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capabilities. If the Soviet Union can accept similar limitations on its objectives, there would appear to be a basis for negotiations to limit strategic armaments.

This neither requires nor implies a resolution of the fundamental political differences that pervade Soviet-American relations. But moderating the pace of the strategic arms race may make possible cooperation in other areas and help to accelerate a resolution of some of these political conflicts.

December 1968

THE FUTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE:
OPTIONS FOR THE 1970'S

George W. Rathjens

Visiting Professor of Political Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Summary

Although American strategic forces were built up rapidly during the early 1960's, their level has been almost constant during the last two years. In contrast, Soviet strategic forces have recently been growing at a fast rate, although according to most measures of strategic strength, the United States continues to have "superiority."

In the present context, the concept of "superiority" may have outlived its usefulness.

The present strategic balance might be more meaningfully characterized as one of "sufficiency" in strategic forces in the sense that each side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other, regardless of the conditions under which nuclear war might develop. Thus, further increases in strategic force levels are not likely to offer either country new political options. Yet on both sides there have been vigorous research and development programs that now make probable the deployment of new strategic systems.

There was hope a few years ago that during the early 1970's the strategic balance might become stabilized, with both the Soviet Union and the United States willing to base the planning of their strategic forces on the view that they could serve little purpose other than to deter a Soviet-American thermonuclear war. It now seems possible that this hope of stability based on mutual deterrence may not be realized; there is no evidence that the expansion in Soviet strategic forces is tapering off;

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technological advances have made possible new strategic weapons that are likely to be deployed; and the emergence of China as a nuclear power may be a stimulus to the expansion of strategic forces.

At the heart of the difficulty in moderating the arms race is the fact that the United States is likely to react to any deployment of new strategic forces by the adversary by making compensating or over-compensating improvements in its own capabilities; the same is probably true of the Soviet Union. Indeed, because of the time required to translate decisions into operational capability, both sides often react in anticipation of possible adversary deployments. The problem is exacerbated by the great uncertainty of each side about its adversary's capabilities and intentions. These factors must be taken into account in any attempt to control the arms race by agreement--and in unilateral decisions regarding new weapons choices.

Some of the weapons systems that now appear on the horizon, particularly anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses and multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), are likely to introduce large uncertainties into the calculus of the strategic balance, and thus are especially likely to stimulate adversary reaction or over-reaction.

Despite the lateness of the hour, it may still be possible to head off a new escalation of the arms race. However, this may require a reversal of some decisions already made. The most promising approach would be through negotiations between the superpowers, although the importance of reciprocal unilateral restraint regarding new weapons choices should not be discounted. It should be added that strategic arms talks, even if they do not result in a formal treaty, may still serve a useful purpose if they help dispel some of the uncertainties that fuel the arms race.

In any case, fundamental clarification of U.S. objectives is required as a basis for making specific decisions regarding weapons choices and negotiating positions. In this connection

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we are confronted with two difficult dilemmas: that of reconciling our desire to minimize damage to ourselves in the event of war with our desire to escape the adverse consequences that may flow from developing damage-limiting capabilities; and that of minimizing the likelihood of escalation while relying on it as a deterrent.

There is a desire on the part of both Americans and Russians to try to limit to very low levels damage to their own countries in the event of war, and a desire on each side to ensure that it will emerge from a nuclear war less damaged than its opponents. Yet attempts to develop and deploy forces that might contribute to the attainment of these specific objectives are likely to have two adverse effects: an increase in the probability of thermonuclear war; and a build-up in strategic forces leading not only to greater expense for both sides, but probably even to an increase in the total damage that each might expect in the event of war.

As for the second dilemma, the consequences of thermonuclear war are rightly judged so horrible that major efforts to avoid it are justified. Yet there is a tendency in the United States and elsewhere to rely on the danger of escalation as a deterrent to limited aggression, particularly in Europe--a tendency that is incompatible with minimizing the possibility of a thermonuclear war occurring.

It is suggested that it is in the interest of the United States to resolve this second dilemma by moving away from reliance on the likelihood of escalation as a deterrent to limited aggression.

As regards the first dilemma, we should give greater weight than we have in the past to curtailing the action-reaction cycle that drives the arms race, even at the expense of our deep-seated desires for "superiority" and for development of effective "damage-limiting"

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December 1968

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a concern that arose at the time of the election of 1960 but which was rapidly dissipated by
improved intelligence indicating that the "missile gap, " if any, would be in our favor.

The projected size of the U.S. strategic force was set as large as it was--at 1054
intercontinental ballistic missiles, 41 Polaris boats each with 16 missiles, and about 650
intercontinental bombers--in part because of uncertainty about possible Soviet actions and the
importance given to hedging against the worst possible contingencies. However, there was
another factor that made a large force attractive--a desire to have a capability to limit
damage to the United States by destroying Soviet offensive capabilities. Indeed, there was
pressure, particularly from the Air Force, to expand our "counterforce" or "damage-
limiting" capabilities by enlarging our strategic offensive forces beyond the levels finally
decided on.

This pressure was resisted because of: (a) the probability of a compensating or
over-compensating expansion in Soviet offensive forces; (b) the unlikelihood of a war
developing in a way that would permit a U.S. attack to catch a significant fraction of the
Soviet bomber and missile force on the ground; (c) the relatively small diminution in damage
to us that would result from additional U.S. counterforce capability, even if circumstances
should develop under which we would attack before all of the Soviet strategic offensive force
had been launched. With time, the last of these arguments became increasingly persuasive as
it became apparent that the Soviet Union would emulate the United States in making its forces
relatively invulnerable by increasing emphasis on dispersing its ICBM's in "hardened" under-
ground protective sites, and by building a submarine-based missile force. Thus damage-
limiting arguments played a diminishing role in the rationalization of our strategic force
posture as shown, for example, by a comparison of former Secretary McNamara's Ann Arbor
speech of 1962 and his more recent statements. ¹

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The demand by the Army to improve our "damage-limiting" capability by deploying an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system was also resisted simply because its performance seemed inadequate. To those with the decision-making responsibility it seemed clear that any ABM deployment by us would easily be offset by modest improvements in Soviet strategic offensive capabilities.

Thus, the line against further expansion of U.S. strategic forces was held during the early and mid-sixties. Up to 1966, nearly all of the important *procurement* decisions, as distinct from *research and development* decisions regarding major new strategic systems were negative: the decision not to develop a rail-mobile Minuteman; the decision not to proceed with the B-70 bomber force; the cancellation of Skybolt; and deferrals of decisions to go ahead with a full-scale ABM system and a new advanced manned strategic aircraft. Consequently, the budget for strategic forces dropped from over eleven billion dollars in 1962 to less than seven billion for fiscal 1966, as the major strategic weapons programs came to fruition without any major new procurement decisions.*

While the size of the U.S. strategic force approached the levels specified at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, Soviet strategic forces were growing rapidly, and they continue to do so. However, this growth has lagged several years behind ours, and still lags far behind in intercontinental bombers and especially in Polaris-type submarines (see Table 1). In numbers of ICBM's the Soviets are rapidly approaching the United States; but some of theirs are still "soft" or unprotected against the effects of a nuclear explosion, while in the case of the United States all the soft missiles were phased out several years ago.

* These figures, and others that appear later, do not reflect the total cost of our strategic program since certain research and development and other costs are not included. Also, the figures may be slightly deceptive in another respect since they are not converted to constant dollars. However, relative to the year-to-year budget changes, the correction for inflation would be small.

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with the kind of superiority in exploitable strategic strength that we had vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in the 1950's; nor does it solve our other problems such as Viet Nam and our cities. This has been a disillusioning and frustrating experience, and it is not surprising that we should wistfully seek to recapture the past and look for scapegoats who can be blamed for letting it escape.

Second, despite recognition that both societies would be destroyed by an all-out nuclear exchange, it is argued that our forces should be structured so that we can, in the event of war, "come out a little better than they do."⁴ Or, as Senator Richard Russell put it, "If we have to start over again with another Adam and Eve, then I want them to be Americans and not Russians--and I want them on this continent and not in Europe."⁵ Whatever their reaction to Senator Russell's apocalyptic remark, most Americans would probably agree that the first quotation expresses a desirable objective. But many believe it could only be pursued at the expense of an increase in the absolute level of damage to us or in the risk of war, or both, and doubt whether it is worth the price.

Third, there exists a difference of opinion regarding the extent to which we can or should rely on the possibility of escalation as a deterrent to actions by the Soviet Union other than direct attack against the United States. This controversial point has been one of the critical considerations in NATO policy during the last few years (others being the closely related question of the relative capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to fight a conventional war, and the question of Soviet intent).

Finally, there is dispute about whether strategic weapons could serve as a deterrent or a response to Soviet or other non-nuclear attacks of limited objectives. The possibilities seem unrealistic or remote. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union the risks of escalation seem too large. And as regards other adversaries, including China, it is difficult to imagine a

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realistic provocation that could not be dealt with by other means, and to which a limited
strategic nuclear attack would be judged an appropriate response.*

That there is as much consensus in the United States as there is both about the con-
sequences of a nuclear exchange and about the present roles and limitations of strategic
forces is in part due to the fact that the Soviet-American strategic balance has not changed
qualitatively in several years. Although the Administration submissions for strategic
weapons have increased dramatically--some forty per cent from the fiscal 1967 budget
to that for fiscal 1969--because of the time lag between the obligation of money and the
impact on operational capabilities, our present posture does not yet reflect this recent
escalation in strategic budgets. In fact, the present operational force is probably changing
less rapidly than at any time since 1945--a reflection of the low strategic budgets of fiscal
1965 through 1967. Thus, there has been time for argument, and at least some resolution of
differences and maturation of opinion about the present situation, if not about future prospects
and objectives.

But unless we modify our present plans, our posture will soon begin to change qualitatively
and rapidly as our operational forces begin to reflect decisions made during the last two
years regarding such new systems as Sentinel, Poseidon, Minuteman III, and the FB-III
bomber. Soviet operational forces, in addition to growing rapidly, may also change in new
qualitative ways if the U.S.S.R. deploys some systems it apparently has in development, such
as fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and land-mobile ICBM's.

*The problems of objectives will continue to be serious ones as we develop policies and postures for the 1970's. They are discussed further in Part III of this paper.

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Because a relatively small fraction of China's population is urban, it is far less vulnerable than that of the U.S. or the Soviet Union to nuclear attack (except to an attack with large yield weapons relying heavily on fall-out). However, China's modern industry is heavily concentrated and could be destroyed with a small number of nuclear weapons. These could be delivered without significantly compromising our capabilities against the U.S.S.R. This is true not only because our strategic offensive capabilities are so large relative to our actual requirements for retaliation against either country, but also because Chinese air defenses are so poor that we could use bombers with great flexibility, and with only moderate losses, to deliver an attack of almost any weight against China.

Thus, the only impediment to relying on our strategic offensive capabilities as a deterrent to Chinese nuclear attack is possible irrationality of the Chinese leadership. On this point there is an extraordinary divergence of opinion. Some, for example, General J.P. McConnell, the Air Force Chief of Staff, argue that the Chinese are highly irrational,¹⁰ but the record hardly suggests that. On the contrary, despite a notorious record of vituperation, the Chinese have been quite careful in the actual use of force, particularly when there was any likelihood of open conflict with the United States or the Soviet Union.

However, one does not have to subscribe to the McConnell view to admit the possibility of Chinese nuclear attack, particularly in response to great provocation. As long as there is any possibility, possession by China of an intercontinental nuclear capability will serve to some degree as an effective deterrent to large-scale U.S. actions against China. This is

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particularly true considering that (a) the interests in the Far East over which the United
States and China might come into conflict are not likely to be vital to us; and (b) the damage
we might suffer should the Chinese retaliate could be very great.

Indeed, the desire to have a deterrent vis-a-vis the U.S. may well have been one of
the major motivations for the extraordinary effort China has made to develop a nuclear
weapons capability. (Other plausible reasons are prestige, and possible use to coerce
its neighbors in Asia.)

Recognizing that a Chinese nuclear attack, however irrational, could not be discounted
completely, we made the decision to deploy Sentinel. But one must wonder about its
effectiveness in coping with China's nuclear capability. The Administration made it clear
that Sentinel was to be bought largely because of its anticipated effectiveness in reducing
damage to the United States in the event of a Chinese ICBM attack in the seventies.<sup>11,12</sup>
This is an objective it may well accomplish. Will it have any other value? It will hardly
diminish the prestige that China has acquired through possession of a nuclear capability;
on the contrary, our decision to deploy Sentinel will tend to magnify the importance of the
Chinese achievement. And Sentinel is hardly a direct response to the possibility that China
might threaten its neighbors with nuclear attack, although it was claimed by the Administration
that Sentinel would reinforce confidence in Asian states that the United States would come
to their aid if they were threatened by China.<sup>13</sup>

Sentinel could conceivably do that by restoring whatever freedom of action we might have
felt we had to intervene in Asia before the acquisition of a Chinese intercontinental nuclear
capability, but only if we had extraordinarily high confidence in its effectiveness. Otherwise, the

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To minimize the chance of deterrence failure, it seems important for both sides to develop strategic postures such that preemptive attack would have as small an effect as possible on the anticipated outcome of a thermonuclear exchange.

Table 2

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Soviet damage potential<br>in terms of millions of<br>U.S. fatalities <sup>1</sup></th></tr><tr><th>Soviet<br>first<br>strike</th><th>U.S.<br>first<br>strike</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>U.S.S.R. threat I: <sup>2</sup></strong></td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture A</td><td>80-95</td><td>25-40</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture B</td><td>50-80</td><td>20-30</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>U.S.S.R. threat II:</strong></td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture C</td><td>105-110</td><td>35-55</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture D</td><td>75-100</td><td>25-40</td></tr></tbody></table>

¹Rounded to the nearest 5,000,000.

²DL is damage-limiting. Both the Soviet threats and the U.S. damage-limiting postures are hypothetical.

Threat I is basically an extrapolation of current Soviet forces reflecting some future growth in both offensive and defensive forces. Threat II is a major Soviet response to our deployment of a ballistic missile defense.

Two of the four U.S. damage-limiting programs, postures A and B, are tailored against threat I; and the other two, C and D, against threat II. Postures B and D include more anti-ballistic missile defense forces and SAM-D batteries than postures A and C. Postures C and D include more F-12 interceptors than postures A and B.

In short, there is an inherent inconsistency in the objectives spelled out in our basic military policy, namely, "to deter aggression at any level and, should deterrence fail, to terminate hostilities in concert with our allies under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and allied interests." Hard choices must be made between attempting to minimize the chance of escalation and attempting to minimize the consequences if it does occur.

Actually, we may have only limited freedom of action in trying to achieve the latter objective even if we try to do so. For example, it is unlikely that the Soviets would passively watch us

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develop the damage limiting postures hypothesized in Table 2; rather they would very likely react by modifying their force posture so that the advantage to us of attacking preemptively would be less than indicated in the table.

This is the second facet of the dilemma: to what extent will any measure to limit damage to the United States in the event of a nuclear war stimulate a compensating or over-compensating reaction in the structuring of Soviet forces? This is especially troublesome, for while the United States generally reacts by anticipating possible Soviet moves, we cannot be sure of the extent to which the Soviets do likewise.

Recognizing this uncertainty, many responsible Americans, including senior military officers, assign high priority to capabilities to limit damage to the United States in the event of war. Whether they are right in advocating such capabilities depends on the extent to which the action-reaction hypothesis applies to the Soviet decision-making process, as well as on the impact of such actions on the probability of a failure of deterrence.

The decisions that the U.S. has taken in recent years with respect to new weapons development and deployment reflect a middle ground philosophy. We have generally avoided actions whose *primary* rationale was to limit damage the Soviet Union might inflict upon us and to which the Soviets would probably respond. Thus, we have not deployed an anti-Soviet ABM system, and have given air defense low priority.

On the other hand, where there were reasons other than a desire to improve our damage-limiting capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, we have proceeded with programs despite their probable escalatory effect on the arms race or their effect on first-strike incentives. This was true in the case of MIRV's and Sentinel.

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We will face more such decisions. For example, we may feel it necessary to change our strategic offensive posture in order to make our forces less vulnerable to possible Soviet MIRV attack. The nature of our decisions will depend on the importance we attach to the action-reaction phenomenon and to the effect of improved counterforce capabilities on the probability of war. Emphasis on these two factors implies discounting options that would increase our counterforce capability against Soviet strategic forces and that might therefore provoke an expansion of Soviet offensive forces. Options requiring long lead-times would also be discounted, since decisions regarding them might have to be taken while we were still uncertain whether the Soviet Union was developing MIRV's.

Should we in the future give more weight to developing damage-limiting capabilities? Or should we give more weight to minimizing the probability of a thermonuclear exchange and to curtailing the strategic arms race? Again, as in the case of the escalation phenomenon, it is hard to see how we can have it both ways.

Despite some changes in technology, there is little to indicate we could get very far with damage-limiting efforts, considering the determination of the Soviets and the options available to them for denying us the attainment of such capabilities.

The emergence of new nuclear powers, the rapid pace of technological advance, and the other important demands on our resources suggest we give a clear first priority to moderating the action-reaction cycle. Moving toward greater emphasis on "damage-limitation" would seem justified only if we can persuade ourselves that the Soviet Union will not react to our moves as we would to theirs, and if we can focus on means that will not increase the probability of war.

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In announcing the Sentinel decision, Secretary McNamara made it clear that he regarded the decision as marginal.²⁵ He also indicated that despite the possibility of some Chinese ICBM's leaking through it, Sentinel might save up to 14 million American lives in the event of a Chinese first strike with ICBM's during the 1970's.²⁶ Subsequently, other Administration spokesmen claimed the system could *deny* damage to the United States from a Chinese nuclear attack.²⁷ However, to have high confidence in the system one must allay doubts of three kinds. First, there is the question of whether such a complicated system will work at all when called upon to do so. It must be recognized that while component tests will be possible, it will never be feasible to test the full system against a satisfactory simulation of an operational environment. This fact, together with the history of initial failures of far less complicated systems, leads many experts to believe that the probability of a catastrophic failure of Sentinel, or any other ABM system, is high (and much higher than for strategic offensive systems which are, by comparison, simple and more susceptible to adequate testing).

Second, there is the possibility that the Chinese may develop penetration aids that could defeat the system. This possibility is discussed at some length by Drs. Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe.²⁸ The author is aware of no convincing rebuttal of their thesis. General A.W. Betts, Chief of Research and Development for the Army, in replying to the Garwin-Bethe argument, disputes the contention that development of effective penetration aids would be as easy as claimed. To make his point, he cites American difficulties in developing *high confidence* penetration aids.²⁹ There are, however, two considerations that make our experience largely irrelevant:

(1) Our programs aim at the development of penetration aids effective not only against exoatmospheric defenses but also against terminal interception.

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If one has to cope only with the former, which is all that is required in the case of
Sentinel, the problem is much less complex.

(2) Although the Chinese would probably prefer to have a _high confidence_ system as a deterrent vis-à-vis the United States, one with a moderate probability of penetrating the Sentinel defenses might be almost as useful to them.

Third, there is the fact, mentioned earlier, that damage _denial_ is a _much_ more demanding task than simply reducing damage by small amounts. The extreme difficulties involved can be illustrated by a simple calculation. Let it be assumed that a given target is defended by 50 interceptors, that the Chinese have 25 ICBM's with a reliability of 80 per cent, and that each interceptor has an 80 per cent chance of destroying an ICBM. According to this scenario, there is no more than about a 50 per cent probability that Sentinel would succeed in preventing at least one ICBM from hitting its target. It must be borne in mind that the offense can choose any target on which to concentrate its attack; the defense must defend all. The range of the Spartan interceptor, which is used with the Sentinel system, implies that not 50 interceptors, but about 500 would have to be deployed throughout the United States if every important target were to be within the effective defensive range of 50 Spartan missiles. Thus, even with a twenty to one superiority in numbers of interceptors over the number of Chinese missiles, the picture is far from comforting.

When one considers that a single one-megaton warhead detonated over one of the larger U.S. cities would produce about one million fatalities, it is clear that those who claim a damage-denial or near damage-denial capability for Sentinel are assuming an extraordinarily high level of effectiveness for it.

References

1. See, respectively, U.S. Department of State Bulletin (9 July 1962) pp. 64-69, and, for example, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate (90th Cong. Feb. 2, 1968), p. 144, 150-153. Also, discussion between James T. Kendall and General Earle G. Wheeler in U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on Status of U.S. Strategic Power (27 Sept. 1968), pp. 5-8. (Cited hereafter as Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power.)

2. See former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1969-73" Program and Fiscal Year 1969 Budget in U.S. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I (14 Feb. 1968) p. 147; (Cited hereafter as Posture Statement 1969-73.) Some of the figures are based on a statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, 25 Oct. 1968; see New York Times, 26 Oct. 1968.

3. Posture Statement 1969-73, p. 152.

4. General J. P. McConnell, statement at Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, op. cit., (30 Apr. 1968), p. 222.

5. Congressional Record (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) (1 Nov. 1968), p. E9644.

6. Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," Scientific American (Mar. 1968), pp. 21-31.

7. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part II, (24 Apr. 1968), p. 455; emphasis added. (Cited hereafter as House Hearings on Defense Appropriations.)

8. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Statement for Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (6 Nov. 1967), p. 2; emphasis added.

9. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1968-72," Program on the Fiscal Year 1967-68 Budgets (Cited hereafter as Posture Statement 1968-72), p. 42.

10. General McConnell, statement at Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, op. cit., p. 205.

11. Secretary of Defense McNamara, Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, 18 Sept. 1967.

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12. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club*, Detroit, 6 Oct. 1967.

13. Ibid.

14. See *Posture Statement 1968-72* and *Posture Statement 1969-73*, as well as Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers*, op. cit.

15. See letter by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford to Senator Russell, *Congressional Record*, op. cit., p. E9641.

16. Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club*, op. cit.

17. See article on former Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Life Magazine*, (29 Sept. 1967), p. 28c.

18. See *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations, Part I*, p. 266.

19. See *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, respectively, p. 11 and pp. 346 and 366.

20. *Congressional Record*, op. cit., p. E9640; see also *Congressional Record*, respectively. (18, 19, 21 June, 29 July, 2 Oct., and 1 Nov. 1968).

21. *Posture Statement 1969-73*, op. cit., p. 152

22. See discussion between General Wheeler and Senator Henry M. Jackson, *Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, op. cit., p. 19.

23. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1967-71" Program and the Fiscal Year 1966-67 Budgets, in U.S. House of Representatives (89th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1967, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I*, (June 1966), pp. 46-47.

24. General Wheeler, statement at *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*, p. 2.

25. Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers*, op. cit.

26. *Posture Statement 1969-73*, op. cit., p. 152.

27. See Dr. Foster, statement at *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*, op. cit., p. 455; and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze, *Statement for Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Defense Appropriations*, op. cit.

28. Garwin and Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," op. cit.

29. General A. W. Betts, Letter to the Editor, *Scientific American*, (May 1968), pp. 6-7.