SEP 16 '93 05:12PM 2123505146

P.8

IN0413

henry

DEPT.

himself will be unable to endow this transition with the nearly mystical significance given to it by many Israelis. Any political leader must fall into his constituency. And in the past, the PLO has been an umbrella organization including terrorists, rejectionists, and radicals, many of whom have been condemned the agreement and are unlikely to ever be converted to views contrary to those of a lifetime. Even granting Arafat's unreserved commitment to peace, the pressures he faces will make him an increasingly complicated partner. If he pursues a PLO or radical consensus, he will be forced to be ambiguous; if he goes beyond his constituency, he may be removed or become irrelevant.<-

When the Palestinians recognized Israel, did they mean that they have become genuinely reconciled to its existence? Or was it with the same attitude that France renounced Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871, as a stage in a continuing struggle? I asked this question of a PLO representative after the signing ceremony. He answered: "I consider myself as coming from Jaffa. My

(((MORE))))

[18]

SEP 16 '93 05:12PM 2123505146

P.9

IN0413

henry

DEPT.

children, who have never lived in Palestine,
will also tell you they are from Jaffa.'' At the
same time, he was voluble-and I believe
sincere-in protesting his yearning for
peace. <--

[14]

The follow-on negotiations must strive to remove this ambivalence. They must make clear that there is a point beyond which Israel should not be asked to make concessions, and that Israel's international support has been enhanced by the risks it is taking for peace. They must also demonstrate to the Palestinians that their dignity is an essential aspect of a final settlement. The major tasks will be to help Palestinians and Israelis to learn to live side by side with each other.

[11]

It will be painful for each side to accept
the consequences of its own decisions. After
the elections in the occupied territories
in nine months time, the Israeli recognition
of the Palestinian entity will be irrevocable,
as will the withdrawal of Israeli troops.
Israeli politicians who speak blithely of ab-
rogating the agreement or of reoccupying
vacated areas are deluding themselves. The

(((MORE))))

["SEP 16 '93 05:12PM 2123505146", "P.10", "IN0413", "henry", "DEPT.", "international isolation such acts would pro-\nduce would prove unsustainable. And even\nif Israel should withdraw its recognition of\na Palestinian entity, the rest of the world\nwould not follow.<-", "[14]", "At the same time, the Palestinians must\nnot delude themselves that they can resort\nto their traditional pressure tactics. The fol-\nlow-on negotiations cannot succeed and co-\nexistence in the occupied territories would\nbe thwarted if the PLO returned to harass-\nment, not to speak of terrorism. The road to\nprogress, lies in enhancing the sense of secu-\nrity of the Israeli people, and the sense of infinity of\nthe Palestinian people.", "[9]", "In the immediate future, Israel will gain\nconsiderable benefits. It will be rid of the\nnearly half of the total Arab population of\nthe occupied territories living in Gaza. It\nwill be able to withdraw its forces from the\npopulation centers in the rest of the occu-\npied territories and thus reduce, perhaps\neven eliminate, the impact of the intifada.\nCooperative patterns between Israeli and\nArab authorities on the West Bank are sure\nto develop. Relations with other Arab coun-", (((MORE)))))"]

["SEP 16 '93 05:13PM 2123505146", "[Y]", "N0413", "henry", "DEPT.", "believe that Arafat and the police force that\nthe PLO will be permitted to organize will\nhelp keep the West Bank quiet. But the\n''strong'' Palestinian police force envi-\nsioned in the agreement is likely to become,\nat best, a study in ambivalence. With what\nenergy will they resist acts aimed at sub-\nverting the Israeli presence? With what\nconviction will they pursue terrorists re-\nturning from Israel? At what point will they\nbecome the problem rather than the\nsolution?<-", "[21]", "The most serious danger is that the dissi-\ndent groups will try to create Lebanese-\nstyle conditions in the occupied territories.\nThe central authorities may not be able to\nprevent terrorism, either against moderate\nArabs or against Israelis on the West Bank.\nIf conditions become too chaotic, Israel\nmay intervene, or outside Arab forces may\ntry to infiltrate the West bank, or both. The\nsame result could occur if the PLO entity\nseeks to intervene in Jordan. All these de-\nvelopments could usher in another Middle\nEast war.<-", "[13]", {"bbox": [707, 1345, 836, 1366], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

SEP-16-1993 20:31

FROM KISSINGER CONSULTING

TO

01133142602371

Palestinians inside as well as outside the West Bank, provided
the latter carry Egyptian or Jordanian passports.

These agreements are a significant and, above all, a
necessary step forward. As all diplomatic documents, the agreement
refined in Jordanian
represent a compromise which must be compared not with what
each side would consider ideal, but with what would exist in
the absence of the agreement. They are, however, the beginning
of the march toward peace, not the end of it. And all the
parties must learn to live with what they have built, which is
quite different from what is familiar to them.

The most immediate issue is to understand what exactly has
been recognized and who did the recognizing. Israel has
recognized the PLO but seems to believe that it has not
recognized a Palestinian state and that it can choose the
representatives of the Palestinians with whom it is prepared
to deal. This is surely an illusion. I have in the past

TOTAL P.08