REMARKS AT THE SWEARING IN OF PHILIP C. HABIB
AS UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

JULY 1, 1976 AT 5:35 P.M.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Under Secretary and
Mrs. Habib:

Somebody has been trying to teach me the word
by which the Lone Ranger was addressed and to tell him
that this is now what he should address me as, but I have
forgotten it again -- Quemo Sabe.

(Laughter)

At any rate, from now on, Phil, you can
address me with Quemo Sabe.

(Laughter)

The new Under Secretary first came to my
attention when I was sent to Viet-Nam to write a report
about the situation. And this will surprise many of you
if I say that I was rather full of myself when I entered
Mr. Habib's office. My personality has changed since then.

(Laughter) And I was immediately thrown out of it because
Mr. Habib explained to me, first of all, what he thought
of visitors; secondly, what he thought of consultants;
and thirdly, what he thought of Harvard professors.

(Laughter)

2

Phil and I have overcome this initial
encounter. (Laughter) And I have worked with him
closely, and I have followed him, his work, with
admiration.

You can imagine that a Seventh Floor that
has Habib at one end and me at the other will be marked
by serenity, calm, and quiet.

(Laughter)

And I think you will all agree with me that
Phil reflects the subtle and quiet tact of his Brooklyn
upbringing and the straightforwardness and candor of his
Lebanese ancestry.

(Laughter)

Phil has assumed -- or will as soon as he
signs these documents -- what has become, what is, the
senior position in the Foreign Service. It is a position
that has never been more important, and it leads a
Service whose role has never been more vital.

When I have talked about the institutionalization
of foreign policy, people tend to think of it as slots on
a bureaucratic chart. But foreign policy is not
institutionalized by bureaucratic procedures. Foreign
policy can only be institutionalized if there exists a

3

group of dedicated individuals who make service to the
Nation their principal objective and who understand that
the national interests of the United States and the basic
values of this country cannot be changed every four or
eight years but rather that they reflect something that
must be continued over the decades.

It is this aspect of policy-making, this necessity
of continuity, this willingness to serve any administration,
putting forward the best judgment of which it is capable,
that reflects the greatest attributes of the Foreign
Service. And the position of Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, the man who deals with the regional
bureaus and sees to it that there is coherence in their
approach to foreign policy is one of the most decisive in
the Department.

I have worked with Phil for over a decade.
There is nobody I admire more and for whom I have
greater affection. So I am proud for the Department
that he has agreed to serve in this position. As I
said, it will be a noisy place when two strong
individuals go at each other.

4

He will succeed one of the most distinguished Foreign Service Officers that has ever occupied that position in Joe Sisco. But I will have an opportunity to state my views about him next week, and I can't pour forth all my resentments in one session.

So, Phil, welcome aboard.

(Applause)

MR. HABIB: Mr. Secretary, I will try to modulate my voice so that I can fit into the austere surroundings to which you have now promoted me.

There are just a few things that I would like to say. First of all, thanks to you for the confidence that you have in me. Secondly, thanks to my family for putting up with me all these years. I am sorry my children are not here. And thanks to many and all the colleagues in this room who helped me. And that includes those who are not with us. But to my good fortune the widow of my first boss is here and the widow of my second boss is here, and I am truly indebted for this opportunity to say thanks to them and to the memory of the men who got me started off in the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service has been my life, and I couldn't have had a better one. I intend to represent

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the Foreign Service in the councils of deliberation,
which means that I will get the blame when the Foreign
Service does something that the Secretary finds less than
perfect, but from time to time he will give through me
the credit that is due the Foreign Service.

I happen to know and to believe that the
Foreign Service has never occupied a more strategic and
influential position than it now occupies in the
deliberations of the Department. The Secretary has
expressed his confidence in the Service in the
appointments he has made. All you have to do is look
around this building and see where the Foreign Service
sits.

The greatest tribute that he gives to the
Foreign Service is the anger which he displays when it
is less than perfect. If he didn't care he wouldn't
say what he sometimes says.

(Laughter)

He is going to leave behind, if and when he
ever leaves the Department of State, a Foreign Service
which is better by virtue of the fact that we have been
given the opportunity to serve the Department and the
Nation in a unique way.

6

I am not a pessimist in this affair of either
the Foreign Service, the young Foreign Service Officers,
the morale of the Foreign Service, or the future of the
Foreign Service, or for that matter a pessimist about
anything.

I would like to close by reminding you of a
little story I once heard. There were once two very
bright children, but one was a chronic pessimist and the
other one was a chronic optimist. And one Christmas the
parents of these two bright children decided to sort of
test this business of optimism and pessimism, so they took
the pessimistic child and they put him in a room, and they
filled the room full of toys and they closed the door. And
they took the optimistic child and put him in a room full
of horse manure, and they closed the door.

Several hours later they came back, and they
opened the door of the child with a room full of toys,
the pessimist, and they found him sitting in the middle
of the room crying, afraid to touch a toy for fear that
he would break it. They went to the other room, for the
optimist, and there he was digging away like mad saying,
"With all this horse manure there has to be a pony
somewhere."

(Laughter)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 6, 1976

No. 339

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND
THE MID-AMERICA COMMITTEE

PALMER HOUSE HOTEL
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

JULY 6, 1976

THE FUTURE OF AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Two days ago this nation joyfully and confidently celebrated its 200th birthday. And in a little less than four months our people will go to the polls to elect a President and begin charting our course through our third century.

No two events more vividly symbolize our contemporary challenge, its hope and its promise. For two hundred years we struggled to build a nation from a wilderness, a sanctuary for the oppressed, and a home for all those who love liberty and believe in man's right to govern himself. And during those two hundred years, despite occasional setbacks and mistakes, we have succeeded in vindicating the dreams of the great men who came together in Philadelphia to proclaim a new nation. At home, we have created a society more free, just, and prosperous than any other on earth. And abroad no nation has done more to defend peace, promote prosperity, feed the hungry, heal the sick, spread knowledge, welcome refugees from tyranny, and champion the rights of man.

The past gives perspective to our endeavors, pride in where we are, and hope for what we may become. But the future, as always, depends on choices which now are ours to make.

Much will be said in the months between now and November about the state of our nation. Some of it will make sense; some will not. Some of it will reflect reality; some of it will not -- but rather the desire to create a temporary mood or to capitalize on it. Let us recall that four years ago we were told by some that we had become a nation of potential war criminals, that our military establishment had passed the bounds of reason and was out of control, that our foreign policy aggressively invited conflict, and that we were neglecting the needs of our people. That was not true then. It is not true now.

Today we are told that we have let our military position slip to the point that we are second-rate, that we are being pushed around and that our government is resigned to seeking the best available terms. That also is not true, and the American people know it. They know we remain far and away the strongest nation in the world. They know that America's dedication to peace and progress is essential to the world's security and well-being. They have learned painfully

For further information contact:

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long ago that military conflict abroad threatens American lives; more recently they have seen how global economic conflict can threaten American jobs and well-being. With our defense shield the core of the security of free countries, with our economy representing a third of the Gross National Product of the entire free world, our actions and the confidence of those nations who depend on us are crucial for the prospects of all free peoples. We must avoid a complacency that is unworthy of our challenges. But equally we must resist a rhetoric of impotence which disquiets friends and emboldens adversaries.

The people of Chicago hardly need a lecture about the vigor and strength of their country. Chicago has been called "the pulse of America," "the city of the big shoulders." Chicago is a symbol of America's phenomenal productivity, energy, and economic power. No other city so embodies the sense of America's fibre. Here is where the skyscraper was born; here is where the atomic ago began. This city is a promontory from which to view the world of tomorrow, a world in which America must live and which it therefore must help to shape. Chicago's excitement is a testimony to might and mass and beauty and to the raw pursuit of excellence.

It is clear that before us lies a period of potentially unparalleled creativity. This is an age of complex and dangerous forces. But the United States, and the great industrial democracies which share our values and our ideals, have the opportunity to give a new meaning to the vision of human dignity which for centuries has brightened the prospects of Western man.

Thirty years ago, with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the formation of our alliances and new international economic institutions, America burst forth on the world scene in a great outburst of creative statesmanship. Because it had conquered the depression, the generation which shaped our postwar policy had faith in the power of governmental programs to promote economic advance and social progress. Because it had won a war whose moral imperatives were clear-cut, it acted on the assumption that we would always face straightforward moral choices. That generation was inspired by the hope that at some point its exertions could end, as our allies became self-sustaining and our adversaries mellowed.

Today, reality is more complex. We have learned that economic development cannot be achieved overnight or through governmental projects alone. The nuclear age imposes upon us the inevitability of co-existence. We now live in a world of greater diversity, a world of many centers of power and ideology. America, for the first time in our history, faces the reality of permanent involvement in international affairs.

The challenges of peace, prosperity, and justice are unending; there are no easy and no final answers. Good intentions alone do not constitute a foreign policy. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations throughout history have had to conduct it -- with persistence, subtlety, flexibility, nuance, and perseverance; with the knowledge that what can be achieved at any one point will always fall short of the ideal; but that without ideals the search for the merely practical becomes stultifying. We can no longer afford to oscillate between isolation in preservation of our purity, and interventionism in pursuit of objectives whose attainment would permit us to withdraw from the world. Foreign policy must be conducted not as a response to domestic passions, or to international crises, but as a long-term enterprise -- engaging our best efforts for as far ahead as we can see -- of building a better and safer world.

Our national objectives and ideals if they are well conceived cannot change every four years, or with every new Administration. To pretend that they do, or even that they can, would make American policy itself a major factor of instability in the world.

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Whether we call it "structure" or "architecture," whether the process which produces policy is solitary or done by committee, the nation will have to continue to engage itself in managing the transition from the postwar international order based primarily on defense against aggression to a new international system which adds to security the needs of economic cooperation and political consensus on a global scale.

And we must do so under radically altered psychological conditions at home. The generation that undertook the great initiatives of the post-war period was inspired by the recollection of a conflict whose morality was unquestioned and whose outcome was conclusive. The generation that will have to sustain contemporary foreign policy recalls only wars that appeared morally ambiguous and whose outcomes were profoundly frustrating. Ours is a period much less confident of the ability of governments to manage the great issues of the era.

And yet too much depends on us to permit our commitment to falter. We have physical strength in abundance. We must marshal the vision to put it into the service of our ideals.

The time has come to build a new foreign policy consensus similar in scope but different in content from that which sustained our previous achievements. Democrats and Republicans, Congress and the Executive, government and citizen must once again conduct the foreign policy debate in the spirit of partnership -- recognizing that we are not at war with each other, but engaged in a vital national enterprise affecting our future and the world at large. Our electoral process can do much to strengthen our role in the world -- both by healing the wounds of the last decade, and by forging the elements of a new nonpartisan consensus in foreign policy. This election, whatever its outcome, should be remembered as the time when the American people rediscovered their unity in formulation and execution of foreign policy.

Despite the domestic turmoil of recent years, much has already been achieved.

For the first time in a decade and a half, we are at peace. Our relations with the industrial democracies are the closest they have been in twenty years and our collaboration is steadily expanding into new fields. Here in the Western Hemisphere, we are forging a new association based on equality and mutual respect. We have inaugurated a hopeful new policy in Africa. Important progress towards peace in the Middle East has been made and the elements for major new advances exist. In Asia, our relations with Japan have never been better. We have opened a new relationship with the People's Republic of China that will expand in keeping with the Shanghai Communique. And with respect to the Soviet Union we have combined vigilance with conciliation, a determination to resist expansion with a readiness to build relations on a more stable and lasting basis than a balance of terror.

But great tasks remain: to strengthen further the solidarity with our major allies; to explore new prospects for reducing tensions with our adversaries; and to shape the new dialogue between the industrial and developing nations into a constructive long-term relationship of common benefit.

Let me turn now to these issues:

## The Collaboration of the Democracies

The collaboration of the industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan has been the central core of America's foreign relations throughout the postwar period. It remains the principal focus of our foreign policy today. And it has been constantly strengthened in recent years.

The intensity, regularity, and scope of the permanent dialogue among the industrial democracies can scarcely be exaggerated. President Ford since he

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has been in office has conferred with the leaders of our NATO and Japanese allies at four Summit meetings and over 60 individual meetings, abroad or in Washington. I have met with Foreign Ministers or heads of government of the industrial democracies over 200 times since I have been Secretary of State -- including over 100 times with leaders of the major nations represented at the Puerto Rico Summit. This solidarity is a record unmatched by any other group of independent nations. For many years there have been no major disputes between America and our allies; today there are no significant differences in approach or policy. The relations among the industrial democracies have not been as close in many decades -- and are far closer than they were ten years ago.

Of course, frequency of consultation is not enough. We must never cease to keep our alliances relevant to current conditions. Our alliances were formed a generation ago to stave off common dangers -- the threat of Communist aggression and the fear of economic collapse. These goals have been substantially achieved.

Our economies are the most prosperous on earth; we comprise 65 percent of the world Gross National Product and 70 percent of its trade. Our technology, managerial skill, and productive dynamism have proven to be indispensable to all nations that seek to develop their economies and improve the lot of their citizens. The developing countries and the socialist countries -- despite their habitual denunciation of the free market system -- now recognize that they must turn to the industrial democracies for trade and assistance in improving their own economies.

We confront the agenda before us with confidence and aware that our cohesion which has brought us this far remains crucial to all that we do.

-- We must maintain our common security in changed circumstances. For most of the post-war period we relied on strategic forces for both deterrence and defense. Today, the numbers and destructive power of nuclear weapons tend to produce a strategic stalemate. Challenges below the strategic nuclear level become more dangerous; forces for regional defense, land, sea, and air, therefore grow more important. Our alliance forces must reflect these new realities and be strengthened in crucial categories.

-- We must continue to coordinate our economic strategies to encourage economic growth while controlling inflation. In a period of growing economic interdependence, we cannot afford to have national economic policies working at cross purposes.

-- We must develop joint approaches to relations with the developing nations. Almost all development in the world today gains its impetus from the industrial democracies. There is no reason for defensiveness. If we compete among ourselves for the favor of the developing nations, we dissipate our own resources and tempt the developing nations in unproductive and unrealistic directions. If the industrial nations cooperate among themselves, we have the best chance to bring about cooperative relations between developed and developing. Only this can end tactics of confrontation and contribute to new global arrangements in which all nations participate and benefit.

-- Finally, the industrial democracies must coordinate our policies with respect to East-West trade. The volume of that trade has been growing at a rapid rate -- more in the other industrial democracies than in the United States. We must better understand the implications of interchange between market and centrally controlled economies; we must avoid its political exploitation; we must study the implications of the mounting debts of the non-market economies; we must shape the trade in a direction beneficial to the over-all purposes of the industrial democracies.

This is the meaning of the President's meeting ten days ago with the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan at the Puerto Rico

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Economic Summit. There, as at Rambouillet last November, the allied leaders discussed such basic issues as how to consolidate our economic recovery and head off a resurgence of inflation. They exchanged views on East-West economic relations, and the status of the dialogue with the developing nations. The meeting reflected and promoted the growing cooperation of the industrial democracies. It symbolizes their political will to shape their future together.

All the tasks that I have enumerated here grow out of the strength of the industrial democracies. And all these tasks are inescapable. We have every reason to face the future with confidence. A world that yearns for peace and freedom, for economic advance, for fundamental human justice, today looks to our nations for understanding and for leadership. If the democracies remain strong and united, we can usher in an era of unprecedented peace and progress.

## The Agenda of War and Peace

Throughout its existence, the Atlantic Alliance has based its quest for peace on two complementary policies. First, we must maintain our defenses, resist military challenges, and prevent the Soviet Union from transforming its military strength into political expansion. Secondly, we must seek to resolve conflicts and disputes through negotiation, foster habits of restraint in international conduct, and expand the area of constructive relations.

However we label such an approach, its objectives are imposed by the unprecedented conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman will lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. Every President, after entering office and seeing the facts, has come to President Eisenhower's insight that "there is no alternative to peace."

We have no illusions about the Soviet ideological and geopolitical challenge; but neither should there be illusions about what is needed to deal with it.

The strength of the West -- military, economic, and moral -- must be used to shape international relationships in accordance with our vision of a better world and with a full sense of responsibility toward the awful cataclysm of nuclear war. We must avoid both a sentimentality that would substitute goodwill for strength, and mock toughness that would substitute posturing for a clear perception of our interests. We will maintain the balance of power, but we will also recognize that peace, to be lasting, must rest upon more than a balance of terror constantly contested. Specifically:

- We will continue to seek a fair and reliable agreement on strategic arms limitation because this is in our interest and the interest of world peace. The President will not hesitate to sign an agreement that protects our national interests and those of our allies. But he will never agree simply for the sake of agreement or run risks with our national security.

- We will continue, together with our allies, to seek negotiated solutions to East-West political problems in order to diminish the risks of confrontation.

- We will continue to develop cooperative ties on the basis of reciprocity to foster responsible international behavior and a mutual interest in better political relations.

It goes without saying that a reduction of tensions requires an equivalence of obligations and commitments:

- Agreements reached must be balanced and reliable; they must be complied with strictly both as to their letter and their spirit.

- There must be consistent patterns of behavior in different parts of the world. We will not permit the relaxation of tensions to be practiced selectively. We cannot accept insistence of restraint on strategic arms

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or in Central Europe while tensions are exacerbated in other parts of the world in the name of national liberation or proletarian internationalism.

-- There must be tolerable definitions of ideological rivalry. We do not fear ideological competition; indeed, we assume it. We have every reason for confidence in the power of the idea of freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology alone is involved when Soviet military power is exerted in remote areas or when ideology is invoked so that regional or local instabilities can be exploited.

-- The relaxation of tensions must not become a subterfuge to play allies off against each other. Allied cohesion ensures that relaxation of tensions is broadly based; division and competition among us would only dissipate our advantages and open up opportunities for adversaries.

In Europe, the relaxation of tensions must apply to the Eastern as well as Western half of the continent. There should be no room for misconceptions about American policy:

-- We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretentions to hegemony.

-- For this reason, we will continue to develop our bilateral ties in economic and other fields with the nations of Eastern Europe, and encourage similar efforts on the part of our Western European allies.

-- We will continually seek improvements in the basic conditions of human life in Eastern Europe -- in terms of emigration, unification of families, freer flow of information, increased travel and economic interchange.

Improving relations between East and West is a long-term process. We pursue it on the basis of *our* purposes and *our* ideals. We will never slacken the quest for peace.

We can only benefit from the challenge of peaceful competition. Nowhere have the industrial democracies suffered setbacks because of lack of strength. Without exception, the problems have been internal; they are therefore within our power to remedy.

We must not so bemuse ourselves with rhetoric that we forget that in every category of relevant power, the democracies have the means to preserve and foster their objectives. We need only to stay together and stay the course.

In the military field, we have the strength to defend our interests. In the economic area, our performance has been overwhelmingly superior. In the ideological competition, it is not our nations, but the East, that has shown fear of the power of freedom. The winds of change are blowing from the West. If we act with wisdom and unity, the free nations have it in our power to leave our children a safer and more hopeful world than the one we found.

## The Emerging Structure of a Global Community

Within the past decade and particularly over the past several years, a new dimension of international affairs has moved to center stage: the relations between the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres.

For the first time in history the international system has become truly global. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given

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birth to scores of new centers of power and initiative. The globe's security and prosperity have become more and more indivisible.

Yet in a world of over 150 sovereign nations, many of which have only recently achieved independence, progress toward understanding of our common destiny has been halting and uneasy. Too many nations still seek to extort what is meaningful only if freely offered. Attempts at economic warfare, and sterile disputes between the industrial and developing nations, have been all too characteristic of international conferences. Such tactics overlook some basic realities:

- Development is an arduous and long-term process, not susceptible to quick or easy solutions. It requires great efforts to bring about social change, above all by the developing countries themselves.

- If there is to be any hope of development, the new nations need the sustained help of the industrial democracies. The Communist countries have been to all practical purposes irrelevant to this process and clearly unwilling to assist it.

- A serious development effort requires cooperation. Confrontation and artificial voting majorities destroy the psychological basis for a sustained relationship. Parliamentary victories in international forums prove empty if they are not followed by the willing implementation of the minority.

The United States has a vital stake in the health of the world economic system. We need only recall the oil embargo of 1973 to know that interdependence is more than a slogan. That event helped to produce the worst inflation as well as the most severe recession of the post-war period. The price and supply of energy and raw materials, the conditions of trade and investment, the protection of the environment, the use of the oceans and space -- these are all issues on which American jobs and livelihood and progress depend. And we know as well that no structure of international relations can be durable if the world remains divided between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the oppressed, the hopeful and the despairing.

We have offered our cooperation in our own interest and in the hope that it will help build a better world. But we insist that others meet us in the same spirit. We will not submit to blackmail or to pressure. We will resist hostile resolutions and unworkable proposals. Artificial majorities and claims to a monopoly on morality in world forums will only undermine public support here and in the other industrial democracies -- the only nations capable of contributing effectively to development.

The task is to build consensus based on mutual respect and self-interest. Only in this way can we encourage realistic methods of international collaboration and lay the foundation for a cooperative international economy.

To this end the United States has in the last few years assumed a role of leadership. We have offered comprehensive initiatives in such areas as energy, food, trade, finance, commodities, technology transfer, and the special problems of the poorest countries. We have done so in many international forums; at the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly last September; at the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation in December; at the Jamaica Conference on world monetary issues in January; at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi this spring. Progress has been achieved on many of our proposals; many new institutions and vehicles of cooperation are already underway.

Thus, just as we seek to move beyond a balance of power in East-West relations, so we are seeking long-term cooperation in North-South relations with a view to building a genuine world community.

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In this enterprise there is no more important place to start than in our own Hemisphere. If we are to build a stable, prosperous, and just world structure, we will need the firm foundations of close bonds with our friends in Latin America.

Our traditional special relationship in the Hemisphere antedates our cooperation with other regions of the developing world. We share unique experiences in the Americas -- the exploration and development of new continents, the forging of nations free from colonial domination, the development of unique human and moral ideals. We have shaped democratic institutions and spurred economic growth, conscious that we benefited greatly from our relationship with each other. We have long held a common interest in shielding our Hemisphere from the intrusion of others. We have led the world in building international organizations to serve our cooperative endeavors for both collective security and economic progress.

The challenge we face today is that history -- and indeed the very growth and success we have achieved -- has complicated our relationship. What used to a simple perception of Hemispheric uniqueness, and a self-contained exclusive relationship, have become enmeshed in the wider concerns we all now have in the rest of the world.

The United States recognizes its global responsibility to maintain the world balance of power, to help resolve the age-old political conflicts that undermine peace, and to help shape a new international order encompassing the interests and aspirations of the more than 150 nations that now comprise our planet.

At the same time, in the Sixties and Seventies Latin American nations have become steadily more prosperous and self-confident. They are now major factors in their own right on the world scene. Their economies are among the most advanced of the developing world -- indeed they can be said to constitute a "middle class" among the nations of the world, encouraging progress but with an increasing stake in stability. They are increasingly important in the global economy and the world's political forums. And they have a growing sense of solidarity with developing nations in Africa and Asia. Such global involvement in inevitable; at the same time, it inevitably creates new and conflicting pressures on traditional friendships.

The United States has sought to build a new framework in our Hemispheric relations which takes into account new realities without sacrificing the precious advantage of our tradition of collaboration.

Most important, given the long period of neglect, real or perceived, our sister republics in the Western Hemisphere now know that we care. We have inaugurated a new dialogue based on equality and mutual respect and on a recognition of sovereign independence. This dialogue does not reflect demands by one side and defense of old patterns by the other. On the basis of the new Latin American strength and self-confidence, we now deal with one another with a mutuality of regard and understanding quite impossible a few years or even a decade ago. There is a growing recognition that we have shared concerns as well as different perspectives; that the nations of this Hemisphere, where men sought a haven from oppression, have an opportunity to begin a new era of cooperation between industrially advanced and developing countries.

In the past few years, the United States has offered initiatives to deal coherently with the catalogue of Hemispheric issues: political, economic, and moral. A milestone in this process came at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Santiago last month where we presented a comprehensive series of proposals:

-- to advance Hemispheric cooperation for development, including trade opportunities and access to contemporary technology;

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-- to strengthen joint efforts to deal with the issue of human rights in the Hemisphere;

-- and to modernize our inter-American system of political consultation.

The United States is demonstrating leadership on all these issues. As a result, Latin American nations expressed their belief at Santiago that a new chapter in Hemispheric relations is opening up. There was a climate of candor, of friendship without complexes, and of common endeavor. Our initiatives no longer raise fears of paternalism or domination, but are welcomed again by our sister republics as reflecting mutual interests and our proper role.

We believe that we have inaugurated a new era of inter-American cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit. And we believe, too, that this can serve as a bridge between developed and developing nations everywhere and as an example for the world community.

## America and the World

The world has entered a new era. We live in a time marked by change and uncertainty; our age cries out for new patterns of order and new efforts to better the human condition. The challenges of peace and progress and justice require sustained and devoted effort from the responsible nations of the world, and a permanent role of leadership by the United States.

The United States has faced challenge before. No other people could have celebrated its birthday so joyfully or with such optimism about its future. America has always stood for something beyond its own physical strength. The heritage we have celebrated this week is a vision of mankind's most glorious ideals -- the equality of all peoples and individuals; the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Only in our free countries where these principles are secure do they sometimes seem platitudes; to a world in which the majority of mankind lives without them, they are the burning issues of our time.

America's success has come from its blend of pragmatism and idealism. Our pragmatic tradition has helped us confront reality, neither blinded by dogma nor daunted by challenge. Our idealism has given us not only principles to defend, but the conviction and courage to defend them. In today's world of complexity, we need more than ever a moral compass to steer by, a sense of conviction that enables us to persevere through the stages of the attainable toward the ideal which will always be beyond.

The world no longer offers us the simplicity of detachment or temporary applications of overwhelming power. In a world of interdependence, of unending challenge, and of diversity, we must recognize our permanent involvement. Nor do we have reason for apology or hesitation. We remain the most powerful nation on earth. And there is much to accomplish together with the other industrial democracies as long as we offer the leadership for which all free nations long. And other nations will join us in collaborative endeavors if they see us -- the world's most powerful nation -- offering leadership.

So it is time to put an end to our domestic divisions, for they are the principal obstacle to the full realization of our opportunities. We have consumed too much of our substance in domestic strife; we run the risk that in pursuit of such self-absorption we will lower our sights. All great achievements were dreams before they were realities. The truly creative actions do not grow out of fine calculations of expediency and technical analyses. They require a vision which draws men to far horizons.

Almost seventy years ago Winston Churchill, with that blend of optimism and humanity that so set him apart from lesser men, described our contemporary challenge:

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"What is the use of living, if it be not to strive for noble
causes and to make this muddled world a better place for those
who will live in it after we are gone? How else can we put our-
selves in harmonious relation with the great verities and consola-
tions of the infinite and the eternal? And I avow my faith that
we are marching towards better days."

So let us avow our faith that we are marching towards better days. And through
that act America, with its vast strength, its optimism and idealism, can make
a decisive contribution to a world of peace, progress, and justice.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

Speech

July 6, 1976

Chicago, Illinois

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Mid-America Committee.

Two days ago this nation joyfully and confidently celebrated its 200th birthday. And in a little less than 4 months our people will go to the polls to elect a President and begin charting our course through our third century.

No two events more vividly symbolize our contemporary challenge—its hope and its promise. For 200 years we struggled to build a nation from a wilderness, a sanctuary for the oppressed, and a home for all those who love liberty and believe in man's right to govern himself. And during those 200 years, despite occasional setbacks and mistakes, we have succeeded in vindicating the dreams of the great men who came together in Philadelphia to proclaim a new nation. At home we have created a society more free, just, and prosperous than any other on earth. And abroad no nation has done more to defend peace, promote prosperity, feed the hungry, heal the sick, spread knowledge, welcome refugees from tyranny, and champion the rights of man.

Much will be said in the months between now and November about the state of our nation. Some of it will make sense; some will not. Some of it will reflect reality; some of it will not—but rather the desire to create a temporary mood or to capitalize on it. Let us recall that 4 years ago we were told

Today we are told that we have let our military position slip to the point that we are second-rate, that we are being pushed around and that our government is resigned to seeking the best available terms. That also is not true, and the American people know it. They know we remain far and away the strongest nation in the world. They know that America's dedication to peace and progress is essential to the world's security and well-being. They have learned painfully long ago that military conflict abroad threatens American lives; more recently they have seen how global economic conflict can threaten American jobs and well-being. With our defense shield the core of the security of free countries, with our economy representing a third of the gross national product of the entire free world, our actions and the confidence of those nations who depend on us are crucial for the prospects of all free peoples. We must avoid a complacency that is unworthy of our challenges. But equally we must resist a rhetoric of impotence which disquiets friends and emboldens adversaries.

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embodies the sense of America's fibre. Here is where the skyscraper was born; here is where the atomic age began. This city is a promontory from which to view the world of tomorrow, a world in which America must live and which it therefore must help to shape. Chicago's excitement is a testimony to might and mass and beauty and to the raw pursuit of excellence.

Thirty years ago, with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, the formation of our alliances and new international economic institutions, America burst forth on the world scene in a great outburst of creative statesmanship. Because it had conquered the depression, the generation which shaped our postwar policy had faith in the power of governmental programs to promote economic advance and social progress. Because it had won a war whose moral imperatives were clear-cut, it acted on the assumption that we would always face straightforward moral choices. That generation was inspired by the hope that at some point its exertions could end, as our allies became self-sustaining and our adversaries mellowed.

Today, reality is more complex. We have learned that economic development cannot be achieved overnight or through governmental projects alone. The nuclear age imposes upon us the inevitability of coexistence. We now live in a world of greater diversity, a world of many centers of power and ideology. America, for the first time in our history, faces the reality of permanent involvement in international affairs.

The challenges of peace, prosperity, and justice are unending; there are no easy and no final answers. Good intentions alone do not constitute a foreign policy. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations throughout history have had to conduct it—with persistence, subtlety, flexibility, nuance, and perseverance; with the knowledge that what can be achieved at any one point will always fall short of the ideal, but that without ideals the search for the merely practical becomes

stultifying. We can no longer afford to oscillate between isolation in preservation of our purity, and interventionism in pursuit of objectives whose attainment would permit us to withdraw from the world. Foreign policy must be conducted not as a response to domestic passions, or to international crises, but as a long-term enterprise—engaging our best efforts for as far ahead as we can see—of building a better and safer world.

Our national objectives and ideals if they are well conceived cannot change every 4 years, or with every new Administration. To pretend that they do, or even that they can, would make American policy itself a major factor of instability in the world.

And we must do so under radically altered psychological conditions at home. The generation that undertook the great initiatives of the postwar period was inspired by the recollection of a conflict whose morality was unquestioned and whose outcome was conclusive. The generation that will have to sustain contemporary foreign policy recalls only wars that appeared morally ambiguous and whose outcomes were profoundly frustrating. Ours is a period much less confident of the ability of governments to manage the great issues of the era.

The time has come to build a new foreign policy consensus similar in scope but different in content from that which sustained our previous achievements. Democrats and Republicans, Congress and the Executive, government and citizen must once again conduct the foreign policy debate in the spirit of partnership—recognizing that we are not at war with each other, but engaged in a vital national enterprise affecting our future and the world at large. Our electoral process can do much to strengthen our role in the world—both by healing

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ing the wounds of the last decade, and by forging
the elements of a new nonpartisan consensus in
foreign policy. This election, whatever its outcome,
should be remembered as the time when the
American people rediscovered their unity in the
formulation and execution of foreign policy.

For the first time in a decade and a half we
are at peace. Our relations with the industrial
democracies are the closest they have been in 20
years and our collaboration is steadily expanding
into new fields. Here in the Western Hemisphere,
we are forging a new association based on equality
and mutual respect. We have inaugurated a hopeful
new policy in Africa. Important progress toward
peace in the Middle East has been made and the
elements for major new advances exist. In Asia our
relations with Japan have never been better. We
have opened a new relationship with the People's
Republic of China that will expand in keeping with
the Shanghai Communique [February 28, 1972].
And with respect to the Soviet Union we have
combined vigilance with conciliation, a determi-
nation to resist expansion with a readiness to build
relations on a more stable and lasting basis than a
balance of terror.

But great tasks remain: to strengthen further
the solidarity with our major allies; to explore new
prospects for reducing tensions with our adversar-
ies; and to shape the new dialogue between the
industrial and developing nations into a con-
structive, long-term relationship of common
benefit.

Let me turn now to these issues.

The collaboration of the industrial democrac-
cies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan
has been the central core of America's foreign rela-
tions throughout the postwar period. It remains
the principal focus of our foreign policy today.
And it has been constantly strengthened in recent
years.

The intensity, regularity, and scope of the
permanent dialogue among the industrial democra-
cies can scarcely be exaggerated. President Ford
since he has been in office has conferred with the
leaders of our NATO and Japanese allies at four
Summit meetings and over 60 individual meetings,

abroad or in Washington. I have met with Foreign
Ministers or heads of government of the industrial
democracies over 200 times since I have been
Secretary of State, including over 100 times with
leaders of the major nations represented at the
Puerto Rico Summit. This solidarity is a record
unmatched by any other group of independent na-
tions. For many years there have been no major
disputes between America and our allies; today
there are no significant differences in approach or
policy. The relations among the industrial democ-
racies have not been as close in many decades—and
are far closer than they were 10 years ago.

Of course, frequency of consultation is not
enough. We must never cease to keep our alliances
relevant to current conditions. Our alliances were
formed a generation ago to stave off common
dangers: the threat of Communist aggression, and
the fear of economic collapse. These goals have
been substantially achieved.

Our economies are the most prosperous on
earth; we comprise 65 percent of the world gross
national product and 70 percent of its trade. Our
technology, managerial skill, and productive
dynamism have proven to be indispensable to all
nations that seek to develop their economies and
improve the lot of their citizens. The developing
countries and the Socialist countries, despite their
habitual denunciation of the free market system,
now recognize that they must turn to the industrial
democracies for trade and assistance in improving
their own economies.

We confront the agenda before us with confi-
dence and aware that our cohesion which has
brought us this far remains crucial to all that we
do:

* We must maintain our common security in changed circumstances. For most of the postwar period we relied on strategic forces for both deterrence and defense. Today, the numbers and destructive power of nuclear weapons tend to produce a strategic stalemate. Challenges below the strategic nuclear level become more dangerous; forces for regional defense-land, sea, and air- therefore grow more important. Our alliance forces must reflect these new realities and be strengthened in crucial categories.

* We must continue to coordinate our eco-
nomic strategies to encourage economic growth

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while controlling inflation. In a period of growing
economic interdependence, we cannot afford to
have national economic policies working at cross-
purposes.

* We must develop joint approaches to relations with the developing nations. Almost all development in the world today gains its impetus from the industrial democracies. There is no reason for defensiveness. If we compete among ourselves for the favor of the developing nations, we dissipate our own resources and tempt the developing nations in unproductive and unrealistic directions. If the industrial nations cooperate among themselves, we have the best chance to bring about cooperative relations between developed and developing. Only this can end tactics of confrontation and contribute to new global arrangements in which all nations participate and benefit.

* Finally, the industrial democracies must coordinate their policies with respect to East-West trade. The volume of that trade has been growing at a rapid rate—moreso in the other industrial democracies than in the United States. We must better understand the implications of interchange between market and centrally controlled economies; we must avoid its political exploitation; we must study the implications of the mounting debts of the nonmarket economies; we must shape the trade in a direction beneficial to the overall purposes of the industrial democracies.

This is the meaning of the President's meeting
10 days ago with the leaders of Canada, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan at the
Puerto Rico Economic Summit. There, as at
Rambouillet last November, the allied leaders dis-
cussed such basic issues as how to consolidate our
economic recovery and head off a resurgence of
inflation. They exchanged views on East-West eco-
nomic relations, and the status of the dialogue with
the developing nations. The meeting reflected and
promoted the growing cooperation of the indus-
trial democracies. It symbolizes their political will
to shape their future together.

All the tasks that I have enumerated here
grow out of the strength of the industrial democ-
racies. And all these tasks are inescapable. We have
every reason to face the future with confidence. A
world that yearns for peace and freedom, for
economic advance, for fundamental human justice

today looks to our nations for understanding and
for leadership. If the democracies remain strong
and united we can usher in an era of
unprecedented peace and progress.

The Agenda of War and Peace

Throughout its existence, the Atlantic
Alliance has based its quest for peace on two
complementary policies:

First, we must maintain our defenses, resist
military challenges, and prevent the Soviet Union
from transforming its military strength into politi-
cal expansion.

Second, we must seek to resolve conflicts and
disputes through negotiation, foster habits of re-
straint in international conduct, and expand the
area of constructive relations.

However we label such an approach, its ob-
jectives are imposed by the unprecedented condi-
tions of the nuclear age. No statesman will lightly
risk the lives of tens of millions. Every President,
after entering office and seeing the facts, has come
to President Eisenhower's insight that "there is no
alternative to peace."

We have no illusions about the Soviet ideologi-
cal and geopolitical challenge; but neither should
there be illusions about what is needed to deal with
it.

The strength of the West—military, economic,
and moral—must be used to shape international
relationships in accordance with our vision of a
better world and with a full sense of responsibility
toward the awful cataclysm of nuclear war. We
must avoid both a sentimentality that would sub-
stitute good will for strength, and mock toughness
that would substitute posturing for a clear per-
ception of our interests. We will maintain the
balance of power, but we will also recognize that
peace, to be lasting, must rest upon more than a
balance of terror constantly contested. Specifical-
ly:

* We will continue to seek a fair and reliable agreement on strategic arms limitation because this is in our interest and the interest of world peace. The President will not hesitate to sign an agreement that protects our national interests and those of our allies. But he will never agree simply for the

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* We will continue, together with our allies, to seek negotiated solutions to East-West political problems in order to diminish the risks of confrontation.

* We will continue to develop cooperative ties on the basis of reciprocity to foster responsible international behavior and a mutual interest in better political relations.

* Agreements reached must be balanced and reliable; they must be complied with strictly both as to their letter and their spirit.

* There must be consistent patterns of behavior in different parts of the world. We will not permit the relaxation of tensions to be practiced selectively. We cannot accept insistence on restraint on strategic arms or in Central Europe while tensions are exacerbated in other parts of the world in the name of national liberation or proletarian internationalism.

* There must be tolerable definitions of ideological rivalry. We do not fear ideological competition; indeed, we assume it. We have every reason for confidence in the power of the idea of freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology alone is involved when Soviet military power is exerted in remote areas or when ideology is invoked so that regional or local instabilities can be exploited.

* The relaxation of tensions must not become a subterfuge to play allies off against each other. Allied cohesion insures that relaxation of tensions is broadly based; division and competition among us would only dissipate our advantages and open up opportunities for adversaries.

In Europe the relaxation of tensions must apply to the Eastern as well as Western half of the continent. There should be no room for misconceptions about American policy:

* We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretentions to hegemony.

* For this reason we will continue to develop our bilateral ties in economic and other fields with the nations of Eastern Europe, and encourage similar efforts on the part of our Western European allies.

* We will continually seek improvements in the basic conditions of human life in Eastern Europe—in terms of emigration, unification of families, freer flow of information, increased travel, and economic interchange.

Improving relations between East and West is a long-term process. We pursue it on the basis of our purposes and our ideals. We will never slacken the quest for peace.

We can only benefit from the challenge of peaceful competition. Nowhere have the industrial democracies suffered setbacks because of lack of strength. Without exception the problems have been internal; they are therefore within our power to remedy.

We must not so bemuse ourselves with rhetoric that we forget that in every category of relevant power the democracies have the means to preserve and foster their objectives. We need only to stay together and stay the course.

In the military field we have the strength to defend our interests. In the economic area our performance has been overwhelmingly superior. In the ideological competition it is not our nations but the East that has shown fear of the power of freedom. The winds of change are blowing from the West. If we act with wisdom and unity the free nations have it in their power to leave their children a safer and more hopeful world than the one we found.

Within the past decade, and particularly over the past several years, a new dimension of international affairs has moved to center stage: the relations between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres.

For the first time in history the international system has become truly global. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to scores of new centers of power and initiative. The globe's security and prosperity have become more and more indivisible.

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* Development is an arduous and long-term process, not susceptible to quick or easy solutions. It requires great efforts to bring about social change-above all by the developing countries themselves.

* If there is to be any hope of development, the new nations need the sustained help of the industrial democracies. The Communist countries have been, to all practical purposes, irrelevant to this process and clearly unwilling to assist it.

* A serious development effort requires cooperation. Confrontation and artificial voting majorities destroy the psychological basis for a sustained relationship. Parliamentary victories in international forums prove empty if they are not followed by the willing implementation of the minority.

The United States has a vital stake in the health of the world economic system. We need only recall the oil embargo of 1973 to know that interdependence is more than a slogan. That event helped to produce the worst inflation as well as the most severe recession of the postwar period. The price and supply of energy and raw materials, the conditions of trade and investment, the protection of the environment, the use of the oceans and space-these are all issues on which American jobs and livelihood and progress depend. And we know as well that no structure of international relations can be durable if the world remains divided between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the oppressed, the hopeful and the despairing.

claims to a monopoly on morality in world forums will only undermine public support here and in the other industrial democracies-the only nations capable of contributing effectively to development.

To this end the United States has in the last few years assumed a role of leadership. We have offered comprehensive initiatives in such areas as energy, food, trade, finance, commodities, technology transfer, and the special problems of the poorest countries. We have done so in many international forums: at the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly last September; at the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation in December; at the Jamaica Conference on world monetary issues in January; at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi this spring [May, 1976]. Progress has been achieved on many of our proposals; many new institutions and vehicles of cooperation are already underway.

In this enterprise there is no more important place to start than in our own hemisphere. If we are to build a stable, prosperous, and just world structure, we will need the firm foundations of close bonds with our friends in Latin America.

Our traditional special relationship in the hemisphere antedates our cooperation with other regions of the developing world. We share unique experiences in the Americas-the exploration and development of new continents, the forging of nations free from colonial domination, the development of unique human and moral ideals. We have shaped democratic institutions and spurred economic growth, conscious that we benefited greatly from our relationship with each other. We have long held a common interest in shielding our hemisphere from the intrusion of others. We have led the world in building international organizations to serve our cooperative endeavors for both collective security and economic progress.

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The challenge we face today is that history—and indeed the very growth and success we have achieved—have complicated our relationship. What used to be a simple perception of hemispheric uniqueness, and a self-contained exclusive relationship, have become enmeshed in the wider concerns we all now have in the rest of the world.

At the same time, in the sixties and seventies Latin American nations have become steadily more prosperous and self-confident. They are now major factors in their own right on the world scene. Their economies are among the most advanced of the developing world; indeed, they can be said to constitute a "middle class" among the nations of the world, encouraging progress but with an increasing stake in stability. They are increasingly important in the global economy and the world's political forums. And they have a growing sense of solidarity with developing nations in Africa and Asia. Such global involvement is inevitable; at the same time, it inevitably creates new and conflicting pressures on traditional friendships.

The United States has sought to build a new framework in our hemispheric relations which takes into account new realities without sacrificing the precious advantage of our tradition of collaboration.

Most important, given the long period of neglect, real or perceived, our sister republics in the Western Hemisphere now know that we care. We have inaugurated a new dialogue based on equality and mutual respect and on a recognition of sovereign independence. This dialogue does not reflect demands by one side and defense of old patterns by the other. On the basis of the new Latin American strength and self-confidence we now deal with one another with a mutuality of regard and understanding quite impossible a few years or even a decade ago. There is a growing recognition that we have shared concerns as well as different perspectives; that the nations of this hemisphere, where men sought a haven from oppression, have an opportunity to begin a new era of

In the past few years the United States has offered initiatives to deal coherently with the catalogue of hemispheric issues: political, economic, and moral. A milestone in this process came at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Santiago last month [June 7-10, 1976] where we presented a comprehensive series of proposals:

* to advance hemispheric cooperation for development, including trade opportunities and access to contemporary technology;

* to strengthen joint efforts to deal with the issue of human rights in the hemisphere; and

* to modernize our inter-American system of political consultation.

The United States is demonstrating leadership on all these issues. As a result, Latin American nations expressed their belief at Santiago that a new chapter in hemispheric relations is opening up. There was a climate of candor, of friendship without complexes, and of common endeavor. Our initiatives no longer raise fears of paternalism or domination, but are welcomed again by our sister republics as reflecting mutual interests and our proper role.

## America and the World

8

(L)

beyond its own physical strength. The heritage we
have celebrated this week is a vision of mankind's
most glorious ideals: the equality of all peoples and
individuals; the right to life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness. Only in our free countries where
these principles are secure do they sometimes seem
platitudes; to a world in which the majority of
mankind lives without them they are the burning
issues of our time.

The world no longer offers us the simplicity
of detachment or temporary applications of over-
whelming power. In a world of interdependence, of
unending challenge, and of diversity we must
recognize our permanent involvement. Nor do we
have reason for apology or hesitation. We remain
the most powerful nation on earth. And there is
much to accomplish together with the other indus-
trial democracies as long as we offer the leadership
for which all free nations long. And other nations
will join us in collaborative endeavors if they see

us—the world's most powerful nation—offering
leadership.

So it is time to put an end to our domestic
divisions, for they are the principal obstacle to the
full realization of our opportunities. We have con-
sumed too much of our substance in domestic
strife; we run the risk that in pursuit of such
self-absorption we will lower our sights. All great
achievements were dreams before they were reali-
ties. The truly creative actions do not grow out of
fine calculations of expediency and technical
analyses. They require a vision which draws men to
far horizons.

Almost 70 years ago Winston Churchill, with
that blend of optimism and humanity that so set
him apart from lesser men, described our con-
temporary challenge:

"What is the use of living, if it be not to strive
for noble causes and to make this muddled world a
better place for those who will live in it after we
are gone? How else can we put ourselves in har-
monious relation with the great verities and con-
solations of the infinite and the eternal? And I
avow my faith that we are marching towards better
days..."

So let us avow our faith that we are marching
toward better days. And through that act America,
with its vast strength, its optimism and idealism,
can make a decisive contribution to a world of
peace, progress, and justice.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

PAUL E. BARBIAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROOM 7226

[L.C.]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 6, 1976

No. 339-B

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
CHICAGO COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND THE MID-AMERICA COMMITTEE
PALMER HOUSE HOTEL
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

JULY 6, 1976

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, would you please comment on what bearing the outcome of last week's meeting of European Communist parties has on the future course of our foreign policy, and particularly the bearing it has on maintaining the unity with the industrial democracies which you have so stressed?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have expressed my view on the Communist parties of Western Europe on a number of occasions, and I found that I became a political issue, even in foreign countries. [Laughter] I feel that I can be a political issue in only one country at a time, and I have to give preference to the United States. [Laughter]

But there are two problems in connection with the Communist parties of Western Europe: one is their relationship to Moscow; and secondly, that they are Communists, regardless of what their relationship to Moscow may or may not be. None of these parties has disavowed the Leninist principles of political organization which have inspired their leaders for all of their adult life. For all of them, participation in government would raise serious problems for NATO, for the European Community, and for other multilateral institutions.

Nor can one take statements at face value. They would have to be tested over a period of time. In 1947 the leader of the Czech Communist Party, Mr. Gottwald, made the following statement:

PR #339-B

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The Czechoslovak Communist Party seeks to attain socialism, but we are of
the opinion that to reach socialism there exists not only the method of
the dictatorship of the proletariat. I believe not only that we are capable
of attaining socialism by routes different from that of the Soviet example,
but that we have already set off in that direction. The Communist coalition
with other parties is not opportunism. With regard to parliamentary insti-
tutions, they will have no more vigilant guardians than the Communists,
when they are written into the new Constitution.

A year later Mr. Gottwald overthrew the parliamentary institutions.

So I would have to say that we have to look at the actions and not at
the rhetoric before we make any judgment about the final significance
of that conference.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in your estimation would relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union — or detente, if you please — is there a consensus in which US foreign policy can operate and, if so, what is it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Since there is press here, I want to make clear that the word "detente" was used by the questioner. [Laughter]

I think that the relations with the Soviet Union are a permanent
feature of the international scene. I think that the avoidance of
nuclear war must be a permanent objective of American foreign policy.
And I believe that to seek to avoid war by maintaining our principles
and our interests enables us to define the consensus and to obtain
public support.

How to do this in every concrete circumstance, of course, requires
discussion and examination. But in itself, we should not pretend to
ourselves that we have a choice in which suddenly the problem of the
Soviet Union will disappear — the problem will be with us. It is
the responsibility of the Government and of the public, together, to
manage it in such a way that we preserve our values and the interests
of our country and of our allies — without nuclear war. And we can
do it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what will be the US position on the raid to rescue hostages? And also, Mr. Secretary, what is your personal view on this event?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The President has expressed the great gratifi-
cation of the American people at the rescue of the hostages. It is
very difficult to establish a general rule in a situation like this.
Clearly the attack on an airport is an unprecedented attack. But
equally clear is that the hijacking of airliners. — the holding of
a hundred innocent people for ransom in a situation where the host
government, at a minimum, proved impotent to enforce any accepted
international law — indicates that we face here a new international
problem.

PR #339-B

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The United States over a period of years has proposed to the United Nations an international convention where no country would permit hijacked airliners to land or where, automatically, hijacked airplanes that do land are subject then to arrest and will receive no support whatever from the government concerned. For many years we have failed in this effort.

We believe that it is essential that some international arrangement be made to deal with terrorism because it cannot be tolerated that innocent people become the playthings of international thugs.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, is there going to be some effort made to maintain the present value of the dollar internationally?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have a treaty of non-aggression with Secretary Simon, because he holds the view that my knowledge of economics is an argument against universal suffrage. [Laughter] And the agreement is that if I will not speak about economic matters, he will take over foreign policy only slowly. [Laughter]

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, my question relates to southern Africa. Can we expect our Government to take a greater and more realistic attitude to the problems in southern Africa as they affect the black Africans themselves and the interests of the devout democratic nations as well?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have, in recent months, attempted to adjust our African policy to the new realities in southern Africa. These realities are: that a war is already taking place in Rhodesia which all black African countries are supporting; secondly, that 15,000 Cuban troops were permitted to land in Angola and that we were prohibited by the Congress from opposing them; third, that a way must be found to permit African problems to be settled within an African context because otherwise there will be major international confrontations; [and] fourth, that the best hope for the white minorities in countries like Rhodesia and Namibia is a negotiated solution with moderate black leaders before the radical elements take over, perhaps supported by foreign forces.

The United States has attempted to put an end to the war that has already been going on in southern African — to return matters to the negotiating table — to permit the white minorities and the black majorities to work out a method of coexistence — to encourage the moderate African states that are prepared to settle matters without foreign intervention and on the basis of the rights of all the peoples in these countries.

We are doing this because without it, the warfare is certain to escalate — and the danger of foreign intervention is likely to increase. And a racial conflict of extreme violence is likely to break out all over southern Africa, in which then the coexistence between the races becomes impossible.

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So our intent is to mediate and to enable the communities to live
together and to put an end to the cycle of violence that started
before we made our speeches.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned during your talk, there has been some recent criticism of American defense policy for allegedly falling behind the Soviet Union in military strength.

Regardless of the accuracy of this criticism, others have contended
that the more important factor is that the Soviet Union is perceived
by leaders in many parts of the world as gaining rapidly in military
strength and that the military balance is trending in its favor.

Does this problem of perception seriously weaken the political influence
of the United States in the world?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Of course there is a third factor: it's that the perception of many foreign leaders is formed by what is said in the United States in the years divisible by four. [Laughter]

There is no question that the Soviet military strength is growing,
as Soviet industrial strength and its technological basis are growing.
And therefore the free world countries must make continued efforts to
maintain the military balance.

As somebody who has had responsibility for diplomacy for many years,
no one is more convinced than I am that you cannot have an effective
diplomacy without an adequate military strength.

At the same time, we must not talk ourselves into a position of impotence.

In most significant categories of strength we are still ahead of the
Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has always had a very large land army. And if we
look ahead over the next ten years, as I pointed out in my prepared
remarks, we must make greater efforts, together with our allies, in
building forces that are suitable for regional defense, because the
strategic balance is tending towards a stalemate.

But overall, if we look at the total parity of strength, the free
world countries cannot be defeated by a lack of strength. Their
problem is to muster the will to mobilize that strength.

I think at this moment the United States' strength is adequate to
its responsibilities, and we have every intention of maintaining it
in this position as far as we can.

PR #339-B

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I offer this question most respectfully, and ask why should the US continue to remain a member and provide a major portion of the financial support for an organization whose Charter and principles have become a mockery and the antithesis of what we as a nation stand for? And of course I am referring to the United Nations.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has expressed repeatedly its objection to many of the tendencies that we now see in the United Nations.

In my remarks today, I pointed out that these artificial majorities, one-way morality, and the dependence on parliamentary maneuvering cannot be accepted as the normal pattern of international relations. We have repeatedly pointed out in United Nations votes that we will not accept this.

On the other hand, there is a necessity for some meeting place where views can be exchanged and for some mechanism in which crises can be handled rapidly and in which discussion can take place without the need for formal arrangements.

So we still believe that the United Nations has a useful role to perform, but we shall also insist that the United Nations behave in a more equitable manner than has been the case in recent years. And we will not let ourselves be pressured by the artificial majorities that can be generated by demagogery.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you foresee a permanent peace settlement in the Middle East — especially in Beirut, Lebanon, in the near future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, there are two separate but related problems: one is the problem of Lebanon; and the second is the overall problem of the Middle East, although I recognize that the two are related.

The tragedy of Lebanon arises from the fact that two communities that have coexisted for several generations — and used to be cited as an example of how different religions can live together in the Middle East — have gradually fallen into conflict with one another partly because of demographic changes, partly because of the influence of outside countries.

The Constitution of Lebanon of the 1930s depended, or was based, on certain assumptions about a population ratio which a generation since then has altered. So some political adjustment was inevitable in Lebanon.

It then became caught up in the politics of the area, where various of the factions were supported by various of the Arab countries and by some other outside countries, with the result that Lebanon became a microcosm of the larger countries.

PR #339-B

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The United States has constantly warned against military actions in
Lebanon. The United States believes in the sovereignty and independence
and territorial integrity of Lebanon and in a political solution which
permits both the Christian and the Moslem communities to coexist
side by side.

The missing ingredient has been how an outside force could be intro-
duced, or how an inside force could be generated, that would bring
about the authority of the central government.

We favor a round-table discussion among all of the parties. And a
new Special Representative of the President, who went there last
week, is encouraging all the parties in that direction.

Of course the primary solution has to be found among the concerned
Arab states and cannot be imposed by the United States. But I am
hopeful that a solution will be found.

With respect to the Middle East in general, I believe that significant
progress has been made towards a settlement in the Middle East. I
believe the conditions are being created in which further progress
can be made, and I would stress that a permanent peace in the Middle
East is one of the primary objectives of American foreign policy —
and one of the goals which must be approached on a nonpartisan basis
in the interest of all concerned.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. On behalf of the Chicago
Council and the Mid-America Committee, we thank you all for attending.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[lc]

July 9, 1976

No. 344

TOAST BY THE HONORABLE
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT A LUNCHEON IN HONOR
OF PRINCE ABDALLAH
OF SAUDI ARABIA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JULY 8, 1976

Your Royal Highness, it is always a great privilege for me to welcome friends from Saudi Arabia to the United States. His Royal Highness pointed out to me that I have visited Saudi Arabia thirteen times in the last three years; I pointed out to him that on my first visit, I detected a certain suspiciousness on the part of my host, but I'm glad to say that we have developed a relationship now of mutual confidence and of personal friendship.

Of course, I always feel a little apologetic when I welcome people from Saudi Arabia here, because I recognize that as far as hospitality is concerned, the United States is an underdeveloped country. (Laughter)

Your Royal Highness is visiting the United States at a very important period in the relationship between the Arab countries and the United States, and in the history of the Middle East. We are all conscious of the tragedy that is taking place in Lebanon, and we are also aware of the necessity of making progress towards peace in the Middle East. The two events are closely related because, in all candor, peace in the Middle East cannot progress without unity among the Arab nations. Contrary to what our critics are saying, the United States favors unity among the Arab nations. We think that the Kingdom, and His Majesty in particular, has taken wise initiatives in bringing together the Prime Ministers of Syria and Egypt, and in using the good offices of Saudi Arabia to arrange negotiations among all of the parties in Lebanon. Whatever assistance the United States can give these efforts, we will be eager to do. We believe that the time has come in Lebanon for all of the parties to recognize that a continuation of the conflict only leads to a needless loss of life, and only encourages outside forces that are neither interested in the independence of Lebanon, nor in progress towards peace in the Middle East, to explode the situation. I believe, and I have the impression that our friends in Saudi Arabia also believe, that it is time to have a round-table conference in which all of the parties discuss arrangements in which the various communities can live together, the independence and

For further information

PR #344

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sovereignty of Lebanon are safeguarded, and outside influences
are gradually withdrawn.

As far as the Middle East as a whole is concerned, the United
States has stated repeatedly that we believe important steps
have been taken towards peace in the Middle East. But very
major steps remain to be taken, and those steps,
in our view, and I believe in the view of all of the
parties now, have to be taken on all fronts, so that progress
towards peace can be uniform for all of the principal parties concerned. This is the attitude with which the United
States is approaching the problem, and again I want to emphasize
that the cooperation between the Arab states has to be
an important component of this effort.

As far as our bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia are concerned, Saudi Arabia has been our oldest friend in the Arab world. We have had an uninterrupted relationship of trust and confidence, and in the world as it is today, it is important that countries know that friends of the United States know of our interest in their sovereignty, in their prosperity, and in their independence; and that it is known that the United States stands behind its friends.

A few years ago, a group of the National War College sent a
plaque (in brass, since only the Saudis can afford gold), with
a piece of a plank on which the first meeting took place be-
tween President Roosevelt and the King of Saudi Arabia. A
few weeks ago, the wheel of that ship was presented by Ambas-
sador Porter to the Government of Saudi Arabia. It symbolizes
the fact that, while it may have taken 170 years of our history
for our leaders to meet the leaders of Saudi Arabia, in the last
thirty years these contacts have been frequent and important in
the negotiations that I have had the privilege of conducting in
the Middle East. The advice of His Majesty King Faisal, of HM King Khalid,
and of the Crown Prince, Prince Fahd, has been of enormous importance.
And anyone who knows how Saudi diplomacy operates - discreetly
and unostentatiously - also knows that our Saudi friends al-
ways do more than they say, and I would like to stress that this
close relationship we are dedicated to maintaining and to
strengthening.

It is a great privilege, Your Royal Highness, to welcome you
to the Department of State and to the United States, and I
would like all of our guests to drink a toast: To His Royal
Highness, and to the growing friendship between our two
peoples.

NATIONAL BONSAI COLLECTION
REMARKS

Last week Prime Minister Miki
presented to the American people $3 million
for the completion of the studio theater in
the Kennedy Center. When I was told that
within ten days we would dedicate another gift
from Japan, matching the first one, I confess
that I was a bit skeptical -- a condition
which is quite alien to my personality. In
a sense, I was proven right: the gift which
we dedicate this evening is *beyond* price.

The warm friendship between our two
countries, which inspired and gives special
meaning to these gifts, is also of inestimable
value. Our relationship with Japan rests on
a firm bedrock of converging interests. We

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share an enduring stake in the peace of
Asia, an enduring commitment to the
political values of free societies, an enduring
responsibility to harmonize our economic
policies for the benefit of our peoples and the
wider global community. Through our joint
endeavors we have made substantial progress
in relation to the central contemporary
challenges -- promoting economic and
political collaboration among the advanced
industrial democracies, improving relations
with adversaries, and building a new pattern
of cooperation with the developing countries.

If our shared interests have brought us
together, a growing mutual understanding has

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enabled our friendship to thrive to a degree scarcely imaginable a generation ago. And this friendship between our nations continues to grow as our peoples acquire a wider knowledge and appreciation of our unique national traditions and circumstances as well as our shared aspirations.

For our part we also intend to redouble our own efforts to assure the permanent friendship of Japan and the United States.

Last October, shortly after the American people enthusiastically welcomed Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan on their historic visit to this country, President Ford signed into law the US-Japan Friendship Commission, with a $30 million

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the world that's involved, I don't think we'll be able to use the
phrase, "Habib Plan."

I think one of the best and most important decisions I made
during my early days as Secretary of State was to ask Joe to serve
as Under Secretary. I had, of course, long been intimately
acquainted with his extraordinary talents, and he certainly put them
to use both during these last 2-1/2 years as the Under Secretary and
throughout his long and very distinguished career in the Department
of State.

His energy, judgment and skill are legend in the State
Department. He earned a reputation over the years for demanding
and getting superior work -- because he required of others not only
what he was capable of doing himself but, more importantly, what
he knew his colleagues were capable of doing.

Alexander Wollcott once called diplomats "Babies in silk hats

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playing with dynamite." In over a quarter of a century on the firing line, Joe was often called upon to play with dynamite -- but no one has ever accused him of being a babe in a silk hat. On the contrary, Joe typifies the down-to-earth, shirtsleeves individual which the crises of the postwar period have increasingly drawn to our Foreign Service. Straight-talking, without pretense, and with an uncommon devotion to the practical work of making this a better world, Joe is a credit to the Department and to public service generally.

Joe spent almost all of the first 15 years of his career working with the UN and other International Organizations. He became Assistant Secretary of State for that area in 1965, and remained in that job until he became Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asia in 1969. He has, therefore, this whole last decade been in key policymaking positions. Joe has

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worked tirelessly and in many cases literally through the night
to help find a solution to the dilemma of the Middle East. We
haven't achieved all of what we wanted to achieve, but we are
all closer to our goal as a result of Joe Sisco's efforts.

Joe showed what he was made of when the going was
toughest, during our legendary Middle East shuttles. As one
of that small band which was with me throughout every twist and
turn -- every step forward, and every setback -- of those first
halting steps away from conflict in the Middle East, Joe was the
proverbial pillar of strength. Always there, always thinking two
or three steps ahead, always following through on our strategic
design with persistence and imagination, he made an invaluable
contribution to what will go down as a history-making series of
negotiations. I don't think we could have done it without him.

As most of you know, I am sure, this is not really a farewell,

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since Joe will continue to be involved in our foreign policy
deliberations as a consultant to the Department of State. Thus,
while I am glad to honor him here for the long and valuable
years of service he has given his country, I am also pleased
that Joe has not closed the book on us and that we will in the
future, as we have in the past, continue to be able to make
use of his good sense.

TOAST FOR TURKISH OPPOSITION LEADER
BULENT ECEVIT TO BE GIVEN AT YOUR LUNCHEON

Thursday, July 29, 1976 1:00 pm

Distinguished Guests,

I am pleased to be able to welcome you back
to the United States. Bulent, you may have wondered
at the effusive welcome you received at the White
House. I arranged the whole thing -- and it was
easy -- I told the President you were an uncommitted
delegate from North Carolina!

Bulent, I am honored to have had you as one
of my students at Harvard. I'm not sure what
your grades were, but the scope of your achievements
to date suggests you deserved to have been on the
honor roll. Not only are you a successful

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politician but you have achieved eminence as
lecturer, translator, writer and art critic.

You are a true son of modern Turkey -- a
renaissance man.

I take comfort in noting that your career as
a consummate politician and statesman, poet
and journalist has in no way been diminished
because of the unfortunate label you bear of being
one of my former students. Such a stigma has
proven the undoing of men of lesser talent and

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resolve. Certainly, I miss no opportunity to
point out my association with you -- for it is
one of the few enduring positive factors in my
consistently fluctuating public image.

Bulent, you have been eminently successful
in translating into reality that old maxim that
true poets are guardians of the State. You guided
the destiny of Turkey during a critical era and
proved that man can take that quantum leap from
the intellectual ivory tower of poetry into the more
practical, if perhaps less satisfying, world of
politics and diplomacy. I am fascinated by this

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process and wonder -- more and more of late --
if it is possible to effect it in reverse. Although
I am not certain whether you -- nor the world
for that matter -- are ready for Kissinger's
iambic pentameter.

Though you come as a private citizen at this
time, I feel your visit will make a substantial
contribution to the understanding of Turkey among
academic and press circles in the United States.
You come at a time when the partnership between
Turkey and America, which has been a crucial
element in promoting the cause of peace and

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progress throughout the post-war era, has come
into doubt both in your country and mine. It
should be our common objective to remove these
doubts since our continued partnership is as
indispensible in the decades ahead as it has been
in the generation since World War II. Your visit
is a reaffirmation of the close and binding
mutual interests which link our two countries.
We are honored by your visit and know it will
contribute to the task of strengthening the ties
between our nations.

It is in this spirit that I ask you all to join

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me in a toast to Bulent Ecevit and to the
enduring friendship to the peoples of Turkey and the
United States.

Welcome to the United States. Have a good
visit.