DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

10:43 a.m.

12/17/7

P: On this one other thing on the Cuban thing and backgrounder. On the Cuban thing we have done everything we can about getting information and filing protest?

K: The protest has been filed.

P: British going to protest?

K: I have not heard their reply.

P: Panamanians have?

K: That's right.

P: Follow it thru ruthlessly. Great public visibility. I want the Russians to know we are raising hell about it.

K: I fully understand that.

P: I was just looking at the morning papers here and probably TV too. Great Indian victory and Dacca and ceasefire. It's important to get across fact that Indians were aggressors and when she did ceasefire it wasn't an act of grace. She shouldn't get credit for starting the fire and then calling in the fire department. The size of a country on its form of government cannot justify aggression. The U.S. does not take issues on side of who has the power. It's back to Hitler and _______. It's a moral position. My whole view is not anti-Indian or pro-Pakistan but anti-aggression. I don't want India to get the victory.

K: They have a victory.

P: But they shouldn't praise it.

K: Right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Richard Scaife/Paul Hayworth/Kissinger

11:15 a.m.

12/17/73

S: I am so frustrated. I listened to NBC news this morning. You know what's going on in the world. I have my editorial page editor here. I want good news to come out.

K: What's NBC doing?

S: Shaking everyone up. Will you tell Hayworth your views?

H: It's an honor to talk with you, sir. The overall public feeling that we have blown it in the India-Pakistan situation. I would like something positive. I know it's a complex situation. I am trying to look at possible areas of future solutions for this area.

K: What's the basis of saying we have blown it?

H: We were indecisive in the area. Damned if we do and damned if we don't. No concrete steps. That's oversimplistic.

K: Total nonsense. We took major steps but India determined to have war. Only steps to prevent war -- pouring military aid into Pakistan -- we couldn't talk. Major steps that would have been perfectly (concordant?) with ______ but India won didn't want it. They were egged on by the Russians.

H: Best you could, trying to reduce --

K: We have given more relief to refugees then rest of the world put together. We have done a whole list of things. I could have an assistant call you and tell you what we have done. Once we are started President moved to keep it from spreading to West and U.S. deserves credit for not letting it spread.

H: It's a good point. We are about to cut it to 14 days. Where are we going now as it stands? Eventual recognition of Bangla Desh?

K: We want to defuse the situation.

H: How?

K: I don't want to go into that.

H: A definite plan you hope to follow?

K: Hoping to be active. President's final decisive moves towards India and Soviets were a major factor that brought war to a conclusion.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN
McCloy/Kissinger

11:23 a.m.

12/17/7

M: I tried to get you yesterday.

K: I have been in over my head.

M: Had a thought to get you out of difficulties with a nomination.

K: Why don't you write a letter to the President?

M: Suggesting it? I don't see how Fulbright can turn him down.

K: It's an excellent idea.

M: I thought of some time back of writing you a little note of what I thought he might be ready to do. You don't need it, do you?

K: I transmitted it to the President. He has a horror of commissions and special __________.

M: The other ~~WEEK~~ wasn't my dish of tea. I see a light in the tunnel on the monetary situation.

(The "he" referred to above for nomination is Dave Packard)

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rabin/Kissinger

11:36 a.m. 12/17/7

R: It was my ______ from Joe. Started y by Secretary saying he wants this exchange. It would help to have a special meeting but because of time table it's impossible. He started by asking our Foreign Minister for his analysis and estimate of what happened in the Gen. Assembly and results of talk yesterday with Jarring. With Jarring it's freezed and no flexibility from our point of view. The Secy. was not sorry about ______ at mission. Israel would have found more positive language to answer Jarring message of Feb. 8. The main issue as the Secy. sees it is resumption of talks on ______. Our Foreign Minister said that talks in N& there's no interim settlement. The Secy. said no, the U.S. has its own reasons that beginning of January the Egyptians might agree. I am afraid even though the Foreign Minister said there is basic differences between the U.S. and Israelon interim settlement and how it can work, ~~we~~ I wouldn't be surprised if the Secy. got the impression that we would talk.

K: You were not supposed to do that.

R: I am having lunch with Sisco. Unfortunately the Foreign Minister forgot that there were certain qualifications of the U.S. we asked and not answered yet.

K: Can't you do that?

R: I will do it.

K: Make sure it stays in phase. That ______ doesn't get ahead of what I am doing.

R: The Foreign Minister goes back Sunday.

K: Can you come in at 5:00?

R: Yeah. Sisco says now we are free to go ahead --

K: He said I had to talk with you.

R: I will call him and say definition of ??_?

K: Time consuming procedures.

R: I am leaving on the 29th and probably return on 6 or 7.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Amb. Bush/Kissinger

11:43 a.m.

12/17/7

B: We are waiting to hear from Bhutto. I talked to him earlier. The British --

K: I just talked with Cromer. On ______ resolution. What's your view?

B: It's a lower common denominator. It's an attempt to subvert what Somalia's trying to do. They said he was making progress and this looks like buying out for India at the cheapest possible price. But if we want to get off perhaps its way to do it.

K: Ceasefire and withdrawal.

B: The one we worked on yesterday? Bhutto said this morning he didn't want to legitimize surrender. I am seeing the Ambassador at 12:00. Our resolution had withdrawal in there.

K: I saw it.

B: It had also humanitarian thing. The British are buying off the lowest common denominator to get the Security Council off the matter. They probably see in our resolution a support of other activities going through.

K: Then we stuck with ours.

B: I may get a call from ______ saying minister wants to buy off on it.

K: On British? We have no reason to be more Pakistani then the Pakistanis. Do the Pakistanis have the British resolution?

B: Ghutto in press conference so I cannot be sure.

K: Let me know where the state of play is. I prefer our resolution. I share your views on the British. But if the Pakistanis are ready to go, we are. It's a lousy, cheap exercise. I have expressed it to the British Ambassador. Would Russians have accepted last night

B: No. The Indian Foreign Minister said okay, you would have to go back to Moscow. I said yeah. As soon as Pakistan ambassador comes back -- he wanted what we had last night.

K: Don't press them.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
J. Alsop/Kissinger
3:13 p.m. 12/17/71

A: I hear you claim you made a disaster into a setback and I claim you have turned a catastrophe into a disaster.

K: At least we stopped the fighting into the West.

A: I am going to write about it and you can't stop me. I was going to see Al Monday.

K: I won't be here.

A: Let's set a time on Wed. How about 11:00?

K: I have to keep my mornings free.

A: Let's make lunch.

K: We will.

A: No, I can't change my plans. How about later in the morning?

K: Let me aim for 12:30 in the morning.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Raza/Kissinger

3:25 p.m.

12/17/71

R: I was at it until 12:00 last night going through each telegram. I prepared a statement and signed every page and want to hand it over to you. I don't want to let my friends down. It's clear so I would like to come for 5 mins.

K: Come at 4:30.

R: Did you ask about Mr. Bhutto?

K: Not yet but I will know by the end of the day.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Justice Goldberg/Kissinger

3:55 p.m. 12/17/71

G: What I have to call you about is probably outdated for the moment. This is latest business about Jacobsen.

K: I don't know where it stand at the minute.

G: Anybody suggested to you the frustration of the Soviet maneuver?

K: Veto any candidate except Jacobsen on first ballot.

G: It seems absurd to let them off the hook.

K: You know the UN.

G: I went to the UN with high hopes. They don't want to say that a Finn and Jew is not acceptable and a private unmarked poll is their way around it.

K: It's my private recommendation to State. I don't think the President should become involved.

G: It's what I would do automatically. I want to Pittsburgh and when I heard about it I said I would not let them get away with it. He would differ with getting to public against India.

K: We had to do it to keep them off W. Pakistan. We weren't concerned so much about East Pakistan.

G: I am out of government and don't know the facts. I have no sympathy with them at all. I never hesitated to punch them in the nose when they misbehaved. We are a great power too. You pass it on to the Dept.

K: No one expects to? ? ? ? . Everyone takes your views with utmost pain. I have no pain about what you said.

G: If we have time in NY -- the President shouldn't get involved. People should handle without involving him. Handles in NY. I would never have agreed to this procedure. I would have said let's go ahead and vote.

K: They proposed it. Let me check on it. OK. Nice to talk with you.

G: Let's get together soon.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Henry Brandon/Kissinger

4:50 p. m.

12/17/71

B: I would like to see you for a few minutes about the Heath meeting.

K: I doubt it.

B: Anything special on your side?

K: No. We have to wipe up the mess on the subcontinent. It ended after the tragedy of it's beginning. We at least saved W. Pakistan. That's what we were after.

B: What do you think should be done now?

K: You know what can be done now? Can't -- there's not much that can be done now. We have to face the facts of what this means.

B: What does it mean to you?

K: You know my views. It could not have happened without the Soviet Union.

B: Yeah.

K: It's also true it could not have ended without the Soviet Union. But I don't know if someone who throws a match into a powder keg should get credit for bring the fire dept.

B: It was their doing.

K: Like the M.E. war was. It could not have happened without them.

B: In terms of common action.

K: Whose?

B: U.S. and U.K.

K: I am not sure that common action is the motto of your govt at the moment.

B: I think it may be true. I am not sure that -- it may be a little bit of pick in this.

K: at what?

K

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

President/Kissinger

5:42 p.m. - 12/17/71

K: Mr. President.

P: I worked that thing out with Bhutto. I told Bob and we are doing it at 1:30. I think it is a very good idea. I would like to stick it to the Indians and under no circumstances will I see the Indian Ambassador. We will give Bhutto a good showing. He is coming in for a half hour. You have a little cold?

K: No, I have probably been talking a lot today.

P: You feel all right though.

K: I feel fine.

P: How is everything going?

K: It looks like there won't be any Security Council Resolution. The Paks won't accept the British. The British have been outrageous. I have been talking with Cromer and he says the British don't want a big announcement out of Bermuda.

P: Then why the hell go to Bermuda?

K: But I think it is important not to let them off the hook and tell them we are satisfied with the degree of unity there has been on this and other things.

P: What is the matter with them? Are they playing the Russian line?

K: Well, they are playing a Jekyl line.

P: Did you try to use the French?

K: They have just separated themselves. The British have actually worked against us as they did on the presentation issue.

P: What do they want? Just be on the side of the Indians?

K: Well, they don't want to do anything that displeases the Indians. Reston had a very good comment. He said the only ones who understood what was involved was the Administration; it finally understood the larger strategic challenge of Moscow's power play.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

2

P: You know it probably was the backgrounder thing that did it. Now how have you done today?

K: I talked to the AP and UP through Scali. That worked very well. Scali is doing Kalb.

P: You do Time-Life and Frankel.

K: Well, Frankel is in another country. I did a little bit with Kleiman in the morning.

P: Do it simple.

K: Now I talked to Time but Time is way off on the Indian side. Now they will claim their letter to you is a terrible pushoff and I think we ought to put off your reply tomorrow so it hits the same cycle.

P: OK.

K: I am getting a reply ready now on the things we have done so this is a matter of record.

P: I would think State would have done it already.

K: Oh, State, it took them 10 hours to get two paragraphs over here.

P: Let's give it a full reply and shoot it off. Make it on plain white paper.

K: But we will have to get it out before the newspapers close.

P: You will have to do it fast.

K: I think we will come out well on that. I talked to the Board of Directors at the Hoover Institute today. They asked some questions about India and Pakistan and I really let them have it.

P: OK, well, I wouldn't be too concerned about it. Try to get the rest of it out. You have done the wire services, but I wouldn't be too feverish about it. If time is a losing cause, forget it. How do you think Reston came to his view?

K: I don't know because I didn't even talk to him.

P: Did he know about the ceasefire?

By NARA, Dale 5/26

3

K: He noted in the article that everyone has missed the point. It had to do with Moscow's power play.

P: You know they wouldn't understand it that way. Moscow's power play - that's what it was all about.

K: Mr. President, if it hadn't been for us Pakistan would have been destroyed.

P: Well I would say we saved more than 40% of it.

K: We saved more than the situation permitted.

P: As far as American public opinion is concerned I don't think they gave a damn.

K: No, they don't give a damn. All they can say is there was a war and we helped to end it in 10 days.

P: Well, on Bhutto I think. . .

K: I think it is a good move and it also commits us to the preservation of Pakistan.

P:

K: The

P:

K:

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

6:08 p. m. 12/17/71

K: You called me earlier.

L: At the time I was calling to talk over if you wanted me to come down on list of options I was sending you. I sent them.

K: Which list?

L: A, D, C. The Cuban thing. It was noon and it's worked out.

K: On the God-damned Defense Budget? How will we get it done?

LL: They are here this weekend.

K: I will not be available until Wed.

L: We have to get a print out.

K: Can it wait?

L: Then I will let these people go until then. Is there a disagreement?

K: & 78.5 and 79.5.

L: It all depends on whether you want to put the alms and sorties.

K: How much for alms?

L: 200 million.

K: And 200 million for F-111.

L: What they have decided to do on that is to go in and use that on the supplemental. George has agreed on that and Boeing 747 is ? ? ? ? ? .

K: 200 is alms we can give you.

L: And I want capability on sortie to carry out President's directive.

K: Then 79.

L: Then no 400 million on all volunteer force/

K: It's knocked out anyway.

L: It's not in 78.5.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

6:08 p.m. 12/17/71

-2-

K: I can justify 200 for alms and 200 for sorties. How about 100 more for all volunteer?

L: Then knock me down on 200.

K: What will budget read?

L: 200 on ~~alms~~ and 200 on sorties and only 100 on all volunteer --

K: Then you will be at 79. Can we settle on that?

L: I can settle on anything. I would like 100 million for research and development. But I will not be an SOB on these things.

K: I like working ~~xerox~~ with you. You make your argument and you never give trouble to the President when he makes his decisions. You are not a cry baby and in '73 we will ~~settle~~ still be friends.

L: I hear you talked with the Hoover Institute.

K: I gave it to them.

L: The alms and sorties. I would like to have that. I reclamaed on volunteer forces because President --

K: He ~~xerox~~ is willing to give it up.

L: He wasn't for it in the first place.

K: Let me try to get George on it tonight.

L: If you can get him to come 200 on alms and 200 on sorites I would like to have 100 for RDT&E. Then the new ~~initiative~~ such as F-111 we will do in a '72 supplemental and also the Boeing 747.

K: For what purpose?

L: Airborne command.

K: I don't need his trips to NY.

L: To what Flanigan (?) is working on.

K: The airconditioning has broken down here. They are putting heat on me.

L: If you can't get it 79.1 --

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Kissinger/Zeigler
12-17-71 6:30 p.m.

Zeigler: Should I announce the Bhutto thing?

HAK: Wait until tomorrow morning. Do it tomorrow morning.

RZ: Let me talk to Al.

XEROX MEX

HAK: This is his view--it isn't a big deal--don't get them together, if you don't have a normal briefing. That is not a good idea to get the impression that he is coming back just to see Bhutto. We will also be having a letter go to Mrs. Candhi tomorrow or Sunday.

RZ: Hard-lined?

HAK: Yes, either tomorrow or Sunday.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELOON
Rogers/Kissinger

12-17-71 6:35 p.m.

WR: We got word from the Panamanian government, but they rejected our help. To do anything with these vessels, we had to have requests from the Panamanian government to do it. We can't do anything and comply in international law. To give protection to our vessels....

HAK: As long as the President is in Florida, he will do anything

WR: I know.

HAK: You know what the mood is down there. What do you suggest? I know what the President will say---"I don't give a damn, bomb the Cubans--this is piracy."

WR: Nothing can be done tonight. I thought you should know, but part of the deal was getting the Panamanians not to reverse themselves. They think these Cubans... (interruption) Panamanians don't want involved

HAK:

WR: When one of these ships followed Miami, and we are scrambling planes and sending destroyers to protect it. Let me find out where we are militarily. We just got word from ..... Will you give some more briefing on the Paks?

HAK: I am doing nothing.

WR: I thought someone told me the President asked you to deal with these fellows on an individual basis.

HAK: I have given Scali some points, but I am not seeing anyone.

WR: If you do, I would appreciate it if you would touch base with me. I am trying to get my people quiet. We should figure out a way to give the President some credit and it should be coordinated.

HAK: I agree

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Scali/Kissinger
6:50 p.m. 12-17-71

HAK: Did you tell Rogers that I was briefing newsmen? I called you and you were on another phone.

Scali: The I am in hot water because I said no backgrounders for the next number of days.

HAK: There is no question of backgrounders--somebody said we were doing it on an individual basis.

you had said

JS: He had talked with you and/that there would be no backgrounders and there would be none for the next few days and that it would be coordinated with State.

HAK: I just said I gave some basic facts to Scali.

JS: I didn't acknowledge doing anything with it. I said it was too early to start crowing about how we had handled it.

HAK: He wants to do the crowing.

JS: Said it should be coordinated. He said I am available with the President wants it, and said he was holding a backgrounder next week. I said good, I agreed. I haven't found anything to disagree. Now he will say that John Scali mislead him

HAK: No, he will say I have misled him. I have never heard him coming forward with any help before.

JS: Did he say that you were doing individually?

HAK: Have you talked with any one else?

JS: I have talked with Kraslow, Kalb, Gill, Gurtzman.

HK: What is Kraslow saying?

JS: The story is being understood, so there is not a problem--the only one is in the State Department.

HAK: I will take the blame.

JS: Al said no--we should not have told him anything.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Asst. AG Mardian

7:30 12-17/71

HAK: I have a question which will drive you up the wall, but I won't do it unless you tell me. You remember McDonald? His wife was murdered in Trenton. Yes, mugged and murdered.

Mardian: She was?

HAK: Her funeral is tomorrow. Would it hurt your case if I went to the funeral?

Mardian: Well, they will use it, of course, but I don't think so.

HAK: He is a mad Irishman.

Mardian: Will attempt to use it as evidence. I don't think that should stand in you way. Our case isn't that week. There will be a lot of publicity, sure.

HAK: She was a Negro.

Mardian: I didn't know that. The fact that you were compassionate enough to attend the funeral wouldn't hurt the Administration. Was it Brian McDonald?

HAK: Yes, Brian.

Mardian: Your involvement will give the attorneys an excuse to credit him for your attendance.

HAK: I would go surprisingly.

Mardian: It is not that significant. It shouldn't do one thing or the other for our case--

HAK: I will let you know what I decide.

Mardian: Okay

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

7:58 p.m., December 17, 1971

K: Ron, I am already 45 minutes late.

Z: This will only take a second. Your stuff is starting to move. quite well on the network news tonight.

K: Oh, is it.

Z: And I am starting to get calls from people. People call me who are willing to pick this up on the AP & UPI, I will say I am not going to give you a quote from the White House but off-the-record that it is all good. Is that all right.

K: I think that's fine.

Z: NBC had the hotline thing.

K: I don't know where they got that.

Z: They have it and I will be asked in the briefing.

K: Just say we do not discuss the channel.

Z: But off-the-record I can say, yes.

K: No. I would just say "no comment on that. This they did not get this from me.

Z: NBC using that, is that all right.

K: The Russians are just getting madder and madder. Ron, just do not confirm it.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

Telcon
Secretary Laird

December 18, 1971; 9:05 a.m.

K: Al tells me he has worked out with Pursley rules according to which scramble planes but be sure ~~they~~ back here.

L: Yes, but we can't wait to get authority too long.

K: We will speed it up. We shouldn't go to the President now. Will get your authority quickly.

L: I would like to be able to shoot. Because I am afraid the President will get upset again. I don't know what he and Bebe are cooking up now.

K: I am not eager to start shooting Cubans when we are confronting Russians on the one hand. I would like to wait until we have an occasion.

L: OK. Goodbye

By. NARA, Dalo 5/66

Telcon
Geo. Shultz
Dec. 18, 1971; 9:10 a.m.

K: I'm on my way to a funeral. Can we get together Tuesday or Wednesday morning?

S: That's awfully late for us.

K: I realize that. I have had the Indian-Pak thing to run with an absent President and public relations upset in the White House. I am not upset with you George. I am working a 15-hour day.

over into
S: Our problem is we need to get a decision from you on the Defense Department so that we can work effectively with them on the basis of an understanding of what the overall total was going to be.

K: Laird said he would hold off until we know and he wouldn't do anything until then. The issue isn't between you and me. Laird now says if 78.5 he will want the Chiefs to appeal to the President. The President will not overrule the Chiefs. The President wants at least 79 billion. He is going to talk to you to put the rap on me. I was willing to go with the 78.5. Laird says 200 million he wants. I think it is good to show the Russians.

S: This was included in our estimates.

K: He will pull forces out if we don't give it to him. The only problem I will guarantee the President will settle for 79.5 or 79. He will dance around and try to stick me with giving you the bad news about pretending I am the guy who wants it. But I haven't got time for these games now but if you want to know the real situation, that is the situation.

S: We are in an impossible situation with the public because the more money that is spent on things of no use, subh as the F-111 or this new method of buying 747's. I sent you a note with the facts on those things -- the less money there is for anything else. We just have to make some decisions on these things. Ehrlichman has his research initiatives that will just go by the boards.

K: Will the $500 million make that much difference?

S: Yes. We have already squeezed out of the budget all of the President's enacted domestic issues.

K: I was content to go along with 78.5. I can't tell you we have just discovered great strategic needs. I think in terms of foreign policy it always helps to have somewhat more in defense, but I have to tell you the President's motives are entirely political in this. He doesn't want

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

to fight with Laird and Laird is playing that for all it's worth. I will
talk to him in Bermuda and find out what he wants. But if he says
get it can you and I do it peaceably?

S: You and I can do it peaceably, frankly, and directly, any time.

K: How about breakfast Wednesday?

S: Well, we will try.

K: Look, I know this wasn't right but you don't know what we have been through here the last month. We have had to run the entire tactics of the thing. But I have got to go if I am going to go to the funeral.

S: All right. Goodbye.

of all of the Presidents

I tell you we have just
of foreign policy it
but I have to tell you
in truth, he doesn't want

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rowland Evans/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. 12/18/71

K: I was sorry I couldn't have breakfast. I have to go to a funeral this morning. And I don't talk with columnists who write as you do about our domestic policy.

E: Stablized on West?

K: I think so if everyone will stay shut up.

E: What I would like to do sometime is how much involvement of the Soviets. Help in reconnaissance. How much in Indian operation. That except for the Soviets there would have been a political settlement.

K: If the Soviets acted as we there would have been no war. Soviets made a treaty that obligated them in case of war to keep <u>all</u> other countries out of war. Holding the ring (?). At no stage despite repeated requests from us did they <u>all</u> undertake measures to restrain India. When the outbreak --

E: Did we ask them hard?

K: Repeatedly. Here and in Moscow. President even raised it with Gromyko. We didn't threaten but didn't want a consultation.

E: What did you get <u>from</u> Gromyko?

K: Power of restraint but we are convinced <u>that</u> they were only using formal words.

E: What's this show of detente?

K: Once it started they ______ Chinese and other countries that might give arms. But in last <u>two</u> week they were helpful. But should an arsonist be given credit for calling the fire dept. ?

E: What <u>do</u> they <u>do</u> this show about your policy?

K: It shows it's brilliant, as usual. Seriously, in the Soviet Union there's two strands. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Always in conflict. They don't create <u>strife</u> situation in South Asia, it was there. They took maximum advantage. It indicates hazard of govt. whose basic instincts are aggressive and who slides into major crises and wants a <u>strong</u> on national basis. But helpful in ending it to preserve the detente.

E: That's why they did it. Did you see Scotty yesterday?

K: It was one of his best pieces.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

9:50 a.m. 12/18/71

-2-

E: Tell me a little bit more on reconnaissance.

K: I can't.

E: Did they help in that aspect of Indian invasion?

K: Don't press it because I would have to tell you too much. I said this for guidance. Don't tie it to Administration sources.

E: I won't but if it's accurate -- they have a treaty but it doesn't run to that extent.

K: It's reason to believe that they shared some of it.

E: Preliminary reconnaissance.

K: But don't go further.

E: Did you see our piece on the M.E.?

K: You wrote as a decision what's a tendency.

E: It's going to happen.

K: The whole basis -- have to do something which csnnot happen there. It wasn't our first choice. We didn't think it has ruined detente policy and it might have jolted them too.

E: Doesn't effect ____________?

K: No. Before India/Pakistan thing relations with Soviets were better then they have ever been.

E: I agree. That's why I hope we are not being taken for a ride.

K: That's why we had to act violently. They can't sell good manners when they are undertaking the whole balance of power. We may have erred too much on hard side in the last few days.

E: Are they angry?

K: Probably sulking.

E: Where are you going?

K: To Phila. for a funeral and then NY and Bermuda.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

9:50 a.m.

12/18/71

E: Where will you be for Christmas?

K: Probably in NY.

E: Monetary crisis cleared up this week?

K: At least this month.

E: Everybody placing you and Connally against each other. You will push him for settlement because he sees domestic aspect and you see foreign policy.

K: Sure but Connally is a Cabinet Member with whom I work most closely. In early Nov. He and I agreed on common strategy. Not a shred of conflict. I raised the concerns that involved me.

E: It's obvious. It's the function of the two jobs.

K: Connally is more subtle then the press gives him credit for. I have a high opinion of him. It was desirable that someone hang tough. We steered towards solution at Azores and (we had) it.

E: All the way back to August?

K: No. By mid-Nov. Or end of Oct. Before left on Asian trip there was a tentative decision and made final after the trip.

E: Nice to call me.

K: Soviets irresponsible in getting it started and shows legacies of the past die hard in that system. They helped it end but cannot give them credit for that. Detente policy has a jolt on that side. For both our sakes they couldn't use it for cheap gainst. Good reason for both sides and expecially for them in months ahead.

E: Maybe not so harmful in the M.E.

K: I am not so sure. Maybe even a positive one. We will save that for a later talk. I really mean that.

E: I will call you after the first of the year for breakfast.

K: Good.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sullivan/Kissinger

10:22 a.m. 12/18/7

S: Ellsworth wanted to spend Christmas with Carol in Katmandu but can't get clearances for his plane up there so proposing to go to Bombay and fly by Indian Airways to Katmandu. What do you think?

K: It's going to be hard for him to get back.

S: I don't follow you.

K: It's hard if I have to come back urgently.

S: He said Christmas with Carol and travelling for a week afterwards. Three flights from Bombay daily and a daily TWA flight from Bombay to Saigon.

K: I don't see how we can stop him.

S: From a security point of view ? ? ? ? ? . It's tough to say no.

K: Let him go then.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

10:33 a.m. 12/18/71

K: You know we are going to send a new strictly technical advance party to China in January. No substance. One thing I would like to have for that party is some language on Formosa that we could possibly put into the communique.

J: In the final communique? So they can think about it.

K: Can I work with Al Jenkins on that?

J: By all means. We worked on some before.

K: One language I gave was on that problem. That was clearly unacceptable. We can haggle about rest of communique because no problems.

J: This will be the key problem. Al is your man. I am not sure whether he is here today. I saw him a few days ago but going on leave.

K: I will get in touch with him. I would like your judgment.

J: I do think I have a feel for their positions on this and problems involved and I am interested on working on it. A lot of theorectical and c______ words involved on it. Would be glad to do anything I can.

K: I will talk it over with you on the earliest opportunity. If he is not here perhaps you can take charge of it. I think we have come out as well as we could on this.

J: I think so. What we did had to be influential (?). We have nothing to apologize for.

K: After everyone knew what we wanted it was good cooperation. I appreciate everything you did.

J: You will call Al?

K: I will and maybe we will get together later today for a______.

J: Good.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. 12/18/7

S: I would like you to give a message to the President for me. I would like to apply for Ambassador in India.

K: Are you serious?

S: It's the last place in the world I want to go!

K: We need a tough guy there. My prediction is we will come out ahead.

S: I could care less that you and I are bete noits of India. Look at the Washington Post this morning. It says she is upset about you and I.

K: It's nothing compared to what she will say.

S: (About that letter) I did it a last night. It's upstairs. Have Haig call Ted Eliot. I am seeing Rabin at 1:00 and find out how he wants to proceed. I need a directive.

K: What's the Secy's view?

S: I don't know. A directive would be helpful.

K: We have to have planes moving in there.

S: Will have it in my hands. Read directive to President and get it to me today so Secy reads directive.

K: OK.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 12/22/71

K: Thanked you already for the cheese. It was good for my ego. I was dropped last year. I talked with the President and 300 million pay raise going into effect Oct. 1 which doesn't show in this budget so I guess he will let you have that $7__ instead of 78.5.

L: 400.

K: He thinks its 300. Whatever it is, __he__ will let you have.

L: What about sorties and __ULMS alms?__

K: I wanted to discuss this with you. On alms we are talking about 135. You tried to sneak one by me.

L: The new actually (?) figure has now gotten down to 135 million. That's the amount that will be expended.

K: We should have discussion on whether alms or 640. We have 100 million in budget.

L: We have money but we wanted to accelerate alms to 77 instead of 79 or 80.

K: That makes the 640 irrelevant.

L: No. I don't understand why they said that.

K: For one thing you would have 300 million to play with.

L: __________ is pay increase.

K: I just had an hour and a half with Shultz fighting for you.

L: 395 is exact figure.

K: You will get whole amount.

L: Alms is out.

K: We can put alms into that. In effect we are giving you 359 free.

L: What about -- Shultz doesn't want to go with F-111.

K: It's in x '72. 200 for that. He will give it to you.

L: Supplemental?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 12/22/71

-2-

K: He didn't say.

L: Expenditures in '73 -- Shultz and my people have no disagreement on pricing. If I know what program is you want we know the price. We don't have any problems in pricing out. If The President wants to go on 947 --

K: He has 200 million in for that. He has given me a whole list.

L: Give it to me so I know what it is. Call me right back.

********

K: What I have here is what he shows as Jolly Green Giant at ______ and 200 million for expenditures rates which I thought should be in '72.

L: What's Jolly Green Giant?

K: F-111.

L: 200 million but in '72?

K: No, in '73.

L: We allow that. OK.

K: 100 million for strategic submarines.

L: That's what's in 78.5.

K: That's correct. Basic thing -- on air defense you are with us except for national guard.

L: National Guard and reserve thing on air defense we cannot take out of the program.

K: We have killed to 4 sites. That's ok. In effect we are saying if you get 359 million ______ is close to 500 you and I talked about we can discuss strategic submarines. What would you spend it for?

L: On priority I would put it first on ULMS, second on sorties. Unless he changes sorties requirement.

K: If he changes I am worried you will sneak forces out of there.

L: If we can get back on money for ammunition you think we will take out assets?

K: Yeah.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 12/22/71

L: With 50 million we can keep assets there and ? ? ? ? . Just so it's an understanding. I have a dictated ______ from the President dated Aug. 6, 1972, and following that.

K: On submarines and sorties.

L: First and then Jolly Green Giant kind of program. They say I am dragging my feet on that and holding back on orders. I would as soon go ahead but ULMS has bigger political impact.

K: They are being dropped in wet season of '73. Hold through '72 and spring of '73.

L: I am told now to go ? ? ? ? and 750 on gunships. I have worded budget but not allowed that.

K: If we want to lower sorties XXXX rate you could keep it up at close our present levels.

L: For half the year without phasing it down. After that I would need 50 million. I only need a change in the directive. Sortie money out.

K: We gave you 50.

L: OK. That will require a change in directive. Then we would be at 78.9. 359 million on the pay thing and 50 million keeping assets up and ? ? ? ? . That's where you come down?

K: Let's settle on that.

L: I don't want a hassle on this.

K: I understood this from the beginning.

L: On Jolly Green Giant on expenditures we will shove it into '72 program.

K: OK.

L: How will I know?

K: I will get it down with Shultz this morning.

L: And you will send a piece of paper over here. One other thing -- Did you talk to the President yesterday, how long he wants us? We can go a long time but stalling around in the Indian Ocean.

NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 12/22/71

K: As long as the Russians stand. I may tell them we will withdraw if they do.

L: Christmas packages are going out there to the fleet. Inter-service group has a paper that's difficult. I have a destroyer standing off Dominican Republic and they are prepared to shoot.

K: But not without orders from here.

L: But in situation under attack they can return fire.

K: What's interagency paper say?

L: They can do nothing. If one ship under attack we would respond now. If Cuba attacked ships then our aircraft would knock the hell out of them without coming back here. Those ships are not in area of Cuban aircover. I might bring one of those destroyers back.

K: Hold it awhile.

L: Shultz asked me the other day if he could wrap (?) in military assistance in this year's budget. I can do it but it will take 2-3 years to get it ready. I haven't changed my position.

K: It's a technical thing.

L: I doubt if the President will side with me.

K: I think he is.

L: I haven't gone around marketing it but State has gone up to the Hill last week. If I have forbidden my people from going up. No campaign. My friends have put on quite a campaign.

K: They feel strongly about jurisdiction and not program.

L: I know that the President wants to go higher then ____. In ____, 73.

K: Can you go this higher?

L: In '73 we can.

K: Will you?

L: I have sent recommendation over there. But I don't want it to drop out.

K: It will not. Absolutely. Especially Indonesia.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
Candy Stroud
12/22/71; 11:00 a.m.

K: I've been a little busy.

S: Me too; sick too. Wondering if you would like a blind date tomorrow night. A little old, but...

K: You are very nice, but I am busy. Who is it, you? Oh, no, not if she's a little old. That couldn't be you.

S: No, we are going to take a group to the Choral Arts Society.

K: Whom did you have in mind?

S: Perle Mesta.

K: Oh, Jesus!

S: We would like you to join us for a little dinner and go to the Choral Arts Society.

K: I have something tentative. Could I call you in the morning? If you just have to have a man, you had better call someone else.

S: Yes, sure, but feel free to come, Henry. What are you going to do for Christmas?

K: I am going to spend it with my kids in Boston, and then going to Key Biscayne with the President.

S: Try to join us for a bite here at 6:30. The concert is at 8:00. Do try to join us.

K: Well... you are very sweet to think of me.

S: Well of course we think of you. Bye-bye, Henry.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon

Gabriel Hauge

12/22/71; 11:15 a.m.

H: Thanks for taking time from your busy schedule to take this call.

K: The day I don't take a call from you my regular menu will have become.....

H: This is something I need your reaction to. Guido Goldman - this German Marshall Memorial Fund. You know about it?

K: Yes.

H: He came to see me Friday about this fund. It was entirely new to me. He suggested I should become the chairman of a founding committee to create the thing.

K: I didn't know about that part, but I think you are a great idea.

H: But to create anything is not like going to set on a board an hour a week, as you know. I am trying to think whether the kind of person they ought to get is a fellow like Douglas Dillon, who has a good deal of free time.

K: I didn't know he was going to approach you. I implored him to stay away from the Rockefeller-Dillons, who are all very good friends of mine. They are going to have a good deal of money.

H: 115 Marks over a period of 15 years.

K: They need somebody who is tough minded.

H: They have a great emphasis on the new board being composed of young people -- under 50. You would qualify - I would not.

K: I would barely qualify. You have to assess it in terms of your other priorities. I am delighted they came to you.

H: I did not know Guido.

K: I had spoken to Guido about you very favorably. He is a student of mine and a great quality person.

H: Thank you, Henry. I will work this out the best I can. Are you reasonably hopeful about the world?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: The Indian thing is being written in the press as a great American defeat. We have to consider what would have happened if we had not acted. We were sure they were moving into West Pakistan so we have had to do something.

H: I thought the program on the President's day was one of the best things that has come along.

K: I am so close to it - I watched it but had no judgment.

H: Technically it was done very well. I think it generated a great deal of sympathy for the President as a man who is buffeted from corner to corner. Third, I thought the way you all participated, coming in and out, did not look very Hollywoodish. I think sympathy was generated for him and that was the main thing. Tell him, Henry, will you?

K: All right.

H: Thank you, Henry. Goodbye.

They came to you.

How Guide.

Taken to Guide about you very favorably. I like and a great quality person.

Hi, Thank you, Henry. I will work this out the best I can. A very careful about the world?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
The President
Dec. 22, 1971; 1:50 p.m.

P: Anything new? I got pretty much tied up with my domestic problems today.

K: There is a big North Vietnamese offensive in the Plain of Jars.

P: Yes.

K: I have called the Special Action Group together for tomorrow morning. We were given absolutely no warning about these North Vietnamese concentrations.

P: So our intelligence broke down again.

K: Either the intelligence or the way it is being transmitted. They have overrun all the fire bases. They are within artillery range of Long Tienh. It is going to be tough to hold.

P: Well they won't get it all. It is going to wash back and forth, badk and forth, isn't it?

K: Unless they are pursuing the strategy we discussed yesterday to inflict the maximum blow before they move to the diplomatic move.

P: Right. Otherwise nothing new?

K: Otherwise there is nothing new.

P: Bermuda played very well I thought.

K: Bermuda played very well, very well. They had a half-hour presentation -- I don't know whether you saw it.

P: I heard they did. I didn't see it.

K: You heard about the new Secretary General. He is bound to be better than U Thant.

P: Well, no worse.

K: We could have carried it into a few more ballots. I don't know whether we want a strong Secretary General. If he isn't more favorable to us than the last one.

By. NARA, Dalo

5/26

P: Right. Nothing on the India-Pak front? Bob Haldeman said they had some gruesome pictures on the atrocities.

K: I saw them yesterday on the evening show and it is sickening.

P: Really?

K: This was to a considerable degree Indian propaganda. But here they had torturing and killing of the people on the television last night. And in the Post and Times today.

P: Bob said the Indians censored 6 pictures.

K: That's right but the photographer brought them out and 3 are in the Post today. Including one showing a child that ran after his father and the Indians stomped him to death. The Indians will not have moved away from us any farther than they have always been. What the picture of Bangla Desh will be is not clear that we will be vindicated. I believe that India has such a ______ now that their own domestic communist problem can get so magnified they can't afford to move too much away from us. It is partly in our interest now that they hold down Bangla Desh.

P: They will wish they had Yahya back.

K: For them they were much better having Pakistan in control. Because it was weak, they could never put a military force there. They had no direct responsibility. They kept communists out. I think India will regret this. The war was originally fought because the Pakistanis would not cede the Awami League. But now we are in a position where the local people will not let the Awami League come back. The Indians who have a deal with the Soviets have asked the Awami League to broaden their base, which means taking Communists.

P: We will wash our hands of that part of it, which means let them do as they damn please.

K: All right, Mr. President.

P: Goodbye, Henry.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Amb. Bush/Kissinger

4:17 p. m.

12/22/71

B: I hope your secretary told you this was the lowest priority call presented to you but I am leaving in an hour for Texas and wanted to wish you a Merry Christmas.

K: It was a pleasure working with you.

B: It has for me too.

K: It's been hectic and they didn't write it like this in the political science books.

B: Hope you have a good time off and give my best to Al. He has worked very hard.

K: He has.

B: My best to you and your family.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

4:20 p.m. 12/22/71

L: I got word via the grape vine that you went back to 78.6.

K: We have agreed to 400 million above what it was. So question is whether it had pay raise.

L: It did not and all memos to President say so.

K: G. Shultz thinks it did.

L: His people know it's not.

K: It's a question of fact. No problem of 400 million.

L: I don't know who is reading my stuff over there.

K: Heread it and G. Shultz says it's part of it.

L: We always anticipate the President wouldn't take that action. We anticipated thing would be signed and in every memo it's been that way. George tells someone over there it's what Moot said. He never did. I am on the Hill. Shall I come over there?

K: No. I will call you when I get back to your office.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon

Gerry Schecter

December 22, 1971; 5:00 pm

S: Hi. We come out with a toss-up between you and Chou En-lai for
second place. We have you with some claim to being diplomatic man
of the year.

K: Don't give me that stuff. You are going to send me a mirror and say
man of the year

S: You mentioned that you talked about Haldeman. We are not going to
use that.

K: Did I say he was a mechanic?

S: You said aggressive.

K: Someone said I said I didn't talk to him because he is a mechanic. I said
he was aggressively nonsubstantive.

S: I reported it as you said it.

K: Besides, it was on the Lindley rule anyway.

S: ... describing the sessions for us, saying you met with the President
in the EOB or in the Lincoln sitting room. You say you find an elaborate
exchange with the Chinese. Kissinger was enormously ingenious in
originating ways of communicating with Peking. We have general outline
of how you are going to do it but not breaking down the book. Otherwise
I hope you will still talk to us after.

K: I am not the subject anyway. So the basic conditions for my talking
to you are already eliminated.

S: Great.

K: You are not helping me push for the Vice Presidential nomination.

S: If I were sure you really want it you can count on me.

K: Well, OK.

S: Goodbye

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Robert McNamara
12/22/71; 6:45 p.m.

M: I just called to wish you a Merry Christmas. I hope you will get away.

K: I am going to Key Biscayne next week for the Brandt meeting.

M: To paraphrase Jack Valenti, I sleep better knowing you are in the White House. (laughter)

K: I told Joe Alsop you have been the best friend and an honorable critic.

M: Also a tremendous admirer. It is a tremendous accomplishment that you are staying here so long. I know what you are paying and I really admire you.

K: Let's get together soon after the New Year.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mrs. Moshbacher
12/22/71; 6:50 p.m.

M: Do you realize you are talking to the mother of a Jr. Staff member to be?

K: I am thrilled. I wanted to call you to thank you for your help.

M: Good luck.

SANITIZED

I am going to Key Biscayne Saturday evening.

M: Bus is going down Sunday.

K: When is Brandt coming -- Tuesday?

M: Monday.

K: You are probably right.

M: Don't be late. (laughter) Have a wonderful holiday. You are dear to call. All the best and thank you for your Christmas card.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Sen. Javits/Kissinger

morning

12/22/71

J: IN NY and want to touch base with you. Can't get satisfaction on Riad.

K: Don't think you should go there.

J: That's my reaction. Going to Jerusalem. As result if we have anything urgent I
will call you.

K: Right.

(Any problem withmy)

J: Before making a move. Morocco. / Going there for a vacation.

K: I don't think so. I will check it out. Get in touch with you in Israel.

J: The President did brilliantly.

K: Six We have come out fine on that.

J: It's unbelievable. Look at things today.

K: Where is that?

J: NY.

K: You are doing that? On Op Ed?

J: Press conference yesterday. Moderate indirect talk with ______
yesterday morning. NY campaign chairman. It seems to suit you both.
I have declared I am ______ the President. Make it official in late spring
rather then now.

K: Does the President know?

J: I don't think so.

K: May I tell him this morning?

J: If you would.

K: Is Marian going with you?

J: I don't know if she will go to Israel. She will stop in Rome.

K: Thanks for everything you have done this year.

J: You have been very kind. If you do anything for me, you will pass it on.