[N]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Dirk Stikker -2- January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

Also, we would underrate at our risk the suspicion that existed of our motives--particularly in Germany. He had been shocked by the distrust he had found in his visit there during the previous week. Strauss, Hopf and Adenauer had been beside themselves about the Nassau accord. They also were extremely critical of Secretary McNamara. Schroeder was more reasonable. Their worry was not only the fear of a Directorate. It was above all concern about the provisions with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. They were afraid that assigning the tactical weapons to NATO instead of the present bilateral arrangement might be the first step towards atomic disengagement.

(Note: I am not sure I followed this point, but I am putting it down as I understood it.)

They were also restless about the intimations that a NATO nuclear commander would be appointed.

Stikker had urged the Germans to be more trusting. Instead of ascribing bad motives to us they should ask specific questions and seek satisfactory answers. This had been done. He thought the policy enunciated by Secretary Ball the previous day had a good chance of being a basis for progress.

It was important, however, not to try to do too many things simultaneously and to avoid the impression of trickiness. He

simultaneously and to avoid the impression of thickness. He

It was important, however, not to try to do too many things at once, a good chance of being a paste for progress.

He thought the policy emulated by Secretary Bell the brevions questions and seek satisfactory answers. This had been done. Instead of articulating bad motives to us they should ask specific Stikker had urged the Germans to be more trusting. Instead commander would be aboarded.

They were also restless about the intimations that a NATO butting it down as I understood it.)

(Note: I am not sure I followed this point, but I am might be the first step towards some disengagement. weapons to NATO instead of the present fraternal arrangement nuclear weapons. They were afraid that assigning the tactical apone all concern about the hostilities with respect to tactical their work was not only the fear of a Directorate. It was critical of Secretary McNamara. Schroeder was more reasonable. themselves about the Nauau accord. They also were extremely the brevions week. Strana, Hoh and Adenauer had been pleased shocked by the contrast he had found in his visit there during existed of our motives—particularly in Germany. He had been Vize, we would understate at our risk the assumption that

January 15, 1963 Conversation with Dirk Stikker -3- January 21, 1963

[A] PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

January 12, 1963

was concerned about the reference in Secretary Ball's speech
that all pretargeted forces be assigned to SACEUR. Did this
mean the Germans would lose the F-104's? Also, there had been
a phrase that it was "not now" contemplated to withdraw tacti-
cal nuclear weapons. This was bound to magnify fears. He had
succeeded in getting the phrase eliminated. He hoped it was
a drafting problem and did not reflect an American long-range
intention.

He also thought it was unwise that we proposed to hold
back target information until NATO nuclear forces existed.
This might take years and in the meantime pressures would
continue to mount.

I said that I had had the impression that target informa-
tion was being given. Stikker replied that the information
was very vague and dealt only in gross figures. The Europeans
were in no position to judge whether all targets of interest to
them were being covered. The NATO Atomic Committee had been
stillborn. The United States had never supplied any information
to it. This had to be remedied. Also, a way had to be found
to give military advice to the Secretary General.

Stikker was so eager to get some of these problems settled
in a straightforward manner because otherwise German insistence

in a straightforward manner because otherwise German inattentiveness
Stikker was so eager to get some of these problems settled
to give military advice to the Secretary General.

This had to be remedied. Vfao, a way had to be found
stillborn. The United States had never abdicated any information
them were being annulled. The NATO Atomic Committee had been
were in no position to judge whether all targets of interest to
was very vague and dealt only in gross figures. The Enormous
tion was being given. Stikker replied that the information
I said that I had had the impression that target information
continue to mount.

This might take years and in the meantime breaches would
pack target information until NATO nuclear forces existed.

He also thought it was unwise that we proposed to hold
intention.

a drafting problem and did not reflect an American long-range
succeeded in getting the phrase eliminated. He proposed it was
cal nuclear weapons. This was pound to magnify fears. He had
a phrase that it was "not now", contemplated to withdraw tact-
mean the Germans would lose the B-104's? Vfao, there had been
that all pretargeted forces be assigned to SACENS. Did this
was concerned about the reference in Secretary Bell's speech

January 13, 1963

Conversation with Dirk Stikker -3- January 31, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

on a dominant role in NATO would increase. He was extremely
critical of France's contribution and attitude. Stikker urged
a thorough examination of the European and American points of
view without mental reservations along the lines of a
memorandum he had recently submitted to Washington.

Henry A. Kissinger

Henry V. Kissinger

A view without mental reservations along the lines of a
a thorough examination of the European and American points of
critical of France's contribution and attitude. Stikker urged
on a dominant role in NATO would increase. He was extremely

January 13, 1963
Conversation with Dirk Stikker
-4-
January 21, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL