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to decide, first of all, what are we going to do about the areas of starvation and famine.

I would like very much, Mr. Secretary, if my vote prevails, that you give this issue priority attention, because I have noted day after day the problems in India and Bangladesh and the Sahel, in other areas, and our Public Law 480 program has ground to a halt insofar as any assistance is concerned.

I do not expect that the United States can do this alone, I want to be very frank about it.

For example, in the West African countries, France has a special responsibility.

Let me just put it in the form of a question.

Would you initiate, after consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and obviously with the President, a discussion amongst the main exporting nations and the main importing nations as to what we are going to do in the coming year to relieve conditions of human misery and, in some areas, famine, in the light of the world food supply situation?

Mr. KISSINGER. You know, Senator Humphrey, that your suggestion runs counter to all our traditional attitudes with respect to agriculture.

Senator HUMPHREY. Correct.

Mr. KISSINGER. We have always resisted the idea of commodity-type agreements because we wanted to have the maximum opportunity for the export of American products, and we thought we would have enough to take care of all needs. In this respect the experience of the last year has been a challenge to all of our traditional assumptions. We recognize that now we are living in a new world.

We have recently started an interdepartmental study of this problem. The proposal you make is one that some of us were discussing informally earlier this year; at that time it did not receive too much favor because of the weight of previous assumptions.

All I can say, pending the completion of that interdepartmental study, is that the approach you have suggested is needed, and we will look at it with the greatest sympathy.

STATE DEPARTMENT INVOLVEMENT IN AGRICULTURAL EXPORT POLICY
RECOMMENDED

Senator HUMPHREY. I will share with you some correspondence on it. Let me say again, Dr. Kissinger, my basic feeling is—and as Chairman of Foreign Agricultural Policy, I deplore export controls. I would like to see the market as open as possible. But I know that the Chairman of the Agricultural Committee, Mr. Talmadge, is deeply worried about the outflow, for example, the excessive outflow of American cotton. All of this is due, might I say to my colleagues, to the fact that the dollar has a 35 percent discount. There is a run on everything we have.

Yesterday morning we spent 2 hours on the fact that we have a shortage of fertilizer, and let me say that this fact means that we will be short 20 million tons of feed grains next year. Unless we can remedy the fertilizer shortage within 90 days we will be 20 million tons short next year on feed grains which will precipitate an international eco-

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nomic crisis. And in the United States inflation will be like a barn
burning down. There is no way that we can lose 20 million tons and
not be in a major disaster.

I again say that I don't like to see export controls, but I want the State Department to be involved in this, and it hasn't been in the past. It has been looked upon as strictly commerce, or as agriculture, and yet this deals with our foreign policy. If we put on export controls it upsets others, as it did the Japanese, and the French used it to great advantage in terms of the common agricultural policy of the European Community. I hope, Dr. Kissinger, that you will involve yourself, as the Secretary of State, in matters which today have been essentially looked upon as commercial.

Might I say that even those who write about this are ill informed
because there is a whole new ball game. People do not understand
what is hitting us. I want to state for the record today that unless
the Government of the United States takes some measures to either
extend terms of shipment or enters into some form of licensing to
where we can keep a better record on what is happening in terms of
exports so that we can avoid export mandatory embargoes we are
going to have an international food crisis, Dr. Kissinger, the likes of
which no one has ever dreamed of. We are the only reserve producing
country in the world, the only one, with any major reserve. The
predictions, yesterday from Dr. Pearlberg of the Department of Agri-
culture were that we are headed for a 20-million-ton shortage next
year, even though we open up 22 million more acres, because of one
little subject called fertilizer which is running out of this country at
$20 a ton more overseas than they can get for it domestically. Enough
on that, I just wanted to get you involved in it because I think the
trade matters are going to be at the heart of all of your new efforts.

Mr. KISSINGER. It is a new field for us. We had not in the past
thought that agricultural exports required foreign policy decisions.
But I can assure you that the State Department will be deeply involved
in these issues that you have raised.

IMPORTANCE OF CIA INDEPENDENCE

Senator HUMPHREY. I have one other observation. My time is up.
You noticed my esteemed colleague, Senator Symington, questioned
you at some length and detail and, may I say, very fortunately in ref-
erence to the Central Intelligence Agency. I want to make one com-
ment so we have an understanding about it.

I think the independence of that Agency and to see that it does not
come under the domination of the military or the Defense Department
is critically important. I served in an administration where, had
we listened more to some of the estimates of the Central Intelligence
Agency, we would have been much better off than we were in listening
to some of the estimates from Saigon. Having been through the pun-
ishment and the sorrow and the misery of this, I don't want to see it
happen again. I don't want to see a situation develop where the inde-
pendence of judgment that is necessary in that agency is lost.

I happen to believe in competition among the intelligence services.
Don't misunderstand me, but I wanted to fortify, as one Senator, a
colleagues, what Senator Symington has had to say, because first of all

150

we respect his views on this and secondly, I think he knows maybe
more about it than any other member on this committee and I wanted
to collaborate and associate myself with his commentary.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have expressed my view about this yesterday. Any
President will have to have an independent source of intelligence in
addition to what the services produce.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator very much for what he
said. In turn, I was much impressed with his, the voice of experience,
warning about future problems.

DOCUMENT ENTITLED, "PEACE, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE SALT AGREEMENT"

I now have that document, Dr. Kissinger. It is called, "Peace, Na-
tional Security, and SALT Agreements," and will read three sentences:

"Since World War II the United States and the Soviet Union com-
bined have produced nearly $20 trillion in gross national product—ap-
proximately $15 trillion in the United States and more than $4 trillion
in the Soviet Union. Of that amount, more than $2 trillion has been
spent on defense (approximately $1.3 trillion by the United States, and
an estimated $1 trillion by the Soviet Union).

"If the two societies continue to grow as projected to the end of the century, and if both continue to spend the same proportion of GNP on defense, the two countries together, by the year 2000 A.D., could spend another $5 trillion or more to maintain national security."

This is dated August 1, 1972. It is a State Department release. It has
charts and the figures mentioned. We always hear about how big the
Soviet missiles are, as compared to ours, which was a calculated de-
cision on our part years ago. The chart shows that four 1-megaton
bombs are equivalent in destruction to one 16-megaton bomb. It gives
a graph, and a note,

The United States has more small weapons, the Soviet Union has two larger weapons. This gives the U.S.S.R. a lead in megatonnage, but as this chart shows, it is not the total megatonnage that counts. It is the effectiveness best measured in equivalent megatonnage.

This was the document I asked your opinion about.

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes; I will express my view in writing.

PROBLEM OF WITNESS' TWO HATS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, I think it is clear to everybody that if you win in this new work, we all win, and if you lose, all of us lose. With that premise, I would present a short statement drawn up by an expert in the field of foreign policy in Government.

A perturbing aspect of Dr. Kissinger's nomination to be Secretary of State is the knowledge that the President intends to keep him as his Assistant for National Security Affairs. In the simplest language, Dr. Kissinger, if confirmed, would wear two hats rather than the one which has already given him unpre- ceded authority in the field of foreign policy.

No matter what Dr. Kissinger may say to the committee, no matter how
vehement his reassurances, and no matter that we have every reason to take
him at his word, all this can be swept away by a simple, one-sentence order by
President Nixon. If anyone doubts the responsiveness of the nominee to the
President, he need look no further than the revelations about the meeting
of the Washington Special Action Group at the time of the Pakistan tilt. If

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Mr. Nixon wishes, he can take the important business of the State Department into his hands via Dr. Kissinger and leave Secretary Rush to empty the burn baskets.

The problem currently facing the committee is that there literally does not appear to be any way of dealing with this problem successfully unless two developments take place: First, the President name someone else as his Assistant for National Security Affairs and second, there might in the near future be a means of arriving at a consensus on the issue of executive privilege.

The first step would be relatively simple should the President wish to undertake it. The second is difficult at this juncture. It does no good for us to say that there is no doctrine of executive privilege but rather a custom of executive privilege. It would seem that this whole issue is going to be settled by political power and public opinion rather than legal maneuverings.

The experience of the Congress and the Foreign Relations Committee thus far with the Nixon administration has not been constructive. From its first days in office this administration has tried to concentrate power in the White House at the expense of the executive branch departments and agencies and the Congress and the courts and the American people.

There should not be any question about the principle of Executive accountability to the Congress. As stated by Senator Fulbright on July 27, 1973:

"In 1789 Congress adopted and President Washington signed a statute stating that it 'Shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to make a report and to give information to either branch of the legislature in person or in writing * * * respecting all matters referred to him by the Senate or the House of Representatives or which shall appertain to his office.'"

Congress has consistently enacted legislation to maintain and refurbish this principle ever since Washington's day. This is a far cry from some inherent power claimed for the President in a Constitution which clearly states that all powers not delegated to the United States "are reserved to the individual states respectively or to the people."

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, my opinion for what it is worth, I have been in the executive branch, have sat on the National Security Council, was in the executive branch when the National Security Council was created, and I believe it is going to be far more difficult for you to handle this new job the way you are capable of in wearing the two hats. I know we do not agree or you would not have accepted it. Kindly comment on the statement read, or if you prefer, take it and file a reply for the record at your convenience.

Incidentally, I would ask unanimous consent that all the detail of this State Department document, not long, be inserted in the record.

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, Senator Symington, we have discussed this problem privately. Of course, the President would have it in his power, if he appoints another Assistant, to withdraw all foreign policy matters from Secretary Kissinger, and have him empty the wastebaskets in the State Department. So that problem is not solved by separating the two positions. In fact, the danger is reduced by combining the two positions.

The intention of the President in combining the two positions, however, as he expressed in his press conference, is to move the central focus of policymaking from the White House to the State Department, reserving to himself, of course, the final decisions, but making the Secretary of State accountable to the committee in terms of the operation of the interdepartmental machinery which would remain under the Assistant to the President. It, of course, depends on the fairness with which this is conducted, about which each of the Departments will have its own judgment; and if fairness is lacking it will certainly lead to expressions of concern by the Cabinet members and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, each of whom has direct access to the President.

152

BUILDING UP STATE DEPARTMENT MORALE

Senator SYMINGTON. You have stated that it was your intention to build up the morale of the State Department, which, as everybody knows, could stand some building up. In Emmet Hughes' latest book, he mentioned that State has a problem; it doesn't have any, you might say, constituency. In the Labor Department there are a lot of people including the unions working on labor; Commerce Department, business works on Commerce, and bankers work on the Treasury. The State Department has nothing of that character from the standpoint of support. My question, do you believe that maintaining the position you have in the White House, and, at the same time functioning as Secretary of State will make it possible for you to improve to the extent you and all of us would like to see the status and morale of the State Department.

Mr. KISSINGER. I am convinced, Senator, that if I am confirmed, the State Department will notice that it is playing a major role. Morale derives from a sense of participation and a sense that one is doing something important and in the national interest. If I cannot achieve that in the State Department, I will be missing my primary function.

I am sure I can achieve it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me wish you the very best of luck.

Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. I would like to yield to Senator Griffin.

Senator GRIFFIN. No questions.

WITNESS' RETENTION OF WHITE HOUSE POSITION

Senator JAVITS. I have two questions to ask Dr. Kissinger on this very subject of the two-hat theory. Dr. Kissinger, do you consider it an essential precondition to your being Secretary of State that you should retain this position in the White House?

Mr. KISSINGER. I think, Senator Javits, that in terms of the opera-
tion of the Government, in terms of the relationships that have devel-
oped within the Government, this will be by far the most efficient way
of conducting the affairs of the Government.

Senator JAVITS. But I assume you do not wish us to rule out the
possibility if you don't find that works satisfactorily you can still be
Secretary of State without being the President's Chief Adviser in the
White House.

Mr. KISSINGER. If it does not work satisfactorily, then I am cer-
tain that the President will want to make other arrangements.

Senator JAVITS. Now, the question which leads from that is the
following, and I think again our committee has had these assurances
but let us phrase it within this context: You represent to the com-
mittee, as a condition of your confirmation, that there is nothing that
you will do as Special Adviser to the President and a White House
official which will prevent you from, or inhibit you either in your
relations with this committee or in the exercise of the Office of Secre-
tary of State to operate as you would if you were not a White House
official.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, Senator Javits.

NOMINATION OF HENRY A. KISSINGER

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:45 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, McGovern, and Aiken.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

I regret the weather and the strikes, and so forth, have caused all of us some trouble, but we are glad to get started.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Committee on Foreign Relations is meeting this morning to receive testimony on the nomination of Dr. Henry Kissinger to be Secretary of State. I note that we have 10 witnesses on our agenda. I hope that each individual will comply with the committee's request to limit his testimony to 10 minutes. If you have prepared statements we will include all of the statements in the record and you may present your testimony as you see fit.

Our first witness this morning is our friend Donald M. Fraser. He is speaking for the Americans for Democratic Action, and also expressing his views as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House. Mr. Fraser, we will be glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. FRASER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA AND NATIONAL CHAIRMAN, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN ISAACS, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, ADA

Mr. FRASER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for this opportunity the committee has given me to comment on the nomination of Dr. Kissinger to be Secretary of State. I am appearing Mr. Chairman, as already indicated, today both as a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and as the National Chairman of Americans for Democratic Action. With me, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. John Isaacs, who is legislative representative of our organization.

My position here this morning is made more difficult because of antisemitic and extreme right wing objections interposed regrettably by others. I emphasize that I am in no way associated with such views. Nevertheless, I feel an obligation to set forth some grave reservations I hold concerning this nomination.

(155)

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QUESTIONS RAISED BY COMMITTEE

The experience of the past 4½ years has taught us that if we ignore ethical and constitutional principles in executing foreign policy, we run the risk of seriously undermining the democratic process of government. During the past week, the Committee on Foreign Relations has wisely raised questions about Dr. Kissinger's culpability in wiretapping telephones of members of his staff and the press, and in the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and 1970. You have also inquired as to his intentions regarding the invocation of executive privilege in communications with Congress. Satisfactory answers to these questions and assurances concerning future conduct are essential before confirmation can be justified.

REQUIRED ASSURANCES

Dr. Kissinger's pledge to this committee "to seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust" is encouraging, but public and congressional confidence in his and the President's commitment to the democratic conduct of foreign relations has been so severely shaken that more specific assurances are required. One has to acknowledge frankly that a "climate of mutual trust" would be a major departure from the deception and jealous guarding of power which has been characteristic of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. Accordingly, Dr. Kissinger's confirmation should be withheld until and unless you receive complete assurance on the following four points: (1) that the administration will not engage in military combat not sanctioned by Congress; (2) that the administration will tell Congress and the American people the truth about its foreign activities; (3) that the administration will provide Congress with the information it needs on foreign policy; (4) that Dr. Kissinger will neither participate in nor condone any invasion of constitutional rights in the performance of his duties.

Such simple and fundamental assurances from a Secretary of State, it seems to me, normally ought to be taken for granted. But we are living in a strange time when it is necessary to go back to "square one" to make certain that the ground rules are really what we thought they were; regrettably, very little can be taken for granted.

The bombing of Cambodia in 1969, 1970, and 1973, and the hundreds of military incursions into Laos are serious examples of official deception and contempt for congressional authority. We need firm guarantees that in the event of an attack on Saigon, for example, North Vietnam would not be bombed without congressional approval; likewise, in the case of a U.S. combat role in insurgencies in Thailand and the Philippines where thousands of U.S. troops are stationed.

The administration's false reporting on the bombing of Cambodia, its pledge of evenhandedness in the Indo-Pakistan war, when it strongly supported Pakistan, and Dr. Kissinger's initial denial of knowledge of wiretaps on his staff reveal a pattern of dishonesty in dealing with the American people. All of us have a responsibility to demand the truth, and the administration has a responsibility to give it. But the crisis of confidence is presently so severe that doubts inevitably arise as to whether we can believe the administration's denial of involvement in the coup in Chile, for example.

157

The administration's unwillingness to provide Congress with the information it needs to carry out its constitutional responsibilities in foreign relations, its excessive recourse to executive privilege, its distrust of newsmen, its intransigence toward widely supported challenges to its foreign policy assumptions create the impression that Dr. Kissinger and the President regard the conduct of foreign relations as somehow exempt from the democratic process. We have a right to expect more openness from them. It is deplorable that the American people and Congress should have to depend so much on the press to ferret out information—by whatever means available—in order to find out what the Government is doing in foreign affairs.

## COMBINATION OF POSITIONS

Combining in one person the positions of Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is an innovation with much to commend it. The incumbent with this dual portfolio has the unique opportunity to make U.S. foreign policy more internally coherent than ever before in the post-World War II era by maximizing the potential of both the State Department and the National Security Council system. This is an organizational experiment worth launching in search of a more coherent way to manage foreign affairs.

On the other hand, if the combined Secretary of State/Presidential assistant were to hide behind White House executive privilege, refusing to testify before Congress and withholding information, the new arrangement would be counterproductive for the Nation on balance. I hope Dr. Kissinger's assurances to this committee on this matter will be reflected in his actions.

## NIXON-KISSINGER PREOCCUPATION WITH BIG-POWER POLITICS

I am convinced that the Nixon-Kissinger preoccupation with big-power politics is shortsighted and that if we are to secure a "generation of peace," U.S. foreign policy must show a great deal more sensitivity in relations with countries other than the Soviet Union and China. Certainly, the slighting of Japan in our contacts with China was a major blunder, and Dr. Kissinger's consistent lack of concern for Japanese views is alarming. We are now halfway through the heralded "year of Europe" without any evidence of any concrete policy to define what it means. And there is an urgent need to build a firm and cordial "trilateral" relationship among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

Our neglected relations with third world nations call for greater American commitment to development assistance emphasizing mutual respect and cooperation. With black Africa low on the totem pole of priorities, the administration sat with folded hands while Congress gave the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia its biggest boost by authorizing imports of chrome ore in violation of international law under U.N. sanctions. Close ties and military assistance to Portugal help it to hold tightly to its African colonies. Dr. Kissinger's recent public statement supporting efforts to repeal the Rhodesian chrome amendment must be followed by high-level action by the State Department and the White House if these efforts are to succeed.

21-172—73—pt. 1—11

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Improvements in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and China would seem to set the stage for a new American emphasis on multilateral diplomacy, particularly in the United Nations. Since a growing number of world problems—such as environmental decay, disarmament, and law of the sea—cannot be solved bilaterally, new American initiatives are needed to strengthen the United Nations and other broad multilateral forums. But instead, this country too often buries its head in the sand with its position isolated even from its traditional friends.

The United States spiteful policy of not exchanging ambassadors with Sweden is unworthy of a mature nation. The administration's childish reaction to Swedish criticism of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam was uncalled for, and I hope Dr. Kissinger's stated intention to name ambassadors to all unfilled posts by mid-November includes the appointment of an envoy to Stockholm.

## PROMISE OF MORE OPEN ADMINISTRATION

In the wake of distressing revelations in the Watergate scandal, President Nixon has promised a more open administration and his Secretary of State-designate has been emphatic on this point in regard to foreign affairs. It would be cynical simply to reject these statements by citing the record of the past 4 years and recalling that the President made an identical promise in 1969 at the beginning of his first administration. Clearly, though, without a change in the Nixon-Kissinger style, these promises cannot be kept because, heretofore, that style has been inconsistent with openness.

Without satisfactory assurances of democratic process, confirmation of the Kissinger nomination would make every acquiescing Senator a collaborator in endorsing the infringement of constitutional rights and the practice of deception upon the American people.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS' STATEMENT

I want to say you have made a very fine and constructive statement. I agree in principle with you on nearly everything you said. We thank you for appearing.

Senator Aiken.

## QUESTION SUBMITTED TO DR. KISSINGER

Senator AIKEN. I have no comment and no questions to ask, because there have been submitted to Mr. Kissinger several dozen questions to which he is to reply in writing. His replies will be printed in the record of these hearings. This record should be available, I would think, by next Tuesday. If the nomination is approved by the committee, then the record will be available for anyone to read it before the Senate votes on his confirmation. So I think all the questions you have raised have been asked and will be replied to in writing anyway.

Mr. FRASER. I am very happy to learn that. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

159

Our next witness is Col. Curtis B. Dall.

Former Senator Ernest Gruening, I understand, has not arrived yet. So we will call up Colonel Dall, chairman of the Board of Policy of the Liberty Lobby. Colonel Dall, we are very glad to see you, sir. Will you proceed with your statement.

## STATEMENT OF COL. CURTIS B. DALL, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF POLICY, LIBERTY LOBBY; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT M. BARTELL

Colonel DALL. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to have my associate, Robert M. Bartell join me here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, indeed. Glad to have you here, Mr. Bartell.

Colonel DALL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Curtis Dall, chairman of Liberty Lobby, an institution consisting of American citizens who have voluntarily joined together to promote their patriotic and constitutionalist convictions. Liberty Lobby is fundamentally different from other pressure groups in Washington because we do not speak for any special interest but for the broad interest of the United States.

In addition to our publications, which go to more than 200,000 readers every month, more than a million listeners hear our daily radio program, This Is Liberty Lobby, now on 81 stations coast to coast.

## CONFIRMATION OF DR. KISSINGER OPPOSED

I speak to respectfully oppose the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, and my reasons for doing so are numerous. In fact, in the time allotted to me I can only sketch a few of these reasons which seem to Liberty Lobby to be the most important.

## CONTINUATION OF POLICY OF INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONALISM

Our basic objection to his confirmation is that Dr. Kissinger represents a continuation of the policy of intervention and internationalism which has devastated America and the world in the past 60 years. The underlying philosophical assumption of internationalism is that Americans are so perfect and good and wise that we have the right and even the duty to meddle into the affairs of others to make them as perfect and as happy as we are. Internationalism is not only an irresponsible and deceptive philosophy that is totally unworkable in practice, as history for the past 60 years has shown, but it is extremely damaging to the interests of the United States and trends to the total relinquishment of the most precious thing you and I possess—American sovereignty.

Since its very inception, Liberty Lobby has distributed to its members and sold to anyone who wants to purchase, copies of the Farewell Address of George Washington. As you know, every February 22d, the address is read on the floor of the Senate. It contains a strong warning against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is the most baneful foe of republican government. This advice, gentlemen, represents the distilled wisdom of all history, and to keep ignoring it and pretending as if

160

George Washington did not know what he was talking about is totally
irresponsible.

As few men, Dr. Kissinger represents the antithesis of this policy—insofar, I mean, as one can make any sense out of his policy, because his written words are obtuse and unclear. But there is no doubt that his idea of foreign policy consists in becoming embroiled in the problems and quarrels of every nation on earth in the alleged search for peace, and this is, Liberty Lobby states, irresponsible, contrary to the interests of every man and woman who lives in America, and in the long run, suicidal. This great indictment of the philosophy of internationalism must no longer be shirked by reasonable men.

As evidence of Dr. Kissinger's clear intention to continue the dev-
astation of internationalism in his pronouncement of his aim to cre-
ate a "New Atlantic Charter." I was speechless when I heard this.
Nothing could be more clear in historical retrospect than the so-called
Atlantic Charter was a hypocritical fraud practiced on the American
people for the sole purpose of preparing them for war. In fact, no At-
lantic Charter even exists. It was simply a press release issued by
Churchill and Roosevelt to cover up their war conspiracy 4 months
before Pearl Harbor. Its provisions are so blatantly dishonest that men
should cringe at such massive perfidy.

Instead of the utopia promised by the so-called Atlantic Charter, the end of the war brought slavery for 130 million Eastern Europeans, who, by the way, are fated to remain in perpetual slavery under the heel of the Red Army if the Kissinger policy should prevail. Shamefully, while there is widespread and extremely vocal concern for the "human rights" of certain favored minorities inside the Soviet Union, no one seems to give a hang about 130 million people in Eastern Europe who can testify to the humbug of the so-called Atlantic Charter.

In spite of the tragedy of Eastern Europe, sold into slavery by the
signers of the so-called Atlantic Charter over the corpses of millions
of military and civilian combatants, Dr. Kissinger shapes his plans
for the future around a "new Atlantic Charter." If he, who is touted
as an historian and a "brilliant mind," does not agree that the so-
called Atlantic Charter was and was meant to be a well-planned decep-
tion on the people of America, then he is doubly unfit to serve as Secre-
tary of State.

ENHANCEMENT OF CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The second major reason Liberty Lobby opposes the confirmation
of this appointee is that, should the Senate confirm him, it would
represent an enhancement of the concentration of power in the execu-
tive branch and a further undermining of the power, prestige, and
status of the legislative. Dr. Kissinger comes to you not only as a pros-
pective Secretary of State, a job which he has in fact more than
shared with the previous Secretary, but also as the Chairman of the
National Security Council, and as such the de facto head of all intel-
ligence operations in the United States, and chairman of the Defense
Programs Review Committee, which, as I am sure this committee
realizes, has the power to make recommendations to the President con-
cerning all defense expenditures in the annual budget. Does this not

161

give him effective control over the Department of Defense? We are also aware that he is chairman of the "Secret Forty Committee," according to the September 11 New York Times. Pray, what is that? Certainly, very few Americans have ever heard of it, and all we are told is that it "deals exclusively * * * in covert operations."

Dr. Kissinger's power is already far greater than that of anyone else in the United States with the possible exception of the President himself. Let me point out that to confirm him as Secretary of State would not only invest this man with power greater than any one man should have, but also it would constitute de facto approval of his authority in his other positions. Please ponder that well.

To assume that he would respect the prerogative of this committee or the Congress after his confirmation is unrealistic. If the task of restoring the authority of Congress is to be undertaken by Congress, then the place to start is here by denying the confirmation of this designate.

## INVESTIGATION OF DR. KISSINGER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NONOFFICIAL GROUPS URGED

Finally and briefly, we urge that Dr. Kissinger's relationship to certain secret and semisecret, nonofficial groups be investigated for evidence of collusion or conspiracy. I refer particularly to the Council on Foreign Relations and more specifically to the international Bilderberger group. Dr. Kissinger is known to have attended two very secret meetings of this group, the latest in Woodstock, Vt., April 23-25, 1971. Among the subjects alleged to have been discussed here was devaluation of the dollar, which became a fact a few months after this meeting. The American people have a right to know more about this secret meeting, and I point out that there was a possible violation of law involved; namely title 31, chapter 10, section 551 of the United States Code, because of the illegal use of Government-provided transportation, Secret Service and FBI agents not in discharge of official duties. Gentlemen, the taxpayers have a right to know how their money is spent.

## INSERTIONS FOR THE RECORD

I ask for permission to insert into the record, as documentation and extension of my remarks, our issue of Liberty Lowdown for June 1971, No. 100. Liberty Lowdown is a monthly report sent to all our members, and this issue concerns the secret Bilderberg meeting to which I have referred.

Second, I submit for inclusion into the record a copy of our emergency mailing earlier this month, containing a brief item from the Los Angeles Times which I should bring to your attention.

## DENIAL OF CONFIRMATION RECOMMENDED

In conclusion, Liberty Lobby recommends that this committee deny the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State.

I thank you for this opportunity to present the reasoned objections of a significant sector of American opinion, and an opinion that has for its motivation only the best interests of America.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Dall.

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The papers you asked to include are not too voluminous, are they?

Mr. BARTELL. No, they are very short.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection, they will be included.

[The information referred to follows:]

LIBERTY. LOBBY,
Washington, D.C., June 1971.

LIBERTY LOWDOWN

SECRET WORLD SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Liberty Lowdown has penetrated the outer hard shell of secrecy around the mysterious Bilderbergers—the most secretive coterie of super-rich, leftist internationalists in the world. This story was first broken by Rep. John Rarick (D-La.), in the May 5 Congressional Record, with information supplied to him by Liberty Lobby on May 3. Other than this and the article in the May 15 Washington Observer, this tremendous story has been totally suppressed in all of the national news media.

What makes the following so vital is not only the meeting itself but the fact that the allegedly "free press" of America has cooperated in a great conspiracy to keep it secret.

The "permanent" chairman or front man of the Bilderberg group is H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, royal consort of Queen Juliana. He is the only official designated as "permanent" in the Bilderberg clique—all others are "honorary" or "temporary." But lurking ominously in the shadows behind him are the Rothschilds, Warburgs, Wallenbergs, Rockefellers, and other great international banking dynasties. For inexplicable reasons, they are highly elusive about the whole thing.

You did not read about it in the "free press" but the latest Bilderberg meeting was held Apr. 23-25, 1971, at Woodstock, Vt. Liberty Lowdown dispatched a reporter to the scene despite the tight security and secrecy maintained by about 150 state and local policemen working under a task force of FBI agents. Never before had there been such an array of law enforcement officers in the village of Woodstock (population 1,600). The Woodstock Inn is owned by Laurance Rockefeller, who lives in a spacious home on a hillside; everyone was barred from the inn except the Bilderbergers.

THE DIGNITARIES ARRIVE

When Prince Bernhard arrived in his private jet in Boston, a terse 2-page statement was released to about 30 waiting newsmen. No further information was given out about the meeting and no interviews were granted by the distinguished personages attending. As the foreign VIP's arrived in New York and Boston, three private Rockefeller planes ferried them to West Lebanon, N.H., where chauffeured limousines whisked them away to the Rockefeller estate or the Woodstock Inn.

Several foreign ministers of cabinet level rank attended. No Nixon cabinet officer was there, but Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, participated in the meeting. He arrived in a White House plane, accompanied by four U.S. Secret Service bodyguards, and Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt, director of the Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs. (NOTE: The secret guest list of the participants has been obtained as this issue goes to press, and will be sent free to any member of Liberty Lobby upon request, accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. Be sure to give Board of Policy number.)

Back in 1937, Prince Bernard, an impoverished German princeling, was working in the Paris office of I. G. Farben, when a telegram from his mother summoned him to Switzerland, where he met and wooed Princess Juliana of Holland. During World War II, Bernard was Dutch liaison officer with the British Royal Air Force in London. After the war, he was public relations promoter of the NATO alliance and the European Common Market, and helped promote the sale of Dutch products to South America. Prince Bernard was approached by the Polish liberal writer and political philosopher Retinger, with his scheme for a united Europe and eventually one-world government.

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Bernard thought Retinger had a good idea, but the Dutch ministers feared that the scheme might embarrass Holland. Bernard took off for Washington, D.C., where he got support for the Retinger plan from Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and C. D. Jackson, a White House aide also closely connected with the CIA. "Beedle" Smith had been American ambassador to Moscow, where he had been thoroughly brainwashed. His first act as CIA director was to assemble all his top officials and announce, "We can't lick world communism—no counter-insurgency plans will work. We must compromise and co-exist with communism." The CIA officials were shocked.

In 1953, President Eisenhower appointed Smith Under Secretary of State, and named Allen Dulles to head CIA. The first Bilderberg meeting occurred in the Bilderberg Hotel, Osterbeek, Holland, with funds from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, and covert support of the CIA.

Since 1955, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has administered funds for the Bilderberg organization, provided by the Ford Foundation and other sources. And Joseph E. Johnson, head of the Carnegie Endowment, has been the Bilderberg honorary secretary general for the U.S. When Prince Bernard de-parted at noon on the second day of the recent Woodstock meeting, Johnson presided over the remainder of the conference.

## ENIGMATIC WOODSTOCK FESTIVAL

The Bilderbergers have held 17 meetings. The recent 3-day Woodstock session was the third in the U.S. (St. Simons Island, Ga., 1957, and Williamsburg, Va., 1964—all three on Rockefeller-owned properties).

Bilderberg spokesmen say that Bilderberg is strictly a one-man thing, operated by Prince Bernhard without any permanent membership or even any permanent organizational structure. This is simply not true. The permanent Bilderberg secretariat is at 1 Smidswater, The Hague, The Netherlands. The secretary general for Europe is Ernst H. van der Beugel, professor of International Relations, Leiden University. And as previously stated, Joseph E. Johnson is secretary general for the U.S. In addition, a permanent international steering committee nominates the "participants" for each conference to Prince Bernhard, who issues invitations. And the "participants" (not delegates) are picked because of their involvement in the program of the agenda of the meeting. The 10 U.S. members on the international steering committee picked the 30 American participants in the recent Woodstock session.

When Mrs. Dori Parker, assistant to American Secretary General Johnson, was asked the names of the American members of the steering committee, she replied, "I am not supposed to give out that information." Not only are meetings held under heavier security than the U.S. National Security Council, but even the identity of the members of the international steering committee is secret. However, Liberty Lowdown was able to ferret out the names of the following members of the international Bilderberg committee: David Rockefeller, chairman, Chase Manhattan Bank; George W. Ball, managing director, Lehman Brothers, Inc.; Arthur H. Dean, senior partner, Sullivan & Cromwell; Gabriel Hauge, chairman, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.; Henry J. Heinz, chairman, H. J. Heinz Co.; Thomas L. Hughes, president, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Howard Stein, president, Dreyfus Corp.; Emilio G. Collado, executive vice president, Standard Oil Co. (N.J.); Robert O. Anderson, chairman, Atlantic Richfield Co. and chairman, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; and Ian K. MacGregor, chairman, American Metal Climax.

The Bilderberg steering committee members generally nominate each other as conference participants—but not always. How the original members of this autocracy are chosen is not only a secret but how they are replaced is a secret. And even the total membership of the international steering committee is also a secret. Why do great international financiers and noted educators want to conceal the fact that they are Bilderberg committeemen? The Bilderberger operations appear more like the clandestine meetings of the dreaded Mafia or the murderous Stern Gang than the harmless get-together of world leaders for a frank discussion of international affairs. Phyllis Schlafly, in A Choice Not an Echo, called the group an example of a "little clique of powerful men who meet secretly and plan events that appear to 'just happen.'"

The noted British authority on internationalist groups, A. K. Chesterton, in The New Unhappy Lords, asserts, "If the facts concerning the Royal Institute

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of International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations be accepted, it will be seen that the proper study of political mankind is the study of power elites, without which nothing that happens can be understood. These elites, preferring to work in private, are rarely found posed for photographers, and their influence upon events has therefore to be deduced from what is known of the agencies they employ. There are dozens of such agencies. Financial support received from one or the other or all three big American foundations—Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford—provides an infallible means of recognizing them. One of the most blatant of these agencies, despite its adoption of a secret society technique, is the Bilderberg group. Strange, is it not, that Prince Bernhard should be the 'front' man for a powerful left-wing secret society? ..."

IT IS OFFICIAL—THE AMERICAN ROLE "CHANGES"

Only two topics were on the Woodstock agenda: (1) The contribution of business in dealing with current problems of social instability and (2) The possibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences. The first subject was scheduled for only the first day, and Dr. Kissinger apparently did not consider it very important, because he skipped it. The next morning he presented his "working paper." Discussion on his proposals lasted all day, continuing to a cocktail party hosted by David Rockefeller. This "working paper" was the most significant presentation at the closed-door parley, according to informed sources. In fact, it was a briefing of U.S. estimates and intentions regarding its "changing global role."

Ironically, only one U.S. Senator participated, Adlai Stevenson III (D-Ill.), and four Congressmen: Donald Fraser (D.F.L.-Minn.), Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R.-N.J.), Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.), and Donald W. Riegle (R-Mich.), Frelinghuysen and Reuss belong to the CFR.

Gabriel Hauge also presented a working paper. Incidentally, when he was a White House aide, he was known as the "man who tells Ike what to think," according to the Wall Street Journal. A forerunner of Bundy, Rostow, and Kissinger, he held the status of American foreign policy arbiter. Now he is in a strategic spot in the power elite as chairman of Manufacturers Hanover Trust, a bank with close ties with the Zionist international banking firm of Dillon, Read & Co. Manufacturers Hanover has long been controlled by Horace Flanigan, father of Pete Flanigan, vice president of Dillon Read, now on leave while serving as a top Nixon aide. The Flanigans and Dillon's have joint oil investments tied to Union Oil and Standard Oil of California; the Dillon Read firm also has close tie-ins with the Rockefellers and Standard Oil of New Jersey.

PEACE CARNEGIE STYLE

The notorious Alger Hiss left his high State Department post to become president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A few years ago, the group prepared a plan for a U.N.-sponsored military operation against South Africa. The U.S. and Soviet air forces were to cover the invasion of the republic by national forces from a number of countries. When the plan leaked prematurely before the liberals could "condition" public sentiment, a furor arose.

Three years ago Henry Kissinger and Charles W. Yost, then Nixon's ambassador to the U.N., helped prepare the Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the Seventies. The report, published by the Carnegie Endowment, advocated nuclear power "sufficiency" rather than "superiority."

In a campaign speech on Oct. 24, 1968, Nixon declared his intention to "restore our objective of clear-cut military" superiority over the Soviet Union. This strong pro-American statement doubtless helped Nixon get votes. But a week after taking office, the Carnegie Report was issued, and Nixon has since advocated nuclear "sufficiency."

Perhaps it is more than coincidental that only a few days after the Bilderbergers met at Woodstock to make it official that the U.S. was about to experience a "change in the American role" in the world, billions of dollars were rushed to Germany to profit from American dollar devaluation, one aspect of this Nation's waning power and prestige under internationalist leadership.

Americans aware of the sinister group that met at Woodstock in April will have no difficulty in identifying those responsible for their national troubles.

(Copyright 1971 Liberty Lobby.)

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EMERGENCY P.S.!

In only a matter of days the Senate will begin hearings to confirm the appointment of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. Liberty Lobby will, of course, officially urge that he not be confirmed in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee.

But this is not enough! Your personal opposition to Kissinger must be made known emphatically and immediately—and your friends must join their protests with yours without delay!

Why should Kissinger not be Secretary of State? As Nixon's National Security Advisor and head of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, Kissinger has wielded power "second only to that of the President himself," in the words of a Senator. Few people realize that all spy agencies, including FBI, CIA, Defense, and Treasury intelligence have been reporting directly to Kissinger since Nov. 6, 1971, when Nixon turned over this horrifying power—lock, stock, and barrel—to Kissinger by Executive Order.

Now, if confirmed as Secretary of State in addition to his job as spy boss, the enigmatic Kissinger will actually wield more power than the President himself, who is gravely weakened by "Watergate"! (Strange, isn't it, how Kissinger will benefit by Watergate?!)

Henry Kissinger must not be Secretary of State because:

1. The Constitution stipulates that the President and Vice President be native-born. Certainly an unelected official with power equal to or greater than that of the President should also be native-born. Plenty of native-born Americans would make a good Secretary of State!

2. Kissinger has stated that the time is at hand for the surrender of "institutions based on the concept of national sovereignty"! He is recognized as being pro-Soviet and pro-world government. He is, in the words of a top security official, "a security risk as bad as Walt Rostow or Owen Lattimore."

3. Kissinger's appointment is a slap in the face of the oil-rich Arabs, who know where his loyalties really lie (see reprint from page 1 of Los Angeles Times). America must maintain a stance of neutrality in the Mideast, and not give Israel everything demanded.

For our own best interests—Here is what to do:

First, contact your two Senators now! Write, wire, or call them to oppose the confirmation of Henry Kissinger . . . and

Second, send a generous contribution to Liberty Lobby, which will devote every radio program to Kissinger beginning Sept. 4! Be sure to listen, and tell your friends to listen. Remember, your influence counts . . . use it!

[From the Los Angeles Times, Aug. 27, 1973]

KISSINGER, AS A JEW, WILL FACE HOSTILITY OF ARABS IN NEW POST

(By William J. Coughlin)

BEIRUT—Henry A. Kissinger, whatever his qualifications as secretary of state, will face a hostile Arab world because he is a Jew.

That already is clear from initial reaction to his appointment.

One newspaper here called Kissinger's new assignment an Israeli victory over the Arabs comparable to that of the June, 1967, war.

Another denounced him as "the Israeli Henry" and declared that the American Zionist movement forced President Nixon into the appointment.

Kissinger's assertion at a California news conference that "I will conduct the foreign policy of the United States regardless of religion and national heritage," was greeted with jibes in the Arab press.

"There is no doubt that the man will serve Israel more than the United States, as do the Jews everywhere and at all times," said Beirut's Al Moharrer.

Arab diplomats here take a similar view, although one suggested that Kissinger, because he is a Jew, might be able to wring more concessions out of Israel than outgoing Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

High officials in several Arab countries have expressed the view, that efforts by Rogers to end the Middle East deadlock were blocked by Israeli intransigence. It seemed unlikely to observers here that Kissinger will get the benefit of any such considerations.

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Overall, reaction has been that the Kissinger appointment was a setback to any Arab hopes of a more even-handed role by the United States in the Middle East. That, in turn, appeared likely to increase the belligerence of Arab nations toward both the United States and Israel.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. No questions now.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, sir.

Next will be Bronson P. Clark, American Friends Service Committee.

## STATEMENT OF BRONSON P. CLARK, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN SULLIVAN, ASSOCIATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I brought John Sullivan, my Associate Executive Secretary, with me this morning.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very glad to have both of you, sir.

Mr. CLARK. My name is Bronson Clark, and I am executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee.

## OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION

We speak today in opposition to the confirmation of Dr. Kissinger from the viewpoint of our experience of 54 years in work abroad in a variety of wars and variety of situations on all sides of conflict; in the operation of seminars, conferences for diplomats, including members of the American Foreign Service.

Our experience abroad has reinforced our basic belief that we cannot separate the Judeo-Christian ethic from the affairs large or small, in what we do. We think the policies and actions of Dr. Kissinger are a prime example of that separation, and in view of this and in view of the limited time, I am going to confine my testimony, in the brief 10 minutes allowed, to two major deceptions as practiced by Dr. Kissinger. I am not speaking in an attack on the man; I am talking about the policy, but you cannot separate the man from that policy.

## DECEPTION CONCERNING VIETNAM WAR

The deception will be a deception which is currently practiced. Let us turn on the one in the past.

In 1969, I, along with other American Friends Service Committee representatives, held three substantial meetings with Dr. Kissinger. Our purpose was to ascertain why it was that the war was continuing to be prosecuted when the President had announced that he had intended to bring about American withdrawal.

We discovered then, for the first time, what Vietnamization really meant. By withdrawing in certain increments of American ground forces this was given as an index of our desire for peace. Actually, we discovered that what was done was a substitution of the most awesome air power in the history of modern warfare on an essentially peasant society. The tonnage of bombs it is now well known that the Nixon-Kissinger administration dropped not only on North Vietnam but

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even four times the tonnage on South Vietnam as well as Laos and now even Cambodia.

I remember one meeting in May 1969 when Dr. Kissinger said to me "well, if we are not, if we have not ended American intervention in 6 months come back and tear down the White House gate." Even when he said that he had commenced the bombing of Cambodia 2 months earlier.

Is the U.S. Senate to endorse this gross deception of the Congress and the public by confirming the man whose guidance was at the heart of these policies? Not only were the Cambodian bombing and incursions into Laos in violation of the Constitution which gives Congress the right to declare war, but they violated American law inherent in treaties signed by the United States, namely, the protocols and statutes of The Hague and Geneva and the principles established at Nuremberg. Under these laws it is a crime to uproot civilian populations and force them into regroupment camps or strategic hamlets. It is a war crime to bomb villages and cities. It is a war crime to torture prisoners, let alone murder them by throwing them out of helicopters. Those are the things that happened. We now know of the step-by-step descent into the moral quagmire which finally led to the error bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong at Christmas last year. I myself went to Hanoi and personally can support the testimony of U.S. Air Force personnel who stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 8 that North Vietnamese hospitals were routinely targeted as "a third priority item." I visited a North Vietnamese city named Hon Gai located north of Haiphong, a city of 80,000, in which not a building was left standing.

Then, after all 4 years of this outpouring of blood and treasure what was the result? An agreement was signed on January 27, 1973, in Paris which was not unlike the Geneva Accords of 1954. Not only that, but these terms had been available all along these 4 years. Dr. Kissinger always had the opportunity to terminate U.S. prosecution of the war in exchange for a compromise political settlement in South Vietnam. As long as the United States attempted to determine the kind of government that should prevail in South Vietnam, so long were the negotiations blocked. It was not until the recognition of the Paris Accords of the existence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam . . . the so-called "Vietcong" . . . that signatures were put on the Paris agreements of 1973.

### DECEPTION CONCERNING U.S. FOLLOWUP ON PARIS ACCORDS

This brings me to the second major deception that I would like to highlight in my testimony. I speak now from a background of American Friends Service Committee years of operation of a prosthetics center in Quang Ngai south of Danang, where Vietnamese are trained in the manufacture of artificial limbs, in physical therapy skills and in the rehabilitation work necessary for civilian war victims. Our firsthand knowledge and experience in the field has given us an idea of what the continuing extension of the war even beyond the Paris Accords has meant. I would like to quote one sentence which the entire article IV of the Paris Accords.

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"The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." Yet, the U.S. followup in the Accords was to ask Congress for over $2 billion for Thieu, $651 million for economic aid and more than twice that for military aid.

It should surprise no one that our supplying aid to one of the two sides of the war will continue to fuel the war, and we know from our experience in the field that casualties are running as high as they did even before the ceasefire.

Just before the ceasefire deadline the Nixon administration, under Dr. Kissinger's guidance, shipped $1 billion worth of modern aircraft, weaponry to the Thieu government, including F-5E's which were rolling off the Northrop assembly lines. More than that, we signed an agreement to dismantle our air bases, to avoid that we passed a piece of paper to General Thieu that said to General Thieu "You own these air bases and, therefore, how can we dismantle them." Then we turned around and signed a contract with Lear Seigler Corp. to run the Bien Hoa Air Base for a multi-million dollar contract. This is typical of the deception I am speaking about.

Out of the war room went the generals, into the war room in Saigon went the so-called MACV, thousands of civilians retired U.S. military personnel wearing sport shirts. They signed 67 corporation contracts to run the new war. ITT runs the military communications systems for the Saigon Air Force, and maintains certain other communications for the government. Lear Siegler maintains aircraft and basic electronic maintenance for aircraft. Northrop Aviation Corp. assumed a contact to train Vietnamese fighter pilots. We continue to train hundreds of Saigon's police.

Under the Paris Accords, two major political forces were recognized in South Vietnam as I have mentioned, Provisional Revolutionary Government, so-called Vietcong, and the Republic of Vietnam, the Thieu Regime. The struggle was to move from the military phase into the political phase. In order to do this there had to be free speech, according to the Accords, free press, release of prisoners, free movement of people has been agreed to. What has been Dr. Kissinger's policy in regard to this?

One day after the ceasefire one of our Quaker team heard a Saigon government loud speaker in the refugee camp in Quang Ngai "if you attempt to go back to your ancestral home in Communist areas, you will be shot." In the refugee camps and cities, a vast system established with U.S. advice and money, enforces Saigon's tight police controls. It costs the United States millions of dollars to run. Is it out in the open for all to see? The fact is that some of the funds are hidden in the USAID budget giving Congress and the public the false impression that it is "economic aid."

We have increased the Saigon police force from 20,000 to 120,000. Now every Vietnamese in South Vietnam under the Saigon control over the age of 15 must carry an ID card under the penalty of death with his photograph and fingerprints. There are rooms of massive files, a bureaucracy of surveillance which bows down on the Saigon people.

General Thieu has closed his press, his neutral press and forced enrollment of all he can reach into his own political party.

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PHOENIX PROGRAM

Up to a short time ago we worked in a provincial prison and witnessned first-hand, our doctor's discovered that torture, which came about as a result of the so-called Phoenix program, this program is now known openly. On July 7, 1969 Dr. Kissinger said to me "one of the problems we are dealing with with the other side is they will not negotiate." At which point Dr. Gilbert White, our board chairman, who had just been talking with some of the delegates at the Paris negotiations said "Well, Dr. Kissinger, one of the greatest craws in their throat is your Phoenix program." As this committee knows even by Mr. Colby's own testimony, Mr. Colby headed up the Phoenix program and is now the head of the CIA, Mr. Colby's testimony was 29,000 Vietnamese have been imprisoned and 20,000 killed or assassinated.

So Dr. White said to Dr. Kissinger "well, Operation Phoenix is a craw in the throat to block the negotiations." Dr. Kissinger looked up "Operation Phoenix, Operation Phoenix, never heard of it."

The Paris peace accords called for the withdrawal of personnel associated with this Phoenix program, but Saigon issued a secret order in April 1973 to all police headquarters directing that this program be continued. It has been continued and accelerated under the code name of F-6.

HOW IS WORK OF U.S. GOVERNMENT TO BE CARRIED ON?

Well, time presses but let me say that the Council for Reconciliation and Concord called for in the Paris agreements cannot come into being with the jails full of professors, student leaders, Catholics and Buddhists alike. We operate these prisons in the sense we pay their keepers salaries. U.S. money paid for the new tiger cages. Is the work of the U.S. Government to be carried on in secrecy and by illegal and unconstitutional means? Or is it to be a healthy Government, an open one, in which our representatives and citizens can effectively debate the great issues of the day? Are we to have government leaders who do not lie to us? Who do not place us under surveillance? Or tap our telephones? Are our civil rights and liberties to have a real meaning?

So I say for the Senate to confirm Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State... in the absence of any indication from him or the administration that it will change the character of the policies I have discussed with you today... is to confirm a foreign and military policy with a shocking history of war and deceit.

We need a sign from this committee and from the Congress that a different policy is wanted.

We need to turn to the difficult but worthwhile task of building adequate international institutions. Let us bring into check a runaway military budget with its powerful corporate lobbies and put our resources into an American foreign and domestic policy of which, finally, we shall be proud, proud before each other, our children and the world family.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Clark's prepared statement follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRONSON P. CLARK, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

My name is Bronson P. Clark. I am executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee with headquarter offices in Philadelphia, Pa.

The American Friends Service Committee has worked abroad for 56 years in programs of relief and reconstruction. It has rendered nonpartisan aid to war victims in many wars. In the Vietnam war, our medical programs have aided victims on all sides of the war and still do.

Our work includes efforts to reduce the chances of war. Ten percent of the world's diplomatic corps have participated in our off-the-record Quaker conferences for diplomats. These conferences give Foreign Service officers an opportunity for communication on some of the thorniest problems in international affairs. In 1947 the A.F.S.C. received the Nobel peace prize.

In recent years the A.F.S.C. has put more and more resources into programs in the United States. We have conducted educational programs on the great issues of war and peace, based on our firsthand experiences abroad. We have seen the damage caused by misplaced national priorities, especially as we became deeply involved with those Americans who suffer from powerlessness, hunger and poverty in the many areas of the unfulfilled American Dream. I refer to migrant farm workers, prisoners, Indians and other disadvantaged citizens of whatever race.

Our experiences and our Quaker viewpoint have given us an insight into the tragic results of misguided foreign and military policies. We have thereby reinforced our basic belief that the religious values of our Judeo-Christian heritage should not and, in the final analysis, cannot be separated from the daily affairs, large and small, of our collective life together as a society, a nation, and a developing world family.

This applies to the great issues which come before the members of this committee. In matters of power, of politics, national security, building the international structures for commerce, justice and peace—in all of this, we proceed at our peril if religious or moral values are not a part of every process.

In coming before you today, I am not the spokesman for all Friends or Quakers. Rather it is from the specific experience and point of view of the American Friends Service Committee that I speak. That experience and viewpoint leads me to speak in opposition to the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger as U.S. Secretary of State.

To confirm the man is to confirm the policies in which he has been centrally involved and for which he stands.

In discussing these policies, I might raise questions about the unchecked arms race and the developing plans for new and staggeringly expensive U.S. weapons such as the B-1 Bomber and the Trident Submarine. I might ask why such weapons are thought necessary if the detente with Russia and China are as great achievements as they are described to be. I might ask why under the Nixon-Kissinger policies the sale of U.S. arms abroad has increased and why our country is the world's chief munitions salesman.

But rather than unfold the long list of points on which one might challenge the Nixon-Kissinger policies, I wish to concentrate on the area where I have first-hand knowledge. That is on the subject of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, past, present and future.

As Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, I took part in three long and substantial meetings with Dr. Kissinger in May, July and October of 1969 on the subject of continuing American military involvement in Indochina. President Nixon had been elected to his first term on a pledge of U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina. In the early months of his Administration I was trying to learn why the Administration was continuing to prosecute the war.

It is now a matter of public record that Dr. Kissinger as foreign policy advisor to the President participated in a gross deception of the Congress and the public. Withdrawal of American ground forces by stages was cited as an index of our desire for peace. It was depicted as "winding down the war." But in fact it was used to overcome the growing disenchantment of the American public with the war and with American casualties at the very moment when the war was being escalated by enormous increases of air power and military equipment flowing into the area. The policy of Vietnamization, of which Dr. Kissinger

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was a chief architect, was not a formula for peace in Vietnam which should be evident today to the most wishful of thinkers. Rather it was a plan to use the most awesome air power in the history of modern warfare against an essentially peasant society. Consider the statistics. Pentagon figures show that the intensity of the bombing in the Nixon years was without parallel and included more than 1.5 million tons of bombs on South Vietnam, more than 1.6 million tons on Laos, and more than 237,000 tons on North Vietnam. Pentagon statistics show that what was billed as a war against North Vietnam was in fact much more a war against the people of South Vietnam, U.S. bombing of South Vietnam under Nixon was six times as intense as against North Vietnam. While U.S. military combat deaths were reduced by 50% for the total of the Nixon years, the number of Vietnamese combat deaths on all sides rose in the Nixon years to greater totals than before. That, I submit, was the real nature of Vietnamization.

In May 1969, Dr. Kissinger told me during our discussions that "if the U.S. has not ended its military involvement in six months, come back and tear down the White House gate." Yet, even while he spoke those words, he had approved the secret bombing of Cambodia and it had been underway for two months. Rather than ending American military involvement as the President pledged, the Administration with Dr. Kissinger in a central role, invaded Cambodia and stepped up the covert war in Laos at enormous cost to life and property, rupturing the very fabric of their peasant societies. These actions were contrary to public statements made at the time by the President and Mr. Kissinger.

Furthermore, at that same meeting I have just mentioned, Dr. Kissinger told me that one of the goals which he and the President had was to reduce the credibility gap and restore the confidence of the people in the White House. Even while he was telling me this, he was the advisor on the policy of bombing raids into Cambodia that were so steeped in deception that not only was Congress being lied to, but even members of the actual bomber crews were being systematically deceived as to the nature and destination of their mission.

In view of this it is shocking now to recall that in 1970 Secretary of State Rogers came before this committee and said that Cambodia is the one country where we can say with complete assurance that our hands are clean and our hearts are pure.

Is the U.S. Senate to endorse this gross deception of the Congress and the public by confirming the man whose guidance was at the heart of these policies? Not only were the Cambodian bombing and incursions into Laos in violation of the Constitution which gives Congress the right to declare war, but they violated American law inherent in treaties signed by the United States, namely, the protocols and statutes of The Hague and Geneva and the principles established at Nuremberg. The acceptance of those treaties by the Senate has the force of law for the United States and is a solemn obligation on the American people, including the military. Under these laws it is a war crime to uproot civilian populations and force them into regroupment camps or strategic hamlets. It is a war crime to bomb villages and cities. It is a war crime to torture prisoners, let alone murder them by throwing them out of helicopters. Those are the things that happened. We now know of the step by step descent into the moral quagmire which finally led to the terror bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong at Christmas last year. I do not hesitate to call it terror bombing. I have personally visited Hanoi and Haiphong and have seen what our air power did.

I can personally support the testimony of U.S. air force personnel who stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee on August 8 that North Vietnamese hospitals were routinely targetted as "a third priority item." I visited Hon Gal in April of this year, a North Vietnamese city of some 80,000 people. It had been totally destroyed by 578 U.S. air raids, mostly by tactical F-104s, F-105s, and F-111s from the Seventh Fleet. The hospital Hon Gal like many others had been badly damaged. Other observers have testified about the destruction of the six North Vietnam cities ranking in size next below Hanoi and Haiphong. Such were the fruits of our Vietnam war policies after 1968.

Finally, after all the outpouring of blood and treasure in Vietnam, the United States on January 27, 1973, signed the Paris Accords. The terms are not unlike those agreed to at Geneva in 1954. They were obtainable as terms all along. There always had been the option available to Dr. Kissinger to agree to U.S. troop withdrawal, to end the bombing, to terminate U.S. prosecution of the war in exchange for a compromise political settlement in South Vietnam. As long

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as the U.S. attempted to determine the kind of government that should prevail in South Vietnam, so long were the negotiations blocked. It was not until the recognition of the Paris Accords of the existence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam . . . the so-called "Vietcong" . . . that signatures were put on the Paris agreements of 1973.

Thus, in the end, a political compromise was reached, but it appears so far to have been chiefly on paper.

But the paper was not signed until a last horror had been committed. We all recall the "peace at hand" statements by Dr. Kissinger on the eve of the Presidential election of 1972. We all recall what followed: the bombing of the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong in a kind of terror blackmail that made the season of Christmas and Hanukkah a mockery. But, be that as it may, the United States did sign the Paris agreement and in it we pledged to assist in bringing about "reconciliation and concord" and to provide rehabilitation assistance to all parties, friend or foe. But what has been the record of the Administration, in which Dr. Kissinger played such a role, with respect to this matter?

That brings me to the second deception, this one currently practised by the Administration under the Nixon-Kissinger policies, with Congress and the American people once again misled.

To introduce this point I wish to note that the A.F.S.C. has for years operated a prosthetics center in Quang Ngai south of Danang, where Vietnamese are trained in the manufacture of artificial limbs, in physical therapy skills and in the rehabilitation work necessary for civilian war victims. Our first hand knowledge has given us experience in the agonizing cost to the Vietnamese of this Administration's 4-year extension of the war under the guidance of Dr. Kissinger's policies.

In Article 4, the Paris Accords state "The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam." Yet the U.S. follow-up on the Accords was to ask Congress for over 2 billion dollars for Thieu, 651 million for economic aid and more than twice that for military aid.

It should surprise no one that our supplying aid to one of the two South Vietnamese parties has continued to fuel the war. Casualties are running at least as high for the South Vietnamese as before the so-called "ceasefire." The Quang Ngai hospital continues to receive many new civilian casualties. Our Quaker workers continue to report tragic case histories of shattered lives and deaths. In the first six months of so-called "peace" there were 76,000 casualties in South Vietnam compared to 80,000 in the last six months of acknowledged war.

Just before the ceasefire deadline, the Nixon Administration shipped General Thieu more than one billion dollars of aircraft and weaponry. After the deadline, Thieu was given the more advanced F-5Es rolling off the Northrop assembly lines. This was a violation of the spirit of the Accords but more importantly of the letter of the Accords, since the F-5E had not been in use and so was not a replacement plane, but a new plane. In the Peace agreement we pledged to "dismantle" our air bases. But just before the ceasefire deadline we technically turned over the title to the bases to General Thieu's armed forces, instead of dismantling them.

But, even if the arms supplies and bases suddenly changed hands just before the deadline, thus being legal only in the most technical sense, who was now to run the war?

The war room in Saigon today is filled with "retired" American military officers who wear sport shirts, not uniforms. This and other military functions are performed by more than a thousand U.S. civilians; hundreds more U.S. civilians are employed by the CIA in Vietnam. The Administration, through the Pentagon, signed contracts with 67 U.S. corporations to help run the war with American tax dollars. ITT has a contract to help General Thieu's military communications system. Lear Siegler Inc. received a contract for aircraft maintenance including basic mechanics and electronic maintenance. The company also received a 6½ million dollar contract to help run Bien Hoa air base. Northrop Aviation Corporation assumed a contract to train Vietnamese fighter pilots and many of these corporations advertised in the public media for personnel to go to South Vietnam to assume active functions under these contracts to strengthen the military forces of the Saigon government.

We continue to train hundreds of pilots for the Saigon air force. And the slaughter goes on in South Vietnam.

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Thus, the Nixon-Kissinger policies support the continuation of the killing, by fueling and sustaining the war effort of one side.

But the Paris Accords recognized two major political forces in South Vietnam. The Provisional Revolutionary government ... the so-called Vietcong ... and the Republic of Vietnam ... the Thieu regime ... were to move the struggle from a military to a political level. Free speech, free press, release of prisoners, the free movement of people were agreed to. What then is the record? What does U.S. policy support in this regard?

One day after the ceasefire, our Quaker staff heard a Saigon government loud-speaker announce in a refugee camp at Quang Ngai "If you attempt to go back to your ancestral homes in Communist areas, you will be shot to death."

In the past 10 years U.S. aid expanded the South Vietnam police force from 20,000 to 120,000. The Computer Sciences Corporation, under U.S. government direction, developed the computer that coordinates the police operations. Every South Vietnamese over 15 years of age must have an ID card with photograph and thumb print. Families are photographed and fingerprinted to help control their movements. Hundreds of checkpoints dot the roadsides. A massive bureaucracy keeps track of people who bow under the weight of one of the most representative regimes in the world today, significantly paid for and serviced by the United States. Thieu has closed the opposition and the neutral press and forced enrollment of all he can reach into his own political party.

Those who do not conform and comply find themselves in the prisons.

Let us look deeper at the question of the prisoners.

Our Quaker workers, up until a short time ago, provided the only medical service in one of the South Vietnamese provincial prisons. We witnessed firsthand some of the results of the "Phoenix" program, a program now known openly, but one which Dr. Kissinger would not acknowledge when I, and other Quaker representatives, met with him in his office on July 7, 1969. Dr. Gilbert White, formerly chairman of the Board of Directors of the American Friends Service Committee, was just back from Paris at the time where he had consulted with representatives of the negotiating parties. He told Dr. Kissinger, if you want to negotiate, the biggest roadblock is Operation Phoenix. Dr. Kissinger looked at his chief aide and said, What is Operation Phoenix? In other words he acted as if it never existed. I might add that William Colby, the recent Administration appointee to head the CIA, directed the Phoenix program which used kidnapping and assassination and by Mr. Colby's own report led to jailing 29,000 Vietnamese and killing 20,000 others.

The A.F.S.C. protested to the Saigon and U.S. officials regarding the torture of prisoners which our doctors discovered and we provided detailed documentation to the Senate Refugee Subcommittee about these shameful practices. Regrettably it should be noted that U.S. advisors were assigned to each major South Vietnamese prison. The Paris Peace Accords called for the withdrawal of personnel associated with this Phoenix program, but Saigon issued a secret order in April 1973 to all police headquarters directing that this program be continued. It has been continued and accelerated under the code name F-6.

No one knows for certain how many political prisoners are in Saigon jails including some new tiger cages built at U.S. government expense. We continue to think that the number 200,000 may be correct.

On humanitarian grounds, it is inconceivable that American aid should go openly or indirectly to maintain the suffering of prisoners who should have been released long since, if they ever should have been imprisoned. But apart from the humanitarian issue: there is a very practical consideration about these prisoners that is important to the U.S. Senate as it weighs the question before it.

The "Council for Reconciliation and Concord" provided for in the Paris Accords cannot go forward with any effectiveness or fairness while the Thieu government continues to imprison political leaders, newspaper editors, neutralists, professors, religious leaders including Catholic and Buddhist leaders alike, and, of course, members of the Provisional Revolutionary Government side. The AFSC has spoken about the prisoner issues many times to U.S. government officials and we feel it has never seriously been weighed by them.

21-172—73—pt. 1—12

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Let me conclude with a few more observations:

(1) The Administration has maintained that there is a high priority for humanitarian aid in the economic aid budget for South Vietnam. But the portion of the aid budget slated for health and education has been cut from a level of 2.6% of the budget for Fiscal 1973 to 1.2% of the budget in Fiscal 1974. Even the "food for peace" program provides that food will be sold to local merchants in South Vietnam, 80% of what they pay for it then goes to Saigon's military budget.

(2) Both sides in Vietnam have committed ceasefire violations. But they pale in significance, when it comes to undercutting the Paris Accords, compared to the post-combat policies and practices of the Administration under Dr. Kissinger's guidance.

(3) Continuation of the policies I have discussed here today can only have further tragic consequences, not the least of which is the inadequate attention to social needs in the United States resulting from the gross distortion of national priorities in favor of war and military expenditures.

(4) The close support our government gives to the Thieu regime is another instance of the troubling fact that our government becomes identified with militaristic and repressive regimes. Americans have learned with dismay about the practices of the Park government in South Korea and the Marcos government in the Philippines. As long as these regimes draw support from our policies, how can we claim to be a people that can be counted on to support independence and self-determination? We are increasingly seen abroad, as well as by some critics at home, as the new imperialists ready to use or support military intervention in an effort to preserve the brand of governments we favor.

I do not need to point out to members of this Committee that the United States today is in a crisis of government. We must also acknowledge that we are in a moral crisis. Is the work of the U.S. Government to be carried on in secrecy and by illegal and unconstitutional means? Or is it to be a healthy government, an open one, in which our Representatives and citizens can effectively debate the great issues of the day? Are we to have government leaders who do not lie to us? Who do not place us under surveillance? Or tap our telephones? Are our civil rights and liberties to have meaning?

Such questions as these are germane to the consideration before you. So is the question of whether our country supports militaristic and repressive regimes rather than risk the possible consequences of self-determination. So is the question of whether our government puts a value on moral and ethical precepts that stem from the religious heritage of the people—a value higher than it puts on the short-term results of a pragmatism in which there is insufficient leeway for the claims of conscience and the proddings of morality.

So I say: for the Senate to confirm Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State *** in the absence of any indication from him or the Administration that it will change the character of the policies I have discussed with you today *** is to confirm a foreign and military policy with a shocking history of war and deceit.

We need a sign from this Committee and from the Congress that a different policy is wanted.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Clark. We appreciate your statement. We know in the past of the good representatives that your group had here in Washington. They have appeared before us many times, and always brought good ideas.

Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I have no questions, Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you.

Our next witness will be Joseph H. Crown, Cochairman Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam, New York.

Mr. Crown, we are very glad to have you, sir, and we shall be glad to hear from you.

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STATEMENT OF JOSEPH H. CROWN, COCHAIRMAN, LAWYERS
COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM

Mr. CROWN. Thank you, Mr. Acting Chairman. I appreciate this
opportunity to present the views of the Lawyers Committee on Ameri-
can Policy Towards Vietnam on Dr. Kissinger's nomination.

LAWYERS COMMITTEE

Perhaps I should say a few words about the Lawyers Committee.
The formation of the committee was prompted by the issuance in
March 1965 of a memorandum by the State Department defending
the legality of U.S. acts in Vietnam. The memorandum impressed
us as a travesty on international law and constitutional law that we
felt impelled that the record ought to be set straight, straightened
out. We prepared a memorandum of law which documented the re-
grettable but inescapable fact that American involvement in Vietnam
violated our Constitution, contravened essential provisions of the
United Nations Charter, as well as violating the 1954 Geneva Ac-
cords which we had pledged to observe.

We sent this memorandum to 193,000 lawyers throughout the country and to some 3,700 law professors. I should say that the memorandum was also inserted into the Congressional Record by Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, those original crusaders who spoke out so courageously against the illegality and immorality of the war. When Senator Morse left the Foreign Relations Committee he joined the Lawyers Committee as its honorary chairman.

Our consultative council is composed of 18 leading authorities on
international law and constitutional law. All objective scholars, with-
out any partisanship in the political spectrum. Among our most emi-
nent members are Philip Jessup who, as you know, was a judge of the
International Court of Justice, and our President Dean Wright, long
recognized as an authority on international law, served actively with
our committee until his death.

We have previously submitted for the record a comprehensive statement of our views with respect to Dr. Kissinger's nomination, and I shall only touch here the highlights, and particularly the role of Dr. Kissinger vis-a-vis the Indochina war.

DENIAL OF COMMITTEE CONSENT TO DR. KISSINGER URGED

We wish to really earnestly urge the committee to deny its consent to Dr. Kissinger. We propose that the committee do so as a dramatic demonstration of Senate opposition to the administration's lawless and ruthless course in Indochina, a course marked by an absence of legality, morality, and humanity in which Dr. Kissinger has been intimately associated as principal architect and executor. We propose that also as an expression of Senate determination to prevent further intervention in Indochina and the spawning of new Vietnameses such as now threatened in the Philippines, but most importantly, we suggest it so that it would serve notice upon the world of a reversal by the United States of the policy of unpracticed, un-

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principled practice, of resort to armed force and expediency which are
the touchstones of Dr. Kissinger's conduct of foreign affairs.

The debasement of international law and domestic democratic pro-
esses which have marked the administration's course throughout the
past 4 years are completely consistent with, indeed if not a product
of, Dr. Kissinger's political philosophy.

He has no use for the abstractions, that is the principles, of the
United Nations' Charter, since these are incompatible with his geo-
political balance of power concept of international relations and his
parochial view of the national interest.

In his testimony before your committee, Dr. Kissinger voiced the
idea that the choice before the United States was between a policy of
daring too much or attempting too little. With due deference, we think
that is quite misleading. Rather we believe that the lead editorial of
the New York Times yesterday stated the issues much more correctly.
It is rather, "between what is right and what is wrong, between honesty
and deception, between adherence to principle and pursuit of real-
politik."

The military and moral disaster that we have seen in Vietnam and
Cambodia was indeed the bloody end of a long, long road.

Our committee urges that the Senate committee should not place its
stamp of approval upon a man who was a principal architect of a
policy which initiated a secret war against Cambodia, never authorized
by the Congress, within 2 months of Mr. Nixon's inauguration in Jan-
uary 1969, in the face of Mr. Nixon's campaign assurances that he had
a secret plan to end the war; a policy which submitted information to
Congress vis-a-vis the Cambodian war which was deliberately falsified;
a policy which deceived the Congress and the American people that
peace was at hand at the eve of the 1972 Presidential elections, and
thereafter launched the Christmas offensive of about 52 bombings of
Hanoi and Haiphong.

I should tell the committee that I, together with three colleagues of
the Lawyers Committee, visited North Vietnam last October at the
invitation of the Bar Association of the City of Hanoi. I had occasion
personally to go to Haiphong, and visit the bombed-out fishing villages,
the destruction of the bombs, and to meet with children, all of whose
families had been bombed out. These were heartbreaking scenes and,
with due deference, we do not think that this type of terror reflects
favorably on the good name of our country.

POSSIBILITY OF APPOINTMENTS JEOPARDIZING VIETNAM PEACE

The Lawyers Committee is also concerned that Dr. Kissinger's ap-
pointment may indeed jeopardize the establishment of peace in
Vietnam.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF SAIGON GOVERNMENT

You will recall that Dr. Kissinger upbraided North Vietnam for its
alleged lack of cooperation vis-a-vis the MIA's in Laos, but he was
singularly silent as to the failure of the administration to abide by
and comply with many of the commitments undertaken by our Govern-
ment under the cease-fire agreement, under the cease-fire agreement
that recognized the dual sovereignty of the Saigon regime and the

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PRG in South Vietnam. The ceasefire agreement makes repeated references to the two South Vietnamese parties both of whom signed officially on January 27 as the established governments. Mr. Thieu did not get any wording identifying him as the sole and legitimate repository of his temporary sovereignty. In short, there remain two rival claimants in South Vietnam, the PRG and Saigon, and it is notable that in a recent conference at Algiers with 76 nonalined nations the PRG participated as a representative of an independent state.

However, in contravention of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement, President Nixon has stated that the United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate Government of South Vietnam, and indeed has appointed an Ambassador solely to the Saigon regime. This attitude, which is evidently shared by Dr. Kissinger, can only serve to jeopardize and delay the establishment of peace in Vietnam.

## DISSIDENTS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SAIGON JAILS

We recall, too, that Dr. Kissinger expressed his concern for the dissidents of the Soviet Union. We want to make clear that we are deeply concerned with the fate of those courageous fighters for human rights, and indicated that he had made unofficial representations to the Soviet Union. But strangely he has expressed no concern for the tens of thousands of dissidents and political prisoners who remain in the Saigon jails.

The cease-fire agreement called for the release of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam, and admonished Saigon and the PRG to do their utmost to resolve this question within 90 days after the cease-fire came into effect.

Yet, despite the vast influence which the administration has with the Saigon regime there is no evidence that Dr. Kissinger has exhorted the Saigon regime to release the tens of thousands of political prisoners who still languish in the tiger cages in South Vietnam.

I should tell you that on the return from Hanoi we met with Madam Binh, the Foreign Minister of the PRG and in the most moving terms she expressed grave concern about political prisoners and this is a very serious provision which the PRG takes very seriously and yet we have no record that Dr. Kissinger has made any official or unofficial representations to the Saigon regime for their speedy release.

## RECONSTRUCTION IN INDOCHINA

Finally, we are concerned about Dr. Kissinger's attitude toward reconstruction in Indochina. You will recall that under article 21 of the cease-fire agreement that stipulates that in pursuance of its traditional policy the United States will contribute toward healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina. That provision constitutes an obligation assumed by the United States. The decisive word is "will" contribute. That term connotes a mandatory obligation, not a discretionary or permissive provision.

Although preliminary machinery has been set up for the implementation of this provision we are unaware of whether any substantive

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progress is being made. We want to emphasize in the most serious
terms that the failure to implement this provision which the Congress
also has responsibility for, which is a central provision in the cease-fire
agreement, could seriously jeopardize the entire agreement.

I can personally attest to this for at a conference I had with Premier Fan Van Dong in Hanoi last October 21, the Premier expressed his very serious concern over the reconstruction obligation, making it clear that it was a crucial provision in the settlement of the war.

It is, of course, a fundamental principle of international law that the failure of one party to fulfill an essential provision of an international agreement authorizes the other party to withhold compliance of any obligations devolving upon it. As a matter of fact, the United States invoked that principle at the time when it halted the removal of mines from the Tonkin Gulf on the claim and ground that Hanoi had failed to agree to its agreement for the successive release of prisoners of war, and what is sauce for the goose is likewise sauce for the gander.

COMMITTEE REVIEW OF ISSUES URGED

I urge the committee when it meets in executive session with Dr. Kissinger, to review each of these issues, dual sovereignty, political prisoners, reconstruction, and securing his commitment that the administration will seriously do all in its power to see that these provisions are fully implemented with deliberate speed.

CRY FOR MORAL LEADERSHIP

At this point in our history when we face a grave constitutional
crisis, the country cries out for moral leadership. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee can strike a blow for morality and honesty and
decency in our foreign policy. It is lamentable that that moral leader-
ship cannot come from the occupant of the White House or San
Clemente or of Key Biscayne, nor can it come from Dr. Kissinger,
whose political saint is Prince Metternich, but whom historians record
as the Saint of Evil.

Thank you.

[Mr. Crown's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH H. CROWN, COCHAIRMAN, LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS VIETNAM

I appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam on Dr. Kissinger's nomination.

Perhaps I should say a word about the Lawyers Committee. The formation of the Lawyers Committee was prompted by the issuance in March 1965 by the State Department of its Memorandum, "Legal Basis for United States Actions Against Vietnam." Our original memorandum was sent to more than 193,000 lawyers and 3,750 law professors and documented the regretable but inescapable conclusion that United States intervention in Vietnam violated our Constitution, contravened essential provisions of the United Nations Charter and violated the Geneva Accords which we had pledged to observe. Our memorandum was inserted in the Congressional Record on September 23, 1965 by Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening—the two crusaders who spoke out courageously against the immorality, illegality and imprudence of American intervention in Vietnam. When Senator Morse left the Committee on Foreign Relations, he joined our Lawyers Committee as its Honorary Chairman.

Our Consultative Council is composed of eighteen leading authors on International Law and Constitutional Law—objective scholars without partisan com-

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mitment to any particular segment of the American political spectrum. Our most eminent member is Philip C. Jessup who, as you know, served as a Judge on the International Court of Justice.

Our Committee has sponsored two volumes (1) Vietnam and International Law, prepared by Professor John Fried and Professor Richard Falk and a volume on the constitutional aspects entitled "Undeclared War," by Professor Lawrence Velvel of Catholic University.

Through the long, sad history of the war, we have presented our views to the Congress, particularly your Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and we have also sought to enlighten our citizenry on the crucial aspects concerning the Indo-China War.

We have submitted to your Committee a statement embodying the Lawyers Committee's position on Dr. Kissinger's nomination. I will confine myself here to the highlights of that statement, with particular emphasis on Dr. Kissinger's role in the Indo-China War.

We earnestly urge your Committee to deny its consent to Dr. Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State. We propose that to do so would serve as a dramatic demonstration of Senate opposition to the Administration's lawless and ruthless course in Indo-China—a course marked by an absence of legality, morality and humanity—with which Dr. Kissinger has been intimately associated as principal architect and executor. We propose it also, as an expression of Senate determination to prevent further intervention in Indo-China and the spawning of new Vietnams, such as are now threatened in the Philippines, and most importantly, to signal the Senate Committee's determination to revise our foreign policy in accordance with our United Nations Treaty obligations and our commitment to International Law.

The debasement of International Law and domestic democratic processes which have marked the Administration's course through the past four years are consistent with, if not a product of, Dr. Kissinger's political philosophy. He has no use for the "abstractions" that is, the principles of the United Nations Charter since these are incompatible with his geopolitical "balance of power" concept of international relations and his parochial view of the "national interest."

In his testimony before your Committee, Dr. Kissinger voiced the idea that the choice before the United States was between a policy of daring too much or attempting too little. But that is quite misleading. It is rather, as the lead editorial of yesterday's New York Times said, a choice "what is right and what is wrong, between honesty and deception, between adherence to principles and pursuit of Realpolitik." The military and moral disaster of Vietnam and Cambodia was the bloody end of a long wrong road.

The Senate Committee should not place its stamp of approval upon a man who was a principal architect of a policy which: (1) initiated a secret war against Cambodia—never authorized by Congress—within two months of Mr. Nixon's inauguration in January 1969 (in the face of Mr. Nixon's campaign assurance that he had a "secret plan" to end the war); (2) deliberately falsified information submitted to Congress vis-a-vis the Cambodian war; (3) deceived the Congress and the American people that peace was "at hand" at the eve of the 1972 presidential elections and thereafter launched the Christmas offensive of B-52 bombings of densely populated cities of North Vietnam which outraged world opinion.

Although Dr. Kissinger in his testimony upbraided Hanoi for its lack of cooperation vis-a-vis the MIAs in Laos, he was singularly silent as to the Administration's failure to abide by and comply with the commitments undertaken by our Government under the Cease-Fire Agreement. That Agreement recognized the dual sovereignty of the Saigon Regime and the PRG in South Vietnam. The Cease-Fire Agreement consistently refers to "two South Vietnamese parties" both of whom signed officially on January 27 as established Governments. Mr. Thieu did not get any wording identifying him as the sole legitimate repository of his "temporary sovereignty." In short, there remain two rival claimants in South Vietnam, the PRG and Saigon. It is notable that at the recent Conference in Algeria of 7 non-alligned countries, the PRG participated in full compliance with international law, as a representative of an independent state.

However, in contravention of the Cease-Fire Agreement, President Nixon has stated that the "United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate Government of South Vietnam." This attitude, evidently shared by Dr. Kissinger, can only serve to jeopardize and delay the establishment of peace in Vietnam.

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In this connection, the Administration's decision to appoint an Ambassador solely to the Saigon Regime jeopardizes the establishment of peace.

Although Dr. Kissinger has expressed his concern for the MIAs in Laos and his concern for the dissidents of the Soviet Union, he has expressed no concern for the tens of thousands of dissidents and political prisoners who remain in the Saigon jails. The Cease-Fire Agreement calls for the release of "Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam" and admonishes Saigon and the PRG to do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

Despite the vast influence which the Administration has with the Saigon Regime, there is no evidence that Dr. Kissinger has exhorted the Saigon Regime to release the tens of thousands of political prisoners who still languish in the Saigon jails.

Under Article 21 of the Cease-Fire Agreement which stipulates that "the United States will contribute towards healing the wounds of war and war reconstruction of the democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout the Indo-China." That provision connotes an obligation assumed by the United States. The decisive word is "will" contribute; that term constitutes a mandatory obligation not a discretionary or permissive provision.

Although preliminary machinery has been set-up for the implementation of this provision, we are unaware whether substantive progress is being made.

Failure to implement this provision—a central provision in the Cease-Fire Agreement—could seriously jeopardize the entire Agreement.

I can personally attest to this for at a conference I had with Premier Phan Van Dong in Hanoi last October 21, the Premier expressed his very serious concern over the reconstruction provision, making clear that it was a crucial provision.

It is, of course, a fundamental principle of international law that the failure of one party to fulfill an essential provision of an International Agreement authorizes the other party to withhold compliance of any obligations devolving upon it. Indeed this principle was invoked by the Administration in halting the removal of mines from the Tonkin Gulf on the claim that Hanoi was failing to comply with its Agreement to release American POWs. What is sauce for the goose is sauce of the gander.

I urge the Committee when it meets in Executive Session with Dr. Kissinger to review each of these issues—dual sovereignty, political prisoners, reconstruction—and secure his commitment that the Administration will seriously do all in its power to see that these provisions are fully implemented.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Crown.

## COMMITTEE EXAMINATION OF ISSUES

I note your statement at the end that you hope that the committee will examine with Dr. Kissinger these various issues you have mentioned. I believe, if you have followed the record, you will find that we have gone into just about everything that anyone could think of. We are interested in principles that you state.

By the way, you mentioned Dr. Philip Jessup. He was before our committee not too long ago. But when you mentioned him, I could not help remembering, I believe, 20 years ago when he was nominated for a very high position in the Government and the committee held hearings on his confirmation. I was named chairman of a subcommittee to hold those hearings and I presided over them. The opposition to him was terrific, as you may guess from that era of time. I remember we had a nomination of somebody to be ambassador to India and exactly the same situation arose. It is almost humanly impossible to name somebody to a responsible office without there being opposition. I am not condemning it. I think perhaps it may be good, because it does provide for a thorough and complete examination of all of these issues in which we are all interested. I just want to assure you and

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all others that we have tried in these hearings to go into all of these matters with which we are concerned, and we have not finished yet. This will complete the hearings, but the committee has some meetings of its own in which I am sure that these various things will be plumbed anew.

Mr. CROWN. Senator Sparkman, I should only like to say that I am sure the committee will draw a distinction between the unwarranted criticism that had been made in opposition to Judge Jessup—I remember those times very well—and the criticism to that extent which is warranted with respect to the present designate.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you that the criticism then was unwarranted, but I think we have to be careful not to take any particular side as being the correct side. We have to examine the facts presented to us from all sides, and I assure you we are going to do that.

Mr. CROWN. Well, during this dark period really, of the Vietnam war the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has really given great leadership to the country. I do not want anything I have said here to be any implication or intimation on aspersions. We have wonderful relations with the Senator Foreign Relations Committee and it is the leadership which the Senate Foreign Relations Committee gave during the war indicating its opposition which I am sure was responsible for hastening the end of that war, and I think it is to the great credit of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that they gave that fine moral leadership and all of the American people, I am sure, are grateful to you. So my criticism is directed to the Secretary of State-designate, but in no sense with respect to the critical examination and really the fine, courageous leadership that the Foreign Relations Committee has given to the country. We are really proud of all of the members of the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not criticizing your criticizing. Thank goodness in this country we have that right, and we appreciate your presentation.

Senator Aiken.

## WITNESS' VISIT WITH PREMIER PHAN VAN DONG

Senator AIKEN. I note, Mr. Crown, your visit with Premier Phan Van Dong in Hanoi on October 21st. Did he at that time indicate a willingness to accept economic and technical assistance from multilateral organizations or was he concerned simply with the United States?

Mr. CROWN. The conversations that we had, Senator Aiken, were limited solely to the reconstruction obligation which were evidently described in the tentative agreement at that time and he did not in any way make any mention as to plus or minus as to multilateral or multinational reconstruction. We did not discuss that, nor did he.

## ADMINISTRATION ATTITUDE CONCERNING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Senator AIKEN. In that instance, however, I do not understand that the administration is unalterably opposed to cooperation in that field as were some very vigorous and outspoken members of Congress.

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I believe that the administration finally said they would not agree to any economic assistance without the consent of the Congress. At that time it would be very helpful if they could have gotten the consent.

Mr. CROWN. Yes, I do agree the Congress does have an important role to play in the sharing of the question of reconstruction.

## NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

Senator AIKEN. We also have heard reports that North Vietnam was not very favorably disposed to multilateral cooperation, including some of the neighboring countries.

Mr. CROWN. I might just say, Senator Aiken, not that it grew from the conference. We had with Premier Phan Van Dong a general discussion because we have had, participated in general conversations where we had opportunities to meet members of the PRG and NLF and Vietcong in those days. I have a feeling they have a concern not to dilute what they regard as the commitment and obligation of the United States for reconstruction and I think they are concerned if it were done on a multinational basis that would be somewhat diffused. That seems to me to be an impression that I received from some of the discussions that I have had with leading people of North Vietnam.

Senator SPARKMAN. You said it would be so much abused?

Mr. CROWN. Pardon, diffused, or the obligation might be somewhat diluted.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. CROWN. That is the concern.

## COMMITTEE VIEW CONCERNING MULTILATERAL RECONSTRUCTION

Senator SPARKMAN. I may say, if the Senator will yield, this committee, even before the agreements were made, had discussed within itself the problem of reconstruction. I believe there has been a rather strong feeling in the committee that it ought to be done on a multilateral basis. What view Congress will take when the time comes for authorizing legislation and the appropriation of funds we cannot know at this point.

Mr. CROWN. I might say that we in the Lawyers Committee kind of share a good deal of that view from the point of view that economic aid has always been, at least in the past, has had the danger of abuse by, you know, the pressure of the donor country, and that channelizing the material, say, through a United Nations development fund or through multinational agencies diminishes that. I think in that respect I think the members of our committee would share the viewpoint of the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because I think there is much less opportunity for abuse where it is channeled through multinational or perhaps hopefully, through the U.N. and, I might say on that score, we had tried to do a good deal of spade-work with respect both to the PRG and with Hanoi in our discussions also with the United Nations of trying to move them in, and I spent almost a solid hour and a half with some of their leading people just before I departed to emphasize they were making a serious mistake in their attitude toward the U.N. The notion it was dominated by the

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United States did not seem to me to be historically realistic and we knew from the discussions we had had with the members of the U.N. they would welcome participation and I would hope we had made, and if I may say so, I think we may have had a role in the last discussion we had for inviting Secretary General Waldheim to sit in at the international conference at Paris, so I think that they are realistic and I hope they will move closely to and become a member of the United Nations and participate in the community of nations.

So I think the Senate Foreign Relations Committee thinking in multinational terms is on sound ground which I think would be in a very commendatory fashion.

## U.S. PRESENCE IN HANOI

Senator AIKEN. I get the impression that both Hanoi and Washington felt that an American presence in Hanoi might not be only helpful in the reconstruction period but also be helpful in preventing further international complications which might lead to further outbreak of war. I do not know whether that was correct or not. Do you suppose that they would now be willing to accept American technicians in Hanoi?

Mr. CROWN. Well, I do not have anything positive, but I would be inclined to think so, yes, because the country's devastation is very vast, I would think they would.

Senator AIKEN. There was an uproar from many Members of Congress at that time and the result was that the administration said they would not reach any agreement without the consent of Congress, which I do not think they could have gotten at that time. Whether as time goes on the situation softens, which is the hope of the world, there might be a change of heart.

Mr. CROWN. Yes, I think the situation is fluid and we were very much impressed with their realism in viewing world affairs.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. CROWN. And their intelligence, so I would think that reason and rationality ought ultimately to prevail.

Senator AIKEN. Personally, I believe an American presence in Hanoi would be helpful.

Mr. CROWN. Of course, on the question—

Senator AIKEN. Both politically and economically.

Mr. CROWN. Yes, and also I take it we do have a moral responsibility.

Senator AIKEN. That is right.

Mr. CROWN. To undo so much of the damage that has been done. I think that is an important thing for the good name of our country, that we, even the generous attitude we had after World War II with respect to those whom we fought Japan and Germany, here is a nation which in our view was never a threat, never threatened the United States, never threatened its security, all of the damage we have done and I might tell you it is most heartbreaking to have been there and to have seen these things, I do think that the good name of the United States requires that we make moral restitution there and heal the wounds and reconstruct that country as fast as we can.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator McGovern, do you have any questions?

Senator MCGOVERN. No, no questions, Mr. Chairman.

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Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your appearance.

Mr. CROWN. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now I will call on Senator Ernest Gruening, who has arrived in spite of the weather and heavy traffic. Senator Gruening, we appreciate your appearance before us again. It is good to see you here, sir.

## STATEMENT OF ERNEST GRUENING, FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to testify. You are about to conclude hearings to determine whether you will or will not vote to confirm the nomination of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. He has, in effect, in reality, if not in name, held that post for 4½ years; so the committee has a unique opportunity to appraise his future conduct from his past programs and judge what his performance in the future will be from what has been the performance under the Nixon-Kissinger aegis.

## VIOLATION OF PREELECTION PROMISES

When Richard Nixon was running for election for the Presidency 5 years ago he promised the American people he would, if elected, end the war, and on the basis of that promise a war-heavy American people elected him by a small margin because his opponent, my good friend, Hubert Humphrey, could not bring himself to reverse his stand on the war, to break with President Johnson and announce his determination, if elected, to put an end to the folly into which President Johnson had plunged our Nation.

How did Richard Nixon carry out his promise to end the war? He violated it immediately by a massive and continuous bombardment of Cambodia, aggression against a country that wanted to stay neutral, an action deliberately concealed from the American people, to whom Richard Nixon lied when he told them over nationwide television, after 40 months of that bombing, that the United States had respected the neutrality of Cambodia.

Has the committee received any favorable, plausible explanation of why this costly and needless aggression was vital to American security or to any American interest? Obviously, it has not received any such plausible explanation, and so under the Nixon-Kissinger conduct in further violation of campaign promises the war was escalated throughout Southeast Asia with intensified bombing of North and South Vietnam and Laos without success in obtaining even the objectives the Nixon-Kissinger team has sought.

So the Nixon-Kissinger tandem violated the preelection promises to the American people, and with the consequences of tens of thousands, tens of thousands more American boys killed, several hundred thousand wounded, millions of Southeast Asians killed and wounded, and billions of dollars squandered which are now reflected in our steadily mounting inflation.

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All this could have been avoided if Richard Nixon had ended the war in the early weeks of his administration in 1969 as the American people had every right to expect.

## LACK OF HONOR IN WAR'S CONCLUSION

Now, seeking confirmation, Mr. Kissinger promises an open policy which, if it means anything, means a return to the constitutionally established joint role of the executive and legislative branches in the conduct of foreign policy. But why, on the basis of his past record of deliberate mendacity, should his promises be believed? Eight months ago Richard Nixon proclaimed that he had achieved peace with honor. Well, nothing could have been more devoid of honor in the war's conclusion than the massive bombing of a helpless peasant people who had neither planes nor antiaircraft guns with which to defend themselves. It was a massacre of noncombatants, of women and children.

I saw and heard the defense of it myself at the Third International War Crimes Commission meeting at Copenhagen last fall. The two previous meetings had been held in Oslo and Stockholm. I saw and heard a 24-year-old Vietnamese schoolteacher testify to the bomb that had hit her school. It tore her right arm off, killed 6 children outright, and wounded 10 others, some of them crippled for life. Her right arm was missing as she testified.

Have the American people become insensitive to the atrocities committed in their name? Has this committee become so? George Wald, the internationally famous biologist at Harvard from whom one of his pupils, Henry Kissinger, might have learned much but apparently did not, reported in his Penn State lecture last year, what he saw in Vietnam and I quote:

> They took me through the hospital wards. There was a little boy, Chin, 3 years old, whose arm had been torn off. There was a boy, Theng, 9 years old, whose right foot was torn off, there was a girl, Quan, 8 years old, whose spinal chord had been severed by a pellet so that she was paralyzed permanently below the waist and incontinent permanently. There was a 3-month-old baby being held by her grandfather; her father was killed by a bomb, her mother wounded in her backbone and still in the hospital. There was a young man, Minh, 20, a bomb fragment had torn open his skull and damaged his brain. There were two little girls 8 and 13, sisters, both badly wounded by bullets. But more than that, her mother and brother had been killed instantly and their father had been killed shortly before so there was nowhere for them to go.

These are among the fruits of the Nixon-Kissinger policy, and this U.S. legacy will be visible for years in the armless, legless, paralyzed victims.

Unfortunately, history will record that it was the United States, we, you, who did this, and not the Nixon-Kissinger team. This team will continue to propagate the myth that the United States is fighting aggression whereas from the start the United States has been, and continues to be the aggressor.

## CONGRESS FINALLY ENDED THE WAR

And, finally, it was not Richard Nixon who ended the war, with or without honor. It was the Congress which finally ended our part in it on August 15 while Richard Nixon wanted to continue.

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## WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE

But what about the future? The Nixon-Kissinger team has made it plain that it has not given up. Of course, it could no longer, thanks to the Congress, continue military action, but it will try with American dollars and hired mercenaries to perpetuate its domination of Southeast Asia, and if so there will be no peace, there will be no peace as long as the Nixon-Kissinger policy of imposing their candidates and their policies on the people of Southeast Asia continues.

The cause of the continuing war in Southeast Asia; namely, the U.S. violation of its agreement to support the Geneva Accords, the betrayal of a promise of a united Vietnam choosing its own government, leaves the issue unresolved. Those who fought for it beginning a quarter of a century ago in a French rule, the Vietcong in the south, and the North Vietnamese will continue to do so. We should have been on their side for the same ends that our colonial forefathers sought here is what they sought.

The American people who have been taken in by the mistaken policy by the administration, both administrations, constantly reiterated emphasis that we were fighting Communists. Doubtless there were many among them but they were, above all, nationalists, and their economic and social doctrines were their own business, not ours, and today, and for years past, the Nixon policy continues to prop up a loathsome dictator, Nguyen Thieu whose jails are filled with thousands of political prisoners for the crime of wanting a united Vietnam, its independence and freedom from foreign control. Many have been tortured, and others outright murdered in prison?

Is that what the Senate wants to see continued? Does it want to continue to squander billions of dollars to perpetuate the Nixon-Kissinger folly? That is what we will get under the continued Nixon-Kissinger satrapy, a costly involvement without end in sight to the neglect of our overdue pressing needs at home.

## DILEMMA CONFRONTING COMMITTEE

The committee obviously confronts a dilemma. If it were to reject Kissinger's nomination, he would continue, as he has been, as a Presidential adviser not subject to Senate confirmation. But the committee members could disassociate themselves from these Executive follies, could avoid becoming particeps criminis, as history may otherwise record them, by refusing to bestow the additional powers and prestige of the Secretaryship of State on one whose record casts doubt on his worthiness of it. Give him an opportunity for a few months or a year or more while an Undersecretary is in charge, to demonstrate under Senate scrutiny that a new deceny, a new humanity, a new honesty, a new respect for the Constitution, and regard for the opinion of mankind will henceforth prevail in the conduct of the foreign affairs of our beloved country.

I thank you.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Senator Gruening. You have given us some things that naturally we should consider very carefully. We recall the fine service that you had here with us.

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Mr. GRUENING. I beg your pardon, a little louder.

Senator SPARKMAN. We do not want you to go yet.

Mr. GRUENING. Very good.

Senator SPARKMAN. I just wanted to say for the record that to my
way of thinking, Senator Gruening has been one of the most remark-
able men I have ever known.

Mr. GRUENING. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Trained as a doctor, practiced, I believe, as a
doctor, and then, had all kind of activities in Alaska, then became
Governor of Alaska. I recall being in Mexico several years ago, and
Senator Gruening and Mrs. Gruening were with us. I learned that
one of the outstanding books, a history of Mexico, which I believe they
used as a school text, was written by him. He told the Mexicans some
things about themselves they apparently had not known before. When
he was in the Senate, it was the same thing here with America.

Mr. GRUENING. You are very kind.

Senator SPARKMAN. We welcome you here, and we have enjoyed
your testimony. If I may, I will ask Senator Aiken to take over if I
may be excused for just a minute.

Senator AIKEN. I have no questions to ask you, Ernest.

All I want to say is whatever else you may do you do not waver. Some-
times you pay a price for not wavering.

Senator McGovern have you any questions?

Senator McGOVERN. Senator Gruening, I want to join Senator
Sparkman in expressing my personal appreciation for your advice
and your influence, and your continuing influence and work. It is great
to see you in such vigor again this morning. I think I was on the Sen-
ate floor with very few other people the day you made your first full
dress speech warning against our involvement in Indochina. If I re-
member correctly it was in March of 1964. Is that correct? I think that
anyone with that kind of foresight, which you held to without any
wavering at all, deserves the commendation of us all. I wish it were
possible for you to be awarded the Nobel peace prize. I think you
deserve it as much as any other American.

We had in the recent Presidential campaign, a slightly arrogant
slogan, "right from the start." That fits you and your record on the
war much better and I want to commend you.

BASIS FOR PEACE IN INDOCHINA

This morning's news tells very jubilantly about the coming of peace
to Laos. As I drove in to the office today, the newscasters were reporting
that for the first time in 10 years peace has come to Laos, and the Pathet
Lao forces, the Communist forces, have entered into a coalition with the
other political forces in Laos. Apparently that is the foundation for
the peace.

Do you see anything in that kind of a formula that is fundamentally
different from what you were proposing 10 years ago as a possible
basis for peace in Vietnam and elsewhere in Indochina?

Mr. GRUENING. Well, I cannot say that I read the terms of this new
agreement, but I would like to repeat what I said a few months ago—
that the only hope for peace in Southeast Asia is for us to keep out
and let the people of Southeast Asia settle their own destiny. What-

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ever the solution, it will be theirs and not the imposition of a foreign power.

Now, it may be that our intentions were the best at the beginning. There are various opinions about that. But why do we not apply the basic principle of self-determination. Now there may be interference from other powers, but if we do our part and keep out at least our conscience will be clear and I am convinced that a better solution will obtain. We have been down there now for a decade or more, and the situation has gone from bad to worse, and we are trying to do the same thing all over the world, imposing our ideas on other people. It is completely contrary to our own principles, our own ideals, and our own heritage. We started with a basic concept of self-determination, having a government of, by and for the people. If we would only apply that all over the world, sooner or later I am sure it is bound to work out better than any policy of interference either by us or any other foreign power. So I am very hopeful over the peace in Laos, but I am very fearful that the present administration, if it continues its policies, will continue to interfere, either overtly or covertly, and there will be no peace. And why do we not come home and mind our own business and take care of our long-neglected overdue domestic needs?

## IDENTIFICATION OF DR. KISSINGER'S POLICY WITH NIXON ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Senator McGOVERN. Senator Gruening, I agree fully with your position. I think you are quite right in identifying Dr. Kissinger's policy as the Nixon administration's policy. They were one and the same thing. As a matter of fact, when Dr. Kissinger was asked a question about how he felt about the President, he said "I agree with the President." Then he added, "It is almost irrelevant whether we like each other and it is almost like asking me whether I like my arm." He went on to say that on all the major decisions they saw eye to eye.

## BASIS FOR DENYING CONFIRMATION

But if it is true that Dr. Kissinger represents the President's view, on what basis do we deny confirmation to the administration that is in power of the men the President wants to serve with him? Presumably a President is going to pick those men who carry out his policy. On what constitutional grounds would we have a right to object to Dr. Kissinger's confirmation?

Mr. GRUENING. Well, you have the constitutional grounds to deny confirmation to any man whom you do not consider qualified.

I do not think there is any doubt about Mr. Kissinger's ability. He is an able man, but his policies in the past have been part of the administration policy of concealment and deception, and this is very alarming. You want to be able to feel once you have confirmed him, and that confirmation is irrevocable, and he will be free to do what he pleases, that you can trust what he says, that he will come clean, that he will tell you what is happening, that he will not deceive you, and he will not conceal, it, and you have a perfect right to suspect that might not happen on the basis of the past record.

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Now, I hope that will not be the case. We all want a decent foreign policy, which we have not had now for some years, and this is a non-partisan thing. Johnson got us into this war by deception and it has been continued under Nixon and Kissinger, and I hope we can break away from that. That was the burden of my remarks, and I am very confident that you agree with that.

## EFFECT OF DENYING CONFIRMATION

Senator McGOVERN. I thoroughly agree, Senator Gruening, with the indictment of the Nixon-Kissinger record on Vietnam. I think it is an outrage that the war was not ended 5 years ago. But the only point I am making is that if, in fact, Dr. Kissinger is carrying out the policy the President wants, and they have no basic policy disagreement, it would seem to me that denying him confirmation as Secretary of State simply means that he stays there in the White House and continues to run the policy in concert with the President. Then we are deprived even of the opportunity to cross-examine him in public.

I would like to think that maybe some of these questions we have put to Dr. Kissinger over the last week may give him pause on some of—

Mr. GRUENING. Well, maybe it will be a new Kissinger. We have had new Nixons at various times. They have not proved very different. But I do think that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate and the Congress certainly have a responsibility and a duty to help shape foreign policy and if it feels that policy is being shaped in such a way with which it disagrees it has every right to do what it can to shape it in the way it wants.

## INSISTENCE ON POLICY COMMITMENTS FROM MR. KISSINGER SUGGESTED

And maybe the beginning of that would be, if it does not deny confirmation to Dr. Kissinger, which it probably will not, is to at least insist on as many commitments that you hope will be kept to shape the policy in a way that the Senate believes it should be shaped.

You want to stop aggression; you want to stop deception; you want to go back to a policy that is consistent with our own traditions and heritage, and I hope that in the course of these hearings you have gotten or will get before the hearings conclude as many commitments from Mr. Kissinger as is possible and hope that after his confirmation those commitments will be kept. I believe that is as far as you can go.

But I felt it desirable in my testimony to stress the record which was a record of mendacity, deception, not merely Kissinger himself but the Kissinger-Nixon team. They have been gold dust twins; they have shaped the policy of the United States, and I think they can both be held responsible for what has happened.

I hope the Senate, I am confident the Senate in these hearings and before these hearings conclude, will try to impress upon him as far as possible what the Senate's views are and what the Senate's hopes are, and hope that those ideas will prevail because obviously the Senate's views are far saner than those of the administration.

Senator McGOVERN. I appreciate fully your suggestions on that score, Senator Gruening. I think you are right, that we have to stress as hard as we can to get certain understandings and certain commitments from Dr. Kissinger.

21-172—73—pt. 1—13

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PRINCE SIHANOUK'S ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. BOMBING

I interrogated him the other day on his contention that Prince Sihanouk actually approved American bombing of Cambodia. I do not believe that. In response to that Dr. Kissinger said he would provide certain information indicating that Prince Sihanouk did, in fact, support the bombing. The information he supplied does not back up his argument one bit. As a matter of fact, it leaves us right where we were before, with me firmly convinced that Prince Sihanouk did not approve of the bombing. We have had no evidence yet from Mr. Kissinger, although he promised to provide it to the committee, that would support his side of the case. If the documents he has sent here thus far are designed to show that we had the cooperation of the Cambodian Government when we were bombing them, it just will not wash. So we will have to go into that matter more, and there will be other things that we will have to interrogate him about.

DILEMMA OF DENYING OURSELVES PUBLIC CROSS-EXAMINATION

But I raise these questions simply because I do think it puts a member of the committee who feels, as I do, that the Kissinger-Nixon policies have been a disaster, in a very serious dilemma to then have to vote on the question of whether we want to deny ourselves the chance to at least give him a title where we can call him up here and cross-examine him from time to time. We cannot do that now and I think there is something to be said for giving him the title that he holds in any event. He is running the major foreign policy decisions and he is doing it without public cross-examination by the Congress. So perhaps there is something to be said for that side of the argument, too.

MR. GRUENING. Well, I think at least these hearings have dramatized the folly of our past policies under this administration and I am hopeful in consequence of that that Mr. Kissinger will come closer to a policy which Congress approves.

Of course, there is no justification whatever for our invasion of Cambodia. No vital interest of the United States was involved and, of course, that applies to our whole Southeast Asian misadventure. There never was any justification for going in there 10 years ago. We were lied into the war, as you all know. The Tonkin Gulf episode was spurious. The Senate was denied the information, that was in President Johnson's hands before he went on nationwide television, that the attack had not taken place. There was a telegram from the captain of the Maddox. Captain Herrick, the one man who knew, as no one else did, what had happened or what had not happened in the Gulf of Tonkin, who said in effect:

Hold it. It is very doubtful whether any such attacks have taken place. The earlier reports were due to freak weather effects and I suggest complete re-evaluation before action.

That telegram was in the hands of Secretary of Defense McNamara and Lyndon Johnson at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of August 4, 1964, and yet 7 hours later when the Senate leaders and the House leaders convened to hear from President Johnson what he wanted the Congress to do, namely, to pass the Tonkin Gulf resolution, this telegram was deliberately concealed from them and it was deliberately

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concealed from the entire Congress during the next 3 or 4 days while they were debating it. Obviously, the Members of Congress, if they had known about that telegram, they never would have voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution. They never would have given Lyndon Johnson the power to plunge us into a war and this ghastly tragedy would have been averted.

So we were deceived, we were lied into the war and that will be eternally on the conscience of Lyndon Baines Johnson, wherever he now is. It is a tragic thing. [Laughter.] And this kind of thing has continued to various degrees ever since, and it is long overdue that we can have a government whose word we can trust, and that is the great issue before this committee in this particular hearing, and I am very hopeful that your hearings, what you have said to Mr. Kissinger, what you tried to impress upon him, and the obvious desirability, I think Mr. Kissinger would like to emerge from his service as Secretary of State with a record that he can be proud of. I do not think he wants to continue this kind of deception, even though he has practiced it, and I am hopeful that will take place, but I am not too optimistic, and I hope the members of the Foreign Relations Committee will keep that caution alive and continue to watch it carefully, because this is an issue vital not only to this committee, to the Congress, but to the American people.

We have gone through a crisis unprecedented in our history with tragic results, results that will be with us for generations to come, to a certain extent perhaps forever.

We can never live down some of these things that I have read to you today. It is a horrible thought that we, the United States, have been guilty of the kind of butchery of innocent little children that has been incidental to our policy, a policy pursued for no good purposes whatsoever.

Senator McGOVERN. Thank you very much, Senator Gruening.

Mr. GRUENING. Thank you.

## VOTES AGAINST GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gruening, I believe there were only two votes against the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Mr. GRUENING. Beg pardon?

Senator SPARKMAN. Two votes against the Tonkin resolution.

Mr. GRUENING. There were two, Wayne Morse's and mine.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is right. I recall it quite well. Thank you very much, Senator Gruening. We have enjoyed having you with us.

Our next witness is Rev. Douglas Moore, Black United Front, Washington, D.C.

## STATEMENT OF REV. DOUGLAS MOORE, CHAIRMAN, AND ABSALOM F. JORDAN, JR., FIELD CHAIRMAN, THE BLACK UNITED FRONT

Reverend MOORE. Thank you. I do not want any discrimination from the press; they cut things off for the little people.

Seriously, Mr. Chairman, we are very glad to be here. It is unusual for a Methodist priest to be talking to two Methodist members of the

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Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am an ordained Methodist minister, I served in Africa as a missionary for 5 years. I studied at Boston University School of African Studies and also University of Monrovia and have been a student of African affairs as a scholar and as one who is a descendant of Africa.

Mr. Chairman, we are very happy that your committee permitted us to come to speak on these issues. Although some of us may cynically say it is an exercise in futility, I think it is an exercise in faith in the democratic process.

I am the chairman of the Black United Front, which has chapters in Washington, D.C., in the States of Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Massachusetts, Florida, and other States like Texas. We receive no money from anybody. We receive no money from the Government; we receive no money from foundations, private or public. So, therefore, what we say is not because we are involved with anybody except an interest in what happens to black people.

## BLACKS' VIEW OF DR. KISSINGER AS U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECT

When blacks look at Dr. Kissinger as the architect of American foreign policy, we feel that he is the epitome of the philosophy of benign neglect of America on the foreign scene as Moynihan is on the domestic scene. Benign neglect has been Dr. Kissinger's attitude toward Africa and African problems.

This policy stems from his foreign policy that is based on close American collaboration with Europe, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan. The objective of this policy is to structure new international political stability under the management of the industrialized powers. His view is to reduce conflict by building a network of interdependence between the West and former cold war enemies. Consequently, we have the wheat deal for Russia and China and Soviet acquiescence in U.S. "end the war—peace with honor" diplomacy in Indochina, and I might add that the wheat deal is penalizing American families for the high cost of bread.

As Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger will seek to institutionalize this new policy of international stability. This will be disastrous for Africa. This myopic view of foreign policy can only bring nightmarish results in the future of Africa. Such a preoccupation with Europe as over against upgrading and developing new policies for Africa will lead this country to some dangerous pitfalls in the years to come. The record is quite clear on Dr. Kissinger: he is a Europeanist or a Eurocentric. His policies, even his proclamation "this is the year of Europe," reflects the man's total attitude toward Africa.

## EFFECT OF DR. KISSINGER'S CONFIRMATION OF AFRICA

Africa is not important to Dr. Kissinger, or for that matter, Latin America. Joseph Kraft in the January issue of Harper's magazine, in an article entitled "In Search of Kissinger," said "When Africa, Latin America, or economic affairs come up, the White House, in effect, is out to lunch." The confirmation of Dr. Kissinger, we feel, will not be welcomed by Americans of African descent. Africa has not been important to him as the mastermind of Nixon's foreign policy.

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Dr. Kissinger's policy of stability or law and order will inevitably rein-
force the U.S. acquiescence to white minority domination in Southern
Africa. Such a policy can only lead to a bloodbath in Southern Africa,
as well as the further polarization of races in the United States. As
the liberation forces move closer to liberating the land the Portuguese
and Rhodesians will become even more repressive and barbaric.

Our indirect intervention will switch to direct intervention. This is
the logical development of Dr. Kissinger's stability and Eurocentric
foreign policy. Black Americans were highly indignant at President
Nixon's snub of President Kaunda of Zambia and then Chairman of
the nonalined nations, who came to the United States on a mission
from the nonalined nations which carried him to the major capitals
of the world; but was vulgarly refused an audience with the President.
It is inconceivable that this would have happened to Mrs. Golda Meier.
This snub we accuse Mr. Kissinger of, for it is he who advises the
President what to do or not to do in foreign matters. The snub was
uncouth, arrogant, and degrading.

Portugal is a part of NATO and as is well known, is the "poor man
of Europe." How can the poorest nation in Europe fight three major
wars? It is because of the U.S. indirect economic assistance;
because of our Azores Agreement which Dr. Kissinger will preside
over in its renewal discussions; and finally, because of our being a part
of NATO which serves as a blind for funneling U.S. money into
Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau. Dr. Kissinger is responsible for
the Europeans' bully boy Portugal's capacity to wage a most barbaric
war against the people of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, as
well as napalm. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the first time I ever heard of
the use of napalm was in 1962 in Angola when I saw women and chil-
dren who were burned, in the Congo.

The recent massacre in Mozambique by Portuguese and recently by
Rhodesian troops has brought no reaction from Dr. Kissinger or the
State Department. Why? Because he is a Eurocentrist who practices
stabilizing politics. Yet, we find a persistent probing in our relations
with the Soviet Union about the status of Jews. The State Depart-
ment, National Security Council, and many Senators talk about how
Jews are being treated in the Soviet Union and how Russia ought to
change its policy before receiving aid or political considerations. To
our knowledge, there have been no massacres of Jews in Russia. Black
Americans are incensed that there is no interest by Dr. Kissinger in
what is happening to our people in southern Africa. What about the
murder of the gold miners in South Africa, the massacre that Roman
Catholic priests have spoken about in Angola, the massacre of 600
Methodist preachers on Palm Sunday in 1964 by the Portuguese, and
what about the murder of the gold miners in South Africa just a few
days ago? How long will Dr. Kissinger be concerned about what hap-
pened to Jews in Russia and not what happens to our people in Africa?

EFFECT OF U.S. EUROPEANIST VIEW OF WORLD

Our Europeanist view of the world has closed our eyes to the re-
pugnant regime in South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia and the
Portuguese, Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Chairman, is a case in point. Two
hundred and fifty thousand European settlers dominate 5 million

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Africans and yet Mr. Clark MacGregor, president of a great aircraft company that builds helicopters, accidentally, privately goes to Rhodesia and on Rhodesian television talks about the American Government may be thinking about changing its policy. As an administrator, if anyone for the Black United Front made such a statement I would know about it, and I would think it is unbelievable that Mr. Kissinger did not know that Mr. MacGregor was about the business of reinforcing his Eurocentrists policies in southern Africa.

Our Europeanists bias did not permit military action as a solution to the Rhodesian rebellion. Our Government said it was ineffectual. We opted for economic sanctions. Yet, this country violated U.N. sanctions by permitting the Byrd amendment and importation of chrome. Our Rhodesian policy is a reflection of the demonic aspect of our American foreign policy. On one hand, the world condemns us for our involvement in Vietnam and we arrogantly and doggedly stayed under the pretext of defending a people's right to self-determination.

But on the other hand, we are quiet about freedom being taken away in Rhodesia and the world calls for universal sanction against Rhodesia. We go just the opposite way and we refute them and renege on them. We have become again the laughing stock of the world as well as blatant renegers on our treaty obligations under the charter of the United Nations which we freely signed, law and all. Southern Rhodesia is in violation of U.N. Rhodesian Resolution 232 as well as in violation of Executive Order 11322 and there are certain persons who have responsibilities for enforcing that order, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of the Treasury, and in coordinated concert with other agencies are necessary, and yet we know that the Rhodesian information center still operates here in Washington, D.C., spilling out its spurious propaganda. We know that PanAm, TWA, Hertz, and Avis are violating the law by doing business in Rhodesia, and we have talked about law and order, and that this is a rule of law. We ask a very fundamental question of Mr. Kissinger, what passports do the Rhodesians live or operate in the United States on? It cannot be a British passport. So in fact, we have de facto functionally recognized them as a government.

U.S. companies have large investments in South Africa, over a billion dollars. When the virtually repressed majority rises up, what will our policy be? At the present time, because of our Eurocentric foreign policy, we are going to be caught short.

## BLACK AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION AND REQUESTED MEETINGS

Two years ago, 30 to 40,000 black Americans demonstrated in Washington, D.C., they wanted a change in U.S. policy toward our ancestral land, and particularly toward southern Africa. Dr. Kissinger has ignored our cry for justice in southern Africa but he has made sure that the Jews in Russia be heard. We have asked that he meet and when the heroic leader of Guinea-Bissau was in this country his aides sought a meeting with one of Mr. Kissinger's underlings, but they would not even listen or talk to him. And this reminds me of the arrogance of John Foster Dulles in relationship to the Chinese of Mr. Chou En-lai of how that remained as a bitter pill. How many others have been turned off by this arrogant man?

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Mr. Kissinger has met with the Jewish community about what happens to Jews in Russia but never upon our asking and request has he ever met with the black Americans who have a deep interest in what happens in Africa. This, we feel, is racist.

## MEMBERSHIP OF NSC STAFF

And when we examine the staff of the National Security Council reported to be at 79, they have a funny numbers game, but anyhow, 79 last week, we note there is not one black in a policymaking position. There are Catholics, there are Jews, and Protestants, all white. Dr. Kissinger is responsible for this. Why are there no blacks in policy-making positions on the National Security Council? Certainly, black men died in Vietnam out of proportion to our number, our quota, to carry out his demonic and deathlike policy. Is it because he feels there are no competent blacks in the area of foreign policy? Is it because he does not believe that blacks can pass the security tests for this Nation or is it in fact that Dr. Kissinger is a racist? Because of the composition of the National Security Council staff, we say he is a functional racist.

## CONFIRMATION WILL NOT ADD TO WORLD STABILITY OR PEACE

Mr. Chairman, in our judgment, for the record, the Black United Front does not believe that the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger will add to the stability or peace of the world because his Eurocentric foreign policy can only lead to bloodshed and further polarization of blacks and whites in this country over our deeper and deeper involvement in southern Africa.

## U.S. POSITION ON GENOCIDE

We also, Mr. Chairman, would bring to your attention the position of this Government on the whole question of genocide and how it affects black people in this country as a foreign policy issue. Mr. Jordan.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to augment our chairman's testimony by raising an additional question for Mr. Kissinger's discussion.

Senator SPARKMAN. Just a minute. Has your name been given to the reporter?

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, it has, Absalom Jordan.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right.

Mr. JORDAN. Well, we feel Mr. Kissinger's attitude toward blacks has adequately represented the philosophy of benign neglect, we feel that the overall treatment of black people in this country is more analogous to callous neglect. Our concern is that the advice and consent necessary from the Senate for the ratification of the treaty against genocide has been held in abeyance and opposition against the treaty is captious.

In 400 years of black presence in this country, the United States has failed to deal with black people in a way which would demonstrate concern for them as human beings. While my cynicism is tempered with a chimerical hope, I am cognizant of this country's failure to col-

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laborate with blacks in building a country worthy of our Founding Fathers' dream.

The United States is culpable for the murder of 13 blacks in South Africa just as it is culpable for the murder of George Jackson. But more importantly, blacks are circumspect of the opposition to the ratification of the treaty—for it would permit aberrations in the treatment of men culminating in the perpetration of the same type of atavistic action against blacks that were performed against the American Indian, European Jews and more recently the massacred in Mozambique.

Our question to Mr. Kissinger is whether the President and he will extend themselves beyond effete rhetoric with respect to this treaty and fight as diligently for its ratification as he has to uphold the President's veto of five bills passed by the Congress.

Our concern is this country's failure to oppose genocide and this goes beyond our concern for black people in this country but extends to our black brothers and sisters in our motherland.

Corporations in this country are deeply involved in the economics and politics of minority ruled African nations and because of this country's failure to ratify the treaty against genocide. These companies feel no obligations to interfere in the internal affairs of that nation.

However, if the policy of this Nation is to prohibit genocide, then it become the responsibility of all Americans to act accordingly.

Considering the successes of Mr. Kissinger both with Mr. Nixon and in the Senate of the United States, we would suggest that Mr. Kissinger demonstrates that he is an efficacious administrator and we would raise the question as to whether or not the administration has demonstrated duplicity with respect to the ratification of a treaty against genocide.

It is our conjecture that the administration will not oppose genocide because this country contemplates genocide against the blacks of this Nation and also against blacks throughout the world and, therefore we raise the question of whether Mr. Kissinger will fight within the Senate to insure that blacks will be spared the fear of genocide in the same way he and his family were spared from the horrors of Nazi Germany's desire to eliminate the Jewish people.

Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. Thank both of you gentlemen. You exceeded the time a little bit, but they were very forceful statements and we are very glad to have had you.

Reverend MOORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Our next witness is Mr. John D. Hemenway, National Association of Pro America, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Hemenway, will you come around, please, sir.

## STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HEMENWAY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRO AMERICA, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. HEMENWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Hemenway, we had the pleasure of having you before the committee on a previous occasion and we welcome you again.

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Mr. HEMENWAY. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. Your statement, I believe, will exceed the 10 minutes we requested. I hope you are prepared to summarize it or else let part of it be placed in the record.

Mr. HEMENWAY. Yes, sir, I will do my best and, as a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, there is a little table of dates that I will submit later on for the record, and I will proceed with a summary of the testimony.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well, sir. You handle it as you see fit. The entire statement will be included, as you know.

## NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRO AMERICA

As you noted, I represent today the National Association of Pro America. Pro America was founded in 1933, by the way, as an educational, patriotic, volunteer organization whose membership consists of middle-of-the-road Americans of moderate views. Speaking quite personally, Mr. Sparkman, you might be interested that we have a chapter in Birmingham, Ala.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have a very good friend there who I believe is a very good friend of yours, Dr. Leslie Wright.

## REASONS FOR OPPOSING DR. KISSINGER'S CONFIRMATION

Mr. HEMENWAY. Yes, sir. To summarize the position of Pro America, I would like to say that we oppose the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State for a number of valid reasons, in four general categories. Dr. Kissinger's professional judgment is poor. The disastrous grain deal with the Soviet Union is merely the most recent example, and probably not the most disastrous.

Second, Dr. Kissinger's foreign policy appears to have no general strategy to it. It is based on highly dubious assumptions for which there is little or no evidence. Yet, these assumptions are so basic to everything that underlies everything we are doing in foreign policy today, I think the committee owes it to itself and to the Nation to do what they have been doing and press even harder to examine what is the basis of the premise, and I will list three of them:

* That the Soviet Union has ceased to be a revolutionary power and is now a status quo power interested to play according to the rules.

* The assumption that merely by increased commercial and cultural ties we will somehow accelerate the conversion of the Soviet Union into a status quo power.

And third, the Sino-Soviet split is permanent and so severe that we can build a policy on that split.

The third major reason we oppose the nomination and confirmation is that there are several serious constitutional institutional problems with the confirmation and I will go into that in a moment, and then most importantly, Senator Sparkman, as you mentioned. I have been before this committee before, we registered the belief that Dr. Kissinger's administrative ability is hardly proven and this comes at a time when he will be Secretary of State in a State Department that needs reform, when you need in fact, a very capable administrator. I think that several of his own personnel appointments, that of

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David Young, that of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, whose confirmation for Undersecretary of the Treasury has been held up for a number of months for reasons that I think a number of Senators even on your committee will understand. The Chairman, Mr. Fulbright, is a member of the Finance Committee.

There is another appointment which is quite a strange one, the appointment or at least the offer of the ambassadorship to the Soviet Union to Mr. Armand Hammer, who had the good sense, of course, to turn it down, but this must have been approved by Mr. Kissinger and it suggests an inability, perhaps, to make the right kind of personnel decision when he goes into a large bureaucracy that is going to be desperately in need of capable administration.

## GRAIN DEAL WITH SOVIET UNION

Mr. Chairman, the grain deal with the Soviet Union is so bad that I have not personally met anybody in Washington who is prepared to defend it and yet it was handled as a foreign policy matter and the national security adviser, Mr. Kissinger, was seemingly responsible for its execution.

As early as January 31, 1972, 11½ years ago, Dr. Kissinger evidently was aware of an impending deal. He had a full year to get all of the details down and yet at the confirmation hearings held of Mr. Sonnenfeldt, one of his principal aides, it turned out that this man did not know what rate of interest was being charged the Soviet Union on the loans that were made for the wheat. He did not know what the discount rate of the United States was. The committee determined he did not know a lot of economic facts that one would have thought any staff member on the NSC would have known if they were engaged in a wheat deal of this, a grain deal of this proportion. Is it any wonder, therefore, that frankly, Mr. Chairman, we were taken, and now the housewife has to pay a lot more at the grocery store for her weekly groceries. We have sold our wheat for $1.50 when now the current price is $5. The Soviet Union will be able to take this wheat, indeed there are reports, as you well know, that they are selling the wheat that we sold them on the world markets for a profit and, at the same time, turning it to political advantage.

I cite then the wheat deal as one major mistake of Mr. Kissinger.

## MR. KISSINGER'S NONINTERFERENCE DOCTRINE

Then, there is Mr. Kissinger's extremely confused noninterference doctrine. He claims that our foreign policy does not permit the United States to interfere in domestic affairs. Well, Senator, we had a seminar on foreign affairs recently up on the Hill. We had 10 foreign policy experts in the caucus room of the House, we put out this press release. I think you probably have a copy of it. It was distributed to every Senator on the committee which summarizes 6 hours of discussion on the Kissinger foreign policy. Now, one of the amazing conclusions of that seminar was that we do not have a foreign policy in most of the world, there is no consistent line. We go from crash landing to crash landing. We respond to events. We do not have a standard policy.

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Well, the noninterference doctrine is one of these things. Mr. Kissinger told you that he was all for repeal of the Byrd amendment. What is that if it is not direct interference in another nation's affairs and, to boot, probably a strategic mistake. It forces us to buy low-grade chrome ore from the Soviet Union, certainly not our strategic friend, and reject high grade ore which Rhodesia has turned out in the past has sold to the Soviet Union and is in turn sold back to us so while he is against interference in that country, excuse me, for interference in that country he seemingly is against interference in other countries. The doctrine again shows an inconsistency in foreign countries. He has not thought about his strategy and he desperately needs to do that.

### MR. KISSINGER OUGHT TO BE QUALIFIED FOR PRESIDENCY

Well, I thought, I have a couple of other examples here that I will leave for the record, Mr. Chairman, but I want to mention in passing something that our membership wants to have the Senators give serious attention to. Senator Javits already has mentioned in the record that Mr. Kissinger is ineligible for the Office of the Presidency and he mentioned it was a great honor, and it is a great honor, for a man who is a naturalized American to rise to the pinnacle of his profession, and to be qualified for this office. But if he is in line for the named succession in a time of programs impending constitutional crisis, we feel that he ought to be qualified for the Office of the Presidency. We feel that the Senators ought to consider very seriously whether the second man in line in succession after Speaker Albert should the President and Vice President be, for some reason be removed from office, should in fact be qualified for that office. That is a constitutional problem. An institutional problem involves the NSC machinery. It is quite clear, and was clear before the rather splendid explanation to Senator Symington's questions on committee structure where Mr. Kissinger is chairman of this committee and that committee and chairman of another committee, it is quite clear why Mr. Kissinger wants to maintain his NSC position. It is to retain power. As just Secretary of State he might be put in the position that William Rogers has been for the last few years. The only way he can guarantee that and keep pure is to keep his NSC position where he is not only Secretary of State but he can overrule by virtue of his committee positions, anyone who gets in his way bureaucraticly. I am not so sure that that is consistent with the principles of good government. It sounds to me like high-handed bureaucracy.

### MOLLENHOFF-KISSINGER STANDOFF

Now, that gets me to the last point I want to briefly skim over. We have not only Mr. Kissinger's appointment, David Young, Armand Hammer whom he approved of but, of course, was not appointed, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, as a measure to judge his ability to judge, but we also have an interesting spectacle a couple of years back in 1970 of the Mollenhoff-Kissinger standoff.

Mr. Clark Mollenhoff is a man who is known to all the newsmen present; he is a man of extremely high integrity. Two of your col-

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leagues, Mr. Chairman, that is specifically Senator Curtis and Senator Williams of Delaware, on the occasion of his retirement from the executive branch of Government back in 1970, expressed the highest praise. I will read Mr. Williams of Delaware's statement, it comes from the Congressional Record of June 2, 1970. Mr. Williams of Delaware:

> The suggestion was made that there would be those in certain quarters who would be glad Mr. Mollenhoff was leaving this position because they feared him. I have known Clark Mollenhoff for a number of years. I will state that no man in America need have any fear of Mr. Mollenhoff, and I emphasize, unless he had heretofore done or had contemplated doing something that was unethical as far as the government was concerned. In that instance, Clark Mollenhoff would be a most dangerous man to have in public office because he would expose such activities regardless of who or what political party was involved.

Well, I am sure that anyone in the Senate who has had an experience with this courageous journalist would echo that kind of a comment. But the reason I mentioned this at all is that the press around May and June of 1970 was filled with comments of a dispute between Clark Mollenhoff and Henry Kissinger. On two occasions prior to March 1970, Mr. Clark Mollenhoff reported to Dr. Kissinger and also to General Haig, who was promoted from colonel to four stars in 3 years, you will remember, there were serious security charges against Helmut Sonnenfeldt. There is no public record of any action taken by Dr. Kissinger or General Haig. Now these matters are now in the Finance Committee's record in connection with his confirmation, so I will not take your time to go into them. They are a matter of record.

Now, on the 11th of March Helmut Sonnenfeldt's name was forwarded, presumably with Mr. Kissinger's approval, to be an FSO-1. That is like entering the Army with the rank of major general. On the 19th of March, that is only 8 days later, there are a lot of press reports claiming that Dr. Kissinger is upset, is the word that was used, by Presidential counselor Mollenhoff's inquiry into the matter of Biafra. Now, the press reports make it clear what Mr. Mollenhoff was doing was investigating reports that someone somewhere in the State Department or the NSC structure was undercutting the Presidential order to see to it that America does what it could to keep the Biafrans from starving. In other words, it was the kind of humanitarianism which I personally believe is a thread that ought to run throughout our foreign policy. America does give a damn, America does care about the other fellow in trouble. America is, does feel that he is his brother's keeper.

Well, Mr. Mollenhoff was looking into that matter. A few days later Senator Thurmond was alerted and he opposed the Sonnenfeldt nomination which he called a strange nomination. This is now Mr. Kissinger's right hand man for Europe, for the Soviet Union, engineered in part the wheat deal, has been given credit for the opening in China. It is one of, I say, his unfortunate personnel choices.

## DISPUTE BETWEEN MR. MOLLENHOFF AND STATE DEPARTMENT

Now, on the 18th of May the never exhaustible Clark Mollenhoff opposite another front, according to the press, and he gets into a fight with the State Department requesting an antiadministration petition

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signed by 250 employees of the Department of State. Deputy Under Secretary Macomber refuses to give a Presidential counselor a copy of this unclassified document. Well, a few days later, 12 days later, Mr. Mollenhoff announces his resignation.

Now, in August after Mr. Mollenhoff leaves the White House, the Senate confirms Mr. Sonnenfeldt as an FSO-1. Subsequent to that David Young, Mr. Kissinger's appointment secretary, goes to work in activities that have been made infamous by the Watergate investigation. A few months after that Mr. Hunt, with no White House rank whatsoever, requests and gets top secret sensitive cables from the State Department with, from the same person who had refused Clark Mollenhoff unclassified documents.

## ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD OF MR. KISSINGER

Well, there are in the record, and you will have this in the chronology that I submit to you, Senator, other evidences of the strange attitude of Dr. Kissinger toward fair play and investigations in general, personnel assignment in particular. You know as well as any man in this country the kind of trouble the State Department is in personnel-wise. They need help; they do not need an addition to the problem. I submit that when you examine the evidence that our reason for not recommending that this committee recommend Senate confirmation of Henry Kissinger is also valid. That his administrative record is unproved and some inquiry ought to be made into his capacity as an administrator before he is put in charge of a very large and very important agency of the Government. That ends my summary, Senator.

Thank you.

[Mr. Hemenway's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN D. HEMENWAY, REPRESENTING NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRO AMERICA ON THE CONFIRMATION OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, the National Association of Pro America, founded in 1933, is an educational, patriotic, volunteer organization whose membership consists of Americans with moderate middle-of-the-road views. You may be interested in the fact that, among our many chapters in about twenty states we have a chapter in Birmingham, Alabama.

Pro America opposes the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State for a number of valid reasons. For your convenience I shall summarize these reasons by category and then provide several illustrative examples in the following material.

SUMMARY: EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THAT DR. KISSINGER SHOULD NOT BE CONFIRMED

I. Dr. Kissinger's professional judgment is poor.—The disastrous grain deal with the Soviet Union is merely the most recent example—and not the most disastrous. His confused doctrine of "non-interference" in internal affairs is another.

II. Dr. Kissinger's foreign policy appears to have no strategy.—It is based on highly dubious assumptions for which there is little or no evidence. Three premises which are crucial to and underlie most of the Kissinger foreign policy are so unsupportable that they must be considered premature: (1) the premise that the Soviet Union has ceased to be a revolutionary power and now is a status quo power interested in playing according to the rules; (2) the assumption that increased commercial and cultural ties will accelerate the conversion of the USSR into a status quo power to provide us with "peace in our time"; and

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(3) the assertion that the Sino/Soviet split is permanent and so severe that US policy and a new balance of power can be built upon it.

Not only is there little evidence to support the above basic assumptions underlying Dr. Kissinger's foreign policy, there is a considerable body of evidence to the contrary.

III. *Serious constitutional and institutional problems*.—Arise in connection with Dr. Kissinger's confirmation.

IV. *Dr. Kissinger's administrative ability is unproven*.—At a time when the Department of State badly needs reform. Selection of a number of persons by Dr. Kissinger to sensitive tasks provides evidence that there is something wrong. I have in mind Mr. David Young, now indicted; Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, whose confirmation as Treasury Under Secretary has been held up for a number of valid reasons; and the selection of Mr. Armand Hammer to be US Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Mr. Hammer, a friend of Lenin and about every other leader in the Communist Pantheon, had the foresight to decline the appointment.

For the reasons summarized on the previous page, Pro America believes that Mr. Kissinger's nomination as Secretary of State should not receive the advice and the consent of the Senate.

Last Saturday, September 8, due to the fact that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was examining the credentials of Dr. Kissinger, a seminar of ten experts was convened to consider US foreign policy, under the auspices of the University of Plano (Plano, near Dallas, Texas). As Dr. Morris, President of the University of Plano explained, the various senators questioning Dr. Kissinger were not coming to the essence of US foreign policy. Pending the publication of a monograph on the seminar, a summary for the press was prepared and distributed for the use of each senator/member of the Foreign Relations Committee on 11 Sept. A copy is submitted as an attachment to this testimony.

The seminar findings reveal an astonishing similarity between the concerns regarding US foreign policy and peace expressed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn on September 11 and those voiced three days earlier by the ten experts meeting on Capitol Hill. Dr. Morris pointed to this similarity in a telegram sent yesterday, September 13, to Solzhenitsyn. A copy is attached for your information.

With the conclusion now of these preliminary remarks, a more detailed examination of the evidence suggesting that Dr. Kissinger should not be confirmed follows:

# I. UNFORTUNATE DECISIONS POSSIBLY REFLECTING BAD JUDGMENT

## (1) *The grain deal with the Soviet Union*

It is so bad that no one I have met in Washington wants to defend it. Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt acknowledged on May 15 at his confirmation hearing that the administration erred (i.e., Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt erred) in concluding the arrangements. Recent statements by Federal Reserve Chairman Burns and Secretary of the Treasury Schultz indicate that bad judgments and faulty policy assessments were involved for which Dr. Kissinger is responsible.

The Soviet grain deal was handled as a foreign policy matter and National Security Adviser Kissinger was responsible for its execution.

This blunder has cost us many billions of dollars, so far, and it has endangered our national food supply for the first time in our history. It has permitted our own food to be used as a political weapon against us in a decade when food is increasingly important as a weapon for peace.

The financial losses incurred by Dr. Kissinger in this one calculation would be sufficient to run the Department of State for the next 15 years, at the present budgetary levels. In fact, you could run the Department of State on the interest on that money alone, calculating at current rates of at least 8%, without ever using up capital.

As early as January 31, 1972—one and one-half years ago—Dr. Kissinger formally notified the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Agriculture of the Soviet interest in buying large quantities of U.S. grain. He permitted no effort to inform U.S. farmers and the general public, thereby insuring secret negotiations with the Russians. It is odd that President Nixon, who is said to admire President Wilson (“Open covenants, openly arrived at”) has a chief of staff who covets such secrecy.

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In effect, we have permitted the Soviet Union to have the luxury of both guns and butter. If the housewife must pay high prices and suffers from the rampant inflation, she should know that evidence suggests that it was triggered by the grain deal. If Moscow outstrips us in the arms race and can also maintain her marginal standard of living, it is because the West provided the resources—on credit. Dr. Kissinger has set up a Marshall Aid program for the preservation of Communism which was in one of its periodic agricultural crises.

A memorandum being circulated by Senator Jackson has been quoted in the press as saying: "The grain sale brought food to the Russians, huge profits to a few grain corporations, and more inflation to the American people. Selling twenty-five percent of our wheat crop created a demand situation and a sympathetic price rise of other grains which, in turn, created other shortages such as soybeans. . . . These higher grain costs pyramided into higher costs for feeding poultry and livestock and eventually the large increases were reflected in prices to consumers in higher costs of meats, eggs, poultry, butter and other commodities."

The Soviets shrewdly have accomplished what many traders in commodities have tried and failed to do—they cornered the market—and Dr. Kissinger helped them. It is now the Russians who have surplus grain to offer to the world, not the nation whose economic system produced that grain. It is inevitable that this grain will be used as a political weapon against our own freedom and that of people all over this globe. The Soviets will be able to make political adventures involving grain pay handsomely, as well, for their grain, purchased on credit for $1.50 per bushel is now worth $5.00 per bushel. By selling far below world prices they can use it for political purposes and still make a handsome profit. The United States, for its part, now has a stake in the stability of the current Soviet leadership, to which it has a loan outstanding.

It is said that, for all of Dr. Kissinger's impressive academic background, he is weak in economics. Perhaps his staff can compensate for him? One of his principal assistants (for Europe and the Soviet Union) is Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who, as Dr. Kissinger's protege, was nominated to be Under Secretary of the Treasury to direct East-West trade matters. At his May 15, 1973 confirmation hearing, Mr. Sonnenfeldt did not know the current U.S. discount rate, what the U.S. government must pay for the money it borrows to service our own debt, and he could not state the interest rate which had been given to the Soviet Union. In other words, Dr. Kissinger's immediate staff was ignorant of the basic facts needed to conclude such arrangements wisely. Is it any wonder that the President is ill advised?

## (2) Mr. Kissinger's confused "noninterference" doctrine

Mr. Kissinger takes the position that the United States should avoid interfering in the internal affairs of another state. This appears to be the principal given reason for not trying to bring some relief to persecuted minority groups in the Soviet Union such as Soviet Jewry and intellectuals such as Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.

"Noninterference" is a favorite State Department theme and therefore a comfortable posture for Mr. Kissinger. But as a doctrine it is dead wrong.

By contrast, the Soviet Union interferes constantly in American domestic affairs. For example, during his visit to the United States, Brezhnev received his comrade in revolution, the Secretary General of the American Communist Party. The American Community Party is dedicated to the overthrow of the government of the United States by any means, including violence, if that is expedient.

Surely Kissinger must know the primitive fact that the purpose of any nation's foreign policy is to influence the domestic affairs of other nations, at least to the degree necessary to stimulate a foreign policy responsive to our own needs. Dr. Kissinger's assertions before this Committee that the US could not interfere in behalf of Soviet scientists Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn was identified by a panel of ten experts on foreign policy as the application of a moral double standard. At these same hearings (Friday, 7 September) Dr. Kissinger supported a move to repeal the Byrd amendment. In effect, he thereby advocated direct interference in the internal affairs of another nation, an act he takes at the jeopardy of US strategic interests. The Congress passed the Byrd amendment because, by refusing to buy chrome ore from Rhodesia, we cut off our noses to spite our faces. Deprived of Rhodesian ore by our own actions, we were forced to buy chrome ore of an inferior quality from the Soviet Union, the only other source of ore needed

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for strategic purposes. Not only was the Soviet ore more expensive, it was of a lower quality. The Soviet Union, which was not encumbered by "noninterference" compunctions of Mr. Kissinger and the US Department of State, purchased its own chrome ore from Rhodesia at a lower price and at higher grades than its own ore.

Mr. Kissinger is also on record as opposing the Jackson amendment which is supported by Senator Buckley of New York and others, presumably because of this "noninterference" doctrine. This measure is calculated to make some small gesture in behalf of oppressed minorities, although Soviet Jews probably would be the most immediate beneficiaries.

From my two years service in Moscow as a US diplomat, I know a little about this problem. In fact, I was denounced by the Soviet Union in an anti Semitic tract called "Judaism Without Embellishment". The book was translated, in part by B'nai Brith and awakened such ugly memories in the West that the Soviets decided to withdraw it. It was one of my official duties to keep track of the official State policy in the Soviet Union of persecuting various religious minorities, whether they were Roman Catholic, Jews, Uniates, or Orthodox—all suffer from various degrees of persecution.

Americans expect to try to help people in distress. Americans everywhere can be expected to reject Dr. Kissingers views that we should turn away—at least turn our official face away. These injustices should concern us and trouble us. If we do not admit that we are our bother's keeper, we are less civilized than we all would like to believe.

Personally, I cannot understand why Mr. Kissinger turns his official back on his co-religionists and the other groups being persecuted in the Soviet Union. If I were sitting on this Committee, I would be afraid that this might reflect a character flaw.

Press reports claim that Metternich is a hero of Dr. Kissinger's. Metternich suppressed the liberties and freedom of minority groups for the entire 40 years he was Foreign Minister in the Austrian Empire. As he suppressed liberty everywhere, he also lied and maneuvered his way through the councils of Europe in the name of "stability" and "peace."

Frankly, Senators, if Metternich is Dr. Kissinger's hero, I believe the American public would like a Secretary of State with a hero whose principles are more compatible with American ideals. I am reminded that when Dr. Kissinger come to work in the White House we used to couple the words "peace" and "freedom". Now we seem to be searching only for "peace". Whatever happened to "freedom".

### (3) Kissinger's attempt to give away U.S. Naval nuclear propulsion technology

Admiral Hyman Rickover must be one of the greatest Americans of our generation. As much as any single American Admiral Rickover must be credited with providing us all in the free world with adequate security. For years, however, Admiral Rickover has had to guard U.S. nuclear secrets from misguided American officials who wish to win praise or some other intangible benefit by offering to share U.S. nuclear propulsion technology with our friends overseas.

Dr. Kissinger supported one such scheme. A specific proposal supported by the State Department and Kissinger/Sonnenfeldt was resisted by the Pentagon. There was a fight at every level of the NSC machinery. Admiral Rickover himself deplored this give-away project in unclassified testimony he gave before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The matter finally reached the ear of the President, thanks to the vigilance of then Presidential Counselor Clark Mollenhoff and the President simply over-ruled the State Department view favored by Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt. Every bureaucratic trick was used by those persons who control the NSC machinery to promote their partisan view.

Everyone makes mistakes and sometimes what comprises error is capable of interpretation. According to Stephen Graubard in "Kissinger, Portrait of a Mind", for example, "Kissinger opposed any recognition of the East German regime ... and had to support German unification, whatever its misgivings." Since formal recognition appears to be around the corner, Dr. Kissinger's own view on that subject must have changed. Many Americans, myself included, consider the change a mistake. There are other illustrations, such as the 1971 decision to give the Soviet Union a mission in Berlin without any compensating gesture from the Soviet Union at all. This "achievement" has paved the way for the permanent de jure partition of Germany, in violation of our solemn treaty obligations.

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## II. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY UNDER KISSINGER APPEARS TO HAVE NO STRATEGY

Close examination reveals that US policy has no underlying strategy. Further, the Senate Committee has not probed for any broad strategy underlying Dr. Kissinger's policy. In their questioning, Dr. Kissinger has protected himself by attempting to limit his response to a specific problem faced under specific conditions. It is obvious that in the foreign policy world of the "pragmatists" around Dr. Kissinger, we go from crash landing to crash landing.

On September 12, news commentator Howard K. Smith summarized our South American policy by saying, "There is no policy." Four Days earlier, the ten foreign policy experts discussing US foreign policy on the eve of the Kissinger confirmation hearing had come to that same conclusion with regard to US policy world wide. Under Dr. Kissinger's direction, the panel members concluded, US foreign policy stands for no principles that can be clearly identified; the policy is merely an ad hoc reaction to events.

In the case of Germany, as I have stated, four years ago (and 20 years before that) we stood for the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom. We now are about to permit de jure division of the country by the recognition of East Germany. This is no brave new innovation or new initiative on our part; the evidence suggests that this simply is a mistaken course. As long as I can remember, there have been persons who wanted to recognize East Germany, or Communist China.

Trips to Moscow or Peiping; recognition game plans for Mongolia and Albania; normalization of relatinos with Cuba all have been subjects for "thinking pieces" for years. The novelty of these actions does not make them wise.

Nowhere is the lack of a general strategy of foreign policy more evident than in Asia. Great gains are claimed as accruing from the President's trip to Peiking. Is it not fair to ask just exactly what are these great gains? On the other hand any claimed advantages of the President's trip to Red China have been more than offset by serious long-lasting disadvantages that include: (1) A general setback to democracy in Asia; (2) near collapse of the friendly Sato government in Japan; (3) expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the U.N.; (4) the near or imminent collapse of Cambodia; and (5) the necessity to introduce martial rule in the Philippines.

Solzhenitsyn's writings have recalled Munich and it might be well to reflect on that. In the mid-thirties, Stanley Baldwin had to confess to the House of Commons that he had not called for rearmament against Hitler because the Baldwin government would have fallen as a consequence. The United States has now slipped to second place militarily, and the strategic balance has shifted against us. What has become of the Nixon strategy of parity and "bargaining from strength"?

Clearly the Nixon Doctrine is not a strategy for peace.

The Nixon Doctrine can justly be criticized for its imprecision. It provides yet another indication that there is no identifiable U.S. foreign strategy. How can anyone believe that the Paris Agreements actually produced "Peace With Honor", a claim advanced for this Agreement which permits North Viet Nam to keep hundreds of thousands of its troops in the territory of South Viet Nam? In fact, is not the Kissinger policy simply to "get out", i.e., to abandon our allies, but, if possible, without evident embarrassment to the administration?

## III. SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

This nation has been through several crises in recent years; it is now in the midst of a Constitutional crisis.

Senator Javits has noted that Mr. Kissinger is ineligible for the Office of the Presidency. This means that, even if he is second in line in the named succession after Speaker Albert, should the President and Vice President be removed from office, he could not serve.

Pro America always has followed Constitutional issues with deep concern. We feel that the Senate should weigh carefully possible consequences of confirming a man to a position high in the order of succession who is not a "natural born citizen" as required by Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution.

The NSC Machinery poses another problem. There really is no way for solving inter-Departmental disputes at any level except to appeal them to the next higher level.

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The real reason Dr. Kissinger seeks to hold two positions, Advisor to the President and Secretary of State, simultaneously has not been stated unequivocally. Let us bring it out into the open. The reason goes to the manipulation of the endless conferences and governmental machinery arising from the NSC machinery. The final arbiter has been Dr. Kissinger, the President's Advisor, in most cases.

Whenever a Department feels its own vital interests are threatened by a matter in which its view does not prevail, it escalates the fight in an attempt to reach the President—or Dr. Kissinger speaking for the President. That is why the President is such a busy and harassed man; that also is why Dr. Kissinger is such a powerful man.

That also is why Dr. Kissinger wants to hang on to his second position. It represents power. Archimedes wanted only a place to stand and a lever long enough to move the world. Dr. Kissinger as both (a) Secretary of State, and, (b) Presidential Advisor on National Security Affairs would have a place for both feet.

A pertinent question, perhaps is this: would Dr. Kissinger move the world in the right direction?

#### IV. DR. KISSINGER'S ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITY IS UNPROVEN

One critical test of a good executive is the ability to select subordinates wisely. If only for that reason, one must consider Dr. Kissinger's selections of subordinates. The wisdom of his choices is not always apparent.

(1) *David Young*.—Can one ignore Dr. Kissinger's selection of David Young to be his appointments secretary? Now that Mr. Young is under indictment, the American public will have to presume that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has thoroughly looked into that matter in executive session, because it is clear that it has not been examined thoroughly in public sessions.

(2) *Armand Hammer*.—The selection of Mr. Armand Hammer as a candidate to be US Ambassador to the Soviet Union is even more mystifying. That the post was offered to Mr. Hammer in fact was confirmed by the Washington Post on August 27, 1973 (p. A-28) when a spokesman for the Occidental International Corporation informed the press that the post had been offered to Hammer, but that he could not accept such a post because of obligations to his company and its stockholders. Armand Hammer has had a close relationship with top Soviet leaders since 1921. A personal friend of Lenin, Hammer's father was one of the founding members of the American Communist party. Armand Hammer is an "insider" with the present Soviet regime and its top leadership and he always has been. Surely Dr. Kissinger, the president's advisor on National Security Affairs had to approve this choice before it was made. Why did he permit such an unwise selection? Mr. Hammer showed better judgment in rejecting the offer than did those who offered him the post. Conflict of interests, if not ideology, are obvious. There is no point in dwelling on this case which I use only as an illustrative example of trouble in the personnel department. As Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger will have responsibility for many such appointments.

(3) *Helmut Sonnenfeldt*.—The failure of Kissinger's aide Sonnenfeldt to receive confirmation as Under Secretary of the Treasury because of lack of qualifications (see, for example, Congressional Record of May 23, 1973, page E 3428) and certain security charges is a matter of record. Details of the alleged security breaches were published in Human Events (August 25, 1973, p. 3) and there is no need to go into them here.

Taken together—and there are other examples—these cases suggest that personnel selection is not Dr. Kissinger's talent—yet that is what he will have to do as Secretary of State.

(4) *The Mollenhoff/Kissinger stand-off*.—There is a far more serious matter in personnel/administration involving deep-seated attitude toward service under the President (I refer to the office, not the man). I now refer to a series of clashes, recorded in the press, that took place between Mr. Clark Mollenhoff, when he was Counsel to the President, and Dr. Henry Kissinger.

The evidence strongly suggests that Dr. Kissinger is guilty of wrong doing.

It is a matter of record that the Second Session of the 85th Congress (Concurrent Resolution No. 175) set forth a Code of Ethics for Government Service which states, in part: "Any person in Government service should: ... uphold the Constitution, laws, and legal regulations of the United States ... and never be a party to their evasion ... expose corruption wherever discovered."

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A chronology of events recorded for the most part in the press tells a story suggesting that Dr. Kissinger does not welcome impartial inquiries:

*Two occasions prior to March 1, 1970.*—Mr. Clark Mollenhoff informs Dr. Kissinger and also Gen. Haig (who was promoted from colonel to four star general in three years) of serious security charges against Helmut Sonnenfeldt. There is no record of any action having been taken on the basis of Mr. Mollenhoff's information.

*March 11, 1970.*—Name of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Dr. Kissinger's principal aide is forwarded to the Senate for lateral admission into the career diplomatic service as an FSO-1. (This is equivalent to entering the army as a major general.)

*March 19, 1970.*—Press reports that Dr. Kissinger is "upset" by Presidential Counselor Mollenhoff's inquiry into Biafra. Mollenhoff is investigating reports that persons in the Department of State or NSC are defeating the President's desire to give aid (food) to Biafra.

*March 26, 1970.*—Senator Thurmond opposes the Sonnenfeldt nomination which he calls "strange" and in violation of career principles. (Cong. Record of March 26, 1970, p. S4644.)

*May 18, 1970.*—Presidential Counselor Mollenhoff requests a copy of anti-Administration petitions signed by 250 employees of the Department of State and related agencies who signed it to demonstrate their opposition to US involvement in Cambodia. Deputy Under Secretary Macomber refuses to give Presidential Counselor Mollenhoff a copy of this unclassified document.

*May 30, 1970.*—Mollenhoff announces his resignation, effective July 1.

*August, 1970.*—Senate confirms Sonnenfeldt after Mollenhoff leaves the White House.

*Subsequent (?)*.—Dr. Kissinger's appointments secretary David Young begins work that leads to his indictment.

*Subsequent (?)*.—Mr. Hunt, with no White House rank, requests and gets top secret sensitive cables from the State Department. Deputy Secretary Macomber provides Hunt with highly classified documents.

*December 1971*.—(1) Request made of Sonnenfeldt to appear at a hearing under oath to clear up contradictory statements (Hemenway Hearing). (2) High aide of Dr. Kissinger takes what appears to be an attempt at reprisal against Hemenway, an employee at the Pentagon.

*May 15, 1973.*—First day of Confirmation Hearings for Helmut Sonnenfeldt to be Under Secretary of the Treasury. Hemenway introduces evidence that his entrance into the Foreign Service was fraudulent and records security violations. (See Congressional Record of May 23, 1973, page E 3428; May 24, 1973, page E 3500; May 24, 1973, page E 3477; May 29, 1973, p. E 3537; Aug. 3 1973, p. E 5444.)

In the light of the revelations of the Senate select committee hearings it seems evident from even this partial record that Counselor Mollenhoff's efforts to pursue an investigation in the name of the President was being defeated by officials who were applying two sets of standards simultaneously. The evidence seems to suggest that Dr. Kissinger was obstructing him in this effort.

Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, who was in a position to play a key role in Helmut Sonnenfeldt's fraudulent lateral entry into the Foreign Service, also appears to have blocked legitimate inquiries for Dr. Kissinger when they were initiated by Mr. Mollenhoff. The question remains why this would be done, since both men were working for and supporting the President.

Evidently Dr. Kissinger did not always feel like a supporter of the President. In 1968, just after Mr. Nixon had defeated Mr. Rockefeller decisively, Rockefeller supported Kissinger is reported by Bernard Collier in the Boston Globe to have said, "That man Nixon is not fit to be President." Serving President Nixon with much zeal would appear to have required a great deal of flexibility from Kissinger.

In evaluating the worth of the above chronology, it might be useful to recall the statements in praise of Clark Mollenhoff made by two senators (page S-8172 of the Congressional Record of June 2, 1970.):

"Mr. CURTIS: I wish to add a word of praise to Clark Mollenhoff who has displayed honor, integrity, and great ability. I hope the time comes when he will again consent to serve in public office. As a reporter, he was diligent and a thorough investigator. He is fair and he is honest....

"Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware: ... the suggestion was made that there would be those in certain quarters who would be glad Mr. Mollenhoff was leaving this position because they feared him. I have known Clark Mollenhoff for a num-

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ber of years. I will state that no man in America need have any fear of Mr. Mollenhoff unless—I emphasize unless—He had heretofore done—or had contemplated doing—something that was unethical as far as government is concerned. In that instance Clark Mollenhoff would be a most dangerous man to have in public office because he would expose such activities regardless of who or what political party would be involved."

You will recall that just over two years ago this Committee heard testimony from me to the effect that the Department of State personnel system was "sick and corrupt." This very Committee refused to confirm the Director of Personnel of the Department of State to an ambassadorial assignment at that time because of facts brought out in the hearing.

There is ample evidence to suggest that the man before you today also is not worthy of the trust that this high post demands.

Then, in addition to the personnel matters just discussed, there is the record of foreign policy; let's look at Dr. Kissinger's record in foreign policy.

## A ROUND-UP OF DR. KISSINGER'S RECORD IN FOREIGN POLICY

For the last 25 years, i.e., ever since the end of WWII, when the United States emerged as a "super power" conscious of its international role in international affairs, the USSR has set certain goals for itself vis-a-vis the West.

For much of this time Soviet policy has been conducted within the framework of "peaceful coexistence." According to the Philosophical Encyclopedia (in Russian), III, 452-454, Peaceful coexistence is defined as: "a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena. . . . The policy of peaceful coexistence which is carried out by socialist countries represents a powerful factor hastening the global revolution process. . . . Peaceful coexistence does not exclude revolutions in the form of armed uprisings and just national liberation wars against imperialist oppression which takes place within the framework of the capitalist system."

With regard to the United States and the west an eminent Soviet affairs expert summarized the goals of "peaceful coexistence" as follows: "(1) The Soviet Union has demanded that East Germany be recognized and given status equal to that of West Germany; (2) Moscow has demanded talks to demilitarize or limit the military powers of the NATO military powers; (3) The Soviets have demanded the removal of US forces from Europe; (4) The Soviets have demanded of France the neutralization and expulsion of NATO from French territory; (5) the Communists have demanded American retreat from South east Asia; (6) Soviets have demanded a general program of reducing US military capacity and superiority; and (7) The Soviets have demanded generous commercial credits and economic assistance from the West."

For years Moscow's ideologues have claimed that the accomplishment of these goals would be a tremendous victory for the peaceful coexistence doctrine of communism. And, in truth, today all of these goals appear to have been very nearly accomplished. Yet Dr. Kissinger and certain of the media who support his foreign policy present the achievement of these Soviet goals as "concessions," and US giving in to these long term Soviet goals is viewed as a US "victory".

We can not stand too many "victories" of the peaceful coexistence kind. Most of the above "victories" have been achieved during Dr. Kissinger's period of stewardship over US Foreign Policy. For the last four years Dr. Kissinger has been Secretary of State in all but name.

In determining how he will cast his vote in the matter of the confirmation of Henry Kissinger, each senator need ask himself only one question: Is the policy we have seen for the past four years the policy of a Metternich, building up the strength and influence of his nation from that of a second rate power, or is this a policy of a Chamberlain or Baldwin converting his nation from a great power into one that is second rate.

We would do well to heed the warnings of Soviet Scientist Sakharov who specifically addressed the foreign policy being pursued by Henry Kissinger. Mr. Sakharov urged the West to make detente conditional on democratization of the of the Soviet system: "Detente without democratization, a detente, when the West in fact accepts our (Soviet) rules of the game in this process, such a detente would be dangerous. It wouldn't solve any of the world's problems and would mean a capitulation to our (Soviet) real or exaggerated strength. By liberating us (the USSR) from problems we can't solve ourselves, we could concentrate on accumulating strength. And as a result the whole world would be disarmed and

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facing our uncontrollable bureaucratic apparatus.”—(Wash. Eve. Star-News, Aug. 22, 1973.)

Since Henry Kissinger will not heed Mr. Sakharov's levelheaded warning, the Senate should.

SOLZHENITSYN/SAKHAROV SUPPORTED BY ACADEMIC PANEL

The similarity of concerns regarding world peace expressed by Alexander Solzhenitsyn on September 11 and those voiced three days earlier by a panel of American foreign affairs panelists meeting on Capitol Hill was noted in a telegram sent today to Nobel laureate Solzhenitsyn in the USSR.

The cable was sent by Dr. Robert Morris, president and chancellor of the University of Plano, Dallas, Texas, whose university sponsored the ten-man panel discussion in the Caucus Room of the House of Representatives in the Nation's Capital.

The text of the cable reads: "Telegram to Mr. Alexander Solzhenitsyn: You and your brave associates do not stand completely alone. An academic panel with ten participants, meeting on Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C., last Saturday (September 8) expressed the wish that you and Dr. Sakharov, with your feet planted firmly in reality, could question Dr. Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dr. Kissinger's assertions that the U.S. could not attempt to interfere in behalf of you and your fellow scientist Sakharov was considered as an application of a moral double standard. It was this academic group, under the auspices of the University of Plano, Plano, Texas, and not the Senators that challenge the assumption of Dr. Kissinger's policy that: (1) the U.S.S.R. was no longer a revolutionary force; (2) that unilateral economic nourishment of communism would produce stability; and, (3) that the Sino/Soviet split would endure.

"All free men should support you in your gallant efforts for freedom and personal liberties everywhere.

"(s) ROBERT MORRIS,
"Chancellor, University of Plano.

The above telegram was sent to Mr. Solzhenitsyn through TASS, the official telegram agency of the U.S.S.R., and a copy was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Contact: John D. Hemenway, Dean, University of Plano in Washington Cd (202) 244 4819 and 244 5085.

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 11, 1973]

SOME POINTED QUESTIONS FOR KISSINGER HEARINGS—PART III

(By Hon. John M. Ashbrook of Ohio in the House of Representatives)

Mr. ASHBROOK, Mr. Speaker, a variety of pertinent questions for the Kissinger hearings now in progress before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were implicit in the views expressed by 10 panelists at a foreign policy seminar held here in Washington last Saturday, September 8. The seminar, sponsored by the University of Plano in Dallas, Tex., covered a variety of issues of topical importance in a wide-ranking review of current foreign policy over an extended period of 6 hours. A summary of the seminar and its findings was released by Plano University today, a copy of which I insert in the RECORD at this point.

ACADEMIC PANEL VOICES CONCERN OVER KISSINGER FOREIGN POLICY

Dr. Kissinger's foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union is built on premises, the ignoring of which could bring disaster to the United States, an eminent American specialist on Soviet affairs warned in Washington this week.

Dr. Joseph Schiebel, Director of Georgetown University's Russian Area Studies program, was one of ten experts who examined Kissinger's foreign policy critically and extensively during a public seminar on Capital Hill.

Some of the most basic premises of the Kissinger/Nixon foreign policy were questioned and shown to be without actual foundation by these experts.

Scheduled for the week during which Dr. Kissinger's testimony is being heard by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the six-hour panel discussion pointed to the failure of certain senators on the Foreign Relations Committee to question Dr. Kissinger critically on substantive matters and the evident deterioration of US foreign policy and decline in US prestige abroad.

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"Questions (regarding Kissinger's Soviet policy) seem to be coming from an unusual source, namely the Russian intellectuals—the Russian scientists—rather than from the lips of the Senators," observed Dr. Robert Morris, President of the University of Plano.

"This is something for us to be ashamed of," responded Professor Schiebel.

Meeting in the historic Caucus Room of the House of Representatives, other seminar participants included Allan Brownfield, noted journalist; David Lichenstein, general counsel of Accuracy in Media, Inc.; Alan Bock, Editor of the Pink Sheet on the Left; Paul Deac, Executive Vice President of the National Confederation [NCAEG]; government economist Reed Irvine; Mr. Miroslav Gregory, Executive Vice Chairman, Washington Chapter [NCAEG]; retired US diplomat and Soviet expert John Hemenway, who also is Dean of Plano University in Washington; and, Secretary General of the Freedom Leadership Foundation, Gary Jarmin.

Several participants found the current Kissinger/Nixon foreign policy to be reminiscent of Chamberlain's disastrous Munich policies of the nineteen-thirties.

## KISSINGER'S WHEAT DEAL WITH SOVIETS

Soviet purchase of US wheat and shipment (on US credits) was identified as a principal cause of current inflationary pressure in the United States, Statements by Federal Reserve Chairman Burns and Secretary of the Treasury Shultz were cited to establish that bad judgments and faulty policy assessments for which Dr. Kissinger is responsible were involved in the US/Soviet wheat transaction.

## NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT BASIC FOREIGN POLICY PREMISES

Professor Schiebel of Georgetown summarized three premises crucial to and underlying the Kissinger foreign policy which, he thought, may be premature and are unsupportable:

(1) The assertion that the Soviet Union has ceased to be a revolutionary power and now is a *status quo* power interested in playing according to the rules;

(2) The assumption that increased commercial and cultural ties will accelerate the conversion of the USSR into a *status quo* power to provide us with "peace in our time."

(3) That the Sino/Soviet conflict is permanent and so severe that US policy and a new balance of power can be built upon it.

Dr. Schiebel observed that not only is the evidence to support these assumptions inadequate, there is a good deal of evidence to the contrary.

## THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND KISSINGER'S CONFUSED "NONINTERFERENCE" DOCTRINE

The ten experts agreed that US foreign policy implementation necessarily involved an attempt to influence the domestic affairs of other nations, if only to stimulate a foreign policy response to our needs. Dr. Kissinger's assertions that the US could not attempt to interfer in behalf of Soviet scientists Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn was seen as an erroneous application of a moral double standard. In the same hearing Dr. Kissinger professed support of a move to repeal the Byrd amendment, thereby proposing action—if not advocating it—tantamount to direct interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country.

## THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The ten experts wondered why the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not inform the public of the issues by putting the right questions to Kissinger. The belief was expressed that many Americans are not aware of certain fundamental questions that are not being pressed by the Committee and that a disservice is performed not facing up to hard questions and issues.

Dr. Morris of the University of Plano noted that the most incisive questioning concerning the wisdom of US foreign policy seemed to be coming from an unusual source: Russian intellectuals and Soviet scientists.

Several panel members expressed their concern that, during the first day of his hearing Dr. Kissinger was allowed to retreat into the specific details of specific questions severely limited both in scope and implication. No senator probed for Dr. Kissinger's broad strategy of the US foreign policies under his direction.

A consensus developed among the panel members who concluded that, under

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Dr. Kissinger's direction, US foreign policy stands up for no principles that can be clearly identified. In the view of the panel, the ideology of American freedom and a search for human dignity and freedom should underlie all US policy. Instead, under Kissinger, for all practical purposes there is no US foreign policy; it is all *ad hoc* reaction to events.

The ten experts want the US Senate to demand answers to vexing problems and to require a satisfactory general outline of the strategy of US Foreign Policy *before* Kissinger is confirmed, rather than *after* he leaves office, when many men suddenly become very wise.

MANY OTHER AREAS DISCUSSED BY THE SEMINAR OF EXPERTS

The Nixon Doctrine was criticized for its imprecision—yet another indication that there is no identifiable US foreign policy, merely “pragmatic” reaction to a series of events. Allan Brownfeld remarked that not one senator questioning Dr. Kissinger wondered aloud what the US actually had gained from the Moscow or Peking trips or whether the Paris Agreements actually had produced “Peace With Honor”, a claim advanced for the Agreement which permits North Viet Nam to keep hundreds of thousands of its troops in the territory of South Viet Nam. In fact, panel experts concluded that the Nixon/Kissinger policy was simply to “get out”, i.e., to abandon our allies, but, if possible, without evident embarrassment to the administration.

The Soviet Government was characterized as a “bureaucratic despotism”. Panelists agreed that such tyrannies must be resisted wherever they are found, whether it is in the US in the form of OEO encroachments on liberty or threats against liberty from foreign despotisms. To protect what America stands for, the ten foreign policy experts believed it essential to project America's idealism overseas and, when and if necessary and practicable, to interfere in the affairs of another nation in order to promote developments that are in the US national interest. At this time, all ten of the exports believed that the Soviet Union needs western technology, western food, western help and friendship. Therefore the US should not consider providing these valuable considerations without advancing US interests and American idealism in the process. The Kissinger/Nixon foreign policy has failed to exploit this advantageous situation in the interest of freedom.

A Common denominator for common action was suggested by Dr. Morris. the President of the University of Plano. President Morris observed that, "Since there is a moral impervative for all men to 'love your brother' and since all of man- kind is his brother, every American should work for his brother's interests, which include his liberty and freedom. On the positive side, therefore, American for- eign policy efforts should be directed in the interests of the liberty and freedom of all men." Dr. Morris' view was compatable to the views of the other panel members.

"Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov 'twist slowly in the wind'", thanks to Kissinger's foreign policy, declared Alan Bock. The West watches these men bravely and shrewdly fight to be free men and, by their actions, undermine the legitimacy of their authoritarian government, which is alien to U.S. foreign policy objectives. Despite dire warnings from Soviet intellectuals of the highest rank and creden- tials, concerning the intentions of the Soviet leadership and the risk to peace, United States policy of detente seems wedded to the concept of "peaceful co- existence."

Nixon's Asian Policy has been calculated to create the propaganda image of a "generation of peace" by "grand slam" tactics, according to Allan Brownfeld, who believes that the Nixon/Kissinger style of diplomacy is "dangerously ineffective." He declared that any advantages of the trip to Red China have been more than offset by serious long-lasting disadvantages that include:

(2) Near collapse of the friendly Sato government in Japan;

(3) Expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) from the UN;

(4) The near or imminent collapse of Cambodia;

(5) The necessity to introduce martial rule in South Viet Nam.

"The United States is now militarily No. 2," according to John Hemenway, former Pentagon official, retired U.S. diplomat, and Soviet-German specialist. Hemenway wondered why the President had his facts wrong. Hemenway recalled President Nixon's assertion to the VFW in New Orleans a few weeks ago to the effect that the U.S. will not be allowed to slip to No. 2, militarily. Yet that is

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exactly where we are. The strategy of "bargaining from strength," considered by all of the panel members as essential in negotiations with the Soviet Union appears to have been abandoned in fact, although the rhetoric continues.

A Steady Deterioration of U.S. Foreign Policy was noted by all ten experts of the panel, who, in various different ways, noted the total absence of any moral direction or purpose in U.S. policy which seems to have lost its direction under the Nixon/Kissinger leadership.

Curiously, during the six-hour discussion of U.S. Foreign Policy of the William P. Rogers era, Secretary of State Rogers' name was seldom mentioned. There was little doubt in the mind of any panelist that the real Secretary of State in the "Rogers" era was Henry Kissinger.

A Haunting Memory of Munich was recalled by historical precedents presented by Professor Schiebel who drew an analogy of the present period with U.S./Soviet relations in the thirties in which intense U.S. interest in detente, commercial ties, and technological aid to Moscow nevertheless culminated in the Ribbentrop/Molotov Pact, ending all hope in the West for "Peace in our Time". John Hemenway recalled British PM Stanley Baldwin's dreadful "confession" to the House of Commons in which he admitted that he had not advised preparedness when Hitler was rearming. Baldwin thereby left Chamberlain in the lurch to face up to Hitler at Munich, totally unprepared. Hemenway saw a parallel in the present failure of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee critically to examine Kissinger by drawing out the real issues.

A Profound Change may be taking Place in U.S. Policy, reflected Dr. Morris of the University of Plano. University President Morris said that, "Judging from yesterday's (the first day) Hearings, we do not seem to be coming to the essence of U.S. foreign policy." Dr. Morris explained that the seminar of ten experts was hastily convened because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee now is examining the credentials of Dr. Kissinger to be Secretary of State. These important events made it imperative for the academic world to examine our foreign policy in an open-minded way so that we might give some guidance and direction to its furtherance.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. I understand this discussion you had about Mr. Mollenhoff—

Mr. HEMENWAY. That will be submitted to you this afternoon.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is a separate document?

Mr. HEMENWAY. Yes, sir, it is a separate chronology.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection, it will be printed in the record.

Mr. HEMENWAY. Thank you very much.

Senator AIKEN. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hemenway.

Mr. HEMENWAY. Thank you, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Glad to have you.

Mr. HEMENWAY. Thank you, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Next is William A. Small, president, Federation of American Arab Organizations of New York. We are glad to have you, sir. We have your paper and you present it as you see fit.

## STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM A. SMALL, PRESIDENT, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN ARAB ORGANIZATIONS, NEW YORK, N.Y.; ACCOMPANIED BY M. T. MEHDI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Dr. SMALL. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Aiken, my name is Dr. William A. Small, president of the Federation of American Arab Organizations. It is our great pleasure to appear on behalf of the Federation of American Arab Organizations to share with you our thoughts on the nomination of Dr. Henry Kissinger. We believe that Dr. Kissinger

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is a competent man who has demonstrated his diplomatic skills with ability and distinction. He is also a scholar and a historian, which should add to his ability in conducting the foreign policy of the country.

With the end of the Vietnam war and hopefully, with the termination of the conflict in Cambodia, America will have to become more and more concerned with the Middle East. President Nixon has indicated twice that the Middle East has the highest priority on the agenda. Dr. Kissinger will have to be dealing in the Middle East with 18 Arab States and with three Moslem countries (Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan) which are sympathetic with the Arab position. He also must deal with Israel.

Dr. Kissinger has stated that his religious background will not affect his policy decisions, and we believe that he is, intellectually, honest in so stating his position. We are not so sure, however, that Dr. Kissinger, as other Zionist Jews, can emancipate himself emotionally from the traditional link to Zionism and the Jewish state.

It is of the utmost importance that the prestige and position of the American Secretary of State should be at such a height that it would significantly affect the views of the countries of the areas and guide them toward accepting American goodwill and induce them to establish better relations with the United States. He does not have to be "acceptable" to those countries as an ambassador should be, but in order to establish good relations it is important at least not to have unnecessary obstacles to hinder the development of good relations.

## U.S. POLICY CONCERNING MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

As you know, Mr. Chairman, there is a bitter conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians in which the Palestinians are supported by fellow Arabs and Israel is supported by the United States. We were gratified when the President said in his last press conference that both Israel and the Arab States are at fault. This was the first time an American President had considered Israel to be at fault. We were, however, unable to believe our ears when the President maintained that America was not "pro-Israel, nor pro-Arab." America has indeed been pro-Israel and its pro-Israeli policy has been demonstrated by the sending of hundreds of phantom jets and billions of dollars to the Jewish state.

## ISRAELI STATEMENTS ABOUT U.S. JEWS

Mr. Chairman, the Israelis have stated time and again that American Jews are "Israelis residing in exile." and are "potential residents of Israel and Israeli occupied Arab lands." Mr. David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel and a Zionist thinker has stated that a Jew in America regards Israel as his government. In the Government of Israel Yearbook 1953-54, p. 35, Mr. Ben-Gurion wrote as follows:

> When a Jew in America or in South Africa speaks of 'our government' to his fellow Jew, he usually means the Government of Israel, while the Jewish public in the various countries view the Israeli ambassadors as their own representatives.

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The Atlantic issue of Newsweek, July 9, 1973, page 56, provides an interview with Dr. Nahum Goldman, former president of the World Zionist Organization in which he tries to define the relationship between the Israeli Jews and the Jews outside the Jewish state. Dr. Goldman says that the Jews outside Israel—such as the American Jews—are junior partners of the Israeli State while the Israeli Jews are the senior partners.

Mr. Chairman, there are many such assertions by Zionist Jewish leaders, and there is enough circumstantial evidence to show that large numbers of American Jews have indeed behaved as Israeli partners.

To the Arab delegations at the United Nations, the behavior of Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg in 1967 was identical with the actions of the Israeli Ambassador Michael Comet. Many prominent American observers of the Goldberg behavior concur with the Arab position.

### DR. KISSINGER'S TIES TO FORMER AMBASSADOR RABIN

Dr. Kissinger's special ties to the former Israeli Ambassador to Washington, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, create a great deal of anxiety and apprehension throughout the Arab world and among all Americans concerned with the Middle East and American interest in that part of the world. According to the Jerusalem Post, August 28, 1973, page 4:

> "Professor Kissinger's handling of the Middle East hitherto was always discreet, even at times of major crisis like the Syrian armored invasion of Jordan, when—as U.S. analysts revealed—he virtually established a two-man war room, with then Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin. He also became closely involved during Premier Golda Meir's visits to Washington. His relationship with Rabin was a kind he maintained with only a handful of other foreign envoys. He took pains to let the State Department play its rightful role front stage.

### DR. KISSINGER SHOULD PUBLICLY RENOUNCE ALL ZIONIST CLAIMS

In the light of all above Zionist assertions that American Jews are junior Israeli partners, and in the light of the fact that most American Zionist Jews, including Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, have indeed behaved as partners of the Israeli State, and in the light of the strong ties between Dr. Kissinger and the Israeli Embassy in Washington, and because there is a great apprehension that Dr. Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State will aggravate the crisis of United States-Arab relations and the energy shortage—in the light of all these, we believe that it is imperative that Dr. Kissinger should publicly renounce all Zionist claims that he has any ties, emotional or philosophical or political, to the foreign State of Israel.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that such a declaration by Dr. Kissinger will eliminate the apprehension felt in America and in the Arab world and only then Mr. Kissinger could perform a useful function in the interest of America and in the interest of international peace.

Thank you, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Small. Has the gentleman with you been identified for the record?

Dr. SMALL. Yes, Dr. M. T. Mehdi.

Dr. MEHDI. I have a brief statement, sir, that if Dr. Kissinger renounces the assertions of the Zionists we believe that his contribution to the energy crisis and the elimination of the energy crisis will be of

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utmost value. Otherwise, there will be no communication between
America and the Middle East, which today we have to establish.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. That in effect, is the concluding statement that Dr. Small gave us. Thank you. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. Well, I think Dr. Kissinger did comment on this situation on the first day of his appearance before the committee. Any-way, what he said will appear in the record of the hearings.

Dr. SMALL. Sir, this is a public denouncement of these ties?

Senator AIKEN. It is hard to remember back. There have been so many questions asked him, but I think this was one of them. I believe he commented on it during the first day of his hearings. I do not guarantee it, but it appeared then. Anyway the record of the hearings will be made available next week.

Dr. MEHDI. What Dr. Kissinger said was that his religious and national heritage will not affect his policymaking decisions. We want a little bit more positive than this. We want a public denunciation of the Zionist claims to his being a junior Israeli citizen.

Senator AIKEN. These are innumerable. Heavens knows how many questions have been submitted in writing to which he is supposed to reply in writing for the record and this may be one of them. Anyway, he comes before our committee again Monday.

QUESTIONS PUT TO DR. KISSINGER

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to join with Senator Aiken with reference to all of the questions that have been put to him. We have made a real effort to cover the whole field and to cover the whole world. Of course, the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Congress all have a different idea about all sections of the world. We have made an effort to cover all of it and I believe you will find that true when you read the printed record of the hearings.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Dr. MEHDI. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Our next witness is Mr. Saul H. Mendlovitz of Rutgers University, Committee of Concerned Scholars for a Just World Order. Did I pronounce your name right?

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. Close, Mendlovitz.

Senator SPARKMAN. Right.

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. We are very glad to have you. We have your paper and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF PROF. SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED SCHOLARS FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. I assume my paper will be in the record and I will just say a word about the proceedings that have gone thus far. We are thankful you have given us this opportunity, although I must confess I feel I am in the top half of the ninth inning, two men out with a pinch-hitter and the score is 9 to 0 against me.

The atmosphere in the past week and in this room is that Henry Kissinger's appointment is a foregone conclusion, and while we are

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exploring deeply some of the issues we will be concerned with even Senator McGovern, I take it, feels that it is appropriate to make him the next Secretary of State.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I say in that connection—

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. You may interrupt me and I will take my 2 minutes back, Senator, OK?

## FUNCTION OF COMMITTEE CONCERNING APPOINTEE

Senator SPARKMAN. I just want to mention something that I thought of while Senator McGovern was talking and something we have to keep in mind. I believe sometimes people overlook it. That is that our only job is to consider the adequacy of the appointee. We have the power to recommend either confirmation or nonconfirmation. We do not have the power to appoint or to choose somebody ourselves. We have for consideration only that one that is submitted to us by the President. So it is a matter of deciding whether or not it is an appropriate nomination and not whether or not we could name a better one.

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. I am glad you made that clear to the group, although, Senator, I was aware—

Senator SPARKMAN. I know that.

Mr. MENDLOVITZ [continuing]. Of what the functions of this committee were. I really did not come down here on a rainy day for the purpose of getting myself in the record. I come with the pinch-hitter's feeling that perhaps we might change just one.

## REASON FOR OPPOSITION TO APPOINTEE

We are opposed, as our paper shows, to the appointee, potential appointee, because we think he is morally unfit for the job. We believe that his appointment would be a serious blow to the establishment of a just world order, and what is more, we honestly believe that the world policy, foreign policy which he wishes to promote is incapable of being carried out and is immoral, and I will speak mostly to the last issue and I will forego the first issue that he is morally unfit, although that seems to me sufficient reason alone to deny him this office.

## DEMONSTRATION IMPACT OF MR. KISSINGER'S APPOINTMENT

But on the demonstration impact many of my colleagues and I have had an opportunity to travel throughout the globe over the past 10 years and we are very much involved with politics and social life of our own community, and we have discovered, as you probably do, that the United States in which it does both domestically and foreign has a great impact on both the substance and style of the way the world political community operates.

We feel very much that if Henry Kissinger were appointed Secretary of State we would be demonstrating both to the global political community and to our own citizens that we were going to go about the conduct of the next 4 and perhaps the next 10 years as business as usual. We are about to appoint a man to the Office of Secretary of State who, if he were brought before an appropriate tribunal, would certainly be charged as a war criminal, and I am not saying he is one but if

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there were—these were standards of conduct we set up in Nuremberg which we promoted, which we are trying to see the world aspire to enforce and we are now in the great act of cynicism about to appoint this man to be Secretary of State. This will mean that societies throughout the globe when they think of the Secretary of State and the foreign ministers they ought to appoint will think of men who are adroit, clever, brilliant but whose lack of moral sensitivity or presence of moral sensitivity have nothing to do with the position he is about to get.

## WORLD AT PRESENT MOMENT

I move to what I think is our most important point, and it has to do with the world view of the potential appointee. If you will permit me a professor's prerogative, I will just stay 3 or 4 minutes on how we see the world at the present moment. We begin with the notion, with the reality, that the global village is not merely rhetoric but is a psychohistorical fact. For the first time in human kind over 95 percent of the human race understands that they live on the same globe. That has all occurred in our own lifetime. This is equivalent. I would say, to the people in the 15th century and the early 16th century suddenly discovering the earth is round and not flat. We have—the changes in attitudes and images and the way we view the world are undergoing very dramatic change. What we need now is a kind of leadership which looks to a new governance of the world community in terms of those changes. We think thoughtful and responsive people throughout the globe have developed and thought through a set of five global political problems. They are well known to everybody here. They are war, they are poverty, social injustice, ecological imbalance, and alienation. We believe that these five problems are interrelated, that there is no way of solving one without looking at the other four.

Furthermore, we believe that they provide the opportunities for what we call world order values and those would be peace, social justice, ecological stability, participation, and economic well-being.

## KISSINGER DOCTRINE OF FIVE-POWER WORLD

What we see in the Kissinger doctrine of the five power world is an inability to deal with those five problems. What we understand him to be saying is that we should revert to a view of the world in which the, in which a concert of power of the five major powers of the world should by tacit agreement and some formal treaties agree to the governance of the community, the global village, and as we understand that, what it will amount to is a moderation of the hostilities amongst the big five without participation, as some of my colleagues up here, of Africa, Latin America and Asia in the decision as to what that governance will be. We find that to be an impracticable and unworkable world community. We do not think it will handle, for example, the nonproliferation of weapons. It will mean that there will be a premium for India, for Brazil, for those powers who are near nucs in order to get into that club to become nucs.

We think the escalation of the arms race in the third world is likely now to increase rather than decrease. If we look at the environmental world then the attempt to establish environmental standards, that

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would be beneficial for the big five but harmful in terms of the de-
velopment for the underdeveloped world, are nowhere mentioned by
Mr. Kissinger.

When it comes to South Africa we find Mr. Kissinger strangely
silent on what the world community ought to be doing with regard to
what is an immoral and illegal regime. We find, therefore, that in the
long run, within the next 15 or 20 years, the attempt to establish a
five-power world will not work and furthermore, we find it is impracticable.

REASONS COMMITTEE MEMBERS FEEL COMPELLED TO VOTE FOR
DR. KISSINGER

All of these matters are in our documents and I will not take any
time, further time and I am sorry Senator George McGovern has
left, because I want to pick up the points he made. As I understood
Senator George McGovern and as I understand other members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, they are really opposed to the
appointment of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. What com-
pels them to vote for him, hopefully, at least, some of you will ab-
stain since this is an unjust and immoral appointment, what com-
pels you to vote for this man at this point, as I understand it, is
some notion that the President is entitled to have his own Secretary
of State to implement his policy, and there is some notion of execu-
tive privilege. If you did not, if you do not put him in that office
he will retain the position he always has had as counselor to the Presi-
dent and you will not get him up here on the Hill to testify.

I find both of those reasons unpersuasive and, furthermore, I think
they are invalid. I think that on the second issue, on the second mat-
ter, that you will not get him up on the Hill. I think a good deal
more work has to be done on the constitutional basis for that executive
privilege, and it seems to me that in fact, under appropriate cir-
cumstances those executive privileges, they are not to be found in
the Constitution. They are an interpretation of the Constitution, and
I would advise that we go to the writings of Professor Berger of
Harvard and look more closely at whether that privilege really pre-
vails over the way it has been exercised in the past so I would look
more closely at that.

As to the question of whether we want a Secretary of State that
carries out the policies of the USA, I would take it that is really the
guts of the matter. I would remind the Senators when Judge Hayns-
worth and Judge Carswell were nominated for the Office of the
Supreme Court of the United States. This Senate denied that con-
firmation, not on grounds I would say of incompetence but of moral
unfitness for the office. They did so because they understood that it
would mean to the black community and to the white community
that to put segregationist people into positions of power at the time
we were trying to integrate this society was an immoral and terrible
act.

One of the reasons I am down here is not because my colleagues on
the campus have urged me to come alone but we did our soundings
in our own communities and we find in the land that we know, the
local communities of which we are part, there is a great deal of con-
cern, uneasiness and of hostility to the appointment of Henry Kis-
singer as the next Secretary of State, and the reason there is no out-

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(3) The foreign policy he proposes is both immoral and inadequate to deal with the global political and social problems of our time.

We, the Committee of Concerned Scholars for a Just World Order, oppose the confirmation of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. Like many other citizens and a number of groups who are testifying here today, we oppose his confirmation because of his moral unfitness for the office. Illicit wire tapping, deception of Congress and of the American people, secret and massive bombing, and deep involvement in the most brutal use of armed violence against human beings in the post World War II era, are sufficient reason to deny his confirmation. We wish however, to go beyond his past performance and raise two matters which we consider have not been sufficiently discussed in connection with this appointment.

First, we believe that the demonstration impact that this appointment will have throughout the world, will be a severe blow to the possibility of establishing a more just and humane world order. Having taken the lead at Nuremberg in establishing standards of conduct for officials of state, with regard to the use of violence and crimes against humanity, it is an act of the greatest cynicism to put Mr. Kissinger into the position where he would act as our chief foreign policy officer. Indeed were an appropriate tribunal to be established, Mr. Kissinger would today face charges as a war criminal. This appointment will confirm to the people of the world that the leadership of this society has decided that "business as usual" is our policy, and that one of the top managers in our recent brutality is to execute this business. For a world which is groping for a new political and moral foundation, the appointment of Henry Kissinger to the office of Secretary of State is therefore an egregious error.

Second, and more important perhaps, our opposition to Mr. Kissinger's appointment to this post, has to do with his overall view of the world and of the position of the United States in this world. And here we should like to provide a summary analysis of our position.

We believe it is necessary to accept seriously not only the rhetoric but the reality of the term "the global village". As we see it, the fact that the overwhelming majority of humankind understands for the first time in history that human society encompasses the entire globe, is a phenomenon equivalent to our understanding that the globe is round rather than flat. It is having an enormously dramatic impact on the images and the attitudes we have with regard to the authority structures of the international community, as well as those of our domestic societies. Thus it is that many thoughtful and responsible individuals throughout the globe are beginning to discuss quite seriously the governance of the global village.

There is increasing recognition that we now face five major global problems. They are: war, poverty, social injustice, ecological instability, and alienation. Many of us see these problems and the effort towards their solution as presenting the opportunity for a realization of the most basic human values. We wish therefore to work towards acceptable conditions of economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability, participation in political process throughout the globe, and peace. And we do not believe these can be achieved without the creation of new kinds of global institutions and new kinds of transnational cooperation.

As we see it these five problem areas are closely interrelated, and in order to achieve a humane and just world order, there will have to be appropriate tradeoffs for the various regions of the world, in accordance with the uneven development in solving these problems that exists in different regions. Establishment of appropriate environmental standards for global survival can only be accomplished if we also take into account the development needs of the underdeveloped world. Vigorous political and perhaps even world community enforcement in connection with the illegal and immoral practices of the South African regime is necessary if we are to achieve both social justice and the minimization of violence.

So far as we are able to ascertain the only tradeoffs presented by Mr. Kissinger are those between the major centers of power. This century provides abundant testimony that such "balance of power" arrangements cannot create the much discussed "stable structure of peace". The problems of proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the escalation of the arms race, creation of environmental institutions to provide for survival of human society, formulation of appropriate energy and agricultural policies to meet the needs of all human beings, are unlikely to be met in a just fashion under this kind of a regimen. Instead there will

221

have to be a balancing of interests and that should most emphatically include the
interests of those who are now most powerless and weak.

What is in the end most dangerous about Kissinger's appointment is his view
of this country's role in the world. The secret method of the Nixon-Kissinger
world order design is to regulate the relations of the five major centers of power
with moderation, while permitting them to satisfy their appetites for riches,
exploitation and expansion, at the expense of the poor and the weak. In other
words, the old colonial formula of the few at the expense of the many, in a
new guise.

Our prospects as a nation and as a species depend on shedding such a short-
sighted and indecent view of international relations. In the coming decades we
must build a global political community, based on the well being of all parts of the
planet, on safeguarding resources and environmental quality, and on respect for
human dignity. Such a unified view of human destiny and national interest is light
years away from the outdated great power fantasy that animates the political
imagination of Henry Kissinger.

SAUL H. MENDLOVITZ,
Chairman, Professor of International Law,
Rutgers Law School.

WITNESS' POSITION AT RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Thank you. By the way, what is your position at Rutgers Univer-
sity?

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. I am professor of international law at Rutgers.

Senator SPARKMAN. Professor of international law?

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. Yes.

APPROPRIATE TRADE-OFFS TO ACHIEVE JUST WORLD ORDER

Senator SPARKMAN. There is one thing I wanted to ask you about. You say there are five problem areas closely interrelated, and in order to achieve a humane and just world order there will have to be appropriate tradeoffs for the various regimes. I do not quite know what you mean. Do you mean you have to neglect some and favor others?

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. No, just the contrary.

Senator SPARKMAN. Trade between them, go ahead.

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. Well, I am sorry, I guess that is a shorthand jar-
gon phrase that we now use.

Senator SPARKMAN. The reason I ask is that is because we do have
these areas of the world and it is a problem with us all the time.

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Try to—

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. If you will permit me to disclose for just 30 sec-
onds, I think what has appeared over the past 10 years in the academic
community has developed a frame of reference for now viewing the
global political community which we call a world order frame of
reference, and these five global problems which I have suggested seem
to interrelate and in order to deal with one of the problems one must
think now of dealing with the other problems so when talk about
tradeoffs, for example, we look at the environmental problem and in
trying to establish environmental standards, let us say, with regard to
the use of the internal combustion machine or let us say, with regard to
the use of DDT, we are immediately forced to think of how would that
affect the developing areas of the world where if they are to develop

21-172—73—pt. 1—15

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the cheap and inexpensive use of DDT as contrasted with other kinds
of fertilizers, the cheap and inexpensive use of the internal combus-
tion machine without governors on them or without seeing something
that would clean it, is the kind of thing we are talking about. It is
that kind of tradeoff we are talking about.

Senator SPARKMAN. I see what you are talking about. I misinter-
preted it. I thought you were referring to geographical tradeoffs.

Mr. MENDLOVITZ. No. It turns out they are geographical anyway, it
turns out but nevertheless, they are problem area tradeoffs.

Senator AIKEN. No questions. You asked my question, Mr.
Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Professor.

Mr. Nicholas Camerota, Jr., National Youth Alliance, Washington, D.C. Come around, sir. We are very glad to have you, and you may submit your statement as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS CAMEROTA, JR., NATIONAL YOUTH ALLIANCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. CAMEROTA. I have with me a copy of a statement which I be-
lieve is in your possession now and I ask that this be submitted into
the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is this what you submit to us?

Mr. CAMEROTA. That is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well. That will be printed in full.

Mr. CAMEROTA. But in addition to all of this, I would ask the com-
mittees' indulgence to allow two photographers from our organization
to come up and take photographs at this time.

Senator SPARKMAN. What, one of yours?

Mr. CAMEROTA. All right?

Senator SPARKMAN. I suppose anybody can take photographs. We
let all of these people take them. But go right ahead with your
statement.

THREAT REPRESENTED BY DR. KISSINGER'S CONFIRMATION

Mr. CAMEROTA. I do not want to exceed the 10-minute time limit. It
is getting very late this afternoon, so I will simply confine myself to a
few remarks and most of them will be extemporaneous. First of all,
I am thankful to have the opportunity to address the committee this
afternoon regarding the confirmation of Henry Kissinger for Secre-
tary of State but in the opinion of the National Youth Alliance,
Kissinger's confirmation would represent a great threat not only to the
internal security of the United States, but to our foreign relations as
well.

PROMOTION OF SECURITY RISKS BY MR. KISSINGER

Now, reviewing Kissinger's record as Chief of the National Security
Council, objectively it would seem that Kissinger is in the habit of pro-
moting security risks. Pentagon papers revealer Daniel Ellsberg was
himself one of the national security risks, as a result of Kissinger's

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promotion and we ought to pause momentarily to consider the fact
that Ellsberg was responsible for procuring a job for James Schlesin-
ger with the Rand Corp.

Two other outstanding security risks promoted by Kissinger are
Morton Halperin, a defense witness for Ellsberg, and Helmut Sonnen-
feldt, whom we have heard a great deal about this morning, who also
leaked confidential information to foreign nationals.

SOVIET WHEAT DEAL AND SEARCH FOR DÉTENTE

Now, in considering the international scene, however, Kissinger's
brilliance as a politician was readily evident in his now handling of
the wheat deal with the Soviet Union and one would suspect Soviet
citizens would hail with enthusiasm, supporting Kissinger's confirma-
tion since they were certainly on the right side of that wheat deal, but
Americans cannot afford wheat prices considering Kissinger's master
stroke cost the taxpayers some $400 million and completely clobbered
the small wheat farmer.

Of course, this is just one result of the highly praised détente we
have been seeking to commence and despite this search for this very
elusive détente and all of Kissinger's peace overtures, even the New
York Times can continue to print articles entitled "Soviet Military
Continues Tough Line Toward the West," and "New Younger Soviet
Generals Thought To Stress the Offensive," this comes from the April
23d issues of the Times this year.

Now, the increase of the already considerable Soviet nuclear arsenal
amply states the Times claim. On the other hand, Kissinger's thoughts
can be seen in the May 26 SALT agreement which was signed by
President Nixon which granted Soviets 35 percent numerical super-
iority in nuclear weapons. When we praise Mr. Kissinger in light of
his actual foreign policy accomplishments to date instead of his rave
reviews in the press we can only be appalled at the series of catastro-
phies that this supposed diplomatic genius has wrought for America,
and I suppose many of us tremble for the future as a result of this.

PEACE WITH HONOR IN INDOCHINA

Now considering his so-called peace with honor in Indochina, what
Kissinger did was sort of a sleight of hand show which was accom-
panied by a lot of fast patter while American troops pulled out igno-
miniously leaving the fighting going on in full range and hundreds of
POW's, missing in action still not accounted for. It is bitter indeed
to realize 50,000 young Americans gave their lives in Indochina think-
ing they would put an end to communism, and Mr. Kissinger came
along and with a few sessions at the conference table rendered all that
sacrifice and pain useless.

DÉTENTE WITH MOSCOW AND PEKING

His détente with the two Communist powers, Moscow and Peking,
the advantages to the American people are less apparent. In order to
get Red China into the U.N., Kissinger treacherously slipped the knife
into our longtime ally Taiwan and then yanked the rug out from

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under Japan and in general caused frankly, some euphoric feeling
throughout the Asiatic Pacific area, all to the great advantage of the
Communist Chinese but hardly of any advantage to ourselves.

RAND CORP. STUDY

But in spite of all this, Kissinger should not really be thought of
as a dove in spite of all the peace proposals and everything else, mainly
because he had arranged a contract that a study should be undertaken
by the Rand Corp. of California which would attempt to keep out
Russian reaction to U.S. atomic attack on Egypt. One can only wonder
whose interests Kissinger was protecting, since that study was taken
and done without the knowledge of either the Secretary of State or
Defense.

FACT THAT MR. KISSINGER IS JEWISH

For we must consider the fact that Kissinger is Jewish and, there-
fore, has a personal stake in the fortunes of another nation, that nation
being Israel. And with the cessation of large-scale military involve-
ment in Indochina, the Middle East itself becomes our No. 1 foreign
problem, and in attempting to conduct negotiations Kissinger is go-
ing to be in an extreme disadvantage by being Jewish. As a matter
of fact, we have quoted from the Los Angeles Times of August 27,
1973, which bears upon this issue, "Kissinger, whatever his qualifi-
cations as Secretary of State, will face a hostile Arab world because
he is a Jew."

APPOINTMENT'S EFFECT ON POSSIBLE ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT

Kissinger's appointment almost certainly destroys any chance of the
possibility of peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. He has
already demonstrated his willingness to commit American military
planes to that region. So before this committee he had stated that
he had advised, he advised the President, to send American troops
into Jordan in 1970 when Syrian tanks rumbled into that land where
the American puppet king was holding sway mainly to insure that
we did not lose this very valuable ally and a real Arab nationalist
leader could take over there. Obviously, that was one decision where we
had to pull Israel's chips out of the fire.

MAN WITH DIVIDED LOYALTIES

The main point with regard to Kissinger, the one I feel needs to
be stressed over and over again, is a man with divided loyalties cannot
serve the best interests of the American people.

The National Youth Alliance represents what we believe to be a
majority of people in this country, white gentile Americans, and be-
cause of this we feel that a man from a minority background, a man
who has divided loyalties cannot do the sort of job we want to see
done in the Middle East.

I know in my capacity as an organizer for the National Youth
Alliance, having gone to many college campuses throughout the coun-
try, that the feelings that you see on college campuses is very much

225

against Kissinger's confirmation for reasons I had stated earlier. Many of these young men and women feel that Kissinger's ethnic background and so on, the possibility of committing U.S. troops into the region is quite real, all of Kissinger's statements notwithstanding.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MR. KISSINGER'S APPOINTMENT

So again, I believe that having Henry Kissinger appointed as Secretary of State may have disastrous consequences for this country and for the majority of people in this country.

If there are any questions you would like to ask me with regard to any of these statements, I would be glad to answer them.

[Mr. Camerota's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS C. CAMEROTA, JR., ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL YOUTH ALLIANCE

The National Youth Alliance is opposed to the confirmation of the nomination of Henry Kissinger to be the secretary of state for the United States. The Kissinger nomination is contrary to the best interests of the American people on a number of grounds, including the following:

NEED FOR UNDIVIDED LOYALTY

First, the man who serves as secretary of state and conducts the relations of the United States with other states must have an undivided loyalty to the United States. He must have no national, racial, or religious ties to another state which may bias his conduct of the affairs of his office to the detriment of the interests of the United States.

Mr. Kissinger, as a Jew, cannot help but feel a personal stake in the fortunes of Israel (as occupied Palestine is generally called under the present Jewish regime there). Regardless of his protests to the contrary, it would be foolhardy for Americans to assume that Mr. Kissinger will always put American interests ahead of those of Israel, the state which claims to represent the interests of all the Jews of the world and looks on all Jews, including him, as members of a single community of interest. In view of the deep American involvement in the Middle East and President Nixon's assertion that the Middle East now represents America's highest priority in foreign affairs, America cannot afford to have as secretary of state a man exposed to even the slightest temptation to sacrifice American interests to Israeli interests.

KISSINGER'S POOR JUDGMENT OF CHARACTER

Second, the man who serves as secretary of state must have sufficient good judgment to properly fill a large number of highly sensitive posts with trustworthy men. The national security of the United States will be critically dependent on such good judgment. Unfortunately, Mr. Kissinger has demonstrated deplorably poor judgment in his past appointments of persons to fill sensitive posts in connection with his National Security Council duties.

Three such appointments which may be mentioned in this regard are Daniel Ellsberg, Morton Halperin, and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, all of whom, incidentally, are also Jews. Mr. Kissinger appointed Daniel Ellsberg to a National Security Council position in 1969, shortly before Ellsberg began stealing highly sensitive secret documents of the United States government. Ellsberg then revealed those secret documents to unauthorized persons, including foreign nationals, in an attempt to undermine the American military forces in Vietnam.

ELLSBERG, SCHLESINGER, AND KISSINGER

The relationship between Ellsberg and James R. Schlesinger, currently secretary of defense, should also be noted here. It is similar to the Kissinger-Ellsberg relationship, in that Ellsberg brought Schlesinger into national security work through recommending him for a position at the Rand Corporation, just as Kissinger

226

singer had earlier brought Ellsberg into the National Security Council. The prospect of having two Ellsberg intimates—Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger—both with the same minority ethnic background, simultaneously occupying the two cabinet posts most concerned with the national security, can only raise the gravest misgivings on the part of all thoughtful and patriotic Americans.

## CATASTROPHIC POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST NATIONS

Third, the policies of the secretary of state during the next three years will vitally affect the national interests of the United States. If Mr. Kissinger becomes secretary of state and is allowed to continue his policies of the last four years, the nation will be exposed to grave jeopardy and will, perhaps, suffer irremediable harm.

Consider the consequences of Mr. Kissinger's policies which we have already experienced. Guided by Mr. Kissinger's policy, the United States withdrew from Vietnam, having achieved nothing of value to the American people and leaving behind hundreds of still-unaccounted-for MIA's and POW's. The sacrifice of 50,000 American lives was nullified by a policy, first of vacillation, half-measures, and crippling restrictions on the use of American military power, and then of virtual surrender under the guise of "peace with honor." All Mr. Kissinger's flitting back and forth from Paris to Washington and all his clever and hopeful news conferences could not change the grim reality of America's Vietnam catastrophe, even if they did serve somewhat to distract public attention from it at the time.

Likewise, consider Mr. Kissinger's policy of detente with Communist China and the Soviet Union. What has that brought to America but dishonor, economic hardship, and military disadvantage? The Soviet wheat swindle of 1972 is the principal economic consequence of Mr. Kissinger's policy of detente America has so far experienced, and it has been a painful experience indeed.

Mr. Nixon's signing of the strategic-arms-limitation agreement in Moscow this spring, which has given the Soviet Union a staggering numerical advantage in offensive nuclear missiles and warheads over America, is the principal military consequence of that policy to date, and it is a terribly dangerous consequence. There is no tangle advantage to be gained by continuing to develop closer ties between America and the two communist powers, and the moral price to be paid is enormous.

## REJECT KISSINGER

America cannot afford—and may not survive—three more years in which her foreign policy is subject to Mr. Kissinger's ethnic bias, his amply demonstrated lack of good judgment in the choice of subordinates for sensitive national-security positions, and his catastrophically ill-advised tendency toward accommodation of and collaboration with communist governments.

The National Youth Alliance strongly and emphatically urges and beseeches this Committee to reject the nomination of Henry Kissinger.

NATIONAL YOUTH ALLIANCE,
Washington, D.C., September 14, 1973.

## NYA OPPOSES KISSINGER CONFIRMATION

The attached statement was presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations today by Mr. Nicholas C. Camerota, Jr., who testified against the confirmation of the nomination of Henry Kissinger to be secretary of state.

Mr. Camerota was a spokesman for the National Youth Alliance. He is a leader of the group's Action Unit in Springfield, Massachusetts. He is a 23-year-old graduate student majoring in political science and philosophy at American International College, in Springfield. Mr. Camerota has been active as a NYA organizer on the AIC campus for the last three years and has spoken on behalf of NYA to many student groups in Massachusetts and Connecticut.

NYA is an action-oriented organization of American patriots, most of them under 30 years of age. Their goal is to build a better America by awakening in Americans a sense of racial, cultural, and national identity to replace the alienation, rootlessness, and neo-liberal cosmopolitanism which now threaten the continued survival of the nation and the race.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator Aiken.

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COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator AIKEN. No, Mr. Chairman. I understand this concludes the open hearings and we will meet again Monday morning with final consultation and an interview with Henry Kissinger. I might say that if he is approved as Secretary of State, I should hold the President responsible for the kind of work that he does. If he is not approved than I have very strong suspicions that he will continue to exercise an influence in formulating and carrying out our foreign policies, perhaps as much as he would have if he were approved. But I do not know about that now. We will know next week what happens.

COMMITTEE'S FUNCTION

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Camerota, you were in here, I believe, when I reminded the audience that this committee's function is to determine the competence, the adequacy. We have no appointive right. So regardless of what kind of an individual we might think of would be a good one, we cannot name him. We can only say yea or nay to the nominee that the President presents.

NO OTHER SUGGESTIONS FOR POSITION

Senator AIKEN. I might say, John, that I have had no suggestion of anybody else for the position. There were a good many people who were sorry when Secretary Rogers left but—

Senator SPARKMAN. I was one of them.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, we all were, but I think no other nominees were presented to me.

Senator SPARKMAN. We certainly appreciate your presentation, and we appreciate the cooperation of all of the witnesses this morning. We have finished up on time, and this concludes our public hearings. We will have Dr. Kissinger here again Monday. Will any part of the hearings Monday be public? No, it is closed session Monday.

Thank you very much, and the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

[Committee staff note: The executive hearings with Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus on September 10, 1973, and with Mr. Kissinger on September 17, 1973, are in the process of being sanitized and will be published shortly.]

# APPENDIX

## RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CURTIS FOR THE RECORD

**Question 1.** In recent weeks, the press has reported a spiraling wave of repression within the Soviet Union as the mistreatment of Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet physicist, and Alexander Solzenitsyn, the novelist, and others attest. Thus, it appears to be a necessary corollary of detente that as government-to-government relations between the United States and the Soviet Union improve, Soviet society becomes more repressive, secretive, and totalitarian. This seems to me to be a repetition of our experience with the Soviet Union during World War II where our respective governments were quite close during the war, but the post-war orgy of political repression at home and military aggression abroad by the Soviet government brought on the cold war. What precautions will you recommend that will insure the American people against the possibility that the Soviet regime will use detente to increase their military power for later use, and facilitate the suppression of the liberties of their own citizens?

Answer. I addressed many of these issues at length in my September 7, 1973 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In addition I have the following comments.

First, the maintenance of our own defense posture is essential to preserving a stable strategic balance with the USSR. Second, we must pursue the negotiations for strategic arms limitations to secure that balance at the lowest levels consistent with our security. Thirdly, we should continue, as we have over the past four years, to engage the USSR in discussions on concrete security issues so that measures of detente will rest on a foundation of mutual interests rather than merely an improved climate.

As I indicated in my testimony there is a limit on how much we can influence the domestic structure of other nations. In any event, I believe that the relaxation of international tensions and greater exchanges offer the best long-term hope for improving the lot of the Soviet people.

**Question 2.** Last year, in its ratification of the ABM Treaty and the Executive Agreement on offensive weapons, the Congress expressed the view that any permanent agreement on strategic arms would provide for parity in such arms; we cannot "live with" a situation where the Soviet Union enjoys a four-to-one advantage in ballistic missile payload capacity permanently. This stipulation was supported by the Administration. What steps will you take to insure that our negotiating posture is consistent with the will of the Congress on these matters.

Answer. We, of course, fully agree with the Congress that negotiations must result in a stable strategic balance. This represents our fundamental negotiating approach.

There is a disparity in ICBM payload, and we are concerned about it. It is only one of the strategic factors, however. We have at present other offsetting advantages such as superior technology, better accuracy, MIRVs, and more submarine-launched missile payload and bomber payload.

One of our concerns is that the Soviet advantage in ICBM payload could be exploited by further technological advances, particularly MIRVs, in ways which will have adverse consequences for strategic stability. For this reason we are seeking a permanent agreement that constrains qualitative improvements, including MIRVs.

**Question 3.** To what extent do you believe that recent Soviet weapon developments, such as more accurate warheads and MIRVs (when coupled with their already numerical advantages) represent a threat to America's basic deterrent?

Answer. The USSR is now testing at least four new ICBMs. At least three

(229)

230

of them have MIRVs. If it turns out that these MIRVs have the size and accu-
racy to attack our Minuteman silos, serious questions would be raised concern-
ing the future survivability of our ICBMs and the purpose for which the Soviets
are acquiring this capability.

It is important, however, to maintain perspective and recognize that a de-
ployed capability is many years away for the USSR. It may be possible to limit
these developments in SALT. In addition, other elements of our strategic forces,
such as our bombers and our submarines, will continue to provide us with an
adequate strategic deterrent if we go ahead with appropriate improvement
programs.

As the President has repeatedly emphasized, we will ensure that the strategic
balance is maintained.

Question 4. Given the long lead time necessary to get new weapons programs underway, how long can the United States afford to wait before beginning new deployments to offset these Soviet developments?

Answer. We believe that the programs we have asked for will help meet our strategic needs in the next decade. We are also examining concepts to enhance the survivability of our ICBM forces or reduce our dependence on them. For the present these programs are sufficient, but Congressional support for them is vital.

Question 5. Given the status of the Soviet developments, does our continued reliance on Minuteman—even MIRVs make sense?

Answer. Minuteman is not vulnerable today, and it will not be for the re-
mainder of the decade. We believe, therefore, that we can continue to depend
upon Minuteman for some time to come. We, of course, depend on other stra-
tegic forces as well, such as bombers and submarine-launched missiles.

Nevertheless, a major issue that SALT must address is the possible vulner-
ability of ICBM forces in the next decade. Our own defense planning must in-
volve the consequences of such vulnerability and possible offsetting measures.

Question 6. You have talked many times of the need to consult closely with our European and Asian (notably Japan and Taiwan) allies on matters affecting common interests. Do you believe that this has been accomplished during your tenure in the Administration?

Answer. The President has stated from the beginning of his Administration that consultation with our allies is central to the conduct of our policy. This consultation is constant and is institutionalized at several levels and in several channels:

The President has visited Western Europe four times. He made an extensive tour of Asia in 1969. He has had four Summit meetings with Japanese Prime Ministers and hopes to visit Tokyo in the near future. He has met in the U.S. with allied leaders periodically, and more frequently than with any others.

Secretary Rogers and I have paid frequent visits to Western Europe and Japan for high-level political discussions. I personally have visited Japan three times in 1972 and 1973 and visited several countries in Asia on several occasions. There are regular Cabinet-level meetings of the Japan-US Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs. There are constant exchanges of visits at the Cabinet level between the U.S. and allied countries.

The President has long held the view that genuine consultation is a matter
not just of communication but of developing positions cooperatively on issues
of common interest:

Our consultations with our NATO allies from the very beginning of the US-Soviet SALT negotiations have insured that US positions have always protected allied interests.

The Atlantic Alliance in 1970 completed a major collective review of Alliance defense strategy.

Our consultations in NATO on MBFR and the European Security Conference have helped develop common allied positions from which to pursue detente with the Communist countries in Europe.

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Extensive discussions at the Summit level with our allies preceded the President's visits to Peking and Moscow and the Brezhnev visit to the U.S.

The President's Year of Europe initiative in 1973 is a major effort to develop, cooperatively, a fresh affirmation of partnership with our Atlantic allies and Japan. This has our highest priority.

*Question 7. Were the Europeans consulted in advance—as opposed to being informed—that the "B" had been dropped from the MBFR talks?*

*What is the significance of the change; are you no longer insisting that the Soviets withdraw more weapons and troops from the NATO front than the allies? And how do you feel about the Soviets using this interim period, like they did the interim period of SALT, to build up their stockpiles?*

Answer. Dropping the "B" has no substantive significance.

Various terms have been used to describe the subject—mutual force reductions, reciprocal reductions, mutual and balanced reductions. In the West MBFR has been the most recent acronym, but in the Vienna preparatory talks all of the countries involved agreed that the title of the conference would be "Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe." The U.S. position, which we will continue to develop with our allies, will take full account of all the factors—including the geographical advantages of the Warsaw Pact—in arriving at possible reduction measures.

Obviously if either side takes advantage of negotiations to undertake a major build-up of forces this would seriously jeopardize the success of those negotiations.

*Question 8. There is much pressure in both the House and the Senate of the United States Congress to unilaterally reduce our troops in Europe. Now I know that you have indicated your opposition to such policy, however, at some point, the popular consensus is America's contingent in Europe will be halved. This will probably entaile the withdrawal of the seven thousand tactical nuclear missiles which are under U.S. Command. Given this predicament, the Europeans have already indicated their interest (as has Japan) in the further development of their nuclear weapons systems. What role do you believe the United States should play, if any?*

Answer. First of all, we disagreed with the premise that there will be a 50 percent reduction in American forces in Europe. Even in a hypothetical situation created by such an action this would not necessarily mean the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons. In fact, the Administration has pointed out the unilateral withdrawal or reduction of conventional forces, without reciprocity, might lead to an increased reliance on nuclear forces. That is why we strongly favor negotiated mutual reductions of forces, and why we have urged the Alliance to strengthen its non-nuclear capabilities.

*Question 9. In the fall of 1971, following Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations, the Congress considered and rejected the nullification of the 1958 Formosa Resolution, thus reinforcing once again the Congressional determination to maintain the integrity and credibility of the United States treaty commitments. What steps would you recommend with specific regard to our defense commitment to Taiwan that would leave no doubt in anyone's mind as to our intentions to prevent the absorption of Taiwan by Communist China by force?*

Answer. First, there must be a certain reservation about your premise: we have no indications that the People's Republic of China now intends to use force to bring Taiwan under its control. Secondly, our view was clearly expressed in the February 1972 Shanghai Communique which affirmed our "interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

As regards our defense commitment to the Republic of China, we have stated repeatedly that we continue to honor that commitment. We are also continuing a modest security assistance program—now largely consisting of sales—to assist the Republic of China's defensive capability against possible attack.

*Question 10. A recent study conducted by economists at the Library of Congress for the House Foreign Affairs Committee stated that the economic advantages to*

232

the United States from trade with the Soviet Union will necessarily be small for the foreseeable future. If the economic benefits are likely to be small for the United States—even if they are large for the Soviet Union—specifically, what political benefits from this trade will accrue to the United States which would justify the build-up of Soviet economic potential by American technology?

Answer. First of all, we do not believe that our economic advantages from trade with the USSR would necessarily be small for the foreseeable future. For example, assuming that there is MFN for the USSR, we have envisaged about two to three billion dollars in trade over the next three years, with the US probably having a favorable balance.

In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of September 7, I addressed some of the political aspects of an expanded economic relationship with the USSR. Now that our political relations have improved, our economic relations should be normalized so we can advance over a broad front toward an increasingly stable relationship with the USSR. We are at a stage where advancement in the economic area is important for further improvement in our overall relations.

**Question 11.** The press has had frequent reports of threats by the East German regime to interfere with the access routes to West Berlin because citizens of East Germany have made a decision to leave the country and escape to West Berlin. Thus, despite the "detente" rhetoric, the simple problem of the free movement of people between East and West Germany remains with us. What steps will you recommend that will provide for our negotiating posture at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that will tie a political detente in Europe to the meaningful adherence to the notion of a free movement of people, information and ideas between Eastern and Western Europe?

Answer. In the preparatory work and the Ministerial meeting of the CSCE, the U.S. has consistently supported the principle of freer movement of people, information and ideas. This is now on the agenda of the committees that will begin their work on September 18. The U.S. will continue vigorously to support practical measures to bring this exceedingly important principle to life. The agreements reached would apply fully to all participants, including the German Democratic Republic.

**Question 12.** Dr. Kissinger, as a scholar of international relations, you expressed the belief that the path to stability comes not from seeking peace, but from an accepted legitimacy among the great powers about the nature and scope of the international system. You also stated that stability will only result if we are willing to set certain principles, values, and goals above peace. What do you, then, as a man now in a position to implement some of your earlier ideas, perceive to be the purpose of this country in the coming decade. And how do you perceive the international system and the threats to that system?

Before you reply, I would like to add one further thought. In your writings as a scholar, you stated that at times a nation must recognize that there will be revolutionary powers which will accept no compromise in their quest to upset the status quo. Do you see any revolutionary powers in the present international system, I would cite North Vietnam in Southeast Asia and the Arab countries in the Middle East, and how do you propose to counter the intent of these revolutionary powers?

Answer. The thoughtful questions that have been raised involve issues of great scope. I could not do justice to them in a brief written reply.

It would be much more productive to discuss these matters personally. I would be pleased to do so at a mutually convenient time.

## RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HANSEN FOR THE RECORD

**Question 1.** Dr. Kissinger, the National Petroleum Council in its recent report, "U.S. Energy Outlook," estimated that if current trends continue, we will be importing over half our oil, or 9.7 million barrels per day, by 1975, and that

233

by 1980 66% of total oil supply, or 16.4 million barrels of oil per day, will be imported. The NPC added that most of this will be coming from the Middle East. Do you have any reason to believe that within the next five years the U.S. could exist without Middle Eastern oil?

Answer. There appears to be no near-term alternative to increasing imports of oil from the Middle East.

We have excellent relationships with our principal Middle Eastern suppliers of oil, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and we do not foresee any circumstances in which they would cut off our supply. If an emergency, such as a war, were to deny temporarily the supply of oil from the Middle East, we would have to resort to special measures, such as drawing down oil stockpiles and rationing. We are working now on the necessary contingency plans.

Over the longer run, as the President emphasized on September 8, the domestic alternatives we are pursuing such as offshore exploration and accelerated programs in such areas as coal and nuclear energy, should make us self-sufficient by the next decade.

**Question 2.** The Arabs have repeatedly indicated by their words and their actions that their enthusiasm for selling the United States the oil it needs will be closely linked to a change in attitude with respect to the U.S. political position regarding the Middle East. The Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula is a particular thorn in their side. Even if Arab countries declined to refuse further sales of oil to U.S. companies and merely froze production at current levels, such action could wreak havoc with our petroleum based economy. Could you tell us what approach you would have in mind as Secretary of State and chief foreign policy adviser to the President in dealing with this issue?

Answer. The U.S. has an important interest in an Arab-Israeli peace. This is true for a number of reasons, oil being just one of them. We have stated repeatedly since 1969 that we will do all we can to help the governments involved reach a settlement.

But the U.S. by itself cannot produce a solution. A settlement has to come from a serious effort by the governments involved to reach an agreement that reflects the legitimate interests of all parties. There must be a decision by Arab and Israeli leaders that they want a negotiated settlement and are prepared to make the difficult decisions that will be necessary to carry through a settlement.

So we are committed to do what we can to help achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement, but the crucial decisions are not ours primarily.

**Question 3.** Although many feel that no matter what U.S. action is taken short term dependency on Middle Eastern oil will be an unavoidable reality, many have suggested that an expedited leasing program—particularly on the Atlantic continental shelf, an area of the country most dependent on Middle Eastern oil—could help mitigate our dependence on such oil. It has also been suggested that a crash program should be initiated to develop our coal, oil shale, geo-thermal energy resources, among others. Easing of sulfur restrictions and other environmental adjustments are also seen as a means to mitigate foreign dependence.

**Do you see any relationship between a dramatically expanded domestic energy effort and the ability of the United States to retain an independent attitude with respect to foreign policy matters pertaining to Israel?**

Answer. For a variety of domestic and foreign policy reasons, we must make every reasonable effort to reduce our dependency on foreign supplies of energy. The President's energy program aims in part at this by measures such as facilitating accelerated production of conventional energy sources, an energy conservation program, and accelerated funding for energy research and development efforts.

Apart from the concrete benefits to the U.S. in increasing the actual availability of energy, such efforts will broaden our sources of energy. This should make it apparent to oil producers that the higher oil prices go, the more economic it will become to produce energy from other sources.

In any event, oil is only one of the factors that affect our policies toward the countries of the Middle East. We shall continue to be guided by our fundamental interest in the achievement of a stable and enduring peace in which the security and independence of Israel and all its neighbors are assured.

21-172-73-pt. 1—16

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RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, CHAIRMAN JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES, FOR THE RECORD

1. The Congress and most Americans commend and support many of the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by President Nixon's Administration, particularly in charting new courses and new relationships with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. However, in the effort to build what the President and others refer to as a "structure for peace," it appears that most of the effort is being directed toward relations among the Great Powers.

The question many Americans are asking, is how a durable and genuine structure of peace can be built if it fails to consider more fully the interests of Third World countries, and the massive and growing humanitarian and survival problems affecting the vast majority of mankind in these countries. Too often, the Administration's failure to recognize the interests and problems of Third World countries—including massive human tragedies from political-military conflict or national disaster—has seemingly resulted in a non-policy on the part of the Administration toward the interests and concerns of the developing countries. The Secretary of State must consider whether the United States can successfully contribute to building a lasting structure for peace without giving far greater priority and substance to the developing and humanitarian problems which affect so much of mankind and the peace of the world.

*Question 1. a. In the context of this Administration's foreign policy, how does Dr. Kissinger generally define the place and role of "Third World" interests and concerns in building a structure for peace?*

*b. What new initiatives—involving such things as foreign assistance and diplomacy—is Dr. Kissinger prepared to advocate in according greater priority to the interests and concerns of the "Third World" countries?*

Answer. We accord great importance to the "Third World" and this area will receive even closer attention during the next few years. Relations with major powers have dominated the headlines in recent years—and perhaps this is inevitable. But now that certain breakthroughs have been made, a larger degree of concentration can be focussed on the developing nations.

It is dangerous, however, to generalize about the "Third World" or even to define its membership; the countries that are usually put into this category cover a wide range geographically, politically, socially and economically. It is difficult, if not impossible, to postulate interests and concerns for such a disparate grouping and then attempt to fit such an artificial construct into the structure for peace.

Because of their great diversity we must generally approach the problems of these nations on a country-by-country or a regional position; some have a stronger interest in international issues; and some share our values more than others. Obviously these differences will to a considerable extent determine the nature of the contribution that the individual states can make to any structure of peace.

In the long run, no structure of peace will be possible if the bulk of the world's people are dissatisfied. They must be able to acquire the kind of stake that will in their view, make the structure just. This is an immense task in which we have a major role to play along with others who have the means to contribute. Our contributions in areas such as trade and aid depend heavily on the Congress, and I look forward to working together with it in further improving our performance.

I would not attempt now to describe any broad program of increase diplomatic initiatives that we might under take toward "Third World" nations. Progress will have to be accomplished on a country-by-country and area-by-area basis. We will be undertaking a series of studies and reviews of our relations with

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many of the "Third World" countries to see how we and they can work togethier more effectively.

Question 1. c. In Bangladesh, still recovering from the dislocations and de-
struction of the civil strife in 1971, what is Dr. Kissinger's understanding of our
country's responsibility towards current food shortages in that country and
Bangladesh's urgent need for general humanitarian and economic assistance?
And, in the current West African food crisis, what is Dr. Kissinger's view of the
nature, level and scope of our government's responsibility to aid those nations
affected by the Sahelian drought?

Answer. Bangladesh.—The United States has made generous contributions of food, essential commodities and cash to Bangladesh. This assistance has helped meet the urgent food and other needs of millions of persons affected by the civil war and has helped revive economic activity. US relief and rehabilitation assistance totalled $431 million as of June 30, 1973, comprising approximately one-third of the total of all bilateral and multilateral aid. [A table providing further details of U.S. assistance is attached.]

Our primary concerns in Bangladesh continue to be humanitarian in nature. For this reason, future US development assistance will concentrate on increasing food production through programs in agricultural and rural development, and on family planning.

The US has been the leading international donor of aid to Bangladesh. I be-
lieve that we, together with the other developed nations, have a responsibility to
continue to assist that country as generously as our resources permit.

*West Africa.*—The United States has taken the lead in responding to the present food crisis in West Africa. We have allocated more than 560 million pounds of grain to meet identified and projected needs in the Sahel Region during the past year. More than 60 percent of the grain has been delivered, and the rest is on its way or scheduled to move over the next few months. As members of an FAO-sponsored team we are now preparing to examine the requirement for additional food inputs to the Region. As such needs are identified, we will work with other donors to insure no threat of mass starvation arises. In addition to major food inputs, we have also provided emergency funds to buy medicines, blankets and canvas tenting for refugees, feed for livestock, and planes to fly grain to remote regions.

Our assistance, coupled with efforts of other donors, has been a fine example
of international cooperation. We will continue emergency food shipments and
related disaster efforts for as long as such support is needed.

The United States will also work with the countries of the Sahel, and other members of the international donor community, including the United Nations, to help develop medium- and longer-term programs aimed at recovery and rehabilitation of the Region. Substantive details and magnitudes of these programs have not yet been determined.

*Question 1. d. In this connection, what kinds of initiatives does Dr. Kissinger advocate regarding people interests and problems in the Middle East—including the Palestinian refugees—which would contribute to building a structure for peace in this area of the world?*

Answer. The single most important contribution to bettering the lives of the people in the Middle East would be a peace settlement in which all parties would have a stake. The US Government has said that any peace settlement should, among other things, address the legitimate interests of the Palestinians. In particular, the United States, in cooperation with other countries, would be willing to do its share to help resolve the human dimension of the Palestinian refugee problem in a future peace settlement. It is our view that this could go a long distance toward the normalization of political relations in the Middle East, which in turn would contribute to the building of a structure of peace in that area.

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Question 2. In Indochina, what is Dr. Kissinger's view of American humanitarian responsibilities toward rehabilitating the peoples and countries of the region?

Generally define American policy toward the post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction of Indochina, including such things as immediate and long-term objectives, anticipated priorities, and so forth.

What department, agencies, and offices within our government have been responsible for post-war planning in Indochina?

How should our country's contribution to post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction be implemented—through international agencies, bilateral arrangements or both? What considerations are defining these channels for Indochina generally and for each country in the area?

What role is anticipated for the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and other international or regional organizations in participating in the post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction process? Does our government anticipate the creation of a special international agency along the lines previously created in Korea, Bangladesh, and elsewhere?

What kinds of arrangements and funding levels are anticipated in our government's post-war assistance to North Vietnam? Among other things, does our government anticipate an American presence in North Vietnam?

Apart from the general economic or reconstruction assistance as envisioned in the cease-fire agreements, does Dr. Kissinger believe that the United States should consider providing immediate humanitarian assistance for such things as rebuilding destroyed medical facilities and housing in North Vietnam?

If, under the provisions of cease-fire agreements or other arrangements, for the individual countries of Indochina, different political authorities function within the same country, will all such authorities be responsible and eligible for administering post-war assistance? In South Vietnam, for example, what is the anticipated role of the PRG in rehabilitating areas under its control? Elaborate our government's views on these kinds of problems in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and our policy on providing humanitarian assistance to people in all areas of these countries.

Answer. We believe that large-scale economic assistance to Indochina is essential for the next few years in order to maintain a durable peace, to meet urgent humanitarian needs, and to promote the economic reconstruction and recovery of the area. Direct assistance to those groups of people most severely affected by the war—refugees, disabled persons, orphans—is needed both to help improve their living conditions and assist in their reintegration into the social and economic life of their countries. Equally essential is the need to promote economic recovery without which the pressing human needs of the area can only be met temporarily. The reconstruction of the economy of Indochina involves not only the physical repair of roads and bridges and houses and hospitals, but the reestablishment of healthy economies and societies in which useful and productive jobs are available, and which can themselves support the costs of providing adequate medical care, education and social services. In our view, economic assistance in Indochina must be provided so as to support and accelerate the transition from war-time conditions of poverty and dependence, to peace-time conditions of relative prosperity and economic independence.

The East Asian Bureau of the Department of State and the Supporting Assistance Bureau of the Agency for International Development have been primarily responsible, in coordination with the National Security Council and other agencies, for planning and implementing U.S. assistace efforts in Viet Nam, and for conducting international negotiations concerning this subject.

We favor broad international participation in postwar assistance to Indonesia. One possible mechanism would be a Consultative Group arrangement along the lines of the one that has been established in Indonesia. Such a group could include the bilateral donor countries and international financial institutions and agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the IMF and the U.N. and its specialized agencies. In the existing consultative groups, the international banks and agencies have played a very important role in working closely with the host government, assessing economic conditions, proposing economic policies and programs, preparing development programs and projects and coordinating the activities of the donors. While providing valuable services within an international framework, the consultative group structure permits great flexibility for the individual donors which can select those programs and projects they wish to undertake and maintain control over the expenditure of their funds.

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Recently the Government of South Vietnam requested the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to establish such a Consultative Group for South Vietnam. Those institutions agreed to explore this possibility and consultations are now under way. We hope to see an international aid structure of this type extended to Laos and Cambodia at an appropriate time. The North Vietnamese have indicated a preference for direct bilateral assistance rather than multi-lateral aid or bilateral aid coordinated through a Consultative Group. While we do not anticipate the establishment of a special international agency for Indo-china in the near future, we do foresee an important role for the U.N. agencies throughout the region through their regular program activities.

Though we have had extensive discussions with representatives of the Government of North Vietnam, these have been recessed pending assurance that the North Vietnamese are observing all of the provisions of the cease-fire agreement. No requests for aid funds for North Vietnam will be made until we are satisfied as to North Vietnamese adherence to the agreement. Any discussion of aid levels or implementation procedures would be premature prior to completion of the talks.

Our assistance in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is now channeled through the Governments of those countries. However, we are not opposed to humanitarian-type assistance being given to people in non-government controlled areas of Indochina. Of course, this must be worked out in a way satisfactory to the legitimate Governments in the area and we are hopeful that appropriate means can be found to provide such assistance.

**Question 3.** In 1969, a report of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees Recommended that the President create by Executive Order a Bureau of Humanitarian and Social Services, to be headed by an Assistant Secretary within the Department of State. The creation of such a Bureau would serve to coordinate and give greater priority and standing to our government's humanitarian policies and programs. The thrust of this proposal was later incorporated in the Petersen Report on the reorganization of the Agency for International Development and foreign aid programs. The Proposal was recommended, as well, in President Nixon's subsequent Foreign Aid messages to the Congress. In 1970-1971, the Subcommittee on Refugees worked closely with the National Security Council staff in an effort to implement the proposal. On April 12 of this year, Senator Pearson and Senator Kennedy introduced the proposal as an amendment to the Foreign Assistance authorization bill for fiscal year 1974. The Department of State and AID opposed the amendment's adoption, and it failed in Committee. However, in its report on the bill, the Foreign Relations Committee stated that although the Committee "has not acted to report new legislative authority for the creation of such an official [bureau], the Committee wishes to make plain its view that the need for improved coordination remains acute, and urges appropriate action by the Administration to meet this need, thus possibly avoiding the need for legislative action."

What are Dr. Kissinger's views on the establishment of a Bureau of Humanitarian and Social Services within the Department of State along the lines initially recommended by the Subcommittee on Refugees?

Answer. I am of course fully aware of the Judiciary Subcommittee's interest in having a Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs established within the Department of State. As you noted, back in 1971 this Administration supported the creation of such a Bureau as part of the President's legislative proposals in the area of foreign assistance. As you also know, those proposals were not acted upon by the Congress. Therefore, the Administration took a number of executive actions to improve coordination and give greater priority to our government's humanitarian policies and programs. The Agency for International Development consolidated its humanitarian activities under one operational bureau. Full, high level coordination of disaster relief operations was provided for major disasters, such as those in Bangladesh, the Philippines, the Sahel and now Pakistan, by the designation of the Deputy Administrator of A.I.D. as coordinator.

By the same token, the Secretary's Special Assistant for Refugee and Migration Affairs assures that high level coordination is provided in refugee relief operations—for example, the Bengali refugees in India, Soviet Jews, and the Southern Sudanese refugee repatriation program. The apparent effectiveness of these measures leaves me reluctant to commit myself to the establishment of a Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs at this time. I can assure you that I plan to involve myself closely in these programs and will be prepared to take whatever

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action is required to assure that our Government's humanitarian policies and programs are effective and receive the attention and priority due them.

*Question 4.* What are Dr. Kissinger's views on how the United States can help contribute to a better response within the international community toward humanitarian problems and concerns?

a. In December 1971, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary General to establish a high-level position within the Secretariat to coordinate disaster relief, which was considered by many as a first step towards the creation of what some have called a permanent United Nations Emergency Service. What initiatives is the Administration prepared to take in assisting the United Nations to develop such a capability for responding more effectively to humanitarian problems around the world? What is Dr. Kissinger's understanding of the Administration's policy toward the creation of a United Nations Emergency Service, along the line previously recommended by the Subcommittee on Refugee, and what role should the United States play in support of such an emergency service?

Answer. The concept of United Nations humanitarian assistance is a commendable activity which the United States has traditionally supported. The United States initiated action within the United Nations to create the office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRC) in 1971 and the Administration has continued to encourage its activities as provided for by General Assembly resolution. We believe that the UNDRC, along with other United Nations agencies which deal with such matters as refugees and assistance to children, currently provide the mechanism to enable the United Nations to respond to humanitarian appeals throughout the world. Although I am not familiar with details of the proposed United Nations Emergency Service, I should be prepared to consider the proposal with interest.

*Question 4, b.* Many members of Congress and Many Americans deplore the Administration's advocating reductions in America's contribution to the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations. What is Dr. Kissinger's view on the current level of American contributions to international humanitarian organizations, such as UNICEF, World Health Organization, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Committee of the Red Cross, League of Red Cross Societies, and other international bodies?

Answer. The Administration agrees with, and is in the process of implementing Public Law 92-544, dated October 25, 1972 which had as its goal the reduction of the U.S. rate of assessment to 25 percent in certain agencies of the UN system whose assessments the United States has agreed to honor as a condition of membership. This provision does not, of course, apply to programs and funds to which the United States contributes voluntarily as a result of a perceived national interest. Most humanitarian programs are funded through such voluntary contributions.

Accordingly, I will examine the current level of the US voluntary contributions to international humanitarian organizations on a case-by-case basis and would plan to recommend a level of contributions to the Congress based upon the importance of the program in the light of competing needs and degrees of US interest.

UNICEF, which was established in 1946 to meet the emergency needs of children arising out of World War II, continues to provide such assistance—Nigeria, Bangladesh and Nicaragua are examples. But the agency's major emphasis is now on long-range development programs for children.

The US has strongly supported UNICEF over the years. This support has been manifested by our cash contribution to the organization: $15 million was contributed in FY 1972 and FY 1973 and $18 million will probably be decided on for FY 1974.

ICRC—The US regular annual contribution to the International Committee for the Red Cross is authorized by law (PL 89-230, October 1, 1966, 89th Congress) at a maximum of $50,000. In addition, the US Government made a special contribution of $1 million to the ICRC on June 30, 1971 for humanitarian and disaster relief and assistance to war victims. This contribution was in addition to those made for specific programs, such as humanitarian relief in Bangladesh, Nigeria-Biafra, and Indochina.

*The League of Red Cross Societies* is a federation of national red cross societies and does not receive regular contributions from governments.

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For fiscal year 1974 the Administration has asked the Congress for modest increases in our contributions to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and for the International Committee on European Migration. It should be remembered that, in addition to our regular contributions, the United States has made substantial special contributions to various United Nations and other international organizations for emergency relief and refugee programs, such as Bangladesh, Sudanese refugees and Jewish emigrants from the USSR.

*Question 4. c. Proposals have been suggested to give the United Nations Economic and Social Council a permanent and continuing role in responding to humanitarian crises around the world. This would be similar to the Security Council's role in the political-military area. What is Dr. Kissinger's view of authorizing the Economic and Social Council's humanitarian intervention in massive people problems resulting from natural or man-made disasters?*

Answer. During the past few sessions of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) one of the most widely discussed subjects involved various recommendations concerned with measures to strengthen the Council. An overall objective of the United States has been to obtain Council agreement on measures to revitalize ECOSOC and to permit it to function as a principal organ of the United Nations as laid down in the United Nations Charter. In response to the question of "authorizing the Council's intervention in massive people problems resulting from natural or man-made disasters" it should be noted that the Rules of Procedure of the Council provide that special sessions may be held by decision of the Council, or at the request of (1) a majority of the members of the Council; (2) the General Assembly; or (3) the Security Council (rule 4). It would thus appear unnecessary to give the Council, in addition, a permanent and continuing role in responding to humanitarian crises. We have at the present time an example of this procedure. The Government of Pakistan has indicated its interest in calling a special session of the Council to respond to the recent Pakistani floods and has sought our views. We have supported this move and a majority of Council members have agreed to hold such a meeting on Monday, September 17, 1973.

*Question 5. It is anticipated that a diplomatic conference will be convened next year by the International Committee of the Red Cross to revise and update the Geneva Conventions of 1949—including those relating to weapons of war, non-international armed conflict, and the protection of civilian populations.*

Given the difficult and bitter experience of the United States in Indochina, and the massive destruction caused by the new technology of war, can Dr. Kissinger generally elaborate the Administration's position on the revision of the Geneva Conventions?

*What progress can we expect in this area?*

*What specific provisions of the Geneva Conventions does Dr. Kissinger believe need revision?*

*What are his recommendations in this area?*

Answer. The Administration supports the efforts under way to strengthen and develop international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. The United States has and will continue to participate actively in this work.

The Swiss Government has convened a diplomatic conference on this subject, scheduled for Geneva, February 20 to March 29, 1974. A second session of the conference a year later will probably be required to complete the work. The conference will consider two draft protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions which have been developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross as the end product of a series of conferences of government experts held over the last two years. One of the draft protocols deals with international armed conflicts and the other with non-international armed conflicts.

The United States Government received the final drafts of the protocols at the end of August. We have just begun our study of the revised proposals, and we expect that it will require considerable time to develop positions for the February diplomatic conference.

We can, however, indicate at this time general areas in which we think progress will be possible.

Our first priority has been to develop provisions aimed at improving the implementation of the existing law. If current law is not lived up to there is little hope that new rules will have much impact. Thus, the United States has submitted proposals which would make more likely the appointment of a Protecting Power or substitute organization to help ensure compliance with Geneva Convention provisions covering treatment of POW's and others, because we consider that outside inspection is the surest way to improve implementation of the law. We would like to establish a requirement that parties to an interna-

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tional armed conflict accept the ICRC if no other Protecting Power or substitute
were accepted.

A second area where we can expect advances is that of protections accorded to the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked. In this area we also hope for major advances in the protection accorded to medical transports, particularly medical aircraft, including medevac helicopters.

Another area where there is considerable potential for progress is in broadening somewhat the categories of irregular combatants in international armed conflicts entitled to receive prisoner-of-war treatment.

Finally, we are hopeful that a protocol dealing with internal conflicts can be developed that will be a significant advance over the current basic protections accorded to victims of armed conflicts of this nature by Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.

Far more difficult are some of the proposals relating to the means and methods of warfare. I refer in particular to provisions relating to area bombardment, to certain prohibitions on attacks, and to proposals which are likely to be advanced by various countries for the limitation or restriction of certain specific conventional weapons. We favor and shall strongly support efforts to increase protection of civilians and to promote respect for human rights during armed conflicts. However, we firmly believe that such improvements in the law must be carefully considered and framed so that they will be acceptable to states and workable in practice. In this area of international law, as in others, the development of new conventions which predictably will be ignored in practice is not progress; on the contrary, it is likely to foster disrespect for the law and further denials of the human rights the conventions are designed to protect.

You may be assured that we shall exert our most thoughtful and determined efforts to the improvement of the Geneva Conventions.

**Question 6.** A difficult and sensitive issue in our foreign policy formulation is what the American response should be to the suppression of human rights within another nation. The persecution of dissidents and religious groups in the Soviet Union; the jailing and mistreatment of political prisoners in Greece, Brazil, South Vietnam, and other countries; the massacres in Burundi and the Portuguese territories of Africa; and similar developments in other parts of the world pose difficult problems for American foreign policy?

Should such events or developments be a consideration in the formulation and implementation of American foreign policy? If so, why, in the recent past, is there a record of official silence on so many of these issues—such as occurred over Pakistan's actions in East Bengal in 1971? Should the United States be silent? What factors should be considered in a decision to speak out against the suppression of human rights or mass killings in another nation? What kinds of actions can the United States Government usefully take in such situations?

Answer. I addressed those issues at length in my testimony before the Committee. Let me recapitulate some of the major elements in our approach.

The United States stands emphatically for such basic principles as human liberty, individual rights, freedom of movement, and freedom of the person. On the other hand, the protection of basic human rights is a very sensitive aspect of the domestic jurisdiction of the governments with whom the United States has to conduct foreign policy.

On the international level we will cooperate and advocate enforcement of human rights. In our bilateral dealings we will follow a pragmatic policy of degree. If the infringement on human rights is not so offensive that we cannot live with it, we will seek to work out what we can with the country involved in order to increase our influence. If the infringement is so offensive that we cannot live with it, we will avoid dealing with the offending country.

If we are to be true to our principles we can never imply that we are acquiescing in the suppression of human liberties. But at the same time I believe it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the world a direct objective of American foreign policy for the reasons I have stated in my testimony.

**Question 7.** In addition to the growing international energy crisis, there is also developing a world-wide food crisis.

**How would Dr. Kissinger define our country's international food responsibilities and what measures would he advocate by the international community for a better allocation of food supplies?**

**What is Dr. Kissinger's understanding of the Administration's position regarding the future allocation of PL 480 food? There appears to be a growing imbalance in our government's overseas food allocations, between dollar sales and food for security purposes (under Title I of PL 480), and humanitarian donations (under**

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*Title II.* In our foreign policy considerations, why is it more important to sell food to the Soviet Union at the expense of helping to feed starving people in West Africa or Bangladesh?

Answer. The world food situation is an extremely important issue and is under intensive review within the Government.

We must continuously weigh the competing claims for our agricultural output. Quite suddenly, we confront a serious problem affecting not only the recipients of commodities financed under PL 480 but the many nations dependent in whole or in part on our agricultural exports.

PL 480 legislation requires that commodities exported under either Title I or Title II of PL 480 be in excess of amounts needed for domestic consumption, adequate carryover stocks and anticipated dollar exports. In the absence of export controls, no limitations are placed on dollar sales. At present supplies are short because commercial demand is heavy. Commodities available for PL 480 must be limited to the amount which will not, in the judgment of Secretary of Agriculture, interfere with commercial sales, or result in an inadequate carryover. The impact of PL 480 on market prices, particularly when prices of farm products are at a record high, must also be given due weight.

As to the various claims, I feel that we must contribute our fair share of food aid to combat hunger and malnutrition, to promote general economic development in the developing countries, and to provide emergency food aid to countries that are hit with natural disasters. We should also urge other nations to increase their share of providing food assistance to developing countries.

I would advocate that the international community adopt policies to share the responsibility for providing world food needs. This is one of the topics now being considered in the FAO and the OECD. It is also a subject of the interagency study I have requested on the world food situation.

PL 480 Title II is not the only way in which humanitarian requirements are met. This year we have switched some of our food aid for Bangladesh to Title I and we have just provided wheat for emergency flood requirements in Pakistan under Title I. In short, providing food for those in the world who would otherwise go hungry has received the highest priority in PL 480 allocations this year, even though area programs have had to be reduced.

Because of the legislative restrictions placed on PL 480, the choice between dollar sales to the Soviet Union or any other country and feeding starving people is not solely a matter of foreign policy. In point of fact, however, the US is providing food to Bangladesh and to the Sahelian zone of Africa. In response to United Nations requests, the US will contribute about half of all the grain supplied as aid to Bangladesh during CY 1974. Similarly, the US is by far the largest single donor of food for drought relief in Central West Africa—about 50 percent of the grain donated so far. It is true however that the current allocations of commodities for PL 480 shipments in FY 1974 will severely limit the capacity of the US to respond to disaster situations.

*Question 8. Just as our national leadership cannot build an effective "structure for peace" by failing to recognize the important interests and concerns of Third World countries abroad, so also can not our national leadership build a "structure for peace" without a fuller involvement of Congress and the American people at home.*

*What new initiatives does Dr. Kissinger advocate to involve a broader segment of the Congress and the American people in the making of United States foreign policy? And what new initiatives does Dr. Kissinger advocate to seek that basic public support without which, as he has so often stated, no foreign policy can truly be effective?*

Answer. I addressed these issues extensively in my opening statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in my subsequent testimony.

We discussed in particular executive-legislative relations in its various forms. As I stated, if I am confirmed, I will meet promptly with the Chairman and ranking member of the Committee to work out procedures to promote this goal.

I also pointed out that if our foreign policy is to be truly national, we must also deepen our partnership with the American people. This means an open articulation of our philosophy, our purposes, and our actions. Equally we must listen to the hopes and aspirations of our fellow countrymen. I plan, therefore, on a regular basis, to elicit the views of America's opinion leaders and to share our perspective freely. The closer and more effective consultation which I will have with the Congress is another means of involving the public, through its elected representatives, more deeply in the foreign-policy-making process.

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*Question 9. How does Dr. Kissinger generally define the role and priority of economics in the formulation and implementation of America foreign policy? What new initiatives will he take; organizationally within the Department of State, vis-a-vis such other Executive Branch agencies as the Department of the Treasury, and how does he define the role and function of the International Economic Policy Council?*

Answer. Economic issues are as much the subject of inter-governmental relations-of conflict, negotiation, and compromise-as are so-called "political" issues. Furthermore they have a high political content. One has only cite such examples as oil, or multinational corporations, or foreign aid to recognize the political nature of economic issues. Foreign policy must address these issues.

The policy-maker needs to assess the full consequences of a proposed course of action-the economic as well as the political and security implications. Economics is in this sense an integral part of the making and execution of foreign policy.

As to priorities, one cannot assign an abstract ranking to the various facts such as political, military, economic, humanitarian, etc. These various and sometimes conflicting elements can be considered and weighed only in context. As a general rule, however, we must be careful not to decide important economic questions on a purely technical basis; the political framework is an essential consideration.

I have not yet determined whether, or what, new initiatives organizationally within the Department of State or vis-a-vis other Executive Branch agencies are necessary to improve the functioning of the Department of State on international economic matters. This is receiving my urgent attention, and I will keep this situation under review as I gain experience.

In any event, I plan to have the Department play a leading role and continue to work closely with other agencies in the consideration of economic aspects of foreign policy issues.

The role and function of the International Economic Policy Council are (1) to clarify options among agencies on economic issues so as to permit informed decision-making; (2) to recommend policies to the President; and (3) to initiate interdepartmental studies on economic issues that may need further exploration.

## RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HUGHES FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1. Did the President know of and approve the special security procedures for the Cambodia bombing which involved the use of dual reporting channels (one accurate, the other with falsified figures)? If not, who made the decision to set up the false reporting system?*

Answer. This issue was addressed in my testimony of September 7, 1973. As I said then, the President did not know of the dual reporting channels. The President and the NSC unanimously did agree on the need for secrecy, however, for the reasons that have been explained. It was in carrying out this requirement that special double accounting procedures were developed within the Department of Defense.

*Question 2. Who made the decision to tell only certain members of Congress about these operations? Why were the Speaker of the House, the Majority Leader of the Senate, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and most members of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committee not informed?*

Answer. While a number of key Congressional leaders were consulted on the Cambodia bombing operations, a more thorough and systematic procedure would have been desirable. This failed to happen not because of any decision to deceive Congress about those justified and successful operations which saved American lives and speeded the achievement of Vietnamization.

Rather it was a consequence of the deteriorated state of trust and cooperation between the branches and the lack of adequate consultative procedures between Congress and the Executive, as well as among the interested committees of Congress.

An improved climate of trust and cooperation, the attainment of which will be one of my highest objectives, should go far toward insuring full communications on such matters in the future.

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*Question 3. What documentary evidence is there for the claim that Prince Sihanouk "acquiesced" in the U.S. bombing? If there is such proof, why was it necessary to continue to withhold this information from the Congress and the public at the time and even after Sihanouk's ouster in March of 1970?*

Answer. I covered this question in my testimony of September 7, 1973. We have supplied the committee with a copy of Prince Sihanouk's press conference of May 13, 1969. Committee members have also been given access to correspondence between the President and Prince Sihanouk during this period.

Two other specific examples of Prince Sihanouk's views on the bombing were cited in a June 25, 1973, briefing by the Department of State spokesman who cited telegrams from State Department files of the period reporting the following:

In a January 10, 1968 meeting with U.S. emissary Chester Bowles, Sihanouk stated that he did not want any North Vietnamese in Cambodia, and further stated that while he could not say so officially, he wanted the United States to retaliate against these North Vietnamese forces with "hot pursuit" or bombing in the unpopulated border areas of Cambodia.

In a conversation on August 22, 1969 with Senator Mansfield, Sihanouk pointed out that there had not been Cambodian protests of bombings in his country when these hit only Viet Cong forces and not Cambodian villages or population. Sihanouk's tacit consent for the bombing was indicated as well in a public toast to Senator Mansfield on August 21, 1969 wherein he expressed hopes that "frontier incidents . . . do not assume proportions of a nature to jeopardize" U.S.-Cambodian friendship.

These documents show that the Prince as a minimum acquiesced in the bombing of unpopulated border areas since it was in his power to protest such bombing at any time, and he never did. Indeed his correspondence at the time was very friendly and forthcoming including an invitation to the President to visit Cambodia. Furthermore, in July 1969, several months after the bombing was initiated, Sihanouk renewed diplomatic relations with the United States which had been broken off in 1965.

This need for secrecy has also been covered previously. Sihanouk was most anxious not to be put into a position in which he was obliged to admit that he was aware of, and had acquiesced in, the bombing. Given the disparity in the strength of the North Vietnamese field army and the small Cambodian defense forces, and in view of the sensitive diplomatic aspects involved, an explicit acknowledgement of the bombing would have obliged the hard-pressed Cambodian Government officially to request cessation of the bombing.

In view of these sensitive diplomatic considerations and with the unanimous recommendation of the members of the National Security Council, the President ordered that the bombing be kept secret.

After Sihanouk's ouster we did not publicize the earlier bombing primarily because of our negotiating efforts with Hanoi. We were working for a settlement in private talks. We did not wish to charge the atmosphere or force North Vietnam into a retaliatory effort which might jeopardize the negotiations.

*Question 4. Was Dr. Kissinger ordered to convey to the North Vietnamese threats of further escalatory actions (beyond the secret operations in Laos and Cambodia) if Hanoi did not respond appropriately?*

Answer. We did not engage in threats during the negotiations. Our approach was consistent throughout. We wanted to negotiate a settlement as rapidly as possible—this was our strong preference and highest priority. In the meantime we launched the Vietnamization program. During this process, and failing a settlement, we made it very clear—publicly and privately—that we would protect American lives and emphasized to Hanoi that it should not take advantage of our withdrawal. Thus in our statements and negotiating proposals we stressed our desire for agreement; at the same time we left no doubt in Hanoi's mind that we would take whatever defensive actions were required if it stonewalled the negotiations and stepped up attacks.

## RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ABOUREZK FOR THE RECORD

*Question 1. Does the Administration intend to allow our aid to continue to be given to countries who now practice the repression and internment of its citizens for political purposes?*

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Answer. As I stated in my testimony, the primary concern of our foreign policy must be the international conduct of the countries with whom we are dealing. We are, of course, deeply concerned, both as human beings and as a government, about the abridgement of human rights and liberties anywhere in the world. We have expressed and we will continue to express this concern in appropriate ways.

Wherever the issue arises in international forums as an international question, the United States will join with other nations and advocate enforcement of human rights. In our bilateral relations with other states, we will follow a pragmatic policy of degree: If the infringement of liberty is not so offensive that we cannot live with it, we will try to work out what we can in our relations with the country involved in order to have a constructive influence. Where the action of a country is so morally repugnant to us that we cannot live with it, we will avoid dealings with that country, and that includes adherence to internationally agreed sanctions when adopted to which we are a party.

**Question 2.** What will be the State Department policy in regard to providing financial support to national police forces, prisons, or internal security forces in foreign countries either directly or indirectly through other programs?

Answer. As a general proposition the development of national police forces should be the responsibility of the nations concerned and should not involve a major commitment by the United States. But there are unusual circumstances in which we should provide some assistance in the efforts of countries to develop a civil security institution that is responsive to the needs of the people and helps to provide a framework for economic and social growth in a climate of freedom.

We are confident that our Policy Assistance programs have made and continue to make a genuine contribution to development. However, the Administration is mindful of the many criticisms of this program in recent years.

Accordingly, we believe that each of the Policy Assistance programs should be reviewed to determine its desirability and utility. Moreover, each country program should be evaluated to determine whether it makes a positive contribution in terms of current U.S. foreign policy objectives and interests and whether it should be continued, modified, or eliminated. We are prepared to undertake such an evaluation.

**Question 3.** There has been a great deal of activity by the State Department in restricting the admission of Arab students into this country. First of all, the reasons are not made clear and I would like to know the reasons why their entry is restricted. Secondly, assuming that if the reasons are that they happen to be on the wrong side of the Middle East conflict, why do we single out those students who wish to be educated and to travel in this country and also why do we not accord them the same treatment as we do those on the other side of this conflict?

Answer. There is no policy to deny visas to Arab or other foreign students. As one of the measures adopted to combat terrorism, certain visa applications (of whatever kind; e.g., student, tourist, temporary worker) are subject to special screening procedures that delay, usually for a few days, such applications. Only a handful of visas have been denied as a result of this screening procedure. If the Arab student applicant is otherwise qualified, he receives his visa.

## RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PEARSON FOR THE RECORD

**Questions 1.** Why was no timetable established in the Paris Agreement for the accounting of our missing and the return of our dead? 2. Do you believe our government should take a stronger public position on the failure of the other side side to live up to the terms of the Paris Agreement in accounting for our missing men? 3. Why have our known dead not been returned? 4. Should you be confirmed as Secretary of State, what are your plans for resolving the missing in action issue?

Answer. In view of the interrelationship of these questions concerning the status of the POW's and MIA's, the following single answer will respond to all four questions.

As I indicated in response to similar questions from Senators Church and Case, the Administration shares your concern about the Communist side's failure to live up to its obligations. The Vietnam Agreement, signed on January 27, 1973, contained specific requirements for accounting for the missing and return of the

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dead. No timetable was specified because we hoped action on this humanitarian matter would begin at once, without being linked to other aspects of the Agreement, and that efforts would continue as long as it was required, until satisfactory results were obtained. In any event it was impossible to predict how long even an all out genuine process would take, and we didn't want to have an arbitrary cut-off after which the other side might claim it need make no further efforts.

We are seriously dissatisfied with the other side's performance on this subject—it has been one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of the Agreement.

I can assure you, however, that we are determined to seek scrupulous fulfillment of the Agreement signed last January 27 and to secure as full an accounting as possible of all our men throughout Indochina. In an address on Armed Forces Day, May 19, 1973, the President expressed the Administration's concern in the following words:

> "The cooperation which North Vietnam promised to give us in making a full accounting for Americans listed as missing-in-action has not been satisfactory. And I can assure you that we must and will insist that this promise, this pledge, this solemn agreement be kept, because just as America never broke faith with our prisoners of war, I can assure you today we will not break faith with those who are reported missing in action. They must all be accounted for by the North Vietnamese."

The Administration has taken a number of steps to seek compliance with the accords:

During my trip to Hanoi February 10-13, we provided files concerning the circumstances involved in cases of our missing personnel.

This information was supplemented by complete lists given to the Communist side by the U.S. delegation on the Four-Power Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) of all U.S. personnel missing in Indochina and lists of those we list as having died but whose remains were not recovered.

The U.S. delegation to the FPJMT has pressed repeatedly for further information. The team visited North Vietnam twice in May and viewed the graves of 23 U.S. pilots identified as having died in captivity. However, there has been no progress on exchange of information on repatriation of remains.

The U.S. delegation to the FPJMT has also raised questions concerning the international journalists missing in Cambodia, and we have worked closely with the committee of journalists seeking their release.

The U.S. Embassy in Laos has repeatedly raised with representatives of the Pathet Lao side the subject of the many U.S. personnel missing in Laos, and we have taken this matter up with the North Vietnamese as well. We have been promised that upon the implementation of the Laos protocol, which is schedule to be signed September 14, we will be able to search in Laos. We, therefore, expect to receive more information on the fate of our personnel who are missing there.

Search teams from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) located in Thailand have conducted operations in Government-controlled areas in South Vietnam and have found some remains on the basis of which some cases may be resolved. Regrettably the other side has refused to cooperate in this effort and has effectively barred the JCRC from searches in Communist-controlled sections of South Vietnam as well as in Laos and North Vietnam. However, we have stressed the peaceful, open and humanitarian nature of the JCRC, and we will continue to press for cooperation by the other side in the JCRC's efforts.

On June 13, 1973, in a Joint Communique signed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States, the two parties reaffirmed their solemn commitment to implement fully the January Agreement, including in particular the provisions for accounting of all of the Missing in Action throughout Indochina.

On July 29, 1973, the U.S. Government delivered a diplomatic note to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam strongly protesting the continuing failure of North Vietnam and its allies to fulfill their obligations and calling for prompt action by the Communist side. (A complete text of the note is attached for your information.)

I have pointed out in my testimony that one of the results of our continued disengagement from Indochina is that the pressures and incentives we have available are also shrinking. However, the other side clearly understands that we will continue to insist on full compliance and that we will not be able to proceed

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with the Agreement's economic assistance provisions for example, until we have achieved more satisfactory compliance. We will, of course, use diplomatic pressure to the extent that it is available to us, and we will continue to make it clear to the North Vietnamese that normalization of relations with them, which we would otherwise seek and welcome, is severely inhibited by their slow compliance with the missing-in-action provisions of the Agreement.

## TEXT OF U.S. NOTE CONCERNING MISSING IN ACTION DELIVERED TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, JULY 29, 1973

In view of the fact that more than six months have elapsed since the signing of the January 27, 1973 Agreement on Viet-Nam and more than six weeks since the signing of the Joint Communique of June 13, 1973, the USG notes with serious concern that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has failed to comply with Article 8B of the Agreement and paragraph 8E of the Joint Communique which require the parties to "Help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action." Although there have been continuing discussions of these subjects in the FPJMT, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has refused to cooperate in the necessary actions to implement this basic humanitarian obligation.

The United States Government has provided complete lists of American personnel listed as missing in action with requests for information. No information has been provided. The United States Government has repeatedly sought to arrange the repatriation of remains of Americans who died in captivity. No remains have been repatriated.

The accounting for the missing and the repatriation of remains are purely humanitarian obligations unrelated to other issues. They could have been largely carried out by now if a spirit of good will and cooperation had been manifested on this subject. This would have brought solace to the families and loved ones of the more than 1,300 Americans listed as missing, and of those who have died but whose bodies have not been returned.

The United States Government calls again on the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to help get information on the military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action. This can be accomplished promptly by responding to the request for information on the lists that have already been provided. The United States Government would be pleased to provide additional data on specific cases to assist in getting such information. The United States Government also requests the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam promptly to accomplish the exhumation and repatriation of remains, and to enable the JCRC to carry out its humanitarian mission.

**Question 5.** While the Secretary of State is supposed to be the President's principal foreign policy advisor, recent Secretaries have played a secondary role in some aspects of the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy. For example, in international economic affairs, Treasury has been dominant in military assistance policy, DOD has been in charge, and in trade policy, Commerce has played a dominant role. Do you believe that the Department of State should resume its former status as the principal agency guiding all aspects of American foreign policy or are you content with the current interdepartmental sharing of responsibility?

Answer. The contention that other agencies are "dominant" or in "charge" of the areas you mention is incorrect. The State Department has had a role in all of them; the diplomatic aspects of any issue should be carefully weighed. On the other hand, foreign policy is an increasingly complex activity, and other departments such as Treasury, Commerce, and Defense have clear responsibilities in certain areas, some of which are established by statute.

The NSC system under this Administration is designed to ensure that all agencies have a fair hearing and that our various activities are coordinated. The State Department plays a leading role in this process.

If I am confirmed, I hope to strengthen this role still further. The President has pointed out that one of the reasons for my nomination was to move more of the policy-working process out of the White House and into the State Department. At the same time, in my continuing responsibilities as Assistant to the President, I will help to assure that other agencies continue to have the opportunity to present their positions and reflect their responsibilities.

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**Question 6.** There is a widely accepted belief that the morale of the Foreign Service is low, that many of its most promising officers are leaving the service and that these conditions will have an adverse effect on U.S. foreign policy. Do you accept the validity of these assertions? If so, what specific measures do you plan to take to revitalize the Department of State?

Address: I addressed this issue in my opening statement and during the hearings. As I testified, one of my highest priorities, if I am confirmed, will be to reinvigorate the Foreign Service and the State Department. I will seek to do this by promoting a sense of excitement and mission. The greatest boost to morale can come from participation in policies that are important and that further the national interest. Now that certain policy foundations have been laid, we are able to bring the Foreign Service more closely into the foreign policy process and exploit to the utmost their talents and experience.

Certainly if the most promising officers leave the Foreign Service this would have an adverse effect. But we have no intention of letting this happen. We will seek to attract and keep personnel of the highest calibre.

**Question 7.** From time to time, the Policy Planning Bureau of the Department of State has played an important role in the formulation of medium and long-term plans for American foreign policy. Currently, Policy Planning does not seem to be particularly active. How would you propose to organize the Department to plan long range foreign policy directions and goals?

Answer. I plan to strengthen the role and capability of the State Department's Planning and Coordination Staff both in analyzing problems and in considering various approaches to their solutions, including medium and long-range planning. More generally, I plan to emphasize the requirement for all parts of the State Department to think of the long-range implications of our policies and to reflect them in tactical and short-term actions.

**Question 8.** There has been speculation based, in part, on your writings that now that major shifts in U.S. foreign policy have been accomplished, you intend to "institutionalize" the changes; that is, to establish within the federal bureaucracy, personnel, policies and procedures designed to carry out diplomatic functions for implementing new relations with China, the Nixon Doctrine, and an increased emphasis on international economic affairs. Is this speculation correct? If so, how do you plan to accomplish this so-called "institutionalization" of the recent changes in U.S. foreign policy?

Answer. As I have indicated, the major changes undertaken during the President's first term required to a great extent diplomacy conducted on a rather restricted bases. However, we must now build on the foundations that have been laid with a view to creating a more permanent structure that we can pass on to succeeding Administrations. I believe this requires a greater institutionalization of foreign policy in general, with the bureaucracy fully understanding and effectively implementing various initiatives. In particular one of my principal functions, if I am confirmed, will be to make sure that the extremely capable professionals in the Foreign Service and the State Department will now be brought more directly into the foreign policy process. It is these professionals who will be here long after this Administration has gone and who will be able to carry on those policies which have been found to be valid.

## RESPONSE OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO A QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBE FOR THE RECORD

**Question.** My friend and colleague Senator Saxbe visited Bangladesh during the recent Congressional recess. He informs me that the Bengalis are very appreciative of the assistance provided by the United States since their independence. However, he was told that there will be a food shortage from mid-November to January of this year when the new crop is harvested and distributed.

As you know, their food deficit was caused first by the war in 1971 and the drought in 1972. When this nation declared its independence, it had a short fall of 2.5 million tons of food grain and therefore relied on supplies from the United States and India. Last year we furnished 800,000 tons of food. This year on March 31 the United States Delegate to the AID meeting in Dacca pledged 500,000 tons of wheat. To this date, we have committed 280,000 tons. The first 200,000 tons, which consists of a grant, has already arrived while the 80,000 tons of P.L. 480 is

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now being purchased. This assistance plus the diversion of 200,000 tons of food grain by the Soviets has held off the famine until mid-November.

Because of the world food shortage and possibility of export controls, I am aware of the difficulties involved. However, do you believe we can fulfill our pledge of 220,000 tons of wheat before the critical period of mid-November?

Answer. As you know, because of the heavy worldwide demand for US wheat, only limited amounts are available this year for assistance programs. Consequently we have not been able to make as much wheat available as we would have liked for a number of needy nations, including Bangladesh.

At the time of the meeting in Dacca on March 31-April 1, 1973, we believed we would be able to provide 500,000 tons between them and the end of the year. We couched our pledge, however, in terms of dollar amounts and noted that it was subject to budgetary and supply constraints.

Bangladesh has already received a large share of worldwide US food contri-
butions this year. We are looking at Bangladesh's further needs along with
those of other countries and will do our best to help meet them. At this time,
we cannot state that we will be able to provide another 220,000 tons of wheat
by mid-November, but as Senator Saxbe noted, there is wheat in the pipeline
from the US; there is also wheat from other donors that is scheduled to arrive
during the fall.

Even if a serious shortage materialized in mid-November in Bangladesh, this
should ease within weeks since the harvest comes in early December.

RESPONSES OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BUCKLEY FOR THE RECORD

The first five questions asked by Senator Buckley were submitted also by
Senator Curtis and the answers have already been given to the Committee.

Question 6. In view of the increasingly repressive character of the Soviet regime as detente proceeds, would you, as Secretary of State, urge the Administration to change its present position, with respect to the Jackson Amendment, and press for its adoption? Do you feel it is unreasonable to tie an explicit component of detente—increased U.S. trade with the Soviets—to a modest reduction in one of the principle sources of international tension between the two nations, namely the right of a citizen to emigrate from one nation to another? If you do, are you saying that you oppose attaching any political conditions to our economic dealings with the Soviets?

Answer. I oppose the adoption of the Jackson Amendment for the reasons fully explained in the present hearings. There are, of course, important political considerations to be weighed in all of our economic dealings with the Soviet Union, but in our view the conditions contained in the Jackson Amendment do not represent a balanced consideration of political, economic and humanitarian factors.

During my testimony I addressed extensively the relationship between foreign policy and the domestic policies of other nations.

RESPONSE OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY FORMER SENATOR SPONG FOR THE RECORD

Question 1. In general terms, what do you consider to be the principal obsta-
cles, from the standpoint of procedures, processes, and institutions, to the effec-
tive conduct of our foreign relations?

Question 2. How do you view the personal role of the Secretary of State, as distinguished from his role as head of the State Department, in the total process of our foreign relations, particularly in relation to the Presidency; and how do both of these roles of the Secretary of State differ from that of the President's National Security Adviser?

Question 3. What precisely do you have in mind when you speak of "institu-
tionalizing" the foreign policy process?

Question 4. Can one individual serving both as Secretary of State and as the President's National Security Adviser really manage to reconcile the two functions of being the President's primary foreign policy adviser and of administering the Department of State, and aren't there potential conflicts and contradictions between the two?

21-172—73—pt. 1—17

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Question 5. Do you see a need for legislative action, or for any other kinds of action to strengthen or improve the position of the Secretary of State?

Question 6. With respect to the Department of State, including the Secretary in his organizational position, how do you view its function in forming, and in carrying out foreign policy? Is there any distinction between its roles for these two functions?

Question 7. What do you see as the major weaknesses of the foreign affairs bureaucracy, and what steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to make State's bureaucracy more effective?

(Is it really going to be possible for State as an institution to be more involved in foreign policy making, as opposed to implementation, than it has been?)

Question 8. If you are confirmed as Secretary, how do you plan to use the current NSC Staff—will you take some of its members with you to the Department of State and operate more or less as before, or will it be necessary to adopt a new way of doing things in order, to use your word, "to institutionalize" the foreign policy process?

(What do you envision the division of labor to be between the NSC Staff and the top staff at State?)

Question 9. Can you suggest any organizational changes, or legislative actions, which might help "institutionalize" the proposed Legislative-Executive partnership in foreign affairs which you have spoken of recently, just as you plan to "institutionalize" the policy process on the Executive side?

Question 10. What criteria should be applied regarding information about the nation's foreign policy which would allow the fullest possible disclosure to Congress and the public while still protecting vital national interests?

Question 11. What do you see as the major problems involved in coordination among the various Executive Branch agencies, and what steps do you propose to take to improve matters in this area?

Question 12. Assuming that your nomination can be taken as an indication of an intent to have the State Department assert a more effective leadership role among the several agencies involved in foreign policy, what must be done to make this a reality? Could such devices as greater use of programming systems or a unified foreign affairs budget, if properly used, enhance State's ability to lead in dealing with other parts of government?

Question 13. How do you feel about the idea of a "Permanent Under Secretary" or "Executive Under Secretary" of State, who would be the number two or number three man in the Department, and whose function presumably would be to assist the Secretary in pulling together substantive policy and administrative support, and possibly to supervise interagency coordination efforts?

[Note: This has been frequently suggested, especially by the Herter Committee in 1962 and by the American Foreign Service Association 1968 report, Toward a Modern Diplomacy]

Question 14. We are constantly reminded today that one of the dominant features of foreign policy is the inextricability of domestic and foreign policy issues. Agricultural sales abroad and the energy crisis are shining examples. How do you see this problem being dealt with organizationally, and what are some of the ways in which you as Secretary of State expect to take an active part in solving such problems?

Question 15. Do you have an understanding with the President and other officials such as the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy, and the Special Trade Negotiator about the division of responsibilities in the area of foreign economic policy, and more generally, what is in store here?

Question 16. What sort of balance do you think there should be between career and noncareer Ambassadors, and do you plan to use your influence to argue for a larger proportion of career Ambassadors? Is there really any justification for using noncareer Ambassadors?

Question 17. In your opinion, what are the major criteria for effective planning in foreign affairs, and what modifications do you see as necessary in State's planning techniques, as well as those in use in other parts of government?

Question 18. What are your views about the desirability of eliminating some current programs in foreign assistance and in the information area, and moving the remaining activities of USIA and AID into the State Department?

Question 19. What do you see as the proper future approach of the United States to participation in international organizations and multilateral agencies,

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both in terms of policy and in terms of how the U.S. government organizes itself to deal with these organizations?

Question 20. What do you see as the major difficulties facing State, and the government as a whole, in the acquisition and use of intelligence information for assisting policy makers, and what suggestions will you make to improve matters in this area?

Question 21. What purposes do you expect the Secretary of State's annual foreign policy report to serve, and do you expect to continue to produce such a document, or will there be just the President's report from now on?

Answer. The twenty-one questions submitted by former Senator Spong are extremely thoughtful and go to the heart of the system and process of foreign policy making.

I attempted to address many of the issues raised in these questions in my opening statement, and in subsequent testimony. On most of the questions I am still deliberating and consulting. Indeed many of them are logical agenda items for the consultations with the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees that I plan if I am confirmed.

These questions warrant serious thought and a thorough treatment in any answers for the record. For this reason I prefer to take more time, drawing upon the discussions I intend to have with Congressional leaders, and to submit answers at a later date.

## RESPONSE OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO A QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CASE FOR THE RECORD

Question. What are your views on politically federating the NATO nations, a project approved over the past 23 years by several Secretaries of State as well as by several Presidens including Secretary Rogers and President Nixon as late as this past spring—1973?

Answer. The President has consistently supported the concept and goal of Atlantic Union, and he reiterated his support last spring, as the Senator has noted. Should I be confirmed by the Senate, I would, of course, also support this goal. This is, however, a very long term project, which involves the future of the many nations of the Alliance. The United States cannot prescribe for the Europeans either the methods or pace of progress.

## RESPONSE OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TO A QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR AIKEN FOR THE RECORD

Question. There has been much concern in recent years, going back even to the time of President Eisenhower, that the role of the military in the formulation and execution of foreign policy has been excessive.

Will you please give me the benefit of your comments on this concern, including the number of military officers now detailed to the State Department and the positions which they occupy, the role of the State Department in determining the nature and extent of overseas military bases arrangements (such as the forward base agreements in Greece), the formulation of the assumptions on which U.S. force deployments are based, JCS assumption regarding the interrelation of U.S. and foreign forces in specific areas, and the "requirements" on which foreign military aid are based?

Answer. Military considerations obviously occupy a primary role in the formulation of foreign policy. A strong military capability has been a foundation for the diplomatic progress we have made over the past years in such areas as arms control, relations with China and the Soviet Union and the Vietnam peace agreement. Thus it is critical that our foreign policies be formulated in a context of continuous and close consultation and cooperation at all levels between the State and Defense Departments. In fact, at the start of the Administration, the President created the expanded National Security Council system expressly for this purpose. The NSC system provides a systematic process for the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic factors into a coherent national security policy in which no one of these factors receives undue emphasis.

I believe this system has been successful in striking the delicate balance between these competing considerations. Morover, we have explicitly set out to ensure our foreign policy objectives and national interests determine our mili-

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tary strategies and forces rather than vice versa. If confirmed I will continue to guard against the tendency for military resources to dictate or unduly influence the form of our foreign policy objectives. This will continue to be a primary objective of the National Security Council system which I shall continue to help to manage.

In this context let me address your specific questions.

## MILITARY OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO STATE DEPARTMENT

There are twenty-two military officers currently detailed to the Department. Four of these are assigned as military watch officers in the State Department Operations Center, primarily to assist in liaison with National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon. Of the remaining 18 military officers fifteen are associated with the State-Defense Officer Exchange Program. A list of these officers and the offices to which they are assigned is attached. The increasing interdependence of the Departments of State and Defense in the field of international affairs has long pointed to the desirability of creating in each Department a reservoir of selected and especially trained officers who, by virtue of their experience, would be singularly well-prepared to deal with matters of common interest. In recognition of this, the State-Defense officer Exchange Program was initiated in the early Sixties to afford intensive politico-military training for upper-middle grade foreign service and military officers with relatively long periods of service ahead of them.

The broad and disparate background and professional competence of these exchanges has been invaluable in consideration of politico-military issues of concern to the Departments to which they are assigned. The military officers participating in this program, as well as their foreign service counterparts detailed to the Pentagon, are assigned for normal two-year rotational tours of duty. The billets are generally at the action officer level; and none of the exchanges are assigned office directorships.

## OVERSEAS BASING

The Department of State not only plays a major role within the NSC system in determining the nature and extent of overseas military basing arrangements, but also in negotiating base arrangements with foreign countries when we are assured that the requirement is necessary and consistent with our larger foreign policy interests.

For example, it was inevitable that homeporting in Athens would be seen by some, regardless of our actual motive, as an act of support for the Greek Government. Recognizing this, the Department of State insisted that all reasonable locations in the Mediterranean be exhaustively explored by DOD. This study required a full year to complete and concluded that Athens was, by a considerable margin, the best location for the proposed homeporting in view of our extensive security equities in the Mediterranean area and the central role of the Sixth Fleet in sustaining those equities. Even then, the Department of State undertook an extensive review of the political considerations before endorsing the Defense proposal. As previously noted such a review, based on political as well as security criteria, is characteristic of the State Department's role regarding all overseas Defense basing requirements.

## THE FORMULATION OF THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH U.S. FORCE DEPLOYMENTS ARE BASED

Among the primary assumptions underlying our force deployments is, first of all, the deterrence of aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and to our allies the U.S. resolve to honor our commitments. Our force deployments are also designed to assist our allies in collective defense in the event they are attacked; and to provide the President with the flexibility necessary in responding promptly to contingencies.

In support of these objectives and because our forces are designed in large part to supplement and complement the forces of friends and allies abroad, we pursue a strategy which is intended to safeguard U.S. interests and to honor U.S. treaty commitments. Furthermore, the U.S. will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an allied nation or of a nation whose survival is vital to U.S. security.