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FOR

NBC-TV PRESS

REF1680M

PROGRAM

TODAY SHOW

STATION

WNBC-TV & NBC
TELEVISION NETWORK

DATE

NOVEMBER 22, 1977

8:15 A.M.

CITY

NEW YORK

BROADCAST EXCERPT

JANE PAULEY: And with new hopes for peace in the Middle East, Tom Drokaw is with a man who's experience in the past in diplomatic relations in that area is unparalleled. Tom?

TON BROKAW: Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, is with us this morning to size up the situation in the Middle East, following President Sadat's visit to Israel over the weekend. Dr. Kissinger, there is a late dispatch from Amman, Jordan. Jordan's Information Minister, no doubt speaking for his king, today praised Anwar Sadat's visit to Israel, saying that the visit of President Sadat has achieved its goal. Do you find that a significant development in the Middle East?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: I think it is important because it shows that the initial criticism of President Sadat was a reaction to a totally novel, almost Biblical event, that now he will get the support of at least the moderate Arabs.

BROKAW: So it was more than just a psychological breakthrough that was achieved, in your mind?

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DR. KISSINGER: In my mind, it changed the entire situation in the Middle East. It changed it psychologically, and I also believe it will change it diplomatically.

BROKAW: Do you think that Sadat came away from Israel with more than he has been willing to talk about publicly?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends how you define success. I think he came away with the confidence that an agreement acceptable to both sides can be negotiated. He would not have put out the statement today that it was a hundred percent successful, he would not have arranged the sort of reception that he did. And I really think that both sides, the Egyptians and the Israelis, came up to the historic nature of the occasion.

BROKAW: Now, what do you think that the role of the United States should be? You have been reluctant to criticize the Carter Administration. But give us an evaluation of what you think that the role of the Administration should be in this situation?

DR. KISSINGER: This isn't a question of criticizing the Carter Administration, which has made major efforts towards peace since the Inauguration of the President. The problem is we are all facing a totally new situation, for which we couldn't have planned. In these circumstances, I think the United States should not tie itself to any one particular formula. The United States should facilitate the realization of whatever the Egyptian

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and Israeli leaders have in principle agreed upon, to make it
possible for moderate Arabs to join this process, and for all
people of good will in the Middle East to join this process.
But we shouldn't tie it up as the one formula and make it look
as if there was a particular approach that people have to carry
out to please us. Our interest is peace and the easing of tensions,
not a particular procedure.

BROKAW: Well, translated, that means we ought not to get
hung up on going to Geneva just for the sake of going to Geneva.

DR. KISSINGER: Not for the sake of going to Geneva. If
the parties want to go to Geneva, of course we should go. But
it is now important to permit this process, to give this process
a chance to develop. And with respect to Geneva, it's important
to know whether we want to negotiate something or to ratify
something. I think Geneva as a ratification forum can be very
useful. As much as possible should be negotiated ahead of time,
and we now have the opportunity to do it, to facilitate it.
And now that the parties are directly in contact with each other,
our role should be more facilitating than intrusive.

BROKAW: Is it a little tricky for the United States, however,
to facilitate meetings between Sadat and the rest of the Arab
world, to try to marry his hopes and their desires?

DR. KISSINGER: It's tricky. But the opportunity is enormous.
It can be done. It was American efforts that brought matters
importantly to this point, and I think the United States should
pursue these efforts and, in my judgment, pretty much on its
own.

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BROKAW: Without the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: If the Soviet Union genuinely wants peace, it should welcome it. The Soviet Union has been responsible for most of the crises in the area. It opposed the trip of President Sadat. It has discouraged other Arabs from welcoming it. We should have -- If there is a solution the Soviet Union can participate in, endorsing it. But I do not think the Soviet Union is necessary to bring matters beyond this point. And I know that President Sadat said yesterday in his press conference in front of Mr. Begin that nothing that he does seems to please the Soviet Union, and this may happen to him at Geneva, too.

BROKAW: So that could only stir the situation if we were to continue, in your judgment at least, if we were to continue this joint role of the Soviet Union...

DR. KISSINGER: We have not pursued a very joint role up to now, but I would certainly not enhance the position of the Soviet Union at this point. It isn't necessary.

BROKAW: In our other hour here on the "Today" program this morning, we had an interview with a young man by the name of Frank Smith, who has written a book called "Decent Interval." I know you are aware of it. He was a CIA information analyst in Saigon in the closing days. He makes some very serious charges about the role of the CIA and about the role of your administration of the State Department in Washington. The charges, in essence, are that you refused to acknowledge information

[5]

that was coming from reliable sources in South Vietnam about
the North Vietnamese determination to take over Saigon, and
that there was no advance planning for the evacuation of Saigon.
As a result, according to Mr. Smith -- as a result, hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of friends of the American CIA were left
behind unduly in South Vietnam.

DR. KISSINGER: I have not read the book. I have only
read news accounts. Mr. Smith was at the second level in Saigon,
ten thousand miles away. He could not possibly know what planning
was being done in Washington. We became convinced early in April
that there was a high probability that Saigon would collapse.
We'd also had to conduct ourselves in such a manner that we
could not appear to be betraying an ally, that we did not create
a panic, and at the same time get out the maximum number of
people. We got out all Americans that wanted to leave, without
losing anybody. We got out close to 150,000 Vietnamese in a
three-day period. I think those numbers speak for themselves.
Mr. Smith could not possibly know what we were thinking of and
what we were doing. And what he is writing is gossip and a
very local situation.

BROKAW: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.