*

TELCORN
Secy Rogers

Mr. Kissinger

6-2-69 12:50 PM

R said he had been talking to G Smith about SALT talks and he mentioned
July 20 as starting date for talks. R said he thought it was unwise to (*Smith)
fix date now but we should talk to Dobrynin about fixing date soon. R said
he agreed with Smith but wondered about doing before ABM vote and whether
it made much difference. K said he was under impression that Pres
told R not to say anything before the AMB vote. R said he was the one who
suggested that. R said he will have to say something tomorrow at press
conference and asked when this was on for the NSC. K said on June 18.
R said he could say matter was on for NSC discussion and shortly thereafter
he would talk to Dobrynin about fixing date and hoped it would not be before
too long. K said he thought we would have to say something about consulting
allies. R said he could say that too. R said he is more concerned about
ducking and then credibility will be challenged. R asked if K had noticed
Fulbright's tough statement this morning on it and K said no.

R said he originally said late Spring or early Summer and if he could offer
to get started before July is out, it would be helpful. K asked if Elliot
had told R about K's conversation with Dobrynin. Dobrynin came in to
deliver private message from fellow from Academy of Sciences re scientific
meeting and question was asked if he should go to this
meeting in view of fact SALT talks starting at this time. K said that of course
led to discussion of SALT talks and Dobrynin said he did not much care when
they started - we could not point out to his every having asked to start them.
R said that though we should give him at least some hope of a decision date

R said the reason he said that, Dobrynin told him off the record his govt
had asked him not to show any urgency. K said he told Dobrynin whatever
notification he got would come through R. K said he had no fixed
view about the date but it is his feeling if we gave English Europeans
impression we have dealt with Soviets without talking to them there will
be enormous amount of trouble. R said he did not disagree with this. K said
he thought a date like August 10 we would be under less pressure. R said
he did not think there would be much trouble with Allies if we
talked a month in advance - they know we are considering this going to have
the talks. K said he thought it would be better before we offer a date to the
Soviets, to check it with the allies. R said trouble with that is that it will
probably leak but he does not object - public will think we were forced into it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

-2-

K said he did not know about public but almost any European you talk to is not all that easy about it. K said if you think of fixed date, August 10 might be more realistic than July 20. R said Pres had said July 18 and R said before the end of July. K said Pres did not mention this to him. R said they then discussed whether any announcement should be made and R max brought up AMB matter. R asked when ABM vote is scheduled - K said after July 4. R said we cannot wait that long. K said when Pres talked to him he had impression he was thinking of around Aug 1. R said in that case, July 31 sounds better.

R said what he will say is that matter will be considered by the NSC the middle of the month and thereafter he will talk to Dobrynin about it. K said he would say we will talk to all our Allies and Dobrynin. R said o.k. R said he wanted to give press some idea we will not drag our feet. R said he did not know why we could not start talking to our allies now about it. K agreed. R said why don't we decide we will think about July 31. K said he would not announce date at the press conference, but if this date is just for R's use and K's, that seems possible. R suggested talking to allies now about July 31, saying before we talk to Soviets we wanted to get their views. K agreed.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCORN

William Buckley
Mr. Kissinger
6-2-69 6:15 PM

B said he has a friend in the Pentagon who called him to say decision
has been amde to pull out in Vietnam and Midway conference is
planned in order to stage backdrop for doing it - to force Thieu into
such a position of intransgience that would result in considerable
defection from his own ranks - he will be dropped by his own people.
K said this was <u>nonsense</u>. B said K was quoted to effect that
this was not his decision but the President's decision and President
is after all responsible for foreign policy. K said he did not want to
discuss on the phone but meeting will have its tactical aspects but the
impossibility of dumping Thieu morally and politically is one of
the things the President and K are clearest about. This would be
politically disastrous - no counterweight left to the NLF. K said
frankly under those conditions he would resign. B said he could
sleep peacefully then. K said he does not deny there are people who hold
this view. B said his friend is old soldier and rather reliable one.
K asked if he were military man and B said yes. B said this is only
third time he has called B in three years. K said the only aspect that
interests him is where he got it. K said he knows B would not call unless
he took it seriously. B said he believes that his friend believes it.
B said he got it from some superior who presented it as what <u>continues</u>
has gone on in the White House and what has gone on athwart K's own wishes.
K said he cannot say he knows everything the President thinks but if he
made that decision it would be startlingly at variance with everything he has
told K. K said he (K) also does not going around telling people what he thinks.
K said what would interest him as far as national interest is concerned
is where he got it - it would help insofar as who tells what to subordinates.
It would help perhaps in knowing where some of these other stories come from.
B said he would see what he could do at that end.

K said not to write about it, but we expect Midway to be a success - it will
be harmonious; otherwise, we would not be going there.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958 *

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCOM

Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger

6-3-69 11:40 AM

L said President had given him a note about his concern over the
story today in the New York Times. K said concern is no expression -
he is climbing walls. L said he is sure it is not out of his shop.
K said L will get an official request by President to conduct an investigation.
K said we have a pretty good idea where it came from, but in order to be
fair we are going to ask every senior official to make an investigation.
L said it was the worst thing that could have happened over there.
K said there was one argument that it was leaked in order to get the
L said he would wait for the
memo. K said he would get it from Haldeman on the plane. K said
frankly we do not think it comes out of L's shop. L said it is a lousy
thing to come out now and K said it was disastrous.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCOM

Gov Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger

6-3-69 2:50 PM

R said he is afraid he caused K some trouble. K said not at all. R said it is a little better than some people think. R said they had marvelous meetings with all the people they met - people very friendly - getting good ideas, conceptually, structurally, etc. R said he has a very complete memo for K which he wrote on the plane coming back - will relate to Lleras' visit to Nixon. K said reason they are rioting is because mission is in danger of succeeding, not the opposite. K asked whether R got message that President said he would see CECLA group only after they talked to R. R said yes the good Colonel had called him. R said the President called him from the plane - told him he had been very good sport about it, etc. K said Pres feels R has done just what he was asked to do and did it with distinction. K said Pres called him from plane and left word that he wants to see R after he gets back from Midway. R said fine - he said the CECLA people are coming on the 10th. K said he guesses Pres could see on the 11th and R the day before. K asked whether R wanted to see in NY or here. R said he thought he should see K and Pres and could do it all at once and asked when they were coming back. K said night of 10th. R said he should probably see K and Pres before Pres sees the group. R said they have a good paper - Dave Bronheim got copy thru whatever channels they have and it is a good paper. R said he will be leaving on 16th again, sticking to schedule to degree that anyone can see them. R said these people have to learn to cope with it - this will force Congress to start thinking about concepts about military aid. R said they have learned a lot and he is optimistic that Peru thing will be settled.

R said he would get memo to K tomorrow so he could read it on the plane. R said Colombians are very anxious to help - very constructive ideas. R discussed wire he had sent re Ecuador. R said he is willing to meet with fishing people and try to persuade them to buy licenses, or USG could buy. K said this is one of things they could discuss when R comes down.

R mentioned a friend of his on NY Times by name of [illegible] Juandi Oneise (?) who is going to Peru and will see the President. R said he took liberty of saying to him to tell the President informally that R would like to see him while down there and could fly to some place and drop in quietly for a talk. K said that would be welcome here. R mentioned that Cannon sent which went to Rogers first. R said that was intentional. K asked about Nachmanoff and R said they were crazy about him and want to take him all the way - he was very helpful.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958 *

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCOM
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
6-3-69 3:10 PM

R said he was going to have a press conference on Thursday and asked if K had copies of his backgrounder last week. K said the only one he had concerned only one point and that was whether our casualties were caused by offensive operations. R said Hamburger Hill and K said it dealt with Hamburger Hill only very indirectly. R said he thought K had two backgrounder and K said one lasted 20 minutes and one lasted three minutes. K said at end of first one (the ax figures he had only went back to November) one of the newmen asked him to take the figures back. K said he got those figures and gave them the next day - there was nothing substantive or political; just convened relationship between our offensive operations and casualties. K said basic point was that major role of our offensive action is to spoil their offensive action and make it harder. R said if that is all that was involved, it was not necessary to send over copies. R asked if K gave backgrounder after President's speech and K said no, he gave one just before the speech and merely ran through the speech. R mentioned Chal Roberts piece of May 26 and memo he had received from Haldeman about this. R said he does not want to get into cross-purposes with anyone and asked if K had discussed this subject. K said not in backgrounder. K said Roberts had come in to see him and said at that time that he understood Rogers said in Saigon that he was in favor of coalition government. K said he told Roberts that what R probably meant was if they managed to agree on a coalition government, we could not stop them. K said this was the only time he ever mentioned the subject. R said Roberts does twist things. K said he thought Elliot had given Roberts a longer explanation.

R said he told the President he thought he should not react so quickly to what Senator Kennedy says. K said the reason for backgrounder on figures was the thing R discussed with Abrams while he was out there. R said he would try to struggle along with the coalition. K said the President is not too eager to set record straight on how meeting came out until after Midway. R asked if K had said anything about that and K said no. R and K discussed Rockefeller trip. K said he is determined to go on and President has asked him to do so. R said there is something in to effect that Frei in Chile is praying Rockefeller will not come.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958 *
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON

Philip Geyelin
Mr. Kissinger

6-3-69

6:25 PM

G said he was calling re backgrounder K had last week and whether K thought the paper had given away the source of it. K said of course. G asked K whether he thought this would happen. K asked what G meant. G said he was just interested as a problem. K said his impression is that people who did not like the conclusion started tackling technique and it was not very backgroundish. K said both Oberdorfer and Broder made it clear that K was source. G said he just wanted to know if K felt it was terribly important for his identity to be held. K said he did not quite understand what G meant, but he does not want to be an official spokesman. K said he wanted to make it clear that he did not complain. K said he does not feel badly treated. G said it is lousy for them and tough for K. K said he is not complaining - after all when people see White House spokesman on foreign policy, how many are there.

G said one wonders why do it - it is an interesting question that G thought he would kick around in an editorial. G said everyone does it, not just the White House PR people. G said problem is when White House PR people calls in press, there is no choice but to attend - there may be major announcement or not so it does raise a problem. K asked what is problem. G said someone gets to talking about it the way Broeder and Oberdorfer did and can't do this without saying source. G said he did not want to take up a lot of K's time but wanted to know if K thought system had broken down.

K said no - he thinks backgrounder is particularly appropriate for White House, otherwise he would be appearing as spokesman for the Administration and that would not be correct. K said that would be poaching on something Laird and Rogers should do. K said he is merely giving factual information that should be considered - K said he is not saying everything is appropriate for backgrounder. G asked if K set terms on which the meeting was held. K said Ziegler sets the terms. K said he sets term that he will not speak for quotation. G said that excludes his doing "Meet the Press", etc. - K said right. G said he understands it better then. K said this is way he wants it and the way the President wants it - that K does not speak for quotation because K does not want to appear as principal spokesman in his own right. G said the distinction between speaking for the White House and the President is one he does not get. K said he is not up there expressing his own view as Henry Kissinger or as man who provides a checklist on basis of which you could tell his views finally became policy.

G said he would like to talk with K when he returns from trip. K said fine.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

*

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Joseph Kraft
6:45 p.m., 6/3/69

Kraft wanted to know what the original objectives behind Midway when the invitations were sent out.

HAK said we wanted to get an agreed strategy for the next phase of the negotiations. It will have to do with the whole political framework; what a political solution for South Vietnam would look like.

Kraft felt that the accrued public dialogue has put the President in a difficult box. To explain, he said, the President was for an interum coalition government. Then Thieu came out strongly against that. Ziegler then gave the impression that the President agreed with Thieu. Now it seems the President has to produce something out of Midway.

HAK said its a complicated way of conducting negotiations.

*

Telecon
Philip Geyelin

7:00 p. m. 6/3/69

Kissinger wanted to make clear that he was not complaining about anything they had done. He said it was an odd charge to make from a paper who has been asking him over for backgrounders. Geyelin said he was not making a charge. He wanted to know HAK's feeling on whether this kind of thing works. HAK said he thinks it is an agreement worth discussion on a matter-of-fact basis. Geyelin said they were delighted to have him over and understood they did so knowing it is not going to be for attribution. HAK said he had no particular interest in giving the backgrounders. G said in cases like this, when they are called by the WH, they are in a difficult position to say no. This has a long history. HAK said the only thing is they can't quote where they got the information. The figures he gave were studied by the WH and were not his personally No one claimed that he made up these figures. HAK said they didn't gain anything by ascribing the figures to a person although G did. He was beginning to think it looked like when Rostow gave figures they might not be accepted but when Kissinger gives figures, you don't argue. It makes a lot of difference whether you are talking about what is secure and whether you are saying that there is a direct statistical relationship when one set of figures varies and the other stays the same. The gray area is "enemy attack" and how it is interpreted. HAK understood G's philosophy about the idea of a backgrounder. He added that you can use these figures and show on one hand why de-escalation doesn't work but you can use them to prove that escalation doesn't work either. He added that he never speaks for quotations. He said he would re-examine his position on backgrounders. He didn't see that he should speak on quotes or how the White House can fail to speak to the press.

G wanted HAK to talk to Meg about the ABM but he said it would have to wait until he got back from Midway.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
7:30 p.m. 6/3/69

Richardson called to say that Rogers had received a not from Haldeman about the Chalmers Roberts' column. HAK wanted to know if that was the memo regarding MIRV or about the coalition government. Richardson said it was on coalition government. He didn't have a copy of the memo but he understands the President heard Roberts was talking to someone at State about this. He said he had talked to Roberts and as far as the U.S. was concerned, the political situation was to be negotiated between GVN and NLF. HAK said he was prepared to tell the President this had been discussed between the two of them and they both agreed. What Rogers was probably saying was that if the two sides agreed, we would not stop it. Richardson said the Secretary was going to make a statement about this at his press conference. HAK said we should be careful it doesn't conflict with the Midway trip. He didn't think it was a hot issue and we could settle this with the President internally heassured Richardson. He added that he would say they both discussed this and if Richardson had any influence with Rogers, it would be ill advised to make a statement boefore Midway. He had not heard the President raise Richardson's name in connection with this and he preferred not to. If he gets a copy of this note of Haldeman's he will make that point to the President. Richardson thought orally would be fine if it comes up. Richardson said Rogers had called Haldeman on this.

On the MIRV thing -- HAK said the President heard some people in State were trying to stop MIRV. The President wanted Haldeman to tell those people to keep quiet because he was determined to continue MIRV. The President dictates these notes and they are always subject to re-discussion.

Both HAK and Richardson had discussed the NSC story with Roberts.

DECLASSIFIED

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
9:00 a.m. 9/4/69

Laird was very upset about the Times story by Rick Smith this morning as was HAK. Laird thought they were speculative and didn't understand how it happened. HAK pointed out the Star story of yesterday which pointed to a State Dept. source saying there would be an announcement after Midway.

The Donavan and Smith story are directly attributable to State since both these men write from there. The point is whether the stories were given directly to the writers or from another hand. HAK said there was only one person here that knew about it.

Laird wasn't quoting the statement from State of yesterday but he was sure they did not rule out this possibility which may have lead Smith to assume that an announcement would be made.

HAK said the RXX President's reaction is to say that we won't announce anything now at Midway. He asked that any cables be cleared with the President before going out. Laird said he would stick to the original line the President set about three conditions and there is no change. Laird said this is about the only thing we had to give the people. They aren't going to understand the communique.

HAK wanted to know Laird's view on how this got out. Laird thought someone was handed a paper but he didn't know where. Thieu said ______ would be on the agenda; maybe that's where they got part of their story. Maybe State was dissappointed that Laird cut the reductions to 50,000 instead of 82,000. Laird didn't want to attribute this directly to State. The pattern bothered him back since the men were attached to State.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

9:15 a.m. 6/4/69

They discussed how the stories got in the Times and Star. Ron thought it had to come from someone.

They decided to let the President know about the Times article after his speech today.

Ron suggested HAK give a non-backgrounder. Simply state that he would not discuss any direct aspects of the meeting but would, if they (press) wanted, discuss matters leading up to the meeting. The press would understand and respect him for it. Otherwise, they would just run wild. HAK said maybe we should let them run wild.

HAK had to go to a meeting so nothing was settled.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
The President
2:00 p.m. 6/4/69

The President wanted HAK to back channel Bunker to be sure they don't confirm this dope story -- no discussion whatever on this matter until we meet at Midway. Wanted to know if HAK had warned Defense and State. HAK said yes, this was done last night and again this morning. He also went over the press conference.

The President wanted to know if HAK had any more ideas on where the story came from. HAK asked to Rogers. HAK felt there was a pattern that is emerging by people trying to get out ahead to steel the thunder. Richardson is really shaken and realizes that the President just won't discuss anything with them if this continues and the President agreed. Only one person in his office was aware of this HAK said. The President's opinion was that it was coming from State. HAK said someone called his attention to the fact that Beecher had not written a by line since these stories started coming from Smith. The President wasn't as concerned about this as he was the Okinawa story. He wanted to make sure HAK had told Rogers he had changed his mind and HAK confirmed that he had discussed this. They agreed to go along the three guidelines and to reaffirm just that.

The President wanted also to be sure that Rogers was briefed re Salt, and supporting the President's statement that he made at the Air Force Academy re the military. HAK said Rogers would say that we are consulting with our allies first on SALT. Between themselves a date of July 31 seemed possible but the Soviets couldn't be ready by then so it would most likely be put back a couple of weeks which Bill had no problems with.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
2:35 p.m. 6/4/69

HAK said he mentioned their conversation with the President and it seemed like a responsible procedure and the planning date could slip a little. HAK told the President about Rogers' feeling on the leaks and the President agreed with him.

HAK wanted Rogers to read the text of the President's speech to the Air Force Academy and be aware of his remarks regarding the military and that Rogers should support it. Rogers said there would be no problem on that since he agrees completely.

Rogers said he would look at it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
2:50 p.m. 6/4/69

Rockefeller said he had a good talk with Rogers and with Richardson. He thought relationships were improving. HAK said there was never a worry about Richardson but would be careful of the other.

HAK explained that Chile wanted to cancel. Rockefeller suggested that they wait until the Minister of Foreign Affairs comes up but HAK said they couldn't wait that long.

HAK suggested that any future cables to be sent go through State and not Jim Cannon. Cannon shouldn't expose himself that way by exchanging cables with Ambassadors. Put the ball in State's court since Rockefeller is an agent of the government. Cannon should be in contact with Haig or Vakey. The Governor understood and would talk to Cannon about this and was appreciative of HAK's advice.

They discussed the possibility of problems with Uruguay and in that case might skip it. Rockefeller said they were trying to put Venezuela back on -- maybe a short meeting at the airport.

HAK wasn't too happy with Gallo Plaza's statement. Rockefeller said it wasn't all that bad -- the press picked it up wrong. He was going to send the transcript down.

Rockefeller said Woods sent a letter to Salzberger giving him hell for the stories in the Times.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Amada-- Will you call Kissinger's secretary, tell her that I agreed to submit to Dr. Kissinger any direct quotes, and ask her to submit to me the following quotes:

"I've had some experience in government, but until I came here I never fully realized--- I don't think it's possible for someone who has not been close to the Presidency to realize--- the pressures which operate on a President, the endless demands on his time and attention. And I'm concerned, of course, only with foreign affairs."

"The bureaucracy is accustomed to producing answers, not questions. And the bureaucracy is not accustomed to analyzing whether the questions are really worth asking. We have introduced a Socratic element into the process. It does not always work, of course, but it works most effectively at times of the day."

"I used to think that the President just had to make a decision and issue orders, but it isn't as simple as that. You have to find ways to make the bureaucracy want to do what the President wants to do. That is why it's important that the people who have to carry out a decision participate in the making of it, even if they may not wholly agree with it."

On eliminating the unrealistic options: "For example, in a Viet Nam paper, some such essentially silly option as loading the troops on ships and seiling away would not be included."

"If only we had eighteen months--- if only this were 1967, not 1969. I'm sure that if we had time, we could end it on honors; settlement in Viet Nam. But it's awfully hard to play chess with

*

TELCONE
Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger
6-4-69 5:25 PM

Re cancelation of NSC meeting on Wednesday. H said President does not want an NSC meeting be cause NSC leaks everything he tells them.
H said Pres wants to cut down on number of meetings, less papers, more material put privately to him by K from the subcommittee rather than NSC.
K said he agrees with much of this but we have to go thru the NSC on next two sessions on strategic arms talks. K said we have to have a meeting on the 13th and one on the 18th - after that we can put into effect what the Pres wants. K said NSC is President's one way of keeping control of the Govt. K said we need to cancel the Wednesday meeting, but it should be held some other time during the week because we do not want Pres accused of holding up talks. It was agreed to tentatively block out 3:30 on Friday, June 13, for two hours.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.0.12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger

June 4, 1969 - 5:40 p. m.

H said the President now has the answer to the leak on Midway -- someone gave a deliberate backgrounder. It has now appeared in the Star, the NY Times and there is a definitive piece in the LA Times by Bob Donovan. These people all obviously had the same source or they could not have come up with the same piece. H said the President is convinced of treason, and asked H to get in touch with K right away and have him call State and make the point to Rogers that it is clear to the President someone put this story out. We have to find out who did it.

K said, considering how beautifully the secret was held, this is unforgivable. He thought it might die after the Star article on Tuesday, but it is now the headline in every paper he sees -- even the Boston Globe. K told H to tell the President he would ask each Department to give him a list of backgrounders given this week and by whom. (H said not to let this negate his earlier request to the Departments for a report this evening on Cambodia.)

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCOM

Jerome Weisner
Mr. Kissinger
6-4-69 5:45 PM

W said he showed letter which Kistiakowsky worked on to K the last
time they saw one another. W gave it to Killian and he thought he should
not sign it - he is sensitive about W's relationship with Teddy. W said
he then talked to George who did not want to be identified with W alone.
W said he could sign it himself, let Killian and Kistiakowsky sign it, or
throw it away and asked K what he thought. W said he did want to be
helpful to the President in connection with NPT. K said
whoever signs it, it will get to the President. W asked if he signed it
whether the President would read it. K said yes, Pres certainly does
not dislike W. W agreed to do that then. W said he would like a chance
to talk to the President sometime - he was very impressed with RSCA
PSAC meeting. K said let's see if we can arrange it for sometime in
July.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCOM

Bob Haldeman

Mr. Kissinger

6-4-69 5:50 PM

K said he thought it would be best if H called but not to make accusation. K said just to say President has requested list of backgrounder, who gave them and who attended - K said he would not say we know it was done at a backgrounder; let them fret, they will get the point. K said he would call both State and Defense and tell both he is asking the other dept for the same thing.

H said Pres is building up a head of steam at a rapid rate. Because of leak, there will be no NSC meeting at any time on SALT and there will be no NSC meetings at all until further notice from Pres. H said Pres will decide on basis of discussion with K. K said he better have a talk with the Pres. H said this is not the time to do it. Pres had said he wanted it understood there is no appeal on this. K said he just cannot do this - he will be cut to ribbons if there is no NSC on SALT, they will say he is delaying deliberately. H said this was not the time to argue with him and if the Pres calls him again, he will tell him K has been given the message.

H said Pres had asked him what he was doing on other matter and H told Pres that K felt it would be better for H to make contact with Depts and not say we know backgrounder was source - just to get list of backgrounders, etc. He said he agreed and then told H to write down the following: "You are to call K and tell him we have learned from one of reporters present at backgrounder this week, that there was a discussion of this whole thing at backgrounder. We know this now and therefore the President wants in two hours a report back on this." H asked K what he does now. K said he really would not do it - he would be meticulous in carrying out the President's orders unless he feels it would hurt him. K said he would not say it is state Dept and to say we have a report that suggests backgrounder was source. K said he thought H should call Laird too. H said he hated to play the game with him because he knows we are kidding. K said that is precisely why he would call him - because he knows we are kidding. H said the Pres said the only thing wrong with K's judgment is that K has not seen the Donovan story. K said he does not exclude fact that Pres is wrong but if he makes a flat charge which does not stick for some reason, this would be bad. K said he is only thinking of the President.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCONE

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

6-4-69

6:55 PM

R said he thought it was up to both of them to keep the other constantly
advised about press conferences and what they say, etc. K said he
sent it over to R the same evening. R asked if K was going to have
one this week on Friday. K said no - there had been some thought about
it but he is not going to do it. R asked if there was anything he should
be careful about tomorrow - not saying anything on troop replacements,
he will just duck completely. R asked what he should say about purpose
of meeting and K said it was to plan strategy - review Vietnamization of
war. R said on coalition, he will say what he did in his backgrounder.

R said he did not mean to hurt K. K said Bob said R said that it was
definitely pinned down and clear that it came from K. R said these
were not leaks, just came from the three of us - R, K and Richardson.
R said this is quite different. K said on a number of occasions when
Pres read something about Elliot in press briefings, K told him it was
misrepresented. K said he thought Chal Roberts came out of conversations
with both Elliot and K. Whatever he misrepresented, he drew from
everyone. K said in any event, when he has opportunity to play role
with President it is to ease his concerns and <u>coax</u> suspensions rather
than to pin them on someone. R said if we do our job right there are
bound to be some <u>sox</u> stores he will not like - you cannot do it any other
way. R said he thought the Roberts story helped rather than hurt us -
whoever is responsible did not hurt the Administration. R said he told
Pres he should not react so quickly. R said Fulbright make a rough
attack on Pres today. R said he really is sorry, he did not mean to hurt K.
K said these jobs are tough enough without this. K said he does not
take their problems to the Pres, R can be sure of this.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Bob Haldeman

June 4, 1969 -- 7:35 p. m.

K told H he had reviewed again the backgrounder to which Rogers had referred, and noted that the inference was absurd and had been taken out of context. It was talking about what happens after settlement. K said it stood to reason that his backgrounder was before the speech. Chalmers Roberts wrote his article after the speech and said there had been nothing new in it. K said he found this very distasteful.

H said he had just talked to the President about Laird's depositions. The President asked H to call Richardson, tell him about the DOD depositions, and ask him to do the same at State. H asked K how he thought that would be received. K said not very well -- that the screws had been turned very well up to now but that one notch too many might kick back. This would mean a loss rather than a gain.

In response to a query from K, H said the President had directed him to call Richardson now because he wanted to get something going on it. H said Richardson was in with Rogers and that he (H) had really been grinding on him. He thought he would check with Laird to see how he went about obtaining the depositions and, then when Richardson called him shortly, he would advise him of the President's desire for similar action at State. He asked what K thought, and K said it was his instinct not to grind on them any more. The major thing to achieve now is an expression of Presidential displeasure. H said the President knows it isn't likely but thinks he is going to find out who did it. K said it wouldn't be found by deposition. H thought it might if enough fear were put into them by requiring it, but K said enough fear has been implanted now as you are likely to obtain. He felt they are really shaken, but said it was a question of judgment. H wondered how a kick-back would occur. K said, 'if Bill calls the President and screams, do you not think the President will say, "Forget about it; I understand." '

H said he saw what K meant and would wait to see what Richardson came up with when he reported to H. (H, in the course of the conversation, said the President had asked him again if he had told K there would be no more NSC meetings. K said he planned to talk with the President about this when he got out there.)

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

USecy Richardson
Mr. Kissinger

June 4, 1969 -- 7:45 p. m.

K told R he understood he found the man who leaked the information about the coalition government. (See 6:20 p. m. telecon between K and Haldeman.) R said the Secretary had been digging around through the backgrounder. K pointed out that Chalmers Roberts, the day after that backgrounder, had said there was nothing new.

R said, in the meanwhile, he had spoken to the Secretary again about Davidson and he feels he can't take him on. K said that, technically, he was State's man -- a Foreign Service reserve officer.

R then said the Secretary might receive a question in his appearance before the Foreign Service Committee about Mongolia. K said State should have already been notified that the President turned it down. He (the President) had been given State's full paper plus K's recommendation which was the same as State's. What the President said was that we should delay for the time-being.

K told R he would be hearing from Haldeman again; and ended by saying, 'I hope we can work together again on more productive things.'

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Gov. Rockefeller
6-10-69, 9:35 p.m.

R welcomed K home and asked if there was anything left of him. K said it was pretty exhausting. R said it looked pretty good in the papers. K said it worked out pretty well and said it was a delicate operation. K said we are trying to set it up for getting tough later on.

K said we are seeing the Latin Americans tomorrow. He said the President's intention was to be cool -- to mention that he doesn't think this is the way to improve relations. K asked R if he wanted the President to be warmer. R said he talked to the Chileans and they talked purely about Chile. R said they didn't mention anything about the report. R said they simply talked about Chile and when they got to the end, they told him about the Anacondia negotiations -- hopefully Anacondia will sell 51%. K said we are seeing them with 23 ambassadors. R said he had seen a copy of the report and it looked perfectly all right. R said the Brazilians initiated it in response to the President's statement that he wanted to know what the Latin's thought. R said there was to be no further effort, but the Chileans would like to carry this on. K said they won't get any encouragement from us.

R said they were going to Brazil on Monday and that he thought they were going to Uruguay. R said they are going to go ahead with Chile but the Chileans wanted to leave it indefinite and wait until the last minute to announce it.

K asked R if he was coming down to meet with the President at 4:30 on Thursday and also asked if he would be at dinner. R said yes.

K said he was playing with the idea of reorganizing his office and said the name Bill Watts occurred to him. R said Watts was doing a good job for us in the urban area for the State but if Watts wants to go to Washington, he would not stop him. K asked R if he would recommend him. R said to tell the truth he really doesn't know him. R said Al Marshall says he is doing an excellent job with black groups. K said he saw him during R's campaign and Watts was impressive. R said he wasn't saying anything more because he personally didn't have the knowledge about Watts but added that everybody thinks very highly of him.

K said "that Colonel I have is absolutely first class but he is killing himself."
R asked why don't you get General Parker. K said "but then I would lose
my Colonel because the General would outrank him." R said why don't

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

-2-

you get Nancy Hanks to help you? K said he needed people who can work on their own and that he needed someone who knew the bureaucracy. K said bringing people from outside just never really works.

R said they were impressed with Nachmanoff. K said he is an excellent man. K said after your trip I plan to draw him more and more into my work. R said it would help if Nachmanoff could come with us again. K said he had already approved that.

K said then what you suggest the President do is receive the report and thank them period. K said Rogers nearly had a heart attack (?) R said Rogers is something. K said yes, we have to exchange impressions on that subject.

R said they met with the fishing people in New York. The fishing people took the initiative in the meeting. R said for 14 years they have not been able to get State to settle this problem. K said the Department really needs a shakeup from top to bottom.

R said we are trying to play it by ear on the Latin American trip. K said Nachmanoff will go along with you again and I will be watching it from here. K said if we can do anything from this office, let us know. R said you have done more than enough.

R said he thought pretty soon they would get to Peru. K said good.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Peter Flanigan
9:45 p. m., 6-10-69

K asked F if he had been giving him publicity in Newsweek that K is the only one standing in the way of (I couldn't hear the rest). F said that he had been hearing a lot from Nancy Hanks about K's night life -- about his liking to stay up late at night. F said he didn't press her on the details. F said did Newsweek really say that? K said it was no help to him -- it happens to be true but he would rather have the reputation of being a dove. K said they quoted a White House aide as saying that K was the only one standing in the way of a cut and run (?) policy.

K said on the Johnston Island thing, let's not get it too public yet. F said the people he spoke to are Ehrlichman, Borman, Chapin and Safire. K asked why Safire? F said the President wanted his view on how to get the most use out of it.

K asked if F knew how far Johnston Island was from Hawaii. F talked about when the President should go to see the splashdown -- he should fly to the Hornet in a helicopter and spend the night on the carrier. F said he was dead set against the President going just to see them as they went by. F said they had to wear cocoons and the President could only communicate with them from a little 2'x2' window -- it was not an exciting picture. If it hadn't been for the other thing involved, F said he would have been against it. F said if he is going around the world, he should definitely go there.

K asked if F had checked out with NASA the chances of failure? F said Paine was the only one to check it out with. F said the President wouldn't leave before they were on their way back from the moon so if anything went wrong, he wouldn't leave.

K said he urged the President not to go to the lift off if he goes to the splashdown. K said he thought it was too much publicity with the trip and all -- too much traveling. F said he disagreed with K on that one. K said okay, you change his mind. F said okay.

F told K about an article on the first page of the NY Times re ABM and MIRV's -- what the Russians have done and said it reported that not only is it designed for attack on silos -- it is designed for nothing else. K said he would definitely read it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/1969

*

TELCONE

Hugh Sidey (TIME)
Mr. Kissinger
6-11-69 11:45 AM

S said they are doing cover story on VN thing and aftermath
and S really needs to straighten out some of their previous
concepts. K said he had been telling them that for months.
S asked whether there was any chance of seeing K to get a little
more of feel of it - how the two men got along, etc. K said
he would tell S what his problem is and he would like to ask the
President. A number of people have asked similar question
and Pres wanted K to talk to five or six newsmen on this subject.
K said we were planning to include S and wondered if S would
mind if that is the way it is done. S said he understood K's
time problem and any way K wanted to set up would suit him -
sooner the better however. K suggested aiming for 6:15 or
6:30 today - K will talk to Ehrlichman who was asked to do this
and will get back to S. K asked S whether including someone
from TV would have any effect on S. S said no but problem is
each guy has his own approach.

K told S to count on later this afternoon - he will check with Ehrlichman and call S back.

Jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Elliot Richardson

12:40 p. m. 6/11/69

Richardson wanted to know how the trip went. HAK and he decided to have a meeting after the NSC meeting on Friday to discuss it.

Richardson received a memo from John Walsh saying that the President didn't want any discussion on the troop withdrawals. R was a bit confused by this. HAK explained that it meant no discussion on further withdrawals. The initial withdrawal announcement would be discussed along the lines the President, and Secretary Rogers announced.

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCON
Amb Dobrynin
Mr. Kissinger
6-11-69 3:55 PM

Amb thanked K for the photographs.

Amb said he had received telegram from Moscow asking him
to come for consultation - he is leaving at 6:00 AM tomorrow.
K said they better have a talk before he leaves and Amb agreed.
K asked how long he would be gone - Amb said he did not know.
K said he will be coming back - Amb said he thinks so; he
was just asked to come for consultation without any unnecessary
delay.

Amb and K agreed to meet at 6:30 today.

jm

(Sidey changed to 10:00 AM June 12 per HAK instructions)

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCORN

Maxine Cheshire
Mr. Kissinger
6-11-69 4:20 PM

C said she understands K is going to marry the very beautiful and
brilliant Nancy Maginnes. K said he could not stop C from writing
that but it will turn out to be wrong. C said he must have been told
that by 50 different people - everyone thinks they are an absolutely
delightful couple. K said there is nothing to it. C said she is going
to quote K. K said he would just as soon not be quoted. K said
although he is flattered to be in social pages, he has absolute passion
about not having his private life written about. He has no intention
of getting married but if he does, C will be among the first he tells -
K said he would not advise C to hang around the phone waiting for
that.

C said she found K enormously fascinating - can't put her finger on it.
She was watching him with Mrs. Luce at TIME dinner and asked if
he always ate nuts and drank champagne.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCORN

Stanley Hoffman
Mr. Kissinger
6-11-69 4:45 PM

K asked H if he would be coming down here at some point. K said things are hectic - it's hard to please people. K said he had written to Birrenbach weeks ago telling him he wanted German program under H. K said he agreed and what he needs is formal letter from H. K said it is going to be sent by Franklin - it boiled down to question of stationery. H said stationery says German Research Program - Director Henry Kissinger, on leave. H said all decisions made by standing committee - seems it was impossible to get formal agreement of Bowie, K said he is mad man - what the hell is he after. H said he seems to have quired the xxxxxx quieted down a bit. H said letter has gone out and we are waiting for an answer. H asked if K is coming up there at all and K said perhaps a weekend in June to see his children. K said he will be here until July 1 then Calif for two months. H said he will be in Calif! in Aug. K said Pres has said he would not be as busy out there as here and perhaps they could get together.

K said H's memo was read by the President.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCORN

Bryce Harlow
Mr. Kissinger
6-11-69 4:50 PM

H said re lamb, re could veto bill which is what Agriculture wants.
Two, we could tell Bennett we will try to get quotas and
tell New Zealand and Australia to string along thru session - both
have elections coming up and may not play this game. K asked if
this would satisfy Bennett. H said he would be willing to try to find out.
K asked if he should ask the President what he wants. H said he thinks
we should do second. K asked if H could wait until he talks with Pres
and H said yes. K said he would then have to talk to New Zealand and
Australian Ambs. H said of course doing this foreordains passage
later. K said we could then veto. H said he realizes that but it poisons
the water. Harden and Richardson want us to veto when it is passed - question
is what to do before it is passed. K said Pres wants him to brief Russell
and Stennis on something very secret - he is seeing them at 5:00 and then
Pres will see right after. K said why doesn't he tell Pres that H will
be present for discussion. H said o.k.

jm

DECLASSIFIED