MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME & DATE: 9:30 p.m., November 17, 1971

PLACE: Cincinnati Country Club, Cincinnati, Ohio

PARTICIPANTS: Members and Guests of the Commercial Club of Cincinnati and the Commonwealth Club of Cincinnati [see list attached]
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Dr. Kissinger was introduced by Mr. John Bullock. Mr. Bullock cited from the *Time* article on Dr. Kissinger which was published shortly after his appointment as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He referred especially to a quotation with Senator Javits that this appointment might be the most important appointment in the Administration, since it would be in the area of foreign affairs that the Nixon Administration would make its mark. Mr. Bullock added broad bibliographical remarks.]

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say that Senator Taft had no small hand in getting me out to Cincinnati tonight. Perhaps I better not describe the methods that he used. In Washington, you know, Senator Taft and I live in the same row of houses. There is a series of steps that descends from the walkway in front of the houses, and I found day after day that Senator Taft (or sometimes Mrs. Taft) would waylay me there and tell me how desirable it would be for me to come to Cincinnati. In addition, Mr. Bullock smuggled a former law assistant of his onto my staff to keep him informed of all my activities. Because I don't know what aspect of foreign policy interests you most, I will begin by speaking briefly and then take questions from the floor.

The major problem in foreign affairs our Administration faced when it came into office in 1969 was the fact that the foreign policy of the post-war era had come apart at the seams. In 1961, Kennedy was able to say that we would fight any enemy, defend any friend, go anywhere in the

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

world to fight for freedom. I don't say this in a critical way. I just say it to emphasize how dramatically the world situation has changed. What I want to do in my opening remarks is to identify the structural changes in the world order that have become visible. Five years prior to President Nixon's Administration things were dramatically different from the situation when we came into office. In 1962, for example, during the Cuban missile crisis the Russians had some 70 land-based missiles; all were out in the open and required some 10 hours to fuel. Today they have approximately 1500 such missiles well protected in silos. In addition, they now have missile submarines. This change in the Soviet strategic forces has been one matter that has changed sharply. Additional such matters that have been changed in the recent years, are our relationships with Europe and Japan.

Following the Second World War, the U.S. was the dominant free nation in the world. Our government was primarily responsible for the defense of other nations; and in large measure we directed the foreign policies of other nations. By the time the Nixon Administration took office, however, both Europe and Japan had regained enough vigor economically to become serious competitors with the United States in world markets.

A third dramatic change obvious under the Nixon Administration has occurred within the Communist world. In the post-war era of foreign policy we viewed communism as a monolithic threat to use organized military units to cross fixed national borders. But then we saw that the most dramatic fissure in the international order occurred between two communist nations--the split between Peking and Moscow. Such a split is unprecedented; ten years ago, we would have thought it inconceivable. So I want to begin by saying that regardless of who was elected President in 1968, he would have found it necessary to make dramatic readjustments in foreign policy.

Let me make a few observations now on the Vietnam situation. Vietnam has been the nightmare of our Administration. When we came into office, there were 550,000 Americans in Vietnam, and we were suffering some 300 casualties a week. At that time the number of American troops in Vietnam was increasing. If, in 1969, upon taking office

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

President Nixon had announced that in two and a half years he would have reduced casualties from 300 a week to 5, that he would have done so under conditions where the roads would remain open and the civilian administration would be making dramatic progress in Vietnam, he would have been accused of an incredible credibility gap. Yet that is what he has done and still the Administration is attacked by war critics. It seems that the more successful we are in the Vietnam area, the farther out on the left we push our critics. Things have gotten so bad now in the Senate that I've sort of come to be convinced that Cooper-Church is a hyphenated name (Laughter). For all practical purposes though, the Vietnam war is over--what remains to be decided is whether we can end it in a decent fashion. Our view has always been that we owe something, not only to the people that might face service in Vietnam now or in the future, but also to those who have suffered in Vietnam in the past. The only difference between this Administration and the critics on the Vietnam issue regards the rate of withdrawal.

You hear arguments about whether this Administration is pursuing all avenues of opportunity to end the Vietnam war. Let me ask you this question: Is it reasonable to think that this Administration, which is obviously known for making the big play in foreign affairs, would be neglecting a promising path toward settlement of the Vietnam war? Let me say this: there has been one thing and only one thing that we have categorically refused to do. We have refused to ally ourselves with our enemy against the very people who for ten years, relying on our assistance, have stood and fought in Vietnam. Isn't it reasonable to imagine that everything else in the Vietnam situation is negotiable? If we have to, we will go to the American people themselves to their view of whether, in order to extricate ourselves from Vietnam, we should participate in an overthrow of the very government that we have been supporting. This is the only thing that this Administration has refused to do. I will take some questions later on the Vietnam issue, but let me make a few additional remarks.

I believe that when the history of this period is written the Vietnam war will appear as a mere incident in a broader perspective of foreign affairs, and that people will ask themselves what all of the trauma and excitement over Vietnam was all about. This Administration will

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

be judged, not on whether it ended the war (and it will end the war),
but rather on whether it was capable of making a broad adjustment
from the post-war era of foreign affairs to a new and more stable
international order. It will be judged on whether it engaged in
dialogue with its opponents, as well as its friends, without reducing
international affairs to a psychological condition of atmospherics.
The United States cannot withdraw from the world, and we will not
withdraw from the world. But, on the other hand, the United States
cannot pretend that it is in its interest to run the affairs of the other
nations of the world.

Our policy is to ask other nations to define their interests and to
help assume the burdens that are incumbent upon them as nations in
the international order. We will not make ourselves responsible for
every inch of ground in the Free World. We can no longer promise
that we will defend any of that ground against any enemy at any time.
The key that we face is the problem of adjustment. We are having
troubles, and those troubles are obvious in our dealings with the
Europeans and the Japanese. But we are in the beginning of a new
period and we are implementing a new policy of adjustment. Adoles-
cence is always difficult. Of course, it is always easier to pass
decisions somewhere else, and the Europeans and the Japanese have
every interest in wanting their responsibility and burdens to be
handled by Washington.

Let me cite one specific example. The structure of the international
monetary system has had serious affects on the United States. First,
we have had tremendous deficits arising in major part from foreign
aid and security assistance. But in addition, we found that the structure
of the system has enabled other nations to rig their exchange rates in
ways unfairly to disadvantage the dollar. Now we hear that the United
States is uncooperative. We are accused of being uncooperative
precisely because we pursue a policy in which we refuse to tell other
nations of the world exactly what international monetary system should
be established--that is, because we refuse to assume the sole burden
and responsibility of establishing and running the system. The fact
is that the other nations have been asked to make proposals for a new
international monetary system, and they have made none. We have
not refused any proposal from any other nation in the area of inter-
national economics.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

I don't mean to get off on another discussion about economics, but
rather just to use economics as an example of our approach to
international affairs. I think in the coming months you will see,
however, that this Administration will be creative *vis-a-vis* its
allies, as well as creative in dealing with its opponents.

Now let me turn for a moment to the coming summit meetings.
China and Russia are two very different communist nations. The
Russians are a people governed by a very heavy bureaucracy.
They have an extraordinarily potent economy. Their leaders
have reached positions of responsibility through brutal struggle.
In addition, the Russians have enormous military might which has
been dramatically increasing in potency over the last years. If
this increase in military power continues in Russia, in the next
decade the United States will be forced to drastic action to counter
it. In the past the American government has tended to deal with
the Russians in what I characterize as a psychotherapeutic manner.
The old idea has been that improved personal relations would in-
evitably lead to progress in international affairs between the Russians
and the Americans. The approach of this Administration is different.
We feel it important to recognize that causes do exist for the pro-
blems that we have with the Russians. At the President's first press
conference he emphasized that in the conduct of foreign affairs this
Administration would face realities. Our relationship with the Soviets
has been more businesslike than it has been in any other recent time.
After four crises that brought us to the brink of war, we have finally
reached an agreement in Berlin. We have reached agreements on
strategic arms limitation and also in the accidental war area. In
addition, there have been a series of other agreements with the
Russians. Due to the progress on these specific issues, the Presi-
dent judges that the time is now ripe for a summit meeting with the
Russians.

China is an entirely different communist nation from Russia. It is a
society that has been cut off from the United States for 22 years.
Ideologically the Chinese are deeply motivated, and I can say to
you with full confidence that the Chinese do not wish us well. But
we see it in our interest to communicate with the Chinese, and not
use Russia as a middle man in our communications with the other
Communist nations. We started communications with the Chinese

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

early in this Administration. Let me say, though, that we must
guard against both over-optimism and depression in dealing with
the Chinese people who are very subtle, very talented. The Deputy
Foreign Minister's recent speech at the United Nations was entirely
predictable. We must realize the Chinese view of the world and
understand it. We must recognize that their statement of that world
view at the United Nations is not a cause for us to despair. At the
same time, we must realize that the gracious treatment I received
in China does not mean that all is well between China and the United
States.

My major point, though, is a broader one. Following the Second
World War the United States was projected into a dominant position
of power in international affairs. This resulted from the power vacuum
created by the withdrawal from the international scene of the former
world powers and by the weakness of both our friends and our opponents.
Now things have changed and it is necessary for us to enter into a pro-
cess of dialogue with those very friends and antagonists. The Vietnam
issue should only be looked upon as an interruption in the basic policy
that we are following. In this Administration we want to be judged
not by this or that tactical move in a local arena, but rather on a
larger scale by whether we successfully move internationally toward
a structure of peace. [Standing ovation]

Question: (Mr. Bullock) Thank you very much for your fine address, Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger has agreed to be gracious enough to take questions from the floor, so we are ready now for questions.

Question: I would like to ask you about the problem with Japan. Japan is one of our biggest customers and it seems to me that we pulled the rug out from under it. What will happen in the long run to our relations with Japan?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) As I see it, there were two major shocks and one less major shock that we have recently delivered to the Japanese. The first was the initial China trip. This came as a surprise to the Japanese. The second was the international impact of the New Economic Policy, with its consequential floating of the yen. The third was the subsidiary problem of textiles. Let me take them in order.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

The trip to China was a shock to the Japanese. There is a folklore that has developed that the first trip to Peking resulted in some grievous harm to the Japanese which dramatically affected American-Japanese relations. Let me say first of all that Japan was not discriminated against. There were major sections of our government itself which didn't know about the trip to Peking. (Laughter) But for us to have told the Japanese of the upcoming Peking trip in advance would have been impossible. First of all, in order to tell the Japanese, we would have obviously had to tell the Taiwanese. The Formosans' incentive-- if they had received such advance notice--would not have been to wish us an overwhelming success. (Laughter) Let me say, too, that we did not know at that time what would happen on the trip to China. In retrospect everything looks quite certain; but looking forward to the trip we had no idea how it would turn out. So there was the problem of notifying the Taiwanese; the problem of uncertainty about the trip itself. In addition to that there was the problem that the Japanese have a government which is leakier even than our own, and that must be a world's record. The only use to a political leader in Japan for information about an upcoming trip to Peking by American officials would have been to position himself against the consequences of the American trip. The trip was a shock to the Japanese but that's not the question. The question is what this shock actually meant.

Let me say that the shock itself certainly did not damage Sato. Sato goes out next summer anyway and, as you may well know, the last year for a lame duck is always a tough year. What the trip did do in Japan was to accelerate a series of forces that were already at work in Japan. There is peculiar U. S. nostalgia that leads us to view all members of the world community as Americans at heart. I sometimes say that Americans have the view that if you could ever catch an Englishman off-guard, for instance, at 4 o'clock in the morning, you would find that he had dropped his phony accent. (Laughter). Prior to our trip to Peking it was clear that Japan had already begun to move in the direction of new independence. Economically we had no choice in dealing with the Japanese. The Japanese have carefully pursued a policy of developing high priority industries which enable them, with advantages in currency valuation, to carve successful markets worldwide for special products. For two and a half years we have been telling the Japanese that adjustments were necessary, but like all politicians the Japanese leaders needed more than talk; they needed a demonstration that we were serious. Japan is the most powerful economic nation in Asia and our ally. We would be fools to trade Japan, our ally, for a mitigation in tensions with

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

the Chinese. Your concern about the problem with the Japanese is
appropriate; but give us a year. I think in that period of time you
will see proper adjustments to our relationship with the Japanese.

**Question:** Can you give us any details on the diplomatic techniques that you used to force the Chinese to invite the President to Peking; and second, can you relate these techniques to the upcoming trips.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) It is incorrect, I think, to say that we forced the Chinese to invite the President to Peking. Necessity brought us together in these meetings. The variety of diplomatic techniques involved on both sides was considerable, as each maneuvered skillfully in its own interest. I can't go into the details on the procedures that were involved, but let me say that it is not easy to deal diplomatically with a nation that you have not had relations with the 22 years. The problem of finding an appropriate intermediary is a serious one, because you are of course dealing with somebody in the middle who is reading the mail on both sides. I ask you how many nations in the world you know that we could properly put into that position. (Laughter) You all may be aware of the fact that currently there is construction of air raid shelters in Peking. I can tell you this: they are not building those air raid shelters against any American threat. If they feared us, I suggest that the 1950's would have been a much more appropriate time for them to build shelters. The China move for us was for our own reasons. They did it from their perspective for their own reasons. It was necessity, as I said before, that brought us together.

**Question:** Can you give us your impression of the leadership in China of Chou and Mao, and of Mao's heir-apparent?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You are determined that I will never write my memoirs, I guess. (Laughter). Let me begin by saying that the future of Mao's heir-apparent appears to be behind him. (Laughter). Mao, I believe, can best be likened to a Chairman of the Board who is control of overall company policy, but who is not concerned with the operational details of the implementation of that policy. Chou appears more like a Chief Executive Officer with responsibility for running daily affairs. Wherever Mao has a serious concern, though, it appears that he has the ability and power to achieve what he wants. From my dealings with Chou, I judge him to be an intelligent,

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

broadly sweeping, formidable man. Regardless of whether or not one agrees with his point of view on world affairs, nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that he is a man of extraordinary talent.

**Question:** I would like you to address the UN subject, especially regarding the excusing of "Free China" as we used to call it. Was the United States concerned about the timing of your second China trip? Can you comment on this?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I said at my press conference following the second trip that the concurrence of the vote in the United Nations with my arrival back from China was a painful coincidence. You must understand that for us to communicate with the Chinese takes a week, and so for messages to go back and forth on any unsettled issue requires quite a time span. On the first visit, which had to be short for a series of reasons, we agreed with the Chinese that there would be a subsequent visit in advance of the President's trip, for a longer discussion of issues. We tentatively agreed with the Chinese that the period from the 15th of September to the 15th of October would be appropriate. In August it turned out that the Chinese did not want to do the meeting at the end of September because of a possible conflict with their celebrations on October 1. From the 6th to the 13th of October Haile Selassie was visiting in China, and so they suggested that we come as soon as possible after Haile Selassie's visit. We agreed, and settled on the 18th.

We had looked at the prospect of a vote in the United Nations. The vote there on the China issue had never occurred before November 8th--usually it was about the 15th of November. Last year I think it was November 28th. So the 18th of October seemed like a good time. We assumed of course, that we would return before the vote in the United Nations. The argument--quite a strong argument, I think--could then be made that we had demonstrated conclusively it was possible to deal constructively with China while at the same time opposing their admission to the United Nations. This, of course, was a position which we would have argued at the UN to nations on the China issue itself. Unfortunately, the process at the United Nations accelerated for reasons that are too complicated to go into. We could not stop the trip at that time, could we, by saying to the Chinese that we wanted to change the date of the trip in order that we could be more successful in our attempt to keep them out of the United Nations? (Laughter) I will say, though that any implication there was a conspiracy between China and the United States on the UN vote is absurd. Our position on the Republic of China's right to remain in the United

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

was clear. In addition, let me say that I am not at all sure that the People's Republic of China was very interested to join the United Nations this year. The United Nations problem had never been an issue in our discussions with the Chinese.

Putting all that aside, let me say that I have agonized over this. Pouring over the list of countries which voted against us in the United Nations though, I can not find a single country the vote of which I am convinced was affected by the second China visit. Quite arguably it is the Chinese who should be defending their policy domestically: trying to explain how it is that they could wine and dine me in Peking at the same time that the United States was moving heaven and earth to keep them out of the United Nations. Just today, as a matter of fact, Ron Zeigler emphasized that we will continue to honor our defense commitment to Taiwan.

**Question:** How do you interpret the impact of the China initiative around the world?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Whenever you are dealing with a nation of 800 million people you are automatically dealing with a nation that creates in other countries desires for diplomatic contacts. There is always a blackmail potential under such circumstances for the Chinese to exact a price on the United Nations front. That didn't mature this time, but it was a possibility. I don't think that my second trip damaged our prospects to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. What actually hurt us wasn't the second trip, but the first trip. The implication of the first trip was that future relations between nations of the world and China could then properly be pursued. It gave other countries a change--an excuse --to initiate contacts with the Chinese on a broad front. But this isn't to excuse the conduct of countries that inexplicably voted against us at the United Nations on the China issue.

[At this point Dr. Kissinger's remarks ended and he departed the Country Club.]

NOVEMBER 17, 1971 ATTENDANCE

GUESTS

WILLIAM H. ANDERSON - attorney with Graydon, Head & Ritchey

DOCTOR ESLIE ASBURY - physician

JAMES H. STONE - with Stone Oil Company

LLOYD I. MILLER - Chairman of the Board, Cincinnati Transit Company

HARRY HOPKINS - with Mitchell Steel Company

JOHN M. BULLOCK - Senior Vice President, The First National Bank of Cincinnati

J. MACK SWIGERT - Partner, law firm of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister

JACK LANDEN - Vice President and Trust Officer, The Central Trust Company

JOHN T. LAWRENCE - with Taft Broadcasting Company

PAUL D. MYERS - President, The Ralph H. Jones Co., advertising

MURRAY S. MONROE - Partner, law firm of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister

FREDERIC C. HIRONS - Frederic C. Hirons Co., Insurance Consultants

WILLIAM O. DeWITT, JR. - Son of former owner of Cincinnati Reds baseball club

WARREN C. GILES - Former Commissioner of Baseball

DONALD C. ALEXANDER - Partner, law firm of Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates & Deupree

JOHN F. STEELE - Chairman of the Board, Hilltop Concrete Corporation

JOSEPH P. HAYDEN, JR. - President, The Midland Company

CHARLES S. MILLARD - Benj. D. Bartlett & Co., stock brokers

ARNOLD A. JOHNSON - Senior Vice President-Finance, Ohio National Life Insurance Co.

PAUL R. ILYINSKY - Executive Vice President, Professional Realty Service, Inc.

WARNER A. PECK, JR. - Physician

DONN D. EARLY - President, Early-Selmeier, Inc. advertising agency

E. TRIMBLE SMITH - Former Vice President, The First National Bank of Cincinnati, now retired

WILLIAM N. LIGGETT - President, The First National Bank of Cincinnati

ASA I. ATKINS - President, Atkins & Pearce Manufacturing Company

CHARLES G. PUCHTA - Partner, law firm of Frost & Jacobs

JAMES J. ESPY - Vice President, R. C. Crisler & Company

DOCTOR JOHN CAMPBELL - physician

LAWRENCE H. KYTE, JR. - attorney with Kyte, Conlan, Wulsin & Vogeler

JOHN S. ANDREWS - President, The John Shillito Co.

EDGAR MACK - Seasongood & Mayer

DUDLEY S. TAFT - Secretary, Taft Broadcasting Co.

ROBERT J. BARTH - Hudepohl Brewing Company

CLIFFORD H. COORS - Secretary, The Coors Bros. Co.

DOCTOR JOHN WULSIN - Physician

LESLIE GAUT - President and General Manager, Fas Foto, Inc.

PHILIP G. BARACH - President, U. S. Shoe Corporation

FRANK H. SHAFFER, III - President, D. H. Roth Co.

POWELL McHENRY - Partner, law firm of Dinsmore, Shohl, Coates & Deupree

-2-

HERBERT S. LANDSMANN - Executive Vice President
Federated Department Stores, Inc.

ROBERT O. ADERS - Chairman of the Board,
The Kroger Company

JOHN V. EARLS - President-Treasurer, The
Earls-Blain Co. - insurance

LEONARD M. SIVE - President,
Leonard M. Sive & Associates, Inc.
advertising agency

H. H. HAMILTON - President, Jet Centers, Inc.

THOMAS Y. ALIMAN - Attorney with Taft, Stettinius
& Hollister

WILLIAM J. GRAHAM, JR. - Attorney with Taft, Stettinius
& Hollister

WILLIAM R. SEAMAN - Partner, law firm of Frost &
Jacobs

BRUCE I. PETRIE - Partner, law firm of Graydon, Head
& Ritchey

-3-