Draft IV
July 11, 1975

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY
SPEECH AT MINNEAPOLIS

We have now entered upon our 200th year as a free
nation. In these two centuries America has grown from
a small agricultural country with idealistic global
power with global responsibilities. Yet we remain deeply
committed to those same values, while
we defend at the birth of our independence.

These are the aspects of our national experience
to-day
I would like to address tonight: the pursuit of America's
values in our tradition as a humane and just example to
others; and the furthering of America's interests in a
world where power remains an ultimate arbiter. The
events of recent years have brought new significance to
the relation of the age-old questions of principle and power. How do

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we reconcile and advance both these aspects of our national purpose? Though the greater part of our history we have avoided this problem by pretending that no clear-cut necessity or only one choice was possible.

We have recently been passing through a time of uncertainty. Amid frustration, some in America questioned the rightness and the value of our involvement in the international arena; in the wake of our disappointments, some abroad questioned our resolve. But we are coming out of this period with a renewed sense of confidence. Events have brought home to us -- and the rest of the world -- how essential America is to peace and progress.

They have reminded us of the contribution this country has made in the thirty years since World War II -- and what is at stake in the next thirty years.

The United States can look back on an extraordinary generation of achievement. We have maintained a stable balance of power in the world, thereby preserving peace

and the flourishing of the industrial democracies of
North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped
shape the international trade and monetary system which
has nourished prosperity around the globe. We promoted
decolonization and pioneered in development assistance
for the new nations. We have taken major initiatives
to forge more reliable and positive relationships with
the major Communist powers. We have spurred progress
across the range of global issues calling for inter-
national cooperation.

In a planet shrunk by communications and technology,
in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the
first steps of nationhood, one not of empire but of
scores of independent states, the global contribution
of one nation -- the United States -- has been without
precedent in human history.

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This is not a legacy on which we can now turn our backs, it should be a source of pride and inspiration to every American.

## The Modern Agenda

But we face a new agenda. Our very accomplishments over the past generation have defined our tasks for the coming decades:

- Our allies, the major industrial democracies, have recovered their vigor and influence. We are transforming our alliances toward more equal partnerships. If we act in harmony, we can together provide a pillar of stability and force for progress and justice. If we do not act in harmony, we dilute our collective strength and invite frictions with those whose cooperation is indispensable to our security and prosperity.

- The incredible destructiveness of modern

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weapons has transformed international politics.

Imbalances in the strategic equation could imperil our safety. An unrestrained arms race would dissipate our resources and generate new dangers. The proliferation of nuclear weapons technology poses fresh challenges to international stability and peace. In our own interest, as well as the world's, we must work with other nations to control both the growth and the spread of nuclear weapons. And we must strengthen the incentives for restraint in international conduct.

-- The Communist world has evolved into competing elements with differing doctrines and interests. In our relations with the Communist powers, the safeguarding of our security is essential, but it is only a first step. In the thermo-nuclear age, general war would be

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disastrous, but it is not impossible. While the
antagonism of our conflicting values persists, we share
the same small planet. We have an obligation to shape
a more hopeful future.

-- The world's prosperity over thirty years has in the world become diffused economic and political power. At the same time, nations are learning that they prosper together or suffer together. The health of the dollar, the expansion of trade, the free flow of resources, the supply and price of energy and other vital commodities, economic growth and the vitality of social policies in free societies, the capacity of democratic government to meet basic needs -- all of these goals depend upon the general health of the international economic system. Therefore, as America's engagement in the world has broadened, changed conditions have made our choices more complex.

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a source of hope and an example.

We have always been uncomfortable with the uses of power and with our involvement in the diplomatic game. There were soul-searching debates at the turn of the century over the Spanish-American War and our first acquisition of non-contiguous territories. While many saw our policies as dictated by our interests, others saw this as our entrance into a morally questionable world.

Our tradition of law encouraged repeated attempts in American diplomatic history to banish the interplay of power by seeking solutions to international conflicts -- legislate and
arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation, collective security systems. When our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1916, Woodrow Wilson translated our political interest in preventing any nation's hegemony in Europe into, instead, a universal

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an apparently A monolithic and hostile ideological empire
whose ambitions and values were antithetical to our own.

Thus throughout our previous history as a nation, it
has been easy to define and justify our foreign policy in
moral terms. We never saw ourselves to be just another
nation-state pursuing selfish aims. This faith contributed
to our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained
our confidence in ourselves. It has been, and is, a
powerful force.

The strength of this impulse is evident today. Once
attacked as cold-war oriented, our foreign policy is now
criticized by some as insensitive to the moral antagonism
between Communism and freedom. Once regarded as naive in
the use of power, we are now alleged to be placing too much
reliance on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most
generous of nations, we now stand accused by some of resisting
movement toward a more equitable international economic order.

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but as the richest and most powerful nation, we retain a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a sponsor of world order.

-- We cannot by ourselves banish power politics from international affairs. We can't through our conduct promote new and wider communities of interest among nations; we can mute the use and threat of force; we can help establish the benefits of restraint and the penalties for its absence; we can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation; and we can help construct a more equitable pattern of relations between developed and developing nations.

To say that we must therefore choose between morality and pragmatism is to state our challenge wrongly.

We must pursue both, and they are not necessarily in conflict.

Indeed, paradoxically, today's world calls on America

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on us. We live in a world of partial satisfactions --
of half-way houses. We must strike a balance between
what is desirable and what is possible.

What then is the role of moral purpose in the
conduct of our foreign policy?

First, where the choices are narrow and the line
between right and wrong is not obvious, our values
provide a compass to steer our policy. Let us be frank --
many of our decisions involve our security, and the
choices are tough. For example, in the Second World
War we joined forces with the Soviet Union to fight
against the Nazis, even though Marxist ideology and the

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Soviet domestic system were anathema to us. Today we
are joined with many nations in allied relationships which
promote our security interests even though we find odious
to many of their internal measures.

Moreover, there is always an irreducible element of
conjecture in foreign policy decisions. To influence events
one must choose before the outcome is clear. We are
dealing with forces over which we have but marginal control.
Our options are frequently limited; the selection among
them is often agonizing. Particularly at such times,
it is essential to know what we stand for -- what we must
defend and what we should assert. It is our values which
give our policies constancy of purpose and steadiness in
implementation.

Second, where our margins are more ample, the pro-
motion of our values abroad can more readily be an end
in itself. Our security is not always at stake. Many

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of our foreign relationships have to do with other
legitimate pursuits. Many of our decisions are not
imposed on us by events. In such cases the latitude for
action is broader; the degree of moral opportunity is
greater; the risks of seeking to evoke cooperation through
our own example are more manageable.

Our assistance to developing nations, for example,
serves both tangible interests and our humanitarian
ends. It strengthens political ties to other nations.
It contributes to expanded trade, greater employment in
our export industries, and market access for our com-
modities. Close to 90% of our foreign assistance is
eventually spent in this country. And our assistance
serves a valid moral end, Because as a people we cannot
close our eyes to the suffering of others. And as a
nation we cannot long prosper as an island of plenty in
a world of deprivation.

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In the whole field of foreign aid, and particularly
in food aid, America's record is unsurpassed. We --
and the world -- owe much to leaders with vision and
compassion like Senator Humphrey who drafted the Food
for Peace legislation some twenty years ago.

Finally, ~~throughout~~ our values link the American
people and their government. In a democracy the conduct
of foreign policy is possible only with public support.
Our policies must consequently reflect principles on
which the society itself rests. And those principles --
freedom, democratic procedures, the dignity of the
individual, the sanctity of the law -- also are the
foundation of our most basic and natural partnerships
~~step~~ with the great industrial democracies which are essential
to our safety and well-being.

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Morality and Policy

These are not abstract philosophical issues. They pose
practical problems in many areas of our foreign policy.

They apply to many topics of the current debate. For
example:

-- in relations with the Communist powers, where
we must manage a conflict of moral purposes and
interests in the shadow of nuclear peril; and

-- in our political ties, even alliances, with other
foreign nations whose domestic practices are in-
consistent with our own values.

Our relationship to the Communist powers has been
differently affected by an agonizing question for Americans since the Bolshevik
Revolution. It was understood very early from the beginning that
the Communist system and ideology were incompatible with
our own principles. Sixteen years passed before President

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Franklin Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Government. But he did so in the belief, as he put it, that "through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened."

Today again, voices are raised -- including courageous voices -- reminding us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to defend freedom against its encroachment.

About this there is no disagreement.

Indeed, the clear moral conflict is the heart of the problem -- and a tragic condition -- of our age. We live in a world of nuclear weapons; in a century which has seen the resort to brutal force on a scale and with an intensity unknown to history; in a period of inexorable rivalry of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union; and in an age of ideology which turns the domestic policies

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of nations into issues of international contention. In such an era the problem of peace takes on a profundity that we have never before experienced. I refuse to accept that this is not also a moral concern.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a better future have both hinged on the relationship between the two nuclear super-powers. In an era of strategic nuclear balance, there is no alternative to our coexistence. As President Kennedy pointed out: "In the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

It is said -- correctly -- that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours, that Soviet policies aim at the furthering of Soviet objectives. But the issue, surely, is not whether peace and stability

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also serve Soviet purposes, but whether they serve our own.

Constructive actions in Soviet policy are objectively desirable ~~whatever the ultimate Soviet purposes~~ metives.

This Government has stated clearly and constantly the principles which _we_ believe must guide US-Soviet relations and international conduct:

-- We will judge the state of US-Soviet relations not by atmospherics but by whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

-- ~~All~~ Arms control negotiations and all our bilateral ~~dealings~~ are a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable agreements.

-- We will insist, as we always have, that progress in US-Soviet economic relations must reflect progress toward stable ~~international~~ political relations.

-- We will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve the balance of power. ~~We~~

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our objective. This is our purpose.

Practical progress has been made on problems such as Berlin; crises have been dampened; the frequency of US-Soviet consultation today on mutual and international problems is unprecedented; the scope of bilateral exchanges and cooperation in many fields is in dramatic contrast to the state of affairs ten, even five years ago. The agreements already achieved to limit strategic armaments -- the central weapons of our respective military arsenals -- are unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Senator Mondale is a strong and constructive advocate of such strategic arms control efforts. Today's joint manned mission in space -- in an area in which fifteen years ago we saw ourselves in almost mortal rivalry -- is symbolic of the distance we have traveled.

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On immediate - 29

The international action of the Soviet Union is our immediate concern, not because it is our only moral concern, but because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect. On issues such as emigration, we have successfully used our influence to promote human rights. Expressions of concern by the Congress and the public are a valid and legitimate reflection of our political values. But to mix these issues with the issues of international policy, to attempt a to legislate change in the Soviet system by passing laws in the U.S. Congress, jeopardizes our objectives in both the international & the human sphere. We cannot expect, in effect, to reverse five decades of Soviet history and centuries of Russian history. Changes in Soviet society have occurred, and more will come. But they are more likely to come through an evolution that can best go forward in an environment of decreasing, not increasing, international tension.

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from many discussions with him. There is never any reason
to condone repressive practices. It is not only a command-
ment of our values but also a dictate of reality -- the
reality that regimes which lack legitimacy or moral
authority are inherently vulnerable. There will be inherent
limits to the degree to which they can be ~~intimate or~~ congenial partners. We have, therefore, used our influence
to alleviate hardships in many cases, and our traditions
and interests demand it.

But truth compels also a recognition of our limits.
Can we promote human rights in other countries more by
counsel to those governments while we treat them as allies,
or by confrontational propaganda and discriminatory
legislation?

Our alliances and political relationships serve mutual
ends; they are not favors to other governments which one side can
retract as a punishment to the other. They contribute to regional

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and would security, and thus support the well-being of others.

In many countries, whatever the internal structure, the populations are unanimous in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries — Greece, Portugal, Southern Africa — our foreign policy relationships were no obstacle to the forces of democratic change. And in many countries — especially in Asia, for example — it is the very process of American military disengagement over recent years that has eroded the sense of security and created a perceived need for greater internal discipline — and at the same time diminished our ability to influence domestic practices.

The attempt to deal with this by restrictive legislation raises a serious problem, not because of the moral view it expresses — which we share — but, because of its unmitizable failure as an instrument. It has almost

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always been too public, too final, too inflexible, too humiliating, and too much a stimulus to nationalistic resentment. Its use against a democratic government and ally such as Turkey is doubly anomalous.

There are no simple answers. Painful experience should have taught us that Americans have no monopoly on insight, and that we ought not exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. But there is no escape from decisions. Therefore let me state the principles that will guide our action.

-- It is settled now that human rights are a legitimate international concern. They have been defined in international agreements for more than a generation. The universality of belief and the pervasiveness of communication are part of the

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authoritarianism. Our conception of rights and
free government is still the ideal of civilized men --
and it is the most revolutionary force in the world.
If we have faith in its power, we need not despair
of its future.

I will go further:

I refuse to accept the premise that we must always
choose between moral values and policy objectives, as indeed
that they may in conflict.
The ends we seek in our foreign policy must have validity
to us in the framework of our beliefs or we have no
meaningful business having a foreign policy at all. The maintenance
as well as a part of peace is a moral objective; measures to limit
as well as part of armaments serve a moral end; our mediation of political
conflicts is a moral action; the cohes ion of our
alliances with the great industrial democracies makes
more secure our way of life and our principles;
cooperation to improve the world economic system

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enhances the well-being of peoples; policies to
reconcile the rich nations and poor, to enhance the
progress of both, serve a humane end.

The philosopher Kant saw law and nature, morality
and necessity, as convergent. The obstacles to justice
and humane ends -- and the imperatives, practical and
moral, which compel action to surmount these obstacles --
together define the tension and struggle of the human
condition.

## The Domestic Dimension

One conclusion we must draw is that moral questions
are harder to answer, not easier to answer, than other
kinds of questions. The American conscience has always
been our source of unity; it is time to stop wielding
it as a weapon against each other in our debates at home.
The moral conviction of Americans has always been a

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should not turn into a source of our strength; it cannot become a means of escape from dilemmas, and realities. If morality is to infuse our practical action, it cannot become confused with rhetoric, posturing, or futile and self-defeating steps. If our morality is not to lure us into over-extension, it must be tempered by wisdom.

Moral conviction is not only relevant to foreign policy; it is at its heart. There is no greater need today than a renewal of our conviction, our peace of mind, our belief in the value of what we believe in and our willingness to defend it. These are the elements of moral strength.

We live in a relativist, secular, compromising, other-directed, convictionless age. We live in a country that has too often measured success by

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The modern society
pragmatism and technical expertise. We live in a
is bureaucratized society, which offers impersonal
institutions, mass communications, and homogenized
culture. The young, who in every generation crave
a sense of purpose, are too often offered cynicism
and escapism instead of a faith that truly inspires.

All modern democracies are beset by problems beyond
the margin of governments' ability to control.

Debunking of authority further drains democratic
government of the ability to address the problems
that beset it. Executive-legislative relations are
impaired by mutual frustration. Instant communications
force the pace of events. Think-tanks write studies

trying to identify the national purpose, indeed so
important it defies our premises and ours
And yet America now lives in a world that offers
no clarity of its own; it is a world without inherent
structure, and latent with turmoil and dangers. The

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opportunities that we face as a nation to help shape
a more just international order depend on a self-assured
American role of leadership.

Therefore, what we need from our morality is
not a chart of good and evil--because we know the
difference--but the moral strength to navigate with
courage toward a horizon we know is there, though we
cannot always see it. Statesmen must decide and act,
even when their premises are unprovable, because to
wait for perfect certainty is to abdicate the possibility
of shaping events. This requires confidence--an inner
confidence in the hearts of leaders who must act, a
public's confidence in its own chosen government, and
a nation's collective confidence in the worth of its
own objectives. None of these is easy to come by in

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by nuclear peril and marked by new economic and social imperatives on a global scale.

The global agenda now before us is vast and compelling.

The basic requirements of our security remain.

-- We must above all never lose sight of the need to build a new structure of peace for succeeding generations

-- We must maintain our defenses, and on this basis seek realistically to moderate tensions with our adversaries.

-- We must help to resolve regional conflicts.

-- We must stop the spiral and spread of nuclear weapons.

-- We must look to our economic health and rebuild the economy requisite to the expansion of mankind's economic system. We must restore the pattern of stable growth, ensure the collaboration and mutual support of the industrial nations in the field of energy, and engage the producing nations in a constructive relations hip in which all nations will have

an equitable part.

-- We must shape a world economy responsive to the
aspirations of mankind.

The new world has great potential for chaos -- or for
creativity. The foreign policy of the United States thus has
as its central focus to help shape a new international structure,
based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, banding
nations together by practices of cooperation reflecting the reality
of our interdependence and the ultimate fulfillment of national
objectives.

To be strong abroad we must be strong in our power and
in our purpose.

To preserve peace, our military strength must be beyond
challenge. Our adversaries will not curtail their ambitions or
moderate their actions unless it is clear that any other course
is too perilous.

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY
---
SPEECH AT MINNEAPOLIS
---

We have now entered upon our 200th year as a free
nation. What is striking is not only the durabiliy of
our constitutional system -- the oldest modern democracy
on this planet. The anniversary of our Revolution is a
reminder of a deeper aspect of our uniqueness -- the
fact that political society in America was consciously
created, by men dedicated to ideals, to the principles
of liberty.

In these two centuries America has grown from a
young agricultural country with a vision to the worlds
most sophisticated technological power. Today our involve-
touches every aspect of world affairs. Yet we remain a
people deeply committed to those same values our country-
men rose up to defend 200 years ago. These are the
aspects of our nationhood I address tonight: the

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furthering of America's interests in a role of world
leadership; and the pursuit of her principles in our
tradition as a humane and just example to all. How
do we reconcile these aspects of our national expression?
The events of recent years have brought new significance
to the age old question of principle and practice.

Recently we have been passing through a time of
uncertainty in international affairs. Amid frustration,
some in America questioned the value of our involvement
in the international arena; in the wake of our
disappointments, some abroad questioned our resoluteness.
But at the same time this period has brought home to
us -- and the rest of the world -- how essential America
is to the peace and progress of mankind. It has
reminded us of what is at stake -- and of the contribu-
tion this country had been making for the thirty years
since the end of World War II.

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It has been, looking back, an extraordinary
record of success. We have maintained a stable balance
of power in the world which has permitted the postwar
recovery and flourishing of the industrial democracies
of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. We helped
shape an international economic system of trading and
monetary relations which nourished prosperity around
the globe. The United States supported the process of
decolonization from the beginning, and pioneered in
the techniques of assistance to the economic and social
development of the new nations. We have taken the
initiative to seek more reliable and positive relation-
ships with the major Communist powers -- achieving
unprecedented measures of strategic arms limitation
with the Soviet Union, and ending a generation of mutual
isolation with the People's Republic of China. The

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United States has been a creative force in almost all areas of international cooperation -- in arms control, protection of the environment, international law, support for the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

In a planet shrunk by communications and technology, in a world either devastated by war or struggling in the first steps of nationhood, in a world not of empire but of scores of independent states, the global contribution -- and achievement -- of a single nation, the United States, has been without precedent in human history. It is not a legacy on which we must now turn our backs; it is a source of pride to every American of this generation.

## The Modern Agenda

But there are no plateaus in the affairs of men and nations. We cannot rest on our achievements. Our role of leadership is a source of hope for our future,

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not only pride in our past. Our very success over the
past generation has shaped new conditions which define
the agenda for the coming decades.

-- Our allies, the major industrial democracies,
are vigorous free nations, no longer dependents
or junior partners. We are adapting our alliances
from American tutelage to equal partnerships so
that they can continue as pillars of world
stability. If we act in harmony, together we can
shape events. If we do not, we face debilitating
tests of strength with those whose cooperation is
indispensable to our security and prosperity.

-- The incredible destructiveness of modern
military power has transformed international politics.
Imbalances in the strategic equation could imperil
our safety. An unrestrained arms race would

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The proliferation of nuclear weapons technology
poses fresh dangers to peace. In our own interest,
as well as the world's interest, we must engage
other nations in reliable measures to halt both
the spiral and the spread of nuclear weapons. And
we must strengthen the political restraints on
the use or threat of force.

-- The Communist world has fragmented into rival
centers of doctrine and power. In our relations
with the Communist powers, our vigilance against
aggression is but a first step. In the thermonuclear
age, general war is an impossibility -- for both sides.
The moral antagonism of our competing ideologies
persists; yet the practical imperative of our
coexistence has not yet been translated into
live-and-let live. We have an opportunity to shape
a more hopeful future.

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The world's prosperity over thirty years has produced a new diffusion of economic and political power. Yet the developed and developing nations have learned that they prosper or suffer together. The health of the dollar, the expansion of trade, the free flow of resources, the supply and price of energy and other vital commodities, economic growth, the vitality of social policies in free societies, the capacity of democratic government to meet basic needs -- all of these goals depend upon the health of the international economic system. And all of these goals depend upon international cooperation.

## America's Role

What does this mean for America? It means that our leadership is summoned as never before. We live in a

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world of over 140 nations, a world without inherent
structure. In a world of many centers of power and
systems of values, we must help fashion new bonds of
cooperation in the practice of nations. Our leadership
must elicit the participation of others in an inter-
national system in which all nations feel they have
a stake. One fact is clear: there is no hope for
shaping a new world of peace and prosperity without
an active American contribution. There is little hope
of shaping a world of onrushing events without our energy,
imagination and perseverance.

What does this require of us? It is a challenge
to our moral purpose, to our confidence in ourselves,
as much as to our resources. It summons us to our
maturity as a people.

Throughout most of our history, isolation made
possible an uncomplicated view of the world. In the

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period following World War II, our preeminent power
encouraged us to believe we could shape the globe
according to American designs. Today, as we approach
our third century, we find -- like most other nations in
history -- that we can neither escape from the world
nor dominate it. America is destined to cope with a
shrinking planet of dispersed power, diverse goals,
and interdependent economies.

In the postwar period of our preponderance, we
could overwhelm many problems through the sheer weight
of our resources. No other nation could afford so
much insurance as we, against so many contingencies.
Our overwhelming power gave us a broad margin for
error. We could attempt to shape events in the world
by our unilateral preference or legislative fiat.
We could afford to be imprecise in the definition of
our interests. Indeed, we spoke in universal terms

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and imagined we had nothing so selfish as interests,
only "responsibilities." Our exertions of economic
and military power were cloaked in moral values; in
a period of black-and-white divisions in the world,
we had little self-doubt about the validity of our
own purposes.

We no longer live in such a world. We remain
the strongest nation and the largest single factor in
international affairs. But our strategic superiority
has given way to nuclear parity. Our economic and
political predominance has been eroded as new centers
of power have emerged and our own dependence on the
world economy has grown. Our margin of safety has
been reduced and our choices have become more ambiguous.
The challenges of foreign policy now appear in a more
complicated form.

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Today we are in the position of other nations
in history -- requiring subtlety, flexibility, maneuver,
imagination in the conduct of foreign affairs. We
have learned:

- We can no longer impose our preferred solutions to problems, though we can encourage them.

- We can no longer provide the remedies to the world's ills; at best we can contribute to a structure of relationships that will foster the initiative and evoke the cooperation of others.

- We can no longer express our moral purposes in absolute terms; but as the richest and most powerful nation, we retain a special responsibility to look beyond narrow definitions of our national interests and to serve as a trustee of world order.

- We cannot by ourselves banish power politics from international affairs; we can through our exemplary

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times we have overestimated our ability to transform the
world in our own image -- by our example or by our
conduct in the world.

But we have always represented freedom and progress.
Moral purpose has always been a part of the meaning of
America -- a durable legacy of our history. Our citizens
have always given special weight to considerations of
principle in the conduct of our foreign policy. This
spirit, our sense of mission, has been the source of
our unity and of our true strength. It has been both
the underpinning of our free and open society, and the
goal and spur to our striving.

But as a consequence of our history, we waver as
a people between awareness of our uniqueness and the quest
for universal acceptance of our ideals; between intervention
in and isolation from international developments; between
being ashamed of our power and expecting too much of

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it; between extreme pragmatism and rebellion against
practicality.

We began life as an independent nation with a strong
sense that the purposes and ideals of the revolution --
self-government, self-determination, non-interference --
had universal validity, that they embodied the deepest
aspirations of mankind, that they imposed on us an

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obligation to work in their service -- to set an example
for all to follow.

Paradoxically, while proclaiming the universality
of our ideals, we sought to shield our country and
hemisphere from outside intrusion, to shun involvement
in the European balance of power, and to limit the role
of the practitioners of power politics -- soldiers and
diplomats -- who were considered dangerous threats to
republican principles. We hoped to regulate our relation-
ships with others through commerce rather than alliances.

For most of the 19th century our security was
inherent in a number of extremely favorable external
circumstances. It appeared to be a natural condition
rather than an object of policy. Geography and the
bounty of nature nurtured our separateness. Shielded
by the oceans and by British

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seapower, we could assert moral convictions in ringing,
often utopian, terms. Our distance from the rough-and-
tumble world of international competition and conflict
made it difficult to recognize that the standards we
expected of others were often unrealistic in view of
their need to combat immediate dangers to their survival
or security.

While we never monopolized claims to moral conduct,
our country was unique for the self-consciousness with
which we pursued moral objectives and for the fact that
others recognized in our conduct a persistent effort to
live up to our unusual standards of rectitude and
generosity. We were seen as a haven by millions of people,
especially in Europe; a place where the injustices,
inequities, privations and abridgements of human dignity
which they had suffered were absent, or permitted rapid
redress.

-17-

We need only look at the debates and soul-searching at the turn of the century in connection with the Spanish - American War and our first acquisition of non-contiguous territories. Although many of our political leaders saw our policies at that time as dictated by our interests, others saw a break with our tradition of avoiding the pitfalls of a morally questionable world. They doubted whether such involvement could long permit us to preserve our own values intact.

The tension between the necessities of power and the claims of morality defies simple resolution. American diplomatic history is studded with attempts to banish power through the promotion of a variety of procedural devices for the resolution of conflicts -- arbitration, conciliation, international legal arrangements, neutrality legislation,

[Y]

-18-

collective security systems. When our involvement in conflict became unavoidable in 1916, Woodrow Wilson translated our domestic values and aspirations into universal policies. We fought the First World War to "make the world safe for democracy."

Subsequently disillusionment with the results of our participation in war and in peacemaking contributed to a resurgence of isolationist sentiment. Most Americans in the 1920's and 1930's felt that our proper role was to deal with the problems of our own society, to remain detached from quarrels beyond our borders. We foreswore the responsibilities of power -- power that had come to us partly by our own design, partly conferred on us by events. And we rejected the counsel of other nations who sought to encourage our active involvement in international affairs. Our idealism again took the form of isolation, though we sustained an enviable record in providing relief to war-torn societies.

19

We were stirred from isolation to oppose an unmistakably
evil totalitarian threat in the Second World War. Our
victory further strengthened our sense of moral rectitude.
And in the postwar bipolar world of cold war confrontation
we faced a seemingly monolithic and hostile ideological
bloc whose ambitions and values were anathema to our own.

Thus throughout our history as a nation, we have sought
to justify our foreign policy in moral terms. Our self
image as a nation did not permit us to consider ourselves
to be just another nation-state expediently pursuing
selfish aims. This sense of moral purpose contributed to
our unity, gave focus to our priorities, and sustained
confidence in our righteousness. It has been and is a
powerful force.

This is evident today in the reaction against policies
that are considered excessively pragmatic. Once attacked

- 20 -

M

as cold-war oriented, our foreign policy is now criticized for
being too insensitive to the profound moral antagonism between
Communism and freedom. Once regarded as naive in the use
of power, we are now alleged to be placing too much reliance
on the efficacy of force. Once viewed as the most generous
of nations, we now stand accused by some of resisting move-
ment toward a more equitable international economic order.

**The Tension between Security and Morality**

We clearly are in need of some perspective on the
rival claims of power and principle; a clearer perception
of the necessities of security policy as well as the range
of moral choice. We must begin with the broad principles:

-- All foreign policy must start with security; without
it, we cannot pursue effectively our purposes in the world.
A nation must tend to its survival first of all, and we
cannot in a world of competing sovereignies mortgage our
future to the goodwill of others. There can be no security

-21-

[Y]

for us or for others without a stable equilibrium; and no
such equilibrium is conceivable without America's strength
and America's participation. The considerations impose
some practical limitations on our conduct.

-- But, security cannot be our exclusive goal. While
no nation can yield its survival for principle, neither
can survival be the only principle. The quest for security
and international stability must be seen as a bridge to
the realization of wider human aspirations. Our security
policy must be a means to an end, and the ultimate end
consists of the general objectives of American society,
which are enshrined in the Preamble to the Constitution --
the perfection of the Union, the establishment of justice,
promotion of the general welfare, preservation of domestic

- 23 -

We also know enough about the experience of others to recognize
that we have something special to offer. We can tolerate
a world of diversity; we can afford to let other nations
utilize the lessons of our experience as they see fit.

In the nuclear age there is no alternative to a
diplomacy which accepts the compromise of conflicting
principles. We cannot impose our designs on others; we
will not allow others to impose theirs on us. We live
in a world of partial satisfactions -- of half-way houses.
We must strike a balance between what is desirable and
what is possible. Progress is measured in partial steps.
Tension is unavoidable between our values, which we tend
to state in categorical terms, and our efforts to promote
them, which, of necessity, require us to come to terms
with the values of others.

Beyond these precepts, what is the role of moral
purpose in the conduct of our foreign policy?

-24-

-- Where our margins are narrow, our values provide a compass to give direction to our policy. Let us be frank -- many of our decisions involve our security, and the choices are tough. There is always an irreducible element of conjecture in them, for we seek to avoid contingencies or to shape events which have yet to occur; and we are dealing with forces over which we have but marginal control. Our options are frequently limited, and the selection among them sometimes agonizing. Particularly at such times, it is essential to know precisely what we stand for -- what we must defend and what we should assert. Our values give to our policies constancy of purpose and contribute steadiness to their implementation. They provide roots -- and heart.

-25-

[y]

-- Where our margins are more ample, the promotion of
our values abroad can more readily be an end in itself.

Our security is not always at stake. Many of our foreign
relationships have to do with other legitimate pursuits
in the world. Many of our decisions are not imposed on
us by events. In such cases the latitude for action is
broader; the degree of moral opportunity is greater; the
risks of seeking to evoke cooperation through our own
example is more acceptable.

-- Throughout our values provide a necessary link
between the American people and their government. In a
democracy the exercise of foreign policy is possible
only with public support. Our policies must consequently
rest on values that are generally shared. And those
values -- freedom, democratic procedures, the dignity of
the individual, the sanctity of the law, the blessings of

[V]

Contemporary Issues

These are not merely subjects for abstract
philosophizing; they pose opportunities and problems
for us in the daily conduct of our foreign policy.

Let me illustrate with respect to three central issues
in our diplomacy:

-- In East-West relations, where we must accommodate
continued ideological competition with the imperatives
of peace and stability;

-- In relations with foreign governments whose
 domestic structures and whose behavior toward their own
citizens clash with the values we cherish; and

-- In foreign aid, where our humanitarian concerns
and our tangible interests often converge, yet where
there are nevertheless difficult choices.

28

## East-West Relations

One of the central issues of American foreign policy is our relationship with the Communist powers.

We face conflicting moral imperatives in our relations with the East. On the one hand, the tenets of communist ideology are antagonistic to our values, imposing ideological competition. On the other hand, the prevention of nuclear holocaust is an overriding moral imperative, imposing mutual restraint.

This issue has been a troublesome one for Americans since the Bolshevik Revolution. Seventeen years passed before President Franklin Roosevelt established diplomatic relations. There was never any question but that Communist ideology was incompatible with our own political principles, and that the Communist system was anathema to ours. The question we face as a government is how

to deal with it. Many voices are raised -- courageous voices -- reminding us of the nature of the Soviet system and of our duty to oppose it and to defend freedom around the world against its encroachment. About this there is no disagreement.

But in the thermonuclear age, the inexorable competition between our respective values and national interests takes on a poignant new dimension -- the spectre of nuclear war and the fact of our coexistence on this planet.

It is said -- correctly -- that the Soviet perception of "peaceful coexistence" is not the same as ours. It is inferred -- not correctly -- that unremitting antagonism is our only course until the Soviet system is fundamentally altered. In this view, an internal transformation of the Soviet system must be the precondition

for any attempt to ease international tensions. In
this view, any apparent moderation of Soviet behavior
is a ruse, a temporary tactical ploy.

The key to the problem is not what are Soviet
intentions but what are _our_ objectives? They are: the
avoidance of general war, vigilant defense of our interests
and those of friends and allies against encroachment,
an effort to engage the Soviet Union in constructive
rather than antagonistic or autarchic relations with the
rest of the world, and creating objective external conditions
that offer the most hopeful prospect for peaceful
evolution of the Soviet system. Constructive actions in
Soviet policy are objectively desirable _whatever_ ultimate
Soviet purposes remain. And just as we have no illusion
about the nature of their system, we must have no
illusion about the severe limits of our ability to

change it. Their international behavior is our first concern, not because it is our only moral concern, but because it is the sphere of action that we can most directly and confidently affect.

Our definition of the U.S.-Soviet relationship has been stated consistently and clearly over many years:

- The United States will maintain a strong and flexible military posture to preserve the balance of power.

- We will never sacrifice our ideals or our friends.

- We will not negotiate over the heads of against the interests of others.

- We will insist, as we always have, that progress in bilateral relations such as trade must follow and reflect progress toward stable international relations.

[Y]

-- We will see to it that arms control negotiations, economic relations and all our bilateral dealings are a two-way street, based on reciprocity of benefit and reliable agreements.

-- We will judge the state of our relations not on atmospherics but on whether concrete problems are successfully resolved.

-- We will oppose attempts by any country to achieve global or regional predominance.

-- We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exploit opportunities in international trouble spots.

Beyond this, there is the potential for more positive relations. The American people will never be satisfied with a relationship of tension and a world of danger.

The practices of U.S.-Soviet consultation and cooperation

on important issues of international relations are a
source of hope. Our bilateral collaboration in technical
fields -- dramatized today by the unprecedented joint
mission in space -- will be a source of mutual benefits,
and of the increasing engagement of the Soviet system,
at all levels, in relations with the world outside.

We will look to our interests, without illusions.
But we will also look to the future, with the hope of
leaving our children a world of more secure peace and
greater prospects for freedom.

# The Domestic Structure of Other Nations

There is a profound question that we must ask more generally: Can we by our own actions decisively affect the domestic structures of other governments? Should we try? It is not simply a question of East-West relations; it arises in our domestic debate on issues beyond our ties with the Communist countries. Of the more than 140 nations in the world, only a minority subscribe to democratic forms. The rest, by definition, are systems whose ideology and whose definitions of civil rights are different from our own. This problem confronts our foreign policy around the world -- in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa -- and indeed in Europe as well.

This poses a fundamental dilemma, and it is right to discuss it. There is never any reason to condone

[v]

repressive regimes. A concern for the well-being of
other peoples, and encouragement of wider respect for
principles we hold dear are more than reflections of our
own traditions; they represent important realities of
international affairs. Regimes that lack legitimacy
and authority are inherently vulnerable. And there are
inherent limits to the degree to which they can be reliable
or congenial partners. The thwarting of human aspirations
and the erosion of popular acceptance opens the door
wide to subversion and aggression. We therefore cannot
remain indifferent to governments that sustain themselves
by systematic violation of the most fundamental human
rights. To do so would mock our own traditions and
jeopardize our own national interests.

Yet the urge to reform others carries with it its
own risks. Many of our allies face genuine threats —
their security and believe domestic stringency is needed
for stability and national defense. One cannot seek to
change the domestic structure of others without incurring
responsibilities for what follows. We would be fool-hardy
to exaggerate our capacity to predict, let alone shape,
social and political change in foreign societies. We
have learned through painful experience that we do not
possess a monopoly of insight. We must guard against
pragmatism which turns into a cynical acceptance of all
repressive measures; but we must equally guard against
a return to moralism tempting us into the role of world
policeman.

[Y]

What about legislative restrictions that single
out individual countries for special requirements to
conform in their own policies to our statutory fiat?
Whatever our good intentions, the record of success
in such attempts is poor. Such conditions are often
too drastic or too public, or too undiscriminating to
achieve their intended effect. This approach is often
blunt and rigid, as well as presumptious. It merely
invites nationalistic resentment and builds resistance
to any counsel that we might offer.

The task is to strike a balance between the
necessities of security and our need to remain faithful
to our own ideals. This is no easy task. It requires
a realism which avoids the pitfalls of excessive
cynicism and an idealism which does not lapse into
sentimentality.

To acknowledge the complexity of the dilemma
regrettably does not resolve the specific choices.
But there are some guidelines.

-- Human rights are a legitimate international
issue.

-- We must express our concerns not only in
appropriate international forums but also in our
exchanges with other governments where it can have
a useful effect.

-- We must remain mindful of the fact that public
exhortation is often the approach most likely to fail,
impairing our bilateral relations without benefiting
those it is meant to help.

-- We must seriously consider the wisdom of attempts
to reform others through legislative fiat.

The world we live in is a world of diversity:

It cannot be shaped in our own image. But the

promotion of human rights will continue to be a goal

of our foreign policy. We will continue to use our

influence whenever possible for the furtherance of

freedom and human dignity.

Foreign Aid: The convergence of morality and interest

No issue more clearly demonstrates that our purposes and our principles need not be at odds than the question of foreign aid.

The United States virtually created the concept of foreign aid. It became a key element of our postwar policy. We helped to create the international institutions which have spurred development in many lands and which supplemented our own substantial aid. We have given generously to relief of our fellow men from disasters, natural and manmade, as well as in support of the aspirations of new nations for economic and social development.

We have provided such assistance for a variety of
reasons:

- Because as a people we cannot close our eyes
to the suffering of others.

- Because as a nation we cannot long survive and
prosper as an island of plenty in a world of deprivation.

- Because in a world of interdependence our
assistance contributes to expanded trade, and greater
employment in US export industries and market access
for our commodities.

The imperatives of assistance are no less compelling
today. Hundreds of millions in the developing world
live in poverty, facing the daily reality of hunger and
malnutrition, with only limited access to education,
health services and the chance for productive employment.

For many
Perhaps, their most compelling problem is food.
The scourge of famine and malnutrition is age-old.
But despite immense gains in agricultural productivity
in a handful of countries, world productivity has not
kept pace with population growth; human error and
natural disaster has exhausted the world's food reserves.
According to present projections, the world's food
deficit could rise from 25 to 85 million tons in the
next ten years. This present situation and the ominous
future is disruptive of international stability and
totally repugnant to our moral values.

America's record in food aid is unsurpassed, for
which we and the world owe much to Senator Humphrey and
the Food for Peace legislation he drafted some 20 years
ago.

But over the long term the world will never have enough food for all unless food production in developing countries is dramatically increased and a system of grain reserves established to help defend against the cycle of feast and famine brought by the uncertainty of annual harvests. In the short term, we have a moral duty to share some of our abundance with those who are starving. In the longer term, neither their interests nor ours are served by a system of food production which leaves so many countries dependent on the largesse of a few producers.

If a country becomes excessively dependent on food aid it may delay food projects of its own or fail to provide incentives for increased domestic production. In the long run, then, a food aid dependency relationship may only cause more hunger and starvation. It is

necessary to balance food aid with measures to help
countries improve their own agricultural development.

Furthermore, food aid may under certain circumstances
bring increases in our own agricultural prices. And
this may work a hardship on our own people, especially
the neediest who spend a large proportion of their
income on food.

The United States has taken the lead in acting to
meet the global food problem. We called for the World
Food Conference which met last November in Rome. There
we engaged other nations in a multilateral commitment
to increase food aid, to raise food production in
developing countries, to improve agricultural financing
and distribution, and to set up an international system
of nationally-held grain reserves. We will continue to

try to meet this global challenge and to make a cooperative
solution on food a model of how nations should cooperate
on the issues of all vital resources.

Food is only one illustration of the complicated
challenges of interdependence. In areas such as energy,
trade, the use of the seas, the environment, as well as
in food, there are no easy answers. Progress on one
issue may exact a price in another. Long-term benefits
to our nation may require short-term hardships for our
people. But in each of the great issues of our time,
points can be discerned where what is right and what is
advantageous coverage. If we have the clarity to
perceive this and the discipline to work for broader,
longer-range benefits, we need feel no tension between
the claims of conscience and the demands of national
interest. For in today's world they
increasingly coincide.

-46-

The American Conscience

Foreign policy begins at home. The true determinant
of our course abroad has always been the attitudes and
purposes of the American people. How, then, must we
conduct our domestic deliberations over foreign policy?

We live in a world without certainty, without
simplicity. We have learned that peace is a process
with no final answers, that exertion is perpetual and
must be an end in itself. Yet our striving brings its
rewards -- not only in specific accomplishments, in
individual successes, but in the tranquillity of mind
that comes from knowing the contribution we are making
to the well-being of our children and of mankind. We
must be -- and ought to be -- at peace with ourselves.

The American conscience is our strength, not our
weakness. It is time to end the cynical self-punishment

- 47 -

which imagines that we are too evil for the world,
just as we have put behind us the illusion of an
earlier period that we were too good for the world.
It is time that we have outgrown the notions that an
equilibrium of power is an evil, that diplomacy is a
conspiracy, that secret intentions lurk behind public
policies, that military power is itself the cause of
conflict, that suffering can be traced to American
involvement, and that flexibility masks cynicism and
subtlety reflects deviousness. Carried to their
ultimate end, these outworn ideas are an excuse to do
nothing, to foreswear involvement, to let events drift.
This is an invitation to chaos abroad -- and grave
peril to our nation.

Nor can our morality be an excuse for self-righteousness
as individuals any more than as a nation. In our domestic

- 48 -

debates too we must remember that no one has a monopoly
on virtue or justice -- and we must conduct our dialogue
in a spirit of mutual tolerance and respect. The
bitterness that characterized recent debates over foreign
policy was itself one of the greatest costs of Vietnam.
It was destructive; it was a poison; it threatened to
turn us against ourselves.

On the contrary, the American conscience, in its
truest sense, must be what brings us together. Our
fathers fashioned a state out of common principle. We
are, to a unique degree, a people who are not united
by common origin or even necessarily common history.
We are joined by our common purpose; if we lose it, we
lose more than we know. For, lacking a common past, we
depend upon our common future.

The morality of this nation -- the basic decency

-49-

and generosity and idealism of its people -- should be
a source of pride and therefore a source of confidence
in ourselves. Our ideals are our compass as we navigate
through difficult waters -- not weapons in divisive debate --
among ourselves. They must point to our future, and not
fuel recrimination about our past. The new generations
coming behind us must find them an inspiration to new
dedication, not an excuse for cynicism or escapism.

A great responsibility rests upon us in Washington.
The American people will support a responsible foreign
policy if their leaders give them something to be proud
of. The younger generation -- traumatized by Vietnam,
disillusioned by the excesses of government, rootless
in an impersonal age of bureaucracy and technology --
must be given a sense of direction and purpose. In an
era of ambiguity, there must be a restoration of faith
in our leaders and our institutions. But after the

- 50 -

past decade, this will have to be earned and maintained
by a demonstration of vision and strength and integrity.

Finally, all the branches of government must
recognize that we are indeed one government, and we are
engaged in a common enterprise. Unless we come together,
we hobble each other and achieve nothing. The world no
longer allows us the margin we once enjoyed for disunity,
disarry or disruption in the conduct of our foreign
affairs. The American people want a leadership that is
worthy of their goals -- and an effective foreign
policy capable of achieving them.

What we believe in deserves to be defended -- and
promoted. With this conviction to guide us, we have
ahead an era of unprecedented accomplishment. Let us
renew our faith in ourselves and in our destiny. And
in so doing we will rediscover peace at home and fully
contribute to peace in the world.

Toward the Recognition of Russia

pulsory charge upon the security
holders. It raises its money by re-
questing voluntary contributions
from bondholders and from debtor
Nations after the conclusion of suc-
cessful debt negotiations. It also re-
lies for funds upon contributions
and advances from its members.
The Council recently amended its
By-Laws to provide that houses of
issue for foreign bonds and short
term creditors of foreign Nations
are ineligible to membership.

On May 14, 1937, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, after an
investigation of protective commit-
tees and agencies for holders of de-
faulted foreign Government bonds,
including the Foreign Bondholders
Protective Council, Inc., made rec-

ommendations for certain reforms
in the operation of the Council, al-
though it pointed out the superior-
ity of the Council as a protective
medium over the conventional pro-
tective committee. Following the
submission of these recommenda-
tions of the Commission, the Coun-
cil asked the Secretary of State and
the Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission to appoint a
Board of Visitors to visit the Coun-
cil from time to time to scrutinize
its financial operations, including
payments made to it by foreign Gov-
ernments and by bondholders.

This request was granted and a
Board of Visitors was announced on
July 22, 1937.

144 The President Opens the Door to the
Recognition of Russia — An Exchange of
Letters with Mikhail Kalinin.

October 10 and October 17, 1933

The President, on October 20, 1933, made public the following correspondence:

Washington, October 10, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

Since the beginning of my Administration, I have contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations between the hundred and twenty-five million people of the United States and the hundred and sixty million people of Russia.

It is most regrettable that these great peoples, between whom

415

a happy tradition of friendship existed for more than a century
to their mutual advantage, should now be without a practical
method of communicating directly with each other.

The difficulties that have created this anomalous situation are
serious but not, in my opinion, insoluble; and difficulties be-
tween great Nations can be removed only by frank, friendly con-
versations. If you are of similar mind, I should be glad to receive
any representatives you may designate to explore with me per-
sonally all questions outstanding between our countries.

Participation in such a discussion would, of course, not com-
mit either Nation to any future course of action, but would indi-
cate a sincere desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the prob-
lems involved. It is my hope that such conversations might result
in good to the people of both our countries.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Mr. Mikhail Kalinin,

President of the All Union Central Executive Committee,
Moscow.

Moscow, October 17, 1933

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of October tenth.

I have always considered most abnormal and regrettable a
situation wherein, during the past sixteen years, two great Re-
publics — The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics — have lacked the usual methods of communi-
cation and have been deprived of the benefits which such com-
munication could give. I am glad to note that you also reached
the same conclusion.

There is no doubt that difficulties, present or arising, between
two countries, can be solved only when direct relations exist be-
tween them; and that, on the other hand, they have no chance
for solution in the absence of such relations. I shall take the lib-

416

The Uses of an Education

erty further to express the opinion that the abnormal situation,
to which you correctly refer in your message, has an unfavorable
effect not only on the interests of the two States concerned, but
also on the general international situation, increasing the ele-
ment of disquiet, complicating the process of consolidating world
peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace.

In accordance with the above, I gladly accept your proposal to
send to the United States a representative of the Soviet Govern-
ment to discuss with you the questions of interest to our coun-
tries. The Soviet Government will be represented by Mr. M. M.
Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who will come
to Washington at a time to be mutually agreed upon.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

MIKHAIL KALININ

Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

145 The Uses of an Education — Extempora-
neous Speech at Washington College, Chester-
town, Md., on Receipt of Honorary Degree.

October 21, 1933

Chairman Brown, President Mead, friends of Washington College:

I DO NOT think either that it would be appropriate or that I could
say anything that would be adequate after the very splendid
words that you have heard from the new President of Washing-
ton College. He has spoken as the new head of a living college,
to living men and women. He has spoken of today, and he has
spoken of tomorrow; yet in coming here, I cannot help but feel
the past. I cannot help but feel the close relationship with the
early days of the Republic, as I stand here, the second President

417

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Support of the Red Cross*

158 The First Joint Statement Issued by the
President and Mr. Litvinov of Russia.
November 10, 1933

THE President and Mr. Litvinov reviewed the questions be-
tween the two countries which had previously been discussed
between the Secretary of State and Mr. Litvinov.

These conversations with the President and with the State
Department will continue in normal course.

(See Item 144, this volume.)

159 The President Appeals for Support of the
Red Cross Roll Call. November 11, 1933

WHEN our people in any section of the country are faced with
the perils and suffering which follow so swiftly in the wake of
disaster, they look with one accord to the American Red Cross
for instant and efficient relief. They have never looked in vain.

Those of us who are willing to lend a helping hand in time
of emergency to others less fortunate than ourselves look to this
great national relief agency as our representative in the hour of
need. It does not disappoint us. It is an historic institution closely
allied with your Government, and its President is always the
President of the United States.

Just now the Red Cross is asking every adult American to lend
his or her support to Red Cross service through individual mem-
berships. The record of the Red Cross is one we may all be proud
of. In the past year sufferers of one hundred and seventeen dis-
asters have been cared for. Five million families have benefited
by distribution of relief materials. A million Americans have
served as volunteers under the Red Cross banner.

I earnestly urge you to respond most generously to the annual
Red Cross roll call. We must do our part to keep the Red Cross
ready, day or night, for service.

465

"The American March of Progress"

binding, and printing) as may be necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Order. The Executive Director may also, with the consent of any board, commission, independent establishment, or executive department of the Government, including any field service thereof, avail himself of the services of the officials, employees, and the facilities thereof and, with the consent of the State or municipality concerned, may utilize such State and local officials and employees as he may deem necessary.

For the purposes of this Order, the sum of $10,000 is hereby allocated to the National Emergency Council from the appropriation authorized by Section 220 of the National Recovery Act and made by the Fourth Deficiency Act, fiscal year 1933, approved June 16, 1933 (Public No. 77, 73d Congress).

All volunteer field agencies established under, and for the purpose of effectuating, the provisions of the aforesaid legislation, are hereby abolished, this provision to become effective thirty days from the date of this Order; and thereafter all functions theretofore performed by said agencies and considered necessary by the Executive Director for carrying out the purposes of this Order shall be assumed and performed by the Council.

NOTE: The foregoing Executive Order established the National Emergency Council and enumerated its membership and powers.

Its membership was subsequently amended by Executive Order No. 6513 of December 18, 1933.

164 (Address Delivered at Savannah, Georgia.
"The American March of Progress."

November 18, 1933

Mayor Campbell, Governor Talmadge, my friends of Georgia and South Carolina:

I AM glad to come back again to my own State; and because Georgia has given me the privilege of serving as the Honorary

489

It is the pioneering spirit and understanding perspective of the people of the United States which already is making itself felt not only here, but among other Nations of the world. The simple translation of the peaceful and neighborly purposes of the United States has already given to our sister American Republics a greater faith in professions of friendship than they have held since the time, a century ago, when James Monroe encouraged South America and Central America in their struggles for freedom. So, too, my friends, I have had a good example of the effect of honest statement and simple explanation of the fundamental American policy during the past week in Washington. For sixteen long years a Nation, larger even than ours in population and extent of territory, has been unable to speak officially with the United States or to maintain normal relations. I believe sincerely that the most impelling motive that has lain behind the conversations which were successfully concluded yesterday between Russia and the United States was the desire of both countries for peace and for the strengthening of the peaceful purpose of the civilized world.

It will interest you to know that in the year 1809 the President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, wrote as follows to his Russian friend, Monsieur Dashkoff:

> "Russia and the United States being in character and practice essentially pacific, a common interest in the rights of peaceable nations gives us a common cause in their maintenance."

And so in this spirit of Thomas Jefferson, Mr. Litvinov and I have believed that through the resumption of normal relations the prospects of peace over all the world are greatly strengthened.

Furthermore, my friends, I am confident that in a State like Georgia, which had its roots in religious teachings and religious liberty, a State in which the first Sunday School was established, there must be satisfaction to know that from now on any American sojourning among the great Russian people will be free to worship God in his own way.

It is perhaps especially significant that I should speak of the

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“*The American March of Progress*”

resumption of relations with Russia in the city from which over
a century ago the first trans-Atlantic steamship set out on its
voyage to the old world.

I am glad to be back on Georgia soil. I am hurrying to Warm
Springs with special interest, for I shall find there a splendid
new building, given to the cause of helping crippled children
by the citizens of the State of Georgia. And I am hurrying back
there to my cottage for the almost equally important objective
of seeing to it that a prize Georgia turkey is put into the primest
possible condition for the Thanksgiving Day feast.

On this Thanksgiving, I like to think that many more fathers
and mothers and children will partake of turkey than have
in recent years. What a splendid thing it would be if in every
community, in every State in the land, in celebration of this
Thanksgiving—and here in Georgia in celebration of the Bi-
centennial of the founding of the Colony—every community
would set as its Thanksgiving Day objective the providing of a
Thanksgiving dinner for those who have not yet been blessed by
the returning prosperity sufficiently to provide their own.

Let me, in closing, read to you a very short passage from a mes-
sage delivered a generation ago by a great son of a great Georgia
mother, Theodore Roosevelt. He said:

> "Materially we must strive to secure a broader economic opportunity for all men so that each shall have a better chance to show the stuff of which he is made. Spiritually and ethically we must strive to bring about clean living and right thinking. We appreciate that the things of the body are important; but we appreciate also that the things of the soul are immeasurably more important. The foundation stone of national life is and ever must be the high individual character of the individual citizen."

My friends, I count on that individual citizen, and on his char-
acter and on her character, to continue with me our American
march of progress.

NOTE: The foregoing address was
made on my trip to Warm Springs,
Georgia. Since 1926 I had been in
the habit of spending some parts

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The First Ambassador of the Soviet Union

These difficulties, in future years, will be substantially mini-
mized by the control which I have established.

It is evident to me, as I am sure it is evident to you, that power-
ful forces for recovery exist. It is by laying a foundation of con-
fidence in the present and faith in the future that the upturn
which we have so far seen will become cumulative. The corner-
stone of this foundation is the good credit of the Government.

It is, therefore, not strange, nor is it academic, that this credit
has a profound effect upon the confidence so necessary to permit
the new recovery to develop into maturity.

If we maintain the course I have outlined, we can confidently
look forward to cumulative beneficial forces represented by in-
creased volume of business, more general profit, greater employ-
ment, a diminution of relief expenditures, larger governmental
receipts and repayments, and greater human happiness.

For later budget message of this year, see Item 83, this volume, May
15, 1934.

4 (The President Welcomes the First Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

January 8, 1934

Mr. Ambassador:

I AM very happy to receive the letters accrediting you as Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and to welcome you in that capacity.

The foundation has now been laid for the development of gen-
uinely friendly relations and close cooperation between the Gov-
ernments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. It will be your privilege and mine to work
together in the task of building upon that foundation a perma-
nent structure of friendship and collaboration.

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A deep love of peace is the common heritage of the people of both our countries and I fully agree with you that the cooperation of our great Nations will inevitably be of the highest importance in the preservation of world peace. The successful accomplishment of this mutual task will be of immediate and lasting benefit not only to the people of our countries but to all peace-loving peoples everywhere.

I welcome you personally, Mr. Ambassador, with especial satisfaction. On more than one occasion during recent years you have shown your friendliness for the American people. This has not been unnoted or unappreciated by the Government of the United States and I consider it most auspicious that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should have selected as its first Ambassador to this country not only one of its most distinguished citizens but also one whose friendly feelings for this country are well known.

You may be assured, Mr. Ambassador, of reciprocally friendly feelings toward you on the part of the American Government and people. Members and officials of this Government will do all in their power to cooperate with you and will be glad to lend you every assistance that may contribute to the accomplishment of your mission, the success of which is greatly desired by my own as well as your Government.

I trust that you will inform His Excellency, the President of the Central Executive Committee, the Government, and the people of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that their kind messages of good-will are deeply appreciated and that I send in return sincere wishes for their peaceful progress and happiness.

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