ALBERT WOHLSTETTER

August 5, 1966

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Center for International Affairs AUG 8 1966
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Thanks for the offprint on the Atlantic
Alliance which I received today just as I was
about to get off a note to you, saying how much
I liked your short piece in *Look* on Vietnam.
It was by far the best piece of the bunch, and
very good on any standards. My own views on
Vietnam are very close to yours.

June 8, 1966

Mr. Kissinger is Professor of Government and faculty member of The Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. His most recent book is *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of The Atlantic Alliance*. He has also written *The Necessity for Choice, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and A World Restored*.

During the Kennedy Administration, he was consultant to The National Security Council and has consulted at various times with other governmental agencies.

Henry A. Kissinger

LOOK Magazine Statement

6 June 1966

The war in Vietnam is dominated by two factors: withdrawal would be disastrous and negotiations are inevitable. American policy must take both of these realities into account.

## A. The Impossibility of Withdrawal

An American withdrawal that could plausibly be represented as a Communist victory would be disastrous for the following reasons:

(1) Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focussed on the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world.

(2) In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries--especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand--which have supported our effort.

(3) The long-term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willingness and ability to honor its commitments. For example, whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depends crucially on its confidence in American support against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

- 2 -

(4) A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas which are geographically far removed from Vietnam will thus be basically affected by the outcome there.

In short, we are no longer fighting in Vietnam only for the Vietnamese. We are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability.

## B. The Inevitability of Negotiation

Historically the purpose of the war for the United States has been the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crushed.

But the primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military. What makes the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "shadow government" permeating every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure which can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

A purely military solution is impossible also because Vietnam directly engages the interests and prestige of so many major powers. Finally, the Administration has stressed its unconditional readiness to respond to any overture by Hanoi for negotiations.

- 3 -

In these circumstances, the political program--both within Vietnam and for negotiations--is crucial. Military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to build political structures. Negotiations will be sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with significant areas of the country substantially free of terror.

## Where do We go from Here?

-- Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100 per cent control in 40 per cent of the country than 40 per cent control in 100 per cent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory which would leave us with three Hong Kongs and two Berlins in the midst of a hostile population. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory that we cannot securely control. We will always retain a capacity for preventing the consolidation of Communist control even in areas that we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must be given to creating "secure" zones containing a maximum of population which can be expanded if the war continues and which will give us reliable negotiating counters at a conference.

- 4 -

We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern state --a process which took centuries in the West. Such a process involves a profound shift of loyalties--a task which would be searing in the best of circumstances but which is compounded by the pressures of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) we must have compassion for the travail of society which has been wracked by war for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for failing in our duty; and (b) we must give special emphasis to building political structures from the ground up.

The notion drawn from our experience in Europe that economic assistance automatically produces political stability does not apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our enthusiasm and concern with technical refinements will overwhelm slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization. The test should be whether a program can enlist local support and thus give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out from there.

It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference which deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are conducted in a large forum consisting of many nations which are already rivals (e.g., the U.S.S.R. and Communist China or the U.S. and France) energies may be dissipated in political jockeying which is peripheral to the central problems

- 5 -

in Vietnam. It may be wiser to segment the issues into their component
elements, each of which is to be settled by the parties primarily involved.
A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already
achieved in other forums.

-- The war in Vietnam is a crucial test of American maturity. In
the lives of nations, as of individuals, there comes a point when future
options are limited by past actions. The choices of 1966 are not those
of 1961. We must recognize that the defensive requires us to be engaged
in places chosen by opponents for their difficulty and ambiguity. We do
not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those challenges which most
flatter our moral preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic
and military problems as an integrated whole, we will not be able to deal
with them individually.

488 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • MURRAY HILL 8-0300

Leo Rosten
Special Editorial Advisor

June 27, 1966

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I enclose, for Leo Rosten, a galley
of your forthcoming article in LOOK
magazine.

Please read and initial it.

We have followed your text, and
urge you to make no further corrections
--since our schedule is very tight
and the deadline close.

Enc.

Henry A. Kissinger

LOOK Magazine Statement

6 June 1966

(1) Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focussed on the RUSSIAN doctrine of peaceful coexistence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world.

- 2 -

(4) A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas which are geographically <u>far</u> removed from Vietnam will <u>thus</u> be basically affected by the outcome there.

B. <u>The Inevitability of Negotiation</u>

Historically the purpose of <u>GOAL</u> war for the United States has been the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crushed.

- 3 -

## Where do We go from Here?

-- Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100 per cent control in 40 per cent of the country than 40 per cent control in 100 per cent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory which would leave us with three Hong Kongs and two Berlins in the midst of a hostile population. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory that we cannot securely control. We will always retain a capacity for preventing the consolidation of Communist control even in areas that we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must be given to creating "secure" zones, each a maximum of population which can be expanded if the war continues and which will give us reliable negotiating counters at a conference.

- 4 -

-- We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern state --a process which took centuries in the West. Such a process involves a profound shift of loyalties--a task which would be searing in the best of circumstances but which is compounded by the pressures of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) we must have compassion for the travail of society which has been wracked by war for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for failing in our duty; and (b) we must give special emphasis to building political structures from the ground up.

-- The notion drawn from our experience in Europe that economic assistance automatically produces political stability does not apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our enthusiasm and concern with technical refinements will overwhelm slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization. The test should be whether a program can enlist local support and thus give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out from there.

-- It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference which deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are conducted in a large forum consisting of many nations which are already rivals (e.g., the U.S.S.R. and Communist China or the U.S. and France) energies may be dissipated in political jockeying which is peripheral to the central problems

- 5 -

in Vietnam. It may be wiser to separate the issues into their component elements, each of which is to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in other forums.

JUL 29 1966

July 28, 1966

Miss Joan Blanchard
Secretary to Henry Kissinger
Harvard University Center for
International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Miss Blanchard:

Enclosed please find three sets of
tearsheets from the piece on Vietnam
published in LOOK.

I inquired about the selection of
pictures for these articles. Evidently,
it is a decision made by a number of
people and I could not trace the reasons
for this particular selection.

Enc.

Suppose the President asked you

# WHAT SHOULD WE

## Five experts give their answer

We are at war in Vietnam. Whether we should have gotten into it or not is a separate issue. We are in Vietnam.

Americans have always backed their armies with the moral certainty that in our victory right would triumph. But to many today, our cause seems stained by doubt. Never, during a foreign war, have Americans debated our national policy with such passion: "Get out. . . Escalate. . . Negotiate. . . 'Hole in' at coastal enclaves. . . Blockade Haiphong. . . Push 'hot pursuit' into Laos." The bitterness of the partisans consolidates the confusion.

LOOK invited five experts, who hold varying views about Vietnam, to answer this question: "Suppose the President today asked you, 'What should we do now?' " We urged each to reply in the intentionally brief space of 1,000 words—for we sought not a pabulum of agreement but sharp, specific proposals.

Here are their answers. Each man presents a program that millions would no doubt support.

### HANS MORGENTHAU

Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modern History, University of Chicago; director, Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy; has served as consultant to the Department of State and the Department of Defense; author of In Defense of the National Interest, The Purpose of American Politics, etc.

> "The great mass of the people of South Vietnam prefer an end to the war rather than a fight to the finish with the Vietcong. The two main arguments with which our involvement has been justified have...been demolished...."

PRESIDENT JOHNSON is wont to ask the critics of his Vietnam policy, "What would you do if you were in my place?" This is a legitimate question, and it deserves an answer. Having been a consistent critic of our Vietnam policies for more than four years, I have tried to answer that question before and am glad to do so again.

Mr. President, I would say, you must choose between two alternative policies. You can start with the assumption that in Vietnam the credibility of the United States and its prestige as a great power are irrevocably engaged; that the war in Vietnam is a test case for all "wars of national liberation"; and that in consequence, the fate of Asia, and perhaps even of the non-Communist world at large, might well be decided in Vietnam. If you believe this, then you must see the war through to victory. That is to say, you must escalate the war both in the South and in the North by committing what will amount (according to authoritative estimates) to a million American combat troops and by bombing, without restrictions, the industrial and population centers of North Vietnam. By doing this, you will destroy Vietnam, North and South, and risk a military confrontation with China or the Soviet Union or both. Yet these risks are justified by the magnitude of the issues at stake.

This is the policy that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advocating and that you have pursued since February, 1965, even though you have been anxious to differentiate your policy from that of the Joint Chiefs. In truth, the difference between the two has not been one of kind but rather of degree. You have been escalating the war at a slower

pace than the Joint Chiefs recommended. But escalate you did, and you will continue escalating because the assumptions from which you have started leave you no choice.

There is another policy, Mr. President, which you could and, in my view, should have pursued. This policy assumes that the war is primarily a civil war; that its global significance is remote; that, far from containing China and communism, it opens the gates to both—by destroying the social fabric of Vietnamese nationalism, which is impossibly hostile to China; and that, in consequence, the risks we are taking in the pursuit of victory are out of all proportion to the interests at stake.

We should never have gotten involved in this war, but we are deeply involved in it. The aim of our policy must be to avoid getting more deeply involved in it and to extricate ourselves from it while minimizing our losses. Recent events in Vietnam offer us the opportunity of initiating such a new policy of disengagement.

These events have clearly demonstrated two facts: The Saigon government is hardly worthy of the name; and the great mass of the people of South Vietnam prefer an end to the war rather than a fight to the finish with the Vietcong. The two main arguments with which our involvement has been justified have thus been demolished: that we have a commitment to the government of Saigon to assist it in the fight against the Vietcong; and that the people of South Vietnam want to be saved by us from the Vietcong—even at the risk of their own destruction. The prospect of elections to be held in South Vietnam provides us with the chance

PRODUCED BY LEO ROSTEN

DO NOW

VIETNAM

?

to use these new facts for the initiation of a new policy of disengagement. Such a policy would proceed on two fronts, the political and the military.

Politically, we ought to work for the achievement of four goals.

1. We must promote the establishment of a broadly-based government in which the elements seeking an end to the war would have decisive influence. This government would have the task of organizing elections for a constituent assembly and a legislature at an early date. It must be recognized that such elections will neither be representative nor "free." The group that organizes them is likely to win them. Hence, the crucial importance of the composition of the government presiding over the elections.

2. We must see to it that the government that emerges from these elections will negotiate with the Vietcong for a *modus vivendi*. Such a settlement would no doubt increase the risk of a complete takeover by the Vietcong. However, it is quite possible to visualize a coalition government under which different sections of the country, after the model of the Laotian settlement, would be governed by different factions. One can even visualize a South Vietnamese government that would be anxious to maintain its independence vis-à-vis the North.

3. We should put United States military forces stationed in South Vietnam at the disposal of the government that emerges from the elections, to be used as bargaining counters in negotiations with the Vietcong. In other words, we would honor our commitments and would leave it to the South Vietnamese Government to interpret them—in order to

bring the war to an end.

4. Our ultimate goal would be the withdrawal of our armed forces from South Vietnam. Such a withdrawal would be coordinated with the progress of negotiations between the government of South Vietnam and the Vietcong. Our military forces would be gradually withdrawn, and our military presence would always be commensurate with the political purposes it is intended to serve.

Pending such withdrawal, our military policy would come in three parts:

1. We would stop both the bombing of North Vietnam and the search-and-destroy operations in South Vietnam that seek to kill the Vietcong and occupy territory controlled by them. For the continuation of such operations in the North and South is compatible only with a policy aiming at victory, not with one seeking a negotiated settlement among the Vietnamese factions.

2. We would hold the cities and coastal enclaves that we and the South Vietnamese military now control. That is to say, we would be satisfied with a de facto division of South Vietnam.

3. We would expect the Vietcong to reciprocate by ceasing attacks upon the perimeter of our positions and by stopping sabotage within them. It can be assumed that we and the Vietcong have a reciprocal interest in maintaining the military status quo pending negotiations.

The policy here advocated, Mr. President, is anathema to the men who advise you. Yet it has always been supported by officials fairly high in your administration. It now has the support of a number of senators who in the past have been "hawks" rather than "doves."

You, Mr. President, will have to decide whether the present policy—morally dubious, militarily hopeless and risky, politically aimless and counterproductive—shall be continued or whether a better policy shall take its place. You aspire to be a great President. Whether you remain the prisoner of past mistakes or have the courage to correct them will be the test of your greatness.

continued

LOOK B-9-66 25

VIETNAM?

HENRY KISSINGER

Professor of government, Harvard, and member of
The Center for International Affairs;
consultant to the National Security Council
under President Kennedy; author of
The Troubled Partnership,
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, etc.

"We are no longer fighting in
Vietnam only for the Vietnamese.
We are also fighting for ourselves
and for international stability."

THE WAR IN VIETNAM is dominated by two factors: Withdrawal would be disastrous, and negotiations are inevitable. American policy must take both of these realities into account.

1. The impossibility of withdrawal. An American withdrawal under conditions that could plausibly be represented as a Communist victory would be disastrous for these reasons:

Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focused on the Russian doctrine of peaceful coexistence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world.

In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries—especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—that have supported our effort.

A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas geographically far removed from Vietnam will be basically affected by the outcome there.

2. The inevitability of negotiation. Historically, the goal of a war, for the United States, has been the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crushed. But the primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military.

What makes the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "shadow government," permeating every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure that can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

A purely military solution is impossible also because Vietnam directly engages the interests and the prestige of so many major powers. Finally, the Administration has stressed its unconditional readiness to respond to any overture by Hanoi for negotiations.

In these circumstances, the political program—both within Vietnam and for negotiations—is crucial. Military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with significant areas of the country substantially free of terror.

**Where do we go from here?**

1. Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100-percent control in 40 percent of the country than 40-percent control in 100 percent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory, which would leave us with three Hong Kong and two Berlins in the midst of hostile populations. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory that we cannot securely control. We will always retain a capacity for preventing the consolidation of Communist control even in areas that we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must be given to creating "secure" zones that contain a maximum of population—zones that can be expanded if the war continues and that will give us reliable negotiating counters at a conference.

2. We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern state—a process that took centuries in the West. Such a process involves a profound shift of loyalties—a task that would be searing in the best of circumstances, but is compounded by the pressures of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) We must have compassion for the travail of a society that has been wracked by war for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for failing in our duty; and (b) we must give special emphasis to building political structures from the ground up.

3. The notion drawn from our experience in Europe, that economic assistance automatically produces political stability, does not apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our enthusiasm and our concern with technical refinements will overwhelm slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization. The test should be whether a program can enlist local support and thus give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out from there.

4. It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference that deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are conducted in a forum consisting of many nations that are already rivals (e.g., the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, or the U.S. and France), energies may be dissipated in political jockeying that is peripheral to the central problems in Vietnam. It may be wiser to separate the issues into their component elements, each to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in other forums.

5. The war in Vietnam is a crucial test of American maturity. In the lives of nations, as of

individuals, there comes a point when future options are limited by past actions. The choices of 1966 are not those of 1961. We must recognize that to be on the defensive often forces us to be engaged in places chosen by opponents for their difficulty and ambiguity.

We do not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those challenges that most flatter our moral preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic and military problems as an integrated whole, we will not be able to deal with them individually.

HANSON W. BALDWIN

Military editor of the New York Times, Pulitzer Prize winner for journalism, graduate of Annapolis, war correspondent in the South Pacific, North Africa, Normandy, Korea, Vietnam.

"Congress should declare a state of national emergency. . . . The President should . . . mobilize up to 500,000 reserves. . . . We have no easy choices. . . . And if we lose, our children and grandchildren will face tomorrow a far worse problem than we face today."

T'S THE ELEVENTH HOUR in Vietnam. The United States must decide to win or get out. It is not too late to win, but it soon may be.

Victory means, first of all, a Governmental and national determination to win.

Congress should declare a state of national emergency and authorize a limited mobilization. Our trained and ready military power is spread thin all over the world. Limited mobilization would provide—more quickly than any other means—a pool of at least partially trained manpower and organized logistical, training and combat units to sustain a rapid buildup in Vietnam and, ultimately, to strengthen our weakened positions in other parts of the world.

The President should be authorized to mobilize up to 500,000 reserves for two-year service. Draft calls should be increased as necessary. All enlistments should be extended for a minimum of six months.

South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand must be regarded as a strategic whole. The war in South Vietnam is clearly nourished from outside. Soldiers, medicines, supplies, and especially arms and ammunition, today reach South Vietnam by sea, from Cambodia, through Laos, and from North Vietnam by any and all methods. Most of the small arms now used by the Vietcong "main-force" units are standardized on the Soviet 7.62-mm caliber basis and are Chinese-manufactured. All of the heavy arms—mortars, continued

26 LOOK 8-9-66

# VIETNAM?

antiaircraft guns, SAM missiles, MiG's, IL-28 bombers, and the world's largest helicopter, the Mi-6—are either Chinese- or Russian-manufactured.

We must shut off, to the best of our ability, the stream of Communist supplies into North Vietnam. We should turn off the faucet, not merely put a stopper in the drain. This means blocking the seaborne arms traffic to North Vietnam—by mining, bombing, naval gunfire; the sinking of a dredge in the narrow, silted ship channel to Hai-phong; by so-called "pacific blockade" or "quarantine" or other means.

The land supply routes, even more important to the Communist war effort, must also be interrupted. Past limitations upon the bombing of railroads and roads, and of the choke points and communications bottlenecks in North Vietnam's extensive road network, must be removed. We must reduce the flow of supplies from North Vietnam through Laos and Cambodia. Many of these supplies move partway by truck; we have been bombing the trucks but, until recently, not the fuel-oil supplies that power them. We should bomb all the fuel-oil depots in North Vietnam. Electric power plants, which provide power for a variety of war purposes, should also be bombed.

Interdiction of the many branches of the Ho Chi Minh Trail (which leads over various passes from North Vietnam through Laos or Cambodia into South Vietnam) must be improved—by eliminating some of the restrictions that now hamper bombing and particularly by assigning more

trained Forward Air Controllers, both on the ground and in the air.

Air cavalry raids by helicopter against Lao-tian bottlenecks on the supply route should be undertaken whenever possible. The doctrine of "hot pursuit" must be applied to any guerrilla forces that use Cambodia as a sanctuary.

At sea, the Navy's coastal surveillance and river patrols must be extended and tightened—to stop Vietcong gunrunning by junks and sampans. This will require more air and small-craft bases in South Vietnam and Thailand.

U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam should be doubled to a figure of 500,000 to 700,000 men, to enable U.S. and South Vietnamese forces to patrol areas that have been Communist sanctuaries for years. We must find and fix the main force of the enemy, and force him to expend his supplies in action, if possible. An enemy "body count" is not the proper yardstick by which to judge success in this kind of war. Even if the enemy refuses action and fades away into the jungles, or into the shadows of the U Minh Forest, the capture and destruction of his base camps, of his rice and food supplies, of his medicines and weapons and ammunition will reduce his combat capabilities. The war must ultimately be won on the ground by destroying or breaking up the main-force units of the Vietcong, and especially by destroying the enemy's bases of operations.

The final part of the strategy for victory—the part that will shape the peace—is the pacification

program. The American and South Vietnamese military can launch search-and-destroy and search-and-clear operations; but only specially trained South Vietnamese administrative and paramilitary forces can hold the areas that are cleared. The pacification program—in the past mishandled and underemphasized—has this year started slowly but well; it must be pushed to the maximum. For one can confirm victory in a guerrilla war only if one wins the people over and protects them against the enemy.

This is a slow, a comprehensive, a tedious process. The administrative, police, educational and health authority of the central government must be built up from what Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge calls "the precinct level."

The enemy cannot win in a military sense; he is stymied on the field of battle. But political instability in Saigon, and U.S. impatience at home, may cause us to lose the struggle—politically and psychologically.

We have no easy choices—only grim alternatives. Victory, which means making it possible for a South Vietnamese government to govern without interference from outside, is possible; but it may not be possible soon.

The victory road will be long and hard and bloody. But defeat or stalemate in Vietnam will gravely impair the U.S. position in Asia and in the world; and if we lose, our children and grandchildren will face tomorrow a far worse problem than we face today.

WOODY ALLEN GIVES A SMIRNOFF MULE PARTY FOR MONIQUE VAN VOOREN, CHARLES REID, JULIE NEWMAR, 'KILLER' JOE PIRO, AND DOLORES HAWKINS.

THIS IS THE

28 LOOK 8-9-66

HERMAN KAHN

Director of the Hudson Institute (a nonprofit organization conducting research in the area of national security and international order); former member of the RAND Corporation; author of Thinking About the Unthinkable, On Thermonuclear War, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios.

"Our cause in South Vietnam is not immoral. . . . I have yet to hear of an alternative that is not likely to involve costs far greater, far more deplorable, far more inhumane. . . ."

I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY LOOK to describe my personal position, rather than give an analysis of the pros and cons. The first and overwhelming point is that whether or not one agrees with the steps that led to it, our present commitment to oppose force and terror by the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam is as solemn an engagement as any modern nation has made. I do not believe that commitments must be blindly kept, regardless of costs; but just as we should be careful about making commitments, we should be very careful about honoring them.

Maintaining the credibility of our commitments is not just a matter of "saving face." Our ability to support world peace and security, particularly without using excessive force, depends in great measure upon the faith that other nations repose in American commitments. (Germany, Japan, India and Israel, for example, restrain their activities in obtaining nuclear weapons partly because of American commitments.)

To renege on commitments as serious as those we have made in Southeast Asia could be a major step in a disastrous erosion of faith in the United States. If faith in our commitments became so weak that we would have to give excessive commitments in order to make them believable—for example, giving minor states control over our policy (as the British had to do with Poland in 1939)—then the likelihood of major escalation, such as a war with China, would be dangerously increased.

The United States also has a crucial interest

in dispelling two illusions that have grown up since World War II: that radical terrorists almost always win; and that radical regimes can subvert, or intervene in, a neighboring area with little risk. History is replete with examples of how a victory by terrorists in one area powerfully influenced the likelihood and the tactics of subversion in other areas. The invalidity of oversimplified "domino theories" should not lead us to underestimate the worldwide costs of letting the Vietcong succeed with their resort to violence. In addition, I am seriously concerned about the political and moral repercussions within the United States were we to "pull out" of Vietnam.

Our cause in South Vietnam is not immoral. Many think we are creating more destruction, more death, more human suffering than our cause justifies. But what would happen were we to let South Vietnam fall into the hands of the National Liberation Front? It is not likely that a victorious NLF would treat with restraint: the Cao Dai, the Hoa Hao, the Catholics (each a community of about 1,000,000 human beings); the 500,000 South Vietnamese soldiers; the many other groups that have demonstrated they are anti-Communist; the tens of thousands who would probably be labeled enemies of a Communist state. Those who dismiss this likelihood need only look at how the Chinese Communists and the Indonesian Army treated their opponents, and might ask themselves if the victorious NLF is likely to be more restrained. Nor should the West view with equanimity 15,000,000 continued

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LOOK 8-9-66 29

VIETNAM?

people passing behind a Communist Iron Curtain.

What, then, should we do in Vietnam now?

1. An important aspect of the battle for "the hearts and minds of men" is this: Which side will succeed in symbolizing national identity? Many Vietnamese prefer good government to bad government, but even more prefer self-government to foreign control. We should encourage self-government, and should minimize our nonmilitary role.

2. Thus, we should accept and encourage more independence by the South Vietnamese in handling their political and economic problems. Even if a Buddhist nationalist comes to power, he is likely to be more opposed to the NLF than to the Americans; and if his government does not want our protection, or makes it impossible, we can then leave with honor—having fully honored our solemn commitment. (I assume we would not have concluded at his election or policy.)

3. To the extent that it can be encouraged to, the Saigon government should compete with the Vietcong in promises of social reform, should launch selective but significant social-reform programs now, and should carry out pacification programs in a legal and humane way.

4. We should replace the present system of four levels of American advisers in the Vietnamese Army (which tends to result in four levels of double veto) with a simpler, more unified system.

5. We should urge the South Vietnamese Army to make promotions and assignments on the basis of merit. The efficiency of the fighting forces would be greatly increased if the army adopted the simple expedient of promotions on the battlefield, raising enlisted men to officer rank, regardless of education—rewarding proven ability, aggressiveness and dedication.

6. The amnesty programs offered to the Vietcong should be broadened and liberalized. The counterinsurgency wars that have been won since World War II often involved generous, well-publicized amnesty programs. (The Philippine Government, for instance, promised and gave farms to many Huk guerrillas who surrendered.) Although the South Vietnamese think it wrong to treat rebels better than loyal peasants, it is clearly worth a good deal to South Vietnam to make surrender safe and attractive, and to guarantee a decent, useful life to the man who surrenders.

7. We probably do not need to escalate military activities against North Vietnam. The military tactics we have introduced—aggressive patrolling to carry out search-and-destroy and clear-and-hold operations—contain many significant benefits that have not yet been fully realized, but should soon show important results.

8. I believe we can pacify Vietnam. A stable, reasonable government there is possible. Although the political situation looks bad today, many current political problems are likely to be solved following, and as the result of, military victories. The political difficulties in South Vietnam are likely to be diminished when and after elections are held—especially if the elections follow military victories.

Our present policy is the only realistic alternative the United States really has. It is a hopeful policy. If we are patient, resolute, realistic, that policy can probably realize our goals. I have yet to hear of an alternative that is not likely to involve costs far greater, far more deplorable, far more inhumane in both the short and long run.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

Albert Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities, City University of New York; professor of history, Harvard, 1954-61; twice winner, Pulitzer Prize; winner, National Book Award; assistant to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; author of A Thousand Days, etc.

> "The bitter fact is that the war in Vietnam can never be won as a war of white men against Asians.... The more we Americanize the war ... the more we make the war unwinnable."

THE MODERATE CRITICS of the administration's Vietnam policy do not question its proclaimed purposes: resistance to Communist aggression, self-determination for South Vietnam, a negotiated settlement in Southeast Asia. They do question, with the greatest urgency, the theory that the way to achieve these objectives is to intensify the war. The more we destroy Vietnam, North and South, in their judgment, the less chance there will ever be of attaining our objectives. The course of widening the war, moreover, will mire our nation in a hopeless and endless conflict on the mainland of Asia, beyond the effective use of our national power and the range of our primary interests—and may well end in nuclear war with China.

And the alternatives? Instead of supposing that a guerrilla movement can be crushed by strategic bombing, instead of using military methods to solve a political problem, we must adapt the means we employ to the end we seek.

1. **Stop the Americanization of the war.** The bitter fact is that the war in Vietnam can never be won as a war of white men against Asians. It cannot be won "unless the people [of South Vietnam] support the effort.... We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Vietnam" (President Kennedy, 1963). The more we Americanize the war—by increasing our military presence, by summoning Saigon leaders, like vassals, to conferences in an American state, by transforming a local war in Vietnam into a global test between America and China—the more we make the war unwinnable.

2. **A civilian government in Saigon.** We have never had a government in Saigon that could enlist the active loyalty of the countryside, and we certainly do not have one in Marshal Ky's military junta. Instead of identifying American interests with Marshal Ky, and rebuffing the broader political impulses of the South, we should long since have encouraged a movement toward a civilian regime that represents the significant political forces of the country and is capable both of rallying the army and carrying out programs of social reform. If such a government should favor the neutralization of South Vietnam, if it should want to negotiate with Vietcong, even if it should wish to release us from our commitment to stay in Vietnam, we cannot and should not object.

3. **Reconvene the Geneva Conference.** We should persevere in the quest for negotiation.

Since the Vietcong are a principal party to the conflict, it would appear obvious that peace talks at Geneva are meaningless without their participation. And since they will never talk if the only topic is their unconditional surrender, we must, unless we plan to exterminate them, hold out to them a prospect of a say in the future political life of South Vietnam—conditioned on their laying down their arms, opening up their territories and abiding by the ground rules of democratic elections, preferably under international supervision.

4. **Hold the line in South Vietnam.** Obviously, Hanoi and the Vietcong will not negotiate so long as they think they can win. Since stalemate is thus a precondition to negotiation, we must have enough American ground forces in South Vietnam to demonstrate that our adversaries cannot hope for military victory. I believe that we have more than enough troops and installations there now to make this point.

It is an illusion to suppose that by increasing the size of the American Army we can ever gain a reliable margin of superiority; for, by the Pentagon's preferred 10:1 ratio in fighting guerrillas, every time we add 100,000 men, the enemy has only to add 10,000, and we are all even again.

Nor does "digging in" mean a static strategy with initiative relinquished to the enemy. The South Vietnamese Army of half a million men is better suited in many ways than are Americans to search operations in the villages.

We should also limit our bombing in the South. Have we really no better way to deal with guerrilla warfare than the aerial obliteration of the country in which it is taking place? If this is our best idea of "protecting" a country against communism, what other country, seeing the devastation we have wrought in Vietnam, will ever wish for American protection?

5. **Taper off the bombing of North Vietnam.** Secretary McNamara has candidly said, "We never believed that bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will," and thus far, bombing the North has neither brought Hanoi to the conference table, demoralized the people nor stopped infiltration. As a result, pressure arises for ever-wider strikes—first oil depots, then harbors, factories, cities, the Chinese border. But these won't work either. As we move down this road, we will only solidify the people of North Vietnam behind their government, make negotiation impossible and eventually assure the entry of China into the war. And even if we bombed North Vietnam back to the Stone Age and earned thereby the hatred of the civilized world, this still would not settle the present war—which, after all, is taking place not in North but in South Vietnam.

6. **A long-run program for Southeast Asia.** We should discuss with Russia, France, China and other interested countries a neutralization program, under international guarantee, for Cambodia, Laos, North and South Vietnam. If these states could work out forms of economic collaboration, as in the development of the Mekong Valley, the guarantors should make economic and technical assistance available to them.

A program of limiting our forces, actions and objectives still holds out the possibility of an honorable resolution of a tragic situation. A program of indefinite escalation offers nothing but disaster; for our adversaries can, in their own way, match our every step up to nuclear war—and nuclear war would be just as much a moral and political catastrophe for us as it would be a physical catastrophe for the Far East and the whole world. END

LOOK 8-9-66 31

VIETNAM:
What we might
have done—
1945
A
SECRET
ENCOUNTER
WITH
HO CHI MINH

By René J. Defourneaux,
as told to James Flowers

I SPENT THREE MONTHS during the summer of 1945 with Ho Chi Minh at a time when the destiny of Indochina—and perhaps all of Southeast Asia—was being decided.

In those days, Ho Chi Minh was making up his mind on a course of action to take after the Japanese had been booted out—an event, as it turned out, that was only weeks away. He was debating three possible moves: 1) getting a strong nationalist movement under way throughout Vietnam; 2) turning somewhat pro-United States in a bid for aid and cooperation; or 3) seeking all-out Communist assistance and matériel.

Even though this wily revolutionary was Communist-trained and oriented, he was also a fanatical nationalist. He told me during many conversations that, given United States help and encouragement, he would be our friend, unite Vietnam and drive a solid wedge between China and the south. This was the period when China had a price on Ho's head, and he said he had an uneasy feeling about Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia.

Many times, Ho talked to me about John Foster Dulles's speech on self-determination at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. "I have a government that is organized and ready to go," he would say. "Your statesmen make eloquent speeches about helping those with self-determination. We are self-determined. Why not help us?"

While directing the fight against the Japanese, Ho had drafted a constitutional form of government for the new Vietnam, basing it partly on the U.S. Constitution. At that time, he was willing to accept a 15-year transition period in which France would train the Vietnamese in the complexities of self-government, with a gradual turnover of governmental power from the French to the Vietnamese. Thus, Ho Chi Minh visualized a Vietnam completely governed by Vietnamese by 1960.

Ho asked us to radio this plan to American Army headquarters in China for transmission to Washington, and we did. The French turned down the proposal, and the United States, committed to France in that area, sent back ambiguous replies, which amounted to a rebuff.

I'll never forget Ho's reaction. In essence, he was saying: "Look, you guys [meaning the United States] have just lost the ball over here." Then, with his fierce eyes snapping, he said, "If you do not help us achieve our goal, I know a country that will be only too glad to come to our aid!"

I hate to sound like a Monday-morning quarterback. But if only someone in official Washington had listened to Ho's plea that we relayed from his headquarters deep in the mountain jungles of North Vietnam 21 years ago, there's a chance that things might be different in that part of the world today. Since we did not listen, Ho accepted Communist help, gave the French a massive hotfoot and drove them out of Indochina.

I got to know Ho in 1945 because I was a member of an eight-man oss team that dropped behind Japanese lines to organize and train native guerrillas. These tough fighters were called Vietminh, which means roughly "united for freedom."

Although I was born in France and grew up there, I had been a U.S. Army intelligence officer since 1943. The rest of the group were Americans, except for a French Army captain. He was assigned to us at the insistence of French intelligence and posed as an American.

It was around 3:30 in the afternoon on a bright, sunshiny day in June when we parachuted low-level, along with a mass of equipment, into a

small jungle clearing near Cho Chu in the Tonkinese mountains 75 miles north of Hanoi.

A French intelligence expert at our American air base in China had described Ho to me as cunning, fearless, sly, clever, powerful, deceptive, ruthless—and deadly. I halfway hoped this legendary figure would be there to greet us, but he wasn't. Instead, after what seemed an unnervingly long time, a small group of barefoot jungle fighters emerged from the thick foliage. Fortunately, they were members of the guerrilla force we were to organize and train.

Because of my fluency in French, we were able to establish contact with the eager young soldiers right away. They helped us collect our gear, and we followed them to a newly built bamboo village deep in the jungle. This was the secret command post of Ho Chi Minh.

I must say that my first encounter with Ho was not very inspiring. Early on our first morning in camp, a guerrilla lieutenant asked me and my medic to take a look at their leader. The lieutenant led the way to one of the huts, and on a mat in the darkest corner of the room lay a pile of bones covered with yellow, dry skin. A pair of glassy eyes stared at us. The man was shaking like a leaf and obviously running a high fever. When my eyes had become accustomed to the darkness, I noticed the long, scraggly goatee hanging from a pointed chin.

The medic took a quick look and said, "This man doesn't have long for this world."

As I studied the physical wreck on the floor, I remember saying to myself: "So this is the great Ho Chi Minh." For a fleeting moment, I thought of the French intelligence officer in China and wondered what he would have done had he faced Ho in that dark hut. He undoubtedly would have allowed him to join his ancestors.

But we needed this man to succeed in our mission. Our medic started treating Ho Chi Minh immediately. The corporal decided that such a fever had to be caused by either malaria, dengue or dysentery, or a combination of all three—plus God only knows what other mysterious Oriental diseases. He swung into action with quinine, sulfa drugs and other medicines.

In the meantime, our group was briefed by Ho's second-in-command, who seemed to appear from out of nowhere. He asked me to interpret for him, since he only spoke French. The moment he said, "Je suis Monsieur Van," I knew he was Vo Nguyen Giap, a bitterly anti-French hard-line Communist, masterful political organizer and shrewd tactician.

He was a wiry little man with large, calculating eyes and a perpetually angry look. But after we got to know him better, he was pleasant enough, and we called him "Mr. Van."

Giap proudly informed us that the 200 soldiers in camp were handpicked by Ho from all over Vietnam. "Once this cadre is thoroughly trained," he said, "they will be the leaders of Vietminh units scattered through the country."

Ironically, Giap had been a professor at the University of Hanoi, and like many French teachers, he had learned Marxism in France at the expense of the French Government. Nine years after our meeting, he scored the final smashing victory over the French at Dien Bien Phu.

The medic had Ho Chi Minh on his feet in about ten days. Ho then began to amble around camp and mix with his fighters, who idolized him. It was difficult for me to believe that this mild mannered man had given the French so much

32 LOOK 8.9-66

6 June 1966

A. <u>The Impossibility of Withdrawal</u>

(1) With the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focussed on the doctrine of peaceful coexistence.

(2) In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries
--especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand--which have
supported our effort.

supported our effort.

---Especially in Asia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand--which have

(3) In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries

States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the intermecine
A victory by a third-class Communistinant state over the United
"realityism" have focused on the doctrine of beihilic coexistence.

(1) With the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet
as a Communist victory would be disastrous for the following reasons:

LOOK Magazine Statement
Henry A. Klaasen

8 June 1968

(3) The long-term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willingness and ability to honor its commitments. For example, whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depends crucially on its confident in American support against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

The stability of areas which are geographically far removed from Vietnam will thus be basically affected by the outcome there. It would be a mistake to believe that we can placate our critics by a demonstration of impotence or irresolution.

attractivity.

attrition of importance to us.

would be a mistake to believe that we can bcaste our critics by a demon-
from Vietnam will thus be basically affected by the outcome there. It

The stability of areas which are geographically far removed
credibility of American pledges in other fields.

A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the
on its confident in American andport against Chinese nuclearatakall.
whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depend crucially
America's willingness and spiltiy to honor its commitments. For example,
Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of

- 3 -

Historically the United States has treated peace as successive phases of the purpose of war was thought to be the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crushed.

But Vietnam does not fit these categories. The primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military. What makes the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "shadow government" permeating every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure which can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

Finally, the Administration has stressed its unconditional readiness to
directly endorse the interests and prestige of so many major powers.

A purely military solution is impossible since Vietnam
command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure which can
depend on permingting every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable
makes the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "anarchy
in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military. What
But Vietnam does not fit these categories. The primarily
an enemy had been crushed.

destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the
~~phase of~~ the purpose of war was thought to be the

Historically the United States has treated peace so successively

- 3 -

- 4 -

In these circumstances, unless the political program--both within Vietnam and for negotiations--matches the military component, we run the risk of building on quicksand. Military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to build political structures. Negotiations will be sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with significant areas of the country under reliable governmental control.

**Where do We go from Here?**

--Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100 per cent control in 40 per cent of the country than 40 per cent control in 100 per cent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory which would leave us with three Hong Kongs and two Berlins in the midst of a hostile

leave us with three Hong Kong and two Berlin in the midat of a postife
not to ask that we should adopt a static "exclusive" theory which would
country than 40 per cent control in 100 per cent of the country. This is
areas. It is better to have 100 per cent control in 40 per cent of the
the primarily dosl of military operations should be the creation of secure
the process will accelerate the londer the war lara. It follows that
absurdness in the country side is being aystematically reduced, and that
-- Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that political
its

Where do We do from Here?

significant areas of the country under reliable governmental control.
Negotiations will be sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with
embty if they are not complied with an effort to build political structures.
we run the risk of building on quicksand. Military victories will prove
within Vietnam and for negotiations-- matches the military component.
In these circumstances, unless the political program--both

- 4 -

--We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects
the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern
state--a process which took centuries in the West. Such a process
involves a profound shift of loyalties--a task which would be searing
in the best of circumstances but which is compounded by the pressures
of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) we must have
compassion for the travail of a society which has been wracked by war
for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for failing in our

for two decades and not use its adyess as an slip for falling in our
compulsion for the travail of a society which has been wracked by war
of civil war. This implies two requirements on us: (s) we must have
in the beat of circunmatances put which is compounded by the pressures
involves a broiling shift of loyalties--a task which would be arsing
state--a process which took centuries in the West. Such a process
the transformation of an essentially tendal structure into a modern
- - We must understand that political inaptability in Vietnam reflects
negotiating counters at a conference.

which can be expanded if the war continues and which will give us reliable
be given to creating "secure" zones containing a maximum of population
we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must
preventing the conaollisstion of Communist control even in areas that
that we cannot securely control. We will always retain a capacity for
population. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory

- d -

(m)

- 6 -

duty; and (b) we must give high priority to encouraging the building of
political structures from the ground up.

--The notion drawn from our experience in Europe that
economic assistance automatically produces political stability does not
apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our
enthusiasm and concern with technical refinements will overwhelm
slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization.
The test should be whether a program can enlist local support and thus
give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be
concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out
from there.

--It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference
which deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are
conducted in a large forum consisting of many nations which are already

conducted in a large forum concerning many nations which are already
which deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are

--It must prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference
from there.

concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out
dive the must population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be
The test should be whether a program can elicit local support and this
slender administrative resources and combined political demobilisation,
enhancement and concern with technical refinements will overwhelm
apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our
economic assistance automatically produces political instability does not

--The notion drawn from our experience in Europe first
political structures from the drownded nb.

duty; and (b) we must give high priority to accompanying the building of

- 6 -

- 7 -

rivals (e. g., the U. S. S. R. and Communist China or the U. S. and France) energies may be dissipated in political jockeying which is peripheral to the central problems in Vietnam. It may be wiser to segment the issues into their component elements, each of which is to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in other forums.

--The war in Vietnam is a crucial test of American maturity.

In the lives of nations, as of individuals, there comes a point when the choices of 1966 are not those of 1961. future options are limited by past actions. We must recognize that the defensive requires us to be engaged in places chosen by opponents for their difficulty and ambiguity. We do not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those challenges which most flatter our moral preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic and military

preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic and military
deciding to meet only those challenges which most flatter our moral
for their difficulty and simplicity. We do not have the privilege of
the defensive requires us to be engaged in bisaces chosen by opponents
future options are limited by past actions. We must recognize that
In the lives of nations, at of individuals, there comes a point when

other fronts.

could these work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in
to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A further conference
separation the parties into their component elements, each of which is
brieferst to the central problems in Vietnam. It may be wiser to
France) energies may be dissipated in political lockeying which is
rivalsa (e. g., the U. S. S. R. and Communist China or the U. S. and

- 7 -

- 3 -

## Where do We go from Here?

- 4 -

- 5 -