[139] May 3

Public Papers of the Presidents

ments, and we laid the foundation for major increases in trade. Most importantly, we reached an unprecedented agreement limiting the nuclear arsenals that have haunted the world for a generation.

In the early months of 1973, intensive negotiations and a decisive military policy brought us at last to a just settlement of the long and costly war in Vietnam. We achieved our fundamental objectives—a cease-fire, the return of our prisoners, a commitment to account for those missing in action, the honorable withdrawal of our forces, and the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own political future.

But the peace in Vietnam and the parallel peace in Laos remain fragile because of North Vietnam's continued violations of the peace agreement. A cease-fire still has not been reached in Cambodia. We earnestly hope these problems can be solved at the conference table. We will not turn our back on our friends and allies while Hanoi makes a mockery of its promise to help keep the peace.

During recent months, with less fare than in negotiations with our adversaries but with no less dedication, we have also been working closely with our Atlantic and Pacific partners. In addition, we have moved toward major reform of the international economic system, although the process of readjustment is still marked by crises.

We have continued to share more responsibilities with our friends under the Nixon Doctrine. In sum, recalling the challenges we faced and the goals we set at the outset of this Administration, all Americans can take satisfaction in the record of the recent past.

But our progress in the early 1970's has

been more marked in reducing tensions than in restructuring partnerships. That is why we must make 1973 not only the "Year of Europe," as some have called it, but also the year of renewal for all of America's alliances and friendships.

In this spirit, we shall cooperate with our European friends to forge even stronger partnerships, cemented by a new articulation of the goals we share.

There will be the closest collaboration on such major issues as the mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe, the European Security Conference, and the current round of strategic arms limitation talks. Before the end of the year, I will visit our Atlantic allies.

We shall also continue to attach the highest priority to our relations with our major Pacific ally, Japan. Prime Minister Tanaka will visit the United States this summer for talks on this subject.

We shall work with all concerned nations to create a stable monetary system and to promote freer trade. To make this possible, I again urge the Congress to pass promptly the crucial trade legislation I submitted last month.

We are also seeking in 1973 to further the positive momentum in our relations with the Soviet Union. I look forward to welcoming the Soviet leadership to this country later in the year.

Dr. Kissinger leaves tonight for Moscow to prepare for that visit. New U.S.-Soviet talks are already underway, aiming for further agreements on controlling nuclear weapons.

We shall also continue this year to build our promising new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

We shall pay particular attention to our neighbors in this hemisphere. Secretary Rogers is soon to embark on a trip to Latin

346

202

America, and the journey may be more tiring.

We shall continue to reduce tensions in such areas as Asia, and we shall continue to strengthen our partnerships of our friends with the free world's Congress to this effect.

We shall continue to strengthen our partnerships of our friends with the free world's Congress to this effect.

Our policies can be summarized in two points: to work to maintain world peace and security.

Where we shall work to maintain world peace and security.

Where we shall continue to pursue our policies.

140 M
R

To the Contrary

This Article is mental, not material, and well as the mental image of the material image.

Public policy is essentially an urgent, essential part of any American goals is to secure the support of the American people in the policy for these goals.

These goals are the practical expression of the practical philosophy which the practice of the practical philosophy reflects, and which reflects the context in which it is made

Richard Nixon, 1973

May 3 [140]

America, and I look forward to a similar journey myself during my second term.

We shall do our part with others to reduce tensions and increase opportunity in such areas as the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

We shall continue building new partnerships of shared responsibilities with all our friends around the globe. Approval of the foreign aid bill which I sent to the Congress this week will be fundamental to this effort.

Our policy in the world for the next 4 years can be summarized quite simply:

Where peace is newly planted, we shall work to make it thrive.

Where bridges have been built, we shall

work to make them stronger.

Where friendships have endured, we shall work to make them grow.

We shall keep America strong, involved in the world, meeting the responsibilities which no other free nation is able to meet in building a structure of peace.

I said upon taking office more than 4 years ago that a nation could aspire to no higher honor than the title of peacemaker. America has done much to earn that title since then. Let us resolve to do still more in the years ahead.

Thank you and good evening.

NOTE: The President recorded the remarks for use on radio.

## 140 Message to the Congress Transmitting Fourth Annual Report on United States Foreign Policy. May 3, 1973

To the Congress of the United States:

This Administration attaches fundamental importance to the articulation as well as the execution of foreign policy.

Public understanding is, of course, essential in a democracy. It is all the more urgent in a fast changing world, which requires continuing, though redefined, American leadership. One of my basic goals is to build a new consensus of support in the Congress and among the American people for a responsible foreign policy for the 1970's.

These were the reasons that I began the practice of annual Presidential Reports to the Congress. This fourth Review, like the previous ones, sets forth the philosophical framework of our policy and discusses major trends and events in this context. Two other important documents

complement this one with the more detailed record of current questions and policies. The Secretary of State's third annual report of April 19, 1973, covers our specific country, regional, and functional policies and provides basic documentation. The Secretary of Defense's yearly report of April 3, 1973, presents a thorough accounting of our policies and programs for national defense.

It is my hope that this Report will inform and lift the national dialogue on our purposes and our place in the world.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
May 3, 1973.

NOTE: The President signed the report at a ceremony in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

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347

VIETNAM

On January 27, 1973, when the United States and the three Viet-
namese parties signed "The Agreement on Ending the War and Restor-
ing Peace In Vietnam," we completed one of the most difficult chapters
in our history. It was an honorable ending to a long and costly effort.

Peace in Indochina is not yet solid or comprehensive. But four years of
intensive negotiations and the steady transfer of responsibilities to our
friends achieved the fundamental goals we had set. As a result of the
Agreement:

- Our military forces have left South Vietnam with honor.

- Our prisoners have returned to their homes and families. A full accounting for all those missing in action is stipulated.

- There is a ceasefire, though still imperfectly observed, in Vietnam and Laos.

- The South Vietnamese people have the opportunity to determine their own political future.

The settlement is a tribute to the brave people of South Vietnam. It is also a monument to the valor of American fighting men and the steadfastness of the American people who supported an unselfish but extremely difficult mission until that mission was accomplished.

What We Found

From the moment I took office, my highest priority was to bring an honorable end to the war in Vietnam. America had been involved for eight years in a well-motivated but costly and seemingly endless effort. Every year we had sent more men to Vietnam. Our casualties, draft calls, and financial costs had risen steadily. The war dominated our national attention. Abroad it complicated our efforts to adjust to changing conditions. At home it fostered growing dissent.

Clearly we needed to end the war, or at least our involvement in it. But if this was our most urgent task, it was also our most difficult. For the way we went about it would have much to do with the future of American foreign policy and the future of our own society.

The costs and frustrations of our involvement had led an increasing number of Americans to urge extreme solutions—either massive military escalation or immediate retreat. We rejected both options. Trying

to win the conflict by all-out military measures would have opened
the divisions in our society, and risked drawing other nations into the
war. It would not have addressed the complex nature of the struggle
and therefore was likely to be indecisive.

Immediate withdrawal from Vietnam might have brought a sense of temporary relief in this country. But soon this mood would have turned to regret and recrimination. We could not suddenly abandon allies with whom we had stood for so many years. We could not mock the sacrifices of Americans who had given their lives. We could not set out to shape a responsible American foreign policy with a first step of heedless abdication. Reckless withdrawal certainly would have brought neither peace to South Vietnam nor honor to America. It might have led to the collapse of Southeast Asia, and it would have crippled our efforts to build peace in the world.

But neither could we continue on the path we found. Our troop levels had risen steadily for five years and had reached an authorized level of 549,500. Our combat deaths had mounted to an average of 278 weekly during 1968. We were spending an additional $22 billion each year on the war. Draft calls had risen to a monthly average of 30,000. And despite this investment, there was no decisive outcome on the battlefield.

The picture was similarly bleak at the conference table. As a result of our bombing halt, public negotiations had been launched in Paris, but they had proved sterile. Only procedural matters had been settled. No comprehensive plans for a settlement lay on the table. No prospects for a breakthrough existed.

The Basic Foundation: Vietnamization

Faced with this situation, we chose what we believed to be the only responsible course—to follow the parallel tracks of negotiation and Vietnamization. Our first preference was a negotiated settlement, and we undertook both public and private diplomacy to this end. Our irreducible conditions were that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to determine their own future and that all our prisoners be returned. We also looked toward a ceasefire to end the war for all participants.

But one side cannot negotiate a peace, and the North Vietnamese constantly made two unacceptable demands. First, they insisted we withdraw totally from South Vietnam before any other conditions were even discussed. Secondly, they demanded we overthrow the existing government in South Vietnam and replace it with a Communist-dominated structure. This was the only way, they said, to get our prisoners back or obtain an overall settlement. Unless we were prepared to hand South

42

43

Vietnam over to the enemy, there was no prospect of an early break-
through the conference table.

Therefore, even while we sought peace through negotiations, we
needed an alternative course of action. We wanted to ensure that:

- Our withdrawal would not depend on the enemy's reasonableness at the conference table. We wanted to reduce our involvement to demonstrate that it was not open-ended.

- The act of our withdrawal would not overthrow the non-Communist forces. We were determined to disengage responsibly.

We thus developed the Vietnamization program in close cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN). This policy was designed to strengthen the armed forces and the people of South Vietnam so that they could defend themselves. As their forces increased in numbers, equipment, combat skills, and leadership, they progressively assumed responsibility for their own defense. The process also involved the extension of governmental authority in the countryside through the pacification program, the growth of economic capacities, the development of political institutions—all the elements that would allow South Vietnam to stand on its own.

While negotiations foundered on Communist intransigence, Vietnamization was an honorable and convincing alternative. We had the following considerations in mind:

- Vietnamization allowed us unilaterally to achieve our objective of winding down our involvement.

- We had to ensure that our friends over the longer term could take over their self-defense completely, since we could not stay there indefinitely.

- Our policy reflected our overall approach to friends and allies around the world—we would continue to play a strong supporting role, but we would increasingly look to our partners to assume greater responsibilities for their security and development.

- We needed to demonstrate to Hanoi and its allies that we had an option so long as they blocked progress at the conference table—one that enabled our allies to stand on their own and could gain the support of the American people for a continuing role until our allies were ready.

The tangible progress of Vietnamization was reflected in the statistics. In four years, we progressively reduced our presence from more than half a million men to 27,000, a 95 percent cut, by December 1, 1972. Other allied forces from Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines were withdrawn or phased down during the period. American casualties in South Vietnam fell from almost 300 a week

44

when we took office to 26 a week in 1971, and to four a week during the final six months of our involvement. Over 60 percent of the casualties under this Administration occurred in 1969 before our policies could take hold. We reduced the cost of the war by billions of dollars each year.

During this period, the South Vietnamese progressively took over the battle. Our ground combat role was steadily reduced and officially ended on June 30, 1972. Our friends also assumed all naval missions and an increasing share of direct air support. The South Vietnamese armed forces and people shouldered the burdens with courage and skill. And all the other crucial indicators of the struggle stayed promising also—the security situation in the countryside, the performance of the economy, and the cohesiveness of the political fabric.

## The Need for Decisive Action

During this process, firm but measured military actions were also required:

- To protect our men in Vietnam as their numbers declined.

- To assure the continued success of Vietnamization and thus reduce our presence, our casualties, and our costs.

- To demonstrate that the enemy could not wage war on South Vietnam with impunity while using the rest of Indochina as a base area and stalling us at the conference table.

The North Vietnamese stepped up their pressure during the first months of each year, after building up their potential during the dry season. In 1969 shortly after we took office, they increased their attacks in South Vietnam. In 1970, they launched major attacks in Cambodia, attempting to link up their base areas into one continuous band. In 1971 they staged a major buildup in southern Laos.

These operations threatened American and allied forces. Beyond that, they challenged the whole Vietnamization program. The Communists were intent on expanding their base areas bordering South Vietnam, strengthening their logistics network, and linking up conventional and guerilla forces for future assaults.

Our basic strategy was to blunt the threat to our men, meet the challenge to our program, and buy the time needed to make our ally self-sufficient. Our actions were defensive and limited in both duration and scope. In 1970 there were joint U.S.-South Vietnamese operations against the North Vietnamese base areas in Cambodia. In 1971 the South Vietnamese, with our support, attacked the enemy base areas in Laos.

45

These actions achieved the objectives we set. In the months following each action, our troop levels and casualties showed a marked decline while South Vietnam's security situation and self-confidence improved.

Each of these phases in turn demonstrated the continuing success of Vietnamization. The 1969 Communist attacks made little headway because the enemy had suffered heavy losses in their Tet Offensive the year before and our own forces were still at a peak level. In the 1970 Cambodia operation, the South Vietnamese conducted large scale military operations of their own alongside U.S. forces. In 1971 in Laos our allies carried on all of the ground combat while our role was limited to air and logistic support. At each stage the South Vietnamese did more and we did less; and after each stage we were able to accelerate the shifting of responsibilities. In 1972, when the most severe test of all came, the South Vietnamese were ready.

By early 1972, South Vietnam had made impressive progress across the board. Militarily, its forces had taken over virtually all of the ground fighting and much of the close air support mission. Over one million civilians had joined the People's Self-Defense Forces. The government had the confidence to supply this local militia with weapons. The pacification program was succeeding. Eighty percent of the population lived in areas under government control. Nearly all of South Vietnam's 2,200 villages had elected their own local leaders. Comprehensive economic reforms had cut the rate of inflation and stabilized South Vietnam's economy. Industrial output, exports, and tax revenues had reached their highest point in many years. A vigorous land reform program had transferred nearly one million acres of farm land to former tenants, and the government had established a widespread system of low interest agricultural loans. The rice harvest promised a bumper crop, thanks in part to high yield grains introduced with our assistance. School attendance and classroom construction had reached new high levels. Nearly one million refugees—most of them displaced by the Communists' Tet Offensive in 1968—had resettled or were being cared for.

In the spring of 1972, faced with South Vietnam's growing military, economic, and political strength, North Vietnam launched its most massive challenge. On March 30, its troops poured through the Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam which the 1954 Geneva Agreements had established. In so doing, Hanoi abandoned its previous tactics and fundamentally changed the nature of the fighting, for it employed almost its entire army in an all-out frontal assault.

This challenge came just as we were trying to revive private negotiations in Paris to get a response to a comprehensive U.S.-GVN peace proposal that had been tabled on January 27, 1972. While Hanoi was

46

preparing its major military assault—and even after it wasкерway— we tried every route of restraint. After months of effort, finally arranged a secret meeting in Paris on May 2 with the North Vietnamese. This proved abortive as they rejected all possibilities for de-escalation or for settlement. They were obviously determined to settle matters through military action.

South Vietnamese valor and America's forceful support blunted the Communist offensive. On May 8, faced with aggression in Vietnam and intransigence in Paris, I announced that we were mining all major North Vietnamese ports and were resuming air and naval attacks in North Vietnam to interdict the flow of troops and supplies into the South. At the same time, I held out the alternative of a peaceful settlement along lines that eventually began to emerge five months later to the day.

I took these actions only after all other options had been exhausted and the imperatives were clear. We could not passively acquiesce in all-out aggression, fueled by the arms of outside powers and conducted in total disregard of international agreements and understandings. Most immediately, the enemy attacks threatened our remaining forces in South Vietnam as well as regional stability. Beyond that, it challenged America's credibility and thus the chances for stability around the world. Finally, it was the eve of my journey to Moscow: how could the President of the United States go to a summit meeting while our ally was being overrun with the help of arms supplied by the country he was visiting?

The South Vietnamese stood up well under the massive attack, which was designed to inflict political, psychological, and economic damage as well as to gain territory. Enemy guns pounded civilian centers, such as Quang Tri City and An Loc, into rubble, but the Communists kept little territory, and they failed to crack the spirit of the South Vietnamese. Buoyed by our actions, our allies rolled back most Communist territorial gains and liberated Quang Tri City, the only provincial capital the Communists had been able to take. More than one million South Vietnamese “voted with their feet” by moving into areas controlled by their government rather than staying with the enemy. Local leaders performed well under pressure. Even opposition groups closed ranks with the government against the common enemy. The inevitable economic dislocations were slight. The land reform program continued and, by March 1973, two and a half million acres had been distributed by the government, virtually eliminating land tenancy in South Vietnam.

Thus, the North Vietnamese offensive had failed. The steady development of Vietnamization and the allied military reactions of 1970 and 1971 had made possible the defense of South Vietnam in 1972. The cli-

47

military phase gradually underlined to all parties the futility of
continued conflict and the need for genuine negotiations.

In sum, the military measures we took in Indochina were a difficult
but essential aspect of our peace-making efforts. In each case we made
clear our limited objectives. Throughout we emphasized the alternative
route of a negotiated end to the conflict. Reinforcing the tracks of Viet-
namization and negotiations, these decisive actions made an indispensable
contribution to the peace that was finally achieved.

Negotiating the Peace

The Agreement which was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, culminated four years of intensive negotiating effort. Throughout this process, our fundamental attitude was as I described it on November 2, 1972:

"We are going to sign the agreement when the agreement is right, not one day before. And when the agreement is right, we are going to sign without one day's delay."

In Vietnamization the guiding principle was to give the South Viet-
namese the chance to defend themselves; in negotiations it was to give
the South Vietnamese the chance to choose for themselves.

In reviewing the long negotiating record, certain basic elements should
be kept in mind.

Our preference was always to solve military questions alone. The best way to ensure that the South Vietnamese could determine their own political future was to leave political questions to them. We believed that we should not negotiate a political settlement for South Vietnam. Furthermore, we knew that military issues would be easier to resolve than political issues that would be extremely difficult given Vietnam's long and bitter history. We were neither qualified, nor justified, in detailing specific political formulas such as governmental bodies or electoral processes for the Vietnamese people. Nor did we wish to be directly involved in—or responsible for—the functioning of the political machinery.

We preferred to concentrate on those aspects of a settlement that directly involved us—the military activity, withdrawals, and prisoners. We felt the political future should be negotiated by the South Vietnamese themselves, hopefully in a calmer atmosphere. We did not seek to impose a political victory, any more than a military victory, but we were not prepared to impose a political defeat.

Until the final stage the North Vietnamese and their allies insisted
on a settlement that would effectively guarantee that the future of South

48

Vietnam would be Communist. Public speculation and commentary to the contrary, they never agreed to separate military from political issues until the end of 1972. And when, in light of this position, we presented comprehensive proposals, including political elements, they never wavered from their basic goals.

However they packaged their proposals, the fundamental provisions were a fixed date for our total and unconditional withdrawal; the removal of the leadership of the Government of South Vietnam; and the installation of Communist rule disguised as a so-called coalition government.

This basic philosophic clash, not the failure to find precise formulas,
delayed a settlement for four years. So long as the Communists insisted
on their basic demands, we were faced at the conference table with one
overriding issue. I addressed this question in last year's Report:

"Will we collude with our enemies to overturn our friends? Will we impose a future on the Vietnamese people that the other side has been unable to gain militarily or politically? This we shall never do."

The only solution offered by our domestic critics was to turn our ally over to the Communists, either through accepting their terms in Paris or removing all our support from South Vietnam. And neither course provided any guarantee that we would obtain the release of our prisoners.

Instead—as we pursued fruitless negotiations in Paris—we wound
down our presence in South Vietnam responsibly. Vietnamization re-
assured our allies and spurred their initiative. South Vietnam's steady
advance toward self-reliance was certainly a factor in the enemy's ulti-
mate decision to negotiate seriously.

In the end we emerged with a settlement that met our basic principles
and gave the South Vietnamese people a chance to determine their own
future.

The First Three Years. In last year's Report I detailed our public initiatives and secret diplomacy for peace during the first three years of this Administration. Briefly, the record was as follows:

- At the outset we took *unilateral steps to induce negotiations*, such as the progressive withdrawal of our troops and reduction in air sorties in Vietnam. Each of our measures was met by fresh and more stringent demands by the enemy.

- We also moved publicly to *define the framework for a negotiated settlement*, emphasizing the withdrawal of foreign troops and general principles to allow the South Vietnamese to determine their own political future. On May 14, 1969, we proposed

49

a settlement that would remove all outside forces from South Vietnam and establish internationally supervised elections. On July 11, 1969, the Republic of Vietnam offered free elections to be run by a mixed electoral commission, in which all parties could participate. On April 20, 1970, I spelled out the principles of a political solution that would reflect the choice of the South Vietnamese people and the existing relationship of political forces within the country. I pledged that the United States would abide by the outcome of any political process chosen by the South Vietnamese.

- On October 7, 1970, we presented an overall proposal for a settlement that looked to the resolution of military questions and free political choice for the South Vietnamese. We proposed an internationally supervised ceasefire; an Indochina Peace Conference; the withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam; a political solution based on the principles of April 20; and the immediate unconditional release of all prisoners of war.

- Throughout this period we intensively pursued secret diplomacy in the hopes that a private forum might produce genuine negotiations. Dr. Kissinger went to Paris regularly to meet with the North Vietnamese Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy.

- In these secret sessions we spelled out positions that were more detailed and forthcoming than our public stance, as we made maximum efforts to make a breakthrough toward peace. On May 31, 1971, we offered a special settlement of military issues alone—the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in exchange only for an Indochina ceasefire and release of all prisoners. All other questions would be left to the South Vietnamese.

- The North Vietnamese continued to insist that political questions also be included, specifically that a coalition government dominated by their side be installed. During the following months the Communists followed a particularly cynical negotiating procedure designed to mislead public opinion. On June 26, they tabled a secret nine-point proposal; five days later, on July 1, the South Vietnamese Communists made a public seven-point proposal. Our own subsequent secret positions responded to both plans. Meanwhile the North Vietnamese castigated us publicly for not responding to the seven-point proposal even though privately they said we should respond to their nine-point proposal, and we had done so.

- In view of Hanoi's insistence that political issues be addressed, we presented during the summer a series of increasingly generous and comprehensive peace plans which were designed to frame a political

50

process as well as settle the military questions. By August we had our total withdrawal in nine months; a political process which included elections and our pledge to neutrality and acceptance of the outcome; limitations on military aid to South Vietnam providing there were limits on aid to North Vietnam as well; non-alignment for South Vietnam and all of Indochina; and reunification to be worked out between North and South Vietnam.

- On October 11, in response to North Vietnamese comments, we conveyed still another comprehensive plan to Hanoi and proposed another secret meeting in November to consider it. They agreed to meet on November 20, but abruptly cancelled the session just three days before, on November 17.

- On January 25, 1972, after waiting in vain for more than three months for the North Vietnamese to answer our proposal to meet, we were compelled to explain the situation to the American people and try to elicit Hanoi's reaction to our offers. We revealed the scope of our private diplomacy, and President Thieu and I offered a new comprehensive plan for peace. Once again we sought to make the political process as free and open to all parties as possible while resolving the military conflict.

- Our proposal provided that within six months of a settlement all U.S. and allied forces would withdraw from South Vietnam; all prisoners throughout Indochina would be released; there would be a ceasefire throughout the region; and a new Presidential election would take place in South Vietnam. In addition, President Thieu offered to resign one month before the elections. We spelled out these provisions and others in considerable detail. We also made clear, as we had proposed in May 1971, that we were prepared to settle only the military issues and to leave political matters for later resolution by the South Vietnamese.

**January–October 1972.** The North Vietnamese response to our comprehensive offer was to continue their massive military buildup in South Vietnam and to launch their Easter invasion. They never replied to our negotiating proposal; they refused to meet us privately; and they repeated their same negotiating demands publicly.

The North Vietnamese finally agreed to meet again in Paris privately on May 2. We made every effort to find a way to end or scale down military conflict. We proposed a variety of approaches: mutual escalation; a de facto ceasefire; a partial withdrawal of the invading

51

forces; an overall military settlement; or more comprehensive solutions
All of our proposals were rejected.

Accordingly, we had little choice but to respond with the decisive
measures of May 8, 1972. At the same time we proposed a fair settle-
ment, one that would prove eventually to be the framework for peace:
the cessation of all our military activities and the withdrawal of all our
forces within the same period, and a ceasefire. We told Hanoi that we
would resume private negotiations at any time.

The North Vietnamesse eventually decided to resume talks in Paris
on July 19, 1972. As these discussions went on throughout the summer,
the enemy continued to insist on a comprehensive political and military
solution along familiar lines. While there were marginal changes in their
approach, enough to justify continuing the negotiations, there was no
real progress toward a solution. In the July, August, and September
sessions, their positions, however modified around the edges, contained
the unacceptable core—imposition of a coalition government that the
Communists would control.

Until October 1972, therefore, the basic stumbling block remained
North Vietnam's demand that political victory be handed to them as a
pre-condition for settling all military questions. In that case, of course,
the latter would become totally irrelevant since the very issue that the
struggle was all about would have been settled.

The October Breakthrough

On October 8, 1972, the North Vietnamese presented a new plan in Paris accepting the basic principles of our position. It was the essential breakthrough toward a negotiated settlement. For the first time, Hanoi agreed, in effect, to separate military questions from the principal political issues. They spelled out specific solutions to the former while the latter were to follow later and were left basically up to the South Vietnamese. Moreover, they dropped their insistent demand for President Thieu's resignation and formation of a coalition government.

To be sure, there were major problems in their plan, and tough negotiations lay ahead. But, in their own words, the North Vietnamese had essentially accepted the approach that I had outlined in my May 8th speech. We could see that, given a constructive attitude on their part, there was, at long last, the genuine prospect of a negotiated peace.

Once this breakthrough was achieved, we moved decisively and quickly toward a final settlement. The North Vietnamese negotiated seriously as well. In areas where there had never been significant movement, there was now rapid progress. Through intensive negotiations

from October 8-12 and on October 17, and diplomatic communications, we hammered out a basic draft agreement.

Perhaps to catch the South Vietnamese off balance, perhaps to pin us
down to a settlement before our own elections, the North Vietnamese
insisted on a very short timetable, with October 31, 1972, the date for
final signature. After refusing to negotiate seriously for three years, the
enemy now demanded that we complete the negotiations within three
weeks of their proposal. We promised to make a maximum effort to meet
the deadline, subject to discussions with Saigon and a final negotiating
round to complete the draft.

To prove our serious intentions and to reflect the progress that was
being made, I ordered suspension of all bombing above the 20th parallel
in North Vietnam on October 23, 1972. During this period, as a result
of several developments since the October 17 meetings in Paris, we told
the North Vietnamese privately that, while we stood by the basic draft
agreement, we could not meet the October 31 target date.

There were three main reasons we could not do so:

- During the last half of October, we received mounting evidence that the Communists were planning to take advantage of the ceasefire with military offensives. This threw a different light on their eagerness to complete the agreement rapidly. Our South Vietnamese friends would have minimum time to prepare for the new situation. It also made more imperative the need to tighten up certain aspects of the agreement, including the supervisory mechanisms. Failure to settle on international machinery would mean that any violations would occur in an unsupervised context.

- At the very time we were conducting delicate consultations with our ally, Hanoi's leadership made public comments suggesting the possibility of a coalition government, which both sides had firmly agreed was not envisaged in the settlement. These and other ambiguities had to be put to rest.

- We ran into opposition in Saigon. Our South Vietnamese ally wanted many changes in the agreement, and they wanted more time for consultations. We were not prepared to accept all their proposals, but their deep concerns and the other factors made it essential to take a little more time. We believed a country that had suffered so much was entitled to have its views fully considered. We made clear, however, that we would maintain the integrity of the draft settlement.

On October 26, Hanoi publicly revealed the outlines of the agreement we were negotiating and repeated its insistence that we sign by the end

52

E2C3

53

of this month. We had agreed to keep the content of the negotiations private so as not to jeopardize their outcome. The North Vietnamese disclosures, however, gave us the choice of either breaking off negotiations or affirming our commitment to the framework of the settlement while describing the types of changes still needed. We chose the latter course and publicly outlined our position in response to North Vietnam's propaganda offensive.

Our primary audiences were Hanoi and Saigon. We believed that peace was very near, and we wanted to underline the message to both capitals. To our adversary, we committed ourselves publicly to the essence of the draft agreement. To our friends, we emphasized that we would take their concerns very seriously into account, but we left no doubt that we considered the basic settlement fair to all parties. We sympathized with Saigon's perspective. The war, after all, was on their soil; they would have to live with any agreement after we departed. But we were determined to conclude a settlement as soon as we were satisfied it was sound.

We emphasized our conviction that the remaining problems could be solved in one more negotiating round of three or four days, as had been foreseen earlier in October, if Hanoi continued to share our serious attitude. We did not wish to release the full text of the draft agreement or to get into specifics. To do so would only give observers a scoreboard on which to register points won by each side in subsequent bargaining. It would hurt the chances for a final settlement by making the outstanding problems matters of prestige for the parties.

Therefore, we indicated the general nature of the issues that still needed resolution in order to solidify the settlement:

- We wished to elaborate the details of the control and supervisory machinery which was established in principle.

- We wanted to speed up ceasefires in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, for the conflict affected all of Indochina.

- We needed clarification of certain ambiguities. For example, the North Vietnamese and we clearly agreed that no coalition government was contemplated in the settlement, but the Vietnamese text of the agreement could be read to suggest a new governmental organ.

- We needed to work out the signing procedure for the four parties.

- We wished to clarify a few other technical problems in the text.

These matters were important in order to solidify the agreement, but they were minor compared to the hurdles that had already been surmounted. We would not be stampeded into an agreement by an arbitrary deadline. We would negotiate until it was right. And once we believed it

was right, we would not be deflected from signing it. Only the settlement would determine the date of our signature—not enemy pressures, nor excessive requests from our friends, nor an electoral deadline.

## The Final Stages

In retrospect, peace certainly was near in late October—the ending of a twelve-year conflict was reached twelve weeks later. But the record of those twelve weeks makes it equally clear that peace could have come even sooner if it were not for a cynical North Vietnamese approach at the end of 1972.

On November 20, negotiations resumed and lasted five days. We took up the remaining problems in the agreement and presented draft protocols designed to supplement it. These were technical documents. They introduced no new issues but spelled out in neutral detail the implementation of such aspects as ceasefire supervision and prisoner release. At first the North Vietnamese remained serious. We made significant progress in the agreement itself, although we received no responses on the protocols. A stalemate developed over the few residual issues, however, and both sides agreed to recess until December 4 to reconsider their positions.

Throughout this period we continued our intensive discussions with the Republic of Vietnam. We consulted through our Ambassador in Saigon, with South Vietnamese representatives in Paris, and through high level emissaries to each other's capital. We listened closely to South Vietnam's concerns and presented many of them forcefully in Paris. We did not adopt all of them as our own, however. We determined what we thought would make a fair agreement, and we stayed within the framework of the October draft.

On December 4, when we resumed the talks, the North Vietnamese attitude had changed fundamentally. The final issues could have been resolved in a few days given a serious attitude on both sides. The North Vietnamese began this round, however, by withdrawing all the changes they accepted in November. We spent the next few days working arduously back to where we had been two weeks previously. Then we reached a total impasse. Throughout the last several days of the negotiations in December it became very clear that Hanoi had no intention of settling at that time. We therefore recessed on December 13 after several fruitless and exasperating sessions.

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ELCJ

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During the problems we had pointed to on October 26 had been settled: the prospects for an early ceasefire in Laos at least were firmer, and various technical improvements had been made in the agreement. But other problems remained and, because of the North Vietnamese approach, they were growing, rather than shrinking.

On December 16, we explained the reasons for the stalemate. Although many ambiguities in the provisions had been clarified, a few remained. We still had to work out a signing procedure for the agreement that would accommodate the sensibilities of the various participants. We were still far apart on the concepts of supervisory machinery for the ceasefire, and the North Vietnamese had allowed no serious discussions of any of the protocols.

The impasse was created both by North Vietnamese rigidity on these specific issues and by their whole negotiating approach. They kept a settlement continuously out of reach by injecting new issues whenever current ones neared solution. At technical level meetings, scheduled only to conform the English and Vietnamese texts, they raised fresh substantive problems. Questions already resolved in the agreement were revived by the North Vietnamese in the protocols. Instead of the constructive approach of October, there were now determined, often frivolous, tactics designed to frustrate the negotiations.

In mid-December, therefore, we had little choice. Hanoi obviously was stalling for time, hoping that pressures would force us to make an unsatisfactory agreement. Our South Vietnamese friends, in turn, still had some strong reservations about the settlement. The more difficult Hanoi became, the more rigid Saigon grew. There was a danger that the settlement which was so close might be pulled apart by conflicting pressures. We decided to bring home to both Vietnamese parties that there was a price for continuing the conflict.

On December 18, we moved strongly in both directions. We resumed bombing north of the 20th parallel in North Vietnam, which we had suspended while serious negotiations were underway. We had to make clear that Hanoi could not continue to wage war in the South while its territory was immune, and that we would not tolerate an indefinite delay in the negotiations.

At the same time, we talked sternly with our friends in South Vietnam. In our view they were holding out for terms that were impossible to achieve without several more years of warfare—if then. We therefore reemphasized our determination to conclude the agreement if the North Vietnamese should once again prove reasonable in Paris.

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During this time we maintained direct private communications with Hanoi. Once we had been assured that serious talks could again be undertaken, we suspended our bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th parallel on December 31, 1972.

On January 2, 1973, the technical talks on the protocols to the agreement resumed in Paris and serious drafting began. From January 8 to 13, Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho met. The serious approach of October reappeared. There was rapid progress on the remaining issues in the agreement on the protocols. The residual ambiguities in the text were resolved. We agreed on a procedure for signing the agreement that satisfied all parties. Four protocols were elaborated into final, agreed form, detailing such key military provisions as ceasefire supervision and release of prisoners. In short, we had achieved essentially all that we had set out to do on October 26.

Simultaneously, we continued consultations with the South Vietnamese Government, and these moved to a successful conclusion. On many questions we had improved the agreement to our ally's satisfaction; on others, the South Vietnamese changed their positions for the sake of concluding the settlement.

On January 23, 1973, Dr. Kissinger returned to Paris for a final meeting. On that date the United States and North Vietnam, with the concurrence of their allies, initialled the agreement.

That evening in announcing the settlement, I said:

> "We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia, but contributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world."

In Paris, on January 27, 1973—the first anniversary of the comprehensive U.S.-GVN peace plan—Secretary of State Rogers signed the agreement for the United States.

## The Agreement

This Agreement met the essential conditions that we had laid down on January 27, and on May 8, 1972; a ceasefire, return of all prisoners, the withdrawal of American forces, and the political future of the South Vietnamese to be determined by the people themselves. The major elements were:

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—Internationally-supervised ceasefire throughout Vietnam, effective at 7:00 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, Saturday, January 27, 1973.

—The release within 60 days of all captured Americans held throughout Indochina, and the fullest possible accounting for those missing in action.

—The parallel withdrawal of all United States and allied forces and military personnel from South Vietnam.

—A ban on infiltration of personnel into South Vietnam.

—A ban on the introduction of war material into South Vietnam except one-for-one replacement of military equipment worn out, damaged, destroyed, or used up after the ceasefire.

—The reduction and demobilization of both sides' forces in South Vietnam.

—The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia.

—A ban on the use of Laotian or Cambodian base areas to encroach on the sovereignty and security of South Vietnam.

—The determination of the political future of South Vietnam by the South Vietnamese themselves.

—Formation of a non-governmental National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord operating by unanimity, to organize elections as agreed by the parties and to promote conciliation between the parties and implementation of the Agreement.

—Respect for the Demilitarized Zone dividing South and North Vietnam.

—The eventual reunification of North and South Vietnam through peaceful means, step by step, through direct negotiations.

—Respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia.

—In accordance with traditional United States policy, U.S. participation in postwar reconstruction efforts throughout Indochina.

—An International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) composed of Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland to control and supervise the elections and various military provisions of the Agreement.

—Joint Military Commissions of the parties to implement appropriate provisions of the Agreement.

—An International Conference within thirty days to guarantee the Agreement and the ending of the war.

There were also four protocols which spelled out the implementation of the Agreement in the following areas: the ceasefire and the Joint

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Military Commission; the ICCS; the release of prisoners and mine clearance in North Vietnam.

These then are the principal provisions of the Agreement and the negotiating history that produced it. The following points emerge.

**The Agreement corresponded to our overall approach.** We consistently held the view that a settlement should involve specific resolution of military questions alone. This was, we believed, the most feasible and rapid route to peace. The final settlement embodied this principle. The military issues—such as the ceasefire, prisoner release, withdrawals, and supervision—were spelled out in detail in the Agreement and accompanying protocols. On the political side, the provisions were general, leaving those matters to be negotiated between the two South Vietnamese parties.

**The Agreement included the basic features of our earlier peace plans.** An internationally supervised ceasefire, return of all prisoners, the withdrawal of Americans and allied forces, and an international conference were basic provisions of all our plans since October 1970. Internationally supervised elections were always the centerpiece of the U.S.-GVN political approach. And the National Council corresponded in many respects to the mixed electoral commission of our January 1972 plan.

**The settlement represents a compromise by both sides.** While our essential principles were met, we and the Communists had to make compromises. Many of these were more significant for our ally than for us. For example, we did not insist on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam. On the other hand, this had not been part of our negotiating position since our October 7, 1970, plan. There were other mutual compromises. But the fact these were made reflected the *de facto* situation and represented an outcome fair to all parties. Neither side could expect to impose at the conference table what it had not gained on the battlefield. The military outcome was not clear-cut and therefore the political future was yet to be determined. For us the important principle is that the Agreement does not hand over this political future to the Communists. Our friends have every opportunity to demonstrate their inherent strength.

*It was not possible to reach this Agreement any sooner than we did.* Some observers have asked why we did not negotiate this settlement four years ago. The answer is simply that it was impossible to do so at any time before October 1972. As the record makes clear, the North Vietnamese from the very outset always insisted on linking political and mili-

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tary. They always demanded removal of the government in South Vietnam and the installation of a Communist-dominated structure. They never varied from that basic approach until the final months of this Administration's first term. Once we had achieved this breakthrough, we moved as rapidly as possible to complete the settlement.

> *Peace in Vietnam will depend not only on the provisions of the Agreement but on the spirit in which it is implemented.* It was vital to reach a settlement that would provide a framework for South Vietnamese self-determination and for our honorable disengagement. We have never been under the illusion, however, that any single document would instantly move the people of the region from a generation of war and hatred to peace and reconciliation.

We have laid the best obtainable foundation for the beginning of this process. We hope that the contending factions will now prefer to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and political competition rather than through the brutal and costly methods of the past. This choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant concerning violations of the Agreement. We are always ready to encourage accommodation among the South Vietnamese. But the peace and progress of South Vietnam and its political future depend on the people themselves.

## Ongoing Efforts To Maintain the Peace

In the period immediately following the signing of the Agreement, we moved on several fronts to promote its implementation. We talked to our adversaries, to our friends, and to other countries principally involved in guaranteeing the peace.

### Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.
The Four Party Joint Military Commission started immediately to make the arrangements for release of our prisoners of war. The two sides exchanged lists of prisoners of war on January 27, the date of the signing. The list of prisoners captured in Laos was furnished by North Vietnam on February 1. A U.S. team from the State and Defense Departments flew to Hanoi on February 12 to pick up the first group of returnees; another group was freed in South Vietnam the same day, and further releases were due at 15 day intervals. When there appeared to be stalling, we immediately held up U.S. force withdrawals to emphasize the importance we attached to prompt and full compliance with the Agreement and Protocols. Releases then continued on schedule. A final dispute over the release of the U.S. prisoners of war captured in Laos was resolved when the Communist side agreed to release them in Hanoi on March 28. In the meanwhile,

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the Republic of Vietnam, with our support released the more than 66,000 prisoners of war in its custody.

With the return of our prisoners, our efforts turned to the missing in action. More than 1300 U.S. military personnel and civilians remain in this category. The Vietnam Agreement contained unprecedentedly specific language on this issue—with similar provisions in the Laos ceasefire agreement—and we made clear to the Communist side our determination to secure the fullest possible accounting for each of our men. As stipulated in the protocol, a Four Party Joint Military Team is being maintained to gather information about the missing in action. We also established a Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in Thailand—near the Laos and Vietnam borders—to search for the missing. These efforts will continue until we have exhausted all possible means to find information on each of our men.

### North Vietnam.
Dr. Kissinger visited Hanoi from February 10 to 13, for direct conversations with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese leaders. As stated in the Joint Communique after the visit, the two sides carefully reviewed implementation of the Agreement, problems in Laos and Cambodia, postwar economic reconstruction, and the International Conference on Vietnam that was held shortly afterwards. They also considered the bilateral relationship between our two countries and concrete steps to normalize our relations.

A significant result of this trip was an agreement to establish a Joint Economic Commission to develop economic relations between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This Commission began its work in Paris on March 15, 1973. Its agenda includes not only economic assistance but the whole range of economic matters. And it could become not only a technical group but a forum for a more constructive dialogue between our two nations.

The essential message we have for North Vietnam's leaders, and which was conveyed during this trip, is as follows.

We do not assume Hanoi will give up its long-range goals. We do expect it to pursue those goals without using force. Hanoi has two basic choices. The first is to exploit the Vietnam Agreement and press its objectives in Indochina. In this case it would continue to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam, keep its forces in Laos and Cambodia, and through pressures or outright attack renew its aggression against our friends. Such a course would endanger the hard won gains for peace in Indochina. It would risk revived confrontation with us. It would, of course, destroy the chances for a new and constructive bilateral relationship with the United States, including economic assistance.

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The second course is for North Vietnam to pursue its objectives peacemfully, allowing the historical trends of the region to assert themselves. This would mean observance of the Vietnam settlement and the removal of foreign forces on both sides from Laos and Cambodia. It would transform years of military conflict in Indochina into political struggle. It would enable the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to normalize relations. If Hanoi follows this path, the United States will abide by whatever the historical process produces in Indochina.

If North Vietnam chooses the peaceful option, the United States remains committed to better relations. We are convinced, as stated in the Joint Communique at the conclusion of Dr. Kissinger's visit to Hanoi, that this process would "help to ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the cause of peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

**Indochina Reconstruction.** Thus the basic challenge in Indochina is to move from two decades of violent struggle to peaceful evolution. It will not be easy to make this transition after a generation of conflict, to discard familiar techniques and join in constructive enterprises, and to rely on political competition and the forces of history for the achievement of goals.

The economic assistance we propose in concert with others, for the reconstruction and development of the entire region would help make this transition a reality. To be effective it must include the Democratic Republic of Vienam. The rebuilding of war-torn economies of former enemies is a traditional policy of this country and served the goal of reconciliation the period after World War II. This concept was first proposed for Indochina by the previous Administration in 1965. We have reaffirmed it on many occasions during this Administration, including last year's Report. It would be a sound investment in peace, providing avenues and incentives for an insulated and suspicious country to engage in peaceful and cooperative pursuits. It responds to humanitarian needs as well as to political and psychological necessities.

We will pursue this program with determination. The funds required will not be drawn from any domestic programs. As we proceed, however, we will be guided by two fundamental principles:

- We will observe Constitutional requirements both in letter and spirit and consult closely with the Congress at every step of the way.

- We will not provide aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam if it violates the Agreement. Hanoi cannot expect to receive our economic assistance while pursuing its goals through military pressure.

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We believe that the American people and the Congress agree to provide the relatively modest amounts to help keep the peace that ended such a long and costly war.

**South Vietnam.** The Republic of Vietnam and the United States fought and suffered together many years. We supported that government and its people in their valiant efforts against aggression. And we consulted closely with them throughout the long, torturous road of negotiations. We now look forward to working together in peace as we did on the battlefield and at the conference table.

The Republic of Vietnam will find us a steady friend. We will continue to deal with its government as the legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people, while supporting efforts by the South Vietnamese parties to achieve reconciliation and shape their political future. We will provide replacement military assistance within the terms of the Agreement. We expect our friends to observe the Agreement just as we will not tolerate violations by the North Vietnamese or its allies.

We will also continue to contribute generously to South Vietnam's economic rehabilitation and development. That country is making a major effort to make its economy self-sufficient, but the peace agreement does not lessen its need for substantial outside assistance. South Vietnamese requirements will, in fact, increase in the short term. The government' heavy military budget will decline only slowly, for it must maintain a vigilant defense and support the total military responsibility created by the withdrawal of the American and allied forces. Simultaneously, South Vietnam will bear the double burden of creating new jobs for demobilized personnel and of meeting massive expenditures for relief of refugees and war victims. Finally, the country faces other heavy financial drains as it reconstructs the many destroyed towns, repairs the country's transportation and irrigation systems, and brings back into production large arable regions abandoned during twenty years of fighting.

None of the country's major economic tasks can be accomplished without substantial economic assistance. With such aid, none of these problems is insuperable. South Vietnam has the natural and human resources to be economically independent and viable. What is needed is time for these resources, diverted or idled by the war, to be put back to productive use.

The Republic of South Vietnam now seeks the economic counterpart to Vietnamization. As we helped them take over their own defense in conflict, we will help them now become economically self-sustaining in peace.

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They were the principles I expressed to President Thieu when we met at San Clemente a few weeks ago. His visit to the United States symbolized both our common struggle in past years and our common endeavors in the years to come. As we said in our joint communique:

> "... both Presidents agreed that through the harsh experience of a tragic war and the sacrifices of their two peoples a close and constructive relationship between the American and the South Vietnamese people has been developed and strengthened. They affirmed their full confidence that this association would be preserved as the foundation of an honorable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia."

**The International Conference.** From February 26, 1973, to March 2, 1973, the International Conference on Vietnam met in Paris. Twelve nations—the four parties to the Agreement, the four ICCS countries, and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—plus the Secretary General of the United Nations, attended. The Final Act signed on March 3, 1973, endorsed the Vietnam Agreement; called for its strict observance by the four parties; pledged respect for the Accord by members of the Conference; urged all other countries to do so as well; set up procedures for reporting violations of the Agreement and reconvening of the Conference; and called for countries to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, as stipulated in the Agreement.

A single meeting lasting several days cannot guarantee the peace. But the gathering and the statements of the nations involved underlined the reality that all countries, not just those directly concerned, have a stake in peace in Indochina. We expect the nations that signed the Act of the Conference to live up to their obligations. We will take their performance into account in the conduct of our bilateral relations.

## Future Tasks

Achieving an end to the war was exceptionally difficult, but keeping the peace will be no less challenging. It involves not just Vietnam but all of Indochina, and not just the Indochinese countries but outside nations as well. The following are the major tasks:

- Strengthening the peace in Vietnam.

- Implementing the agreement on Laos.

- Achieving a ceasefire and beginning negotiations on Cambodia.

- Ensuring restraint toward the region by outside powers.

*The peace in Vietnam* itself remains fragile. A period of misunderstandings and ambiguities was to be expected in the first months of

peace after so many years of war. The process of reconciliation and mutual accommodation is bound to take time. Nevertheless the overall record so far has been less positive than we had hoped.

The United States has scrupulously carried out its obligations, and we have urged all others to do likewise. On those military elements of the agreement directly affecting us the record has been generally good. Our listed prisoners have returned from Indochina. There remains, however, the difficult task of accounting for all those missing in action throughout the region, and we will not rest until this task is completed. All American and allied military forces and advisors have been withdrawn from South Vietnam. We have strictly observed the ceasefire and have given full cooperation and support to the supervisory organization. And we began to clear the mines from all North Vietnamese ports and waterways, a complicated and time-consuming job.

Observance of the ceasefire is now, of course, in the hands of the Vietnamese. Compliance has been spotty, and substantial fighting continues. While violations and casualties have diminished from the first weeks, much greater efforts are needed to stop the conflict completely and fully stabilize the situation.

The most ominous aspect of the situation to date has been the continued infiltration of North Vietnamese troops in violation of the Agreement. In blatant disregard of Articles 7, 15, and 20, Hanoi has continued to send troops and military supplies into South Vietnam. It has also continued its military activities in Laos and Cambodia in violation of Article 20. In so doing, it has built up the military potential of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. Whether this is a prelude to another offensive is not clear. What is clear is that it must cease. We have told Hanoi, privately and publicly, that we will not tolerate violations of the Agreement.

On the political front, the two South Vietnamese parties are now negotiating in Paris on such subjects as the functioning of the National Council of National Reconciliation, the elections, the issues of civilian prisoners held by both sides, and the reduction and demobilization of both sides' armed forces. We hope that the South Vietnamese parties make progress on these issues and settle their differences.

*Laos and Cambodia* will be treated in more detail later in this Report. It is important to point out here that the Vietnam settlement obligates all foreign countries to withdraw their forces from these two countries, cease sending military personnel and equipment into the two countries, and stop using their territories to encroach on other countries. These obligations are clear and unconditional. Here, too, Hanoi has not yet carried out the terms of the Agreement. We expect North Vietnam to

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with its forces from Laos and Cambodia in the near future, and to comply with the other provisions regarding those countries. As I have stated repeatedly, there cannot be stable peace in Vietnam until its neighbors are also at peace. The conflict has been indivisible. The peace must be too.

*Countries outside the region* have a strong interest in the maintenance of peace in Indochina. If the flames of conflict flare up again, there will be renewed suffering for the peoples of the area, the danger of another war, and a threat to the improvement of relations among the major world powers.

Accordingly, we look to outside powers to lend a moderating influence to the affairs of Indochina. This means, first of all, that there can be no reasonable justification for sending Hanoi large arms shipments now that there is a negotiated settlement. North Vietnam certainly is not threatened by its neighbors. A military buildup would raise questions not only about its intentions, but also about the motivations of the suppliers. Restraint in the North on this matter will be matched by restraint in the South.

Beyond that, we believe that friends of the Vietnamese belligerents can helpfully underline to them the advantages of maintaining the peace instead of rekindling the war. This will be our approach. For there cannot be a global structure of peace while conflict persists in Indochina.

This is a complex and difficult agenda. Unlike that of the last dozen years, our role will not be dominant. But it will remain substantial and important. And it will require both generosity and firmness, both patience and vigilance.

America has those qualities and will exercise them in the interest of peace in the region.

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LAOS AND CAMBODIA

There cannot be lasting peace in Vietnam until its neighbors are at peace.

As of this writing, the situation in both Laos and Cambodia remains fluid. In Laos, the parties reached a ceasefire settlement in February 1973, but the framework is fragile, and the Communists have delayed negotiations which were stipulated in the Agreement to reach a definitive settlement. In Cambodia, the Communists have stepped up their military attacks since the Vietnam and Laos ceasefires, rejecting both the Government's unilateral military restraint and its call for negotiations. In both countries, North Vietnam continues to violate the past international agreements to which it was a party. And in both countries it is now violating the Vietnam Agreement it signed in January 1973.

North Vietnam, as well as the other parties to the Vietnam Agreement, has unambiguous obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia. Article 20 of that Agreement stipulates that:

- The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, and shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

- They will undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

- Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war materiel.

- The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

- The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

These provisions are clear. They are not tied to any other conditions. To date they have been ignored by Hanoi. Although fighting has subsided in Laos, attacks there by the North Vietnamese and their allies continue. In Cambodia, Communist forces have increased their attacks

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in a massive effort to isolate Phnom Penh and other population centers. Hanoi has continued to infiltrate men and supplies into and through Laos and Cambodia. It gives no sign of ending this flow or withdrawing its forces from either country.

The U.S. position is clear. We will not tolerate violations of the Vietnam Agreement. We have every interest in seeing peace observed in Laos and peace attained in Cambodia. The legitimate governments of the two countries are working toward this end. In both countries we will honor whatever agreements are worked out by the peoples themselves. We firmly intend to implement all the provisions of the Vietnam Agreement, and we insist that all other parties do so as well.

## The Setting and U.S. Policy

Hanoi has always exploited Laos and Cambodia in its conduct of the Vietnam War. It has etched a similar, distressing pattern in both of South Vietnam's neighbors in recent years:

- Neither Laos nor Cambodia has ever threatened North Vietnam, nor could they threaten it.

- The neutrality, independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of both countries were established by international agreements signed by Hanoi and its allies.

- The North Vietnamese have continually violated all these principles for years by sending tens of thousands of their troops into both countries and organizing insurgent forces.

- Hanoi's primary target has been South Vietnam. It has used Laos and Cambodia for infiltration corridors for its troops and supplies, for base areas for launching attacks on South Vietnam, and for sanctuaries.

- In the process, North Vietnam has also threatened the neutral governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh.

- The helpless people of both nations, wanting nothing but to be left alone, have been subjected for years to outside aggression and exploitation.

Given the indivisibility of the Indochina conflict, our policy toward Laos and Cambodia has always been closely related to our policy in Vietnam. A fundamental concern has been with the Communist use of Laos and Cambodia in pursuit of their main objectives in South Vietnam. We also have been concerned with Hanoi's breaking of international agreements on these countries, and we have an interest in the independence and neutrality of the states in Southeast Asia.

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Diplomatically, all our negotiating proposals on Vietnam have included Laos and Cambodia as well. The basic elements of our plans, such as ceasefire, release of American prisoners, the ban on infiltration and base areas, and the holding of an international conference concerned all of Indochina. Militarily, we have provided air and logistic support to the internationally recognized governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh. This policy has been essential to protect the independence of South Vietnam and to enforce the Indochina aspects of the Vietnam peace settlement.

In Laos and Cambodia we have never undertaken the primary role but have confined our efforts to supporting those of the indigenous governments. This is true both at the conference table and on the battlefield:

- We have supported the attempts of the Laotian and Cambodian Governments to negotiate peace either on their own or as part of an overall Indochina settlement. In these efforts they have taken the lead and shaped the nature of the settlements they were seeking.

- While negotiations have been blocked by Hanoi's intransigence, the Lao and Cambodians have carried the ground combat responsibility while we provided military and economic assistance and, at their request, air and logistic support. We also supported South Vietnamese defensive strikes into North Vietnamese base areas in these two countries.

- Our role has been, and will continue to be, strictly limited: no U.S. ground combat personnel, a minimum American presence overall, and military support strictly tailored to the pressures of the North Vietnamese, the situation in South Vietnam, and the requests of the threatened governments.

- Our help has nevertheless been crucial for the independence of these countries and the pursuit of our objectives in Vietnam.

## Laos

The United States Government has always favored a stable peace in Laos and the genuine independence and neutrality of that nation. Our objective has been a Laos free of conflict, free of outside forces, and free to determine its own future.

We therefore welcome the Agreement on Laos negotiated and concluded by the Laotian parties themselves on February 21, 1973. We hope that this Agreement, coupled with the related provisions of the Vietnam settlement, will secure a lasting peace in Laos and finally per-

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miting country to devote itself to the tasks of reconstruction and development.

**A Fragile Peace.** In the negotiations on Vietnam we took the consistent position that there should be an early ceasefire in Laos as well as Vietnam. The shaping of a settlement there was, of course, up to the parties themselves. Our friends needed no encouragement from us to negotiate the end of the conflict, so we pressed in Paris for Hanoi to ensure Pathet Lao readiness to conclude a settlement.

Negotiations between the Laotian parties began on September 18, 1972, and ran parallel to our talks with the North Vietnamese. One of the issues still not resolved to our satisfaction in late October in Paris was the prospect for early peace in Laos. As we moved toward a final settlement for Vietnam, the Laotian parties made progress in their talks. By the time we signed the Vietnam Agreement on January 27, 1973, we were confident that a ceasefire in Laos would be achieved within a matter of weeks, and we knew that our prisoners captured in Laos would be released within sixty days. Final obstacles to a Laos settlement remained, however, when Dr. Kissinger visited Vientiane, Bangkok, Hanoi, and Peking in mid-February and accordingly the Laos situation was a major topic on the agenda for those visits.

During this period, the final issues were settled by the Laotian parties and the Agreement was signed on February 21, 1973. It has the following main provisions:

- Affirmation of respect for the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

- An immediate in-place ceasefire supervised by a Joint Military Commission with the assistance of the current International Control Commission (ICC), composed of India, Canada, and Poland.

- The formation of a new bipartite coalition government (the Provisional Government of National Union) and a consultative political council within 30 days of the ceasefire. The two Laotian parties were to negotiate and agree on the modalities and the exact membership in these bodies during the interim.

- The withdrawal of all foreign forces within 60 days after the installation of the new political bodies.

- The release of all POWs within the same 60-day period, except for Americans captured in Laos who were released within the 60 days provided for prisoner release under the Vietnam Agreement.

- The eventual holding of legislative elections to be organized by laws adopted by the new Consultative Council and Provisional Government.

- Pending these elections and the formation of a permanent government of national union, the separate administration by the two sides of the areas under their respective control.

Following signature of the Agreement, the Royal Laotian Government made a maximum effort to reach final agreement on the protocols implementing its political and military provisions. The government presented concrete proposals to the Pathet Lao in order to obtain agreements on these matters necessary to form the Provisional Government within the specified 30-day period and thus speed the withdrawal of North Vietnamese and other foreign forces. However, the Laotian Communists adopted obvious delaying tactics in the implementing talks, including keeping their senior negotiator away from the conference table for weeks on end. As a result, the 30-day period for the establishment of a new government and a Consultative Council passed without agreement.

The same pattern persisted on other related questions such as the talks concerning a Joint Military Commission and a revitalized ICC. Meanwhile, in blatant violation of its international obligations, North Vietnam has continued its military activities in Laos and expanded its logistics and base network there, threatening South Vietnam.

**U.S. Support.** We have consistently maintained the supporting role that the previous Administrations inaugurated. On the diplomatic plane, as already indicated, we have continually backed Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's efforts to negotiate a peace.

In the face of enemy aggression, and in light of the threats to South Vietnam, we have also responded to the Laotian government's request for military and economic assistance. By Congressional action, our total assistance expenditures in Laos were limited to $375 million in fiscal year 1973. Our economic aid efforts were devoted primarily to programs for the care of refugees and the stabilization of the heavily burdened Laotian economy. Military assistance involved primarily the delivery of supplies and equipment to the Laotian forces. These forces carried the ground combat role and, even in the air war, the Laotian Air Force provided much of the air support.

With the conclusion of a ceasefire in Laos, we look forward toward reductions in U.S. operations and expenditures there. Since the ceasefire, limited U.S. military activities in Laos have been conducted at the request of the government. They were necessitated by and taken in direct response to North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao violations of the Laos

70

71

cease agreement. Considerable financial assistance will continue to be needed.

- When requested, and within the provisions of the Agreement, we will provide military supplies so that Laotian forces can maintain a high level of readiness in the future.

- We will continue an adequate economic aid program to help the Lao move ahead to better their conditions and their lives.

- We will include Laos in the overall reconstruction effort in Indonesia which we consider to be an important investment in peace.

Hanoi will largely determine whether the peaceful people of Laos will at long last gain a respite from conflict and enjoy a period of tranquility and progress. If North Vietnam and its allies observe the ceasefire in Laos, move toward completion of a definitive settlement, and honor the obligations of both the Vietnam and Laos settlements, they will find a forthcoming response from the Royal Laotian Government and its friends. If they choose instead to maintain an aggressive course, the whole fabric of regional peace will be jeopardized.

## Cambodia

Our objectives and our policies in Cambodia run parallel to those in Laos.

We aim for an independent, neutral and stable country. We do not insist on any particular political orientation, but we believe any course should be the free choice of the people themselves, not one imposed by North Vietnamese arms. Nor should Cambodia be used as a sanctuary or staging area for Vietnamese Communist assaults on South Vietnam.

In light of these objectives, we have supported the Cambodian government. That government favors independence, neutrality, and stability. It is willing to deal with its indigenous opponents at the conference table. It is fighting North Vietnamese aggression not only against Cambodia but also against South Vietnam.

The Cambodians, like the Lao, are clearly innocent victims who wish only to live in peace. Like the Lao they are carrying the brunt of the battle for their self-defense, while we supply military and economic assistance and, when specifically requested, air support.

**The Past Year.** Since last year's Report, there has been little progress in Cambodia. The military picture has remained spotty and at times precarious. The Khmer armed forces have managed to contain most enemy thrusts and maintain control of the major population centers. However, Communist forces have often temporarily interdicted key routes

72

and lines of communication in an attempt to isolate theINFO areas. This has on occasion generated short-term needs for airlift or other land and water convoys to bring supplies to the capital and other cities.

The mixed security situation in Cambodia should be kept in perspective. Three years ago many observers thought that it would only be a matter of months, if not weeks, before the Communists would topple the Lon Nol government. Since then the Cambodian people have shown courage and resilience against repeated pressures. The Cambodian army has grown from a largely ceremonial force of 35,000 in 1970 to some 200,000, most of whom are volunteers. It has undertaken an internal reorganization, further training, and important reforms to develop its full potential for future self-defense. Progress in self-defense efforts, however, has been uneven and needs to be accelerated.

The crucial ingredient in Cambodia remains political stability. Since 1970 most of the population and opposition leaders have rallied in opposition to Communist aggression. Politically, there were both positive and negative developments during 1972. In the past year, the Khmer Republic adopted a Constitution, elected a president and a bicameral legislature, and put into operation various organs of government provided by the new Constitution. The government also initiated programs to improve community self-defense and to encourage the return of Khmer who have taken up arms against it. On the other hand, the leading non-Communist groups and personalities have not always worked effectively together and, at times, they have been openly at odds. This only serves to undercut morale, jeopardize the security situation, and prevent the establishment of an effective base from which to negotiate with the enemy if the enemy ever chooses to do so. Greater efforts for a unified front against the Communists are clearly needed. Recently, the Lon Nol government moved to broaden its political base by including more of the non-Communist opposition.

**The Continuing Conflict.** In the Vietnam negotiations we pressed very hard for an early peace in Cambodia to accompany the ceasefires in Vietnam and Laos. We succeeded in getting the clearcut provisions for both Laos and Cambodia of Article 20 included in the Vietnam Agreement. In response to our insistence that all American prisoners throughout Indochina be released within sixty days of that Agreement, we were assured that there were no Americans held captive in Cambodia. But while we signed the Agreement with the expectation that there would be an early cessation of hostilities in that country, we did not have the firm confidence in this prospect that we held for Laos.

During the final stage of the Paris negotiations, the other side repeatedly pointed out that the situation in Cambodia was more complex

73

than Laos because of the many factions involved and the lack of an established framework for negotiations. However, Communist actions in the Khmer Republic since the Vietnam and Laos Agreements raise serious questions about Hanoi's professed desire for early peace in that country.

The signing of the Vietnam Agreement brought a brief ray of hope to Cambodia. On January 28, 1973, the day the Vietnam ceasefire went into effect, President Lon Nol ordered his forces to cease all offensive activities and urged the enemy to follow suit. He repeated his willingness to enter into direct negotiations to turn a *de facto* ceasefire into a more definitive settlement.

We welcomed these measures, suspended our own combat air operations in support of the Khmer forces, and hoped that the North Vietnamese and the Khmer insurgents would respond favorably. Unfortunately, then—and since—the Communist side rebuffed this gesture and all other efforts by the government to inaugurate contacts with a view to ending the fighting.

Instead, Hanoi to date has chosen to pursue its aggression in Cambodia. Indeed, since the Vietnam and Laos settlements, Communist military operations in Cambodia have reached new levels. Widespread attacks have continued, chiefly against the important lines of communications and the population centers. In light of this situation and at the request of the Khmer Government, the United States resumed the air operations in Cambodia which we had suspended in an effort to promote a ceasefire. The objective of our assistance to Cambodia is the full implementation of the Vietnam Accords and an end to the fighting in Cambodia which threatens the peace in Vietnam.

The Cambodian Government has repeatedly declared its desire for a ceasefire and prompt political negotiations. We are prepared to halt our military activity in Cambodia as soon as there is a ceasefire. On the other hand, if Hanoi still pursues aggression in Cambodia, we will continue to provide the Khmer Republic with U.S. air support and appropriate military assistance. We will not introduce U.S. ground forces into Cambodia.

The Cambodian situation is a serious threat to the hard-won peace in Vietnam. The only feasible solution is an end to the conflict and direct negotiations among the Cambodians themselves. We fully support the efforts of the present government to launch this process.

We call on North Vietnam to observe its solemn pledges in the Vietnam Agreement and to give the people of both Laos and Cambodia the chance to live their own lives.

74

LcJ

# PART III

## STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIPS

- Europe and the Atlantic Alliance

- Japan

- Asia and the Pacific

- Latin America

Richard Nixon, 1973

May 19 [160]

of the Marines who was buried with the highest honors at Arlington just a few days ago.

And Virginia today has the distinction of having more of its Senators and Representatives serving on the two Armed Services Committees in Congress than any State of this Union except one. That delegation includes four members who are with us today: Senator [Harry F.] Byrd, Senator [William L.] Scott, Congressman [Robert W.] Daniel, and Congressman Bill Whitehurst.

You can see why Governor Holton always speaks with such pride of Virginia's great tradition in the field of the Armed Services.

Now, what does Armed Forces Day mean? Let us think now not just in terms of this ship, not just in terms of the men and women who are serving here in our Armed Forces but in terms of America and the world, for the rulebook says that—I speak as one who many years ago was in the Navy. As a matter of fact, I had what I, looking back, found was a very, rather subordinate position. I was a lieutenant junior grade, and if you think a lieutenant junior grade is important, ask a Navy chief, and he will tell you how unimportant he is.

Well, the rulebook says that the men and women who wear the uniform of our country are supposed to salute the Commander in Chief, and of course, anyone who is elected President of the United States is the Commander in Chief. But on this day, I, as your Commander in Chief, salute you, each and every American who serves in our Army, our Navy, our Air Force, our Marine Corps, and our Coast Guard. Your courage, your steadfastness are the backbone of America's in-

fluence for peace around the world. And I speak for all of America today—that is one of the great privileges of being President of this country—I speak for all of our fellow Americans when I say we owe you, those who serve in our Armed Forces, a debt of gratitude we can never fully repay.

For the first time in 12 years, we can observe Armed Forces Day with all of our fighting forces home from Vietnam and all of our courageous prisoners of war set free and here, back home in America.

There was and will continue to be for years to come much controversy about this longest war in America's history, but historians will record in the end that no military organization ever took on a more selfless task and completed it more honorably than the Armed Forces of the United States have done in the defense of 17 million people of South Vietnam. It was an honorable task, and they did it well, and we owe them a debt for how well they did it.

So today we pay a special, heartfelt tribute to all who made this achievement possible:

- to the more than 2 million men and women now serving in uniform;

- to the millions of veterans who have returned to civilian life;

- to those missing in action and those magnificent men who “toughed it out” in enemy prison camps; and above all,

- to the memory of those who gave their lives for their country.

Today, we are thankful, too, for the strengths and the sacrifices of America's military families. And today we are reminded and we do remind those young Americans who are completing their high school or college education—and I

3. Precinctly by

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541

[160] May 19

speak to all of you all over the country, as you complete your high school or college education this spring—let me say to you the profession of serving this country in the new volunteer armed force of the 1970's offers a career in which any young man or woman can find great pride and satisfaction; be proud to wear the uniform of the United States of America.

Over the past several years, the chances for peace have grown immeasurably stronger, not only in Southeast Asia but all over the world. We have brought this long war in Vietnam to an end. After a generation of hostility, the United States has opened a new relationship with the leaders of one-fourth of all the people who live in the world, the People's Republic of China. We have negotiated far-reaching agreements with our longtime adversary the Soviet Union, including the first limitation of strategic nuclear arms. We have begun revitalizing our Atlantic partnership with Western Europe and our Pacific partnership with Japan.

In the explosive Middle East, we averted a major crisis in 1970. We have helped to establish a cease-fire which is now well into its third year.

There are still enormously difficult problems there and in other parts of the world, but we have come a long way over these past 5 years toward building a structure of peace in the world—much further simply than ending a long war, but building a structure that will avoid other wars, and that is what every American wants, and that is what we are working toward today.

I know that some might interpret the achievements I have just mentioned as the result of diplomacy, diplomacy from

the President and the Secretary of State and others who have responsibility. But that interpretation would be incomplete.

The positions that a head of state or a diplomat puts forward at the conference table are only as good as the national strength that stands behind those positions.

So it has been the respect of other countries for our military strength that has been vital to our many negotiating successes during the past 4 years. And that same military strength helps secure our own security and that of our friends as we go forward with them in building new partnerships.

What I am saying to you today is that a large share of the credit for America's progress toward building a structure of peace in the world goes to you, the men and women in uniform. You are the peace forces of the United States, because without you, we couldn't have made the progress we have made. They would not have respected us, and without strength, we would not have the respect which leads to progress. Let's keep that strength and never let it down, because our further hopes for peace also rely on you.

This year, the year 1973, we face a series of negotiations even more significant than those of the year 1972, negotiations that will help to determine the future of international peace and cooperation for the rest of this century and beyond.

Every time I see an audience like this, I look at everybody—the older people, particularly the people that I see over here in wheelchairs, and also the young people, those that are so young, with all of their years ahead—and my greatest hope is: Make this country a better country

542

for them in world a more peaceful

That is what we want. That is what we want today.

In just a few weeks, the new Secretary of State and the new Union will be in the conference to build up relations that we have with Soviet nations. We are ready to leaders in efforts to limit strategic mutually advantageous relations with our mutual and balance of armed forces.

We are moving toward a settlement of the China, now that our terms of engagement permanent and in Washington.

We are continuing our talks with our friends in Japan, with participating in the international security and equity efforts.

Because all of our critical period ahead is well-intentioned, relations that because we have made toward to slash America's economic dollars.

There could be for failure in the just talked about situation for other nations to seek to peace, than for us of the United States to seek to end the war on our own terms as the head

31-870 O - 75 - 38

Richard Nixon, 1973

May 19 [160]

try for them in the future, make this
world a more peaceful world for them.

That is what leadership is all about.
That is what we are dedicated to here
today.

In just a few weeks, as you know, Gen-
eral Secretary Brezhnev of the Soviet
Union will be in this country for a summit
conference to build on the new negotia-
tions that we have made in United States-
Soviet relations in Moscow one year ago.
We are ready to join with the Soviet
leaders in efforts to seek additional ways
to limit strategic nuclear arms, to expand
mutually advantageous trade, and to-
gether with our allies, to work toward
mutual and balanced reductions of the
level of armed forces in Central Europe.

We are moving, as I have already in-
dicated, toward normalization of our re-
lations with the People's Republic of
China, now that our two nations are open-
ing permanent liaison offices in Peking
and in Washington.

We are committed to wide-ranging
talks with our friends in Europe and in
Japan, with particular emphasis on plac-
ing the international economy on a more
secure and equitable footing.

Because all of that is at stake in the
critical period ahead, we must reject the
well-intentioned but misguided sugges-
tions that because of the progress we
have made toward peace, this is the time
to slash America's defenses by billions of
dollars.

There could be no more certain formula
for failure in the negotiations that I have
just talked about, no more dangerous in-
vitation for other powers to break the
peace, than for us to send the President
of the United States to the conference
table as the head of the second strongest

nation in the world. Let that never happen
in the United States of America.

Let me put it quite bluntly, particu-
larly in the presence of my colleagues
from the House and the Senate, those
distinguished Virginians who presently
serve there and who happen to be also
on the Armed Services Committees. Of-
ten when votes come up as to whether
America will be strong enough to keep
its commitments or be so weak that it
will not command respect in the world,
those who vote to cut our arms are said
to be for peace and those who vote for
strength are said to be for war.

I want to put it right on the line today,
bluntly: A vote for a weak America is
a vote against peace. A vote for a strong
America is a vote for peace, because a
strong America will always keep the peace.

If the United States were to cut back
unilaterally in the strength of our Armed
Forces without obtaining reciprocal ac-
tions or commitments in return, that ac-
tion—and I speak with measured tones—
that action of unilaterally cutting our
strength before we have a mutual agree-
ment with the other side to cut theirs as
well will completely torpedo the chances
for any successful negotiations, and those
who vote to cut that strength will be de-
sterming the chances, the best chance we
have had since World War II, to build
an era of peace. And so, support those
men and women who have the courage in
the Congress to vote for a strong America,
rather than to vote for a weak America.
We need a strong America if we are going
to have peace.

Let me turn to that area of the world in
which we need that strength so much—
Southeast Asia.

After the long ordeal we have been

31-370 O - 75 - 38

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543

[160] May 19

through, I can realize how so many Amer-
icans say, "We want to do no more"—
just 100 days after the cease-fire agree-
ments were signed in Paris. These agree-
ments which preserve both the honor of
the United States and the freedom of
South Vietnam were achieved in principle
through a combination of diplomacy and
strength. They can only be maintained
and upheld through that same combina-
tion—diplomacy and strength.

Now, so far there has been considerable
progress in carrying out the provisions of
the peace agreement that we signed just
100 days ago in Paris. Our troops, our
prisoners are home, violence in South
Vietnam is declining, the cease-fire has
been extended to Laos.

But compliance with the agreement is
still gravely deficient in many respects.
The cooperation which North Vietnam
promised to give us in making a full ac-
counting for Americans listed as missing
in action has not been satisfactory. And
I can assure you that we must and will
insist that this promise, this pledge, this
solemn agreement be kept, because just
as America never broke faith with our
prisoners of war, I can assure you today
we will not break faith with those who
are reported missing in action. They must
all be accounted for by the North Viet-
namese.

North Vietnam, as you have probably
read, has also persisted in violations of
the Paris agreements. They have, for
example, refused to withdraw thousands
of troops from Cambodia and Laos. They
have poured huge amounts of military
equipment into these areas and into
South Vietnam. And I say to you, my
friends, today, it would be a crime against
the memory of those Americans who
made the ultimate sacrifice for peace in

Indochina, a serious blow to this coun-
try's ability to lead constructively else-
where in the world, for us to stand by and
permit the peace settlement that we
reached in Paris to be systematically
destroyed by violations such as this.

That is why we are continuing to take
the necessary measures to insist that all
parties to the agreement keep their word,
live up to their obligations. A peace agree-
ment that is only a piece of paper is
something that we are not interested in.

We want a peace agreement that is
adhered to. We are adhering to the agree-
ment. We expect the other side to adhere
to that agreement.

It should be clearly understood by every-
one concerned in this country and abroad
that our policy is not aimed at con-
tinuing the war in Vietnam or renewing
the war that has been ended. Rather, the
aim of our policy is to preserve and
strengthen the peace, a peace which we
achieved at great cost in the past, which
holds such promise in the future.

During the homecoming ceremonies for
our returning prisoners of war several
weeks ago, you may recall that one of
the men had a small American flag which
he had made while he was in prison. He
carried it out to freedom with him. His
name was Major Robert Peel, United
States Air Force. When his turn came to
speak, he held up that small flag and
said, "We never lost faith in the American
people, and we knew these colors
wouldn't run."

We can be proud today that all during
the long struggle in Vietnam, these
colors—and there they are, see them
there, gloriously flying in the wind—these
colors didn't run from America's com-
mitment to freedom and peace in the
world. And let us resolve today, they are

not going to
Southeast Asia,
globe, where-
America.

I have seen
not to every
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people—young
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children for
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And that
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161 St
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544

Richard Nixon, 1973

May 22 [161]

not going to start running now, not in
Southeast Asia, not anywhere around the
globe, wherever people put their trust in
America.

I have seen virtually all of the world—
not to every country but to most of them.
I have seen hundreds of millions of peo-
ple—young people like those I see here
today, as well as their parents. And as I
see them, I know that the hopes for all
the people in the world—not just the 200
million Americans, but of 3 billion people
in the world—the hopes of all the world’s
children for peace—they rest right here
and nowhere else. They rest in our hands,
in America’s hands, and believe me, those
hopes rest in good hands, in good hands.

And that whole world today is watch-
ing to see whether the Star-Spangled

Banner still waves over the land of the
free and the home of the brave. Well,
together let us prove that it does. Let us
so conduct ourselves at home that we
truly remain the land of the free. And
let us so meet our responsibilities in the
world as to show that we are still, more
than ever, the home of the brave.

And then we can look to the future
with confidence that Armed Forces Day
in the years to come will be not only a
day of pride but also a day of peace for
America and for all the people of the
world.

NOTE: The President spoke at 2:12 p.m. at pier 12 on the naval base.

Adm. Douglas C. Plate was Deputy to the
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

On the same day, the White House released
an advance text of the President's remarks.

161 Statement Announcing a Broadened Management Role for the General Services Administration, and Selection of Administrator and Deputy Administrator.

May 22, 1973

ONE OF the great challenges of govern-
ing well today is to make the institutions
of government an efficient servant of the
people, rather than simply a mammoth
machine running by its own momentum.
It is a task that demands all of the mod-
ern management skills we can muster.

In creating the Office of Management
and Budget in 1970, I took a major step
toward upgrading the effectiveness of
management in the Federal executive
branch. My proposals to consolidate and
streamline the domestic Cabinet depart-
ments point in this same direction.

I am now taking additional action to
improve the caliber of management in the
Federal Government. I have directed that

the General Services Administration as-
sume a broader management role by be-
coming the President's principal instru-
ment for developing better systems for
providing administrative support to all
executive branch activities.

This shift of responsibilities is being
accomplished as follows:

—By Executive order [11717], I have
transferred to the General Services Ad-
ministration many functions previously
exercised by the Office of Management
and Budget in the areas of financial
management systems development, pro-
curement, contracting, property man-
agement, and automatic data process-
ing management. GSA now has overall

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545

Richard Nixon, 1974

Apr. 24 [119]

cant shift in intergovernmental responsi-
bilities." The Manpower Report I am
sending you today provides important new
information concerning the step-by-step
implementation of this long-needed trans-
fer of manpower program planning and
design responsibilities to units of govern-
ment which are best equipped to measure
and meet local needs. From now on, State
and local governments will be able to de-
cide for themselves what kind of man-
power services they require, for how long
and in what quantity—and I am con-
vinced that they will be able to provide
such services more efficiently and more
promptly than was possible under the pre-
ceding system of federally-managed
categorical programs.

Among other important topics discussed
in this report is the energy shortage and
the measures taken by the Department of
Labor and other agencies of Government
to minimize the temporary disruptions of
the labor market caused by the energy
crisis. The report reveals that, in spite of
these disruptions, 1973 was a good year

for labor. The number of those employed
as of December numbered nearly 86 mil-
lion. In the past 2 years alone, over 4.1
million Americans entered the labor force,
including significant numbers of women
and younger workers. While the unem-
ployment rate has moved upward tempo-
rarily after many months of steady de-
cline, we should not overlook the sizable
increases during the same time-span in
the number of new jobs and newly em-
ployed Americans.

For the convenience of the Congress,
this edition of the Manpower Report
brings together in one volume an overview
of numerous manpower activities carried
out under separate legislative mandates.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,

April 22, 1974.

NOTE: The message is printed in the report entitled "Manpower Report of the President—Including Reports by the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Transmitted to the Congress April 1974" (Government Printing Office, 387 pp.).

119 Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation for Funding of Foreign Assistance Programs in Fiscal Year 1975. April 24, 1974

For more than twenty five years, Amer-
ica has generously provided foreign assist-
ance to other nations, helping them to
develop their economies, to meet the hu-
manitarian needs of their people and to
provide for their own defense.

During this era foreign aid has become
an indispensable element of our foreign
policy. Without it, America would risk
isolating herself from responsible involve-

ment in an international community upon
which the survival of our own economic,
social and political institutions rests. With
the continuation of a healthy foreign aid
program, this Nation can continue to lead
world progress toward building a lasting
structure of peace.

Now that we have ended the longest
war in our history and no American troops
are serving in combat for the first time in
more than a decade, there is a temptation

373

Richard Nixon, 1974

Apr. 24 [119]

to supplement and consolidate what has
been achieved so far. I am therefore re-
questing a Special Assistance program for
the Middle East, and have asked the Con-
gress to provide the following:

- For Israel: $50 million in security
supporting assistance and $300 mil-
lion in military credit sales. Israel's
continued ability to defend herself re-
duces the prospect of new conflict in
the Middle East, and we must con-
tinue to assist her in maintaining that
ability.

- For Egypt: $250 million in support-
ing assistance. These funds would be
used for the tasks which come with
peace: clearing the Suez Canal, re-
pairing the damage in adjacent areas,
and restoring Egyptian trade.

- For Jordan: $100 million in military
assistance grants, $77.5 million in
security supporting assistance, and
$30 million in military credit sales.
Jordan has been a moderating force
in the Arab world and these funds
will enable her to maintain a position
of moderation and independence
which will be crucial to a permanent
settlement in the area.

- For a Special Requirements Fund:
$100 million. This fund will be used
for new needs that may arise as the
outlines of a peaceful settlement take
shape, including provision for peace-
keeping forces, refugee aid or settle-
ment, and development projects.

All of this aid will contribute to the
confidence these nations must have in
the United States and in their own secu-
rity if they are to have the base from which
to negotiate a lasting settlement. It will
strengthen moderate forces in an area
where only moderation can form the basis
for a settlement acceptable to all.

TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION OF INDOCHINA

Another area of acute and continuing
concern to this Government is Southeast
Asia. Our aid in Indochina is no less
crucial than our aid in the Middle East
in achieving a peaceful outcome which
protects our interests and reflects our past
involvement in these two areas. I am
asking the Congress to authorize the ap-
propriation of $939.8 million to assist
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in
their efforts to shift their economies from
war to peace and to accelerate the
reconstitution of their societies.

We have already invested heavily in
these countries. Progress has been signifi-
cant, and we are nearing success in our
efforts to assist them in becoming self-
sufficient. Although our total request is
higher than last year, the budget I am
proposing is actually austere. We must rec-
ognize that a modest increase in economic
assistance now will permit the develop-
ment of viable, self-supporting economies
with lower requirements for assistance
within a few years.

The South Vietnamese face an unusu-
ally difficult task in reconstructing their
economy and caring for their war-torn
population even as the effort to end hos-
tilities goes forward. Progress in recon-
struction, economic development and
humanitarian programs, which offer the
hope of a better life for the people there,
should make it clear that a peaceful settle-
ment of political disputes is in the interest
of all.

This year and next the South Viet-
namese face several related challenges
which make increased U.S. economic as-
sistance essential:

- They must resettle more than a mil-
lion refugees and displaced persons.

375

[119] Apr. 24

—They must provide the investments needed to create productive jobs for the several hundred thousand who have lost jobs with the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

—They must meet the much higher costs of such essential imports as fertilizer and other critical resources caused by worldwide inflation.

—They must provide for the orphans, the disabled, and for widows who can never recover their wartime losses.

—They must continue to support the military forces needed to preserve movement toward peace so long as hostile forces continue to be deployed within South Vietnam and supported from outside.

The South Vietnamese have made laudable efforts to solve their own problems. They have increased their taxes—a 40 percent increase in real terms in 1973. They have expanded their exports, which were virtually eliminated by the war—doubling exports in 1972 and again in 1973. They have sharply reduced the consumption of imported goods, including a notable reduction in petroleum. But after more than a decade of war, they cannot reconstruct their economy and their society alone. Increased U.S. assistance is needed now to support the increasing efforts of the Vietnamese to achieve peace and self-sufficiency as soon as possible.

In Laos, a peaceful political solution to the conflict is in motion and the people there can finally look forward to a secure and stable environment. The problems of resettling refugees and establishing a viable economy, however, will provide a major test of the Laotian government's ability to work in the interests of all. Our continued assistance is essential to permit this underdeveloped, land-locked

country to reconstruct its economy after so many years of war.

Continued U.S. assistance is also essential to alleviate the hardships facing the Cambodian people, many of them refugees with little opportunity to support themselves until hostilities subside.

The investment I am now seeking—an investment to sustain the peace, to overcome the human suffering resulting from the war, and to give the people of Indonesia a chance to stand on their own feet—is small in comparison with what we have committed over the years in Indochina. But the potential return on this investment is large in enhancing the prospect of peace both in Indochina and around the world.

## DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

U.S. assistance programs—both bilateral and multilateral—have made a very substantial contribution to the economic growth of the developing nations over the past decade.

In spite of encouraging progress, it is estimated that 40 percent of the total population in all the developing countries still remain trapped in conditions of poverty beyond the reach of the market economy. These people continue to exist below minimal levels of nutrition, literacy, and health.

It is clear that in the modern world, peace and poverty cannot easily endure side by side. In the long term, we must have peace without privation, or we may not have a durable peace at all. All that we have worked, and fought, and sacrificed to achieve will be in jeopardy as long as hunger, illiteracy, disease, and poverty are the permanent condition of 40

percent of the nations of the world which we hope not to be a permanent part of the order of progress.

To provide the中国人民 year 1975 with a million for finance program, and a million already in the Foreign Assis-

These actions of the U.S. Agency for International Development caused food production to decline, leading to a rise in prices. In many cases, famines and famines, and even civil战争, makes it difficult to provide the food needed to support the large number of people in the country. In order to achieve the goal of providing 60 percent of the population with programs which will be of benefit to the nation as a whole, we will need to continue our efforts on these two basic points.

We will continue our efforts on these two basic points. We will need to continue our efforts on these two basic points. We will need to continue our efforts on these two basic points. We will need to continue our efforts on these two basic points.

[20]

376

["Richard Nixon, 1974", "July 3 [209]", "and painstaking work to prepare this meeting\nand the appropriate agreements.", "I would like to say a few words more about\nour talks on international problems. As during\nour previous meetings with President Nixon,\nthey were thorough, quite frank, and useful.\nGiven all the differences of views and positions\nof our two countries on a number of specific\nquestions, both the Soviet and, evidently, the\nAmerican participants in the talks have treated\nand continue to treat as a matter of paramount\nimportance joint or parallel efforts by the So-\nviet Union and the United States to strengthen\nuniversal peace and create conditions for the\npeaceful cooperation of all states in the spirit\nof the well-known principles of peaceful co-\nexistence and the provisions of the United\nNations Charter.", "The last 2 years have already shown the use-\nful influence that the improvement of Soviet-\nAmerican relations may have in this sense. It\nhas certainly played a positive role in ending the\nwar in Vietnam and in creating conditions for\ncertain progress towards a peaceful settlement\nin the Middle East and in convening the Euro-\npean conference.", "Now the task, as we see it, is successfully to\ncomplete what has been started and to ensure\nthat the development of Soviet-American rela-\ntions continues to be beneficial for universal\npeace and for the security of nations.", "I feel it will be no exaggeration to say that\nthe political results of our talks will be a new\nconfirmation of the determination of both sides\nto go on developing and deepening ties and co-\noperation between our two countries in many\nfields and to act on the international scene in", "favor of détente and peace. This is exactly what\nwe expected from the talks, and that is why\nwe express our satisfaction with their results.", "We appreciate the contribution that you have\nmade, Mr. President, to the achievement of\nthese results. And we wish you and the entire\nAdministration and the Congress of the United\nStates every success in giving effect to the good\ninitiatives of peace, growing mutual confidence,\nand useful cooperation embodied in the docu-\nments signed in the days of this meeting, as well\nas in those Soviet-American documents that\nwere signed last year and the year before last.", "You may rest assured that the leadership of\nthe Soviet Union, fully supported by the entire\nSoviet people, will do all in their power in this\ndirection. We are glad, Mr. President, that\nMrs. Nixon and you have returned from your\ntrip to the Crimea and to Byelorussia with good\nimpressions.", "For my part, I want to say that I remember\nwith gratification my stay in the United States\nlast summer, and I thank you, Mr. President,\nfor the invitation to pay a new visit to the\nUnited States next year.", "Availing myself of this occasion, I wish to\ncongratulate you, Mr. President, on the com-\ning national day of the United States, Inde-\npendence Day, and to wish the American\npeople peace, happiness, and well-being.", "I propose a toast to the health of the Presi-\ndent of the United States of America, Richard\nNixon, and Mrs. Nixon, to the further develop-\nment of relations of friendship and cooperation\nbetween the Soviet and American peoples, to a\nlasting peace between all people.", "209 Joint Communique Following Discussions With\nSoviet Leaders. July 3, 1974", "IN ACCORDANCE with the agreement\nto hold regular US-Soviet meetings at\nthe highest level and at the invitation, ex-\ntended during the visit of General Secre-\ntary of the Central Committee of the\nCommunist Party of the Soviet Union\nL. I. Brezhnev to the USA in June 1973,\nthe President of the United States of", "America and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an\nofficial visit to the Soviet Union from\nJune 27 to July 3, 1974.", "During his stay President Nixon visited,\nin addition to Moscow, Minsk and the\nSouthern Coast of the Crimea.", "The President of the United States and\nthe Soviet leaders held a thorough and", "that the\ndiplomacy\nof the\nUnited\nSoviet\ncould\nachieve\na\nful\nand\nsustained\nim-\nprovement\nin\ndiplomacy\nand\ngood\nfor\nthe\ngreat\nefforts\nof\nthe\nSoviets\nin\nthe\nU.S.A.\nand\nthe\ngreat\ndiplomacy\nof\nthe\nSoviets\nin\nthe\nU.S.A.\nand\nthe\ngreat\ndiplomacy\nof\ndiplomacy\nand\nthe\ngreat\ndiplomacy\nof\ndiplomacy\nfor\nthe\ngreat\ndiplomacy\nand\nthe\ngreat\ndiplom

Richard Nixon, 1974

July 3 [209]

#### IV. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

In the course of the meeting great attention was devoted to a review of the status of and prospects for relations between the USA and the USSR in the commercial and economic field.

Both Sides reaffirmed that they regard the broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous ties in this field on the basis of equality and nondiscrimination as an important part of the foundation on which the entire structure of US-Soviet relations is built. An increase in the scale of commercial and economic ties corresponding to the potentials of both countries will cement this foundation and benefit the American and Soviet peoples.

The two Sides noted with satisfaction that since the previous summit meeting US-Soviet commercial and economic relations have on the whole shown an upward trend. This was expressed, in particular, in a substantial growth of the exchange of goods between the two countries which approximated $1.5 billion in 1973. It was noted that prospects were favorable for surpassing the goal announced in the joint US-USSR communique of June 24, 1973, of achieving a total bilateral trade turnover of $2.3 billion during the 3-year period 1973-1975. The Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission continues to provide an effective mechanism to promote the broad-scale growth of economic relations.

The two Sides noted certain progress in the development of long-term cooperation between American firms and Soviet organizations in carrying out large-scale projects including those on a compensation basis. They are convinced that such cooperation is an important element in

USSR will continue to remain in close touch with a view to coordinating the efforts of both countries toward a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

#### INDOCHINA ✓

Both Sides noted certain further improvements in the situation in Indochina. In the course of the exchange of views on the situation in Vietnam both Sides emphasized that peace and stability in the region can be preserved and strengthened only on the basis of strict observance by all parties concerned of the provisions of the Paris Agreement of January 27, 1973, and the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam of March 2, 1973.

As regards Laos, they noted progress in the normalization of the situation as a result of the formation there of coalition governmental bodies. Both Sides also pronounced themselves in favor of strict fulfillment of the pertinent agreements.

Both Sides also stressed the need for an early and just settlement of the problem of Cambodia based on respect for the sovereign rights of the Cambodian people to a free and independent development without any outside interference.

#### STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United States of America and the Soviet Union attach great importance to the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining peace and security and the expansion of international cooperation. They reiterate their intention to continue their efforts toward increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in every possible way, including in regard to peacekeeping, on the basis of strict observance of the United Nations Charter.

and the political condition of the world should be accourate military

importance to the mutual interests and policies of the peoples of all nations. The two sides shouldnegotiate, with due speed, all questions of any importance to any one of them.

The removal of all obstructions to the international Resolving of争tion, on the part of any one of them, to the establishment of a stable and permanent international order based on the principles of law and order, and the right to ex

elvea Peace, the USA should, as soon as possible, take all steps to bring to an end the international tension which has been caused by the action of some of the major Powers. The USA and the

573

V-113

[Lc]

In the period of the 1970 Cambodian sanctuaries operations, U.S. KIA in all of Vietnam were 754 in May and 418 in June. Although this was higher than preceding months (526 in April, 449 in March), American casualties were cut by more than half as a result of the Cambodian operation. As the attached table shows, the total American KIA for the second half of 1970 (1345) were less than half the total of the first six months of the year (2876). The yearly total for 1970 -- even with the slightly increased figures during the May-June campaign -- was less than half the total for 1969 (down to 4221, from 9414). In each month of 1970 beginning with June, the casualty figure was less than half of the figure for the corresponding month of 1969.

In the week ending June 4, 1970, U.S. battlefield deaths dropped to 101, the lowest weekly figure since December 1966. U.S. KIA in the four-week period after the conclusion of the Cambodian operation were 276, the lowest casualty figure for any four-week period since the period ending January 22, 1966 (when KIA were 195). By October 3, HK could report to the President that U.S. KIA were at a new low of 38, the lowest weekly figure since April 1966 and the fourteenth week since the Cambodian operation that KIA were below 90.

80.

"e. On this basis, smash the Americans' will of aggression; force them to give up their intention of ending the war in a strong position, and to end the war quickly and withdraw troops while the puppet army and administration are still too weak to take over the responsibility of the Americans; force the Americans to accept a political solution, and recognize an independent, democratic peaceful and neutral South Vietnam with a national, democratic coalition government working toward reunifying Vietnam."(emphases in original)

Rosemary, chemistry very good. Should be better as well.

U.S. combat casualties (KIA) in 1969 amounted to 9414 -- or 60 percent of the 16,000 total casualties during the four years of the first Nixon Administration.

REPUBLICAN RESEARCH REPORT

Prepared by the
Research Division

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1625 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

ROBERT L. L. McCORMICK
Director of Research

RAY C. BLISS
Chairman

REPORT No. 29

March 15, 1968

VIETNAM CASUALTIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>I.</td><td>Summary of Casualties 1961-Present</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>II.</td><td>U.S. Casualties: Causes and Comparisons</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>A. The Wounded Analyzed</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>B. Casualties During "Truces"</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>C. Prisoners of War</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>D. Some Comparisons</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>III.</td><td>Civilian Casualties</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>IV.</td><td>South Vietnamese Military Losses</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>V.</td><td>Enemy Losses</td><td>8</td></tr></table>

VIETNAM CASUALTIES

This report represents a collection of statistics from numerous
sources concerning casualties in human life which have resulted from
the Vietnam conflict. The figures reflecting _enemy_ and _civilian_ cas-
ualties should be recognized for what they are - estimates. Variance
in some totals stems from differing time periods over which they are
calculated.

I. SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES 1961-PRESENT ¹

<table><tr><td>-U.S. casualties</td><td>136,000*</td></tr><tr><td>-U.S. killed</td><td>18,709</td></tr><tr><td>-U.S. non-hostile deaths</td><td>3,408</td></tr><tr><td>-South Vietnamese forces killed</td><td>56,888**</td></tr><tr><td>-Other free world forces killed</td><td>1,947</td></tr><tr><td>-Enemy killed</td><td>301,179</td></tr></table>

U.S. CASUALTIES, 1961-67/ ²

<table><tr><td>1961-62</td><td>146</td></tr><tr><td>1963</td><td>525</td></tr><tr><td>1964</td><td>1,234</td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>7,842</td></tr><tr><td>1966</td><td>36,146</td></tr><tr><td>1967</td><td>71,187</td></tr></table>

1/ Department of Defense-March 1, 1968

* As of March 9, 1968, National Republican Congressional Committee

** Does not include para-military losses

2/ Department of Defense (includes non-hostile and combat dead and wounded.)

-2-

## II. U.S. CASUALTIES: CAUSES AND COMPARISONS

### A. The causes of troop casualties are numerous with the impact of the use of static devices such as mines and booby-traps on the rise. Disease is also a major cause of casualties.

"In October, 1965, the percentage of the wounded hospitalized by rifle and machine-gun fire was 49.2; by grenades, mortars and mines, 47.4; by burns, lacerations, (etc.), 3.4.

"By October, 1966, the percentages had undergone a dramatic change. In order they were: 25.3 percent wounded due to gunfire, 58.3 percent due to grenades, mortars and mines, and 16.4 percent to burns, lacerations, (etc.).

"In World War II, mines and booby traps accounted for 3.1 percent of combat wounds; in Korea 4 percent, but in Vietnam 21 percent.

"Disease is a growing threat to U.S. troops in Vietnam. Of all servicemen evacuated last year (1966), 50 percent were victims of malaria, hepatitis, or other diseases; 12 percent had been injured in non-combat accidents. The remaining 38 percent had been wounded in action."

(U.S. Surgeon General Study)

U.S. News & World Report

March 6, 1967

### B. Casualties During "Truces:"

For over two years now, U.S. policy makers have continued to recognize ground "truces" though each "truce" has been flagrantly and systematically violated by the enemy. The "truce" periods and U.S. casualties sustained during each are listed as follows:

-4-

-Despite President Johnson's campaign pledge of September 25, 1964 that "We don't want our American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys," casualty figures show that U.S. troops are doing the bulk of the fighting.

"...the Vietnam war has now become a full-fledged American war in that American casualties since January 1967 are now running almost twice as heavy as Vietnamese casualties."

(Rep. Melvin R. Laird)

July 8, 1967

"U.S. casualty lists are already longer in the first five or six weeks of 1968 than they were during the entire year of 1965. In all of 1965, 1,369 Americans were killed. By Feb. 10, this year, 1674 Americans had already been killed. According to reports issued in Saigon on yesterday (Feb. 29), 543 additional Americans were killed in the last seven days, the highest weekly total of the war."

(Senator Mike Mansfield)

Congressional Record, page S1994

March 1, 1968

Fatalities and Wounded: 1961-67

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>U.S. KILLED IN ACTION</th><th>SOUTH VIETNAMESE KILLED (ARVN)</th><th>VIET-CONG KILLED</th><th>U.S. DEATHS (NON-HOSTILE)</th><th>U.S. WOUNDED (HOSPITALIZED)</th><th>U.S. WOUNDED (NON-HOSPITALIZED)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>'61-'62</td><td>42</td><td>8,400</td><td>33,000</td><td>23</td><td>43</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>'63</td><td>78</td><td>5,700</td><td>21,000</td><td>36</td><td>218</td><td>193</td></tr><tr><td>'64</td><td>147</td><td>7,500</td><td>17,000</td><td>48</td><td>522</td><td>517</td></tr><tr><td>'65</td><td>1,369</td><td>11,000</td><td>35,500</td><td>359</td><td>3,308</td><td>2,806</td></tr><tr><td>'66</td><td>5,008</td><td>9,500</td><td>55,500</td><td>1,045</td><td>16,526</td><td>13,567</td></tr><tr><td>'67</td><td>7,482</td><td>10,880</td><td>88,104</td><td>1,680</td><td>32,371</td><td>29,654</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>14,126</td><td>52,980</td><td>250,104</td><td>3,191</td><td>52,988</td><td>46,775</td></tr></tfoot></table>

Source: Dept. of Defense

-6-

### III. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

- The war in Vietnam has produced more civilian deaths than military.

Eric Severeid
CBS News, January, 1968

- The Blasingame (medical) team has reported, as have others, that it is impossible to estimate accurately the number of civilian casualties or the cause of their injuries. Official U.S. and Vietnamese reports place the number at about 50,000 a year. Others have estimated the number from 100,000 to 150,000 a year.

Editorial Comment,
The New York Times, October 1, 1967

- The U. S. Mission in Saigon reports that its latest figures show that 57 American civilians were either killed, captured or missing as a result of the Communist Lunar New Year offensive.

The Washington Post, March 5, 1968

### -THE TACTIC OF TERRORISM

- In hamlets and cities, using bombs, grenades and assassination, well-organized Vietcong terrorists are stepping up their attempts to kill Americans and intimidate Vietnamese who support the South Vietnamese government.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1966</th><th>1967</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Assassinations</td><td>1,618</td><td>3,280</td></tr><tr><td>Kidnappings</td><td>3,507</td><td>5,368</td></tr></tbody></table>

Foreign Policy Briefs
Department of State, Jan. 29, 1968

"Over the months, Sam (leader of a terrorist cell in Saigon) rolled up an impressive list of accomplishments. In February of 1966 he mined the Vietnamese General Staff Headquarters gate, killing 13 and wounding 60. In May he mined an American bus station, killing five and wounding 29. Around election time in September of 1966 he ran six operations, killing one and wounding 27, and the following month he hit the Ky Son American billet, killing three and wounding 10..."

Life, January 12, 1968

-7-

## IV. SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY LOSSES

-From 1961 to March 1, 1968, the regular armed forces (excluding paramilitary forces) of South Vietnam suffered 56,888 troops killed.

### SOUTH VIETNAMESE KILLED (ARVN)

<table><tr><td>1961-62</td><td>8,400</td></tr><tr><td>1963</td><td>5,700</td></tr><tr><td>1964</td><td>7,500</td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>11,000</td></tr><tr><td>1966</td><td>9,500</td></tr><tr><td>1967</td><td>10,880</td></tr></table>

Total: 52,980
(Department of Defense)

Newsweek, Jan. 1, 1968