HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

HOLLIS B. CHENERY

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

ALEX INKELES

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SEYMOUR M. LIPSET

EDWARD S. MASON

GUSTAV F. PAPANEK

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

January 6, 1969

Mr. Harry Rubey
College of Engineering
Department of Civil Engineering
University of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri 65201

Dear Mr. Rubey:

Thank you for your letter of December 31 enclosing a
copy of your article "An Engineer's Approach to a Better
World." I appreciate your making it available to me and
look forward to reading it with interest.

Best regards,

AN ENGINEER'S APPROACH TO A BETTER WORLD

by Harry Rubey

While nuclear disaster, starvation, over-population, over-
crowded cities, poor transportation, war, crime, civil disorder,
air and water pollution, inflation, high taxes, speculation, and
other catastrophies hang over our heads, leaders ignore the only
sure and acknowledged practical basis for an improved world, namely,
production and trade cooperation combined with friendly competition
among all humans aimed at mutual improvement of living standards
through profits. As typified by the Christmas moon shot, man now
possesses unbelievable engineering and technological ability; unfor-
tunately, there is little evidence that he will use it wisely.
The engineer must now extend his unique pragmatic, analytical,
and synthesizing talents to the broader field of human relations.

Despite great material advance since the turn of the cen-
tury, the United States has suffered four major wars and con-
tinuous disturbance with a deteriorating image at home and
abroad; it remains dangerously on the brink of catastrophic
disasters. Progress in attaining improved human relations remains
notably deficient, in fact has deteriorated through impractical
idealism and character-destroying paternalistic government. Man's
only unchanging motivation through the ages, of a competitive
struggle to improve living standards, has been forgotten while he
magnifies minor differences and objectives into crises.*

* Durant, William James, *The Story of Civilization*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1935-1967. Ten volumes. A summary entitled *The Lessons of History* is in December 1968 *Reader's Digest*, page 257.

2

It has become evident that a new pragmatic approach is essential if we hope to abandon the misconception that confrontation, war, acquisition of territory, and unlimited unilateral commercial supremacy are essential for national welfare. We must realize that the more rational and logical expansion of cooperation, friendship, diplomacy, production, trade, profits, and encouragement to those who help themselves offer a better and more practical solution.

Increased production and avoidance of military waste and suffering could provide for the expanding desires of the fortunate as well as the necessities of the less fortunate, while cooling bitter animosities with increased hope, ambition, profits, and living standards.

Leagues of Nations, United Nations, balances of power, religion, affluent society, material progress, and do-good ideologies have all been tried and found wanting. The world must believe that individual, group, national, and international progress can rest only on increasing intelligent pragmatic power, which will result from widely distributed profit rather than armed force. Forceful demonstration and peace disturbance cannot be tolerated, although orderly dissent should be encouraged.

At the top there could be two or more international groups with mandatory police powers for maintaining peace and order. Once established, such authority would filter downward through national and local levels to the individual. The image of profitable authority must everywhere replace irresponsible and costly revolt.

3

For centuries international power has centered around the Atlantic Ocean. How this group should, and must if it is to survive, abandon its senseless war cycle and grow nationally and profitably in the forthcoming intelligent technological age has been explained by a world renowned French editor and by our own Senator Javits of New York. #

The somewhat non-cooperative Atlantic group should be supplemented by a Pacific group where intelligent modern ambition is replacing old enmities. Fortunately, profitable cooperation is already under way in this area and only needs encouragement and guidance among Japan, Siberia, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, and ultimately all of Southeast Asia and China. The more advanced nations of this group already resemble the British and Roman empires in that their genius lies primarily in profitable cooperation for production, trade, and administration; they relegate war and unilateral success to a lower category.

One can conceive easily of a third Middle-east group. More backward nations and groups could be welcomed as they progress.

North America and Russia-Siberia could best act as friendly connecting bridges, or liason, or homoginizers, or arbitrators between these groups rather than joining any of them. Thus there could be profitable competing groups rather than the

\*Servan-Schreiber, Jean Jacques, *The American Challenge*, with foreword by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., translated from the French by Ronald Steel, New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1968.

4

expensive, ineffective, clumsy, political, and world-wide organ-
izations that have failed in the past in their larger aims,
although they have had beneficial fringe and developmental values.

Recent fast-growing profitable cooperation among American
industries by a highly intelligent professional management,
especially in the area of acquisitions and mergers, shows that
the foregoing profit-type of thinking is practical, and it points
the way to analogous international action. Under profitable
international leadership each nation, group, and individual could
perfect a better life. Only in such an orderly, friendly, profit-
able, competitive society based on recognized normal human moti-
vation can we capitalize our progress toward a better world.
Beginning with international relations, it would spread downward
to the individual.

This radical reversal of motivation and thinking will not
come easily or quickly, although it is already vaguely under way,
as witness release of the Pueblo crew and the Paris Vietnam
negotiations, due in large part to international cooperation.
Long planning with hard organizational and promotional effort
will be essential; an early start is indicated to prevent more
trouble and involvement. Russia and America should cooperate
in the encouragement of this new approach, and it should have
support from engineers.

Rabbi Schulem Rubin

902 BRADY AVENUE
BRONX, NEW YORK 10462

TEL. 828-2247

YOUNG ISRAEL OF PELHAM PARKWAY

ב"ה

July 26, 1971

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

To congratulate you on your brilliant endeavor, incomparable in
the history of United States diplomacy, is not enough. It is
incumbent upon all, especially those of us who had the privilege
of meeting with you, to help in any way possible, particularly
in the area of public opinion.

Americans of all political persuasions should stand firmly behind
the President's policy in your present peace endeavor which will
bring permanent peace with honor and freedom to this war stricken
generation. I humbly report to you that I spent an hour on the
Larry King Program, which has a large listening audience through-
out the state of Florida, blessing your recent "stomach ailment"
and expressing strong support for this new posture of the Admin-
istration.

I have intentions of appearing on as many radio talk shows as my
schedule will allow me for the purpose of gaining support around the
Nation for the Nixon Administration's policies.

May God grant that you achieve your purpose so that your family,
friends and all mankind shall forever be indebted to you for both
your extraordinary mission and historic achievements.

Respectfully,

RSR:1d

FRIEDRICH RUGE

74 TÜBINGEN
LINSENBERGSTR. 47

10 June 1973

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Professor:

Please, accept my booklet "Bündnisse" as a belated present to your 50th birthday about which I just read in a paper. I know how busy you are but I think that the subject might interest you. After my retirement in fall 1961 I was asked to lecture on military-political subjects at the University of Tübingen and did so until last year. I found the history of the alliances fascinating, and I only regret that I discovered your "Grossmacht Diplomatie" ("A World restored") after I had finished my book.

We met at the German Embassy in Washington in spring 1961 when I was "Inspekteur der Bundesmarine", and I sent you my "Entscheidung im Pazifik".

Please, do not trouble yourself to answer. Your time is needed for much more important things.

With my very best wishes,

sincerely yours,
F. Punge

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

S
R

SAARLÄNDISCHER RUNDFUNK

ANSTALT DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS

The WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON DC
USA

Copie

66 SAARBRÜCKEN, den 6.Mai 1973

Funkhaus Halberg, Postfach 1050

- Das Beste von Europa ist Amerika -

- Das Beste von Amerika ist Nixon -

Auch wenn es stimmen sollte, dass einige Politiker
auf nicht ganz legalem Wege und mit unlauteren
Mitteln geholfen haben, Nixon bei seiner Wahl zu
unterstützen, so haben sie sich um ganz Europa
und Amerika in hohem Maße verdient gemacht. Ihnen
gebührte der Orden des: "Honi soit qui mal y pense."

Es gibt und gab wohl noch nie eine Wahl in irgend einem
Land, bei der es ganz legal zuging. Nur wurde nicht so
ein Wirbel darum gemacht und künstlich hochgespielt.

Die Watergate Affäre ist weder ein Skandal, noch ein
Kriminalfall, sie ist einfach ein Naturgesetz, für den
stärksten Mann, auf dem wichtigsten Posten.

Glückliches Amerika, das verstanden hat, den rechten
Mann zur richtigen Zeit zu wählen. Gott gebe, dass er
Europa und Amerika noch viele Jahrzehnte erhalten
bleibt und von so intelligenten und treuen Beratern,
wie Henry Kissinger und den "Watergate Herren" um-
geben wird.

Das wünschen ihm seine Berliner, darunter:

RECEIVED

JUN 5 1973

CENTRAL FILES

Telefon: 60 21 · Fernschreiber: 4/428977
radio sarbk · Drahtanschrift: Radio Saarbrücken
Autobahnausfahrt: Saarbrücken-Brebach

Alle Zuschriften sind ausschließlich
an den Saarländischen Rundfunk und
nicht an Einzelpersonen zu richten

Mündliche Vereinbarungen bedürfen
ausnahmslos der schriftlichen Bestätigung

GENERAL

SP2-3-8

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Dean:

Thank you for your letter of March 5 and for
taking the time to set out your comments on
the President's Annual Review of Foreign
Policy. You are not the first person to discover
that I am not a Saint!

I agree with your advice on dousing speculation
on personal rivalries. It is a game which I
have scrupulously refused to play, but much
to my dismay this has not been the attitude of
the press.

Again, many thanks for writing. I often wish
we could talk at length sometime. Please
let me know when you are next going to be up
here so we can have lunch together.

Honorable Dean Rusk
School of Law
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30601

HAK:jlj 3/10/71

RECEIVED
MAR 1 9 1971
CENTRAL OFFICE

School of Law
University of Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30601
March 5, 1971

PERSONAL

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I have just finished reading the President's 180-page
report on the state of the world. I was prepared for
the Gospel according to St. Henry, but I was a little
startled to discover that the Creation occurred only
two years ago. Every President feels some compulsion
to be different - even though ninety-five per cent of
foreign policy reflects continuity. I remember that
President John F. Kennedy took hold of the work that
Milton Eisenhower had been doing on Latin America,
called it the Alliance for Progress and went to town
on it.

It is true that President Nixon "inherited" the Southeast
Asia problem. The same is also true of President Johnson,
President Kennedy, President Eisenhower and President
Truman. When President Kennedy assumed office, the North
Vietnamese were overrunning Laos and stepping up their
infiltration into South Vietnam. The only specific
recommendation which President Eisenhower made to President-
Elect Kennedy on the day before Inauguration was that
President Kennedy put troops into Southeast Asia.

The purpose of this note is merely to say that I thought
the report as a whole was an interesting and competent
job, although I doubt that such a general statement will
be of much help in providing guidance for the specific
decisions which will have to be made week by week on
important matters of policy.

While I am writing, I might add that I hope that Bill
Rogers and you will find ways to douse the speculation
about personal rivalry between the two of you. This is
a game which the press tries very hard to play - parti-
cularly when Senators back it up, but it is not good for
the President or for the United States to have such specu-
lation rampant. I hope you will be able to persuade your

JUNIOR LITV
FEB 7 1969
BLACKLISTED

Henry V. Klaaringer

Warm regards,

With every good wish for the New Year,

will you be so kind in reaching me.
Please accept my apologies for the tardiness
of my reply; but because of changing offices, my
will have beenafew in reaching me.

I hope you will let me talk to you.
It was very interesting and as we get into this same
Finnland: The Middle East and United States Policy.
Thanks in sending strong hom信号, "Peaceful
kindness in writing to me, as well as your thought-
Thank you for your letter. I appreciated your
hom.

Dear Dan:

New York, New York 10002
GSS West 113th Street
Columbia University
School of International Affairs
Professor Denkmart A. Enjom

January 8, 1969

KLAARINGER, HENRY V.

KUSTOM

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10025

622 West 113th Street

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

December 10, 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Congratulations on your new appointment. I could not think of any choice for the particular assignment that would make me feel more confident about the course of our military and foreign policy in the next four years.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a paper entitled "Peaceful Pluralism: The Middle East and United States Policy." It was submitted in late October to Mr. Humphrey, but never released as part of his campaign. It seems to me that some of the considerations and proposals it contains may prove to be just as relevant under the Nixon administration.

Our major concern in the Middle East, I think, must be (1) to prevent a drift toward full-scale confrontation with the Soviets while (2) fully safeguarding the long-range interests of the United States and its friends, including Israel. Since the Jarring mission seems to be quietly petering out without tangible result, I think it is all the more essential that the next administration take immediate and positive steps toward that twofold end.

Please feel free to make any appropriate use of the enclosed and do not hesitate to call on me if I can be of any help.

DAR/mp
encl.

622 West 113th Street

December 10, 1968

Dear Henry:

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a paper entitled "Peaceful Pluralism: The Middle East and United States Policy." It was submitted in late October to Mr. Humphrey, but never released as part of his campaign. It seems to me that some of the considerations and proposals it contains may prove to be just as relevent under the Nixon administration.

DAR/mp
encl.

PEACEFUL PLURALISM: THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNITED STATES POLICY

Report to the Vice President of a Task Force Chaired
by Dankwart A. Rustow

October 21, 1968

## Summary

The overall objective of our Middle Eastern policy must be to encourage a pattern of peaceful pluralism.

Pluralism is inescapable in a region so diverse within itself and is reinforced by Europe's need for oil, Russia's desire for influence in the region, and United States interests in global communications.

Peaceful pluralism means a Middle East in which there is room for Israelis as well as Arabs, for economies with larger or smaller government and private sectors, and for governments friendly with the United States, the Soviet Union, or both. It means opposing hegemony or bipolarization and reducing the dangers the Middle East poses for world peace. Pluralism must be turned in a peaceful direction so that the energies of the peoples of the Middle East can be directed increasingly to the tasks of economic development, social progress, and human welfare.

A - **Immediate Initiatives.** Unless by the beginning of the next presidential term substantial progress toward a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been made, we should take two simultaneous initiatives:

(1) further Security Council action to break the deadlock of distrust

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between Arabs and Israelis;

(2) an understanding between ourselves and the Soviets to limit or reduce the supply of arms to the region.

The Security Council should reaffirm and spell out its resolution of November 22, 1967: "termination of... belligerency," "acknowledgement of... sovereignty," "secure and recognized boundaries," freedom of navigation," and "just settlement of the refugee problem." Arms limitation must be explored between ourselves and the Soviets as the major suppliers; it should include not only an end to the conventional arms race but also an effective provision to keep the Arab-Israeli area a nuclear-free zone.

For Israel this twofold plan would achieve its long-standing aim of sovereignty recognized by her neighbors. To the Arabs it offers recovery of territories lost in 1967 and an end to the plight of the refugees. For each of the peoples of the Middle East it would at last give an opportunity to concentrate their full energies on the tasks of economic and social development. Between ourselves and the Soviets such a dual policy would make explicit a mutual interest in keeping the region from embroiling us in global confrontation. It would not in other respects harmonize American and Russian interests in the Middle East and the Mediterranean but turn rivalry into more peaceful channels. Even to persuade the Soviets of our more limited mutual interest in avoiding

-3-

confrontation over the Middle East is a task that may require considerable
time and patience; it is nonetheless a goal to which we should commit
ourselves.

While pursuing this twofold policy, we must continue to make it clear
that we will not allow Israel to be destroyed. We should give favorable
consideration to Israel's request to purchase a limited amount of advanced
American weapons, such as phantom jets, unless the need for these is over-
come by positive action toward reaching a political settlement and in ending
the arms race. In the current situation, in view of the Soviet arms build-
up in Egypt and the cessation of French aircraft deliveries to Israel, such
a sale would serve to uphold rather than to alter the military balance in
the region. All these policies are based on the assumption that neither
Israel nor Egypt will develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

B - **Middle and Long Range Policies....** To forestall bipolarization, we should maintain or be ready to restore diplomatic relations with all countries. As some countries veer closer to the Soviets, we should help them through patient diplomacy to rediscover the value of true neutrality and national independence. We should stand fully by our commitments to Turkey under NATO, to Iran, and to other countries but reconsider the size of some of our overgrown civilian and military missions. We should not oppose Arab aspirations toward national unification, *provided* they do not proceed by conquest or subversion and are not aimed at revenge against Israel.

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Our long-range aim must be closer integration of the Middle East into the world economy for the release of its human and economic potential. Recent trends toward diversified control of oil production and toward association of Greece and Turkey with the European Economic Community are to be welcomed.

Multilateral agencies such as the OECD, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program will play important parts in the economic development of the region, and so will projects financed from the oil revenues accruing to its governments. Our own most fruitful contribution will lie in technical assistance and educational exchange. Hybrid corn took 25 years to come from the Middle West to the Middle East; weather control, once feasible, must not be allowed to take that long.

End of Summary

# PEACEFUL PLURALISM: THE MIDDLE EAST AND UNITED STATES POLICY

## I. Introduction: The Importance of the Middle East

The Middle East links the three continents of the Old World and major branches of two oceans. It has given birth to many ancient cultures and to three of mankind's great religions. Beneath its sands lies the world's largest known pool of petroleum, the chief reservoir of liquid fuel for the industries of Western Europe and Japan.

The Middle Easterners themselves, nearly 150 million of them in an area stretching from Egypt to Iran and Turkey to South Yemem, are in the midst of an often painful process of modernization of their social, economic, and political institutions. After centuries of foreign rule and outside political influence, nationalism has become their most deeply felt political passion.

In a context of global strategy, the shift from bombers to missiles and other technological changes have greatly reduced the importance of any territory outside the major political and economic centers, that is, the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as a restless region adjacent to two of these centers, the Middle East retains a far greater political and strategic significance than almost any other of the developing regions of the globe.

More immediately, the deepseated conflict between Arabs and Israelis, and the danger of outside involvement, make of the Middle East a region on which the prospects for war or peace in the world in the next decade may well depend.

## 2. United States Interests and Objectives: Peaceful Pluralism

The objectives of our Middle Eastern policy have evolved gradually. One major concern, going back to the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, has been to find a solution to the Palestine problem that will guarantee Israel's right to a secure national existence without encroaching on the legitimate interests of her Arab neighbors.

A second objective, embodied in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, has been to support the spontaneous forces of local resistance so as to prevent any Soviet take-over of countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Elsewhere in the region we have developed close relations of friendship with other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan. The failure of the communist bid for a take-over in Greece, and the Soviets' shift toward friendlier relations with Turkey and Iran are positive fruits of that policy.

A third objective has been to secure the normal flow of petroleum. Because of the major role of American petroleum companies in the Middle East, these operations have been an important source of foreign exhcnage in our balance of payments. Even more directly, petroleum production has brought enormous benefits to the governments and peoples of the oil-producing countries. Through institutions such as the Kuwait Development Fund, these

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benefits have extended to other countries of the region as well.

A fourth American objective has been to assist in the development of the human and economic resources of the region. Public programs such as economic and technical assistance under AID and its predecessors and food shipments under P.L. 480, and private philanthropic programs have all been part of this American effort. Among the tangible achievements have been the dramatic development of all sectors of the Turkish economy, agricultural progress in Jordan, Iran, Lebanon, and elsewhere, and improved methods of administration and management in Egypt, Iran and other countries.

Other elements of our past Middle Eastern policy reflected more passing concerns or otherwise proved inadequate. In the 1950's and early 1960's the use of airfields, radar facilities, and overflight rights were a pressing concern. With the shift to long-range missiles and reconnaissance satellites, the need for such facilities has all but disappeared. As a result, our military programs in the region now can be based on security needs mutually recognized and shared--our continuing cooperation with Turkey under NATO being a prime example.

Similarly, there were times, particularly during the mid-1950's, when we sought to play an active role in influencing the international alignment of Middle Eastern governments through various forms of pressure, in encouraging defense pacts for which there was little local support, and in promoting solutions of our own devising to some of the political conflicts of the region. These attempts usually remained fruitless or even

-4-

backfired.

Building on the elements of strength in our Middle Eastern policy, and benefiting from the lessons of occasional mistakes, it is time to formulate positively our overall objective.

The overall objective of our Middle Eastern policy must be to encourage a peaceful pluralism in the region so that the energies of its peoples can be directed increasingly to the tasks of economic development, social progress, and human welfare.

Pluralism is inescapable in a region as diverse as the Middle East. It is reinforced by outside factors including Europe's need for oil, Russia's desire for greater influence in the largest non-communist region on her borders, and United States interests in communications around the world as well as our close and friendly relations with such countries as Turkey, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.

Peaceful pluralism means a Middle East in which there is room for Israelis as well as Arabs, for governments professing a "revolutionary" or a "moderate" ideology, for economies with larger or smaller government sectors, for countries seeking friendship with the United States, the Soviet Union, or both. Peaceful pluralism also means a Middle East where there is room for political change within the area and for competition of outside interests --without making of the region the trigger that would set off a Third World War.

Frankly recognizing this deepseated pluralism, we should not in the Middle East anymore than elsewhere in the world play the policeman, seek to prescribe forms of government or economy, or attempt to impose

-5-

ready-made diplomatic solutions.

Our most immediate and imperative interest in the Middle East is to reduce the dangers it presents to world peace. This requires us to oppose any policy, or drift of events, whereby a single power-- such as the Soviet Union, or some militant pan-Arab leadership leaning on outside support--would establish its hegemony over the region as a whole.

Even aside from the Arab-Israeli conflict, intraregional tensions and disputes (comparable to the recent civil wars in Lebanon, Yemen, and Cyprus or the tension in 1961 between Iraq and Kuwait) are likely to recur. In such situations we must fully stand by our prior commitments without turning the dispute into a full-fledged confrontation within the region--let alone a global confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union. In short, we must in so far as possible avoid a bipolarization either within or around the region.

Our specific interests and commitments can be readily fitted into such a broader context of peaceful pluralism. These have included the continued existence of the state of Israel without prejudice to the legitimate interests of its Arab neighbors; the protection of Turkey, Iran, and other countries against any threat of communist subversion or direct Soviet attack; and the continued flow of Middle Eastern oil into the economy of the free world.

Our policy for the short-range must be aimed at avoiding a resumption of full-scale war between Arabs and Israelis, at removing or alleviating

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the tensions that might escalate into such a war, at avoiding an
American-Russian confrontation in the Middle East, and at stopping the
dangerous arms race that might escalate into such a confrontation.

Our policy for the middle range must above all strengthen the
patterns of peaceful pluralism in and around the Middle East.

Our policy for the long range must encourage economic cooperation between the Middle East and Europe and the closer integration of the Middle East into the world economy. Only in this way can the peoples of the region proceed to the full realization of their economic and human development potential.

3. Immediate Initiatives: Arab-Israeli Settlement and Arms Reduction

To deal with the most immediate and explosive aspect of the Middle
Eastern situation we must take positive steps toward a settlement of the
<u>Arab-Israeli conflict</u>.

There is, of course, no rational consideration that would compel
either side to proceed to a fourth round. Israel since June 1967 holds
a set of de-facto lines that, short of a negotiated settlement, give her
far greater military security than did the lines of 1949. The United
Arab Republic knows from its experience in 1956 and 1967 that mere weapons
without adequate training and organization cannot ensure victory--in fact
may precipitate defeat. Rationally, too, these motives for avoiding war
would furnish so many justifications for making peace. And indeed, with
the opening of the fall 1968 session of the General Assembly, the diplomatic
scene has come to life: Ambassador Gunnar Jarring has for the first

-7-

time been able to relay substantive memoranda from one side to the other.

Still, the gap between the demands on either side remains wide, and there is no firm evidence as yet that we are on the verge of a decisive break-through. Meanwhile, the continuing state of belligerency, with its pattern of skirmishes, terrorism, and retaliation raids, might well flare up into another full-scale war. The on-going arms race poses the dangers of involvement, whether by accident or design, of the major outside powers. In short, there remain the dangers of suspicion, irrationality, and mis-calculation: we must realize that in a post-Vietnam world, the Middle East remains more likely than any other region to bring us to the brink of a third global war.

Unless by the beginning of the next presidential term in January 1969 substantial progress toward a peaceful solution has been made, our immediate initiative should take the form of a coordinated, two-pronged attack: further Security Council action to facilitate an agreement between Arabs and Israelis, and an understanding between ourselves and the Soviets to limit or reduce the supply of arms now in the region. Settlement of the dispute and arms reduction thus would become mutually reinforcing parts of a single package. For both parts of the package the logical first step would be preliminary soundings between American and Soviet representatives.

The broad outlines of further Security Council action are implicit in its resolution of November 1967, which called for "termination of... belligerency," "acknowledgement of...sovereignty," "secure and recognized boundaries," "freedom of navigation through international waterways," and a

-8-

By January 1969, it should be reasonably clear whether the contacts that Ambassador Jarring began a year ago on the basis of that November 1967 resolution will yield positive results. If not, a restatement of the Security Council resolution in somewhat fuller detail and with emphatic support from ourselves, the Soviets, and other Security Council members may be a necessary step toward overcoming the climate of suspicion prevailing in the Middle East and toward achieving a settlement. But an even more essential step is an end to the arms race which resumed once again after the 1967 war with the massive new Soviet deliveries to Egypt.

Arms limitation in the Middle East might take a variety of specific forms, but once again the first step in this direction must be an understanding between ourselves and the Soviets as the major outside suppliers. It should cover not only the limitation or reduction of conventional arms but also an explicit understanding keeping the Arab-Israeli area a nuclear-free zone.

While pursuing this positive policy toward settlement and arms limitation, we must do our part to keep the situation from deteriorating before such a plan can come to fruition. We must recognize the destructive potential of the arms race resumed after the June War through the massive Soviet program of military assistance to Egypt and other Arab countries. To help preserve the precarious peace we must continue to make it clear to Egyptians, Soviets, and others that we will not allow the destruction

of the state of Israel. This does not imply that we support all of
Israel's present or future claims following the war of June 1967. It
does not imply support of any particular territorial solution. But it
emphatically rules out any solution based on the destruction of the
political existence of one of the protagonists.

Pending an overall Arab-Israeli settlement and agreement on arms
reduction, we should deal forthrightly with continuing requests for arms
from countries in the area. A limited amount of defensive weapons for
Jordan furnished from the United States will be preferable to larger
supplies that might be furnished more indiscriminately by the Soviet
Union. In view of the arms build-up in Egypt during the past year and
the cessation of French aircraft deliveries to Israel, we should respond
favorably to Israel's request to purchase a limited amount of advanced
American weapons, such as phantom jets, unless the need for these is
overcome by positive action toward a peace settlement and in ending the
arms race. Such a policy recognizes Israel's continuing needs for defense.
It will serve to uphold rather than to alter the temporary military
balance in the region. But such a policy will also, both by itself and in
combination with the twofold initiative just outlined, contribute to
a reduction of Middle Eastern tensions.

To speak of giving Israel "sufficient military power to
deter an attack" including a "technological military margin," and to
insist that "the balance must be tipped in Israel's favor, is to

misconceive the most basic realities of the crisis in the Middle East.
Israel's technology already is vastly superior to that of her neighbors.
The additional territories she holds since the June war make her less
dependent than ever on deterrence. And any attempt to "tip the balance"
would merely invite a Russian counter-attempt to redress the balance or
tip it in Egypt's favor. Such a line of rhetoric, in short, is a thinly
veiled prescription for an indefinite and escalating arms race that would
only aggravate the existing risk of war in the Middle East and thus render
the gravest disservice to the interests of Israel, of the United States,
and of world peace.

We should make it clear to both Israel and the United Arab Republic
that our policy in favor of settlement and arms reduction, and our policies
pending such a settlement, are predicated on the assumption that neither
country will develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

The twofold initiative here proposed--further Security Council action
combined with an American-Soviet understanding about arms reduction--would
create an overall framework, the specifics of which must of course be
filled in by Israeli and Arab negotiators with whatever help outside friends
or mediators may be able to provide. These specifics presumably would
include the drawing of permanent frontiers, and in particular the status of
Old Jerusalem, various parts of the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip; compen-
sation and resettlement for Palestine Arab refugees; the reopening at the
earliest possible moment of the Suez Canal; the passage of Israeli ships
through Suez and the strait of Tiran; possible Jordanian access to Israel's

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Mediterranena ports; demilitarization of Sinai, the West Bank, or other areas; the stationing of United Nations observatories or peace-keeping forces. The very length of the life suggest the diversity of compromises that could be hammered out—and also the lengthy course that negotiations might take if and when negotiations should begin in earnest.

The virtue of the dual framework itself lies in the advantages that such a combined solution would offer each party. For Israel it would mean achievement of its long-sought objectives—and to belligerency and the recognition of its sovereignty a definite boundary by its Arab neighbors; freedom of navigation and freedom from fear of terrorism; in short, real peace and security instead of the insecurity and mounting burdens of the arms race.

For the Arabs it would offer the only practical way, in the foreseeable future, of regaining territories lost in 1967 — and avoiding Israeli retaliation raids. It would end the on-facto state of war which has made their borders a recurrent battleground, which has warped their political life, frustrated their economic development, and made them increasingly dependent on foreign military and economic support. Egypt, in particular, would be relieved of its close dependence on the Soviets for arms and the Arab oil monarchs for financial subsidies in lieu of Suez Canal revenues. Instead, Egypt could turn its full attention to its massive social and economic problems.

To the Soviets such a twofold solution might appeal because it would

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relieve them of the unenviable situation of the past year in which all
their pro-Arab propaganda and all their arms shipments have failed to
secure any immediate or tangible benefits for their Arab friends. The
current Middle Eastern situation, moreover, poses for the Soviets the grave
risk of involvement in war by proxy. Even so, time, firmness, and patience
may be required to persuade the Soviets of the inherent connection between
arms reduction and peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Nonetheless,
without harboring any illusions of instant or easy success, it is a diplo-
matic course to which we should commit ourselves.

For the United States, finally, such a twofold policy would be fully
consonant with our commitment to world peace and to freedom of global
communications, with the peaceful interests of our friends in the Middle
East, and with the economic stake that our allies in Europe and Japan have
in the regular flow of Middle Eastern oil.

Recognizing these advantages of our twofold initiative, it is equally
important to keep in mind what such a policy is not designed to accomplish.
It would stop belligerency between Arabs and Israelis without assuring
instant amity or economic cooperation between them. It would end the arms
race in the region, but it would not cure the endemic causes of domestic
political instability in the Arab countries. As between Americans and
Russians, the policy here proposed would make explicit a joint interest in
keeping the Middle East from embroiling them in a senseless arms race or
a global confrontation. It would not in other respects bring American and
Soviet interests in the Middle East and the Mediterranean into consonance.

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Rather, it would channel continuing rivalry into safer and more peaceful directions.

4. Policies for the Middle Range: Peaceful Engagement

To help prevent bipolarization, we should wherever possible maintain, or stand ready to restore, diplomatic relations with all countries of the region. In situations of domestic overthrow of governments or of civil war, our principle of diplomatic recognition should be de-facto control of territory and population. Where appropriate, diplomatic relations should be reinforced by economic assistance, mainly in the technical and educational fields. Such a purposeful pattern of diplomatic and aid relations in all directions will enable us to keep open channels of communication with both sides in any given dispute and, where the parties themselves are ready, to facilitate agreement.

The appointment of ambassadors familiar with the culture and languages of the country to which they are accredited--one of the more imaginative policies of the Kennedy administration--will be a definite asset in our Middle Eastern diplomacy.

We should make it clear that we disapprove of military invasion of one Middle Eastern country by another or externally sponsored overthrows of government. Yet, we should not aside from our existing prior commitments, bind ourselves to any blanket guarantee of all boundaries or regimes. As various countries such as Egypt, Syria, or Iraq from time to time veer closer to the Soviet Union, we should not respond with the old cold-war

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1950's. It would be desirable if reduced military missions under the NATO programs of Turkey and Greece came to include, in addition to Americans, increased personnel from other NATO countries so as to emphasize the multilateral character of these continuing programs.

In the economic sphere, we should welcome the voluntary diversion of oil income from Persian Gulf countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to oil-poor Arab countries, such as the U.A.R., Syria, and Jordan-- provided the purpose is economic improvement rather than political intrigue or financial support of international intransigence. Regional economic cooperation, e.g., through the Kuwait-Arab Development Fund, is fully in consonance with our interests.

More generally, Arab aspirations toward modernization--including moves toward national integration among existing states--are to be encouraged, *provided* they do not proceed by external violent intervention (as in Lebanon in 1958 or in Yemen after 1962) and do not have for their major aim revenge against Israel. In view of the withdrawal of British military forces from the Persian Gulf scheduled for 1971 such moves seem particularly appropriate among the Arab sheikdoms of that area.

## 5. Policies for the Long Range: Integration into the World Economy and Development of Human Potential

Averting the dangers of a renewed Arab-Israeli war in the short run and promoting a climate of peaceful pluralism by constructive middle range policies will enable both ourselves and the peoples of the Middle East to

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concentrate more fully on long-range objectives which are in the mutual interest of both sides. The principal one of these long-range objectives is the closer integration of the Middle East into the world economy, so as to permit the release and development of the full human potential of the peoples of the region.

Our principal means toward that objective is economic and technical assistance, and the Middle East deserves high priority within our global aid program. Our cultural interests, our concern for the security and welfare of those nations sympathetic to the West, and our long-term obligation to support the mergerce oforderly societies exploiting the immense natural resources of the area--all these constitute both justification and incentive to provide technical assistance even where immediate political interests might not seem to dictate it. The cross-roads position of the Middle East makes it likely that aid given now and seemingly justified only on altruistic grounds might very well be seen before too many years as a vital factor in the emergence of stable political, economic and social systems and greater national sympathies with the constitutional than with the totalitarian world.

In formulating our aid policies we must keep in mind both the region's dire need for technological and scientific innovations and the fact that almost alone among the developing regions of the world the Middle East has as its disposal vast financial resources in the form of oil revenues. A wider regional distribution of these funds for development purposes will

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not only constitute an effective form of regional self-help; it will
have the additional advantage of giving the non-oil producing Arab
countries a direct stake in maintaining the flow of oil which is of such
vital importance to the rest of the world.

To safeguard this flow of oil

To safeguard this flow of oil, whose volume will be growing through-
out the remainder of this century, against political interruptions should
be another aim of our long-term Middle East policy. While we have little
direct need for oil imports from the Middle East (nor, for that matter,
does the Soviet Union), the dependence of most of our allies in the
Eastern hemisphere on this source of fuel and the fact that three-fifths
of all petroleum in the Middle East and North Africa is currently produced
by United States companies do give us a very real interest in the mineral
resource policy of the region. In the past, political interruptions of
the flow of oil have illustrated the close interdependence of producer
and consumer interests. In 1967, after some hesitation, the interests
of European need and of continued revenues for Middle Eastern governments
prevailed. Neither a brief interruption of oil supply from all Middle
Eastern countries, nor a prolonged interruption from a single major
producing country would seriously threaten the economies of Europe.
Only an extended interruption of oil supplies from several of the major
Arab producing countries would have significant repercussions on the
European and Japanese economies.
The recent trend toward greater participation of companies from
countries not previously active in the search for Middle Eastern oil

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(Japan for instance) might help to reduce the likelihood of a total Arab oil export embargo in the future. Similarly, the continuing search for new sources of petroleum outside of the Persian Gulf region and outside the entire Middle Eastern-North African area will help assure the diversification of supplies for our friends in Europe.

While the continued availability of vast oil incomes and their wider dispersion through the region will reduce the need for financial (as distinct from technical and educational) assistance, we should also carefully consider the most suitable arrangements for such assistance is given. Bilateral programs of aid between the United States and countries of the Middle East, particularly the Arab states have often been impaired by suspicions which come naturally to small and poor countries long accustomed to foreign domination and interference. Hence multilaterality is as desirable in the extension of aid as is diversification of oil supplies. Technical assistance and investment programs by such bodies as OECD, the United Nations, and the World Bank have a promising future in the Middle East, and we should channel a maximum of our own efforts through these international organizations.

Present plans for the gradual association of Greece and Turkey with the European Economic Community represent another form of closer integration of parts of the Mediterranean-Middle Eastern region with the rest of the world. Perhaps similar forms of association can be worked out for other Mediterranean countries not yet associated with the EEC.

Among the specific goals of development aid in the Middle East to priority should be accorded to increasing the educational and training

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facilities in all parts of the region so as to meet its increasing need for skilled and educated people in its modernizing agriculture, industry, and public services. In some countries such as Egypt the population explosion has reached critical dimensions, and in others such as Turkey and Iran it is beginning to do so. This requires an effort of medical research and of public health organization in which foreign assistance will have an important place.

There is an urgent need for application, particularly in the desert areas, of such critically important technological breakthroughs as desalination of water, improved drainage, introduction of hybrid and other sophisticated seeds, and the production of cheap and abundant fertilizer. Because of its problems of economic underdevelopment and over-population, the Middle East has a greater need than do advanced industrial societies for such technical innovation. Hybrid corn took 25 years to get from Iowa to Iran. Weather modification, once it becomes technically feasible, must not be allowed to take that long.

As appropriate safeguards of inspection are worked out and in those areas now deficient in fuel, the United States should seek in concert with the International Atomic Energy Agency the introduction of nuclear reactors for peaceful uses.

The United States, finally, should seek vigorously, unilaterally, multilaterally, and through the United Nations the evolution with all deliberate speed of an institutional formalization of "peaceful pluralism." While this last objective will probably not be attained in the foreseeable

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future, the wholehearted commitment of the United States to work toward
it will certainly lend courage to those within the Middle East itself who
seek peaceful evolution and will have a strong impact on the short-term
and medium-term prospects for peace and reasonable economic growth and
development.