So we had never seen the brightest ray
Of Truth Divine, hadst thou not shewn the way,
Thou art our Drake, Thou who alone didst dare
To move in an unknown, untrodden Sphere,
And, for less active Mortals, didst descry
New Worlds of most refin'd Philosophy.
So, by the Conduct of an Angel's Hand,
The Israelites posseff'd the happy Land.
To thee, on Contemplation's Mount, were shewn
The Heavenly Glories, on the Face they shone,
And with thee thou hast brought the inherent
(Brightnesses down.)

In thy Idea we ingraven see,
In Characters Divine, Felicity.
Thou a new Map of Paradise haſt drawn,
And more exact than e're before was known.
Which (if there's ought that Poets may foretell)
Shall last as long ('tis drawn so rarely well
As men believe a Heaven, or fear a Hell.

London, Feb. 7.

1684.

W. R.

## II.

The Seraphins they guarded him along,
And as he upwards did aspire,
With Hallelujahs rais'd his Genius higher,
And with Cœlestial Cadence fill'd his Tongue.

Till he at length pas'd on,
Through many a Blissful Region,
To the bright Court above,
The Element of Love.

Where, with enlightned and inamour'd Eyes,
In Beatific extases,

He view'd the dazling Jasper mound,
That did the Empyrean Seat surround,

The great Metropolis of Bliss,
And in its Anti-courts did fit,
Enjoying all that could be fit,
For one not made Immortal yet.

Thus did his Soul from Heaven but one remove
Abstracted by Seraphic Love,

From tyes Corporeal well nigh rent,
By powerfull Energys of Thought intent
Dwell fix'd in Contemplation on the bright
Ideas of the God of Light.

Till scorning senfual Objects, he could feast
On Praises, and on Anthems make Repaft.

And did on this fide Heaven with rays Divine
Of antedated and immortal Glory Shine.

## III.

Then, like a bright Columbus, down the Skies
He sail'd, his Voyage told, and new discoveries
Of Islands Fortunate, and Coasts of Blis
And Continents of everlafting Happineſs.
And of them Charts and Maps he drew,
Fair, like th' Original, and True,
Casting the Rumb's by wth you are to Steer, (clear
And how the Shelves to paffs, and how the Rocks to
Of Joys that true and good appear.
He tells how the Coaſt bears, and how to tack
Left we for Shoar the Clouds miſtakę,
Left into gulphs of ſenſual Joys we fall
Purſuing Intellectual;
He ſhews the ſhortneſs of the formers date,
How few they are, and how they Circulate
Still to the Point from whence they firſt begun,
That nothing's good nor new under the Sun.

## IV.

Then, as a Radient Cynoſure, he leads
By these his Lines of Light
And paths then Milky way more bright,
Souls more refin'd; Them he conducts and guides,
By many a Degree
Of the large Latitude of Extasie,
In th' Ocean of perpetual delight

Through

*Through Visions, Raptures, Elevations high,*
*To the round Haven of Eternity.*

*Till by Calm Silence all a round*
*And still tranquillity 'tis found*
*That an eternal Paradise is nigh.*

*And having made the Port*
*Where joys without allay resort,*
*They take their larger Portions with the Blest*
*In Vision, Love, and Joy, and endless Rest.*

London, March 25.
1684.

S. P.

[ i ]

An Idea of Happineſs, &c.

SIR,

THO you have been pleas'd to affign
me the Task of an Angel, and in
that Reſpect have warranted me to
disobey you ; yet ſince, a conſiderable part
of that experimental Knowledge which I
have of Happineſs is owing to the Delight
which I take in your vertuous and endearing
Friendship, I think 'tis but reaſonable I
ſhould endeavour to give you an *Idea* of
that, whereof you have given me the Pos-
ſession.

You deſire to know of me wherein the
greateſt Happineſs attainable by man in this
Life does conſiſt. And here, tho I ſee my
ſelf engaged in a work already too difficult
for me, yet I find it neceſsary to enlarge it :
For, ſince the greateſt Happineſs, or Sum-
mum Bonum of this Life is a *Species* of Hap-
pineſs in general, and ſince it is call'd (Great-
eſt) not becauſe absolutely perfect and com-
pleat ; but inaſmuch as it comes neareſt to

G that

[ 2 ]

that which indeed is so, it will be necessary first to state the Notion of Happineſs in General, and then to define wherein that Happineſs does conſist which is perfect and complete, before I can proceed to a Reſolution of your Question.

By Happineſs, in the moſt general Senſe of the word, I understand nothing else but an Enjoyment of any Good. The leaſt Degree of Good has the fame Proportion to the leaſt Degree of Happineſs as the greateſt has to the greateſt, and conſequently as many ways as a man enjoys any Good, so many ways he may be ſaid to be happy: neither will the Mixture of Evil make him forfeit his Right to this Title, unleſs it either equals the Good he enjoys, or exceeds it: And then indeed it does; but the Reaſon is, because in strictneſs of Speaking, upon the whole Account the man enjoys no Good at all: For if the Good and the Evil be equal-balanc'd, it muſt needs be indifferent to that man either to be or not to be, there being not the leaſt Grain of good to determine his Choice: So that he can no more be ſaid to be happy in that Condition, than he could before he was born. And much leſs, if the Evil exceeds the Good: For then he is not only not

[ 3 ]

not happy, but absolutely and purely miserable: For after an exact Commemoration supposed between the Good and the Evil, all that remains over of the Evil is pure and simple Misery; which is the Cause of the Damn'd: And when 'tis once come to this (whatever some Mens Metaphysicks may perfwade them) I am very well satisfied, that 'tis better not to be than to be. But now on the other side, if the Good does never so little out-weigh the Evil, that Overplus of Good is as pure and unallay'd in its Proportion, as if there were no such Mixture at all; and consequently the Posteffion of it may properly be call'd Happineſs.

I know the Masters of Moral Philosophy do not treat of Happineſs in this Latitude; neither is it fit they ſhould: For their Buſineſs being to point out the ultimate End of Humane Actions, it would be an impertinent thing for them to give any other Idea of Happineſs than the highest: But however this does not hinder but that the General Idea of Happineſs may be extended farther, even to the Fruition of any Good whatsoever: Neither is there any reaſon to find Fault with the Latitude of this Notion, ſince we acknowledge Degrees even in Glory.

G 2

In

[ 4 ]

In this General Idea of Happiness two things are contained. One is, some Good, either real or apparent, in the Fruition of which we are said to be in some measure or other happy. The other is the very Fruition it self. The first of these is usually called Objective Happiness, and the latter Formal. Some I know divide Happiness into these as distinct Species; but I think not so artificially: For they are both but constituent Parts, which joyntly make up one and the fame of Happiness: Neither of them are sufficient alone, but they are both equally necessary. That the last of these is a necessary Ingredient, I think no doubt can reasonably be made: For what would the greatest Good imaginable signify without Fruition? And that the former is likewise necessary is no less certain: For how can there be such a thing as Fruition without an Object? I grant 'tis not at all necessary that the Object be a real substantial Good; if it appear so, 'tis sufficient.

From this Distinction of real and apparent Good, some have taken occasion to distinguish of Happiness likewise into two forts, real and imaginary: But I believe, upon a more narrow Scrutiny into the matter, 'twill be

[ 5 ]

be found, that all Happineſs, according to
its Proportion, is equally real; and that that
which they term Imaginary, too well de-
ferves the Name, there being no ſuch thing
in Nature: For let the Object of it be never
so Phantastick, yet it muſt ſtill carry the
Semblyance and Appearance of Good (other-
wife it can neither move the Appetite nor
pleaſe it, and conſequently be neither an
Object of Deſire nor of Fruition;) and if
so, the Happineſs muſt needs be real, be-
cause the Formality of the Object, tho'twere
never so true and real good, would notwith-
standing lie in the Appearance, not in the
Reality: Whether it be real or no is purely
accidental: For, ſince to be happy can be
nothing eſſe but to enjoy ſomething which
I deſire, the Object of my Happineſs muſt
needs be enjoy'd under the ſame Formality
as 'tis deſired. Now ſince 'tis deſired only
as apparently good, it muſt needs pleaſe me
when obtained under the ſame Notion. So
that it matters not to the Reality of my Hap-
pineſs, whether the Object of it be really good,
or only apprehended so, ſince if it were ne-
ver so real, it pleafes only as apparent. The Fool
has his Paradice as well as the Wife-man, and
for the time is as happy in it; and a kind

G 3

Delu-

[6]

Delusion will make a Cloud as pleasing as
the Queen of Heaven. And therefore I think
it impossible for a man to think himself hap-
py, and (during that Perfection) not really
to be so. He enjoys the Creature of his own
Fancy, worships the Idol of his Imagination,
and the happiest man upon Earth does no
more: For let the Circumstances of his Life
be what they will, his Opinion only that
must give the Relief. Without this, Hea-
ven it self would afford him no Content,
nor the Vision of God prove Beatific. 'Tis
true, the man is feated at the Spring-Head of
Happiness, is surrounded with excellent Ob-
jects; but alas, it appears not so to him; he
is not at all affected with his Condition, but,
like Adam, lies fast in a dead Sleep in the
midst of Paradice.

The Sum of this Argument is this; Good
is in the same manner the Object of Fruition,
as 'tis of Desire; and that is not as really
good in its own Nature, but as 'tis judged so
by the Understanding: And consequently,
that it be only apparent, it must needs be as
effectual to gratify the Appetite as it was at
first to excite it during that Appearance.
So long as it keeps on its Vizor and impoles
upon the Understanding, what is wanting in
the

[ 7 ]

the thing, is made up by an *obliging* Imposture, and *Ignorance* becomes here the Mother of *Happiness* as well as of *Devotion*: But if the man will dare to be wife, and too curiously examine the superficial Tinfel-Good, he undeceives himself to his own Cost, and, like *Adam*, adventuring to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, sees himself naked, and is ashamed. And for this reason I think it impossible for any man to love to be flattered: 'Tis true, he may delight to hear himself commended by those who indeed do flatter him; but the true reason of that is, because he does not apprehend that to be Flattery which indeed is so; but when he once thoroughly knows it, 'tis impossible he should be any longer delighted with it. I shall conclude this Point with this useful Reflection, That since every Man's Happiness depends wholly upon his own Opinion, the Foundation upon which all envious Men proceed, must needs be either false or very uncertain. False, if they think that outward Circumstances and States of Life are all the Ingredients of Happiness; but uncertain however: For since they measure the Happiness of other Men by their own Opinion, 'tis mere Chance if they do not misplace their Envy, unless they were sure the other

G 4

Person

[ 8 ]

Person was of the like Opinion with them-
felves. And now what a vain irrational thing
is it to disquiet our selves into a dislike of
our own Condition, merely because we mi-
ftake another Man's ?

Thus far of the Notion of Happineſs in Ge-
neral; I now proceed to confider that Happi-
neſs which is ὑγιής ἡ ὁλόκληρος (as Plato ſpeaks)
found and entire, perfect and compleat. Con-
cerning the general Notion of which, all men,
I ſuppoſe, are as much agreed as they are in
the Idea of a Triangle. That tis ſuch a State
than which a better cannot be conceiv'd : In
which there is no Evil you can fear, no Good
which you deſire and have not; That which
fully and constantly ſatisfies the Demand of
every Appetite, and leaves no poſſibility for
a deſire of Change; or to ſumm it up in that
comprehenſive Expression of the Poet,

Quod fide esse velis, nihilque malis.

When you would always be what you are,
and (as the Earl of Roscommon very signi-
ficantly renders it) do Rather nothing. This
I ſuppoſe is the utmoſt that can be ſaid or
conceiv'd of it, and leſs than this will not be
enough. And thus far we are all agreed.
For I ſuppoſe, the many various Disputes

ma in-

[ 9 ]

maintained by Philosophers concerning Happineſs, could not reſpect this general Notion of it, but only the particular causes or means whereby it might be acquired. And I find Tully concurring with me in the fame

Observation, *Ea eſt beata vita* (ſays he) *quærimus autem non quæ fit, ſed unde.*

The difficulty is not to frame a conception of a perfectly happy State in the general, but to define in particular wherein it conſifts.

But before I undertake this Province, I think it might not be amils to remove one Prejudice, which, becaufe it has gain'd upon my ſelf sometimes in my Melancholy Retirements, I am apt to think it may be incident to other men alſo. It is this, Whether after ſo many Deſputes about, ſo many reſt-leſs endeavours after this ſtate of perfect Happineſs, there be any ſuch thing or no. Whether it be not a meer *Idea*, as imaginary as *Plato's Common-wealth*, as fictious as the Groves of *Elysium*. I confefs, this ſuſpicion has often times *overcaſt* my mind with black thoughts, damp'd my Devotion, and as it were, clipp'd the Wings of my Aſpiring Soul. And I happened to fall into it upon a ſerious reſlection on the nature of Fruition in the ſeveral Periods and Circumſtances of my Life. For

I

[ 10 ]

I observ'd according to my *Narrow* experience, that I never had in all my Life the fame thoughts of any good in the very time of the enjoying it as I had before. I have known when I have promised my self valt Satisfactions, and my imagination has presented me at a distance with a fair *Landscape* of Delights, yet when I drew nigh to grasp the alluring Happineſs, like the *Sensitive* *Plant* it contracted it self at the touch, and *shrink'd* almost to nothing in the Fruition. And though after the Enjoyment is past, it seems great again upon *Reflection* as it did before in *Expectation*, yet ſhould a *Platonical Revolution* make the fame Circumſtances recur, I ſhould not think so. I found 'twas ever with me as with the *Traveller*, to whom the Ground which is before him, and that which he has left *behind* him ſeems always more curiously embroider'd and delightſome, than that which he *stands* upon. So that my Happineſs, like the time wherein I *thought* to enjoy it, was always either *past* or to *come*, never *present*. Methought I could often say upon a *Recollection*, How happy *was* I at ſuch a time! Or when I was in *expectation*. How happy *shall* I be if I compaſs ſuch a design! But ſcarce ever, I *am* so. I was pretty well pleas'd

[ II ]

pleas'd methought while I expected, while I
hoped, till Fruition jogg'd me out of my
pleasing slumber and I knew it was but a
Dream. And this single Confideration has
often made me even in the very purfuit after
Happineſs, and full career of my Paſſions, to
ſtop ſhort on this ſide of Fruition, and to
choose rather with Mofes upon Mount Nebo
to entertain my fancy with a remote Prospect
of the Happy Land, than to go in and Poſſeſs
it, and then Repine. How then ſhall Man
be happy, when fetting aſide all the Croſſes of
Fortune, he will complain even of Suſeſs,
and Fruition it ſelf ſhall disappoint him !

And this melancholy reflection bred in me
a kind of Suspicion, that for all that I knew
it might be ſo in Heaven too. That although
at this diſtance I might frame to my ſelf bright
Ideas of that Region of Bliſs; yet when I
came to the Poſſeſſion of it, I ſhould not find
that perſect Happineſs there which I expected,
but that it would be always to come as 'tis now,
and that I ſhould ſeek for Heaven even in Hea-
ven it ſelf. That I ſhould not fully acquiſce
in my condition there, but at length deſire a
Change. And that which confirm'd me the more
in this *unhappy Scepticism*, was, because I confi-
der'd that a great number of excellent Beings

who

[ 12 ]

who enjoyed the very *Quintessence* of Blifs,
who were as happy as God and Heaven could
make them, grew soon uneafy and weary of
their State and left their own Habitation,
Which argues that their Happineſs was not
perſeſt and compleat, becauſe otherwife they
would not have deſired a Change, ſince that
very deſire is an Imperfection. And if Hap-
pineſs be not compleat in Heaven, ſure 'tis
impoſſible to be found any where eſſe.

Before therefore I proceed to define where-
in perfect Happineſs does conſiſt, I think it
neceſſary to endeavour the removal of this
Scruple, which, like the flaming Sword, forbids
entrance into Paradice. In order to which,
I ſhall inquire into the true Reaſon why theſe
Sublunary good things when enjoyed do
neither anſwer our expeſtations, nor ſatisfy
our Appetites. Now this muſt proceed either
from the nature of Fruition it ſelf, or from
the Imperfection of it, or from the Object of
it, or from our ſelves. I confers, did this
defect proceed from the very nature of Fruiti-
on (as is ſuppoſed in the Objeſtion) 'tis im-
poſſible there ſhould be any ſuch thing as
perſeſt Happineſs, ſince 'twould faint away
while enjoy'd, and expire in our embraces.
But that it cannot proceed thence, I have this

to

[ 14 ]

infinite Object can never be over-valued and
consequently cannot frustrate our Expectations.

And as we are not to charge Fruition with
our disappointments but our selves (because
we are accessory to our own delusion by ta-
king false measures of things) so neither is
the Unsatisfactoriness of any condition to
be imputed to the Nature of Fruition it self,
but either to the imperfection of it or to the
finiteness of the Object. Let the Object be
never so perfect, yet if the Fruition of it
be in an imperfect measure there will still be
room for Unsatisfactoriness, as it appears in
our enjoyment of God in this Life. Neither
can a finite Object fully satisfy us though we
enjoy it never so thoroughly. For since to
a full satisfaction and acquiescence of Mind 'tis
required that our Faculties be always enter-
tained and we ever enjoying : it is impossible
a finite Object should afford this Satisfaction,
because all the good that is in it (being fi-
nite) is at length run over, and then the en-
joyment is at an end, The flower is fuck'd
dry, and we necessarily desire a Change.
Whenever therefore our enjoyment proves
un satisfying, we may conclude, that either
the Object is finite, or the Fruition imperfect.
But then how came the Angels to be diffatis-
fyd

[ 15 ]

fy'd with their Condition in the Regions of
light and immortality, when they drank free-
ly of the Fountain of Life proceeding
out of the Throne of God, with whom
Revel. 26.
is fulnes of Joy, and at whose Right hand are
Pleasures for evermore. Here certainly there
is no room either for the finitenefs of the Ob-
ject, or the imperfection of Fruition. And
therefore their diffatabaction can be imputed
to no other Cauſe, than the Nature of Frui-
tion in general, which is to leſſen the good
enjoyed, as was ſuppoſed in the Objeſtion.
This I confels preſſes hard, and indeed, I
have but one way to extricate my ſelf from
this difficulty, and that is by ſuppoſing a
State of Probation in the Angels. That they
did not immediately upon their Creation en-
joy an infinite Objeſt, or if they did, yet
that twas in an imperfect meaſure. For ſhould
it be granted that they were at first confirm-
ed in Blifs and compleatly happy both in reſpect
of Fruition and Objeſt, as we ſuppoſe they are
now, I cannot conceive it poffible they ſhould
be diffatisfy'd with their Condition. This
being repugnant to the Idea of Perſect Happ-
pineſs.

Since then this diffatabaction muſt be de-
rived either from the imperfection of the Frui-
tion

[ 16 ]

tion, or the finiteness of the Object, and not
from the Nature of Fruition in the general,
to infer the possibility of perfect Happiness,
there needs no more to be supposed than the
existence of a Being full fraught with infinite
inexhaustible good, and that he is able to
Communicate to the full. There may be
then such a thing as Perfect Happiness. The
possibility of which may also be further pro-
ved (that not explicated) from those bound-
les Desires, that immortal Thrift every man
has after it by Nature: Concerning which I
observe, that nothing does more constantly,
more inseparably cleave to our Minds than
this Desire of perfect and consummated Happ-
pinefs: This, as Plato pathetically expresses it,
is, wééas twv πόνων το ἡλιστον ὁ μέγας ἀγών,
ἐλπὶς ἡ μεγάλη, the most excellent end of all
our Endeavours, the great Prize, the great Hope.
This is the Mark every Man shoots at, and
tho we miss our Aim never so often, yet we
will not, cannot give over; but, like passionate
Lovers, take Resolution from a Revulsion. The
rest of our Passions are much at our own Dis-
pofal; yield either to Reason or Time; we
either Argue our felves out of them, or at
least out-live them. We are not always in
Love with Pomp and Grandeur, nor always
dazzled

[ 17 ]

dazzled with the glittering of Riches ; and
there is a Season when Pleasure it self shall
Court in vain: But the desire of perfect Happineſs
has no Intervals, no Viciffitudes, it
out-lasts the Motion of the Pulse, and ſur-
vives the Ruins of the Grave. Many VVa-
ters cannot quench it, neither can the Floods
Drown it: And now certainly God would
never have planted ſuch an Ardent, ſuch an
importunate Appetite in our Souls, and as it
were interwoven it with our very Natures,
had he not been able to ſatisfie it.

I come now to ſhow wherein this perfect
Happineſs does conſist, concerning which, I
affirm in the firſt place, that it is not to be
found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life.
The greatest Fruition we have of God here,
is imperfect, and conſequently unsatisfactory.
And as for all other Objects they are finite,
and conſequently, though never ſo fully en-
joy'd, cannot afford us perfect Satisfaction.
No; Man knoweth not the price there-
of: Neither is it to be found in the Job 28.
Land of the Living. The Depth ſaith, it is
not in me, and the Sea ſaith, it is not in me.
The Vanity of the Creature has been ſo co-
piously discourſed upon, both by Philoſo-
phers and Divines, and is withall ſo obvi-

H

ous

[ 18 ]

ous to every thinking man's *Experience*, that I need not here take an *Inventory* of the *Creation*, nor turn *Eccleſiastes* after *Solomon*. And besides, I have already anticipated this Argument in what I have ſaid concerning *Fruition*. I ſhall only add one or two Remarks concerning the Objects of *Secular Happineſs*, which are not ſo commonly infiſted upon, to what has been there ſaid. The firſt is this, that the Objects wherein Men generally ſeek for *Happineſs* here, are not only *finite* in their *Nature*, but also *few* in *number*. Indeed, could a Man's Life be ſo contrived, that he ſhould have a new *Pleasure* ſtill ready at hand after ſoon as he was grown *weary* of the Old, and *every* day *enjoy* a *Virgin* Delight, he might then perhaps like Mr. *Hobbs* his Noſtion, and for a while think himſelf happy in this *continued Succession of new Aquisitions*. But alas, Nature does not treat us with this Variety. The compaſs of our *enjoyments* is much ſhorter than that of our Lives, and there is a *Periodical Circulation* of our *Pleasures* as well as of our *Blood*.

—*Versamur ibidem atque inſumus uſque.*
*Nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas.*

Lucretius.

The

[ 19 ]

The Enjoyments of our Lives run in a perpetual Round like the Months in the *Kalendar*, but with a quicker Revolution; we dance like *Fairies* in a *Circle*, and our whole Life is but a naufeous *Tantology*: We riselike the Sun, and run the fame Course we did the day before, and to morrow is but the fame over again: So that the greatest Favourite of Fortune will have Reasom often enough to cry out with him in *Seneca, Quosque eadem?*
But there is another Grievance which contributes to defeat our Endeavours after perfect Happiness in the Enjoyments of this Life; Which is, that the Objects wherein we seek it, are not only *finite* and *few*; but that they commonly prove Occasions of greater *Sorrow* to us than ever they afforded us *Content*. This may be made out several ways, as from the Labour of Getting, the Care of Keeping, the fear of Losing, and the like Topicks, commonly infilted on by others; but I wave these, and fix upon another Account lefs blown up-on, and I think more material than any of the reft. It is this, that altho the Object lo-fes that great appearance in the *Fruition* which it had in the *expectation*, yet after it is gone it Resumes it again. Now we, when we lament the lofs, do not take our meaures

H 2

from

[ 20 ]

from that appearance which the Object had in
the *Enjoyment* (as we should do to make our
farrow not exceed our *Happiness*) but from
that which it has in the *reflection*, and conse-
quently we must needs be more *miserable* in
the loss then we were *happy* in the *enjoyment*.

From these and the like *Considerations*, I
think it will evidently appear, that this per-
fect *Happiness* is not to be found in any thing
we can enjoy in this Life. Wherein then
does it confest? I answer positively, in the
full and entire Fruition of God. He (as
*Plato* speaks) is ἀρξωμένος ἀρχὴν ἀρχεῖν
the Proper and Principal End of Man, the
Center of our *Tendency*, the Ark of our *Rest*.
He is the Object which alone can satisfy the
appetite of the most Capacious Soul, and
stand the *Tent* of Fruition to Eternity. And
to enjoy him fully is perfect Felicity. This
in general, is no more than what is deliver'd
to us in Scripture, and was believ'd by many
of the *Heathen Philosophers*. But the manner
of this Fruition requires a more particular
*Consideration*. Much is said by the School-
men upon this Subject, whereof, in the first
place, I shall give a short and methodical ac-
count, and then fix upon the Opinion which
I best approve of. The first thing that I ob-
serve,

[ 21 ]

ferve, is, that 'tis generally agreed upon among
them, that this Fruition of God confists in
fome Operation ; and I think with very good
Reason. For as by the Objective part of per-
fect Happineſs we understand that which is
beſt and laſt, and to which all other things
are to be referr'd ; So by the Formal part
of it muſt be understood the beſt and laſt Ha-
bitude of Man toward that beſt Object, ſo
that the Happineſs may both ways ſatisfy the
Appetite, that is, as 'tis the beſt thing, and
as 'tis the Poſſeſſion, Use, or Fruition of that
beſt thing : Now this habitude whereby the
beſt thing is perfectly poſſeſ'd, muſt needs be
fome Operation, becauſe Operation is the ulti-
mate perfection of every Being. Which
Axiom (as Cajetan well obſerves) muſt not
be ſo understood as if Operation taken by it
ſelf were more perfect than the thing which
tends to it, but that every thing with its
Operation is more perfect than without it.

The next thing which I obſerve, is, that 'tis also farther agreed upon among them, that this Operation wherein our Fruition of God does conſift, is an Operation of the Intellectual part, and not of the Sensitive. And this also I take to be very reaſonable. First, becauſe 'tis generally receiv'd, that the Eſtence of God cannot be the Object of any of our Senſes.

H 3

[ 22 ]

Senſes. But Secondly, Suppose it could, yet ſince
this Operation wherein our perfect Happineſs
does conſiſt muſt be the perfecteſt Operation,
and ſince that of the Intellectual part is more
perfect than that of the Sensitive, it follows
that the Operation whereby we enjoy God
muſt be that of the Intellectual part only.

But now, whereas the Intellectual part of
man (as 'tis oppoſed to the Sensitive) is dou-
ble, viz.: That of the Understanding, and that
of the Will, there has commenced a great
Controverſy between the Thomiſts and the
Scotiſts, in which Act or Operation of the Ra-
tional Soul the Fruition of God does conſiſt,
whether in an Act of the Understanding, or
in an Act of the Will. The Thomiſts will
have it conſiſt purely in an Act of the Un-
derstanding, which is Vifion. The Scotiſts in
Act of the Will, which is Love. I intend not
here to launſh out into thofe Voluminous In-
tricacies and Abſtrusties, occasioned by the
management of this Argument: It may ſuſſice
to tell you, that I think they are both in the
extream, and therefore I ſhall take the middle
way and resolve the perfect Fruition of God
partly into Vifion and partly into Love. These
are the two arms with which we embrace the
Divinity, and unite our Souls to the fair one
and

[ 23 ]

and the good. These I conceive are both so
effential to the perfect Fruition of God, that
the Idea of it can by no means be maintain-
ed if either of them be wanting. For, since
God is both Supream Truth and infinite Good-
nefs, he cannot be intirely possefs'd but by the
most clear knowledge and the most ardent love.
And besides, since the Soul is happy by her
Faculties, her Happineſs must conſist in the
most perfect Operation of each Faculty. For
if Happineſs did conſist formally in the ſole
Operation of the Understanding (as moſt
ſay) or in the ſole Operation of the Will (as
others) the Man would not be compleatly
and in all reſpects Happy. For how is it poſſi-
ble a Man ſhould be perfectly Happy in loving
the greatest good if he did not know it, or in
knowing it if he did not love it? And more-
over, these two Operations do ſo mutually
tend to the promotion and conſervation of
one another, that upon this depends the per-
petuity and the conſtancy of our Happineſs.
For while the Bleſſed do ώρεϊσωπον ώρεΐς ώρεϊ-
σωπον, Face to Face contemplate the Supream
Truth and the infinite Goodneſs, they cannot
chufe but love perpetually; and while they
perpetually love, they cannot chufe but perpe-
tually contemplate. And in this mutual re-

H 4

ciprocation

[ 24 ]

ciprocation of the Actions of the Soul confifts
the perpetuity of Heaven, the Circle of Feli-
city.

Besides this way of resolving our fruition
of God into Vision and Love, there is a Famous
Opinion laid to be broacht by Henricus Gan-
davensis, who, upon a Supposition that God
could not be so fully enjoy'd as is required to
perfect Happineſs, only by the Operations or
Powers of the Soul, fancied a certain Illapſe
whereby the Divine Eſſence did fall in with,
and as it were penetrate the Eſſence of the
Bleſſed. Which Opinion he endeavours to
illustrate by this Similitude. That as a piece
of Iron, red hot by reason of the Illapſe of the
fire into it, appears all over like fire, so the
Souls of the Bleſſed by this Illapſe of the Di-
vine Eſſence into them, ſhall be all over Di-
vine.

I think he has ſcarce any followers in this
Opinion, but I am ſure he had a leader. For
this is no more than what Plato taught before
him, as is to be ſeen in his Discourſes about the
refuſion of the Souls of good men into the
Anima Mundi, which is the ſelf-fame in other
terms with this Opinion. And the Truth of what
I affirm may farther appear from an expreſſi-
on of that great Platonick Plotinus, (viz.) that
the

[ 25 ]

the Soul will then be Happy when it Enn.6.lib.
shall depart hence to God, and as a- 9. cap. 10.
nother and no longer her self shall become
wholely his, ἐαυτῷ σειρὰ ὑσπερ ἀντρώπων ἀντὶ ὑν συν-
δας, having joyn'd her self to him as a Center
to a Center.

That such an intimate Conjunction with God
as is here described is possible, seems to me
more than credible from the Nature of the
Hypostatic Union, but whether our Fruition
of God after this Life shall conſift in it, none
know but those happy Souls who enjoy him,
and therefore I shall determine nothing be-
fore the time. This only I obſerve, that
ſhould our Fruition of God conſift in such an
Union or rather Penetration of Eſſences, that
would not exclude but rather infer those Ope-
rations of Viſion and Love as neceſſary to Frui-
tion; but on the other hand, there ſeems no
such neceſſity of this Union to the Fruition,
but that it may be conceiv'd intire without it.
And therefore why we ſhould multiply diffi-
culties without cauſe, I ſee no reaſon. For
my part I ſhould think my ſelf ſufficiently
happy in the clear Viſion of my Maker, nor
ſhould I deſire any thing beyond the
Prayer of Moſes, I beſeech thee ſhem
me thy Glory.

Exod.33.
18.

For

[ 26 ]

For what an infinite Satisfaction, Happi-
neſs, and Delight muſt it needs be to have a
clear and intimate perception of that Primi-
tive and Original Beauty, Perfection and
Harmony, whereof all that appears fair and ex-
cellent either to our Senſes or Understandings
in this Life is but a faint imitation, a pale Re-
flection! To ſee him who is the Fountain of
all Being, containing in him ſelf the perfecti-
on, not only of all that is, but of all that is
poſſible to be, the Alpha and Omega, the be-
ginning and the ending, the first and the last,
which is, and which was, and which is
to come, the Almighty! To ſee him of
Rev. 1. 8.
whom all Nature is the Image, of whom all
the Harmony both of the viſible and inviſible
World is but the Eccho! To ſee him, who
(as Plato divinely and magniſcently expresſes
it) is πολυ πέλαγ & τῶ ἡλι ἀυτὸ ἡθ' ἀυτὸ μεθ'
ἀυτὴ μονοειδὴ ἀεί ὄν. The immeſſe Ocean of
Beauty, which is it ſelf by it ſelf, with it ſelf,
uniform, alwayes exiſting! This certainly will
aſſect the Soul with all the pleaſing and ravi-
ſhing Transports of Love and Desire, Joy and
Delight, Wonder and Amazement, together
with a ſettled Acquieſcence and Complacency
of Spirit only leſs infinite than the Lovelineſs
that cauſes it, and the peculiar Complacency of
him

[27]

Ehim who rejoices in his own fulneſs, and the
Comprehenſions of Eternity. We see how
at Pſtrangely our Senſe of Seeing is affected with
the Harmony of Colours, and our ſence of
Hearing with the Harmony of Sounds, inſo-
much that ſome have been too weak for the
enjoymment, and have grown mad with the
Sublimate of Pleasure. And if so, what then
ſhall we think of the Beatiſc Vifſon, the plea-
ſure of which will ſo far tranſcend that of the
other, as God who is all over Harmony and
Proportion exceeds the ſweeteſt Melody of
Sounds and Colours, and the perception of
the Mind is more vigorous, quick and pier-
cing than that of the Senſes? This is perfect
Happineſs, this is the Tree of Life which
grows in the midſt of the Paradife of God,
this is Heaven, which while the Learned di-
ſpute about, the Good only enjoy. But I ſhall not
venture to Soar any longer in theſe Heights,
I find the Æther too thin here to breath in
long, and the Brightneſs of the Region flaſh-
es too ſtrong upon my tender Senſe; I ſhall
therefore haſten to deſcend from the Mount of
God, left I grow giddy with ſpeculation, and
loſe thoſe Secrets which I have learnt there,
the Cabala of Felicity.

And

[ 28 ]

And now, (Sir) I come to consider your Queftion (viz.) Wherein the greatest Hap- pineſs attainable by Man in this Life does conſift. Concerning which, there is as great variety of Opinions among Philosophers, as there is among Geographers about the Seat of Paradise. The Learned Varro reckons up no leſs than 288 ſeveral Opinions about it, and yet notwithstanding the number of Wri- ters who have bequeath'd Volumes upon this Subject to Pofterity, they ſeem to have been in the dark in nothing more than in this, and ( excepting only a few Platonifts, who placed Man's greatest End in the Contemplation of Truth ) they ſeem to have undertak en nothing ſo unhappily, as when they eſ- fay'd to write of Happineſs. Some meaſure their Happineſs by the high-tide of their Riches, as the Egyptians did the Fertility of the Year by the increaſe of the River Nile. Others place it in the Pleaſures of Sence, others in Honour and Greatneſs. But theſe and the like were Men of the common Herd, low groveling Souls, that either underſood not the Dignity of Humane Nature, or eſſe ſorg that they were Men. But there were others

of a Diviner Genius and Sublimer Spirit,
Queis meliore luto finxit præcordia Titan.

Who

[ 29 ]

Who had a more generous blood running in their Veins, which made them put a just value upon themselves, and corn to place their greatest Happiness in that which they should blush to enjoy. And those were the Stoics and the Peripatetics, who both place the greatest Happiness of this Life in the Actions of Vertue, with this only difference, that whereas the former are contented with Naked Vertue, the latter require some other Collateral things to the farther accomplishment of Happiness, such as are Health and Strength of Body, a Competent Lively-hood, and the like.

And this Opinion has been subscribed to by the hands of eminent Moralifts in all Ages. And as it is Venerable for its Antiquity, so has it gain'd no small Authority from the Pen of a great Modern Writer (Descartes) who resolves the greatest Happiness of this Life into the right use of the Will, which conflicts in this, that a Man have a firm and constant purpose always to do that which he shall judge to be best.

I confess, the Practice of Vertue is a very great instrument of Happiness, and that there is a great deal more true satisfaction and solid content to be found in a constant course of well living, than in all the soft Careles of the

[ 31 ]

Now this I readily submit to as a great
truth, that the degrees of Happineſs vary
according to the degrees of Vertue, and conſe-
quently that that Life which is moſt Vertuous
is moſt Happy, with reference to those that
are Vicious or leſs Vertuous, every degree of
Vertue having a proportionate degree of
Happineſs accompanying it, (which is all, I
suppofe, that excellent Author intends.) But
I do not think the moſt Vertuous Life ſo the
moſt Happy, but that it may become Happier,
unless something more be comprehended in
the Word (Vertue) then the Stoics, Peripatetics,
and the generality of other Moralifts under-
stand by it. For with them it signifies no
more but only ſuch a firm σένη or habitude
of the Will to good, whereby we are con-
ſtantly diſpoſed, notwithstanding the contra-
ry tendency of our Paffions, to perform the
necessary Offices of Life. This they call Mo-
ral or Civil Vertue, and although this brings
always Happineſs enough with it to make am-
ple amends for all the difficulties which at-
tend the practice of it: Yet I am not of Opi-
nion that the greatest Happineſs attainable by
Man in this Life confiſts in it. But there is
another and a higher Senſe of the Word,
which frequently occurs in the Pythagorean
and

[ 3² ]

and Platonic Writings, (viz.) Contemplation
and the Unitive way of Religion. And this
they call Divine Vertue. I allow of the di-
stinction, but I would not be thought to de-
rive it from the Principle, as if Moral Vertue
were acquired, and this infused (for to speak
ingeniously, infused Vertue seem'd ever to me
as great a Paradox in Divinity, as Occult
qualities in Philosophy) but from the noble-
ness of the Object, the Object of the former
being Moral good, and the Object of the lat-
ter God himself. The former is a State of
Proficiency, the latter of Perfection. The
former is a State of difficulty and contention,
the latter of ease and serenity. The former
is employ'd in mastering the Passions, and
regulating the actions of common Life, the
latter in Divine Meditation and the Extases
of Seraphic Love. He that has only the for-
mer, is like Moses with much difficulty climb-
ing up to the Holy Mount, but he that has
the latter, is like the same Person converging
with God on the serene top of it, and thin-
ing with the Rays of anticipated Glory. So
that this latter supposes the acquisition of
the former, and consequently has all the
Happiness retaining to the other, besides what
it adds of its own. This is the last Stage of

Humane

[ 33 ]

Humane Perfection, the utmost round of the Ladder whereby we ascend to Heaven, one Step higher is Glory. Here then will I build my Tabernacle, for it is good to be here. Here will I set up my Pillar of Rest, here will I fix, for why should I travel on farther in pursuit of any greater Happiness, since Man in this Station is but a little lower than the Angels, one remove from Heaven. Here certainly is the greatest happiness, as well as Perfection attainable by Man in this State of imperfection. For since that Happiness which is absolutely perfect and complete consists in the clear and intimate Vision and most ardent Love of God, hence we ought to take our Measures, and conclude that to be the greatest Happiness attainable in this State, which is the greatest participation of the other. And that can be nothing else but the Unitive way of Religion, which consists of the Contemplation and Love of God. I shall say something of each of these feverally, and something of the Unitive way of Religion, which is the result of both, and so shut up this Discourse.

By Contemplation in general (Koine) we understand an application of the Understanding to some truth. But here in this place we take the word in a more peculiar sense, as it

I

signifies

( 34 )

signifies an habitual, attentive, fteddy applica-
tion or conversion of the Spirit to God and
his Divine Perfections. Of this the Masters
of *Myſtic Theology* commonly make fifteen
Degrees. The firſt is Intuition of Truth, the
ſecond is a Retirement of all the Vigour and
Strength of the Faculties into the innermoſt
parts of the Soul, the third is Spiritual Silence,
the fourth is Reſt, the fifth is Union, the
fixth is the Hearing of the ſtill Voice of God,
the ſeventh is Spiritual Slumber, the eighth
is Eſtacy, the ninth is Rapture, the tenth is
the Corporeal Appearance of Chriſt and the
Saints, the eleventh is the Imaginary Appea-
rance of the Same, the twelfth is the Intel-
lectual Viſion of God, the thirteenth is the
Viſion of God in Obſcurity, the fourteenth
is an admirable Manifestation of God, the
ſifteenth is a clear and intuitive Viſion of him,
fuch as St. *Auftin* and *Tho. Aquinas* attribute
to St. *Paul*, when he was rapt up into the
third Heaven. Others of them reckon ſeven
degrees only, (viz. ) Tafte, Desire, Satiety,
Ebriety, Security, Tranquility, but the name
of the ſeventh ( they ſay ) is known only to
God.

I ſhall not ſtand to examine the Scale of
this Diviſion, perhaps there may be a kind
of

[ 35 ]

of a *Pythagoric Superstition* in the number.
But this I think I may affirm in general, that
the Soul may be *wound* up to a most strange
degree of *Abstraction* by a silent and steddy
Contemplation of God. Plato defines Contem-
plation to be ἀόσις ἡ χρεισμός του φυχῆς δόπος
σώματος, a Solution and a Separation of the
Soul from the Body. And some of the severe-
ner Platonists have been of Opinion, that 'tis
possible for a Man by mere intention of thought
not only to withdraw the Soul from all com-
merce with the Senates, but even really to se-
parate it from the Body, to untwist the Liga-
ments of his Frame, and by degrees to resolve
himself into the State of the Dead. And thus
the Jews expreſs the manner of the Death of
Moses, calling it *Oſculum Oris Dei, the Kiffs
of God's Mouth*. That is, that he breath'd
out his Soul by the mere Strength and Ener-
gy of Contemplation, and expired in the Em-
braces of his Maker. A Happy way of Dy-
ing! How ambitious ſhould I be of such a
conveyance, were it practicable? How paſſi-
onately ſhould I joyn with the Church in the
Canticles ? φιλισσάτω με δὲ φιλιμάτων σόμα-
τω ἀνθς, Let him Kiffs me with the Kiffes of
his Mouth. Cant. I Ver. 2.

12

But

[ 36 ]

But however this be determin'd, certain it
is, that there are exceeding great Meaures of
Abstraction in Contemplation, so great, that
sometimes whether a Man be in the Body or
out of the Body, he himself can hardly tell.
And consequently the Soul in these Prælud-
ums of Death, these Neighbourhoods of Sepa-
ration, must needs have brighter glimpses, and
more Beatifick Ideas of God, than in a state
void of these Elevations, and consequently
must love him with greater Ardency. Which
is the next thing I am to consider.

The love of God in general may be confi-
sidered either as it is purely intellectual, or as
it is a Passion. The first is, when the Soul,
upon an apprehension of God as a good, dele-
dable, and agreeable Object, joyns her self
to him by the Will. The latter is, when
the motion of the Will is accompany'd with
a sensible Commotion of the Spirits, and an
eftuation of the Blood. Some I know are
of Opinion, that 'tis not possible for a man
to be affected with this sensitive Love of
God, which is a Passion, because there is
nothing in God which falls under our ima-
gination, and consequently ( the imagination
being the only Medium of conveyance ) it
cannot be propagated from the Intellectual
part

[ 37 ]

part to the Senſitive. Whereupon they af-
firm, that none are capable of this ſenſitive
paſſionate Love of God but Chriſtians, who
enjoy the Mystery of the Incarnation, where-
by they know God has condeſcended ſo far
as to cloath himſelf with Fleſh, and to be-
come like one of us. But 'tis not all the
Sophiſtry of the cold Logicians that ſhall
work me out of the belief of what I feel and
know, and rob me of the ſweeteſt entertain-
ment of my Life, the Paſſionate Love of God.
Whatever ſome Men pretend, who are Stran-
gers to all the affectionate heats of Religion,
and therefore make their Phiſophy a Plea
for their indevotion, and extinguiſh all Holy
Ardours with a Syllogism; yet I am firmly
perſuaded, that our love of God may be not
only paſſionate, but even Wonderfully ſo, and
exceeding the Love of Women. 'Tis an Expe-
rimental and therefore undeniable Truth, that
Paſſion is a great Inſtrument of Devotion, and
accordingly we find, that Men of the moſt
warm and pathetick Tempers and Amorous
Complexions (Provided they have but Con-
fideration enough withall to fix upon the
right Object) prove the greateſt Votaries in
Religion. And upon this account it is, that
to heighten our Love of God in our Religi-

I 3

ous

[ 38 ]

ous *Addresses*, we endeavour to excite our Passions by *Musick*, which would be to as little purpose as the *Fanatic* thinks 'tis, if there were not such a thing as the *Passionate Love of God*. But then as to the *Objection*, I Answer with the excellent *Descartes*, that although in God who is the *Object* of our *Love*, we can *imagine* nothing, yet we can *imagine* that our Love, which conjoins in this, that we would unite our *selves* to the *Object* beloved, and consider our *selves* as it were a part of it. And the sole *Idea* of this very Conjunction is enough to stir up a heat about the Heart, and so kindle a very *vehement Passion*. To which I add, that although the *Beauty* or *Amiableness* of God be not the fame with that which we see in *Corporeal Beings*, and consequently cannot directly fall within the Sphere of the imagination, yet it is something *Analogous* to it, and that very *Analogy* is enough to excite a *Passion*. And this I think sufficient to warrant my general division of the Love of God into *Intellectual* and *Sensitive*.

But there is a more *peculiar Acceptation* of the *Love* of God proper to this place. And it is that which we call *Seraphic*. By which I understand in short, that Love of God which is

[ 39 ]

is the effect of an intense Contemplation of him. This differs not from the other in kind, but only in degree, and that it does exceedingly, in as much as the thoughtful Contemplative Man (as I hinted before) has clearer Perceptions and livelier Impressions of the Divine Beauty, the lovely Attributes and Perfection of God, than he whose Soul is more deeply set in the Flesh, and lies groveling in the bottom of the Dungeon.

That the nature of this Seraphic Love may be the better understood, I shall consider how many degrees there may be in the Love of God. And I think the Computation of Bellarmin, lib. 2. de monachis, cap. 2. is accurate enough. He makes four. The first is to love God proportionately to his Lovelines, that is, with an infinite Love; and this degree is peculiar to God himself. The second is to Love him, not proportionably to his Lovelines, but to the utmost Capacity of a Creature, and this degree is peculiar to Saints and Angels in Heaven. The third is to love him not proportionably to his Lovelines, nor to the utmost capacity of a Creature, absolutely consider'd, but to the utmost capacity of a Mortal Crea-

I 4

ture

[ 40 ]

ture in this Life. And this (he says) is pro-
per to the Religious. The fourth is to love
him not proportionably to his Lovelineſs, nor
to the utmoſt capacity of a Creature, confi-
der'd either abſolutely or with reſpect to this
Life, but only ſo as to love nothing equally
with him or above him. That is, not to do
any thing contrary to the Divine Love. And
this is abſolute indiſpenſable duty, leſs than
which will not qualify us for the enjoyment
of God hereafter.

Now this Seraphic Love which we here
discourse of is in the third degree: When a
Man, after many degrees of Abstraction from
the Animal Life, many a profound and ſted-
dy Meditation upon the Excellencies of God,
sees ſuch a vaſt Ocean of Beauty and Perfection
in him, that he loves him to the utmoſt ſtretch
of his Power; When he ſits under his ſhadow
with great delight, and his fruit is ſweet to his
Taſt. Cant. 2. 3. When he Confecrates and
Devotes himſelf wholly to him, and has no
Paſſion for Inferiour Objeſs. When he is ra-
vished with the delights of his Service, and
breaths out ſome of his Soul to him in every
Prayer. When he is delighted with Anthems
of Praise and Adoration more than with
Marrow

[ 41 ]

Marrow and Fatneſs, and Feaſts upon Alleluiah. When he melts in a Calenture of Devotion, and his Soul breaketh out with fervent Desire. Pfal. 119. When the one thing he delights in is to converſe with God in the Beauty of Holineſs, and the one thing he deſires to ſee him as he is in Heaven. This is Seraphic Love, and this with Contemplation makes up that which the Mystic Divines ſtyle the Unitive way of Religion: It is called ſo because it Unites us to God in the moſt excellent manner that we are capable of in this Life. By Union here I do not understand that which is local or preſential, because I consider God as Omniprefent. Neither do I mean a Union of Grace ( as they call it ) whereby we are reconciled to God, or a Union of Charity, whereof it is ſaid, he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God and God in him. Jo. 4. 16. The firſt of these being as common to the inanimate things as to the moſt Extaſſ'd Soul upon Earth. And the two laſt being common to all good men, who indeed love God, but yet want the excellency of Contemplation and the Mystic Union. The Union then which I here ſpeak of, is that which is between the Faculty and the Objeſt.

[ 42 ]

jeç. Which conſists in some Habitude
or Operation of one toward the other.
The Faculties here are the Understanding and
Will, the Object God, and the Operations
Contemplation and Love. The reſult of which
two is the Mystick Union. Which, according
to his complex Notion of it that I have

here delivered, is thus moſt admi-
rably repreſented by the excellent
Bishop Taylour. It is (says he) a
Prayer of quietneſs and ſilence, and

a Meditation extraordinary, a Discourse with-
out variety, a Vifion and Intuition of Divine
Excellencies, an immediate entry into an Orb
of light, and a reſolution of all our Faculties
into Sweetneſs, Aſſections, and Starings upon
the Divine Beauty. And is carried on to Ex-
tafſes, Raptures, Sufpensions, Elevations, Ab-
ſtractions and Apprehensions beatifical.

I make no doubt but that many an ho-
neſt Pious Soul arrives to the heavenly Ca-
naan, who is not fed with this Manna in
the Wilderneſs. But though every one muſt
not expeſt theſe Antepaſts of Felicity that is
vertuous, yet none eſſe muſt. Paradise was
never open but to a State of Innocence. But
neither is that enough. No, this Mount of

God's

The great
Exemplar,
pag. 60.

[ 43 ]

God's Prefence is fenced not only from the *profane*, but also from the *moderately* vertuous. 'Tis the Privilege of Angelical Diffpositions, and the Reward of *eminent* Piety and an excellent Religion, to be admitted to these Divine Repafts, these Feafts of love. And here I place the greatest Happineſs attainable by Man in this Life, as being the neareſt Approach to the State of the Bleſſed above, the outer Court of Heaven.

These ( Sir ) are my thoughts concerning Happineſs. I might have spun them out into a greater length, but I think a little Plot of ground thick-fown is better than a great Field which for the most part of it lies Fallow. I have endeavour'd to deliver my Notions with as much Perſpicuity and in as good Method as I could, and so to answer all the ends of Copiousneſs, with the advantage of a shorter Cut. If I appear singular in any of my Notions, 'tis not out of an induſtrious affectation of Novelty, but because in the composing of this discourse ( the Meditation of a few broken hours in a Garden ) I confulted more my own experimental Notices of things and private Reflections than the Writings of others. So that if sometimes I happen

[ 46 ]

ing it I shall work you into a contrary per-
fusion.

Sir, You say you should like my Notion concerning the reality of that which is usually call'd *Imaginary Happiness*, that is, ( as you well explain both your own and my meaning ) that although the *Object* may be an *Imaginary Good*, yet the *Happiness* which confists in the Fruition of that Object, will not be *Imaginary too*, but real, and consequently, that 'tis impossible for a man to seem to himself to be happy, and not to be really so, all Happiness confisting in *Opinion*. This Notion, you say, you should like rarely well, could you free your self from one difficulty which it engages you upon ; (viz.) That hereafter, in the state of Glory, either one Saint shall think himself as happy as another, or not ; if not, this must needs occafion Envy or Discontent, but if one shall think himself as happy as another, then, according to my *Hypothesis*, that *Opinion* is the Measure of Happiness, 'twill follow that he will really be so ; and this brings in *Equality* of Happiness, which you look upon ( and I think justly too ) as another absurdity.

I confess, Sir, this Argument is pretty
subtle and surprizing, but I conceive the

Knots

[ 47 ]

Knots of it may be untied by this Answer.
First, it may be justly questioned, whether
the first part of your *Dilemma* be necessarily
attended with the appendant absurdity,
'Tis true indeed, not to think ones self as hap-
py as another, is the Spring of Envy or Dis-
content among Men in this World, but whe-
ther this be the *genuin* and *constant* effect of
that Consideration, or whether it ought not
rather to be ascribed to the present Infirmi-
ties and Imperfections of Human Nature,
may admit Dispute. But in case this abfurd-
dity does inseparably cleave to the first part,
then I betake my self to the latter, and af-
firm, that in Heaven one Saint shall think him-
felf as happy as another. Then, according
to my own Notion (*say you*) it will fol-
low that he *is really* so. No, I deny the con-
sequence, the invalidity of which will plain-
ly appear by distinguishing the ambiguity
of the *Phraſe*. For this Expression, *One Saint
thinks himself as happy as another*, may be
taken in a double ſenſe, either that he thinks
himſelf as happy as he himſelf thinks that o-
ther, or that he thinks himſelf as happy as
that other thinks himſelf. I grant, ſhould
one Saint think himſelf as happy as another
in this latter ſenſe of the Phraſe, he would,
according

[ 48 ]

according to my *Hypothesis*, really be so; so
that this would bring in equality. And there-
fore in this Senſe I deny the Propoſition, and
that without the least danger of ſplitting up-
on the first absurdity. But for the former
Senſe, *that* has no ſuch *levelling* quality, for
to ſay that I think my ſelf as happy as I think
another, amounts to no more than this, that
in my apprehenſion another does not exceed
me in Happineſs: But tho he does not in *my*
apprehenſion, yet he may in *reality*, for tho
my Opinion gives meaſures to my own Happ-
ineſs, yet it does not to another Man. So that
one Saint may be ſaid to think himſelf as hap-
py as another in the former Senſe, without
equalling the Happineſs of the Blessed, tho, I
confers, I ſhould much rather adhere to the
contrary propoſition, (* viz.*.) that *one ſhall
not think himſelf as happy as another*, in caſe
such an Opinion be not neceſſarily attended
with *Envy* or *Discontent*. Because it ſeems
unreasonable to make them ignorant of the
degrees of one anothers Bliſs, unleſs that ig-
norance be neceſſarily required to prevent the
alledg'd absurdities. But I *determin* nothing
in this point, my buſineſs was only to break
the force of your *Dilemma*, and to ſhow that
my Notion does not involve you in the dif-
ſiculty

[ 49 ]

ficulty supposed. This, Sir, is all that I think
necessary to say to a Person of your apprehension, and therefore I end these nice Speculations with this profitable reflection, that altho the Notion of Happineſs be intricate and obscure, yet the means of attaining it are plain, and therefore twould be most advisable both for you and me chiefly to apply our ſelves to the latter here, and we ſhall understand the former with the best ſort of Knowledge, that of Experience, hereafter.

Yours

J. N.

K

Ano-

[ 50 ]

*Another Letter to the same Person,
concerning the true Notion of
Plato's Ideas, and of Platonic
Love.*

SIR,

Were I not as well acquainted with your singular *modesty*, as I am with your intellectual accomplishments, I should readily conclude, that your directing your inquiries to *me* proceeded not so much from a Curiosity to *improve your own* Knowledge, as to *try mine*. But when I consider that you are ignorant of nothing so much as of your own Worth and Abilities, I begin to think it possible that you may propose these *Questions* even to *me* out of a desire to be *informed*. Which way so ever it is, I acknowledge my self to be obliged to you for affording me an opportunity of serving you, especially in such an Instance, where I cannot gratify your Requeft without *humouring my own Genius* at the same time. For indeed to my apprehension, there is

[ 51 ]

is not a finer or more Sublime piece of Spe-
culation in all Plato's Philosophy, than that
of his Ideas and that of his Love, tho it has
undergon the fame hard Fate with many o-
ther excellent Theories, firſt, to be either ig-
noranily miſunderſood, or malitiouſly miſre-
prefented, and then popularly vilify'd and de-
cry'd.

To do right therefore to the name of this
great Man, as well as to ſatisfy your De-
mands, I ſhall firſt propoſe the general miſtake,
and then rectify it, firſt preſent you with the ſup-
pos'd Opinion of Plato, and then with the
true and genuin one. I begin with his Ideas,
by which 'tis taken for granted by the gene-
rality of Writers, especially thoſe of the Pe-
ripatetic Order, that he underſtood univerſal
Natures or abſtract Eſſences ſubſilting eter-
nally by themſelves, Separate both from the
mind of God and all ſingular Beings, accord-
ing to which, as to many patterns, all Singu-
lars are form'd. As for inſtance, that a Bull,
not this or that in particular, but a univerſal
Bull, or a Bull in general, ſhould exiſt by it
ſelf eternally, according to which all parti-
cular Bulls were made. Sir, I ſuppofe you
can hardly forbear ſmiling at the odneſs of
the Conceit, but as ridiculous as you may

K 2

think

[ 52 ]

think it, 'tis said to be maintained by no lefs
a Man than *Plato*, and has been thought of
that *moment* too, that *Multitudes* of great
Men have fet themfelves very *feriously* to
confute it as a dangerous Hereſy, and have
oppoſed it with as much *zeal* as ever St. *Auſtin*
did the *Manichees* or the *Pelagians*.

But now, that this Opinion was not only
for its Abſurdity and Contradictiouſneſs unwor-
thy of the contemplative and refin'd Spirit
of *Plato*; but was alſo apparently none of his,
I dare ſay any capable Person will be con-
vinc'd that ſhall heedfully and impartially ex-
amin' and compare the Works of *Plato*; And
this *Ariſtotle* himſelf muſt needs have known
(he having been his conſtant Auditour for
twenty years together) but only he wanted a
Shadow to fight with, and ſo father'd this
monſtrous Opinion upon his Maſter. And
of this diſingenuity of *Ariſtotle*, together with
other abuſes, *Plato* himſelf complain'd, while
alive,in theſe words ; 'Αρειστέλνης ἡμᾶς ἀπέλα-
υπισε ἡχθαπέρει τὰ πωλάεια ἀρνηδέντα τῷ μη-
τέρᾳ, as is recorded by *Laertius* in the Life
of *Ariſtotle*.

And now, that the groſſneſs of this Abuſe
may the more fully appear, I will in the next
place preſent you with another Senſe of Pla-
to's

[ 53 ]

to's *Ideas*, and such as by a more than ordinary acquaintance with his Works, I know to be the *true* and *genuine* one. Know then that *Plato* considering the World as an effect of an *intellectual* Agent, and that in the Operations of all other *Artificers* or rational *Efficients* there must be some form in the Mind of the *Artificer* presupposed to the Work (for otherwise what difference will there be between a *fortuitous* effect and an *intended* one, and how comes the effect to be of this Species rather than another?) thought it necessary to suppose *a iuxvia &darr; gadeisypalea*, Eternal Forms, Models or Patterns, of all the Species of being in Nature existing in the Mind of God. And these he calls *Ideas*. I say existing in the Mind of God, for there is not the least Intimation in all *Plato's* Works of any such *Ideas* existing separately from the Divine intellect, nor do the great Masters of *Platonic Philosophy*, *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, *Procles*, or any other that I know of make mention of any such *Spectres* and *Ghosts* of Entity. No, this Monster was hatch'd in *Aristotle's* Brain, and I believe did never enter *Plato's* Head so much as in a Dream. For he is not only silent about it, but does in several places especially affirm the contrary; Particularly in his *Timæus*, where, of set purpose, he describes the

K 3

Origin

[ 54 ]

Origin of the World, he says that God made the World according to that Pattern or *Idea* which he had in his Mind. The fame you will find more amply confirm'd in his *Hippias*, his *Parmenides*, and his fixth Book of Repub. and many other places. And these *Ideas* he calls τὰ ἀρωγὰς νομά, the first Intelligibles, and τὰ ὄνταν μέτες, the Measures of the things that are, implying, that as all things were form'd according to these specifical Platonic forms; so their truth must be measured from their Conformity to them. And in this Sense must be taken that Common Axiom of the Schools, that the Truth of a thing is its Conformity with the Divine Intelligence, for it is in no other Sense Intelligible, as you will discern in the Proces.

But now, left you should imagine, that this Platonic Hypothesis of Ideas existing in the Divine Mind should ill comport with the Simplicity of God, or clash with that approved Doctrin of the Schools, Nihil est in Deo quod non fit deus, ( which is another cavil of the Antiplatonists ) you are to understand that Plato by his Ideas does not mean any real Essence distinct from the Divine Essence, but only the Divine Essence it self with this Connotation, as it is variously imitable or participable by created Beings, and consequently, according to the multifariousness

[ 55 ]

neß of this imitability, so are the possibilities
of Being. Which is as fine a Notion as
was ever framed by the Mind of Man, and
that it is his, you will find, if you con-
sult his Parmenides. And this will serve to
help us out with another difficulty, for
whereas Plato makes his Divine Ideas not on-
ly the exemplary causes of things, but also
(which is a consequent to the former) the
measure of their Truth, this may seem to fall
in with their Opinion who make all Truth
dependent upon the Speculative understand-
ing of God, that is, that God does not un-
derstand a thing so because it is so in its own
Nature, but that a thing is therefore so be-
cause God is pleased so to understand it. Which
is an Opinion full of mischief and absurdity,
as you may see compendiously, and yet evi-
dently demonstrated, in Dr. Rust's little Dis-
course of Truth. Now for the clearing this
Difficulty, it is to be observed, that the Effence
of God, according to Plato, is distinguished into
væs voeęs and væs vountds, the Counterpart where-
of in English is Conceptive and Exhibitive.
By the Mind of God Exhibitive is meant the
Effence of God as thus or thus imitable or
participable by any Creature, and this is the
fame with an Idea. By the Mind of God
Conceptive is meant a reflex act of God's Un-
derstand-

[ 56 ]

derstanding upon his own Essence as *exhibi-
tive*, or as thus and thus imitable. Now if
you confider the Divine Understanding as
*Conceptive* or *Speculative*, it does not *make*
its Object but fuppose it, (as all *Speculative*
Understanding does) neither is the Truth
of the Object to be measured from its Confor-
mity with *that*, but the Truth of *that* from
its Conformity with its Object. But if you
confider the Divine Understanding as *Exhi-
bitive*, then its Truth does not depend upon
its Conformity with the Nature of things,
but on the contrary, the Truth of the Na-
ture of things depends upon its Conformity
with it. For the Divine Essence is not thus
or thus imitable, becaufe such and such things
are in being, but such and such things are in
being, becaufe the Divine Essence is thus and
thus imitable, for had not the Divine Essence
been thus imitable, such and such Beings
would not have been *possible*. And thus is
*Plato* to be underftood when he founds the
Truth of things upon their Conformity with
the *Divine Ideas*, and thus muſt the Schools
mean too by that foremention'd *Axiom* con-
cerning *Transcendental Truth*, if they will ſpeak
Senſe, as I noted above.

And now, Sir, from Plato's Ideas thus am-
ably ſet forth, the *Transition* methinks is very
natural

[ 57 ]

natural to Love. And concerning this I shall
account in the fame Method, firſt, by point-
ing out the popular Miſapprehenſions about
it, and then by exhibiting a true Notion of
it. Platonick Love is a thing in every bodies
Mouth, but I find ſcarce any that think or
ſpeak accurately of it. The miſtakes which
I obſerve are chiefly theſe. Some of the groſ-
ſer Underſtanders ſuppoſe that Plato by his
Love meant ὀσιδεσπα, the Love of Males, but
the Occaſion of this Conceit was from a paſ-
fage in his Convivium, where he brings in A-
riſtophanes ſpeaking favourably that way. But
he that ſhall from hence conclude Plato a pro-
ſtitute to that vile Paſſion, may as well con-
clude a Dramatic Poet to be an Atheiſt or a
Whore-maſter, becauſe he repreſents thoſe of
that Character. But that Divine Plato inten-
ded nothing leſs than to countenance any
ſuch thing, is evident from the whole ſcope
and purport of that Dialogue, and from other
places where he expreſſly condemns it, and re-
jects it with great abhorrence; particularly
in the firſt of his de legibus, where he calls it
τὸ ἀόφυσιν τὸ μυρίον, an unnatural attempt.
Others by Platonic Love understand the Love
of Souls, and this indeed has ſomething of
truth

[ 58 ]

truth in it, only it is much too narrow and before
particular.

Others take Platonic Love to be a desire of the people, imprinting any excellency, whether moral or intellectual, in the Minds of beautiful young men by Instruction, and so likewise of enjoying your own Perfections reflected from the Mind of another, mix'd with and recommended by the Beauty of the Body. According to the usual saying, Gratior è Pulchro, &c. And thus Socrates was said to love his beautiful Pupils Phædrus and Alcibiades. Others measure the Nature of Platonic Love, not from the Object ( to which they suppose it indifferent) but from the manner of the Act. And according to these, that man is said to love Platonically, that does Caffo delectamine amare, love at a distance, that never design a close fruition of the Object what ever it be, whether Sensual or Intellectual, but chooseth to dwell in the Suburbs, pleasing himself with remote Prospects, and makes a Mistriss of his own Desire. And this is the receiv'd Notion, and that which People generally mean when they talk of Platonic Love. But this too is far enough from the right, for the Platonic love does not aim at the fruition of sensual Objects, yet it designs the fruition of its own Object as much as any other Love does. That there-

[ 59 ]

therefore which distinguishes Platonick love,
is not the manner of the act above-mention'd,
but the peculiarity of the Object. And what
that is must be collected from the Design of
Plato in that Dialogue, where he treats pur-
posely of it, his Convivium. Which is brief-
ly to shew the manner of the Souls ascent to
God by love. For Plato makes the Happi-
ness of Man to conjoin in the Contemplation
and Love of God, whom he calls the Idea of
Beauty. But now because this Idea of Beauty
(God) is of too sublime and refined excel-
lency to be immediately fastned upon by our
Love, he recommends to us µέθοδος ἀνόδως,
a Method of Ascent, which is from loving the
Beauty we see in Bodies, to pass on to the Love
of the Beauty of the Soul, from the Beauty
of the Soul to the Beauty of Vertue, and last-
ly from the Beauty of Vertue, ἀναπτυχία πολυπε-
λαγωτὸς καλῶς ἀυτὸ το ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἐρετὸν ἐν
ἐφετὸν, to the immense Ocean of Beauty, &c.
For so have I observed a tender Infants Eye
not enduring to gaze directly upon the too
powerful Excellence of the Meridian Sun,
chuse to entertain it self with the abate-
ments of corrected and reflected Light, and
take up with the feebler refreshments of lesser
Beauties for a while, till at length the facul-
ty

[ 60 ]

ty grows more confirm'd, and dares encoun-
ter the Sun in his Strength. And these are
the *Steps* of the *Sanctuary*. So that *Platonic*
*Love* is the Love of Beauty abstracted from
all sensual Applications, and desire of corpo-
ral contract, as it leads us on to the Love of the
first original Beauty, God; or more plainly
thus, The Ascent of the Soul to the Love of
the *Divine* Beauty, by the Love of *abstracted*
Beauty in Bodies. This Love of abstracted
Beauty in Bodies he calls 'Ερως 'ουρωδιος,
*Celestial Love*, in opposition to that which he
calls ἐπιδημος, which is the same with that
Passion commonly signified by the name of
Love, (viz.) a desire of corporal contact
arising from the fight of Beauty. This last
indeed is a very vile, brutish, unmanly af-
fection, and such as considering the vileness
of our Bodies, one would think a man could
never be charm'd into without the *Magic* of
a *Love-potion*. But the former is an Angeli-
cal Affection, for certainly Beauty is a Di-
vine thing; It is ( as the *Platonic* Author
says of Wisdom ) the pure *Influence* flowing
from the *Glory of the Almighty*, and the Bright-
ness of the *Everlasting Light*: or in Plato's own
Words, *A Ray of God*. And therefore the
Love of abstract Beauty must needs be a very
gene-

Books set forth by the Author of these Poems
and Discourses. viz.

1. EFFIGIES Amoris, or the Pi-
ature of Love unveil'd, in En-
glish, twelves.

2. A Meditation of Life and Death,
out of the learned Eusebius, in English,
octavo.

3. Hierocles upon the Golden Ver-
fes of the Pythagoreans, in English,octa-
vo.

4. A Tract against the absolute De-
cree of Reprobation, Latin, octavo.