Excerpts from the remarks of Dr. Henry Kissinger at the Presidents
Conference memorial meeting honoring the late Yehuda Hellman:

I have very great worry. Unanimity has never been an attribute of Israel or Israelis, but in the past there has always been a consensus on fundamental issues of national survival. Thus, the American Jewish community could deal with a homogeneous point of view. Today, however, there is a clear cut public division of views in Israel. Whatever the merits of either position, there is inevitably an effort to enlist outsiders in these disputes. I regard this as extremely dangerous. I would urge that some solution be found so that there can be an expression of a common point of view. Israel is a tiny community of barely 3 million. It is very difficult for the United States to understand Israel's narrow margin of survival. I always thought it would be useful to draw Jordan across the river to give them Jericho as the price of their taking the PLO out of the situation. Once, in visiting Hadassah hospital the day was so clear that I could see the Jordan river, and the mountains to the East in Jordan seemed within the reach of my hand. I could understand that when the margin of survival is so narrow, one cannot risk the great experiment that is Israel. It is difficult enough to get this across to American policy makers. But when Israel speaks with a divided voice that task becomes almost impossible.

I am quite worried about the substance of this matter. We are in the last 18 months of the present American administration. With the best will in the world, the State Department cannot guarantee what its successor will do. I have no doubts about Secretary Shultz, but with an election coming up, the East-West negotiations proceeding, with other preoccupations on his mind, no Secretary of State can today give enough time to working out a Middle-East solution.

This then is a perplexity. I have grave doubts about a very large international conference composed mainly of countries whose stated position is not at all sympathetic to that of even the most dovish forces in Israel. Comparison has been made to the international conference of 1973, but very special conditions obtained then. May I remind you that Israeli troops were 15 miles from Damascus and on the other side of the Suez Canal and that Egypt had Anwar Sadat at its helm. That situation cannot be duplicated today. My experience with an international conference is that it is not easy to disband it once it has assembled, and that it is not easy to walk out of one. And so a series of questions crosses my mind:

Do King Hussein and Assad of Syria understand and agree that the conference will play no role in the negotiation, that it will meet for a day or two and then disband?

Is it understood that the conference will not be able to impose its views? I remind you that the mere expression of views by conference participants is a form of pressure.

What are the substantive understandings among the participants? Why do the Arabs want it? Who will be deceived by a conference that meets for only a day or so?

On the substance: Is there a US-Israel agreement on the limits beyond
which Israel will not be pushed? Indeed, what does "pushed" mean? Again,
I remind you that the mere expression of an American position is a form
of "push". I did it myself.

Is there an agreement between Israel and the United States on the minimum
conditions of a settlement? Is there agreement that Syria will have to
get back at least some of the Golan and Jordan at least some of the West
Bank, in any negotiation? If we don't have the answers to these questions,
than I am very worried indeed.

I want to say that these are not my formal of final views on the subject,
and I am not advocating any particular position but merely expressing my
concerns. If I had to express an opinion I would probably say that on
the procedural issue, I am pro-Likud; and on the substance, pro-Labor.

At all events, to enter negotiations without knowing the outcome and to
assume that the process itself will provide new solutions is an extremely
dangerous course. A year ago I would have asked Yehuda to get the American
Jewish community to address some of these questions. Because if we don't
answer them others will -- and the pressures they exercise will create a
new reality. As was said before by a great world statesman, "Woe to the
national leader whose arguements at the end of a conference are not as
persuasive as at the beginning." (Bismark)

These are some of my worries at the moment. I do not mean to be critical
of anyone. My problem is I do not know what agreements have already
been made. But I do feel that we must not start a process in which
Israel and its friends cannot give their own answers. Again, let me
emphasize that I'm raising these matters as questions, I am not giving
answers.

Dr. Kissinger agreed to accept one or two questions from the audience.
In responding he said:

I would not be surprised if the Soviets participate in the international
conference. (I spent years trying to keep them out.) Inevitably, they
will defend the Arabs, the United States will be a mediator and Israel
will be alone. I believe they would act in a restrained manner in the
beginning, and that it would be in their interest to accept what other
countries, in the West, propose.

The Chinese do not seem so eager to join a Middle-East conference and the
Soviets might even accept the idea that the conference would not impose
a solution. But again, I remind you that it would be difficult to keep
any country from expressing a point of view. It would be one thing if
Jordan and Israel come to a rapid agreement and if that agreement wins
acceptance. But a prolonged deadlock is quite another matter.

On Glasnost -- I can see some increase in Jewish emigration from the
USSR but I would be surprised if it reached the earlier levels of the
period before and just after the Jackson-Vanik agreement. More likely,
I think the Russians might decide on how many Jews they are willing to

let out in total -- perhaps as many as 50,000 or 100,000, and establish
one particular set of criteria for such emigration -- for example, Jews
with families abroad. But I think that once this one-shot emigration is
completed, that would be all.

What price should the US pay for this? This can get very complicated.
Economic help, perhaps. Giving up political positions is another story.

Concerning the Palestinians -- my view is if the PLO is part of the inter-
national conference it would lead to a debacle. Inviting the PLO to the
conference means that sovereignty and territory will become inevitable.
Arab states might live in peace with Israel but I cannot believe the PLO
ever will, composed as it is of the msot radical elements. It is of
course desireable to have Palestinians in the negotiation, but to sneak
in a de facto PLO spokesman as part of a non-PLO delegation does not
solve the fundamental problem. If Israel is willing to make territorial
concessions the price the Arabs must pay is that such territory cannot go
to the PLO. It would be a debacle for Jordan and cause a profound crisis
for Israel if that is permitted.

Jonathan J. Hellman
Attorney at Law

695 S. Colorado Boulevard
Suite 300
Denver, Colorado 80222
(303) 778-6708

June 3, 1987

JUN 8 1987

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K. Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

On behalf of my family and myself, I would like to thank you for honoring the memory of my late father by your appearance at the First Annual Yehuda Hellman Memorial Lecture. My father's admiration for you went beyond your obvious prominence to a more personal appreciation of your views and your moral philosophy. Now, having listened to you in an informal role, I see he chose his heroes well.