PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: GERALD R. FORD, 1975

245

THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF
MARCH 6, 1975

THE PRESIDENT. Good evening. Will you please sit down.

ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Before we start the questions tonight, I would like to make a statement on the subject of assistance to Cambodia and to Vietnam.

There are three issues—the first, the future of the people who live there. It is a concern that is humanitarian—food for those who hunger and medical supplies for the men and women and children who are suffering the ravages of war. We seek to stop the bloodshed and end the horror and the tragedy that we see on television as rockets are fired wantonly into Phnom Penh.

I would like to be able to say that the killing would cease if we were to stop our aid, but that is not the case. The record shows, in both Vietnam and Cambodia, that Communist takeover of an area does not bring an end to violence, but, on the contrary, subjects the innocent to new horrors.

We cannot meet humanitarian needs unless we provide some military assistance. Only through a combination of humanitarian endeavors and military aid do we have a chance to stop the fighting in that country in such a way as to end the bloodshed.

The second issue is whether the problems of Indochina will be settled by conquest or by negotiation. Both the Governments of Cambodia and the United States have made vigorous and continued efforts over the last few years to bring about a cease-fire and a political settlement.

The Cambodian Government declared a unilateral cease-fire and called for negotiations immediately after the peace accords of January 1973. It has since repeatedly expressed its willingness to be flexible in seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. Its leaders have made clear that they are willing to do whatever they can do to bring peace to the country.

The United States has backed these peace efforts. Yesterday, we made public an outline of our unceasing efforts over the years, including six separate initiatives since I became President.¹

Let me assure you: We will support any negotiations and accept any outcome that the parties themselves will agree to. As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities involved will not, themselves, constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

Yet all of our efforts have been rebuffed. Peace in Cambodia has not been prevented by our failure to offer reasonable solutions. The aggressor believes it can win its objectives on the battlefield. This belief will be encouraged if we cut off assistance to our friends.

We want an end to the killing and a negotiated settlement. But there is no hope of success unless the Congress acts quickly to provide the necessary means for Cambodia to survive.

If we abandon our allies, we will be saying to all the world that war pays. Aggression will not stop; rather it will increase. In Cambodia, the

¹ On March 5, 1975, the Department of State Office of Press Relations had made available a summary of negotiating efforts on Cambodia.

Volume 11—Number 10

246

aggressors will have shown that if negotiations are resisted, the United States will wory, abandon its friends, and force will goail.

The third issue is the reliability of the United States. If we cease to help our friends in Indochina, we will have violated their trust that we would help them with arms, with food, and with supplies so long as they remain determined to fight for their own freedom. We will have been false to ourselves, to our word, and to our friends. No one should think for a moment that we can walk away from that without a deep sense of shame.

This is not a question of involvement or reinvolvement in Indochina. We have ended our involvement. All American forces have come home. They will not go back.

Time is short. There are two things the United States can do to affect the outcome. For my part, I will continue to seek a negotiated settlement. I ask the Congress to do its part by providing the assistance required to make such a settlement possible.

Time is running out.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

QUESTIONS

ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA

Q. Mr. President, you wound up saying, "Time is running out" in Cambodia. Can you give us any assurance that even if the aid is voted it will get there in time? Is it stockpiled and ready to roll, or what is the situation?

THE PRESIDENT. If we don't give the aid, there is no hope. If we do get the necessary legislation from the Congress and it comes quickly—I would say within the next 10 days or 2 weeks—it will be possible to get the necessary aid to Cambodia, both economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, and military assistance. I believe there is a hope that we can help our friends to continue long enough to get into the wet season then there will be an opportunity for the kind of negotiation which I think offers the best hope for a peace in Cambodia.

Mr. Growald [Richard Growald, United Press International].

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Q. Mr. President, would you tell us what Director Colby has told you of any CIA connection with the assassination of foreign leaders?

THE PRESIDENT. I am not in a position to give you any factual account. I have had a full report from Mr. Colby on the operations that have been alluded to in the news media in the last week or so really, involving such actions that might have taken place beginning back in the 1960's.

I don't think it is appropriate for me at this time to go any further. We do have an investigation of the CIA, of our intelligence agencies, by the Congress, both overt and covert, going back from the inception of the CIA. And, of course, we do have the Rockefeller Commission going into any CIA activities in the domestic front.

But for me to comment beyond that, I think, would be inappropriate at this time.

CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Q. Mr. President, you say that there would be a deep sense of shame in the country if Cambodia should fall. If that would be the case, sir, can you explain why there seems to be such a broad feeling of apathy in the country, and also in the Congress, toward providing any more aid for either Cambodia or South Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT. I believe there is a growing concern which has been accentuated since we have seen the horror stories on television in recent weeks—the wanton use of rockets in the city of Phnom Penh, the children lying stricken on the streets, and people under great stress and strain, bloody scenes of the worse kind.

I think this kind of depicting of a tragedy there has aroused American concern, and I think it is a growing concern as the prospect of tragedy of this kind becomes even more evident.

So, I have noticed in the last week in the United States Congress, in a bipartisan way, a great deal more interest in trying to find an answer. And yesterday I spent an hour-plus with Members of Congress who came back from a trip to Cambodia and South Vietnam, and they saw first-hand the kind of killing, the kind of bloodshed, and it had a severe impact on these Members of Congress, some of whom have been very, very strongly opposed to our involvement in the past in Vietnam. And I think their impact will be significant in the Congress as well as in the country.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Q. Mr. President, the question is raised by many critics of our policy in Southeast Asia as to why we can conduct a policy of détente with the two Communist super powers

Volume 11—Number 10

247

in the world and could not follow a policy of détente should Cambodia and South Vietnam go Communist. Could you explain that to us?

**THE PRESIDENT.** I think you have to understand the differences that we have with China, the People's Republic of China, and with the Soviet Union. We do not accept their ideology. We do not accept their philosophy. On the other hand, we have to recognize that both countries have great power bases in the world, not only in population but in the regions in which they exist.

We do not expect to recognize or to believe in their philosophies. But it is important for us, the United States, to try and remove any of the obstacles that keep us from working together to solve some of the problems that exist throughout the world, including Indochina.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have supplied and are supplying military assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia. We have to work with them to try and get an answer in that part of the world, but at the same time, I think that effort can be increased and the prospects improved if we continue the détente between ourselves and both of those powers.

Tom [Tom Brokaw, NBC News].

Q. Mr. President, putting it bluntly, wouldn't we just be continuing a bloodbath that already exists in Cambodia if we voted the $222 million in assistance?

**THE PRESIDENT.** I don't think so, because the prospects are that with the kind of military assistance and economic and humanitarian aid we are proposing, the government forces hopefully can hold out. Now, if we do not, the prospects are almost certain that Phnom Penh will be overrun. And we know from previous experiences that the overrunning of a community or an area results in the murder and the bloodshed that comes when they pick up and sort out the people who were the schoolteachers, the leaders, the government officials.

This was told very dramatically to me yesterday by several Members of the Congress who were there and talked to some of the people who were in some of these communities or villages that were overrun.

It is an unbelievable horror story. And if we can hold out—and I think the prospects are encouraging—then I think we will avoid that kind of massacre and innocent murdering of people who really do not deserve that kind of treatment.

Q. Mr. President, if I may follow up, as I understand it, the Administration's point is that if we vote the aid that we will have the possibility of a negotiated settlement, not just the avoidance of a bloodbath. Is that correct?

**THE PRESIDENT.** That is correct, sir.

Q. And yet, just yesterday, as you indicated in your statement, the State Department listed at least six unsuccessful efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Cambodia, dating to the summer of 1973, when American bombing

stopped there. The Cambodian Government was certainly stronger than it would be with just conceivably another $220 million.

**THE PRESIDENT.** Well, I think if you look at that long list of bonafide, legitimate negotiated efforts, the best prospects came when the enemy felt that it would be better off to negotiate than to fight.

Now, if we can strengthen the government forces now and get into the wet season, then I believe the opportunity to negotiate will be infinitely better, certainly better than if the government forces are routed and the rebels—the Khmer Rouge—take over and do what they have done in other communities where they have had this kind of opportunity.

Q. Mr. President, you said, sir, that if the funds are provided that hopefully they can hold out. How long are you talking about? How long can they hold out? In other words, how long do you feel this aid will be necessary to continue?

**THE PRESIDENT.** Well, this aid that we have requested on an emergency basis from the Congress is anticipated to provide the necessary humanitarian effort and the necessary military effort to get them through the dry season, which ends roughly the latter part of June or the first of July.

## THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

Q. Mr. President, if I might, I am sure you have seen news accounts to the effect that the conservatives, especially within your own party, are considering starting a third party in 1976, and they are bolting.

And I understand yesterday that a group of conservative Republican Senators met with you, and afterwards they came out and talked with reporters at the White House and told us that they were unhappy with your policies, they thought you were going too far to the left. And, in fact, they said they wanted you to know that you could no longer take the right wing of your party for granted.

That being the case, sir, do you intend to go out and court conservative Republican support to woo them back for 1976, and do you think anything short of dropping Nelson Rockefeller from the ticket will do that?

**THE PRESIDENT.** Well, let me say, the meeting that I had with about 11 very fine Republican Members of the United States Senate was a very, very frank discussion, and I think very constructive.

Some of them indicated that in certain areas they had disagreements with me. In other areas, they indicated a very strong support for the position that I have taken on various issues.

It is my feeling that the Republican Party has to be a broad-based, wide-spectrum party if it is going to be a viable force in the political situation in the United States.

Volume 11—Number 10

248

I happen to believe that Nelson Rockefeller is doing a very fine job as Vice President, and if we can broaden the base of the Republican Party, I think we have an excellent chance to prevail in 1976.

My maximum effort will be in getting all elements of the Republican Party on the team, and I think, in the final analysis, we will.

Q. Mr. President, as a follow up, sir, can you really broaden that base without losing the right wing of your party?

THE PRESIDENT. Oh, yes, I think we can. In 1968 and 1972, that was achieved and we were successful. I think it can be done in 1976.

## SENATE FILIBUSTER RULE

Q. On Rule 22, when Mr. Rockefeller ruled, had you approved what he was doing beforehand? Do you agree with the ruling, and do you agree with the assertion of some of the Senators you met with that it is going to make it much harder for your program to get by in the Senate with three-fifths rather than two-thirds?

THE PRESIDENT. I think we have to understand that the Vice President occupies the position as presiding officer of the United States Senate under the Constitution. He has a constitutional responsibility in that regard.

I am in the executive branch of the Government. He, in that part of his responsibility, is in the legislative branch. He has the obligation under the Constitution to make a ruling, to preside in the United States Senate.

I think it is inappropriate or inappropriate, I should say, for me to tell him, as a member of the legislative branch in that capacity how he should rule. And therefore, I did not. I have had a number of discussions with the Vice President as to my personal philosophy concerning the United States Senate. I happen to believe that the United States Senate ought to be a somewhat different legislative body than the House of Representatives, where by a 51 percent vote, a majority, can prevail.

But our Founding Fathers very wisely thought that the Senate ought to be a little different, and they provided that the Senate should have other rules, other parliamentary procedures, including the requirement of more than 51 percent to conduct its business under certain circumstances.

I expressed those views to the Vice President, but I went no further, and I do not think it would have been appropriate for me to go any further.

Q. To just follow that question up, do you think that it is going to be harder for you to get your programs through the Congress with this prospective change in the filibuster rule?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think it will be any more difficult to get the programs through. It might be more difficult in other ways, but I do not think it will be more difficult to get the programs through.

## FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON

Q. Mr. President, some people who have visited former President Nixon in recent months have quoted him as saying that he would like to, after his illness is over, become a major figure in the Republican Party again. Do you foresee any time in the future when it would be beneficial for the Republican Party to have him re-emerge as a leader?

THE PRESIDENT. I think any comment that I make in that regard is inappropriate at the present time. Mr. Nixon is still recovering from a very serious illness. And for me to speculate down the road, I think, is unwise at this point.

## TAX REDUCTIONS

Q. Mr. President, Secretary Simon said the other day that he thought the jobless rate, unemployment rate, could rise to as much as 9 percent before things turned around. Now, in view of this, would you be willing to go for a larger tax reduction? Would you be willing to raise it, say, $10 billion or some other figure?

THE PRESIDENT. In the first place, I have doubts that it will go to 9 percent. It might. But without commenting on whether it will or won't, if there is a need for a greater stimulant, I would certainly go for a greater tax reduction than for increased spending. I think that the tax reduction route is a lot more desirable than just increasing spending on some of these categorical programs or other programs that really do not help the individual as much as a tax reduction which would put money back in his pocket.

I believe that the program we have, as it appears to be moving through the Congress, is at this stage of the game moving in the right direction. The big problem is not the size of the tax reduction, but the slowness with which the Congress is acting on it and the failure of the Congress thus far to limit the tax reduction to something that can be enacted into law quickly.

What we need is speed and a figure of $16 to $19 billion in tax reduction. If we delay—and I hope it is not—then delay is more of a problem than the size.

Q. Sir, in the bill that came out of the House, you really got a different kind of character to that bill than the one you proposed. There is a greater percentage going to lower income groups and yours would go more to middle and higher income groups. Would you veto a bill if it got to your desk in the form it came from the House, or how would you feel about the House bill?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think it is wise for me to speculate on what I would do with the House bill. It does have to go through the Senate committee, it does have to go through the Senate, itself, and then it has to go to conference and come down to me. For me to speculate at this stage, I think, is very unwise.

Volume 11—Number 10

249

I would like to add this, however: I agree with Secretary of the Treasury Simon, who testified yesterday or the day before that there ought to be a larger increase for the middle-income taxpayer. I think the House version of the bill was much too limited. It didn't give a sufficiently large rebate or tax reduction to the middle-income taxpayers, and those people, I think, deserve a break because in recent years they have gotten a heavier and heavier burden imposed on them.

### THE FORMER PRESIDENT

Q. Mr. President, I am wondering if you agree, sir, with Leon Jaworski who feels that the time has now come for former President Nixon to tell the truth about Watergate?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think it is appropriate for me to give any advice to Mr. Nixon on that matter at this time. A fairly comprehensive story has been told in the impeachment hearings in the House, in the testimony of many, many people in the court here in the District of Columbia. I think the proper place for any further discussion in this regard is in the court system of the United States.

### ARAB TERRORIST ATTACK AT TEL AVIV

Q. What effect do you think last night's massacre in Tel Aviv will have on the current Kissinger negotiations, and what advice would you give to Israel to counteract such terrorist attacks?

THE PRESIDENT. Let me answer the last first. I don't think it is appropriate for me to give any advice to Israel or any other nation as to what they should do in circumstances like that. I hope that the very ill-advised action—the terrorist action—in Israel or in Tel Aviv last night was absolutely unwarranted under any circumstances. I condemn it because I think it is not only inhumane but it is the wrong way to try and resolve the difficult problems in the Middle East.

I would hope that that terrorist activity would not, under any circumstances, destroy the prospects or the possibilities for further peace accomplishments in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, have you considered asking Israel to become part of NATO?

THE PRESIDENT. I have not.

### CAMBODIA

Q. Mr. President, you sounded encouraged about the prospect for Cambodian aid. Can you give us an estimate of what you think the chances are now of it being passed?

THE PRESIDENT. They are certainly better than they were. I had a meeting this morning with Senator Sparkman and Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Clifford Case. They want to help. They say the prospects are 50-50. But if they are that, I think we ought to try and make the effort because I think the stakes are very, very

high when you involve the innocent people who are being killed in Cambodia.

Q. May I follow up? If the Congress does not provide the aid and the Lon Nol government should fall, would the country be in for any recrimination from this Administration? Would we have another "who lost China" debate, for example?

THE PRESIDENT. I first would hope we get the aid and the government is able to negotiate a settlement. I do not think—at least from my point of view—that I would go around the country pointing my finger at anybody. I think the facts would speak for themselves.

Q. Mr. President, from some of the remarks the Senators who met with you today made, they did not indicate that they were quite in as much agreement as you have indicated, but Senator Humphrey, for one, asked, as part of a negotiated settlement that you spoke of, if you would be willing to seek the orderly resignation of President Lon Nol.

THE PRESIDENT. I do not believe it is the proper role of this Government to ask the head of another state to resign. I said in my opening statement that we believe that the settlement ought to be undertaken, and it is not one that revolves around any one individual. And I would hope that some formula—some individuals on both sides could sit down and negotiate a settlement to stop the bloodshed.

Q. Could I follow up? On that, are you saying that the United States will support any government, no matter how weak or corrupt, in a situation like this?

THE PRESIDENT. I am not saying we would support any government. I am saying that we would support any government that we can see coming out of the present situation or the negotiated settlement.

### PROGRAMS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED

Q. Mr. President, yesterday on unemployment you requested $1.6 billion for public service jobs to run through mid-1976. Now, your advisers, meantime, keep predicting that the problem will improve in mid-'75, just a month or two from now. How do you reconcile those two positions?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the requested additional manpower training funds that I requested will fully fund the authorized amount that was approved by the Congress last year. We believe that this amount is needed to take care of any potential contingencies.

We think there will be an improvement toward the end of this year, and certainly in the beginning of next year, on the unemployment. On the other hand, we think it is wise at this time to be prepared for any adverse developments.

Q. You mentioned earlier that it might go to 9. Are you revising upward the figure from 8.5?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I think I said that I was not going to agree to any figure, but I did say that if we had any such

Volume 11—Number 10

250

development, the better way to solve it would be for a further tax cut rather than some of these additional spending programs, and the most important thing was to get the Congress to act affirmatively, quickly, on the tax bill. I am very disturbed with their lack of affirmative action as quickly as I think it should come.

## OIL PRICES

Q. Mr. President, out of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] summit meeting in Algiers today came a declaration that oil prices should be pegged to inflation and the prices they have to pay for the products they buy. Do you think this kind of inflation indexing system is fair?

THE PRESIDENT. We are trying to organize the consuming nations, and we have been quite successful. I believe that once that organization has been put together—and it is well along—that we should sit down and negotiate any matters with the producing nations.

I personally have many reservations about the suggestion that has been made by the OPEC organization. I think the best way for us to answer that problem is to be organized and to negotiate rather than to speculate in advance.

## THE BUDGET DEFICIT

Q. Mr. President, things have been sort of piling up since you announced your $52 billion prospective deficit. You have now postponed your tax proposal for March and April. You have put out $2 billion for highways, another $2 billion for relief jobs, and now the Congress has refused to put a ceiling on food stamps. My question is this: Just how high do you think this $52 billion deficit is going to go, and where do you think it is at this point?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the $52 billion deficit was too high, in my judgment. We did our best to keep it down, and the Congress so far has added substantially to it by not approving the recommended rescissions and deferrals that I proposed.

I think I recommended in one group about a $950 million rescission, or deferral, and Congress only approved about $110 or $120 million of that. They have, in addition, as you indicated, added about $650 million in additional food stamp costs. I am disturbed.

And I will continue to work trying to convince the Congress that a deficit of $52 billion is too much, and anything above that is very, very bad. If they think the way to stimulate the economy is to blow the Federal budget, I think they are wrong. I think the better procedure, if we need any additional stimulant, is through a tax cut.

MR. CORMIER. Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you very much. Have a good night.

NOTE: President Ford's tenth news conference was held at 7:31 p.m. on Thursday, March 6, 1975, in Room 450 at the Old Executive Office Building. It was broadcast live on radio and television.

# Advisory Council on Social Security

*Statement by the President Upon Receiving the Council's Final Report. March 7, 1975*

I have received today the final report of the Advisory Council on Social Security. I concur strongly in the Council's unanimous endorsement of the basic principles of the social security system.

In my view, the most important recommendation of the Council calls for the stabilization of the benefit structure so that future benefits will maintain a consistent relationship to earnings and will not be so vulnerable to changes in the economy.

Consequently, I have directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to present to me a series of proposals for stabilizing the benefit structure. This will enable me to make recommendations to the Congress as early as possible.

Stabilization of the benefit structure, however, will not provide all the additional revenues that will eventually be required by social security. While existing reserves are adequate to maintain the fund's financial integrity for the next several years, I want to ensure the integrity of the system into the 21st century. Therefore, I have asked the Vice President to have the Domestic Council explore alternative approaches to financing and to make appropriate recommendations to me.

I strongly support the "earned right" principle that has been a basic feature of social security since its inception 40 years ago. Therefore, I am opposed to the Advisory Council's specific recommendation calling for the transfer of Medicare financing from the Social Security trust funds to general funds of the Treasury.

# Federal Power Commission

*Exchange of Letters Between the President and Rush Moody, Jr., Upon Mr. Moody's Resignation as a Commissioner. March 7, 1975*

March 7, 1975

Dear Rush:

I have your letter of February 28, and it is with a special sense of regret that I accept your resignation as a Commissioner of the Federal Power Commission, effective March 15, 1975, as you requested.

You can be sure I understand the reasons which led you to your decision and that I share your strong conviction in the urgent need to review and change our present natural gas policies. I will continue to support, in the strongest terms possible, Congressional action deregulating new natural gas. I recognize, as you do, that affirming

Volume 11—Number 10

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 17, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(South Bend, Indiana)

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME CONVOCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
ATHLETIC AND CONVOCATION CENTER

11:15 A.M. EST

Father Hesburgh, Governor Bowen, my former good friends and colleagues in the Congress, Senator, Birch Bayh, and Senator Hartke, Congressman John Brademas, distinguished public officials, honored faculty, members of the student body and distinguished guests -- and I add our new Attorney General:

It is really a great privilege and a very high honor for me to have the opportunity of being in South Bend on the University of Notre Dame campus, but I am especially grateful for the honor that has been accorded me this morning. I really cannot express adequately my gratitude being made a member of the Notre Dame family. I thank you very much.

I would be most remiss if I did not also express as strongly and as sincerely as I can the gratitude that all of us have in the government for the contributions that have been made, not only in the program described by Father Hesburgh, but by his many other contributions. I say to you, Father Hesburgh, thank you from the bottom of our hearts.

This has been a most exciting morning. As we were getting off the plane at the county airport, a rather amazing thing happened. Somebody asked me, "How do you get to the campus of the University of Notre Dame?" What made it so amazing -- it was Father Hesburgh.
(Laughter)

I especially want to thank Father Hesburgh for all he has done to make me and my party most welcome here today, and particularly for granting amnesty to the classes this morning.

MORE

(OVER)

["[10]", "Page 2.", "It is also a rare opportunity for me to be at Notre Dame, the home of the Fighting Irish, on, of all days, St. Patrick's Day. I tried to dress appropriately and honestly, I have a green tie on. Let's face it, this is one day we can all be part of the greening of America.", "As your next door neighbor from Michigan, I have always been impressed by the outstanding record of the students of the University of Notre Dame. You have always been leaders in academic achievement, in social concerns, in sports prowess, and now, once again, if you are blazing new paths in the developments of new concepts in mass transportation.", "Some communities have the mono-rail, some have the subway, Notre Dame has the quickie. (Laughter)", "MORE", "Once upon a time, there was a man who was very tall. He was the son of a farmer, and as a boy, he would run and play with the other boys. He was always the leader, and as he grew older, he became a farmer himself. He had a son, also a farmer, and he taught him all he knew. The boy was young when his father died, and he took all the responsibility of the farm. He worked hard to make it go, and he had a son, who also became a farmer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a artist.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a artist, you're a farmer's son.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to an art school, and he became a good artist. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a teacher.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a teacher, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to a school for teachers, and he became a good teacher. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a lawyer.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a lawyer, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to law school, and he became a good lawyer. But he was always looking over his shoulder, and the other boys never liked him. He was sad, and he went to the farmer, and he said, \"I don't want to be a farmer. I want to be a doctor.\" The farmer said, \"No, you can't be a doctor, you're a artist.\" But the boy was determined, and he went to medical school, and he became a good doctor.

[1e]

Page 3

The Fighting Irish of Notre Dame have become a symbol of tenacity and determination of the American people.

But Notre Dame believes not only in might on the football field or on the basketball court, but in a spiritual response to humanity's struggles for a decent life.

I have been told many of you chose to go without a normal meal, eating only a bowl of rice to save money to help feed the world's hungry. It is heartwarming to know that students are concerned about others abroad at a time when many here at home are finding it difficult to afford an education or to get a job.

Although life is hard for many Americans, I am proud that we continue to share it with others. And that, in my opinion, is the measure of genuine compassion, and I congratulate you.

I am especially proud to be on a campus that looks up to God and out to humanity at a time when some are tempted to turn inward, and turn away from the problems of the world. Notre Dame's great spokesman, Father Hesburgh, is known in Washington as a non-conformist. I must admit that I do not share all of the Father's views, but he is following one non-conformist viewpoint to which I fully subscribe, and I quote, "Be not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God."

To conform to apathy and pessimism is to drop out and to cop out. In that sense, I fully reject conformity. In that sense, I am a non-conformist who continues to be proud of America's partnership with other nations, and who makes no apology for the United States of America.

America's goodness and America's greatness speak for themselves. I believe in this Nation and in our capacity to resolve our difficulties at home without turning our back on the rest of the world.

Let me share a personal experience. I was elected to the Congress in the aftermath of World War II. A non-partisan foreign policy was emerging at that time. America realized that politics must stop at the water's edge. Our fate was linked to the well-being of other free nations. We became the first Nation to provide others with economic assistance as a national policy. Foreign aid was an American invention or an American project of which we can be justifiably proud.

MORE

Today, as I look back, I am grateful for the opportunity to serve in our government during the third quarter of the 20th century. The past 25 years, while not perfect, were incomparably better for humanity than either of the two previous quarters of this century. There was no world war nor global depression. Major nations achieved detente. Many new nations obtained independence. There has been an explosion of hope, freedom and human progress at home as well as abroad.

America's role, considered in fair context, was a catalyst for change, for growth, and for betterment.

The Marshall Plan, unprecedented in world history, restored a war-ravaged Europe. Even earlier, United States relief and rehabilitation activities during World War II and assistance to Greece and to Turkey after the war had provided precedents and experience in America's overseas assistance.

In the same year that I came to Congress, 1949, President Truman advanced Point IV, an innovative and remarkable concept providing technical assistance to developing nations. It brought new American ideas and technology to people hitherto unable to benefit from advances in health, agriculture and education.

The Food for Peace Act, designed to use America's agricultural abundance to assist others, was a product of the Eisenhower Administration. In the late 1950s, we created the development loan program to help others help themselves. In 1961, the Congress established the Agency for International Development to consolidate and to administer the various activities and agencies. They were carrying out the will of the Congress and the President at that time.

Programs to help people in the developing countries are an expression of America's great compassion and we should be proud of them. But such aid is also part of the continuing effort to achieve an enduring structure of world peace. It is no longer a question of just the Third World. I am deeply concerned about the problems of the fourth world, the very poorest world where from 400 million to 800 million people suffer from malnutrition; where average per capita income is under $275 per year; where life expectancy is 20 years less than in the developing countries; where more than 40 percent of the children will never reach the age of five; where more than half of the population has never been to school.

Page 6

But population growth and increased demand collided with inflation and energy shortages. Gains in many, many instances have been wiped out. At the very time when our policy seeks to build peace with nations of different philosophies, there remains too much violence and too much threat to peace.

The Congress defined the role of foreign aid this way, and I quote from the legislation itself: "The freedom, security and prosperity of the United States are best sustained in a community of free, secure and prospering nations. Ignorance, want and despair, breed the extremism and violence which lead to aggression and subversion."

Those words, written by the Congress, I think are so accurate. If nations are to develop within this definition, they must be able to defend themselves. They must have assurances that America can be counted on to provide the means of security, their own security, as well as the means of sustenance.

People with affirmative vision of the future will not resort to violence. While we pursue a peaceful world in which there is unity and diversity, we must continue to support security against aggression and subversion. To do otherwise, in my judgment, would invite greater violence.

The United States, in this day and age, cannot avoid partnership with nations trying to improve the kind of world the children of today will face tomorrow. Recent events have demonstrated the total interdependence of all people who live on this planet.

The 1973 war in the Middle East showed that war confined to a limited region nevertheless has an economic impact, not only in South Bend, but in every corner of the world.

Developing and developed countries are all part of a single interdependent economic system. This audience, I am told -- and this student body includes many students from over 60 foreign countries, and I congratulate you, Father Hesburgh -- let this demonstrate to all Americans that other people place a high valuation on what America has to offer. Let it demonstrate that the University of Notre Dame rejects what some call the new isolationism.

MORE

Page 7

Let me share with you a specific problem that Father Hesburgh mentioned in his introduction. When the World Food Conference met in Rome in the fall of 1974, I -- as the newly chosen President -- was faced with a very perplexing problem.

Food prices in America were over one-fifth higher than in the previous year. Food reserves, as reported by the Department of Agriculture, were dwindling. The corn crop and other commodities were disappointing in 1974. There were concerns about higher among our own people.

Against this background, I was presented with several alternative estimates on how much we should spend for food for peace for those in other lands.

At the Rome conference, American spokesmen pledged that we would try our utmost to increase our food contribution, despite our own crop problems. As crop reports improved, I designated -- as was mentioned by Father Hesburgh -- a sum even higher than the highest option recommended to me at the time of the conference.

A factor in my own decision was your fine President, Father Hesburgh, and you should be thankful that you have a person who has such broad interests as he, as the President of your university.

A factor also in my judgment was that the program provided, and properly so, a reminder of America's moral commitment. Food for peace was increased from about $980 million to $1.6 billion. This will provide about 5.5 million tons of commodities, up from 3.3 million tons last year.

Most of the commodities will be wheat and rice, but also desperately required and also increased are blended foods used in nutritional programs for mothers and for infants.

The United States, fortunately, is no longer the only country aiding others, but we continue to lead -- and we will -- in providing food assistance. In 20 years of food for peace, we shipped over 245 million tons of wheat, rice and other grains, valued at roughly $23 billion.

Every American should be proud of that record. It is an illustration of the humane feeling and the generosity of the American people.

MORE

[L]

Page 8

While food helps, only by technical assistance
can emerging nations meet their needs. It has been
often said, but I think it is appropriate at this time,
that if a hungry man is given a fish, he can eat for
one day, but if he is taught to fish, he can eat every
day.

The greatest opportunity lies in expanding
production in areas where production will be consumed.
The world is farming only about one-half of the potential
crop lands, yet there are insufficient farmer incentives
in many countries, shortages of fertilizer, high fuel
costs and inadequate storage and distribution systems.

The answers to the world food problem are to be
found in interdependence. We can and will help other
nations, but simplistic paternalism may do more harm
than good. Our help must take the form of helping every
nation to help itself, and we will.

I am particularly concerned about the problem
of fair distribution. America believes in equality of
opportunity. This Nation provides a showcase of change
in providing better nutrition, education, health, to
more and more people, including those who can least
afford it.

Some nations have made excellent use of our
assistance to develop their own capacities. Other
governments are still struggling with the issue of
equality of opportunity and fair distribution of
life necessities.

Good world citizenship requires more than
moralizing about the role others should take. It requires
each nation to put its own house in order. Good American
citizenship requires more than moralizations about what
is wrong with the United States.

It requires personal involvement and action
to bring about change. It requires voting and organizing
and challenging and changing with the flexible and
dynamic American political process.

Our system, by any standard, works, and will
work better, and you can be a part of it.

The developing nations of the world are
increasingly successful in bringing prosperity to
larger numbers of their own people. In fact, the
assistance we have provided these nations is not just
a one-way street.

MORE

Page 9

Thirty percent of U.S. exports are purchased by these developing nations, thereby obviously contributing to a better life for their people and jobs for ours. In cases where countries have the means, let them join in sharing with us, as they should.

Some have helped; others have not. We lead the way, and we will not shirk from future burdens, but all nations must cooperate in developing the world's resources.

We extend the hand of partnership and friendship to make a better world.

Another challenge facing the developing nations, as well as other nations, is to realize the need for peaceful accommodation with neighbors. An interdependent world cannot solve disputes by threat or by force.

People now and in the future depend on each other more than they sometimes realize. For example, we in America import between 50 and 100 percent of such essential minerals as cobalt, bauxite, nickel, manganese and others.

The challenge, as I see it, is for America and all other nations to take responsibility for themselves while building cooperation with each other.

The challenge is also the preservation of the freedom and dignity of the human individual throughout the world. Just as the world's nations can no longer go it alone, neither can the American people.

Woodrow Wilson said that "What we should seek to import in our colleges is not so much learning itself as the spirit of learning.

MORE

[12]

Page 10

Great universities that pursue truth face the challenge that confronts the entire American people. It is whether we will learn nothing from the past and return to the introversion of the 1930s to the dangerous notion that our fate is unrelated to the fate of others.

I am convinced that Americans, however tempted to resign from the world, know deep in their heart that it cannot be done. The spirit of learning is too deeply ingrained. We know that wherever the bell tolls for freedom, it tolls for us.

The American people have responded by supplying help to needy nations. Programs, both government and the volunteer agencies, could not have been, and cannot be, reenacted without popular support. CARE and Catholic Relief Services, pioneers in Food for Peace programs, are feeding over 28 million people around the world right today. Protestant, Jewish and other groups are similarly involved at universities throughout the Nation.

Researchers seek answers to world problems. Right here in Indiana, Purdue University, scientists have made discoveries in high protein aspects of sorghum, a basic food of more than 300 million people in Asia and in Africa.

Not only the scientists at Purdue, but people throughout America, realize that no structure of world peace can endure unless the poverty question is answered. There is no safety for any nation in a hungry, ill-educated and desperate world.

In a time of recession, inflation, and unemployment at home, it is argued that we can no longer afford foreign assistance. In my judgment, there are two basic arguments to the contrary.

First, foreign aid is a part of the price we must pay to achieve the kind of a world in which we want to live. Let's be frank about it. Foreign aid bolsters our diplomatic efforts for peace and for security. But secondly, and perhaps just as importantly, even with a recession, we remain the world's most affluent country and the sharing of our resources today is the right, the humane and the decent thing to do. And we will.

But just as we seek to build bridges to other nations, we must unite at home. This Administration wants better communication with the academic world and I express again my appreciation for the warmth of this reception.

MORE

[LC]

Page 11

But this communication must not just be a search for new technology, but for the human and spiritual qualities that enrich American life. In the future, fewer people must produce more. We must, therefore, unleash intellectual capacities to anticipate and solve our problems.

The academic world must join in the revival of fundamental American values. Let us build a new sense of pride in being an American.

Yes, you can make America what you want it to be. Think about that for just a moment, if you would. Is it really true? Yes, in my judgment, it is.

But there is a catch to it. You will never see it come true. Perhaps your children or your grandchildren will. What you can do is move America slowly, but surely, along the right direction.

Admittedly, today's America is far from perfect, but it is much closer to the America that my class of 1935 wanted than it was when I left the University of Michigan.

Today's America is a far better place than it was 40 years ago when the lingering shadows of worldwide depression were being blotted out by the darker clouds of worldwide war. My generation did not wholly save the world, or lously. But we did, to a degree, help to move it along in the right direction.

We learned along the way that we are part of one world. The author of that phrase was a Hoosier, the first political candidate about whom I got personally involved enough to volunteer as a campaign worker. His name was Wendell Wilkie.

Wendell Wilkie, of Indiana, was never President, but he was right. He fought for what he believed in against almost impossible odds. In the last Presidential campaign before Pearl Harbor, he believed most deeply -- too far ahead of his time, perhaps -- that America must be part of one world. He lost the 1940 election but he helped unite America in support of the truth, which has been our non-partisan national policy since the Second World War, and I say with emphasis, there has been no third world war.

On the contrary, the prospects for long-range peace have slowly, but surely, improved.

MORE

[L.C]

Page 12

Despite setbacks and current international problems, the standards of human life have been lifted almost everywhere. Yet, today, we hear another theme, that the tide of history is running against us, that America's example of American leadership is neither needed nor heeded at the present time; that we should take care of ourselves and let the rest of mankind do likewise; that our domestic difficulties dictate a splendid selfishness that runs counter to all of our religious roots, as well as to all recent experience.

We are counseled to withdraw from one world and go it alone. I have heard that song before. I am here to say I am not going to dance to it. Nor do I believe this generation of young Americans will desert their ideals for a better nation and a better world.

You can and you will help to move America along in the right direction. Hopefully, you can do a better job than the Class of 1935, but while the Classes of 1975 and 1935 are still around, we have much to learn from each other.

We can renew the old American compact of respect for the conviction of others, in faith in the decency of others. We can work to banish war and want wherever they exist. We can exalt the spirit of service and love that St. Patrick exemplified in his day.

I am not alarmed when I hear warnings that the tide of history is running against us. I do not believe it for a minute because I know where the tide of history really is -- on this campus, and thousands and thousands of others in this great country, and wherever young men and women are preparing themselves to serve God and their countries and to build a better world.

You are a part of the tide of this history, and you will make it run strong and true. Of that, I am sure.

Thank you, and the top of the morning to you.

END (AT 11:55 A.M. EST)

PRESS
Public Statements
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 19, 1975

No. 157

REMARKS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
AHMAD ZAKI YAMANI
MINISTER OF PETROLEUM
ON DEPARTURE FROM RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA
MARCH 19, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all I would like to thank His Majesty and his advisors for the very warm hospitality that has been extended to us, and for the very useful talks that we have had. I reviewed with His Majesty the state of the negotiations in which I am engaged, and in which I am acting as a go-between, and the prospects of peace in the area in general. We also discussed with general agreement certain other issues in which the United States and Saudi Arabia have common interest. In my conversations with Minister Yamani, the Acting Foreign Minister, and Prince Fahd as well as with His Majesty, my attention was called to recent newspaper articles speculating on the military intentions of the United States in the area. I would like to state categorically here that our relation with Saudi Arabia is based on friendship and cooperation in which threats, military or otherwise, play no part and we base our relationship on cooperation and not on confrontation.

**MINISTER OF PETROLEUM YAMANI:** Mr. Secretary, this visit is a very constructive and fruitful one. We had a chance to discuss with you the future relationship between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia. We listened carefully to your report, and that strengthened our belief in the good intention and the good will of the United States in its efforts to bring peace to this area based on the implementation of the various resolutions by the United Nations. We just heard the official views about the fantasies of the newspapers, the articles written by certain groups of writers, and we are pleased that is now in public. We thank you for your efforts and wish you the best of luck. Thank you.

* * * * * * *

For further information contact:

Under Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Meet the Press"

Following is the transcript of an inter-
view with Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, on the NBC television
and radio program "Meet the Press" on
February 23. Interviewing Under Secretary
Sisco were Bernard Gwertzman, New York
Times; Joseph Kraft, Field Enterprises syn-
dicated columnist; Henry L. Trewhitt, Balti-
more Sun; Richard Valeriani, NBC News;
and Lawrence E. Spivak, "Meet the Press"
moderator.

Mr. Spivak: Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco. Mr. Sisco has just returned from a trip to the Middle East and Western Europe with Secretary of State Kissinger. We will have the first questions now from Richard Valeriani of NBC News.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, is the United
States now considering a mutual defense
treaty with Israel in order to guarantee
Israel's security and survival?

Mr. Sisco: No, it is not, Mr. Valeriani. I think there has been a great deal of confusion in the recent press reports. We are focusing, as you know, on trying to achieve an interim next step.

The question of guarantees has been
studied over the years, and any studies that
will be given to this matter will be in rela-
tion to an overall political settlement.

Mr. Valeriani: Isn't such a treaty inevi-
table in the context of an overall settlement?

Mr. Sisco: Well, let me say this: There
is a great deal of confusion about this word
"guarantee." We have always thought that
the basic assurance that is essential in the
area is the actual agreement between the

parties. Any study of guarantees, I think,
will be in the context not only of an overall
political settlement but also as supplemen-
tary and complementary to the agreement
itself.

We think the obligations that the sides
exchange with each other, we think the
agreement that is to be achieved based on
the November 1967 resolution, including the
question of borders, is something that has to
be negotiated between the two sides. So
that when one talks of guarantees, one has
to talk in terms of a supplement and a com-
plement to the actual agreement between the
parties.

Mr. Valeriani: Then you do not rule out
an eventual defense treaty with Israel?

Mr. Sisco: I am saying that this is some-
thing which is quite far down the pike; it is
something that obviously we will want to
look at in the context of a political settle-
ment.

Mr. Gwertzman: Mr. Sisco, when Dr.
Kissinger returned from the Middle East he
said some progress had been made. What
was this progress?

Mr. Sisco: I think the essential progress,
Mr. Gwertzman, was in defining and devel-
oping the framework for negotiations on a
possible next step.

As you know, we explored this possibility
with all of the parties principally concerned,
and we will soon be returning to the area to
resume the process. I am, frankly, guard-
edly optimistic, because I think we are begin-
ning to see at least the parameters of this
problem.

Mr. Gwertzman: Specifically in Israel, Dr.
Kissinger said Israel would not have to give

March 17, 1975

337

up territories without a quid pro quo. Did Dr. Kissinger get from Mr. Sadat in Egypt an agreement that Egypt had to give something to get something?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, without getting into the specifics of the various elements, I think we came away with the feeling that there are really two elements here. The question of withdrawal, of course, has been emphasized, as well as that there must be progress toward peace, and we think that the desire for withdrawal and the desire for progress toward peace which has been emphasized on one side and the other can be reconciled. And for that reason I think that we can look forward, hopefully, to moving this along.

**Mr. Kraft:** Mr. Sisco, I'd like to ask a question that is a little bit off the Middle East, though not entirely. Mr. [Vladimir S.] Alkhimov, who is the Deputy Foreign Trade Minister of the Soviet Union, gave a press conference here in Washington the other day in which he said the Administration couldn't be trusted to keep its commitments. Does that seem to you an appropriate thing for a Soviet official to be saying here in Washington?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, I saw that report, Mr. Kraft. I would say this: I think if one looks over the history of the commitments of the United States since World War II, I think the history is very clear. I think we have undertaken specific commitments; I think we have carried them out both definitively as well as in good faith, and I obviously would not agree with that statement.

**Mr. Kraft:** Do you think it was appropriate for him to make it? Are you going to do anything to indicate displeasure, for example?

**Mr. Sisco:** I think I would just repeat again, I would not agree with that statement.

**Mr. Kraft:** In the course of your trip, the Secretary saw Mr. Wilson [Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the U.K.] and Mr. Gromyko [Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei A. Gromyko of the U.S.S.R.]. Did you get any reports on the state of Mr. Brezhnev's

[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] political and personal health?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, I think the question of health is fairly self-evident. Mr. Brezhnev was very heavily involved in the entire Wilson visit. This was very clear to the entire media, and as far as we know he is operating fully, as was evidenced by that particular high-level exchange.

**Mr. Trewhitt:** To pursue Mr. Kraft's point about the meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, one got the impression that the meeting was somewhat chilly. I wonder what you can say about the general state of détente? Is détente in any way in jeopardy as a result of the intervention of Congress?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, I think the bread-and-butter issue between ourselves and the Soviet Union is the question of the strategic balance. The SALT Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] talks are proceeding. My hope is that these will make progress. I think that is the key element in the situation. These were very good talks that we had with the Soviet Union. Obviously the practical issues that were discussed are both delicate and difficult, but I think, myself, that there is a very good chance that we can deepen the relationship, and I think the next few months in particular are important in relationship not only to SALT Two but the whole question of the European Security Conference as well as the question of mutual balanced reduction of forces, and these key areas of the Middle East and Cyprus.

**Mr. Trewhitt:** How do you assess the Soviet role in its attitude on the Middle East —at what point must they come in, are they unhappy about being dealt out at this point?

**Mr. Sisco:** Mr. Trewhitt, no peace in the Middle East is possible in the long run without the cooperation of the Soviet Union. The reason why we are undertaking the kind of "middleman" role that we are pursuing at present is that this is the desire of the parties, and we don't preclude the renewal of

338

Department of State Bulletin

the Geneva Conference in appropriate circumstances, and neither are we pursuing a policy of excluding the Soviet Union in the Middle East, because the reality is they are there, they have interests, and we recognize that if you are going to get a durable peace they have got to be part of the process and they have got to agree with it.

Mr. Spivak: *Mr. Secretary, may I ask you this: There have long been many obstacles to peace in the Middle East. What do you now consider the major obstacles? Have they changed any?*

Mr. Sisco: Well, I feel that the objective conditions in the area, in the aftermath of the October 1973 war, actually have improved the prospects for progress toward peace in the Middle East. The reason why I say this is this—that I think that both sides in the aftermath of that war concluded that the best alternative is the process of diplomacy and the process of negotiations. The Arabs, for example, did not feel that they needed to go to the conference table with their heads bowed as the result, for example, of the defeat during the 1967 war. I think the aftermath of the 1973 war proves that both sides —regardless of the fact there are gaps to be bridged and there are differences to be bridged—that both sides continue to be committed to the diplomatic process, and I find that is a huge plus in this situation.

Mr. Spivak: *Mr. Secretary, a recent Gallup poll shows that 61 percent of the American people who were polled said they thought a war between Israel and the Arabs is likely this year. Based on your intimate knowledge of the situation, do you think a war is likely this year?*

Mr. Sisco: War, of course, can never be—

Mr. Spivak: I said "likely."

Mr. Sisco: —precluded as a possibility. I do not believe it is likely; and the reason is, I am still hopeful that we can make progress on a step-by-step basis and I do not believe that the processes of diplomacy have been exhausted and, moreover, as I read the area—and I have now spent as many as 4

months of the last 12 in the Middle East—I think both sides are sick and tired of war and I think the diplomatic process that we are seeing is a reflection of the desire of both sides to try to get something done.

Mr. Spivak: *Was there anything new and especially encouraging from this trip that you came away with?*

Mr. Sisco: Nothing that one can cite as new or decisive. I find it significant that both sides want the process to continue, and as long as each side wants the process to continue it means each feels there is still an opportunity to achieve something as a result of dialogue.

Mr. Valeriani: *Mr. Sisco, an Egyptian magazine said this past week that another Egyptian-Israeli agreement is already in the bag. Is that report accurate?*

Mr. Sisco: No, it is not. I wish it were, Mr. Valeriani. It might shorten this next trip that we intend to take in the month of March.

Mr. Valeriani: *What makes it so difficult?*

Mr. Sisco: I think what makes it difficult is that each side needs to try to meet at least the minimal conditions and the minimal terms of the other, and each side, Mr. Valeriani, is operating within what I would consider to be a rather confined political setting.

Mr. Valeriani: *For example? What does that mean?*

Mr. Sisco: It means that both the leaders in Israel as well as Egypt have to get the kind of agreement that can be fully justified before their own people. In the case of Israel it has to be the kind of agreement that can get through the parliamentary process. In the case of Egypt, not only must this agreement be supported by the Egyptian people, I think it is important that whatever agreement is achieved have the broad support in the Arab world as well.

Mr. Gwertzman: *Following up on that, how serious is the opposition of Syria to an agreement between Egypt and Israel?*

March 17, 1975

339

Mr. Sisco: Well, I have read reports of this sort, Mr. Gwertzman, and let me say this: The focus, as is evidenced from the press, is on the Egyptian-Israeli aspect of the problem. However, I would recall to you that we went to every capital, that we feel the question of an overall settlement involves all of the fronts. We would like to make progress wherever progress can be made, but we are not excluding anyone or any aspect of the problem.

Mr. Gwertzman: But after the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, presuming it is carried out, do you anticipate there could be an Israeli-Syrian interim accord, or would all sides then go to Geneva immediately?

Mr. Sisco: It is very difficult to speculate. What we would do in these circumstances is obviously to consult not only with Israel but with the key Arabs as well, both in terms of the process and where we could go from there.

Mr. Kraft: Have the Syrians shown any disposition to make concessions in the event the Israelis moved a few kilometers back from the Golan Heights?

Mr. Sisco: We are exploring, of course, all possibilities with both sides. The question of concessions or conciliation or whether it be on the Israeli side or the Syrian side—I think one can't make this kind of a judgment at this juncture. One would have to make this kind of a judgment as the process continues.

Mr. Kraft: Would you say, Mr. Secretary, that the Israelis might be missing the boat by not exploring the possibilities for flexibility in this area?

Mr. Sisco: Well, the Israelis have said, and the leaders in Israel are on record as saying, that they are prepared to try to explore the possibilities of a peace agreement across the board, so that it can't be said that the Israelis have necessarily excluded any

particular front in terms of a peace agreement.

Mr. Kraft: Is there any disposition, Mr. Secretary, to move back at all from the Golan Heights—five miles even?

Mr. Sisco: Again I would refer you to what has been said publicly by the Israeli Prime Minister in this regard and that is that they have indicated a willingness to explore what the possibilities are on all fronts as it relates to a peace agreement. Now, let me emphasize "a peace agreement."

Mr. Trewhitt: Mr. Secretary, just to clarify a point, I take it you feel that it is quite possible that an interim agreement might call for a partial Israeli withdrawal on the Sinai Peninsula without a corresponding withdrawal on the northern front with Syria.

Mr. Sisco: I haven't said that, Mr. Trewhitt. All I have said is that the focus at this particular juncture is on the Egyptian-Israeli aspect of it, but I would underscore again that our discussions are not limited to this; our discussions have included talks with the Syrians as well as the Jordanians.

Mr. Trewhitt: And I would like to return to Mr. Valeriani's original question if I might . . . does the United States, in fact, guarantee the continued existence of Israel as a sovereign state?

Mr. Sisco: Well, the United States, of course, has no formal treaty relationship with the State of Israel. However, I think our support over the years has been made manifest, both on the basis of an ongoing military assistance relationship as well as the economic support, and I find no basic change in the position of the Administration in this regard. Our support continues.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, from time to time there has been debate as to whether the United States regards the security of Israel as a vital American interest and therefore could not and would not tolerate its

340

Department of State Bulletin

destruction. Can you tell us whether we do
consider it a vital interest to the American
people?

Mr. Sisco: My answer would be affirmative. We have been long the principal supporter of the existence of the State of Israel and its economic viability. We have played a major role in the creation of the State of Israel, and I think ever since the creation of the State we have been its prime support, and my answer to you would be affirmative.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the New York Post indicated that you believe that the United States is moving toward official recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Do you think the United States is likely at any time soon to officially recognize the Palestinian Liberation group?

Mr. Sisco: I do not believe this, and I have made no such statement, but to answer your question—

Mr. Spivak: They said not that you made the statement but that you have indicated this.

Mr. Sisco: Neither is true. I will get to your question here, Mr. Spivak. Insofar as the PLO is concerned, we have made clear that we cannot in good conscience recommend any negotiations with the PLO as long as the PLO fails to recognize the existence of the State of Israel, and I see no evidence that the PLO has any intention to do so in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Spivak: Where does that put the PLO as far as the Geneva Conference is concerned then?

Mr. Sisco: When we convened originally at Geneva, one decision was taken—namely, that the question of any additional participants at that conference would be a determination to be made by the members of that conference. In other words, the question of the PLO would come up if and when any Geneva Conference were reconvened, and it

would be a decision that would have to be made by those present.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, you said here that war cannot be precluded in the Middle East, and President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have emphasized repeatedly how explosive the area is, how volatile the situation, and yet the Administration is pouring billions of dollars of new weapons into the area on both sides. Why?

Mr. Sisco: Well, let me say, first of all, that insofar as our support on the military side for Israel is concerned, I think it is important that we maintain its strength. Insofar as our arms sales to other parts of the area—let's take first of all the gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. I have heard it said that we are doing this willy-nilly, on an ad hoc basis.

This is not the case. I can recall the kind of studies that we undertook on this whole question of arms in this area in the aftermath of the exodus of Great Britain. What confronted us at that particular time was this: Do we try to fill this kind of a void directly or do we undertake a policy of helping those who really have legitimate security interests and need the arms for self-defense purposes? We concluded the way to proceed in this area was to try to help in regional cooperation. We see Saudi Arabia, Iran, and these countries as elements of stability in the area with legitimate self-defense needs. And it is not a question of whether we provide arms, or no arms going into the area; it is a question of whether we provide them or others in circumstances where they perceive a real danger.

Mr. Valeriani: Are you willing to go along with a six months' moratorium on arms shipments to the Persian Gulf as suggested by Senator Kennedy?

Mr. Sisco: I have read the press report this morning. Obviously I have not seen the resolution itself, but I would only emphasize that we feel that we are meeting a legitimate

March 17, 1975

341

concern of the countries in the area and these
are friends of ours—these are friends who
are trying to pursue a moderate course in
the circumstances.

*Mr. Gwertzman: Speaking of arms, has the Administration decided to lift the embargo against arms shipments to Pakistan?*

*Mr. Sisco:* I expect an announcement on this, Mr. Gwertzman, very soon, and let me say that we have felt that a rather anomalous situation has existed in the area where one side has been getting arms from the Soviets and has its own production capacity, whereas the other side—an ally, I might add, with whom we have a formal relationship—has been denied this insofar as the United States is concerned. The matter has been under active consideration. I expect an announcement very soon.

*Mr. Gwertzman:* From what you are saying, I assume the answer is we will lift the embargo. Do you think this will really damage relations with India as the Indian Government says it will?

*Mr. Sisco:* In my judgment it should not, because I think we have explained this quite thoroughly. We are not trying to balance one side against the other in this situation. We think that it is as much in India's interest to have a relatively secure Pakistan —to pursue the so-called Simla process, to pursue the process of negotiation—as it is in the interests of Pakistan itself.

*Mr. Kraft:* Speaking again of arms, the White House keeps saying that the United States has a commitment to South Viet-Nam and on the basis of that commitment is pushing for this $300 million supplemental. What is that commitment and when was that commitment made—to whom and by whom and when?

*Mr. Sisco:* Let me just say this about South Viet-Nam, without getting into the legal basis. I think that what is clear is that we directly have gotten out of South

Viet-Nam insofar as our own personnel are concerned. The question before us is: Do we continue to support South Viet-Nam so that it can continue to defend itself in circumstances where it continues to be under threat? Our judgment is that this $300 million is needed to do this.

*Mr. Trewhitt:* Mr. Secretary, we haven't talked about oil at all. I will ask you whether it is possible to settle the Middle East situation politically without a concurrent settlement of the whole question of energy and oil in the area?

*Mr. Sisco:* I think these are two separate problems, Mr. Trewhitt. I think, obviously, to the degree to which we can make progress on the Arab-Israeli dispute this will help the overall climate. But I think the oil question has to be resolved on its merits. I think it is important that the United States develop its own independence and that it not be vulnerable to outside sources, and we are not interested in a confrontation between the United States and the Arabs. We are interested in a producer-consumer dialogue that resolves the problem.

*Mr. Spivak:* Mr. Secretary, you have worked pretty closely with Secretary Kissinger now for some time and have had an opportunity to observe the reaction to the recent attacks on him by Congress and the press. What has been the effect on his power and his influence?

*Mr. Sisco:* I don't see any diminution either of his power or his influence, Mr. Spivak. For example, I spent the last two weeks with him in the Middle East. I find it very significant that both sides are very anxious to have our Secretary of State continue this process. In fact, I will go further. Both sides see Mr. Kissinger as the indispensable element in these negotiations, and I share this view.

*Mr. Spivak:* Thank you, Secretary Sisco, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."

342

Department of State Bulletin

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Public Statements [LC]

March 18, 1975

No. 155

REMARKS TO PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
HIS EXCELLENCY ANWAR AL-SADAT
PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
FOLLOWING MEETING AT ASWAN REST HOUSE
ASWAN, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

MARCH 18, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The President and I reviewed in the usual friendly atmosphere the ideas which I brought from Israel. The President has given me some additional considerations and ideas to take back to Israel. I am returning there this afternoon and I expect to continue the negotiations there. This is all I have to say.

**QUESTION:** Can you see a breakthrough, Dr. Kissinger?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** One can't, in negotiations, speak of any particular point at which there is a breakthrough. I am trying to narrow the gap between the two sides by explaining the ideas as carefully as I can.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you already narrowed the gap between the two sides?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I have said on several occasions, the gap has narrowed, but it always remains to be seen whether it can finally be closed.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, how would you characterize the progress, if any, in this specific session?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, as Secretary Kissinger has stated, we had a fruitful talk and I have given him some new considerations as an answer to what he has brought here and I think it is premature now to say more.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, are you determined to stay in the region?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I have said on many occasions, I am determined to stay until we either reach an agreement or it is clear that we cannot reach an agreement, so I am determined to stay here.

PR # 155

-2-

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, in view of the views brought from Israel by Secretary Kissinger, do you believe that an agreement that would involve an Israeli withdrawal from the passes and from the oil fields would be within the realm of possibility?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I can answer your question on Thursday, let us hope, when Dr. Kissinger returns.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, are there some substantial areas on which you and the Israelis do agree?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, I think you should ask the Secretary this question.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary? (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think there are some areas of agreement and there are several substantial areas of disagreement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you get the feeling that there has been progress in the last session here, in the last round of exchange?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I have the impression that, as I told you at the beginning, it is a very hard, difficult and complicated round.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, the Israelis appear to be talking about a demand for the elements or the principles of non-belligerency from Egypt. Is this any more acceptable to you than the per se demand for non-belligerency?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I have stated our position and it is quite clear. We shall not agree to non-belligerency as long as there is any foreign soldier on our land, and I said that doing so means that I am inviting them to stay, so I think that this is quite clear.

**QUESTION:** The idea of joint patrols with Israel, Dr. Kissinger, has been dropped completely?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the Foreign Minister has put out a statement on the Egyptian position, which is clear and fully understood and has been fully communicated.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you believe that there should be a buffer zone in which there would be a strengthened United Nations force between the Israeli and the Egyptian forces if an agreement could be reached?

[Lc]

PR # 155

-3-

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I think this is quite natural because it is already there. There is a buffer zone between us in which the United Nations operates, it is already there.

**QUESTION:** So that any area that will be evacuated by the Israelis as a part of a new agreement, could be replaced or could be soldiered by United Nations troops? Is that correct?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, you are driving again to try to find some of the details of what we are discussing.

**QUESTION:** That's true, Sir. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the ideas you'll be carrying back to Israel now, are they a refinement or are they substantially different from the ideas you carried back last Friday?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** In each round the ideas, of course, advance and sometimes cover collateral areas. But I don't want to get drawn into a discussion of whether they are entirely new or a refinement, but I think they represent, as I have said, additional input for the Israeli side.

**QUESTION:** Do you think, Dr. Kissinger, that you can reach an agreement before the time of the renewal of the UN forces?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Certainly, yes.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you have any time idea how long an agreement might take to implement?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** We have not yet reached this point.

**QUESTION:** But wouldn't time be a crucial element, some idea of how long it would take, would that not be a crucial element?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** You were speaking of the implementation and you are asking now about reaching an agreement.

**QUESTION:** My point, Mr. President, is there has to be some understanding of how long it would take to implement the agreement before an agreement could be signed.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** When we agree first on the principles, I think the period of implementation can be discussed after that, but we have not yet agreed upon the principles.

PR # 155

-4-

**QUESTION:** Do you think, Dr. Kissinger, you can reach the same kind of agreement?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** We have not yet agreed upon the principles.

**QUESTION:** Do you think there can be at the same time an agreement on the Syrian front?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The conditions in the different areas vary, so I do not want to say that principles can necessarily be automatically applied. But I have stated repeatedly and publicly that the process of peace applies to the whole area, that the United States will do its utmost to promote peace in the entire area.

**QUESTION:** Have you discussed bilateral relations between Egypt and the USA?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We always discuss our bilateral relations, which we think are excellent. (The President nodded.)

**QUESTION:** Do you think the idea of a single Arab delegation might be a way around the United States and Israeli objections to dealing with the PLO in Geneva?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not had an opportunity to discuss this sort of idea, and when it comes time to organize the Geneva conference, we can address specific issues of this nature.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you see any possibility of opening indirect trade to Israel, or indirect tourism, following a withdrawal from part of the Sinai?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I'll tell you, up to this moment we didn't agree on the principles of this very limited withdrawal, and you are raising issues that should be discussed there in Geneva after the final solution. You can't raise issues like this now.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, you must have an idea though what the final solution would look like. Can you give us in general terms what you would like to see so far as a final solution? Where would Israel exist? Where would its boundaries in general lay?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I have already stated this before -- the borders of 1967. And if we can succeed in Geneva to end the state of belligerency I think we would make a very big achievement for this generation. Sure, as I told you before and so I have stated before also, the core of the whole problem is the Palestinian problem. So if we can achieve

PR # 155

-5-

in our generation the end of the state of belligerency between the Arabs and Israel and solve the Palestinian question, it will be a great achievement.

**QUESTION:** With your foresight, sir, you always say this generation, can you look to the next generation perhaps with your foresight and tell us what situation you envision between the Arabs and Israelis in the next generation?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I have said before it depends upon their conduct and I can't speak for the next generation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, clarification: do you mean to leave the impression in this current disengagement that you don't think it should include such things as improved commerce between Israel and Egypt or improved transportation between Egypt and Israel. There have been some proposals made in Israel that part of the agreement can be steps such as improving transportation from Cairo to Tel Aviv or something like that.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Are you asking me?

**QUESTION:** In answer to a previous question you said you thought that such matters should be taken up in Geneva and not within this disengagement agreement.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** It is still premature and it is really absurd to discuss such matters as this. As I said, if we had reached a state of ending the state of belligerency between the Arabs and Israel, this would be a great achievement for our generation. There is no point at all in discussing these relations when we can't agree upon ending the state of belligerency.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, just how serious will it be if these negotiations fail?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, I have told my press that there is a possibility that we may not reach any agreement and we are ready to face whatever comes.

**QUESTION:** What would be the consequences, sir?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, as the British say, we can't cross that bridge until we reach it.

**QUESTION:** And if an agreement is reached, is it a big push for peace?

PR # 155

-6-

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Sure, it will be a turning point.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, do you believe it is at this stage the Palestinians would participate in these talks concerning their future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the two press corps are competing in asking provocative questions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, why do you think it would be a turning point? You said it would be a turning point if it succeeds, could you elaborate?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** The next time, the next visit of Dr. Kissinger, then I can elaborate.

**ANSWER:** Thank you.

********

March 20, 1975

NO. 161

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHIMON PERES
FOLLOWING A MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAMS
MARCH 20, 1975

DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:

As you know, the Cabinet yesterday empowered the team of Ministers that is negotiating with the Secretary of State to continue the negotiations. And in order to do so we had to clarify some points. This was done at the morning meeting which was, as usual, conducted in a very friendly and serious air. Once we have the clarifications we are now returning to the Cabinet to report. That is the best news I can give you for the time being.

Thank you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

I can add nothing to the statement that the Minister of Defense has made. We had a good, constructive and friendly meeting and I will stay in Jerusalem until after the Cabinet meeting and meet again with our colleagues before I return to Egypt this evening.

Thank you.

QUESTION:

Dr. Kissinger, are you more confident now that you received the assessment of the Israeli Cabinet that an agreement can take place?

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Well, I have told you all along that I wasn't going to give you estimates. I do feel that each side is making a very serious effort to try to take into account the considerations of the other, and this is certainly true of the Israeli side.

QUESTION:

Sir, do you have plans to see Mr. Gromyko in the next few days?

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

I do not have any firm plans at this moment.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[LC]
Public Statements

March 21, 1975

NO. 162

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHIMON PERES
FOLLOWING THE EVENING MEETING
OF THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAMS
MARCH 20, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

We have had another meeting with the Israeli negotiating team and they presented to us the ideas and proposals of the Israeli Government in response to the proposals and ideas of the Egyptian side that I brought here. I am now leaving immediately for the airport and will go to Aswan and will be discussing these Israeli proposals with President Sadat and his advisers.

Thank you.

QUESTION: New proposals? Are they new proposals?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think there are some new ideas, yes.

QUESTION: Is an agreement close, Sir? Would you say that it was closer?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not want to speculate. I will be back, I hope, tomorrow and I will be able to give a better assessment then.
Thank you.

DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:

We gave the complete proposal of the Israeli Cabinet to Dr. Kissinger.

QUESTION: Were there amendments to the original Israeli guidelines for a settlement?

DEFENSE MINISTER PERES: We have concluded our proposals this afternoon.

QUESTION: Is the gap closing? Is the gap very wide? Has it narrowed somewhat?

DEFENSE MINISTER PERES: Can I see from here up to Cairo how many gaps are there on the way? I wouldn't guess.

QUESTION: Did Dr. Kissinger raise any of his own ideas?

DEFENSE MINISTER PERES: Well, it is a dialogue and both sides are suggesting and questioning and answering, as the nature of things are.

- 2 -

PR #162

10

**QUESTION:** Has he introduced American ideas?

**DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:** Well, how can I speak for the United States? But, usually it is a negotiation, a clarification, and it works in a way of conversations, you know.

**QUESTION:** When do you expect him back tomorrow?

**DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:** I hope as early as possible. Before Shabbat comes in. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 20, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

America must adjust to turbulent global economic events. The world has moved from a period of slow economic growth in 1971 through a two-year expansionary boom to a sudden and pervasive recession. Recent events have caused the United States, as well as other countries, to reappraise international economic policies.

This, the third annual International Economic Report, describes the very difficult situation confronting us. It also reflects the progress made toward achieving our goal of an open world economy to serve the interdependent needs of all countries.

In 1974, most of the world's economies were beset by problems flowing from the unprecedented combination of recession and inflation. Additional pressures, including precipitous increases in energy costs and disappointing food harvests further strained the world economy, particularly in the areas of trade and monetary flows and adjustments. Moreover, these factors contributed to the trend towards increasing economic nationalism which could frustrate our desire for an open world economy.

In recent years, many governments have elected more direct involvement in economic activities, notably through restrictive supply and pricing practices and, sometimes, by the expropriation of foreign investment. When governments manipulate international markets to maximize short-term benefits, they often do so at the expense of others and, ultimately, of themselves. Improved living standards and a more peaceful world are the rewards of an open world economy based on international cooperation. Such rewards are too great to allow short-sighted distractions to alter our course.

Building effective economic institutions and policies in today's economic environment is more difficult, but also more necessary, than ever. Unless we act constructively, energy and food problems, growing economic nationalism, the possibility of increased protection for trade, and the prospects of world recession and unemployment will jeopardize the world cooperation developed after World War II.

The United States does not and cannot govern the world economy. But it should fulfill its responsibility as an economic leader among nations. The Administration recognizes this responsibility. We have taken steps to turn the difficult food, energy, trade and investment issues into positive opportunities for achieving cooperation with trading partners and coordination between the Nation's domestic and international economic policies. Specifically, the Trade Act of 1974 -- which exemplified constructive cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches -- reflects the U.S. commitment to an open and equitable world trading system.

more

(OVER)

2

The World Food Conference, proposed by the United States, set in motion international activities to improve world food reserves, agricultural assistance, crop information systems and increased food production. At the time I signed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 which authorized the collection and analysis of data on foreign investment in the United States, I reaffirmed American support for the operation of free market forces to direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive way. Therefore, we will oppose any new restriction on foreign investment in the United States except where absolutely necessary on national security grounds or to protect an essential national interest.

The goal of normalization of economic relations with the Communist countries has been reaffirmed. America also has continued its commitment to help the less developed countries. Moreover, we have proposed that an International Monetary Fund trust be established to provide special assistance to the least developed countries. We will shortly implement a generalized system of preferences in trading with less developed countries. We are also continuing our cooperative efforts to achieve equitable treatment for U.S. investment abroad.

Recently, I sent to the Congress a comprehensive energy and economic program. It is designed to reduce our dependence on imported oil. The plan provides incentives to increase domestic energy production and conserve energy use. The United States is meanwhile developing joint policies with other major oil-consuming countries aiming at increased resource development and more efficient use of energy. The major consuming countries must act jointly to build a constructive relationship with the oil producing nations. Such actions are essential to restore the international confidence in adequate and reliable energy sources.

These interrelated economic activities are aimed at achieving an improved international economic system. They are part of a balanced policy. They also accentuate the positive initiatives being taken to cope with the specialized problems of food, assistance to less developed countries and East-West economic relations.

The United States firmly believes that our own problems, and those of the rest of the world, can be dealt with most effectively through international cooperation. We lead in the pursuit of peace. Therefore, our motivating principles, our standards of conduct and the guidelines we set for the conduct of international economic development are ever more crucial to our national well-being, and that of the world.

GERALD R. FORD

THE WHITE HOUSE,

MARCH 20, 1975

[L.C]

Public Statements

March 21, 1975

No. 164

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING A MEETING OF
THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAMS
JERUSALEM
MARCH 21, 1975

I am running out of variations of these formulations, but I have brought the Egyptian counter-suggestions to the Israeli proposals of yesterday to the Israeli negotiating team. It is my understanding that there will be a Cabinet meeting in a little while at which these Egyptian ideas will be discussed and after that I will meet with the negotiating team again.

**QUESTION:** Are you prepared to say now that an agreement is 'close'?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am not prepared to say that, no.

**QUESTION:** Has the gap been significantly narrowed in the last twenty-four hours?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, as I have pointed out before, gaps can narrow and still remain and there is still a gap.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there are many reports that you are planning to leave the area in a day or two. Would you care to comment on that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Why don't we wait until the Cabinet meets?

**************

PRESS
STATEMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF

March 23, 1975

NO. 166

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK RABIN OF ISRAEL
UPON THE SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE
BEN GURION AIRPORT
JERUSALEM
MARCH 23, 1975

PRIME MINISTER RABIN:

Mr. Secretary, I have come to see you off on your way back to Washington as an expression on behalf of the Government of Israel and the people of Israel for the special, unique relations that have existed and will continue to exist between our two countries. I believe that the relations between your country and our country have been based on many common concepts and interests, and I am sure that what has been done in twenty-six years will continue to be developed.

I have come here, Mr. Secretary, to express our deep appreciation to you. I know you, for many years, from my term as Ambassador of Israel to the United States. I know you as Secretary of State and especially in the last efforts to move this area from war towards peace. I know that you have done more than a human being can do in the efforts to move from war towards peace. I am sorry that the present efforts to bring about an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel have been suspended. I am sure that the United States and you will continue to find every possible option, every avenue, to move, or to help the parties to move, from war to peace.

Please accept our great respect, appreciation and admiration for what you have done.

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Thank you. Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of my colleagues, let me express our appreciation for your consideration in coming to the airport to see us off. We have worked together for two weeks in the traditional spirit of friendship to move this area towards a peace that no people needs more than the people of Israel, gathered here after two thousand years of dispersion and a generation of struggle. This is a sad day for America which has invested much hope and faith, and we know it is a sad day also for Israel which needs and wants peace so badly. But the necessities that brought about this effort continue and the need to move towards peace cannot be abandoned. We will now have to look for different methods and new forums, but, in any event, the United States will do its utmost to contribute to a just and lasting peace in this area. We have had no other goal except to enable the young peoples in this area to grow up without the fear of war. And, as we leave, we wish the people of Israel all the best. And I

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Public Statements

March 22, 1975

No. 165

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER SHIMON PERES
FOLLOWING AN EARLY MORNING MEETING OF
THE AMERICAN AND ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAMS

JERUSALEM

MARCH 22, 1975

**DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:** Well, as you know, we had an important and long Cabinet meeting this afternoon. Afterwards we have reported to Dr. Kissinger about the deliberations in our Cabinet session, and we went into great details about the many and complicated problems ahead of us, and since today is Friday night we have decided to continue tomorrow. I hope the Secretary will remain so we shall be able to deal with the very serious matter in a relaxed and thoughtful way tomorrow night.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Peres, are the talks deadlocked? Have you hit a really serious snag?

**DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:** I would not like to conclude the negotiations as long as they go on. Let us be a little bit patient and not run ahead of time, neither with guesses nor with conclusions.

**QUESTION:** Why the special session tonight, on Friday night?

**DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:** Basically, I believe because we are a democratic country and decisions are being taken by the Cabinet.

**QUESTION:** Could we get Dr. Kissinger's assessment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I agree with what the Defense Minister has said. We reviewed in great detail all the points that are involved in a potential agreement. We thought that both sides would benefit from a day of thinking over where we stand, and we are going to meet again tomorrow evening and continue our discussions.

**QUESTION:** Secretary Kissinger, how do you react to these tales of deadlock? How would you characterize where it stands?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would say that over the recent week the positions of the two sides have come closer to each other. Both sides have made a serious effort to take into account the considerations of the other, but a gap remains and, of course, as long as a gap remains there remains a lot of work to be done.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to continue with the work? Do you plan to keep going, keep going to Aswan, keep up the shuttle?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I plan to continue the shuttle as long as I think there is a possibility of bridging the gap.

**QUESTION:** And do you think so now, Sir?

[LJ]

PR #165

-2-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think so now, and we will continue our discussions tomorrow.

**DEFENSE MINISTER PERES:** Goodnight, gentlemen. Go and have a rest.

*****

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 23, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT
AND
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SOUTH LAWN

8:21 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Secretary, it is a great privilege for me to welcome you back on an extraordinarily difficult mission on behalf of the United States and the problems that are in the Middle East.

I know that you made a maximum effort. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our control, it did not turn out the way we wanted it.

But let me say, the United States will continue to emphasize our desire to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East by working with one country, other countries, and all countries.

It is in the national, as well as in the international, interest that we do everything we can with the emphasis on peace. Although we have, on a temporary basis hopefully, not achieved all that we had desired, I continue to be an optimist, that the good judgment and the wise decisions of all parties will result in the ultimate objective of peace in the Middle East and its ramifications on a worldwide basis.

Henry, would you like to add anything?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. President, I very much appreciate your greeting me here as you sent me off from here.

The necessities that produced the mission continue and the need for a lasting peace in the Middle East remains.

As the President pointed out, the United States remains ready to work with the parties, and other interested countries, to promote a peace of justice in the Middle East.

Thank you.

END

(AT 8:24 P.M. EDT)

REPORT ON BIPARTISAN CONGRESSIONAL MEETING

March 24, 1975

When the President entered the room with Dr. Kissinger, the attendees stood and applauded.

The President began the meeting by saying that he did not intend to assess blame for the suspension of the Middle East peace talks. The President then gave a short history of recent efforts to help Israel and Egypt to make another step toward peace. The President said that he was greatly disappointed that the talks were suspended without agreement.

The President said the parties involved now will assess how to proceed toward peace. The President praised Dr. Kissinger for his skill and patience, and said that everyone was grateful for his efforts.

Dr. Kissinger concluded that the U. S. will now consider how to further the cause of peace, including the possibility of negotiations at Geneva.

At this point, the President announced that the United States will now re-examine the Middle East situation and will keep Congress fully informed on the results of the examination.

-3-

The Congressional leaders who spoke were unanimous in their
praise of the President and Dr. Kissinger for the latest effort to take
another step toward peace in the Middle East and the Congressional
leaders promised their continued bipartisan support for Middle East
efforts.

At one point Speaker Albert said that on behalf of the Democratic
leadership he wanted to tell Dr. Kissinger "you have outdone yourself
to bring this thing to a conclusion." Everyone present applauded.

The President informed the Leaders that, as the result of the
situation in which we now find ourselves, he has ordered a reassess-
ment of the United States' policy toward the Middle East in all its
aspects and toward all countries of the area. He told the Leaders that
he would stay in touch with them as the policy review proceeded.

March 24, 1975

INTERVIEW OF THE PRESIDENT
BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF HEARST NEWSPAPERS
THE OVAL OFFICE

4:05 P.M. EDT

QUESTION: I will start off by asking, do you think -- and this is an anticipatory thing -- that the action of the Congress, in effect, not going forward and not sustaining the country's commitments had any effect in the Middle East, or the failure of the Congress not to put up the aid, doesn't that cast some question on how good your commitments are as President?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe the failure of the Congress to fund the programs in Cambodia and in South Vietnam undoubtedly had some impact on the Middle East. It is my impression that some of the news media in Israel have indicated that was a factor. How big a factor it is is difficult to measure.

QUESTION: Henry himself didn't say any more than one guy said: "Look, your word is no damn good anymore."

THE PRESIDENT: I have heard that said, but, of course, I wasn't there, and I am told the news media in Israel have inferred that must have been a factor.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have said you were going to reassess or should reassess Indochina policy and today Ron, speaking for you, said that there would be a re-examination of the Middle East policy.

In the light of these events and past events, where does this leave the Nixon doctrine? Is it dead or is it badly damaged, because that is a global doctrine, as we understood.

Page 2

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have to continue to have a global doctrine. I strongly believe in the United States having an international policy. I said that out in South Bend last Monday, and I reiterate it here, but within that framework, I think we have to take a new look at how our best interests can be protected and how we can continue to show leadership. Until we have had that opportunity, I can't give you any specifics.

But it is not going to be a retreat. It is going to be how we best utilize our resources to protect our own interests and maintain our world leadership.

QUESTION: You don't feel that the so-called Nixon doctrine has been negated by the failure of Congress to follow through on Cambodia and Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT: Not at all. It is just a matter of how you implement it with these changed circumstances.

QUESTION: Out of this, could we expect there might be a revision which could be called a Ford doctrine?

THE PRESIDENT: I would rather wait and see how it develops, Bill. I can assure you to the extent that we can control it, it will be a forward looking 1975 extension of what I think was a sound policy, foreign policywise, of the Nixon Administration.

QUESTION: This kind of presupposes, as conditions and times change, even doctrines can change, too.

THE PRESIDENT: An implementation of it, yes.

QUESTION: Mr. President, can you effectively pursue a global policy if Congress continues to tie your hands?

THE PRESIDENT: It makes it a great deal more difficult, but I happen to think that the Congress will respond. They have been slow, and they have hamstrung us in some instances, but as the circumstances develop in Southeast Asia and the problems we have had in the Middle East sink in, it is my judgment that the Congress will take another look and respond accordingly.

QUESTION: And show a greater understanding of the realities of the world situation.

THE PRESIDENT: I am confident of that. It may be sort of a lull for the time being, but everybody who was realistic in Congress knows we cannot just pull in our horns and go back to the old concepts. They have to know that the United States must play a role on an international basis.

QUESTION: In other words, it is not going to be a runaway, isolationist Congress that is doing this?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they have taken some action, or failed to act, that could lead you to believe that, but I say again, on second thought, I can't believe that that is what they are going to do on a long-range basis.

Page 4

QUESTION: Is Senator Mansfield going to have any second thoughts on this?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mike has strong feelings about Southeast Asia. Mike, of course, says he has been misinterpreted in relationship to NATO. I will accept his explanation.

On the other hand, Mike has been very helpful on some other things. On the Cyprus problem, Mike has been extremely helpful. Mike, of course, took the leadership with Hugh Scott, and they passed a resolution on the floor of the Senate today commending Henry, showing, I think, disappointment in the outcome.

So, except for Southeast Asia, where he feels very strongly, I think Mike can be counted on to be helpful.

QUESTION: Mr. President, how do you believe that the peace efforts in the Middle East can now be best pursued?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe we have any choice now other than to go to Geneva. I regret it, but without having been successful with the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, but they, having failed, there appears to be no alternative except to go to Geneva.

QUESTION: There is no prospect of making any further progress through diplomatic channels before Geneva?

THE PRESIDENT: As of Monday morning, March 24th, I see no prospect for any other initiatives except to go to Geneva.

QUESTION: The report from the Middle East now, they are saying that Russia is expected to assume a much more active role in Middle East affairs, and possibly even launch a diplomatic offensive against Israel.

Will you be in touch with Chairman Brezhnev in an effort to avert the danger of another war?

Page 5

THE PRESIDENT: I will certainly be in contact with all parties in an effort to avert another war in the Middle East. We expect to have this reassessment -- it is started already -- completed within a reasonably short period of time because time is of the essence.

In the meantime, we are hoping that all parties keep their cool and avert a war in the first place, and take this new tack aimed at solving the problem.

I think we have to be very pragmatic. Most of the other parties are committed to the 1967 borders, which is from Israel's point of view, something that they can hardly accept and certainly will oppose.

QUESTION: Do you think that Israel should be pre-pared to take greater risks for peace in the long-term interests of its survival?

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to refer to the unfortunate developments of the last 72 hours. If they had been a bit more flexible, you can say a greater risk, I think in the longer run it would have been the best insurance for peace.

I think those kind of actions would have been real insurance for peace in the short-haul as well as in the long pull.

QUESTION: Is it too late for them to change their mind before the Geneva Peace Conference?

THE PRESIDENT: It doesn't look very optimistic.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in the event that Hue falls and Saigon is thoroughly threatened, would you consider in any way a last-ditch air strike assuming they were bunched up outside of Saigon?

THE PRESIDENT: Bob, the law says I can't.

QUESTION: Would you consider recommending that to Congress?

Page 6

THE PRESIDENT: We have not considered that as an option for obvious reasons. The law says it cannot be done. We certainly, in our reassessment of policies generally in Southeast Asia, will consider any options we have within the law. I would not want to comment on whether we would go beyond that.

QUESTION: Just to go back a second, you cannot say it was Kissinger's fault? He failed to bring them together, you can say that. Do you see a change in his role -- Dr. Kissinger's role -- now that things have gone badly for him?

THE PRESIDENT: I think his individual role as a negotiator between the parties on a step-by-step process has to be changed. In going to Geneva, Henry, or our representative, will be an active participant, but it is not the same as it was under the step-by-step process.

QUESTION: There is no more shuttlecock, then?

THE PRESIDENT: No. It will be in Geneva and whatever happens there is quite different from what has been going on.

QUESTION: Mr. President, if Israel was subjected to a major Arab attack this year, would you endeavor to keep it as adequately supplied with the means to defend itself as it had in October of 1973?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I should comment on a matter of such delicacy at this point.

Page 7

QUESTION: Mr. President, on balance, even though an accord was not reached at this point, was or was not the prospect of war decreased by what has taken place in the last couple of weeks?

We were asking Ron this morning about it. You were pretty pessimistic about the imminence of war in the Middle East. Isn't the situation better than it was then? That is what I am asking.

THE PRESIDENT: My reaction -- and I don't know what Ron said -- my beeling is that the potential volatility in that area has increased as a result of the nonagreement between Israel and Egypt.

QUESTION: You don't think that the fact that they could talk this long and so seriously with so much commitment, even though they didn't get a final agreement, didn't improve the situation?

THE PRESIDENT: Not on the subject of potential military conflict. I would think just the opposite.

Did Ron and I agree?

MR. NESSEN: I said we hoped to avert a war in the Middle East.

QUESTION: I was asking a different question as to your judgment on it now -- whether it had improved or decreased.

QUESTION: If the Soviet action in the Middle East now should encourage, consciously or otherwise, the Arabs to attack Israel, what effect would that have on detente?

THE PRESIDENT: The relationship that we have with the Soviet Union I think could be helpful in avoiding the stimulation of any parties in the Middle East to initiate any military activity. I think detente in this situation would be a benefit rather than a liability.

How it could be used to keep peace there is a matter as we move along in the months ahead.

Page 8

QUESTION: The Soviets, I believe, would like to have a summit meeting on the European Security Conference this summer, and that is directly tied, at least in the minds of the European allies, with the Soviets showing a great sense of responsibility in respect to danger spots in the area.

Wouldn't what they do in the Middle East have some effect on whether there is going to be a European Security Conference or summit meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't see a necessary relationship between the problems of the Middle East and the European Security Conference. Hopefully, progress will be made and some time this summer there will be a signing and potentially a summit. But, I really don't see any direct linkage between the Middle East and the European Security Conference.

QUESTION: Mr. President, if you can say, have you had any reason to be encouraged by the Soviet attitude in the wake of the Middle East failure? Have you had any kind of a sign that they are not going to take undue advantage of the situation?

THE PRESIDENT: As of this moment, Bill, I have seen no official action. I read of some Soviet newspaper account where they had listed the various problems we have had the last ten days, but there have been no official communications.

QUESTION: This is a domestic story question. There was a piece in the Washington Post this morning-- I am sure you saw it--that you are going to have a completely new approach to the 1976 nomination as opposed to President Nixon's approaches. Could you outline that a bit for us?

THE PRESIDENT: I would like to go back to a speech I made in Chicago a year ago, or about a year ago, as I recall, where I said when I was Vice President that the Republican candidate for the Presidency ought to tie his campaign directly to and operate under the Republican National Committee. I believe that today as President.

[Lc]

Page 9

The question was raised last week about when I was going to start setting up an organization to get the nomination and to carry on if I got the nomination. I think it is premature for me to start in a political way seeking the nomination for this reason:

Number one, the minute I do, decisions I make here in the White House in this interim will be alleged to be politically oriented rather than calling them as I see them on a nonpolitical basis.

I think the time will come when we must begin to think about delegates and about primaries and so forth.

When we do it, it will be announced. We will probably delay it for some time. We haven't made a decision as to the date, but it will be a national program.

It will be separate from the National Committee prior to the convention, but it will be folded into the National Committee after the national convention.

QUESTION: There is a general feeling that any candidate for the Presidency has to get started by July of this year, from a fund-raising standpoint. Does this fit more or less into your timetable as to when this would begin?

Page 10

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think July 1 is any magic
date.

QUESTION: I mean, sometime in the mid-summer.

THE PRESIDENT: But I would think that sometime in
the later summer would be a good target date, Bill.

QUESTION: In that connection, the National
Committee is quite divided on the question of whether they
should take advantage of the public financing and you
have undoubtedly resolved that question in your mind
since they are on record.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean taking the money for the
convention, itself?

QUESTION: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: In that case, I think the decision
of the National Committee is one that we would abide by.

QUESTION: Mr. President, if Congress continues
to make it impossible for the Government to fulfill the
commitments that were made to South Vietnam in the past
peace agreements, what effect do you think that will have on
the credibility of our commitments to our other allies,
especially those in Europe?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe that the failure of
the Congress to respond as of this date to my request for
military and economic assistance in Indochina will have an
immediate impact on our relations with our NATO or Western
European allies.

I believe we have to let some time pass to see
whether they are going to raise questions. If we don't
support our allies in Southeast Asia, how can they believe
we will support our allies in Europe? I think it is
premature to make that judgment.

I am not sure, but I think undoubtedly they have
some questions in their minds, but they have not expressed
them to us.

Page 11

QUESTION: Did you and the Secretary, sir, discuss Portugal with them at all, or was it all Middle East?

QUESTION: Bill and Joe were just in Portugal several weeks ago.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Secretary did not stop there, but while he was gone, we have been working on the situation as properly as we can. When he returned, of course, it was a matter of discussion last night and again this morning, not in the meeting with the leadership, but as a subsequent discussion I had with him personally.

QUESTION: That is a difficult problem.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a very difficult situation and I am sure we are not the only country that is deeply concerned about it.

QUESTION: It involves NATO and the whole operation. There are a couple of parties that were middle of the road, or to the right of middle of the road, and some are to the left of the Communists, and the extreme left ones wouldn't have affected anything, they had no place to go, but they knocked out a couple of the ones to the right.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that I should be on the record making any comments.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have warned against the dangers of a new isolationism. Why would it be dangerous for the American people to get the notion that their fate is unrelated to the fate of other freedom-loving people?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have to go back to the 1920s and 1930s and see the tragedy of being so America-oriented. Failure to take a broader view certainly encouraged some of the activities of the aggressors in Europe and certainly encouraged, I think, the aggressors in the Pacific.

I lived through that era in college and law school and somehow, the American people, with limited exceptions, thought that two oceans were the barricades that protected us and it was so short-sighted.

Page 12

If we had been broader in our view, we might have
been very helpful in preventing the outbreak of World War II.
But that was a tough environment. I remember it and it just
contributed, I think, to the appetites of those that thought
America wouldn't participate.

QUESTION: Isn't there a tendency to forget those
lessons today?

THE PRESIDENT: It appears in some areas, but I don't think we are in that situation now. But it seems to me we have to meet the challenge head-on and the sooner we meet it, the better.

QUESTION: I think the kids who participated in
Vietnam and those who didn't have to go, I think they are
inclined to be more isolationist than our generation was.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, Bill. But you go back
and refresh your memory, as I have on occasion. In the
early 1930s, and even up to about 1938 or 1939, most young
people -- and I was in college and in law school in that
period -- didn't really care. I think the first feeling or
the real shock I had was when I was driving along the high-
way -- I recall this vividly -- and I had the radio on. I
heard Winston Churchill give that famous speech, and
believe me, that shocked me, and I suspect it shocked others.

QUESTION: Selective Service won by one vote, as
you will recall.

Page 13

QUESTION: This generation didn't get the kick about that speech. They wouldn't know this business of standing off aggression has been the policy of every Administration -- Republican and Democrat -- from that time to this. They just thought we are biting off more than we can chew, as though it was a new policy.

THE PRESIDENT: Maybe this disappointment in the Middle East will have a catalytic effect.

QUESTION: It might. That is a thought.

QUESTION: I would like to ask you a couple of domestic questions before our time runs out. Could you give us an updated idea of your own feeling about the way this is going at the moment?

THE PRESIDENT: You are talking about the domestic economy?

QUESTION: Yes. Are the signs of reduced inflation and whatever improvement there might be enough to make you more encouraged than you have been recently?

THE PRESIDENT: We have become very encouraged by the trend both in the Wholesale Price Index and the Consumer Price Index. The results so far for the last several months have been better than we anticipated. The next two will be very indicative, if they continue to show improvement.

The last Wholesale Price Index was minus .8, and the last CPI was .6 for the second month in a row. If they continue to show the trend they are on, we will have made substantial headway.

QUESTION: It will mean you are on your way.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but we have to continue the battle, Bill. That is the problem.

Unemploymentwise, I believe we are probably going to have a few more months of disappointment there. But as soon as we get this inventory liquidation out of our system and the trend there has been unbelievable -- the curve there is the greatest it has been I think since

Page 14

we started keeping records -- but the quicker it happens, the better, so you get some balance, and between the buyer and production, the quicker we will start on our way up in getting employment back in the right direction.

I have a feeling that the signs are better than what they really are showing on a graph, as I listen to people, and as I read the trends in consumer confidence, the one from the University of Michigan of a week or so ago. I talked to several of your colleagues over the weekend, at the Gridiron, and people who came in from different communities said their local polls were more encouraging.

So, when you put all of the signs together, the improvement in the battle against inflation, the reduced interest rates, both short-term and long-term, and the public confidence polls, I am encouraged.

QUESTION: Now, an important element in all of this, I think, is this tax bill that you are going to get this week, hopefully. Can you give us any indication, if that bill in conference is stripped of its most objectionable Easter basket gimmicks that you would take an exception to -- but is uncomfortably higher than the figure you originally asked -- do you feel that you would still have to veto it or would it be worth the gamble if more tax reductions would do the job.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a very good question.

QUESTION: I am taking $25 billion against your $18 or $19 billion.

THE PRESIDENT: Just for illustrative purposes, and with no commitment, it is more important for us at this stage to strip it of the various amendments that over the long pull could be more harmful than a one-shot added reduction.

What I am saying is we could take a higher figure of tax reduction for one year if we could get rid of all the extraneous amendments.

In other words, if they put a lot of amendments on which are, over the long pull, more harmful to the economy --

QUESTION: And more costly?

THE PRESIDENT: That is right. That would be
the easiest way for me to veto the bill.

QUESTION: But if they took them off in conference,
as I gather there is a fair chance, at least many of them,
would the dollars, would the excess dollar figure
still be so critical in your mind when even economists
will differ on whether $10 billion more or $5 billion
more is the right figure?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that we could compromise
the dollar figure more easily than we can the ill-advised
amendments that in the long pull would have a much more
adverse impact.

Page 16

QUESTION: And keep those other things for the permanent things?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

QUESTION: Taxes are only for one year and those other things might go on.

THE PRESIDENT: There is such a mixed bag. Some of them are permanent and some of them are not.

QUESTION: I wanted to ask a question along the lines of the economic situation.

Have you any doubt, Mr. President, that the basic economic soundness of the country is such that we will have a restoration of prosperity within the next few years?

THE PRESIDENT: There is no question about it in my mind. I am a complete optimist. I believe the economic strength of this country is so good that if we act with a reasonable degree of responsibility, we are bound to have good economic conditions over the next decade.

QUESTION: I wanted to ask one question, if I may, about the Cambodian situation. Everybody seems to be concerned about what may happen if the Communists go in there and take over. I wondered whether it would be practicable or feasible or make any sense if in order to avoid a blood bath in Phnom Penh when the Communists take over, would you favor a U.N. peace-keeping force being stationed there to assure a peaceful transfer of power and safe conduct for those who might wish to leave?

THE PRESIDENT: If that could be achieved, I certainly would support it. Anything from a humanitarian point of view there if the Communists prevailed or anything to save lives and anything to save the country would get my personal support.

QUESTION: Would you be prepared to seek the support of Russia and China and the other permanent members of the Security Council for such a move?

Page 17

THE PRESIDENT: I would do anything that is responsible to achieve the saving of lives and the preservation of a country from devastation.

I must add, as a postscript though, we intend to support the government and I am not one who is going to sell them short with the great effort they are making at the present time.

QUESTION: If it reaches the point where they are prepared to facilitate a transfer of power with the understanding that there isn't slaughter in the cabins, it seems to me that perhaps the Security Council could do something through the use of a U.N. police force. Using that as a hypothetical set of circumstances, I would be willing to use the U.N., or any other force, that would save lives and preserve Cambodia as a country.

QUESTION: If this is a Communist victory, if it should turn into one, which is the direction it is going, I can't see China or Russia either going along with them and backing away and letting the U.N. go in. They would have vetoed it in Korea, a thing which they have always regretted, and I don't think they will want that again.

QUESITON: They might be willing to do it to facilitate the transfer of power.

QUESTION: The U.N. has never been in there.

QUESTION: I have two quick questions on Executive privilege which is a kind of thicket that everybody gets into.

THE PRESIDENT: We have avoided it so far, Bill.

QUESTION: You have one request from the Church CIA Committee now for information, and can you say yet what you plan to do about those?

THE PRESIDENT: Bill, it is one request, but it is a massive request.

Page 18

QUESTION: They want a lot.

THE PRESIDENT: They want everything, literally, from the day the CIA was established. It is a massive request. We are going over each item and I can't give you an answer at the present time.

QUESTION: The other thing is the broad question of a permanent policy on the whole question. What should be the parameters of Executive privilege? It has been suggested in Congress and elsewhere, that perhaps the machinery ought to be defined by statute to say, perhaps, that Executive privilege should be limited to those things which only relate to the responsibilities of the Presidential office and to eliminate such things as Watergate and politics from Executive privilege.

Do you think there should be any attempt to define this? It is not defined now and it isn't even in the Constitution, to simplify it for each President?

THE PRESIDENT: First, there was an important decision by the Supreme Court which validated Executive privilege in, I think, the Nixon-Sirica case -- I have forgotten the exact title of it -- the Supreme Court decision is that it is a valid concept. There have been, in recent years, some attempts in Congress to enact legislation that would define what is Executive privilege and what isn't, but it is my recollection that when they got down to writing the language, it was impossible to take into consideration all of the contingencies.

If it was possible, I think I would go along with it, but a lot of experts and the Congress and a great many lawyers have tried to draw language that would make it more certain on both sides, and they practically have thrown up their hands and said, "You have to do it on a case-by-case basis."

Page 19

QUESTION: And let it go to the courts?

THE PRESIDENT: I have talked to the Attorney General about it, and they are trying to get their ideas together in case we do have to face up to it.

QUESTION: I wondered if you had asked anybody to really take a hard look at it.

THE PRESIDENT: We have asked the new Attorney General to do so. He is a very eminent legal scholar.

QUESTION: Mr. President, I am very deeply impressed by your kindness in fielding these kinds of questions that we have.

THE PRESIDENT: You have asked a couple of tough ones. When will this be published?

QUESTION: Later in the week.

QUESTION: Do you have any contact whatever with your predecessor, and does he call you?

THE PRESIDENT: I talk to him infrequently, and every time I have, Ron has announced it. When was the last time? There was some occasion.

MR. NESSEN: I think you called on his birthday.

THE PRESIDENT: I called on his birthday, and I don't recall talking to him since then.

QUESTION: Since you are going to be in California next week, is there any possibility you will stop by and see him?

THE PRESIDENT: I have not made a final decision to go to California.

QUESTION: Well, we assumed you were going.

THE PRESIDENT: We are establishing contingency plans, and we may stay here, but we have no plans to see him while I am out there, if we do get there. It would be nicer in Washington, you know.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 26, 1975

No. 172

#51

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MARCH 26, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to begin with a brief statement concerning the suspension of the Middle East Peace talks:

The step-by-step approach pursued by the United States attempted to separate the Middle East problem into individual and therefore manageable segments. Now that approach has suffered a setback and the Middle East issues have to be dealt with comprehensively, under more difficult circumstances.

A moment of potentially great danger is not the time to assess blame between the parties, or to indulge in recrimination. We need a calm appraisal of the situation and the United States policy best suited to the new conditions.

Let me sum up the United States position:

--With the end of the step-by-step approach, the United States faces a period of more complicated international diplomacy. Consequently, a reassessment of policy is essential. This reassessment has been ordered by the President.

PR #172

2

-- The dangers which produced the need for progress towards peace are still with us. The United States, therefore, is determined to continue the search for peace in the Middle East. It is prepared to go to Geneva, and will be in touch with the Co-Chairmen of the Conference -- the USSR -- in the near future.

-- The United States is prepared to consider any other approach acceptable to the parties.

-- The United States remains fully committed to the survival of Israel.

-- The search for peace can be nurtured only in an atmosphere of calm. The parties involved in the Middle East conflict thus have a responsibility to moderate words and deeds, and to refrain from threatening acts.

-- All outside powers have a responsibility to exercise restraint and to follow a course of moderation.

We face a difficult situation in the Middle East and throughout the world. The times demand a renewed sense of national purpose.

We must understand that peace is indivisible. The United States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere.

We cannot master our future except as a united people.

PR #172

3

Our energies should be directed, not at recrimination about the past, but toward a vigorous and constructive search for a lasting peace. And to this, the Administration is dedicated.

Now I'll take questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, with respect to American policy and what you have just said regarding selective reliability: in 1965 the United States equated the defense of South Vietnam with the commitment to NATO.

Now it appears to be equating the additional aid to South Viet-Nam with regard to the Middle East, and so forth.

Do you feel that during the past five years, the policy and the techniques of diplomacy which we have pursued have been wrong? Have the conditions been wrong? Or what has happened?

A As I understand it, you are asking two separate questions:

One is the policy, the relationship between Indochina and other parts of the world.

And the second is whether the policies pursued in the last five years have been wrong.

First, let me talk --

PR #172

4

Q I didn't mean "policies," I meant "strategies."

A Well, that's a distinction without much difference

Q In what way?

A Well, if the strategy is wrong -- I don't see how you can have the right strategy and the wrong policy -- or the wrong strategy and the right policy.

So let me answer your question:

With respect to Indochina, we are not equating the intrinsic importance of each part of the world, and we are not saying that every part of the world is strategically as important to the United States as any other part of the world. The problem we face in Indochina today is an elementary question of what kind of a people we are.

For fifteen years, we have been involved in encouraging the people of Viet-Nam to defend themselves against what we conceived as external danger.

In 1973, we negotiated a settlement in which we withdrew our forces and, in return, achieved the release of our prisoners.

This settlement, it is well to recall now, was -- while we were negotiating it -- generally criticized for our holding out for stronger terms. The fact of the matter

PR #172

5

is that now that we have withdrawn our forces and have
obtained the release of our prisoners, there was never any
question that the United States would continue to give
economic and military aid to Viet-Nam. And what we face
now is whether the United States -- not just "will withdraw
its forces" which we achieved -- and not just "will stop
the, or end the loss of American lives" -- but whether it
will deliberately destroy an ally by withholding aid from it
in its moment of extremity.

This is a fundamental question of how we are viewed
by all other people, and it has nothing to do with the
question of whether we should ever have gotten involved there
in the first place.

Now with respect to whether the basic policies have
been correct in the last five years:

That, of course, is a rather sweeping question
which would require an answer that could easily occupy the
better part of this press conference.

With respect to Indochina, I would urge people
to look at the newspapers, and the public debate during the
period that these agreements were being negotiated, to see

#172

6

what the imperatives were on the Administration in
negotiating these settlements.

And that general conviction was that the
United States had done enough in expending American
lives and that the people of Viet-Nam should have an
opportunity to defend themselves without American support.
There was never any proposition that the United States
should withdraw and cut off aid.

And these agreements were negotiated on the
assumption that there would be -- that the United States
would continue economic and military aid to South Viet-
Nam -- and also, that there would be some possibility
of enforcing the agreements.

And this is the basic problem with the policy
in Viet-Nam.

With respect to other policies, I would rather
answer specific questions.

Yes.

PR #172

7

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up on that question, it appears that the Congress, at least, has felt that the Nixon doctrine has outlived itself, and that now supplies will not be provided as have been committed by the United States in the past. Do you plan to reassess the alternatives, as a result of the demise of the Nixon doctrine, particularly in reference to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Thailand?

A We have to face the fact that there are many countries in the world which have no conceivable opportunity to defend themselves without American economic or military assistance. And therefore if it becomes our national policy that countries must at some point be able to rely entirely on their resources, we will have brought about a massive change in the international environment that in time will fundamentally threaten the security of the United States, as well as the security of many of our friends.

The so-called Nixon doctrine was based on the assumption that the United States would help those countries that were prepared to help themselves. If this is no longer true, then we are likely to find a massive shift in the foreign policies of many countries, and a fundamental threat over a period of time to the security of the

PR #172

8

United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, how serious did you find
in your Middle East negotiations the concern on the Arab,
on the Egyptian and the Israeli sides, the problems you
are facing in getting aid for Indochina? Was this a factor
in the breakdown of the talks?

A I cannot assign any particular cause for
the breakdown of the talks. There is no question that
events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indochina had an
effect on the conduct of the negotiations. On the part of
our friends, it raised the question of the durability of
our assurances. And since one of our problems was to sub-
stitute American assurances for some physical terrain
features, this was a factor.

On the part of those who were threatening our
friends, there was the feeling that perhaps concessions
were less necessary, because the drift of events was in
any case favorable.

Nevertheless, I think that the major reason for
the breakdown of the negotiations was intrinsic to the
negotiations themselves; but the surrounding circumstances
were certainly not favorable.

Q Mr. Secretary, to pursue the question of

PR #172

9

the interrelationship of Indochina and other portions of
the world, where does the Administration go from here?
It is clearly at loggerheads with the Congress on this
fundamental question. The United States policy, according
to the Administration, apparently is immobilized diplomatica
on Indochina. Is there any way over this barrier except
a constant head-on clash with Congress?

A I don't agree that United States policy
is immobilized over Indochina. There is a philosophical
disagreement which I have attempted to explain earlier.

I have believed ever since I came to Washington
that it is overwhelmingly in our national interest to put
the debate on Indochina behind us.

The Administration has proposed to the Congress
a three-year program for phasing out American military
aid to Viet-Nam, and which would, if the Congress and the
Administration can agree, remove this issue from the yearly
Congressional-Executive battles.

I believe, as I pointed out, that we face a
grave situation. The Administration cannot give up its
convictions simply for the sake of a technical compromise.
But we believe that this three-year program, if the levels
are adequate, might provide an opportunity to get the

PR #172

10

debate behind us.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the reassessment of U.S.
policy toward the whole Middle East primarily aimed at
prompting Israel to adopt a more relaxed or less intransigent
negotiating posture?

A At this moment, there are no negotiations
going on, and therefore we would have no concrete proposals
to make to Israel, even if Israel asked us what negotiating
posture it should adopt.

The assessment of our policy that is now going on
is made necessary by the new circumstances. Our policy
had been designed, as I pointed out in this statement, to
segment the issues into individual elements, to negotiate
each element separately, and therefore to permit each party
to adjust itself domestically and internationally to a
process of a gradual approach towards peace.

Now that this approach has to be abandoned, we
face an entirely new situation in which, in all probability,
all problems will have to be negotiated simultaneously,
and in which, instead of a forum in which Israel deals with
one Arab country through the mediation of the United States,
the strong probability is that Israel will have to deal

PR #172

11

with all Arab countries in a multilateral forum.

The assessment of our policy is not directed against Israel. It is not designed to induce Israel to alter any particular policy. It is designed to develop a position that the United States can take in order to prevent an increasing radicalization in the area, and an increasing tension, and above all, in order to avoid a war in which inevitably the United States would be involved at least indirectly, given the international circumstances.

Q. A very quick follow-up. You and your spokesmen have denied that this reassessment contemplates a cutoff, but I don't think anybody has denied that it might contemplate a reduction. Can you respond to that?

A. There is no level of aid right now that has been set for next year's -- for the next year. And therefore the question of a reduction is an entirely academic one.

We have before us an Israeli request of rather large size which at this moment is being staffed on the entirely technical level, and has been staffed on the entirely technical level for weeks.

It has not yet reached either my desk or the

PR #172

12

President's desk. We will make our decisions on aid to Israel on the basis of our national objectives and on the basis of the statement that I made here that we remain committed to the survival of Israel.

Of course whatever conclusions we come to will be submitted to the Congress, and the Congress can make its independent judgment.

We are not approaching the reassessment with an attitude of cutting aid. And we are approaching it with the attitude of looking at the over-all situation in the Middle East to determine what the best course might be.

Q Mr. Secretary, now that you have written an obituary on step-by-step negotiating, does that mean that you are writing off the possibility of unilateral American action in the Middle East? Are you now going to be walking step-by-step with the Soviet Union? What will be your approach?

A Our approach will be whatever is most likely to lessen the dangers of war and to produce steps towards peace.

As I pointed out in our statement, the United States is prepared to go to Geneva. The United States is prepared also to go along with any other approach that the parties may request of it. So we are not indicating

PR #172

13

on any particular approach. We will follow whatever approach
is most likely to be effective and is requested by the
parties. The obvious forum that is now open is Geneva,
but we are prepared to look at other approaches.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, could you
say when you go to Geneva, would it not be likely that the
talks would themselves become segmented into the various
problems, and that would provide an opportunity for the
United States or other parties to play a role in each
individual problem -- Israel-Egypt, Israel-Syria, Israel-
Jordan?

A If that is the turn that the negotiations
take, the United States will be prepared to participate
in it. The United States has no fixed idea on which course
to pursue.

At this moment, we have to consult with the other
parties, and we of course also have to consult now with
the co-chairman of the Geneva Conference.

The United States will do what is most likely to
reduce the danger of war and to promote peace, and if it
should turn out that separate negotiations develop at
Geneva, the United States will certainly support them.

PR #172

14

Q Mr. Secretary, it seems that --

A Go ahead, and then you.

Q You averted to difficulties in Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Indochina. One could add the dismemberment of Ethiopia by an Arab coalition, the sell-out of the Kurds, and so on. To what extent do you consider that this --

A An objective question. What do you want me to say, yes? [Laughter.]

Q Would this reflect what Dr. Schlesinger has described as a world-wide perception of American impotence?

A I have pointed out at many press conferences over the years that the central authority of a major country cannot be under persistent attack without ultimately paying a price in foreign policy.

We have gone through the experience of Viet-Nam, through the anguish of Watergate. And I think the cumulative effect of nearly a decade of domestic upheaval is beginning to pay -- to take its toll.

Foreign governments, when they deal with the United States, make a bet in their dealings on the constancy

PR #172

15

of American policy, and on the ability of the United States
to carry through on whatever it is we promise, or fail
to promise, or threaten. And this is one of the big problems
in foreign policy today. It is not a problem of the Congress
at this particular moment, because the Executive also shares
a responsibility for it over a period of a decade.

At this moment, it is senseless to try to assess
the blame. At this moment, the great need is to pull
together and to see whether we can restore a sense of national
purpose. And as far as the Administration is concerned,
we will do our utmost to do this in a cooperative spirit.

PR #172

16

Q Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that part of the national debate over Vietnam has come about because of what might be called the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel syndrome. And now you are suggesting that possibly with three more years of aid, the Indochina question could be more satisfactorily resolved. Isn't this just another way of buying yet another slice of time?

A Well, Mr. Koppel, my own personal conviction, about which I have left no question, is that the right way to do it is to vote annually what is necessary. There are some problems in the world that simply have no terminal date. And in Indochina, as long as the North Vietnamese are determined to attack, it is not responsible to say that there is an absolute date in which an end can be achieved. On the other hand -- given the very strong feelings in the Congress, given the cataclysmic, or the very dangerous, impact on the United States' position in the world, of destroying a country where we have lost 50,000 men, where we have fought for ten years, and which we, as a country, projected into this conflict -- we are prepared to go to a three-year program in which, with adequate aid, we believe that there is at least a chance

#172

17

that then, with the development of oil resources and
other factors, that this country could be put on a more
self-sustaining basis.

It is our offer, in order to take Vietnam out
of the national debate for this period, and in order
to avoid what we think would be a very grievous blow to
the United States.

Q Sir, in another part of the world, this
is a question about your projected trip to Latin America.
Is it still on, and what is the main purpose of the trip?
And whom do you expect to see there?

A Well, I have planned a trip to Latin
America for the last six months. And as I pointed out
in the speech in Houston a few weeks ago, the United
States attaches great importance to its relationships
with Latin America, with which we have had the longest
uninterrupted tradition of foreign policy in our history,
which is a part of the world which is in a position
somewhere between the less-developed nations and the
advanced nations, with which we share many cultural and
political traditions. And therefore we believe that
Western Hemisphere policy is a central part of our
overall policy and a test of our relationship to many of the
less-developed countries.

PR #172

18

Now, I am planning to go to -- I will definitely go to Latin America before the meeting of the OAS here in May. So I will definitely go in April. Given the various pressures that exist right now in Washington, I am not in a position to announce the exact date. But we will determine that within the next few days. But it is definite that I will go in April.

I am planning to visit Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile and Venezuela. And I plan to visit other Latin American countries later this year.

Q Mr. Secretary, if the Geneva Peace Conference ends in a stalemate, as everybody thinks it will, how great will the danger of another war in the Middle East be? And in that connection, do you expect Egypt and Syria to allow United Nations troops to remain in the buffer zone between them and Israel?

A Let me take this in two parts. The longer there is a stalemate in the Middle East, the greater the danger of war becomes. The danger of war can best be reduced in the Middle East if all of the parties see a prospect of peace somewhere down the road and some plausible means of attaining it. And this is why we

PR #172

19

pursued the previous approach.

When the United States goes to Geneva, it will not go there with the attitude that it will end in a stalemate, but rather with the attitude of seeing whether this forum can now be turned into an arena for constructive progress. And therefore the United States will go there with a positive attitude and it will ask all parties concerned to go there with a similar attitude, keeping in mind the needs and requirements of everybody.

Was there another part to your question?

Q What do you expect Egypt and Syria to do about the United Nations troops in the buffer zone between them and Israel?

A Well, we believe that the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt and the United Nations Disengagement Service Force* in Syria were essential components of the disengagement agreements. It would be hoped that the mandates of both of these would be renewed as a contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East, and to permit the process of negotiations to go forward in a tranquil atmosphere

Q Mr. Secretary --

A Mr. Lisagor.

* United Nations Disengagement Observation Force

PR #172

20

Q Inasmuch as we deal with every Communist country in the world, with the exception of Cuba, today, why would we, to use your words, be destroying South Vietnam if it became Communist?

A Well, on that theory we can give up all of our alliances because we would not be destroying any ally if it were overrun by a Communist country. It is not a question of our not dealing with Communist countries. It is a question of countries that obviously have a desire to defend themselves being prevented from defending themselves by an American decision to withhold supplies. And therefore we would be destroying those people who have resisted, whom we have encouraged to resist, by such an action.

Now, I think it is interesting also to point out that, after all, the flood of refugees in Vietnam is going away from the Communist area of control. And even in Cambodia, under conditions that one would have to say are extraordinarily discouraging, somebody is still fighting around Phnom Penh. So that we are here in a position where the United States is forcing people to surrender by withholding supplies.

Q Mr. Secretary, Egypt, according to a

PR #172

21

senior American official, was willing to sign a pledge
not to have recourse to force in the Middle East, that
force was not the way to resolve the conflict in the
Middle East, to refrain from military and paramilitary
activities, and to allow Israel the right to renew any
agreement at the expiration of its one-year term. In
your view, did those concessions by Egypt satisfy the
military side of non-belligerency?

A Well, the issue of non-belligerency is
a complicated legal position, because non-belligerency
is an international status which you cannot approach
simply in components. I don't think any useful purpose
is served for me to give an assessment of the various
negotiating positions. Both sides made a serious effort
and they did not succeed in bridging their differences.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the impact on
the world oil situation, and is the United States prepared
to go ahead with the consumer-producer conference? Is
that about to take place? Would you discuss also the impact
of King Faisal's assassination on that situation?

A Of course, it is commonly believed that
tensions in the Middle East do not particularly help the

PR #172

22

world oil situation. The United States has taken
the position that it would conduct its negotiations in the
Middle East independent of any oil pressures. And
- American policy will not let itself be affected by oil
pressures. We do not see any developing at this moment.

We believe that the consumer-producer conference
is being conducted in the interests of both sides for
the common benefit, for the interest of a developing and
thriving world economy, which is in the interest of
producers as well as consumers and should not be tied
to the situation in the Middle East. Therefore, we are
proceeding with our preparations for the consumer-producer
conference, and progress is being made in that direction,
and we find it essentially on schedule.

King Faisal ruled a country of extraordinary
importance to the energy picture of the world. And also
due to his extraordinary personality he had a major influence
on all of the Arab countries, being one of the few Arab
leaders with a major influence on both the moderates and
the radical elements in the Arab world. King Faisal
was an element for moderation in the negotiations between
Israel and the Arab countries. And he was a friend of

PR #172

23

the United States. His great personal prestige will
be missed, even though we are convinced that the basic
policies of Saudi Arabia are going to continue.

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up
on that question about the light at the end of the tunnel
that was raised here earlier by Mr. Koppel. It seemed
to me that your answer to that question really was that
you did, given a three-year program in South Vietnam,
see another light at the end of that tunnel. And I think
the real question that is involved here is whether the
Administration is perceiving reality. I think we have a
problem with the public in this country. We have given
50,000 men. We have given $150 billion. And it has not
saved South Vietnam. You are asking people now to believe
that if you get three more years of help, you, Henry
Kissinger, believe it can be saved. Now, I would like
to know if that is not telling people that you see a light
at the end of the tunnel.

A I am saying that if you do not give enough,
then you are bringing about consequences very similar to
what we are now seeing. Since May last year, South
Vietnam has received only ammunition and fuel. It has
received almost no spare parts and no modern equipment.

[L]

PR #172

24

Under those conditions, the demoralization of an army
is inevitable. And therefore, some of the consequences
we now see are not surprising.

I am saying that, as a people, we should not
destroy our allies. And that once we start on that course,
it will have serious consequences for us in the world.

I have stated that it would be better if we
did it on an annual basis. Given the enormous divisions
that have arisen in this country, for the sake of avoiding
these divisions we are prepared to go the other route.

- It is not our first choice. The better course is to do it
by determining each year what is necessary. And in the
nature of things, there are many situations around the
world in which the necessity of assistance depends on
the degree of outside pressure. And if we cannot control
the outside pressure, then our cutting off assistance
means turning these countries over to their enemies.

Mr. Binder.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you give us your
assessment of the events in Portugal, what U.S. policy is
towards Portugal, and whether it might have to change?

A Portugal, of course, is a member of the

PR #172

25

North Atlantic Treaty Organization and has had close
and friendly relationships with the United States. What
seems to be happening in Portugal now is that the Armed
Forces Movement which is substantially dominated by
officers of leftist tendencies has now appointed a new
cabinet in which Communists and parties closely associated
with the Communists have many of the chief portfolios.
This was an evolution that was not foreseeable over recent
months, and it will, of course, raise questions for the
United States in relationship to its NATO policy and to
its policy with Portugal.

With respect to NATO, this is a matter to be
discussed with all of our allies, and we are in close
contact with them.

With respect to Portugal, the United States
has a tradition of friendly relations with Portugal,
and it does not intend to take the initiative in breaking these
friendly relations. However, we are disquieted by an
evolution in which there is a danger that the democratic
process may become a sham, and in which parties are getting
into dominant position whose interests we would not have
thought were necessarily friendly to the United States.

PR #172

26

Q Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that in 1973, when the Viet-Nam peace accords were negotiated, there was no doubt about continuing U. S. military and economic assistance. What assurances did you have then, in '73, that the Congress would continue this assistance?

A We had no assurances. If you review now the nature of our domestic debate -- say, from 1969 to 1973 -- it was essentially that American involvement in Viet-Nam should be terminated but that the Vietnamese should be given an opportunity to defend themselves; and the entire pressure of the domestic debate was on the withdrawal -- at least, insofar as I became conscious of it -- was on the withdrawal of American participation.

We stated, on the date that the agreement was signed, if you read my press conference of that day, that economic and military aid would continue. And none of this was ever challenged in '73 and '74.

In fact, the debate started this year over appropriating a sum of money that had already been authorized by the Congress; so a question of principle could not possibly have been involved because the authorization was approved

PR #172

27

last year with very little division. There were no assurances, but it seemed to us inherent in the whole posture that we had taken that this would continue.

Q If I could follow up on that, did you give at that time the South Vietnamese Government assurances that this aid would continue?

A We told the South Vietnamese Government -- not a commitment of the United States that aid would continue -- but that, in our judgment, if the South Vietnamese cooperated in permitting us to withdraw our forces and, therefore, to reclaim our prisoners, that in our judgment the Congress would then vote the aid that would be necessary to sustain Viet-Nam economically and militarily. It was not given as an American commitment.

We're not talking here of a legal American commitment; we are talking here of a moral commitment.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think there will be another Middle East war?

A I think there is always a danger of a Middle East war, as long as the parties have such irreconcilable differences. We do not believe a Middle East war is inevitable. We believe a Middle East war would involve

PR #172

28

the greatest dangers to all of the countries concerned,
as well as serious dangers of great power involvement.
And, therefore, the United States will work with
determination and with confidence to avoid a war and to use
its influence to promote a movement towards peace.

Q Mr. Secretary, sir, did you look at the
record of the assassin of King Faisal? I'm sure you must
have. And did you find, when he was in the United States,
any input or anything that might have contributed to
this action?

A Frankly, I have not looked at the detailed
-- I have just seen a brief summary of the record of
the assassin, but I'm absolutely confident that nobody
in the United States had anything to do with such an action
because we considered King Faisal a good friend of the
United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, can we ask another question
on the step-by-step --

Q Mr. Secretary, why is there such a pre-
sumption in this country at this moment, in newspaper
articles, in the meaning -- in the interpretation -- of the
reassessment of Mideast policy, that Israel, somehow,

PR #172

29

was at fault for the breakdown of the talks and should
somehow be punished by reduction in aid or some other
manner?

A Well, I cannot answer why people make certain assumptions. Many of you were on the plane with me, and you know how I attempted to explain the situation.

We -- the Administration has made no assessment of blame, nor will it serve any useful purpose to engage in that now.

Secondly, punishment of a friend cannot be the purpose of a national policy. We now face a new situation. No useful purpose is served by conducting it in a fit of pique or by encouraging even greater tensions in the area. We will make an assessment of the American national interest in relation to our long-term commitments, as well as the necessity of preserving the peace; and our policy will be based entirely on this. And in no sense is any consideration given to punishing any particular country.

Mr. Kalb?

Q Mr. Secretary, in that connection, going back to the step-by-step approach once again, since you started

PR #172

30

this approach, there was an agreement between
Egypt and Israel in January of '74, an agreement between
Syria and Israel in May of '74, an enhancement of the
American diplomatic position in the Middle East, and
one setback. In light of the balance on the pluses and
minuses, why so radical and dramatic a change, a need
for a major reassessment of policy? Why not continue
along the old way, recognizing that there was one setback
but a lot of blessings?

A. We, obviously, believe that there were
large blessings. As I made clear before we went on this
trip, it seemed to us that in any event, even if another
step had succeeded, a reassembling of the Geneva Conference
was the most likely next step, because we believed that the
Geneva Conference would then have taken place under
easier circumstances than will now be the case.

We have made the assessment that the step-by-
step approach, as it has been conducted up to now, is not
likely to be able to be continued. And, therefore, we have
to assess where we go from here, under conditions in which
some of the presuppositions are no longer valid. And I don't
consider anything particularly dramatic about assessing

PR #172

31

American policy when it finds itself in a new situation.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have used the word "suspension" to describe the talks, and yet you said that the step-by-step approach is ended. Now, you just said it's not likely to be able to continue. Is there any chance whatsoever that the negotiations between Israel and Egypt on an interim settlement -- that is, another step -- can be revived?

A My impression, from Egyptian public statements is that this is extremely unlikely. Should, however, the parties request us, against our expectations, to undertake it, we would be prepared to do it. But we are making no effort to urge the parties to do so. We stand ready, if there should be any such request.

Q Mr. Secretary, the question was being raised after your briefing on the Hill --

A Miss Berger, and then you.

Q A question was being raised yesterday after your briefing to Congressmen on the Hill as to who made that decision that the step-by-step approach is now finished. Was it your personal decision? Was it a decision

PR #172

32

of the parties? Could you tell us about how that decision
was reached?

A The Egyptian Foreign Minister announced, on the evening that he announced the suspension of the talks, that the step-by-step approach was now finished and that Egypt would return to Geneva. This is how the decision was reached.

The United States will do whatever it can and whatever the parties agree to, to promote peace in the Middle East; and if the parties should request us to do it, we would be willing to entertain it.

Q Mr. Secretary, would it, in your view, enhance the prospects to go to Geneva if the United States would move beyond the role of intermediary and take a publicly stated position on the substantive issues being negotiated there?

A Well, we have generally refrained from taking a position of our own because we felt that when the peace and security of countries is concerned that they have to make their fundamental decisions. On the few occasions when the issues between them had narrowed sufficiently, the United States took a position.

PR #172

33

Now whether in the evolution of the negotiations
-- at Geneva or elsewhere -- a moment will come when the
United States should take a position of its own, that
remains to be determined. We have not yet made this
decision.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for all
of your trouble. I had one more question but I didn't ask
it.

(Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the news
conference was concluded.)