- 30 -

Thus, we have not only tackled the traditional issues
of peace and war, but made a good beginning in helping to
fashion more cooperative relationships in new dimensions
of world concern.

The structure of our foreign policy is sound and
ready to encounter the future.

- 31 -

America's Imperative: Domestic Unity

For more than three decades America has, despite setbacks
and mistakes, conducted a remarkably effective foreign policy.

We have done so because we recognized, even when we
disagreed, that what we did beyond our borders was done

in the name of the nation as a whole. Partisan interests were
channeled into positive accomplishments. We acted as

a confident people. We did not doubt ourselves; we did not
consume ourselves in self-hatred.

That was the ultimate underpinning for the role of world
leadership that was thrust upon us; it was the true measure
of our greatness. It is a strength we must not lose.

- 32 -

History has made America the repository and guardian of the best values of mankind, for no other free nation is strong enough to replace us. Without our commitment there can be no security; without our dedication there can be no progress. We must have the steadiness to oppose military pressures and the vision to work for a more peaceful international order. Moderation has meaning only when practiced by the strong, and strength has purpose only when tempered by conciliation.

These twin strands of firmness and conciliation reflect the permanent interests of our nation. Yet our ability to pursue either course has been, in recent months, increasingly threatened.

A strong, coherent and effective international role is jeopardized by acrimonious controversy which thwarts serious discussion of the great issues, and by the growing

-33-

tendency of too many in the Congress not only to supervise but
to legislate the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.

The slogans of a past we thought we had transcended are
suddenly reappearing. We now hear again that suffering
is prolonged by American involvement, that injustice is
perpetuated by American commitments, that defense spending is
wasteful at best and produces conflict at worst, that American
intelligence activities are immoral, that the necessary confidentiality
of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the public, that flexibility is
cynical, and that tranquility is somehow to be brought about
by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no
example.

If these attitudes shape our policies, we will deprive our diplomacy
of its essential tools; conciliatory policies and firm measures

- 34 -

alike will be undermined by growing doubt about the steadiness of our national will. An atmosphere of suspicion and a lack of even the most elementary confidentiality will make impossible the management of the government and the conduct of negotiation. If a national consensus does not exist, our policy will be driven by narrow interest groups and short-term political considerations.

In an era when the danger of war has been reduced but the rivalry of Communism and freedom continues, the grey area between foreign policy and overt conflict continues to be important, and indeed takes on increasing significance. Yet, leaks, sensational investigations and the demoralization of our intelligence services -- at a time when our adversaries are stepping up their own efforts -- are systematically

- 35 -

depriving our government of the ability to respond.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong national government which can act with assurance and speak with confidence on behalf of all Americans. But when the Executive is disavowed repeatedly and publicly, other governments wonder who speaks for America and what an American commitment means. Our government is in danger of progressively losing the ability to shape events, and a great nation that does not shape history eventually becomes its victim.

Too much depends upon a strong and confident America to allow this state of affairs to continue. When America abdicates from shaping the future, when its policy falls prey to the passions of the moment and the play of

- 36 -

pressure groups, it disheartens friends, emboldens adversaries, gives pause to the wavering and thus undermines international order.

We must restore our unity while the essential structure of our foreign policy is still sound and before irreparable damage is done to it. We retain the capacity, if we have the will, to prevent military expansion by our adversaries. Our alliances with the industrialized nations have never been more solid. A further agreement to limit the strategic arms race is within reach. We are well launched on a durable and improving relationship with the world's most populous nation. The elements for peace in the Middle East exist. A dialogue with the developing world has begun on a hopeful note.

- 37 -

The threat of war around the globe has been reduced. The
principal danger we face is our domestic divisions.

The American people have a right to demand of their
leaders in and out of government an end to the destructive
debate that has in recent months come to mark our political
process. They know, as the world knows, that the United
States is still a great country. And they know how much
damage these continuing attacks on their country's institutions
have done and will do to undermine America's ability to keep
the peace.

We have every obligation to draw the right lessons
from our past mistakes, and to see that they never happen
again. But we have an equally compelling duty to remember
that a faltering of will on the part of a country that has for

- 38 -

decades been the principal guarantor of peace and progress
can have disastrous consequences for the prospects of a
better and safer world.

America now finds itself in a world of proliferating,
often competitive, and sometimes threatening power. We
must often make choices that will not solve but only manage
problems; we must occasionally make compromises that by
definition will not produce ideal results. We need confidence
in ourselves to master a complicated period in which the
United States can no longer overwhelm problems with resources;
when it needs purpose, firmness, coherence, flexibility,
imagination and above all unity.

The formulation and conduct of our foreign policy
must, of course, be the product of consultation and

- 39 -

accommodation between the Congress and the President.

Neither branch can, alone, determine the course we
will pursue abroad. The Congress, entitled by the
letter and spirit of the Constitution and by the practices
of two hundred years, must be an equal partner in the
process.

- 40 -

But if that partnership is to flourish, each branch must respect
the role of the other, and each must recognize the limitations --
constitutional and practical -- on its authority. The Congress
can set broad guidelines and decide basic policies. But the
Congress does not have the organization, the information or the
responsibility for deciding the tactical questions that arise daily
in the conduct of our foreign relations, or for executing a
coherent, consistent, comprehensive policy. The President
has this responsibility and must be permitted to exercise it
on behalf of the entire nation. For in the last analysis, the
United States, when it deals with other nations, must speak
with one voice.

It is time we recognize that, increasingly, our difficulties
abroad are largely of our own making. If America is to be safe,

- 41 -

we must cease dismantling and demoralizing our intelligence
services. If America is to preserve its values and maintain
the global balance of stability, we must have a strong defense.

And if America is to help build a world environment in
which our citizens can thrive and be free, we cannot deny
ourselves the essential tools of policy. Without these
our only option is to retreat -- to become an isolated fortress
island in a hostile and turbulent global sea, awaiting the
ultimate confrontation with the only response we will not
have denied ourselves -- massive retaliation. Our branches
of government, special interests, and ordinary citizens must
pursue their legitimate concerns with an understanding that

-42-

there are basic, overriding national interests which, if
neglected, will render pointless all else we do.

In our age whose challenges are without precedent, we
need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our
pragmatic tradition must help us understand reality and
shape it, rather than be diverted by an obsession with
technical detail or method without purpose. Our love
of our country must inspire us to persevere with dedication
and unity and not to consume our substance in civil strife.
Our idealism should remind us that we remain the beacon of
hope for all those who love liberty and that this imposes a heavy
responsibility upon us.

- 43 -

Our international role is not a burden; it protects
the lives and wellbeing of our people. It has been a historical
success. In our first two centuries we have done great things
as a united people. We can accomplish even more in our third
century. America remains the strongest nation in the
world; our government continues to be the noblest
experiment undertaken by man; we still are an inspiration to
all the world's millions who are much less fortunate than we.
Our past achievements should be but prologue to the exciting
future that crowds in upon us.

It is, in the final analysis, up to us.

* * * * * *

PR #47

-1-

It is good to be here in the West. The people of this land remind me once again that America is not the cynical, confused, and tired nation so many in Washington would have us believe it is. Instead, as I have so often seen in my trips, the American people continue to have pride in their country. They know that America has done more for the world, and for peace, over the past 30 years than any nation in history. They know we have given more of our resources, fed more of the starving, taken in more immigrants, and educated more people from other lands than any other nation before us.

The American people are tired of hearing how evil we are, how terrible are our mistakes, and how misguided our purposes. They know better. And they want better.

It is true that we have passed through a decade and more of tragedy; we have been witness to assassination; we have suffered through a tragic war that shattered our domestic unity; and we have endured our greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War.

But we have come through these difficult times with our institutions as strong as ever. We remain the world's greatest democracy; we continue to be the bastion to which other nations look for their protection; and we remain the symbol of hope to the millions around the world who live in tyranny and poverty but yearn for freedom and prosperity.

America, from its birth, has meant much to the world. The Founding Fathers were animated by a sense of obligation, and of mission, to other peoples and to posterity. Our revolution, our independence, and our democracy set examples which excited and encouraged imitation around the globe. America represented an inspiration and the most important political experiment of modern history -- the spectacle of successful self-government, economic opportunity, social equality, civil and religious liberty and the tremendous capacities of a free people to shape their own destiny.

Later in our history these values affected the world in a new way -- as a powerful magnet drawing great tides of immigration. It was a movement of ideas as well as people, which not only shaped this nation, but vastly altered the assumptions and social structures of the old world.

In recent decades, America's impact on the world has been more immediate. For much of this century, global peace and prosperity have depended upon our contribution. When World War II ended, we took the lead in helping a shattered globe rebuild from devastation. We shaped the commercial and financial system that spread prosperity and economic opportunity to far corners of the world. We built peacetime alliances to maintain global stability and defend the values we share with the great industrial democracies. We resisted aggression. We mediated conflicts. We helped ease the process of decolonization. And we led the fight against disease, hunger, ignorance and the forces of

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(L)

-2-

oppression and terror that have scarred this century.

No other nation has made such a contribution. No other nation can make
such a contribution now. The best hope for a planet still beset by
war, poverty and tyranny is a strong, committed, vigilant America.

## Nation-Building in the Global Context

We must never forget that in serving peace and progress we both serve
ourselves and live up to our best traditions.

We declared our independence "in decent respect to the opinions of
mankind." Our Founding Fathers were sophisticated statesmen who
understood the European balance of power and knew how our country could
profit from it. Our independence was not won by American arms alone.
The shrewd diplomacy of Franklin and Jefferson led to the involvement
of Britain's enemies France, Spain and Russia and eventually
engineered the only defeat Britain suffered in the modern era. We
then cut loose from our temporary allies when John Jay won the
British crown's recognition and liquidated the residual problems of
our war with England.

For more than three decades after we gained our independence, we lived
in an age of international turmoil that saw us go to the brink of
war with France and suffer the capture of our capital by Britain. Again,
alert to new opportunities provided by changes on the international
scene, we moved astutely to take advantage of them. The effective
elimination of France and Spain from the hemisphere, the expansion
of Russia in the Pacific Northwest, and the growing disaffection of
Great Britain from the European powers led us in 1823 to concert the
Monroe Doctrine with Great Britain.

Thereafter, for the hundred years between Waterloo and 1914, America
benefitted from the existence of a world balance of power, presided
over by Britain, which maintained global stability and prevented inter-
national war. In the words of Prime Minister Canning, the Doctrine
"called the new world into existence to redress the balance of the old."

Thus, the balance of power in Europe and our skill in using it protected
the young United States; it enabled us, in reliance upon the British
navy, to turn our back on the Atlantic and open the continent before us.

Theodore Roosevelt noted that long before Jefferson negotiated an end
to the French claim to Louisiana, foreign claims had been effectively
undermined by the great western movement of Americans and the free
communities they quickly founded. But the consolidation of their
pioneering achievement was made possible by those negotiations and by
the subsequent series of remarkable diplomatic successes. The
annexation of Florida, the Oregon boundary settlement with Great
Britain, the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, the Gadsden Purchase,

PR #47

Secretary of State Seward's purchase of Alaska from Russia -- all
were triumphs of diplomacy during decades when most citizens believed
America did not have -- or need -- a foreign policy.

Indeed, our very achievements in dealing with the world brought
Americans under the sway of a shared mythology. As a society made up
of men and women who had fled the persecutions and power politics of
the old world, Americans -- whether Mayflower descendants or refugees
from the failed revolutions of 1848 -- came to assume that we were
beyond the reach of the imperatives of traditional foreign policy.

While our security continued to be assured by our place in the inter-
national structure of the time, we became bemused by the popular
belief that President Monroe's obligation to defend the western
hemisphere and, indeed, almost any obligation we might choose to
assume, depended on unilateral American decisions to be entered into or
ended entirely at our discretion. Shielded by two oceans and enriched
by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed our special situation as
universally valid even while other nations with a narrower margin of
survival knew that their range of choice was far more limited.

The preoccupation of other nations with security only reinforced our
sense of uniqueness. We came increasingly to regard diplomacy with
suspicion. Arms and alliances were seen as immoral and reactionary.
Negotiations were considered less a means of reconciling our ideals with
our interests than a device to entangle us in the endless quarrels
of a morally questionable world. Our native inclination for straight-
forwardness brought increasing impatience with diplomacy, whose
essential attribute is ambiguity and compromise.

In this atmosphere even the purchase of Alaska -- which excluded
Russia from our continent -- was regarded in its day as a towering
folly explainable only in terms of American gullibility in the face of
old world diplomatic guile. Congress was prevailed upon only with the
greatest difficulty to provide the seven million dollars to complete
the deal. The mythology of American ineptitude in its diplomatic
pursuits has carried into the twentieth century. Will Rogers was
always assured of a laugh when he cracked, "America never lost a war
and never won a conference." With the humility for which I am
famous, I of course reject this attitude.

Forgetful of the wisdom and skilled statecraft by which the Founding
Fathers won our independence and secured our safety, and disdainful of
the techniques by which all nations -- even the United States -- must
preserve their interests, America entered the twentieth century --
the most complex and turbulent time in history -- largely unprepared
for the part we would be called upon to play.

PR #47

-4-

As Lord Bryce said in his *American Commonwealth*, America had been sailing "on a summer sea," but a cloud bank was "on the horizon and now no longer distant, a time of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may be concealed whose form and magnitude she can scarcely conjecture."

## America's Ascendency: Maintaining Global Stability

In the early years of this century, America seemed to face a choice between continued detachment and active involvement in world affairs. But this was more apparent than real, for the Pax Britannica on which we had relied for so long was coming to an end. We had become -- almost without noticing it -- the world's major economic power. Increasingly, we were the only democratic nation with sufficient power to maintain a precarious world balance. But nothing in our experience had equipped us to recognize our new responsibility. We continued to reject the demands of the politics of security, and abhorred alliances as contrary to American principles. In the place of foreign policy we fell back on our tradition of law, in repeated and unsuccessful attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Many thought that power and principle were forever incompatible.

Our entry into World War I was produced by real geopolitical interest, such as freedom of the sea and the threat of the domination of Europe by a hostile power; but we chose to interpret our participation in legal and idealistic terms; we fought the war "to end all wars." The inevitable disillusion with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationism. We responded again with moral and legal gestures -- humanitarian relief; new disarmament schemes; the Kellogg-Briand Pact to ban war -- at a time when the very nature of the international order was being brought into question by the convulsions of the new century. We sought security in aloofness, just as we looked for scapegoats -- rooting out the so-called "munitions makers" -- to explain why we had ever engaged in such an undertaking as the first World War. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward to deal with the problems of our own society, even while economic upheaval simultaneously generated overwhelming perils abroad.

Our refusal to admit that foreign policy should be related to interests led us, in the years between the wars, to treat allies as rivals, whose armaments had to be limited because they contributed to international tensions. On the brink of World War II, isolationism had been transformed from a comfortable assumption to a deeply felt conviction. Just as the world was about to impinge upon us as never before, we had virtually abandoned the basic precautions needed to preserve our national security. Only with the greatest difficulty could President Franklin D. Roosevelt begin to assert international leadership openly and take steps against the mounting global threat by preparing America for war.

PR #47

-5-

World War II was well underway before we were shocked out of isolation by external attack. Total victory, and the refusal to consider the security of the postwar world in terms of any notion of equilibrium, ill prepared us for the war's aftermath -- when the destruction of Europe's traditional power centers suddenly drew Soviet power into the heart of the European continent.

Yet in the first postwar years America found within itself extraordinary capacities of statesmanship and creativity. Leaders of both parties and many backgrounds -- Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles -- built a national consensus for responsible American world leadership, for a foreign policy based on both principle and pragmatism.

Albert Einstein said at the outset of the nuclear age that "everything has changed, except our mode of thinking." To cope with a world whose basic conditions were so radically altered was a task comparable in magnitude to that which faced the Founding Fathers. When Dean Acheson said he was "present at the creation," he referred not only to the creation of our postwar policy, but to a new era in the history of mankind.

American foreign policy had come full circle. With sophistication, the Founding Fathers had manipulated the balance of power to gain our independence and then drew on the international system to assure our survival. A century and a quarter of almost total security had tempted us into isolationism. And now, after two world wars in this century, we have learned that the responsibilities -- and the burdens -- of world leadership are inescapable.

Americans can be enormously proud of what their country has accomplished in the postwar decades to build a more stable, secure and prosperous world. The recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the creation and revitalization of peacetime alliances, the shaping of the global trade and monetary system, the economic advance of newer and poorer nations, the measures to control the nuclear arms race -- these comprise an enduring achievement of American statesmanship.

America has been thrust into the role of global leadership with a dual responsibility; we must maintain our security and global peace by the traditional methods of balance of power and diplomacy. But we know that nuclear war could destroy civilization, and therefore we must go beyond traditional foreign policy to shape a more cooperative world reflecting the imperatives of interdependence and justice.

PR #47

-6-

The Traditional Agenda of War and Peace

Our well-being begins with strength at home. To keep America strong and secure, we will maintain the military power needed to meet any challenge. But security cannot be achieved in isolation. Our close ties with the industrial democracies of Western Europe, Canada and Japan have been the cornerstone of world stability and peace for a generation. We share a common conception of human dignity, a common interest in peace and prosperity and a common conviction of linked destiny. Today we and our allies look beyond military issues to joint endeavors across a broad range of human activity: we have coordinated our diplomacy to ease global tensions, our policies for economic growth and our efforts in new fields such as energy.

A secure and stable world requires as well that we seek a reconciliation of interests with potential adversaries. We shall never lose sight of the fact that in an age threatened by thermonuclear extinction, the search for peace is a moral imperative; without it nothing else we do will be of enduring value.

Peace, to be stable and durable, must place on a more reliable basis the relations between nations that possess the power to destroy our planet. The suspicion and rivalry of two generations will not soon be swept away, and we have no illusion about the continuing moral and ideological conflict. But we will spare no effort to seek reliable, reciprocal measures for containing the strategic arms race; we will continue to pursue cooperative arrangements across a wide range of technical, cultural and commercial fields to deepen the mutual stake in peace.

Progress towards relaxation of tensions, and our overall attitude toward those who would oppose us, have always depended upon restrained and responsible conduct on their part -- on issues where America's interests are affected directly, as in Europe, as well as in peripheral conflicts, such as Angola. Let no nation misconstrue America's commitment to an easing of tensions as a license to fish in troubled waters. Let no country believe that Americans will long remain indifferent to the dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast amounts of materiel to impose minority governments -- especially when that expeditionary force comes from a nation of the western hemisphere. Americans may be slow to rouse but they will do their duty implacably once a threat is clear.

If the world is to remain at peace and advance in progress, an active American role in the world is essential. The Middle East is perhaps the most critical example. We must be involved there because of our historical and moral commitment to Israel; because of our important interests and friendships in the Arab world; because continued instability in the Middle East strains our relations with allies and risks severe global economic dislocation; and because continuing crisis risks direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

PR #47

-7-

The broad implications and imminent dangers of regional conflicts such as those in Angola and the Middle East have compelled us to play an active part. But it would be wrong to conclude from this that the United States seeks to operate as the world's policeman. There are innumerable local conflicts around the globe in which we neither have nor seek any role. We do not seek to police the world -- but neither will we accept it if the Soviet Union attempts to do so. The Soviet and Cuban pattern of conduct in Africa, if continued in other areas, could unravel global security. The tensions of the Middle East, if not overcome, could threaten global peace. With prudence and wisdom, we can prevent dangers to our wider interests by engaging ourselves now at far less cost than we will inevitably have to pay later if we abdicate responsibility. We cannot escape the fundamental reality that it is the United States, alone among the free nations of the world, that is capable of -- and therefore responsible for -- maintaining the global balance against those who would seek hegemony and shaping a new world of hope and progress.

# The New Agenda: Building a Cooperative International Order

True progress requires more than security. We must seek to break past patterns of confrontation and response. It is no longer possible for America or any other nation to achieve its purposes by physical power alone; in today's world influence derives not only from military strength, but also from economic, social, and political factors, from the ability to inspire other nations with the conviction that they have a stake in a shared future.

On a shrinking planet of diffused power and linked destinies, we are called upon to demonstrate vision and patience. Our generation has the opportunity to shape a new international order. If we succeed, the prospects for America and the world are bright. If we fail, the world will be shaped by others who do not share our principles; our period will witness mounting conflict and suffering.

We can approach these new challenges with confidence. Our technological advance, our managerial genius, our achievements in science and medicine, the productivity of our farms and industries, our physical resources, our commitment to the rule of law -- ensure for us a role of leadership. And we have been demonstrating the resiliency of our economy by emerging from a global recession faster and more steadily than any other nation.

Fundamental to our well-being is international economic cooperation. In the past few years, Americans have seen clearly just how much international economic relations determine the progress of all nations including our own. The oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent price increases with their devastating global consequences have reminded us to what extent far off events affect our prosperity and how important international economic cooperation is for our own well-being and for the prosperity of the rest of the world.

PR #47

-8-

The United States has taken far-reaching steps to lay the foundations for international economic cooperation:

- We have worked closely with the other great industrial democracies on trade, energy, and monetary reform.

- We have organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries, and to channel resources -- including the new wealth of the oil producers -- into improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

- We have developed and implemented a strategy to end our domestic and international energy vulnerability. We have joined with the other industrial consuming countries in solidarity programs to protect us against further oil embargoes and against destabilizing movements of assets held by oil-producing countries. Only last week the International Energy Agency -- a group of industrial consuming countries brought together at our initiative -- adopted a sweeping program of cooperative action. We consider this one of the most significant cooperative efforts of the past decade. The industrial democracies will now begin to coordinate their research and development effort to develop alternative supplies of energy -- both nuclear power and the more exotic sources such as synthetic and solar energy.

- And the United States has presented to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session a comprehensive and practical program for a multilateral effort to promote economic development.

But America cannot hope to shape the future of the world unless we are a confident and united people.

## America's Imperative: Domestic Unity

PR #47

-9-

History has made America the repository and guardian of the best values of mankind, for no other free nation is strong enough to replace us. Without our commitment there can be no progress. We must have the steadiness to oppose military pressures and the vision to work for a more peaceful international order. Moderation has meaning only when practiced by the strong, and strength has purpose only when tempered by conciliation.

These twin strands of firmness and conciliation reflect the permanent interests of our nation. Yet our ability to pursue either course has been, in recent months, increasingly threatened. A strong, coherent and effective international role is jeopardized by acrimonious controversy which thwarts serious discussion of the great issues, and by the growing tendency of too many in the Congress not only to supervise but to legislate the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.

If these attitudes shape our policies, we will deprive our diplomacy of its essential tools; conciliatory policies and firm measures alike will be undermined by growing doubt about the steadiness of our national will. An atmosphere of suspicion and a lack of even the most elementary confidentiality will make impossible the management of the Government and the conduct of negotiation. If a national consensus does not exist, our policy will be driven by narrow interest groups and short-term political considerations.

In an era when the danger of war has been reduced but the rivalry of communism and freedom continues, the gray area between foreign policy and overt conflict continues to be important, and indeed takes on increasing significance. Yet, leaks, sensational investigations and the demoralization of our intelligence services -- at a time when our adversaries are stepping up their own efforts -- are systematically depriving our Government of the ability to respond.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong national government which can act with assurance and speak with confidence on behalf of all Americans. But when the Executive is disavowed repeatedly and publicly, other governments wonder who speaks for America and what an American commitment means. Our Government is in danger of progressively losing the ability to shape events, and a great nation that does not shape history eventually becomes its victim.

PR #47

-11-

We must restore our unity while the essential structure of our foreign policy is still sound and before irreparable damage is done to it. We retain the capacity, if we have the will, to prevent military expansion by our adversaries. Our alliances with the industrialized nations have never been more solid. A further agreement to limit the strategic arms race is within reach. We are well launched on a durable and improving relationship with the world's most populous nation. The elements for peace in the Middle East exist. A dialogue with the developing world has begun on a hopeful note. The threat of war around the globe has been reduced. The principal danger we face is our domestic divisions.

The American people have a right to demand of their leaders in and out of Government an end to the destructive debate that has in recent months come to mark our political process. They know, as the world knows, that the United States is still a great country. And they know how much damage these continuing attacks on their country's institutions have done and will do to undermine America's ability to keep the peace.

We have every obligation to draw the right lessons from our past mistakes, and to see that they never happen again. But we have an equally compelling duty to remember that a faltering of will on the part of a country that has for decades been the principal guarantor of peace and progress can have disastrous consequences for the prospects of a better and safer world.

The formulation and conduct of our foreign policy must, of course, be the product of consultation and accommodation between the Congress and the President. Neither branch can, alone, determine the course we will pursue abroad. The Congress, entitled by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and by the practices of two hundred years, must be an equal partner in the process.

PR #47

-12-

It is time we recognize that, increasingly, our difficulties abroad are largely of our own making. If America is to be safe we must cease dismantling and demoralizing our intelligence services. If America is to preserve its values and maintain the global balance of stability, we must have a strong defense. And if America is to help build a world environment in which our citizens can thrive and be free, we cannot deny ourselves the essential tools of policy. Without these our only option is to retreat -- to become an isolated fortress island in a hostile and turbulent global sea, awaiting the ultimate confrontation with the only response we will not have denied ourselves -- massive retaliation. Our branches of Government, special interests, and ordinary citizens must pursue their legitimate concerns with an understanding that there are basic, overriding national interests which, if neglected, will render pointless all else we do.

Our international role is not a burden; it protects the lives and well-being of our people. It has been an historical success. In our first two centuries we have done great things as a united people. We can accomplish even more in our third century. America remains the strongest nation in the world; our Government continues to be the noblest experiment undertaken by man; we still are an inspiration to all the world's millions who are much less fortunate than we. Our past achievements should be but prologue to the exciting future that crowds in upon us. It is, in the final analysis, up to us.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## Speech

February 4, 1976

Laramie, Wyoming

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

## AMERICA'S DESTINY: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger at the University of Wyoming.*

It is good to be here in the West. The people of this land remind me once again that America is not the cynical, confused, and tired Nation so many in Washington would have us believe it is. Instead, as I have so often seen in my trips, the American people continue to have pride in their country. They know that America has done more for the world, and for peace, over the past thirty years than any nation in history. They know we have given more of our resources, fed more of the starving, taken in more immigrants, and educated more people from other lands than any other nation before us.

It is true that we have passed through a decade and more of tragedy—we have been witness to assassination, we have suffered through a tragic war that shattered our domestic unity, and we have endured our greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War.

But we have come through these difficult times with our institutions as strong as ever. We remain the world's greatest democracy, we continue to be the bastion to which other nations look for their protection, and we remain the symbol of hope to the millions around the world who live in tyranny and poverty but yearn for freedom and prosperity.

America, from its birth, has meant much to the world. The Founding Fathers were animated by a sense of obligation—and of mission—to other peoples and to posterity. Our Revolution, our independence, and our democracy set examples which excited and encouraged imitation around the globe. America represented an inspiration and the most important political experiment of modern history—the spectacle of successful self-government, economic opportunity, social equality, civil and religious liberty, and the tremendous capacities of a free people to shape their own destiny.

Later in our history these values affected the world in a new way—as a powerful magnet drawing great tides of immigration. It was a movement of ideas as well as people, which not only shaped this Nation, but vastly altered the assumptions and social structures of the old world.

In recent decades America's impact on the world has been more immediate. For much of this century global peace and prosperity have depended upon our contribution. When World War II ended we took the lead in helping a shattered globe rebuild from devastation. We shaped the commercial and financial system that spread prosperity and economic opportunity to far corners of the world. We built peacetime alliances to maintain global stability and defend the values we share with the great industrial democracies. We resisted aggression. We mediated conflicts. We helped ease the process of decolonization. And we led the fight against disease, hunger, ignorance, and the forces of oppression and terror that have scarred this century.

PR 47

2

No other nation has made such a contribu-
tion. No other nation can make such a contri-
bution now. The best hope for a planet still beset
by war, poverty, and tyranny is a strong, com-
mitted, vigilant America.

## Nation Building in the Global Context

We declared our independence "in decent
respect to the opinions of mankind." Our Found-
ing Fathers were sophisticated statesmen who
understood the European balance of power and
knew how our country could profit from it. Our
independence was not won by American arms
alone. The shrewd diplomacy of Franklin and
Jefferson led to the involvement of Britain's ene-
mies France, Spain, and Russia and eventually
engineered the only defeat Britain suffered in the
modern era. We then cut loose from our temporary
allies when John Jay won the British Crown's
recognition and liquidated the residual problems of
our war with England.

For more than three decades after we gained
our independence, we lived in an age of interna-
tional turmoil that saw us go to the brink of war
with France and suffer the capture of our capital
by Britain. Again, alert to new opportunities
provided by changes on the international scene, we
moved astutely to take advantage of them. The
effective elimination of France and Spain from the
hemisphere, the expansion of Russia in the Pacific
Northwest, and the growing disaffection of Great
Britain from the European powers led us in 1823
to concert the Monroe Doctrine with Great Britain.

Thereafter, for the hundred years between
Waterloo and 1914, America benefited from the
existence of a world balance of power—presided
over by Britain—which maintained global stability
and prevented international war. In the words of
Prime Minister Canning, the doctrine “called the
New World into existence to redress the balance of
the Old.”

Thus the balance of power in Europe and our
skill in using it protected the young United States;
it enabled us, in reliance upon the British Navy, to
turn our back on the Atlantic and open the con-
tinent before us.

Louisiana, foreign claims had been effectively
undermined by the great western movement of
Americans and the free communities they quickly
founded. But the consolidation of their pioneering
achievement was made possible by those negotia-
tions and by the subsequent series of remarkable
diplomatic successes. The annexation of Florida,
the Oregon boundary settlement with Great
Britain, the Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo, the
Gadsden Purchase, Secretary of State Seward's pur-
chase of Alaska from Russia—all were triumphs of
diplomacy during decades when most citizens be-
lieved America did not have—or need—a foreign
policy.

Indeed our very achievements in dealing with
the world brought Americans under the sway of a
shared mythology. As a society made up of men
and women who had fled the persecutions and
power politics of the Old World, Americans—
whether Mayflower descendants or refugees from
the failed revolutions of 1848—came to assume
that we were beyond the reach of the imperatives
of traditional foreign policy.

While our security continued to be assured by
our place in the international structure of the time,
we became bemused by the popular belief that
President Monroe's obligation to defend the West-
ern Hemisphere and, indeed, almost any obligation
we might choose to assume, depended on unilateral
American decisions to be entered into or ended
entirely at our discretion. Shielded by two oceans
and enriched by a bountiful nature, we proclaimed
our special situation as universally valid even while
other nations, with a narrower margin of survival,
knew that their range of choice was far more limi-
ted.

The preoccupation of other nations with
security only reinforced our sense of uniqueness.
We came increasingly to regard diplomacy with
suspicion. Arms and alliances were seen as immoral
and reactionary. Negotiations were considered less
a means of reconciling our ideals with our interests
than a device to entangle us in the endless quarrels
of a morally questionable world. Our native incli-
nation for straightforwardness brought increasing
impatience with diplomacy, whose essential attri-
bute is ambiguity and compromise.

In this atmosphere even the purchase of
Alaska—which excluded Russia from our conti-
nent—was regarded in its day as a towering folly
explainable only in terms of American gullibility in

3

the face of Old World diplomatic guile. Congress was prevailed upon only with the greatest difficulty to provide the $7 million to complete the deal. The mythology of American ineptitude in its diplomatic pursuits has carried into the 20th century. Will Rogers was always assured of a laugh when he cracked: "America never lost a war and never won a conference." With the humility for which I am famous I, of course, reject this attitude.

Forgetful of the wisdom and skilled statecraft by which the Founding Fathers won our independence and secured our safety and disdainful of the techniques by which all nations—even the United States—must preserve their interests, America entered the 20th century—the most complex and turbulent time in history—largely unprepared for the part we would be called upon to play.

## America's Ascendancy: Maintaining Global Stability

In the early years of this century America seemed to face a choice between continued detachment and active involvement in world affairs. But this was more apparent than real for the *Pax Britannica*, on which we had relied for so long, was coming to an end. We had become—almost without noticing it—the world's major economic power. Increasingly we were the only democratic nation with sufficient power to maintain a precarious world balance. But nothing in our experience had equipped us to recognize our new responsibility. We continued to reject the demands of the politics of security and abhorred alliances as contrary to American principles. In the place of foreign policy we fell back on our tradition of law in repeated and unsuccessful attempts to legislate solutions to international conflicts. Many thought that power and principle were forever incompatible.

Our entry into World War I was produced by real geopolitical interest, such as freedom of the sea and the threat of the domination of Europe by a hostile power, but we chose to interpret our participation in legal and idealistic terms—we fought the war "to end all wars." The inevitable disillusion

with an imperfect outcome led to a tide of isolationism. We responded again with moral and legal gestures—humanitarian relief, new disarmament schemes, the Kellogg-Briand Pact to ban war—at a time when the very nature of the international order was being brought into question by the convulsions of the new century. We sought security in aloofness, just as we looked for scapegoats—rooting out the so-called "munitions makers"—to explain why we had ever engaged in such an undertaking as the First World War. The Great Depression drew our energies further inward to deal with the problems of our own society, even while economic upheaval simultaneously generated overwhelming perils abroad.

Our refusal to admit that foreign policy should be related to interests led us, in the years between the wars, to treat allies as rivals, whose armaments had to be limited because they contributed to international tensions. On the brink of World War II isolationism had been transformed from a comfortable assumption to a deeply felt conviction. Just as the world was about to impinge upon us as never before, we had virtually abandoned the basic precautions needed to preserve our national security. Only with the greatest difficulty could President Franklin D. Roosevelt begin to assert international leadership openly and take steps against the mounting global threat by preparing America for war.

World War II was well underway before we were shocked out of isolation by external attack. Total victory, and the refusal to consider the security of the postwar world in terms of any notion of equilibrium, ill prepared us for the war's aftermath—when the destruction of Europe's traditional power centers suddenly drew Soviet power into the heart of the European continent.

Yet in the first postwar years America found within itself extraordinary capacities of statesmanship and creativity. Leaders of both parties and many backgrounds—Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles—built a national consensus for responsible American world leadership, for a foreign policy based on both principle and pragmatism.

4

faced the Founding Fathers. When Dean Acheson
said he was "present at the creation," he referred
not only to the creation of our postwar policy but
to a new era in the history of mankind.

American foreign policy had come full circle. With sophistication the Founding Fathers had manipulated the balance of power to gain our independence and then drew on the international system to assure our survival. A century and a quarter of almost total security had tempted us into isolationism. And now, after two World Wars in this century, we have learned that the responsibilities—and the burdens—of world leadership are inescapable.

Americans can be enormously proud of what
their country has accomplished in the postwar
decades to build a more stable, secure, and pros-
perous world. The recovery of Western Europe and
Japan, the creation and revitalization of peacetime
alliances, the shaping of the global trade and mone-
tary system, the economic advance of newer and
poorer nations, the measures to control the nuclear
arms race—these comprise an enduring achievement
of American statesmanship.

America has been thrust into the role of
global leadership with a dual responsibility; we
must maintain our security and global peace by the
traditional methods of balance of power and diplo-
macy. But we know that nuclear war could destroy
civilization, and, therefore, we must go beyond
traditional foreign policy to shape a more coopera-
tive world reflecting the imperatives of interde-
pendence and justice.

## Traditional Agenda of War and Peace

Our well-being begins with strength at home. To keep America strong and secure we will maintain the military power needed to meet any challenge. But security cannot be achieved in isolation. Our close ties with the industrial democracies of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan have been the cornerstone of world stability and peace for a generation. We share a common conception of human dignity, a common interest in peace and prosperity, and a common conviction of linked destiny. Today we and our allies look beyond military issues to joint endeavors across a broad range of human activity: We have coordinated our diplomacy to ease global tensions, our policies for economic growth, and our efforts in new fields such as energy.

A secure and stable world requires as well that we seek a reconciliation of interests with potential adversaries. We shall never lose sight of the fact that in an age threatened by thermonuclear extinction, the search for peace is a moral imperative—without it nothing else we do will be of enduring value.

Peace, to be stable and durable, must place on
a more reliable basis the relations between nations
that possess the power to destroy our planet. The
suspicion and rivalry of two generations will not
soon be swept away, and we have no illusion about
the continuing moral and ideological conflict. But
we will spare no effort to seek reliable, reciprocal
measures for containing the strategic arms race; we
will continue to pursue cooperative arrangements
across a wide range of technical, cultural, and com-
mercial fields to deepen the mutual stake in peace.

Progress toward relaxation of tensions, and
our overall attitude toward those who would op-
pose us, have always depended upon restrained and
responsible conduct on their part—on issues where
America's interests are affected directly, as in
Europe, as well as in peripheral conflicts, such as
Angola. Let no nation misconstrue America's com-
mitment to an easing of tensions as a license to fish
in troubled waters. Let no country believe that
Americans will long remain indifferent to the dis-
patch of expeditionary forces and vast amounts of
material to impose minority governments—
especially when that expeditionary force comes
from a nation of the Western Hemisphere. Ameri-
cans may be slow to rouse but they will do their
duty implacably once a threat is clear.

If the world is to remain at peace and advance
in progress, an active American role in the world is
essential. The Middle East is perhaps the most criti-
cal example. We must be involved there because of
our historical and moral commitment to Israel, be-
cause of our important interests and friendships in
the Arab world, because continued instability in
the Middle East strains our relations with allies and
risks severe global economic dislocation, and be-
cause continuing crisis risks direct U.S.-Soviet con-
frontation.

The broad implications and imminent dangers
of regional conflicts, such as those in Angola
and the Middle East, have compelled us to
play an active part. But it would be wrong to con-
clude from this that the United States seeks to
operate as the world's policeman. There are in-

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5

numerable local conflicts around the globe in which we neither have nor seek any role. We do not seek to police the world—but neither will we accept it if the Soviet Union attempts to do so. The Soviet and Cuban pattern of conduct in Africa, if continued in other areas, could unravel global security. The tensions of the Middle East, if not overcome, could threaten global peace. With prudence and wisdom we can prevent dangers to our wider interests by engaging ourselves now at far less cost than we will inevitably have to pay later if we abdicate responsibility. We cannot escape the fundamental reality that it is the United States, alone among the free nations of the world, that is capable of—and therefore responsible for—maintaining the global balance against those who would seek hegemony and shaping a new world of hope and progress.

## New Agenda:

### Building a Cooperative International Order

True progress requires more than security. We must seek to break past patterns of confrontation and response. It is no longer possible for America or any other nation to achieve its purposes by physical power alone; in today's world influence derives not only from military strength but also from economic, social, and political factors, from the ability to inspire other nations with the conviction that they have a stake in a shared future.

On a shrinking planet of diffused power and linked destinies, we are called upon to demonstrate vision and patience. Our generation has the opportunity to shape a new international order. If we succeed the prospects for America and the world are bright. If we fail the world will be shaped by others who do not share our principles; our period will witness mounting conflict and suffering.

We can approach these new challenges with confidence. Our technological advance, our managerial genius, our achievements in science and medicine, the productivity of our farms and industries, our physical resources, our commitment to the rule of law—insure for us a role of leadership. And we have been demonstrating the resiliency of our economy by emerging from a global recession faster and more steadily than any other nation.

Fundamental to our well-being is international economic cooperation. In the past few years Americans have seen clearly just how much inter-

* We have worked closely with the other great industrial democracies on trade, energy, and monetary reform.

* We have organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries and to channel resources—including the new wealth of the oil producers—into improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

* We have developed and implemented a strategy to end our domestic and international energy vulnerability. We have joined with the other industrial consuming countries in solidarity programs to protect us against further oil embargoes and against destabilizing movements of assets held by oil-producing countries. Only last week the International Energy Agency—a group of industrial consuming countries brought together at our initiative—adopted a sweeping program of cooperative action. We consider this one of the most significant cooperative efforts of the past decade. The industrial democracies will now begin to coordinate their research and development effort to develop alternative supplies of energy—both nuclear power and the more exotic sources such as synthetic and solar energy.

* And the United States has presented to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session a comprehensive and practical program for a multilateral effort to promote economic development.

Thus we have not only tackled the traditional issues of peace and war but made a good beginning in helping to fashion more cooperative relationships in new dimensions of world concern.

The structure of our foreign policy is sound and ready to encounter the future. But America cannot hope to shape the future of the world unless we are a confident and united people.

6

For more than three decades America has, despite setbacks and mistakes, conducted a remarkably effective foreign policy. We have done so because we recognized, even when we disagreed, that what we did beyond our borders was done in the name of the Nation as a whole. Partisan interests were channeled into positive accomplishments. We acted as a confident people. We did not doubt ourselves; we did not consume ourselves in self-hatred.

These twin strands of firmness and conciliation reflect the permanent interests of our Nation. Yet our ability to pursue either course has been, in recent months, increasingly threatened. A strong, coherent, and effective international role is jeopardized by acrimonious controversy which thwarts serious discussion of the great issues and by the growing tendency of too many in the Congress not only to supervise but to legislate the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.

If these attitudes shape our policies we will deprive our diplomacy of its essential tools; conciliatory policies and firm measures alike will be undermined by growing doubt about the steadiness

of our national will. An atmosphere of suspicion and a lack of even the most elementary confidentiality will make impossible the management of the Government and the conduct of negotiation. If a national consensus does not exist our policy will be driven by narrow interest groups and short-term political considerations.

In an era when the danger of war has been reduced but the rivalry of communism and freedom continues, the grey area between foreign policy and overt conflict continues to be important, and indeed takes on increasing significance. Yet leaks, sensational investigations, and the demoralization of our intelligence services—at a time when our adversaries are stepping up their own efforts—are systematically depriving our Government of the ability to respond.

An effective foreign policy requires a strong national government which can act with assurance and speak with confidence on behalf of all Americans. But when the executive is disavowed repeatedly and publicly other governments wonder who speaks for America and what an American commitment means. Our Government is in danger of progressively losing the ability to shape events, and a great nation that does not shape history eventually becomes its victim.

Too much depends upon a strong and confident America to allow this state of affairs to continue. When America abdicates from shaping the future, when its policy falls prey to the passions of the moment and the play of pressure groups it disheartens friends, emboldens adversaries, gives pause to the wavering, and thus undermines international order.

7

(L)

The American people have a right to demand of their leaders, in and out of Government, an end to the destructive debate that has in recent months come to mark our political process. They know, as the world knows, that the United States is still a great country. And they know how much damage these continuing attacks on their country's institutions have done and will do to undermine America's ability to keep the peace.

We have every obligation to draw the right lessons from our past mistakes and to see that they never happen again. But we have an equally compelling duty to remember that a faltering of will on the part of a country that has for decades been the principal guarantor of peace and progress can have disastrous consequences for the prospects of a better and safer world.

America now finds itself in a world of proliferating, often competitive, and sometimes threatening power. We must often make choices that will not solve but only manage problems; we must occasionally make compromises that by definition will not produce ideal results. We need confidence in ourselves to master a complicated period in which the United States can no longer overwhelm problems with resources—when it needs purpose, firmness, coherence, flexibility, imagination, and above all unity.

The formulation and conduct of our foreign policy must, of course, be the product of consultation and accommodation between the Congress and the President. Neither branch can, alone, determine the course we will pursue abroad. The Congress, entitled by the letter and spirit of the Constitution and by the practices of 200 years, must be an equal partner in the process.

But if that partnership is to flourish, each branch must respect the role of the other and each must recognize the limitations—constitutional and practical—on its authority. The Congress can set broad guidelines and decide basic policies. But the Congress does not have the organization, the information, or the responsibility for deciding the tactical questions that arise daily in the conduct of our foreign relations or for executing a coherent, consistent, comprehensive policy. The President has this responsibility and must be permitted to

exercise it on behalf of the entire Nation. For in the last analysis the United States, when it deals with other nations, must speak with one voice.

It is time we recognize that, increasingly, our difficulties abroad are largely of our own making. If America is to be safe we must cease dismantling and demoralizing our intelligence services. If America is to preserve its values and maintain the global balance of stability, we must have a strong defense. And if America is to help build a world environment in which our citizens can thrive and be free, we cannot deny ourselves the essential tools of policy. Without these our only option is to retreat—to become an isolated fortress island in a hostile and turbulent global sea, awaiting the ultimate confrontation with the only response we will not have denied ourselves—massive retaliation. Our branches of Government, special interests, and ordinary citizens must pursue their legitimate concerns with an understanding that there are basic, overriding national interests which, if neglected, will render pointless all else we do.

In our age whose challenges are without precedent we need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our pragmatic tradition must help us understand reality and shape it rather than be diverted by an obsession with technical detail or method without purpose. Our love of our country must inspire us to persevere with dedication and unity and not to consume our substance in civil strife. Our idealism should remind us that we remain the beacon of hope for all those who love liberty and that this imposes a heavy responsibility upon us.

Our international role is not a burden; it protects the lives and well-being of our people. It has been an historical success. In our first two centuries we have done great things as a united people. We can accomplish even more in our third century. America remains the strongest Nation in the world; our Government continues to be the noblest experiment undertaken by man; we still are an inspiration to all the world's millions who are much less fortunate than we. Our past achievements should be but prologue to the exciting future that crowds in upon us. It is, in the final analysis, up to us.

The Secretary
of State

[L.C.]

Statement

CONGRESS AND THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Senate*
*Government Operations Committee.*

I welcome this opportunity to appear before this committee to give you my views on the relationship I hope will develop between the Congress and the U.S. intelligence community.

Executive-Legislative Relationship and
Foreign Policy

It is essential that a sounder relationship
between the executive and the legislature evolve.
The present relationship has reached a point where
the ability of the United States to conduct a co-
herent foreign policy is being eroded. This is cer-
tainly true in the intelligence field. One has only to
look at the recent leakage—indeed official publica-
tion—of highly classified material and the levying
of unsubstantiated charges and personal attacks
against the executive to see the point the relation-
ship has reached and the harm we are doing to
ourselves.

This situation must be unacceptable to us in
both branches of the Government, and it must be
unacceptable to the American people. Fundamen-
tal changes are taking place in the world at an
unprecedented rate. New centers of power are
emerging, altering relations among older power
centers. Growing economic interdependence makes
each of us vulnerable to financial and industrial
troubles in countries formerly quite remote from
us. And, most important, we are working hard to
establish more rational and reliable relationships
with powers whose values and interests are alien

February 5, 1976

Washington, D.C.

and inimical to us and who, in some cases, have the
power to destroy us.

The conduct of foreign policy in this complex
and fast-changing situation requires that there be
close coordination and mutual trust between Con-
gress and the executive branch and a large measure
of trust in both branches by the American people.

I am aware of the benefits of a certain
amount of dynamic tension between the branches
of our Government. Indeed the Founding Fathers
designed this into the Constitution with the princi-
ple of the separation of powers. But there is an
adverse impact on the public mind in this country
and on our national image abroad when this benefi-
cial tension deteriorates into confrontation. We
have recently seen this happen. This is why I hope
this committee and the Congress as a whole, with
help and suggestions from the executive, can con-
struct an oversight mechanism for U.S. intelligence
that can bring an end to the strife, distrust, and
confusion that have accompanied the investigations
of the past year.

I look to the development of means by which
Congress can participate more fully in the guidance
and review of the intelligence activities of this
Government and by which the executive can direct
and conduct those activities with the confidence of
being in step with Congress in this vital area of our
foreign affairs.

Need for Intelligence

Our foreign policy must cope with complex
problems of nuclear and conventional arms races;
traditional and ideological disputes which can trig-

PR 51

2

ger wider wars and sweeping economic dislocations; emerging new nations which can become the arena for great-power contests; environmental pollution, food shortages, energy maldistributions which affect the lives of hundreds of millions; and financial shifts which can threaten the global economic order. In the face of these great challenges our goals are to foster the growth of a rationally ordered world in which states of diverse views and objectives can cooperate for the common benefit. We seek a world based on justice and the promotion of human dignity.

We cannot pursue these goals in this hazardous world unless we are secure, and we cannot be secure unless we are strong and alert. Our ability to be both strong and alert depends in part on good intelligence.

To be strong we must know as precisely as possible how we are threatened. In this age of highly sophisticated and expensive weapons systems, we cannot afford to arm ourselves against all possible threats; we must concentrate on those that are most likely in order to save our resources for other programs that make our country economically, socially, and morally strong.

To be alert is not just a matter of knowing where the dangers of war and change are increasing, basic as that knowledge is. We must have the knowledge essential to our ability to try to help reduce the dangers to peace. Intelligence is crucial to the future of this Nation.

To help construct a more cooperative world we must understand trends and possibilities. Intelligence is an indispensable tool in this effort.

The intelligence on which such judgments must be based can come only from a highly professional intelligence service supported by Congress and the people of this country. President Ford expressed it very well in the State of the Union address when he said:

> "As conflict and rivalry persist in the world, our United States intelligence capabilities must be the best in the world.

> "The crippling of our foreign intelligence services increases the danger of American involvement in direct armed conflict. Our adversaries are encouraged to attempt new adventures while our own ability to monitor events and to influence events short of military action is undermined. Without

> effective intelligence capability, the United States stands blindfolded and hobbled."

Let me give you just two examples:

* Our policy to establish a more rational and reliable relationship with the Soviet Union—commonly referred to as detente—would be impossible without good intelligence. Indeed our confidence in the SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] agreements is based in large measure on the specific provisions which permit each side to check on the compliance of the other through national technical means of verification.

* Similarly without excellent intelligence the United States would not have been able to play the leading role in seeking to bring about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. All agree that a new conflict there could bring the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of war.

## Principles Involved in Congressional Oversight

As I have repeatedly said, this Nation's foreign policy must reflect the values, aspirations, and perceptions of its people; it must have broad public support. The American people must have confidence not only in our policies but also in the institutions which formulate and carry out those policies. This means that our foreign policy must reflect consultation and accommodation between the executive and legislative branches. But each branch has its special responsibilities as well. The executive must provide strong, central direction of foreign policy and must consult with the Congress. Congress must provide mature counsel and must protect the confidentiality of its consultations with the executive.

That brings me to the question this committee is addressing: How should a democracy provide for control of its intelligence activities which, if they are to be effective, must operate in secret?

It is not my place as Secretary of State to recommend how the Congress should organize its oversight effort, but for oversight to be effective and constructive, conditions must be created which will promote mutual trust in dealing with the necessarily sensitive aspects of intelligence information and operations. Both overseers and those overseen must be able to feel sure that information

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3

given in confidence will remain in confidence. No other single condition for success is as important as this. The system cannot function in the atmosphere of distrust that has prevailed in recent months.

Rather than make specific proposals for oversight, I would prefer to set forth some general principles which I believe are important and should be given serious consideration.

First, I believe that the goal of congressional oversight should be to insure that the intelligence activities of the United States are grounded in the basic values, perceptions, and aspirations of the people of this country as well as in a clear view of the national interest.

Congress has a particular responsibility in insuring that this is so because intelligence does not lend itself to extensive public or media debate. This requires that the public have great confidence in the congressional oversight mechanism. Americans must be assured that their constitutional rights will not be abridged by intelligence operations. I welcome congressional oversight because I believe it will build public confidence in our intelligence system, and we in the executive branch can benefit from the wise counsel oversight can provide. But correction of the errors of the past must not take the form of controls in the future that would stifle intelligence.

Second, I believe we must maintain the proper constitutional perspective.

Under the Constitution the conduct of foreign relations is the responsibility of the President as the Nation's chief executive officer. Congressional oversight must not infringe on the President's responsibility for intelligence in a way which would violate the principle of the separation of powers. The Constitution is written as it is for practical as well as for political reasons.

Congress is a deliberative and law-making body, not an executive organ, and it is not organized to provide day-to-day operational direction to ongoing intelligence programs. Any proposal based on the idea of executive management by Congress is, in my judgment, a mistake. Existing legislation requires the President to determine that covert action operations are important to national security and to give timely notice of those operations to appropriate bodies of the Congress. I believe this is adequate for oversight. I recommend that this or a

similar arrangement be continued but that it be concentrated in the oversight committee.

Third is the crucial matter that the information provided to the congressional oversight body must in many cases remain secret.

Much of this information is highly classified and is gathered from intelligence sources and methods whose continued existence must be protected by secrecy at all times. Much of the information is supplied us in confidence by foreign governments and services whose cooperation could be lost by public exposure. Some of it also bears on U.S. plans or policies whose effectiveness depends on continued protection from disclosure. Unauthorized release of such information could do great damage to national security and our foreign policy. Protection of it is a responsibility both the Congress and the executive must share. I strongly believe that any legislation to establish an oversight committee must include safeguards for the protection of this sensitive and important information. Classified information given to the Congress should not be made public without the concurrence of the President or his representative.

As a related point I would like to state my agreement with Mr. Colby [William E. Colby, former Director, CIA] that it is essential to establish procedures and sanctions to prevent unauthorized disclosure of classified material. Legislation for this purpose is currently under consideration in the executive branch. It would provide for the prosecution of government employees, in both the Congress and the executive, who disclose such information without authority.

Fourth, and last, I believe the best oversight is concentrated oversight—ideally by a joint committee.

The benefits of such an arrangement are numerous: It would permit rapid responses both ways between the Congress and the intelligence community when time was crucial; it would reduce the chance of leaks by limiting the number of people with access to sensitive information; it would encourage maximum sharing of information; and it would permit a rapid development of expertise to facilitate penetrating and effective oversight.

If a joint committee is not possible I ask that you keep the principle and benefits of concentration in mind and limit oversight to the minimum

Remarks by the Secretary of State
Swearing In Ceremony of Thomas O. Enders
as Ambassador to Canada

February 5, 1976

Mr. Ambassador, Mrs. Enders:

I have been asked very often why we are sending
Tom Enders to Canada. Now, there are many reasons for
this. Of course one important reason is that a Harvard
man always likes to take every opportunity he can to
tell a Yale man where to go.

Part of the importance that we attach to our
relations with Canada is shown by the fact that we
are sending Tom up there in the middle of the winter,
but the fact that we are sending Tom Enders indicates
the enormous importance we attach to this relationship.

Canada is our biggest neighbor, close ally, greatest
trading partner. Its press expresses its views with
great eloquence on the whole range of our relationships,
and it is in the process successfully of attempting to
define a relationship of asserting its national identity
in the context of our traditional friendships. Now, this
is an effort with which the United States can cooperate,
and I believe, as I have had occasion to say a number of
times recently, that in fact our dialogue with Canada is
broad and intense and fruitful. I had the personal

- 2 -

experience when I was in Ottawa in October not only of
receiving a very warm welcome but of being able to
discuss the issues that inevitably arise in a relation-
ship of such scope in a spirit of cooperation and
confidence.

Now, Tom has been one of my closest associates
and a good personal friend. From time to time we
undoubtedly will call him down here for advice and
to teach me humility. I would like to give a few
pieces of advice to both sides in this new relationship:

-- To Tom, not to trust backgrounders with the
press and above all stay away from microphones.

-- And to the Canadians I want to say that Tom
goes there with the conviction not just that he seems
superior but that he is superior. This implies no
condescension on his part, it reflects his objective
assessment of realities, and it is exactly as it should
be because there is no reason in the world why Tom
should treat the Canadians any better than he treats
Americans and why the Foreign Minister of Canada should
get preferential treatment over the Secretary of State.

So, Tom is going to Canada determined to treat
Canadians the way he treats everybody which is after
all what the Canadians have told us they wanted. He

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 6, 1976

No. 53

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
IN SUPPORT OF
NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCE ACT OF 1975
FEBRUARY 6, 1976

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of State in support of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act of 1975.

Since its creation in 1946, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has played a unique and highly constructive role not only in the establishment of nuclear power as a major, viable energy source, but also in enabling the United States to provide leadership in international nuclear cooperation under effective guarantees and safeguards. Senate Resolution 221, which you co-sponsored, Mr. Chairman, calling for further strengthening of safeguards and other measures against proliferation, is a timely and important addition to our non-proliferation policy. The legislation you are considering now can be another milestone in the development of our peaceful nuclear program.

The Department of State attaches the highest importance to the earliest possible passage of this measure which will enable the United States to reassert its traditional leadership in international nuclear cooperation.

From our foreign policy standpoint, nuclear cooperation obtains a number of important benefits to the United States, the most significant of which are:

- strong support to our efforts to stem further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other military uses of the atom;

- relieving the pressures on both ourselves and our partners abroad for increasing dependence on imported oil;

- contributing to the economy of the United States and strengthening our balance-of-trade position.

In this nuclear cooperation, the ability of the United States to supply uranium enrichment services for power reactor programs abroad -- as well as for itself -- on a dependable long-term basis is, I believe, the key ingredient. The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act will fill an indispensable role in pursuit of our foreign policy objectives by maintaining the U. S. in its longstanding position as the world's foremost supplier of such enrichment services.

For further information contact:

-2-

PR 53

Our policy of sharing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy with others has been the key factor in the development of an unprecedented network of international agreements, arrangements and institutions which have, to an encouraging degree, enabled us to avoid the unrestrained proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because of our position of leadership, other key international suppliers of nuclear equipment and material have been influenced to follow the United States example and require peaceful use guarantees on their exports. Since the technology available from these suppliers is the most highly advanced, nations embarking on nuclear power programs have generally been willing to accept such safeguards and controls as an adjunct to obtaining this technology, rather than developing indigenous programs which would not be subject to safeguards.

It is not an overstatement that effective application of this policy, including our bilateral cooperative arrangements, the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the development and acceptance of international safeguards, and the widespread adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have all been made easier by our capability and willingness to furnish uranium enriching services along with other elements essential to peaceful nuclear development.

In foreign policy terms, however, the benefits of U. S. nuclear cooperation, in which our enrichment supply capability has been the key ingredient, go beyond even the crucial issue of advancing our non-proliferation objectives. I have already noted the importance of nuclear power to fulfilling our own energy needs, as well as those of our partners. We are fortunate that nuclear power has become a reality as an alternative energy source at this time, when not merely our economic well-being but our very independence of judgment and action are threatened by an excessive and growing dependence on imported energy sources whose availability and price are not within our control. In the near-term, there are limited options available to avoid further dependence on imported oil, and nuclear power will have to play a vital role if we are to avoid having U. S. policies subject to intolerable outside pressures.

I want to stress that these additional benefits are secured not at the expense of, but in parallel with, the primary objective of advancing our non-proliferation policy. We do not trade off our non-proliferation goals to advance other political or economic objectives, and there is no inconsistency between the two.

Just as nuclear energy is important to us, so it is to our partners abroad, whose well being is closely tied to our own, and who often draw for their essential energy needs on the same limited resources as do we. Out of the energy crisis has emerged an enhanced understanding of the benefits -- in fact, the absolute necessity -- of interdependence if we are to avoid the stultifying effects of dictated prices and insecurity of energy supplies on our economic health and our political well-being. One of the outcomes of this understanding has been the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA). By 1985, the members of this group are expected to be obtaining about 400,000 megawatts of their vital power needs from nuclear power sources. In seeking alternatives to ever expanding dependence on imported oil, expanded use of nuclear power is a major element of the IEA's strategy. But this plan will be viable only if adequate supplies of nuclear fuel can be made available. Thus, the United States is serving its own interests by creating a framework which will enable it to return to the international enrichment services market, offering such services abroad under comparable terms and conditions to those available to domestic customers.

-3-

PR 53

Today, unfortunately, our ability to influence worldwide nuclear development in directions favorable to our own interests is being gravely limited by our inability to assure the supply of enrichment services for additional nuclear projects abroad.

We should not underestimate the implications of this fact. The image of the most advanced industrial power in the world, which was responsible for the very development of nuclear energy, no longer able to meet its own or other nations' future enrichment needs is hardly calculated to generate confidence in our economic strength, our political resolve, or our decision-making processes.

Beyond this, our current inability to provide enrichment services has prevented us from consolidating our early leadership in this market, which can contribute significantly to our economic health and strengthen our balance of trade position, while serving to advance our non-proliferation objectives. U. S. foreign exchange revenues to date from the sale of enriched uranium and enrichment services have reached $1.1 billion, and overseas contracts now in force are expected to generate revenues in the order of $17.6 billion over their lifetime, at present price levels.

The economic benefits of our uranium enrichment supply arrangements are not confined to these contractual revenues alone, since our ability to provide nuclear fuel is vital to the sale of U. S. reactors and related goods and services abroad. To date, such sales are estimated to have brought us revenues of over $2 billion. Over the next two and a half decades, these sales could -- if we are able to take advantage of the opportunities presented -- total $140 billion. In the process, thousands of jobs to support these overseas sales will be created and maintained. The implications of this for our economic well-being in an increasingly competitive world are enormous. But these expectations are threatened unless U. S. reactor vendors are in a position to assure a long-term supply of enrichment services for the plants which they are seeking to sell.

The characteristics of the enrichment service industry do not allow mistakes to be easily reversed, or lost opportunities to be easily recovered. The enormous investment in nuclear reactors themselves, as well as the enrichment facilities, dictate the use of long-term contracts which create both an assured supply for reactor operators and an assured market for the enrichment plant operator. Thus, opportunities not initially secured are lost forever.

Until a few years ago, the United States was essentially the world's only supplier of enriched uranium for nuclear power reactor fuel. Today, the USSR is actively in the market, a British-Dutch-German group and another group headed by the French are constructing commercial-scale enrichment facilities, and major programs which could lead to such facilities are underway in as many as three or more other nations.

There is no question that these developments, while responsive in part to nationalistic motivations and a desire by enrichment users to diversify their sources of supply, have been spurred by uncertainty over the adequacy and availability of supply from the United States. Their scale and rate of growth will therefore respond in the future to uranium enrichment developments in the United States. Failure to bring new U. S. enrichment plants into being on a timely basis would do significant damage to our non-proliferation objectives by giving further impetus to alternative sources of enrichment supply and forcing customers to turn away from the United States.

-4-

PR 53

I have concentrated so far on the need to expand our enrichment capacity at a rate which will ensure that future capacity keeps up with domestic and foreign demand. This is the fundamental objective of the proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, and is of overriding importance both to our domestic and international goals. I should like to turn now to several additional features of the proposed program which are of direct international significance.

The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act is far more than a plan for the next increments of uranium enrichment capacity in the United States, important as that aspect is. Like other landmark U. S. legislation in the nuclear field, the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act involves a policy decision which is essential to the future growth and development of the nuclear industry. That decision is that uranium enrichment, like every other activity of the civil nuclear industry -- with exception of radioactive waste management -- and in keeping with the fundamental nature of our economy, should henceforth be undertaken in the United States by private industry. While this decision may appear to involve fundamentally domestic considerations, it has important implications for our international nuclear cooperation as well.

Under our private enterprise system, capacity expansion in response to increased demands normally is provided with few transitional problems given adequate economic incentives. This capability to respond to growing needs without resort to our complex Governmental procedures can serve our foreign policy -- including non-proliferation objectives -- as well as our domestic interests.

Knowledgeable private and governmental authorities responsible for nuclear power developments abroad are well aware that in the United States the continuity needed to assure that the requirements of an expanding market are met is best provided by industry, rather than by Government. I am convinced, therefore, that the earliest possible establishment of a private enrichment industry will greatly enhance the credibility of the U. S. as a reliable source of enrichment. Based on the current state of our technical and economic knowledge and the schedule on which new enrichment demands must be filled, this will require commercialization of both the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge processes. The Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act will serve this purpose.

Another key feature of the proposed legislation are the governmental guarantees and assurances to ensure the early and successful launching of a viable private enrichment industry. This factor should rapidly rebuild confidence on the part of both foreign and domestic users of enrichment services in the reliability of the United States as a nuclear fuel supplier. From this standpoint, the most important aspects of the proposed legislation are those enabling the Government to supply and warrant its technology and to assume the assets and liabilities of the private venture should it be threatened with failure. These features, coupled with the President's pledge that orders placed with a private entity will be filled as the services are needed, are necessary to instill that confidence.

A third important feature is that foreign investment is not precluded for either the gaseous diffusion or centrifuge enrichment facilities whose construction the Act will bring about. Aside from the importance of such investment in facilitating the successful execution of any of the uranium enrichment projects under consideration, we consider it important to encourage foreign investment in private U. S. uranium enrichment facilities within the limits, of course, defined by the Atomic Energy Act. We plan to reasonably limit foreign investment and access to enrichment services both on an individual nation and overall participation basis. To discourage

-5-

PR 53

or exclude foreign participation would be inconsistent with our traditional support for freedom of investment opportunities and with the necessity for interdependence in meeting the challenges of the energy crisis. There can be no more effective assurance both of the reliability of our supply undertakings and their international acceptability than the existence of a healthy level of foreign investment in U. S. uranium enrichment facilities.

In connection with at least one of the contemplated projects -- the U.E.A. gaseous diffusion plant -- foreign investment is expected to be an essential ingredient in enabling the project to go forward. Several countries have indicated an interest in participation in this undertaking. Their final decision will depend on a number of complex issues, including expected requirements for enrichment services, available financial resources and the attractiveness of alternative means of meeting these needs. This Committee can exert a positive influence on these deliberations by expressing at the earliest possible date support for the program as a whole, including the element of foreign investment in the projected enterprises.

I should like to emphasize that the question of foreign investment in any U. S. enrichment facilities under the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act is a separate issue from the transfer of sensitive enrichment technology. The Act authorizes no such transfer, and foreign participation will take place without any Governmental commitment whatsoever for the transfer of enrichment technology. Access to U. S. enrichment technology by our partners abroad may, under certain carefully controlled circumstances, serve U. S. foreign policy interests, but any proposals toward this end would be dealt with as a separate issue which would be subject to Congressional review.

Similarly, the establishment of a private enrichment industry in the United States will have no adverse effect on existing U. S. policies and programs designed to avoid proliferation. Appropriate Agreements for Cooperation would continue to be required for transfers of the uranium enriching services abroad and all of the normal guarantees and safeguards controls would be applied to such transfers. Given the benefit to U. S. non-proliferation objectives discussed previously, our national security will be enhanced, rather than endangered, by the earliest possible passage and implementation of the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act.

In proposing this legislation, President Ford described the nation as at a crossroads. The Congress and this Committee have shown strong leadership in the past in support of the development of a strong, competitive private nuclear industry capable of asserting America's nuclear leadership throughout the world. The challenge today -- in the face of an energy crisis that will remain with us for the indefinite future -- is greater than ever. I urge the Committee to continue its leadership by giving prompt approval to the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. I and members of the Department's staff will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have.

* * * * *

TESTIMONY OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY
IN SUPPORT OF
NUCLEAR FUEL ASSURANCE ACT OF 1975

February 6, 1976

Since its creation in 1946, the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy has played a unique and highly constructive
role not only in the establishment of nuclear power as a
major, viable energy source, but also in enabling the
United States to provide leadership in international
nuclear cooperation under effective guarantees and safe-
guards. Senate Resolution 221, which you co-sponsored,
Mr. Chairman, calling for further strengthening of safe-
guards and other measures against proliferation, is a
timely and important addition to our non-proliferation
policy. The legislation you are considering now can be
another milestone in the development of our peaceful
nuclear program.

The Department of State attaches the highest impor-
tance to the earliest possible passage of this measure
which will enable the United States to reassert its tradi-
tional leadership in international nuclear cooperation.

From our foreign policy standpoint, nuclear coopera-
tion obtains a number of important benefits to the
United States, the most significant of which are

-2-

In this nuclear cooperation, the ability of the United States to supply uranium enrichment services for power reactor programs abroad -- as well as for itself -- on a dependable long-term basis is, I believe, the key ingredient. The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act will fill an indispensable role in pursuit of our foreign policy objectives by maintaining the U.S. in its long-standing position as the world's foremost supplier of such enrichment services.

-3-

use guarantees and safeguards on their exports. Since
the technology available from these suppliers is the
most highly advanced, nations embarking on nuclear
power programs have generally been willing to accept
such safeguards and controls as an adjunct to obtaining
this technology, rather than developing indigenous pro-
grams which would not be subject to safeguards.

It is not an overstatement that effective applica-
tion of this policy, including our bilateral cooperative
arrangements, the creation of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, the development and acceptance of inter-
national safeguards, and the widespread adoption of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty have all been made easier by
our capability and willingness to furnish uranium
enriching services along with other elements essential
to peaceful nuclear development.

In foreign policy terms, however, the benefits of
U.S. nuclear cooperation, in which our enrichment supply
capability has been the key ingredient, go beyond even
the crucial issue of advancing our non-proliferation
objectives. I have already noted the importance of
nuclear power to fulfilling our own energy needs, as
well as those of our partners. We are fortunate that
nuclear power has become a reality as an alternative

-4-

energy source at this time, when not merely our economic well-being but our very independence of judgment and action are threatened by an excessive and growing dependence on imported energy sources whose availability and price are not within our control. In the near-term, there are limited options available to avoid further dependence on imported oil, and nuclear power will have to play a vital role if we are to avoid having U.S. policies subject to intolerable outside pressures.

Today, unfortunately, our ability to influence world-
wide nuclear development in directions favorable to our
own interests is being gravely limited by our inability
to assure the supply of enrichment services for additional
nuclear projects abroad.

Beyond this, our current inability to provide enrich-
ment services has prevented us from consolidating our
early leadership in this market, which can contribute

-6-

significantly to our economic health and strengthen our
balance of trade position, while serving to advance our
non-proliferation objectives. U.S. foreign exchange
revenues to date from the sale of enriched uranium
and enrichment services have reached $1.1 billion, and
overseas contracts now in force are expected to generate
revenues in the order of $17.6 billion over their life-
time, at present price levels.

The economic benefits of our uranium enrichment
supply arrangements are not confined to these contractual
revenues alone, since our ability to provide nuclear fuel
is vital to the sale of U.S. reactors and related goods
and services abroad. To date, such sales are estimated
to have brought us revenues of over $2 billion. Over the
next two and a half decades, these sales could -- if we
are able to take advantage of the opportunities presented --
total $140 billion. In the process, thousands of jobs
to support these overseas sales will be created and
maintained. The implications of this for our economic
well-being in an increasingly competitive world are
enormous. But these expectations are threatened unless
U.S. reactor vendors are in a position to assure a long-
term supply of enrichment services for the plants which
they are seeking to sell.

(10)

-7-

There is no question that these developments, while
responsive in part to nationalistic motivations and a
desire by enrichment users to diversify their sources of
supply, have been spurred by uncertainty over the adequacy
and availability of supply from the United States. Their
scale and rate of growth will therefore respond in the
future to uranium enrichment developments in the United
States. Failure to bring new U.S. enrichment plants
into being on a timely basis would do significant damage
to our non-proliferation objectives by giving further
impetus to alternative sources of enrichment supply and

(lc)

-8-

I have concentrated so far on the need to expand
our enrichment capacity at a rate which will ensure
that future capacity keeps up with domestic and foreign
demand. This is the fundamental objective of the
proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, and is of over-
riding importance both to our domestic and international
goals. I should like to turn now to several additional
features of the proposed program which are of direct
international significance.

The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act is far more
than a plan for the next increments of uranium enrichment
capacity in the United States, important as that aspect
is. Like other landmark U.S. legislation in the nuclear
field, the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act involves a policy
decision which is essential to the future growth and
development of the nuclear industry. That decision is
that uranium enrichment, like every other activity of the
civil nuclear industry -- with exception of radioactive
waste management -- and in keeping with the fundamental
nature of our economy, should henceforth be undertaken
in the United States by private industry. While this
decision may appear to involve fundamentally domestic
considerations, it has important implications for our
international nuclear cooperation as well.

(LW)

-9-

Knowledgeable private and governmental authorities
responsible for nuclear power developments abroad are
well aware that in the United States the continuity
needed to assure that the requirements of an expanding
market are met is best provided by industry, rather than
by Government. I am convinced, therefore, that the
earliest possible establishment of a private enrichment
industry will greatly enhance the credibility of the U.S.
as a reliable source of enrichment. Based on the current
state of our technical and economic knowledge and the
schedule on which new enrichment demands must be filled,
this will require commercialization of both the gaseous
diffusion and centrifuge processes. The Nuclear Fuel
Assurance Act will serve this purpose.

Another key feature of the proposed legislation are
the governmental guarantees and assurances to ensure the
early and successful launching of a viable private enrich-
ment industry. This factor should rapidly rebuild

-10-

A third important feature is that foreign invest-
ment is not precluded for either the gaseous diffusion
or centrifuge enrichment facilities whose construction
the Act will bring about. Aside from the importance of
such investment in facilitating the successful execution
of any of the uranium enrichment projects under con-
sideration, we consider it important to encourage foreign
investment in private U.S. uranium enrichment facilities
within the limits, of course, defined by the Atomic
Energy Act. We plan to reasonably limit foreign invest-
ment and access to enrichment services both on an
individual nation and overall participation basis. To
discourage or exclude foreign participation would be
inconsistent with our traditional support for freedom

(c)

-11-

of investment opportunities and with the necessity for
interdependence in meeting the challenges of the energy
crisis. There can be no more effective assurance both
of the reliability of our supply undertakings and their
international acceptability than the existence of a
healthy level of foreign investment in U.S. uranium
enrichment facilities.

I should like to emphasize that the question of
foreign investment in any U.S. enrichment facilities
under the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act is a separate issue
from the transfer of sensitive enrichment technology. The Act
authorizes no such transfer, and foreign participation will

-12-

take place without any Governmental commitment whatsoever
for the transfer of enrichment technology. Access to U.S.
enrichment technology by our partners abroad may, under
certain carefully controlled circumstances, serve U.S.
foreign policy interests, but any proposals toward this
end would be dealt with as a separate issue which would
be subject to Congressional review.

Similarly, the establishment of a private enrichment
industry in the United States will have no adverse effect
on existing U.S. policies and programs designed to avoid
proliferation. Appropriate Agreements for Cooperation
would continue to be required for transfers of the uranium
enriching services abroad and all of the normal guarantees
and safeguards controls would be applied to such transfers.
Given the benefit to U.S. non-proliferation objectives
discussed previously, our national security will
be enhanced, rather than endangered, by the earliest
possible passage and implementation of the Nuclear Fuel
Assurance Act.

-13-

[LC]

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 12, 1976

No. 64

PC #87

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEBRUARY 12, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to make a
brief statement on Guatemala.

This is my first opportunity to express publicly
our Government's and my personal sympathy for the people of
Guatemala in the unparalleled tragedy which has befallen
them and their country.

Americans have always traditionally responded
generously in thought and deed to the needs of the
suffering. Reflecting that humanitarian spirit, our
Government, joined by its citizens and charitable
organizations, is mounting a major effort to assist the
Government and people of Guatemala to ease the suffering
caused by the earthquake.

I will visit Guatemala on February 24 in
connection with my Latin American trip.

PR #64

2

Q- Mr. Secretary, the State Department Spokesman has this week consistently refused to comment on the reports of the microwave bugging of the Embassy in Moscow. Will you now tell us the facts and what action you have taken to get the Russians to cease this activity, which has been going on for years?

Also, could you discuss the radiation hazard that is involved in this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This issue is a matter of great delicacy which has many ramifications. Our overwhelming concern is, of course, the health and welfare of State Department and other personnel in Moscow. We have made unilateral efforts to reduce any dangers, and we are also engaged in discussions on the subject. But I do not believe it would serve these purposes if I went into any greater detail.

Q- May I follow it up, please, because radiation in the minds of many Americans means radioactivity? Can you rule out that this is radioactivity?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not know exactly. These matters have to be related to accepted health levels, and they have to be related also to the safety standards over a period of time. I would not use the word "radioactivity."

PR #64

3

Q Mr. Secretary, in light of the diplomatic and military successes of the Popular Movement in Angola, is the United States prepared to follow the OAU line and recognize the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, or at least open diplomatic contacts with them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States has declared consistently that its objection was not to the MPLA as an organization, nor to its political views as such. Our objection has been to the imposition of a minority government by what is now 12,000 Cuban troops and nearly $300 million worth of Soviet equipment. Since January alone the Soviet Union has introduced over $100 million worth of military equipment into Angola.

Those facts will not be changed by the military victory that will inevitably result when one side is deprived of restraint and the other is given no opportunity to resist.

What the United States will do when a *de facto* situation exists, we will decide under those circumstances. But I have said before our objection is to the outside imposition of a government and not to the African component of the government itself.

PR #64

4

Q. Mr. Secretary, last year you spoke eloquently of the principles that give purpose to our strength --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I beg your pardon?

Q. Last year you gave a number of speeches dealing with the principles that give purpose to American strength. In your opinion, what are these basic principles of American constitutional democracy, and how do you conform your official conduct and that of the State Department to the dictates of these principles?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't seen this gentleman in over a year and a half, and I think we will go to another question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could ask another question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Certainly.

Q. Specifically in a government such as ours, which functions by the consent of the governed, do you feel that public officials such as yourself have a duty to fully, currently, and truthfully inform the public, their employers, so that the consent will be informed and not blind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What was the last?

PR #64

5

Q -- consent of the governed will be informed
consent and not blind consent.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In a democracy the government has an obligation to keep the public informed and to get support by the existing constitutional processes. In a democracy also, it is not possible to have effective government unless there is a minimum of restraint and a minimum of decency in the public debate so that the essential element of confidence that must exist if a society is to get through its difficulties is preserved.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the status of the SALT talks is, the prospects for your return to Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As we have pointed out, in the SALT talks there were a number of propositions made in Moscow, and a number of proposals were made by the Soviet Union in reply to the propositions that we have advanced. These moved matters forward somewhat. We are now studying the Soviet reply, and we are developing a position to transmit to the Soviet Union within the next week or so. After we have a Soviet reply, we will be able to judge how close we are to an agreement and what the next step should be.

PR #64

6

Q Mr. Secretary, on the question of the
Lockheed reports, could I ask you a three-part question,
please?

What effect do you think these revelations will
have on both the diplomatic and economic interests of the
United States abroad?

Two, could you tell us about a letter that was
published in the _New York Times_ yesterday which says that
you supported pleas by Lockheed that the names of officials
to whom it had made payoffs, along with the names of their
countries, be kept secret?

And three, could you tell us when the Department
first became aware of these matters?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not have the exact
answer to your last question. We became aware of these
matters some months ago when we were asked about the
foreign policy implications of some of these revelations.
And we pointed out that the implications for the domestic
stability and the domestic situation of other countries
could be extremely serious.

The impact of these revelations has been serious.
On the other hand, we not only do not condone these actions,

PR #64

7

we strongly condemn them. We think it is an inappropriate
way to conduct business, and we regret very much that these
actions, if they are true, in fact took place.

Q Could I take you back to part two of that, sir,
as to why you thought not revealing the names, that the
names be kept secret, was in the interest of the United
States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because the revelation by
a Congressional committee of the names of senior officials
of other countries is bound to have serious consequences in
those countries. And that is a matter that we thought the
Committee should keep in mind.

But I repeat, this has nothing to do with our
approving or condoning the actions that are revealed in
those reports, if they are true -- which I do not know.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same point, sir, does
it disturb you at all that an American company was engaging
in activities involving foreign officials, including in
many cases right-wing officials, that from your statement
was apparently unknown to U.S. intelligence officials or
the State Department?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It disturbs me. I

PR #64

9

Q Mr. Secretary, what are your future plans for any sort of negotiations regarding the Middle East situation, and also can you confirm reports of meetings between Israeli and Jordanian officials concerning the West Bank?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think other governments have to confirm or deny meetings that they may be having. We are not involved in any such activities. We have had full and, on the whole, satisfactory talks with Prime Minister Rabin. We will have some more exchanges with the Israeli Government, and then we will bring back our Ambassadors from the Middle East, from the Arab countries, for consultation to discuss what the next move should be. And we will then convey our best judgment of the various opportunities that are available to all of the parties within the course of the next month.

Mr. Lisagor?

Q Mr. Secretary, a representative of Zaire has been here talking to the President and yourself. Does this Administration plan some overt course of policy in relation to those countries that surround Angola?

PR #64

10

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to overt actions as they apply to Angola, I do not think it has been generally understood the difficulty that any overt request would have from a legal point of view, because it would in effect say that the United States is asking for funds for some country to intervene in a civil war in some other country. So that part of it is a matter of extreme legal and political difficulty.

The second problem we now face is that, as a result of this war and of the Cuban and Soviet intervention, there is grave concern in countries like Zaire and Zambia and other countries of Africa that this pattern might be repeated, or that the weapons that have been accumulated there might be used for purposes beyond the borders of Angola.

We are talking to the Governments of Zaire and Zambia, and we will be talking to other governments, to make sure that we understand what they consider their necessities, and to do the best that we can to prevent the pattern of Angola from setting a precedent for the rest of Africa. And when I go to Africa later this year, this is one of the subjects that I plan to discuss.

PR #64

11

Q Can I follow that up by asking if they are requesting specific American actions now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they request specific American action now, we would take it very seriously and we would, of course, discuss it fully with the Congress.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have gone to quite a bit of trouble in the last few weeks to set forth your views about the kind of debate on foreign policy that ought to take place in 1976, particularly with reference to the Soviet Union. How do you feel, having done that, about the statements which have recently been made that the only result of detente is advantages to the Soviet Union and the ability of the United States to sell some Pepsi-Colas in Siberia?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that there are a lot of candidates, and they all have a problem about getting into the headlines. I can not spend my time answering every candidate making some political charge.

I believe that the Administration has attempted to set forth our over-all philosophy, tied to our interpretation of realities. I believe that a debate ought to deal with some other version of reality, with some other concepts, and not with slogans. And I think that the

PR #64

12

relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China is too delicate, too important for the peace of the world to be used for simply partisan sloganeering.

Q Mr. Secretary, the president of an outfit called Hudson Engineering in New Jersey claims that he has seen Soviet trawlers using sonic equipment testing for oil off the Jersey coast. Mr. Hudson claims to have been in touch with the State Department, and to have heard from the State Department that the Soviets have tried to begin talks on this subject, and that such talks are in fact underway. Would you respond, please?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never heard this, and I will have to check into it. I have never heard this argument.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you comment, please, on two things -- Angola and the Moscow Embassy affair? Do these have a cumulative effect which at least affects the climate in which the other aspects of detente, such as SALT, proceed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Moscow Embassy affair, I have tried to point out, is a matter of great complexity

PR #64

13

and sensitivity.

Angola, we have stressed since November, is a pattern of behavior that the United States will not accept, that if continued it will have serious consequences for any possibility of easing of relations with the Soviet Union, and if continued, and if it becomes a pattern, must affect other relationships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on recent changes in Peking, and on what effect this might have on U.S.-China relations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We were not previously con-
sulted before these changes were made. Indeed, at the
risk of undermining our reputation for foreseeing things,
we were surprised by the changes.

We believe that the basic foreign policy of the
People's Republic of China, as well as ours, depends on
the basic conception of the national interests of both
countries. Those interests will determine the policies,
and their personalities, in this sense, play a secondary
role. So we expect that the basic lines of our foreign
policy, as the basic lines of Chinese policy, will continue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you saw former President Nixon

PR #64

14

in San Clemente before it was announced that he was going to go to China. What do you think of his trip, and what does it mean for American-Chinese relations? What are the Chinese trying to tell us by that invitation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When I saw President Nixon he did not tell me that a trip by him to the Peoples Republic of China was imminent. He talked in very general terms of his intentions eventually to take a trip, but not that it was as imminent as it turned out to be.

President Nixon was responsible for the opening to China, and I believe this to have been one of the major American diplomatic initiatives of the recent period.

The Chinese are undoubtedly attempting to underline the importance they attach to this relationship by their invitation.

This Administration has repeatedly made clear that we attach very great significance to the relationship with the Peoples Republic of China, and therefore we consider anything that symbolizes this to be, on the whole, helpful.

On the other hand, President Nixon is going there as a private citizen, and what the intentions of the

PR #64

15

Chinese were, beyond what I have stated, is really a
matter that they have not discussed with us.

Q Mr. Secretary, going back to Angola, now
that the MPLA seems to have won a military victory, how
serious a setback do you think this is for the United
States, and what lessons does this tell the rest of the
world about the attitudes and divisions in Washington?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The MPLA did not score a
military victory. Cuba scored a military victory, backed
by the Soviet Union. Almost all of the fighting was done
by Cuban forces.

What it should make clear is that we can conduct
foreign policy only as a united people, that these victories
and setbacks that I am being asked about are not victories
and setbacks for the Administration, they are setbacks
for the United States; and not so much for the United
States as for those who have to make the decision what
to do in similar circumstances when similar pressures
appear again.

It cannot be in the interest of the United States
to establish the principle that Soviet arms and Cuban
expeditionary forces can appear in situations of turmoil.

PR #64

16

As we look around the world at areas of potential conflict, it cannot be in the interest of the United States to create the impression that, in times of crisis, either threats or promises of the United States may not mean anything because our divisions may paralyze us.

So, leaving aside the merit of the particular argument as between one branch or the other, the absolute requirement of the United States is to come together on a unified position, and this cannot wait for our electoral process to work itself out.

PR #64

17

Q Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, there is a catch phrase that has been kicking around the hemisphere for about twelve years -- the export of revolution -- with reference to Cuba. Premier Castro denies that he is exporting revolution. The Soviets deny they are exporting revolution. Premier Castro this week in Havana was saying this. Do you feel that the Soviet Union and Cuba are attempting to export, if not revolution, at least their system in the Angola matter?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not care what label you give it. There are 12,000 Cuban troops and hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet equipment in a situation that, had it been left alone, would have led to some African solution of a coalition of all of the factions in which over a period of time one or the other might have prevailed, but in a local context.

This is a pattern which, as one looks at other parts of the world, would have the gravest consequences for peace and stability, and it is one which the United States treats with indifference only at the risk of buying graver crises at higher cost later on.

PR #64

18

Q Well, if you had your "druthers", what would you do vis-a-vis Cuba?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We stated our preferences in December, when the situation in our judgment was manageable and negotiable. It did not get out of hand until our domestic divisions deprived us of diplomatic leverage.

What we will do in the future is not for me to say right now, except that we cannot leave the impression that we will be indifferent to a continuation of these efforts. And if we continue to speak about Angola it is not because we have any illusions about what is going on in Angola, but because we want the American public to understand, we want other countries to understand, that at least the Executive Branch understands what the problem is and that it will exercise its responsibilities in a democracy to try to bring home to the public and to the Congress what our future obligations may be.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been a published account of the Pike Committee report, including dozens of charges against you, ranging from the allegation that your policy resulted in a willful massacre of Kurds, and also that your practices of withholding information on the SALT talks produced comments by you which are at variance with the facts, which of course is a

PR #64

19

euphemism for lying. Can you direct yourself specifically
to any of these charges so that we can run through them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, it is
extremely difficult to reply to charges in a leaked
document. And I do not know what version of the Pike
Committee report is now being circulated.

The Pike Committee report presents two problems.
One, the use of highly classified information in violation
of an agreement between the Executive Branch and the
Legislative Branch.

Secondly, the use of classified information
in a manner that is so distorted, so geared to preconceived
ideas, that the total impact is to produce a malicious
lie.

And therefore, even where documents in themselves
are correct, they are taken so out of context and they
are so fitted into a preconceived pattern that we are
facing here a new version of McCarthyism.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I ask a question?
It is indicative of the general interest that until
now no question has been asked about Latin America.
Why are you going to Latin America? And in connection

PR #64

20

with the previous discussion on Angola and the role of
Cuban troops, are you going to take this up and possibly
propose putting Cuba back into the Hemispheric diplomatic
doghouse?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The trip to Latin America
has been planned for a long time, and it had to be
postponed on a number of occasions because overwhelming
other events occurred. It is designed to discuss
primarily Hemispheric problems: the relationship of
Latin America to the United States; the relationship
of the Western Hemisphere in which we are facing the
problems of the traditional Hemispheric pattern in a
world of interdependence; in which the regional concerns
of some of the countries are now competing with the
interests in the developing world in general; and in
which in Latin America we deal with countries of similar
backgrounds, similar histories, but a different economic
development.

So that how we manage this relationship is
of very great importance.

What is happening in Angola may or may not come
up. It is not the primary purpose of my trip. I am
not travelling through Latin America in order to line up

PR #64

21

Latin Americans on the Cuban problem.

It is clear that the evolution towards
normalization of relations with Cuba, which had started
last year and with which we had been prepared to cooperate,
has been interrupted.

But we are not going to Latin America on a
crusade against Cuba.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the United States
encourage the Kurds to expect our support and then
suddenly double-cross them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is a total falsehood.
But it is impossible in these covert operations to
explain the truth without creating even more difficulties.

But the charges that have been made are
utterly irresponsible.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the UN resolutions
concerning Namibia, what would be the U.S. position
if the military operations now in Angola extend
through the frontier to Namibia and involve now South
African troops against Cubans or against Angolans?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a problem that
we have not yet had to face. But I can only say we
cannot look with equanimity to the sending of Cuban

PR #64

22

expeditionary forces around the world.

Q Mr. Secretary, the West German Republic and the United States have just concluded an international treaty on social security matters. Before this treaty was signed, about $1 billion worth of insurance policies held by American citizens were cancelled by the West German Government. These people are now in suspense. Cannot some pressure be borne on the West German Government to re-institute them into their contractual rights?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the risk of under-mining public confidence, I do not know what you are talking about. (Laughter) We will look into this.

Q Mr. Secretary, referring to your characterization of the Pike Committee leaks, could you tell us to what extent they will affect your conduct of the foreign policy of this country?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the misuse of highly classified information in a tendentious, misleading, and totally irresponsible fashion must do damage to the foreign policy of the United States and has already done damage to the foreign policy of the United States. As far as my conduct of foreign policy

PR #64

23

is concerned, the best I can do is to recommend what I
believe to be in the national interest, to defend it
within the government and to the public as best as I
can, and then let the democratic process and history
sort it out.

Q Mr. Secretary, given the irreconcilable
clash between your enemies, those who attack you, and
your own determination to continue foreign policy as you
best see fit, at which point -- and I hope you won't
dismiss it again with a joke -- at which point does
it become necessary for you to consider whether you in
effect should not step down in the interest of American
foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I should conclude
that it is in the interest of American foreign policy,
I would step down. But what one also has to consider
is whether the style of public debate should be that
any public figure can be destroyed by the most
irresponsible and flagrant charges, and that then the
argument should be made that the effectiveness is
affected because totally irresponsible and essentially
untrue charges are made. That, too, has to be weighed.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you receive a

PR #64

24

gift from General Barzani, and if so where is it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a question --

Q Following up Mr. Marder's question.

He asked you in generalities; I'm asking you for details.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: General Barzani sent a gift to the White House which was never in my possession, which I have never received, which I never in any way dealt with, which was kept in the White House in some regular procedure. And I have never received a gift either from General Barzani or a gift I kept from any other foreign leader. And I think it is a disgrace to believe, and to imply, that the United States would conduct foreign policy because of gifts that senior officials may receive.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on our buying oil from them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are negotiating the purchase of 10 million tons of oil a year, which is about three percent of our total imports. This involves a number of issues -- price, shipping rates and related matters. There is a particular interest in it, because our shipping is going to the Soviet Union

PR #64

25

anyway, delivering grain, and could therefore be
advantageously used on the return trip carrying oil.

The negotiations are still in process. There
is an agreement that 10 million tons a year will be
available if we can agree on a price that is advantageous
to the United States or surrounding benefits that will
make this competitive with other purchases.

Q Don't you think the price is below
what the OPEC countries are charging?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One has to look at the
over-all package, including all the related matters, before
one can make a judgment whether it is a competitive deal.

Q Mr. Secretary, at the initiative of the
Soviet Union, the press credentials of the Radio Free
Europe correspondents in Innsbruck were lifted by the
International Olympic Committee. I wonder whether or not
you think that is a violation of the Helsinki agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not considered
this. But of course as you know we support Radio Free
Europe, and we have always encouraged it.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how
your wife is doing after her operation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: She is improving daily,

The Secretary
of State

[LC]

## Press Conference

### MAJOR TOPICS: Relations with U.S.S.R., Angola, Pike Report, Latin America Trip

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would like to make a brief statement on Guatemala.

Americans have always traditionally responded generously in thought and deed to the needs of the suffering. Reflecting that humanitarian spirit our Government, joined by its citizens and charitable organizations, is mounting a major effort to assist the Government and people of Guatemala to ease the suffering caused by the earthquake.

**THE PRESS:** The State Department spokesman has this week consistently refused to comment on the reports of the microwave bugging of the Embassy in Moscow. Will you now tell us the facts and what action you have taken to get the Russians to cease this activity, which has been going on for years? Also, could you discuss the radiation hazard that is involved in this?

**A:** This issue is a matter of great delicacy which has many ramifications. Our overwhelming concern is, of course, the health and welfare of State Department and other personnel in Moscow. We have made unilateral efforts to reduce any dangers, and we are also engaged in discussions on the subject. But I do not believe it would serve these purposes if I went into any greater detail.

February 12, 1976

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

**Q:** May I follow it up, please, because radiation in the minds of many Americans means radioactivity? Can you rule out that this is radioactivity?

**A:** I do not know exactly. These matters have to be related to accepted health levels, and they have to be related also to the safety standards over a period of time. I would not use the word "radioactivity."

**Q:** In light of the diplomatic and military successes of the Popular Movement [for the Liberation of Angola—MPLA] in Angola, is the United States prepared to follow the OAU [Organization of African Unity] line and recognize the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, or at least open diplomatic contacts with them?

**A:** The United States has declared consistently that its objection was not to the MPLA as an organization, nor to its political views as such. Our objection has been to the imposition of a minority government by what is now 12,000 Cuban troops and nearly $300 million worth of Soviet equipment. Since January alone the Soviet Union has introduced over $100 million worth of military equipment into Angola.

What the United States will do when a de facto situation exists, we will decide under those circumstances. But I have said before our objection is to the outside imposition of a government and

PR 64/87

2

Q: Last year you gave a number of speeches
dealing with the principles that give purpose to
American strength. In your opinion what are these
basic principles of American constitutional
democracy, and how do you conform your official
conduct and that of the State Department to the
dictates of these principles?

A: I haven't seen this gentleman in over a year
and a half, and I think we will to to another ques-
tion.

Q: If I could ask another question.

A: Certainly.

Q: Specifically in a government such as ours,
which functions by the consent of the governed,
do you feel that public officials, such as yourself,
have a duty to fully, currently, and truthfully in-
form the public—their employers—so that the con-
sent will be informed and not blind?

A: What was the last?

Q: —consent of the governed will be informed
consent and not blind consent.

A: In a democracy the government has an
obligation to keep the public informed and to get
support by the existing constitutional processes. In
a democracy also, it is not possible to have effec-
tive government unless there is a minimum of re-
straint and a minimum of decency in the public
debate so that the essential element of confidence
that must exist if a society is to get through its
difficulties is preserved.

Q: Can you tell us what the status of the SALT talks is, the prospects for your return to Moscow?

A: As we have pointed out, in the SALT talks
there were a number of propositions made in Mos-
cow, and a number of proposals were made by the
Soviet Union in reply to the propositions that we
have advanced. These moved matters forward
somewhat. We are now studying the Soviet reply,
and we are developing a position to transmit to the
Soviet Union within the next week or so. After we
have a Soviet reply we will be able to judge how
close we are to an agreement and what the next
step should be.

Q: On the question of the Lockheed reports,
could I ask you a three-part question, please?

Two, could you tell us about a letter that was
published in the New York Times yesterday which
says that you supported pleas by Lockheed that
the names of officials to whom it had made pay-
offs, along with the names of their countries, be
kept secret?

And three, could you tell us when the Depart-
ment first became aware of these matters?

A: I do not have the exact answer to your last
question. We became aware of these matters some
months ago when we were asked about the foreign
policy implications of some of these revelations.
And we pointed out that the implications for the
domestic stability and the domestic situation of
other countries could be extremely serious.

The impact of these revelations has been
serious. On the other hand we not only do not
condone these actions, we strongly condemn them.
We think it is an inappropriate way to conduct
business, and we regret very much that these ac-
tions, if they are true, in fact took place.

Q: Could I take you back to part two of that,
sir, as to why you thought not revealing the
names—that the names be kept secret—was in the
interest of the United States?

A: Because the revelation by a congressional
committee of the names of senior officials of other
countries is bound to have serious consequences in
those countries. And that is a matter that we
thought the committee should keep in mind.

But I repeat, this has nothing to do with our
approving or condoning the actions that are re-
vealed in those reports, if they are true—which I do
not know.

Q: On the same point, sir, does it disturb you
at all that an American company was engaging in
activities involving foreign officials, including in
many cases right-wing officials, that from your
statement was apparently unknown to U.S. intelli-
gence officials or the State Department?

A: It disturbs me. I think it is a matter that
should not take place and we must make every
effort to prevent in the future.

Q: What are your future plans for any sort of
negotiations regarding the Middle East situation,
and also can you confirm reports of meetings be-
tween Israeli and Jordanian officials concerning the
West Bank?

A: I think other Governments have to con-

3

firm or deny meetings that they may be having. We are not involved in any such activities. We have had full and, on the whole, satisfactory talks with Prime Minister Rabin [Yitzhak Rabin of Israel]. We will have some more exchanges with the Israeli Government, and then we will bring back our Ambassadors from the Middle East—from the Arab countries—for consultation to discuss what the next move should be. And we will then convey our best judgment of the various opportunities that are available to all of the parties within the course of the next month.

**Q:** *A representative of Zaire has been here talking to the President and yourself. Does this Administration plan some overt course of policy in relation to those countries that surround Angola?*

**A:** With respect to overt actions as they apply to Angola, I do not think it has been generally understood the difficulty that any overt request would have from a legal point of view, because it would in effect say that the United States is asking for funds for some country to intervene in a civil war in some other country. So that part of it is a matter of extreme legal and political difficulty.

We are talking to the Governments of Zaire and Zambia, and we will be talking to other Governments, to make sure that we understand what they consider their necessities and to do the best that we can to prevent the pattern of Angola from setting a precedent for the rest of Africa. And when I go to Africa later this year, this is one of the subjects that I plan to discuss.

**Q:** *Can I follow that up by asking if they are requesting specific American actions now?*

**A:** If they request specific American action now, we would take it very seriously and we would, of course, discuss it fully with the Congress.

**Q:** *You have gone to quite a bit of trouble in the last few weeks to set forth your views about the kind of debate on foreign policy that ought to take place in 1976, particularly with reference to the Soviet Union. How do you feel, having done*

that, about the statements which have recently been made that the only result of detente is advantages to the Soviet Union and the ability of the United States to sell some Pepsi-Colas in Siberia?*

**A:** I think that there are a lot of candidates, and they all have a problem about getting into the headlines. I cannot spend my time answering every candidate making some political charge.

I believe that the Administration has attempted to set forth our over-all philosophy, tied to our interpretation of realities. I believe that a debate ought to deal with some other version of reality, with some other concepts, and not with slogans. And I think that the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China is too delicate, too important for the peace of the world to be used for simply partisan sloganeering.

**Q:** *The president of an outfit called Hudson Engineering in New Jersey claims that he has seen Soviet trawlers using sonic equipment testing for oil off the Jersey coast. Mr. Hudson claims to have been in touch with the State Department and to have heard from the State Department that the Soviets have tried to begin talks on this subject and that such talks are in fact underway. Would you respond, please?*

**A:** I never heard this, and I will have to check into it. I have never heard this argument.

**Q:** *Would you comment, please, on two things—Angola and the Moscow Embassy affair? Do these have a cumulative effect which at least affects the climate in which the other aspects of detente, such as SALT, proceed?*

**A:** The Moscow Embassy affair, I have tried to point out, is a matter of great complexity and sensitivity.

Angola, we have stressed since November, is a pattern of behavior that the United States will not accept, that if continued it will have serious consequences for any possibility of easing of relations with the Soviet Union, and if continued and if it becomes a pattern, must affect other relationships.

**Q:** *Would you comment on recent changes in Peking, and on what effect this might have on U.S.-China relations?*

**A:** We were not previously consulted before these changes were made. Indeed, at the risk of undermining our reputation for foreseeing things, we were surprised by the changes.

4

**Q:** You saw former President Nixon in San Clemente before it was announced that he was going to go to China. What do you think of his trip, and what does it mean for American-Chinese relations? What are the Chinese trying to tell us by that invitation?

**A:** When I saw President Nixon he did not tell me that a trip by him to the People's Republic of China was imminent. He talked in very general terms of his intentions eventually to take a trip but not that it was as imminent as it turned out to be.

President Nixon was responsibile for the opening to China, and I believe this to have been one of the major American diplomatic initiatives of the recent period. The Chinese are undoubtedly attempting to underline the importance they attach to this relationship by their invitation.

This Administration has repeatedly made clear that we attach very great significance to the relationship with the People's Republic of China, and, therefore, we consider anything that symbolizes this to be, on the whole, helpful.

On the other hand President Nixon is going there as a private citizen, and what the intentions of the Chinese were, beyond what I have stated, is really a matter that they have not discussed with us.

**Q:** Going back to Angola, now that the MPLA seems to have won a military victory, how serious a setback do you think this is for the United States, and what lessons does this tell the rest of the world about the attitudes and divisions in Washington?

**A:** The MPLA did not score a military victory. Cuba scored a military victory, backed by the Soviet Union. Almost all of the fighting was done by Cuban forces.

It cannot be in the interest of the United States to establish the principle that Soviet arms and Cuban expeditionary forces can appear in situations of turmoil. As we look around the world at areas of potential conflict, it cannot be in the interest of the United States to create the impression that, in times of crisis, either threats or promises of the United States may not mean anything because our divisions may paralyze us.

So leaving aside the merit of the particular argument as between one branch or the other, the absolute requirement of the United States is to come together on a unified position, and this cannot wait for our electoral process to work itself out.

**Q:** Following up on that, Mr. Secretary, there is a catch phrase that has been kicking around the hemisphere for about 12 years—the export of revolution—with reference to Cuba. Premier Castro [Fidel Castro of Cuba] denies that he is exporting revolution. The Soviets deny they are exporting revolution. Premier Castro this week in Havana was saying this. Do you feel that the Soviet Union and Cuba are attempting to export, if not revolution, at least their system in the Angola matter?

**A:** I do not care what label you give it. There are 12,000 Cuban troops and hundreds of millions of dollars of Soviet equipment in a situation that, had it been left alone, would have led to some African solution of a coalition of all of the factions in which over a period of time one or the other might have prevailed, but in a local context.

**Q:** Well, if you had your "druthers," what would you do vis-a-vis Cuba?

**A:** We stated our preferences in December, when the situation in our judgment was manageable and negotiable. It did not get out of hand until our domestic divisions deprived us of diplomatic leverage.

5

impression that we will be indifferent to a continu-
ation of these efforts. And if we continue to speak
about Angola it is not because we have any illu-
sions about what is going on in Angola, but be-
cause we want the American public to understand,
we want other countries to understand, that at
least the executive branch understands what the
problem is and that it will exercise its responsi-
bilities in a democracy to try to bring home to the
public and to the Congress what our future obliga-
tions may be.

Q: There has been a published account of the Pike committee [Representative Otis G. Pikê, Chairman, House Intelligence Committee] report, including dozens of charges against you, ranging from the allegation that your policy resulted in a willful massacre of Kurds, and also that your practices of withholding information on the SALT talks produced comments by you which are at variance with the facts which, of course, is a euphemism for lying. Can you direct yourself specifically to any of these charges so that we can run through them?

A: Well, of course, it is extremely difficult to
reply to charges in a leaked document. And I do
not know what version of the Pike committee re-
port is now being circulated.

The Pike committee report presents two prob-
lems. One, the use of highly classified information
in violation of an agreement between the executive
branch and the legislative branch.

Secondly, the use of classified information in
a manner that is so distorted, so geared to precon-
ceived ideas, that the total impact is to produce a
malicious lie.

Q: It is indicative of the general interest that until now no question has been asked about Latin America. Why are you going to Latin America? And in connection with the previous discussion on Angola and the role of Cuban troops, are you going to take this up and possibly propose putting Cuba back into the hemispheric diplomatic doghouse?

A: The trip to Latin America has been
planned for a long time, and it had to be postponed

on a number of occasions because overwhelming
other events occurred. It is designed to discuss
primarily hemispheric problems: the relationship
of Latin America to the United States; the relation-
ship of the Western Hemisphere in which we are
facing the problems of the traditional hemispheric
pattern in a world of interdependence, in which
the regional concerns of some of the countries are
now competing with the interests in the developing
world in general, and in which in Latin America we
deal with countries of similar backgrounds, similar
histories, but a different economic development.

What is happening in Angola may or may not
come up. It is not the primary purpose of my trip.
I am not traveling through Latin America in order
to line up Latin Americans on the Cuban problem.

It is clear that the evolution toward normali-
zation of relations with Cuba, which had started
last year and with which we had been prepared to
cooperate, has been interrupted. But we are not
going to Latin America on a crusade against Cuba.

Q: Did the United States encourage the Kurds to expect our support and then suddenly double-cross them?

A: That is a total falsehood. But it is impossi-
ble in these covert operations to explain the truth
without creating even more difficulties. But the
charges that have been made are utterly
irresponsible.

Q: On the U.N. resolutions concerning Namibia, what would be the U.S. position if the military operations now in Angola extend through the frontier to Namibia and involve now South African troops against Cubans or against Angolans?

A: This is a problem that we have not yet had to face. But I can only say we cannot look with equanimity to the sending of Cuban expeditionary forces around the world.

Q: The West German Republic and the United States have just concluded an international treaty on social security matters. Before this treaty was signed about $1 billion worth of insurance policies held by American citizens were cancelled by the West German Government. These people are now in suspense. Cannot some pressure be borne on the West German Government to reinstitute them into their contractual rights?

6

A: At the risk of undermining public confidence, I do not know what you are talking about. [Laughter] We will look into this.

Q: Mr. Secretary, referring to your characterization of the Pike committee leaks, could you tell us to what extent they will affect your conduct of the foreign policy of this country?

A: I believe that the misuse of highly classified information in a tendentious, misleading, and totally irresponsible fashion must do damage to the foreign policy of the United States and has already done damage to the foreign policy of the United States. As far as my conduct of foreign policy is concerned, the best I can do is to recommend what I believe to be in the national interest, to defend it within the Government and to the public as best as I can, and then let the democratic process and history sort it out.

Q: Given the irreconcilable clash between your enemies—those who attack you—and your own determination to continue foreign policy as you best see fit, at which point—and I hope you won't dismiss it again with a joke—at which point does it become necessary for you to consider whether you in effect should not step down in the interest of American foreign policy?

A: If I should conclude that it is in the interest of American foreign policy, I would step down. But what one also has to consider is whether the style of public debate should be that any public figure can be destroyed by the most irresponsible and flagrant charges and that then the argument should be made that the effectiveness is affected because totally irresponsible and essentially untrue charges are made. That, too, has to be weighed.

Q: Did you receive a gift from General Barzani [Mulla Mustafa Barzani, Kurdish leader], and if so where is it?

A: This is a question—

Q: Following up Mr. Marder's question. He asked you in generalities; I'm asking you for details.

A: General Barzani sent a gift to the White House which was never in my possession, which I have never received, which I never in any way dealt with, which was kept in the White House in some regular procedure. And I have never received a gift either from General Barzani or a gift I kept from any other foreign leader. And I think it is a disgrace to believe, and to imply, that the United States would conduct foreign policy because of gifts that senior officials may receive.

Q: What is the status of the negotiations with the Soviet Union on our buying oil from them?

A: We are negotiating the purchase of 10 million tons of oil a year, which is about three percent of our total imports. This involves a number of issues—price, shipping rates, and related matters. There is a particular interest in it, because our shipping is going to the Soviet Union anyway, delivering grain, and could therefore be advantageously used on the return trip carrying oil.

Q: Don't you think the price is below what the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries are charging?

A: One has to look at the over-all package, including all the related matters, before one can make a judgment whether it is a competitive deal.

Q: At the initiative of the Soviet Union, the press credentials of the Radio Free Europe correspondents in Innsbruck were lifted by the International Olympic Committee. I wonder whether or not you think that is a violation of the Helsinki agreement?

A: I have not considered this. But of course as you know we support Radio Free Europe, and we have always encouraged it.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT - CARACAS

[LC]

It is a great pleasure for me to be here in
Venezuela, the nation that gave freedom and hope
to the people of this continent through the leader-
ship of its most distinguished son, Simon Bolivar.

In the United States, we associate the name
of the Great Liberator with the just struggles of
peoples everywhere. He is, for us, the George
Washington of South America.

And it is particularly appropriate, therefore,
that it should be here that I have the first oppor-
tunity to reaffirm, in South America, the very
special ties between the United States and the
nations of this Hemisphere.

Our two nations have much in common, not
only in the form of our national heroes, but also
in what they represent for mankind: human
freedom, dignity and equality under law.

2. [illegible]

The strong historical friendship and cooperation
between Venezuela and the United States reflect
the commonality of interests of our people and the
mutual esteem in which we hold democracy.

Although we face some issues today over which
we may disagree, I am confident that we can through
patience and mutual trust, resolve these differences
to the satisfaction of our two sovereign nations.
I look forward to talks with your esteemed
President, Carlos Andres Perez, as well as
the opportunity to continue the cordial and con-
structive discussions I have had in Washington
with your distinguished Foreign Minister,
Ramon Escovar Salom, and your Minister
of State for International Economic Affairs,
Manuel Perez Guerrero.

[16]

The people of the United States honor
the memory of Bolivar--as do those
in every quarter of the globe who
cherish liberty. Our two nations, who
hold in trust the heritage and
promise of democracy remain dedicated
to the belief that the cooperative
effort of free men and women,
inspired by the noblest ideals, is the
surest path toward the world
community of peace and justice we
all seek.

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 16, 1976

NO. 66

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL
CARACAS, VENEZUELA

February 16, 1976

Secretary Kissinger:

Mr. Foreign Minister, Ambassador: Since with respect to the art of oratory, the United States is an underdeveloped country, I take the liberty of reading some of my remarks.

It is a great pleasure for me to be here in Venezuela, the nation that gave freedom and hope to the people of this continent through the leadership of its most distinguished son, Simon Bolivar. And it is particularly appropriate, therefore, that it should be here that I have the first opportunity to reaffirm in South America the very special ties between the United States and the nations of this Hemisphere. Our two nations have much in common, not only in the form of our national heroes, but also in what they represent for mankind -- human freedom, dignity, and equality under law. The strong historical friendship and cooperation between Venezuela and the United States reflect the common interest of our people and the mutual esteem in which we hold democracy. Although we face some issues today over which we may disagree, I am confident that we can, through patience and mutual trust, resolve these differences to the satisfaction of our two sovereign nations. I look forward to talks with your esteemed President, Carlos Andres Perez, as well as the opportunity to continue the cordial and constructive discussions I've had in Washington with your distinguished Foreign Minister and your Minister of State for International Economic Affairs. I fully subscribe to the view so eloquently enunciated by President Perez that we must create a world of cooperation and avoid the dangerous confrontations that arise from a world hobbled by injustice and contradictions. The nations of this Hemisphere, which, with all their differences, have so many common ties can make a major contribution to a world of peace and progress and justice. It is in this spirit that I come to Venezuela today.

Thank you for your warm welcome.

* * *

DINNER TOAST - CARACAS

Mr. President, Mr. Minister and Distinguished
Guests:

It is fitting that Caracas should be my first stop
on my first trip to South America as Secretary of
State.

For this year -- the 200th anniversary of my country's independence -- is also the 150th anniversary of the Amphictionic Congress convoked by Simon Bolivar.

Thus we are reminded once again of the common
history out of which came our revolutions and our
democratic institutions. And it should remind us
also of the responsibilities we bear together in the
world of the future.

Our two nations have a long history, as well, of
friendship and working together. General Francisco
de Miranda was a friend and supporter of our cause
in the American Revolution. In 1812, assistance to

2. (cc)

the victims of an earthquake here was the first act of foreign assistance in our history. The ideals, objectives and campaigns of your greatest son, Simon Bolivar, inspired heart-felt support among the people of the United States. And in 1822, the United States was the first to recognize your independence.

Our peoples are bound together not only by geography, but by common experience, the common heritage of Western civilization and a common dedication to justice, freedom and prosperity.

But we, in the New World, now face a new world.

Historic ties do not in themselves assure, Mr. President, that states will continue to cooperate in the future as they have in the past. The nations of Latin America are part of the Western world, yet at the same time part of the developing world. My own country is conscious of global responsibilities to maintain the peace now that we have irrevocably put behind us our isolationist history, but it also is

conscious of the need to shape a new dialogue with the
developing world. So we are part of two circles that
partially overlap. The complexities of today's world,
the powerful forces of change, including divisions between
the industrial and developing countries, have posed a
challenge to our traditional friendships in the Hemisphere

The United States has sought to respond to the
global challenges of a new era. We have formulated
major proposals, in many forums, to respond to the
aspirations of developing countries and to ensure that
they are full participants in the economic system and
the international community. We have reached out to
adversaries in the Communist world, because our
people believe that perpetual confrontation is sterile
and dangerous, and that a more constructive pattern
of international relations can be built if we are patient,
and strong, and confident and far-sighted.

4.

But as my country seeks to build wider
communities of interest and new friendships, it
makes no sense for us to lose or weaken those
cherished friendships which we have enjoyed and
benefitted from for so long past.

Therefore our friendship with Venezuela, and
with Latin America, takes on new significance as
a cornerstone of the global edifice which we must
build in a new era.

The dialogue between our two countries, in its
substance and intimacy, reflects the important
work we must do together and the friendship that
gives us such hope for the future. We know there will
be differences in our interests and in our perspectives.
But we know we can overcome these differences in
the spirit of conciliation and common endeavor.

But my visit here has in fact a higher aim than
simply improving our bilateral relations. I want
to begin with you, Mr. President, one of the
authentic leaders of Latin America, the great

5. (w)

enterprise of strengthening the relations among
all the nations of the Hemisphere for the role that
we must play in a new world.

We should avoid commitments that are mainly
rhetorical. So let us work toward a specific
milestone ahead of us -- the June meeting of Foreign
Ministers at the Organization of American States.
Let us consider how, by careful consultation between
now and that meeting, we can prepare an agenda
of concrete measures for cooperative action that
give new meaning to our historic ties.

My standing here with you, Mr. President,
symbolizes that our countries stand together before
all mankind. Venezuela and the United States are
living examples of freedom, of the power of free
peoples. We do not hide our faults, our uncertain-
ties or our internal tensions. We are free people
committed to social progress and the struggle against
injustices, convinced that we -- and others in the

6. (c)

world -- can improve the lives and futures of our peoples and prove once again that constitutional processes are the greatest liberators of talent and creative energy and therefore the most powerful engine of progress.

Toqueville thought that democracies were inferior to other forms of government in the conduct of external relations. Democracies, he said, tend to concentrate their energies on their own _internal well-being_. They develop a _public spirit_. They nurture _respect for law_. These, he thought, are not talents prized in diplomacy or of much utility in arranging the affairs of nations. Foreign policy, he said, does not call for any of the good qualities of democracies.

Experience, however, demonstrates that these qualities are vital to the modern world.

The health of our societies -- economic, political and social -- is a demonstration to all of

7. (ii)

what free men and women can achieve. The public
spirit of our citizens underlies all our achievement,
in every field of endeavor, and ensures the moral
direction of our national effort. And our respect for
law is the blueprint of the new international structure
of relations that must be built.

These qualities of our own tradition become, in an
interdependent world, international responsibilities
which our two democracies share.

Therefore, Mr. President, let us begin here, in
the Americas, inspired by our common heritage. Let
us offer the rest of the world the model and effort
of our own cooperation. Let us infuse our own
relations with this spirit, knowing that our common
experience and dreams in this Hemisphere are a
precious advantage as we address the new range
of problems of interdependence. For as we deepen
and intensify international understanding and progress
here, we enhance the prospects for progress around

8.

the world.

Mr. President,

I take particular pleasure on this, my first
stop in South America, in saluting the common
dedication of our two countries.

My toast, Mr. President, is a simple one:
to democracy, to peace and to progress.

I fully subscribe to the view, so eloquently enunciated by President Perez, "that we must create a world of cooperation and avoid the dangerous confrontations that arise from a world hobbled by injustice and contradictions."

The nations of this hemisphere which, with all their differences, have so many common ties can make a major contribution to a world of peace, and progress and justice.

It is in this spirit that I come here today.