sensible. To the allies on whose
territory such a war would be fought,
however, a Soviet penetration of
even a hundred miles might well
spell the end of their national ex-
istence. They have compelling in-
centive to strive for a strategy that
poses the threat of maximum devas-
tation for the Soviets. Europeans are
almost inevitably more concerned
with deterrence than with defense.
They will prefer a strategy that
seems to magnify the risks of the ag-
gressor rather than reduce the losses
of the defender.

Of course an improvement in
NATO's conventional capability is de-
sirable. But as in the nuclear field,
we have pushed valid arguments to
such extremes as to defeat our ob-
jective. The notion of a purely con-
ventional defense of Europe goes
much further than arguing for an
improved capability to resist Soviet
local pressures. It has the paradoxi-
cal consequence of removing the in-
centive for a conventional build-up
as well as raising the nuclear issue
in an acute form.

In this context, such statements as
Under Secretary Ball's to the NATO
parliamentarians last November are
extraordinarily double-edged. Secre-
tary Ball argued that the Cuban
crisis proved the importance of
superiority in conventional weapons.
It was fortunate that the Cuban
crisis occurred in an area of over-
whelming U.S. conventional superi-
ority. But most Europeans are
convinced that in Europe the reverse
relationship obtains. They tend to
draw two lessons from the Cuban
episode: that they were faced with
nuclear war without being consulted
and that a settlement was made by
the two nuclear powers without the
participation of Cuba—the country
which was most concerned but which
possessed conventional weapons only.

The incentive for nuclear forces
thus cannot be assessed entirely in
terms of military operations. The
issue of peace and war does not arise
in terms of either-or. There are
many intermediate stages where a
country's bargaining position de-
pends on the risks to which it can
expose an aggressor. To some of our
European allies it appears that even
a small nuclear force is more effec-
tive for this bargaining purpose
than a few more divisions, whose

effectiveness in every case depends
entirely on a solid allied front, thus
in effect giving a veto to the least
resolute ally.

During the Berlin crisis it was
often said that since the United
States has the entire responsibility

for nuclear defense, we would re-
serve the right to negotiate even
without the consent of our allies.
(President Kennedy made this quite
clear, for example, in his press con-
ference of May 9, 1962). And last
October, McGeorge Bundy wrote:
"Outside the nuclear field, in which
mutual understanding must include
the present fact of our special respon-
sibility, our claims upon our allies
can be entrusted to the formula of
reciprocity." In these terms, our
allies have an incentive to develop
national nuclear forces not only to
bargain with the Soviet Union but
also to gain a greater influence over
our actions.

Since the chief impetus for the
European nuclear programs derives
from intangibles of political and
psychological influence, it is im-
mature to turn the issue into a per-
sonal debate about the integrity of
the assurances of a particular Presi-
dent. For the Europeans to forgo
national nuclear programs would be
to resign forever from a realm of tech-
nology on which their future security
and indeed their economic welfare
will depend to a greater or lesser
extent. It would mean entrusting
their fate not to this President but
to all future Presidents, and not only
on clear-cut issues of war and peace
but with respect to every nuance of
policy. In effect, this would trans-

form Europe from a partner into a
satellite.

Apart from the moral issue this
raises, Europe has had too many
recent proofs of the inability of one
President to commit another not to
want some means of determining
its own fate. The change in emphasis
in U.S. strategic thinking over the
past two years, the peremptory way
in which we canceled Skybolt, with-
drew the Jupiter bases, and altered
the strategic doctrine of NATO, in-
dicates that no President can pos-
sibly predict the judgments of his
successors in an age of extraordinar-
ily volatile technology.

BUT THE PROBLEM goes deeper still.
Europeans, living on a continent
covered with ruins testifying to the
fallibility of human foresight, feel
in their bones that history is more
complicated than systems analysis.
They have had too much experience
with the nuances of interpretation
that are possible with all formal
commitments. They know that in
this century no person, however
wise, could have predicted at the
beginning of any decade what the
world would be like at its end. They
do not believe that they must be
able to describe the exact circum-
stances in which they might have to
rely on their nuclear forces in order
to wish to reserve some degree of
control over their destiny.

Our frequently expressed outrage
at the seeming European doubt
about the reliability of our nuclear
guarantee has blinded us to the fact
that we have in effect accused our
allies of being too irresponsible to
be entrusted with the ultimate
means for their protection. The
asymmetry—to use a favorite word
of the new strategic analysis—be-
tween the two kinds of distrust is
pronounced. For if the Europeans
are wrong, the chief penalty is a
certain duplication of effort; while
if they are right, our policy would
seal their fate.

Our arguments that we oppose
European nuclear efforts because
they are useless tend to be overdone
even on the purely technical plane.
A few hundred British and a few
score French delivery vehicles can-
not be without some impact on So-
viet calculations. The Soviets cannot
launch a pre-emptive attack against

March 28, 1963

27

these forces even if their bases are vulnerable. As long as the NATO guarantee retains any validity, such an attack would involve an immense risk of U.S. retaliation—as the President pointed out with respect to the NATO nuclear force in his press conference of March 6. And in launching other forms of attack the Soviets must surely consider whether the objective is worth the very large—even if not decisive—casualties that could be inflicted by the British and French retaliatory forces. The real basis of our opposition to national nuclear forces, then, is not so much their ineffectiveness as the fact that we do not want to be drawn into nuclear war against our will.

Of course this concern casts a curious light on our frequently repeated assertions that no difference in the conceptions of vital interests between us and Europe is possible. Above all, the fear that France and Great Britain may prove more reckless than we can only be based on a misunderstanding. They must know—perhaps better than we—that using their forces independently would be a desperate last resort, though we can hardly expect them to advertise this fact. Whatever they may say now, they will learn that they must think of their nuclear forces much as Sweden and Switzerland think of their armies. Neither country is able to withstand a full-scale attack by a major power. Both would prefer allies in such a case. Their military forces do give them the possibility of posing risks that an aggressor may consider out of proportion to the objectives to be achieved. And they may gain time for allied assistance to be effective.

The frequent insinuations that those of our allies developing nuclear programs *prefer* to do without the Alliance are the result of a grave misapprehension. Taking out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary, it may prevent a remote contingency from turning into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive tasks.

WE THUS REACH the heart of the issue raised by European nuclear forces. Does the interdependence of the Atlantic area have to be

vindicated by a structure in which only one ally possesses the physical ability to engage in nuclear war? Is the test of Atlantic partnership really a "single strategic force" integrated into a "single chain of command," as Secretary McNamara asserts? Or is it possible to have several centers of decision co-ordinated politically so that their power serves a common end?

After all, one of two things is likely to happen with respect to European nuclear power: either our allies will realize the importance of co-ordinating their forces with ours,

or they will assume the major burden of their own defense, which is what we have always said we wanted. All considerations of technology, strategy, and policy indicate that the former is by far the more likely outcome. Our allies—if they understand their own interests—will always prefer the assistance of our enormous nuclear arsenal. This has been our experience with Great Britain. It is likely to be our experience with France, if we ever get away from scholastic arguments over the relative merits of "integration" and "coordination" and face practical issues of how to relate a French nuclear force to the common defense.

A policy of confidence in our European allies is all the more necessary because the range of our control over events is extremely limited. A British strategic force exists. A French nuclear program has been in operation for nearly a decade. Attempts to atrophy them are liable to

lead to the most extreme formulations of strategic doctrine and to the most dangerous, because vulnerable, strategic design. Or else, if we succeed, we may well discredit not a particular defense policy but *all* attempts to assume responsibility for national defense. Then we will have brought about the kind of Third Force that should really worry us: one based on the resentments of the impotent and relying on the manipulations of the irresponsible. Not everyone who gives us no trouble will give us support. This is illustrated by the contrasting behavior of President de Gaulle and Premier Fanfani during the Cuban crisis. The former backed us without reservation; the latter adopted an essentially noncommittal policy.

To be sure, many of the formulations on behalf of European nuclear forces have been extreme and one-sided. A rudimentary technology has produced an often crude strategic doctrine. But these theories are subject to the same evolutionary process as they have been in the United States. We should not judge a mature European program by its beginnings—which, moreover, are needlessly protracted by our opposition.

The real problem is whether we are ready to face an independent European center for decision on nuclear matters, and rely on political consultations to relate European purposes to ours.

So far, we have indicated a preference for continued hegemony. Terms like "multilateralism" and "interdependence" have hidden the reality of an attempt to maintain undivided physical control—which in terms of our strategic doctrine has to mean U.S. control. Given European pressures in the opposite direction, this policy has forced us to adopt remedies more dangerous than the ill they have sought to cure. We have purchased brief respites in allied disputes by mortgaging the future. Almost every program that we have advanced in the name of our notion of multilateralism has had the practical consequence of accentuating rather than ameliorating NATO's nuclear dilemma, and therefore it has underdetermined the long-term political stability of the Atlantic Alliance.

28

THE REPORTER

## IV. Proposed United States Remedies: The Creation of a Multilateral Force

The administration has adopted three policies in pursuit of its goal of a single, centrally controlled nuclear force for the Alliance.

(a) It has indicated increasing willingness to permit Europeans to share in the targeting of our strategic forces, which remain almost entirely under our exclusive control.

(b) It has "assigned" nuclear submarines to NATO subject to agreed NATO guidelines.

(c) It has pushed—ambivalently and with various degrees of intensity—the creation of a NATO multilateral force.

Of these steps, the first is constructive even if it does not go to the heart of the problem. It is no doubt highly desirable for Europeans to know of the targeting of our strategic forces and to participate in planning. Joint targeting does not, however, alter the United States monopoly position. To some extent, it meets the interests of all allies in a common war plan. It does not solve the far more important problem of political control, specifically the decision to enter nuclear war.

As for the assignment of Polaris submarines to NATO, this measure was first announced by President Kennedy in Ottawa in May, 1961. It was then repeated with considerable dramatic effect by Secretary McNamara at the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens last year. At that time, it was stated that five Polaris submarines had been "assigned" to NATO, with more to come. In his report to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963, Secretary McNamara pointed out that we had "earmarked a fully operational Polaris force to the NATO Command."

However, it is important to understand what this "earmarking" consists of. All forces in NATO are national forces. The line of command of U.S. forces runs from Washington through the appropriate U.S. headquarters. NATO headquarters are planning outfits that control forces "assigned" to them only during specified maneuvers or in war. Each

ally, of course, retains the right to go to war according to its own constitutional processes.

With respect to Polaris forces, the line of command runs from Washington to the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic. The same admiral is also NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

The practical effect of the "assignment" of Polaris to NATO is that the admiral involved can give orders in his capacity as NATO commander to himself in his capacity as United States commander. Whatever hat the admiral wears, the President continues in ultimate control of our Polaris force. Our veto remains ab-

solute. The influence of our allies over the targeting and planning of this force is not noticeably greater than over those strategic forces which remain under exclusive U.S. control—particularly if Europeans can participate in the targeting of the latter. In other words, the "assignment" of the Polaris force to NATO is largely symbolic.

In fact, the influence of our European allies on nuclear strategy has actually diminished with respect to the three Polaris submarines "assigned" to the Mediterranean to replace the Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey. The Jupiter missiles were subject to the double-veto system; that is to say, Italy and Turkey had to agree before the Jupiters could be fired. The only influence Italy and Turkey will have over the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean is through NATO guidelines, if these can be agreed upon.

The notion of guidelines presents serious problems of its own. Are they to be conceived as a kind of contingency plan for the employment of nuclear weapons, *provided* the governments concerned agree to implement these plans? Or are they to be considered a delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons in certain specified contingencies without further reference to political authority?

If guidelines are to be interpreted in the former sense—as a form of contingency war plan—they are another version of the joint targeting previously described. But in that case it is not clear why a formal assignment to NATO was necessary or how the NATO-committed Polaris forces are to be distinguished from our other strategic forces.

If, on the other hand, the guidelines are to determine not the targets but the circumstances in which nuclear weapons are to be used, serious problems would arise. A guideline so conceived not only includes; it also excludes. It defines not only when nuclear weapons are to be employed but also the circumstances when they will not be used. It is possible that the only contingency in which all the allies would agree in advance is a massive Soviet nuclear attack on Europe—the circumstances about which there is likely to be least doubt and where the seeming need for prior specification may only magnify uncertainties. In short, if the guidelines are too vague, they may multiply concerns; if an attempt is made to be too specific, they will magnify divisions.

Whatever else the guidelines may accomplish, they will not affect the United States veto or, for that matter, the right of any of the other allies to determine whether the circumstances to which the guideline refers have in fact arisen. At the same time, predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons either to the secretary-general of NATO or to some allied commander or to both acting in concert—as has sometimes been suggested—would represent an unprecedented abdication of Constitutional responsibilities. It is difficult to see any President or Prime Minister agreeing to this step. If it were taken, it is certain that the predelegation of authority would be con-

March 28, 1963

29

fined to the most obvious and unambiguous cases of nuclear aggression, raising uncertainties about the ambiguous cases that have caused much greater worries. In short, guidelines have the uses and limitations of joint targeting; they are only a small step in the direction of solving NATO's nuclear dilemma.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS come to a particular focus with respect to the keystone of our NATO nuclear policy: the NATO multilateral force composed of mixed crews. This proposal has had a checkered history. It was first advanced for study by former Secretary of State Christian Herter in December, 1960. It was then cold-shouldered in the first few months of the Kennedy administration. Then in May, 1961, at Ottawa, President Kennedy announced a willingness to consider "a NATO sea-borne missile force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control..." Our European allies were invited to make proposals to this end.

Given the fact that none of our allies possessed sea-borne nuclear systems and that a command and control system even for a national force is not a simple matter, the probability that our allies would come up with a meaningful control system was not great. Indeed, many believed that the problem would be recognized as insoluble. Our allies were then expected to ask the President to act as executive agent of the Alliance with respect to nuclear weapons.

When this did not happen, the United States a year later again offered to consider a NATO nuclear force, provided our allies first built up their conventional forces and came up with an acceptable control system. Since the control problem had not become any easier and since most of our allies were dubious about the need for the kind of conventional build-up we were proposing, it was not clear whether our proposal was put forward in order to be accepted or to be rejected.

Three months later, in September, 1962, McGeorge Bundy spoke in terms of a multilateral *European* force: "It... would be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which we feel with respect to individual, in-

effective, and antiquated forces would be extended automatically to a European force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of the Alliance." This speech said nothing about what we understood by "multilateral," "integrated," or "unified."

Two months later, Under Secretary of State George Ball returned to the theme of a NATO force. He argued that we thought "a European nuclear contribution" to NATO militarily unnecessary. However, "should other NATO nations so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuinely multilateral Medium-Range Ballistic Missile force fully co-ordinated with the other deterrent forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

At the regular NATO ministerial conference in December, 1962, nothing was done about the creation of a NATO multilateral force. A week later, on December 21, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan signed the Nassau Agreement, which provided for two multilateral forces: one that would absorb the strategic forces of Great Britain and France together with a United States contribution of nationally owned submarines; another in which the non-nuclear countries of NATO would create a truly multilateral Polaris force, which was later explained to mean that it would be jointly financed, owned, planned, manned, and operated.

Nothing was said about how either multilateral force was to be controlled, deployed, or targeted. On January 10, prior to President de Gaulle's press conference, Under Secretary Ball was back in Paris to explain to the NATO Council that the multilateral NATO force that he had declared militarily unnecessary in November was now a high priority goal of the Kennedy administra-

tion. Indeed, he was reported to have suggested that the United States was ready to begin training submarine crews of mixed national composition immediately.

This sequence of events is important to keep in mind because it might well have led even political leaders less suspicious of U.S. motives than President de Gaulle to doubt whether we really had a "grand design" or whether we were not simply offering palliatives to perpetuate our hegemony.

In any event, after President de Gaulle's press conference, the multilateral force composed of the presently non-nuclear powers was pushed energetically. "Informed sources" were quoted as having said that we would create a force so strong that the Federal Republic of Germany in particular would see that the advantages of our notion of multilateralism far exceeded any benefits to be gained by association with France.

In order to thwart French nuclear pretensions, we proposed to create a counterweight by bringing some of the non-nuclear European countries into the nuclear field. The already difficult issue of multilateral control has thus become further complicated because we have made membership in the "mixed" force a test of Atlantic solidarity. Livingston Merchant was appointed to carry out the negotiations to bring this force into being.

SINCE THEN, the U.S. position has continued to shift. We have recently indicated that surface ships are a better solution than submarines. Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy have spoken of both a European and a NATO multilateral force. But the practical requirements they impose make the distinction elusive. They agree that any NATO force must be "integrated" with our strategic forces; there must be a single chain of command and a single finger on the trigger. In the light of Secretary McNamara's strategic theories, this must mean that either a European or a NATO nuclear force has to be under ultimate U.S. command. "The American representatives also will make it clear," the New York Times reported on February 27, "that there will be only one finger on the trigger of any nuclear

30

THE REPORTER

force established by NATO. It will be
that of the President of the United
States."

In giving multilateralism this defi-
nition, we are trying to defend At-
lantic solidarity on an issue and with
a solution certain to magnify allied
disagreements in the long run. The
valid and important concept of inter-
dependence can only be discredited
by association with schemes that de-
prive our allies of the physical possi-
bility of independent action while
we reserve this right for ourselves.
U.S. dominance in the nuclear field
may be a desirable solution from our
point of view—though it is apt to
prove shortsighted. But we should
not call such an arrangement a part-
nership, and we must recognize that
it will generate rather than alleviate
pressures for change.

At the moment, the political con-
stellation of Europe prohibits an
articulation of this problem, perhaps
even its clear recognition. Great
Britain, though in practice striving
to retain a nuclear independence
very similar to France's, cannot af-
ford any further controversy. Never-
theless, the much-heralded "assign-
ment" of the British V-bomber force
to NATO has had the same signifi-
cance as our previous "earmarking"
of Polaris submarines. It was a sym-
bolic act that did not diminish
British control. It is not clear wheth-
er the assignment of national forces
represents the total British contribu-
tion to NATO's nuclear arsenal. But
Britain's national program can
leave resources for only a token con-
tribution to the multilateral force
composed of mixed crews.

As for the other allies, West Ger-
many has seen in agreement to a
multilateral NATO force of mixed
crews an opportunity to reassure us
about Atlantic solidarity and to
enter the nuclear field. The other
European countries that have agreed
to participate—at last report Italy,
Belgium, and, perhaps, the Nether-
lands—are more likely to do so to
keep an eye on Germany than be-
cause of strategic convictions.

Indeed, any reflection about the
structure of the multilateral force
composed of mixed crews gives us as
much reason to worry about the
allies that agree to join as about
those who refuse. For one thing, the
requirement of mixed manning is

a symptom of distrust, since the chief
reason is to prevent any national
government from withdrawing part
of the force. Is every national con-
tingent to receive separate instruc-
tions before the missiles can be fired?

No wonder nearly all the military
commanders, U.S. as well as allied,
regard mixed manning with extreme
distaste.

Apart from the problem of what
may be termed control by the threat
of mutiny, it is difficult to see just
what would be achieved by the pro-
posed force. According to Secretary
McNamara's testimony, it cannot be
used independently of our much
larger forces. In any event we would
presumably keep control over the
nuclear warheads of the NATO mul-
tilateral force—according to the
McMahon Act, we would have no
other choice. Even if the law were
changed with respect to the physical
control over warheads, the problem
of the veto would remain.

If we retain the veto, one of two
things would happen. If we decided
to engage in nuclear war and our
allies refused, we would use the
Strategic Air Command and our en-
tire Polaris force, including that part
of it "assigned" to NATO. If the situ-
ation were reversed—that is, if our
allies wished to use nuclear weapons
and we disagreed—neither the NATO
force nor SAC could operate.

CAN WE GIVE UP the veto? It is not
easy to see how a country can
abdicate so fateful a decision to a
majority vote of allies, no matter
how close. The Constitutional issue
would surely be formidable.

Moreover, what would giving up
the veto commit us to? Does it
mean that we would not obstruct the
utilization of the NATO force in

which we participate? In terms of
Secretary McNamara's testimony, this
partial employment of nuclear power
is what must in all circumstances be
avoided. In any event, it is difficult
to imagine making a commitment to

go to nuclear war indirectly and
with only the smallest part of our
forces.

But if we agree to go to war with
our entire nuclear arsenal, what is
the point of creating a NATO force?
Then it would be wiser to create a
political control body for the Alli-
ance as a whole and agree to go to
war on the basis of whatever ma-
jority vote seems indicated. (Such a
commitment would probably still
not meet the need. Even under exist-
ing arrangements, we could refuse to
aid our allies if we are reluctant to
honor our NATO commitments, and
that situation would not change
under the new scheme.)

It has also been reported that
the United States is willing to ac-
cept a European commander for the
proposed multilateral force. But this
is either a palliative or a source of
concern. If political control is effec-
tive, the veto will remain regardless
of the nationality of the com-
mander. If political control is
not reliable, we would be in a posi-
tion of showing more confidence in
a European military man than in
the constitutionally established lead-
ership. Unauthorized use is likely to
be a particular problem in an or-
ganization deliberately constructed
so that its members can have no
primary allegiance to any of the
established political entities.

WHAT OF the argument that the
proposed NATO force could in
time be transformed into a European
force if our allies request it? We

March 28, 1963

31

have repeatedly hinted at our will-
ingness to consider this prospect.
However, there are two major ob-
stacles. The first is our strategic doc-
trine. Our insistence on a unified
command, a single target system, and
the need for instant response is as
inconsistent with a separate Euro-
pean force as with national forces.

Even if we are prepared to change
our strategic doctrine, serious prob-
lems would remain. The only way a
NATO force as now conceived could
be transformed into a European one
would be for our allies to ask us to
withdraw from it. This would de-
feat the prime purpose of many of
the smaller countries in joining the
force: to demonstrate Atlantic soli-
darity. Such a step, even if it were
politically feasible, is much more
likely to accentuate allied divisions
than beginning with an explicitly
European program. Moreover, as
long as France is not part of a NATO
force and Britain's contribution is
token only, any attempt to turn it
into a European force will raise
the specter of German domination
and thus create powerful antago-
nisms in other European countries.

It can be argued, of course, that
the fear of German domination will
make Britain and France more eager
to join the multilateral force. This
is doubtful. But even if it were cor-
rect, such a process of arriving at a
European force would be extremely
worrisome. It would be better for
the long-term stability and cohesive-
ness of Europe if West Germany
joined a Franco-British program
than for Britain and France to be
obliged to seek membership in a
grouping of which Germany is the
senior European partner. History
has been altered by smaller nuances.

This suggests the need to re-
examine another of the assumptions
behind our advocacy of the NATO
force. The NATO force is often said
to be a device to avoid the issue of
nuclear weapons in German hands.
The contrary is likely to be the case.
The multilateral force as now con-
ceived may wind up by frustrating
every member. If West Germany is
seriously interested in acquiring
strategic weapons, the multilateral
force is apt to prove only an interim
step and may turn out to be the
easiest way of getting Germany into
the nuclear business. The danger in

the multilateral force is that those
who want effective control over their
nuclear destiny will not long remain
content with the projected arrange-
ments, while those who go along
for such motives as pleasing us, defy-
ing France, or keeping an eye on

Germany will soon grow tired of
the expense and will search for other
options.

This becomes apparent when the
financial implications of our pro-
posals are examined. The number of
missiles most frequently mentioned
for the NATO nuclear force is
three hundred. It is interesting
that this represents four times the
delivery vehicles of the French
Mirage force and three times that
of the projected British Polaris
force. We are in the curious position
of opposing the existing national
nuclear forces, but in order to
thwart them we are engaged in
diffusing an even larger number of
weapons to a group of countries not
now in the nuclear business and with
no immediate prospect of entering it.

The cost of a fleet of Polaris sub-
marines is estimated at more than
$1 billion a year, or an increase of
twelve per cent in the defense spend-
ing of the participating countries.
A fleet of merchant ships has been
estimated to cost upwards of $500
million, or an increase of seven per
cent. And as the technical problems
of placing Polaris missiles on mer-
chant ships is studied and the re-
quirements for assuring invulner-
ability are analyzed, the costs are
liable to mount.

For this heavy expense, the par-
ticipants would obtain no signifi-
cant increase in control over nuclear
weapons. Can anyone seriously be
lieve that this can be a permanent
state of affairs? Is it not infinitely

more likely that after a few years we
would face repetitions of our cur-
rent problem with France in rela-
tion to some of the projected
members of the NATO nuclear force?

Our present proposals grant the
need for a separate force, but they
do not grant the equality that
would give that force meaning.
In a few years, after they have
gotten into the nuclear business
with our assistance, some of the
countries now projected as partici-
pants will indeed be much better
able to raise the nuclear issue than
France is today. They will not have
to argue about the possession of
nuclear technology—since this will
have been conceded—but about the
control of a force where their influ-
ence is patently out of proportion
to their contribution. If we resist
these pressures, we may bring about
a violent swing toward de Gaulle's
conceptions. Nothing is more likely
to promote Third Force tendencies
in Europe than for us to engage
our prestige in pressing for a force
which on our own showing makes
no sense militarily, does not alter
existing control arrangements sig-
nificantly, yet requires a heavy
European financial contribution.

THE multilateral NATO force is thus likely to combine the disadvantage of every course of action. It will not prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons; it may well accelerate it. It will neither stop the acquisition of nuclear arms by West Germany nor satisfy over any extended period whatever demands may exist there for a greater voice on nuclear matters. It will stop the building up of conventional forces, for none of the countries reported ready to join the NATO nuclear force is likely to increase its defense budget beyond the expenditures required for the multilateral force. Among the many inconsistencies of our present position is the simultaneous pressure for the NATO multilateral force and an increase in European conventional strength. The two policies are incompatible.

Finally, the NATO nuclear force
will not represent any significant
burden-sharing. Since some of the
European countries will possess
some kind of veto, our strategic
planning could not count on the

32

THE REPORTER

NATO force. The strategy envisaged by Mr. McNamara would then require us to maintain whatever strategic forces are thought necessary for a U.S. counterforce response—as if the NATO force did not exist.

As for other political effects often advertised as the chief, if not the sole, purpose of the NATO nuclear force, allied cohesion is unlikely to be strengthened. On the contrary, Europe will be fragmented even further. France will be isolated, but at a heavy price. We will have shifted the relative weight in Europe toward countries which, while more pliable in the short term, may prove more unstable in the long run. If the influence of West Germany in the multilateral force becomes too great, neutralism may grow in Britain, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries. (The New York Times of March 9 reported that the Federal Republic would contribute about two-thirds of the European share of the NATO force, or about forty per cent of the total costs, and that influence in manning and operational control would be proportionate to the financial contribution.)

The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest—least of all West Germany's—to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Soviet thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of fifty years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not—in its own interest—be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy. We are encouraging tendencies that we may later regret. There must be better ways for West Germany to demonstrate its devotion to the Atlantic Alliance than to become the

largest European contributor to a multilateral nuclear force.

THE DANGER of our present course thus goes far beyond disputes about strategic theory. An issue as complicated as the control of nuclear weapons within the Alliance cannot be expected to have a quick or a neat solution. Nevertheless, the frequent and rapid changes of our position undermine our reputation for reliability—whatever the merit of particular proposals.

How can the most well-disposed governments follow our lead when our proposals are in a constant state of flux, moving from indifference to eager advocacy of a NATO force and from submarines to merchant ships all within two months?

Even so staunch a friend as Great Britain must be bewildered. First we abruptly canceled Skybolt. Then Prime Minister Macmillan loyally supported the Nassau Agreement with the argument that the acquisition of Polaris submarines would align Great Britain with our strategic thinking and our NATO concepts. A month later we proposed that the multilateral NATO force of mixed crews be composed of merchant ships. This leaves Prime Minister Macmillan exposed to the criticism of having purchased an unnecessarily expensive system for Great Britain. It makes us vulnerable to the charge of foisting a second-best system on the Europeans. And the situation is made the

more poignant by the fact that Britain has been asked to join both forces.

Our friends do not know what to support. Our opponents are encouraged to exert pressure or at least to procrastinate in order to elicit other offers. Open-mindedness is often a virtue. But we must remember that

the leader of a great coalition simply cannot afford to do all of its thinking in public.

To be sure, we are still able to obtain support, partly because we remain the strongest ally and our good will continues vital; partly because many of the smaller European countries have developed a habit of dependence. Our influence is still sufficient to generate domestic pressures in many European countries. But all this is to no avail if the basic direction is mistaken. Then, the domestic forces we encourage may well produce long-term instabilities.

One of the major achievements of American postwar policy has been the growth of a moderate, self-confident Europe that is willing to assume a degree of responsibility for its destiny. We take this so much for granted that we tend to forget how difficult the process has been and how precarious the balance still is in many European countries. In our eagerness to advance our new strategic theories, we have failed to perceive that ultimately success or failure depends on the political forces associated with us.

In this respect, there is reason for serious concern. In too many countries, governments that painfully obtained a commitment to the existing defense programs and to the very concept of NATO find themselves charged with undermining U.S. relationships by those who opposed every step along that road. In several countries, our policies are supported by groups who see in the slogan of Atlantic solidarity a convenient tool to discredit the existing European structure. The Nenni Socialists in Italy have not become converts to our concept of nuclear defense; they halfheartedly support us because they want to retain an option for their favorite schemes of nuclear disengagement. Britain, if it abandons its nuclear program, will not introduce conscription. Conventional defense may be invoked to wreck the nuclear program; the result is much more likely to be a form of neutralism than a conventional build-up. Undermining the major program of an ally must produce upheavals that cannot be measured by purely technical standards.

Our present course may thus encourage simultaneously neutral-

March 28, 1963

33

ism and rabid nationalism, a sense of impotence and frustration. In another five years we may be confronted by a Europe that can truly be described by many of the epithets presently applied to President de Gaulle. The fact that many of our actions are taken with the seeming agreement of much of our press and some of our allies is no consolation. The test of leadership is not tomorrow's editorial but what history will say of us five years from now.

## V. Where Do We Go From Here?

It is always difficult to reverse course. The longer a given policy is maintained, the more vested interests—in dedication, in conception, and in bureaucratic persistence—it is bound to create. Yet sometimes the wisest policy is to resist the temptation to rely on momentum, and to step back and take stock.

Perhaps the best way to begin a reappraisal would be to ask ourselves what our real interests in Europe are. We should examine what kind of structure we desire in the long term rather than seek for devices to head off immediate pressures.

The goal of a strong, unified, and self-sufficient Europe, which American policy has consistently pursued for a decade and a half, is as valid today as it was when first developed in 1947. We may not have fully understood then that an economically powerful Europe would be more self-assertive in the political and military field as well. We may have believed subconsciously that our policy would relieve us of economic burdens without requiring a redefinition of Atlantic relationships. But whether or not we fully realized the implications of what we were doing, the Europe of today stands as a testimony to our foresight and our ability to subordinate short-term advantage to long-term benefits.

However, in the past few years there has been a tendency to recoil before the inevitable implications of our policy. It was always in the cards —indeed, it was our stated purpose—that as Europe regained its economic health it would also seek to develop

its own specific policies. It never occurred to us originally that the relations of the European states to each other should not be closer than each of them was to the United States. On the contrary, the original conception was that a cohesive Europe would be a more effective partner for the United States. Atlantic partnership was then thought of in terms of establishing a relationship with a Europe whose internal structure would be firmer than the Atlantic bonds.

This great conception can be reversed today only by undermining the structures that have been laboriously developed over the past fifteen years. Fifteen years ago it might have been possible to try to construct an Atlantic Community on the most favored nation principle; that is, that no nation have closer relations to any other than to the United States. Today this attempt jeopardizes all that has been achieved.

Yet stripped to its essentials, this is the course we have been pursuing with Europe in the nuclear field. Our definition of interdependence has the practical consequence of discouraging the emergence of any European identity in nuclear matters. We are fostering a concept of multilateralism that will add new divisions to the existing rifts in Europe. A multilateral force in which France does not participate and to which Britain makes only a token contribution will lead to a structure in the nuclear field inconsistent with all our postwar policies. The result is likely to be either competing European groupings or the ultimate emergence of a European unity in which the leadership roles have been drastically altered with our assistance.

It is still possible—though it is getting late—to prevent these developments by fostering a European nuclear identity growing out of the British and French programs. It is often said that such a course would divide the Alliance. But surely we are not going to maintain that partnership is possible only with nations incapable of independent action. Moreover, if we cut through the phrases to the facts, a separate European entity need be no more divisive in the military than in the economic field. In both instances it

calls attention to the need for a political effort to devise common objectives.

It would be idle to claim that conceding European nuclear autonomy would by itself solve NATO's nuclear dilemma. The problem of relationships in the nuclear field is sufficiently complex to resist simple remedies. But encouraging a separate European center of decision-making is a vital first step.

We have had two choices with respect to Europe's nuclear future. We could accept the British and French national efforts and encourage first a common Franco-British and ultimately a European program. Or else we could group the non-nuclear countries into a multilateral force more responsive to our notions of a single chain of command and an indivisible target system.

We have chosen the second course. The first is preferable by far. It is hard to conceive a stable Europe that does not include France as well as Britain. Any genuine nuclear policy must grow out of existing programs that will continue whatever the fate of the multilateral force. A policy that cannot relate us to the existing nuclear powers—our traditional allies—is not likely to be more effective when the present non-nuclear powers have become members of the nuclear club with our help.

Thus, instead of being hostile to the French nuclear program and, at best, indifferent to the British effort, we should use our influence to place them in the service of a European conception. This would also be the most reliable road to Atlantic partnership. The emerging European force could then be related to ours through political co-ordination and joint strategic planning. Such a policy would require a change of attitude on our part; at the very least the technical pressures from the Defense Department would have to be subordinated to an overriding political direction.

This is not to say that the United States should support every strategic theory developed in Britain or France. It is plain that we have certain interests in any European nuclear development which we are bound to foster:

(a) The European forces should be well protected so that they do not

36

THE REPORTER

invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability.

(b) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction.

(c) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response.

(d) They should become an instrument to foster European integration.

(e) They should be co-ordinated with our forces.

All these objectives are more likely to be achieved by offering assistance to Great Britain and France in enhancing the invulnerability of their forces and improving their command and control than by the so-called NATO multilateralism. We could make the scale of our assistance depend on the British and French ability to develop common programs and a common strategy. We could encourage Britain and France to put their nuclear forces into the service of Europe, perhaps by associating other countries in the control mechanism. We could strongly urge that the savings accomplished by our assistance in the nuclear field be devoted to a build-up of conventional power.

Such a program would maintain the principle of flexible response (though not perhaps of counterforce general war). It would grow organically out of existing European nuclear programs. It would avoid the necessity of organizing the presently non-nuclear powers into their own separate nuclear force and thus in the long run represent a smaller diffusion of nuclear power. It would make Britain's entry into Europe inevitable. And it would lay the basis for a more natural association between Europe and the United States than the so-called multilateralism.

It may be argued that once we help Britain and France, every European country will want its own national nuclear force. The President has mentioned even a Belgian nuclear force as a possibility. We must distinguish, however, between the possession of some nuclear weapons and the development of an indiguous nuclear program. The latter is beyond the present capability of

any European country, for either political or economic reasons or for both.

West Germany is prohibited by the Paris treaties from manufacturing nuclear weapons. While treaties have been broken before, in this particular instance the international repercussions are apt to be so serious as to give any German government pause. At the moment and for at least the next legislative period—that is, until about 1969—there are in any event no signs of any domestic pressures in Germany for a national nuclear-weapons program. This may change, however, after the multilateral force has whetted appetites.

Italy has neither the resources nor the domestic support for a national nuclear program. As for Belgium and other smaller countries, it can hardly be argued that the French program exceeds France's resources but that we must gear our NATO nuclear policy to preventing the development of similar programs by much poorer countries.

To be sure, a joint Franco-British program would probably lead to efforts by West Germany and perhaps other European countries for a de-

gree of participation in at least the control mechanism. But in this way the Franco-British effort could become a spur to European political integration. France and Britain would have a high incentive to foster European unity before the issue of

nuclear weapons under German national control becomes acute.

Whatever is done in the military field, the current crisis underlines the urgent need for greater political cohesion in the Western Alliance. We are now in the curious position of pressing for military integration while practicing political bilateralism. On a variety of issues from Berlin to the test ban, we have claimed the right for independent approaches to the Soviets.

HOWEVER, unity in the security field is bound to be ephemeral without a common diplomacy. We cannot have different conceptions of a possible casus belli—which is at least one implication of different negotiating positions—and insist at the same time that the resulting strategy must be unified. If we want to spur integration, the political field would seem much more promising than the military. If the nations of the Atlantic Community follow common policies, the existence of different centers of military decision would present primarily a problem of technical co-ordination, not a challenge to allied unity.

The Atlantic Alliance requires urgently a political body to define common objectives and the means to achieve them. It might be useful to begin by developing a common position on such issues as Berlin, disarmament, or the test ban. If it should be argued that this is impossible, the emptiness of nuclear multilateralism is patent. Nations that cannot agree on common negotiating positions on such matters are not likely to be able to devise a common strategy for an apocalypse.

Withal, it is important to keep the difficulties of the Western Alliance in proper perspective. Deep as the divisions are, they are the result of the success of previous policies. They testify to the emergence of a strong and self-confident Europe—a consistent goal of U.S. policy in the last three administrations. Few of the recent fissures in the West have been produced by Soviet actions. This is another way of saying that the West is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to waste its own substance. It also means that the remedies are still within our own control.

March 28, 1963

37

AT HOME & ABROAD

A Return to the Frontier

EILEEN CHANG

WHEN I got off the plane in Taipei on my way to Hong Kong, I did not expect to see anyone I knew. I had asked the Chu's not to meet me, knowing they were busy just then. But it was possible that they would get somebody else to come in their stead, so I was not surprised when an efficient-looking man in neat western clothes approached me. "You are Mrs. Richard Nixon?" he said in English.

I had seen many photographs of the blonde Mrs. Nixon and never imagined I resembled her. Besides, he should be able to tell a fellow Chinese even behind her dark glasses. But with a woman's inability to disbelieve a compliment altogether, no matter how flagrantly untrue, I remembered that she was thin, which I undoubtedly was. Then there was those glasses. "No, I am sorry," I said, and he walked away to search among the other passengers.

It struck me as a little odd that Mrs. Nixon should come to Formosa, even if everybody is visiting the Orient just now. Anyhow there must have been some mix-up, as there was only this one embassy employee to greet her.

"Did you know Mrs. Nixon is coming today?" I asked my friends Mr. and Mrs. Chu, who had turned up after all.

"No, we haven't heard," Mr. Chu said. I told them about the man who mistook me for her and what a joke

that was. "Um," he said unsmiling. Then he said somewhat embarrassedly, "There's a man who is always hanging around the airport to meet American dignitaries. He's not quite sane."

I laughed, then went under Formosa's huge wave of wistful yearning for the outside world, particularly America, its only friend and therefore in some ways a foe.

"How does it feel to be back?" Mr. Chu asked. Although I had never been there before, they were going along with the official assumption that Formosa is China, the mother country of all Chinese. I looked around the crowded airport and it really was China, not the strange one I left ten years ago under the Communists but the one I knew best and thought had vanished forever. The buzz of Mandarin voices also made it different from Hong Kong. A feeling of chronological confusion came over me.

"It feels like dreaming." And taking in all the familiar faces speaking the tones of homeland, I exclaimed, "But it's not possible!" Mr. Chu smiled ruefully as if I had said, "But you are ghosts."

MRS. CHU told me as we left the airport, "This is an ugly city, but the minute you get out of town it is beautiful."

They lodged me in a mountain inn. I got the Generals' Suite, where the generals stay when they come

uphill to report to the Generalissimo, who lives a few steps away across the road. The suite was reached through a series of deserted little courtyards, with its own rock garden and lotus pond. In the silence there was just the sound of the evening drizzle on the banana palm and in the bathroom a tap of sulphur water constantly running out of a stone lion mouth and splashing over the rim of the cement tank. There were rattan furniture on the tatami flooring and a wardrobe and bed with stained sheets. I told myself not to be fastidious. But there were bedbugs. Finally I had to get up near dawn to sleep on the ledge of the honor recess, where in Japanese living rooms the best vase and picture scroll are displayed. The maid was frightened when she came in the morning and could not find me.

It was plain that the generals had feminine companionship while spending the night awaiting audience with the Generalissimo. I wondered at the ease of procuring girls almost next door to that Christian and Confucian founder of the New Life Movement. Surely it was unseemly with "Heaven's countenance only a foot away," as we used to describe an audience with the emperor. After I left Taipei for the countryside, I realized that prostitution was more open on this island than perhaps anywhere else in the world. In a small-town newspaper five or six advertisements of this type appeared in one day: "Joy and Happiness Prostitute's Domicile, 1st Class. 124 Shin Ming Road. Swarms of pretty girls like clouds, offering the best service."

IN THE COUNTRYSIDE Formosa peels back, showing older strata. There were more native Formosans than refugees. The mixed emotions of my homecoming of sorts gave way to pure tourist enthusiasm.

From time to time Mrs. Chu, sitting next to me in the bus, whispered urgently, "Shandi, shandi!" I just caught a glimpse of a shandi, or mountain dweller, a gray little wraith with whiskers tattooed on her cheeks carrying a baby on her back and loitering outside a shop along the highway. "Shandi, shandi!" Again the breathless little cry and a nudge. I saw gypsylike children in ragged

38

THE REPORTER

LWV BULLETIN

Published by
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS
OF MASSACHUSETTS

41 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston 8, Mass. LA 3-3545

Vol. XXXIX January, 1963 No. 4

Subscription price: non-members .75 a
year; members .25 a year; single copy .10

and Tisbury, too

Entered as Second Class Mail
Return Requested

Mrs. Henry A. Kissinger
104 Fletcher Rd.
Belmont, Mass.

AHEAD OF THE HEADLINES

CANADA IN A WORLD CONTEXT

The 1963 School of International Relations — the 41st sponsored by The League of Women Voters of Massachusetts — presents “Canada In A World Context” at Kresge auditorium, Wednesday, January 30, 1963, from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

For three hundred years Canada and the United States have grown side by side with a minimum of friction and sometimes a minimum of cooperation. The “small world” concept and dramatic problems of lands as far away as Asia and Africa have led us to be far more concerned with border problems in India and growing pains in Ghana than with our own relationships within the hemisphere.

Is the League now mature enough to renounce crisis diplomacy and headlines in order to take a quiet, penetrating look at Canadian-American interdependence? Can we stimulate serious discussion of the changing role of North America in the expansion of world economy and the consequent shift in the balance of power for both Canada and the United States?

Evolution in public opinion and a

long-range perspective will be required in both the United States and Canada before an Atlantic Community can develop.

Meanwhile consideration must be given to the kind of relationship that can develop. Should this be an economic agreement? Would recent recommendations for closer political association by NATO conferees be feasible?

Is this really the right direction for Canada and the United States in view of their commitments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa? Would a North American Free Trade Area be an advantage to Canada? to the United States? Should the League be working for an extension of the Common Market principle to this part of the world?

Canada, fearing political absorption by the United States through economic interdependence, moves toward stronger integration with European policies politically and culturally, and strengthens diplomatic relations with countries throughout the world. This Canadian struggle for national identity is reflected in public attitudes toward NORAD, the mutual defense and security pact so

necessary to the protection of both countries. If NORAD operated within NATO would Canadian autonomy be stronger?

While Cuba held the headlines recently, Canada safeguarded our northern flank and strengthened our defense posture. Is it not time we began to understand our closest ally, to regard seriously the problems confronting Canada, to compromise our differences and to negotiate on conflict of interests?

The transition in world economy, the interdependence of nations require a new assessment of the roles of Canada and the United States. Can we enter the larger world context together with mutual respect for the uniqueness of each and with a more realistic understanding of our mutual interdependence?

On January 30, Canadian experts will involve League of Women Voters members in a search for possible economic compromises, for political understanding through the deepening of real knowledge of Canada's role in a changing world.

“School” Ground Rules

Kresge Auditorium is on the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and Memorial Drive, a short walk back from the street. It is very accessible via public transportation from Harvard Square and Mass. Station. Those who must travel by car are urged to use carpools and plan to park away from the Institute. Leagues who have a large enough group coming

may find it wise to hire a bus.

The Graduate House at MIT will again open its Campus Room for the use of the LWV and will serve a 99¢ luncheon. Other eating places are within walking distance. *Eating is not permitted in Kresge.*

For those who must leave a number at home for emergencies, please use only the following: UN 4-6900, Extension 2902.

Last Call

For the few tickets still remaining in the Auditorium for the School . . . a check for $2 for each ticket (not refundable if not used) desired may be sent with a self-addressed, stamped envelope to:

Mrs. David Epstein
51 Bailey Road
Watertown, Mass.

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LWV OF MASS. BULLETIN

JANUARY, 1963

## ANOTHER ELECTION

League members are reminded that election of state officers will be held at the State Convention, May 14 and 15, 1963.

The Nominating Committee is eager to have suggestions from local leagues for the five officers and nine directors to be elected. Names should be sent to the State Nominating Committee, 41 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston or to Mrs. Milton C. Wasby 35 Pequossette Road Belmont 78, Mass.

## Looking for Lively Issues?

Wherever two or more are gathered together in our beloved Commonwealth these days, the conversation inevitably turns to the political reputation of Massachusetts, and the members of the League are certainly not immune to the current concern for the health of our state.

Where others wring their hands and shrug their shoulders, however, the League reviews its Continuing Responsibilities (see President's column), assesses the progress of its Current Agenda items and begins to weigh the merits of the coming issues as possible program items for the next biennium.

Rarely before has the need for study and action on the state level been so acute. Seldom has the field of "lively issues" been so broad. Now, of course, comes the hard part, choosing that problem (or problems) in the area of government of interest to the whole state in which the League can expect to be most effective. While the concerted efforts of 12,000 League members in any area is not to be discounted, the time has come for all Leaguers to consider carefully the particular areas where its effectiveness will be maximized.

Choice of program starts with planning in the local leagues NOW. The interminable workings of the democratic process will come to fruition at the State Convention in May when the suggestions receiving the most support across the state will come to a vote. To

jog your thinking a bit, let us consider some of the areas where problems abound.

**THE CONSTITUTION:** A document of great reputation and considerable antiquity, does it "speak to our condition" in 1962-63? 1975? 2000? The League's study of the Constitution for the past two years has indicated that all the problems of Massachusetts are not to be solved by Constitutional Revision: implementation and proper legislation are what make it work. However, a concentrated study of the executive branch has posed some questions for further study. **THE LEGISLATURE.** The governor, to be effective, must work closely with the legislature. Some of the controls now exercised elsewhere properly belong with this body. How shall the executive and the legislature work in closer affiliation for the good of the electorate? What are some of the problems of the Legislature? An easily recognized one is the number of items of purely local concern with which it has to deal. A proposed solution is

**HOME RULE.** The first drive for Home Rule stems from the days when a city represented a separate organic social and economic community; a practical and natural self-contained settlement. This is no longer valid. Much of the theory of home rule assumes that there can be a clear cut separation of governmental functions, but the experts have come to appreciate that our governmental structure within the state resembles a marble cake rather than a layer cake! Do we, nonetheless, have a stake in avoiding the rigidities and costs of a huge bureaucracy? Is the local unit as we know it the one to gain home rule or is a redefinition of the word 'home' in order? And how do we classify

**COUNTY GOVERNMENT?** The stepchild of Massachusetts politics, has the county outlived its usefulness? Can it be incorporated into new Regional Planning areas as the governmental structure? It is obvious from the number of blanks on the ballots at the county level that these candidates, who control huge sums of money when elected, are largely unknown. This is a real area of concern for those who would modernize our total governmental structure for economy and efficiency.

**CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION.** With all the many phases of our government requiring review what are the means for obtaining such revision as may be needed? Some have come to feel that Massachusetts should have provision for periodic calling of a constitutional convention, although no specific mention of the convention method exists in our Constitution at all. This periodic review, it is felt, calls to the attention of all the voters the issues involved with the advantage of open and systematic reporting. Leagues in other states have often opposed calls to constitutional conventions because provisions relating to the election of delegates served only to perpetuate a *status quo* rather than achieve genuine revision that favored no specific interests or group. In some cases, however, convention is the only avenue open for achieving reform.

The ultimate control of government is in the hands of the voters and theirs is the right to change the basic structure. This is exercised by ratification or refusal of amendment, change, revision, etc. whether proposed by legislative amendment, initiative petition, or constitutional convention. Is a convention a true "voice of the people" or is a convention with an elected delegation again a representative body not vastly different from the legislature? Should we amend our constitution to provide specifically for the convention method?

This obviously suggests another area of broad concern across the country—

**ELECTION PROCEDURES.** A national study of this was turned down this year, because League members believed a national item would have a firmer basis if the states had all made a study of their own election laws. Since the Massachusetts LWV Convention in 1961, there has been an active citizen group studying election laws. As a result of their findings, Massachusetts has pioneered in solving part of the problem of the disenfranchised in our mobile society. A new law enables residents in Massachusetts who have been in the state thirty (30) days to vote in national elections. The revision of the law which requires candidates to disclose the source of their campaign funds can also be attributed to this group. There are, however, several areas requiring further study and action — a major one

*Continued on page 5*

JANUARY, 1963

LWV OF MASS. BULLETIN

3

## John Wendell Holmes

The President of the Canadian Insti-
tute of International Affairs, Mr. John
Wendell Holmes will discuss "Canadian
External Affairs" at the opening of the
afternoon session.

Educated at the Universities of West-
ern Ontario, Toronto, London, and
Duke, he entered the sphere of foreign
affairs after five years on the staff of
Pickering College in Ontario. Among
his subsequent positions are included
Special Wartime Assistant, Department
of External Affairs, 1943-44; Second
Secretary, Office of the Canadian High
Commissioner, London, 1944-47; Charge
d'Affairs, Canadian Embassy, Moscow,
1947-48; Head of the United Nations
Division, Department of External Af-
fairs, 1949-50; Acting Permanent Re-
presentative of Canada to the United
Nations and alternative Canadian Rep-
resentative on the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, 1950-51; directing staff of
National Defense College, 1951-53; As-
sistant Under-Secretary of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs (United Nations, Far
Eastern and Commonwealth Affairs),
1953-60. Mr. Holmes assumed his pres-
ent position in 1960.

As a part of his responsibilities he has
attended more than a score of inter-
national conferences both official and
unofficial, including Canadian Delega-
tions to the U. N. General Assembly up
to 1958; U.N. Security Council ses-
sions in 1948-49 and 1958; NATO Min-
isterial Meeting, Paris, 1954; Korea
Conference at Geneva; Meeting of
Presidents of U. S. A. and Mexico
with the Prime Minister of Canada,
1956; NATO Defense Ministers' Meet-
ing, 1958; Conference on World Ten-
sions, Chicago, 1960; European Ameri-
can Assembly, Burgenstock, 1961, etc.

Recent articles include "Political Im-
plications of the European Economic
Community," *Queen's Quarterly, Spring,*
1962; "Canada and the United States in
World Politics," *Foreign Affairs,* Oct-
tober 1961; "A Critical Look at Europe,"
*Wilton Park Journal*, December 1961.

## Forty-First School of International Relations

Sponsored by
**The League of Women Voters of Massachusetts**

**CANADA IN A WORLD CONTEXT**

at

**Kresge Auditorium**

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
70 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge

**Wednesday, January 30, 1963**

Morning Session — 10:00 a.m. to 12:15 p.m.

Stuart D. Hemsley, Canadian Consul General

Welcome

George V. Ferguson, Editor-in-Chief
Montreal Star

Canadian Political
Attitudes

William Diebold, Jr., Research Consultant
Council on Foreign Relations

Canada in the World
Economy

Afternoon Session — 1:45 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

John Wendell Holmes, President
Canadian Institute of International Affairs

**Canadian External Affairs**

Panel: Messrs. Ferguson, Diebold, and Holmes

Moderator: Laurence Martin, Professor of Diplomacy
School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University

## To Bridge The Gap

There's excellent background mate-
rial in the following reading list sug-
gested by the S.I.R. Committee!

Aitken, Hugh G.J., *American Capital and Canadian Resources*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961. Canada's attempts to offset its growing economic involvement with the United States by strengthening connections with other countries, especially Europe.

Conant, Melvin, *The Long Polar Watch*; Canada and the Defense of North America, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1962. Focusing on mutual security Conant recommends: revision of U.S. attitudes toward Canada; support for operating NORAD within NATO; acceptance of Canadian political independence within the U.N.

Eayrs, James, *The Art of the Possible*; Government and Foreign Policy in Canada, University of Toronto Press, Canada, 1961. Fascinating analysis of Canadian foreign policy and the evolution of her autonomy in the area of foreign affairs. Excellent background for an understanding of Canadian problems vis a vis the United States.

Holmes, John W., "Canada and the States in World Politics," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 105-117, October 1961. Canada and the U.S. have moved onto the world stage but their differences are more complex and frequent despite their interdependence. Holmes appeals for more understanding, for diversity in diplomatic approaches by Canada and the U.S. in relation to other countries.

Johnson, Harry G., *Canada in a Changing World Economy*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1962 (Alan B. Plaunt Memorial Lecture at Carelton University, Ottawa). Brief description of the Common Market effect on economic power balance and the economic implications for Canadian and U.S. policy if the challenge is to be met constructively.

Kent, Tom, "The Changing Place of Canada," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 4, pp. 581-592, July 1957. The circumstances that have changed the environment of Canada have caused its current nationalism. Kent is convinced that Canadians will and can exercise with greater maturity and strength their role as a "middle power."

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LWV OF MASS. BULLETIN

JANUARY, 1963

G. V. Ferguson

With his wide experience as a writer and commentator on political affairs, G. V. Ferguson, Editor-in-Chief of the *Montreal Star* is well qualified to set the stage on the topic of "Canadian Political Attitudes."

Born in Scotland, he came to British Columbia when his family emigrated in 1911. In 1915 he entered the University of Alberta only to leave before a year was up to join the Canadian Army. Returning from France in 1919 he re-entered the University and in 1921 went to Christ Church, Oxford, as a Rhodes Scholar where his field of study embraced Philosophy, Politics and Economics.

After a brief stint on the London *Times*, Mr. Ferguson joined the *Winnipeg Free Press* in 1925 where he stayed in various capacities until 1946 when he became Editor of the *Montreal Star*.

His chief professional occupation has been writing editorials, but he has also written a great many articles, mostly on politics and foreign policy topics. In 1947-48 he was Canadian representative on a United Nations' sub-committee on freedom of information. He has also broadcast as a commentator on political affairs and appears on CBC television panels.

Mr. Ferguson is the author of a book on J. W. Dafoe, late editor of the *Win-

nipeg Free Press and of a small book entitled, *How We Are Governed* published in 1951. He holds two honorary degrees from the Universities of New Brunswick and Alberta and is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

Laurence W. Martin

To moderate the afternoon panel discussion, the League has invited Dr. Laurence W. Martin, associate Professor of Diplomacy, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and Research Associate, the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Dr. Martin was born in the United Kingdom in 1928, received his undergraduate degrees from Christ's College, Cambridge, and a Ph.D. from Yale. He served as a Flying Officer, Royal Air Force, during World War II and returned to teach international politics at Yale and M.I.T. He has been Rockefeller Fellow for Advanced Research, 1958-59; Social Science Research Council Fellow, 1960-61; and Consultant to Twentieth Century Fund Study of Civil-Military Relations, Institute of Defense Analyses. He is the author of *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs*, 1956; *Peace without Victory*, 1958; and *Neutralism and Nonsignification*, 1962.

William Diebold, Jr.

From his work in 1939-40 under a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship at the Council on Foreign Relations to his present position as Senior Research Fellow for that organization, Mr. Diebold has devoted 25 years to foreign economic policy.

His first book, *New Directions in Our Trade Policy* was the result of a study of the impact of the war on the United States' trade agreements program. He then spent three years on the Economic and Financial Group of the Council's War and Peace Studies Project which assisted the government in analysing the problems which would arise after the war. Two years in the OSS in economic warfare intelligence and two in the State Department's Division of Commercial Policy ended in 1947 when he returned to the Council on Foreign Relations to be responsible for the economic part of their program. His particular interest has been in U.S. foreign economic policy, Western European integration and, more recently, Africa. His books include *Trade and Payments in Western Europe*, 1952; and *The Schuman Plan*, 1959.

A graduate of Swarthmore with graduate work at Yale and the London School of Economics, Mr. Diebold is occasionally Visiting Lecturer in the School of International Affairs, Columbia University.

JANUARY, 1963

LWY OF MASS. BULLETIN

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*Continued from page 2*

being REAPPORTIONMENT. Many areas in the state are under-represented at this time and, according to our Constitution, a reapportionment is now seven years overdue. Since the right to vote and to adequate representation and the need to get good candidates on the ballot is still a vital requisite to the improvement of Massachusetts' political climate, this study would be most fruitful.

What about the money to finance the operation of our state? A survey in June by the Massachusetts Taxpayers Federation this fall showed an enormous ignorance throughout the electorate about STATE FISCAL MATTERS. Should the League restudy this with the aim of educating League members and the public? There are two possible areas of consideration for a fiscal item: 1) the methods of raising money and 2) the methods by which state-collected money is distributed to cities and towns. This involves over $100 million at the present rate of collection and distribution. Re-examination of the kinds of taxes which support our educational programs, our highways, etc.; a review of the formulae by which the state disburses its funds may serve to disperse some of the fog of misunderstanding which is plauing our tax-conscious citizens at the present time.

There are two areas in which the League has demonstrated its effectiveness and two others of lively current interest which might also be "naturals" for League program....

EDUCATION. Half of the bills supported by the League in the 1962 legislative session were on education. Fourteen of the total of 26 League 'wins' were in education. It is obvious that the League must continue its vigilance on the many bills filed each year which directly affect high standards of public education. New areas, outside our consensus, are due to come to public attention during the next two years. The Special 21-member commission appointed to study all aspects of public education in the Commonwealth and the Advisory Board of Higher Educational Policy, to work on the problem of coordination of public

higher education will be reporting. Much ferment, some conclusions, and some important legislation will result from their findings. The League lacks consensus in one of the major areas of concern — that of coordination. This was barely touched at the conclusion of our most recent study. Perhaps the time is propitious to take up this problem now.

JUVENILE COURT. From 1937 to 1954 the League concern for welfare was concentrated in efforts to achieve a state-wide juvenile court system and to improve the probation system in the belief that there should be specialized handling of juvenile delinquents and other youthful offenders. In Massachusetts the statute provides for a specialized juvenile court judge in Boston Juvenile Court, but throughout the rest of the state these matters are heard by the district court judges. In 1960 the report of the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth said, "The Continuing problem of extreme variations in the level of services in our District Court Juvenile Session was considered. The need for a state-wide Juvenile Court system or a Family Court system which would have jurisdiction over problems involving families and children was stressed. For many years there has been a crying need for uniform standards in the handling of children and families in our courts throughout the state. It is hoped that in the not too distant future progress may be made in developing a court structure adequate to meet these needs."

Juvenile delinquency in the nation is increasing faster than the population. At present approximately 10,000 juveniles come before courts in Massachusetts annually. Steps are being taken by a special commission set up to consider the establishment of a proper kind of court based on the report of the Legislative Research Council issued in March of this year. If the interest shown by the League in the past is any indication, this may be a particularly appealing and timely study for voters for 1963-65.

MENTAL HEALTH. "Every American who is suffering from mental illness is entitled to intensive treatment in a facility which is easily accessible to him." (Policy statement of Governor's Conference on Mental Health, Chicago, 1961) Is this possible for Massachusetts citizens? There is a great variation in the amount of community based mental health services available to our cities and towns. One third of the employees on our state payroll are in the Department of Mental Health, but its budget is only 10% of the state budget. (Massachusetts is 48th in the nation in salaries paid to mental health personnel.) Some of the problems facing Massachusetts today are the need for state hospitals which are therapeutic as well as custodial; for community mental health centers; for professionally qualified personnel; for increased research; for overhaul of our personnel practices; and, particularly, for a citizenry aware of the needs of an adequate mental health program. Health, education, and welfare have been the peculiar concern of women and the area in which they can rally support most effectively. To put the League 'in the picture' in this area would carry on to its logical conclusion some of the work in Civil Service on which we have such good consensus.

And lastly an area of rising concern — **CONSUMER PROTECTION.** *The Silent Spring*, thalidomide babies have focused the attention of many on the kinds of control now exercised over the distribution of pesticides and dangerous drugs, to mention only the most dramatic. This is a state as well as a national problem and one on which the League should be able to shed some unbiased light. If there is legislation, is it adequate? Is it properly implemented with staff and funds? What comes under its jurisdiction and what does not? The issue is timely and lively.

There are undoubtedly other burning issues which cry for action. The first round of program planning is underway. It is time for you, the member, to speak.

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LWY OF MASS. BULLETIN

JANUARY, 1963

## President's Column

Your state board suggested that this month's column be devoted to one aspect of the business of state convention — the adoption of continuing responsibilities.

The primary business of league conventions, of course, is the adoption of Program, both current agenda and continuing responsibilities. We devote a great deal of thought and discussion to our current agenda. Possible new fields of league action always provoke much member interest before convention and considerable excitement during the debate at convention.

When we get to the adoption of continuing responsibilities, I sometimes wonder if we perhaps take them more for granted than we should. Should we spend more time on CRs — both before and during convention? What is the role of CRs in the league? Why are they important to all league members? If you know why, skip this column; if you don't, read on!

First of all, each CR represents agreement of league members on an issue; in other words, a CR is a position of support or opposition agreed on after sustained study and discussion by a substantial number of league members. This means that a CR forms the basis for league action. As such, a CR is an integral part of the purpose of the League of Women Voters — to increase informed and active participation by citizens in government.

Secondly, CRs provide continuity from the past to the present and to the future because they relate previous study, discussion and consensus of league members to the work we are now doing and to the work that we will do in the future.

Our state legislative program each year is based on our various continuing responsibilities and represents the results of league work over a period of years. If you look back over our annual legislative programs you will see that we have taken action on some CRs every year — in the correctional, educational, and fiscal areas, for instance. Sometimes our opportunity for action comes when a CR is fairly new, as with our positions on fiscal and administrative independ-

ence for institutions of public higher education and on strengthening the state's parole system.

Some CRs are currently inactive. For instance, we have had few opportunities in recent years to take action on the basis of our CRs on constitutional rights. Other CRs seem to be akin to "hardy perennials." Every year we support the electric roll call and equalized valuations and we oppose attempts to remove financial independence of school committees and qualifications for probation officers. (Last year was the first year since 1956 that no bill was introduced to lower qualification standards for probation officers.)

Since effective league action depends on our keeping up-to-date, it is not surprising that CRs occupy considerable league time and effort on all levels. The state league publishes pamphlets, such as "Where We Stand — Continuing Responsibilities," issues memos and copies of legislative statement to local league legislative and CR chairmen, holds meetings and workshops on CRs for local chairmen and their committees, and publishes articles on CRs in the state Bulletin. Local leagues hold a variety of legislative and CR meetings, make state and national league publications available to you, and include further information in your local league bulletins. The national league performs the same services for all league members on national CRs. (Be sure to get a copy of "NCR" — just published by the LWV of the U.S.)

The importance which the league attaches to CRs is also evident in the requirement of the national league that provisional leagues review all the CRs (state and national) before they may apply for recognition as a local league. In this sense, when a member enrolls in the league she also "enrolls" in the CRs. This does not mean that she must agree with all league positions; it does mean that she accepts them as positions previously agreed upon. This is not the final word — every member, new and old, has equal opportunity to work for changes in the CRs.

The time to make changes in the CRs is NOW. Program suggestion time is here and convention is not far off. What do you think of your CRs? Would you like to see one or more of them changed or dropped from the Program of the LWV of Massachusetts?

I hope you will all "look them over once and look them over twice" and ask yourself: "do I agree with this position?", "will I support legislation based on this CR?", and "is this CR outdated or is it still pertinent to the problems of Massachusetts today?"

THE CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES ARE YOUR POSITIONS. Now is the time for you to have your say about them. Don't miss it.

## CALENDAR

* Jan. 2 Legislature Convenes

* Jan. 3 State Board Meeting

* Jan. 8 Finance "Revival Meeting"
  3 Joy Street

* Jan. 10 Legislative Program Day
  CR Workshop
  3 Joy Street
  Legislative Tour

* Jan. 22 Special State Board
  Meeting

* Jan. 30 School for International
  Relations

* Feb. 7 State Budget Day
  3 Joy Street

## BULLETIN

### League of Women Voters of Massachusetts

Affiliated with the League of Women Voters of the United States

Mrs. HAROLD M. PETERS, editor

Published monthly

September through June inclusive except
December, March and May

Published at 41 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston 8,
Massachusetts. Second class postage paid at
Boston, Mass. President, Mrs. Bruce B. Benson,
Amherst; Vice-presidents, Mrs. Melvin Thorner,
Quincy and Mrs. L. William Bertelsen,
Wayland; Secretary, Mrs. William Stenzel,
Sudbury; Treasurer, Mrs. Maurice B. Strauss,
Boston.

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