PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1964

Conversation with Müller-Roschach - Chief of the Policy Planning Staff of the German Foreign Office. May 25, 1964.

Müller-Roschach stated his fears about the detente between Washington and Moscow in much the same terms as Ritter. He said that he was convinced that powerful circles in Washington wanted an accommodation and that it was a major problem of German policy to prevent this from being done at Germany's expense.

Müller-Roschach said that a non-aggression treaty along the present dividing line in Germany was out of the question because it was a means of giving legal recognition to the division of Germany. I asked about the Oder-Neisse line. Müller-Roschach said that until there was a formal settlement between Germany and Poland this line too could not be recognized. Germany was prepared to guarantee its Western frontier. Its Eastern frontiers, however, had to be left to eventual negotiation. This sounded like Locarno to me.

About the MLF, Müller-Roschach said that it was being egregiously oversold by Washington. It might do some good in giving Germany some access to nuclear weaponry and strategic planning. However, most of its other benefits--particularly its alleged contribution to European unity--were nebulous. In any event he wondered whether the MLF did not come at the wrong moment. It could be that a more natural role for Germany was to use

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

the United States and France for atomic cover while leading a non-nuclear
bloc including Poland in Central Europe.

Müller-Roschach said that Germany was not happy about being asked to participate in Vietnam. The government was trying to find some way to respond to our request without getting Germans involved in the ground.
One proposal being considered was a hospital ship.