CHAPTER I
THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES

The most constructive American policy since the end of World War II
has been the development of Atlantic relationships. Starting with the
Greek-Turkish aid program and the Marshall Plan, the United States com-
mitted itself to the reconstruction of Europe. Every post-war Administration
has promoted European unity. More recently, the United States has advanced
the "Grand Design" based on a partnership between an integrated Europe and
the United States. Partly as a result of these far-sighted policies, Europe
today is more prosperous than ever. Significant steps towards European
integration have been taken. The Common Market is a going concern. Until
President de Gaulle's veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market, a form
of political union seemed the logical next step. The Atlantic Alliance has
survived many crises and withstood many pressures.

The promises, then, are great. In the Atlantic area we are dealing with
countries of similar cultural background, sharing comparable values and in-
stitutions and with a high level of economic activity. In the relationship
of the peoples bordering the North Atlantic if anywhere, free peoples should
be able to demonstrate a unity which thrives on voluntary association and a

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dynamism unimaginable within the frame-work of a narrow conception of
the national interest. Western Europe and the United States, which gave
the concept of the nation state to humanity, could take the lead in pointing
the way to the more embracing associations which a technology of global
impact has made essential.

Yet in recent years the promise has been flawed by increasingly
sharp disputes among the allies. The absence of agreement on major policies
is striking. It is rare to find the major countries of NATO taking a similar
view on crucial issues. For a while Great Britain and the United States
favored a more "flexible" policy on Berlin than France and Germany did.
More recently the United States has moved closer to the German position. On
dismarmament, the U.S.-British view is rejected by France and greeted with
distrust and fear by the Federal Republic. The United States finds little
support for its policies outside of Europe: the issue of trade with Cuba
and the Communist world is a glaring example. The United States has made
a major effort to obtain allied support for its policies in South East Asia

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but the European support has been token. The United States and France are at loggerheads about the role of the United Nations. From Suez to the Congo, from Yemen to Malaysia, the Western allies have failed to agree on a common policy towards what has come to be called the Third World. European integration has been slowed while various schools of thought debate the relative merits of abstract constitutional concepts like federation and confederation. Basic issues of strategic doctrine have gone unresolved for years. The need to maintain a facade of unity has compounded frustrations.

This impasse has produced some ugly accusations on both sides of the Atlantic. President de Gaulle has been charged by some of his American critics with deliberately wrecking allied unity for the sake of old-fashioned notions of *grandeur*. His policy is described as being animated by nothing higher than a 19th century concept of nationalism. French spokesmen-- with limited support elsewhere in Europe--charge the United States with hiding hegemonial aspirations behind vague notions of Atlantic community. United States strategic views are said to mask a desire to keep open the

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option of a strictly bilateral settlement between the United States and
the Soviet Union over the heads of our European allies.

A debate conducted on this level makes it impossible to face the
real issues. Of course, in an alliance of sovereign states a measure
of disagreement is inevitable. But current disputes do not concern the
tactics for reaching an agreed goal. What is at stake is basic assumptions
about the nature of Atlantic relationships, the future of Europe and the
relative influence of the various partners, For the first time since
the war there exists an open challenge, not just to the technical imple-
mentation of American plans but to the validity of American conceptions.
The nations bordering the Atlantic have been brought face to face with
two questions not unlike those which each Western society has had to
deal with in its domestic affairs: How much unity do we want? How much
pluralism can we stand? Too formalistic a conception of unity risks
destroying the political will of the members of the Atlantic area. Too
absolute an insistence on national particularity must lead to a fragmenta-
tion of any common effort.

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There is no question that the abrupt tactics of the French President have severely strained the pattern of allied relationships which emerged after the war. Also, the United States has often been slow to adapt itself to the changed circumstances of a world transformed in part by the success of previous policies. United States actions have been highly ambivalent. On the one hand, we have been proclaiming the need for adaptation, on the other most United States remedies have involved primarily a modernization of familiar patterns. We have been slow to accept that fundamental changes have been taking place in the nature of alliances, in the character of strategy and in the relative weights of Europe and the United States. A new conception of allied relationships would have been necessary no matter who governed in Paris or in Washington.

No one man could have disrupted the Alliance by himself. The impact of particular statesmen aside, a farsighted policy will gear itself to dealing with these underlying forces. Reality demands close association between Europe and the United States whatever the vagaries of individual statesmen.

But it has happened often enough in Western history that an underlying

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community of interests was submerged by subsidiary rivalries. Ancient Greece foundered on this dilemma. Western Europe nearly tore itself apart before it submerged its rivalries. And now the Atlantic area faces the challenge of how to combine common action with a respect for diverse approaches.

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II. <u>The Change in the Nature of Alliances</u>

Since the end of World War II an important change has taken place
in the nature of alliances. In the past, alliances have been created
for three basic reasons: (1) To provide an accretion of power. According
to the doctrine of collective security, the wider the alliance, the greater
its power to resist aggression. (2) To leave no doubt about the alignment
of forces. It has often been argued that had Germany known at the beginning
of both World Wars that the United States--or even England--would join the
Allies, war would have been averted. (3) To provide an incentive for mutual
assistance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the national
interest.

To be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons, there was
some inconsistency among these requirements. The attempt to combine the
maximum number of states for joint action occasionally conflicted with
the desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation. The wider
the system of collective security, the more various were the motives
animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action

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proved to be. The more embracing the alliance, the more intense and direct
must be the threat which would produce joint action.

This traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age.
The requirements for tight command and control of nuclear weapons are to
some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states. The enormous
risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of traditional pledges of
mutual assistance.

As a result, many of the theories of nuclear control now current
within the Western Alliance have a tendency either to turn NATO into a
unilateral U.S. guarantee or to call into question the utility of the
Alliance altogether. American strategic thought verges on the first
extreme; some French theorists have hinted at the second.

As for the United States, official spokesmen have consistently
emphasized that the European contribution to the over-all nuclear strength
of the Alliance is negligible. European nuclear forces have been described

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as "provocative," "prone to obsolescence" and "weak."¹ For a considerable period after the advent of the Kennedy Administration, some high officials held the view that on nuclear matters the President might serve as the Executive Agent of the Alliance. Since then, the United States has made various proposals for nuclear sharing, the common feature of which has been the retention of the United States veto over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. The proposed NATO Multilateral Force is a good example.

However sensible such schemes may appear from the point of view of the division of labor, they would perpetuate American hegemony in nuclear matters within the Alliance. Allies are considered necessary not so much to add to over-all strength as to provide the possibility for applying power discriminately. In such a structure, American decisions must continue to be paramount. The policies of our allies must continue to be directed towards gaining influence over essentially American positions.

In other words, the predominant United States view is a sophisticated

¹For the classic indictment of Europe's national nuclear forces see Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor, June 16, 1962, _DOSB_, July 9, 1962, Vol. XLVII, No. 1202, pp. 64-69.

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adaptation of conditions of the late Forties and early Fifties. It is
designed to make our hegemony more bearable, not to alter it.

According to the opposing view, alliances have lost their significance altogether. The French theorist, General Gallois, has argued, for example, that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete.¹ Faced with the risk of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries to their fate.

This formula would mark the end of collective security and would be likely to lead to international chaos. In the face of the growing nuclear arsenals of the major protagonists, it would be idle to deny that the threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its credibility. The Gallois theory would, however, transform a degree of uncertainty into a guarantee that the United States would not come to the assistance of its

¹Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe", ORBIS, VII:2 (Summer 1963), pp. 226-249.

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allies, thus greatly simplifying an aggressor's calculation.

Moreover, in order to protect itself in this new situation, each
country would need to develop not only a nuclear arsenal of its own but
also foolproof procedures for assuring the Soviets that a given nuclear
blow did not originate from its territory. If Gallois is right, and each
country is unwilling to risk nuclear devastation for any ally, it will also
want to prevent itself from being triggered into nuclear war by a neighbor.

Thus each country will have a high incentive to devise methods to protect
itself against attacks based on misinformation. The Gallois theory would
lead to a multiplication of national nuclear forces side by side with the
development of methods of surrender or guarantees of non-involvement.

When views such as these carry influence on both sides of the
Atlantic, it is no accident that much of the debate on nuclear matters
within NATO turns on the issue of confidence. The United States tends
to ask those of its allies possessing nuclear arsenals of their own: If
you trust us, why do you need nuclear weapons of your own? The allies reply:

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If you trust us why are you so concerned about our possession of nuclear weapons? Since the answer must inevitably emphasize contingencies where either the goals or the strategy would be incompatible, the debate on nuclear control within NATO has been inherently divisive.

The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of one country poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises another. In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or of surrendering. If it resisted, it had to be prepared to accept the consequences in terms of physical damage and loss of life. A distant ally could be effective only if it was able to bring its strength to bear in the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants from the Alliance is the assurance that an attack on it will be considered a *casus belli*. It strives for deterrence by adding the strength of a distant ally to its own power. But, equally, each state has an incentive to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The range of modern

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weapons for the first time provides the technical possibility to combine
these objectives. In 1914 Belgium could not base its defense on a strategy
which transferred to Britain the primary risks of devastation. In the age
of intercontinental rockets this is technically feasible.

Part of the strategic dispute within the Alliance, therefore, involves
jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater of war
if deterrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit). A
conventional war confined to Europe must appear in a different light to
Americans than to Europeans who remember the casualty lists of two world
wars and on whose territory such a war would be fought. A nuclear exchange
which spares their territory may appear to Europeans a more attractive
strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent.
The interests of the Alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate sense. But
this does not guarantee the absence of sharp conflicts on methods to reach
these objectives.

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The destructiveness of modern weapons compounds this problem. In the past, a nation would come to the assistance of an ally because the ultimate consequences of inactivity were considered to be worse than the immediate risks of assistance. This was because it was feared that defeat of the ally would precipitate a relative decline in its world position and ultimately the nation's own defeat. In short, the consequences of resistance seemed preferable to the risks of inaction. With modern weapons it is not self-evident that the ultimate results of passivity will be worse than the immediate penalties of conflict. If the strategic doctrine of the Alliance relies on the threat of general nuclear war, the outbreak of a war involves risks which previously were associated with total defeat. But if an attempt is made to create a more flexible response, fuel is added to suspicions inseparable from a coalition of sovereign states. Color is lent to the argument that the senior partner takes his allies' interests less seriously than his own.

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In short, the destructiveness and range of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and neutralism. A wise alliance policy must take care that in dealing with one of these dangers it does not produce the other.

Indeed, the deepest problem of NATO, is that the pressures of the new technology run counter to traditional motions of national sovereignty. The risks of nuclear warfare may be too great to be reliably combined with what has heretofore been considered a key attribute of sovereignty; the unilateral right of a sovereign state to alter its strategic or political views. Unless a more embracing political structure is devised for the countries bordering the North Atlantic area, a gradual erosion of Allied cohesion seems inevitable.

The nature of alliances has changed in yet another way. In the past, one of the reasons for joining an alliance was to impose an additional obligation for assistance in time of need. Were each country's national interests completely unambiguous, it would know precisely on whose assistance it could count; a formal commitment would be unnecessary. Both

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the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront
and could act accordingly. Wars could not be caused by a misunderstanding
of intentions. They would occur only if the protagonists calculated the
existing power relationships differently.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unambiguous.
Often the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined
up against it; Germany in 1914 was genuinely surprised by the British
reaction to the invasion of Belgium. Occasionally the defenders could
not be certain of the extent of their potential support--as was the case
with the Allies in both wars regarding U.S. participation. Historically,
the existence of an understanding on this point, tacit or explicit, has
often been the determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the
decade prior to World War I, the staff talks between Britain and France,
which led to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean, were
one of the key factors in Britain's decision to enter the conflict in
August 1914. (Thus the talks achieved one objective of traditional

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alliances: to commit Britain to the defense of France. They failed in
another: to make the opposing alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)

One of the distinguishing features of the nuclear period is that
the national interest of the major powers has become less ambiguous. Neither
of the major nuclear countries can permit a major advance by its opponent
regardless of whether the area in which it occurs is formally protected by
an alliance or not. Neutral India was no less assured of American assistance
when the Chinese attacked than allied Pakistan would have been in similar
circumstances. In these conditions, the distinction between allies and
neutrals is likely to diminish. A country gains little from being allied
and risks little by being neutral.

This inevitably results in the weakening of allied cohesion, producing
what some have described as polycentrism. But polycentrism does not reflect
so much the emergence of new centers of physical power as the attempt by
allies to establish new centers of decision.

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The gap in military strength between the United States and its European allies has in fact widened, not narrowed, in the past decade. What *has* changed is the use to which this power can be put. The paradox of modern weapons technology is that states have a high capacity to destroy, but only a limited credibility for threats. And those issues where nuclear threats *are* credible are so clear-cut as to leave little doubt about the commitment of the major partner.

Polycentrism is virulent not because the world has ceased to be bipolar, but because with respect to nuclear weapons it essentially remains so. President de Gaulle is convinced that those circumstances in which the United States might be prepared to resort to its nuclear weapons cannot be fundamentally affected by his actions. In other words, the United States commitment need not be purchased by being conciliatory and cannot be hazarded by intransigence--within very wide limits at least.

Thus President de Gaulle sees little risk and considerable potential gain in political independence. In a curious way, it is possible for him

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to add American power to his own in pursuit of policies. Policies often
contradictory to those of the United States are thus in a sense supported
by the American nuclear umbrella--a fact which adds to the irony of the
situation and to the annoyance of some American policy-makers. Although
traditionally a state's diplomatic influence corresponded roughly to its
military strength, this is no longer inevitably the case. Influence
can now be achieved by using another country's protection even for policies
not in accord with the ally's preferences.

The frequent insistence of United States officials and commentators
that in the nuclear age an isolated strategy is no longer possible misses
the central point: it is precisely because of this that allies have un-
precedented scope for the pursuit of their own objectives. And the more
the detente--real or imaginary--proceeds, the more momentum these tendencies
will gather. We live in a curious world where neutrals enjoy most of the
protection of allies and allies aspire to have the same freedom of action
as do neutrals.

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### III. The Abstractness and Novelty of Modern Power

The destructiveness of modern weapons gives the strategic debate unprecedented urgency. The speed with which they can be delivered complicates the problem of command and control in a way unimaginable even a decade and a half ago. Doctrinal and technical disputes occur within each government. It is not surprising, then, that they should rend the Alliance as well.

The destructiveness of modern weapons has put into question traditional notions of the relationship between military power and diplomacy. Some argue that if the risks have become incomparably greater, the essential principles of strategy have stayed the same. For others, war has become unthinkable, and they ask that diplomacy settle all conflicts through the exercise of negotiating skill.

Each view has its difficulty. If massive quantitative changes can bring about qualitative ones, then the increase in destructiveness threatened by nuclear weapons must be considered crucial. A basic discontinuity is

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established when a statesman is compelled to risk tens of millions of lives instead of thousands, when his decision no longer involves the loss of a province but the survival of society itself. Even if the classic principles of strategy are not entirely outmoded, the statesman will inevitably be reluctant to put them to the test.

However, to say that the unqualified reign of diplomacy has begun is an equal oversimplification. If nuclear war has become the last resort of desperate men, this has not made diplomacy any easier. On the contrary, it has made it more intractable. In the past, unsuccessful negotiations never returned matters to their starting point; they called other pressures into play. But many of these pressures are no longer available, and thus diplomacy, too, has become less flexible. Where no penalty for non-compliance exists, there is no incentive to reach agreement. As statesmen have become increasingly reluctant to resort to war, negotiations have become more and more ritualistic.

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This situation reflects the basic paradox of the nuclear age: power has never been greater; it has also never been less useful. In the past the major problem for strategists was how to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary period the problem more frequently is how to apply power discriminately. But, no matter what spectrum of power the major contenders may have at their disposal, the fear of escalation is inescapable. The major nuclear powers have the capacity to destroy each other. But this fact works to reduce their ability to employ power because the threat is not credible and the risks are too great.

Consequently the primary purpose of modern weapons is deterrence: to prevent an undesirable course of action by a specific threat. However, even the nature of deterrence has been changed by the enormity of modern weapons.

In the past, a military threat was based on the possibility of victory. Under contemporary conditions, the primary problem is to convince the opponent that certain actions may lead to a war which *neither* side can win, rather than one which the aggressor is certain to lose. Diplomacy and strategy

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turn into a test of will. Deterrence becomes as much a psychological as a military problem. It depends on the aggressor's assessment of risks, not the defender's. A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a "genuine" threat interpreted as a bluff.

Moreover, if deterrence is successful, aggression does _not_ take place. It is impossible, however, to demonstrate why something has _not_ occurred. It can never be proved, for example, whether peace has been maintained because NATO pursues an optimum strategy or a marginally effective one. Finally, the longer deterrence lasts, the more credible becomes the argument that perhaps the Communists never intended to attack in the first place. An effective NATO deterrent strategy may thus have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the arguments of the quasi-neutralists.

Another element of discord is produced by the novelty of modern weapons. Never before in history has so much depended on weapons so new, so untested, so "abstract." Nuclear weapons have been exploded in wartime

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only on Japan, which did not possess means of retaliation. No one knows
how governments or people will react to a nuclear explosion under conditions
where both sides possess vast arsenals.

Moreover, modern weapons systems are relatively untested. During the
debate over the nuclear test ban treaty, a great deal of attention was
focused on the adequacy of nuclear warheads. In fact, the other components
of modern weapons systems contain many more factors of uncertainty. The
estimated "hardness" of Minuteman silos depends entirely on theoretical
studies. Of the thousands of missiles in our arsenal, relatively few of
each category have been tested under operational conditions. There is little
experience with salvo firing. Air-defense systems are designed without any
definite knowledge of the nature of the offense. A high proportion of the
phenomena discovered in nuclear testing have been "unexpected'.!"

The novelty of modern weapons gives disputes an abstract, conjectural,
almost metaphysical, cast. How does one threaten with solid-fuel missiles?
As these are always in an extreme state of readiness, how does one demonstrate
an increase in preparedness such as historically served as a warning? From a

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technical point of view, it is highly probable that missiles can perform
most of the functions heretofore assigned to airplanes. The shift to missiles
and the elimination of airplanes envisaged by the former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric¹ makes a great deal of sense technically. But has
adequate attention been given to the kind of diplomacy which results--parti-
cularly in crisis situations--when the retaliatory threat depends entirely
on solid-fuel missiles in underground silos? During the Cuban missile crisis,
dispersing SAC planes to civilian airports proved an effective warning. What
will be an equivalent move when our strategic forces are composed entirely of
missiles?

Similar intangibles underlie much of the strategic debate between
some of our European allies and the United States. Since 1961 the United
States has insisted that deterrence was best achieved by posing a credible
risk. And it has related credibility to whether the risks were tolerable if
deterrence fails. For a variety of reasons, many Europeans have argued that

¹"Our Defense Needs: The Long View", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, p.373

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deterrence is most effective if the threat is extreme. The promise of all-out retaliation has seemed to most of our allies a more certain guarantee than the promise of retaliation carefully proportioned to the challenge.

A later chapter will deal with these problems in greater detail.

For present purposes, it is enough to point out that they involve psychological judgments not subject to clear-cut proof. And their intimacy is such that an ever-widening gap has appeared between the sophistication of United States technical studies and the capacity of allied leaders to absorb their intricacy.

It is unlikely that even the most conscientious allied leader--or U.S.

President, for that matter--can devote as many hours to a given problem as the weapons analyst has had years to study it. The decision-maker will have to work with approximations, and his decisions will have to be made under stress. Doctrines of too great complexity can bring about the psychological collapse of those with the final responsibility for implementing them--as happened with the elaborately intricate Schlieffen Plan on which Germany based its strategy in 1914. The Plan, for all its careful calculations and

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painstaking rehearsals, provided for every contingency except the psychological
strain on the Commander.

The United States-European dialogue on strategy is thus confused
by ambiguities which are essentially psychological in nature. The United
States tendency to treat political and psychological problems as if they
were primarily technical exacerbates disagreements beyond their intrinsic
significance. Acquiescence in American strategic hegemony can have two
meanings: It can either represent a sincere commitment to Atlantic partner-
ship or disguise a neutralist wish to abdicate responsibility. Many of
those who applaud our views may do so for reasons which will not prove
very comforting in the long run. For the American nuclear umbrella, now
sometimes exploited by President de Gaulle for his own purposes, can also
be used--and more dangerously for the West--to support policies amounting
to neutralism. In many countries it is the leaders and groups traditionally
most committed to national defense who have developed views on strategy
which challenge American concepts while some of those most ready to accept

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U.S. strategic hegemony have in the past been the least interested in making
a serious defense effort. An understanding policy must therefore go beyond
the technical analysis of weapons systems. Its test will be the political
vitality of the members of the Alliance.

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## IV. The Growth in European Strength and Self-Confidence

The most important change in United States-European relations is due to one of the great successes of America in the post-war period: the restoration of European vigor and self-confidence. Through a series of far-sighted and bold measures starting with the Greek-Turkish aid program and culminating in the Marshall Plan, the United States helped Europe over the shock of six years of war.

But as with all great achievements, there is the danger that their memory may become an obstacle to the creativeness required by new situations. Many of those Americans most responsible for European recovery are finding it difficult to adjust to conditions where American leadership is no longer unquestioned. To many of them the face to a challenge to American pre-eminence is almost as irritating as its content. They are still subject to the distortion of perspective produced by the immediate post-war period when the end of America's isolation coincided with the temporary loss of Europe's ability to play an effective international role or to protect

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itself against foreign danger. Every European country--with the exception of Britain--had known defeat at one time or another during World War II. Every country--again with the exception of Great Britain--had been, at some point, the victim of foreign occupation. Societies were shattered. Europe was dependent on the United States for its material well-being, domestic cohesion and safety from invasion.

United States-European relationships took on their present cast during this period. It has, of course, never been correct to speak of Europe as if it were an entity and as if every country were going through the same process. Considerable differences exist as to the vigor with which European countries attempt to assert their own role in international affairs. But whatever the differences among European countries--some of which are becoming significant now--the trend is clearly in the direction of increased European assertiveness. To be sure, many of the actual disputes which now rend the Alliance have been produced by the strong-willed personality of President de Gaulle. But equally many other Europeans have muted views not too different from those of the French

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President, because they object to his style of government and his
diplomatic methods.

In itself this is not undesirable. For in the immediate post-war
years Atlantic relationships developed on a basis which was psychologically
unhealthy in the long run. Faced with an impotent Europe, the United States
came to deal with its allies on a paternalistic basis. This involved a
certain self-righteousness, impatient of criticism, eager above all to
remove the obstacles to the achievement of whatever plans we might have at
the moment. As a result, the United States and Europe too often conducted
their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured
in America.

In part this American attitude was both the cause and the product of
some bad habits developed by Europe during the period of unchallengeable
American hegemony. The policy of our European allies essentially consisted
of influencing American decisions rather than developing conceptions of
their own. This in turn, produced querulousness and insecurity. At times,

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our allies seemed more eager to extract American reassurance than to encourage
a consistent United States policy. Excessive suspicion was coupled with
formal pliancy. For a decade, European statesmen showed whatever dis-
agreement they felt by delaying the implementation of agreed measures rather
than by confronting the issues before the Alliance. This led to a negativism
characterized by a greater awareness of risks than of opportunities and by
a general fear of any departure from the status quo.

The period of American hegemony came to an end in the late Fifties
and early Sixties under the impact of four events in which United States
policy had played a major role: European economic recovery, European
integration, decolonization and the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath.
Each of these events illustrates that even the most successful policies
create their own dynamism. Results cannot always be judged by the in-
tentions of those who start a historical process, even less by their public
pronouncements.

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European recovery was promoted by the United States in a constructive and far-sighted spirit. Europe was seen as a potential partner which could eventually share with us the burdens and responsibilities of world leadership. Most pronouncements of American purposes reflected our expectation that after its recovery Europe would no longer require American economic assistance but would continue to pursue parallel, if not identical, policies.

This was, however, always unlikely. With the growth of European economic vigor, Europe's traditional political dynamism was bound to return. The trend was given impetus by the existence of an intact younger generation--the first since the carnage of World War I--eager to assert its own view of the world.

The process of European economic integration magnified Europe's new-found assertiveness. The orthodox view of the European Economic Community was that it should be "outward looking" and that its economic strength would buttress all free peoples on a non-discriminatory basis.

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However, it is the essence of a Common Market that it will inevitably maintain _some_ tariff barriers to the outside world. As internal barriers are lower than external ones, a measure of discrimination is inherent in the creation of any common market. Moreover, the reduction of external barriers will have to be the result of negotiations. And, obviously, the stronger the economic unit, the more formidable its bargaining power.

The increasing power of the Common Market was bound to complicate economic negotiations with Europe--a fact not to be eliminated by epithets like "inward looking". It is no accident that in most economic negotiations--whether they concerned Britain's entry into the Common Market or the Kennedy Round--the position of the Common Market Commission has been close to that of France despite profound differences about the organization of Europe. The economic interests of the Common Market--by its own inner logic--often coincide with the political goal of France to vindicate a more independent role for Europe. Many American spokesmen talk as if a

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politically unified Europe making decisions by some sort of majority voting of the European states would end the current impasse in Atlantic relationships.¹ The experience of the Common Market suggests that this conclusion is far from inevitable and that France might have little to fear from such a system.

Then, too, the process of decolonization, in which we often sided against our European allies, has produced a new assertion of European vigor. Ironically, the end of Europe's colonial empire has led to a reversal of roles between us and Europe in many underdeveloped countries.

Some European leaders are now repeating the American argument of the Fifties: that the larger interests of the free world are sometimes served by allowing for differing, sometimes even competing, Western approaches to the emerging nations.

This attitude, too, was inevitable, even when it bears the marks of de Gaulle's high-handed tactics. Having shed their colonial possessions,

¹See below, Chapter

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often under American pressure, our European allies have a psychological
bloc against running major risks on behalf of areas from which they have
been so recently ejected. As a result of the process of decolonization,
our European allies have ceased to think of themselves as world powers.
They possess neither the resources nor the domestic framework for distant
enterprises. No European government is likely to be convinced that its
security is jeopardized by events in a different part of the globe. Each
European ally has a general concern in the maintenance of peace. But
this will produce at best token support for such enterprises as the war
in South East Asia. The motive of our European allies will be to obtain
a veto over United States actions, and their major concern will be that
United States policy not involve them in a direct show-down--a policy
which will always incline them to avoid even the semblance of risk.
Henceforth, we are the only member of NATO with worldwide interests,
and this produces inevitable differences in perspective.

In a way the United States is now paying the price for the self-
righteous and shortsighted policies best epitomized by the Suez fiasco

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of 1956. This illustrates that the penalties in foreign policy while inevitable are often deferred and must be paid by people different from those bearing the major responsibility. That this policy reflected a wide consensus at the time should give pause to those who today conduct policies geared to overcoming immediate symptoms of crisis while neglecting the long-run implications of their actions.

Finally, relations with the Communist world have changed dramatically since the Cuban missile crisis. Most of our European allies have drawn the conclusion that the two main nuclear powers will avoid a direct confrontation for an indefinite period. This conviction has been strengthened by the hope in some, and the suspicion in others, that bilateral United States-Soviet dealings are under way. Such an atmosphere of detente removes the previous urgency for Allied cohesion. As the Soviet threat appears to recede, the scope for national action widens proportionately.

As the impression grows that bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations are under way, Third Force tendencies in Europe are stimulated. The issue

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is not whether the United States would make a "deal" contrary to the
interests of its allies. It is rather that in an alliance of sovereign
states, each ally will think that it is a better judge of its interests
than any partner, however close. No country will be prepared to let
another settle what it considers its vital interests. As the detente
develops, only wise and restrained statesmanship can mitigate its
corrosive impact on North Atlantic unity.

Thus major structural changes have occurred in U.S.-European
relations which perhaps are exploited by President de Gaulle but which
have not been caused by him. On both sides of the Atlantic this has
led to ambivalence caused by a persistence of old attitudes in new
circumstances. It is always difficult for a country which has enjoyed
a hegemonial position to adjust to a loss of pre-eminence. Grown ac-
customed to finding its views unchallenged, it tends to identify its
policies with the general interest. A network of connections with
people accustomed to the relationships of dominance reinforces the

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conviction. The quest for autonomy appears as distrust; independance
seems indistinguishable from self-will. Why should a country want
freedom of action when its interests cannot diverge from those of the
dominant partner?

By the same token, countries striving to alter a relationship
of tutelage will be tempted to emphasize the burdensome aspects of the
existing relationship and to neglect its benefits. They will not credit
the motives of the senior partner and look for hegemonial designs in
sincere efforts to achieve a consensus. This process makes it difficult
to confront the central issue. Which Atlantic structure is more vital
in the long run: one that deprives all partners (except the United States)
of the capacity of autonomous action or one that grants the capacity for
autonomous action but seeks to reduce the desire for it? The answer
to this question will determine the shape of Atlantic relationships for
decades to come.

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V. Differences in Historical Perspective

Perhaps the deepest cause of transatlantic misunderstandings
is a difference in historical perspective. Americans live in an
environment uniquely suited to an engineering approach to policymaking.
As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any
problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With
such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any
inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their
merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a
problem may mortgage the future--especially as there is sufficient optimism
to assume that even should this prove to be the case, it will still be
possible to overcome the new problem when it materializes. When applied
to foreign policy, such an approach tends to consider division of labor
its own justification. Allies are considered factors in a security ar-
rangement; their utility is measured in terms of their contribution to
a common effort, whose criteria are often determined abstractly with

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each nation assigned a specific role with little regard to its history
or domestic structure.

But, Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying
to the fallibility of human foresight. In European history, the re-
cognition of a problem has often defined a dilemma rather than pointed
to an answer. The margin of survival of European countries has been
more precarious than that of the United States. Each country--with the
possible exception of Great Britain--has known national catastrophe as
America has not. European reasoning is thus likely to be more com-
plicated and less confident than ours. Our European allies think of
themselves not simply as components of security schemes but as expressions
of an historical experience. Policies that neglect their sense of
identity may destroy the psychological basis of whatever common effort
is attempted to be organized.

This explains some of the strains in Atlantic relationships.
Americans tend to be impatient with what seems to them Europe's almost

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morbid obsession with the past, while Europeans sometimes complain about
a lack of sensitivity and compassion on the part of Americans. In the
fall of 1963, our newspapers were filled with derisory comments about
French maneuvers then taking place. The scenario of these maneuvers
supposed that an aggressor force was attacking France through Germany.
France's allies had surrendered. As the aggressor's armies were approaching
her borders, France resorted to her nuclear weapons.

It is, of course, easy to ridicule this scenario by contrasting
the small size of the French bomber force with the magnitude of the
disaster envisaged. But the crucial issue is not technical. It arises
from the fact that France has undergone shattering historical experiences
with which Americans find it difficult to identify. The scenario of the
French maneuvers recalled importantly--perhaps too rigidly--France's
traumatic experience of 1940, when foreign armies attacked all along
the Western front and France's allies collapsed. The British Fighter
Command remained in England; the fact that this critical decision was wise

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does not affect the basic psychological point. Moreover, the French
disaster came at the end of two decades in which France almost single-
hanedly shouldered the responsibility for the defense of Europe while
her erstwhile allies withdrew into isolation or offered strictures about
France's obsession with security. The nightmare that some day France
might again stand alone goes far deeper than the obstinate ill-will of
a single individual.

A comparable problem exists in Germany. Washington has at times
shown signs of impatience toward the German leaders and their constant
need for reassurance. Secretary Rusk has been reported more than once
to be restless with what he has called the "pledging sessions" which the
Germans seem so often to demand. However, insecurity is endemic in the
German situation. A divided country with frontiers that correspond to
no historical experience, a society which has lived through two disastrous
defeats and four domestic upheavals in 40 years cannot know inward
stability. The need to belong to something, to rescue some predictability
out of chaos, is overwhelming. The memories of our allies should be factors

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as real in the discussions of our policy-makers as the analysis of weapons
systems.

The importance of this difference in historical perspective is
compounded by the continuing disparity in strength between the two sides
of the Atlantic. While it has become fashionable to speak of Europe's
new-found equality, it is important not to take it too literally. Europe
**has** gained in strength over the past decade and a half. It can and should
play an increasingly responsible role. But for the foreseeable future we
are likely to be by far the stronger partner.

It is important to be clear about this because it requires that
the United States show unusual tact and steadiness. Many of our allies
have been guilty of unilateral actions far more flagrant than ours. But
when we act unilaterally, disarray in the Alliance is almost inevitable.
Sudden, drastic, and, above all, unilateral changes in U.S. strategic
doctrine--whatever their merit--create a sense of impotence and are
resisted as much for symbolic as for substantive reasons. Actions without
adequate consultation--such as the removal of IRBM's from Italy and Turkey

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or the withdrawal of troops from Germany--increase the pressure for more autonomy. Bilateral dealings with the Soviets, from which our allies are excluded or about which they are informed only at the last moment, are bound to magnify Third Force tendencies. When our allies oppose such practices, it is not necessarily because they disagree with our view but because they are afraid of creating a precedent for unilateral changes in other policies. (Even statements of substantive disagreement may be a smoke screen for deeper concerns.)

Moreover, many allied leaders who have staked their prestige on U.S. policies can suffer serious domestic consequences if we change them drastically. This causes the voice of Europe to reach us in extremely distorted form. President de Gaulle sharpens all disputes and even creates them in pursuit of his policy of independence. But some other leaders do not give full expression to their disquiet because they do not want to undermine further the solidarity on which their security is thought to depend. Whereas France exaggerates her disagreements, some other countries obscure theirs. Thus the dialogue with Europe is often conducted on false

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issues, while real issues--like the future of Germany, or arms control, or the role of tactical nuclear weapons--are swept under the rug in order not to magnify the existing discord.

We, in turn, are faced with the problem that technology and political conditions are changing so rapidly that no policy can be maintained over an indefinite period of time. How to shape policies that are responsive to change while maintaining the confidence of our allies? How to develop a sense of unity from the diverse conceptions of so many proud peoples?

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## VI. Whither the Atlantic Alliance?

Nothing is more dangerous than the fashionable theory that all problems in the Atlantic Alliance have been caused by one man and that the major problem is to await his disappearance from the scene so that the traditional patterns can be resumed. No doubt President de Gaulle's style of diplomacy, which is not really compatible with the requirements of coalition, has exacerbated tensions. The United States shares the responsibility through too much insistence on technical solutions and too little allowance for intangibles of political judgment and will.

However, it would be a mistake to confuse these symptoms with the causes. Regardless of the personalities of the leading statesmen, a redefinition of Allied relationships would have been inevitable. Any new act of construction, moreover, would involve stress. The danger is that an attempt may be made to solve new problems by applying traditional concepts. There is a great deal of talk about "unity," "community," or "indivisible interests." But the issue before the West is precisely to give these terms a new meaning. Invoking the need for unity will not change

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the fact that American and European interests are not identical outside
of Europe. Inveighing against exalting national sovereignty only
emphasizes the contradiction of United States policy which has nationalism
as the most reliable bulwark against Communist domination everywhere
except in Western Europe. Proclaiming indivisible interests does not
solve the problem of how allied cohesion can be maintained in negotiations
with a suddenly multifaceted Communism. Slogans of integration do not
answer the question of how in the era of nuclear weapons sovereignty
can be related to community. Above all, the United States will not for
long be able to evade this issue of how much of its own sovereignty it
is prepared to give up.

Under the impact of the strong personality of President de Gaulle,
it has become commonplace to speak of the recovery of Europe's strength
and self-confidence. American spokesmen never tire of emphasizing the
folly of an excessive estimate of Europe's power while many U.S. policies
seem based on the assumption that European vitality will be permanent
and that the only obstacle to Atlantic cohesion is the traditional form of

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European nationalism.

However, de Gaulle's policy may have produced an illusion of European strength and self-confidence which is more a reflection of his personality than of underlying factors. If one moves from Europe in the abstract to an examination of the individual European countries, it becomes apparent how precarious Europe's recovery really is. On the Iberian peninsula, stability may not survive two aged dictators. Italy's center-left coalition is tenuous; its capacity for major policy initiatives is limited. Its policy tends to confuse maneuvering with statesmanship and in times of crisis may verge on neutralism.

A post-de Gaulle France may be rent by internal schisms. Germany suffers from the absence of traditions and the pressures produced by a divided country. The vigor so noticeable in Europe today is very close in time to nihilism; European self-confidence is still precarious. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength by a neutralism which exalts impotence. To avoid both dangers and to create a new and more vital structure is the challenge before the Atlantic Alliance.

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Justifiable irritation with de Gaulle's tactics should not obscure the fact that he has asked an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others, it must first mean something to itself. Though de Gaulle has often acted as if he achieved identity by opposing our purposes, our definition of unity has occasionally carried overtones of tutelage.

Every great act of construction was an idea before it became a reality. Immediate crises must not become an obsession. The nations bordering the North Atlantic require above all a vision of their future. Only then will discussions of specific remedies prove meaningful.