ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

December 26, 1982

**ANNOUNCER:** From ABC News, This Week with David Brinkley. Now, from our Washington headquarters, here's David Brinkley.

**DAVID BRINKLEY:** Here in Washington, in New York, from the Middle East by satellite, we're all here and waiting for you. We'll have today's news, since the Sunday morning papers, and on the day after Christmas there are continuing troubles where Christmas began, in the Middle East. The U.S. is eager to get all the foreign troops out of Lebanon, so far without success, and eager to get an agreement on the Palestinian people in the West Bank occupied by Israel — so far without success. Why? Our guests today: Ariel Sharon, defense minister of Israel; Ashraf Ghorbal, Egypt's ambassador to the United States; and Henry Kissinger, who started the Middle East toward a peace settlement not yet achieved. Some background from there by our Sunday regular, James Wooten; and our free-for-all discussion with George Will, Sam Donaldson and Marty Nolan. All here on our Sunday program.

Today's news: in the Middle East this morning, in Lebanon, there was not a great deal of peace or good will. In a country about half Christian and half Moslem, there was supposed to be a Christmas truce. There wasn't. There was shelling, fighting between the two religious groups, and continued violence and death. Nevertheless, the Israeli Cabinet met this morning, and it announced negotiations with Lebanon on the withdrawal of foreign troops, including Israel's, will begin on Tuesday. Here is ABC News correspondent Mike McCourt in Israel.

**MIKE MCCOURT [voice-over]:** Only two points were certified this morning as facts by the Israeli Cabinet. The first was that negotiations will start with Lebanese officials on Tuesday in Lebanon, and the second was that they'll continue on Thursday in the Israeli border town of Qiryat Shemona. Beyond that the story of these negotiations remains confused and uncertain. For example, no time is given for the start of the talks, nor is there, as one might expect, a final agenda.

**DAN MERIDOR, Israeli Cabinet secretary:** It is a possibility. I don't know exactly the place that will be chosen by the Lebanese. I don't see it as any matter of principle; it's just a technical problem whether it will be Khalde or any other problem— any other place.

**MCCOURT [voice-over]:** Meridor refused to comment further on the details — any of them — concerning the negotiations except to say that Qiryat Shemona will be the Israeli venue. The Cabinet did not specify that the Beirut suburb of Khalde will in fact be the location in Lebanon. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon is also reported here to be delaying a final agreement to talk by insisting that the Lebanese endorse an amended working paper. The Lebanese are refusing because they say they were not consulted about the proposed changes.

[on camera] When all is said and done, it is the Israelis who are saying the negotiations are on, the Israelis who say that, at most, insignificant technical details remain to be settled. The point is, that's almost exactly what they were saying a week ago, and there certainly is some question here as to whether any real progress has been made. Mike McCourt, ABC News, Tel Aviv.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** While in Beirut, again, there has been continued fighting over the holiday, the Christian holiday weekend, and though the war presumably is over, there remain 40,000 Syrian troops and 30,000 Israelis and some number of PLOs. And the U.S. government is angry at all of them for not moving out. Again, they meet on Tuesday to talk about moving them out. Here is ABC News correspondent John Donvan in Israel [sic].

**JOHN DONVAN [voice-over]:** For the Lebanese it may have been a meeting today between Lebanon's President Amin Gemayel and U.S. envoy Morris Draper which finally helped to set the Tuesday starting date. The state radio broadcast announcing that talks would begin also said the decision was made only after certain problems were successfully ironed out earlier today. Those problems were not spelled out, but it's known here that Lebanon does not want the talks to move in a direction that will mean Lebanon gets squeezed between Israel and the Arab world. The problem for Lebanon is that its negotiators go into these talks the weaker party, their territory occupied by a military power

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that can stay put until it gets its way. The Israelis have been stressing normal relations as the chief goal of these talks: the Arab world has warned Lebanon to sign nothing with Israel that will look like a peace treaty. Lebanon balances the two pressures by saying the talks are aimed at getting foreign troops out of the country. That the talks will now get started does not necessarily mean that Lebanon has resolved that dilemma. And then there's the much more practical problem facing Lebanon — security around this hotel in Khalde outside Beirut where the negotiations have been scheduled to take place. But that venue is now in doubt after fighting between Christian and Druse militia broke out less than a mile from the hotel this week. Now that Lebanon seems ready to meet the Israelis, it's not certain they'll find a place safe enough to do the talking. John Donvan, ABC News, Beirut.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** We'll be back with our interviews — trying to see how all this might turn out, and all the rest of today's program, in a moment.

[commercial break]

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** The holiest shrines of the three great religions are found in the Middle East, and each of the three religions began, with one set of words or another, with the idea of peace on earth and good will toward men. In the Middle East of today there is very little of either. After years of negotiations, meetings, shuttling, treaties, agreements, promises and hopes, it remains a place of war and death. Before we ask our guests about what they see in the future, some background on all this from James Wooten, Jim?

**JAMES WOOTEN [voice-over]:** Many centuries ago an exiled Jew remembered his roots and sang this homesick song: "If I forget Jerusalem, let my hands be stilled/May I speak no more if I forget thee, O Jerusalem." But who could ever forget Jerusalem — this place that is so much more than a place shimmering in the sun — for Jerusalem is an idea, glimmering through the years, shared by all the millions for whom it is a holy city, the heart of a holy land. For the Jews, in whose temple stones are yesterday's pain, today's prayers and the promise of tomorrow. For the Moslems, too, who devoutly believe their Allah plucked Mohammed from a rock beneath this dome. And for Christians as well, whose young Messiah walked these narrow streets leading to his tomb. For all these faiths and for all these faithful, this land is a faith — a fragile faith in a flickering dream of peace on earth some day.

But not this year and not in many years, not for Israelis nor for Lebanese, and not for West Bank Arabs or Palestinian refugees all gathered here together in this land of sorrow so well acquainted with grief. All the years of terror, all the tears of dying, all the wars, all the hatred and the fear and the pain have overwhelmed the dream and frustrated the faith. Still, there is much talk of peace these days — talk of peace in shattered Lebanon where Beirut's thousands rebuild their lives after years of fighting with the PLO and Syria, after last summer's Israeli bombardment. And there is talk of peace on the West Bank, too, with all sorts of plans for Palestinian autonomy or a Palestinian federation with Jordan or a Palestinian state. But all on the very same land where Israeli settlements are still going up and Israelis settlers still moving in, and no hint that the territories will ever return to Arab hands.

And amidst all this talk of plans for peace, the Christians came to the West Bank this week, to Bethlehem's ancient Church of the Nativity to celebrate Jesus' birth. And if there were fewer pilgrims than usual this year, the masses said at the manger still serve their age-old purpose — raising once again the flickering dream of peace on earth.

[on camera] It has always been that way in this land: if not the reality, then at least the dream. And if not the fact, then at least the faith that man can be better than he has been. And, once a year, here in Bethlehem, that almost seems sufficient. It isn't, of course, but it is better than no dream at all. David?

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Jim, thank you. Coming next, our interview with Ashraf Ghorbal, Egypt's ambassador to the United States. In a moment.

[commercial break]

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Mr. Ambassador, we're very happy to have you with us today. Thank you for coming in.

**Amb. ASHRAF GHORBAL, Egyptian ambassador to the United States:** Thank you for inviting me.

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[L.C.]

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Here with me are George Will, ABC analyst, and Sam Donaldson, ABC News White House correspondent. Mr. Ambassador, King Hussein of Jordan was here this past week talking with President Reagan, and he said one problem for him in trying to work on the Reagan peace plan—the principal problem for him was the continuing Israeli settlements on the West Bank. From the standpoint of Egypt, what are your thoughts about this?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** I think you'll find us really on the same wavelength with King Hussein. All of us in the area feel that we are, in a way, in a race. The *fait accompli* is being established by Israel, and the anxiousness of the United States and all of us who are there to find a solution before that *fait accompli* gets to be the order of the day.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Before the *fait accompli* — being the total settlement of the West Bank by the Israelis?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** Yes, yes. What will be left to negotiate in case of the settlements continue to grow? If in a year, two or three you are going to talk about the final fate of the West Bank and Gaza, what will be left with that kind of a pace in building settlements and then enlarging the present ones?

**GEORGE WILL:** Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to pursue that metaphor of a race. If the Israelis are racing ahead toward — by implication — annexation, who else is in the race? If the other runner, so to speak, is Hussein, can't he on his own speed things up by perhaps agreeing to deal with Jerusalem and Tel Aviv directly?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** Well, let's look at it. They have had the experience of Camp David. When we all came down from Camp David, we really worked out the modality for the solution. The modality was, for a number of years, to give the Palestinians autonomy, and then to, after three years, you decide on the fate of the West Bank and Gaza. There was an agreement, George, in Camp David, to freeze the settlements. And then Prime Minister Begin just retracted from that. If there was a freeze of settlement at that time, then you would have had all the Jordanians and the Palestinians definitely encouraged to come on board. But having come down from the mountain, Prime Minister Begin decided he is going not to continue with that freeze except for three months. And every time a president of the United States, including President Reagan, talks about a settlement — "It's a hindrance to peace and they must stop" — the next day the Israeli government decides on building additional settlements.

**Mr. WILL:** As you know, Mr. Ambassador, Begin denies that that was agreed to at Camp David. Now, are you saying that he's being dishonest or that there was an honest mistake that was unfortunate?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** Let's not get into a quarrel about honesty or dishonesty. We are talking about facts. And let us not forget that President Carter did say that there was an agreement. So you have the word of a president of the United States that we have accepted and we have followed, and unfortunately did not follow through.

**SAM DONALDSON:** Well, Mr. Ambassador, let's talk a bit about the peace talks between Israel and Egypt, or at least the withdrawal talks — or rather, Lebanon and Israel — that are going to get underway this coming week. Would Egypt like to see Lebanon sign a peace treaty with Israel?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** Sam, for a country that has peace between it and Israel and we say this is the beginning, we would like to see everybody in the Arab world in peace with Israel.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** But sign a separate peace, just as you did?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** But let me tell you something. If Egypt could take it, because we are 45 million, because we have been put aside of a distance from the Arab world, can Lebanon take it? That is the question.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** What's your answer?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** The answer is, number one, Israel went in Lebanon to do what? To sign a peace treaty with Lebanon? It went into Lebanon with 100,000 soldiers in order to create a security zone in the northern part of Israel, southern part of Lebanon. What happened to that objective? Why can't it be now the objective upon which Israel try to sell to the world its invasion of Lebanon, and build gradually, but to try to use occupation? And, very frankly, President Reagan is right when he calls every force in Lebanon today is a force of occupation. To use the force of occupation to extract peace? No. Peace comes voluntarily. Peace comes

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through the negotiations that we and Israel conducted through your help.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** So you're saying you want to see a result in which the Israeli forces withdraw from Lebanon, but you don't want to see a peace treaty separately between Lebanon and Israel?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** Now, Sam, don't put things into my mouth. I am concentrating on the first stage. The first stage, therefore, is for Israeli forces to withdraw from Lebanon because they are occupying forces. And, by the same token, other forces equally leave Lebanon, including the Syrians, including what is left from the Palestinian army. If Lebanon decides on her own free will to conclude a peace treaty with Israel, why should we have an objection? I have no objection. But free will — not through the use of occupation where Shamir now goes to Beirut not as an invited guest but as the — a leader of an occupying force.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** You don't then expect to see a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon? Do you think it is a doubtful development?

**Amb. GHORBAL:** Listen. I am not the foreign minister of Lebanon, nor I speak on behalf of the Lebanese government. But we talked about is that possible and I tell you the difficulties in which the Lebanese find themselves in. And I think it is very essential that we move step by step. Let us first of all speak of the withdrawal of foreign forces. Let us build the centrality of the Lebanese government and it being a central force. And then let her come to the conclusion of a peace treaty. And I'm sure nobody in the Arab world would object. We would be the first to support it. Why? Because we have peace with Israel.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Fine. Thank you. We'll switch to Israel in a minute; we'll ask them some of the same questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for being with us today. We have enjoyed having you. We'll be back with an interview by satellite from Israel with Ariel Sharon, the defense minister of Israel, in a moment.

[commercial break]

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Mr. Minister, we are delighted to have you with us today, and we thank you for coming in at a time when there is a great deal to talk about in your part of the world and ours. We're glad to have you. Could you hear— did you hear what Ambassador Ghorbal was saying here a minute ago, Mr. Minister?

**ARIEL SHARON, Israeli Defense Minister:** I heard some of the things.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Do you have any comment on what you heard from him?

**MIKE McCOURT [in Tel Aviv studio with Mr. Sharon]:** Do you have any comment on what Ambassador Ghorbal said?

**Def. Min. SHARON:** I would like to refer to the situation, and I'll try of course to say some words about the forecast of peace in the Middle East. I believe that we got good news for all peace-loving people in the world from Jerusalem and from Beirut today where in both places it has been announced that we are to start negotiations on the coming Tuesday. The negotiations will be on normalization of relations between Lebanon and Israel, about security arrangements, and about the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, which of course will be part of the withdrawal of all the external forces in Lebanon. Generally, I believe that the new year, in 1983, will be a year of peace. Peace between Israel and Lebanon which will move forward all the peace process in the Middle East.

**Mr. WILL:** General Sharon, if Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is contingent on Syrian withdrawal, can you tell us, first, what if anything is being done by whom to get the Syrians out of Lebanon, and is it the case that there are new Soviet missiles put in for the Syrians in the Bekaa Valley?

**Mr. McCOURT [in Tel Aviv studio with Mr. Sharon]:** What is being done to get the Syrians out of Lebanon and by whom is it being done? And—

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** That's Mike McCourt of ABC in the studio in Israel.

**McCOURT:** —secondly, is it true that the Russians and the Syrians have put new missiles in the Bekaa Valley?

**Def. Min. SHARON:** We have now two parts in our negotiation or our settlement in Lebanon. One is the security arrangement, normalization, which should be done mostly in direct contact between the two governments. We arrived to a breakthrough after weeks or months of secret

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talks with Lebanese authorized people. We managed to arrive to a breakthrough which, as I said before, will bring to these negotiations on the coming Tuesday. We, of course, both sides invited the Americans to participate. We believe that they have a very important role. And we hope that they will participate in that negotiation. As about the withdrawal of the Syrian forces, and I may include even the withdrawal of the PLO terrorists which are still in northern Lebanon — the valley of Lebanon — I believe that here in this part of the agreement or settlement the United States must have the most important role.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** General Sharon, are you going to insist on a peace treaty with Lebanon as part of the agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, or will you agree to withdraw Israeli forces and talk about, what you say, normalization of relations — that is, a peace treaty — later?

**Mr. McCOURT:** Are you going to insist on a peace treaty?

**Def. Min. SHARON:** We do not insist on a direct or immediate peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, though I don't see why that should not have been. I would say, the target. What can be a simpler and clearer and important than to have a peace agreement between two countries? Myself, I have been watching the United States preaching for peace all around the world, and I believe that the United States should have had, I would say, a vital interest to promote the peace, and I believe that here, of course, the American administration can do much. But Israel, in order to move forward, and understanding the difficulties and the complications of the situation in the Middle East, we decided not to insist on an immediate peace now, but what we were doing now, it's, I would say, a kind of a corridor to a peace treaty in the future. And I believe that we'll arrive to peace because that is the mutual interest—

**Mr. DONALDSON:** A second question—

**Def. Min. SHARON:** —of Lebanon, of Israel, and I believe myself, that is a vital interest of the United States. As about the missiles, we don't have now any information about a new Soviet-made Syrian missiles in Lebanon.

**Def. Min. SHARON:** We destroyed them and they never deployed again, and when they tried, we repeated our action, and they don't have, as we know, any new deployment of [unintelligible] missiles now.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** A second question, if I may, General. Are you going to insist as part of a withdrawal agreement on stationing Israeli people — either military or civilians — in southern Lebanon in order to monitor the situation?

**Def. Min. SHARON:** Yes, that is a part of our—that's part of our working paper that has been prepared together between us and Lebanese authorized people, which—with whom we discussed for, as I said, for weeks and months. Myself, I had the opportunity to participate, or I would say, to conduct most of these talks, and we regard this as a very important part of the security arrangement. That is not in the arrangement that they should last forever. The period or the length of the stay — of our warning stations, according to the working paper — must be decided by the committees that will meet, or will start meeting on Tuesday. I believe that the most important thing — and people all the time are talking and referring to withdrawal — and though Israel never changed its mind about withdrawal, and we are advocating and urging the withdrawal of all the external forces, I believe that the most important thing at the present time is to arrive to normalization, which is a very important part of the security arrangement, a security arrangement which will prevent any possibility in the future that Lebanon would become again a center of local, regional and international syndicated terrorism. We managed to destroy and eliminate the infrastructure—the terrorist PLO infrastructure, and to bring to situation that they were expelled from Beirut and destroyed in all the southern Lebanon. That what really is promising a peace for this region, for Lebanon that suffered so much, and for Israel that suffered so much during those years.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, General—

**Def. Min. SHARON:** Therefore I believe that the most important thing is not to stand with a stopwatch and ask all the time, "When are you withdrawing?" but to try and see what would be the best security arrangement that we can achieve together with the Lebanese, and of course, with the participation of our American friends, because that is the most important.

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**Mr. BRINKLEY:** General, a question about another topic. King Hussein was in Washington last week, as you know, talking with President Reagan, and the President was urging him to take a part in the peace negotiations. And he said it was difficult, if not impossible, for him to do that while the settlements on the West Bank continue. What would you say to the King and to the President?

**Def. Min. SHARON:** I would like first to refer to one remark made by Ambassador Ghorbal, whom we know and appreciate, and that is about Prime Minister Begin, a promise that we would not aid the settlement. I would like to make it very clear, Prime Minister Begin promised to stop settlements for three months during the negotiations, and that what we did. But we never promised to stop a settlement, and we never regarded settlements as an obstacle to peace. It's very interesting, but we arrived to peace treaty with Egypt while establishing settlements. And I'm not speaking now about the right to settle, because Jews and Arabs have been living together and now living together in Israel. But I'm speaking now about settlements from the security point of view, and the role in the security of Israel.

We are building the settlements as part of our national security concept, and I believe that if Israel will feel secure, then the possibility to arrive to peace becomes much more realistic. So we never regarded settlements as an obstacle to peace. They are not in contradiction with the plan that have been decided at Camp David, and that is the autonomy plan. And we were urging to start negotiating about the autonomy plan for months and years. So we don't see that that is the obstacle, and I believe that we will be able to move forward along the autonomy plan which will bring to a peaceful coexistence in this area, which all of us know how much it's needed.

**Mr. WILL:** General Sharon, Ambassador Ghorbal indicated, however, that the continuing of the settlements was an obstacle to Hussein's coming into the negotiations. How would it harm Israel to make the statement that the settlements will be suspended for the duration of the negotiations as soon as Hussein begins negotiations with Israel?

**Def. Min. SHARON:** I don't think that Israel can take upon itself such a commitment. We have a settlement plan that's part of our national security concept. No doubt it's our right to settle. It is our country. It's our homeland. People speak about occupied territories. These territories were occupied by Egypt and Jordan, and when it comes to Samaria and Judea, also by Iraqi troops, in 1948. They were occupied. It's not that it invaded this area. These areas were invaded by Egyptians and by the Jordanians. There is no question here of returning any territory to anyone. That is a part of the land of Israel. That's our right. That is the cradle of the Jewish people. And we will not take such a commitment because we believe the settlements are not in any contradiction to peace. On the contrary, we believe that everything that contribute to the security of Israel contribute to the peace.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** General, thank you very much. Thank you for coming in, for being with us today. Coming next, Henry Kissinger, who, as Secretary of State, arranged the one peace settlement so far in the Middle East that has worked — between Israel and Egypt. In a moment.

[commercial break]

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Mr. Kissinger, thank you very much for coming in. We're delighted to have you.

**HENRY KISSINGER, former Secretary of State:** Glad to be here.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** If you were advising the Israelis about the difficulties and the controversies about the West Bank, what would you suggest to them that they do?

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, I think, frankly, more in terms of what I would advise Americans. I think that as a general proposition the Israelis should suspend the settlements after a peace process is started. I can understand why they would not want to pay in advance of a negotiation, and as long as Hussein has not agreed to enter the negotiations, I can't— I see no reason why, from their point of view, why they should not continue what they are doing. But I do believe, and I do agree with Ambassador Ghorbal, that once the negotiations start that then we should return to the Camp David formula, and ask Israel to suspend the settlements.

**Mr. WILL:** But, Mr. Kissinger, you just heard the answer that General Sharon gave to the last question in the segment with him, where he said, "It's our land; it's the cradle of the Jewish people." Doesn't that rhetoric— doesn't the very vocabulary in which he couches Israel's position mean that, from Jordan's point of view, the negotiations are over before they start? That there's nothing, really, to be negotiated?

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[LC]

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, with all my respect for General Sharon, that is not a position that is sustainable. It's not a position that any American administration of either party will ever accept. There are nearly a million Arabs living on this territory, and it is—of course, it has historical connotations for the Jewish people, but to say that the whole West Bank is Israel's would in fact preclude any meaningful negotiations. But I assume that we will play an active role in the negotiations, and I think that is one proposition we cannot accept. And I don't know any American administration that would accept it.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Dr. Kissinger, the Reagan administration made every effort to bring the King, King Hussein, into the process this week and failed. How much longer do we have under the Reagan peace plan? When does it die? When does its shelf life expire?

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, I would think we have about six to nine months to get a process underway with enough dynamism so that people think something is going to happen. King Hussein—and it isn't King Hussein alone because he cannot enter the negotiations by himself. The Arabs—the moderate Arab leaders have to decide whether they are going to engage in rhetorical statements of ultimate objectives, or whether they are willing to enter a negotiating process in which the United States has made pretty clear what the parameters are. Failing an Arab interlocutor, there is very little we can do to recommend positions to Israel. If Hussein enters the negotiations on the basis of the Reagan plan, then we can make the convictions that the President has stated and that Secretary Shultz has stated much more explicit. And that, I think, has to be the next step.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Why do you think the King didn't enter the plan at this time, and what will persuade him to do so? What will happen in the Arab world to galvanize it behind the Reagan peace plan?

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, there are two problems in the Arab world. One is the pressure from the radical Arabs. That, I think, has to some extent diminished as a result of events in Lebanon because the emptiness of the radical program — the inability to lead anywhere — has become pretty clear. The second problem is that the King must have—must be given some idea of where this process will eventually lead. He is very worried that he will wind up as being totally isolated and that he, with a population of about two to three million — half of whom are Palestinians—will not be able to withstand the pressures of a united or of Arab hostility. So these are reasonable concerns. But verbal reassurances or theoretical reassurances can go only so far, and at some point—I would think within the next four to six weeks—he must make the decision whether he wants to let the situation continue to deteriorate from the Arab point of view on the West Bank, or whether he will enter the negotiations; and above all, the moderate Arab governments have an obligation to make it possible for him to enter these negotiations in a fulfillable framework. That seems to me the big immediate issue.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, in Washington we use the term—they use the term "worst-case scenario," Mr. Kissinger. If Hussein refuses to take part in the negotiations, the settlement of the West Bank continues, what do you see after that?

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, I think if Hussein refuses to participate in the negotiations, I would expect a gradual deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. In the immediate future there is no Arab country that has the military capability to challenge what Israel is doing. But in the long term Israel will suffer in two respects. They will have a large Arab population that is growing more rapidly than the Jewish population, and the effort to hold it down will distort Israel's moral image in the world and will absorb Israeli physical resources. Secondly, sooner or later a hundred million Arabs are going to organize themselves and are going to find enough foreign support to make this a constant source of crisis, and I do not believe that over a historical period the United States can be counted upon to support what will be perceived in America as Israeli occupation of a territory which is largely inhabited by the Arabs. Therefore, I think it is in the overwhelming interest of Israel to arrive at a settlement on the West Bank which in my view should partition the West Bank with most of the Arab populations returning to some sort of Arab rule, and Israel's security concerns being accounted for by the maintenance of some security zones, most of which, as it happens on the West Bank, are largely unpopulated by Arabs.

**Mr. WILL:** Mr. Kissinger, at the end of this year that was supposed to see—to have seen a great crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations, Congress increased, above the administration request, the aid for Israel. Given that, is it realistic for you to expect the Israelis to be moved to compromise

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by a fear of deteriorating support in the United States when, even after this difficult year, their support seems to be as high if not higher than ever before?

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, I think Israeli leaders ought to look at the fact that two American administrations now — the Carter administration and the Reagan administration — have expressed certain views about the West Bank. From that it is likely that future American administrations are also going to do this. What I have suggested—it's not a favor that Israel does to the United States, but some—but something that Israel does for itself. Sooner or later, if these conditions on the West Bank continue, there will be a demand for the return to the '67 borders, for no security guarantees for Israel, for none of the things that are now achievable. The art of making peace is to do so when you are not under pressure and when there is no apparent necessity in terms of external circumstances. Right now I can see where Israeli leaders have a strong temptation to sit where they are, and they can, for two, three, four years. But in the long term, I do not think that this is compatible with the security and future of Israel, nor with the security of the Middle East, nor with the long-term interests of the United States.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Well, Dr. Kissinger, would it be easier to get the peace process going at this point if Prime Minister Begin were no longer Prime Minister and the Israeli government changed?

**Sec. KISSINGER:** I have to say, when I was in office I had to negotiate with the opposition to Prime Minister Begin, and I can't say that that was an unmitigated joy ride either. Certainly Prime Minister Begin has his abrasive side, and he has these views on what they call Judea and Samaria that we've heard from Minister Sharon. I think that the United States should not engage in internal Israeli politics.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** But you're not a government official, so I'm asking you for your private view.

**Sec. KISSINGER:** Well, my private view is that Prime Minister Begin made major concessions in the Sinai, that on the West Bank he has this fixed theoretical view that all of it belongs to Israel, and therefore it will be very difficult for him to do what I think—what I think is necessary. And so in that sense he has—his convictions are very difficult to reconcile with what I have—what I consider to be the best course.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Mr. Kissinger, thank you very much. We've been glad to have you with us today. We'll be back with our discussion here of whatever comes up, and joining us for that will be Marty Nolan, editorial page editor of *The Boston Globe*. In a moment.

[commercial break]

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Congress got out of Washington and got home barely in time to spend a little money before Christmas, and will be back again soon. But in the meantime, if we look back on the lame duck session of Congress — and in fact the 97th Congress in general in its second session — it left behind, shall I be generous and say, something of a mess, or would you describe it otherwise? Marty, how would you assess its performance?

**MARTIN NOLAN, The Boston Globe:** Well, in a way, the system works. We all know how Washington was exhausted by Senator Helms and his filibuster, but if you check the original Dutch origins of the word "filibuster," you'll find that it came from the word *friebuter* which meant pirates. It meant that those engaging in a filibuster were trying to get some sort of pelf for their own. But you see in the final vote for cloture, it was 81 to five, with Senator Barry Goldwater stirring from his sickbed to take the cause of respectable conservatism against Senator Helms.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, it was not a great triumph for Jesse Helms, was it?

**Mr. NOLAN:** I think he was handed his lunch, is what we say.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Well, Marty, I don't think the system worked, unless we agree with David that the system here in Washington produces a mess. After five weeks they passed only four of the remaining appropriations bills, had to do another continuing resolution. Mr. Reagan barely got his gas tax, as you point out, after breaking a filibuster that should never have happened. That's a case of — George, last week we discussed the filibuster — a small, willful band of men holding up a majority view, and to no effect, except maybe a heart attack or two.

**Mr. WILL:** Yes, of course, when Senator Metzenbaum as a small, willful band of one holding up the Senate for liberal purposes, the outcry is rather less.

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**Mr. DONALDSON:** Not from me. I think he was wrong.

**Mr. WILL:** Well, all right, but I agree— I think neither were wrong. I think it's perfectly all right to try and tie it up a bit. I think the filibuster, as we argued last week over the wrong—

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** How much is a bit, George?

**Mr. WILL:** Well, I think you can do it until you have cloture, and then you get rolled over and the system goes on, as Marty says. I think it is wrong, really, to filibuster about a revenue measure. But frankly, let's face it. They came back here; they did pass some appropriations bills. They passed a major revenue-raising measure. They passed a revenue-raising measure that was part of a transportation policy. That's the business of government. And of course it's messy. Democracy has a great many virtues; tidiness doesn't happen to be one of them.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Let me interrupt. Marty, you run an editorial page and I am looking forward with some trepidation to all these interminable op-ed pieces about how to reform Congress, to change it to a parliamentary system, to limit the number of terms, to hold the President to six years—all sorts of other theories, none of which will ever come about.

**Mr. NOLAN:** A diet—

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Are you going to print a lot of those?

**Mr. NOLAN:** Well, I'm afraid a diet of lame duck leads to two unfortunate consequences: you get every professor with access to a word processor, and worse yet, these large, distinguished letterheads of bipartisan coalition behind every bad idea to tinker with the Constitution — have the President for six years; have the Congress in for four. All tinkering with what's a pretty good system. It works better than most other systems in the world. If you look at Germany, Italy, Ireland, Canada, they're all having turmoil now. Our system works pretty well, and I hope they don't try to tinker with it.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Well, I think the best tinkering is left up to the voters, and that may happen to Senator Helms. A lot of people believe, although he said he was standing on principle, that actually he was trying to reestablish his credentials in North Carolina as a man against such taxes because he fears that Governor Hunt may beat him in the next election. You know, there's a rule in Washington. It's called the Washington rule. That is, "Don't get mad: get even." And when Senator Helms next session tries to get some things for North Carolina, tries to protect the tobacco interests, a lot of senators are going to smile very sweetly — not get mad, but get even with him for this.

**Mr. WILL:** Well, so they say except the senators from Kentucky were at one point quite exercised against Senator Helms, and I'll live to see the day that they come out against the tobacco subsidy. And it would be really quite a vindication of the rule that Washington, when it does the right thing, it does so for the wrong reason if it then, in order to get even with Jesse Helms, did something they ought to do anyway, which is quit subsidizing tobacco.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, is there a single member of the Senate who is confident he himself will never in his career wish to filibuster?

**Mr. DONALDSON:** No, but David—

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, then won't they be—

**Mr. DONALDSON:** —you can carry something a little too far. Fun is fun and business is business, but at some point you subside.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, you will have to explain the difference to the Congress. They seem not to understand it.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Well, I mean, I'd like to ask all the questions on this broadcast, too, but I realize that you and George have to ask some questions so at some point I have to subside. Senator Helms had a right to filibuster, I suppose, but at some point he saw he was going to lose.

**Mr. NOLAN:** Well, last week Senator Dole defined a new menace — the post-cloture filibuster. Now, that's one where you've been voted down but you still keep talking. That's a menace, wouldn't you agree?

**Mr. WILL:** Sure, the Senate is like every other free, permissive society, and that is it works as long as people are reasonably gentlemanlike. Ladies and gentlemen can live this way. Once

you get some rowdies, then you have to have lots of niggling little rules. That's why the House of Representatives has lots of niggling little rules — because it's a big, cumbersome body, and you can't count on 435 ladies and gentlemen. The Senate, in theory — we all know the gap between theory and practice — can function this way. But you get four, five, six, seven people — it's a critical mass of about seven roughnecks — in the Senate, and the system comes unstuck.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Let me ask a quick question before we wind it up. The Christmas shopping season is over and I haven't seen the final figures. They may not be out yet. I think the shopping this year was a little below last year. Is that right? Have you all heard? I haven't seen this.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** The preliminary figures suggest that, David, yes.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Well, we are in a recession, of course. I wonder if any of you see the end of it or see the beginning of the end of it in '83. Just briefly, Marty?

**Mr. NOLAN:** Wall Street's very happy, and they think they know more than the rest of us. I hope that the joy in Wall Street spreads to Detroit and Cleveland and Pittsburgh, but I wouldn't bet on it.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** This time last year I thought the recession would end in the third or fourth quarter of this year. It didn't. So I think I'll now switch and say it looks like we're just going to have a stagnant period of no growth in the economy for the next six to nine months.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** George, what do you think?

**Mr. WILL:** I think that's the one thing you can't have is a sort of flat. It's either going to grow a bit or you're going to tip over into really deep economic trouble. There are too many International Harvesters out there waiting to happen.

**Mr. DONALDSON:** Will it happen?

**Mr. WILL:** Well, the argument you keep hearing is that there is a lot of pent-up demand in the economy. There's a pent-up demand for automobiles. The average automobile on the road now is something like seven years old. It used to be three and a half years old. The problem is there may be a huge pent-up demand for Japanese automobiles. You hear there's a pent-up demand for housing. There's a pent-up demand for housing in Bangladesh. The question, really, is to figure out how to make pent-up demand translate itself into a working market, and that we don't know.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** George, we will talk about the Bangladesh economy on some other occasion.

**Mr. WILL:** Please don't.

**Mr. BRINKLEY:** Partly because I don't know anything about it. Thank you all. We'll be back with a few words, more or less, in a moment.

[commercial break]

**Mr. BRINKLEY** (*commentary*: Finally, we might all hope that 1983 is a good year in all respects, 1983 standing alone, because it doesn't need any troubles of its own. It will inherit enough from 1982, and none of them will go away at midnight this Friday. 1983, for example, will inherit a recession spread around the world — 12 million unemployed, the first soup kitchens we have seen in a generation. It will inherit a Washington establishment spending close to $200 billion it does not have; and a Congress that would like to bail itself out by raising taxes but can't; a Social Security system that if not rescued will very soon run out of money: various industries — automobiles, steel, so on — devastated by imports at least equal in quality but lower in price. And more. Our town here, Washington, regardless of who is in power, cannot fix all of this. But after a generation of promising to solve every social economic ailment, it has led people to expect Washington solutions, and so it will try a number of them. The good news is that the mathematics of probabilities shows that if they try enough, sooner or later, by accident or otherwise, somebody will do something right. It does seem that it's time, preferably in 1983, for the probabilities to fall our way. Stay tuned.

And for all of us at ABC's This Week, thank you, and a Happy New Year.

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