OUTLINE NOTES ON CHINA POLICY

Efforts to strengthen NATO may force inter-Allied discussion of
China, an issue which is a source of much divisive feeling and suspicion.
If the U.S. Administration shows indications of being willing to modify
its present rigid position, the following approach might be worth
consideration.

1. The question of recognition is of marginal importance; recognition is a matter for each government to work out in its own way and in its own good time.

2. The question of the Chinese membership in the United Nations is the most troublesome aspect of the China problem and the one which creates the greatest difficulty for the United States in its dealings with its own allies and with uncommitted nations. This is the point on which reconsideration ought to be concentrated.

3. The present position of the United States is not only politically weak but technically eroding. The steady build-up of pressure in the United Nations to clarify the China seat opens the way for a majority to admit Red China over United States opposition, especially in those organs and agencies where no veto is present. Even in the Security Council, there is considerable doubt that the question is vetoable; it seems unlikely, for example, that the International Court of Justice would rule that the seating of a particular delegation is subject to veto. Quite apart from the veto, if the present Nationalist Chinese representative should die or leave his post for another reason, one must expect that there would not be 7 votes in the Security Council required to accredit his successor; the result would be that, as a minimum, the China seat would become vacant.

-2-

4. The United States is now carrying a heavy political burden with many nations whose friendship it seeks because of its rigid resistance to the seating of Peiping. Were the United Nations to seat Peiping over United States objectives, the result would be a considerable loss of prestige to the United States and substantial public bitterness (whipped up by certain politicians) against the United Nations and, indeed, against the most enlightened aspects of foreign policy. Such a situation would give at least a strong impetus to isolationist groups. When one is impaled upon a dilemma, there is merit in seeking to impale one's adversaries on the dilemma instead. What follows seeks to do this.

2. At the moment, the question is posed in the United Nations as a technical question of credentials, namely, which delegation is entitled to occupy the chair for "China". From the United States point of view, this is the wrong question; it offers only the two alternatives of total victory or total defeat. Further, handling the matter as a credentials problem would only move from one unrealistic position into another one equally unrealistic.

6. Since the principal adjective used by our friends to describe United States policy is "unrealistic", we ought to invite them to sit down to talk about what the realities of the situation require. The seating of China (and the recognition of China) are political acts; political realities ought to be on the table for discussion.

7. Starting from a base in the realities, the target in such negotiations with our friends ought to be a reasonable position upon which reasonable men in the free world can agree; the target need not be to find a position which we would know in advance would be acceptable to Moscow and Peiping. There is no point in

-3-

our doing their negotiation for them in advance. Free world unity
should be the primary objective; if Moscow and Peiping find the
resulting position unacceptable, then they take on the responsibility
for Peiping's absence at the United Nations.

2. What are the essential realities? First, there are two Chinese Governments, both of which are qualified for membership in the United Nations. Formosa has all of the attributes of statehood and membership of other United Nations members; it is larger, more populous, more powerful, and more important than many existing members. A membership in the United Nations for both Peiping and Formosa should be fundamental.

2. The second political reality is that, by no stretch of the imagination, could one say that Peiping is the state which the United Nations agreed in 1945 should be a representative of Asia as a permanent member of the Security Council. Permanent membership of the Security Council should, therefore, be renegotiated. In reaching an answer, the views of all the Asian states should be carefully canvassed and taken heavily into account. It might prove wholly unworkable to suggest that India, say, replace China as a permanent member. But the negotiations might conclude with the addition of India and Brazil as permanent members.

10. We should be able to get rather wide agreement on the above two essential elements in a solution for the China seat (separate membership for Formosa, reconstituted permanent membership). It will take a strong diplomatic effort in some quarters because there will be some who will insist upon a formula known in advance to be

-4-

acceptable to Peiping, but an American effort in the direction of
an essentially reasonable position would greatly assuage existing
tension on the subject. If there are those who would worry about the
acceptability of the result in Peiping, there would be others who
would be just as concerned about the attitude in Formosa.

11. The above position should be worked out as a bipartisan matter within the United States, but the Administration should be expected to take its full share of responsibility for the result. The domestic history of the China issue makes this especially important.

12. It is strongly urged that no solution be contemplated which would leave Formosa in an equivocal position or which would leave Peiping as the only national government to which Chinese nationals all over the world could turn. Even though they may not say it publicly, leaders in a number of the uncommitted countries having large Chinese communities are relieved that Peiping is not now the only government to which their own Chinese residents can turn. Formosa should emerge out of the negotiations as a wholly independent state, a member of the United Nations.

13. There is some reason to believe that some of our closest friends abroad would welcome a chance to take up the China question with the United States along such general lines.

with the United States stock and bond market fines.

YI. China should welcome a chance to face up to the Chinese situation there in some reason to believe that some of our closest

a sample of the United Nations should emerge out of the negotiations as a sort of independent state, government to which first our Chinese residents can turn. Romanes Chinese committees are reflected that Beijing is not now the only理事 in a number of the uncommitted committees dealing with the world could turn. Even though such and not ask it definitely, as the only national government to allow Chinese nationals to own Chinese homes in an extraneous position or which would leave Beijing

YI. If it is strongly argued that no solution can be contemplated which would prevent the Chinese issue from this absolutely impossible.

YI. To take the view alone of responsibility for the result. The domestic right in the United States, put the Administration should be expected to take the whole issue of responsibility for the result. The domestic

would be that so concerned about the attitude in Japan, should be that so concerned about the attitude in China.

-4-