DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Jos. Sisco/Kissinger

10:18 p a. m. 3/1/71

S: One, no one will say anything in the US Govt today. I have that laid on
and told McCloskey to touch base with the S WH.

K: We will not say anything.

S: Secondly, we will try out the communique but we will insist that there's
a call for a cease fire using the language of the SecGen of a month ago.
Whether he wants to do that is up to them. We will see how it comes out. On
the paper yesterday, I have finished the first draft. I will send want to clean
it up 24-48 hours depending on the tactical situation but it's well on its way.
If I can get it in the next day or so I will send you a draft and you will
see how I am going.

K: I will schedule a meeting for Wed.

S: Hold off until tomorrow. I have to talk with the Secy. and you and I will
have to work on him. Wed. if in principle for the moment. You and I will --

K: What was the Egyptian reaction?

S: OK on the communique but ____ part they are under such pressure at
home it will not carry. They (something about a 4-power action) but you
can't beat the Israelis over the head.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCOM
Geo. Franklin/Kissinger
10:22 a.m. 2xxx 3/1/71

K: How nice to hear from you. I heard about you from the nemesis of my existence last week -- Danielle Hunebelle.

F: How amusing.

K: Whatever she told you is a lie.

F: That doesn't surprise me.

K: I am her cause and she drives me mad. Someday I will have to tell you the saga.

F: I have had a lack of trust but she was fun. I met her at a dinner at the ... She's a friend of Shepherd Stone.

K: She showed up every conceivable place. It was a good film but a heavy price.

F: This may be of no interest. Do you know Jesef Fontaine (sp?)? The French Minister of Labor and Employment. He will arrive in Washington later today. He's a very fine man. Good friend of mine and has been for 20 years. He is one of the 6 ministers who resigned under de Gaulle on Britain and the Common Market. He has a broad view of things in France. He is not a specialist in foreign policy but I thought he might interest you because he is very honest and second, he has real doubt that Britain will get into the Common Market. he feels -- I don't have the full details. He has dealt with the Algerians a good deal. On the social system in France. Went to Algeria --

K: Where can I reach him?

F: The French Embassy. No need to at all. I just thought --

K: How long will he be here?

F: In Washington at least tomorrow and the next day and perhaps Thurs.

K: I will see what I can do.

F: OK. At the Embassy with Lucet.

K: Right.

F: He is seeing Rogers so he is being taken care of so it's not necessary for a protocol point of view.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Geo. Franklin/Kissinger

10:22 a.m. 3/1/71

-2-

K: I appreciate this. If I can fit in half an hour, I will.

F: But not from my point of view.

K: I tend to see views of those I know instead of those who I can learn from.

F: That's what I thought, particularly in the Common Market situation.

M: I hope to see you within the next month or so.

F: When you have a chance. Don't have it on your mind. It was nice seeing you the other night. You look very well.

K: I will probably go to pieces some day.

F: We are not expecting that.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELCOM
Scotty Reston/Kissinger
10:30 a.m. 3/1/71

K: Can I make a personal point that is not a complaint but a reflection on our time? What I -- I don't want you to correct anything but I am saddened when I see someone of your moral stature make a point -- 65-45 and you will stick with it 100%. The thing I was trying to say that makes this present situation so sad in this country -- if you put Harriman and me in the same room the difference between us is 10% but when they speak it has to come out -- any decision is 100%. You can reverse it but the fact that it's done ____ and thoughtfully, a comment pro or con doesn't? ? ??. That's the point I was trying to make.

R: You didn't make it.

K: But not what you are making either. The fact that we are stuck with it. I am not complaining but things are being done that must be debated.

R: But they are not being debated. We are being tricked. There's not an honest debate between you and the critics on your policy. Not at all.

K: It's not true. The one thing I am not doing is a testifying before Congress. No one has met with more college groups or outside groups than I have. You may have violent disagreements with what's being done and that's sad enough.

R: I don't disagree with that but I am talking about the central question here. This town is riddled with mistrust. It wasn't worse even during the Johnson time. I believed for awhile but I don't any more.

K: That your entitled to do. We will have to see how it looks after awhile.

R: The decision of this government going across an international border without the President saying a word. The President seeing only those who support his position and not others. It's shoddy.

K: I am not here to argue the public relations policy. I think the systematic attack on the credibility is not the most elevating but I see no point in our throwing things back and forth now. It's barely conceivable that there are serious people on both sides.

R: I think there are.

K: It's also conceivable that we have the same objectives. The assumption of virtue on one side --

R: I don't think -- there's that element and there always has been.

By NARA, Date 5/26

S. Reston/Kissinger
10:30 a.m. 3/1/71

-2-

K: It doesn't help to make it with that quote. I am not attacking your column. That would take more time.

R: You have read the Fulbright testimony of yesterday.

K: I haven't read it yet.

R: Here's an extraordinary situation that a man who is a friend of the Secy. of State cannot get him to testify in public on war and peace. It's not to be believed.

K: I want to see what he said. I don't know the facts on this. Has the Secy. refused to testify? I will look into it on my own information.

R: What's the truth of the assertion that you haven't answered his letters?

K: I? Henry Kissinger? What letters?

R: You have a fellow on your staff named Lehman.

K: To the best of my knowledge -- Lehman did something that was poor judgment. Fulbright asked him to testify. It was handled by the Councillor's office at State. To the best of my knowledge he was informed and sent a letter. I will have to check. It was a formal letter going out from Irwin or Morgan g because I didn't want to give the impression that I had discretion on that. I have offered Fulbright to come as close as I can to meet at his house with the committee so he can get my views. I offered 4 weeks ago and 3 weeks ago. He hasn't taken me up. I have met twice with him and the committee at his house. It's the closest I could come.

R: He is probably taking a technical position that is foolish.

K: I respect Fulbright.

R: I don't find that surprising. He has been in town fighting for world order for 25 years.

K: A most thoughtful man. I may totally fail in the substance of what we do here but I am trying to -- God knows, one makes mistakes and doing the tactical is always present (?) -- you are not attacking me personally.

R: I am attacking the one thing that is more important than anything else. That in this country there's no kind of government, press, university, church and we cannot go on with this kind of atmosphere. It's impossible.

K: We should ask ourselves why that is and the government must bear some responsibility for it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

S. Reston/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. 3/1/71

R: Can anything be done about it? It cannot drift away into feuds within this country.

K: Do you want to have lunch this week?

R: I have to go to NY for a series of meetings and will be there until next week.

K: Want to do it next week?

R: Sure.

K: How about Wed., the 10th?

R: That's fine.

K: Let's do it.

R: Over there?

K: Or any place you want.

R: It's more private there.

K: Let's do it in my office. Of all the problems here it's the one that bothers me most. I don't have a good answer but I would love to talk with you. If you have a suggestion I will do my best quietly.

R: I will think of it and try to have something positive to say.

Some people on both

Hink there is

K: I see also c
of virtue on a

I don't think

there always has been.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Max Frankel
3/1/71 10:50 a.m.

K: I read your article today with great interest. Since this is the third time I read that Laird had recommended a terminal date I just wanted you to know that unless these things are being done by ESP it is totally and utterly untrue.

F: Oh God. As you know, I sent James Reston over to ask you about these things but he said you were understahdably...

K: I didn't talk to him about that. He was so worked up about our general credibility.

F: He said you didn't want to get into who stands for what.

K: That's generally true. But I am astonished. The withdrawal program is one thing in which the White House has exceeded all the recommendations made. But I don't want to go into that. But there has been no recommendation by phone, oral communication or writing that said what you are writing.

F: This is not a subtle or private matter and people are sure telling us they stand for this.

2 K: Then they are lying. Not for quotation. I don't want to make a big thing of it.

F: You sure ought to inside the government.

K: This came from a source you are inclined to believe.

F: I wouldn't do this without that. I pressed the point very hard.

K: All I can say is let them produce one scintilla of evidence.

F: That's a good question. We'll pursue it...

K: There's no big brawl going on. You didn't uncover anything.

F: But you've seen it in other places?

K: Oh yes. At first I thought it was just some journalist being mischievous but when I see Max Frankel writing it I know this is not the case.

F: It isn't the case with my colleagues either usually Henry. I don't understand why the embarrassment that would ensue with my President is worth making this up. This is what makes us so curious. It's hard for me to understand.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Max Frankel

3/1/71 10:50 a.m. page 2

K: I don't understand how people can be so public about their private views, even if it is so. That is only slightly less embarrassing than when it is not true.

F: Except for some reason or another Henry maybe they want to put him on the spot.

K: No, this is not the case here.

F: What do you people do about these things? Do you sit down over a drink and say what is going on? I mean it's none of my business but I am sure curious.

K: I tell you, if anyone had told me before I came here I wouldn't have believed it. I will have to look into what to do.

F: Okay, I suppose your call Henry. Maybe somebody is pushing for something I misunderstood or you didn't recognize.

K: No, not possible. This is something we review periodically and make sure everyone is together.

F: Okay. How are things going in Laos.

K: It's a tough battle but . . . it sounds trite but it doesn't matter who has what hill at what point. The issue is that if the South Vietnamese can hold we will have caused a major disruption in their supply effort and the South Vietnamese will have held off a good part of the North Vietnamese strategic reserve. If it succeeds, Vietnamization has a good chance of succeeding; if not we will have learned a good lesson.

F: But so far you are not worried?

K: It is the toughest battle since we came here. But it's like being in the eye of a hurricane -- there's not a thing you can do about it. Well, I hope to see you soon.

F: Right. Likewise.

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Henry Graff
2/1/71 11:10 a.m.

G: I take it you have had a busy week.

K: It's been fairly active.

G: In response to your very generous words in a letter to me I wondered if it would be possible for me to come to Washington and talk to you and some of your principal associates. It would result not only in a piece on how important decisions are made and in something you would be eager to see published.

K: After what I've seen published lately I can hardly imagine this, but if so I would like it to be from you.

G: Thank you very much.

K: No really. I read Tuesday Cabinet -- found it very thoughtful.

G: Thank you. You probably say what Hans Morganthau said in the New York Review if you have time for such reading . . .

K: No, I do make time for reading that -- it's the masochist in me.

G: I am very troubled by what our fellow historians are doing. I think this is a period in which the social scientists have committed treason. The amazing lack of information. That is my interest in talking about the way in which decisions are made. The amount of talk about what we do is at variance with . . . Any kind of help you would be willing to give me . . .

K: Why don't you call David Halperin my assistant. He makes my schedule. We'll fix definitely something.

G: Would it be possible to begin it during this week?

K: We will try. We will do our damnedest.

G: Wonderful. I am a great reader of your books.

K: The intellectual community is abdicating. The misrepresentation, the gloating in what they consider American defeats. The total inability to grant even the possibility of good faith.

G: This is what disturbs me. The theme of Tuesday Cabinet was that men of wit and wisdom have managed American policy. But there's always the suggestion that somebody out there has a crystal ball that works.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Henry Graff

3/1/71 11:10 a.m. page 2

K: Anyone who has gone through recent history and seen one gimmick after another fail and then they offer this as a moral issue.

G: It's the intellectuals -- our colleagues -- who behave as if the ideas they dream over cocktails haven't been thought of before. And maybe that the attack on the university society is a common sense response to the vacuity on the campus.

K: Hope to see you within the week.

G: Good. May I call Mr. Halperin today?

K: Yes.

G: Is he at the White House?

K: Yes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

11:28 a.m.

3/1/71

K: I keep reading in the papers -- first I ignored it -- that you are in favor of setting a terminal date for a total pullout? (The Max Frankel article --)

L: That's not right. My position is that as long as negotiations go forward in Paris -- it's the position that Jackson is using in caucus.

K: So what we have in writing from you is your position. The President asked me to find out.

L: That memo we put out on the trip report -- it was held closely and one copy went to Bill Rogers. It says what we should be after for the election campaign.

K: There would be forces there.

L: On the POW question. I don't know what the Frankel column is about.

K: There's no difference with the WH spirit?

L: No. What do they say?

K: The JCS, I and President is for go slow policy and you are for terminating involvement.

L: That's not the case.

K: We have gone along with every recommendation you have made. I wanted to be sure it's not a misunderstanding.

L: I don't see how there can be.

K: Why don't you read the column.

L: And I think I should talk with Max.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

March 1, 1971 12:07 p.m.

jlj

S: Henry, I just wanted to let you know Dobrynin has asked for a meeting with the Secretary. He is seeing him just about now. I went up to brief the Secretary for about 2 minutes. I told him I think we should take a tough line with him. He has been beating us over the head publically. Is he interested in peace or propaganda points. We know what the problems are and what is to be done. If he comes back to why haven't we answered their former note then he should tell them that part of it is OBE . . . [Sisco told Secretary to take a hard line and stiff arm] . . . Rogers plan. Gaza and Sharmel Shiek - subject for negotiation between the parties.

K: Is he going to tell you what he did?

S: Yes. And when I know I will call you.

K: I will keep you informed. Nothing is going on over here.

S: I will call you at least once more today Henry.

K: Thank you Joe.

Henry Brandon/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

March 1, 1971 12:15 p.m.

jlj

NARA, Dale

5/20

K: This is enough caluding with the President against me. You were in his office when he called me. I want to be the dispenser of the favors around here.

B: Yes I was. I wanted to protect you. It was a great occasion for me.

K: He was very pleased with it. Did you write on the State of the World this weekend?

B: I used some of what he said about isolationism in that connection yes.

K: I have been dropped from the Sunday Times.

B: It is because of the mail strike.

K: Oh yes. You found it a good occasion. How did you find him?

B: He was very relaxed and at ease. He is better when he does not sit behind a desk. He was totally relaxed. I have never actually been with a President that much. He is very much at ease with historic perspective.

K: He is extra ordinary that way.

B: He said he would see me again in 6 months time.

K: He told me that.

B: Muffie is rather under the weather and I am leaving for a week tomorrow to take her to Florida.

K: It is rather late in her pregnancy isn't it.

B: Due in April. She has been to the doctor today and he said that it was all right. She has been in a miserable mood and with her New England stiff upper lip it is really hard for her. I have cancelled my own . . . Henry, what I am calling about is I am having a luncheon on March 13 for Azar Berlin (phonetic ?? ??) and was wondering if you could come. It is on a Saturday.

K: I think I will be in town that weekend. It is the weekend of the Gridiron Club and I couldn't miss that. I am the resident masochist in the White House.

B: He is not a masochist.

K: He does not enjoy it.

B: And you do. You will make a note - 1 p.m. You know him don't you?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

K: No not really. I have met him and I have been at a luncheon with him. I attended a lecture he gave.

B: He is giving a lecture here in May I believe to the Congress of Psychologists (?) on Modern Irrationalism. When I come back can we start again?

K: We should just pick one topic and cover it fully. When will you be back.

B: Do you want to put something down now?

K: Let me consult my calendar. My assistant has again deprived me of a consolidated calendar so that I am completely dependent on him. . . . towards the end of next week. My staff likes to keep me dependent. How about Monday the 15th. How would that be?

B: For dinner?

B: I don't believe that Henry.

K: Yes. I am being kept in a state of total dependency. /But I get back at them from time to time by throwing a temper tantrum.

From
It's House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Sen. Fulbright/Kissinger
12:22 p.m. 3/1/71

F: Did you set that bomb up here?

K: There's no limit to your legislation.

F: It's a little rough bombing the Capitol on things such as that.

K: I haven't seen it or read the transcript. You know my feelings and respect for you. I cannot appear before your committee but I will be always available for an evening such as we have had before and meeting which would be helpful to you or to the committee on a collective basis, I will be happy to meet with you.

F: This came up this morning. The members would be interested in having a discussion with you. They felt it was better not to go to somebody's house. We could have a meeting without a reporter there. Completely off the record. Meet us here in a private office or a committee room. It's embarrassing to me to -- I tried it as an experiment/because it makes me different from them to do it this way.

K: Didn't you have a good quorum then?

F: I didn't invite all of them.

K: Oh, you didn't?

F: One or two were not on the committee. Several of them -- Scott, Aiken, Church, Symington and Spong would like to have a discussion.

K: I will not argue with you. I want to be helpful. I will try to reconcile the necessities of my position with your needs.

F: You think about it.

K: I will work of course want to discuss it with the President.

F: No record whatever. No staff. Just members of the committee and that's all and we can have it in the committee room because it's secure. No staff or anyone else. Or any other alternatives but open to members of the committee. It gives me a problem to pick and choose on them. I also dislike reporting to the committee as a mouth piece reporting on matters so controversial.

K: The President is out of town. Also I don't want to trade on Bill Rogers' toes so I prefer to do it in your house with the whole committee to make it more informal.

k

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

F: They have gone as far as they could to make it informal. No record at all. They even do a record with the CIA. You think about that aspect. We also have a room that is not a committee room. They felt it was not suitable to have the meeting at my home and these are people that were there.

K: You have to be the best judges of that. Let's leave it on the basis that I will try to respond in some way. I will talk with the President tomorrow. I always feel that -- if you can understand I do not have a ______ and I don't want to appear as a chief spokesman. That's the Secy. of State's job. Let me figure out some way to do it and be responsive to you. I am always available on a personal basis to meet with you. You can have lunch with me sometime?

F: Certainly.

K: I would be more than happy to do that at your convenience. I will talk with the President tomorrow and come up with a formula that enables me to meet informally with members of your committee that will not start a precedence for other Presidents.

F: But we should talk deal as a committee.

K: I will do my best to come up with a constructive proposal.

rsial.

Bill Rogers'
tee to make it

Henry Owen/Mr. Kissinger

(not verbatim)

XX March 1, 1971 2:40 p.m.

jlj

NARA, Dale 5/26

O: I am just calling to see about my invitation to you to see an executive group on Friday.

K: Is this off the record? Is it at Brookings?

WX O: Sure. It is a luncheon at 12:30 (?) at the Dupont Plaza Hotel.

K: Will they come out of there and pop off to the press?

O: It doesn't usually happen. All I can say Henry is that we put stringent rules on this type of thing.

K: Why don't I say I will do it.

O: Thank you Henry.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Mike Wallace

3/1/71 2:45 p.m.

W: Night before last, or I should say three or four nights ago I said to myself I'm going to call Henry and ask him to go on "Sixty Minutes" and answer some questions. And the next morning you dirty dog there you are with the Kalb brothers.

K: Listen I got trapped. I went there thinking I was going to answer questions about the Annual Review and got hit with questions about Southeast Asia. It went okay but now I've got people screaming to me for making public statements but not testifying.

W: I watched Fulbright with interest yesterday.

K: I didn't see it.

W: You should get the transcript. Henry, the President has been talking for quite some time about doing a one-on-one TV interview. Is it sensible to suggest to him that this might be the time?

K: I have nothing to do with this.

W: I know you don't. I'm asking your opinion as a friend.

K: I would be glad to raise it and get you an answer.

W: Would you? I wasn't calling for that reason, but I wanted to know if it's a sensible time. I don't want to bother Ron if it's not the right time.

K: I really don't know.

W: I think it might be a very strategic time.

K: I don't know how they make these decisions, but will raise it and call you in a few days.

W: Would you?

K: Absolutely.

W: Good.

K: How was Korea?

W: Bill Brown got there. We think all of us will go back in the spring. They didn't let him out of Pyong Yang. He just got a few still pictures and talked to no one of consequence. They won't let us come in now because they aren't

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mike Wallace

3/1/71 2:45 p.m. page 2

ready for us, but in May they will be. The weather will be better and we'll
just keep our fingers crossed.

K: They are not the most charming people in the world.

W: I just gave ______ a copy of Anthony Gray's book "_________"

K: I'll check and let you know.

W: Thank you Henry.

ese decisi...

K: How was Korea?

W: Bill Brown got there. We think all of us will go back in the spr.
They didn't let him out of Pyong Yang. He just got a few still pictures and tal
to no one of consequence. They won't let us come in now because they aren't

NARA, Dato 5/26
BY

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

3:22 p.m. 3/1/71

L: Sorry to bother you. In Tom Moorer's press briefing that he gives on
x_________ and highly classified he refers to the new ICBM silo construction.

K: That's okay. We authorized the distribution of that this morning.

L: We will talk about it on a classified basis then.

K: They will just say we'll be held up until the safe guard started. The
President is giving a press conference and he will say you will announce it on
Mar. 9.

L: That's right.

K: OK

L: I don't have this other directive.

K: Don't you think it's better to let it out now?

L: It won't get out publicly.

K: But we can say we drew attention to it. I think we had better get it out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger

3:34 p.m. 3/1/71

S: I have just been briefed by the Secy. Dobrynin left a letter from Kosygin to the President. I am transmitting it to you. It's a letter which has a good deal of propaganda overtones. Emphasis in re-emphasizing Egypt's line on Israeli withdrawal. Holding us responsible for negative Israeli reply. Along lines of what they made public yesterday. I just got this from the Secy. I thought I would put it together and have it sent to you.

K: What did he say?

S: He dictated it to me. I wasn't there. I have just put it on paper. If it's accurate it's good. Disappointed that Soviet Union had to make a statement. The kind of paper issued by the Russians could only be bad. Dobrynin said they said we are out for a settlement. The Russians pressed us for a 4-power meeting today and tomorrow but we said Thurs. was soon enough. Not bad. They will make hay. I will send it to you as soon as it's transmitted from the 7th floor.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Senator McGovern/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

March 1, 1971 4:35 p.m.

jlj

K: I just wanted to talk to you about a letter I have here signed by you referring a letter from somebody in North Dakota asking for complete biographical data with complete genealogical information also. I would be delighted to give you anything I have but genealogical is a little complicated.

McG: I think all you can do is give them a brief biographical sketch. We had an urgent request to get the information but I get these things all the time too and you cannot respond exactly to them. You are awfully nice to call.

K: Any time you want to get together I am most willing to see you. Perhaps we could have breakfast sometime.

McG: That would be good. How is your calendar?

K: How about Friday?

McG: I am going to be out of town the later part of this week. The only time is Wednesday.

K: Can I check with my staff and call your office back within the hour?

McG: If that is bad I am free almost any morning next week.

K: Breakfast or lunch either this Wednesday or some day next week.

Senator McGover/Mr. Kissinger

March 1, 1971 5:03 p.m.

jlj

McG: Henry, I understand a group of college students from various colleges and universities have been trying to see you and I was wondering if you could take some time out to try and see them. Would it be possible for you to see them anytime tomorrow?

K: I have been trying to see them today but my schedule has just not permitted it.

McG: These are the type of people that are trying to keep the lid on rather than trying to blow it off.

K: I always see students. I will try and give them 1/2 hour tomorrow.

McG: Do you know how to get in touch with them? It is the same number where you reached them this morning.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Rowland Evans
3/1/71 5:05 p.m.

E: We are having a little party on April 15. It's the ASNE week -- all the editors will be here. We've having 6 or 7 of the important ones, a few politicians and a couple of guys in the cabinet and want you.

K: Aren't you nice.

E: It's the night of the Woman's National Press Club dinner. Most of the guys I have called said we've gotten them off the hook, that they're so relived not to have to go to that dinner. It's Thursday night

K: April 15?

E: That's right.

K: I accept.

E: You don't have to now. We can check later. And if you want to bring someone you're welcome to. It's a joint party.

K: I'll be there.

E: Good. You'll get a note from Katherine on the time, place and dress.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger
7:12 p. m. 3/1/71

K: Nothing in particular. Wanted to check with you at the end of the day. I
 got a note on the NSSMs -- working with your people. No problem.

R: We are keeping fully quiet today. We refuse to have 4-power meeting
until Thurs. Are you going to be at the dinner tonight?

K: No. Are you sending over the letter from Kosygin?

R: I will have it to you shortly. I am sending a little briefing thing too. I am
getting dressed but will have it to you shortly.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:18 p.m., March 1, 1971

NARA, Dalo 5/26

P: Hello, Henry. Well, what's happened while I was gone? Since 12 o'clock not much happening.

K: Not a great deal happening in Vietnam. They are getting reinforcements ready -- beginning to move the men. The action in the Hill 31 area slackened off for the time being.

P: It may slack off a bit but they can go back and take that hill or any hill for that matter.

K: They are going to vacate that hill -- our side -- not try to hold onto it. It was an arbitrary designation. One of the problems they have had, they faced positions and they didn't move around enough.

P: They may start moving around a bit more.

K: In Cambodia, there was a British armed fight last night. The other side inflicted casualties. They have started moving again. On the Middle East, the Russians delivered a letter for you to the State Department -- the Israeli attitude is our fault and they have asked for a Four Power meeting. That is essentially what we thought would happen.

P: It seems that the greatest interest is the bombing in the Capitol.

K: Fulbright -- I talked to Fulbright on the phone today, he wants me to meet ...

P: No.

K: ... on an informal basis. I said I would have to take it up with ...

P: No, no, because of the Executive thing, the White House meeting with the Senate committee.

K: I agree.

P: You just put it off, they can have Rogers but they can't have you.

K: That's what I think. They say a bomb is supposed to go off on the House side tonight.

P: Yeah, yeah, that sort of thing doesn't help the other side.

K: Those are the major things, all together it was a relatively quiet day today.

P: All right, okay.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Lord Cromer (British Amb.)

7:27 p.m., March 1, 1971

C: I am sorry to have disturbed you on Sunday morning.

K: I appreciated it very much. I was coming in anyway and it was extremely helpful. On the agriculture issue --

C: I am not very good on this either.

K: Let me tell you how the problem looks from here. For reasons which are connected with our bureaucratic machinery, I just learned that your people had told us a few weeks ago that you wanted an answer by the end of February and your people said on Friday that if we didn't give you an answer by Friday ... This unfortunate reaction is not justified by the merit of the issue. The President has been gone and the Secretary of Agriculture will be out of town tomorrow and I don't want to in this short time -- for us this is a major political issue, not to be embarrassed with our farmers. We are most anxious to get into the common market but it would be most helpful if we could have a couple of weeks to work on this. On a personal basis, could you take this up with the Prime Minister.

C: I most certainly will raise it with him without any delay. Rickman (sp?) our Minister dealing with this, will be in Washington next Monday and if he could see you ....

K: Of course, I will see him and he must see Peterson too.

C: He will do that anyway. I will most certainly get on this right away. I just don't want to worry you with these things every time they come up -- we just wait for them to go through the normal channels.

K: I will never be upset if you don't raise agriculture issues with me.

C: I most certainly will get on this right away.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Peterson/Kissinger

early afternoon 3/1/71

P: One on UK problem. I will guess they will want to sit down with the President tomorrow afternoon. I have the whole thing going. The NSC people are meeting with me at 3:00. I think we should sit down for a summary.

K: How about 7:00 tonight?

P: OK. Secondly, I forget who said this -- Geo. or Geo and the President saying foreign aid I should coordinate. We have this meeting with Rudy Peterson tomorrow.

K: My understanding is it's a joint effort but I will not bleed on it. Who has the meeting with Peterson?

P: The President and You and I will be there.

K: That's not ______?

P: No. We wondered who will handle future liaison with Rudy and I wanted to suggest to the President I think it has to be you or me.

K: I agree.

P: If that's all right --

K: It's all right with me. Let me think about you or me or both or us. I have no overwhelming concern with it. No problem.

P: Let me send this memo over to you that Bergsten or Johnson wrote. I need a feel on it.

K: OK

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
9:58 a.m. 3/3/71

P: What's the latest on the Laos problem this morning? You can't tell much from papers. Not as heavy as it was.

K: In the battle areas the situation has slackened off. Abrams has airlifted a ranger battalion in further than they have been and another near Tchepone. He is going forward on his plan. I feel they might as well go for broke.

They
P: Go in and if they can't take it, get out. That could be close to breaking as much as the SVN.

K: No matter what happens on the supply lines if we win S. Laos -- they can refit themselves in 2-3 years but then we will be out.

P: SVN are holding their own but because of domination in the air.

K: In Cambodia they are 75% doing it themselves.

P: I think you should put a hell of a lot of emphasis on air. Training is needed.

K: Good strategy for us to keep a lot of air power until '72 and pull it out at the end. Air power get's into less trouble at home.

P: If the POWs are in there. The NVN would be good to negotiate us out of there.

K: If this goes well we should offer a negotiated cease fire this summer. It might not be a bad deal for SVN. They could strengthen themselves.

P: What do you have on the M.E.?

K: Likely to blow this weekend. Tomorrow we will go with the statement condemning Israel. Then Israel will make a public --

P: I don't care about rhetoric --

K: The next sequence of moves will be -- it may tempt the Arabs into an attack. I didn't want to press State yesterday or today. They are reluctant and I don't think it's good now. We will do it over the weekend and take the public heat for a few days. Too much now to overrule it. They have gone too far. It's not desisive. If we can get a package together saying what they must do but also what we won't demand.

P: The condemnatory statement will be done by the 4 powers?

K: They loaded it and we couldn't pull back. It gives the Soviets something they wanted but it's not decisive. At any rate Mitchell was in yesterday and was very

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: (cont) concerned. I told him to sit tight.

P: What about the answer from Kosygin?

K: At the end of this week. Could you give me advance information on what you intend to say on NVN invasion at the press conference?

P: I have the briefing book and getting everything together now. I am reading what I have said previously. I will know by tomorrow noon.

K: If you can give me a few hours advance warning then I can use it as an excuse to call Dobrynin in. That's all the major things.

gotiate us out of here.

It's fire this summer. It
... strengthen themselves.

Tomorrow we will go with the statement
I make a public --

"I be -- it may tempt the Arabs into an attack
today. They are reluctant and I don't
I take the public
one too far.
they must do

P: The comment

K: They loaded i
wanted but it's not d

iets something they
 yesterday and was very

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Joe Sisco

3/2/71 ca. 10:15 a.m.

S: Justthought I'd bring you up to date. Consultations are continuing
in New York, nothing much has changed. The New York Times article is
pretty good on the way it described the situation. You were given a memo
on Dobrynin's meeting . . .

K: Yes, is that a fairly full description?

S: Henry this is what I was told -- I was not there. I'm not happy
that he sees this fellow alone but there's nothing I can do about it. I need to
talk to the Secretary regarding the Review Groups and the kind of approach
I have put down on paper . . .

K: I think it is a very positive contribution.

S: I don't know whether he agrees with this. But I can't see coming to
a Review Group meeting without knowing what the Secretary thinks.

K: I will set it for tomorrow.

S: What I am asking you is to hold off on setting it till I have talked
to hom today. If I'm way off base as far as he is concerned then I've got nothing
to contribute.

K: But otherwise things just run away. The President has asked for this.

S: Nothing is running away. We are doing nothing. Delaying just to get
over the interim hump in New York -- nothing getting away on fundamental things.
Nothing is going to happen till the President decides on the next step.

K: The only time I have this week is tomorrow afternoon -- I will just
schedule it and if he has any violent objection I'll change it.

S: Why don't you talk to John Irwin on this? I'm sorry but I can't say
on my way or another.

K: What is it, you are not supposed to say anything?

S: He is reluctant to go into a Review Group. He may have no objection --
I just haven't been able to tell him and haven't gotten his views on substance or
timing of the Review Group.

K: Well, I don't want to be put in the position that the Secretary can beto
a Review Group meeting. I'll just schedule it on my own.

S: I understand that, but I was sure you would like to avoid any trouble.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
S. Reston/Kissinger
10:20 a.m. 3/2/71

R: I am going to do a piece about executive privilege problem and I wanted to get your thoughts on the difference on your approach to the job -- the President's approach to the job -- and that job as run by you and Mac and the differences in staffs. Inside.

K: Some of these figures you read in the paper are due to the fact that in previous administrations the people detailed from other departments were not listed but we do. Secondly, we allegedly have 110 members. We have 42 professional members. Third, what we are trying to do is give every dept. a chance to be heard and ? ? ? ? ? shooting from the hip requires more paper work. No decision is made that all agencies are not given a chance first in a subordinate group and then the NSC to express their views. You never know how you carry it out. But the intention is to let everyone express his views. The committee chairmen are to give the widest range of choices to the President. They go to the President. We try to avoid the situation that whoever goes to the President last gets the decision.

R: How would you characterize the difference of the operation now and that of Mac under Johnson.¹

K: I knew it better under Kennedy. You should talk with Mac.

R: I have this morning.

K: The difference is produced in part on the personality of the President. Whatever helps the President makes the decisions. Kennedy was more freewheeling in his approach. Not as much machinery but done on ah ad hoc basis. I think Mac was more involved in tactical decisions and less focused on long-range decisions. That's why it doesn't how it would appear to me. What does Mac say?

R: He is the first person to support you. Second, to make the point that the man on the job only has one client and organizes things as the President wants.

K: I have no formal power at all. Chairing committees is a help to the bureaucracy. If I wanted my ideas adopted I would be in the President's office pushing. I don't have to chair a committee to have my views heard. I have put Defense policy on NATO panels. In issues they were never into. The State Dept. is involved in budgetary process of the (Defense?) Dept. We had our first meeting yesterday for next year's budget. It enables the departments to be heard. Not to impose views. But Mac is right -- the job has only one client.

R: Mac makes the point that even if you had an ideal Secy. of State -- the most informed in the country, if you asked him if he wanted such an office in the

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

R: (cont) WH his answer would be yes. He doesn't agree that the job or you
or he should be the principle advisor to the President on foreign policy.

K: You don't get to be advisor -- I didn't know the President. You can't say
I have a right to be consulted. No one should claim that the assistant to the
President should be the principle advisor.

R: Nothing in the Constitution says it has to be *unlimited* from the Secy. of State. The President can consult with his Aunt Mary. When he does it the other way thought it makes a new question -- you are regarded widely as the principle advisor to the President on foreign policy and foreign policy is in a controversial phase and those who are critizing in other branches of government don't have access to you and so there's a problem.

K: But there's a difference. My only role at NSC meetings is that I say, Mr. President, the Senior Review Group has look at the problem and has X number of choices. And that's about all I ever say. Then he calls on the Secy. of State to give his recommendation. The difference in our positions at the NSC illustrates distinctions between me and the Secy. I should hlep the President make decisions. The Secys. should make recommendations.

R: You never make recommendations?

K: No, I am not saying that. No one would believe it. I am saying that when the President meets with the senior advisors he/Inever make recommendations. At the end of the day and the President asks what I think after he has heard all sides, I k may give my advice but -- on Loas, I never spoke. I did have a view but I am conscious of this. No major decision has ever been made that didn't go through this machinery. We never give the President only one point of view.

R: Who sits in NSC meetings deciding on the recommendations on Laos?

K: This will go the following way. Let's not take Laos because it's a crisis situation -- no, let's take it. The Senior Review Group -- Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secy. of Defense, myself, Helms and Moorer plus one member each of ataff looks at this and say we have the following choices. It goesto the NSC -- in case of Laos, a restricted meeting. The President, Secy. of State, Secy. of Defense, and myself. In that particular case I didn't even present the choices because Laird had just come back and was in the best position. Normally I would have presented the choices. The President would ask members for recommendations but not from me. 70% of the time the decisoms are made coming from the formal meeting. At the end of the day he will put his feet up and talk to me about it. The fact he does that has nothing to do with my position. Who he consust alone with -- he usually goes off and writes on a pad of his paper the pros and cons as he sees them

By. NARA, Date 5/26

S. Reston/Kissinger

10:20 a.m. 3/2/71

K: (cont.) and then reviews with me if he has the pros and cons straight.

R: In Johnson's case it could have been Clark Clifford or Acheson.

K: As you say, it could be his Aunt Mary. Leaving me aside, the normal
is that the President is going to have someone on his staff to sort out the
pieces for him and keep him from confrontation with the bureaucracy.
Ehrlichman and Shultz are in the same position on the domestic side.

R: But being head of a bureau he is subject to call.

K: Ehrlichman is really the counterpart.

R: Yes. That does it.

K: I understand the problem and people raising it are not unreasonable.

R: They are troubled by it not in the present context. For example I see the
power of the President allied to TV in hands of a President we have never
had with ? ? ? ? ? I worry about that as a structural thing. It exists now
and under Kennedy and before that. No one had the will or ability to do it
that way. The potential.

K: That's very kind. Thank you, Scotty.

ext,
ose views.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Reston/Kissinger

10:45 a.m. 3/2/71

K: Two points which I think you should consider -- talk with Elliot Richardson who has been thoughtful observer and can help you. I haven't talk to him and I will not. The second, is there one of the efforts in making sure we do have all the choices we make we have one staff member who goes through the literature on a topic and if any ? ? ? ? it's put to the Sr. Review Group to inquire if it should go to the President. But the second isn't as crucial as I think Elliot Richardson would be a good observer.

R: On the first -- of all emotion that is engendered I have never hears charge that you are pushing your view -- it came up a little on the German question, that you are less happy about Ostpolitik then State but that's the only thing --

K: It's probably demonstrably untrue.

R: Thank you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

Telecon
David Rockefeller
3/2/71 11:00 a.m.

K: You are going away?

R: Tomorrow?

K: I wanted to touch base with you. One, on the Council of Foreign Relations dinner, I can't give you a positive answer but I think you should write a letter of invitation so at least it isn't impossible.

R: Okay, very good. How should we do that?

K: Sent it to the President and send me a copy. That way we'll get it into channels and I'll follow it up.

R: Excellent -- we will just say we would like to do it in the fall and work out a date, and we're hopeful that it can be done some time soon.

K: I think that is appropriate to request. Second, on your trip. I don't have a great deal to suggest other than what you must have been briefed on.

R: I had a briefing from James Critchfield (sp?), you know, from Helms.

K: Oh yes.

R: And am going to see U Thant this afternoon.

K: You can discount that by about 50%. If you can get a feel in Israel of what they are willing to give it would be very helpful. And the suggestion that they can't just sit in occupied territories would be helpful.

R: You think there's any movement now?

K: Well, the Egyptians have made a very forthcoming movement.

R: I thought so.

K: Israel has been less so.

R: Any progress on bilateral and side progress on the Canal?

K: Sisco has been most reluctant to take that up. I am inclined to push that. It seems a face-saver to everybody. At the time being he is pushing more in the Jarring direction, but I think we will have to come back to that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
David Rockefeller

3/2/71 11:00 a.m. page 2

R: I think so too.

K: And it would get Israel used to the idea of some withdrawal.

R: Well, that's interesting. I think it's going to be an interesting trip.

K: I think fascinating.

R: See you when I get back.

K: I'm counting on it. When will that be? April?

R: The end of the month. Fred Bergsten is coming to talk to our Economic Advisory Committee at lunch.

K: He is extremely able.

R: I think so.

K: Let me know when you get back, and if there is anything I can do while you are on the trip -- I can't imagine it -- but you always know how to get in touch with me. The embassies will send a cable for you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Tom Braden/Kissinger
11:36 a.m. 2/2/71

B: Last night I went to dinner at Rabins. He and Sisco get into a raging arguement that was friendly-but vocal.

K: I didn't know about it.

B: You might have heard of it. It was a friendly shouting match. Mischieve was there and had asked to see a map. Rabin said Israel was accustomed to looking after herself and we cannot trust these powers. Finally, Sisco said, you are isolating yourself more than ever. If you made one move the Russians would be involved and then we would be involved. It was fascinating. Rabin implied that you have already agreed to border changes without our knowledge. Sisco said no. Then the air was left heavy with suspicion that Sisco is selling Rabin out behind his back.

K: You get to all the brawly dinners.

B: Have we agreed to certain borders?

K: I don't think so. It's always hard to tell who mumbled what to whom in the corridors.

B: Is this thing going to break out again? It looks like Rabin won't move ~~mmx~~ an inch. If they don't we are in a tough spot.

K: You have hit the nail on the head.

B: Are you optimistic or pessimistic? I know you are supposed to be optimistic but does it look good?

K: Between you and me, not particularly.

B: Jesus Christ! When does the ~~mm~~ cease fire end?

K: Sunday. ~~k~~ Even if the cease fire ends the fighting will not resume right away.

B: OK.

K: Good to see you this weekend.

B: That was fun, Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

11:41 a.m. 3/2/71

B: I had a long call from Reston this morning. You probably know what he is pestering about. Is Henry Kissinger the victim of troubled circumstances and why Fulbright is mad. You probably know it all.

K: He has been after me on the issue of executive privilege but more that the Administration is lying to the public.

B: He didn't try that with me. The problem is press and not officilas. He agreed to that. He pushed the discussion -- what I think the legitimate worry is that the only people who can explain American foreign policy are the two guys who don't go to the Hill -- you and the President. There's no way of doing that if it's the night before Cambodia. He does perceive Fulbright as unreliable (?) confidant. Fulbright tells Reston that you don't tell him about those meetings.

K: Obviously you know the position of a Presidential assistant.

B: That leads to my point. The substantive suggestion I offer is that it would be very valuable if someone from the Dept. could go and stand on the document. It's the most substantive that's come out.

K: The State of the World Report?

B: If there were ways of getting Senators to say to the Secy. come and talk to us about this so the person that talks is the man responsible and not the two at the WH.

K: Good suggestion.

B: I think the legitimate worry they have is the guys that (who don't make policy?). This has been true since Dulles dies. The last 4 Presidents have wanted to be their own spokesman on foreign affairs and the mild manners of Rogers and ______ and the simplistic ______ of Rusk. So they say, where the hell do I go?

K: They should go to the Secy. of State.

B: But that will take some doing. No one can read that as the President and yourself. It's that kind of subtle document.

K: You don't think a private meeting with the foreign relations committee would help?

B: It's edgy.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

11:41 a.m. 3/2/71

K: It would get me into trouble with the State Dept.

B: Any chance that 2 or 3 of you could meet with the Senate Foreign Relations?

K: The Secy. of State and I?

B: And Laird and Connally and Peterson. It's not a good idea but I don't think a meeting with committees -- there will be a shower of arrows from the wigwam on foggy bottom. They need people who have sensitivity to answer the questions. If the President said to Rogers take my statement and go forward and sell it on the Hill.

K: He will be more eager to defend his own. But between you and me it's just a recital. Not much analysis. It's good but what you would expect a country director to produce, country by country. It's not bad but not conceptual.

B: The President could say take up the supplementary document with my document.

K: I am strongly in xerox favor of that.

B: If you could do it before Scotty writes.

K: I can't do it.

B: That makes it worse.

K: And then I would have to do it on everything.

B: I agree.

K: Let me talk with the President about this. I think this is very helpful.

B: In passing I might say that Scotty went out of his way that this was not a case of Svengali or Rasputin. He knew you were doing what the President wanted done but worried about Congress getting a sense of the dialogue. I said this was always a problem.

K: I appreciate this. Hope to see you soon.

It's edgy.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

12:07 p.m., March 2, 1971

S: Let me have a private word with you. I have now finished this paper and I won't be able to get it to the Secretary before 3:00 to 4:00. I would like to do this no matter what his reaction is -- I have to trust you. I would just as soon get this paper to you. I want you to focus intellectually on it like no other paper you have focused on. I want you to think it all the way through and try to understand what I am trying to do. Tuck it away.

K: Can I mention it to the President?

S: You read it first and let's wait. Let me see what the Secretary says. I don't want to be in the position of acting disloyally. I am getting discouraged. This is a very impossible problem.

K: I will needle you on tactics but I will be behind you.

S: If I ever felt you weren't, I would want to leave. I want you alone to first see it. I am not sending it through Hal. Then I will see how the Secretary reacts. I have done what you and I addressed ourselves to. Whether it sees the light of day or not...

K: I think it will be forced to see the light of day. Alternative courses will produce an impact. Tom Braden, for your information, said he was present when you and Rabin met with each other last night. I said I didn't know anything about it. The Israelis get emotional on some of these issues.

S: What was his reaction?

K: That there would be some sort of showdown. He said, "Are you optimistic or pessimistic?" I said we all realize it would be very tough.

S: This was a social occasion.

K: He was sympathetic to your position.

S: I may give him a call and invite him to sit down and talk. That's a good idea -- he's a nice guy.

K: Don't tell him I mentioned it to you.

S: I won't. Thank you, Henry,

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Amb. Rabin/Kissinger
1:31 p.m. 3/2/71

K: I wanted to check on one thing that has been mentioned to me and I want to be sure I understood your thought. I was told on the basis of your conversation with Sisco yesterday that you are prepared to accept some 4-power statement. Is that true.

R: I just have read to Joe Sisco the summary of the talk between the PM and Zurhellen, your representative in Israel since Amb. Barber is ill. What she said because I told Sisco two hours ago is that by no means it is allowed in the 4 powers in the last meeting today a consensus of criticism will be established and the U.S. will give a hand to it.

K: What if we do it anyway?

R: You ask what our position is and we want to explain it. Once such a consensus will criticize the next Israeli move will be interpreted by Eygpt as backing of their refusal to conduct any negotiations on territorial or any issue and as a result a very severe crisis will come into being. So Zurhellen, your representative in Israel, will clarify this position in the 4-power meeting in NY and Washington. Therefore, I read to Joe Sisco the following and explained it to him. Second, we said the PM wants the U.S. to take the following position in the next meeting of the 4. First, in accordance with what Pres. Nixon promised Israel and listed in his last speech in public, the talks are to be conducted in a free way without interference from outside. Second, that the U.S. will mention that now the parties have defined the options. Third, that the parties have to conduct negotiations, discussions and talks without pre-conditions. Fourth, that the U.S. will mention that Egypt is ready to enter into peace agreements with Israel and Israel is ready to do the same.

K: I understand.

R: The fifth point that now that every side has defined its position there's a need of the conditions of the decisions to bring closer the two sides and finally, to reach an agreement. Sisco yesterday said that there will be no public statement. He said that voluntarily. I said I am surprised there's any need for a statement on your part. That has not submitted a report before the UN Security Council so I don't know what the U.S. will try to do something without knowing what the position are of those responsible for conducting the talks. I said that you have to understand -- I talked only about the public statement.

K: He must have misunderstood. He seemed to think you were ready to accept a 4-power statement.

R: Not at all. Sisco said after that that they will consider and give greater thought to what the Prime Minister has said but he doesn't see that they would be

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

1:31 p.m. 3/2/71

-2-

R: (cont.) able to refrain from criticism. I argued with him.

K: You are a well-known softy, Mr. Ambassador.

R: It's beyond possibility to work this way.

K: I check with you when I have a question.

R: We have just had a long talk on the phone.

K: You can be sure that your view will be brought to the attention of the proper people.

R: It's more than that. He said it's true that we have to criticize you. I said why? Then he said how can you decide on your position without having the Thant report. He said it's only our judgment. I said how can you have judgement without having the data or the facts. It might be changed.

K: I understand your view. You can be sure that it will --

R: Make clear that I am not quoted wrongly.

K: I will correct any misapprehension that exists. It will be set straight. Don't worry about that.

R: I read him the instructions.

you were ready to

ier and give greater
esn't see that they would be

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Dr. John Foster
3/2/71 2:25 p.m.

F: I've got a candidate to help you.

K: Good.

F: His name is Roland Herbst. He has been with me over two years and that was the time of his agreement. Now he'd like to go elsewhere. I think he would be a great addition to your staff.

KL: Let me talk to him. I will tell him to get in touch.

F: He's about as smart as Harold Brown...

K: I hope he has better character.

F: He's less self-centered, less management ability, but more concerned about National Security. He'd not be good with getting papers by Monday morning, but as good as Harold at smoking out the issue. He's the smartest guy in the Pentagon in strategic thinking.

K: Let me talk to him within the week.

F: Paul Nitze would give him an 'x' very high marks.

K: That's a good recommendation.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Peterson/Kissinger

4:12 p.m.

3/2/71

K: I am told by Sonnenfeldt your people will not show us the paper you submitted to the President. That can't be right.

P: I can't believe that. What subject?

K: At 4:15 you and I were to meet with the President. They think it's on grains.

P: We have nothing on that. I have a paper on cheeses.

K: If you showed me a paper on cheese, I wouldn't talk with you.

P: There are 3 items I think --one, cheeses, is almost all political with Mills and the dairy lobby. It's a lousy economic case and I am appeal to the tariff ______ on that. Perhaps Sonnenfeldt is talking about that. I am going to say we have these wrinkles and we are talking with State, Agriculture, and ______. If you wzt to see that, you can.

K: He wouldn't want me in on that.

P: Shoes. My friend Stans is in on that. $55 million. Itlay and Spain are climbing the wall. Stans is talking all over town. I want to ask where he wants me to head. The choices are for a two week study. What we should know is that Peter and Stans have let the work go to the bureaucrats ? ? ? ? ? ? ?.

K: Just say what you want. Don't criticize Stans or Flanigan. Above all, Flanigan.

P: Stans is talking to foreign ambassadors on that. I will say we will try to defuse these questions and isn't that what you want? East-West trade -- we are together on this. Henry tells me when we can go. When he does, we will know it's millions and billions. There's business pressure on this. Currency convertible problem and they want to barter.

K: Right.

P: UK trade. We have agriculture telling them to stop and State saying continue. You and I agree we cannot put him and the gov't. in this. We are going for two weeks. It makes no difference for the long term. Agriculture will get hurt when we go into the Common Market. Industrial products will be helped.

K: Use Britain to help us.

P: With political --

K: We are completely together.

P: Find out what Sonnenfeldt wants.

K: I don't care. I have what I want.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Rabin/Kissinger

4:20 p.m.

3/2/71

R: I had another talk with Sisco and I want to be sure that you know it. Our previous conversation to make clear the following: Israel opposes the statement by the 4-powers in which ? ? ??. Second, if the U.S. will take such a position, Israel will have to make a public statement against this U.S. position. Third, I cannot promise you that in accepting the U.S. peace initiative Israel will be promised to withdraw to the UAR borders.

K: Could you send it over here, unsigned?

R: Sure.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger

4:25 p.m., March 2, 1971

KG: How nice of you to call back so quickly. I am so embarrassed to have to ask this. I checked this out to see if I was being super-consciencious. We are having a problem with the dealers organizing to be blunt about it. There is a retirement party for one of the circulation men on Monday. I said I have an engagement with this guy at the White House which I won't break unless you tell me I absolutely should go. He said don't break it, but I need to make brownie points.

K: How about doing it Friday the 12th?

KG: I said how can I call Henry up to change lunch when foreign dignitaries are beating on his door.

K: But they are not friends of mine.

G: You are awfully sweet. I'm dying to do it.

K: This is a friendly lunch. There is nothing that is going to happen that we can't do equally well on the 12th.

G: Thanks so much, Henry.

K: I'm looking forward to it.

lds

Telecon
Murray Marder
3/2/71 5:30 p.m.

NARA, Dato 5/26

M: K I'm not trying to bug you. We are making some references in this story to something you might not see on the ticker.

K: No, I don't want to say anything, but if it's for factual points . . .

M: The speech -- the President made some comments through Ron Ziegler on it. Other points concerned the committee's . . . until about a year ago request to have you appear before the committee which you turned down.

K: There never was a formal request to appear before the committee. To the best of my knowledge some comments on why I was ______ were made on a personal basis. I then worked out with Fulbright . . . the main point was I read Symington's speech and he said I refused to testify as Shultz does. But the budget director always does; a Presidential assistant never does. That's a Presidential decision, not my decision. I offered, if Fulbright invited me to his house and had his committee there sitting around over a glass of beer I'd do that. We had two such meetings. On January 1 or 2 I called Fulbright to wish him a happy new year since I have high regard for him, and I offered to meet again on the same basis. Three weeks ago I had breakfast with Jack Javits and offered him the same. So I am aware of the problem. On the other hand I am not a cabinet member. I shouldn't appear as an independent agent. I am an advisor to the President. It is totally prohibited by the President, has been by every other President

M: These meetings were with part of the committee?

K: Yes, but the guest list was naturally up to Fulbright. It was at his house.

M: These were in the past year?

K: Yes.

M: About when?

K: I don't remember exact dates. The last was as I recall in April, so it's been quite a while.

M: Then I hear reference to your calling Fulbright after his Face the Nation report.

K: Sunday?

M: Yes, and renewing the offer.

K: I reminded him that I had offered in January and renewed it 4 weeks ago.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Murray Marder

3/2/71 5:30 p.m. page 2

I don't want to make it a response to what he said on Face the Nation. There
has been no acrimonious debate.

M: I had no indication that it was. You also . . . we know that at least
in a fragmentary way you have met with other members of the committee.
Church . . .

K: Frank Church, Cooper, Case, Javits. Who's on the Democratic side?
Fulbright . . .

M: I think Symington was at one of these sessions at Fulbright's house.

K: He was at two of them.

M: Aiken, and he was at one of them.

K: That's right.

M: Mike Mansfield.

K: I have met with him several times.

M: McGee.

K: I have met with McGee; I have met with Church/

M: Just wanted to make reference to the fact that in addition to that
you have individually met with most of the members of the committee.

K: That's right. I don't think I've met with Sparkman. I met with Church --
had him for lunch and on 2 or 3 other occasions.

M: It's not vital to my purposes unless you want to get into it -- the reference
to the M Lehman business.

K: I had absolutely no knowledge of that ahead of time.

M: Which I gather helped set off Symington.

K: Why should it have?

M: Because I gather the references to the . . .

K: I have known Symington for many years. I knew him in 1960. I have
no desire to do a hatchet job.

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Murray Marder

3/2/71 5:30 p.m. page 3

M: He says the same about you. Nothing quotable?

K: No, it's not proper for me to get into a debate with a senior Senator. These things you can mention factually on your own authority but I don't want to promote this controversy.

M: We now have the President's statement from Ziegler. Aiken has made a statement regarding the letter the President wrote to him on February 9 regarding Secretary Rogers.

K: I know of no decision in which Rogers was not a full participant. Again this is not for quotation. Elliot Richardson can tell you how the process operates.

M: I don't know if we've got a one-day flurry or more than that. Is giving a speech tonight in Talahassee. I've got the text here. [reads] "Occasionally the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs holds background sessions for the press. Under no circumstances however will Mr. Kissinger or a member of his staff testify."

K: This is a peculiarity of all Presidential assistants, not of me.

M: A reference we have is a letter that was sent to you -- have no date -- about a year ago raising the question of asking you to come to the committee. They got the same reply as the committee previously received from McGeorge Bundy.

K: I have no recollection of it, but will have to check it. It would have been handled in the same way.

M: There was a proposal for how to work out a meeting -- maybe at a club. And it ended up at Fulbright's house.

K: Right.

M: This helps straighten out the factual stuff.

K: Right, but I don't want to be quoted. It's a sign of the times -- everyone is a little edgy.

A review of January and renewed it 4 weeks ago.

5/26

NARA, Dato

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Marvin Kalb

7:06 p.m., March 2, 1971

Kalb: I had something to tell you, it is more personal than professional and I won't do it on the phone. I didn't want to bother you but just wanted to find out if I can hop over to see you.

K: Where are you now?

Kalb: At the studio, 2020 M. Can do it tomorrow morning if it is easier for you. It is something which I think you should be informed about.

K: I appreciate that.

Kalb: But I don't want to do it on the phone.

K: I understand but I am going home now, have to be at a dinner at 8:15 and I have to change first. How long will it take do you think?

Kalb: 5 minutes, maybe less.

K: Why don't I come by where you are?

Kalb: Whichever is easier for you, I can be there in 5 minutes.

K: Why don't you come on over then.

Kalb: Okay.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Martha Mitchell & The Attorney General

7:35 p.m., March 2, 1971

The Attorney General

AG: Henry, I just got a call from Max Fisher. Apparently he called Sisco or Sisco called him but I gather it was the former. Sisco let Max Fisher know they were going to have to condemn Israel on Thursday. The scenario I saw today.

K: That's right.

AG: It is within ...

K: Oh, yes. After I talked to Rabin, he called Sisco and he sent me a copy in which he said he would like to make clear the following points (read the four points). In other words we are going to have one hell of a blow out on Thursday.

M: Does this change anything we said today do you think? Should I talk to the President?

K: If Fisher called you, you can use that as a pretext.

M: All right.

K: Or you can wait until the fat is in the fire.

AG: Which do you think?

K: I think we are locked in the condemnation.

AG: The French and British.

K: You could let all hell break loose.

AG: The French and Israelis will react in the press and the Israelis will react pretty strongly. Maybe it is better to take that initial step.

K: Think it is too far gone.

AG: Will get the State Department's neck out.

K: That's my view.

k

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

7:35 p.m., March 2, 1971

AG: Then let the President pull it back. What time will this happen on Thursday?

K: During the course of the afternoon. Israel won't say anything before Friday or Saturday.

AG: Would it be helpful to try and get them to lay off until there is a White House reaction?

K: I have implored them to stay away from the President.

AG: Not criticize him, that would be good. If they can be postured, that would be good.

K: I think it can.

AG: Do that, of course we have got the Blue Chips.

K: Think we ought to play it that way.

AG: It would be constructive. The reading on the hill of the Congress would be basically against the position of the State Department don't you think?

K: That is my strong impression.

AG: Fulbright ???? strongly for the Israelis.

K: I think that is right.

AG: Let's let them get out on a limb if we can keep them away from the President.

K: I think we can.

AG: Thank you -- I appreciated the luncheon today. Keep me posted on when we can move.

K: All right.

AG: Okay, Henry.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

They
P: Go in and if they can't take it, get out. It could be close to breaking as much as the SVN.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., March 3, 1971

S: Good morning, Henry. We are making progress. The Secretary did have an opportunity to look at this fundamental paper. He likes the approach. I am now going to spend the next day to clean and tighten it up. You will get it officially tomorrow for the meeting on Friday.

K: Terrific.

S: This is wonderful. I will send you a clean draft in 24 hours.

K: I had a brief talk with the Secretary this morning.

S: I think that helped, Henry.

lds

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
The President
3/3/71 10:40 a.m.

K: I just got a backchannel from Bfunker that Thieu made today the statement we suggested which backs off from a North Vietnamese invation thing. The only problem that arises is when the North Vietnamese keep attacking and the South Vietnamese will not attack the North if their aggression stops.

E: Ziegler says that was alreayd on the wire so he is going to answer it at the press briefing. We can get that out of the way. So this is good.

K: Very good.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

McDonnell/Kissinger

10:50 a.m. 3/3/71

M: I am trying to get schedules together.

K: Sat. morning?

M: We have done that. Dinner Friday?

K: xerox Probably can't. But can I let you know tomorrow? We might have lunch on Sat.

M: You should see your father this weekend. Let's not mess up that.

K: Let's talk about it.

M: But Friday for dinner looks bad.

K: Yes.

M: OK. How are you doing?

K: Fine.

M: It was a bitch of an article today.

K: With an election coming up it's to be expected. If Sat. doesn't work out how does Monday do with the group?

M: Then I would have to rearrange them. Let's keep it Sat. morning at 9:00.

K: OK. And we will try for breakfast or lunch. How are things?

M: It's rough up here. Two gang killings last night.

K: How is Alice?

M: Amazingly strong when she has to be. I hope I don't give her too much to carry.

K: I know she doesn't think that.

M: Be good and be safe.

K: I will be fine and look forward to seeing you.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Lord Chalfont/Mr. Kissinger

10:52 a.m., March 3, 1971

K: Allen, how are you?

C: Henry, how are you? I am passing through New York and thought I would telephone.

K: How nice of you. It's been much too long since we talked.

C: I have kept in touch with you through TV and the press. I know what you have been up to.

K: Don't believe everything you read.

C: I don't believe even what I write in the papers.

K: I believe what _you_ write in the paper.

C: I see from this morning's papers you are having a few local problems.

K: I'm very impressed with my influence when I read about it.

C: How are things going generally?

K: They are going fine. It's a time-consuming job. On the other hand, it is sometimes easier or less frustrating to be in that sort of job than worry on lower levels.

C: I guess you wouldn't have missed it for anything.

K: It's an experience.

C: I am getting involved in some business associations which are going to bring me to the U.S. quite a bit.

K: I hope you will plan to come to Washington. Let me have a week or two warning, and I will be sure to arrange lunch.

C: I know what a difficult time you have.

K: But we have been friends for a long time. I have always enjoyed our meetings.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Lord Chalfont/Mr. Kissinger

10:52 a.m., March 3, 1971

C: I have enjoyed them, too.

K: I will count on hearing from you.

C: I will be back again within a month and as soon as I have
the details, I will send you a telegram giving you the details of where
I will be and I will make a point of spending at least a day in Washington.

K: Give me some alternatives because I can't control every schedule.

C:] I hope we will be able to have lunch or dinner. Good luck.

K: I look forward to seeing you within a month or so. Are you
writing for the papers now?

C: I am doing a little writing for The New Statesman, but I'm
about to give it up. I am heavily involved in business activities, and
I am also writing a book and still doing my opposition spokesman
act in the House of Lords on foreign affairs and defense.

K: What do you do in your spare time?

C: About the same as you, Henry. I am using this visit to the
U.S. to make a break, and not going to do any journalism. I will
stick to my book, politics and business.

K: I look forward to seeing you soon. It's nice to hear from you.

C: It's nice to talk to you.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

4:45 p.m., March 3, 1971

R: I just called about seeing about getting together.

K: You give me the time.

R: I have to testify in the morning. It may not take too long.
Maybe I can call in.

K: You don't want to do it today? It's entirely up to you.
If you want me to, I will drop by on my way home tonight.

R: Or after I testify tomorrow.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger

5:10 p. m. 3/3/71

K: I am not exactly clear where we are heading and I want to check with you. Are we proceeding with the 4-power condemnation of the Israeli reply?

S: No one is using condemnation.

K: Along lines of what we approved?

S: We are but no agreement on the SecGen report and ______ so it's very fluid.

K: What do you think will happen?

S: I think something will come out critical of Israel. Israel will not be happy but I explained to Rabin we will do what we can and that we are completely isolated. That's all I can say. It's almost impossible to describe it at the moment.

K: A statement along the lines of what we cleared Sunday?

S: It may be a little stronger but I am holding their feet to the fire. I am insisting the Secy. Gen. include the cease fire in his report. He doesn't want to but I have refused to go ahead on the communique until he does. It will all be public. We have read off anything unilaterally and it will come out as 4 and the U.S. will have to go along. This is better than our making a statement a day or two ahead and taking the lead.

K: I agree.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Sen. Javits/Kissinger
5:42 p.m. 3/3/71

J: I didn't know you were Rasputin.

K: If this is what my friends say about me what will my enemies do?

J: Did you read the debate?

K: No.

J: He says he protested his admiration for you. (But of course that was after all the rest.)

K: His facts are wrong.

J: If you give me the facts and I will use them at the appropriate moment.

K: That's not what I called about. I called to tell you I never got the invitation for dinner tomorrow night. I made other plans.

J: Some slip up in your office or mine.

K: I knew about the dinner -- you had spoken to me but I didn't have the date.

J: George will be there.

K: I admire him. Give him my warm regards. I will give you some of the inaccuracies if you want.

J: That would be important and Rogers can do a lot with this. He is the man who was assailed. / He is the one that's laughed at.

K: It's not true.

J: He should take a stern and strong position on this. I think it's up to him. I was asked on TV why you appeared on TV for an hour.

K: It was 10 min.

J: I said the President appears 40 times more often than Kissinger and does he have to come to the Foreign Relations Committee?

K: I appeared for 10 mins. and it was a mistake. I thought it was going to be on the report.

J: It wasn't conclusive in any way.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Pete Peterson
3/3/71; 6:45 p.m.

P: I've got another crisis on this God damn UK thing. I think you almost have to listen to this.

K: I have to get off to a dinner.

P: It is so God damn complicated. I am not sure I understand. They say they will give us ten days. However, if they give us ten days we must agree not to obstruct them in going to GATT. I think you almost have to listen to this guy Deane Hinton in my office to be sure we understand this. What they are saying is if we don't agree to that they will go to GATT.

K: Alright come over.

feg

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

7:10 p.m., March 3, 1971

K: How are you?

C: I am all right.

K: I have got one of my great problems. All I can tell you is that when we reach the subject we both know something about there is no telling what we will achieve. What do you know about agriculture?

C: Very, very little.

K: Very little, so you can't take advantage of me.

C: No danger.

K: Our Embassy in London has been given another ultimatum, by beginning of business tomorrow if we don't accept ....

C: That's not my understanding.

K: It is our understanding now that they are willing to give us 10 days.

C: That's my understanding too.

K: But also we have to agree not to obstruct your going to GATT at the end of 10 days. Unless we agree to this, our Embassy tells us that you are going ahead.

C: That isn't my information.

K: That is what our Embassy seems to think and since I can't get to the President tonight, I would like for you to give us 24 hours to reply to that part of the proposition.

C: They were going to have a Cabinet meeting today on what they were eventually going to do and after that I was to ask you whether we could speed up on the 10 days if possible. After that, could we try and keep it to the negotiations that have been taking place with the State Department rather than start new negotiations.

K: Rather than us getting involved you mean.

C: Rather than someone introducing new basics, keep it to the basics that the State Department is aware of.

k

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

7:10 p.m., March 3, 1971

K: That's right, I have no reason to suppose that won't work. If there is a major misunderstanding, we can do what we can. Unless you call us, we can assume we have 24 hours to reply. Why don't I do the following, get that proposition typed up and send it over to you.

C: That would be good if you could do that.

K: With the understanding that we will not reply to it until this time tomorrow evening.

C: There must be some misunderstanding to what I am aware of. If I find that I am misinformed, I will come back to you.

K: You can call me, the White House will always know where to reach me.

C: I would be very surprised. Why don't you send it out to the residence?

K: Okay.