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that extended another 5 to 10 kilometers behind the front line.

In other words, the Israeli and the Egyptian forces were in close proximity . . . .

[Adjusting of a microphone] [Inaudible joke] . . .

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Isn't it better up here without a miscrphone?

The Egyptian line was along that front line, about 10 kilometers from the Suez Canal

The Israeli Line was about 20 kilometers from the Suez Canal and there were small, [ground] but limited armaments behind them.

In the Agreement that has been negotiated, the Egyptian Line has moved forward to the former Israeli Line

The Israelis have withdrawn on the frontier front a distance of 30 to 50 kilometers and they are then in this area here, along the Gulf of Suez -- a distance of about 150 kilometers --

Egyptian sovereignty has been restored but the area is without military forces, installations and fortifications -- it is under Egyptian civilian administration with

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a U.N. presence to determine the military provisions or to
check on the military provisions of the Agreement.

And the Central Front where the major Israeli withdraw-
al had occurred, the military dispositions are such as to make
a surprise attack extremely difficult.

Behind these lines, there is a zone of limited
armament, indicated by the dotted line here -- and by
the dotted line there along the Suez Canal.

In the zone of limited armament, the total number
of forces is 8,000 -- the total number of artillery pieces
is 72 and the total number of tanks is 75 -- and no weapons
can be stationed in that area that can reach the front
line of the other.

Behind the zone of limited armaments, each side
has agreed not to station weapons that can reach the front
line of the other.

In other words, neither side will station long rang
artillery or rockets in such a position where it could fire
on the front line of the other -- so that the military
dispositions on the Central Front are so designed that a
surprise attack would become extremely difficult.

Or to put it another way: A surprise attack can

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occur only by the violation of a series of undertakings that
are part of the agreement that the other side will have
warning.

In return for the withdrawal, Egypt undertook a
number of commitments such as:

No military blockade.

The progress of Israeli nonmilitary cargo through
the Suez Canal.

And the commitment to settle the problems of the
Middle East by peaceful means.

Now it is in this context that the American presence
has to be understood. The need for American presence [...]
because Israel maintains a strategic warning station at this
point and because it insisted that it had to maintain at
least a capability of this warning

And if offered Egypt a similar warning station
which was finally it was agreed, would be located here.

Since neither side agreed on this warning station
being under the control of the nationals of that station, they
both proposed to the United States that it assume the trustee-
ship over these stations.

We refused to man these stations, because this

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would have required in each station, some 300 Americans
on any one shift, meaning a total of about a thousand, if
you take three shifts.

But the basic idea that the United States would
supervise the fact that these stations would not be used
for fortifications, and would not contain military equipment
was accepted.

Later on in the negotiations, Israel proposed that
in addition to the two strategic warning stations, the
United States placed six tactical warning stations into
this area -- and indeed, Israel insisted that it would not
make the agreement unless the United States agreed to
man these warning stations.

Israel insisted on American participation because
it was not confident enough about some of the Members of
the United Nations force -- and because both parties had
confidence only in the United States for manning these
stations.

It was then agreed the red line and this blue
line -- the zone in which the American warning stations
will be located, which is about, as I pointed out, 30 to
50 kilometers each -- it's a United Nations Zone -- it will

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contain about 5,000 troops of the United Nations Force -- mostly Finnish, Swedish, Canadian, [Zambian?] and a few other nationalities -- but they are the principal contingents and -- it is important to find out that each of these contingents is larger than the American presence in that same area.

Now let me say a few words about this American presence:

The American presence is confined, as you can see -- confined to the yellow shaded areas. It does not exist along the whole front between Israel and Egypt. It is confined to two roads through the two primary passes -- the Mitla Pass and the Giddi Pass.

The total number of Americans that will be assigned to this mission cannot, by the Agreement that has been signed, exceed 200.

in shifts

Since they had to operate [? which means that the total number of Americans in that area at any one time cannot exceed 75, and may well be less.

The Americans in that area have no military function whatsoever. They are civilian volunteers. They are not there in contrast to Viet-Nam, to support one party

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against the other.

They are not there to bring about a victory for
one side over the other.

They are there in a peacekeeping role, exactly
analogous to that of the United Nations force -- and,
indeed, exactly analogous to that of the 49 Americans that
are at this moment working with the United Nations in the
Sinai.

Now they will report to both parties and to the
United Nations about what they will find.

They are Under the Agreement the President has
the right to withdraw them at any time that he believes
their safety is jeopardized.

When I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Church asked me whether we would accept
a Congressional mandate that they had to be withdrawn in
case of hostility. And I indicated, on behalf of the
President, that we would have no difficulty with such a
Congressional Amendment to our Resolution.

And to sum up, basically conceived as a peace-
keeping force similar to that supplied by the Canadians,
by Canada, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and all the other

Members of the United Nations Emergency Force.

They are there is a separate way
because technical equipment is complicated and because the
confidence of the parties is such that only the United States
has been asked to perform this role. It was not something
the United States volunteered for. This is not a mission we
were eager to undertake. It was something to which we
reluctantly agreed at the urgent request of both parties --
at the special request of one of the parties with respect
to the tactical warning station.

Now let me make one other comment:

I have read in the press, many statements to the
effect that the United States "bought" this Agreement in
Sinai by the promise of military and economic aid to
both of the parties.

Now I think that in considering the validity of this
Agreement, that Congress would consider the merits of this
particular argument.

I think it is important to keep in mind that
economic and military aid to Israel has been an unchallenged
premise of every foreign aid bill before this Country.
More frequently than not, the Congress has increased

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the Administration's request.

Last year nearly $3 billion were appropriated as a result of the War of 1973 -- and the normal Congressional request for economic and military assistance.

On May 21st, 1975, seventy-six Senators wrote a letter to the President, which thich I am sure the Members of this Committee are familiar, in which they pointed out that the Congress, at best, would receive foreign aid requests for the fiscal year 1976 -- and I quote:

"We trust that your recommendation will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs. We urge you to make it clear as we do, that the United States, acting in its own national interests, stands firmly with Israel in the search for peace in the future negotiations and that this premise is the basis of the current reassessment of the United States policy for the Middle East."

On the basis of Israel's need, the Government of Israel requested:

First, a total of $2.59 million.

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And later, a total of $3.3 billion.

Unconnected with the Agreement, the request we shall put before the Congress will be less than this -- and that includes additional funds that have been made necessary because of Israel's willingness to give up the oil fields of Aba Rudeis [?] to Egypt

With respect to Egypt, the Congress appropriated last year, without this Agreement, a total of $250 million -- and we had already provided in our own planning for a substantial increase in this amount -- without the Agreement -- on the day it was put before this Committed -- that the additional funds that are made necessary by this Agreement are relatively small and are nothing like the total amount that has been reported.

Insofar as one can make any estimate of them they amount to a few hundred million dollars -- and nothing like the billions of dollars that have been mentioned.

It is important that the United States support Israel economically and militarily -- as we have in the whole postwar period.

It is also important that we take into account Egypt's economic needs, because of the courage and wisdom

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of the Egyptian President in moving his country on the
road to moderation -- on a road which had brought him
under sharp attack from many quarters, but which we are
convinced history will show was the only way towards a
permanent peace -- not only for his country, but for all
of the countries in the area.

We would put before this Committee and the
Congress, a resolution for approving the American presence.
And in considering it, I hope that this Committee will keep
in mind that the process of peace in the Middle East is not
a matter that occurred thousands of miles away, but it is
something that affects every American.

I hope you will agree with us that the Agreement
that has been signed could open the door to peace in the
whole area -- and that the American role is in our best
tradition of keeping the peace -- and that we can take
pride in the fact that the parties have said that we were
the country that the parties had confidence in -- both to
conduct the negotiations, and to preserve the peace --
and as we look back on this period, it is our fervent hope
that it will be remembered as the point where peace came
at last to the Middle East -- or began to come to the Middle