1. W.W. Rostow Dec. 4, 1968 speech - "Limits and Responsibilities of American Power" - keynote address at the 14th Student Conference on National Affairs at Texas A. and M. University, College Station, Texas.

Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 6, 1969 Vol LX, No 1541 page 8.

2.

3. Aug. 6, 1969 ABM vote:

51-50 defeat of Smith Amendment (Agnew cast the additional, but unnec. vote)

51-49 defeat of Cooper-Hart amendment

4. Midway Island - a circular atoll of 2 sq. mil.

5. Cyrus ✓Vance proposed "standstill ceasefire" in first public statement. telephone interview June 15, 1969. following publication-- public release of his letter to Clark Kerr, Chairman of the National Committee for a Political Settlement in VN by the NY office. Vance endorsed the group's 5-pt. program for a peace settlement, the first of which was "a standstill ceasefire by all sides in VN."

NY Times June 16, 3:4 1969

6. Senator Milton R. Young of N. Dakota.

7. Wheeler term due to end July 2, 1968. LBJ action to extend by one year reported in Mr. 23 NYT. 1968.

8. suspended Jan. 18 after 174th weekly session. (NYT).

9. Hayden Article - ~~Jane Fonda article attached.~~
~~July 4, 1974 Rolling Stone, p. 58.~~

San Clemente
Sun Post

Nixon
Right

Lofton

January 19,
1979

WASHINGTON — On April 30, 1970, President Richard Nixon went on national TV to announce a limited, joint U.S.-South Vietnamese incursion into the Fish Hook area of Cambodia, the purpose of which was to shut down the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in Vietnam (COSVN) and to clean out the major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong-occupied sanctuaries being used to launch attacks against Cambodia, and against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. This operation was bitterly criticized by Nixon's adversaries. But now, more than eight years after it occurred, the central rationale for the president's Cambodia incursion has been corroborated by a most unlikely source: the Cambodian communists themselves.

Following his decision to go into Cambodia, President Nixon was bitterly denounced by numerous so-called anti-war activists. Peter Dale Scott, an associate professor of English at the University of California at Berkeley who co-authored "The Politics of Escalation in Vietnam," accused Nixon of being not only "misinformed" but also "probably lied to" by U.S. intelligence agencies seeking to "induce a crisis." Stating flatly that U.S. military sources in Saigon had "no knowledge" of a communist buildup in Cambodia, Scott said that what this intelligence blunder illustrated was "yet again the old maxim that the objectivity of official intelligence tends to vary inversely with its relevance to impending strategic decisions."

Another critic of Nixon's Cambodian incursion was Noam Chomsky, a professor of linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Like Scott, he felt that it was possible that "faulty intelligence" was to blame for the president's move. However, "for the most part," Chomsky said the incursion was probably "capricious or vengeful" and motivated by the U.S. military's attitude that it has the right to "defoliate or crater" any country that interferes with U.S. plans. He labeled as "hypocrisy" Nixon's reference to communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Franz Schurmann, professor of history and sociology at the University of California at Berkeley, portrayed the president's Cambodia action as a

simple cave-in "tailored to the Pentagon's desires." He declared: "Rather than reject the Pentagon's invasion plan, Nixon resorted to the transparent lie that the communists were building up in the sanctuaries for an impending massive assault in South Vietnam."

So now it is more than eight years since the 1970 U.S.-South Vietnamese move into Cambodia. In recent weeks, two Western reporters, have been allowed into Cambodia — Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and Elizabeth Becker of The Washington Post. Here is the startling admission buried in a Post story by Becker, beginning with the 36th paragraph

> "While my two-week journey does not enable me to provide a definitive report on the military situation throughout Cambodia, I was given a remarkable new document in which Cambodia confirms for the first time the extent to which the Viet Cong used the country for sanctuary during the early 1970s.

> "The 94-page 'Black Paper,' which bitterly details instances of Vietnamese aggression and perfidy, reports that 'in 1970, the figure of Viet Cong in Kampuchea (the communist name for Cambodia) reached 1.5 million to 2 million.'

> "The 'Black Paper' also discloses that when former President Richard Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia in 1970, there were in fact some 200,000 to 300,000 Viet Cong in the northeastern region of Cambodia, including 'the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Party' — the long-sought COSVN.

> "In fact, the Viet Cong had no territory in South Vietnam," a high-ranking official told me one night. "They had to come here. We had to provide them with food, hospital care, transportation for their military. At that time, there were 80,000 wounded VC in our hospitals."

John Lofton is a columnist with United Feature Syndicate.

-4-

such a conference may succeed in giving the existing
detente some concrete form, or it may simply be
another fencing match....." (p. 31).

In July 1970 -- after Cambodia -- Norman Podhoretz wrote bitterly
about the war:

> "By the time we leave [Vietnam], more than 40,000 Americans will have been killed in a war for which even the President of their country refuses to make any noble or transcendent claim." ("First Things, and Last," p. 27). "... the wanton American involvement in Vietnam comes closer and closer to an end." (p. 27).

Commentary

A few months later, Dennis H. Wrong criticized the left opposition in "The Case of the 'New York Review'" (November 1970). The New York Review's causes were right, but it went too far:

> "Vietnam became, and remains, the most frequent subject of the *NYR*'s political journalism. In attacking forthrightly the deepening American involvement in the Spring of 1965, the *NYR* undoubtedly helped to mobilize intellectuals against the war, especially through the reports on Vietnam itself by Jean Lacouture and the late Bernard Fall, and on policy formulation in Washington by Hans J. Morgenthau, Joseph Kraft, and Theodore Draper (all of whom, to be sure, were writing on Vietnam in other magazines, including, of course, *Commentary*, as well). ... But by 1966 and 1967, a new tone of extravagant, querulous, self-righteous anti-Americanism began to creep into the *NYR*'s reports on Vietnam, especially those of Noam Chomsky, Mary McCarthy, and I. F. Stone. The war seemed increasingly to provide the occasion for an extreme and bitter repudiation, marked by an unmistakable touch of *Schadenfreude*, of a great deal more in American life than the Johnson Administration's foreign policy, the Pentagon, the military-industrial complex, and the wretched clichés of cold-war propaganda. (pp. 52-53).

255

# THE POPULAR UNITY'S PROGRAMME

Programme presented to the Chilean people during the Presidential Election campaign in 1970

## INTRODUCTION

The parties and movements of which the Popular Unity's Co-ordinating Committee is composed, without prejudice to our individual philosophy and political delineations, fully agree on the following description of the national situation and on the programme proposals which are to constitute the basis of our common effort and which we now present for consideration by the whole nation.

Chile is going through a grave crisis, manifested by social and economic stagnation, widespread poverty and deprivation of all sorts suffered by workers, peasants*, and other *exploited classes* as well as in the growing difficulties which confront *white collar* workers, professional people, small and medium businessmen, and in the very limited opportunities open to women and young people.

These problems can be resolved in Chile. Our country possesses great wealth such as copper and other minerals, a large hydro-electric potential, vast forests, a long coast rich in marine life, and more than sufficient land, etc. Chile also has a population with a will to work and progress and people with technical and professional skills.

### Why have we failed?

What has failed in Chile is the system - a system which does not correspond to present day requirements. Chile is a capitalist country, dependent on the imperialist nations and dominated by bourgeois groups who are structurally related to foreign capital and who cannot resolve the country's fundamental problems - problems which are clearly the result of class privilege which will never be given up voluntarily.

* The word peasants and peasantry should be taken to include small proprietors, agri-cultural wage labourers, sharecroppers, migrant and temporary rural labourers, smallholders who rent their land and other types of agricultural workers. (Editor)

256 *The Chilean Road to Socialism*

Moreover, as a direct consequence of the development of world capitalism, the submission of the national monopolistic bourgeoisie to imperialism daily furthers its role as junior partner to foreign capital, increasingly accentuating its dependent nature.

For a few people it is good business to sell off a piece of Chile each day. And every day this select few make decisions on behalf of all the rest of us. On the other hand, for the great majority of Chileans there is little to be gained from selling their labour and brain power and, in general, they are still deprived of the right to determine their own future.

The 'reformist' and 'developmentalist' solutions, which the Alliance for Progress promoted and which the Frei Government adopted, have not changed anything of importance in Chile. Basically, the Christian Democrat Government was nothing but a new government of the bourgeoisie, in the service of national and foreign capitalism, whose weak efforts to promote social change came to a sad end in economic stagnation, a rising cost of living, and violent repression of the people. This experience demonstrated once more that reformism cannot resolve the people's problems.

The development of monopoly capitalism prevents the extension of democracy and exacerbates violence against the people. As 'reformism' fails and the people's capacity to struggle increases, the most reactionary sectors of the dominant classes who, in the last analysis, have no recourse but to use force, become firmer in their position. The brutal forms of violence perpetrated by the Frei Government, such as the activities of the Riot Police Unit, the beating up of peasants and students, and the killing of shanty town dwellers and miners, are inseparable from other and no less brutal forms of violence which affect all Chileans. People living in luxurious houses while a large part of the population lives in unhealthy dwellings or has no shelter at all also constitutes violence; people who throw away food while others lack the means to feed themselves also commit violence.

**Imperialist exploitation** of backward economies takes place in a variety of ways: through investments in mining (copper, iron, etc), industrial, banking and commercial activities; through the control of technology which obliges us to pay exaggerated sums for equipment, licences and patents; through American loans with crippling conditions which require us to purchase from the U.S.A. and with the additional obligation to transport these purchases in North American ships. Just one example of imperialist exploitation is the fact that from 1952 to date, the U.S.A. invested US$ 7,473 million in Latin

America and received back US$ 16,000 million.

**Imperialism** has taken resources from Chile equivalent to double the value of the capital accumulated in our country throughout its history. **American monopolies**, with the complicity of bourgeois governments, have succeeded in taking over nearly all of our copper, iron and nitrate resources. They control foreign trade and dictate economic policy through the International Monetary Fund and other organisations. They dominate important branches of industry and services, they enjoy statutory privileges while imposing monetary devaluation, the reduction of salaries and wages and the distortion of agricultural activities through their agricultural surpluses policy.

They also intervene in education, culture and in the communications media and they try to penetrate the Armed Forces, making use of military and political agreements.

The dominant classes, acting as accomplices in the process and unable to defend their own interests, have increased Chile's foreign indebtedness over the last ten years. It was argued that the loans and arrangements with international bankers would increase economic development. But the only result is that today Chile holds the record of being one of the world's most indebted countries in proportion to its population.

In Chile government and legislation is for the benefit of the few — that is they only serve the large capitalists and their hangers-on, the companies which dominate our economy, and the large landholders whose power still remains almost intact.

The owners of capital are only interested in making more money and not in satisfying the needs of the Chilean people. For example, if it appears to be a good business proposition to produce and import expensive cars they use our economy's scarce resources for this purpose, ignoring the fact that only a minute percentage of Chileans have the means to purchase them and that there are far more urgent needs to be satisfied. The improvement of public transport and provision of machinery for agriculture are obvious examples of such urgent needs.

The groups of businessmen who control the economy, the press and other communications media, the existing political system, and the threats to the State, when it hints at intervention or refuses to favour all these interests, are an expensive burden on the Chilean people. For these groups to deign to continue 'working' — since only they can afford the luxury of working or not — the following conditions are necessary. They have to be provided with all kinds of assistance. Important businessmen pressure the State under the

The Popular Unity Programme 257

258

The Chilean Road to Socialism

threat that, unless the help and guarantees they request are
authorized, there will be no private investment.

They have to be allowed to produce the products they want with money belonging to the whole Chilean people, instead of producing the goods needed by the great majority; and to transfer the profits obtained to their foreign bank accounts. They wish to be allowed to dismiss workers if they ask for better wages; and to be permitted to manipulate food distribution and stockpile food products in order to create artificial shortages and thereby raise prices in order to continue enriching themselves at the expense of the Chilean people.

Meanwhile, a large proportion of those people who actually produce face a difficult situation. Half a million families lack housing and as many or more live in appalling conditions lacking sewage, drinking water, light, and healthy conditions. The population's education and health requirements are insufficiently provided for. More than a half of Chile's workers receive wages which are insufficient to cover their minimum vital needs. Every family suffers from unemployment and unstable employment. The chances of employment are impossible or uncertain for countless young people.

Imperialist capital and a privileged group not exceeding 10% of the population receive half of the National Income. This means that out of every hundred escudos produced by Chileans, 50 end up in the pockets of 10 of the oligarchy and the other 50 have to be shared among 90 Chileans from the poor and middle classes.

The rising cost of living creates havoc in people's homes, especially for the housewife. According to official statistics, the cost of living has risen almost 1,000% in the last 10 years.

This means that every day Chileans who live from the proceeds of their work are robbed of part of their salaries or wages. The same happens to retired people, craftsmen, independent workers and small scale producers, whose meagre incomes are daily eroded by inflation.

Alessandri and Frei gave assurances that they would put an end to inflation. The results are there for all to see. The facts prove that inflation in Chile is the outcome of deeper causes which are related to the capitalist structure of our society and not to increases in incomes, as successive governments have tried to make us believe in order to justify the system and restrain workers' incomes.

On the other hand, the large capitalist can defend himself from inflation and what is more he profits from it. His property and his capital become more valuable, his construction contracts with the State are revalued, and the prices of his products always rise ahead of wage increases.

The Popular Unity Programme

259

A large number of Chileans are underfed. According to official statistics, 50% of children under 15 years of age are undernourished. This affects their growth and limits their learning capacity. This shows that the economy in general and the agricultural system in particular are incapable of feeding Chile's population in spite of the fact that Chile could support a population of 30 million people right now—that is, three times the present population.

Yet, on the contrary, each year we must import hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of food products.

Most of the blame for the food supply and nutritional problems of the Chilean people can be attributed to the existence of latifundia which are responsible for the backwardness and misery which characterize the Chilean countryside. Indices of infant and adult mortality, illiteracy, lack of housing and ill health in the rural areas are markedly higher than for the cities. The Christian Democrat Government's restricted Agrarian Reform Programme has not resolved these problems. Only the peasants' struggle, backed by the whole nation, will resolve them. The present struggle for land and the abolition of the latifundio is opening up new perspectives for the advance of the Chilean people.

The growth rate of our economy is minimal. In recent five year periods the average rate of growth has been scarcely 2% p.a. per capita; and since 1967 there has been no growth at all. On the contrary, we have moved backwards according to the Government Planning Office's figures. This means that in 1966 each Chilean had more goods than he has today, which explains why the majority are discontent and are looking for an alternative for our country.

The only alternative, which is a truly popular one, and one which therefore constitutes the Popular Government's main task, is to bring to an end the rule of the imperialists, the monopolists, and the landed oligarchy and to initiate the construction of socialism in Chile.

## THE ORGANIZED PEOPLE IN UNITY AND ACTION

The growth in size and organization of the labour force and the growing struggle and consciousness of its own power reinforce and propagate criticism of the established order, the desire for profound change and conflicts with the established power structure. There are more than three million workers in our country whose productive efforts and enormous constructive capacity cannot be put to good use within the present system, which only exploits and subjects them.

260 *The Chilean Road to Socialism*

These organized forces, in a common effort with the people to mobilize those who are not sold out to national and foreign re-actionary interests, could destroy the present system and, by means of this united struggle on the part of the large majority of Chileans, progress could be made in the task of liberating themselves. The Popular Unity alliance has been formed precisely for this purpose.

The imperialists and the country's dominant classes will struggle against a united people and will try to deceive them once again. They will say that freedom is in danger, that violence is taking hold of the country, etc. But each day the popular masses are less and less taken in by these lies. Social mobilization is growing daily, and is now reinforced and encouraged by the unity of the left wing groups.

In order to encourage and guide the mobilization of the Chilean people toward the conquest of power, we will set up Popular Unity Committees in every factory, farm, poor neighbourhood*, office or school, to be run by the militants of the left wing movements and parties and to be composed of the thousands of Chileans who are in favour of fundamental change. These Popular Unity Committees will not only constitute electoral organizations. They will interpret and fight for the immediate claims of the masses and above all they will learn to exercise power.

This new form of power structure which Chile needs must begin to develop itself right now, wherever people need to be organized to fight over specific problems and wherever the need to exercise this power becomes apparent. This system involving a common effort will be a permanent dynamic method for developing our Programme, constituting a practical school for the masses and a concrete way of deepening the political content of the Popular Unity at all levels.

At a given point in the campaign the essential contents of this Programme, enriched by discussion with and the support of the people, and together with a series of immediate government measures will be set out in a People's Act (Acta del Pueblo) which the new Popular Government and the Front which sustains it will regard as an unrenounceable mandate.

Support for the Popular Unity's candidate does not, therefore, only involve voting for a man, but also involves declaring oneself in

* The word used in the original Spanish text is 'población' and refers to various types of low income housing areas in towns and villages. These include slums, illegally occupied squatter settlements, temporary shanty towns and permanent but poor housing developments promoted by the government and housing associations or constructed by means of self-help programmes in which technical and material assistance is provided by the government. In the rest of this document references to low income housing districts or low income neighbourhoods should be taken as referring to all these different low income housing areas. (Editor)

The Popular Unity Programme 261

favour of the urgent replacement of our present society, the basis of which is the power and control exercised by large national and foreign capitalists.

## THE PROGRAMME

### Popular Power

The revolutionary changes required by Chile can only be carried out if the people of Chile take power into their own hands and exercise it in a true and effective manner.

In the process of a long struggle, the Chilean people have achieved certain democratic liberties and guarantees which will require vigilance and constant battle if they are not to be lost.

The revolutionary and popular forces have not united to simply fight for the substitution of one President of the Republic by another, nor to replace one party by others in Government but, rather, to carry out the profound changes which are required by national circumstances, based on the transfer of power from the old dominant groups to the urban workers, rural population and progressive sectors of the urban and rural middle-classes. This popular triumph will therefore open up the way for the most democratic political government in the country's history.

As regards the political structure, the Popular Government has the double task of preserving and making more effective and real the democratic rights and achievements of the working classes, and transforming present institutions in order to install a new system of power in which the working classes and the people are the ones who really exercise power.

### The strengthening of democracy and working class progress

The Popular Government will guarantee the exercise of democratic rights and will respect the social and individual liberties of all sectors of the population. The freedom of worship, speech, press and of assembly, the inviolability of the home, and the right to unionize will be made effective, removing the present obstacles put up by the dominant classes to limit them.

In order to put this into practice, the unions and social organizations formed by manual workers, white collar workers, peasants and rural workers, shanty town dwellers and inhabitants of

262 *The Chilean Road to Socialism*

low income neighbourhoods*, housewives, students, professional people, intellectuals, craftsmen, small and medium businessmen, and other groups of workers, will be called upon to participate in government decision making at the relevant level. For example, in the social security institutions we will establish a system of management by the contributors themselves, ensuring that the governing bodies are elected democratically and by secret ballot. As for firms in the public sector, their governing committees and production committees must include direct representation of manual and white collar workers.

The Neighbourhood Committees (*Juntas de Vecinos*) and other organized groups of inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods will have ways and means of controlling the activities of the pertinent national housing organizations and of participating in many aspects of their activities. It is not just a question of these particular examples, but of a new philosophy in which ordinary people achieve real and effective participation in the different organisms of the State.

Likewise, the Popular Government guarantees the right of workers to employment and to strike, and the right for all people to obtain a proper education and culture, fully respecting all ideas and religious beliefs and guaranteeing the freedom to practise them.

All democratic rights and guarantees will be extended, by granting to social organizations real means of exercising their rights and creating the mechanisms which will allow them to participate in the different levels of the State's administrative apparatus. The power and authority of the Popular Government will essentially be based on the support extended to it by the organized population. This is our notion of strong government — the very opposite of that held by the oligarchy and imperialists who identify authority with the use of coercion against the people.

The Popular Government will be a multiparty one, composed of all the revolutionary parties, movements and groups. The executive will therefore be truly democratic, representative and cohesive. The Popular Government will respect the rights of the opposition as long as they are exercised within the legal framework.

The Popular Government will immediately proceed to effecti-
vely decentralize the administration which, in conjunction with

* The original Spanish text refers to 'pobladores' which generally means 'settlers'. But in this context reference is being made to both inhabitants of shanty towns and squatter settlements and to the inhabitants of new low income housing estates constructed for or with the aid of working class people who are often immigrants from the countryside. In the rest of the text the word 'pobladores' will usually be translated simply as inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods and should be read as including the various categories just listed. (Editor)

The Popular Unity Programme 263

democratic and efficient planning, will eliminate the centralization of
the bureaucracy, replacing it with real coordination between all parts
of the administration.

The structure of the municipalities will be modernized according
to the plans for coordinating the whole state administration, while
granting them the authority due to them. They will become local
organs of the new political organization, possessing sufficient finance
and powers to enable them to deal with the problems of the local
districts and their inhabitants, in conjunction and coordination with
the Neighbourhood Committees. The Provincial Assemblies must
begin to operate with the same purpose in mind.

The police must be reorganized so that they can never again be
used as a repressive force against ordinary people but, instead, ensure
that the population is protected from anti-social behaviour. Police pro-
cedures will be made more humane, effectively guaranteeing full
respect for human dignity and physical integrity. The prison system
and prison conditions at present constitute one of the worst aspects
of the present judicial system and must be radically transformed with
a view to reforming the lawbreaker.

A NEW INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION:
THE POPULAR STATE

Political Organization

The new power structure will be built up from grass roots by ex-
tending democracy at all levels and by organizing the mobilization of
the masses.

A new political constitution will validate the massive incorporation of the people into governmental power. We shall create a unicameral form of government with national, regional and local levels, and in which the Popular Assembly will constitute the supreme power. This people's Assembly will be the only parliament, expressing the sovereignty of the people at national level and in which all the various currents of opinion will be expressed.

This system will enable us to root out the evils suffered in Chile
under dictatorial presidencies and corrupt parliamentary rule. The
powers and responsibilities of the President of the Republic, the
ministers, Popular Assembly, regional and local government organi-
zations and political parties will be precisely redefined and co-
ordinated in order to ensure the functioning of the legislature,

264 *The Chilean Road to Socialism*

efficiency in government and above all respect for the will of the
majority.

All elections will take place simultaneously in an orderly
process so as to establish the necessary harmony between the
different expressions of the popular will and to ensure that these are
expressed coherently.

Organizations representing the people may only be created by
means of secret and direct universal suffrage of men and women of
over 18 years of age, including civilians and military personnel, and
literate and illiterate people. The members of the Popular Assembly
and other organizations representing the people will be subject to
control by the electors through consultation procedures, which
would also allow for their mandate to be withdrawn. A rigorous code
of conduct will be established requiring deputies or high level civil
servants to lose their mandate or post if guilty of acting on behalf of
private interests.

The economic policy instruments to be used by the Govern-
ment will constitute a national system of planning, and they will be
executive instruments to be used to direct, coordinate and rationalize
government activities. The operational plan must be approved in the
Popular Assembly, and workers' organizations will play a funda-
mental role in the planning system.

The regional and local organs of government in the new People's
State will exercise authority in the relevant geographical areas and
they will have economic, political and social powers. In addition they
will be able to make proposals to and criticize the higher levels.
However, in exercising their powers these regional and local bodies
must work within the limits set by national laws and by the overall
social and economic development plans. Social organizations with
specific attributes will be integrated into each of the different levels
of the Popular State. It will be their duty to share responsibilities and
develop initiatives in their respective spheres of influence as well as
analyse and solve the problems within their competence. These attri-
butes will not in any way limit the complete independence and
autonomy of these organizations.

From the very day the Popular Government assumes power it
will provide ways of ensuring that the influence of the workers and
people is brought to bear on the administrative decisions adopted
and on the control over the operation of the state administrative
machinery. These constitute decisive steps in the elimination of an
overcentralized bureaucracy which characterizes the present adminis-
trative system.

The Popular Unity Programme 265

The Organisation of Justice

The organization and administration of justice must be based on the
guaranteed principle of autonomy and on real economic indepen-
dence.

We visualize the existence of a Supreme Court whose members
are appointed by the People's Assembly, the only limitation being
the natural suitability of the members. This Court will be free to
determine the internal, personal or corporate powers of the judicial
system.

It is our intention that the new administration and organization
of justice will come to the aid of the popular classes; it will operate
more rapidly and in a less burdensome fashion.

Under the Popular Government a whole new concept of the
judicial process will replace the existing individualistic and bourgeois
one.

National Defence

The Popular State will pay special attention to the preservation of
national sovereignty, which it also views as being the duty of every
citizen.

The Popular State will remain alert before those threats to our
territorial integrity and the country's independence, which are
encouraged by the imperialists and by those groups of the oligarchy
in power in neighbouring countries who encourage expansionist and
retaliatory pretensions as well as repressing their own people.

The People's State will establish a modern, popular and
patriotic concept of the nation's sovereignty based on the following
principles:

(a) The guarantee of the national integrity of all branches of the
Armed Forces. In this sense we reject the use of these forces to
repress the people or their participation in activities of interest to
foreign powers;

(b) The provision of technical training with contributions from any
modern military science, as deemed convenient to Chile and in the
interests of national independence and of peace and friendship
among peoples;

(c) The integration of the Armed Forces into different aspects of
national life and the increase of their contribution to social life. The
Popular State will find ways of making it possible for the Armed
Forces to contribute to the country's economic development with-
out prejudice to its primary task of national defence.

266 *The Chilean Road to Socialism*

Following these lines, it will be necessary to provide the Armed Forces with the necessary material and technical means and to establish a just and democratic system of remuneration, promotion and retirement, which guarantees economic security to personnel in all ranks while serving in the forces and on retirement, and which provides real possibilities for promotion through the ranks on the basis of individual merit.

## THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW ECONOMY

The central policy objective of the united popular forces will be the search for a replacement for the present economic structure, doing away with the power of foreign and national monopoly capital and of the *latifundio* in order to initiate the construction of socialism.

Planning will play a very important role in the new economy. The main planning organs will be at the highest administrative level, and the decisions, which will be democratically determined, will be executive in character.

### The Socially Owned Sector

The process of transformation in our economy will begin with the application of a policy intended to create a dominant state sector, comprising those firms already owned by the state and the businesses which are to be expropriated. As a first step, we shall nationalize those basic resources like large scale copper, iron and nitrate mines, and others which are controlled by foreign capital and national monopolies. These nationalized sectors will thus be comprised of the following:

1. Large scale copper, nitrate, iodine, iron and coal mines.

2. The country's financial system, especially private banks and insurance companies.

3. Foreign trade.

4. Large distribution firms and monopolies.

5. Strategic industrial monopolies.

6. As a rule, all those activities which have a strong influence on the nation's social and economic development, such as the production and distribution of electric power, rail, air and sea transport, communications, the production, refining and distribution of petroleum and its by-products, including liquid gas, the iron and steel industry, cement, petrochemicals and heavy chemicals, cellulose and paper.

The Popular Unity Programme 267

In carrying out these expropriations, the interests of small shareholders will be fully safeguarded.

### The Privately Owned Sector

This area includes those sections of industry, mining, agriculture and services where private ownership of the means of production will remain in force.

In terms of numbers these enterprises will constitute the majority. Thus, for example, in 1967 out of 30,500 firms (including artisan establishments) just 150 firms monopolistically controlled the entire market, received most of the assistance from the State, and most of the bank credit, and exploited the rest of the country's businessmen by selling them raw materials at high prices while buying their output at low prices.

The firms which compose this sector will benefit from the overall planning of the national economy. The State will provide the necessary technical and financial assistance for the firms in this sector, enabling them to fulfill the important role which they play in the national economy, when the number of people they employ and the volume of output they generate is taken into account.

In addition, the patenting system, the customs tariffs, and the social security and taxation systems will be simplified for these firms and they will be assured of adequate and just marketing of their products.

These firms must guarantee the rights of workers and employees to fair wages and working conditions. Both the State and the workers in the respective firms will make sure that these rights are respected.

### The Mixed Sector

This sector will be termed mixed because it will be composed of enterprises combining both State and private capital.

The loans or credits granted to the firms in this sector by development agencies may take the form of contributions, thereby making the State a partner rather than a creditor. The same holds in those cases in which the firm obtains credits with the backing or guarantee of the State or one of its agencies.

### Intensification and Extension of the Agrarian Reform

In our view the Agrarian Reform process should be complementary to, and simultaneous with, the overall transformation which we wish to promote in the country's social, political and economic structure, such that its implementation is inseparable from the rest of our

268 *The Chilean Road to Socialism*

overall policy. Existing experience in this matter has shown up gaps and inconsistencies which suggest a reformulation of the policy for the distribution and organization of land ownership on the basis of the following guidelines:

1. Acceleration of the Agrarian Reform process, expropriating the holdings which exceed the established maximum size according to the characteristics of the different regions, including orchards, vineyards and forests, without giving the landowner the priority right to select the area to be retained by him. The expropriation may include the whole or part of the expropriated farm's assets (machinery, tools, animals, etc.).

2. The immediate cultivation of abandoned and badly exploited state lands.

3. Expropriated land will be organized preferably on the basis of cooperative forms of ownership. The peasants will be given titles which confirm individual ownership of the house and garden allocated to them, and the corresponding rights over the indivisible land of the cooperative as long as they continue to be members. When the circumstances warrant it, land may be allocated to individual peasants, with the organization of work and marketing being promoted on the basis of mutual cooperation. In addition, lands will be allocated to create state agricultural enterprises using modern technology.

4. In certain qualified cases land will be allocated to small farmers, tenants, sharecroppers and trained agricultural workers

5. Minifundia properties will be reorganized by means of progressively cooperative forms of agricultural work.

6. Small and medium peasants will be given access to the advantages and services provided by the cooperatives operating in their geographical area.

7. The defence of the indigenous Indian communities which are threatened with usurpation of their land will be ensured, as will be the democratic conduct of these communities, the provision of sufficient land and appropriate technical assistance and credit to the Mapuche people and other indigenous groups.

## Policy for Economic Development

The Government's economic policy will be carried out by means of a national system of economic planning and through control

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mechanisms, guidelines, production credit, technical assistance, tax and foreign trade policies, as well as through the management of the state sector of the economy.

The policy objectives will be:

1. To resolve the immediate problems of the working classes. In order to achieve this we shall divert that part of the nation's productive capacity at present used to produce expensive and unnecessary products for high income groups to the production of cheap, high quality mass consumption goods.

2. To guarantee work and adequate wages to all Chileans of working age. This will involve devising a policy which generates a lot of employment while making adequate use of national resources and adapting technology to national development requirements.

3. To free Chile from subordination to foreign capital. On the one hand, this means expropriating imperialist capital and implementing a policy for increasing our capacity to self-finance our activities and, on the other, it means that we must determine the conditions under which non-expropriated foreign capital may operate, and achieve a greater degree of technological independence and greater independence in international transport, etc.

4. To secure rapid and decentralized economic growth, which will develop the country's productive forces to a maximum, achieving the optimum use of the available human, natural, financial and technical resources in order to increase labour productivity and satisfy the need for greater independence in the development of the economy, as well as those needs and aspirations of the working population which are compatible with a dignified human life.

5. To implement a foreign trade policy which will tend to develop and diversify our exports, open up new markets, achieve growing financial and technological independence and put an end to the successive scandalous devaluations of our currency.

6. To take all necessary measures to achieve monetary stability. The fight against inflation is already implicit in the announced structural changes. But it must also include measures which adjust the money in circulation to the real needs of the market and include the control and redistribution of credit and efforts to keep interest rates low. Measures must also be taken to rationalize marketing and commerce, to stabilize prices and to prevent price increases which emanate from the demand structure and reflect expenditure patterns of the high income groups.

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The achievement of these objectives is guaranteed by the fact that it will be the organized masses who will exercise economic and political power, a situation which is represented by the existence of the public sector and of the overall planning of the economy. Government by the people will ensure the fulfillment of the indicated targets.

## SOCIAL TASKS

The Chilean people's social aspirations are both legitimate and possible to satisfy. For example, Chilean citizens want decent housing without crippling rent increases, schools and universities for their children, adequate wages, a once and for all end to increases in the cost of living, stable employment, appropriate medical attention, street lighting, sewers, drinking water, surfaced roads and pavements, a just and efficient social security system, which is not based on privilege and which does not provide starvation level pensions, telephones, police, nursery schools, sport fields, holidays, tourism and popular beach resorts.

The satisfaction of these rightful aspirations, which in fact constitute rights which society must recognize, will be the principle concern of the Popular Government.

The basic aspects of Government action will be:

(a) The definition of an incomes policy, with the immediate creation of committees, which, with the participation of workers, will determine what constitutes a subsistence wage and minimum wages in different regions of the country.

As long as inflation continues, wage readjustments related to the cost of living will be decreed by law. These adjustments will be made every six months or whenever the cost of living rises by more than 5%.

High level salaries in all Government departments, and above all the salaries of those appointed directly by the President, will be limited to levels which are compatible with national circumstances. Within a certain technically determined period, we shall begin to set up a system of equal minimum wages and salaries for equal work, wherever the work is done. This policy will first be introduced in the public sector, gradually being extended to the rest of the economy respecting, however, the differences made possible by varying levels of productivity in different firms. In the same way we intend to

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eliminate wage and salary discrimination between men and women or for reasons of age.

(b) To unify, improve, and extend the social security system, maintaining all the legitimate advances made so far, eliminating the abuse of privilege, inefficiency and bureaucracy, improving and speeding up treatment and attention, extending social security to groups of workers not yet included, and making the contributors responsible for the administration of their Social Security Schemes, which should function within the overall planning framework.

(c) To provide all Chileans with preventive and curative dental and medical care financed by the State, by employers and by social security institutions. The whole population will join in the task of protecting public health. Medicines, etc. will be provided in sufficient quantities and at low cost, on the basis of a strict control of laboratory costs and the rationalization of production.

(d) Sufficient funds will be provided for a large housing programme. The industrialization of construction will be developed, controlling prices and limiting the amount of profits made by the private or mixed enterprises operating in this field. In emergency situations, plots of land will be allocated to those families requiring them, also providing them with technical and material assistance to build their own houses.

One aim of the Popular Government's housing policy is for every family to become a house owner. The system of readjustable rents will be eliminated. The monthly mortgage or loan repayment and rents, to be paid by house purchasers and tenants respectively, will not exceed 10% of family income as a general rule. We shall undertake the remodelling of cities and suburbs to prevent poor people being forced to the outskirts, respecting the interests of such inhabitants of redeveloped areas as small businessmen, by assuring them of a future in the same area.

(e) Full civil status of married women will be established, as will equal legal status for all children whether born in or out of wedlock, as well as adequate divorce legislation which dissolves legal ties and safeguards the woman's and children's rights.

(f) The legal distinction between workers and white collar employees will be ended, both being classed as workers in future and the right to unionize will be extended to all those who do not have this right at present.

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## CULTURE AND EDUCATION

### A new culture for society

The social process, which will begin when the working class wins power, will develop a new culture which considers human labour with the highest regard, which emphasises the desire for national assertion and independence and which develops a critical understanding of present reality.

The profound changes which have to be undertaken require a socially conscious and united people, educated to exercise and defend their political power, and scientifically and technically prepared to develop the transitional economy towards socialism, and a people wide open to creativity and the enjoyment of a wide variety of artistic and intellectual activities.

If, today, the majority of intellectuals and artists fight against the cultural distortions of capitalist society and attempt to convey their creative efforts to the workers and link themselves to the same historical destiny then, in the new society, they will continue this effort but from a *vanguard* position. A new culture cannot be decreed. It will spring from the struggle for fraternity as opposed to individualism, for the appreciation rather than disdain of human labour, for national values rather than *cultural* colonization, and from the struggle of the popular masses for access to art, literature, and the communications media and the end of their commercialization.

This new State will involve the whole population in intellectual and artistic activities not only by means of a *radically* transformed educational system but also through the development of a national system to promote popular culture. A large network of Local Centres for Popular Culture will encourage ordinary people to organize themselves and exercise their rights to participate in and promote culture. This system of Popular Culture will stimulate literary and artistic creativity and it will multiply the links between writers and artists and a very much larger public than their existing one.

### A Democratic, Integrated and Planned Educational System

Action by the new Government in this field will concentrate on providing the best and most extensive educational facilities possible.

Both the general improvement in the working classes' living conditions and the recognition of the responsibilities borne by teachers at different levels will influence the extent to which these

proposals are fulfilled. Also, a National Scholarship Programme will be established which will be sufficiently broad as to ensure the inclusion and continued education of all Chilean children, especially the children from working class and peasant backgrounds.

Furthermore, the new Government will implement an emergency plan for the construction of schools, relying on contributions of national and local resources mobilized by grass roots organizations. Luxury buildings which are needed as premises for new schools and boarding schools will be expropriated. In this way, it is hoped to create at least one integrated school (both basic and middle levels*) in each rural district, and in each urban residential district and low income neighbourhood.

In order to provide the special requirements needed for the proper development of pre-school age children, and to facilitate the incorporation of women into productive work, we shall rapidly expand our nurseries and nursery schools systems, granting priority to the most needy groups in our society, As a result of this policy, the children of urban and rural workers and peasants will be better prepared to start school and continue to benefit right through the normal school system.

To make the new teaching system a reality, new methods are required which put emphasis on the active and critical participation of students in their teaching, instead of perpetuating the passive attitudes they are expected to adopt at present.

In order to rapidly repair the widespread lack of culture and education resulting from the present system, we shall set in motion an extensive popular mobilization campaign aimed at the rapid elimination of illiteracy and the raising of the educational level of the adult population. Adult education will be mainly organized around work centres, until it is possible to have a permanent system of general, technical and social education for workers.

The transformation of the educational system will not only be the task of technically qualified people. It is also a task requiring study, discussion, decision and implementation by teachers', workers', students' and parents' organizations within the general framework of national planning. Internally, the planning of the schools system will pay particular attention to the need for integration, continuity and diversification in teaching.

In the executive management of the educational system there must be real representation of the aforementioned social organi-

* The basic level of education lasts 8 years commencing at 6 years of age, and the middle level lasts 4 years, following completion of the basic level. (Editor)

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zations, which will be integrated into the Local, Regional and National Education Committees.

In order to achieve effective educational planning and turn the idea of a unified national and democratic school system into a practical reality, the new Government will take over responsibility for private educational establishments, starting with those educational institutions which select their pupils according to criteria of social class, national origin, or religion. This will be done by integrating the staff and other resources of the private education sector into the state system.

## Physical Education

The Popular Government will be constantly concerned to ensure that physical education and participation in all kinds of sports is possible right from the earliest years at school and in all youth and adult social organizations.

## University Democracy and Autonomy and the Role of the Universities

The Popular Unity Government will give strong backing to the University Reform process and it will resolutely push forward this reform. The democratic outcome of this reform process will constitute an important contribution by universities to the revolutionary development of Chile. On the other hand, the reorientation of academic teaching, research, and extension functions towards national problems will be encouraged by the Popular Government's own initiatives.

The State will allocate sufficient resources to the universities to ensure the fulfilment of their functions and to ensure that they become fully democratic public institutions. In line with this, the members and employees of the universities will be responsible for running their respective institutions.

As class privilege is eliminated from the whole of the educational system, it will be possible for children of working class background to enter university and for adults to gain access to higher education either by means of special scholarships or through a system which simultaneously combines study and work.

## The Mass Media

The mass media (radio, publishing, television, the press and cinema) are fundamental in helping to develop a new culture and a new type of man. For this reason it is necessary to redefine their purpose,

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putting emphasis on their educative role and ending their commercialization, and to adopt measures which allow social organizations the use of these communications media, eliminating the harmful effects of the monopolies. The national system of popular culture will be particularly concerned with the development of the film industry and the preparation of social programmes for the mass media.

## THE POPULAR GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY

### Aims

The main lines of emphasis of the Popular Government's Foreign Policy are:-

* The assertion of full political and economic autonomy for Chile.

* The establishment of diplomatic relations with all countries, irrespective of their ideological and political position, on the basis of respect for self-determination and in the interests of the Chilean people.

* Ties of friendship and solidarity will unite Chile with dependent or colonized countries, especially those who are fighting for their liberation and independence.

* The promotion of strong interamerican and anti-imperialist sentiments based on foreign policies which are the expression of entire nations rather than on policies formulated solely by foreign ministries.

* Efforts by nations to achieve or maintain self-determination will be given decided support by the new Government as a basic condition for the existence of international peace and understanding. As a consequence, our policy will be one of alertness and action in defence of the principle of non-intervention and we shall resist any attempt by the imperialist nations to discriminate, pressure, invade or blockade. We shall reinforce our relationships, trade and cultural exchanges and friendship with socialist countries.

### Greater National Independence

The active defence of Chilean independence means that we must denounce the present Organization of American States as an agent and tool of American imperialism, and fight against all forms of Panamericanism which are implicit in this organization. The Popular Government will attempt to create an organization which is really

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representative of Latin American countries.

It is considered absolutely necessary to review, denounce or renounce, as befits each case, those treaties or agreements which involve commitments limiting our sovereignty, and, in particular, treaties of reciprocal assistance, pacts of mutual aid or other pacts which Chile signed with the U.S.A.

The Government will reject and denounce foreign aid and loans which are extended for political reasons, or involve conditions requiring the investments derived from those loans to be made in ways which prejudice our sovereignty and are against the people's interests. Likewise, we shall repudiate all types of foreign charges imposed on Latin American raw materials such as copper and the obstacles put in the way of free trade which, over time, have made it impossible to establish collective trade relations with all countries of the world.

## International Solidarity

The Popular Government will demonstrate effective and militant solidarity with those struggles in which people are fighting for freedom and for the construction of a socialist society.

All forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism will be condemned and we will recognize the right of those peoples subjected to these systems to rebel. Likewise, we shall condemn all forms of economic, political and military aggression provoked by imperialist powers. Chile's foreign policy must be one of condemnation of North American aggression in Vietnam, and one of recognition of and active solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people.

In the same way, the Chilean people will demonstrate meaningful solidarity with the Cuban Revolution, which is the vanguard of revolution and construction of socialism in Latin America.

The Middle Eastern Nations who are struggling against imperialism can count on the solidarity of the Popular Government, which supports the search for a peaceful solution based on the interests of both the Arab and Jewish peoples. We shall condemn all reactionary governments which promote or practise racial segregation and anti-semitism.

## Policy for Latin America

With regard to Latin America, the Popular Government will advocate an international policy which asserts the identity of Latin America in the world.

It is our view that Latin-American integration must be built on

the basis of economies which have liberated themselves from imperialist forms of dependency and exploitation. Nevertheless, we shall maintain an active policy of bilateral agreements in those matters of interest for the development of Chile.

The Popular Government will take action to resolve frontier problems which are still outstanding on the basis of negotiations which exclude imperialist and reactionary intrigues, and which take into account both the interests of Chile and the interests of the peoples in neighbouring countries.

Chilean foreign policy and its diplomatic expression must break away from its bureaucratic habits and lack of initiative. Moreover, our foreign policy must derive from the peoples of many nations with the double purpose of, on the one hand, taking up the lessons learned from their struggles for application in the construction of our socialist society and, on the other, of offering them our experience, in such a manner that it is in the very practice of the idea that we shall build up the international solidarity for which we are fighting.

## THE POPULAR GOVERNMENT'S FIRST FORTY MEASURES

1. An end to enormous salaries! We shall put a limit on the high salaries earned by those appointed directly by the President. We shall not allow people to hold simultaneously various paid posts such as advisory posts, directorships, representatives.

We shall do away with administrative promoters and political mongers who use their official positions to promote their own ends and the interests of their friends and business and political acquaintances.

2. More advisors? No! All civil servants will belong to the normal staff grades and none will be exempted from the Administrative Statute's conditions. We will not have any more advisors in Chile.

3. Honest administration. We shall put an end to favouritism and grade jumping in the Public Administration. It will not be possible to remove civil servants from their posts without due cause. Nobody will be persecuted for their political or religious beliefs. We shall ensure the efficiency and honesty of government officials and the civil treatment of the public.

4. No more unnecessary foreign trips. Foreign journeys by government officials will not be allowed except for those which are really necessary in Chile's interests.

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5. No more use of government cars for pleasure. Under no circumstances will the government's cars be used for private purposes. Those vehicles which are available will be used in the service of the public, - for transporting school children, for transporting people requiring medical attention from low income housing districts, or for police duties.

6. The Civil Service will not enrich its employees. We shall establish strict control over the incomes and property of high level public officials. The Government will no longer allow public officials to use their position to enrich themselves.

7. Fair Pensions. We must put a stop to millionaire level pensions whether they be for parliamentarians or any other public or private group, using the resources to improve pensions at the lower end of the scale.

8. Fair and timely retirement. We will give retirement rights to all people over 60 years of age who have been unable to retire because their contributions have not been paid.

9. Social Security for Everyone. We shall incorporate into the Social Security system all people in small and medium scale commerce, industry and farming, and independent workers, artisans, fishermen, small scale miners and housewives.

10. Immediate and full payment of pensions and benefits. We shall finally pay the increases in pensions due to retired members of the Armed Forces and we shall arrange for the proper and due payment of retirement pensions and widow's pensions under the Social Security System.

11. Protection of the family. We shall set up a Ministry for the protection of the family.

12. Equal family allowances. All family allowances will in future be fixed at the same level.

13. Children are born to be happy! We shall provide free education, books, materials, exercise books etc. for all children throughout the basic level.

14. Better meals for children. We will provide breakfast for all children in the basic level and lunch for those children whose parents cannot provide it.

15. Milk for all Chilean children. We guarantee a daily ration of ½ litre of milk to all Chilean children.

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16. Family welfare clinics in all poor areas. We shall set up family welfare clinics in all working class neighbourhoods, slums and squatter settlements.

17. Real holidays for all Chilean students. The best pupils selected from the basic educational level throughout the country will be invited to the Presidential Palace at Viña del Mar.

18. Control of alcoholism. We shall overcome alcoholism, by providing possibilities for a better life and not by repressive means. We shall stop abuse of the drinking laws and licensing regulations.

19. Housing, lighting and drinking water for all Chileans. We shall undertake an emergency plan for the rapid building of houses. Also, we shall ensure the provision of drinking water and electric lighting in every block.

20. No more readjustable 'CORVI' payments. CORVI, the Housing Corporations dividends and the loan repayments it receives will no longer be readjusted in line with rising prices.

21. Fixed price rents. We shall fix rents at an amount corresponding to 10% of family income as a maximum. Key rights will be abolished immediately.

22. Vacant sites, No! Housing, Yes! We shall build on all disused public, semi-public and municipal sites.

23. Property taxes on mansions only. We shall free from the payment of property taxes the owners of dwellings with a surface below 80 square metres as long as the owner lives there permanently and the house is neither a luxury house nor a beach villa.

24. A real Agrarian Reform. We shall intensify Agrarian Reform, which will also benefit medium and small-scale farmers, minifundia holders, sharecroppers, employees and temporary rural labourers.

25. Medical attention without bureaucracy. We shall eliminate all the bureaucratic and administrative obstacles which hinder or make difficult the provision of medical attention to contributors and unemployed people.

26. Free medical attention in hospitals. We shall abolish payment for medicines and examinations in hospitals.

27. No more artificially high prices for medicines. We shall drastically reduce the price of medicines by lowering the import duties and taxes on the raw materials.

28. Scholarships for students. We shall establish the right of all

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good students to obtain a scholarship for the basic and middle school levels and university education, taking into account performance and the family's economic resources.

29. Physical education and popular tourism and holidays. We shall promote physical education and we shall establish sports fields in schools and all neighbourhoods. Every school and low income urban or rural housing district will have a sports field. We shall organize and promote low income tourism and holidays.

30. A new economy to put an end to inflation. We shall increase the production of items of popular consumption. We shall control prices and prevent inflation by immediately setting up the new economic structure.

31. No more links with the International Monetary Fund. We shall renege the commitments with the International Monetary Fund. We shall put an end to the continual shameful devaluation of the escudo.

32. No more taxes on food. We shall stop increases in taxes which affect basic food necessities.

33. Abolition of the sales tax. We shall abolish the sales tax and replace it by another more just and expedite tax system.

34. No more speculation. We shall severely penalize economic crimes.

35. No more unemployment. We shall ensure the right of all Chileans to work and we shall prevent unjustified dismissals.

36. Work for all Chileans. We shall immediately create new sources of employment by implementing plans for public works and house building, by setting up new industries, and by carrying out development projects.

37. The Riot Police Unit will be disbanded. We shall ensure law and order in lower and middle class residential areas and the protection of the individual. The police and detectives will be restricted to crime prevention duties. We shall disband the Riot Police Unit incorporating its members into the normal duties of police vigilance against delinquency.

38. An end to class justice. We shall set up a rapid and free legal procedure, in which the Neighbourhood Committees will cooperate, to examine and resolve special cases such as quarrels, ruffianism, abandonment of the home and acts which disturb the community.

39. Legal advice bodies in all neighbourhoods. We shall set up Legal

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Advice Bodies in all low income neighbourhoods and districts.

40. The Creation of a National Institute of Art and Culture. We shall create a National Institute of Art and Culture and schools for training in the arts in all districts.

## THE TWENTY BASIC POINTS OF THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT'S AGRARIAN REFORM

ONE. Agrarian Reform and agricultural development will not be isolated factors, but will form an integral part of the overall plan for transforming the economy into one which serves the whole people. This implies that Agrarian Reform will not only involve the expropriation of all latifundia, the distribution of land to peasant producers and rural labourers and the provision of the technical assistance and credits which are necessary to enable them to produce what Chile requires, but also includes the transformation of commercial and industrial relationships for the sale and purchase of products required by peasants for consumption and for production. The marketing and processing of agricultural output must be in the hands of the State or peasant or consumer cooperatives.

TWO. The benefits of Agrarian Reform will be extended to the groups of medium and small farmers, smallholders, employees, sharecroppers and temporary labourers who have so far been excluded from these benefits.

THREE. The peasantry, represented by unions, cooperatives and small scale farmers' organizations will replace the representatives of the large estates in all Government departments and agencies. The Popular Unity Government will only deal with these representatives of the rural population because it is they who are the true representatives of the 98% of the population which lives from agricultural activities or depends on an income from agriculture.

At the level of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, as it will then be called, under whose direct responsibility will be placed all branches of the State which deal with the agricultural sector, a National Peasant Council will be set up to advise the Minister and top civil servants and officials of the various government agencies. This Council will be democratically elected by the grass roots peasant organizations.

At the same time Regional Peasant Councils will be formed in each of the country's agricultural zones in which the officials responsible for the zone and the elected peasant representatives will

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participate on an equal footing. All the measures necessary for implementing Agrarian Reform and agricultural development will be adopted in these National and Regional Peasant Councils—i.e. expropriations, land distribution, credits, marketing of products and inputs, etc.

**FOUR.** Agrarian Reform will no longer be implemented on a farm by farm basis but by areas and, in each of these areas, productive work will be guaranteed for all peasants and rural labourers in the area either in direct work on the land, or in the processing and distribution of the products, or in the provision of the general services required in production.

**FIVE.** We shall employ new legal concepts to help us to achieve integration and cooperation by the united action of the various rural organizations of wage earners, employees, sharecroppers, temporary labourers and small and medium scale farmers. This will involve an increase in the number of tasks to be carried out by the unions, agrarian reform settlements (*asentamientos*) *, rural cooperatives, indigenous Indian communities and other types and forms of small farmers' organizations, such as the small farmers' committees.

Furthermore, the Popular Government will end the present mockery of the law whereby agricultural employers refrain from paying the 2% employer's contribution required by the law governing peasant unions inducing the bankruptcy of the rural workers' trade unions.

**SIX.** Areas under forest will also be included in the Agrarian Reform.

**SEVEN.** Only small and medium scale farmers will be excluded from expropriation, and only those larger scale farmers whose social and economic contributions to agricultural production and rural community development are recognized by the peasants will have the right to retain some land. And in any case, the right to retain some land will not be accompanied by the preferential right to select this piece of land, since it may be necessary to offer other land so as facilitate the restructuring of peasant holdings.

* Asentamiento. This was a transitional system adopted during the Christian Democrat Government and during the first year of the Popular Unity Government to manage the expropriated estates for a three to five year period. The asentamiento coincides with the boundaries of the old estate and is run as a unit on a cooperative basis by the agrarian reform corporation and asentamiento members. During this transitional period the peasants are trained to take over full management responsibilities and Government agencies provide technical assistance and credit. According to the law the peasants may decide whether the land will be divided into individual holdings or be organized and operated on a cooperative basis on the expiry of the asentamiento period, though the Government may impose cooperative ownership operation if there are overriding technical reasons for doing so. (Editor)

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**EIGHT.** Working capital will be included in expropriations so that, right from the very beginning, expropriated holdings have the capital necessary for farming operations.

**NINE.** Technical assistance to peasants will be provided without charge and special credit, technical assistance and training programmes will be drawn up for the most backward groups especially the indigenous Indian committees.

**TEN.** Each peasant will have family rights to his house and garden. Production will be organized preferably under the cooperative system, though in special cases individual cultivation and ownership of land may be considered.

**ELEVEN.** By means of credit, technical assistance, regional and national planning, we shall orient production towards high priced products both for export and for the home market. Credits for certain types of labour intensive products, such as pigs and poultry, will be reserved for small farmers and other peasants to help increase their income and improve their social and economic situation.

**TWELVE.** At an early stage of the Popular Government the Agrarian Reform Law will be fully enforced, making use of all powers that the present Government does not wish to use or has not been able to use, such as allocating land to cooperatives, defending the interests of sharecroppers and tenants, reorganizing irrigation areas and systems, etc. The necessary amendments to the present Agrarian Reform Law will be discussed and approved by the National and Regional Peasant Councils before being sent to Parliament.

**THIRTEEN.** The State will guarantee the purchase of that part of the peasants' output which is not marketed at official prices through the normal channels, and gradually the State will make anticipatory contracts for all livestock and agricultural output which is planned according to the country's needs.

Advance credits for production will be granted to small peasants in cash only, and not in the form of credit notes as happens in most cases at present and which involves the further exploitation of those peasants who can only get their credit notes discounted at burdensome rates and on unfavourable terms.

**FOURTEEN.** Agriculture-based industries will preferably be located in the agricultural regions which at present suffer most severely from agricultural unemployment or underemployment.

**FIFTEEN.** The State will nationalize all monopolies controlling the marketing, preparation and processing of livestock and agricultural products or the necessary inputs for agricultural production. These enterprises will be either directly managed by the State, with advice

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from the Peasant Councils, or they will be handed over to rural cooperatives.

SIXTEEN. A national social security system for all rural workers will be set up, especially including those small farmers who are at present excluded from social security. In the same way, we shall ensure that social security arrangements for farmers and agrarian reform settlements will be continued.

SEVENTEEN. Special programmes will be undertaken to improve and to construct rural housing because, until now, peasants and rural workers have been excluded from all previous housing improvement programmes.

EIGHTEEN. We shall set up rural hostels in the principal towns in agricultural areas, so that passing migrants and temporary labourers or peasants on business in town have somewhere to lodge which also provides them with support and guidance in carrying out their tasks, especially in relation to public services, education, health, etc.

NINETEEN. A general policy for education will be developed through adult literacy programmes, publications of books, newspapers and radio programmes for the rural population, and through courses on agricultural technology in line with the region's production plans. At the same time, theatre, art and other cultural activities will be promoted, which will help develop the character of rural communities.

TWENTY. A special effort will be made to push ahead with plans for the protection of natural resources, forestation plans, etc., and with plans for making better use of irrigated areas.

vintage whose strong recoil, moreover, was most unsuitable for the small Vietnamese soldier. A study carried out in the fall of 1968 revealed that the U.S. soldier, per man in a combat battalion, was supported by 10 times as many rounds of artillery and air attack sorties as a Vietnamese in an ARVN unit.⁵ The number of helicopters available to U.S. troops was similarly disparate.

The failure to upgrade the equipment of the South Vietnamese armed forces (RVNAF) was due in part to American production shortages. Under President Johnson's "policy of guns and butter—but mostly butter," Westmoreland recalls, "M-16 rifles, machine guns, mortars, radios, trucks, recoilless rifles, artillery pieces all were hard to get." Not until well into 1968 did these items become available in any quantity for other than American troops.⁶ On the other hand, it was the impression of some Washington officials that Westmoreland until 1967 was reluctant to make the RVNAF a more equal and trusted partner in the war or to put a greater part of the combat burden upon it. "There is no indication," wrote the assistant secretary of defense (SA) in a memo dated 1 May 1967, "MACV has the same sense of urgency about increasing ARVN effectiveness as it has about increasing the number of U.S. forces."⁷ More recently, former premier Nguyen Cao Ky has made the same point. The U.S., he said, delayed in preparing the Vietnamese to fight on their own because U.S. officials felt the superior American firepower would assure a swift victory. Vietnamization, according to Ky, should have begun in 1965 instead of in 1969.⁸

## The Beginning of Vietnamization

The process of upgrading the Vietnamese forces, it is generally agreed, began in the summer of 1967—after the establishment of CORDS under Komer and the new emphasis on pacification and after President Johnson in July had decided to limit the further input of American troops. All the military ever want is more of the same, Johnson told his "intellectual-in-residence," John P. Roche, later that year, but "I'm not going to give it to them. They're going to have to live with what they got . . . and waste some of their valuable time training Viets."⁹ Westmoreland's new deputy commander, Gen. Creighton Abrams, now was given specific responsibility for improving the performance of the RVNAF. During his visit to Washington in November 1967, Westmoreland told the National Press

Club that within two years or less it might be possible to phase down the American level of commitment and turn more of the burden of the war over to the Vietnamese, whose army was being modernized.¹⁰ This forecast proved accurate, though the shakeup produced by the enemy's Tet offensive undoubtedly was a crucial factor in maintaining if not accelerating the pace of Vietnamization.

The report of the Clifford task force, delivered to President Johnson in early March 1968, proposed an urgent effort to improve and modernize the equipment of the RVNAF, and this recommendation was acted upon by the president almost immediately. On 5 March he told the new secretary of defense to take whatever steps were necessary to increase the effectiveness of ARVN by providing more helicopters, additional M-16 rifles and other needed equipment. The following day orders went out to accelerate the production of the M-16 rifle, which had been lagging badly.¹¹ Hanoi's agreement to President Johnson's proposal to begin peace talks and the prospect of a negotiated withdrawal of U.S. troops gave further urgency to these moves. On 16 April Clifford ordered the development of a program to gradually shift the burden of the war to the South Vietnamese and to support as quickly as possible the modernization of their armed forces. Plans for Phase I of this effort, providing for the improvement of Vietnamese ground combat forces through the addition of more artillery, armor and helicopters, were ready by late August and were approved on 23 October 1968. On 31 October the president announced a complete halt of the bombing of North Vietnam and there was great expectation of quick progress at the peace talks, held in Paris. On 9 November the new MACV commander, General Abrams, requested permission to move rapidly toward Phase II of the Vietnamization plan, which called for the creation of a self-sufficient RVNAF capable of coping with the internal insurgency after a U.S.-North Vietnamese withdrawal. The JCS concurred, and the outgoing deputy secretary of defense approved the Phase II plan on 18 December.¹²

The higher Vietnamese force levels called for by these plans became possible as a result of a new willingness on the part of the GVN to assume a greater share of the fighting. Jarred by the Tet attacks and disturbed by the evident hesitancy of the Johnson administration to rush in more American troops, Saigon ordered a recall of reservists and the drafting of nineteen-and eighteen-year-olds. On 19 June a new general mobilization was announced which provided for the conscription of all males between

AMERICA IN VIETNAM

164

THE TRAVAIL OF VIETNAMIZATION

165

JEAN SAINTENY, 70, IN PARIS,
FORMER CABINET MINISTER

PARIS, Feb. 25 (Reuters)—Jean Sainteny, a former Cabinet minister and colonial administrator, has died at his Paris home, it was reported today. He was 70 years old.

After fighting in the Resistance during World War II, Mr. Sainteny held a series of key diplomatic posts in Southeast Asia.

In 1945 he headed the French military mission to China, before becoming commissioner for Tonkin and North Annam in French Indochina, a post he held from October 1945 until December 1947.

From 1954 to 1958, Mr. Sainteny was the senior French representative in Hanoi after the French military withdrawal from Indochina.

Following Charles de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, Mr. Sainteny was elected to Parliament on the Gaullist ticket and was minister for war veterans and war victims under Prime Minister Georges Pompidou from 1962 to 1966.

BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB, INC., 485 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

212/867-4300

December 19, 1978

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I'm sorry I did not get to see you last Monday, although I must say I felt
your presence. It came at me as I sampled your furniture, including, of
course, the chair in which you made all the decisions that I will undoubt-
edly read about in Volume II.

Ms. Vick was helpful and kind and hospitable and I hope you will thank her for me. With her guidance I think I managed to read a third of what was available. I wish I could have kept going but I did at least get a sense of your book, and I was enormously impressed. It seems to me to be full of riches, written in a rhythm that rocks, statesmanlike, from eloquence to incisiveness, from philosophic musings of profound relevance, to candid appraisals of men and events. My overall impression is that you have caught your moment in time, rescuing "some permanence from the tenuousness of human foresight."

For me personally, of the thousand or so pages I read, I think I was most
captivated by your account of the China breakthrough, especially the prep-
arations for that secret visit and those first meetings with Chou En-Lai.
You will have trouble trimming there because it seemed to me to be quite
tight, and continually fascinating.

If I slowed down at all it was in the Vietnam-Cambodia sections. I read
your first chapter on Vietnam and the chapter recounting the 1970 Cambodia
crisis. I think that when it comes time for you to edit and cut you will
find it easiest to do so in this area. You say at the beginning, "I cannot
write about Vietnam except with pain and sadness." And sometimes it shows.
And you must remember that most Americans today cannot read about Vietnam
without a sense of that same pain and sadness. For my own part, it may be
that I have read too much about Vietnam lately, for I felt the same vague
sensation of discomfort, and weariness, as I sat in San Clemente reading,
from President Nixon's mountainous manuscript, his sections on Vietnam.
I'm not quite sure what you can do about this except to cut. Both chapters
seem to me to be overlong, a shade too academic in tone (or, perhaps, too
orthodox), slightly defensive and covering ground many of us are at least
superficially familiar with. One approach might be for you to look at those
areas in which you set down the record remorselessly, perhaps extending the
record too far. Sometimes there is an over-accumulation of detail. It may
not be necessary to spell out every agonizing step taken in the process of
trying to end the war.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 2

Specifically, I think you might look closely to your use of secondary sources -- newspapers and news magazines -- when you quote them either to bolster a point or to show how the opinion makers swing with the wind. I think everyone expects Henry Kissinger to state the record, and interpret -- indeed he should be expected to do that -- without having to fall back too often on secondary sources.

I was totally fascinated with your chapters on your early days with President Nixon, including the transition period, with your views (and entertaining anecdotes) on U.S.-Russian relations, and especially with your assessments of the men around the President. I'm sorry I didn't get to read any of your Middle East material and of other trouble spots around the world. But, as I said, I did read enough to be convinced about the power and importance of your book. As I was leaving I told Ms. Vick it felt like I had just read *War and Peace* in one sitting, and that wasn't so far off the mark.

I did want to offer you one more thought about this whole, massive project. I do feel you should think carefully about the presentation of the book. In view of its tremendous length, certainly justified by the material (I didn't come across a trivial line in the thousand pages I read), I understand the need to make it a two-volume work. Reading what I did from Volume I, I can't imagine Volume II not having the same thrust. I wonder, however, if the two volumes should be published separately, a year apart, as I understand is the strategy now. The danger for you in this arrangement, it seems to me, is the possibility that the public's appetite for Volume II might be dulled by the reception Volume I brings. There is no certainty that all the critics and book reviewers will be kind to the first volume. Also even if the reception for Volume I is overwhelmingly favorable, potential readers for the second volume might say, "My, Lord, I think I've read all I want to about Dr. Kissinger's role in the Nixon Presidency. And to go through another book covering Watergate...."

Some of our recent experiences at the Book-of-the-Month Club embolden me to suggest that you consider the possibility of publishing your two-volume work together at one time. We had a great success with Solzhenitzyn's *Gulag I* -- I believe it sold over 350,000 through the Book-of-the-Month Club in a single month. Success diminished considerably with each succeeding volume in the Gulag series. We used John Bartlow Martin's two-volume biography of Adlai Stevenson, one volume at a time, as the publisher released it. Neither volume did particularly well for us, or the Publisher. I think the Stevenson biography would have done far better had the two volumes come out together.

On the other hand we enjoyed a success with a two-volume work by Page Smith on the American Revolution, *A New Age Now Begins*, the two volumes published together. I believe the Publisher's price of the two-volume edition was $24.95. The book worked.

There would be disappointment, I'm sure, if waiting on Volume II meant a year or more delay in publishing your book. But I don't believe that delay would damage its chances; in fact, it might enhance them. The farther we get away from Vietnam, for instance, the better our chance to understand that experience. Same with Watergate, I believe.

PROPOSED ARTICLE ON CONCEALMENT OF INFORMATION ABOUT BOMBING OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

On July 30, 1974, the Committee considered a proposed Article of Impeachment dealing with the unauthorized bombing of Cambodia and the concealment from the Congress of that bombing:

In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, on and subsequent to March 17, 1969, authorized, ordered, and ratified the concealment from the Congress of the facts and the submission to the Congress of false and misleading statements concerning the existence, scope and nature of American bombing operations in Cambodia in derogation of the power of the Congress to declare war, to make appropriations and to raise and support armies, and by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.

The Committee, by a vote of 26-12, decided not to report the proposed Article to the House.

The article charged that the President had concealed the bombing in Cambodia from the Congress and that he had submitted, personally and through his aides, false and misleading statements to the Congress concerning that bombing. The investigation of those allegations centered upon the initial decision to bomb Cambodia; the type, scope, extent and nature of the bombing missions; the reporting and recording system used internally within the military and the Administration; and the statements made by Administration officials to Congress and to the public both during the military operation and after it had ceased.¹

On February 11, 1969, the President received the initial request to institute the bombing from his military advisors. On March 17, 1969, after a series of National Security Council meetings, the President approved the request and directed that the operation be undertaken under tight security.

On March 18, 1969, the bombing of Cambodia commenced with B-52 strikes under the code name MENU OPERATION. These strikes continued until May 26, 1970, almost one month after the American incursion into Cambodia. The operational reports prepared after each mission stated that these strikes had taken place in South Vietnam rather than in Cambodia.

Between April 24 and May 24, 1970, American planes conducted tactical air strikes in Cambodia under the code name "regular" PATIO. No operational reports were made with respect to these

¹ The detailed findings of the Inquiry Staff concerning the bombing of Cambodia are compiled in Book XI of the Statement of Information. The findings were based upon an examination of all available sources of material, including Congressional testimony, classified documents made available by Congressional Committees, and reports of public statements by the President, civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense, and State Department officials. Some classified documents were not made available to the Committee.

(217)

218

strikes. Similarly, prior to June 30, 1970, an unspecified number of tactical air strikes occurred in various parts of Cambodia. Again no regular reports were prepared.

On May 14, 1970, a one day series of "special" PATIO sorties were conducted, operational reports stated that the strikes had occurred in Laos rather than Cambodia. The tactical air sorties with the code name "regular" FREEDOM DEAL were accurately reported as having occurred in Cambodia. A series of tactical air bombing missions in Cambodia called "special" FREEDOM DEAL occurred outside the boundaries designated for FREEDOM DEAL bombing, although the operational reports indicated otherwise.

On July 1, 1973, Congress enacted P.L. 93-50 and P.L. 93-52 providing for the cessation of all bombing in Cambodia by August 15, 1973. At that time the bombing had not been formally acknowledged by the President or his representatives.

Later, during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on the Cambodian bombing, military and Administration officials explained that the bombing was not publicized because of the delicate diplomatic and military situation in Southeast Asia prior to the American incursion into Cambodia. They stated that it was their understanding that Cambodia's ruler, Prince Sihanouk, had privately agreed to the bombing of Cambodia prior to his overthrow. It was further stated that certain Members of Congress had been informed of the military action and that this constituted sufficient notice to Congress of the President's military decision. Finally, the submission of false data to Congress was said to have resulted from the highly classified nature of the accurate bombing statistics.

The Committee considered the views of the supporters of this proposed Article of Impeachment that the President's conduct constituted ground for impeachment because the Constitution vests the power to make war in Congress and implicitly prohibits the Executive from waging an undeclared war. Stating that impeachment is a process for redefining the powers of the President, the supporters argued that the President, by issuing false and misleading statements, failed to provide Congress with complete and accurate information and thereby prevented Congress from responsibly exercising its powers to declare war, to raise and support armies, and to make appropriations. They stated that informing a few selected members of the Congress about the Cambodian bombing did not constitute the constitutionally required notice, particularly inasmuch as the President's contemporaneous public statements were contrary to the facts and the selected Members were committed to a course of action involving war that did not represent the views of a substantial portion of American citizens. The supporters also stated that Congress had not ratified the President's conduct through inaction or by its 1973 limitation on bombing because Congress did not know of the bombing until after it voted the authorization. Finally, they asserted that the technicalities or merits of the war in Southeast Asia, the acquiescence or protests of Prince Sihanouk, and the arguably similar conduct of past Presidents were irrelevant to the question of President Nixon's constitutional accountability in usurping Congress' war-making and appropriations powers.

The Congress of the United States, by a vote of two to one, declared that the President was in public會 of the United States, and by a vote of two to one, declared that the President had违抗了The Congress of the United States, and by a vote of two to one, declared that the President had

² Represen-
tative for
the Comm-
mittee on
Foreign
Affairs,
classified
by the
Committee
on
the
Ground
of
certain
reasons,
and
therefore
publicly
dis-
played
by
the
Committee
on
Foreign
Affairs,
the
Committee
on
Public
Affairs,
and
the
Committee
on
Naval
Affairs.

219

The Committee did not agree to the article for a variety of reasons. The two principal arguments in opposition to it were that Persident Nixon was performing his constitutional duty in ordering the bombing and that Congress had been given sufficient notice of the bombing. Several Members stated that the President as Commander-in-Chief was acting to protect American troops and that other Presidents had engaged in similar military activities without prior Congressional consent.² Examining the bombing of Cambodia from the perspective of Congressional responsibility, the opponents of the Article concluded that, even if President Nixon usurped Congressional power, Congress shared the blame through acquiescence or ratification of his actions. They stated that the President had provided sufficient notice of the military actions to Congress by informing key Members. Finally, they said that the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 mooted the question raised by the Article.

² Representative Seiberling also stated that because of the President's decision not to declassify certain materials, such evidence could not be made public or be discussed during the Committee's debate. Representative Seiberling said that this prevented the public use of certain documents which tied the President into acts of concealment. He stated that this was one of the reasons he opposed the Article. The classified materials which were not publicly disclosed are listed on pages 122-23 of Book XI of the "Statement of Information." (HJC Debates, 7/30/74, TR. 1225-26).

298

lative Branch is supreme and cannot be thwarted by claims of Executive privilege on the part of the Executive Branch.

Executive privilege is a doctrine dependent on Separation of Powers. Impeachment is a process that assumes an "intrusion" by the Legislative Branch into the Executive and thus the Separation of Powers upon which Executive privilege is premised is absent.

Failure of a President to respond to a lawfully authorized subpoena of the Legislative Branch pursuant to its impeachment authority, constitutes an impeachable offense.

If this President can ignore these subpoenas, all future Presidents will assuredly ignore all future subpoenas of any impeachment inquiry.

We must redefine this Executive power and by impeachment, limit it so future Presidents will ignore lawfully authorized subpoenas in the impeachment process at their own risk.

Finally, I believe we should have approved an Article of Impeachment dealing with the exercise of the War Power.

Though it is undeniable that abuse of the War Power did not begin with President Nixon, that in fact it was severely abused by President Johnson, the truth remains that Richard Nixon, too, seriously abused the War Power by concealing and misrepresenting the facts concerning the massive bombing of neutral Cambodia. A War Power whose exercise is dependent on the deception of the American People is a War Power that is seriously abused. And yet the ability to wage war in recent years has almost seemed dependent on a President deceiving the American People. It is increasingly clear that the Vietnam War was a result of lies and deception on a massive scale, not to confuse or mislead the enemy, but to confuse and mislead the American People, the source from which all powers of the President, including the War Power, must flow.

Therefore, if ever a power of the President desperately needed a Constitutional redefinition and thereby a Constitutional limitation, it is the War Power.

I regret we did not recommend an Article of Impeachment based on the conduct of the President in concealing and deceiving the American People with respect to the exercise of the War Power in the bombing of Cambodia. Failing to do so, we may have unintentionally ratified such conduct for future Presidents. And if we have done that, all the good we might have done in redefining and limiting Presidential power in other fields may be of little avail.

Subsequent to preparing these views, Richard Nixon, facing certain impeachment and conviction, resigned his office.

Gerald Ford, in his first address to Congress as President, described these events as a "National Nightmare."

The "nightmare," as Gerald Ford so aptly described it, is not yet over, but it is undeniable that it is receding. The final admission of complicity in obstruction of justice by Richard Nixon precipitated his forced resignation under the universal perception that his impeachment and conviction were certainties.

It was with mixed feelings that I viewed those events. I desired that the constitutional process of impeachment and trial be carried out that a full and complete record of what Mr. Nixon did to our country might

# SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF MR. DRINAN

## INTRODUCTION

Contemporary commentators and future historians will have reason, it seems to me, to raise the most serious questions as to why the House Judiciary Committee did not more adequately investigate the deliberate and persistent cover-up by President Nixon of the clandestine bombing which he personally authorized over the neutral nation of Cambodia between March 18, 1969 and May 1, 1970. From the beginning of the impeachment inquiry I persistently raised with the members and with the staff of the Committee the possibility of an impeachable offense based upon the usurpation of the power of Congress as well as the deception of Congress involved in the Cambodian bombing and the subsequent falsification of military records submitted to the U.S. Senate.

## CAMBODIAN ISSUE ACCORDED LOW PRIORITY

The fact is that the House Judiciary Committee made its decision against the Cambodian bombing as an impeachable offense upon inadequate evidence. The concurring statement contained in this report by Congresswoman Holtzman, joined in by myself and several other members of the Committee, indicates that "the statistical information regarding [Cambodia] is incomplete because the inquiry staff declined to obtain it." Congresswoman Holtzman continues by stating that "unfortunately, the investigation in general of the secret Cambodian bombing was not pursued as fully by the staff as its seriousness required."

The fact of the matter is that not a single subpoena was issued in connection with the Cambodia question, not a single witness was summoned and no apparent attempt was made to compel the declassification of those documents essential to an investigation of the reasons why the air war in Cambodia was concealed from the American people until it was discovered quite by accident in July 1973.

I am not minimizing the seriousness and the gravity of the three articles of impeachment set forth and justified in this report. I have concurred in the judgment that all of them constitute impeachable offenses. At the same time it seems paradoxical that a bipartisan majority emerged for votes to impeach the President on the basis of strictly domestic offenses whereas a bipartisan majority did not emerge with respect to the presumably bipartisan role which the President fulfilled as Commander-in-Chief. Only history will be able to decide the reasons for this phenomenon. I feel compelled to state at this time, however, that I find it incongruous that a President be impeached for unlawful wiretapping but not for unlawful war making. Similarly, I find it disturbing that the Committee voted to impeach a President for concealing a burglary but not for concealing a massive bombing.

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In the scant material in the Committee Report on the Cambodian question there is reference in a footnote to "the detailed findings of the Inquiry Staff concerning the bombing of Cambodia." Not everyone will agree that those findings are "detailed". The origins of those findings are described in this footnote as based on "all available sources of material". This contention is also open to question. A careful review of the written record of the debate in the Judiciary Committee on the Cambodian question indicates that many of the members did not have answers to the questions which in their judgment were essential to a decision on the impeachability of the President's conduct in ordering that information concerning bombing in Cambodia be withheld from Congress and the American people.

Members did not have that information because from the beginning of the impeachment inquiry the Cambodian question was given a very low priority. The members of the Judiciary Committee did not establish that low priority. Clearly the inherent seriousness of the matter could not justify the paucity of staff assigned to the Cambodian issue. Only history will be able to decide whether a Congress which funded a war in Indo-China even after it had repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in December, 1970, was so confused about its own role in the Vietnam War that it was unable or unwilling to delve into presidential conduct more shocking and more unbelievable than the conduct of any president in any war in all of American history.

## THE PROPOSED ARTICLE ON IMPEACHMENT ON CAMBODIA

The proposed article of impeachment which was rejected by the Judiciary Committee on July 30, 1974, by a vote of 26 to 12 reads as follows:

In his conduct of the office of President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, on and subsequent to March 17, 1969, authorized, ordered and ratified the concealment from the Congress of the facts and the submission to the Congress of false and misleading statements concerning the existence, scope and nature of American bombing operations in Cambodia in derogation of the power of the Congress to declare war, to make appropriations and to raise and support armies, and by such conduct warrants impeachment and trial and removal from office.

The gravamen of this proposed article of impeachment is not the bombing itself nor even the secrecy of the bombing, but, rather, its concealment from the Congress. The concealment was carried out in a course of conduct by President Nixon which was a clear usurpation of the right of Congress to declare war.

It is overwhelmingly clear that the Framers of the Constitution granted to Congress exclusively "the power of the sword". Alexander Hamilton pointed out that the Constitution provides that it is "the exclusive province of Congress, when the nation is at peace, to change that state into a state of war." Similarly in the *Federalist Papers*, James Madison states:

> The power to declare war, including the power of judging the causes of war is fully and exclusively vested in the legislature; but the Executive has no right, in any case, to decide that question, whether or not there is a cause of declaring war.

309

One need not approach the ultimate scope of congressional power in the area of declaring war in order to recognize the unconstitutional conduct of the President in carrying out a policy of deception from March, 1969 until July 16, 1973,—more than four years after the bombing commenced. That deception included a violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution which declares that "a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." One of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, Colonel Mason, stated during the Virginia ratifying convention of 1787 that he could not conceive of any situation in which the receipts and expenditures of public money ought to be concealed. "The people," he affirmed, "had a right to know the expenditures of their money." The President violated both the letter and spirit of that constitutional mandate by misrepresenting the expenditure of 145 million dollars for the bombing of Cambodia as having been spent in South Vietnam.

The article of impeachment reproduced above refers directly and exclusively to the massive cover-up of the facts during and after the secret bombing raids of 3,695 B52's over Cambodia carried on over a period of 14 months. Although the evidence suggests that these bombings were not successful in eliminating the alleged sanctuaries of the North Vietnamese in Cambodia, one need not dispute the claimed merits of these bombings in order to condemn their concealment. The proposed article of impeachment based on the secret bombing in Cambodia takes no position on the war in Indo-China. The resolution was not designed to separate those who approved of the war from those who disapproved. Indeed one can hold that the 3700 B52 sorties actually saved American lives in South Vietnam and still recognize that the cover-up of these bombings is such a serious offense against Congress and the Constitution that it reaches the level of impeachability.

## PROPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CONCEALMENT

Those who would justify the withholding of information from the Congress and the country on the basis that the bombing of Cambodia was necessary to preserve the lives of American troops in South Vietnam cannot use that justification for the policy of deception which was continued until July 16, 1973,—more than four years after the bombing began. Indeed President Nixon never asserted any military justification for the secrecy and deception. The alleged justification of protecting Prince Sihanouk from embarrassment clearly ceased when Sihanouk was overthrown on March 18, 1970.

There was no military justification for maintaining secrecy about the Cambodian bombings. There was no diplomatic reason, at least after the overthrow of Sihanouk on March 18, 1970. The only reason for the deception of Congress and of the country was President Nixon's political objective of deceiving and quieting the anti-war movement. The President orchestrated a conspiracy to keep the lid on Cambodia until at least after the elections of November, 1972.

Those who would justify the deception of Congress on the grounds of national security contend that the alleged communication of the

310

bombing in Cambodia to a handful of members of Congress satisfies the requirements of the Constitution. No one has ever revealed who communicated what information to the alleged 13 members of Congress who were reported to be advised about the secret bombing. In direct contradiction to the claim that some members of Congress knew about the bombing, there stands the testimony of General Wheeler on July 30, 1973 before the Senate Armed Services Committee in which the general reported that President Nixon had ordered him personally never to disclose the bombing of Cambodia to any member of Congress.

## THE UNRAVELLING OF THE COVER-UP

The calculated cover-up of Cambodia like the cover-up of Watergate, unravelled by accident. According to Senator Symington, the acting Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, during the hearings in July and August 1973, he and other members of Congress heard of the secret bombings of Cambodia because of the circumstances he describes in these words.

I would like to point out that the knowledge of this whole bombing of B52's in Cambodia resulted from a foreign correspondent in a small airplane going from Phnom Penh to Saigon seeing the craters that the B52's had made in Cambodia. If it had not been for that, there would have been no knowledge of the subject on the part of the American people...

This accidental unravelling of a calculated deception revealed the falsity of testimony given on a regular basis over a four year period by the highest military and civilian officials of the government. It is clear, moreover, that all of the persistent testimony on behalf of the cover-up of the bombing in Cambodia is directly traceable to the decree of the President that there should be absolute and abiding secrecy about the bombing in Cambodia. No other motivation except a presidential directive can explain the testimony of Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor on April 16, 1970, the testimony of General Earle Wheeler in May, 1970, and the report of Secretary of the Air Force Seamans in May, 1970, all of whom reported that no bombing strikes had occurred in Cambodia prior to May 1, 1970.

Unfortunately the staff of the House Judiciary Committee declined to investigate the unprecedented and indefensible falsification of military documents by Pentagon officials. All of the documents related to the 3,695 raids were altered to indicate that these attacks had occurred in South Vietnam rather than in Cambodia. Pentagon officials testified falsely to the Senate regularly and persistently. The Pentagon spokesman, Jerry Friedheim, distributed falsehoods to the press knowing them to be falsehoods. When confronted later, Mr. Friedheim said: "I knew at the time that it was wrong and I am sorry." The President never urged that Mr. Friedheim be fired and he was not. Mr. Friedheim's summary judgment of the long series of lies came to this: "We were not smart enough to foresee" that the secret bombing and falsification would inevitably be disclosed.

## THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSIBILITY

No plausible explanation of this deception is sustainable except the conclusion that it originated in a Presidential command that no dis-

311

closure ever be made of the clandestine Cambodian bombings. When the falsification of records became known in July, 1973, Dr. Kissinger deplored it. General Wheeler, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed horror at the falsification of records but stated that if the President had ordered him to falsify them, "I would have done it." If all of the lying was done originally to diminish domestic opposition to the war in Vietnam it was indefensible. If Prince Sihanouk had agreed to the bombing and the lies were to protect him from the wrath of his own people, the deception was still indefensible.

One can come only to a single and inescapable conclusion: the deception and falsification was ordered by the President so that he could pursue the bombing without objection from anyone in the Congress or in the country. Independent of whether one approves of that massive bombing, the conduct of President Nixon simply cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of the Constitution that Congress appropriate all funds necessary for the waging of war.

The unconstitutionality of the conduct of President Nixon was cogently stated by Senator Symington in these words:

> I have been on this committee, this is my 21st year. I knew nothing whatsoever about this (the secret bombing of Cambodia). I put up the money. Apparently nobody knew about this except two or three Senators at the most. If we are asked to appropriate money for one thing and it is used for another, regardless of its effectiveness, that puts us in a pretty difficult position.

> I personally think it is unconstitutional, because you dropped over a hundred thousand tons on this country, and I had no idea you dropped one ton, nor did other members of the committee except those chosen few, all of whom, I might add, supported the war, which I once did and later changed in 1967.

Senator Harold E. Hughes, reflecting on the persistent deception engaged in by Pentagon officials about the Cambodian bombing came to these conclusions in a speech on the Senate floor:

> I deeply believe that the peril to our free institutions created by these official practices of official deceit and secret warfare are more ominous than any problem confronting our country.

> No group within our society, however well-intentioned, can be permitted to make the momentous decision to wage secret warfare while officially deceiving the Congress and the public.

## CONCLUSION

The Framers of the Constitution came together in Philadelphia from May to September in 1787 in order to create a government where no one ever again would have to enter into an armed rebellion to vindicate his right to be free of tyranny. The framers of the Constitution deemed the ultimate tyranny to be war carried on illegally by the executive. Mr. Randolph of Virginia noted that the President would have great opportunities in the American system of abusing his power,—particularly in time of war. In order to prevent the Executive from engaging the entire nation in war, the Framers of the Constitution carefully diffused that power among both bodies of the Congress. The authors of the Constitution, after an extensive debate, gave the power to "declare" war to Congress and the power to "make" that war to the Executive. The Framers of the Constitution devised the remedy of impeachment for those members of the executive branch of government who would bring the ultimate tyranny of war on the people of America without the Congress officially and formally declaring that war.

312

The manner in which President Nixon unilaterally conducted an air war in Cambodia and the subsequent course of conduct in which he covered up that period of massive bombing in a neutral country cannot be justified by the Constitution, by the relevant laws, or by any traditional relationship between the Congress and the President in a period of war. The fact is that President Nixon, in the concealment and cover-up of the war in Cambodia, violated the most fundamental right of the Congress and usurped the most basic constitutional privileges of the people of America. He committed offenses for which the remedy of impeachment is uniquely suited and for which that extraordinary remedy was placed in the Constitution. Nothing in the exalted powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief can justify the manner in which President Nixon treated the Congress and the country when he entered into a course of conduct that began in March, 1969, two months after he became President, and terminated in July, 1973, to the embarrassment of the Pentagon and the White House. The dark series of events during that period and the habitual decep- tions of the American people by the President constitute conduct, as outlined in the proposed Article IV of Impeachment, which rivals, if not surpasses, the lawless activity set forth in the first three articles of impeachment as outlined in this report.

It is exceedingly regrettable that the unconscionable and unconstitutional conduct of Richard Nixon with respect to the neutral nation of Cambodia was not also deemed by the Committee to be an impeachable offense. I can only hope that future generations will not interpret this decision of the Judiciary Committee as implied consent and sanction of such conduct.

ROBERT F. DRINAN.

ness and
—stands
countable
ning un-
and from
stitution,
t to de-
HOLTZMAN.

DISSENTING VIEWS OF MS. HOLTZMAN, JOINED BY
MESSRS. KASTENMEIER, EDWARDS, HUNGATE,
CONYERS, WALDIE, DRINAN, RANGEL, OWENS AND
MEZVINSKY

PROPOSED ARTICLE IV: SECRET BOMBING OF CAMBODIA

We believe that Richard Nixon committed a high crime and misdemeanor when, as President, he unilaterally ordered the bombing of Cambodia and deliberately concealed this bombing from Congress and the American public, through a series of false and deceptive statements, for more than four years. Proposed Article IV—which would impeach Mr. Nixon for these acts—is one of the most serious the Committee on the Judiciary considered during the course of its inquiry.

It is difficult to imagine Presidential misconduct more dangerously
in violation of our constitutional form of government than Mr. Nixon's
decision, secretly and unilaterally, to order the use of American mili-
tary power against another nation, and to deceive and mislead the
Congress about this action. By depriving Congress of its constitu-
tional role in the war-making and appropriations processes, the Presi-
dent denied to the American people the most basic right of self-
government: the right to participate, through their elected repre-
sentatives, in the decisions that gravely affect their lives.

The framers of our Constitution were well aware of the horrors of
war. They knew it could impoverish a country; they knew the toll
it could take in death and ruined lives; they knew the destruction it
could wreak. They were therefore careful to construct checks and
balances so that a decision to go to war would never be made casually
or lightly, without a national consensus. As Jefferson put it, to check
the "dog of war," it was necessary to take the war-making power out
of the hands of a single person, the President, and place it in the
hands of Congress where a majority vote—arrived at after debate
and deliberation—would be required.

The decision to make war has enormous human, economic and ethical implications. It is intolerable in a constitutional democracy to permit that decision to be made in secret by a President and to be hidden through deception from the law-making bodies and the public.

For that reason the Committee should have found that President
Nixon, in waging a secret war in Cambodia, committed a high crime
and misdemeanor.

THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE

The central facts with regard to Richard Nixon's role in the con-
cealment of the bombing of Cambodia are undisputed.

On March 17, 1969—less than 2 months after he took office—Presi-
dent Nixon authorized a series of B-52 bombing strikes in Cambodia.

(323)

324

The bombing began on March 18, and in the succeeding 14 months, 3,695 B-52 sorties were flown, dropping 105,837 tons of bombs, at a cost of more than 150 million dollars.

President Nixon's decision to conceal the Cambodia bombing opera-
tions from the Congress was an integral part of the decision to bomb,
made at the same time. On several occasions thereafter he ordered the
highest secrecy for the raids and forbade their disclosure.
In accordance with President Nixon's instructions, the top officials in

In accordance with President Nixon's instructions, the top officials in
his administration, including the Secretaries of Defense and State, two
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Staff for the
Air Force, made false and misleading statements to the Congress,
even though their testimony was usually given under the cloak of top
secret communications. In order to carry out President Nixon's direc-
tions, the Defense Department falsified its own classified records and
submitted false reports to Congress based on these records.
President Nixon personally misrepresented to the Congress the facts

President Nixon personally misrepresented to the Congress the facts concerning the bombing of Cambodia when, on February 25, 1971, he stated in his Foreign Policy Report to Congress:

In Cambodia we pursued the policy of the previous administration until North Vietnamese actions after Prince Sihanouk was deposed made this impossible.
This policy of deception continued until July 16, 1973, more than

This policy of deception continued until July 16, 1973, more than
four years after the bombing began.¹
When the secret Cambodia bombing was finally exposed, President

When the secret Cambodia bombing was finally exposed, President Nixon told the American people, in his August, 1973, press conference, that the secrecy had been necessary. He thus ratified and approved the policy of concealment and deception, a policy which he had earlier ordered.

PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION FOR SECRECY

The bombing of Cambodia was initiated only two months after Richard Nixon became President in 1969. The concealment of that bombing and deception of the Congress continued uninterrupted for more than four years—and persisted even after all American troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam and our prisoners had been returned.

President Nixon has attempted to justify this deceit on diplomatic
grounds: that without the secrecy, Prince Sihanouk, the ruler of Cam-
bodia, would have been compelled to abandon his position of "affirma-
tive acquiescence" and publicly protest the bombing strikes. No mili-
tary justification for the secrecy and deception has been asserted. The
V.C. and North Vietnamese knew they were being bombed. The
only people who did not know about the bombing operations were
Members of Congress and the American people.
Assuming, for the moment, that protecting Prince Sihanouk was a

Members of Congress and the American people.
Assuming, for the moment, that protecting Prince Sihanouk was a
legitimate justification for the deception of Congress and the Amer-
ican people, that justification ceased when Sihanouk was overthrown
on March 18, 1970. After that date there was no justification for sec-
recy or deception. Nonetheless, for three years after the fall of
Sihanouk, Mr. Nixon persistently lied about the bombing.

¹ In fact, absent persistent efforts in the Senate to uncover the full truth about Ameri-
can military activities in Southeast Asia, the facts regarding American bombing operations
in Cambodia might still be secret.

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325

Thus, on April 30, 1970 (two months after Sihanouk's overthrow and 13 months after the bombing had commenced), in announcing the invasion of Cambodia by American ground troops, President Nixon told the following lie to the American public in a televised address:

American policy . . . has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people.

For five years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation.

Again, on June 30, 1970, President Nixon repeated the lie:

For five years, American and allied forces—to preserve the concept of Cambodian neutrality and to confine the conflict in Southeast Asia—refrained from moving against those sanctuaries.

Because Prince Sihanouk was no longer in office at the time of these Presidential statements, there was no justification for these or subsequent falsehoods.

The fact that the deception went on for years after any purported justification ceased to exist substantially impeaches what little validity that justification may have had for the period prior to March 18, 1970, when Sihanouk was still ruler.²

In any event, no authority exists for the proposition that the explicit provisions of the Constitution regarding the war-making and appropriations powers of Congress may be overridden by a President in the interest of protecting a foreign prince.

## ARGUMENTS OFFERED AGAINST THE ARTICLE

In the course of debate on this Article, many Members of the Judiciary Committee conceded that President Nixon's deception was improper. The majority of those who voted against the Article, however, appeared to do so for reasons not directly related to the offense charged. Rather, they referred in the debate to assertions that Congress had acquiesced in the bombing or would have if it had been disclosed, that some Members of Congress had been notified of the secret bombing, that former Presidents had acted similarly, and that the recently enacted War Powers Resolution somehow alleviated the problem of future offenses. Examination of these arguments, however, demonstrates that they do not provide a viable defense to impeachment under Article IV.

1. The President's defenders contended that Congress ratified the secret bombing operations in Cambodia through the passage of various appropriations measures.

In fact, there was no ratification of this bombing. Congress passed on the Indochina war for the last time on June 29, 1973, when it ordered an August 15th cut-off date for all bombing. The secret bombing of Cambodia did not become known until July 16th—two weeks later. There is no way in which Congress could have ratified actions of which it was unaware.

²The evidence concerning Sihanouk's alleged acquiescence in the bomb;ng is inconclusive at best.

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326

2. Other Members opposed to Article IV argued that the disclosure of the Cambodia bombing operations to selected Members of Congress constituted sufficient notification to Congress and satisfied the Constitutional requirement.

This position is not supported by the facts or the law. According to the Department of Defense, President Nixon, and newspaper reports, thirteen Members of Congress were allegedly advised about the secret bombing. Of this number, three are deceased, three have denied being informed, and only four definitely recall being told. No record has been found of these briefings. There is no evidence that any Representative or Senator was fully informed of the nature, extent and purpose of the secret bombing or the reasons for its secrecy. In fact, the evidence suggests otherwise. Thus, Senator Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the only Member who has spoken to the issue, specifically stated that he was given "no indication of the massiveness of the bombing."

It is significant, too, that whatever procedures for notification were used in this case, they were not those established and regularly followed for the handling of the most highly secret matters such as the CIA budget and its intelligence activities, nuclear research and new weapons development.³

In any event, selective notification to persons who supported President Nixon's war policy hardly satisfied the Constitutional requirement of Congressional participation in appropriations and war-making. That mandate of the Constitution—to require legislative debate and decision on grave matters such as the bombing of a neutral country—was frustrated by the concealment of the Cambodia bombing from the Congress regardless of the knowledge, or even consent, of a few members.

3. It was also argued that the Cambodia bombing aided President Nixon's efforts to end American involvement in the Vietnam War, and that, therefore, Congress would have approved it.

We do not question whether the Congress would have approved the bombing had it been informed. It might well have done so. On the other hand, Congress might have chosen to impose limitations on such actions, as it did with regard to American ground operations in Cambodia, and later, with regard to all other bombing in Cambodia.

The question is not what Congress would have decided had it not been deceived, but whether Mr. Nixon had the right to order that deception. He clearly did not.

4. Another argument advanced on behalf of President Nixon is that other Chief Executives, notably President Johnson, deceived the American people about the Vietnam War, and, thus, President Nixon should not be made to answer for wrongs that others have also committed.

The simple answer to this proposition is that the existence of prior misconduct does not justify its continuation or repetition, and that the

³ Under such procedures, secret matters are treated as "classified line items," hidden in the Federal budget, but accessible to the appropriate committees of Congress. These procedures would certainly have been adequate to meet whatever legitimate need for secrecy existed. For example, these procedures were used to report secret ground operations in Laos, begun under President Johnson, providing full disclosure to all the Members of the relevant House and Senate committees.

327

unsanctioned wrongdoings of some do not justify the misdeeds of others. This Committee has firmly rejected the notion that because other Presidents may have abused their powers, the abuses of President Nixon are acceptable.

Moreover, the deception in prior administrations was not related to the very fact of U.S. involvement as in the case of Cambodia, but to the purposes and motives of the disclosed involvement. When the Congress is misled about the purpose of governmental conduct, it can, at least, review the facts independently and adopt or change that conduct. If, however, Congress is unaware of military action, it has no way to decide whether that action should be allowed to continue.

In addition, in this inquiry we are engaged in setting standards of conduct for Presidents. We should make it clear that Presidential lying and deception, in derogation of the Constitutional powers of Congress, are intolerable. James Iredell, one of the first Supreme Court Justices, made this point in the course of debate on the impeachment clause of the Constitution when he said:

> The President must certainly be punishable for giving false information to the Senate.

5. The final opposing argument advanced in the Committee debate was that the War Powers Resolution enacted by Congress in November, 1973, is a sufficient deterrent against repetition of such activity in the future and that, therefore, impeachment of President Nixon on this ground was unnecessary.

This argument is a thin reed. Do its proponents believe, analogously, that the fact Congress is considering a bill to increase the penalties for obstruction of justice bars impeachment of President Nixon under the obstruction count of Article I?

The War Powers Resolution cannot and does not provide any deterrent to secret decisions by a President to institute war in a neutral nation. If a President would violate the clear mandate of the Constitution, the passage of a mere statute reasserting those Constitutional proscriptions can add nothing further in the way of deterrence.

The sole remedy which Congress can employ to bring a President to account for usurpation of the war-making and appropriations powers is impeachment. Only the use of that power is an effective deterrent; and, failure to employ it, when necessary, sets a dangerous precedent.

## CONCLUSION

In these proceedings we have sought to return to the fundamental limitations on Presidential power contained in the Constitution and to reassert the right of the people to self-government through their elected representatives within that Constitutional framework.

The Constitution does not permit the President to nullify the war-making and appropriations powers given to the Congress. Secrecy and deception which deny to the Congress its lawful role are destructive of the basic right of the American people to participate in their government's life-and-death decisions. Adoption of Article IV would give notice to all future Presidents that the American people and the Congress may not be excluded from those decisions.

By failing to recommend the impeachment of President Nixon for

the disclosure of the President of Congress to the Congress denied the Constitution.

According to paper reports, about the secret meeting being denied being No record has been made of any Report, extent and secrecy. In fact, Chairman of the Committee who has "no indication of

of the facts were regularly followed such as the research and new

oppornted Presidential require-and war-mansslative debate of a neutral Cambodia bombing a consent, of a

approved President Lyndon B. Johnson, and

approved the one so. On the questions on such actions in Cambodia. had it not been to order that

Nixon is that he received the President Nixon have also com-

tence of prior to the meeting, and that the

the items," hidden in the Congress. These are the items that need for a secret ground opera-tion to all the Members