# Greece, Turkey, and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis

## Background:

Cyprus is an island state in the eastern Mediterranean with a population that is roughly 82% ethnic Greek and 18% ethnic Turkish. In 1960 Cyprus gained its independence from Britain through a set of treaties known as the London-Zurich Agreements. The London-Zurich Agreements stipulated that the government of Cyprus would consist of a Greek-Cypriot President, a Turkish-Cypriot Vice President, and a legislative assembly and cabinet divided proportionally along ethnic lines. The Agreements also permitted the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Britain to station military units on Cyprus, and to intervene in Cypriot politics to defend the terms of the constitution.

In its first 15 years as an independent nation, Cyprus experienced successive waves of political and ethnic turmoil. In 1961, the government of Greece and the government of Turkey began to arm and train underground paramilitary organizations to advance the interests of their respective Cypriot ethnic groups. In 1963, a constitutional crisis provoked open hostilities between these groups, and in early 1964, Turkey threatened Greece with war over Cyprus. In 1967, after a Greek-Cypriot attack on Turkish-Cypriot villages, Turkey again threatened to invade Cyprus.

Throughout this time, the ethnic Greek community in Cyprus was itself divided. The majority supported the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, and favored an independent Cyprus. A militant minority (clandestinely armed by Greek rightists) favored enosis, or "union," with Greece. In 1970, members of this minority tried and failed to assassinate President Makarios.

In July 1974, President Makarios wrote the military government of Greece to demand the withdrawal of a number of their forces from Cyprus. The government of Greece refused, and instead sponsored an attempt to assassinate President Makarios on July 15. Makarios escaped to London, but was temporarily replaced as President of Cyprus by an extreme proponent of enosis with Greece. This prompted the government of Turkey to intervene militarily and to declare a territorial division of Cyprus along ethnic lines.¹

¹ Bunge et al., *Cyprus: A Country Study*, Chapters 1, 4, and 5, 1980. [I will fill in specific footnotes when I return to Boston and have access to the revised 1995 edition of this book.]

In the United States, this crisis happened to coincide with the denouement of the Watergate scandal. Impeachment hearings against President Nixon began on May 9, 1974 and gathered momentum through the summer. On August 8, 1974 Richard Nixon announced his decision to resign the office of President of the United States. His successor, Gerald Ford, was inaugurated the next day.

# 1. Context – Hitchens' Analysis of Kissinger's Memoirs

a. **Hitchens** cites a passage from Kissinger's memoirs, "[Nixon] was consumed by Watergate. The last thing he or I needed was to encourage a crisis in the eastern Mediterranean between two NATO allies."² Hitchens dismisses this statement as "disingenuous,"³ and presents it as evidence that Kissinger *did* seek to encourage a crisis in the eastern Mediterranean.

**Fact:** There is no logical basis for this argument. The longstanding policy of the United States government was to work to prevent military and ethnic tension in Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, both crucial members of the NATO alliance. No member of the United States government had any reason to instigate a coup in Cyprus and thereby *bring about* a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey.

b. **Hitchens** presents the following argument as “evidence” of Kissinger’s alleged desire “to murder the head of state in the democratic nation of Cyprus”⁴:

[O]n page 199 of [the third volume of Kissinger's memoirs] *Years of Renewal...* President Makarios is described without adornment as 'the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions'.... To describe his [sic] person as 'the proximate cause' of most of the tensions is to make a wildly aberrant moral judgment. The same aberrant judgment, however, supplies the key that unlocks the lie at the heart of Kissinger's presentation. If the elected civilian authority (and spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox community) is the "proximate cause" of the tensions, then his removal from the scene is self-evidently the cure for them.⁵

² Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, pp 204-05.

³ Hitchens, p 79.

⁴ Hitchens, Preface, "Proper Bill of Indictment," p x.

⁵ Hitchens, p 80.

The problem of Cyprus is one of patience. We have not had many incidents between the two communities. Often we have intra-Greek and intra-Turk incidents.... We hope to resume the intercommunal talks.... In my view, if no formula can be agreed on in a short while, the Secretary General of the U.N. is coming here soon, and perhaps he can get the sides together.¹¹

Later that month, Kissinger's office received a memorandum from Thomas Boyatt, the State Department's desk officer for Cyprus, predicting an effort by Athens to overthrow President Makarios. Boyatt recommended that the United States government warn the government of Greece against such a course of action (as the United States government had successfully done in 1972). Although Kissinger was absent from Washington at the time, the Acting Secretary of State approved Boyatt's recommendation, and the US Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, informed the Greek president and foreign minister that the United States did not support the use of force in Cyprus.

b. **Hitchens** acknowledges that Ambassador Tasca did deliver an American warning against the use of force in Cyprus to the Greek president and foreign minister. Hitchens asserts that this was insufficient, and that Ambassador Tasca should have also delivered the message to the head of the Greek secret police, Dimitrios Ioannides, who was at the time the *de facto* head of the military government of Greece. Hitchens interprets Ambassador Tasca's failure to contact Brigadier Ioannides as evidence of Kissinger's purported "collusion in" an attempt to assassinate President Makarios.

**Fact:** At Ambassador Tasca's advice, the decision of the State Department was that a direct American approach to Ioannides would provoke the notoriously volatile junta leader, and thereby work *against* the American goal of decreasing tension in Cyprus. Instead, Ambassador Tasca delivered the American message to the Greek president and the Greek foreign minister, as well as Archbishop Seraphim, who was believed to be a close friend of Ioannides.

For several weeks this initiative appeared to have succeeded. On

*[DATE - I called Rogers about getting Boyatt's post-mortem memorandum on Cyprus]*

¹¹ Makarios to Gromyko and Kissinger in Nicosia, 7 May 1974, as quoted in Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p 203.

4

the CIA reported that the government of Greece had abandoned its efforts to unseat Makarios. On July 12, Makarios told the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, that the situation was "delicate" but not "critical." Ambassador Davies reported to Washington: "[Makarios] gave no indication he was seeking any US intervention with Athens."

3. <u>Turkish Military Action in Cyprus</u>

a. **Hitchens** asserts that, because Kissinger failed to prevent Turkish military intervention in Cyprus after the July 15 coup, Kissinger is therefore "guilty of collusion in... two [Turkish] invasions [of Cyprus] which flouted international law, and in the murder and dispossession of many thousands of noncombatant civilians."¹²

**Fact:** Following the Greek coup on Cyprus, the United States government received reports of the mobilization of Turkish forces in the region. This prompted Kissinger to cable the State Department a series of urgent instructions for the US special envoy for the Cyprus crisis Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco:

> I want a telegram to Sisco that as soon as he arrives [in Turkey] he is to tell [Turkish Prime Minister Bulent] Ecevit that we are extremely concerned about unconfirmed reports we have about Turkish military moves. He is instructed to point out to the Turkish government that the US would take the gravest view of Turkish military moves before all diplomatic processes are exhausted. That is point one. That he must do immediately because I think we have been waffling and weeping around the place and we have not made clear that we are opposed to military intervention. Secondly, he is to say we are doing this in the Turkish interests, that Turkish intervention will not be the last move, it will be the first of a whole sequence of moves.... Any government in Cyprus which would emerge at the end of this process would not better serve the Turkish interests because in order to attempt a counterbalance of Turkish dominance... [that] government would inevitably look for support both internally and externally to Communism. You should give Ecevit an assurance that we are totally opposed to enosis whether direct or creeping.... Finally, you should tell Ecevit that as his friend and admirer, I must make clear my convictions that if he follows the course of military intervention, he will have started a process which will not only have serious adverse effects for Turkey in the long run, but will be extremely dangerous for the West as a whole.¹³

¹² Hitchens, p. 79.

¹³ As quoted in Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, pp. 217-218.

5

b. **Hitchens** asserts that Kissinger's subsequent opposition to the decision of the United States Congress to cut off military aid to Turkey constitutes "evidence" that Kissinger "colluded in" the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and that Kissinger bears personal "responsibility for [the] outrages" committed by Turkish troops during the Cyprus action, which, Hitchens asserts, included "unpunished acts of rape, torture, and looting."¹⁴

**Fact:** Following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Kissinger instructed Under Secretary of State Sisco to call on Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey and press for an immediate ceasefire. Under Secretary Sisco was instructed to inform Prime Minister Ecevit:

> I [Kissinger] take an extremely grave view of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus which will have the most serious consequences, chief of which is the position it will place on free world security. We [the United States government] are deeply disappointed that the Turkish government did not heed our pleas to exercise restraint.

> Now that the step has been taken, however, the most urgent means must be found to restore peace and stability to the area....

> The United States, for its part, is prepared to support a constitutional solution and a level of forces which existed before the coup. The only way, in our view, to restore constitutional government is through the legitimate succession of [the speaker of the Cypriot parliament, Glafkos] Clerides [as interim President of Cyprus]....

> We are proposing urgently to the UK that it call for immediate negotiations with the guarantor powers in London to seek the constitutional solution which will open the way for the restoration of stability in Cyprus and in the area.

> We urgently appeal to the Turkish government to weigh most carefully the proposals we are making, for we are convinced that to do otherwise would be self-defeating in terms of Turkey's own self-interests.¹⁵

As Secretary of State, Kissinger also announced at a July 20 press conference that, if hostilities in the region continued, "a war between Greece and Turkey will not be fought with American weapons. It may be fought with those weapons they have, but it will not be fought with an open supply line."¹⁶ On July 30, the two sides agreed on a ceasefire brokered by Britain and the United States. Two weeks later Turkey broke this ceasefire and seized more Cypriot territory. Turkey declared another ceasefire on August 16. This

¹⁴ Hitchens, p 88.

¹⁵ As quoted in Kissinger, pp 219-220.

¹⁶ Background briefing to reporters in San Clemente, July 20, 1974 (White House press release).

ceasefire held, with Cyprus now divided into two contiguous zones along
ethnic lines.

On October 17, 1974 the US Congress voted to cut off all US military aid to Turkey to "punish" the government of Turkey for its military action in Cyprus. Both President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger harbored reservations about this policy because they believed it would damage the NATO alliance, of which both Greece and Turkey are key members.

The government of Turkey responded to the US aid cutoff by closing all US military installations in Turkey except one base. This posed a significant problem for the US military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Congress voted to repeal the military embargo against Turkey in 1978, during the Carter administration.

4. The Greek Dissident Journalist Elias P. Demetracopoulos

a. **Hitchens** asserts that if Elias P. Demetracopoulos, a US-based Greek "guerilla journalist and one man band"¹⁷ who was a close acquaintance of President Makarios, had returned to Greece during the time of the Greek junta, he would have been imprisoned or possibly killed for his dissident views. Mr. Demetracopoulos did not return to Greece, and he was not harmed; he is still alive as of this writing. Nonetheless, Hitchens asserts that there is "a *prima facie* case that Henry Kissinger was at least aware of a plan [for the Greek junta] to abduct and interrogate, and almost certainly kill, a civilian journalist [Demetracoupolos]."¹⁸ Because Kissinger may have been "aware of" what was possibly an aborted attempt to capture and interrogate Demetracoupolos, Hitchens charges Kissinger with "personal involvement in a plan to kidnap and murder a journalist living in Washington, DC."¹⁹

**Fact:** There is no factual basis for this charge.

¹⁷ Hitchens, p 86.

¹⁸ Hitchens, p 119.

¹⁹ Hitchens, Preface, x, "Proper Bill of Indictment."

7

Cyprus

Superseded

PRELIMINARY SKETCH as of Friday evening

1.

**Hitchens** asserts that "on page 199 of [the third volume of Kissinger's memoirs] *Years of Renewal...* President Makarios is described without adornment as 'the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions.'" Hitchens further asserts:

> To describe his [sic] person as 'the proximate cause' of most of the tensions is to make a wildly aberrant moral judgment. The same aberrant judgment, however, supplies the key that unlocks the lie at the heart of Kissinger's presentation. If the elected civilian authority (and spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox community) is the "proximate cause" of the tensions, then his removal from the scene is self-evidently the cure for them.

On this basis, Hitchens concludes that "it follows logically and naturally that" Kissinger conspired to overthrow Makarios in a military coup.

**Fact:** The correct quotation from *Years of Renewal* is as follows:

> When all was said and done, Makarios, the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions, was also the best hope for a long-term peaceful solution. For once he had exhausted all possible maneuvers, he could be eminently practical about his necessities.¹¹⁵

This is followed by a tribute to the late Archbishop:

> Once Makarios returned to Cyprus [on December 7, 1974], he played his usual complicated [political] games, gradually edging, however, toward a settlement on terms he would have rejected indignantly two years earlier. When he died of a heart attack in 1977, I felt that with the by then somewhat chastened archbishop had also died the best hope for a rapid negotiated settlement of Cyprus.¹¹⁶

2.

**Hitchens** asserts that "In May of 1974, two months before the coup in Nicosia," Kissinger "received a memorandum from the head of his State Department Cyprus desk," in which the author predicted a Greek effort to unseat Archbishop Makarios. Hitchens asserts that, because Kissinger "saw this document in real time, while engaged in his [diplomatic] shuttle between Syria and Israel (both of them within half an hour's flying time of Cyprus),"

¹¹⁵ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p 199.

¹¹⁶ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p 237.

45

and yet did not personally intervene, Kissinger is therefore "guilty of collusion in an
assassination attempt on a foreign head of state, [and] in a fascist military coup."¹¹⁷

**Fact:** On May 7, Archbishop Makarios hosted a meeting between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. There Archbishop Makarios commented:

> The problem of Cyprus is one of patience. We have not had many incidents between the two communities. Often we have intra-Greek and intra-Turk incidents.... We hope to resume the intercommunal talks.... In my view, if no formula can be agreed on in a short while, the Secretary General of the U.N. is coming here soon, and perhaps he can get the sides together.¹¹⁸

Later that month, Kissinger's office received a memorandum from Thomas Boyatt, the State Department's desk officer for Cyprus, predicting an effort by Athens to overthrow Archbishop Makarios. Boyatt recommended that Washington warn the government of Greece against such a course of action. Although Kissinger was absent from Washington at the time, the Acting Secretary of State approved Boyatt's recommendation, and the US Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, relayed the message to the Greek president and foreign minister.

On July 12, Makarios told the US Ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, that the situation was "delicate" but not "critical." Ambassador Davies reported to Washington: "He gave no indication [that] he was seeking any US intervention with Athens." Three days later, the government of Greece instigated a military coup against Archbishop Makarios.

¹¹⁷ Hitchens, p. 79.

¹¹⁸ Makarios to Kissinger in Nicosia, 7 May 1974, as quoted in Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 203.

46

DATE

OCT 16 2003

CORR. FILE: Schouten, Sky

[Y]

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

Jessee

Theresa

Don Amanda Suzanne

SUBJ. FILE __________

CROSS REF. __________

COMMENTS:

✓10/17 Sky called to say he had redone nearly all the drafts and the attached was superceded. So the new material was given to HAK via a/p pouch upon arrival from Germany Sat. eve.

DC OFFICE:
Christie / Jody / Tiffany

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED ✓

# US Operations Against North Vietnamese Military Installations in Cambodia

Drafted 10/13/03 by Sky Schouten

## Background:

In 1965 North Vietnam established a series of 15 military staging posts and supply depots in eastern Cambodia along the border with South Vietnam. Around this time, North Vietnam also armed and trained an assemblage of militant Cambodian communists known as the Khmer Rouge. Fearing communist reprisal, and lacking sufficient military means to dislodge the Vietnamese invaders, the government of Cambodia refrained from publicly protesting these infringements on its sovereignty.

The United States government was barred by domestic political constraints – though not by international law¹ – from undertaking major military operations against the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. However, throughout the Johnson administration American and South Vietnamese troops had returned fire against Vietnamese communists attacking from the sanctuaries, and had occasionally bombed Vietnamese military positions on Cambodian territory.²

In February 1968, Vietnamese communists utilized the Cambodian sanctuaries as a staging post for their surprise Tet offensive against South Vietnam. That fall, Cambodian troops sought to dislodge the Vietnamese forces from Cambodian territory, but were beaten back after a series of clashes.³

In March 1969, in the midst of a major North Vietnamese offensive, President Nixon lifted prior restrictions on US aerial operations against the Cambodian sanctuaries. The United States then undertook Operation "Menu," a campaign of air strikes against six of the Cambodian sanctuaries.

In March 1970, Cambodian Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk was deposed by his own government ministers on charges of corruption and leniency towards North Vietnam. The Cambodian legislative assembly transferred Sihanouk's duties to Prime

¹ See Section 5 below, "Cambodia and International Law."

² The first such air strike occurred in January 1962. See also US Department of Defense, *Cross-border Operations, Southeast Asia; 1964-1968 - Section 2: Cambodia*, August 7, 1973.

³ Wilfred P. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, p 52.

Minister Lon Nol, a Cambodian general with a record of public opposition to the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia.

On March 12, 1970, the government of Cambodian formally demanded the withdrawal of all Vietnamese communist troops from Cambodian territory. North Vietnam refused, and instead launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia on March 29, 1970. At the request of the Cambodian government, the United States undertook a series of air strikes in support of defending Cambodian forces. In addition, in April 1970 the United States undertook an "incursion" 22 miles into Cambodian territory to neutralize the North Vietnamese border sanctuaries.

# 1. North Vietnamese Sanctuaries and Supply Depots in Cambodia

a. Hitchens asserts that Cambodia "allegedly" and "supposedly concealed or protected North Vietnamese supply lines." Hitchens suggests that the North Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia was an American "propaganda fantas[y]."⁴

*Fact:* Hoping to preserve at least the semblance of Cambodian neutrality, Prince Norodom Sihanouk at first publicly denied the existence of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries. Yet by late 1967 – as the North Vietnamese amassed supplies in Cambodia for their February 1968 Tet Offensive against South Vietnam – “the Vietnamese Communist presence in Cambodia had grown too large for the prince to hide.”⁵

On January 19, 1968 Prince Norodom Sihanouk privately informed a US government envoy:

> We don't want any Vietnamese in Cambodia.... We will be very glad if you solve our problem. We are not opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas. You would be liberating us from the Viet Cong. For me only Cambodia counts. I want you to force the Viet Cong to leave Cambodia. In unpopulated areas, where there are not Cambodians,– such precise cases I would shut my eyes.⁶

⁴ Hitchens, p. 34.

⁵ Donald Kirk, *Wider War: The Struggle for Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos*, p. 106. Kirk himself accidentally encountered a North Vietnamese military encampment in Cambodia in April 1970. He recounts this episode on pp. 113-116 of *Wider War*.

⁶ Prince Norodom Sihanouk to Ambassador Chester Bowles, January 19, 1967. As quoted in Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War*, p. 67. See also Bowles, *Promises to Keep*.

2

Prince Norodom Sihanouk offered regional commander General Creighton Abrams similar counsel:

> If the Americans bomb where the VC are, that's none of my business... I can't imagine the Hanoi representative coming to my Minister of Foreign Affairs and saying, "I have the honor to inform you that the Americans have bombed my forces who are in your country without authority."⁷

In the fall of 1968, Prince Norodom Sihanouk ordered the Cambodian army to mount an offensive against Vietnamese communist troops encamped along a highway in eastern Cambodia. The Vietnamese "vigorously resisted," and "violent clashes resulted."⁸

Beginning in June 1969, General Lon Nol of Cambodia made public a series of reports detailing the North Vietnamese military positions in Cambodia. General Lon Nol estimated the foreign communist presence at between 35,000 and 40,000 men, and described the North Vietnamese as "masters of the occupied regions."⁹

## 2. Cambodian Civilians Inhabiting the Border Areas

a. **Hitchens** refers to a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum noting the possibility that "some Cambodian casualties would be sustained in the operation" against North Vietnamese military encampments in Cambodia. Hitchens paraphrases the memorandum as follows: "The target district for Breakfast (Base Area 35) was inhabited, said the memo, by about 1,640 Cambodian civilians. Lunch (Base Area 609) was inhabited by 198 of them, Snack (Base Area 351) by 383, Dinner (Base Area 352) by 770, and Dessert (Base Area 350) by about 120 Cambodian peasants." On the basis of these figures, Hitchens asserts that the United States undertook Operation Menu "with full knowledge of its effect on civilians." Hitchens further asserts that "Kissinger was lying when he later [in 1973] told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that areas of Cambodia selected for bombing were 'unpopulated.'"

⁷ As quoted in Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam*, p 119.

⁸ Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields*, p 52.

⁹ Kirk, *Wider War*, p 111, 109.

3

**Fact:** In preparation for military efforts to neutralize the Cambodian sanctuaries, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff compiled a report in April 1969 concerning communist positions in fifteen "base areas" along the Cambodia-South Vietnam border. Each "base area" was a space of 10 to 20 square miles, *within which space* intelligence operations had identified both Cambodian villages and North Vietnamese military positions.

One issue addressed by the JCS report was the minimization of risk to Cambodian peoples and structures within these areas. The JCS analyzed the number and location of Cambodian civilians believed to reside inside each base area; on this basis, the 9 most populated base areas were omitted from consideration for military strikes. In the remaining 6 base areas, the JCS reached the following conclusions:

a. There is very little mixing of the VC/NVA Forces with the Cambodian populace. Conversely, Cambodians rarely go into areas under de facto control of the VC/NVA.

b. Cambodian villages and populated areas are readily identifiable and can be essentially avoided in conducting preplanned operations into the base areas.

c. Very few permanent structures exist in the base areas outside the Cambodian villages. Virtually all those that do exist are enemy-occupied.¹⁰

"Extreme care would be taken to attack only known enemy bases in Cambodia, thus minimizing the risk of engagement with Cambodian forces or of causing Cambodian casualties."¹¹

b. Hitchens notes with approval that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird sent "a memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff" during Operation Menu inquiring whether ""steps [were] being taken, on a continuing basis, to minimize the risk of striking Cambodian peoples and structures."" Hitchens asserts that "There is no evidence of Henry Kissinger... ever seeking even such modest assurances."¹²

**Fact:** In keeping with the policy outlined in the aforementioned memorandum, the United States sought to minimize damage to Cambodian peoples and structures in the North Vietnamese base areas. During the execution of Operation Menu,

¹⁰ JCSM-207-69, April 9, 1969, Appendix E, p. 27.

¹¹ JCSM-207-69, April 9, 1969, Appendix B, p. 8.

¹² Hitchens, p. 29.

4

Secretary of Defense Laird sought to confirm with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that these precautionary measures were still being observed. As National Security Advisor, Kissinger made similar requests, one of which Hitchens describes on pages 38-39 of *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*.

[Joint Chiefs of Staff B-52 specialist] Colonel [Ray] Sitton does recall, it must be admitted, that Kissinger requested that bombing avoid civilian casualties. His explicit motive in making this request was to avoid or forestall complaints from the government of Prince Sihanouk.¹³

c. Hitchens asserts, on the basis of the figures cited in the aforementioned Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, that Kissinger “slaughter[ed] large numbers of [Cambodian] civilians”¹⁴ during Operation Menu.

**Fact:** Nearly two months into the American bombing campaign, Cambodian Chief of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk addressed a press conference:

> Here it is – the first report about several B-52 bombings. Yet I have not been informed about that at all, because I have not lost any houses, any countrymen, nothing, nothing. Nobody was caught in those barrages – nobody, no Cambodians.

> I have not protested the bombings of Viet Cong camps because I have not heard of the bombings. I was not in the know, because in certain areas of Cambodia there are no Cambodians.

> That is what I want to tell you, gentlemen. If there is a buffalo or any Cambodians killed, I will be informed immediately. But this is an affair between the Americans and the Viet Cong – Viet Minh without any Khmer witnesses. There have been no Khmer witnesses, so how can I protest?¹⁵

### 3. Domestic Legal Authority for US Military Operations in Cambodia

a. Hitchens asserts that Kissinger “usurped the customary chain of command” during planning for Operation Menu. Hitchens cites as evidence a passage from Kissinger's memoirs in which Kissinger describes “work[ing] out the guidelines for the bombing of the enemy's sanctuaries.”¹⁶

**Fact:** On February 21, 1969, North Vietnam launched a nationwide offensive against South Vietnam. The next day, President Nixon embarked on a previously planned

¹³ Hitchens, pp 38-39.

¹⁴ Hitchens, p 37.

¹⁵ Prince Norodom Sihanouk, press conference in Phnom Penh, May 13, 1969. As quoted in Kissinger, *Ending the Vietnam War*, p 68.

¹⁶ Hitchens, p 37.

5

series of state visits to allied European capitals. President Nixon sought immediately
to begin preparations for the bombing of selected North Vietnamese military
installations in Cambodia. Yet the president could not, in his capacity as a visiting
Head of State, attend all the meetings necessary for planning this course of action.
Therefore, he designated as his representative White House Chief of Staff Robert
Haldeman. President Nixon ordered Haldeman, National Security Advisor
Kissinger, General Alexander Haig, and Colonel Ray Sitton, a B-52 expert at the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to meet in Brussels on February 24, 1969, to begin the first
round of preparations. At the end of the day, Haig and Sitton returned to
Washington, D.C. to brief Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. When President
Nixon returned to the United States, deliberations continued. The first B-52 strike
took place on March 18.

b. <u>Hitchens</u> charges that American air strikes against North Vietnamese installations in Cambodia "violate[d] the United States Constitution."

Fact: John Norton Moore, a renowned expert on national security law at the University of Virginia, furnishes the following legal analysis:

"[The] decision to intercede against the border base areas seems most appropriately characterized as a command decision incident to the conduct of the Viet-Nam War. As such, there is little doubt that President Nixon was acting within his Constitutional authority as Commander-in-chief....

"[Furthermore], the Southeast Asia Resolution [of 1964] lends substantial support to Presidential authority. The Southeast Asia Resolution, which is the principal Constitutional authorization for the Viet-Nam War, provides that:

[Sec. 1....] Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression....

Sec. 2.... the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

"In view of the continued use of Cambodian border sanctuaries in support of armed attacks launched against South Vietnamese and United States forces, the President would seem to have Congressional authorization under Section 1 of the Southeast Asia Resolution for limited actions directed against the sanctuaries.... Since Cambodia, like Viet-Nam, is a protocol state of SEATO, the language of Section 2 of the resolution

would, in the event of a request for assistance from Cambodia, also seem to
authorize a Presidential decision to take military action necessary to the
defense of Cambodia."¹⁷

4. War in Cambodia, 1970-1975

a. Hitchens faults the United States for "the actual territorial invasion of Cambodia" and asserts that Kissinger brought about "the expansion of the war."

*Fact:* On March 12, 1970, the Foreign Minister of Cambodia demanded the withdrawal of all Vietnamese communist troops from Cambodian territory within three days. When this deadline passed without any discernible change in the Vietnamese presence, the Foreign Minister requested a meeting with the Ambassador of North Vietnam and the Ambassador of the National Liberation Front. The day before this scheduled meeting, the two communist ambassadors left Cambodia. Two days later, on March 29, 1970, four divisions of the People's Army of [North] Vietnam (roughly 50,000 soldiers) invaded Cambodia and occupied the eastern third of the country. Within days the invasion force was 10 miles from the Cambodian capital Phnom Penh.¹⁸

One month after the North Vietnamese invasion, President Nixon ordered an "incursion" 22 miles across the Cambodian border into North Vietnamese-held territory. Participants in this incursion included American, South Vietnamese, and Cambodian government forces.¹⁹ These forces commandeered the following communist supplies, all evidence of a prior North Vietnamese "expansion of the war" into Cambodia:

* A total of 9,300 tons of weapons (both individual and crew-served), ammunition, and supplies;

* 32 cases of cryptographic equipment;

* Over 1 million pages of documents, including detailed plans for the overthrow of the Cambodian government.²⁰

¹⁷ John Norton Moore, "Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia," in Falk, ed., *The Vietnam War and International Law*, Volume 4, pp 83-84.

¹⁸ Deac, p 72.

¹⁹ Deac, p 77.

²⁰ Sorley, p 204; and Deac, p 79.

7

b. *Hitchens* asserts that at least "600,000" Cambodian "civilians" died "[a]s a result of the expanded and intensified bombing campaign" undertaken by the United States. Hitchens claims that "these are not the highest estimates."²¹

*Fact:* 600,000 to 700,000 is the generally accepted estimate of *total* Cambodian casualties, both military and civilian, incurred during the North Vietnamese invasion of March 1970, forced deportations of ethnic Vietnamese citizens, early Khmer Rouge massacres of "bourgeois" Cambodians, and the Cambodian general war of 1970-1975.²² One aspect of the war during these years was an expanded American bombing campaign in support of Cambodian government forces fighting North Vietnamese troops and their Khmer Rouge allies.

### 5. Cambodia and International Law

a. *Hitchens* charges that American "hot pursuit" of Vietnamese communists retreating to the Cambodian sanctuaries violated "all ... law and precedent." On this basis, Hitchens charges Kissinger with "the crime of aggressive war."²³

*Fact:* The Fifth Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the "Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land" stipulates:

*Article 2.* Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power....

*Article 4.* Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents.

*Article 5.* A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory.

If a neutral state is unwilling or unable to expel foreign military forces making use of its territory – as in the case of Cambodia and the Vietnamese communists – the customary law of war is as follows:

Should a violation of neutral territory occur through the complaisance of the neutral state, or because of its inability, through weakness or otherwise to resist such violation, then a belligerent which is prejudiced by the

²¹ Hitchens, p 35.

²² See, for instance, Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule*, Clodfelter, *Vietnam in Military Statistics*, and Tucker, ed., *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War*, "Cambodia."

²³ Hitchens, p 34.

8

violation is entitled to take measures to redress the situation, including, if
necessary, attack on enemy forces in the neutral territory.²⁴

b. <u>Hitchens</u> asserts that subsequent US operations in Cambodia “violat[ed] international law.”²⁵ Hitchens cites as alleged “crimes” the 1970 US incursion into North Vietnamese-held Cambodian territory, as well as the “expanded bombing campaign”²⁶ undertaken by the United States in support of Cambodian government forces.

*Fact:* Following the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia on March 29, 1970, the Government of Cambodia appealed to the United Nations Security Council for assistance against the “invading Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces.”²⁷ President Nixon subsequently ordered US aerial strikes in support of besieged Cambodian government forces, as well as limited ground operations to neutralize the communist sanctuaries along the Cambodia-South Vietnam border.

The day after President Nixon's televised address on these operations, the government of Cambodia issued a formal statement "express[ing] its gratitude for" the "aid of the United States of America in the defense of the neutrality of Cambodia, violated by the North Vietnamese." The Cambodian statement further emphasized that Cambodia would "accept all unconditional help from friendly countries in all forms (military, economic, and diplomatic)."²⁸ As American troops crossed over into Cambodia, the High Command of the Cambodian Armed Forces issued a communiqué calling the American operations "indispensable" in "driv[ing] these Vietcong and North Vietnamese aggressors from our territory."²⁹

²⁴ Greenspan, *The Modern Law of Land Warfare*, p 538.

²⁵ Hitchens, p 30.

²⁶ Hitchens, p 35.

²⁷ *New York Times*, April 23, 1970, p 4, column 5.

²⁸ *New York Times*, May 5, 1970, p 16, column 8.

²⁹ *New York Times*, May 6, 1970, p 18, column 2.

9

# Conflict in Portuguese Timor/East Timor

Drafted 10/14/03 by Sky Schouten

## Background:

Timor is an island in the southern part of the Indonesian archipelago, 430 km northwest of Australia. During the first half of the 18th century the Netherlands controlled the western half of Timor, and Portugal controlled the eastern half. West Timor was incorporated into the adjoining territories known as the Dutch East Indies, and East Timor was a Portuguese colony.

In 1949, all of the territories comprising the Dutch East Indies were reconstituted as the independent Republic of Indonesia. Included in these territories was the western half of the island of Timor; the eastern half remained under Portuguese administration. In 1974, the government of Portugal was overthrown, and the new government of Portugal declared a program of rapid decolonization.

Three main Timorese political parties now contended for control of East Timor. APODETI (Timorese Democratic People's Union) advocated integration with Indonesia. FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) advocated immediate independence. UDT (Democratic Union of East Timor) advocated eventual independence after a period of association with Portugal.¹

In June 1975, representatives of the government of Portugal, APODETI, and UDT held a series of talks in Macao to determine the political future of East Timor. FRETILIN boycotted these talks. In August a civil war broke out between the three Timorese factions, and the Portuguese colonial administration withdrew to the offshore enclave of Atauro.²

In a separate series of events, on April 30, 1975 Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam, fell to a North Vietnamese invasion force. On December 1, 1975 President Ford embarked on a series of official visits to China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

Shortly after President Ford's departure from Indonesia, the government of Indonesia deployed combat troops to East Timor and asserted sovereignty over the territory. For the next two and a half decades, the government of Indonesia attempted, through a combination of economic aid and military repression, to incorporate East Timor as an

¹ Krieger, ed., *East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents*, Introduction, p xix.

² Ibid., Section 2.4, "The Outbreak of Civil War in East Timor."

1

Indonesian province. These efforts failed, and in 1999 East Timor became an independent territory under partial United Nations administration.

# 1. President Ford's December 1975 Visit to Indonesia

a. Hitchens asserts that Kissinger "told newsmen in Jakarta that the United States would not recognize the FRETILIN-declared republic and that 'the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question.'"³ On this basis, Hitchens accuses Kissinger of "[t]he incitement and enabling of genocide in East Timor."⁴

**Fact:** On November 28, FRETILIN issued a unilateral declaration of independence.⁵ On November 30, UDT and APODETI responded with a joint declaration of independence and simultaneous integration with Indonesia.⁶ Neither faction was able to enforce its mandate entirely. Clashes between the rival parties continued, and thousands of refugees crossed over into Indonesian-administered West Timor. At this point, the government of Indonesia began preparations for a military occupation of East Timor.

On December 5, President Ford departed China and traveled to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. There he met with Indonesia's President Suharto. Talks between the two heads of state concerned bilateral aid, Indonesian economic policy, and South East Asian political and military affairs. At one point, President Suharto raised the topic of the civil war in East Timor. In keeping with the US government's decision to "eschew involvement in the Timor situation and leave its resolution to the Indonesians, Portuguese, Australians, and Timorese,"⁷ President Ford told President Suharto that the United States "will not press [Indonesia] on the issue."⁸

³ Hitchens, pp 91-92.

⁴ Hitchens, p x, "Proper Bill of Indictment."

⁵ Krieger, ed., p 39, Document 21.

⁶ Krieger, ed., p 40, Document 23.

⁷ Department of State Briefing Paper: "Indonesia and Portuguese Timor," November 21, 1975. Declassified 10/31/01.

⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford and President Suharto, December 6, 1975. Declassified 6/26/01.

2

## 2. US Military Aid to Indonesia

a. Hitchens asserts that since the United States government did not cut off military aid to Indonesia after the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, Kissinger is guilty of "involvement in the extirpation of the Timorese." Hitchens further asserts that the continuation of military aid to Indonesia "bent American laws"⁹ because the Indonesian army may have used some of this military equipment in East Timor. He cites as evidence a memorandum showing Kissinger arguing with his staff about this question.

*Fact:* Throughout the 1960s, '70s, and '80s the United States maintained a partnership with Indonesia based on Indonesia's status as a bulwark against communist expansion and as the site of some of the world's key shipping lanes. In September 1975, the government of Indonesia and the government of the United States concluded an agreement for continued US military aid to Indonesia. The projected American aid package consisted of helicopters, ships, and communications and radar equipment.¹⁰

Following the Indonesian occupation of East Timor in December 1975, several members of the US Department of State wondered whether the United States would be obliged to cut off military aid to Indonesia on the grounds that Indonesia was in the midst of conducting an offensive operation in East Timor. At the time, the government of Indonesia maintained that since the government of China (a traditional rival of Indonesia) had backed FRETILIN in the East Timor civil war, Indonesia's annexation of the territory was in fact a matter of self-defense. The United States government accepted this argument, and, after a brief cut-off, military aid to Indonesia was reinstated. This was also the policy of President Ford's successor President Carter, during whose administration the violence in East Timor reached its peak.

⁹ Hitchens, p 100.

¹⁰ Kissinger, talking points memorandum for President Ford, "Your Trip to Indonesia," November 1975, declassified 10/31/01.

3