SEP 18 '93 12:39PM 2123505146

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haustion on the part of Israel. This is
why all the truly contentious issues
have been set aside-borders, settle-
ments, refugees, and Jerusalem. Even
the mutual recognition on which the
agreement is based is ambiguous. Is-
rael has recognized the PLO but
seems to believe that it has not recog-
nized a Palestinian state and that it
can choose the representatives with
whom it is prepared to deal. This is
surely an illusion. I have in the past
expressed grave reservations about
the consequences of creating a Pales-
tinian state. But after Arafat has been
received at the White House on an
equal footing with Rabin and elec-
tions are held in the occupied terri-
tories, a Palestinian state is inevitable
sooner or later. And its leaders will emerge
from the elections.17,.25,.5,1

At the same time, Arafat, with the best
will in the world, will be unable to endow his
recognition with the nearly mystical signifi-
cance given to it by many Israelis. Any politi-
cal leader depends on his constituency. And
in the past, the PLO has been an umbrella
organization including terrorists, rejection-H
ists, and radicals, many of whom have con-
demned the agreement and are unlikely to
ever be converted to views contrary to those
of a lifetime. Even granting Arafat's unre-
served commitment to peace, the pressures
he faces will make him an increasingly com-
plicated partner. If he pursues a PLO or
radical consensus, he will be forced to be
ambiguous; if he goes beyond his constituen-
cy, he may be removed or become irrelevant.17,.25,.5,1
11,.25,.48,1 When the Palestinians recognized Israel, did
they mean that they have become genuinely
reconciled to its existence? Or was it with the
same attitude that France renounced Alsace-
Lorraine to Germany in 1871, as a stage in a
continuing struggle? I asked this question of a
PLO representative after the signing. He an-
swered: "I consider myself as coming from

Jaffa. My children, who have never lived in
Palestine, will also tell you they are from
Jaffa.'' At the same time, he was voluble-and
I believe sincere-in protesting his yearning
for peace. 17,.25,.5,1
11,.25,.48,1 The follow-on negotiations must strive to
remove this ambivalence. They must make
clear that there is a point beyond which Israel
should not be asked to make concessions, and
that Israel's international support has been
enhanced by the risks it is taking for peace.

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They must also convince the Palestinians that their dignity is an essential aspect of a final settlement. 17, .25, .5,1

11, .25, .48,1 It will be painful for each side to accept the consequences of its own decisions. After the elections in the occupied territories, which must be held in nine months' time, the Israeli

recognition of the Palestinian entity will be irrevocable, as will the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Israeli politicians who speak blithely of abrogating the agreement or of reoccupying vacated areas are deluding themselves. The international isolation such acts would produce would prove unsustainable.
And even if Israel should withdraw its recognition of a Palestinian entity, the rest of the world would not follow.

17, .25, .5,1

**Benefits:** At the same time, the Palestinians must not delude themselves that they can resort to their traditional pressure tactics. The follow-on negotiations cannot succeed and coexistence in the occupied territories would be thwarted if the PLO returned to harassment, not to speak of terrorism.

11, .25, .48,1 In the immediate future, Israel will gain considerable benefits. It will no longer need to deal with the nearly half

of the total Arab population of the occupied territories living in Gaza. It will be able to withdraw its forces from the population centers in the rest of the occupied territories and thus reduce, perhaps even eliminate, the impact of the *intifada*.

Cooperative patterns between Israeli and Arab authorities on the West Bank are sure to develop. Relations with other Arab countries will improve,

though I would expect full recognition to be withheld pending an overall settlement. 17, .25, .5,1
11, .25, .48,1 The Palestinians' major achievement in the initial period is the de facto recognition of a Palestinian entity and the establishment of the PLO as the governing authority in the occupied territories. After a while, this fact is bound to alter the negotiating pattern fundamentally. Once follow-on talks begin, the continuing presence of Israeli settlements, military bases, and unrestricted use of roads is certain to be challenged-perhaps even in the interim period of two years and surely after that.

An even more serious challenge may come from within the Muslim world. Since 1948, every major step toward peace in the Middle East has been followed by an in-

crease in terrorism. Dissident groups have

SEP 18 '93 12:40PM 2123505146

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[Y]

tried to interrupt the process either by assassinating those who carried it forward, as happened to Sadat, or by triggering Israeli retaliation. Some leading Israelis seem to believe that Arafat and the police force that the PLO will be permitted to organize will help keep the West Bank quiet. But the ``strong'' Palestinian police force envisioned in the agreement is likely to become, at best, a study in ambivalence. With what energy will they resist acts aimed at subverting the Israeli presence? With what conviction will they pursue terrorists returning from Israel? When will they become the problem rather than the solution? 17, .25, .5, 1
11, .25, .48, 1 The most serious danger is that the dissentient groups will try to create Lebanese-style

conditions in the occupied territories. The central authorities may not be able to prevent terrorism, either against moderate Arabs or against Israelis. If conditions become too chaotic, Israel may intervene, or outside Arab forces may try to infiltrate the West Bank, or both. The same result could occur if the PLO entity seeks to intervene in Jordan. All these developments could usher in another Middle East war. 17, .25, .5, 1

The prospects of a permanent peace thus depend on how well the interim arrangements can be made to work, and after two years whether the follow-on negotiations on Jerusalem, borders, settlements, etc. will show progress. In this respect, the outside world has a major responsibility. While the role of economic development is often exaggerated, in this case rapid progress in that

field is one of the few tools available to give the parties-especially the Palestinians-a stake in an evolutionary approach. A substantial aid program is necessary. America has quite properly taken the lead, but major resources must come from the Arab world. In addition, the world community has an obligation to come down hard on terrorism. Heretofore, the pattern has been token opposition to terrorism and passionate condemnation of Israeli retaliations. That pattern must end. 17, .25, .5, 1

But the ultimate challenge remains the follow-on negotiations. Fitting two states into a territory fifty miles wide-the distance from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River-would be difficult even if irredentism were not built into the situation. This remains above all a psychological problem. Israel will have to navigate

SEP 18 '93 12:41PM 2123505146

P.6

between the two extremes of an occu-
pation mentality on the one hand, and
a nearly mystical belief in a formal
peace (for which there is no historical
warranty) on the other. After all, most
wars start between countries that are
legally at peace; recognition has never
precluded war or even conquest. The
PLO must overcome the twin tempta-
tions of sustaining the intifada and
using softer language to disarm Israel
while pursuing its traditional L
objectives.17,.25,.5,1

America's role should be to rally
support for the development of the
autonomous area, insisting that most
of these funds come from the Arab
world. It should use its influence with
the moderate Arabs to end their boy-
cott of Israel, and to encourage Pales-
tinian restraint. It should be available at
times of deadlock, but without returning to
its dominating role. And it should organize
plausible international sanctions against ter-
rorism and make clear to the PLO that this is
a key test of its seriousness.17,.25,.5,1
11,.25,.48,1 What America must not do is to offer its
military forces as the deus ex machina for
solving every security issue. Nothing would
more undermine the willingness of the Amer-
ican people to support the peace process than
a permanent stationing of U.S. combat
troops, especially in the heavily populated
territories on the West Bank, where they
could easily repeat the experiences of the
Marine contingent in Beirut.17,.25,.5,1
11,.25,.48,1 A formidable agenda thus lies ahead. Like
all diplomatic documents, the agreement
signed in Washington represents a compro-
mise which must be compared not with what
each side would consider ideal, but with what
would exist in the absence of the agreement.
All the parties must now learn to live with
what they have built, which is quite different
from what is familiar to them. The spirit of the
emotional signing should be a huge help in
getting the parties to their destination.ig0

17,.25,.5,1

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[Lc]

IN0413 henry

DEPT. in

cess, the ceremony at the White
House had the aura of a fairy tale. It
seems only yesterday that I walked
the streets of Tel Aviv with my valued and
trusted friend Yitzhak Rabin after the '67
war, when he was the hero of conquests.
Now he was seeking to become an instru-
ment of conciliation. And next to me sat the
serene and beautiful Mrs. Sadat, sus-
pended between hope and regret that
it took twenty years for Yasir Arafat,
the leader who had vilified her hus-
band, to embrace Sadat's noble path.
Would it now Arafat who at last ful-
fills Sadat's vision in his final conver-
sation with me-of building a
mosque, a church, and a synagogue
on top of Mount Sinai to symbolize a
generation's hope for peace?

#It was one of those rare occasions
on which hope suspends all doubt.
Neither I nor anyone else present
will ever forget the anguish and hope
in the nearly Biblical remarks of
Prime Minister Rabin. Nor could one
fail to be affected by the culmination

(((MORE))))

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