talk-in in history and have nothing forceful to
say about the Russian tanks on the Czech border less than 50 miles
away. If philosophy has any real function it should be performing
it now."

Clearly, what the student seeks is a relevant orthodoxy rather
than an agonizing enquiry. Faced with some of the toughest choices
in history and living in a period when traditional certainties and
traditional values have been challenged and opposed by alternatives
the student is really calling upon his professor for a clear and
definitive answer and one preferably couched in a currently fashion-
able vocabulary and bearing the marks of current social concerns. To
the student education is irrelevant if it cannot provide a solution;
preferably of course, a solution which costs the student nothing and
whose weight is born by the non-student sectors of society. The
student wants to know what to think rather than how to think.

And the student has far too many professors who are willing to
tell him what to think rather than attempt to teach him how to think
for himself. The student has learned his lessons only too well.
His professors, especially in the humanities and the social sciences
have all too often been exponents of an established orthodoxy rather
than masters in the art of reasoned enquiry.

The situation is not to be mended by diversifying orthodoxies.
That is the student's solution. He wishes to replace the Liberal
orthodoxy with a New Left orthodoxy, a WASP orthodoxy with a Black
orthodoxy, a permissive and tolerant orthodoxy with a repressive
orthodoxy. What the student wishes is a substitution of orthodoxies
rather than an end to all closed systems. His efforts will only
compound the problem, for the Liberal ascendency in today's colleges
and universities is like the pre-1918 Austrian Empire; "an autocracy
ameliorated by inefficiency," while the student's Maoist dictatorships
would end altogether the life of reason.

The professor, if he is to reestablish the authority of reason
must not only admit of the possibility of his being wrong but must

[lc]

-7-

have the openness of mind necessary to, as Lord Acton said, "make out the best possible case for error." He must actively court diversity and contradiction rather than seek the world of like-minded men. He must continuously engage in a great debate not only with his students and his colleagues but above all with himself, and as President Truman said, "if he can't stand the heat he should get out of the kitchen."

The ideological and cultural uniformity of higher education in America is a disgrace. Why is it that our colleges and universities have conformed themselves over the past two decades to the orthodoxy of secular liberalism? Why has the atmosphere been so increasingly hostile to open debate? Why does it take the crisis of the exclusion of the Negro from the university to make us see that not only people but ideas have been excluded by higher education?

The authority and the relevance of the university lies in its ability as an institution to explore systematically and rationally the problems men face. Its success is not dependent upon current fashions in ideas or current solutions to particular problems. Its success derives from its ability to take the long view and ask the hard questions, and the hardest of these is the question the professor asks of himself, of his colleagues and his society about the possibility of being wrong.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Subject: Note from the President

There was a short paragraph concerning the Vietnam war in the
President's daily news summary. It read as follows:

"The 'widespread revulsion from the Vietnam War' being witnessed on U. S. campuses 'illustrates again the grave disadvantages which democracies suffer when engaged in any protracted conflict with a disciplined, ideologically motivated dictatorship. ... The problem arises in a cold war as well as a hot one' as witness the lukewarm Western reaction to the Soviet's 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. The U. S. failed to heed the 1963 advice of Britain's Asian expert, Sir Robert Thompson: 'If we plan for a long haul, we may get quick results, but, if we go for quick results, we may at best get a long haul.' Today the Communists 'who never could have won on the battlefield, look like they're winning the battle of hearts and minds in the U. S.' (Anthony Lejeune in 4/19 Dallas Morning News 'Report from London')"

The President felt that the quote by Sir Robert Thompson (the underlined portion above) was particularly apt, and asked that you circulate it -- via written papers, interviews, backgrounders, etc. -- to the maximum extent possible.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

cc: Mr. Keogh
Mr. Klein

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. HENRY KISSINGER

The President would like you to read the following "Chieu Hoi" item which appeared in his April 23rd Staff and Department Brief:

"USIA notes that the chieu hoi (open arms) returnee rate continues high, with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers and members of the National Liberation Front's political apparatus rallying to the Government of Viet-Nam at a rate unprecedented since the spring of 1967. The 1,048 rallies in the week ending April 5 were the highest weekly figure since March 1967. Over 11,500 defected from January 1 to April 12, 1969, compared with about 3,000 for the same period last year, - almost the equivalent of a division of Communist forces.

Causative factors are: the three-month Accelerated Pacification Campaign of late 1968 and early 1969, which gave both incentive and opportunity for dissident Viet Cong to defect; development of information and psychological operations to a high level of effectiveness; and the apparent success of a new 'third party inducement' program, which provides cash awards for inducing Viet Cong to return."

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

April 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. KNOCH
LOR. MR. GUNN

I have again discussed with the President the question of adding a foreign policy speech writer - telling him that Keogh feels the need now may not be as great as it had been and that the only candidate he seriously is considering is John Jessup. I have also told him that Kissinger has no strong view one way or the other, but that if the President would feel more comfortable with one, he thinks we should get somebody, and that he feels Jessup is first-class.

The President is not enthusiastic about Jessup feeling that, as Keogh suggested, he is probably a little old for the job and he, too, is not sure that he really needs someone.

On the other hand, if we could come up with an outstanding candidate, the President would very much like us to move ahead on him with the understanding that he would be used in other activities as well.

On this basis, I think both Kissinger and Keogh should continue to explore the possibilities in this area on a relatively high priority basic, recognising that when the need starts to arise again - for instance, for the next foreign trip - the urgency level is going to go up at a rapid rate. If we can solve the problem before that it would be wise to do so. If we can't, we will still survive.

H. R. HALDIMAN

cc:
Mr. Higby

[LC]

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

29 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE HENRY KISSINGER

Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Presidential Request for Information Concerning
Soldier Dissent in the Army

This responds to your memorandum of 16 April 1969 on the
above subject.

Early this year Army intelligence analysts concluded, after weighing all available reports and the comments of Army commanders, that soldier dissent had not generated significant internal dissidence or exerted any meaningful effect upon the Army's capabilities. In the last three months, however, anti-war militants within the Army have stepped up their activities noticeably and have been able to persuade more soldiers to take part in such activities as anti-Vietnam war parades. The numbers involved are still quite small and at this time the Army does not consider soldier dissent a serious problem in the sense that it has reduced the effectiveness of any unit or has impaired responsiveness to authority on a significant scale.

However, the Army is taking the matter quite seriously because of its potential threat to morale and discipline and hence over-all effectiveness. The Chief of Staff of the Army has given the matter his personal attention over the past several months and a letter of guidance to commanders in dealing with dissidents has been drafted at his direction and will be distributed soon, after some further staffing. Also, plans are under way to intensify intelligence and data collection activities and to couple them with a periodic analysis of the activities, objectives, numbers and capabilities of the dissidents and the impact which their activities are having on the effectiveness of the Army. I will keep you advised of significant developments.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Thank you.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

[lc]

April 29, 1969

To: The President
From: Rite E. Hauser

I met today with Governor Harriman at his request for lunch at his New York City house. He wanted to meet me to discuss ratification of the various human rights treaties, and to lend his support. We got on very well, and despite efforts on my part to leave, he insisted on talking to me for nearly three hours. He was very frank in his comments about people in and out of Government, stating he "found it easy" to talk to me. I was happy to listen, and wish to report to you the following which I think important:

The Governor made clear that he wanted to quit Johnson's peace efforts numerous times, as he felt they were a sham in large part. But he remained in an effort to help promote peace in Vietnam. He now feels himself locked into these efforts, and would not undermine them or you unless they appear to go nowhere. In that case, in the event of a "Nixon War", he said he would be obliged to join the opposition openly. He stated several times that he had opposed you in the Election and would again in 1972, but would back the peace efforts as long as fruitful. He noted he was not a part of them.

I had the very clear impression that he would be happy to be part of the efforts and, were he thus, he would feel constrained to support them even if the war became a "Nixon War".

[L.C.]

By a "Nixon law", he meant such time as demonstrations begin again as was true under Johnson. He said he is under pressure from the press to talk about the Peace Negotiations, the inside story, and to pass judgment on the current round. He has resisted so far.

I believe Harriman can be enlisted in the Administration peace efforts. This would neutralize him against a future negative position; indeed, he would support developments.

I remember that Lodge founded a Citizens Committee to support Johnson in Vietnam when the demonstrations got rough. Can we not ask Harriman to form a similar group to get bi-partisan establishment support for the Paris talks? I believe he would be willing to do this.

Harriman is meeting with Dr. Kissinger next week, and this subject might be explored.

***

His other comments on personalities were intemperate, and need not be repeated.

REH

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED

May 15, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

It has come to the President's attention that some members of your staff or the National Security Council staff have been asked to meet with members of the press for the purpose of background interviews, etc.

The President wants it clearly understood that no one on your staff and no one on the National Security Council staff is ever to hold any meeting with an individual or group of press people either for background or attribution. He wants you to be the only spokesman for the White House and the NSC in the field of national security and foreign policy, and any time a briefing is required you are to conduct it.

Obviously, there may be specific, highly unusual situations where it will be desirable to violate this rule. If this should become the case, it should not be done without the President's specific authorization for each individual case, and you should discuss this directly with the President.

Will you please be sure that the members of your staff understand this. By carbon of this memo, I am also advising Ron Ziegler of the same situation and will ask that he make sure his staff is aware of it too.

cc:
Mr. Ziegler

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

Today the President read in his daily news summary that Peking's Ninth Party Congress had denounced him as a "hypocritic priest", a "gangster wielding a blood-dripping butcher's knife", and one who "resorts to crafty counter-revolutionary double-faced tactics towards socialist China."

His only comment (addressed to you): "Very colorful!"

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

Before our next meeting on force levels, I want a direct recommendation from Defense as to what they believe we should have in order to provide sufficiency. I do not want any equivocation, just a straight out declaration of what they think we need. I also would like a similar recommendation from State and also an opinion from CIA in this respect. Make clear to all three departments that the purpose is not to make a case in the event they prove to be wrong, but to get their best judgment as to what our force level should be. These recommendations should be made to me personally, on an 'eyes only' basis, and will not be disclosed in an NSC meeting.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM: The President

When I suggested that Col. Haig brief Agnew and Mitchell I was referring only to those matters that involved a high degree of sensitivity. I do not want him to waste his time, particularly where Agnew is concerned, unless the matter is in that category. That is why I would strongly urge that you use Dick Allen for the purpose of briefing Agnew on the general political developments around the world which will thereby keep him abreast with what is going on. I think Allen would be ideal for this assignment and it will save Haig's time.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY KISSINGER (Information only)

Last night ABC-TV noted publicly that Secretary Laird's optimistic assessment of the Vietnam situation was "reminiscent of MacNamara." The news report said that the Secretary's statement - "We've turned the corner in Vietnam" - may well come back to haunt him.

The President wanted you to know he tends to agree with ABC on this one.

ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KILSINGER

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

In talking to President Diaz Ordaz, he mentioned several subjects which I assume were also mentioned in the Advisers' Conference.

1. His concern over duty-free shops.

2. The need for some helicopters in Mexico so that the Mexican Government border patrol could be more effective in handling narcotics.

3. That we should limit the sale of arms and keep them from being smuggled into Mexico. He expressed great concern over the 15 from Brazil who have been given asylum in Mexico. He said some were "very dangerous". He also mentioned the "Che 8" movement operating in Mexico City which had "lots of money in Switzerland".

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VIRON P. VAKY

THROUGH: Bill Watts
FROM: Al Haig

Attached is a memorandum from the President to Henry. Would you prepare a interim status report for Henry's signature to the President together with an outlined plan for the implementation and follow up of the President's conversations with President Ordaz.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

HENRY KISSINGER

In his news summary of September 24, the President noted an item on Cuba that quoted an official of the Castro government as saying a new situation is developing in Latin America that could lead to improved relations between Cuba and the U.S. The paper said that a minister in Fidel Castro's government "was, in effect, inviting the U.S. to join in furthering such a development which would in fact be putting into practice a form of the alliance for progress suggested by JFK."

The President wants you to tell State "absolutely not."

KEN COLE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

The President would like you to take a look at the transcript of today's press conference, giving special attention to the length of his answers.

You will note that he answered a total of 23 questions and, since this was done in 28 minutes including the question time, the average answer had to be about one minute long, in other words, about 125 words.

He has the feeling that in his Briefing Books the suggested answers are almost always way too long. He insists, therefore, that in the future they be sharpened up substantially.

He would like your people to think of this in terms of how they would give a sharp, quick, crisp answer to the question, rather than trying to put down all the detail.

The problem here is when you give the President all of the details, then *he* has to sharpen it up, and this requires long hours of study on his part, which he is trying to avoid (to some extent at least). Instead he suggests that you give him the crisp, quick answer, and then if you feel more information is needed for his background, attach that as a background summary in addition to the actual answer - but only if really necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

HENRY KISSINGER

In his October 24 news summary, the President noted an item regarding the University of Pennsylvania's action to lower its American flags and place them in storage. School officials, fearing a confrontation with student war protesters, said the flags were unmasted pending a meeting of a university advisory group.

In response to this action, the State Adjutant General of the American Legion said his group would insist that the U.S. flag code be followed and said the Legion would not let "demonstrators and persons on the street" determine the flag flying policy. In response to this, Governor Shafer responded that he deplores the fact that the flag is not flying at full staff over the campus but that there is "no law that requires the University to fly the flag at any time. It is a matter of choice and good citizenship."

The President expressed total amazement over Governor Shafer's reaction.

KEN COLE

cc: Bryce Harlow
Harry Dent

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR
Henry Kissinger
FROM THE PRESIDENT

In your backgrounders I think two themes that
should constantly recur are the fact that the President
is in charge of policy where major matters like Vietnam
and SALT are concerned and in addition the emphasis
on the Nixon doctrine as well as our new initiatives in
Latin America, toward Romania and toward China.

I think a major problem on the horizon is that
we may be blamed for the rapidly deteriorating situation
in the Mediterrean and the Mideast. I think this is one
where the case should be made now that we inherited an
impossible situation and are trying to dig our way out
of it.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR

Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I think the time has come to reduce our Korean presence. We could not do so because of the EC 121 at any earlier date but I do not want us to continue to temporize with this problem. What I have in mind is to maintain the air and sea presence at whatever level is necessary for the kind of retaliatory strike which we have planned. On the other hand, I think it is time to cut the number of Americans there in half and I want to see a plan which will implement this laid before me before the end of the year. It, of course, should be well worked out and sold to the Koreans on a proper basis.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 24, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR

Bob Haldeman

John Ehrlichman

Bryce Harlow

✓Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have been giving some thought to how we ought to handle the Senators who have voted against us on both ABM and Haynsworth. Here are some ideas that I would like to have implemented.

1. There should be no change in the relations with Williams. He is vital to us in the tax field.

2. Even though Griffin supported us on ABM, we should maintain a proper but not too close relationship with him due to the strong feelings that people like Dole, Baker, Cook et al, have developed on this score. In other words, let us be sure that our friends and supporters on both issues get some preferred social and other treatment for a while. The same, of course, applies to Scott.

3. I think that Goldwater et al should be discouraged from having a confrontation with Scott and Griffin at this time. It is doubtful if they could win it but beyond that it would leave scars that would be very difficult to heal. I think the better plan is to lay the foundation for what needs to be done after the elections of 1970.

4. With regard to all those who opposed, I want one general rule followed without deviation. You are undoubtedly going to have instances where people like Jordan, Griffin, Schweicker, Percy et al may contact members of the White House staff

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

indicating their willingness to support us in the next nomination
or on some other issue which may be coming up. They will,
of course, do this only when we are sure to win it. I want
the answer in each case to be along these lines: "Thank you
very much but the President wants you to feel free to vote
your politics on this issue. He doesn't need you on this one."
This will be quite effective and very hard for them to respond
to.

5. We will have a definite policy from now on of
having leadership meetings every other week and will try to
have subjects for discussion only those where we really have
to bring matters up to the leadership for their assistance.
On the alternate week, we will have in groups of our friends
and I would occasionally mix some of our Democratic supporters
into those meetings.

6. Since several Senators like Jordan, Saxbe,
Schweicker et al have complained about "White House pressure"
I think the best line to follow in the future with them is not to
discuss anything with them and if they complain simply say we
didn't discuss it with them because we wanted to honor their
request that we not exert White House pressure.

7. It goes without saying that those who are in
this group should be given completely proper treatment so that
they cannot have anything obvious to complain about but none of
them should get in to see me until I have gone through the
list - one by one - of seeing all of those who supported us on
these issues. I anticipate that this will take me several
months!

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

In talking to Annenberg, he said that Hughes had turned out much better than he had anticipated, and that he considered him far better than Kaiser, who he said was really overrated. Of course, as you know, Kaiser has a labor background and has now gone with Encyclopedia Brittanica.

He strongly urged that there be a cut in the military aides in our embassies abroad, and also a cut in the CIA staff. I completely agree with him on this score, and I want a study made along the lines of bringing down the numbers. I know that the answer in both cases would be that they serve intelligence purposes, but generally the intelligence that both our military aides and our CIA people get from our embassies abroad is pretty thin.

For future planning, at some time you should talk to Ambassador Freeman with regard to the visit of Prince Charles which he is going to make to Canada this summer. When he makes that visit, he probably can and should come to the United States. What I would suggest here, and I want you to discuss this with Ehrlichman so as to get an off beat effective PR benefit from it (both for him and for us), is that he not go on the grand tour at dinners and so forth, but that he visit some of our parks and places like Disneyland, etc. My thought was that David and Julie and Tricia might escort him from time to time. This is a long lead-time item, but I discussed it briefly with Annenberg, and you might be discussing it with Freeman because I think this could do an enormous amount of good for U.S. -British relations. Annenberg tells me that he is the real gem of the family and makes an enormously favorable impression wherever he goes.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 16, 1970

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

The January 12 Special "Report from Saigon" (please see attached) ended with a comment that overall one would conclude that U. S. policy -- particularly under this Administration -- came out well from this group of respected observers.

Upon reading this report the President directed the following comments to you:

1. I disagree (except for Beech) that they are respected observers - I know them all - and all except Beech probably want us to lose.

2. However, it is important to note these critical views and raise these questions with our people in Vietnam so that we don't become complacent. Particularly we must keep pounding on the necessity to build up the ARVN strength and morale.

3. We must also have a contingency plan to handle whatever offensive may be launched in spring and summer -- by ourselves if necessary. (And without the big strike unless the size of the attack merits it.)

Thank you.

J. R. B.
JOHN R. BROWN III

SECRET

"REPORT FROM SAIGON"

NET Special Report, Monday, Jan. 12

Participants:

Robert Kaiser, Washington Post

Peter Arnett, AP

Keyes Beech, Chicago Daily News

Robert Shaplen, New Yorker

Charles Mohr, New York Times

The most interesting aspect of this 60 minute show was the near-total agreement on the part of these diverse participants that there were some very positive changes in the war under the Nixon Administration. While Shaplen and Mohr were far from willing to go all the way with the Nixon program, even these long-time critics did find some good signs. Shaplen said no longer is the conflict predominantly a US war -- the ARVN is carrying the brunt of the battle. The tempo of the war has definitely slowed down and US troops are being pulled out in what are likely to be increasingly large chunks -- both favorable developments in Shaplen's view. He said there has been considerable progress in pacification and on the military front, but Thieu's inability to broaden and consolidate his support caused Shaplen to register in as a pessimist on the future. He sees Thieu reverting to Diem's style and said RN doesn't seem to mind.

Keyes Beech repeated the theme of several of his recent columns -- this is the year of the crunch. Despite all the analyses, the test has yet to come. The acid test will probably occur this spring when the next 50,000 Americans leave and the enemy will seek to exploit the ARVN. Right now, said Beech, sounding more bullish than anyone else on the show, the allies

[LC]

2

are in an excellent position; there's been enormous progress in pacification and security; long-closed roads and waterways are open; in "many places, you'd hardly know the war was going on." But in the Delta, the SVN forces (ARVN, RF and PF) are performing in a very spotty fashion. Also of concern to Beech is the continuing existence of SVN's raging inferiority complex, a lack of confidence which bodes ill for the future. They seem to have a deep psychological fear of the NVA divisions. Nonetheless Beech thinks the South has better than a 50-50 chance of making it. He was disdainful of those who anticipate a reconciliation between North and South -- for only 30 years since the 10th Century has Vietnam been united. Beech also was critical of the Senate resolution regarding Thailand and Laos.

"It's a great mistake; almost invites the enemy to come." He called the statement "No more Vietnams" a slogan, not a policy and said it sounded like "No more Koreas."

Robert Kaiser held to the thesis developed in his *Post* series several weeks back that there is a "new optimism" in VN. Old hands who in past years have seen things go from bad to worse are now seeing programs develop far better than they anticipated. The question is whether these programs will be enough. Kaiser was rather dubious about the strength of the SVN forces in the Delta. As far as what happens when the US has the bulk of its troops out, Kaiser suggested we allow the SVN to develop their own standards. Let them find their own level. We may be satisfied to have 90% of the country under control; when we're gone, they may be glad to

3

have 60%. Kaiser also said it is far from certain how RN will respond when the Communists start pushing the "test" battles with ARVN which so far have resulted in draws. The ARVN will lose some; we'd best accept it as we can't leave and bail them out too.

Peter Arnett demonstrated his past hostility to the US effort by reciting a catalogue of complaints but he confessed he was far more optimistic -- particularly regarding the political and military breakthrough in the country side which is visible, measurable and continuing. But Arnett fears this is more due to the US than the SVN. If our programs and new hopes falter, as they have so often for the peasants, the chances are remote that a pro-Western government can survive. Arnett feels the key factor in the future is the growing buildup along the Cambodian border. It is this huge development which shows Hanoi is digging in for the long haul and reduces SVN's chances below 50-50. Arnett feels the pressure will be so heavy that Saigon will move for an accommodation. He conceded that vacuums along the DMZ and in the Delta left by US pullouts have not been filled by the enemy. He's afraid that may not be the case for long near the Cambodian border, although he feels sure the enemy couldn't pound through to Saigon itself.

Mohr was primarily a nay-sayer. He doubts if anybody in the US will believe the "new optimism" and rather than crediting what he concedes is far better security in the countryside to either the US or SVN, he feels it is due to temporary VC exhaustion. Mohr said ARVN's main problem has not

[lc]

4

been a problem of firepower, but instead ineffective leadership, especially
in the smaller units. If Saigon would utilize the peasants -- rather than
only the few educated citizens -- in its regional and provincial leadership
positions, they'd be better off. Mohr, along the lines of Shaplen, also
sharply differed with Thieu's handling of the "politicization" of the war and
sharply criticized the US for failing to make our advice and influence better
felt. There are many good programs, according to Mohr, but we've failed
to execute them, due to lack of purpose and continuity. Finally Mohr asked,
what is the Nixon program anyway? Is it just a policy to get out and not
really solve the problem? Unless the Administration really feels Vietnamiza-
tion can work, then this drawn-out withdrawal is immoral.

The correspondents also dealt with the question of anti-Americanism and
the anti-Vietnamese mood of Americans. Mohr said we've never lived up to
our own doctrine that SVN is a friendly nation; many times, especially in the
past, we've treated it as a hostile power. Kaiser said resentment of US
troops who are there and their reaction when buddies are killed has led to
the anti-Vietnamese attitude of Americans. But Arnett said he felt this was
no longer true although it certainly was the case until late '68 and early '69.
But now US and SVN troops are fighting and dying together. Moreover
free-fire zones and steam roller operations through the countryside are
out. Even helicopters which used to shoot back when they drew any fire
from a village now turn back. There is far less lead flying around in the

[LC]

5

countryside, said Arnett as he pointed out there's also far less anti-Americanism, especially in the countryside.

Shaplen attributed the US-SVN friction to a contradictory set of war policies under LBJ. Many different things were tried at once. American advisers were coming and going. Arnett interjected that the US has not been in VN for 15 years; it's been here 1 year 15 times. Overall, despite Shaplen's reservations, he seemed to imply things were at least aimed in one direction under RN -- a lot different than in past.

On the subject of corruption, Kaiser said the economic mess, including the serious problem of inflation, could be the straw that breaks the Vietnamization camel's back. He said the soldiers are being paid 1/2 what they need -- thus corruption and moonlighting increases. Arnett called corruption endemic to the system; rooting it out may well bring the entire system down. Mohr said Arnett's acceptance of corruption is part of the "we can win anyway" argument. But Mohr agreed with Ed Lansdale who said the virtuous image the VC have maintained has been very helpful to them. The US mistake regarding corruption, said Mohr, is that we make excuses for ills we could cure.

Beech sided with Mohr on this one -- he said he used to feel that corruption didn't matter and that we had to accept it. But we've tolerated far too much; we know about a lot of it; we're in a position to do something about it but we remain negligent.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

The January 18 News Summary reported that the big news from
Vietnam is President Thieu's shake-up involving two generals
who were less than effective handling corruption as well as their
military responsibilities.

The President noted that he hopes this is the result of your
pushing and requests that you give him an analysis as to its
significance.

Please submit your analysis to the Office of the Staff Secretary.

Thank you.

[LX]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 20, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

The January 17 News Summary reported that the Allies have acquired portions of a Communist directive which outlines plans for a coup which would bring about the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon. The directive tends to substantiate the argument that even though the enemy is greatly weakened -- there is now so much at stake that they will be forced to launch another "spasm" like the Tet offensive. If they do not strike a blow now, they risk the collapse of the entire guerrilla apparatus in South Vietnam in the next year or two.

The President noted that this makes sense. He feels that we should predict it and be prepared to blunt it.

J. F. K.
JOHN R. BROWN III

[LC]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

The January 24 News Summary included a report by CBS that Hanoi has charged RN's belief that peace hopes in Vietnam are brighter is "pure fiction". Meanwhile in Saigon U.S. Intelligence sources report a sharp increase in enemy buildup.

On reading the above the President directed the following comment to you, "We should consider some planted predictions on the buildup by the enemy and our intent to react and our ability to handle; i. e.

1. We expect an attack.

2. We can handle the attack.

3. We will do _more_ if they go too far."

Please submit a report to the Office of the Staff Secretary on what actions are taken to comply with the above request.

Thank you.

MEMORAND

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

The February 8 Los Angeles Times contained an editorial by Theodore White reporting the Vietnam War is "degenerating into the grotesque" while the peace talks remain stagnant. It is impossible to believe that the Vietnamese people will ever trust each other and continued talk of a coalition government is absurd. It is time for the U.S. to try a new initiative. The U.S. should pursue "a partition of South Vietnam, within a federal government, into political cantonments."

On reading the above the President noted that this is not a new
suggestion but that it may be one worth checking.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1970

Confidential

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

The February 12 News Summary reported that at Senator Fulbright's hearing on Vietnam, Senator Hughes, Senator Cranston and Senator Eagleton called Vietnamization a hoax and extension of LBJ's policies; they urged that Thieu be forced to broaden his political base.

The President requests that you call this attack to the attention of former President Johnson and point out the names of those individuals who engaged in the attack.

Thank you.

JOHN R. BROWN III

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 28, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

As a result of a conversation with Director J. Edgar Hoover, the President asked me to inform you that he desires the necessary steps to be taken by Monday noon to prevent United States citizens from going to Cuba to work in the cane fields.

Such action violates our foreign policy. Our foreign policy embodies an economic quarantine of Cuba. Therefore, please cause the Department of Justice and the State Department to stop it and have something for the President to sign by Monday noon.

[L]

February 28, 1970

As a result of a conversation with Director J. Edgar Hoover, the President asked me to inform you that he desires the necessary steps to be taken by Monday noon to prevent United States citizens from going to Cuba to work in the canefields.

Such action violates our foreign policy. Our foreign policy embeds an economic quarantine of Cuba. Therefore, please cause the Department of Justice and the State Department to stop it and have something for the President to sign by Monday noon.

JOHN D. EMRLICHMAN

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

March 2, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HALDEMAN
MR. EHRLICHMAN
✓DR. KISSINGER

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

For discussion with the group and implementation.

After a great deal of consideration of our performance during the first year, I have decided that our greatest weakness was in spreading my time too thin -- not emphasizing priorities enough. This may sound strange in view of the fact that I did arrange my time to do the November 3rd speech and the State of the Union adequately; but the balance of this memorandum will demonstrate what I want implemented for the future. Also, while this applies primarily to my time, I want Ehrlichman and Kissinger to apply the same rules to allocating their time to the extent that they find it possible.

What really matters in campaigns, wars or in government is to concentrate on the big battles and win them. I know the point of view which says that unless you fight all the little battles too that you do not lay the ground work for winning the big ones. I do not agree with this point of view to the extent that it means that I will have to devote *my time* to any significant part of my time to the lower priority items, or to the extent that Ehrlichman and Kissinger have to do so.

This means that there must be delegation to the Departments and within the White House staff of complete responsibility for those matters which are not going to have any major effect on our success as an Administration.

Applying this general rule to specifics, in the field of Foreign Policy, in the future all that I want brought to my attention are the following items.

1. East-West relations.

2. Policy toward the Soviet Union.

EYES ONLY

-2-

3. Policy toward Communist China.

4. Policy toward Eastern Europe, provided it really affects East-West relations at the highest level.

5. Policy toward Western Europe, but only where NATO is affected and where major countries (Britain, Germany and France) are affected. The only minor countries in Europe which I want to pay attention to in the foreseeable future will be Spain, Italy, and Greece. I do not want to see any papers on any of the other countries, unless their problems are directly related to NATO. At the next level out where I am indicating policy toward the Mid-East and then finally in the last is policy with regard to Vietnam and anything that relates to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, etc. As far as the balance of power in Asia is concerned, that part of Africa which is not directly related to the Mid-East crisis, and all of Latin America and all countries in the Western Hemisphere with the exception of Cuba and anything else that may be concerned with the East-West conflict, I do not want matters submitted to me unless they require Presidential decision and can only be handled at the Presidential level.

This is going to require a subtle handling on Kissinger's part. He must not let members of his staff or members of the establishment and the various Departments think that I do not care about the under-developed world. I do care, but what happens in those parts of the world is not, in the final analysis, going to have any significant effect on the success of our foreign policy in the foreseeable future. The thing to do here is to farm out as much of the decision-making in those areas to the Departments, and where Kissinger does not have confidence that State will follow up directives that I have previously laid down with regard to Latin America, Africa and the under-developed countries of Asia, he should farm that subject out to a member of his staff but he, himself, should not bother with it. I want him to concentrate just as hard as I will be concentrating on these major countries and these major problem areas.

In the future, all that I want to see with regard to what I consider the lower priority items would be a semiannual report indicating what has happened; and where a news conference is scheduled, of course, just enough information so that I can respond to a question, although it is interesting to note that we have received very few questions on the

[LC]

continuation of Memo to Haldeman, Kissinger and Ehrlichman

EYES ONLY

With regard to domestic affairs, our priorities for the most part will be expected but a couple will be surprising for reasons I will indicate.

I want to take personal responsibility in the following areas:

1. Economic matters, but only where the decisions affect either recession or inflation. I do not want to be bothered with international monetary matters. This, incidentally, Kissinger should note also, and I will not need to see the reports on international monetary matters in the future. Problems should be farmed out, I would hope to Arthur Burns if he is willing to assume it on a confidential basis, and if not Burns to Houthakker who is very capable in this field. I have no confidence in the Treasury people since they will be acting in a routine way. International monetary matters, incidentally, are a case in point in making the difficult decision as to priorities. I feel that we need a new international monetary system and I have so indicated in several meetings. Very little progress has been made in that direction because of the opposition of Treasury. I shall expect somebody from the White House staff who will be designated who will keep the pressure on in this area. The man, however, who could really be the lead man is Arthur Burns because he feels exactly as I do and it might be that he could exert some influence on the others. Ehrlichman, of course, could be helpful on the staff side but he is not familiar enough with the intricacies of the problem to assume the lead responsibility.

2. Crime: I feel that we have really failed in this area, not perhaps so much in what we have done but in publicizing it adequately. I am going to take charge and start pressuring some people and I want a lead man, either from the White House staff or in Justice, whom I can call daily if I feel like it and ask what is being done. The emphasis here must be more on crime in the street and narcotics. The attack on organized crime is important but not politically except as it affects the Democratic political machines in places like New Jersey and Missouri. Here, of course, we can count on Mitchell going ahead full-steam.

3. School integration: I must assume the responsibility here because it will be the major issue of controversy for the foreseeable future. Here again, I hope we can find one man to whom I can turn and on whom I can rely. This man should not be Garment because of his bias in one direction, or Buchanan, because of his bias in another direction.

EYES ONLY

[LC]

- 5 -

You will note that I have excluded the environment. I consider this to be important from the stand-point of the nation and from the standpoint of the Administration making a good record in a vital field, but I have every confidence in Whitaker and believe that he can assume the lead responsibility and I don't want to be bothered with the details. Just see that the job is done. Of course, to the extent Train shapes up as an in-house Administration man he can work in tandem with Whitaker to carry out our objectives.

I have also not included family assistance, revenue sharing, job training, the whole package making up the "New Federalism." I consider this to be important but here again I think that our team is adequate to carry out our policies and I am going to count on them to do so without submitting to me the day-to-day decisions. In such fields as this I am only interested when we make a major breakthrough or have a major failure. Otherwise, don't bother me.

In the fields of education, housing, health, transportation, Post Office, agriculture and labor I want lead men, either within the Administration or within the Department, to assume the responsibilities. I consider each important but they are not the kind of matters which should require my attention. Here I think you could give Harlow a good batch of these, but tell him at the time that he has the responsibility and that I cannot be called upon unless it is something that requires Presidential decision.

The actions of the various agencies fall into the same category of lower priority items -- lower priority not because of their not being important but because they do not need my attention -- they can and should be handled by White House personnel or by a good Agency man who knows he has the responsibility.

In writing this memorandum I failed to include under the Kissinger section the national defense positions. Here I am interested only in those positions where they really affect our national security and East-West relations. That means that in the case of ABM I, of course, will consider that a high-priority item as long as it is before us. Where an item like foreign aid is concerned I do not want to be bothered with it unless it directly affects East-West relations. I have already indicated in my meeting with Pedersen (?) that I want some reform here and I shall expect that reform to be accomplished in some degree or the other.

EIES ONLY

- 6 -

A lot of miscellaneous items are not covered in this memorandum but I think you will be able to apply rules based on what I have already dictated.

For example, trade policy is a case in point. This is something where it just isn't going to make a lot of difference whether we move one way or another on the glass tariff. Oil import is also a case in point. While it has some political consequences it is not something I should become deeply involved in. A recommendation should be made and responsibility given at other levels and I will then act without getting involved at lower levels of the discussion.

One final note as to an area where I do feel Presidential involvement is necessary is in government reorganization. Here, however, I do not want to sit down in long haggling sessions but I do want the pressures kept on for a complete reorganization. I will expect Haldeman et al to assume the lead responsibility, calling upon me only when I have to give it a push.

May 14, 1970

From THE PRESIDENT

I understand from the Douglas Committee that several polls have been taken in Vietnam that could be very helpful to us with regard to the attitude of the Vietnamese people. These polls are not being released because of government policy that was established shortly after the Eisenhower Administration left office. At least check into the matter to see if there is some way that these polls which apparently are being talked about privately a great deal could slip into a column if it is proper to do so.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 22, 1970

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Be sure that Laird, or your office - or both, get to Dole, Griffin, Stennis and possibly Scott in the Senate as well as Ford and Arends in the House a no-nonsense reply to any doves who may attack the Saturday strikes.

They should take the offensive very strongly on this issue. They should respond with a simple statement -- stating the understanding that reconnaissance planes were not to be fired upon; that we have consistently reacted when they have been fired upon; that we did so, for example, in May and that we have not reacted over the past few months despite several firings due to the fact that we were moving forward on the negotiation front; that this reaction was necessary and that others will occur in the event that there are other attacks on our reconnaissance planes.

The point also should be made strongly that these reconnaissance flights must not only be continued on a routine basis but that they are even more important now than in the future because as we continue our withdrawal program the remaining forces in South Vietnam would be seriously endangered if massive movements from North to South were allowed to occur undetected.

This is one where there should be a strong, affirmative reaction on a bi-partisan basis against those who may raise the question.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1970.2

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM THE PRESIDENT

On a very confidential basis, I would like for you to have prepared in your staff - without any notice to people who might leak - a study of where we are to go with regard to the admission of Red China to the UN. It seems to me that the time is approaching sooner than we might think when we will not have the votes to block admission.

The question we really need an answer to is how we can develop a position in which we can keep our commitments to Taiwan and yet will not be rolled by those who favor admission of Red China.

There is no hurry on this study but within two or three months I would like to see what you come up with.

[LX]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 14, 1971

Aboard Air Force One

FROM THE PRESIDENT

You have on occasion pointed out that one positive
point we had going for us is the fact that the President
of the United States, due to a number of factors, is now
the undisputed world leader.

My guess is that many of our critics are also aware
of this development and will do everything they can to
knock it down. The Times selection of Willy Brandt as
Man of the Year is of course, right along this theme. You
might give some thought as to how we might do a more effective
job of building the world leadership image which is, in fact,
a very legitimate theme but which will not get across unless
we find a few people on our side in the media who will begin
to speak and write in that vein.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 8, 1971

FROM THE PRESIDENT

You will recall my suggestion that I would like to have more activity with regard to writing selected foreign leaders and also those Ambassadors who are our appointees or who we know will want to serve our interests. I would add to this suggestion the possibility of a telephone call from time to time. For example, when I called Trudeau in Canada and talked to Heath in London and much earlier Brandt in Germany, this had a very great effect. I want to be sure that Presidential presence is used to the maximum extent possible with foreign leaders and with those Ambassadors of our own who can have influence with them. I do not believe we have undertaken enough initiatives in this respect. The distribution of the State of the World message will be a starter. Those letters should be carefully prepared (run them through the Price shop for style) and distributed in a way that they will have maximum effect. For example, a letter to a South American head of government should refer specifically to that section on Latin America, summarizing briefly the major points of the Latin American section. The letter to a European head of government should emphasize, for example, that section dealing with NATO and emphasizing the points we are making on NATO, and so on down the line. Wherever I have met the head of government, either by visiting his country or on his visit to ours, a warm personal reference should be made about my recollections of our visit and my hope that we shall meet again in the future. And also a suggestion that I shall look forward to any comments that any of these people may have on the message that I have sent to them.

MEMORANDUM

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT: Laotian Operation

It has been suggested that you particularly note the Dan Rather portion of the February 17 Telecast as reported in the News Summary:

Dan Rather -- pointing out the ARVN progress on a map -- reported the Administration view of the situation, based on Laird and RN statements. Half of the trail is cut (as Dan pointed out the distance left to go) though the White House is "a bit disappointed" with the ARVN pace. The slowness is laid to ARVN "supercaution". The operation will probably not go over 50 miles into Laos and will end along in May due to the rainy season.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
A. Butterfield

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1971

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN

The March 10 News Summary stated that there was a straight account in *Time* on the war although a page is very critically devoted to the Pentagon's use of statistics which goes beyond the bounds of credibility. *Newsweek* features the reportedly very dangerous chopper war and expresses doubts over 1) the major role in future land wars for choppers and 2) Vietnamizing the current allied chopper operation.

It was suggested that you take note of the fact that primary weekly news magazines follow the TV's offensive in their reporting.

Thank you.

cc: Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Butterfield
Mr. Colson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1971

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

DR. KISSINGER
JON HUNTSMAN
The Washington Post

The March 12 News Summary stated that <u>on NBC we were told</u>
<u>that the NVA may be preparing to move the ARVN out of Tchepone</u> --
in fact, Reuters says there are no ARVN in the area. Moreover,
it reports that 3,000 ARVN -- 1 of 6 -- have been killed. NBC
film showed ARVN marines fighting for the first time as an entire
division.

Regarding the underlined portion of the above statement it was asked
that you note that this was the same line as appeared in The Washington
Post.

Thank you.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1971

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT: White House Staffer

The March 12 News Summary stated that HK Smith said that in the last 10 years, three Presidents have tried to establish a viable index of progress in the Vietnam war. Last week RN said that 55% of the enemy traffic along the Ho Trail had been cut, but doubt has been cast on those figures. Jarriel followed stating that estimating the amount of enemy supply movement along the Trail is as uncertain as, in the words of one White House staffer, "walking on quicksand". When RN made his estimate he was using the highest possible estimate.

Regarding the underlined portion of the above statement referring to the White House staffer -- the President would like to know who this is.

Please submit your response to the Office of the Staff Secretary.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 22, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: H. R. HALDEMAN

The President feels that you should get Howard Stein down and work on him.

Apparently you have discussed this, and the President now feels it would be timely to move on it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1971

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I noted that one of the newest press attacks is with regard to the "thousands" of illegitimate children in Vietnam, according to NBC.

I think you ought to look into what, if anything, the Army et al are doing on this problem because it could be blown up into a significant issue.