First Line Report

June 27, 1972

With Marvin Kalb

MR. KALB: Henry Kissinger, the phenomenon at the White House, who has a problem: that story in one minute.

(Announcement)

MR. KALB: As Henry Kissinger reaches for an accommodation with the North Vietnamese --"I want to be known as the Walt Rostow of peace," he once said -- reporters are reaching for adjectives to describe his effort. "Phenomenal," one of them wrote; "Legendary," another added; "Inexhaustible," still one more noted. They were describing not only his effort, but him. Henry Kissinger, who as they say needs no introduction, has become a very large figure indeed on the diplomatic campus; he strides across the Communist capitals of the world like a colossus. He jokes with six foot four inch Soviet Marshals. He confides with Chou En-lai and Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon. He flies into out-of-the-way airports in the dead of night and finds big limousines with curtained windows waiting for him. He hasn't had a taxi problem in years. And when the traffic is bad, as it was last Friday on his return from his latest trip to Peking, he travels from the airport to the White House in a helicopter -- faster that way.

He briefs reporters on every twist and turn of American foreign policy and he does it with total fidelity to the President's views, and with enough self-deprecating humor to turn usually skeptical newsmen into happy and sometimes unknowing conduits for official propaganda.

Veteran columnists who have seen briefers come and go since the Roosevelt Administration consider Kissinger the best explainer of American foreign policy they have ever heard. Foreign diplomats want to invite and see Kissinger, believing he has a direct pipeline to the President, which he has. That means he is one of the busiest men in town, when he is here, consorting with the press and Democrats.

- 2 -

The Administration swinger in one sense, linked
to the left in another. He is a bachelor, the most
eligible one in town, if he is free for that extra seat
at the dinner table. He is tough to work for, some of his
aides say. Quite a few have quit, either unable to take
the pace or unable to stomach policy.

At the State Department, Kissinger is cursed or
praised. He leaves no one limp with apathy. He is regarded
as a strong leader and his very strength is his problem.
For those who forgot, Kissinger used to be a Harvard
professor. Harvard is an old and venerable university.
It bends rules only seldom. One rule is that a professor
can leave for government service or for some other good
reason for only two years and then if he wishes to keep
his job and retain his professorial tenure he must return
to the university.

In Kissinger's case, Harvard made an exception.
They gave him two years and then they gave him two more
years. By November of this year, Kissinger must make
up his mind whether to stay in government, assuming the
President's re-election, or return to Harvard.

Of course, if the President is defeated, Kissinger's
choice is blessedly narrowed, unless the President's
successor asks him to stay on, which is possible, though
unlikely. But, one of his own aides said recently that
Kissinger would make up his mind about returning to Harvard
before the election. It could be that all of the jets,
and the starlets, and the choppers, have combined to change
Kissinger's metabolism, away from the contemplative life
of the university towards a more activist role in some
other capacity, maybe even Secretary of State.

No one knows. There are large decisions for
him as well as the President in the months just around the
corner, decisions that will shake and shape the foreign
policy establishment.

END

WASHINGTON STAR 2 JULY 1972

Kissinger's Curious Optimism

In the light of the record, continued expressions of faith in the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam by such as Henry Kissinger must be rated as remarkable.

Kissinger, of course, knows a good deal more about the course of these negotiations than the rest of us. But as more and more of the record comes to light through the indefatigable efforts of Jack Anderson, one is struck by an overwhelming sense of the futility of the negotiating track.

In essence, the volume of detail tells us exactly what we have known to be the case all along: That a compromise result of the war in Vietnam simply is not possible — that one side or the other will control in South Vietnam, and whether that control is established by negotiations or by military force will make no real difference.

The Communists, certainly, have understood this clearly from the outset. So far as the Paris peace talks have been concerned, they are, to the leaders in Hanoi, merely an extension of the battlefield in South Vietnam.

On both sides, the various "peace plans" have collided over the single non-negotiable issue of ultimate political control of the government in Saigon. And resolution of that issue seems no nearer today than it was in 1964.

The Communists, to be sure, deny that they are demanding the immediate reunification of Vietnam under Hanoi's leadership. Instead, they are demanding the creation of a coalition government in Saigon on terms which would assure them effective control. Their definition of "self-determination"

CROSBY S. NOYES

for South Vietnam firmly rejects any idea of elections, however organized and supervised.

This, then, is the heart of the matter — the problem which no amount of diplomatic ingenuity can resolve. All the other issues which have agitated public opinion in the United States — the withdrawal of American forces, the return of prisoners, the rules of a cease-fire —are of secondary concern to the leaders in Hanoi. From all the evidence so far, the only terms for a settlement in Vietnam are terms which will effectively deliver the country into their hands.

There are many Americans who are prepared to accept these terms. The Democratic platform, for example, quite explicitly writes off all of Indochina to the Communists, by pledging to cut off forthwith all further military aid to Saigon along with the withdrawal of all American forces. According to the platform:

"The U.S. will no longer seek to determine the political future of the nations of Indochina. The issue is not whether we will depose the present government, rather that we will cease insisting that it must be the core of any political settlement. We will do what we can to foster an agreement on an acceptable political solution — but we recognize that there are sharp limits to our ability to influence this process..."

In short, if the Democrats win, it will be left to the leaders in Hanoi to determine the political future of the nations of Indochina and

there is no doubt in the world that the resulting "political settlement" will be greatly more acceptable to them than to the people of South Vietnam.

On this basis, one can indeed be hopeful of the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam — provided, of course, one is not Vietnamese. But what gives the McGovern Democrats reasonable, and contemptible, grounds for hope hardly applies to Henry Kissinger. Since he and the Nixon administration have no plans for surrendering South Vietnam to the Communists, the grounds for his optimism must be entirely different.

It can only be based, in fact, on the conviction that the South Vietnamese are quite capable of defending themselves with minimum American help and that the American people are willing to give them that help. Only if one is convinced of that, can one have much faith in the survival of South Vietnam.

And only if one believes that the North Vietnamese are equally convinced of the survivability of South Vietnam, can one have any realistic hope of a settlement of the war on any terms other than outright surrender. If the leaders in Hanoi come to the conclusion that their latest offensive has failed and that their allies are unwilling —or unable—to give them further effective military support, a settlement might be in the making.

In any event, these leaders are known to be in the process of a major reassessment of their situation. Which could be the reason for Kissinger's curious optimism.

7-F

Despite a highly successful overall economic record, North Korea is currently wrestling with a number of interlocking economic problems, and the easiest way out of its difficulties would be a cut in its armed forces permitting reduced defense spending. Premier Kim Il Sung now has offered to negotiate mutual force reductions with South Korea.

The Kim Il Sung regime started virtually from scratch after the economic exploitation of the Japanese colonial period and the devastation of the Korean war years. Emphasizing heavy industry, Pyongyang has achieved a significant degree of economic independence in two short decades.

North Korea now makes 30,000 machine tools a year and equips its factories largely with domestically made machinery, except for specialized high-technology items imported reluctantly and sparingly from the Soviet Union and East Europe. Trucks, buses, tractors, automated textile looms, generators, mining machinery and electric locomotives are all made here.

Steel production reached 2.2 million tons in 1970, the last reported year, drawing on the country's extensive domestic iron ore deposits. Pyongyang also has its own reserves of anthracite coal, magnesite, mica and other industrial raw materials but depends on imports of rubber, crude oil and light metals.

Initially, industrial production here moved along at a rapid clip, doubling every five years in some products and tripling in others. Bottlenecks have gradually emerged, however, especially in power and extractive industries unable to keep pace with the needs of factories supplying both civil and military needs.

Among the many factors contributing to these bottlenecks appear to be

the labor supply is inherently greater here than in the South, which has twice the population of the North. The North Korean regular armed forces are believed to number slightly fewer than 400,000; South Korea has an estimated 630,000 men under arms.

## Goals Cut Back

OFFICIALS HERE are unwilling to discuss or even acknowledge their economic problems beyond occasional fleeting hints, and provide on the barest statistics. Nevertheless, the existence of continuing problem areas in the economy is implicit in the fact that the current six-year economic plan ending in 1976 lowers the projected target for annual growth in national income from 15.2 to 10.3 per cent and the industrial growth target from 18 per cent to 14 per cent. These are still eminently respectable goals, however, and their achievement would make North Korea one of the world's fastest-growing countries.

The most serious dilemma confronting economic planners here arises from the competition for limited resources between heavy industry and light industries needed to expand the production of consumer goods. So far, officials have been unwilling to sacrifice heavy industry, not only for defense reasons but because they are unashamedly bashed economic nationalists and see heavy industry as their basic armament against economic conquest by neighboring Japan. Heavy industry is receiving 40.7 per cent of government investment in the six-year plan as against 8.3 per cent for light industry. Since they are not ready to alter their basic economic priorities, officials imply that reduced defense budgets offer the best route of escape from their present impasse.

North Korea is one of the world's

8-F

SAN DIEGO UNION 25 JUNE 1972 (7 JULY)

Questions From The Board Of Editors

Answers Of NATO Admiral

Vice Admiral John E. L. Martin, CB, DSC, Royal Navy, is deputy
Supreme Commander Atlantic for the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization. He talked with a board of editors of The San Diego Union.

QUESTION: Does President Nixon's summit meeting in Moscow affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in any way?

ANSWER: When one of the nations of the alliance goes into a summit meeting it's very important to NATO. I personally can see nothing but good coming out of this.

Q. There is a great deal of pressure to reduce the level of U.S. troops in NATO. Do you think this is feasible?

A: I know that Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, certainly doesn't think that there is any room to reduce any troops in Europe.

Q: Will there always be a need for a strong NATO naval force?

A: Emphatically yes. Almost every country of the alliance depends on the sea for trade and merchandising. The United Kingdom imports a great deal by sea. The oil for Europe comes through the Dutch ports. We are going to need a strong Navy to make certain that this trade cannot be interfered with by anyone.

Q: Can NATO forces be reduced as the Communist Warsaw pact nations reduce theirs?

A: I think that you have to remember that one of the principals upon which this would rest would be undiminished security for the alliance. In other words, the West must have undiminished security. It isn't easy to find a way in which you can reduce forces on both sides and still have undiminished security.

Q: Why is that?

A: The Warsaw Pact countries have about a three to one advantage in conventional military forces. If you start mutual reductions when you're already at a three to one disadvantage you're going to get an even greater disadvantage — even though the other side is cutting its forces. And secondly, what happens to the forces that are reduced? The reinforcement capability of the Warsaw Pact forces is very quick because all they've got to do is get onto a road or a railway, and they can return from the middle of Russia very quickly indeed. If, on the other hand, the British forces are removed to Britain and the American and Canadian forces are removed to this continent, then we've got something like a 3,000-mile ship voyage to return — which is very slow. You can't do it all by air. Some say you can pull our troops back and stockpile arms in Europe. This is a very difficult problem because those arms need to be kept lubricated, maintained, and working.

Q: How does the Soviet submarine force compare in numbers with the NATO force?

A: Their submarines number about 350. That is bigger than all of the world's combined submarine forces.

Q: Are their newest submarines effective?

A: They are fast. They travel about 27 knots under water. They are not particularly silent, so we sometimes can hear them. They can stay at sea for three or four months without any problems and keep up with a fast tanker, and with our carriers and frigates.

Q: What is our countervailing force?

A: Frigates, patrol boats, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft. What we would like more of in NATO is small aircraft carriers to project more airpower.

Q: What is the United Kingdom doing about submarine construction?

A: For the past nine years we have been increasing our nuclear submarines. As we bring a nuclear submarine into service, we take out a diesel one. Our submarine force is still small in comparison with the Soviet fleet.

Q: There's a dialogue about linking an All European Security Conference and the mutual and balanced force reductions in the central area of Europe. What is your feeling on this?

A: We in the military feel that it is important that the military and political sides must cooperate if there is to be a conference.

Q: Isn't it a fact that France is dragging her heels in the military aspects of NATO?

A: I wouldn't use the words "dragging her heels." France is still a member of NATO. She takes part in the council activities and in military committee meetings for certain subjects. She does not take part in the military organization itself.

Q: Does France take part in military exercises?

A: Yes. We had a NATO exercise off the coast of Portugal last year. Fifty per cent of the ships taking part were French.

Q: Could you comment about the mining of Haiphong Harbor?

A: I can comment about mining, in the context of my own job. There are three bases from which the Warsaw Pact navies operate. One is in the Baltic, and one is in the Black Sea. The exits to the Baltic and the Black Sea are very mineable.

Q: Of course mining itself brings about a confrontation, doesn't it?

A: This is the difficulty. I think that the decision to mine is a very, very difficult one. I would just remind you of the furor that Sir Winston Churchill raised when he laid the mines off the Norwegian coast during World War II. It was done just before the Germans invaded Norway.

Q: Isn't it true that no matter how good the Soviet navy is unless it has CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

5-F

THE NEW REPUBLIC 8 JULY 1972 (7)

After the Summits

Here are some judgments, drawn from the public record and set down in advance of the press conference scheduled by the President for June 29, on the results to date of the summit meetings in Peking and Moscow and of Henry Kissinger's return visit to Peking on June 19-23. The record drawn upon is chiefly the one provided by the President at a press conference on June 22 and by Kissinger at four press conferences in the Soviet Union, at another one at the White House when he returned from Peking, and at a question-and-answer session with members of Congress on June 15.

My reading of Kissinger's statements in the Soviet Union and in Washington, along with the formal documents issued after the Peking and Moscow summits, is that the President succeeded beyond his hopes in one tremendously important respect and essentially failed in another respect. His success was in bringing the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union measurably nearer to that "new international relationship" which he and Kissinger declared to be the primary objective of both summit conferences and of the years of preparation that made them possible. The essence, the indispensable requirement, of that relationship is that each of the super-powers in its dealings with the others give precedence to its own "supreme interests" and to the bearing of those interests upon each other over the interests of the major powers' satellites and dependents. In the terms of greatest current importance to Americans, this means that the United States subordinate its obligation to South Vietnam and its proclaimed interest in a satisfactory outcome of the Vietnam war to its developing relationships with Communist China and the Soviet Union. It also means, of course, that Communist China and the Soviet Union subordinate their obligations to North Vietnam and their interest in an outcome of the Vietnam and Indochina war that would be satisfactory to them to the necessity, now recognized by both Peking and Moscow, for a stable and peaceful relationship with the United States.

Here we come to the President's seeming failure in Peking and Moscow, a failure that has to be defined in relative and extremely uncertain terms. It was to persuade the Peking and Moscow leaderships, principally meaning Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in Peking and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, that they have it in their power to persuade if not compel the Hanoi leadership to so alter its bargaining stance in Paris that what Kissinger calls a solution of the Vietnam war "which is just and reasonable for both sides" may at last become negotiable. Kissinger has repeatedly denied that this, stated in these terms, was the President's hope or objective in Peking and Moscow. He has said, and was still saying when he returned from his latest trip to Peking, that the Nixon administration has never asked either the Peking or Moscow governments to "do anything" of the kind. He went so far as to say in Washington on June 24

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

AFTER THE SUMIT...........CONTINUED

that "we have no information about the relationship of North Vietnam to its two principal allies."

The denial and the claim do not stand the test of known fact. Before and on May 8, when the President announced the mining of North Vietnam's harbors and the resumption of heavy bombing of North Vietnam, he and Kissinger complained in the plainest and most bitter language that the Soviet Union had made the current Hanoi offensives against South Vietnam possible with its supply of weapons and that the Soviet leaders had misled Kissinger and Nixon into believing that Hanoi's chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho, was ready for productive negotiation with Kissinger. The publication last week of hitherto secret portions of the Pentagon Papers demonstrated that abortive attempts at negotiation in the late 1960s, in which Kissinger was deeply involved for the Johnson administration, rested in part upon a conviction that the Moscow government could assist and was assisting in pressing Hanoi toward useful negotiation. It is believable that Kissinger and Nixon learned from the earlier experience and failure that there are limits to what may be expected of either Peking or Moscow. It is not believable that no effort to renew the attempts occurred at the Nixon summits. Kissinger's frequent refusals to discuss "the substance" of the discussions is just one indication that a great deal that has yet to be published passed between Nixon and his hosts.

It is evident from events that the failure was offset by a very considerable success. The events that make this evident are that Moscow allowed its summit with Nixon to proceed after he announced his determination to do everything in his power to deny Communist China and the Soviet Union further supply access to North Vietnam and that Kissinger was, as he said, "treated with extraordinary courtesy" when he returned to Peking in June. In actions though not in rhetoric, the Peking and Moscow governments have come very close to telling Hanoi that its war is no longer their war. This they have done by tolerating the mining and bombing of North Vietnam and the affront to both the Chinese and Soviet governments that these actions and the Nixon rhetoric that accompanied and still accompanies them constitute. This alone could be—I suspect that it is—the basis for Kissinger's repeated indications at the press conference following his return from Peking that he and the President expect to be in a position to announce that "serious negotiations" with Hanoi are about to be resumed.

A question yet to be answered is the extent, if any, to which the President has subordinated or is prepared to subordinate his interest—he would say, the United States' interest—in the outcome of the Vietnam

and Indochina war to the larger relationships that he has labored so long and so hard to develop. The best answer to that question at this writing is another question. Is it conceivable that the Peking and Moscow leaderships would have subordinated their interest in the outcome, to the extent that they have, without a credible indication from the President that he is ready to make some return in kind? A return in kind would have to be a readiness to settle the war on terms short of the ones that he proclaimed on May 8: a return of all American prisoners; "an internationally supervised cease-fire"; a cessation of all American "acts of force" throughout Indochina; the withdrawal within four months of all remaining American forces in South Vietnam; and, at and after that point, "negotiations on a political settlement by the Vietnamese themselves." The President's press secretary, announcing a further reduction of American forces in South Vietnam from 49,000 to 39,000 by September 1, said that the bombing and mining of North Vietnam "are continuing and will continue" until these terms for negotiation are accepted. At Henry Kissinger's post-Peking press conference, however, there were some suggestions of departure from the May 8 terms, and particularly from the undertaking to leave the political settlement to "the Vietnamese themselves."

Kissinger appeared to place total reliance on the bombing and mining and to stand by the latest Nixon terms when he said: "We hope that a further study of the President's May 8th proposal, plus the failure of the [North Vietnamese] offensive to succeed in achieving a military solution for North Vietnam, will convince the leaders of the Democratic Republic to enter serious negotiations." But, in what has to be read as a reference to the Peking and Moscow leaderships, he also said that "we are prepared to listen seriously to the views of others who also have an interest in bringing the war to a conclusion." He remarked that "our efforts over the last weeks" to find a basis for renewed and conclusive negotiation "certainly have not been to bring about a purely military solution." And, in what I took to be his most significant statement, he said: "We expect that when the war is finally settled, it will be through direct negotiations between the North Vietnamese and American negotiators." There wasn't one word about leaving the political settlement to "the Vietnamese themselves." This could mean that Richard Nixon intends to be right in there, preventing the imposition of a Communist government upon South Vietnam. My reading of it is that the President hopes and intends to be right in there, during the campaign months of 1972, settling this war on the best terms that he can get and at any necessary cost to his Saigon clients.

John Osborne

ANSWERS OF NATO ADMIRAL...........CONTINUED

warm, open ports its effectiveness is diminished?

A: There is absolutely no doubt they've got to get their ships out into the open water. However, the Soviet navy now is to be found in almost every sea on the earth.

Q: How does the overall Soviet navy compare to the NATO forces?

A: The number of ships that NATO and the United States have is greater than the number the Russians have.

What worries us in NATO is the quality of the Russian ships. They've built their ships since World War II. There has been a tendency in the NATO groups to go with their World War II ships, not to have a building program.

Q: Have you noticed any trend toward isolation throughout the world?

A: Not in terms of trade. I think it's of interest that trade using the seas is expanding its tonnage at the rate of eight per cent every year. The actual number of merchant ships afloat is go-

ing down because we're now building such enormously large ships.

Q: Do you think that the Suez Canal will open soon?

A: The Suez won't open until there's some settlement in that area.

Q: Whom would the opening of the Suez Canal help the most?

A: If you like to look upon it militarily, it might help the Russians most. Looked at commercially, it would help the Western nations, I think.

6-F

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

Kissinger Appears Optimistic That Hanoi
Plans 'New Approach' for Resumed Talks

WALL STREET JOURNAL

10 JULY 1972

WASHINGTON POST 9 JULY 1972 (10)

John P. Roche

War Command Chaos

By RICHARD J. LEVINE
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif.—The White House again is issuing upbeat signals that the Paris peace talks—due to resume Thursday—may yet produce a Vietnam settlement.

But the basis for the guarded optimism of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his chief foreign policy adviser, remains unclear. And White House officials concede they're highly uncertain just what Hanoi's attitude will be when the parties return to the negotiating table.

The latest hopeful word came from Mr. Kissinger in a press conference here Saturday dealing mainly with the big grain agreement with the Russians.

In response to questions, Mr. Kissinger, who chooses his words carefully, twice said, "We have some reason to believe" that the North Vietnamese will have a "new approach" when the talks resume. The presidential assistant declined to detail what evidence Washington has for this conclusion, citing only "very intensive diplomatic activity" in recent weeks.

However, Mr. Kissinger quickly added: "We cannot guarantee it (the new approach) because it won't be certain until we have heard it from them." And at another point, asked if he was optimistic, he replied: "I am open minded."

In announcing the resumption of the talks at his press conference on June 29, President Nixon said the U.S. was returning to the negotiations "on the assumption that the North Vietnamese are prepared to negotiate in a constructive and serious way. . . . If those negotiations go forward in a constructive and serious way, this war can be ended, and it can be ended well before Jan. 20."

Linguistic Subtleties

Thus, Mr. Kissinger's weekend comments both supported the President's and appeared to go a bit further—substituting "reason to believe" for "assumption" of North Vietnamese intent to bargain seriously. Such linguistic subtleties can often have great significance in diplomatic dealings.

Fueling speculation that the peace talks will produce progress have been recent reports—discussed by Western diplomats—that the Soviet Union and China have been pressuring Hanoi to deal with Washington and the improving battlefield position of the South Vietnamese.

While the reports of allied pressure tactics on Hanoi have been generally discredited, there are signs that Hanoi has been advised that it may be unwise to postpone a settlement with the U.S.

Good Time to Bargain

If Mr. Nixon is reelected, this theory goes, he will be tougher to deal with because there won't be any effective political restraints on his ability to wage a vigorous air war in Indonesia. Now, it's said, is the best time to strike a bargain with Mr. Nixon as he's anxious for a settlement prior to the November election.

The effectiveness of such a message on Hanoi—assuming it's getting through clearly—is debatable. And administration officials continue to maintain publicly, as Mr. Kissinger did Saturday, that Washington recognizes "the final settlement will be made with Hanoi and not in any other capital."

The situation on the ground in Vietnam, always difficult to assess, does seem a bit clearer than usual. In the view of independent battlefield observers, Hanoi's troops have run into serious trouble—mainly in the form of U.S.

GEN. JOHN D. LaVelle's private war with North Vietnam has justifiably touched off quite a stir. Lavelle, it will be recalled, was commanding general of the 7th Air Force and apparently decided to use the ambiguity of "protective reaction" as a justification for some preemptive strikes against North Vietnamese military installations. He had the records of these strikes doctored up in such a fashion that they indicated compliance with the rules of engagement. However, because the President subsequently authorized wider bombing, the chances are that many people will write off the Lavelle incident on the ground that he was premature but sensible.

Actually the Lavelle initiative is symptomatic of a far more basic problem than simple battlefield improvisation. Leaving aside the strange love scenarios which have local commanders joyously firing off Minutemen, what occurred was a complete failure of the command structure that should concern all of us. It was far more than a breakdown in civilian control over the military; it was a breakdown in military control over the military. Not since Abraham Lincoln put U. S. Grant in command of the Union armies have we seen such a shambles as the command structure of the Vietnamese war.

WHO IS theoretically the top American official in South Vietnam? The chief of mission, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. What was the official function of Gen. William Westmoreland and, later, Gen. Creighton Abrams? They were the ambassador's subordinates in charge of the Military Assistance Command (MACV). That is, in theory, these four-star generals had exactly the same status as, say, the colonel who is in charge of an American military assistance group in some Latin American nation.

For openers, then, the commanding general, MACV, worked for the ambassador, just like the local director of the Agency for International Development or the local head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Then came the war and half a million American troops—Army, Air Force and Marines, plus the assets of the Seventh Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. Now who was in charge? Well, if you can believe it, the ambassador.

At this point General of the Army George C. Marshall must have been spinning in his grave. Vietnam was never made into a military theater of command with the highly structured lines of control that existed in World War II (and even then there were problems; George Patton, for instance, had a do-it-yourself view of strategy). Nor were our ambassadors, either by character or conviction, will-

ing to take on the job of consul.

Which brings us to Gen. Lavelle and the 7th Air Force. Who was Lavelle's boss? In one capacity, he worked for Abrams; in another, for the commander in chief, U.S. Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC)—an admiral in Hawaii; in still a third, for the chief of staff of the Air Force in Washington.

THE SAME sort of command chaos permeated all the services. Indeed, if one looked at the chart, he sometimes wondered how anything ever got accomplished. But conversely, such a labyrinth is perfectly designed for a general who wants to go into business for himself.

In political terms, it is a classic case of hardening of the categories. Even though the character of the war radically changed between 1963-66, the fiction was maintained that we were merely providing "military assistance." Thus we fell between two stools: there was no theater commander to run the show; there was no ambassador willing or able to exercise his theoretical responsibilities.

I have often thought in this context that perhaps President Johnson's greatest error was in not accepting Robert F. Kennedy's offer to go to Saigon as ambassador. With Bobby at the head of the table there would have been no ambiguities in the command structure.

airpower—since their sweeping successes in northern South Vietnam in the first month of their offensive, launched on Easter weekend. U.S. planes have blunted the effectiveness of North Vietnamese artillery and tanks and have caused heavy enemy casualties. Some of Saigon's units also have been fighting well.

Mr. Kissinger said that a new on-the-scene report by Major Gen. Alexander Haig, deputy director of the National Security Council, shows the military situation "greatly improved" and the offensive "essentially ar-

rested." But, Mr. Kissinger cautioned, the Communists still could mass enough manpower and material for "some high point over the next month," though not enough for a renewal of country-wide attacks.

This improving battlefield situation, Mr. Kissinger said, "reinforces our conclusions that the time for serious negotiation has arrived."

Later this week, Washington will begin to find out if Hanoi feels the same way.

1-F

LIFE EDITORIALS

## McGovern, not Goldwater

Even before his California victory, George McGovern had gone into the ritual dance that is as old as politics, known as Broadening the Base. That he must do so, and should want to, will come as a surprise only to the messianic true believers in his original constituency. They may be disillusioned to learn that George McGovern is a working politician—this man who has been a familiar face on the Washington scene for 15 years.

Well, George McGovern has been underestimated by just about everybody, and perhaps it's now his supporters' turn. Republicans at first gleefully dismissed him as a Goldwater of the left. In 1964, Goldwater successfully resisted being blanded down to appeal to the center; he would be a choice, not an echo, and he lost. Goldwater just seemed too eager to lob one, as he once phrased it, into "the men's room of the Kremlin." McGovern however has shown a readiness to restate his views in milder language, or to declare he's been misunderstood. Take that full-page "Letter from McGovern" ad in a recent *Wall Street Journal*. In it he said nothing about the $28 billion in taxes to be gained from plugging the loopholes against "the rich and powerful." Instead, he argued reassuringly that he did have some ideas about tax reform, but obviously none could possibly get by Congress unless they were "deliberate, reasonable, and technically sound." Or in other words, never mind if a Pres-

consistency in the other fellow's conduct is praise-worthy flexibility in yours.

Actually McGovern can't stray too far, and probably doesn't want to, from his now well-known views on a quick exit from Vietnam, a sharp cut in defense spending and a lot more money for social benefits. But he will be toning down some parts of his message to prove that he isn't dangerous, and learning from his applause meters which subjects touch the public nerve. That kind of adaptation is necessary to winning politics, new or old. Romantic absolutists, who are a prolific breed this year, will see only hypocrisy in this. But should George McGovern get the Democratic nomination, which now seems hard to deny him, we suspect he will still seem a choice, not an echo.

The pattern of the Democratic primaries this year, in which moderate candidates have done so poorly, suggests a public in a restless mood. What troubles a lot of conventional Democrats is that when it comes to the nation at large, there may be a voting majority hanging out the Don't Distrumb sign.

P.S. It's clear that McGovern wants out of Vietnam, and wants to cut back our troops in Europe. Has he any other foreign policy? Odd how little is being said about it.

## A summit well climbed

The President returned from Moscow sober of mien and restrained in expression, making no claims to have changed the world in a week. Here's one time when it is possible to proclaim a Nixon adventure more of a success than the administration itself does.

He and Henry Kissinger have studied the Communists and prepared for them with great care. They have played the schism between Moscow and Peking with subtlety—first giving Peking the recognition it longed for as a great power and then, having established the triangle, taking advantage of the rivalry between the two Communist powers. But not in any cheap way, not by meddling in ideological differences between the two—simply by giving each a competitive reason to want good relations with the U.S. Such a diplomatic two-step would have pleased one of Kissinger's heroes, Prince Metternich.

Already, since the Moscow trip, the Senator Jacksons and the Joe Alsops are asking whether the Russians got the better of us in the deal. Congress will properly scrutinize the nuclear bargain. But trying to balance off nuclear weapons of different sizes and missions to come out evenly—when half of either remaining arsenal could wipe out the other nation anyway—is one of those exercises which perpetuate a badly expensive and essentially futile arms race. Both sides have spent more than two years drawing up the terms.

Brezhnev comes across as shrewd, hard and formidable and he evidently wanted the agreement badly enough (let us hope in order to spend more

attention on Russia's consumer needs) to quash some opposition in his own house and to swallow the humiliation Nixon administered to him over Haiphong. Whether Brezhnev also wanted agreement badly enough to help us get out of the Vietnam war is a point the President has left fuzzed up. So it's not clear whether the President is any nearer to success in ending the war he inherited and finds so hard to get rid of.

But he and Kissinger, too, deserve credit for having found a way to talk out, in sober and probing ways, our differences with the Communist powers and for having detected and encouraged a similar readiness on their side. This is an achievement well conceived and skillfully executed.

## Trial by button

Those who wore Free Angela buttons can now wear upturned-smile buttons instead. The lady has gone free. Her own sobs of joy after the verdict was announced seem a more genuine commentary by her on trial by jury than her tedious party-line remarks afterward that she hadn't changed her mind about the American judicial system, and "the only fair trial would have been no trial."

Which brings up something troubling about those Free Angela buttons. Like similar exhortations to free the Chicago 7 or the Catonsville 9 before trial, the messages have been blunt but not quite clear. Perhaps there isn't room enough on buttons for fine-print explanations. Did the button-wearer think Angela Davis should be freed *without* trial, implying that she was framed in the first place, or that she couldn't possibly get a fair trial? Or did he merely wish to express a sympathy for her side, a faith in her innocence and a hope she wouldn't be convicted?

It may be just an impression, but there seemed to be fewer Free Angela buttons in evidence as the trial wore on, as it became clear that the judge was scrupulous and that Angela Davis and her lawyers were perfectly capable of making their side heard. We hope also that the button-wearers discovered something else: Miss Davis's ready admission that she bought the pistols that were used in the killing, and her close emotional bond with one of the prisoners, showed that she was not merely being hounded for her political beliefs. What was at issue was the degree of her involvement in a prisoner escape that turned into a murder. Far from being a political trial, it was a proper criminal matter for a jury to decide, and in the end an all-white jury was not persuaded by circumstantial evidence.

Mexican-Americans in California are now stirring up civil rights demonstrations over Juan V. Corona, accused of murdering 25 men and burying them in orchards. For more than a year he has been held in jail, denied bail. A hand-lettered sign carried by one demonstrator may lack the imperious zip of a Free Angela button, but its sentiment can't be faulted: "Don't pre-judge Juan Corona."

ident's ideas are wild, Congress will save us from them. Fortunately, some of McGovern's other wordings come out better than this.

So Republicans now say they've collected 70 pounds of old McGovern statements from South Dakota and are going to show up his inconsistencies, switches and duplicities. Fair enough. For all the good it will do them, Democrats will be similarly rehashing the Nixon who was all for Taiwan but propelled Peking into the U.N.; the Nixon who resisted devaluation, deplored deficits and hated controls, only to resort to all of them. In the politicians' vocabulary, what is in-

LURIE

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON

July 10, 1972

PERSONAL

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: PETER G. PETERSON

Knowing of your desire for universal love and
acclaim, I thought you would be interested in the
attached progress report.

Don't get discouraged. There are many of us about
whom this question is never asked.

Attachment

PETER LISAGOR

# The Astounding Performance of Henry Kissinger

Henry Alfred Kissinger has ceased being a phenomenon. He has become a legend, and the word is not lightly used.

Few presidential assistants have undertaken as many diverse roles and executed them with such skill, wit and aplomb. He luxuriates in the sweet uses of publicity, and has learned to spar as nimbly with Arlene Dahl and Ali McGraw as with Leonid I. Brezhnev and Andrei N. Gromyko.

He is the compleat cosmopolite, urbane without swagger, self-centered without smugness. As a reputed ladies' man, he undoubtedly has given aid and comfort to every squat, owl-eyed, overweight and middle-aged bachelor in the land. He has perhaps described best the reason for his nocturnal reputation with the remark that "power is the ultimate aphrodisiac."

While seemingly beyond embarrassment, he is capable of momentary outrage. When a national magazine recently carried a report on a book, titled "Dear Henry," and written by a French woman journalist who claimed an unrequited love for him, he objected strenuously, not about

her allegations that he is at heart a woman-hater or suffers from a "thirst for publicity, and a nature that is often childish," or that he has bad table manners and is insecure and defensive.

What troubled Kissinger was the magazine's quote from the book relating that he had accumulated a year's worth of unlaUNDERED underwear in his apartment. What one should make of that is for other analysts, but Kissinger could surely argue that his restless traipsing around the globe gave him little time to send out his laundry.

He is now off to Peking again, after returning only a few days ago from Tokyo. He preceded President Nixon to Moscow, where he laid the groundwork for the summit achievements for which he has become the chief publicist.

Bureaucrats boggle at Kissinger's gargantuan energies and versatility, even as they admire his disciplined mind, his ability to rationalize twists and turns of policy. It is clear that he, not Secretary of State William P. Rogers, is the President's chief adviser on foreign policy. More than that, he has drawn into his hands

some of the advisory functions of the Secretary of Defense and the head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Through him flows the strategic advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well.

When the President invited the relevant congressional committees into the White House last week for an initial detailed briefing on the arms control agreements signed with the Russians, it was an event because Kissinger was to be the star witness.

For an hour, he beguiled the legislators with an analysis of the agreements, a chronology of their history, and the military-political-diplomatic arguments for supporting them. He answered their questions with the assurance of a man confident that he knew his case better than his inquisitors.

Inasmuch as the President reiterated that Kissinger would not be permitted to testify before the committee in the halls of Congress — an assertion of the protective cloak of "executive privilege" — a congressman asked if Kissinger would be available for consultations. Obligingly, Kissinger said he would discuss aspects of the treaty and

interim agreement any time, individually or in groups within limits imposed by the President.

A purr of satisfaction rolled through the room.

As if his geopolitical and romantic labors, coupled with his travels as a presidential emissary, were not enough to engage his time and energy, Kissinger has turned up at political meetings in support of senators up for re-election.

The former Harvard professor is, in short, putting on a remarkable show. Not everyone at the White House is delighted with the attention he gets, and if he should stumble or falter, there are those who will not shrink from trying to cut him off at the knees.

But as long as he serves the President with such virtuoso skill, he can pile his laundry up in a corner, gallivant about with Jill St. John, exchange banter with Soviet Defense Minister Marshall Grechko, and proclaim jokingly that he is trying to make the world safe for Persian belly-dancers, without too much worry of being toppled from the pinnacle he occupies with such relish and gusto.

McGovern
interview:
'No Kissinger
for me'

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.
National political correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Aboard McGovern campaign plane

Sen. George McGovern has told this newspaper that he "would like to take the State Department out of the White House and restore it to the important role it ought to play in shaping foreign policy."

On his recent swing through the South, Senator McGovern, in an interview aboard his plane, said:

"I want a real secretary of state and a real foreign-affairs team that can play its historic role.

"I want no [Henry A.] Kissinger in my administration," he said. "I would want a Kissinger in my administration to be secretary of state."

Under Mr. McGovern as president, the foreign-policy shaping process would look like this, according to the Senator:

* The secretary of state would be the most important — and most visible — man to fill the position since John Foster Dulles, under President Eisenhower.

* Mr. McGovern intends to select a secretary of state who would be able to relate to and deal readily with the Defense Department on substantive matters. In fact, Mr. McGovern would expect him to be able to provide Defense as well as State-related input into decision-making.

Senator McGovern feels that recent administrations have leaned on a secretary of defense who has been allowed to move in to and have a strong voice in the field of foreign policy.

As president, Mr. McGovern would reverse this, extending the role of State and trimming the role of Defense.

Senator McGovern is aware that the exceedingly high demands he will put on the secretary of state will require that the position be filled with a giant of a man.

The Senator had earlier told this reporter that Sen. Frank Church "would make a great secretary of state." Senator Church remains high on Mr. McGovern's selection list.

Please turn to Page 2

★McGovern:
'No Kissinger'

Continued from Page 1

But it now develops that Mr. McGovern might select someone else, someone who might not even be in government, someone he has not even thought about yet.

Asked what his own role would be in the field of charting a foreign-policy course, Senator McGovern said he "definitely" would not be — or emerge as — his own secretary of state.

"I would, of course, as president have to make the final judgment," he said. "But I would like to elevate the State Department in its development and execution of foreign policy."

Kissinger assessed

Senator McGovern feels that there is no question about Dr. Kissinger being a brilliant man. But he thinks Dr. Kissinger has his own predilections and biases, and that he can't possibly absorb everything in foreign policy.

Senator McGovern believes that this too heavy reliance on Dr. Kissinger has resulted in some major gaffes. The most classic of these blunders, he feels, is the case of the needless agitation of Japan stemming from the failure of the United States to consult with Japan in advance of the U.S. trip to Peking and on the launching of the new U.S. economic policy last year.

Senator McGovern's thinking on why the State Department started to fade, opening up the trend toward the shaping of foreign policy in the White House:

Because of the fright that Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin threw into the State Department in the early 1950's, State's people became too nervous to perform well. Many good people left the department. And other good people refuse to come aboard.

But now Senator McGovern is convinced that there is a new generation in the State Department with an abundance of outstanding people who want to perform their traditional function.

CSM 10 July 1972

["Deutsche Zeitung / Christ und Welt", "POLITIK", "30. Juni 1972", "Nr. 26", "Seite 3", "„Wir sind zur Koexistenz gezwungen“", "Das Gleichgewicht der Supermächte", "Von Henry A. Kissinger", "Mitte Juni hat Präsident\nNixons Berater Kissinger\nvor einem ausgewählten\nKreis von Senatoren und\nAbgeordneten einen Über-\nblick über die Bedeutung\nder kürzlich in Moskau\ngeschlossenen Abkommen\ngegeben. Der sonst in der\nÖffentlichkeit ziemlich\nschweigsame Architekt der\nUS- Außenpolitik umreist\nhier den Hintergrund der\nMoskauer Verhandlungen.", "Millarmacht der Vereinen Staat: Die Abrüstungspolitik der USA wird erdruckst auf die Röcksicht auf die Bündispartnerin in Europa.", "Die Abkommen, die Präsident Bressnethal und Generaloberstvorsitzender Bresnethal sind am 26. Mai kurz vor Mittnacht im Altmittelalter ein erstmaliges Abkommen- Staat mit dem „Kopf in die Knochen“ verhandelt. Im Verhältnis der Verhältnisse der Welt – getragen durch ihre Ideologie, der herabgesetzten und her waldreizenden Interessen – das Kermatkr der Bewaff- nung einer gewöhnlich vielfreien und unverkennbaren, man kann daher mit Recht fragen. Was sind die neuen Umstände, die sich der alten Supermächte bewegen haben, in ihrem Intere- senes einige so bedeutende Schritt zu?", "Ich muß hier auf die Grundgedanken zuführen, dass die Präsidentin, bei unserer Beseitigung der SALT-Verhandlungen, letzt- dem, bei ihrer einstlichen Wendung der SALT-Verhandlungen kam es uns nicht so sehr auf reine taktische Lösungen an, so wie es uns nicht gegeben hat, die der grünen Stunde zu verließen.", "Ewa seit der Präsidentin Jahre\nhat sich in der internationalen Situation\nein tiefgekröntes Strukturwandel, volk-\nismes. Der Verhältnis unter den großen\nStaatengruppen ist unverkennbar, und\nstanden wir, hatte es sich der verändert\nscheinen lassen, die als der grünen\nStunde zu verließen.", "Die Gleichgewicht war es für die Vereinen\nStaatengruppe, die sich als ein entgegenseitig\nunbestreitbarer strategiescher Über-\ntragung gegen die militärischen\nProgramme regle und immer ungedämpft\nverlangt wurde, da erhebliche Mittel,\ndie bisher für die Veröffentlichungen vorgesehen\nsollten. Ausserdem zugegeben kommen\nsollten.", "Zeitlich begrenzender Kompromiss\nbeide die Verhandlungen stand\naus einer fest: Ein geschützter Friede hing we-\nentlich zwischen den Vereinen Staaten und der\nSowjetunion. Im Verhältnis der Verhäl-\ntung, die diese Rivalität versuchte, haben,\nsind etwas real wie bedeutsam. Ideologische\noder politische Auswirkungen, die vor\nausreichend auch in der verhältnismäßige\nZwischenordnung der Staatengruppe\nhatten ihre wirtschaftliche Stärke und ihre\npolitische Wirkung verlitten.", "Die Nationen, die sich als ein\nVorstands- und Verwaltungs- und\nVorstandsschreiber begleiteten, haben\nihren Widerstand gegen die Verhäl-\ntung, die sie nicht mehr der heutigen Lage. Im\nAltmittelalter haben sich die Kritiken\nauf die Verhältnisse der Staatengruppe\nnachhaltig verändert. Im Verhältnis\nder bisherigen Geschlechtssituation verursacht\ndie Veränderung des möglichst geordnete\nund militärische Maßnahmen anzuwenden.\nNoch vor einer Generation wäre es unver-\nziehbar, wie wir es ebenso wie die So-\nkretion und die Verwaltungs- und Ver-\nordnungs- und Ver

## Nominees for 'Sensuality' Title Told

Twelve nominees for the title of America's Most Sensuous Man have been selected by members of the Frasier (the Sensuous Lion) Fan Clubs.

They are Bill Ballance, Kirk Douglas, Merv Griffin, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dean Martin, Ricardo Montalban, Paul Newman, Burt Reynolds, Cesar Romero, Doc Severinsen, Rudy Vallee and Flip Wilson.

The nominees have been chosen "for their sheer sensuality and animal magnetism, regardless of age," said Mrs. Marilyn Arcoli, president of the nationwide organization.

awaiting America's Most Sensuous Man will be the Golden Frasier, a trophy sculpted in the likeness of Lion Country Safari's old (the human equivalent of 85) lion who recently sired 33 cubs in a 16-month span.

The winner will be announced in late summer, after being determined by a popular vote with newspaper columnists and radio-TV personalities conducting the poll.

7/5/72

## Center for Now Offering

and inexplicably it is playing only one city: San Francisco. This group, little-known outside its Irish borders though highly regarded within them, has brought over a repertory of three plays: "Sive" by John B. Keane, "The Country Boy" by John Murphy and "The Year of the Hiker." On Saturday, company member James N. Healy will also give a one-man show of Irish poems, ballads and reminiscences simply entitled "Himself." All performances are at Riordan High School, 175 Phelan Ave., San Francisco and a call to (415) 826-4635 will get you information on performance dates etc. The company leaves our shores for their own July 13, which is entirely too soon on a range that is too limited. Come back and see us sometime.

eking over the L.A. basin start-
Evans will be auditioning

Western Europe, p. 2 Asia, p. 7 Communist Countries, p. 9

KISSINGER ON OUTLOOK FOR NEW PARIS TALKS

Summary

Media in many countries prominently reported Henry Kissinger's Saturday press conference in San Clemente, interpreting as optimistic his observations on Hanoi's mood on the eve of the Paris talks.

Comment in light volume did not call attention to the distinction he made--that he was "openminded" rather than "optimistic." These were typical assessments of prospects for productive talks:

- The London *Daily Telegraph* saw "indications that Dr. Kissinger is planning fresh secret negotiations with North Vietnam."

- French television spoke of "new hope for peace in Vietnam," citing his "optimistic statement."

- The *Straits Times* of Kuala Lumpur and Singapore said the outlook for the meetings was "brighter than at any time in their long and practically motionless history."

Expectation that the current efforts at rapprochement between North and South Korea will increase pressure on North and South Vietnam to make peace was expressed in Britain, West Germany and Austria.

Dusseldorf's *Rheinische Post* called the Korean developments "a success of the Nixon Doctrine," expecting them to influence North Vietnam "to make concessions when the... talks are resumed."

Hanoi media did not mention Mr. Kissinger's news conference. They have given little attention to the planned resumption of the talks.

Moscow media have consistently advocated negotiations as the only means of ending the war, but this theme has tended to be submerged in the current anti-U.S. polemics on the subject of Vietnam.

*

*

*

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London: "Kissinger Returning to Paris?"

Today's conservative London *Daily Telegraph* said in a story from Washington:

"New hopes of progress in the deadlocked Vietnam peace talks have been raised by President Nixon's adviser, Dr. Kissinger, amid indications that Dr. Kissinger is planning fresh secret negotiations with North Vietnam."

The paper added that the fact that Le Duc Tho is returning to Paris "strongly suggests that Dr. Kissinger plans to do likewise."

"U.S. Optimism Not Based on Any Signal"

The liberal Manchester *Guardian* reported today from San Clemente that as the U.S. prepared for resumption of the Paris talks, "American officials are allowing themselves the luxury of believing that Hanoi may be ready to negotiate an end to the war. But it appears that this optimism was not based on any direct signal or change in attitude from the North Vietnamese.

"For both diplomatic and military reasons the U.S. Government believes it is more likely that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong will be willing to talk seriously about achieving peace."

Earlier Report of U.S. "Cooling"

On Friday, before Mr. Kissinger's news conference, the paper reported from Washington, "The Nixon Administration is deliberately squashing hopes that the resumption of the Paris peace talks next week may lead to a breakthrough in the negotiations." It added:

"The Administration's caution may or may not reflect behind-the-scenes reality. But there has been a noticeable cooling in the optimistic atmosphere since Dr. Kissinger returned from his last visit to Peking."

Meanwhile, the paper stated, "the State Department...has sought to counter North Vietnamese claims that American planes have been bombing dikes. Senior officials acknowledged that some bombs may have accidently hit dikes in the north

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that were near strategic targets but insist there has been no systematic bombing of
the dike system."

The London *Sunday Times* gave brief front-page coverage to Mr. Kissinger's statement that the U.S. has "some reason to believe" that Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.

## Korean Reunification and Vietnam

The independent Sunday *Observer*, in an editorial about reunification of Korea, asserted that "there seems little doubt that, before long, this desire by the big powers to 'cool' the international climate will clear the way... for an agreement in Vietnam."

British television and radio networks over the weekend reported Mr. Kissinger's press conference and a Pravda article accusing the U.S. of deliberately bombing dams and dikes in North Vietnam.

## Paris: "New Hope for Peace?"

Editors and broadcasters prominently played Mr. Kissinger's remarks. First network television news on Saturday opened with the statement that there may be "new hope for peace in Vietnam," citing his "optimistic statement."

The main headline in today's rightist *Aurore* ran:

"VIETNAM--KISSINGER CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC... Communists Expected To Be More Conciliatory When Paris Talks Resume Thursday."

Diplomatic editor Roger Massip of moderately conservative *Figaro* reported from Peking, where he is accompanying Foreign Minister Schumann, that "the Chinese appear to accept the French concept of simultaneous political settlement and cessation of hostilities [in Vietnam] provided, of course, that North Vietnam will do likewise."

Moderate-left *France-Soir* asked in today's early afternoon edition, "Is the Vietnam conflict at last headed for settlement?" It judged: "While nothing so far

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warrants an affirmative answer, some facts and statements prompt one to seriously think so: in the first place, the remarks, cautious indeed but optimistic, made by Henry Kissinger... who asserted that North Vietnam will adopt 'a new attitude' and 'negotiate seriously'...

"Yet Kissinger's optimistic remarks contrast strikingly with Peking's attitude. Yesterday again, Chou En-lai restated with impressive strictness that the U.S. is the main obstacle to peace in Indochina... But is it not usual for a good diplomat to speak sternly before negotiating?"

## West German Emphasis

Many major papers in West Germany front-paged Mr. Kissinger's press conference under headlines quoting his statement that there is reason to assume North Vietnam will take a more positive attitude when the talks resume.

## "Saigon Skeptical About Hanoi's Readiness to Talk"

A Saigon correspondent reported Friday in influential *Die Zeit* magazine of Hamburg that skepticism prevailed among South Vietnamese leaders about North Vietnam's readiness for serious talks in Paris. But Saigon leaders, he wrote, realize that President Nixon, rather than Saigon, "holds the key to a settlement with Hanoi.

"Hanoi may offer the release of the American POWs, and the U.S. may offer discontinuation of the bombing. President Thieu has scored some points recently. For the first time, something like national identity is developing in South Vietnam as a result of the invasion from the north and ARVN's successes in warding it off. However, President Thieu's fate will be decided in Paris rather than in Saigon, and, in any event, the next South Vietnamese President will again be a general."

## "U.S. Experts Agree Korean Thaw Isolates Hanoi"

The Washington correspondent of pro-Christian Democratic Rheinische Post of Dusseldorf reported today that "American circles believe the sudden thaw in

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Korea may mark the beginning of dramatic change in the political scene in East Asia.

"The developments in Korea amount to the most obvious success of the Nixon Doctrine. Washington experts on Asian affairs agree that the thaw in Korea further isolates Hanoi ideologically and diplomatically. Hanoi 'is bound to feel left out in the cold,' a Washington official said.

"These developments indeed substantiate American hope that North Vietnam, finding itself under pressure from its own allies, will be ready to make concessions when the Vietnam peace talks are resumed.... The Korean developments are also an asset for President Nixon in his election campaign--he may reap in Korea the first fruits of his courageous policy of rapprochement with Peking and Moscow."

Today's independent-right Frankfurter Allgemeine also generalized on the Korean talks:

"The complex interplay of forces in the Moscow-Washington-Peking triangle prevents North and South Korea from relying on the permanency of the situation created by the cold war.... The Nixon Doctrine is bearing fruit. The present political efforts in Korea represent a step toward a new order of peace in the Pacific region."

"U.S., Chinese Suggestions to Hanoi and Saigon?"

In a commentary on the visits of French Foreign Minister Schumann to Peking and Defense Minister Debre to Washington, the paper concluded that "the revision of America's East Asian policy has produced a shock wave...."

"All this makes us wonder whether Chinese and American detente suggestions will soon carry more weight in Hanoi and Saigon."

Rome TV: "Visible Diplomatic Activity"

State-run Italian TV last night carried filmed excerpts of Mr. Kissinger's press conference and observed that "his optimistic words have drawn much attention."

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Its commentator observed that "a visible resumption of diplomatic activity is
taking place." He then alluded to Pope Paul's recent speech urging "all people
concerned to have the courage to make peace."

Rome radio this morning noted Chou En-lai's statement that China would give full
support to the "Vietnamese people" and attached special significance to it because
of its being made on the eve of resumption of the negotiations.

## Communist Paper: "U.S. Must Decide to Negotiate Seriously"

A continuing labor dispute prevented all but leftist newspapers from publishing yesterday and today. Communist L'Unita quoted a statement from the DRV Foreign Minister to the Mainichi of Tokyo to the effect that the "Americans must decide to negotiate seriously in Paris" and that the "Saigon troops are in difficulty at Quang Tri." The paper commented:

> "Now that the rainy season is at hand, the American plan to cause the most terrible disasters by attacking the dikes has become increasingly evident... Even the denials coming from U.S. military sources are getting more stereotyped and less frequent...."

Pro-Communist Paese Sera of Rome ran excerpts from the Pope's peace message in a story headed: "Paul VI Says: Stop the War."

## Vienna Radio: "Kissinger Win Over Giap"

The chief editor of state-run Austrian radio, Alfons Dalma, suggested yesterday that Hanoi should take the North-South Korean developments "as a signal." He judged that General Giap's offensive "is running out of breath" and that Hanoi's "gravest error is in mistaking the current political climate."

He asserted that "Kissinger's political offensive" had won over General Giap's military offensive and that "one of the ways out for Hanoi is sincere negotiations in Paris..."

## Swedish Paper on Palme Statement

Stockholm's conservative Svenska Dagbladet yesterday reviewed recent Vietnam developments in criticizing Swedish policy on the war. It said that Prime Minister

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Palme "tried to dodge the troublesome questions" of why Hanoi decided to risk U.S. air retaliation "by completely reversing the order of events.... Would there have been so little reaction in the U.S. itself if the order of events had been as Mr. Palme attempted to portray it--that is, that the air attacks against the north preceded Hanoi's large-scale offensive? Certainly not."

## Kuala Lumpur: "Brighter Prospects"

The conservative *Straits Times* of Kuala Lumpur and Singapore declared today that prospects for progress in the Paris talks are now "brighter than at any time in their long and practically motionless history.

"An obvious reason is the dramatic change in the war situation, the collapse of the North Vietnamese offensive which Hanoi believed would make further negotiations unnecessary--or would merely require formal arrangements to assist the Americans to get out without further trouble.

"Any persuasion which Peking and Moscow may have applied has not counseled settlement at any cost.

"But both China and Russia are anxious that their own relations with the U.S., and the development of the detente cautiously begun, shall not be endangered by the war in Vietnam. This is quite clear--a major factor contributing also to the flexibility the Americans have said they will show if the negotiations get off to a new start."

## Bangkok Predictions

A columnist in independent *Phim Thai* of Bangkok on Friday forecast that North Vietnam would negotiate seriously. He said this was because of U.S. military pressure and Hanoi's view that Mr. Nixon was likely to be re-elected.

A columnist is conservative *Siam Rath* asserted, however, that North Vietnam would not heed the urgings by Moscow and Peking to make peace because they had failed Hanoi in time of crisis.

Chinese-language *Chung Hua* credited resumption of the Paris talks to U.S. air strikes and mining operations, and "possibly also" to President Podgorny's visit to Hanoi. It said the North Vietnamese would try to take advantage of Democrats'

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calls for concessions to Hanoi as a device to blackmail the Administration.

## Indian Treatment

Indian papers widely cited Mr. Kissinger's remarks that Hanoi was edging toward serious talks. Motherland of New Delhi headlined, "Hanoi to Make New Approach: Kissinger."

The independent Statesman of Calcutta and New Delhi frontpaged a story attributed to Agence France-Presse asserting that "military sources confirmed the U.S. had tried artificial rain-making over Indochina despite a State Department denial."

The independent Indian Express of Bombay, New Delhi and Madras declared that the "U.S. and the USSR are similar in their cynical disregard for the price exacted from other nations in order to further their own interests." As "proof" it cited the "Russian welcome to Nixon at a time when the Americans were pounding North Vietnam into a pulp."

## A Pakistani View

Karachi's left-wing Dawn declared on Friday:

"The U.S. political approach needs to be reviewed in the light of the failure of the Vietnamization policy. The only way to bring about U.S. military disengagement is to dismiss the puppet regime and install a national government in South Vietnam."

## Lima: "U.S. Policy for Peace"

Conservative Correo of Lima praised U.S. initiatives at Paris and added:

"Nixon's policy definitely seeks peace. It is not one that would impose a Communist regime against the will of the Vietnamese people... The North Vietnamese invasion has worn itself out without lessening South Vietnamese resistance....

"Does all this mean that Mr. Nixon has achieved his main objective, which was to retire from Vietnam without abandoning it to Communism? It is too early to say yes or no,"

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## Hanoi: Little Attention to Talks

Hanoi media have not mentioned Mr. Kissinger's press conference, and, in general, they have given little attention to the resumption of the Paris talks. The French news agency Agence France-Presse reported from Rome yesterday:

> "Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh said Saturday that the U.S. return to the conference table could be considered a victory in the political struggle of peace forces.

> "In an interview given to the Sunday issue of *Unita*, organ of the Italian Communist Party, the PRG Foreign Minister added that this gesture does not demonstrate goodwill of the U.S. Mrs. Binh said that the U.S. has intensified the land war and is conducting it with fury. The U.S. wants to fool the public.

> "Mrs. Binh continued: The PRG will return to the Paris peace talks on July 13, but it will continue to demand the end of U.S. aggression in the North as well as the South, the renunciation of the Vietnamization policy and the adoption of a more serious and realistic policy in the negotiations."

## Xuan Thuy: "Evades Questions"

From Paris, AFP reported today that chief North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy, who had just returned from consultation, "evaded all questions concerning new instructions he might have received in Hanoi."

## Moscow Treatment

Moscow media have consistently advocated negotiations--"a political solution"-- as the only means of ending the Vietnam war, but this theme tended to be submerged in the current anti-U.S. polemics on the subject of Vietnam. Yesterday's weekly "Moscow Roundtable" feature on Moscow radio, for example, failed to mention the Paris talks, although participants sharply condemned U.S. bombing and shelling of North Vietnam as "barbaric acts."

No. 84

9

7/10/72

JOYCE HABER

Karate Instructor Acquires Prize Pupil

I'll call him Mr. S-H—but that doesn't stand for "shh," because on stage or screen he's anything but quiet. Mr. S-H (now could that stand for "Swivel Hips?") is a Super Star who has always surrounded himself, perhaps of necessity, with bodyguards and hound dogs, as much to keep his fans as his foes away. In Hollywood's outlying, out-priced Holmby Hills, Mr. S-H not too long ago bought a mansion for roughly $500,000. It is virtually the only house on its street, and stands like a fortress above a driveway that is protected by electric gates.

Now given his thing for seclusion and self-defense, it isn't surprising that Mr. S-H persuaded his wife to take up karate. She took it up with a vengeance with Mr. E-H (for "empty hands," which derives from the term "karate," ) who's a black belt champion in the San Fernando Valley. Mrs. S-H succeeded so well that she became a green belt.

But, along the way, Mrs. S-H absorbed more than her lessons. She fell very hard—and not from a chop, for her instructor. So hard, in fact, that Mrs. S-H has moved out of her Superstar husband's stronghold and into the very strong hold of her tutor, Mr. E-H. Lock, stock and baggage.

Son of Bistro Due on Canon

The thriving, buzzing Bistro restaurant of Beverly Hills will soon have an offshoot, right down the same street, on Canon Drive. It will be called the Bistro restaurant and gardens, with the outdoor portion available to Beautiful People who prefer no ties and no Gustave Tassells (depending on sex) to formal attire . . .

Speaking of the Bistro (or "The Original Bistro" as it will soon inevitably be called), it has been the Place for Action of late. Like on Tuesday night, when it was jammed—and the jammers consisted of stars at every other table. Downstairs, among others: John Gavin, who's the President of the Screen Actors' Guild; George Raft, Sammy Davis, Fred Astaire, the Charles (Carol Channing) Lowes with the Prentis Hales (of the Broadway-Hale clan and San Francisco).

Upstairs were rather sneakier doings. Henry Kissinger (whose date was Sally Kellerman, no less, in a bare-midriff Halston) tossed a party for Russia's visiting Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. The doors to the upstairs rooms were carefully closed—by maitre'd Kurt, his aide de camp Jimmy, or the Secret Service, no doubt.

Inside were the expectable Republican Celebrity Establishment guests—the John Waynes, Bob Hopes, Universal's Taft Schreibers, Kissinger's attractive aide, Gen. Haig, the Fred MacMurrays (June Haver). Plus Cary Grant (stag), the Frederick Brissons (Roz Russell) and Norton Simons (Jennifer Jones). And what I would call, of late and most frequently, Kissinger's Celebrity Establishment House Democrats: the attorney Paul Ziffrens and NBC's Herb Schlossers. The line of the evening: Dobrynin, speaking of secret world traveler Kissinger: "He's learning to eat caviar with chopsticks" . . .

Earlier, Kissinger had spent the afternoon at Universal with the Dobrynins and his children, Elizabeth and David. The Soviet ambassador had never been on a Hollywood movie set until he toured that studio's "Showdown," where he met stars Dean Martin and Rock Hudson as well as director George Seaton.

Rock was wearing a four-day growth of beard and dirty clothes for a shoot-out scene when he was introduced to the dignitaries. Aware that he was virtually indistinguishable as the usually clean-cut, Mr. Hudson, Rock told the ambassador, "I'm sure you don't know me." Do-

brynin replied, very promptly: "Yes, yes, you're very well known" . . .

All-In-The-Family Dept.: Judy Balaban Quine will act as producer for "Trick or Treat" and her star will be her ex-husband, Tony Franciosa. Judy's present husband, Don Quine, will direct her ex in the "scary comedy" about the adventures of a trio of kids and a lot of strange monsters on Halloween. This is the first of four projects for the Quines, and all—surprise!—will be for all-in-the-family entertainment . . .

Politics makes for strange casting substitutions, and this week's Miami convention caused Jack Nicholson to bow out of Roman Polanski's black comedy "What" now shooting in Amalfi. Marcello Mastroianni bowed in to join Hugh Griffith and a sweet young thing called Sydney Rome (yes, Sydney's a girl) in the Carlo Ponti Production.

Sydney lost the title role in "Candy" to Ewa Aulin but was reportedly kept on salary during the filming (don't ask me why). Now she'll make her major movie debut in every frame of "What": and two of the frames consist of nude scenes. Her beau is cinematographer Emilio Lari (he just completed "The Valachi Pavers") and her teacher, so to speak, is Sai Baba, an Indian "miracle man" who's known as a prophet. Warners is preparing a documentary on Sai Baba under the guidance of Madame Indra Devi, who started such as Zsa Zsa and Gloria Swanson on yoga . . .

People

Soviet Ambassador
Goes Hollywood

From Wire Reports

Two movie-struck tourists wandered through Hollywood's Universal studios this week and, for a change, some of the stars gawked back. Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger conducted the tour for Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and his wife, Irena, tossing in a Wiener schnitzel luncheon with director Alfred Hitchcock at the studio commissary. At one movie set, Mrs. Dobrynin, in keeping with the occasion, snapped away with her Polaroid while her husband held a sponge-rubber rock menacingly over Kissinger's head. Dobrynin moved on to more serious matters yesterday, visiting President Nixon at the Western White House for talks on the eve of resumption of the Paris peace negotiations.

Henry Kissinger
... 'so masculine'

Kissinger
Rated Tops
By Bunnies

FORTY-EIGHT Playboy bunnies in Baltimore, Md., have chosen presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger as "the man I'd most like to go out on a date with."

Kissinger, whose White House assignments have led at least one belly dancer to flop into his lap, will not be on hand today for the formal award. A 15-foot-high poster will be his stand-in.

Running second in the ballooning was rock singer Eric Clapton, and third was actor Burt Reynolds, the subject of a recent nude centerfold picture in Cosmopolitan magazine.

"His eyes are so penetrating they make him look like he knows what's on your mind before you even say it," said bunny Lynn Cole about her vote for Kissinger.

"He looks so masculine and mature," added bunny Celine Foutz.

"You can look at his picture, and you just know he's a genius," commented bunny Dana Lasecki.

People

Kissinger Wins
In Pole of Bunnies

Afl. CmshFA
July 7, 1972

BALTIMORE—Forty-eight Playboy bunnies have chosen presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger as “the man I’d most like to go out on a date with.” Kissinger, whose White House assignments have led at least one belly dancer to flop into his lap, will not be on hand Friday for the formal award. A 15-foot-high poster will be his stand-in. Running second in the balloting was rock singer Eric Clapton and third was actor Burt Reynolds. “His eyes are so penetrating they make him look like he knows what’s on your mind before you even say it,” said Bunny Lynn Cole on her vote for Kissinger.

Dallas Morning News

May 7, 1972

***

People:

Bunnies Pick
Kissinger

(Compiled From Wire Reports)

FORTY-EIGHT PLAYBOY bunnies have chosen presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger as "the man I'd most like to go out on a date with." Kissinger, whose White House assignments have led at least one belly dancer to flop into his lap, will not be on hand for the formal award in Baltimore. A 15-foot-high poster will be his stand-in. Running second in the balloting was rock singer Eric Clapton and third was actor Burt Reynolds, the subject of a recent centerfold picture in Cosmopolitan magazine.

all black people

'Man I'd like to date'

Chi. Sun-Times
July 8, 1972

# Bunnies elect Kissinger

BALTIMORE (UPI) — An aura of mystery is the reason women are attracted to presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, according to bunnies at the Baltimore Playboy Club.

Kissinger, President Nixon's chief foreign policy adviser was voted "the man I'd most like to go out with on a date" by a majority of the 48 bunnies here.

"He was the image of being a protector ... mysterious and masculine," said Kitty Prumo, club bunny of the year.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Bunny Ginny Krupinski, in a quick pause between serving drinks, said "I think he's very intelligent, not like a sex-symbol image, but just a great personality. I'd like to have a date with him to see what he's really like."

"I'd like to find out what he's got that everybody wants," said bunny Nanci Peschek.

Kissinger outpolled runners-up Eric Clapton and Burt Reynolds in the girls' voting.

"He's interesting, responsible, kinda strong, kinda mysterious; that's the kind of man I like," smiled Candi Conway.

"He's so attractive he should be the next centerfold in Cosmopolitan magazine," said bunny Charlie Wadsworth. "I think they owe it to the women of the world. I have a space reserved for it on my bedroom wall."

Kissinger, who was represented at the presentation of his award Friday by a large poster, will receive a letter informing him of the honor plus an invitation to meet the bunnies.

SUSPECTS IN 'JOY' KILLING

charged with the "joy"
Joyce Ann Huff of
Los Angeles, near Los Angeles,
Oscar Hernandez,
Paul, 21; Michael Ram-
was ordered held with-
arrangement in Bell

flower, a Los Angeles suburb. A hearing has been set for July 19. The little girl was killed while playing in her yard when a car with several occupants slowed down and one of the occupants aimed a shotgun at her and fired. (AP)

## Conservative GOP Group Vexed by Kissinger's Talk

WASHINGTON — Ultra-conservative Republicans here are pretty upset because President Nixon is getting chummy with Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, R-Md., whom they regard as the free state's "Charlie Goodell," the New York liberal GOP senator who was defeated with the help of Nixon's opposition two years ago.

Like Goodell, McC. Mathias has persistently "gone the wrong way," as far as the right-wing Republicans are concerned, voting rather consistently against the President on such major matters as the Haynsworth and Carswell Supreme Court nominations, the safeguard anti-ballistic missile system, and moves to force quicker withdrawal from Vietnam.

Maryland conservative Republicans have been lining up their artillery to defeat Mathias for re-election in two years and had been counting on Nixon's support. But, to their horror, the President last week sent his famed aide, Henry Kissinger, to puff Mathias before 900 of his admirers at Cockeysville, a Baltimore suburb. Saying he was speaking for the President, Kissinger described Mathias as "a man of independent judgement" whose support "we know we have to earn," and then expressed the hope that the senator "will be with us for a long time to come."

That "valentine" in July caused "Human Events," a right-wing Washington publication that ardently supports Rep. John M. Ashbrook, R-Johnstown, in his abortive race against the President, to lament: "Few things surprise conservatives about this administration anymore. But the blessing bestowed upon Mathias ... is still somewhat startling when one reviews Mathias's voting record over the years.

By ROBERT RUTH
Of The Dispatch Staff

KEY BISCAYNE, Fla.—If Ohio supporters of Sen. HBert H. Humphrey still wonder how Sen. George McGovern has come to within a few votes of the Democratic presidential nomination, a young couple from Oregon could give them the answer.

The couple, William Cross, 24, and his wife Cory, 22, both of Portland, made it all crystal clear Saturday evening in the lobby of the Sonesta Hotel here.

THE HOTEL, while serving as official headquarters of the Ohio Democratic Party, also houses most of Humphrey's Ohio delegates.

But ironically, by Saturday evening it was McGovern's campaign literature, not Humphrey's, that was being distributed in the lobby of the plush hotel.

The events leading up to this somewhat embarrassing incident began Saturday morning.

JOHN E. Jones, arrangements chairman for the state Democratic party, set up a makeshift information center in the Sonesta's lobby to distribute purely nonpartisan information about future happenings at the convention — where and when meetings are to be held, transportation and lodging data, and the like.

The information center consisted of a table, blackboard and two chairs.

About 1 p.m., the Crosses came into the hotel and asked if they could set up their own information booth for the benefit of the press corps.

JONES SAID he was making arrangements for such facilities to be used by both McGovern and Humphrey supporters.

But, Jones added, the press section would not be ready to open until sometime Sunday afternoon.

The Crosses asked if they could wait in the lobby.

JONES ANSWERED, "You can do anything you want to."

By 5:30 p.m., Jones was ready to close up shop for the day. As he was clearing

NEW STYLE PRISON — A correctional officer at the Coldley Prison, in Surrey, England, about eight inmates. Coldley ment, a training prison providing industry, education and rehabilitation.

OVERCROWDING V

## British But Rich

EDITOR'S NOTE — Prisoner rebellions and reform movements have focused much attention of late on the prison system in the United States. Among those watching with concern were British officials, who are also faced with the massive overcrowding of inmates. Here's a look at the British prison setup.

By LOUISE COOK
By The Associated Press

LONDON — Martin Wright leaned back in his chair, took a sip of tea and mused: The potential is there, but so far, there haven't been the provocations.

Wright is director of the Howard League for Penal Reform and he referred to the potential for trouble in

tain most training in an aged man to have pervaded clock levels to earn accord works will all

A planned possible signed side with a 40-year-old to the most of paid in their cells, be from within

Richmond News Leader, Sat. July 15, 1972 A-29

# Soviet Envoy Tours Studio With Kissinger

By JERRY BUCK

Associated Press Writer

HOLLYWOOD (AP) —

Snapping pictures like two movie-struck tourists, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and his wife Irena toured a studio with Presidential adviser

Henry Kissinger.

The Dobrynins, Kissinger and Kissinger's children, Elizabeth, 13, and David, 10, spent nearly three hours Tuesday visiting sets, talking to stars and seeing outdoor film locations.

David, carrying a White House memo pad, was an avid autograph collector, getting signatures from Rock Hudson, Dean Martin, Raymond Burr, Dennis Weaver, Jackie Cooper and many others.

Between 8,000 and 10,000 persons tour the huge Universal

studio on an average summer day, craning their necks to catch a sight of a star on the lot.

But Kissinger and his party caused a number of stars' necks to crane as they entered the Universal commissary to have lunch with studio officials and film director Alfred Hitchcock and his wife.

After a luncheon that included Weiner schnitzel and wine, the VIP tourists set out in a special trolley for the set of the motion picture "Showdown."

There they watched Rock Hudson and Dean Martin film a scene under the direction of George Seaton. As the two actors were introduced, Hudson shook hands with his left hand, apologizing that his right hand had been broken in an automobile accident.

"Oh, we know all about that," said Mrs. Dobrynin, an attractive blonde who carried a Polaroid camera. Her husband had a 35-mm camera.

Kissinger said, "The ambassador is here on pleasure, but he will go to San Clemente for a brief talk with the President. He's never seen a movie studio before."

On the set of the television series "Ironside," David presented the White House memo pad to Raymond Burr for an autograph. After Burr signed it, David asked, "Now may I have one for my best friend?" Burr laughed and signed again.

David later got behind the camera and cranked it round.

Asked if he was a movie buff, Dobrynin said he was. Did he watch television?

"Yes, of course," he said. "I've been here long enough to know the series."

Next the tour went to the huge back lot of city streets, jungle villages, Spanish towns and other outdoor locations. At a jungle set, where a stuffed gorilla flies by on a cable for the benefit of the tourists, Dobrynin took his wife's picture by the gorilla. Then she took his.

On a lakeside fishing village

set, they watched a vampire scene for "Night Gallery." The director, Leonard Nimoy, said, "My parents came from near Kiev."

Mrs. Dobrynin asked "Do you speak Russian?"

Nimoy laughed and said, "No. They used it as a secret language so we couldn't understand."

The trolleys stopped by a pile of artificial rock and Dobrynin held a sponge rubber boulder over Kissinger's head while his wife snapped a picture. Kissinger quipped, "Throw it at me."

He's wanted to do that for years."

MR. LE ROY

NOW ASSOCIATED WITH OUR STAFF. HAVING JUST RETURNED TO RICHMOND FROM ONE OF WASHINGTON'S MOST PRESTIGIOUS SAINTS INVITES HIS MANY CUSTOMERS & FRIENDS WITH WHOM HE WAS ASSOCIATED WHILE OPERATING TWO SALONS IN THE DOME AND DUCODD AREAS.

FEATURES COLUMNS

Joseph Alsop

WASHINGTON POST 21 JULY 1972

Nixon's 50-50 Viet Odds

THE OFFICIAL White House view continues to be that the Hanoi leaders will surely prolong the Vietnamese war until after election day. It is a logical view, with the candidate of one of the two great American parties publicly committed to abject surrender, plus traveling to Hanoi "to beg" for the release of the American prisoners.

The fact remains, however, that ill-concealed encouragement has been the first reaction to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's first talks in Paris. This considerably reinforces the view of other exceedingly astute government analysts outside the White House that President Nixon has at least a 50-50 chance of ending the Vietnam fighting on honorable terms before the end of the autumn.

Cold-blooded analysis supports the view of these other analysts, who can weigh the facts without the White House's inevitable political bias. To begin with no one can tell at this distance, exactly how the McGovern-Nixon contest is affecting the leaders in Hanoi.

They know in Hanoi, of course, that George McGovern is determined to give them on a moralistic golden platter the victory

that has been proved utterly beyond their reach in any other way. But there are some other things they know, too, at least if they pay the smallest attention to the Soviet and Chinese Communist allies.

IT CAN BE stated on unquestioned authority that both the Soviet and Chinese governments have warned the Hanoi government that President Nixon's re-election is close to a certainty. On the same authority it can be stated that the Soviets and Chinese have also warned that President Nixon, once re-elected, will be immeasurable harder and harsher to deal with.

"Make the best bargain you can, while the bargaining is good," is the essence of what the Hanoi leaders have been told.

This is not the kind of advice that any sane government could lightly ignore, yet if you read the public crowing in Hanoi over Sen. McGovern's nomination, you cannot be sure. In the same fashion, you cannot be sure of Hanoi's response to what has been happening in the war itself. But once again, no sane government could lightly ignore the fate of Hanoi's great 1972 offensive.

At any rate, the North Vietnamese field headquarters are not ignoring it. The

COSVN documents now being picked up in many parts of South Vietnam are entirely novel in character. The disaster of Tet in 1968, for instance, was portrayed in similar documents in terms of "surging victories," combined with grave "shortcomings" that needed to be corrected.

This time, instead, the enemy high command is admitting to its cadres that the great offensive has fallen far short of expectations. The only exception made is for northern Binhdinh province—which is like the Democrats saying, next November, “Well, we still won in Rhode Island.”

THESE GRIM admissions are further combined with admonitions to the Communist cadres to dig in as deeply as they can. And it is specifically stated that this is needful in order to be ready for an eventual ceasefire.

This should astonish no one, either. The truth is that every week that passes makes this year's great offensive into a greater catastrophe.

The units that were first engaged—the great majority of divisions in Hanoi's regular army—are now known to have lost from 60 to 90 per cent of their effectiveness, without exception! Hanoi's

total loss in dead, without counting the tragic wounded, has pretty certainly passed 60,000 men already—with nothing whatever to show anywhere in South Vietnam except for two little districts in Binh-dinh, above-noted.

Because of the dreadful losses, the offensive has ground to a halt everywhere except in the extreme northern front. Even here, it has been transformed into a defensive—a desperate, hideously costly effort to hang on to a toehold in Quangtri. Laos has been stripped, and so have the recruits' training camps in North Vietnam, to provide about a division and half's worth of reserves. But only these are left.

War being war, this does not mean that very bad luck in the Hue-Quangtri fighting is now beyond the realm of possibility. Bad luck is always possible in any battle. But with North Vietnam's ports closed and all transport in the North hopelessly crippled all this unquestionably means that the Hanoi leaders may find it inordinately difficult to ignore the advice of the Soviets and Chinese.

Such, then, is the nature of President Nixon's 50-50 chance. As this reporter signs off until the Republican convention, it may be in order to add a prayer that the chance works.

© 1972, Los Angeles Times

DETROIT NEWS 6 JULY 1972 (21)

Close air support:
a hazard in Vietnam

By EDWIN G. PIPP
News Aerospace Writer

BIEN HOA, South Vietnam — The two A-37 jet fighter-bombers are hardly off the runway when the area controller is asking them what bomb loads they are carrying.

As on most missions supporting ground troops, Lt. John Marshall, of Washington D.C., leader of the two-ship flight, called "Rap 15," doesn't know what his target will be.

It can be in a high-threat area like An Loc, where the enemy has plenty of guns to shoot down the small jets, or perhaps it will be some place in central Vietnam where the fighting isn't so fierce.

The ground controller will decide that after learning what the jets are carrying and the needs of Forward Air Controller (FAC) pilots working with the ground troops.

Today "Rap 15" flight has what the pilots call a "shake and bake load" — 500-pound bombs to shake the enemy and napalm and anti-personal bombs to bake them. This is a normal load and each jet has a forward firing "mini gun."

Sitting next to Marshall in the small cockpit of the plane, which is a beefed-up version of a trainer, you hope it will be a low-threat area. You've seen pictures and looked at the battle damage to RAP planes that have made it home after being hit.

But the A-37 Dragon Fly, dubbed the "Super Tweet," because of its peculiar engine noise is

the best close-support jet in the air force.

It is small and relatively slow so that it can hit targets only a few yards from the "good guys."

The ground controller tells Marshall to fly west from Bien Hoa, 15 miles north of Saigon, and contact Sundown 43, the airborne FAC, who immediately asks for the details of the bomb load.

He tells Marshall the target is west of Tay Ninh, about five miles from the Cambodian border.

"There's a pol (petroleum) storage area there we've wanted to hit all day," says controller from his tiny O-2 plane. "There is negative AA (anti-aircraft), but you'll get small arms fire. Friendlies are no factor," meaning no friendly forces are in the area.

"Immediate bailout area is Tay Ninh, 10 miles east." You feel better after hearing there is no anti-aircraft weapons in the area, but then Marshall says not to count on it.

"If they've spotted a pol dump there, the bad guys can have any kind of weapons," he said, as the A-37s approach the target area. "We can't afford to ever get complacent."

It has only been 15 minutes since the two ships lifted off the runway, and we are ready to descend through clouds toward a radio signal Sundown 43 is sending to help us locate him.

"Will you put us to work right away," Marshall asks the FAC. He doesn't want to

descend to lower altitudes, where the jets will burn more fuel, until needed.

"Affirmative," says Sundown 43, and RAP 15 flight starts down from 15,000 feet to 8,000.

"When you break out you'll see a mountain and a river west of it. Follow the river north," Sundown orders the fighters. "Set your bombs on delay fuze."

Bomb fuzing is set from the cockpit for the either instantaneous explosion, or a brief delay after they hit the ground. Sundown wants them to delay.

The two jets come out of the clouds, and within seconds, Marshall spots the small observation plane and tells him he is in sight.

The FAC pilot fires a smoke rocket to mark the target, but it doesn't satisfy him.

"I'll see if I can get a better smoke," he says, and fires another rocket. "Hit a little north of the smoke."

The two white clouds of smoke creep like fog through thick trees next to a small road. This is a green countryside area with little evidence of the bombings that have hit so much of South Vietnam, but it is known as an enemy storage area.

Suddenly over the radio comes a new voice warning all planes to stay away from a designated area because of "heavy artillery."

This is a routine warning that comes before B-52's drop their bombs from high altitude. This attack is some distance away and the RAP 15 flight doesn't worry.

Marshall's A-37 now is at 6,000 feet, and he starts a steep dive toward the target. This is when the jet is most vulnerable to enemy fire because it is going in straight and low.

"Looks like the smoke is right over the

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

HAS NORTH VIET OFFENSIVE FOLDED... CONTINUED

They also have returned to war zones "C" and "D" northwest and northeast of Saigon, areas that until a few months ago were regularly patrolled by U.S. troops and where Communist activity had dropped off sharply.

In some areas where they never really were driven out, particularly northern Binh Dinh and southern Guang Ngai, the Communists have strenthened their hold on the local population, driving off those regional militiamen who refused to join them.

"Once we get regular army troops back to their old areas of operation," one ranking American said, "It will be only a matter of time before we push them out and bring the areas back under government control."

provided.

The air power was necessary, sources here explain privately, because the American Vietnamization program was designed to counter an insurgency guerrilla war — not the full-scale conventional attack the North Vietnamese launched with a wide range of sophisticated weapons.

SINCE THE BEGINNING of the offensive, the South Vietnamese have modified their use of fixed fire bases, effective in combating guerrilla armies but easy targets for the long-range artillery the Communists have used to spearhead their assaults.

The South Vietnamese also have been given a number of new weapons, including wire-guided missiles and antitank

NEW YORK NEWS

21 JULY 1972

Watch Henry K for Peace Key

Washington, July 20 (NEWS Bureau)—Watch Henry Kissinger.

If he goes back to Paris within the next week, it will be a tipoff of a possible breakthrough in the Vietnam peace negotiations.

## ANALYSIS

If much more time than a week goes by without another secret meeting between President Nixon's national security adviser and North Vietnamese politburo member Le Duc Tho, it probably will mean that the peace talks will remain deadlocked until after the November election.

The White House would say absolutely nothing today about the 6½-hour meeting Kissinger had in Paris yesterday with Tho and the nominal head of the North Vietnamese delegation, Xuan Thuy.

All the public indications were that if there was any narrowing of the gap between the two sides, it was only by inches—that there was still a very wide gulf between Hanoi's demands and those of the United States.

There was no indication of progress at today's semipublic session of the peace talks. U.S. Ambassador William J. Porter said, "There was a slight improvement in the tone of the exchanges but nothing discernible of substance."

The only visible agreement at the secret meeting between Kissinger and Tho was to hold further secret meetings—and to announce them when they are held, a departure from past practice.

White House officials explained why this particular change was decided on. It was because Kissinger's absence from the White House inevitably created speculation about his whereabouts, making it next to impossible to keep his visits to Paris secret. Hanoi agreed to a White House suggestion that future meetings be announced, but that the substance of the talks be kept secret.

Other knowledgeable officials outside the White House did not regard this change as significant in indicating either progress or lack of progress in the secret talks.

These officials doubted that the Communists, during the secret meeting, had altered their position much from what they were saying publicly.

held assumptions about defense economics with facts which fail to support them — except, in Lenin's cutting phrase, as a rope supports a hanged man.

Col. Heinl

The premises which underlie Senator McGovern's proposals for a vertiginous $30 billion annual defense cut may be briefly summarized in the following terms:

"Massive" and "recklessly wasteful" annual defense expenditures are running away with the federal budget, derailing the economy, spiralling out of control and stealing a "peace dividend" which otherwise would finance social welfare programs more important to the United States than the demands of national security.

### THE FOREGOING CONVICTIONS,
asserted as articles of faith by McGovern and his disciples, are shared by much of the general public. The relevant facts, however, appear sharply at odds and quite otherwise:

* The Defense Department slice — whether of federal budget, gross national product, public employment, national labor force or net public spending — is at its lowest point in two decades and in some instances the lowest since Pearl Harbor in 1941.

* Defense Department purchases from industry have been reduced 40 percent since the 1968 Vietnam war peak — a procurement slash of $17.4 billion which, incidentally, has already killed 2.8 million defense jobs in industry. (The latter statistic, if extrapolated, incidentally suggests that, aside from other effects, McGovern's proposed $30 billion defense cut almost certainly would trigger a national depression.)

* Manpower, military or civilian, now absorbed in the

more than double 1972's entire defense budget.

* In 1952 (as McGovernites are still claiming in 1972), defense spending did indeed dominate the U.S. economy. The Pentagon that year spent almost twice as much on defense as on all other government agencies, and less than 20 percent of the country's

* Do they have 1950's or 1960's standards?

* They have grown at a major rate, especially in the area of aeronautics, only

* What

CIA target number streaks do

"Affirmative" it sees ground. 2,500 feet

There has been a leftwing

THEN the stick You're poked in the denly the weaving f

Then it's staring down a quickly fol

The same target. It

TO ANSWER the McGovern defense assumptions — most of which under examination turn out to be misleading or long outdated — there hardly can be a better expert witness than Robert C. Moot, the apolitical veteran civil servant

It was 4 a.m. in the Azores. Henry Kissinger was in bed, trying to grab a good night's sleep. He had good reason for needing it. He had a breakfast meeting scheduled with French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou at which would be negotiated the devaluation of the American dollar. And Pompidou was a financial whiz, the former chairman of the Rothschild banks in France. What was at stake was—literally—billions of dollars.

Suddenly someone was waking Henry. He groaned in weariness and disbelief. Could it already be time for the meeting? How could he face Pompidou with his mind half drugged by sleep? But no, it was not time to get up. Hovering above Henry's bed was Richard M. Nixon. The President had been burning midnight oil listening to a football game on Armed Forces radio, had become excited by the action, had felt certain Henry would want to know the outcome.

Later Richard Nixon called the agreement worked out with Prime Minister Pompidou "the most important economic decision in the history of the world." Waking Henry Kissinger to relay a football score became just another amusing anecdote.

The trouble is, what the American public knows about Henry consists almost entirely of amusing anecdotes. He is the second most powerful political figure in America, responsible daily for life and death decisions, yet is virtually unknown. There is, in fact, nothing at all amusing about his job, nor about the policies he has been called on to formulate. Consider just a few of the highlights:

☐ President Nixon's historic trip to China was negotiated step by step by Henry. In addition to winning the admiration of tough old Chou En-lai and proving that he could outwit the press and visit Peking without their knowledge, he set up a summit conference that could affect world history for decades.

☐ The Vietnam War was the burning issue of the 1960s, and Henry was the man Richard Nixon chose to negotiate its end. Again operating with a secrecy that would make James Bond envious, Henry flew to France and met 12 times in 30 months with top North Vietnamese officials. More recently, during the furious Communist spring offensive, while the President vacationed in Key Biscayne, Henry was left in charge of the war.

☐ Richard Nixon has conducted what many people believe to be a successful foreign policy, but he did make one blunder, and he made it on Henry's advice; backing Yahya Khan's murderous tactics against the East Bengalis. The subsequent Anderson Papers, detailing Henry's role in the India-Pakistan

conflict, revealed that our government and its Number Two man are sometimes less than truthful. Even more sinister was the news that Henry had talked King Hussein of Jordan into loaning West Pakistan U.S.-built Phantom jets.

☐ Richard Nixon's all-important May summit meeting with the Russians was endangered by the North Vietnamese offensive and Henry, as always, was called on to save the day. Once again, however, the government was caught in an embarrassing lie: Press Secretary Ron Ziegler had said that Henry was at Camp David with the President when in reality he was in Moscow.

International fiscal policy, Rapprochement with China. The Vietnam War. The India-Pakistan War. Saving the summit meeting between the rulers of the world's greatest powers. These issues and more are the heady problems Henry wrestles with. More needs to be known about the man who, along with Herman Kahn, was the model for Terry Southern's Doctor Strangelove!

The Administration presents Henry as a brilliant but lonely academic who burst on the scene like a shooting star in 1969. In fact Henry's voice has been heard and heeded at the highest levels of government for almost 20 years, though it is true that in the beginning he seemed an unlikely candidate for success. He was born of Jewish parents in Furth, Germany, in 1923, moved to the U.S. in 1938 because his family feared Nazi persecution, was naturalized in 1943, and served in the U.S. Army during World War II. He was directed to Harvard by wealthy Fritz Kraemer, who said: "Henry, gentlemen do not go to the College of the City of New York."

Henry graduated from Harvard in 1950 with a B.A. in political science, Summa Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa. He received his M.A. in 1952, his Ph.D. in 1954. His doctoral thesis, *A World Restored*, was about Prince Metternich. Foreign Minister of Austria between 1809 and 1848. Metternich was an arch-conservative, and Henry admires him for it. In fact, Henry's primary criticism of Metternich was that he was unsuccessful in the principal task he set for himself: undoing the liberties won by the French Revolution. Metternich's job was to keep the powers-that-be in power. So too does Henry Kissinger view his historical mission.

It was in graduate school that Henry Kissinger earned his first important post, and it would be followed by many others. So, despite Administration claims, these are not the credentials of a Johnny-come-lately: associate director of Harvard's Center for International Affairs, 1951-69; director of the Special Studies Project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 1954-56; consultant to the Defense Department, 1956-60;

consultant to the National Security Council, 1961-62; consultant to the State Department, 1965-69; chief presidential foreign policy adviser, 1969-.

Henry Kissinger has, in other words, found himself at home with our last four presidents. two Republicans and two Democrats, though there was some friction between him and John Kennedy. Russell Baker of the *Times* has jokingly suggested that there is more than one Henry Kissinger, in fact that two of them were seen in Ethiopia arranging for a 1973 summit conference with Haile Selassie. One was there to arrange the meeting for President Nixon, the other for the Democratic nominee, should he win.

Henry is unquestionably bright, but intellect alone did not catapult him to his present lofty status. Early on a guardian angel discovered him at Harvard, and the angel's name was Rockefeller. When Henry wasn't teaching graduate seminars at Harvard, or advising generals and ambassadors what to do, he was earning extra money, writing books at the request of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Rockefeller Foundation. These books, whose point mainly seemed to be that the United States needed ever larger defense budgets, were often used by the Pentagon when asking for more money from House and Senate appropriation committees. One of the books, *The Necessity for Choice*, convinced John Kennedy there was a missile gap, an issue that became a key one in the 1960 election race with Richard Nixon: Another book, more scary, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, coolly discussed possible scenarios, right down to the number of people who could expect to die, should there be a nuclear exchange between America and the Soviet Union.

The Rockefellers, deep into providing, profitably, for the nation's defense needs, were delighted with Henry Kissinger's books. Some of the companies the Rockefeller family have an interest in that have profited from increased defense expenditure include: Pan American World Airways; Hercules; Sperry Rand; Boeing; United States Steel; Chrysler; Standard Oil of New Jersey; Goodyear Tire & Rubber; International Telephone & Telegraph; American Telephone & Telegraph; and Chase Manhattan Bank.

The Vietnam War has been especially good for the Chase Manhattan Bank, of which David Rockefeller is chairman.

It took the Chase National Bank (the forerunner of Chase Manhattan) until the year 1965 to go over the 12-billion-dollar mark in assets. Since 1965, when President Lyndon Johnson announced the first large-scale escalation of the Vietnam War, Chase Manhattan's assets have shot up to more than 24 billion dollars, doubling in just seven years

87

what it took the bank almost 90 years
to acquire. Much of the recent increase
is a direct result of the war, and of the
policies advocated, and executed by
Henry Kissinger.

The 'links between Henry and the
Rockefellers are many. Not only has
Henry worked for their foundations, but
one of his early discoverers was David
Rockefeller, who has been on the Board
of Overseers of Harvard since 1954. In
addition, Henry led an 18-month study
group for the Council on Foreign
Relations, a prestigious non-govern-
mental organization that has been called
"the real United States State Depart-
ment." The CFR was founded in 1921
but was of little consequence until a
decade later when it began receiving
money from various Rockefeller and
Carnegie foundations. Today CFR mem-
bership is restricted to 700 resident
members (people who have homes or
businesses within 50 miles of New York
City) and 700 non-resident members.
The organization provides a "corpora-
tion service" which costs a minimum of
$1,000, a year and which provides
subscribers with inside information
about what is happening at the highest
levels of government and finance. The
CFR also provides special studies and
reports for the President of the United
States, does in-depth research into the
economic and political stability of other
nations, presents speakers and seminars
for subscribers to the corporation ser-
vice, and publishes the highly influential
magazine *Foreign Affairs*.

A number of Henry's books have been
published through the CFR, whose
members regularly shuttle between im-
portant posts in industry and important
posts in government. CFR members
have included Edward R. Stettinius,
John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Nelson
Rockefeller, David Rockefeller, Adlai
Stevenson, Walter Lippmann, and John
McMooy.

Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon
are good friends now, but it wasn't that
way in 1968. Henry was one of Nelson
Rockefeller's chief campaign aides and
had this to say when asked by *New York
Post* correspondent Paul Hoffman what
he thought of Richard Nixon: "He is the
most dangerous of all the men running
to have as President."

The Rockefellers made the largest
political contribution in American history
to the Nixon campaign in 1968, and
bygones were bygones. The money
contributed was more than $1,000,000.

Still, many observers were surprised
in 1968 when William Rogers was
named Secretary of State. Besides the
$1,000,000 contribution, that post often
has been held by former Rockefeller
employees: Dulles, Herter, Rusk (Rusk
continued to draw pay from the Rocke-
feller Foundation for three years after he
was appointed). But one looked in vain

for a connection between William
Rogers and the Rockefellers. The truth
became evident later. Henry Kissinger
was the real Secretary of State. A UPI
telephoto recently identified him as just
that: "Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
has arrived in Acapulco to. . ."

To Henry, perhaps, should go credit
for saving the world from nuclear
destruction. In the middle 1950s our
evangelial Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles was threatening all-out
war with Communist China over Que-
mo y and Matsu, two microscopic
islands just off the mainland. Dulles was
given (by guess who) a book of Henry's,
*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*,
which advocated limited war instead of
the Dulles policy of massive retaliation.
There will be no winners. Henry
reasoned, if hydrogen bombs start
flying. The theory of limited war has

“
Kissinger and the
President haven't always
been friends. "The most
dangerous of all the men
running to have as
President" was how he
described Nixon—in
1968
”

been applied ever since. Henry is its
acknowledged author, and the policy is
the one used to this day in Vietnam.

A few years back Harvard students
occupied the office of the university
president and took (along with some
good liquor) documents that were not
intended for the public's eye. One of
these, a message from State Depart-
ment official Robert H. Miller to Dean
Franklin Ford of Harvard, read as
follows: "The United States Govern-
ment deeply appreciates Harvard's mak-
ing Professor Kissinger available for his
extremely successful mission to South
Vietnam. That mission was of great
importance. Could only have been
carried out by Kissinger and had to be
completed prior to the Manila Con-
ference." A copy of the message was
sent to Lyndon Johnson. The year, of
course, was 1966, and Henry's purpose
had been to lay the groundwork for
President Johnson's important meeting
with then President Ky. After the Manila
Conference, the U.S. committed itself to
another large troop increase.

It is clear that Henry Kissinger is no
newcomer to high-echelon politics. But
to understand his politics, his view of

himself in a changing world, it is
necessary to examine his fascination
with Metternich, a man who, like
Henry, reached a high station "through
an almost uncanny faculty of achieving
a personal dominance over his ad-
versaries." Henry sees Metternich as his
historical counterpart. Here is what
Metternich said in 1848 after he was
swept from power: "I claim to have
recognized the situation, but also the
impossibility to erect a new structure in
our empire . . . and for this reason all my
care was directed to conserving that
which existed."

Henry Kissinger is no more an optimist
than Metternich was. "There is no
doubt," he has written, "that the
Western world is in deep trouble. It has
not been able to articulate either a
philosophy or program adequate to our
time. It has failed to identify itself with
the revolutionary period through which
we are living. It has not had the vision or
willingness to carry through a sustained
program to bring a sense of direction to
a world in turmoil."

What America has, it is clear, is a
man not overly convinced that the
country can or should be saved. Yet this
powerful man is rarely interviewed on
television (the Administration fears that
his German accent will call up un-
pleasant associations) and seldom ap-
pears before Congress (he pleads
executive privilege).

Henry Kissinger is one of a number of
presidential aides, albeit the most im-
portant one, who have been dubbed by
the press The Berlin Wall. Some of the
others are Ken Erlichmann, Ron Ziegler,
and Bob Haldeman. It was Haldeman
who, a few months ago, used the
dictionary definition of treason to
describe Democratic presidential hope-
fuls, among them Edmund Muskie, who
disagree with the President's policies on
Vietnam. The penalty for treason, in
court, can be death.

Kissinger's real first name is Heinz,
and that coupled with his accent have
made many liberals call him a Nazi. This
is grossly unfair. He lost 13 members of
his family in German concentration
camps.

Anyone talking with Dr Kissinger soon
understands why President Nixon places
so much confidence in him. His grasp of
foreign affairs is encyclopedic. He is
as much at home with broad philoso-
phic concepts as he is with the most
minute details. When he gives assess-
ments at National Security Council
meetings, those assessments are likely
to go unchallenged by everyone in the
room. He is probably the prainst man
in government, and certainly he is the
hardest-working. Anyone seated around
the table thinking of debating him risks
intellectual humiliation.

Henry has another advantage over
mere cabinet members. He sees the

CONTINUED ON PAGE 114

88 PENTHOUSE

NIXON'S ALTER EGO

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 88

President every day. He knows what Mr Nixon is thinking, and he knows what Mr Nixon wants to hear. Arguing with Henry Kissinger at a National Security Council meeting might mean arguing with the President himself. The power he has gathered around himself has not made him the most popular man in government. Rumors abound in Washington of petty jealousies nurtured by men in high positions. Nor is Henry universally loved by his staff. More than two-thirds of the people he originally hired have left him. Some say he is arrogant and overbearing, unwilling to listen to advice. More likely, he has a low tolerance for fools and bureaucratic doubletalk. Also, his staff admittedly found it hard to match the 18-hour days he likes to log.

Former aides say that being questioned by Henry Kissinger is like being run through a wringer. The questions come with jackhammer rapidity, and usually Henry knows the answer before he asks.

His job requires that he be brusque.

He supervises 46 assistants and 105 administrative personnel and is responsible each day for coordinating information from all areas of the bureaucracy concerned with foreign policy (State Department, Defense Department, CIA) and turning it into what one reporter described as "the clearest, most concise and most accurate action reports on world affairs that any President has ever received."

Henry Kissinger is not always right, however. During the 1950s he strenuously adhered to the doctrine that no deep differences could exist between Chinese Communism and the Russian variety. Like so many others, he saw Communism as monolithic, a single unified titan. Mao and Khrushchev he viewed as twins. How wrong this notion has proved to be is history.

For years people will be guessing what President Nixon hoped to obtain from the China visit, and what he intended to give away. Instead of speculation, the experts would have done better to go to the writings of Dr Kissinger, the man who masterminded the trip: "It is precisely 'good faith' and 'willingness to come to an agreement' which are lacking in the conduct of a new power. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade each other. Instead, diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to influence and win over public opinion. They are less a form of negotiation than a platform for propaganda."

Those words were written in 1957 and published by the Council on Foreign Relations, shortly after Henry had chaired a special studies group for the CFR. Among the "extraordinary group of individuals" he thanked at the book's beginning were McGeorge Bundy, Frank Pace, David Rockefeller, and Lt.-General James Gavin.

There is another side to Henry Kissinger—the personal side—and this has been given more attention in the press than his professional background. Henry enjoys his reputation as a swinger, but evidence indicates that privately he is a lonely man. "Henry doesn't really believe anybody likes him," said a former Harvard colleague. "Not many people do," said another. The truth is that if Henry has any close male friends the secret is as well guarded as his Paris negotiations with the North Vietnamese.

It is different on the distaff side. Henry has dated some of the most glamorous women in the world and is proud of it. He has been seen with Marlo Thomas, Samantha Eggar, Angel Tompkins, Jill St. John, and Gloria Steinem. His steadiest date is Rockefeller aide Nancy Maginnes. When Cabinet Secretary Peter G. Peterson wondered about "the gap" between rhetoric and performance" in Henry's

sex life, the designer of the China trip snapped back: "Eat your heart out, Peterson; eat your heart out." Henry boasted, on another occasion, that "I make both love and war."

There is no question that Henry gets around socially, but it is doubtful if he would have received the same kind of press attention in a more "swinging" Administration, like Kennedy's. After all, Melvin Laird, John Mitchell, and George Romney are not apt to squeeze many people out of the gossip columns.

President Nixon seems to enjoy, or at least to find interesting, Henry's publicized dates. One of Henry's aides described decorating Air Force One with a movie poster: "It had Jill St. John with her boobs hanging out and fights between pirate ships and castles being stormed and a man jumping ahead with his sword held high. The line said something like, 'Hardship and danger were his lot; women and adventure, his reward.' Henry's face had been substituted for the face of the swashbuckler. We were all admiring the artwork when, unexpectedly, the President walked in. He sat down facing the poster, and he was there for five minutes; but he never gave any indication that he noticed it."

But is Henry really a swinger? Is he a woman killer, as a sensation-starved press describes him? His wife, who divorced him in 1964 and lives with his two children in Cambridge, Mass., won't say. One thing is certain: Henry's appeal to women is not universal. At a recent White House reception for a group of touring Cub Scouts, he approached one of the den mothers. "I'd put my arm around you," he said, "but you know my reputation." Later the den mother asked a friend: "Who was that old man, anyway?"

Whether Richard Nixon wins re-election or not probably will have little effect on Henry's future ability to find a job. He has shown himself able to transcend party politics or, put less kindly, to be "a good German," as one Harvard student described him. It is fortunate that Henry can work with a variety of different politicians, for he just might not be welcome back at Harvard. Many faculty members were disenfranchanted by the Nixon Administration's inability to end the war, and the disenchantment grew to hostility when a group of them journeyed to Washington after the Cambodian invasion to talk personally with Henry. It seemed Henry had never gotten along with them personally ("No one there [at Harvard] knew where I lived—they knew where I lived physically, but not where I emotionally lived") and he saw no reason to be appeasing. Also, Henry believed they were less than sincere in their opposition to the invasion. "Today," he said, "I am living the life most

CONTINUED ON PAGE 118

114 PENTHOUSE

NIXON'S
ALTER EGO

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 114

of them would like to lead, and they resent it."

Even if Henry was wanted back at Harvard by the faculty, however, the students, even more furious about the war, might have the final say by boycotting his lectures—or taking to the street. Dean Rusk had to go to Georgia to find work, and the parallel certainly has not been lost on Henry.

Kissinger is many things, and what he is can profoundly influence the course of history. First of all, he is an academic, perhaps not an intellectual but who, compared with some of the other men close to the President, makes them look like mental midgets. What he advocates must carry more weight than other advisers,

Henry is no radical thinker. "What the hell's an establishment for," he asked after Cambodia. "if not to support the President when he's in trouble?"

Henry is conscientious. He carries electronic equipment on his person that allows the President to reach him on a

moment's notice. He is usually the first to arrive for work at his office in the White House West Wing, and except for Mrs. Nixon, is almost always the last to see the President before he retires.

Henry is deceptive. He told reporters that President Nixon might cancel the Moscow visit if Soviet aid continued to pour into India, when Mr Nixon had no intention whatsoever of dropping the trip.

Henry is charming, the perfect diplomat. He was able to establish a personal rapport with such unlikely people as Yahya Khan and Le Duc Tho, with General Thieu and Chou En-lai.

Henry is conceited. "She's a great fan of mine," he said of an influential society woman.

Henry is a hardened right-winger. If his theories helped avert nuclear holo-caust, they also put money into the pockets of big defense contractors by making it necessary to have an abun-dance of smaller weaponry. His entire adult life, as he himself has stated, has been a struggle to maintain the status quo against the winds of change.

Finally, Henry Kissinger's closeness to Richard Nixon and the latter's dependence on his thinking suggests a touch of the Svengali in the relationship. Others have spoken of the isolation of the Presidency, and of the dangers engendered by it. It would seem equally

dangerous for the President's most potent adviser and confidant to be similarly isolated. Yet those who approach Henry Kissinger, and those to whom he speaks, are keenly aware of their proximity to the very pinnacle of power; it is hard to think they would speak any more freely to Henry Kissinger than they would to Richard Nixon. In the fateful upcoming election, the American people would do well to examine the credentials of both men.

# Did Kissinger Check Bobby?

By LARRY EVANS

REYKJAVIK, Iceland—The word here is that White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger made an 11th-hour phone call and persuaded Bobby Fischer to go ahead with the third game of his world championship chess series with Boris Spassky yesterday.

There has been no confirmation of the rumor, which has it that America's honor was at stake, as well as U. S. political relations with Iceland. But interestingly enough, there is a vociferous minority of Icelanders agitating for the removal of a U. S. Air Force base here.

Play in the third game of the series was to continue at 1 p.m. EDT today, with Fischer given a good chance to win. "Though his one-pawn advantage would seem slight to the average player, it is generally ample in a contest between grandmasters," Isaac Kashdan, a grandmaster, wrote in a dispatch for the Associated Press.

Fischer backed down on a threat to fly home yesterday and appeared for the third game in a small upstairs room of the Reykjavik sports hall, under the eye of a closed-circuit camera but away from the big cameras he had said distracted him on the stage in the main hall.

The future of the competition remained in suspense, however, The American challenger is still fighting a ruling that he forfeited the second game of the series by refusing to show up because of a disagreement over the TV cameras. And aides to Spassky warned today that the Soviet champion would refuse to play any more games in the private room.

Fifteen minutes before the start of yesterday's game, no one was really certain that Fischer would show up. His second, the Rev. William Lombardy, and one of his lawyers, Paul Marshall, had been to Exhibition Hall and

inspected the private room that the organizers had set aside as a concession to Fischer's demand that no cameras be allowed to disturb his concentration.

Under the new arrangements, a room on the second floor was chosen for the third game of the match. Rumors flew that the Russians were holding a secret meeting and, although they had agreed to Spassky's continuing the match, the word was that their complaints might be formalized after the game.

The room itself, usually set aside for ping-pong, contained little but Fischer's chrome and black chair and a simple armchair for Spassky. A closed-circuit TV camera setup was used to relay the drama to the spectators in the hall. Many of them expressed outrage at having to pay five dollars to watch a TV screen instead of the real thing.

During the early part of the game, Fischer argued with Spassky and the officials about the presence of the closed-circuit camera. Spassky opened play by moving P-Q4, the same move he had played in Game 1.

In contrast to Game 1, Fischer adopted a fighting defense instead of merely trying to hold Spassky on even terms.

After all, he had lost the advantage of making the

first move with the white pieces when he forfeited the second game and now he was out for a kill. With his 11th move, Fischer surprised Spassky with an unorthodox knight sortie to the edge of the Board—a violation of opening principle, since pieces are best stationed in the center.

At this point many of the spectators felt that Fischer was pressing too hard in an effort to score. A player of Fischer's stature, however, would hardly venture any risk without thoroughly preparing it beforehand. It was one of Bobby's little secrets.

Spassky deliberated long and hard and chose a faulty continuation. The initiative passed over to Fischer and he made good use of it—relentlessly increasing the pressure against white's weak center pawn.

Fischer laid siege against white's king pawn, which eventually fell under the continued battering of black's doubled rooks on the king file.

At adjournment, Spassky was fighting desperately to hold a draw.

Here is the play of yesterday's game:

<table><thead><tr><th>White</th><th>Black</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Spassky</td><td>Fischer</td></tr><tr><td>1 P-Q4</td><td>N-KB3</td></tr><tr><td>2 P-QB4</td><td>P-K3</td></tr><tr><td>3 N-KB3</td><td>P-QB4</td></tr><tr><td>4 P-Q5</td><td>PxP</td></tr><tr><td>5 PxP</td><td>P-Q3</td></tr><tr><td>6 N-B3</td><td>P-KN3</td></tr><tr><td>7 N-Q2</td><td>QN-Q2</td></tr><tr><td>8 P-K4</td><td>B-N2</td></tr><tr><td>9 B-K2</td><td>O-O</td></tr><tr><td>10 O-O</td><td>R-K1</td></tr><tr><td>11 Q-B2</td><td>N-R4</td></tr><tr><td>12 BxN</td><td>PxB</td></tr><tr><td>13 N-B4</td><td>N-K4</td></tr><tr><td>14 N-K3</td><td>Q-R5</td></tr><tr><td>15 B-Q2</td><td>N-N5</td></tr><tr><td>16 NxN</td><td>PxN</td></tr><tr><td>17 B-B4</td><td>Q-B3</td></tr><tr><td>18 P-KN3</td><td>B-Q2</td></tr><tr><td>19 P-QR4</td><td>P-N3</td></tr><tr><td>20 R-K1</td><td>P-QR3</td></tr><tr><td>21 R-K2</td><td>P-N4</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th>White</th><th>Black</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Spassky</td><td>Fischer</td></tr><tr><td>22 QR-K1</td><td>Q-N3</td></tr><tr><td>23 P-N3</td><td>R-K2</td></tr><tr><td>24 Q-Q3</td><td>R-N1</td></tr><tr><td>25 PxP</td><td>PxP</td></tr><tr><td>26 P-N4</td><td>P-B5</td></tr><tr><td>27 Q-Q2</td><td>QR-K1</td></tr><tr><td>28 R-K3</td><td>P-R4</td></tr><tr><td>29 R/3-K2</td><td>K-R2</td></tr><tr><td>30 R-K3</td><td>K-N1</td></tr><tr><td>31 R3-K2</td><td>BxN</td></tr><tr><td>32 QxB</td><td>RxP</td></tr><tr><td>33 RxR</td><td>RxR</td></tr><tr><td>34 RxR</td><td>QxR</td></tr><tr><td>35 B-R6</td><td>Q-N3</td></tr><tr><td>36 B-B1</td><td>Q-N8</td></tr><tr><td>37 B-K1</td><td>B-B4</td></tr><tr><td>38 K-K2</td><td>Q-K5ch</td></tr><tr><td>39 Q-K3</td><td>Q-B7ch</td></tr><tr><td>40 Q-Q2</td><td>Q-N6</td></tr><tr><td>41 Q-Q4</td><td>sealed adjourned</td></tr></tbody></table>

12. (B x N): an unwise swap that puts white on the defensive. Better is 12n-b4 or 12 p-kn3.

14. (... Q-R5): an aggressive sally that brings pressure against the enemy king.

16. (... P x N): eliminating a weakness by straightening out the doubled pawns.

18. (P-KN3): creating a

severe weakness on the white squares. More natural is 18 B-N3.

40. (... Q-N6): Fischer is a solid pawn ahead, with excellent winning chances. If white tries 41 Q-N5 (ch) then he is foiled by B-N3.

The best try for a draw appeared to have been 41b-N2, in order to maintain a blockade on QB3 square. If Spassky could have exchanged queens he might have drawn. But with the queens on the board, black's mating threats may become overwhelming.

© 1972, King Features Syndicate

Associated Press Wirephoto

Position at adjournment.

names mentioned, but police would not discuss the reports.

Eboli lived in Fort Lee, N. J., and his normal territory of operations was in Manhattan, so detectives said they knew of no other reason for him to be in Brooklyn at that time.

# What U. S. Probers
# Might Ask Sinatra

By ANDREW PORTE

Frank Sinatra has his
share of friends in organized

FRANK SINATRA

Partied with Luciano.

violation of law in Nevada, where Sinatra had controlling interest in the posh Cal-Neva Lodge in Lake Tahoe.

It turned out several years later that two mob bigs — Ramond Patriarca, head of the New England mob, and Thomas (Three Finger Brown) Luchese, head of a New York mob family, held a secret interest in the track.

## Met With Luciano

Luchese is dead, and Patriarca is in jail for conspiracy.

Sintra also will have the opportunity to refute charges made to the committee by Joseph (the Baron) Barboza, a mob muscleman and enforcer, that Sintra owned part of the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami Beach for Patriarca.

Sinatra was in the casino business until 1963, when Giancana, who was on the Nevada Gaming Board's list

of undesirables, turned up at the Cal-Neva.

Sinatra told the board he would still continue to be friends with Giancana—outside Nevada. His attitude incensed the board, which began proceedings against him. Before they could act, Sinatra sold his interest.

Giancana is dead now, and so is Lucky Luciano. When Luciano, who had been deported, came to Cuba in 1947 in the hope of wangling his way back into the U. S., Sinatra was there to greet him and a four-day party ensued.

## Heard On Tape

Sinatra pops up several times on the DeCarlo tapes. In a 1961 conversation between DeCarlo and extorctionist Harold (Kayo) Konigsberg, the two men were talking about taking over a hotel in Jamaica by paying off a $2 million mortgage. The question arose: where would they get the money?

"I'm going down there to Florida next week," says DeCarlo. "I'll see Sinatra and have a talk with him."

This and the other taped conversations may have just been mob fluff, however—hoodlums trying to impress each other. Sinatra appeared before the New Jersey State Investigation Commission in February, 1970, testified for 75 minutes in closed session, and none of what he said was revealed. No charges were placed.

"He must have been lured over here," said one officer.

Witnesses told police that they heard shots and saw flashes from a truck that drove by at the time of the slaying. The truck, apparently stolen, was found abandoned a block away.

Another car, a small Plymouth with New Jersey license plates, was found about three blocks from the scene with an unfired M-3 machine gun and silencer in the rear seat.

Eboli was believed to have driven to the site in his 1971 blue Cadillac, which has not been found.

Eboli, a native of Italy who became a naturalized citizen in 1960, had a criminal record that dated back to 1933 and included arrests for gambling, vagrancy, assault and consorting with known criminals.

During the early part of his career, he was alleged to be the muscleman for various crime figures and the chauffeur for Albert Anastasia, who was slain in a hotel barber shop in 1957.

His greatest notoriety came in 1952 when he was kicked out of boxing for slugging a fight promoted in Madison Square Garden after his fighter, middleweight tender Rocky Castellani, lost a TKO decision.

As a result, Eboli was barred from boxing for life and fined by the State Athletic Commission.

He also was taken into custody in a police raid in 1967 after the "little Appalachin" meeting of organized crime leaders.

Federal officials say he served as underboss of the Genovese family during this period while Vito Genovese was in prison for bankrolling a narcotics smuggling operation.

By 1969, it was estimated by some sources that Eboli was in charge of 450 racker-

## On the Llam

An 18-foot trailer loaded yesterday from the Children's land Boardwalk, police reported.

The animals, valued at $30,000, were killed by a miniotare white bull, six sheep, and imported goats and nine chickens.

## Television and Radio— X=P.R.

# Kissinger Visits Gagsters

By ADRIAN SLIFKA
(Vindicatørar Television-Radio Editor)

A meeting of writers for NBC-TV's "Laugh-In" program was "disrupted" by a surprise visit from Henry Kissinger, the much-traveled foreign policy adviser to President Nixon, and Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States.

The two foreign policy experts, interrupted a working session of the "Laugh-In" gagmen while touring the networks' Burbank (Calif.) studios last week.

The visit was a surprise to all the jokesmiths except Paul W.

Keyes, producer and head writer of the Monday night comedy-variety series. Keyes, tipped off in advance, convened the writers and kept the meeting

going — and Adrian Slifka going — waiting for Kissinger and Dobrynin to arrive.

Finally the door opened and Kissinger popped in.

"Hi, Henry," said Keyes, a personal friend of the presidential aide.

### "Stuns" Writer

Writer Robey Greeber, whose view of the door was blocked by a filing cabinet, moaned: "Kissinger, I suppose." He was right, and also stunned.

Amidst howls of laughter, Kissinger introduced the Soviet envoy and Keyes came up with, "Now, Mr. Ambassador, you know where our foreign policy really is made." A writer then popped up with: "What's the matter, couldn't you get into Disneyland?"

As both visitors shook hands all around, Keyes introduced his staff with, "Gentlemen, meet our writers — these are the guys I get blamed for." Then he remarked that John Wayne

28 Youngstown Indicator
Thursday, July 20, 1972

would be the guest star on the first show of the new season in September.

Before Kissinger had a chance to comment, writer Jim Mulligan chimed in, "Mr. K., tell me something. If you're here, who's in charge?"

### Recalls Harvard Days

More laughs. But when they subsided, writer Marc London broke up the lull with his best conversation-making tones: "Mr. Kissinger, we were both at Harvard at the same time. Tell me, what have you been doing since then?"

The few minutes allotted for the visit were up and the two advisers started to leave — or, perhaps, retreat — as the wiser-cracks continued.

Kissinger had his hand on the doorknob when another writer asked, "What do you think of that old song, 'I Wonder Who's Kissinger Now?'" Kissinger's laugh was drowned out by the sound of the door he closed behind him.

### NEWS AND NOTES
— Sen. George McGovern, who, last week won the Democratic presidential nomination, will be the guest on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" at 11:30 a.m.-noon Sunday, over Channel 27. McGovern will be interviewed by reporters to be selected.

Later Sunday John B. Connally, former secretary of the treasury, will be the guest on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press." Connally, a Democrat, just returned from a worldwide trip as a spe-

cial representative of the President. He has announced that he will support President Nixon for reelection this fall.

Lawrence E. Spivak, producer and regular panelist, will moderate the 1 to 1:30 p.m. broadcast. Interviewing Connally will be Hobart Rowen of The Washington Post, J. F. ter Horst of The Detroit News, Robert B. Semple of The New York Times and Edwin Newman of NBC News.

A panel of judges has been named to select Miss Universe 1972 from among 72 contestants during the "Miss Universe Beauty Pageant," two-hour CBS-TV special to be broadcast Saturday, July 29 (10 p.m.-12 midnight) live, via satellite, from the Cerromar Beach Hotel in Dorado, Puerto Rico. Channel 27 will carry the pageant colorcast.

Judges chosen are American film and stage star Ruby Dee; syndicated columnist Earl Wilson; British film actress Lynn Redgrave; Edison Cid Varela, Brazilian newspaper and television executive; Scassi, noted Canadian courting; French singing star Line Renaud; Jean-Louis Lindekens, a Sabena Airlines executive; German film star Curt Jurgens; Sylvia Hitchcock, Miss Universe 1967; Kiyoshi Hara, Japanese ABC Network president, and Latin American actress Mapita Correz.

Arthur Godfrey, star of the Youngstown Charity Horse Show will be a guest on Ted Conner's "F.Y.I." program at 9:45 a.m. Friday morning over Channel 27.

In addition to his appearance, at the horse show, Godfrey will discuss plans to inaugurate a syndicated radio series dealing with ecology. Friday's colorcast will mark Godfrey's second appearance on "F.Y.I."

### STARS in EPIC
— Peter O'Toole stars in "Lord Jim" — epic adventure based on Joseph Conrad's literary masterpiece of a young man's attempt to redeem his lost honor. This film will be telecast in its entirety on "The ABC Sunday Night Movie," July 23, (9 p.m.-conclusion, approximately 12:15 a.m.) over Channel 33.

## Answer Man

By RICHARD K. SKULL

Q: So Brian Keith is going to be in another kiddie comedy next fall, huh? I think that stinks. He's too fine an actor to be wasted in such trash.—D.P.

A: But, it's big money for him and he can practically phone in his part. All he has to do is freeze a benign smile on his face and the moppets do all the work, playing to the laughing machine.

Q: What will Glen Campbell do now that his series is going off TV for good?—R.T.W.

A: He's going to be very busy with concerts, hotel dates and state fairs. And he has a tour coming up to both Europe and the Far East, including TV specials in England and Japan. He's not lying fallow.

(United Features Syndicate, Inc.)

## TV Time Previews

8:30 p.m. (27). MY WORLD AND WELCOME TO IT. (Rerun). Ellen is away and the Monroe's have a new housemaid. It turns into a near catastrophe. The maid can't seem to cope with modern conveniences such as toast prepared in the oven, and a hand-squeezer for orange juice.

1:30 p.m. (24). NBC ADVENTURE THEATER. "War of Nerves," (Rerun). Louis Jourdan and Stephen Boyd, are costarred in the story that deals with the Algerian struggle to win freedom from France. The plot is set in Paris, involving a "secret army" during the crisis.

## Blossom Gets Dorsey Band, Rock Festival

CUYAHOGA FALLS — Two new specials, replacing, scheduled attractions, have been booked for appearances next month at the Blossom Music Center.

On Thursday, Aug. 24, at 8:30

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THE ECONOMIST JULY 15, 1972

# The ritual becomes more real

## The reopened Paris talks could end the Vietnam war in either of two different ways—if North Vietnam really is ready

Even if Mr Nixon, against the odds, did lose in November, he would leave something behind him of his creation: the foreign policy of the United States has begun to show more evidence of planning, of intellectual coherence, of dealing with the world as it is, than it has for 20 years. The fashionable thing to say at the moment is that there is only one flaw on the smooth circle of new relationships Mr Nixon has built up around the world, and that is Vietnam. So it is, give or take a kink or two in such places as India and Egypt. The question is whether the creation of the circle will help to remove the Vietnam problem, or whether Vietnam could destroy the circle. As the Paris peace talks began again this Thursday, two months after North Vietnam's offensive got them called off, it is possible to say, very quietly, that the forces Mr Nixon has brought into play in favour of a settlement may prove too much even for the men in Hanoi.

Of course, the decision is North Vietnam's, and it would be even if the Soviet Union and China were to cut off all their aid to it. Even then, the South Vietnamese army would probably not be capable of destroying the North Vietnamese one, which would be the only conclusive way of removing the power of decision from Le Duan and Truong Chinh and their colleagues. And in fact neither the Soviet Union nor China is going to risk the furious accusations of betrayal that would follow the ending of all their assistance; the Chinese are still sending light arms across the border, and are ready to pump oil into the plastic emergency pipeline the North Vietnamese are trying to lay between the border and Hanoi, and there are still some Russian tanks trundling along the railway through China. What Mr Nixon has done is to give both of North Vietnam's rival patrons an interest in keeping the flow of help just about small enough to persuade the government in Hanoi that it cannot win the war by the means it is using at the moment—a conventional military assault, which may be the only means left to it.

### The trick Nixon has pulled off

The trick Mr Nixon has been able to pull off, which neither John Kennedy nor Lyndon Johnson could, is to give both the Russians and the Chinese good reason to believe that they have less to fear from the United States than they have from each other, and at the same time to make them realise that the Vietnam war is an obstacle to what each of them most wants from America. With China that was spelled out explicitly in the statement that ended Mr Nixon's visit to Peking in February: the next stage in an American withdrawal from Taiwan, it said, would have to wait until "tension in the area diminishes." With the Russians it has been done more by a hint and a wink; but Mr Kissinger, in his briefing at the end of Mr Nixon's Moscow trip in May, made it clear that the American credits the Soviet economy needs so badly were likelier to be forthcoming "as our general relationships improve." This is how the two wings of the circle converge on Hanoi. The mining of North Vietnam's ports, the apparent acceptance by American opinion of the renewed bombing of the north, and now the fact that both Russia and China have been given an interest in a settlement, are all working against North Vietnam's ability to continue the war.

The further price that the people of North Vietnam have had to pay in the course of this should not be ignored.

When Anthony Lewis of the New York Times went to North Vietnam in May he saw some of the casualties that the bombers cause by mistake, by carelessness, sometimes by bloody-mindedness. He is right to say that even those who oppose North Vietnam's part in this war should bear in mind the suffering inflicted on people whose only share in the responsibility is to live under a government that has been determined to unite the south to itself by force. The appalling calculus of any war is that it is an attempt to purchase an exemption from future suffering, not only physical, and not only where the war is taking place, at the price of people dying and homes shattered here and now; and neither side of the calculation should ever be forgotten.

If North Vietnam does decide to give way to the pressures that are being applied to it, there are still two quite different courses it could follow. What the Russians would like, if the reports from India after President Podgorny passed through there last are month are correct, is something along the lines of the ceasefire Mr Nixon proposed on May 8th, when he announced the blockade of North Vietnam. Mr Nixon has three things to offer the North Vietnamese, if they take him up on what he said then: he could end the mining, he could call off his bombers, and he could agree to withdraw the 39,000 American troops who are still scheduled to stay in South Vietnam. And North Vietnam too has three cards to play: in ascending order of military, but not political, importance they are the return of its American prisoners, a withdrawal from South Vietnam without a promise not to come back, and a supervised ceasefire that would put it in violation of an international agreement if it renewed the offensive next year. It may be that the secret negotiations of the coming weeks between Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho will be about who can get most for least in a bargain over these half-dozen marketable items.

What the North Vietnamese must be hoping, of course, is that getting the American prisoners back before election day is important enough to Mr Nixon to make him pay the top price. It is doubtful whether it is, although he might agree to a straight exchange of the prisoners for the withdrawal of those last 39,000 American troops by, say, early next year; the help South Vietnam needs from then on might just adequately be provided from the Seventh Fleet, and the air bases in Thailand, and a few thousand American ex-servicemen hired by the Saigon government. But in present circumstances he is likelier to hold out for the formal, supervised ceasefire he called for in May, or at least for the observed and unmistakable withdrawal of North Vietnam's troops from the few parts of the south they still occupy.

### The real issue: who shall rule in Saigon?

That is why this particular line of bargaining is so unattractive to the North Vietnamese, and why they may prefer the other negotiating course open to them. After this year's failure a supervised ceasefire, even a publicly conducted withdrawal, would make it pretty hard for them to renew the attack next year against American air power backing a much cockier South Vietnamese army. Even the return of the prisoners in exchange for the removal of the remaining American troops would cost them their last effective means of using American public opinion to put pressure on the man in the White House. So they may turn to the alternative, which is a settlement

3

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

19 July 1972

Focus

India's
Kissinger

By Henry S. Hayward

New Delhi

India's rough equivalent of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger as an international troubleshooter is a man named Durga Prasad Dhar, generally known by his initials simply as DPD.

Like President Nixon's national security adviser, Mr. Dhar is Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's usual choice as a personal envoy whenever delicate and vital foreign relations problems confront her country.

Thus, Mr. Dhar was the quiet but powerful chief of the Indian delegation at Simla where Mrs. Gandhi conferred with Pakistan President Bhutto.

In April it was Mr. Dhar whom Mrs. Gandhi sent to Rawalpindi and Murree Hill Station to make arrangements with Mr. Bhutto and his staff for the Simla confrontation.

During the past year in particular, Mr. Dhar has emerged as one of several younger men in the ascendancy in the Indira Gandhi government. As chairman of the policy planning committee of the Ministry of External Affairs, he carries a rank equivalent to minister of state, which makes him second in the Foreign Office after veteran External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh.

Closer Soviet contact

Mr. Dhar was in charge of relations with the emerging state of Bangladesh before, during, and after the India-Pakistan war last December.

In this role he was the first important Indian civilian official to visit Dacca and see the new Bangladesh Prime Minister, Shiekh Mujibur Rahman, after the Bengali leader's return to his country after imprisonment in Pakistan.

Before that, Mr. Dhar was India's ambassador in Moscow in 1968 in the days when Soviet-Indian relations were only beginning to move toward the later treaty of peace, friendship, and Cooperation. The suave diplomat returned to Moscow to negotiate the final stages of the treaty which terminated India's former nonalignment policy and set the stage for greater Soviet influence in South Asia.

Regarded as a pragmatist in politics, Mr. Dhar is an articulate Kashmiri Brahmin. Tall and with a good smile, he gained much of his early experience in the government of divided controversial Kashmir. At that time he was a friend of the late former Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.

'Old professionals'

He became Kashmiri home minister in 1965, and it was then that he reportedly first attracted the attention of Mrs. Gandhi in the days before she became Prime Minister. Many feel he may soon be taken into the Gandhi Cabinet as a recognition of his services, but that he may retain his trouble-shooter role.

Yet the personable DPD is not alone among the new men of India coming to the fore. Mrs. Gandhi relies heavily on two different groups. One might be termed "old professionals," and includes such figures as Swaran Singh, Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, and Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan. These are top men in her Cabinet team.

Below them in rank are the younger up-and-comers. Beside Mr. Dhar, the most prominently mentioned are P. N. Haksar, who is Mrs. Gandhi's principal secretary, and T. N. Kaul, who holds the title of foreign secretary.

Although Mr. Dhar reportedly makes his reports directly to Mrs. Gandhi herself, in most instances some feel that Mr. Haksar, as her principal secretary, has the Prime Minister's ear daily and continually. They therefore rank him as at least an equally powerful influence in the government.

Not overshadowed

Some observers rank Mr. Kaul considerably below the other two, and others would place other names ahead of his in the up-and-comer category.

Swaran Singh, meanwhile, has not been maneuvered into the background by Mr. Dhar's special missions, as the impression here is that United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers has been overshadowed by the Kissinger trips to Peking, Moscow, and Paris.

Mr. Singh is regarded as a reliable senior man, first rate with Parliament.

"A stabilizer not a cipher," one source described him, "more than a genial presence and by no means as secondary as Mr. Rogers in Indira's scheme."

In international affairs, as distinguished from domestic politics, these are the men in Mrs. Gandhi's life. Many concede that under her firm hand they make quite a formidable team.

30

American return to Egypt and pressures on Israel suddenly loomed large and enticing.

Diplomats are confused and overwhelmed by the decision. Sadat's move, although it came after several months of growing tension with the Russians, was unexpected, particularly in the form it was presented to the country and the large Soviet mission here.

The Egyptian president apparently informed Soviet Ambassador Serge Vinogradov at the end of last week. On Sunday, Russian housewives in the Zamalek district of Cairo told their Egyptian shopkeepers they were going for summer vacations to Moscow. Sunday night and Monday the first home-bound flights of Soviet personnel took off from several military bases near Cairo and Alexandria.

Originally believed to affect only some 3,000 to 4,000 advisers attached to Egyptian military units, Sadat's decision has taken a more sweeping form after his one and a half hour explanation to the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's ruling political party, last night.

The subsequent radio announcement and headlines

in the Egyptian press left little doubt that Sadat was asking for the withdrawal of Soviet personnel and taking over all military installations manned by Soviet troops in this country.

This would mean that from now on Egyptian troops would have exclusive control over intricate electronic warning system, radar sites, the sophisticated SAM 3 missile batteries deployed in the Suez Canal zone and the squadrons of Su-5khoi bombers and MiG-23 fighters believed hitherto manned by the Russians.

Sadat's speech did not specify clearly how much time he had given the Russians to leave the country, but it was understood to be one week. It was not impossible, however, that some form of a longer transitional period will be devised.

The best estimates of Soviet military personnel in Egypt are some 4,000 officers attached to Egyptian combat units, plus 11,000 to 12,000 airmen and missile crews billeted in separate camps and kept out of contact with the Egyptians.

Also in Egypt are civilian

Soviet technicians and their families. Their number is estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000, although no specific figures are available. As far as it can be ascertained, their presence in Egypt is not affected by Sadat's decision, although some may be swept up by the wave of Soviet departures.

Sadat stressed that he was not challenging the concept of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, but merely giving all weapons on Egyptian territory into Egyptian hands. Yet the implication of his move was clear to al Egyptians, who did not hide their jubilation.

In announcing his decision, the Egyptian president asked for top-level meetings with the Soviet Union to define further relationship between the two countries.

Sadat said continuing contacts were taking place between his government and Russia, "to devise a method of cooperation which would be more effective in the future."

The national congress of the Arab Socialist Union meets Sunday to assess the whole new situation and its implications. At its emergency meeting last night the Central

Committee of the party gave its total support to the drastic move.

Sadat explained the difficulties which have marked Egypt's relations with Russia. He did not hide Soviet contributions to Egypt's defense, stressing that the Soviet Union replaced 50 percent of war materiel destroyed during the 1957 war with Israel.

The Soviet Union, he said, "supported us politically and backed us economically because the battle of construction cannot be separated from that of liberation."

But then he said, "There arose a difference of viewpoints concerning armaments, its quality and the timing of arms supplies."

The Egyptian president refused to accept Soviet limitation on arms supplies — which had been reduced to a trickle — as well as Soviet pressures to head off Egyptian efforts to cross the Suez Canal.

"We reject any agreement on the continuation of the state of no war and no peace because this would mean Israel gains in the long run," Sadat said.

BALTIMORE SUN

20 July 1972

# Egypt and the Russian Advisers

Immediate guesses on the mean- political power of the officers is to 20,000, all depart, there will stilling of Egypt's expulsion of Russian such that no leader can do without

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

20 July 1972 P18

RAY CROMLEY

# Isolation a Major Kissinger Problem

The unhappiness at the State Department over Dr. Henry Kissinger's great power as President Nixon's adviser on foreign and national security affairs is well known.

Not generally realized is the equally high concern at other key points in the government.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has had two serious confrontations with Kissinger on defense. Laird came out on top in both instances — but only because he has proved to be a very strong man indeed in this type of in-house fighting.

There is worry too in the higher echelons of Treasury, Commerce and in the White House itself. This reporter is told that one reason Peter Peterson, now Commerce Department Secretary, left his White House economic post so quickly was that built-in rivalry with the Kissinger group made his job all but impossible.

The concern over Kissinger's role is, in part, a problem of natural personal jousting. In part it is a conflict of national security and foreign concepts. But there is more.

A major problem is Kissinger's isolation. He has few intimate friends, few men he trusts intellectually. He gets no determined arguments from his staff. They funnel material to him; he picks and chooses. Thus there are few men who can pound at his ideas until the bugs are beaten out.

Every man this reporter has talked to conceded Kissinger's brilliance as a historian. And as a novel and innovative mind, capable of designing precedent-shattering concepts. But their persistent worry is that ivory castle. Brilliant ideas frequently have unexpectedly serious indirect effects if not argued through at length by men with different types of experience. Yet quite frequently the men who are to be key actors in any decision hear about a new line much too late to make meaningful changes.

Then too, Kissinger is a thinker, not an operations man. "Henry doesn't know how to carry things out and he won't let others in on the operations." says one colleague. "Even well-thought-out ideas have operational bugs. The side effects can

break you. It's a one-man show and one-man shows are dangerous."

Witness the bitter, unnecessary side effects of two recent Kissinger involvements:

The China trip as carried out resulted in a near disaster in Japan. It undercut our closest friends in that island country, threatened a serious loosening of Tokyo's close ties with the United States.

The tragedy is that it need not have been. The Japanese government did not object to an opening in China. Tokyo, in fact, wanted a China approach, and had held off only at the insistence of the United States. The problem lay in the way Kissinger carried out the plan. We did not take the Japanese into our confidence.

The need for this close collaboration with our allies in advance of action has been recognized publicly and privately by Kissinger in the strongest terms. But in practice he slipped up. A cross fire of spirited argument before the action would certainly have resulted in shifts in technique which could have prevented the shock to Japan.

The Kissinger-inspired behind-the-scenes negotiation to prevent the India-Pakistan war was a brilliant approach. But it bungled, as is quite evident now, because of the way the plan was carried out. Some sharp pre-action discussions might have changed the picture.

more flexible tactics to muddy Nixon's re-election campaign.

According to analysts here, the first sign of that tactic came in the formal session last Thursday. A North Vietnamese spokesman after the meeting said that Xuan Thuy had made a distinction to Porter between "two aspects of the political question" in South Vietnam.

Some observers immediately judged that Hanoi was hinting at a new willingness to separate a military solution — cease-fire and American withdrawal — from political matters relating to the future of the government in Saigon. Nixon's May 8 proposal made such a separation, leaving a political settlement up to the Vietnamese.

But administration officials today deny that anything new was contained in the North Vietnamese formulation.

One of the two distinct aspects of the political question cited by Hanoi still calls for American removal of President Nguyen Van Thieu from power in Saigon. "The responsibility of the United States," said the North Vietnamese spokesman, is to end its support of Thieu and to end "intervention in the internal affairs of Vietnam."

### McGovern View Noted

(The New York Times reported today, however, that there is some speculation among officials that Hanoi may be easing slightly its insistence on removal of Thieu.)

The second aspect of the question, the North Vietnamese spokesman explained, is the question of "power in Saigon—a question for the Vietnamese people to negotiate excluding all outside influences."

Officials say that the con-

The U.S. Command reported that four more were killed in action last week than the previous week. The number of Americans wounded last week was 26, an increase of 8 from the previous week.

There were 14 Americans added to the list of missing, captured or interned during the week, raising that total to 1,653. Five Americans died from nonbattle causes, the same as in the previous week.

South Vietnamese battle deaths last week totaled 837, up 26 percent from the previous week when the total was 661. There were 2,367 South Vietnamese wounded, a decrease from the previous week's 2,585, but the total missing was 321, more than double the 155 for the previous 7 days.

tinuing impasse will not lead again to any break in the formal talks. They are a screen for Kissinger's private probing of Hanoi intentions — and their continuance is probably essential to Nixon's re-election campaign.

In its first official reaction to McGovern's nomination, Hanoi yesterday took a favorable view of his plan for ending the war. The McGovern plan, said an editorial from Nhan Dan, leading Hanoi newspaper, would end unconditionally the bombing of the North, unconditionally withdraw all American forces, and end unconditionally all U.S. support of the Saigon regime.

The Democratic party candidate, said the editorial, has introduced "a more acceptable stand on Vietnam issues," by recognizing that prolongation of the "military adventure" in Vietnam "only pushes the United States more deeply into failures, errors and deadlock."

Pared to strengthen its military relationship with Egypt in order to maintain its toehold in this vital Middle East nation.

East European diplomats said Russia was taken aback by Sadat's abrupt decision but was not losing hope of finding a way around it. There was talk that some key Soviet weapons instructors would remain in Egypt even after the departure of the bulk of Russian troops.

With secrecy shrouding all military movements, it was difficult to ascertain how many Russians have left Egypt so far. Diplomatic sources knew of only three planeloads of Russians departing yesterday, with others getting ready to move by ship. All Egyptian sources limited themselves to laconic references to Sadat's Tuesday speech in which he asked the Russians to leave.

Cairo itself felt no dramatic or visible change after Sadat's announcement. The Russians have never been conspicuous in the capital, being billeted mainly in desert bases.

However, a number of Soviet families living mainly in the Zamalek suburb were reported gone or preparing to leave.