- 29 -

into secret commitments is to destroy deliberately the basis of
public confidence. But the Congress and the public must know
and will continue to be fully informed of these exchanges implying-
national actions.

We shall in the future carefully scrutinize new commitments.

But we shall scrupulously honor those we make. Let no nation
ever believe again that it can tear up a solemn treaty with the
United States with impunity.

There will be no vacuum of leadership. Our friends will
find our resolve tempered by experience and our adversaries
will find us determined to uphold our principles.

We shall continue our policy of seeking to ease tensions.

But we shall insist on strict reciprocity. We shall not forget

who supported the aims which were used to tear up the Paris
accords. Continuation of such actions will risk all that has been

- 31 -

of national politics today -- unchallenged by the Executive Branch.

The question now is whether Congress will block the diplomacy
of the Executive Branch while unable to formulate or carry out
a clear national policy of its own, or whether both branches
will, with some humility, recognize that a spirit of cooperation is
a grave necessity for this nation at this moment in our history.

The Executive Branch will do its part to consult and to
work in partnership. But cooperation must be a two-way street.

Just as the Executive has an obligation to reexamine its
policies, so the Congress should reconsider these *Actions*
which have produced our paralysis with respect to events in
Portugal, our loss of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and
have set back our relations with the USSR. The problems we face
are national problems, not those of one Administration. Foreign
policy must have continuity; if it becomes partisan the very

- 32 -

alteration in office of our national parties becomes an element
*international*
of instability. If we now exacerbate foreign policy issues by
struggles between us, they will only be inherited by the next
Administration, but under worse conditions.

At home, the American people yearn for an end to the
divisiveness and bitterness of the past decade. They will
look to those leaders who offer them a positive vision of
what America can do, at home and abroad. The American
people believe their government is their own, not the enemy.
They have a President worthy of elementary trust.

When other countries look to the United States, they
see one nation. When they look to Washington they see one
government. They judge us as a unit -- not as a series of
unrelated actions or essentially uncoordinated branches.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 15, 1975

Mr. Secretary --

Attached is my editing of Draft V of your speech. I think your efforts last night greatly improved the tone and content (you can tell this to your father). I think it is now basically in good shape with two remaining problem areas: the beginning still needs smoothing out; and the Domestic Dimensions -- Lessons for the Future sections still need a clearer structure. I have tried to help on these areas as well as throughout, but more work is still needed.

I think I can in good conscience now leave for Europe, although I am genuinely sorry to miss the home stretch and delivery of this important speech. If you still wish to veto my departure I will understand but I need to know by 5:15 p.m. today.

I have asked Sam Lewis -- who knows my thinking and yours -- to monitor the final drafts, together with Charlie Hill.

Good luck. I would appreciate your clearing any significant changes with Bette.

Attachment

- 6 -

strong assets -- a sound design for an international
role, major foreign policy achievements in recent
years, a strong and compassionate country, and the
enormous capacities of an industrious and gifted
people. We have the resources -- and the will --
to turn adversity into opportunity.

-7-

Indochina

Let me start with our most tragic problem.

I can add nothing to the President's appeal for military
and humanitarian assistance for the anguished people of
South Vietnam. I support his proposal totally, and I have
testified to that effect before several Congressional committees.

The time will come when it will be clear that no President
could do less than to ask aid for those who with our encouragement fought at our side for fifteen years and who need our help
in their hour of travail. And when that day comes Americans
will be glad that they had a President who did what he believed was right.

-back.

In Indochina our nation undertook a major enterprise for
almost fifteen years. We invested enormous prestige; tens
of thousands died and many more were wounded, imprisoned

- 8 -

and lost; we spent over 150 billion dollars; and our domestic
fabric was severely strained.

Whether or not this enterprise was well-conceived
currently does not now change the nature of our problem. When
such an effort founders, when a great nation debates its
exit as we are doing, it is an event of profound significance
-- for ourselves and for others.

The Administration has made its case. Let both sides
by the verdict -- without recrimination or vindictiveness.

Where so many think that the war was a dreadful
mistake, where thousands grieve for those they loved, and
where still others sorrow over their country's setback --
there has been enough heartache to go around.

I, for one, do not believe it was ignoble to have sought
to preserve the independence of a small and brave people.

- 9 -

Only a very idealistic nation could have persevered in the face
of such adversity. We have much to be proud of. ~~But that~~
debate has ~~now~~ run its course, the time has come for
--
restraint and compassion all around. Let us not apportion
responsibility for our past experience in Indochina, but
 determine this country's responsibility for foreign policy
after Indochina.

## The Design

Let us turn to the future. We start with a sound foreign
policy structure. And we have the means to make continued
progress -- if we exhibit purpose and resolve.

It should not be forgotten that the central thrust of our
foreign policy has been to adjust our conceptions, our methods,
and our commitments to the conditions of a new era -- including
an America already fatigued by Indochina.

- 10 -

We were convinced that a continuing, strong American
role was indispensable to global stability and progress. But
we knew as well that this required tailoring our role to new
realities abroad and a new mood at home.

The postwar order of international relations ended with
the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the passage
of that era, but the cumulative change by the end of the
1960's was profound. Gone was the rigid bipolar confrontation
of two coalitions headed by Moscow and Washington and vying
for adherents in the third world. In its place was a more
fluid and complex world—with many centers of power, more
subtle dangers, and fresh openings. Western Europe and Japan
were stronger and more self-confident; our alliances needed to
move from American predominance towards partnership. The
Communist world had fractured over doctrine and national

- 11 -

interests; there were more promising prospects for more stable
relations based on restraint and negotiation. And many of our
friends in other parts of the globe were prepared to
shoulder more responsibility for their security and well-being,
but they needed our transitional assistance.

We had to devise new policies to meet our domesito
mood as well. The American people and Congress were weary
from two decades of global enterprise and domestic turmoil.
They wanted our prosperous allies to take on more of the
burdens. They were not prepared for confrontation with
adversaries unless all avenues toward a more peaceful world
had clearly been explored. The essential challenge
of our foreign policy was to strike a strong, but more balanced,
US role in the world--rectifying over-extension without swinging
toward dangerous withdrawal.

- 12 -

It is worth recalling how far we have come, along way.

Our major allies in the Atlantic world and Japan have achieved their own identities, and are the firm anchors of mutual security and prosperity. There is now a solid basis for close cooperation on a range of unprecedented new problems -- from détente to energy.

We have launched a hopeful new dialogue with Latin America and moved toward resolving long-standing issues. We are looking to a new era of relations with Africa and Asia.

We have taken historic steps to stabilize and improve our relations with our major Communist adversaries. We have reduced tensions, deepened dialogue, and produced some major agreements.

We have begun to bring under control the strategic arms race which threatens global catastrophe.

- 13 -

We have helped to ease long-standing political
conflicts in such sensitive areas as Berlin and the Middle East.

And we have taken major initiatives to mobilize an
international response to new global challenges such as energy,
food, environment and the vast reaches of the oceans.
We will use "vast reaches" on p.37

In all these areas the American role has been [frequently]
decisive. The design still stands, our responsibilities remain.
There is every reason for hope. There is every prospect of

achievement.

Setbacks are bound to occur in a world which
no nation alone can dominate or control. The
peculiar aspect of many of our difficulties is
that they are of our own making. They result
from a slackening of our unity and self-confidence
# Foreign policy begins at home.

- 17 -

achievements in American foreign affairs, the preservation
of peace and the reconstruction of order, are taken for granted.

An impersonal, technological, bureaucratized, materialistic
society provides too few incentives for dedication and idealism.

To satisfy this frustration, too much iconoclasm and cynicism,
is offered by our intellectual leaders too often offer

Let us remember that America's commitment to
involvement in the world has always been problematical. The
roots of isolationism, nourished by geography and history,
go deep in the American tradition. The reluctance to be
involved in foreign conflicts, the belief that we somehow defiled
ourselves if we engaged in "power politics" and balances of
power, the notion that weapons are themselves the causes of
conflict, the conception that humanitarian assistance and
the
participation in economic order are an adequate substitute

For all Americans the adjustment to a more complex world
is always care difficult because of our historical experience.
In our foreign involvement we have oscillated between
exuberance and exhaustion, between crusaders and isolationist.

- 18 -

for political engagement -- all these were familiar
characteristics of the American isolationism of the '20's
and '30's. We took our power for granted, attributed
blamed on our successes to virtue and our failures to the evil of
others. We disparaged means. Thus in our foreign
involvement we have oscillated between exuberance and
exhaustion, between crusading and retreats into isolation.

Following the Second World War, a broad spectrum of
civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen,
clergy, the media, Congressional and national leaders of
both parties -- led American public opinion toward a new
internationalist consensus. Taught by the experience of the
Second World War, the nation understood that we best
secured our domestic tranquility and prosperity by enlightened
participation, indeed leadership, in world affairs. Assistance to

- 19 -

friends and allies was not a price to be paid but a service
to be rendered to international stability and therefore to our
self-interest.

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina
and other frustrations of global engagement, leadership
opinion has turned sharply against many of the internationalist
premises of the postwar period. For years now too many
have sought to drum into us the view that conflicts are
stimulated, not prevented, by American military equipment;
that suffering is prolonged, not eased, by American action;
that defense spending is inherently wasteful; that intelligence
activities are immoral; that the necessary confidentiality
of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the American public; that
flexibility is cynical and amoral -- and that tranquility is

- 20 -

somehow to be purchased by an abstract purity of motive for which
history offers no example.

All of this has produced the complex problem of executive-
legislative relations, we face today. In every country, the
modern state seems frustratingly remote from those whose
lives it increasingly affects; in every country, it is challenged
by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy
except piecemeal or negatively. Accommodation of special
groups -- the essence of problem-solving on domestic issues --
robs foreign policy of consistency and focus the essence
of a constructive international posture. Issues become so
technical that legislative oversight becomes nearly unmanageable.

-- sometimes in almost precise proportion to the importance
of an issue. Governments must make decisions before all
facts are clear, or else they abdicate control over events. Yet

- 21 -

predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided
are never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus have
a field-day and when they become endemic in executive-
legislative relations; reasoned debate is replaced by a
series of confrontations on peripheral issues.

For Americans, the adjustment to a more complex
world is in any case extremely difficult.

And so America today is a paradox. In the nation with the
highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the
world, in the nation that is perhaps the most secure in the
world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the
ideals of civil liberty and pluralist democracy -- we find a
deep and chronic self-doubt, especially in the large urban
centers and particularly among presumptive leaders.

- 22 -

The result is a nation at the height of its powers
that needs to recover its faith in itself.

Will the American people now support a
responsible and active American foreign policy?
They can and they will -- if their leaders, in and
out of government, give them a sense that they have
something to be proud of and something important to
accomplish.

When one ventures out in the American land of
resilience and the lack of that corrosive cynicism
which is so fatal to democracy. We who sit at what
my friend Stewart Alsop -- a great journalist --
once called "the center" tend to dwell too much on
our problems; we tend to dissect in overly exquisite
detail our difficulties and our disputes.

- 23 -

I find it remarkable that two-thirds of the Americans interviewed in a nationwide poll in December at a time of severe recession, still thought it would be better for the future of their country if we took an active role in world affairs, rather than withdrawing. Even as other nations may be closely watching our constancy in foreign affairs, I suspect they marvel at the resiliency of our people and our institutions.

There is a great reservoir of confidence around the globe in this country's values and strength. Equally, there is a great reservoir of confidence within America that we have the means and the responsibility to strive for a better world.

## Where Do We Go From Here?

What are the right lessons from our present situation?

This section still lacks structure

[Y]

- 24 -

First, we no longer have the margin of safety we once had. In the era of American predominance, we could overwhelm our problems with our resources. We had less need to resort to the traditional style of diplomacy for nations conducting foreign policy with more modest means -- subtlety, maneuver, patience, flexibility.

Today we need these qualities -- but they demand public understanding and public confidence.

We are still the largest single factor in international affairs -- but we are one nation among many. The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our perseverance, our creativity, and our perceived reliability. We can no longer afford either over-

- 26 -

To achieve good ends requires good relations with other governments of whom there are 140 in the world and of whom only a handful subscribe to our ideals.

We must maintain both our values and our security.

The first without the second means impotence, the

second without the first spells irrelevance.

The American people must never forget that our strength gives force to our principles and hope to all those who seek safety and peace.

Let us understand the nature of our obligations.

We have an obligation of steadfastness simply from our
position as a great power upon whom others depend.

Thus our actions and policies over time embody their
own commitment whether or not they are enshrined in
legal documents. Diplomacy must have an element

- 27 -

of confidentiality. To force it entirely into the
open is to destroy all serious exchange with other
governments. To misrepresent exchanges of generalized
intentions as secret commitments is to destroy the
basis of public confidence.

One lesson we must surely learn from Vietnam is
that <u>now</u> commitments of our nation's honor and prestige
must be carefully weighed, ~~But a major national
interest in our present situation is to make certain
that commitments will be uniformly kept.~~ Let no ally
doubt our steadfastness. Let no nation ever believe
again that it can tear up a solemn treaty with the
United States with impunity.

We shall continue our policy of seeking to ease
tensions. But we shall insist on strict reciprocity.
We shall not forget who supplied the arms which North

- 29 -

in foreign affairs is over. It is last year's
issue. The assertion of Congressional authority is
the dominant fact of national politics today.

The question now ~~is whether Congress will seek to~~ *for* ~~is whether it~~ *is whether an* ~~control over~~ *conduct of* go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of tactics; whether it will block the diplomacy of the Executive Branch while being unable to formulate or carry out a clear national policy of its own. *or*
*whether both branches will,* with some humility, recognize that a spirit of cooperation is a grave necessity for this nation at this moment in our history.

for the Executive. The obligation news is
do give the Congress both the sense and the
reality of participation; to make foreign policy
once again a shared enterprise.

needed for balance

- 30 -

The Executive Branch will spare no effort to consult and to work in partnership. But cooperation must be a two-way street. Just as the Executive has an obligation to reexamine its policies, so the Congress should reconsider the actions which have produced paralysis with respect to events.

in Portugal, our loss of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and weakened our hand in relations with the USSR, and our inability to conduct our dialogue in this atmosphere.

changing of Administration if it becomes partisan, the very alteration in office of our national parties becomes an element of international

- 31 -

When other countries look to the United States, they see one nation. When they look to Washington they see one government. They judge us as a unit -- not as a series of unrelated actions or essentially uncoordinated branches. If we cannot achieve certain sorts of fundamental agreements within our own body politic -- between the executive and the legislative authorities between both and with the great public on which they together ultimately depend, there is little hope of our being able to negotiate effectively with others abroad, whether they be friendly to our purposes, neutral to them, or openly hostile. Just as we cannot wish to impose our will on others outside our shores, our system of government must be such that unless we all can operate where there is no will to concede, and to acknowledge that wisdom is not the prerogative of any single individual or group, we must in the government acknowledge our responsibility in this regard. Just as the people must renew its faith in government, the government must maintain its faith in the people.

This would be a very helpful note

- 32 -

Indeed,

Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from recent events is to restore the civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years of the Vietnam debate rational dialogue has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have been called into question. Not only policy but character has been attacked. What began as overwhelming national consensus progressively deteriorated into vicious, poisonous contention. And disturbing traces remain.

This type of debate must be put behind us. Civil discourse is a two-way street: leaders in Government and others allied with them have at times abused their position and demonstrated excesses of conduct and rhetoric.

The Administration, following the President's example, will

- 33 -

do its utmost to inject moderation and respect into the
dialogue. But equally foreign policy in a democracy
cannot be conducted when vilification becomes the staple

and when symbols of authority
of debate, when the integrity of those who conduct the
are systematically divided,
nation's affairs is constantly put into question.] In the end
the whole nation suffers.

The American people yearn for an end to the bitterness
and divisiveness of the past decade. Our domestic stability
requires it. Our international responsibilities impose it.

Our friends in this audience are in a unique position
to contribute to [illegible] the healing of this nation,

The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever
complained of a want of opportunity." Neither does a great
nation.

- 35 -

-- We must see to it that international forums

--including the UN -- cease being cockpits of confrontation dominated by groupings united only by common resentment. Only then will all members of the world community be able to address their common destiny with realism and generosity and compassion.

-- We must continue our crucial role in promoting settlement of regional conflicts -- especially where we uniquely possess the confidence of both sides, as in the Middle East. [Let no nation believe that we can be pushed into sacrificing vital interests by threats of war or economic pressure. But equally let no country gear its policies to stalemates which we

- 36 -

consider as a threat to world peace and
contrary to the national interest. Beyond
the immediate task of peacemaking lies the
ennobling challenge of regional reconciliation
and collective efforts to better the human
condition.

-- We must cap the spiral -- and the spread --
of nuclear weapons. We can then move on to
a more ambitious agenda -- mutual reductions
in strategic arms, progress on the control of
other weaponry, restraint in other environ-
ments, the inclusion of other powers.

-- We must ease famine and protect against
nature's vagaries. But the fundamental
challenge is to help others feed themselves so
hungry in the year 2000.

- 37 -

-- We must continue striving to reduce conflict and tension with our adversaries. Over time, we can hope that both vigilance and conciliation will lead to more positive enterprise and a true global community.

-- We must ensure that the vast reaches of the oceans and space become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. Future generations will then reap the economic and technological resources that can enrich life on this earth.

Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role in the incipient world order which is taking form around us. But we must come to terms with ourselves. We must understand our own interests and act purposefully.

- 38 -

If not, the field will lie open to others -- not necessarily friendly to us. The result could be a reshaping of the world which takes little account of our values and our interests, and produces great dangers of war.

In the words of Longfellow, it is time to "look not mournfully into the past. Wisely improve the present. Go forth to meet the shadowy future without fear, and with a manly heart."

In an era of turbulence, uncertainty and conflict, the world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and a vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized for generations man's conquest over nature, so too has America -- with its banner of progress and

4/13/75

Draft IV

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER
TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
WASHINGTON, D. C. - April 17, 1975

America is being tested.

We meet at a moment of severe trial.

Our response as a people will shape the kind of
world we leave to our children.

A nation faced with setbacks has a number of
choices.

It can paint apocalyptic visions and sink into
gloomy resignation.

It can wallow in recrimination, looking for scape-
goats rather than lessons.

It can try to ignore or sugar-coat its difficulties
and fatuously proceed as if nothing had really changed.

Or it can examine its situation dispassionately,
draw appropriate conclusions, and chart its future with
realism and hope. Only in this manner can it turn
difficulty into opportunity.

- 2 -

A week ago President Ford chose this latter course.

He called upon Congres and the American people to turn
this moment of malaise into a demonstration of spirit --
to prove once again our resilience and our vision, and
to put these into the service of building a better world.

Let me state succinctly at the outset the burden

of my message:

-- The United States has suffered setbacks
and faces serious problems in foreign policy.

-- It is idle and dangerous to ignore this reality.

-- For all of the post-war period our struggle has
been the main factor in preserving the peace;
our leadership has been essential to promote progress.

-- If either falters our security and our prosperity
will be in great danger.

-- At this moment other nations are watching closely
our reaction to crisis; they will base their
policies on their judgments of our reliability
and resolve.

- 3 -

-- The President and the Administration are determined to meet this challenge and confident of doing so.

-- We have strong assets -- a sound design for our international role, major achievements in recent years, a powerful country and the enormous capacities of this nation.

-- Our deepest problem is not abroad but the erosion of our domestic foundation through years of turmoil and bitterness.

-- So our essential challenge is to restore unity and confidence and authority at home.

-- If we do not, we will see a period of great upheaval and danger. If we do, we have the opportunity for great creativity and accomplishment.

- 4 -

## The International Context

The way to overcome our present trial is first
to recognize that they exist.

We should not despair over our current difficulties,
but neither should we gloss them over. We must face up
to the basic reality that events in Indochina, in
Portugal and the Middle East have had a serious impact.

A great nation undertook a major enterprise for
almost fifteen years. We invested enormous prestige;
tens of thousands died and many more were wounded,
imprisioned and lost; we spent over 150 billion dollars;
and our domestic fabric was severely torn.

This is not to say that it was all in vain or
without redemption for the sacrifices made. But when
such an effort nears failure, when a great nation
debates its exit as we are doing, it is an event of
profound significance. We cannot dismiss the ramifications
for our posture in the world.

- 5 -

Every day reports are coming in from our embassies all over the world, relaying disquieted questions from our friends abroad. What do events in Indochina and elsewhere signify for the America's competence -- constancy -- credibility -- coherence? How will Americans react at a time of travail? What are the implications for America's policies?

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing to serious consequences makes for a self-fulfilling prophecy; that if we would only keep silent, there would be no problem. To say that those who predict consequences are responsible for them shuts off rational debate -- and in our present situation will make the consequences inevitable. Such an attitude ignores the elementary fact that other nations judge us by our actions, not our rhetoric. It implies that we can manufacture credibility. It suggests that we can

- 6 -

achieve our aims through proclamations rather than
exertion.

To offer bromides to the American people now would
only compound our problems. Precisely because -- for
whatever reason -- we have drawn down our credits of
steadiness and coherence we must now shed illusions.
Precisely because we have used up some fat in our
resources and our reputation we must fac facts as they
are.

This is not to state an extreme domino theory,
with adversaries inexorably extending their reach and
friend after friend mechanically toppling over. This
simplistic version discredits the more real -- if
gradual and preventable -- dangers that arise when a
great power's resolve and reliability or even internal
stability are called into question. Those who gear
their policies to ours -- either to rely on our

- 7 -

fidelity, or to hinder our purposes -- are making
crucial decisions of their own which affect their
course of action and their domestic stability.

This is a fact, not a theory. It does not spring
from our rhetoric. Nor will it go away because we
choose to ignore it. Nothing will disquiet other
nations more than a pretense of business as usual.

## Indochina

Let us start with the current headlines.

The President fully understood the national mood
when he requested military as well as humanitarian assistance
for South Vietnam. He knows the American people are under-
standably tired of a conflict that has already cost us
so much.

But a President is responsible not only to the
mood of the moment but to the judgment of history.
It is the President's responsibility to tell the people

- 8 -

what he believes is right, not what is necessarily
popular.

We are concerned about what we think of ourselves
not just at a moment of passion and confusion but in
the decades ahead. When we look back on this period
will we understand why at the time of their greatest
need we failed to help people with food and ammunition
who relied on us and who are now the victims of cruel
aggression?

We believe this assistance is the minimum America
can do in present circumstances. And we believe that,
whatever the outcome, the fact that American leaders
requested it is also of fundamental importance -- in
the eyes of America, the world and history.

The Administration has made its case. We will abide
by the verdict -- without recrimination or vindictiveness.

- 9 -

It is vital that all Americans do so. For one of
the greatest casualties of Vietnam has been the
civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years
debate has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the
issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have
been called into question. Not only policy but character
has been attacked. What began as overwhelming national
consensus progressively deteriorated into vicious,
poisonous contention. And disturbing traces remain.
As fateful events in Indochina once more dominate the
news, dormant passions threaten once more to erupt.

This type of debate must be put behind us. Civil
discourse is a two-way street: leaders in Government
and others allied with them have at times abused their
position and demonstrated excesses of conduct and words.
But equally foreign policy in a democracy cannot be
conducted when leaders are continuously vilified, when

- 10 -

trust is systematically undermined, when all symbols
of authority are continuously derided. In the end
the whole nation suffers.

It is time for restraint and compassion. The
time has come to concern ourselves not with who has
been responsible for our experience in Indochina but
who -- and how -- we will be responsible for our
foreign policy after Indochina.

This country can -- and this country will -- shape
its destiny. This country can and will play a major
role in world affairs. We have the basic resources
to continue to be the major force for stability and
humaneness in the world. This Administration is
determined to turn our difficulties into the beginning
of a new period of creativity.

The Over All Design.

As we look toward the future we start with a sound
structure in our foreign policy -- if we can sustain it

-11-

here at home. And we have the raw materials for continued
progress -- if we exhibit purpose and resolve.

It should not be forgotten that the central thrust
of our foreign policy has been to adjust our conceptions,
our methods, and our commitments to the conditions of
a new era -- including an American *already* fatigued by
Indochina.

The postwar order of international relations ended
with the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the
passage of that era, but the cumulative change by the end
of the 1960's was profound-- both in the condition of
the world and the attitude of the American people. We

- 12 -

needed fresh concepts and policies to help shape a
new design:

-- Our allies in Europe and Japan had regained their economic vitality, social cohesion and political self-assurance. We needed to forge with them more balanced and dynamic coalitions.

-- The Communist world, which we had perceived as a monolithic bloc, had fractured into competing centers of power and doctrine. New relationships based on restraint and negotiation became more promising.

-- A rough balance in strategic weaponry had developed, changing both defense doctrines and the context of diplomacy. Arms control and strong defense were inseparable elements of our national security.

-- Across the globe nations were gaining identity and self-confidence. They were able to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and well-being.

- 13 -

But they needed our steady assistance to make the transition.

These policies were designed to elicit from the American people and Congress -- weary from two decades of global enterprise and domestic turmoil -- support for the continuing world responsibility of the United States without which the peace of the world and our own security cannot be maintained.

It is worth recalling how far we have come.

Our major alliances with the Atlantic world and Japan remain firm anchors of security and prosperity. They are now a solid basis for close cooperation on a range of unprecedented new problems.

- 14 -

We have reduced tensions, deepened dialogue, and pro-
duced some major agreements.

We have begun to bring under control the race in
strategic armaments which threatens a global catastrophe.

Ours has been a key role of leadership in helping
to ease long-standing political conflicts such as Berlin
and the Middle East.

Ad we have taken the major initiatives to mobilize
an international response to new global challenges such
as energy, food, and the vast reaches of the oceans.

In all these areas the American role has been
crucial. The design still stands, our responsibilities
remain. But we must now pursue them in more sober circum-
stances.

We will meet these challenges. We will dispel any
doubts. But we can only do so as a united people.

What is being tested is the mettle of our people and
our institutions. Setbacks are bound to occur in a

- 15 -

We must face one overwhelming fact: most of our
travails are of our own making. They can be traced
not so much to the actions of foreigners as to the
slackening of our own unity and self-confidence after
a convulsive decade. But this very fact gives us
reason for hope. If the causes are within ourselves,
then so are the remedies.

## The Domestic Dimension

The American people expect their government to
conduct foreign policy effectively, to achieve national
goals. For this, government needs boldness, direction,
nuance. It must have a sense of the future that
cannot be proved when it is developed; a sense of
proportion that depends on intangibles. And thus foreign
policy requires above all a sense of partnership and

- 16 -

confidence between the public and the government and
between the Executive and the Legislative.

We must fact the fact that our deepest problem is
a crisis of confidence -- the causes of which are
deep-seated. Some afflict democracies everywhere;
some are unique to America's tradition and recent
history.

We face the problem of modern government, besieged
by social, economic, and political challenges that cut
across national boundaries and lie at the margin of
governments' ability to control. The process by which
political leaders reach office too often does not
prepare them for the scope of the challenges with
which they must grapple. Management of bureaucracy
consumes their energies and turns issues of public
policy into issues of institutional bargaining. Instant

- 17 -

communications force the pace of events and expectations.

Issues are so complex that a premium is placed on a
simplification that approaches demagoguery. Persuasion --
the essential method of democracy -- becomes extraordinarily
difficult in an era that is without simplicity and
without certainty.

The result is a disaffection that simultaneously
debunks government and drains it of the very public
confidence that it requires if it is to act, in a
democracy. In this country we have witnessed the de-
struction of three Presidents in succession; in many
democratic countries we see an almost inexorable ebbing
of confidence in whatever government is in office.
Just when our need for creative leadership is greatest,
the conditions for it are most undermined.

We face as well the problem of a new generation.
The gulf between their historical experience and ours

- 18 -

is enormous. They have been traumatized by Vietnam
as we were by Munich. They derive no lesson from the
tragedies of the previous era and no inspiration from
the great postwar period of American

- 19 -

achievement in foreign affairs. They find little meaning or
incentive for loyalty in an impersonal, technological, bureau-
cratized, materialistic society. To satisfy their frustration,
only iconoclasm is offered. The alienation of the young is a
powerful factor for the demoralization of any society.

This has been compounded by the decline, if not the
demoralization of what has been called "the Establishment."
Following the Second World War, a broad spectrum of
civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen,
clergy, the media, Congressional and national leaders of
both parties -- led American public opinion in a new inter-
nationalist consensus. Taught by the very experience of the
Second World War, the nation understood that we best secured
our domestic tranquility by enlightened participation, indeed
leadership, in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies

- 20 -

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina,
leadership opinion turned sharply against many of the inter-
nationalist premises of the postwar period. For years now
we have had drummed into us the view that conflicts are
stimulated by American military equipment given in support
of friends that injustices are perpetuated by American action
or inaction, that suffering is only prolonged by American
steadfastness to allies, that defense spending is a waste, that
American intelligence activities are immoral, that the con-
fidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the American
public, that flexibility is cynical and amoral -- and that
tranquility is somehow to be purchased by America's abandon-
ment of its causes and its friends.

- 21 -

These themes strike a responsive chord in a disillusioned public. And they are all the more persuasive at a time of serious unemployment and inflation at home. But they are indiscriminate and they are dangerously irrelevant in a period of evident and complex dangers abroad.

All of this has produced the complex problem of executive-legislative relations in a new period. In every country, the modern state seems frustratingly remote from the human beings whose lives it affects; in every country, it is challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Accommodation of special groups -- the essence of problem-solving on domestic issues -- robs foreign policy of consistency and focus, which are the essence of national action abroad. Issues become difficult for

- 22 -

legislative oversight to encompass, as they become either more
broad or more technical -- precisely as they become more
important. Governments must make decisions before all
facts are clear, or else they abdicate control over events. Yet
predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided are
never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus have a field-
day and when they become endemic in executive-legislative
relations, reasoned debate is replaced by a series of
confrontations on peripheral issues.

These problems are the malaise of all democratic
societies. In America, it has its own dimension.

We cannot afford domestic disarray perhaps tolerable in
other societies -- because of the global consequences that
inescapably flow from our national policy. For Americans, the
adjustment to a more complex world is inevitably difficult.

- 23 -

We are a people accustomed to triumph, to unlimited horizons.

Our earlier experience taught us that exertions had a terminal
point, that striving was rewarded. We had a soaring idealism,
a faith in law-- rarely tempered by the experience of tragedy
or knowledge of the contingent quality of human ends. We took
our power for granted and attributed our successes to virtue.

We disparaged means. Thus in our foreign involvement we have
oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, between crusading
and retreats into self-doubt.

We are a self-centered nation. In periods of success, we
project ourselves. In periods of difficulty, we attack ourselves.

- 24 -

the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in
foreign conflicts, the deep-seated aversion to "power politics"
and balances of power, the notion that weapons are themselves
the causes of conflict, the conception that humanitarian
assistance and participation in the economic order are an
adequate substitute for political engagement -- all these were
familiar characteristics of the American isolationsim of the
'20's and '30's.

And so America today is a paradox. In the nation with
the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in
the world, in the nation that is perhaps the most secure in the
world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals
of civil liberty and pluralist democracy -- we find a deep and
chronic self-doubt. There is a danger of forgetting the lessons
painfully learned at great cost in our own lifetime.

- 25 -

Will the American people now support a responsible and active American foreign policy? They can and they will -- if their leaders, in government and outside of government, give them a sense that they have something to be proud of and something important to accomplish.

There is a great reservoir of faith around the world in this country's values and strength. Equally, there is a great reservoir of confidence within America in the contribution this country can and must make to a better world.

This Administration dedicates itself to working in partnership with Congress in a new spirit of commitment to international affairs in our nation.

- 26 -

Where Do We Go From Here?

Let us learn the right lessons from our present situation.

We no longer have the margin of safety we once had for
disarray or abdication or short-sightedness in the conduct of
foreign policy. In the era of American predominance,
America's simple preferences held great sway. We could over-
whelm our problems with our resources. We had less need to
resort to the traditional style of nations conducting foreign policy
with more modest means -- subtlety, maneuver, patience,
flexibility. Now we must have these qualities -- but in a democracy
they place a very high premium on public understanding and public
confidence.

In the era of our predominance, our constancy was not in
question; now it is. We are still the largest single factor in

- 27 -

We can no longer afford isolationism in the guise of moralism
-- either in overinvolvement in the affairs of others or in
abject renunciation of our great responsibilities.

We will have to work harder to earn trust and confidence
and we shall.

We must stop the pretense that we can choose between
morality and pragmatism. American cannot be true to itself
unless it stands for humane values and unless it upholds the
dignity of the individual. But to stand for our values we must
be secure. The deepest problem of foreign policy to strike
a balance between these requirements. In 1941 Churchill supported
the Soviet Union whose values he abhored and had fought all his

- 28 -

life against the Nazi invasion. He thought the survival of the
West required it. Similarly we may have to cooperate at times
with governments with whose practices we do not fully agree.

We must recognize that we must maintain both our
security and our values. We must have the wisdom to recognize
that we can achieve neither without the other and neither of them
absolutely. The American people must never forget that our
strength gives force to our principles and hope to all those who
seek safety and peace.

Let us understand the nature of our obligations. Our
most serious commitments arise out of our actions as a nation
over a period of time, not from legal documents even less
from "secret" commitments never invoked seriously by anybody.
Diplomacy ostensibly has an element of confidentiality, to force it
entirely into the open is to destroy all serious exchange, to turn this

- 29 -

into secret commitments is to destroy deliberately the basis of
public confidence. But the Congress and the public must know
and will continue to be fully informed of these exchanges implying
national actions.

- 30 -

achieved in the policy of detente.

At this moment, a great responsibility rests upon all

of us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative branches

is the only possible basis for national action. In every country,

their cooperation is a complex problem. It is compounded in

this country by the separation of powers and by the weakening

of traditional patterns of authority within the Congress, occurring

at the same time as the weakening of the authority of the

executive branch.

Let there be no mistake about it: in this country, the
decade-long struggle over alleged executive dominance in
foreign affairs is over. It is last year's issue. The assertion
of Congressional authority is with us; it is the dominant fact

- 31 -

- 32 -

alteration in office of our national parties becomes an element
of instability. If we now exacerbate foreign policy issues by
struggles between us, they will only be inherited by the next
Administration, but under worse conditions.

- 33 -

When they measure our continuity, our will, our purpose, our
ability to follow through on what we promise, their index is
our performance and not our debates. The country cannot
afford partisan warfare at this moment in our history.

## The Coming Agenda

Our resources are vast, our leadership essential, our
opportunities unprecedented and insistent:

> -- The United States provides the core of the great alliances -- with the industrial democracies of the West, with Japan and the other nations of Asia, and with Latin America. These alliances are the anchor of our security, the foundation for détente, and the expression of shared values

- 34 -

and purposes. They require our strength and our stamina.

They will be strengthened.

-- United States' strength is indispensable to the process of reducing conflict and tension in the world. With the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China we are seeking reliable long-term relationships founded on mutual restraint and more positive cooperation. But their relationships with us rest heavily on their estimates of our power and influence on the international scene. Only with a strong national defense can we balance potential adversaries, buttress alliances and thus nourish the processes of detente.

-- The United States is the only country that has the confidence of both sides in many regional conflicts. We have made striking progress in helping the parties of the Middle East move toward peace. The United States is determined to maintain

- 35 -

this momentum on whatever course is most promising. Let
no nation believe that we can be pushed into compromising
vital interests by pressure. But equally let no country gear
its policy to maintaining a stalemate which we believe dangerous
to world peace and contrary to the American national interest.

The United States is by far the world's largest producer
and supplier of food. With foresight and commitment, we can
help the world close the ominous gap between population growth
and food production. We have a moral obligation to do so. And
we have a political interest in tracing a constructive pattern
for other producers of other resources in an interdependent
world.

-- The United States is central to any solution of the
energy problem. We consume one-third of the world's energy,

- 36 -

we are a major producer, and our technology and leadership
are vital. Together with other consumers we have made major
progress on many fronts. Without our own major efforts on
conservation and energy development, however, there is no
hope of success for our collective efforts.

-- The United States has the world's most dynamic economy and the most advanced technology. We must apply these assets to the emerging agenda: reforming the international economy; ensuring that the oceans become areas of cooperation rather than conflict; harnessing technology to the service of mankind while protecting the environment; and reconciling the interests of developed and developing nations with humanity and realism.

These challenges in the coming decades will dwarf today's
disputes. If we act purposefully the events of today can be
seen as the shedding of old illusions to free us for our real

- 37 -

challenges.

An incipient world order is taking form around us. Our
nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role.

But we and our friends must come to terms with ourselves.

If not, the field will lie open to others -- others not necessarily
friendly to us. The result could be a reshaping of the world
which takes little account of our values and our interests, and
produces great dangers of war.

It is time for America to act without guilt and without
self-doubt. It is time for America's leaders, in and out of
government, to say what they are for, not what they are
against. In the words of Longfellow, it is time to "look not
mournfully into the past. Wisely improve the present. Go
forth to meet the shadowy future without fear, and with a manly

- 38 -

heart."

In an era of turbulence, uncertainty and conflict, the
world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating
influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a
tradition and a vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized
for generations man's conquest over nature, so too has
America -- with its banner of progress and freedom -- symbolized
man's mastery over his own future.

For the better part of two centuries our forefathers,
citizens of a small and relatively weak country, met adversity
with intense courage and creativity. And in the course of
their struggle they built the freest, richest and most powerful
nation the world has ever known. As we, their heirs, take
America into its third century, as we take up the agenda of the
modern world, we are determined to recover the belief in
ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our history.

4/13/74

DRAFT III

America is being tested.

This is a moment of severe trial, # and great opportunity. Our response as a people will shape the kind of world we leave to our children.

It can wallow in recrimination, looking for scapegoats rather than lessons.

- 2 -

A week ago President Ford chose this latter course. He set forth a program for executive-legislative cooperation across the whole range of our international challenges. He looked forward, not backward. He called upon Congress and the American people to turn this moment of malaise into a demonstration of spirit -- to prove once again our resilience and our vision, and to put these into the service of building a better world.

As the President said, it is a time for clear thinking and straight talk about where we stand and where we're going. Let me state succinctly at the outset the burden of my message:

- 3a -

The International Context

The way to <u>emerge from</u> our present trial is
they
first to recognize that <u>it</u> exist#.

If we should not despair over our current
e
but
difficulties, neither should we gloss them over.

We must face up to the basic reality that events
*in Portugal + the Middle East* / 
in Indochina have a serious impact. A great nation
undertook a major enterprise for almost fifteen
years. We invested enormous prestige; *tens of thousands* died
and many more were wounded, imprisoned and lost;
we spent over 150 billion dollars; and our domestic
fabric was severely torn.

- 4 -

This is not to say that it was all in vain or
without redemption for the sacrifices made. But when
such an effort nears failure, when a great nation exits
erit
as we are doing, it is an event of profound significance.

For other nations are closely watching America.
Every day reports are coming in from our embassies in
all over
Asia and many other regions of the world, relaying

disqualified
questions from our friends abroad. What do events in
Indochina and elsewhere signify for America's
competence -- constancy -- credibility -- coherence?

How will Americans react at a time of travail? What
are the implications for the policies of America's
friends?

-8-

The Overall Design
---

As we look toward the future we start with a sound
structure in our foreign policy -- if we can sustain it here
at home. And we have the raw materials for continued progress
-- if we exhibit purpose and resolve.

It should not be forgotten that the central thrust
of our foreign policy over the last six years has been to
adjust our conceptions, our methods, and our commitments to
the conditions of a new era -- including an America already
fatigued by Indochina.

The postwar order of international relations was gone, ended with World
No sudden upheaval marked the end of that era, but the
cumulative change by the end of the 1960's was profound --
both in the condition of the world and the attitude of the

-9-

American people. We needed fresh concepts and policies
to help shape a new design:

-- Our allies in Europe and Japan had regained their
economic vitality, social cohesion and political self-
assurance. We needed to forge with them more balanced and
dynamic coalitions.

-- Across the globe nations were gaining identity
and self-confidence. They were able to shoulder more
responsibility for their own security and well-being. But

-10-

These policies were designed to elicit from the American people and Congress -- weary from two decades of global enterprise and domestic turmoil -- support for the continuing world responsibility of the United States, withoutetyl the maintenance of peace of the world + an armament security which is maintained.

We have begun to live under an international peace agreement, which includes a global economic system. Ours has been a key role of leadership in helping to ease long-standing political conflicts such as Berlin and

the Middle East.

And we have taken the major initiatives to mobilize
an international response to new global challenges such as
energy, food, and the vast reaches of the oceans.

we must now pursue them in more sober circumstances ~~with~~

~~the background of~~ others questioning our constancy.

We will answer these questions. We will dispel any
doubts. But we can only do so as a united people.

-13-

Indochina

Let us start with the current headlines. For our engagement in Indochina has been a major source of our domestic troubles, even as our exit reverberates in the world.

The President fully understood the national mood when he requested military as well as humanitarian assistance for South Vietnam. He knows the American people are understandably tired of a conflict that has already cost us so much.

But a President's speech has a profound international impact. It is the Administration's responsibility — it is the President's responsibility — to do what we believe is right, not what is necessarily popular.

We are concerned about what the Vietnamese think of us. What is to be their reaction to America, and Americans, to whom they bound their future?

We are concerned about what other countries think of us. What conclusions will they draw when they see us

-14-

walk away from friends with whom we fought for a decade?

And we are concerned about what we think of ourselves.

who relied on us, I think not.

We believe this assistance is of fundamental importance.

It is vital that all Americans do so. For one of the
greatest casualties of Vietnam has been the civility of our
domestic discourse. Over the years debate has yielded to
emotion, sweeping far beyond the issues involved. Not only
judgments but motives have been called into question. Not
only policy but character has been attacked. What began as an
overwhelming national consensus progressively deteriorated into

-18-

Instant communications force the pace of events and issues are sampled at a premium, is placed on expectations. Persuasion -- the essential method of democracy -- becomes extraordinarily difficult in an era that is without simplicity and without certainty.

The result is a disaffection that simultaneously debunks government and drains it of the very public confidence that it requires if it is to act, in a democracy. In this country we have witnessed the destruction of three Presidents in succession; in many democratic countries we see an almost inexorable ebbing of confidence in whatever government is in office. Just when our need for creative leadership is greatest, the conditions for it are most undermined.

We face as well the problem of a new generation. The gulf between their historical experience and ours is enormous. They have been traumatized by Vietnam as we were by Munich. They derive no lesson from the tragedies of the previous era and no inspiration from the great postwar period of American

-19-

achievement in foreign affairs. They find little meaning
or incentive for loyalty in an impersonal, technological,
bureaucratized, materialistic society. To satisfy their
frustration, only iconoclasm is offered. The alienation of the
young is a powerful factor for the demoralization of any
society.

We face, in addition, a complex problem of executive-
legislative relations in a new period. In every country,
the modern state seems frustratingly remote from the human
beings whose lives it affects; in every country, it is
challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult
to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Accommo-
dation of special groups -- the essence of problem-solving
on domestic issues -- robs foreign policy of consistency
and focus, which are the essence of national action abroad.
Issues become difficult for legislative oversight to encompass,

-21-

For Americans, the adjustment to a more complex world
is inevitably difficult. We are a people accustomed to
triumph, to unlimited horizons. Our earlier experience
taught us that exertions had a terminal point, that striving
was rewarded. We had a soaring idealism, a faith in law --
rarely tempered by the experience of tragedy or knowledge
of the contingent quality of human ends. We took our power
for granted and attributed our successes to virtue. We
disparaged means. Thus in our foreign involvement we have
oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, between
crusading and retreats into self-doubt.

-22-

The result is a nation at the height of its powers that needs to recover its faith in itself. see p24.

Let us remember that America's commitment to involvement in the world has always been problematical. The roots of isolationism, nourished by geography and history, go deep in the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in foreign conflicts, the deep-seated aversion to "power politics" and balances of power, the notion that weapons are themselves the causes of conflict, the conception that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement -- all these were familiar characteristics of the American isolationism of the '20's and '30's.

tr p21

tup19
demobilization

This has been accompanied by the decline, if not the collapse, of the Second World War, a broad spectrum of civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen, and what has been called "the Establishment."

-23-

clergy, the media, Congressional and national leaders of both parties -- led American public opinion in a new internationalist consensus. Taught by the very experience of the Second World War, the nation understood that we best secured our domestic tranquility by enlightened participation, indeed leadership, in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies was not a price to be paid but a service to be rendered to international stability and therefore to our self-interest.

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina, leadership opinion turned sharply against many of the internationalist premises of the postwar period. For years now we have had drummed into us the view that conflicts are stimulated by American military equipment given in support of friends, that injustices are perpetuated by American action or inaction, that suffering is only prolonged by American steadfastness to allies, that defense spending is a waste, that American intelligence activities are immoral,

-24-

that the confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive
the American public, that flexibility is cynical and amoral
-- and that tranquility is somehow to be purchased by America's
abandonment of its causes and its friends.

Will the American people now support a responsible
and active American foreign policy? ~~They will -- if their~~
leaders, in government and outside of government, give them
a sense that they have something to be proud of and something
important to accomplish.

-25-

## Where Do We Go From Here?

We no longer have the margin of safety we once had for
disarray or abdication or short-sightedness in the conduct
of foreign policy. The Cold War had its own moral simplicity
which is now a thing of the past. In the era of American
predominance, America's simple preferences held great sway.
We could overwhelm our problems with our resources. We had
less need to resort to the traditional style of nations
conducting foreign policy with more modest means -- subtlety,
maneuver, patience, flexibility. Now we must have these
qualities -- but in a democracy they place a very high
premium on public understanding and public confidence.

In the era of our predominance, our constancy was not in
question; now it is. We are still the largest single factor
in international affairs -- but we are one nation among many.
The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our

-27-

At this moment, we must also maintain our vigilance.

As moral men, we must recognize that we must maintain both our security and our values. We have the wisdom to know that we can achieve neither without the other, and neither of them absolutely. But the American people know that in a turbulent world our strength gives force to our principles and gives hope to all those who seek safety and peace. There will be no vacuum of leadership of which other nations can take advantage. In particular, we shall not forget who supplied the arms for the assault on the Paris Agreement. We shall not permit such an event to recur.

-29-

At home, the American people yearn for an end to the
divisiveness and bitterness of the past decade. They will
look to those leaders who offer them a positive vision of
what America can do, at home and abroad. The American
people believe their government is their own government, not
the enemy. They have a President worthy of elementary trust.

It is time to remember that the differences between moral
questions and practical questions is that moral questions
are harder, not easier, to answer. It is time to end the
viciousness of the debate. No, the country cannot afford
partisan warfare at this moment in our history. The
people expect more. The issues are too vast and too important.

Let us give the public reasoned discourse and thoughtful
argument. Let us discuss the issues -- and subject accusations
to the same scrutiny as governmental actions always receive.

-14-30-

My friends in this audience, the editors of the national press, are in a position to make a great contribution and help elevate the national discourse with fairness and impartiality.

-31-

The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever complained of a want of opportunity". Neither does a great nation.

-- The United States provides the core of the great alliances -- with the industrial democracies of the West, with Japan and the other nations of Asia, and with Latin America. These alliances are the anchor of our security, the foundation for detente, and the expression of shared values and purposes. They require our strength and our stamina.

They will be strengthened

-- The United States is indispensable to the process of reducing conflict and tension in the world. With the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China we are seeking reliable long-term relationships founded on mutual restraint and more positive cooperation. But their relationships with us rest heavily on their estimates of our power and influence

-33-

-- The United States is central to any solution of
the energy problem. We consume one-third of the world's
energy, we are a major producer, and our technology and
leadership are vital. Together with other consumers we
have made major progress on many fronts. Without our own
major efforts on conservation and energy development, however,
there is no hope of success for our collective efforts.

-35-

influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all,
a tradition and a vision of hope. Just as America has
symbolized for generations man's conquest over nature, so
too has America -- with its banner of progress and freedom --
symbolized man's mastery over his own future.

Today's challenges to the American nation are enormous,
the price of failure substantial. But the opportunities
for great creation are also present, if we have the will
and wisdom to grasp the chance. For the better part of two
centuries our forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively
weak country, met adversity with intense courage and creativity.
And in the course of their struggle they built the freest,
richest and most powerful nation the world has ever known.
As we, their heirs, take America into its third century,
as we take up the agenda of the modern world, we recover
the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative
periods in our history.

We are no longer innocent. Nor are we guilty. We have come
of age. We shall do our duty.