SUPPLEMENTAL CLIPS : THURSDAY, 25 SEPTEMBER 1980

Who Lost Iran:
Revising Revisionist History
WASHINGTON POST 21 SEPTEMBER 1980
Pg. D-1

By Stephen Cohen

T HIS IS NOT the best time to debate who lost Iran. To begin with, that's the wrong question; the right one is whether different U.S. policies might have led to less damaging results. Moreover, a fair appraisal demands some historical perspective, and disputes over past policy preferably should await the release of the hostages.

But the debate has already begun, especially with former Ambassador William Sullivan's recent version of what went wrong. While Sullivan's account is essentially accurate so far as it goes, it is nevertheless an incomplete story that he tells. So for the sake of a better, if tentative, understanding, it might be worth considering another participant's account.

Sullivan does ask an important question: whether the United States should have acted differently between mid-November 1978 and mid-January 1979, the last two months before the shah's fall. But his account suggests another question that is at least as important: whether we should have acted otherwise at an earlier time, between November 1977 and November 1978. Sullivan was also ambassador then, a period of intense opposition to the shah.

In the last two months of the shah's rule, his probable fall should have been all but unmistakable. In mid-November 1978, for example, it became apparent that a million or more Iranians (about half the adult male population of Tehran) would march against him on Dec. 11, the Muslim holy day of Ashura.

But concerted political acitivity against the shah was clearly visible to Western observers a year before that, beginning in November 1977. What were the signs then and how good were Americans, both private and official, at reading them?

Before, during and after the shah's November 1977 visit to Washington, thousands of students and Western-educated professionals joined in Tehran to protest his rule. In early January of 1978, mass riots erupted in Qom to protest a government press campaign against the Ayatollah Khomeni and the death of his son under mysterious circumstances.

A month later there was a full-scale insurrection in Tabriz, in which thousands of demonstrators burned banks, modern stores, movie theaters and other visible signs of "foreign influence." From then on, mass marches, protests and demonstrations, growing ever larger and drawing the participation of Iranians from all walks of life, occurred with regular and increasing frequency until the shah's departure.

In some quarters, these signs were a cause for grave concern. On March 10, 1978, the State Department's alarmed Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened a panel of both inside and outside experts to discuss the shah's future.

Stephen Cohen, former deputy assistant secretary of state for human rights, currently teaches at the Georgetown University Law Center.

The experts warned that the opposition was broad-based and that anti-shah sentiment ran deeply through the entire society. In a paper prepared for the meeting, one U.S. scholar wrote, with remarkable prescience:

> "... time is not on the side of the shah ... those chasing him are more numerous, more dedicated, and more prepared ... the government can now only respond with more and more coercive force ... the large groups of individuals already alienated by the regime will in turn become more demanding and more desperate ... And they will be joined by others ...

> "Unless something is done to break this wildly spinning vicious circle, the future of current actors in the Iranian political drama can only be a grim one. And the American future in Iran can now in no way be considered bright."

Why, then, didn't United States policy recognize the gravity of the situation?

One major obstacle was the considerable disparity between the picture drawn by these experts and the impressions the U.S. embassy conveyed from Iran. The embassy consistently underestimated the strength and significance of the opposition to the shah. It was not until those last two months that it suggested the regime might fall.

The fact that protests were occurring, often involving large numbers of Iranians, was, of course, reported. But the embassy usually characterized the participants as a minority, representing for the most part religious extremists and radical students. It did not convey the impression that profound anti-shah sentiments were shared by a large majority of Iranians.

At the same time, the embassy seriously overestimated the degree to which the shah still retained some credibility with the Iranian masses. As a result, its reporting exaggerated the shah's ability to manage the crisis by making partial concessions designed to satisfy some opposition demands.

For example, in June 1978, the shah made a speech to the faculty of Tehran University in which he repeated earlier promises of "liberalization," including the constitutional separation of powers and greater public participation in political decisions. The embassy reported the an-

nouncement as a positive step that would help calm the opposition by showing that the shah was moving to change conditions in Iran. In fact, the promises failed to produce, on either the opposition forces or the general public, the calming effect that was predicted.

As early as late 1977, a few members of the U.S. mission in Iran began to view the opposition as a serious threat to the shah. Washington was usually not informed of those differing views. On one occasion when a pessimistic assessment was forwarded, it was in a format designed to attract a minimum of attention, and the embassy added that it did not share the reported views.

It is worth noting that the U.S. official in Iran who most accurately judged the strength of the opposition during 1978 spoke fluent Persian, while most other U.S. diplomats did not. Moreover, his daily routine brought him into contact with many ordinary Iranians, whereas others in the embassy tended to restrict their contacts to high government officials and other members of the Iranian elite.

Does any of this matter? Could a different U.S. policy between November 1977 and November 1978 have led to a better outcome? If we mean keeping the shah in power, the answer is probably not.

Had the shah's regime been different, the revolution might have taken a different path or been avoided altogether. But by the time Carter became president and Sullivan was named ambassador, there was probably little, if anything, that could be done to shape or delay forces that had been set in motion many years before. The grievances against the regime — rampant inflation and widespread unemployment, excessive and wasteful military spending, massive corruption, and indiscriminate repression — were too long-standing and too deeply felt.

Certainly by early 1978 the revolution was already well underway, and the fall of the shah was more or less unavoidable. Only massive military intervention, on the scale of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, might have saved him.

Still, there are actions that might have left the U.S. better positioned to deal with the new revolutionary government.

(CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

21

seems even more concerning
anyone in the country should see Carter, Kennedy, and
Brown debate because Brown has ignored Iowa?

Because the Register is a private institution, it can
invite whomever it wishes to debate. That is the law,
but an institution of the Register's character might be
expected to aspire to a higher standard of fairness. A
debate like this instantly becomes the kind of national
event that makes or breaks candidates. If the Register
excludes Brown from this debate, it is virtually saying
he is not a viable candidate. That is something the
voters should decide, not a newspaper.

From the Horse's Mouth

On November 1, three days before the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, the following message from the Ayatollah Khomeini was broadcast over Iranian radio:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.
Four November is the anniversary of the day when the
hated regime attacked the University of Tehran and
massacred our dear students.

The regime, opposed to all manifestations of
civilization and progress in the country, one day
attacked the Feyziyeh theological school [in Qom] and
other Islamic schools throughout Iran, and another day
it attacked Tehran University and colleges and univer-
sities throughout Irán, the centers of knowledge and
scholars.

Now, with the anniversary of the attack on the
university, it is necessary for all the great spiritual
figures of Qom, Tehran, and other towns near Tehran
to take part in a ceremony to be held at Tehran
University to bring the two thinking minds closer
together. As for the spiritual figures in other cities,
they should also take part in similar ceremonies held in
other universities to mark the day and, thus, by their
presence, foil the divisive plots aimed at these two
gigantic forces. These spiritual figures should join
pupils, students, and professors in order to achieve this
goal. Our enemies use every opportunity, especially on
this day, to hatch all sorts of plots. They are determined
to use any pretext to disturb our people's peace. It is,
therefore, up to the dear pupils, students, and
theological students to expand with all their might their
attacks against the United States and Israel, so they
may force the United States to return the deposed and
criminal shah, and to condemn this great plot. It is also
up to our dear university students and university staff
and theological students to maintain their unity with
everything in their power and support these two fronts
with all their might. God bless you all.

[Signed] Ruhollah Mosavi Khomeini.

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6

Access

NEW YORK /MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1979

singer anointed the shah as the protector of all Western interests in the Persian Gulf just as the United States protected those interests in the rest of the world. As payment for the shah's accepting that responsibility, Nixon not only gave the shah implied recognition of Iran's equality with the United States but also unlimited access to our most sophisticated military hardware, with American officials forbidden to interpose their judgment to deny the shah anything he wanted. It was a privilege we have never in our history accorded to any other country.

Prior to that fateful meeting the United States had kept the shah on a short leash, permitting him over a period of 22 years to buy a total of only $1.2 billion of American weapons and equipment. But, during the next seven years alone, the shah, intoxicated by the Nixon blessing, purchased from the United States over $19.5 billion of our most sophisticated weapons or sixteen times as much. Nixon's offer of unlimited access to our entire arsenal was like giving an alcoholic the key to the world's largest liquor store.

Equipped with this mighty array of elegant weapons the shah acquired fatal delusions of grandeur, while his isolation from the Iranian people progressively intensified. Meanwhile, believing the mythology of his own omnipotence, he permitted his family and hangers-on to satisfy their greed for vastly increased graft and corruption while he himself indulged in vulgar and flamboyant displays of wealth and power. Perhaps because his father, an Iranian Cossack colonel, had seized power only in 1925, the shah compulsively sought to identify his parvenu dynasty with the ancient Persian emperors by staging such events as an elaborate coronation in 1967 and a festival Persepolis in 1973 that is estimated to have cost as much as $120 million. Not only was it circuses instead of bread but the Iranian people were not even admitted to the circuses.

Such a weakness for extravagance was reflected also in the shah's fascinatión with spectacular capital-intensive (instead of labor-intensive) projects. That, combined with his huge outlays for American weapons, created a critical cash-flow squeeze in 1974 and 1975 which required an abrupt halt to construction projects with catastrophic unemployment in the cities.

In time all this became too much for Iran's impoverished population to swallow; for, added to economic hardship, was the bitterness induced by the cruel and repressive activities of the shah's huge secret police organization, the Savak, which was responsible for the imprisonment and sometimes the unexplained disappearance of thousands.

The adulation of the shah, begun by Nixon, and continued by President Gerald Ford, was rather thoughtlessly accepted by the Carter Administration, which, in standing by the shah to the end, like the orchestra of the Titanic, thoroughly identified America with a monarch all Iran had come to hate. That accounts for the extreme bitterness of the current anti-American passion; the Iranian people believed—and were encouraged by the ayatollah to believe—that the shah was America's chosen instrument—which, to an extent, was what Nixon had made him.

Aware of the intensity of this bitterness the State Department stopped the shah from coming to America after Khomeini had returned to Iran. Our Tehran embassy explicitly warned. Washington that, if we received the shah in America, the embassy might well be overrun and its personnel made hostages.

The decision to exclude the shah stirred violent opposition on the part of Kissinger and his friends. They mounted enormous pressure to persuade the President to reconsider. It was, Kissinger told the President and Secretary Cyrus Vance, "intolerable" for us to reject an old friend. Later, at a Harvard Business School dinner, Kissinger declared that "a man who for 37 years was a friend of the United States should not be treated like a Flying Dutchman who cannot find a port of call."

Still, the Carter Administration, realistically assessing the dangers, held firm, resisting the increasing pressures from the shah's friends until the third week in October when

those friends announced that the shah was dangerously ill and required medical treatment of a quality available only in New York. Though uneasy at the prospect, the Administration yielded to the pressure and, for reasons of compassion, nervously agreed to admit the shah for a brief course of treatment. The rest is known to every American.

One might have thought that those who had blamed the government for letting the shah be overthrown and then frantically insisted on his entry into America would at this point observe a decent reticence. But instead Kissinger has intensified his caring. He has suggested darkly on television that the Russians would never have let their people be held hostage, and the other day he told a meeting of Republican governors that he was "sick and tired of seeing America pushed around." Just who has been doing the pushing he did not say.

91

© BOSTON GLOBE

NOV 2 2 1979

## Diplomacy and retaliation

Roger Fisher is a professor at Harvard Law School and a specialist in the resolution of international conflicts. This is an edited transcript of an interview yesterday with The Globe. NOV 2 2 1979

Q. What do you think the ayatollah really wants? And what do you think he will accept? Obviously the public demand is for the shah. Do you think that's what he's really after?

A. Look behind people's positions to their interests. The position, is, we must have the shah, we'll try the hostages unless we have him. But the interest is in having the world understand the outrageous conduct the shah engaged in in Iran with the support of the United States. That's what they want. It's not one dead shah. They want a process to be gone through that will persuade the world of the abuses they have suffered.

Q. Having said that, there does seem to be an escalation of words that on the part of the United States have a much sharper military tone. Do you think this is a bargaining chip or a bluff?

A. We cannot by physical military means guarantee the safety of the hostages. No one should think that we can kidnap them back, or that we can do an Entebbe-style raid. In terms of physical power over the lives of the hostages, Iran has the military power. We do not. They could kill them tomorrow. They could hide them in the basements of buildings around Tehran.

Threats of military action tend to undercut our legitimacy in the eyes of many. We are now strong. We would look unjustified.

Q. We're strong because our stand thus far has been principled.

A. The stand has been principled. The United Nations has believed in the immunity of ambassadors — every ambassador's life is at stake on that principle. They agree with us on that. As to whether we should try to use force now, they won't agree with us. We'd lose some support.

> I think our task here is to convince ourselves and the world that we are behaving properly — that we are behaving responsibly, correctly. If they should kill the hostages, I would like the situation to be such that everyone in the world says that it was Iran's fault, not the United States'. What the President owes the

Continued

World

Middle East

IRAN

91

**Words CONTINUED**

es in the 1980s, Kissinger spoke with
Clare Crawford-Mason of PEOPLE:

**What should the U.S. attitude be to the takeover of our embassies abroad?**

First of all, we have to stop our self-
flagellation. Not everybody who at-
tacks us is doing so because we
supplied a just grievance. Secondly, it
must be made clear that challenging
the U.S. is not for free. There has to be
some penalty for opposing us and
some reward for being friendly. Unless
we can reestablish that balance, this
trend will continue.

**What should the penalties be?**

It would be irresponsible for me to
speak in the abstract. With Iran, the
best way is to demonstrate to terror-
ists that, whatever our divisions, we are
a united people in a crisis. After the cri-
sis, we should develop a posture that
makes it clear that the United States is
not to be trifled with in the conduct of
its foreign policy.

**Are you satisfied with the U.S. treatment of the Shah?**

I have held the position all along
that the Shah was a friend of the U.S.
for 37 years. Every President, starting
with Truman, lauded the Shah's
friendship and his modernizing tenden-
cies and spoke of the gratitude we
owed him. Even President Carter said
in January 1978 there was no family
with whom he would rather spend New
Year's Eve than the Shah and Shah-
banou. With those circumstances, I
believe we owed them private human-
itarian asylum, not political support,
after he left office.

**Can you give specific examples of the Shah's helpfulness?**

When I was in office, he always kept
Iran's oil production at its maximum. His
was the only country adjoining the
U.S.S.R. in the '73 Middle Eastern war
that did not permit overflights of So-
viet transports. He never joined the oil
embargo, he fueled our fleets, he sup-
ported our negotiations. We, of
course, should have the best possible
relations which the present govern-
ment of Iran permits, but we cannot
give up our tradition of asylum.

**Did you personally intercede to have the Shah admitted to the U.S.?**

My original involvement with the
Shah's domicile was in January. I was
asked by the Administration to help find
a residence in the U.S. in order to en-

CONTINUED

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**Words CONTINUED**

courage the Shah to leave Iran, although I did not approve of that policy. Eight weeks later I was asked by Washington to go to Morocco to tell the Shah he was no longer welcome. This I refused to do.

**Did you take any private actions?**

I inquired whether our government was helping him get into any other country. I was told no. Over the next few weeks I made three telephone calls to senior officials, and I saw Secretary Vance twice to try to convince them to reverse their decision. They refused. In light of the Shah's help to our nation, I felt a duty to help. I called up the President of Mexico and encouraged him to grant the Shah asylum, which Mexico did.

**After the Shah became ill, did you intercede with the U.S. government?**

No, neither directly nor indirectly. As I understand it, the government was informed of his medical condition and admitted him, and I think they took the right decision.

**You have been mentioned as being instrumental in admitting the Shah.**

I do not want to give the impression of walking away from the decision. The fact is I did *not* intervene myself in October to get him admitted. I was out of the country. Had I known and had it been necessary, I would have made an appeal. Had I been asked, I would have strongly supported the government's decision. It was right and courageous.

**But former U.S. diplomat George Ball has said, "Had it not been for Mr. Kissinger and a few others making themselves enormously obnoxious trying to force the Shah into this country, maybe we wouldn't have done it, even for reasons of compassion." What is your reaction?**

Your readers can judge from what I have just told you whether I did generate pressure.

**How often have you seen the Shah since he came to the U.S.?**

I have seen him twice.

**Have you urged the Shah not to leave the U.S. unless or until the Carter administration directly asks him to?**

Absolutely not! It's a lie put out by those unwilling to assume responsibility for their own actions.

**Are you surprised at the anti-Americanism surfacing in Muslim countries?**

No, anti-Americanism such as we are seeing in Iran is partly the result of a government's using it to deflect attention from its own domestic difficulties. Envoy of the richest nation is not hard to whip up, especially when you have Marxist-front organizations and PLO-type revolutionary activists who have their own reasons.

**Isn't it true that the Shah did not enjoy popular support?**

The Shah's government was certainly authoritarian, but it had the best educational system in the area. It spread literacy, sent students to the

U.S., wiped out malaria, eradicated locusts. It was a reforming government, but the process of economic development is unbelievably unsettling. It moves people from their villages and traditional societies into the cities, where they are rootless. They need some values to make the changes bearable. So we witness resentment against the West, which principally offers economic progress, and a return to religious orthodoxy and in some cases religious fanaticism. This is the fundamental problem in Iran.

**On your recent trips abroad, what was the mood about the '80s?**

There's a feeling of confusion. Everybody knows great changes are coming and feels uneasy about them. Nobody is quite sure what these changes will be, or how to master them, partly because there is a sense that America has given up its leadership role, and there is no substitute for it.

**What is the mood here at home?**

We've gone through 15 years of tremendous travail of a war we did not know either how to win or conclude, and a domestic crisis unrelated to any popular issue, but really to the personality of the President—I mean Watergate. There was a feeling that America should retrench. Now I think this post-Vietnam retreat syndrome has come to an end and we are prepared to play a larger role. We are essential to peace and progress, and I don't think the handicap to our playing such a role is the public mood.

**Then what is the handicap?**

We have developed impotence into a cult. It is one thing to say we must learn the limits of our power, which is true; it is another to concentrate foreign policy on our limits. We also must know the scope of our possibilities.

**What would you say will be the spiritual keynote to the '80s?**

A search for faith, but without definition as yet. Indeed, there is a great danger that the nihilism of the early '70s could turn into an irrational faith for its own sake. Jonestown would be the absurd extreme. Our necessity now is to give the search for faith a content that is also rational.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 117

In Austin, Kissinger told Republican governors, including Texas' Bill Clements (left) and Vermont's Richard Snelling, that the U.S. had not been "willing to offer the Shah support or even understanding."

## Words CONTINUED

**You say that America is looking for a spiritual center. Where is yours?**

I have no doubt been profoundly influenced by my experience with totalitarianism as a young man. I remember what America meant to us. With all the imperfections of American society, I know that they are relatively trivial compared to the hope that we give the rest of the world. Having lived in a truly totalitarian society, I can distinguish between flaws in a healthy society and real oppression.

**Have you been consulted by private industry about its investments in the world?**

My position with regard to private industry is the following: I will not make introductions. I will not establish contacts. I will not give commercial-type advice. If somebody asks for my assessment of political circumstances and foreign policy trends, I will give that judgment, but I will not apply it to any concrete cases they may face. I don't want to know what those cases are.

**From your days in government, what do you recall about the moments of crisis?**

One consolation is that you are doing something that makes a difference to your country's future and hopefully to the future of mankind. The disadvantage is, of course, that your decisions become irretrievable. Therefore people who are obsessed by the uncertainty of events become exhausted emotionally. Everyone aspiring to high office probably needs a touch of

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## Words CONTINUED

monomania; in uncertain situations, without that self-confidence you will destroy yourself.

### Did Nixon have such self-confidence?

Yes, and so does Carter, although he doesn't know how to apply it, at least not yet to concrete situations.

### How do you foresee our relations with the Soviet Union in the decade ahead?

I would say that history will be on our side by the late 1980s. But in the first half of the '80s the military balance could be against us. Sometime in the decade the Soviet Union is going to face the problem of all Communist societies, namely, that you cannot run the modern industrial state by a system of total planning, and you cannot encapsulate your population into a rigid orthodoxy which leaves no scope for human personality. Before it turns to its internal reforms, the Soviet Union will have a very great temptation to dominate the external environment.

### During this period, what should U.S. foreign policy be?

If we can keep the global turmoils from turning in a pro-Soviet, anti-Western direction, we can have genuine coexistence. We have no clashing interest with the Soviet Union as a national state, only as an expansionist power. If we can get through the first half of the '80s without an international collapse, then I would be very optimistic for the second half of the decade.

### Are there potential Vietnams ahead?

Right now in almost every continent

the situation is sliding out of control. In Southeast Asia, since our withdrawal we face the same problem of the threat of Vietnam to all surrounding countries. In the Middle East, Iran is only a symptom of the overall situation of radicals intimidating the moderates. In Central America, we are at the beginning of great turmoil. I hope both presidential candidates in the campaign will tell the American people that there are crises to be dealt with.

### What techniques did you evolve for personal relaxation while in office?

I am a bad person to ask. I'm fundamentally a workaholic. I like to listen to music, see friends. I'm a sports nut and a ballet fan. In office when I had time to read, I read classified documents. Now I read books a lot.

### You said you have become more secure since your marriage.

I have never had such a close relationship with any person. It sounds corny, but trust and love are freely given by Nancy. And this makes me more secure in all other relationships.

### Will there be a Senator Kissinger in the '80s?

I expect Senator Javits to run from New York in 1980, and I expect to support him. I will under no circumstances oppose Senator Moynihan in 1982. So ask me about 1986—in 1986 I might be tempted. ☐

At their Georgetown house, Kissinger romps with labrador Tyler, wife Nancy and his son by his first marriage, David, 18.

United Press International

# P.L.O./Khomeini Connection

by Kenneth Jacobson

The P.L.O. has been the single most consistent supporter of Khomeini and the Iranian revolutionary forces. This was true throughout the 70's, when the Ayatollah and many of the revolutionaries were in exile and in opposition; it was true upon the takeover from the Shah February, 1979; and it continues to be true throughout the hostage crisis.

The P.L.O. commitment began as far back as 1969, when first the P.F.L.P. (a leftist faction of the P.L.O.) and then Fatah (Arafat's arm) gave sanctuary to Iranian rebels. Basic military training and specialized coaching in urban guerrilla tactics and sabotage soon followed, mainly in Palestinian camps in Lebanon. For some of the trainees, the Lebanese civil war of 1975-6 proved practical military experience as they fought side by side with Palestinians and Lebanese leftists. Among those said by the reliable British publication, the *Economist*, to have received P.F.L.P. training in a camp in South Yemen is Sadeh Ghotbzadeh, now Iran's Foreign Minister.

*Mr. Jacobson is director of ADL's Middle Eastern Affairs Department.*

While definitive figures are not available, *Time* magazine has reported that more than 3,000 Iranians were trained under the P.L.O. in the past few years and that the Palestinians smuggled as many as 30,000 weapons into Iran to await the day of revolution. Clearly, in the weeks leading to the fall of the Shah, the Palestinians were providing the opposition with funds and weapons, including Kalashnikov sub-machine guns. And ever since, the training program has flourished, as Robert Moss, London *Daily Telegraph* columnist, points out in the *New Republic* (January 19, 1980): "Moscow-trained P.L.O. specialists are advising a new revolutionary secret police group in Iran, while a 300-strong contingent of Iranian 'volunteers' is deployed in Southern Lebanon to serve as auxiliaries in the Palestinian assault on Christian bases."

Neither the P.L.O. nor the Khomeini regime has been particularly shy about the long-standing connection. Hani El-Hassan, P.L.O. representative in Teheran, said (January 2, 1979) that "the Palestinian revolution [had] played an important role in training and equipping the opposition in Iran." Sheikh Khalkali, chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Court, told reporters (December 18, 1979) that

9

there were Iranian agents doing work abroad who had been "trained by the Palestinians."

## The Revolution

During the final stages of the Khomeini revolution in January and February, 1979, P.L.O.-Khomeini solidarity and the specialness of the relationship surfaced. On January 7, Arafat referred to the revolutionaries as "our allies, the Iranian people" in an address to a crowd of guerrilla fighters in Beirut.

The following month, the Khomeini regime, in the midst of the turmoil of revolution, paid homage to the P.L.O. for past and present support. Arafat received a glorious welcome in Teheran as the first foreign "dignitary" to be received. Concurrently, the new government seized the Israeli legation in Teheran and turned it over to the P.L.O.

While in Teheran, Arafat, speaking on behalf of the revolutionary regime, took as his major theme "Today Iran, Tomorrow Palestine." On February 18, he told reporters that the revolution had radically altered the Middle East power balance and had turned "the whole policy and strategy in the region upside down." Referring to the new Iran as "my second home," he described the revolution as "our earthquake... a glorious torch that will enlighten the whole region." Later, he told a crowd of Iranians that "the road to Palestine now leads through Iran."

Arafat's call for solidarity did not go unanswered. The Voice of the Islamic Revolution commented: "The Iranian revolution can be safeguarded only if we remember to send assistance to freedom fighters all over the world. Certainly, in sending men to fight side-by-side with the fighters on Islamic fronts, the P.L.O. will hold a special position."

## The Hostage Affair

The P.L.O. has continued as the staunch advocate of the Iranian regime from the very outset of the hostage affair to this day. While there was much publicity regarding P.L.O. diplomatic activity in the early days of the drama, it was

evident that the P.L.O. was hoping to score public relations points should the Iranians agree to give up the hostages rather than seeking to persuade them to do so. Since it soon became clear that the militants had no intention of letting the Americans go, P.L.O. support for the Khomeini government blossomed anew.

In an interview last November with Al-Shab, an Algerian publication, Arafat boldly stated his organization's position: "We have not and will not make any efforts to mediate with the Iranian revolution. We and the Iranian revolution are in the same boat. From the beginning we have maintained close contacts with the Iranian revolution on the basis of the principle that Iran is a friend of the Palestinian Revolution.... I see in the freezing of bank accounts and military preparations real dangers. I have given an order to put our forces on a state of alert, so that they be ready to help the Iranian revolution. I warn you that heavy clouds of war are massing in the skies...."

The uniqueness of the P.L.O.-Khomeini relationship manifested itself at the Arab Summit Conference in Tunis on November 24. Even though Conference rules prohibited participation by non-Arab representatives, the P.L.O. sponsored a three-man Iranian delegation for admittance; its purpose was to seek support from the Arab heads of state for Iran against the U.S. in the ongoing crisis. The member states rebuffed this P.L.O. move, though the Iranian delegation did meet outside the Conference structure with Assad of Syria, Hoss of Lebanon, Al-Turayki of Libya, as well as Arafat himself.

A number of reliable reports are now suggesting that the P.L.O. had a role either in the actual takeover of the embassy or in its securing. On December 12, for example, Marvin Kalb of CBS News reported that American intelligence experts, in seeking to determine the captors' identity and aims, discovered that "an unknown number of Palestinian guerrillas joined the Iranians inside the compound and provided what's called 'technical assistance.' CBS has learned that it was the Palestinians who mined the embassy grounds and walls and have

10

taken a direct hand in the security of the
hostages. The Palestinians are still there,
which explains why Arabic is heard in-
side the compound in addition to the
native language, Farsi."

On December 12, columnist Jack An-
derson reported on ABC that intelligence
sources indicated not only that some of
the militants "were trained by Arafat's
Palestine Liberation Organization," but
also that the "assault on our embassy
may even have been planned and exe-
cuted by the P.L.O." Anderson added that
"Arafat may have tried to allay suspicion
by pretending to seek the release of the
hostages."

More recently, other charges have
come from the London bureau of the Los
Angeles *Herald-Examiner*. On January
20, Seymour Friedin wrote that the inva-
sion of the embassy "was under the di-
rect instruction and programming of Dr.
George Habash," head of the P.F.L.P.
wing of the P.L.O. According to him, the
idea for the takeover germinated in
Habash's headquarters in Lebanon and
was carried out by joint participation of
veteran P.F.L.P. terrorists and activist
members of the Iranian Revolutionary
Council.

While full details of the P.L.O. role are
not yet available, these reports have
credibility because of the intense ongo-
ing relationship between the P.L.O. and
the Iranian revolutionary forces.

Behind the Support

P.L.O. support for Khomeini rests on a
coincidence of ideology, strategy and
tactics. It sees the Islamic leader as the
means to achieve its three central aims:
the subversion of American interests, the
undermining of moderate states in the
Middle East, and the destruction of Is-
rael. Each movement draws for its intel-
lectual and emotional nourishment on
that strange mix of Islamic fundamen-
talism and Marxist radicalism.

P.L.O. statements of support for Kho-
meini invariably focus on these aims.
Concerning the U.S., Arafat told a Pale-
tinian audience last January that the
revolution in Iran would allow the P.L.O.
to turn the tables on the U.S. Referring to

remarks about the P.L.O. by President
Carter's National Security Adviser, Arafat
said: "We and our allies, the Iranian
people, can (now) tell Brzezinski 'bye-
bye to American interests in the most
sensitive part of this region.'"

On February 19, in a Teheran press
conference, Arafat again tied the revolu-
tion to the defeat of the U.S.: "The Israeli
military group demands to watch the
American interests in the area. . . . I say
nay to imperialism and to Zionism in this
region. I say that a new epoch has begun
in the full sense of the word. We shall
continue to step hand-in-hand, two revo-
lutions within one revolution, and we
shall build the liberty and the revolu-
tionary civilization together with the
triumph."

In its struggle with Israel, Arafat has
seen in Khomeini a golden opportunity
to win increased support — political,
military, financial — while reducing his
dependence on other Arab states. On
February 11, 1979, Arafat linked the revo-
lution in Iran to his cause against Israel:
"Because the time of the Palestinian Lib-
eration is coming soon, the words of
truth rise up now against the oppression
in the entire area. The hour for liberating
the holy places in Palestine is coming
soon." In a press conference in Teheran
six days later, Arafat said that the Iranian
revolution pulled Iran on the Arab side:
"The most important outcome of the
revolution is its threat on the imperialis-
tic presence embodied in Israel."

United Press International

Arafat visits Khomeini in the hospital one year
after their first meeting.

11

On February 22, Arafat talked of Iranians joining Palestinians in the struggle against Israel: "Caravans and divisions of Iranians and Palestinians would fight together.... We are two peoples who have become one people, two revolutionary movements which came to be one revolutionary movement. We have been united.... Carter and Begin should know that these two revolutions go together, and caravans and divisions of Fedayeens will be dispatched to the Palestine frontiers."

P.L.O. belief in the centrality of Khomeini's Iran to the victory over Israel persists. With Americans being held hostage, Hani El-Hassan, the P.L.O. representative in Iran, said (November 29) that Arafat and Khomeini will "enter Jerusalem hand-in-hand and defeat the imperialists and the Zionists." On December 31, El-Hassan again tied P.L.O. victory to the Imam: "We derive our main support from the Iranian revolution and Khomeini. In five years we shall proclaim a Palestinian government and in 15 years we hope to destroy Israel. ... It is our hope that the leaders of Iran and Palestine will enter Jerusalem arm-in-arm."

> "... Khomeini and P.L.O. share goal of destroying Israel..."

At a time when individuals still proclaim P.L.O. moderation, and when the United States must begin to distinguish with great clarity between its friends and its foes, the lessons of the P.L.O.-Khomeini connection must not go unlearned.

Several conclusions seem appropriate:

1. The P.L.O. is the model and the instructor for Khomeini-style terror. What the Iranian terrorists have done was to carry to its logical extension what the P.L.O. has been doing for years with world approbation or reticence. Taking innocent hostages? The P.L.O. has taken hundreds of hostages since 1967. Invading embassies and assassinating or

threatening diplomats? The P.L.O. set the precedent for Khomeini time and time again, including the murder of American representatives in Lebanon and the Sudan, and the seizure last summer of the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara.

2. Terror as a means is intimately connected with the goal of destroying American interests. An illusion exists in some quarters that Middle East terror tactics are concerned with specific grievances — related to the Palestinians or the Shah. In truth, as developing events in Teheran have demonstrated, these tactics only begin with specific grievances but then invariably move on to the true goal of subverting American interests. The strange combination of Islam and Marxism in Iran, Libya, and among the P.L.O. focuses on America as the enemy.

3. Khomeini and the P.L.O. share the goal of destroying Israel; to give them power is to whet their appetites, increasing their lust for destruction. There are those who contend that all Arafat needs is his own state and, once having that state, he will moderate his anti-Israel policies. Here too the Khomeini regime is instructive. Not only has the Ayatollah not become more moderate, but now that he has power, he has the ability to cause great damage.

4. The P.L.O. and Khomeini share a desire to use oil as a political weapon against the U.S. While the Saudi Arabians in practice keep oil issues distinct from political issues, it is the P.L.O. and Iran which look to turn the oil weapon against the United States.

5. In larger strategic terms, the Soviet Union is the main beneficiary of Iranian and P.L.O. activity. An American setback is a Soviet gain. Whether or not the Soviets helped engineer the fall of the Shah, whether or not the Soviets encouraged the Ayatollah's terror tactics, the Soviet Union has benefited from the demise of American influence in Iran. The invasion of Afghanistan reflects Soviet perception of U.S. decline. The creation of a P.L.O. state would provide the Soviets another major gain in the heart of the Middle East and would be a serious strategic setback for the United States.□

12

tential adversaries. He warned against the nation and a world turned into "a prison in which man awaits his executioner."

When the nuclear test ban treaty was signed in 1963, he voiced the hope—though he dared not yet voice the anticipation or expectation—that there would some day be controls on the numbers and the types of nuclear weapons. Now the SALT II treaty can redeem that hope. Its ratification will be a further fulfillment of the needs of all humanity.

President Kennedy knew that the future of freedom would be increasingly bound up with social, political, and economic justice in what has since become known as the Third World. His one bold expression of this vision was the Peace Corps which, with its combination of activism, idealism, and adventure, summed up so many of John Kennedy's virtues.

I'm proud that this kind of commitment has now been vigorously renewed and that America once again holds out her hand to the poor, the silenced, and oppressed of every country in the world.

Like every President who hopes to leave the world a better place because he served in it, President Kennedy chafed under the limits of his power to act. These limits on a President still exist. As he put it during his second year in office, "There are greater limitations upon our ability to bring about a favorable result than I had ever imagined." Yet, President Kennedy persisted. He became and he still remains a symbol of human aspiration. Perhaps that's why the outpouring of grief at his death had such a special quality.

On that November day, almost 16 years ago, a terrible moment was frozen in the lives of many of us here. I remember that

my warehouse to weigh a load of grain. I was told by a group of farmers that the President had been shot. I went outside, knelt on the steps, and began to pray. In a few minutes, I learned that he had not lived. It was a grievous personal loss—my President. I wept openly for the first time in more than 10 years—for the first time since the day my own father died.

People wept in Boston and in Paris, in Atlanta and in Warsaw, in San Francisco and in New Delhi. More than anyone had realized before that day, the spirit of this young American President had taken hold of the hearts and the imaginations of countless millions of people all over the world.

During the months that followed—in civil rights, in medical care for the aged, in greater dignity for the poor, in an increase of caring for one another—his vision was carried into the reality of our Nation's life with the help of a united Congress and a united people, united in grief, but also united in determination to fulfill the dreams which he had painted for us.

At the time, the tragedy in Dallas seemed an isolated convulsion of madness. But in retrospect, it appears near the beginning of a time of darkness. From Vietnam to Cambodia, from Los Angeles to Memphis, from Kent State to Watergate, the American spirit suffered under one shock after another, and the confidence of our people was deeply shaken.

The American people are good and strong. We've undertaken a solid commitment to heal those wounds, and at long last the darkness has begun to lift. I believe that America is now ready to meet the challenges of the 1980's with renewed confidence and with renewed spirit.

1980

which I use is the same as when John F. Kennedy sat behind it; but the problems that land on that desk are quite different.

President Kennedy was right: Change is the law of life. The world of 1980 is as different from what it was in 1960 as the world of 1960 was from that of 1940. Our means of improving the world must also be different.

After a decade of high inflation and growing oil imports, our economic cup no longer overflows. Because of inflation, fiscal restraint has become a matter of simple public duty. We can no longer rely on a rising economic tide to lift the boats of the poorest in our society. We must focus our attention and our care and our love and concern directly on them.

We have a keener appreciation of limits now—the limits of government, limits on the use of military power abroad, the limits of manipulating, without harm to ourselves, a delicate and a balanced natural environment.

We are struggling with a profound transition from a time of abundance to a time of growing scarcity in energy. We're only beginning to learn the new habits and to utilize the new technologies that will carry us to a future age of clean and renewable energy.

And we face these times when centrifugal forces in our society and in our political system as well—forces of regionalism, forces of ethnicity, of narrow economic interests, of single-issue politics—are testing the resiliency of American pluralism and of our ability to govern. But we can and we will prevail.

The problems are different: the solutions, none of them easy, are also differ-

nship dedicated to the common good—is more urgent than it ever was. The spirit that he evoked—the spirit of sacrifice, of participation, of unsorting dedication—is the same spirit that will bring us safely through the oddesties that we face today. The ongoing purpose of this Nation remains the same: to build a just society in a secure America living at peace with the other nations of the world.

The library that we dedicate today is a symbol of all that unchanging purpose. Through our study here of his words and his deeds, the service of President Kennedy will keep its high place in the hearts of many generations of America to come after us.

This library may be dedicated with the words of a poet from Tennessee, a contemporary of the President whose name the library will bear:

* To those who in all times have sought the truth and have told it in their art as in their living, who died in honor ...

* To those who died in the high and humble knowledge of God ...

* To those who died in sorrow, and in kindness, and in bravery: to those who died in violence suddenly ...

* To those who died in the time of the joy of their strength ...

This library is dedicated to John F. Kennedy, 35th President of the United States of America.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:25 a.m. outside the library.

Prior to the ceremonies, the President was given a private tour of the library.

¹ Excerpts from James Ager's dedication to his first book of poems, "Permit Me Voyage."

1981

October 1979

9

THE PRESIDENT:
News Conference
of July 25 (Excerpts)

Q. Are you planning to install any foreign exchange controls or capital controls in order to protect the decline of the dollar, and are you planning any further appointments from the corporate section?

A. I do not contemplate taking action of that kind. I think the dollar is sound. In the long run, the principles which will decide the value of the dollar are determined by how effective we are in dealing with the energy question, how effective we are in dealing with the inflation question, how much we act to resolve the adverse balance of payments, how we deal with the Federal budget deficit, and so forth. The basic underlying economic factors will be what causes the value of the dollar, not some contrived action that I might take to interfere with the normal operation of the international monetary scene.

I have just announced today that I'm appointing Paul Volcker [to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board], a highly qualified person, internationally respected as a knowledgeable man on monetary systems, on whom I can depend. There's no doubt that he will work harmoniously with me, with Bill Miller, who will be the new Secretary of the Treasury. And I believe that this new team will be very effective.

I would like to reserve the right to make future appointments from the corporate world or the academic world or the journalistic world or from among mayors and Governors or Members of the Congress. But I can't exclude the corporate sector. But I can't say now where I'll make future appointments from.

Q. I wonder, in looking at Nicaragua, if we are in danger of another Cuba there, and what the White House plans to do in terms of

taking some positive steps to assure their safety?

A. It's a mistake for Americans to assume or to claim that every time an evolutionary change takes place, or even an abrupt change takes place in this hemisphere, that somehow it's the result of secret, massive Cuban intervention. The fact in Nicaragua is that the incumbent government, the Somoza regime, lost the confidence of the Nicaraguan people. There was a broad range of forces assembled to replace Somoza and his regime as the head of the Nicaraguan Government.

We worked as closely as we could without intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua with the neighboring countries and with the so-called Andean group in the northern part of South America to bring about an orderly transition. Our effort was to let the people of Nicaragua ultimately make a decision on who should be their leader, what form of government they should have. We also wanted to minimize bloodshed and to restore stability. That is presently being done. We have a good relationship with the new government. We hope to improve it. We are providing some minimum humanitarian aid for the people of Nicaragua, who've suffered so much.

I think that our posture in Nicaragua is a proper one. I do not attribute at all the change in Nicaragua to Cuba. I think the people of Nicaragua have got enough judgment to make their own decisions, and we will use our efforts in a proper fashion without interventionism, to let the Nicaraguans let their voice be heard in shaping their own affairs.

Q. You said earlier that you think that the U.S. dollar is sound. The dollar seems to be taking a pounding

on the foreign exchange markets, and it's approaching the low levels that once before you had to launch a dramatic rescue program last November.

In addition to that, you've just named Paul Volcker, a conservative Republican, to head the Federal Reserve Board. How do the poundings that the dollar is undergoing on the exchange markets and your naming of Mr. Volcker square with your earlier description?

A. I see no incompatibility at all. Mr. Volcker, by the way, happens to be a Democrat. But he, I think, is a conservative in that he believes in controlling inflation and he believes in maintaining a sound dollar.

I can't guarantee what the exact value of the dollar might be in months ahead. We don't freeze the value of the dollar. That's determined by international monetary considerations. What I said was that the basic value of the dollar will be determined not by the identity of a President or even the identity of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve; it will be shaped by how effectively our nation moves to meet the energy challenge. There is some present doubt that the Congress will pass the proposals that I have put forward. I have no doubt that the dollar will increase in value when the Congress has passed the programs that I proposed. And, obviously, the dollar will be adversely affected if inflation should increase.

My prediction is that inflation will decrease in the months ahead. And I'm sure that the dollar would be adversely affected if I abandoned my commitment to a responsible Federal budget and start on wild spending programs when they are not needed.

So, basic decisions made of fiscal soundness in our government is a much more important factor in shaping the value of the dollar than is the identity of officials who might serve in a transient time.

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of July 30, 1979.

HOW BAD WAS IT?

The Shah vs. Khomeini

ROBERT C. DE CAMARA

On a global list of political prisoners per million of population, compiled by James D. Seymour for an article in the quarterly publication *Universal Human Rights*, Iran under the Shah ranked 22nd. Some countries with worse records were Cuba, Ethiopia, and East Germany; and, in the immediate region, Pakistan, Oman, and Syria. Other notorious offenders (e.g., Iraq and South Yemen in the Mideast) were lumped in a special unranked category for lack of hard data.

"Political prisoner" or "detainee" as used by such organizations as ICJ, Amnesty International (AI) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) means something different from the way that term is understood in this country. Here, it generally means what AI refers to as a "prisoner of conscience"; that is, someone incarcerated for his political views. The rights groups apply the description "political prisoner" to bomb-throwers and pamphleteers alike, although, in fairness, SAVAK was not always or even usually forthcoming as to the nature of the suspects' offenses.

In interviews the Shah was inclined to portray all political activists behind

bars as terrorists. Many were. It is clear that some were not, and AI cites "theologians, writers, theater directors, actors, and university teachers" arrested for non-violent political activities. In one year AI had "adopted" or was considering adopting 114 Iranians as prisoners of conscience. Heavy contributors to the prison population were Islamic and Marxist guerrilla groups (Mujahedin, Fedayan), and local autonomy movements (Kurdish, Baluchi, Azerbaijani).

It is also clear that prisoners were tortured. The testimony from many sources is overwhelming, including this account from an ex-prisoner published in *Index on Censorship*:

> It [the torture room] resembles an ancient Egyptian tomb and is reserved for those suspected of being terrorists or accused of having made attempts on the life of the Shah or a member of the royal family. Not every prisoner goes through the same process, but generally this is what happens to a prisoner of the first importance. First he is beaten by several torturers at once, with sticks and clubs. If he doesn't confess, he is hanged upside down and beaten; if this doesn't work, he is (homosexually) raped; if he still shows signs of resistance, he is given electric shock which turns him into a howling dog; if he is still obstinate, his nails and sometimes all his teeth are pulled out.

How many died? A hundred thousand, as Khomeini claims? Although the available statistics are fragmentary, the Ayatollah's figure again seems wildly inflated. AI apparently did not start thorough record-keeping until 1972. From that date, the Shah's government announced the executions of 62 persons for political crimes, according to AI, which thinks the true number was "considerably in excess of three hundred." However, the organization's official yearbooks show only two persons executed after mid-1977, one the murderer of a U.S. Embassy employee and the other a general convicted of espionage.

© Frans de Boer. Amsterdam

BEFORE THE SHOUTING starts up again, let's fix a cool, appraising, Bakeresque eye on the Shah: What did he do and when did he do it?

Specifically, the Shah has been accused of having had under lock and key either 350,000 or 100,000 foes of his regime (according to Khomeini and exile sources as far back as the mid-Seventies) and of having killed 100,000 enemies (Khomeini).

The issue has now been joined, and it is at least conceivable that the UN Commission now in Teheran will be less than a model of dispassionate analysis. The temptation will be to measure truth with a decibel meter. In this lull, what does the record show, insofar as anybody was counting? How many killed or murdered, how many imprisoned, how many tortured—if any?

One begins with SAVAK. Formed in 1957, SAVAK, the National Intelligence and Security Organization, was handed far-ranging powers to go with a loosely drawn penal code. SAVAK investigated opponents of the Shah, arrested them, could and did detain them indefinitely without filing charges, and encouraged them to confess.

In the next stage of the legal process, SAVAK switched hats and, in the role of hearing examiner, remanded prisoners to trial after weighing its own evidence. Persons accused of political crimes were sent before military tribunals which, after 1972, tried cases in secret. Guilt or innocence was determined by the evidence in the SAVAK dossiers alone, without witnesses and, of course, without defense lawyers.

It would be surprising in such a system if there were not abuses. But on what scale?

On the basis of the best available figures, it looks as if the Shah's arithmetic is better than Khomeini's. In 1976, for example, the Shah told *Le Monde* that there were "perhaps three thousand" political prisoners in his jails. For the same year, Charles W. Naas, a U.S. State Department official, set the figure at 3,700 during one head count. William J. Butler of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) says today he doubts the number ever rose above 3,500 or so.

Mr. de Camara is the winner of four first-place awards from the Maryland-Delaware Press Association.

352 NATIONAL REVIEW

Another unknown number died under torture, were shot and killed while "resisting arrest," or were taken out of jail by SAVAK and illicitly executed. And some people simply disappeared. "There is no guess as to how many these would be," says an AI official.

The Shah himself, in the David Frost interview, put the total number of political deaths at "certainly below one thousand," and Frost said his researchers estimated one thousand to 1,500 from 1963 to mid-1977. Another three thousand people, it is thought, died in a 1963 uprising, and five thousand during the revolution that ousted the Shah. Altogether, the deaths from 1963 to the Shah's exile in January 1979 come to perhaps ten thousand, an estimate endorsed by Butler of the ICJ.

A State Department authority says, "If people want a number, that's fair enough. There's really no way of knowing for sure . . . The thing to remember is that the Shah was a Persian king; no better, no worse than other Persian kings. That's the context to look at." Butler observes, "I think [the Shah is] way down the list of tyrants. He would not even make the A list."

For a grisly comparison, it might be noted that, in the last decade, Idi Amin is blamed for 300,000 deaths in Uganda, Pol Pot and Heng Samrin for two to three million in Cambodia, and Macias Nguema for fifty thousand in Equatorial Guinea, a country with a population of 320,000 (or less than one-hundredth that of Iran, where a proportionate number of deaths would be well over five million). In next-door Afghanistan, the Communist regime executed six thousand political enemies in the space of a year—thousands more than the Shah, it seems, during his entire reign.

In 1976, which in retrospect was a watershed year, the Shah was converted, as it were, by a born-again American President-elect. Even before Jimmy Carter took office, the Shah instituted reforms aimed at mollifying the rights-conscious leader-to-be of the Western bloc. In early 1977 he extended invitations to the heads of AI, ICRC, and ICJ to visit Teheran. In personal audiences, he informed AI's Martin Ennals and ICJ's Butler that he had ordered torture stopped, and he challenged Butler to produce a single instance since the previous September. He opened the prisons to the Red Cross.

Butler says the Shah promised "substantial changes" in the military-procedures code for trying those accused of political crimes. Shortly after, bills to this purpose were submitted to the Iranian legislature and were passed in August 1977. In October 1977 the House Subcommittee on International Organizations called a hearing on human rights in Iran. Attending were Butler; Charles Naas, State's director of Iranian affairs; and two professors.

Professor Richard W. Cottam of the University of Pittsburgh, an Iran specialist, told the subcommittee that the Shah "had responded in ways that are not simply cosmetic." "Iran is a country in which the Carter human rights proposals have had a major impact," Cottam declared: "the Shah is willing to accommodate President Carter's human-rights eccentricity." Butler told the sub-committee the ICJ was unaware of any cases of torture in Iran in the preceding ten or 11 months.

NAS testified that the U.S. Government had received no reports of torture in Iran in 1977. He pointedly told about a writer for Belgium's *Le Soir* who was granted interviews with prisoners remored by exiles to have been crippled or killed by torture. The journalist had found the prisoners in good health. Furthermore, Naas said, the number of prisoners had dwindled to 2,200 at the time of the hearing. (The Red Cross, whose figures are probably the most authoritative of any because of their exclusive on-scene inspections, puts the prisoner tally at 3,500 for 1977, down to 2,100 for 1978.)

In the event, some of the penal-code changes failed to materialize. Trials remained closed. However, defendants did get the right to a civilian lawyer of their choice and more time to prepare a case. Except for occasional freelancing by SAVAK or the gendarmerie, torture apparently ceased.

The consensus of the watchdog organizations is that, beginning in 1976, Iran's performance in human rights improved markedly.

A notable dissenter to this view on occasion has been Amnesty International. Following a mission to Iran in late 1978, during which about sixty ex-prisoners and their families and friends were interviewed, the organization accused

the Shah of "gross hypocrisy" and said that torture "has been practiced systematically throughout the country and has not stopped." It bolstered the charge with recent cases—but only three.

Two months later, presumably with fresh evidence on hand from that mission, AI issued a fuller report on torture—but, curiously, only for the years 1971 to 1976. A preface to the report did acknowledge that torture "appeared to have decreased since early in 1977."

In December 1979, AI renewed the hypocrisy-and-systematic-torture charge without mention of any lessening. However, New York lawyer David Emil, who led that last AI mission to Iran, has this to say: "It's undoubtedly true there was a big change between '76 and the fall of the Shah. It could be characterized as an end of systematic torture. A lot of the more medieval aspects ended. Very cruel tortures were no longer practiced." Prisoners were still subjected to what Emil termed "psychological torture"—cold and wet cells, random kicks and blows, verbal abuse, deprivation of sleep.

Most compelling is the Red Cross's confidential report to the Shah on its inspections of Iranian prisons in 1977 and 1978. After portions favorable to the Khomeini regime were leaked earlier this year, the Red Cross released the full text of the document.

Two visits to Iran by the Red Cross in the spring of 1977 had uncovered complaints of torture and marks on inmates at 16 of 18 prisons, according to a *New York Times* dispatch from Geneva. Returning in the fall, Red Cross doctors found no new marks, and "virtually all" of the prisoners denied that they were being ill-treated. Trips the next spring and summer disclosed further improvements in prison conditions.

The Red Cross had access to all prisoners for physical checkups and private interviews.

"Things improved in '77 and '78," says Dr. Raymond Gastil, an Iran expert at Freedom House. "He let quite a few people out of jail, and they told their horror stories to the press, which was able to print them since censorship had eased. So it might have looked as though things hadn't improved, but they really had. I'm sure that any torture that went on [after 1976] was ad hoc."

*(Continues on page 369)*

MARCH 21, 1980 353

## DE CAMARA

(Continued from page 353)

Butler of the ICJ concurs: "I think everybody realizes that things got a lot better, but nobody seems to want to talk about it. I guess it's not fashionable."

THEY'RE REBELLING against the government, hundreds have been executed by firing squads, and political prisoners languish in jail. In the provinces, a wave of psychological terror has been unleashed. Iran in the days of the Shah? No, Iran today.

From newspaper accounts, human-rights groups, and well-placed Washington sources who stipulate anonymity, here is a thumbnail sketch of the Ayatollah's land, with respect to killings, imprisonment, and torture:

As of late January, "close to eight hundred known executions" had taken place under Khomeini, far exceeding the number in any like period of the Shah's rule. The victims include mainly dissident tribesmen, former generals of the Shah's army, and SAVAK agents,

but also pimps, prostitutes, and rapists.

Reports received in Washington on the number of political prisoners range from ten thousand down to 1,500. The best guess is "several thousand." In one amnesty, Khomeini let go three thousand—more than the total number the Shah had behind bars in his final year.

Hundreds of revolutionary militiamen and tribesmen—perhaps as many as two thousand or more—have died in battles as the central government attempts to crush separatist movements in Iran's provinces. One Washington source says the Khomeini regime has instituted a "campaign of psychological terror" in outlying regions aimed at keeping the ethnic groups in line.

"Beatings by the revolutionary committees are very, very commonplace," says this source. Other elements of repression and terror include death-threat letters to influential newspaper editors, summary arrests of foes, and the seizure of suspects' families to flush out fugitives. There have been few allegations of SAVAK-type tortures, and even these few are being discounted. ☐

J. Howard Pew Fine Arts Center
Site of 1980 Institute

### HANS F. SENNHOLZ

Internationally-known free market economist, author and lecturer
Professor, Grove City College

### RUSSELL KIRK

Editor, *The University Bookman*
Director, Social-Science Program,
Educ. Research Council of America

### ROBERT M. BLEIBERG

Editor, *Barron's National Business & Financial Weekly*

### ARTHUR A. SHENFIELD

Economist, Barrister-at-law,
International lecturer

### JOHN A. SPARKS

Lawyer, economist,
Professor, Grove City College

### R. HEATH LARRY

Immediate Past President,
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## Fourth Annual

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369

ESSAY

# The Huyser Mission

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16.—A generation ago, as most students of Iranian history know, the American who helped place the Shah on his throne was C.I.A. operative Kermit Roosevelt.

In 1979, as most students do not know, the American who may have carried out Presidential orders to discourage a military coup aimed at blocking the power-grab of Ayatollah Khomeini was U.S. Air Force Gen. Robert E. (Dutch) Huyser.

The Huyser mission, conceived at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, is suspected of having been designed to prevent the Iranian armed forces from stopping the Khomeini accession to power. If that was the mission, then the Carter Administration has itself partly to blame for setting in train the mob rule, taking of hostages, and subsequent show of weakness that invited a Soviet power play.

The story of the secret Huyser mission deserves investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee because it involves the use of the Joint Chiefs and an excellent military officer in what may have been a shabby political-diplomatic role. Here is more than what is generally known:

Pentagon records show that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. David Jones, placed a call to Gen. Alexander Haig, Supreme Commander of our NATO forces in Europe in December 1978, to inform him that President Carter wished to send Haig's deputy, General Huyser, to Teheran for meetings with the Iranian military leaders, Huyser was the American general who had most often dealt with the Iranian generals.

General Jones was asked if the purpose of the proposed Huyser mission was to urge the generals to re-establish law and order or to tell the Shah to leave the country. America's highest-ranking military officer stated that the mission was merely to be certain that the Iranian military "remains unified during this difficult period."

(At that time, millions were marching, shouting "Death to the Shah!")

General Haig's response, I am informed, was "I non-concur." (That has the ring of truth; it's the way Al Haig talks.) The reason for the non-concurrence given to Jones was that it was wrong to use a professional military man to execute a political mission; if dirty work was in the offing, a political emissary was more appropriate. Jones noted Haig's other objection: that an attempt by the United States to force out the Shah would lead to disaster in Iran.

Enter Charles Duncan, the former Coca-Cola executive who was then serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense and is now Energy Secretary. The Joint Chiefs discussed the Haig reservations with Duncan, who — in Defense Secretary Harold Brown's absence in California — took the matter to the President and National Security Adviser Brzezinski.

Secretary Duncan, who returns calls, insists that "the purpose of the Huyser mission was to cause the military in Iran to have confidence in U.S. support, to avoid disintegration of the military." He acknowledges that "the military did ultimately decide not to resist Ayatollah Khomeini" but brands as inaccurate a report by Richard Sale in The Washington Post that General Huyser was sent to

abort a coup by the Iranian generals.

Despite that denial, the possibility persists that Huyser — a good, efficient and patriotic soldier — was sent to make happen what did happen. Around Christmas of 1978, President Carter told Duncan to overrule Haig and to cut the orders for the Huyser mission to Teheran. Secretary Duncan recalls so informing Haig, on a bad but secure connection to Brussels. Haig soon decided to resign his post.

At about that time — one year ago — our intelligence agents in Teheran were reporting that a military coup was imminent. General Huyser arrived in Teheran with the New Year. He met with the generals who wanted to take power from the benumbed Shah and deny power to the mullahs. After he spoke with them, the Iranian generals decided "not to resist." Cause and effect? We don't know.

Soft-liners will say that the Huyser mission prevented a bloodbath, with the Iranian Army battling the mobs; hard-liners will say that the U.S. would have been far better off not meddling in the planned resistance to a violently anti-American regime.

The trouble is that we do not know the truth about the Huyser mission. General Haig has remained silent, except for a brief remark hinting at Carter Administration undercutting of the Iranian military; General Huyser is evidently under orders to keep mum. The Shah has an ax to grind. The Administration line is fishy: Was our only interest really in keeping the Iranian military unified and confident, at a moment when their inaction would probably lead to their deaths? (The generals were later executed; more are reportedly being executed now.)

If a good soldier was misused, or is being maligned, that should be set straight. If his mission's purpose was as advertised — reassurance, or even to keep our option open for a military coup — brief and secret hearings will suffice. Senators Stennis and Tower ought to get to the bottom of this.

NYT
Jan. 17, 1980

## Shaggy Scene

### Whittemore

### Wellaneous Activities for the Early '80s

#### Biz for a Smart Computer

navigates in motion
the Indian Ocean?

#### Real Exercise for Gov. Hughes of Maryland

fatiate on the value to the State
the employes of the State
lawyers, judges and those at colleges who
(strate)
lished and irate.

### Assignment

er of the Fed should read
story of usury and greed.

### Tip for P.G. County Tax Assessor

y through the houses you're assessed
essed, blindly, from your sedentary desk,
s each one again, this time with eyes.
ve you healthy (and not as wealthy) and
edently wise.

### Notion

The White House has had the poets to tea,
undertake to invite yet another inspired multitude,
strategists,
berless smarties who know what to do with Khomeini,
ny difficult dude.
posals would fill the East Room like the fierce drums of
ecret Service could seize them and make them
s.

mmunist, have al-
ly long view." It is
ng view in response
be reestablished in
king.

reed with Acheson
ulles or not, one of
hat they made for-
ject of a great de-
mew what it was
But with the excep-
ively marginal issue
nam — for such, in
it was — there has
debate on foreign
ica since the early

ne that it will be a
hat the opportunity
b be distracted and
nly by the election,
ally are side issues,
hospitality to the
ultimate fate of the
are not much in the

60 years, to where
the British threw
hanistan in 1919,

over what is now Iran, and in effect
seized the right to mandates over
what are now Israel and Jordan and
Iraq, and so established themselves
from the Mediterranean to India,
which they happened also to have
under their belt: in fact, over the
whole area that is now in turmoil.

It was a last absurd fling of terri-
torial empire. Britain very quickly
withdrew from Afghanistan and, lo
and behold, American and French
protests forced it to withdraw from
Iran. But at least the British had
some idea of the unity of the vast
area, with Russia lying along the
whole stretch of its northern border.

For behind it all lies one vast
question that has yet to be an-
swered. America is a nation which in
effect is bounded by two oceans.
Russia is a huge land power that
stretches across two vital continents.
Britain may also have been a sea
power, but in the days of empire it
could make itself a land power as
well. The question which America
has to settle is: What can its planes
and ships do with no empire on
land?

That ought be the measure of

B6

SUNDAY, JANUARY 13, 1980

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

## The Kremlin Used-Car Lot

LIKE CLOCKWORK, the Soviet public relations apparat is quietly pushing the approved explanation of why the Kremlin invaded Afghanistan. It happens after every Kremlin-created crisis just as the rest of the world, especially the part of it open to political debate, is recovering from the initial shock and trying to figure out where to go next. Needless to say, Moscow does not speculate, as Americans do, whether the invasion was meant to add a province to the empire, or to redeem a failing political investment, or to muffle Moslem restiveness that might seep back through the border, or to move toward a warm-water port or Persian Gulf oil, or to flex Soviet muscle and test the West, or what have you. Most Westerners are still trying a little this and that at this familiar smorgasbord of possible Soviet motivations. Moscow offers an explanation of its own.

The first and simple part of it is, of course, that whatever happened is the United States' fault. In this instance, Jimmy Carter's zigzagging is cited, the delay on SALT, the non-delivery on trade, the defense increases, the missile program in Europe and the military programs in the Middle East, the joining with China to "encircle" the Soviet Union, and so on. Such developments combined, it is said, not merely to dull Moscow's taste for détente but also to give it an urgent need to protect a troubled flank.

There is enough surface plausibility in this explanation at least to muddy the waters-until you stop to consider that the step under question here is not just another routine hardball move in the standard geopolitical game, but a most unroutine, indeed, unprecedented, move: an unprovoked invasion of a friendly sovereign state. We suspect the encirclement theory represents mostly a neurosis the Soviets find it convenient to peddle abroad. Regardless, it does not justify Moscow's act.

Then comes the tricky part of the Soviet explanation. The Politburo's doves, including Leonid Brezhnev, the political patron of détente, and Alexei Kosygin, the economic patron, resisted the invasion, it is being put about, but the aforementioned American

failings had removed their high cards, and they have been sick. The chief hawk, party ideologist Mikhail Suslov, finally got the whip hand, or so the Soviet whispers were going before Mr. Brezhnev's blast at Mr. Carter yesterday.

Well, maybe so. We weren't under the table in the Kremlin and it is at least feasible that so bold a step as the Afghan operation would have been a close call. Except we aren't convinced. The explanation being retailed now leans in an all too familiar way on what you might call the used-car lot model of Soviet politics. There are always two salesmen: the bad guy who will never give you a fair deal on your trade-in-for 30 years it's been Mikhail Suslov-and the good guy to whom you supposedly turn in relief and gratitude to close the deal. The Kremlin's signal now is that the bad guys invaded Afghanistan but the good guys remain available if the United States still wants détente.

The used-car lot theory sounds so reasonable and appealing. Yet it overlooks that Leonid Brezhnev is not only the patron of détente but the author of the "Brezhnev doctrine," in whose name Moscow intervened to preserve the tender shoots of socialism in Afghanistan-this much was evident even before Mr. Brezhnev spoke yesterday. And it does not explain how the United States can deal with the good guys without giving the bad guys exactly what they want. And, again, there is no real proof that the theory is true.

The United States can't know just why Moscow invaded. That being so, it would be silly to make American policy hostage to any one guess, least of all to an extreme guess: either that the invasion betrays an intent to start right now a relentless armed march toward world domination, in which case we should start preparing for World War III, or that it is a limited, unique and possibly accidental episode, in which case we should grimace and bear it. It is something, or more than one thing, in between: it is real, it is serious, it must be dealt with in a careful and calculated way, without illusion and without hysteria. Certainly, in figuring out how to respond, we cannot make policy as though we were buying a used car.

## Unevenhanded Justice

EMBEZZLING MONEY from a national bank is a federal crime, but whether the embezzler gets prosecuted for it or not depends upon how much money was taken and where the bank is located. In some parts of the country, the federal government will prosecute the case only if $5,000 or more was involved. In other places, $500 is enough.

seriousness of the crime, the size of their staffs, the ability of state officials to handle the cases, and the age and history of suspects are all relevant considerations in the judgment of how that discretion is to be exercised. But a federal crime, big or small, is still a federal crime. The Department of Justice (or Congress, if need be: the U.S. attorneys general should consider

"WE'VE GOT TO GET SOME BRAKES FOR THIS WAGON"

©1980 HERBLOCK

## For The Record

From a statement by M. Carl Holman, president of the National Urban Coalition:

Blacks and Hispanics must not be counted out in the 1980 census... The outcome of the census, whether accurate or not, will determine where and how billions of federal dollars will be spent.

It also will have a direct bearing on how much political muscle is gained or lost. I don't know how many students in our nation's classrooms are being told about the "undercount" of blacks and other minorities that has occurred in the past. I do know, however, that many programs are tied to population figures, and such an "undercount" can deprive these students, as well as their cities, town and counties, of the benefits to which they are entitled....

In a recent meeting with the director of the National Census, I stressed the importance of involving black and Hispanic media and grass-roots leadership in every community to the greatest extent possible. In addition, I emphasized the need to bridge the information gap and overcome some of the ingrained reluctance or antipathy of people whose experiences have simply not conditioned them to cooperate freely with people "from the government" who come around asking questions....

As we push for sharply increased voter registration among blacks and other minorities or try to determine which presidential candidate will best serve our interests, we must remember what will be happening in 1981.

In 1981, state legislators will be gathering to redraw congressional and state legislative districts. Though a number of factors will be at work during this process, the basic determinant will be the 1980 census figures. If redistricting decreases or erases black or Hispanic power, it will be too late.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

### Boycott the Olympics in Moscow?

Our participation in "friendly" competition at the 1980 Moscow Olympics would, in the face of recent Soviet action, be an intolerable endorsement of business as usual. It seems most officials on the U.S. Olympic Committee think athletics and politics shouldn't be mixed. Who are they kidding? No one uses these athletic events for political propaganda more than the Soviets. This is one means of letting them know all isn't well in a way that can't be concealed from the Russian people.

HEATHER CALLOW

Falls Church

Since President Carter has only suggested the possibility of boycotting the 1980 Olympic games at Moscow, why shouldn't the American people decide for themselves the ultimate course the country might follow? What I have in mind is a national referendum that would ask the voters to declare the position the president should take relative to the games. The sheer frustration that each of us feels-a frustration growing daily as a result of apparent

While agreeing wholeheartedly with the recent editorial and the columns in The Post by George Will, Robert Kaiser, Richard Cohen and Shirley Povich against holding the Olympics in Moscow, may I make a suggestion that would serve to strike a further blow to Soviet prestige and legitimacy while solving the problem for the Western athletes?

Why not have a "Freedom Olympics" held in a free, democratic country, where athletes from the West could compete with one another. If the media would focus on that event, the Soviet's planned propaganda show would then be consigned to oblivion.
IRENE MANEKOFSKY

McLean

In 1936, our Olympic athletes were present in Berlin as "Heil Hitler" was shouted and Germany began its attempt to conquer the world. We gave credibility to an appalling situation by participating in the Olympics that year. Will history repeat itself in 1980 in Moscow? If we allow America to be

"The games aren't as important as self-perpetuating Olympic officials think," stated Shirley Povich. Has Mr. Povich forgotten about the many years of training American men and women have invested in preparation for the games?

Do not deny these young people this opportunity because of politics; they've worked too hard.

THOMAS R. MATTHEWS

Vienna

The Post blew it! It buried Shirley Povich's column "Boycott of Games Obligatory for U.S." in the Jan. 6 sports section. His comments had every right to be on the op-ed page as a coherent expansion of the lead editorial.
H. M. SCHOELKOPF

Falls Church

Saudi Arabia chose to pull its team out of the summer Olympic games in Moscow. I have heard rumblings about the United States possibly doing the same, due to Russia's hostile activities in Afghanistan. Nothing could be more

55

DEC. 11
A STORY from the Kennedy years which has the rare quality of being true is that once, when the President was otherwise engaged, Dave Powers, his original guide to the poor Irish of Boston and later a combined companion and jester at the White House, was delegated to kill a few minutes with the Shah of Iran. Subsequently, he was asked how he liked His Imperial Majesty. "Well," Powers said, "he's our kind of Shah."

I was reminded of that story when I saw the Shah a few weeks ago here in Teheran. At that point, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi wasn't anybody's kind of Shah. He received me, as he had on several of my previous visits, in a ballroom on the second floor of the Niarvan Palace, on the northern outskirts of Teheran. He looked pale, spoke in subdued tones, and seemed dwarfed by the vast expanse of the room, with its huge, ornate chandeliers and heavy Empire furniture. He wore a double-breasted suit whose blackness suggested mourning. He started with an apology. He was sorry to have kept me waiting. The American and British Ambassadors had been in to see him. "They tried to cheer me up," he said. "As if there were anything to be cheerful about."

I expressed surprise at—and, indeed, felt some suspicion about—this show of gloom. There had been demonstrations in many parts of the country, and strikes, but Teheran, apart from the university, seemed calm, and the Army was in thorough control. Moreover, the opposition was headed by the Moslem clergy, and they were clearly divided. Surely, I said, the factions could be played off against each other.

"Possibly," the Shah said, shrugging his shoulders in an elaborate show of disbelief.

I pointed out that the leader of the lay opposition, Karim Sanjabi, was due to go to Paris to see the most intransigent of the religious leaders, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The gossip in Teheran was that a compromise deal was in the works. Sanjabi would win Khomeini's blessing for a coalition government. The coalition would make reforms but maintain the monarchy.

The Shah expressed doubt that Khomeini would agree to that. "Certainly not with Sanjabi," he said.

I further noted that, while there was obvious unrest in the country, the Shah himself had lifted the lid by easing up on security and initiating reforms. May-

be all that was required was a slower pace and more publicity for the changes he had made. I mentioned that one of the problems was corruption in the royal family. He had decreed a new code of conduct for royal behavior, but it had not been published. Could I get a copy? The Shah agreed—with a weary air.

If worst came to worst, I went on, there was always the Army. The military was strong, and its leaders were loyal. The Shah said that force had its limitations. "You can't crack down on one block and make the people on the next block behave," he said.

I asked him if the Army leaders realized that. "I hope so," he said. He went on to mention his son and heir, Crown Prince Reza, who, at eighteen, is now an air cadet in Lubbock, Texas. The Shah said that he might not be able to pass all his powers on to his son, but he could at least pass on the throne.

I remarked that I had never seen him so sombre, and asked when the black mood had begun.

"Sometime in summer," he said.

"Any special reason?"

"Events," he said.

I intimated that maybe he was overdoing the blues to elicit sympathy and perhaps support from the United States. "What could America do?" he asked.

I said that that depended upon what happened, and asked him what he thought that might be. "I don't know," he said.

I asked him what his advisers thought was going to happen. "Many things," he said, with a bitter laugh,

and he rose, indicating that that was all he had to say.

THE day after seeing the Shah, I drove, with an Iranian friend who had agreed to serve as an interpreter, to Qum, a religious center with a population of roughly two hundred and fifty thousand, about seventy-five miles south of Teheran. Qum is the country's foremost training center for the priests—or mullahs, as they are known in common parlance—of Shiite Islam, the creed of ninety per cent of Iran's thirty-six million people. Shiism was made the state religion at the beginning of the sixteenth century by a new dynasty, the Safavids, who needed to dig in against the Ottoman Turks. The Shiites form the minority—and largely Persian—branch of the Moslem religion. As distinct from the majority branch—the Sunnites (who for centuries vested the line of authority from Mohammed in a caliphate that followed the tides of history from Da-m nucleus to Baghdad and thence, with the Turks, to Constantinople)—the Shiites traced the line of descent through the Prophet's son-in-law, Ali. Ali, according to Shiite law, was the first of twelve Imams, or holy leaders. The twelfth Imam withdrew from this world and is due to return some time as a Mahdi, or Messiah. Ali was buried in An Najaf, and his son, Hossein, in Karbala, and those cities, now in Iraq, are, after Mohammed's tomb in Mecca, the principal shrines of Shiite Islam. The eighth Imam, Reza, died in Meshed, which is a town some five hundred miles east of Teheran, and is the most holy shrine in Iran. Reza's sister, Fatima, died in Qum, so the city includes Iran's second holiest shrine as well as many madressahs, or seminaries.

The most renowned students of Islamic law in Qum, Meshed, and other major cities are referred to by the title Ayatollah, which means, literally, "Sign of God." For roughly the past fifty years, the Ayatollahs of Qum have been the dominant religious leaders in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini, though born in eastern Iran, was educated in An Najaf, and then in Qum, and subsequently taught in Qum. He achieved national stature between 1961 and 1963 as the leader of the opposition to various features—including co-education and, many say, land reform—of what the Shah called his "white revolution." In 1963, Khomeini was expelled, and moved to the shrine of An Najaf. The radical regime in Iraq, which in 1975, after years of bickering, reached an accommodation

TIRF CASSIS

with the Shah, forced Khomeini out last September, when troubles became intense in Iran, and he moved to Paris. He had been succeeded as the dominant figure in Qum by Ayatollah Shariatmadari. For most of the past dozen years, the madressah students have made Qum a center of opposition to the regime. Professor Michael Fischer, of Harvard, who spent much of 1975 in that city, described the atmosphere at the time, in a monograph he called "The Qum Report," as "one of siege and courageous passive hostility to a state perceived to be the stronger, but morally corrupt, opponent." The present wave of troubles was set in motion early this year by violent demonstrations against the Shah in Qum.

I had telephoned ahead for an appointment with Shariatmadari, and had been connected with a Pakistani aide of his named Seyyed Rivzi, who spoke English. Rivzi told me to be in Qum by eight in the morning, because His Holiness, as he called Shariatmadari, went to the mosque at nine and spent the rest of the day in prayer and meditation. My translator friend and I arrived before eight and, with the help of directions from the local police, found our way to Shariatmadari's quarters. He lives in a narrow back street, paved with white brick and lined with yellowish walls. There are doors in the walls every ten yards or so, and, behind the doors, courtyards leading to buildings that are used as offices and houses. We were first shown into an office, where we were received by Rivzi, a fat, middle-aged man wearing spectacles and a black turban; he kept pushing the turban back from his forehead in order to scratch his scalp. Rivzi said that I was in luck, for His Holiness was feeling ill that day. Because he was not well enough to pray, there would be ample time for the interview. Rivzi asked me to disclose my questions in advance. He would write them down in Farsi and then read them off to His Holiness—that way, there would be no mistakes. I began read-

ing from a list of questions I had prepared. He repeated them in English, then set them down in Farsi, and read them back to my Iranian friend for his approval of the translation. A couple of times, the English version of my question differed significantly from the original, and at length I pointed out one of the discrepancies. Rivzi said, "I was not trained as a reporter, but in the past few months I've been the interpreter for sixty-eight different interviews. I've become quite good at framing questions. I hope you don't mind a little editing."

After the questions had been given, edited, and translated, we moved across the street to see Shariatmadari. He is a man of seventy-six, with a white beard, a frail frame, and a thinnish voice. He, too, wore a black turban and glasses—in his case, thick glasses over weak but distinctly friendly eyes. He received us in a bare, whitewashed room lit by a single electric bulb, which dangled from the ceiling. There were some uninteresting rugs on the floor, and a curtain hung across the window on a string. Shariatmadari was lying down on an opened crimson bedroll, with his head and shoulders raised on a purple pillow. Rivzi and another aide, whose function I never discovered, sat, legs crossed, facing His Holiness. I sat

parallel to him, also cross-legged, but with my back against a wall. In the course of our talk, which lasted several hours, various people came in to see Shariatmadari, kissing his hand, pressing petitions on him, often with money between the pages, and then hurrying away. A telephone by the bedroll rang frequently, but it was answered only rarely, by the non-Pakistani aide, who usually managed to pick it up after the caller had stopped trying to get through.

Shariatmadari began by asking about my trip down to Qum. I said that it had been easy but that we had noticed a lot of troops in the town and, on the wall of his house, a scrawled sign saying "Death to the Butcher Shah."

His Holiness said, "I don't know what is happening in Iran. I never saw a nation in such a spirit of revolt. It is erupting like a volcano, and, like a volcano, after building up pressure for years and years it is impossible to stop."

My first question had to do with the revival of religion in Iran as a political force. Shariatmadari said, "Religion used to be considered marginal—apart from the mainstream of events. Now it has become much stronger than before. The reason is that religion provides answers to problems of conscience. It provides a vantage point for fighting in-

"Everybody's having spritzers."

57

justice. In our Shiite religion, spiritual leaders are ready at all times to assert the truth and the right."

I asked him what injustices he had in mind. He said, "We have never had free elections. The elections in the past were all dominated by local magnates or the consulates of foreign powers. The consequence has been that we now have laws repugnant to Islam and to the public interest. For example, alcoholic beverages are permitted. There is gambling. There is illegitimate sex—by that I mean sexual relations between people under twenty who are not married. The authority to marry is in the hands of civil officials. But it should not be. Marriage is not a deal or a contract. It is something spiritual, and so it should be performed by the religious authorities."

At that point, there were sounds of firing in the distance, and I started. "Don't be afraid," he said. "We're used to that kind of noise."

I asked him to tell me about the troubles in Qum. He said, "From the beginning of the disturbances in Qum, we have asked people to speak their minds, but with calm and dignity, not in a provocative way. But I remember a few months ago a company of soldiers headed by a major general walked into these premises and announced they were on a mission from the government. They started breaking windows and shooting. One person was killed on the spot and another died in the hospital. Later, the government apoloyized. But I ask, 'How can you apoloyize for killing people?' Had it been the Prime Minister's house, would it have been enough merely to apologize? Such an action alone is adequate for me to declare a holy war or a revolution. That might have happened if I were not devoted to the cause of moderation."

I asked him how he would rectify the many injustices and wrongs he had cited. He said that he favored a return to the constitution of 1906—a document that a liberal movement with support from the clergy had wrung from the Qajar dynasty, which preceded the family of the present Shah. The 1906 constitution provided for, among other things, a supreme council of five religious leaders who would have a veto right over all laws. "If they found the laws repugnant to Islam or to principles of justice or against the interests of the majority," Shariatmadari said, "they could reject them."

I asked what would happen if the

five religious leaders disagreed among themselves. He said, "That would not be possible, for they represent the highest spiritual authority."

I persisted with the question about a possible disagreement. "In that case," he said, "the issue would be referred to the highest spiritual authority in the land."

I assumed he meant himself, and any doubts on that score were settled by Rivzi. He said, "His Holiness would have the final word."

I remarked that many people in Iran, and in other parts of the world, had different views from His Holiness on such matters as religious liberty, land reform, and the role of women. He cut in before I could develop this theme. "The journalistic community in the world," he said, pointing a bony finger at me, "has constantly made the libellous charge that we religious leaders are anti-progressive and reactionary and anachronistic. That is not the case. We want science, technology, educated men and women—physicists, surgeons, engineers. But we also want clean and honest political leaders. Those who make the charges against us are themselves reactionary, because their goal is to stop us from instituting a government of hope. The government of God is the government of the people by the people."

I said that I would still like to know where he stood on the issue of equal rights for women—coeducation, for example.

Very smoothly, as if there were no break in the line of thought at all, he asked me how many Presidents there had been in American history. I said that it wasn't altogether clear whether the figure was thirty-eight or thirty-nine.

He said, "You come all the way over to Iran to ask about the rights of women here, and you don't even know how many Presidents you have had in your own country."

I explained that the matter was complicated by the fact that Grover Cleveland had been President twice but not consecutively. I said that for the sake of argument we could assume there had been thirty-nine Presidents.

"How many of them have been women?" he asked.

I said that none had but that that seemed to me beside the point. What, for example, did he think about coeducation?

He said, "I'm not opposed to the education of women for all kinds of

tasks. But I do not want coeducation. I want to separate the schools of learning from the schools of flirting. We in Islam don't look on women as playthings, accepted as long as they are young and beautiful, and then cast away. In Islam, the older the woman, the higher her status. We know that in coeducational schools there is a corruption of moral values, which is reflected in the police records. The girls develop certain relations, and some have illegitimate children, and others have abortions. The girl loses her self-respect and her status in society. Either she suffers a great personal loss or she takes up another way of life—prostitution."

I asked him his opinion of abortion. He said, "In Islam, abortion is considered murder. Therefore, abortion is not permitted."

I asked him his views on birth control. He said, "Birth control depends on certain circumstances. In small, overpopulated countries that have no land, birth control is acceptable. But in our country, where the population occupies only one-fifth of the land, there is no need for birth control. Procreation should be free unless there is a particular problem. In our country, that problem doesn't exist."

I asked him whether there was equality in Islam for people of other religions. He said, "In Islam, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians are all accepted as equal—unless they become a Fifth Column for foreign meddling in this country. Jews are accepted as Jews but not as defenders of Zionist aggression." He then referred to the Baha'i sect, which began as a reform offshoot of Shiite Islam, and has been popular in Iran, particularly among educated people who have done well in business and politics. He said, "Baha'i is accepted as Baha'i per se but not as a clique dividing up government posts among themselves and working for the foreign interests."

I asked him where he stood on the land reform that the Shah had decreed in 1963. He said, "Land reform is a question of the past. Even if there were some objections made at the time, there were no objections to the principle of land reform but only to the means of implementation. The Shah could have done the same thing in accordance with the principles of Islam. That is typical of his regime. In order to build roads and streets, he destroys the house of an old woman and does not give her another house."

At that point, Shariatmadari re-

58

proached me for picking out one issue at a time instead of dealing with the culture as a whole. "Culture is a mixture of many interwoven things," he said. "You cannot in fairness just pick on individual matters as if they were unrelated. For example, in the West you cannot conceive of a banking system that does not charge interest on loans. But in Islam, for many different reasons, our view is that interest should not be charged."

I said that that was true; no one in the West could understand how a government, without the power to raise interest rates could control inflation. I went on to say that his point seemed valid, and so I would shift subjects. I asked him where he stood on the issue of meetings with representatives of the Shah.

He had had some "unofficial meetings," he said, and went on, "But we can't have official meetings. The religious authorities will participate in all offers of a solution to the present problems, but only with a fair and just government and parliament. We can cooperate fully only after free elections have returned a popularly chosen government."

I said, and he acknowledged, that the Shah had tried to institute some reforms directed toward liberalization of the regime. I observed that many Americans felt that President Carter, by his human-rights campaign, had played a role in fostering those reforms.

Shariatmadari said, "Carter's human-rights policy has not been a very important propelling force, though it has not been totally without effect in pushing liberalization. But in Islam we have some skepticism about the sincerity of Carter's human-rights approach, because he doesn't apply it to the United Nations. In the U.N., five countries have the veto. That means we are not equal. But the Americans don't say anything about that."

A COUPLE of days later, I flew to Isfahan, with my Iranian friend again accompanying me as an interpreter. Isfahan, as the 1966 *Hachette Guide* proclaims with unwonted effusion, is "one of the most marvellous places in the world." The city lies on a plateau watered by a large oasis and a lovely stream. Shah Abbas I—the greatest Persian emperor, not excepting Xerxes and the three Dariuses—made it his capital at the end of the sixteenth century; at that time, it had a population of about half a million, and was among the largest cities in the world. I remembered from a previous visit, a decade ago, broad, tree-lined avenues;

a magnificent central square, the Maydan-e-Shah; the extraordinary Bridge of Thirty-three Arches; and a general air of refined elegance. But even from the air, I could see burgeoning suburbs and smoke from factories—signs that change had come to Isfahan.

A local official, who asked not to be mentioned by name, rapidly brought me up to date on developments in Isfahan. He said, "Five years ago, there were five hundred and sixty thousand people in Isfahan, and this was one of the most beautiful cities in the world. Then the Shah decided that there was too much administrative and economic concentration in Teheran, and that he needed to decentralize. So he put a steel mill here. And an airbase, with a helicopter training center. Naturally, foreign companies followed suit. Bell Helicopter came in with the training base. Du Pont put a plant here. Now we have more than a million people. The doubling in five years of a population that had been stable for three hundred "years has changed everything. This used to be an educational center, with a university, many religious schools, and lots of music. Now it is an industrial town. Over three hundred thousand workers have come in from the countryside, most of them without their families. They live five or six to a room in the poorer quarter of town. They make good wages—a dollar seventy-five an hour—but they don't have their families, and they're miserable. Everybody else has been affected, too. The bazaar merchants used to be very important. Now the banks manage credit, and the engineers are the big shots in town."

"Students have grown up under the Shah, and they don't know what things were like before development started. All they know is that the Shah promised that Iran was going to be like France or Germany. That isn't happening. The huge surge in population means that services are spread too thin and are constantly breaking down. There aren't enough telephones. It's impossible to buy a car. The schools are jammed. Housing is scarce. During the past three years, there has been a recession, especially in building, and many laborers are out of work. So the students are in a mood to reject everything that has happened. They are turning back to the old days, and pursuing an idealized version of what things were like then. They are pushing the mullahs to go back and re-create the wonderful past. The mullahs see a chance to regain their prestige and power. The students provide them

with a power base for putting pressure on the government to give them the consideration and importance they have been seeking for years. So the mullahs go along. That's the dynamic of trouble in Isfahan."

I asked about the circumstances relating to the declaration of martial law in Isfahan back in August, a month before it was declared in the other major cities of the country.

The local official said, "That's a perfect example. All through the spring and summer, after riots in Qum in January, and in Tabriz in late February, this town was seething with unrest. The workers were demanding better housing conditions, and more money to meet inflation. The bazaar merchants were bitching about the loss of their old status, about price controls, and competition from the big banks and supermarkets. The intellectuals were complaining about the lack of freedom. The students were telling the mullahs to do their stuff, and the mullahs were saying 'right on.' About the first of August, a mixed group of workers and students occupied the home of the most prominent local religious leader, Ayatollah Khademi. The governor-general and the local Army commander went to Khademi and told him to get them off the premises. He tried, but he couldn't. On the contrary, the crowds got bigger and bigger. At one point, maybe twenty thousand people were camping there. When Khademi tried to cool them down, the students turned ugly. They took down the posters of the Shah and put up posters of Ayatollah Khomeini. On August 11th, the military decided to clear the place. Troops moved in, threw tear gas, and pushed the crowd out at bayonet point. The crowd then went on a rampage. It burned down a bank and a hotel and fifteen other buildings. It threw a bomb into a bus for Bell Helicopter employees. That's when martial law was declared. The bazaaris—the bazaar merchants—immediately went on strike and closed down their shops in protest. The *madressah* students stayed in their schools, but they demonstrated every day, always making more radical demands. On the night of August 21st, two high-school teachers, who had built up a large following of anti-government young people, were arrested and sent to Teheran. Next day, the kids hit the streets, and there has been trouble of one kind or another ever since."

I asked for and was given the names of the teachers—who had been released after a month in custody. They

59

had no telephones, so my Iranian friend and I picked one—Hassan Zehtab—and drove out to see him. He lives on the outskirts of town, in a neighborhood of narrow, twisting unpaved streets. The car could barely squeeze between the walls, and the puddles and mud in the road reminded me anew of the origins of the custom of removing one's shoes before entering a mosque. Once we were in the neighborhood, we had no trouble finding the house; everybody we asked knew Hassan Zehtab, and where he lived.

Mr. Zehtab turned out to be a partly bald, moonfaced middle-aged man with a complexion slightly darker in tone than that of most Iranians. He was carefully dressed, in a suit, white shirt, tie, and sweater. I saw only two rooms of his home, and they were modest in size and bare of ornament. When we arrived, Zehtab was meeting in one of the rooms with about forty disciples. He agreed to see me, and we moved into the other room, with ten of his disciples coming along. I asked Zehtab to tell me a little about who he was and what he believed.

He said, "I'm forty years old, and I have been a schoolteacher here in Isfahan ever since I graduated from the University of Teheran, fifteen years ago. In all this time, I haven't seen one truly free election, or one instance of concern on the part of those in authority for the happiness of the people. I think the only way to bring about the happiness of the people is through an Islamic culture. We're given to understand that the ruling clique is talking about religion now, and putting on a turban and the white garments of holiness. But that is a mere pretense. Even a child can see through that. It is like the ceramic facing on the wall of a building. Everybody knows that beneath the facing there is a real wall, of a different material."

I asked him if it was not true that under the Shah the country had taken large strides toward economic development over the past fifteen years.

He replied, "I have to say with great sorrow that our economic growth is based on a windfall called oil. If we consider where we are, and then where the progressive states like Japan are, we realize how little we have accomplished. When I think of Japan, I think of a verse:

> Leila and I were fellow-travellers on the road of life;

> She reached her home, and I am still a vagabond."

I said that even if some countries had done better than Iran, Iran had done quite well.

He said, "What we see here is inflation—prices for food have gone way up. What we see is the depletion of our oil reserves. At the present rate, we have only twenty years to go. What we see is an agriculture worth zero. We buy vegetables from Israel, wheat from the United States, onions from Turkey, meat from Australia, oranges from six different countries. Our industry is just an assembly line for products made in other countries. We would be poor fools indeed if we were satisfied with that."

I asked him what would satisfy him. He said, "My ideal future is within the framework of Islamic law. That is the guarantee of happiness and a good future for society. On particular religious questions, I don't find it in my area of competence to make answers. I leave that to the highest religious authorities."

All during the interview, Zehtab, his disciples, my Iranian friend, and I were sitting cross-legged on the floor. I was extremely uncomfortable, and it must have been evident, for one of the disciples asked if I would like a piece of fruit. I said yes, and he took an apple out of a bowl in the middle of the floor. He began to peel it for me, but at the first stroke of the knife the blade separated from its handle. He held out the broken knife. "There you see it all," he said in disgust. "Our country owns twenty-five per cent of Krupp in Germany, but in Iran we can't even produce a knife that cuts an apple."

Everybody laughed, and I began questioning the disciples. All of them were students or professional men between the ages of twenty and thirty, and had participated actively in many demonstrations against the Shah. They all supported Zehtab in his quest for an Islamic society. I expressed surprise that young men with professional training should be so drawn to a religion that seemed—to a Westerner, at least—not exactly with it. I went around the room, asking the disciples, one by one, a single question: "What drew you toward Islam?"

The first to answer was a mullah, in robes and turban, who had a degree in psychology from the University of T-heran. He said, "My love for Islam has grown because I have studied it and compared it with other religions." The others—four students, two employees of the National Iranian Oil Company, an accountant, an engineer, and a physicist—all gave nearly the same answer. Two of them said that they had compared Islam with the teachings of a nineteenth-century European social philosopher—that is, Marx, whose

name has been taboo in Iran—and found it preferable. Another offered the generalization “Islam offers a solution to the complications of our life.”

As we drove away, I remarked to my Iranian friend that the similarity of the answers was disappointing. “You don’t understand,” he told me. “They all followed the lead of the mullah. It doesn’t make for interesting answers, but it makes them happy.”

I SPENT the night in Isfahan at the Shah Abbas Hotel. The clientele was entirely foreign—a sprinkling of Japanese, Indians, Americans, and Europeans. Apart from the sight of a section of the hotel which had been damaged during the riots of August, and an armed guard in the gardens, there was no sign of trouble.

Before dinner, I visited Wanda Hake, an American psychologist employed by the United States companies working in the Isfahan region. Mrs. Hake reported that most of the Americans in the area lived in a compound, largely removed from contact with the Iranians. They had the problems usually 'found in such communities. There was great boredom—especially among the children. Alcoholism was common among the women, and many of the children had drug problems. There was a good deal of contempt for the Iranians. "Because of their turbans, many Americans call them rag heads," Mrs. Hake said. "That's the nicest name they call them."

Mrs. Hake had some guests, and one of them was a bazaar merchant from an old Isfahan family. "I could cry about what has happened here," he told me. "It used to be a paradise of waster and gardens and beautiful buildings. Now the town is full of strangers. There are the people from the villages. They live in shantytowns. There are ten thousand Americans. They drive up the price of everything—especially houses. A house that rented for five thousand rials per month five years ago now costs forty thousand rials per month. Many people are unhappy. One of my interests is a building project. My workers were Afghans—three hundred of them. The other day, the government sent the Afghans home. I know why: There was a crime wave, and they did a lot of the stealing. But nobody gave me any warning. Now what do I do?

"Lots of the young men come to see me about their problems. They don't know how to deal with the young women sitting next to them in their

classes. In the past, they had never seen any women, even mothers and sisters, who were not wearing a veil. Now they see miniskirts and bare arms and bare legs. They say to me, 'What do they want, these women? What are they trying to do to me?'

"When I go to Teheran, I feel as though I were in Hell. Somebody could die right in front of you and nobody would do anything. Deep sadness comes over me when I see the uses to which we have put our oil wealth. So it is not surprising that there has been a political eruption. Five years ago, Khomeini was nothing. Now he is held up as the equivalent of the Shah."

At breakfast the next day, I met a professor of religion at the university who had been educated at Harvard and Oxford. His family are members of the Baha'i sect, and he is going back to Oxford, at least partly because of religious persecution. He said he would like to talk about the state of religion in Iran, but only on condition that I not 'affection his name. I agreed.

He said, "As a student of religion, I read with great interest Toynbee's 'A Study of History.' I always wondered why he felt that the next stage of regeneration in the world would be religious. I felt that religion had been on the run all over the world for centuries. In some places, there have been adjustments, but they have been made only slowly and painfully. Christianity accommodated itself to Darwin, but it was hard even in a tolerant country like Britain. Islam has experienced a number of shocks and adjustments. There have been several efforts to update the religion. But they have all failed. By and large, the clergy remains narrow, fanatical, and ignorant."

He went on, "The merchants of the bazaars worked hand and glove with the mullahs. They were the two most conservative elements in the cities. The bazaars usually rented land from the religious foundations, and made the foundations big gifts. But both the bazaaris and the foundations have been outmoded by recent developments. When I left Iran to go abroad to school, in 1960, this was still a backward country. Only a few cities in the country had running water. There were only about ten thousand people who had been or were at universities. Most industry was handicrafts, and about eighty per cent of the people still lived in rural villages. In 1970, when I came back, it was a different country. All the young people—

and so on, any per cent of the population—were going to school. There are a hundred thousand university graduates now and almost two hundred thousand people in universities. On a normal weekend, between one and two million people drive out of Teheran in their own cars.

"The mullahs have been losing steadily through these developments. Their base was education. Now they have to contend against state schools and universities. They've lost the large landholdings they once had. Most of their endowments have been nationalized, and are controlled by the state. No one ever paid much attention to them until the present wave of troubles. The bazaaris have also lost great power. The banks and big companies have taken away their control over loans and credit. There are shops out in the streets—across from your hotel, for example—so people don't go to the bazaar as much. And for a while there was price inspection as part of a campaign against inflation. That hit the bazaaris very hard."

After a pause, he continued, "People now don't remember what it was like in the old days. As late as 1955, I remember going with my father to a village in the countryside. The local khan—the head man—did justice the religious way. He cut off hands for thievery, splitting people's tongues for talebearing. There was a peasant in the village with a beautiful wife. The khan took her, and the peasant complained to my father. The khan went out riding with my father, and they encountered the peasant. The khan took his riding crop and beat the peasant senseless.

"The oil boom ended all that and put it out of mind. But it also brought lots of trouble. Mainly inflation. There are buses now, and vegetables, but most people can't afford them. Moreover, a lot of the money has been spent—I almost said wasted—on big projects and arms purchases that don't do ordinary people any immediate good. And it has to be said that on the cultural side the Western world has not done well in Iran. Students coming back from Europe and the United States present the cities there as Mecas for drunks, whores, and illegitimate children. They depict a total breakdown of morale. So to the difficulties of local adjustment there is added a tarnishing of the classic model. The West is seen xenophobiaically, as something frightening, and the search for old values is intensified.

"It also has to be admitted that the Shah, in his enthusiasm to build the country, ignored the people in it. The

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61

masses were left out of his development program. The bazaaris were left out. The mullahs were left out. He thought he could bring them along through economic progress without any accompanying change in ways of thought. The heart of the difficulty, though, is the new group of university students. From fifty to seventy-five per cent of them come from poor homes. They are very disturbed when they sit next to a girl in class. They feel a sense of guilt, a fear of being polluted—of secularization. All this takes the form of opposition to the regime as the bearer of Western values. The sexual drive pushes the students in the direction of religion, and the mullahs latch on to them to maintain their position of importance."

BACK in Teheran, I found mounting turbulence and confusion. A wave of strikes that had started in September with employees of the central bank had spread to other banks, to the telecommunications industry, and to the oil workers. One day, there was a rumor that the gas-station workers would go on strike. I saw hundreds of cars lined up at several gas stations. Angry motorists jockeyed for position, and in one place troops had to fire into the air to maintain order. The university had been scheduled to reopen at the end of September, and then at the end of October. Each time, registration had been stopped by student strikes and demonstrations. After the second effort, the authorities gave up, and turned the campus, in downtown Teheran, over to the demonstrators. There were daily protests, and one morning I went to watch, with a visiting American professor who spoke Farsi. Armed soldiers in tanks and armored personnel carriers patrolled the gates, but we were allowed in without any demand to show our credentials. There were two groups of demonstrators, marching back and forth. One group—of about seventy-five students, almost all men—was clearly Marxist in its political sentiments. The students carried placards denouncing international imperialism, and chanted slogans calling for the unity of the workers. The other group, obviously Islamic in orientation, bore pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini and carried signs calling for an Islamic republic. There were several hundred students in the Islamic group, including many women. All the women were veiled. Some wore the chador, a garment that envelops the body from head to foot, while others wore bluejeans, blouses, and scarves that veiled their heads and faces. A few

times, word went through the crowd that soldiers were coming. The ranks broke and everybody rushed for cover. But that day, at least, no soldiers came.

The professors, having no classes, were available and talkative. By far the most interesting was Karim Pakravan, an economist trained at the University of Chicago, whose father, a former Iranian general, had at one time been head of the security-police apparatus, known as SAVAK, and was now working at the Imperial Palace in a high administrative position. He came to visit me at my hotel room, and talked freely of his own situation and that of his colleagues.

"Young professional people want to escape the establishment," he said. "The establishment is everybody who has real power. In one way or another, either morally or financially, it is corrupt. We are not brave enough to join the opposition, but by being at the university we maintain a passive opposition. Our case against the government is lack of freedom. All creativity has been crushed. I teach a course in economics. I'm not allowed to say that there's malnutrition or poverty, or that we're underdeveloped. A doctor friend of mine went to the countryside to look at health problems. He found all the diseases typical of underdeveloped countries—trachoma, dysentery, that kind of thing. He didn't find cancer and hypertension—the diseases that go with modern society. So he was never allowed to make a report.

"A whole generation of Iranians has been raised, educated, and given no freedom. Young engineers, for instance, have only a minor chance to take part in technological development. The Shah didn't develop a technology—he bought a blueprint of technology from the West. So there were very few major jobs for Iranians. At least ninety per cent of our people have been left out of development. I have a small consulting firm. I take only private clients. Unless we were huge and foreign, we couldn't get government contracts anyway. I might be able to do a project for the government at a charge of, say, ten thousand dollars for a couple of months' work. But people in the government would rather hire foreigners at a thousand dollars a day. That way, they get a kickback."

He continued, "Khomeini is merely a symbol of opposition. He is respected as a Moslem, but he has no power. Ten years ago, no prayers were said in the universities. Religious students were mocked. Now there is a genuine student problem. Many of the students

come from poor families in the provinces. They have to rent rooms, and the financial burden is unbearable. There has never been a systematic study made, so we don't know how badly off they are. But they don't have enough money. They have to cluster six or seven in a room. In the last few years, there has been an undoubted effort to reform things. There's real talk in the parliament. Those in SAVAK who were corrupt and who tortured people have been ousted. There's an effort to bring roads to villages, and water. If there should be elections soon, I'd probably vote. But I wouldn't join the government. Next year is going to be bad. Already, because of the strikes and the big wage settlements, it is clear that the gross national product will be down by ten per cent. There'll be an incredible inflation. One good thing I can say: At last, after twenty-five years, Iranian politics are becoming interesting."

Pakravan put me in touch with another economist trained in the United States, who divided his time between teaching and working for Iran's Plan and Budget Organization. Because of his government job, he asked me not to mention his name. He said that economists at the Plan and Budget Organization had repeatedly done studies showing that, while the national wealth was increasing, many people, particularly in the countryside, were relatively worse off. He showed me a report that indicated that the income share of the top twenty per cent of urban Iranians had risen from 57.5 per cent in 1972 to 63.5 per cent in 1975. The share of the middle forty per cent dropped from 31 per cent to 25.5 per cent. The share of the bottom forty per cent dropped from 11.5 per cent to 11 per cent. While urban consumption per head was about two times that of the rural areas in 1959, it had by 1972 grown to three times that of the rural areas. But these studies, while circulated abroad, were, he said, not published in Iran.

The economist went on to talk about the religious revival. "I was very active in politics during my high-school years," he said. "At that time—the early nineteen-fifties—there were only two important groups: the Communist, or Tudeh, Party, and the National Front—which included the Pan-Iranians, who wanted to take over parts of Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. The young had absolutely no interest in religion. After that, the political situation calmed down. There was a brief revival of politics in 1961 and 1962, when Ali Amini

came to office as Prime Minister. He started the land reform that the Shah later claimed as his own. The Tudeh Party was dead then, but the National Front was strong. The religious people didn't count. Khomeini became important only after he was driven into exile by the Shah. The Shah's father, Reza Shah, had been very successful in fighting the mullahs. He made a direct assault on the clergy—forcing women to take off veils, riding into the shrines and heating the mullahs. He had public sympathy, because then the clergy were corrupt and wealthy. They were hated by everybody. Now they have lost their lands and the religious foundations. The mullahs have been purified. They have the power of poverty."

THE economist at the planning agency introduced me to Magid Tehranian, an intellectual in his middle thirties who had been trained at Harvard and then co-opted into the Shah's system as the head of an institute for the study of communications. I went to see him at the institute, where he looked every bit the European or American intellectual in his cozy oyster shell; he had a comfortable office with a couple of secretaries, and wore a neat blue suit, a silk tie, and shoes of soft Italian leather. He talked briefly about Iranian intellectuals. He said, "The great problem facing the university graduates once they are out of school is a lack of freedom. We have lots of intellectuals and technocrats who have views, but they are never allowed to express them. Everything is dictated from the top, and some of it is silly. For instance, the government tried to build up the television network—with which I was involved. It was extended to the point where it reached seventy per cent of the people in Iran. Then the palace intervened. They insisted that we show pictures of urban guerrillas confessing their terrorist deeds. They made us put Parviz Saberi, the head of SAVAK's anti-terrorist campaign, on the screen, giving his view of history. We have an intelligentsia, but they have no chance to participate. They're just supposed to support the regime. But they don't like slavishly supporting the Shah, so they turn against him. Yet, with all this, we have been surprised by the breadth of the movement against the Shah. It reaches from plush Teheran to the remotest villages."

Tehranian was said to have been a Marxist before he joined the government, and I had gone to see him primarily because I needed some help in

ascertaining the part that the Marxists had played in what had been happening. Clearly, the Marxists counted for something in the movement against the Shah, but I had been given the most diverse estimates of their role, from the most surprising sources. The view around the palace was that the religious movement had been totally taken over by the Marxists. That view was shared by the economist who taught at the university as a form of "passive resistance" to "the establishment." "The resistance is run by the Communists," he had told me. "If you want to buy weapons, there is a number you can call and you get what you ask for. I don't know exactly who supplies the weapons—the Russians, the Cubans, or the Palestinians. But they're the ones who have made the country erupt." An American official, on the other hand, put absolutely no stock in the theory of Communist manipulation. He remarked to me that "the Army and the police and SAVAK have been combing the country all year looking for the Communists behind the demonstrations. So far, they haven't found a single one. Why? Because there aren't any. The mullahs and the bazaaris between them have informal networks that they've used for years to organize processions and festivals. That's all it takes now. That's all there is."

I told Tehranian of the confused picture I was getting, and asked if he could put me in touch with any of his former Marxist colleagues. He said that it would be easy, and set up an appointment for me with a friend holding a high post in the Ministry of Information. The friend would organize an interview with three officials in the Ministry. I was not to talk about Marx. Instead, I should use the euphemism—"a European social philosopher of the nineteenth century."

At the last minute, I had to change the appointment from the morning to the afternoon, but that was no problem. I went to see the official, and after a few moments he took me into a room behind his office. Three men, all about thirty, were sitting at a table with a woman—a graduate student at the University of Michigan, who acted as translator. I asked them if they were believers in the philosophy of a certain well-known European social philosopher of the nineteenth century, and all three smiled and nodded. I asked them about their education and their jobs. They were university graduates—one from the Sorbonne, the two others from the University of Teheran. The man from the Sorbonne helped put to-

gether public-opinion polls for the Min-
istry, and the two others had jobs as
engineers.

I asked what they found useful in
the works of the nineteenth-century
social philosopher. One said, "He ex-
poses the imperialists and their rape of
all the countries of the Third World,
including Iran."

I asked how, specifically, the philos-
opher's theories were relevant to Iran,
and was told about the depletion of
Iran's oil reserves and the purchase of
American weapons for open "use against
the people." I asked about Iran's prac-
tice of selling natural gas to the So-
viet Union, and they responded that
there was no shortage of natural gas.

I asked if they felt that the Russians
had designs on Iran. All of them
thought that compared to the United
States influence, which was "all-perva-
sive," the Russian influence was "so
small it doesn't count." I asked what
recent works by followers of the well-
known nineteenth-century social phi-
losopher they had read. After some
hesitation, the man from the Sorbonne
said, "Jean-Paul Sartre." No other
names were forthcoming.

I asked how they felt about the reli-
gious movement against the Shah. All
said that they agreed with its objec-
tives. I asked if there wasn't a con-
tradiction somewhere. Wasn't religion
supposed to be "the opium of the peo-
ple"?

"Sometimes that is true," I was told.
"But in developing countries it is dif-
ferent. At times, religious feelings and
social movements go hand in hand.
That is the way it is now in Iran. We
are all of us united against the Shah."

I asked how they thought the gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union felt about
the Shah. They said they felt that they
had the backing of Moscow.

I asked whether they and their
leaders were working from within
the religious movement. There was a
silence. Then one of them said, "We
are in an Islamic country, and all so-
cial movements inevitably have a re-
ligious coloring. We do not believe
there will ever be Communism here
as there is Communism in Russia or
China. We will have our own brand
of socialism."

Later, the official who had arranged
the interview told me that I should
have asked him the same questions. "I
believe that the Communists are ma-
nipulating the religious movement,"
he said. Still later, an American official
showed me a translation of an article in
*Navid*, a new, underground publica-
tion of the Tudeh Party. The article,

entitled "The Tudeh Party and the
Moslem Movement," said, "We are
ready to put at the disposal of our
friends from other political groups all
our political propaganda and technical
resources for the campaign against the
Shah." I was also shown an inter-
view with Iraj Eskandary, the sec-
retary-general of the Tudeh Party, now
living in exile in Moscow. Among oth-
er things, Eskandary said, "As far as
the religious aspect of the present
movement is concerned, it should be
emphasized that the Shiite clergy can-
not be viewed as a force demanding a
return to the past, to the Middle Ages.
The position of the clergy reflects, to
a significant extent, popular feelings.
And the fact that the religious move-
ment is now playing an important role
in the mobilization of democratic and
nationalist forces against the dictatorial,
anti-nationalist, and pro-imperialist re-
gime of the Shah can only be wel-
comed. . . . We are in favor of a union
with all democratic forces, including
the religious ones."

IF the role played by the Marxists in
the fomenting of trouble remains
obscure, the role of the liberalization
sponsored by the Shah and his ministers
looms larger and larger. The Shah ac-
knowledged when I saw him that he
had begun to loosen things up "about
two years ago." I was in Iran in the
spring of 1977, and I remember well
the widespread talk of relaxation. Jim-
my Carter's emphasis on human rights
was one of the reasons, but only one,
and not the most important. Iranian
students in the United States and Eu-
rope had focussed attention on the re-
pressive features of the regime—partic-
ularly the practice of torture by SAVAK.
The international press, led by Le
Monde, of Paris, had picked up the
theme. Both the Red Cross and Am-
nesty International, the private human-
rights group based in London, were
asking questions and proposing visits.
But by far the most important reason
for the relaxation was that the rapid
development that followed the great
oil-price increase of 1973 proved too
complicated for direct control from
above. Dislocations and shortages were
universal. I recall visiting a new alumi-
num plant in an industrial area outside
Teheran. The plant was supposed to
accommodate several hundred workers,
but they had no housing and no trans-
port, and there were no telephones in
the offices. All over the country, power
failures were frequent, and the pursuit
of scarce goods and services drove in-
flation above the twenty-five-per-cent-

per-year level. An effort to hold down
inflation by fixing prices was failing in a
spectacular manner. It was clear that
the economy could be made to work
only if there was some freeing up,
some devolution of authority.

Signs of reform were abundant that
spring. Batches of prisoners were re-
leased, and were allowed to talk to the
press. The Shah declared that torture
would cease—an admission that it had
been going on. Corruption, which had
never been far below the surface—as
witness the Persian origin of the word
“baksheesh”—became public in the
wake of a scandal that involved payoffs
to high officials of the Iranian Navy.
The National Front, the chief opposi-
tion party, was allowed to circulate let-
ters highly critical of the regime. Stu-
dent demonstrations went forward
with only token harassment. Even the
television appearances of Parviz Saberi,
the director of SAVAK's political sec-
tion, were part of an effort to prove
that the organization had a human
face. ...

The direction of policy, to be sure,
remained ambiguous. Low-level agents
of SAVAK continued to stage raids on
opposition meetings. Investigation of
corruption at the highest levels was sys-
tematically blocked—reputedly by the
Shah's entourage. But a key figure in
the entourage, Amir Assadollah Alam,
the Minister of the Imperial Court,
fell ill in 1977, and died in New York
early this year. His departure from the
Court Ministry opened the way for a
political change that signalled an un-
doubted commitment to reform. In
August, 1977, the Shah appointed a
new Court Minister, Amir Abbas Ho-
veida, and a new Prime Minister, Jam-
shid Amouzegar. I saw both men at
their homes in Teheran in late Octo-
ber of this year, along with the Infor-
mation Minister in the Amouzegar
government, Dariush Homayun. They
all talked freely, but not for indi-
vidual attribution. What follows is
my interpretation of their accounts
of what happened during the twelve
months beginning in August, 1977—a
period of sweeping reforms that boom-
eranged to injure them, and the Shah
as well.

HOVEIDA, an affable and highly in-
telligent man, with degrees in
history, economics, and political science
from the Universities of Paris and
Brussels, came to the Court Ministry
after nearly thirteen years as Prime
Minister—the longest term in modern
times. He had a major hand in the rap-
id development that changed the face

of Iran and soured so many of its people. Though he was said to have been tolerant of corruption in the past, he was reputed never to have been on the take himself, and he certainly did not live on the grand scale. He had realized as early as 1975 that the pace of development had to be slowed down. "We're in orbit," he had told me at the time, "and we have to come down to earth." He brought to the Court Ministry a determination to achieve economic slowdown and political reform. As he saw it, the key to both was ending corruption at the highest levels. From the beginning, he worked with the Shah on a code of conduct for the royal family. That project brought him into conflict with many members of the family who had been active in private business affairs. In July, 1978, after a long and bitter battle, Hoveida finally won the Shah's approval for the code of conduct.

The code was not published, for fear that the spelling out of what was henceforth prohibited would be regarded as a confession of past guilt. But the fact that it was adopted was made known, and caused virtually every member of the royal family to leave Iran. Here—published for the first time, I think—is the code that the Shah approved last summer:

## CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE IMPERIAL FAMILY

In order to maintain the high status of the Imperial family, which is respected by all Iranians, the following principles are instituted as the Code of Conduct of the Imperial family:

1) Refraining from conduct considered distasteful by social custom.

2) Refraining from any acts or actions not in keeping with the high status of the Imperial family.

3) Refraining from direct contact with public officials for the purpose of handling personal business. These matters will be handled through the Ministry of Court or His Imperial Majesty's Special Office.

4) Refraining from contacts with foreign companies or organizations which are parties to contracts and deals with Iranian public organizations.

5) Refraining from receiving commissions for any reason whatsoever, from companies and organizations, foreign or Iranian, which are parties to contracts or deals with the Iranian government.

6) Refraining from receiving valuable gifts from persons, companies, or organizations.

7) Refraining from deals of any kind with public organizations, be it the government, organizations associated with the government, municipalities, or public organizations.

8) Refraining from direct or indirect (through third person or persons) partnership or holding shares in companies or organizations that are parties to deals

with the government or public organizations.

9) Refraining from founding or holding shares in organizations or companies whose activities are not compatible with the high status of the members of the Imperial family, such as restaurants, cabarets, casinos, and the like.

10) Refraining from the use of facilities and properties belonging to government and public organizations for private use.

11) Refraining from the use—for private or commercial purposes—of the services of the employees of the government and associated organizations who also have responsibilities and duties in foundations associated with the Imperial family, or related organizations.

12) Refraining from asking for special favors or making recommendations to public officials in the interest of members of the Imperial family or others.

13) Refraining from the use of legal exemptions for persons outside of the Imperial family.

14) Refraining from the use of nationalized lands belonging to the government or public organizations for the purpose of profiting, for example, through construction projects or establishing commercial, service, or industrial organizations.

15) Refraining from receiving anything from persons (natural or legal) in lieu of influencing public officials in order to legalize acts which would not otherwise be eligible for profit-making (such as partnership in ownership of large pieces of land in return for registering such lands for the purpose of making profit).

16) Refraining from the use of nationalized lands for agriculture and dairy projects.

17) Refraining from accepting positions on the boards of insurance, banking, and other companies.

18) Voluntary compliance with security regulations and whatever relates to public order.

19) Protecting the prestige and respect of national values and beliefs outside of the country.

20) Refraining from contacts with foreign embassies in Iran unless through the Ministry of Court.

Amouzegar came to the office of Prime Minister with a reputation as a brilliant public servant. He was educated at the University of Teheran, at Cornell, and at the University of Washington, and has a Ph.D. in civil engineering. Before becoming Prime Minister, at the age of fifty-four, he had successively headed four Ministries—Labor, Agriculture, Finance, and Interior—and had also served as Iran's chief negotiator in the price-fixing sessions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Though less supple than Hoveida in political matters, Amouzegar was thought to be equally free of corruption and far more competent in economics. As Prime Minister, he set his sights on curtailing inflation and rooting out corruption at the ministerial

level. By squeezing hard on the money supply, he cut inflation from thirty-five per cent in August, 1977, to ten per cent in August, 1978. In the process, he earned the enmity of many of those dependent on credit, including most of the bazaar merchants and the high rollers in the construction field. As for corruption, he pushed General Nematollah Nasser out as the head of SAVAK and off into a corner as Ambassador to Pakistan. He forced Husang Ansari, the Minister of Finance, to step out of the Cabinet and become head of the National Iranian Oil Company. He obliged Mayor Gholam Reza Nikpay, of Teheran, to quit. Those actions put him at odds with both the Shah and Hoveida, who had close ties to several of those who had been shunted aside. In the recesses of the Imperial Court, an intrigue was concocted which came to engulf everybody.

The starting point was the death, late in October of 1977, of Seyyed Mustafa Khomeini, the son of the exiled Ayatollah. The son, a mullah, was forty-nine at the time, and he died, according to supporters of the Shah, of a heart attack. His father suspected foul play, and, during the Shiite days of mourning for the dead, which fell in late December last year, circulated a number of letters throwing blame on the Shah. Early in January this year, there was sent from the office of the Court Minister, Hoveida, to the office of the Information Minister, Homayun, the text of an article. Homayun, as was the custom, passed the article on for publication to the editors of a leading Teheran daily, Eta'alaat. The editors at the paper were sufficiently disturbed by the text to check with Homayun. He told them that it came from the Court and they should go ahead and publish it. The editors then apprised Amouzegar of what was in the works. Amouzegar called Homayun, who repeated the explanation that the article came from the Court and was supposed to be published. Exactly who wrote the article is not known to me, but the unwillingness of those involved to name the author suggests that it was either the Shah himself or somebody acting on his orders. My impression is that part of the motive was to embroil the Amouzegar government with the religious opposition.

The article appeared on January 7th. It bore the title "Iran and the Red and Black Imperialism," and contained a harsh personal attack on Ayatollah Khomeini. It started obliquely, with references to the recent days of mourning in which Ayatollah Kho-

meini had circulated his grievances against the Shah. It moved on to a discussion of forces designated as Red and Black Imperialism, meaning the Communists and the clergy. It said that coöoperation between the two had been "rare" but that an exception was "the close, sincere, and honest coöoperation of both vis-à-vis the Iranian revolution, especially the progressive land reform in Iran." The article went on to recall the opposition to land reform back in 1963, including the "riots of June 5th and 6th," which had precipitated the expulsion of Ayatollah Khomeini. It said that the opposition to the reform had come from the Communists grouped in the Tudeh Party and from "the landowners who had been robbing the peasants for many years." These groups, the article continued, had turned for "succor to the clergy... since the clergy enjoy great respect among Iranians." Most of the clergy, the article said, proved "far too intelligent to act against the Shah's-people's revolution," so at that point the opponents had decided to "recruit someone from the clergy who would be adventurous." That "someone" had turned out to be Ayatollah Khomeini. According to the article, he had "an unknown past," but apparently had lived for many years in India, where he had developed "contacts with centers of British imperialism." The article concluded by denouncing Ayatollah Khomeini as "someone who had taken the initiative in carrying out the plans of Red and Black Imperialism... who fought land reform, the women's vote, the nationalization of the forests... who would sincerely serve conspirators and Fifth Columnists."

On January 9th, two days after the article appeared, the religious students in Qum went into the streets to protest the attack on Khomeini. A

clash with police ensued. Nine people were killed and many were injured. Forty days later, in Tabriz, a memorial service was held for those killed in Qum. Again, there was a clash with police. This time, thirteen people were killed. After that, trouble came in Tcheran and Isfahan and Meshed, and then in Qum once more. August 5th marked Iran's Constitution Day, and the eve of Ramadan, the Moslem month of abstention. The Shah delivered a nationwide television broadcast, pledging that he would go ahead with the liberalization program. But all through that month, in city after city, there were assaults on the symbols of Western modernity associated with the Shah's rule—banks, casinos, and cinemas. The campaign reached a horrible climax in Abadan, the site of the country's largest oil refinery. On August 20th, the Rex Cinema was destroyed by arson, and some four hundred and thirty people lost their lives in the blaze.

After that, Amouzegar had had enough. He resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Jaafar Sharif-Emami, a political veteran from a religious family who had worked closely with the Shah as, among other things, head of the Pahlavi Foundation, a multimillion-dollar semi-family enterprise, which is the owner of most of Iran's foreign holdings. Sharif-Emami moved swiftly and across the board to make concessions to the troublemakers. He lifted press censorship and arranged for live radio broadcasts from the previously dozing Majles, the lower house of the parliament. With the wraps off, resentment found tongue. In the parliament and in the press, there was a surge of complaints about corruption and discrimination against the middle and working classes. The new government met the strikes with generous concessions on wages and pensions. In response to charges of corruption, investigations were opened into the cases of General Nasseri (who was recalled from Pakistan) and former Mayor Nikpay. Thirty-four leading officials of SAVAK, including Parviz Sabeti, were dismissed in one day. At every opportunity, Sharif-Emami sought to placate the mullahs. He closed down casinos, and cinemas showing foreign films. Provincial and university officials who had taken a strong stand against religion were replaced by milder men. Most important of all, Sharif-Emami entered into consultations with religious leaders, including Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and with the lay opposition, including Karim Sanjabi, the head of the

National Front, for a broad understanding about new elections.

I WENT to visit Sharif-Emami in his office, just before the end of October. I found a large, bluff, partly bald man in his sixties who exuded confidence. He said that there were many "dissatisfied and unhappy people in Iran who turned to the mullahs to voice their grievances." His strategy was "to establish a good relation with the clergy." As he saw it, the clergy was divided into two groups. "One group, which follows Ayatollah Khomeini, is radical but very small," he said. "The other, which follows Shariatmadari, is moderate and very large. A split between them exists in every city and every village." He was negotiating with Shariatmadari for some kind of convocation where the majority could prevail. "They must do it," he said of his plan for forcing a decision. "Somebody must be the head of our clergy, a Pope."

He told me he was sure that lifting the lid on censorship and on the Majles debates was the right thing to do. "A free press is much better than pressure," he said. The economic consequences of the strikes and the high wage settlements were, he thought, "not serious." There would be a cost to the state in higher wages and pensions, but that could easily be made up by a cutback on expensive military projects and plans for nuclear power plants. He favored the allocation of more money to the villages, for "by increasing credits for machinery, electricity, and water, rural life can be made more attractive and agriculture more effective." He said he hoped to "draw the men who came to town back to the villages." He acknowledged that inflation might be a problem, but he hoped to keep it down by subsidies on basic commodities—rice, bread, sugar, tea. He did not fear a military coup. "If they come in, there will be killing and shooting," he said. "Nobody wants that." He did sense that a test would be coming within the next six weeks, and he hoped to put together a large political grouping that would help open the way to free elections. Among other people, he mentioned former Prime Ministers Hoveida and Ali Amini. "I'm a patient man," he said. "I do not intend to leave this office until there is calm in Iran."

SHARIF-EMAMI had begun the interview by saying that that day Tcheran, at least, was calm. But driving from his office back to my hotel I had

to detour around the center of town. I
smelled burning rubber and saw a car
in flames. Later, I learned that students
had come off the university campus and
smashed shops and destroyed cars in
what was considered the worst day
of rioting that month. Convinced that
Sharif-Emami could not last, I went to
see the man widely tabbed as his suc-
cessor—Ali Amini, a renowned liberal
and reformer, who had been Prime
Minister at the time of the land-reform
legislation of the early sixties.

Mr. Amini received me at his home, a comfortable villa in the northern section of Teheran. He had been educated in Paris, and, like most of the older generation of the Iranian élite, spoke French more easily than English. He said, "The heart of the problem is the Shah. He doesn't like to hear the truth. He has allowed himself to be surrounded by flatterers who have isolated him. He has given over the country to a class of nouveaux riches. They show off all the time. That shocks people and turns them against the regime. The clergy has become important only because there is a lack of rapport between the Shah and the people."

His solution was to form a govern-
ment of national unity which would
take over the country and open the
way to new elections. He would in-
clude representatives of the National
Front. "Sanjabi isn't much," he said of
the Front leader, "but his party has a
great name." The key to such a gov-
ernment, however, was the Shah. "He
has to learn to reign, not rule," Amini
said. "He must accept the idea of a
constitutional monarchy in Iran. In
fact, he must lead the way to constitu-
tional monarchy."

I asked Amini whether he thought
the Shah was ready for such a step. He
said that he had not seen the Shah in
some time, and went on, "I'm pre-
pared, but I don't think he wants to see
me. That probably means he isn't
ready to lessen his role in government.
But I'm waiting."

FROM the home of Mr. Amini, I
went to the home of Mr. Sanjabi—
an equally comfortable villa, with a
swimming pool. Amini had indicated
that Sanjabi was important as the lead-
er of the National Front—the politi-
cal remnant of the most serious pre-
vious challenge to the Shah. That had
been made back in 1951-53 by Mo-
hammed Mossadegh, who, as Prime
Minister, confiscated the formerly Brit-
ish oil holdings and put together a na-
tionalist following embracing the mul-
lahs, the bazaaris, and, for a time, the
Tudeh Party. At one point in Amini's

1953, Mossadegh forced the Shah to
flee the country. But a countercoup was
organized with help from the Central
Intelligence Agency. Mossadegh was
driven from power, and the Shah re-
turned. Sanjabi, a lieutenant of Mos-
sadegh's in those days, had survived
years of prison to emerge as the fore-
most figure in the National Front.

He spoke French to me, and was
wearing yellow-gold-rimmed glasses, a
gray suit of rich flannel, and Italian
shoes. "There is unhappiness at every
level," he told me. "It engulfs all class-
es—intellectuals, students, mullahs,
bazaaris, civil servants, teachers, peas-
ant s. A true agrarian reform is neces-
sary. The relations between the land-
lords and the peasants are still not just.
Despite the talk of land reform, the dis-
tribution of land was not fully achieved.
It was not accompanied by the passing
out of the credits, fertilizers, tractors,
and irrigation facilities that modern
farming requires. We had a twenty-
billion-dollar gift in the oil-price rise of
1973. We should have developed rural
Iran first, and then industry. Instead,
the Shah spent most of that gift on his
family. So we had a terrible inflation,
a building boom that collapsed, and
acute shortages of food. Discontent be-
came universal. Now everybody in the
universities is against the regime. The
young men have twentieth-century
ideas, but, as in a war or any difficult
period, their sentiments turn to reli-
gion. The corner mosque is the only
forum for discussion. And the mullahs
are not as backward as you might
think. The Iranian people are capable
of democracy. The West thinks we're
in the fifth century. That's wrong.
Mossadegh was a sincere democrat.
He wanted democracy in this country
and in this century."

I brought Sanjabi back to the present
with a series of questions. How did he
see the present government? What
were the chances of a military coup?
What did he expect from a visit to
Paris to see Ayatollah Khomeini,
which he was to undertake the next
day?

He said, "The government of Sharif-
Emami has done some good things.
But he enjoys no confidence. The pub-
lic doesn't trust him. He has to take
radical decisions, but he doesn't. He
waits, and the situation gets worse and
worse. Now it's too far gone." He
acknowledged the possibility of a mili-
tary coup. "But it has no chance of suc-
ceeding," he said. "There's no political
support. The Army could stay in pow-
er only by force, as in Pakistan and
South Vietnam. It couldn't last. Thus,
the average citizen of this country in

the Shah. He detains all the liberals
and keeps down men of integrity. He
likes thieves. He has sexual weaknesses.
He is not sincerely for liberalization.
He wants to gain time, divide the re-
ligious from the lay opposition, and
go back to his old system, which is
essentially military rule." Of his
visit to Paris, Sanjabi said, "I am not
worried about my coming encounter
with Khomeini. I am an optimist.
Ayatollah Khomeini doesn't want
chaos. We have to turn to Ayatollah
Khomeini."

AS it happened, nobody's plans—not
those of the Shah or those of
Prime Minister Sharif-Emami or those
of former Prime Minister Ali Amini or
those of opposition leader Karim San-
jabi—carried the day. On Wednes-
day, November 1st, the Shah, appar-
ently convinced that Sharif-Emami
could not continue, received Ali Amini
for the first time in years and began
conversations concerning the formation
of a coalition regime. According to the
local press, Amini told the Shah he
needed support from Sanjabi, and the
Shah agreed to receive Sanjabi on his
return from Paris. On November 3rd,
after seeing Sanjabi, Ayatollah Kho-
meini said in an interview on the Paris-
based Radio Luxembourg, "We have
told the representatives of the opposi-
tion, such as Ali Amini and Karim
Sanjabi, that if they agree to negotiate
with the regime they will be banned
from our movement." Karim Sanjabi
came back to Teheran and called a
press conference to announce his terms
for negotiating with the regime. The
press conference never took place. By
that time, events had pushed another
set of actors, the military, to center
stage. Two months before, on Septem-
ber 4th, there had been large demon-
strations in Teheran to mark the end of
Ramadan. Though the demonstrations
were peaceful, thousands marched, and
the military feared that matters might
get out of hand. On September 6th, the
government banned unauthorized gath-
erings, and the next day there was an-
other large rally against the Shah in
Teheran. That afternoon, the military
leaders went to the Shah and asked for
a proclamation of martial law. The
Shah told them to clear it with the
Prime Minister and his government.
The issue was argued between the sol-
diers and the Cabinet late into the night
of September 7th. Toward midnight,
the Cabinet gave its consent, and early
the next morning martial law was de-
creed in Teheran and eleven other
cities. But it was too late for a public

proclamation to reach most people. Later that morning—Friday, September 8th—a large crowd gathered in Jaleh Square, a central meeting spot in downtown Teheran. After repeated orders to disperse were ignored, the security forces opened fire. More than a hundred people were killed, by the official count, and many hundreds wounded.

The shock of that massacre caused everybody to draw back. Prime Minister Sharif-Emami was able to ne-

gotiate a loose understanding whereby martial law was not enforced to the letter. Strikes by civil servants, which had begun in September, were not broken up, though they were illegal. Nor were student demonstrations, though the martial-law proclamation forbade any gathering of

more than three persons. "There was martial law without there exactly being martial law," the Prime Minister observed to me.

That fuzzy condition put an obvious strain on the military leaders. Top commanders were unsure of their responsibilities. At one point, in October, the commander of the ground forces, General Gholam Ali Oveisi, sent an officer to warn the staff of the English-language daily *Kayhan* against articles he considered inaccurate and inflammatory. The reporters thereupon threatened to go on strike, and the Prime Minister backed them up. Unit commanders never knew exactly when to intervene. At least some of the rank and file, and perhaps some of the junior officers, sided with demonstrators. On two occasions, provincial police officers were shot by enlisted men in the Army.

Moreover, the military leaders had trouble reaching a consensus on what to do. The Shah, to assure his supremacy and to guard against coups, had set up separate lines of communication with many different security organizations and their leaders. The Shah himself is Supreme Commander of the armed forces. He has a personal chief of staff, General Gholam Reza Azhari, who oversees all the branches of the military, and meets tête-à-tête with the Shah twice a week. There are the chiefs of the three separate services—General Oveisi, commander of the ground forces, with two hundred and eighty thousand men; Admiral Kama-leddin Habibollahi, commander of the naval forces, with thirty-two thousand men; and General Amir Hossein Rabü, commander of the Air Force, with forty-eight thousand men—who also

is the head of the rural police, or governorerie, which is some seventy-five thousand strong and exercises administrative control over all villages with a population of less than four thousand, General Abbas Gharabaghi, who was also Minister of the Interior in the Sharif-Emami government. There is the head of the secret police, General Nasser Moghaddam. There is, finally, the head of procurement, General Hassan Toufanian, who also serves as

Vice-Minister of War to a figurehead Minister of War, General Reza Azimi.

The differences in military specialty are compounded by variations in personality and experience. The commanders of the Air Force and the Navy are relatively young men—both are forty-six—and do not carry a lot of weight in the system. Air Force General Rabü is known as a typical fly-boy, weak in political and geopolitical understanding. General Oveisi, a former classmate of the Shah at the military college, is particularly close to the ruler. General Azhari, the Shah's chief of staff, is sixty-nine and is noted for his deliberate ways and lack of ambition. "He is underwhelming," an American who worked with him once said. "He always gives the impression that he'd rather climb a mountain or read a book than command an army. He's exactly the right man when tensions run high."

Toward the end of October, I went to the Army headquarters, northeast of Teheran, to visit General Oveisi. I found a solidly built, plainspoken man whose chest was covered with ribbons. He was in a distinctly unhappy mood. He did not like one bit the messy politics associated with the Shah's liberalization campaign, which he felt played directly into the hands of the Communists. He said, "Two years ago, the Shah decided to let people be really free. Iranians who had fled the country—writers and people like that—came back here. The National Front began speaking out. The Communist Party began acting up. The religious people asserted themselves. Basically, there were two types. One group was very religious. They followed Shariatmadari, and they didn't meddle in politics. The other group specialized in politics. They were the followers of Khomeini. They started to organize people against the government and its institutions. The Communists took advantage of the situation. They made strong statements. They burned books and schools. Communists said

many instructors in high schools and colleges are Communists. The instructors persuaded all the students to go on strike, and so all classes were postponed.

"Most people in the United States and Europe are against our government. You send journalists here who see only leaders of the opposition. Then the journalists produce stories that are broadcast by the radio here and printed in the press. So the people here think they are not free.

"We have a well-disciplined and well-trained Army. The forces are ninety-nine per cent loyal to the Shah. Maybe there's one per cent not loyal—I don't know. I just say that to be careful. So we are not worried. What does worry me is that there is a Communist Party growing stronger. What worries me more is that when the Communists use freedom to write or to speak to undermine the government, the government is silent. When people strike and make difficulties for others, it is not correct. It jeopardizes security."

General Moghaddam, the head of SAVAK, who is a tall, pleasant-faced man with receding iron-gray hair, expressed similar ideas when I called on him in late October at his headquarters in Teheran. He said that the demonstrations were "organized one hundred per cent by the Communists, working through students and religious leaders." He said that he himself had talked with Shariatmadari. He was convinced that Shariatmadari "supports the regime but is afraid to speak out"—afraid because the government offered no protection. It was too weak to take action even against the Communists. "Two weeks ago, we identified a writer who was very active in provoking people to demonstrate against the government," he told me. "We asked the government's permission to arrest him. We were told no. We did arrest several press people for instigating rebellion with false stories. We were obliged to release them all. The military and the police now have things under control. But there are dangers. It is difficult for our security forces to attack young people. If the students keep pouring into the streets, they will paralyze our security forces. If we had a powerful government that met difficulties in a powerful way, we could deal with the troubles. But we now believe the government is not strong enough. We in the security forces—in the Army, the police, and SAVAK—feel handcuffed."

The security forces' sense of being handcuffed by a weak government in-

Early introduced in late October and
early November. Demonstrations grew
eyer larger in scope, and strikes spread,
reaching the oil industry and threaten-
ing to cripple it. Negotiations for a
wider coalition picked up steam. In the
first week of November, the two series
of events moved in counterpoint to a
showdown. In Paris, on November
3rd, Ayatollah Khomeini refused to
play at coalition-making and ordered
his followers not to stop demonstrating
until they had forced the Shah from
power. In Teheran, on November 4th,
the university students, sallying forth
from the campus, toppled a statue of
the Shah at the entrance. The troops
there forced them back onto the cam-
pus. But the next day, November 5th,
there was another demonstration. This
time, the troops fired first into the air
and then into the crowd, killing several
students. The students went on the
rampage, burning banks, theatres, and
the British Embassy. The day after
that, Prime Minister Sharif-Emami
submitted his resignation, apparently in
protest against the breach of the under-
standing about limited use of martial
law. The military, with General Oveisi
in the van, seized the opportunity.
They insisted that the resignation be
accepted and that a military regime be
appointed. The Shah consented.

ON Monday, November 6th, at noon Teheran time, the Shah went on national television and radio with an extraordinary statement. He announced the appointment of a military government, but at the same time he recognized the legitimacy of the opposition, and promised to deal with grievances and to move toward free elections. He spoke with contrition, and referred to himself as the Padeshah of Iran—a term meaning simply “King,” and far less exalted than Shahanshah, or King of Kings. He said:

Dear People of Iran:

In the open political atmosphere,
gradually developed these two recent
years, you, the Iranian nation, have risen
against cruelty and corruption. This rev-
olution cannot but be supported by me,
the Padeshah of Iran.

However, insecurity has reached a
stage where the independence of the
country is at stake. Daily life is en-
dangered and what is most critical, the
lifeline of the country, the flow of oil,
has been interrupted.

I tried to form a coalition govern-
ment, but this has not been possible.
Therefore, a temporary government has
been formed to restore order and pave
the way for a national government to
carry out free elections very soon.

I am aware of the alliance that has
existed between political and economic
corruption. I renew my oath to be pro-

tector of the constitution and under-
take that past mistakes not be repeated and
[be] compensated. I hereby give assur-
ance that government will do away with
repression and corruption and that social
justice will be restored, after the sacri-
fices you have made...

At the present juncture, the Imperial
Army will fill its duties in accordance
with its oaths. Calm has to be restored
with your coöoperation.

I invite the religious leaders to help
restore calm to the only Shiite country in
the world.

I want political leaders to help save
our Fatherland. The same goes for work-
ers and peasants.

Let us think of Iran on the road
against imperialism, cruelty, and corrup-
tion, where I shall accompany you.

By validating the revolution and
pledging early free elections, the Shah
presumably hoped to put a straitjacket
on the soldiers even as he handed over
power to them. He named as Prime
Minister of the new government the
mildest of the military chiefs, General
Azhari. But the military, once in of-
fice, acted with brisk confidence. Sol-
diers were moved into the refineries,
and the striking workers, threatened
with the loss of their jobs, gradually
went back to work. Demonstrations
were repressed with heavy force. Sev-
eral leading officials—including former
Prime Minister Hoveida; General
Nasseri, the former SAVAK head; and
former Mayor Nikpay—were placed
under arrest. When Sanjabi, the Na-
tional Front leader, after his return
from his meetings with Ayatollah Kho-
meini in Paris, tried to hold a press
conference, he, too, was arrested. In-
vestigations were opened into two high-
ly sensitive matters—corruption in the
royal family, and corruption in the
Pahlavi Foundation. Either investiga-
tion could be conducted in a way that
might implicate the Shah himself.

The opposition reacted very strong-
ly. Both Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris
and Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Qum
denounced the military government.
Khomeini exhorted Iranians to “broad-
en their opposition to the Shah, and
force him to abdicate.” In a series of
fiery statements, he called for a cam-
paign of mounting demonstrations dur-
ing Moharram—the Shiite month of
mourning, which began this year on
December 2nd. He singled out as a
special target the holidays of Tasua and
Ashura, which this year fell on Decem-
ber 10th and 11th, and which com-
memorate the deaths of Hossein, the
third Imam and the grandson of Mo-
hammed, and his followers, at the Battle
of Karbala, thirteen hundred years
ago. Normally on Ashura, religious
Iranians dress themselves in black,
gather at the principal bazaar, and

march to the main mosque. As they
march, some cut their heads with
swords and whip their bodies with
chains in an ecstacy of atonement. The
processions, with blood drenching the
garments of frenzied believers, are a
revolutionary's dream.

Sensing peril, the military govern-
ment on November 28th banned "pro-
cessions of any kind" during Mohar-
ram. Nevertheless, crowds demonstrat-
ed in Teheran during the first two
days of the holy month, and there were
violations of the curfew on a large
scale. Oil production dropped from 5.8
million to below 2 million barrels a
day. An exodus of Americans got un-
der way. But even as high noon ap-
proached, the major protagonists drew
back. The Shah ordered that a hun-
dred and twenty political prisoners be
freed on Sunday, December 10th. On
December 6th, Karim Sanjabi, the
National Front leader, was released
from custody. On December 8th, Aya-
tollah Shariatmadari, at a press confer-
ence in Qum, urged his followers to
avoid violence. That same day, the
military government announced it
would permit the religious processions,
and the next day pledged to keep
troops only in the northern sections of
Teheran, out of the line of march.

On Sunday and Monday, December
10th and 11th, crowds of several hun-
dred thousand paraded through the
downtown streets. They shouted Is-
lamic religious slogans, and showed
hostility toward the Shah, the military
government, and the United States.
But there was no serious violence, and
those who tried to make trouble were
constrained by more responsible ele-
ments in the procession. The troops
drawn up in the northern section of
town, in the vicinity of the Niavaran
Palace, were not even tested.

Obviously, there had been put into
effect at the last moment a typically
Persian compromise. The palace and
the military government—working
through former Prime Minister Ali
Amini—had struck a deal with Shariat-
madari to avoid a violent showdown.
But, though the testing time has passed,
all the contending forces are still in
place. The moment seems ripe for
steps toward a regime that limits the
role of the Shah, in keeping with the
1906 constitution. But the moment is
not going to last very long. Just be-
fore the peaceful processions began,
Shariatmadari indicated that he was
prepared to renew pressure if conces-
sions were not forthcoming. He was
asked when the screw would be turned
again. He said, "It will be soon."

—JOSEPH KRAFT

THE WASHINGTON STAR Tuesday, December 4, 1979

Kennedy's Blast at Carter

"Because the shah . . . ran one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind, how do we justify . . . accepting that individual (into the U.S.) . . . with his umpteen billion dollars that he'd stolen from Iran . . . ? I think that the interest of the United States is with the Iranian people . . . I think to tie American fortunes . . . on one man (the shah), rather than on a whole nation and a people, is a policy that's bankrupt."

Text of Kennedy Interview

Following are Sen. Edward Kennedy's answers to questions about the deposed shah of Iran during an interview with KRON-TV in San Francisco that was shown Sunday.

QUESTION: What . . . is your response to (Ronald) Reagan's point and Henry Kissinger's point that we really should allow (the shah) to stay in the United States, that this is a betrayal of a friend, of a man who was a loyal ally for 30 years? And what does American friendship mean, if we're going to reject the shah?

KENNEDY: Because the shah had the reins of power, and ran one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind, in the form of terrorism, and of the basic and fundamental violations of human rights under the most cruel circumstances to his own people? How do we justify that in the United States? On the one hand accepting that individual because he would like to come here and stay here with his umpteen billion dollars that he'd stolen from Iran, and at the same time, say to Hispanics who are here legally that they have to wait nine years to bring their wife and their children to this country? Or someone who comes across the border from Mexico whose only desire is to work and provide for their family that we may even put them in jail?

QUESTION: But you don't think that these years, though, he wasn't a loyal ally of the United States?

KENNEDY: I think he was looking out after one person, himself. I think that was the number one interest of the shah, to look out after himself. I

think that the interest of the United States is with the Iranian people. We have, and should have, a strong association with the Iranian people. I think to tie American fortunes, whether it is the energy to heat the home of elderly citizens, or to run the plants and factories in this country, on one man rather than a whole nation and a people is a policy that's bankrupt. And that was the policy prior to the time the shah fell. I think the Americans and American foreign policy have to get their act together. And if we continue to identify with dictatorships, whether it's Somoza and Nicaragua, because he's prepared to vote with us X number of times and then shows he has no support of his people, or the shah or other dictators, I don't think that's wise foreign policy.

QUESTION: You don't think necessity forces you to do that at times? I'm trying to think of a Kennedy administration, where you would find yourself in a position of having to deal with a government you didn't find totally satisfactory.

KENNEDY: I think that is what diplomatic relations are. Diplomatic relations do not give tantamount to approval or disapproval of a country. I've long favored, since 1969, the formalization of relations with China — the People's Republic of China. Now the fact of the matter is that doesn't say that we approve or disapprove, it says that they exist and we have to deal with them. That's a lot different from saying that we have to take extraordinary actions in full regimes on it (sic). Now, I think we have to give a long and hard thought to these matters, and I think it's important that we do.

Connecticut City Elec

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Jackson, 53, a submarine welder, was appointed to a vacant seat on the last month ago and elected to a full term. He had lost a seat on the council 1977.

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The Senator and the Shah

SEN. KENNEDY has an interesting sense of history—both the long sweep and the only yesterday kind. You don't have to have been a friend of the deposed shah of Iran or an apologist for the depredations of his secret police to know that Mr. Kennedy's characterization of the shah's regime as “one of the most violent . . . in the history of mankind” doesn't leave any language available at all for the truly special monster regimes of ancient and modern history, those that in fact would qualify as the most violent. If the shah had been the total beast Mr. Kennedy now depicts, right up there in the—let us say—Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin class, what on earth was President John F. Kennedy doing receiving him in Washington? What was Sen. Edward Kennedy doing paying him a visit in 1975?

Yes, we know—Sen. Kennedy has said he did criticize the shah while the shah was in office, and he did also take the occasion of his visit to Iran to question

the wisdom of the Iranian arms buildup. But the man he described in his Sunday night attack on the shah was not someone you merely *criticize*, meanwhile paying a call on. Do you think while howdy-and-shaking, as in the accompanying photograph, Mr. Kennedy was saying: You, sir, run one of the most violent regimes in the history of mankind and (the rest of the allegation) are stealing umpteen billion dollars and care only for yourself? Doesn't look like it.

If there was a time to say that, surely it was then and not now. The shah's cruel successor has sought to camouflage his own depredations by demanding that the shah be called to account—and Sen. Kennedy asserts as simple truth the ayatollah's claims. Yesterday, as the predictable and justifiable uproar was heard, Mr. Kennedy backed off some. Yet the damage in this tense situation was done. It wasn't right, it wasn't responsible, and it wasn't smart.

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Wall Street Journal

# Khomeini's Theocratic Vision

By MICHAEL LEDEN

Recently Jonathan Randall of The Washington Post quoted without comment the remarkable claim of Ayatollah Khomeini, the elderly Iranian Moslem leader living in exile in Paris, that he would be quite willing to see his country maintain good relations with the U.S. American columnists have reported enthusiastically claims by associates of Khomeini that they favor a form of democratic socialism based on the Koran.

As George Will acidly remarked earlier this week: "The sort of people who, a decade ago, compared Ho Chi Minh to George Washington, are now comparing Khomeini to Jefferson."

This, despite a convincing body of evidence, that Khomeini, who has called for the removal of the Shah and who appears to be controlling much of the disruption in Iran, is in fact a clerical fascist, a violent anti-Semite and an intensely chauvinistic anti-American. This evidence, moreover, is not the sort which is closely guarded in the offices of intelligence agencies; it is published in several books in Arabic and Persian, and is readily available to anyone willing to look at it. Until recent days, few Western observers apparently were willing to take the time.

Khomeini's attacks on the Shah are cut from a single piece of theological cloth. In both "Islamic Government," a collection of his lectures published in Arabic in 1970, and "Khomeini and His Movement," a collection of his speeches and harangues, published in Persian in 1975, Khomeini criticizes the Shah for violating Islamic law and for betraying the principles of the Koran. "The rationale of (the Shah's) government and some of its members is the abolition of the laws of Islam," Khomeini is quoted as saying in the 1975 volume.

## Violations Ascribed

The violations he ascribes to the "Shah's government are those that characterize what we would call a secular, pluralistic society. Thus, Khomeini rails against the employment of women in boys' high schools, and men in girls' high schools, "the moral wrongness of which is clear to all." Furthermore, the Shah and his allies are condemned for urging that "women enter (certain) government offices, while their being there is both self-evidently useless and morally wrong." The Shah is also attacked for his lenacity in the enforcement of the Koran's moral code. "We want," according to Khomeini's 1970 volume, "a ruler who would cut off the hand of his own son if he steals, and would flog and stone his near relative if he formulates."

If Khomeini and his followers come to power in Iran, all this will presumably be rigorously enforced. In the 1970 book he says: "If a just mullah is placed in charge of the enforcement of canonical punishments ... would he enforce them otherwise than how they were enforced in the days of the Prophet ...? Would the Prophet have imposed more than a hundred lashes on the fornicator not previously chastise? Can the mullah reduce the amount of this punishment, thereby creating a divergence between his practice and that of the Prophet? Most certainly not!

The ruler ... is no more than the executor, of God's command and decree."

Khomeini's complaints about the Shah are made, then, in the name of the Muslim divines in Iran, for only they (the mullahs) can be expected to enforce the laws of Islam properly. The attacks on the Shah are not complaints about the harshness of his regime or violations of human rights by Savak, the secret police. Rather, Khomeini condemns the Shah's regime for having sapped the fiber of the country by bringing unsuitable people (non-mullahs) to positions of power.

Above all, Khomeini bemoans the replacement of mullahs with lay persons in

> "If a just mullah is placed in charge of the enforcement of canonical punishments, ... would he enforce them otherwise than how they were enforced in the days of the Prophet?"

the courts of Iran. In fact, under the Shah's father and more recently under the Shah himself, some lay persons have been appointed to judgements, and it is even theoretically possible that some non-Moslems could become judges (although no such cases have been reported). Khomeini is quoted in the 1975 book as finding such pluralism contemptible:

> "In order to accomplish its own designs and to abolish manliness and adherence to Islam as qualities for judges, the government's Ministry of Justice has shown its opposition to the established laws of Islam. From this point on, Jews, Christians and enemies of Islam and of the Muslims must interfere in the affairs of Muslims...."

When Khomeini refers to "enemies of Islam," this is a code-word for the Baha'i, an eclectic offshoot of Islam, who, along with Christians and Jews, would find a regime led by the mullahs extremely unpleasant.

But if Khomeini is consistently xenophobia toward all non-Muslims he reserves particular venom for the Jews, and for their two great national supporters in the world: Israel and the United States. In the case of Israel, no distinction is made between Jews and Israelis, and the Shah is viewed as the agent of both: "... what is this relationship and association between the Shah and Israel that the Savak says, 'Do not speak about the Shah or about Israel.' Is the Shah in the view of the Savak an Israeli? Or, in the view of the Savak, is the Shah a Jew?"

It is Israel and the Jews who, in the writings of Ayatollah Khomeini, have brought about the desecration of Iran. Over and over again, in a series of books: lectures and harangues, Khomeini has lashed out at Israel (and, ultimately the United States) as the basic cause of his country's moral and religious ills. From "Khomeini and His Movement":

> "Israel does not wish that the Koran exist in this Kingdom; Israel does not wish that the mullahs of Islam exist in this country ... Israel through its evil agents

> ... has dealt a blow to us. It strikes at you, the nation: it wishes to seize your economy; it wishes to carry off your commerce and agriculture; it wishes to make itself the owner of wealth. ... The Koran bars its way—it must be removed. ... The Iranian government in pursuance to the purposes and schemes of Israel has humiliated us and continues to do so."

Little wonder, then, that Khomeini is now finding willing allies in the Libyan regime of Muammar al-Khadaffi, and among the Palestine Liberation Organization. But Khomeini does not stop with attacks on Jews, Christians, Baha'is and Israel; for behind all these enemies of the new order he wishes to create in Iran lies the United States. Again, from "Khomeini and His Movement":

> "It is America which supports Israel and its well-wishers; it is America which gives Israel the power to turn Muslim Arabs into vagrants; it is America which directly or indirectly imposes its agents on the nation of Iran; it is America which considers Islam and the glorious Koran a source of harm to itself and wishes to remove both from its path."

## "Stop Interfering"

These words were published in 1975, and although the Washington Post reports critically Khomeini's statement that he is quite willing to have good relations with the United States if America "stops interfering in the internal affairs of Iran," it seems that his basic hatred of this country continues as before. After all, the same Khomeini urges his followers at the Tehran airport to strike against American and Israeli airlines. And the same Khomeini told the audience of the MacNeil-Lehrer Report that he would stop oil shipments to the United States and Israel.

In light of Khomeini's writings, it is astonishing to find him treated with such sympathy in the West. No matter how strongly one may deplore the Shah's authoritarianism, no matter how revolting one may find the excesses of Savak, there can be little reason for any democratic citizen of the West to sympathize with Ayatollah Khomeini. For if he has a major voice in the government of Iran, all women and all those not in the good graces of the Muslim divines will be second-class citizens, and all Iranians subject to stern punishment for violating the theocratic code.

As Judith Miller of The New York Times wrote in an important article tucked away on the fourth page of last Saturday's edition, Khomeini's writings demonstrate contempt for all forms of government except the theocracy. In the present circumstances, it is not surprising that Khomeini and his followers should have made attempts to disclaim authorship of the books; they make very unpleasant reading for the West.

Finally, for those who believe that Khomeini, whatever his faults, is nonetheless a sincere patriot who is fighting for his people, there is a significant incident from his own past. In 1968, when Khomeini was a guest of the Iraqi government, some 300,000 Persian Shi'ites (in whose name Khomeini now speaks) were brutally expelled from Iraq. Many of these had been born and raised in Iraq, since the two holiest cities of the Shi'ites lie in that country. The expulsion caused great suffering, but Khomeini did not say a word.

Mr. Ledeen is executive editor of The Washington Quarterly, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University.

George Lenezowski
2957 Avalon Avenue
Berkeley, California 94705

Saturday, Feb. 23, 1980

Mr. Joseph V. Reed, Vice President
The Chase Manhattan Bank
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10015

Dear Mr. Reed:

Enclosed please find a summary of my forthcoming report. This summary omits certain items contained in the full report. It does, however, include all the four essential points requested by you on the telephone.

With my warm personal regards,

Enclosure

Mailed by air express.

REVOLUTION IN IRAN: SOME REFLECTIONS AND HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS

Public opinion in the United States and the world at large has been
exposed in recent times to many distortions of truth regarding the pre- and
post-revolutionary situation in Iran. Most of these distortions have emanated
from the present Iranian regime and, wittingly or unwittingly, have been
amplified by the media. This activity has been accompanied by terroristic
methods used by the revolutionary authorities in Iran toward their political
enemies, in the form of secret summary trials, executions, and imprisonments,
as well as by the seizure, mistreatment, and humiliation of the hostages in
the American Embassy. Today, as a condition for the release of the hostages,
the United States government is asked by the Teheran authorities to agree
to the investigation of the alleged misdeeds of the deposed Shah, Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi, to apologize for the past American "crimes" toward Iran, and
to promise not to interfere in Iran's internal affairs. In the face of
these arrogant and humiliating demands and of the systematic misrepresenta-
tion of the truth by Iran's revolutionary regime, it is appropriate to repudiate
a number of allegations and correct a number of distortions. Four points
in particular deserve attention: the record of the Pahlavi rule, the alliance
relationship of Iran to the United States, the alleged misdeeds of the Shah,
and the methods of the revolutionary regime.

1. The Record of the Pahlavi Rule

The Pahlavi regime (1925-1979) was a modernizing monarchy that brought about remarkable and altogether beneficial changes in Iran. On the eve of the takeover of power by the father of the present Shah in 1921, Iran was in a sad state of almost complete disintegration. Foreign armies--Russian,

2

Turkish, British, and some German--criss-crossed Iranian territory at their will; provincial tribal chiefs were a law unto themselves; banditry flourished in the countryside as well as in the cities; breakdowns in the supply of food caused repeated famines; the Iranian military forces, with the exception of the Russian-officered Persian Cossacks and the Swedish-officered Gendarmerie, were in a state of disarray; the country had virtually no paved roads and no railways; and the government, nominally headed by the weak-willed last incumbent of the Qajar dynasty and in reality run by a small oligarchy of wealthy but corrupt politicians, was utterly incapable of performing a minimum of tasks expected from it.

The advent to power of the energetic and patriotic soldier, Reza Shah, brought a radical change in this situation and ushered in an era of major reforms which, after his abdication in 1941, were vigorously continued by his heir, Mohammed Reza Shah.

In the first place, the Pahlavis, both father and son, defended, safeguarded, and promoted the independence, territorial integrity, and unity of Iran, against both Soviet encroachments and the remnants of British imperialism. Typical of this concern for the country's survival were four actions, two conducted by the father, Reza Shah, and two by the son, Mohammed Reza Shah.

In the 1920s Reza Shah curbed the rebellion of Kuchik Khan, putting an end to the short-lived but dangerous Soviet Republic of Gilan established with the help of Soviet troops along the Caspian Sea. He also subdued the recalcitrant semi-autonomous potentate, Sheikh Khazal of Mohammira, who traditionally relied on British assistance to press his claims in the oil-rich province of Khuzistan.

Similarly, Reza's heir, Mohammed Reza Shah, faced Soviet-sponsored rebellions in the northwest province of Azerbaijan and in Kurdistan. In

3

1946 his troops defeated both rebel structures and reintegrated these two areas into the Iranian state.

Both rulers were engaged in a difficult nation-building process as against ethnic, tribal, and provincial centrifugal tendencies. Both built and maintained a highly centralized state which was an absolute necessity for national survival. To accomplish this prime objective, they developed and maintained a substantial military establishment which vividly contrasted with the military disarray and weakness of the preceding, Qajar, era. While Iran's army could never be regarded as capable of coping with a major Soviet invasion, it could and did protect the borders against infiltration and smuggling and definitely constituted a deterrent to any neighbor other than the Soviets, should such a neighbor contemplate an aggression.

To erect and run an effective machinery of the state, both rulers paid special attention to the orderly administration of finances and did not hesitate to avail themselves of expert American assistance. Such assistance was provided on a contract basis by the mission led by Dr. Arthur C. Millspaugh on two occasions, in the 1920s and the 1940s.

Both Pahlavi rulers were modernizers. The role of Reza Shah has often been compared to that of Kemal Atatürk in neighboring Turkey. Reza Shah deplored the backwardness of Iran and worked hard to Westernize it in the technical, economic, social, and cultural fields. The major difference between Reza Shah's reign and that of Mohammed Reza Shah was that the former had to rely on a very limited financial base while the latter could promote modernization with ample financial resources, especially after 1954 following the conclusion of the oil crisis.

Reza Shah's monumental achievement was the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railroad linking the Persian Gulf with the Caspian Sea. His son

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Mohammed Reza's policy of development was much more comprehensive. He built on the foundations laid down by his father, but he both broadened the scope and intensified the pace of development. Soon after World War II, American consulting firms, Morrison-Knudsen of Boise, Idaho, and Overseas Consultants, Inc., were engaged to survey Iran's needs and prepare blueprints for the first Seven-Year Plan. The oil crisis of 1951-53 disrupted the implementation of this Plan, but as soon as Iran's oil revenues resumed in the mid-1950s, a number of consecutive Development Plans--usually of five years' duration--were adopted and implemented. The last of these, the Fifth Plan (1973-78), called for a total of nearly $70 billion expenditures, divided between some $40 billion of public funds and some $30 billion of private investments.

Major strides were made in the field of industry. To give a few examples: during 15 years between 1960 and 1975 production of steel and aluminum rose from 29,000 to 275,000 tons--a nearly tenfold increase; of cement from 680,000 to 4,300,000 tons--a sixfold increase; of fertilizers from 27,000 tons to 414,000--a fifteenfold increase; of passenger cars from 2,000 to 71,000--a 35-fold increase; of trucks and buses from 1,000 to 38,000--a 38-fold increase; of coal from 237,000 to 900,000 tons--a nearly fourfold increase; of iron ore from 58,000 to 900,000 tons--a fifteenfold increase; and of cotton and synthetic textiles from 170 million to 533 million meters--a three-fold increase. In the field of services, transportation claimed much government attention. During the first four Development Plans Iran increased its highway and paved road network by nearly 25,000 kilometers, which more than doubled the 17,000 kilometers of roads existing at the beginning of Mohammed Reza Shah's reign. The railroad network was also substantially expanded: branches were built to connect such provincial

5

centers as Tabriz, Meshed, Qum, Isfahan, Kerman, and Zahedan with the original Trans-Iranian Railway. A new stretch of the railroad provided connection between the Iranian and Turkish railway systems, thus making it possible to travel by rail from Istanbul to Pakistan and India.

Similarly, great expansion took place in the construction and improvement of harbors. Notable was the development of new ports on the island of Kharg, as well as in Bandar Mashahr and Chah Bahar in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Although in the era of Five-Year Plans agriculture received a somewhat lower priority than industry and services, much positive, especially infrastructural, work was accomplished. To ensure adequate water supplies to the dry areas of Iran, a number of big dams were constructed, notably the Karaj Dam, the Dez River Dam and the Sefid Rud Dam. The twelve dams constructed between 1957 and 1972 generated some three billion kilowatt-hours of electricity per year and made it possible to expand the irrigated area by nearly 300,000 hectares and improve an additional 366,000. During the five plans, the irrigated area increased from 2.8 million to about 4 million hectares.

Overall Iran's GNP growth rate was 10.4 percent between 1965 and 1972 and about 25 percent during the Fifth Plan (1973-78), placing it in the group of four to five highest growth rate countries in the world.

Whereas the first Pahlavi ruler put a primary emphasis on the strengthening of the state, his son, Mohammed Reza Shah, aimed at a simultaneous economic and social development. In fact, social issues--as attested by his own statements and the emphasis of the successive Development Plans--were of major concern to him. His pioneering venture in this respect was the decision reached in the 1950s to distribute the inherited royal estates

6

among the peasants and to treat it as a pilot project for a more comprehensive land reform.

In pursuance of his social goals, the Shah launched in January 1963 the so-called White Revolution by announcing a program of six points which by the later 1970s had grown to nineteen points. The most important of the original six points were land reform, the granting of voting rights to women, a guarantee of a workers' share in the profits of enterprises, and the formation of a Literacy Corps. With the passage of time, a number of other points, dealing with health, reconstruction, rural justice, water resources, employee stock ownership, free education, free nutrition for infants, and nationwide social security were added.

Cultural, educational, and welfare problems claimed consistently the attention of the Shah and Empress Farah, as exemplified by their active participation and leadership in the annual educational conference held in Ramsar. During the Shah's reign the number of Iranian universities grew from one to thirteen. Increased emphasis was placed on improvement of quality of academic instruction and introduction of advanced technology. A separate Ministry of Science and Higher Education was established. Special recruiting teams were sent to Europe and America to bring back Iranian holders of higher degrees from Western institutions and thus reduce the brain drain by offering them attractive academic and other positions. A network of primary and secondary schools was greatly enlarged. And the health services were expanded to such an extent that the New York-based American organization dedicated to assistance in the sector of health, The Iran Foundation, was dissolved in the mid-1970s because its excellent but financially limited services were outdistanced by the amply-financed Iranian government facilities.

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Most Western analysts of Iran's economy and social scene in the 1960s and 1970s agreed that Iran's development was progressing at a remarkably swift pace. Between the end of World War II and the later 1970s the per capita income rose nearly tenfold and reached the vicinity of $2,000. Iran was certainly a fast-growing and dynamic country, attracting thousands of foreign experts, imported laborers, tourists, and high-ranking official visitors.

The implementation of such an ambitious program of development and reform, telescoped as it was within a short span of time, was bound to encounter difficulties, infrastructural bottlenecks, and administrative failures. In fact, the economy, especially in the mid-1970s, following a tremendous rise in oil revenue, appeared to be overheated, with such adverse effects as inflation. However, the basic vision of progress, the dedication and steadily improving quality of highly educated technocratic leadership were there. The Shah, with his perseverance and energy, provided the initiative and direction to his country's march toward "the Great Civilization."

## 2. The Shah as an Ally of the United States

A frequent allegation has been made by the revolutionary regime that the Shah was a pliable instrument of American foreign policy who placed foreign--particularly American--interests above those of Iran.

The truth is that the Shah was an independent ruler who, while fully safeguarding Iran's independence and sovereignty, voluntarily chose to pursue a policy of alliance with the United States. He did so out of conviction that the United States could more effectively than any other power help Iran in resisting the threat of Soviet aggression and domination. Thus the Shah welcomed the Truman policy of containment of Communism and its sequel, the Eisenhower Doctrine. He willingly joined the Western-sponsored security

8

system in the Middle East by signing the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the mutual security pact with the United States in 1959. He played a positive stabilizing role in the Persian Gulf and, by sending an expeditionary force to Oman at the request of Sultan Qabus, he materially contributed to the containment and repulsion of the Aden-supported Marxist rebellion in the province of Dhofar. In pursuance of his policy of stability in the region, the Shah cooperated with such moderate regimes as Saudi Arabia and Sadat's Egypt. He lessened the aggravation caused by the Arab oil boycott and embargoes in 1973 by continuing the exports of Iranian oil without any restrictions and by actually supplying the United States Navy in certain locations where the Arab oil embargo would have had an adverse effect on its mobility. He refused to subject Israel to any boycott measures and, as head of a non-Arab state, he both supplied oil to Israel and used Israel's Red Sea-Mediterranean pipeline for transit purposes. Last but not least, he made Iran's territory available to the emplacement of American electronic tracking stations vital in the surveillance of Soviet conformance with the strategic arms limitations agreements.

These policies were first and foremost dictated by Iran's national interest and were based on a rational and intelligent perception that the Shah has had of world strategy and international politics. But while pursuing these national objectives, the Shah--by firmly identifying himself with the Free World and contributing his share to its defense--was also rendering a signal service to the security of the United States. It was certain that when the British power was removed from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran--with American arms assistance--was performing a constructive security task in that area, both by deterring external aggression and by combatting internal subversion; it was also certain that should this Iranian power be

9

removed from the scene, a dangerous vacuum would occur, a vacuum which would
bring the United States and the Soviet Union closer to a military confron-
tation. President Carter's policy statement of January 23, 1980, defining
the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest to the United States, where
an attempt at domination by a foreign power would be resisted even by
military means, has starkly vindicated this thesis.

3. Issues of Oppression and Plunder

It has been alleged by Iran's revolutionary regime and some other critics
that the royalist system was that of oppression and plunder of national wealth.

The truth is that the Shah's rule was authoritarian but not totalitarian
and that the Shah made tremendous contributions to the increase of Iran's
national wealth.

As for the allegation of oppressive rule, Mohammed Reza Shah, like his
father, felt--especially since 1953--that to carry out his modernization and
reform program, to overcome the traditionalist pockets of resistance
(landowners, clergy, and tribes), and to mobilize the nation toward a sus-
tained effort, a strong central authority was needed. Thus there occurred,
beginning with the 1960s, a significant shift of power from the parliament to
the executive. Furthermore, ample evidence of Communist subversion and
Soviet espionage posed the need for the existence of dependable security
organs. An eloquent example of such dangers was provided in 1954, when
Iranian intelligence discovered a large Soviet-sponsored espionage ring in
the army. It was composed of some 600 officers of whom 60 were of colonel
rank. A country with a 1200-mile boundary with the Soviet Union could hardly
tolerate subversion of this sort in the most sensitive arm of the state.

In addition, Iran, like most countries of Asia, has had a long tradition
of authoritarianism going back some twenty-five centuries. To create a

10

working democratic system takes time; it requires a slow development of
political culture and an atmosphere free of threats in international rela-
tions. Iran, like many countries of the Third World, could aim at speeding
up its development process; but, like so many of them, it found it difficult
to ensure a corresponding fast pace of political development.

As a result, the Shah emerged as the holder of supreme authority, even
though the formal parliamentary institution was maintained. The regime was
clearly authoritarian, which meant that active opposition was not tolerated
and that any attempt at violent resistance was bound to be countered by
coercive measures. However, this insistence on conformity was almost exclu-
sively restricted to the political sphere. So long as activity of individuals
and groups was free of political connotations in the social, economic, and
cultural spheres, the government did not interfere and much freedom obtained.

To give a few examples: under Mohammed Reza Shah the government did
not issue any rules regarding the dress of women: despite the earlier ban
on veils (enforced by Reza Shah), women were free to dress in a traditional
or modern way. Nor were there limitations on their employment and educa-
tional opportunities. On the contrary, their status was markedly enhanced.
Although Iran is a predominantly Moslem country, production and consumption
of alcohol was permitted. In the educational field, large numbers of young
men and women were allowed and encouraged to study abroad, often on govern-
ment scholarships, and thus to be exposed to foreign ideas and way of life.
In 1978-79 there were about 53,000 Iranian students in the United States
alone, testifying to the government's openmindedness about contacts with
foreign cultures and different political systems. Similarly, there was
marked tolerance in the religious sphere: authorities did not interfere with
massive attendance and worship in the mosques, Shi'a Islamic clergy were

11

partly subsidized and permitted to run their own religious schools--the so-called *maktabs* and *madrasehs*, pious Moslems could freely perform their pilgrimages to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq as well as to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. If certain religious leaders were at one time or another subjected to arrest, imprisonment or expulsion, it was not on account of their religious practices but invariably because of their political activity, sometimes of provocative and violent type, against the regime.

By the same token, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and Bahais were left free to worship in their own churches, temples, and congregations.

A number of Bahais held high-ranking positions in the Iranian government.

Although the Shah's regime did not tolerate active political opposition, it never engaged in massive executions of its political enemies.

Considering the challenge to the monarchy that Premier Mossadegh's government represented, it is remarkable that, after its overthrow in August of 1953, Mossadegh was merely sentenced to a short term of prison, following which he was confined to enforced but comfortable residence on his own country estate. Furthermore, only one minister of Mossadegh's last cabinet, Hossein Fatemi, was sentenced to death and executed, not for serving in the cabinet but for calling, in alliance with the Communist Tudeh Party, for the overthrow of the monarchy. No drastic punitive measures were taken against other ministers of Mossadegh's government.

It is true that there were political prisoners in Iran. Their exact number is not available but surely it bears no relation to the grossly inflated and frequently changing figures cited by the revolutionary leaders.

These leaders, by the way, initially claimed that some 60,000 people were executed during the Shah's rule. This figure was later--in the fall of 1979--increased to 100,000, with another 100,000 maimed. No evidence

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whatsoever was supplied to sustain these exaggerated claims.

As for the prison conditions, they began to improve in 1977-78 as attested by the reports of the International Red Cross, reports which the present revolutionary regime tried to suppress.

There is no doubt that the security organization in Iran had in a number of instances acted roughly toward militant political opponents of the royalist regime. But again this pattern was not unique to Iran. Questionable and sometimes brutal police behavior has been characteristic of many less developed countries where there is a strong concentration of power in the hands of the ruler or the ruling party; it has been especially pronounced in Communist states. In contrast to the Soviet Union, with its Gulag forced labor camps network, confinement of dissidents in insane asylums, a record of mass murder of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, harassment of Jews for their attempts to emigrate, persecution of national minorities--most recently the people of Lithuania--, and continuous suppression of religion, Iran had no concentration camps, no ban on emigration nor restrictions on travel, no coercion to ensure religious conformity, and such repressive measures as were taken at one time or another were directed against politically active opponents of the regime, Communist agents and spies, and elements guilty of terrorist-type subversion. All in all, Iran's royalist government compared favorably with a number of its neighbors and was certainly less repressive than either some radical-socialist states or some traditionalist regimes in the area.

Regarding the accusation of plunder of the national wealth, the fact is that, far from plundering, the Shah actually exerted major efforts--with notable success--to bring about a spectacular increase in the wealth of his country. This was done in two principal ways: by launching and implementing

13

the development plans which were discussed in the first part of this presentation, and by multiplying a hundredfold the national oil revenues. As for the latter, Iran's oil policy, under the Shah's personal supervision, had aimed at both the emancipation of its oil industry from foreign control and the maximization of income. In 1973, following the Shah's demand and a resulting agreement with the international Consortium, Iran took over all the operations and equipment in the oilfields, refinery and sea terminals. As for the oil revenue, the Shah's objective was to bring it to the highest possible levels by struggling for an increase in production, ensuring Iranian control over so-called downstream operations, and raising the prices. Pursuing a persistent and firm policy, the Shah succeeded in attaining most of these goals. In fact, Iran's oil policy scored a number of notable victories, of which the first was the Teheran agreement of February 1971, to be followed by a number of other successful steps. Of these the most striking was OPEC's unilateral decision reached in Teheran in December 1973 to quadruple the price of oil from $3 per barrel to nearly $12 per barrel. It was the Shah who provided the leadership in this bold move. As a result of his perseverance, Iran's oil income expanded in twenty years _100 times_ from about $200 million in 1957 to more than $20 billion in 1977.

Questions were often raised about the allegedly profligate spending of the Imperial Court. The facts are that, for example, in the itemized expenditures of the Iranian budget for the year 2537 corresponding to 1978-79, the Court accounted for about $67 million on a total of nearly $44 billion--that is, less than one-sixth of one percent.

As for the Shah's personal wealth, it is virtually impossible for an outside observer with access to published official sources to know its amount.

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It is doubtful that any reigning royal family, whether in Europe or in Asia, should be regarded as financially underprivileged. It is known that the father of Mohammed Reza Shah, during his reign in the interwar period, accumulated considerable wealth, mostly in land. But his heir, Mohammed Reza Shah, divested himself of this wealth by ordering the distribution of royal estates among the resident tenants already in the 1950s. This program was implemented as a pilot project for the subsequent land reform carried out in the 1960s.

It is true that, especially in the 1970s during the steep rise in oil revenue, a good deal of corruption occurred at various government levels-- a fact the Shah acknowledged publicly in the fall of 1978. It is doubtful whether corruption in Iran was worse than that in other states of Asia and the Middle East. Temptation to resort to corrupt practices exists everywhere, but it is especially strong where there is much money to be spent and where, as in the case of oil-rich countries, the government is the principal channel through which money percolates downward toward the nation's economy. Moreover, repeated measures were taken by the Iranian government to curb waste and corruption, perhaps not as successfully as one might expect, but resulting in dismissals from service, sentencing and imprisonment of a number of those found guilty. This record compares altogether favorably with the broad tolerance of corruption, with no known cases of action taken against high public figures, in some neighboring countries.

### 4. Conclusion: The Pahlavi and the Khomeini Regimes

In conclusion, it is useful to place the Pahlavi era, and especially Mohammed Reza Shah's regime, on a comparative scale with the Qajar period that preceded it and the revolutionary period that succeeded it.

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Little needs to be said about the vivid contrast between the Qajar and the Pahlavi eras. The Qajar era was that of shocking weakness of the state, of a merely nominal independence, of continuous encroachments of foreign powers and violations of Iran's territorial integrity. The Qajar rulers shamelessly bartered away the rights to exploitation of Iran's national resources for a few handfuls of money, supplied by the tsars of Russia or unscrupulous Western adventurers, to satisfy their immediate needs for luxury living and foreign travel. The word "development" simply did not exist in the Qajar economic vocabulary, and such notions as progress and reform had no place in the political thinking of the Qajar dynasty. The government was arbitrary but weak, incapable of ensuring the minimum of law and order; its only effective military forces were controlled by foreign officers; and tribal potentates held sway over large areas of the country, conducted their own foreign relations, and utterly disregarded the will of the central government. The country was one of the poorest and most backward in Asia.

The advent of the Pahlavis marked a turning point in the destinies of Iran and a new era of strength and progress was inaugurated. Today, when the record of the Pahlavi dynasty is attacked with the full force of malice and partisanship, and when those who strove for its overthrow were promising the country respect for human rights and democracy, some light should be thrown on the performance of the Khomeini regime as compared with that of the Pahlavis. This comparison may best be summed up under the following four major points: (a) sovereignty and strength; (b) development and reform; (c) type of government; (d) Iran's foreign policy.

(a) With regard to sovereignty, the Pahlavi regime was one of strong assertion of Iran's independence. To ensure success, the Pahlavis based their policy on organized armed strength which not only protected Iran from foreign

16

aggression and rapacity but also ensured unity of the country. As for the Khomeini regime, its assertion of sovereignty focused more on imaginary than real enemies and threats, and, in its irrational spirit of revenge, concentrated on slogans likely to incense the emotions of the mobs rather than on reasoned interest of the state. The revolutionary regime reduced Iran's military establishment to impotence by executing most of its high command, undermining its discipline, and encouraging widespread desertions. It left Iran's borders unprotected and, through its military weakness and brutal methods, opened the gates to massive assertion of centrifugal separatist movements of its ethnic minorities.

(b) In the sector of development, the Pahlavis' record was spectacular. It was also very impressive in the field of reforms, most notably that of land reform in the 1960s. The country was pushed vigorously toward modernization. Advances in education, promotion of science and technology, public health, and status of women could be cited as a few striking examples of progress. By contrast, the advent of the Khomeini regime marked a retreat or virtual collapse in virtually every one of these sectors. Arbitrary seizures of property, confiscations, repudiation of foreign debts, terror directed against both Iranian managers of enterprises and foreign specialists produced a semiparalysis of the economy. About 40,000 intimidated and frightened managers and executives left Iran, and between an estimated one-third and one-half of the labor force has remained idle. Regular credit arrangements with foreign banks suffered a major relapse. As for reform, many advances achieved by the Pahlavis were erased or nullified; instead the country was pushed headlong toward medievalism, beginning with the status of women.

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(c) As to the type of government, the Pahlavi era was broadly that of royal authoritarianism justified by the rulers by the need for strong controls to ensure national discipline, to promote rapid development, to safeguard the security of the country against foreign-inspired subversion, and to overcome reactionary resistance to modernization. The regime, without repudiating religion, was essentially secular and administered by largely Western-educated technocrats. By contrast, the Khomeini regime introduced something resembling a theocratic totalitarianism of clearly antiliberal and antidemocratic tendencies. Religious minorities--especially the Bahais--suffered shocking persecution. The new revolutionary constitution vested supreme power in the hands of the chief religious dignitary--the faqih--whose decisions are final and who can override the decisions of the president, the cabinet, and the parliament. Under the revolutionary dispensation an ill-balanced dualism of authority developed between the formal civilian government apparatus and the Supreme Revolutionary Council which, in a characteristically antidemocratic way, did not even reveal the full identity of its membership. Moreover, terrorists claiming to be students and local bands of armed revolutionary guards became a law unto themselves, constituting a state-within-the-state, according to the expression used by the recently elected President Hassan Bani-Sadr.

In fact, both the official President and--before his election--the Prime Minister have had their powers severely undermined by the continuous interference of the Revolutionary Council, of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, and of local centers of power such as the terrorist invaders of the U.S. Embassy. The result has been a disorderly, inconsistent, and contradictory decision-making process where much depends on the whim of a secluded religious figure ignorant of world politics, economics, and military affairs, and

18

animatèd by revenge and his own interpretation of Islamic law. It may be of
interest in this connection that while, back in 1925, when attempts were
made to promote the idea of a republic, Iran's religious leaders opposed
it and proclaimed the principle of monarchy as the only one compatible with
Islam, in the 1970s Khomeini has been preaching exactly the opposite.

Moreover, today's revolutionary-religious leaders, while attacking the
Shah's regime for oppression, have resorted to massive violations of human
rights. Within a few months after the overthrow of the monarchy they
arbitrarily imprisoned thousands of people, without ever revealing their
number; they executed (according to the count of the U.S. press) about 700
persons, many on such imprecise bases as "corruption on earth," in secrecy,
following mock trials with complete disregard of due process of law in either
the Western or the Islamic sense, and, more broadly, introduced into the
country an atmosphere of terror, resulting in the flight of some 1.5 million
Iranians abroad. The so-called "brain-drain" of the Pahlavi era (common to
many developing countries) pales in comparison with the massive hemorrhage
in the ranks of the best-educated and most productive intelligentsia of Iran
since the advent of the Khomeini revolution. The most eloquent example of
the violation of human decencies with worldwide repercussions has been pro-
vided by the capture of the American Embassy, the seizure of the hostages, and
their continuous detention under humiliating and painful conditions. This
act alone showed the regime's arrogant disregard for the norms of law and
morality of the civilized community of nations. Moreover, the flimsy excuses
for such ill treatment of men and women protected by diplomatic immunity
(such as alleged participation in espionage activities) would not stand the
test of any impartial scrutiny. Does the ayatollah claim that--for example--
the Soviet Embassy in Teheran does not shelter operatives who have espionage

19

functions? What proof can he adduce that other nations' embassies do not
have officers with intelligence assignments?

(d) This brings us to the final point, that of Iran's foreign relations under the Pahlavi and the Khomeini regimes. Iran's foreign policy under the Shah was based on a rationally conceived idea of national interest. Its main merit was to identify realistically and without emotion the source of greatest threat to Iran's survival and to seek appropriate means to counter this threat. The threat was defined as the aggressive power of the Soviet Union and Soviet-sponsored Communist subversion. The United States with its Western allies was selected as a country whose economic and military power and whose strategic interests in the area would best assist Iran in the safeguarding of its independence and integrity. Considering the fact of Soviet expansionism and the American containment policy since World War II, this appeared to be a logical and sound perception. As a result, an alliance relationship developed between Iran and the United States for their mutual benefit and that of the Free World at large. Certainly, the security and stability of the Persian Gulf region was enhanced by this relationship.

By contrast, the Khomeini regime has designated the United States as enemy No. 1 of Iran. Furthermore, although occasionally pronouncing themselves against Communism, Iran's revolutionary leaders have given no priority to the emphasis on either its inhumane practices or Russia's aggressive expansionism. One would look in vain in Khomeini's statements for a ringing condemnation of the Soviet conquest of Afghanistan, a condemnation comparable to the denunciations of "Satan-America." On the contrary, the Khomeini regime appears to be motivated by the persistent desire to humiliate the United States while largely playing down the record of atheistic Communist Russia.

A recent demand that the United States should apologize for helping the Shah

20

regain his throne in 1953 is an attempt to humiliate a great power basically friendly to Iran, while dangling the threat of further indignities to be inflicted on the American hostages. Actually, the United States has absolutely nothing to apologize for: its motivation in assisting the Shah in the restoration of royal legitimacy in Iran was first and foremost strategic: under the chaotic and irrational leadership of Mohammed Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani, and with an upsurge of the militant and Soviet-sponsored Tudeh Party in 1953, with its treasury empty and its economy paralyzed, Iran was rushing headlong into complete disintegration which might have ended in its slipping behind the Iron Curtain and becoming either a Soviet republic or a satellite state. It was the resolute action of the Iranian army and civilian patriots and the American assistance that spared Iran this sad destiny. Unfortunately, today's revolutionary regime is in many ways following the suicidal path taken by the Mossadegh-Kashani-Communist coalition of 1953.