THE REQUIREMENT OF DISARMAMENT

1. Because the significance of the President's Geneva proposal for reciprocal inspection of Military forces has been misunderstood, it might be desirable to set forth its implications against other efforts in this field.

2. The proposal:

"No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.

"The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the dangers of war and do not brighten the prospects of peace.

"Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subject of inspection and reporting.

"Questions suggest themselves.

"How effective an inspection system can be designed which would be mutually and reciprocally acceptable within our countries and the other nations of the world? How would such a system operate? What could it accomplish?

"Is certainty against surprise aggression attainable by inspection? Could violations be discovered promptly and effectively counteracted?

"We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear

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weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a
discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. We have not
as yet been able to discover any accounting or other inspection method
of being certain of the true budgetary facts of total expenditures
for armament. Our study of this problem is continuing. We by no
means exclude the possibility of finding useful checks in these fields.

"As you can see from these statements, it is our impression that
many past proposals of disarmament are more sweeping than can be
insured by effective inspection.

"Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present
to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for some-
thing that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great
sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

"I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates
from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly
possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise
in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and danger
of surprise attack.

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we
begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves — immediately.
These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military
establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries
to the other: lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints
to each other.

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8. The objective of the pseudo-pacifist movement launched by the Cominform, in which the Soviet disarmament proposals form an important part, "is to prevent the emergency of a strong western alliance, reduce armaments in the West, and prevent the rise of a positive policy against the Soviet Union. More specifically, the partisans of peace are presently the most significant element within the communist program of revolutionary antimilitarism. Even if this effort is unsuccessful in reducing armaments, western morale can be hurt sufficiently to render American and European soldiers reluctant to fight in a war against the Soviet Union" (Stefan Possony in "A Century of Conflict").

9. One of the objectives of the partisans of peace is to promote the concept of peaceful co-existence. But "peaceful co-existence" is not a static condition; rather it is a form of struggle, it is a product of force. Khrushchev, at a Communist rally in Prague in June 1954, emulated this point most forcefully.

"...Peace cannot come of its own accord. One has to struggle for peace; peace must be won ... As Comrade Lenin said: 'While capitalist encirclement exists, it is very difficult and complicated to come to terms; we shall struggle ceaselessly ... but peace must be consolidated by our toil ... The bourgeoisie knows full well that it recognizes only force and nothing else ... to live with the enemy one must be strong.'"

## ANALYSIS

10. Despite the Soviet desire to use the disarmament issue to disarm the West while they remain strong, a safeguarded system of arms regulation is a desirable U.S. goal.

11. The historical record of efforts to achieve a reduction in arms is, however, disappointing -- just as has been the record of endeavors to

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achieve security through an uncontrolled arms race.

12. There is much greater sophistication today than formerly concerning the relationship between arms and international trust. Arms are no longer regarded, in most quarters, as the major cause of international tensions. Yet a better understanding of the problems of armaments and the requirements of disarmament is essential to the attainment of stable international security. There are many instances which show that when mutual trust exists, disarmament takes place without prodding. Where such good faith does not exist, disarmament without effective controls would be an act of sheer irresponsibility.

13. At all times the statesmen must hold the security of his country as his primary concern. He must look, therefore, for a disarmament plan which will provide more, not less security, than he currently enjoys. Even though it is doubtful that any inspection system can be devised which will prevent the unauthorized manufacture of atomic weapons, it seems probable that some can be developed which will minimize the chances of a surprise nuclear attack.

14. This is a desirable goal in itself. Further, there remains the possibility that in the process of developing, on a step by step basis, an effective system of inspections, some modification in underlying Soviet hostility will occur.

## SUMMARY

15. The following general conclusions are advanced:

a. An effective inspection system is the absolute prerequisite of any disarmament scheme compatible with U.S. security interests.

b. The President's proposal for reciprocal and mutual inspection, both aerial and ground, with the USSR provides the foundation for such an inspection system.

c. Technical means for conducting an aerial inspection are such that major evasions can be avoided.

d. The Soviet willingness to enter into a reciprocal inspection plan comparable to that proposed by the President at Geneva must be the fundamental test of the genuineness of Soviet willingness to accept peaceful co-existence as an actual rather than a "cover" policy.

e. The Soviets can make major political and other concessions without abandoning any plans they might have to eventually destroy the United States, but as long as they do not also join in an adequate arms inspection system, even major Soviet concessions should be viewed with suspicion.

f. In subsequent negotiations with the Soviets, the U.S. should insist that the initial aspects of its inspection proposal be given a concrete test on a reciprocal basis by representatives of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Soviet refusal to enter into such a concrete test should be regarded as proof of Soviet insincerity and further discussions with the Soviets regarding disarmament should be suspended until such a test is undertaken.

TAB A - "U.S. Statement of Principles"

The United States submitted a resolution suggesting that the commission accept as its guide the following six principles:

1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war impossible.

2. To achieve that goal, all states must cooperate to establish "an open and substantially disarmed world in which no state would be sufficiently armed to start war and in which no state could undertake preparations for war without having the rest of the world get wind of them."

3. International agreements must be entered into under which all states would reduce their armed forces to levels necessary for internal security and the fulfillment of obligations to maintain peace and security "in accordance with the United Nations Charter."

4. The agreements must insure progressive reduction of armed forces and weapons to fixed maximum levels, "radically less than present levels." Mass armies and instruments capable of mass destruction must be eliminated.

5. There must be effective safeguards provided for in all phases of the disarmament program. Elimination of atomic weapons must be accompanied by an effective system of international control.

6. Before there can be effective disarmament, there must be a system of "progressive and continuing disclosure and verification" of armed forces and weapons—the military census idea.

The United States' set of principles was put forward in answer to the basic Soviet demand for a decision in principle to prohibit atomic weapons and to reduce arms.

Extracts from Soviet
Proposal on Disarmament

TAB B - Key Features of Soviet May 10, 1955
Proposal on Disarmament

CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND
THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The General Assembly (Security Council).

Seeking to save mankind from a new and destructive war, to reduce
the tension in relations between States, and to relieve the peoples of
the heavy burden of taxation they bear as a result of the continuing
armaments race,

Desirous of ensuring the possibility of resources thus released
being used to improve the well-being of the peoples and to afford
extensive assistance to the economically under-developed countries,

Instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to draw up and
submit for the approval of the Security Council a draft "international
convention (treaty) on the question of the reduction of armaments and the
prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction".

Such a convention, having as its purpose the strengthening of peace
and international security, shall provide for:

(a) the complete prohibition of the use and production both of
nuclear and of all other weapons of mass destruction, and the conversion
of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes;

(b) a major reduction in all armed forces and all conventional
armaments;

(c) the establishment of a control organ with rights and powers
and functions adequate to guarantee in the case of all States alike the
effective observance of the agreed prohibitions and reductions.

FIRST STAGE - MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1956

The following measures shall be carried out in 1956:

1. The States Parties to the convention (treaty) shall undertake, as a first step towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces, not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments above the level

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obtaining on 31 December 1954. They shall also undertake not to increase their appropriations for armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, above the level of the expenditures effected for those purposes during the year ended 31 December 1954.

2. An agreed level shall be established to which armed forces of all States in excess of that level shall be reduced, in order that no State may possess armed forces capable of constituting a serious threat to international peace. A substantial reduction of armed forces shall be effected by the United States, the USSR, China, the United Kingdom and France. To these ends the above-mentioned five Powers shall undertake to reduce the strength of their armed forces so that they do not exceed the following figures.

3. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons shall undertake to discontinue tests of these weapons.

4. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures for the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers by the first 50 per cent of the agreed reduction to the prescribed levels and before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic weapons, States shall assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

5. States possessing military, naval and air bases in the territories of other States shall undertake to liquidate such bases.

## SECOND STAGE - MEASURES TO BE CARRIED OUT IN 1957

The following measures shall be carried out in 1957:

1. The production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall be discontinued immediately, and budgetary appropriations of States for military requirements shall be reduced correspondingly.

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CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE
REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION
OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the great importance and the necessity of instituting
effective international control over the fulfilment by States of their
obligations under the convention on the reduction or armaments and armed
forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons,

Notes that the necessary conditions for the institution of a
control system which would enjoy the trust of all States and would fully
meet the requirements of international security do not at present exist.

In the existing situation, when many States are displaying legitimate
anxiety for their security, it is difficult to expect that these States
would trustingly provide other States with facilities for access to
industrial and other resources of theirs which are vital to their security.

In so far as the necessary trust does not at the present time exist
between States, a situation may arise in which the adoption of decisions
on international control will in reality be reduced to a more formality
which does not achieve the objective. This is all the more inadmissible
because, in present conditions, the greatest apprehensions exist among
peace-loving peoples in connection with the existence of atomic and hydrogen
weapons, in regard to which the institution of international control is
particularly difficult.

This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production.
It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic
materials, and moreover, in ever greater quantities. This means that
States having establishments for the production of atomic energy can
accumulate, in violation of the relevant agreements, large quantities of
explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons. The danger of
this state of affairs becomes still more understandable if account is
taken of the fact that where the corresponding quantities of explosive
atomic materials exist production of actual atomic and hydrogen bombs is
technically fully feasible and can be effected on a large scale.

Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between
States, any agreement on the institution of international control can
only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a
false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the
production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, hence the threat of
surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appall-
ling consequences for the peoples.

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The problem of instituting International Control and of the rights and powers of the international control organ must therefore be considered in close connection with the execution of the above-mentioned measures for the lessening of international tension, the strengthening of trust between States and the carrying out of other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

## 1. DURING THE FIRST STAGE of execution of the measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons

(a) In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall establish on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see to it that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.

(b) The International Control Organ shall have the right to require from States any necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Staff recruited to carry out the work of inspection shall be selected on an international basis.

(a) To have permanently in all States signatories to the convention its own staff of inspectors having, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.

In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall in particular have on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes.

2. The Control Organ shall make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression with regard to violators of the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

3. The functions and powers of the permanent international control organ shall be defined on the basis of the foregoing principles, and appropriate instructions shall be prepared for this purpose.