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OCT 12 1988.

"NEWSMAKER SUNDAY"

AIR DATE: Sunday, October 2, 1988, 10:30 AM & 5:30 PM (EDT)

ORIGINATION: Washington, D.C.

GUESTS: GENNADI GERASIMOV
Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman

HENRY KISSINGER (in San Francisco Bureau)
Former US Secretary of State

JEANE KIRKPATRICK
Former US Ambassador to the United Nations

DIMITRI SIMES
The Carnegie Endowment

CORRESPONDENT: Charles Bierbauer, CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY"

PRODUCER: Elissa Free

ASSOCIATE PRODUCER: Kevin Bohn

PRODUCTION

COORDINATOR: Lisa Lawrence

CONDITION OF USE: Credit "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" (CNN).

(C) Copyright 1988, Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

EDITORS: This is a rush transcript provided for the convenience of the press. Print and broadcast media may quote this transcript *provided credit is given to "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY,"* Cable News Network. Video and audio cassettes are available upon request to the press. For further information, please contact

Transcript Inquiries only: (301) 277-1661.

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MR. BIERBAUER: Welcome to "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY." In Washington, I'm Charles Bierbauer. Has Mikhail Gorbachev eliminated his Kremlin competition? And what does this week's power play in Moscow mean for the next US president? Questions today for Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov, and for Kremlin watchers Henry Kissinger, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Dimitri Simes, all on "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY."

MR. BIERBAUER (Voiceover): It took the Supreme Soviet just an hour to elect a new president Saturday. Mikhail Gorbachev did not have to face the grueling months of a US presidential campaign, but brevity does not mean that Kremlin leaders don't play power politics. Gorbachev plans to strengthen the role of both the president and the Supreme Soviet, until now a rubberstamp parliament for the dictates of the Communist Party Politboro.

GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV (Translator, on tape): "I see my task to do everything to strengthen in -- to strengthen the authority of the soviets and turn them into the true organs of the people's power."

MR. BIERBAUER (VO): Gorbachev replaces 79-year old Andrei Gromyko, who held the ceremonial presidency for three years, but who has been in the Soviet leadership since the days of Stalin. Apparently even more significant is Gorbachev's CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

2

success in putting his strongest Kremlin competitor, Yegor Ligachev, on a side track. Ligachev will have to deal with the eternal problem of Soviet agriculture.

Gorbachev has heard the complaints of the Soviet people that there is nothing in their shops. He faces the dissatisfaction of minorities in the Soviet Union.

President Reagan, who has been to the summit four times with Gorbachev, avoided substantive comment on the changes in Moscow, but the US is clearly hoping that it means stability.

SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ (On tape): "...Mr. Gorbachev is a strong and determined person. He has a major reform program that he's working on. And if there is any message from this, it is that he intends to pursue that program."

MR. BIERBAUER: Earlier this morning I asked Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov about the urgency of this week's changes.

MR. GERASIMOV: Actually these changes were long overdue. They must have come, and now they came and it's a big push for our perestroika, for our new policy.

MR. BIERBAUER: When you say long overdue, I noticed this week you said that the -- the generation coming into power has waited perhaps too long. Have things gotten to the point -- We've seen riots in -- in Azerbaijan, we've seen disturbances in several places in the country. Mr. Gorbachev went to Siberia and was told by the people there was nothing in the shops there. Is CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

(tc)

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that what you mean by things have gone too long?

MR. GERASIMOV: These are just examples that changes were long overdue and I think that Gorbachev's trip to Krasniarsk convinced him even more than changes must be -- that changes are urgent.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, what is it that the generation coming into power wants to accomplish?

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, we want to put our country back on tracks again. We want to fill our shops with foods and goods and we want a housing problem to be solved and we want to be a civilized nation.

MR. BIERBAUER: Is what these changes will mean to the average Soviet citizen?

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, these are only personnel changes, it's only the beginning of a -- of a very long road. And, of course, as Gorbachev emphasized all the time, including during his trip to Krasniarsk, these changes are in the hand of the people, people in the street.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, but the people in the street have to know that they've got the support from the top. Has -- Has Mr. Gorbachev --

MR. GERASIMOV: That's -- That's -- Yes, that's the -- that's what they're getting now. You see, Gorbachev tried to convince them that they must -- they must now think for themselves and do things for themselves and not --

4

MR. BIERBAUER: Isn't that a -- Isn't that --

MR. GERASIMOV: -- and not rely on a -- on a czar, on a king or somebody. Yes?

MR. BIERBAUER: Isn't that a difficult thought process for the average Soviet citizen to make? He's not had a pattern over the last seventy years of being encouraged to think for himself.

MR. GERASIMOV: Oh, I agree. It's not easy and it's difficult sometimes for old dogs to -- to learn new tricks, and sometimes it's difficult to -- to brush off your old habits, habits, for instance, of relying on the government to supply with everything from housing to food. And to think for themselves, it's difficult, but it's the only way out of the situation.

MR. BIERBAUER: Has Mr. Gorbachev now removed those who would be obstacles to such reform? Is he now completely -- he and his -- those who think as he do, completely in control?

MR. GERASIMOV: I don't think it's just the obstacles, I think maybe the better word is just change of generation. Because old people are stepping down for many reasons, including just health reasons and age reasons, and the new generation is coming in.

MR. BIERBAUER: Were US officials informed by Mr. Shevardnadze before he hurried back to Moscow of what was going to happen?

MR. GERASIMOV: Not to my knowledge. But when he left -- when he left he said that he is going to the plenum of the CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

(LC)

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Central Committee, that he did.

MR. BIERBAUER: Let me ask you, with Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Dobrynin both being retired, men who served for decades in -- in the important role, functioning of liaison between the US and the Soviet Union, who is -- who's Mr. Gorbachev's key advisor in dealing with the United States now?

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, the Minister of Foreign Affair Shevardnadze is dealing with -- with the United States and he met your secretary of state almost thirty times. But there will be also organized an international commission at the Central Committee and it will be headed by Mr. Alexander Yakovlev, a former ambassador to Canada.

MR. BIERBAUER: So, Mr. Yakovlev and Mr. Shevardnadze will then be --

MR. GERASIMOV: In tandem.

MR. BIERBAUER: -- the key people.

MR. GERASIMOV: Yes.

MR. BIERBAUER: What do you see in the way of US-Soviet relations? What path will they take from here on?

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, there -- We want radical change for the better. And, in this sense, our policy toward your country didn't change at all. It -- It is being reinforced.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, Mr. -- Mr. Shevardnadze, the foreign minister, met in New York, both with -- or here and in New York, both with Vice President Bush and with Gov. Dukakis. What were CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

(L)

the results of those meetings? What was his assessment of the two
candidates for US president?

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, he had an interesting talk with Mr.
Dukakis and, of course, he met Vice President Bush, not for the
first time, but his meeting with Mr. Dukakis was for the first
time, and he got a very favorable impression of the man.

MR. BIERBAUER: Can you take it beyond that? Would --

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, as -- as my minister put it, his
preferences, he will tell your preferences after the election
day.

MR. BIERBAUER: Alright. Let me ask you just finally then,
where do you -- What should we watch for in the weeks and -- and
months ahead in the Soviet Union? What will be cues that say that
these things are working, that -- as Mr. Gorbachev wants them to?

MR. GERASIMOV: Well, we want changes to take place as
quickly as possible. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We must
work hard for these changes to be brought about. So, immediately,
in weeks, you can -- you are not going to see any radical
changes, but, in the long run, there will be.

MR. BIERBAUER: Alright, Mr. Gerasimov, thank you. When we
return, we'll be joined by former US Ambassador to the United
Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick; by Dimitri Simes, of the Carnegie
Endowment; and in our San Francisco bureau, by former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger. Stay with us please.

[Commercial announcements.]

7

MR. BIERBAUER: Now for the views of the Kremlin watchers.
Dr. Kissinger, let me start with you. You heard Mr. Gerasimov say
that these changes were overdue. What we've seen a lot of is
personnel changes, but can he deliver?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it depends what you mean by can he deliver. First of all, we have to keep in mind that what we are seeing is what happened in every previous succession from one general secretary to another; that is, that the new general secretary purges all of his colleagues that brought him in and brings in his own people. So, in this sense, it is an attempt by Gorbachev to get absolute power.

Secondly, I find of all the changes, the replacement of
Dobrynin the most interesting. He is their foremost expert on the
Soviet -- on the United States, he's the man who has dealt with
the United States longest, and he appears to have been totally
dependent on Gorbachev, who brought him back from -- from the
United States. So, I think we ought to be careful, to see this
whole thing entirely in terms of reformers, good guys against bad
guys. It is partly a conventional power struggle, it is partly
conservatives against reformers and the fundamental problems
haven't disappeared of centralization versus decentralization.
When they decentralize, they get into problems with their
nationalities. If they centralize, they stagnate. Of moderation
in foreign policy against control of Eastern Europe. And it's
interesting that the man who has risen most rapidly, Medvedev, is

(LC)

8

an expert on Eastern Europe. So, it is a more complex situation
than the one Gerasimov presented.

MR. BIERBAUER: You've touched on a lot of bases there. Let me try and take them more on a -- on a one-by-one approach, but you've set the groundwork for us, Dr. Kissinger. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, by -- by deliver, in one sense, we mean can he answer the complaints of the people, who are saying there is no food, there is -- they're no better goods. We heard Mr. Gerasimov say that the general secretary's trip to Krasniarsk was significant in making a decision to move. By deliver, I guess that's what I mean. Can he improve things?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, it's not easy. Of course, I mean, this is a vast interlocking bureaucracy and it's very difficult to change anything significant. And to change the system in a way that makes it a more effective economic machine that delivers the goods, so to speak, and raises the standard of living of the Soviet people is very, very difficult. It's beyond the power of one man. Any one man, no matter who is general secretary, could not do it alone.

I find it extremely interesting that Ligachev, who is now heading the commission on agriculture and with responsibility for agricultural production, which is very important part of delivering the goods --

MR. BIERBAUER: And the job once held by Mr. Gorbachev.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: That's right, and once held by Mr.

(IC)

9

Khrushchev, too, I think was in agriculture. Very tough job. Hard to deliver. I agree with Henry Kissinger, that it's to early to tell. I think the scene is -- is confused, I think it -- Again, what we're seeing is a very -- a long succession struggle --

DR. KISSINGER: And we ought to have --

AMB KIRKPATRICK: -- and that, too, is typical.

DR. KISSINGER: If I may say, we have to keep in mind that the attack on Gromyko started last June at the party conference and could have had very little to do with the visit to -- to Krasniarsk. So that the -- the fundamental problems have nothing or have very little to do with the immediate situation. The fundamental problem is that it's a highly centralized state that has to decentralized in order to have an economic -- better economic performance, but this runs counter to the way the government has been run in the past. That's the real trouble here.

MR. BIERBAUER: That's the -- That's the Kremlin power politics side of this. I want to ask Dimitri Simes, as well. The other thing that struck me about Mr. Gerasimov's remarks was getting the Soviet citizen involved, saying it's hard to teach an old dog new tricks, that there is still enormous skepticism, I would think, on the part of the Soviet citizen as to what is going on above him.

DR. SIMES: I think there is enormous skepticism and I don't think that this party plenum will do very much to change the CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

10

skepticism, because, afterall, all they were able to do was to
remove some old people from power. Incidentally, Gorbachev was
not able to accomplish that much. The leadership stalemate would
continue and he really would increasingly look inept and almost
irrelevant. He was trying to change the structure of the leader-
ship for a number of months. Then he went to Krasniarsk and I
think that Krasniarsk, in a way, was a set up. He almost
intentionally triggered a scene with an angry mob, people who are
saying what is going on, where is food, where are consumer goods.
And Gorbachev loved it. And under Alexander Yakovlev, the Soviet
TV covered this event very, very dramatically. Gorbachev almost
wanted to say, look, we reached the moment of truth, we cannot
continue this way any longer.

MR. BIERBAUER: We've reached the moment where we have to
take a break. We'll be back with more of this. Stay with us
please on "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY."

[Commercial announcements.]

MR. BIERBAUER: Continuing our discussion of Mr. Gorbachev's
moves in the Kremlin this week to solidify his power. Amb. Kirk-
patrick, I know you wanted to add something to this discussion. A
lot of these names are names that we've kicked around for awhile
-- Ligachev, Dobrynin, Gromyko, the one that -- that troubled you
was --

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Well, I was interested in the point about
Dobrynin having been, basic- -- just let go and what that might
CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

(10)

11

mean for US-Soviet relations. I was going to -- It reminded me
that when Henry Kissinger and I and Cyrus Vance were meeting with
Gorbachev two years almost now, a year and a half ago, Yakovlev
was at his right throughout that conversation, Dobrynin on his
left. Diplomatically speaking, the -- it took -- that's
significant.

I believe that Yakovlev has been Gorbachev's principal
advisor on North American affairs for a long time, as he is
perhaps his principal ally inside the Politboro.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, does that mean that Dobrynin was
someone he needed for a transitional period, but because Dobrynin
was a Gromyko protege, he has to go at some point?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: Yes, yes, yes, I think so, and that he
didn't really feel finally the need for him because he has been
relying more heavily on Yakovlev for expertise on North America.
That's --

DR. KISSINGER: But I don't think Dobrynin was a Gromyko
protege, I think Dobrynin and Gromyko and generally believed to be
at -- at loggerheads and Yakovlev, in that arcane science of
criminology, has usually been considered as fairly anti-US and
certainly has written many things that were highly critical of
the United States. So, to that extent, whatever balance existed
among Gorbachev's advisors has tilted clearly toward Yakovlev.

MR. BIERBAUER: So, are you saying that one -- one should
expect a -- a --

12

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I agree.

MR. BIERBAUER: -- a sterner approach towards the US, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: I -- This is -- One can only judge by first analysis. I expect -- I think that the kind of promotions that have been made would indicate to me a --a tightening up perhaps in Eastern Europe and paying the price, if necessary, of some slowdown in relations with the United States. I don't think the policy will change fundamentally, but I would expect a slightly sterner tone in the next administration.

MR. BIERBAUER: Dr. Simes, the question about Eastern Europe has come up a couple of times here and Medvedev you mentioned I believe as a man familiar with that area. Do we know anything else about Medvedev? Is there anything significant that we should be looking for?

DR. SIMES: Well, Medvedev is somewhere between, I would say, Yakovlev, the reformer, quote-unquote the liberal, and I would say somebody like Yegor Ligachev, the conservative. He was a professor of economics, but he was a very particular professor. He was professor of Marxist-Leninist economics. He came from the party apparatus. He came from Leningrad, from a very conservative party organization there. And when he was in charge of European affairs, I have to say it was Yakovlev rather than Medvedev who was particularly broadminded about East European issues.

Let me say a word about Dobrynin. I think that he was
CNN's "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY" -- 2 October 1988.

13

irrelevant for sometime. When he was brought to Moscow, he was
the American expert, he was also equal to Yakovlev. They were
both Central Committee secretaries and Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze was inexperienced. Now Shevardnadze's powerful and
experienced, Yakovlev goes on the Politboro, and Dobrynin simply
was not a heavyweight, he was not in the same league. I don't
think that his departure will make much of a difference.

MR. BIERBAUER: Let me ask you -- bring up one other name.
Alexandra Biryukova. For the first time in twenty-some odd years,
there is a woman within this -- the hierarchy, she's a candidate
member of the Politboro and responsible for light industry and
consumer affairs as a deputy foreign minister. Is there any
significance to bringing in a woman? Is this tokenism in the
Soviet style or what?

DR. SIMES: I think it is tokenism. She is not a full member
of the Politboro, she is not on the Central Committee
Secretariat. They made -- They made her one of deputy prime
ministers. I think it is an important position, she has quite a
potential, but I don't expect her to be a major player, certainly
not unless and until she is made a full member of the Politboro.

MR. BIERBAUER: Any other thought on that?

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: No, I agree with this. I agree with that
entirely, that it's fundamentally a tokenist move, too.

MR. BIERBAUER: What about then Chebrikov and the KGB,
losing the KGB portfolio, but staying within the Politboro?

(Lc)

14

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I think that's extremely interesting, but I also don't think we quite know what it means yet. That is, I don't think we know what this whole shift is going to result in. And hard as it is to say, I think we have to wait and see, in part. That's -- I don't see it as a clear victory for Gorbachev either, -- DR. SIMES: It's a great victory for Gorbachev.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: -- I think it is an uncertain --

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think the most -- I --

MR. BIERBAUER: We've got 30 seconds. Let me just -- You don't see it, Amb. Kirkpatrick, as a clear victory; you say it's a great victory?

DR. SIMES: Yes, it is a great victory for Gorbachev because they made Alexander Vlasov, Gorbachev's old flunky from Stavropol (phonetic), and now minister for internal affairs, candidate member of the Politboro. Now he outranks the KGB. They gave him responsibility for internal security and they gave him specially newly created squads, Gorbachev's personal praetorian guard.

MR. BIERBAUER: Alright, we need to take another break.

We'll be back in just a moment. Stay with us please.

[Commercial announcements.]

MR. BIERBAUER: We've poked around at the personnel changes inside the Kremlin, but in the two or three minutes we've got left, Dr. Kissinger, let me ask you first -- and I have to ask each of you to be brief -- how does this play out through the presidential election in this country? What would you expect Mr.

(ll)

15

Dukakis and Mr. Bush to have to say about this?

DR. KISSINGER: I think -- I -- I don't know what they --
what they will say about it. I think they should avoid giving the
impression that they can handle Gorb- -- who can handle Gorbachev
best. The most important problem is whether we can define our own
objectives and to un- -- to realize that in these arcane
manuevers in the Kremlin, the best way to find our course is to
define our national interest and the relationship between the
Soviet Union and the United States independent of personalities,
so that they can survive changes in leadership that are totally
out of our control.

MR. BIERBAUER: Alright. We've got just a few seconds. Dr. Simes, a final thought?

DR. SIMES: My impression is that Mr. Gorbachev proved his
devious, calculating credentials. Look what he did to his
colleagues. You have to be very careful with this man.

MR. BIERBAUER: Amb. Kirkpatrick.

AMB. KIRKPATRICK: I think that both candidates will assume
that they can deal best with Gorbachev and that they will not
make an -- an issue of it though, because they'd be afraid
something might bring down -- some major changes before the
election.

MR. BIERBAUER; Alright. I'm sorry, time is short. Thank you
all, Amb. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Simes, Dr. Kissinger. In Washington,
I'm Charles Bierbauer. Thanks for being with us on "NEWSMAKER
SUNDAY."

(End of Broadcast.)

CONDITION OF USE: Credit "NEWSMAKER SUNDAY."

★MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1988

The Washington Times

Despite coup, Gorbachev
is not out of the woods yet

By Richard Beeston
and Martin Sieff

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Mikhail Gorbachev's Kremlin coup, despite its speed and drama, is emerging as less of total victory for his leadership and more of a compromise in a continuing power struggle.

Over the weekend, Mr. Gorbachev acted quickly in stripping five members of the Soviet leadership of their posts, moved two leading Politburo critics to one side, took over the presidency and halved the powerful Central Committee bureaucracy.

NEWS
ANALYSIS

While most Soviet experts agree - Mr. Gorbachev has greatly strengthened his hand, American Kremlinologist Marshall Goldman asserted yesterday that the reason he had acted so suddenly was to prevent a plot to oust him.

Whatever the reasons, former U.S.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said on CNN's Newsmaker Sunday program that he expects the new Soviet president to deal more toughly with Washington.

"I don't think the policy will change fundamentally, but I would expect a slightly sterner tone in the next administration," Mr. Kissinger said. He also expects "a tightening, perhaps, in Eastern Europe and paying the price, if necessary, of some slowdown in relations with the United States."

[Mr. Gorbachev pledged Saturday in Moscow to continue his policy of cooperation with the West, saying, "Our course in foreign affairs is clear. We will continue to follow this course without wavering," Reuters news agency reported.

[Moscow policy, he told the Supreme Soviet that elected him, "is aimed at eliminating the danger of nuclear catastrophe, at normalizing international relations ... at broad cooperation in the most varied areas."]

Among those retired Friday were four members of the ruling Politburo, including President Andrei

Gromyko and former Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, a Central Committee secretary.

But Mr. Gorbachev proved unable to rid himself of his chief conservative rivals: Yegor Ligachev, the No. 2 man in the Kremlin, and KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov.

Mr. Ligachev, 68, the party's chief ideologist, had been the most outspoken critic of Mr. Gorbachev's glassmost or openness policies. He is now head of a new party commission on agriculture — the black hole of the Soviet economy.

In December, he said he was virtually joint ruler of the party with Mr. Gorbachev. But Mr. Gorbachev showed that the expansive Soviet Union has room for only one boss.

A bad harvest is expected this year and Mr. Gorbachev clearly wants the people to see Mr. Ligachev's face through the empty shelves.

Mr. Chebrikov helped bring Mr. Gorbachev to power by providing secret police dossiers on his rivals, analysts believe. But he has over the past year expressed serious misgivings about the reform program — that it was getting out of control, especially among ethnic minorities.

Mr. Gorbachev sidetracked him, too, naming him head of a new commission on legal policy. He was replaced by a deputy, Col. Gen Vladimir Kryuchkov.

"He clearly could not remove the political conservatives from positions of real power," said Soviet affairs expert Dimitri Simes of the Carnegie Endowment. Instead, Mr. Gorbachev had to accept a "clearcut compromise," Mr. Simes said on ABC's "This Week."

Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov said yesterday that the changes, the most sweeping in Mr. Gorbachev's 3½ years in power, were "long overdue." He asserted that everyone knew the plenum was about to take place but that "simply the date had not been fixed." He then compared it with American corporate changes when decisions — unknown to the outside world — are known all along to the "insiders."

Asked on "This Week" about the demotions of Mr. Ligachev and Mr. Chebrikov, Mr. Gerasimov alluded

cynically to George Orwell's novel "Animal Farm" by saying, "All Politburo members are equal, although some may be more equal than others."

Mr. Goldman disputed Mr. Gerasimov's American business analogy, saying Mr. Gorbachev alone knew in advance of the meeting.

Most Soviet experts believe that Mr. Gorbachev called his meeting at such short notice to catch his critics off balance, especially Mr. Ligachev, who was away on vacation. Mr. Goldman claimed that Mr. Gorbachev called it as soon as he heard there was a move afoot to overturn him as a "pre-emptive strike."

Mr. Gerasimov said that Mr. Gorbachev's recent visit to Siberia, where he was heckled by angry citizens who complained about food and housing shortages, had shown that "people are dissatisfied with the pace" of perestroika or restructuring. He said there was "no alternative" to Mr. Gorbachev's reform policies and that the time had come to replace the generation of leaders of the 20th Party Congress of 1956 in which the demotion of Stalin was followed by "years of stagnation."

Foreign Affairs Magazine editor William Hyland, on the ABC program, said yesterday Mr. Gorbachev's purge was not a "clean-cut victory. But it strengthens his hand greatly and I think now he is in a better position to push some of his political ideas."

He said that a power struggle was under way in the Kremlin in which institutions, the KGB, the military and figures in the party bureaucracy were playing key roles. "Gorbachev's people are on the rise. His opponents are moving to the sidelines," Mr. Hyland declared.

But there are some indications that Mr. Ligachev may not have abandoned his position as the No. 2 man in the Politburo. On Saturday in the Politburo meeting, he sat in his usual position in the same row as Mr. Gorbachev.

Another puzzling feature about the leadership upheaval is the decision to give Mr. Ligachev control of agriculture — a key ministry in Mr. Gorbachev's efforts to cope with his

greatest domestic political problem
— food shortages.

"Ligachev says he is not in favor of the market system that Gorbachev is proposing. He doesn't like family farms, which is the main thrust of what Gorbachev is trying to do," Mr. Goldman said.

Two immediate issues facing Mr. Gorbachev in his new role as party leader and president are continuing ethnic unrest in Armenia and Azerbaijan and the nationwide opposition to his reforms from party bureaucrats, stubbornly resisting perestroika in an effort to protect their jobs and privileges.

Troops and armored cars have been sent to Armenia, and unrest is growing in the Baltic states. Food and consumer shortages throughout the nation are worse now than when Mr. Gorbachev took office, and glasnost has made it easier for the Soviet public to voice its criticism and disappointment with the Gorbachev era.

There was little glasnost or democracy in the way Mr. Gorbachev was elected president — just the ritual Supreme Soviet's unanimous vote — nor in the manner that the Kremlin's faithful Mr. Gromyko and the others were summarily removed.

The appointment of Gen. Kryuchkov to head the KGB means that the security service has lost its powerful seat on the Politburo and is perhaps less of a potential threat to Mr. Gorbachev. And Mr. Ligachev's key position as head of party ideology has been handed to Mr. Gorbachev's fast-rising protégé, Vadim Medvedev, an economist who has also been named a full member of the Politburo.

Mr. Gorbachev has yet to impose his will on the bureaucrats who micromanage the Soviet industrial economy and have proven hostile to economic reforms.

Also, the army, led by Defense Minister Dmitri T. Yazov and Marshall Sergei Akhromeyev, is sitting on the sidelines, apparently supporting Mr. Gorbachev for the moment, but its Political Directorate remains a hothouse of virulent anti-Western and anti-Semitic sentiments, distrustful of the dovish direction of Mr. Gorbachev's foreign policy.

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SOVIET SPOKESMAN SAYS SHAKEUP TO BRING ECONOMIC REFORMS

By Jacqueline Frank

WASHINGTON, Oct 2, Reuter - Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov said on Sunday the sudden shifts in Kremlin power were aimed at bringing quick economic reform, and doubted another summit would be held with President Reagan.

Speaking on ABC television's "This Week With David Crinkley," Gerasimov also said it was unlikely President Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev would hold a final summit before Reagan leaves office in January.

"They must have some reason to meet. I personally don't see any chance of them meeting again," Gerasimov said.

Gerasimov said the two-day whirlwind makeup in the Kremlin hierarchy which consolidated the power of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was simply a shift to a younger generation to bring success in the "perestroika" (restructuring) reforms of Soviet society.

"The old guard is stepping down and the new generation is coming in," Gerasimov said.

Gerasimov explained the changes in Soviet power as necessary to fulfill Gorbachev's "perestroika" reforms to bring more consumer goods, foods and housing to the Soviet public.

"We want to be a civilized nation," Gerasimov said. But he added it may take two to three years to find out if the plan is successful.

Gorbachev on Saturday was elected president of the Soviet Union, replacing 79-year-old Andrei Gromyko, and also held on to his role as leader of the Soviet Communist party.

He is only the fourth Soviet leader to hold both posts simultaneously.

The changes brought the retirement of several long-time leaders including former ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin, who was serving as Gorbachev's foreign policy expert.

But Henry Kissinger, national security adviser in the Nixon administration, said the changes reflected a far more complex power struggle.

"A highly centralized state has to decentralize in order to have better economic performance," Kissinger said on Cable News Network's "Newsmaker Sunday."

Kissinger also said the promotion of a conservative, Aleksandr Yakovlev, to head a commission on international affairs may signal a slightly sterner policy toward the United States.

He regarded Yakovlev as "fairly anti-U. S." because he has written many articles highly critical of the United States.

"I think that the kind of promotions that have been made could indicate to me a tightening up perhaps in Eastern Europe and paying the price, if necessary, of some slowdown in relations with the United States," he said.

Reuter JF

P-NY-10-02-88 1327EDT

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