NOT FOR PUBLICATION * NOT FOR QUOTATION

Attributed statements based on notes taken at
an information session but not been approved
by participants and are not to be considered
authoritative statements of their positions

SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL

American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline Station, Massachusetts

ACS-14

7/11/60

SEMINAR: by Dalimil Kybal, based on

"SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL, AND DETERRENCE",
Paper Delivered before the Asilomar Strategy Seminar on
April 27, 1960 by D. Kybal

The purpose of this paper is to spell out in conceptual form those feasible and alternative approaches which the United States and its allies should consider in order to preserve the security of the free nations in the forthcoming nuclear missile and space age, with particular emphasis on military aspects which are basic to the problem of achieving security, arms control, and effective deterrence to aggression. About ten years ago, the U.S. enjoyed an overwhelming degree of nuclear weapons superiority predicated largely on the striking power of the Strategic Air Command supplemented by our weapon stockpile and the availability of overseas bases. With a steady increase in Soviet military capability, it has become unlikely that the U.S. can maintain a nuclear supremacy posture. Even if we are able to settle on a desirable deterrence posture, we must realize that any such posture will call for the maintenance of a delicate balance of terror and will serve its basic purpose only if the nuclear nations and their leaders behave rationally at all times. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the potentialities of arms control as an initial supplement of the deterrence approach to security and to consider the possibility of ultimately achieving security through arms control as a complete substitute for security through deterrence. The following considerations are greatly oversimplified to permit the use of a mathematical model. Nonetheless, they illustrate the underlying principles and logical concepts involved.

# I. Security through Deterrence

Let us first consider the effects of counterforce exchanges only with no counter-population threats involved. Figure One depicts a bilateral military situation in which the level of Force One is plotted along the X axis and that of Force Two is plotted along the Y axis. The asterisks along each axis represent values for the minimum military capability which each force must maintain for insurance against aggression by the other force. It is assumed for simplicity that this "insurance" or "retaliatory" capability is the same on both sides. The critical parameter in counterforce exchanges is the ratio R of the number of weapons expended by a force to the number of weapons killed. The strategic situation is greatly different, depending upon whether R is greater than or less than one. (Strictly speaking, there are values R1, R2 for each side, but it is assumed here that R1=R2=R.) The numbers labeling the arrows show the effect of an initial strike by Force One or Two. Notice that if R is less than one, a situation of high vulnerability, a decisive advantage is gained by the side making the initial

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attack. Force One, for example, assuming it started with a force level sufficiently far above its minimum insurance capability, by initiating an attack could completely wipe out Force Two without going below the minimum. Similarly, for Force Two attacking first. However if R is greater than one, the situation is reversed and a sufficiently massive first strike by Force One, because of the great invulnerability of Force Two, would result in the expenditure of all of Force One without reducing Force Two below the minimum. Thus if R is greater than one, there is an effective deterrence against a first strike.

In **Figure Two** the military exchange relationships for the situation R less than one give rise to the three darkened areas, each representing a different type of deterrent posture. The lower triangle illustrates the situation of nuclear supremacy for Force One; that is, if the relative force relationship between Force One and Force Two is within this triangle, Force One can win whether it strikes first or second. In other words, "victory" here means that Force One can eliminate all the military capability of Force Two and still retain its own capacity at a level beyond the asterisk minimum. In such a situation, it would probably be better for Force One to initiate the attack rather than await attack by Force Two; but in either case, Force One could win. (Notice that the upper boundary of the superiority region for Force One is determined using the worst possible case, i.e. Force Two strikes first; this boundary is parallel to the arrow representing a strike by Force Two.) The same superiority can be assumed for Force Two as shown by the triangle at the upper left of this slide. The same considerations and results apply to the advantage of Force Two.

The third darkened region--a common area--appearing in the center of the slide, is designated as one of negative deterrence, and involves a condition of capability balance in which neither side has weapon superiority. Here advantage lies with the initial attacker, and this creates a motivation for both sides to initiate an attack. This is the kind of situation that could lead to thermonuclear war with its characteristics of massive surprise attack.

**Figure Three.** In the case of R greater than one, we are again concerned with the three regions of deterrence. Similar regions of superiority for Forces One and Two are shown. Although Force One could win under any conditions, within its superiority area, it would win more easily if it did not initiate the attack. The situation is the converse of the condition just described in Figure Two in which there was some advantage to be gained by making the initial attack. Here there is also an implication that it might be desirable, from the standpoint of military advantage, for Force One to goad or entice Force Two into attacking first.

The third, or common region, shown on this slide, is represented by the central triangle. If the initial force relationship lies in this region, which I have defined as one of positive deterrence, there is no basic incentive for either side to initiate an attack. This region represents a situation of stable deterrence (also called "nuclear stalemate" or

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"secure-parity"), but it is important to emphasize that this stability is not automatically achieved or maintained. Victory in the technological arms race, rather than the production arms race would be of paramount concern.

A region of limited superiority is shown in white adjacent to the positive deterrence region. This posture of limited superiority makes it practical to conduct limited nuclear exchanges of an all-out nature perhaps to obtain better information on the actual invulnerability of the opposing force, or to obtain political advantage. So long as the leadership of both forces remains rational, the degree of balance between the opposing forces is such as to impose defeat on the side that might initiate total war.

## II. Stability of a Deterrent Posture

A posture of nuclear supremacy is inherently unstable since it can be easily upset if the weaker side chooses to engage in an arms race. A race in which both sides increase their armaments at the same rate will tend to move either side out of the region of superiority, as indicated in Figure Three. A negative deterrence posture is basically unstable in that it provides a significant advantage to the side making an initial attack, and its instability is increased by an arms race. Positive deterrence, on the other hand, has a potential for stability provided that the conditions underlying the existence of the posture can be maintained without change for a given period of time. Moreover if both sides have as national objectives the preservation of the positive deterrence condition, there is no incentive for an arms production race. This should be distinguished from a technological arms race which would seek to change the value of R so as to move one side into a region of superiority.

Note first that the effect of a technological arms race in which the value of R is symmetrically increased on both sides is to increase the region of positive deterrence and thus to further stabilize the situation, (see Figure Four.) Now assume, for example, that the mutual force relationship of both powers occurs at point A in this diagram, and that both sides know the approximate boundaries of the positive deterrence region. Force 1, desiring to reduce its forces and yet remain within this region, reduces its capability along the horizontal line until point B is reached. Noting this move, Force 2 might be similarly motivated and reduce its forces to position C. This process can continue indefinitely until the boundary of the positive deterrence region for a given value of R is reached at point X. Notice that symmetrical technological increases in invulnerability will eventually move the point X down to point Y at which each side has the minimum force necessary for "insurance." Thus positive deterrence is a positive incentive for arms reduction.

Unfortunately such a posture still contains many dangers, particularly if the invulnerability of the forces maintaining positive deterrence is anything less than high (R=10 or more). It is essential that the character of such forces be sufficiently diversified among different

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weapon types so that a sudden breakthrough by one force in military technology will not result in a drastic disturbance of the deterrent posture. One difficult problem is deciding what number to set for the minimum retaliatory capacity on both sides. Is this to be developed to cover action against city targets only, or should it also include provision for a counter-force capability? There is some upper limit to this number such that the retaliation envisioned would cause an unacceptably high level of damage.

The preservation of rational behavior must constitute a most important objective which will require us to maintain a high degree of national fortitude and discipline. We must continue to study the appropriate responses we should make when confronted by extremely provocative political and military actions by the Soviet Union, including the possibility of limited attacks on nuclear forces located on our own soil. There is little or no consolation to be found in having a force sufficiently strong to wipe out the USSR if, in applying this force, we simultaneously commit national suicide. Our responses, therefore, should not be massive; they must be selective and limited and may even in certain circumstances exclude the use of a direct military response. A broad national program of popular education on the nuclear facts and associated behavior becomes an overwhelming requirement. We need communication with the Russians in order to assure each other that both sides will continue to act on rational principles. A TV link between Eisenhower and Khrushchev has been suggested, although this perhaps opens new dangers of blackmail.

Another serious problem is the possibility of technological surprise. There are two possible types: (a) the "anti-gravity" breakthrough which has been discussed by this group at some length. This is any kind of a fundamental discovery which might be applied to greatly change the strategic balance. In its incipient stages, this kind of a breakthrough is usually not appreciated by the military, and hence is not classified. Thus, it may pay to watch general scientific progress of the other side. The internationalization of basic research is one possible way of doing this. (b) An applied breakthrough, such as improvement in guidance, is born under a cloak of secrecy, and there is very little we can do about this except to keep up our own efforts at improved technology. An unrestricted arms race in the R and D phase seems desirable. Controls can be instituted at all subsequent phases from testing on to production and operational capability much more easily than in the R and D phase. Our motto might well be "Speak softly and carry a big technological stick."

### III. The Interrelationship between Deterrent Posture and Arms Control

Both of these contribute to the achievement of security and it is possible at least in theory to substitute one for the other. The type of arms control--as exemplified by rigidity of inspection and control procedure--is a function of the stability of the deterrent posture considered. In the case of supremacy deterrence, arms control agreements are not likely to stabilize conditions since the superior power lacks the incentive to

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accept and honor such agreements, and the weaker power would regard them as a hazard since they would disclose the exact degree and kind of the lesser power's weakness, and make the disclosure continuous and permanent. A similar argument would obviate arms control in a situation of negative deterrence since its implementation would disclose and confirm more precisely the high vulnerability of the opposing forces. Inspection and control agreements under positive deterrence, however, become both feasible and desirable since an effective enforcement of such agreements would confirm the invulnerability of an opponent's forces. This information, available to both sides, would reduce the possibility of a war being initiated through miscalculation regarding such invulnerability.

**Figure Five.** This diagram demonstrates the fact that under positive deterrence inspection of armaments need not even be completely reliable. A large AN may be tolerated without appreciably upsetting the strategic balance, provided that the invulnerability, R, is large enough. This figure can be taken from a family of diagrams like Figure Three with various values of R. It shows the relation that must exist between Force F₁ and its own relative vulnerability R₁ in order to establish itself at the upper boundary of the positive deterrence region. What it shows is that a relatively small force variation coupled with high invulnerability, could cope with large force variations of the side that desires to break the positive deterrence deadlock. This means, therefore, that the force level control does not have to be too rigid.

#### IV. Arms Control

In a speech to the National Press Club on February 18, 1960, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter spelled out two major American goals for the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. The first is, to quote: "Urgently, to try to create a more stable military environment which will curtail the risk of war and permit reductions in national armed forces and armaments..." The achievement of a situation of positive deterrence does, at least in theory, appear to satisfy the foregoing goal.

The second goal suggested by the Secretary is, to quote: "Subsequently, to cut national armed forces and armaments further and to build up international peace-keeping machinery to the point where the aggression will be deterred by international rather than national force." In terms of the diagrams discussed above, we can see that what is being advocated is the creation of a posture of supremacy for the international body which would, in fact, effectively deter all reduced national forces. Obviously, the instability of such a posture would have to be steadied through proper and probably quite rigid control of international machinery.

A posture of U.S. superiority or a posture of secure parity (which is another term for positive deterrence)--does effectively deter a massive attack against the United States. However, the effectiveness of the secure parity posture becomes more doubtful than the one for superiority when we consider potential conflicts in areas of vital U.S. interest, such as Western Europe. Consequently we may question the effectiveness

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of such a nuclear posture as long as it consists solely of a U.S. capability. Serious consideration should be given to the design of a composite deterrent capability combining U.S. deterrence with deterrent capability deployed locally in Western Europe under NATO control.

In addition, intercontinental deterrence will probably do little to prevent limited wars such as in Korea and Indo-China. Deterrence of these seems to be a political problem and one of internal politics at that. Since we cannot expect to deter internally all of these conflicts, we must have, therefore, the capability of intervening promptly and energetically in these localized disputes.

## V. General Conclusions

### A. Deterrent Posture.
(1) It is unlikely that the U.S. can maintain a nuclear supremacy posture. (2) A secure parity (i.e., positive deterrence) posture at relatively high force levels should therefore be our initial goal. (3) Such deterrent posture could be the basis for creation of a "more stable military environment---." (4) Secure parity will be achieved primarily through vulnerability of nuclear forces to surprise attack. (5) Maintenance of secure parity requires willingness to engage in a technological race, probably with some limitations. These limitations, however, must be subjected to strict control; de facto, unilateral restrictions must be avoided. (6) Secure-parity should reduce world tension and the danger of nuclear war through miscalculation. (7) Secure-parity contains a potential incentive towards arms reduction rather than an arms production race. (8) Irrational behavior will remain an ever-present menace to peace. To mitigate such danger, the U.S. should actively promote a Doctrine of Nuclear Response. (9) Maintenance of rational behavior demands continuous communication with the USSR.

### B. Local Deterrent Posture.
(1) While a U.S. secure-parity posture should deter nuclear conflicts invoving the respective U.S./USSR home lands, it might not deter low-scale conflicts. (2) Because of the type of NATO alliance, political considerations require a local Western world deterrent capability, operated under NATO control. (3) Such local deterrence should be designed on a "composite" basis, taking into account the U.S. capability. (4) This local deterrence could prove ineffective to deter limited conflicts in Western Europe. Therefore, adequate shield forces are required. (5) With regard to lower grade conflicts, the following progressive steps are essential: (a) internal political restraint, (b) prompt and effective international intervention, and (c) effective fighting capability.

### C. Arms Control.
(1) Mutual security-parity is the logical first step in the implementation of arms control agreements. (2) Secure-parity theoretically does not require a rigid inspection and control system of the forces in being. (3) Control measures to prevent technological surprise are highly desirable. The development and application of such measures is difficult. (4) The establishment of an international peace-keeping machinery is identified with a situation of supra-national nuclear supremacy. Proper international controls essential to the elimination of its inherent instability require "world peace under enforceable

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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE OPTIMUM SIZE FOR DETERRENT FORCES

FOR THE CASE OF DETERRENCE OF BIG WARS

7/26/60

by Marvin Kalkstein

It might be helpful to get some feel for the problem by considering Kybal's diagram for counter-force attacks with R>1.

R = number of weapons needed to destroy one opposition weapon

N<sub>1</sub><sup>O</sup>, N<sub>2</sub><sup>O</sup> are minimum insurance values: minimum number of weapons each side would desire to be remaining after an attack to be sure of having a meaningful deterrence

A is area of positive deterrence

B is area of side 1 superiority

C is area of side 2 superiority

P is minimum point of positive deterrence

### Maximum size

According to the diagram the maximum sizes of the deterrent forces should stay within area A to have a condition of positive deterrence, but are otherwise unlimited. To assure survival of a major fraction of the world's population (and some semblance of civilization) one would hope that the maximum would be a small fraction of "One Beach"; "One Beach" is of the order of 10<sup>7</sup> MT.

### Minimum size

The minimum size for positive deterrence is dependent on the assurance values N<sup>O</sup> and on the value of R (R>1). Several possible cases, involving different sets of assumptions, can be considered. A few of these are outlined below.

#### Case A. Bilateral Situation

Assume N<sub>1</sub><sup>O</sup> = N<sub>2</sub><sup>O</sup> = N<sup>O</sup>; R<sub>1</sub> = R<sub>2</sub> = R (R>1); N<sub>1</sub>' = N<sub>2</sub> = N

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where N is the allowed initial number of forces, preceding an attack from either side. The condition for minimum stable deterrence is that the side attacked is left with N° after a full attack by the other side. This is represented by the following equation:

$$N - N^{\circ} = N/R$$

which solved for N gives

$$N = \frac{R}{R-I} N^{\circ}.$$

It is seen from this that the greater the value of R, the smaller N becomes and the closer N comes to N°. (As R gets larger the area of positive deterrence broadens). In the limiting case, the Kybal diagram would look as follows:

Side 2

Side 1

A is again the area of positive deterrence. B and C are still areas of superiority, but no longer can a side in such an area gain anything by initiating a counter-force action.

The above case considered R as a constant, which is not likely to be exactly the case. However for large R, the results are not greatly changed if the R used is a minimum value.

### Case B. Multilateral situation

m = number of independent sides involved ($m \ge 2$)

$$\text{assume } N_1^\circ = N_2^\circ = \dots = N_m^\circ = N^\circ$$

$$R_1 = R_2 = \dots = R_m = R$$

The worse situation that one side has to fear is the one in which all the other sides unite together against it. In this case we would have

$$N - N^{\circ} = \frac{(m - 1)N}{R} \quad \text{which solved for N gives}$$

$$N = \frac{RN^{\circ}}{R - m \neq I}$$

In order to have stability in this situation R must be greater than $(m-1)$. Again for R sufficiently large, we arrive at a limiting value of N close to N°. In this case, the

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ACS-3

6/21/60

Attributed remarks, based on notes taken at an informal seminar, have not been approved by participants and are not to be considered authoritative statements of their positions.

SEMINAR: Deterrence

SPEAKERS: John Phelps, Tom Milburn

I. John Phelps

1. Of all the analyses of deterrence which have been made, we will take note of two. The first is that of Kybal:

(1) Supremacy deterrence - when one side has really overwhelming superiority. From the U.S. point of view, elements of this kind of deterrence may have existed in the 1945-60 period.

(2) Negative deterrence - when retaliatory forces are vulnerable and the second strike capability is limited. The temptation for preemptive attack is present. An approximate time period for this is the 1955-65 period.

(3) Positive deterrence - mutually stable deterrence with fairly invulnerable forces and assured second strike capability. There is little temptation for preemptive attack. This is the kind of bilateral situation we might have from, say, 1965 on.

2. Kahn distinguishes three types of deterrence:

(1) Type I deterrence - deterrence of an all-out attack on one's homeland.

(2) Type II deterrence - deterrence of extreme provocation (Soviet attack on Europe, etc.).

(3) Type III deterrence - "tit-for-tat" deterrence allowing for graduated retaliation against limited aggression.

The Kybal classification relates to the ratio and nature of the respective forces, whereas Kahn's classification relates to what may be asked of the deterrent forces.

It is usually assumed in the (perhaps somewhat over-simplified) military arguments that, if catastrophe can be avoided and the "missile gap" can be overcome, we will reach a state of bilateral positive (in Kybal's sense) deterrence by the mid-sixties.

3. What is wrong with this "simple military view" of deterrence? (i.e., why arms control is needed.) The answer is that the kind of deterrence envisioned may be:

(1) Numerically unstable. Small weapons imbalances may be unimportant but a factor of 10, which is conceivable, could cause instability.

(2) Technologically unstable. Possibilities which have been suggested are: increased missile accuracy, development of active defenses, improvements in antisubmarine warfare, etc.

(3) Incapable of providing for new nations in the power balance. The simple bilateral stability concept does not reckon, for instance, with

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China as a nuclear power.

(4) Incapable of allowing for irrationality. The assumption is usually made that decision-makers on each side will be completely rational and will have complete intelligence. This seems a dangerous assumption.

(5) Inflexible. Some analysts of deterrence think somewhat exclusively in terms of strategic deterrence and large nuclear forces. Frequently, little allowance is made for graduated or flexible deterrents of limited aggression. Good military arguments have been made by others for flexible limited war capability. Hopefully, comprehensive arms control plans will meet both dangers.

Changing the subject rather abruptly, we will review the results of some illustrative analytical calculations on deterrence. Operations research type studies along this line, using unclassified information, can be applied to other kinds of problems we may want to come to grips with quantitatively later in the summer.

Figure 1 is a sample result for a counterforce attack by an aggressor. The fraction of aggressor weapons surviving is plotted as a function of the force ratios. The numerical assumptions are: yield, 5 megatons; hardness, 25 p.a.; reliability of attacking missiles, 60%; attrition, 0 (meaning no active defense); dispersal of attacked weapons, 3 per site; intelligence, 75% of the aggressor weapon sites are known to the aggressor; preattack launch capability, 25% of the aggressor force. This could represent an attack with some warning on a fairly-well dispersed ballistic missile force in hardened and/or mobile sites. The asymptote at $P_s$ equals 0.44 shows the greatest damage that the aggressor could ever hope to inflict with his incomplete intelligence on a force which is able to launch some of its weapons before it is attacked. The importance of missile accuracy, used as a parameter in the figure, shows up clearly. Figures 9 and 11 show sample results for a counterpopulation attack, with accurately delivered megatons as the independent variable. Figure 9 shows, for the U.S., the integrated dose (24 hour distribution) for the U.S. population with and without blast fatalities subtracted out. These are the usual infinite plain dose values with respect to which shelter assumptions may be made. The curve is for a level of attack of 1000 accurately-delivered megatons.

Figure 11 shows blast and fallout fatalities as a function of delivered megatons. This is a "standard curve" from which, by means of some techniques worked out in the analysis, fatalities can be estimated for a range of values of such parameters as missile accuracy, average target hardness, "dirtiness" of the attacking weapons, average fallout protection, and so on. The aim is to make the analysis as flexible as possible.

For an unprepared population, Figure 11 and also the results of Everett and Pugh, suggest that delivered megatonnage of the order of 10 KMT would destroy about 90% of the U.S. population. If we are interested in punitive deterrents as part of an arms control system, the range of delivered megatonnage of any practical interest is actually in the tail of the curve of Figure 11.

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Discussion following Mr. Phelps' talk:

The discussion following Mr. Phelps' talk brought up a number of other factors to be considered. Phelps gave the figure of 10 KMT delivered to targets as a rough estimate of the yield required to wipe out (approximately 90% short-term fatalities) the entire United States if the population were in an unprepared state. Schelling noted that the figures given by Phelps could not be used directly as a measure of an adequate deterrent since some of the warheads would be directed to higher-priority, non-city targets, and since optimal targeting could not be assumed for a return strike. This is particularly true in the case of positive deterrence in which a second strike capability is included in the figure. The second strike capability could be much reduced by the first retaliatory strike of the attacked country.

Feld made the distinction between two separate kinds of targets in a nuclear attack: cities and strategic targets, such as SAC bases. An article in a recent issue of *The Nation* was mentioned by Rowen in which plans were noted to locate SAC bases near cities. It was pointed out that blast fatalities could be much reduced in an attack primarily upon military targets if the bases and large cities were not too close to each other. Rowen also mentioned that blast fatalities would be lessened by evacuation of the population. However, Phelps noted that this might do little good in the northeastern part of the United States where people would have to travel more than a hundred miles to escape death by fallout. Rowen asked whether Phelps' figures referred to a population equipped with shelters. The answer was that these figures were based on fallout radiation one metre above an infinite plain, and that no account of shelters or other means of protecting a population was included in the basic estimates. It was agreed that there would be far fewer fatalities if an attack is on SAC bases or military bases alone and if the population takes civil defense measures; however, the whole concept of deterrence includes the threat against civilian populations.

Smithies said it was important to try to look at some of the figures mentioned from the point of view of a decision-maker. "It is too easy," he said, "to become depersonalized in dealing with figures of megatonnage and millions of people killed. The concept of an adequate deterrent discussed so far seemed to imply killing a fairly substantial fraction of the population of the United States or Russia; but, even ten million casualties, for example, might be too many for a President to contemplate." Milburn conjectured that emotionality might play a larger role in decision-making after the outbreak of hostilities.

Schelling mentioned a number of other factors. The first was that, even with arms control, the possibility of blackmail is not eliminated. Secondly, our discussion of deterrence does not apply to accidental attack. The response to, or conduct of, an accidental war might differ greatly in kind from the reaction usually contemplated against a premeditated attack. An attacker might bend over backwards to see that accidental attack would do minimum damage. It is part of our responsibility to see that some attempt is made to minimize the damage in an accidental attack. If a bomb were dropped by accident, a supreme rationality might be invoked to prevent a chain reaction into all-out war. Along these same lines, Milburn emphasized that we should not only have plans available for what to do in the

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event of surprise attack, but that definite plans should be made for the
reaction to an accidental attack or, perhaps, a premeditated attack against
which we are forewarned by our intelligence. Rowen added that there is
the possibility that a war could be one of armies versus armies. We
must make provision for this if the enemy is willing to pursue a war in
that manner.

As a final comment on deterrence, Phelps recalled that some estimates for
the number of missiles which must be kept invulnerable for stable deterrence
in an "arms control environment" are of the order of two to four hundred.
Phelps, however, feels that, if we want to keep deterrence punitive and
not suicidal, we may want to reduce this number in our plans for an
effective deterrent. These numbers, and the whole rationale of stable
deterrence in relation to arms controls, need much further study.

## II. Tom Milburn

Most of us would agree that deterrence has psychological, as well as
political and military, connotations. Deterrence is aimed at the minds
of men. We seek to discourage actions in some directions. There is,
however, some disagreement as to what constitutes adequate deterrence.

One frequently-taken position is epitomized in an unclassified document
put out by Boeing Aircraft Company recently in which they defined adequate
deterrence as that which provides for greater destruction to them than
they do to us. This would provide evidence that, by the usual rules of
the game, we would win. We assume, in this case, that one side will win
and the other, therefore, will lose. This is somewhat similar to the
situation in a boxing match when both players may be quite bloodied but
one is the winner. Somehow, the judges decide in favor of one rather
than the other. Judges tend to decide that the fighter who has received
the least damage is the winner. This is regardless of how great the
damage sustained by both may be.

While this description of adequate deterrence may apply to games, somehow
the motivation involved seems to simple to apply to real life and is,
therefore, not altogether satisfying. Several persons have commented
upon the fact that a mix of weapons is more effective as a deterrent than
a single weapon or a single weapon system. I like to think of deterrence
as involving the discouragement of behavior in some directions while, at
the same time, encouraging the behavior which goes in other directions.
This involves influencing the choice matrix, or the set of possible
choices or set of classes of choices available to a decision-maker on
the other side. There are several parts we can influence. In general,
we can influence both the number and the nature of the paths from which
he chooses, and we can do so in various ways.

By influence, I mean that we would diminish or enhance his expectations of
value gain or preservation under certain contingencies - those contingencies
being associated with particular paths. By path or choice or alternative,
I refer to an image of a sequential class of behaviors expected by him to
lead to some goal or set of goals which may stand in disjunctive, con-
junctive or some other relationship with respect to the allocation of
resources. Some may be continuous goals. Some may be at points. We are
rather certain that the Soviets have several, rather than just one, goal,

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To the extent that we do not appreciate this fact, this complicates our predictions and our influence of them. Soviet leaders may concentrate on goals of military conquest of the world, of nonmilitary conquest of the whole world, of reduction of fear on their own parts, of increase of their scientific or economic prestige, of their own economic development, or even the pursuit of the good life. If fighting and military conquest were the only Soviet goals, I suspect that there would be precious little that we could do deterrent-wise to handle this situation. We might be able to delay the start of the battle, but mostly we could fight.

The assumption of more complex goals appears to have more heuristic value as well as appearing to be more realistic. By at least one definition of rationality, a decision-maker should choose from among that set of alternatives he perceives is available to him, the one for which the product of his subjective probability times his expected utility is the greatest. He should also, other things being equal, select choices which permit him more, rather than a lesser, range of choices at his next choice points. It should be remembered that time enters in here too, because all alternatives which he might perceive as available are not available right now. Some may not be available for months, others for years.

The situation is, in some respects, more complicated and more restricted than is suggested by this model. We, the U.S., and they, the Russians, have preferences for certain ranges of subjective probability and even for certain sizes of stake that limit us. These kinds of things, by the way, may be predicted, too, on the basis of personality characteristics, of situations, ideology, and history. All of these give an indication of the preferred range of subjective probabilities which Soviet decision-makers might be inclined to select, and even such characteristics of a decision-maker as the temporal span with which he deals gives some indication of his preferred size of stake or, in technical terms, his preferred variance. Both they and we are inhibited for reasons of personality, role, context, culture and ideology from choosing paths which go in some directions. We feel, for example, that we wouldn't choose paths which we regard as immoral. Since we understand the antecedent conditions for many of these aspects, prediction is, of course, far easier than it might be otherwise. Prediction is, by the way, easier for neurotics and psychopaths than it is for normals. The psychopath doesn't have much of a future and so he only has available to him those alternatives which exist right now. Also, he really isn't attempting to maximize his freedom over time, but only for the present moment; and this, of course, may box him in and we can predict his behavior with that in mind. Neurotics tend to have their tomorrows be mostly larger or expanded yesterdays, and don't have as complex or as rich futures as the rest of us. Of course, societies, as well as individuals, may be characterized as future-oriented, with the consequences which future orientation has for choice-making.

It is easier to predict classes of behavior in time of crisis than at other times, for at such times time tends to collapse. The temporal span with which individuals deal is very much shortened. There are fewer alternatives perceived as available, fewer goals. There is, of course, depersonalization of some aspects of behavior and greater concretization of thought. We might note that there is greater likelihood and greater probability of war under such circumstances, unless there is an increase in the number of paths or alternatives available at that time.

I have implied in all this that we influence the Russians, their choices, and

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they influence ours. I would suggest that perhaps we influenced their behavior through the U-2 incident, that Khrushchev could influence Nixon's ability to get elected President of the United States, that the size of the military budgets of these two great powers represent influences of each country upon one another. Obviously, many of these influences are unintended, in the same sense that countertransference in psychotherapy amounts to at least consciously unintended hate or affection, or to the extent that teachers of various subjects influence their students in ways which may be very different from the ones they have in mind. Their teachings have unintended consequences. This doesn't decrease the extent of their influence.

Clearly, if we are going to maximize the effectiveness of our deterrence, we are going to deal with the subjective probabilities and expected utilities, or outputs, or satisfactions associated with certain alternative behaviors. We may seek to decrease an enemy's expected probability of being successful, or we may seek to add to his expectation of disutility. In fact, we would like to have the expectation of disutility be very high, and the subjective probability of position utility associated with the choice be very low if this subject happens to involve an attack upon the United States. Some weapon systems generate such characteristics more effectively than others. What I am suggesting, in part, is that we can be more effective in influencing Soviet behavior, or in the behavior of any possible opponent, if we are concerned not merely with what we might call negative influences but are interested also in influencing them to go in certain directions. That is, we can increase the subjective probabilities that they will be successful, and even decrease expected disutilities or increase expected positive utilities for taking certain paths which we consider consonant with our own goals. Now clearly, to be able to do this most effectively, we ought to have an idea of what our goals are and what kinds of behaviors by them are most consonant with them.

This latter may not always be an easy task because, in part, we do not even know what behaviors of our own may be most consonant with the achievement of our own goals, and there needs to be a rather substantial research effort in that direction. The matter is complicated further by the fact that going in certain paths and choosing certain means tends to change the direction of one's goals.

Ordinarily, when we think about deterrence we think about the destruction of people and property as a most important threat. However, we could spend time thinking about threatening the values which are most important to a decision-maker one is attempting to influence, or about the enhancement of values which he regards as most important. At least at the moment, it seems likely that Soviet leaders would regard as exceptionally important the preservation of the integrity of their nation and the continuity of their own rule, something which U.S. leaders would tend to regard as extremely important, too, with respect to the U.S. The important point here is that, through various independent means, we can get estimates of the values of Soviet leaders just as we can of U.S. leaders and, independently, we can get pictures of their goals or their motivational systems as we can, hopefully, for ourselves.

We sometimes talk about continuous deterrence. This means being able to influence the choice matrix of an opponent even after limited war or a general war has begun. We are providing the choice of quitting or stopping

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in some way all along the line. One limited aspect of this kind of thing appears in the notion of a graduated deterrent.

Arms control can be conceived as a class of new paths, a new social invention, one of the potential consequences of which hopefully would be decreasing the probability of war.

We do make references, from time to time, to the N nation situation. It is interesting to look at it in the context just discussed. In one sense, having more nations possessing nuclear weapons should increase the probability of attacks, simply because decision-makers are around who can start nuclear wars. But the variance associated with such decisions, the size of stake, the possible loss, is much greater than it was, simply because nations involved in war can lose relatively more compared with nations not so involved; and the possibilities for mutual gain through cooperation are much greater than they are, otherwise. It would appear, therefore, that the incentive toward systems of arms control ought to prove greater once there are several more nations possessing nuclear weapons than is true at the present time; but this is just my guess.

It might be noted, parenthetically, that the Chinese, who would prefer to have a general nuclear war break out between the United States and Soviet Russia, have announced, and the announcement was published in the *New York Times*, that they intend not to make nuclear weapons.

Discussion following Mr. Milburn's talk:

As a kind of psychological deterrent, Feld mentioned the recent suggestion for the wholesale exchange of college students between the United States and Russia. If, for example, all of our college students were required to spend one of their four years in Russia and vice versa, we would have a system of "hostages" which would produce a number of benefits to all concerned. In addition to the long term improvement in relations which would result from this exchange, it might be expected to affect the plans of decision-makers in the two countries for initiating a nuclear attack by putting direct responsibility, for example, on Khrushchev for killing his own people if he dropped bombs on the United States. There was further discussion on this point. Schelling expressed the view that (a) the hostages should not be volunteers, but should be in effect, drafted for a year of education in the other country, and (b) that these "hostages" should not be of military age, taking the point of view that people of military age are expected to be killed in any war. However, the killing of innocent children might act as a more effective deterrent.

Schelling noted that both of these proposals would raise constitutional problems. It was not clear to Smithies why the Russians should be more deterred by their own people killed in the United States than they would if these people were at home and were killed by a retaliatory attack. Was this not just a semantic difference? Alexander felt that this semantic difference might be important in that a leader would feel personally responsible for killing his own nationals abroad, and could not shift the onus to the other power. Milburn felt that, while decision-makers may frequently divorce themselves from their personal lives in national planning, this exchange of students might tend to reinstate

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personal factors into policy-making.

(u)

Milburn restated his thesis that the problem of deterrence could not be viewed merely in terms of inhibiting the objective of military conquest, but that there were a number of psychological and other factors, some of which were mentioned above, to be considered. Barber added that one of these was the image of expectations of the future held by the Soviet society as contrasted with our own. If the Soviet image was one of expecting eventual decay of the capitalist countries, they might be less willing to press the button now in anticipation of eventual victory. The United States, he contended, was not so much future-oriented as was Russia.

Milburn added another point: People who have lived through disasters have been shown to react more effectively or less extremely to cues of subsequent disaster than people who have not. In this connection, the Russians' experience in the Second World War might lead them to react differently to the contingent threat of war (deterrence) than the United States population. The realization of this situation might, in turn, affect the decisions of policy-makers.

Smithies stated that it was important to realize that the whole notion of deterrence implies that the aggressor is willing to win at a finite price. The example of Great Britain resisting the invasion by Hitler during the Second World War was mentioned. England gave the impression of being willing to defend itself at all costs, and Hitler was not willing to pay the large price for a successful invasion of England. Smithies felt that small countries might be able to deter large countries by this means. They might be able to save themselves entirely if they make clear their willingness to give up everything to resist invasion. From this point of view, it might be a good thing to give missiles to the West Berliners. If the Berliners are prepared to defend themselves, he feels that they might be able to defend their position indefinitely by making the price too high for the Russians to contemplate an invasion.

The discussion concluded with the raising of the question as to whether weapon deterrents were, in fact, a preferred mode of influence on decision-makers. Since their primary function is the attempt to influence, it is worth considering whether there might be other less risky means for accomplishing the same end.

Participants: S. Alexander

A. Barber

D. Cavers

B. Feld

M. Gewirtz

A. Hadley

M. Kalkstein

R. Luce

T. Milburn

J. Phelps

I. Pool

H. Rowen

T. Smith

A. Smithies

MC, WS

ACS-E2

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## II. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN DETERRENCE*

### T. W. Milburn

It is often assumed that deterrence works by convincing rational decision-makers that the gains resulting from an aggressive action are not commensurate with the losses, or that gains from using non-violence to gain their ends can be greater. These views tend to neglect the effects of fear itself, in a balance-of-terror situation. Humans often seek to reduce fear by attempts to achieve feelings of strength, as well as by embarking on aggressive actions. In trying to establish criteria for the size of the deterrent force, it is important to realize the extent to which deterrence is a psychological matter, and that it is the psychological "meaning" of force capabilities rather than these by themselves that counts. A review of American thinking about strategic deterrence is needed, because of a growing conviction that it is by focusing on the minds of the Russians and the Chinese that war must be prevented, rather than by building our armed forces to some specified level.

An effective deterrent should first of all be credible. The opponent who is contingently threatened must believe that we can and will attack him vigorously, should he attack us (or do whatever else we seek to discourage with our weapon system). An analysis of this credibility must take into account that a) the deterrent capability must not only be in existence but must also be perceived as sufficient by the aggressor, b) the intent of the deterring force must be clear, and c) the past experience of the deterred must be taken into account, including his reaction to previous deterrent threats.

Some of the ideas already discussed, as well as some new ones, can be conveniently presented in graphical form. Graph One shows the possible relationship between the fear of people in the U.S. and the cost of the military establishment. There are discontinuities in the slope of this graph, when we move militarily from a first strike to a second strike capability, and also when we move from a second strike or positive deterrence system to an international force without nuclear weapons. This graph is, of course, of a highly subjective and speculative nature, as is revealed by some modifications suggested by B. T. Feld. He points out that there is not necessarily a monotonic relationship between fear and cost, and that the graph should perhaps contain loops, and show "hysteresis" effects. A general qualitative point to notice is that there are breaks in the curve corresponding to significant changes in our military posture, and that there are flat portions in which the cost may go up or down by an appreciable amount without changing the degree of fear. Another parameter for the abscissa might be time, as is illustrated in Graph Two. The ordinate, which is here called "insecurity," might be defined as the product of the subjective probability of war, times the number of dead expected. Or, it might reflect feelings of relative impotence on the part of U.S. decision-makers as to their ability to influence other decision-makers.

* Some of these ideas have been presented before by the author in an article entitled "What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?" in *Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 1959, and in a brief report by the author on the Inyokern Meetings of June 1959.

**Graphs referred to in this document have not been included.

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Graph Three suggests that the cost of a military establishment increases monotonically with the "bandwidth" of deterrence, the range of purposes one's deterrent establishment is supposed to achieve. Although it might be desirable to have as large a bandwidth as possible, it is certainly not feasible to raise the cost without limit. Perhaps a good "deterrent" should cost the U.S. no more than necessary to prevent the Soviet Union from initiating a major attack upon the U.S. or its allies. After all, the possibility of an attack is not the only, nor perhaps the biggest, peril suggested by the Soviet military strength. A percentage of the U.S. GNP not going into the military could go into foreign aid or capital formation.

Graph Four illustrates the idea that the effectiveness of a level of deterrence does not continue to increase monotonically with the size of the deterrent. The three curves for the U.S.S.R., U.S. and China are displaced from each other, indicating that a larger deterrent is needed in the case of China than the U.S. Speculation that the U.S.S.R. requires less deterrent than does the U.S. is based on the consideration in the next paragraph. Graph Four may be explained in part by a principle of psychophysics known as the Weber-Fechmer Law. This states that physical stimuli grow in quantity logarithmically relative to one's ability to make subjective discriminations concerning them. To the extent that this law applies to anticipated events, then one would have to square the physical size of a deterrent threat to double its effectiveness. Increases in the number of stockpiled missiles or bombs are unlikely to result in commensurate increases in their meaningfulness to one's opponent. The same is true with increases or decreases in net pay-off (positive gain minus cost).

The question of the relative effectiveness of a deterrent of a given size against the U.S.S.R. and China may be answered in part by the qualitative features of Graph Five, which shows a possible relationship between adaptive behavior and the size of the disaster which would result from the actual use of forces maintained for deterrent purposes. The initial increase in adaptivity with size results from the fact that people have to be "stirred up" to get them to act in many cases. A disaster of major proportions will, of course, tend to inhibit adaptiveness.

An effective deterrent threat must also be meaningful. Meaningfulness is not only determined by the situation, but also by one's previous experience. The threat of a spanning to a child should be muddy up the floor means little if he has rarely or never been spanked. The Soviet leaders, though not Soviet youth, have experienced the near fatal national disaster of World War II. They have experienced a considerable lack of success at aggressive military operation, as well. It seems unlikely that a given deterrent threat (in terms of the disaster it would produce if carried out) would have the same meaning to the U.S. and to the U.S.S.R.

The question of the meaningfulness of deterrence is inseparably bound up with the value scheme of Soviet leaders. Many Americans regard the Soviet decision-makers as possessing but a single dominant motive--of possessing one value that vastly surpasses all others--the economic or power motive of world domination and the enslavement of peoples through a major military effort. Psychologists have long inveighed against the spectre of the economic man or

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Hobbesian man or game-theoretical man as displaying gross oversimplifications of man's motives. Assumptions of a single motive could handicap American military planners. Often, we or our friends appear to have rational, complicated motives, and it is only strangers, persons about whom one has little knowledge, who could possess single, compelling, obsessive desires. Such an assumption about Russia ignores many historical, political, and cultural data and their detailing of a variety of motives, conflicts, and orientations (towards the future, towards risk-taking) by Russian decision-makers.

There are many conceivable goals of the Soviet leaders of varying degrees of concreteness. Some examples are a) world domination, b) being a force for the industrialization and development of backward areas in the world, c) reduction of fear and insecurity, d) scientific prestige, e) high GNP (exceeding that of the U.S. if possible), f) high consumption and standard of living, g) preservation of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union, a goal which is fostered by the ring of satellites. There may be many others. Almost all of these goals might be achieved relatively cheaply for the Soviet Union by other than military means. And it is clear that military deterrence may not be the most effective way to influence Soviet decision-makers insofar as their goal is not simply world domination by military force.

One may present the would-be aggressor with intriguing alternatives to military force for the achievement of goals which are functionally similar to those which he now has, e.g., security, influence, or prestige. One often makes accessible, in everyday life, substitute activities that may turn out to be more satisfying than those originally contemplated, as when one presents potentially aggressive delinquents with opportunities to aggress harmlessly, to achieve, and to win prestige and influence through organized athletics. Internationally, one may supply a potential aggressor with rewards and satisfactions of various sorts and with the possibility of many more of them, not for abstaining from aggression per se, but for moving in directions consonant with the goals of one's own long-range national policy. Rewards might range from mild but gracious applause through trade concessions to treaties, and might be given in response to any behavioral steps, however tentative, in directions consonant with United States values including reduction in the use of terror, increasing the share of scientific knowledge, a higher ratio of consumer goods to capital formation (and so less for less military expenditures), or toward a more pluralistic (and more tolerant) society.

Influencing Soviet decision making through the use of a deterrent threat alone is not making the most imaginative use of the weapons system. It seeks merely to prevent their initiating a nuclear attack--rather than discouraging certain activities in favor of others in which we might rather see them engaged. It is assumed that they are a going concern, that they will very likely continue to develop, to move (not necessarily geographically), and to compete in some directions. It seems most unlikely that they will be stopped cold without a major war. The deterrent weapon system may be used more creatively, not only to decrease the probability of success and to increase the likelihood of loss of one possible avenue of their movement, but also to influence them positively by increasing the likelihood of success to them for every step in other directions. This approach to deterrence is in accord with learning and decision theory.

4

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ACS-17

8/19/60

SEMINAR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DETERRENCE

Remarks by Feld

It has been quite generally agreed that practically any use of nuclear weapons for military purposes is undesirable. There is a paradox here in that we hope and expect that the very existence of these weapons will preclude their use. There is always the possibility, however, that if any are used, they will eventually all be used. It is important, therefore, to explore the psychology of nuclear deterrence to see, if possible, how and why it works and under what conditions it may not work. A slightly circular definition of deterrence makes surprisingly good sense: Deterrence is the application of the threat to use deterrent forces to deter the use of force by the other side.

One can list two basic goals which may be fostered by including stabilized deterrent forces in an arms-control agreement and two general types of problems which arise out of this. The first goal is to reduce the total number of armaments to a "tolerable" level, namely much less than "one beach". The second goal is to make really significant general disarmament easier by putting a suitable invulnerable deterrent force into an agreement. High invulnerability does much to alleviate the problem of noise in an inspection system. The problems which arise from such an agreement involving stabilized deterrence are one, technical problems, and two, the problem of what it is that makes these forces actually deter. The technical problems involve questions like: what constitutes a deterrent force? What size of the force is needed for stability? What destabilizing factors need to be guarded against such as improved CEP, hardening, etc? With respect to the second problem, it is clear that just having hardened missiles around is not enough unless the opposing side believes that they are hardened and believes that they would be used to retaliate in the event of an attack. Thus, for deterrence to work, national policy should be made clear to the other side, or perhaps sufficiently obscure so that there would be considerable anxiety that we would retaliate in the face of aggression.

Remarks by Milburn

We can think of deterrence as one of a number of methods of attempting to influence. The word deterrence, in fact, comes from a French root, and may be translated as control through fear. The following is a list of some methods of influence including deterrence which evolved during the course of the discussion.

Control Through Fear

Control of equals

Uncertainty

Clearness

(It is assumed that certain
groups, not friends of course,
can be influenced only through
fear.)

Influence Through Non-Fear Methods

Exclude "bribes"

Expectation of gain (to both sides) as
reward; what we and they think is good:

Cultural exchanges

Opening Russia (?; this may be
valued as bad by the Russians
and as good by us.)

Improve standard of living

Less terror internally

Not all of these actions are unilateral

Although we usually say that we have our weapons to influence Russia, there
are many important ways in which our own weapons influence us as well.

Discussion

Some of the points listed in the table above will be discussed at greater
length. **Phelps** emphasized that our weapons not only influence through pure
fear but also through the enemy's uncertainty about our response. To the
extent that arms control removes some of this uncertainty, it may in part
defeat the idea of deterrence. **Barber** disagreed with this, contending that
if response to aggression is made unambiguous, through an arms control
agreement perhaps, then deterrence may actually become more effective. It
seems, therefore, that uncertainty may or may not deter depending upon the
circumstances. As **Halperin** put it, if you are going to intervene, you
don't want uncertainty; however, if you are not, you do want uncertainty.
One does not give away his plans in a war game. **Bothwell** felt that it was
necessary to have a certain degree of ambiguity in response to keep the sys-
tem from being too accident-prone. Mrs. **Salpeter** remarked that in the old
days of power politics, uncertainty often failed to deter because the stakes
in a war were not catastrophic. She feels that the situation is much
different today and that the possibility that there will be a nuclear war,
because of lack of certainty about when we will use nuclear weapons,
actually may make it less likely that we will have a war.

Deutsch initiated a discussion on influence through non-fear methods. He noted that many social situations are stabilized not through fear but through other means including competition. This is particularly true in the case of a dispute between equals. **Barber** pointed out that the whole problem of deterrence involves emotional cognitive values which are not rational; the fundamental idea of deterrence itself is irrational. It may be that Bert-rand Russell's idea of giving up to the enemy rather than facing possible annihilation if deterrence does not work may be more rational than deter-rence. This is not to advocate his approach, however! **Deutsch** agreed with this and noted that the likelihood of rash actions by one who feels vul-nerable is particularly great. For this reason control through fear cannot be our ultimate end. To **Phelps**, stabilized deterrence with arms control involves more than fear; it also involves mutual recognition of a common interest which can in fact act to reduce fear. **Phelps** noted the possibility that it might even be desirable to help the other side to achieve invulner-ability in order to reduce its fear. **Milburn** thought that our greatest fear was not merely fear itself, but lack of control. He noted that under some circumstances deterrence might stop working. In a study at Stanford

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by North and others of the prelude to World War I, it was found that the capabilities of the opposing sides ceased to be a deterring factor as tension increased.

If we attempt to influence Russia or China through non-fear methods such as giving aid to improve their standard of living, won't this be taken as a bribe? Deutsch said that the affect of a bribe depends on how much gain is received by the giver as a function of the gain of the receiver. If the person who received the "bribe" feels that what he is gaining is of greater worth than the resultant gain to the briber, he is less likely to react unfavorably. Sohn mentioned the relevance of these considerations to US aid in Latin America. As Milburn expressed it, a gift is not effective if it is seen as a method of control of the person or nation who receives the gift. Barber felt this was not true of British colonial policy in the last century where it was clear that the British were acting in their own interests, but predictably and responsibly. This earned them respect. Although many in the group were agreed that it is better to influence Russia through helping her to achieve her own goals rather than merely discouraging her from thwarting ours, it does not seem so easy in practice to do this. For example, the opening of Russia to Western values is not always seen by them as a good thing. Many Western customs seem immoral to them. Both the U.S. and Russia should be able to agree, however, that it is a good thing if the Russians achieve a better standard of living. Although this is true, Barber emphasized Russian national pride and felt it quite unlikely that they would want to be assisted from outside in something they can achieve by themselves. They do not want to be the junior partner and therefore we must try to find ways to help them without treating them as inferiors. Space research is certainly a good field in which to do this. Orear noted that the Russians and Leftists are always eager to point to the rate of growth of the Russian GNP per capita as about 8% per year. The US growth rate is much less. We might get a surprising amount of cooperation from the Russians if we were to admit to them that their economic system has many virtues and to solicit the advice of their economic experts. At this point Gewirtz mentioned some ideas of Dr. Kardiner. He feels that neither we nor the Russians really know how to deal with underdeveloped nations, and that it would be foolish for either to try to go it alone in a program of technical assistance. It is imperative that we and the Russians cooperate soon in this field in order to avoid an "explosion" in Africa.

To Deutsch the notion of stable deterrence through armaments is unacceptable because of its inherent non-rationality. It provides a choice between two equals and therefore does not qualify as a sufficient condition for stability. As long as we have a posture of antagonistic nations facing each other with military threats, the world is inherently unstable even with invulnerable retaliatory forces. It is all very fine to talk about pursuing common objectives, but Halperin questions whether our goals are really compatible. May we not have to give up some of our goals in order to remove this instability, for example the idea of liberating the satellite nations, etc. Deutsch agreed that in any relationship there is always a certain amount of conflict, but the basic problem is to place the conflict within a broadly cooperative context such that it can be resolved by less drastic means than the use of military force. Barber summed up the argument with the statement that stabilized deterrence has a value but it is not something calculated to inspire men. It is not an end-point in any

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sense. To Feld, stabilized deterrence is a desirable next step, working in conjunction with cultural exchange and economic cooperation. The stability brought about by invulnerable deterrents should move the world not toward more fear but toward less. It seems hard to suppose that moving from 2,000 soft missiles to 200 hard ones should have any other effect but to lessen fear, according to Bothwell. Smith noted that there is an education problem here. We should not merely assume that the Russians will regard our introduction of the Polaris as a great new step toward peace, nor do all the American people regard it as such. Both may have to be taught that a less vulnerable weapon is not necessarily more horrible, but if properly used, more stabilizing.

In view of our desire to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Russians, Barber thinks we would be wise to be more careful about the statements of our military and civilian leaders. Because of the present ease of communication in the world we can no longer afford to talk out of both sides of our mouths. We need to take positions and make statements that are both "true" and are acceptable at the same time to Russia and the United States. As Phelps noted we cannot say at home that we want to make ourselves stronger and more feared as a military power and expect the Russians to read this as evidence of our desire to make them feel more secure. Milburn pointed out that there is a tendency to simplify the goal structure of an opponent and to assume a singleness of purpose which is not there in fact. If the motives of the Russians are pure world domination, there is little we can do about it; but there is some hope that we can make common cause with some of their other motives which may in fact be just as important to them.

Feld mentioned some things that we can do unilaterally regardless of the Russians such as eliminating a first strike capability. It would be a serious mistake to try to sell the country on complete disarmament without being confident that it is reliable and that the Russians would undertake it in good faith.

Although there are many unilateral actions we can take without waiting for the Russians, the Nth country problem makes it important to get their cooperation as soon as possible. Kybal noted that, in this connection, to disarm the great powers too suddenly would increase the importance of the French and the Chinese in the strategic picture. Sohn suggested a sort of pairing off of great powers against great powers and smaller powers against smaller powers in a series of parallel actions aimed eventually towards as complete a disarmament as is feasible.

## Part II. Discussion of Criteria for Sufficient Deterrence

Feld raised the question of what constitutes sufficient deterrence against Russia. Would the threat to destroy Moscow deter a major attack, or would it be necessary to threaten Moscow and Leningrad, or would we need a hundred hardened missiles threatening widely scattered targets? The degree of deterrence needed would presumably depend on the specific circumstances and size of the crisis. Sohn mentioned the opinion of Lewis Bohn that no general threat against Soviet population would be sufficient to deter, but that something is needed which appeals directly to the special interests of Soviet leaders; perhaps holding the children of these leaders as hostages would be sufficient. Deutsch supported the idea of substantial exchange of college students between the US and Russia on the grounds that this would serve a

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positive educational and cultural function as well as a hostage function. Even if this were accepted it would not be a panacea, as Feld and Sohn indicated. There is the possibility that in a crisis of sufficiently long duration, the exchange students would be recalled to their native country. Looking back to Roman times, we have the lesson that former hostages of the Romans were among their most effective enemies in future conflicts. It is hard to see how one would change his deterrent force calculations if a system of hostages were introduced.

There was some discussion of the uses of a limited invulnerable strategic deterrent in several possible situations which could arise. Bothwell contends that if the force is properly based, it is possible to cut strategic forces from 2,000 down to 200 missiles unilaterally. This is true even if the opposing missiles have zero CEP, provided that our own force is sufficiently mobile and that its location at any time is a secret. Mrs. Salpeter was dubious about our ability to live up to our commitment to protect Western Europe if we cut our strategic forces to 200 missiles. Is our deterrent credible with respect to an attack, for instance, on Paris? Do the Russians believe that we have sufficient stake in Western Europe or a part of it to commit our massive strategic forces? Phelps pointed out that although we might conceivably hesitate to respond with missiles to an attack on Paris, that there are other effective alternative responses. Barber saw the problem of the protection of foreigners as a matter of defining the term "foreigners." He argues that there is only a quantitative difference between foreigners in Paris as opposed to "foreigners" in Yakima, Washington. An astute political statesman might want to unify Western nations in such a manner that we think of the whole Western block as one political entity. Although this would seem to be the basis for policy statements that we regard an attack on, say, Berlin as attack upon ourselves, steps could be taken to make this a more realistic position.

The previous discussion led into the question of whether a strategic deterrent was credible in deterring an attack against a certain territory if the deterring weapons were controlled by people in another territory. A related point was mentioned by Barber: If our strategic forces can be unleashed only by one man or from one point such as the SAC Control Center at Omaha, the system becomes extremely vulnerable in that it is incapacitated by knocking out that one point. It is thus clear that there is a kind of trade-off between extreme vulnerability with perhaps less risk of an accidental upset, and decentralized control with its low vulnerability but high accident-prone-ness as far as the problem of control of strategic forces is applied to Europe. Bothwell noted the possibility of loaning some strategic missile forces to a country which is our ally, but only when the threat of aggression is imminent against that country. Deutsch wondered how we would go about getting our missiles back after such a loan, but Kybal thought that the details of a joint control scheme could be worked out which would provide safeguards against this. Mrs. Salpeter then noted that this brought up a whole series of questions: How big a deterrent is needed for France, Germany, England, etc.? Feld said that it was indeed important to increase the credibility of our deterrent to an attack on Western Europe since it is much more likely to be needed here than it is for an attack against the continental United States.

Another possible method, short of loaning our strategic forces to an European ally is for the US to threaten to retaliate against an attack on some part of Europe on a city-for-city basis. This assumes that our strategic forces

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are sufficiently invulnerable so that we have a second strike capability. While it is not clear that this city-for-city threat would be effective against the Russians, Orear noted that the Russian threat to use missiles in retaliation against any further U-2 flights after the Powers incident was a single weapon launch threat. No massive retaliation was threatened here.

The possibility of a unilateral conversion of our military forces into a small number of invulnerable strategic deterrent type weapons should not be dismissed without consideration. Such a unilateral move might increase the total probability of war somewhat while reducing the probability of a major nuclear war. If this were to be done, Smith noted, we must be absolutely sure that the Russians are as convinced of the invulnerability of our strategic weapons as we are. This might be done by conducting a test in their presence. Barber warned that even if we should decide that we could cut, say, 80% of our force unilaterally without ill effects militarily, we have thrown away a valuable negotiating lever. Kybal then suggested that the cut might be part unilateral, as a stimulus, and part negotiated. The whole basis for this proposal, as Bothwell said, is that with sufficient invulnerability you don't need a balance of forces, you just need enough. Orear added that to decrease the probability of non-nuclear wars after such a cut of strategic forces it would be desirable to build up conventional forces concurrently. Sohn and Feld agreed that any unilateral cuts in our strategic forces must result in a real reversal of the arms race or it is without value. For example the Russian cut in forces last year brought the scornful response from the United States that the Russians were now really stronger because they were de-verting superfluous military personnel into needed industrial jobs. Bothwell said that it would be necessary to guard against a tremendous arms race in conventional weapons if we cut our strategic forces and Feld agreed, saying that the principal use of the unilateral cut is as a device to get us into an agreement. Some agreement might be necessary in fact, including inspection, to convince the Russians that we actually were making the alleged cuts.

B. T. Feld

M. Gewirtz

D. Luce

N. Hoepli

M. Halperin

M. Kalkstein

W. Smith

J. Phelps

A. Barber

M. Salpeter

R. Coward

F. Bothwell

T. W. Milburn

M. Deutsch

J. Orear

L. B. Sohn

D. Kybal

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SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL NOT FOR PUBLICATION * NOT FOR QUOTATION
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline Station, Massachusetts
Attributed remarks, based on notes taken at
an informal seminar, have not been approved
by participants and are not to be considered
authoritative statements of their positions.
SEMINAR: Informal Discussions with Professor Hans Bethe

ACS-13

7/7/60

**Professor Bethe** said that of the subjects so far discussed by the summer study, he was most interested in stabilized and limited deterrence. He thought that further study as to its meaning, effects, and advantages or disadvantages was well worthwhile. The concept of a limited deterrent would require that the Air Force give up its ideas on the possibility of a pre-emptive attack. A stabilized deterrence system would be invulnerable enough so that such an attack would yield few advantages. Deterrence problems must be studied both from a bilateral and a multilateral viewpoint.

**Professor Bethe** mentioned one common misconception as to the warhead capacity of a Minute Man missile. The warhead size is essentially the same as that of Polaris and is considerably smaller than the warhead which can be carried by Atlas and Titan. Some figures were mentioned: approximately 5 megatons for Atlas and Titan, less than one megaton for the Minute Man and Polaris, according to **Barber**. (**Phelps** mentioned an estimate on the order of five hundred KT for the Minute Man or Polaris.) With regard to possible increases in the range of some of the smaller missiles, **Bethe** pointed out that it was more difficult to increase the range from, say, 1500 miles to 5000 miles than it is to increase the range of an ICBM from 5000 miles to infinity. (Infinity in this case is anything over half-way around the earth -- about 12,000 miles.) The reason for this is that only a small velocity increment is needed to put an object into orbit above the velocity needed to give it a 5000 mile range (the distance at apogee depends on the initial kinetic energy, which is proportional to velocity squared).

**Bethe** was interested in the arguments for a treaty versus a unilateral declaration. He was impressed by the arguments in favor of unilateral declarations other than formal treaties, but thought that the fact that there might be a change of government and, hence, a change in unilateral policy, made the treaty, in some cases, more stable. **Feld** wondered whether the unilateral declaration may not have the advantage of greater flexibility than a treaty could provide.

**Bethe** replied that, in many cases, he felt the treaty would be adequate and that we were perhaps a little bit overcautious in making agreements with the Russians because of their proven ability to twist a new situation for their own purposes. It seemed to **Barber** that the military could be convinced that arms control was a change in the arms race, rather than an abolishment of it, and that a number of agreements can gradually be obtained without a formal treaty (which must be ratified by Congress) by means of strictly military understandings between the two sides. Certain things, such as the limitation of overseas bases, either unilaterally or through military liaison, are indeed possible, said **Bethe**, but it seemed to him that such important features of arms control as overflights could not be agreed to without political decisions at high level.

There was some discussion of the relationship between hardened missiles and stable deterrents. **Barber** thought that it might be in our interest to see that the Soviet's missile bases were made hard, as many of ours will be. Such hardened bases obviate the need for a pre-emptive first strike. The present Russian missiles seem to be of the large liquid fuel type and are apparently quite soft. Vulnerability is the key to whether one has a deterrent force or a first-strike force. A deterrent force involves a combination of equality

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of strength and invulnerability. <u>Bethe</u> felt that the Russians have changed their opinions on deterrence radically in the last few years and may be coming around to a willingness to accept a stabilized deterrent system. Until the Russians have hard missiles they are likely to resist the inspection provisions of such a setup, since as <u>Hadley</u> pointed out, secrecy is their form of hardening. <u>Bethe</u> mentioned some figures as to the cost of hardening a 200 missile deterrent force. A reasonable estimate might be 20 million dollars per site, which would amount to 4 billion dollars for all 200 sites. This does not seem beyond the capabilities of either our own or the Russian's military budget.

There was some discussion between <u>Bethe</u> and <u>Barber</u> as to how to set limits for the two sides in a "200 missile" deterrent system. A missile-for-missile exchange, ignoring relative yields, is no more to be preferred than a comparison of megatons with no consideration of the number of delivery vehicles involved. <u>Bethe</u> estimates that 200 missiles of roughly Minute Man size (1 MT or so) could not even nearly destroy life in the United States. 20 million casualties would be a rough estimate, depending, of course, on the state of preparation in the civilian population. But a total yield of 5 KMT properly dispersed would indeed be sufficient to kill most of the U.S. civilian population. In response to a question, <u>Bethe</u> said that he would regard the 200 missile stabilized deterrent as the end to be sought for the time being and not necessarily as one step toward eventual complete disarmament.

The idea of records inspection which has been discussed already this summer should be pursued further. It may hold great promise as a technique of arms control. Past records should by no means be destroyed when some kind of inspection agreement is reached. <u>Hadley</u> suggested that it might be a good idea to turn 20 percent or so of U.S. and Russian stockpile records over to the United Nations <u>now</u>, to be opened in the event of an inspection agreement. This would prevent falsification at a later date. <u>Bethe</u> recalled that the IAEA had made a study on inspection of records as a means for detecting diversion of fissionable material. They gave a figure of 1 percent undetected diversion as a conservative upper limit for a situation in which these materials were being distributed for peaceful purposes. He also mentioned a report of the Vitro Corporation on this same subject.

<u>Gewirtz</u> asked Bethe's opinion of the feasibility of using Russian scientists for psychological inspection. <u>Bethe's</u> answer was that, although the Russians probably know who many of our weaponeers are, we have very little notion as to who are their's. He did not think that Szilard's arms-control proposal to send U.S. and Russian weaponeers off to Austria where they could do no harm was very serious, nor was his city trading scheme. Szilard's suggestion of an international secret service, he felt, does deserve serious consideration. One of the main difficulties is the replacement of national loyalties with international loyalties for the personnel. This has already been achieved to some extent by employees of the United Nations. As part of the inspection team for, say, Oak Ridge, <u>Bethe</u> felt that both Russian and American nationals should be used. Some of these people might be former employees of the plants they are inspecting, who would know something of the routines, etc.

<u>Bethe</u> was asked to make some comments on R and D inspection. With respect to missiles, there are two categories of missiles inspection: inspection of missile testing and inspection of R and D, which requires no testing of the completed missile. The latter is more difficult to inspect. One of the important achievements of testing would be an improvement in CEP which might make it possible eventually to destroy a hardened site which the opponent

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had thought invulnerable. This is why inspection of missile tests is so
important; in particular, a careful watch must be made on improvement in
terminal guidance systems. Barber suggested that ultimately a noise level
might be reached which put a limit on improvement in CEP. A guidance system
for a missile is sufficiently different from that of a Mars probe so as to
permit differentiation between the two at the R and D stage. Terminal guid-
ance, which is so important in a missile, is of relatively less importance
in long range space flight. For an ICBM it would be possible to reduce the
perturbing effects of winds by increasing the weight to air-drag ratio. As
to the desirability of controls as opposed to inspection on research, Bethe
acknowledged that this was a somewhat repugnant idea to one who had spent his
life in science. However, he recognized that research has gotten us into a
great deal of trouble recently. He thinks we can and should control certain
types of research. Control of the purse strings is just one means of achieving
this. Control of research should not be a first step, however, but might
become effective and desireable in certain areas when an open society is
achieved.

There was further discussion of the value, scope and timeliness of a mutual stabilized deterrence treaty. Hadley pointed out that one of the values of a treaty was that it could be achieved when the international climate was right, and would then act as restraining anchor if the situation deteriorated. Bethe and Barber agreed that although our present operational missile force is negligible, it was a short step from the first operational missile of a given type to mass production. They estimate that the number of missiles on both sides would exceed the 200 mark before 1965, and that we need a policy decision before 1961 or 1962 if we are to place a limit on the number of missiles in our arsenal. Only prompt, concerted action can prevent a missile population explosion.

When asked about the problem of China and nuclear weapons, Bethe replied that he felt quite sure that the Russians don't want the Chinese to get them. A simple type of treaty which we might conclude with the Russians as soon as possible would be not to give nuclear weapons to other countries. He made three points: (1) little inspection, if any, would be required to see that the Russians live up to this agreement; (2) such an agreement would give the Russians a rationale for refusing to give China weapons, something they do not want to do anyway; (3) such an agreement would put pressure on the Russians to prevent a change of heart about giving nuclear weapons to China at some later date. Schelling pointed out that this kind of treaty would force small nations which would not be able to produce their own weapons to get them clandestinely from us or from the Russians, if at all. This would thus remove one of the principle reasons a nation might have for wanting these weapons, namely, their brandishment as a blackmail threat. Bethe believes that China cannot get, on her own, an extensive arsenal of fission and fusion weapons without a far more developed technology than she now has. In the process of achieving this she will become more properous and hence hopefully less belligerent. Bethe guesses that it will be roughly five years before the Chinese can get atomic weapons on their own, even of the French type. The problem is more one of materials than of design in the early stages. There is a distinction between having enough material for one bomb and being able to mass-produce bombs.

Orear suggested that the arms control study should make a list of a number of
simple agreements such as the one just mentioned as well as unilateral action.

which could be put into practice in the next few years. This might prompt further study on the part of government decision-makers of some of these proposals.

Kalkstein asked Bethe his opinion about inspection of stockpiles. Bethe asserted that materials inspection did not seem as powerful a technique as inspection of the weapons themselves. The main problem in materials or weapons inspection is to know where the stockpiles are. As far as location of isotope separation plants is concerned, checking electric power consumption in various areas is a good way to find them. Halperin asked Bethe to summarize for the group possible military gains from further atomic testing. Further testing of strategic weapons might result, first of all, in an improved yield to weight ratio. (The theoretical maximum here with lithium deuteride type fusion weapons is 30 kilotons per pound, not 80 as has been previously stated.) What would be the virtue of continued improvements in yield to weight ratio which are still possible? The only use, said Bethe, is in a pinpoint attack on a hard site. But it must be recognized that the destructive radius is proportional to the cube root of yield, so that further improvements will do little to increase destructive radius. For an attack on a city, present-day weapons are more than adequate. The second military reason for further testing would be to push down the limit of weight at which it is possible to have a thermo-nuclear weapon. This would increase the mobility of a missile force, for example; one might eventually get a Minute Man small enough to be carried by truck. Bethe asserted that the present limit is almost as far as we can go in this direction. A third result of further testing would be to improve the making of cleaner weapons.

As to testing to develop tactical weapons, we have a great many of them now, even below 1 KT yield. Bethe noted a mistake in one of the previous ACS Reports, in which it was asserted that the Russians do not have small tactical weapons. He said the Russians do have these weapons, but not as many of them nor as full a spectrum as we; their lower limit on the size is not as low as ours. The tactical weapons that we already have can be quite easily delivered by small fighter planes. Decreasing their size still further might conceivably help for rocket and infantry delivery. The Russians will be the gainers if we permit further testing of tactical weapons to go on, since we can expect no significant improvements while the Russians still have some distance to go in this regard. Bethe doesn't believe Dyson's claims in the recent Foreign Affairs (April, 1960) article about a fusion weapon that would be triggered by conventional high explosives rather than by fission. The important point in such a triggering device is the energy per unit volume released. Thousands of times more energy per unit volume is released in fission than in any kind of high explosive detonation. Such a weapon, if it were to work at all, would have to be made of tritium rather than lithium deuteride. Since tritium costs more per unit destructive power than plutonium, it is clear than these weapons, even if they could be made, would not be significantly cheaper than present fission-fusion weapons. Bethe mentioned the fact that there was little further research needed to produce weapons of low destructive power or blast but high personnel damage, i.e., radiation. This can be achieved at present by using a relatively large number of low yield dirty weapons. Further testing might result in a certain amount of new information on weapons' effects. We have information at present on the effects of nuclear explosions on radio communications, as a result of the 1958 Argus tests. We are present ahead of the Russians in this field. Further testing might also have military value in demonstrating the effects of explosions on hardened structures, but Bethe believes that we might be able to get this information just as well by

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calculations and the use of scale models. Previous weapons' tests provided us with essentially all the information we need about pressure distribution and crater size after various types of blasts at various altitudes: air bursts, ground bursts, and underwater bursts.

A number of miscellaneous points were mentioned: first that a limited deterrent force of the size we have contemplated costs next to nothing as thermo-nuclear warheads are concerned. Second, further warhead testing would be little help in the development of an anti-missile missile. Present warheads are adequate. The main difficulty here is in distinguishing missiles from ucoys and in hardening ground radar systems for the anti-missile, to render them less vulnerable to attack. Brennan asked about the blast overpressure dependence upon distance from an explosion. Bethe said that, ignoring ground reflections, dependence was $1/R^3$ in a high pressure region around a thousand PSI and that the dependence changed to $1/R^2$ in medium pressure regions and finally to $1/R$ at considerable distances from the blast.

Orear asked for some comments about possible shortcomings of Jules Moch's recent proposal about inspection of delivery systems rather than stockpiles. This has great appeal to Bethe but seems to him more difficult to inspect than stockpiles in many ways. Furthermore, if controls are involved, limitations on delivery systems now would not permit evolution to more stable types of deterrence which might be expected with further development. Delivery system inspection does not seem to Bethe to be a real substitute for stockpile inspection.

Feld remarked upon the need to have some kind of understanding about the use of nuclear warheads in a limited conflict and suggest that control of missiles might help here. Barber claimed that we have the capability using our Marine forces and conventional armaments to take care of a limited war against any conceivable aggressor, except Russia and China, without using nuclear explosives. Aside from the question of nuclear versus conventional explosives in limited war, Schelling pointed out that a stable retaliatory system might make limited war again possible if there should be sufficient provocation, without the fear of its erupting into an all-out conflict.

There is little to be gained by a pre-emptive attack. Limited retaliation is even possible on a city-for-city basis, but Brennan was skeptical that military planners would take this proposal seriously. Schelling suggested a kind of "limited deterrence" in which we might threaten to hit Kiev if the Russians were to invade Iran. Even if the Russians had a chance to evacuate the city before we hit it under this arrangement, they might be deterred because of their fear that this kind of situation would erode an arms-control agreement which they might consider beneficial. There was some discussion about the significance of protecting the President in the event of an attack. Bethe said that although the military commanders would no doubt be on their own to a great extent in a massive attack, the President's influence might be decisive in a small attack, particularly in stopping the war. The President's leadership might be crucial in the process of recovery after attack, large or small.

Feld expressed the thanks of the group to Professor Bethe for his participation.

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ACS-21

9/13/60

Seminar: A Second Informal Discussion with Hans A. Bethe

Professor Bethe had a number of comments on the reports and working papers issued by the Arms Control Study since his last visit. He was profoundly impressed by the idea of a stable invulnerable deterrent force limited by treaty, and noted that there seemed to be a great deal of group consensus in favor of this idea. What seemed to be missing, in his opinion, however, was an impassioned plea for stabilized deterrence -- the best of all visible worlds. Bethe agreed with Bothwell that there are possibilities for large unilateral reductions in strategic forces and that it would be difficult but not hopeless to persuade the military of this fact. There are many things that we can give up without seriously weakening our military posture, including some foreign bases.

It was noted that the new weapons such as the mobile Minuteman on a railroad car will be quite conspicuous to the public and might seem to many Americans as unnecessarily warlike. It is, therefore, important that people be educated on the significance of mobility for the achievement of a stabilized deterrent force.

There was some discussion of counter-force versus counter-population strategies. As Barber pointed out, if our strategy of deterrence involves threatening to retaliate against cities, and if the Russians are not planning a counter-force attack, there is no need to match the Russians missile for missile. Bethe felt that it was important to demonstrate, if possible, to strategic planners that a counter-force strategy will not work against mobile missiles and that, furthermore, it is dangerous because it invites a first strike. Although Rowan felt that a counter-force strategy might be made to work successfully against mobile missiles, Barber disagreed, pointing out that we were not able to hit even a single mobile V-2 during World War II. Rowan agrees that we should assume that our opponent is extremely competent, but we must recognize that an attack on his mobile missiles might have some success. If a war were to last only a few hours, counter-force would look impractical. However, in a long war, mobile weapons might not be as invulnerable as they look at first sight.

Fischer mentioned the need to have more specific factual data on Soviet military posture. Bethe felt that a counter-force strategy had little utility beyond destroying airfields or aircraft carriers. As far as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is concerned, Bothwell pointed out that the Navy has been working on this for thirty years with very limited success. It must be recognized that, with the possible exception of the B-70 program, it is hard for the Russians to tell from our military posture whether we are using a counter-force or counter-population strategy. Bethe and Bothwell had three basic arguments against a counter-force strategy: a) it is technically impossible; (b) it

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produces fear; and c) it diverts military thinking from more relevant (c) problems. Sohn noted that, under a mobile missile counter-force strategy, there was a temptation to destroy railroads and communication networks. Pursuing this goal efficiently would eventually lead to the destruction of cities, so it is not safe to assume that the population will go unscathed with counter-force targeting.

Bethe believes that the conventional war problem is another one which needs more attention. Cutting down our large strategic forces would permit the concentration of military thinking where it belongs, namely, on dealing with small wars. We can't do this when we are paralyzed with fear. If the number of big weapons is limited, we might be able to use tactical weapons in small wars, should it prove advantageous, without the fear of escalation.

In examining the relative virtues of a treaty and a unilateral limitation, Bothwell suggested that, if we limited our strategic forces unilaterally to 200 missiles, there was some chance the Russians might do the same. One does not want to delay a unilateral action indefinitely in lieu of a treaty, but a treaty has some advantages if it can be achieved. Bethe was somewhat sceptical of the unilateral reduction, since the Russians would have a psychological edge (even if not a military one) should they refuse to limit their missiles to 200. It would be very difficult to convince our own country that we were still safe when the Russians have such an apparent numerical advantage on us. Phelps suggested that it would be easier to sell the American people on stabilized deterrence if it were embodied in a formal treaty rather than in a series of unilateral actions.

How good do the prospects for negotiating a treaty with the Russians seem to be? Antarctica is one area of successful arms control negotiations with Russia. Sohn noted that, in these negotiations, the Russians were actually willing to make many more concessions than was the United States. Frequently, the United States would make a proposal which would not be accepted immediately by the Russians. In time, however, they would study it and bring up the proposal as a new one of their own, substantially without change. Bethe recalled the 1958 negotiations in which Wiesner and Kistiakowsky took part. In general, the Russian negotiators seemed to be serious but cantankerous. As we all know, their chief bone of contention seems to be the demand for substantial concessions on disarmament before a reasonable amount of inspection is introduced.

Rowan noted that one of the difficulties in 1958 was that the United States allies were anxious that we not make concessions which would weaken them vis-a-vis Russia. Nonetheless, there seems to be a strong public desire in Europe for disarmament. If we pull our bombers out of strategic overseas bases, reduce strategic forces materially, and gradually revitalize conventional forces, Europe will be safer in the end. However, there will be an interim period when she may well feel uneasy.

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Bethe had the feeling that one of the criticisms that might be made of the Summer Study is that it is not focused sufficiently on specific details, but that it has tried to cover too broad a scope. As far as any technical results are concerned involving specific numbers, a convincing study can only be done using classified information.

There was further discussion on mobility and invulnerability. Bethe believes that the only real key to invulnerability is mobility and a weapon mix of, perhaps, half Minutemen on railroad cars and half Polaris. Trucks are somewhat small, but can be used for launching small missiles. Barber brought up the difficulty with the Minuteman of the agent in the railroad switching station, but Frisch maintained that sabotage, in order to be really effective, would have to be achieved within a small period of time before warning could be given to the other missile sites, and sabotage on time is very difficult indeed with a large force (greater than five or ten trains). Barber argued for putting more emphasis on airborne alert over the United States, using B-52's with ASM's plus a Polaris fleet. Some fixed missiles in an arms-controlled environment are also all right. Bethe cautioned that we should try to set up a system that will give us adequate defense before arms control is achieved.

The inspection problem is an interesting one. Bethe did not like the idea of Minuteman, aircraft, or submarines with inspectors aboard. This seemed to him to defeat the purpose of the unknown location, particularly for slow-moving weapons carriers. He suggested, instead, that every Minuteman be required to come past a checkpoint periodically in such a way that the inspectors would not usually know its location. Barber noted that, if we want to get the Russians to agree, it might be best to let them suggest what type of inspection plan would be acceptable to them and then investigate it ourselves to see if we can agree to it. Frisch thought that it might be well not to have specific inspection plans in the first proposal for a treaty, but instead to give a general class of ideas and seek to agree on basic principles before the details are worked out. In looking over the Sohn-Frisch, etc. draft treaty, Bethe said that he was disturbed at the idea of giving the United States 1.7 million men in uniform as opposed to the same number each for Russia and China. Sohn's answer to this was that there are many non-Communist nations involved which would be allowed small forces totaling about 8 million. The total number of Communist forces under the treaty would come to somewhat less than 8 million. Making this calculation, Bethe said we should count mainly on Western Europe and not depend on the military support of Africa and Asia in the event of a crisis.

On the question of stockpile size (a Kalkstein-Smith-Feld working paper on this subject will be forthcoming), Bethe agreed with the general conclusion formulated by Frisch that there could be a substantial cut in our nuclear stockpile and still leave plenty of fissionable material for 100 to 500 missiles.

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In conclusion, <u>Bethe</u> had a number of comments about specific ideas he found in ACS working papers. On Salerno's inspection plan involving (c1) estimated inventory, he felt that, if our estimates are as good as seem to be required for this method, there is no need to inspect. He liked Feld's report on physical inspection, but thought that it underestimated the potential success of budget inspection if it were sufficiently detailed. He was not sure how one would implement the idea of putting the burden of the proof for inspection on the country being inspected, but noted that public exhortations to comply with the arms control agreement may help some if the pressure of public opinion has any influence. The idea of chemical coding (mentioned in Coward's section of ACS-E1) as a means of identifying the source of a missile was an appealing one. Frisch suggested microphotography as a sure way of identifying objects.

Commenting on Smith's article in ACS-E1, Bethe said that he felt military and space uses of missiles were now diverging to a great enough extent that arms control need not imply serious restraints on space exploration. As just one example, it has been suggested that research with the aim of landing on the moon would be of great aid in developing ICBM's. However, Bethe pointed out that the moon has no atmosphere, and atmospheric effects are among the most important which must be considered with ICBM's. Big rocket boosters are good for space exploration but cannot be hidden easily and are not needed for military purposes.

With respect to the use of exchange programs to facilitate inspection of research and development, Bethe thought there would be little enthusiasm for participating in such programs unless they contributed to the professional advancement of the exchanges. An international agency carrying out R & D must be a recognized leader if it is to attract the good people who are needed for part-time inspectors.

Commenting on ACE-E2, the draft treaty, Bethe said that he liked the first stage in particular as a whole, but that he was not over-optimistic about the ease of getting it accepted. He objected somewhat to placing the clause about renouncing first use of nuclear weapons in the first stage. He did not think that it would be accepted this soon, but thought that it might come later. (Now removed -- Ed.) Frisch suggested reserving this until more tactical conventional strength is phased in. Kalkstein suggested that at some stage of the treaty there should be a ban of first use of biological weapons. Bethe agreed, but thought that we might want to permit the use of certain "non-lethal" biologicals. Lethality is, of course, a question of dosage.

WS

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July 11, 1960

# STEPS TO A STABLE AND EFFECTIVE DEFENSE

Frank E. Bothwell

The past has seen many attempts to stabilize world peace through the mechanism of negotiated arms limitations. No such international treaty has preserved peace for long, and recently the world has been unable to agree even on the terms of possible arms control agreements. And yet, the danger of catastrophic war and the need for effective controls are far greater now than ever before.

It is interesting that the world has had much more success with unilateral actions, such as the current cessation of nuclear testing, with all its tacit understanding, and its strong moral and psychological controls. I am convinced that the first steps to worldwide arms control can be achieved only through unilateral actions aimed not only at a reduction of international tension and accidental war, but also at a drastic improvement in the overall force structure of the nation. How is this possible?

Present war plans call for several thousand weapons delivered against Russia in a major strategic war. Suppose we plan to fulfill our stragetic requirements with a total force of just a few hundred missiles, that we employ the utmost measures to make the force invulnerable and diversified in composition, that we purposely build into the system a delay in response to avoid accidents, that we deliberately renounce the counterforce mission and rely on second-strike retaliation, and that we make all this credible by allowing the Soviet Union complete inspection privileges consistent with the need for secrecy in overall deployment. A fleet of 20 Polaris submarines (300 missiles), plus 100 mobile Minutemen, plus a force of bombers sufficient to keep 25 airborne carrying four missiles each would provide a force of some 500 missiles, of which some 300 or so would effectively threaten the destruction of every major Soviet city. Its safety is insured by mobility and secrecy in deployment, its effectiveness by its invulnerability, regardless of the size of Soviet strategic forces, and its accident proneness will be contained by its slow response capability. The cost of building and operating such a system with complete amortization over a period of five years should not exceed one or two billion dollars per year.

Let us now set a target date of 1963 for full operation of such a system, making our plans completely open to discussion, gradually reducing and closing up our overseas strategic bases and eliminating all other strategic forces as our new force takes form. During the period before 1963, our purpose and plans should be carefully and sincerely explained to the Russians, they should be encouraged to follow our example, and we should provide them all the assistance possible, even to the extent of active technological assistance in the construction of their forces. There may, in fact, be some advantage in joint research and development activities in this field.

Although we should encourage full Soviet inspection of our strategic system

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(a)
(consistent, of course, with overall deployment secrecy) even to the extent
of occasional observer privileges on individual Polaris submarine missions
in peacetime, the strength of this proposal is contained in the fact that
inspection of enemy forces is unnecessary, that the power of our forces is
largely independent of the size of his forces, that the reduction of
tensions and accidental war can be achieved by us without equivalent
actions on his part.

If, in addition to the proposed strategic force structure, we should
accept very modest continental defense goals, perhaps no more than a raid
warning system, relying on the absolute measure of the power of a secure
retaliatory system to prevent general nuclear warfare, a vast amount of
defense money would be freed. It is recommended that the entire saving
be invested initially in the improvement of our force structure for
limited war. It is maintained that this policy would greatly improve the
overall power structure of the nation and place us in a much better bar-
gaining position for overall disarmament negotiations.

Such drastic reallocation of our defense funds from strategic warfare and
continental defense into tactical operations would inevitably force the
Soviet Union, and any other hostile major power, along the same path.
The Russians are sensitive to tactical strength, and a major increase of
our activities in this area would be likely to produce a similar response
from the Soviet Union with a resultant drain on its strategic warfare
activities.

If these activities do nothing more than shift the arms race from strategic
weapons to tactical weapons, the world gain would be enormous, for the
probability of a sudden explosion of unrestrained warfare with almost
unlimited destruction would be greatly reduced. It seems doubtful that a
negotiated disarmament of strategic forces is feasible, and I believe that
unilateral actions can be just as effective. However, unilateral disarma-
ment of tactical forces is quite ineffective, and negotiated disarmament
proposals are effective in this area only if proposed from a position of
great relative strength.

In summary, I believe the first step to arms control is a unilateral action
aimed at the construction of a modest but secure system for retaliation to
stabilize the world strategic balance and to reduce the probability of
accidental war. The release of defense funds from strategic warfare
activities would be employed to greatly expand our capabilities in tactical
limited warfare. The second step is disarmament in tactical weapons
negotiated from a position of great relative superiority.

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A TECHNIQUE FOR ESTIMATING THE
VULNERABILITY OF LAND-MOBILE MISSILES

Raymond Foye

John Phelps

The vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles, such as the Minuteman, has been studied quantitatively and thoroughly enough to supply some guidance in the design of stabilized deterrence schemes. We are doing some work on the vulnerability of sea-mobile missiles, such as the Polaris. A third case of possible interest in arms control studies is land-mobile missiles. We envision Minuteman-type missiles carried by train or truck over the rail or highway network of a country. The results in this memo are for railroads, but the analysis should also be satisfactory for highways.

Consider first the case of zero intelligence on the part of the aggressor. A target train is as likely to be at any one point of the rail network as at any other point. The expected fraction of the force which the aggressor can knock out is assumed to be equal to the fraction of the rail net which he can "saturate" with his attacking weapons. If he can saturate the entire rail net of the aggressor country he eliminates the rail-borne retaliatory force. We make the usual "cookie cutter" assumption: A weapon of yield W and a target hardened to resist a static overpressure H determines a sharp radius of destruction R.

The rail net is saturated when each point on it is covered by at least one circle of radius R. If no two rail lines are within a distance R of each other, the number of weapons needed to saturate would be equal to the total length of the rail lines divided by 2R. But if, as is frequently the case, rail lines run close together or have many junctions, the aggressor can distribute his weapons to cover all the railroad lines with a minimum number of weapons. The optimum distribution of weapons can be worked out by plotting on a rail map or, if the rail net can be described mathematically, the optimum distribution can at least in principle be worked out mathematically also.

We assume here, as an approximation for the weapon distribution problem which holds for both sparse (e.g. Nevada) and dense (e.g. New Jersey) rail regions, that the circles of radius R are spread along a rail line to form a band of minimum width $2\sqrt{2R} = 1.41$ R. The distance between centers of the circles is then 1.41 R also. (See diagram.)

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We trace a band of width $1.41$ R along all the rail lines on a map, as in the next diagram.

We can estimate, by counting squares in an overlaid transparent grid or by other means, the fraction of the total area which is covered by the shaded bands. Then, assuming that each weapon covers an area of $(1.41)^2 R^2 = 2R^2$, we can find the total number of weapons needed to saturate the area of interest.

Using standard rail maps and other data (1950 or later sources), we were able to estimate for each state in the continental U.S. the areas covered for bands of width 12.8, 9.6, 6.4, and 3.2 miles, corresponding to R's of 9.0, 6.8, 4.5, and 2.3 miles. (Five selected states were read with a grid; the others were estimated by inspection.) Since $R = R(H,W)$, the number of weapons needed to saturate an area can be shown as a function of $W$ and $H$. We plot approximate results for the entire U.S. and for the U.S. west of the Mississippi in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively.

If, for instance, the Minuteman trains are assumed hardened to 2 psi and the aggressor has 5 MT weapons, Figures 1 and 2 show that approximately 9,500 weapons are needed to saturate the entire U.S. and 5,800 are needed to saturate west of the Mississippi. The number of weapons increases sharply with decreasing yield or increasing hardness.

It will clearly be helpful to have some means of handling the land-mobile vulnerability problem in the case where the aggressor may know that Minuteman trains are restricted to travel on certain tracks, e.g. mainline tracks are off limits to the trains. Or he may know that the trains are confined within a certain region, e.g. the western U.S. or certain states. Or he may know, as he plans his attack for time $t_1$, that a train was at a certain point at time $t_0$, and so on. But if we make the assumption that the intelligence information tells the aggressor only that:

1) the trains are restricted to certain lines in the rail net, or

2) the trains are restricted to certain geographical areas, or

3) the trains are restricted in both these ways, a general, approximate method of handling the problem seems possible.

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The principle is that, with some intelligence information in either of these two forms, the aggressor is obliged to saturate only a restricted portion of the rail net. For any state (or other area on which data are available) a certain number of weapons of destruction radius R is needed to saturate all the linear miles of railroad tracks in the state. Because of overlapping, the ratio of the number of weapons to the total miles of track is large for states with few rail lines and small for states when the rail lines are dense. For Nevada and New Jersey, for instance, the ratios are 0.049 and 0.022, respectively, for R = 9 mi.

We define two quantities:

$$ \frac{\text{number of weapons (of radius R)} \quad \text{area in square miles} = \begin{cases} \text{weapon} \\ \text{density} \end{cases}}{\text{w = necessary to saturate all rail lines in an area}} $$

$$ \frac{\text{total miles of railroad track}}{\mathcal{R} = \text{in the area}} \quad \text{area in square miles} = \begin{cases} \text{rail} \\ \text{density} \end{cases} $$

Evidently, as we proceed from sparse states to dense states w and $\mathcal{R}$ both increase. But the ratio $w/\mathcal{R}$ decreases (from 0.049 to 0.022 for Nevada and New Jersey. Although $\mathcal{R}$ can in principle increase indefinitely as railroad lines multiply in a state, w reaches its upper limit when the entire area of the state is covered by the circles (or bands) drawn along the rail lines.

It turns out that, using the data from a number of states, w can be approximately represented as a smoothly varying function of $\mathcal{R}$. We show this in Fig. 3 for four radii. The asymptotic values of w represent complete coverage of the state areas. Thus for R = 9, $1/(1.41)^2 \times 9^2 = 0.0062$. The limiting slopes as $\mathcal{R} \to 0$ (not plotted on log paper) are 1/1.41 R, corresponding to entirely isolated rail lines. The curves represent smoothed data for states having differently clustered rail lines. Actual points are shown along the R = 9 curve for five states. Iowa, which has a fairly uniform rail net over the whole state and few large rail centers, has a higher value of w than does New Jersey, which has a heavy railroad concentration near New York City and one or two relatively empty areas elsewhere.

Suppose that the aggressor knows that his target trains are in an area A, made up of several smaller areas $A_i$. The $A_i$ may be states or fractions of states, and A and the $A_i$ may be of any shape. Suppose further that in the ith area the trains are restricted to some fraction $f_i$ of the total miles of track. If the density of all rail lines in the ith area is $\mathcal{R}_i$, $f_i\mathcal{R}_i$ gives a new rail density which, through Fig. 3, determines a value of $w_i$. For the ith area then, the total number of weapons needed to saturate the selected rail lines is $A_i w_i$. The total number of weapons needed to saturate the selected rail lines in the whole area A is then $\sum A_i w_i$ where in each case $w_i = w_i(f_i \mathcal{R}_i)$ from Fig. 3.

For purposes of computation the $\mathcal{R}_i$ and the areas of the 48 states are in Table I.

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Suppose as an example the aggressor knows that U.S. Minuteman trains move only in Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Nevada. He knows that to avoid interference with normal rail traffic the trains operate on, say, 3/4 of the tracks in Utah and Nevada and 2/3 of the tracks in Arizona and New Mexico. The aggressor knows which tracks the trains use but has no other information on their location. If the trains will withstand 2 psi of blast overpressure and the aggressor has 2 MT weapons, R equals 6.7 miles. We can interpolate approximately between the curves of Fig. 3 for R = 6.8 and R = 4.5 to find w (f%) for R = 6.7. Then the computation is

<table><thead><tr><th>State</th><th>A<sub>i</sub></th><th>L<sub>i</sub></th><th>f<sub>i</sub></th><th>f<sub>i</sub>L<sub>i</sub></th><th>w<sub>i</sub>(f<sub>i</sub>L<sub>i</sub>)</th><th>A<sub>i</sub>w<sub>i</sub></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Arizona</td><td>114,000</td><td>0.019</td><td>2/3</td><td>0.013</td><td>.00080</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>New Mexico</td><td>122,000</td><td>0.020</td><td>2/3</td><td>0.014</td><td>.00090</td><td>110</td></tr><tr><td>Utah</td><td>82,000</td><td>0.021</td><td>3/4</td><td>0.016</td><td>.00115</td><td>94</td></tr><tr><td>Nevada</td><td>110,000</td><td>0.015</td><td>3/4</td><td>0.011</td><td>.00056</td><td>62</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td colspan="5"></td><td>357</td><td></td></tr></tfoot></table>

So about 350 weapons would be needed to saturate all rail lines where the trains might be.

There are some obvious limitations on the accuracy of this method of assessing the vulnerability of rail-mobile missiles. The 'cookie cutter' value of R, used in most missile vulnerability calculations, is a definite limitation. Our analysis here makes no allowance for attacking weapon accuracy, although the geometric picture of a band of width 1.41 R drawn along rail lines will not be greatly upset if the miss distances are substantially less than R. The assumption that the attacking weapons are placed a distance 1.41 R apart along the rail lines helps to compensate for inaccuracies in weapon delivery but may overestimate the number of weapons required to saturate the sparse rail areas by 10-20%. The use of a composite w (L) function as a means of handling intelligence information is a further approximation. But a probable overall accuracy of about ± 50% seems reasonable for this method and it certainly makes possible better than order-of-magnitude estimates. Considering other limitations of the "mathematics of deterrence," it seems doubtful that the rail mobility problem deserves more elaborate analysis at this time.

We have some similar, very rough data on the U.S. highway net. Clearance limitations--bridges, underpasses, etc.--do not seem too severe for Minuteman-size missiles. In more densely populated states the number of weapons needed to saturate the highway net is increased by factors up to about two over the rail case and in sparsely populated states by factors of five or six.

(Note: Most of the data used in this analysis are the work of S. M. Rosow of Ohio State University. The data and this analysis will be written up later in a modified form in a research paper from the Mershon National Security Program at Ohio State.)

118

ACS-W6

8/25/60

SOME DATA FOR USE IN ESTIMATING THE VULNERABILITY
OF MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINES

Winthrop Smith

Thomas Brewer

John Phelps

In the design of stable deterrent weapons systems, submarines equipped to launch ballistic missiles such as Polaris seem to look very promising. The submarines are generally assumed to be unlocatable and hence extremely invulnerable to a counterforce attack, and by operating on the high seas they do not draw counterforce nuclear weapons to their homeland. But, if the missile-launching nuclear submarines can be partly or largely destroyed by an aggressor, they are relatively "destabilizing" weapons. Our aim in this paper is to collect in a convenient form some data which may be of use in estimating submarine vulnerability. Our efforts are extremely limited because (1) the vulnerability of submarines depends critically on the effectiveness of future systems which may be used to locate and destroy them (A.S.W. systems) and on these only a few general unclassified remarks are possible; and (2) such reliable data as may exist on the vulnerability of submarines underwater to nuclear weapons are highly classified. But, it still may be worthwhile to collect some approximate auxiliary information and a few illustrative results.

Several possible kinds of A.S.W. systems may be at least contemplated:

(1) The submarine is tracked in some manner from its home port and its location is known continuously and precisely to an aggressor. Presumably, the submarine could be destroyed at any time and there is little more to be said about this case.

(2) Submarines may be located by some kind of active search technique in which the number or fraction of submarines located is a function of the search effort. Once a submarine is located, it can be destroyed or, possibly, tracked for an indefinite time.

(3) Some kinds of anti-submarine warning systems might yield the information that a submarine is in a particular area but no more. In this case, an aggressor might be able to saturate the area with (probably nuclear) weapons and so destroy the submarine, or with a search effort, he might be able to pin-point its position and destroy it.

(4) If a submarine remains essentially unlocatable before the start of a war, but begins to launch its missiles in retaliation for an attack on its homeland, an adequately equipped aggressor could probably locate the submarine by analysing

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the trajectories of its first one or two missiles. He might destroy the submarine before it had launched all its missiles and thus prevent it from delivering its full measure of retaliation. All this depends on how fast the submarine can launch its missiles.

It is often assumed (as in our curves below) that nuclear weapons would be used against submarines. A valid argument can be made that, if a submarine is located at all, it is or can be located quite exactly and that in this case chemical weapons could be used to destroy it. In many possible war situations, especially limited wars, each side may want to avoid the use of nuclear weapons and will try hard to "win" with chemical weapons only. But the kind of strategic balance and retaliatory situation of interest to us here assumes that nuclear weapons would be used anyway and so we present our numerical results for yields in the nuclear weapon range. (We do not speculate on the possibility of unannounced undersea wars of attrition, short of general war, in which chemical weapons would certainly be used.) And if World War II destroyer vs. submarine experience is any guide chemical weapons may be quite ineffective at times.

In an underwater nuclear explosion (see the "Effects of Nuclear Weapons", AEC-DOD, 1957) a shock wave is propagated outward at a speed equal to or somewhat greater than the speed of sound in water, about 5000 ft/sec. When the wave reaches a given point the overpressure suddenly increases to a maximum value and then falls off with a time constant of the order of some tens of milliseconds. Peak water overpressure, energy per unit area, impulse per unit area, and the time constant adequately characterize the shock wave at a point. For submarine-sized objects and yields in the nuclear range (1 kt. and up) the relationship of shock velocity and time constant indicates, very generally and as a first approximation, that the submarine will be enveloped quite briefly by sharply decreased hydrostatic pressure. If the critical response time of the submarine (roughly, the time required for a suddenly applied hydrostatic pressure to damage the hull) is of the order of or shorter than the time constant, the peak overpressure is the shock wave property which largely determines damage to the submarine. (Actual damage data of this sort are classified, but Cole, "Underwater Explosive", Princeton University Press, 1948, outlines some useful qualitative consideration.) Our curves below assume that damage results mainly from the overpressure of the shock wave, and this permits a simple appropriate measure of submarine "hardness": the hardness of the submarine is determined by its absolute maximum diving depth, remembering that each foot of depth is equivalent to about 0.43 psi.

If either the nuclear weapon burst or the submarine is near the surface of the water the peak overpressure may be reduced. If the burst is near the surface some fraction of its energy will be dissipated in air blast. If the submarine is near the surface a direct shock wave from the burst point and a reflected shock wave (with phase reversed) may reach it at nearly the same time and partially cancel each other. Both of these surface effects work to the advantage of the submarine, and if we are interested in establishing the approximate maximum vulnerability of the submarine we may consider the deep burst, deep submarine case.

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Assuming a sharp radius (slant range; more exactly, but since the slant ranges of most practical interest are large compared with submarine operating depths, we consider the problem as two-dimensional) of destruction which is a function of yield and submarine hardness, neglecting surface effects, and using data from the "Effects of Nuclear Weapons", we plot Figs. 1 and 2. The ordinate of Fig. 1 shows both overpressure and maximum submarine depth using the 0.43 psi/ft. rule. Fig. 2 shows, as a function of overpressure and for several yields the number of weapons per square (statute) mile required to saturate an area. The ordinate of Fig. 2 is $1/\pi R^2$ where R, the range of destruction, is determined from yield and overpressure using Fig. 1. Evidently the use of $1/\pi R^2$ underestimates the number of weapons needed to completely cover an area, but we are intentionally choosing our approximations on the conservative side.

A submarine cruising underwater is under a hydrostatic pressure determined by its depth. As a reasonable approximation, this pressure must be added to the overpressure in a shock wave in determining whether or not the submarine is destroyed. If a submarine is at its absolute maximum depth, it can theoretically be destroyed by the shock wave from a very distant explosion.

As an illustration of the use of the curves, suppose that a submarine has an absolute maximum depth of 2000 ft. (a possibly reasonable guess for a 1960-70 submarine) with essentially no safety margin. Suppose that it is at a depth of 500 ft. and is attacked by 10 KT weapons. The overpressure necessary to destroy the submarine is then (2000-500)×0.43=645 psi. Fig. 1 shows that the submarine will be destroyed if the weapon bursts within about 1.2 miles. If the submarine is known to be in an area of 50 miles², then Fig. 2 shows that 50 × 0.23=12 of the 10 KT weapons will be needed to cover the area and destroy the submarine.

127

ACS-W2

8/17/60

THE "DESTABILIZING" EFFECTS OF CHANGES
IN MISSILE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS

Raymond Foye

Thomas Brewer

John Phelps

Stabilized deterrence depends on an assured retaliatory capability. And this capability almost always means a strategic force sufficiently invulnerable to substantially survive a first strike. If some simplifying assumptions are made, the fraction of a force expected to survive an attack by ballistic missiles can be expressed as a function of about a dozen parameters which describe the two forces. The particular analysis on which the results in this memo are based is contained in a paper (RP-1, August 1959) from the Mershon National Security Program at the Ohio State University.

The pertinent notation, adapted with slight modification from RP-1, is:

W = weapon yield

C = circular probable error

H = hardness of attacked weapons in psi of blast overpressure

R = lethal radius, a function of W and H

r = overall reliability of attacking weapons (excluding normal scatter about target

a = attrition rate of attacking weapons

m = number of weapons which strike in vicinity of each target weapon

n = number of weapons launched at each target weapon

pI = fraction of aggressor weapons whose location is known to aggressor

Pq = fraction of aggressor weapons launched before the attack arrives

Ps = fraction of aggressor weapons expected to survive attack

The assumption of a circular normal distribution, the "cookie cutter" approximation and other assumptions set forth in RP-1 yields the following relations among the parameters:

$$P_s = 1 - P_i (1 - P_q) (1 - P_m),$$

$$R = R(H, W),$$

$$P_m = e^{-mR^2/1.44C^2}, \quad (m \ge 1)$$

$$m = nr(1-a)$$

$$P_m = 1 - m(1 - e^{-R^2/1.44C^2}),$$

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The case of $m>1$ is the case of most practical interest in deterrent stability analyses. The function $R(H, W)$ is determined empirically from data in the unclassified Effects of Nuclear Weapons. $P_m$ is the dependent variable of interest if it is known or assumed that m missiles are successfully delivered to the vicinity of the target. More generally, if allowance is made for less than perfect intelligence, fast launch of retaliation with warning, anti-missile defenses, and reliability, the formulas for $m$ and $P_s$ may be used.
The quantity $n/m - P_s$ represents the average number of attacking missiles necessary to destroy one target missile. This quantity has been called the exchange ratio.

Stabilized deterrence requires a high value of $P_s$. In designing stabilized deterrence arms-control schemes, we are interested in the effect on $P_s$ of changes in the missile performance parameters. If, for instance, one side is able to improve the accuracy of its missiles, substantially reducing $C$, $P_s$ might be cut sharply and the force balance would become relatively unstable. Or what might be the effect of an increase in $W$, or the development of significant anti-missile defenses? And so on. Clearly, in designing an inspection program as part of an arms-control agreement, some kinds of research and development breakthroughs are more to be feared than others. It is of interest to try to see what kinds of improvements are most destabilizing, i.e., to changes in which parameters $P_s$ is most sensitive.

We show some illustrative results in Figures 1, 2, and 3. We first calculate $P_s$ for the parameters shown in the box in each Figure. All the plotted values of $P_s$ and the parameters are normalized to the values for the "standard case" shown in the box. The curves show the factors by which $P_s$ is multiplied if the change in a particular parameter is expressed as a multiplier of that parameter. In Figure 1, for instance, if a 2-mile CEP is reduced to 1 mile and all the other parameters are held constant $P_s$ is reduced to about 57 per cent of its original value, or about 0.45. The quantity $R/C$ is plotted as a parameter because it governs the exponent in the formula for $P_m$. The curves for $n$ and $r$ coincide because $m$ is proportional to each of these. Since, in all these Figures, $a$ and $P_s$ are zero in the standard cases, variations for these two parameters are shown not as multipliers but as values of $a$ and $P_s$ which are located by arrows along the curves. All curves have upper asymptotes at $P_s=1$.

Figure 1 shows the effect of parameter variations from a case which might represent quite hard Minuteman-type missiles. Figure 2 shows more accurate, super-hardened missiles. No curve for $H$ is shown in Figure 2 because blast-distance data for hardnesses in the vicinity of 1,000 psi were not readily available. Figure 3 differs sharply from the other two figures. It might represent large liquid-fuelled missiles which are difficult to harden and relatively very vulnerable.

Two or three general observations can be made from the Figures. Improvements in missile accuracy appear to be the most destabilizing of all possible improvements. How destabilizing a particular reduction in $C$ may be depends, however, on the original relations between $W$ and $H$. Thus, a reduction in $C$

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from 2 miles to 1 mile is much more destabilizing in the case of a 100 psi
target than a 1,000 psi target.

The function $R = \frac{5.62 W^{1/3}}{H^{0.47} C^2}$ gives an approximate fit to the empirical data

for 500 KT < W < 5 MT and 10 < H < 100. With this approximation, for m > 1,

$$
P_m = e^{-\frac{3.90 m W^{1/3}}{H^{0.47} C^2}}
$$

then,

$$
dP_{n1} = \frac{\partial P_{w}}{\partial m} dm_{1} + \frac{\partial P_{n1}}{\partial W} dW + \frac{\partial P_{m}}{\partial H} dH + \frac{\partial P_{m}}{\partial C} dC
$$

or,

$$
dP_m = \frac{3.90 m W^{1/3}}{H^{0.47} C^2} e^{-\frac{3.90 m W^{1/3}}{H^{0.47} C^2}} \left[ -\frac{dm}{m} - \frac{1}{3} \frac{dW}{W} + \frac{c.47 dH}{H} + \frac{2 dC}{C} \right]
$$

which shows again that variations in C have the greatest effect on Pm.

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ACS-W12

9/15/60

NUCLEAR EXCHANGE RATIOS

John Mullen

Air Force Research Division

It has been argued by many analysts that possession of hardened missiles in substantial quantities by the major contenders is a very strong stabilizing influence in a cold war situation. These analysts argue that there is no appreciable advantage in a first strike or preventive war against these hardened points, for these are invulnerable to surprise attack. They argue that, if there is no advantage to fast response, accidents are less likely to trigger a general war, and these two ("accidents" and preventive strikes) being the major causes of a possible war, such war would be virtually precluded. The argument appears to be quite sound insofar as the hardened missiles place a disadvantage upon the potential attacker; assuming reasonably equal numbers on both sides, if the exchange ratio is highly favorable to the victim, it would be unprofitable to attack. In other words, if it takes ten or twenty shots to destroy one target, the attacker would fail to destroy the victim (still assuming equal forces). The exchange ratio, we will see, is one which depends upon the weapons used, and upon the target which receives the weapons.

In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of missile and target exchange ratios to such parameters as weapon yield, missile CEP and target hardness, the following curves may be offered. It can be demonstrated that the probability of survival of a given target is given by:

$$Ps = \left(\frac{\frac{36W^2}{3n}}{C^2H}\right) \text{ where } 
\begin{aligned}
Ps &\equiv \text{probability of survival} \\
W &\equiv \text{warhead yield in megatons} \\
n &\equiv \text{number of like missiles fired} \\
C &\equiv \text{Circular Error Probable (CEP), (that is, the radius in nautical miles of that circle into which 50\% of the warheads may be expected to impact.)} \\
\text{and } H &\equiv \text{the overpressure in pounds per square inch needed to destroy the target.}
\end{aligned}$$

The statistic Ps, by definition, is the probability that the target will survive. We are more frequently concerned with the vulnerability, which is the probability that the target will not survive; this quantity we will call Pk (for kill probability), and it will be exactly equal to (1-Ps).

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The formula as shown is taken from empirical data and is probably as good for our purposes as any other general expression. It does not take into effect the "aborts," those missiles which "die on the pad" or are destroyed shortly after launch. Actually, we are unable to guess this quantity with any great confidence, but one must bear in mind that:

(a) Reliability of operational missiles should be between .5 and .9.

(b) During a mass launch one may, by the very numbers involved, expect a higher number of "aborts" than during single launches, where more careful procedures may be followed.

One therefore should realize that all numbers of attacking missiles are conservative by this quantity, and in the real world, a somewhat larger number would be required. It has been said that this factor alone poses an element of uncertainty of sufficient magnitude to deter a military planner. It appears, however, that this quantity is very small, enough so that other uncertainties and normal "overkill" methods should swamp out this uncertainty.

Another simplifying assumption will be made to expedite calculations. It will be assumed that a $P_k$ of .9, or greater, will be needed to define "killed." Since we will consider all targets to be isolated from each other (a logical but as yet invalid assumption), we know that one or more enemy missiles will be needed to destroy each of our targets. This number is the exchange ratio; it tells us how many enemy missiles are needed to destroy one of our targets, and this ratio will run from one to a thousand or more, depending upon missile parameters and the target hardness. The hardness figures of 5 psi, 100 psi, 500 psi, and 1000 psi, were chosen because:

(1) 5 psi is about the limit for a reinforced concrete building not especially designed for blast resistance.

(2) 100 psi is a reasonable figure for an <u>underground</u> reinforced concrete structure; standard for hardened missile installations.

(3) 500 psi is about the limit for an economical underground reinforced structure.

(4) 1000 psi is very nearly (within a factor of 2 or 3) the limit of hardness attainable at any cost.

Let us model a missile exchange having the following parameters:

(a) CEP = 2 nm

(b) Yield = 1 mt

(c) Target hardness = 100 psi

This model is, as far as the literature indicates,\* a realistic one. We may see from our curves that about 37 of these weapons must be fired against our 100 psi target. Already it looks as though this indicates a stable situation; if we had one thousand missiles hardened to 100 psi,

\*See for example, Murphy, C.V., "The Embattled Mr. McElroy," *Fortune*, Vol. LIX, No. 4, April 59, pp. 147 ff.

138

any enemy would need 37,000 weapons to launch at us, and he would still expect to receive at least a hundred in retaliation.** If he were to increase his yield to 10 mt, he would still need about 8000 to accomplish the same destruction (and receive the same.)

## Conclusion:

From this quick look at the numbers of the situation, it would appear that from a hardened force of missiles on both sides, we may expect to receive only a *temporary* stability; the length of the stable period being purely a function of technology.***We are committed to the concept of the hardened missile force; for the time it is clearly a good one, possibly the best one, and probably will remain so for five or ten years. It only remains for us to observe the lesson of history and put our faith in a dynamic rather than a stagnant posture.

**Our number of targets destroyed has been the mean number; that is, the most likely quantity. Another way of expressing the quantity would be as follows:

Fifty per cent (50%) of the time for any of the given threats, the offense would expect to kill 900 or more of its 1000 targets. Sixty-eight per cent (68%) of the time, the offense would expect to kill between 890 and 910 of its targets. Ninety-five per cent (95%) of the time, the offense would expect to kill between 883 and 917 of its targets, and ninety-nine per cent (99%) of the time, the offense would expect to destroy between 873 and 927 of its targets. Statistically, it is not possible to kill 100% of the targets, but one can calculate that 999.9 targets may be destroyed with 95% confidence by using a cumulative kill probability of .99995 which can be obtained by using about 17,000 missiles which themselves have an individual $P_k$ of .62; that is, they are 1 mt, 0.5 NMCEP weapons fired against a 100psi target.

***It may also be pointed out that as the weapons systems become more complex, and the "systems of systems" become more complex, the confidence of the planner in the availability and performance of his weapons must necessarily decrease.

139

(cc)

8/24/60

SOME PROBABILISTIC FACTORS IN DETERRENCE MODELS

Winthrop Smith
John Phelps

Some problems of deterrence, particularly those involving counterforce attacks with strategic weapons, are particularly amenable to mathematical calculation.

Brennan & Phelps (see ACS-3, ACS-9, and RP-1 of the Mershon National Security Program at Ohio State University) among others, have calculated weapon survival probabilities in terms of weapon performance and development characteristics, and Kybal & Kalkstein (see ACS-14 and Kalkstein's ACS paper of 26 July 1960) among others have developed diagrams and analytic relations showing regions of deterrent stability for bilateral force balances.

In the work so far, results are usually (although not always) expressed and diagrams drawn in terms of mean values and implied 50% confidence levels. Our aim in this paper is to consider some of the purely probabilistic uncertainties (as distinguished from many other uncertainties which may arise from discrepancies between the model and reality or from the lack of exact information) in deterrence models and to present some illustrative results.

I.

In the RP-1 paper a quantity $P_s$, the probability that a base will survive an attack by m missiles, is calculated. The assumption is made that if there are N bases altogether, the mean number of survivors is $N_p = S$. Actually, the probability that there will be exactly S survivors out of N bases is given by the binomial distribution

$$P_N^S = \binom{N}{S} P_S^{N-S} (1-P_S)^S \quad (1)$$

The probability that the number of survivors will be greater or less than a certain number can be found by summing the terms (1) over the appropriate range. The standard deviation (r.m.s. deviation) for the binomial distribution is

$$\sigma = \sqrt{N_p S (1-P_S)} \quad (2)$$

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(See, for instance, E. Bright Wilson, "An introduction to Scientific Research.") Tables of the binomial distribution, giving both individual terms and partial sums, exist (See, for instance, National Bureau of Standards Applied Mathematics Series, No. 6, "Tables of the Binomial Probability Distribution").

But for many practical purposes, the binomial distribution can be approximated by either the normal distribution (for large N and $p_s$, not too near 0 or 1) or by the Poisson distribution (for large N and $p_s$ near 0 or 1).

Fig. 1 is plotted using the normal approximation. It shows confidence intervals for 50% and 90% confidence levels as a function of N and for several values of $p_s$. In the case of 100 bases and $p_s = 0.70$ for instance, we are 90% confident that the actual number of survivors will lie between $\bar{s} - \Delta S$ and $\bar{s} + \Delta S$ or between 62.5 and 77.5. Since the normal distribution is symmetric and the binomial distribution is ordinarily not, the approximation is poorest for large or small $p_s$. A comparison of Fig. 1 with actual tabulated results for a binomial distribution with $p_s=0.50$ shows, as would be expected, that Fig. 1 somewhat overestimates the $+\Delta S$ interval and underestimates the $-\Delta S$ interval but that the $2\Delta S$ ($=(S + \Delta S)$ - $(S - \Delta S)$) "bandwidth" is accurate to within two or three percent.

For establishing approximate confidence intervals on S in cases other than those illustrated in Fig. 1, the standard deviation (2) may be multiplied by an appropriate factor read from Fig. 2, which shows multipliers as a function of $\bar{s}$ for a normal distribution.

(See Graph, following page)

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Figure 2 - Normal Distribution: Confidence Interval As A Function of Confidence Level

The analyses of Kybal & Kalkstein (see above reference papers) assume that the "exchange ratio"

$$R = \frac{\text{weapons expended}}{\text{weapons killed}}$$

determines the slopes of the lines bounding a region of stable deterrence. If, in a given attack, N weapons are attacked by m weapons apiece and there are survivors then

$$R_s = \frac{m N}{N-S}$$

But since values of S follow a binomial distribution, it can be shown

$$\bar{S} - \sqrt{\frac{N}{S}} \approx S \left( \frac{P^S}{N} \right) \approx N P_s .$$

(See, for example, Wilson's book, P.188) thus

$$R_s = \frac{m N}{N-S} = \frac{m N}{N-N_{Ps}} = \frac{m}{1-P_s(m)}, \quad (3)$$

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for $N \gg 1$. $R$ is thus a function of the number of weapons per target and of position on the force diagram. The region boundaries therefore are not straight lines.

Fig. 3 shows boundaries of regions of stable deterrence for several cases. Curves A, B, and D were constructed using the scheme of RP-1 (reference above) and Curve C using RP-1 and Fig. 1 of this paper. For convenience we assume a completely symmetrical situation with a minimum of 40 weapons on each side. Curves A represent, with 50% confidence, Minuteman-type missiles of 2 MT warhead and 1 mi. CEP hardened to 100 psi and dispersed one per base. The region AAA is the region of stable deterrence. Curves B represent similar missiles but with hardening to only 50 psi. Curves C are the 90% confidence limits for this same case. Curves D show 50% confidence for the same missile parameters but with a dispersal of three missiles per base.

Fig. 3 shows that the assumption of straight-line boundaries for the region of stable deterrence is quite satisfactory for fairly invulnerable (high $R$) weapons.

(See Graph - Page 6)

$R$ may be expected to increase as the number of weapons in an attack increases since (for the "one-shot" assumption of this kind of analysis) more and more overkill occurs and attacking weapons are wasted. Curves B and C show that the region of stable deterrence is smaller if high confidence is required. Curves D illustrate the fact that, if the initial forces are large enough and residual forces can be set small enough, there is at least in principle a region of stable deterrence for arbitrarily vulnerable weapons. The existence of this region is due to overkill, but the forces required to get inside it are so large as to make it uninteresting from an arms control standpoint.

### III.

In II it is stated that the relation between Kybal's "exchange ratio" $Rs$ and the number of surviving weapons $S$ is

$$Rs = \frac{mN}{N-S}$$

The relation between a confidence interval $\Delta S$ (obtained from I) and the corresponding confidence interval in $Rs$, namely $\Delta Rs$, is given by

$$\Delta Rs \approx \left| \frac{\partial Rs}{\partial S} \right| \Delta S = \frac{mN}{(N-S)^2} \Delta S$$

$$\text{or} \quad \frac{\Delta Rs}{Rs} = \frac{\Delta S}{N-S}$$

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In computing $\Delta Rs$ average values can be used, i.e.

$$ \Delta Rs \approx \frac{\bar{Rs}}{N - \bar{s}} \qquad \Delta S \qquad \text{or} \qquad \Delta Rs = \frac{m}{(1 - Ps(m))^2} \qquad \frac{\Delta S}{N} \qquad (4) $$

The most vulnerable situation for a nation is that for the smallest likely value of $Rs$. Thus for any given confidence level, $N$, $m$, and $Ps$, $\Delta Rs$ is found using the formula above and $\frac{\Delta S}{N}$ as obtained from Fig.1.

A conservative estimate of the force-in-being required to guarantee any specified minimum number $N^o$ of weapons after the attack may be obtained by substituting $Rs - \Delta Rs$ for $R$ in any of Kalkstein's formulas (see Kalkstein's ACS paper of July 26, 1960). For example, in a bilateral situation with:

$$ \frac{N_1^o}{Rs} = \frac{N_2^o}{Rs} = \frac{N_o}{Rs} \qquad \text{same for both sides} $$

$N_1$ - $N_2$ - $N$ (allowed initial number of weapons for both sides)

$K$ - uncertainty in stockpile (allowance for cheating)

Kalkstein gives the condition for minimum stable deterrence as

$$ N - N^o = \frac{N + K}{Rs} $$

which solved for $N$ gives

$$ N = \frac{R_s N^o + K}{R_s - 1} $$

If we take a smaller value of $R_s$ because of statistical uncertainty we get for the minimum required initial number:

$$ N = \frac{(R_s - \Delta R_s) N_o + K}{R_s - \Delta R_s - 1} $$

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ACS-E1/1

7/11/60

# SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A 200-MISSILE STABILIZED DETERRENCE AGREEMENT

## I. INTRODUCTION

John Phelps

Our aim in the three or four draft papers which follow is to pick out some of the principal implications of a 200-missile stabilized deterrence agreement, and to comment briefly on them. A secondary aim is to establish some dimensions of the overall research problem, and to see how it might be analyzed with possible further work in mind. We will first state the problem in a concise form, and then outline an approach to it.

Since our work here is partly in the nature of a research exercise, we can state the problem in an arbitrarily simple form. But we are guided somewhat by our intuitive ideas of what might be a reasonable stabilized deterrence scheme for the mid-sixties. The problem, with whose strategic and other implications we are concerned, then can be stated as follows:

The stabilized deterrence agreement is bilateral, involving the US and the USSR, although we allow for China and other countries in the discussion. 200 "second generation" missiles are permitted to each side. These missiles have the characteristics of either fixed Minutemen or submarine launched Polarises. The force on one side may consist of any mix of these up to a total of 200. There are no limits on the availability of nuclear warheads for these missiles, but we eliminate some difficult questions about the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons by requiring that all nuclear weapons belonging to a country must be kept in its zone of interior (or in its missile-launching submarines at sea). Our time period is 1965-70.

The rationale of this statement of the problem is: We aim to emphasize a second-strike capability exclusively, so we eliminate vulnerable forces, particularly bombers. We eliminate the otherwise unclear distinction between the tactical and strategic roles of fighter bombers and aircraft carriers by keeping the nuclear weapons at home. Presumably, if tactical nuclear weapons were needed in a limited war overseas, they could be airlifted in a hurry without disturbing the strategic balance which is our concern here. Assuming a bilateral agreement simplifies our problem greatly, but means that we probably must make very explicit allowance for China. The 1965-70 time period makes possible reasonable planning now and perhaps the imposition of a ceiling on the numbers of second generation missiles as these come in.

We group the implications or consequences of a stabilized deterrence

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agreement into three areas: strategic (including implications of the agreement for both general and limited wars), social (including political and economic effects and value changes which might result from a stabilized deterrence agreement), and some related arms control problems (including, in this very preliminary look at the system, how to get from an uncontrolled arms race to the stabilized deterrence state). We exclude the problem of how the stabilized deterrence agreement can be inspected and policed.

Our main concern is with the implications of the stabilized deterrence agreement in these three areas on the assumption that the agreement works and that the problem is as stated above. But we must also consider what might happen if there are major variations in the statement of the problem; in other words, what would be the implications, for instance, if one side cheated and had not 200, but 400 missiles, or if effective active anti-missile defenses were suddenly introduced, or if jet transports were suddenly converted to bombers, and so on.

For purposes of organizing any further research, a suggested approach is to list various implications ("dependent variables") such as the probability of a deliberately-launched massive attack, the destructive-ness of a massive attack, the probability of a limited war spreading, the effects on the Western alliance, and so on, and then to discuss each of these implications in relation to "independent variables" which would include such things as the possibilities of cheating or suddenly abrogating the treaty, R and D breakthroughs, civil defense, new nations in the power balance, and so on. This approach amounts to enumerating a large number of implications of a stabilized deterrence agreement, and then examining these implications individually first, on the assumption that the agreement holds and, second, on the assumption that there are major variations in the real situation.

## II. IMPLICATIONS FOR GENERAL WAR

### John Phelps

We will separate the strategic implications of a stabilized deterrence agreement into the implications for a general war and the implications for a limited war. We take up general war first. The general war may be considered as either deliberately-launched or accidental. A deliberately-launched general war is the case which has received most attention in security planning so far: the massive sneak attack with subsequent retaliation against the aggressor's homeland. An accidental general war might result from technological accidents, human aberrations, a cataclytic situation, or from some variety of misjudgement or miscalculation. A very large number of war situations are possible, ranging from a truly confined "limited war" to the general nuclear war with all-out massive strategic attack in both directions. Graduated retaliation, for instance, seems to be an important and relatively seldom analyzed possibility.

In considering general war, there are two central questions: What would be the consequences of such a war, as measured in total destruction? And, what is the likelihood of such a war? We take up these two questions se-

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parately in relation to the 200 missile stabilized deterrence agreement.

Consider the consequences of a general war with 200 missiles launched from each side. Assume Country A strikes Country B first. Then we might represent the different targeting possibilities in a kind of matrix,

where the elements in the matrix describe, in one way or another, the consequences for the A country and the consequences for the B country. Some cases make more sense militarily than others; thus, 12 (first row, second column) is the usually treated case, while 21 would seem strategically senseless. We note that the case of B attacking A would require another similar matrix. There are thus eight cases to be considered, even limiting ourselves to pure counter-force and counter-population targeting, and more or less all-or-none attacks. Nevertheless, this scheme seems to offer one way of systematically discussing the damage which would result for different attacks.

Let's look at a few representative numbers. Suppose, for the sake of some novelty in illustration, the US attacks the USSR. Assume Minutemen-type missiles and pure counter-population targeting for USSR retaliation. Assume $W=1$ MT, $CEP = 1$, $H = 100$ psi, $r$ (reliability) = 0.9 for the US missiles and 0.6 for the USSR missiles, 2 missiles at each USSR site, and perfect intelligence. 100 US missiles go to USSR missiles and the remainder to cities. About 78% of the USSR missiles would survive to r閲estigate. Thus, $0.6 \times 0.78 \times 200 = 93$ USSR missiles would hit US cities.

Assuming that the USSR population is prepared to the extent of elementary knowledge of fallout effects and the US population is the same (or slightly better prepared, since US is "aggressor") but that there has been no major civilian defense progress on either side, short-term USSR fatalities would be (from rough curve in ACS-9 notes) 5-10%, while US fatalities, because of greater concentration in cities, would be perhaps 10-15%. Clearly, the US would "lose."

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If the US launched a pure counter-force attack with all 200 missiles, US fatalities would be 5-10% and USSR fatalities probably 1-3% (because of fallout from weapons on bases).

These numbers may be scaled up or down to allow for variables such as civil defense, variations in weapons characteristics, force mixes, and so on. The all-or-none situation considered here sets probable limits on the damage that could be done on a piecemeal basis if retaliation was flexible, or if a city-for-a-city exchange developed.

Short-term fatalities is an incomplete measure of damage. A better analysis would allow for long-term fatalities, psychological problems, economic disruption, etc.

If the USSR attacks the US, it would in general probably come off relatively a little better because of the higher US population density and because fallout from weapons on bases would affect more people.

Now consider some variations in the constraints. What if the strategic balance is changed? What if one side cheats and gets 400 missiles, or converts its jet transports to bombers, or equips its overseas fighter bombers and carriers with nuclear weapons? Some order of magnitude numbers (still assuming that the US is the aggressor) are:

For 400 missiles (Counter-force targeting):
Only about 30% of USSR force survives to destroy 1-3% of US population. Or, if pure counter-population attack is used, 15-20% of USSR population is destroyed.

For 200 (fair fraction of US civil jets in a few years) 707's or DC-8's loaded with about 10 MT per plane (Counter-population targeting):
USSR fatalities are very large (in 30-50% range). But if USSR missiles were able to launch, US fatalities would be in 10-20% range.

For fighter bombers and carriers equipped with nuclear weapons:
Great damage (30% and up) to USSR possible, depending on circumstances. Probable heavy retaliation.

Thus the use of alternate delivery systems would more drastically upset the strategic balance than would, for instance, a factor of two in missiles only. Similarly a breakthrough in active defenses or a real passive defense program would have a decisive effect.

We can make a table of important and relatively unimportant dangers in designing a stabilized deterrence scheme.

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<table><thead><tr><th>Most Serious Dangers</th><th>Less Serious Dangers</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Conversion of jet transports.</td><td>Variations in n over a factor of 2 or 3.</td></tr><tr><td>Clandestine deployment of nuclear-armed tactical aircraft and carriers.</td><td>Small improvements in missile accuracy.</td></tr><tr><td>Real C.D. Programs.</td><td>Variations in any agreed-upon missile mix (e.g. Polaris vs. Minuteman).</td></tr><tr><td>R and D breakthroughs on active defenses or A. S. W.</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

What about the likelihood of general war? So long as the strategic balance (i.e., the stabilized deterrent agreement) is maintained, it is difficult to see how one side could rationally and deliberately plan an attack on the other. If a war were "accidental," then presumably the relatively small advantage of the side which struck first in haste would be reduced since its attack might be poorly organized. The danger of an accidental war would be reduced in a stabilized deterrent environment mainly, of course, because there would be only a slight advantage in pre-emption. Further, the realization, among commanders on both sides and over a period of time, of the quantitative nature of the deterrent balance might lead to new military doctrines with a built-in tolerance for accidents.

What of China and new countries in the power balance? One positive consideration is that if the US and the USSR enter into a bilateral stabilized deterrence agreement, they will probably have a strong common interest in making it work. The longer it works, the more bilateral trust should develop and the greater the possibility that the two countries might work together to counter threats to stability. Probably China cannot independently develop a 200 ballistic-missile delivery capability before 1970 although it will certainly have nuclear weapons. From this viewpoint, a bilateral agreement might be a reasonable goal for the 1965-70 time period. Aggression by China, in S.E. Asia for instance, could if necessary be met with tactical nuclear weapons airlifted, perhaps with notice and reassurances to the Russians, from the U.S.

### III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LIMITED WAR

Morton Halperin

#### General

Any arms control agreement will affect the likelihood of limited war taking place and the probability of the war remaining limited. These general considerations will be touched upon briefly before considering the particular

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effects of the proposed agreement. An arms control scheme implies a desire to reduce the likelihood of war and eliminate tensions. It will depend for its operation on a climate of some mutual trust and free communication. It is unlikely that any arms control scheme involving inspection or production constraints could survive limited war involving both the United States and the Soviet Union. Whether it could survive a war involving one of the two countries would depend on the circumstances and the nature of the arms control agreement. In this sense any arms control agreement provides a deterrent to limited war in that it raises the cost of starting such a war. If both sides see in the arms control agreement a substantial reduction in the Probability of total war, they will have to weigh the value of the scheme in the balance of deciding whether or not the gains of the limited war will exceed the cost.

An arms control agreement will also produce circumstances which make limited war more likely. A major deterrent on limited war is the danger that it will spread to total war. An arms control agreement which reduced the likelihood of total war might well encourage the outbreak of limited warfare. How these two factors balance is likely to depend on the relative influence of China and Russia in controlling the forces planning a local attack and the nature of the arms control agreement.

The arms control agreement proposed would imply an extensive inspection system and forms of positive inspection which implied friendly relations if not mutual trust. If both sides were willing to negotiate such an agreement and to go through the expense and effort involved, they are not likely to force its breakdown by precipitating a crisis because of a limited war effort. But this assumes that the agreement was negotiated in good faith and not as a cover to neutralize strategic forces for a limited war effort. How well the agreement operated as a restraint on limited war would depend on how well each side thought it was working out. If either side found that it badly wanted out of the agreement, it might in fact precipitate a limited war to force the other side to break the agreement. Alternately if one side decided that the gains from a limited war were likely to be very great, it might be willing to gamble that a new agreement would quickly be negotiated after the short limited war, or that the other side's dependence on the agreement would keep it in force during the war.

A missile control agreement is more likely than most to survive a limited war since it concerns a weapon which almost by definition will not be used in a limited war. While each side might curtail whatever general inspection powers the other side had, it might desperately want the other side to continue monitoring its missiles so that it knew that no all-out attack was being planned. Even if the agreement gradually broke down, it might give either side confidence that the other would not use its missiles in a "limited retaliation" fashion since it had a relatively small number of them.

On balance, an estimate of the effect which the proposed agreement would have on the possibility of a limited war, encouraged or instigated by the US or the Soviet Union, would depend on our assessment of the extent to which the Soviets fear all-out war, and the gains they might conceive of making by limited war actions. The situation, however, changes radically when China is introduced into the picture.

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The Chinese are not likely to place a very high value on the maintenance of an agreement which, among other things, prohibited the sharing of information about missiles or reduced the likelihood that the Russians would commit their missile force in the defense of China. At the same time the Chinese might look upon the agreement as of value in neutralizing the American strategic force in the event of a Chinese attack on the periphery. But this advantage comes to the Chinese only if in fact they start a limited war. The Chinese might well be motivated to start a series of limited wars after the proposed agreements were functioning and accepted by both sides. If the agreement survived a limited war, then it would have served as an umbrella under which to fight the war, and would probably have made the Russians less hesitant to support the war effort. If the limited war led the US to break the agreement, the pressure on Russia to give missiles to China would probably be even greater than if there had been no agreement.

## Western Alliance

An agreement of the kind proposed is likely to cause serious problems for the Western Alliance, particularly for NATO. The European members of NATO have become increasingly aware of the possibility that the American strategic deterrent will not prevent a limited attack in Europe. Hence there is a demand both in England and on the continent for individual missile forces or a NATO missile force. An agreement which left Russia with 200 missiles but prevented Europe from having any might well be resisted by the major allies of the United States.

The United States might have to follow up this agreement by stationing larger forces on the European continent and substantially improving NATO's capacity to fight limited nuclear and conventional wars. The question would have to be faced as to whether this activity would destroy the Russian-American confidence necessary to maintain the arms control agreement.

This problem is closely tied in with that of nuclear blackmail. The absence of a European missile force contributes to the danger of Russian blackmail against West European states. On the other hand, the agreement would make missiles relatively scarce and therefore less likely to be used by Russia against a secondary target.

Should the Russians suddenly break off the agreement, they would have succeeded in preventing the build up of a European missile force in the period before the Russians had developed invulnerable second strike forces. If the Russians had such forces, without any control agreement, they would run a much smaller risk in using them against European states, since they would not lose anything if the US as a consequence got in the first blow in a general war.

## Neutrals

Neutral states are likely to applaud the proposed agreement as contributing to a reduction of tensions. On the other hand, they are likely to be uneasy about a system which allows both Russia and the United States to keep 200 missiles. They are not likely to be sympathetic to the argument that the missiles are needed to protect the two countries.

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Neutral states with a desire to create tensions or even war over local issues (e.g. Nasser, Castro, et al.) may well feel that the Russian-American agreement makes total war less likely and hence decreases the risk of limited operations.

## IV. HOW DO WE GET THERE FROM HERE?

### A PROGRAM FOR ARMS CONTROL

Arthur Barber

One of the myths of modern times is the idea that any arms control agreement must be negotiated in great detail, be absolutely foolproof and acceptable to Congress. Such limitations guarantee that no arms control agreement can be achieved. We must cease our search for ultimate solutions and begin to examine and compare the alternatives. The question is not whether any agreement is absolutely secure, stable, but is this more secure, more stable than the absence of any agreement.

At the present time the existence of large, vulnerable, first-strike delivery systems is extremely unstable. The exchange ratio, the number of weapons required to destroy a weapon carrier, is a good indication of military stability. At the present time this is much less than one for our soft weapons on the ground. All the B-52's on a SAC base or the soft Atlas missiles at Vandenburg AFB in California could be destroyed by a single ICBM. However, hardened ballistic missiles may require anywhere between 2-10 missiles to destroy a single site. Therefore hardening (or mobility) will contribute to stability.

In this regard it is important to note the lack of any Soviet statements regarding the construction of an invulnerability deterrent. There has been a notable lack of statements of Soviet missile firing submarines, airborne alert or hardened ICBM sites. Their strong objection to our "open spies" policy may be not merely for propaganda benefits, but a realization of the vulnerability of their forces due to the Soviet missile gap.

Recent government statements have indicated that Polaris will become operational sometime this year and Minuteman late in 1962. If we are to view arms control as another facet of national security, it would appear that we should delay any arms cut back until 1962. Even in the absence of any agreement, we will phase out B-47's and some B-52's as we phase in hardened Minutemen and Polarises. The question then is how far we should reduce our soft forces and limit the build up of our hardened forces. This question is clearly dependent upon the confidence which we can place in our inspection system. As we feel more confidence in the inspection system, we should be prepared to accept mutual decreases in weapons.

The more difficult question is the question of the Soviet position. It would appear that an agreement on the mutual installation of a hardened missile force of 200 missiles would be possible. Neither side should object to the enemy's increase in the hardness of his missile levels of several 1000 psi.

A. The Soviet-American position is very unstable now. The chart of stability over the next four years, while not positive at all points, does not appear to have any points of decreasing stability as we move to a limited secure force. (Sole possible exception: unilateral overflights.)

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B. Any new aircraft for theatre forces should be designed primarily for high explosive operation. Aircraft capable of effective high explosive operation can readily deliver atomic weapons. The reverse is not necessarily true. Given such a posture and a modest stockpile of 5 20-KT weapons in the ZI under Soviet surveillance, we could, if pressed by third parties such as China, take a small number to the theatre and if necessary use them. It is possible that the news of their movement might be sufficient in itself. The destruction of weapons between 50 and 500 KT could provide a clear distinction between tactical and strategic weapons.

We undoubtedly will be pressured by the Soviet to reduce personnel in the Armed Services. This will result in decreases in overseas military personnel. As a result, increased emphasis will be placed on the use of indigenous forces. Experience of the past decade indicates that one of the primary uses for these forces will be the preservation of internal security. New and more effective weapons for action against guerillas and street mobs can be built and provided to nations in Africa, South and Central America, and Asia. This is a mixed blessing, for while it will make revolution more difficult, it is not certain that revolution is always a bad thing (Korea and Turkey, 1960).

## Program for Arms Control

### A. Unilateral (1961)

1. Announce no bombs in orbit. Prelaunch inspection of our orbital vehicles by any interested parties.

2. Unilateral withdrawal of atomic weapons from overseas installations to be completed in all NATO installations by 1 July '62; all overseas SAC installations by 1 Jan. '63. Certain bases maintained in operation for logistics. No significant withdrawal of aircraft or men. No ballistic missiles provided to US troops on the Continent or to NATO.

3. Treaty: Soviet--No atomic weapons to third parties.

4. Congress repeal Connelly Amendment on World Court.

### B. Bilateral

1. 1962: Negotiate bilateral agreement with Soviet on small high explosive police force. Then ask UN to endorse agreement. Composition: Regimental Combat Team from US and equal from USSR. Command alternates from US to USSR. Support airlift and communications joint operations. If called upon, US and Russian shock troops backed up by units from other UN nations. Use nationalities not involved in dispute, e.g. Japanese in South Africa; Swedes, Turks, and Poles at Formosa and Okinawa.

2. 1962-63: Based upon modest inspection privileges, agree to reduce strategic delivery systems to 200 invulnerable weapons (1000+ psi Minuteman) by 1 July 1963. We agree to bring all Polaris submarines

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to port 30 days after the first *successful* series of inspections.
(The number of submarines is so small that, even in addition to
200 Minutemen, it could not pose a threat to a Soviet invulnerable
force of 200 hardened missiles. Its existence, however, would pro-
tect us against the possibility of attack by large numbers of covert
missiles, which should be dispelled by the completion of the first
complete inspection. This inspection would reduce ΔN to tolerable
limits.)

**Note:** This is signing a treaty for action which would require 12-18 months to carry out. It is quite possible that the Soviet would press us for a quicker time schedule, or suggest no agreement. We should seriously consider building the required hardened sites with improved Titan missiles, reserving the option to change some sites to Minutemen sites at a later date.

## V. DETERRENCE AND CHINA

### T. W. Milburn

Mao has been the only decision-maker of the larger powers to have been re-
cently quoted as claiming that he would welcome a nuclear war. There are
estimates that he would welcome the growth of limited war into general
war if the general war were to involve a struggle between the US and the
Soviet Union. He would surely gain relatively the most from a struggle
involving the US, NATO, the Soviet Union and its European satellites that
left out China and did not involve anything like half a beach of fallout.

It might be expected that China would feel even safer in the event of a war
between the US and the USSR following arms reduction such as that necessary
to reach a bilateral 400-nuclear-weapon position described in today's problem.

I assume that the chief reason that the Chinese have not provoked a war thus far is that they are gaining quite rapidly without the diversion of their resources. Coupled with that is the fact that the outcome of any large conflict in which China may become engaged is rather less certain in outcome during the next ten years than are the carefully-planned economic and social changes envisaged in China's Great Leap Forward. An invasion of the rich rice lands of Burma would likely reduce drastically the amount of rice China might import from Burma at least temporarily, besides which the outcome of any such war is uncertain at present.

China, then, is not much deterred at present by our military threats and
might well be less so in the future under arms control unless the US and the
Soviet Union were to combine forces.

Even then, it would be my presently not well thought out conclusion that
China would be most deterred by the thought of losses of advantages it still
as now possesses because of its rather favorable relationship with the Soviet
Union in case it acted in strong opposition to the desires of the Soviet
Union.

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VI. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

T. W. Milburn

The effects of arms reductions on the Soviet Union should prove more predictable, i.e., the new allocations of resources should prove more predictable, than the same effects upon the US.

It is possible, but doubtful, that the proposed bilateral reduction in strategic nuclear loaded missiles to 200 per side would result in "savings" to each side of somewhat over 15 billion dollars a year. The figure might be closer to ten. Restrictions in the size of strategic forces implies restrictions in the number of missions or objectives on which each strategic force could concentrate (I would imagine more emphasis on the task of deterring attacks upon ZI as contrasted with, say, the deterrence of "provo-cations.") and the need, therefore, to allocate a larger proportion of the military effort than at present upon that tactical arm designed to handle so-called limited wars. The present large strategic forces may, it is assumed, act to reduce the probability of limited wars occurring. The counter-possibility should be recognized, however, namely that present strategic forces actually increase the likelihood that limited wars will occur because it is generally recognized that it is simply not very credible that massive retaliatory forces--or nuclear forces of any kind--would be used for any missions but the most important, e.g., in retaliation for an attack upon the American mainland, simply because the cost to the US for their use would be so incommensurate with any probable gain because of their use. Were this latter possibility correct, or more accurately, were it accepted by American military decision makers as correct, then savings might be somewhat larger.

This ten to fifteen billion dollars released out of total US GNP might have very different effects upon the total economy depending upon how it was then employed. Were it used for those forms of capital formation that accelerate the rate of growth in productivity of the nation, its effects upon the total economy would be profound. Its effects would be very large if utilized in foreign trade or in the development of capital goods that build capital goods in underdeveloped countries although the effects would then take longer. The effects of the changed utilization of these funds would prove least if they were injected into the private sector of the economy as increased expenditures upon consumer goods as might well be the case if the results were a drastic decrease in the US income tax rates. These additional resources would, in the short-term, affect us very differently and the world--including the underdeveloped and the uncommitted--very differently depending upon how they were used.

It seems very likely that the USSR would see such additional resources as a basis, first, for increasing or keeping up its high growth rate, then for trade and for the support of capital goods, projects in underdeveloped countries, and only tertiarily as a means of providing more to consumers (since "more" can come out of a percentage of increases in national productivity). It seems unlikely that large proportions of such savings would be used either to aid Chinese growth or to defend against possible encroachments upon Russia by the Chinese--at least for some time to come.

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The greatest effects of reduced military expenditures presumably would come from the reallocation of scientific and military manpower into the rest of the economy. It appears in the US that basic scientific research is coming to be supported more and more by the military establishment. Unless this would continue under arms control, or unless some other government agency would continue this support, it is likely that arms control could mean a reduction in the level of scientific effort in the United States. (It is clear that arms control would not mean any reduction of scientific effort in the Soviet Union.)

People do internalize the values of their occupations; and modal values in a society influence the direction of that society's growth. Reducing the military establishment would certainly provide possibilities for value change over a period of five to ten years, thus changing the relation between the two countries in ways dependent upon the spread and concentration and values induced thereby into the societies.

I would hypothesize that preoccupation with death and with methods of destruction tends to induce a depersonalization in the thinking of the consequences of military planners and strategists. I would even hypothesize further that that depersonalized thinking of the consequences of war can be a major source of increased probability of war. Aside from these guesses, it seems clear historically that wars have been more often started or instigated by nations with strong military traditions. Eventually, a smaller concentration of occupations in the military support areas should lead to less consideration of force as a means of handling and "solving" human conflict.

Increased mutual trade would likely result from a decrease in the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union unless the reduction in the possibilities for strategic war increased those for limited war and so upped tension. Decreases in conflict should not only permit increases in the exchange of goods with possible military applications, but should also result in decreases in the (psychological) atmosphere that currently prevents much other trade. Any extensive trade always tends to reorder the allocation of effort with the countries involved following the economic principle of relative advantage; each country concentrates upon what it is relatively best at.

## VII. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Winthrop Smith

<u>Brennan</u> had a number of comments: If 1963 is the target date at which the 200 <u>missile</u> capability is to be on hand, it is important that we start negotiating towards an arms control agreement well before that time. These negotiations should consider the destabilizing influence of an "anti-gravity machine", i.e., an unexpected technological breakthrough. <u>Brennan</u> thought <u>Barber</u>'s suggestion of having "stand-by" and "moth-ball" delivery systems available was an excellent one, provided that they could be made sufficiently invulnerable. This sort of arrangement is to be preferred to a weapons depot. <u>Schelling</u> feared the destabilizing influence of these moth-ball or stand-by vehicles and suggested instead that efforts should be made to shorten the time necessary to get new ones into production. <u>Barber</u> said that the vulnerability of the moth-

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balled vehicles is not so important, but they must be made invulnerable when they become operational. Assuming an inspection and warning system, it would be desirable that the response time necessary to get these vehicles operational should be more than 20 minutes but less than a few weeks. A response time of the order of days permits mobilization of the moth-balled vehicles to serve as a warning to an enemy planning an attack. Milburn agreed that Barber's plan involved clearly recognizable steps of preparedness for war; at the end of any of these there would be time for negotiation to stabilize the situation.

Kybal had some remarks on the orbital bomb which he felt was a good retaliatory but not a good first strike weapon. Instead of putting Polarises at dock-side it might be possible to have recoverable orbital-type bombs on the ground ready to put in orbit as a warning in event of an emergency. Brennan was skeptical about the feasibility of protecting the security of the command and control link if an orbital bomb were contemplated. To Kybal's objection that the same problem applied to SAC bombers and Polarises, Brennan replied that these have the advantage of having personnel at the receiving end.

Feld said that this discussion of technological instabilities in the 200 missile system seemed to imply that R and D constraints were needed on certain things and that the agreement would have to disallow certain substitutions. Kybal noted that there might be a strong incentive for the side which was behind in the technological race to break such an agreement so that they could attain parity with the other side.

Kybal reiterated his feeling that it was impossible to dissociate peaceful space technology from military applications so that a missile development ban would have to be on an all-or-none basis. Brennan disagreed, feeling that it was possible to make the distinction without curtailing all peaceful space technology by making certain peaceful uses more expensive and more difficult, but not necessarily impossible. Feld said that one practical point at which R and D constraints might be applied was at the level of testing completed weapons or devices. Schelling pointed out that certain technological developments might lead to a more stable rather than a less stable system so that constraints per se were not necessarily desirable. Kybal suggested that the only way to constrain military technology would be the internationalization of research. Schelling said that in planning a weapons system it is important to ask how vulnerable the system is to unexpected developments. One answer is to have a mix of weapons, the obsolescence of any of which would not be sufficient to render the whole deterrent system obsolete. The orbital bomb, for example, might be good as a part of such a mix. Hadley feared that the psychological effect of such a weapon would be destabilizing and Feld agreed that we would want to consider the orbital bomb only if it had distinct advantages as part of a mix over some other combination of weapons. In conclusion Kybal expressed the opinion that no R and D control was desirable but that controls on production would be sufficient. It is possible to find out a great deal about the other side's technological advances simply by carrying out your own research. Brennan agreed, but felt that some controls on both R and D and production would be desirable.

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SYNOPSIS OF GAMING EXERCISE
ON POSSIBLE MODES OF OUTBREAK OF WAR

Max Singer

During the Summer Study on Arms Control, a group of about twenty participants, led by Donald G. Brennan and Herman Kahn, spent the week of August 29 - September 2, 1960, playing "peace games". This paper grows out of the discussions, but does not attempt to be either a complete report or exclusively a report.

The Summer Study involved individual and group efforts to study elements of the arms control question, from specific inspection techniques to over-all policy questions. The work of the Study was based on the assumption that there may be arms control arrangements with which both the world and the United States would be better off than without arms control.

Questions concerning the advantages and disadvantages of various kinds of arms control arrangements were considered. The discussions from which this paper grew were an experiment with the use of the gaming technique for solving questions of this type.

Peace games and war games are methods by which a group can think about a problem. The word "game" is doubly misleading. First, war games and peace games are not sports, nor are they played for fun. Second, war and peace games, at least as they were played during the Summer Study, do not have more than the most tenuous connection with "game theory".

In its most simple form, the gaming technique consists of assigning each player a role and asking the player to describe how his role requires him to respond to the events of the game. In our games at Endicott House, some of the roles played were those of the United States, the British Labour Party, the Catholic Church, the Asian-African bloc, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the "Stalinist faction" in Russia. One player plays "nature". He describes the situation at the beginning of the game, determines whether proposed actions by the players are possible or impossible, and presents any events not under the control of the players.

The line between war games and peace games can be drawn in a number of places. Loosely, I would call a game a "war game" rather than a "peace game" if its beginning point is after a war has begun, or if it assumes that a war will begin, or if it is centrally concerned with the possible events of a war -- rather than whether a war will start. The values and methods of the gaming technique are the same for both war and peace games. The only reason for using the phrase "peace game" is that the word "game" is too ambiguous, and "war game" may seem to some people too militaristic.

(CC) ACS-E3(R)

8/29/60

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The purpose of gaming is to increase the understanding of situations involving the interaction of several more or less independent forces. Gaming exercises may encourage the development of several degrees of "understanding". The first might be called "simple thinking"; e.g., "It never occurred to me that the response to X would be Y." Another product of gaming can be called "enriched understanding". That is to say, one can get the feeling of a situation and appreciate it emotionally. Finally, most mysteriously and significantly, one may learn something about a class of situations by dealing richly enough with a number of specific examples. Bernard Feld has suggested the analogy of using a computer to obtain enough solutions to non-linear differential equations in order that mathematicians can get a feeling for the types of solutions that exist, and can then make a more effective use of their intuition with other examples of such equations.

Two reasons why gaming is a useful technique might be mentioned. One is that it is an example of specialization, of breaking a complex problem into component parts. The other reason is based on human nature; most people are naturally partisan. Just as lawyers for two litigants are likely to do a better job of raising all the issues involved in a dispute than would the same two men if they sat as judges, so people trying to understand reactions in a complicated hypothetical situation will be more effective if they each try to identify with one of the participants.

Some of the limitations of the gaming technique should be noted, as well. First, since it is not possible to simulate the passage of time, the effect of delay and of the great mass of background events is greatly reduced. Second, the players tend to act more rashly than they would if real lives or real money were at stake. Third, forces appear more monolithic than they actually are: e.g., the Asian and African countries do not actually think as a single person. Internal elements are an important part of the decision-making process of each country, even of one as relatively monolithic as Russia.

The games must not be taken literally. They do not represent predictions, and rarely are they realistic. They should not result in statements such as "as the game proved ...," or "the game demonstrated ...,", etc. However, the fact that the scenario produced by a game seems very improbable doesn't mean that it is of no interest. Improbable things have a way of happening. Even though the chance of any one strange event taking place may be very low, the chance that some strange event will affect our destiny is very large.

The games played during the Summer Study involved some frightening and unpleasant possibilities, and were a source of inspiration for some of those games described here. No one should draw the conclusion that we were trying to demonstrate the worthlessness of arms control, or that we must be "war-mongers" to have produced such ideas. I think that all of the participants in the discussions, including myself, regard the present competition of accelerating weapon technologies as unsatisfactory and extraordinarily dangerous. A spectrum of our individual opinions

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might be described as ranging from those who feel that the present prospects for an arms control environment are more frightening than anything except a world without arms control, to those who are afraid that the only possibilities more frightening than the present situation are the arms control prospects currently visible. All of us, however, participated in the discussions in an attempt to further the development of the strongest possible efforts toward arms control arrangements.

The first two games start with the same incident, in each case occurring in the world of 1960-1961, and follow from two different responses by the United States to that incident.

The incident is the explosion of a U.S. nuclear weapon in U.S. hands at the SAC base near Mobile, Alabama, which kills tens of thousands of United States citizens. In addition to the estimates of destruction and death (50,000 Americans), the President gets the following information: the location of explosion is consistent with accident or sabotage; there is very slight likelihood that the explosion was an enemy bomb because of the location of the explosion and the lack of evidence of a delivery vehicle; there is virtually no chance that the explosion was ordinary human error or mechanical failure. Therefore, the most likely cause is either Russian sabotage or unauthorized (including insane) conduct. Russian sabotage and unauthorized conduct are virtually the same, as far as the ability to penetrate a security system is concerned, and it is impossible to judge which is the more probable explanation on the basis of which event was more likely, a priori.

There exists a good deal of intelligence evidence indicating that the explosion was caused by Russian sabotage. Previously, there had been a number of indications that the Russians had placed at least one person fairly high up in SAC (i.e., squadron commander or equivalent). Before the explosion, this idea had been accepted by the administration, and intense efforts to find the party (or parties) had been underway. In addition, there had been signs of a "special project" that the Russians expected to come to a head soon. There also had been some evidence of subversive activity in the Mobile area in the month or so previous to the explosion, which had not been satisfactorily tracked down. There is no indication that the Russian strategic force is on special alert status.

The President's dilemma is created by the following facts and predictions. Because of Russian missile capability, either actual or possible, there is a good chance that the United States will have virtually no ability to retaliate against a missile attack unless it maintains an air alert and a 15-minute ground alert with ready bombs. Any substantial new safety measures taken in response to the Mobile explosion would make these alerts impossible. If the Mobile explosion was produced by a Russian agent, the President must raise his estimates of both the Russians' willingness to take chances, and of the likelihood that they have the

*One suggestion that occurred to some of us is the possibility of devising radioactive "signatures" that could be incorporated in bombs so that it would be obvious whose bomb had exploded.

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maximum number of missiles they could have if they had pushed missile production.

If people think that the explosion was an accident, there will be great pressures for safety measures to prevent future accidents, and both the country and the administration will be in an embarrassing position. On the other hand, if the American public believes that the explosion was caused by sabotage, there is likely to be great pressure for action against the Soviet Union. In addition, world confidence in United States' leadership and power will be sharply reduced if the U.S. tolerates such a blow, although most people, if asked, would say that the country should not retali ate.

The President decides to announce that the explosion was probably caused by Russian sabotage, that he has requested an immediate Security Council meeting, and that he has formed a special investigating team to gather evidence.

The Russians deny vigorously that they caused the explosion. They support the request for a Security Council meeting, and announce their willingness to help the medical and welfare teams providing emergency relief to Mobile. The Russians say that their fears of our alert practices have been justified, and they unilaterally renounce the use of air alerts and the loading of nuclear weapons onto planes as too dangerous.

Public reaction is generally confused. Outside the United States, the principal reaction is fear of war and nuclear accidents. There is concern that the United States might take precipitate action, and there is great skepticism about the claim of Russian sabotage. The British Labour Party ridicules the claim of sabotage. It argues that, in any case, if the United States can't protect against sabotage, it can't protect against accidents. For this reason, the country shouldn't transport bombs, especially since, in the opinion of the Labour Party, the alerts manage only to increase tensions. The Party and similar groups in the United States and other countries (including Communist-oriented groups) demand that the bombs be disarmed and shipped to isolated central storage places as the only alternative to immediate nuclear disarmament.

In the United States, in addition to movements of the type described above which are actually stronger in other countries, there are non-ideological protests against the dangers of alerts instigated by groups of mothers, etc. In addition, there are "patriotic" groups which believe the story of Russian sabotage and demand revenge.

In the first UN Security Council meeting, the United States does not present its intelligence evidence, because it feels the evidence will not be convincing and hopes that better proof will be found, and also because it is reluctant to compromise its intelligence apparatus. The United States presents physical evidence of the occurrence, describes protections against accidental explosion to prove that the explosion must have been sabotage, and demands UN action against Russia.

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The other countries agree that action against Russia should be taken, if there is absolute proof that the explosion was deliberate and authorized. The Russians do not dispute this, but merely reiterate their position as previously described. The Security Council begins its own investigation, and holds off all other action.

Days pass with the confusion unrelieved. The United States' failure to produce evidence of sabotage results in increasing skepticism about the charge against Russia. The belief that the explosion was an accident of some kind becomes widespread. By this time, the United States has concentrated its alert forces on the most isolated SAC bases, but has brought the remainder of SAC up to maximum readiness, short of 15-minute alert.

About two days after the explosion, two things happen. The CIA, at the President's direction, produces some framed evidence that the Russians produced the explosion. This evidence is strong, but not conclusive. Also made public are several letters which had been sent to newspapers before the Mobile explosion. They are signed by a person who had access to the SAC base at Mobile and who has disappeared. These are quack letters stating that the writer intends to cause an explosion to show the world how horrible it is, and to bring peace on earth. The FBI points out that the writer had been active in Communist front organizations some 15 years earlier.

At this point, it is clear that ambiguity about the motivation for the explosion, and about possible Russian responsibility, will never be resolved. The UN cannot take any action against the Soviet Union. The pressure against United States' alert procedures mounts.

It should be clear without going through the steps that, if the Soviet Union is even reasonably adroit, it can exploit the situation in such a way that the United States will have only two choices: it can let its guard drop, i.e., yield to the pressures to eliminate alert procedures and perhaps to accept inadequately-inspected nuclear disarmament agreements, or it can part company with its allies. If the United States drops its guard, then the next step depends on what the Soviet purpose has been. If the Soviet purpose was to soften us for attack, they have succeeded and can disarm the United States by a single counterforce surprise attack.

********

The second version of this game starts with a different response by the President to the Mobile explosion. This time he has the same information, but realizes that his claim of sabotage will be believed only if he acts as if he himself believed it. Unless he takes violent action against the killing of 50,000 Americans, people are apt to think that he did not believe the explosion was caused by the Russians at all. However, many people will not admit this, and would wish for him to take violent action.

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For six hours after the explosion, no announcement is made and the President does not accept calls from representatives of other countries. His decision is to fire a single missile with a megaton warhead at the Russian gaseous diffusion plant. (There is no city within the target area.) As the missile is fired, the President radios this fact to the Russians. He tells them that it is a single missile in response to their destructive act, and that it is only because he desires peace that he is not aiming at a target where one Russian will be killed for each American fatality at Mobile. The President says that he is requesting a UN Security Council meeting to consider the Russian action and to make steps to stop any future aggression. He tells the Russians that if they respond to the United States' missile, he will double any attack they make.

There are two essential elements in the course taken by the President. He must have no way of stopping his attack after he notifies the Russians -- otherwise, he faces the possibility that they will threaten to retaliate if he carries out his intention. Of course, once the missile is in the air, no threat the Russians make can stop it, and the President is able to make counterthreats. The Russian position is moved back to what it was before the first explosion, except that the President has demonstrated a willingness to respond to violence with violence.

The other essential element of the President's decision is that it has, in effect, presented the world with a pair of simultaneous explosions. The United States does not have to reject counsels of caution or self-restraint because it has acted before the counsels could be given. By the time the world has a chance to express itself, such counsels are no longer relevant.

The world is shocked, horrified, and frightened by the news, but the United States' claim that the Mobile explosion was caused by Russian sabotage is believed. It is the only psychologically-adequate rationalization for the two sets of smoking ruins. The world has to respond to the facts as it learns of them: the Russian destruction of Mobile with 50,000 Americans killed, followed by the American response of destroying a Soviet atom bomb factory with 5,000 Russians killed.

It is at this point that world attitudes toward Russia and the United States begin to pay off for the latter. Today, the United States suffers before world opinion because the world applies higher standards to American conduct than to that of Russia. In the two-explosion situation, the underlying respect for the United States encourages belief in the claim that the Mobile explosion was caused by the Russians.

(From the point of view of possible Russian response, the President's action may not be as dangerous as it seems. Since the President is responding to the Mobile explosion, his action does not represent the same problem to the Russians as would an unprovoked blow. They do not have to believe that there will be another blow next week if they "let

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him get away with this". There is little risk that the single missile accompanied by the radio broadcast will be mistaken for an all-out attack. Because the Russians acted first, and because they had taken ten lives for one, they are not under pressure to retaliatetheir own population or from the need to save face with the rest of the world.

(Interestingly enough, this is almost as true if the Mobile explosion was, in fact, an accident, so long as the Russians think the President actually believed it was Russian sabotage. They cannot believe that the United States staged the Mobile explosion. They know their denials will not be believed because they have cried "wolf!" too often. It is impossible for them to prove that the explosion was not caused by a Russian agent. As in the first game, the true facts about the cause of the explosion are irrelevant. The beliefs of the world are determined by the reaction of the United States.)

On the same day, the President requests a UN Security Council meeting at which the United States argues that the Russian conduct demonstrates the need for an enforceable arms control agreement, and that the key element is the elimination of secrecy. The United States argues that there should be no more hidden missiles or air bases, and that immediate UN overflights and on-the-spot inspection of all military activity should be initiated. The country gives subtle hints that it still feels itself to be the aggrieved party, and that there may be more unilateral action if the UN does not take a satisfactorily stiff line with Russia.

It is just possible that, in this situation, some useful arms control systems could be installed almost immediately. A very large number of inspectors in Russia would make up for defects in the plan caused by the haste with which it would be worked out. There is the possibility, however, that Russia might resist all pressure upon her. She would not be in the same situation as the United States was in the previous game, when the pressure was on the latter country. First of all, she need not be as concerned about her ability to retaliatela the United States is; second, she doesn't have to worry about allies; third, she does not have the same kind of threat from her own public opinion. If necessary, Russia can accept (and has in the past) a monumental unpopularity with the rest of the world. Although the Russians could exploit the break-up of Western alliances by taking over one country at a time, in the reverse situation, there is no way in which the West can exploit Russian unpopularity to reduce her present empire. By rejecting the world's demands for arms control and thus incurring world condemnation, the Russians lose only their present opportunities for profits -- they do not jeopardize their capital.

* * * * * * * * * *

Game Three starts in 1967. The United States and Russia have enforced an arms control agreement which limits each side to 500 missile warheads, 500 missiles (hardened, solid fuel and Polaris), 20 bombers, air defense, etc. This agreement provides for maximum practical inspection which, it

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is estimated, would prevent the concealment of more than 500 warheads. Inspection against weapons tests seems adequate, and inspection against the production of missiles, bombers or other weapons is about what could be expected; i.e., "big" things which cannot be camouflaged will be found, and "little" things, or things that can be made to look like something else, will be hidden.

China and other nations have been brought into the agreement, but effective inspection outside of the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR has not really begun. Throughout most of the world, the inspection authority has not had sufficient time and manpower to do the job. In China, it has been found impossible to establish control posts for a number of reasons. While the Chinese government has stated that it is cooperating, there have been a series of accidents, fires, riots, strikes, local guerilla wars, material shortages, transportation and communication breakdowns, and local criminal activity (muggings, murders, etc.). These, in combination with the size of the inspection authority's job as well as general inertia, have been responsible for the fact that large parts of China have not been adequately inspected.

China and Russia have continued to be allies. China, however, is increasingly dissatisfied with the fact that the United States and Russia have nuclear weapons and she does not. Russia has been devoting more and more of her production to consumer goods, while the Chinese government has had to become tougher and tougher to produce the industrialization it seeks. The Chinese leaders feel that Russia is becoming soft and bourgeois. They are afraid that, if a crisis should arise in the movement toward world Communism, Russia would side with the capitalists. However, despite of their increasing distrust, the Chinese have maintained warm relations with Russia because of the latter country's aid to China, as well as her historical position in the Communist movement.

For several years, China has been developing a propaganda campaign against the "white man's" arms control agreement which allows only white countries (i.e., the United States and the USSR) to have nuclear weapons. She wants permission for colored countries to produce an equal number of nuclear weapons, or an agreement between the United States and the USSR to completely destroy their nuclear weapons.

In several Asian and African countries, indigenous Communist-Nationalist groups have come into power over the past four or five years. These governments are not under the absolute control of Russia, but they are closely allied with international Communism. There is an intense undercover conflict between Russia and China for control of the Communist overseas empire, although the only apparent point of conflict between Russia and China is the Chinese objection to the white nuclear monopoly.

Russia and the United States have stood together against the elimination of nuclear weapons, and against the distribution of these weapons to other countries. They have argued that the weapons are a necessary safeguard to peace, and that their invulnerability and the growing trust between the two countries have eliminated the risks of accidental war.

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However, because of the pressure exerted by the colored nations, the United States and the USSR have each agreed to reduce their forces by ten missiles and warheads per year. They also have been willing to negotiate on the creation of an international force, without a veto, to take over the nuclear weapons. These negotiations have been proceeding very, very slowly.

The game starts with China's announcement that it has orbited a tiny satellite for scientific purposes, and that the satellite was launched with a new, small rocket which had been developed, built and tested in secrecy. The Chinese add that, since production costs of the rocket are slight, they will be glad to make them available at a low price to other countries for scientific purposes.

From information released by the Chinese, United States' and Russian experts judge that the rocket is too small and otherwise poorly adapted for effective use as an ICBM. However, it is fairly clear that, built in a larger size, the rocket could be used as a weapon. In addition, the experts indicate that the low cost of manufacture, together with present knowledge of the Chinese economy, suggests the possibility that the Chinese might have produced large numbers of full-size rockets.

Previously, the United States and Russia had been relatively relaxed about the failure of the arms control inspections in China. The two countries had believed that the Chinese were reluctant to admit outsiders into parts of China merely because of bad conditions there. (The regime was having to break a lot of eggs to make its omelette.) The United States and the USSR had figured that, even if the Chinese were developing atomic weapons, the latter did not have delivery capability. In addition, the United States and the USSR had felt safe because of the invulnerability of their missiles. After the launching of the missile is announced, the efforts to make an effective inspection in China are greatly intensified, but with no success. The Chinese government meets every request for cooperation with a protest against the "white monopoly".

The Soviet Union gets reports from its intelligence agents about great industrial activity in the area of China where inspection has completely failed. Two Soviet technical assistants in that area (the only ones) die of a strange disease.

Reports of a mass innoculation program begin to come out of China. Every Chinese is being innoculated with a special new serum. The program is being carried out in semi-secret. Government sources make vague statements about a multi-purpose disease prevention campaign, and indicate that the serum will be made available to the rest of the world as soon as enough has been produced for the Chinese.

The Russians receive intelligence reports that two factories in the uninspected area are producing large missiles. There are additional reports of an atomic weapon-producing complex in the area. Aerial photographs from satellites disclose that there are unexplained indus-

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trial facilities in the area, but do not reveal the nature of these
facilities.

The Russians ask the Chinese about the factories. The Chinese deny that the plants are producing weapons. They refuse to admit Russian inspectors, making it very clear that, as long as Russia tries to preserve its nuclear monopoly, China will not be receptive to inspection proposals.

Russia reveals privately to the United States its intelligence about the Chinese factories, and indicates that she is concerned about the possibility of the Chinese having or getting a substantial nuclear weapon capability. The Chinese have been acting very tough lately. This has not aroused many fears on the part of most people because of China's continued emphasis on the fact that she has no nuclear weapons and is at the mercy of the "white nuclear powers".

United States' concern about China is also great. It is based on China's hard line in international affairs, her secretly-developed missile capability, the possibility of biological warfare implied by her mysterious mass innoculation program, and her prevention of inspections, as well as the Soviet intelligence information (which, of course, like any clandestine intelligence, is not completely reliable).

The United States and the USSR agree to make one last effort to inspect the suspicious Chinese area and, if that fails, to force their way in. The United States is pleased at the degree of cooperation displayed by the Russians, but is not yet entirely unwary of Russian actions.

The last effort to get an inspection fails. Despite the veiled threats of the USSR and the United States, the Chinese refuse to discuss the difficulties the inspectors are having in reaching the suspicious area. They are willing to discuss only the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The team of inspectors trying to reach the suspicious area is killed by a rioting mob which clearly seems to have been inspired by Chinese Party agents.

The United States and the USSR announce that they jointly are going to fly in troops to inspect the suspicious area. The Chinese denounce this invasion of their sovereignty and threaten resistance. The United States and Russia launch a joint paratroop force to inspect the suspicious area. These forces are resisted by masses of poorly-armed Chinese troops. Members of these Chinese troops are killed by the thousands before the joint paratroop force can get to the mysterious industrial complex.

The United States' and Russian experts sent in with the troops discover that the factories are neither weapons plants nor atomic facilities of any kind. The plants are producing the serum and other materials for the mass innoculations, but there are no signs of biological warfare materials. The serum is, in fact, useful for disease prevention, although the wisdom of the mass-inoculation campaign may be doubtful.

The United States and the USSR are strongly condemned for their ruthless

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attack. The Chinese charges against the militaristic white nuclear
monopoly are strengthened by the death of the Chinese soldiers and the
proof of Chinese innocence. The pressure on the USSR and the United
States to destroy their missiles becomes intense. A UN resolution
urging this action is passed on a 80 - 2 vote, with ten abstentions.
The pro-Russian leaders of the Communist African and Asian countries
report privately to Moscow that their positions are becoming untenable,
that anti-Russians will overthrow them unless Russia yields to pressure
to get rid of its missiles.

The United States announces publicly that, if Russia will relinquish
its missiles, the United States will follow suit.

The Chinese privately meet with the Russians and say that, although the
Russians wronged them by their suspicions and their attack, the Chinese
stand ready to renew their friendship. The Chinese point out that they
and the Russians are both Communist countries with basically similar
interests, and that only the Russian insistence on a preferred position
with nuclear weapons divides them. China points out that, if the United
States and the Russians get rid of their missiles, the two Communist
countries need not fear the capitalists and thus will share the power
to dominate the world by combining China's missiles with the 50 warheads
the Soviets have hidden. (The Chinese had not been told of the hidden
warheads, but they correctly assume that the weapons exist.)

The Russians, because of their desire to maintain their position in
their African and Asian outposts, because of their hidden weapons,
because of Chinese pressure, and because over the years they have lost
some of their resolution, agree to give up their missiles.

The United States and the USSR destroy their official missiles and
warheads.

United States' weapons scientists report secretly that they have dis-
covered how to produce a pure fusion weapon. They are convinced that
it is possible and fairly easy to produce.

There are appreciable intervals separating the following events.

China takes over Japan by a combination of internal Communist Party action
and military force used on trumped-up provocation (on the style of Austria
and the Sudentenland in the thirties).

China demands representation on the international inspection teams in the
United States, the USSR and Europe. The UN passes a resolution approving
this proposal. The Chinese demand is met.

The Chinese announce a Plowshare program. They are going to explode under-
ground 50 nuclear weapons with yields in the megaton range to develop a new
ore field in China. They say they will make pure fusion explosions for any
nation needing them for peaceful purposes.

The world realizes that the Chinese have megaton weapons available to them.

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In the UN, the Chinese denounce racial discrimination. They say that the disproportionate share of the world's wealth held by the United States, Russia, and Europe is a denial of human equality, and propose an international equalization plan under which the rich countries would be required to transfer five percent of their GNP each year to raise the standard of living of the colored peoples. They say that rejection of this plan will be regarded as aggression against China.

There are rearmament proposals in the United States. China announces that any increases in armaments are a threat to the peace and an act of aggression. Two Chinese members of an arms inspection group are booed by an American crowd. The Chinese announce that they are sending protection for the inspection teams. A ship arrives with two divisions of Chinese troops and demands transportation to the inspection headquarters. They pitch camp in Central Park. At the same time, a similar force arrives in Russia to attend May Day celebrations.

The United States demands that the Chinese troops leave. The Chinese refuse. United States' troops arrive in New York.

A Chinese missile delivers multimegaton explosions high over Chicago and Moscow, producing one-half psi over the cities. This breaks many windows, etc., but does no great damage. The Chinese announce that the missiles were a mistake, that a training exercise had gone wrong. They offer to pay for the windows.

The Chinese and the United States' troops parade together down Fifth Avenue.

* * * * * * * * *

The arms control arrangement which is in force in the third game is one which might be entered into because each side thought as follows:

1. We want to be neither destroyed nor dominated.

2. The other side will destroy or dominate us if it can do so without substantial risk.

3. We cannot, at this time, alter the motivation of the other side.

4. We cannot expect to inspect so perfectly that we can prevent the other side from concealing enough power to inflict more damage than we can afford to risk.

5. We cannot expect the other side to weaken itself so that we will be able to destroy or dominate it with the safety we require.

6. The only feasible method of assuring that one is not destroyed or dominated is to maintain the power to inflict grievous injury on any attacker.

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7. We want our power to inflict injury (i.e., our deterrent) to be invulnerable. Our deterrent is necessary to us (per above) and if it is vulnerable, it may be destroyed. In addition, if it is vulnerable, we may have to make hasty choices between using it or taking big chances of losing it, and we will not be able to use it a little at a time if we so desire.

8. We want the other side's deterrent to be invulnerable because otherwise he may be frightened into using it by mistake. We are more confident that our deterrent will deter a man who has time to calculate than that it will deter a man who is afraid he will be disarmed if he doesn't attack.

9. We also want the other side to have an invulnerable deterrent. If he doesn't, his attempt to get one may make our deterrent more vulnerable. In other words, we are afraid of the technological race which results from our mutual fears that our deterrents are not adequate or will not remain adequate.

10. We also want to limit the absolute number of nuclear weapons in the world so that, if worst comes to worst and they are all used, the damage will be as low as possible.

11. In summary, we think that we will be better off than we are now if the role of nuclear weapons between East and West is limited to giving to each side the power to produce mutual mutilation.

If such a rationale is held by both the United States and the Soviet Union, it represents some common interest between them. A few comments about an arms control system of this kind may be in order.

First, it does not rely on trust. It is built on essentially the kind of thinking and assumptions current in this country now. Some people will think this good -- some will think this is bad.

Second, it has limited objectives. It is concerned almost entirely with reducing the likelihood of, and/or the damage from, a large-scale nuclear exchange, particularly as a result of an accidental war.

If one sees the limited mutual invulnerable deterrent system as an attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons (or at least strategic nuclear weapons) from the power calculations of the world, then one must recognize that, as such a system approaches perfection, it gradually returns the world to its position before July, 1945 -- a time when few people thought the world to be perfect.

Third, such an agreement may have effects on other aspects of the world political system, in addition to reducing the possibility of nuclear war. The United States now has a substantial ability to make an effective first strike. How safely we could do so is questionable, but it is likely that we could inflict more damage than we would suffer. Under

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the mutual invulnerable deterrents system, the first strike power of the United States would be lost. It can be argued that we will never strike first and will therefore lose nothing by giving up our first strike power. It can also be argued, however, that Russia and others cannot assume that we will not strike first -- and that the possibility of our striking first has had a calming effect on possible aggressive adventures.

Although the margin of our first strike advantage is decreasing as Soviet power to retaliation increases, it will never be reduced to the level involved in the arms control agreement of the last game. Furthermore, instead of hastening the reduction of our first strike threat, we have the alternative of increasing it by building up civil defense, making preattack mobilization preparations, etc.

On the other hand, a change from our present military posture, which seems to be designed primarily for a first strike, to a posture which is primarily designed for retaliation* would give the Russians less objective reason for concern about possible aggressive Western interests.

Although stabilizing the risks of a major nuclear exchange will certainly have a major effect on the likelihood of conventional war and on the possibility that the level of violence in limited wars will be increased, it is probably impossible to predict which way the effect will move. Particularly in the long run can no confident prediction be made. The best way to evaluate the effect of the agreement sketched here may be to ask what the situation would be if that bomb at Alamogordo had not worked. We still would be in a world which could not be confused with Heaven, even if it had been improved by the agreement on mutual deterrents.

Fourth, the way in which the agreement deals with the problem of other countries' nuclear weapons is not entirely satisfactory. There are basically two principles on which such an agreement could include other countries. One principle would allow other countries to have nuclear weapons as long as a sufficient balance could be preserved to cause mutual mutilation if the nuclear weapons were used. Such a balance of forces is harder to achieve with more than two powers. The alternative principle is that the United States and the USSR together would enforce nuclear disarmament on the part of the rest of the world, as they attempted in the third game.

*Of course, to some extent the weapons used for retaliation are the same as weapons used for a first strike. Furthermore, the concepts of first strike and retaliation are somewhat blurred by a middle category preemptive attack which essentially covers attacks made because an enemy nuclear attack is thought to be on the way or imminent. Very roughly, one can distinguish between a first strike attack and a preemptive attack by saying that the motivation for the former is primarily political and for the latter primarily military. Roughly, first strike capability can be distinguished from retaliatory capacity in that it can be used against enemy strategic forces instead of against cities and industries (numbers, deployment, plans, etc., affect this), and because it is more vulnerable and has slower command and control procedures. For example, liquid fueled missiles massed in one place above the ground are a significant first strike weapon, but have virtually no retaliatory importance because they can be so easily destroyed.

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The only physical protection held by a third country without nuclear weapons against the possibility of United States or Russian nuclear blackmail would be the hope that the other nuclear power would be willing to try to deter the blackmailer by the threat of limited retaliation, or the threat of ending the arms control agreement. This theoretical defenselessness would be galling to some countries, although there probably would be other kinds of sanctions which might protect them from Russian or United States nuclear blackmail.

In the third game, a high degree of cooperation was apparent between the United States and the USSR. This can be attributed in part to the stability of the mutual invulnerable deterrents system. It also could be the result of the cooperative efforts to effect the arms control agreement.

It seems fairly likely that an agreement for a major limitation on strategic weapons could be a "friendly" agreement -- an agreement in which there is not a great deal of underlying tension because the parties actually agree on the principle being implemented.

If the agreement is based on a level of inspection effort genuinely accepted by the Russians, the implementation need not involve much conflict. This is, indeed, quite a different situation than would exist if the treaty were designed to balance delicately two basically different concepts about the level of inspection. The Yalta agreement on Poland is an example of this latter kind of agreement; the basic intentions of the parties to that agreement were quite different, but, because they needed to agree, they found a formula which concealed their disagreement.

Because a major arms control agreement is significant only over a period of time and is not intended to serve solely as a means of ending a dispute, we should beware of these "delicate" agreements.

A Soviet willingness to fulfill fully and generously the inspection promises is perfectly consistent with a Soviet program to violate the agreement by concealing weapons. Inspection might be evaded in several cases. In one case, the evasion is theoretically impossible, but succeeds because the inspection system is so harassed and nibbled at that it doesn't work as well as it should. The other kind of evasion succeeds because it is basically immune to the inspection system. Such "immunity" might be possible because it relies on something that was not taken into account when the inspection system was designed, or because the parties implicitly decided that they could tolerate the amount of evasion which would be "immune" to the inspection system.

The arms control agreement in the third game was based on the judgment that the amount of cheating possible would not result in an unacceptable advantage to the cheater. This seems to be the most reasonable kind of agreement. Since it is not possible for an inspection system to be perfect, the simplest way to accept this fact is to allow a margin of error when making the agreement. For example, we might conclude that it is possible to effect an inspection system which would prevent the

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concealment of more than 100 megaton warheads. We might conclude further that we could afford the risks involved if the Russians had 50% more warheads than agreed upon. Therefore, we would meet the problem of uninspectibility by allowing the permitted forces to be no less than 200 warheads.*

Basically, the idea of establishing and maintaining a system of mutual limited invulnerable deterrents is a cooperative one. Each side would sign an agreement instituting such a system because it believes it would be better off if both sides had a limited invulnerable deterrent force. The common interest in mutual invulnerable deterrents which induces the parties to make the agreement in the first place may continue after the agreement has been put into effect. If this is the case, then both sides would want to protect the other side from losing its deterrent.

This seeming paradox may be clarified by supposing that, after such a system had been installed, the Soviets found a way to make our deterrent vulnerable.** It is possible that they would decide to use the new development to put themselves in a dominant position immediately. Since this course is full of risks, it is not likely to be an attractive one. On the other hand, if the Soviets decide not to try to take over by force right away, then they must be concerned about restoring the system of mutual invulnerable deterrents. They will recognize that the benefits of this system are lost unless something is done about the new development. The obvious answer is for them to meet with the United States, describe the new development, and work out modifications of the permitted weapons systems or the inspection system, so that mutual invulnerable deterrents are again possible.

A system of limited invulnerable deterrent forces probably must be designed in such a way that it is capable of developing. The agreement probably must have provision for a joint research and development program to find out how the invulnerable forces can be destroyed, how they can be made more effective, and how additional forces can be concealed. If possible, there should be limitations on secret research outside of the cooperative program. One of the advantages of the cooperative program is that it enables scientists who are essentially inspectors to work in a positive way -- in other words, to try to do something themselves instead of trying to find out if someone else is doing something. By working at the problem of breaking the system, the scientists not only will develop better ideas about what the inspectors should be looking for, but they may improve the system, as well.

*This example is obviously oversimplified. It is intended only to spell out the concept of accepting and taking into account the possibility of evasion.

**The word "invulnerable" has been used in a special way; i.e., as meaning "intended and thought to be invulnerable at the moment" or, as Herman Kahn says, "invulnerable by assumption". Reasonable prudence requires us to assume that any system which does not develop can be made vulnerable.

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If there were no cooperative research program, each country would feel
the need to keep up its weapons research capability by separate efforts
because of the long lead time required to start an effective program.
The work of these separate research programs would tend to reduce the
stability of the agreement.

It should not be necessary to make provisions in the original agreement
for the action to be taken on any results of the cooperative research
program. If both countries are aware of technological developments,
changes in the agreement may not be necessary, or appropriate amend-
ments can be agreed upon at the time. Often amendments will not be
necessary because there will be ways of countering the new develop-
ments. If one side knows that the other side is aware of a weapon
while it is in the research and development stage, it may not be
worthwhile to put the weapon into production.

The kinds of cooperation described above might have a significant
effect on United States-USSR relationships.

* * * * * * * * * *

The last part of this paper will consider further use of peace games
to help develop sound arms control proposals.

There are basically two problems in considering arms control systems:
"Where should we go and how can we get there?" The latter question has
not been considered in this paper. The former problem involves the
type of question for which the gaming technique is most useful. In
deciding what kind of arms control system to propose, one must first
ask the question: "How would countries act if a proposed arms control
system were in effect?" The gaming technique releases people's creative
and imaginative powers by placing them in a hypothetical situation and
asking them how they would react in this situation. When people are
asked such a question in a setting which encourages them to identify
themselves with their role and requires that they try to look at things
only from their own point of view, they are much more productive than
when they are asked "What would X do?" -- particularly since, if the
second question is asked, people then quickly shift from thinking about
X's viewpoint to thinking about Y's and then to Z's, etc.

The process of determining how people will react in various arms control
situations should not be regarded as solely a negative one. The players
do not have to act in a narrowly self-interested, or militaristic way.
In organizing the game, a player can start with any attitude which the
country he is representing might have. For example, a particular game
might be played twice, once with a "malevolent" Russia and once with a
"benevolent" Russia.

There are several suggestions of a procedural nature which I would make,
if the gaming technique is to be used seriously. First, a reasonable
amount of time should be made available between moves for the players
to give some thought to their actions. Second, each player should

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determine a strategy, attitude or approach before the game begins, so that actions represent part of a pattern and are not made just because of a desire to keep busy. The players should not reveal their strategies to each other, except to the extent that they would be revealed objectively. In other words, all statements of intention should be made by the players "in character".

Third, care should be taken that objective facts are stated separately to the extent that they would be known, if they were real. Thus, where a player's move is to deliver a speech which makes an assertion, he must separately state the true fact to any of the players who would be able to know this fact. For example, if one of the players is the European public and Russia makes a speech saying that she has just fired 30 missiles at the moon, the person playing Russia would have to tell the United States whether or not the missiles were fired, because the United States could (I assume) get that information.
"Russia" would not step out of character to tell the "European public" because the European public has to get its information from statements by entities who are represented in the game. Of course, "nature" must say what the newspapers and other sources of information not represented by players would reveal about the facts.

It should be recognized that gaming can be used as a technique for teaching or convincing as well as for learning or studying. If one wishes to demonstrate the probability of certain reactions to proposed arms control systems, a person can be invited to play the key role and discover for himself why the proposal would have the predicted effects. The experience of participating in some games may be very convincing. It is possible, however, to convince people of things that are not true, so one must watch closely for signs that a particular game is giving a misleading impression.

Despite its problems and limitations, I think that gaming is a technique which should be used widely in thinking about and discussing arms control proposals, both by "professionals" who are seriously working on new ideas or actual proposals, and by "amateurs" who are thinking about arms control as interested members of the public.

## Principal Participants in Peace Games:

<table><tr><td>A. Barber</td><td>R. Herbst</td></tr><tr><td>G. Bing</td><td>N. Hoepli</td></tr><tr><td>D. Brennan</td><td>H. Kahn</td></tr><tr><td>R. Coward</td><td>D. Kybal</td></tr><tr><td>R. Donohue</td><td>G. Quinn</td></tr><tr><td>B. Feld</td><td>H. Rowan</td></tr><tr><td>M. Gore</td><td>M. Singer</td></tr><tr><td>A. Hadley</td><td>W. Smith</td></tr><tr><td>M. Halperin</td><td></td></tr></table>

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SHORTCOMINGS OF A STABILIZED NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Jay Orear

Those of us who are working toward the goal of a stabilized nuclear deterrent consisting of small, balanced, invulnerable second strike forces should be well aware of the grave dangers inherent in such a military posture. Although these dangers are clearly less than the dangers inherent in the present situation, the dangers of a stabilized nuclear deterrent are so great that they should not be ignored or under-rated. I have the uneasy feeling that most of the discussions and writings of the Summer Study on Arms Control have not given adequate attention to these dangers. I am suggesting that our sense of perspective and approach to the stabilized nuclear deterrent has been unbalanced. This may be excusable when talking to ourselves, but it is not excusable when presenting our case to the public or to the Russians. Some of the dangers inherent in a stabilized nuclear deterrent posture that I feel merit further discussion and study are:

1. Possibility of a major nuclear war. This is discussed in detail below.

2. The 4th nation problem. As long as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. still retain nuclear forces, nations such as China, France, and Germany may feel they also deserve nuclear weapons. China, in particular, may set out on its own to produce nuclear weapons. Even with a stabilized nuclear deterrent, China may emerge in the next 10 to 20 years as the major military power armed with nuclear weapons.

3. Capability for rapid nuclear remobilization. In a period of crisis, an all-out remobilization could increase nuclear forces by an order of magnitude in a matter of months. One advantage of an arms-control scheme involving elimination of the nuclear stockpiles, is that a much longer time would be required to produce new plutonium and U235.

4. Increase in small wars. The instabilities and uncertainties in the present situation tend to deter various military conflicts that might otherwise break out.

## Possibility of major nuclear war

Attempts to predict the probability of a major nuclear war in the next 10 years may be compared to the Chinese method of determining the height of the emperor. To this end, I circulated a questionnaire to our group on 6 July and have received 16 responses. In general, the estimated probabilities of a major war were alarmingly high. The median of the estimates of a major war assuming no arms control was 40 per cent for the next 10-year period. The corresponding figure assuming a stabilized nuclear deterrent was 15 per cent. This figure of 15 per cent, if true, is still dangerously high, especially if we are interested in more than the next 10 years. It is interesting that our group (which predominantly favors a stabilized nuclear deterrent) estimated that a stabilized nuclear deterrent would reduce the probability of war only by about a factor of two

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over the no arms-control situation. In proposing a stabilized nuclear deterrent we should at the same time point out that a factor of two is not enough and that we should continue to strive for more.

The group felt the major cause of war with the stabilized nuclear deterrent was the "bluffing problem". Let me give two timely examples. Suppose right now both sides had balanced invulnerable second strike forces, and then due to further Cuban provocations, the United States imposed a naval blockade around Cuba which resulted in the firing on Cuban ships. Then the U.S.S.R. would be morally obligated to live up to its promise to attack the United States with rockets. To go back on its word would be a loss of face to the Soviet Union.

In the second example, suppose the new President of the United States tried another U-2 flight (Nixon has advocated further U-2 flights) and the U.S.S.R. responded by bombing out the overseas base from which it took off. Then according to the very explicit commitment of Secretary Gates, the United States is morally obligated to an all-out attack on the U.S.S.R. These two examples are just two sets of threats and counterthreats which occured in a period of two months. We can expect many more in the next 10 or 20 years. There may be situations where one side feels forced to "call the bluff" of the other side. If the other side was not bluffing, the big war could easily be set off. One recent example illustrating the seriousness of Communist threats was the Chinese threat to enter the Korean War if we should cross the 38th parallel. We made the mistake of calling this "bluff" with dire consequences that very easily could have led to all-out war.

These examples illustrate why the probability of nuclear war resulting from "bluff calling" and "nuclear blackmail" is still too high even with a stabilized nuclear deterrent. In addition, nuclear war could still result from the growth of small war, or from accidental causes, e.g., a Polaris submarine commander decides on his own to "save" America.

I feel that the reduction of probability of war resulting from a stabilized nuclear deterrent is not so much due to improvement in the physical and strategic situation as it is improvement in the political climate. I believe arms-control agreements can be not only the effect, but also the cause of relaxation of tensions. If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should succeed in working together to the large extent necessary to obtain a stabilized nuclear deterrent, I feel that the mutual trust and goodwill developed in the process would in itself reduce probabilities of war. In other words, to first order of approximation it is not the stabilized nuclear deterrent posture which would save us, but the act of obtaining it. Perhaps it is not too important just what we obtain, as long as it is something substantial and to the mutual advantage of both sides. In concentrating our group's attention on the physical details of the stabilized nuclear deterrent, I feel we tend to be missing the forest for the trees. Such concentration on the strategic and military pros and cons can force us into too rigid a position. We must always keep in mind that our goal is not a stabilized nuclear deterrent, but the prevention of major war. More explicitly, we want to minimize the most probable number of lives lost. The quantity to minimize is the product of probability of war, times expected amount of life lost in such a war. Our goal should not be stability.

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In fact, too much stability can be a dangerous thing. We should not fear increased probability of war, if at the same time the number of people killed would be decreased even more. The considerations of complete disarmament should not be discarded merely by commenting that it might be less stable than a stabilized nuclear deterrent posture.

My main personal reasons for supporting the stabilized nuclear deterrent are that it is something substantial (but not so substantial as to be unobtainable) and that in itself it is to the mutual advantage of both sides. However, if the Russians should propose something else that is also substantial and to our mutual advantage, I would support that also. Serious study should be given to the June 2 Soviet disarmament proposal to see how easily it can be modified to meet these requirements.

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### III. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION ON STABILIZED DETERRENCE AS ONE STAGE OF A GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT PROGRAM

#### A. Discussion of July 25, 1960

Sohn has pointed out that, although they have many advantages, deterrents are subject to some of the same dangers as an unrestricted arms race, e.g., the possibility of an attack resulting from psychotic behavior or accident. Thus, in his opinion, stabilized deterrence should be looked upon as a stage along the way to a general and complete disarmament agreement. In such a capacity, stabilized deterrents provide 1) a possible way to stop the arms race, 2) a means for keeping the balance of power during a period when conventional forces are being drastically reduced under a disarmament agreement, 3) a trial period for building up inspection and control measures which would help develop confidence that a general disarmament agreement could work.

As a jumping-off point for a disarmament agreement, Feld listed two main points to be considered. First, certain types of weapons would be eliminated entirely; second, force levels would be reduced. This might be very difficult to negotiate without first achieving certain political settlements (Berlin, Congo, Cuba) and agreement on ground rules, e.g. for U-2 and RB-47 flights. As far as fixing force levels is concerned, it must be recognized that Soviet secrecy is maintained partially to cover up the fact that they have fewer weapons than they want us to think. Therefore, an agreement should specify what the force levels will be at a certain specified time after the agreement goes into effect, but need not require a census of weapons at the time the agreement is negotiated. The time scale for the institution of measures up to the "jumping-off point" for a disarmament agreement--the phasing and sequence--is very important.

The aim of the initial steps of a disarmament agreement, according to Feld and Smullin, is to choose the path which will minimize insecurity the fastest with cost a secondary factor. This path may or may not reverse the steps by which the military build-up was achieved. Insecurity, it should be noted, is affected by anticipated increases in strength, such as the Polaris system on the horizon, as well as actual strength. These anticipated increases of strength by the other side might increase the probability of war through the possibility of a pre-emptive attack.

If a nuclear deterrence system is set up as one of the first stages of a disarmament agreement, it is not clear that this would represent a deterrent to limited war in Europe. For this reason, Milburn suggested that it is at least worth considering the possibility of banning conventional (or tactical nuclear) weapons first before trying to limit the number of strategic nuclear weapons. Feld thought that an agreement by the U.S. and the Soviet Union (assuming China has no nuclear weapons) to forego first use of nuclear weapons should come first. This worried Halperin because he felt that it gave up a deterrent to limited war in Europe and perhaps even the possibility of winning such a war if it should start.

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A serious road-block to the achievement of stabilized deterrence starting from our present military posture is that we must have a period of "controlled armaments build-up" which will probably meet with considerable public opposition, *Smullin* pointed out. Sohn agreed that we must present to the world a disarmament proposal which is so attractive that we will gain the moral support of world public opinion. Feld thought that this problem might be solved by careful phasing out of our old weapons as new ones are added, i.e., by removing one division of SAC when a Polaris squadron is made operational.

It is clear that when we move to stabilized deterrence with a minimum number (*Feld* favors something like 100) of missiles, a doctrine of response in limited war situations will be essential. Kahn has made clear the need for further thinking in this direction by suggesting that we will not retali ate against Russia with nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on Europe. Sohn's answer to the problem of limited war would be to cut conventional armies to the bone after achieving stabilized deterrence and to replace them by an international force large enough to cope with nearly any limited outbreak but not large enough to attack a major power. It would be necessary to scale down the national armies until the international force becomes the dominant conventional force. It is not absolutely necessary that the proposed international force be larger than all of the national conventional armies since it could join one side or the other against the aggressor of the moment in order to keep the balance of power. It is clear that the problem of handling small conflicts is an important one and that stabilized deterrents do not provide a real answer to the limited war problem. Our doctrine of response would have to include specific plans for countering such actions as Chinese troops pouring into Tibet, another Hungary, intervention in Cuba, etc. It is an open question whether we can rely on our deterrents to hold off war long enough so that the military has sufficient time to prepare for fighting a limited conventional war. Any disarmament scheme we envisage ought to include some type of controls on limited war to prevent escalation into a general war and the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Feld feels that his agreement foregoing first use of nuclears is a big step in the right direction.

*Smullin* thought that much of this discussion was contrary to his concept of expediency. He pointed out that most engineers realize that very pessimistic assumptions about a particular scheme may lead to the conclusion that the scheme is practically impossible. If there is some possibility that an optimistic model may be correct, it is much more efficient to take the chance and try it. He felt that the model of Russia as purely predatory may not be correct and that if we want disarmament we should at least give them the opportunity to show their good faith. *Coward* pointed out that Russian acquiescence to a stabilized deterrence system might be partial evidence of this. *Feld* summed up by saying that we should proceed on the assumption that the US is really interested in disarmament and that we want to persuade the Russians of this. We are not certain about their honesty, however, so we still need to retain a guarantee against their taking us over. A deterrent system would provide this and if coupled with inspection could lead to a substantial increase in mutual trust.

Looking ahead to the end point in a period of general disarmament, Sohn expressed his belief that the political structure of the world might have to

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be quite different. New institutions would be needed to deal specifically with political problems at such a time. International courts would probably not be sufficient for that purpose.

## B. Discussion of July 26, 1960

Feld suggested the following points which might be covered by an agreement.

1. The limitation and/or elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. Some agreement on limited war forces.

3. The removal of nuclear weapons from overseas bases.

4. An agreement that neither side will use nuclear weapons first in a conflict.

5. Control of the production of weapons.

6. Agreement that after x years there will be no tactical nuclear weapons.

7. Agreement limiting conventional forces.

Hadley expressed the concern that a nation that was losing a high explosive type war might become willing to use nuclear weapons in spite of any such agreement. Kalkstein suggested that a low level be set on conventional weapons, and Sohn suggested a level of 500,000 or even 300,000 troops in this area. It was Brennan's feeling that in the symmetrical use of nuclear weapons, the U.S. would be at a disadvantage.

Sohn suggested the following typology for the factors involved in an arms control agreement.

### A. Types of limited war:

1. Between two big powers

2. Between a big power and a small power

3. Between two small powers (with big power support)

4. Between two small powers (without big power support)

### B. Types of power:

1. Air

2. Sea

3. Land

### C. Types of weapons:

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1. Missiles (and outer space)

2. Nuclear

3. Conventional

D. Types of usage:

1. Aggressive

2. Defensive

C. Discussion of July 28, 1960

Feld opened the discussion on an "Agreement for Complete Disarmament--Stages for 1963-1965" with a number of points for consideration.

1. We should consider what would be the most appropriate jumping-off point for an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

2. The agreement, by concentrating on second strike capability with reliable, and mobile or hardened weapons should attempt to provide a situation in which both sides would feel some degree of security in the stabilized-deterrence situation.

3. In view of this large measure of security the agreement would not require in the first stage a complete disclosure of all armaments or a comprehensive inspection system.

4. Some assurances could be given through the unilateral action that there is no danger of a first strike, and the danger of pre-emptive action could thus be removed.

5. We should also set up some reasonable limit on conventional armaments, although keeping some limited war capability.

6. At the same time we should aim for a military posture which foregoes the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war.

7. Without Soviet assistance, China is unlikely to have a nuclear capacity before 1970. However, we should find some method of bringing China into the agreement.

8. We should consider the possibility of the introduction of an international force in order to enforce the agreement.

Phelps noted that the military has always used the argument that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was militarily useful especially against such nations as China. It is unlikely that they would come quickly to the point of view in which they readily gave up the use of nuclear weapons. Feld, however, suggested that such an agreement might well force the military to provide other limited war capabilities and Sohn added that military arguments usually do not consider situations in which conventional forces are also limited.

Melman expressed concern over the possible continuance of the arms race within the framework of an arms control agreement with stabilized deterrence. It was

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his feeling that such an agreement would do little to bring out the long term
change in the way of thinking needed to effect disarmament. It might mean the
continuance of an unstable situation with great pressures to find gaps in
fences and to attain leads over the opposing side. He proposed that we at-
tempt to develop an alternative strategy--one of inspected arms control orien-
ted toward complete disarmament and the building up of supra-national loyal-
ties. The objective of this program would be to encourage long-term changes
and movements away from the present war-making postures, institutions, atti-
tudes, etc. In response to a question by Milburn, Melman said that he felt
that the time period involved in this was not important but that we should
start immediately since the longer the delay the more unstable the situation
becomes.

**Bohn** suggested that the real problem in the deterrent situation is that it is
aimed at influencing the leaders and decision-makers while the consequences
of using nuclear weapons would affect the general public more than the leaders.
We might give some thinking to a method of more accurately aiming the deter-
rence at the decision-makers themselves. A possible method of doing this might
be by labeling the use of nuclear weapons as a crime which merited massive re-
bellion on the part of the people whose leaders were guilty of the crime.

**Bloomfield** felt that it was very difficult to separate peoples from their
government. At many points in history we have attempted to take this possibil-
ity entirely too seriously. In fact it is not possible to circumvent govern-
ments in attaining any agreement.

**Sohn** noted that there were two methods of approach which might be taken in
disarmament. We might cut out certain types of weapons or we might attempt to
cut all arms by proportional amounts. Clark and Sohn have suggested a 10%
cut as being large enough to be meaningful but not so large that cheating
would prove damaging. The importance of timing is pointed up by Bolté's scheme
for quick and substantial cuts, the speed providing momentum while allowing
no time to devise evasions. Proportional cuts might also well be accompanied
by territorial withdrawal and/or inspection. Other questions which we must con-
sider are: First, whether a preliminary census is feasible and necessary; it
is undoubtedly necessary but the feasibility presents problems. Second, prob-
lems of inspection, including enforcement against violators and compensation
for abuse of power by the inspectors.

**Melman** suggested that the following criteria be used in evaluating possible
disarmament agreements.

1. The workability and reliability of the agreement.

2. Cost.

3. Is a meaningful reduction in military capability to be expected?

4. The effect of the agreement on the reduction of tensions.

5. The effect of the inspection system upon internal security and upon
the possibility of evasion.

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A possible inspection scheme, according to Sohn, would be to have each country divide its area into five separate zones. At each of five different stages the other country could choose one of the five zones and be allowed to thoroughly inspect that area. This is the "You cut the pie, I choose" approach. Brennan suggested that such a scheme might be bought from the Russians by offering a genuine program of complete disarmament. While one side might attempt to shift all evasion into the areas remaining uninspected, comprehensive production control over a wide spectrum of facilities, and special reconnaissance efforts on the day of choice of the zone would minimize the possibility of success in this.

Melman said that it was hard to speculate on developments four or five steps into a disarmament plan. The success of initial steps should bring about some change in atmosphere. It is also true that the Russians would use any disarmament system to advance their own interests (e.g. using freed industrial plants to supply goods to underdeveloped areas). We must recognize this in making the agreement and realize that it is concerned with safety and not with solving the cold war problems except through incidental by-product effects.

The closed nature of Soviet society makes the determination of their motives very difficult, said Smullin. If two men sit behind black curtains with revolvers pointed at one another and then agree to each lay down their weapons, whether one really lays down his depends upon his assumptions concerning the motives of the other. If we cannot trust each other, said Bohn, perhaps we can establish a third body, trusted by both sides, to supervise some continuing agreement.

Feld noted that the force working on both sides to press them towards arms control is the threat of accidentally getting involved in an atomic war. With such a motivation, it is likely that the first steps evolving from this will work directly upon this threat. Further steps would stem from a continuing feeling of uneasiness. These inducements should be accelerated if at all possible.

The problem of inducement seems crucial, said Bloomfield, since at this time the Soviet Union does not seem to be really desirous of significant disarmament agreements. One of the problems we face is of drawing up plans for the time here and now when agreement seems impossible, while these plans probably are not applicable to the time in the future, near or far, in which agreement is possible. The Russians may be deriving some satisfaction in our anxiety, suggested Milburn, since this is an old and familiar tool used to keep the West off balance. If the Soviets feel no anxiety, on the other hand, the clinical example of being unable to get far with a patient satisfied with his present condition suggests that we are unlikely to get anywhere with them on disarmament.

An agreement might cover a number of different types of force, said Sohn, such as military, economic, domestic control, etc. Even if military force is eliminated, tension may find its outlet in other types of force which must be coped with. Feld agreed that we must consider the dangers which might arise in a completely disarmed world. A solution to many of these problems may be

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found in an international force. This in itself, however, raises a number of
difficulties. Nevertheless, said Bohn, it is unlikely that we can get along
without it.

What is aggression is determined by a subjective test, Sohn noted. Our objectives in putting the determination of aggression into the hands of an international force is to put this test outside the competence of the conflicting parties. In the world which we contemplate under disarmament, a number of sources of present tension, such as foreign bases, would be eliminated. A more difficult type of disorder which must be coped with is the problem of civil war and the handling of subversion. Hadley suggested that a good reference on the subject of the powerless state was Bennett's book, The Nemesis of Power. Brennan suggested that the control of a number of these problems, however, did not require a very high level of arms and that we could safely assume that disarmament need not go below this level. This concluded the discussion of possible complete disarmament schemes.

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ACS-5

6/23/60

SEMINAR: The Case For and Against General and Complete Disarmament

SPEAKERS: Tom Schelling, Philip Noel-Baker and Don Brennan

## Introductory remarks by Mr. Noel-Baker

There will never be any arms control until there is drastic disarmament. Two basic propositions shall first be stated:

1. The arms race has been the most important single factor in foreign affairs for the past seventy years. It caused the First World War and was really the beginning of the Second World War.

2. In all this time, there has been an active conflict between those who believe in disarmament and those who believe that arms are essential for the safety of the nation.

(Following immediately was a historical review of disarmament conferences, beginning with the one called by the Czar of Russia in 1899. This material can be found in the first chapters of Philip Noel-Baker's *The Arms Race*. This summary will concern itself with additional comments and a reiteration of the most important points made relevant to the current situation.)

When the British drew up a disarmament treaty in 1932, the support of almost the entire nation was realized. However, there was strong opposition to the 1932 treaty by three groups of people: (1) many members of the general staff; (2) vested interests and arms firms; and (3) amateur and literary strategists and, most dangerous of all, the academic strategists. Lots of people find armaments fascinating to a very high degree. Regarding the more recent history of disarmament talks, one of the most difficult problems, which has been emphasized especially by Jules Moch, has been the question of secret atomic stockpiles. However, in 1954, the Anglo-French memorandum was accepted by the Russians as a basis for further efforts toward disarmament. This memorandum included (1) regulation, limitation and major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments; (2) the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons to peaceful purposes; and (3) the establishment of effective international control through a control organ with rights, powers, and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of the agreed reductions of all armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and to insure the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

During the early part of 1955, the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission reconvened to work out the problems posed by the above memorandum. There were serious and fundamental differences in the subcommittee on the specific means of attaining the agreed general objectives of full disclosure, inspection, control and safeguards. However, on May 10, 1955, the USSR representative presented a plan which, for the first time, used ideas and language similar to views put forward by the Western Powers. The West did not respond to this but, instead, at the

195

Summit Meeting in the summer of 1955, proposed the Open Skies plan.
Finally, the original Western proposals were withdrawn, presumably because
the question of the secret stocks was a stumbling block which could not be
surmounted.

In Mr. Noel-Baker's opinion, Russia had good historical reasons to be sus-
picious of the West. (An example would be the West's attempt to suppress
the Bolshevik Revolution.) The fact that we did not pursue our own pro-
posals in the May, 1955 meetings made them question whether the West really
desired disarmament at all.

Since 1955, Khrushchev has been very serious about disarmament because, after that point, he was firmly in the saddle. Partial disarmament plans were introduced between 1955 and 1960 with little success or expectation of success. At the same time, the arms race has gained incredible momentum. In 1940, the U.S. military research budget was $25 million; by 1953, it was $1,700 million, and by 1960, it was $8,400 million. In the period of the last five years, since we have abandoned proposals for comprehensive disarmament, missiles, chemicals and biological weapons have become respectable.

The question of secret stocks still remains one of the main stumbling
blocks, but Noel-Baker feels that Moch's present plan of the abolition
of the means of delivery should provide sufficient guarantee to permit a
treaty. Nevertheless, we should work to convert nuclear stocks to peaceful
purposes.

Mr. Noel-Baker then proceeded to quote from a speech given by Mr. Stanley
Baldwin in 1925, the year after he became Prime Minister:

"Our civilization will fall, with as great a shock as that of
Rome, if there should ever be another world war."

Mr. Noel-Baker then concluded his formal talk by saying:

"I'm not sure (civilization) hasn't been destroyed already . . .
The Second World War was far more degraded and degrading than
the first one. We had gas, but we didn't have gas chambers;
we had the sort of cruelty that goes with all-out heroism,
but we didn't have concentration camps. We had espoinage and
treason and execution, but we didn't have torture chambers,
the thumbscrew and the rack . . . six million people in gas
chambers . . . We had millions of German prisoners in our
hands. We didn't kill them, we didn't take reprisals against
them; but, today we're saying if anyone is attacked by conven-
tional or other means . . . we shall retaliate by using weapons
which will kill hundreds of millions of people. Nearly all of
these will be civilians - women and children who, by our own
reasoning, have probably no responsibility for the actions
their governments have taken. I think that is the destruction
of the whole morality upon which our civilization is built; and
I don't believe we shall ever get back to civilized thinking
again until we have faced the problem of disarmament, and over-
come the people who still resist it, and make the general treaty
which I believe is required."

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A brief discussion followed Mr. Noel-Baker's remarks. Mr. Smithies asked whether Mr. Noel-Baker did not feel that the period 1932-1939 could be used as evidence that ineffective attempts at disarmament could lead to war. He suggested that if the United States had been more fully armed in this period the Second World War might have been averted. Mr. Noel-Baker felt that, in spite of the fact that the U.S. could be blamed for not joining the League, the U.S. actually supported many League measures, and that the onus should fall largely on Britain. U.S. oil companies, he pointed out, were ready and willing to impose sanctions on Mussolini for his aggression in Ethiopia, while Britain opposed this. He admitted that, had the British General Staff been as quick as Hitler to accept a modern concept of war, this would have had an important deterrent effect.

Returning to the topic of the disarmament talks with the Russians in 1955, Mr. Cavers suggested that, if the Soviets had really changed their policy after May 10, 1955, and wanted to negotiate in spite of our heel-dragging, they could have pressed their point harder than they did. Noel-Baker conceded that the Pentagon had a strong case at the time for being suspicious of Russian intentions. The intransigence of the North Koreans toward the truce inspectors and the evidence that the "neutral" inspectors themselves were not free from bias, as well as the year-old Dienbienphu incident, formed part of the grounds for this suspicion of Russian good faith. Nonetheless, Noel-Baker believes that it was a great mistake not to continue negotiations in 1955 with the aim of probing the Soviet position a bit further. One indication of sincerity he mentioned was that, after May 10, there was a marked temperance in place of the strongly abusive language the Russians liked to hurl at the United States. Mr. Noel-Baker concluded that, while in 1955 there was good reason for caution, we may very well lose Asia if we don't come up with a positive disarmament proposal soon. He said that he was beginning to hear people saying in England "... it's a great pity the President is resolved to stop both the test agreement and anything about disarmament". He warned that "if that (sort of thing) is heard around the House of Commons, it will soon be heard elsewhere."

Barber wanted to know Mr. Noel-Baker's opinion of an international police force to preserve law and order among nations in a world of general disarmament. Noel-Baker replied that he thought such a police force was worthwhile, but that a disarmament program should not be made contingent upon the inclusion of a workable police force. He suggested that an international police force might be made up of men and officers recruited primarily from the small nations. The point was emphasized that, within the last 70 years or so, arms races have always led to war. Although wars have become many times more terrible in modern times, he felt it significant that they have also become less frequent and more difficult to set off. The greatest part of the human race, he said, has already renounced war.

Brennan stated that he agreed with a number of the points Mr. Noel-Baker had made, but that he would like to list a few reasons why he was still dubious about the idea of general and complete disarmament, even if it could be ascertained that the Soviets are sincere in wanting it. First, Brennan recognized that, even if the United States and Russia disarmed, we would still have to face the problem of aggression by other nations. The Russians have suggested privately that the United States and Russia might deal with this problem by pooling the police forces which they

197

keep for internal security to respond to outside aggression. Still, there
are possible situations analogous to Berlin and Korea for which (a) a
"police force" might be inadequate, and (b) Russia might not want to cooper-
ate with us (in fighting the army of one of her satellites, for example),
and a "baseball-bat" war would be very difficult for the United States to
win. Mr. Noel-Baker agreed that there were serious problems, but pointed
out that there were types of problems which do not demand a military or
police type of solution; the Berlin airlift, which was Mr. Noel-Baker's
idea, is an example of this. If Russia disarmed, Mr. Noel-Baker is
convinced, the East Germans, Hungarians, and Poles would give up their
Communist governments and renounce any aggressive designs. The union of
Germany, he believes, would help greatly toward lasting peace in Europe.

Smithies found it hard to believe that, if disarmament results in the
dissolution of the Soviet satellite empire, Russia could favor it. Noel-
Baker said that he had become convinced, in part through a personal inter-
view with Khrushchev himself, that Khrushchev might be willing to make even
this concession, knowing that the dangers of the arms race are paramount.
There was a rumor among diplomats, he said, that, before the U-2 incident
came along, Khrushchev was preparing at the summit to agree to keep hands
off Berlin for two years in exchange for substantial progress on disarma-
ment. Khrushchev's post-summit speeches in East Germany were, in fact,
surprisingly unprovocative. More recently, in a speech in Rumania,
Khrushchev came out in flat disagreement with China's aggressive policy
toward the West and in favor of peaceful coexistence. Mr. Noel-Baker
admitted that one apparent difficulty with nuclear disarmament has been
thought to be the Russian manpower advantage. This, he feels, is not as
bad as it seems, if we add up the manpower resources not only of the United
States, but also of England, Canada, the European countries, the free
nations of Asia, etc.

Schelling argued that, if Khrushchev was as bright and as sincere as Mr. Noel-
Baker seemed to be saying, there was no need for him to meet with Eisenhower
to arrange disarmament. He could take some unilateral actions in this
direction to show his good intentions, to which we could respond. After all,
it was Khrushchev who started the arms race by permitting the outbreak of
the Korean conflict. Barber wanted some more explicit indications of what
some of these unilateral actions might be. Mr. Noel-Baker said, in defense
of Khrushchev's actions, that (1) he won't stop the arms race until he is
sure that we will, (2) he has stopped major provocations in recent years,
and (3) he has avoided a number of potential minor provocations. He did
nothing to intervene on Cyprus. He has been unsympathetic with any Chinese
attempts to provoke the Algerian rebels and a number of other things. The
question as to what to do about Formosa was mentioned, and Mr. Noel-Baker
said that one of the principle difficulties was that Formosa was used as a
large United States base. He suggested that perhaps handing over Formosa
to the Chinese might not be too great a price to pay for the peace of the
world, if this were the only way the problem could be settled.

Schelling said he felt it might be important to consider the kinds of
military strategy which would be contemplated in a totally disarmed world,
and other peculiar difficulties arising from a stateless international
decision-making military force. In a disarmed situation, would a non-
nuclear power armed only with "baseball bats" be tempted to provoke a
quick conventional war to subdue a richer nation before it could begin
nuclear rearmament? Feld and a number of others agreed that this was an

198

important question and envisaged particular dangers in an international police force which is stronger than any individual country. *Brennan*, however, felt that the design of an international police force was not as difficult as it might appear, but that without a police force the problems of a disarmed world would be much more difficult to analyze. *Feld* compared the disarmed world with police force-type of situation to problems of the hierarchy of police authority in the United States. Eisenhower should have had very little question that he could send the National Guard into Little Rock to bring order, but, in practice, the situation turned out to be an uncertain one at best, and Eisenhower was hesitant. Such problems are magnified if you contemplate an international police force which would have disciplinary authority in a complex and homogeneous world of many countries and cultures. *Brennan* indicated that the problem as to who should control an international police force is a tough one. The police force must remain effective, but cannot be allowed to get out of hand. Someone suggested that a single force is not enough. It might be desirable to have two balanced forces. *Schelling* remained dubious about the kind of sanctions that could be imposed on an aggressor in a disarmed world. He fears that military strategy is no simpler, and might, in fact, be considerably more complex in a disarmed world with an international security force. *Brennan* disagrees that the military problems of a security force would be as complex as Schelling thinks. Brennan feels that the principal problems would be bilateral, at least on a short time scale, although long-term multilateral problems could arise.

It was *Smithies'* impression that a completely disarmed world could not remain just like the present world in political organization. He noted that *Khrushchev's* four-year disarmament plan anticipated no political changes during this period. Smithies feels that complete disarmament could not be achieved in an atmosphere of competition between Communist and Western countries. *Feld* proposed that enough forces be left in each of the five or so major nations for internal security, but that the balance be such that three out of five large nations would have to get together to force a major change upon a single one of them. *Kalkstein* then brought up the possibility that three nations might agree to "gang up" in aggression against one of the others.

*Schelling* thought that it was worthwhile to consider whether the arms control study would pursue this question of a disarmed world at some length during the summer, or whether we should consider it from the outset as an ill-defined Utopian end point. *Brennan* proposed that this not be studied by the whole group, but that the only kind of real progress on this problem would come from a study in depth on the part of one or two people going off by themselves. *Smithies* expressed the view that this kind of a search for end points was not a practical guide to policy. The best that one can do is move in the right direction. This end point is not something which can determine current policy, but current policy must proceed on something of a day-to-day basis. *Barber* added that, if this kind of a study were pursued, it should include a study of international police force problems. *Brennan* noted that the State Department had done some work on this. Some of this work is available for reading by interested parties.

Along the lines of Smithies' comment about the difficulties of formulating current policy in terms of distant ends, *Schelling* noted that disarmament is a process and not a state, although it might be worthwhile to ask sometime the question, "Where will this process lead?" Schelling's purpose in

99

United States' interest to develop a $10,000. missile. This would be especially true if there were no controls over nuclear weapons. It is strategically disadvantageous to a large and wealthy nation to develop a lot of "bang for buck" since this allows poorer nations to do much to equalize the power gap.

There are a number of technical characteristics and problems in a surveillance controls system. It is not likely that there would be more than 100-200 satellites up at one time in the near future. However, this might go up by a factor of as much as $10^3$. It is also possible to use coatings designed to shield satellites from radar detection. These, however, can be countered. It is also relevant to consider the sort of satellite kill system in use in the design of the satellite itself.

A number of monitoring proposals were made at the recent Ten-Nation Conference. They include the following: (1) to monitor only Cape Canaveral and Vandenburg Base and the Russian equivalents; (2) to monitor everywhere; (3) to prelaunch inspect satellites, but not to inspect missiles.

## Discussion

In response to a question concerning the cost of launch vehicles, Brennan noted that NASA was now in possession of the Scout rocket capable of putting 200 to 300 pounds into orbit and costing approximately $70,000 a piece. While $10,000 may be somewhat of an exaggeration, the cost of rockets can be reduced significantly. *Schelling* did not believe that the diffusion of rocket technology to other countries was likely to be quite as dangerous as had been portrayed. Considering the possible aims of such small nations, it would seem that they could achieve their desired ends by working their mischief in a still less expensive fashion. A few rockets could be easily destroyed, if such a nation were to attempt to use them for blackmail. *Coward* felt that it was more to the point to attempt to control smaller nations through the control of nuclear weapons. *Brennan* agreed that nuclear control had first priority but maintained that enough mischief could be done by these countries to make it also desirable to control the vehicles.

*Barber* noted that it was much easier and cheaper to shoot down a satellite on its tenth pass than on its first. In choosing which satellites are to be shot down, one can easily so designate a communications-jamming satellite. The problems in the controlling of the satellite bomber would make this weapon seem to be unlikely. In response to a question, he said that it would be very hard to effect the return of a captured satellite to the earth, especially considering the re-entry problems.

*Orear* wondered if the Soviets might not follow up any announcement on our part that we would shoot down uninspected satellites by a response of sending up a large number of junk satellites which would cost us a great deal to shoot down. *Feld* suggested that the proposal might be advanced in a way which would not produce such a response. *Barber* felt that decoys in themselves were not that easy. They are expensive in

308

themselves and they can be recognized in several ways. First, light decoy satellites would fall earlier than heavy payload ones due to drag effects. They also might be separated out by monitoring communications.

Schelling believed that one possible motivation for reducing the cost of rockets would be that there might be some excellent uses for short range solid fuel missiles. Such uses, said Barber, might be in communications and in meteorology. At present, we need some time to redevelop the science of meteorology in order to utilize the benefits of space technology. Brennan pointed out, however, that electronic systems of communication based on space vehicles were likely to be developed rather than using rockets for quick transportation of physical objects. Nevertheless, Schelling did not feel that it would be easy to hold rocket technology back. Once the prohibitive cost of development had been undertaken, it will be difficult to prevent other nations from attempting to use this technology. It was interesting to note, he concluded, that there had been very little really good analysis done on the economic uses and implications of space and missile technology.

309

ACS-W15

10/20/60

COST OF A RADAR NETWORK FOR A MISSILE TEST BAN

J. Salerno

In an article entitled, "Why Space Control?" (BAS, May 1959), D. G. Brennan has given an estimate of the cost of a world-wide radar network needed to monitor a missile test ban. This note constitutes a comment on that estimate.

In determining the number of stations, N, one assumes that a radar has a range of r nm which gives a coverage of $r^2$, that the earth has a total surface area of $4\pi R^2$ (R ≈ 3460 nm), that the radar range and height capability are related by $r = 2.67Rh$, and that there is some overlap required so that

$$N = \frac{4 \pi R^2}{R^2} \quad k = \frac{1.5 \text{ kR}}{h} \text{, where k is an overlap factor.}$$

If one assumes that the useful portion of the radar coverage corresponds to the area of the square inscribed in the circle of radius r, then $k = 1.57$; if the inscribed hexagon is used as a criterion, $k = 1.21$. When one considers specific siting problems, it probably is reasonable to estimate the number of stations as

$$N = \frac{2.3R}{h} \quad \approx \frac{8000}{h} \text{, where h is in nm.}$$

Brennan's Figure 3 gives a value of N that is approximately 60 - 70% higher than this estimate.

With respect to costs, there are three gross aspects that should be considered: site development cost, equipment cost, operating cost. Equipment costs for a 500-nm radar have been estimated by Lincoln Laboratory radar experts as $2 - $5M. The operating and site development costs depend considerably on the site location. For a typical United States heavy radar site, 178 airmen at 6K/year and 13 officers at 11K/year are used, giving an operating cost of $1260K/year. (Other operating costs such as power, gas, are negligible by comparison.) To develop a United States radar site (buy land, build access roads, erect buildings, etc.), costs are approximately $2M. Hence, for a typical United States heavy radar site, the initial cost is of the order of $4-5M and the annual operating costs are of the order of $1.25M/year.

Another type of site for which costs are available is a main DEW line site. Site development for a typical main station is $10 - 13M and

311

and personnel costs are about $2.1M/year. (This is based on 110 men station, average salary of 10K/man, and maintenance cost of $25/man/day.) Other operating costs, not including personnel and site development costs, amount to approximately $0.4M/year. Hence, for a main DEW line site, the initial costs (including equipment at $5M) are about $13 - $16M, and operating costs are about $2.6M/year.

Since two-thirds of the earth's surface area is water, presumably one would use ship-borne radar to give radar coverage over the oceans. Where suitable islands are available, they would undoubtedly be preferred to ships, and island installations would very likely cost less than ships. In a paper of this limited scope, this feature is accounted for by assuming that 50 islands can be found to replace 50 ship installations. Furthermore, it is assumed that ship radar site costs are approximately the following.

Victory ship $50M
Equipment 3M
Personnel cost/year 1M
Operating cost/year 1M

The last two items are right out of my hat, and anybody else's guesses probably have as much validity. The cost of the ship was out of the hat of a Navy liaison officer, and purports to be the building cost of a Victory ship today. If the mothball fleet can be used, the coating is obviously quite different.

To arrive at a cost estimate for a world-wide radar network, some allowance should be made for the site locations where each of the three cost figures apply. For the sake of definiteness, it is assumed that United States radar site costs apply to North and South America, Europe, and Asia, and the DEW line costs apply to all other land sites (including islands). For ship-borne radars, it is assumed one requires one-fifth of a ship in port for one ship on station. Furthermore, a 30-nm detection altitude is assumed. On these assumptions, the initial and annual operating costs are the following.

| | Initial Cost (Millions) | Operating cost/year (Millions) |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Land sites for North America, South America, Europe and Asia (Area = 36.8M sq. mi., N = 49) | 220 | 61 |
| Land sites other than those in line 1 (Area = 23.8M sq. mi., N = 32 50 islands = 82) | 1,190 | 205 |
| Ship-borne sites (Area = 139M sq. mi., N = 165 - 50 = 135 plus 1/5(135) = 27, N = 162) | 8,600 | 324 |
| **Totals** | **10,010** | **590** |

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On the basis of the assumptions stated above, the following conclusions can be stated. To detect all missiles fired above 30 nm would require an initial investment of ten billion dollars and an operating cost of about 590 million dollars per year. The overwhelming part of this cost is due to ship-borne radars. If one would be satisfied with land-based radar surveillance only (no islands used), the initial cost would be approximately 685 million dollars and the annual operating costs would be approximately 140 million dollars.

In using the cost figures given above, it is important to keep in mind the very restrictive assumptions used. It would be very desirable, when and if serious consideration were given to a missile test ban, that specific site locations be selected. Another caution is appropriate with respect to operating costs: the cost of manning radar sites with an international team would undoubtedly be higher than United States costs. Furthermore, since so large a portion of the initial cost is due to ship installations, more consideration would have to be given to detailing these costs. In fine, a much more exhaustive effort would be required to cost a world-wide radar network than was possible in this brief comment.

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ACS-W9
9/4/60

SOME PROBLEMS OF MISSILE PRODUCTION INSPECTION

John Phelps

Missile production inspection may be viewed as a subproblem of at least two larger problems: (1) The control of long-range delivery systems, and (2) The control of weapons production in general. Some of what follows is transferable to these two larger problems, both of which figure in some proposed arms control schemes. But it may be particularly useful at this point in the development of our understanding of arms controls to focus on a (relatively) limited problem, namely, missile production inspection, and to try to see some of its dimensions, what variables are involved, how they interact, how they shape the specification of the problem, and so on. My main aim in this draft paper is to try to collect, without too much concern for organization and completeness, some insights and some perspectives which have emerged in the Arms Control Study in the last few weeks. Principal inputs to my thinking are written materials of Bernard Feld and D. G. Brennan; Melman's book; our two visitors, J. M. Bedrick and Willis Hawkins; and many informal discussions.

Assume as a sort of general framework for the problem that an agreement can be reached between the U.S. and the USSR to limit their long-range missiles to some maximum number, which may be in the 100 to 1000 range. Various sources of information are required to provide assurance of compliance with this and other parts of the arms control agreement. Several types of inspection, psychological or personnel inspection, for instance, may yield some information on any illegal missile production, but it seems likely that a main dependence in guarding against missile production will be on records inspection and on on-the-spot inspection of facilities. Narrowing the problem even to this extent, we still ask what level of inspection effort distributed in what way and under what conditions will yield what assurance that how many missiles are not being produced?

A Missile Production Model for Purposes of Inspection

The manufacturing of an advanced-type weapon may be diagrammed in a sort of conceptual pyramid (Fig. 1) with the missile at the top, raw materials at the bottom, and various processes and manufacturing steps in between. The manufacturing steps as we go up the pyramid are in order of increasing specificity for the missile. The bottom of the pyramid represents the raw material input to the whole economy and it is, of course, the base of other pyramids for other complex products which the economy produces; a load of iron ore in the bottom level of the pyramid is no more identifiable with a missile than with a refrigerator.

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The number of plants where missile or missile component production occurs - the fourth level and higher - is much lower than the number of plants at the third level which includes a large part of the manufacturing economy. Thus known facilities at the fourth level and higher would presumably be most carefully inspected.

It is possible, in principle, to trace an item of raw material all the way through processing and manufacturing stages into a finished product. Hidden plants, built for evasion and unknown to the inspectorate, would certainly have to draw most of their input materials from known facilities and parts of the economy. Thus completely concealed missile plants at the fourth level and higher would need to draw at least some items from the known plants at the third level. In principle, the disappearance of these items from the known and inspectable parts of the economy could lead to the detection of the hidden plants.

## Nature of the Inspection

The pyramidal model helps to analyze the nature of the inspection task. There is no sharp separation into critical and non-critical components, but rather an increasing degree of specificity for missiles as we go up the pyramid. The intensity of the inspection applied - whatever the form or type of the inspection - will be greater near the top of the pyramid.

The task of the inspectorate at the seventh level amounts to counting missiles in the inventory and checking for hidden ones. What constitutes a missile may or may not be completely clear, as Tom Schelling and others have pointed out. Assume here that a completely assembled long-range missile is a fairly identifiable object. Assume further that N permitted operational missiles implies a somewhat smaller number of missiles in production, in pieces, in transit, undergoing maintenance, and so on. The arms control agreement *must* provide in some realistic way for these other missiles, and one of the tasks of the inspectorate is to keep their number within reasonable bounds.

Hunting for hidden missiles is not a problem of production inspection. On-the-spot inspection of production facilities will yield little or no information on missiles produced before the inspection began. Records inspection may do better although a carefully planned effort by a large enough group of well-placed individuals could perhaps accomplish a kind of retroactive embezzlement of a substantial number of missiles. If this embezzlement could be planned before or as it occurred - during the time between the signing of an arms control agreement and the beginning of inspection, for instance - it would have a much higher probability of successful concealment in the records to which the inspectorate would eventually have access. Other techniques, such as psychological inspection or public reporting, seem to offer the most promise on the pre-inspection embezzled missile problem.

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With reference to the pyramidal model, records and on-the-spot facility inspection will certainly have the greatest payoff at the fourth level and above. These levels should clearly have priority and what can be done at the lower levels depends on the degrees of effort and access which are possible.

There is a large difference between what is theoretically achievable with records inspection and what may be practical with working inspection processes. It is possible with enough input-output information to trace the progress of a chunk of iron ore through a steel mill to a small manufacturing plant making screws, and to follow a particular screw into an airframe and then into a missile. The input-output information for the whole economy can, in principle, be fed into and checked by a large enough computer which could be made to signal the disappearance of half a dozen screws, presumably into some kind of clandestine activity. Theoretically, complete input-output controls could be applied to the model in Fig. 1. Obviously, these infinitely detailed controls can never be achieved, but the abstraction nevertheless provides some insights into the records inspection problem.

In the United States today fiscal record keeping may be considered as fairly well developed both at the macroscopic (level of local, state and national governments, etc.) and microscopic (level of individual plants, businesses and persons) levels. Input-output record keeping on materials and products is in relatively poor shape and a large part of such records as these are kept for primarily fiscal purposes. Financial statements, those traditional indicators of corporate vitality, show only dollar measurements. Economists who aim at analyzing segments of the economy in terms of quantities of material and numbers of products often find that the most essential data are not at hand. Records kept for tax purposes would be of very limited usefulness as production indicators. Embezzlement of money even in the face of tight controls and by individuals working alone is possible, as some examples teach us, and embezzlement of materials and products with much looser controls seems to be limited mainly by their lack of utility to a potential embezzler. Money is never wasted; it is never rejected; it is measurable by a single, fixed scale; materials and products have none of these properties which contribute to reliable bookkeeping.

At the national level the examples of the Manhattan Project and the CIA point to the possibility of large-scale fiscal concealment (see, for instance, Melman's book). In the USSR, the level of fiscal information may be roughly similar although it is assembled with somewhat different aims and perhaps with less advanced techniques, e.g., without punch cards. But USSR input-output information may well be somewhat more detailed because, among other things, of the emphasis on productivity per worker, per plant, and so on.

The present state of record keeping sheds some light on the difficulties of production controls through records. As a practical matter records inspection will surely have to be concentrated on the upper levels in the

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pyramidal model, probably on the upper four levels. Even though the data
handling problem in the inspectorate might conceivably be solved with
enough effort and equipment, the requirement of adequately detailed input-
output records from all the plants at, say, the third level of the model
would probably require an additional clerical force (from the host country)
which would be measured in millions for a U.S. or USSR-sized economy. (Some
illustrative U.S. data on the number of plants which might be involved are
included below.) This would appear to be an insuperable "irritation hazard."
Records will have to be, for the most part, extremely detailed and exactly
verifiable from one plant to another if they are to form any kind of reliable
indicator of the clandestine production of a few missiles in a large economy.

If record inspection is to be really fruitful even at the fourth level of
the model and above it will require, among other things:

1. A large amount of initial basic data on plant capacities, equipment, manpower and processes which must be gathered and verified at the start and kept up to date with time;

2. Manufacturers of missiles and components to begin new input-output and other record keeping;

3. Probably rather elaborate and yet to be developed allowances for manufacturing wastages and rejected items.

The record inspection will be accompanied by on-the-spot physical inspection of facilities. To the extent that records from an inspected facility have been furnished previously they may be checked against the appearance of the facility with as much care as time and circumstances permit. Detailed checking of records at a medium-sized facility would probably require an effort of the order of a few man days or weeks. The experiences of bank examiners and auditors is illustrative here. The inspectors may simply look around for physical evidence of clandestine production such as products other than those the plant is supposed to be making, a suspiciously high number of "rejected" items, concealed production space as in basements and sheds, too many (or perhaps too few) workers, and so on. A plant making permitted missile or rocket components for the allowed missile force or for space research may have, in effect, a resident inspector, or two or three, whose jons amounts to patrolling the plant and making certain that no components disappear. Other plants making products less specifically for missiles might be checked only occasionally and for more obvious evidences of clandestine production. It does not seem worthwhile at this point to try to specify the duties of inspectors in any detail. But once other questions relating to such things as the permitted production, plant locations, and availability of records were understood, it should be possible to specify the jobs of the on-the-spot inspectors in a manner which would approximately maximize the probability of detecting significant illegal missile production.

A very important question -- and one on which the whole feasibility of missile production inspection has often been assumed to hinge -- is whether or not there are really "critical" missile components over which very tight

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controls can be maintained. Critical components may be especially character-
istic of missiles or especially difficult to produce or both. Possible
critical components include airframes, fuels (liquid or solid), guidance
systems (including inertial, infrared, radar and stellar), nose cones (not
including, for our purposes here, warheads) and rocket engines. Parts and
materials include such things as high precision gyroscopes, ball bearings,
special heat-resistant materials, nitrates, a variety of electronic equip-
ment, and so on. The production of relatively critical materials and com-
ponents may be checked in a variety of ways. Some components have a limited
number of manufacturers; manufacturing experience and know-how may be as
important as special equipment.

The question of which components are most critical and therefore offer the best targets for inspection is a large one on which a great deal of expert study would be needed. Our latest information gathered informally from two or three particularly knowledgeable persons seems to stack up about as follows: Most components which might originally be quite "critical" can, with enough effort and ingenuity, either be produced by novel methods or eliminated (i.e., "designed around) entirely. Ball bearings in inertial guidance systems, for instance, have tolerances of the order of a millionth of an inch or less. At present probably less than half a dozen plants in the United States make such bearings. But bearings are very small parts and a concealed facility to produce them in small quantities could probably be arranged with relative ease. Or, air or gas bearings may be substituted entirely. Precision gyroscopes used in inertial guidance systems may be subject to "mass shift" if stored for long periods. Beryllium may be used to reduce this effect, but other materials may probably be substituted. And on the question of inertial guidance it has been pointed out that the circular probable error of current (land-launched) Polarisers is probably doubled or tripled if inertial guidance is left out entirely, that is, if the path of the missile is completely determined by pre-launch programming and no post-launch correction is supplied by integrating inertial equipment.

Presumably the kind of inspection system of most interest to us now is one
that might be in operation by about 1965. I missile development continues
at its present pace for about the next three or four years, both the U.S.
and the USSR are certain to have thoroughly debugged missiles in steady
production. (The Soviet missiles may be solid or liquid fuelled; this is
not of critical importance as far as production inspection is concerned.)
Ballistic missiles will have become thoroughly proven weapons and an abun-
dance of design and production know-how will have been accumulated. All
this will make clandestine production a much easier task. Small design
changes to "design around" critical components can be made with confidence,
although we can hopefully assume that an inspected ban on missile test
firings will inhibit major design changes. Many clandestine design changes
can be made with predictable but perhaps acceptable losses in performance.
It is clear that "critical components" look much more critical in the early
stages of missile development. Melman's 1958 book is now two years old. It
is sad, but probably true, that we have already in the summer of 1960 passed
the point where missile test and production controls, by the time they could
be put into operation, would be most effective.

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Many missile parts are made by automated, numerically controlled machine tools. Something of the order to thirty U. S. companies now make these tools. All large machine tools, especially more complex ones, have serial numbers. It might be possible for an inspectorate to obtain the numbers and locations of all the tools of certain kinds which have been produced and to check on the uses to which they were actually being put. But here again opportunities for pre-inspection embezzlement and variations in production methods are apparent, and machine tools are probably no more critical than many missile components.

Although the analysis so far has tended to emphasize the difficulties of inspection it is worth keeping in mind that technical ingenuity in evasion can be countered by technical ingenuity in inspection. We can at least contemplate a kind of special professional competence in what might be called"inspection engineering". The designers of an inspection system should include a variety of missile experts and skilled operations analysts. Many of the inspectors would be trained engineers (we assume they could be recruited!). Some provision in the agreement for communication between missile experts on each side and perhaps a joint inspection commission would seem to offer many advantages.

## Some Important Variables

The success or failure of a missile production inspection system depends on several important variables which need to be clearly identified and assessed. Relatively few conclusive observations can be made about the inspection problem unless the assumptions made about these variables are specified. Variables which shape the nature of the inspection problem may be called independent variables; those which measure the success of the inspection system may be called dependent. On this basis, at least the following seem to be important:

### Independent Variables

1. Is some testing and production of missiles allowed?

2. How hostile is the environment in which the inspection system must work?

3. Does the inspectorate have complete or less than complete access to facilities, records and people?

4. What other kinds of inspection, besides records and on-the-spot inspection of facilities, is going on, and how useful is the other information?

5. What is the quantity and quality of the inspection effort?

### Dependent Variables

6. What level of clandestine production must the system be able to detect?

7. With what confidence must it be able to detect it?

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In the same order of variables, we can list some of the reasons why they
are important.

1. If no testing, maintenance or production of rockets either for peaceful purposes or for maintaining an authorized missile force is permitted the inspection problem will be made enormously easier. The problem of distinguishing between missile components and similar-looking devices for peaceful purposes will be greatly reduced, but certainly not eliminated in a technologically advanced world. Even more important, probably, missile know-how and skilled employees -- so important in any clandestine production -- cannot be transferred from areas of permitted activity. But the chances of shutting off space research in the 1960's are near zero and it is at least improbable that a stabilized defense agreement would not permit some missile production. Certainly the greater the permitted rocket and missile activity the greater the difficulty of preventing the production of a few clandestine missiles. A related question is whether the inspectorate has access to actual missiles and missile designs in the host country. Probably the first case to be looked at in designing an inspection system is that in which there is (1) essentially uncontrolled peaceful space research, hopefully on an international or at least bilateral basis; (2) an annual production of not more than about a hundred, and perhaps many less, missiles; and (3) the inspectorate knows general missile characteristics (this would seem a prerequisite to any agreement, anyway) but not design details.

2. The hostility of the host country in which the inspection system must work is obviously an important question. If there exists a kind of monolithic national will to cheat, the task of the inspectorate will almost certainly be impossibly difficult. But in this kind of situation there would probably be no arms control agreement anyway; so we may set aside the monolithic-hostility case as of not much practical interest. A question which seems more to the point is, how motivated will the people of the host country be to obey the agreement? (Related to this is, how motivated they will be to report violations.) If they as a group are favorably motivated it may be quite difficult for would-be violators to collect the considerable resources of manpower and materials needed to make missiles. If they are strongly motivated and have a satisfactory means of reporting violations, clandestine production can almost certainly be prevented. Thus, good access to a favorably motivated people seems to be one of the most hopeful prospects for further study.

It has been suggested that one of the best ways a hostile country could foil an inspection system would be to "jam" it with a large number of false reports of violations. But probably this scheme would not work well because (1) most reported violations would be relatively easy to check, often by simply going to a spot and looking, and (2) the successful jamming of the system would probably lead rapidly to a breakdown of the arms control agreement and this eventuality, we here assume more or less by hypothesis, is desired by neither country.

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3. Most discussions of production inspection have assumed more or less complete access to facilities, records and people, unlike the situation currently under discussion with respect to a nuclear test ban. Any reduction of access will certainly make the inspection job much harder, perhaps prohibitively so. Yet it is also usually assumed that, at least in the earlier stages of evolving arms control plans, nations will retain in some areas of activity some secrets and some privileged facilities and records. Where and how the line is to be drawn with respect to the specific problem of missile production inspection seems to be an unresolved question. It is worth noting that a few cases of concealed production -- the Lockheed P-80 and U-2 are examples -- were accomplished through the use of carefully guarded facilities to which only a small number of people had access. It may be that the existence of a designated privileged facility will so serve to draw attention to it that rather special safeguards -- detailed inspection of items and people going in and out, for instance -- can be designed to prevent its use in manufacturing missiles; after all, the central problem in missile production inspection seems to be the great number of facilities to be inspected and the detection of hidden and unrevealed facilities.

4. The analysis, so far, and the numbers in the next section, point to the major difficulties in detecting clandestine missile production by records and on-the-spot inspection alone. A general conclusion which seems to be increasingly apparent is that, except in extremely unlikely favorable cases, these two kinds of inspection by themselves will not do the job. But if they are supplemented by psychological inspections, a guaranteed ban on missile test launchings, personnel inspection, public reporting, and so on, the outlook is vastly improved. The interdependence of various forms of inspection and sources of information is a large subject and one I cannot delve into in this paper. Suffice it to say that the problem of missile production inspection serves nicely to illustrate the interdependence of and the need for many sources and kinds of information in arms controls.

5. The success of the inspection system is obviously a function of the effort which is put into it. If the inspection force is large enough, any significant clandestine activity can be detected. The problem is to determine whether a high enough probability of detection of evasion can be achieved by an inspection system with reasonable costs, a reasonable number of skilled personnel, and acceptably small enough total irritation to the host country.

6. The level of clandestine production which the inspection system must be able to detect is presumably somewhat less than the level of production which could significantly upset the deterrent balance. The larger the permitted deterrent forces the larger the clandestine production which would not be decisive; this is a principal argument for large deterrent forces. There are at least three or four questions which need to be examined in relating a "tolerable" level of clandestine production to a permitted deterrent force.

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Is the ostensible, agreed deterrent balance to remain static enough over a period of time so that missiles, produced slowly but accumulated over a period of perhaps several years, could be decisive? Unfortunately, if more disarmament is to occur with time, a few accumulated but carefully hidden missiles would become a more serious threat. But hopefully disarmament will be accompanied by increasingly tight controls, greater "openness" and the growth of trust, so that hidden missiles would sooner or later be uncovered. Also, if a nation is clandestinely producing a total of ۱۰ missiles a year, is the inspection system likely to uncover all of these at once, or only a fraction of them? Is there some kind of a maximum degree of violation which will, either automatically or through ensuing controversy, lead to the collapse of the agreement? Would the discovery of some clandestinely produced missiles lead to intensified inspection? And so on.

It will be convenient in the next two sections of this paper to think in terms of a level ۱۰ of clandestine production which the inspection system will be able to detect with a certain confidence. For simplicity and since it is not practical here to try to analyze the question of partial detection, I will assume that the total ۱۰ production will be either essentially detected or essentially undetected.

7. Probably, the confidence levels required of an inspection system need not be too high. A reasonable possibility of detection may be enough to deter a potential evader. If partial detection is considered, the probability of detection goes inversely in some manner with the number of missiles detected. For the purpose of this paper, it seems reasonable to think in terms of a confidence level of 50%.

## Some Illustrative Numbers

Enough data are conveniently available to give some rough quantitative idea of the task of a missile production inspection system operating in the United States.

*Aerospace Facts and Figures for 1960* (Aerospace Industries Association of America, Washington) says that there are about 200,000 subcontractors producing parts and components for current U. S. missiles. This figure seems very high but it includes production of all kinds of items for all kinds of missiles, and the house organs of growing industrial associations probably tend to large numbers.

Data from *Missiles and Rockets* annual Missile Market and Product Guide (May 30, 1960; *Missiles and Rockets*, Washington) are broken down in a more useful manner. There are listed about 4500 companies or divisions of companies"engaged in the missile industry." About 3150 of these are listed by their area or areas of activity. A sample of about 400 companies shows an approximate area of activity breakdown of the 3150 companies:

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<table><thead><tr><td>Activity</td><td>Number of Companies</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Structures</td><td>300</td></tr><tr><td>Propulsion Systems</td><td>290</td></tr><tr><td>Missile Support</td><td>730</td></tr><tr><td>Materials</td><td>1000</td></tr><tr><td>Guidance</td><td>520</td></tr><tr><td>Checkout & Testing</td><td>720</td></tr><tr><td>Tracking & Telemetering</td><td>500</td></tr><tr><td>Research & Development</td><td>1000</td></tr><tr><td>Human Space Engineering</td><td>100</td></tr></tbody></table>

Some of the companies carry on more than one kind of activity. An inspection of the listings shows that to a first approximation each of the listings corresponds to one location. (This is roughly thus for even large companies with many divisions. General Electric, for instance, has 21 divisions listed in 16 different cities.) This makes possible some idea of the geographic distribution of production facilities.

Assuming somewhat arbitrarily that structures, propulsion, guidance and research and development activities are to be inspected, the list above gives 2110 facilities in an approximately equal number of locations (if not different cities). The list of companies is almost certainly inflated to some extent since a company would probably prefer to identify itself with as many activities as possible. But from the standpoint of inspection each company and area of activity certainly represents potential production facilities. Adding some allowance for other perhaps less critical activities, e.g., materials, and extrapolating a rapidly growing industry to about 1965, we conclude that there may be of the order of 3000-4000 production plants which would require reasonably close inspection. Call it 4000. These are the plants at the fourth level and above in the pyramidal model.

Some of these 4000 plants are very big (lockheed, Martin, Convair, etc.) and would require several inspectors, perhaps even some tens of inspectors, working full time. The number of inspectors might be in some rough proportion to the number of contract supervisory representatives which the armed services now maintain at large plants. Other plants are quite small, employing perhaps 10-25 workers, and would not need a full-time inspector. Many of the plants are concentrated in limited areas (Los Angeles, Boston, etc.) so that an inspector could travel easily from one to another.

For on-the-spot inspection, then, let us assume that the 4000 plants will require about 4000 inspectors. Let us further assume that these inspectors, having about 98% access to facilities and records and taking advantage of this access with ingenuity, would have an even chance of detecting the clandestine production of a few missiles with components from these plants in a year.

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What about records from these 4000 plants? The remarks above on the difficulties of input-output record keeping in sufficient detail to be of definitive use to the inspectorate apply here. But such record keeping would indeed be valuable to the inspectorate, and the data handling problems could probably be solved with good equipment. But as a guess the 4000 companies would have to add a total of around 10,000 new employees to do the extra record keeping. This figure may seem high, but consider the difficulty of keeping detailed track, at the level of single diodes and bolts, of materials and components flowing into Lockheed. The 10,000 or so new employees are provided by the host country and not the inspectorate; but they, along with the overhead and red tape they bring, certainly constitute a sizable "irritation hazard".

There remains the question of clandestine production in at least some tens of thousands of less critical manufacturing plants. The Aerospace Industries figure of 200,000 subcontractors comes within about a factor of two of a rough estimate of D. G. Brennan's of the number of plants with more or less suitable facilities for producing one or more missile components. Detailed input-output records from these, say, 100,000 plants are out of the range of practical possibilities. Presumably these plants would have to be physically visited by inspectors on an occasional basis. It would probably take an inspector about half a day to do an adequate job of checking an average-sized plant; he might want to check the appearance of the plant against whatever fiscal and other records were available, and to scout around carefully for physical signs of questionable activity. Suppose these plants were randomly checked without warning an average of twice a month and the inspector could average two plants per day. This means 100,000 inspector days per month and figuring about 20 working days per month per inspector we would need a force of about 5000 inspectors.

There remains still the problem of checking for completely concealed manufacturing facilities, and examining known facilities whose ostensible output (e.g., textiles, lumber) is completely unrelated to missiles but which might be used to hide concealed production equipment. Known plants in this category are probably over 200,000. The kind of inspection required here may be more akin to F.B.I.-type investigation than industrial inspection. Random visits to facilities might be used and a variety of "leads" traced down. For this a force of another 5000 inspectors might be reasonable.

The processing of the detailed records from the 4000 known missile plants would require some kind of a records-processing center with quite elaborate equipment and a large number of skilled employees. Say 1000 employees altogether.

We thus envision an inspection force of 4000 & 5000 & 5000 & 1000 = 15,000 people. Travel and overseas support costs, constant travel by the inspectors in the host country, some buildings for headquarters and records processing, some quite expensive records processing equipment, and other costs could well run the total annual per person cost of the inspection tino a $30,000 - $40,000 range. Thus the system sketched here might cost on the order of one-half billion annually.

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These estimates of the personnel and costs of the inspection system involve large uncertainties, but they should have better than order-of-magnitude accuracy. A more detailed operations research type analysis of the geographic distribution of plants, travel times, data processing system requirements and so on could be made without great difficulty. But this does not seem worthwhile, in view of our inability to specify more accurately the effect of some of the variables outlines in the preceding section.

No data on the size and diversity of the Soviet missile industry are readily available. There are certainly fewer small plants producing missile components in the USSR than in the U.S.; this should tend to make inspection easier. But the "closed" character of the Soviet society and the lack of abundant U.S.-type information on individual plants and companies should make the inspection job more difficult, at least in its earlier stages.

Most of the discussions of stabilized deterrence so far have involved force levels in the range of 100-1000 weapons. The mathematical analyses of deterrence tend to show that, with advanced, well-chosen weapons, stability -- meaning a minimum retaliatory capability -- can be maintained even if one side exceeds its permitted force by a factor of two or three. Even higher factors might still give stability on the basis of a simple strategic model. But this kind of drastically unbalanced situation seems to be of little practical interest in setting the detection capability requirement of the inspection system. In terms of the kinds of stabilized deterrents ordinarily envisioned, then, a few undetected missiles would do no damage. Some tens of clandestinely produced missiles might or might not be critical. But the inspection system would probably be considered a failure if it failed to prevent the production of a few hundred clandestine missiles.

## General Conclusions

The discussion up to this point suggests some general characteristics a missile production inspection system limited to records and on-the-spot inspection should have. Because of the great difficulty of obtaining sufficiently detailed input-output records, records inspection will probably play a much less important role than has sometimes been suggested.

Physical surveillance of known missile component plants will need to be very close. The number of plants in which missile components could be produced is so large in a U.S.-size and type economy that the inspectorate will be obliged to inspect these plants by sampling and on an occasional basis in the hope that some possibility of detection will discourage would-be violators. A large part of the economy will be virtually unobservable in any consistent fashion and this requires a kind of flexible investigative capability on the part of the inspectorate. The job of the inspection system will be not so much to process masses of information in a routine way but to use a maximum of ingenuity in tracking down hints and bits of evidence of suspected violation. The system should develop all possible information inputs.

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Some order-of-magnitude estimates of what an inspection system might accomplish are shown in Fig. 2. The abscissa scales equate one employee to about $35,000 annually. The ordinate is the (all-or-none) detectable annual production level. The assumptions for the principal independent variables are noted alongside the curves. Curve A seems to represent the kind of situation most frequently envisioned.

Records and on-the-spot facility inspection are probably not adequate to prevent clandestine missile production in the kinds of 1965 technology, stabilized deterrent, limited trust situations ordinarily envisioned. The capabilities of record inspection for this task seem particularly disappointing. Any positive functions the inspection system might perform, such as providing useful economic information, will almost certainly be more than offset by extreme irritation hazards.

It is important to keep in mind that the negative conclusions of this paper regarding the capabilities of records and on-the-spot inspection apply only to the particular problem of missile production. The case of fissionable material production, for instance, may be very different.

By focusing on the particular question of missile production and only two inspection techniques I have to some extent prejudiced the statement of the problem and so predetermined the negative conclusions. But this example makes a powerful argument for more sources of information in a more comprehensive arms control plan and, perhaps also, for more general disarmament. 15,000 inspectors in a country could inhibit the production of artillery and tanks as well as missiles, and without much extra effort. If the inspection system can draw information from a variety of sources and techniques and if the population of the host country can be induced to cooperate with it, clandestine missile production and many other things can very probably be prevented. It seems more important now to find ways to create a favorable environment for the inspectorate and to increase the quantity and diversity of the information available to it than to refine industrial inspection techniques.

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# A PHYSICAL DEVICE FOR MODERATING NUCLEAR WAR

Jay Orear

A possible physical means for slowing down nuclear war will be presented in this paper. I shall use the word *inhibitor* for a physical device which, when attached to a missile or aircraft, will render the delivery vehicle unusable except for a few hours per month. For example, consider the case where each side has an invulnerable second strike force of 150 missiles equipped with inhibitors, then only 5 missiles per day could be delivered. This would give ample time to bring the war to an end before all was lost. A nation might decide to call it quits after it has lost 10 million men.

The design of an inhibitor is a straight-forward engineering problem. It could be a small bomb which is set off by any kind of motion. The device would also contain a clock which disarms the bomb for a few hours per month. Only during this time could the missile be used; otherwise, the movement of the missile would fire the inhibitor, thus crippling the missile. If the inhibitor requires power, it should be fail-safe with respect to a power failure; i.e., the bomb cannot be disarmed during a power failure. As outlined above, an inhibitor could be removed from a missile or aircraft only during the few hours per month that it is disarmed. Since there is some strategic advantage for one side secretly to remove its inhibitors, permanent inspectors would be needed at all missile sites. Then such action would give almost a month's warning time. Under a situation where the inhibitors cannot be removed secretly, it would be to the mutual advantage of both sides to keep the inhibitors attached.

## The non-detachable inhibitor

Permanent inspectors at each missile site are not needed if the inhibitors are so designed that they will always detonate upon removal from the missile. Here the design problem is more challenging. The non-detachable inhibitor could contain two motion-sensing devices: Motion Sensor A to detect any motion with respect to the earth (a simple accelerometer), and Motion Sensor B to detect any motion with respect to the missile. A signal from either sensor would detonate the inhibitor except that, as before, Motion Sensor A would be disabled for a few hours per month. A possible design for Sensor B would be to have a permanent magnet contained a few feet inside the missile. Sensor B would consist of detectors responding to any changes in the magnitude, direction, and gradient of the magnetic field. Any such signal would always detonate the inhibitor. The non-detachable inhibitor is to be preferred over the simple inhibitor because it eliminates the danger of secret removal of inhibitors and does not require permanent inspectors at all missile sites.

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## Phasing-in of the inhibitors

One could not make use of the inhibitors until there was first some degree of international control over delivery systems. The inhibitor devices could then be installed in stages. For example, each succeeding month, another 10 per cent of the delivery systems could be equipped with inhibitors until 100 per cent had been reached. Further progress in disarma- ment could be marked not only by reducing the size of the delivery systems, but by converting to inhibitors with longer time periods. The inhibitor concept introduces new strategic and psychological considerations which will require further thought.

Block diagram for the simple inhibitor

Block diagram for the non-detachable inhibitor

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ACS-6

6/24/60

SEMINAR: Surprise Attack Agreements

SPEAKERS: Bernard T. Feld, Thomas C. Schelling, and Donald G. Brennan

## Remarks by B. T. Feld

In the matter of surprise attack agreements, we may consider two problems: (1) the problem of definitions - what components and what sort of surprise attack the agreement is to be concerned with; and (2) what proposals have been made to date, and what is their relevance?

The basic question posed in this matter is whether, in a world in which weapons do exist, an arrangement can be made to prevent the use of these weapons in surprise attack. There are two approaches to this problem.

(1) The deterrence concept is to make the consequences of such an attack so unattractive that no nation would be willing to attempt it. (2) Effort may be directed at the elimination of the element of surprise by instituting an agreement putting the weapons under surveillance. This is based on the theory that any preparations for a surprise attack would be reported. While the second approach has been very popular in the recent past, the present emphasis seems to be upon the first.

The following table was introduced to further the discussion.

<table><thead><tr><td>Weapon System</td><td>Control Point</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Nuclear weapons</td><td>Launching site (down to suitcases)</td></tr><tr><td>Radiological, biological, chemical</td><td>Preparation points, large-scale immunization program</td></tr><tr><td>Missiles and satellites</td><td>Launching sites, submarines</td></tr><tr><td>Airplanes</td><td>Airports (civil and military)</td></tr><tr><td>Submarines</td><td>Inventory at harbors, straits, etc.</td></tr><tr><td>Land armies, conventional artillery, tanks, etc.</td><td>Railroad terminals, harbors, etc.</td></tr></tbody></table>

Arthur Hadley noted that perhaps a better control point in the case of nuclear weapons would be where recallability cuts off, rather than the launching site.

It is quite possible that radiological, biological, or chemical weapons might be used by the smaller nations as well as the larger. This might be either among themselves, or in order to create a chaotic situation which

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might prove beneficial to their interests.

The combination of missiles and nuclear weapons will be the most important
system to consider within the next few years. It is unlikely that satellite
weapons will be of much significance for at least five to six years. On the
other hand, some of the older weapon systems, such as airplanes, land armies,
conventional artillery, and so forth, may assume new importance in a
partially disarmed world, should such come about.

While the problem of controlling submarines is a difficult one, it is possible
that keeping track of the numbers involved, rather than pinpointing locations,
would serve the purpose for an "anti-surprise-attack" agreement.

At this time, there is still taking place considerable discussion of the
"open skies" proposal. While this system can obtain important information
about the location of military installations and the activities thereabout,
aerial reconnaissance presents a number of serious difficulties. The most
important of these is the fact that there are long periods when the weather
will not permit such observation. These periods could be used to cover
important activities. Hadley noted, however, that this sort of system
could be thought of as both eliminating the element of surprise and as a
method of deterrence. The enemy's knowledge that we were aware of the
location of their important installations might well serve in this latter
capacity.

In the past, the installation of inspectors in key positions in harbors,
railroad terminals, airports and so forth, might have been an effective
anti-surprise-attack measure. It is probably no longer so.

While such disengagement proposals as the Rapacki Plan are more directed
at reducing tensions than reducing the possibility of surprise attack, they
have some relevance. By leaving a large area between opposing forces, a
time element is introduced in making any attack.

Disarmament, while a more comprehensive measure, is also obviously relevant.
One must especially consider here what level of disarmament is obtained.

Finally, there is the possibility of relying upon unilateral measures
designed to make it impossible to launch a surprise attack. An example
of such a measure would be both sides building only second-strike hardened-
type weapon systems.

## Remarks by Donald Brennan

The use of the phrase "measures to safeguard against surprise attack" to
cover a variety of concepts would seem to be a rather poor practice. Every-
thing, from "open skies" to radar, has been included in this terminology,
making discussion quite difficult.

It is perhaps more fruitful to look at the problem of warning in discussing
this concept. We may think of two types of warning: (1) positive warning
that an attack has just been made or is about to be made; and (2) negative or
unwarning - the assurance that there is no attack in the offing.

In considering warning systems, one must compare the time taken to relay the
information with the time required to make and implement the important

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actions and decisions which this information should trigger.

The following chart was introduced:

SCALE - WARNING TIMES

The reason that the lower end of the scale is unlikely to be a fruitful area for investigation is tied to the problem of communication. It is very difficult to verify the source, validity, and content of information within time periods this short. Schelling noted that it was important to consider what was to be done with the warning time. If it was only to slam doors and prepare for the attack, the consequences are very different than if missiles were to be fired.

In arranging a warning system, it is easier to arrange the simple cessation of an all-clear signal than to have a changed signal, or to have a new signal start up. It is easier to guarantee that the first type of system will go off.

Advances in communication techniques stemming from the development of satellites may speed communications and bring more of the lower end of the scale into the zone of relevance for investigation.

## Remarks by Tom Schelling

In considering measures against surprise attack, we must ask whether these are designed to assist us in preparing for an attack, or to deter an attack by the enemy by posing a threat of a greater ability to retaliate on our part.

In the latter case, a number of factors become important in influencing the enemy's planning process. For example, a warning system which is known to work only in good weather will cause considerable trouble in enemy planning if the enemy is unable to predict weather further than a week in advance. Similarly, a warning which would be only fifteen minutes, if all were to go smoothly, may turn into a one-hour warning, if something goes wrong during the enemy's attack preparations.

While it presently appears that the head of SAC is intent upon not depending upon a warning provided by BMEWS, this does not mean that he would not make use of it. Furthermore, Soviet planning could not necessarily count upon

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a future commander holding a similar view.

The lower end of the scale may not be as irrelevant as has been suggested. It is possible that a small increment in warning time could make, or even only appear to make, a significant difference in our ability to retaliate, thus reinforcing the deterrence concept. In evaluating any system of warning, it is necessary to examine the enemy's perception of this system. The enemy's planning is made much more difficult by a system which he does not understand and cannot accurately assess.

Inspection teams might well have a more deleterious than beneficial effect. Beyond giving an enemy information on targets and the workings of our warning systems, other unstabilizing information might leak through. For example, it might be communicated that a substantial portion of our crews were down sick, whether this illness had been caused by enemy design or by accident. This information could be used to establish an optimum time for attack.

Even very nearly perfect warning systems might move us in directions away from peace and security rather than toward it. They might, for example, make limited war a much less risky business, which is probably a real advantage to the Soviet Union and/or China. As long as limited war threatens to escalate, it may well be deterred.

Even if neither side is able to preclude the possibility of retaliation, there remains the possibility of having major wars. These might take two forms: (1) a strategic war of attrition, in which submarines, satellites, or missiles engage in small or large wars of attrition, possibly far away from population centers. This sort of a war might be made possible by the same process which would make limited war less risky. (2) A population war might be waged in which each side would trade off losses of population until one side had to demand out.

Any measures for disarmament must take into consideration the possible effects upon surprise attack. Do they make it more or less likely either in the transition period or at the end?

## Discussion

Brennan remarked that, while a few extra minutes added to a warning time at the lower end of the scale might be valuable, either for what they allow us to do or for their effect on the Soviet mind, the problem is that they are very expensive. The costs are so great that it is not likely that these would be worthwhile.

Schelling suggested that it might be useful to negotiate the mutual elimination of accident-prone warning systems as unstabilizing influences.

Hadley noted that it might be possible to combine inspection with a system of keeping weapons in a state which would require a substantial time period before they could be used. Brennan said that some such systems had been developed or thought about. The most obvious of these was keeping bombers on the ground. This, however, increases their vulnerability to an undesirable degree. Another suggestion is that the bombers in the air report in on a beacon, allowing inspectors to keep some track of their location.

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The American "Pearl Harbor" syndrome came under discussion. Hadley said that our fears may be excessive in that very few wars have actually started with a surprise attack. While Schelling suggested that the advantage of time with modern weapons systems has probably changed that, Hadley said that he had been impressed by the arguments that there may be more ways to start a war than through surprise attack. Such possibilities as coercive bargaining would seem to become more probable as our second-strike capacity becomes more secure.

Discussion turned to the problem of "unwarning", that is, methods of demonstrating that there was no intent of surprise attack during periods of international tension. These periods may have deleterious effects in both countries by provoking alarmist reactions. A recent example of such a period was the case of the summit alert called by Secretary Gates. Schelling suggested that we might have such a concept as a "tranquilized alert". This might take the form of sending dromedary-type planes along routes which would maximise their security while not threatening the Soviets. At present, we do not have enough play in terms of range for such a system.

Brennan suggested that we might denote the measures under consideration by more specific terms. Thus, we could have measures against false pre-emption, warning measures, zonal restrictions, etc. At present, the varied content within the concept of "measures against surprise attack" allows each group to take its own view. This frequently results in their talking at cross purposes.

The problem of "unwarning" may be extended to include measures to keep wars limited or to terminate a war. Schelling said this might include measures to slow down the tempo of decision, as well as to improve communications. If war threatens, there is the problem of what negotiations are to be concerned with.

Brennan noted that the problem of getting any arrangements to cover such a situation beforehand was complicated by the lack of desperation now when they should be established. This might be circumvented, Schelling said, either by disguising a proposal in a more immediate motive, or by garbing it in very general terms. Such discussions, however, must of needs touch upon very delicate problems. They require talking in terms of weaknesses in warning systems and in other important aspects of the military establishments. It is thus possible that the institution of such measures might vitiate our present deterrence posture.

The seminar concluded in agreement that some valuable investigations could be done both in the fields of warning and so-called unwarning.

Participants:

<table><tr><td>A. Hadley</td><td>M. Kalkstein</td></tr><tr><td>J. Phelps</td><td>R. Coward</td></tr><tr><td>W. Smith</td><td>D. Brennan</td></tr><tr><td>M. Gewirtz</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>B. Feld</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>T. Schelling</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>R. Luce</td><td></td></tr></table>

RC, MO

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ACS-8

6/28/60

Summer Study on Arms Control
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline, Massachusetts

SEMINAR: The Test Ban

SPEAKERS: Feld, Brennan

Remarks by B. T. Feld

In considering the test ban, we must ask ourselves two questions - first, what are we attempting to buy with a test ban, and second, what, in fact, are we gaining?

The test ban itself is not a direct measure of disarmament. No weapons are being changed nor any destroyed. Thus, the important part of the test ban is in the implications which it has for the future. The question is whether it will or will not retard the development of weapons, by the United States and by other nations. At the present state of weapons development, it would seem that testing could buy for the United States only marginal improvements.

Some persons think that by instituting a test ban we are insuring a clean atmosphere. This is probably a nonsequitur since any testing which did take place today would be very likely either underground or outside the atmosphere. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would wish to risk the adverse public reaction by carrying out tests within the atmosphere.

What might be bought with a test ban is a pattern-setting agreement arrived at relatively easily. Since the issues involved here are not of crucial importance, a certain amount of leeway in negotiations exists. Thus, obtaining an inspected test ban, even if not airtight, might serve as an important first step towards arms control.

Probably the most important benefit which might accrue from a test ban would be a certain amount of leverage on the Nth country problem. While the ban might not make it impossible for other countries to develop independent atomic weapons capability, it would certainly make it more difficult for them to do so. A particular motivation for the Russians seems to be their desire to prevent China from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The problem of an inspection system may turn out to be an insuperable obstacle. While it is easy enough for us to assure the Soviet Union that we are conducting no tests, the problem of instituting a system which will assure Congress, the AEC, etc. that the Soviets are not testing is much more difficult. Nevertheless there would seem to be minimal benefits in testing for the Russians and the risk which we are taking seems quite small compared to the risks inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons. It would seem that we have reached a point of no return in the negotiations however. While there was a time when we might have attempted a unilateral declaration of intentions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, we are past that point now. The time spent and the Soviet concessions made in the negotiations have made them crucial enough so that it would probably be better to allow a less than perfect agreement to be reached than to disrupt the negotiations. If the latter were to occur, it might have the effect of destroying any possibility of arms control measures for some time in the future.

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+

(c/o)

The two important issues which would seem to be worth discussing here are whether we do in fact get any Nth country benefits from a test ban and this problem of there being no turning back at this time.

## Discussion

In response to a question, Feld said that the Russians' repeated assurances that they would do all in their power to influence the Chinese seems to indicate their misgivings about allowing that nation to acquire nuclear weapons. Orear noted that while China has paid lip service to Russian bids for an Asian Atom free-zone, it has done no more than this. The Soviets would seem to be looking for an excuse not to give China the bomb. Thus a possibility, aside from a test ban, could be a treaty pledging the nuclear powers to give no nuclear weapons to other nations.

Halperin suggested that two possible benefits coming from testing might be important information on hardened missile sites and the possibility of cleaner weapons. While it is possible that research might be done on the first of these without nuclear testing, Schelling said that it might be very hard to scale up dynamite tests. It was his hunch that one could not say that further testing would produce no new benefits. This is especially true in the field of weapons effects. Beyond this there is the problem of getting around the "ban the bomb" atmosphere which would be generated by such an agreement. This might place severe constraints upon the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war. While these constraints would make him even more favorable to a test ban, we must examine the other side in considering the effects of the ban on national security.

Smithies felt that the Nth country problem required a more forthright approach than through a ban. A crucial issue in this problem is the question of supplying nuclear weapons to Nth countries as opposed to their developing these weapons. In the present world situation both China and Germany are more likely to receive weapons from one of the nuclear powers before they are able to produce them. This is an urgent problem and should be dealt with directly. One possible approach might be placing an embargo on sending nuclear weapons to such areas as Latin America and Africa. While it must be realized that sharing our nuclear weapons with our NATO allies such as Germany might enhance the effectiveness of our deterrents, Smithies agreed with several others that the disadvantages accruing from the spread of nuclear weapons far outweigh any advantages which we might get.

In suggesting a reason for dissenting from this view, Pool cited Fred Ikle's paper on this problem. It is quite possible that the dangers which arise as nuclear weapons spread may give a common motivation to the United States and the Soviet Union to do something about this. It is such a common interest which is probably a necessary requirement in order to bring about a real improvement in the situation. Thus there may be a real advantage to a limited diffusion of nuclear weapons.

## Remarks by Donald Brennan

The Nth country problem is more complex than simply preventing China from gaining possession of a few old fission type weapons. What we really wish to prevent China from getting is a highly developed nuclear weapons production establishment.

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In order to give a clear picture of the pros and cons of the test ban,
Mr. Brennan introduced the following chart:

? ← (Bilateral Stability) → ?

In discussing the chart, Brennan noted that he very seriously questions
Ikle's argument against the ban. The reason that stability appears across
both the pro and con columns is that these effects are very difficult to
foresee. So far as tactical weapons are concerned, the experts seem to dis-
agree as to whether there is or is not already a sufficient spectrum of these
weapons. The Soviets, however, do not seem to be very interested in this
particular field.

The problem of stability and strategic weapons is tied up with the yield
per weight ratio question. We may list a few figures from this in order to
get a better picture of it.

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Yield per Weight Ratios

<table><tr><td>Theoretical limit - fission process</td><td>8 kT/lb.</td></tr><tr><td>" " - Lithium Deuteride</td><td>80 kT/lb.</td></tr><tr><td>Present ratios</td><td>x kT/lb.</td></tr><tr><td>Achievable limits</td><td>q x kT/lb.</td></tr></table>

$$ (\text{Where } x \ll qx \ll 80) $$

Hadley took a very rough guess as to the present carrying capacity of our strategic bombers as being five tons and used the figure given in recent discussions for the size of our bomb loads as being on the order of 20 MT to find the following ratio: 20,000 kt. over 10,000 lbs. equals 2 kt. per lb. yield to weight ratio. While this figure is obviously a very rough one we can see that the orders of magnitude are such that almost any possible Soviet advance in the yield weight ratios through cheating on strategic weapons in a test ban could be countered by our increasing the size of our deterrent force. The expense involved in this is in producing more vehicles. Thus the listing of money as a counter to Strategic Weapons Cheating on the chart.

Discussion

It seemed to Smithies that the argument on strategic weapons was centering around the question of a "bigger bang for a buck". Since the Russians can no doubt quite easily afford to increase their own deterrent force in order to achieve a higher yield, it would seem unlikely that they would take the risks involved in cheating on a test ban in order to achieve a higher ratio. In general, it seems to him that any argument which takes a chance on nuclear war for the sake of money should probably be rejected.

Schelling said that the substitution of money for a larger weight per yield ratio may have very serious consequences. In this vein it is obvious that we would feel much safer in a world with forty Polaris submarines and perhaps a higher ratio than in one with 100 such submarines even though the weapons might have a lower weight per yield ratio. Furthermore, we must ask ourselves whether there is indeed nothing which the Russians could achieve by clandestine testing which we could not offset by spending more money. Even if there were none, noted Barber, in order to invest our money wisely we must know what accomplishments are being made by the Russians.

Hadley suggested that the effect of increasing the military budget in order to offset what we believe to be clandestine testing might be to increase world tensions. It is also very likely, added Coward, that such an increase would have disastrous effects upon efforts being made for further arms control measures.

The problem of Irritation Hazards came under discussion. We can always be sure of catching clandestine tests if we are more willing to classify ambiguous occurrences as cheating. The resulting recriminations, however, Schelling said, are likely to do the cause of peace no particular good. Field suggested that while we must have a system which will not allow con-

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sistent ambiguities this may not be possible in the first try. Thus any agreement should have provision for the revision of the inspection procedures. Orear noted that a negative Russian outlook on inspectors, thinking of them as spies, as opposed to workers for world peace, would also have a bad effect in this area.

Brennan gave some figures on the probability of detection of a test, giving sixty unidentified seismic occurrences in the Soviet Union of a magnitude of 4-3/4 during a year. A system allowing fifteen inspections per year would give a 20-25% probability of detecting a 20 KT coupled nuclear explosion. There was a general feeling that a more precise understanding of these figures would be desirable since there are a number of other factors to consider. Some of the imponderable or difficult factors to consider are the following: How obvious is a test site? The area surrounding one of these unexplained occurrences may be sufficiently wild so that a superficial look would be enough to insure inspectors that it was not a test site. Thus, would it be possible to have, say, three helicopter over-flight inspections to one on-site inspection. How are the 15 inspections distributed? Would they be better saved toward the end of a year to test the most suspicious of occurrences or should they be used as occurrences arise? What happens if the 15 are soon exhausted? Brennan stated that due to these and many other possible factors the figure given is good only as a guide.

There are technical limitations on evading a test ban also, noted Barber. While it would be possible to test components of weapons separately it is doubtful that either side would be willing to go to war with new weapons which remains untested. Many of the new weapons which we have developed in the past have produced a number of unforeseen effects. At this time there is no evidence the Soviets have tested any of the smaller weapons. They have thus apparently rejected the Kissinger theory about nuclear limited war. Brennan added that there is only a slight probability that the testing of very small weapons can be detected. There is presently some interest in the United States in developing weapons as small as the range of 10 to 100 tons.

Several comments were made by Pool. A counterbalancing effect to the Irritation Hazard problem is the fact that while we find certain events difficult to dismiss the same thing should be happening on the other side. Thus, there is a force existing for mutual restraint.

One possible method for the Soviet Union to carry out a series of tests which they believe necessary would be to prepare the ground for this series by creating a tense international situation. If and when a request for an on-site inspection of one of their tests which has been detected was made they would be in a position to raise political barriers to this by questioning the entire inspection system. They might demand that the system be held in abeyance while the whole problem was submitted to renegotiation.

Probably the best method of approaching a test ban agreement is to attempt to find what burdens and difficulties can be attached to the problem of evasion. In this vein, the negotiations have presently done very well in the case of strategic weapons. However, this is not at all true of the case of tactical weapons. Since it is quite inconceivable that any army would prepare for a war in which they planned to use untested weapons, more effort should certainly be devoted to this. Brennan added that any comprehensive agreement might well include the monitoring of troop training

12

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This would make it difficult to train forces to use new weapons.

Barber suggested that the Soviet refusal to agree to any ban which would exclude the testing of smaller weapons might be interpreted to indicate a lack of interest in tactical nuclear weapons. Barber also suggested that it seemed that most of the higher military commanders in the United States seemed to be high explosive limited war advocates. The forces which resist this are the executive branch in the Bureau of the Budget on the basis of its expensive implications.

Schelling posed the question of whether the dilemma on how far into the negotiations we have gotten could be solved. Is there no sort of partial ban which could be achieved since no total ban seems to be completely in-spectable. Pool suggested that however cumbersome and difficult any agreement might be, it would have the advantage of giving a continued reason for interaction between the two societies. However, Feld said, anything short of a total ban seems to be quite unacceptable to the Russians. Furthermore, while a ban which did not cover tactical weapons might prove somewhat of an impediment to Nth countries, it would not be as conclusive as a total ban.

The importance of the human element in inspection was brought up by Orear. The inspectors would be capable of questioning various persons and it might be possible to add an article to a ban obligating citizens to report any violations which they knew of and exempting them from any legal reprisals for doing so. It has been suggested by Szilard that a Soviet request to their scientists to carry on an illegal test program would prove so disastrous to morale that such a program would be unlikely to be very successful anyway. A problem raised in the questioning of personnel is whether we know enough about who is involved in Soviet research to be able to check on the appropriate people.

Some discussion arose over whether a test ban might be instituted through executive agreement rather than by treaty. Those who do not believe so pointed out that it might involve enabling legislation which would require Senate approval that there were certain tacit restraints against this and that the effect of the ceremony surrounding a treaty might be desirable in influencing other nations. On the other hand, Smithies pointed out that the reciprocal trade agreement was an excellent example of this type of contract. We should need a treaty only if we are setting up an international enforcement agency. Pool added that it would be easier to change an executive agreement in the light of new developments and that such an agreement might well get Congress off the hook, allowing them to let it pass by. Cavers believed that a treaty with some degree of flexibility was more likely to accomplish the purpose desired.

Participants:

<table><tr><td>A. Barber</td><td>R. Luce</td></tr><tr><td>D. Brennan</td><td>J. Orear</td></tr><tr><td>R. Coward</td><td>J. Phelps</td></tr><tr><td>B. Feld</td><td>T. Schelling</td></tr><tr><td>M. Gewirtz</td><td>D. Cavers</td></tr><tr><td>A. Hadley</td><td>A. Smithies</td></tr><tr><td>M. Halperin</td><td>T. O'Sullivan</td></tr><tr><td>N. Hoepli</td><td>Simpson</td></tr></table>

RC/MG

344

SUMMER STUDY ON ARMS CONTROL
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Brookline Station, Massachusetts,

SEMINAR: Research and Development Constraints

SPEAKERS: Donald G. Brennan and Thomas C. Schelling

Remarks by Mr. Schelling

It is not obvious that constraints on research and development are desirable at present. It is necessary to examine the directions in which weapons research and development are likely to go. If our weapons are evolving toward a more secure second-strike capability, it might be a disastrous mistake to impose R and D constraints at this point. R and D constraints also imply some kind of inspection. If the Russians inspected our missile development and found out how hard our missiles were, or weren't, for example, we might lose a great deal of our deterrent power. It is conceivable that, in four to five years, we may have progressed to the point where weapons are more secure, i.e., less accident-prone. R and D constraints applied at this point might freeze-in a stable situation. A graph of our security against time with continuing research and development might show an oscillatory behavior, and R and D constraints would be most desirable applied at a point of maximum, not minimum stability. But it is doubtful whether we need to anticipate "troughs" to follow the next "peak". In any case, no general constraints seem desirable now.

From the point of view of deterrence, diversity of weapons is a good thing. First, diversity tends to discourage a preemptive attack. It makes knowledge of targets more difficult and increases the overhead cost to wipe out any given type of target. For example, in a saturation attack, the cost may be independent of the number of weapons actually in use; e.g., the Minuteman on a railroad car. In the second place, deterrence is a matter of influencing decision-makers, not primarily of influencing strategic planning analysts like ORO, Lincoln Laboratory, the RAND Corporation. It is more a matter of influencing people like Khrushchev, who may not have the time or the competence to read detailed analyses. Regardless of whether the experts agree or disagree on the invulnerability of a diverse weapons system, it seems clear that diversity may have considerable psychological impact on a decision-maker like Eisenhower or Khrushchev.

If the only R and D constraints available are nonspecific, budgetary-type controls, it is probably better not to have them now; but, if we are considering specific weapons, such as missile systems, certain research and development constraints might prove important in closing loopholes. It is important to ask the questions: Just what is being constrained? Do we want to prohibit research and development in the short run, or perhaps at some later time? Is technology running for or against us and the Soviets?

Remarks by Mr. Brennan

R and D constraints are desirable only as part of a more comprehensive arms control program. Since a high degree of inspection may be a necessity, the problem of making sure that these constraints are working effectively in a limited program is a big one.

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Our R and D efforts seem to be moving us toward greater security at the moment, but it seems likely that in four to five years technological advance may lead to unbalance again. There is the possibility that the Russians might develop, for example, a missile defense system. Our deterrent becomes obsolete if we have no similar system for defense against missile attacks and have, in the meantime, discarded our bomber force. Constraints may be helpful to avert such a possibility, and to prevent the use of new weapon developments as blackmail levers. Disclosure of some new development which would make our retaliatory power much less effective on very short notice could be used in just such a way. Also, the incentive to surprise attack would be greater.

Another difficulty, if constraints are to be of a very specific nature, is that of rapidly understanding the implications and strategic significance of a new development. Even with the inspection of R and D efforts, it may not be evident to the inspectors how great is the variety of ways in which a new weapon might be used. It is difficult to know what kind of constraints or controls should be applied. The strategic implications of a potential weapons carrier like the Dyna-Soar are far from being understood.

What sort of things should be monitored? Bomb test or missile test monitoring is easy enough if cost is no object. Inspection against the clandestine development of an electronic guidance system, however, is nearly impossible. You need people as inspectors of the same competence as the laboratory force. It is estimated that, in the absence of psychological inspection, effective inspection of electronics development would take a group comprising at least 10% or 20% of the research team. We do not want to inhibit research for peaceful purposes, but it is not easy to distinguish the military from non-military developments in this regard.

## Discussion

Schelling stated that R and D inspection, not constraints, might be the desirable thing. Maximum circulation of information about developments of a military nature between two sides could be a stabilizing influence. If actual constraints are employed, it is always possible that the enemy may succeed in sneaking through a new weapon while constraints he imposes simultaneously bottle-up any parallel development on our part. Thus, constraints can be a hindrance to freedom of information. Brennan disagreed with this, feeling that it is actually easier to get information under a system of constraints.

Pool pointed out the relevance of the Nth country problem. It may be desirable, in the interest of stability, for the most advanced countries to keep ahead of the others in weaponry by means of their greater capacity for research and development. Another point is that Schelling seems to have assumed a posture of second-strike capability. If both countries, however, have a first-strike posture, it would seem best to have secrecy and constraints so as to slow down technological break-throughs in this unstable situation, and to prevent a country from feeling obligated to pre-empt the effects of any such break-through which did occur. The uncertainty in a secrecy constraints situation may actually prove to be a stabilizing influence.

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The following table was suggested by Dr. Pool:

<table><thead><tr><th>Posture</th><th>Secrecy</th><th>Prohibited</th><th>Constraints</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Both sides - first-strike capability</td><td></td><td>No</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Both sides - second-strike capability, but not second-strike intent</td><td></td><td>Yes</td><td>No</td></tr></tbody></table>

On the other hand, for the reasons Schelling and others gave, full information without constraints on research might be more stable if one viewed the enemy's purpose as essentially deterrent. Constraints immediately put the cheater outside the legal pole. As with narcotics control, it may be more effective to keep all the scientists in the community of law-abiding persons rather than putting a corps of them into a conscious conspiracy.

Barber took the stand that continued developments are bringing us greater stability. We may be able to avoid the employment of orbital weapons by threatening to shoot down anything the Russians put up, unless we are allowed to inspect it. He holds, with Jules Moch, that research and development constraints are not as promising as constraints on weapons delivery systems for the following reasons. As already suggested by Brennan, it is impossible to separate basic science from weapons technology, particularly in the fields of space technology and oceanography. For example, the amount of information of military value which we obtain from oceanographic research is quite comparable to that which the Navy gets from its own R and D program. Secondly, the privacy of an individual or a corporate research organization is a sacred thing. Inspection of government labs, for example, would not be sufficient in an R and D inspection program. It would also be necessary to inspect industrial labs which guard their trade secrets jealously. Thirdly, there are many significant weapons (like the Skybolt and Hounddog) which have been put into production with very little new R and D effort needed. Finally, constraints in such fields as missile guidance, warhead design, hardening research and development, etc., are inherently difficult. Consider how little research it takes to show that burying in sand may be effective as a means of hardening. The conclusion is that constraints on the testing of complete weapons systems and their production is best. Constraints on the development of components is less desirable and more difficult.

Brennan noted the importance of constraints and monitoring of non-military, as well as military, research and development. We might want to constrain continued improvement in the accuracy of missile guidance, for example. Such a constraint may make non-military progress more expensive, but still possible. There is a clear distinction between the guidance system for a Mars probe and an ICBM. The Mars probe guidance system would not require extreme accuracy if direction and velocity control are not limited to the outset of a flight. Thus, constraints on the ICBM may not hinder development of the Mars probe. The importance of non-military constraints is illustrated by the large amount of military "fall-out" we are getting from the NASA program. Barber agreed with much of this, but reiterated that the important point for inspection is at the end of a military production line, not at a research and development stage where there would be more ambiguity between military and non-military applications. It was recognized that a

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peaceful moonshot could be used in the calibration of the guidance system for an ICBM, but there is little we can do about this.

Phelps remarked that while a plateau of stability may be coming, predictions on developments after this are either highly intuitive or of a statistical nature. They are not as reliable as necessary for this sort of work. It is also true that the power in weapons has become very great in relation to targets, and even a small incremental change might have a disastrous effect in the arms race. Von Neumann has pointed out that the smaller nations of the world are no longer large enough to survive a modern war.

Schelling added two points. The first was that he thought one factor was working for stability in the long run, namely, that the "target" of a retaliatory attack--people--is not easy to change, hide, harden, keep mobile, etc., in spite of research and development advances. Because of its inertia, lethargy and fragility, the populace will always be more vulnerable than weapons and military forces. Biological weapons and attack by means of fall-out are difficult for R and D to counter. The second point is that, in constraining research, we must not only consider the effects on the research itself, but the lowering of morale in general. This may have very serious effects, not only in destroying creative science, but also in undermining democratic principles and the concept of arms control as a good thing. Prohibition was mentioned as an example of a "good thing" which undermined the forces of law as it was instituted.

Hadley agreed and went on to say that free experimentation is a cherished
advantage of U. S. science over that of Russia, and would tend to keep us
ahead of her technologically. Feld replied that research and develop-
ment constraints are not the main point at issue in scientific freedom.
He pointed out that industrial labs are less productive than university,
in general, because of the lack of the free exchange of ideas and openness
in the former. The discovery of nuclear fission in Germany became known
throughout the world in about six days due to the tradition of open com-
munication and close personal contact among the relatively few nuclear
physicists then active. On the other hand, the secrecy surrounding the
Manhattan Project was not the factor which hindered the Germans in their
attempts at developing atomic weapons (it may have hindered us). The
reasons that Germany failed were because they used the wrong approach
(heavy water) and because of the low morale of the scientists due to the
government's apathy and interference. The problem seems to be in devo-
loping reasonably accurate projections of the effects and dangers of a
new discovery rather than imposing restraints on the research leading to
the discovery. For this purpose, openness would seem a desirable end to
pursue.

Following up Schelling's contention that we don't want constraints because
research and development is leading toward a more stable world, Smithies
said that he found this argument difficult to accept on the basis that it
was technological development that had gotten us into our present un-
stable situation. He offered the simile that it might be argued as a
good thing to raise the speed limit for automobiles to 100 miles per

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hour on our highways. This would have the effect of making the automo-
bile, a more terrible instrument of destruction, and so it might be
hoped people would try more carefully to avoid accidents. It would seem
like a better idea to have constraints. Feld agreed with Smithies on
the need for constraining the exponential increase of technology. How-
ever, he noted that there are at present self-imposed restraints on
certain kinds of research (medical experimentation with untested new
drugs on humans, for example). It might be possible, in an arms-control-
led world, to restrain science from creating new means of mass destruc-
tion, particularly if the governments favored such a restraint. Admittedly
there is still the problem of what to do about a lone individual, unsus-
ceptible to pressure from his colleagues, who might come rushing to the
Defense Department with, say, a militarily significant antigravity machine.
Barber objected that such a gadget would not have any particular effect
on our deterrence, but Brennan was not so sure that this was the case.

It might be more valuable if one were to look at some of the more tan-
gible dangers emerging from research and development, rather than con-
sidering the "unknown" as generally dangerous, noted Schelling. Any
system of R and D constraints must be based upon a mutual desire for arms
control and an acknowledgement of this. Even if this were true, however,
any process of discussing possible areas of danger emerging from R and D
is fraught with dangers. It might be necessary to hint to the enemy the
possibility of developing weapons which could be of a decisive nature.
One way of overcoming a reluctance in communicating such ideas to the
enemy might be to have an international scientific mediator of some sort;
an agency with wide powers of inspection whose head would have the res-
ponsibility for recognizing sensitive information and disseminating it
to all governments in an acceptable fashion. Brennan noted that such a
mechanism does indeed exist now to a certain extent in the Pugwash con-
ferences. Barber felt that constraints on development were preferable to
those on basic research and, in particular, the constraints on the pro-
duction of weapons delivery vehicles was a good idea. He pointed out,
however, that the vehicle development program in itself is amoral; it
has both good and bad possibilities. It is which of these are developed
that counts. As an example, the Dyna-Soar is designed to carry a man in
a winged vehicle into space and to get him back safely. This is vital
to space exploration, but it also has considerable military possibilities.
Feld concurred that it was neither effective nor desirable to institute
controls on the first stages of research. The direction and the pace of
development is chosen only when a specific end product is envisaged. This
is the place to apply constraints. Using the example of nuclear fission
again, constraints could be used at the point of decision in favor of a
"Hanford" v.s. a "Shippingport" type of reactor. Development of these two
proceeded along quite different and clearly recognizable lines. Only the
Hanford Reactor is aimed at producing fissionable material useful for
weapons production.

There was some further discussion of a possible international authority
to inspect research and development programs. Smithies felt that such
an agency should have the right to investigate research programs at will
and to publish pertinent information on them. An ideal situation would

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be that such an agency would not only study research and development pro-
grams, but would have a budget of its own with which to promote R and D
along desirable, stabilizing lines. Thus, the agency would have a posi-
tive, as well as a negative, reason for its existence. The function of
disseminating information might suffice; there would be no need to give
the agency the power to impose actual constraints.

Returning to Barber's point about constraints on testing and production
of weapons, Feld wondered whether a Dyna-Soar produced for peaceful space
exploration, for example, couldn't be turned into a new weapon by merely
strapping a bomb onto it. Barber agreed that this sort of thing was
possible in principle, but that such a weapon would require an extensive
development program in order to have any accuracy

Smithies pointed out that thus far much of the discussion had centered on
methods of evading an agreement including R and D constraints. He brought
up the question as to whether one would enter into such an arms-control
agreement as a tactic to deceive the enemy or because one actually wanted
it to work. It ought to be assumed that the parties to the agreement have
some interest in making the agreement work, even though such an assumption
implied certain risks. It seemed to Coward that our concern was that
although we might enter into arms control in good faith, our motivation
might not be shared by the other side. Pool clarified this point a bit
further. It is futile to ask, he said, whether the other side really
wants arms control. The obvious answer is that they do and they don't.
They do want the security it brings, but they also want to get away with
whatever evasions they can. Smithies' point was that, although this
may be true, it has been our national position to assume that the Russians
would violate an arms-control agreement for the slightest advantage
when this in fact may not be their attitude at all.

One of the difficulties raised in connection with an agreement on R and D
constraints is the difficulty of discussing particular types of constraints
with the Russians for the fear that we will mention developments which we
have worked on and of which they are not yet aware. Without a compre-
hensive agreement this might seem to be playing into their hands. Brennan
mentioned that this was, in fact, one of the hazards of discussing our
weaknesses with the Soviets at the recent surprise-attack conference. We
have to take the risk of guessing about the motivations of the other
side. Orear mentioned our telling the Russians about the "big hole" de-
coupling theory last December in test ban negotiations. Many felt that had
we kept it secret, the Russians would not have thought of it. The fact
that we did tell them about implies that our negotiators believed they
didn't want to cheat on a test ban. Barber noted that one criterion of
whether to tell the Russians about new development or not might be the
ease with which we could detect their working on it. Smithies gave as a
dramatic example of a successful arms-control agreement the fact that po-
lice and criminals have "agreed" in London not to carry firearms. Any
individual criminal attempting to violate this agreement has considerable
pressure put upon him by his "colleagues," since it is recognized that
there is a common interest to both parties in keeping the agreement.

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It was pointed out by Feld that we should keep in mind the fact that a research and development constraint program is not the first thing we would try to agree upon. Is it likely to be a by-product of a comprehensive arms-limitation scheme, or a necessary component of one? He felt that the latter was the case, but Orear disagreed, remarking that an arms-control program would include enough inspection (nearly complete access) to give us most of the R and D information we would want as a by-product.

Barber emphasized again his feeling that the weapons systems being considered would most likely be caught in the development stages under any system as open as a general agreement. Brennan concurred and said that, provided sufficient effort was made, these developments could be caught enough in advance to provide adequate warning. Hadley still feared that inspection at the testing and development stage might be too late. Schelling thought that under a general inspection system it would not be necessary to tell the Russians specifically what we were looking for, but Brennan was of the opinion that telling them just this information might be a good thing. It then might be possible for us to agree not to build such a weapon if the Russians don't, and to work out some sort of a mutual re-assurance system which might guard against either side achieving an insurmountable lead in development of a new weapon. O'Sullivan suggested that we might perhaps develop certain things jointly, but this did not seem to be a fully satisfactory answer in cases in which a new type of weapon (like the H-bomb) might be destabilizing even if both countries have possession of it.

Participants:

B. Feld

J. Orear

M. Halperin

N. Hoepli

J. Phäls

W. Smith

M. Gerwitz

A. Barber

T. Schelling

T. O'Sullivan

A. Hadley

A. Smithies

D. Luce

I. Pool

R. Coward

RC, WS

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ACS-LG.

8/22/60

Seminar: THE PROBLEM OF CHINA

Remarks by: Dr. Feld

Most of our discussions of arms control have treated the problem as a bi-lateral one, with passing recognition of the fact that the problem is really more complex and in any working agreement, China must be considered. There are two sets of problems involved in applying a stabilized-deterrence arms control scheme to China. The first type of problem is what relevance has deterrence for China, and does it work at all? Related to this is the question of what sort of conflicts are likely to be initiated by the Chinese when faced with United States strategic deterrent capability? The deterrence situation vis-a-vis China will be particularly affected by whether they develop nuclear capability, either by themselves or with Soviet assistance.

The second type of question which is raised about China is whether it will be possible to get China into an arms control agreement. Of particular interest, of course, is an agreement which would be initiated within the next two to three years which would involve actions to be taken over the next decade or so. As an example, assuming that we sign a test ban agreement with the Russians in the near future, what are the chances that China will come in to such an agreement? To insure against nuclear tests in China, we would need stations there; what price will the Chinese demand for the privilege of bringing in inspectors? Similarly, what chance is there of inducing Chinese participation in a stabilized deterrent agreement?

Milburn expressed his concern over the fact that we had treated China as a frequent footnote case in discussions. In order to get some perspective on this problem, he has invited Robert North of Stanford University and Benjamin Schwartz from Harvard to discuss the Chinese situation with us.

Remarks by: Robert North

At Stanford, an extensive study has been conducted on the period of six weeks or so immediately prior to the outbreak of World War I. They have studied perceptions on the part of the powers involved of the external threat to them, the possibility of various coalitions, and the type and size of the conflict which they feared.

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In particular the perceptions of those decision-makers such as monarchs, prime ministers, etc., within each country whose decisions were binding on the state concerned were studied. It was found that both Germany and Austria-Hungary were disturbed about their insufficient military capability. However, Austria-Hungary was obsessively concerned with external threats far out of proportion to the actual threat. Everything in their environment was perceived by the leaders of Austria-Hungary as being a threat. In some cases, particularly in that of the Teutonic elements in Austria, these exaggerated impressions were also held by elements of the populace in the country concerned. In contrast, the British were little concerned with external threats, until the last two days, while the Germans were concerned to a greater degree than the British, but less than the Austria-Hungarians.

The Stanford study has also investigated the connections between decisions and the appropriate perceptions with which they could be associated. It appeared that Austria's perceptions were in many cases "incorrect", but the decisions made were consistent with these exaggerated perceptions. An important observation was that the greater the perceived threat, the less concerned were the nations involved with their own lack of military capability and the less deterrence worked on them. At the beginning of the crisis, there was little concern with allies, but as the tension increased, allies came to seem more important. In fact, the leaders of Austria-Hungary became ecstatic over the support of such small nations as Rumania and Montenegro.

A number of disturbing parallels may be discerned between the situation leading to World War I and our situation today, particularly as far as excessive concern with outside threats goes. (Bothwell noted the statement often made in the United States that it is impossible to push through defense appropriations, etc., unless there is a campaign to convince people that we are in a crisis.)

A number of comments can be made about the conflict between Moscow and Peking. It is instructive to look at some of Khrushchevs' clear statements about his ideology and compare them with those of Mao. Khrushchev has four main arguments:

1. that a major general war is not inevitable

2. that a nuclear war would destroy much of the world as we know it - damage would be incalculable

3. that the communists have enough military capability to deter an attack from the capitalist world

4. that the communists will win in the end without the necessity of a shooting war.

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These four main points represent a major shift from the Leninist theories to which Mao adheres closely. For example, Mao states that war is inevitable and that it is beyond human will to prevent, citing Lenin's work, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.

There is really nothing to fear from the damage of a nuclear war which would not be nearly sufficient to destroy civilization, particular in China. Just as Communism took root during World War I and spread over half the globe as a consequence of World War II, out of the ashes of World War III Communism will triumph over the world.

When one interviews engineers and diplomats from the Soviet Union who have worked in China the opinion is frequently expressed that the only power in the world which can win as a result of a nuclear war is China. In any such situation the United States and the Soviet Union would direct their massive attacks against each other as the technological and industrial bases of the alliance systems. Therefore, the argument is frequently put forward that the Chinese would do best without any nuclear capability so that it would be less likely that an attack would be directed at them. In the world emerging from the war China would then hold the balance.

Aggressive behavior can be expected from a nation confronted with a long series of frustrations. China has had in the past hundred years a number of very frustrating experiences, often at the hands of the West. Even pre-Communist literature is full of hate symbols for the West. The Chinese interpret the Korean war quite differently from the United States. It was not a draw, but a victory, in their eyes, fought as it was under great handicaps by a regime still consolidating its power.

It would seem more likely that China, not the Soviet Union, would trigger a nuclear war. The Soviets, having suffered the devastation of modern war, are well aware of the consequences of a nuclear war - probably more so than Americans. As the years go by, the Russians will have less to gain, and more to lose from initiating a nuclear war.

If we can only find the key, it thus seems likely that the Russians can be approached with measures designed to reduce the threat of nuclear war. Today, the whole Communist block is in ideologic ferment. There are three basic positions; that of Khrushchev, of Mao and of Tito. Too many Americans have assumed that the Communist block is really monolithic, which it obviously has not been in recent years.

Benjamin Schwartz agreed with much of the analysis given by North. He felt, that in some respects, however, it was a bit too pessimistic. There is always the danger of seeing a short term party line which the Chinese may be following, only for the moment, as the secular tendency rather than a line which will change with changing situations. Some Chinese documents seem to have said not that war was inevitable

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with the capitalist world, but rather that the Communists should not be afraid of war if it should come. North replied that he has seen many categorical statements on the part of the Chinese that an imperialist war is inevitable, although he does not claim to have exhausted all of the literature on this subject. These statements seemed particularly evident when Khrushchev was in the United States and just prior to the U-2 incident. In the first case they were proclaiming that "revisionism is more dangerous than imperialism".

The peak of Chinese anger seemed to come just before the U-2 incident and North has the hunch that Khrushchev was busy using this incident to help him re-align his support. Presumably, he had done so by June 12th, when he began his counter-blasts. The Rumanian Conference, which followed aimed quite clearly at China.

Another hopeful aspect of the situation, pointed out Schwartz, is that since the Russians and the Chinese have a common ideology, what one does, presumably will, in time, influence the other. North agreed with this, but pointed out that the difference in levels of technological and industrial development between Russia and China must make it extraordinarily difficult to coordinate policy between the two.

## II

### Discussion:

Bothwell asked whether there were any supporters of the Khrushchev view in China. North replied that there very possibly were. However, if they do exist, they are definitely lying low since the 100 flowers period was brought to its abrupt end. Schwartz added that in 1958 a group did appear which criticized the Communes as petty bourgeois fanaticism, although the Chinese generally disclose nothing to us about the factions within the country.

There is no exact parallel, of course, between China and Austria-Hungary. North said. China is a power on the way in, while Austria-Hungary was on the way out. However, both are societies with a high degree of internal dissatisfaction and with an urge to maintain or to establish prestige. A question was raised concerning China's in-again out-again attitude on an atom free zone in Asia. North replied that China appears to move back and forth between perceptions of extreme threat and hostility, and a desire to be recognized as a great power. It is very doubtful, however, that recognition would be sufficient at this point. In fact, China might not find this at all rewarding. However, the act of recognition, Milburn pointed out, conceivably would be easier if our leaders thought that they would not reward the Chinese through recognition.

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It is certainly not likely that recognition would be rewarding for a long period, said Schwartz. China's real motivation seem to stem from the desire to grow as a nation and to talk the way that they perceive their interest lies. It is quite conceivable that they might make a few gestures to the United States just to demonstrate their independence to the Soviets. North agreed that Communist ideology has never been immutable and that it might easily change. Moreover it is not an all-controlling factor. There is too much of a tendency, he thought, for us to see the Soviet Union as the one great enemy, and to ascribe all mischief to the leaders in the Kremlin. The point here is that status and prestige are, along with many other political and economic factors, involved in the causes of war. At this point China is much more of a dissatisfied nation in most respects than Russia. At some later time they may be more interested in the status quo. Certainly Germany was a classic case of dissatisfaction between the World Wars, and this dissatisfaction was not entirely economic.

Americans started out some time ago arguing that Mao might well turn out to be a Tito. Since it has proven not to be so, we now tend to try to avoid discussion of China. We inevitably use a diachronic solution passing China by. Actually both the Soviet Union and China are in states of flux. We must look at each of them and realize that these are different kinds of flux.

We are, unfortunately, in a position of knowing very little about China due to our lack of communication with that nation, said McNeil. In fact, we might well prefer to cast China as our chief enemy rather than the Soviet Union if we knew more about China.

There was some discussion as to whether the U-2 incident indicated that Khrushchev was losing out in Russia to the advocates of the stronger line similar to that advanced by China. North hypothesized that the U-2 incident weakened Khrushchev's position with respect to his opponents.

One definite difference in attitude between the Chinese and the Soviets is vis-a-vis the new nations which are coming into existence. The Chinese are far more interested in proselytizing these nations, giving them the message of development which they believe that they carry. The Soviets, on the other hand, approve far more of the neutralism of these countries, saying that time is on the side of Communism. From this there emerges a divergence on how to deal with these new nations. It would be a grievous error, added North, if we were to perceive the Communist threat only in terms of weapons. If they were to win the world at all, it may well be in non-military ways.

Frisch turned the discussion to the problem of whether China would enter an arms control agreement involving inspection. Schwartz pointed out that they have said that they would certainly not join

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anything in the negotiation of which they were not involved.

Certainly, said North, if the Soviet Union is difficult to get into such an agreement, China will be much harder. Trying to get the two of them together in an agreement is something like trying to get two paranoids together, although of course all negotiations bring out the paranoid in us. However, someone must advance elements of trust sometime if the negotiations are to succeed.

We may look at a number of questions concerning the problem of China as a potential nuclear power, said Feld, a situation which they can certainly achieve, unaided, in six or seven years. There is the question of whether Russia will continue to withhold nuclear weapons from China. There is also the problem of bringing China into an agreement which would limit their own capability. It might prove necessary to give nuclear weapons to China in order to get such an agreement. What pressures or bribes could we use in order to buy an agreement? North raised the question of why the Soviet Union has not yet given the Chinese nuclear weapons. Feld believed that it was probably that they wished to avoid nuclear war and simply did not trust the Chinese. Hadley suggested that this might well be a quid pro quo for our not giving such weapons to Germany. Salerno noted that parity at least has been a criterion in this arms race of the willingness to negotiate. How can we get around this with China?

We have thus far definitely skirted the problem of China in respect to the test ban. It is very doubtful that the Senate would let pass unnoticed such an omission if there could be no inspection stations in China. Thus we may be cutting our own throats by not considering this. The only pressure which could seem to be brought on China, said Schwartz, would stem from a desire to put on a benign face to the non-Western world. However, considering recent events in Tibet and India, this hardly seems a heavy pressure.

Schwartz suggested that considering the rapid changes in the Communist line, it might be worth establishing some fabric of communication with the Chinese. McNeil suggested that we get together in conferences on non-controversial topics such as urbanization. Unfortunately such conferences are more easily carried out where there is at least some area in which each side can display some accomplishment. The Chinese being behind in so much does not assist in this. Feld noted that the Pugwash experience with the Chinese has not been good at all. Nevertheless, suggested Salerno, experience indicates that channels other than diplomatic ones allow more acceptance of information. It was generally agreed that such a program certainly could serve as no more than a small educational adjunct to a program attempting to get together with China. North noted that all of our information at this point only indicates that you simply cannot talk to the Chinese at this point. Schwartz agreed with Feld that a change could very quickly alter this. During the 100 flowers period at least minimal contacts were possible. If we have no means of contact, noted McNeil, we will not be able to detect changes.

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There was some discussion of the possibility of inviting both China and France to participate in the Geneva Test Ban negotiations. If this were done, however, it would be very difficult to get around the problem of recognition. Coward pointed out that this was a well reported platform for the world while the negotiations between the United States and Communist China in Poland are relatively unpublicized. Furthermore, Schwartz pointed out, as of now they will not accept recognition without Formosa.

At this time, said North, the United States and China are at a complete impasse and there seems to be no way out for the present. Each side reinforces this attitude in the other and there is no prospect of a change unless some central factor is altered. While a change in leadership might assist in this, it is not likely to be enough. At present all we can do is take some very small steps in small areas in an effort to alleviate the problem. In short, at this time there seems to be no price at all which we could pay in order to gain China's participation in an arms control agreement.

Schwartz remains unconvinced that the Chinese take nuclear war lightly. Their line might be interpreted to be that a fearful attitude taken vis-a-vis unclear war would weaken the sense of struggle in the world and therefore should not be shown toward the West.

During the summer we have frequently considered the possibility of a stabilized deterrent, said Milburn. One argument for first strike forces, however, would be that these would serve to deter Chinese attack on such as Burma. This, however, might well not be true if North's hypothesis on Chinese attitudes is correct. Certainly, Schwartz pointed out, if their attitude were as extreme as we have suggested, the question arises as to why things have been so quiet around Quemoy and Burma recently.

There was some discussion of the pressures which the Soviet Union might put upon China in order to induce them to participate in an arms control agreement. Coward questioned whether the Soviets would be willing to strain their alliance with the Chinese over such an issue if the Chinese were adamantly against it. The failure of such an attempt would leave them with a broken alliance and no arms control agreement. Since the Soviets seem to want agreements such as the test ban, it was pointed out that they must have something in mind.

However, Bothwell suggested that this is based on the assumption that they must be sincere in the test ban negotiations, which they may well not be. Some doubts were also raised as to whether a deterrent system would actually work against the Chinese, considering their expressed attitude on population.

Generally speaking, the discussion tended to the feeling that the Chinese situation is a depressing one. Certainly within the near

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Chinese Military Policy
Some Comments on the Problem

[L]

The importance of China in considering current military policies and strategies and possible arms control agreements is perhaps too obvious to belabor. Nevertheless, virtually all discussion on the problem of deterrence and the problems of arms control have avoided China and have focused exclusively on the Russian threat. I can identify a series of problems relating to China and point out the scarcity of data and even speculation on these problems without being able to suggest any solutions, or provide definitive information. The problem of China, in effect, has two dimensions. One is the dimension of time and the other is the dimension of the problems being faced. One has the problem of China now, and China in X number of years when it has a nuclear force and a delivery capability.

The first problem is the problem of the strategic deterrent, preventing China from starting an all-out war by an attack on the United States. At the present time, this is a relatively unimportant problem. China lacks both the delivery capability and the nuclear forces to start such a war. Estimates as to when China would have such capability tend to be around ten years from the present. There is virtually no speculation about what the Chinese motives would be for starting such a war, or her strategy in an attack on the United States. It has been pointed out that the Chinese seem less afraid of a total nuclear war than the United States or the Soviet Union.

The second problem is that of arms control, and here one again faces the two problems of what will the Red Chinese agree to now and what will their attitude be when they have nuclear weapons and delivery capability. Here again, in focusing on the problem of negotiating an arms control agreement, most of the attention is centered on the Soviet Union and little has been asked about the willingness of the Chinese to accept an arms control agreement and their willingness to submit to inspection, and the degree to which it is possible to contain the Chinese by an arms control and disarmament agreement.

Undoubtedly, the crucial question for the moment is the Chinese propensity to start limited wars. The question of whether limited war involving China and the United States could be kept limited and not grow into nuclear limited war and finally into nuclear total war, and the question of the relationship between the Chinese expansionist goals and the possibility of an arms control agreement, are critical. On the question of the likelihood of the Chinese starting a limited war, there is very little information that can pin this question down. General consensus seems to be that the Chinese are not likely to start a limited war because of their success in methods of subversion, etc. The big exception to this, of course, is Quemoy and Matsu where certainly the Chinese have displayed a willingness to use military means. It is not clear at all just how far they are willing to go, and what has been restraining them. Much of this analysis took place before the Chinese invasions of parts of Indian territory, and we have yet to have any real analysis of what they were after here, and whether

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this reflects a greater Chinese willingness to engage in limited wars or not. One would have to explore this question very critically in deciding whether an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union would affect the Chinese desire to start limited wars and whether, in fact, it could survive a Chinese limited war.

Cutting through these questions is perhaps the critical question of the Chinese attitude towards nuclear weapons. The literature indicates that, prior to 1955, the Chinese exhibited very little interest in nuclear weapons. Chinese military strategy took the view that nuclear weapons would not be effective against the Chinese, both because of the size of their army and the nature of their logistic systems, and because of the large Chinese population. The feeling was that nuclear weapons would not be effective in a war against China and that China had no need for nuclear weapons. In the period around 1955, corresponding to a change in Soviet attitudes towards nuclear weapons, the Chinese began to develop an interest in nuclear forces and since then seem to have undertaken a drive to get nuclear weapons, although the extent of their effort is unknown. At the moment, Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons involve a crucial ambivalence. On one hand, the Chinese seem to recognize the important role of nuclear weapons, the decisive effect which they might have in a war, the importance of the Russian threat of massive retaliation as an umbrella under which the Chinese can carry on local military activity. On the other hand, the Chinese are reluctant to stress their reliance on the nuclear umbrella of the Russians. There has been a debate going on among the Chinese military leaders, who are reluctant to rely on Russia for a crucial element of their military strategy, and the political leaders, who stress the reliability of the Russian umbrella. These ambivalences reflected the Chinese attitudes towards a nuclear free zone in Asia. In general, they have favored such a zone, reflecting the fact that it would put them on a level of parity with the United States and would reduce their dependence on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it would interfere with the Chinese desire to develop a nuclear capability which would make them a major world power.

All that I have done here is to raise in a very sketchy way the problems of Chinese military policy. The literature available does not provide any ability to be much more precise. There is very little discussion of Chinese military policy, of the Chinese desire to get nuclear weapons, of the extent of the Chinese capability in this field, or of the problems that the Chinese would face in developing nuclear weapons. Probably this is partly a function of the fact that this technical information may be classified, but is basically a function of the fact that there has been very little research in the United States on China. This is reflected in a recent article by Howard L. Boorman entitled "The Study of Contemporary Chinese Politics: Some Remarks on Retarded Development", which appears in World Politics, XII, (July, 1960), 585 - 589. Here he discusses the lack of research on China and identifies the major areas of ignorance, including that of military strategy. It is clear that a great deal needs to be done in this field and that there are critical questions about China which need to be answered in assessing any arms control agreements and in devising any suitable arms control scheme.

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The best sources that do exist on China are the following: The work of Mao on protracted war is perhaps vital background information to understand the Chinese strategy which was successful in the civil war, and which is being used by the Communists throughout Asia. The book by Rigg is valuable in getting some feel for the development and the strategy of the People's Liberation Army of China. The pieces by Mrs. Hsieh and the Barnett article in the *Daedalus* volume are the only available ones which deal at all with Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons. The essay by Robert Barnett is valuable in assessing the effectiveness of the nuclear threat against China, and the chapter in Doak Barnett's book provides information about the general problems of Chinese military policy. Finally, the piece by Whiting is valuable in assessing the military relationship between the Soviet Union and China.

What follows is an annotated bibliography and selected reading. Most of the rest of the material is available in the library.

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An Annotated Bibliography
on Chinese Military Policy

Morton H. Halperin

Baldwin, Harrison W. "China as a Military Power," *Foreign Affairs* XXX (Oct. 1951) 51-62. Argues that China lacks the industrial potential as well as adequate communications, and sea and air power to be a major world power. The Russians are training Chinese soldiers and supplying them with jets and other equipment but are unlikely to be willing to develop a self-sufficient Chinese army. Presents a picture of an illiterate but dedicated Chinese soldier, who exhibits blind adherence to orders, but lacks initiative.

Barnett, A. Doak. *Communist China and Asia*. New York: Harpers (For the Council on Foreign Relations) 1960. An excellent study of the problem of Communist China. Chapter 6 (pp. 110-146) is a discussion of Chinese military power and Chinese military aims. Argues that prior to 1955 the Chinese felt that nuclear weapons would not be decisive in a war, but since then there has been a shift in Chinese thinking and a determination to get such weapons. Feels that the Chinese are unlikely to start either limited or total war, except perhaps over the offshore islands, and that the major danger is subversion and indirect aggression.

Barnett, Robert. "Quemoy: The Use and Consequence of Nuclear Deterrence," (mimeo.) Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1960. A study of Chinese and American action and communication during the Quemoy crisis. An excellent treatment of the problem of communicating threats, including the American threat to use nuclear weapons. Argues that China will probably be able to get nuclear weapons from the Russians if the United States uses them in the Taiwan Straits area.

Boorman, Howard L. et. al. *Moscow-Peking Axis: Strengths and Strains*. New York: Harpers (For the Council on Foreign Relations) 1957. A study of the political, economic and ideological strengths and strains of the Moscow-Peking Axis, with little attention given to military and strategic problems.

Chang-Tu Hu et. al. *China: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture*. New Haven: Human Relations Area File Press, 1960. A study of Chinese society with emphasis on social and cultural problems. Some discussion of Chinese military power and industrial potential.

Chiu, S. M. "Chinese Communist Army in Transition," *Far Eastern Survey* XXVII (Nov. 1958) 168-75. A technical study of the changes in the Chinese Communist army resulting from the switch from guerilla warfare to regular status. Some comments on the development of the Chinese air force.

______. "A History of the Chinese Communist Army," an unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of Southern California Library.

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Garvey, James Emmott. *Marxist-Leninist China: Military and Social Doctrine*. New York: Exposition Press, 1930. Assumes the Chinese military system and method is in accord with the orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory and practice, and works deductively from this assumption to explain Chinese military policy. The book is very theoretical and has little relevance to contemporary military problems of Communist China. It contains an interesting analysis of Mao's writings and of the classical Marxist-Leninist military tradition, and includes an extensive bibliography. Chapter 7 (pp. 307-50) is a summarizing chapter and includes everything of value in the book.

Hsieh, Alice Langley. "Communist China and Nuclear Warfare," *The China Quarterly* I (April-June 1960) 1-15. An excellent study of Chinese attitudes towards nuclear warfare. Traces the switch in 1955 towards the acceptance of the new Soviet view of the dominant importance of nuclear weapons. Discusses the debate between the military and the Party over the extent to which China should and could rely on the Soviet nuclear deterrent to prevent American attack. Discusses the vacillating Chinese attitudes towards the proposal for an Asian atomic free zone.

——, The Significance of Chinese Communist Treatment of Khruschhev's January 14th Speech on Strategy. RAND, RM-2534, February 19, 1960. Analyzes the Chinese Communists' reaction to Khruschhev's speech in which he threatened to use massive retaliation and extended the massive retaliation blanket to the entire Socialist world. The Chinese emphasized the disarmament aspects of the speech and the fact that they would have to participate in any disarmament conference which would bind them. They ignored Khruschhev's stress on nuclear weapons and missiles and his willingness to extend massive retaliation to all Socialist states. Concludes that the key to Chinese major military moves against the United States continues to remain in Moscow, and that while Russia has extended the threat of massive retaliation to action against China it has not given China a blank check to use this threat. Points out that the resolution of the Berlin question might have important consequences for Russian and Chinese expectations in regard to Taiwan.

Ikle, Fred C. *The Growth of China's Scientific and Technical Manpower*. RAND, RM-1893, April 24, 1957. Argues that by the 1960's China will have the trained manpower to be a major industrial power.

Katzenbach, Edward L. and Hanrahan, Gene Z. "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung," *Political Science Quarterly* LXX (Sept. 1955) 321-40. Analyzes Mao's strategy of guerilla warfare as based on his writings. Argues that Mao's thinking derives partly from Marxist sources and partly from classics of military doctrine but is largely an original statement of the strategy for guerilla war. The central problems are to combine dispersion and concentration, to be patient and to gain time. The three stages of warfare, according to Mao, are the strategic defensive, the stalemate, and finally the strategic offensive. Mao's strategy has been used extensively by Communist forces throughout Asia.

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Kuter, Lawrence. "The Meaning of the Taiwan Strait Crisis," *Air Force XLII* (March 1959) 103-112. A recounting of the military activity during the Taiwan Strait crisis with the argument that the U. S. threat to expand the action was effective in deterring the Chinese.

Liu, F. F. *A Military History of Modern China 1924-1949*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. Mainly a history of the Nationalist army with emphasis on the role of foreign advisers in training the army.

Mao, Tse-Tung. *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (1938)*. The classic statement of Mao's strategy of protracted (guerilla) warfare.

Maurach, Bruno. "Zehn Jahre Chinesische Wehrpolitik," *Revue Militaire Generale* (May 1960) 619-38. Surveys ten years of Chinese military policy.

*National Policy Machinery in Communist China*. Study submitted to the Committee on Government Operations of the United States Senate by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Congress, First Session, 1959. An excellent study of the policy making machinery in Communist China including a short discussion of the military structure.

North, Robert C. "The New Expansionism," *Problems of Communism IX* (Jan.-Feb. 1960) 23-30. Traces the traditional Chinese desire for expansion, and relates it to present policy.

Ostrolowska, N. von. "The Development of the Chinese Red Army," *Military Review XXXIX* (Jan. 1960) 82-87. Traces the development and formation of the PLA.

"Peking on Co-existence," *Foreign Affairs* XXXVIII (July 1960) 676-81. An annotated reprint of an article from *Red Flag*. States the Chinese doctrine on the inevitability of war and contains several references to the Chinese willingness to give up nuclear weapons and to have a nuclear free zone in the Far East.

Rigg, Robert B. "Red Army in Retreat," *Current History* XXXII (Jan. 1957) 1-6. A review of the military lessons learned by the Chinese in Korea and the effort to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

______. Red China's Fighting Hordes. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1951. An excellent, somewhat technical study of Chinese military history. Generally suggests that Chinese military power is not as great as one might suppose. Traces the transition of the PLA from a guerilla force to a modernized regular army.

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Strausz-Hupe, Robert, et. al. *Protracted Conflict*. New York: Harpers, 1959.
A study of Russo-Chinese military and strategic policy.

Walker, Richard L. "The Chinese Red Army," The New Republic CXXXVI (May 13, 1957) 39-42. Part of a special issue devoted to Communist China. Points out that all of the top Chinese leaders have had military combat experience. Traces the efforts to modernize and mechanize the PLA.

Whiting, A. S. *Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis*. RAND, RM-1992, Sept. 24, 1957. Traces contradictions in the economic, ideological, and military realms. Soviet military deliveries to China have totaled 22 billion dollars. This has all been a loan, and the Chinese now have this debt to the Russians. Since 1954-55, China has had the capability to carry on limited war without Russian military aid. The Chinese are still dependent on the Russians for air and sea power, and in the event of general war would have to rely on the Russian nuclear threat, because of their lack of missiles and nuclear weapons. Only bottlenecks of the Chinese for limited military action are electronic equipment, jet engines, and petroleum products.

Barnett, A. Doak. "The Inclusion of Communist China in an Arms-Control Program," *Daedalus* LXXXIX (Fall 1960). Argues that China is attempting to develop nuclear weapons as soon as possible and may well be able to explode a device within three years. Feels that China is not likely to agree to any arms control scheme without gaining political concessions. Hence political stabilization must precede disarmament in Asia.

## Documents

Publications of the U. S. Consulate General in Hong Kong:

*The Current Background*. Publishes translations of important Chinese Communist documents and statements

*Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP)*. Publishes New China News Agency (NCNA) English language releases and significant articles from mainland newspapers.

*The Chinese Propaganda Review (CCPR)*. Published from Aug. 1951 to Aug. 1953. Translated articles from Chinese magazines.

(These three series are generally available in libraries throughout the country.)

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*. These are summaries and verbatim accounts of radio broadcasts of most foreign countries including extensive reprints of broadcasts from the Chinese Communist radio.

July 27, 1960

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July 21, 1960

READINGS ON CHINESE MILITARY POLICY

I. Barnett, A. Doak, *Communist China and Asia*, New York: Harpers, 1960, pp. 145-146.

"Perhaps the ultimate military problem, in Asia as elsewhere, is that of disarmament. In the present atmosphere of Asia, however, there is little prospect of discovering useful approaches to it. Until existing conflicts of interest and tensions can be substantially reduced, any steps which might weaken the already unstable military position of the non-Communist nations in the region would be completely unrealistic.

In terms of the world-wide problem of disarmament, however, it is difficult to see how measures for arms control—including, for example, means of controlling nuclear weapons tests—can be made effective without including the territory and the military forces of Communist China within their scope.* Certainly Communist China would have to be included in any international inspection system if it were to be made effective. Any agreement which embraced the major Western powers but only one of the two major partners in the Soviet bloc would provide the Communists with such great opportunities for evasion that its enforceability would be dubious.

In the long run, if progress is to be made toward the regulation of armaments, the West will have to deal with Peking as well as Moscow on these questions. Furthermore, since the chief military problem in Asia today is the overwhelming predominance of Communist China's conventional ground forces, any arms control measures which concentrated on the control or limitation of nuclear weapons alone would not get to the root of the security problems in that part of the world.

Disarmament is, in any case, a problem for the future rather than for the immediate present in Asia. Before any real progress can be made toward arms control in that region, a more stable military balance must first be achieved. Only then, perhaps, can a basis be established for working gradually toward a reduction of military tensions, as a prerequisite for arms control measures which would include Communist China as well as the other major nations concerned with the power balance in Asia."

*On February 22, 1959, Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson stated that 'if it were possible to establish a sound workable system for controlling armaments or nuclear tests or surprise attacks—a system that truly protected our national security—then, of course, I believe Red China should be included.' He stressed the fact that such a system would have to be 'sound' and 'workable' and underlined the fact that Peking has 'repeatedly broken promises' over the past decade. *Disarmament and Foreign Policy*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 86th Congress (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959).

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## II. United States Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery in Communist China, 1959, "The Party and the Armed Forces," pp. 13-14.

"Although party supremacy over the army is a cardinal Communist doctrine, the 'military viewpoint' in China does carry some weight in the formulation of national policy. Five members of the party Politburo made their mark as political officers in the armed forces. Continuous indoctrination of military personnel is designed to promote viewpoints in line with party thinking on major issues.

The party Politburo, or Standing Committee acting for the Politburo, is the ultimate arbiter of military policy. At a lower level in the party, the Military Committee may make policy recommendations. The committee which meets irregularly is important in articulating policy and has explained major policy lines in several long sessions....

In the government, the Ministry of Defense implements the general directives issued by the party's Military Committee and engages in the routine business of operating the military machine on the mainland. Such weight as the ministry carries in actual policy formation derives from the high party rank of its officials. The present minister is a member of the inner core of power, the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

Under the government constitution, one other organization, the National Defense Council, is concerned with military affairs. It has at most an advisory role; more likely it exists as a purely honorific body. It has been convened only four times for sessions of 2 days each since 1954. Many of its members are not Communists. Almost one-third of its members are former Chinese Nationalist generals and it includes a fairly large number of party faithfuls who have been, so to speak, put out to pasture."

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III. Whiting, Allen S., "Contradictions" in the Moscow-Peking Axis, RAND, RM-1992, September 24, 1957, "The Military Component," pp. 3-10.

"Whatever else may follow from the Sino-Soviet alliance, its irreducible minimum would appear to be the military obligation of each partner to 'immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal' in the event of 'being attacked by Japan or any state allied with her.'¹ Such a pledge has no absolute guarantee of observance and the terminology permits of varying interpretation. At the very least, however, this commitment compels an opponent, clearly conceived by the signatories as the United States, to weigh seriously the possibility of Soviet assistance to China in the event of hostilities with Peking. Indeed, much suggests this was the critical factor limiting American action during the Korean war.

At the very most this clause offers China the protective power of long-range Soviet aircraft and submarines. Even should such equipment come into the hands of China shortly, there is no immediate possibility of Peking's independent participation in the race for nuclear weapons and missiles systems. The Soviet and American lead time in such developments combined with China's severe shortage of technical and human resources compels Peking to rely upon Moscow's shield against this type of external attack.

Aside from treaty obligations the military component has operated both to tie the partners in the past and to lessen their interdependence in the future. While Peking's military strength is kept secret, experienced observers estimate that China possesses upwards of 2,500 aircraft of which more than half are jet.² Many pilots received battle training in Korea or have seen action against Nationalist sorties from Taiwan. In addition a massive army of perhaps 2.5 million men has been re-equipped and modernized since the Korean war began in 1950. Last and least is the Chinese navy with primarily patrol craft but perhaps including submarine units of token size.

Virtually all this force is from Soviet deliveries, financed by large loans from Moscow. In 1957, Li Hsien-nien, vice premier and minister of finance, revealed that China's indebtedness to the Soviet Union exceeded previously

1. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., February 14, 1950, Article I, in H. Wei, *China and Soviet Russia*, D. Van Nostrand, Co., New York, p. 314.

2. Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, "Red Army In Retreat," *Current History*, vol. XXXII, no. 185, January 1957; and Richard L. Walker, "The Chinese Red Army," *The New Republic*, May 13, 1957, p. 39.

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announced figures by U.S. $2.0 billion.¹ This confirmed earlier Chinese references to sizeable although unspecified amounts received in 1954-1955 for Soviet military shipments.² Taking this into account together with information Li offers on the timing of loan receipts, we may conclude that most if not all of the U.S. $2.0 billion covered military imports from Soviet Russia.³

We know nothing of the terms for settlement except that little if any came on an outright grant basis. Lung Yün, a vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, reportedly protested, 'It is unreasonable for China to bear all the expenses of the resist-America aid-Korea war,' reminding his listeners that 'during the second world war, the United States granted loans and leases to her allies. Later some of these allies refused to pay back the loans while the United States excused some from repayment. It will take us more than ten years to repay the loans from the Soviet Union if we can ever repay them. Besides we have to pay interest to the Soviet Union. China fought for socialism, but look at the result!'⁴ Although counterattacks criticized Lung

1 Li Hsien-nien, "Final Accounts for 1956 and the 1957 State Budget," NCNA-English, Peking, June 29, 1957, in CB, no. 464. In February 1950 a Soviet loan of U.S. $300 million was announced. A second loan of 520 million rubles, or U.S. $130 million at the official rate of exchange, came with the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Peking in October 1954. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Richard Moorsteen of The RAND Corporation for his invaluable advice and assistance in the economic sections of this paper.

2 Li Hsien-nien, "Final Accounts for 1954 and the 1955 State Budget," in CB, no. 336, explained significant increases expected in 1955 revenue from loans 'in the fact that aside from the equipment which the Soviet Government turned over without compensation when the Soviet forces withdrew by the end of May 1955 from the naval base of Lushun (Port Arthur), the Soviet Government handed over to us much military material in the form of a loan.'

3 Thus Li in his 1957 report, op. cit., claims more than U.S. $1.0 billion was received before 1953, although announced loans for this period came to only U.S. $300 million with scheduled deliveries planned at U.S. $180 million. The Korean war undoubtedly accounts for the difference. Similarly he claims that more than U.S. $1.4 billion was borrowed from the Soviet Union since 1953 of which all but U.S. $35 million arrived prior to 1956. This agrees with budget reports for 1954-1955 in suggesting significant amounts of Soviet military support during this time, perhaps in preparation for a move against Taiwan for which Peking undertook intensive and expensive propaganda moves.

4 NCNA, Peking, June 18, 1957, reporting a Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee Group Meeting held during the so-called "rectification campaign." Lung Yün, a former Yunnan warlord, is a prominent member of the 'democratic parties' which allegedly share in the government of China. He accompanied Politburo member, Peng Chen, on a much publicized tour of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe following the Hungarian uprising in November 1956.

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for 'anti-Soviet' statements, no speaker challenged his facts.

Li's admission that by mid-1957 China's credits with Soviet Russia neared an end and aocompanying stress on the need to decrease imports because of re-stricted export capacity both suggest that Peking considers its present force sufficient for anticipated needs. Defensively it can repel any invasion from neighboring territory, even if backed with limited United States air and sea power. Offensively it needs no further Soviet assistance to stage an attack upon the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu unless the American response would strike at key points throughout mainland China, in which case Soviet assistance seems certain. Limited operations along the Burmese border or in support of civil wars in Laos or Viet Nam similarly lie within the capability of Peking, unaided by Moscow.

While Peking's freedom to maneuver militarily does not encompass operations incurring general war with the United States, this restriction appears academic in view of the absence of such grandiose ambitions in present Chinese policy. The most likely action is limited action and here independence of Soviet support is apparent. Except for critical deliveries of electronic equipment, jet engines, and petroleum products, maintenance of the armed forces can now be undertaken by China. Thus disagreement with Soviet strategy is a real alternative open to Chinese planners should they calculate American intervention as unlikely or minimal in its effect. An attack upon Taiwan, lies within Chinese capabilities. The likelihood and the nature of American retaliation varies according to the commitments of strength elsewhere in the world and the availability of strength made possible by annual Congressional appropriations. In the event that Peking sees Washington as more of a 'paper dragon' than does Moscow, Moscow's advice to the contrary might well go ignored.¹ The ultimate sanction which Moscow could apply in such an eventuality would be prior notice to Peking, abrogating the Treaty of Alliance in the event of all-out American attack. Yet this threat carries serious liabilities for the Soviet Union, given the value of a strong ally covering its Central Asian and Far Eastern flanks.

Thus within the context of the alliance the military dependence of China upon Russia has decreased significantly since 1950-1953. Conversely China is more of a military asset to Russia. The net effect is to increase Chinese bargaining power, or put differently, to make more possible independent action by China. In the world context, however, military developments within both Russia and the United States make more necessary than ever Soviet assistance to China in the event of war with America.

How likely does Peking conceive this war to be? Chou En-lai remarked in 1957 that industrial development along China's coast was to be encouraged now that

¹ This statement is framed exclusively within the consideration of the military factor. Economic and ideological factors will be considered at a later point.

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the threat of attack was held less serious than two years previously. In a major speech the same year Mao Tse-tung was rumored to have predicted no general war likely for at least eight years, although this forecast did not appear in the revised version published several months later.¹ Both official propaganda and economic policy suggest little concern over imminent war with the United States, in contrast with the critical winter of 1954-55. This reduction of fear for general war might encourage Peking to engage in limited war, with or without approval from Moscow. At the very least it permits greater independence in other spheres of action should economic or political considerations warrant.

At the same time the Communist view of a hostile world, headed by an armed America, remains operative in extreme situations. Explicit statement of this came in an authoritative comment on the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Postulating the consequences of a 'counter-revolutionary victory' in Hungary, the editors of the communist youth journal, *Chung Kuo Ching Nien* warned, 'What would follow then is: incidents would constantly occur on the Hungarian borders, and frequent armed conflicts result from provocations against the Soviet Union. This eventually would lead to large-scale war... Whither we would go is also clear: war.'² This is the stark meaning underlying the ritualistic formula of Mao and Chou, proclaiming the Sino-Soviet alliance 'an indomitable bulwark of world peace.' In the last analysis, the alliance is vital to China's interests as perceived from Peking.

1. Mao Tse-tung, *On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among The People*, NCNA, June 18, 1956, "revised by the author," originally delivered on February 27, 1957 to the 11th session (enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference; CB, no. 458. Polish reports on the speech appeared intermittently in *The New York Times* prior to its publication in China and agreed with the final version in most instances, although most foreign policy references appear to have been deleted in the revision.

2. *Chung Kuo Ching Nien*, "Several Questions on the Current Movement of International Communism (reference materials for study of current events)" by editorial office of the magazine, ECMM, no. 64. I have reversed the order or the two parts of this quotation for clarity. The original article places the forecast of events immediately after the reference to 'Whither we go...' in justification of this statement.

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ACS-W13 (revised)

11/7/60

The U. S. S. R. and Arms Control

by
George Fischer

Ever since Hiroshima the question of arms control has commanded some attention in the United States. But until a year or two ago, systematic effort was limited to a very few groups and individuals in and out of the government. Whether we think of arms control as complete or partial disarmament, or as "mutual arms accommodation" not necessarily involving disarmament at all -- regardless of the definition it is clear that the United States is now moving toward a new, more intensive consideration of the question. And since today the United States and the U. S. S. R. are the two major factors involved, information about the U. S. S. R. must, inevitably play a major role in the growing American discussions of arms control.

A. <u>American Discussions on Arms Control</u>

It is in terms of this vantage point of the U. S. S. R. that I recently explored the American discussions. I did so by participating in the Arms Control Study of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Boston) in the Summer of 1960, and at the same time surveying the American literature in the field. From this specific vantage point, my main reaction has been one of shock -- shock at how few concrete facts and analyses about the U. S. S. R. enter into the American discussions. In almost none of these discussions did I find the U. S. S. R. "as she really is" -- Soviet practices and procedures, Soviet precedents and policies, Soviet problems and potentials.

The current American deliberations and writing on the question of arms control appear to be limited to one of two approaches. Either the arms control problem is viewed largely or exclusively in terms of Western data, Western policies, and Western perspective; or the problem is treated altogether in the abstract, with a framework of logical propositions and conjectures rather than concrete data. Both of the approaches serve to reflect and also to reinforce the striking vacuum concerning the U. S. S. R.

Almost all the arms control material published in the United States currently illustrates these two approaches. A most immediate example of what I have in mind is the Fall 1960 issue of *Daedalus*, devoted exclusively to arms control. Throughout this thousand-page collection of specialized essays, authors include brief statements -- a paragraph or a mere sentence -- on various Soviet aspects of arms control. (Examples of this may be found on pp. 692, 703, 709, 714-715, 719, 800, 895, 907, 911.) Some of these judgements seem tenable and others do not. But what stands out is something else: this important collection does not contain one essay on the U. S. S. R., and only three contributors devote more than a paragraph or so explicitly and specifically to the U. S. S. R. These exceptions consist of Donald G.

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Brennan, on basic Soviet attitudes toward arms control (pp. 697-700); Jerome B. Wiesner, on the issues and difficulties of arms-control negotiations (pp. 916-937 *passim*); and Ithiel de Sola Pool, on influencing Soviet policy through public opinion (pp. 989-999).* The remainder of the *Daedalus* arms control issue eshews systematic consideration of the U. S. G. R. as much as do American discussions, in general.

Among the many examples of this practice are *Inspection for Disarmament*, edited by Seymour Melman (1958), and *The Technical Problems of Arms Control*, by Bernard T. Feld and others (1960). Other examples include Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960), and Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, as well as Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law* (revised edition, 1960), and Emile Benoit, *Economic Adjustments to Disarmament* (1960).

## B. Books on the U. S. S. R.

If American discussions of arms control have been sidestepping the U. S. S. R., in a way the same is true in reverse. Books on the U. S. S. R. seldom, if ever, touch upon arms control. At present, there does not exist a single comprehensive work on the U. S. S. R. and arms control in English or, for that matter, in Russian. Nor are there more than a few books in English that systematically treat specific Soviet aspects of arms control. The only thing available, now, is a scattering of books and pamphlets which together provide some kind of starting point:

### Science and Technology

There are three relevant studies in English. None of them bear directly on arms control.

1. George A. Modelski, *Atomic Energy in the Communist Bloc* (1959)

2. Arnold Kramish, *Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union* (1960)

3. Albert Parry, *Russia's Rockets and Missiles* (1960)

Arms control is also not emphasized in the one translation into English of the writings of a leading Soviet authority.

4. G. I. Pokrovsky, *Science and Technology in Contemporary War* (1960)

### Strategy

The most recent general introduction to the Soviet military goes back to the aftermath of World War II.

5. Augustin Guillaume, *Soviet Arms and Soviet Power* (1949)

In the 1950's, American writing concentrated on military doctrine. Here, too, arms control was not stressed.

6. Raymond L. Gartoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (1953)

7. Raymond L. Gartoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (1958)

8. Raymond L. Gartoff, *The Soviet Image of Future War* (1959)

9. Herbert S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (1959)

* One other contributor, A. Doak Barnett, alludes to the subject when he discusses relevant Soviet-Chinese relations (831-842 *passim*).

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Economy

Due to the difference in the level, rate, and organization of economic development
in the United States and the U. S. S. R., the same questions do not apply, here.
In the case of the U. S. S. R., probably the main question concerns its ability to
maintain a high rate both of capital investments and of armaments. The question
links arms control to the much-discussed question of Soviet growth. This question
was most recently reviewed in

10. U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Papers (Parts I-III) and Hearings* (all 1960)

Law

No book is available in English which throws light on relevant Soviet aspects of arms control: Soviet legal theory and practice on international law, international courts and justice, international organization, and the like.

Diplomacy

The only specialized study in English on the U. S. S. R. and arms control appeared
before World War II.

11. W. L. Mahaney, *The Soviet Union, The League of Nations, and Disarmament* (1940)

The one major American work on Soviet negotiating techniques goes back largely to
World War II and its aftermath.

12. *Negotiating with the Russians*, edited by Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (1951)

Of the analyses of recent disarmament negotiations, two offer brief but specific
discussions of Soviet diplomacy in this realm.

13. Richard J. Barnett, *Who Wants Disarmament?* (1960)

14. Joseph Nogee, *The Diplomacy of Disarmament* (1960)

Descriptively, three other publications provide the most current information.

15. U. S. Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament* (two volumes, both 1960)

16. U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests* (1960)

17. U. S. Army Library, *Disarmament, a Bibliographic Record* (1960)

As yet there are only a couple of extensive monographs on specialized international negotiations in some way related to the U. S. S. R., as well as to arms control.

18. Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld, *Controls for Outer Space -- and the Antarctic Analogy* (1959)

19. John G. Stoessinger, "The International Atomic Energy Agency" in *Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age* (1959)

377

Government

Above and beyond diplomacy in the narrower sense, several aspects of Soviet poli-
tics enter into any consideration of arms control. Among these are Soviet foreign
policy in general and arms control in particular. Also important are over-all
official doctrine and the Soviet process of policy-making and decision-making.
On Soviet foreign policy in general, the most authoritative American synthesis
appears in a pamphlet:

20. U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U. S. S. R. and Eastern Europe, a Study Prepared by a Columbia-Harvard Research Group* (1960)

Also in pamphlet-form is the one American survey on Soviet arms-control policy.

21. U. S. Senate, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Attitudes of Soviet Leaders Toward Disarmament, Replies from Experts on the Soviet Union to a Questionnaire* (1957)

Of the many Western discussions of Soviet ideology, these have, perhaps, the most
direct bearing on arms control.

22. Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (1956)

23. Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (1958)

24. Elliott R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (1960)

On the Soviet process of policy-making and decision-making, the standard work in
English is

25. Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U. S. S. R.* (1948)

This work is in part brought up to date by still another U. S. Government pamphlet.

26. U. S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union* (1960)

Public Opinion

How Soviet society as a whole may affect arms control, in the form of public
opinion, is one of the most perplexing questions, and also among the least explor-
ed. Two studies represent the prevailing American view on public opinion in the
U. S. S. R. The first of these covers the techniques and agencies of mass per-
suasion, the other the substance of Soviet popular attitudes.

27. Alex Inkes, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (revised edition 1958)

28. Alex Inkes and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (1959)

C. <u>Specialized International Conferences</u>

Both the American discussion of arms control and Western books on the U. S. S. R. have slighted one outstanding potential source of arms control information on the U. S. S. R. That is the often very extensive, accessible, and revealing record of specialized international conferences with Soviet participation which are related in one way or another to arms control. A list I compiled of such conferences shows that from 1946 to the Fall of 1960, over forty took place:

378

## Principal Disarmament Bodies

### United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

1. 14 June to 30 December 1946 (New York)

2. 19 March to 11 September 1947 (New York)

3. 7 to 17 May 1948 (New York)

4. 18 February to 29 July 1949 (New York)

### United Nations Commission for Conventional Armament

5. 24 March to 16 July 1947 (New York)

6. 2 August to 15 September 1948 (New York)

7. 15 February to 1 August 1949 (New York)

### United Nations Disarmament Commission

8. 14 March to 29 August 1952 (New York)

9. 20 to 29 July 1954 (New York)

10. 3 to 16 July 1956 (New York)

### Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission

11. 13 May to 22 June 1954 (London)

12. 25 February to 18 May 1955 (London)

13. 29 August to 7 October 1955 (New York)

14. 19 March to 4 May 1956 (London)

15. 18 March to 6 September 1957 (London)

### Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests

16. 31 October 1958 to present (Geneva)

### Committee on Disarmament

17. 15 March to 27 June 1960 (Geneva)

## Meetings of Experts

### Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of United Nations Atomic Energy Commission

18. 19 July to 26 September 1946 (New York)

### Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests

19. 1 July to 21 August 1958 (Geneva)

### Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures which might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack

20. 10 November to 18 December 1958 (Geneva)

379

Specialized international conferences of this type leave behind them, not infrequently, a sizable record. In these instances, the published official record -- often in the invaluable form of a verbatim transcript of the proceedings -- is available in English, either in major libraries or from a sponsoring organization. Still another kind of record is also involved, as illustrated by Jerome B. Wiesner's contribution to the arms-control issue of *Daedalus*. In addition to an extensive formal record, these conferences also spawn highly competent Western eyewitnesses, some of whom are outside of government service, and can in many important ways supplement the written documents. In view of the role that such specialized conferences are likely to retain in the immediate future, and their value as a source of arms-control information on the U. S. S. R., any comprehensive American research in this domain might well draw heavily upon a telescoped equivalent of Columbia's Oral History Research Office.

These specialized conferences are cited frequently in Western studies on arms control. With rare exceptions, however, these studies stress, once again, the Western vantage point. No less important is another point. The existing studies usually restrict themselves to the United Nations Assembly and Security Council and to the principal disarmament bodies of the moment. As the list of conferences brings out, this practice overlooks the growing number of international organizations and specialized conferences that are equally relevent to arms control, but in a manner that differs from that of the principal disarmament and United Nations bodies.

### D. The Problem of Language

Some of the most important Soviet material on arms control is at present available only in Russian. But by comparison with other questions, that of arms control, at least at the outset, may depend less on the use of Russian-language materials than is true elsewhere. The main explanation for this is that to date Soviet statements made on arms control have not been as numerous or varied as on some other questions -- and that the statements are already often published in English as well as in Russian.

This results, on the one hand, from the countless volumes of official records, in English, of the specialized international conferences related to arms control. Through this means the U. S. S. R. has in recent years made available, in English, a considerable amount of both technical and political information. On the other hand, similar Soviet technical information can to some extent be culled from the abstracts and translations of Soviet technical publications now becoming widespread in the United States.* Likewise, important Soviet political statements frequently appear in the American-sponsored *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), as well as, in official English-language periodicals such as *New Times* and *International Affairs* (both Moscow).

The problem of language may be more serious, in fact, in another domain. This is the way the same words and terms are, on occasion, used quite differently altogether in Russian and in English. This conclusion suggested itself to me after a careful reading of key Soviet documents on arms control, all of which were made public during Premier Khrushchev's visit to New York in September 1960. I did so on receiving the issues of *Pravda* that contained the Soviet statements submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at the time of Premier Khrushchev's disarmament address, and after I also compared the *Pravda* version of Premier Khrushchev's address with the Soviet translation reproduced in the New York *Times*. A reading of these documents demonstrates in a striking fashion what is perhaps the central language problem on arms control.

* Such material is described in two pamphlets of the U. S. National Science Foundation: *Providing U. S. Scientists with Soviet Scientific Information* (revised edition, 1959); and *List of Russian Scientific Periodicals Available in English* (1960).

381

The specific point that emerged is that Russian usage of the term "control" differs significantly from the English usage. In Russian, "control" is employed exclusively to mean "checking", "examining", "inspecting". In this, it follows the original French usage. In contrast, English usage employs the French-Russian meaning of "checking", but also includes "commanding", "directing", "supervising".

As an outgrowth of Russian usage, all three of the cited documents employ "arms control" as a literal equivalent of "inspection". This is true both of the Russian text and of the Soviet translation in the New York *Times*. The term "arms control", therefore, appears repeatedly, but only when referring to the inspection part of Premier Khrushchev's proposal for general and complete disarmament. This is, of course, diametrically opposed to current usage in the United States, where "arms control" now often stands for a whole alternative approach to disarmament.

### E. Conclusion

The amount of arms-control information available to Americans on the U. S. S. R. is wholly inadequate. This applies equally to discussions on arms control and to books on the U. S. S. R. I, therefore, dwelled on specialized international conferences and the problem of language to underscore one thing: the current paucity of information cannot be ascribed to lack of raw data alone. Some such information is, indeed, lacking and other data are available only in classified form within the U. S. government. But in almost every one of the enumerated Soviet aspects of arms control there exists appreciable published and available raw data, and, at least, a few adequate secondary studies here and there. This is true, as just noted, even if English alone were to be relied upon. It is not likely, to be sure, that we will ever get wholly adequate information to fill the gap on the U. S. S. R. Nor would filling the gap necessarily "solve" anything. Less incomplete information may well lay bare problems that will seem still more intractable than those before us today. Nevertheless, the present gap is in considerable measure unwarranted.

While paucity of information explains much of the sidestepping of the U. S. S. R. in American discussions, moreover, this is not the only reason. Even a close familiarity with the all too few sources I list here could add a great deal. So could more frequent self-reminders of how limited our information is. Without such a first step, followed by other steps in the same direction, we may well retain a one-sided perspective on the U. S. S. R. and, thereby, on the whole question of arms control.

382

ACS-W18

11/7/60 (cc)

Communism and Coexistence:
The Key to Peace?

by
Roberts Coward

During the past several months newspapers and journals have been filled with commentary on the subject of the apparent ideological rift between Moscow and Peking. The failure of this spring's Summit Meeting has been attributed by some to the victory of the Chinese "hard line" advocates while more recent events have led some observers to believe that the Soviet "soft line" will be the victor. Communist leaders have held, and will hold, their own Summit conferences on this matter. The importance of the ideological theme in which this crisis of Communism has been cast is of great relevance to the continuing stability of the world. Maintaining that they are the ones who are adhering to orthodox communist doctrine, the Chinese continue to assert the necessity for an Armageddon between Communism and capitalism, from which they assert Communism will emerge triumphant. Against them Nikita Khrushchev asserts that the revolution in weaponry which has made war so devastatingly destructive, combined with the ever growing strength of Communism, has brought us to the point where socialism can win the world by means other than violence. The possibility that the more extreme and, indeed, the more irresponsible point of view expressed by the Communist Chinese might win out has raised some concern in the West.

This Iron Curtain debate has come up following a period in which East-West relations had shown steady improvement over time. The Soviet Premier has spent a number of years and has employed a variety of tactics in order to lay the groundwork for what he terms peaceful coexistence. While the suspicious were quick to jump upon the sudden alteration in the Communist line displayed at the time of the Summit Meeting, the period of softening had raised the hopes of many Westerners. To these more hopeful individuals the softening of the line might be interpreted as that result which was the ultimate aim of the policy of containment. The policy of containment as originally formulated was designed to check the expansion of Communist power and to hold it

383

within its present bounds, hoping that time would bring about a change in Communist society, either peacefully or through revolution. The development of the coexistence line could well have signified that change.

At the other end of the scale one might take the view, as in varying degrees some have, that the policy of peaceful coexistence is little more than a tactical maneuver. Thus the softening of the Communist line would be designed only to cause the West to lower its guard and perhaps make concessions which it would later regret. From this point of view the sudden reverse at the Summit Conference last May would be only another of the many alterations in tactics which the Communists use to keep the West off balance.

In fact, either one of these interpretations is probably an exaggeration of the actual case. The blow up in May may have been a tactic by Khrushchev, either in his domestic machinations or as a method of keeping the international scene in a state of confusion, but few would attribute the entire six year period of peaceful coexistence policies to pure Communist tactics. On the other hand, it is just as doubtful that the comparatively rapid shift since Stalin's death is sign of the sudden political "coming-of-age" of the Soviet Union. It is much more likely that a rising middle class of bureaucratic officials, stemming from the state of economic development which the Soviet Union has attained, is having some effect upon Communist ideology, while the bases of this ideology continue to provide channels for Communist efforts. The effect on this sort of development of the revolutionary Communist Chinese regime is one which will probably have to remain largely a matter of speculation for some time.

Whatever the motivations behind the Soviet changes may be and whatever the effect on these the Communist Chinese may have, the omnipresent concern and involvement of the entire world in the East-West struggle enhances the importance of these attitudes toward war. Frequent criticism is leveled at the West's apparent inability to act as an initiator in the East-West struggle. Rather the West seems to be continually the responder to the thrusts made by the Communist powers. However, it is unnecessary to debate the factors leading into this situation in order to demonstrate that a substantial portion of present and future Western action will be composed of responses to the dynamic Communist world, and this possible change in Communist strategy and ideology will require its responses in a number of fields of Western strategy.

Two of these areas stand out preeminently. The first is, of course, the question of economic aid. If Khrushchev returns to his policy of peaceful coexistence and economic competition, a vigorous Western response will be required in the field of assisting the economic and political development of the more backward areas. In fact this is likely to be true however hard or soft the Communist line turns out to be in the end. Despite Chinese insistence that Soviet economic aid be devoted to those countries who have been in the "socialist camp" it is

384

unlikely that this area of competition will not continue either on a
greater or lesser scale. In any event the problems of political and
economic development are ones which would face us even if the Soviet
Union and Communist China were to vanish from the globe tomorrow
morning.

The other preeminent area is in the problem of maintaining stability and peace in a world in which warfare threatens dire consequences to all. It is largely this problem which it is proposed to discuss in this paper. We may approach this problem of stability from either of two points of view. The first is the effect which it would have upon the present state of the world and its projection into the future. The second is its effect upon the obtainability and then the stability of an arms control system. In either case the problems are very much complicated by possible spread of atomic weapons, especially when one considers China as the possible "Nth" country. In any case, our efforts to obtain an arms control agreement are very much complicated by the present split in the Communist world, by the Western attitude toward Communist China, particularly the United States attitude, and by the difficulties in assessing the Communist motivations in negotiations.

## The Ideological Base

The Moscow-Peiping conflict has been highlighted by such headlines as that of the *New York Times* of May 26th, 1960, "Peiping Held Victor in Rift With Moscow on Ideology". Using the phraseology of Marxism-Leninism, the leaders of the opposing sides have regaled themselves and the rest of the world with a remarkable display of the flexibility with which a body of doctrine may be interpreted. The Chinese have accused Premier Khrushchev and his followers of being "revisionists", one of the more unkind epithets in the language of Communism, while the Soviets accuse the Chinese of "Left-Wing Communism", which, as the title of one of Lenin's pamphlets was subtitled, "An Infantile Disorder". Within this framework of ideology each side has attempted to justify its position.

Since the two sides would seem to be diametrically opposed one cannot help but ask oneself which one is right? Certainly the historical basis of the Chinese position is much better than that of the Soviets. In fact, in the particularly virulent exchange which preceded last May's Summit Conference, it was reported that the lengthy Communist documents setting forth their arguments "bristled with violent revolutionary quotations taken from Marx, Engels, and Lenin."¹ On the other hand, in a much briefer Soviet rebuttle to the Chinese arguments, "there were no citations from Lenin or Marx." Thus it would appear that the Soviets had had considerable difficulty in backing up their arguments with such quotations.

¹New York Times, May 26th, 1960.

385

Indeed Premier Khrushchev has found it necessary at one point in his campaign to admit that Lenin's view in fact did not coincide perfectly with his. His justification for the difference has been that Lenin was out-of-date, having lived before the development of atomic weapons. As one analyst has noted, this represents "some danger to the authority of Marxism-Leninism as a sacrosanct doctrine".²

It is not difficult to find innumerable statements of the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin concerning warfare. The philosophy of Communism is one of struggle centering about the struggles of one class to succeed another in pre-eminence. Thus *The Communist Manifesto* begins with a sentence "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle."³ This class struggle is only to cease when capitalism, under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, is succeeded by communism, as the proletariat displaces the bourgeoisie.

The problem of war as viewed by the Communists prior to the Bolshevik take over of power in 1917 was seen as basically a two-fold one. The first aspect was the class warfare between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This was to reach its culmination in the seizure of power by the proletariat in a *world* revolution. War among the capitalist powers, however, was also seen as a natural consequence of the last stages of capitalism.

In the system which Marx and Engels developed, the exploitation of the
proletariat by the capitalists resulted in ever-increasing impoverish-
ment of the workers while the wealth became increasingly concentrated
in the hands of a few people. In seeking to maintain the system, the
capitalists were forced to turn outside their own countries for markets,
leading to the system of imperialism which Marx and Engels saw developing.
The competition of colonial powers for the remainder of the world would
lead to warfare among the *capitalist* nations and ultimately to their
downfall. This conception was developed to its utmost by Lenin in 1916
in his pamphlet *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, produced
while World War I was in full swing. The pamphlet endeavors to reconcile
Communist theory for the developing course of events. In it Lenin
says,

²G.F. Hudson, "Russia and China: The Dilemmas of Power," *Foreign Affairs* October, 1960, p. 4.

³Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955) p. 34.

386

"Imperialism is a striving for annexations... The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex not only agricultural regions, but even highly industrialized regions (German appetite for Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine), because 1) the fact that the world is already divided up obliges those contemplating a new division to reach out for any kind of territory, and 2) because an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between a number of great powers in the striving for hegemony, i.e., for the conquest of territory not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine his hegemony."⁴

"We ask, is there *under capitalism* any means of removing the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and 'spheres of influence' for finance capital on the other side - other than by resorting to war?"⁵

It is not difficult to extrapolate this theory of imperialism to the implication that the Communist camp must constantly be on guard lest it become the object of the imperialist appetite of the capitalist powers. However, it must be recalled that prior to 1917 Communism foresaw no two camps; the Communist revolution was to be a world revolution! It was only after the Communists had seized power in Russia that they were forced to develop theories involving a "camp of socialism" and a "camp of capitalism" in order to compensate for the dis-appointing failure of the revolution to become a universal one. It was from this that the theories of "socialism in one country" and "capitalist encirclement" developed; not from Marxism and the early thought of Lenin.

Nevertheless, Lenin's work on imperialism is one of those most frequently cited by the Communist Chinese in support of their point of view. The basis of Khrushchev's argument is that the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons has made the capitalist nations realize that a major war would only bring about their own downfall. This, he believes, re-sults in their unwillingness to fight amongst themselves, or to attack the socialist camp. In first attacking the apparent unity of capitalist powers, Communist Chinese pull out Lenin:

⁴V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, (New York: International Publishers, 1939) p. 91-2.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 98.

387

"Therefore, in the realities of the capitalist system ... alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing all the imperialist powers, are inevitably nothing more than a 'truce' in periods between wars. Peaceful alliances prepare the ground for wars, and in turn grow out of wars; the one is the condition for the other giving rise to alternating forms of peace and non-peaceful struggle out of one and the same basis of imperialist connections and the relations between world economics and world politics."⁶

Further support of the Chinese point of view on the inevitability of war amongst capitalist powers may be derived from some of the last writings of Stalin, whose stature has been much less diminished by the Chinese than by the Soviets:

"Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the United States has brought the other countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them from going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the foremost capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again - and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable. These comrades are wrong."⁷

All this, however, has little to do with the problem of the inevitability of war between the capitalist and socialist camps. It is on this matter that the Communist debates seem to be hottest and that they have the most serious implications for the continuing stability of the world. In this aspect of the argument each side can claim a somewhat stronger position. The Chinese may do so because the literature abounds with statements by Lenin and Stalin regarding the complete hostility between the imperialist and the socialist camps; quotations much more relevant to the inevitability of war between these two camps. The Soviets, on the other hand, are now working against evolutionary Communist theory, rather than the considerably more sacrosanct original pronouncements of Marx and Engels.

⁶Ibid., p. 119.

⁷J.V. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, 1952, quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupe, *et al*, *Protracted Conflict*, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959) p. 98.

388

The failure of the Communist Revolution in 1917 to become a world-wide one was only one of a number of dilemmas which the seizure of power forced upon the Communists. In response to this particular one, Trotsky, Lenin, and later Stalin, were forced to set forth the concept of developing socialism in one country while surrounded by a hostile capitalist camp. Thus, during the period between World War I and World War II the need for constant vigilance against this hostile encirclement was always stressed, along with the inevitability of conflict between the two camps. Ultimately this inevitability of conflict was apparently borne out by the German attack on the Soviet Union during the course of World War II. During this period the Soviet ideologists cranked out innumerable statements, all of which are proving embarrassing to Premier Khrushchev in his campaign for peaceful coexistence. Perhaps one of the most pointed and plain spoken of which was made by Lenin in a speech in 1920:

> "As soon as we are strong enough to defeat capitalism as a whole, we shall immediately take it by the scruff of the neck."⁸

Building their case on such quotations as this the Chinese have built a strong case for themselves. It is for this reason that Khrushchev has been forced to fall back upon the ploy or rationale that Lenin requires revision since he wrote before the time of nuclear weapons. In doing so, he develops the thesis that the balance of power in the world is shifting. He has said:

> "The steady strengthening of the forces of socialism, democracy and peace and the forces of the national liberation movement is of decisive importance. The foreign policy positions of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Peoples Republic, and the other socialist countries, have grown stronger during this period, and their prestige and international ties have grown immeasurably. The international camp of socialism is exerting ever-growing influence in the course of world events."⁹

Maintaining that he is in agreement with the Leninist thesis regarding the sources of war within the system of imperialism, he questions only the inevitability of war between the two camps.

> "In these circumstances of course, the Leninist thesis remains valid: as long as imperialism exists, the economic base giving rise to wars will also remain. That is why we

⁸Quoted by Lazar Pistrak in "Lenin and Peaceful Coexistence", *Problems of Communism*, December 1959, p. 55.

⁹Quoted in United States Senate Document 57, 86th Congress, *Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces*, September, 1959, pp. 2,3.

389

must display the greatest vigilance. As long as
capitalism survives in the world, reactionary forces,
representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies,
will continue their drive toward military gambles and
aggression and may try to unleash war. But war is not a
fatalistic inevitability. To-day there are mighty
social and political forces possessing formidable means to
prevent the imperialists from unleashing war and, if they
try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the
aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans."10

Despite his willingness to revise Leninism in the light of new data,
Khrushchev is eager to bolster his position by associating it with that
of Lenin. In one of his frequent forays into the use of Western mass
media as a propaganda base, an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs*
of October, 1959, he has attempted to claim the policy of peaceful
coexistence as one pursued by the Soviet Union from its earliest days.

"From its very inception the Soviet state proclaimed
peaceful coexistence as the basic principle of its
foreign policy. It was no accident that the very first
state act of the Soviet power was the decree on peace,
the decree on the cessation of the bloody war."11

Against such quotations as that involving the "scruff of the neck",
cited above, Khrushchev cites a remark of Lenin made in the same year
that that quotation was written (1920); a remark to an American
correspondent "Let the American imperialists not touch us, we won't
touch them."12

In the Soviet response to last spring's sally by the Communist Chinese,
Otto Kuuisinen said in an address that Lenin had first stated the prin-
ciple of coexistence of the two systems.

"The principle of peaceful coexistence, as it did then,
still lies at the basis of all Soviet foreign policy.
Our party in recent years has creatively developed this
idea of Lenin. In this connection the conclusions of the
20th and 21st Party Congresses concerning the absence of the
fatal inevitability of war in our epoch and the possibility of
war are decisive."13

10 <u>Ibid.</u>

11Nikita S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1959, p. 3.

12 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 2.

13 *New York Times*, May 26th, 1960.

390

Over the origins of the policy of peaceful coexistence there is no bone to pick between the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union, for the Chinese conceive that this was a Leninist concept. However, the Chinese see it as imposed from the outset by the failure of the imperialist powers to overthrow the Soviet revolutionary government.

"'Peaceful coexistence' is a new concept which arose only after socialist countries appeared in the world following the October revolution. It is a new concept formed under circumstances Lenin had predicted before the October revolution when he said Socialism cannot achieve victory simultaneously in all countries, it will achieve first in one or several countries, while the others remain bourgeois or pre-bourgeois for some time. The concept is one advanced by Lenin after the great Soviet people overcame the armed imperialist intervention. As was pointed out above, at the outset the imperialists were not willing to coexist peacefully with the Soviet Union. The imperialists were compelled to coexist with the Soviet Union only after the war of intervention against the Soviet Union had failed."¹⁴

The Chinese will even concede that some of the developments of military technology and changes in the power situation in the world have their effect upon peaceful coexistence.

"True, some new questions have now arisen concerning peaceful coexistence. Confronted with the powerful Soviet Union and the powerful socialist camp, the imperialists must, at any rate, carefully consider whether they would not hasten their own extinction, as Hitler did, or bring about the most serious consequences for the capitalist system itself, if they should attack the Soviet Union, and/or attack the socialist countries."¹⁵

"They consider it a fine thing" if atomic and nuclear weapons could be prohibited. However, "even under those circumstances as long as the imperialist systems do exist, the most acute form of violence, namely war, has by no means ended in the world."¹⁶

Nevertheless, all these attempts to obtain the blessings of Father Lenin for the position on each side only appear ancillary to the basic controversy, which is over what can be expected from a great war. Mr. Khrushchev has based his political existence on the necessity of peaceful

¹⁴"Peking on Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1960, p. 677.

¹⁵*Loc.cit.*

¹⁶*New York Times*, May 26th, 1960.

391

coexistence and the winning of the world through economic competition in order to prevent what he foresees as a war from which no victor would emerge. Against this the Communist Chinese broadly assert that:

> "The result will certainly not be the annihilation of mankind. On the debris of a dead imperialism the victorious would create very swiftly a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves."¹⁷

This then would appear to be the heart of the controversy. All charges of left-wing Communism and right-wing revisionism aside, the basic disagreement appears to be over whether a war with the West would advance or set back the cause of Communism.

## The Search for Motivations

In the obscurity and haze which surround the ritualistic world of Communism, it is inevitable that the search for motivation behind this debate will be able to only supply speculations. Those which are incorrect will, in time, be assigned to the "ash can of history". Meanwhile Western policies must be adapted to those speculations which we consider the shrewdest of guesses.

Principal speculation on the problem of motives centers about possible internal reasons on the part of both the Soviets and the Chinese for their positions in the debate. We have already mentioned those who see the hopeful ultimate aim of containment being realized in the Soviet position. Many believe that the economic development of the Soviet Union has created a class of technicians and bureaucrats which is roughly comparable to what Western nations consider the middle classes. It is maintained that the satisfaction of this group with its present status, its concern over the maintenance of the gains that it has just made, and its hopes for continuing gains, has formed a powerful bloc of opinion within Soviet society which is serving to act as a check upon the revolutionary fervor of Communist ideology.

Others ascribe the change in Soviet policy to a variation of this. They believe that after the immense drive and high tension of the period under Stalin, particularly during its latter days, the Soviet rulers must now give way for a period of less drive, less sacrifice and more attention paid to the material desires of the people. Without such a thaw, these persons believe that an explosion would have been imminent within the Soviet system shortly after the death of Stalin.¹⁸

17New York Times, May 26th, 1960.

¹⁸See for example, Leonard Schapiro, "Has Russia Changed?", *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1960, pp. 391-401.

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The essential difference between these two views would seem to be the old question of chickens or eggs first. In the former view a middle class of restraining tendencies has developed and made its influence felt within the Soviet hierarchy. In the second, the Soviet hierarchy, having lost the unifying force of Stalin, has been pushed by the accumulated tension of economic development to release control sufficiently to allow the middle group to emerge with a now continuing influence.

The difference in ideological point of view may be reflective of the differences in level of development between the Soviet and the Chinese societies. There have been previous differences between the two over the question of the rate at which and the means by which Communism might be attained. The Chinese have taken a considerably more vigorous point of view on this since the beginnings of the Communist system.

The violence so central in a nation in the throes of a revolutionary period as is China may find expression in their view on the question of war. This is to say, or rather to carry the above argument concerning the development of a middle class in Soviet Russia one step further that the differences between the two nations as the difference between a young and revolutionary society versus an older and more mature one.

Another difference in terms of development is that with regard to the possession of nuclear weapons. It is to be noted that the Soviet Union maintained the essential ineffectiveness or rather insignificance of nuclear weapons until it had obtained these weapons for itself. From that time on its view changed, culminating with development of Khrushchev's ideas on peaceful coexistence and the catastrophic nature of nuclear war. It is difficult, however, to separate the effects of the development of the weapons with the effects of the death of Stalin, since the Soviets tested their own first hydrogen weapon close onto the time of the demise of the dictator. Nevertheless, one may wonder whether the Chinese might not develop a more responsible point of view if they did have nuclear weapons.

The differences between the two societies point up the possible internal reasons in the case of each for the position which they have taken. It has already been mentioned that the Soviet position is possibly a reflection of an over-all let-up in the pressures and tensions which were prevalent in that society during the closing years of Stalin's reign. Considering reports from Russia of a hard-line or Stalinist group within the Kremlin which is opposed to that group which supports Premier Khrushchev, it is possible to analyze the situation somewhat as follows. The over-all pattern of economic development in the Soviet Union has produced a group not only impressed and satisfied with the economic gains which have been made, but indeed quite jealous of them. It is this group, cognizant of the catastrophic effect of nuclear weapons, which supports Premier Khrushchev in an attempt to approach the problem of warfare from a responsible point of view, reflecting the stake of the nation in any possible war. Opposed to this group is an old line group which remains more impressed with the traditional ideological lines. These two groups may be contending the power within the Kremlin.

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The Chinese may have their own internal reasons for taking the line which they do. Any revolutionary society in order to maintain the necessary zeal within its public for carrying out its aims has frequently turned to outside threats. We have lately been witnessing a similar phenomenon with regard to the actions of Premier Castro of Cuba. It is possible that the Chinese are attempting to play a two-sided game with their line on the inevitability of war in the belief that they need these outside threats in order to carry forward their programs. This not only serves in itself to stimulate fear of outside attack but in turn provokes the other side to take measures which may be fed back into the society as further provocation. Thus the Chinese may be attempting an overly provoking gambit to attain purely internal objectives.

Spokesmen of the Peking government have been frequently quoted in statements to the effect that China has very little to lose and much to gain in any possible nuclear clash, thus placing it in direct opposition to the above suggested group which recognizes how much the Soviet Union might lose. One of the more disturbing statements attributed to Chou En-lai during a trip last spring to Yugoslavia was that in which he mentioned that time after the Third World War, when there were "thirty million Russians, twenty million Americans, and three hundred million Chinese left amongst ruins of war." Thus the Chinese feel that they would be in a position to build Communism "on the debris of a dead imperialism." In this they certainly have some convincing evidence to offer the Soviets straight from Soviet history. The greatest leaps in Soviet economic development came immediately after the end of the Second World War. At that time the Soviet seizure and transportation to the mother land of the remaining industrial establishments within the areas into which its army had marched, provided the base for a "great leap forward" much as the Chinese are attempting to do now.

One doubts that the "monolithic unity of the socialist camp" extends to a Soviet willingness to sacrifice her gains in order to provide China with means for a great economic leap. Nevertheless, this raises the spectre of the Chinese provoking a war, if able, should their efforts at developing their economy be less than successful.

One may speculate that the Chinese would develop a more responsible view once they had nuclear weapons. Nevertheless this possibility has given pause to think to all those concerned with the problem. The desire to keep nuclear weapons from China, in fact, has been advanced as a possible principal motivation for the Soviet Union's attempt to obtain a test-ban treaty. It has also been suggested that Russian efforts to populate their vast eastern areas are an attempt to establish a base in these areas before the Chinese, faced with an expanding population, turn hungry eyes upon them. It is thus possible that the Soviets have undertaken their line in an attempt to lay the basis for controlling the "revolutionary zeal" of Peking.

Some persons have claimed to detect a subtle difference between the Chinese position and the "let's go to war now" one which has been ascribed to them. These persons suggest that the Chinese are only saying that the

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Communists should not fear a nuclear war, not that they should initiate one. This may signify a difference between the views of the Soviet Union and Communist China on how to handle the West. In a variation on the old "carrot-stick" characterization, one may say that Moscow wishes to take the carrot approach, while Peking wishes to use the stick. Russia appears to have been considerably aggravated by a number of the more aggressive Chinese actions which they believe to have set back the cause of Communism in a number of areas where gains were imminent through years of the carrot approach. Such areas are in Iraq, where the Chinese urged premature violent action, and in India, where the encroachments on the border have hampered Moscow's efforts at cultivating good-will with Prime Minister Nehru.¹⁹

Finally, it is possible that the debate is only one of the elaborate and esoteric methods by which Communists reveal differences of opinion over more mundane affairs. For a number of the above mentioned reasons (e.g., possible Chinese territorial ambitions, differences over immediate day-to-day methods of obtaining limited ends) a difference of opinion has been stimulated between the two great Communist powers of a type which might well arise between Western powers. However, within the framework of their revolutionary ideology they find it necessary to carry on debates over their differences of opinion in the ritualistic and esoteric language of Marxism and Leninism.

One of the more valuable ideas espoused by Freud was that different and possibly even conflicting motives might lie behind any particular piece of behavior. In the case of nations as well as men there is a great deal of truth in this. It is unlikely that any one of the motives which have been suggested here, or for that matter other possible ones, is the reason for the Peking-Moscow debate. Which ones are the more significant and the manner in which they are mixed is what has its implications for the problem of arms control.

## Communism and Arms Control

The entire world to-day seems to be almost pathologically concerned with the problem of disarmament. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, spokesmen proclaim their desire to reach an accord on this one problem. Depending upon their assessment of Soviet motives and objectives, there are a variety of approaches which Western statesmen may take to this problem.

The most obvious and the least practical approach is to totally reject the possibility of reaching an accord by assuming the complete malevolence of Soviet objectives. This approach appears the most obvious, perhaps, because of past experience. It is the most impractical because of the world stage on which the interplay must be presented.

The opposite extreme which one may take, elements of which have become quite popular recently, is that the Soviet Union, like any other nation, is

¹⁹See Max Frankel in *The New York Times*, Sept. 13th, 1960.

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interested only in its own security; that we must approach the arms control problem as one in which each side must make some concessions in order to attain a greater degree of national security, perhaps by sacrificing some of the more traditional elements of security in order to protect the nation from a nuclear holocaust. Thus the road to disarmament is only a question of finding a mutually satisfactory basis upon which to conclude an agreement. A method is needed to communicate between the two sides what their security interests are felt to be and what concessions each side is willing to make; then to match these together and come up with a program which will insure the preservation of man from the dangers of his own scientific creativeness.

We would suggest here that neither of these approaches is a realistic one and that each one is equally dangerous. The position of ascribing complete malevolence to the Communists, beyond leaving us in an untenable position with regard to world opinion, leaves us in the danger of a totally unmitigated arms-race; an arms-race which is so fraught with dangers that, no matter how much faith one places in the concept of deterrence, it is difficult to believe that the race can continue without eventually becoming unstabilized. This position does not offer the opportunity to make use of possible genuine changes in Communist motivations or to seize upon the mixture of motives which the Communists must have.

The essential danger in the second position is in the disregard which it displays for the historical evidence. If Communism is not a completely malevolent force, it has certainly shown a remarkable degree of being so in the past. Communism was and remains an ideology which is totally hostile to the Western way of life. The Communists are out to conquer the world and they agree upon it. With respect to this what is significant about the Soviet-Chinese split is not the differences but the similarities. Both agree that Communism is the inevitable end, toward which history is moving. It is only over the question of means which they disagree. As one columnist has put it, "There is little reason to rejoice because your enemies are disagreeing if one of their principal arguments is whether to get rid of you by the stiletto or the battle axe."²⁰ It is not simply their own security which the Communists seek, but their security and the undermining of ours.

Disarmament has never been an essential element of Communist ideology. In the past, Communists have varied from one side to another depending upon which side they perceived as being advantageous to their cause.²¹ It is very unlikely that the development of nuclear weapons has effected a complete reversal in Soviet sincerity. If the Soviets sought only reassuring actions one might recall that there should have been no more reassuring ones than those taken by the United States at the close of World War II.

²⁰New York Times, Nov. 13th, 1960, section 4, p. 14.

²¹For an excellent analysis of disarmament and Soviet goals (with a slightly different aim than here being attempted) see Richard J. Barnet, Who Wants Disarmament? (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960) Part II.

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The Soviet Union seized the opportunity to take and consolidate their power in Eastern Europe. The principal problem in Communist efforts to arrive at a disarmament agreement is one which has been delineated as follows:

> "Unfortunately for Khrushchev, there was a basic contradiction in his whole approach to world affairs. Churchill once remarked that the rulers of Russia 'do not want war, but they want the fruits of war.' What he meant was that the fundamental idea of Communist diplomacy is always to get something for nothing, to gain without paying a price, the kind of advantage which is normally only to be obtained at the point of a gun. This attitude is in fact inherent in the Communist outlook. In a system of ordinary international relations among states which, however sharp may be the conflicts between them, regard other governments as having the same rights to existence as themselves, there is a tacit assumption that negotiations which are not directly subject to duress can produce results only through a process of mutual give and take. The ideal diplomatic agreement is a trade between a willing buyer and a willing seller, to the advantage of both sides. But the fundamental Communist attitude is that all non-Communist governments are only interim authorities; they are representatives of the class enemy, historically doomed to destruction sooner or later... Talk about peaceful coexistence does not alter this attitude; as Khrushchev himself has explained, it means only that military conflict is ruled out, while ideological, political and economic struggle continues."22

All this is not to say that there is no hope for a viable disarmament agreement, although it does suggest that this is unlikely. This is where the advantage of parallel motivations comes in, providing that there is indeed a group within at least the Soviet Union which realizes the catastrophic nature of nuclear warfare and which wishes to guard the gains which the Soviet Union has made in its economic development. In that there exists a strong motivation to reach some sort of accord; an accord which will at least guard against the destructiveness of nuclear warfare. Similarly, the desire to lay the groundwork for the control of possible expansionist ideas which might appear on the Communist Chinese horizon provides some motive for pushing toward certain types of arms control agreements. What kind of arms control agreements?

We have recently had a number of suggestions for possible arms control schemes involving a system of stabilized mutual deterrence. Within such a system each side maintains its deterrent capability under certain limitations designed to render the system more stable than it presently is. Some of the suggested controls on the system involve limitations on the number of weapons, limitations on possible alleys of technological development, better schemes of communication and control of the system,

22G.F. Hudson, op.cit., p. 5.

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and so forth. We would suggest that these parallel motivations on the part of the Communist world would offer the most hope for such a system as this.

The essential nature of a mutual deterrence system is that it is not an attempt to remove the elements of political difference and competition between the participants. To attempt to do so at present we would suggest is an impossible goal. What a system of mutual stable deterrence does attempt to do in essence is to buy time, a concept which many noting what we have done with past time bought, look upon with disdain. Nevertheless, to this writer this would appear to be the one last great hope or last clear chance of humanity, caught as it is in a world embroiled in a conflict between antithetical ideologies, each of which has at its disposal the most devastating weapons ever known.

We do not suggest here that such a system of arms control would attain all of the objectives which those who seek disarmament desire. It is unlikely that it would bring peace; it is unlikely that it would remain viable for too long without alterations in the system itself, and alterations in the world in which it attempts to operate.

It is possible that such an arms control agreement would only reduce the situation to the point where the two sides would be forced to fight it on either limited or gigantic means, but on a less than suicidal basis. This would pose dangers to the system and hardly gives us the picture of a peaceful world which so many of us desire. It moreover does not appear to reduce the burden of armaments, which would remain whether the world became a semi-peaceful one or one in which conflict was simply limited at the highest level. Certainly under any such arms-control agreement we would have to be prepared to make no little sacrifice in order to meet possible contingencies of limited war. Provided that the system helped, however, the war would at least not be one of total annihilation.

Over time a system based upon such highly technical devices as those involved in deterrence would inevitably call for amendment as technology moves forward. The methods by which the technology feeding into the system would be controlled should, in fact, provide the most if not the only difficult political problems. These certainly involve the most gross disturbances of the present political situation, the minimization of which it has been suggested is the chief advantage of a system of stabilized mutual deterrence.

Time presents another hazard to a system of stabilized mutual deterrence. Since the competition between East and West would hypothetically continue under such a system, we are faced with what may be called the ultimate fallacy of deterrence. This is that deterrence only works when each side believes that it will win in the end. Therefore if anyone is to win, no one will win at all. This is because the side which finds itself suddenly on the short end of the stick, unless it has the grace to peacefully throw up the game and yield to the hegemony of the other side, will ultimately push the button rather than be forced into surrender and loss of national existence. Thus deterrence must freeze the situation or ultimately it cannot work. Yet it is precisely our inability to freeze

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the situation which has led us to propose a system of stabilized mutual deterrence!

Essentially this would appear to be a very pessimistic position, for what hope then remains for humanity if deterrence is the only way out, if deterrence must ultimately fail if one side or the other wins, and if we have no way of freezing the situation? The answer is that the hope in the system lies in the same assumption which was made by those who instituted the policy of containment. At that time the emphasis of hope was based upon the probability that the contradictions within the Communist system would ultimately cause its break-up from within. In this case we rather place our hopes upon probability that, as economic development proceeds within the Communist world, the degree of moderation will also grow. This is essentially the reason for attempting to buy time.

These changes will not occur overnight, just as it has been suggested here that changes in the Soviet attitudes had not changed within the last decade - at least not substantially enough to warrant the assumption that they may now be treated as though they were behaving as any other nation. Meanwhile the Communist situation would appear to be essentially unbalanced by the utter depths of poverty in which the Chinese find themselves. Until these situations alter, and there is hope that they will do so, we suggest that the security of the non-Communist world must be protected on as many fronts as exist. The problem is more to control that front on which an eruption would appear to be most suicidal.

We do not suggest here even that such an agreement as one of mutual stabilized deterrence is likely to be obtainable in the immediate future. For some time yet, the Communists are likely to continue their efforts to get "something for nothing". They do not play by what we consider the rules of the game! What does appear to be growing, however, is enough of a parallel motivation in this so that we may hope that the Communists may eventually wish to come to terms at least to prevent the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. This will have to be done, however, if not by their getting something for nothing, then by their giving up nothing for something. At the same time we can afford to do little giving up on our own part.

## Conclusions

In this paper, then, we have examined the more recent flow of Communist policy and the apparent debate between Moscow and Peking in order to show how these might be used in order to achieve some modicum of world stability, if not world peace. It has been suggested that the differences between the two great Communist powers are not nearly as important as the similarities: that the essential element of Marxist-Leninist dogma which still persists in both is the will of Communism to take over the world. This belief in the ultimate victory of Communism makes exceedingly dangerous our present efforts to reach an agreement with the Communists on the problem of arms control.

Like other people, however the Communists have a variety of motives which

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make up their national interests. By exploiting these motives we have suggested that it may be possible for us, through working for a system of stabilized mutual deterrence, to achieve at least some degree of stability in the world today. This would decrease the danger of a nuclear holocaust if not changing the political climate of basic hostility. Within this climate the competition for world power will continue. In the end, neither arms control nor good will are likely to change this: in fact, any arms control plan which is predicated upon such changes will probably fail, and any scheme which requires such changes as prerequisite must remain unacceptable. What we must hope for is that the process of political and economic development which is going on within the Communist world will sometime lead to a change in the nature of their society which will allow us to live with them in peace.

Until such a time of a projected earthly paradise we must live with the dangers which technology and our own human weaknesses have presented to us. The best hope of living through this period will be in the application of all our intelligence and effort to the control of these weaknesses that they do not prove fatal to us all.

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1 August 1960

# A SHORT HISTORY OF DISARMAMENT

by

L. B. Sohn

1. Before 1899. During the 19th century several proposals were made for the reduction of armaments; e.g., by Czar Alexander in 1816 and by various French Governments in 1831, 1863 and 1870. Merze TATE, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907 (New York, 1942), pp. 8, 11, 15, 18.

2. **Hague Peace Conferences.** The failure of the French proposals discouraged other governments from approaching the question of disarmament, though numerous private peace congresses and parliamentary resolutions provided evidence of continuing public interest in this matter. This deadlock was broken by the Russian Government, which decided to make another effort in this direction. In August 1898, Czar Nicholas II sent a circular suggesting a general conference to seek "the most effectual means of insuring to all peoples the benefits of real and durable peace, and above all, of putting an end to the progressive development of the present armaments." U.S. Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 541.

When the delegates of 26 States met at The Hague in May 1899, Russia proposed that all nations agree not to increase their armed forces for five years and to fix the naval forces for three years. In addition, she presented a proposal to prohibit new guns and explosives, submarines and the discharge of projectiles or explosives from balloons. *Idem*, 1899, pp. 511-513; J. B. SCOTT, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1899 (New York, 1920), pp. 305-306. The delegates of other countries came to the Conference with instructions to limit discussions to rules relating to the humanization of the conduct of warfare and to arbitration, but to avoid any actual limitation of armaments. For example, the American instructions stressed the fact that the idea of reduction of armed forces was inapplicable to the United States whose forces were far below the effective forces of other nations. With respect to the prohibition of new weapons, the instructions proceeded on the assumption that it would be inexpedient to restrain "the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense", in particular as "it is doubtful if an agreement to this end would prove effective." J. B. SCOTT, Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Peace Conference (New York, 1916), pp. 6-9. It was, however, the German delegation which took the lead in opposing disarmament; it pointed out that various national armies are not comparable and that a general limitation of the size of the effectives (i.e., of land armies) cannot be determined without taking into

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account all the other elements (length of active service,
obligations of retired soldiers, efficiency of the railway
system, etc.). The special committee of the Conference on this
question finally agreed that "it would be very difficult to fix
even for five years, the number of troops without regulating at
the same time other elements of national defense," and that
"it would be no less difficult to regulate by an international
agreement the elements of this defense, organized in each
country upon different principles." SCOTT, The Proceedings,
*op.cit.*, p. 315. Similar difficulties arose as to naval
armaments, where the British delegates led the opposition. The
Conference also refused to adopt restrictions on the caliber of
rifles and introduction of new types of guns, but it approved
three declarations prohibiting the discharge of projectiles from
balloons, the use of projectiles diffusing asphyxiating gases and
of "dumdum" bullets. *Idem*, pp. 262-66. The United States
deblegation opposed all these declarations, mostly on the ground
that the use of such new weapons "might decrease the length of
combat, and consequently the evils of war as well as the expenses
entailed thereby;" (*Idem*, p. 280); it agreed, however, to accept
the declaration on balloons after the conference approved the
American suggestion to limit the prohibition to a term of five
years. The Conference was more successful in other fields;
conventions were adopted for the pacific settlement of disputes,
to codify the laws and customs of war on land and to adapt the
Red Cross Convention to the requirements of maritime warfare.
*Idem*, 235, 247, 251. Under the first of these conventions a
hesitant step was even taken towards the organization of an
international tribunal, but the Permanent Court of Arbitration
established by it was actually only a panel of qualified persons
from which international arbitrators could be chosen by special
agreement of the parties to a dispute.

The importance of the first Hague Conference lay principally
in inaugurating a new method of dealing with international
problems and in bringing into the open the practical difficulties
inherent in proposals for temporary limitations of selected
armaments. In pacifist circles it was thought that the conference
constituted a good beginning and the Inter-Parliamentary Conference,
held in 1904 at St. Louis, asked President Roosevelt to propose
a second conference. Compte rendu de la XIIe Conference, pp.60-61.
He agreed to bring the matter officially to the attention of
other governments, but the convocation of the conference was
postponed in view of the Russo-Japanese war. After the end of
that war, the Russian Government expressed a desire to take
over the preparation for the conference and the American
Government acceded to this request.

The agenda of the new conference proposed by Russia was
limited to the improvement of the conventions adopted at the First
Conference, and made it clear that the conference should not deal
with the question of "limitation of military and naval forces."

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1 SCOTT, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1907 (New York, 1921-22), p. 1. The British Government, however, insisted on introducing the question of "expenditure on armament," believing that "even a failure to secure a definite result was better than no discussion at all". 8 G. P. GOOCH and H. TEMPERLEY, British Documents on the Origins of the World War, 1898-1914, p. 243. The German Government, on the other hand, declared that it would content itself with "leaving it to those Powers who are sanguine that the discussion will prove successful to conduct this discussion alone." *Idem*, p. 221. After a discussion of only twenty-five minutes the Conference, on August 17, 1907, unanimously adopted a British proposal to reaffirm a resolution of the First Conference that "the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind," and declared that "inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time . . . it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question." SCOTT, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90. No action was taken on a further British suggestion that States should communicate to one another naval construction plans to facilitate "an exchange of views between the Governments on the subject of the reductions which it might be possible to effect by mutual agreement." *Idem*, p. 89. The Conference was more successful in its other tasks and succeeded in adopting thirteen conventions on the laws of war and peaceful settlement of disputes. *Idem*, pp. 599-672.

British German negotiations on the reduction of naval expenditures, from 1908 to 1914, foundered mostly on the question of the ratio between the German and British shipbuilding programs: Should it be 3:4 or 2:3? Should only ships in European waters or all ships be included in the agreement? Should it be limited to capital ships or should it extend to smaller vessels? One of the first interventions of Winston Churchill in international diplomacy, a proposal for a "naval holiday" in 1912, during which no ships would be built, again bogged down in a discussion of the implications of a British requirement of 60 per cent superiority over the German fleet. E. L. WOODWARD, Great Britain and the German Navy (Oxford, 1935), p. 369. Then the World War came in which both fleets suffered grievous losses, and navies of other countries joined the race for the mastery of the oceans.

3. **Covenant of the League of Nations.** Following many private projects and a British official suggestion, President Wilson included in his Fourteen Points a reference to "adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."
1 The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1924), p. 468. This statement formed the basis of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but an important Japanese

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amendment during the Paris Peace Conference substituted "national
safety" for "domestic safety" and thus broadened immeasurably
the exception in the final clause of this provision. A French
amendment was also accepted inserting as another important
criterion "the geographical situation and circumstances of each
State." 2 MILLER, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928),
pp. 264, 777. After a final struggle over a clause in the
Wilson draft prohibiting private manufacture of munitions, in
which this clause was watered down as a result of objections by
the British Admiralty, Article 8 was approved in the following
form:

1. The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and
revision at least every ten years.

4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the
several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall
not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.

In addition to Article 8, the Covenant provided in Article 9 for the establishment of a permanent commission to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Article 8. A French suggestion that this commission be given a general power of inspection and supervision was rejected by President Wilson as incompatible with U. S. Constitution. The British official commentary on the Covenant gave as reasons for rejection that "such a power would not be tolerated by many national States at the present day, but would cause friction and hostility to the idea of the League; nor, in fact, is it in harmony with the

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assumption of mutual good faith on which the League is founded, seeing that the members agree to exchange full and frank information; nor finally, would it really be of practical use. Preparations for war on a large scale cannot be concealed, while no inspection could hope to discover such really important secrets as new gases and explosives and other inventions of detail." British Parliamentary Papers, Misc. No. 3 (1919), Cmd. 151, p. 15.

4. **Disarmament of Central Powers.** At the same time, the Treaty of Versailles and the treaties with other defeated States imposed upon these States an obligation to disarm, softened by the statement that this was necessary "in order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations." German compliance with her disarmament obligations was for a while under a rather unsatisfactory supervision by an Allied Military Control Commission and a special Allied Military Committee of Versailles, under the general control of the Conference of Ambassadors. The Treaty of Versailles and other peace treaties obliged the defeated States in addition, "to give every facility for any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary," and an elaborate scheme of organization was prepared by the Council in 1924 and 1926 for the execution of these provisions. LN Doc. C. 5⁴+1(I).189(I).192⁴(IX), and LN Pub. 1926.IX.17. Except for one investigation in Hungary, no attempt was made to utilize this procedure. While it was quite well known that the German Government had succeeded in circumventing its obligations with respect to disarmament, they were officially denounced by Germany only in 1935 and 1936.

5. **Special Commission of the League of Nations.** The Council of the League established already in 1920 the commission envisaged by Article 9 of the Covenant, as a "Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions" (LNOJ, 1920, No. 4, p. 134), composed of representatives of national General Staffs, who from the very beginning adopted a negative attitude on the subject. To remedy this situation the Council established in 1921 on request of the Assembly a "Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments" to consider the disarmament problem not only from the military but also from the social, economic and political points of view. LNOJ, 1921, No. 2, pp. 148-49.
A large part of the work of that Commission was devoted to a study of the question of the supervision of the private manufacture of, and trade in, arms and ammunition. LN Doc. A.16.1924.IX, pp. 20-23.
The Geneva Convention of 17 June 1925, which dealt with this subject, never came into force, principally because Italy and Japan had refused to ratify it. On the other hand, a protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of gases and of bacteriological weapons, which was adopted at Geneva on the same date, came into force in 1928 and received ratifications by 41 States, though the United States and Japan did not ratify it. 3 HUDSON, Int.

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Legislation, pp. 1634, 1670. Another phase of the work of the Temporary Mixed Commission was consecrated to an endeavor to combine British-Scandinavian proposals on disarmament with French proposals on collective security. The first result was a draft treaty of mutual assistance of 1923 (LNOJ, Spec. Supp. 16, p. 197), which was rejected by the new Labor Government in Great Britain. A more comprehensive protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes, in which provisions on arbitration were added to those relating to security and disarmament (2 HUDSON, Int. Legislation, p. 1378), prepared in 1924 to satisfy this British Government, was rejected by the Conservatives when they returned to power in 1925.

After the Locarno agreements with Germany contributed to the solution of some of the problems of security and arbitration, the Council decided to try a new approach to the disarmament problem and set up a new body of government delegates, to be known as the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. LNOJ, 1926, pp. 119, 164, 218. This body had the advantage that it was joined from the start by the United States and in November 1927 by the Soviet Union, despite the fact that these two countries were not Members of the League. A new important Member of the League -- Germany -- took also an important part in the deliberations of the Commission, insisting from the beginning that the Commission cannot limit itself to fixing the status quo but must also "reduce the existing disproportion between the armaments of the States Members of the League." LNOJ, Spec. Supp. 44, p. 108. The Commission encountered great difficulties in trying to decide: whether trained reserves should be considered as part of the armies to be reduced; whether budget expenditures should be limited; to what extent war potential should be taken into account and what weight should be given to the differences in "conversion lag" from peace-to war-time economy; whether it is necessary not only to limit air forces but also to control civil aviation; what should be the extent of international supervision. W.E. RAPPARD, the Quest for Peace since the World War (Cambridge, Mass., 1940), pp. 361-89.

For a while the Soviet Union diverted the attention of the Commission from the technical problems by presenting a proposal for immediate, complete, and general disarmament and the abolition of all armed forces on land, on the sea and in the air, as the best way of implementing the recently concluded Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war. LN Pub.1928.IX.6, pp. 239-41, 324-37. The United States delegate rejected this proposal mostly on the formal ground that it was incompatible with the drafts studied by the Commission and would require scrapping the result of several years of careful negotiations. Idem, pp. 258-59. No better reception was given to a more limited Soviet proposal for a 50 per cent reduction of the armed forces of the big Powers and for a lesser reduction of the forces of smaller Powers.

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Idem, pp. 247-55; SOHN, World Law, pp. 865-69.

## 6. Naval Conferences.
The work of the Preparatory Commission was interrupted by the London Naval Conference of 1930. The naval race after World War I was checked by the Washington Conference of 1921-22, at which American proposals for establishing the ratio of 5:5:3 for the American, British and Japanese capital ships were accepted by other naval Powers, after Japan exacted a promise that no new fleet bases will be built in the Pacific. France and Italy were permitted to retain a number of ships equal to Japan, but their tonnage was reduced; on the other hand, they succeeded in preventing the adoption of any restrictions on submarines. 2 HUDSON, Int. Legislation, p. 798. No quantitative agreement was reached, however, at that time with respect to smaller vessels, though some restrictions as to size of cruisers and caliber of guns were accepted by the Conference. The American Government called together a conference in Geneva in 1927 to solve the question of smaller vessels; France and Italy refused to take part in the conference, while Japan played only a minor role in it. The discussion between the American and British delegations bogged down in a dispute over the comparability of a smaller number of big cruisers with a larger number of small ones (mathematical parity vs. substantial or strategic equality), the relative importance of 6- and 8-inch guns and the convertibility of merchant vessels. Though actual differences were limited, no agreement was reached. Merze TATE, The United States and Armaments (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 141-60. To avoid another such failure, the London Naval Conference of 1930 was called together only after the main points in dispute were solved in Anglo-American conversations. The situation was complicated, however, by various Japanese claims and the strong rivalry between Italy and France. The American and British delegates agreed on equality in combat power and slight differences as to the number of ships in various categories; Japan was granted a larger quota of cruisers and parity in submarines; but no agreement was reached between Italy and France. 5 HUDSON, Int. Legislation, p. 394. The second London Naval Conference of 1935 was confronted with the Japanese delegates' request for complete parity, and their withdrawal from the Conference led to only minor agreements between Great Britain, United States and France. 7 Idem, p. 263. Though there was no longer a rivalry between the British and American navies, the Japanese denunciation of the Washington Treaty resulted in a new naval race. While the Japanese fleet was able to inflict great losses on the combined forces of the Western Powers, the latter were able to turn the tide thanks to their greater shipbuilding capacities.

## 7. Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.
Spurred by the success of the London Conference of 1930, the Preparatory Commission decided to round up its work in the form of a draft convention of 60 articles, with an elaborate commentary listing countless reservations. LN Pub. 1931.IX.1, pp. 597-620.

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The draft was rejected outright by the Soviet Union as the product of imperialist capitalism, and by Germany as an attempt to maintain the existing inequalities. Idem, pp. 400-04, 409-10. While some delegates criticized the draft because of insufficient security provisions, others approached it in a spirit of cautious optimism, laying stress on all the constructive possibilities offered by the Convention and on the number of problems for which adequate solutions have been found. RAPPARD, op. cit., pp. 397-402.

When delegates of sixty-one States finally assembled for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in February, 1932, its President - Arthur Henderson, former British Foreign Secretary -- guardedly proposed that its task should be limited to reaching an agreement on a "substantial reduction and limitation of all national armaments," and to arranging for "holding of similar conferences at reasonably short intervals of time." LN, Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Series A, Plenary Meetings, Vol. 1 (LN Pub. 1932.IX.60), pp. 39-46. The United States delegation immediately presented proposals for a proportional reduction of naval tonnage, abolition of submarines, of lethal gases and of bacteriological warfare, "most effective measures to protect populations against aerial bombing," computation of the numbers of the armed forces on the basis of the "effective necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defense" ("the former are obviously impossible of reduction, the latter is a question of relativity"), and for special restrictions on arms of a peculiarly aggressive character such as tanks and heavy mobile guns; it also expressed its willingness to consider a limitation on expenditures on materials "as a complementary method to direct limitation" which might prove useful "to prevent a qualitative race, if and when quantitative limitation has been made effective."

Idem, Conference Documents, Vol. I (LN Pub. 1932.IX.63), p.139.

The British delegation put emphasis on "qualitative disarmament," distinguishing between arms which should be entirely eliminated and arms which should be only limited. It agreed, therefore, to the outlawing of such new methods of warfare as gas, submarines and bombing from the air ("the temptation to resort to armed conflict is obviously reduced if defense is strengthened at the expense of attack"). Idem, Plenary Meetings, Vol. I, pp. 55-59.

The French delegation made a plea that disarmament should be preceded, or at least accompanied, by an improvement of the League's machinery for collective security; they asked for the setting up of League armed forces, internationalization of aviation, "guarantees as to the rapidity of the authority controlling the international force", a definition of aggression, compulsory arbitration and international control over the execution of all agreements concerning armaments. Idem, Conference Documents, Vol. I, pp. 113-16. Dr. Bruning, speaking for Germany, opposed the injection of extraneous issues into the disarmament discussions and insisted that Germany and "an indisputable right"

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to expect that "the disarmament of Germany shall be followed by
general disarmament;" he thought that this could be accomplished
best by prohibiting all essentially offensive weapons (i.e., those
weapons which were taken away from Germany by the Treaty of
Versailles) and by reducing other armaments. *Idem*, Plenary
Meetings, Vol. I, pp. 67-70. The Soviet delegation criticized
the French proposals for two partly contradictory reasons
i.e., that the proposed international army would be too weak to
help a victim of aggression and that an army controlled by an
organization consisting largely of States openly hostile to the
Soviet Union would constitute a dangerous threat to her. In a
conciliatory spirit it agreed, however, to discuss any proposal
tending to reduce armaments, "and the further such reduction goes,
the more readily will the soviet delegation take part in the work
of the Conference". It continued, nevertheless, to insist from
time to time on "reduction to zero" as the only way to achieve
security, and on proportional reduction as the best method to
achieve this aim. *Ibid*, pp. 81-87; *idem*, Series B, General
Commission, Vol. I (LN Pub.1932.IX.64), pp. 6-9.

Following one of the American proposals, the Conference
decided to start with "qualitative disarmament". *Ibid*, p. 113.
But the technical committees could not agree which weapons should
be classified as "offensive", in particular as each delegation
tended to regard as defensive all weapons which its own country
possessed in sufficient quantities, and as aggressive those
classes of weapons which it either did not possess or did not
wish to acquire.

In June 1932, President Hoover suddenly made a new proposal
which bore a marked resemblance to the main Soviet suggestions.
He proposed, for instance, that all land armies and navies be
reduced by one-third, and that certain specific weapons (heavy
mobile artillery, tanks and bombing planes) be abolished entirely.
To meet the German difficulty, he suggested that the reduction by
one-third should apply only to the "defense component" of national
land armies but not to the "police component" required to maintain
internal order; this component should be calculated on the basis
of population in proportion equal to that of Germany, i.e., 100,000
soldiers for a population of 65 million people. *Ibid*, pp. 121-23.
Though a majority of the delegations was willing to accept these
proposals, they were opposed directly by France and Japan and
indirectly by Great Britain. *Ibid*, pp. 124-28, 130.

A British proposal led to the adoption of a resolution which
welcomed the Hoover initiative while actually putting his
proposals aside, and in which was outlined the limited measure
of agreement reached by the Conference with respect to a few
weapons. *Ibid*, pp. 153-56; *idem*, Conference Documents, Vol. I,
pp. 268-71. Only Germany and the Soviet Union voted against
this resolution and Germany announced that she could not any
longer take part in the Conference. *Idem*, General Commission,
pp. 188, 205. She returned only after the other Powers declared

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that one of the guiding principles of the Conference should be granting to Germany "equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations." Idem, Conference Documents, Vol. II (LN Pub.1935.IX.4), p. 447. In May 1933 President Roosevelt made an attempt to revive the Conference by endorsing British proposals for the elimination of some offensive weapons and a reduction of others, to be coupled with a solemn non-aggression pact and an obligation to refrain from assisting any violator. Idem, General Commission, Vol. II (LN Pub.1933.IX.10), pp. 461-62. (This United States promise to participate in an embargo against an aggressor was nullified, however, in 1935 by the adoption of a new neutrality resolution in the U. S. Congress, which in fact prohibited differentiation between parties to a conflict; 49 Stat. 1081) Germany withdrew again from the Conference in October 1933. LN, Records of the Conference, on cit., Series B, General Commission, Vol. III (LN Pub.1936.IX.1) p. 646.

Various technical committees of the Conference continued to work until the middle of 1935 on improving the British draft convention and on a special convention for the regulation of the manufacture of, and the trade in, arms and implements of war, a subject in which the Government of the United States evinced special interest. The records of the many committees and the "preliminary report" of Mr. Henderson constitute a great source of materials on the many technical questions connected with limitation and control of armaments, but definitive proposals were arrived at only with respect to a rather small group of problems. Idem, Preliminary Report on the Work of the Conference (LN Pub.1936.IX.3), pp. 152-206; SOHN, World Law, pp. 869-77). The death of Mr. Henderson in October 1935 ended the Conference for all practical purposes, though the Bureau of the Conference continued to hold meetings for several years.

8. **Atlantic Charter.** World War II proved that the Axis powers were much better prepared for aggressive action than their opponents. The first important agreement on Post-war problems, the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, prepared by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt and later accepted by other Allied Powers, contained the statement that the disarmament of aggressor nations is essential and that all other practicable measures should be encouraged to "lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments." 9 HUDSON, Int. Legislation, pp. 3-5.

9. **Charter of the United Nations.** The basic provisions on regulation of armaments in the Charter of the United Nations are contained in Articles 11, 26 and 47. Article 11 provides that "the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both." Article 26 defines the powers of the Security Council

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in this field as follows: "In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments." Article 47 implements Article 26 by providing that the Military Staff Committee shall advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to "the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament."

During the first six years of the United Nations, the question of disarmament was divided into two separate topics: control of atomic energy and atomic weapons, on the one hand, and regulation of conventional (i.e., non-atomic) armaments on the other hand. The Military Staff Committee which was principally intended to deal with this question, had taken no active part in the preparation of the plans envisaged by the Charter.

10. **Atomic Energy Commission.** The first session of the General Assembly in January 1946 unanimously established an Atomic Energy Commission along the lines agreed upon at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. The Commission was to be composed of the States represented on the Security Council plus Canada and was to receive directions from the Security Council in matters affecting security. The General Assembly asked the Commission to prepare proposals:

"(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

"(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

"(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

"(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions." Resolution 1(I); GAOR, I.1, Resolutions (A/64), p.9.

On 14 December 1946, the General Assembly unanimously recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission and the Security Council "expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspections, these conventions to include the prohibition of atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction and the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes." Resolution 41(I); GAOR, I.2, Resolutions (A/64/Add.1), p. 65.

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At the Atomic Energy Commission's first meeting on 14 June 1946 the American representative, Mr. Bernard Baruch, presented the U.S. plan for control, based on the so-called Acheson-Lilienthal Report (US, DS, Pub. 2498). Giving to the world the "choice between the quick and the dead" Mr. Baruch called for "the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority, to which should be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy, starting with the raw materials and including --

"1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

"2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities.

"3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy.

"4. Research and development responsibilities of an affirmative character intended to put the Authority in the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus to enable it to comprehend, and therefore to detect, misuse of atomic energy....

"When an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon and put into effective operation and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes....

"1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;

"2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and

"3. The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy....

"In the agreement, penalties of as serious a nature as the nations may wish and as immediate and certain in their execution as possible should be fixed for --

"1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;

"2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;

"3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority;

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"4. Wilful interference with the activities of the Authority;

"5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary-to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body....

"The matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system.... There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes...." AECOR, I, No. 1, p. 4-14.

Five days later the Commission received the following Soviet draft:

"ARTICLE 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations:

"(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever;

"(b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;

"(c) to destroy within a period of three months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition.

"ARTICLE 2. The high contracting parties declare that any violation of Article 1 of the present convention is a most serious international crime against humanity.

"ARTICLE 3. The high contracting parties shall, within a period of six months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the present convention." AECOR, I, No. 2, pp. 26-28.

The first report of the Atomic Energy Commission (AECOR, I, Spec. Supp., pp. 15-19) contained the following findings:

"1. That scientifically, technologically, and practically, it is feasible to control 'atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes'...

"2. That effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their fissionable derivatives. Appropriate mechanisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or clandestine

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production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure -- including one or more of the following types of safeguards: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing -- must be applied through the various stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuel and are used.... Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as mandatory.

"3. That whether the ultimate nuclear fuel be destined for peaceful or destructive uses, the productive processes are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced state of manufacture. Thus, the control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished through a single unified international system of control and inspection designed to carry out all these related purposes.

"4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions.

"5. That an effective system for the control of atomic energy must be international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within the United Nations, possessing adequate powers and properly organized, staffed, and equipped for the purpose.

"Only by such an international system of control and inspection can the development and use of atomic energy be freed from nationalistic rivalries with consequent rises to the safety of all peoples. Only by such a system can the benefits of wide-spread exchange of scientific knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence of the people of all nations.

"6. That international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any such international system of control and inspection....

The Commission recommended that:

"1. There should be a strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection aimed at attaining the objectives set forth in the Commission's terms of reference.

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"2. Such an international system of control and inspection should be established and its scope and functions defined by a treaty or convention in which all of the nations Members of the United Nations should be entitled to participate on fair and equitable terms....

"3. The treaty or convention should include, among others, provisions:

"(a) Establishing, in the United Nations, an international control agency possessing powers and charged with responsibility necessary and appropriate for the prompt and effective discharge of the duties imposed upon it by the terms of the treaty or convention.... Such powers should be sufficiently broad and flexible to enable the international control agency to deal with new developments that may hereafter arise in the field of atomic energy. The treaty shall provide that the rule of unanimity of the permanent Members, which in certain circumstances exists in the Security Council, shall have no relation to the work of the international control agency. No government shall possess any right of veto over the fulfillment by the international control agency of the obligations imposed upon it by the treaty nor shall any government have the power, through the exercise of any right of veto or otherwise, to obstruct the course of control or inspection.

"The international control agency shall promote among all nations the exchange of basic scientific information on atomic energy for peaceful ends, and shall be responsible for preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes, and for the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.

"The international control agency shall have positive research and development responsibilities in order to remain in the forefront of atomic knowledge so as to render the international control agency more effective in promoting the beneficial uses of atomic energy and in eliminating its destructive ones. The exclusive right to carry on atomic research for destructive purposes should be vested in the international control agency.

"Research in nuclear physics having a direct bearing on the use of atomic energy should be subject to appropriate safeguards established by the international control agency in accordance with the treaty or convention. Such safeguards should not interfere with the prosecution of pure scientific research, or the publication of its results, provided no dangerous use or purpose is involved.

"Decisions of the international control agency pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by the treaty or convention should govern the operations of national agencies for atomic energy. In carrying out its prescribed functions, however, the international

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control agency should interfere as little as necessary with the
operations of national agencies for atomic energy, or with the
economic plans and the private, corporate, and State relationships
in the several countries.

"(b) Affording the duly accredited representatives of the
international control agency unimpeded rights of ingress, egress,
and access for the performance of their inspections and other
duties into, from, and within the territory of every participating
nation, unhindered by national or local authorities.

"(c) Prohibiting the manufacture, possession, and use of
atomic weapons by all nations parties thereto and by all persons
under their jurisdiction.

"(d) Providing for the disposal of any existing stocks of
atomic weapons and for the proper use of nuclear fuel adaptable
for use in weapons.

"(e) Specifying the means and methods of determining
violations of its terms, setting forth such violations as shall
constitute international crimes, and establishing the nature of
the measures of enforcement and punishment to be imposed upon
persons and upon nations guilty of violating the terms of the
treaty or convention.

"The judicial or other processes for determination of
violations of the treaty or convention, and of punishments
therefor, should be swift and certain. Serious violations of
the treaty shall be reported immediately by the international
control agency to the nations parties to the treaty, to the
General Assembly, and to the Security Council. Once the
violations constituting international crimes have been defined
and the measures of enforcement and punishment therefor agreed
to in the treaty or convention, there shall be no legal right,
by veto or otherwise, whereby a wilful violator of the terms of
the treaty or convention shall be protected from the consequences
of violation of its terms.

"The enforcement and punishment provisions of the treaty or
convention would be ineffectual if, in any such situations, they
could be rendered nugatory by the veto of a State which had
voluntarily signed the treaty.

"4. In consideration of the problem of violation of the
terms of the treaty or convention, it should also be borne in
mind that a violation might be of so grave a character as to give
rise to the inherent right of self-defense recognized in
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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"5. The treaty or convention should embrace the entire program for putting the international system of control and inspection into effect and should provide a schedule for the completion of the transitional process over a period of time, step by step, in an orderly and agreed sequence leading to the full and effective establishment of international control of atomic energy. In order that the transition may be accomplished as rapidly as possible and with safety and equity to all, this Commission should supervise the transitional process, as prescribed in the treaty or convention, and should be empowered to determine when a particular stage or stages have been completed and subsequent ones are to commence."

At a meeting of the Security Council on 18 February 1947 the USSR proposed a number of specific amendments and additions to the general recommendations contained in the report, including the following: that the system of international control "must be administered within the framework of the Security Council"; and that the sentence in paragraph 3(e) of the Recommendations with respect to the right of veto be deleted. AEC/31 and S/283; SCOR, II, Supp. 7, pp. 63-68.

On 10 March 1947 the Security Council adopted unanimously a resolution urging the Commission to continue its enquiry and to prepare a draft treaty or treaties on the subject.

The second report of the Atomic Energy Commission (AECOR, II, Spec. Supp.; SOHN, World Law, pp. 899-932) was submitted to the Security Council on 11 September 1947, and contained detailed proposals dealing with the operational and developmental functions of an international agency for the control of atomic energy. They implemented the recommendations of the First Report, and provided (p.2) for the following measures:

"(a) Production quotas based on principles and policies specified in the treaty or convention;

"(b) Ownership by the agency of nuclear fuel and source material;

"(c) Ownership, management and operation by the agency of dangerous facilities;

"(d) Licensing by the agency of non-dangerous facilities to be operated by nations; and

"(e) Inspection by the agency to prevent or detect clandestine activities."

In the meantime, the USSR had presented to the Commission on 11 June a series of alternative proposals (AEC/24; AECOR, II, No.2, pp. 20-24), which provided for simultaneous establishment of international controls over all stages of atomic production.

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