# NOTES ON NATO

## I. THE PROBLEM

The task of NATO in Western Europe should be to maintain sufficient strength to deter major attacks rather than to expect attacks and repulse them. Even a limited war in Western Europe would be so unlimited that the risks of having to wage one should be minimized through the provision of adequate deterrents. Although NATO was conceived primarily to defend Europe, the location of strategic weapons there can also help to deter attacks on the U.S.A.

Deterrents, however, may not be able to prevent incursions and infiltrations. NATO forces should be able to repulse such actions (and possibly engage in them). This kind of operation is particularly likely to occur in the Greece-Turkey area. And in that area incursions may amount to invasions with conventional forces.

## II. THE NATURE OF DETERRENTS

A deterrent is effective if it imposes on the enemy a higher cost for a given objective than he is prepared to pay, and at the same time imposes on us a cost that he knows we are willing to pay to defend that objective.

There can be little doubt that to maintain an effective deterrent is far cheaper than to maintain an ineffective deterrent and consequently become involved in war. In fact, if we are not prepared to provide an effective deterrent we should not be prepared to go to war to defend an objective. But we cannot be certain that our estimate of the value the enemy attaches to an objective is correct. We should, therefore, always provide stronger deterrents than are needed, according to our estimates.

If the enemy has an objective that is limited from his point of view, he can be deterred by a limited deterrent

(an unlimited deterrent will impose an infinite cost on him).
Consequently there is a finite deterrent that will deter him.

If the enemy's objective is limited from our point of view
(and he knows it), he will not be deterred by an unlimited
deterrent (an infinite deterrent will evoke infinite retaliation and we are not prepared to pay that price to defend the limited objective).

The objectives of an aggressor nation are necessarily
limited from his point of view--since his national survival
can hardly be at stake if he is able to be an aggressor.

If the enemy's objectives are unlimited from our point
of view, we should be prepared to apply an unlimited deterrent--one that involves an infinite cost (in the form of
retaliation) to us.

### III. DETERRENTS PROVIDED BY AN ALLIANCE (NATO)

When "we" is not a single nation, as assumed above, but
an alliance, the question of deterrents becomes more complicated.
The members of an alliance do not have identical interests. In
particular, a given enemy objective may be unlimited from the
point of view of some members and limited from the point of
view of others. For example West Berlin is an unlimited
Russian objective from the point of view of the West Berliners,
but it is unlikely to be an unlimited objective from the
point of view of the U.S.A. or even of West Germany. Nothing
short of full scale invasion of Western Europe may be unlimited
from the point of view of the European members of NATO, and
even that may not be unlimited from the point of view of the
U.S.A.

Since no enemy objective is likely to be unlimited to all
members of an alliance, the policy of the alliance will be
to apply limited deterrents--unless the enemy objective is
unlimited to the dominant member of the alliance. A member

to whom the enemy objective is unlimited will remain in the
alliance if a limited deterrent applied by the whole alliance
is more effective than an unlimited one applied by him alone.
Otherwise he will resign and act independently. Other members
may resign if the enemy objective is too limited in relation
to the cost of the deterrent to them.

IV. THE NATO PROBLEM

Strategic Weapons. If the European NATO countries pos-
sessed strategic weapons they could use them as part of a
NATO policy or they could act independently of NATO. (Their
choice in the matter might be limited by the conditions on
which they could get them from the U.S.A.)

A country that possessed a number of weapons sufficient
to act as a deterrent to an attack on itself would probably
prefer to act independently of NATO. If, for instance, West
Berlin had strategic weapons under its control, it could and
probably would threaten to use them in the event of an attack
on itself. If, however, the use of these weapons were dictated
by NATO, they might not be used to defend Berlin for fear
that their use might bring retaliation on the U.S.A.

The European countries might be unwilling to have strategic
weapons without the freedom to use them or to threaten to
use them when they saw fit. If the use of the weapons were
under NATO control, the U.S.A. might permit them to be used
only to deter attacks on the U.S.A.--since NATO use would
essentially be U.S.A. use and would invite retaliation on
the U.S.A. The European countries might be reluctant to
become targets for the sake of protecting the U.S.A. rather
than themselves. However some European countries may prefer
to sacrifice the protection given by nuclear weapons under
their own control in the hopes that, without these weapons,
they can improve their relations with the U.S.S.R.

The U.S.A. would derive some advantages from having
strategic weapons under independent European control. If
West Berlin, for instance, could deter a Russian attack by
risking retaliation on itself, little risk would be run by
the U.S.A. Russia, even if bombed by West Berlin, would be
unlikely to bomb the U.S.A. for fear of retaliation by the
U.S.A.

By the same argument, however, nuclear independence would
mean that the European countries would regard defense of
the U.S.A. as a limited objective from their point of view,
even though their political sympathies remained with the
U.S.A. But this possibility is unlikely to be important.
Russia could not risk an attack on the U.S.A. and retaliation
by the U.S.A. while leaving Europe's nuclear capacity
intact.

A more serious possibility from the U.S.A. point of view
is that nuclear independence might breed a high degree of
political independence among the European countries. What
if a "third force" appeared on the continent that was prepared
to play off the U.S.A. and Russia against each other? What
if the Communists won control of a nuclearly armed France?
Such possibilities indicate that there may be a serious risk
to the U.S.A. in the nuclear independence of European countries.

**Tactical Forces.** If there are no strategic forces in Europe or if they are to be used only to deter attacks on the U.S.A., invasion of Western Europe must be deterred by tactical forces, including tactical nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, strategic weapons under independent
European control would reduce the need for this limited
deterrent and might well provide more deterrent for the same
cost. In the case of Berlin particularly, very large tactical
forces would be needed to have the same deterrent value as

strategic weapons in the hands of the Berliners--especially
since there would always be uncertainty concerning their use.

If strategic weapons are used to defend Western Europe,
the NATO countries could afford to maintain larger conventional
forces than would otherwise be possible. These forces would
strengthen NATO itself, particularly in the Greek-Turkey area.
They would also permit the NATO countries to operate effective-
ly in areas outside the NATO jurisdiction.

V. CONCLUSIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

U.S. policy should depend critically on its assessment of
the political consequences of nuclear independence on the
European countries.

If the U.S.A. could be confident that those countries
would remain firmly anti-Communist, it should encourage and
assist them to acquire strategic weapons as rapidly as pos-
sible.

Since the U.S.A. cannot be certain on this point, it
must make a difficult choice. If there were no budgetary
famine, its safest course would be to keep control over
strategic weapons and to build up NATO tactical forces. But
since there is a budgetary famine, this course involves the
danger that Europe will be inadequately defended. The U.S.A.
may therefore take the view that the political risks are
worth running for the sake of obtaining a more effective
deterrent. But it must not opt for the worst of both worlds;
it would do that if it were to provide the European countries
with strategic weapons and regard them as an excuse for
cutting the budget still further.

ARTHUR SMITHIES

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE THEORY OF DETERRENTS

(Suggested by Discussion on September 4)

In the earlier memorandum an effective deterrent is defined
as one which imposes on the enemy a greater cost than the objec-
tive is worth to him and imposes on "us" a cost that he knows
we are willing to pay to defend the objective. The concepts
involved in this definition require further examination.

The cost to us involves both the cost of maintaining the
deterrent in being <u>plus</u> the additional cost of using it. By
far the greatest element of that additional cost is the retaliation the enemy will inflict on us if we do use it. The cost imposed on the enemy is similar.

A further element of cost is the damage done to the
objectives. If the objective is Berlin, and Berlin is destroyed
in the process of attacking and defending it, additional
costs are imposed on the winning side (or the value of the
objective is reduced). A country may prefer to surrender a
city rather than have it destroyed or it may prefer destruction
to surrender. The French in the last war were unwilling to
risk the destruction of Paris, but the Russians were prepared
to see Stalingrad destroyed to halt the Germans.

One major difficulty in the practice of deterrence is
that the enemy does not know what the objective is worth to
us and we don't know what it is worth to him. Even if we
announce that we will bomb Kharkov if he attacks Berlin, he
does not know whether Kharkov (plus his retaliation on us) is
the maximum price we are prepared to pay to defend Berlin or
whether it is merely something more than our estimate of the
maximum price he is prepared to pay to get it. If he has the
latter belief he may be deterred, but if he has the former,
he will not be deterred if he thinks Berlin is worth the

destruction of Kharkov to him.

Suppose we do announce Kharkov as the deterrent for Berlin, and the enemy nevertheless attacks Berlin. If Kharkov is our maximum price, we should then let him have Berlin, provided we are convinced that he does not think we are bluf-fing. If Kharkov is less than our maximum price, we shall bomb it when he attacks Berlin. He will retaliate on us and we will counterretaliate. If both sides remain rational, the process of retaliation and counterretaliation will go on until the bidding becomes too high for one side. The other side keeps or gets the prize. This process could go on in small steps or large ones depending on the adversaries' estimate of each other's psychology. We may feel that a succession of relatively small blows and counterblows will defend Berlin most cheaply from our point of view. Or we may feel that a single large blow will bring the dispute to a swift conclusion in our favor.

The difficulty with this argument of course is that neither we nor the enemy may remain rational. As the war continues, the objective of Berlin may give way to more comprehensive objectives--possibly total destruction of the enemy and ourselves (so fighting cocks initially intend to kill each other). Whatever happens, if we put too low a price on Berlin at the outset, we are virtually certain to get involved in far heavier costs defending it than are necessary.

While we must be prepared to pay the full cost of using the deterrent, it is far cheaper to maintain a deterrent that is so strong that we do not have to use it.

The argument so far leads to these conclusions:

(1) The deterrents we establish to prevent attack on a given objective should correspond to the maximum

price we are prepared to pay to defend the objective.
Deterrents that are not used are so cheap in relation
to those that are used that it does not pay to gamble.

(2) Deterrents should be devised so that the enemy
is as certain as possible that they will be used if
he attacks.

The second conclusion suggests that, to remove uncertainty
the deterrent should be closely related to the enemy's objec-
tive. Thus strategic weapons are a more effective deterrent
if controlled by a country that is likely to be attacked than
if controlled by the U.S. This is true not only because that
country is necessarily prepared to pay a higher price for its
survival than is the U.S., but also because there is greater
certainty that the country will pay that price than that the
U.S. will pay its price.

Among deterrents provided by the U.S., tactical forces
seem more certain than strategic to be used. Forces located
in Germany will certainly be used to repel an attack on Germany.
There is much more uncertainty concerning whether SAC will bomb
even a limited number of Russian cities in the event of such an
attack. Our strategic deterrent thus gives the Russians a
chance to gamble; the tactical deterrent, if strong enough,
does not.

To put the matter in another way, the enemy makes an
estimate for himself of the probability that a given deter-
rent will be used. His estimate may reflect indecisiveness
on our part; or it may merely reflect the fact that he thinks
we will be indecisive. In either case the effectiveness of
the deterrent, or a deterrent, is reduced to the extent that
the enemy assigns a low probability to its use. The probabil-
ity will depend on the military character of the deterrent (strate-
gic or tactical) and the control of the decision to use it.

We should clearly devise our deterrent system so that the enemy assigns the maximum probability to any given deterrent being used.

Is it therefore desirable for us to announce specific deterrents, e.g., Kharkov for Berlin? At the most, minimum deterrents should be announced. If we say anything we should say "we shall bomb Kharkov and possibly more." No useful purpose is served by announcing maxima: if we do that the enemy may find he can get Berlin surprisingly cheap. But the announcement of minima may not be helpful to us. The enemy can infer something about our actual intentions from the minima. A low minimum may induce optimism on the part of the enemy. A high one may induce him to disbelieve that our intentions are serious.

The announcement serves its purpose if it convinces him that our intentions are more serious than he thought they were. But this can better be done by letting our capabilities speak for themselves. In most cases we can afford to do this. Since effective deterrents can be provided at a cost we can afford, we should not resort to bluff. The announcement seems called for only when our strategic capability is to be used in a limited way, and if it is used it should convey our actual intentions.

The foregoing argument has shown that strategic weapons can be used in a limited way, and there are some situations, notably Berlin, where they probably have to be used. There is no reason why either side should start an unlimited war; or should let the quest for limited objectives blow up into one. The argument against using strategic weapons is that countries cannot be assumed to act rationally when cities are being bombed--as World War II demonstrated. However, strategic deterrents that are effective will not start any war. They are therefore less dangerous than ineffective tactical deterrents. Because of the pressure for economy, we may be confronted with this

kind of choice.

THE NATO ALLIANCE

Can attacks on Europe be most effectively deterred if the forces of the NATO countries are under a unified NATO command or if the members of the alliance have the capacity for independent action?

It was pointed out in the earlier memo that given enemy objectives are likely to be less limited from the point of view of some members of the alliance than from the point of view of the alliance acting as a unit. On the other hand, the alliance as a whole is likely to take a less limited view than its most reluctant members.

West Germany, for instance, is likely to put a higher price on Berlin than will the alliance as a whole; and provided Germany acquires the needed capability, it will be more likely than the alliance to make the price too high for the alliance.

Moreover the probability factor used by the enemy with respect to countries immediately affected must be higher than that which he applies to the alliance as a whole. It is reasonable for him to assume that the implementation of a collective policy is subject to greater uncertainty than action by an individual country closely concerned.

With respect to strategic weapons, the argument leads to the conclusion that strategic weapons in Europe will be most effective as deterrents if they are under independent control. If Britain, Germany and France possess such weapons, at least one of them is more likely to act in a given situation than they are likely to act in concert with each other or with the U.S. There is also a good case for Italy having strategic weapons. In the age of nuclear plenty, Italy like France may be open to atomic blackmail by Russia if it does not possess strategic weapons.

In other NATO areas, Greece and Turkey for instance, the
prospect of independent action by the U.S. may be more effective
than the alliance. The Western European countries may be more
reluctant than the U.S. to run the nuclear risks of deterring
attacks in Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the most effective deterrent with strategic weapons
can be obtained by an agreement among NATO countries whereby
each country has the right of independent action, but the others
agree to support it if attacked. That would confront Russia
with the certain prospect of some retaliation and the less
certain prospect of retaliation by the whole alliance.

With respect to tactical forces the conclusions are quite
different. No single NATO country is likely to possess suf-
ficient tactical forces to be adequate as a deterrent to
Russia. Moreover, as argued above, tactical forces of NATO
located in the areas of possible attack are certain to be used
in the event of attack. Consequently there is nothing to be
gained and much to be lost by independent control of tactical
forces.

ARTHUR SMITHIES