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"Extreme care would be taken to attack only known enemy bases in Cambodia, thus minimizing the risk of engagement with Cambodian forces or of causing Cambodian casualties." (Appendix B, p. 8)

Even more important, Shawcross has totally ignored the memorandum's extensive evidence of the military danger that the sanctuaries represented to American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. The April 9, 1969 memorandum, indeed, is one of the most impressive statements ever made of the case for attacking the North Vietnamese military bases in Cambodia. Some examples:

--"The enemy's north-south lines of communication within South Vietnam (SVN) and his seaborne lines of communication into SVN have been interdicted so successfully that it is unlikely that he would be able to conduct sustained large-scale combat operations in III and IV Corps without logistic support through Cambodia. In addition, he would be unable to retain major forces threatening III Corps if Cambodian sanctuary were unavailable to those forces....

"It is clear that the enemy is not reducing his activities in Cambodia. In fact, he continues to increase his use of this sanctuary. Recent and continuing enemy activity in southern Laos, continuing infiltration and supply activity through Cambodia toward III Corps, new road and military facility construction in Cambodia near the SVN border, and recent movement of several NVA and VC regiments from Cambodia into SVN indicate enemy plans for continuing use of, and reliance on, the sanctuary." (Cover memo, pp. 2-3)

--"Late in 1967, the enemy withdrew major forces from SVN into Cambodia. From October until January 1968, he received replacements and retrained and resupplied these forces in sanctuary. In late December and during January, he commenced infiltrating the units from Cambodia, and these and other forces undertook the Tet offensive on 30 January. Subsequent to the Tet offensive, he attempted to retain as much of his force within SVN as possible, although most of his units were driven away from major offensive actions in SVN during May. After the May offensive, a significant portion of the enemy force was withdrawn to Cambodia but some major forces were retained in SVN. After the enemy's short-lived and abortive August offensive, most of the enemy's offensive capability in II

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Corps and much of it in III Corps was withdrawn to sanctuary in Cambodia, and it remained there receiving replacements, retraining, refitting, and resupplying from early autumn until January. The reconstituted enemy forces then commenced movement of supplies and units back into the III Corps area where, despite friendly operations to preempt their initiatives, they have been able to conduct attacks by fire and some ground attacks. A continuing enemy threat, mounted and supported from Cambodia, exists in the III Corps area." (Appendix B, pp. 5-6)

--"The enemy's confidence that he can conduct combat operations on the periphery of SVN with sanctuary nearby permits him many options, both in planning for attack and for subsequent withdrawal that would otherwise not be available to him. These options also tend to inhibit freedom of action by allied commanders because US/RVNAF operations and dispositions within SVN must be undertaken with the knowledge of the enemy capability to conduct operations in the border areas.

"An appropriate time to undertake operations to destroy an enemy force is subsequent to a contact in which the enemy has been defeated and is withdrawing. It is at this point that the enemy force is most disorganized and vulnerable. The option of conducting pursuit operations has essentially been withheld from COMUSMACV because the best place to conduct such operations is against his rallying and collection points in Cambodia.

"Authority to conduct pursuit operations to limited depths in Cambodia could result in destruction of enemy units involved as effective fighting forces, and could require the enemy not only to provide filler replacements to regenerate such units but also to provide new cadre leadership. Pursuit operations also could result in capture or destruction of munitions and supplies in the sanctuaries to which enemy forces are withdrawing. Possibly most important of all, however, is the fact that once US/RVNAF pursuit operations have been undertaken, the enemy would be forced to adjust to the possibility of future pursuit operations, and would not be able to operate in border areas with confidence that sanctuary was available nearby. Reestablishment of bases deeper in Cambodia would be very difficult for the enemy, due to increased visibility and the likelihood of confrontation with the Cambodian populace and forces, the International Control Commission, and the foreign press. Elimination of the enemy from these areas could result in establishment of Cambodian

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control and in joint Cambodia-GVN border control activities which would deny or inhibit reestablishment of de facto enemy control in the areas. This could be particularly important in areas bordering III Corps.

"It is considered that pursuit operations, as described above, could be undertaken with minimum immediate military risk to friendly forces, and that the longer range military risk to friendly forces in SVN could be reduced appreciably by conduct of such operations.

"It is estimated that, as the enemy reaches his full deployment for the current offensive, and his operations begin to run their course, an opportunity will be presented in the III Corps area to strike a strategic blow of major proportions. If successfully exploited, this blow could change the whole balance of forces in Vietnam, severely curtail enemy capability in the vital III Corps area, and shorten the war." (Appendix C, pp. 23-24)

The pursuit operations outlined in the memo were not undertaken in 1969; only aerial attack was permitted. The ground operations that took place in 1970 were limited to 60 days. The JCS recommendations were thus never fully carried out, in spite of the case so powerfully presented.

Shawcross, who had this document, mentions none of these military considerations.

## SIHANOUK'S COMMENTS TO CHESTER BOWLES

**Allegation:** Shawcross devotes three and a half pages (pp.68-71) to an effort to explain away Sihanouk's statements to Chester Bowles in their meeting of January 10, 1968. Sihanouk's remarks to Bowles were cited by the Nixon Administration as inviting American military action against the North Vietnamese sanctuaries; Shawcross cites sanitized State Department talking papers, the escort officer's report, as well as Bowles's reports to Washington, to contradict this assertion. Admitting that his documentation is partial and therefore not "conclusive evidence," Shawcross nevertheless spends three pages implying that the Administration must have lied.

**Fact:** Never does Shawcross quote one word of what Sihanouk actually said to Chester Bowles. This omission, for whatever reason, is of enormous importance. For Sihanouk said to Chester Bowles, inter alia:

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"We don't want any Vietnamese in Cambodia. I can't say this officially, on hot pursuit, but you have the opportunity to exercise hot pursuit. But instead you come in and kill villagers, provisional guards, and FARKal-Cambodian Armed Forces. We don't mind if you go into unpopulated areas. You will both be guilty. The Viet Cong more so, and we will protest to both. We don't want you to stay in Cambodia and we don't want the Viet Cong to stay. We will be very glad if you solve our problem. We are not opposed to hot pursuit in uninhabited areas. You would be liberating us from the Viet Cong. For me only Cambodia counts. I want you to force the Viet Cong to leave Cambodia. In unpopulated areas, where there are not Cambodians,--such precise cases I would shut my eyes."

Sihanouk mentioned only "hot pursuit" because no B-52 bombing was yet being considered. But the import of his remarks is unmistakable -- and was repeated publicly in a press conference on May 13, 1969 after the B-52 bombing had begun and was reported in American newspapers.

## NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE: SPRING 1969

**Allegation:** Shawcross makes the startling assertion that eight months into the Nixon Administration, "no Communist offensive had been launched" yet the Administration was considering further US military actions (pp.110-111).

**Fact:** This is false, and is flatly contradicted by all evidence, including not only 1969 news accounts but also a document quoted by Shawcross on the *immediately preceding page*: a captured enemy document hailing the North Vietnamese spring offensive of 1969 as a "great victory" because "we killed more Americans than we did in the 1968 offensive:"

"One enemy document, captured in late April 1969, noted that the spring offensive 'was a significant tactical and a great strategic victory...we killed more Americans than we did in the 1968 spring offensive. [It] upset Nixon's plan, because U.S. forces were heavily hit and their weakening puppet army could no longer provide support for the implementation of neocolonialism. The antiwar movement in the U.S. flared up again strongly demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops....For each additional day's stay the U.S. must sustain more casualties...'" (p. 109)

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As this document reveals, not only was there an enemy offensive in early 1969 but inflicting American casualties was one of its principal goals. It was in response to this offensive that the bombing of enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia began.

## MENU'S "FAILURE"

**Allegation:** Shawcross asserts that General Abrams and the JCS "accepted" that the MENU bombing had "failed:"

"By fall 1969, General Creighton Abrams and the Joint Chiefs had accepted that the Menu bombing had failed in its primary military purpose; neither COSVN headquarters nor the sanctuaries themselves were destroyed." (p. 113)

**Fact:** This assertion is supported by no evidence and is in fact totally false. Abrams sent repeated reports to Washington that the bombing was crucial in preempting enemy offensives and enhancing the security of the most populous areas of South Vietnam. Shawcross simply ignored General Abrams's public statement in the 1973 hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee:

"The only change I would make in it / my recommendation of B-52 bombing /, if I were to do it over, would be to recommend it earlier." (Hearings, p. 346)

## "RECOGNITION" OF NEW GOVERNMENT

**Allegation:** Shawcross asserts flatly that after the Cambodian legislature deposed Sihanouk on March 18, 1970, "United States recognition was immediately conferred upon the men who overthrew him." (p. 122)

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Fact: This is a distortion. The State Department spokesman, when asked by newsmen on March 19 whether the United States recognized the new government, replied: "Our position is that the question of recognition does not arise." The spokesman stated that constitutional reasons in Cambodia made it unnecessary for the United States to take action on diplomatic recognition; he refused to respond to questions about Sihanouk's status. On March 21, President Nixon, in a reply to a question at his news conference, made clear that he took no position as to approval or disapproval of the new government, and indeed still expected Sihanouk to return to Cambodia:

"These developments in Cambodia are quite difficult to appraise. As you know from having been out there yourself on occasion, the Cambodian political situation, to put it conservatively, is quite unpredictable and quite fluid.

"However, we have, as you note, established relations on a temporary basis with the government which has been selected by the Parliament and will continue to deal with that government as long as it appears to be the government of the nation. I think any speculation with regard to which way this government is going to turn, what will happen to Prince Sihanouk when he returns, would both be premature and not helpful.

"I will simply say that we respect Cambodia's neutrality. We would hope that North Vietnam would take that same position in respecting its neutrality. And we hope that whatever government eventually prevails there, that it would recognize that the United States interest is the protection of its neutrality." (emphasis added)

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NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS: APRIL 1970

**Allegation:** Shawcross attributes the April 1970 US-South Vietnamese ground operation against the North Vietnamese sanctuaries to such factors as the "White House's truculence," Nixon's eagerness for "restoring his slighted authority" after domestic setbacks, "negligent and emotional decision making," and other factors amounting to a gratuitous, unprovoked aggressiveness (pp. 130 ff.). The North Vietnamese had only defensive motives: "...the North Vietnamese moved westward into Cambodia with the apparent intention of securing their lines of communication" (p. 130).

**Fact:** Thus does Shawcross make only the barest (and tendentious) mention in passing of the wave of North Vietnamese attacks on Cambodian outposts, towns, roads and rivers at the end of March and beginning of April 1970. It was this assault on Cambodian military and civilian locations -- on Cambodian soil -- that brought Cambodia into the Indochina war as a belligerent for the first time. It was this crisis that prompted the allied ground operations of April 30, to protect American and South Vietnamese lives against the enemy's effort to link his scattered sanctuaries into a vast continuous base area covering all of eastern Cambodia.

Information on these North Vietnamese attacks is on the public record: in newspaper reports of April 1970; Presidential statements or reports of April 30, June 3, and June 30, 1970; and the President's Foreign Policy Report to the Congress of February 25, 1971. Shawcross likewise had declassified military information in his possession, released to him under the Freedom of Information Act, that confirmed this concern. Thus, a message from the Chairman of the JCS to Admiral McCain and General Abrams on April 21, 1970:

"As you are certainly aware, there is highest level, concern here with respect to the situation in Cambodia. This concern has been heightened by the following:

"a. It appears that the success of NVA and VC troops to date have encouraged them to expand what may have been limited objectives initially to a current drive to isolate Phnom Penh.

"b. Most lines of communication leading into Phnom Penh from the north, east, and south have been interdicted by enemy forces and the security of Phnom Penh and the Cambodian Government appears to be seriously threatened." (JCS 05495 Apr 70)

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KHIEU SAMPHAN'S TRAVELS: APRIL 1974

**Allegation:** Shawcross takes at face value the claims that a negotiating opportunity may have been lost in not contacting Khmer Rouge commander-in-chief Khieu Samphan on his world travels in April 1974 (pp. 325-326).

**Fact:** Khieu Samphan explicitly ruled out all negotiations and any prospect of compromise at the beginning of that very same trip. Shawcross indeed makes this very clear in his next chapter:

> "In early April 1974 Khieu Samphan, vice-president of Sihanouk's Government of National Union and commander in chief of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Army, had come to Peking. To Sihanouk's intense discomfiture he was welcomed almost with the honors due to a head of state. At a formal banquet given in his honor he attacked all "such vicious maneuvers as sham cease-fire, sham talks and sham peace," and he ruled out all compromise. He presented Chou En-lai with a grenade launcher; the Chinese Premier aimed it at the ceiling. It was a critical moment which symbolized an important shift in Chinese policy away from a political solution toward a military end to the Cambodian crisis. In talks with the Chinese government the Khmer Rouge commander requested a major commitment of military supplies from Peking; that request was granted. It was with the help of these new weapons that the Khmer Rouge were able to keep the fighting through the 1974 wet season at a higher level than ever before and then to launch the offensive that won them the war." (p. 336)

Shawcross simply ignored the fact that repeated attempts were made by the United States in 1973, 1974, and 1975 to promote a negotiation between Prince Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh government. All these efforts were blocked by the Khmer Rouge.

KHMER ROUGE BRUTALITY

**Allegation:** Acknowledging the horrors committed by the Khmer Rouge after their takeover in April 1975, Shawcross attributes their conduct to a "Manichean fear" caused by the "punishment" inflicted upon them in the years of their struggle, that is to say, American and Cambodian efforts to resist their victory. Shawcross provides no documentation whatsoever to substantiate this assertion, which is in fact the central thesis of his book:

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"All wars are designed to arouse anger, and almost all soldiers are taught to hate and to dehumanize their enemy. Veterans of the combat zone are often possessed of a mad rage to destroy, and to avenge their fallen comrades. It does not always happen, however, that victorious armies have endured such punishment as was inflicted upon the Khmer Rouge. Nor does it always happen that such an immature and tiny force comes to power after its country's social order has been obliterated, and the nation faces the danger of takeover by a former ally, its ancient enemy. In Cambodia that did take place. In the last eight years, degree, law, moderation had been forsworn. The war and the causes for which it was fought had brought desolation while nurturing and then giving power to a little group of zealots sustained by Manichean fear." (p. 389)

Fact: Shawcross had evidence available to him that proved the contrary. Referred to elsewhere in his book (but always selectively) is extensive documentation that shows in fact that the brutal internal policies of the Khmer Rouge were planned and premeditated, motivated by ideology, and indeed long practiced in all areas under their control beginning as early as 1971. Forced dispersal of whole populations; destruction of traditional social structures, organized religion, and even the family; forced collectivization of agriculture; destruction of the middle class; and systematic terror -- all these features of the post-1975 holocaust in Cambodia were in evidence in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas for several years before April 1975.

This is one of the clearest points to emerge from the book by Francois Ponchaud, *Cambodia: Year Zero*, which Shawcross cites occasionally. Ponchaud writes, for example (emphases added):

> --"...accusing foreigners cannot acquit the present leaders of Kampuchea: their inflexible ideology has led them to invent a radically new kind of man in a radically new society. A fascinating revolution for all who aspire to a new social order. A terrifying one, for all who have any respect for human beings." (p. 16, Penguin edition)

> --"So we must look elsewhere for an explanation of the deportation from Phnom Penh. The official reasons certainly had something to do with the decision to clear the city, but they do not seem sufficient. The deeper reason was an

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ideological one, as we saw very clearly later on when we learned that the provincial towns, villages and even isolated farms in the countryside had also been emptied of their inhabitants.

"The evacuation of Phnom Penh follows traditional Khmer revolutionary practice: ever since 1972 the guerrilla fighters had been sending all the inhabitants of the villages and towns they occupied into the forest to live, often burning their homes so they would have nothing to come back for. A massive, total operation such as this reflects a new concept of society, in which there is no place even for the idea of a city. The towns of Cambodia had grown up around market-places; Phnom Penh itself owed its expansion to French colonialism, Chinese commerce and the bureaucracy of the monarchy, followed by the Republic. All this must be swept away and an egalitarian rural society put in its place." (p. 37)

--"A radical revolution, more radical and destined to go farther than that of China or the USSR.' That was the conclusion of the Swedish ambassador Kaj Bork on his return from a visit to Democratic Kampuchea from 20 February to a 6 March 1976. I can only agree: abolition of the towns, total liquidation of the former cadres, total restructuring of the society and economy, recasting of the culture and prohibition of all religion - in all likelihood no revolution has ever travelled so far or, what is more, so fast towards the achievement of its goals." (p.156)

--"On 17 April 1975 a society collapsed; another is now being born from the fierce drive of a revolution which is incontestably the most radical ever to take place in so short a time. It is a perfect example of the application of an ideology pushed to the farthest limit of its internal logic. But the farthest limit is too far, and 'too far' is akin to madness -- for in this scheme of society, where is man?" (p. 214)

Moreover, Shawcross had possession of detailed studies done in the US government by Foreign Service Officer Kenneth Quinn. From interviews with refugees fleeing Cambodia in 1973 and 1974, Quinn pieced together a detailed description of Khmer Rouge totalitarian practices which he says began in some areas as early as late 1971. Shawcross cites some of Quinn's account (pp. 321-322), but does not allow it to disturb his preconceived conclusion that the United States is to blame. Thus Shawcross omits any of Quinn's references to developments before 1973,