TELCON
Ron Ziegler/HAK

March 22, 1974/9:27 a.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hi Henry.

K: Ron, yes?

Z: On this ABC thing.

K: I have no interest in it. You know, its entirely up to you.

Z: I mentioned it to the President and he said fine to have film taken he said but he didn't feel that -- he thought that the matters you would talk about were too sensitive to really have them include on sound.

K: I agree completely.

Z: And he said I don't want to act when it comes to you know Moscow and foreign policy.

K: I couldn't agree more.

Z: So I think I'll call Obwess(?) and say if you want a little film fine or if you want to delay this until Henry gets back and they're talking about it in those terms fine but the President said I don't mind doing this but you know I just don't like to act when it comes to foreign policy and I said I think Henry would feel that same way.

K: I didn't realize they want it soon.

Z: Right. OK fine. We're tracking then and we may do some pictures if not we'll do them later.

K: It's entirely up to you.

Z: OK Henry. Thank you.

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TELCON
David Rockefeller/HAK

9:31 a.m. /3/22/74

K: Hello.

R: Henry Hello. Thank you so much for calling back. There were just two things I wanted to mention to you. (1) There has been no one in the OECD Ambassadorship for a long time.

K: No, we are appointing somebody within the next week.

R: Oh you are because I had a suggestion that might make sense namely Dewey Dane.

K: Who is it.

R: Dewey Dane was Governor -- was one of the Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and was not reappointed I think largely because he had been appointed originally by President Kennedy but he had been in the Federal Reserve for 35 years and I think he is one of the most experienced people in this field.

K: We pretty much have somebody already.

R: OK. Then you won't need him. The other thing is the Dartmouth Conference is meeting in the Soviet at the end of April. I wonder whether it might be good for the steering committee of three or four people to have a brief word with you after you come back from the Soviet and before we go because it is -- the way things are going it might be helpful.

K: I favor that.

R: Would you. Could we set that up.

K: Could you set it up with Eagleburger or Campbell. I just don't have my calender here.

R: I don't mean with you. I mean with them. If you approve of the idea.

K: Certainly. I do approve of the idea.

R: Incidentally, I thought that Jim Callaghan's talk was encouraging.

K: Very good yes.

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R: I was pleased about that.

K: The only thing is we must... I mean the British, the present British government is not the major problem. But we must not let them up for air too fast.

R: No. I think that is true but it was helpful.

K: It was helpful yes.

R: How do you think things are shaping up for the trip?

K: In the Soviet Union?

R: Yes.

K: I can't fully judge yet. It's a difficult period in our relations.

R: It certainly is. But I'm certainly delighted about the embargo and it seems to me on that score things are a little better, don't you think.

K: Oh yes. I think if we now can get the Israelis to move a little on the Syrian front that's our biggest problem.

R: Absolutely. I had a good talk with Hussein and I thought that he certainly is of course 100%.

K: He's a fine man and the Israelis are crazy not to deal better with them.

R: I think so too but aren't the Egyptians doing better.

K: The Egyptians are getting ready to see him.

R: That's good. Well Henry, good luck on the trip if I don't see you before.

K: Thank you David. Are you going to be at Builderburg? XXXXX

R: Yes I am is there any chance you are?

K: Well, the only day. You see we have that OAS meeting which I had forgotten about. So that the only day I could really come would be on the Sunday and I don't know whether most people would be leaving then.

R: Well, they won't if you're there. Nelson is coming for the first time.

K: Oh marvelous.

3

R: I'm taking him over.

K: Isn't that great.

R: Well if you can make it -- it would be important because this meeting is of course what its all about so far as Europe and Atlantic Alliance is...

K: Somebody told me Fred Berkstone is doing the American paper.

R: I don't know.

K: I could hardly believe that he would give a fair account of the governmental postion. Fond as I am of him.

R: Yes. I don't know.

K: Well, that doesn't make any difference. I'm -- well, I could invasion arriving Saturday night.

R: If you could do that it would be enormously helpful. It really would. I think you could make a great difference.

K: Could you look into that for me.

R: I mean.

K: What do I do. You don't have to do it.

R: Sure. I mean you're invited.

K: No, I am invited. The only question is whether enough people will stay

R: There is no question Henry. If you're thered you can be sure they will. I'll get word to them right away and I think if we send word out you can count on it.

K: Good. Then let me aim to be there on the 21st.

R: Perfect. That's great. Well, I hope to see you before.

s

K: That would be marvelous. Fine.

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TELCOM

Larry Eagleburger/HAK

March 22, 1974 - 9:45 a.m.

E: Right sir.

K: Have you found out about this?

E: The oil executives? Yes. Hopefully they can come at 6:00 tonight if not they can probably make it at 10:00 tomorrow and I've had Dick just call over and ask whether tomorrow is OK if we can't do it at 6:00 tonight.

K: Well, I'd rather do it at 10:00 tomorrow anyway.

E: You would? OK. Let me see what we can do.

K: But tell them it is no emergency meeting.

E: I understand that. That's been done.

K: But how did that happen?

E: Dick tells me that when he talked to you last week you said no you didn't want to do it so he and Win Lord then dropped it.

K: Look. They scheduled it for Tuesday. I said I didn't want to do it that day. I said I wanted to do it later. . that week.

E: He said you didn't.

K: Look, why would I turn to McCloy and say I want to do it, please get them together and then never reply.

E: I'm not arguing the point but Dick Campbell thought you did not want to proceed.

K: And then it just disappears. Now who is talking now to McCloy who is after all not a nobody.

E: Win Lord has been talking to Jamison who apparently is the fellow who dealt with you on the subject in the ;first place he knows what its all about. Win Lord is the one that is doing it now.

K: But will you make clear to them this is not an emergency.

E: That has already been done but I will do it again.

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K: OK now, another thing. Could some thoughtful person plan something for my children and not just have some idiot do it on this trip?

E: OK. In Moscow you mean.

K: Well in Moscow we have three days. But say in Bonn for 3 hours.
What's being done for them.

E: I'll have to check with.....

K: You know I said Cathedral in Cologne so I am sure now they have a
committee of eight studying the Cathedral in Cologne so I but that is
only 15 minutes away and we have three hours. They've never been
in Germany.

E: I'll talk to Bonnie.

K: Bonnie doesn't know Germany.

E: No, I know. I'll talk to Bonnie to find out what has been done and I'll
get into it myself.

K: But if they could see the Rhine or something. I know the Germans would
kill themselves if somebody will just make an effort. If there is some
old German town nearby with some of these wooden houses you know.

E: I'll do it myself.

K: And also for London for the way back. With some humanity.
in

E: I'm lots of things Mr. Secretary. I'm not humane. No, I'll do it myself.

K: Alright.

E: I think I know enough about both places.

K: OK. Well now of course its Friday again and we've managed to blow that
whole week. This should have been done earlier this week automatically.
As soon as it was known. Let's see whether we can get something done.

E: I'll do it right now.

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TELCONE

Hal Sonnenfeldt/HAK

March 22, 1974/9:50 a.m.

K: Hal. I wanted an expanded version of the NATO declaration to be given to Ramsbothom before he leaves.

S: You have it you know if its in agreement with you.

K: Now, just don't tell me I've got it. The fact that Campbell has it doesn't mean I've got it.

S: It was sent to you yesterday morning. Because I thought you wanted to look at it.

K: That's right. I haven't seen it.

S: Well, it's there waiting for you.

K: Then will you kindly arrange with Campbell that it be given to me.

S: Yes. It's all there on a spread; sheet to show where the changes are and it can even be given to Ramsbothom that way.

K: I'm not eager that we do it that way.

S: Which ever way you...

K: Secondly, there is a back channel here at the White House from Rumsfield which you should take a look at in which ______ claims its a misunderstanding. Now I want Rumsfeld to get in touch with Dobinyou(?) and say it was not a misunderstanding.

S: What is this?

K: March 4th. We have to toughen up our Ambassadors. Then Hilenbrand was wailing with the Germans again.

S: Let me look at the demony(?) thing. I think we better do a little message to Alex Johnson if you agree telling him roughly what is happening.

K: No. I do not agree. What is happening do you think.

S: That there was an NSC meeting in which there was a discussion about whether you were going and that, if so, it really a question of how much you want to get him into the.

K: I do not want to get him into the thing.

S: What happened at the NSC meeting will in some way seep back to him.

K: Well do a very vague one.

S: That's what I had in mind. I gather he sent in a very plaintiff response to your other one.

K: I haven't seen it.

S: OK. I'll make sure the NATO declaration is there for you when you get back.

K: Fine. Thank you.

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*

TELCOM
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/Kissinger

3/22/74 - 10:03 am

W: Hello.

K: Mr. Secretary-General, how are you?

W: Well, I'm fine. I was quite tired when I returned from Africa, but I'm fine again. I'm sure you are very busy with your trip to Moscow and I've only to wish you the best success...

K: Aren't you nice.

W: I hope everything goes well. I congratulate you on your press conference. I saw part of it and I read carefully what you said. I think that this trip to Moscow will be very helpful because I do have the feeling that our friends there are getting a little worried and I think your trip couldn't be better timed.

K: Well I think, too, it is at a good time.

W: Mr. Secretary, I have a few points which I wanted to mention to you. First of all, things are going quite well here; we have things under control. The Security Council this year is easier to handle than last year because of the new composition of the non-permanent members. They are more... they are not as... actually, I'll put it this way, in asking for a meeting for ______ we had informal consultation a few days ago, as you know, on the request of Malek and the Russians, and the three main items which were mentioned, the ceiling of 7,000 troops per unit, Malek is worried that I could go beyond 7,000. I calmed him down. I told him that this is not my intention, that 7,000 will be enough. Of course, if we had a new situation in Syria, for instance, it could be that we need more, but as far as I see it, if there will be no new situation we could even handle a possible Syrian bumperstorm (?) with the troops over there. In other words, we could dispense without any problems, two or three battalions which are now in the reserve in the tidal area to Syria in case the U.S. would succeed and that there is a similar solution that we had on the Egyptian front.

K: O.K.

W: So he was very satisfied with this. Then there was the question of the mandate for units in Egypt. He created the impression that each unit that they didn't ask for the mandate to police the _______. I told him that in my report to the Council last October, it is said that one

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of the purposes of units is to avoid the outbreak of new fighting, and
in my opinion this covers the mandate so he accepted this, too. The
third point was the discrimination. You know the Russians con-
tinuously complain as do some of the non-aligned countries that the
Israelis do not permit contingents from countries which have no
diplomatic relations with them. I mentioned the matter to Abba
Eban with whom I had breakfast a few days ago and I hope that
sooner or later the Israelis will give up their opposition against this
contingent. For the time being I continue to avoid sending those
contingents to the Israeli security zone, but I don't know how long I
can maintain this practice.

K: Yes. Well, of course, I think the Israelis have some merit on their side here.

W: Well, physiologically it is understandable. On the other hand, the mandate for the force is very clear and it says that they should move freely, wherever they want to move and it is a little complicated for us. I always try to do it in a pragmatic way, and it worked until now, but I thought I should mention it to you in case you have the possibility to the Israelis so that sooner or later we can get the agreements. But all countries can move freely in the buffer zone.

K: Right.

W: Now, there's one problem which seems to me extremely important, and also in connection with your trip to Moscow. I discussed this with Bill ______ when he was here, the possibility, and in fact, I don't know whether you, yourself, have discussed it with your people in the State Department, to try to get a commentation on the mandates per unit for one year, not for another half-year. The reason is very clear. I think ______ and of course ______, but suppose the others who are trying to be helpful will be in the fall. But my feeling is that it could be that just at the moment when we have to again prolong the mandates per unit in October, that the situation will be ______ and it could be that we could then have probably ______. So I wonder whether we couldn't try to get ....

K: Well, for your information, I've had an informal talk with Sadat and I think he would agree to it.

W: Oh, good. I feel it is important that the Russians also agree that they don't ....

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K: Let me talk to Gromyko about it when I'm in Russia.

W: That's what I thought would be helpful because it's good to know that the Egyptians are in favor. That will certainly help very much. But I think ______ of very importance in this regard. It would also be helpful to me and to my people here because for plenty of reasons.

K: Exactly.

W: To facilitate our planning.

K: Exactly. Well, I will do my best.

W: Thank you very much. Now, the last thing is the special session, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to tell you that now of course there is very hectic activity here amongst the delegations. The current trend is to make sure that we do not have confrontation here, but cooperation. I stress this in all my statements and I have the feeling that the great majority is all in favor of having a good cooperation amongst all delegations, but we heard rumors. Unfortunately they are ______ and the Ambassador is not back yet from ______ that the ______ are still thinking of some sort of confrontation. Now this would be the worst, of course, that could happen. I still hope that the whole session will go in a constructive way....

K: When is your opening session?

W: On the 9th of April.

K: Is that when the opening speeches are, or is that....

W: Well, the 9th will be only the procedural opening. The President ______. The idea is to have three committees and three sub-committees. The President (precedent) will probably be the same as last year. Ambassador ______ from Ecuador ______. You know him?

K: Yeah.

W: And so I don't expect too much trouble in this regard so that the real ______ starts on the 10th, and then the idea is to have three weeks special session.

K: I haven't decided yet whether I will come up, or how to do it.

-4-

W: I would, of course, be very happy if you could make it and could come personally to make a statement and to ________ the people here. It will be on a high level. The ________ ideas that it should be on a ministerial level. We have an idea that a great number of foreign ministers will come a few prime ministers, and even a few heads of state. When I was in Africa they told me that a number of heads of state intend to come. But no formal invitation. The only formal information I have is that the President of Zambia is coming personally. Otherwise it will be the foreign ministers, finance ministers and....

K: But ________ is coming, isn't he?

W: But this is what we expect but we haven't got the formal information. The Ambassador is still in ________. He's expected to be back in the next few days.

K: Right. I will try to come. I'm going to be on vacation so I may not be there for the opening day.

W: Well this is not absolutely necessary. I am glad to hear that you have decided to take a few days' rest. You really deserve it. I remember you wanted to earlier, but it didn't work.

K: That's right.

W: So please don't worry about this. The important thing is that you are coming. If you come a little later I think it doesn't matter, but it would of course be highly appreciated if you could come personally. The debate will last, at any rate, a couple of weeks.

K: Well I will try to come during the second week of the debate.

W: That would be perfect. That is excellent.

K: Good. Mr. Secretary-General I will see you then, if not before.

W: Well, at any rate, if you are in New York I hope we can get together and discuss a few other things.

K: Absolutely. I wouldn't come to New York without seeing you.

W: You're very kind. Again, my very best wishes for your trip to Moscow.

K: Bye.

W: Goodbye, Mr. Secretary.

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TELECON
Mr. McCloy/Sec. Kissinger

March 22, 1974

12:48

K: How are you?

M: I was talking to Winston Lord when you came on the phone. I told him that these fellows are sort of scattered to the four winds when they had gotten a sort of informal word from X Ken Jamison that there was very little likelihood of meeting this week, but I can x get Ken Jamison who is down in the Bahamas now, but he is one the way back.

K: No, no. Don't get anybody back it was just stupid of my associates. I told them I couldn't do it Tuesday, but I would do it before the end of the week.

M: Well, I think your Assistants were trying to protect you. a good bit.

K: Yes, but Jack, you know that is one of the problems in these jobs that you get protected.

M: I know, what I want to be sure, Henry, is that when they come down they x are well-equipped to tell you in a short period of time just what their thinking is. That means that I can get them together before they did come down -- it is going to be pretty hard to do that before 10:00 tomorrow morning.

K: No, no, there is no sense doing it but it is sort of a pity because I am going to the Soviet Union now, I don't need it there and then I'll be back for a day and then I am going on vacation, then I'll be...

M: You ought to go on vacation and if it is anything of any substance we can take it up with Rush or something else.

K: No you can't.

M: I know it is not going to be like dealing with you but I don't want to do anything half-baked tomorrow.

K: No, no, let's forget about tomorrow. That just can't be under these circumstances.

M: Ok. Then we'll be back at you. There are a lot of things I would like to x have them tell you about their reading of that whole area.

K: How about a week from today?

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M: Anything like that would be fine but I don't want to harrass you.

K: No, no you don't harrass me. But I will be more tired a week from
today because I will be just back from a long trip.

M: Don't have it on your mind.

K: It isn't a question of being on my mind, it is a question that since we are thinking of doing some of these bilateral things that I told you.

M: Yes, yes there is a lot of that going on now.

K: But I want to understand first of all what it is that others are doing bilaterally. And it doesn't do me any good if you tell it to Rush.

M: Let me go to work on that this coming week and put something together. And then I'll be in touch with...

K: What I want to understand from them is first, what bilateral things are being done by others. Secondly, what bilateral things we should do.

M: What bilaterals we should be doing.

K: That's right, because we are quite willing to do it.

M: Ok, what else?

K: Those are the major things.

M: Those are the main things and I think they have some ideas as to what you can do to help and I think third and fourth, they would like to report to you their reading of what is going on in connection with the cha cha they hear in the area in regards to the settlement. That might be helpful to you.

K: I would appreciate that. But can they keep their mouths shut?

M: What's that?

K: They can keep quiet, can't they?

M: They can what?

K: They can be discreet.

M: Oh, definitely. You don't need to worry. I can guarantee that.

-3-

K: They are not like Jewish intellectuals.

M: They are not like Congressmen's wives. I can guarantee that.

K: No, the Congressmen's wives were fine. It was the press

M: It was the press. I had some fascinating talks, by the way, In Paris over the weekend.

K: Oh you did.

M: I saw some members of the Chamber and I saw some people that came over from London and I got a lot of reading. You know those little remarks you made had a profound effect and I think they did good.

K: I think the net impact turned out to be good, although I didn't plan them.

M: Yes, it came out pretty well. The attitude in Paris was very interesting, but I will tell you about that when I see you.

K: Well, I look forward then -- you tell your associates that if I am not at my best it is because it is the end of a long trip. But let's aim for a week from today.

M: Ok, I'll tell them that.

K: Thank you. Bye.

END

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TELECON
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

March 22, 1974

2:35 pm

First part of conversation was missed.

K: An Israeli command spokesman said that Egyptians had moved more guns into the restricted zone despite inspection by UN observers and had stationed artillery in regions forbidden by the terms of the January pact. Why?

D: I am sorry. I don't have any answer for you Mr. Secretary. I know that I got a statement that in case the thing was publicized we would say the following.

K: That was perfect.

D: Yes, and you know it was a little change from what we agreed yesterday.

K: No, no that I don't know what you agreed. What were you going to say.

D: When I saw you last night, you suggested that we would say that we are studying the situation to the extent that there were violations.

K: That was fine. I liked that.

D: Israel did not accept exactly this formulation. And said that if the thing would be published by Newsweek or someone else, they would say, in answer to a question, no missiles were involved in the matter because there is a great concern in Israel about missiles. We have information that the Egyptians are holding somewhat lighter artillery than was agreed. The Chief of Staff talked with General Silvaso; the matter is under investigation and we are confident it will be rectified. Which is better than what you read me.

K: Although, why did you have to say that much.

D: The only element that we could use was the artillery because of the concern in Israel is themissiles and that nobody is concerned in Israel about a few more pieces of artillery. What they are concerned is the missiles. Because of the implications of it. So that is why, the story would have been published.

K: But please keep the debate down with Egypt. Egypt cannot act for you on Syria if you keep attacking Egypt.

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-2-

D: But Mr. Secretary, not on ly am I in complete agreement with you, but that was the reason why the Prime Minister and Dayan both okayed to me that that was what would be done. Why ____ made the statement in his name I cannot explain. I don't know. I am so sorry.

K: Is there any Chief of Staff who doesn't run for Cabinet in Israel.

D: He did not run for Cabinet. He is basically a very decent fellow.

K: No, acutally, he is one of my favorites.

D: I am going to cable and ask them to go down and speak to him.

K: Good, I have one or two other things whic I will call you about later. One is that Sadt, we got a report -- he made no comment on that information you gave him.

D: Also not on our ability to continue to look for the corpses.

K: He made no comment either way. He just nd it. But if you do this other thing I am sure I can get ....

D: I have a number of items which I want to take with you subsequent to our conversation yesterday. We will do it when you call. Except that I will be at 4:00 with Scowcroft, Mr. Secretary.

K:

K: I thought you were going to a Bar Mitsvah again.

D: No, no. So, if you will be looking for me, I will be from 4 to 5:00 at Scowcroft and the rest of the time in the office.

K: Are you trying to impress me.

D: I am trying to drop names Mr. Secretary.

K: I noticed that. Ok.
good

D: I will give you one/piece of news though. The question of the stray Egyptians will be settled Silvaso is informed about it.

K: But that you should have XXXX done through us.

D: The thing is when I passed my request through you, ty that time they had already agree to give it to Silvaso. So my cable from Sisco came a few hours late. But in any event, since many arrangements need to be ma de, I asked

4:20 pm

March 22, 1974

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: Have you dried your tears?

D: Have I dried my tears? No. When I am with the General I am
laugheing. I keep my tears for other places.

K: Ok, now listen. Two things, one -- we have had an urgent message
from Sadat saying he has information that Israel is planning a major strike
on Sunday against the Syrians.

D: A major strike on Sunday against the Syrians?

K: And that he wants us to know that this would have serious repercussions
on everything we have done up to now.

D: I hear it for the first time. Naturally, we will check on it right away.

K: well, Would you please add my urgent request not to do it, especially
when I am on the way to Moscow.

D: I can tell you Mr. Secretary, 99% I am sure it is nonsense. But I
am going to check on it because I have been in constant communication
with Israel today and I don't think anything of this sort is planned.

K: Well, they are also busy making press statements that they can't
plan military operations.

D: That they can't plan.

K: I am going to tell Sadat that El Lazar is now becoming a press star.

D: No actually, I saw the full statement. It wasn't as, I mean the tone was
much more minor -- but on this question that you told me I will check
immeidately. I am sure there is nothing. Would you like me to phone
you later with regard.

K: Yes, I have one other matter which is just follow-up on what we
discussed. But I will discuss that with you later, I don't want to take away
time from important people.

D: Ok, Bye. END

TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

March 22, 1974

4:35 PM

S: I think it's important with the Frenchman, if you're still going to see him, to be as hard as nails with this guy.

K: I'm going to be very alouf. I'm not going to be very communicative.

S: Yes. I think it's important from all the kind of gap that I get to take the focus away from the method of consultation and to emphasize how the consultation issue arose in the first place.

K: Yes.

S: Which is not a question of methodology in the first place, but a question of general orientation.

K: Which is what?

S: That the consultation methods that they were employing reflected their view of what the European decision making process should be and what results it should yield.

K: And that it's a basically hostile direction.

S: That's right. A pattern was developing in that direction. We know that this is largely French, we can't quite account for it. Although we know it isn't entirely French. I wouldn't mind even saying that to the French. I think it's true, they had support from the British.

K: Yes.

S: At least from the British. And from various of the Eurocrats. It's very clear how defensive they are when you talk to them now. Anyway, I think with the French above all of us is the time to hold the line.

K: No, no. That you can be sure. Eurocrats are defensive, why?

S: They keep saying that they give you all these identity arguments and above all at the table and after all we gave you those things privately and you knew about everything we were doing. That's all.

K: I'm telling them also we object violently to the substance of the policy.

S: Well, of course. It's party because of the substance of the policy that they chose the kind of consultative methods, because they know that they were going

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Authority E6 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

John Mulliken/Secretary Kissinger

March 22, 1974

4:45 PM

M: Hello, Mr. Secretary. John Mulliken. Hi.

K: How are you.

M: Fine. I've got these quotes here - can I run through them with you?

K: Sure.

M: OK. Starting out here. On the Watergate, I would like to be remembered for what I did here, not for being part of a conspiracy.

K: Well now, this depends entirely on the context in which this is put in.

M: You want the whole paragraph?

K: Yes.

M: Kissinger, his sensitive criticism but also his determination not to let it get in the way of his goals. He's determined not to be hurt by, in any way, by Watergate. Then comes the quote.

K: OK. In that context it's alright.

M: Now we go on in the same paragraph. He told Time diplomatic editor, Gerald Schecter, last week. That's the end of the sentence. In other words, you told him that. New sentence. As for detente, he insists that quote, it is not a love affair, but rather a process by which the interests of both Moscow and Washington, can be exposed and in some way reconciled, enquote.

K: Good.

M: OK?

K: OK.

M: I don't think you said, I think I said that and they picked it up. As for the criticism of his personal diplomacy, he simply points out to the achievements and asks whether any other approach would have gained more, quote, Our records still look good, he says, quote, my relations with China are solid, Vietnam has held up better than I thought in the face of Congressional restriction. In Europe we will come out of the latest blowup much stronger, because we will bring issues that have been tangled back into some political focus, enquote.

Mulliken - page 2

K: If we would just leave out the phrase, our records still look good. That
looks sort of self serving.

M: Yes.

believes

K: Why don't you just say, he apparently/or he believes the record still looks good.

M: OK.

K: You see what I mean?

M: I see it. Now, we're talking earlier - this is another sentence - another
paragraph rather. About various types of negotiations. I'll read the whole
paragraph if you like, maybe that makes more sense to you. It's short.

K: Go ahead.

M: Once specifically, in so far as some Asians are concerned," is Kissinger's
close identification with the present PT(?) regime. The Secretary considers
the Chinese the best negotiations he has seen. Quote, they said what they
mean and they stick to it, while the Russians are tough and the French difficult
byt with style enquote. And then it goes on to talk about ...

K: Can you take out the while?

M: The while.

K: Just say the Russians are tough.

M: Yes, sure.

K: You see then it's no contrast.

M: They had brutal in there, I had to take that out. Yes sure, OK. That's fine.
Now what we need are two quotes that we don't have. One is a quote about Sadat.
We have a very full quote about Sadat being nice about you and great stateman,
strategist, etc. The main thing I have on Sadat, I don't know why we only have
that, is that he's a man who can give orders and is in charge. This is in a
discussion with the difficulties in Damascus and in Jerusalem. Is there something
you'd like to say.

K: No you can say Sadat is a man of vision. Who said of course, and stuck to
it against enormous difficulty.

M: That's good. OK, that's fine. In the Middle East, Jerry, who is moving

Mulliken - page 3

about at the moment, remembers only one word that you - we would like to say something about the Middle East situation. In line with Europe and Moscow and the record generally, and he only remembers you saying is murderous. I don't think we can use that, although I'm sure it's very accurate.

K: Complex?

M: Complex. Anything a little fuller? In the Middle East you're still complex. Is that alright?

K: Yes.

M: Good.

K: Complex and potentially explosive.

M: Yes, OK. That's fine. I think if you'll clear all that. There's one thing I'm sure it wouldn't bother you. One of your quotes, it's not a serious quote, if you want to here it, I'll be glad to - it's a joke quote on the plane.

K: What is it?

M: It has to do with you saying, I haven't got it right in front of me, basically, never have I known more secrets, never had more influence and no one has tried to seduce me with beautiful women - it kills me.

K: It's alright.

M: It's the ___ of the plane idea. If you don't like it we can remove it. I hope you don't. When you talked to Sadat do you address him as Mr. President?

K: Yes. He addresses me as Henry.

M: As Henry. OK.

K: I'm sure he would let me address by his first name, but I always have a hesitation with Presidents.

M: Yes. You told me that one of your students who is current Prime Minister of Turkey is that name Taku (phonetic)?

K: No, Ecevit.

M: E-c-e-v-i-t.

K: Incidentally, I gave you the wrong name for the Foreign Minister of Norway.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By TARA Date 6-8-04

Mulliken - page 4

Who is a student of mine, not the Prime Minister.

M: No, you gave me the Foreign Minister.

K: Ok, good.

M: But I don't know where they got the name Taku. If it's Ecevit and he's
Prime?

K: Prime Minister.

M: Well, I'll have to straigten that out. We have it, now we're talking backgroun
e we have it that Mr. Hodgeson is possibly not your personal choice for the
Ambassadorship of Tokyo.

K: I approved him.
took place in

M: A big uproar / Tokyo which our people found about because it was Lockheed all that thing.

K: Oh really, I didn't know.

M: They thought they were going to force them to buy Lockheeds.

K: Oh, God, that's ridiculous.

M: That is ridiculous. I think we can get around that. It's not a bad cover.
Can I ask you some other points if you have five seconds more.

K: Sure.

M: We're just saying that your children live in Belmont, Mass.

K: Yes. If you want I can give you something since it won't appear until Monday
that you may or may not want to use. It's entirely up to you. I'm not eager to
get abused, but I don't want you to feel you were scooped or anything.

M: Yes.

K: I'm taking my children to Moscow with me.

M: I'd like to use that.

K: It's their vacation and I haven't seen them in four months and I wouldn't have
a chance to see them for another four months if I didn't taken them.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By NARA Date 6-8-95

Mulliken - page 5

M: Oh yes, we'd like to use that, it's very nice. Thank you. You have taken them to the Kennedy center in the Presidential box.

K: Yes.

M: I have seen you at the Redskins games. He never worked for you, did he, Brezinski (phonetic)?

K: No.

M: He left with the Johnson administration.

K: That's right.

M: I'm down to the last question. I don't think you have to answer it, but I have to ask it. Alright? You have mentioned your weight before. Do you have any particular weight you would like to suggestion or just let me knock that out. Do you have any perimeters? That you prefer?

K: I prefer it around 175, but I'm far from that today.

M: I see. Alright. OK. I couldn't say 175 to 200 and not get disbarred from the State Department.

K: It isn't 200.

M: It isn't 200.

K: It's closer to 185.

M: OK. I can't think of anything else that I can't bother Dick Campbell with. You usually eat your dinner if you're eating in the State Department, in your office don't you.

K: That's right.

M: And your breakfast and lunch you go to the dining room.

K: My breakfast I usually eat at the White House.

M: At the White House, of course.

K: And lunch usually in the dining room.

M: Right. Alright. I think that's all. You're not going up to New York tonight.

K: No I'm not.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0 NARA DATE 6.8.95

TELECON

Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger

March 22, 1974

6:45 PM

K: You can point out that the Israelis have now given me formal assurance that nothing will be done.

A: I'll have it up very shortly.

K: There are a few other things. Second, that they agree to the ____ returning but S____ has disagreed because they shot at him once and if the Egyptians can work it out with S____ the Israelis will be prepared to discuss it.

A: OK. I'm surprised the Israelis agreed.

K: Third, we'll they've already agreed to the rangers(?) going back. And Fourth, they are exploring the Egyptians to give them some assurance that they artillery pieces would be withdrawn, because that is going to blow up into a big debate in Israeli which they don't want to have to conduct. Can you add that to it.

A: Yes, I'll add that.

K: Good, and let's get that off tonight.

A: I'll have them all up to you.

K: And fifth, they are asking for some consideration of their - they have some talk about looking for bodies.

A: I think we've done that one. This is the request they be able to use heavy equipment ____ on the 1st of March.

K: I guess.

A: I think we've already done that one, but I'll double check.

K: Oh, here it is, yes, I've got it here.

A: Alright sir. I'll do the others right away.

K: Right.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-74

TELECON
Jerry Schecter/Secretary Kissinger

March 22, 1974

8:12 PM

S: I tried to put some commas in here, but how does this strike you.

K: I've got ten guys in the other room going over my Soviet trip.
When you try to put that security conference, I summed up one proposition, I said is that correct, and they said it's a caricature, but it's correct so I said where is it a caricature, so we now have just agreed it wasn't a caricature.

S: I hope this isn't a caricature of your profound lecture. Our initial negotiations were directed to authoritarian governments because that was where we faced the danger the war. Negotiations with allies in this phase of the development of western democracy are more complex in this phase of the development of western democracies. The west is only now receiving from the legacy of World War II a nation are just beginning to conduct their own foreign policies and redefine their goals. Events of the last two weeks will leave us all stronger because we are now dealing with essentials.

K: Yes. Where you say, are more complex, can you add, but in the long run even more important.

S: Sure. OK.

K: OK, Jerry.

S: Thank you very much.

K: You're coming with me aren't you.

S: Yes sir. I hear you're taking David and Elizabeth.

K: You know I haven't seen them in four months and it's their vacation.

S: It should be fun for them.

K: They're out of their minds.

S: It's a great idea because - you'll have to let them see the Kremlin and all that sort.

K: Oh, yes, that's all done.

S: That's OK great.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CP NARA Date 6-8-74

Schecter - page 2

K: We'll go to Zavidovo only for an evening. Most of the talks will be in Moscow.

S: Oh, they will.

K: Yes.

S: I see, great.

K: In Bonn we have two hours so Mrs. Scheel is taking to the ____ Cathedral and to an old restaurant.

S: That's great.

K: I think they're going to have a ball.

S: You have to have a little fun. At least for them. That's great.

K: OK

S: Thanks. See you tomorrow.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-67

March 22, 1974

7:25 PM

S: Henry.

K: Yes, Jerry. How are you.

S: Al Haig says the President thinks you're a unique national asset. Is that true?

K: You're trying to ruin me.

S: Henry, I'm sorry to trouble you, but on these things I like to get back to you and we're going all around the world on this thing and so there are some criticisms that have come back. A couple of them I think you ought to address yourself if, if you would. One in particular is that people say that if they - if we look at your style, it seems that it's easiest for you to deal with authoritarian heads of states then it is to deal with democratic leaders.

K: Yes, I've heard that.

S: How does that grip you? How should we deal with that.

K: Let me, not for quotation, let me tell you my view on this. It is the big - first of all, of course our initial negotiations had to be with the authoritarian government because this is where the danger of war was.

S: Right.

K: Secondly, it is always somewhat more complex to deal with allies then with enemies because the style of negotiation has to be different.

S: That's right, more complex.

K: It has nothing to do with democracies and authoritarian governments. Thirdly, in this phase there is a problem of the western democracies which has been noted. In which, not because they are democracies but because they are now all facing really the legacy of world war II in the sense they are just getting back to conducting their own foreign policy. The governments are in a complicated position and for that reason there have been some difficulties over the past year in dealing with them but not because they're democracies, but because of a problem that all western countries have. But nevertheless, when this is worked out I think we'll come out stronger for it. I actually believe that the events of the last two weeks with respect to Europe are going to leave us all in a much stronger position, because for once we're talking about essentials.

S: What do you mean by secular problems - we'll have difficulty dealing with them because it's a secular problem of all western countries. That's a little...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

Schecter - page 2

K: The problem of the western countries right now is, that the nature of authority in all of them is in the process of redefinition. The nature of their national purposes is in redefinition is because all of them are going through domestic crises, including we. That on top of that to relate to other countries becomes a much more complex task. Now wether I'm better suited for one then the other I think others should comment it. But it's sort of a [REDACTED] statement.

S: OK.

K: You can, of course, quote me saying that anyone who criticizes me cannot be in good faith. I comment on all of this with that provisal.

S: OK. Can I use any of this.

K: Why don't you distill a quote out of this and call me back.

S: Alright. OK.

K: You can use some of it.

S: Well, sure.

K: You've been - Mulliken read back the quotes and they were all fair. We won't disagree.

S: Yes, alright.

K: You got any other criticisms.

S: I want to save somefor Monday morning.

K: Is my father going to cut you off after this cover?

S: No, I don't think so. It's a nice cover. It's sort of a cartoon cover.

K: No, I don't mean the cover.

S: I'm trying to use a Kissinger Technique of a comic poise in serious negotiation. No, I think's if anything it's too auditory. But it can't be right?

K: It's hard to imagine.

S: I think it's alright. Listen, one thing I did on my own, I'd just like to run by you. On the question of survivability of the President. I say that the cover says, let's put it this way, if this question is raised that you're going to say the institutions, you might say, that the institutions in this country are strong

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-67

Schecter - page 3

no matter what happens and the U.S. is going to be mistaked to think the
U.S. can't respond and everybody should look to the long term interests.

K: You better not put that into my mouth.

S: No, no.

K: Why don't you say that might be in character.

S; Right, that's what I did say. OK, fine. Very delicate. Let me work around..

K: Please on that point you know in terms of my utilities, you put that in any
way can be brought to the President as having been a striketo me.

S: No it's not.

K: Good.

S: OK.

K: Will you call me back.

S: Yes sir.

K: Good, thank you.

END

DELEGATION
Authority E0 12958
By CB NARA Date 6-8-64

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-04

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

March 22, 1974

9:55 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Did you ever talk to Whickem (phonetic) about his boss.

S: Yes I talked to him.

K: Are they quieted down.

S: He said, he told him what I said and he said he didn't really answer. He said, he's been in a funny mood all day and he said - well I talked to him twice, earlier this morning and passed it on then I talked to him later this afternoon and he said it's been a bad day and he said it even could be the fact that Ducket (phonetic) didn't include the backfire bomber in his briefing charts, so he must have said something to Whickem about that, otherwise there was no way Whickem would know. He said, I really don't know what's gotten after him.

K: SANITIZED

S: Oh, he is.

K: Don't you think?

S: Oh yes, there's no question about it. Very much so. That's what gets him hung up on some of these things.

K: yes.

S: Maybe he's upset because he - I'd say he caved almost completely in terms of pulling the rug out from under previous defense positions.

K: That's what I think.

S: Maybe he's upset about doing that. I don't know.

K: You think I should call him tomorrow?

S: You might just call him to say - did he seems upset with you when you talked with him after the meeting.

K: He seems very preoccupied.

S: You might just call him to you know, sort of to say goodbye.

K: OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-94

*

March 22, 1974

10:23 PM

K: Have we heard on that dinner?

S: It looks very good. The President looked over the schedule but he has not made any commitment, but he apparently is in favor. Would you want him to make a speech too if he were going down to Atlanta.

K: Well, he would have to make a speech, yes.

S: I mean besides the dinner.

K: Oh, no, if he does the dinner, he might drop by at the OAS, you know, just for five minutes.

S: Just to drop by. Apparently, it looks very good.

K: At most, drop by.

S: But nothing really would be required. Even though it's technically a different form.

K: Actually if he gives the dinner in Washington, he doesn't have to do anything there. Why did we put in for both?

S: No. We haven't. He may be in Atlanta on the 19th. That's the only thing.

K: I would lean towards his not doing much. If he wants to come in of course he can come in. Then just to drop by.

S: Good.

K: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CO NARA Date 6-8-74</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Miss Peer/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

9:20 A. M.

K: Hello.

P: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

K: How are you?

P: This is very heroic of you when you are just about to leave, and I will
make it very fast.

K: I am leaving later in the day.

P: Yes, I know, but I really do appreciate it because it is terrible
helpful to the story and it is very gracious of you. The cover we are
doing is a very long profile which means both professional and sorta
personal look at Barbara. The first thing I would be interested in
knowing, is how you evaluate her as a journalist--how tough an interviewer
is she?

K: I think she is very persistent interviewer, and quite tough. She has a
great ability to get to the heart of the question and not to quit.

P: Has she ever asked you on television a question that you really did not
wish to answer?

K: Yes.

P: Which one?

K: I don't won't to tell you. No but several times.

P: She several times what?

K: She several times asked me questions that I really didn't want to answer.

P: But you did.

K: Well I, Yes, because she wouldn't let me get away any evasion.

P: Is she, taking the last interview for example when you about a year ago,
I am told privately that you had said privately to people at CBS. Barbara
told me this and said it was all right to pursue it with you, that her questions
were tougher than Marvin Kalb's. Is this anything I can use newsworthy?

K: No. I don't want to make individuals...

P: No I can appreciate that. One of the problems of the story is trying
to ...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CQ NARA Date 6-8-74

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CD NARA Date 6-8-97

Peer/Kissinger
her

-2-

K: Well, questions, incidentally on what basis are we talking here?

P: On the record.

K: Well then will you read back to me whatever quotes you are going to use?

P: Yes, I will. Would you like for me to start right now?

K: No, let's get through and you can then tell me what quotes you are going to use.
Her questions were more personal.

P: Than what?

K: Than some of the other interviews that I have had.

P: Do you as the interviewee consider that a good or bad thing?

K: I am very fond of Barbara, so I, its, I don't say, you know it makes it a different interview.

P: In what sense?

K: Because it's more personal.

P: It is my thesis in writing the piece that this is one of the reasons she gets particularly in her long interviews with people some of the news that she does get because it is a human interview as well as a news interview. Would you share that?

K: I think that, yea, that makes sense.

P: How do you see Barbara as a woman?

K: She is a very good hearted, warm person and she has been very good friend.

P: Are there any particular examples when she has gone out of her way to be ... kind or do something for you.

K: She has always been a good friend.

K: I think I have said as much as I am going to say.

TELECON

G. Hauge/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

10:00 a. m.

K: I am calling you about the Under Secretary position for Economic Affairs in the Department and as you know Casey has left to become head of the EXIM Bank. And one of my big problems is to get a better relationship between political and economic objectives. And we haven't ever really been organized well in the State Dept. to do this. And with Shultz leaving it becomes even more important. I was wondering if whether by any wild chance one might be able to induce you to take this?

H: Well, I think it would be an exceedingly wild chance Henry. I am in the midst here of a very considerable operation. I have been Chairman for about 2 1/2 years. I have got about four plus some to go.

K: Four years to go.?

H: For some years to go for retirement. I turned 60 years old Henry. I am getting to be an ancient of days. And so, I am pretty well ruted in here I think for the duration.

K: Well I am sorry to hear that.

H: I took over when Mr. McNeal retired and I have got a good young president, but he isn't ready to take over yet by any means. He is 41 years olds, he is best president in the business. But you know how it is this is a small operation compared to some of those down there but.

K: I know, but it is an important one.

H: And not a simple one to operate.

K: That I am certain of.

H: But Henry I certainly will put my mind to this immediately to see if I have any thoughts. being useful to you.

K: But could you? It almost has to be somebody who knows something about Washington, don't you think.

H: Yes, indeed.

K: There are a lot of bright businessmen one knows, but they couldn't really do it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON
Hauge/Secretary Kissinger

-2-

H: And in addition I think somebody who can cope with Treasury.

K: Exactly.

H: The State Department hasn't been able to do that for a long.

K: And deservedly so, because it hasn't since Dillon they haven't really
had anyone here.

H: Precisely. Henry, I will turn my mind to this and are you leaving shortly.

K: I am leaving tonight, but you can call Ken Rush.

H: I'll call Ken Rush. I know him very well.

K: I would appreciate it. very much.

H: Right to Henry. All the best.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CD NARA Date 6-8-84

*

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

1:00 PM

D: Hello

K: Communications from your Government which Eagleburger has handed to me. Let me make a number of points: First of all, I am sending it back to you, I refuse to accept it, and you can tell them that.

D: This is not the communications that I was suppose to hand to you.

K: At any rate. Just tell them I have refused to accept the first part of it in any form in which it has been communicated. Secondly, if you think if it is in your interest to bring this matter to a head while I am in Moscow, you go right ahead and do it.

D: But we don't think it is in our interest to bring it to a head.

K: Thirdly, if Dayan doesn't come, I'll withdraw from the negotiation and state publicly what has happened and you do what you want. And then we will put somebody else in charge here. We have now communicated to other Governments that Dayan is coming. Your behavior is outrageous and frivolous and you know dam well we have told Sadat they should be removed by the time we fly our next plane. You know very well that he has told us the tanks would be removed and has not refused to withdraw the artillery. I have communicated with Fahmy yesterday so it is entirely up to you, if you want to play domesticate politics you go ahead and do it, but I think and you just communicate this to the Prime Minister, I don't care to debate it. I cannot accept this communication in any of its points. We are talking about 72 lousy artillery pieces which we have told you we would get removed and if you can't understand why we wanted to get to Sadat personally for the first time we flew a mission and why it was so desirable to do if after the embargo had been lifted then and why we wanted to have the military photographer interpreter there who could explain it to him.

D: We understand this.

K: So then the first part of your thing is just totally unacceptable but if you don't like our reconnaissance you do your own reconnaissance, we would be delighted to stop it.

D: Can I say something Mr. Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By C. NARA Date 6-8-74

TELECON

Dinitz/Kissinger 3/23

-2-

K: YCuz can say something but I don't want to debate it.

D: I would not say it for the sake of debate of an argument. I think
your reply to me now is based on the wrong assumption. It is assumed
that we don't come or that we are looking for a reason not to come.
The fact of the matter is so the Prime Minister and the Minister of
Defense are very anxious to carry these negotiations and for D'Ayan
to come. The point is that we are asking your help in moving

K: You have my help. I sent a cable last night in which I made
essentially the points you asked me to except I didn't make them
conditional and I still don't believe I've told you for months not to
lengthen Syria and Egypt together.

D: We are not lengthening Syria and Egypt together, but you will have
to understand Mr. Secretary the situation in Isareal there is now
questioning these violations and a question of creditability of the
government.

K: If by the time you get ready to settle it, there is still violations
then you have a point. If at a time when you have been assured by the
U. S. Government one, that the tanks would be withdrawn; two, that
we are in active discussion with the Egyptians about the artillery being
withdrawn; three, when you have the backing of the Government to get
it withdrawn, but when we are pleading with you not to make an issue
of it with the Egyptians, who are under attack from the Soviets alreay.

D: Yes, but this is not the question we are making an issue with the
Egyptians. We are really appealing to you to help us.

K: That we are doing. I have already done it last night and if after
the next flight they are still there then we have a real problem. I have
in any case told them to remove it as quickly as possible.

D: Isn't it possible Mr. Secretary they can remove it by Tuesday
when the .... expects

K: Maybe it is. I am not saying it isn't. The method we used was the
right one. The method you using is wasting a lot prestige for nothing.

D: We are not using any method, but we are under attack and we are only communicating with you. We have not communicated with public ly on any of these methods. We are trying to bring the situation, to rectify the situation so that everything can proceed, this is our only interest. We have no interest in...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CD NARA Date 6-8-87

Dinitz/Kissinger 3/23

K: I told you, you could say that we have told you that by the next time. Well you can't use the reconnaissance publicly.

D: I called the Prime Minister after our conversation last night.

K: Well at any rate, I sent message to the Egyptians last night. No we have made all the points you wanted us to make.

D: Can I say to the Prime Minister that you have asked the Egyptians to remove the artillery and that you last night sent message to the Egyptians asking them to remove the artillery and rectify the violations as quickly as possible?

K: Yes, but that is the second time we have done it.

D: It is the second time you have done it and the...

K: And they have never refused to do.

D: And they have not refused to do it. And...

K: I have no question that they will do it. Why should they want to cheap with 72 artillery pieces?

D: I don't understand it either. That is why Dayan says that he thinks that a strong plea by you would be responded by them. He doesn't think it is a major method for them to move these..

K: We have made a strong plea. Now I will not tell this to the President until 6 p.m. tonight, when I talk to him. Now if you want to get me a reaction from Israel, you can do it up until then.

D: I will communicate to the Prime Minister and Dayan.

K: But I must say two things, one, it cannot be in your interest to have a public confrontation with Sadat.

D: Mr. Secretary.. this is the one point.

K: Secondly, you cannot want to emphasize violations while I am in Moscow for god's sakes.

D: That is why we want to solve the thing before you go. I mean if we have this assurance that you have done all what you could.

K: You have the assurance, you can tell them that we have personally intervened with the Egyptians. However, it isn't helpful to have all of this in your gd knitze(?) Well then it will be on every Moscow radio station

Dinitz/Kissinger 3/23

-4-

to the Middle East.

D: But that is not up to us, Mr. Secretary. When the opposition
tables a motion for the agenda as they did, We can't stop it.
I can assure you we are interested in a debate or in foreign affairs
security because that is the last thing in the world we are interested,
and this is not a threat, Dayan ask me to tell you; tell the Secretary
we are not threatening him, we are not using c____ leverage. But it
would be physically impossible for me if I have to debate and give evidence
and the thing is not rectified. They say the Minister of Defense of the
country does not leave when the agreement is violated and believe me
Mr. Secretary

K: But look I am holding this thing together against all probability
here. If he doesn't come, I'm going on vacation. If the Middle East
explodes in a nuclear war, I've canceled too many visits. If haveasked
the Syrians to come here on April 11. If this whole scenario which has
been designed in order to give you the maximum amount of time
falls apart and you make the Egyptians who are trying to help us ...
for this, then I can't do any more.

D: But is it so difficult for them to do this before Tuesday? Then
everything is set in motion again. I mean really if surely.

K: I don't know whether it is that difficult for them because I can't go
to Sadat every other day. I now have to go to kx Fahmy. Fahmy is
much tougher on these things than Sadat.

D: I understand. But if you have asked for Sadat to do this then he
owes you an answer.

K: What I asked Sadat was, thinking that we were dealing with rational
people, that by the next time our planes would fly, 6 or 7 days,
I expected that they would not find these things there. I didn't ask
him to reply to it, because I wanted to do it in a face saving way
so that the next time we could report they weren't there. I have
attempted precisely to avoid having him to back down. This is
exactly my strategy.

D: I understand.

K: Now when we are flying next to I don't know but it will certainly be
next week.

D: I understand this but this is, we are also .. rectify this out of the..

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-95

Dinitz/Kissinger 3/23/74

K: And therefore, I know we are flying next week sometime because I have just approved it. I don't know the exact date on which we are flying. But it will take two days to get the pictures after that.

D: Maybe if you fly on Tuesday and then we can get the pictures by Thursday and then he can leave on Thursday and be here on Friday. I am simply trying to find a way out of a situation that is really impossible. Not that we are looking for it, Mr. Secretary after all, we really have meticulously done everything in the agreement.

if

K: Yes, but I am confident that the Egyptians violate the agreement they won't do it with 72 artillery pieces and you know it too.

D: That is correct and that is..

K: And therefore, we are not talking about anything but a technical violation which I am sure will be rectified if you do it in our way and if you put Israel on war footing over there then keep the defense minister there and fake a great crisis.

D: No we are..

K: When you have Syria to worry about then you can go right ahead and do it.

D: Mr. Secretary, but you surely believe me that it is not to our interest either to make a crisis out of this or to put The Secretary of the country in a war or delay coming of the Secretary of Defense nor of which is to our interest and not only you and I understand it but Golda and Dayan understand it. What we want is a way that all these things would not happen. If the thing is out in the public It has all been kept secret, that is a different situation. SK But since the thing is all in the public, we are trying to find a way in which the Minister can come as scheduled which the Egyptians will rectify the situation and in which we can rectify the Syrian situation. I mean this is precisely what to do. The Prime Minister says we gave credit here, continue to give credit and with Sadat. We really want to do SK this and I said to Larry Dayan told me on the telephone he hadn't even thought about our second line defense after we would lose Sinai because we don't want to make it a permanent line. And as a result of it wait for nobility there. I mean, I passed it on to Larry as a kick of information. And this just shows to what phase we are meeting. Now we have a very serious public situation to face and this is not of our making. And this other question Mr. Secretary you tell me you can't be concerned with gd domestic politics, it is not domestic.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

Dinitz/Kissinger

3/23/74

K: Oh, come on if you can't explain that you have been asked by the U.S. Government to that all we are talking about are 72 artillery pieces and that you want to wait until another inspection after which you will of course pay the different thing. Really if the public (Israeli) is so stupid not to understand that then I think we are in bad trouble. For all I know they may be gone by next Tuesday. We didn't ask him. We avoided what you are forcing us into.

D: Well we are not really forcing you into any Mr. Secretary.

K: Well, look, it is up to you. The fact is, his not coming will become known just as I will be leaving Moscow, which is going to be tough enough as it is.

D: No, No, I don't think we should face a situation. It is best for us ... We are trying.

K: I regret that I have already put in, I have sent a long cable to Fahmy yesterday after our discussion explaining to him that 6 batteries is 36 pieces not 72 and I said it would be unfortunate in deed if this matter were to cast a cloud over the excellent record so far metitously observed at the disengagement agreement. Then at the end I said you should tell Fahmy that the Israelis have just contacted me with an urgently that the artillery fleet in excess of 36 pieces withdrawn in order prevent this discussion from becoming a major political issue in Israeli with all the unfortunate repercussions and complications that cause for what we are seeking to accomplish together in preparing the atmosphere and way for the ongoing peace effort with Syria. So I have made the...

D: That is correct Mr. Secretary. The only thing that maybe I can suggest is that if this things can be achieved before the session of the UN that would remove the whole issue from the public line and would facilitate the whole operation. I mean this is only one point that ... can make it possible because I think that will allow us to

K: I will make that point today. It is a grave mistake. It is a grave mistake you are forcing us into and you

D: Why, Mr. Secretary?

K: It is a mistake because I am certain the next time we fly the gd things won't be there. I know Sadat; he isn't going to risk his relations with us for 72 artillery pieces. You are now forcing us to force them to back down in writing.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C.B. KARA Date 6-8-95

Dinitz/Kissinger

3/23/74

D: They don't to put it down in writing.

K: I cannot ask our Ambassador to see Sadat three times a week.
Therefore, it has to go through channels, therefore, there will be a
written recored of it.

D: Suppose you make reconnaissance Tuesday then send it

K: I don't know when our reconnaissance is flying. I am going to find that out.

D: I am just trying to find a way ... There is no need to make a crisis.
It is no good to any of us. I am trying to convey and be as honest as I can

K: Look I know you were honest about. Look, I won't tell the President
until about six o'clock, if there is anything you want to modify fine, or
otherwise I will have to send a piece of paper to him in a synopsis form.

D: (inaudible) Well I be talking again with my Minister.

K: I would not recommend however that we be in a position when he is
worried about what the Israelis do while I am out of town. I do not think
that is any bodby's interest.

D: No, definitely not. (Inaudible) And Dayan said to me to tell the Secretary
what we are doing is a today we have another causlty
Except for his diplomatic effort we would have never reacted the way we did.

K: That I believe. Look we have this immediate problem in which your
proposition is unacceptable. Now is we can. First part. If we had wanted
to g cover up for it we could have done it easily and the second part is
unacceptable.

D: Was not in a document questioning relationship between .
It was a description of the situation . Which authorizes us to
to ask you to help us rectify it.

K: That we. I have read you what I said.

D: I understand.

K: I will now send another one.

D: That is the only thing--if you can possibly send reconnaissance.

K: I'll find out when the gd reconnaissance is.

OK Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C0 NARA Date 6-8-95

March 23, 1974

1:17 PM

K: Brent.

S: Yes sir.

K: Brent, do you know when we are flying that reconnaissance thing?

S: The 26th, if the weather is right, that is Tuesday.

K: Can you find out whether we can make sure that we are going to fly
it on the 26th and whether we can get the films back by the 27th?

If we can let the Israelis have the problem with their parliament, and
in fact if we could fly it on the 25th it would be that much better.

S: I don't think. I'll check I don't think we can. It takes that much time.

K: All right. Will you make sure it flies on the 26th and that we get a read out
on the artillery pieces right away.

S: OK

K: And hopefully on the 27th early.

S: Sure. I think I can probably get a read out on that specific thing.

K: OK. Thank you.

S: Sure.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-64

TELECON

March 23, 1974

1:25 PM

D: Solve the problem I think.

K: It may or may not. In either event I think you should not draw any consequences until we have had a chance to work with Egyptians.

D: No. I wouldn't

K: I am confident when Sadat's personal emmissary was over here and I told him we suspected violations. And he said there is no problem, we will take care of it.

D. Yes. Well that is all what we want Mr. Secretary. We don't want any confrontation.

K: Well let me know by 6 pm what I should tell the President, if any thing. But you can tell the Prime Minister that we are flying weather permitting on Tuesday.

D: OK. And you will let the Egyptians know.

K: I am sending a message now. I'll say we are taking the unusual step of letting them know so that they can take the step.

D. Fine, I appreciate it Mr Secretary.

K: OK

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E0 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6.8.04</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

130 PM

D: Hello.

K: Anatoliy

D: Oh yes, Henry, how are you?

K: Ok

D: Eleven o'clock?

K: Eleven o'clock.

D: Henry, I have list of where your children to go and how.

K: I saw something from our Embassy. It sounded very good to me.

Yes, because I received it yesterday from Gromyko and this is the
hole list. And if you and they want something to add there is no
roblem.

I notice you have me down for ballet again but I know I will never
t there.

The ballet is up to you to make a decision. There is no problem.
nything you would like to see.

K: No, No, you had me down on my schedule for a ballet., but I don't
think I'll ever see it.

D: Well when you were there as a matter of fact three evenings or four

K: Well the first it is very difficult. So three..

D: Well maybe some good performances.

K: Anatoliy, I had two minor things, one on. I don't know whether you
can help with this. My ex-wife is a little worried about too many pictures
being taken of my children with all these terrorists and kidnappers around.
If your people at the airport could discourage pictures of my children,
I would appreciate it.

March 23, 1974 - 1:30 PM

D: Only the problem is with your Americans correspondents there so you would like, or you may do it in a different way. There is no problem with us because if we have some photographs we will just give it to you without showing.

K: Sure. That doesn't bother me.

D: It is more from American side, but if you don't mind we could do it this way for instance if you go out, they will stay in longer for say three minutes later. -- Not to come with you.

K: Exactly.

D: Then they will take separate car by our security men where you will stay.

K: I think that is better.

D: Then there is no problem. One of our men will come from our Foreign Ministry and pick them up and the security car will bring them to your residence.

K: There is no ceremony is there?

K: No.

K: So in this case I could arrange they arrive you come down and meet your children and someone will come to airplane and bring them to you.

K: Don't you think that is better.

D: I leave it up to you. Yes I think it is better. You shake hands and someone will accompany and then they will come.

K: Should I make a few remarks when I arrive?

D: Your own people may ask you. We will not press you to make or not to make. But it is really for you and your pressmen. There will be no forward statement but you'll stop half a minute to chat with them.

K: Right. OK. Good.

D: What else?

DOLLASFILED
Authority EC 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3/23/

-3-

K: That is all. On the press band. I don't think we can have a moratorium
But we would be prepared to discuss a threshold.

D: About....

K: Whether I have not really I cannot proceed without having seen that
study which is not yet completed.

D: I see.

K: Let's put that in abeyance for the time being.

D: Yes. Could you get it during stay in Moscow?

K: I'll try.

D: If not, it goes on another page and on this troops deduction is an
idea not to go into details because you will..

K: Well, what we discussed the other day say anything between
5 and 10 % US/USSR we would be willing to discuss.

D: Just as initial step, but with understanding.

K: But with a link to a second step which would include national forces.

D: OK, so long as those lines we discussed. He may... annoying
negotiations maybe as I mentioned to you just a number of troops which
you put there along figures I mentioned to you privately, but those are the
same we understand and agreed. Half year and other half from there.

K: Well that is more difficult.

D: Why you don't won't to have any.

K: No, but because we have never discussed that with any of our allies.

D: Oh, I see.

K: As soon as you can discuss it.

D: OK this doesn't make issue really in this meeting.

K: We will have chance to talk on the plane.

D: OK, so at eleven o'clock.

K: Eleven O'clock.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

HHumphrey/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

1:53 PM

K: Hello

H: Henry.

K: Hubert, how are you?

H: Fine, my friend.

K: I am going off to Moscow tonight. But I wanted to talk with you about one matter which I know you disagree with some of the thinking here. Which has to do with some use of some development loans for Viet Nam.

H: Yea.

K: The problem is that the oil bill alone for Viet Nam has risen by a $125 million as a result of the rise in prices and that almost all their difficulties are caused by world inflationary treasures.

H: I had a talk yesterday with Gen. Van Dong and the Ambassador that was in here.

K: Right.

H: And I do understand that problem, Henry, but here is what I was worried about, Henry. In fact, I am not adverse trying to help as much as possible in these matters, but the problem that I see and I had Gail Magee in here; We got worried if you start to transfer it just stirs up such ungodly troubles over here as all of my colleagues, I don't know whether we would be able to get another bill out that is all.

K: Yes.

H: As I told Mr. Parker, you can do it this year, you got the authority to do it, the law is clear, you can do it.

K: Right.

H: But right away just between us you will have Frank Church, Ted Kennedy, and Cranston and Abourezk and all these fellows jumping up and raising hell, and the Chairman of the Committee and Mansfield and all of them.

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C9 NARA Date 6-8-04

HHumphrey/Kissinger

3/23 1:53 PM

H: And I just got to worry about whether the short term gain was worth the long term risk.

K: Well, that is a point I understand very well. I have two problems I don't expect you to give us the go ahead but some of our people here are worried if we do do it as a last resort that your willingness to manage the AID Bill would be affective and that of course would be very bad blow to us.

H: Henry, I am not a petulant young man about stuff like that. I want to work with you. I mean I am a soldier in the ranks in things I believe in and I know we have some obligations there. I am not going to jump.

K: After all the agony we went through, all of us and you perhaps more than anyone, to let it all slide down now because of what is not a huge sum that's what bothers us.

H: Now you have got a $54 million request in here for economic to try to get that sub up to the organization.

K: Right.

H: Now, uh,

K: Of course, if we got that we would not have to do the loan.

H: I think that its my judgment that we can get most of that over here. That's if we really work at it, because it isn't a large enough sum of money and it was authorized. You know we did authorize it, and we authorized it with a pretty good majority, better majority than we did with appropriations.

K: Well, why don't I do this Hubert. Let's hold off a few more weeks to see how that supplemental goes.

H: Right.

K: And then if we get absolutely against it then we may have to do the loan.

H: I understand that.

K: And you and I am not asking for your public support at that time but for your sympathy that we have to do it despite of your preference.

H: Well, now let me assure you of this. If you have to do it, which I know that, that is something that you will have to weigh very carefully because the only reason I told Parker that I looked with opposition on it was because I was worried about fiscal 75 because I thought we had things colled down on SEA, but they are still at it. It's got us like we're on heroin. You know. It is unbelievable around here that we get hooked on this.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0-KARA Date 6-8-04

HHumphrey/Kissinger

3/23 1:53 PM

K: Then they are going to crank it up again.

H: Yes, they are trying to crank it up again. If you got to do it, just have your man, just tell us when you got to do it and I'll, I'm not going to raise any hell about it. I am not going to join the pack.

K: That is really all we can ask for.

H: But I would like us to pursue the course of the supplemental if we can and see if we can do it the regular way.

K: Well, why don't we hold off for 2 or 3 weeks.

H: Yes.

K: And see what the situation is then.

H: I had a heart to heart talk with the Deputy Prime Minister here and told him exactly what was being said around here in terms of Congress of you know what it is, but I have to be very honest with you, I think you are wasting ammunition. You have to be frugal and you have got not to over react. And you have to show some progress in your country in economic development, even though it is minor you have got to be able to show it, of course they don't get any good press here, it is impossible.

K: It is awful. Because they are really working hard and they are caught by the world economic situation. Look India is taking a beating. Every country is caught by these high raw material prices.

H: Of course, and this is the worse problem we have right now. All right Henry.

K: Good Hubert, when I get back from the Soviet Union I would like to sit down with you on SALT at some point because I know you have always been interested in this problem.

H: I have been. You know what, just before you go, let me say this, I talked the other day here with some of our people on this Jackson amendment business. I wish we would get that damn thing off the MFN and MFN ought to be done really on the basis of a rather normal thing and if we got any argument with him it ought to be on credits. You know a banker has a right to say before you get my money, we would like to talk with you about certain things. But on MFN it seems to me that that is a normalized relationship that this world in this year of 1974 requires. And I think that means more to the Soviets in many ways than even the money. Because there are other places to get money. I see they ..

By 08 NARA Date 6-8-04

HHumphrey/Kissinger

3/23/74 1:53 pm

-4-

H: got a billion dollar plant from Germany coming up.

K: Yea. Of course, the credits they already got, so if they were cut off
that too would be taken unfriendly--as an unfriendly gesture.

H: Well, we are not going to let that happen but

K: But I think we could come to an understanding with the Congress
about the rate of lending.

H: Yes:

K: And that it won't go beyond a certain point unless there are certain
things that the Soviet Union does.

H: Yes, I think people understand that. They really I mean a banker will
say to you like to they say to PANAM and PENN Central and a few others
unless you do certain things in management we are not going to continue
the money.

K: Well let's see what they are going to come up with on the immigration
issue when I am there.

H: Well, good luck to you, my dear friend.

K: Thank you Hubert, and I look forward to seeing you. How is your
health?

H: Oh listen, I am feeling just great and I am so grateful I can't tell you.
I really do. And I want to help you in any way I can.

K: Well, you know your admirers are all praying for you.

H: I know that. Well you do so much, I really worry about you just between us.
The Lord blessed you with all kinds of strength and vitality.

K: Well, I was very fortunate that way.

H: Good luck on this journey friend.

K: Thank you.

H: You bet, Henry.

K: Bye

By DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EC 12958
 NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

McGeorge Bundy/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

2:23PM

K: Mac, how are you.

B: You're on your way aren't you?

K: I'm on my way this evening, but since all my letters are written by others I wanted you to hear from me personally how much I appreciated your letters.

B: Well, you are nice to take the time with all you've got on

K: No, I thought it was extremely thoughtful. What you said about George Ball also crossed my mind.

B: I found myself snickering to McCloy about it so I thought I would share it with you.

But I agree with your basic point. I think now that a shot has been fired across the bow we can all...

I think it worked better than I was afraid it would, you know I think you've other people to do work for you now.

That's right. I think now no European government it going to vote on something that effects our interest without getting it to us : one way or other.

B: That's right.

K: I have had incidentally, I've had the, our own records checked on what we were told when. We were told some of these things, but in such a peculiarly inconclusive way.

B: They may have been. It is absolutely characteristic of the Germans. They are doing it now with the French. You can see they are not being as firm in conveying what they would like of the French as they are conveying to us what they would like to convey to the French.

K: Yes. But, I think we can cool the confrontation.

B: I think you already have.

K: Exactly.

B: I think it is four or five days better off than when I was scribbling that.

K: But I appreciated it very much. What I would like to consider working out at some point in the near future is how I can get you gentlemen down here and

Bundy/Kissinger

3/23/74

get you read into some things so that it is more a consultation.

B: I think that the way to do that is, is not to put so much of your own time in it. If you wanted to delegate somebody that you had confidence in, then people, could come in and out as they were able to get to Washington and...

K: Let me work that out when I get back from the Soviet Union, because on the two big issues which are going to be SALT II and the MidEast we'll need every scrap of public support we can get and every bit of advice we can get.

B: I think both are going to be edgy and I think on the Middle East in particular there is a need not to be longingly given the climate of opinion here.

K: And that's going to be, you know that is going to get nastier and nastier.

B: I saw Eban in the airplane coming back the same day we were down here, because he had been seeing you. And he said something cryptic about what a difficult day it had been and I could see that you had begun the educational process.

K: Well, I am trying to avoid a head on confrontation for as long as possible.

K: Well, you are absolutely right. First place you would break up the government and then it would be your fault.

K: Exactly. Exactly. But on Syria for example, they have just got to give up a slice of the Golan Heights. It won't be

B: Told ______ in Berlin about that who understands them better than almost anybody I know and he thinks they will, when they really.

K: I think they will too. It they can figure out how to stick us with the blame for it.

B: And if they can decide if Country(phonetic)? doesn't really matter, I don't know if that is the one that doesn't really matter or not. But all they have to do is find a piece of property that they, that their generals can most easily part with and you have a bargain going.

K: That is what I think. That is what I hope any way, but even if we don't get a bargain going, I will then be able to split the Egyptians away from the Syrians.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C9 KARA Date 6-8-95

Bundy/Kissinger

3/23/74

-3-

B: You can get the Egyptians away from the Syrians, but I'm sure
how far you can get them from the Saudis, which is why I worry
about Jerusalem.

K: On Jerusalem something has to happen. Jerusalem, on Jerusalem the Saudis will not give up.

B: Exactly right.

K: I hope the next move after Syria can be a major settlement with Egypt.

B: Well if Sadat will go. It depends a little bit how far he can go and still say he is keeping the solid front that he always talks about.

K: As long

B: He probably knows better than we do.

As long as we don't call it peace I think it can go quite a distance.

Yea. Well that gets theological with the Israelis.

That's right. But I think the Israelis are so..if the Israelis had any
aise they would offer the 67 porters to Egypt. And get them out of the
r, because for that they could get anything.

I'm sure that is right. That is what you said to us the other day and
on reflection I am convinced of it. It's the government that is not
capable of thinking for itself though it is much the same proposition
that applies there that you applied to the Soviets in the context of SALT.

K: Yea.

B: You have to give them the menu because it is just an act against nature for them to design it.

K: But if they are not willing to give up all the territory, then maybe they should settle for not getting all the peas.

B: Well. They will do much better the other way around and their own does know that but, but.

K: They would do a lot better the other way around because whether they get those 10 or 15 miles. makes no difference in history.

B: None.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

-4-

Bundy/Kissinger

3/23/74

K: An Som Mosaedic has become irrelevant because they can close Bal Ba Monday(?)

B: Absolutely. All clear. You know a lot of them have begun to say it. I think you are right to negotiate with Dayan because at least you can say that kind of thing to him.

K: He is the only one of them who really has some strategic grasp. But he may not last through that report of the investigating committee.

B: Well, that is the trouble. How long will you be gone?

K: I'll be back Thursday night.

B: ______ says you look forward to boar hunting.

K: Inhuman. And I tell you the last time I participated in that sport, where I refused to shoot, but when you sit up in that stand, it makes you doubt that prudence pays because they put out the food and about 80 boars arrive simultaneously and there was one extraordinarily cautious and looked behind every tree arrived late, searched the ground before he put his foot down and it of course got it. I'll call you when I get back.

: OK Have a good trip.

: Thank you Mac and thank you for your letter.

: Right.

K: Bye

B: Bye

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By C9 NARA Date 6-8-74

TELECON

March 23, 1974

3:35 PM

K: But this is Saturday.

D: I know but it is almost in our minds, the Russians, we are ... Saturday and Sunday. So it is Friday and Saturday in Russia, they are not working. Henry I just received a telegram with a text of letter from Brezhnev to the President. This is an answer to his letter which you mentioned to me, you remember.

K: Yes.

D: I will read it and then it is rather short and then would you like me to take it on the plane or just send it within half an hour to your office.

K: Send it in half and hour to Scowcroft.

: To Scowcroft, yes.

: Yes.

: I will just read it just for you to know.
Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your message of March 21 which I have read with great interest. First of all, I would like to tell you Mr. President, that I highly appreciate and ..... your ....
the historic importance of what we have already managed to do in the last year, in improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. I agree with you that our forth coming meeting can and I would say should demonstrate that the relations are mutually beneficial cooperation between our two people are really becoming a permanent factor for the general peace. General peace this is a goal worthy to work for. It is concrete situation listed in your letter undoubtedly may ... consideration and I am confident that exists ample opportunity to provide both sides demonstrate necessary elimination realistic ... approach to come to a mutually acceptable agreement which would give appropriate importance to our new meeting. We will thoroughly discuss ...... the situation with your Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, proceeding from then the sayings that he will have as before all necessary powers or... from you .....

D: What?

K: You devil, you are up to it again.

D: Well, as before necessary powers from you for reaching some ... agreements.

TELECON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3/23/74 3:35 PM

-2-

K: I know you.

D: Please accept, Mr. President, my best wishes to you....
March 25 ..... matters to you ... with reservations.

Thank you.

K: ...

D: OK

K: Anatoliy, incidentally for your information, the M. Goldman is
running around town saying that you told him Moscow has lost confidence
in me.

D: oh,

K: And that the only person that, that you are the only person left to
leave any confidence in me.

In the present it is Washington that helps me so it doesn't, I'm not affected.

: No, no, it is nonsense. Are you serious

: That 's what he said, I don't believe it, but that is what he said.

: How does he know ?

K: Because he said, he saw you.

D: Yes, but we did not discuss you at all.

K: Well

D: In no way.

K: No, no

D: He knows I would be the last person to say kinds of things.

K: Exactly.

D: You know me for many years.

K: Anatolivy.

D: ... I would tell you personally but never to anybody else.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3/23/74 3:35 PM

-3-

K: Look, I know that. You don't have to convince me. I just wanted to tell you.

D: He is real ...... My impression he hasn't really been an admirer

K: Oh, yes. He doesn't mean any harm.

D: No, no.

K: He just likes to be important.

D: This I would agree with you. And when I will see you, I should say something else to discuss, but it is not specifically important

K: I will see you tonight.

D: Yes at eleven. I hope you will ... but not at 1 AM or 2 AM.

No, no I will be on time.

I hope you will go to a nightclub before.

Absolutely. No, my children will be here.

Oh, yes. .... OK

See you then.

D: Bye, Bye

K: Bye

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

Secretary Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

3:40 P.M.

S: Hello Henry.

K: Jim, I just wanted to call you before I left and really only have one item of business but in general the situation is the way we left it and if anything comes up I will see to it that you get informed through Scowcroft.

S: Right. Incidentally, Henry, I heard that the MBFR meeting was not a thing of joy and enlightenment.

K: No.

S: I wanted to

K: It was a sorta disaster.

cut

S: I wanted to remind you that the discrepancy between US and Soviet Union forces is just based on 15% cut on both sides.

K: Oh, no that I did not object to. What I objected to was you know if you take out the Soviet tank army with equipment for 29,000 Americans without equipment it is a little hard to sell.

S: Well, I think you are going to have to sweeten it up with trament(?)

K: Exactly. As long as that is understood. And what we may have to do is

S: See we have those 7,000 weapons in Europe some of which we don't know what the hell we would do with.

K: Another problem, Jim, we ought to consider is that when you begin analyzing these equipment ceilings you don't really know whom they work for because if you take out their men they probably have to take some of their equipment with them and if you put a ceiling on theirs and a ceiling on ours you breed another disparity.

S: I think the best. It sounds right, I'd have to look at it more closely.

K: I don't expect to get into that in any detail in Moscow. The only thing that may come up in Moscow, but this is simply a guess, I have no knowledge of this, is they may resurrect again the idea of five to eight percent cut which would work out to about 12 for us and 29 for them.

S: That's all right.

Schlesinger/Kissinger

3/23/74

-2-

K: And in a way since we are not held to taking forces out.

S: Listen I think we can get that kind of stuff out of our headquarters and what not.

K: Exactly. It might even be a better way of doing it.

S: Yea. We have positioned ourselves in negotiations far better than the Russians have in that regard, we've got more fat.

K: Jim, one final thing.

S: Maybe that's a disadvantage being so combat heavy.

K: I have the impression of some foot dragging by the Navy on that mine clearance and Ebare(sp?) has now raised a number of questions.

S: Well Ebare(?)

Which I think the Navy put him up to.

I don't think the Navy put them up to that. Ebare(?) we misses a lot there, and I don't know whose fault it is. At the time that State made that announcement we should have informed him previously.

Oh sure.

And a lot of that stuff I think is just a resentment of the bureaucratic situation. Now he is raising two questions. One question is, how can we send our sons to die on foreign soil. And the other question is, who the hell is going to fund this. Now on the funding side I think we will have to find a way of getting it out of the AID budget.

K: Oh, Jim, the President is calling me on the other line.

I will call you right back.

S: Righto.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-64
DE

TELECON

March 23, 1974

3:52 PM

K: Hello

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Jim, On this, I agree that was a stupidity on Ebair(sp?). The reason Sadat wants us to do it, he can get it from the Russians and from the British.

S: I know, but there are two things that have to be done. First, the foreign policy (inaudible)

K: OK I'll do it when I get back.

S: And secondly, I could do it.

Or you do it, if you want to.

I could do it in part for you, but I can't substitute entirely, I think
our personal ways

I'll call him Friday.

Secondly, we want the Navy to go up there and explain the nature of
the operation and that there is really very little risk. Virtually no
 risks at all to US personnel.

K: Both would be good.

S: And the Navy is perfectly happy to do this. The Navy is fully supported
by the operation. I'm not sure the Navy would want the ..... to come out
of its hide.

K: About $10 million for Christ's sake.

S: It is fully support of the operation. I think we can show
Getty around.

K: Good.

S: Now what else is there? We are having real problems on the massive increase
and that's in trouble. I trust we will be able to get an agreement with the Thais
that we are studying the reduction.

By 08 NARA Date 6-8-05

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON 3/23/74
Schlesinger/Kissinger

-2-

I*

K: I have signed off on that thing on that paper and that should be coming over to you on Monday.

S: Yea. But the stuff for the negotiations. They are making an announcement that we are starting negotiations.

K: That's fine.

S: And with that I think I can generate support.

K: Look, I have

S: ...We are in trouble on that. The Mehone Committee is taking a very tough attitude on it and they have been willing to go with a $200 million increase and that's all and that leaves us short of what we need let alone short of what we asked for.

K: What did we ask for?

I am going to try to get Mehone off that and get Stennis to weigh in. But it is very helpful to me if I can say well look fellows we are trying to adjust our problem in SEA where we have got excess resources we are going to reduce them as we plan to do in Thailand, but on the other hand on the Vietnamese side, because we have taken our forces out we need additional money to support the Vietnamese.

Absolutely, you can do that. And I will strongly back. And if you want me to call Mehong I'll do it.

No, I don't think that is necessary. I may call you in at a later date. Now the other thing is that John Stennis and some others have taken a very tough attitude on Diego Garcia.

K: Stennis I talked to him the other day and he told me he was going to come around.

S: OK. That one is going to be very tricky to put through.

K: The thing they are all having trouble with is why it has to be in the supplemental.

S: The answer to that is quite clear. Because we want to get an additional 6 month head start prior to the time they reopen the Canal.

K: Yea. Well

S: OK, Henry.

K: Well, OK, Jim and I'll be in close touch.

-3-

S: Have a good trip and I think that there is some possibilities if you think about it of holding up the option on MBFR or SALT and that you want to have some movement on one or the other. I'm not sure how they feel about MBFR, but some ways that may be a more promising area and shows a sense of diplomatic momentous.

K: Well, I'm not dying to get you know to ram SALT through. Let's see what happens.

S: Yea:

K: Do you think Zumwalt wants me to raise home porting in Odessa? I think that is a more reliable place to homeport than is Athens.
OK Jim.

S: CK

K: Bye

: Bye, Bye.

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

March 23, 1974

K: That isn't the letter I wanted. I wanted a friendly letter you know
telling him that we would, we are under great preassure from the
Soviets, but that no matter what noises he hears from Moscow,
to believe only what I tell him. You see what I mean.

S: Yes. All right. We will get that to you.

K: And that we are staying on the course we had indicated.

S: Around the course.

K: You understand.

S: Yes, I understand what you are saying.

K: Good Thank you.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Authority E0 12958</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>By CO NARA Date 6.8.04</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELECON
Secretary Schlesinger / Secretary Kissinger

March 29, 1974

3:10 PM

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

S: Oh, pretty good. How are you?

K: Well....

S: A little I assume.

K: Yes, but the major problem isn't that. The major problem is that we have
nothing left to offer the Soviets and therefore detente is just in bad shape

S: You mean on the MFM and equivalent?

K: Yes. I mean SALT isn't all that surprising to me and the press is building it into a crisis.

S: Who is building it into a crisis.

K: Well the press is building into a crisis.

S: Oh, the press is. They were after me.

K: Into a failure. You know, given our proposal we haven't got - you know when you listen to the Soviet version, our proposal looks pretty silly.

S: Why is that?

K: Their version is that what we're saying is we're starting off with 6,000 warheads which we're banking volarisis (sp), on poseidon. They're giving us per boat, then we're banking all the air delivered RV's and then we want to restrict their ICBM's on a ratio that's unfavorable to them in the overall.

S: I think that conceptually that has some merit, on the other hand as you stressed, you just can't do with SOBM's what you can with IC's.

K: But then I said, you know, you'll be able to destroy our ICBM's and he said, yes and leave you with 9,000 warheads to hit every village in the Soviet Union. It's not an absurd arugment.

S: No, it's not, except our preference isn't necessarily to hit every village.

Schlesinger - page 2

K: I agree. All I'm saying is, when you hear their version - I think we would like an agreement. Their proposal now is 1100 to 1,000 MERV missiles. No sublimits but they will tell us what the sublimits are. I will ask - you're not free for breakfast are you.

S: Henry, I'm going to take a little rest if you don't mind. I'm going off to Bermuda for two days.

K: OK, I just want a little work done while I'm gone, I'll have some of my people do it. Maybe they could get together with yours so that it doesn't leak out.

S: Sure. Just have them call Paul.

K: Whether any sublimits are conceivable that we could live with. Always keeping in mind what the situation will be without an agreement.

S: Right. OK. How's everything else?

K: Otherwise, things are going along OK.

S: Did somebody shape your senior State Department official conferences on the aircraft? I'd like to know what you say.

K: What I said was...

S: I'm just asking if there is a transcript.

K: But I can tell you what I said. I said some progress was made but not enough to constitute a breakthrough and we now have to analyse it.

S: Well, I guess I was quite consistent with that when they asked me about it yesterday.

K: That's all I did say.

S: OK. Good. Now on the question of Suez. There's a very delicate situation, as you know Herbert was opposed to that. I went up to see him, I guess after you left, and he has now backed off and he indicates that he is willing to support the operation as long as we give him a way of crawling back off the limb, which we think we've given him. He says it is improper, illegal for the DOD to fund this directly. So the position that I've taken is that the administration will seek from the operation in other ways. You can either look around in the aid budget or if you don't have it in the aid budget send a supplemental to the Hill or indicate that you're going to have a supplemental to the Hill. If the supplement doesn't fly then of course we will have done the work already.

K: My nightmare is that with the Egyptians going so far out on a limb for us, if we now get the same problem with the Egyptians that we did with the Soviets.

By 09 NARA Date 6-8-04

I*

Schlesinger - page 4

there, that are kind of odd and unusual and they're putting some pressure up there
on the Iranians.

K: OK.

S: I believe that the watch committee is kind of, said, let's not stir anyone up
about that, but I think that you ought to be informed on that because it looks like
either a little muscling in the political area and it's obviously related to their
threats that the Iranians should stop supporting the _____. That could be a problem.

K: OK, let me take a look at that.

S: OK.

K: Good.

S: Bye. Welcome home.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

March 29, 1974

3:26 PM

(Missed first part)

K: __their negativism continues.

V: I think so, sir. I think they are built in negative, that's my sense of it from their talks - from talking to them before and after. I think the biggest part of it they derive from your own briefing to them from Moscow to London. At least that's the way they interpret it.

K: That's amazing. Was that so negative?

V: They draw that conclusion from it.

K: But you were there, weren't you?

negative

V: I did not draw it that worthy of that total/degree of negativism. If you try to push it further I think it will have a rebound rather than, you know go and make it any further.

K: I wasn't aware I was so negative.

V: There were terms like unacceptable, failure and so on. They were used in a limited context. The problem for them is they take that context and make it a broader one than it was in fact, indeed the fact.

K: OK, thank you.

V: Right, sir.

END

TELECON
Robert McNamara/Secretary Kissinger

March 29, 1974

4:07 PM

K: Bob?

M: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

M: Welcome home.

K: Now that you're through being my recruiting agent, how would you like to be a speech writer.

M: Well, that's beyond my capacity but I know you've got to do something at the UN, is that what you're thinking about.

K: Yes, and we have a draft which is a great term paper. I wanted you to - the speechwriter is just sitting here - I don't want you to think I'm talking behind his back. I would appreciate it Bob if you would just - we're sending it over to you - Joe Sisco is. If you don't - I'm obviously not asking to re-write it - but what other things do you think need saying.

M: Yes.

K: What I would like to do at this speech is to say, look, there is a problem of development but for God's sake don't let's discuss it in terms of a confrontation between the developed and developing nations, but in terms of the complete issues that confront us. In which on major points there is a communitive interest and where there isn't a communitive interest you certainly can't extort it from us.

M: I think that's a good theme to put forward.

K: That doesn't come through in the speech but if you could jot down just the issues which from your perspective seem to be the dominant ones. I can't compete with the demagoguery of ______ and Jobert. I have to have a rational and careful approach.

M: OK, send it over and - I just walked into the office, I've been away for the week.

K: You take - we don't need a reaction this afternoon. We can have it by Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

M: OK, I'll definitely do it. It's a hell of a mess, I can tell you that.

K: That's why I'd like to say something that's not the usual baloney. We have in that whole speech, you will see, not one reference in any meaningful way to these

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By NARA Date 6.8.05

McNamara - page 2

accumulating surpluses of ____ that you've been concerned with.

M: I was in Algeria this week on Monday and Tuesday and I spent two hours with ____.

K: He's an impressive guy.

M: He's a very impressive guy. He's hard, tough, intelligent. He fought 8 years from '54 to '62 and he bears the scars, psychologically and otherwise. They have absolutely no plan. At least they had none then for the UN session.

K: Yes, that's right. I don't think they have one now. That's why actually I think we have an opportunity, we can get ourselves to say something sensible.

M: Well, send it on over and I'll receive it and I'll get something back to you.

K: Many thanks.

M: OK, Henry. Nice to have you back.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12958
By C0 NARA Date 6.8.04