February 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK
FROM: DLB
SUBJECT: Comments on NAR Political Organization Activities

The following comments I wanted to put in writing to you
for two reasons: a) I have raised some of them with John Deardourff
in recent conversations and, therefore, I don't wish you to be
surprised, if they come up at some future date without my having told you;
b) I don't believe I should allow these things to pass without recording
my strong feelings. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX I shall obviously have to
abide by your judgment as to whether you should pass this information on,
or not.

1. Alexander Lankler has approached the Lodge Organization in New Hampshire at least two times, to my knowledge, for the purpose of dissuading them from their active write-in campaign on behalf of the Ambassador. In each case Lankler has tried to convince the Lodge people that Lodge and Rockefeller should be on the same side of things -- that basically both should be interested in defeating the conservative elements within the Party. He then went on to suggest that it was clear that Lodge's write-in effort in New Hampshire was in fact seriously injuring the Governor and, in effect, helping Goldwater. Lankler would then

[Y]

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implied, without saying so specifically, that if it were clear that the Governor could not get the nomination, he would probably swing his entire weight behind the Ambassador.

2. On each of these occasions the people in the Lodge Organization have~~obviously~~ notified me that this has taken place and have tried to impress upon me the fact that, from their vantage point, it seems clear that the Lodge write-in effort is hurting Senator Goldwater far more than it is hurting the Governor. And that in effect, therefore, it was helping the Governor. They also commented that, in their opinion, I~~ankler~~ was not the type of individual who had the capacity to convince the Lodge people that they should get out of the race.

3. I have suggested to you previously, and have expressed the same opinion to John Deardourff, that the only possible means of slowing down the write-in drive in New Hampshire, or of convincing the Ambassador or his organization to withdraw, would involve the following: ~~a)~~ evidence that the write-in effort will not be anywhere near as significant as the Lodge people expect it to be; ~~b)~~ evidence that the Lodge ~~a)~~ write-in effort does, in fact, hurt the Governor more than it hurts Goldwater. In the first instance, the Lodge people will rely on their own findings as to the success of the write-in effort. As to the second point, I suggested to John that conceivably the evidence could take the form of an actual poll taken by the Rockefeller people asking

those ~~people~~ who intend to write in the name of Lodge whether ~~XX~~
~~XX~~ in a two man race they would have voted for Goldwater or
Rockefeller.

I have obviously not discussed any of this with the Lodge
people, but it is clear to me that this is the only way they are
likely to be dissuaded from pursuing their course. I think it is
possible to do so in view of the fact that the Lodge effort involves
a pledge card which each person who intends to vote for the Ambassador
is asked to sign and send to the Concord Headquarters, and which
is then to be forwarded dramatically to Saigon. In view of the fact
that the Ambassador will have ~~so many~~ thousands of these pledge cards,
it is conceivable that he could at the last moment be talked into
issuing a statement asking the people of New Hampshire to vote for the
man of their choice whose name actually appears on the ballot. In
this way he can show that he has support by waving ~~so many~~ thousands
of pledge cards, but at the same ~~xxx~~ time do something to help the
Governor.

I do not think that this is a likely outcome, but it does seem
to me that it is possible, but only under the type of program which
I am suggesting here.

4. In my conversation with John Deardourff, I also expressed
my concern over the appointment of Donald W. Whitehead as Co-Chairman

of the official Rockefeller Organization in Massachusetts. It is my
understanding from John that Whitehead was appointed by Mr. Wells on
the basis of a long conversation between Whitehead and Wells in which
in fact
the former convinced the latter that Rockefeller did not have a single
vote on the so-called unpledged slate of XXXXXX electors in Massachusetts,
even if Lodge were not a candidate, and that, in fact, Rockefeller had to
have an organization in Massachusetts or he would end up without any
delegate support at all. Whitehead expressed the view to Wells, as
I understand it, that Sen. Saltonstall, not only could not be counted
upon to deliver votes to Rockefeller in case Lodge were not a candidate,
but in fact under no circumstance would deliver votes to Rockefeller.

My concerns over this appointment are manifold:

a. In my opinion Don Whitehead is a political prostitute of the first order. He has a substantial history of reasonably successful political organization activities behind him. Nonetheless his administrative abilities should not be described as greater than mediocre. I am unaware of any other abilities which he has. Throughout his political career he has sold himself as an administrative specialist to the highest political bidder within the Republican Party -- working for State Representative Robert Hahn (a liberal), State Senator Oliver Ames, (a conservative), U.S. Congressman Laurence Curtis (a conservative), and Attorney General Brooke (a liberal). Six months ago there were many rumors, some of which I was and am very inclined to believe, that Whitehead was working without public attention, or was on the

verge of accepting a working job for Goldwater.

It is my understanding, again from John Deardourff, that
Massachusetts National Committeeman Dick Treadway was
contacted about the possible appointment of Whitehead and
suggested that it was unwise. I concur, not simply because
Whitehead, but because what Whitehead told Wells was
untrue. In fact I believe it is accurate to say that
of the ten announced members of the unpledged slate, probably
seven of them would vote for Rockefeller, including Saltonstall,
if Lodge is not nominated. Up until this last weekend, it was
my impression that the Governor, although not broadly
popular in Massachusetts, had gained some strength in political
circles by his promise to stay out of the Massachusetts
fight, while Goldwater was refusing to abide by the official
party request that he let the Massachusetts delegation go
uncommitted. While I have thought all along that there should
be an active, but unpublicized, Rockefeller organization that to
secure votes for Rockefeller among the delegates
in case Lodge were not nominated, I do not believe that an
active organization given considerable publicity can serve this
function as well.

[Y]

C or Whitehead is not a man of considerable substance within the Republican Party in Massachusetts. His appointment as Co-Chairman tends to indicate the weakness of the Rockefeller cause in Massachusetts rather than its strength. I cannot believe that his appointment will bring to the Rockefeller fold any new strength within the Party.

D. As a matter of political facts of life, it would have seemed to me that it was vitally important that the head of the Rockefeller Organization in Massachusetts be on friendly terms with the Lodge Organization. After all, if the Ambassador is a candidate for President, he can probably throw away his chance for the nomination if he exists toward one candidate or another. From this standpoint the appointment of Don Whitehead is absolutely inconceivable. It would be impossible for any single individual, especially, including Laurence Curtis, to be named who could draw greater attention among the Lodge people than Whitehead. His performance as campaign manager, the Curtis campaign was not only incompetent, but it was highly improper. The distaste that the Lodge people have for Don Whitehead knows almost no bounds. For example, when, in the

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spring of 1963, Senator Saltonstall and Ed Brooke jointly
tried to convince the State Committee to elect Whitehead
as the new Party Chairman, the Lodge forces through a
vigorous "neutrality" managed to defeat Whitehead and elect
Frederick C. Dumaine, a man who is clearly a Goldwater
conservative. The Lodge people did this, not out of reverence
for Dumaine, but, out of fear for the future of the Party in
the hands of Whitehead. At a much subsequent date, I have
heard Attorney General Brooke say that if he had known what
Whitehead was really like, he never would have hired him for
the Attorney General's Office in the first place.

To emphasize my point, there is now working in the Rockefeller
Headquarters, at Whitehead's right hand, one Bill Arrigal
(I am not quite sure of the spelling). This gentlemen, among
other things, is a professional petition signature collector.
That is, when there are initiative petitions passed around the State
either to get issues on to the election ballot or to secure the
nomination signatures of party candidates, this guy is paid
25¢ per signature on the petitions that he allegedly passes
around. I know for a fact, that in his most recent performance
the Council for Constitutional Reform in Massachusetts, which had
been a vast amount to collect signatures, had a handwriting
expert examine them. The signatures in his opinion, were
roughly 75% fraudulent ( that is forged) and the Council refused
to turn any of the signatures in. If this is the kind of man
whom Whitehead chooses to have around him, and I know for a fact

February 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Deardourff Meeting with Frank Kluckhorn

1. Deardourff met on February 11th at the 49th Street office, at Hugh Morrow's request, with one Frank Kluckhorn -- formerly of the New York Times, author of allegedly vitriolic foreign policy books, and presently employed by the Republican National Committee. Kluckhorn was a former supporter of Goldwater but is presently disillusioned with Goldwater's intelligence. He believes that Johnson is "stupid" in foreign affairs, but that Goldwater is more so.

2. Kluckhorn advises that Cyprus should be made an issue. He suggests that the current crisis be tied to the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey. He points out that for the first time in 300 years, the Russians with the missiles out of Turkey, are free to move beyond the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. He suggests also that the missile withdrawal from Turkey could be tied to the Soviet missile withdrawal from Cuba.

3. Kluckhorn suggests that the Administration is vulnerable to the charge of covert unilateral disarmament through the withdrawal of missiles, the failure to authorize a go-ahead on any new missiles, bombers, etc.

4. Kluckhorn advocates a moderate position on Cuba, saying that Goldwater's position plays into LBJ's hands in that it gives him the opportunity to talk of the great danger of nuclear war. Kluckhorn feels that the United States should demand the implementation of the Soviet-American inspection agreement for Cuba, concluding that if the inspection were carried out, Cuba would be "neutralized" (?). He points out that Cuba, Zanzibar and Cyprus all represent "unsinkable aircraft carriers" in the midst of the free world -- precisely what the Soviets are after.

5. Kluckhorn says that he got Joseph Farland to testify before a closed meeting of the members of the Republican Latin American Subcommittee of the Republican Policy Committee of the House. At this meeting Farland said that JFK had formally agreed to renegotiate the treaty. The meeting was within the last three weeks, and presumably the contents of the meeting were leaked to the Washington Post. Farland described the JFK renegotiation agreement as a "Yalta type agreement."

February 17, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Misc. Thoughts

1. On "Issues and Answers" yesterday NAR said re Vietnam that he thought it was important for the SEATO allies to work out a common policy and then pursue it. He made the same comment in a press conference which I starred for your attention on Friday.

In view of the French policy, I do not think the Governor ought to be saying this. In addition, from a political standpoint, it seems to me that he ought to say, on each occasion when the question arises, that neither he nor the American people have been given sufficient consistent information from the government on which to base a policy proposal -- that he has asked Johnson repeatedly to answer a series of questions and has yet to receive any answers.

2. It seems to me the more often that NAR says that we must deal with Cuba multilaterally -- that we must restore the multilateral spirit -- the more difficult it will be and inconsistent it will seem if and when the issues the specific Cuban policy which has been prepared for him.

3. In view of Johnson's "thin skin" and of the need for some positive points to hammer in the last weeks in New Hampshire, I am more than ever convinded that we should issue: the Communist Challenge statement, the Vietnam statement and questions again, the specific Cuban proposals, and a Malaysia statement calling for specifics such as the end to Indonesian aid.

With these statements released, the Governor could then take advantage of their positive aspects (Summit Meeting of NATO; USSR Trade Agreement, Cultural Exchange Program and call for USSR unilateral acts; cut off of Indonesian aid; and repeated questions re Vietnam). In this positive sense, NAR may be able to gain Johnson's specific ire directed toward him, which would be politically beneficial.

4. Along the same line, a private and confidential letter to Johnson about the Brazil situation might absolutely infuriate him and at the same time be good politics.

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5. I still think that there may be great political advantage to be made out of the Farland and the Panama situation. It seems to me that the situation is fraught with innumerable political possibilities, among which are the following (or any combination thereof):

a. Release to the press correspondence between NAR and Farland in which the former requests information about a possible JFK renegotiation agreement and the latter specifically acknowledges it.

b. The release to the press of a NAR letter to Farland urging him on behalf of the American people publicly to tell the Panama story.

c. A NAR-Farland joint press conference (or a NAR-induced Farland press conference) in which the story is told.

d. Farland's public endorsement of NAR, on the basis of his judgment that NAR is the best man in the country to deal with the Latins.

I think the point here should be not whether JFK's act to pledge re-negotiation was good or bad, but that it was made, and LBJ's renunciation of it is a stain on our dignity and our word, in addition making future relations with the Latins far more difficult.

NAR has already indicated a responsible way in which the treaty can be re-negotiated that is to go back to the 99-year lease proposal of the offer to Colombia.

February 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Carlos Marquez Sterling and Berent Friele in the latter's office, February 21, 1964.

1. Sterling impressed me as a man of considerable objectivity and poise, compared to the Cubans I know. His knowledge of the Cuban personnel is obviously considerable, and in respect to the refugee or exile elements might be very valuable. Among his most noteworthy statements were the following:

a. He said that the CIA has bungled the job of exile coordination, has in the past chosen exile leaders who have no particular following on the island of Cuba itself, and now pays for radio broadcasts into Cuba which have no definite political purpose. He feels that it is clear that if the anti-Castro sentiment on the island were united, behind a specific group of leaders with a specific set of programs, that Castro would fall. On the other hand, he did not suggest that such an element of potentially united leadership existed within the exile group.

b. He favors relying on united Caribbean action against Castro rather than waiting for unanimity among the entire OAS. He said that he thought Caribbean unanimity might come after the Mexican elections in July where the revolutionary party leader he expects to win is very

[Y]

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anti-Castro and probably would shift the Mexican policy.

c. He suggested that DeGaulle's visit to Mexico was good for Castro who apparently is against any attempt to organize the refugees into a substantive revolution. He said that DeGaulle and President Prado of Peru, who are good friends, had discussed the subject and Prado, who at first was optimistic over DeGaulle's support, has reported that DeGaulle does not now favor aiding the refugees.

d. While he suggested that the economic sanctions against Cuba were at present ineffective, he agreed with me when I suggested that perhaps on paper the theory of the economic blockade was a sound one, and that the shortcomings had not been in the concept of the policy, but in its implementation among our allies.

e. He said that a representative of the Cuban refugees in Miami had given Spruille Braden, who is a close friend of his, fairly detailed information that the six Panamanians, allegedly shot by the Americans in the Canal Zone riots, were in fact six thieves who had been burned to death when the store they had been robbing had been set on fire. Presumably Chiari knew that this was so even though he led the public procession to the funeral of these six persons. Sterling said he would attempt to get the documentation from Braden and send it on to us.

[Y]

2. Berent Friele obviously thinks that Sterling could be very valuable to us, and in the sense that he can give us some fairly specific and objective rundowns on the refugee and exile personnel, as well as the type of program that would appeal to the Cuban people, I think Friele is correct. These are, however, valuable assets to a president, not necessarily valuable assets to a presidential candidate. Friele points out that Sterling maybe of value ~~because he has direct access~~ to Spruille Braden; but Friele also says that Braden is available for certain ~~confrontations~~ even though he is a life-long Democrat (but now supports NAR).

Friele says that Sterling is available for full-time work, although he is not a man of means and, therefore, ~~must be given a retainer.~~

3. I recommend that we ask him to prepare a fairly detailed analysis of the exile groups now existent and a fairly detailed program which could be announced by acceptable exiled leadership which would appeal to the anti-Castro elements in Cuba. I recommend that whatever authority he is given be given not on the basis of the Governor but on the basis of some private organization, perhaps the Chase Manhattan Bank, or some other not Rockefeller interest. I think it may be wise for the Governor to engage in this kind of practice directly.

CARLOS MARQUEZ STERLING

355 E. 72nd St., Apt. 14C
New York 21, N. Y.
Rh 4-5734

RESUME

PERSONAL DATA

Place of Birth: Camaguey, Cuba
Age: 63 years
Civil Status: Married, one daughter
Status in the U.S.: Permanent Resident

EDUCATION

Bachiller en Ciencias y Letras (Bachelor in Arts and Science).
Instituto de la Habana. 1916. Law Degree in Civil and Public Law. Havana University.
1920.

LAST POSITION

Director of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission
from August 1961 to June 1963. The position of Director has been abolished.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Lawyer in Havana, Cuba, from 1920 to 1958. Worked at Dr. Orestes Ferrarra's Law Office from 1920 to 1929, at which time I opened my own law office and Notary. I became an expert in Sugar Legislation and an Adviser to many Sugar Mill Companies, such as Amazonas, Limones and Najasa.

Professor of Economics at the School of Commercial Science of
Havana University from 1937 to 1959. In my capacity as professor of Economics, and
representing the Havana University, I took part in several Inter-American Congresses
and Inter-American Conferences of American States from 1931 to 1945.

Editor of the Newspapers "La Prensa," "Política," and other
publications of Havana, Cuba.

Author of several books in Economics and Cuban and American History.

Politician. Director of the Pan-American Office of the State Department in Cuba. Member of the House of Representatives of Cuba from 1936 to 1946. Speaker of the House twice. Minister of Labor and Education in 1942 and 1943, respectively. Author of several social and labor legislations. President of the Constitutional Assembly which drafted the 1940 Constitution of Cuba. Senator elect in 1952. (Did not become Senator because of Batista's coup d'état on 1952.)

MISCELLANY

I am bilingual. Spanish is my native tongue. I read, write and speak English rather fluently.

References upon request.

February 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Luncheon meeting with the French Consul General, Feb. 21, 1964

1. Present were the French Consul General and his principal aide, Roger Vaurs (Director of Press and Service Information at the New York Embassy), Berent Friele, Dr. William Ronan, Congressman Ogden Reid and myself. I was very impressed with Reid, whose points were consistently well-made and pertinent.

2. The Consul General seemed to be interested, in particular, in making only one point -- that is, that it seemed important for DeGaulle and Johnson to meet sometime relatively soon in that if they did not meet soon, the elections would stand in the way of any meeting within the next year. Friele indirectly wondered whether or not Johnson and DeGaulle might not be able to meet at Guadalupe or Martinique after DeGaulle's visit to Mexico in March.

I made roughly the same point, expressing the feeling that perhaps public sentiment throughout Latin America, in the absence of a Franco-American meeting would emphasize during DeGaulle's visit that here was the man who disagreed most dramatically with the United States, thus having an unfortunate effect upon our common desires to secure a strong hemisphere policy against Cuba.

[y]

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Later the French officials emphasized that the kind of DeGaulle - Johnson meeting that we were all talking about could not really be beneficial unless the American government had an absolutely clear objective for its policies in Cuba and in Vietnam. They expressed clear bewilderment over precisely what the purpose of U.S. policy toward Cuba was -- the long-range acceptance of Castro or the long-range removal of Castro, and until this question is settled within the American government, discussions on the subject with DeGaulle might not seem worthwhile. They made the same sort of point in relation to Vietnam -- that at some point the American government would have to make up its mind what its purpose and what its goals were in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

3. On the subject of the recognition of Communist China, no specific reasons were promoted for the act, although they did say that the long-range settlement in Southeast Asia certainly could not be based on any promises of the Soviets regardless of their intentions -- that the participation of the Chinese was mandatory. The point was stressed that when they spoke of a neutrality for Vietnam, they were speaking of the neutrality of both North and South Vietnam. They expressed a detailed fairness of the strength of American public opinion against recognition of Red China or its admission to the U.N. There seemed to be general agreement that the United Nations General Assembly would not meet until after the American elections, among other reasons because it did not wish to raise the admission question during an American election.

[y]

4. The French expressed interest in the question as to whether or not there were American prisoners being held by the Chinese. Congressman Reid pointedly suggested that the General might wish to be aware that one of the major grievances between the U.S. and Mexican governments at the moment is the ease with which travelers from Cuba can pass into other Latin Countries by obtaining visas in Mexico.

5. On the general subject of Vietnam, the view was expressed that the United States had yet to learn the lesson that the French had bitterly learned in Indo-China first and later in Algeria -- that it is best to make the most of the inevitable. The point was repeatedly made -- that the Gaullist solution in Algeria would be similar to what would be an American-French neutralization in Southeast Asia. No such specific proposal was actually made, but the reference was made over and over again. It was clear that they considered any American military action expanded or not as fruitless.

6. M. Vaurs was apparently familiar with most of the details of General Stehlin's visit to the Defense Policy Seminar in mid-April. He said that he did not know whether you had heard from General Stehlin, but that in effect, without citing specifics, the broad *XXXXX* elements of your request had been fulfilled, and that General Stehlin would be available for your program for the entire Wednesday. Vaurs apparently expects to accompany General Stehlin on his visit to Boston.

Later on the Consul General asked me if one of us might inform him of the specific expected arrival time of General Stehlin in New York so that he could meet him. I told him that we would be happy to do this

March 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: AP Q's & A's Published in the Boston Herald, March 8th

The printed answers, to the best of my knowledge, were checked with
no one in the foreign policy section. The following statements in the
answers are of concern:

1. The Panama answer included the following paragraph:

"It has been reported that President Kennedy and Chiari had agreed that the United States would renegotiate the Treaty, but nothing was done and this importantly was responsible for the Panamanian break in diplomatic relations with the United States. Why has there been the delay in honoring the reported pledge?"

Diplomatic relations were broken, but that act had nothing to do with the alleged pledge to renegotiate the Treaty. Secondly, the question at the end of the paragraph goes beyond NAR's earlier position when he suggested that if there was a pledge, we ought to honor it.

2. In relation to Cuba, it was said: "Trading with Cuba is a part of this problem which must be faced by joint action of all of our allies, both in the Western Hemisphere and in NATO."

While I suspect that neither of us disagrees with this position, it is a statement which goes beyond anything the Governor has said on this issue before.

Name below.

It is a statement which does pertain to the Governor has said on this
White I am not that neither of us disagree with this proposition,
the Western Hemisphere and in NATO."

5. In relation to Cops, if we said: "Tracing with Cops is a part of this
engaged that it there was a tie, we ought to honor it.

at the end of the paragraph goes beyond WAR's earlier position when he
with the effected tie to renegotiate the Treaty. Secondly, the question
Diplomatic relations were broken, put that act had nothing to do
the default in honoring the reported tie?

the default in honoring the reported tie?"
relations with the United States. Why has there been
reasonable for the Pennsylvania press in diplomatic
Treaty, put nothing was done and there independently was
had agreed that the United States would renegotiate the
"If he has been reported that President Kennedy and Gorbay
"

7. The Pennsylvania included the following paragraph:
paragraph are of concern;

no one in the foreign policy section. The following statements in the
The printed answers, to the part of Mr. Kennedy, were checked with

SUBJECT: VP G. A. S. V.A. Published in the Boston Herald, March 8th
FROM: DTS
TO: HAK

MEMORANDUM

March 3, 1964

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3. In response to a question on the likely campaign issues, the answer included the following: "(b) The serious deterioration of U.S. prestige and influence in world affairs and the resultant crises for the free world, due to the vacillating and contradictory foreign policy of this administration."

We have never before talked about a loss of U.S. "prestige," and we never should again. If there is one phrase associated with the anti-Eisenhower-JFK campaign, it is a "loss of U.S. prestige."

and we never should again. It there is one person associated with the
We have never before stated upon a loss of U.S. prestige,"
of this administration."

the free world, due to the oscillating and contradictory foreign policy
prestige and influence in world stage and the resultant chaos for
incited the following: "(p) The serious deterioration of U.S.

3. In response to a question on the directly campaign issue, the answer

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9:00 pm

2-21-64

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

RE: Foreign Aid Meeting on Monday, February 24.

I presume you know that the foreign aid meeting with Mikesell, Mason, et al is scheduled for 3:30 on Monday. And I presume you are going.

I raise the subject because I had not heard about it before late this afternoon and was not aware that you were planning to go to NYC on Monday afternoon.

If you want me to go I would be happy to, although this might be a good opportunity to give June a feeling of being "drawn in" more.

1:00 PM March 29th

TO: HAK
FROM: DLB

Enclosed please find:

1. Summary memo of telephone conversation with Peter Drucker.

2. Summary memo of Washington conversations on Vietnam.

3. 2 copies of the mimeographed version of your Detroit speech draft.

4. A copy of the cover memo which accompanied the Detroit draft to the "Substance" people. (I hope to be able to send you their comments tomorrow.)

5. A copy of the cover memo which accompanied the Detroit draft sent to NAR through Cynthia Lefferts.

6. A copy of the Q&A on the Administration proposal to Burn 480 B-47's, which has been sent to the Governor on Pam Hill's assurance that you had cleared it, at the "Kennedy" airport I take it!

7. Another copy of the draft statement on Administration misstatements. (In case you didn't get it you should know that a copy was sent to you at Salinas in care of President Ching.)

8. A copy of the final printed form of the Laos maps to be given to the press along with the statement. In addition there are four big maps for the television presentation which came out equally well. The Governor has been briefed to say, if asked, that the maps were prepared by his staff from public reports/ Ann Black is putting together a notebook which contains all kinds of newspaper reports which could easily justify any of the areas we have put in black, just in case an inquiring reporter bothers to pursue the subject or if the Governor feels compelled to refer reporters to his staff for details.

March 23, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Washington Meeting with Dolf Droge and Donald Rockland of USIA on Southeast Asia. (Evening of March 18, 1964)

1. Both men have spent many years in Southeast Asia or at the corresponding Washington desk. Rockland is particularly familiar with Thailand and Laos, while Droge's particular expertise is in Vietnam (North and South). While Rockland is not a particularly impressive person, Droge is (both in terms of expertise and presentation).

2. In describing the current Southeast Asian crisis, the following points of major interest were made:

a. The fundamental point to understand in South Vietnam is the extraordinary divergence between the 10% who live in the cities and the 90% in the countryside. Diem's active supporters, the military officers, and the people who cheer McNamara all come from the cities. The Vietcong have very carefully not attacked the cities which go on in their day-to-day life as if there were no war. The villagers, on the other hand, must remain uncommitted (or partisan to whichever side is present) for the sake of their land and lives. The Vietnamese military officers have no rapport with the villagers and consequently cannot communicate easily.

b. The Vietnamese Army Officer Corps was built by Diem to serve primarily one function -- loyalty to Diem. Most frequently this loyalty was translated into a requirement that they do absolutely nothing unless specifically told to do so by Diem. Initiative was considered largely incompatible with Diem's stability. The result is that the Vietnamese officers cannot be encouraged to undertake initiative, or even responsibility, in their local relations with the villagers. The American training mission, in the psychological warfare aspects of relations with the population, is not able to teach the Vietnamese officers what is necessary, because those officers do not consider it part of their duty. Apparently, Khanh's regime appreciates this problem but, even if it were successful in doing anything about it, it would take many years.

c. In seeking to influence the villagers, more important than what you give (e.g. medicine) is how you give it. Genuine interest in matters of concern to the villagers has not been shown by the Vietnamese and has been shown by the Vietcong. In particular the villagers consider education as the greatest single means by which their children can achieve a better status. The Vietcong promise education (both in general policy

[Y]

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terms, and in terms of specific individuals who either join the Vietcong or do specific tasks for them). The Vietnamese seldom mention the prospect of education.

d. Communism as an issue is totally irrelevant in the battle for the villagers because the Vietcong speak only through the Liberation Front and stress three goals: peace, unification and "land of the tiller." Of these: unification has little impact because North and South do not share much of a history of unification; peace is promised by both sides and, therefore, is not an effective tool; but "land of the tiller" has a significant impact on the villagers, most of whom work their land for landlords.

e. The strategic hamlets have not been successful for a variety of reasons, among them the fact that they commit people who would prefer to remain uncommitted. A man who is committed to one side or the other is a target for the opposition, but there is no reason to attack an uncommitted man or village. In addition the means by which the strategic hamlet concept was put into effect were questionable; we repeated a mistake made by the French when we ordered the villagers to build the hamlets without pay -- and, therefore, seemed to offer nothing to the villager but insecurity and labor. In treating the villagers, it may always be best to follow the rule that you will never promise anything that you cannot deliver immediately (otherwise you undermine confidence in your word, even though you may have meant well).

f. The Ho Chi Minh trail from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through Laos is not particularly important as a route for large quantities of supplies, cadre or propaganda. It is important because the Vietcong know that it does exist, that it is considered inviolable and that, therefore, they can receive new supplies and new cadre at any time. It is therefore psychologically of immeasurable significance. Its continued existence proves to the Vietcong that, at the very least, they cannot lose.

g. Supplies to the Vietcong are sent by ship from North Vietnam and from China down the East Coast of South Vietnam and up the international waters of the Mekong River past Saigon. Up river in Cambodia they are transferred to large barges and are sent back down through the delta's canal system to the villages. The South Vietnamese-Cambodian border is relatively "porous". When the use of the river for supply became a noticeable irritant to the United States, Sihanouk avoided that issue by raising the subject of an international guarantee for Cambodian neutrality. Sihanouk, while a genius in political strategy and timing, is also mentally unstable and believes he is constantly surrounded by potential assassins -- a view which past American policy has done much to make seem legitimate. (Droge concludes that the only effective way to decrease the Cambodian role as a sanctuary for supplying the Vietcong

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is through effective action against North Vietnam and Laos. It is
unlikely that Sihanouk could ever become a staunch ally of the United
States but, on the other hand, any direct action taken against him by
the United States or by the South Vietnamese might encourage him to
seek outright Chinese aid.) The United States Ambassador in Cambodia
was described as incredibly inept and despised by Sihanouk and the
Cambodian government.

h. North Vietnam is the Chinese "proxy" in South Vietnam, Laos, and Northern Thailand -- (and this point is crucial to the proposed policy). The United States Government can clearly document the fact that there are over 4,000 North Vietnamese cadre among the Pathet Lao officers. When JFK suggested that there was no sense in fighting in Laos if the Laotians did not wish to fight, he neglected the fact that the Pathet Lao fought only because they were under direct orders to do so by their North Vietnamese officers. At the same time the American military advisors to the pro-Western Laotian forces were running from each and every battle to avoid conflict, but, in effect, leaving their forces leaderless.

1. The United States government can document that the Communist Chinese have themselves directly intervened in the Northwestern corner of Laos, have organized the area and have built roads to the Burmese border.

j. The guerrilla penetration into Northern Thailand from Laos has been quite extensive. It is aided by the substantial confusion of the local people in Northern Thailand, many of whom believe themselves to be Lao and actually believe that they are living in the country of Laos.

k. The North Vietnamese machine is in serious economic and agricultural difficulty. All food, etc., is rationed; all villagers are kept under strict regimentation; and the potential for anti-regime discord seems at its maximum.

1. Ho Chi Minh is a distinct individual leader and should not be considered a Communist Chinese puppet, despite the fact that his forces are exercising the Chinese proxy in Southeast Asia. There are in Hanoi (and even in the regime itself) representatives of both schools in the current Sino-Soviet dispute. With a proper platform it is possible that Ho Chi Minh might wish to elevate the influence of the Soviet group in Hanoi at the expense of the Chinese. The purpose of the policy which Droge is proffering is to give Ho Chi Minh that kind of a platform/which to apply anti-Chinese leverage. from

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3. The proposed policy:

a. The South Vietnam regime (with private American urging and subsequent public American support) should declare that no longer can the North Vietnamese regime be considered inviolable -- that the South Vietnamese would consider an extension of the war against the North Vietnamese regime legitimate.

NOTE: The object of the South Vietnamese declaration should be the North Vietnamese regime and not the North Vietnamese people, nor Ho Chi Minh personally. In part, the purpose of the policy would be to assure at least the neutrality if not the support of the North Vietnamese people. Neither an attack on the people, nor on the personal popularity of Ho Chi Minh, would serve this purpose.

NOTE: The declaration can only be made by the South Vietnamese government if the neutrality or support of the North Vietnamese people is to be secured, because a declaration to this effect coming from the United States would merely unite the North Vietnamese people behind their government in opposition to Yankee imperialism.

b. The South Vietnamese declaration should be accompanied by a heavy propaganda campaign designed to reach the North Vietnamese people (through air drops from South Vietnamese planes piloted by their own) and the people of the other beleagured countries of Southeast Asia. The pitch should be that South Vietnam, under attack from the Northern regime for eight years (give documentation), can no longer refrain from specifying the enemy or from expanding the area of conflict in order to carry the war to the Northern regime. The Northern Regime, if should be pointed out, has been the enemy of all of the people of Southeast Asia through infiltration and subversion in South Vietnam and Thailand, through direct warfare in Laos, and through police brutality and regimentation in North Vietnam itself.

c. In well-publicized but infrequent attacks, the South Vietnamese government using its own planes and pilots should strike at non-civilian targets which are directly related to the Vietcong war effort. The goal is a psychological effect not a clearly measurable military victory. If the South were to put out of commission a North Vietnamese supply railroad for one day, the effect would be to undermine the confidence of the Vietcong and to demonstrate to the North Vietnamese people in an inflexible say that the declaration against the North Vietnamese regime is to be taken seriously.

d. The United States, as a signatory to the neutralization agreement for Laos, should publicly and repeatedly document the North Vietnamese and Chinese violations of that agreement and should insist on the maintenance of the integrity of Laos and the enforcement of the treaty provisions.

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e. The United States, as a treaty signatory, should act to underscore its sincerity in safeguarding Loctian neutrality by making limited strikes with U.S. planes and pilots against the Communist supply base at Chapon on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos.

f. On the basis of its newly demonstrated concern for the integrity and freedom of all of Southeast Asia, the United States should seek to develop a new defensive accord between the available nations of South-east Asia, including South Vietnam, The Philippines, Thailand, (and possibly Malaysia).

g. Under the terms of the new defense arrangement, the United States should publicly give at least vocal support to a Thai policy of utilizing Thai troops across the border in Laos to guarantee the security of Thailand. If the Thai must rely for their defense on military action only in Thailand, their cause is severely undermined. Droge would urge, in effect, the extension of the Thai border directly to that point where it is contiguous with effective Pathet Lao control in Laos, thereby creating a form of buffer between Communist physical control and the actual Thai border -- a buffer patrolled by Thai forces. (Although not made explicit in Droge's suggestions, it might make sense to support this action by Thai forces in Laos with a movement of substantial numbers of American troops into Northern Thailand.)

4. Droge commentary on the proposed policies:

a. The goal of a South Vietnamese declaration of extending the war against the Northern Regime is to give Ho Chi Minh reason to reject North Vietnam's role as a belligerent proxy for China. If the South extends the war, Ho Chi Minh's position might not be a stable one because he could not predict the loyalty of his own people. Therefore, it would probably be in his interest to decrease the proxy role of North Vietnam for China, to increase Soviet influence in Hanoi, and to de-emphasize Communist military operations in Southeast Asia. The result might be to undermine the confidence and the effect of the Vietcong, to deprive the Pathet Lao of their officers, and to delay (at least) the anti-Thai effort.

b. Droge thinks the likelihood of direct Chinese involvement is not very great. The domestic difficulties of the Chinese must be extremely limiting. They cannot directly involve themselves in South Vietnam except through North Vietnam or Laos. If they took the former course, they would have to overthrow Ho Chi Minh, who likes his independence. If they chose to move through Laos, they would invite the direct counter-action of the other Western guarantors of Loctian neutrality. While it is possible that China might intervene, simply to annex North Vietnam, this action would solidify Western policies and would turn many of the North Vietnamese cadre in Laos and South Vietnam against the Communist cause.

March 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Peter F. Drucker (138 North Mountain Avenue, Montclair, New Jersey, 07101-6123)

1. Drucker leaves on March 27th for two weeks in Europe and, therefore, declined to write anything for us, but did suggest that he would talk off the top of his head while I took notes. He will return from Europe on April 11th and suggested that he would be delighted to talk to you, or the Governor, or anyone else at that time. (I did not ask him to write anything then, but thought we might ask him to do so when he got back.)

2. Drucker feels that the Governor (as well as Adolf Berle) does not really understand Latin American problems because contemporary Latin American problems are not what they were thirty years ago. In particular, he suggests that NAR thinks of the Latin American middle class as similar to the U.S. middle class, which is not so because entrepreneurship, which is the dominant characteristic of the American middle class, is absent in the Latin American "counterpart."

3. Drucker's views on the current situation, which are expressed in economic terms, conclude that if Latin American can survive the next twelve months it will be "over the hump". He is referring here to the economic collapse brought about in almost every Latin American country as the result of severe commodity price fluctuations in recent years. He says that the tide has sharply turned against the economic crisis and the fundamental question now is whether the social and political underpinnings of the Latin societies can stand the strains of the "early recovery." (This is based on the analogy of the patient whose most perilous days are in the post-operative stage when his chances of contracting mortal disease are greatest.)

4. Drucker cites four areas where the strain (in the recovery period) may well be too great:

a. Drucker expects a collapse in Argentina, which he suggests has shown no capacity for building the social and economic institutions or underpinnings to match contemporary needs. He suggests that Argentina's problems are not so much in the need for social or economic reform as they are in the need to build a unified national will. The absence of Argentine patriotism (and the absence of uniting characteristics between the coast and inland populations) makes any comprehensive national approach to problems unlikely.

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Roderick O'Connor at Georgia Tech); the establishment of credit and housing cooperatives in the Peruvian highlands; and the work of Joseph Cecchi, development consultant in Washington, D.C.

b. The promotion of an Inter-American treaty to guarantee Latin investment in other Latin American countries. Some kind of meaningful international guarantee is necessary to enable the Latin American investors to invest in a neighboring country without fear of punitive measures such as confiscation. The risks to Latin investors may be greater in this regard than to U.S. investors if for no other reason than, for example, nobody is less protected than a Peruvian investor in Colombia. Drucker assesses that a 2 or 3% reinsurance guarantee would probably be sufficient to enable a substantive capital flow between the Americas. (He cites Lawrence Rockefeller and Mr. Aldrich of the Rockefeller development firm as the experts in the field.)

8. In terms of expertise in this entire area, Drucker advises us to contact Leonard Kansky of the W.R. Grace Co., New York City, BI4-1200.

August 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK
FROM: DLB

I have asked Margie to deliver to you this afternoon
the following papers:

1. Draft of NAR foreign policy speech with cover memo.

2. Draft of your memo to NAR, summarizing what the research staff has done and including a personnel summary and evaluation, as requested by NAR. Obviously I have not commented on myself, nor have I done much evaluation on any of the girls.

3. A memo to you proposing how we handle NAR request for a file of what the foreign policy research staff has produced.

John Deardourff raised with me the other day the fact that Rod had very briefly mentioned to him that we ought to be thinking about Margie and Joan, both of whom are on NAR's payroll. I told him that we had already discussed between us and with Margie the fact that a decision would be made immediately after Rod returned. I also suggested that I saw no reason why Joan could not immediately come off the payroll and said that I would mention this matter to you.

Mon.
come off the payroll and said that I would mention this matter to
I asked anguished that I saw no reason why loan could not immediately
test that a decision would be made immediately after Rod returned.
 him that we had already discussed between us and with Mangle the
apout Mangle and loan, both of whom are on MVR's payroll. I told
Rod had very friendly mentioned to him that we ought to be thinking
John Deaton, raised with me the other day, the fact that
was produced.

I was produced.

3. A memo to you proposing how we hang the Mangle MVR request
   ton a life of what the foreign bench research staff

I done much estimation on snb of the girls.
Opinionsly I have not commented on Mabel' nor have
simply and evaporation' as requested by MVR.

S. Draft of loan memo to MVR, summarizing what the
research staff has done and including a personnel

1. Draft of MVR foreign bench sheet with cover memo.

the following headers:

I have saved Mangle to deliver to you this afternoon

FROM: DTP
TO: HAV
MEMORANDUM

August 2, 1964

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: Henry A. Kissinger

FROM: Douglas L. Bailey

SUBJECT: New York Research Office Visit

1. The girls are preparing elaborate notebooks which contain all of the Governor's speeches, press comments, background memos, Q&As, drafts, and assorted papers on any given foreign policy subject. Thus, we will have in one place all the relevant papers on Vietnam, etc. I have asked them to prepare three full sets of these notebooks: one for the Governor's files per his request; one for your Cambridge office; and one for the research office itself. We will maintain on file also three additional copies of all that mimeographed material which is now available in sufficient number. The first volume of each set will include a table of contents for the full set, a list of the subject files available in the New York Research Office, a list of all periodicals to which the research office subscribes, and a complete list of those books on foreign policy maintained in the research library here. One such set already exists, and I am told that the others will be ready in ten days.

2. The girls have now become quite busy working on material for Keating which all seems to be geared to an anti-Bobby Kennedy campaign. Ann Black has been asked to prepare memos on RFK's role in the 1962 Cuba Crisis, his role in arranging the drug company ransom of Cuban prisoners, and his trip to Indonesia. Pam Hill is preparing memos on RFK's participation in the National Security Council, his trip to Poland, and the Kennedy involvement with Yugoslav refugees.

3. I have asked the girls to prepare for you a list of those periodicals which the research office has been taking whose subscription has either expired or will do so shortly. It would be a help to them if you would merely check off those which you feel the office should continue to receive, clip, and file.

24 September 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Douglas L. Bailey

SUBJECT: New York Office

Attached please find:

1. A summary by the girls of the work done for Keating. By and large this has been straightforward research without too much opinion. The Indonesian materials given to Keating were merely a collection of what had already been done for NAR. The Polish paper is enclosed here. I have asked the girls to give us copies of anything they do which goes beyond a simple factual answer to a straight research question.

2. A copy of Keating's press release on Malaysia. This piece, which is not very good nor relevant nor punchy, was largely constructed out of the NAR speech, drafts and briefing papers. It does not, in my opinion, make the point that RFK's trip failed, which is where the political meat lies.

3. A copy of Pam Hill's memos on RFK's trip to Poland. It is my judgment that there is nothing of real value to Keating here. The fact is that what was poor foreign policy in Bobby's trip was good politics in New York State.

4. Ann Black's memo on research office subscriptions which are expiring. Unless you anticipate some firm and clear-cut decisions on the use of the research staff by early November, I recommend reviewing those subscriptions which I have checked, and considering the rest when such firm and clear-cut decisions are made.

Around October 5 there should arrive at your office a fully-indexed, fully-tabbed set of 25 large, hard-cover notebooks which contain everything the staff has done on all foreign policy subjects. They are particularly valuable because they correspond exactly to the set used by the girls in New York and to the set prepared for the Governor's files.

24 September 1964

TO: RICHARD P. NATHAN

FROM: Ann Black
Pam Hill
Mary McAniff
Gigi Wilmers

SUBJECT: Research and Materials on Bobby Kennedy

1. **Research Papers Completed:** The following research papers have been completed:

RFK and the Bosses -- Gigi Wilmers

RFK's Trip to Poland -- Pam Hill

RFK's Trip to Indonesia -- Ann Black

RFK and Civil Rights -- Mary McAniff

RFK and the 1960 Campaign -- Gigi Wilmers

These papers include a detailed record of RFK's statements and actions, analysis and criticism of RFK's record and recommendations for use of the material. In some cases, where it has been requested, a statement for Senator Keating was also drafted as in the case of RFK and the Bosses and RFK's Recommendations of Southern Judges.

2. **Research Completed but no Paper Written:** The following issues have been researched but because there was no basis for criti-cizing RFK, a paper was not written.

RFK's Trips to Berlin, Africa and his 1962 around-the-world tour

RFK's Role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Cuba Missile Crisis

3. **Current Research Projects:** The following issues are currently being researched:

RFK and Crime (especially Valachi hearings)

RFK and McCarthy

RFK and National Security Council

RFK's Trip to Brazil

RFK's "Ruthless" Treatment of Bowles after the Bay of Pigs

4. **Available Research Materials on RFK**

Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 1952-63

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 1959-64

Congressional Record 1962-64

Congressional Record 1963-64

Congressional Quarterly Reports 1960-64
Congressional Quarterly Finance 1963-64

4. Available Research Materials on RAK

RAK's "Rutplees" Treatment of Bowles after the Bay of Baja
RAK's Trip to Brasil
RAK and National Security Council
RAK and McCarthy
RAK and Crime (especially Selective Pensions)

being researched:

3. Current Research Projects: The following issues are currently

RAK's Role in the Bay of Baja Transocean and Cupa Missile Create
conk

RAK's Tribe to Berlin, Africa and the 1963 around-the-world

citing RAK's a baber was not written.

be have been researched but because there was no data for criti-
ical research completed put no paper written: The following issues

RAK and the Boasea and RAK's Recommendations of Southern Juggles.
a statement for Senator Keating was also drafted as in the case of
for use of the material. In some cases, where it has been redacted,
actions, analyses and criticism of RAK's record and recommendations
These baber include a detailed record of RAK's statements and

RAK and the 1960 Campaign -- Gifford Winemere
RAK and Civil Rights -- Mary McVitt
RAK's Trip to Indonesia -- Ann Black
RAK's Trip to Poland -- Sam Hill
RAK and the Boasea -- Gifford Winemere

been completed:

1. Research Papers Completed: The following research papers have

SUBJECT: Research and Materials on Boppa Kennedy

Gifford Winemere
Mary McVitt
Sam Hill

FROM: Ann Black

TO: RICHARD P. NATHAN

34 September 1964

News

HERBERT BROWNELL, Campaign Director

FROM THE CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS OF
U. S. SENATOR KENNETH B. KEATING
(REPUBLICAN - NEW YORK)

521 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

EUGENE T. ROSSIDES, Campaign Manager

Telephone: 212 YU 6-5420

BERYL L. REUBENS, Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE:

Sunday Papers
(Sept. 13, 1964)

KEATING CHALLENGES OPPONENT'S
RECORD ON INDONESIA

STATEMENT BY SENATOR KENNETH B. KEATING

The people of New York know that my opponent is ill equipped to deal with the problems of the Empire State.

His mission to Indonesia demonstrates that my opponent also has a lot to learn about foreign affairs.

Last January my opponent went to Indonesia to settle the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia -- a dispute of critical importance to the Free World.

Everywhere he went there was great excitement and big headlines. But when it was all over exactly nothing had been accomplished -- except to embolden the Indonesian dictator, President Sukarno, the offending party in the case.

There are certain facts with regard to this mission to Indonesia which the public has the right to know. They make evidence why Sukarno was not won over by my opponent's charm.

There is documentary evidence that at the very time my opponent was publicly urging Sukarno to make peace, he knew that members of Sukarno's army were being trained by the U.S. Army in guerrilla warfare techniques right here in the United States. He knew it because he was a member of a Special Counter-Insurgency Committee set up in April, 1961. As a member of this Committee, he was fully aware that Indonesian military personnel were attending "guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency" courses conducted by the U.S. Army.

These courses supposedly were for the benefit of our allies. I know of no U.S. treaty that makes Sukarno an ally of the U.S. Despite this members of Sukarno's army were being given instructions in methods the Indonesian dictator is finding most useful in his

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aggression against our true friend, Malaysia.

These facts raise serious questions about my opponent's ill-fated mission to Indonesia. The two-faced policy which was being followed probably doomed any hopes of reasoning with Sukarno under any circumstances. But the situation was compounded by the inept tactics my opponent used in his attempt at international diplomacy.

His tactics were based on expediency instead of principle. He seemed more anxious to conciliate an aggressor than to help a victim. No weight was given to the question of right versus wrong.

The situation in the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict is very clear. Indonesia's dictatorial, Communist-leaning President Sukarno is carrying on guerrilla warfare and subversive activities against the democratic, pro-Western Federation of Malaysia. He is as great a threat to peace and freedom in Southeast Asia as Nasser is in the Middle East.

So what procedure did my opponent follow? He concentrated on buttering up the aggressor instead of reassuring the victim.

He first went to Tokyo, where Sukarno was visiting, and then followed Sukarno back to Jakarta to try and arrange a conference on the dispute among Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

Eventually he left Jakarta to the accompaniment of reports that he had brought about a cease-fire and a peace conference, but within hours of his departure President Sukarno proclaimed: "Crush Malaysia! Indonesia may change her tactics but the goal will remain the same."

My opponent made the astonishing observation that if the negotiations failed, "Everyone can go back to the jungle and shoot one another again."

In the months since then, Indonesia has stepped up its aggression against Malaysia. Last week, Malaysia took its case to the United Nations Security Council.

And this is the matter my opponent was supposed to have ironed out back in January.

The conclusion is inescapable that my opponent's mission to Indonesia was one of the most naive and futile performances in our

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