New York Times, January 18, 1982

First,
Coherent
Policy

By Henry A. Kissinger

A year ago, it was being said that it
was dangerous to isolate one topic as
the sole object of negotiation; linkage
was the watchword. Arms control, in
that concept, had to follow a military
buildup and proceed on a broad front.
High-level meetings were to reflect
careful preparation and reward re-
strained Soviet conduct. All these
premises are being cast overboard as
negotiations at the highest levels con-
tinue while the vestiges of freedom in
Poland are being snuffed out. Every
Administration learns from experi-
ence, of course, but drastic reversals,
especially midway in a crisis, run the
risk of appearing panicky, of under-
mining credibility abroad and de-
moralizing well-wishers at home.

Moreover, many of the original Rea-
gan arguments had merit. To be sure,
it is easy to disparage linkage — to
demonstrate that nothing will ever
happen if everything is linked to
everything else. But the art of policy-
making is to have a sense of nuance. If
the Soviets can insulate, particular
areas of negotiation — such as arms
control — from their international con-
duct, they are being handed a device
for regulating tensions they cause and
absolving them from their aggres-
sions. Especially those who believe in
the importance of East-West talks
should be concerned that diplomacy
not become a form of psychological
warfare, that talks are serious and ob-
ligations reciprocal. Détente is not ap-
peasement. A policy of coexistence
must be defended against intransi-
gence. I believe it would have ulti-
mately served the cause of negotia-
tions far better had the United States,
early in the Polish crisis, declared a
moratorium on high-level contacts
with the Soviet Union until martial law
was lifted in Poland, the Solidarity
leaders were released, and the mili-
tary rulers began some form of dis-
course with the Church and the union.
Our East-West diplomacy has been
confrontational in periods of relative
calm and apparently eager to negoti-
ate when challenged. A reversal of
these attitudes would serve the pros-
pects of peace better.

The causes of the current state of af-
fairs go back many years. The Reagan
team inherited a record of shifts made

without adequate consultation with
our allies and of episodic upheavals in
American leadership and policies.
These go far to explain why Europe no
longer rushes to follow. America's
lead. But whatever the ultimate cause,
the Administration should use the oc-
casion of the crisis in Poland to learn,
o review its procedures, and to rede-
line purposes.

With respect to the Atlantic alliance,
the following tasks seem to me of the
highest priority.

A notion of security.

The root problem of our relations
with our allies, which the Polish crisis
has so brutally exposed, is not proce-
dural but structural — not that we do
not consult enough but that we are un-
certain of the purpose of Atlantic con-
sultation. Today, the Atlantic alliance
lacks a security doctrine that takes
realistic account of the growing nu-
clear stockpiles in both the East and
West and the new reaches of Soviet
conventional power.

In the past, alliances represented a
pooling of strength; in contrast, NATO
has far too long operated as if it were a
unilateral American nuclear guaran-
tee. And it continues to function this
way although the casualties of nuclear
war have upset all previous verities
about war: Historically, surrender

was considered worse than resistance.
For many, the cataclysmic conse-
quences of nuclear war have reversed
that motivation. To them, nothing
seems worse than a nuclear holocaust.

The result is a combination of neu-
tralism and pacifism. America is
thought to have no choice except to de-
fend Europe; Europe believes it risks
nothing by political dissociation from
the United States, lethargy on defense,
and simultaneous resistance to Ameri-
can measures, such as the installation
of missiles, that represent in fact the
logical consequence of European nu-
clear doctrine. Sooner or later this will

lead to catastrophe. If we are serious
about avoiding nuclear war and do not
wish to yield to the ruthless, the al-
liance must build up its conventional
forces. There is no other choice. But a
serious program to that effect is lack-
ing on both sides of the Atlantic.

East-West relations.

Poland represents a fundamental
challenge to East-West relations not
only because of the brutal violation of
the Helsinki accords. It does so pri-
marily because of what it tells us
about the Soviet perception of securi-
ty. It is one thing for the Soviet Union
to seek to be secure against a hostile
military presence in surrounding
countries; it is quite another to equate
security with a cordon of vassal states
subject to an ultimate Soviet right to
impose a totalitarian government on

populations that overwhelmingly reject it. We can be forthcoming on Soviet strategic concerns; we must resist Moscow's claim to a constant right of intervention. Especially inadmissible is the proposition that the Red Army is the guarantor of the irreversibility of history, the enforcer of the rule that what is Communist is eternal and what is non-Communist is fair game for undermining, or worse.

The function of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Whether to negotiate with our adversaries has unfortunately become a domestic issue and a source of international friction within the alliance. This weakens us in four ways. In relatively calm periods, it allows the Soviets to present themselves as the apostles of peace; when we finally go to the conference table, it looks like the result of allied and Soviet pressure rather than American initiative; to establish our bona fides, we are then tempted into opening positions that look like (and sometimes are) complete reversals, casting doubt on our resolve; and once we are engaged in talks, these negotiating positions turn into ends in themselves, regardless of content.

Our rhetoric and our strategy must be brought into balance. We need a program that avoids the twin dangers of abandoning the peace issue to our adversaries without turning negotiating into a form of self-blackmail. In the long run, we serve the cause of peace best by precision, strict insistence on reciprocity, and a view of the world respectful of legitimate Soviet concerns.

### East-West economic links.

A decade or so ago, when East-West trade, technology transfer, and financial relations began to develop, many believed that economic ties could become an instrument — among others — for moderating Soviet conduct. In a crisis, we thought, the fear of losing markets or access to raw materials, Western technical innovations, or bank credits would produce Soviet caution. But this assumption presupposed a Western willingness to use its economic strength in the service of an overall strategy. That clearly has not happened. On the contrary, so many Western nations have let themselves become dependent on Soviet trade that a trade cutoff is more likely to turn into a Soviet weapon against the West. Our farmers this year take satisfaction in the sale of 23 million tons of food to the Soviet Union. But what will happen when all our plantings and our entire agricultural economy become permanently geared to this level of Soviet imports? Who then has the stronger negotiating position?

Similarly, Western banks have been profligate in extending credit to Poland and other East bloc countries — and free of considerations of state policy in doing so. The result is that

they will be exposed if there is any letup in the breakneck pace of private lending to the East.

In 1976, our Government recommended to a ministerial meeting of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development an urgent study to examine the implications and risks of East-West trade and credits — and the need for greater Western coordination regarding them. The effort has since languished. As a result there are no agreed political criteria today for the management of East-West trade. The industrial nations fiercely compete to fulfill Lenin's dictum that the capitalists would in time fight over the privilege of selling the rope they would be hanged with. There is an urgent need to establish ground rules to guide East-West trade and finance.

Organization of the policymaking process.

In setting up new National Security Council procedures in the White House, Judge Clark will want to re-

view how we came to waste crucial weeks on essentially rhetorical exercises, determine which options were put forward primarily to stall for time, and above all expose the strategic assumptions that underlay the conflicting theories and proposals for Presidential attention. He will want to make sure that in the future what reaches the Oval Office are the real choices.

But he must go beyond that. He must ensure that the Administration's foreign policy philosophy is clarified. For better or worse, a serious foreign policy requires a comprehensive central concept; without it, pronouncements are exercises in rhetoric, and actions are driven by short-term tactical consideration without coherence or sense of direction. The policymaking process must be organized by efficient procedures. But, more importantly it must be organized by a basic strategy.

Events have conspired in recent years to erode the foreign policy consensus of this nation and to create fault lines of opinion that cut across all strategic questions. The Administration seems to me divided

* between a new isolationism and traditional Atlanticism;

* between those who regard as inevitable an apocalyptic showdown with the Soviet Union and those who think that managing the competition will remain a permanent feature of our foreign policy — with a gradual erosion of the Soviet system but no clear-cut terminal point;

* between those who regard trade, technology, and finance as matters of private concern, subject only to pure market considerations, and those who see our economic relationships, particularly with the Communist world, as so centrally important to the future of both the West and East as to be an inherent part of our public policy.

The strains generated by the competition between these contending points of view within the Administration have been all too evident in the weeks following the repression in Poland. They will tug at our policy in the months to come as well, until we move to resolve them and in the process design a longer-term, fully rounded concept of our strategy, our resources, and our broader objectives in the world. Until these issues are settled, it will be impossible even for the wisest of leaders to make more than momentary sense from the range of options presented to him by his staff each day for decision.

If we master these issues and in the process design a coherent policy, the Polish crisis will in the end generate a lasting benefit. If we fail, we shall remember these months not only with shame but as a decisive turning point in Western history.

Henry A. Kissinger is now professor of international relations and associate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, in Washington. This is the second of two articles.

First,
Coherent
Policy

By Henry A. Kissinger.

A year ago, it was being said that it
was dangerous to isolate one topic as
the sole object of negotiation; linkage,
was the watchword. Arms control, in
hat concept, had to follow a military
buildup and proceed on a broad front.
High-level meetings were to reflect
careful preparation and reward re-
strained Soviet conduct. All these
remises are being cast overboard as
negotiations at the highest levels con-
inue while the vestiges of freedom in
Poland are being snuffed out. Every
Administration learns from experi-
ence, of course, but drastic reversals,
specially midway in a crisis, run the
risk of appearing panicky, of under-
mining credibility abroad and de-
moralizing well-wishers at home.

Moreover, many of the original Rea-
gan arguments had merit. To be sure,
it is easy to disparage linkage — to
demonstrate that nothing will ever
happen if everything is linked to
everything else. But the art of policy-
making is to have a sense of nuance. If
the Soviets can insulate particular
areas of negotiation — such as arms
control — from their international con-
duct; they are being handed a device
for regulating tensions they cause and
absolving them from their aggre-
sions. Especially those who believe in
the importance of East-West talks
should be concerned that diplomacy
not become a form of psychological
warfare, that talks are serious and ob-
ligations reciprocal. Détente is not ap-
peasement. A policy of coexistence
must be defended against intransi-
gence. I believe it would have ulti-
mately served the cause of negotia-
tions far better had the United States,
early in the Polish crisis, declared a
moratorium on high-level contacts
with the Soviet Union until martial law
was lifted in Poland. The Solidarity
leaders were released, and the mili-
tary rulers began some form of dis-
course with the Church and the union.
Our East-West diplomacy has been
confrontational in periods of relative
calm and apparently eager to negoti-
ate when challenged. A reversal of
these attitudes would serve the pros-
pects of peace better.

The causes of the current state of af-
fairs go back many years. The Reagan
team inherited a record of shifts made
without adequate consultation with
our allies and of episodic upheavals in
American leadership and policies.
These go far to explain why Europe no
longer rushes to follow America's
lead. But whatever the ultimate cause,
the Administration should use the oc-
casion of the crisis in Poland to learn
to modify its procedures, and to re-
fine purposes.

A notion of security.

The result is a combination of neu-
tralism and pacifism. America is
thought to have no choice except to de-
fend Europe; Europe believes it risks
nothing by political dissociation from
the United States, lethargy on defense,
and simultaneous resistance to Ameri-
can measures, such as the installation
of missiles, that represent in fact the
logical consequence of European mu-
clear doctrine. Sooner or later this will
lead to catastrophe. If we are serious
about avoiding nuclear war and do not
wish to yield to the ruthless, the al-
liance must build up its conventional
forces. There is no other choice. But a
serious program to that effect is lack-
ing on both sides of the Atlantic.

East-West relations.

Poland represents a fundamental
challenge to East-West relations not
only because of the brutal violation of
the Helsinki accords. It does so pri-
marily because of what it tells us
about the Soviet perception of securi-
ty. It is one thing for the Soviet Union
to seek to be secure against a hostile
military presence in surrounding
countries; it is quite another to equate
security with a cordon of vassal states
subject to an ultimate Soviet right to
impose a totalitarian government on
populations that overwhelmingly re-
ject it. We can be forthcoming on
Soviet strategic concerns; we must re-
sist Moscow's claim to a constant right
of intervention. Especially inadmissi-
ble is the proposition that the Red
Army is the guarantor of the irreversi-
bility of history, the enforcer of the
rule that what is Communist is eternal
and what is non-Communist is fair
game for undermining, or worse.

Whether to negotiate with our adver-
saries has unfortunately become a do-
mestic issue and a source of interna-
tional friction within the alliance. This
weakening us in four ways. In relatively
calm periods, it allows the Soviets to
present themselves as the apostles of
peace; when we finally go to the con-

ference table, it looks like the result of
allied and Soviet pressure rather than
American initiative; to establish our
bona fides, we are then tempted into
opening positions that look like (and
sometimes are) complete reversals,
casting doubt on our resolve; and once
we are engaged in talks, these negoti-
ating positions turn into ends in them-
selves, regardless of content.

Our rhetoric and our strategy must
be brought into balance. We need a
program that avoids the twin dangers
of abandoning the peace issue to our
adversaries without turning negotiat-
ing into a form of self-blackmail. In
the long run, we serve the cause of
peace best by precision, strict insist-
ence on reciprocity, and a view of the
world respectful of legitimate Soviet
concerns.

East-West economic links.

A decade or so ago, when East-West
trade, technology transfer, and finan-
cial relations began to develop, many
believed that economic ties could be-
come an instrument — among others
— for moderating Soviet conduct. In a
crisis, we thought, the fear of losing
markets or access to raw materials,
Western technical innovations, or
bank credits would produce Soviet
caution. But this assumption presup-
posed a Western willingness to use its
economic strength in the service of an
overall strategy. That clearly has not
happened. On the contrary, so many
Western nations have let themselves
become dependent on Soviet trade that
a trade cutoff is more likely to turn
into a Soviet weapon against the West.
Our farmers this year take satisfac-
tion in the sale of 23 million tons of food
to the Soviet Union. But what will hap-
pen when all our plantings and our en-
tire agricultural economy become per-
manently geared to this level of Soviet
imports? Who then has the stronger
negotiating position?

Similarly, Western banks have been
profligate in extending credit to Po-
land and other East bloc countries —
and free of considerations of state
policy in doing so. The result is that
they will be exposed if there is any
letup in the breakneck pace of private
lending to the East.

In 1976, our Government recom-
mended to a ministerial meeting of the
Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development an urgent study
to examine the implications and risks
of East-West trade and credits — and
the need for greater Western coordina-
tion regarding them. The effort has
since languished. As a result there are
no agreed political criteria today for
the management of East-West trade.
The industrial nations fiercely com-
pete to fulfill Lenin's dictum that the
capitalists would in time fight over the
privilege of selling the rope they would
be hanged with. There is an urgent
need to establish ground rules to guide
East-West trade and finance.