# Johnson Administration SALT Proposal

(Adopted Unanimously by Executive Committee of Committee of Principals, August 14, 1968)

I. **Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers.** Cessation of initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. Soviet Union permitted to complete launchers under construction as of that date. Under no circumstances could either side deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions on technological improvements, including increasing hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.

II. **Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers.** Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM prohibited. Same qualitative restrictions as above, except hardening prohibited.

III. **Mobile Land-Based Systems.** Complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 KM).

IV. **Mobile Sea-Based Missile Systems.** Ban on construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. Applies to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. No limitation on characteristics of SLBMs or SLCMs, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped. No replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement, pending agreement on rules governing replacement.

V. **ABMs.** Ban on deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles. Total prohibition of mobile ABM systems. No other constraints on characteristics.

NOTE: No limits on bombers, MIRV's, or air defense systems. Ban on freedom to mix.

Column by James Reston in New York Times, June 29, 1969

"President Nixon's Avoidable Blunders"

"President Nixon seems to be developing a weakness for the avoidable blunder. Not satisfied with the agonies of unavoidable problems, he somehow manages to depart periodically from his normal caution and not only create but plan unnecessary trouble.

"He didn't have to appoint Walter Annenberg, of all people, to be his Ambassador to London, of all places. He didn't have to choose to visit the Rumanians, who are the principal critics of Moscow within the Communist alliance, just before trying to reach a disarmament accommodation with the Soviet Union.

"He didn't have to reject the advice of the most liberal member of his Cabinet on the appointment of Dr. John Knowles as the nation's top health officer under pressure from Senator John Tower of Texas and Representative Bob Wilson of California and the other conservative members of the Congress and the American Medical Association.

"He could have avoided his silly personal quarrel with Clark Clifford, the divisive battle over the antiballistic missile system, his provocative lectures to the university radicals, and the unnecessary journeys of Governor Rockefeller in Latin America, but for some mysterious or capricious reason he took on all these avoidable mistakes, and he has clearly hurt himself in the process.

"The Republic will undoubtedly survive all these decisions. The British expect us to be clumsy and Annenberg merely seems to confirm all their prejudices about our political immaturity. The Russians will not change their disarmament policy because of Mr. Nixon's mistimed visit to Bucharest. The Latin-Americans will take over our properties and vilify Uncle Sam, with or without visits from Rockefeller. The rebuke to Secretary Finch and to Dr. Knowles, who was a Nixon Republican, won't change H.E.W. policy by the substitution of Dr. Roger Egenberg, the Dean of the University of Southern California's medical school, who is a liberal Democrat.

"But this only raises the main point about President Nixon's judgment. What makes him dig his own boobytrap? Why irritate the British with Annenberg, the Russians by going to Rumania? Why stir up the anti-Yankee sentiments of the Latin-Americans

Column by James Reston in NYT, June 29, 1969 cont.

by sending Rockefeller, who is needed at home, in any event,
to mind the store?

"On the great questions of public policy -- winding up the war
in Vietnam, trying to control and reduce the colossal expen-
ditures for military arms, and defuse the alarming undeclared
war in the Middle East -- Mr. Nixon has been thoughtful and
prudent. But on the small questions, like President Truman,
he has been willful, political and capricious.

"It is very odd and puzzling in a man who is normally so canny
and concerned with his own past reputation and his own present
place as the political and moral leader of the nation. He is
a minority President, representing a minority party in the
Congress. He needs to widen his political base to govern the
country and be reelected. He needs the help of the Russians
to end the war and cut the military budget in order to finance
the programs of economic and social reconstruction at home.
Yet, on the side, he creates barriers to the objectives he
seeks.

"President Johnson was destroyed by his own willfulness and
emphasis on political maneuver. Nobody knows this better than
Mr. Nixon, who had a reputation for the same kind of political
and personal bias before he was elected to the Presidency.
Accordingly, he started out to dramatize the difference
between his style and Johnson's. He eliminated the dramatics.
He lowered his voice. He decentralized and depersonalized
the Government, and emphasized the integrity and responsibility
of the individual Cabinet members.

"I believe,' he said on Sept. 18 last year, 'in a system in
which the appropriate Cabinet officer gets credit for what is
right and the President takes the blame for what is wrong.
Officials of a new Administration will not have to check their
consciences at the door, or leave their powers of independent
judgment at home.'

"This was obviously a campaign slap at President Johnson, but
though Mr. Nixon said publicly that he would support Secretary
Finch's recommendation of the man to guard the nation's health,
he buckled under political pressure from the right, and abandoned
not only his most liberal Cabinet colleague but his closest poli-
tical friend.

"If the political forces had really been against him on this
one, if he had been overwhelmed by unavoidable realities, as
he is on Vietnam, his decision would have been understandable.
But this was not the case in the conflict between Finch and the
campaign fundraisers and the most conservative element in the
American Medical Association. He didn't have to decide as he did.

"He could have made another judgment on Knowles, on Rumania,
on Rockefeller, on Annenberg and on the ABM, but he didn't, and
the result is that both his liberal opposition and even his
conservative allies are now wondering where they stand, and
a lot of other people are wondering about the President's judgment."

New York Times, Dec. 16, 1968

CLIFFORD DECRIES
MISSILE TALKS LAG

Criticism Appears Directed
at Soviet and Nixon Aides

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 — Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford today scored "foot-dragging" on the opening of missile talks with the Soviet Union, urging that meetings be started promptly even if at a level lower than the summit.

Though he carefully avoided
ascribing responsibility, his re-
marks were apparently ad-
dressed to both the Soviet
leadership and the incoming
Nixon Administration.

Other sources confirmed that neither the Russians nor the policymakers who will take office in Washington Jan. 20 are indicating any eagerness to have the long-awaited talks be-

Mr. Clifford attempted to
answer the arguments of both
sides during an interview on
the Columbia Broadcasting
System's "Face the Nation"
radio and television program.

The Defense Secretary said
he "will not foreclose the pos-
sibility" of a meeting between
President Johnson and Premier
Aleksei N. Kosygin, although
"with each passing day that it
does not take place, there is
less possibility that it will take
place."

"As this administration
nears the end, there seems to
be a good deal of foot-dragging
going on about getting the talks
started," he added. "I might
say the foot-dragging is not
taking place as far as Presi-
dent Johnson is concerned."

The proposal for talks to
limit the two superpowers'
stocks of offensive and defen-
sive nuclear missiles, first an-
nounced last summer, quickly
became linked with President
Johnson's desire to meet Pre-
mier Kosygin again to follow
up on the progress made in
their first meeting at Glass-
boro, N.J., in June last year.

A meeting was finally ar-
ranged on the eve of the So-
viet invasion of Czechoslovakia
Aug. 20 and 21. But that crisis
shelved the whole project.

Economic Benefit Cited

Mr. Clifford reminded the
Russians of the economic bene-
fits to both countries that a
new disarmament agreement
would bring.

"Mr. Kosygin has indicated
very clearly that there are cer-
tain economic pressures in the
Soviet Union, now, that are
placing the hierarchy there
under considerable restraint and
pressure" the Defense Secre-
tary said.

Then, apparently addressing
himself to both the Russians
and the Nixon Administration.
Mr. Clifford asserted:

"We have gone through the
most excellent and outstanding
period of preparation for these
talks I think I have ever seen
in my experience in Govern-
ment. We have an excellent
team that could begin the talks
within a general framework.

"It would not bind or re-
strict the subsequent adminis-
tration in any way.

"If they are not started now
and the new administration
comes in, I believe the new
administration naturally is go-
ing to be faced with a great
many day-by-day problems.

and I fear there will be a sub-
stantial delay in getting the
talks started."

Officials of the Johnson Ad-
ministration are disappointed
that the Soviet Union has not
responded to the veiled offer
to start the talks reported to
have been made by Secretary
of State Dean Rusk on Nov.
25 in a meeting with the Soviet
Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dob-
rynin.

While not adverse to the prin-
ciple of the missile talks, Presi-
dent-elect Richard M. Nixon is
understood to have declined to
send an observer or otherwise
give his endorsement to a John-
son-Kosygin meeting.

Mr. Clifford said he did not
know what the attitude of the
next administration would be
toward opening the talks prior
to Jan. 20 at a level lower than
the heads of government. So
far as could be determined, the
United States has not made a
formal proposal of a lower level
meeting.

Associated Press

Clark M. Clifford, Secretary
of Defense, at a news con-
ference held in Washington.

gin in the closing weeks of the
Johnson Administration. The
negotiations on limitation and
reduction of strategic missiles
are intended to ease interna-
tional tensions by slowing the
arms race.

New York Times Editorial,

Feb. 2, 1969

"Toward a European Dialogue"

"Agreement has been widespread for some time that a United
States initiative is long overdue to restore confidence and
a sense of purpose in the North Atlantic Alliance. There has
also been general recognition of the need to move beyond
that toward reconciliation between East and West Europe.
Unfortunately, American policy toward this area of vital
interest has been dangerously sterile for a decade.

"The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia stimulated renewed expressions of American commitment to Western Europe closer consultations among the NATO allies, some tentative new movement toward increased intra-Western European cooperation and agreement to halt the decline in West European force levels. But these minimum moves give no hint of the kind of imaginative long-range approach the situation requires.

"Proposals for a new European policy released today by a panel of scholars, businessmen and former officials established by the United Nations Association of the United States lean heavily on old ideas for North Atlantic cooperation without exploring adequately whey the old ways no longer work. But the panel has broken new ground with its recommendation for creation of a European Security Commission composed of Eastern and Western powers to prepare the principles of a general European settlement, including arms reduction in central Europe.

"The proposed commission would provide the missing framework for a continuing multilateral dialogue in Europe. It would relieve European fears -- East and West -- of a big-power deal made over their heads. It would bring the two Germanys together for discussion of their common destiny. And, while preparing the way for a long-range settlement, it could help prevent the development of crises that set back progress toward a settlement.

"This is an idea that could give fresh purpose to President Nixon's proposed tour of Western European capitals next spring. If the West Europeans approve, it could become the basis for an early summit conference of the Big Four."

New York Times Editorial

Nov. 12, 1969

"Europe's New Security Patterns"

"The Warsaw Pact's renewed proposals for a European Security Conference are more likely to develop into a process than an early event.

"A conference of 31 countries, or even the preparatory Helsinki meeting which the East now proposes be held nearly next year, could only be a propaganda forum unless concrete agreements had been negotiated in advance.

"There is even a possibility now that the annual NATO Ministerial meeting in December may accept "in principle" the idea that a conference can ultimately be held when agreements are in sight. But what is significant about the current trend is not the imminence of such agreements but the approach of a new form of East-West dialogue.

"The vague idea previously advanced by Moscow that a comprehensive new security system in Europe replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact is no longer in the forefront of Eastern proposals. Instead of dissolution of NATO and withdrawal of American troops, priority now is given to a network of bilateral East-West treaties renouncing force and the threat of force.

"But Moscow's central objective remains unaltered. It is to confirm the status quo in Europe, including the division of Germany, and to achieve Western recognition of Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence. What has changed is the reaction in the West -- and especially in Bonn -- to Moscow's proposals.

"Until 1966 the West insisted that the reunification of Germany must precede new security arrangements in Europe, lest the division of Germany and Europe be frozen. A coming together of the two parts of Germany, it is now realized, can only be achieved with the consent of Germany's eastern neighbors. The prerequisite is a long period of detente and improved relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe.

"The new Brandt Government in Bonn now plans to step up negotiations with Moscow for a network of agreements with the East -- including East Germany -- renouncing force. Bonn is prepared to give East Germany increased recognition as a second state within the German nation and, in separate nego-

tiations with Warsaw, to confirm the Oder-Neisse frontier
with Poland. In return, Bonn seeks to move toward diplomatic
relations with Poland, more travel and contacts between
East and West Germany and, ultimately, liberalization of
the East German Communist regime.

"It is in this context that the NATO countries now are considering a much broader agenda for discussion with the East. Other NATO countries are prepared to negotiate renunciation-of-force agreements. Exchange of observation posts on both sides of the Iron Curtain is suggested to provide assurance against surprise attack. Mutual force reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact could maintain the military balance in Central Europe at lower cost.

"None of these negotiations can be expected to achieve dramatic
results quickly or to terminate the 24-year military confron-
tation in the heart of Europe. But the dialogue itself would
be a stabilizing factor for it could not continue if there
were a new Berlin crisis harassment on the access routes or
other Soviet menaces toward the West."

New York Times Editorial, December 7, 1969.

"Peace, Not a Sword ..."

"Twenty-eight years after Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into World War II and almost a quarter-century after Hitler's defeat, a divided Europe still awaits its long-delayed peace settlement. But, for the first time, there are signs - such as the statements last week by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries - that a process is beginning through which that European settlement may ultimately be brought about.

"The olive branches now being extended from East and West across Europe contain many thorns of suspicion. Moscow's five-year old proposal for a European Security Conference, pressed forward with new urgency this year, still impresses the West as an effort to gain increased international recognition of East Germany and status quo in a Europe that would remain divided. Retroactive acceptance of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 might also be implied. The mere holding of a conference, whether or not any agreements emerged from it, could serve this Easter purpose.

"But some Eastern European countries see in the conference proposal - and the discussion it has stimulated - an opportunity for increased bilateral contacts with the West and increased independence from Soviet control. For their part, most of the NATO countries - despite some shadings of difference - now believe that an atmosphere of detente and of improved relations between West Germany and the East is pre-requisite to ending the division of Germany and Europe. That division cannot be ended without the East's consent. The problem is that detente could also freeze the division of Europe and there is suspicion that this is the central Soviet purpose.

"A solution to this dilemma - advanced by the Grand Coalition Government in Bonn three years ago and now being pushed forward even more imaginatively by the new Government headed by Chancellor Brandt - has become the basis of Western policy. It calls on the West to take the initiative in concrete proposals for negotiation with the East, proposals that link atmospheric detente with substantive improvements that either erode the division of Europe or, at least, ease the hardships it has imposed.

New York Times Editorial, 12/7/69, continued.

"Moscow's proposal for a European Security Conference, in effect, is being treated as the West finally came to treat Soviet proposals for 'general and complete disarmament.' Once total disarmament was accepted as the ultimate objective, it became possible to negotiate on realistic 'first steps' and 'partial measures.' Similarly the NATO ministers last week pronounced themselves 'receptive' to negotiations on concrete issues that could lead to a well-prepared European Security Conference productive of real, rathern than propaganda results.

"Twentynine such issues for negotiation reportedly have been studied within NATO. Those mentioned in the NATO declaration on European security included such items as mutual force reductions, improved access to Berlin, a modus vivendi between East and West Germany and freer movement of people, ideals and information. Simple arms-control measures, such as the exchange of military observers, are suggested as companions to force reductions. And all this would proceed against the background of Soviet-American negotiations to limit strategic weapons.

"The Moscow communique of the Warsaw Pact countries indicates readiness to start down this route. Berlin issues already are in discussion among the Big Four. West German talks with the Soviet Union on renunciation of the use of force and with Poland on the Oder-Neisse border are imminent. The two important Western overtures yet to be taken up are those for talks involving East and West Germany and for discussion of balanced force reduction in Central Europe. But these should not lag far behind.

"An era of confrontation appears indeed to be yielding to one of negotiation. Many years of patience and persistence will be needed to achieve results. But a vital process has begun."

US-SOVIET RELATIONS - 1969

Dec. 18 (1968) HK meets Sedov at Pierre Hotel: Linkage of issues. Lasting settlements must reflect real interests.

Jan. 20 Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman announces Soviet readiness for serious exchange of views on curbing the arms race.

Jan. 22 . HK tells Ellsworth (telcon) to tell Soviets that we look for signs of cooperation from Soviet Union on Middle East and Vietnam.

Transmittal by HK to President of routine con-
gratulatory message from Podgorny and Kosygin.

Jan. 24 Approval of State draft of allied reply to Soviets
are FRG decision to convene Federal Assembly in Berlin,
but delay delivery.

Jan. 25 NSC meeting on Vietnam alternatives focuses on
Soviet role, benefit of US unpredictability.

Jan. 27 . NSSM 10 asks basic review of East-West relations.

HK gives more guidance to Ellsworth (telcon) for
lunch at Soviet Embassy: "we are determined to
end Vietnam war."

In first news conference, President suggests that
arms control discussions with the USSR be
held "in a way...that will promote...progress on
outstanding political problems at the same time..."

Feb. 4 Presidential letters to Rogers and Laird laying
out his basic view on US-Soviet relations as the
framework for future policy.

Feb. 6 . President at press conference says summit would have to be well prepared.

. HK backgrounder discusses concept of "linkage".

Feb. 11 Memo to President on contingency planning re
East German Travel Ban.

Feb. 15 Dobrynin conveys message from Soviet leadership. Interest in channel for private dialogue "outside diplomatic establishment". Soviets prepared to move simultaneously on problems on several fronts, especially in bilateral discussions on Middle East.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

2.

Feb. 15
HK briefs President for meeting with Dobrynin: "Progress depends on specific settlements, not personal diplomacy. Summits should come at end of careful preparation." (Berlin, Middle East, Vietnam to be discussed.)

Feb. 17
President's first meeting with Dobrynin. Soviets prepared to move forward. HK memo analyzes Soviet intentions and linkage.

Feb. 18
Rogers' assessment of Berlin situation: "Believe Moscow would find its interests best served by keeping harassments below threshold of significant Western counter-measures.

HK views Dobrynin message (2/15 above) as forthcoming. "We should seek to utilize this Soviet interest, stemming as I think it does from anxiety, to induce them to come to grips with real sources of tension, notably in Middle East, but also Vietnam..."

Feb. 19
NSC meeting on East-West relations, in preparation for European trip. Assessment of "detente".

Feb. 22
HK warns Dobrynin (telcon) about NVA offensive

HK tasks State, Defense, and CIA to develop options for increasing flow of military traffic to and from West Berlin.

Dobrynin tells HK (telcon) that Berlin should not throw shadow on US-Soviet relations, therefore, FRG should refrain from calling Federal Assembly in Berlin.

March 3
HK luncheon with Dobrynin initiates special channel. Dobrynin expresses Soviet interest in status quo in Europe. HK expresses US interest in ending harassment of Berlin access.

March 4
HK advises Ehrlichman it would be a "bad idea" for Tricia to visit Moscow even on purely educational trek.

March 11
HK/Dobrynin meeting on various topics. Dobrynin gets emotional about China.

March 14
President announces SAFEGUARD ABM decision.

HK letter to National Academy of Science supports their interest in academic contacts with Communist world.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

3.

March 15 HK tells President (telcon) that Soviets (according to Marvin Kalb) reacted mildly to ABM announcement. HK calls Dobrynin and notes conciliatory TASS statement.

March 17 . State Department announces Dobrynin proposal that consulates be exchanged in Leningrad and San Francisco.

Warsaw Pact calls again for CSCE.

March 26 Scenario for Amb. Beam's first encounter with Soviet leadership. Presidential letter to Kosygin and talking points: "I am prepared to explore with you and your colleagues every available avenue for the settlement of international problems..." Middle East, Vietnam, Europe (Berlin), Czechoslovakia ("a shock" to the US public), "sufficiency of" military strength - all mentioned in letter. China included in talking points. Administration will avoid "harsh words" about USSR.

March 28 NSSM 35 asks review of trade policy toward Communist countries, in light of June 30 expiration of ECA and Muskie-Mondale bill to liberalize.

March 29 HK concurrence to State re Congressional exploration re consulates proposal.

March 31 DeGaulle at Ike funeral urges direct US-Soviet contacts.

April 3 Dobrynin gives HK advance word of Soviet note on CSCE. Vietnam, China discussed.

April 4 HK assessment of Soviet call for CSCE: "desirable for us to be in a positive if cautious posture."

April 8 Presidential decision re handling of CSCE at NATO ministerial: We accept idea in principle but would delay convening conference.

April 9 President states at NSC meeting on trade that some restrictions on East-West trade are probably out-moded, but he wants to save them for possible bargaining in broader political context.

April 14 HK and Dobrynin discuss Vietnam.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

4.

April 18 At news conference, President criticizes Soviet ousting of Dubcek and warns future similar actions may affect relations with US.

April 22 Amb. Beam presents Nixon letter (March 26) to Kosygin.

May 2 HK backgrounder discusses preparations for SALT, calling it "most fundamental talks we have" with USSR. Also discusses Soviet system.

May 7 RG discusses East-West trade: premises and options.

May 14 President and HK inform Dobrynin of May 14 speech on Vietnam

May 15 HK agrees with Laird (telcon) on no truck deal for USSR unless we get something for it.

May 19 Presidential approval of strategy for handling invitations to Cabinet members to visit Moscow: should be cleared with White House in context of our overall objectives.

May 21
* NSC meeting on East-West Trade: President insists on linkage.

* Soviets expel US journalist (Anatole Shub); HK concurs May 22 in State proposal to expel Soviet journalist from US.

May 28
* NSDM 15 on East-West trade links economic liberalization to improvement in political relations, asks for no change in legislation.

* Kosygin reply to President's letter of March 26. HK analysis says reply shows "no substantive concessions."

June 2 Presidential note that more USG officials should travel to Eastern Europe as "needle" to Moscow. Discussed guidelines for this at June 3 Cabinet-NSC meeting.

June 11 HK recommendation to State that Soviet Embassy official be expelled from US.

June 14
Soviets deliver to State a note on Sino-Soviet dispute (Toon telcon).

June 28
Nixon trip to Romania announced. HK backgrounder in New York on purpose of trip. Not directed at USSR.

US - SOVIET RELATIONS - 1969

July 1
HK directive to State provides guidance on Nixon visit to Romania as reflecting a "desire to work for improved relations with the countries of East Europe on a basis of reciprocity..." and is in no sense an anti-Soviet gesture

July 2
HK tells Erlichman (telcon) to tell Pres. that Brezhnev/Kosygin visit to Romania has been postponed indefinitely due to Nixon visit

July 3
HK invites Gov. Dewey to serve on Disarmament Advisory Council, says we can get by another 5-6 years but another ten years of military deterioration is going to put US in a very difficult position diplomatically

NSSM 63 asks for review of policy choices confronting US as result of Sino-Soviet conflict. Due by 8/15

July 4
HK memo transmits to Pres Helms report on reduced level of ABM deployment around Moscow

July 7
HK transmits to Pres a DOD paper on Soviets objectives of developing a China-oriented ABM system: "Evidence is strong enough to suggest that Soviets will probably agree with us in SALT that both countries should maintain a ballistic missile capability against PRC and third countries...Soviets have a stronger incentive to build a light ABM than we do..."

July 10
HK to Pres. describes Gromyko foreign policy speech as "temperate," and "on the whole positive as regards relations with the United States" though no advance seen on Middle East, Vietnam, Europe and arms control

July 11
US Navy reconnaissance plans observe Soviet warships off Florida coast bound for Cuba on "friendly visit"

July 12
Pres interested again in options for stiffer protest re Soviet jamming of VOA. HK information memo makes no recommendation

Briefing memo for HK meeting with Mitchell on Rogers' "freewheeling actions" as Sec State and need for action to counter this. [Provides a useful overview of Nixon strategy and "assets" vis-a-vis Sovs..."a short term approach which would involve a somewhat harder attitude toward the Soviet Union; which would involve a patient and reserved attitude toward movement in those areas of Soviet interest until the Soviets

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

had, in turn, indicated a willingness to reciprocate
in areas of prime concern to the US...) PRC, Vietnam,
ME, SALT, global strategy issues also treated

July 17
HK decides against liberalization of export items for USSR and East Europe (Bergsten had argued that this option would be consistent with policy towards East Bloc and on negative Admin. position on liberalization of Export Control Act)

July 18
HK backgrounder says US neither approves nor disapproves of Soviet fleet visit to Cuba: "It is a matter which we regard with utter indifference." HK says, re Asian Collective Security scheme, that "we do not foresee a great power condominium" in Asia. US also feels Soviets have not done all they can to help us end Vietnam war

July 19
HK directive to State to discreetly cool down Romanian optimism about possible new economic concessions from the US

July 21
Pres approves HK recommendation against approval for diesel-powered sub reconn in Soviet waters

Aug. 5
Pres. approval of recommended position to be taken by US with UK, France and Germany to probe Soviet intentions on Berlin. HK notes this idea is largely at German initiative and it is his judgment that the probable results of such a probe of the Soviets will not be encouraging though he does not oppose making a try.

Aug. 7
Pres. decision overrules State/HK recommendation to begin limited negotiations of Czech gold/claims issues. President prefers not to take any initiative for the present and only later consider the minimal negotiating option.

Aug. 12
Len Garment reports on his Soviet trip. He had told Soviets that HK speaks for President (telcon). HK says we should low-key the anti-Soviet propaganda (Czech film) because we have needled them quite a bit lately.

Sep. 4
NSSM 72 creates International Space Cooperation Committee to study possible cooperation with friendly countries as well as USSR.

Sep. 11
HK to Pres. on CIA analysis of Kosygin-Chou meeting. Analysis is that meetings were called by Soviets and reflect Soviet concern that the Sino-Soviet conflict is hurting them. Agency also believes it is likely Kosygin sought to indicate to Peking that there was little possibility of an imminent devastating attack on PRC installations but they could expect a strong reaction to further border provocations.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Sep. 17
Pres. agrees to HK recommendation that DuBridge carry letters to Tito and Ceausescu on increased scientific and technical cooperation during DuBridge's trip to Europe and East bloc. Will enhance chance for Pres. private channels to these leaders, especially Ceausescu.

Sep. 21
HK transmits to Pres. Hubert Humphrey letter on his trip to Moscow. Humphrey: Urges regular summit meetings (HK disagrees); urges US take the initiative in stopping testing of MIRVs (HK disagrees); urges US use USSR as an intermediary to Hanoi (HK notes that without authorization from Hanoi, the Soviets seem unwilling to take any initiative).

Sep. 22
Pres. reaction to Henry Brandon article in Saturday Review asserting that State Department is upset with Nixon's Soviet policy and its 'inherent contradictions'. Pres. asks who is spreading this line. HK notes "the line is characteristic of the Sovietologists who mistrust and resent any moves which would complicate improvements in US-Soviet relationships."

* HK memo to President analyzes Soviet stalling on SALT over past few months. Shift in Soviet attitude between July and August. Soviets may feel no urgency about SALT" "...there is no persuasive evidence for being very optimistic...the Soviets have not been responsive to the concept of an era of negotiation, despite some moderately toned speeches..."

* Views of Arbatov conveyed to HK. "All the old suspicions of the President had returned in Moscow, and prospects for progress in our relations had distinctly worsened...our talk of negotiations was a sham...he cited in the first instance China...next was the Romanian visit...the decision to continue to export controls as before...refusal to make constructive proposals on the ME...this mood in Moscow is basis of Soviet slowness in answering SALT proposal."

Sep. __
Soviet reply to the 3-Power sounding of August 7 on Berlin. HK (9/26) memo to Pres. sees no substantive advance: "Little more than elaboration of Gromyko speech. Thus, I feel we should not appear at all anxious to move on Berlin, nor should we probe very hard for clarifications on the Soviet positions. They are obviously in no hurry."

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Sep. 26
HK tells Sen. Tower to tell Soviets that majority of Americans are hawks on Vietnam (telcon).

Sep. 27
Dobrynin grumbles at lack of progress in relations; HK stresses that Vietnam is the critical issue. Dobrynin asks who thought of Romanian trip; asks whether US prefers 2- or 4-party talks on Berlin. Soviets ask whether Chinese have responded to ending of travel restrictions. HK feels Soviets are eager to improve relations. (See HK/President telcon.)

Sep. 29
HK memo to Pres. on increase in Sino-Soviet tensions and Soviet probe on attitudes toward a possible Soviet air strike on PRC nuclear/missile facilities. NSC contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is underway, but HK notes concern about US responses in the interim to Soviet probes: "Soviets may be using us to generate an impression that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions. We should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics." State should be given clear guidance on deploring reports of a Soviet plan to attack PRC.

Oct. 15
In reaction to press item that Hickel may visit USSR, Pres. asks that HK be sure to brief him prior to his departure.

HK reports to Pres. on new Soviet arrangements for Berlin; the Allies will protest.

Laird asks for guidance on sophisticated communications computers being sold to Eastern Europe. HK asks for State and DOD views (HK/Laird telcon).

Oct. 20
President tells HK he should indicate to Dobrynin that President is "out of control" on Vietnam (telcon).

President receives Dobrynin. Dobrynin present note complaining "Moscow is not satisfied with state of relations." President says anything we do with China is not directed at USSR; complains that year has passed since bomb halt. If Soviets help us end war, US "might do something dramatic to improve US-Soviet relations." Soviet note covers Vietnam, Middle East, warns US vs. exploiting Sino-Soviet conflict.

Oct. 23
HK reports to President that the new Soviet line on Vietnam - most recently in the Franco-Soviet communiqué of 10/13 and Kosygin toast for Pham Van Dong 10/15 - reflects a new sense of urgency about a Vietnamese settlement and end to the war.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Oct 25 US and USSR agree to begin SALT on Nov. 17 in Helsinki.

* President wants no contacts with Soviets on any subject in week of Vietnam speech and "that's a command." (telcon) Rogers claims meeting scheduled with Dobrynin (telcons).

Oct 28 HK tells Stans to wait on decontrolling certain trade items until after Nov. 3 speech (telcon).

* HK tells G. Smith not to get into any substance when he meets Dobrynin (telcon).

* Sisco reports Dobrynin was somber in their Middle East discussion (telcon).

Nov 17 Pres. approves HK directive to State to put brakes on Rogers' latest proposal to go back to Soviets on Berlin.

Nov 26 HK sends Pres. latest NIE on Soviet strategic attack forces. HK argues that the NIE process is faulty and has produced superficial study. Pres. totally agrees, noting that "This report is virtually useless except for a superficial mindless recitation of what we know from the daily press - i.e. that the USSR is building lots of new missiles."

Nov 29 LBJ reports talk with Zorin who pointed to Romania visit as leading to Soviet delay on SALT.

Dec 3 Dobrynin confirms that Cyrus Eaton does not speak for Soviet Government (telcon).

Dec 11 LLewellyn Thompson advises we inform Dobrynin about proposed talks with Chinese. Rogers, HK advise against. (telcon).

Dec 12 HK memo strongly concurs with Rogers recommendation against advising Dobrynin of US talks with Chinese: "...If Dobrynin questions, we should respond with nonchalance that they concern matters of mutual interest and not go beyond that..."

Dec 16 Inozemtsev of Moscow Institute complains that US is linking US-Soviet relations to Vietnam.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Dec 18 Schlesinger (BOB) eliminates budget funds for Radio Liberty. HK tells Helms to appeal so he (HK) can restore it. (Helms telcon)

* HK end of year backgrounder states we are prepared for serious and concrete negotiation unemotionally on a range of issues. We need long-term policy, not oscillation. Summit should be carefully prepared.

* HK sends Pres. report on Rogers talk with Romanian First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu; latter stressed Romanian interest in close bilateral relations; also indicated that Romanian interest in European Security arose from the hope that progress in this field would make more difficult the Soviet application of Brezhnev doctrine. HK and Macovescu also discussed China and Vietnam.

Dec 22 Dobrynin suggests regular HK/Dobrynin meetings on special topics. Soviets seem eager to talk on several issues. Dobrynin says summit is best place to make progress; complains of linkage of Berlin and CSCE.

Dec 23 HK analysis to Pres. on various on-going Soviet foreign policy initiatives: Argues that the Soviets have several balls in the air - SALT, talks with PRC, new negots. with Bonn -- "...While it is tempting to see a grand design behind their diverse moves, one suspects there is a large element of improvisation..."

Dec 27 HK sends Pres. Agency analysis of Sino-Soviet relations which shows PRC the underdog: "Peking will remain the vulnerable and defensive party and seek to improve its international diplomatic position."

Dec 29 HK tells Dobrynin that Pres. agrees to regular HK/Dobrynin meetings.

* HK memo to Commerce favors early movement on liberalizing export controls to Romania by general licenses to free certain commodities.

Dec 30 Useful background memo on history of Soviet proposals on European security, 1966-1969.

STRATEGIC POLICY - 1969

Jan. 21 . NSSM 3 asks for comprehensive review of US military posture and balance of power.

. NSSM 8 asks study of technical questions on US
strategic posture, including reliability and
command and control.

Jan. 27 President at press conference endoreses concept of "sufficiency". Ziegler queries HK (telcon), who tells him President has not changed his position.

Feb. 4 NSC meeting on SIOP.

Feb. 6 RG discussion of strategic policy begins with dis-
cussion of overall objectives of strategic forces.

Feb. 14 NSC meeting on strategic policy. President asks for strategic portion of NSSM 3 study to be ready by May 1. He asks for study of possible SALT positions within three months, but giving no public hint that US is committed to holding the talks.

Feb. 20 . NSSM 23 requests study of amendments to FY 70 Defense Budget, especially re Sentinel ABM program.

. NSSM 24 asks for analysis of Soviet perceptions
of military balance (merged with NSSM 3 study).

NSSM 25 requests study of Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and Limited Test Ban Treaty, and options by which we might proceed with the project. (Project cancelled.)

March 5
NSC meeting on FY 70 Defense Budget and DOD-proposed "modified Sentinel ABM", which emphasizes protection of Minuteman.

March 8
HK and President (telcon) discuss ABM as "protection for the deterrent". Fear that we may lose it in Senate (later telcon).

March 11
State Dept. (Rogers telcon) suggests stretch-out of actual ABM deployment. HK tells Packard (telcon) it could kill the program.

March 14
. Nixon announces SAFEGUARD ABM program. HK backgrounder on decision.

HK telcons with Bundy, Weisner et al try to calm
intellectual community on ABM.

Strategic Policy - 1969

2.

March 17 Clark Clifford praises ABM decision as "excellent" (telcon).

March 19 Brzezinski (telcon) supports ABM decision.

April 19 Laird tells HK (telcon) of SS-9 test with three warheads, but maximum range wouldn't hit US cities.

April 22 Laird analysis of Soviet ICBM and ABM testing.

May 23 NSSM 57 asks review of US Civil Defense Policies.

May 26 NSSM 58 asks review of Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness.

May 29 RG discusses strategic posture. Doctrinal decisions on shaping our strategic forces will guide our SALT positions.

June 4 President approves REDCOSTE proposals of the Under Secretaries Committee.

June 12 RG meeting on SALT (NSSM 28).

June 13 NSC meeting on strategic posture (NSSM 3).

June 18 NSC meeting on strategic posture and SALT discusses criteria of strategic sufficiency.

June 19 First meeting of MIRV Panel to examine consequences of MIRV test ban.

* President at news conference rejects Brooke proposal of unilateral MIRV moratorium.

* HK memo to President reports on final dates for missile deployment of Phase I of SAFEGUARD (1973 and 74 dates).

June 24 MIRV Panel meets.

* NSDM 15 declares four criteria of strategic sufficiency.

June 26 HK memo to President transmits Laird ideas on program to test reliability of Minuteman II. President approves, asking DOD to submit formal recommendation.

STRATEGIC POLICY - 1969

July 1 HK and Symington argue over ABM (see Laird telcon)

Pres approves HK recommendation for follow-up to NSSM 3 with further NSSMs on US strategic posture. [One study would be on "US Strategic Capabilities" - to obtain analyses of less than all-out nuclear conflicts and of measures of war outcome other than the number of dead, i.e. extend the doctrine of strategic sufficiency to situations the Pres might actually face. The other study would be on the Relationship of Strategic and Theatre Forces in NATO - to analyze in depth the contribution of strategic forces and tactical nuclear forces to deterring and coping with conventional and tactical nuclear wars etc]

July 3 HK invites Gov. Dewey to serve on Disarmament Advisory Council, says we can get by 5-6 years or so but another 10 years of military deterioration will put US in very difficult position diplomatically

July 8 NSSM 64 asks for the follow-on studies evaluating (a) US capability to deter and respond to less than all-out Soviet attacks; (b) a range of possible war outcome measures such a surviving military and other economic assets; (c) command and control adequacy. Due Oct 1

NSSM 65 asks for the analysis of relationship among strategic, tactical nuclear and conventional forces for deterring or defending NATO

July 10 Sen. Percy urges MIRV moratorium and ABM delay (HK argues against)

July 15 Pres asks HK to meet with Howard Hughes re Safeguard ABM (Hughes against deployment)

Aug. 6 US Senate approves authorization for SAFEGUARD ABM by 51-49.

Aug. 12 Pres. letter to Kiesinger affirming LBJ understandings (ltr of 9/9/68) on consultations between US and FRG on use of nuclear weapons; matter to remain secret; issue raised during Kiesinger visit.

Sep. 15 Pres. approves HK recommendation that US confirm to UK existing understandings with regard to consultation on use of nuclear weapons; Nixon letter to Wilson (similar to US-FRG exchange).

Strategic Policy - 1969

Oct. 11 NSDM 26 establishes DPRC to review diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of defense strategies, budgets, and deployments.

Oct. 21 DPRC meets to discuss procedures, FY 71 DOD Budget, and interagency involvement in 5-Year Force and Program Plan. (Packard not ready to discuss SAFEGUARD.)

Nov. 13 DPRC meets to discuss FY 71 programs.

Nov. 17 HK tells Laird that President has approved Phase II of SAFEGUARD ABM and SALT delegation should guide themselves accordingly (telcon).

Nov. 25 Presidential announcement of policy on chemical and biological defense policies and program (will ask the Senate to approve the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and renounce deadly biological weapons-DOD will study options for disposing existing bacteriological weapons).

Nov. 26 HK transmits to Pres. latest NIE on Soviet strategic attack forces. HK argues that NIE process is faulty and has produced superficial study: "...the most serious defect is the lack of sharply defined clearly-argued discussions of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet strategic forces. Admittedly, it is harder to be precise about Soviet deployment objectives or war planning than about the wing span of a bomber prototype. But there is evidence relevant to these questions - ranging from studies of missile silo orientation to analyses of power relationships in the Politburo - and it should be reflected." President totally agrees noting that "This report is virtually useless except for a superficial mindless recitation of what we know from the daily press - i.e., that the USSR is building lots of new missiles".

Dec. 9
* Laird reports Soviet SS-11 test confirms CEP of one mile (telcon).

* DPRC discusses budgeting for SAFEGUARD and new strategic bomber.

Strategic Policy - 1969

Dec 15 ABM wins key vote in Senate, 45-36.

Dec 19 DPRC meets on budgeting for Safeguard. HK stresses that Pres. wants to go ahead with Phase II.

HK tells Laird that Pres. wants Phase II of Safeguard ABM started; level doesn't make that much difference. Pres. wants principle of area defense established (telcon).

Dec 29 NSSM 54 Part I concludes that US naval shipbuilding industry is adequate in total capacity but woefully backward in adopting modern production and management techniques used abroad, including in the USSR. However, Navy said to be introducing new techniques. Part II on US naval and merchant marine shipbuilding concludes that the US should not count on post-mobilization construction to meet wartime needs. (HK sends to Pres.)

Dec 30 HK tells Packard that Pres. wants some Phase II to include some area defense capability, if only for bargaining effect (telcon).

SALT/ARMS CONTROL - 1969

Jan. 23 RG considers NPT and decides US ratification does not require pressing other countries to adhere.

Jan. 29 NSC meeting on NPT. President favors NPT but is concerned about allies.

Feb. 5
* NSDM 6: Decision to ratify NPT. President submits NPT to Senate for ratification.

* NSSM 13: Position of key countries on the NPT.

Feb. 12 NSSM 20: Resumption of Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC).

Feb. 14 NSC meeting on strategic posture. President wants SALT papers within three months and wants no hint to Soviets that we are committed to having these talks.

Feb. 20
* HK tells Doty (telcon) to indicate support of arms control in talks with Arbatov. HK hopes scientists will behave if we take their concerns into account on ABM.

* NSSM 25: Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and Limited Test Ban Treaty.

March 5 Lynn memo on Modified Sentinel System.

March 6
* NSSM 28: US Position for Possible SALT Talks.

* RG meets on NPT and END.

March 8 HK and President (telcon) discuss advantage of ABM as protection for the deterrent. Fear that we may lose it in the Senate (later telcon).

March 12 NSC meeting on END issues (CTB, fissionable materials, seabeds).

March 15 Nixon letter to Gerard Smith, head of US delegation to END (result of NSSM 20) gives authority to take forthcoming position on seabeds treaty.

March 27
* Dobrynin tells Sen. Percy that US seems uninterested in SALT.

* Rogers says publicly that if Soviets give up their ABM, US would give up SAFEGUARD.

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

2.

April 7 Rogers says publicly that US plans to begin SALT talks in "late spring or early summer".

April 11 NSSM 41 asks study of Seabeds Arms Control Treaty.

April 21 Gerard Smith proposes (telcon) MIRV ban; HK asks about verifiability.

April 25 . RG discusses seabeds treaty.

. HK recommendation to President for slowing down
State's efforts to fix early date for arms talks,
so not to curtail US flexibility.

April 30 NSC meeting on ENDC and seabeds treaty. Defense opposes it; State supports it.

May 2 . Rogers (telcon) urges we start discussing SALT procedures with Soviets.

. HK backgrounder discusses SALT preparations, "most fundamental talks we have" with USSR.

May 5
HK analysis of Congressional pressure for
strategic arms moratorium with the Soviets:
"moratorium could be taken as an earnest of our
good faith. But persuasive arguments can be made
that by proceeding with our planned programs, we
actually strengthen our position in negotiations."

May 8
Rogers met w. Dobrynin promises date for SALT
NSSM 56 on uranium enrichment facilities.

May 14 NSSM 56 on uranium enrichment facilities.

May 21
Presidential directive to State re planned NSC
meeting (June 18) on NSSM 28: Develop approach
to be taken with Soviets on SALT timing; importance
of consultations with allies.

May 22 US submits draft seabeds treaty to ENDC.

May 23 Sen. Brooke makes strong pitch for MIRV moratorium (telcon).

May 24 Chronology of developments on talks with Soviets sent to President by HK to demonstrate bureaucratic momentum towards promising Soviets early date for SALT.

May 28 NSSM 59 on CBW arms control.

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

June 10 Memo to President summarizing state of SALT preparations

US cancels Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program

June 11
June 12

Rogers suggests July 31 to Dobrynin as target date for SALT.

RG meeting on SALT agrees that first NSC meeting on SALT will focus on scope of agreement and introduce itself to major issues. ACDA's "stop-where-we-are" proposal and other proposed packages would be used as illustrations

June 14 Henry Owen views on MIRV-SALT-ABM issues
HK memo to Pros. consulting delay on SALT
June 16 HK suggests creating MIRV panel (G. Smith telcon)

HK forwards staff analysis of deep undercurrent of worry among our allies on SALT. British "disturbed" and Germans "deeply agitated"

June 17
June 18

Sen. Brooke proposes resolution to ban MIRV deployment.

NSC meeting on SALT (NSSM 28)

Brooke tells HK (telcon) he had to submit MIRV ban resolution "as matter of conscience". 40 co-sponsors

June 19 RG meeting on verification (stop-where-we-are proposal). RG considers report, asks OSD/JCS to prepare counterarguments. SWWA looks good for US; therefore may not be negotiable. Steering Group is asked to prepare specific negotiating models and assess verification problems for NSC

MIRV panel meets to seek consensus on facts re MIRV testing and deployment

HK directive to State transmits President's desire that alternative SALT proposals based on the "limited, intermediate and comprehensive" options developed in NSSM 28 study be considered at 6/25 NSC meeting

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

June 24 Second meeting of MIRV panel considers consequences of MIRV flight ban

June 25 NSC meeting on SALT. Meeting reviews several specific SALT packages or options ranging from simple ICBM freeze to comprehensive SWWA. JCS leans toward limited options; ACDA favors comprehensive options; most favor LBJ Admin. position. Meeting considers need for US consultations with allies. HK urges going slow on SWWA option until further study. Options papers not yet good enough for presentation to allies.

June 26 HK proposes President reply to Sen. Brooke arguing against draft resolution proposing joint MIRV moratorium (Pres. signs reply)

HK proposes written guidance to State, DOD, ACDA on SALT and preparations for NATO consultations to follow-up 6/25 NSC meeting

June 27 NSDM 18 asks review of policy on underground testing

June 30-July 1 First round of US consultations with NATO allies on SALT

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

July 1 NSSM 62 asks for preparation of alternative negotiating positions for SALT based on NSSM 28 report and NSC discussion. NSSM asks for examples of limited, intermediate and comprehensive agreements, including SWWA, and assessment of each in terms of various criteria. Due by July 11

• Pres approves guidance proposed by HK on consultations with NATO allies on SALT

July 3
HK concurrence with some revisions to Gerard Smith on text of "Draft Presentation on Illustrative SALT Alternatives"

• Pres message to ENDC

July 7
HK sends to Pres a DOD paper on Soviet China-oriented ABM system. Soviets will probably agree with us in SALT that both countries should maintain a ballistic missile capability against PRC and third countries. Soviets have a stronger incentive to build a light ABM than we do.

July 8-9 Second round of US consultations with NATO allies on SALT (US presentation of illustrative positions)

July 10 UK draft convention to ban BW submitted to ENDC

• Third meeting of MIRV Panel considers questions re
Soviet MIRV capability

• Sen. Percy proposes MIRV moratorium and ABM delay (telcon)

• Gromyko foreign policy speech. HK describes as "temperate" and "on the whole positive as regards relations with the United States" though no advance seen on Middle East, Vietnam, Europe and arms control

• HK sends report to Pres on sessions with NATO allies on SALT. NATO reactions fall into two distinct attitudes: "Some were mainly impressed with what seemed to be a situation of 'parity' and others were more concerned with the new developments that threatened to upset the 'balance.' " "The principle preoccupation of the Europeans, however, seems to be whether SALT will undermine their own security"

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

July 17
RG reviews five alternative SALT negot. proposals developed by NSSM 62 study. Issue is whether opening SALT phase should be exploratory or specific negotiation

July 21
Pres. letter to Gerard Smith stresses verification, importance of criteria of strategic sufficiency, and willingness to consider both quantitative and qualitative limits on both offensive and defensive: "...I will judge the resulting relationship of US-Soviet strategic forces in terms of the criteria for self-sufficiency that I have established...I will accept limitations on our forces only after I have assured myself of our ability to detect Soviet failure to implement limitations...I am determined to avoid...divisive disputes regarding Soviet compliance or non-compliance...the margin of uncertainty must be reasonable..."

* Memo creates Verification Panel in view of USG differences over reliability of verification

* HK explains President's approach on verification to Richardson (telcon). Pres. wants concrete facts about verifiability

* HK report to Pres on consultations with NATO allies on SALT (country-by-country): "The allies have all expressed satisfaction with the way in which we are handling this...certain specific reservations...but in general seem confident...The British and Canadians were most eager to have us negotiate bans on ABM and MIRV..."

July 22

July 22

First meeting of Verification Panel discuss broad issues, asks for technical report by Working Group

Aug 6
US Senate approves authorization for Safeguard ABM by 51-49

Aug 8
Second VP meeting holds initial discussion of first draft of Verification Report. HK stresses purpose is to clarify factual base before making policy choices. VP asks working group to evaluate US capability to monitor NSSM 62 options.

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Aug 29</td>
      <td>Third VP meeting reviews draft, asks for revisions of MIRV panel report</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 3-5</td>
      <td>Seabeds treaty: Soviets want 3-mile limit; US wants 12-mile limit. Telcons with G. Smith, Laird, Rogers discuss compromise</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 6</td>
      <td>Pres. decides backstopping of SALT talks to be vested in the USC Comte of the NSC and that policy issues would remain with NSC. HK advised Pres. that State option would have "circumvented" the NSC and nullified its procedures (i.e. Rogers had wanted group under his own Chairmanship)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 10</td>
      <td>At NSC mtg, Pres. asks for a quarterly report on Soviet strategic forces from CIA</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 19</td>
      <td>MIRV panel redraft of VP paper "Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban"</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 22</td>
      <td>HK memo to Pres. analyzes Soviet stalling on SALT. Shift in Soviet attitude between July and Aug. Soviets may feel no urgency about SALT: "...there is no persuasive evidence for being very optimistic ...the Soviets have not been responsive to the concept of an era of negotiation, despite some moderately toned speeches..."</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 23</td>
      <td>HK memo to Pres. on UK-Dutch-FRG gas centrifuge project. US has potential problems with UK over transfer of US information or equipment without US consent and safeguards against diversion of enriched uranium</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 26</td>
      <td>HK sends Pres. CIA analysis on PRC 9/22 nuclear test: PRC "now sufficiently advanced in their technology to undertake the complexities of an underground test program..."</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>HK memo to Harlow urges tight coordination of agency communications with Hill on MIRV and SALT if Pres. to remain in control</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 29</td>
      <td>NSC staff analysis of Soviet seabeds proposal</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>4th VP meeting</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 7</td>
      <td>US and USSR submit joint draft treaty banning nuclear weapons from ocean floor to ENDC</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 8</td>
      <td>NSC meetings on Verification study</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Oct 11 NSDM 26 creates DPRC to review diplomatic, political, military and economic consequences of defense strategies, budgets and deployments

Oct 20 Pres. receives Dobyrnin; latter suggests Helsinki
Nov 17 for SALT opening

Oct 24 HK directive to State, DOD, ACDA conveying Prs
decisions on SALT: VP to be permanent, SALT
backstopping comte under the USC to be permanent;
NATO allies to be consulted

Oct 25 US and USSR announce agreement to open SALT in Helsinki on Nov 17

HK report to Pres. that Pompidou, Wilson and Brandt
have now received private Pres. messages advising
them in advance of Sov proposal to begin SALT in
Helsinki

Oct 28 Harold Brown's views on SALT sent to HK

Pres. signs (dated 10/30) guidance to State, DOD, ACDA re speculation on unilateral ban on MIRV test program: "...carefully avoid any statements... which might add to the speculation..."

Oct 30 HK sends Erlichman complete wrap-up of USG statements on SALT, demonstrating problems with State on this issue

HK explains SALT, Soviet build-up to AFL/CIO
Executive Council

RG considers NSSM 59 paper on CBW. Paper to be reworked

Oct 31 VP meeting

Nov 4 VP meets and considers Evaluation Report (veri-fiability of SALT options)

HK meets Doty et al, who report Soviet interest in
SALT reflected at Pugwash

*Oct 24 Pres. says he had told Rogers that MIRV was the issue we really want to hold the line on.

**Oct 28 Laird complains that G. Smith wants moratorium on everything (telcon)

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Nov 5 HK asks Rathjens, Ruina and Garwin to examine
MIRV moratorium idea (HK/Rathjens telcon)

Nov 6 HK approves DOD-suggested revisions re Belgian draft on the NPG consideration of nuclear weapons use. NPG will also consider the UK-FRG paper on guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons

Nov 10 Announcement concerning status of uranium enrich-
ment facilities within AEC

HK explains to Mitchell why MIRV question can't be separated from questions of ABM, ELINT, radar, etc (telcon)

NSC reviews SALT options (options that limit numbers, options that limit numbers and ban MIRVs and one option that reduces numbers). Pres. skeptical of MIRV ban as freezing Soviet edge unless Soviet ABM is limited

Nov 12 NSDM 33 gives instructions for preliminary SALT talks. Objective is to develop work program. Discussion may include all offensive and defensive systems, quantitative and qualitative aspects, including MIRV restraints. Pres. is committed to area defense component of Safeguard. Verification is the key. Pres. also sends ltr to G. Smith: "I view arms limitation talks in the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union...progress in arms limitation must be accompanied by progress in the solution of critical political problems..."

Nov 17 HK tells Laird that Pres. has approved Phase II of Safeguard and our SALT delegation should guide themselves accordingly (telcon)

Pres. briefs Congressional leadership on SALT

First round of SALT opens in Helsinki. (HK Cong. briefing as well). Pres. message for Smith at the beginning of the talks: "...we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies...We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems....We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties..."

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Nov 18 NSC meeting on CBW. JCS sees CBW limit as to US
advantage

Nov 24 Presidium of Supreme Soviet ratifies NPT, NPT
signed in ceremonies by Podgorny in Moscow and
Nixon in Washington

Nov 25 NSDM 35 declares new policy on Chemical Warfare and Biological Research. No first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons (not covering riot control agents and herbicides; Geneva protocol to be submitted for ratification). US renounces all use and stocks of biological weapons -- only R & D for defensive purposes - and joins in UK draft convention banning use of BW.

Nov 26 HK briefs WH staff on SALT and CBW

HK tells Doty that if professors nit-pick on
teargas, Geneva Protocol won't get ratified.
No chance of doing it until war is over (telcon)

Nov 28 HK report to Pres. on first round in SALT (G.
Smith's views). Sovs seemed prepared to talk
about complex problems including interrelationship
of various weapons systems and verification. But
Sovs have also opened up possibility of impasse
by raising NATO arrangements

Dec 3 HK impression of first round of SALT one of "serious tone of the Soviet delegation, though...also...some of their positions could pose difficulties in the next phase of discussions..."

Dec 8 Pres press conf (mainly on Vietnam, with numerous questions as well on Agnew criticizing the press). On SALT, Pres defends US request for postponement as necessary to develop positions on issues and he cites prospects of the talks as "better than I anticipated they would be when the talks began."

Dec 15 HK sends Pres. G. Smith's third report on SALT: Sovs have avoided raising MIRV; Sovs have virtually reversed their thinking on ABMs since the Glassboro conversations; however, Smith feels it is premature to make a judgment on Soviet intentions though Sovs seem to want to end this round on an harmonious note. Pres. writes: "Gerry - Don't let them get a cheap 'Glassboro' type communique - which will read well now and look bad on the action side a year from now."

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Dec 16 President meets with GAC, says SALT is a "blue chip matter."

* Laird complains that ACDA is claiming that toxins are not chemicals, when UN acknowledges that they are (telcon).

Dec 18 HK backgrounder explains SALT policy-making process.

Dec 19 Soviets insist on Helsinki for SALT site, then agree to Vienna after White House insists (telcon).

Dec 29 Pres. meets with G. Smith on SALT; Smith briefing to press.

Dec 31 NSSM 85 directs study of all aspects of US policy and programs re toxins, as follow-up to NSSM 59 study and in light of NSDM 35.