In the course of his analysis many assumptions commonly taken for granted fall by the wayside--especially the assumption that the most effective deterrent is identical with the capacity to deliver maximum destruction. Because America's strategic doctrine has failed to adjust to the requirements of a revolutionary military technology, Kissinger argues, the only war for which we are adequately prepared is the war that is least likely to occur: an all-out war that starts as an all-out war.

This book is more than a devastating dissection of existing American strategy and an comprehensive prescription for an alternative. It is a profound and radical reappraisal of the whole American approach to war and defense policies. It is not easy reading, because it demands hard thinking; but it will be an uncommonly rewarding—and, for America's military and political leaders, an essential—experience.

In January 1954 Mr. Dulles delivered his famous speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in which the doctrine of massive retaliation was announced. In the audience were a number of people who had long wrestled with problems of strategy and politics in a nuclear age. Around the room one could see many whose expression made it clear that they could hardly believe their ears as Mr. Dulles continued from point to point. When the speech was over a number of us met in the bar and exchanged reactions. It seemed almost inconceivable that at the very moment when the loss of our atomic monopoly, which had long been foreseen as a future probability, was becoming an actuality, Mr. Dulles should announce in blatant and offensive terms what he claimed was a new doctrine, the doctrine of depending "primarily upon a great capacity to retali ate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."

From the end of the war, and the hasty "point" desobilization which followed it, until the fall of 1949 the military support for United States policy rested on a capability for atomic retaliation and upon little else. The budget ceiling of 13 to 14 billion dollars permitted little in the way of conventional forces. Our atomic monopoly gave us the feeling that a capability for atomic retaliation, if not all we would desire, was at least adequate to protect our most vital interests, and that we therefore were not under great pressure to provide more.

By the fall of 1949 the Chinese mainland had been captured by the Communists and the Russians had tested their first atomic bomb. It was evident to those who dealt with military-political policy matters

outcome of the war will be determined by the forces in being within the non-excluded area on D day, because reinforcement and resupply after D day will be ruled out. Such a system would put a premium on a secret pre-D day build up in which it would seem the Russians might have considerable natural advantages. If the latter proposition, that the exclusion applies only to nuclear weapons, then the war may become largely a conventional war for control of the areas excluded from nuclear attack and have little to recommend it over a limited conventional war. In any case there are few, if any, areas in Western Europe in which the cities are more than 60 miles apart. If it is possible to exclude one's own cities from destruction by declaring them open, I should think every European country would insist on declaring all their cities open. We are then right back where we started from; either the Russians under threat of massive retaliation forego aggression against Western Europe or the war Kissinger contemplates if a conventional war.

Quite apart from these difficulties there are a host of other difficulties with Kissinger's assumptions. James E. King has dealt with some of them in his review of Kissinger's book in the New Republic.

In a nuclear age everyone must be for the limitation of war, if war itself cannot be eliminated. But if the limitations are really going to stand up under the immense pressures even of a "little" war it would seem something more is required than a Babe Ruth chart of arbitrary limitations, weightless weapons, flying platforms having no fuel requirements, and tactics based on no targets for attack and no logistic or communication vulnerabilities to defend.

Editorials

Carlos Castillo Armas

In its editorial comment on the assassination of Guatemalan President Carlos Castillo Armas, the American press went beyond what the conventions prescribe for tragic occasions of this kind. The editors recalled how Castillo, with a band of tattered followers and a few obsolete planes, drove from power the only Red regime Moscow has succeeded in establishing on American shores. They hailed him as his country's liberator and a stanch ally in the world struggle for freedom.

Castillo was all these things, but in a much more intelligent way than was generally realized. He understood, as too many of the ruling classes in Latin American seem not to understand, that guns and bullets are not a final or convincing answer to Communist promises of a better life for the masses. In his plans for Guatemala, the ousting of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and his Communist conspirators was to be not the last act of the drama but the first. The last act was to be a democratic society consecrated to the cause of social justice.

Not all those who welcomed Castillo's victory in the early summer of 1954 sympathized with these objectives. The powerful landowners, having learned little from their bitter experience under communism, wanted only to return to the good old days. Before Guzman came to power in 1950, they had owned 75 per cent of the land, though they were only two per cent of the population. They wanted Guzman's agrarian reforms repealed. They wanted an end to trade-union agitation among their mostly illiterate workers. They wanted above all the immediate return of the lands which Guzman had expropriated and given to the peasants.

Nor did all Castillo's troubles come from unrecon-

structed reactionaries. The liberal-minded, especially among the students, were overly impatient for reform. They insisted that the hard, dangerous transition from a Communist dictatorship to full-blown democracy be accomplished overnight—and this in a poor country where more than half the population of three million is illiterate.

CASTILLO'S ACHIEVEMENT

Between these extremes Castillo walked cautiously but firmly. He did not grant complete freedom of the press, nor permit opposition political parties, but he laid carefully the foundations for a future democracy. He refused to restore the expropriated lands and confirmed the peasants in their ownership. He sponsored a minimum-wage law and vindicated the right of workers to form free trade unions. He increased property taxes and introduced a personal income tax. With financial help from this country, he so restored the Guatemalan economy that at the time of his death Guatemala City had assumed the appearance of a boom town.

Such was the man cut down on July 26 by a traitorous member of his palace guard—reputed to be a Communist sympathizer. President Castillo died instantly, with his horror-stricken wife at his side. The country remained calm—a tribute perhaps to the progress that had been made under his wise and understanding rule. There was no opposition when "First Designate" Luis Arturo Gonzales took over the Presidency, and no surprise when he announced that within four months elections would be held to choose a successor. Castillo had, indeed, set Guatemala on the road to democracy.

Are We Prepared?

Don't be surprised if, as time moves on, you hear more and more serious talk about U. S. readiness for the contingency of limited war. The massive tensions of the past decade have pulled us into a painful posture in which we stand, fists up, ready for the monster struggle we hope will never come—the one we would have to fight against all-out aggression by the Soviet Union. Our minds and energies have so focused on this one dire possibility that we have thought too little about more likely eventualities. Our growing nuclear strength is somehow connected in the public mind with the sole emergency of total war, made necessary by the final,

overweening ambition of the men in the Kremlin. Psychologically speaking, we are almost prepared for such a war. But are we ready to face the grim, small-scale demands of limited war for such precious but restricted areas as Oman, Indonesia or Guatemala? This is what we must now begin to ask ourselves.

Some say our experience in World War II is responsible for current mistaken thinking about future wars. There we had a war that fitted our American conception of what war should be: overt aggression against us and our allies; obvious superiority of U. S. resources; finally, a terrible retribution inflicted on the enemy by our

478

America • AUGUST 10, 1957

Washington Front

Congress Makes up Its Mind-or Does It?

Last week, I thought I had all the answers to how
Congress makes up its mind. Well, it seems I didn't;
so shall we start all over again?

Since I wrote, House Majority Leader John W. Mc-
Cormack (Mass.) publicly begged the President to
say just one little word to members of his party on the
Senate-House conference committee on the foreign-aid
authorization bill. If he did not, said Mr. McCormack,
when the actual appropriation bill comes up for pass-
age, Mr. Eisenhower stands to lose up to $500 million
below what he had called the margin of safety.

Then there was the school-construction authorization
bill, defeated by five votes. Last Congress, a similar bill
was defeated by tacking onto it the Powell amend-
ment, by which no school district not integrating the
races would receive aid.

But the two cases were different. However mis-
guided, Rep. Adam Clayton Powell (D., N. Y.) had an
idealistic motive: the help of his race. This time, the
maneuver was openly cynical: Republican Rep. Stuy-
vesant Wainwright from Staten Island offered the
Powell amendment again, with the obvious intention,
not of aiding Negroes, but of killing the granting of

Federal funds for new school construction. He suc-
ceeded.

Came the civil-rights bill. When Sen. Richard B. Russell (D., Ga.) "discovered" what everybody knew since February, namely that Sect. III of the proposals was designed to cover all civil rights, not only voting rights (Attorney General Brownell had said this at that time), the section was doomed. That left voting rights, and the tactic then was to tack onto it a jury-trial rider, despite the fact, as Sen. Paul H. Douglas (D., Ill.) pointed out, that 28 other laws exclude jury trials in contempt convictions for violation of Federal court injunctions. The strategy was obvious, and also cynical: to make the civil-rights bill so obnoxious to its own champions that in the end they would vote against it.

The attitude of the President in all this mess was
ambiguous. Why did he not "fight" for his own projects?
He insisted that the civil-rights bill was a right-to-vote
bill, until, after Senator Russell's speech, he was forced
by newsmen to admit he had not "understood" it. On
*July 31 he came out fighting for it.*
*ED.*

On the school-construction bill, a word to three of
his own "team" in the House would have saved the
issue. A wire was kept open to him until the last mo-
ment, but it would have had to be a walkie-talkie out
to Burning Tree. The idea that he considers himself
President of all the people, Democrats and Republicans,
and so "above" the fight, does not hold water. He has
personally intervened in plenty of recent issues. He is
no craven, that is sure; but he remains an enigma to
friend and foe alike.
WILFRID PARSONS

Underscorings

COMMUNISM IN THE MISSIONS
will be the theme of the 27th interna-
tional Mission Week, to be held in
Louvain, Aug. 27-30. Reports will be
heard from students of the problem in
various sections of Africa, in China,
Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Pakis-
tan, Latin America, etc. For information
write the Secretariat, 95 Chausée de
Mont St. Jean, Louvain, Belgium.

► THOSE WHO HAVE TO DEAL with Spanish-speaking immigrants, especially migratory laborers, will find useful *A Practical Spanish Grammar* published by the U. S. Department of Justice for the use of Border Patrol officers (Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Paper, 194p. 55¢).

► THE BERLIN DIOCESE, which in
1945 had only 30 churches undamaged,

has now 315 churches and chapels in
use. Of these 150 are in West Berlin,
38 are in the Soviet sector of the city,
and 127 in East Germany outside Ber-
lin. There are 373 priests in the diocese,
the majority of them serving in the
Communist zone.

► CONSECRATION of the family to our Lady of Guadalupe, for use by the head of the family, is facilitated by a prayer-leaflet (in Spanish or English), a lithographed picture of our Lady and a poster for the family's front door, distributed by the Legion of Mary, 408 E. Quincy, San Antonio, Tex. (10¢ per kit; $9 per 100).

► A LEAFLET MISSAL containing the Mass of St. Joseph the Workman, for use in Labor Day Masses, is being distributed by the Catholic Council on

Working Life, 21 W. Superior St., Chicago 10, Ill. (15¢ each; 10-99, 10¢ each; 100-999, 7¢ each; 1,000 or more, 6¢ each).

► ST. PROCOPIUS ABBEY, Lisle, Ill., will be host, Aug. 29-Sept. 1, to the second Unionistic Congress to be held in the United States. The congress aims to encourage reunion of the dissident Eastern Churches with Rome. The first congress was held at the abbey last September.

► MUSIC LOVERS will welcome the "new" *Caecilia*, official quarterly journal of the Society of St. Caecilia (P. O. Box 1012, Omaha, Neb. $3 a year; $5 for two years). This "oldest U. S. musical journal of any kind" was founded in 1878.

► FOUR PRIESTS AND SIX NUNS are among the 70 U. S. college and high-school teachers who won fellowships for travel abroad this summer under the State Department's international educational exchange program. C. K.

America • AUGUST 10, 1957

477

triumphant forces. Simplicists as always, we tend to think of future wars in this same pattern—the enemy's big aggressive blitz, our retaliatory bombardment of his bases and home cities, then the last inevitable stage when we close in for his unconditional surrender.

### PIECEMEAL WAR

As the brilliant young analyst Henry A. Kissinger writes in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957):

> The lesson of the two world wars had convinced us that we would have to resist a military onslaught against Western Europe. . . . Beyond this, our consideration of the strategic shifts which we would resist by force was inhibited by a doctrine which left no room for intermediate positions between total peace and total war. (p. 29)

As our calculations have frozen harder and harder in this mold, we have tended, in proportion to the growing destructive power of the weapons evolved by our technology, to "define in more and more drastic terms," writes Dr. Kissinger, the Soviet provocation which would ultimately drive us into war.

But what about Korea? Surely that was a limited war,

one which we held within rigidly limited bounds. Yes, writes Dr. Kissinger, we did keep Korea limited. But this happened, not because we understood the meaning of limited war, but rather because we were reluctant to engage in all-out war over the issues at stake there. "In short, we thought we could not afford to win in Korea, despite our strategic superiority, because Russia could not afford to lose." Our ultimate frustration over Korea stemmed, it now appears, from our failure to grasp the strategic opportunities presented by this kind of war.

These considerations point unerringly to the wisdom of what Thomas E. Murray, former Atomic Energy Commissioner, has advocated—a more realistic and more rational nuclear policy regarding limited engagements with the enemy. We should begin to explore this vital question. If we fail to develop such a policy, we shall lose our struggle with the Reds, who are shrewd enough so to calculate their moves that no one stage in their conquering advance will ever seem to us to be "worth" fighting about. The big war, for which we are readying ourselves, would never come; the ultimate provocation would never be given. But one day we should wake to find ourselves defeated.

## The Djilas Time Bomb

In 1936 the French novelist André Gide, on his return from a visit to the Soviet Union, set down his disappointment in language that had a strong effect in pro-Communist intellectual circles. Since then, the literature of anti-communism has grown. Much of it has been written by former Reds whose testimony has been on the whole convincing and authentic. It is to be feared, however, that these protests have had more effect in the free world than among working Communists in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.

A new book is now coming off the presses which has all the signs of an indictment that may well be historic. Its author is Tito's ex-friend and propaganda chief, Milovan Djilas, a convinced Communist from his youth, now sorely disillusioned by Red realities. Whereas Djilas' forerunners registered their protests in the safety of exile, this daring and idealistic Montenegrin sent the manuscript out of Yugoslavia, with the instruction that it be published regardless of what might happen to him as a consequence. Djilas is at this moment in a Yugoslav jail. If the publication of his book proves to be his death sentence, it is because he wanted it that way.

Experts in the field of Communist theory agree that this book is probably the most damaging criticism seen in years. What Djilas says against the movement seems destined to have profound repercussions in the Red empire, at least in intellectual and ideological circles, for which the work is intended.

The earth-shaking volume is entitled *The New Class* and is scheduled for publication shortly by Praeger. The title provides the key to the charges made. Far from

leading to the establishment of a classless society, Communism has produced a new ruling class, with all the domination and exploitation of the former ruling class. Djilas pictures communism as a spent force that has outlived its social usefulness and that now reveals itself, instead, as only a new form of exploitation and tyranny. In place of capitalistic ownership it has substituted a new kind of ownership, that of privilege. Ownership, he says, is nothing other than the right of profit and control: "If one defines class benefits by this right, the Communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the origin of a new form of ownership or of a new ruling and exploiting class."

### ABSOLUTE POWER: ABSOLUTE CORRUPTION

But what makes this new kind of ownership more sinister than the old is that it carries with it the most complete power known to history. By its very completeness it comes in conflict with everything which it does not control. From that all-embracing monopoly stems the long trail of exploitation and brutality that is the record of communism: "Men will marvel at the grandiose adventures it accomplished, and will be ashamed of the means it used to accomplish them."

It would be too much to expect that this blast from the trumpet of an impetuous, devil-may-care Montenegrin will make the parapets of the Kremlin come tumbling down tomorrow. From all accounts Djilas is still a Communist, but, if the analysis of the experts is to be believed, *The New Class* will prove to be a first-class time bomb in the Communist world.

America • AUGUST 10, 1957

479

# Freud in a Gray Flannel Suit

## John P. Sisk

AS YOU MAY KNOW, the latest thing in that branch of rhetoric we know as advertising is MR-Motivation Research. Motivation Research is concerned with probing into the consumer's psyche to discover his real motives for purchasing, which are not necessarily the motives the consumer is himself aware of. To do this probing, MR uses techniques and insights derived from anthropology, sociology, socio-psychology and depth psychology. What the researcher discovers about these real motives is very useful to the ad-man, who can then shape his advertising much more effectively.

There are obvious advantages to inducing people to buy for reasons they are unaware of—especially in very competitive fields where the differences among the goods advertised are very slight. Even an inferior product has a chance at success if the MR expert can find a way to motivate prospective customers.

A good example of MR at work is the virile, tattooed arm in the Marlboro cigarette ads, which previously had strong feminine appeal. That decorated arm, so the story goes, broke through the male prejudice-barrier, Marlboro switched sexes and upped its profits. Significantly, nothing has been said about any change in the product itself. MR is concerned only with packaging and "pitch."

Obviously the only way to find out about MR is to read about it. That is its beauty. Not only does it usually take the form of the "soft" or sophisticated sell (as opposed to the "hard" or high-pressure sell), but it tends to sabotage your sales-resistance without your conscious knowledge. Many of the animated figures that more and more are dominating TV commercials are planned to do just that. They dance on your *id* with feet so light you can't even feel them.

Now since it is to the advertiser's interest to attack any part of the consumer's personality (conscious or unconscious) that will induce him to buy, certain moral questions arise. Among them, says Perrin Stryker in the June, 1956, *Fortune*, is the question "whether any manufacturer should exploit, as buying motives, the deepest human frailties that can be dug out by the psycho-analytic method." Should such techniques be left alone?

he wonders. Are they an invasion of privacy? What harm will result from such a skilfully calculated encouragement of weakness?

### SATAN THE FIRST AD-MAN?

These are good questions. In fact, as long as there has been advertising they have been good questions, for MR makes advertising differ only in degree from what it has always been. Advertisers have always found it useful to exploit the more unlovely aspects of the consumer's personality—his greed, lust, snobbishness, selfishness, narcissism, insecurity and materialism. One way or another advertisers assume original sin as a highly desirable status quo—and, significantly, the first huckster was the Devil. Indeed, Satan, as Milton pictures him in Book IV of *Paradise Lost*, even uses the methods of the motivation researcher as he whispers in the ear of the sleeping Eve:

> Assaying by his Devilish art to reach
> The Organs of her Fancy, and with them forge
> Illusions as he list, Phantasms and Dreams . . .
> Vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires
> Blown up with high conceits ingend'ring pride.
> Him thus intent Ithuriel with his Spear
> Touch'd lightly; for no falsehood can endure
> Touch of Celestial temper, but returns
> Of force to its own likeness: up he starts
> Discover'd and surpris'd.

The picture is perfect for our purpose. Satan is working on the unconscious mind of Eve, softening her up for the sophisticated sell he will work on her later in Book IX. He must arouse the "vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires" so that she will accept his evaluation of what he will offer: a chance to be like God. Actually, of course, he can sell her only illusions, phantasms and dreams, as she will discover. Eve will experience the disillusion we have ourselves so often experienced, when what we have been induced to buy fails to give us the satisfaction an advertisement has led us to expect—or has perhaps failed in the end to give us any satisfaction at all.

One reason for this dissatisfaction, for Eve and for us, is that we do not know ourselves very well. Many of the motives for our actions and attitudes remain hidden from us. Another and related reason is that we tend to think and communicate poetically with symbols—a

MR. SISK is in the Department of English at Gonzaga University, Spokane, Washington.

480

America • AUGUST 10, 1957

For the Record

In a poll taken by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion on the popularity of foreign statesmen, Eisenhower ranked near the bottom. India admires 1) Chou En-lai, 2) Nasser and 3) Tito. Canada's Immigration Department has threatened to refuse entrance to immigrants who break their trip with a visit to the United States. Leaders of the U.S. Delegation in London predict that disarmament talks will continue at least through December. According to Chairman Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission, a luminous watch delivers more radiation "than all that received from the accumulated fall-out to date."

Carl J. Megel, president of the American Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO) hails the recent Supreme Court rulings as "gleams of hope like rays of clean sunshine in a murky sky". In Richmond, Virginia, the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that, the Jencks case notwithstanding, a defendant in a conscientious objector case is not entitled to basic records of the FBI. Vice President Nixon has warned Congress against adjourning before it passes legislation to protect FBI files. The nine California Smith Act defendants, recently granted trial by the Supreme Court, will probably not be retried as the witnesses on whose testimony they were originally convicted may prove impossible to reassemble.

Even if the natural gas bill were to be squeezed into Congress' tight schedule, it would probably not be passed. Thirty Congressmen who voted to relax gas regulations in 1955 lost their seats last year. Congress has voted to require Secretary of Agriculture Benson to mail all soil-bank payments by September 15. Democrats do not want Republicans flooding farmers with checks on election eve.

Free Men Speak, the anti-collectivist monthly tabloid, is sponsoring a National Tax Protest Rally dedicated to the eventual repeal of the personal income tax, in Chicago on September 13. Inquiries about the meeting - which will be addressed by Hon. Ralph W. Gwinn, Willis E. Stone, Dan Smoot - should be sent to Free Men Speak, 7314 Zimplel Street, New Orleans 18, La.

Results of the Traver's Stake at the Saratoga Races: 1) Gallant Man, 2) Bureaucracy. Psychiatric examinations are in order for those who bet on the winner.

NATIONAL
REVIEW

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

EDITOR: Wm. F. Buckley, Jr.

PUBLISHER: William A. Rusher

EDITORS

<table><tr><td>L. Brent Bozell</td><td>James Burnham</td></tr><tr><td>John Chamberlain</td><td>Whittaker Chambers</td></tr><tr><td>Willmoore Kendall</td><td>Suzanne La Follette</td></tr></table>

Frank S. Meyer

PRODUCTION EDITOR: Mabel Wood

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT: Sam M. Jones

ASSOCIATES

<table><tr><td>Maureen L. Buckley</td><td>Priscilla L. Buckley</td></tr><tr><td>Jonathan Mitchell</td><td>Morrie Ryskind</td></tr></table>

CONTRIBUTORS

C. D. Batchelor, John C. Caldwell, Frank Chodorov, John Abbot Clark, Forrest Davis, A. Derso, Max Eastman, Medford Evans, Karl Hess, John D. Kreuttner, J. B. Matthews, Gerhart Niemeyer, Revilo Oliver, E. Merrill Root, Freda Utley, Richard M. Weaver, Gen. Charles A. Willoughby

FOREIGN CONTRIBUTORS

London: Anthony Lejeune
Geneva: Wilhelm Roepke
Munich: E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn
Madrid: J. Dervin

ASSISTANT TO THE PUBLISHER: J. P. McFadden

CONTENTS

AUGUST 31, 1957

VOL. IV, NO. 8

THE WEEK .................................... 171

ARTICLES

<table><tr><td>For President—Lyndon Johnson?</td><td>Sam M. Jones</td><td>177</td></tr><tr><td>Three on the Line</td><td>Willmoore Kendall</td><td>179</td></tr><tr><td>Real World for Sale</td><td>John F. Kiley</td><td>183</td></tr></table>

DEPARTMENTS

<table><tr><td>For the Record</td><td>170</td></tr><tr><td>Letter from London</td><td>Anthony Lejeune</td><td>182</td></tr><tr><td>Letter from the Continent</td><td>E. v. Kuehnelt-Leddihn</td><td>184</td></tr><tr><td>From the Academy</td><td>Russell Kirk</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td>Arts and Manners</td><td>Garry Wills</td><td>186</td></tr><tr><td>To the Editor</td><td></td><td>191</td></tr></table>

BOOKS IN REVIEW

<table><tr><td>Horns of the Nuclear Dilemma</td><td>James Burnham</td><td>187</td></tr><tr><td>Why Teachers Won't Teach</td><td>Russell Kirk</td><td>189</td></tr><tr><td>Reviewed in Brief</td><td></td><td>190</td></tr></table>

NATIONAL REVIEW is published weekly, except the second and third weeks in August, at Orange, Conn., by National Weekly, Inc. Copyrighted 1957 in the U.S.A. by National Weekly, Inc. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Orange, Conn.

EDITORIAL AND SUBSCRIPTION OFFICES:

211 East 37th St.
New York 16, N. Y.
Telephone: MURRAY Hill 2-0941

RATES: Twenty cents a copy, $7.00 a year, $13.00 for two years. Foreign, $9.00 a year; Canada, $8.00 a year.

The editors cannot be responsible for unsolicited manuscripts unless return postage, or better, a stamped self-addressed envelope is enclosed. Opinions expressed in signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of the editors.

170 NATIONAL REVIEW

nan, Eisenhower, Acheson and nine-
tenths of Liberal publicists. But, like
those who denounce Communism but
not Alger Hiss, he never says ex-
plicitly that any one of them was
mistaken or stupid.

2. Neither his text nor his bibliographies cites any Liberal-anathematized writer, although such citation would seem not infrequently relevant and sometimes almost compulsory from a scholarly standpoint. After all, a good part of the cogent analysis of, say, Soviet intentions and methods is not altogether a fresh discovery by Mr. Kissinger.

3. Mr. Kissinger does not directly challenge the first principle of the Liberal (and official) position toward the Soviet Union: the defensive, negative posture of U.S. strategy. He does not explicitly declare what is to be done with our limited warfare capability, if we develop it. Thus he permits an interpretation of his proposals as only a technical improvement on the established strategy of containment conceived as a bridge to normal co-existence.

This ambiguity and the caution
with names may be intended by Mr.
Kissinger as a tactical maneuver to
permit him to carry on a dialogue
with the leaders of opinion that
would be cut off if he brought his at-
tack into the open, directed it against
individuals, and seemed to be lining
up with the outlawed Right. It is a
fact, moreover, that if he had con-
demned George Kennan, quoted
Whittaker Chambers instead of Na-
than Leites, and proclaimed (in-
stead of whispered) that we could
and should have intervened in Hun-
gary, then his critical reception would
have been considerably less ample
and less warm.

The problem of communication is
real enough, but I doubt that Mr.
Kissinger has solved it. His rhetorical
sacrifice is too great, too close to a
political capitulation. By his own
principles he knows that in a struggle
it is not machines, weapons, plans or
organization that decide, but political
will; the problem is not merely what
is done, or with what, but who does it.

Mr. Kissinger as author, so thor-
ough in facing the ultimate problems
of the world conflict, has evaded his
own decisive problem. In conse-
quence, I am afraid, this excellent

book will, like the studies of the Rand
Corporation and the Harvard Russian
Center, prove politically sterile.
Mr. Kissinger will continue to bump

When Dr. D. Louise Sharp—who is
dean of women at Central Michigan
College—began collecting these 120
little essays, *Why Teach?* (Holt, $4.00),
a “nationally known educator” advised
her: “Keep the book as free as pos-
sible from the pedestrian phrases and
circumlocutions that not only be-
wilder but bore readers and which,
alas, are not wholly lacking in a good
deal of professional literature. Leave
out of this the dreary tables from the
guidance experts and the gaudy ha-
rangues of the educational evangelists.
Make of teaching a challenge to the
best minds, to the most adventurous
spirits, and to the highest ideals that
we have yet conceived.”

By and large, Dean Sharp has com-
plied with these counsels: most of
the statements are decently written,
and some—like Professor William
Ernest Hocking’s “The Eighth Grade”
—are valuable and entertaining. Al-
most all of them suffer from an ex-
treme brevity that makes escape from
platitude difficult, however, and which
gives them a repetititious tone; the
editor might have done better to have
published twenty instead of a hun-
dred and twenty statements. The con-
tributors are remarkably various:
Ezra Taft Benson, Omar Bradley,
Stuart Chase, Norman Cousins, Clif-
ton Fadiman, Claude M. Fuess, Paul
Hoffman, Margaret Mead, Yehudi
Menuhin, Dore Schary, Ralph W.
Sockman, Pitirim Sorokin, Adlai Ste-
venson, Mark Van Doren, etc., etc.

A good many people decline to
teach who would make very good
teachers; and one of the persons most
responsible for this state of affairs is
a contributor to this volume, Mr.
William Heard Kilpatrick. This sam-
ple from his "Teaching as a Desira-
ble Profession" is itself sufficient il-
ustration of what is wrong with the
educationist hierarchy, the "patronage
network of Teachers College, Colum-
bia," which works diligently to drive
out of teaching any teacher who de-
clines to conform to its canons:

up against an always unpleasant re-
alization: that if he is serious in a
challenge to the prevailing view, he
will have to make somebody cross.

Why Teachers Won't Teach

Learning also is essential in the life
process. Only as we learn from ex-
perience can the past serve the pres-
ent. Also current learnings serve. As
one faces a new situation—and these
appear continually—he must size it
up as to both threats and possibilities.
With these in mind—that is, learned
—one next proceeds to act. If a
measure succeeds, it is thereby more
strongly learned for future use; if a
measure fails, one learns not to use
it. In such ways one learns and so
grows. He learns what he lives.

This mixture of truism and fallacy,
so wretchedly expressed, suggests
that our first necessity in recruiting
more and better teachers is to break
with the dogmas of entrenched "in-
strumentalism"—and with the smug
educational bureaucrats who call
such stuff "educational philosophy."
A superintendent of schools recently
told me that were it not for compul-
sion, 90 per cent of the teachers he
knows would drop out of their state
education association—affiliated with
the National Education Association—
being utterly bored with the plati-
tudes of that crew. Too many teachers
drop out of the profession altogether
in despair of ever being allowed real-
ly to teach by this hierarchy. It would
have been refreshing to read in
*Why Teach?* some examination of this
problem; but Dr. Sharp told her
contributors to "exclude controversial
issues."

RUSSELL KIRK

AUGUST 31, 1957 189

REVIEWED IN BRIEF

INDIA: THE AWAKENING GIANT, by W. S. Woytinsky (Harper, $3.75). Mr. Woytinsky assumes that man is exclusively an economic animal; and that therefore the purpose of mankind is the abolition of Power. He accordingly ignores most fundamental problems of human society. Nehru's Five-Year Plans, the villages and cities of India described in these pages belong to a world as unreal as talk in the United Nations or the dreams of an opium eater. But the world of reality is governed by laws that will continue to operate, however tightly Mr. Woytinsky and his fellows may close their eyes. If the transformation of India projected by Nehru and his "intellectuals" is to be carried out, it will first be necessary to subvert and destroy the ancient and venerable culture of the Hindu people, which is based on the doctrine of metempsychosis and karma. And when a nation's soul is destroyed, all that is left is the animal instinct of barbarism. The only possible result in India is a social explosion that may loose upon the world another bandit horde of 400 million. R.P.O.

THOMAS WOLFE'S CHARACTERS, by Floyd C. Watkins (University of Oklahoma, $3.75). Unless society changes very radically, it is hard to imagine five-year-olds who will not be enchanted with Pooh Bear; twelve-year-olds who won't fight with pirates on Treasure Island; and eighteen-year-olds who won't identify their pimply urge to write with Thomas Wolfe's portraits of the poet as a voracious young provincial. Wolfe had power certainly (Gertrude Stein once compared him to Niagara Falls, adding that "the water at the bottom is no better and no different than the water at the top"), but what he disgorged is less useful to adults than to post-pubescents. His greatest popularity was in Germany; and he cannot easily be read after twenty, except by people who have read him earlier and are resavoring their own past. Wolfe's truest readers will not care any more about Mr. Watkins' professorial

soundings of his real-life family
than admirers of Christopher
Robin will care to know that their
hero's legal name was Milne. R.P.

GASLIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD OF NAPOLEON III, by Roger L. Williams (Macmillan, $5.50). The Second Empire produced—or rather, co-existed with—some first-rate men; but, excepting Louis Pasteur, Mr. Williams has picked only its shoddy, florid second-raters for his decade of representative leaders. In a preface, he recommends all that picturesquely naughty gas-light, and even enters a plea for the 19th century as a laboratory period in which men were challenged to "redefine liberty." This may be true, but government in France under Napoleon III had no part of it, being, indeed, so consistently and brutally inept that the defeat of 1870 seems to have been one of Clio's most just and merciful coups de grace. R.B.

THE COMPACT HISTORY OF THE U.S. NAVY, by Fletcher Pratt (Hawthorn, $4.95). This is the last of some fifty books, mostly on naval history, written by Fletcher Pratt. He died just a year ago, shortly after finishing the manuscript. The volume of his output was staggering, and yet the quality of his writing was invariably high. He made himself master of his subject as very few in his time have done. This history is a fine recapitulation of his previous work. If American history is still taught in our schools, I hope that this will become a leading reference book. "The sun," as they say in the Navy, "is just coming over the yardarm," so here goes a tall one as a toast to Fletcher Pratt, a first-rate writer and historian, and a patriot. M.M.G.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICES FOR SCHOOLS, edited by W. D. Wall (New York University for Unesco Institute for Education, $2.75). Here complete with the usual verbiage about "the fullest possible development of each child's personality in consonance with the needs of his so-

ciety," is a report on the extent to
which "educational psychologists"
have succeeded in penetrating the
school systems of Europe. This
leads, of course, to a vision of the
glorious future in which every
school and every family in the
world will be run by a "child
guidance clinic team of psychologist,
psychiatrist, and psychiatric
social worker." Three such experts
should be able unassisted to
break any child's spirit and reduce
him to a well-adjusted little moron
incapable of serious thought or
moral integrity. In this way the
happy world of the future will be
assured of a population uniformly
composed of carefree little rabbits
who will contentedly sit in their
cages and nibble the lettuce so
generously provided by their
Keepers.
R.P.O.

THE PINK HOTEL, by Dorothy Erskine and Patrick Dennis (Putnam, $3.50). No political implications in the pink, nor any universal overtones in the hotel. Just a robustly-narrated clutter of sexy high jinks in the guest suites and service elevators of a Florida resort. Funny, slight, tawdry, i.e., exactly what the subject deserves. R.B.

THE SQUARE PEGS: SOME AMERICANS WHO DARED TO BE DIFFERENT, by Irving Wallace (Knopf, $5.00). Nine classic loons, *genus Americanus*—wherewith Mr. Wallace wishes to prod our long-lost instinct for being individuals. “What these eccentrics offer,” he says, “is the example of uninhibited personality, a trait so lacking in our highly organized age.” But do they? A man who tried to persuade Congress that the earth was hollow; the *soi-disant* king of an unclaimed island in the south Atlantic; the nymphomaniac who ran for President on a free-love ticket —don’t these instances of mere megalomania, funny as they are, betray Mr. Wallace’s avowed purpose? Why not some instances of men who were extreme individuals *without* being cranks—say, Poe, or Daniel Boone, or one of the Pilgrims of 1620, or even some of the lesser-known signers of the Declaration of Independence? R.P.

190 NATIONAL REVIEW

# THE COLD WAR & THE SMALL WAR
## A New Study in the Anatomy of U.S. Doctrine

TOMMY WEBER

KISSINGER

In the Pentagon, the State Department, the White House, top U.S. policymakers are earnestly debating a new book, a brilliant, independent analysis of the nation's post-war diplomatic and military struggle with Communism. Title: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harpers; $5). Author: Political Scientist Henry A. Kissinger, 34, associate director of Harvard's new Center for International Affairs, a policy consultant to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, wartime Army intelligence specialist. Heart of Kissinger's analysis: Americans must drastically revise their hopes for Communist redemption, e.g., through disarmament, their fears of all-out war, and their mental clichés about the shape of the next war, if they expect to win out against a relentless, single-minded enemy.

### Between the Alternatives

The U.S., says Kissinger, is so conditioned by its heritage of domestic achievement, by a history of military victories, and a general faith that peace is "normal" that it still does not realize the dimensions of danger in a world half-controlled by "an irreconcilably hostile bloc." The Communists, on the other hand, have exploited the U.S. desire for peace and its fear of all-out atomic war by playing with considerable skill their "strategy of ambiguity," i.e., by alternating belligerence with "peaceful coexistence," open repression (Hungary) with subtle infiltration (the Mideast). "What is striking [is] that essentially the same pattern of Soviet behavior should time and again raise discussion about its 'sincerity' or its 'novelty,'" says Kissinger. "Nothing could be more irrelevant." Steadfast Communist doctrine uses war and peace as varying opportunistic means to the same distant goal: domination of the entire world.

U.S. military policy against Soviet expansion, says Kissinger, has been inhibited by "our notion of aggression as an unambiguous act [i.e., a direct attack on the U.S. or Western Europe] and our concept of war as inevitably an all-out struggle" resulting in the enemy's "unconditional surrender." Against indirect Communist aggression by "internal subversion, intervention by 'volunteers,' domination through political and psychological warfare," U.S. doctrine has no flexible alternative between total war and peaceful inaction, because it is geared to "total" concepts. Neither psychologically nor militarily has the U.S. been willing to take

risks or properly shape its power to battle less than total threats. Even when it enjoyed A-bomb monopoly, the U.S. failed to translate "our military superiority into a political advantage" over the Soviet bloc. Result: Communism took over in China and Czechoslovakia, won control of North Korea and North Viet Nam, is still busily at work in Southeast Asia.

Survival, Kissinger warns, "depends not only on our strength, but also on our ability to recognize [and fight] aggression" in all its forms. "In the nuclear age, by the time a threat has become unambiguous it may be too late to resist it."

### Switching the Burden

Mastering the Soviet strategy of ambiguity, contends Kissinger, requires some drastic revisions in U.S. diplomatic and military doctrine. The U.S. must be willing to spend money—and lives, too, if necessary—to nip small Communist aggressions. He does not in the least down-rate the basic importance of the Air Force's Strategic Air Command and its capacity for massive retaliation. But the very existence of SAC, he holds, provides an opportunity to meet the less-than-total Communist strategy of ambiguity with a less-than-total U.S. strategy. This means that the U.S. must be psychologically, militarily and diplomatically prepared to fight "limited" nuclear wars to upset less-than-total Communist challenges.

Limited war, Kissinger maintains, need not lead either to all-out H-bomb war or to stalemate; linked with diplomacy, it strives for specific political gains. For every new Communist aggression, it promotes a punishing limited setback, a setback that the enemy will reluctantly accept because the loss is not worth the risk of starting the all-out war. Thus the strategy of ambiguity and the burden of decision for risking total war are turned on the enemy; either he must settle for setback or risk the certain destruction that would come with all-out war. Thus the small roads of aggression are stopped before they can add up to an all-or-nothing world crisis. "The fact that the Kremlin may stand to lose from a limited nuclear war does not mean that it could profit from all-out war," says Kissinger. "On the contrary, if our retaliatory force is kept at a proper level and our diplomacy shows ways out of a military impasse short of unconditional surrender, we should always be able to make all-out war seem an unattractive course."

### Example: Korea

Kissinger's horrible example of how not to conduct limited war is Korea, the one limited war the U.S. has fought against Communism. All the confusions of U.S.

policy popped up as fighting went on. Washington's fear of touching off a "big war" enfeebled U.S. planning to the point where General Omar Bradley, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, crossed off an expanded offensive as "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time." Zigzag U.S. policy was further shaken by paying too much attention to allies, e.g., Britain and France, who had no basic strategic interest in Korea, opposed taking any risks, however minor, which might extend the war to Europe. Unprepared for limited war, "we thought we could not afford to win in Korea, despite our strategic superiority, because Russia could not afford to lose." Kissinger contends that a decisive Red Chinese defeat in Korea would probably not have brought an all-out war; instead, the Soviet Union might have coldly reconsidered expending its resources to help a bungling ally. In any case, the Sino-Soviet alliance would have been severely strained. But during the long Korean stalemate, "our traditional insistence on divorcing force from diplomacy caused our power to lack purpose and our negotiations to lack force."

What the U.S. now needs to back up its broadened array of weaponry, says Kissinger, is a more subtle set of concepts in diplomacy and armed forces. Guiding U.S. power, U.S. diplomacy must always keep communications open with the enemy, make clear U.S. intentions to use appropriate force in local situations while possessing the capacity to inflict massive retaliation should big war come. Above all, diplomacy must leave room for "reasonable" settlements, without pushing the Soviets into a blind theronuclear alley.

Equally important, the U.S. armed forces must escape their preoccupation with all-out war, and the resulting scrabble of all three services to get in on the Big-War act. Kissinger holds that the services must still develop a strong secondary capability to fight local wars. The Army, he says, should be expanded (by at least four divisions), not cut, to give it an adequate strategic reserve; it should acquire sufficient transportability and airlift so that it can be quickly moved in force to threatened areas. The Air Force should boost its less favored child, the Tactical Air Command. The Navy should place less emphasis on large, strategic carriers (soon to be downgraded by missiles), more on ocean-controlling antisubmarine warfare.

"To use our strategic striking force as a dual-purpose force would weaken the deterrent to all-out war [exactly] when it should be strongest." Lacking adequate small-war forces, the military command will be strongly tempted to counsel avoiding local conflicts in order to conserve

14

TIME, AUGUST 26, 1957

THE ECONOMY

The Reuther Plan

In a time of growing public concern about inflation, United Automobile Workers' President Walter Reuther last week fired off an astute challenge to the presidents of General Motors, Chrysler and Ford. He proposed that 1) the Big Three should cut prices on 1958 models by a specific $100 below prices for 1957 models—or more; 2) the U.A.W. would then give nonspecific “full consideration” to lower company earnings in framing its 1958 demands (reportedly to include the four-day week and a substantial wage increase); and 3) if U.A.W. demands appeared to force the companies to raise prices again, U.A.W. was willing to be “guided” by the findings of a nonpartisan “impartial review panel.”

Reuther was obviously asking a lot and offering almost nothing. He was just as obviously taking a line designed to soothe the growing public conviction that moderate wage demands by big labor add up to a big factor in inflation (TIME, Aug. 5). But the fact remained that he had astutely framed his argument in the terms of inflation and thereby caught a public ear that would likewise be tuned to the answers of the auto companies.

ESPIONAGE

Charming Counterspy

All his life, roly-poly Boris Mihailovich Morros, 62, has been a suave Slav charmer with a St. Petersburg touch to his accent. As he tells it, when he was 16 and already conducting the Russian Imperial Symphony, the charmed Rastputin pressed gifts upon him. At 42, as a Hollywood musical director, he persuaded Leopold Stokowski to make his first motion picture (The Big Broadcast of 1937). Even the U.S. Government capitulated to his charm. During Boris' twelve-year stint as an undercover man keeping tabs on Soviet spies, bemused FBI men referred to him as their "special special agent." Last week, with the Soble spy ring (TIME, Aug. 19) cracked as a result of his information, and Boris Morros' counterspy career over at last, the Justice Department allowed its departing "special special agent" a hail-and-farewell press conference.

As Special Special Agent Morros unfolded details of his espionage career, it was Soviet Embassy Second Secretary Vassili Zubilin who first asked him to become a Soviet spy in 1943. From then on real life and reel life were sometimes indistinguishable. There were tales of a coded message in which the word Cinerama really meant "You are in danger. Come home at once." There were hair breadth escapes; i.e., one day in Moscow while Morros was in conference with Soviet Spy Chief Lavrenty P. Beria, an incoming message accused him of disloyalty. Boris charmed the Russians into believing that the American woman who had squealed on him was merely jealous.

Last week before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Boris Morros

identified the woman. She was, said he, Martha Dodd Stern, the Communist-minded daughter of William E. Dodd, onetime (1933-37) U.S. Ambassador to Germany in the Roosevelt Administration. The U.S. already knew a lot about the activities of Martha Stern and her wealthy husband Alfred, who had been hiding out in Mexico and dodging extradition and indictment as members of Jack Soble's spy network. But last week it learned more. The Sterns had flown from Mexico City on a Dutch airliner, were said to be leaving Holland and heading East.

Last week Boris Morros was also on the move. He was back in his beloved show business as a man no longer suspect. Friends who once crossed Hollywood-and-Vine to avoid the man they despised as a flagrant fellow traveler were proud to talk

Associated Press

Counterspy Morros

Cinerama spelled danger.

to him again. Boris, who estimates he lost $2,000,000 in possible earnings by becoming a counterspy, was busy with plans for the future. He had already charmed 18 Nobel Prizewinners into recounting their life stories to him, hoped to turn the stories into a series of television films.

INVESTIGATIONS

Hot Cargo

Highballing down a well-marked highway last week, Senator John McClellan's labor-rackets committee stopped the caravan to take on some extra cargo, and headed on, Destination: the front door of James Riddle Hoffa, slick, front-running mastermind of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, who hopes to take over the presidency from Dave Beck next month. The weighty new cargo, the committee hoped, would prove once and for all that Jimmy Hoffa hooked up with racketeers in what was eventually a successful attempt to seize power in the Teamster organization in New York.

First package in the load was cucumbershaped Anthony Doria, who despite his vegetable-like appearance, sounded like the world's longest-playing record. For eleven hours, Doria, former international secretary-treasurer of the U.A.W.-A.F.L., virtually overwhelmed the committee and absorbed television viewers with a display of verbal sidestepping, sermonizing, non-sequiturs and assorted mishmash calculated to assure everybody that Racketeer Johnny Dio is just as honest and devoted to clean labor unionism as Anthony Doria himself ("If society had treated Johnny Dio right, he would have had the opportunity of becoming an outstanding leader in labor").

But as he filled up some 500 pages of testimony, Tony Doria never erased any of the committee's charges that Doria 1) had both hands deep in the international's till, and 2) helped Dio transfer phony U.A.W.-A.F.L. charters to the Teamsters Union, thus enabling the racketeers to take over New York's powerful central Teamster outfit, Joint Council 16.

**Assorted Surprises.** Next came a crate of assorted mugs, who, Committee Counsel Bob Kennedy contended, were rounded up by Dio and his henchmen. They served as officers of the phony locals that were set up to outvote Joint Council 16 President Martin Lacey in 1956 and elect Hoffa's man, John O'Rourke. Among these was one Armando Simontacci, who testified that, all of a sudden, although he had never been a member of the Teamsters, he was told one day by one of Dio's boys that he had been made president of Teamster Local 269.

Q. You were not a member of it, were you?

A. Well, if I was nominated for president, I guess it is the beginning of a membership.

Q. How long did you serve as president?

A. I might still be serving as president.

Surprise package was John O'Rourke himself. Sporting a huge diamond ring and a pink, craggy face, O'Rourke, 57, one-time ready-fisted dock worker, had led the committee to feel that he might cooperate with the investigators. He had been declared winner of the contested election, was forced to give it up after Lacey took the case to court—and finally, unopposed, took over Joint Council 16 when ailing Martin Lacey dropped out. O'Rourke's surprise: Fifth Amendment pleas on all pertinent questions, even a refusal to admit that he is president of the council or that he is acquainted with other Teamster officials. Asked South Dakota's Senator Karl Mundt plaintively: "Is there anything you would like to say to help disincriminate yourself? Is the whole story really that bad?" O'Rourke declined to answer, but after the questioning was over, he stepped outside the Senate caucus room, braced himself against a marble pillar and burst into tears.

**Little Caesar.** Giving orders in New York gangdom was one unwieldy bird named Antonio Corallo, known to cronies and cops as Tony Ducks—a title bestowed in praise of his ability to avoid convic-

16

TIME, AUGUST 26, 1957

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

GRADUATE SCHOOL
1901 F Street, Northwest

Sterling 3-4940

3 September 1957

Mr. Philip W. Quigg
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th St.
New York 21, N.Y.

Dear Phil:

Since the enclosed review (which I was asked to
do for the Journal of Politics) won't appear for several
months, I thought you might want to see it or that some of
it might be of some value to you people in some way. Feel
free to quote if desired. It is certainly a first-class
job and deserves to be famous already, as it is. My own
small voice added to the chorus will not be heard until
March, I guess, when the February issue of the Journal
appears!

I have no doubt that what Kissinger said in the
Preface is perfectly true -- that you had considerable to
do with the excellent style of the book. Solid packed with
clear prose. No P.A.W. subtlety, however.

The only typo I ran across was the one on p. 434,
where "discrete" is spelled right once and wrong once. The
only strange discrepancy in meaning that seemed to me to be
head-on was on p. 276, where near the top of the page "Great
Britain enjoys no such fortunate position", but nearer the
bottom "All states have become equally vulnerable,..." Or
am I misreading? These are things for the second printing,
or the ninth or nineteenth, so they are meant to be a tribute
to the importance of the book rather than a criticism.

We have bought a house at 4224 Reno Road NW, Phil,
and it sure would be fun to see you if you are ever down here.
We wonder how your own housing problem came out. Please give
our very best to Peggy.

[LC]

[LC]

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. By HENRY A. KISSINGER.
(New York: Harper and Brothers, for the Council on Foreign
Relations, 1957. Pp. 455, xx. $5.00.)

What more can a reader ask than to have a vital public problem analyzed by a thoroughly competent student with superb sources of information and able to express his findings brilliantly and freely? Whether or not that reader agrees with the resulting product, he is nevertheless presented with a rare package by Dr. Kissinger, who devoted many months to reflection, inquiry, and contact with a typically outstanding group of men assembled by the Council on Foreign Relations.

This is a comprehensive and penetrating attack on the immediate and middle-range problem of national survival. There is hardly anything more worthy of our close attention, and we should not regard it as a major flaw that the book fails to go farther and discuss the problem of arms control in its ultimate sense. Kissinger deals only with the crucial period we are now living in: the one between the time when total war was a practicable strategy and the time when hot war of any kind between states or coalitions will cease to be practicable. Indeed, Kissinger may not believe that ultimate stage will ever come; he implies that we will be doing well enough to emerge from the present stage unharmed. However, It is a virtue of Kissinger's recommendations that they do not preclude work upon the longer-range problem. He properly gives "preventive war" only a flick of the pen. And he reveals the breadth of his approach in such passages as this: "One of the paradoxical lessons of the nuclear age is that at the moment when we have at our disposal an unparalleled degree of power, we are driven to realize that

an unassailed degree of power, we are driven to realise that
unfeared age is that at the moment when we have at our disposal
strong passages as thus: "One of the benedictory reasons of the
tiger of the box." And he reveals the precept of his approach in
fonder-range problem. He properly gives preventive war, only a
striker, a recommendations that they do not include work upon the
from the present stage unharmed. "Mention" It is a virtue of Kla-
ever come; he implies it & we will do going well enough to emerge
to people. Indeed, Klaasinger may not believe that ultimate stage will
war of any kind between states or coalitions will cease to be pres-
ent the time when total war was a practicable strategy and the time when
only with the crucial period we are now living in: the one period
the problem of arms control in its ultimate sense. Klaasinger deems
it as a major flaw that the book fails to go further and diascends
beyond more worthy of our close attention, and he should not regard
and middle-range problem of national annihilation. There is hardly any
This is a comprehensive and penetrating attack on the immediate
Foreign Relations.

substantially outstanding group of men exemplified in the Connell on
generous many months to reflection, industry, and contact with a
nevertheless presented with a rare package by Dr. Klaasinger, who
whether or not that reader agrees with the resulting programme, he is
information and able to express his thinking prudently and freely,
unaltered in a thoroughly competent student with superb sources of
What more can a reader ask than to have a vital hunchible prop.

Relations' 1954, pp. 488, xx, $8.00.)
(New York: Herber and Brothers, for the Connell on Foreign
Matters, Weapons and Foreign Policy, by HENRY V. KLAASINGER.)

the problems of survival can be solved only in the minds of men." (p. 406)

Kissinger's line of reasoning leads to a strategic doctrine calling for full deterrent power plus the means for limited warfare. This is essentially the policy of graduated deterrence (including "a strategy of intermediate objectives") which the U.S. military already familiar is with this review can be written. Its logic is persuasive: total war cannot be won by force, either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and is consequently not a policy alternative; limited wars, even though nuclear, need not lead to total war; both sides realize these two facts; force has not been abolished from the relations of states; therefore the side which can employ force without causing total war has the advantage; we are unprepared in a military way to meet the Soviet "strategy of ambiguity"; and "everything depends, therefore, on our ability to graduate our actions both in our diplomacy and in our military policy." (p. 360)

Although it is doubtful that the line of reasoning or the conclusion has ever been more compellingly stated, this is not the chief contribution of the book. Kissinger goes farther, including an original argument for theory (strategic doctrine) instead of empiricism (reacting to each move of the opposition with a defensive move); a critique of the effect of our present policy upon coalition diplomacy; an analysis of the problems of limited nuclear war; a critique of our governmental machinery for reaching decisions about strategic policy; and, most concrete and controversial of all, a critique of our present military organization in the United States.

On the latter point, a prediction is in order. By the time

-3-

this review is published, six months or so after it is written,
it will be one in a long list of highly favorable commentaries.
The strategic doctrine Kissinger advocates will have been accepted
in principle in so many influential circles that it will have
created its own countermeasure. There will be many in high places
who follow Kissinger's line of reasoning up to the point where
specific organizational proposals are made, but who will say that
the conclusions do not follow from the argument. This is likely
to come with greatest force from those who agree with present Navy
do doctrine. There will be, and there should be, a great deal of
discussion of the most concrete of Kissinger's conclusions -- that
for all purposes except administration and training there
should be two basic organizations created: a Strategic Force and
a Tactical Force, instead of the present division into Army, Navy,
and Air Force, an outdated trichotomy based upon means of locomotion.

Not unacquainted with the viewpoint of all three services,
this reviewer finds the recommendation so well documented that it
deserves the most urgent consideration in policy-making circles.
It will probably receive that consideration. Unlike some others
who have criticized U.S. foreign policy (especially State
Department policy), Kissinger has not spun a "devil theory" about
anybody or any service or agency. Furthermore, he has wisely
avoided outlining his proposal in detail. It is concrete enough
so as to avoid the criticism that "he may be right in theory but
he doesn't show how it would work in practice". Yet he has not
gone into so much detail that he presents a large number of small
handles which his argument can be grasped and twisted into
irrelevance.

There is an illuminating chapter on "Diplomacy, Disaramament, and the Limitation of War" which throws doubt upon the efficacy of negotiations regarding an inspection and control plan and which contains one of the many intriguing paradoxes that sparkle throughout the book: the idea that it may not be wise to reach agreement on nuclear stockpiles because, for one thing, "to the extent that nuclear stockpiles are in fact reduced, any war that does break out is likely to assume the most catastrophic form. The technical possibility of limiting nuclear war resides in the plentfulness of nuclear materials." (p. 211). There is also a brilliant inquiry into the military dilemma of NATO at the present time, as a case study on the impact of U.S. strategy upon our allies.

By way of criticism, it can be said that Kissinger tends to overlook two important psychological elements that would seriously affect his argument if they have been misjudged. He seems to neglect the change that has come over large segments of the world's population in their attitude toward the use of force in settling domestic and international disputes. And he seems to have too much faith in the reasonableness of men, tending to overlook the fact that they get angry when they are hit; the American people might not be able to conduct a limited war, judging from the Korean experience, if it were much closer to the homeland. In one respect the author seems to be a bit unrealistic: when he checks total war off the list of possibilities, in view of the fact that several small states are almost sure to have the capacity to start such a war in the future with the possibility of escaping the consequences themselves. Perhaps the most controversial link in the entire chain of reasoning is the argument that limited war

nuclear war "may be less likely to become all-out than conventional
war" (p. 176), or indeed that it can be prevented from becoming all-
outnumbered most circumstances. But Kissinger's reasoning on this
point is tight. Finally, the absence of an index would be excusable
only if this put the book on the market notably earlier, or if it
made more people read the book who otherwise would merely finger
the references.

RICHARD W. VAN WAGENEN

The American University

ROOM 5600
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

September 23 1957

To: Miss Nancy Hanks

FROM: MD

Here's the _Nation_ piece in case you haven't seen it.

## LETTERS

### Two Generals Speak

Dear Sirs: Your August 17 editorial, quoting General Douglas MacArthur before the Sperry Rand stockholders to the effect that the governmental manufacture of fear of communism was responsible for the present heavy burden of taxes, deserves a wide audience. As you correctly state, whatever it was that moved the General to testify in this way is less important than that he had the courage to tell the truth.

Ever since former President Truman officially adopted George F. Kennan's containment policy, the Communist ghost has been dusted off periodically for appropriation purposes, if for no other. At the time of the first appropriation request in 1947, it was bruited about Washington that Senator Vandenberg had promised the President that Congress would appropriate the funds provided Mr. Truman scared the pants off the American people. Whether the anecdote is apocryphal or not, both men delivered, and the fear and the funds, as General MacArthur points out, have been available ever since.

The conscientious historian of the future probably will have a difficult task in properly apportioning the blame for the cold war as between Truman's Communist bait and Stalin's intransigence. Personally, I believe the cold war was inevitable because of the general acceptance of the policy makers of the "balance of power" theory under the sovereignty concept of the nation-state system. Communist "expansionism" is the common propaganda matrix for the West as is capitalistic "encirclement" for the East.

The problem is not whether capitalism or socialism is the better economic or political system. The problem is an institutional one. Without a system which provides a code, a court and a cop, applicable individually to those in violation of the laws, international chaos is unavoidable except for a brief period of time. It is for this reason that the top leaders of the great powers should hold meetings regularly and as often as required to discuss the problems dividing the world.

I have only recently completed a 12,000-mile, one-month trip through the USSR, and for whatever it may be worth to your readers, the following are the most important conclusions: (1) the people and even the leaders of the USSR need and sincerely want peace; (2) the socialist system is as firmly

established there as is the capitalist system here; and (3) cooperative coexistence for these two reasons is not only possible but imperative.

HUGH B. HESTER,
Brig. General U.S.A. (Ret.)

Philadelphia, Pa.

### The Algerian Issue

Dear Sirs: May I congratulate you on the excellent editorial, Senator Kennedy's Resolution, in your 20 July issue? The accompanying report by Eleanor Knight is a splendid piece of informative reporting and honest journalism. I only wish that more editors would lift their heads far above the sands and look the facts in the eye.

JAMAL A. SA'D,
Research Officer,
Arab States Delegations

New York, N. Y.

### Our Gentle Era

Dear Sirs: After his excellent analysis of *The Merchant of Venice* (August 3 issue), Mr. Curman writes that Shakespeare was part of his times and "from the puny standpoint of our day was uncouth, savage and bloody to a horrific degree...." The suggestion that our times are weak and tame compared with the supposedly gigantic and boisterous age of Elizabeth I is fairly recurrent. Is it accurate?

If Mr. Curman believes we are not so savage, one may remind him that our gentle times have seen the hugest war in all history, witnessed the vast Communist revolution in China and the ruthless slaughter of the freedom-fighters in Hungary. It is true that the rack is obsolete and that execution by drawing and quartering is no longer legal—a single age can't have everything!—but we strangle men and women to death in our gas chambers and we fry them in our electric chairs, and it is arguable that we are more adept at fiendish mental torture than were the Elizabethans. Here in New York there is gang warfare, knifing in the streets and continual blackmail; and millions of us commit vicarious double murder by reading avidly the lurid details of brutal killings and the follow-up executions in the sensation-mongering newspapers which blanket our nation.

We can hardly complain of a lack of uncouth characters in our stage and screen plays, either, Stanley Kowalski being an arch-hero to a considerable segment of our population. Among the many uncouth plays our times have created are *Tobacco Road* and *Waiting*

for Godot, a drama which is as vulgar and blasphemous as anything Shakespeare wrote, although its style is not grandiose. As for savagery and bloodiness piled onto uncouthness, Mr. Curman himself recently directed a play by Tennessee Williams which ends with the pregnant heroine being shot to death and her illegitimate lover, the hero of the play, being stripped naked and thrown to be torn apart and eaten by ferocious dogs.

WALTER TANNER

New York, N. Y.

## In This Issue

### EDITORIALS

81

### ARTICLES

83 One Billion Chinese

by ROBERT GUILLAIN

86 Memo to Politicians: John Brown
Revisited

by TRUMAN NELSON

89 The Fantasy of Limited War

by MATTHEW JOSEPHSON

90 Dope on the Downbeat

by DAN WAKEFIELD

### BOOKS AND THE ARTS

94 Veblen and the Society of Consent

by ARNOLD A. ROGOW

94 The Revelation (poem)
by H. D.

95 A Bottle of Pop

by MAY SARTON

97 Generalissimo of the Little War
by BENJAMIN I. SCHWARTZ

98 Theatre

by HAROLD CLURMAN

99 Art

by MAURICE GROSSER

Crossword Puzzle (opp. 100)

by FRANK W. LEWIS

George G. Kirstein, Publisher

Carey McWilliams, Editor

Victor H. Bernstein, Managing Editor

Robert Hatch, Books and the Arts

Harold Curman, Theatre

Anne W. Langman, Television

M. L. Rosenthal, Poetry

Mary Simon, Advertising Manager

Staff Contributors: W. Macmahon Ball,

Carolus, Maxwell Geismar, Harvey

O'Connor, Andrew Roth, Howard K.

Smith, Dan Wakefield, Alexander Werth,

H. H. Wilson.

The Nation, Aug. 31, 1957, Vol. 185, No. 5

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Company and copyright 1957, in the U.S.A. by

the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue,

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THE FANTASY of LIMITED WAR . . . by Matthew Josephson

THE TEN-YEAR boom in armament has not only enriched our aircraft and missile merchants; it has provided employment for a whole regiment of university scholars who lecture and write on military policy. The well-nigh insoluble problems of nuclear military "science" certainly offer a wide scope for the imagination. In the climate of the cold war, however, our new crop of military philosophers may bring forth any doctrines they wish about nuclear war, provided they favor it. They may think whatever they like about our national defense policy, provided they are "right-thinking." As long as they observe these principles, the scholars' discourses on war are eagerly sponsored by leaders in public life, makers of opinion, universities and even eleemosynary foundations. The following remarks are stimulated by three such recent utterances.

Power-Think is the real preoccupation of these military doctrinaires. Owing to the menace of Communist aggression in many forms and in many places, our foreign policy, in their view, must remain "polarized"; must be conducted mainly by threats and counter-threats of military action, or by subsidy payments to potential allies. "How can the United States utilize its military power as a rational . . . instrument of national policy?" is the paramount question that Professor R. E. Osgood undertakes to answer.¹ Dr. Henry Kissinger's coldly rational argument for a strategy of limited wars permits no concern for social morality or human values.² We are given only the simple alternative of yielding to "gradual enslavement" by the Russians, or using our nuclear arms to preserve ourselves and our progeny in freedom.

Others have gone on to revise American traditions in conformity with the demands of nuclear power

politics. According to Mr. Thomas E. Murray,³ "History has now laid on America, for fulfillment in the world at large . . . a new international mandate" for the defense of all mankind. Authority for such world-wide extension of our government's policing activities, Mr. Murray believes, is somehow derived from the popular mandate given the founding fathers in 1788 when they decreed the union of the thirteen states. Now it happens that our Communist adversaries also claim a mandate from history. Hence, Mr. Murray concludes, the heart of our problem is "how to harness the illimitable energies of the atom" in order to enforce our own mandate, thwart the mandate of the Communists and defend civilization.

How often in the past have sovereign powers, possessed of a large military equipment and desirous of using it, proclaimed that God or history was on their side! Napoleon's big armies received their sanction from the Goddess of Reason; Kaiser Wilhelm's were fired by the mission of saving *Kultur*, that is to say, civilization.

THAT THE business of "guarding world democracy" with nuclear arms is no simple matter is shown by the several drastic changes of policy announced during the last ten years by the Pentagon or the White House. After 1945, we looked with much complacency upon our so-called monopoly of the atom bomb "secret" as yielding us a supreme advantage in war. Two years later, when the cold war began in earnest, America's military planners thought mainly in terms of air-atomic bombardment. They built up the Strategic Air Command, with its long-ranged carriers of A-bombs as our chief military arm. Popular military journalists, such as Seversky, then advocated total air war and "victory through air power." Under Truman, the Secretaries of the Air

Force, Symington and, later, Finletter, outlined plans for massive deterrence or massive retaliation. In September, 1949, however, the Russians exploded their first atom bomb.

We then turned to making "supers" or H-bombs, holding that our forward airbases and long-range planes still gave us a decisive advantage. Yet in the Korean War we found that the weapons of mass extermination were inappropriate. As it happened, neither that war nor the Indo-China crisis of 1954 was arranged to suit our special military capabilities for large area devastation. In any case, the Russians had by then perfected an H-bomb of their own. The civil war in Indo-China, like the Korean War, required "conventional" forces and arms, which America had neglected in favor of air-atomic power. Both wars were kept confined by both sides, and both ended in a peace of compromise.

AT THE height of the Indo-Chinese crisis, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford favored dropping A-bombs over the battle zone as an experiment in limited nuclear war; but they were overruled by the British and by President Eisenhower. The Russians, who had previously focused their resources on building a defensive air force, had developed by the end of 1954 long-range (intercontinental) jet bombers capable of reaching U. S. territory. Thus Russia and the United States reached approximate air-atomic parity, or the phase of stalemate. Once more our military policy underwent a shift.

For three years we have existed in what has been called a "balance of terror," with the two military superstates each having the power to inflict inordinate destruction upon the other while lacking any adequate defense of the homeland. Talk of massive retaliation no longer makes

MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, author of *The Robber Barons, is at work on a study of the effects of our military establishment upon the national economy.*

¹LIMITED WAR. The Challenge to American Strategy. By Robert E. Osgood. University of Chicago Press. 315 pp. $5.

²NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Henry A. Kissinger. Harper and Brothers. 445 pp. $5.

³Report to the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy: Thomas E. Murray (as published by the New York Times, July 15, 1957).

August 31, 1957

89

any sense. Obviously the Pentagon has found itself in a quandary. One can foresee a saturation point being reached in "super-bombs" for strategic use. Moreover, the taxpayers may grow tired of supporting a huge military budget devoted to making arms of such power that we dare not use them. (The Russians, meanwhile, are suspected of a strategy favoring local disturbances where atomic therapy might work badly.)

Hence the military authorities have begun to talk up schemes for employing small or low-yield nuclear weapons—President Eisenhower's "clean" bombs—in localized conflicts. The well-informed Mr. Murray assures us that we need not fear the effects of radiation generated by the newly-developed nuclear missiles. They may be "safely" used, it is held, as means of "graduated deterrence" so that the punishment in each case will fit the crime. Now come Messrs. Kissinger and Osgood to gather up all the current ideas about running off limited wars and present them, with an air of scholarly authority, in book form.

Is it to be, then, limited war? This is improvement, indeed! Up to now we had only a stunning picture of a total war that would destroy civilized life in Eurasia, while leaving us with (an estimated) 68 million dead or maimed. Now that there are to be only "small" wars, with but three or four million sacrificed here and there, we may breathe more easily. What is more, Dr. Kissinger assures us that—thanks to technological progress—these affairs will be managed at supersonic speed so that the victims will have no time to worry about what hit them.

Kissinger's ideas for limited war have been touted by Gordon Dean, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and others as constituting a highly original and even "revolutionary" strategy, providing the means for both containing the Russians and avoiding the horrors of all-out nuclear war. This is as much as to say that he has invented the equivalent of that old farmer's shotgun which, according to Yankee folklore, would miss if aimed at a cow, but would hit the target if it was a deer!

### Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

is, in truth, a sprightly and provocative affair. Its author takes the reader on a fast ride through the world of nuclear-military "science" and geopolitics. His book is a manual on How to Win Limited Wars, or How to Out-Fox the Enemy Every Time. Disarmament conferences he considers futile, because the U. S. and Russia are so far apart that they cannot agree on minor issues, let alone shed some of their guns. On the other hand, total wars no longer pay; the dread of mutual retaliation as suicide pact tends to paralyze our defense policy. We must not, however, become rigid with fear: if we employ flexible measures, using a "broad spectrum of military-nuclear capabilities," we may counter the cunning shifts or threats of the Communist powers. It is Kissinger's fervent hope that out of the present deadlock, so bleak to the professional military, a new strategy of limited warfare may be evolved, so that we can again afford to march off to war. The losses will be limited; the winnings also will be small. In such times as these, Americans must learn to restrain both their hopes and their moral principles and "run risks without a guarantee of success."

### PROFESSOR Osgood's Limited War

(which complements Kissinger's work of analysis) relies mainly on the historical method, examining specimens of brief military actions in times past. Indeed, both writers speak with nostalgia of the Louis XV style wars, directed by the Marechal de Saxe like formal court ballets. Following strict conventions mutually observed, there were elaborate maneuvers for position, patient sieges; generals took pride in avoiding battle, sparing cities and

even keeping off the grass until the harvests were in. And there were brave costumes, flags and band music; at Fontenoy the aristocratic French officers sighted their cannons with gold lorgnons; the gallant British invited them to fire first. The heads of the warring states, meanwhile, being usually related to each other and having the same ideology, played for small gains, then called the game off.

Kissinger and Osgood would have us return to such wars, restricted in weapons as in theatre through prior diplomatic agreements between the contending powers. To be sure, they would insist on using all the new-fangled machines that are expected to be ready for the 1960s: mobile armies of specialists with heavy striking-power, air-lifted by vertical take-off airplanes requiring no airports. The arms would include the new low-yield nuclear bombs, missiles or artillery shells, of four to 500 kilotons (TNT) capacity, for tactical operation against military personnel and installations exclusively. The battle zone would be 500 miles in depth, according to Kissinger's "projection"; cities outside the zone would be immune to attack; those within it would also be spared if they were declared "open" after mutual inspection showed that they held no military installations. He goes on:

> We might propose that neither bases of the opposing strategic air forces... would be attacked. It would be helpful that inspectors be admitted to those bases.

Moreover, each side would hold its terrible strategic weapons in reserve, for instantaneous use in the event that the other violated the rules of Dr. Kissinger's nuclear polo game. Should that occur, we would proceed, I suppose, to blow up everything, including ourselves, being comforted by the thought that Mr. Khrushchev would surely lose his job.

The kind of war Kissinger proposes, of phantom air-lifted armies racing around each other, has been criticized as being—like other extrapolations of future nuclear war—fanciful indeed. It is a truism among military analysts that the

The NATION

90

actual effect of a variety of new weapons or tactics can never be estimated properly until they have been tested under battle conditions.

In what theatre could such "limited nuclear warfare" be staged? Would it not be best to consign it to Antarctica, rather than Europe with its dense population? The blast power of even low-yield bombs runs up to twenty times that dropped on Hiroshima. About a year ago the NATO forces held air-war games (they were but little publicized in America), simulating the defense of West Germany against an enemy invader. German military correspondents watched closely while some 335 simulated nuclear bombs were dropped within forty-eight hours over an area stretching from the Netherlands to the Austrian border. "The first exposure to the real NATO strategy," Kissinger admits, "came as a severe shock to German opinion." After estimating the simulated damages, our German allies had serious second thoughts about the usefulness of such a "local defense" of West Germany. Is not "limited nuclear war"—though Kissinger denies it—a contradiction in terms?

How are both sides to be held strictly to the rules? How, amid the dust of battle, are dreadful misinterpretations to be avoided? In answer to such questions Kissinger is, by turns, plausible or glib—indeed the suspicion grows upon us that, with tongue in cheek, he is really giving us a clever satire on modern power politics carried out ad absurdum. Since all-out nuclear war, he argues, means a suicide pact both for the United States and Russia, it is to the interest of both to work out rules for limited war; the Russians understand this as well as anyone. (But earlier in the book he has assured us that the Russians are fanatical "barbarians" who can never agree with us on anything. Now, when it suits him, Kissinger pictures them as "reasonable" creatures.)

In a tone almost like that of serious blague he goes on to recommend that we should always announce in advance our own objectives and intended measures of war, since it is all-important that the enemy should

not misinterpret our intentions. (Osgood and other authorities, however, oppose such unambiguous interchanges of intelligence, as being likely to spoil the deterrent effect of any war threat.) Kissinger concludes:

> It therefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey to our opponent what we understand by limited nuclear war, or at least what limitations we are willing to observe. Unless some concept of limitation is established in advance, miscalculation... may cause the war to become all-out even should both sides intend to limit it.

Yet if such elaborate exercises in diplomacy are to be staged in ad-

vance of a limited war, calling for exchanges of intelligence and guarantees, and even mutual inspection, then why in Heaven's name cannot the same diplomatic effort be extended toward bringing about peaceful compromises? Even Professor Osgood, who also loves limited war, holds that the Russians have reconciled themselves to numerous painful compromises, from that of Greece in 1947 to Suez in 1956. Both writers, meanwhile, oppose agreements for "banning the bomb" and returning to conventional arms, those of 1939-45, as being favorable to the Communist powers with their larger manpower. But the program for limited nuclear war, Kissinger says flatly on page 196, is to our advantage and unfavorable to Russia. Now all the Russians need do, is turn to page 196, and the Kremlin will reject the whole scheme. The only constructive suggestion in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is that of extended diplomatic *pourparlers* to precede the ritual of limited war. Let us hope that they become extended and contagious.

Nevertheless, Dr. Kissinger's proposals, according to reliable reports, are being seriously weighed by the Pentagon. One of the most interesting features of the limited nuclear

war business is that it would demand more, not less, expenditure of money for new types of arms—ultimately about $65 billion a year. Besides, the thing might go on forever, as Kissinger admits, since the winnings would be small, or perhaps nothing. This is a point of great significance to our expansion-minded military bureaucrats and to the technical-war industries which contribute so much to our prosperity.

IT TAKES two to play at limited war, and there is always the risk, admittedly, that the thing might turn into unlimited thermonuclear war. Our experience in the narrowly confined Korean War tells us how reluctant either party is to leave the game when he holds the winning hand.

Napoleon said there was really no such thing as military strategy. There is probably no such thing as a strategy of limited war, no insurance that it will turn out to be brief and chivalrous. The German army's general staff in 1914 laid brilliant plans for a quick war, aimed at knocking out the French in six weeks (as in 1871). Indeed no one can say how these things can be managed conveniently. Osgood in his survey of various "short and local contests" waged during the nineteenth century, and prior to 1914, ignores the fact that they usually served as dress rehearsals for the total wars that followed. Strangely enough, he passes over the recent examples of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and of Japan's limited warfare in China in the 1930s. On the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) he concludes fallaciously that they "caused little disruption of society." The little Balkan Wars set off a chain reaction that led to Sarajevo in 1914. The Russo-Japanese War, which the Czar, no doubt, intended to be quick and profitable for his dynasty, led to a great popular insurrection in Russia and prepared the way for the triumph of the Bolsheviks a decade later. The only scientific estimate that can be made about the results to be anticipated from limited wars is that you simply cannot estimate them.

August 31, 1957

91

DOPE on the DOWNBEAT... by Dan Wakefield

WHEN A drummer, a lawyer, a psychologist, two jazz critics, a priest and a piano player gave the first frank airing of the topic, Music and the Use of Habituating and Addicting Drugs, on a panel at the recent Newport jazz festival, they were making history not only for jazz but the public at large. Although narcotics addiction has come in for a great deal of sensational newspaper publicity in recent years, and made its splash in novels and the movies, public discussion of the problem has become something like complaints of the weather: everybody talks about it but nobody does anything about it. And in the case of narcotics, "everybody talks about it" as somebody else's problem. The Newport panel was the first to break that "respectable" and irresponsible tradition—though many segments of society, aside from jazz, are plagued by narcotics. The United States has the largest incidence of narcotics addiction in the Western world; illegal narcotics sales in the nation last year have been estimated at $400 million—and there just aren't that many saxophone players.

If the average man in the street were asked what sort of people take dope, the chances are he would give "jazzmen" as one of the answers. He would certainly not be likely to answer, "Doctors, nurses and drug-gists." And yet, the medical field has a higher incidence of narcotics addicts than any other occupational group. The entertainment field, with its subgroup of musicians, and sub-subgroup of jazz musicians, runs in second place.

Beyond group or sectional interests, however, the problem of narcotics is significant to every taxpayer in the United States. Maxwell Cohen, the lawyer for jazz musicians George Shearing, Stan Getz, Dizzy Gillespie and others, emphasized the public's stake in the problem by pointing out at the Newport panel a set of hair-raising facts: the illegal traffic in narcotics in the U.S. has

tripled since World War II; the use of narcotics is responsible for an estimated 50 per cent of the crime in the nation's large cities and 25 per cent of the crime in the nation as a whole; the results of illegal narcotics use, including crime, punishment and hospitalization, are costing the country nearly two billion dollars a year.

There were many warnings to the Newport sponsors that the choice of "narcotics and music" as a panel subject was not only in bad taste, but would merely serve to strengthen the public image of jazz and "dope" going hand in hand. But those in favor were sure that a factual discussion would help clear the air—and they felt it could also be a start toward finding some solution to the real narcotics problem in music—a problem so complex and sensitive that musicians' unions have consistently shied away from dealing with it.

THE PANEL at Newport met the problem head on—and not only with talk. When the discussion ended, Newport festival sponsor Louis Lorillard announced that the festival board would donate funds to support a permanent narcotics committee made up of the members of the panel. In the brief time since the festival has ended, Maxwell Cohen has met with Lorillard and plans are under way for positive action, including a free clinic with psychiatric help for addicted musicians.

The history of narcotics use, for jazz, goes back to the 1930s. It goes much farther back than that for the nation as a whole, and was in fact in vigorous flower in the early years of the century before the word "jazz" had yet come into being. When jazz musicians in the early 30s began smoking marijuana, a highly complicated process began in which jazz contributed to the popularization of narcotics at the same time that it was victimized by it.

John Hammond, a leading jazz critic and recorder, emphasized on the Newport panel that "music has to shoulder some of the blame" for

the stigma of narcotics on the world of jazz. He pointed out that in the early 30s marijuana got part of its publicity through jazz recordings which mentioned its use. A clarinetist named Milton ("Mezz") Mezzrow began making a business of packaging marijuana cigarettes, and did it so successfully that the cigarettes themselves became known as "Mezzes." This, and other slang names for marijuana were used by Louis Armstrong on some of his records of that period, and kids growing up with their eyes on the jazz idols began to think it was smart to smoke the "reefers." They heard that Louis was doing it and he was the greatest—perhaps marijuana could help them be great too.

ONE of the most damaging myths about narcotics and jazz has been, and is, that drugs are actually helpful to the jazz musician's creative work. "Although marijuana apparently stimulates," Hammond explained, "it hurts the timing."

And marijuana is less damaging than other drugs. It is not physiologically addicting, as morphine and heroin are. Although these sometimes may give an original illusion of greater creativity in playing, the end result is not only the havoc wreaked on the player's technical ability, but, as on any addict, the havoc wreaked on his personality.

Charles Winick, the psychologist who participated on the panel, has written in an excellent study of the relation of narcotics and jazz musicians that the use of narcotics has "ravaged the lives" of talented performers who fell prey to "dope."

Billy Taylor, one of the foremost modern jazz piano players, told the panel at Newport, "It's a terrible thing to see talent stifled by narcotics—it's a frightening thing to watch."

He explained that the addict in the jazz field is not so often a successful musician; he is more likely to be a young player trying to get to the top, or an older musician who "feels that time has passed him by."

DAN WAKEFIELD is a staff contributor.

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[LC]

From ARMY - August 1957

THE MONTH'S BOOKS - Inquiry into National Strategy

By Henry A. Kissinger, Harper & Brothers, for
Council on Foreign Relations, 1957

455 Pages, Maps, $5.00

Reviewed by

Dr. James D. Atkinson, Assistant Professor of Government at Georgetown University, who has contributed several articles and reviews to ARMY.

In his foreword to *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* Gordon Dean says, "Dr. Kissinger's book is not easy reading if for no other reason than that the subject is highly complicated." That may, in some ways, forecast the tone of the entire work, for indeed this is not light summer reading. What is vastly more important, however, is that Dr. Kissinger's scholarly and thought-provoking book analyzes in a penetrating fashion some of the central problems of the age in which we are fated to live.

The book grew out of the ideas generated by a panel of military and foreign policy authorities set up by the Council on Foreign Relations with a view toward examining "all factors which are involved in the making and implementing of foreign policy in the nuclear age." Dr. Kissinger became the study director of the group and, although, the book grew "out of its deliberations," it is essentially his own analysis of the impact of nuclear weapons on the making and implementing of foreign policy with special reference to the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Part One of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, "The Problems of Survival," presents the relation between force and diplomacy and discusses some of the Soviet Union's advantages in today's cold warfare. Here Dr. Kissinger comes to grips with the issues which have aggravated American military policy for the last decade: the lack of an agreed strategic doctrine shared by <u>all</u> the services and, even more significant, the concept -- amounting almost to unshakable dogma - that any future war would be all-out. Indeed, many of our military planners have begun to suffer from virtual color blindness in that they can see only the white of total peace or the black of total war and are unable to visualize the intermediate range of colors in the military spectrum.

- 2 -

We find our military policy, therefore, increasingly geared to
deal with future nuclear "Pearl Harbors," but unable to cope with
the day-to-day moves of an enemy whose strategy looks forward
to warfare's developing future rather than backward at its past.

Part Two, "Techno logy and Strategy" discusses the general
problem of nuclear weapons in warfare, the problems of limited war,
and the possibility of limited nuclear war as well as related problems
of disarmament and international inspection. Dr. Kissinger argues
convincingly that the United States possesses many advantages in
the development of a strategy of limited nuclear war inasmuch as the
Soviet Union, while being able to concentrate in one particular
field and produce results, may be unable to "compete with us in
developing the diversified capability for a limited nuclear war - the
wide spectrum of weapons, means of transportation and elaborate
systems of communication."

The third major part, "Strategy and Policy", discusses American
strategy vis-a-vis our allies, the uncommitted nations, and the
policy of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

The author is at his very best in the section on Sino-Soviet
strategy. The need for a flexible military policy for America is
most cogently demonstrated when he states (referring to the Communist
challenge to the West) that "the tendency of the powers which
represent the *status quo* (is) to confront the revolutionary power
with methods they learned in a more secure environment...but
against a revolutionary power, tactics of conciliation are self-
defeating. Here safety can be found only in a precautionary policy
which stakes an assessment of future menace against current
protestations of innocence." There is the heart of the matter.
Against an adversary whose evaluation of war is based on the idea
of its political consequences and the hydraheaded forms which it
may assume, simplified answers such as "massive retaliation"
are unlikely to suffice. Instead, the national policy of the United
States should be served by a military strategy which provides a
choice of capabilities ranging all the way from the employment of
armed force in a minor police action to the complete destruction of
the enemy's military power.

- 3 -

The possession of a wide range of capabilities by our the armed forces is, of course, highlighted by Khrushchev's elimination of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich on the alleged grounds that "that group...have been obstructing with all available means the implementation of measures for the realization of international tension and the consolidation of peace in the whole world". For nothing could be better calculated to reduce our defense capabilities (already tending toward reliance on an all-out air capability) than to lull us into a belief that a real change has taken place in the Soviet system regarding Marxist-Leninist concepts of warfare as an instrument of policy. Dr. Kissinger prophetically warns against this type of maneuver when he points out that any idea of a real change in Soviet purposes "would be tantamount to asserting that the Soviet leaders have ceased being Bolsheviks...(since) a genuine settlement between different social systems can come about in Marxist eyes only with the end of the class struggle..."

The final chapter is the author's conclusions on the conduct of American diplomacy and the formulation of strategic doctrine. He believes that "it would still be the wisest course to move in the direction of a single service initially by amalgamating the Army and the Air Force." He goes on to say that "the Navy's strategic problems may remain sufficiently distinct not to require integration, and in any case resistance in the Navy to complete unification would be so bitter as to obviate its advantages." Surely this is fallacious reasoning. If there are valid reasons for complete unification, then "resistance: by one of the services, however strong, should not be a barrier. If, there are logical reasons against the single-service concept, the may very well apply to each service rather than to any one.

Dr. Kissinger also suggests that since complete unification "is probably out of the question", a "Strategic Force" and a "Tactical Force: be created in lieu of separate Army and Air Force units while, at the same time, the traditional Army and Air Force administrative and training structure be retained. The Strategic Force "would include the Strategic Air Command, the Air Defense Command, the units of the Army required to protect overseas bases and the units of the Navy which are to participate in the retaliatory attack." The Tactical Force would be composed of "the Army, Air

- 4 -

Force and Navy units required for limited war." While this
is a most interesting concept, it seems to overlook three points
about which we have had past practical experience as opposed
to theoretical study: (1) The difficulty of distinguishing between
"offensive" and "defensive" weapons and forces (and hence their
service assignment) which is inextricably bound up with the entire
question of defense, limited war, and full-scale war. (2) Difficulties
in the past have not arisen through the existence of separate
services, but rather through lack of unified command and staff
structures. Indeed, there is much evidence that the spirit of
competition - one of man's natural drives - *among* distinct services,
when properly channeled and harnessed by a unified command
structure, works as a positive contribution to success in war.
(3) The separation of the training process from the proposed "Strategic"
and "Tactical" operating "Forces" does not seem logical. Training
should be one part of an *entire* process, and our past experience
suggests that the closest connection between training and operations
with cross-fertilization of ideas and techniques has proved most
advantageous to the national defense structure.

These minor criticisms are not intended to disparage
Dr. Kissinger's inquiry into our national strategy. The formula-
tion of military policy was, once upon a time, a kind of luxury
which Americans could indulge as the fancy struck them. Today,
the proper military policy - the grand strategy - of the United
States is a matter of national survival. As such, every soldier
and every thoughtful civilian must do his homework in a field we
dare not reserve either for the expert or the dilettante. To that
end *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is an outstanding
contribution.

# THE BATTLE OF CASSINO

by

Fred Majdalany

A modern battle is not an isolated event existing in a vacuum. It is a phase in a continuous integrated process. It is a patchwork of tiny operations carried out by groups largely unaware of what similar groups on their right and left are doing. It is a way of life extending for days, weeks or months. This book is the story of a modern battle.

About halfway between Naples and Rome, the road bends around a mountain, emerges from its corridor of hills, and cuts across the three-mile valley of the Rapido River in a straight line. At the end it meets a great wall of mountains like a painted backdrop. One in particular is starker, more sheer, more majestic than the others and on its 1700 foot summit is a splash of white. This is the Abbey of Monte Cassino, founded by St. Benedict in 529. His choice of location was not accidental. Fourteen hundred years later, Monte Cassino, towering guardian of the road to Rome, for the nth time lay in the path of a war. A new army had reached the bend in the road. What we know as the Battle of Cassino started on the night of January 17, 1944. It ended June 4, when the Fifth Army entered Rome.

The story of this battle involves the massive design of military strategy translated into a limitless pattern of human ordeal. The complex plan, the problems of supply and communications, the chain of command are explained with clarity. The action takes on an epic grandeur in an almost classic atmosphere of tragedy. It is the joint tragedy of gallant men on both sides, and of the helpless monks and refugees caught up in the fury that destroyed their monastery shelter.

(U. S. Army)

Benedictine Monastery being bombed by Allied Air Force, to clear the enemy from Monastery and surrounding area.

Price: $4.00

The United States
Armor Association

(Established 1885)

President

GENERAL WILLARD G. WYMAN

Honorary President

MAJOR GENERAL GUY V. HENRY, Ret.

Vice Presidents

MAJ. GEN. DONALD W. McGOWAN, NG
MAJ. GEN. JOHN L. RYAN, JR.

MAJ. GEN. WM. M. STOKES, Jr., USAR

Honorary Vice Presidents

GEN. JACOB L. DEVERS, Ret.

GEN. WILLISTON B. PALMER

LT. GEN. EDWARD H. BROOKS, Ret.

LT. GEN. JOHN H. COLLIER

LT. GEN. WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER, Ret.

LT. GEN. HOBART R. GAY, Ret.

LT. GEN. ALVAN C. GILLEM, Jr., Ret.

LT. GEN. GEOFFREY KEYES, Ret.

MAJ. GEN. ERNEST N. HARMON, Ret.

MAJ. GEN. JOHN C. MACDONALD, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. SIDNEY R. HINDS, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. WILLARD A. HOLBROOK, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. HENRY CABOT LODGE, USAR

BRIG. GEN. PAUL M. ROBINETT, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. HARRY H. SEMMES, Ret.

Secretary-Treasurer

LT. COL. WILLIAM H. ZIERDT, JR.

Executive Council

LT. GENERAL GEORGE W. READ, JR.

MAJ. GEN. L. L. DOAN

MAJ. GEN. HOMER O. EATON, JR., NG

MAJ. GEN. EDWARD G. FARRAND

MAJ. GEN. H. H. HOWZE

MAJ. GEN. ALBERT S. JOHNSON, NG

MAJ. GEN. W. P. JOHNSON

MAJ. GEN. PAUL M. JORDAN, NG

MAJ. GEN. ANDREW P. O'MEARA

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT W. PORTER, JR.

MAJ. GEN. PATRICK E. SEAWRIGHT, NG

MAJ. GEN. ALBERT H. STACKPOLE, USAR

MAJ. GEN. EDWARD O. WOLF, NG

BRIG. GEN. CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS

BRIG. GEN. FRANK H. BRITTON

BRIG. GEN. JAMES I. KING

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE R. MATHER

BRIG. GEN. ALMERIN C. O'HARA, NG

COL. F. W. BOYE

COL. ANDREW J. BOYLE

COL. JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, USAR

COL. SAMUEL MCC. GOODWIN

COL. WALTER S. SCHLOTZHAUER, JR.

COL. HOWARD SNYDER

ARMOR

The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

Continuation of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

EDITOR

Lt. Col. William H. Zierdt, Jr.

BUSINESS MANAGER

M Sgt J. William Joseph

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITOR

Sfc Michael E. Kekker

CIRCULATION MANAGER

M Sgt William Coley, Jr.

Volume LXVI SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1957 No. 5

CONTENTS

<table><tbody><tr><td>LETTERS TO THE EDITOR</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>24 HOUR FIREPOWER<br>By Lieutenant Colonel Eric Kobbe</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>EDITORIAL</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>ARMOR IN THE NATIONAL GUARD: A Feature Folio</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>IN THE NATIONAL GUARD . . . IT'S ARMOR<br>By Bruce Jacobs</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>THE REGULAR ARMY SUPPORT OF ARMOR'S GROWTH IN THE<br>NATIONAL GUARD<br>By Major General Donald W. McGowan</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ADVISORS<br>By Major William R. Jacques</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FIELD CONCENTRATION SITES</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>ARMORED CAVALRY IN THE NATIONAL GUARD<br>By Bruce Jacobs</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>DIVISION TRAINS<br>By Lieutenant Colonel James B. Deerin</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>ARMOR LOGISTICS, MAINTENANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS IN THE<br>NATIONAL GUARD<br>By Bruce Jacobs</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>NATIONAL GUARDSMEN TAKING SIX: A Pictorial Feature</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY HISTORY IN THE EDUCATION<br>OF OFFICERS<br>By Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, Retired</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>TRAINING THE 3D ARMORED DIVISION OVERSEAS PACKET<br>By Major General Verdi B. Barnes</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>PREPARING FOR THE PAYOFF AT BELSEN HOHNE<br>By Brigadier General James H. Polk</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>TANK GUNNERY: ECONOMY PLUS QUALITY<br>By Captain Theodore S. Riggs, Jr.</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>COMMANDER'S DILEMMA</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMIES<br>By Major Elam W. Wright, Jr., Infantry</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>THE ARMORED CORPS OF THE PAKISTAN ARMY<br>By Major Howard C. Reese</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>NEWS NOTES</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>FROM THESE PAGES</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>HOW WOULD YOU DO IT?<br>A US Army Armor School Presentation</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>THE BOOK SECTION</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY<br>Reviewed by John G. Norris</td><td>74</td></tr></tbody></table>

ARMOR magazine is published under the auspices of the United States Armor Association, and is not an official publication. Contributions appearing herein do not necessarily reflect official thought or indorsement. Articles appearing in this publication represent the personal views of the author and are published to stimulate interest in, provoke thought on, and provide an open forum for decorous discussion of military affairs.

Publication and editorial offices: 1757 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright 1957, by the United States Armor Association. Second-class mail privileges authorized at Washington, D. C.; additional entry at Richmond, Va. Terms: Domestic subscriptions, including APO's, $4.75—one year and $8.00—two years. Foreign, including Canada & Pan America, $5.50—one year and $10.00—two years.

THE
SEA WAR
IN
KOREA

by
Commanders
Malcolm W. Cagle
and
Frank A. Manson

"A limited war," asserts Ad-
miral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of
Naval Operations, "is the type
of war most likely to occur in
the thermonuclear age."

For this reason, the study of
the Korean conflict is of great
significance to every student of
international or military affairs.

The Sea War in Korea is the
first complete analysis from a
naval point of view of the oper-
ational problems and lessons of
the war.

The authors have woven
much of their story from per-
sonal accounts by many of the
individuals involved. The exten-
sive quotations authorized by
such highly placed commanders
as General of the Army Doug-
las MacArthur and the late Ad-
miral C. Turner Joy attest to the
importance they attach to this
considered study of one of the
strangest wars of all time.

$6.00

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Thanks for the Award

Dear Sir:

I wish to express my sincere apprecia-
tion to you and the U. S. Armor Asso-
ciation for the award that was given to
me as the outstanding Armor graduate
from this university, which incidentally
instructs in the General Military Science
Course. I am sure that the books and
the one-year membership will be a great
help to me in my endeavors.

I further, I hope this award will be
given continuously, because I believe
it will serve as a great inspiration to
those who follow me from here and will
assist them as future officers.

JOSEPH E. HINES, III
Southern University
Baton Rouge 7, Louisiana

* We have received many letters from the various PMS&Ts stationed around the country and have printed some of them. We do not have room to print them all but we want you to know that they are appreciated. This is the first letter this year from a recipient of one of the awards, and it is always a pleasure to receive such comments. Ed.

Artillery in Support

Dear Sir:

I have been reading your magazine ARMOR and I find it quite interesting; therefore, I am submitting a request for a yearly membership. I am an artilleryman, and since the Artillery is the primary supporting arm to the Armor and Infantry, I think it behooves

every artilleryman to familiarize himself
with both branches and keep up with
the latest changes through reading cur-
rent publications. I am already a sub-
scriber to the magazine *Infantry*, being
a former infantryman myself.

It is my feeling that I will become a better artilleryman by keeping myself informed on the latest changes and doctrine of my sister arms. If I am accepted, it will give me great pride to become a member of the Armor Association.

CAPTAIN NEHEMIAH E. RICHARDSON
Hqs, 1st Howitzer Battalion
8th Artillery
APO 25, San Francisco, California

* We believe your feelings are correct that you will become a better artilleryman by reading ARMOR. Many officers of the other combat arms do not realize that they are eligible for membership in the Armor Association. This also applies to the members of the Technical branches. We also invite submission of material concerning the other branches. This gives our members a greater appreciation of the roles and missions of the other branches. We are always looking for new ideas and we hope that all our readers will take this little reminder to heart and submit material. Ed.

Fire and Movement versus
Moving Fire

Dear Sir:

In reference to Lt. Col. Carroll Mc-
Falls, Jr's letter in defense of his recent
article (see page 3, May-June issue of
ARMOR) I must protest against his

ARMOR is published bimonthly by the United States Armor Association.

Copyright: ARMOR is copyrighted 1957 by the United States Armor Association.

Reprint Rights: All Rights Reserved.

Advertising: ARMOR is the professional magazine of the United States Armor Associa-
tion; a nonprofit, noncommercial educational publication. We DO NOT accept paid
advertising. Such advertising as does appear in ARMOR is carefully selected by the Editor
and concerns only those items which may be considered an adjunct to a professional career.

Manuscripts: All content of Armor is contributed without pay by those interested in furthering the professional qualification of members of the Armed Services. All manuscripts should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 1757 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

Change of Address: All changes of address should be sent to the Editorial Office in time to arrive at least weeks in advance of publication date of each issue, which is the 25th day of the even month of the year; i.e., Dec. 25 for Jan-Feb issue, Feb 25 for the Mar-Apr issue, etc.

Rates: See bottom of contents page.

2

ARMOR—September-October, 1957

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
FOREIGN POLICY. By Henry A.
Kissinger. 455 pp. Harper and
Brothers, New York City, New
York. $5.00.

Reviewed by

JOHN G. NORRIS

In the decade since the military lessons of World War II were codified in the National Security Act and Key West functions paper, there have been vast changes in weapons and the world picture. The United States atomic monopoly has been broken. Russia has developed a strategic air force, opening American cities to direct attack. Both East and West have built up big stockpiles of hydrogen bombs capable of destroying whole cities. Development of missiles and small precision atomic weapons are revolutionizing tactics. Long range ballistic missiles—for which there is no defense yet in sight—soon will join the arsenals of both sides.

At the same time, spiraling defense costs have run head on into a new public demand for cutting Government spending. This has brought cutbacks in the armed forces, sharpened inter-service rivalry, and renewed Congressional demands for "greater unification" of the forces. Representatives of the major powers debate plans to avert the horrors of nuclear war and ease the arms burden, with little promise, however, of reaching any meaningful agreement.

Into this muddled situation has come a new element—a catalytic agent in the form of a book. "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard, takes up the greatest problem of the age: how to revamp American foreign and military policy to meet the revolutionary changes in arms.

In a brilliant, penetrating discussion of all aspects of the problem, Dr. Kissinger proposes some radical but logically expounded solutions. Because Russia and United States could knock each other out in an all-out nuclear war, this is the least likely though most dangerous threat. Therefore, the United States must maintain sufficient strategic retaliatory forces to

deter such an attack. But, we must go further and develop both the "caability" and "military doctrine" to counter "more ambiguous" Soviet threats short of all-out war. We must abandon our traditional attitude that we will go to war only to meet direct, unambiguous threats to our most vital interests. Unless we "create a spectrum of capabilities to resist likely Soviet challenges," we will meet each crisis with uncertainty and suffer repeated minor defeats.

To counter and, if necessary, forcibly oppose such indirect threats, the United States must revamp its military doctrine and present the aggressor with "graduated deterrents."

To this end, therefore, we must develop the forces, tactics and willingness to fight limited nuclear wars.

These ideas are not new, and many Pentagon officials will argue that the United States today has the weapons, forces and war plans for fighting such

limited conflicts. This is true to a degree. What the author stresses, however, is the need for a *national* military doctrine—a "pattern of response, a routine."

There is a military doctrine expressed in the law, Key West agreement and the decisions of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But, as many of these were compromises, they are stated in general terms, and existing military doctrine exists largely in conflicting Army, Navy and Air Force concepts.

Moreover, the concentration on all-out nuclear war has resulted in the neglect of some essentials for waging limited nuclear war, such as adequate airlift.

To make possible the development of a new American political-military doctrine to meet the threat, Kissinger proposes sweeping changes in the defense organization.

The book has received highly favorable

reviews in the daily press. The Washington Post's Chalmers Roberts called it "undoubtedly the most important book of 1957." He urged that President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles and top military and civilian officials hole up and read it. The book is important, not so much because of the solutions it offers—which are radical and controversial—or for its prospect of influencing military leaders, but for other reasons.

Prior expositions and criticisms of American political-military problems either have been made by partisans or set forth on the basis of incomplete knowledge. Those with access to all the facts and the pro and con arguments—military men and top civilians in Government—have spoken or written largely in defense of a point of view. Newsmen and other outsiders attempting to weigh current problems are denied, on security grounds, the full facts and largely get only "sales pitches" from contesting groups rather than logical reasoning.

Dr. Kissinger is more fortunate. As study director of a panel of the Council on Foreign Relations, which for 18 months considered what to do about nuclear war, he heard the arguments of the Nation's leading military men, scientists and international experts at round table discussions. The group asked him to write this book making his own conclusions. He approached this assignment with a background of having been a consultant to the Government's Weapons System Evaluation Group, Psychological Strategy Board, Operations Coordinating Board and Operations Research Organization. A World War II veteran and winner of the Bronze Star, the 34 year old educator and writer is now a captain in the military intelligence reserve.

It is as a scholar rather than a military expert, then, a reporter, and contemporary historian with a "secret clearance," but no predeliction to any service viewpoint, that Kissinger writes.

The book has faults. The author gets his missiles mixed up once or twice. He sometimes treats weapons still in the early development stage as being operational. The geographical disadvantages of the Soviet strategic air force in making an attack on the United States are stressed, in playing

Feature Reviews
Exclusive with
ARMOR

ARMOR—September-October, 1957

75

(U. S. Air Force)

THE AUTHOR

Henry A. Kissinger received his degrees, up to and including his Doctorate, from Harvard University. He served in Europe during World War II with the 84th Infantry Division and later the Counter-Intelligence Corps. He presently holds a Reserve Captaincy in CIC. In addition to being a consultant to many government groups, he is the Director of the Special Studies Project, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Associate Director, Center for International Affairs, and Editor of *Confluence*. He is the author of *A World Restored*: 1812-1822, soon to be released.

down such dangers, while similar disadvantages of the Soviet submarine fleet in getting out of the Baltic and Black Seas and approaching the Western Hemisphere undetected are ignored. His conclusion that the location of future ICBM sites will be either underground or mobile, so that there will be little chance of strategic missile forces being neutralized, seems questionable.

But such open-to-criticism statements are no reason for discounting the Kissinger book, as some in the Pentagon are attempting to do. Its influence largely stems from its impact on editors, Congressmen and others interested in the vital problem with which it deals. The author, it seems clear, has fully grasped the essentials of the nuclear war dilemma. It is his full, probing and informed discussion of the current problems and his searching analysis of existing policy and the pros and cons of proposed changes that are so valuable.

"The key problem of present-day strategy," Kissinger declares, "is to devise a spectrum of capabilities with which to resist Soviet challenges. These capabilities should enable us to confront the opponent with contingencies from which he can extricate himself only by all-out war, while deterring him from this step by a superior retaliatory capacity. Since the

most difficult decision for a statesman is whether to risk the national substance by unleashing an all-out war, the psychological advantage will always be on the side of the power which can shift to its opponent the decision to initiate all-out war. All Soviet moves in the postwar period have had this character. They have faced us with problems which by themselves did not seem worth an all-out war, but with which we could not deal by an alternative capability. We refused to defeat the Chinese in Korea because we were unwilling to risk an all-out conflict. We saw no military solution to the Indo-chinese crisis without accepting risks which we were reluctant to confront. We recoiled before the suggestion on intervening in Hungary lest it unleash a thermonuclear holocaust. A strategy of limited war might reverse or at least arrest this trend. Limited war is thus not an alternative to massive retaliation, but its complement. It is the capability for massive retaliation which provides the sanction against expanding the war."

Arguing for a more flexible policy, the author declares: "We added the atomic bomb to our arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking, because we saw it merely as another tool in a concept of warfare which knew no goal save total victory,

and no mode of war except all-out war.

"It is clear that the nature of war has altered. Our traditional insistence on reserving our military effort for an unambiguous threat and then going all-out to defeat the enemy may lead to paralysis when total war augurs social disintegration even for the winner.

"An all-or-nothing military policy will, therefore, play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity which seeks to upset the strategic balance by small degrees and which combines political, psychological and military pressures to induce the greatest degree of uncertainty and hesitation into the minds of the opponent. Moreover, to the extent that we become dependent on the most absolute applications of our power, even the secondary states may be able to black-mail us."

Taking up the most common argument against a policy of limited nuclear war—that any employment of atomic weapons will most inevitably bring on an all-out thermonuclear war, the author declares this idea has been a major tenet of Soviet propaganda. He argues plausibly that horrors of all-out war will make the contending powers in a limited atomic war lean over backward to prevent such a development.

76

ARMOR—September-October, 1957

THE REVIEWER

John G. Norris served in the Navy during World War II. He served aboard aircraft carriers, amphibious landing craft and with shore based naval aviation. He took part in the Normandy, Southern France and Iwo Jima invasions. He is presently a Commander in the Naval Reserve. He has been the Military reporter for *The Washington Post* for the past 20 years. Prior to this assignment he was on the staff of the *Army-Navy Journal*. Writing news and comment on current affairs he travels extensively around the world following various military events.

(Washington Post)

Limited nuclear war, moreover, is a field of conflict in which the West has the advantage over the Russian and Chinese hordes, Kissinger goes on. Massed manpower—the tactics employed against Germany and the UN in Korea—cannot be used in atomic war. In mobile warfare, Western individual initiative and technological superiority should win out over the Communist doctrine of centralized command and almost blind following of orders. Furthermore, he reports, all evidence indicates that while the Soviets have made great strides in building their nuclear stockpile and delivery systems their efforts have been largely confined to employment of higher yield rather than precision, tactical weapons.

With thoroughness and willingness to repeat himself to make his point, Kissinger takes up each phase of his many-sided problem and discusses its pros and cons. He reviews various proposals for limitation of armament now under discussion in London, seeing little hope for their adoption or worth if agreed to. Instead of seeking illusionary plans for "open skies" inspection, he argues, the United States rather should seek an agreement to lessening the horrors of nuclear conflict, i.e., steps to keep it limited.

Another chapter is devoted to an analysis of the United States world-

wide system of alliances. Particular attention is paid to NATO, which he calls "an alliance in search of a purpose."

There is a valuable discussion of Communist military policy and doctrine—the “strategy of ambiguity.” Another chapter analyzes in detail the way the Soviet High Command met and countered the terrific threat of the American atomic monopoly in the immediate postwar years.

Arguing for a new and well-thought out military doctrine, Kissinger calls for changes in defense organization. He feels that the separation of the Army and Air Force probably came two decades too late, and that it would be wise to remerge them. Naval problems are sufficiently different, it is said, to leave the Navy separate. A "single service" probably is out of the question because of traditional resistance and the unwieldiness of such a huge organization.

To meet the two major problems of the age—deterring all-out war and countering other Communist challenges by a readiness for limited nuclear war—Kissinger proposes revamping existing forces into operational commands.

The Army, Navy and Air Force would continue as administrative and training units, in supporting a “Strategic Force” and a “Tactical Force.”

The former would include SAC, Continental Air Defense Command, Army units protecting overseas bases and Navy units earmarked for all-out war. The Tactical Force would consist of the Army, Air Force and Navy units required for limited war. Each force should be self-contained.

Kissinger also would alter the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would be made up of a chairman, the commanders of the Strategic Force and the Tactical Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations "to represent operations such as antisubmarine warfare." Other changes which the author advocates include adoption of a two year budget cycle to encourage long range planning and creation of a "Strategic Advisory Council" of civilians to aid the Secretary of Defense.

Specific proposals like these are subject to challenge on many points. The author does not defend them in detail as he does his well-thought-out advocacy of a military doctrine for limited nuclear war. Regardless, however, whether you agree with his conclusions or not, the exposition of the complex problem is very helpful in understanding its many aspects.

A careful reading of the book is commended to all serious students of the key issue of the age, whether a layman or professional military man.

ARMOR—September-October, 1957

77

OPERATION SEA LION

A detailed study of Hitler's plan for the invasion of England, why it was never carried out, and the factual basis behind rumors of invasions repulsed by "setting the Channel afire" and so on.

Peter Fleming

$5.00

JEB STUART

THE LAST CAVALIER

From the author of the best-selling *They Called Him Stonewall* and *Gray Fox*—the colorful story of the Civil War's most daring hero.

Burke Davis

$6.00

RETIREMENT FROM THE
ARMED FORCES

Emphasis is laid on PLANNING-measures which can be taken now to enable the serviceman and his family to face the future with confidence instead of confusion. Over two years spent in research to insure a work which would help solve specific problems.

Committee of Ret'd Officers

$4.95

SECRET SERVANTS:

A History of Japanese Espionage

The story of Japanese spying—how in the late 19th century Japan came out of her Oriental isolation and adopted among other things Western methods of espionage. The author tells of the influence of her agents in the Russo-Japanese war, at Pearl Harbor.

Ronald Seth

$4.00

THE ALLIED BLOCKADE
OF GERMANY

The author describes the Allied blockade of Germany from 1914 to 1916, which was aimed at starving the German people and crippling their war production. A detailed analysis of negotiations and agreements with neutral powers, and of other measures taken.

Marion C. Siney

$6.50

LOW-LEVEL MISSION:

Story of the Ploesti Raids

A flyer who took part in the Ploesti air raids describes the low-level attacks on the oil fields, some so low that the antiaircraft batteries had to shoot down at them.

Leon Wolff

$4.50

78

ARMOR—September-October, 1957

Reprinted from Volume 1, Number 3 ORBIS

WESTERN STRATEGY IN THE
NUCLEAR AGE*

by Sir John Slessor

This book is like the proverbial
curate's egg—good in parts.
Where it is good it is very very
good and (to continue in the vein
of an old English nursery rhyme)
where it is bad it is horrid. But the
good parts predominate, and on
the whole it is an extremely valu-
able book which should certainly
be read by all who wish to increase
their understanding of the literally
vital problems of strategic policy
in a nuclear age. I hope, however,
it will be read critically and not
with unquestioning acceptance of
all the author's views, especially on
the conduct of limited wars or on
NATO strategy in Europe.

I read the first five chapters, on
the problems of survival, tech-
nology and strategy, with admiRA-
tion and almost total agreement.
Not that they contained any
thoughts which are new to some of
us who have made it our business
to think about these things; but it
is significant that a writer of Dr.

*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy. By Henry A. Kissinger. New
York: Harper and Bros. for the Council
on Foreign Relations, 1957. 455 pp.
$5.00.

Kissinger's ability, backed by the
authority of the distinguished group
of statesmen and analysts of world
affairs in the Council of Foreign
Relations under whose sponsorship
the book was written, should put
before the American people so
clearly and intelligibly such facts as
the dangerous confusion in U.S.
military policy arising from "a doc-
trine which left no room for inter-
mediate positions between total
peace and total war," from the
idea that "a new war will inevitably
start with a surprise attack on the
U.S.," from "our belief in final
answers, our over-emphasis on
technology and above all our con-
cern with 'pure' solutions both in
our diplomacy and in our military
policy." The Free World owes an
immense debt to successive U.S.
Administrations over the past
decade for their brave and gener-
ous assumption of leadership, both
in the military sphere and on the
no less vital economic battlefields.
And that goes for the uncommit-
ted emergent nations as well as for
America's allies in NATO: Dr.
Kissinger has some wise and states-

357

[L]

ORBIS

manlike things to say about colonialism and the position of the "non-aligned" States. But there have been occasions when the friends of the United States have been alarmed by the way Americans "have thought of war more in moral than in strategic terms, and have identified victory with the physical impotence of the enemy" —as though every war today can only be all-out war leading to unconditional surrender. At the crisis of the Korean campaign it was not the possibility of a Soviet onslaught on Europe that led to the hesitations of America's allies (as Dr. Kissinger suggests) as much as their more acute consciousness that to spread the war into China—with or without the atom bomb—would have had political repercussions, especially in Asia, not only out of all proportion to the military advantages to be gained but also disastrous to the political aims for which the Korean war was really being fought.

Incidentally, it is curious to find so well-informed an observer as Dr. Kissinger suggesting that the threat of Soviet rocket attack on England "proved so effective during the Suez crisis". In my view, if there was one thing which caused no anxiety whatever on the part of responsible people in England at that dreadful time, it was that particular piece of impertinent Soviet bluff. The possible appearance of Russian "volunteers" in the Middle East was quite another matter.

It was when I turned to the chapter on the problems of limited nuclear war that I found to my

dismay that Dr. Kissinger had swallowed the dogma of "graduated deterrence" hook, line and sinker. Now, I entirely agree with him (and have said publicly again and again both in America and in England) that we should not be defeatist about the possibility of limiting nuclear war; that as a general rule both sides will be equally anxious to keep it limited; and that, while an essential factor in keeping war limited is the maximum readiness of our retaliatory deterrent force, we must be able and willing to meet limited aggression where it occurs by limited means—notably by forces on the ground. It is not only in a limited war that "the smallest amount of force consistent with achieving the object should be used"; that is one of the hoariest of military axioms, applying as much to a street brawl between military police and a couple of drunks in Manila as to the assault on the Normandy beaches. I think there is everything to be said for leaving our potential enemies under no illusions about our general intentions—which implies first a recognition by our own public opinion of the fact (on which Dr. Kissinger rightly insists) that there is a middle ground between total peace and total war, and that we must be ready to accept something short of unconditional surrender—even a stalemate which (as Dr. Kissinger again wisely suggests) may well represent to us a strategic advantage in limited war.

Where I differ from him and join issue with the proponents of "grad-

358

REVIEWS

uated deterrence" is that I frankly
regard as nonsense this idea of
drawing up, even unilaterally, any
sort of Queensberry rules for lim-
ited war in general, defining details
like the maximum kilo-tonnage of
bombs to be used, the number of
miles in which the depth of a
"battle-zone" is to be measured,
the exact nature of the targets to
be considered legitimate, the old
idea of "open towns", and so-on.
I think there is an obvious distinc-
tion between the massive hydrogen
bomb and the low-yield atomic
weapon, and would not object to
our announcing in general terms
(what is really self-evident) our
intention not to use the former in
limited war. I have frequently ex-
pressed the view that it may some-
times be possible—if it suits both
sides as in some circumstances it
may—to mitigate the horrors of
war for the unhappy non-combat-
ant population by some adaptation
of the old R.A.F. methods of Air
Control in tribal warfare, the issue
of warnings before action against
villages or towns, and some system
of "prescribed areas" defining local
zones of operations, involving some-
thing like the "sanctuary areas"
that Dr. Kissinger envisages. Be-
yond that I would not attempt to
go. It is hopelessly impracticable
to try to produce blue-prints in
advance to suit any and every kind
of limited war; but it would be
desirable for us to confine our-
selves to a general positive declara-
tion of intent, to the effect that
limited aggression will be met on
the spot, wherever it occurs, with
that degree of force required to

deal with it, including if necessary
nuclear weapons—and leave it at
that. That, it seems to me, would
have the effect both on potential
enemies and on our weaker allies
which the advocates of "graduated
deterrence" really want, without
letting ourselves in for the imprac-
tical absurdities of the full and pure
doctrine.

Again, I find myself unable to go
along with Dr. Kissinger's ideas
about how these limited wars
should be fought. If it comes to
overt military aggression, even by
"volunteers" on the Korean model
supporting "spontaneous struggles
for liberation" by indigenous Com-
munist guerillas—which is the most
probable pattern—the object will
not merely be to "deprive aggres-
sion of one of its objectives: to
control territory," but to prevent
that territory from being over-run
by an aggressor. The inhabitants
of, say, Thailand or Iran—least of
all perhaps those of Germany—
even if their towns were left un-
destroyed, would find small com-
fort in the presence on their soil
of small American or British "self-
contained units with great fire-
power gradually gaining the upper
hand" with nuclear weapons over
an enemy already in occupation,
who may understandably be trying
to do the same thing. If we have
to fight to meet our obligations to
our allies in the Baghdad and
Manila treaties, our object would,
or should, be to defend their terri-
tory, with the limited object of halt-
ing aggression and forcing the
enemy to withdraw as a prelimi-
nary to negotiations. This we

359

ORBIS

should do by using the minimum
force necessary, by conventional
methods if possible and, if not, then
by using the nuclear weapon. The
result may very well be a stalemate,
but that would usually suit us
better than the aggressor, and to
make limited aggression clearly un-
profitable is probably the best de-
terrent against it. It is surely im-
portant to understand that it is not
(within reason) the weapons we
use or the targets against which
we use them that will decide
whether or not a localized war re-
mains localized and limited, but
the object for which we are fight-
ing—whether the issue of the war
involves, directly or indirectly, a
matter of life or death to one side
or the other.

When we come to the chapters
on American strategic policy in re-
lation to their allies and particu-
larly to NATO, which he describes
as a test case, we find that Dr.
Kissinger's devotion to the cause
of "graduated deterrence" has
tempted him to invent an Aunt
Sally to knock down. For this I
accept some degree of blame be-
cause I was probably the first to
make use of this expression "trip-
wire," and it is a measure of the
dangers inherent in the use of this
kind of catchword that anyone so
intelligent as Dr. Kissinger should
so completely have misunderstood
me. He accuses me of believing
that the function of the NATO
forces in Europe is to serve as a
tripwire "to unleash all-out ther-
mo-nuclear retaliation." Actually
my view is exactly the reverse—
indeed, in the article from The

*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* to which Dr. Kissinger himself refers, I wrote: "We must have something between the hydrogen bomb and the frontier policeman to ensure ... that we do not have to use the bomb unless the Russians make it clear that they are prepared to force a total war." This extraordinary idea that anyone of my experience could suggest that any minor hostility along the Iron Curtain should be made the signal for an immediate thermo-nuclear holocaust leads Dr. Kissinger into a somewhat dangerous absurdity. He very rightly describes the U.S. in relation to Eurasia as an Island Power "whose survival depends on preventing the opposite land mass from falling under hostile control"; he derides by implication the vacillation of the weaker vessel who will "prefer waiting with the most drastic sanctions until the aggressor has demonstrated he is intent on world domination"; yet he permits himself to suggest that "if the Red Army attacks in Europe explicitly to disarm West Germany and offers to the U.S. and U.K. immunity from strategic bombing and a withdrawal to the Oder after achieving its limited objective," neither the U.S. nor the U.K. would be willing to face up to total nuclear war to prevent it! As if any Soviet "offer" on these lines would be worth the paper it was written on, or its acceptance could possibly lead to anything but the collapse of all America's alliances and the Eurasian land-mass falling irretrievably under hostile communist control! This is the sort of

360

REVIEWS

thing that scholars may debate in
academic seclusion, but it comes
as dangerous nonsense to anyone
with practical experience in the
hard realities of international re-
lations.

As a matter of fact I do not think
that in the NATO context Dr.
Kissinger and I are really as far
apart as it may at first appear.
He says that nothing is more im-
portant than to be clear about the
role we wish NATO to perform—
with which I entirely agree. He
says quite rightly that we must
have a strategic policy in this con-
text; and my only complaint here
is that the strategic policy he
advocates is in my view the wrong
one—or rather is one which I do
not believe is practicable—namely,
to build "a military structure
capable of achieving local defense"
of Western Europe in case the de-
terrent fails to deter and the Rus-
sians decide to risk a thrust to the
Channel. While such a local de-
fense force is theoretically possible,
it is only realistic to face the
political and economic fact that it
is not practicable for free, demo-
cratic nations to build up and
maintain the forces necessary for
such a task. I see no warrant for
the assumption that low-yield
atomic weapons will lend such
overwhelming advantage to the
defensive as to enable the small
nuclear-equipped forces to defeat
large enemy ones equipped with the
same weapons. Moreover, I do not
for a moment believe that a war
involving a major Soviet attack on
Western Europe could conceivably
be kept limited for any length of

time. It would be a matter of life
or death — immediately to our
European allies, in the longer run
to the United Kingdom and ulti-
mately, as Dr. Kissinger himself
implies, to the Island Power of the
United States. In short, I regard
it as dangerous wishful thinking to
imagine that another great Euro-
pean war could possibly be fought
"in a non-catastrophic manner" in
this day and age.

However, this obviously does not
mean that either we or our Euro-
pean allies can have no interest in
providing the necessary divisions
for NATO. Nor does it mean that
there could be no minor hostilities
in Europe. In my view the role
we want the forces of NATO in
Europe to perform is not to fight
another great war but to prevent it.
They are just as much an indis-
pensable part of the deterrent
policy as the Strategic Air Com-
mand; and their job should be to
act as a "fire brigade" to smother
the small local outbreak before it
assumes the proportion of a general
conflagration, to make too danger-
ous the old tactic of the outrageous
*fait accompli* staged in the belief
that we should not consider it
worth the price of an all-out
nuclear holocaust. That might well
involve minor local fighting, but it
is a job for which nuclear weapons
are the last thing we want; conse-
quently, I do not share Dr. Kiss-
inger's anxiety to see all America's
allies equipped *with* nuclear
weapons.

In that connection it is a little
difficult to understand Dr. Kiss-
singer's objections to the latest

361

ORBIS

trend in British military policy as expressed in the White Paper of 1957—which, as a matter of fact, I share, but for a different reason. Perhaps it is partly because he has misunderstood it. It is quite untrue to say that the British are placing “almost exclusive reliance on strategic striking power”; actually that will absorb only about ten per cent of our total military appropriations. My own objection is to the policy of substituting nuclear weapons in the Army for conventional troops in adequate numbers which, in my view, are the primary need both for the NATO deterrent and for limited wars.* If we are ready and obviously willing to use conventional forces to stamp out any minor inroads across the Iron Curtain—for which the Kremlin would probably, at least initially, disclaim responsibility—then it is very unlikely that we shall ever actually have to use them. It is not inconceivable that a local affair might assume proportions with which we should be unable to deal without using low-yield nuclear weapons; but I cannot convince myself that once the conflict reached that stage it could be controlled. I think we should then be faced almost inevitably with the alternatives of all-out war or surrender. And if we were then to take the sort of line that Dr. Kissinger seems to think possible (I hope with his tongue in his cheek) that, after all, the Russians are only

*For further elaboration of this see "British Defence Policy" by this reviewer in *Foreign Affairs*, New York, July 1957.

pursuing the quite understandable aim of disarming the Germans and then they will go quietly back to Russia and we will all live happily ever after—then that would be a surrender compared to which Munich would fade into insignificance, and the Free World would be lost.

Dr. Kissinger makes a powerful and convincing case for the need for an American strategic doctrine "to enable us to act purposefully in the face of the challenges which will inevitably confront us" and which alone can define "the purposes of these weapons and the kind of war in which they are to be employed." This may be a matter of words, but I rather mistrust the conception of a "doctrine" in matters of strategic and diplomatic policy. "No wise man has a policy," said Rudyard Kipling's Viceroy. "A policy is the blackmail levied on fools by the unforeseen." That, perhaps, should not be taken too literally, but to me the word "doctrine" suggests something dogmatic—too rigid, especially when it is suggested that the test of it should be "whether it can establish a pattern of response—a routine—for the most likely challenges." Dr. Kissinger's own quotation from Machiavelli supports what is surely the lesson of history, that it is seldom the most likely challenge that actually arises. There must clearly be a national security policy in the sense of certain basic principles to be applied flexibly to meet constantly changing and usually unforeseen challenges—"a firmly held tradition of

362

REVIEWS

a national strategy" which, how-
ever, in the context of the world-
wide responsibilities of the United
States, can hardly be as simple or
dominating as Britain's traditional
policy that the Low Countries must
never be allowed to fall into the
hands of a hostile power. Indeed, it
is not easy to suggest any simple
formula. The real nature of the
strategic problem confronting the
United States is defined by Dr.
Kissinger as "the necessity for be-
ing protected against all-out war as
the pre-requisite of all other meas-
ures and the capability to fight
limited war." Indeed, his whole
book is a valuable attempt to de-
fine in general terms an American
strategic doctrine. Maybe it is not
susceptible of closer definition. It
would perhaps be an over-simplifi-
cation to define the American goal
as the preservation of the balance
of power in a shrunken world, in
the same way and for the same
reason that Britain for centuries
intrigued and fought for a balance
of power in Europe.

"Policy is the art of weighing
probabilities"—and also, let us re-
member, possibilities. But it should
equally be capable of dealing with
the improbabilities without being
stampeded into unwise action by
unexpected enemy initiatives. The
essence is flexibility based upon a
consistent and generally accepted
conception of the true interests of
the United States — which, in-
cidentally, must today take account
of those of her allies just as Britain
had to do in the days of Marl-
borough and Wellington. Dr.
Kissinger has some interesting

things to say about the difficulty of
arriving at a flexible strategic
policy as long as there exists "a
mechanistic division of functions
among our Services." While ad-
mitting that complete unification
of the three Services is probably
out of the question (I would delete
the word "probably"), he makes
the interesting suggestion that,
while they should continue as ad-
ministrative and training units, for
all other purposes two basic inter-
Service organisations should be
created—a Strategic Force and a
Tactical Force, each self-contained,
and reflected in the Joint Chiefs
of Staff who should consist of a
Chairman, the Chiefs of the Strate-
gic and Tactical Forces and a
Chief of Naval Operations mainly
for anti-submarine purposes. The
idea has some attractions. But, as
Dr. Kissinger himself says, "it would
be a mistake to expect too much
from organisational remedies."
Quite apart from fiscal considera-
tions, I admit to serious doubts that
this really represents a solution and
to a feeling that it would tend more
than ever to rigidity rather than to
the essential strategic flexibility.

The fact is, I think, that there is
no organizational shortcut to a
solution. It is paradoxical that in
an age when military *technique* is
more complex than ever before,
military *policy* is less than ever a
matter for the soldiers alone. "The
practical autonomy of the military
in matters of doctrine" is a com-
pletely out-dated conception in an
age when "the difficult problems of
national policy are in the area
where political, economic, psycho-

363

ORBIS

logical and military factors over-
lap"; and strategic policy depends
more than ever before upon "the
subtlety of the leadership and its
conception of alternatives." Dr.
Kissinger says that in the formula-
tion of over-all strategic judgments
there are only two solutions if the
three services are at variance—in
times of budgetary plenty for each
service to build up on its own the
weapons systems it considers appro-
priate for its mission; in times of
scarcity, a bitter inter-service
rivalry over the assignment of mis-
sions. I think the only solution is a
third one—for government to
govern: in my country for the Cab-
inet and in the United States for
the President acting with the
advice of the National Security
Council to make decisions on policy,
and how it should be applied, and
for the services to carry out those
decisions in a loyal and disciplined
manner without political lobbying.
The conduct of military policy is, in
these days, one of the most vitally
important functions of government,
and you cannot absolve the states-
man from the responsibility of gov-
ernment—which, of course, implies
that government must consist of
statesmen and not merely of admin-
istrative managers.

Dr. Kissinger suggests strength-
ening the hand of the Secretary
of Defense by some form of Stra-
tegic Advisory Council. It is not
for me to rush in where angels
fear to tread in this field, though
I may perhaps be permitted to say
that I have long felt that some
modification of the machinery in

Washington may be desirable, par-
ticularly in the form of making the
National Security Council, in
effect, a Defense Committee of the
Cabinet with the Chiefs of Staff
always in attendance. There, it
seems to me, should be your
Strategic Advisory Council. How-
ever that may be, I think there are
two basic essentials: first, that it
is the function of the civilian
statesman to govern—to make the
decisions, based on professional
military advice, when necessary
between conflicting advice, and to
see that they are carried out;
secondly, that the responsibility for
professional military advice must
rest with those whose duty it will
be to carry out the decisions based
on that advice—which means the
Chiefs of Staff who, in my view,
must therefore continue to com-
bine the functions of professional
advice to the government with that
of executive headship of their own
services. If these two principles are
observed, then the system will work
whatever its detailed structure; if
they are not—then no system will
either produce a sound strategic
policy or be in a position to apply
it flexibly when the need arises.

Dr. Kissinger's book contains
many other points of absorbing in-
terest on which there is no space
for comment in a brief review. I
have concentrated mainly on those
aspects of his case in which I have
found myself unable to agree with
him. But, I repeat, his book is
extremely valuable and I hope will
be widely read in my country as
well as in the United States.

364

SOCIAL
PROGRESS

Published by the Department of Social Education and Action of the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., to provide a forum for the church on subjects of social concern for Christians. It includes program resources, legislative developments, and guides to worship, study, and action for leaders of social action groups in local churches, presbyteries, synods, presbyterial and synodical societies. Articles represent the opinion of the authors—not the official policy of the Department of Social Education and Action or of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.

December 1957

Vol. XLVIII, No. 4

BOOKS FOR THE TIMES

<table><tr><td>International Affairs</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Race Relations</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Economic Life</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Citizenship</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Community Relations</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>General</td><td>32</td></tr></table>

**Department of Social Education and Action:** Clifford Earle, Margaret E. Kuhn, H. B. Sissel, Gayraud S. Wilmore, Jr.; Helen H. Harder (Editorial Assistant), Helen Lineweaver (Director of Washington Office). Editorial correspondence should be addressed to Clifford Earle, Secretary and Editor.

**Counseling Committee on Social Education and Action:** Joseph J. Copeland, Mrs. Frederick J. Church, Edler G. Hawkins, George W. Johns, Henry Lee Willet, Paul S. Wright, Chairman; Mrs. Roland P. Beattie, William Faulds, Richard Pacini; Walter H. Eastwood, John A. Mackay; C. Elwood Boulware, Herbert N. Brockway, Robert Buckle, Jr., Burton Fowler, Clifford Hope, Franc L. McCluer, Kenneth McGilvray, Mrs. Ben Russell, Wolfgang F. Stolper, Mrs. Harold R. Tolliver, and Willem F. Zuurdeeg.

Published monthly, except August, by the Department of Social Education and Action of the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, at 1009 Sloan St., Crawfordsville, Indiana. Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Crawfordsville, Indiana, under the act of March 3, 1879.

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Subscriptions, $1.00 a year; three years for $2.50. Single copy, 15 cents. Group rates on request. Send subscriptions to 830 Witherspoon Building, Philadelphia 7, Pa.

Copyright, 1957, by the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. Printed in the U. S. A.

problem which embrace not only
the displaced Arabs but also the
four hundred thousand displaced
Jews from Arab lands who have
found haven in Israel.) In testify-
ing on the Eisenhower Doctrine be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, he said that peace in
the Middle East will never be real-
ized until "justice becomes more
than a lofty-sounding word. So long
as one million Arab refugees re-
main homeless, so long as the Holy
City of Jerusalem is severed by
barbed wire, and so long as Israel
continues to flout existing resolu-
tions of the United Nations, there
will be new Suezes and more blood-
shed."

*Voice of Israel* is a gathering to-
gether of twenty-some addresses and
lectures by Abba Eban, Ambassador
of the State of Israel to the United
States and head of his country's
permanent delegation to the United
Nations. He is regarded as one of
the most eloquent and forceful dip-
lomats in the Western world. His
moving and persuasive speeches in
the Security Council and the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations
have brought distinction both to
himself and to the nation he so ably
serves.

The addresses cover the period
from May 26, 1948, immediately
following the birth of Israel and the
concerted attack of five Arab states,
to November 1, 1956, the occasion
of the remarkable speech to the
United Nations General Assembly
setting forth Israel's reasons for
launching an attack upon Egypt.

Reading Mr. Eban's major ad-
dresses, chronicling Israel's eight

years of struggle and its achieve-
ment, one has a sense of participa-
tion in events of high moment. The
story is told in language of rare
dignity and grace, and with a full
sense of pageantry. The addresses
touch not only upon events and
issues, but also upon the inner
meaning of Israel's rebirth, Hebrew
culture, Biblical research, atomic
investigation. This is a highly au-
thentic expression of Israel's po-
sition in regional and world affairs.

In the Gray Rain, by Hazel
Severson McCartney. Harper &
Brothers, 1957. 246 pp. $3.75.

This is a group of delicately con-
ceived and sensitively written stories
about the Japan of today. It is a
detailed picture in which a most ap-
pealing group of fully realized char-
acters move against the pastel back-
ground of that enchanting land.

The author lived her childhood on
a Wisconsin farm. Before the war
she spent three years in a mission-
ary assignment in Japan. Later she
worked in the welfare department
of a relocation center for Japanese
on the Colorado desert, and in a
California segregation center. Fol-
lowing the war, she went with her
husband to Japan for an assignment
in a Lutheran mission school. At
present she lives in Iowa, where her
husband is serving a local parish on
leave from his work in Japan.

Seldom is an outsider, a for-
eigner, so able to speak for the
heart of another race as Mrs. Mc-
Cartney is able to interpret the
spirit, problems, hopes of her many
friends in Japan. This book pro-

December 1957

9

vides useful collateral reading for church leaders in developing the foreign missions study theme for the present year.

The Pacific Dependencies of the United States, by John Wesley Coulter. The Macmillan Company, 1957. 388 pp. with index. $6.75.

This is an important, systematic survey of the Pacific territories of the United States and of the trustee-ship territories assigned to the United States by the United Nations.

In the first category are Hawaii, Samoa, and Guam. In the second group are the Mariana Islands, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, the Marshall Islands, Pingelap, and Mokil.

The discussion covers the geography, history, social anthropology, and colonial administration of each of the areas. This is a thorough, accurate, readable, and useful discussion of an important aspect of American foreign relations.

Dr. Coulter, internationally known geographer and authority on the lands and peoples of the Pacific, is professor of geography at the University of Cincinnati.

**Passport to Friendship:** The Story of The Experiment in International Living, by William Peters. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1957. 286 pp. $3.75.

Twenty-five years ago Donald Watt, a young American, gathered a few American boys and took them to Europe to get acquainted with

boys there. He called the project The Experiment in International Living. This book is an informal history of the Experiment. It is a vivid and vital account of the adventures of young people trying to span the gulfs of culture, custom, language, and tradition that separate the nations of the world. In Europe, Asia, North and South America, their experiences are as different as the countries they visit and in which they live for a while as members of foreign families.

The stories prove the ability of young people to be "at home" everywhere in the wide world.

**Radiation: What It Is and How It Affects You,** by Jack Schubert and Ralph E. Lapp. The Viking Press, Inc., 1957. 314 pp. with index. $3.95.

**Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,** by Henry A. Kissinger. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Brothers, 1957. 455 pp. $5.00.

Here are two important and very useful books on problems related to the development of nuclear energy. One has to do with contamination and poisoning resulting from the release of atomic energy, especially the testing of nuclear weapons. The other is a discussion of nuclear weapons and their bearing on diplomacy and international relationships.

Dr. Jack Schubert, biologist and chemist and a former senior scientist with the Argonne Laboratory, is a world-famous authority on radioactive poisons. Articles from his pen

10

SOCIAL PROGRESS

have appeared in many scientific journals. Dr. Ralph E. Lapp is an atomic physicist who since 1950 has devoted himself to being an atomic publicist. During the war he was connected with the Manhattan Project. He is the author of *Atoms and People* and of *Must We Hide?* as well as of many featured pieces in popular periodicals.

Their present book is perhaps the first authoritative popular work on atomic radiation. It describes what radiation is, the various sources from which it comes, the known or likely effects on human beings. There is a lively continuing debate over hydrogen bomb tests as a source of radiation poison, but radioactive fall-out from these tests is only one source of radiation: X-rays and radium rays, among other things, are additional elements in this new problem.

The authors do not come up with sharply defined answers to many of the questions which are raised and discussed. They present the data and underline the implications for the future. Many of the facts will shock the lay reader. For example, expectant mothers will be rightly disturbed by long-term consequences that may follow the excessive use of X-rays. Case histories from medical studies are cited to illustrate the dangers involved in the use of radioactive poisons. The book presents the only definitive account of the radiostrontium hazard to appear in a popular book up to the present time.

This important book will help to bring sanity into discussions, which too often tend to be hysterical, of the wide effects of fall-out from

H-bomb experimentation in the Pacific area. It should be included in the reading list of churchmen who are participating in talks leading to "pronouncements" dealing with atomic radiation.

*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* grew out of Dr. Kissinger's work with a group of experts organized by the Council on Foreign Relations and led by Mr. Gordon Dean, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. It deals primarily with the revolution produced by the development of nuclear weapons, and the effect that this revolution should have on our military strategy and our foreign policy.

The book shows how our military strength can support our political objectives without excessive risk of all-out war. It discusses the diplomacy and the strategy necessary to deter aggression and to defeat it should it come. It is based on the assumption that war can be avoided only by being ready for it, an assumption which, if taken by itself, may easily lead to a fatal overemphasis on military might as the principal means of maintaining peace in a divided world.

The book includes useful discussions of the problems of limited nuclear warfare, of disarmament and the limitation of war, of the Soviet Union's progress in atomic research, and of the need for a strategy which can support our diplomacy in foreign affairs.

This book too is virtually "must" reading for those who are attempting to articulate Christian positions on the use of atomic weapons.

December 1957

11

**Revolution on East River:** The
Twilight of National Sovereignty,
by James Avery Joyce. Abelard-
Schuman, 1956. 244 pp. with index.
$3.50.

**Strengthening the United Nations:** Report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman. Harper & Brothers, 1957. 276 pp. with index. $4.00.

**World Illiteracy at Mid-Century:** A Statistical Study. UNESCO, 1957. 200 pp. with index and map. Paper edition, $2.00.

**Half the World's Children:** A
Diary of UNICEF at Work in Asia,
by S. M. Keeny. Association Press,
1957. 254 pp. with index. $3.50.

**From Witchcraft to World Health,** by S. Leff and Vera Leff. The Macmillan Company, 1957. 236 pp. with index. $4.50.

Two of these five books on the United Nations and its activities deal with the political aspects of the work of the UN, three with some of its related efforts in the field of human welfare.

*Revolution on East River* is an intelligent and hopeful discussion of the United Nations as a relatively effective world organization. The book attempts to take the UN as it is, and to show where it has become, or is becoming, more "sovereign" than the member states that compose it. At the same time, the discussion shows how the organization has been weakened and frustrated, and its evolution toward eventual world government arrested, as a result of

the sovereign claims which its member states continue to assert—"to their own detriment," says the author, "and to the loss of the world community."

Included in the discussion is a review of the ten-year history of the United Nations. This is followed by chapters devoted to Asian neutralism (which, according to the author, has come to stay), human rights versus state wrongs—with focus on Africa, disarmament deadlock, problems related to the development of atomic energy, economic cold war, and the possible development of the United Nations (without the need for Charter reform) in the direction of a truly world organization for peace.

James Joyce holds degrees in economics, political science, law, and history, and has specialized in problems of international affairs for many years. He has served on the staff of the International Labor Office in Geneva and as a consultant to the UN Economic and Social Council. A number of earlier books are useful discussions of international relations.

Whether or not the reader accepts Mr. Joyce's conclusions, he is sure to find in this book a great deal of useful information and a real challenge to creative thinking about the UN and its future as an instrument of peace.

*Strengthening the United Nations* is the comprehensive tenth report of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, an important research affiliate of the American Association for the United Nations.

In formulating its present recom-

12

SOCIAL PROGRESS

August 27, 1957

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Dear Mr. Ascoli:

Nothing is more futile than for an author to protest about the
review of his book. Anything he says is likely to be construed as
pique at not being appreciated. If I write you nevertheless, it is
because I believe that the review of my book by Mr. Paul Nitze goes
beyond the bounds of either responsibility or ethics. In order to
remove any doubts about my motives in writing this letter, I herewith
request you not to publish it or any part of it.

Let me begin by saying that the merit of my book is not at
issue. It would be remarkable if it were possible to produce a work
on a topic of such enormity without evoking disagreement; and if it
were possible it might raise doubt about the merit of the effort. The
subject is so new and its consequences so fateful that only the most
careful and dispassionate debate can advance us toward the goal we
must all share: to spare humanity the horror of thermonuclear obliteration.
But while an author cannot properly complain about criticism, he does
have a right to demand that his thesis be fairly stated, that the attacks
bear some relation to what is said and that a review not be used for
an imputation of his character. It seems to me that Mr. Nitze's review
falls short on all these counts.

**Item:** Mr. Nitze maintains that "There are several hundred passages in which either the facts or the logic seem doubtful, or at least unclear," It is remarkable that this should have eluded such experts in the field as J. Robert Oppenheimer, who complimented the book for its "scrupulousness with respect to fact" and called it "history-making," of Gordon Dean, Ralph Lapp, Edward Teller and Caryl Haskins; or of political commentators like Chalmer Roberts and Alistair Cooke, or of experts on the Soviet Union like Merle Fainsod and Philip Mosely.

To document his grave charge, Mr. Nitze cites precisely *one* error. He does not mention that this mistake occurred in a footnote on page 71 and that it was part of a technical description confined to comparing the Hiroshima bomb with an ordinary TNT "blockbuster." By stringing the footnote together with a sentence on page 270, Mr. Nitze gives the impression that the calculation is central to my whole thesis about the possibility of using nuclear weapons in limited wars. In fact, the sentence refers to the ability to monitor fall-out, of weapons of less than 500 kiloton explosive power, not to the suitability of such weapons for limited war.

As it happens, the error was discovered while the book was in
foundry proofs. The Council and I consulted one of the most eminent
American scientists - who had read the entire book - and asked him
whether it should be corrected in the first edition. Since nothing else
in the text depended on the footnote, he felt that it should not be
changed. The error has been corrected in the second edition, and the
best proof of its irrelevance is the fact that not *one* other line in the
book has had to be changed as a result of it. It seems to me highly
improper to make a statement of hundreds of errors backed up by no more
substantiation.

**Item:** Mr. Nitze's penchant for quoting out of context and for stringing together unrelated phrases leads him to quote a sentence from the last chapter that "certainty results from the imposition of purpose on events" and connect it with a sentence from the first chapter, that "henceforth strategy must be charted against the ominous assumption that any way is likely to be a nuclear war." Playing on the word "purpose", Mr. Nitze comments "I see little purpose in making every war, even a limited war, into a nuclear war." This method of quoting out of context may be useful to score a debating point; the ethics of it are another matter. To be sure, Mr. Nitze indicates the position of these sentences in the book, but he does not tell the reader that the sentence from the last chapter had nothing whatever to do with strategy. Instead, it was part of a discussion concerning the impact of American empiricism on the planning process of our diplomacy. The entire paragraph from pp 435-6 reads as follows in the context:

"The tragic element in foreign policy is the impossibility of escaping conjecture; after the 'objective' analysis of fact there remains a residue of uncertainty about the meaning of events or the opportunities they offer. A statesman can often escape his dilemmas by lowering his sights; he always has the option to ignore the adversary's capabilities by attributing peaceful intentions to him. Many of the difficulties of the non-Soviet world have been the result of an attempt to use the element of uncertainty as an excuse for inaction. But in foreign policy certainty is conferred at least as much by philosophy as by fact. It derives from the imposition of purpose on events."

In the first chapter I was discussing the technical background of contemporary strategic planning. The whole paragraph on p. 14 reads as follows:

"Moreover, there is no 'secret' about the manufacture of nuclear weapons or even of thermonuclear devices. Given a certain level of technology, an industrialized state will be able to produce them. With the spread of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it can be expected that many secondary powers will enter the nuclear race by either making their own weapons or purchasing them from the constantly growing list of countries which will possess a nuclear armaments industry. For better or for worse, strategy must henceforth be charted against the ominous assumption that any war is likely to be a nuclear war."

Putting these two paragraphs side by side can leave no doubt that they have nothing to do with each other.

**Item:** Mr. Nitze maintains that I"repeatedly, almost regretfully, remark that U.S. doctrine has conceded the initial blow in nuclear war to the enemy. This way of stating the problem is thoroughly misleading." Like many of Mr. Nitze's allegations, it is impossible to answer in less than several paragraphs, and Mr. Nitze is therefore likely to achieve his aim regardless of what I may say or fail to say. It might be appropriate to inquire *what* way of stating the problem is misleading. I have repeatedly opposed the notion of preventive war in public and in many private groups to which Mr. Nitze was privy. The first article I ever published was criticism of the concept of preventive war and my

strictures are repeated in the book on pages 110 and 430. Mr. Nitze alleges that I am opposed to maintaining a retaliatory force capable of withstanding a surprise attack and more than implies that I am opposed to a policy of deterrence, indeed that I advocate unleashing a sudden attack. Nothing could be further from the truth. My correct view is explained on page 96 as follows:

> "The purpose of our capability for all-out war will be to deter Soviet aggression against us by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can inflict an unacceptable amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what level of destruction he may accomplish by a surprise attack. A deterrent force, General LeMay has said, is one that is large enough and efficient enough that no matter what the enemy force does, either offensively or defensively, he still will receive a quantity of bombs or explosive force that is more than he is willing to accept. Therefore, he never starts a war."

To be sure, in limited war the problem of nuclear initiative is more complicated. I take it as axiomatic that the U.S. will not start a war of any kind, limited or otherwise. I do question seriously, however, whether we can renounce the use of nuclear weapons to resist aggression even if the aggressor uses conventional weapons. My argument for the possibility of resisting local aggression by using nuclear weapons is too complicated to summarize in a paragraph or two, and a whole chapter of the book is devoted to it. Somewhat reluctantly, and changing an earlier position I have come to the conclusion that a war among nuclear powers is less likely to become all-out, if both sides understand in advance that nuclear weapons may be used than if they seek to fight it as a conventional war. In any case, Mr. Nitze seems to agree with my thesis that in resisting aggression we must reserve freedom of action with respect to the weapons we may use. In fact, he uses this argument to contradict me. It is a strange procedure which refutes a point of view the author does not hold with a position which he does hold.

It seems to me, moreover, that the question of nuclear war is of such enormous gravity that it deserves something better than frivolous reference to Rube Goldberg limitations, weightless weapons and so forth. I took the trouble of checking my conclusions with high officers in all services and while they did not all agree, none thought my proposals quite as ridiculous as Mr. Nitze pretends.

It is a fact that very soon many nations will possess nuclear weapons, and they may be used by irresponsible leaders quite apart from the wishes of the major powers. Moreover, at present and foreseeable budgetary levels it seems inconceivable that we will maintain a conventional capability strong enough to resist a substantial Soviet aggression. Those who contend that nuclear war can not be kept limited are in effect saying that our only choices are Armageddon or surrender.

No one can face the prospect of nuclear war with equanimity. I do not advocate nuclear war for its own sake, but as the best means of avoiding all-out war in certain circumstances. The nuclear age permits only a choice among evils. My correct position is stated on page 189 as follows:

> "Even against less than all-out challenges, limited nuclear war may not always be the wisest course. In a police action against a non-nuclear minor power, in a civil war in which the population must be won over, the use of nuclear weapons may be unnecessary or un-wise for either political or psychological reasons. As a general rule, in a limited war the smallest amount of force consistent with achieving the objective should be used." (Emphasis added).

**Item:** Mr. Nitze maintains that "The only people whose doctrinal and strategic ideas are referred to with approval by Kissinger are Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Hitler, and Napoleon - though I do not mean to suggest that he endorses all their views." It may be that the qualifying clause keeps this statement from being legally libelous; it does not remove its outrageousness. Hitler and Napoleon are mentioned exactly twice in the book. The sentences read as follows. On page 320:

> "Napoleon's conquests were made possible because the 'legitimate' rulers surrendered after a lost battle according to the canons of eighteenth-century warfare; the familiar assumptions prevented them from conceiving the enormity of Napoleon's goals. Hitler could use the doctrines of his opponents in annexing Austria, because they wanted to believe that his aims were limited by the 'legitimate' claim of national self-determination."

- 6 -

And on page 404:

"In 1940, the rapid German tank thrusts demoralized the French Army above all because maneuvers of this kind had been explicitly rejected by French doctrine. A German tank force actually inferior in numbers was able to rout its opponent because French commanders possessed no concepts for dealing with it. Before the end of the war, the strategic doctrine of the Allies had caught up with German tactics, and indeed improved on them. Armored warfare was transformed from a tactic of surprise into a matter of routine. Surprise can take two forms, then: an unexpected timing and an unexpected mode of action. The secret of Napoleon's victories was that he confused his enemies by the speed of his maneuvers. Conversely, it is possible to be aware that an attack is imminent and yet to be unprepared for the form it takes."

To construe these sentences as approval of Hitler or Napoleon's strategic or doctrinal ideas is malicious. As for Mao, Lenin and Stalin, the point of the two chapters on Soviet strategic doctrine, is precisely that we have had extraordinary difficulty in coming to grips with the Soviets because we do not understand its revolutionary nature. To interpret this as approval of Soviet doctrine is no better than the McCarthy criticism of an intelligence report because it analyzed the situation in Siberia.

Quite apart from the personal suffering caused by so unscrupulous a review, a deeper issue seems to me to be involved: One of the most disturbing characteristics of American life over the past several years has been the increasing self-righteousness of the contending positions. The evil of the McCarthy episode resided not only in his infamous attack on individuals but in his denial of the tragic aspect of life and of policy: The insistence that every failure had to be produced by the design of wicked men, that only treason could account for results different from the intention, reduced a momentous historic adjustment to the level of personalities. Above all, it made a rational debate impossible, for henceforth the victims of this kind of attack construed each criticism as a personal assault and responded by, in turn, seeking to destroy their opponent, real or imaginary.

I had thought that if I stated my case calmly and without
personal rancor, it might generate the kind of debate on which freedom
thrives. The result is that I find myself attacked in *The Reporter*
for criticizing "all our military and civilian leaders" while the *National*
*Review* attacks me for not criticizing individuals by name. Both
reviews seem to fail to understand that I am not dealing with individuals.
I believe errors have been made by both parties, as was inevitable
given the magnitude and novelty of our task. I am not saying that I
could have done better had I been in a position of responsibility.
But surely if a critic is to perform a function, he must be given the
right of dispassionate analysis after the event.

Frankly I find it incomprehensible that *The Reporter* dedicated
to the preservation of liberal values, could print a review as vicious
and untruthful as Mr. Nitze's. The examples I chose are but a few of
the distortions. Mr. Nitze's reference to NSC 68, for example, is,
to use a favorite phrase of his, highly misleading. The method of
denigration by innuendo which is satisfied with nothing less than the
intellectual and moral destruction of the opponent can not possibly
contribute to clarity on so grave a topic. I should have thought that
on a subject of this importance Mr. Nitze and I could work along parallel
lines to the general advantage, whatever our disagreements and without
having disputes turn into calumny.

This letter is not for publication. Nothing that I could possibly
say at this stage could undo the damage that has already been done.
Even individuals who will be surprised by the violence of Mr. Nitze's
tone will give a measure of credence to it for they will not know his
motive. The very fact that I have had to devote seven pages to reply
to four sentences indicates the futility of a rebuttal.

It is too bad that we are making our acquaintance under these
unfortunate circumstances.

Mr. Max Ascoli
The Reporter
136 East 57th Street
New York, New York

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Mr. Max Ascoli
The Reporter

Dear Mr. Ascoli:

Nothing is more futile than for an author to protest about the
review of his book. Anything he says is likely to be construed as
pique at not being appreciated. If I write you nevertheless, it is
because I believe that the review of my book by *Paul Nitze* goes
beyond the bounds of either responsibility or ethics. In order to
remove any doubt about my motives in writing this letter, I herewith
request you not to publish it or any part of it.

- 2 -

**Item:** Mr. Nitze maintains that "There are several **hundred** passages in which either the facts or the logic seem doubtful, or at least unclear."

To document his grave charge, Mr. Nitze cites precisely **one** error. He does not mention that this mistake occurred in a footnote on page 71 and that it was part of a technical description confined to comparing the Hiroshima bomb with an ordinary TNT "blockbuster". **bomb** By stringing the footnote together with a sentence on page 270, Mr. Nitze gives the impression that the calculation is central to my whole thesis about the possibility of using nuclear weapons in limited wars. In fact, the sentence refers to the ability to monitor fall-out, of weapons of less than 500 kiloton explosive power, not to the suitability of such weapons for limited war.

-3-

in the text depended on the footnote, he felt that it should not be
changed. The error has been corrected in the second edition, and
the best proof of its irrelevance is the fact that *not one* other line in
the book has had to be changed as a result of it. It seems to me
highly improper to make a statement of hundreds of errors backed up
by no more substantiation.

**Item:** Mr. Nitze's penchant for quoting out of context and for stringing together unrelated phrases leads him to quote a sentence from the last chapter and connect it with a sentence from the first chapter, that "*certainly* results from the imposition of purpose on events". Playing on the word "purpose", Mr. Nitze comments "I see little purpose in making every war, even a limited war, *about the necessity of planning strategy on the assumption that any war is likely to be a nuclear war*."

This method of quoting out of context may be useful to score a debating
point; the ethics of it are another matter. To be sure, Mr. Nitze
indicates the position of these sentences in the book, but he does
not tell the reader that the sentence from the last chapter had nothing
whatever to do with strategy. It was instead part of a discussion
concerning the impact of American Empiricism on the planning process
of our diplomacy. The entire paragraph from pp 435-6 reads as follows
in the context:

- 4 -

"Moreover, there is no 'secret' about the manufacture of nuclear weapons or even of thermonuclear devices. Given a certain level of technology, any industrialized state will be able to produce them. With the spread of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it can be expected that many secondary powers will enter the nuclear race by either making their own weapons or purchasing them from the constantly growing list of countries which will possess a nuclear armaments industry. For better or for worse, strategy must henceforth be charted against the ominous assumption that any war is likely to be a nuclear war."

OK **Item:** Mr. Nitze maintains that I "repeatedly, almost regretfully, remark that U.S. Doctrine has conceded the initial blow in nuclear war to the enemy. This way of stating the problem is thoroughly misleading." Like many of Mr. Nitze's allegations, it is impossible to answer in less than several paragraphs, and Mr. Nitze is therefore

My argument for the possibility of resisting local aggression by using nuclear weapons is too complicated to summarize in a paragraph or two, and a whole chapter of the book is devoted to it. Somewhat reluctantly, and denying an earlier position I have come to the conclusion that a war among nuclear powers is less likely to become all-out, if both sides understand in advance that nuclear weapons may be used than if they seek to fight it as a conventional war. In any case, Mr. Nitze seems to agree with my thesis that in resisting aggression we must reserve freedom of action with respect to the weapons we may use. In fact, he uses this argument to contradict me. It is a strange procedure which refutes a point of view the author does not hold with a position which he does hold.

It seems to me, moreover, that the question of nuclear war is of such enormous gravity that it deserves something better than frivolous reference to Rube Goldberg limitations, weightless weapons and so forth. It is a fact that very soon many nations will possess nuclear weapons, and they may be used by irresponsible leaders quite apart from the wishes of the major powers. Moreover, at present and foreseeable budgetary levels it seems inconceivable that we will maintain a conventional capability strong enough to resist a substantial Soviet aggression. Those who contend that nuclear war can not be kept limited are in effect saying that our

I do not advocate nuclear war for its own sake, but as the best means of avoiding all-out war in future circumstances.

But the nuclear age permits only a choice among evils. My correct position is stated on page 189 as follows:

"Even against less than all-out challenges, limited nuclear war may not always be the wisest course. In a police action against a nonnuclear minor power, in a civil war in which the population must be won over, the use of nuclear weapons may be unnecessary or unwise for either political or psychological reasons. As a general rule, in a limited war the smallest amount of force consistent with achieving the objective should be used." [Complaisance added]

**Item:** Mr. Nitze maintains that "The only people whose doctrinal and strategic ideas are referred to with approval by Kissinger are Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Hitler, and Napoleon - though I do not mean to suggest that he endorses all their views." It may be that the qualifying clause keeps the statement from being legally libelous; it does not remove its outrageousness. Hitler and Napoleon are mentioned exactly twice in the book. The sentences read as follows. On page 320:

- 8 -

And on page 404:

"In 1940, the rapid German tank thrusts demoralized the French Army above all because maneuvers of this kind had been explicitly rejected by French doctrine. A German tank force actually inferior in numbers was able to rout its opponent because French commanders possessed no concepts for dealing with it. Before the end of the war, the strategic doctrine of the allies had caught up with German tactics, and indeed improved on them. Armored warfare was transformed from a tactic of surprise into a matter of routine. Surprise can take two forms, then: an unexpected timing and an unexpected mode of action. The secret of Napoleon's victories was the he confused his enemies by the speed of his maneuvers. Conversely, it is possible to be aware that an attack is imminent and yet to be unprepared for the form it takes."

To construe these sentences as approval of Hitler or Napoleon's strategic or doctrinal ideas is malicious. As for Mao, Lenin and Stalin, the point of the two chapters on Soviet strategic doctrine, is precisely that we have had extraordinary difficulty in coming to grips with the Soviets because _we do not understand_ its revolutionary nature.

-9-

The evil of the McCarthy episode resided not only in his infamous attack on individuals but in his denial of the tragic aspect of life and of policy: The insistence that every failure had to be produced by the design of wicked men, that only treason could account for results different from the intention reduced a momentous historic adjustment to the level of personalities. Above all, it made a rational debate impossible, for henceforth the victims of this attack construed each criticism as a personal assault and responded by in turn seeking to destroy their opponent, real or imaginary. It may seem presumptious but for years I had (set myself the task of transcending the categories of this debate. I had thought that If I stated my case calmly and without personal rancor it might generate the kind of debate on which freedom thrives. The result is that I find myself attacked in the Reporter for criticizing "all our military and civilian leaders" while the National Review in the same week attacks me for not criticizing individuals by name. Both reviews seem to fail to understand that I am not concerned with individuals.

I believe errors have been made by both parties, as was understandable, given the magnitude and novelty of our task. I [could have done better had I been in a position of responsibility. But surely if a critic is

- 10 -

Frankly I find it incomprehensible that the Reporter,
dedicated to the preservation of liberal values, could print a review
as virious
such as Mr. Nitze's. The method which distorts every opinion
and untruthful which
by innuendo and is satisfied with nothing less than the intellectual
not possibly contributes to clarity on so given a gain
and moral destruction of the opponent can only lead to Ceasarism.
I should laud that on a selection of the important but
I repeat that I welcome criticism but an attack as brutal as Mr. Nitze's
along parallel lines with the
does not fall into this category.
disagreements and
opposition, turn into calumny
and
I should be pleased to hear any
Mr. Nitze and I could mark out whether one
pages to reply to 4 sentences indicates the futility of a rebuttal.

This letter is not for publication. Nothing that I could
possibly say at this stage could undo the damage that has already
been done. Even individuals who will be surprised by the violence of
Mr. Nitze's tone will give a measure of credence to it for they will
not know his motive. The very fact that I have had to devote 7
pages to reply to 4 sentences indicates the futility of a rebuttal.

I frankly cannot absolve the Reporter from a measure of
responsibility. Mr. Horton knows me and my views are on public
record. I should have thought that a liberal review would not lend
itself to an attack of this nature no matter what the eminence of the
author and no matter what service he has rendered to the United States.

In January 1954 Mr. Dulles delivered his famous speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in which the doctrine of massive retaliation was announced. In the audience were a number of people who had long wrestled with problems of strategy and politics in a nuclear age. Around the room one could see many whose expression made it clear that they could hardly believe their ears as Mr. Dulles continued from point to point. When the speech was over a number of us sat in the bar and exchanged reactions. It seemed almost incontestable that at the very moment when the loss of our atomic monopoly, which had long been foreseen as a future probability, was becoming an actuality, Mr. Dulles should announce in blatant and offensive terms what he claimed was a new doctrine, the doctrine of depending "primarily upon a great capacity to retaliote, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing."

From the end of the war, and the hasty "point" demobilization which followed it, until the fall of 1949 the military support for United States policy rested on a capability for atomic retaliation and upon little else. The budget ceiling of 13 to 14 billion dollars permitted little in the way of conventional forces. Our atomic monopoly gave us the feeling that a capability for atomic retaliation, if not all we would desire, was at least adequate to protect our most vital interests, and that we therefore were not under great pressure to provide more.

outcome of the war will be determined by the forces in being within the non-excluded area on D day, because reinforcement and resupply after D day will be ruled out. Such a system would put a premium on a secret pre-D day build up in which it would seem the Russians might have considerable natural advantages. If the latter proposition, that the exclusion applies only to nuclear weapons, than the war may become largely a conventional war for control of the areas excluded from nuclear attack and have little to recommend it over a limited conventional war. In any case there are few, if any, areas in Western Europe in which the cities are more than 60 miles apart. If it is possible to exclude one's own cities from destruction by declaring them open, I should think every European country would insist on declaring all their cities open. We are then right back where we started from, either the Russians under threat of massive retaliation forwarag aggression against Western Europe or the war Kissinger contemplates in a conventional war.

Quite apart from these difficulties there are a host of other difficulties with Kissinger's assumptions. James E. King has dealt with some of them in his review of Kissinger's book in the *New Republic*.