[i]

-3-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, it's the, it's in the nature of the
secretaries of defense and ministers of defense
have an obligation to maintain military strength
and obviously you are always stronger with more
expenditures then with less. And it's not their
job to look at the balance between the two sides.
But, the basic trend, in my view, is towards
reduction.

QUESTION:

I see. So, if--what happen, you know, something
unexpected happen, change this trend?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, it would have to be something very dramatic
that would have to happen. If, for example,
the Soviet Union suddenly were to maintain the
division of Germany and wanted to go back to
the previous situation, then you would have
a big crisis in Europe and then, undoubtedly,
the defense budget reduction would be reversed.

QUESTION:

I see.

[c]

-4-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

But that, I'm just giving as an example of some-
thing that almost cannot happen.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

I don't believe Lithuania by itself could produce
a reversal of the defense reduction.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm. How about military manufacturer
reaction to this new situation? You know many
people over the world-

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, they always talk about the indust-military
industrial complex. But the--industrialists
don't understand politics well enough to effect
fundamental decisions of the defense budget,
certainly they will try to sell their weapons.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

But if there is not the feeling that more weapons
need to be bought, then I don't think that the

[c]

-5-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

defense contractors by themselves can reverse
this.

QUESTION:

I see. Still--China increased military budget
and--countries like Iran, Iraq, Saudia Arabia.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well that's a different problem.

QUESTION:

i see.

HENRY KISSINGER:

I think the United States will still retain
a vast superiority over countries like Iran
and Iraq. And China and the United States are
not really competitive in the military field.

China has gone through a cycle in which it staffed
it's military--while it had it's economic reform
and I suppose, partly because of it's domestic
situation, where it, where the leadership depends
more on the military then it did before. And
partly because the resources have now become
available.

[c]

HENRY KISSINGER
SIDE A

-6-

QUESTION:

I see.

HENRY KISSINGER:

It is making up for time it lost in the early eighties.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm. Do you think China might start the reduction of--military expenditure in coming years? Or, what they do? You're quite familiar with Chinese--leaders.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, I'm familiar with Chinese leaders, but they don't discuss every detail of their programs with me. I think--first of all, I don't think that the Chinese military expenditures effect the overall strategic balance in the world. They may effect the local situation.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

But the Chinese had trouble even with the Vietnamese. So it's really a local regional phenomenon. I don't expect the Chinese to reduce their

[c]

-7-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:
military budget significantly in the next three
or four years.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:
In fact, they may increase it.

QUESTION:
I see. I see. Now--I like to ask you about
what kind of structure of--military situation
we have in coming years. The first on nuclear.
The second on the conventional forces. And
the third in the [ ? ]. Now let's start
with nuclear arsenal. You are quite familiar
with this--

[BOTH AT ONCE]

HENRY KISSINGER:
Yes, and it's become-

QUESTION:
-for a long time.

HENRY KISSINGER:
It's become so complicated that it's very difficult
to discuss it in any comprehensible fashion.

[L]

-8-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

The two sides are negotiating what is called
a "fifty percent reduction of

QUESTION:

Is it feasible?

HENRY KISSINGER:

-of strategic forces. Oh, it's feasible, but
it depends how you count fifty percent. Because-
-the Soviet Union, the United States doesn't
want to count cruise missiles of they are dual
purpose, they can be either conventional or
nuclear. And also the weapons that are carried
on bombers are given--so--technical number,
but it is not necessarily the number that is
actually carried.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

-on, on the bomber. --The Soviets, on the other
hand, have certain weapons that are capable
of reaching the United States--if they're used

-10-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

[BOTH AT ONCE] I, I think--one has to understand, right now both sides have about six times as many weapons as President Kennedy had at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Twice as many weapons as President Ford or Carter had at the end of the--seventies. So fifty percent reduction will get us--about where we were in the seventies.

And that is more than is needed to destroy human life. So, the trouble with nuclear disarmament is that...no forseeable level of disarmament will really eliminate the capacity to de-to destroy humanity.

QUESTION:

I see. So, this fifty percent reduction change fundamental structure of [ ? ]

HENRY KISSINGER:

[BOTH AT ONCE] Well, the argument is that a fifty percent reduction will make it and if it's done in the way that they're discussing--it is supposed to reduce the capacity of either

[cc]

-11-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

side to launch a surprise attack on the other.
It will not impair the capacity to destroy human
life, but it is supposed to destroy-to weaken
the capacity to, to destroy the missiles or
the strategic forces of the other side.

QUESTION:

So just--

HENRY KISSINGER:

[BOTH AT ONCE] And there is some merit in that
[ ? ]

QUESTION:

This fifty percent reduction has--what meaning-in sense of strategic--concept it changed?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, I think it has, it gives a, it will add
marginally to stability. It should reduce the
incentive or the, I don't think there's a big
incentive anyway, but I think it should reduce
the technical possibility for a surprise attack
somewhat.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

[c]

-12-

HENRY KISSINGER
SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

Frankly, I don't think it makes a lot of
difference.

QUESTION:

I see. Once this agreement made, once, both
side stop to develop a new technology and a
new missile or SDI?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, you know, the history of--the arms, the
so-called arms race has been that as a result
of arms control the weapons that are destroyed
are the old weapons and the weapons that are
being kept are the new weapons. And the develop-
ment of new weapons has not in the past been
stopped by arms control.

QUESTION:

Hmmmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

--I think in this situation, when there is a
greater consciousness of peaceful relations
between the two countries, I think the development
of weapons will not stop, but it will slow down.

[L]

-13-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION:

I see. How about SDI? It's completely dead?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Of course I'm for SDI because at a minimum I think we should have it for, as a safety valve for countries like Iraq or Iran that may develop—that may develop weapons. I think the technology is continuing. And I, indeed I think the technology is advancing.

QUESTION:

I see.

HENRY KISSINGER:

--So that it is technically more feasible then it was before. I don't think there will be any substantial deployment of SDI in the nineties.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmmhmm. Now second problem is conventional forces and U.S. forces in Europe. Senator Nam[?] propose very dramatic cut of U.S. forces in Europe and also he proposed to reduce a number of carrier—dramatically from fourteen to ten. How do you think about it? It's feasible and

-14-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION, CON'T:

very realistic?

HENRY KISSINGER:

I agree with him that the conventional forces in Europe can be substantially reduced. I don't quite agree with him on the carriers because American land bases around the world are diminishing.

--We see it even in the Philippines that are bases are under considerable pressure. And in my experience in government, and this is even more so now, when the United States wants to deploy forces overseas, the carriers are the most reliable instruments.

QUESTION:

Hmmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Because they are not suffering the limitations of deployment that host countries can--can impose. So I don't agree with him on the carriers. On the de-on forces in Europe, there's no doubt that there will be and should be a substantial

[i]

-15-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

reduction. I think, however, it should be de-
pendent on two factors. One, we have to see
first whether all Soviet forces are withdrawn
from Central Europe.

--If they are all withdrawn, then there can
really be a very substantial reduction of American
forces. Although, not to zero, but about the
numbers that--Nunn is talking about. But it
should be at the end of that process.

Secondly, we need a new doctrine in NATO of
what NATO is supposed to do or all of NATO is
going to disintegrate. One has to explain what
the use of any forces is.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Against what? Against the Soviet?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Against what danger. What is the danger-

QUESTION:

Oh, I see.

[L]

-16-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

That NATO is supposed to address. Is it the
Soviets? Is it the Germans? Is it--is it local
wars in Eastern Europe? What is it?

QUESTION:

So you mean, you have to define--certain-

HENRY KISSINGER:

You need a doctrine.

[BOTH AT ONCE]

QUESTION:

-once again. I see.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Yes.

QUESTION:

It's going to be difficult job. And--

HENRY KISSINGER:

I, I think one of the problems that the United
States is, it's a very funny problem. The
United States and Europe has achieved almost
everything that it wanted to achieve--in the
fifties. And now we have to figure out what
to, what to do next.

[x]

-17-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION:

I see.

HENRY KISSINGER:

The tasks we have set ourselves have been more
or less achieved.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm. How about U.S. forces all
over the world? You also reduce a number of
the troops in--Far East and Middle East and-

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well in the Middle East we have very few forces.
We have some forces in the Indian Ocean and
I don't think we should reduce those.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

In the Far East-

QUESTION:

But you have the rapid deployment forces.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well the Rapid Deployment Forces-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

-18-

QUESTION:

Designated-

HENRY KISSINGER:

You know, it's always a, rapid deployment forces,
you have two problems with rapid deployment
forces. One, to get them where you want to
get them. And then how to supply them once
they get there. And it's easier to get them
there then to sustain them once they are there,
except for occupation duties.

It's one thing to put forces in. But if they
actually have to fight, you need a supply line.
In Korea, I suppose there can be some reduction
of American forces. --Otherwise, Philippines,
I think some marginal reduction may be possible,
but it's not the same as in Europe. Because
in Asia we really don't rely on our ground forces
primarily.

QUESTION:

Soviet has--enough mobility and--power and force
to deploy conventional forces all over the world
after this--reduction of the troops start?

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

-19-

HENRY KISSINGER:

The real obstacle to the Soviet deployment of forces outside their own country is the ethnic difficulties that the Soviet Union has had.

The Soviet Union obviously has difficulty making people from the non-Russian areas serve in--republics from a different nationality and even more, outside the territory of the Soviet Union. So I believe that the Soviet Army will have to undergo a reorganization in the next few years and create special units for foreign operations. I don't think that their present units are very useful for offensive action.

QUESTION:

I see.

HENRY KISSINGER:

And--but if they create special units that also limit their number.

QUESTION:

Hmmmmm. Hmmmmm. Now about the Soviet. What they like to do--they reduce a number of conventional forces. They reduce a number of the missile.

[1c]

-20-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION, CON'T:

What they like to do?

[PAUSE]

Militarily.

HENRY KISSINGER:

--They haven't up to now reduced their, either
their conventional forces or their missile forces
all that much. What they really ought to do
in, in the nuclear field, we have the problem
that both sides have more weapons then they
can possibly use.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

So a certain reduction is quite possible. In
the--in the conventional field, I think the
Soviet problem is to modernize their military
establishment and to figure out a way by which
they can make people serve in the Soviet Army
without deserting in a crisis.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. Hmmhmm.

[L]

HENRY KISSINGER
SIDE A

-21-

HENRY KISSINGER:

If they put them all into national units, then...
they may have large scale desertions. But if
they mix them in with all the other units, then
they have another problem. I don't know how
they're going to--how they're going to solve
this problem.

My guess is that for the next five years, the
Soviet Union will reverse what they did in the
entire postwar period. In the entire postwar
period they relied on their conventional superiority
to frighten their neighbors. I think in the
next five to ten years they will try to maintain
a nuclear monopoly in Eurasia and will be the
only significant nuclear country on the land
mass of Europe and Asia and rely on their nuclear
weapons to achieve their security.

QUESTION:

You mean a mobilization of nuclear weapon?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Modernization of their nuclear weapons put a
great emphasis on keeping Germany and Japan,

[c]

-22-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

for example, from getting nuclear weapons.
And keeping France and Britain from increasing
their nuclear weapons, so that they are the
country that in Eurasia has a nuclear monopoly
so that only the United States, far away, is
another nuclear country. I think that will
be their strategy.

QUESTION:

I see. Now I'd like to ask you about what kind
of world situation we have in nineteen ninety
after this arms reduction start and now we have
historical summit meaning between two leaders
on arms disarmament?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, there can always be unexpected events.
As in China last year. Nobody expected the
crisis that culminated in Tianamen Square.
I think that the Soviet Union is going to have
huge problems with it's various nationalities.
I think Lithuania is the beginning of these
problems, not the end of these problems. And
there's always a possibility that one of these

[d]

-23-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

problems will lead to a situation in which there
is a significant worsening of relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union because
of American attitudes on human rights and on
the domestic situation.

If that doesn't happen, then I expect a significant
improvement of relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union and I think, on
balance, that is what I expect. I think the
summit between Gorbachev and Bush is going to
have some difficulties because of Lithuania.

There will undoubtedly be demonstrations. There
will undoubtedly be criticisms. But I also
think there will be progress in the fundamental
U.S./Soviet relationship. And I think the
situation at the end of nineteen ninety will
be radically different from what it was, say,
two years before, when Gorbachev was here last
time for the United Nations.

[c]

-24-

HENRY KISSINGER
SIDE A

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. In overall pictures, military is less
important?

HENRY KISSINGER:

I think we're moving into a different period
now in which the purely military factors are
less important.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm. In nineteen sixty and seventy, people
like you, Dr. Kissinger or Dr. Schlessinger
and [ ? ] people, General Haig, bright
star in politics of the world. Now--those kind
of younger generation is not necessary to--control
politics internationally, different breed of
the people necessary, younger generation?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, of course there's a younger generation.
Inevitably there's a younger generation. But,
in the sixties and seventies you had very many
extremely dramatic events. And so there was
an emphasis on personalities...to solve them.
I think in the nineties, the events will be
less dramatic and therefore you see it in our

[L]

-25-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

presidencies. President Reagan was a great television personality and a dramatic president. President Bush makes a conspicuous effort not to be dramatic.

And the same is true of, of many of their advisors. So I think there will be young people. They will be just as good as the people before them. But I think the style of foreign policy will be less personal and less dramatic.

QUESTION:

So you say--you don't need--any military strategists, the nuclear strategists as before?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Oh, no, I think you need them. But you need them in a different way. Cause now I think you need a consensus among the various departments. In the sixties and seventies it was a new science, almost, and there were only a few people who had done any--consecutive work on it. --Now the basic knowledge exists and one has to adapt it to new circumstances. So

[Lc]

-26-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

I don't, I cannot see, I mean if you look at
the sixties and seventies, you had the Vietnam
War, you had the Middle East Crisis, you had
the opening to China. So there were a whole
series of events that required dramatic
initiatives.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Now you, it's not so important to have dramatic
initiatives, as a consistent pattern of foreign
policy.

QUESTION:

In these coming years we don't expect such event
as a Vietnam War, Afghan War, the Korean War?

HENRY KISSINGER:

No.

QUESTION:

That kind of danger, no.

HENRY KISSINGER:

--You know, there's so many conflicts among
so many nationalities in the world today, that

[x]

-27-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

you cannot exclude some-some-some of them breaking
out into war. But, the involvement of a super
power in a major conflict, military conflict,
I think is extremely unlikely in the next ten
years.

QUESTION:

I see. Now--on the current issue. --What can
you expect out of meeting between Gorbachev
and Bush? You don't like to--guess--currently
happening things, but--

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well I think that they're going to make significant
progress on the strategic arms talks. Maybe
even a breakthrough so that only details need
to be negotiated. I think they will make progress
on the question of unification of Germany.

I think it will be a good meeting because it
would be very dangerous for-and unwise-to hold
the meeting unless some progress is in prospect
because, if there's no progress--President Bush
will be criticized for having seen Gorbachev

[c]

-28-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

And it's in both their interests to show that
whatever happens in Lithuania, the fundamental
relationship is advancing.

QUESTION:

Now about Gorbachev. He can overcome this
difficulty [ ? ] and military people
is critical on him these days.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, that's what I read in the newspapers,
but I have my doubts that, that this is true.
They, people base this on conversations that
[ ? ] who is, after all, Gorbachev's
advisor, has had with westerners. You could
also say that this is something that they want
the West to believe.

No doubt, the economic situation is bad. It's
lost, from a Russian point of view, Eastern
Europe. He cannot point to many successes.
But he has been very skillful in this integrating

[c]

-29-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER, CON'T:

his opposition. And so...one reason he's staying
in office is because nobody wants to take over
the mess that now exists in the Soviet Union.
So, on balance, I think he will stay through
nineteen ninety.

QUESTION:

I see. And--do you think he can sacrifice his
international reputation for keeping good relations
with the military of the Soviet?

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, I'm not sure that the military really
want bad relations with the outside-with the
outside world. --If he sacrificed his international
reputation he would sacrifice the one conspicuous
achievement of his presidency and of his term
in office. And I think he would be very reluctant
to do that.

QUESTION:

I see. But--recently Soviet Military is very
critical explicitly of--on Gorbachev's stance
on--military using the country and relationship
with the Soviet?

[c]

-30-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, as I said, I've read that and...I'm, I'm
sure they're restless by the loss of their
position in Central Europe. And also officers
have to return from Czechoslavakia and Hungary
and there's no housing for them. So they have
grievances.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

But it does not look as if it is life-threatening
to Gorbachev's position.

QUESTION:

I see. And your prediction on Gorbachev, he
survived nineteen ninety, but still unpredictable
nineteen ninety-one.

HENRY KISSINGER:

Correct.

QUESTION:

And--last part of the question is China. No
big change since--I met you last time. Still-
they are going to be quiet as it is?

[c]

-31-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, the big problem is whether the American
Congress will cut off the most favored nation
status for China, which is coming up for renewal
in June.

QUESTION:

Hmmhmm.

HENRY KISSINGER:

If that cutoff is made then our relations will
deteriorate significantly. Otherwise I would
expect them to be stable. Not brilliant, but
stable.

QUESTION:

Inside of China, you have any information what's
happening?

HENRY KISSINGER:

I--well--my impression of the situation inside
of China is that Deng and his friends are trying
to go back to economic reform, they're undoubtedly
handicapped by the slowdown in foreign investment
as a result of Tianamen. --And the government
has, has difficulties, but it seems to have the
situation under control.

[c]

-32-

HENRY KISSINGER

SIDE A

QUESTION:

So economically and--internationally, China
has no power to influence other countries?

HENRY KISSINGER:

No, no. I think it has power to influence other
countries. After all, it is the largest country
in the world. It has the longest continuous
history. And it is a huge cultural factor.
It does not have the same prestige that it had,
say, five years ago. But I hope it can regain
it.

QUESTION:

I see. But--so far--they are quiet and--President
Bush has nothing particularly plan to, to--to
renew the relations between two countries.
Because of Congress is very critical on-

HENRY KISSINGER:

At this moment, what President Bush is most
concerned with is to maintain the relationship
as it is, without deterioration.

QUESTION:

Thank-you. Thank-you very much.