[189]

Public Papers of the Presidents

April 16

VIETNAM CONFLICT

[5.] Q. Mr. President, in response to Mr. Kirkpatrick's [Clayton Kirkpatrick, Chicago Tribune] question, you mentioned our policy of détente in an affirmative way. The Chinese and Russian military aid to the North Vietnamese has been placed at approximately $1.5 billion. My question is, does that violate the spirit of détente, and if so, of what purpose is détente?

THE PRESIDENT. I think it is worthwhile to point out that none of the signa-
tories to the Paris accords have sought to enforce the violations (provisions)
of those accords, including, of course, the People's Republic of China and the
Soviet Union.

In the agreement that was signed in Paris in January of 1973, the United
States, as part of its agreement with South Vietnam, agreed to supply replace-
ment war materiel, to give economic aid. The Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China, I assume, made the same commitment to North Vietnam.

It appears that they have maintained that commitment. Unfortunately, the
United States did not carry out its commitment in the supplying of military
hardware and economic aid to South Vietnam.

I wish we had. I think if we had, this present tragic situation in South Viet-
nam would not have occurred.

But I don't think we can blame the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China in this case. If we had done with our ally what we promised, I think
this whole tragedy could have been eliminated.

But nevertheless, we hope to and are working through the countries that are
a part or were a part of the Paris accords to try and achieve a cease-fire, and will
continue to do so.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

[6.] Q. On that point, you have asked for more than $700 million worth of military aid. Now, there is some obvious psychological and symbolic reason for simply asking, but militarily speaking, if you could get the package through Congress and get it to South Vietnam, would it militarily do any good at this point?

THE PRESIDENT. I am absolutely convinced if Congress made available $722 million in military assistance in a timely way by the date that I have suggested—or sometime shortly thereafter—the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in South Vietnam today.

April 16

Q. Mr. President, we are getting
should the T

THE PRESIDENT, of state, as I
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THE PRESIDENT, circumstances, a
our relations wit

We have exceed
We value
continue to be concerned
it doesn't seem to
negotiations with
the Republic of China

498

U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding Strength Through Adversity

Following is an address by Secretary Kissinger made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 17, together with the transcript of a question-and-answer session after the address.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 204 dated April 17; as prepared for delivery

I am here to sound a note of hope about the future of our foreign policy despite the fact that we are now going through a period of adversity.

A nation facing setbacks can submerge itself in acrimony, looking for scapegoats rather than lessons. It can ignore or gloss over its difficulties and fatuously proceed as if nothing serious had happened.

Or it can examine its situation dispassionately, draw appropriate conclusions, and chart its future with realism and hope.

President Ford has chosen this latter course. A week ago he called upon Congress and the American people to turn this time of difficulty into a demonstration of spirit—to prove once again our devotion and our courage and to put these into the service of building a better world.

For the entire postwar period our strength and our leadership have been essential in preserving peace and promoting progress. If either falters, major shifts in political alignments will occur all around the world. The result will be new dangers for America's security and economic well-being. The Middle East war and oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated how distant events can threaten world peace and global prosperity simultaneously. A reduction of American influence

in key areas can have disastrous consequences.

How other nations perceive us is thus a matter of major consequence. Every day I see reports from our embassies relaying anguished questions raised by our friends. What do events in Indochina, the southern flank of NATO, and the Middle East signify for America's competence—constancy—credibility—coherence? How will Americans react? What are the implications for future American policy? We can be certain that potential adversaries are asking themselves the same questions—not with sympathy, but to estimate their opportunities.

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing to dangers produces a self-fulfilling prophesy, that the prediction of consequences brings them about. Unfortunately, life is not that simple. We cannot achieve credibility by rhetoric; we cannot manufacture coherence by proclamation; and we cannot change facts by not talking about them.

We can do little about the world's judgment of our past actions. But we have it within our power to take charge of our future: if the United States responds to adversity with dignity, if we make clear to the world that we continue to hold a coherent perception of a constructive international role and mean to implement it, we can usher in a new era of creativity and accomplishment. We intend to do just that.

I know that it is not easy for a people that faces major domestic difficulties to gear itself up for new international efforts. But our economic future is bound up with the rest of the world—and with international developments in energy, trade, and economic policy. Our economic health depends on the preservation of American leadership abroad.

This country has no choice. We must,

May 5, 1975

557

for our own sake, play a major role in world affairs. We have strong assets: a sound foreign policy design, major international achievements in recent years, and the enormous capacities of an industrious and gifted people. We have the resources, and the will, to turn adversity into opportunity.

## Indochina

Let me start with our most tragic and immediate problem.

I can add nothing to the President's request for military and humanitarian assistance for the anguished people of South Viet-Nam. I support this appeal and have testified at length to that effect before congressional committees over the past several days.

The time will come when it will be clear that no President could do less than to ask aid for those whom we encouraged to defend their independence and at whose side we fought for over a decade. Then Americans will be glad that they had a President who refused to abandon those who desperately sought help in an hour of travail.

In Indochina our nation undertook a major enterprise for almost 15 years. We invested enormous prestige; tens of thousands died, and many more were wounded, imprisoned, and lost; we spent over $150 billion; and our domestic fabric was severely strained. Whether or not this enterprise was well conceived does not now change the nature of our problem. When such an effort founders, it is an event of profound significance—for ourselves and for others.

I, for one, do not believe that it was ignoble to have sought to preserve the independence of a small and brave people. Only a very idealistic nation could have persevered in the face of so much discouragement.

But where so many think that the war was a dreadful mistake, where thousands grieve for those they loved and others sorrow over their country's setback, there has been sufficient heartache for all to share.

The Viet-Nam debate has now run its course. The time has come for restraint and compassion. The Administration has made

its case. Let all now abide by the verdict of the Congress—without recrimination or vindictiveness.

## The Design

Let us therefore look to the future. We start with a sound foreign policy structure.

We are convinced that a continuing strong American role is indispensable to global stability and progress. Therefore the central thrust of our foreign policy has been to adjust our role in the world and the conceptions, methods, and commitments which define it to the conditions of a new era—including an America fatigued by Indochina.

The postwar order of international relations ended with the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the passage of that era, but the cumulative change by the end of the 1960's was profound. Gone was the rigid bipolar confrontation of the cold war. In its place was a more fluid and complex world—with many centers of power, more subtle dangers, and new hopeful opportunities. Western Europe and Japan were stronger and more self-confident; our alliances needed to be adjusted toward a more equal partnership. The Communist world had fragmented over doctrine and national interests; there were promising prospects for more stable relations based on restraint and negotiation. And many of our friends in other parts of the globe were now better prepared to shoulder responsibility for their security and well-being, but they needed our assistance during the period of transition.

At home, the American people and Congress were weary from two decades of global exertion and years of domestic turmoil. They were not prepared for confrontation unless all avenues toward peace had been explored.

The challenge for our foreign policy has been to define an effective but more balanced U.S. role in the world, reducing excessive commitments without swinging toward pre-cipitate and dangerous withdrawal.

We have come a long way.

Our major allies in the Atlantic world and Japan have grown in strength politically and economically; our alliances are firm anchors

558

Department of State Bulletin

of world security, the basis for unprecedented to energy.

We have launched with Latin America with Africa.

We have taken and improve our adversaries. We have opened dialogue, major agreements.

We have begun the rival strategies unconstrained, When the Vladivostok completed, a ceiling the first time on nals of the super-

We have helped political conflicts Berlin and the N

And we have to mobilize the entire global challenge environment, and

In all these areas frequently been stands; our respect for every prospect for every reason for

## The Domestic Dim

If this be true of our problem? the signs of improvement and the Congress ourselves together

Setbacks are being made which no nation can control. The peculiar problems is that the Domestic division caused difficulties of NATO to the Mediterranean to per-powers.

Paradoxically, it

May 5, 1975

world security and prosperity. They are the basis for close cooperation on a range of unprecedented new problems, from détente energy.

We have launched a hopeful new dialogue with Latin America.

We are looking to a new era of relations with Africa.

We have taken historic steps to stabilize and improve our relations with our major adversaries. We have reduced tensions, deepened dialogue, and reached a number of major agreements.

We have begun the process of controlling the rival strategic arms programs which, unconstrained, threaten global security. When the Vladivostok agreement is completed, a ceiling will have been placed for the first time on the level of strategic arsenals of the superpowers.

We have helped to ease longstanding political conflicts in such sensitive areas as Berlin and the Middle East.

And we have taken the major initiatives to mobilize the international response to new global challenges such as energy, food, the environment, and the law of the sea.

In all these areas the American role has frequently been decisive. The design still stands; our responsibilities remain. There is every prospect for major progress. There is every reason for confidence.

## The Domestic Dimension

If this be true, what then is the cause of our problem? Why the setbacks? Why the signs of impasse between the executive and the Congress? What must we do to pull ourselves together?

Setbacks are bound to occur in a world which no nation alone can dominate or control. The peculiar aspect of many of our problems is that they are of our own making. Domestic division has either compounded or caused difficulties from the southern flank of NATO to the Pacific, from the eastern Mediterranean to relations between the superpowers.

Paradoxically, herein resides a cause for

optimism. For to the extent that the causes of our difficulties are within ourselves, so are the remedies.

The American people expect an effective foreign policy which preserves the peace and furthers our national interests. They want their leaders to shape the future, not just manage the present. This requires boldness, direction, nuance, and—above all—confidence between the public and the government and between the executive and the legislative branches of the government. But precisely this mutual confidence has been eroding over the past decade.

There are many causes for this state of affairs. Some afflict democracies everywhere; some are unique to America's tradition and recent history. Modern democracies are besieged by social, economic, and political challenges that cut across national boundaries and lie at the margin of governments' ability to control. The energies of leaders are too often consumed by the management of bureaucracy, which turns questions of public purpose into issues for institutional bargaining. Instant communications force the pace of events and of expectations. Perfusion, the essential method of democracy, becomes extraordinarily difficult in an era where issues are complex and outcomes uncertain. A premium is placed on simplification—an invitation to demagogues. Too often, the result is a disaffection that simultaneously debunks government and drains it of the very confidence that a democracy needs to act with conviction.

All of this has compounded the complex problem of executive-legislative relations. In every country, the authority of the modern state seems frustratingly impersonal or remote from those whose lives it increasingly affects; in nearly every democracy, executive authority is challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Issues become so technical that legislative oversight becomes increasingly difficult just as the issues become increasingly vital. The very essence of problem-solving on domestic issues—accommodation of special interests—robs foreign policy of consistency and focus

May 5, 1975

559

when applied to our dealings with other nations.

Statesmen must act, even when premises
cannot be proved; they must decide, even
when intangibles will determine the out-
come. Yet predictions are impossible to
prove; consequences avoided are never evi-
dent. Skepticism and suspicion thus become
a way of life and infect the atmosphere of
executive-legislative debate; reasoned argu-
ments are overwhelmed by a series of con-
frontations on peripheral issues.

America faces as well the problem of its
new generation. The gulf between their his-
torical experience and ours is enormous.
They have been traumatized by Viet-Nam as
we were by Munich. Their nightmare is
foreign commitment as ours was abdication
from international responsibility. It is pos-
sible that both generations learned their
lessons too well. The young take for granted
the great postwar achievements in restoring
Europe, building peacetime alliances, and
maintaining global prosperity. An imper-
sonal, technological, bureaucratized world
provides them too few incentives for dedica-
tion and idealism.

Let us remember that America's commitment to international involvement has always been ambivalent—even while our doubts were being temporarily submerged by the exertions of World War II and the postwar era. The roots of isolationism, nourished by geography and history, go deep in the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in foreign conflicts, the belief that we somehow defile ourselves if we engage in “power politics” and balances of power, the sense that foreign policy is a form of Old World imperialism, the notion that weapons are the causes of conflict, the belief that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement—all these were familiar characteristics of the American isolationism of the twenties and thirties. We took our power for granted, attributed our successes to virtue, and blamed our failures on the evil of others. We disparaged means. In our foreign involvement we have oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, be-

tween crusading and retreats into self-doubt.

Following the Second World War a broad spectrum of civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen, clergy, the media, congressional and national leaders of both parties led American public opinion to a new internationalist consensus. Taught by them and experience of the war, the nation understood that we best secured our domestic tranquillity and prosperity by enlightened participation and leadership in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies was not a price to be paid, but a service to be rendered to international stability and therefore to our self-interest.

But in the last decade, as a consequence
of Indochina and other frustrations of global
engagement, some of our earlier impulses
have reasserted themselves. Leadership opin-
ion has, to an alarming degree, turned sharp-
ly against many of the internationalist
premises of the postwar period. We now
hear, and have for several years, that suffer-
ing is prolonged by American involvement,
that injustice is perpetuated by American
inaction, that defense spending is wasteful
at best and produces conflict at worse, that
American intelligence activities are immoral,
that the necessary confidentiality of diplo-
macy is a plot to deceive the public, that
flexibility is cynical and amoral—and that
tranquillity is somehow to be brought about
by an abstract purity of motive for which
history offers no example.

This has a profound—and inevitable—impact on the national mood and on the national consensus regarding foreign policy. In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the world, in the nation that is certainly the most secure in the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and pluralist democracy, we find a deep and chronic self-doubt, especially in the large urban centers and among presumptive leaders.

Will the American people support a re-
sponsible and active American foreign policy
in these conditions? I deeply believe that
they will—if their leaders, in and out of
government, give them a sense that they have

something to
important to a

When one
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Where Do We Go

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safety. In the e
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now depends cru-
ness, our persever

560

Department of State Bulletin

May 5, 1975

something to be proud of and something important to accomplish.

When one ventures away from Washington into the heart of America, one is struck by the confidence, the buoyancy, and the lack of any corrosive cynicism. We who sit at what my friend Stewart Alsop, a great journalist, once called "the center" tend to dwell too much on our problems; we dissect in overly exquisite detail our difficulties and our disputes.

I find it remarkable that two-thirds of the Americans interviewed in a nationwide poll in December, at a time of severe recession, still thought an active role in the world served their country's interests better than withdrawal. Even as other nations are closely watching the way we act in Washington, I suspect they marvel at the resiliency of our people and our institutions.

There is a great reservoir of confidence within America. We have the values, the means, and we bear the responsibility to strive for a safer and better world. And there is a great reservoir of confidence around the globe in this country's values and strength.

## Where Do We Go From Here?

So, let us learn the right lessons from today's trials.

We shall have to pay the price for our setbacks in Indochina by increasing our exertions. We no longer have the margin of safety. In the era of American predominance, America's preferences held great sway. We could overwhelm our problems with our resources. We had little need to resort to the style of nations conducting foreign policy with limited means: patience, subtlety, flexibility. Today, disarray, abdication of responsibility, or shortsightedness exact a price that may prove beyond our means.

We are still the largest single factor in international affairs, but we are one nation among many. The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our purposeful-ness, our perseverance, our creativity, our

power, and our perceived reliability. We shall have to work harder to establish the coherence and constancy of our policy—and we shall.

We must give up the illusion that foreign policy can choose between morality and pragmatism. America cannot be true to itself unless it upholds humane values and the dignity of the individual. But equally it cannot realize its values unless it is secure. No nation has a monopoly of justice or virtue, and none has the capacity to enforce its own conceptions globally. In the nuclear age especially, diplomacy—like democracy—often involves the compromise of clashing principles. I need not remind you that there are some 140 nations in the world, of which only a bare handful subscribe to our values.

Abstract moralism can easily turn into retreat from painful choices or endless interference in the domestic affairs of others; strict pragmatism, on the other hand, robs policy of vision and heart. Principles without security spell impotence; security without principles means irrelevance. The American people must never forget that our strength gives force to our principles and our principles give purpose to our strength.

Let us understand, too, the nature of our commitments. We have an obligation of steadfastness simply by virtue of our position as a great power upon which many others depend. Thus our actions and policies over time embody their own commitment whether or not they are enshrined in legal documents. Indeed, our actions and the perception of them by other countries may represent our most important commitments.

At the same time, diplomacy must be permitted a degree of confidentiality, or most serious exchange with other governments is destroyed. To focus the national debate on so-called secret agreements which no party has ever sought to implement and whose alleged subject matter has been prohibited by law for two years is to indulge what Mencken called the "national appetite for bogus revelation." It goes without saying that a commitment involving national action must be known to the Congress or it is meaningless.

May 5, 1975

561

One lesson we must surely learn from Viet-Nam is that new commitments of our nation's honor and prestige must be carefully weighed. As Walter Lippmann observed, "In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance." But after our recent experiences we have a special obligation to make certain that commitments we have made will be rigorously kept and that this is understood by all concerned. Let no ally doubt our steadfastness. Let no nation ever believe again that it can tear up with impunity a solemn agreement signed with the United States.

We must continue our policy of seeking to ease tensions. But we shall insist that the easing of tensions cannot occur selectively. We shall not forget who supplied the arms which North Viet-Nam used to make a mockery of its signature on the Paris accords.

Nor can we overlook the melancholy fact that not one of the other signatories of the Paris accords has responded to our repeated requests that they at least point out North Viet-Nam's flagrant violations of these agreements. Such silence can only undermine any meaningful standards of international responsibility.

At home, a great responsibility rests upon all of us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative branches is the only possible basis for national action. The decade-long struggle in this country over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that the Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today.

The executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise. The question is whether the Congress will go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of tactics; whether it will deprive the executive of discretion and authority in the conduct of diplomacy while at the same time remaining institutionally incapable of formulating or carrying out a clear national policy of its own.

The effective performance of our constitutional system has always rested on the restrained exercise of the powers and rights conferred by it. At this moment in our history there is a grave national imperative for a spirit of cooperation and humility between the two branches of our government.

Cooperation must be a two-way street. Just as the executive has an obligation to re-examine and then to explain its policies, so the Congress should reconsider the actions which have paralyzed our policies in the eastern Mediterranean, weakened our hand in relations with the U.S.S.R., and inhibited our dialogue in this hemisphere. Foreign policy must have continuity. If it becomes partisan, paralysis results. Problems are passed on to the future under progressively worse conditions.

When other countries look to the United States, they see one nation. When they look to Washington, they see one government. They judge us as a unit—not as a series of unrelated or uncoordinated institutions. If we cannot agree among ourselves, there is little hope that we can negotiate effectively with those abroad.

So one of the most important lessons to be drawn from recent events is the need to restore the civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years of the Viet-Nam debate rational dialogue has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have been called into question. Not only policy but character has been attacked. What began as consensus progressively deteriorated into poisonous contention.

Leaders in government must do their share. The Administration, following the President's example, will strive for moderation and mutual respect in the national dialogue. We know that if we ask for public confidence we must keep faith with the people.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But it can elevate the nation only if conducted with restraint.

The American people yearn for an end to the bitterness and divisiveness of the past

562

Department of State Bulletin

decade. Our d
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You, in this a
position to con
nation.

The Coming Ag

Ralph Waldo
man ever comp
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Our resources
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May 5, 1975

decade. Our domestic stability requires it. Our international responsibilities impose it.

You, in this audience, are today in a unique position to contribute to the healing of the nation.

## The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever complains a want of opportunity." Neither does a great nation.

Our resources are vast; our leadership is essential; our opportunities are unprecedented and insistent.

The challenges of the coming decades will dwarf today's disputes. A new world order is taking shape around us. It will engulf us or isolate us if we do not act boldly. We cannot consume ourselves in self-destruction. We have great responsibilities:

- We must maintain the vigor of the great democratic alliances. They can provide the anchor of shared values and purposes as we grapple with a radically new agenda.

- We must overcome the current economic and energy crisis. A domestic energy program is thus an urgent national priority. Looking ahead, we envisage a fundamental-ly reformed international economic system, a Bretton Woods for the 1980's and beyond.

- We must stand up for what we believe in international forums, including the United Nations, and resist the politics of resent-ment, of confrontation, and stale ideology. International collaboration has a more vital role now than ever, but so has mutual respect among nations.

- We must meet our continuing responsi-bility for peace in many regions of the world, especially where we uniquely have the confidence of both sides and where failure could spell disaster beyond the confines of the region, as in the Middle East. We will not be pushed by threats of war or economic pressure into giving up vital interests. But equally, we will not, in the President's words, "accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity."¹

- We must stop the spiral, and the spread, of nuclear weapons. We can then move on

to a more ambitious agenda: mutual reductions in strategic arms, control of other weaponry, military restraint in other environments.

- We must overcome two scourges of man-kind: famine and the vagaries of nature. We reaffirm the food program announced at the World Food Conference last November. Our fundamental challenge is to help others feed themselves so that no child goes to bed hungry in the year 2000.

- We must continue to reduce conflict and tensions with our adversaries. Over time, we hope that vigilance and conciliation will lead to more positive relationships and ultimately a true global community.

- We must insure that the oceans and space become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. We can then leave to future generations vast economic and technological resources to enrich life on this earth.

Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role in the new order which is taking form around us. In an era of turbulence, uncertainty, and conflict, the world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized for generations man's conquest of nature, so too has America—with its banner of progress and freedom—symbolized man's mastery over his own future.

For the better part of two centuries our forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively weak country, met adversity with courage and imagination. In the course of their struggle they built the freest, richest, and most powerful nation the world has ever known. As we, their heirs, take America into its third century, as we take up the unprecedented agenda of the modern world, we are determined to rediscover the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our country.

We have come of age, and we shall do our duty.

¹ For President Ford's address before a joint session of the Congress on Apr. 10, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1975, p. 529.

May 5, 1975

Bulletin

563

[204]

April 21

U.S. MARINES IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

[1.] MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, just this moment as we came on the air, I was surprised over this little machine here that the Associated Press and the United Press International are reporting from Honolulu that a large number of battle-equipped Marines, 800 or so, have left Hawaii by air on chartered aircraft. Can you tell us what their destination is and what's up?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, that is part of a movement to strengthen, or to bring up to strength, the Marine detachment in that area of the Pacific. It is not an unusual military movement. On the other hand, we felt, under the circumstances, that it was wise to bring the Marine group in that area of the world—the South Pacific—up to strength.

MR. CRONKITE. Can you tell us where they are going, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, they're going—I don't think I should be any more definitive than that.

MR. CRONKITE. They are not going directly to Saigon are they?

THE PRESIDENT. No, they are not.

VIETNAM CONFLICT

[2.] MR. CRONKITE. Now that President Thieu has resigned, which was the big news of this morning, of course, are we involved in or are we acting as intermediary in any negotiations for a peaceful settlement out there?

The PRESIDENT. We are exploring with a number of governments negotiating opportunities. But in this very rapid change, with President Thieu stepping down, there really hasn't been an opportunity for us to make contact with a new government. And the net result is we are planning to explore with them, and with other governments in that area or connected with that area, so that we don't miss any opportunity to try and get a cease-fire.

MR. SEVAREID. Mr. President, what is your own estimate of the situation now? Do you think that the Hanoi people want to negotiate the turnover of the city, a peaceful turnover, or just drive ahead?

THE PRESIDENT. Eric, I wish I knew. I don't think anybody can be absolutely certain, except the North Vietnamese themselves.

You get the impression that in the last few days they were anxious to move in very quickly for a quick takeover. On the other hand, within the last 12, 24 hours, there seems to be a slowdown. It is not certain from what we see, just what their tactic will be. We naturally hope that there is a period when the

April 21

fighting will cease negotiations might

But it is so fluid, North Vietnamese

MR. SEVAREID. All parties or otherwise

THE PRESIDENT. can't tell you whether I don't know.

MR. SEVAREID. For reasons was America

THE PRESIDENT. Thieu step down that regard.

There may have been President Thieu, to step down, and

MR. SEVAREID. your authority on

THE PRESIDENT. anybody to ask him he should or should not relinquish his role.

After all, he was properly chosen, own.

MR. SCHIEFFER. that something namese could be

Do you think namese oppose it in any kind of no arrangement like

THE PRESIDENT. military effort, in spite of U.S. mil-

On the other disappointment

540

April 21

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[204]

fighting will cease or the military activity will become less intense so that negotiations might be undertaken or even a cease-fire achieved.

But it is so fluid right now, I don't think anybody can be certain what the North Vietnamese are going to do.

MR. SEVAREID. Are they communicating with our Government through third parties or otherwise?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have communications with other governments. I can't tell you whether the North Vietnamese are communicating with them or not. I don't know.

MR. SEVAREID. President Thieu, when he stepped down, said that one of the reasons was American pressure. What was our role in his resignation?

THE PRESIDENT. Our Government made no direct request that President Thieu step down. There was no pressure by me or anyone in Washington in that regard.

There may have been some on the scene in Saigon who may have talked to President Thieu. But there was no pressure from here to force President Thieu to step down, and he made, I am sure, the final decision all on his own.

MR. SEVAREID. But surely our representatives there would not speak without your authority on this matter?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it is a question of how you phrase it. We never asked anybody to ask him to step down. There were discussions as to whether or not he should or shouldn't, but there was no direct request from me for him to relinquish his role as the head of state.

After all, he was an elected President. He was the head of that government, properly chosen, so his decision, as far as we know, was made totally on his own.

MR. SCHIEFFER. Mr. President, on the evacuation, you have expressed hope that something could be arranged so tens of thousands of loyal South Vietnamese could be brought out of the country.

Do you think it is possible to have something like that if the North Vietnamese oppose it or if the Vietcong are not willing to go along with it? Are any kind of negotiations underway now to try to set up some sort of an arrangement like that?

THE PRESIDENT. I would agree with you that if the North Vietnamese make a military effort, it would be virtually impossible to do so unless we moved in substantial U.S. military personnel to protect the evacuation.

On the other hand, if the South Vietnamese should make it difficult, in their disappointment that our support hadn't been as much as they thought it should

541

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April 21

be, their involvement would make it virtually impossible—again, without a sizable U.S. military commitment. That is one reason why we want a cease-fire. That is why we want the military operation stopped so that we can certainly get all the Americans out without any trouble and, hopefully, those South Vietnamese that we feel a special obligation to.

But at the moment, it does not appear that that is possible. We intend to keep working on it because we feel it is the humane and the proper thing to do.

MR. SCHIEFFER. What if it is not possible? Then what do you do? Do you ask the Congress to let you send those troops in there, American troops to protect the withdrawal? Do you send them in without Congressional approval? What do you do next?

THE PRESIDENT. As you know, I have asked the Congress to clarify my authority as President to send American troops in to bring about the evacuation of friendly South Vietnamese or South Vietnamese that we have an obligation to, or at least I think we do.

There is no problem in sending U.S. military personnel in to South Vietnam to evacuate Americans. That is permitted under the War Powers Act, providing we give adequate prenotification to the Congress.

That is what we did in the case of Phnom Penh in our personnel there. But if we are going to have a sizable evacuation of South Vietnamese, I would think the Congress ought to clarify the law and give me specific authority. Whether they will or not, I can't tell you at this point.

MR. SCHIEFFER. Now, if you do send them in and if Congress gives you the authority, they will have to have air power. It will have to be a sizable commitment. They will almost have to have just an open-ended authority in order to protect themselves. That is what you are asking for, isn't it?

THE PRESIDENT. Unless the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese have a cease-fire, and then the evacuation of those South Vietnamese could be done very easily.

Now, if there is a military conflict still going on, or if either one side or the other shows displeasure about this, and if we decided to do it—there are a number of "ifs" in that—yes, there would have to be some fairly sizable U.S., on a short-term, very precise, military involvement, not on a broad scale, of course.

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, when did you last talk to President Thieu?

THE PRESIDENT. I have not personally talked to President Thieu since I became President. I have had a number of exchanges of correspondence with him, but the last time I talked to him was when he was in the United States and I was minority leader, and that was roughly 2 years ago, as I recollect.

April 21

MR. CRONKITE. My adversary, the moment they

THE PRESIDENT. Our Secretary of War, in communication with me in this situation, has said that we shall have a former President.

MR. CRONKITE. He had talked with me.

THE PRESIDENT. I have said that I will be another. I think so, and as a whole, I think so.

MR. SEVARD. He had led the reply to that

THE PRESIDENT. I have said that I will be a commitment to Vietnam. I will be a Vietnam Government for one basis that we as a country that we are a country that we are a Paris in January.

Now, unfortunately from the agreements that

So, we were the replacement in the understanding that he went through.

MR. SEVARD. The question of him in this pullback is terribly important.

THE PRESIDENT. Precise—but

542

11 21

April 21

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[204]

MR. CRONKITE. Gracious, we have this hotline with a potential great power adversary, the Soviet Union, and yet with an ally who is in dire straits at this moment there is no communication between the Presidents. It seems strange.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, there is very good communication between myself, our Secretary of State, and our Ambassador there. So, there is no lack of communication, in and through proper channels. I don't think it is essential in this situation that there be a direct communication between myself and former President Thieu.

MR. CRONKITE. Might it help solve some of the misunderstandings if you had talked directly to him?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think so. We have had communications back and forth, both by message as well as by correspondence. I think we understood one another. I think some of his comments were more directed at our Government as a whole than directed at me personally.

MR. SEVAREID. Mr. President, one of his comments was that the United States had led the South Vietnamese people to their deaths. Do you have any specific reply to that one?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, there were some public and corresponding private commitments made in 1972-1973 where I think that the President of South Vietnam could have come to the conclusion, as he did, that the United States Government would do two things: one, replace military hardware on a one-for-one basis, keep his military strength sufficiently high so that he could meet any of the challenges of the North; and in addition, there was a commitment that we as a nation would try to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris in January 1973.

Now, unfortunately, the Congress in August of 1973 removed the latter, took away from the President the power to move in a military way to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris.

So, we were left then only with the other commitment, and unfortunately, the replacement of military hardware was not lived up to. I, therefore, can understand President Thieu's disappointment in the rather traumatic times that he went through in the last week. I can understand his observations.

MR. SEVAREID. Well, what is the relative weight that you assign to, first, this question of how much aid we sent or didn't send, and his use of it, especially in this pullback? Now, where is the greater mistake, because historically this is terribly important.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, it is my judgment—history will be probably more precise—but it is my judgment at the moment that the failure of the Congress

543

[204]

April 21

to appropriate the military aid requested—the previous administration asked for $1,400 million for this fiscal year; Congress authorized $1 billion; Congress appropriated $700 million; and the failure to make the commitment for this fiscal year of something close to what was asked for certainly raised doubts in the mind of President Thieu and his military that we would be supplying sufficient military hardware for them to adequately defend their various positions in South Vietnam.

Now, the lack of support certainly had an impact on the decision that President Thieu made to withdraw precipitously. I don't think he would have withdrawn if the support had been there. It wasn't there, so he decided to withdraw.

Unfortunately, the withdrawal was hastily done, inadequately prepared, and consequently was a chaotic withdrawal of the forces from Military Regions I, II, and III.

Now, how you place the blame, what percentage our failure to supply the arms, what percentage related to a hastily and inadequately prepared withdrawal—the experts, after they study the records, probably can give you a better assessment. But the initial kickoff came for the withdrawal from the failure of our Government to adequately support the military request for help.

MR. SCHIEFFER. Mr. President, what I don't understand is, if they are saying we have got to leave because the United States is not going to give us some more equipment, why did they leave all the equipment up there that they had? Why did they abandon so much of that equipment?

THE PRESIDENT. As I was saying, the withdrawal was very poorly planned and hastily determined. I am not an Army man. I was in the Navy. But I have talked to a good many Army and Marine Corps experts, and they tell me that a withdrawal, military withdrawal is the most difficult maneuver to execute, and this decision by President Thieu was hastily done without adequate preparation, and it in effect became a rout.

When you are in a panicky state of mind, inevitably you are going to leave a lot of military hardware. It is tragic. There is no excuse for that kind of a military operation, but even though that happened, if they had been given the military aid that General Weyand recommended during the last month, I am convinced that, with that additional military hardware on time, there could have been a stabilization of the situation which, in my judgment, would have led more quickly to a cease-fire.

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, you have said that you were not advised of this withdrawal of President Thieu's. Are you certain, however, that none of the

April 21

American military that a limited to vote these that decision

THE PRESIDENT, any, certainly decision.

MR. SEVAREN and there will be wisest to President Thieu accords?

THE PRESIDENT. The personal corresponds with in this atmosphere personal cor

Maybe history will show that we are right, but if we estimate the state of the world will be to be very frank that such a course of state try to

MR. SEVAREN, what he is doing, is planning it?

THE PRESIDENT.

MR. SEVAREN, the purpose of this course of action for that?

THE PRESIDENT, it, it seems to me, as I said in my statement.

Now, unless it is to be frank if it is to be effective, I think we

solve these problems for this country.

544

April 21

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[204]

American military or diplomatic advisers out in Saigon did not agree with him that a limited withdrawal might be effective in bringing pressure on Congress to vote these funds and that, therefore, there was an American participation in that decision?

**THE PRESIDENT.** As far as I know, Walter, there was no prenotification to any, certainly high-ranking, U.S. military or civilian official of the withdrawal decision.

**MR. SEVAREID.** Mr. President, this whole affair is going to be argued over, and there will be vast books on it for years and years and years. Now, wouldn't it be wisest to publish the correspondence between former President Nixon and President Thieu, which is disputed now, the 1973 correspondence after the Paris accords?

**THE PRESIDENT.** In the first place, I have personally read the correspondence. The personal correspondence between President Nixon and President Thieu corresponds with the public record. I have personally verified that. I don't thank in this atmosphere it would be wise to establish the precedent of publishing the personal correspondence between heads of state.

Maybe historically, after a period of time, it might be possible in this instance. But if we establish a precedent for the publication of correspondence between heads of state, I don't think that that correspondence or that kind of correspondence will be effective, because heads of state—I have learned firsthand—have to be very frank in their exchanges with one another, and to establish a precedent that such correspondence would be public, I think, will downgrade what heads of state try to do in order to solve problems.

**MR. SEVAREID.** Of course, there is no way to keep President Thieu from publishing it?

**THE PRESIDENT.** No.

**MR. SEVAREID.** Things like this have been judiciously leaked when it served the purpose of the President or the Secretary of State. You have no such plans for that?

**THE PRESIDENT.** No, I have no such plans. I think, and to be very frank about it, it seems to me that the American people today are yearning for a new start. As I said in my state of the world address to the Congress, let's start afresh.

Now, unless I am pressed, I don't say the Congress did this or did that. I have to be frank if I am asked the categorical question.

I think we ought to turn back the past and take a long look at how we can solve these problems affirmatively in the future. Vietnam has been a trauma for this country for 15 years or more. A lot of blame can be shared by a good

545

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April 21

many people—Democrats as well as Republicans, Congress as well as Presidents.

We have got some big jobs to do in other parts of the world. We have treaty commitments to keep. We have relations with adversaries or potential adversaries that we should be concerned about. It is my judgment, under these circumstances, we should look ahead and not concentrate on the problems of the past where a good bit of blame can be shared by many.

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, Vice President Rockefeller suggested that he thinks this would be an issue in the 1976 campaign. Will you make it an issue in 1976 or will you try to keep it out of the campaign?

THE PRESIDENT. I will not make it a campaign issue in 1976.

MR. SCHIEFFER. Well, will Mr. Rockefeller? I didn't quite understand what he was driving at in that recent interview when he said, you know, if two or three thousand Americans die in this evacuation, that raises some issues.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, of course, the record—whatever a man in public office says—can be, in and of itself, a campaign issue. But I can speak only for myself. And I do not intend to go out and point the finger or make a speech concerning those who have differed with me who I might privately think contributed to the problem.

By 1976, I would hope we could look forward with some progress in the field of foreign policy. I think we have got some potential successes that will be very much possible as we look ahead.

So, rather than to replay the past with all the division and divisive feelings between good people in this country, I just hope we can admit we made some mistakes—not try to assess the blame—but decide how we can solve the problems that are on our doorstep. And we have a few, but they are solvable if we stick together, if we have a high degree of American unity.

MR. CRONKITE. Well, there is not much trouble leaving the Vietnam issue as the Nation has had in leaving Vietnam here tonight, but I would like to ask just one more. Have you talked to former President Nixon about any aspect of this Vietnam thing in the last few weeks?

THE PRESIDENT. After my state of the world speech April 10, he called me, congratulated me on it. We discussed what I had said. It was a rather short, but a very friendly chat on the telephone.

MR. CRONKITE. Any talk about secret agreements?

THE PRESIDENT. As I recall the conversation, he reiterated what I have said: that the public record corresponds with the private correspondence in reference to the commitments, moral or legal or otherwise.

[3.] I speculating your own the shade speech, or

THE PRESIDENT the problem did want that we were between O and P.

It was my own to try and who has that.

MR. SEVING have been Henry Kissinger.

THE PRESIDENT frankly.

The Nation make—SA, Security Council of the CIA to me in op-

Now, I think it is important in the various the actual National Security

MR. SEVING from some of them opposed?

THE PRESIDENT our discussion, preparing for individual o-

546

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 29

4/29/75

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the Old Executive Office Building on April 29.

Press release 220 dated April 29

Mr. Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford]: The briefing was delayed until the evacuation was completed, and the last helicopters are now in the air. I would like to read a statement by the President.

[At this point Mr. Nessen read a statement by President Ford, the text of which follows.]

"During the past week, I had ordered the reduction of American personnel in the U.S. Mission in Saigon to levels that could be quickly evacuated during an emergency, while enabling that mission to continue to fulfill its duties.

"During the day on Monday, Washington time, the airport at Saigon came under persistent rocket, as well as artillery, fire and was effectively closed. The military situation in the area deteriorated rapidly.

"I therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South Viet-Nam.

"The evacuation has been completed. I recommend the personnel of the Armed Forces who accomplished it, as well as Ambassador Graham Martin and the staff of his mission, who served so well under difficult conditions.

"This action closes a chapter in the American experience. I ask all Americans to close ranks, to avoid recrimination about the past, to look ahead to the many goals we share, and to work together on the great tasks that remain to be accomplished."

Copies of this statement will be available as you leave the briefing.

Now, to give you details of the events of the past few days and to answer your

questions, Secretary of State Kissinger.

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and Gentlemen, when the President spoke before the Congress [April 10], he stated as our objective the stabilization of the situation in Viet-Nam.

We made clear at that time, as well as before many congressional hearings, that our purpose was to bring about the most controlled and the most humane solution that was possible and that these objectives required the course which the President had set.

Our priorities were as follows: We sought to save the American lives still in Viet-Nam. We tried to rescue as many South Vietnamese that had worked with the United States for 15 years in reliance on our commitments as we possibly could. And we sought to bring about as humane an outcome as was achievable under the conditions that existed.

Over the past two weeks, the American personnel in Viet-Nam have been progressively reduced. Our objective was to reduce at a rate that was significant enough so that we would finally be able to evacuate rapidly but which would not produce a panic which might prevent anybody from getting out.

Our objective was also to fulfill the human obligation which we felt to the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese who had worked with us for over a decade.

Finally, we sought, through various intermediaries, to bring about as humane a political evolution as we could.

By Sunday evening [April 27], the personnel in our mission had been reduced to 950 and there were 8,000 South Vietnamese to be considered in a particularly high-risk category—between 5,000 and 8,000. We do not know the exact number.

On Monday evening, Washington time,

May 19, 1975

625

around 5 o'clock, which was Tuesday morning in Saigon, the airport in Tan Son Nhut was rocketed and received artillery fire.

The President called an NSC [National Security Council] meeting. He decided that if the shelling stopped by dawn Saigon time, we would attempt to operate with fixed-wing aircraft from Tan Son Nhut Airport for one more day to remove the high-risk South Vietnamese, together with all the Defense Attache's Office [DAO], which was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport.

He also ordered a substantial reduction of the remaining American personnel in South Viet-Nam.

I may point out that the American personnel in Saigon was divided into two groups; one with the Defense Attache's Office, which was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport; the second one, which was related to the Embassy and was with the U.S. Mission in downtown Saigon.

The shelling did stop early in the morning on Tuesday, Saigon time, or about 9 p.m. last night, Washington time. We then attempted to land C-130's but found that the population at the airport had got out of control and had flooded the runways. It proved impossible to land any more fixed-wing aircraft.

The President thereupon ordered that the DAO personnel, together with those civilians tha⁺ had been made ready to be evacuated, be moved to the DAO compound, which is near Tan Son Nhut Airport; and at about 11:00 last night, he ordered the evacuation of all Americans from Tan Son Nhut and from the Embassy as well.

This operation has been going on all day, which of course is night in Saigon, and under difficult circumstances, and the total number of those evacuated numbers about 6,500—we will have the exact figures for you tomorrow—of which about 1,000 are Americans.

Our Ambassador has left, and the evacuation can be said to be completed.

In the period since the President spoke to the Congress, we have therefore succeeded in evacuating all of the Americans who were in South Viet-Nam, losing the two marines

last night to rocket fire and two pilots today on a helicopter.

We succeeded in evacuating something on the order of 55,000 South Vietnamese. And we hope we have contributed to a political evolution that may spare the South Vietnamese some of the more drastic consequences of a political change, but this remains to be seen. This last point remains to be seen.

As far as the Administration is concerned, I can only underline the point made by the President. We do not believe that this is a time for recrimination. It is a time to heal wounds, to look at our international obligations, and to remember that peace and progress in the world has depended importantly on American commitment and American conviction and that the peace and progress of our own people is closely tied to that of the rest of the world.

I will be glad to answer questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you made some reference a few weeks back to those who believe in the domino theory, and while I don't remember exactly your words, the point was it is easy to laugh at it but there is some justification for subscribing to that theory. Now that this chapter is over, can you give us your estimate of the security of Thailand and other countries in the area, or the near area?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early to make a final assessment.

There is no question that the outcome in Indochina will have consequences not only in Asia but in many other parts of the world. To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing with them.

So, I believe there will be consequences. But I am confident that we can deal with them, and we are determined to manage and to progress along the road toward a permanent peace that we have sought; but there is no question that there will be consequences.

Q. Now that it is over, could you tell us, or elaborate in more detail, what we did through various intermediaries to bring about, I think you said, as humane a political solution as possible, and why those efforts seem to have failed?

626

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger with the president failed because especially when it is premature to act, details, but what the PRG [Government] then and we were told and received

Q. May I then, was it for the government in the

Secretary Kissinger was always for some continuing lie that the South Viet-Nam, North Viet-Nam, about an access day and a half

But you will be of about five U.S. personnel, substantial, over five days, about

Q. Mr. Secretary, now anticipate, intend to move, gon? Do you and the battle of Saigon, an orderly tran

Secretary Kissinger to judge at this point, what are the important points that have been discussed with respect to the situation has been

So, a week ago, the removal of Thieu. When he asked for the reformation that General Huong resigned he was now describing which includes an administration.

A week ago, the

May 19, 1975

Secretary Kissinger: I would not agree with the proposition that these efforts have failed because at least some of the efforts, especially those related to evacuation, were carried out through intermediaries. I think it is premature for me to go into all of the details, but we did deal with Hanoi and with the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] through different intermediaries, and we were in a position to put our views and receive responses.

Q. May I follow on that by saying, why, then, was it necessary to stage a rescue operation in the final stages?

Secretary Kissinger: In the final stages, it was always foreseen that a helicopter lift for some contingents would be necessary. I believe that the dynamics of the situation in South Viet-Nam and the impatience of the North Vietnamese to seize power brought about an acceleration of events in the last day and a half.

But you will remember there was a period of about five days when both civilian and U.S. personnel were evacuated without any substantial opposition—in fact, more than five days, about a week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, do you now anticipate that the North Vietnamese will move in and forcefully seize Saigon? Do you anticipate there will be a bloody battle of Saigon, or is there still a chance for an orderly transition?

Secretary Kissinger: This is very difficult to judge at this moment. I think it is important to point out that the Communist demands have been escalating as the military situation has changed in their favor.

So, a week ago they were asking only for the removal of President [Nguyen Van Thieu]. When he resigned, they immediately asked for the removal of his successor, specifying that General [Duong Van Minh] would be acceptable. When President [Tran Van Huong] resigned in favor of General Minh, it was now described as a member of a clique which includes all of the members of his administration.

A week ago, the Communist demand was

for the removal of American military personnel. This quickly escalated into a removal of all American personnel.

Then a new demand was put forward for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese military apparatus. When that was agreed to, they added to it the demand for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese administrative apparatus. So, it is clear that what is being aimed at is a substantial political takeover.

Now, whether it is possible to avoid a battle for Saigon, it is too early to judge. I would hope—and we certainly have attempted to work in that direction—that such a battle can be avoided. And it is basically unnecessary because it seems to us that the South Vietnamese Government is prepared to draw the conclusions from the existing situation and, in fact, look forward to correspond to the demands of the Communist side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the United States now owes any allegiance at all to the Paris pact? Are we now bound in any way by the Paris agreements?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as the United States is concerned, there are not many provisions of the Paris agreement that are still relevant. As far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, they have stated that they wish to carry out the Paris accords, though by what definition is not fully clear to me. We would certainly support this if it has any meaning.

Q. May I ask one follow-up? Do you now favor American aid in rebuilding North Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: North Viet-Nam?

Q. North Viet-Nam.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do not favor American aid for rebuilding North Viet-Nam.

Q. South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to South Viet-Nam, we will have to see what kind of government emerges and indeed whether there is going to be a South Viet-Nam. We would certainly look at particular

May 19, 1975

627

specific humanitarian requests that can be
carried out by humanitarian agencies, but
we do believe that the primary responsibility
should fall on those who supply the weapons
for this political change.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question about the length of time that it took to complete this evacuation. First, the question of whether days went by after the end became obvious before ordering the evacuation; second, if after ordering it there was a one-hour delay in helicopter landings, apparently caused by military confusion; third, whether the evacuation was prolonged by picking up thousands of Vietnamese instead of concentrating on Americans; and fourth, whether this was delayed even further by Ambassador Martin's desire to be the last man to leave the sinking ship.

In other words, I tried to put the specifics
in order to ask you, did it take too long to get
out of there, to write this last chapter?

Secretary Kissinger: We got out, with all of the personnel that were there, without panic and without the substantial casualties that could have occurred if civil order had totally broken down. We also managed to save 56,000 people whose lives were in the most severe jeopardy.

We had to make a judgment every day
how many people we thought we could safely
remove without triggering a panic and at
th same time still be able to carry out our
principal function and the remaining func-
tions.

I think these objectives were achieved and
they were carried out successfully. There-
fore I do not believe that there was an undue
delay, because an evacuation has been going
on for two weeks.

The difference between the last stage and
the previous period was that the last stage
was done by helicopter and the previous
stage had been done by fixed-wing.

I think the ability to conduct a final evacuation by helicopter without casualties during the operation, at least casualties caused by hostile action, is closely related to the policies that were pursued in the preceding two weeks.

As for Ambassador Martin, he was in a
very difficult position. He felt a moral obliga-
tion to the people with whom he had been
associated, and he attempted to save as many
of those as possible. That is not the worst
fault a man can have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been numerous reports of American appeals to the Soviets, to the Chinese. Can you say today in the evacuation effort were either the Soviets or the Chinese helpful or unhelpful in this diplomatic effort?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we re-
ceived some help from the Soviet Union in
the evacuation effort. The degree of it we will
have to assess when we study the exchanges.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what caused the break-
down of the intent which was spoken of
earlier on the Hill to try to achieve a meas-
ure of self-determination for the people of
South Viet-Nam, and what is your total as-
sessment now of the effectiveness or the
noneffectiveness of the whole Paris accord
operation, which you said at the outset was
intended to achieve peace with honor for the
United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Until Sunday night we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means, and when the transfer of power to General Minh took place—a person who had been designated by the other side as a counterpart worth talking to, they would be prepared to talk with—we thought a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable.

Sometime Sunday night the North Viet-
namese obviously changed signals. Why that
is, we do not yet know, nor do I exclude that
now that the American presence is totally
removed and very little military structure is
left in South Viet-Nam, that there may not
be a sort of a negotiation, but what produced
this sudden shift to a military option or what
would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a
military option, I have not had sufficient op-
portunity to analyze.

As to the effectiveness of the Paris ac-
cords, I think it is important to remember

the mood
Paris acco-
it is worth
criticism
terms we i
the terms

We want
with honor
not end a
with which
seems an

There were made
fied by every
of—that in-
body who
cluding the
ing of exer-
States for a
policy consi-

So, the p-
terms of aid
terms of o-
grate. I see
that particu-
of the time,

Q. Mr. Se-
that. What i
United State-
ical grouping

Secretary
what groupi-
negotiations
the two South
have seen wh
degree of inc
make a decisi
lationship to
sion on that.

Q. Would y
in abeyance o
Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger, state.

Q. Mr. Se-
now, would yo
and what do y

Secretary Kissinger.

May 19, 1975

628

Department of State Bulletin

the mood in this country at the time that the Paris accords were being negotiated. I think it is worth remembering that the principal criticism that was then made was that the terms we insisted on were too tough, not that the terms were too generous.

We wanted what was considered peace with honor, was that the United States would not end a war by overthrowing a government with which it had been associated. That still seems an objective that was correct.

There were several other assumptions that were made at that time that were later falsified by events that were beyond the control of—that indeed were unforeseeable by—anybody who negotiated these agreements, including the disintegration of or the weakening of executive authority in the United States for reasons unconnected with foreign policy considerations.

So, the premises of the Paris accords, in terms of aid, of the possibility of aid, and in terms of other factors, tended to disintegrate. I see no purpose now in reviewing that particular history. Within the context of the time, it seemed the right thing to do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a follow-up question on that. What is the current relationship of the United States to the South Vietnamese political grouping, whatever you would call it?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to see what growing emerges out of whatever negotiations should now take place between the two South Vietnamese sides. After we have seen what grouping emerges and what degree of independence it has, then we can make a decision about what our political relationship to it is. We have not made a decision on that.

Q. Would you say diplomatic relations are in abeyance with the government in South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a fair statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking back on the war now, would you say that the war was in vain, and what do you feel it accomplished?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it will be a

long time before Americans will be able to talk or write about the war with some dispassion. It is clear that the war did not achieve the objectives of those who started the original involvement nor the objectives of those who sought to end that involvement, which they found on terms which seemed to them compatible with the sacrifices that had been made.

What lessons we should draw from it, I think we should reserve for another occasion. But I don't think that we can solve the problem of having entered the conflict too lightly by leaving it too lightly, either.

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking toward the future, has America been so stunned by the experience of Viet-Nam that it will never again come to the military or economic aid of an ally? I am talking specifically in the case of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out in a speech a few weeks ago [April 17], one lesson we must learn from this experience is that we must be very careful in the commitments we make but that we should scrupulously honor those commitments that we make.

I believe that the experience in the war can make us more mature in the commitments we undertake and more determined to maintain those we have. I would therefore think that with relation to other countries, including Israel, that no lessons should be drawn by the enemies of our friends from the experiences in Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the developments in the last week or so, would you agree that there was never any hope of stabilizing the South Vietnamese military situation after the withdrawal from the northern region?

Secretary Kissinger: When the President met with General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army] in Palm Springs, the judgment was that there was a slim hope, but some hope. Somewhat less than 50-50, but still some hope.

The situation deteriorated with every passing day. Those of you whom I briefed

May 19, 1975

629

at that time will remember that I said that whatever—and I said it in public testimony on innumerable occasions—that whatever objective we may set ourselves and whatever assessment we make about the outcome, the Administration had no choice except to pursue the course that we did, which was designed to save the Americans still in Viet-Nam and the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, are you now reassessing the amount of humanitarian aid which Congress should give to the South Vietnamese, and also, can you tell us the President's reaction and mood during the past 24 hours?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam, we spoke to the congressional leadership this morning, and we urged them to pass the humanitarian part of the aid request that we have submitted to the Congress.

The President pointed out that he would make a later decision as to what part of that humanitarian aid could be used in South Viet-Nam after the political evolution in South Viet-Nam becomes clearer.

The President's mood was somber and determined, and we all went through a somewhat anxious 24 hours, because until the last helicopter had left, we could not really know whether an attack on any of these compounds might start and whether missiles might be used against our evacuation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to clarify something that seems rather important at this point? You said here and in the past that a weakening of the American executive authority was a factor in this whole outcome. Now, there have been reports that former President Nixon, with your advice, had decided in April of 1973 to resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam but that Watergate intruded and he could not carry through on that. Is that a historic fact or not?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge, President Nixon had never ac-

tually decided on any particular action. The Washington Special Action Group at that period was considering a number of reactions that could be taken to the beginning flagrant violations of the agreements. This was done on an interdepartmental basis—including the Department of State, my office, the Department of Defense—and had reached certain options.

Then President Nixon, as it turned out, never made a final decision between these options. To what extent it was influenced by Watergate is a psychological assessment that one can only speculate about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a new Asia developing after the Indochina situation. What will the priorities of the United States be in recognizing its existing commitments and in making new ones?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to assess the impact of Indochina on our allies and on other countries in that area and on their perceptions of the United States, and we will have to assess also what role the United States can responsibly play over an indefinite period of time, because surely another lesson we should draw from the Indochina experience is that foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, and if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable.

The President has already reaffirmed our alliance with Japan, our defense treaty with Korea, and we, of course, also have treaty obligations and important bases in the Philippines. We will soon be in consultation with many other countries in that area, including Indonesia and Singapore and Australia and New Zealand, and we hope to crystallize an Asian policy that is suited to present circumstances with close consultation with our friends.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that all the Americans that wanted to come out are out of Saigon, and do you have any idea of the number of Americans who remained behind?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea of the number of Americans that remained behind.

630

Department of State Bulletin

I amCONFIDENTIAL. wanted to chose to STODYFORUM tomorrow. sleft was the immediate until we get

Q. Mr. Secretary, come to see there any person would reccommend South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: should seek advice would be, or

The United States should seek advice would be, or

Q. Mr. Secretary, went wrong in these years? administration, power of the estimated the South Viet-Nam government.

Secretary Kissinger: think this is true. American have an assessment that American foreign policy is equally well understood by the serious people in their countries that maybe assessment, even the effort did not.

As I have said, the American foreign policy would think that the country, for some time, for some reason, and to put it simply, to put Viet-Nam concentrate on the certainly will continue to continue to assess its assessments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, spoken of the United States, what is your assessment of the United States foreign policy?

May 19, 1975

I am confident that every American who wanted to come out is out, but how many chose to stay behind we won't know until tomorrow sometime. The last contingent that left was the Ambassador and some of his immediate staff, and we won't know really until we get the report from them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is President Thieu welcome to seek asylum in this country, and is there any possibility that the United States would recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: If President Thieu should seek asylum in the United States, he would be, of course, received.

The United States will not recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what went wrong, what were the flaws in American foreign policy toward Indochina all these years? Why was it that so many Administrations repeatedly underestimated the power of the North Vietnamese and overestimated the capability on the part of the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: As I said earlier, I think this is not the occasion, when the last American has barely left Saigon, to make an assessment of a decade and a half of American foreign policy, because it could equally well be argued that if five Administrations that were staffed, after all, by serious people dedicated to the welfare of their country came to certain conclusions, that maybe there was something in their assessment, even if for a variety of reasons the effort did not succeed.

As I have already pointed out, special factors have operated in recent years. But I would think that what we need now in this country, for some weeks at least, and hopefully for some months, is to heal the wounds and to put Viet-Nam behind us and to concentrate on the problems of the future. That certainly will be the Administration's attitude. There will be time enough for historic assessments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly spoken of the potential consequences of what

has happened in Southeast Asia. I would like to ask if you feel that your personal prestige and therefore your personal ability to negotiate between other countries has been damaged by what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: If I should ever come to the conclusion that I could not fulfill what the President has asked of me, then I would draw the consequences from this. Obviously, this has been a very painful experience, and it would be idle to deny this has been a painful experience for many who have been concerned with this problem for a decade and a half.

I think the problems in Viet-Nam went deeper than any one negotiation and that an analysis of the accords at the time will require an assessment of the public pressures, of what was sustainable, but I don't think, again, that we should go into this at this particular moment, nor am I probably the best judge of my prestige at any particular point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was it in particular that led you to believe until Sunday night that Hanoi might be willing to go for a non-military solution? Did you have some specific information from them to indicate that, because certainly the battlefield situation suggested otherwise?

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe to you, but the battlefield situation suggested that there was a standdown of significant military activity, and the public pronouncements were substantially in the direction that a negotiation would start with General Minh. There were also other reasons which led us to believe that the possibility of a negotiation remained open.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have blamed the Soviets and the Red Chinese for breaking faith with the letter and the spirit of the Paris peace accords. The Soviet Union has apparently, through its broadcasts, encouraged a Communist takeover in Portugal. The Chinese have signed a joint communique with North Korea encouraging North Korea to unify South Korea by force.

My question is, why, in view of these violations in both the letter and in the spirit of

May 19, 1975

631

détente, does the United States continue to
believe in détente: secondly, are we ever go-
ing to take some obvious action showing
American displeasure at the behavior of the
two Communist superpowers?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think it is
important to keep in mind that our relation-
ship with both the Soviet Union and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China is based on ideolog-
ical hostility but practical reasons for coop-
eration in certain limited spheres.

With respect to the Soviet Union, they and
we possess the capability to destroy mankind.
The question of how to prevent a general nu-
clear war is a problem that some Adminis-
tration must solve before consequences that
would be irremedial. Therefore there is al-
ways a common interest, and indeed a com-
mon obligation, to attempt to deal with this
particular problem.

With respect to the various points you
made, it is important for us to recognize that
we cannot, in this situation, ask of the Soviet
Union that it does our job for us. On the
one hand, as I pointed out previously, of
course the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic must be responsible for the con-
sequences of those actions that lead to an up-
set of the situation in Indochina, or maybe
in the Middle East; that is, the introduction
of massive armaments that will in all proba-
bility be used offensively is an event that we
cannot ignore.

On the other hand, I think it would be a
grave mistake to blame the Soviet Union for
what happened in Portugal. It may have
taken advantage of the situation in Portugal,
but the fact that the Communist Party in
Portugal has emerged despite the fact that
it, in recent elections, had only 12 percent of
the votes cannot be ascribed to Soviet mach-
inations primarily, but due to causes that are
much more complicated and also due to evo-
lutions in Europe that have roots quite dif-
ferent from Soviet pressures.

So, we must not make the mistake of as-
cribing every reverse we have to our Com-
munist opponents, because that makes them
appear 10 feet tall. On the other hand, we
must not make the mistake of lulling our-
self, with a period of détente, into believing

that all competition has disappeared.

Between these two extremes, we must nav-
igate, seek to reduce tensions on the basis
of reciprocity, and seek to promote a stabler
world. When either of the Communist coun-
tries have attempted actively to bring for-
eign policy pressures, the United States has
resisted strenuously, and again we have
called their attention to the fact that the
fostering of international conflict will cer-
tainly lead to a breakdown of détente. But
the individual examples which you gave can-
not be ascribed to Communist actions pri-
marily.

Q. In ordering the evacuation, to what ex-
tent were you responding exclusively to the
military situation and to what extent were
you responding either to a request by "Big"
Minh for all Americans to get out or to your
own feeling that a total evacuation might
facilitate a political settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: When the President
ordered total evacuation, it was done on the
basis that Tan Son Nhut Airport had already
been closed and that therefore the American
personnel in Saigon—and there were 45 in
the province—might soon become hostage to
the approaching Communist forces.

The order to evacuate was made before
any request had been received from General
Minh, and the principal, indeed the only, rea-
son was to guarantee the safety of the re-
maining Americans.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a report last
night that the Communists were backing
away from the airport, the rockets seemed
to be moving back. Was that a direct result
of negotiations and were they prepared to let
us move refugees out or Americans out on
fixed-wing aircraft?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know that
particular report, but the shelling stopped
about 9 p.m., last night. We could not op-
erate fixed-wing aircraft, because the control
at the airport broke down. And it was at
this point that the President decided that
with Communist forces approaching on all
sides and with the airport being closed that
we had to go to helicopter evacuation.

632

Department of State Bulletin

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May 19, 1975

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in New York that last week you sent a further request for the good offices of the Council of Ministers of the Nine, the European Communities.

Secretary Kissinger: We did not approach the Nine last week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any possibility of a negotiated settlement, and also, with respect to that, what can and should the South Vietnamese Government do now?

Secretary Kissinger: I have already pointed out that the Communist demands have been escalating literally with every passing day, that as soon as one demand is met, an additional demand is put forward. So, we should have no illusions about what the Communist side is aiming for.

The South Vietnamese, as far as I can tell, have met every demand that has so far been put forward on the radio. There have not been any direct negotiations with which I am familiar.

What is attainable in the transfer of power that would preserve a vestige of other forces than the Communist forces, that remains to be seen.

## Secreta. of Defense Schlesinger Commends Efforts of Armed Forces

Statement Issued April 29

Department of Defense press release 204-75 dated April 29

As the last withdrawal of Americans from Viet-Nam takes place, it is my special

responsibility to address to you, the men and women of our Armed Forces, a few words of appreciation on behalf of the American people.

For many of you, the tragedy of Southeast Asia is more than a distant and abstract event. You have fought there; you have lost comrades there; you have suffered there. In this hour of pain and reflection, you may feel that your efforts and sacrifices have gone for naught.

That is not the case. When the passions have muted and the history is written, Americans will recall that their Armed Forces served them well. Under circumstances more difficult than ever before faced by our military services, you accomplished the mission assigned to you by higher authority. In combat you were victorious, and you left the field with honor.

Though you have done all that was asked of you, it will be stated that the war itself was futile. In some sense, such may be said of any national effort that ultimately fails. Yet our involvement was not purposeless. It was intended to assist a small nation to preserve its independence in the face of external attack and to provide at least a reasonable chance to survive. That Viet-Nam succumbed to powerful external forces vitiates neither the explicit purpose behind our involvement nor the impulse of generosity toward those under attack that has long infused American policy.

Your record of duty performed under difficult conditions remains unmatched. I salute you for it. Beyond any question you are entitled to the nation's respect, admiration, and gratitude.

May 19, 1975

633

Question-and-Answer Session and News Conferences Held
by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis and Kansas City

5/12/5/13
1975

Following are transcripts of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis, Mo., on May 12, a question-and-answer session following his address before the Kansas City, Mo., International Relations Council on May 13, and a news conference he held at Kansas City on May 13.

NEWS CONFERENCE AT ST. LOUIS, MAY 12

Press release 247A dated May 12

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think the question is fairly obvious. It is on everyone's mind, and that is the seizing of the U.S. vessel by Cambodia. Can we have some comments from you and some insight on perhaps what the President meant by saying that unless the ship is released immediately, or sometime in the near future, our relations may suffer serious consequences?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that the President's statement speaks for itself. He called the action an act of piracy, and he demanded the immediate release of the American ship and crew. And he has pointed out that failure to do so could have serious consequences.

We are undertaking at present diplomatic efforts to bring about this release, and until they have had their chance, we will not make any further comment.

Q. Has a third nation been called into this as a possible intermediary—like China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we don't have any direct communications with the Cambodian authorities.

Q. Have you heard at all from the Cambodian authorities on this?

Secretary Kissinger: Not at the time that

I had left Washington. Not at the time that I came down here to give this speech.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator [James L.] Buckley said that the United States ought to react by surgical retaliatory bombings so this sort of thing wouldn't happen again. What is your reaction to that?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this is the time for me to give a checklist of possible American responses. I think our statement has made it clear that we will not accept this and that we are insisting on the release of the ship and the crew. But what specific steps we will take, if that cannot be achieved by diplomatic means, we will have to wait.

Q. Was your trip to St. Louis ever threatened by this incident? Was there any question at all whether you could come out here today?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is really not very much I can do about this situation in Washington today. But we had an NSC [National Security Council] meeting just before I came here—not to decide whether I should come, but to discuss that issue and its merits.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you comment on this? Paul Lindstrom, the member of the Pueblo committee, has given the following information. He says he got from State Department sources that four crewmen were seriously wounded in the seizure and that, according to the Secretary General of the Communist Party in Cambodia, the members of the ship will be held as prisoners until there is an apology for some sort of criminal action against Cambodia and until the U.S.-made ships and planes used by refugees to flee Thailand are returned to Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know who the

June 2, 1975

723

["State Department sources are that have told him that. I admit the State Department is organized to keep information from its top echelon. [Laughter.] I have not heard that particular information.", "Q. What about the four wounded persons?", "Secretary Kissinger: When I left, I checked with Washington before I came down here. I did not receive any report of this nature. So unless it happened in the last two hours, I just don't know about this report.", "Q. Mr. Secretary, to change the subject for a minute—", "Secretary Kissinger: I would be amazed if that person knew it, but I just don't know.", "And we certainly haven't had any formal communication.", "Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you are now ready to be more specific about the OAS agreement that you say was intended to eliminate, to get rid of the economic sanctions against Cuba. Could you be more specific?", "Secretary Kissinger: Well, there hasn't been any formal OAS action yet. What there has been is an informal exchange of views among the Foreign Ministers designed to respond to the desire of those who want to lift sanctions against Cuba. And that was a majority in the last meeting that addressed this question in Quito. So there will probably be another meeting that will address this problem.", "But I think we have found a formula which will enable us to be responsive to the desires of our Latin American friends and yet enable us to conduct the policy we consider appropriate.", "Q. To follow up, if I could, for a second, Mr. Secretary, when you say you have a majority vote in agreement, is that a substantial majority, or in terms of numbers?", "Secretary Kissinger: At the last meeting that dealt with this issue that took place in Quito—let me explain the situation. According to the Rio Treaty, sanctions are imposed by a two-thirds majority and can be lifted only by a two-thirds majority. When the Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere", "met—of the Organization of American States—met in Quito, they were short of a two-thirds majority by one vote. The United States abstained. So there was a majority then.", "We believe that for the formula we are now discussing, there will be an overwhelming majority but it will be somewhat different from the one that was discussed at Quito, and that makes it possible.", "Q. I am still not clear. Does the United States support decision by a majority vote?", "Secretary Kissinger: If we follow the legal procedures, there has been a proposal that sanctions should be lifted by majority vote. For that to be effective, it has to be ratified by the various governments, which is a time-consuming process. That we can support. But it will take time.", "So then there is a question whether something can be done in the interim while the ratification process is continuing. And this is what we have to discuss with our colleagues. But I don't want to go further than that until the meeting actually has concluded.", "Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you about a point in your speech tonight? You called for Western European countries to join with you in grand new designs. Hasn't the reaction to your oil-energy proposal shown the Western European countries, including Britain, too occupied with their own problems to join in such grand designs?", "Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think I used the words \"grand designs.\" We spoke of great joint enterprises. I believe, on the contrary, the reaction to our energy proposals proves that the Western European countries and Japan can cooperate with us when we have concrete issues that affect all of our interests.", "I believe that the energy program has been one of the success stories of our relationship with our allies. We have, within the space of a year, created the International Energy Agency, developed joint programs of conservation, financial solidarity, and assured prices. And I believe that the energy program proves exactly the opposite of what", "you are cooperating for a purpose, abstract", "Q. Mr. Kissinger, evidence you and your agency are engaged in a bloodbath", "Secretary Kissinger: I have been saying, for five years now, for these bloodbaths, and for what? For the benefit of the Ho Chi Minh regime, which is the only regime that has the power to end this bloodbath. Now, is it absolute that Ho Chi Minh is the only person that can end this bloodbath? And in a few short years, the Ho Chi Minh regime will be gone, and then what? And in a few short years, the Ho Chi Minh regime will be

you are suggesting; namely, that we can cooperate, and that we can achieve unity of purpose, when the issue is concrete and not abstract.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you provide any evidence to support the contention made by you and by the President that there is a bloodbath in progress in Indochina?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware that I have made the statement that there is a bloodbath in progress in Indochina. We were saying, prior to the collapse of Cambodia and Viet-Nam, that we supported additional aid for these countries because we feared a bloodbath.

Now, with respect to Cambodia, there can be absolutely no question that a tragedy and indeed an atrocity of major proportions is going on. When 3 million people are evacuated from a city and told to march into a countryside in which there will not be another harvest until November, when hospitals are cleared out, there is no question that there are going to be deaths numbering in the thousands, and probably in the tens of thousands. There is no press there to record this. All foreigners have been evicted. And in addition, we have some isolated information from various parts of Cambodia of executions of every official, and in some cases of their wives, of the previous government—and "officials" are defined in those cases to go down as low as second lieutenant.

Now, what is happening in South Viet-Nam is much less clear. And we have made no allegations about South Viet-Nam, except that one remembers that in 1954 when 900,-000 people had fled North Viet-Nam, nevertheless, by their own admission, over 60,000 people were killed.

But we have no firsthand information about any significant events of this type in South Viet-Nam at this moment. We do have very clear information about what is going on in Cambodia.

Q. Do you have any idea of the numbers, Mr. Secretary? You talk about "all officials down to the level of lieutenant." Is that hundreds, thousands?

Secretary Kissinger: All we have is iso-

lated instances of individual districts. So in one particular district, this amounted to 90 officials and their wives. But this was a small district town.

Now, if you extrapolate this across the country, you come to very large numbers. If you add to it the evacuation of all the urban centers into a countryside without any apparent plan or previous preparation, you get into very substantial numbers.

Q. [Inaudible] some persons are proposing, or suggesting, that perhaps Thailand will be the next country to be overthrown. Do you have any plans if such a thing were to occur?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it will now be interesting to see whether Thailand—whether the North Vietnamese, who have been behind—who were conducting the Lao-tian war for most of the Viet-Nam period with their own troops and who have been supplying and supporting the Pathet Lao—whether they will now stop at the borders of Thailand or whether they will foment a guerrilla-type war in northeast Thailand. That still remains to be seen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any likelihood that you would resume your shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East prior to a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the President is going to meet with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin. Until these two meetings have taken place, we cannot really make a decision as to which approach will be more effective—another attempt at a step-by-step approach or the Geneva Conference, which of course would, by definition, deal with an overall solution. We want to reserve our judgment until we have had these conversations.

Our interest is to prevent stagnation. As the President has said repeatedly, we cannot accept a diplomatic stalemate in the Middle East. Which method will be pursued depends very much on the wishes of the parties—depends crucially on the wishes of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you still believe that the United Nations is a useful vehicle for the

June 2, 1975

725

United States to belong to in view of what
has taken place?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the United
Nations is a useful tool for the United States
and a useful organization to belong to, as
long as we understand its capabilities and
its limits.

It often provides an opportunity for dip-
lomatic exchanges that would be very diffi-
cult to arrange without it. In Cyprus, even
occasionally on the Middle East, in certain
conflicts in Africa, the United Nations has
performed an extremely useful role.

But what concerns us is that in recent
sessions of the General Assembly, an auto-
matic kind of majority has been—has come
about that reflects the so-called Group of 77
plus whatever other backing they can get,
which develops an almost instinctive reaction
which often are not in the American interest
and which occasionally are against the
Charter of the United Nations, such as the
expulsion of nations from membership in
the General Assembly.

These actions we oppose, and we shall
make clear in the next General Assembly
that the charter must be rigidly observed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech tonight, you said, "When a country's prestige declines, others will be reluctant to stake their future on its assurances; it will be increasingly tested by overt challenges." Do you think this country's prestige has suffered as a result of what's happened in Viet-Nam, in Cambodia, and what's happening in Laos —and what happened today to a merchant ship?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that our cred-
ibility has declined, and that one of the
most important challenges to our foreign
policy is to restore it, partly by bringing our
commitments in line with our capabilities
and partly by making sure that those commit-
ments we make will be strictly carried out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech earlier
tonight you said, and I am quoting now:
"Though we are no longer predominant, we
are inescapably a leader." Does that mean
the predominance of American power as a
global force has come to an end? Are we

seeing the decline of the so-called "American
empire"?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't believe
there was an American empire.

Q. Who is the predominant force now?

Secretary Kissinger: I do believe that the
degree of predominance we enjoyed in the
fifties and early sixties has come to an end
and therefore we have to conduct foreign
policy more carefully, more thoughtfully,
than we did at a period when we had such
an overwhelming physical superiority that
we could afford occasional mistakes that
would be made up by our predominance.

We still are the strongest nation in the
world. We still are, militarily, in a powerful
position, but the margin of superiority that
we possessed when we had an atomic monop-
oly has been eroded through the progress of
technology as much as through anything else.

Q. What I am concerned about, when you
say that we are no longer predominant—
who is the predominant power? Is it the
Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't think the
Soviet Union is predominant. I think we
are no longer as superior to all the other
countries in physical strength as we were,
say, 15 years ago. That doesn't mean that
any other country has replaced us. We are
still probably the strongest nation in the
world, but our margin is no longer as great.

Q. You referred to peripheral areas in
the Soviet competition. Do you have any
specific peripheral areas in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: I mentioned some.

Q. You exempted the Middle East and
Iraq and Indochina as a closed chapter, so—

Secretary Kissinger: I remember—let me
make clear what I meant. I said, not every
problem that is caused in the peripheral area
is necessarily caused by the Soviet Union;
it may be exploited by the Soviet Union. And
I would most definitely include the Middle
East.

And if there is a deliberate exacerbation
of tensions in the Middle East, it would raise
most serious doubts in our mind.

Department of State Bulletin

726

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Q. Well, I think you did—I'm sorry—as I recall, I thought you spoke in terms of active competition now, between us and the Soviet Union, in peripheral areas, and détente can suffer as a result.

Secretary Kissinger: It can.

Q. It can?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. So I am trying to find out in which peripheral areas is this competition going on. The Middle East is one. Are there others?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, the Middle East is one. Basically, what I was—I don't want—

Q. I was asking about the Persian Gulf. Do you have that in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: I have—that is another possible area. But what I wanted to stress was that détente cannot survive if no limit is placed on competition. Some degree of competition is inherent in the conflicting ideologies and positions of the country. But if no—in the absence of self-restraint, détente will be in danger.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your speech that we came out of World War II as a united people and out of this recent conflict as distrustful and divided people. What effect do you think that the condition of our economy and the attitudes of our people in our political structure will have on our foreign policy in our future negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that a strong and vital American economy is absolutely crucial—

Q. True.

Secretary Kissinger: —to the conduct of our foreign policy; that partly, when this country is in recession, it is very difficult for the American people to muster the willingness for the sacrifices that are implied by world leadership—and that is very understandable. The reaction to the Vietnamese refugees, the reluctance to engage in some other foreign activities, are partly the result of economic conditions within this country. So that preconditions for an effective

foreign policy is a vital American domestic economy—

Q. I had reference to the fact that election year is coming up—and is this a political football?

Secretary Kissinger: Election year, certainly, that does not have any conduct in foreign policy. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, just one more question: You left a paragraph out of your speech in which you reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai communique—

Secretary Kissinger: That has absolutely no significance. I have asked Bob Anderson [Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations] to explain that I occasionally cut paragraphs as I go through the speech, in the interest of reading time. I affirm that paragraph, and everything that is in the text that was distributed has the same validity as everything that I read.

Q. So the President is going to China in the fall?

Secretary Kissinger: So that has no significance. Yes. The same will happen in Kansas City. [Laughter.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOWING ADDRESS AT KANSAS CITY, MAY 13

Press release 257 dated May 14

William Linscott, President, Kansas City International Relations Council: I will ask the Secretary a few of the questions that I have here that are representative really of the groups, of the many that we do have.

The first question that I have asks: What is the Soviet Union's long-range foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Suez Canal? And, two, are we really going to take our ship back from Cambodia, or is this a verbal ploy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me take the second question first. With respect to the ship, we have called it an act of piracy. We have said that we demand the release of the ship and the crew and the failure to release

June 2, 1975

727

the ship and the crew could have serious consequences.

We are now giving diplomacy a chance. Until this has been done, I do not think it would be useful to make any statements. But I can assure you that the statement released by the White House on behalf of the President yesterday was not said idly. I repeat that we insist on the release of the ship and the crew. [Applause.]

The other question is: What is the Soviet Union's long-range foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Suez Canal?

The Soviet foreign policy is dominated by many factors. It is important for us to remember that the Soviet Union is ideologically hostile to the United States. And we recognize that the Soviet Union, if it has an opportunity, will fill vacuums.

We are pursuing a policy of seeking to relax tensions, because we believe that we owe it to the American people to make clear that if there is a crisis it will not have been caused by an American failure to seek out every opportunity for honorable solutions.

On the other hand, we must recognize that this policy is not a substitute for our own efforts. If a vacuum exists, it will be filled. And therefore what the Soviet Union does in the Middle East depends importantly on what we are prepared to do in the Middle East as well as in other areas of the world.

If we are ready to act with a sense of responsibility to the overall balance of power, then I believe we can make progress toward peace in the Middle East. And this is our biggest effort at this moment.

So, on the whole, I believe that progress toward peace can be made in the Middle East, but it cannot be done on the cheap.

Mr. Linscott: Thank you. The next question I have is: After the Arab-Israeli negotiations broke down, there was an apparent cooling of U.S.-Israeli relations. How is the temperature today?

Secretary Kissinger: My friend Abba Eban, the former Foreign Minister of Israel, said to me once that the Israelis consider objectivity a hundred percent agreement with their point of view. [Laughter.] So, when

you begin to slide toward the 95 percent mark, you get accused of tilting toward the other side.

Our relations with Israel are friendly. We are engaged in close consultations about what steps to take next. Inevitably, the Israeli perspective is focused on its own survival and on the immediate problems of its area.

We, on the other hand, have interests also in better relations with the moderate Arab countries and in making sure that the situation in the Middle East does not explode into a war, which could bring on another massive recession and a threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

We believe that this is also in the long-term interest of Israel.

So I believe that as we go through our present period of reassessment, that we will come out with a policy that will be generally approved by the American people and will be compatible with the survival and security of Israel, as well as with our relations with the Arab world. And I think that our relations are basically good. [Applause.]

Mr. Linscott: The next question they ask, Mr. Secretary: Do you need congressional approval to take military action in the matter of the Cambodian piracy affair?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that the War Powers Act and the restrictions, the special restrictions, that have been placed on military operations in Indochina complicate the flexibility of the President as compared to a number of years ago.

On the other hand, it has generally been held that the President has inherent powers to protect American lives and American property when they are threatened. And I believe that the President—and I know that the President is operating on this assumption today. Of course, before any steps are taken we would discuss them with the leaders of the Congress.

Mr. Linscott: Will the forthcoming talks in Brussels bring about new dimensions of the U.S.-Common Market relationships? Do you anticipate changes in the troop commitments?

728

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger: The United States of America is totally minating on international issues, particularly, I think, the issue of the United States of America's right to exist.

The president and the deditors of the common press are verbal doormats. They are joining the enterprising field of the economics of other areas.

It is verbal and verbal does not equal joint efforts. Therefore, there can be no emergency vital that

What fifty years of experience, but a joint effort, therefore, can enable us to emergency vital that

Mr. Kissinger: The policy of the United States of America is to view it

Secretary Kissinger: a policy attempt to

I think it makes no sense to talk of the United States of America the United States of America, but it makes that it can be effective in world affairs.

We believe that the United States of America will be a superpower in the sense that in any instance, principle, indifference of power, or the absence of them. [Applause]

Mr. Kissinger: I believe that Secretary Kissinger, who

June 2, 1990

Secretary Kissinger: After recent events, the United States cannot afford a withdrawal of troops from Europe without creating a totally wrong impression about our determination and about our willingness to play an international role. And therefore this is an issue that we will not raise—we do not expect to raise in Brussels.

The purpose of the talks between the President and his colleagues will be to reaffirm the dedication of the Western democracies to common goals.

It is not enough to do this simply with verbal declarations. It is important that we are joined together in some great common enterprises. We are already doing it in the field of energy. I have indicated today in the economic parts of my speech some of the other areas where joint efforts are possible.

What united the Western countries in the fifties and sixties was not simply declarations, but joint efforts. We believe that such joint efforts can again be created. And therefore we believe that the Western alliance can emerge from the present period more vital than before.

*Mr. Linscott: Are we going to revise our policy of containment and limited war in view of its minimal success in Viet-Nam?*

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we do not have a policy of limited war. Our policy is to attempt to preserve the peace.

I think we must learn from the experience of Viet-Nam that if the United States—that the United States should think through all the implications of its commitments before it makes them. But also, if it makes them, that it cannot do so half-heartedly.

We believe that we cannot commit the world to be at the mercy of other Communist superpowers. Now what precise conclusions we will draw from that, in any individual instance, I cannot now say; but as a basic principle of our foreign policy, we cannot be indifferent to changes in the world balance of power, and we are determined to resist them. [Applause.]

*Mr. Linscott: One last question: Mr. Secretary, would you serve as Secretary of State*

*under a Democratic President, if one were elected in 1976?* [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that I will be—I would— [Laughter.] I have the conviction from some of the statements of the various hard-working candidates that this is a decision that I would not have to make. [Laughter.] But I also have the conviction that they will not be in a position to make a concession. [Laughter and applause.]

## NEWS CONFERENCE AT KANSAS CITY, MAY 13

*Press release 251 dated May 13*

Mr. Anderson [Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations]: I would like to make just one brief announcement before the Secretary comes. I said it to a number of you before. In the Secretary's speech today, you will notice that he omitted certain paragraphs. But the full speech stands as the Secretary gave it out.

Secretary Kissinger: I omitted some paragraphs to be able to take some questions. But I stand behind everything that is in the text that we distributed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cambodian Government about the ship? Second, have we entered a period when we must expect harassment in and around Indochina?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot go beyond the statement that was released by the White House yesterday. In that statement, it was made clear that the President had instructed the Department of State to demand the release of the ship and of the crew. Those diplomatic efforts are in progress now. What the precise steps are, we will not discuss for the time being.

With respect to the second question, the United States will not accept harassment of its ships on international sealanes. And whether it can be expected or not is a question that I wouldn't want to answer. We will not accept it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm a Reu-

June 2, 1975

729

ters report that a U.S. reconnaissance plane was fired on at the time the ship was seized?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not heard of such an event. I don't think this is true.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: At the time the ship was seized? Inconceivable, because we didn't know about it until three or four hours later.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we get sort of a puzzled picture out here in the Midwest. We are very much concerned, being midwesterners. We have a picture of troops poised for movement, ships sailing into the Gulf of Siam, aerial surveillance, and a meeting today of the National Security Council. Can you give us anything beyond what you have already said, without violating any security regulations, on a general assessment of the situation and whether this could be just an isolated incident or a pattern?

Secretary Kissinger: I really cannot tell you whether it is an isolated incident or a pattern, whether it was a deliberate action by the Cambodian Government or by some local commander, because what you should remember is that even in Washington, when these events occur the information can be very confused and fragmentary. At this point, we are making efforts to secure the release of the ship. At the same time, the words of the White House statement yesterday were carefully chosen, and they have been reiterated since. So you can assume that we are not taking the matter lightly. But we do want to give an opportunity for diplomatic efforts to succeed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said, and the President has said, that we will pursue serious consequences unless this ship is released. Can you tell us what serious consequences the President could pursue without congressional approval?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I didn't say he would pursue them without congressional approval. But he has certain inherent powers to protect American lives and American property. But it would be done in close consultation—whatever would be considered

would be done in close consultation with the Congress.

Q. What could be considered? What are your options?

Secretary Kissinger: That is what we are at the moment considering in Washington. And there will be other meetings on the subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently Abba Eban said that the reason that you were not too successful with the Mideast peace was because the Israelis themselves caused you to have a few problems there. Would you comment on that, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem of the negotiations in the Middle East is extremely complicated. When you analyze it, it depends at what point in time you start. The negotiation is based on the fact that Israel has to give territory or contribute territory, which is a tangible thing, in return for intangible concessions in the form of promises, steps toward peace, new legal commitments, and so forth. Now, how to balance these two is under the best of circumstances an extremely difficult and complicated matter.

In this negotiation, it was further complicated by the fact that there were many Arab pressures; that within Israel there were many very profound political divisions. And I think that it is more useful for us to concentrate on what we will do in the future rather than going over what went wrong in that particular negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Rabin, according to the Associated Press, has had a book censored. According to the Prime Minister the book is "potentially explosive"—that if it were published it would force your resignation. Do you know of such a book, and what is your reaction to it being censored?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are so many competing groups trying to force my resignation [laughter] that I really don't want to give that much credit to any book that any Israeli journalist could be writing. I don't doubt that the publication of confidential negotiations and the exchange of

views could change the course of events, the matter I don't know me about is my own affair.

Q. And that is your mark that you think affect and that you want the United States to continue to do?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your opinion of the United States policy on the situation in Cuba, especially the United States policy with respect to that particular country?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think so. We are not going to do anything despite sanctions, especially the United States, but we are lifting sanctions. This factor of store with the Communists is very important.

Q. And what is your opinion of the United States policy at this time of the situation in Cuba? And what is your normal

June 2,

730

Department of State Bulletin

views between us and the Israeli Government could be embarrassing. Particularly given the closeness of our relationship, we are apt to speak with considerable candor about events and personalities. On the other hand, the main lines of our policy are clearly known, and I don't know about the book, I don't know about the event—somebody told me about this story. It seems to me that it is my fate at press conferences to talk about my resignation.

Q. Along the same line, the book alleges that you made a number of disparaging remarks about Soviet and Arab leaders. Do you think this will make them suspicious and affect future negotiations with the Arabs and the Soviets?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not particularly worried about this. I don't think it will affect future negotiations either with the Arabs or with the Soviets, with whom we are in constant touch, and they know our views.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you talk about a quid pro quo in the Middle East. We seem to be on the verge of normalizing relations with Cuba. What kind of quid pro quo do they expect there?

Secretary Kissinger: Just a moment—we are not on the verge of normalizing relations wit' Cuba. We faced in the OAS a situation where more and more countries were going ahead on their own in restoring diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, despite the fact that the OAS had voted sanctions. Last year in Quito there was a meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers designed to lift the sanctions on Cuba. According to the statutes of the OAS, lifting of sanctions, as the imposition of sanctions, requires a two-thirds majority. This failed by one vote. Afterward a number of countries went ahead anyway to restore diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba.

So the only issue that is being discussed at this moment is how to bring the practice of the OAS into line with the statutes. It does not affect the American policy directly. And it does not mean that we are going to normalize relations with Cuba.

I indicated in a speech a few weeks ago that we are in principle prepared to improve relations with Cuba on the basis of reciprocity. This, however, requires negotiations, and it requires negotiations with the U.S. Government, not with visitors. And until these negotiations have taken place—and they have not even begun yet—the implication of your question is quite premature.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Ford expressed himself as quite upset and disappointed in the attitude of the American public towards the Vietnamese refugees. Do you share his anger and upset?

Secretary Kissinger: People who work with me know that my nature is very even-tempered, so anger is not something that they would associate with me.

No, I was also profoundly upset. This is, after all, a country in which we were heavily involved for 15 years. And we have an obligation to people who, in reliance on us, put themselves into a position where their well-being and perhaps their survival is in jeopardy as a result of their association with us. We therefore felt we had a moral obligation to help as many of those who felt threatened to escape from South Viet-Nam. And the lot of a refugee, cut off from his society and from everything that is familiar to him and moving into a totally new environment, is in any case very difficult.

I think we have an obligation to them. I think they deserve our compassion and our support. And I have the impression that since the initial hesitation, the American people have now rallied to the view of the President.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction to the refusal of Thailand to allow the U.S. marines who are on Okinawa to go into Thailand for possible use to rescue the ship?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not been informed that this has officially taken place. And if it has taken place—whether or not it has taken place—it is clear that recent events in Indochina have seriously affected the Thai perception of the degree to which they can remain closely associated with the United States, especially on issues that pri-

June 2, 1975

731

marily concern the United States. So leaving
aside this particular report, whose authen-
ticity I am not sure about, this is a basic
fact of the present Thai situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is the United States
selling a Hawk air defense system to Jordan,
and did you discuss this sale with King
Hussein last November?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been dis-
cussing the sale of air defense equipment
to Jordan—I forget when the discussion
started—many months ago. This is not some-
thing that was started now. It is something
that was started probably in November, may-
be even before then. I don't have the exact
date in my mind now.

Jordan has been extremely moderate, ex-
tremely restrained, did not participate in
the last war; is under great pressure from
neighboring countries that get a great deal
of Soviet military equipment, some of which
even offered their own equipment to Jordan.
And we felt that it was in the overall interest
of the United States and the overall interest
of the stability of the area that we continue
to be the principal supplier of military
equipment to Jordan and as a means of
encouraging a continuation of the moderate
and restrained course. The fact that this
agreement was finally concluded—it had
been agreed to in principle many weeks
previously, in fact, during March—and so
it was just a question of—

Q. Do you recall discussing the issue with
King Hussein when you were in Jordan last
November?

Secretary Kissinger: It is highly probable
that I did, but I would not want to tie my-
self to any date. I certainly discussed it
last fall with him on a number of occasions,
but whether it was in November I cannot
remember. I could check it.

Q. A few months back, a New York Con-
gressman was promoting a resolution to re-
peal the native-born requirement for U.S.
Presidents. Do you have any interest in
such a resolution?

Secretary Kissinger: I consider him
one of the leading statesman legislators.

[Laughter.] I am campaigning for his re-
election. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, sir.

Q. —in some quarters the Kissinger per-
sonal shuttle diplomacy is considered dead
and in other quarters is considered recessed.
What is your own evaluation of the chances
of another try for an interim agreement
before Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends very
much whether both parties or one party—
either party—comes up with something that
makes it possible. The last shuttle diplomacy
depended really on two concurrent negotia-
tions—the negotiation between Egypt and
Israel and the negotiation within the Arab
world to make it possible for Egypt to go
ahead.

It will not be easy to re-create these con-
ditions, and in any event, it would be unwise
and risky for the United States to engage its
prestige at this level unless there were some
assurance from the parties ahead of time of
a probable success. So we will be able to
make a better judgment on that after Presi-
dent Ford has spoken to President Sadat
and Prime Minister Rabin.

At this moment, we are not familiar with
any new ideas that have come from either
side that would encourage us to resume
shuttle diplomacy. On the other hand, we
don't want to exclude it at any point in the
next month—if conditions are such that this
would be the best way to promote peace in
the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your
speech—

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't seem to
make any difference whom I point to first
[Laughter.]

Q. You mentioned in your speech this
afternoon, or said that you are building
world grain reserves.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. It has come to our attention on the
news wire service here that USDA [U.S.
Department of Agriculture] has figures a

732

Department of State Bulletin

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June 2,

little bit opposed to what the State Depart-
ment has recommended for a world grain re-
serves quota. I think the USDA wants 20
million tons of grain in the reserve, whereas
the State Department wants 60 million tons
put in reserve.

Secretary Kissinger: Just a nuance of dif-
ference. [Laughter.]

Q. I wonder if you have reached any con-
clusions, and if you have, what would your
compromise be?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the figure—the principles that I outlined today on the world food reserve have been agreed to by the Agriculture Department, and therefore it is a historic occasion when both the State Department and the Agriculture Department have a joint position.

Now, how you would translate—you re-
member that one of the principles is that the
reserves should be able to meet foreseeable
shortfalls, or something like that. I think
that would tend to push them to the higher
rather than to the lower figure on that
spectrum, but obviously the precise figure is
one that will have to be negotiated.

Q. Okay.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. —in several of his speeches, former
President Nixon referred to the situation in
Viet-Nam as "peace with honor." Whatever
happened to peace with honor? Did it ever
really exist?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is impor-
tant in assessing any foreign policy to look,
first of all, at the alternatives that were
available. After all, we found 550,000 Amer-
icans engaged in combat in Viet-Nam when
we took office, and we found an existing and
constantly growing demand for the with-
d withdrawal of American forces and the release of
American prisoners. And, if you remember,
the criticism that was made of our efforts at
the time was not that we were making too
many concessions. The universal criticism
was that we were asking for too-stringent
conditions.

Secondly, it was our objective—for which
we do not apologize—not to end a war in
which the United States had suffered tens
of thousands of casualties and spent untold
treasure by overthrowing the government
which we had been largely responsible for
installing and with which we had been as-
sociated for so many years.

So our definition of peace with honor was
a withdrawal of American forces, a release
of American prisoners, and to create condi-
tions in which that government would have
an opportunity to survive.

Now, in the two years after the agreement
was signed, many conditions changed in
ways that were totally unpredictable at the
time the agreement was signed. One was
the total collapse, or the substantial collapse,
of executive authority in the United States
as a result of Watergate, which encouraged
pressure. Secondly, there were a number of
legislative restrictions. And, third, there
were reductions in aid.

So we thought—and I still believe—that
the terms we achieved were better than any-
body thought possible at the time. And we
thought that they were in the national in-
terest and that the United States should not
put it on itself to end such a war by over-
throwing its allies.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: And I think the con-
sequences we are seeing today would have
been even more severe if we had done this.
And that was the only alternative we had at
that time.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, do you feel that in
the light of recent events, such as Communist
takeovers of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia
—and now apparently Laos—that the
domino theory is manifesting itself?

Secretary Kissinger: I have always held
the view that any action in foreign policy
has consequences—that you cannot end these
consequences simply by denying that they
exist. So a certain domino effect is inherent
in any major action. And when a great
country like the United States engages in a
massive enterprise for 10 years and then

June 2, 1975

733

this enterprise founders, inevitably there is
a certain domino effect.

Now, our problem is not to deny that this
effect exists, but to manage the new situa-
tion. We would like to avoid a debilitating
debate about these events. And I want to
make clear that my answer on peace with
honor was in response to a question; it is
not an issue which we will raise.

It is now important to face the facts that
we now confront and to deal with them. I
believe we can deal with them, and we will
deal with them. But we can't deny that there
have been consequences.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say why you
chose St. Louis and Kansas City as forums
for foreign policy speeches?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that the conduct of our foreign policy requires, very strongly, the support of the American people, and I believe also that here in the center of America that we have too much of a tendency to take it¹ for granted. I've been invited for many months to visit St. Louis, and therefore I took the opportunity of this period when I believe that it is important for the public to understand that we have a purpose in foreign policy—that we think it can be realized—to talk about our political objectives in one part of Missouri and then of our economic objectives in other.

This is essentially why I chose to come
here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in North Korea, do you foresee any type of movement across the DMZ [demilitarized zone] there, or any jockeying for a more stronger position in that area?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the President
has strongly reaffirmed our commitment—
our security commitment—to South Korea.
As you know, this commitment is one that
is embodied in a treaty which has been rati-
fied; and therefore there is no ambiguity
about what our commitment is.

I do not believe that there will be a North
Korean military move unless North Korea

questions the validity of our commitment.
And I think they would make a mistake if
they did this.

Q. Do we have troops?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have 40,000
troops there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since about 1919 the U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Communist countries generally has been based on the single theme of containment. You have talked about dealing with the consequences of recent developments in Indochina. It seems apparent that the idea of "what's theirs is theirs and what's ours we will talk about" has not worked too well. Is there any chance that there will be a major change in foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: The policy of con-
tainment does not mean what is theirs is
theirs and what is ours we will talk about.
And what hasn't worked in Indochina is not
that they talked about what was ours, but
that for a variety of reasons we were not
prepared to sustain the effort there or the
effort was never capable of being sustained.

But in any event, it is not a correct de-
scription of American foreign policy that
what is theirs is theirs and what is ours we
will talk about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects
of Thailand and Burma? Will they need
help?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Burma is of
course a neutralist country and has no direct
—I mean it has diplomatic relations with
us but it has no form of security relationship
with us.

Thailand is a member of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization and as such is
connected with us in that military organiza-
tion. What Thailand will do in the light of
events in neighboring countries which the
United States proved unable or unwilling to
stem—I would expect that Thailand will re-
view its policy, and indeed it has stated that
it will review its policy. The willingness of
all countries that are potentially threatened
by North Vietnamese or other Communist
pressures in Southeast Asia to resist is one

¹The center of America. [Footnote in transcript.]

734

Department of State Bulletin

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June

of the issues that will have to be looked at in assessing the consequences of Indonesia.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a report from Washington today indicates the possibility that the Mayaguez was carrying military weapons, in fact, under lease to the U.S. military. Is this correct?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge this is not correct. The last information that I had was that it was not carrying weapons, that it was a container ship carrying miscellaneous cargo, including some PX supplies. But it is not something to which I want to be finally held, because I have not seen the manifest. What I do know is that the highest officials of the government, when they learned of this, were dealing with it as a merchant ship, finding out information from the company to which it belonged, and therefore we are dealing with it as the seizure of an American merchant ship on peaceful trade in international waters. And I think no other interpretation has yet come to my attention or is valid.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what has been learned about Cambodia's possible reasons for taking the ship? Has there been any communication indicating—

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speculate on this. I have no—

Q. Have we been in communication with them?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that we are pursuing diplomatic efforts to secure the release of the ship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much pressure is there on the Administration to use force now to get the ship back? If there is some pressure, where is it coming from, what part of the government?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you all know, I got out of town as soon as things got hot. [Laughter.] But I have been in close touch with Washington. We are proceeding with deliberation and determination. And we will make the decision not on the basis of what pressures are brought on us, but what

is most likely to secure the release of the ship.

Q. Who is bringing pressure on you—the Pentagon, Congress, any sector of Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have seen a lot of public statements that have been made by various Congressmen with various points of view. But I think as far as the government is concerned—I attended one NSC [National Security Council] meeting, I have had a full report on another one—I have the impression that the government is fully united on the course that needs to be taken. There are no pressures within the government that are trying to push the President in a direction in which he doesn't want to go. So I think this ought to be looked at from the point of view of a problem that the country has, with which it is trying to deal in the most effective way possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you taken a stand on participation in the Geneva Conference by the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not taken a formal stand on it. Our view is that until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel and the relevant resolutions, we don't have a decision to make, because until that is done, we don't see that any negotiation with it could be even theoretically contemplated. After that, we might look at the problem. But this situation does not now exist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were asked before about Hawks. Were you saying that the supplying of Hawks to Jordan was likely to keep Jordan from war with Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: It enables Jordan to pursue the kind of moderate policy that we have sought to encourage and to rely on its own resources rather than on those of its neighbors or other foreign countries.

Q. Wasn't its lack of air defense its reason for not being in the last war? And now they will have an air defense.

Secretary Kissinger: I think they would have no difficulty getting an air defense, if

June 2, 1975

735

they wanted it badly enough, from any number of sources.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why was it not possible, then, to keep that decision in abeyance until after the reassessment of Mideast policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Partly because there has been a whole series of ongoing shipments to Israel that have also continued during this period of reassessment. And this particular negotiation was more in the category of an ongoing one than of moving into a totally new area of technology.

Q. Wasn't it true that the Israelis have been asking also for new weapons systems, like the Lance and the F-15—

Secretary Kissinger: But the Lance and the F-15—the Israelis possess Hawks. The Lance and the F-15 are in a quite different category. Indeed, the F-15 cannot be delivered until late 1977, anyway. So no irrevocable decisions have been taken there.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Prime Minister Lee of Singapore
Visits Washington

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore made an unofficial visit to the United States May 5-11. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Lee at a White House dinner May 8.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 12

PRESIDENT FORD

We are here, all of us this evening, to welcome to Washington the very distinguished Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee of Singapore, and we are delighted to have both of you here, Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee.

Regrettably, I have not yet had the opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to visit Singapore and, unfortunately, until this morning, I had never had the opportunity to get acquainted with you and to exchange views

with you. But obviously, because of your reputation and your country's reputation, I have known both of you.

And I must say that the reputation of both the country and yourself is carried very far throughout the world. In its brief existence, Mr. Prime Minister, a decade of independence, Singapore has compiled a tremendous reputation and record of accomplishment.

Asian traditions have blended in this case very successfully with modern technology to produce a prosperous and a very progressive society without sacrificing a distinctive cultural heritage.

Singapore has built for itself a position of great respect and influence in Southeast Asia and throughout the rest of the world, and I have noticed that in my many contacts with other leaders in the Commonwealth, as well as elsewhere.

As the principal architect of this success, the Prime Minister has become widely known, not only for what Singapore has accomplished under his leadership but also for his very broad grasp of international relationships.

Over the last decade, he has achieved a very special status among world leaders for his very thoughtful and his articulate interpretations of world events. He is a man of vision whose views are very relevant to world issues and whose advice is widely sought.

When the Prime Minister speaks, we all listen most carefully for good and sufficient reasons, and we come away from those experiences far wiser.

And I am especially pleased that we have an opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister at this time. We have had a tragedy in Indochina. It is affecting all of the countries in Southeast Asia, as well as all of us who are deeply concerned for the future of Southeast Asia and for the cause of freedom.

It has made the problems of Southeast Asia much more difficult. But let me say without reservation, we are determined to deal affirmatively with those problems, and we will deal with them.

736

Department of State Bulletin

June 2

headed for an era in which economic problems and political challenges are solved by tests of strength. Will the world face up to the imperative of interdependence, or will it be engulfed in contests of nations or blocs?

The role which the United States takes will be crucial. Will we fulfill our responsibility of leadership? If we know our own interest, we will.

For the United States still represents the single greatest concentration of economic wealth and power to be found on the planet. But what is asked of us now most of all is not our resources but our vision and will.

The American people have always believed

in a world of cooperation rather than force, of negotiation rather than confrontation, and of fulfillment of the aspirations of peoples for progress and justice. Such a world will never come about without our active contribution. The opportunities open to us are immense, if we have the courage and faith to seize them.

We have a stake in the world's success. It will be our own success. If we respond to the challenge with the vision and determination that the world has come to expect from America, our children will look back upon this period as the beginning of America's greatest triumphs.

## U.S. Recovers Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy

### STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, MAY 12

White House press release dated May 12

We have been informed that a Cambodian naval vessel has seized an American merchant ship on the high seas and forced it to the port of Kompong Som. The President has met with the NSC. He considers this seizure an act of piracy. He has instructed the State Department to demand the immediate release of the ship. Failure to do so would have the most serious consequences.

### STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, MAY 13¹

The merchant ship Mayaguez at last report was anchored close to the island of Koh Tang, 30 miles off the coast of Cambodia. During the night, Washington time, it was escorted by two Cambodian naval vessels from the point where it was originally boarded (that point was eight miles from the rock island of Poulo Wai) toward its

present location. The ship is being kept under observation by U.S. military aircraft. The President was kept informed of developments during the night.

### NOTICE TO MARINERS ²

Special Warning: Shipping is advised until further notice to remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam including off lying islands. Recent incidents have been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. This warning in no way should be construed as United States recognition of Cambodian or Vietnamese territorial sea claims or as derogation

¹ Read by Press Secretary Ron Nessen at a news briefing at 6:54 a.m. e.d.t.

² Issued by the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center at 7:15 p.m. EDT, May 12; made available at the Department of Defense and the White House on May 13.

June 2, 1975

Bulletin

719

of the right of innocent passage for United
States flag vessels, or derogation of the free-
dom of the high seas.

U.S. LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL,
MAY 14

USUN press release 40 dated May 14

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: The United States Government wishes to draw urgently to your attention the threat to international peace which has been posed by the illegal and unprovoked seizure by Cambodian authorities of the U.S. merchant vessel, Mayaguez, in international waters.

This unarmed merchant ship has a crew
of about forty American citizens.

As you are no doubt aware, my Govern-
ment has already initiated certain steps
through diplomatic channels, insisting on im-
mediate release of the vessel and crew. We
also request you to take any steps within
your ability to contribute to this objective.

In the absence of a positive response to
our appeals through diplomatic channels for
early action by the Cambodian authorities,
my Government reserves the right to take
such measures as may be necessary to pro-
tect the lives of American citizens and prop-
erty, including appropriate measures of self-
defense under Article 51 of the United Na-
tions Charter.

Accept, Mr. Secretary General, the assur-
ances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

JOHN SCALI
[U.S. Representative
to the United Nations]

U.S. LETTER TO U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
PRESIDENT, MAY 14

My Government has instructed me to in-
form you and the Members of the Security
Council of the grave and dangerous situation
brought about by the illegal and unprovoked
seizure by Cambodian authorities of a United

States merchant vessel, the S.S. Mayaguez,
in international waters in the Gulf of Siam.

The S.S. Mayaguez, an unarmed commer-
cial vessel owned by the Sea-Land Corpora-
tion of Menlo Park, New Jersey, was fired
upon and halted by Cambodian gunboats and
forcibly boarded at 9:16 p.m. (Eastern Day-
light Time) on May 12. The boarding took
place at 09 degrees, 48 minutes north lati-
tude, 102 degrees, 53 minutes east longitude.
The vessel has a crew of about 40, all of
whom are United States citizens. At the
time of seizure, the S.S. Mayaguez was en
route from Hong Kong to Thailand and was
some 52 nautical miles from the Cambodian
coast. It was some 7 nautical miles from
the Islands of Poulo Wai which, my Govern-
ment understands, are claimed by both Cam-
bodia and South Viet-Nam.

The vessel was on the high seas, in inter-
national shipping lanes commonly used by
ships calling at the various ports of South-
east Asia. Even if, in the view of others,
the ship were considered to be within Cam-
bodian territorial waters, it would clearly
have been engaged in innocent passage to
the port of another country. Hence, its
seizure was unlawful and involved a clear-
cut illegal use of force.

The United States Government under-
stands that at present the S.S. Mayaguez is
being held by Cambodian naval forces at
Koh Tang Island approximately 15 nautical
miles off the Cambodian coast.

The United States Government immedi-
ately took steps through diplomatic channels
to recover the vessel and arrange the return
of the crew. It earnestly sought the urgent
cooperation of all concerned to this end, but
no response has been forthcoming. In the
circumstances the United States Government
has taken certain appropriate measures un-
der Article 51 of the UN Charter whose pur-
pose it is to achieve the release of the vessel
and its crew.

I request that this letter be circulated as
an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely,

JOHN SCALI.

720

Department of State Bulletin

STATEMENT
SECRETARY

White House

In fur-
the rele-
crew, th-
ing milit-
Washing-
guez.

—U.S.
Mayaguez.

—U.S.
Island in
as may
be.

—Air
undertak-
ing the ar-
rest of the
c

MESSAGE
FROM THE

White House

We ha-
are prep-
We welc-
... as may
hold un-
will pror

As you
soon as
prepared
carry un-
hold un-
will pro-

STATEMENT

At m-
tonight b-
S.S. Ma-
Koh Tan
crew an-
seized by
ducted m-
military
I have

'Made
House at
vision an-
release).

June 2, 1966

STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS
SECRETARY, MAY 14

White House press release dated May 14

In further pursuit of our efforts to obtain
the release of the S.S. *Mayaguez* and its
crew, the President has directed the follow-
ing military measures, starting this evening
Washington time:

- U.S. marines to board the S.S. *Mayaguez*.

- U.S. marines to land on Koh Tang Island in order to rescue any crew members as may be on the island.

- Aircraft from the carrier *Coral Sea* to undertake associated military operations in the area in order to protect and support the operations to regain the vessel and members of the crew.

MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES
FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, MAY 14

We have heard radio broadcast that you
are prepared to release the S.S. *Mayaguez*.
We welcome this development, if true.

As you know, we have seized the ship. As
soon as you issue a statement that you are
prepared to release the crew members you
hold unconditionally and immediately, we
will promptly cease military operations.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, MAY 15 3

At my direction, United States forces
tonight boarded the American merchant ship
S.S. *Mayaguez* and landed at the Island of
Koh Tang for the purpose of rescuing the
crew and the ship, which had been illegally
seized by Cambodian forces. They also con-
ducted supporting strikes against nearby
military installations.

I have now received information that the

vessel has been recovered intact and the
entire crew has been rescued. The forces
that have successfully accomplished this mis-
sion are still under hostile fire but are pre-
paring to disengage.

I wish to express my deep appreciation
and that of the entire nation to the units
and the men who participated in these opera-
tions for their valor and for their sacrifice.

PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
MAY 15 4

MAY 15, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT
PRO TEM:) On 12 May 1975, I was advised
that the S. S. Mayaguez, a merchant vessel
of United States registry en route from Hong
Kong to Thailand with a U.S. citizen crew,
was fired upon, stopped, boarded, and seized
by Cambodian naval patrol boats of the
Armed Forces of Cambodia in international
waters in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island.
The seized vessel was then forced to proceed
to Koh Tang Island where it was required to
anchor. This hostile act was in clear violation
of international law.

In view of this illegal and dangerous act,
I ordered, as you have been previously ad-
vised, United States military forces to con-
duct the necessary reconnaissance and to be
ready to respond if diplomatic efforts to
secure the return of the vessel and its per-
sonnel were not successful. Two United
States reconnaissance aircraft in the course
of locating the Mayaguez sustained minimal
damage from small firearms. Appropriate
demands for the return of the Mayaguez and
its crew were made, both publicly and pri-
vately, without success.

In accordance with my desire that the Con-
gress be informed on this matter and taking
note of Section 4(a) (1) of the War Powers
Resolution, I wish to report to you that at
about 6:20 a.m., 13 May, pursuant to my in-

³ Made in the press briefing room at the White House at 12:27 a.m. e.d.t., broadcast live on television and radio (text from White House press release).

⁴ Identical letters were sent to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate (text from White House press release).

June 2, 1975

721

structions to prevent the movement of the
Mayaguez into a mainland port, U.S. aircraft
fired warning shots across the bow of the ship
and gave visual signals to small craft ap-
proaching the ship. Subsequently, in order to
stabilize the situation and in an attempt to
preclude removal of the American crew of the
Mayaguez to the mainland, where their res-
cue would be more difficult, I directed the
United States Armed Forces to isolate the
island and interdict any movement between
the ship or the island and the mainland, and
to prevent movement of the ship itself, while
still taking all possible care to prevent loss of
life or injury to the U. S. captives. During the
evening of 13 May, a Cambodian patrol boat
attempting to leave the island disregarded
aircraft warnings and was sunk. Thereafter,
two other Cambodian patrol craft were de-
stroied and four others were damaged and
immobilized. One boat, suspected of having
some U.S. captives aboard, succeeded in
reaching Kompong Som after efforts to turn
it around without injury to the passengers
failed.

Our continued objective in this operation
was the rescue of the captured American
crew along with the retaking of the ship
Mayaguez. For that purpose, I ordered late
this afternoon [May 14] an assault by
United States Marines on the island of Koh
Tang to search out and rescue such Ameri-
cans as might still be held there, and I
ordered retaking of the Mayaguez by other
marines boarding from the destroyer escort
HOLT. In addition to continued fighter and
gunship coverage of the Koh Tang area, these
marine activities were supported by tac-
tical aircraft from the CORAL SEA, strik-
ing the military airfield at Ream and other
military targets in the area of Kompong Som
in order to prevent reinforcement or support
from the mainland of the Cambodian forces
detaining the American vessel and crew.

At approximately 9:00 P.M. EDT on 14

May, the Mayaguez was retaken by United
States forces. At approximately 11:30 P.M.,
the entire crew of the Mayaguez was taken
aboard the WILSON. U.S. forces have begun
the process of disengagement and with-
d withdrawal.

This operation was ordered and conducted
pursuant to the President's constitutional
Executive power and his authority as
Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Armed Forces.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

Letters of Credence

Chile

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Chile, Manuel Trucco, presented
his credentials to President Ford on April
29.¹

Colombia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Colombia, Julio César Turbay
Ayala, presented his credentials to President
Ford on April 29.¹

Haiti

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Haiti, Georges Salomon, pre-
sented his credentials to President Ford on
April 29.¹

Peru

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Peru, Vice Admiral (ret.) José
Arce, presented his credentials to President
Ford on April 29.¹

¹ For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Apr. 29.

722

Department of State Bulletin

Questions by Se-

Follow-
ference
Louis, M.
session f
sas City
cil on M
at Kans-

NEWS CO.

Press release

Q. Mr.
fairly ob-
that is the
bodia. Ca-
and some
dent mea-
released in
future, ou-
sequences.

Secreta-
t President'
called the
demanded
American
out that fa-
consequence

We are
efforts to
they have H
any further

Q. Has a
as a possibl

Secretary
any direct
bodian auth

Q. Have
bodian auth

Secretary

June 2, 1975

1973

TAB

(1) Paris Peace Accords - Signed January 27, 1973:

1

Article 8 on POWs/MIAs. Captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties are treated in 8 (a) and (b) while the matter of Vietnam civilians are treated in 8 (c) as you explained at your January 24 press conference. Much of the discussions with the DRV in 1973 (after our POWs were released) concerned their complaints that the US and Saigon were not cooperating on 8(c). Among "understandings" associated with the agreement (eight of them), two related to Article 8. The first affirmed that the "parties" in (a) and (b) "covers all personnel of the parties and from any other country." The second affirmed HAK statement of October 17, 1972 - re 8(c) - that the US would use its "maximum influence to secure the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam" within sixty days of signing and the return of such detainess within ninety days as envisaged by the Agreement. There was also a Protocol on "Prisoners and Detainees." All at tab 1.

(2) February 1 haggle over POW release: Fulfilling a commitment first made by LBJ, it was promised that a message following up on Article 21 on economic aid would be sent to the DRV. As Years of Upheaval faithfully reconstructed (p 39 at tab), that message was held up because the NVN had failed to turn over a promised list of POWs in Laos. The DRV caved.

2

(3) Secretary Rogers explained the problem of inadequate POW lists (saying "many will not come back") to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 8, avowing that "we will continue to press ahead with all efforts to obtain the fullest possible information on these cases."

3

(4) Visit to Hanoi - February 1973: By the time you arrived in Hanoi, the first POWs were beginning to arrive in the Philippines en route home. The view from RN was that there could be no economic aid unless Hanoi lived up to all provisions of the Paris Accords (the whole issue of aid to NVN was becoming predominant in the press and on the Hill). You specifically raised particular cases with NVN, backed up with evidence - as described in YOU, p. 33-34 (at tab) and you also asked for information on MIAs. Tho offered the release of 20 POWs in connection with your visit. He gave soothing reassurances Hanoi would be of help while simultaneously noting the difficulty of being of help. The visit communique stressed that both sides would "fully and scrupulously" implement the accords.

4

Page 2

TAB

Asked about the prisoner issue by Barbara Walters in a 2/25/73 NBC broadcast, you affirmed that "We will make a full investigation, and we will insist on an accounting."

(5) Viet-Nam Peace Conference in Paris. Rogers issued formal invitations on February 15. On February 21 he discussed the POW issue in a statement to the SFRC noting steps being taken in Vietnam, concern about Laos and citing the Communist side's indication that there were no American POWs in Cambodia.

5

(6) Late February problem over POWs: The NVN had failed to produce a POW list for release on February 27, hinting it was linked to Saigon's release of prisoners - a violation of Article 8. As noted in YOU, the US reacted sharply since the deal was that the rate of POW release was to be no less than the rate of US troop withdrawals; by that time we had withdrawn over 50% of our troops and we warned Hanoi to go ahead with its scheduled release to bring the total up to 50% of those scheduled to come home. We even threatened suspension of the US-DRV Joint Economic Commission talks (not mentioned in YOU). In the end, the NVN complied. Ziegler was instructed to issue a tough statement at the time and Rogers was instructed to raise the POW problem as a priority in the Vietnam conference then convening in Paris.

6

(7) Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris: Rogers presided over this February 26-March 2 confab by which the US hoped to generate some sense of international responsibility for the observance of the Paris Agreement. In attendance were the four parties to the Paris Agreement (US, GVN, DRV and PRG), four parties of the ICCS (Canada, Indonesia, Poland and Hungary) and key parties from the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords (UK, France, USSR and China). The POW issue was raised in Rogers' concluding March 2 press conference in which he said the US would brook no compromise on POWs which could not be linked to NVN complaints of alleged violations of the ceasefire by Saigon. He stressed that the POW issue had been a priority in his talks.

7

(8) Nixon - March 2: Reaffirmed a no compromise posture on POWs. Meanwhile, he was growing apprehensive about the impact of military retaliation on POW release - as detailed in YOU, p 319 ff (at tab). On March 25, RN had Ziegler release a strong statement insisting on POW release by the March 28 deadline:

8

"The President has ordered that U.S. forces will remain in Vietnam until all prisoners of war are

Page 3

TAB

released. President Nixon has repeatedly said that as long as U.S. prisoners of war continue to be held in Indochina, the withdrawal of U.S. forces will not be completed. The President this morning repeated these instructions to U.S. personnel in Washington and in Saigon: Until all U.S. prisoners of war are released, there will be U.S. forces in Vietnam. The deadline for the release is March the 28th, and if this agreed timetable is not met, the other side will have failed to live up to the agreement and their commitments and assurances."

8

(9) **Nixon address - March 29:** RN reported to the Nation that "all of our American POWs are on their way home."

9

(10) **April 20 U.S. Reply to DRV Charges of Violations:** The U.S. circulated a note to participants of the Paris peace conference condemning a whole host of NVN violations of the Paris accords - illustrating the range of problems (of which our POW situation had been only one, up through March 28). The references in this document to POWs are in para. 25 - and relate to exclusively to DRV complaints about Article 8(c). (Indeed, the DRV pressed this in private talks with HAK for the rest of the year).

10

(Meanwhile, Congressional efforts to halt bombing in Cambodia are mounting)

In May the Soviets were warned about DRV violations of the agreement along the lines of the above and were also told of the abysmal compliance by the NVN of Article 8(c).

(11) **State Report on POWs/MIAS - May 31:** A State Department official reported to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on May 31 that all information was that no US prisoners continued to be held in Indochina and that the Communist side in Laos repeatedly assured the US that there were no more Americans held there. He did note reports suggesting prisoners in Cambodia (and quoted HAK on January 24 that there were none) and did acknowledge "the possibility" that some Western personnel continued to be held. He affirmed that the US would press ahead for information on the missing and the dead.

11

Meanwhile, RN's foreign policy report to the Congress had been issued on May 3rd. It spoke of the "return of our prisoners" such that now the focus would be on "the missing in action."

Page 4

TAB

(12) June 13 Communique: You negotiated with Le Duc Tho in three sessions in May-June, leading to the June 13 statement. RN's instruction of May 17 to you was: "Hit them hard on MIA accounting and on withdrawal from Cambodia as conditions for aid." *

12

YOU (at tab) summarizes those negotiations with Tho. As far as POW/MIA matters went, it is noted on p 331 that the discussion turned on Tho's complaints about Saigon's performance on prisoner exchange (i.e. 8 (c) of the Paris Accords).

The June 13 communique is at tab 13. It was preceded by a press conference by you in which you noted concern about "the inadequate accounting for the missing in action," and further that "all sides have pledged that they would make major efforts to help each other to account for the missing in action throughout Indochina, and this is a matter which is of great concern to the United States." (No one asked questions about POWs/MIAs).

13

The communique itself, in addition to language on Article 8(c) of the Agreement, also contains the following: "Any captured personnel covered by Article 8(a) of the Agreement who have not yet been returned shall be returned without delay, and in any event within no more than thirty days from the date of signature of this Joint Communique." There is also a pledge regarding 8 (b) on missing in action. (There were also some "understandings" with the communique - as there were for the Agreement in January. One understanding - as in January - reaffirmed that the US would use its "maximum influence" to secure the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel in SVN.

(There is no further coverage of POWs in Years of Upheaval after the Indochina chapter ending p. 373)

(13) July 29 US Statement on Missing in Action: The US lodged a formal protest on July 29 on DRV's compliance with provisions on missing in action. (At this point in time the White House is fighting the losing battle on Cambodia; the US is also increasingly issue protest statements to the DRV on all manner of its military violations of the Accords - such as one on September 10 complaining of construction of airfields and antiaircraft emplacements within SVN territory and

14

* This instruction was later recalled by RN in a 1977 letter to Lester Wolff in connection with Wolff hearings on commitments to reconstruction aid to NVN. RN's letter defended his position that he did not contemplate such aid if NVN failed to live up to the Paris Agreement, or without Congressional approval.

PAGE 5

TAB

one on October 26 on NVN troop infiltration into SVN).

(14) August 20: Rogers in a press conference was encouraged, among other things, by the fact that "our POWs have been returned, although the agreement was not being implemented as we would like.

15

(Middle East War - October etc)

(15) December 20 Meeting with Le Duc Tho: You went to that meeting armed with a list of rebuttals to various DRV accusations against the US and Saigon, including on the issue of missing in action and the obstacles the DRV/PRG had put in the way of implementing 8 (b) of the Agreement. In the meeting, discussion again revolved around Le Duc Tho's complaints of political prisoners in Saigon.

16

FYI: The day before the meeting, on Dec. 19, the PRG released an American civilian prisoner who had been captured October 6.

APR 23 '92 17:33 212-759-0042

P.1

HENRY A. KISSINGER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

April 21, 1992

Dear Strobe:

Henry Muller may have shared with you my attempt to convince TIME that what is politically correct on Vietnam is not necessarily true. But when my favorite TIME writer parrots the radical rhetoric of the Sixties, I know it is time to give up.

In your recent column you ascribed the "peace is at hand" phrase to a desire to affect the 1972 election. It is a pity you added to an absurd folklore when a little reflection would have shown you the absurdity of your comment.

- What was the context of my notorious press conference? The world awoke that morning to a Hanoi broadcast that peace had been concluded and inviting us to sign 72 hours hence. Moreover, Hanoi published the text of the agreement as it then stood. In other words, it was not the Administration which sprang the word "peace" on the public so close to the election; it was Hanoi asserting not only that peace was at hand but that it was here. We would not have initiated the debate on our own.

The purpose of my press conference was to explain why we would not sign just yet. I tried to indicate that peace was near but required more refinement as far as we were concerned. The bulk of a press conference extending for well over an hour was to explain what remained to be done. It was a balancing act between Hanoi's insistence that we sign and Saigon's temptation to bolt. "Peace is at hand" was not the most felicitous phrase, above all

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APR 23 '92 17:34 212-759-0042

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because it lent itself so easily to distortion. But, considering that an agreement was achieved eight weeks later, it was not so inaccurate either. And it was a tiny portion of a very detailed briefing devoted to explaining why we were *delaying* peace.

- The press conference was held after I had travelled constantly for three weeks and been out of touch with domestic politics, from which Nixon in any event kept me strictly - and correctly - isolated.

- Nixon at that point was twenty points ahead. He was convinced that his biggest political danger was to be perceived to play politics with the war. He was much more worried to lose conservative votes than to gain moderates, most of which he had already. As he repeatedly wrote me - and some of these communications are in my memoirs - he would have preferred to delay a settlement until after the election. On the other hand, he did not want to delay a settlement for political reasons. In other words, in his eyes, to proceed with a settlement was justified by *non-political* motives.

- Amusingly, I did not realize I was on the record since *all* my previous briefings over four years had been on background. Ziegler had neglected to tell me that the rules had been changed just before I went on.

Why don't you read the briefing before you write again.

Mr. Strobe Talbott
Editor at Large
TIME, Inc.
Time & Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, N.Y. 10020

04/22APR 23 '92 17:35 212-759-0042

TALBOTT

P.3

STROBE TALBOTT
Suite 850
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone (202) 861-4079
Telefax (202) 463-5083

April 22, 1992

Dr. Henry Kissinger
New York, N. Y. (by fax)

Dear Henry:

Thanks (I guess) for your letter. I appreciate the generous comment with which you begin. May I assume that this means Walter is only your second favorite TIME writer? If so, the secret is safe with me.

Naturally, I take very seriously the strong exception you register to my recent column. The offending passage contains four assertions: 1) "[In November 1972, you] proclaimed, 'Peace is at hand'; 2) "What was really at hand was another election"; 3) "Nixon won"; 4) "[He] then unleashed the Christmas bombing."

All four are factually correct, although your letter calls into question whether "proclaimed" should perhaps give way to a more neutral verb, like "said." (The business of Ziegler and the ground rules is interesting background but not, I'd respectfully suggest, terribly germane.)

Your quarrel, of course, is with the implication of the four assertions. My point in the piece is that the pressures of the campaign and the impending election drove and complicated the diplomatic process. Your letter confirms that point. So, incidentally, does *White House Years*, pp. 1398-1399.

Both in your letter and in your memoirs, you argue strenuously that your motives, and the President's, were "non-political." My counterargument -- the theme of my column -- is that in election years, *nothing* (notably including the most sensitive, controversial and difficult diplomatic and national-security venture) is non-political. That goes for an incumbent President seeking re-election who is 20 points ahead in the polls. That's why, in general, wise statesmanship and intelligent public debate of the issues have tended to be victims of our domestic political process, at least in the heat of campaign years.

This is a contention I would have expected you to

04/24/1992 '92 17:36 212-759-0042

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P.4 1003

agree with, even though I had no illusions that you would
be delighted by the one reference to you in the piece. Two
paragraphs beyond, I mentioned '76, when both Carter and
Reagan were beating up on Ford from the right. Had space
permitted, I could have expanded on that episode, recalling
how you, along with your considerable accomplishments in
the field of East-West relations, were treated at the Kan-
sas City convention.

I doubt I've assuaged your annoyance over my piece.
But I hope I've persuaded you that whatever lay behind the
sentences in question, and whatever room there may be for
continuing disagreement on that score, it was more than a
"parroting of the radical rhetoric of the Sixties." So
please don't follow through on your threat to give up. I'm
sure you won't.

To conclude on a less combative note: ever since I
started writing about you and your works in 1974 (our first
dispute -- more memorable for me than for you! -- was over
Cyrpus, Turkey and all that), you've let me know when you
were less than pleased; you've given me a chance to
respond; and you've never cast me into outer darkness, at
least not permanently. For all that, thanks --

And cheers,

Strobe Talbott

APR 23 '92 16:41 212-759-0042

TALBOTT

P.1

002

April 23, 1992

BY FAX

Dear Henry:

Let me take your two paragraphs in order...

On the first, I'm guilty as charged. I do indeed believe that there was a connection between certain highly publicized features of the Administration's Vietnam diplomacy in the fall of '72 and the election. I'll defer to you as the best source on what exactly was in your mind when you made the peace-is-at-hand comment, but (as your earlier tends to confirm) there's not much doubt that Ziegler's motives in the way he orchestrated that press conference had something to do with campaign politics. In any event, in my column I was not accusing you or President Nixon of being "diabolical" (perish the thought!); rather, to repeat myself, I was stressing what I still think is the in-disputable fact that election-year politics and foreign policy usually interact in ways that are detrimental to the latter (and sometimes to the former as well).

To be quite frank, Henry, I have the distinct sense from both the substance and the tone of your reaction to my column that those couple of sentences of mine have triggered in you a response not so much to what I wrote as to a whole chorus of others who have opined, in print and elsewhere, on this subject over the years.

Now, as to your second paragraph: Not for the first time in our interactions, you've got me forensically buffaloaed. Or, to borrow a line from your first letter -- I give up! I'm dazzled and a bit mystified, to the point of being without a good come-back or self-defense. Among other things, I'd like to dip into these same books and articles you've been reading about time/space travel. Some of us commentators on events wouldn't mind an occasional opportunity to go back in time and tinker with some of our own deathless prose. But don't let that get around.

I hope to see you in Lisbon. I'm speaking at lunch Sunday on election politics and foreign policy. I will have nothing to say about 1972!

HENRY A. KISSINGER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

February 27, 1992

Dear Mr. Muller:

Due to a visit to Mexico, I did not catch up with your issue of February 24 and the story, "The Long Shadow of Vietnam." I am therefore a little late in protesting in the strongest terms the phrase, "... Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger allowed 18,000 more Americans to be killed so that, bizarrely, the snarling and bleeding Americans could exit from Vietnam with sufficient style, an illusion of credibility."

I cannot remember having read anything more unfair and more unworthy of a major publication. There are many reasons for the loss of confidence your article seeks to describe, including importantly unwise government actions. But a contributing factor is the sneering, self-righteous, insensitive tone animating the quote.

You have available a superb research staff. Had you utilized it properly, it would have told you that, of the 16,000 casualties (not 18,000 as you allege), over 9,000 occured during the first year of President Nixon's term, 12,000 during the first 18 months (see attached Department of Defense table). I do not deprecate a single casualty. But a fair assessment would have shown drastic yearly reductions in casualties, have tried to establish whether a more rapid withdrawal than took place in these first 18 months (about 125,000) was possible, and have sought to determine whether the war could have been ended much more quickly.

Your snide comment totally misstates the issue as it presented itself to Nixon and his colleagues. When Nixon was inaugurated there were 525,000 Americans in Vietnam and the number was still increasing on the basis of plans established by our predecessors, finally

Page Two

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

reaching some 550,000. The official US policy on
withdrawals was the San Antonio formula formulated by
President Johnson, which required a *prior* North Vietnam
withdrawal *and* a reduction in the level of guerilla
violence *before* an American withdrawal. The dissident
Democrats - McGovern, Kennedy et al. - were recommending
an end of search-and-destroy operations and the
beginning of *mutual* withdrawal - a plank rejected by
the Democratic convention.

Nobody could have expected Richard Nixon - known
for relatively hard-line views all of his political
life - to go beyond the minority plank of the
Democratic party. But he did. By August 1969 he had
accepted the minority plank of the Democrats and had
gone far beyond it to a process of *unilateral* American
withdrawal.

From March 1970 onward, Hanoi knew that we were
prepared to establish a schedule of unilateral
withdrawal and indeed did so during the year. What we
would not do is give in to the one demand Hanoi did not
abandon until 1972: to overthrow the Saigon
administration *and* to replace it with their appointees.
(They clothed it in the demand for coalition
government, but in the secret talks we never found a
known political figure acceptable to them, even among
opposition leaders.) We offered many formulae for free
elections after US withdrawal, even including the
resignation of Thieu several months before the election
- an offer for which he never forgave us.

An agreement on honorable terms was thus
unavailable until 1972. Despite your sneering tone,
the definition of honor was quite simple: we would not
end the war by imposing a communist government on
people allied with us. Thus our only option was a
staged unilateral withdrawal. Had we tried to withdraw
without a political settlement faster than we did, we
might have been caught in a crossfire between North and
South Vietnamese forces and have left tens of thousands
of hostages. Your snide authors can ridicule all this
but they had no responsibility.

Be that as it may, as soon as Hanoi dropped its
political condition we settled in a matter of weeks.

There are certainly serious questions left over
from the Vietnam tragedy: was it really so bizarre not
to turn over to the tender mercies of Hanoi millions

Page Three

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

who in reliance on America's word had opposed the
North? Was it immoral to seek to avoid the boat
people, the concentration camps and the carnage in
Cambodia? Was it really so absurd to propose genuinely
free elections as a test of American honor?

I do not argue that mistakes were not made - even
less that a serious debate should not be held. If
there is a loss of confidence in this country, those in
government must bear a heavy responsibility. But a
major publication like *Time* ought to ask itself about
its role when it turns a tragedy into a psychodrama and
when its callous writers claim a monopoly of anguish.

Mr. Henry Muller
Managing Editor
TIME, Inc.
Time & Life Building
24th Floor
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York 10022

After I signed the ROTC letter of intent I began to wonder whether the compromise I had made ... was not more objectionable than the draft would have been, because I had no interest in the ROTC program in itself and all I seemed to have done was to protect myself from physical harm ... Finally, on September 12, I stayed up all night writing a letter to the chairman of my draft board ... stating that I couldn't do the ROTC after all and would he please draft me as soon as possible. I never mailed the letter ... because I didn't see, in the end, how my going in the army and maybe going to Vietnam would achieve anything except a feeling that I had punished myself and gotten what I deserved ... To many of us, it is no longer clear what is service and what is disservice, or if it is clear, the conclusion is likely to be illegal ...

Sincerely,
Bill Clinton

in 1969 knew that the U.S. had given up any intention or hope of winning the war in Vietnam. To go there to fight at that late stage meant joining a demoralized army that was sometimes fragging its officers, smoking dope and avoiding enemy contact where possible. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger had configured the war to end, they hoped, in "peace with honor," or anyway to have the battle "Vietnamized," the allied cause assumed by South Vietnamese forces. For American boys in 1969, the war did not look like an inspiring cause.

Americans may have adopted a sort of mellow realism about Vietnam. Among those men who remember the era and once were vulnerable to the draft, Clinton's answers have occasionally sounded

like trimming—although that impression could also be made by someone having trouble remembering exact details of something that happened many years ago. The letter that he wrote in 1969 had hard clarity: a ring of truth and pain of conscience. In this campaign, the authenticity has sometimes been smudged by political calculation.

That may be understandable. The press has kept probing at the Clinton campaign on the tabloid controversies, on the matter of his relationship with Gennifer Flowers and on the long-ago playlet involving the draft.

The memory of Vietnam retains a curious emotional power. Yet oddly, distinguished service as a Navy SEAL in Vietnam and a Congressional Medal of Honor

do not seem to have endowed Bob Kerrey with much magic. Sometimes audiences have become almost uncomfortable as he discussed his war and the wound that cost him part of his right leg.

In his Inaugural Address, George Bush asked Americans to bury the divisions of Vietnam forever. Many Americans thought that the brief, decisive brilliance of Desert Storm dispelled at last the country's queasy reluctance to take military action abroad if it is necessary. Desert Storm did prove that the American military at least had learned the lessons of Vietnam and acted upon them. The American military that faced Saddam Hussein had been rehabilitated.

But much of the deeper Vietnam syndrome persists in the American psyche and in American politics. The war in Vietnam was a profound wound to the nation. Among other things, it sev-

ered the wires of trust that transmitted authority from the older generation to the younger. For years, the two sides of the Vietnam generation have been at war with each other. That conflict within the generation has been demoralizing, corrupting. And perhaps unnecessary.

The true cause of the Vietnam trauma to America was that the fathers failed. The grownups poured their children into a devouring misconception—a bad war that was a vast elaboration on the theme of lying, almost of hallucination. Lyndon Johnson won election in 1964 by promising that American boys would never go to do the job that Asian boys should do. As late as 1968, Hubert Humphrey told munitions salesmen at the White House, "Vietnam is our great adventure ... and a wonderful one it is." After deciding in 1969 to withdraw from a hopeless cause, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger allowed 18,000 more Americans to be killed so that, bizarrely, the snarling and bleeding Americans could exit from Vietnam with sufficient style, an illusion of credibility.

The young, like Bill Clinton, should never have been faced with the dilemma of either fighting that war or being trainers. It was as if American power, like an Aztec sun god, required terrible infusions of blood. Either sacrifice yourselves upon the altar of Vietnam, the drama demanded, or slay the fathers, tear down their house.

Somewhere within the generation now taking power, Vietnam may have installed the suspicion that leadership and authority are a fraud. That view may have subtle stunting effects upon moral growth. If sons don't learn to become fathers, a nation may breed politicians who behave less like full-grown leaders than like inadequate siblings, stepbrothers with problems of their own. Vietnam was a fairly thorough exploration of American folly. The war still reverberates through American politics today.
—Reported by Sam Allis/

Manchester, Barbara Burke/New York and
David S. Jackson/San Francisco

In November 1969, 250,000 marched to end the fighting

DENNIS BRACK/BLACKSTAR

TIME, FEBRUARY 24, 1992

21

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1973

WASHINGTON POST 19 July 1973 P29

# Rogers Indicates GIs to Stay In Korea Beyond July 1974

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, July 18—Twenty years after the armistice which ended a bloody war on this peninsula, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers flew here today to demonstrate continued support of South Korea and declare that American troops will remain on duty here for many months to come.

The changes in South Korea since the armistice of July 27, 1953, Rogers said at a formal dinner tonight, demonstrate the strength of a constant, steady policy and are accomplishments "not only you can be proud of, but all of us can be proud of."

The U.S. statesman made no reference to the substantial changes in the South Korean political system brought about in October by President Park Chung Hee with the backing of guns, tanks and police. When Park suddenly swept away the constitution, put his opponents under arrest and created a virtually unlimited one-man rule, the United States said nothing other than that it was not consulted.

Roger's presence here now for a three-day round of talks with government officials is by far the most tangible and important demonstration of U.S. acquiescence to the new situation in South Korea. Perhaps for this reason, the Park regime had strongly requested a Rogers visit here and welcomed the secretary of state today in nearly royal fashion.

In a press conference yesterday in Tokyo and conferences with leading government officials today, Rogers declared that the 40,000 U.S. troops will remain until it is clear that their removal will not be destabilizing to the power balance on the Korean peninsula.

Rogers avoided saying just how long that might be, but suggested that the answer depended importantly on the progress of the $1.5 billion South Korean armed forces modernization program begun by the United States three years ago. The program was scheduled to be finished in

KOREA...Page 2

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 18 July 1973 P2 (19)

# Troops Needed, Bonn, U.S. Say

By Orr Kelly

Star-News Staff Writer

Defense leaders of the United States and West Germany announced today that they have agreed to "important force improvements" for the defense of Europe.

"The strategy of deterrents add flexible response, including forward defense, continues to be valid and thus should determine the scope and kind of alliance defense effort," DEFENSE Secretary James R. Schlesinger and West German Defense Minister Georg Leber said in a communique issued here today.

The two defense chiefs thus seem to rule out any immediate unilateral reduction of forces as a result of the June 23 agreement between President Nixon and Soviet party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev. Their statement on the renunciation of force and prevention of nuclear war, signed during the Soviet leader's visit here last month, was hailed by both countries as a major step toward easing tensions between the two countries.

SCHLESINGER and Leber, reporting after a day of talks at Camp David, put the emphasis in the communique on strengthening the NATO alliance as well as the individual defense arrangements of the United States and Germany, rather than on cutting back on defenses.

The communique indicated that West Germany had agreed in principle to con-

BONN...Page 2

NEW YORK TIMES 19 July 1973 P1

# House Passes Bill to Curb President's War Powers

By RICHARD L. MADDEN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 18—Despite the threat of a Presidential veto, the House of Representatives tonight passed a measure that would limit the power of the President to commit United States armed forces to hostilities abroad without Congressional approval.

The vote on the legislation, which now goes to the Senate, was 244 to 170. But it was 32 short of the two-thirds that would be needed to override a veto.

As the House began debate on the legislation today, Representative Gerald R. Ford of Michigan, the Republican leader, read a telegram from President Nixon, dated June 26, warning that he would veto the bill because of its "dangerous and unconstitutional restrictions."

Mr. Nixon said in his message that he would welcome "appropriate legislation" giving Congress what he described as its proper role in war powers, but he offered no specific compromise.

Pending on the House floor was a bill approved last month by the House Foreign Affairs Committee that contains the following provisions:

“Within 72 hours after the commitment of United States forces to hostilities in foreign nations, the President would be required to report to Congress

on the circumstances that prompted his action, his authority and the estimated scope and cost of such action.

“Within 120 days after the President's report, the President would have to terminate any commitment, unless Congress enacted a declaration of war or a specific authorization for the use of the forces.

“Within that 120-day period, Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution, not subject to Presidential approval or veto, terminating the commitment of forces.

## Senate Discusses Measure

The Senate also began debate today on a war powers measure of its own, but it took no action. Mr. Nixon's threat of a veto appeared to apply to the Senate as well.

The Senate's bill, similar to one it approved last year, would set a deadline of 30 days on any United States commitment of forces that had not received Congressional sanction. It would not apply to hostilities under way at the time of enactment of the bill.

In his telegram to Mr. Ford, the President said he was "unalterably opposed to and must veto any bill containing the dangerous and unconstitutional restrictions found in sections" that would set a 120-day deadline for termination of military action unless Congress ap-

WAR POWERS...Page 2

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.
JAMES KILLINGBECK, CHIEF, CURRENT NEWS BRANCH, OX 78765

FOR RESEARCH, CLIPPING SERVICE AND DISTRIBUTION CALL

HELEN YOUNG, ASSISTANT CHIEF HARRY ZUBKOFF, CHIEF, EXECUTIVE AGENCY SERVICE, OX 52884

WASHINGTON POST

19 July 1973 P13C

Aircraft Funding

A Senate Armed Services
subcommittee rejected a De-
fense Department request for
a $150 million authorization to
develop prototypes of modi-
fied F-14D and F-15N fighter
aircraft.

Chairman Howard W. Can-
non (D-Nev.) said the tactical
air power subcommittee will
propose $70.1 million for addi-
tional procurement of 24 A-7D
aircraft to keep the pro-
duction line open, and a fly-off
competition between the A-7D
and the A-X to determine rela-
tive suitability for close air
support and interdiction.

The subcommittee deleted
$19.5 million budgeted to start
engineering development of a
short range missile system for
Army forward area air de-
fense, and deleted $4.5 million
to start engineering of a Navy
Redeye missile for shipboard
anti-missile defense.

Research and development
funds for the Air Force A-X
program were reduced by $20
million, cutting back from 10
planes to six. The entire $30
million requested for long
lead production items on the
A-X was deleted.

The subcommittee added
$158.8 million for 12 additional
F-111 aircraft and $14 million
for research and development
of a two-place trainer version
of the F-5E aircraft. The sub-
committee will continue its
markup today.

NEW YORK NEWS

19 July 1973 P14

Cambo Reds
 Await Henry?

Bangkok, Thailand. July 18
(UPI) - Two High-ranking
Khmer (Cambodian) insurgents
are in Peking as an apparent pre-
judice to possible negotiations to
end the fighting in Cambodia, an
informed American source said to-
day.

The presence of ranking in-
surgent officials could provide a
negotiating route around former
Cambodian chief of state Prince
Norodom Sihanouk when White
House adviser Henry Kissinger
visits Peking early next month,
the source indicated.

The two were identified only
as members of the so-called
"Khmer Hanoi," the Cambodian
Communists who went to North
Vietnam when the Communists
took over there in 1954. U.S. of-
ficials believe the Khmer Hanoi
have been installed in positions
of power in the insurgent move-
ment by the North Vietnamese.

One stumbling block to nego-
tiations in Cambodia so far has
been difficulty in finding some-
one who can speak for the insur-

NEW YORK NEWS

19 July 1973 P17

Clear Mines
Off N. Viet

Washington, July 18 (AP)—

The U.S. Navy's minesweeping
operations in North Viet-
namese waters are over and
Haiphong and seven other
ports are clear, the Pentagon
announced today. Only one of
the 11,000 mines, which were
set to deactivate after a spe-
cific time, actually was de-
nated, defense officials re-
ported.

The minesweeping cost
about $18 million, the Penta-
gon said.

KOREA...Continued

five years, by the summer of
1975, but is currently running
well behind schedule.

The United States had pre-
viously announced that Ameri-
can troops would remain at
present strength in Korea
through July 1974. Roger's
statements in the last two
days suggest that the forces
may be maintained here well
beyond that time.

The cost of the U.S. troops
in Korea was $584 million in
total year 1972, the latest
year for which such statistics
are available. The United
States also contributed $155
million in aid to the military
modernization program as
well as $192 million in eco-
nomic assistance.

The general mood of de-
tente and the discussions be-
tween anti-Communist South
Korea and Communist North
Korea which began a year ago
have reduced tensions here as
in other parts of the world,
Rogers said tonight. Neverthe-
less, he continued, "we have
made it clear beyond any
doubt that we are going to
maintain our alliances, live up
to our treaty obligations and
to make certain that our
friends, those who have been
with us all these years, will
not be harmed by the change
in the world picture."

Beyond reassurance to the
South Koreans, Rogers major
purpose here is discussion and
coordination of the strategy
which the two nations will fol-
low in this fall's United Na-
tions debate on Korean mat-
ters.

To this end, he conferred
for 90 minutes today with For-
ign Minister Kim Yong Shik
and for more than an hour
with Premier Kim Chong Pil.

American sources said Rog-
ers and the South Korean
leaders reached some deci-
sions in their talks about the
facts to be pursued at New
York this fall and appear close
to agreement on remaining
questions.

BONN...Continued
tinuing payments to help
ease the cost to the United
States of maintaining some
300,000 men in Europe. But
it gave no indication of the
level of the payments in the
future.

The communique said the
discussions focused on the
"balance of conventional
forces in the central region
of Europe and the determi-
nation of both ministers to
proceed with important
force improvements within
the framework of NATO
plans."

There was no indication
whether the force improve-
ments mentioned by the two
ministers were those al-
ready under way or wheth-
er important new improve-
ments in the forces are con-
templated.

THE TWO defense lead-
ers stressed the importance
of keeping United States
forces in Europe. There is
rising pressure in Congress
for a reduction of American
forces, and the administra-
tion has begun a major ef-
fort to head off such legisla-
tion at least until after an
effort has been made to
obtain an agreement by the
Soviet Union to reduce its
forces. Force reduction
talks are scheduled to start
in October.

Leber was scheduled to
talk today to Dr. Henry Kis-
singer, the presidential ad-
viser on national security
affairs, and other adminis-
tration officials.

to gain dual admission of the
two Koreans as separate U.N.
members.

Also on June 23, North Ko-
rea rejected the idea of dual
admission and proposed ad-
mission of a single delegation
representing both sides. It is
not certain yet what attitude
the Soviet Union and China
are preparing to take this fall.
Their stand will no doubt be
influenced to a large degree
by the posture of their North
Korean allies.

Another serious question is
the continuation of the sym-
bolic U.N. auspices for the
American and South Korean
troops on duty here. The
North Koreans and their allies
bitterly oppose the U.N. Com-
mand as legalizing the contin-
ued presence of American
forces here. But American and
South Korean officials exude
strong confidence that the
U.N. flag will continue to fly
over military posts here, at
least for another year.

During his talks with Pre-
mi er Kim, Rogers discussed the
internal political situation in
South Korea. Officials reflec-

WAR POWERS....Cont'd
proved and that would enable
Congress to terminate the ac-
tion earlier by concurrent reso-
lution.

"However," Mr. Nixon con-
tinued, "I fully support the de-
sire of members to assure Con-
gress its proper role in na-
tional decisions of war and
peace, and I would welcome
appropriate legislation provid-
ing for an effective contribu-
tion by the Congress."

He urged the House to re-
lect the pending measure "and
to work instead for legislation
that I can sign and which can
enhance the ability of Congress
and the executive to fulfill
their historic constitutional
roles and do so in a way that
reinforces the strength of
both."

Mr. Ford, hailing what he de-
scribed as "flexibility" and a
"new policy" at the White
House in supporting "appro-
priate" legislation on war
powers, urged the House to ac-
cept a substitute bill offered
by Representative David W.
Dennis, Republican of Indiana.

However, by a vote of 250
to 166, the House rejected Mr.
Dennis's proposal, which would
have required Congress, by
bill or resolution, either to ap-
prove or to disapprove the
commitment of forces by the
President within 90 days of his
action. The measure would also
have required similar Congres-
sional action every six months
during the continuation of the
hostilities.

Mr. Dennis argued that Con-
gress should act to approve or
disapprove the commitment of
forces rather than allow such
commitments to be terminated
by "mere inaction" of Congress.

Mr. Ford also contended that
if Congress did not favor the
commitment of forces, "Con-
gress ought to have the guts
and will and stand up and vote
against it."

The measures on war pow-
ers sprang up in Congress after
United States forces in South
Vietnam entered Cambodia in
1970, but to date no such legis-
lation has been adopted by both
houses.

the Park regime since it over-
threw the old constitution in
last October.

In the latest incident, an-
nounced here two weeks
ago, the pastor of Seoul's
First Presbyterian Church and
14 other persons were arrested
on subversion charges for
distributing leaflets of a sun-
rise service here on Easter
morning. The leaflets called
for "a revival of democracy"
and declared "down with dic-
tatorial government."

The minister, the Rev. Pak
Hyong Kyu and most of the
others arrested had been ac-
tive in social action among
slum-dwellers of Seoul.
Church groups and laymen in
the welfare field are reported
to be organizing petitions de-
manding the release of those