I*

TelCon

Dr. Knowles/Mr. Kissinger

9:25 a.m., March 7, 1973

K: John Knowles here, at the Rockefeller Foundation.

K: Yes, how are you?

JK: Fine, how are you. I'm sorry to have bothered you but I just wondered if there were any news on the letter that I wrote you that Gov. Rockefeller asked me to write. I didn't want to bother you--

HK: I told him about it, I'm sorry he-- I think once the liaison office is established I think you should approach them. In principle I think they will be quite sympathetic.

JK: I see.

HK: My experience with them is you don't get any further by pushing them.

JK: Right.

HK: I mean, they are aware of it. And they have your letter and I would let it lie because my experience is that nothing ever gets lost, nothing ever gets wasted.

JK: Oh, that's great.

HK: And in principle they are quite sympathetic.

JK: Oh, that's wonderful. I'm delighted to hear it. I'll just lie low and when the liaison office is established, I'll just write him a friendly letter, or--that would be in Peking?

HK: No, that would be in Washington. But we can also take it up through our Liaison office in Peking.

JK: Oh, fine, great. Well, I'll just to wait to see who it is and when he's established maybe I could check with you again to make sure it's appropriate.

HK: Right.

JK: Thank's very much.

HK: Bye.

JK: Bye, bye.

CLASSIFIED

Advisory E017258 By: D. M. Slayton

TelCon

Secy Richardson/Mr. Kissinger

9:40 am, March 7, 1973

R: Hello Henry, how are you.

K: Okay. Elliot, I left a message with you, I did intend to call you, about Cooper. Because the President and I talked on Saturday and he feels very strongly that we need him more here than you could possibly need him. And, I though frankly that you and I had an understanding on that to begin with, and--

R: I didn't recall any understanding other than I would talk to him and that would have to depend on what he wanted to do.

K: Well, I had misunderstood that. But be that as it may, we just have to have somebody in the international economics field that has some political sense; of course he may not take either position.

R: Well, he's supposed to make up his mind I guess by the end of this week. If there's any way at all--I don't have any, what I'm trying to say I guess is if there's some way of communicating to him the President's judgment as between these two things, that would presumably carry a lot of weight with him. I don't want to try to get in the way of anything the President may want to communicate to him on that score.

K: Well, you know, this whole thing started--

R: The job we had is a -- in some ways an even more important job in the foreseeable two or three or fours, even than it has been, partly because the role of military capability and the use of ground forces in the foreign policy concept--

K: But there are more people who can do that job than there are people you know, it's getting to a point where we lose twice, we can't get our man in and then we lose the man who won't do it. But the major problem that concerns us was that he was here, the President--this is when the whole thing started, to get Cooper to us, and I thought I had mentioned it, but obviously not clearly enough.

R: Well, the first time Cooper came up between us was when --

K: No, I first recommended him to you very strongly and at that time we hadn't--

R: Really, the next stop was that we would not get him back to talk to until after you came back from your trip to Hanoi and Peking, and you would get him back or we would get him back and so I never had any other standing other than--

RECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By DAVID NARANGLISIY

K: That's where we misunderstood each other. I thought I had--well it's done now, so that's not the point, but the point we do have is--

R: Look, we both work for the President and Cooper would be working for the President in either place. If the President feels that he'd rather have Cooper working as an international economist on your staff, then here he knows he's the only person in the whole government who has a real perspective of both, then if that's what he wants there ought to be some way for him to convey this. Because it would be better if he did it through some neutral person. In other words, if you call Cooper and say that, it becomes a sales pitch from you. Obviously I'm not the right person to do it. If Hal deman did it or something like that.

K: Okay

R: You I would be--being done a lot of work on the identification of possible candidates for the ISA job; we've been through at least 30 or 40 names, and I don't have a good fallback.

Jonathan.
K: What you really want is to get me to plead to take Somnambul症

R: No, no, I consider that's over the dam. But I think that Jonathan does in fact have a good combination of the qualities required by the job and I haven't--let me say this on Cooper. I want to have a guy in that job who is more than a good technician.

K: Yeah.

R: In this Department, if it's going to make the kind of contribution that I have gathered from the President in several conversations or asides, he expects me to make, I need a guy who has real intelligence and who can be an energizing source for constructive and creative thought rather than an interpreter and an articulator of the cliches of this business. So I have looked for somebody who could make that kind of contribution. In Jonathan's case the balance would have been a little different but he's so--there would have been the assets there of my own relationship to him, what I think are his supurb talents in the interfaces between political bureaucratic substantive issues.

q

K: Right.

CLASSIFIED

Allied. E01258

-2-

R: At any rate, having put that aside it was by this route that I came to Cooper and not just on the basis of our earlier conversation but as a result of a lot of intervening assisting of possible candidates and so I felt that we had a claim to him.

K: Right.

R: But it is a question of, you know, the President's adjudication of this. Basely he's crossed a little closer to your requirements than he is to ours.

K: Well, that may be, but that's obviously true, and my requirements basically they are his requirements, it's just that we've got to have somebody here to handle the interrelationship between political and economic matters, and those don't grow on trees.

R: Has Dick Cooper blotted his copy book here irreperably.

K: He's unacceptable, you know, he endorsed McGovern publicly and besides he's too doctrinaire and--he's a good consultant but you can't have him in a staff job.

R: Well, not having made any canvass of possible candidates--

K: And he wouldn't be available at any rate having been made Provost of Yale.

R: Yeah.

K: Then again, anyone that came when Brewster thinks is capable of Provost of Yale cannot be acceptable toward this President.

R: Yeah.

K: You know, I'm glad to consult Cooper, he's a good man, but I had him here as a part time consultant and he was just pushing his own theories all over the town, and--

R: What about Art Hartman, have you seen him.

K: No. We thought of Cooper.

DECLASSIFIED
Aero. 507258
By DAVID HARRIS

-3-

-4-

R: Well, what are you going to do now. How is the way to handle this.

K: Well, I think you had a good idea making Haldeman the communicator with Cooper.

R: Okay.

K: And, if not then I may have to talk to you about others.

R: Okay, well let's see what happens.

K: Good, well that's really the only thing we can do now.

R: Okay, well I'm involved in the morning on SALT.

K: Right.

R: I spent a very good 24 hours at SAC.

K: Oh, good.

R: They had already begun some work on illustrative types of situations that would enhance the flexibility of--

K: Well, I would very much like a defense briefing on the various supplementary options that have been developed.

R: Guy Foster did a preliminary--

K: That was very, very preliminary and that was conceptually interesting but it had no practical material at all.

R: Did you see the package of specific posters of scenarios--

K: No. What he did was a conceptual briefing of what they were trying to get done and I favored that.

R: But here's a package of--and we could have a briefing based on that

K: Could we do that within the next, say, two weeks, by the end of next week.

R: Yeah. It's very well done I think.

K: I'd like that very much.

R: Okay, we'll set that up.

K: Good, Thank you.

CLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Amb. Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

10:25 am, March 7, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Henry, good morning.

K: How are you.

C: I'm fine and yourself.

K: Okay. Rollie, my people tell me, I don't have the actual cables here, that your people, now that we've taken off the press at NATO, your people are getting tougher rather than softer.

C: I don't think we are, I think we're going along the same line.

K: My understanding with you is that after two weeks we are going to wind up with something close to the position---
Knew you

C: No, I think I said that and I reported that, and but of course within that two weeks it just is possible to be a move in the attitude of the Warsaw Pact countries.

K: That's right, but I don't expect that.

C: I know you don't. But I don't think we are any tougher, in fact in those sessions aren't any kind to be tougher.

K: Because otherwise--since I don't expect any change in the Warsaw Pact side, if there is no change in the Warsaw Pact side--

C: Then we are back in square one again.

K: Well, except that we-- cause we turned Hungary into a--

C: Oh, yes, there is an indication of--

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 2017 to date

K: They think of everything, I mean--

C: No, no, there's absolutely no indication of that at all. As I told you, we substantially don't--I mean I've got the record, and it so happens--we substantially don't see a tremendous military issue in this at all.

K: Yeah, well we can expect it unless we've called off the UN and everybody else, but if say by the week after next, by the end of next week there is no change, we have to move towards the position we recommended.

C: I'm with you there.

K: We have to move towards the position we recommended.

C: I think that's right, yes.

K: Okay, good, as long as we've understood each other.

C: Fine.

K: Good, thank you.

C: Incidentally, on the messager thing. Did General Scowcroft have a word with you--

K: Yes, and I approved it.

C: You approved it, I know, and now logistic - its up to us with Schlessinger.

K: That's right.

C: Right, Fine. Okay Henry, many thanks.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01725f
By DA HARRIS

2

*

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:45 am, March 7, 1973

K: Anatol.

D: Henry, how are you.

K: Now that you let me wait on the phone five minutes, I'm sufficiently impressed.

D: Henry, I just came in here, but I promise you to improve my efficiency.

K: I hope you stay lazy.

D: Oh, come on. You just--so how I am busy prepared to meet you twice a day.

K: Well, you've got the President all excited now, I hope you are happy.

D: Well definitely.

K: Okay. Well, I just want to tell you from June 25 to July 2nd or 3rd--

D: June 25th to--

K: For eight days.

D: I understand, seven or eight days.

K: And, now what the President--first of all, let's have lunch over here. The President would like to talk to you for 15 minutes himself. For his own personal pleasure.

D: Oh, thank you very much. Well look--

K: Well, come here at 12:45, then we can see the President--

D: 12:45, okay.

K: Come to my office, and then we'll go over and see the President.

D: Okay. 12:45.

K: Now, what we are thinking--there's one slight complication about Camp David which is that he wants to be the first one to show Camp David to Brezhnev which means he doesn't want him to go there the night before he arrives in Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By W.N.APASO 03/04

D: Oh, I see.

K: But that's a pure vanity thing.

D: I understand. I think it is real good, there is no problem.

K: But we will certainly go from here to Camp David for a day or two.

D: Yeah.

K: And have meetings there. Now we can have Brezhnev in Williamsburg or Blair House overnight --whatever you want.

D: Okay. I think this is no real problem. Maybe I will have a chance to bring him in Embassy, but I'm not so sure, it show how over crowded I am here.

K: Well, let's have him in Blair House or Williamsburg.

D: Okay. I don't make this correction. I mention--

K: Look, we can handle Camp David--

D: No, no, no, I'm sure there is no problem at all.

K: It's a pure question--you know, it's like Brezhnev probably wanting to be there--

D: That's it exactly, but if he cannot come to--and he doesn't want the President go alone there, on the same--

K: Exactly, and there's no protocol way the President can be there before the reception.

D: Okay, no problem.

K: That's the only minor thing. Then the President will, of course, give a State Dinner the evening of the 25th. The President said that if you were to give a dinner for Brezhnev, he would break his iron rule which is never to go to an Embassy, and to go to your Embassy.

D: Oh, thank you very much, I think is a good idea.

K: You, know, we are not asking for you to do it, but you should know that if you do it, the President will come.

D: I understand, thank you very much.

K: And then we go to Camp David on the 27th or 28th. What he thinks is on the trip out to California that he will go ahead perhaps and greet him there and Brezhnev would stop for a few hours at the usual place or any place he wants.

D: I understand.

K: And then he'll give a dinner for him out there, and he'll give a reception for him in his house on his lawn which is never done for a foreign leader.

D: Thank you very much.

K: And, so you see his mind is working actively.

D: So I notice.

K: And, so, the only problem is that--and of course he enthusiastically agreed to my going to Moscow, so all of this is--

D: Yeah. As for you, I should mention I talked to him the second part of April.

K: Second part of April. Depending on how we go.

D: Yes, depending on how you go, this is the point.

K: Well I wanted to give you those dates and if they are agreeable maybe you can let me know.

D: So there is plenty--

K: Right.

D: Okay, and I will check with Brezhnev. Good, tomorrow at 12:45 I go to your office first.

K: Right.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Look forward.

D: Thank you very much, bye bye.

K: Bye.

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:45 am, March 7, 1973

K: Anatol.

D: Henry, how are you.

K: I hope you stay lazy.

D: Well definitely.

D: June 25th to--

K: For eight days.

D: 12:45, okay.

D: Okay. 12:45.

K: Now, what we are thinking--there's one slight complication about Camp David which is that he wants to be the first one to show Camp David to Breshnev which means he doesn't want him to go there the night before he arrives in Washington.

-2-

D: Oh, I see.

D: Yeah.

D: Okay, no problem.

DECLASSIFIED

-3-

K: And then we go to Camp David on the 27th or 28th. What he thinks is on the trip out to California that he will go ahead perhaps and greet him there and Breshnev would stop for a few hours at the usual place or any place he wants.

D: I understand.

D: Thank you very much.

D: So I notice.

D: So there is plenty--

K: Right.

K: Right.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Look forward.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258 f
By DAVID

TELCORN

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

12:36 p.m., March 7, 1973

F: ... is being proposed. Now this is just I guess being proposed to the President. I am not going to leak, being proposed to Germany.

K: No, I have knocked that off already.

F: Good.

K: Well, any toast they give him is too much for him.

F: Given the work he has done, I would give him something. I suggested New Zealand or Australia, those kind of things you can live with. But Germany, under the current circumstances --

K: Well, no, Germany is out of the question but they're now thinking of Brazil for him and the guy is a 42 carat jerk.

F: Yeah, he's a good, nice jerk. But I don't worry about economics with Brazil, so you can worry about him on that. But why don't they give him Australia or New Zealand? Particularly, the latter.

K: Yeah, or Iceland.

F: No, we've given that away. We can't do that.

K: Okay.

F: Henry, you sent out a NSSM on a study on U.S. Policy toward Japan.

K: Yeah.

F: And among the issues, and prominent on the issues, are the bilateral economic relations ...

K: Well, ... goes into CIEP.

F: No, at least put us on the group.

K: Oh-h, of course. I tell you I'm -- I have to get this goddamned thing straightened out. We've got a whole bunch of new guys doing it. Of course, no question about it.

F: Could you just tell someone to do that?

K: Yes.

F: Thank you very much. Bye.

wgh

RECLASSIFIED

Actuallv E01725f
By: D.A. HARRIS/Dickley

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:37 p.m., March 7, 1973

P: I hope I wasn't too blunt with our good friend, Pauls.

K: I thought it was superb, Mr. President. I think it was essential.

P: I was watching you out of the corner of my eye.

K: I was hoping you would say it.

P: I wasn't going ...... but I just thought we ought to let a shot across the bow there.

K: I tell you, Mr. President, when he raised the issue, I kicked myself for not having in the talking paper what you finally said.

P: But you think -- Good. Did it get home to him?

K: Oh, yes. He came to my office for a few minutes and really told me what he felt.

P: Well, of course, he probably disagrees with Brandt, doesn't he?

K: Oh, yes. He's on your side.

P: All right. But let's let these people know that they can't have it both ways.

K: It is essential, Mr. President, because that's the only way we'll get a rational ...

P: You know, as you've often said, the thing we do so often -- I mean, not talking papers -- that only the historians will record how many times we, you and I, have had meetings -- sometimes together Sunday lunch -- with people and getting things across like this, which nobody really ever did before with them. You can't imagine anybody from State Department talking to them like that.

K: And to do it on a philosophical basis, Mr. President.

P: So it didn't embarrass him.

K: So that it could be done in a -- The State Department is good at selling particular policies.

P: I know, I know.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258
By: R.A. Kissinger

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:37 p.m., March 7, 1973

2

K: But not in giving any sense of direction.

P: He'll get that back to Bonn, won't he?

K: You can bet. No question about it.

P: Good. Now on this other thing -- the strike -- we're going to try to plan that for the weekend.

K: Or early next week.

P: But let's be damn sure now that we really have something to hit. I just don't want to fly a lot of stuff over there.

K: Well, we're hitting in Cambodia now.

P: That's good. But step it up. I mean, I see no reason not to really whack the hell out of them in Cambodia.

K: The question is whether we should hit also on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

P: On the Trail, I understand. But if they're continuing to violate the thing, I think we've just got to -- but if there's enough. But you know, these Trail things, you remember -- the point is not to use a F-105 to hit one truck. None of that crap!

K: No, no, but they are going day and night now. So we could fly during the daytime. We could do a 24-hour thing and we'd probably raise a lot of hell. I mean, it would be basically a shot across the bow.

P: It wouldn't stop it but it would maybe frighten them a little.

K: Which is what we want.

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay, I'll look it over. Thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1973
By D.N. DeGloist

TELCORN

Anne Armstrong/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 p.m., March 7, 1973

A: Henry, Anne Armstrong.

K: How are you?

A: Just fine. And another big thank you for what you've done with your great adventure to China.

K: Aren't you nice.

A: I wanted to ask your opinion on something. Are you familiar with Nelson Rockefeller's third century study?

K: Yeah.

A: Right. Well, he mentioned to me the other day in a telephone conversation that he has Russ Peterson, of course, as the Director of it but he wants a top staff director and he was thinking of Andrew Goodpaster and he had heard that Goodpaster was thinking of retiring and I was just mentioning this to John Ehrlichman and he suggested that I ask you, that you might know what Goodpaster's intentions were.

K: I don't know what his intentions are, to tell you the truth.

A: Um-humm. Is there any way we could find out or is it better not to rock that boat?

K: It's better not to rock that boat.

A: Don't muddy any waters there, humm?

K: I doubt that he would take it.

A: All right. Well, how would you suggest I put it to the Governor then? Just say that we think he wishes to remain where he is.

K: Well, I would just tell him you don't know.

A: Okay.

K: I just have no way of knowing this.

A: All right.

K: And I don't think we should ask Goodpaster because he might misconstrue it.

DECLASSIFIED
Autograph E017258

By A. MARS D'Alisay

TelCon
Helmut Schmidt/Mr. Kissinger

1:41 pm, March 7, 1973

K: Hello. Helmut how are you.

S: Fine, thank you.

K: I know you talked to George Shultz this morning and I have talked to the President, and now he has been instructed to negotiate with you in a constructive spirit.

S: Yes.

K: Taking into account your special necessities. We thought it was better for you two to work out what that means technically. ON the other hand in the spirit of our discussions, if the point is reached where you want to call me and bring something to the special attention of the President, I know you wouldn't do it unless it were of very great importance--

S: Yes.

K: You feel free to do that.

S: I wouldn't do it before Friday Noon, Herr Henry.

K: I understand that, but if say, on Friday Noon there is one special point which you think is politically overriding, purely economic considerations, we would at least consider it.

S: I think that this might happen in the course of Friday and I might then call upon you on Friday Noon.

K: Yes, I don't--can't guarantee you what our answer will be.

S: Of course.

K: But I want you to know that George understands that there are other considerations except purely economic ones.

S: In my calculations your parameter of action is not very great.

K: No, but what we can consider is what George discussed with you this morning, is how to put some limits to a float for example. How we can reach some understanding from that.

S: Uh humm.

CLASSIFIED

Action: E012758
By: J. HARRIS/Glisson

2

K: So that the thing wouldn't get totally out of hand for you.

S: There is of course the danger of a new push in the direction of distrust into your currency, you know.

K: Again.

S: I think yes. I think as we floated, this would mean a new push in the direction of this front.

K: Well, --

S: It's very difficult to work out *skt* how the markets will react.

K: That's right. No, we understand this and we are not totally wedded to one particular scheme.

S: So aren't we.

K: We have--I have tried to explain to Shultz what I take to be our domestic situation in Germany. Of course can do it better than I can, Secondly what I think the European problem is--

S: Would the US be happy with a common European float.

K: Well, it's a question of happy--we can live with a common European float if you do not attach too many conditions to it.

S: I see.

K: If you attach a lot of discriminatory conditions to it, then it becomes complex again.

S: Yes. Brandt's favor is a European thing, you know.

K: Well, we would not oppose that. But our concern is that the only way you can get a European float is by accepting so many of the French conditions.

S: For the moment being, it's more the British conditions and the Italians.

K: Oh, really.

future

S: Yes. They are --the British are deeply worried about the/course of the Parliament.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority ED1725f
By DAVID HARRIS 06/05/65

3

K: Well, we would not oppose a common Europeam float if it were not discriminatory in some of its restrictions.

S: I understand, Henry, I understand. So far the field of trade policy has not been touched in all these considerations and these talks.

K: Right. Well, if that is the case we would not oppose, but if you have to go to certain alternatives then we would be prepared to discuss with you how to make them politically more bearable for you.

S: Yes, I understand this clearly. I will talk to Willy Brandt tomorrow morning about it.

K: Right.

S: Well, Henry, thank you very much for this information.

K: Right.

S: And I'm very thankful that you show this fair consideration.

K: Well, I know you wouldn't call me unless you attached importance to it.

S: Yeah, I do.

K: So, you feel free to call me on Friday.

S: Okay.

K: Good, Helmut.

S: Thanks Henry.

K: Bye.

S: Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

Act. No. 1251
By: HAROLD GLOSSER

TELCOM

Carroll Kilpatrick/Mr. Kissinger

2:18 p.m., March 7, 1973

HK: How dare you call me!

CK: How dare.

HK: Considering what paper you represent.

CK: I thought I represented a good paper. I have to read the New York Times
though to find out what's going on it seems to me.

K: Well, what do you think is going on?

CK: Well, I don't know -- is that story, Scotty's piece true?

HK: Yeah, but what is so -- I've been saying this for months. I mean, what part of it?

CK: Well, I thought it was an interesting piece bringing up-to-date all that you are working on.

HK: Yeah, but you know these are the things that the President's office would normally be working on.

CK: What about the staff reorgan -- staff changes?

HK: No, no, it's exactly right.

CK: Yeah. Is Sonnenfeldt staying? He was not clear on that point.

HK: Well, we're discussing that right now. It's really a question -- he will work closely with me in whatever capacity he has. The only question is where we put him technically.

CK: Yeah. Why is there some delay on your annual report?

HK: Because I've been busy on Vietnam and China.

CK: Yeah, and it will be next month you think?

HK: Yes. Well, you know, the same group that would be writing the annual report was off negotiating.

CK: Yeah.

HK: There's no profound reason.

CK: What's the holdup on the trade thing?

2:18 p.m., March 7, 1973

2

HK: On what trade thing?

CK: On the trade message and the whole approach to --

HK: I think we'll have that by the end of the month. I'm not conscious of any --

CK: Yeah. Will that include the most favored nation?

HK: We think so, yes.

CK: In that message?

HK: Yeah.

CK: And you're getting away on vacation?

HK: I hope to get away by the end of next week.

CK: End of next week?

HK: Yes. I was going to go early this next week but --

CK: It's not the prolonged kind of vacation you'd first thought of, is it?

HK: No, because the negotiations took a little longer than I anticipated. But I'd be gone about 10 days.

CK: But it's not to decide your future, is it?

HK: No, but it's a quiet week in which I can do some thinking.

CK: What should I tell my editors when they ask me what your future is?

HK: I don't plan any drastic changes right now.

CK: Yeah. And the change in the staff is not as dramatic as --

HK: Well, it's interesting but I don't think it's dramatic. You know, we have more detail now. Haig and I did everything and now we just want to make sure that we don't create two bottlenecks.

CK: Yeah, yeah. Will you work a lot more on Middle East?

HK: Not necessarily. Nor did I understand Scotty to say that we would. He just said that there wouldn't necessarily be a Special Deputy for it. I have a staff man working on the Middle East.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively E012958
By: D.A. DeGlochty

2:18 p.m., March 7, 1973

3

CK: Yeah, yeah.

HK: You know, I can't create a Deputy for every important geographic area.

CK: No, no. But someone asked Ron this morning if this visit of the Italian Prime Minister meant that it'd be followed by others. He sort of ducked that question. Is that the pattern? Are you going to have Europeans come here first and see the President?

HK: Well, we don't have a -- this really isn't definitely settled yet.

CK: Uh-huh.

HK: The Italians didn't come the last time that we were seeing European leaders.

CK: That's right.

HK: Because of their domestic -- they had a Presidential election.

CK: They've really got problems too.

HK: Yeah. Well, Carroll, you know, I think this is an interesting fact but I don't think a world-shaking event. [Change in Tapes]

HK: That's fine.

of note

CK: Any other changes -- any other personnel changes that he didn't mention?

HK: No.

CK: Uh-huh. All right, thank you very much.

HK: Right. Nice to talk to you.

CK: Bye.

wgh

RECLASSIFIED

Auto. by E017258
By D. HARRIS-GIBSON

TELCON
Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger
2:30 p.m., March 7, 1973

S: Henry, I have for me this little guidance that you sent along both to State and Defense on the question of military assistance for the Israelis.

K: Right.

S: Let me ask you if there is something you can clarify because Rabin has already called and he, you know, obviously wants to talk about this and in fact would like to talk about it and try to firm up as much of this on the question of production assistance even before Golda leaves sometime tomorrow.

K: Right.

S: In your guidance what you've written is the United States will assist Israel in the production of at least 100 super mirage aircraft. The technical arrangements are to be worked out immediately. Now in our memorandum of recommendation to the White House --

K: You wanted to sell some items directly.

S: Yeah. Now what kind of --

K: That was not objected to.

S: There wasn't.

K: I mean, it was not objected to by the President.

S: As a matter of control. See, this was in a memo -- It said some parts we will just sell directly because this will help control the situation. Should we go on that basis, Henry?

K: Well, you know, depends how many parts you're talking about.

S: Yeah. Well, look, this is something which the Pentagon, as you well know, is very interested in doing as an element of control.

K: You know, if you don't use it to vitiate the intent of it.

S: There's no one here that I know that wants to use it to vitiate. But, you know, Henry, --

K: No, no; that is understood. You can keep some items.

S: Sure. Okay. But different people have different views on this and, therefore, the reason --

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal HAROLD D. GILLESPIE
BY DA

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 p.m., March 7, 1973

2

K: No, the President did see that and that part of it did not bother him. Now the Israelis will probably kick at that.

S: Yeah, I think they will a little bit but we'll see. You know, in any event. The other thing is in terms of a higher figure when you're talking about the aircraft, this then will have to be cut and negotiated I assume between State and Defense and that we're to come up with some kind of a recommendation as to what that higher figure ought to be. It would have been a little better, Henry, if you could have really kind of taken it out of both State's and Defense's hands and really told us rather specifically because otherwise this little piece of paper, Henry, will throw the negotiation back among the Departments, you understand.

K: Yeah.

S: Did you ever see that paper I sent you under the counter?

K: Yeah.

S: Yeah. Well, you see, what I tried to do in that, Henry, was to answer all of the unanswered questions.

K: Well, the tough thing is -- I'll tell you, why don't you send me an options paper for the President, which includes that option.

S: Yeah. Well, look, the important thing right away is the production anyway and then on the other business, we'll come up with a recommendation. We'll talk to Defense and see what we can come up with on it.

K: Exactly.

S: And after all, you did say in the piece of paper for your guidance, you're thinking in terms of a higher figure. So we recommended 15 to you in that paper and certainly if we came back with 18, that's a higher figure, you see.

K: Yeah, but it -- you know damn well that's playing games.

S: I know it is. But there's one other thing that this guidance misses and I want to call it to your attention. One of the beauties of the recommendation that we came up with in that joint paper was the decision for all 4 years so that the President won't have to take another decision for another 4 years.

K: Well, that he didn't specifically address.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01725f
By DAVID HARLAN

TELCOM

Congressman Passman/Mr. Kissinger

2:53 p.m., March 7, 1973

P: Dr. Kissinger, how are you? I know you're very busy but I need about 3 minutes of your time and I really believe it's something that you want to hear.

K: Right.

P: Let me put it into the proper context. I've been Chairman of the Foreign Aid Committee, this is my 19th year, and of course I went off the two years ago because I'm a great admirer of the President's and I was determined to give him what he wanted. Last year just at the crucial moment, just before we were getting ready to adjourn ......... even Hugh Scott agreed ......... which is absolutely a mockery of the program and I can't bear in your having to surrender my chairmanship because I demanded the Conference, otherwise I just wouldn't play ball. Anyway, I went to Conference and put in 150 million -- three different categories -- in keeping with my prior agreement with the President on security assistance. Now, number two, the continuing resolution, as you know, we pulled it through at the same level that I recommended last year.

K: Right.

P: Here's what I'm concerned with -- I know very well that we have people downtown, and you'll agree, they've got so many diplomas, they can't find a place on the wall to hang them.

K: That's right.

P: Sometimes they're minus in common sense. Now the Foreign Aid Bill for the past two years has been moving as far as the Authorization Bill by the House -- one time 5 votes, one time 7 votes -- and it's just touch and go. This actually happened at a time when all these foolish programs that should have never been started were being funded -- like Head Start, the Jumping Fit and have another illegitimate baby Start and what have you. When everybody was getting everything they wanted, you could just get it through. Now the President has moved in the right direction in either abolishing, consolidating or placing certain funds in budgetary reserve. Now the point -- Of course foreign aid is in a bad, bad way and I've come up with a proposition. I haven't peddled this in any place other than at the right place and if we're going to get people to swallow this bitter pill, you're going to have to sugarcoat it. Now I mention one incident and then I'll get to what I want you to consider if you're called in on it and I'm sure you will be. If we go back at the end of World War II or shortly thereafter,

DEC. 15, 1973

Cong. Passman/Mr. Kissinger

2:53 p.m., March 7, 1973

2

P: (cont'd) when we started the Marshall Plan and subsequent programs, to give grant aid to Europe because we considered it just as much our war as theirs and we wanted to help in recovery. Let's call it a good program. But in retrospect had we made these grants of some -- oh, let's say some $58 billion -- on a long-term loans, no interest, 10-year grace period, today we'd have been getting some of that money back. Now that is the business side of it.

K: Right.

P: The political side of it is if the people downtown will let me sit down and talk to them calmly, I believe that I could convince them that your military assistance should be grant, your technical aid program should be grant, but all the other whether it's north, south or in between or in Indochina, put it on a loan basis. Pick up as your guide the IDA formula, which is 15 years, no interest, 10-year grace period, then 1% a year. And so that I could say something to you worthwhile, I took a cab and went out to the South Vietnamese Embassy and sat down and talked with the Ambassador, who is a very reasonable and well-educated man, slowly and surely and repeated myself so they understand it -- how would your country look at this. He said I think it would be acceptable because we would think in ten years we would have recovered sufficiently to where we could start paying back. Now I'm going to drop the curtain -- Rather than have this Bill come out here and get defeated, rather than have me -- and I certainly intend to carry the ball for the President, make no mistake about that. Hell if it brought about my defeat next year, I think he's the greatest President we ever had and with your help he concluded that war so I'm going to carry the ball! But if these people would listen to me and take this bitter pill, sugarcoat it, have it as a loan, by God I think I could sell it and carry the ball for the President. I've tried to say a lot in just a few minutes because you're --

K: No, no, I understand what you're saying. Let me turn it over -- The North Vietnamese will never understand this, that's their problem.

P: The What?

K: The North Vietnamese won't understand this approach.

P: Who won't?

K: The North Vietnamese.

P: They understand more than we think they do, Doctor.

DECLASSIFIED
Autumn 2023

Cong. Passman/Mr. Kissinger

2:53 p.m., March 7, 1973

3

K: Because they don't have any -- But let me think it over and call you back
next week.

P: The North Vietnamese have been borrowing money ever since they've had
a government. They know exactly -- It's better to do that than have it
defeated. I just don't believe there's a chance to ever get it through the
Congress! This thing has got to be sugarcoated and I wouldn't know why
they wouldn't buy it. We don't have any obligation unless there's an
implied one that we want to help you, we want to make available this money.
We'll borrow it but you won't have to pay the interest. And we know it's
going to take a long time to recover so we're gonna give you a grace period
of 10 years. Then when you start paying back -- 1% a year. I think that
I could sell this to a juvenile moron if I was given an opportunity.

K: Yeah.

P: I want to work with you people and I want to help you formula a plan
that you can get through the Congress. Now remember that this was a
touch and go just on regular aid for Vietnam. When we were losing our
boys every week, we was only getting this Bill by with 5 to 7 votes.

K: Yeah.

P: And today it's a different story. I want to be helpful because I want to
carry the ball for the President and he knows it.

K: I know that.

P: Please turn this over and analyze it very, very carefully. Number one,
it will fly! Number two, it may be the proper thing to do because in 20
years from now, these people may be enjoying great prosperity. Maybe
we'll be in competition with them, especially in agriculture. I want to be
helpful, Doctor. Believe me, that's what I'm trying to do.

K: Well, Mr. Chairman, you have always been helpful.

P: I'll always carry the ball.

K: I don't know where we would be without you.

P: We're in trouble and just as sure as the devil, if I could be let in on some
of this -- I can be trusted -- I'm a good listener. But I want to get myself
in position to carry the ball. And I sent Bill Timmons --

K: Well, I will promise you, we will make no final decisions without
discussing them with you.

DECLASSIFIED

By D. M. CHASE
From HARPER'S

TELCONE (Secure Phone)

Admiral Moorer/Kissinger

4:13 p.m. - 3/7/73

M: Hello.

K: Tom, we want to hit some old supply (routes) in Cambodia oriented toward Vietnam.

M: OK, the South Vietnam border as long as they don't go over it.

K: That is right. I mean, you know, do it in moderation. Don't fly 90 sorties in one night - I mean 90 B-52's.

M: Coming down through S____ K____ there.

K: That's what we want to hit. That's what we're screaming about. Can you take care of it?

M: Sure thing.

K: Can you explain to me the reluctance to hit the truck plants.

M: Because there just weren't any targets that we can put a position on.

K: There must be something because they were defending it so.

M: That was two years ago when they were supporting that operation.

K: Could you send some targets over here near the border and on that supply border it is the North Vietnamese supplying in South Vietnam that we want to disturb.

M: Do you want me to send the targets over and let you take a look at them or

K: Let me take a look at them but we will approve them.

M: They have blanket approval. . .

K: But they apparently aren't hitting them.

M: . . . . . . . . .

K: But the Cambodians have interest in hitting those targets, they're not hurting them.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. by E017258
By DAVID HAROLD BOLSFORD

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01725B

By DAVID HAROLD

M: We operate independently against those targets.

K: I don't mind getting a formal approval of Lon Nol. Will you set that in motion and then let me know.

M: We will take care of it.

K: But we want to give a warning shot to the North Vietnamese.

M: OK, no problem.

K: What we want to do is bring home to the North Vietnamese that these supplies - in fact we want a two-day strike on the Ho Chi Minh Trail next week.

M: We should lay on a half outfit and let Vogt - say within a day or two - when to go so we are sure we have good weather the entire length of the Trail and surprise them hell out of them.

K: That is right and the President will authorize it almost certainly next week.

M: Do we time it with the prisoner withdrawal or...

K: ...

M: We may do it that way.

K: Or before the 18th.

M: Doesn't the thing wind up on the 29th - 15 days before that would be the 14th.

K: That is right.

M: So we have got a plan and the way to do it is to really lay on a big effort and pick a day the visibility is good and surprise the hell out of them.

K: That would be our intention. The targets you checked are fine just so we hit some others.

M: That's what I say. I was just reading Swank's story right here and have you read it?

TelCon
Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

March 7, 1973. (Time?)

K: Bill.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you?

S: Oh, still afloat I think.

K: Now don't get worried if I send messages to ______ to transmit through you. We have to make clear who is who. Bill, what I wanted to get you to get across to them, which apparently I didn't make clear in the message, is I didn't get so much the threat of withholding economic aid wasn't so important to me as to get on record the threat of military action.

S: Oh, no that wasn't clear.

K: That was my reason for having you do it. Economic aid withholding I could have threatened myself.

S: Your message only spoke in terms of economic without any inclination of military.

K: Well, I thought it said it threatened the whole structure of the ceasefire agreement.

S: Well, I must say I didn't read the interpretation that broadly, I didn't really quite understand that.

K: And if they take military action we take very strong measures, didn't I have that in there.

S: Well it had "grave consequences" and it talked about--in terms--something about--

K: You see, I wanted to figure out a way of giving them a military warning short of a message from me but higher than a personal opinion by you.

S: I'm sorry, I didn't get that pitch, cause it didn't come that clear to me that it was military that you were talking in terms of.

RECLASSIFIED

Aut. E01258
By HAROLD GLOSSER

2

K: Yeah.

S: Well, it goes through this song and dance of insisting that it's--

K: I know, but that's all b----s----, but I want them to know--
we may hit the Ho Chi Minh Trail next week and I wanted to find
some way of giving them some starchy message. All this crap,
I let you guys lose for a week and you all turn into a--I mean
Bill Pofter has been crying on me with POW's who --every two
hours.

S: What aspect of POW's.

K: Well, that if we take risky action--

S: Oh, I see

K: we will lose the POW's. We cannot afford to let them build up for
an offensive. We have no intention of tolerating it.

S: Is our intelligence really good on this, because you know when I
talked to Johnny Voght about all that stuff on the trail, one thing
he told me was that most of the trucks were going north. I don't
see that in our intelligence.

K: No, our intelligence is the opposite.

S: Well.

K: At any rate, we didn't get any warning on record that--

S: No, I'm affaid you didn't get a military warning on record from me,
and I'm afraid I just did not understand that in the message.

K: That's why I said it should be more than a personal message from
you--I mean all this crying about economic aid, it's just too
transparent. Well it's done.

S: I'm sorry.

K: Well, what other do we have that I don't--I don't want to put it in a
written message.

S: He's not there anymore. It could be done by Isham to little V, but
that doesn't carry much weight.

K: No, Isham---------well I'll have to figure something out. I should
have been more explicit in the message.

CLASSIFIED
DECEMBER 1964

ACTION
E012258
BY
BARRY DE
01/15/64

3

S: It could be done through a third party.

K: That I also intend to do.

S: Well, I didn't--this makes it clear, I couldn't quite figure what the eagerness was because it didn't seem to me to be saying anything all that earthshaking, but now I understand what you had in mind.

K: When I read your cable about economics, that I would have gone very lightly on. But okay.

S: Okay. What happened to "wine-drop".( ?)

K: Your boss axed him.

S: He said he wanted a man who could be testifying up on the Hill, Palace politics is getting rid of Maury Williams, or what's the story.

K: He made a big issue of it and since I don't know "Weintrout"(?)

S: Well, they are both good.

K: He thinks he needs him for monetary problems.

S: Well, maybe he does, he's about the best we've got on it. Well okay. I hope they got the word in time, I told Guay to get right over the word in time to get it in the communique and get it changed. It would be unfortuante if their communique stated different than ours.

K: Okay, get some sleep. I'll see you tomorrow.

S: Okay, Henry, I'll see you tomorrow.

K: Right, bye.

S: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258 by A. Henry DeAlvis

Telcon
Mr. Kissinger
Professor Graubard
3/8/73; 9:17 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Hi, Henry.

K: Hi, Steve.

G: How are you?

K: Okay.

G: Good. Henry, I think Potam Yanos (?) very much what to see
you. Do you wish to see him or would you rather . . .

K: Where is he?

G: I think he wrote to you. He is in New York and he wants to come --
I am here in Washington. I thought he wrote to you.

K: Well, given the way my office operates it's quite possible and it
may emerge in six months. When did he write me?

G: I think he must have written you last Friday or so. MEX He's
been in New York -- he was in New York when I was there.

K: Well, not this week. It will have to be next week.

G: I see. Okay. How are you otherwise?

K: Okay.

G: Have you ever had a chance to look at any of the . . .

K: Yeah, I thought it was very good. In fact, I tried to reach you and
couldn't. There were two points I disagreed with. On was that not
bombing would have been less dangerous. Our judgment was that it
would have been more dangerous.

G: In other words even stronger than I put it.

K: Yeah. I mean it just isn't right to say in our judgment =at least.

G: Yeah, otherwise . . .

CLASSIFIED

Antonly E01745f 8
By DAVID M. BLOCH

-2-

K: The other thing was to say that until July 15 the policy was the same -- that isn't true either. Even the newspapers at that time were saying that the foreign policy was . . .

G: Was shifting.

K: Was shifting.

G: But there was no -- but still . . .

K: There weren't these dramatic episodes but every crisis was handled, for example, quite differently from Kennedy -- much less dramatically. We established the linkage principle then and pursued it with absolute rigidity.

G: But still -- well, obviously, I have to look at the text. But you felt it was sort of too categorical.

K: Well, I thought it gave too much to the view that is held only at Harvard and in New York.

G: Well . . .

K: Well, I mean it just isn't true that until July 15 -- it wasn't as dramatic until July 15.

G: You really think if I look at the press there was a sense of a great deal having changed?

K: Yeah. I just think I wouldn't overdo it.

G: Yeah, yeah. Well this is it. I have a feeling that most people -- you know -- I don't think -- I think it takes a very dramatic incident to bring to people . . .

K: Because if you read the Congressional campaign of 1970 -- XXXXX even the Democrats were saying the foreign policy was in very good shape. I mean not that this defines anything since they screwed everything up before.

CLASSIFIED

July 30 73 By a HARRIS fly/ist

TELCORN

Wm. Downey/Kissinger

9:23 a.m. - 3/8/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Dr. Kissinger, this is Mr. Downey.

K: Oh yes, how are you, Mr. Downey?

D: I'm over at my mother's hospital room at this moment. I gather you received work yesterday.

K: Yes, we have sent a message to Chou En-lai. Of course we couldn't have had an answer because it was only delivered at midnight last night.

D: She is in serious condition but she lasted through the night which they didn't expect yesterday evening. Would you just point this out to the other side?

"During

K: Well, I'll read you what I sent him. I said to him: /Dr. Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China he mentioned that John Downey's mother was very ill. Prime Minister Chou En-lai pointed and said that the U.S. side should inform the Chinese side if her situation became critical. The White House has just been informed that Mrs. Downey who had been residing in a nursing home because of her stroke entered a hospital on March 6 because of further deterioration in her condition including paralysis on one side of her body. Doctors now consider the condition to be critical. The medical estimate is that she will not live more than a matter of weeks and if further develop it could bring immediate death. The White House has had its own physician check on this report and considers it accurate. The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side of this development in the light of the Prime Minister's assurance to Dr. Kissinger."

D: All right.

K: That's the maximum we can do.

D: That is the situation. Well, thank you very much for calling.

K: We should hear in a couple of - well, I just don't know what they'll do.

D: I don't know either.

BROKEN

TELCONE

Melvin Laird/Kissinger

11:47 a.m. - 3/8/73

K: Hello. Mr. Secretary.

L: How're you doing?

K: OK.

L: Well, that's great.

K: How are you? You're back?

L: Well, I'm just back for a few days. I came back because I took
over this Wolf Trap Farm thing for Dave Packard and we're trying
to get the program ready for 1974. It's this performing arts group
out at the Wolf Trap.

K: Well I miss you.

L: Well I miss you, Henry. There were a couple things that I thought
I'd just like to ask you about and see if-I'm going to be going. I
understand you're leaving too. I'm going to be down at Trace Vedas (sp. ?
not too far from where you are but I won't see you down there.

K: Why not?

L: I'll be about 20 miles south of Acapulco.

K: Are you going to tell me your phone number?

L: Well, it's the Trace Vedas Club.

K: Oh, yeh, I know it. I may take a boat out there.

L: Well, I'll be down there and Barbara's going down with me and we're
going to be going down and spend about ten days there.

K: OK, I'll find you there. I know where it is, I've been there.

L: It's a nice place. There are two golf courses there and kind of a
nice place to go.

K: Good.

CLASSIFIED

Ad. 01258
By: D. M. 01/05/87

2

L: But Henry what I wanted to just check out with you. You know my friend Helmut has gotten in touch with me informally and wants to send a formal request over here for me to receive the highest civilian award of the German Government.

K: Of course.

L: He wants to have a little ceremony over there and I didn't know whether that might embarrass anyone if I told Helmut that I'd like

K: I think you should accept it.

L: And then there is one other - the only two that I was really interested in was Helmut's request and then Prince Sultan.

K: Who is he?

L: A Brother of the King of Saudi Arabia.

K: Oh yeh.

L: Now that one I think I ought to stay away from, don't you?

K: Yeh, that I would stay away from.
because

L: I think/of my personal relationship with Helmut

K: No, it's good for our German relations anyway.

L: OK.

K: Am I going to - well, I'll see you down in Acapulco I guess. Otherwise we can have lunch or breakfast here sometime.

L: /Well, you're going to be busy trying to get away. Why don't we wait until we get back and I'll hope to see you down there but why don't we get together when you get back, Henry.

K: OK. Good.

L: But we may see you down there just for fun but there are a few other things I'd like to talk to you about. I had a couple of things that might be embarrassing if I did them and I don't want to ever do anything that embarrassed anybody and they are some things that, you know.

RECLASSIFIED

Anon. 507258
By: HARRIS Gibbs

CLASSIFIED

Sincerely EO17258

By a HARRY MCGliffey

K: All I want you to know Mel is now that you're out of there we're bombing like crazy.

L: Well, that's good. (Laugs) That's fine. But it has to do with writing some article on a book. They want to make such large advance payments to me, on things like that.

K: Just don't

L: I better not do anything like that, don't you?

K: I don't know, everyone else is doing it. I don't see why you shouldn't.

L: Well, I've always kind of criticized people for doing it, but we'll talk about it.

K: OK, Mel, I'll see you very soon.

L: I will and when you get back we'll get together and talk about a list of things that I really would like to get your advice on.

K: Good. Absolutely, Mel. And I really look forward to it.

L: If we see each other in Mexico it'll be just on a social basis.

K: Exactly.

L: Good.

K: Bye, Mel.

3

TelCon

Sen. Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

3:15 pm, Maych 8, 1973

K: Hello.

J: Henry!

K: Scoop, how are you.

J: How are you doing?

K: Okay.

J: Great. You got everything resolved today?

K: Absolutely. Total absolute confusion.

J: (Laughter) I hope the other side is--

K: Well, we are going to propose a cut of SS-9s, and destruction of SS-9s, a cut of ___lls and we'll give up B-47s.

J: (Laughter) Well we can go out there and Zonar where they've got them all stored you know. And have a little party.

K: And burn them all.

J: Listen, Henry, what I called about--Clifton Daniel's coming, but Margaret has a TV thing up in Philadelphia and can't come. He's a good guy and I think it would be worth your while to be there, you know.

K: Can she be there?

J: She can't be there. He's going to be there.

K: Oh, he's going to be there.

J: Yeah, he's coming. Now what I wanted to ask, I was going to suggest Lloyd Benson and his wife, is that all right.

K: Sure, that's fine.

J: In lieu of Margaret, so that it will be just seven of us.

K: Surround me with Democrats.

J: Yeah, that's right, you can handle yourself. I just wanted to clear it

CLASSIFIED

Auto. 8017258
Byron DeConklin

2

with you. I don't know whether they can come, and if they can--

K: Aren't you thoughtful. I don't know yet whether I'm going to bring somebody, but--

J: Oh, you've got to bring someone now.

K: Okay, if you're gonna take that attitude.

J: That's right. You bring your favorite, so we'll know what line to put out.

K: (Laughter) Okay.

J: Listen, what-- we're just going to put our feet up, you understand.

K: Oh, yeah, that's what makes it attractive.

J: Relax--I hate these long stuffy things, but I thought it would be good to have Benson because he has some questions about some things, you know we had a fight on the Trident, you remember.

K: No, I like him, I really do like him, and it's very thoughtful--

J: I don't know whether we can get him, if we can't get him I'll get back to you with someone else, maybe Harry Byrd or something.

K: Well you are very thoughtful. You don't have to come back about Harry Byrd, that'd be fine.

J: All right, we'll get him if they can't come.

K: Good.

J: And we'll see you Wednesday at 7:30.

K: Look forward to it very much.

J: All right, Henry.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
by A. HAROLD GLISER

TelCon

Secy. Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 pm, March 8, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Yes, Henry.

K: I'm sorry -- this concerned getting Bob Hope into China. If you have a policy view on that--

R: I'm not sure what he's talking about. Yes.

K: As long as we could be sure he doesn't come back.

R: Well you were saying on the--I really just talking about the abc's-- it seems to me if we are going to undertake a program of arming Paks, that's one thing.

K: But it isn't a program of arming the Paks. On any--I read Moynihan's cable, he's bombarding me with the same stuff. It's really--on any objective grounds, the Indians are producing five times as much themselves as that one time exception would be.

R: Uh huh.

K: In addition to the Soviet help they are getting, I mean, what moral right do they have - if they didn't take any help themselves, they'd have a moral case.

R: Well I wasn't really talking about the morality. I was talking about whether if we want to undertake a program of helping Paks early, that's one thing. I don't think the abc's have a hell of a lot of military significance.

K: No, but it would -- what the President has in mind is to clear off the books all the things for which contracts were signed, or agreements were made, including the one for $87 million for India. And then do it in that context. And he's doing it partly because the Chinese have asked us to do something. In fact, they've asked us to do a hell of a lot more than we are doing. They want us to do a supply relationship which we are not willing to do.

R: I suppose if we can actually turn on the spigot and give them the ABC's and not be expected to give them a lot more. But when they talked to you they frankly admit that's not what they--

K: No, no. What they want is a continuing relationship. What the President wants to do is to show some response, is to say everything for which

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01725f
By D. HARRIS-GIBSON

contracts have been signed on both sides, $14 million for Indian air
defense. $35 million or whatever it is for Pakistan plus the $87 million
of AID for India. All of this he clears off the books. And in that--also
gets us off the hook with Pakistan.

R: Yes. With the clear understanding that it is not going to be a continuing line of supply except for spare parts.

K: Absolutely, except for spare parts, that's exactly his view.

R: Well, can we hold up on a decision because if we are going to do that we have enough time to at least--

K: No, no, we must notify the Indians first.

R: And I think we ought to package it pretty well and be sure that we get our ducks in a row before any decision is--

K: Absolutely. But that is what the President is thinking of. There is no consideration whatever to a continuing military supply relationship.

R: Uh huh. Because that would be what would trouble me. I think this will make the Indians mad, but I think that doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference. They've made us mad.

K: No, he's thinking of a one-time deal, wiping off the books and, for example, there are 25 airplanes as part of that one-time exception for which they never signed a contract. And that he would not give them. He would only give them those things they signed contractual.

R: Okay. Well I won't say anything indicating the decision one way or the other, and you won't either.

K: No, no, you can be sure I won't.

R: Okay.

K: Right, sir.

By DAVID HARVEY DECLASSIFIED

TelCon
Robert McNamara/Mr. Kissinger

5:20 pm, March 8, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Hi Henry. Say, I was up in Canada last night and Trudeau was speaking, I was supposed to go to Ottawa today, but the Finance Minister with whom I was to work, went to Paris, so I just went to Toronto where I had to make a speech, and had a meeting with Trudeau. But it was just pleasure, I like him and it wasn't any business. But Minister Sharpe afterwards just insisted that I sid down with him, and we met until 10:30 to 11:30 and he was, he didn't want to talk about what I wanted to talk about, was getting some money out of Canada for the International Development Association, but he just wanted to talk about Vietnam and their role. My gosh, I spent an hour trying to persuade him that they ought to stay in there. I assume that's what you wanted.

K: Absolutely.

M: But I just wanted to mention to you that my impression was that he was really on the ropes. He's under attack politically. The conservatives are making all they can out of it. He, I think, to try to offset their opposition suggested to the three parties that they all send representatives with him to Vietnam, North Vietnam, but the conservatives last night refused to do it. He going anyhow. But I strongly urged him to stay in on the ground that this was the best means of preventing what he wanted to prevent which was potential military action by some one of the major powers.

K: No question about it.

M: But I just wanted to tell you what you already knew I'm sure, but--

K: But I didn't think you'd carry it so far--

M: It's for real, Henry, I'll guarantee you that. Because there was no reason for him to talk to me. He had to fly back to Ottawa last night from Toronto, and we didn't finish talking until 25 of twelve.

K: They are a God damned bunch of selfish gripers.

M: Well, assuming that, I think you've got to massage them, that's really the only purpose of my call.

K: No, we've got to do it, I guess we'll send Porter up there to talk to him.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. by E012758
By DAVID M. GLISST

Telcon
Secretary Lynn/Dr. Kissinger

3-9-73, 8:50 am

K: Would you mind getting out of my business like going on television.

L: I am really sorry.

K: I turned on the television and I get that horrible blarney.

L: Sorry.

K: It was impressive.

L: I am sorry I really do apologize.

K: I really was impressed. I want to know what you were talking about.

L: Neither did I so that makes two of us.

K: But you beat that poor bastard down three times as far as I could tell he tried to set up you up.

L: Well I don't think you can allow them to do that.

K: I don't think you will be asked back so soon again.

L: Oh, I think I will. I spent 40 minutes with him afterward becoming good friends.

K: Oh, you did very well.

L: Oh it was too tough if you want my own judgment not enough smiles.

K: Listen I don't know a damn thing about the subject but I found it impressive.

L: Well, you are very kind. I mean that Henry. Damn nice of you to call.

K: Look in when you come over here.

L: I will, I'll do it, coming over today.

K: Coming over today?

GEORGES角

Telcon

Alex Johnson/Kissinger

3-9-73, 9:10 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Henry,

K: Yes, Alex.

J: Good morning. Whether I see the President today or not I would like.

K: Well you and I have to have a brief chat.

J: Yeah, we have to get together sometime during the day.

K: Also, I will get you ten minutes with the President. It is just ridiculous.

J: Alright.

K: This has gone through about 25 committees here. But I am going in to see the President in 5 minutes. I will get it.

J: I will just wait on the word -- I just wanted to say that in any event I sure wanted to see you.

K: Right. My instinct now is to stick pretty much with the NSDM you had last time.

J: I am agreeable to that.

K: And to let you look into the quantitative aspect.

J: I am a little worried about going down to you know the number of launchers.

K: And the ~~throw~~ weight.

J: Oh, and the ~~throw~~ weight? Well, let's talk about it.

K: And explore the MIRV. But I don't see how we can make a firm proposal on the MIRV.

CLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
Byron H. Kissinger

J: I have been thinking -- you know the problem is that I am going to have to be prepared to take either fork in the road and I don't want to go down too far down the straight road. It is awfully hard to go very far without committing yourself or appearing to the others to be committing yourself to one of the folks.

K: Well, that is the point I tried to make at the NSC meeting yesterday.

J: Oh yearh. You brought it out very very well.

K: I am completely agreed the President will have to make up his mind in the month. Which folk he wants to take.

J: That's right.
I have no problem

K: But if they have any ideas. I had a brief chat with Dobrynin yesterday, I don't think they have a clue. My impression is that whatever your difficulties here they have equal ones -- when you come over I'll talk to you.

J: Okay, I'll wait on word from you Henry.

K: Okay Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. July 5017258 -
By DAVID MARCH 01/5/64

TELCOM

Dep. Sec. Clements/Kissinger

10:10 a.m. - 3/9/73

K: Hello.

C: Hi, Henry, I enjoyed the meeting yesterday very much and I want to compliment you.

K: Well, I think we are getting the interest focused now. Bill, I wanted to raise with you the following question. I am getting very worried about the ALMs. When you have this new in submarines, I am wondering whether 16 - well, when the Soviets are going from 16 to 12, why are we going

C: That's a good question and some of us have been talking about that very issue.

K: Now I don't want to trigger the President into a decision but can you take a really serious look at that.

C: I will do that. I will talk to Foster and others about it and be back to you.

K: I am really worried about it. If it is a question of cost...

C: I will look into it. Give me two or three days and I will be back in touch with you.

K: OK.

C: And I thought the ______ last night, the issue with respect to Pauls yesterday was absolutely perfect.

K: I don't understand what is going on. Why do people think they can win fighting the White House?

C: I don't understand it, Henry.

K: That is not going to work. I wouldn't be here for 5 years if I didn't respect the President's wishes.

C: You can be sure that I am pursuing the Nitze situation right on to a conclusion and I am not going to give up until it...

K: You know the President doesn't like him. We just let him go on the delegation because of the President's insistence.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E01258
By: D. R. DeMersley

TelCon

Dr. Schlesinger/Mr. Kissinger

10:25 am, March 9, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: How important is it to get Defense in on your discussions.

S: Well, they are meeting now at the British Embassy. I think I'll hear back from them and see how satisfied they have been and in that event, If they are relatively satisfied then it isn't that important.

K: Well, they are meeting with whom?

S: They are meeting with four Britishers.

K: Who is they on our side?

S: Some of the people from my old little group at AEC who know the weapons cost. They know nothing on--

K: I think I will mention the whole project briefly to Richardson so that it doesn't blow without his being informed.

S: Okay, and if he can find some fellow he can really trust who knows the numbers down there in the system, it would help.

K: Good. Well I'll tell that you may call on him for assistance.

S: Okay, very good. Anything else.

K: No, that's all. I thought you did a good job at the briefing yesterday.

S: Good, good, good.

K: I'll tell you when I think you don't, so that you can look take it seriously when I tell you when you do.

S: Well that's excellent. Feel free. I discovered that the briefings they put together has been in the past just the way of advertising photographs. Another way of telling the story.

K: Exactly.

S: And that's teasing.

DECLASSIFIED

TelCon
Secy Clements/Mr. Kissinger

10:37 am, Marsh 9, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Hi, Henry.

K: Bill, on these C123s for Thailand, we want to go ahead on it.

C: All right, fine. And, what are you talking about now.

K: You were talking about ~~A10~~ weren't we.

C: Yes, that's what we originally talked about. All right. We'll start the ball a rolling on it.

K: Good. Give me--you say you start the ball rolling on Monday, it gives me a chance to let them know ahead of time.

C: All right. That'll be fine and we'll keep you informed as to what these plans are and give you a piece of paper on it.

K: Good.

C: Thank you, Henry.

K: Thank you.

C: All right, bye.

RECLASSIFIED

TelCon
Amb. Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

10:46 am, March 9, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Good morning, Henry.

K: How are you?

C: I'm just fine, and yourself.

K: Okay.

C: I thought you'd just like to know that our people in Brussels and Vienna have been sent some new instructions about the MBFR which I think will please your heart. The gist of the instructions is that although we think that our minimum objectives still has to be that Hungary somewhere along the line brought into a constrained or--

K: No question.

C:
On the second convention agreement. We expect the Warsaw Pact
now will be most unlikely to accept full participation for Hungary.
So that what our people have been told if there's a consensus
in the Council for pursuing the U.S. abeyance formula, we are
prepared to go along with it despite _________ and its acceptability.
But anyhow, they'll do that. And it's really a question of where
we come out at the end.

K: Good. Are you gonna let Rush know?

C: Yes, I will.

K: You will, okay.

C: Is that all right.

K: That would be fine, it saves me a phone call.

C: I'll tell him.

K: Good, and you can tell him we've talked.

CLASSIFIED

2

Lk

C: What we are most anxious is to see the Alliance keeps up a good front, you know.

K: Exactly, I think we've got it in good shape.

C: Yeah. All right, Henry, I'll do that.

K: Those talks are going okay at the Embassy?

C: They are going on right now. They--I'm sure they are, yes.

K: Well, at any rate I'm considering bringing Richardson in.

C: I see, I see.

K: But let me worry about that. I'll keep you informed.

C: All right. You let me know how you judge it.

K: Good.

C: Okay, many thanks, bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Automatically E017458
By DAVID HARDAHSTON

TELCORN

Newbold Noyes/Mr. Kissinger

11:08 a. m. 3/9/73

NN: Henry.

HK: How are you?

NN: I'm fine. Listen, I didn't mean to be flippant, the other night, about
this business about the Associated Press.

HK: I don't think you had been.

NN: The reason I was sort of casual about it was that I thought that really you
did know about it and had been sort of --

HK: No, no, I didn't know about it--I-- Herb Klein called me last night
and he is going to transmit something or other to me.

NN: Yes, I know. In fact somebody in his office called me and asked me to
give them the information to transmit to you, but the point is I just wanted
to register two things--one, that seriously, the reason nobody has been in
touch with you before is that we were in this ridiculous position to have
to wait officially that the President would not make a speech and the other
thing was--but everybody has agreed and is terribly hopeful that you will
do it and the other thing that I wanted to register is that as you will be told
by Herb and all this is a luncheon--the annual luncheon of the AP member-
ship--it has about 800 people in the Ballroom at the Waldorf Astoria
and includes not only newspaper publishers but all the broadcast executives
--it is the media affair of the year and if you are going to be saying some-
thing--you couldn't have a better form than this one and the whole record of
the people who have been there--the President himself has been there a cou-
of times since he's been President and has been before that, of course, and
it is a --exactly the right audience for you and you must do it if you possibly
can.

HK: And you want a formal speech if I do it--

NN: Yes sir--Well I mean, we would take--that's up to you, whichever you would
think you would do best. But it should be--

HK: What I do best are extemporaneous things but that's too dangerous for such a group.

NN: I don't know, in your case it wouldn't maybe be too dangerous.

HK: How about questions and answers--

NN: I think with a group this large--I've seen that tried in that room and

RECLASSIFIED

Page 2

I wouldn't advise. I would do your own thing on what has happened and where you thing we are going. And I just --would make you own speech of maybe half hour --something like that and if you wanted to work from notes, I know you could do it that way and I know it tends to come across more attractively even more than if you do it that way--but in any event would you do it, if you are in town?

HK: I am very disposed to do --- let me talk to the President about it, I fell
I must do that and I'll be in touch next week--

NN: And like a damn fool I did have an hour with him yesterday and I neglected
 him to try to enlist him to get him you to come, he having just said he couldn't

HK: Well if he agrees, I'll do it.

NN: Thank you very much. I'll just wait word from you.

HK: I didn't think you were flippant at all the other evening.

NN: I do want you to know that I have been delegated to do it--for Paul Miller
who is President of Ganette Organization and who is also president of the
AP--there a lot of much more important people than I who would be in touch
with you but they said that since I was here, to call you up--

HK: No, you are the ideal choice.

NN: Okay.

HK: I'll do my damnest. I'd like to do it.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E01258
Byron HAROLD CLIFFORD

TelCon
Sandor Vanocur/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 am, March 9, 1973

K: Hello.

V: Henry!

K: How are you.

V: Okay, did you get a good rest.

K: Yes, I had a good time.

V: Fine. Listen, Harry Ashmore is in from the Center this week. I wondered if we could have lunch, or have some of your time Thursday or Friday.

K: Lunch I won't be able to do because I just looked at my schedule and I know, there's a slight chance on Friday, but I'll definitely see you in the office.

V: All right. Can I call your office on Thursday?

K: You call Dick Campbell on Thursday morning.

V: I will do that.

K: Good.

V: Okay, bye.

K: I'll see you at any rate this week.

V: Okay. Bye.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

August 9, 1973
By: J. S. M. H.

*

TelCon

11: 46 am, March 9, 1973

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello.

Z: Henry. I just read that Jackman piece.

K: I just saw it in the news summary, I didn't see the piece.

Z: __________ is in no way being presented other than an adjunct of your operation.

K: That didn't occur to me, I didn't even--I just read the news summary--

Z: It simply said that the Press Office is giving its own hack. I just don't want their outfit to give this impression. __________ is a totally geared to program only from K you. You see what I mean?

K: Oh, I have no doubt of that.

Z: Once you get to know him, and when we are loosened up here, we'll see how we can work it.

K: That will be no problem.

Z: Well I want you to know that he's absolutely, totally 100% cautious and recognizes where the foreign policy will come from.

K: Oh, I have no question about that.

Z: I know that, but I want you to know that __________ is not a Scali, he's not--

K: No, no, the differences sbetween you and me have to do with your general level competence, not your intentions.

Z: (laughed) On this basis we're all right.

K: Okay.

Z: I didn't want you to misunderstand--

K: I understand it perfectly.

Z: Okay, good, thank you.

K: Bye.

RECLASSIFIED

Autumnal EV 12/25/73
By: D. HARRIS-Davis

TelCon
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/Mr. Kissinger

11:55 am, March 9, 1973

K: Hello........

W: It is a very difficult situation for me. In all the years of my diplomatic life I wasn't in a difficult situation, but I appreciate the help I got from your delegation and I was grateful for this. Dr. Kissinger I am calling you because I am leaving tomorrow for Latin America in connection with Panamanian Security Council meeting. I go first to Brazil for a visit and from there fly directly to Panama. What I want to ask, after my return we could get together for an exchange of views. There are a number of things I would like to discuss with you, and perhaps we can have lunch or dinner together. Whatever you prefer when you are in New York, do you think that you will be here end of March or first half of April in New York.

K: First half of April, yes. I will have to be with the President on the West Coast until about the 8th of April.

W: The problem for me is that I have to leave again on the 9th in the evening for Paris where I have to -- where I have a speaking engagement and then I go to Geneva for our ACC meetings, but I would then be back again, this is just for one week, be back again around Saturday the 14th of April.

K: Well, why don't we plan something for the week of the 15th.

W: Fine, that would be fine for me.

K: That would be very good, and I would enjoy that.

W: Fine. Now, it suggested perhaps my secretary contact your secretary to find out when you are in New York so that we can then--would you be here over the weekend of Saturday the 14th or Sunday the 15th--

K: That would be a possibility, so that conceivably we could meet on the 16th.

W: Fine, this is perfect for me.

K: Well, could you have your secretary call mine or vice versa.

W: Yes, I can tell my secretary to ring up your secretary and to find out whether it works on Monday, either for lunch or for dinner, whatever you prefer, we could have it in my new residence which is very comfortable and we would then be

RECLASSIFIED

August 9, 1973
By: NARAYANAGIRI

quite alone so that we can talk quietly about a number of things.

K: I think that would be very good. Lunch might be a little better than dinner, but--

W: I imagine, yeah.

K: Because I probably will want to get back to Washington.

W: Well it is very kind, I'm really very happy that we can get together. There are so many things I would like to discuss with you in the light of the recent developments. Then I may perhaps suggest that we have lunch in my residence which is quite near the United Nations--Sutton Place, No. 3, very convenient location. Would one o'clock or 1:15 be fine for you.

K: That would be good. The only thing is please have your office check with mine the week before.

W: Yes, I shall instruct my secretary to discuss the matter further with your secretary.

K: Excellent.

W: Fine, so I'm looking forward very much. I had a very good talk with Ambassador Scali yesterday.

K: Yes, I saw his report and I thought what you said about the CRT is very constructive.

W: Well, thank you. I'm glad you are telling me--

K: I mean the approach you discussed yesterday.

W: Exactly. That's great importance that the matter is clarified and I only Scale to--

K: It will be kept absolutely confidential.

W: Exactly, because otherwise--

K: No, no, no, no, no. This will be held to the Secretary of State and myself.

W: Right. Thank you very much and I'm looking forward to seeing you on Monday the 16th.

K: Excellent. Good bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258

By A. M. Patsalos

TelCon
Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 pm, March 9, 1973

K: Hello.

MK: Henry!

K: Yes, how are you.

MK: Fine, thank you. Dick Campbell suggested that I call and perhaps we can work out an appointment.

K: Yeah. Well, maybe we could meet tomorrow.

MK: Oh, that would be marvelous.

K: Can you call me in the morning just to make sure.

MK: Sure, what time would be convenient.

K: Call me around 10:30 and we could meet around Noon, or maybe even for lunch.

MK: Well, that will be splendid.

K: Okay, Marvin.

MK: Excellent, Henry, I'll call you tomorrow morning.

K: Good.

MK: Bye.

RECLASSIFIED
1-07/25/73

TelCon

Danny Kaye/Mr. Kissinger

12:40 pm, March 9, 1973

K: Hello.

DK: Henri!

K: Danny, how are you.

DK: I'm fine. Will you leave the menu to me.

K: Of course, I'll leave the menu to you.

DK: Listen, when will you be out.

K: I'll be out from the 30th till about the 7th, 8th or 9th, I'm not sure yet.

DK: Are you going to be in ______ or are you going to be in Los Angeles.

K: I'm afraid I'll be in San Clemente.

DK: Will you be able to come down.

K: Yeah.

DK: Marvelous. Do you have any special night you want to come, or do you have any special people you want to see that night for dinner. If you feel like Chinese food a little better, we'd invite him, but I'm not sure you're crazy about him and I don't know how to make chinese cottage cheese.

K: Or Chinese ketchup.

DK: Ketchup, that's marvelous. My daughter is so excited, Dina, about you. She says she's going to Washington.

K: Yes, I'm going to see her tomorrow afternoon.

DK: Oh, that's lovely, that's very kind of you.

K: I said half jokingly, I didn't think I'd get such quick action.

DK: Anybody you want to see, Henry.

K: Let me think about it. I'll leave it up to you essentially.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively E017258
By A. M. Dugan

2

DK: What I don't want is politicians.

K: I couldn't agree more.

DK: Okay.

K: Anybody you enjoy will be fun for me.

DK: Oh, I thought maybe somebody in L. A. you would specifically like to see, because we only have about eight people at one time.

K: Yeah. I like Billy Wilder generally.

DK: I don't know if Billy is here or not, let me find out.

DK: Otherwise, why don't you choose them.

DK: Fine. Now will you know when you will be able to get down.

K: How much warning do you need.

DK: I need at least 40 minutes. (Laughter) I don't need any warning at all because we have what we call a stocked larder. In other words, you can pile in and there we are. If I know the morning of the day, then I'm in great shape.

K: I can do better than that. I could call you when I get out there, say on the 31st, and then do it sometime that week.

DK: Marvelous. The only thing is if you want to see some people or if I want to get some people, if I tell them a couple of days in advance.

K: I'll call you about the 31st or the 1st.

DK: Fine, do you have my phone number.

K: No, can you give it to me.

DK: Oh, sure, It's 213/275-5531.

K: Good, I'll call you on the 31st or 1st and then I think about the 5th or 6th would be good for me.

DK: That'd be great. I have a lady here would like to say hello, okay.

K: Who is that.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E017258
By D.N. HARVEY-GIBSON

3

DK: Kitty Carlisle.

K: Oh, Kitty, oh great.

C: Henry!

K: Kitty, how are you.

KC: Hello darling how are you.

K: Great. I'm so sorry I couldn't make your party.

KC: Oh, you're sweet. Listen I felt that in the cause of peace I could give you up, but not too many times.

K: Well, I wouldn't do it too many times.

KC: Listen, Angel, I'm seeing Ernst on Sunday. Have you got a message.

K: Oh, tell him to call me.

KC: All right. He's only going to be here 48 hours.

K: Did I hurt his feelings, I never hear from here anymore.

KC: Oh Lord no, heavens no. He is coming for a meeting, I think? they put him on the Xerox Board, that may be a secret, buty anyway, he's coming for that and I'm going to have dinner with him Sunday, so I'll tell him to call you.

K: Look, I may be actually in town, shall we all have dinner.

KC: Oh that would be devine, that would be marvelous. Let's all four of us have dinner.

K: That would be great, where should we do that.

KC: Well, why don't you call me when you get in.

K: Well, because you've never given me your phone number, it's my reputation. You realize you still owe me something.

KC: What's that.

K: You told me you were going to tell me some day the secret of my success, such as it is.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal EOL255f
By A. H. Carlisle

4

KC: All right, I will. I'll tell you on Sunday.

K: Will you really.

KC: I promise.

K: Can it be told in front of others.

KC: Yes, I'll tell you partially in public and then we'll have one minute in my living room alone, I'll make an excuse.

K: Good.

KC: I'm in the phone book darling, the number is Templeton 8-3237, under Mrs. Moss Hart.

K: And shall we meet at--

KC: Meet at my house.

K: What is the address.

KC: 32 E. 64th. Now let's all do that for sure. What time do you think you'd like to meet.

K: As early as possible because I have to get back to Washington that night.

KC: Yes, Ernst is coming about 4:00 pm so we ought to meet at half past six, or seven.

K: Half past six or seven.

KC: In case his plane is late, where will I get in touch with you.

K: At Nancy's.

KC: Okedoke, now one more thing. I want to tell you that the food is okay to eat, you don't have to bring any alkaseltzer to Danny's.

K: (Laughter)

KC: Wait a minute, he wants to say a word.

DK: He didn't like the chinese food in China did he.

K: Oh, he didn't mind it. He wasn't wild about it, but--

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. only EO17258
By: D. HARRIS/Hartley

Telcon
Amb Johnson/Kissinger

3-9-73, 3:31 p.m.

K: Alex, I just wanted you to know that I am obviously slipping because I couldn't get it overruled.

J: No, okay that's no.

K: Partly because the President is giving a radio speech today. He communicated anything he's got to say yesterday.

J: I would assume that he doesn't have much more to say.

K: What time are you leaving?

J: Six o'clock takeoff from Andrews.

K: Well, then we had better meet tonight. Do you want to meet at 5:00.

J: That would be fine. Okay I'll be over then to see you.

K: Good.

J: Okay Henry, see you then.

GRASS/TOG

10/5/73 3:52PM

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. only. EOL 12/25 of 1
By DAVID HARRIS

Telcon

Ambassador Bruce/Kissinger

3-9-73, 4:42 p.m.

K: David?

B: Henry?

K: How are you?

B: It's summer time.

K: Well David we are getting you out of the country.

B: You are?

K: Yep

B: My gosh, is that settled?

K: They not only agreed but they agree and welcome the appointment.

B: My goodness. Well now what do we do?

K: Well, now we are proposing to them that we will announce that next Thursday.

B: Yeah.

K: And keep it quiet until then.

B: Fine. When are you going away?

K: I am going away Friday.

B: Can I go away Thursday?

K: I think you should be here when they announce it.

B: I should. I was going to Palm Beach to try and get some pictures for the National Gallery.

K: Well, can you go in the evening?

B: Yeah.

K: If you would go in the evening that would be fine.

B: Okay.

CLASSIFIED

Auto. E01725f
By DAVID HARVEY

K: You should plan to get there around May 1.

B: Around May 1. Okay.

K: The only disadvantage I can see in your appointment is
what the hell can I say I will be doing there when we've
got you there.

B: You're the boss.

K: But I had every incentive to have a second rater there so
that my personal explanations were needed.

B: Oh, my dear fellow. You don't need that. Well I ought
to go there May 1.

K: Yeah.

B: How much intermediary work do I have to do?

K: Next to none.

B: Next to none. Yeah.

K: I mean you are welcome to do any of it.

B: Well I don't really need anything, do I?

K: Well I think you should see the record of my conversations
... But no one else should ever be told of this.

B: No, when are you coming back? In a couple of weeks after
Friday?

K: I will be back on the 27th.

B: Of March?

K: I'll just be gone ten days.

B: Well then should I call you up around the 1st of April or what?

K: ...

B: I don't want to be a nuisance to you.

K: You couldn't be a damn nuisance. I'll be on the West Coast on
the 1st of April. Why don't you call me around the 27th?

CLASSIFIED

Auto. E01725f
By: D.A. HARRIS

B: Yeah I will. All right, thank you very much.

K: I can't tell you how pleased we all are.

B: Well, I am awfully pleased and feel very honored.
I hope I won't mess it up.

K: David it will be among the many distinguished services
you have rendered. And you will see when you readh
these records that what is going there is a very curious
relationship which could in many ways be one of our
almost an alliance relationship.

B: Yeah.

K: It requires however great understanding and just in the
sense that we are reliable and they need a lot of conceptual
attention.

B: Well I think it sounds absolutely fascinating.

K: But they wouldn't have agreed to your coming if they
weren't damn serious.

B: Yeah. Well then all right I will just keep in limbo until
Thursday night. What am I supposed to say when it is
announced on Thursday.

K: Just say that you are delighted or whatever you want to say.
Say I prept for it with Madame Binh.

B: All right One more question. May I tell Evangeline now?
About the May thing. (Tape change)

K: We are sending an advance party around April 1.

B: Oh fine.

K: So you could get together with them after the announcement
or before April 1 about any personal requirements.

B: Okay. All right.

K: But you will see they will just do anything that is humanly
possible.

B: Oh fine. Thank you one thousand times.

Telcon
Secretary Shultz/Kissinger

4:42, 3-9-73

K: George.

S: We have just finished this meeting.

K: I know you screwed it up and you need technical advice.

S: As you would expect with me there, it all went off well.

K: You need some technical advice?

S: Well I want to report to you and you can report to the
President.

K: Okay.

S: What has been achieved is a cooperative attitude toward
the currency problem.

K: Good.

S: And the agreement on a procedure for study during this
week and another meeting of the same group next Friday.

K: Do the markets stay closed?

S: We will have a procedural agreement. We have undertaken
no substantive agreement whatever.

K: But do the markets stay closed?

S: The markets will stay closed during next week. Everybody
seems to think it is perfectly all right. They are not feeling
any stresses or strains as a result of closing the markets.

K: Well it sounds like a very statesmen like way you are proceeding.

S: We say in the communique that we want to proceed with
cooperation. We say we think that the prices is basically
due to speculation that the basic exchange rates are all right
that we all want to jointly insure orderly market that between
now and next Friday the Deputies will meet ~~as a result of
agreement~~ and try to develop a set of measures that
will be helpful and that we should get on with long-term
monetary reform. So in terms of substantive content

CLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258
By A. M. Dilsen

there is little appearance there. In terms of objective
wanting to build a reasonable basis of cooperation here
I think we have achieved that procedurally. You could
report that to the President.

K: That was our principal concern.
You probably can't say which direction you think it is
moving.

S: Yes I can. I think that it is moving substantively towards
some form of a float and what really needs to be worked
out -- what we need to consult with them about are the
understandings among us about what a float really means.

K: Right.

S: And in that connection I think we have a good contact
especially with the Germans.

K: Well that as you know was a big concern.

S: So far we have met with the British and with the French
and I am going to see Giscard again tomorrow morning.
We gave him basically the message that we talked to both(?)

K: Excellent. I talked to Schmidt after you had left as I
had promised him I would and I just told him that you, the
President and I had talked, and that you really know what
our basic approach was. But that for any reason he had
a political not a technical concern that he could call me
and I would then be in touch with him. He hasn't called
me so I am sure, you know that it is the best sign.

S: Right. I expect to come back to Bohn from Moscow and
I will be in Bohn Wednesday night and I will be meeting
with Schmidt.

K: Good. Well it seems to have gone as well as we possibly
could expect.

S: Well I think it is all right and if you would just report in to
the President I won't bother him by calling him or anything
The text of the communique is probably on the wires and I
am going to go and have a little press conference here and
put it out from my standpoint.

DECLASSIFIED

Agency E01258
By: H.A. DeGleisdorff

Telcon:
Secretary Rogers

March 9, 1973; 5:20 p.m.

R: Say, Henry, we have a request now from the President's office, or somebody's office to go ahead and get the agreement on some of these ambassadors. One is Graham Martin. Has anybody talked to Bunker? Does he know that it's coming and...

K: Yeah.

R: But do you think this is a good time to do it or should we wait til the 28th of March?

K: Well, I think...oh, no, no. The way we want to do it is to have Bunker stay until after the Thieu visit and Martin not to go there until the middle of April.

R: Yeah, but I don't see any hurry about sending out the agreement.

K: I don't know how long these things take.

R: Well, it takes, if we nominated him now, he'd be confirmed in a month. What I wonder about is the advisability of getting a lot of instructions geared up over there about a change of ambassadors right at the moment.

K: That's a good point. Maybe we should wait until the 28th.

R: I think we'll just wait til the 28th.

K: We do want him out there fairly shortly afterwards.

R: Well, yeah, we can do that.

K: Whatever it takes to get him there, say, by the 15th, Bill, why don't you...

R: Is that the 15th of April?

K: Yeah. Or 1st of May at the latest.

R: Well, the first of May I wouldn't have trouble. The 15th of April might be a little touch and go.

K: Well, then, let's aim for the 1st of May.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn ED1725f
By: HARRY G. LISLEY