7/31/74

Draft #5

STATEMENT
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

AUGUST 8th

A quarter century ago this nation engaged in a great debate about the role it would play in the world. In the wake of a war we forged the consensus on which our policies were built for over two decades. We found it possible to agree on the purposes and the possibilities, the dangers and the opportunities before us as a people.

Now, a generation later, the international environment which molded that consensus has been profoundly changed. Old antagonisms have been muted and become less rigid; old allies have gained new strength and all nations are caught up in a technology that has compressed the planet and multiplied our mutual dependence.

The world is both less rigid and less manageable. The anxieties of transition and the opportunities for fresh creation mark our era.

We must form a new agreement on our purposes and our possibilities, on our dangers and our opportunities.

The central challenge before this nation, and before all nations, is to preserve the creativity of a pluralistic world while establishing

-2-

a concept of international order without which power will be unre-
strained and international conflict unavoidable.

No relationship is more central to this quest than that between
the United States and the Soviet Union -- the two nations which alone
have it in their power to destroy civilization.

It is fitting that we begin here a debate about that
relationship. If our debate is to be fruitful it must be framed by
clearly posed questions. Otherwise what pretends to be a quest
for national consensus risks degenerating into compilations of com-
peting catalogues of the desirable. If we are to choose well our
national debate must answer these questions:

-- Given the acknowledged differences of ideology, values and interest, is it possible to establish a mutually advantageous and lasting relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union?

-- Is it possible to construct a nuclear relationship that is stable and that assures ~~security~~ for both sides and for their allies?

-- Is it possible for the Soviet Union and the United States to base their approach to international relations on mutual

-3-

restraint and, if so, what would such a code of conduct entail?

-- Finally, what is the relationship between American foreign policy and Soviet domestic structure?

In the past every period of detente has proved stillborn. There have been <u>several</u> periods of <u>better relations</u> since the Bolshevik seizure of power. Each ended abruptly with a new period of intransigence. Thus we should have no illusion that detente will necessarily survive. America must preserve its strength, its will, its national interests.

There are undoubtedly many reasons for this cycle. But the tendency of many in the West to conduct the foreign policy debate in terms of Soviet intentions is a central element. Some are content with changes in Soviet tone, confusing atmosphere with substance, and asserting that as Soviet intentions have been transformed there is no need to press hard for substantive progress. Others assert that regardless of Soviet actions, any effort to achieve substantive progress is an illusion because Soviet intentions remain unchanged.

The effect of both tendencies is to help the Communist leaders avoid the choice which they should be forced to make: whether

-4-

to use detente to lull the West or whether to move toward a
resolution of concrete differences.

And these extremes deflect us from a determination of
American purposes whatever Soviet intentions. Peace will
not result from one grand settlement but from a long diplo-
matic process, and this process requires some clarity as to our
destination.

We must design a foreign policy geared to America's long-range interests, rather than to shifting perceptions of Soviet intentions, one which will serve America's interests whether Soviet intentions are malign or benign. It must be:

- A policy rooted in reality, rather than wishful thinking either about our adversaries benevolence or our own capabilities.

- A policy which our people can support and sustain over a substantial period of time without excessive swings.

- A policy designed to make concrete progress toward a more peaceful, cooperative world where it is possible and reduce the dangers of conflict where it is not.

We believe that what is loosely called a policy of detente
fulfills these criteria regardless of Soviet intentions. But
for our debate to be fruitful those who oppose detente must state
what their alternative would be.

-5-

## Our Heritage

The search for a definition of the right policy must begin with the recognition that the US-Soviet relationship is conducted in an international environment that is radical ly different from that of any previous period in man's history. President Eisenhower expressed this change over twenty years ago when he said, "there is no longer any alternative to peace." This essential truth is rooted in the fact that man's technological genius has provided weapons of unimaginable destructiveness. Every President in the post-war period has lived with the terrible knowledge that the consequences of nuclear war are of such magnitude that in the modern world even one mistake can lead to disaster, that no responsible statesman can base his policy on the threat of such a holocaust, and that every leader must set himself the task of bringing about conditions which reduce the possibility of such a war to a minimum.

-6-

The aspiration for a positive relationship with the Soviet Union is not new. It goes back more than two decades. It has been expressed by every President since World War II. It is this imperative that has been the heart of American policy through five Administrations. If our children are to enjoy a more peaceful, more secure, more cooperative world, it must guide Americans for the rest of this century.

If one looks back on the history of our relations with the Soviet Union, and upon the domestic consensus which supported that policy, it is possible to distinguish the fundamental assumptions that guided us. Shared across party lines, and enunciated through changes of administrations, these basic precepts have remained as immutable as the desire to build a constructive relationship with Moscow.

- First, the United States and the Soviet Union are political, military and ideological rivals. Our relationship is burdened with a history of 50 years of suspicion, hostility and confrontation.

- Second, every confrontation between the world's strongest powers carries with it the immediate danger of escalation.

-7-

into nuclear conflict. Rational policy dictates that we
seek to control and diminish the threat of nuclear
tragedy.

-- Third, for twenty-five years the shadow of great power
competition threatened to turn even the most routine of
international issues into a confrontation. Hopes for a
creative and lasting peace will remain elusive so long
as the United States and the Soviet Union the world's
two most powerful nations, are locked in hostility and
antagonism.

-- Fourth, that foreign policy and domestic structures are
related. For at least a decade, the prevailing opinion
in this country has been that cold war hostility helped
sustain the more repressive aspects of the Soviet domestic
system. To the degree that confrontation between our two
countries could be reduced we could hope over the long run
for an evolution in the system towards greater freedom.
Now some seem to hold the opposite view.

Repeatedly in the postwar period efforts were made to alter
our relationship with Moscow. The evansecent spirits of Geneva
Camp David and Glassboro marked brief, and finally unproductive,

-8-

shifts towards detente. Occasionally there was a substantive breakthrough such as the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. But for a quarter century we remained locked in on incessant and always dangerous contest with the Soviet Union.

## Our Approach

This Administration came to office, like its predecessors, determined to break the Cold War's grip on Soviet-American relations. I will discuss how we have carried that intention forward within the context of the four bed-rock assumptions that have underlain American policy for a generation.

But let me first discuss our overall approach, which has differed in critical ways from what had gone before.

In 1969 we recognized ambiguous tendencies in Soviet policy. There had been profound changes in the international environment affecting Soviet interests and Soviet policy. These changes could move the Soviet Union towards greater hostility. But they also suggested the opportunity to relax tensions.

- The Communist world had been riven by differences and rivalries between China and the Soviet Union. The

-9-

Soviet Union might seek to compete for the mantle of
militancy. Yet the divisions in the communist world
had eased some of the ideological inhibitions against more
normal relations with the United States and had forced
the Soviet Union to re-evaluate its security concerns.
The Soviet Union might seek to ease tensions with the
US and its allies.

-- The Soviet Union had achieved a nuclear force comparable to ours. The Soviet leaders might seek to move towards a strategic advantage -- something we would never allow. Yet, it was also possible that the Soviet Union, freed from its own fears by the new strategic balance, might contemplate arms limitations which would stabilize this balance -- and contain the arms race.

-- The Soviet Union had become a truly global power, as its expanded military and economic resources enabled it to extend the Soviet presence in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere. This could lead to new confrontation with us. Or its extended influence could bring on added sense of responsibility and interest in regional stability. In this

-10-

case the US and the Soviet Union could act on parallel courses.

-- A quarter century of peace, unprecedented in modern Soviet history, had created new hope within that country for a less repressive future. A return to the pressures, hostilities and suspicions of the Cold War would crush those hopes. A more secure peace would nourish them.

We were determined to mold these opportunities to build a new and positive Soviet-American relationship. We began this task by realistically recognizing the depth and the breadth of our differences. They are profound, and do not spring from transitory causes, personalities, or historical accident. Our differences are rooted in our histories, in the nature of our peoples and in ways our countries have developed. Our differences are nourished by our conflicting ideologies and our political and military competition. Our differences extend even to the way we conduct our international affairs.

These disparities and contradictions could not be erased in on administration.

Thus we concluded that progress on our relations would come gradually, if at all, and only if it was based on specific agreements. Indeed, we were then criticized for moving too slowly. But we determined that we must:

-11-

- Seek to alleviate specific sources of tension,

- Concentrate on substance, not climate, and

- Maintain an interdependency among all facets

of our relationship -- political, economic and strategic.

The heart of our policy was the belief that improved Soviet American relations would have to be based on broad and mutual self-restraint. If either side sought to gain a significant advantage, the other, inevitably, would seek to redress the balance. Competition would be encouraged, any progress already made would be jeopardized, and new steps together made far more difficult. The pursuit of unilateral advantage could only perpetuate or even intensify the Cold War.

In the broadest sense then, our aim was, has been, and is to work out with the Soviet Union certain modes of behavior, to put our relations on a more normal basis, and in this sense to coexist peacefully.

It is important to bear in mind the degree to which our relations with the Soviet Union have already been transformed. In the postwar era there were long periods of extremely high tensions and confrontation. It was considered an achievement to merely

-12-

lower tensions. Indeed, this was the major purpose of summitry
in that period. But because there was no broader basis to the relation-
ship such summits not infrequently were followed by disappointed
hopes and heightened confrontation.

In 1974 we have progressed to the point where a Summit is
now considered nearly a matter of routine. Improvement in our
relations is v almost taken for granted and many no longer feel we
must determine our priority of interests. Demands are made for
progress across the entire range of our possible objectives or doubt is
cast upon the entire value of detente.

Indeed, the objectives now frequently articulated as a test of the
validity of detente may place excessive strain upon it. This applies
especially to the demands that we condition further improvement of
Soviet-American relations on basic transformations of Soviet
domestic life. It would be naive to believe that a system that has
repeatedly fought for its survival, suffering tens of millions of
deaths and vast destruction on World War II, would agree to dis-
mantle itself in exchange for some tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars of credits. Centuries of Russian as well as Soviet history
cannot be reversed in a single decade. This is not to condone a
repressive system; it is to suggest that we require a sense of pro-
portion.

-13-

Our belief is that detente to be lasting must be a continuing
political process in which the habits of self-restraint, mutual accom-
modation, and deepening cooperation become more deeply imbedded
in the policy of both sides so that the process itself is not subject
to capricious reversal.

On this basis we have pursued detente in the four interrelated
areas of opportunity I have mentioned: in our bilateral relation-
ships; in controlling the nuclear arms race; in reinforcing peace
where it is threatened and building cooperation where it is needed
throughout the globe; and in promoting the conditions which may
permit the evolution of a more open Soviet society.

Building a New Relationship

-14-

Building a New Relationship

For decades, the policies of both the US and the USSR were conditioned to enmity and suspicion. Although many efforts had been made, particularly in the sixties, to build a degree of cooperation on the assumed common interest in avoiding nuclear war, accomplishments had been quite limited. There appeared to be no broad pattern of improvement in relations and greater contact. Periods of relaxation were followed as a matter of course by renewed tensions and crises. Such progress as had been achieved in individual areas of arms control or cultural exchange was vulnerable to sudden and rapid lapses back into hostility and mutual isolation.

Although relations had evolved from the almost complete rigidity of the Stalin period, the general assumption remained that hostility was the normal state of relations, that values and interests were in most respects incompatible, that virtually all international issues should be seen in terms of bipolar US-Soviet conflict and competition for power and influence, that bilateral contacts would be at best tenuous biproducts of transitory fluctuations in the broader relationship. In taking this general view we seemed to accept the fundamental facets of the Leninist analysis of international politics even though by the time this

-15-

Administration entered office there had been many signs that in the Soviet Union itself some aspects of the traditional Bolshevik approach had come under challenge, if not in theory then at least in practice.

In any event, as recently as five years ago, US-Soviet relations were largely in a frozen state: trade was negligible, contacts between various institutions of our societies and between the nationals of the two countries were at best sporadic, cooperation on problems common to industrial societies was virtually non-existent, cultural exchange was modest and, above all, there was nothing that could be described as political dialogue. The most recent setback that had affected such superficial ties as existed was the invasion of Czechoslovakia which had served once again to highlight starkly the fundamentally antagonistic nature of East-West relations.

This Administration at its inception did not find in the country any coherent answer to the question of how superpower relations might be structured in the period ahead. Some felt that unrelenting confrontation was the only realistic prospect and effective policy even though at that very moment when the agony of Vietnam permeated our society there was ample cause at least to question the country's readiness to sustain such a policy.

-16-

Other approaches were urged on the Administration: an immediate summit meeting to establish high level contact, or the immediate convening of SALT talks, were two such recommendations. Moreover, many believed that Soviet-American relations could be effectively eased by promoting an expansion of economic relations, on the theory that trade would improve relations where diplomacy had failed to do so.

Our own answer was to seek an alternative to confrontation, not through piecemeal and transitory ameliorations but on a broad and extended basis. We did not wish away the clashes of interests and values that were there for all to see; nor, as events have clearly demonstrated, were we unwilling to react sharply and vigorously when our interests or those of our friends and allies were encroached upon. But it was our judgment that opportunities and incentives for dialogue and cooperation existed and that the prospect of more normal relations should be injected into the debates about the future which we felt were proceeding in Moscow as they were here.

Thus, our policy was that summit meetings could only be productive if they were preceded by meticulous political preparations, that relations could not be improved by merely personal gestures or a better atmosphere, if concrete sources of tensions remained, and that there was a linkage among the major issues and the different aspects of relations.

-17-

Our view was that isolated agreements to increase trade or extend economic credits could not be expected to survive in a tense political atmosphere. Nor could we lead the USSR to believe that they could choose those areas for a relaxation of tension that were of primary concern to Moscow, while ignoring issues such as Berlin, that were of concern to the West. At the same time, we hoped that once progress was achieved in an important area, it would reinforce the chances for progress in others. Thus we proposed negotiations over Berlin and we agreed to begin SALT, but only after we had worked out a conceptual approach that maximized the chances of success.

Our overall strategy thus was to try to move forward on a broad range of issues, so that cumulative success would give each side a stake in preserving what had been achieved, and an incentive to make further progress.

Each of the summit meetings has played an important role in this process; the agreements reached are well known, but arguments over the merits of this or that agreement or a debate on whether one summit was more successful than another should not obscure an evaluation of the trend that has been set in motion.

We take the view that the nature of Soviet-American relations has been positively transformed over the past five years. This transformation can be characterized as

-18-

a process of gradual movement away from the habit of con-
frontations and competition toward a relationship that is
characterized today by increasing elements of restraint,
while holding out some promise that in the future the
process will evolve toward a relationship of cooperation.

If we consider the scope and content of the bilateral
cooperative effort already established, in this area
alone the change has been profound.

We have reached more cooperative agreements in the past
three years than in any previous period. No one would
claim that these agreements are decisive to Soviet-American
relations. Nor do we claim that the agreements create
a permanent state of affairs.

What they have achieved is a number of commitments to
cooperate that involve an increasingly broad spectrum of
the institutions of both countries. They greatly expand
the area for discussion and active collaboration between
our two governments, thus establishing a vested interest in
a constructive relationship.

It is in this respect that we can speak of the concrete
benefits of a detente.

At the same time we recognize that the normalization of
bilateral economic relations has become increasingly

-19-

controversial and the subject of genuine concern. Many
responsible Americans ask why we should trade with the
Soviet Union at all, or whether trade and economic credits
subsidize their armament program, or permit the Soviet
leaders to avoid the necessity of allocating resources to
the consumer sectors. Questions of trade have also been
linked to the issue of dealing with totalitarian regimes.

The Administration from the outset took the view -- which it has
never abandoned -- that intensified trade should follow
a generally improved relationship. We were often criticized
for failing to move fast enough on trade, for linking trade
to other international developments, and for depriving the
US business community of lucrative opportunities. Not
once, however, did anyone raise questions about the
relationship of trade to the Soviet domestic system.

The Administration pursued its strategy with determination
despite the pressures to which it was subjected. It was
only after the 1972 summit that the President determined
that trade could reasonably be expanded. By that time
both in substance and tone the US-Soviet relationship had
undergone significant change and a process of normalization
committing the top leaders on both sides had been initiated.
In this setting, the gradual transformation of trading
relationships was a logical step that could serve to
provide additional incentives for maintaining the course
which both sides had set for themselves.

-20-

The communique of that first Moscow Summit clearly indicated that the normalization of trading relationships would be an important task in the months ahead. In none of the commentaries on the Moscow Summit was there any significant opposition voice raised against the course we were pursuing in the economic sphere. It seemed to command the most widespread understanding and approval. Certainly, the question of the Soviet domestic structure was not cited as an obstacle to the processes we had set in motion. Thus bringing the issue to the fore now involves profound questions of whether we negotiated in good faith.

Several points need to be clarified in this debate:

First, granting most favored nation trading status to the USSR is not a privilege. It is the removal of a discriminatory aspect of our policy without which we cannot claim to be moving toward more normal relations with these countries. The extension of non-discriminatory tariff treatment would, for some time to come, have only a modest impact on Soviet exports to the United States, which are largely raw materials not now subject to substantial tariffs.

Second, the major impact of the continued denial of this status to the Soviet Union would be political, not economic. We established most favored nation trading

-21-

relations in 1933 when we recognized the USSR; we withdrew
it in 1951 largely as a political act. Thus, if there are
to be penalties for confrontation there must also be incen-
tives for cooperation. Our unwillingness to remove this
discrimination now calls into question the sincerity of
our interest in a general relaxation of tensions. It has
already blocked fulfillment of the Lend-Lease Accord --
involving repayment of over $700 million to the United States.

It is quite true that in the course of expanding
economic relations the Soviet Union could gain access to some
of our technology; but it is also true that in the last ten
years they have had and will continue to have access to
much the same technology from other countries in the West
and from Japan. Moreover, any one familiar with the Soviet
military program would have to agree that in the past two
decades the USSR, without appreciable economic relations
with the US, has developed highly sophisticated military
technology. In any event, we continue to maintain restric-
tions on the export of technology that might have military
applications.

The notion that we can force the USSR to pay an ex-
orbitant price for their military establishment, and thereby
force a reevaluation of their policy, may have had validity
in the 1950s. It is a doubtful proposition in the 1970s.

-22-

Let me make a basic point concerning trade:

This government's policy must go beyond narrow con-
struction of whether each and every transaction is
economically profitable, or whether one side obtained
an advantage. Clearly, we must operate on sound business
terms, but we have a larger interest in seeing the Soviet
economy become steadily associated with the economy of
the world at large. We should not assume that dependence
runs only in one direction: it must be our goal, as
indeed it is, to encourage the Soviet leaders to value the
benefits of interdependence, of obligations running in both
directions, of goods, services and funds flowing into as
well as out of the Soviet Union. It is precisely this kind
of two-way association, rather than simple kinds of barter
or cash trade, which we believe strengthens the process
of normalization and serves to build deterrents to hostile
and irresponsible political and military conduct.

We are not so naive as to think that complex economic
and cooperative relationships in and of themselves serve
these ends. But that is precisely why we did not begin to
enter into them until broad political relationships had
begun to evolve; and that is precisely why we seek to keep
these functional aspects of our relations in broad harmony
with political and security relationships. And by the same
token, our policies would be unbalanced and incoherent

-23-

were we to pursue the goals of more stable political and
security relationships without reinforcing them by more
normal connections between our two societies.

## The Nuclear Relationship

In the debate that is now beginning we recognize that
the issue which affects all other aspects is the strategic
nuclear confrontation.

We start from a national consensus that the security of
this nation must be our overriding concern. If necessary,
the United States must be prepared to conduct an arms
race to protect that security. No American President
would permit, and under no circumstances will this Adminis-
tration permit, the United States to slip into a position
of military inferiority.

But it is no longer sufficient to merely proclaim our
intention of defending our security. We have to recognize
that the nuclear age is unique, that fears of inferiority
or claims of superiority cry out for a rational definition,
because the nuclear arms competition is an unprecedented
phenomenom:

-- The pace of technological change and the conversion
of technology to armaments has no parallel in hostiry.
In the century that embraces the battles of Waterloo,
Gettysburg and the Marne, technology made only a limited

-24-

impact on military strategy. Even the revolutionary
impact of military aircraft and armored forces took over
25 years to be absorbed in the strategy of the major
powers.

But in the last 15 years we have moved from a few
relatively crude, inaccurate, liquid fueled intercon-
tinental missiles, to highly sophisticated, accurate
ballistic missiles with multiple warheads launched from
nuclear powered submarines. We face the possibility of
both the US and the USSR possessing literally tens of
thousands of warheads and bombs.

Secondly, the penalties of lagging behind the race are
not simply a matter of a temporary shift in the balance of
power that can be addressed at our leisure, but a risk to
the very survival of our country. If the search for a
marginal advantage in military power was the norm of
political conduct in the last century, perpetuating it
in the nuclear age can only lead to tensions and confron-
tation that threaten disaster.

Finally, the burden of sustaining the investment and
allocation of high quality resources to developing and
deploying strategic weaponry has only been experienced
in this country in wartime.

We believe that in the nuclear age we cannot risk
situations in which unconstrained military technology
drives us into decisions that we would not make for

-25-

overall policy reasons. It is necessary to assess realis-
tically both Soviet capabilities and intentions. But it is
equally essential to avoid being irresponsible and allowing
outmoded concepts of the nature of security in the modern
world to drive us into an era of strategic competition
that could have incalculable consequences. I do not mean
to imply that all technological advance is dangerous.
Plainly, much of it is positive: as an example, it can
serve to make military forces less prone to accidental use
and to make them more susceptible to control. The point is
that political leaders must retain mastery over the advance
of technology instead of permitting it to diminish choices
and to dominate decisions.

Thus, at this point in the nuclear era, we require
new and more sophisticated understanding of the nature of
political and military power. Our debate about the re-
lationship of detente and defense must address three
fundamental questions:

-- First, what is the meaning of strategic superiority
or inferiority?

-- Second, has the United States already accepted a
position of strategic inferiority?

-- Third, is it possible to pursue a relaxation of
political tensions if there is no limit to military
competition?

-26-

If one talks about superiority, first we need to define
what it means operationally. Is it only the capacity to
inflict a certain level of industrial damage and destroy
a certain percentage of the population, under any con-
ceivable circumstances? Or is it the capacity to destroy
a certain percentage of the other side's strategic forces
in a first strike?

-27-

Finally, for any conceivable level of nuclear forces over the next decade, you have to ask whether it can be translated into political influence, and what do you do with it in a crisis?

There is undoubtedly some combination of numbers of strategic weapons and qualitative characteristics that would give one side a theoretical "superiority". But that combination is not at all obvious. And as the numbers of missile warheads increase into the thousands an analytical definition of superiority becomes more and more elusive.

The basic situation is that in the conceivable future neither side can gain the capacity to destroy the nuclear forces of the other. In this sense neither side will be superior.

Even though neither side is likely to achieve superiority in this ultimate sense, it is true that there are lesser but significant dangers. With the technology already in hand, over time both sides could pose a threat to the land based ICBM force of the other side. It is almost impossible to conceive of a political rationale that would cause a Soviet leader to order an attack limited to our ICBMs, even if such an attack could be accomplished with a small percentage of Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, the fact that our ICBMs could be vulnerable is politically destabilizing,

-28-

particularly in a crisis situation. It adds an incentive to strike first. This is one factor behind the targeting doctrine in the President's decision to increase the flexibility of our strategic forces, and it is a factor in the recent budget submission for programs that improve our strategic forces.

Thus even in this narrower sense, it is highly unlikely that one side or the other will be able to achieve what might be considered a marginal superiority. But it is also a fact that if both sides pursue programs that are rationalized by fears of theoretical inferiority, then after another decade of competition, at staggering costs, the result would still be a rough parity but accompanied by a return to the tensions of the cold war.

Our policy, which I will explain in more detail in a statement to this Committee, is to use the SALT negotiations as the means to place a ceiling on the size of strategic forces, to slow down the pace of destabilizing technological change, to reduce the vulnerabilities of our strategic systems, and to create a balance of capabilities in which both sides will have confidence in the sufficiency of their strategic forces.

Even though an objective analysis indicates our forces are in no sense inferior, we recognize that political action may be based on a perception of strategic advantage,

-29-

by either side, or by the world at large. The subjective belief that one side did have a margin of superiority would impact on our diplomacy, our will to react in crises, and the confidence of our allies. Our arms procurement policies, and our SALT position, therefore, must ensure that our real as well as our perceived strategic capability does not expose us to miscalculations.

Thus, in this debate, we must settle the question of a so-called American inferiority in SALT lest a false perception in this country lead to an unnecessary and dangerous acceleration of certain strategic arms programs, possible to the detriment of military programs in other areas where continued efforts are required.

I will deal with the present and future nuclear balance at greater length, but permit me to address briefly the SALT agreements.

When this Administration took office the United States had no program for deploying additional land-based ICBMs and no immediate program for building any sea based missiles. Our ICBM and SLBM force had stabilized at 1710 ballistic missiles, and our main effort was in the program to convert a part of these forces to multiple warheads.

(The Interim Agreement therefore stopped no active or planned US program.)

-30-

The Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic effort to build up its strategic missile forces. By 1977 it could have reached a level of over 3,000 ICBMs and SLBMs. Even in this case, in 1977 our MIRV program would have neutralized any purely numerical Soviet margin, but there is no doubt that the popular appreciation of a so-called numerical inferiority at that time would have been a source of growing concern.

The Interim Agreement of 1972 stopped no US programs. It did freeze the Soviet Union to 2360 ballistic missiles. It is argued, however, that we conceded too large a numerical gap. The basic fact is this: if the strategic balance is analyzed in terms of missile warheads and bomber weapons the US lead since 1972 has widened substantially from a three-to-one advantage to a current ratio of 4 to 1. When the Interim Agreement expires, the ratio will be about 5 to 2.

Thus, our warhead advantage will continue to be overwhelming for the entire period of the Interim Agreement.

I believe it is this fact, rather than our so-called numerical disadvantage, that poses one of the major problems in the SALT negotiations.

-- As long as the Soviets remain substantially behind in the number of warheads, which also in their calculation includes forces we consider tactical rather than strategic, we can only expect a determined Soviet effort to close the gap.

-31-

-- The problem is that this effort has the potential of creating a momentum and temptation in the USSR to acquire a temporary advantage at some point in the next decade.

-- Thus, some of our planners foresee a theoretical Soviet advantage, urge that we either abandon SALT or reduce it to a minimum and seek our security in an accelerated rearmament program to recapture the outright superiority of the 1950s.

This is why the present is a critical juncture for the strategic arms negotiations. If each side now relaxes the effort to achieve mutual restraint, and relies solely on its own capabilities, then we face a multiplication of weaponry that will leave our political leaders with an ever decreasing freedom of choice. As the leaders of Europe in 1914, we will become the prisoners of our plans and strategies that will dictate our actions in a crisis.

When put in the context of other policies toward the USSR currently being advocated -- the virtual curtailment of trade and exchanges and the insistence on major changes in the Soviet domestic order as a pre-condition for better relations -- this line of advocacy seems to lead us to a reorientation of our foreign policy based on the doctrines of massive retaliation and liberation of the 1940s and 50s. Such an alternative foreign policy in its cumulative effect will mean paralysis and cannot be sustained either by our

-32-

own body politic or by our alliances. The effect on the
USSR will almost certainly be the return to the rigidities,
isolation and adamant hostilities of the Stalin era --
except that today Soviet physical power and influence in
the world is infinitely greater than they were a quarter a
century ago.

The Moscow talks in July were of profound importance
in this regard. For the first time each side seemed to
understand the longer term frears, concerns and percep-
tions of the other. What at first seemed to us grossly
exaggerated Soviet statements about the military threat to
them, proved more plausible if it were assumed that the
United States would strike first. We are accustomed in
our own analysis to count what we would have left after a
first strike by the other side; the Soviets have done the
same.

The candor and detail of our discussions was unprece-
dented in Soviet-American relations, and surprising when
one considers the sensitivity of the issue.

We realized that we could not come to an agreement in
Moscow because, on the one hand, a truly permanent
agreement would inevitably face the many uncertainties
of technology change, and thus would have to have far
too many hedges built into it. On the other hand,
perpetuating the five-year current agreement for a year or

-33-

two more would allow us to address only the current cycle of weapons decisions. By 1978-79, just after the end of the five-year Interim Agreement, the United States and the USSR will both be potentially on the edge of a period of vast increases in their strategic capabilities. Thus we now believe a ten-year approach might be the most realistic timeframe.

We think we now have a framework within which, over the next six to nine months, we should be able to tell how serious the Soviets are in reaching an understanding.

Soviet intransigence, or the momentum and complexity of technology may prevent us from realizing this opportunity to control the arms race. But an atmosphere in this country of hostility towards further arms negotiations with the Soviet Union could be an equally serious obstacle.

Just as we have insisted with the Soviet Union that we cannot have the atmosphere of detente without the substance, it is equally clear the substance of detente will disappear in an atmosphere of hostility.

-34-

## The Global Dimension

Our discussion must extend beyond our bilateral relationships with Moscow, and its strategic component, to the implications for the global environment. The process of detente must be seen as part of the broad design of our foreign policy.

we have worked

-- In an increasingly multipolar world, with Western Europe and Japan to reinvigorate our alliances and reflect the growing strength of our partners. The process of engaging our adversaries must be carried out in close concert with our friends; indeed, this process must rest on the foundations of our enduring ties.

-- In an age of relative strategic balance, we have pursued national security through intense arms control efforts as well as sustained defense efforts. As I have discussed, the two are complementary.

-- On a planet grown smaller through man's technical genius and universal aspirations, we have begun to grapple with the realities of interdependence. Over the longer term, the challenges of fueling international growth, feeding burgeoning populations, regulating the use of the oceans, preserving the environment can only be met in collaboration with socialist countries.

It is within this framework of building a more cooperative world that we pursue the course of detente.

-35-

In approaching this task, we have no illusions about Soviet intentions or perspectives. We remain ideological adversaries and political-military competitors. There will be inevitable frictions as we deal with a large and dynamic superpower that increasingly defines its interest in global and not just continental terms.

Therefore, our policy includes firmness against pressures as well as conciliation for progress. We look to our friends -- both in terms of our security ties and our shared values -- as the central pillars of our foreign policy. We have maintained a strong military balance and a flexible defense posture as a buttress to stability.

And we have acted decisively whenever Soviet actions have threatened the peace.

These principles guide us:

- We will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally.

- We will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our alliances.

- We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.

The Soviet Union cannot ignore these principles without jeopardizing its entire relationship with the United States. As it increases its influence, it also acquires added responsibilities and hopefully a stake in stability.

-36-

Thus, we are realistic about the global dimensions of our relations with the Soviet Union. We are not attempting quixotically to bridge an ideological divide; or arrogantly to shape a superpower condominium; or imperially to carve up the globe into spheres of influence. At the same time, we are convinced that it is in our mutual interest and in the world interest to strive for a relationship on global issues where we:

- hold frank discussions and realistic negotiations to accommodate conflicting views,

- exercise mutual restraint in areas of existing or potential tension,

- respect one another's legitimate interests.

Given our competitive relationship, the international record of recent years inevitably has been a mixed one. But the overall trend has been positive. We have seen substantial improvement in both the lessening of the risks of direct confrontation and the control of crises when they occur.

- Berlin's perennial potential as Europe's flash point has been eased through negotiations. We and our allies are launched on major negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on European security, including a reduction of our opposing forces in central Europe.

-37-

-- In the Middle East, both the prospects for peace and our relations with the nations of the region have brightened. To be sure, there have been some difficult passages with Moscow which show that our interests do not always coincide. But our overall relationship has helped to avoid a major crisis and facilitated the negotiating process.

-- The honorable termination of America's direct military involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering of regional conflict was due to many factors. But this progress would have been much more difficult -- if not impossible -- in an era of hostility with Moscow and Peking.

In sum, when we weigh the global implications of detente policy, we must ask ourselves the following questions:

-- Has the world been free of tensions and conflict in recent years than during the 1950s and 1960s?

-- What would be the impact on our allies and friends of an American retreat from the path of negotiation and cooperation?

-- Is there a rational alternative to detente in an increasingly interdependent world?

-- Can we sustain a more hopeful international climate if the two superpowers return to a posture of hostility?

We do not claim to have completely erased tension or buried confrontation around the globe. We have been generally more successful

-38-

in containing crises than removing their root causes. But more
constructive relationships with Moscow -- and Peking as well --
have helped to make the international environment more stable
and peaceful. And no other course holds out better hopes as we
build for the long term.

-39-

Moral Choices and Policy Dilemmas

The final issue in this debate is the relationship
between our foreign policy objectives and the "liberalization"
of the internal policies of the USSR. The issue has now been
joined, specifically in the matter of making our economic
relationship dependent on a policy of free emigration.

The morality of conducting relationships with total-
itarian governments or more broadly with governments of
which we disapprove is an old one in our foreign policy.
In the early days of our Republic there was a revulsion
against monarchies and a dispensation for republics.
But it was established in Washington's administration that
we could not define our interests in terms of our ideo-
logical preferences alone.

In the modern period, each President has followed
the doctrine that we will not impose our own set of values
on foreign governments. Yet, the problem of dealing with
Communist governments has always troubled the American
people and the Congress. Currently, there is the implica-
tion that by dealing in increasing intimacy with a regime
that pursues internal policies in sharp conflict with our
own values, we are in some manner condoning these policies.
It is believed by some that until there is a genuine
liberalization of some sign of serious progress in this

-40-

direction, all other elements of detente in Soviet policy
must be regarded as temporary and tactical. Thus, they
would make demands for internal changes the condition for
our own pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet
Union.

Our position has been clearly set forth on many
occasions. We cannot condone the repression of fundamental
liberties in any country. We must always urge humane princi-
ples and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue
comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we
press without provoking Soviet leadership into a return to
those practices in its foreign policy that increase inter-
national tensions? Would a new Cold War encourage the
Soviet Union to change its emigration policies? Would
it nourish the hope of liberalization in Eastern Europe
and within the Soviet Union? Has detente increased
repression or has it helped generate the pressures and
demand for openness we are now witnessing?

Our position is that there are sharp limits to what
we can insist upon as part of an improved relationship with
the USSR. We have a right to demand responsible interna-
tional behavior by the Soviet Union. But with respect to
basic changes within the Soviet Union the issue is not
whether we condone what the USSR does internally; it is the
extent to which we can condition our foreign policy objec-

-41-

tives on domestic changes in any country, let alone a
major power.

We believe we have accomplished much over the past
five years. The attitude of the American people has been
made clear on countless occasions, in ways that have pro-
duced effective results:

-- The exit tax on emigration is not being collected.
We have been assured that it will not be reapplied.

-- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government
have been given increased attention.

-- The volume of Jewish emigration increased from a
trickle to the tens of thousands.

But there are those who say this is not enough. They
argue that the Soviets must massively reshape their policies.
What they seek is in fact a sudden reversal of five decades
of Soviet history and of centuries of Russian history.

The goal may be a noble one, but they have chosen to
seek it through the wrong vehicle at the wrong time. Changes
in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come.
But if they come it is most likely to be through an evolu-
tionary process that can only take place in an environment
of decreasing international tensions.

As political pressures in this country have cast
doubt on our willingness to live up to the agreements of
October 1972, Soviet emigration rates have slowed, and even

-42-

slipped backward. Now we must acknowledge that while our
ability to affect emigration is real, it is also limited.
It may be that we are debating tactics and that there is
no difference about objectives. If such a consensus
emerges from this debate, then we may see a resolution
that ensures both increased trade and increased emigra-
tion.

If, on the other hand, the debate is over the principle
of making internal change a pre-condition to the pursuit of
our foreign policies, and, indeed, subordinating other
aspects of policy to its achievement, then we have a major
issue in which we cannot compromise.

## Conclusion

In concluding my statement I want to return to the
point I made at the outset that the international environ-
ment has changed radically since the early post-war period
when we defined our general policy toward the Soviet Union.
At that time, the closest we came to a great State paper
was the brilliant analysis of Ambassador Kennan about the
nature of our policy which came to be called containment.

In his famous Mr. X article of July 1947, he made the
following points: " . . . it is clear that the main ele-
ment of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union
must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant

-43-

containment of Russian expansive tendencies. . . . It
is clear that the United States cannot expect in the
foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the
Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet
Union as a rival not a partner, in the political arean."

I believe that this was a sound analysis, and the
US had no choice but to pursue the general direction out-
lined by George Kennan. It may be that revisionist histor-
ians will find that the unfolding of the cold war was not
as clear as it seemed. But the point I want to make is
that in our present debate there seems to be an inclina-
tion to return to these judgements, to regard our relations
with the Soviet Union as basically intractable, and to
resign ourselves again to a long period of struggle.

The United States faces a moment of historic choice.
It exists for us as a people, not as partisans of any
particular cause. The consequences of our debate will
be borne not by this Administration, but by its successors
in the decades to come, not by our contemporaries but by
future generations.

Our view is that we face a vital opportunity, one
that will not soon return:

- First, to ensure that a history in which brief
  moments of improved Soviet-American relations
  gave way to prolonged periods of confrontation

-44-

is replaced by an irreversible process of
growing (bilateral) contact and restraint.

-- Second, to place restraints on the acquisition
and deployment of arms so that military power is
not the sole determinant of policy.

-- Third, to create an international environment
in which problems ranging from energy to peace can
be addressed outside the rigidities of stark con-
frontation.

-- Fourth, to build a network of East-West coopera-
tion that by reducing international tensions may
gradually ameliorate conditions in the East.

Foreign policy must not become an alibi or a distrac-
tion from domestic ills. But equally, domestic problems
must not be used as an excuse for abandoning the bipartisan
consensus which has supported our foreign policy for over
a quarter century.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union --
in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But
it is these very differences which compel any responsible
administration to make a major effort to preserve detente.
In the nuclear era there is no rational alternative to a
peaceful relationship between the two powers which have
the capacity to destroy mankind.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

TO: The Secretary of State

FROM: John Newhouse

Attached are two copies of the
draft statement that we discussed.

The section on SALT and the strategic
balance starts on P. 13 and continues
on to P. 36, the end of the statement.

The previous 13 pages cover detente
and the requirements for stability.

Eager to settle things
that we make concessions

DETENTE AND THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

History's detached judgments mock the simplistic terms
and jargon by which we tend to characterize our times.
Rarely do events of a given time follow a common pattern.
Early in the period known as the Cold War, for example, the
Stalin era ended; toward the end of that period we had the
limited nuclear test ban treaty. Equally, the Soviet invasion
of Czechslovakia and, more recently, a near confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle
East occurred during a period that we call detente. Like
fashion, the political environment can change abruptly; but
underlying political forces change less and slowly at
that -- so slowly as to become the continuities of a given
moment in history. Use of the currently fashionable term
detente reflects a modest change in the East-West political
environment, much less a change in political forces.

Detente, according to a common dictionary definition,
means a relaxation of tensions. Actually, the term has come
to stand for more than that. Detente is the euphemism for
better and somewhat more cooperative relations between rival
superpowers; it is shorthand for the web of bilateral and

-2-

multilateral negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact governments. Prospects for continued progress toward better relations arising from successful negotiations are clouded with uncertainty. At issue is whether our detente-related policies and programs will vindicate the larger meaning of the term; whether the more workable relations that have emerged from a perception of our need, among other things, for a stable strategic balance will endure; or whether the will and the capacity of both sides to build on what has been achieved will prove as inadequate as the term "detente" itself, in which case relative stability could yield to relative instability.

The uncertain prospects for our negotiations and the ambiguities of detente trouble serious people and inevitably raise hard questions about our purposes -- more exactly whether these purposes are fully consistent with our interests, especially our security interests. Some thoughtful Americans wonder whether in negotiating in SALT on strategic arms, for example, we may be tricked into exchanging part of our power for a lull which the other side will exploit by gaining an advantage in nuclear weapons; do we risk, they ask, becoming trapped in the momentum of a negotiation which exists mainly for its own sake? Some people wonder why we don't simply

-3-

use our resources to recapture the outright superiority in
nuclear weapons that we once had. Others are understandably
confused by the so-called nuclear balance, which reflects
not just the number of nuclear weapon systems on either
side, but also the number of warheads, the accuracy of
missile systems, the relative capabilities of strategic
bombers and submarines, the size of missile launchers and
their warheads (i.e. the usable weight of a missile system
and known in the jargon as "throw weight"). Because they
sometimes hear conflicting views from their leaders, people
wonder which side, if either, this balance presently favors,
which side, if either, it will favor in the years ahead.
Because they also hear that either side's forces can devastate
the other's society, some people wonder whether and if so
why it is important to increase our forces in order to main-
tain an even strategic balance. How much is enough? And if
our nuclear forces are designed to deter aggression, why must
we exceed our investment in these weapons, as we do, in
maintaining large general purpose, i.e. conventional, forces?
Language compounds the confusion. Nuclear parity is a rather
unfamiliar term, especially to a society that for many years
took for granted its nuclear superiority. Detente is a French
word and one with two quite different meanings. Much of the

-4-

internal Washington debate, as well as the negotiation, is
focused on a weapon we call MIRV. Many people don't know
what exactly this acronym stands for, let alone how a
nuclear missile system equipped with MIRV's actually works,
or why we have them.

Larger questions arise. What exactly are the broad
U. S. interests that we seek to protect or promote by this
heavy investment in defense? And what of the Soviet Union's
strategic purposes and its detente-related goals? Are these
goals and purposes at all compatible with our own?

No one can provide complete or fully reliable answers
to most of these questions. Yet the government, because it
has the obligation to promote public understanding of our
policies, must set such questions in some clear and coherent
perspective. The Department of State, guided by the President,
has the primary responsibility for the conduct of U. S. foreign
policy and, hence, I feel a special and continuing obligation
to respond to questions, which, because they reach the heart
of our security, trouble many citizens.

What is our stake in detente?

Any assessment of our stake in detente must begin with
our purposes; it must also take account of Soviet purposes
and those of our allies. Our purposes and those of our allies
are fundamentally the same. In a sense we are status quo
societies, because we have no larger self-interest than

-5-

improving the quality of life for the greatest number of
our people. For this purpose we require stability. We
and our allies rely on stable political relations for
managing our joint monetary, commercial, defense and
other arrangements. We and the Soviets need stability in
order to give form and substance to our identity of interest
in avoiding the kinds of tensions and crises which carry
the risk of nuclear war.

Soviet purposes in detente are less clear, because
they are more complex. The Soviet stake derives in part
from a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. Otherwise
experience suggests that stability for the Soviet Union is
not an end in itself, as is the case in the West. The
Soviets tend to see stability at least partially as an
instrument to serve other large purposes -- as a means to
create a political environment in which these purposes can
go forward. Although we don't know exactly where the
dynamic, or impulse, of Soviet policy lies, we do perceive
that this policy presently relies on stability. If it's
first a matter of containing China -- perhaps even creating
an anti-China system -- then the Soviets must try to inhibit
dissidence in their East European empire and to extend their
influence in the West and to the South. For such a purpose,
they require stability. If it's first a question of extending

-6-

their influence to the West and the South, while discouraging unrest at home and in Eastern Europe, as well as containing China, they similarly require stability in the world political environment.

We may lack precise understanding of the Soviet Union's order of priorities, but we have no illusions about its priority interests. We see that East-West contacts and negotiations are partially designed (1) to promote Soviet influence in Western Europe; (2) to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow -- the division of Germany and Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe. The "recognition of existing realities" is a Soviet euphemism for these durable consequences of the last world war. We understand that detente is supposed to advance Soviet interests by breeding contacts between East and West, but that these contacts should not collide with any of Moscow's "existing realities." We also understand that the large array of Soviet military force in Central Europe is there not just to stabilize the regimes of client states, but to impress Western Europe with Soviet strength and strength of purpose.

For its part, the United States will not tolerate an alteration of the political balance of power behind the billowy facade of detente. We will not, for example, permit

-7-

East-West undertakings to be used against our priority interests -- either our relationships with our allies, to cite one example, or the clear sufficiency of our strategic arsenal, to cite another. We have no illusions that negotiations in and of themselves will alter fundamental Soviet purposes. We do intend that these negotiations will enhance stability and improve the political environment. Put differently, for the United States it becomes a question of trying to steer the Soviet interest in stability toward compatible and useful goals, while not losing sight of the more potentially disruptive Soviet purposes and, when necessary or appropriate, taking steps to discourage them. In this way, we seek to make detente a beneficial process and a transition to something better.

Years ago, we judged that a period of detente, if properly used, could eventually give way to a time that we might be able to characterize by a broader and more plausibly reassuring term. More recently, detente has taken on even wider dimension in our thinking. Perhaps we, too, can fit detente to a more dynamic purpose than stability for its own sake. Perhaps we, too, can use detente as a means to a precise goal -- in our case, using the period of diminished tension to repair or revise the international monetary system and to push inflation in the West back beneath some

-8-

acceptable and stable upper limit. Failure to achieve these
objectives would harshly penalize the lives of people every-
where and hence create instabilities of a scope and character
that cannot now be precisely calculated. One consequence
of such a failure might well be a loosening of the joint
security structure that we and our allies have built together
and sharply reduced investment in defense. The net effect
would be diminished security and a possible restoration, by
one means or another, of a more tense and hazardous political
environment.

What are the requirements for stability?

Any new structure of peace must be based on a stable
political environment, together with strong security forces
and credible security policies. A sober oft repeated lesson
of history is that stability and security are joined together
indivisibly. Thus, our own security forces require much the
largest single commitment of our resources, a condition
unlikely to change. Just how large this commitment should
be is a question that is annually reviewed by the Congress
and debated both within and beyond the government. The same
may be said for narrower questions, some of them more divisive,
turning on how precisely to allocate this bloc of resources --
which forces merit priority attention, what programs should

-9-

be enlarged or reduced, accelerated or terminated. And
so forth.

However complex these questions may be, an outline of
our security requirements is reasonably clear. We need
strong conventional forces, and we need strong strategic
forces. These two major components of our force structure
are mutually reinforcing. Our conventional forces, a large
portion of which are necessarily deployed in Europe, keep
the nuclear threshold high by helping to contain, discourage
or altogether prevent hostilities, especially those of the
kind that might lead to a confrontation with the Soviet
Union. Our conventional forces are thus an essential
complement to deterrence and to a diplomacy aimed at enhancing
stability. Our strategic nuclear forces are designed to
assure stable deterrence and to alert any potential adversary
that aggression waged on a scale that could not be contained
by our conventional forces could, unless terminated, carry
us all across the nuclear threshold. Thus both our diplomacy
and our conventional war fighting posture are strengthened
by our willingness to deploy balanced and essentially
invulnerable nuclear forces.

Political stability and stable deterrence are relative,
not absolute, values. To achieve and sustain a relatively
high degree of stability is itself a dynamic process. Both
our policies and our force structure must be periodically

-10-

adjusted to take account of a changing political environ-
ment and changing requirements. It is just as true that
certain aspects of our policies and programs do not change;
they are the continuities on which we partially rely for
maintaining stability. One such continuity is Western
unity, which finds expression in the North Atlantic
Alliance. Another is arms control, which as a serious
operational policy has increased in importance as arsenals
of nuclear weapons have increased.

Arms control has, indeed, become an essential element
of United States national security policy as we seek a
transition from confrontation to negotiation in the nuclear
age. And because it is one of the essential elements, arms
control must be related in our planning to other critical
elements of our national policy, including our defense
posture and our alliances. This requirement occasionally
makes the task of promoting and protecting the security
of the United States and its allies more complicated, but
we recognize that the links between these critical elements
of our policy are also mutually reinforcing; we further
recognize that a failure to take account of the inter-
relationship of our priority interests -- indeed to reconcile,
them when necessary -- could be ultimately prejudicial to
our broad purposes. Thus, in the quest for stability, arms

-11-

control and security are really sides of a coin. It was
the failure to understand this point -- a failure to relate
arms control measures to national security requirements --
that in large measure accounted for so many failures in
the past to contain the often destabilizing push for
increasingly lethal arms in increasing quantities. The failure
was at least partially traceable to a misunderstanding of
the nature of weaponry and its effect on relations between
states. Historically, arms have normally been as much a symptom
as a cause of tension. Yet the development and deployment
of rising levels of arms can easily deepen tension and
create instabilities. This is especially the case in the
nuclear age.

under
modern
conditions

Our arms control objectives arise from numerous con-
siderations. Modern technology gives us the means to achieve
the outer reaches of destruction with weapons susceptible
to progressively greater capacity. With the SALT
talks, the United States and the Soviet Union are embarked
on a unique enterprise designed to curb the potentially
destabilizing process of refining nuclear weapons and to
limit their numbers. Apart from its more self-evident
purposes, the SALT process offers another means of helping
to discourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Numerous
societies possess the technological capabilities to develop
and fabricate nuclear weapons. If the so-called superpowers

-12-

fail to set some limits on their own programs, they cannot realistically expect that lesser powers will indefinitely resist the impulse to hedge against an uncertain future by acquiring the weapons, which, rightly or wrongly, they will equate with their own security, as well as their political standing vis-a-vis neighboring states.

As before, our arms control goals extend beyond the great task of limiting strategic nuclear arms. There is the need to inhibit the supply and demand of weapons of various kinds that the forces of adversary states continue to use against each other. A failure to impose some constraints on such weapons will mean penalizing efforts to discourage local and regional conflicts, some of which might spread and lead to a confrontation of the great powers.

At another level, there are underway in Vienna negotiations on mutual reductions of forces deployed along the heavily armed frontier in Central Europe. This project is no less complex than SALT, involving as it does judgments on the differing military capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Progress in these negotiations would enable the United States and its allies to achieve some lowering of the level of forces in Central Europe at no cost to the security of any state; progress here could also improve the climate for negotiation on other difficult matters.

-13-

What is our stake in SALT and what is stable deterrence?

As for SALT, the importance of this process clearly
exceeds its writ. SALT is the rare negotiation that engages
the world's greatest military powers on issues directly
affecting the balance on which their strategic relationship
rests. SALT formalizes and gives concrete expression to
the identity of great power interest in political stability
and stable deterrence. As an East-West undertaking, the
importance of SALT to the Soviet leadership has been rivalled
only by the process initially fostered by West Germany's
Ostpolitik and which led to the Treaty of Moscow. Among
other advantages, the Soviet Union finds in SALT a means
of giving credibility to detente and to the Soviet Union
itself as a strategic power the equal to the United States.

As to whether the advantages of SALT to the United
States are comparable, the question has been answered
affirmatively by two Administrations and seems no less
unambiguous today, since the U. S. interest in stability
is clearly at least as great as the Soviet Union's.

Nonetheless, there is a fair degree of confusion about
SALT and the utility of what has thus far been agreed to
in the talks. In a sense, this is understandable. Few
subjects contain so many abstractions. The concept of

-14-

nuclear warfare itself is an abstraction, because its implications virtually defy comprehension.

There is no argument really on how best to avoid nuclear war. Long ago, we decided that stable deterrence was the main protection, or assurance, against this remote possibility. On the other hand, judgments of what constitutes stable deterrence -- what forces we need for the purpose -- have been subject to change. Our judgments have changed, for example, as our experience in deploying these weapons and thinking about them has altered our perceptions. And our judgments, of course, have changed as the Soviet Union began first deploying and then expanding its own nuclear forces. Briefly, the doctrinal underpinning of our strategic posture was in a process of almost constant change and adjustment until the late 1960's, when it became apparent that the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States in nuclear forces.

At that time, we determined that the strategic forces of both sides should not be vulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. This determination arose in part from our perception that neither side could realistically expect to develop a credible first strike capability against the other. The term "first strike

-15-

This is a page which should be read systematically
 capability" means a force of nuclear weapons whose number,
destructive power and accuracy could reliably destroy the
nuclear forces, or a major component thereof, of the other
side. To pin down this point and to avoid misunderstandings
on the other side, we concluded, however, that neither side
should risk arousing suspicions and fears on the other by
creating forces that might even appear to be designed for
a first strike role, however unattainable and hence
implausible such a posture might appear to be. In short,
after more than two decades of possessing a clear superiority
in nuclear weapons, we reconciled ourselves to a condition
of strategic sufficiency based on invulnerable second strike
U. S. and Soviet nuclear forces, each of which, if attacked,
could inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage on the other's
society. For ourselves, we also determined that in the
unlikely event of such an attack the President of the
United States should have a wide range of options in deciding
at what level and against what targets to respond. Thus,
we built into our strategic forces a substantial measure
of flexibility, meaning that the President, in responding,
need not attack the aggressor's cities, thus inviting the
destruction of his own, but could instead respond selectively
in a way that would avoid population centers or heavy

-16-

collateral damage to society and thus hopefully avoid rapid escalation. Translating this capability of our strategic forces into a coherent system of planning became a novel, as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity; but progress has been made. And more will be made.

The foregoing are the main elements of a strategic doctrine which we arrived at only after perceiving that the time had passed when either great nuclear power would permit the other to gain any significant or appreciable advantage in nuclear weapons. SALT, as noted, became the means by which we and the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding on these doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment and conceivable use of nuclear weapons.

What is the effect of SALT on the nuclear balance?

The agreements already reached in SALT and our further goals must be judged in the light of these considerations -- the requirements of stable deterrence. By formally restricting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) to very low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union have removed a potential source of instability; for one side to build an extensive defense of its cities against missile attack, would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward

-17-

a first strike capability, since before moving in that direction
a potential aggressor would want to protect his population
centers from surviving nuclear weapons on the other side.
Moreover, the treaty on ABM's offers each side an incentive
to cease adding to its offensive missile capability since
neither has a lingering need to worry about penetrating
extensive missile defenses.

With ABM's no longer a major concern, the focus of SALT,
as well as the public and Congressional interest, rests on
offensive nuclear weapons. Knowing what to think, or even how
to think, about these weapons is intellectually demanding, even
for people with relevant experience. The challenge lies partly
in the dissimilar character of the American and Soviet arsenals.
They are similar only in the sense that each side deploys what
is called a triad of strategic systems -- what we call central
systems. This triad consists of heavy bombers, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM's). Each side aims these weapons at targets in
the other's territory. In addition, each side deploys a great
many nuclear weapons of lesser range; these we call non-central
systems. The United States has, for example, nuclear capable
aircraft based in Europe and on aircraft carriers some of which
are capable of attacking the Soviet Union, which in turn deploys

-18-

more such weapons, most of which have targets in Western Europe.

In the case of the heavy bombers, the United States has an
advantage both in quality and in number. Our B-52's are more
modern; we have about 450 of them, compared to the equivalent
Soviet aircraft, which numbers about 140. On the other hand,
the Soviet Union deploys more ICBM's than we do. The ratio is
about 3 to 2. Moreover, these Soviet land-based missiles are
larger than ours; this means that they can carry heavier warheads,
or, in the jargon of SALT, that the Soviets possess a "throw-weight"
advantage in ICBM's.

This is the point, or one of them, at which the equation
becomes complicated. Although we have fewer ICBM's, ours are
more accurate; and accuracy is a more dominant element in this
weird calculus than yield. With time and experience, accuracies
improve, and each improvement is equivalent to an eight-fold
increase in yield; the two criteria are related by cube root.

Even more important, in my view, is our substantial lead
in missile warheads. We deploy nearly three times as many
missile warheads as does the Soviet Union. It is difficult to
overstate the importance of this kind of advantage; missile
warheads -- the actual weapons -- not missile launchers -- the
means of delivery -- represent the more critical measure of
overall strategic power. This gap in re-entry vehicles, as

-19-

they are known, derives from a substantial U.S. lead in the
technology of multiple warheads. For some time our missile
systems have been equipped with Multiple Independently
Targetable Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRV's. The Soviet Union is
testing such systems, but probably will not be able even to
begin deploying them until next year. We continue to deploy
them.

MIRV is a sobering and instructive example of technology's
ineluctable thrust toward exotic weapons of endlessly growing
competence, versatility and destructive power. This particular
leap of the imagination dates to the late 1950's, when defense
planners began looking at various hedges against deployment of
ABM's on the other side. It appeared that missiles equipped
with multiple warheads could penetrate even heavily defended
urban-industrial centers simply by exhausting -- "using up" --
the adversary's ABM's with a superior number of re-entry vehicles.

The improbable MIRV technology is worth contemplating, if
only because even more exotic refinements lie within our grasp.
The so-called bus, or last stage of the missile, releases a
number of re-entry vehicles sequentially. The release of each
is pre-programmed to coincide with alterations in the bus's
course and velocity. These alterations, for reasons perhaps
only fully understood by scientists, establish the path of the

-20-

re-entry vehicle to its predetermined target, which, among
other things, could be a military installation or an industrial
complex.

We no longer deploy MIRV's as a means of assuring the
capability of our missiles to penetrate defenses. The ABM
Treaty removed that need. Instead, we regard our MIRV's as
a more effective--and inexpensive -- means of offsetting the
Soviet missile buildup -- as a means of protecting strategic
stability and guaranteeing, at the least, equivalence.

Let me say a word here about verification. Our SALT
agreements with the Soviet Union, as well as our SALT proposals,
are self-enforcing, in the sense that either side can verify
the other's programs by what we call national technical means.
In short, we rely on technology, as distinct from any element
of trust, for reliable verification. MIRV complicates such
verification, but not necessarily to an unmanageable degree.
The Soviet Union has no difficulty in verifying the capability
of our MIRV'd missiles. By monitoring our tests of such
systems, they know how many re-entry vehicles a given missile
carries. By multiplying the number of missiles by the number
of re-entry vehicles, they have a reliable measure of our
strength. Equally, we are monitoring their MIRV tests. When
they begin deploying MIRV'd missiles, we will make the same

-21-

measurement. However, they are currently testing four different missiles. They may not be intending to deploy all of them. Or they may not be intending to deploy all of them in a MIRV'd version. We don't know. We do know that unless we achieve reasonably soon a new SALT agreement covering MIRV's, the Soviet testing program might undermine the utility of such an agreement. For example, if the Soviets were to continue testing most of their new systems in a MIRV'd version, we would be obliged to assume that, once deployed, each and every unit of a given system that had been tested with MIRV's was in fact equipped with MIRV's. Such a situation would then oblige us to set any proposed limit on MIRV's at a high level -- so high possibly as to be virtually meaningless or destabilizing or both.

Many years ago, we stopped adding to our inventory of missile launchers; we chose instead to equip the major portion of both our ICBM's and SLBM's with MIRV's. And this absolute advantage in multiple warheads is the most critical element in the present strategic balance. Anyone who doubts this would be disabused by a serious discussion of the balance with the Soviet leadership. Notwithstanding our advantage in this crucial part of the balance, we are prepared to negotiate on it -- to set limits on our MIRV's in return for limits on

-22-

the Soviet MIRV's that lie ahead and taking adequate account
of the Soviet advantage in numbers of missile launchers and
in throw weight.

Our major current goal in SALT is an agreement based on
what we call essential equivalence in the three central strategic
systems. Agreement on what constitutes equivalence depends
to some extent on perceptions of what is important. Here
judgment becomes subjective. Because U.S. and Soviet forces
*are* different from each other, they are hard to compare.
Measuring their strategic value is not very different from
trying to barter a supply of oranges, pears and peaches for a
stock of apples, grapefruit and bananas. How, for example,
does our advantage in MIRV's -- in numbers of warheads -- affect
the Soviet advantage in overall numbers and size of missile
launchers? And what happens to that balance if the U. S.
advantage in the number of heavy bombers -- roughly 300 -- is
thrown in?

In dealing with this bizarre equation, we are obliged to
measure present advantage against potential advantages, to
compare existing disparities with future disparities. Viewed
narrowly, we feel that the present strategic balance is weighted
somewhat in our favor. This is a narrow view, because we also
feel that any so-called advantage deriving from the present

-23-

balance is not particularly meaningful, since the Soviet
Union's retaliatory forces could destroy our society as
effectively as our forces could destroy their's.

With the five-year SALT agreement freezing the numbers
of offensive strategic missile launchers, the two governments
took the essential first step toward setting longer term
limits on these and other offensive weapons. Some have alleged
that the interim agreement, which expires in October, 1977,
penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to
deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-based and
sea-based. Such a view is narrow and misleading. When the
agreement was signed in May, 1972, the Soviet Union already
possessed many more land-based ICBM's than the United States
and, given the pace of its submarine construction program,
could have reached the point over the next few years of having
virtually twice the number of nuclear submarines which carry
ballistic missiles; the number of these missile launchers
would also have grown markedly in relation to those of the
United States. The effect of this interim agreement was to
halt the Soviet ICBM program at about the then existing level
and to set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched
ballistic missile program. Since the United States had no
intention of adding to its own arsenal of offensive missile

-24-

launchers during the five-year period of the agreement, we
were conceding nothing in terms of Soviet advantages in numbers
of missile launchers; that so-called advantage already existed
and the agreement, if anything, has served to contain it.

Other important distinctions between the offensive missile
forces of the two sides were not affected by the interim agree-
ment. The most notable of these is our warhead advantage. It
is, as I indicated, nearly 3 to 1. Moreover, our analysis
suggests that this advantage will not be appreciably altered
during the life of the interim agreement; by October, 1977, when
the agreement expires, our lead very likely will be somewhat
less -- about one-third as many more missile warheads as the
Soviets -- but obviously still appreciable. And when bomber
weapons are added to missile re-entry vehicles, the immediate
U.S. advantage in warheads over the Soviet Union is considerably
better than 3 to 1; our estimates suggest that this overall
advantage will be close to 2 to 1 when the agreement expires.
Put simply, if today we stopped where we were and deployed no
new systems, added no new MIRV's to our inventory, by 1980 we
would still be ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of de-
liverable nuclear weapons. One hears talk these days of a
Soviet advantage in MIRV'd throw weight. There is no such
advantage, because the Soviets have not begun to deploy MIRV's.
And it will be many years -- probably not until well into the

-25-

1980's -- before their MIRV's have accuracies comparable to
the current accuracies of our MIRV's.

It is equally true that this Soviet advantage in the size
of warheads their land-based missile launchers can deliver --
the "throw-weight" advantage -- is also unaffected by the
interim agreement. In short, the Soviet Union, as I said, is
presently deploying more and larger ICBM's than the United
States. The authorized numbers are 1,618 on the Soviet side,
1,054 on the American. The agreement also permits the Soviets
to deploy 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles to 710 for
the United States, although we on our side had no intention
of increasing our present force of 656 SLBM's to the authorized
number within the five-year life of the agreement. We are,
however, designing a new and larger submarine, called the Trident.
It will carry 24 MIRV'd missiles, as compared with 16, the
number presently deployed on our submarines. These missiles will
be of intercontinental range, thus permitting the Trident
submarines a vastly greater area of operations as a hedge
against possible breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare.
We do not plan to begin deploying Trident submarines much
before the end of the decade.

In deploying ballistic missiles on submarines, the United
States has many advantages. Our first advantage is geographic;
the sea for us is a more natural strategic environment; our
long coastlines afford our boats swift access to the open seas,

-26-

where they operate. Such is not the case for the Soviet Union; its natural strategic advantages derive from its huge land mass, whereas its more limited coastal waters complicate submarine operations. In 1972, our calculations showed that in the years directly ahead the Soviet Union would require at least half again as many modern ballistic missile submarines as the United States in order to keep something like the same number on station. Even now, the number of these Soviet submarines on station at a given time is substantially less than our own.

An even more significant U.S. advantage lies in the quality of our submarines. Thanks to a long head start in deploying both nuclear submarines and SLBM's, we enjoy a substantial technological lead. Our submarines are quieter, hence harder to detect, and can operate over longer periods of time. Most of our SLBM's have MIRV's. The Soviets do not have such a weapon. Thus, even if we stood still and cancelled our plans for improving our sea-based missile force, the impressive U. S. technological advantage would hold up for a considerable period of time. Thus, in agreeing to a larger aggregate Soviet submarine missile force within the period of the five-year agreement, we were very probably containing an exuberant Soviet expansion program while yielding nothing in the way of a real, as distinct from cosmetic, advantage. Finally, the simple

-27-

numbers are themselves misleading. Under the agreement the
Soviet Union, if it decides to fill its quota of 950 SLBM's,
will be obliged to retire 210 older missiles; most, if not all,
of these would be land-based ICBM's, in which case the size
of that force, which is of greater concern to us, would drop
from about 1,600 to 1,400.

The 1972 agreements contained still other advantages,
including certain qualitative, as well as quantitative,
controls on strategic weapons. For example, the ABM Treaty
sets limits on the size and power of certain radar systems,
as well as their number. And the interim agreement forbids
the conversion of "light" ICBM's into "heavy" ones, while also
banning any significant increase in the size of missile silos.
These latter provisions reflect a long-standing U.S. concern
with so-called "heavy" Soviet land-based missiles. The United
States deploys no such missiles, which disturb defense planners
because, once equipped with highly accurate MIRV's, they could
threaten our own land-based missiles.

How much is enough?

These constraints on heavy missiles imposed by the interim
agreement were not only desirable in and of themselves; they
also amount to useful precedents, since in the second phase of
SALT we are engaged in the more difficult task of working out

-28-

qualitative controls, along with additional quantitative
limitations, of offensive strategic arms. In order to achieve
the stability that we deem so essential, it will be necessary
not only to limit numbers of strategic weapons but to restrain
the process of increasing the destructive potential of these
weapons. Thus, we are dealing not only with disparate levels
of forces but with the kind of disparate capabilities that
MIRV technology, to take the most conspicuous example, can
supply.

As for the future, we recognize that if we were to add
little or nothing to our own forces -- and if SALT failed to
produce a comprehensive agreement -- the Soviet Union could
alter the strategic balance in its favor. We would still retain
retaliatory forces capable of inflicting unacceptable destruction,
but the numbers by which overall strategic power is measured
could change. In order for these numbers to change appreciably,
certain things would have to happen, others fail to happen.
First, the Soviet Union would have to deploy in significant
numbers some combination of the four new land-based missiles
it is currently testing. Three of these missiles are heavier
than any of our own, and one of them falls within the definition
of a "heavy" missile. Second, the Soviet Union would have to
put MIRV's on a large number of these new deployed missiles

-29-

in order to maximize their potential. This would likely be
done, since, as I indicated, some of the new missiles are
undergoing a lively testing program in MIRV'd versions.

At this point, the Soviet Union might have erased our
warhead advantage and even gone ahead; this they could
theoretically accomplish by fully exploiting their advantage
in the number and size of land-based ICBM's. It is also
conceivable, if we choose to think in the most pessimistic
terms, that our technological advantages in sea-based weapons
might also evaporate. For the balance to shift so dramatically
would, among other things, create anxieties about our, by then,
clearly vulnerable force of Minuteman missiles. Much more
important, perceptions -- our own and the world's -- of
America's political and strategic power relationship with the
Soviet Union would be altered in a manner perhaps best described
as destabilizing.

Let me explain this point. Such a shift would be destabilizing not so much because it would represent in absolute terms a shift in usable military power. Rather it would be destabilizing, because of the way in which people would look upon it. They would look upon it as a weakening of our ability to defend ourselves and our allies -- our ability to deter aggression. Briefly, a significant decline in our perceived

-30-

strategic power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union -- a decline serious enough to alter the strategic balance -- would cause a decline in our perceived political power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The decline would be characterized, among other things, by a disintegration of our alliance relationships and our ability to handle effectively crises of the kind that threaten stability. The other side would be irresistably drawn to relentless and destabilizing tests of our determination to protect vital interests.

For these and other reasons, we would never permit the balance to change in such a fashion. If and as the requirements are perceived to change, any government of the United States can be relied upon to revise and/or expand its strategic programs to meet them. We will maintain a balance based on equivalence, real and perceived. Indeed, because equivalence is subjective, reality derives from a collective perception of our strategic force requirements.

Reconciling divergent perceptions on our own side is part of the task. The second part is reconciling our perceptions with those of the Soviet leadership. Too many planners on either side tend to find reality in the other's ultimate capabilities, not in his rational purposes and interests. This tendency is neither useful nor realistic. The United States

-31-

and the Soviet Union are deeply divided with regard to values
and purposes. But they share an incentive to avoid nuclear
war. It is well to be aware of an adversary power's potential.
But to argue strategy and doctrine solely in worst case terms --
in terms reflecting essentially fanciful estimates of a future
strategic balance -- adds nothing to constructive discourse
on the subject and misleads thoughtful people here and abroad.

We must recognize that planners on either side find
vindication for their gloomiest assessments in the rhetoric of
counterparts on the other side. Indeed, the very rhetoric that
accompanies a major investment in new weapons becomes a part of
the rationale for reciprocal moves on the other side. The
tendency on either side to take the most cheerless strategic
rhetoric at face value and to draw from it the gloomiest of
conclusions contributes to assessments that most often are more
prudential than useful, or even analytical. And this deadly
combination of technology, politically innocent rhetoric and
the so-called action-reaction phenomenon, unless suppressed, could
take us and the Soviet Union to steadily higher levels of
nuclear weapons deployments. Neither side would be the gainer
in terms of usable military power. But from the potentially
heavy cost to stability of sustaining such a process, both
sides, along with the rest of the world, could be heavy losers.

-32-

The recent Summit conference caused some confusion, because it failed to produce a new SALT agreement. Our expectations, understandably, sometimes exceed feasibility. Not all summit conferences will return major agreements. That, however, is not a reason not to have such conferences on a reasonably regular basis. Some conferences, as in the case of this one, serve to lay or extend essential groundwork from which subsequent agreements can emerge. We did reach agreement at the recent summit conference on the desirability of replacing the current five-year interim agreement with a 10-year agreement stretching to 1985.

A good deal of concern has been expressed about MIRV's. This is understandable. MIRV's could prove to be destabilizing, partly because people perceive them in this way and partly because, unless limited, they could become the multiplier of endlessly growing strategic force on both sides. Thus, the United States regards a limitation on MIRV's as urgent business. Although agreement on MIRV's eluded us, exhaustive discussions on the subject have given each side a much clearer understanding of the other's position. This better understanding should hopefully provide a basis on which to proceed toward agreement, possibly an agreement covering MIRV's and other kinds of weaponry.

-33-

Both sides appear to have a stake in an agreement limiting
MIRV's. At best, such an agreement would discourage -- perhaps
ultimately prevent -- this process by which both sides at
considerable cost to stability would feel obliged to exploit
their respective advantages in a way that would stimulate a
major buildup in offensive weapons. At the least, an agreement
that limited MIRV's would buy time in which the parties could
try to make further progress. As the power now deploying MIRV's,
the U. S. might appear to have less incentive to bargain away
its advantage by putting limits on them. Yet, as noted, our
projections indicate that within the next decade, the Soviet
Union could erase the U.S./advantage in MIRV's, unless, that is,
we choose to expand our own programs to a degree not presently
contemplated. Thus, the time to start heading off an exuberant
but undesirable competition in MIRV's at some future time would
seem to be now.

The size and character of our strategic forces will be
determined by what can be agreed to in SALT and by the deployment
decisions taken by the Soviet Union. Stable deterrence requires
that we maintain equivalence in the strategic balance, while
seeking in SALT to make the balance more stable. Stable deterrence
also requires that in maintaining equivalence we do not procure
strategic forces in excess of our perceived needs, or forces of a

-34-

character that would create anxieties or misunderstandings as
to our purposes. In short, our procurement decisions must
fully comply with the doctrinal rules of stable deterrence
that we ourselves laid down.

In summary, we deplore the prospect of another cycle in
the competition for strategic advantage. We do not suggest that
a clear advantage would be politically meaningless. We know,
however, that such an advantage is unattainable, since neither
side at this time in history could or would allow it to develop.
If, however, we fail to inhibit movement in the wrong direction,
we obviously have the capability to more than hold our own in
a so-called arms race. As noted, we are building a new and
larger submarine as a platform for improved and longer range
SLBM's. We are also building an improved heavy bomber. At
present, these new systems are intended as replacements, not as
additions to our force structure. If SALT fails -- if mutual
restraint loses out to the mutual impulse to hedge through
force expansion -- then such systems will become additions.
Moreover, we have other potential strings to our strategic bow.
We are engaged in research and development on a nuclear cruise
missile that could be launched from the sea or the air. We have
no plans to deploy such a system. We also have seed money in

-35-

this year's defense budget for a new family of multiple warheads, some larger than any of the MIRV's we currently deploy; more important, substantial accuracy improvements would be built into all such new warheads. We profoundly hope that we will not feel pressed to deploy any of them; among other things, these new weapons would make our task in SALT more complicated, hence more difficult. We would prefer to reduce than to add to our force structure. And we would prefer to hold nuclear weapons within existing technological parameters rather than to take, as we could, a quantum leap to a new qualitative plateau in response to an unrestrained Soviet buildup of its land-based missiles.

The nuclear age and the delicate balance of terror, as Churchill put it, have fostered many historic ironies, not all of them alarming. The inhibitions arising from this terrible knowledge have doubtless discouraged conflicts which, in the absence of nuclear weapons, might have produced World War III. In any case, it is too late to rid ourselves of these weapons. Instead we must try to link them even more directly to a more secure political environment and a more stable equilibrium. Nuclear weapons must be made to serve our larger interests, because the alternative is so alarming as to be inadmissible.

-36-

Detente is admittedly a modest term and even a modest
concept. Yet when linked to such broad and unprecedented
projects as SALT, detente takes on added meaning. The dividends
from detente, as for example the first SALT agreements, should
be seen as a step -- as links in a process that logically should
lead to progressively greater stability. It is in that light
that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

As ever, history will judge that the processes of confrontation and negotiation were not in balance. The balance tilts in one direction or another. In the process of negotiation lies a means of keeping confrontation within stable limits.

It is in that light, along with the other more measurable criteria, that the import of SALT should be judged.

Drafted by John Newhouse:ojf 7/29/74

THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1974

Mr. Secretary:

This is a new version of your proposed testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Hyland and I have reworked it substantially along the lines we discussed in San Clemente, particularly after the introductory section. I am not sure how or whether it meshes with John Newhouse's paper, which you have separately.

Sonnenfeldt/Hyland/Friedman/Palmer

7/29/74

Draft #4

AUGUST 8th

The world is both less rigid and less manageable. The anxieties of transition and the opportunities for fresh creation mark *our* era.

-2-

It is fitting that we begin here a national debate about that
relationship. If our debate is to be fruitful it must be framed by
clearly posed questions. Otherwise what pretends to be a quest
for national consensus risks degenerating into compilations of com-
peting catalogues of the desirable. If we are to choose well our
national debate must answer these questions:

-- Given the acknowledged differences of ideology, values
and interest, is it possible to establish a mutually advan-
tageous and lasting relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Union?

-- Is it possible to construct a nuclear relationship that is
stable and that assures equal security for both sides and
for their allies?

-3-

-- Finally, is the relationship between American foreign policy and Soviet domestic structures?

## Our Heritage

The search for an answer to these questions must begin with the recognition that the US-Soviet relationship is conducted in an international environment that is radically different from that of any previous period in man's history. President Eisenhower expressed this change over twenty years ago when he said, "there is no longer any alternative to peace." This essential truth is rooted in the fact that man's technological genius has provided weapons of unimaginable destructiveness. Every President in the post-war period has lived with the terrible knowledge that the consequences of nuclear war are of such magnitude that no responsible statesman can base his policy on the threat of such a holocaust, and that every leader must set himself the task of bringing about conditions which reduce the possibility of such a war to a minimum.

Can afford
only one
minute

-4-

- First, the United States and the Soviet Union are political, military and ideological rivals. Our relationship is burdened with the possibility of confrontation and confrontation can lead to conflict.

-5-

Repeatedly in the postwar period efforts were made to alter our relationship with Moscow. The evanescent spirits of Geneva, Camp David and Glassboro marked brief, and finally unproductive,

-6-

## Our Approach

-7-

-- The Soviet Union had achieved a nuclear force comparable to ours. The Soviet leaders might seek to move towards a strategic advantage -- something we would never allow. Yet, it was also possible that the Soviet Union, freed from its own fears by the new strategic balance, might stabilize and preserve this balance -- and contain the arms race.

-- The Soviet Union had become a truly global power, as its expanded military and economic resources enabled it to extend its presence in the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere. This could lead to new confrontation with us. Or its extended influence could bring on added sense of responsibility and interest in regional stability. In this

-8-

We were determined to mold these opportunities to build a new and positive Soviet-American relationship. We began this task by realistically recognizing the depth and the breadth of our differences. They are profound, and do not spring from transitory causes, personalities, or historical accident. Our differences are rooted in our histories, in thenature of our peoples and in ways our countries have developed. Our differences are nourished by our conflicting ideologies and our political and military competition. Our differences extend even to the way we conduct our international affairs.

These disparities and contradictions could not be erased in one administration or even one generation.

We concluded that progress on our relations could come only if it was based on specific agreements. We determined that:

-9-

-- We would seek to alleviate specific sources of tension;

-- We would concentrate on substance not climate, and

-- We would maintain an interdependency among all facets of our relationship -- political, economic and strategic.

just to meet.

-10-

lower tensions. Indeed, this was the major purpose of summitry
in that period, a purpose that was not infrequently frustrated when
summits were followed by disappointed hopes and heightened con-
frontation.

In 1974 we have progressed to the point where a Summit is
now considered nearly a matter of routine. Improvement in our
relations is now almost taken for granted and many are tempted to
seek much more ambitious objectives. Indeed, the objectives now
frequently articulated as a test of the validity of detente may place
excessive strain upon it. This applies especially to the demands
that we condition further improvement of Soviet-American relations
on basic transformations of Soviet domestic life. It would be naive
to believe that a system that has repeatedly fought for its survival,
suffering tens of millions of deaths and vast destruction on World
War II, would agree to dismantle itself in exchange for some tens
or hundreds of millions of dollars of credits. This is not to condone
the Soviet system; it is to suggest that we require a sense of propor-
tion.

Our belief is that detente, to be lasting must be a continuing
political process in which the habits of self-restraint, mutual accom-
modation, and deepening cooperation become more deeply imbedded

-11-

Building a New Relationship

After decades of confrontation and hostility, the policies
of both the US and USSR were conditioned to enmity and suspicion
to such a degree that five years ago relations were virtually
frozen: there was little trade, only sporadic contacts between
various institutions of our societies, no cooperation in problems
common to industrial societies, some cultural exchange, but,
above all, no political dialogue.

Many approaches were urged on this Administration: an
immediate summit meeting to establish high level contact, or
the immediate convening of SALT talks, were two such recom-
mendations. Moreover, many believed that Soviet-American

-12-

relations could be effectively eased by promoting an expansion
of economic relations, on the theory that trade would improve
relations where diplomacy failed to do so.

Our policy was that summit meetings could only be
productive if they were preceded by meticulous political prepara-
tions, that relations would not improve by atmospheric gestures
if concrete sources of tensions remained, and that there was an
interrelationship among issues.

We made it clear that isolated agreements in trade or
economic credits could not be expected to survive in a tense
political atmosphere. Nor could we lead the USSR to believe
that they could choose those areas for a relaxation of tension
that were of primary concern to Moscow, while ignoring issues
such as Berlin, that were of concern to the West. At the same
time, progress in one area might reinforce the chance for progress
in others. Thus we proposed negotiations over Berlin, and we
agreed to begin SALT, but only after we had worked out an approach
that maximized the chances of success.

-13-

Each of the summit meetings has played an important
role in this process; the agreements reached are well known,
but arguments over the merits of this or that agreement should
not obscure an evaluation of the process that has been set in motion.

We take the view that the nature of Soviet-American relations
has been positively transformed over the past five years. This
transformation can be characterized as a process of gradual move-
ment away from the habit of confrontations and competition toward
a relationship that is characterized by increasing elements of restraint,
with some promise that in the future the process will evolve toward
a relationship of cooperation.

We have reached more cooperative agreements in the past
three years than in any previous period. These agreements, of
course, are not individually decisive, or of equal importance.
Nor do we claim that they are a permanent state of affairs.

But they do create a matrix of commitments that involve

-14-

an increasingly broad spectrum of cooperation between the bureaucracies of both countries. They enlarge the area of discussion and active collaboration, thus establishing a vested interest in a constructive relationship.

It is in this respect that we can speak of a detente.

## The Nuclear Relationship

In the debate that is now beginning we recognize that the normalization of relations in bilateral projects is not the subject of primary concern to the Congress or the American public.

The overriding issue is the question of a strategic nuclear confrontation and how to contain it.

We start from the proposition that the security of this nation must be our overriding concern. If necessary, the United States must be prepared to conduct an arms race to protect that security. No American President would permit, and under no circumstances will this Administration permit, the United States to fall behind in military

- 15 -

preparedness. Obviously we must have a strong defense.

This is not the issue: the fundamental question in this debate is whether the basic requirements of national defense can be achieved through a combination of necessary military programs and negotiated restraints with the USSR, or whether our fears will inexorably draw us into a new period of unrestrained competition.

We believe that in the nuclear age we cannot risk situations in which unconstrained military technology drives us into decisions that we would not make for overall policy reasons. It is necessary to assess realistically not only Soviet capabilities but also the USSR's intentions. But it is equally essential to avoid being irresponsible and allowing outmoded concepts of the nature of security in the modern world to drive us into confrontations that could have in calculable consequences.

Throughout history increases in military power, however slight, could be turned into specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage is both pointless and potentially suicidal.

This is the central fact of political conduct in the nuclear age, a fact that requires new and more sophisticated

- 16 -

understanding of the nature of political and military power.
Our debate about the relationship of detente and defense
must address three fundamental questions:

-- First, what is the meaning of strategic superiority?

-- Second, has the United States accepted a position of strategic inferiority?

If one talks about superiority, first we need to define
what it means operationally. Is it the capacity to inflict
more industrial damage, destroy a larger percentage of the
population, or obliterate a high percentage of the other
side's missiles?

Merely adding up numbers of missiles is quite misleading.
Adding up numbers of individual missile warheads and bombs
by themselves if also misleading, although it is closer to
the truth.

For any conceivable level of nuclear forces over the
next decade, you have to ask what do you do with it in a
crisis? What can a political leader do with it?

There is undoubtedly some combination of numbers of
strategic weapons and their qualitative characteristics
that would give one side a theoretical superiority. But

- 17 -

that combination is not at all obvious. And as the numbers
of missile warheads increase into the thousands it becomes
more and more elusive.

The basic situation is that in the conceivable future
neither side can gain the capacity to destroy the nuclear
forces of the other. If this is true, then we face the
question of whether the attempt to create such a capacity or
to undertake elaborate programs to safeguard against is not
in itself the greatest source of tension. We must consider
whether it is not preferable to codify a relationship in
which both sides can have confidence in the sufficiency of
their strategic forces without posing real or imagined
threats to the survivability of the other isde's forces.

Even though careful analysis suggested our forces are,
and will be in a state of rough equilibrium, we recognize that
political action may be based on a perception of strategic
advantage, by either side, or by the world at large. The
belief that one side did, in fact, have a margin of
superiority would impact on our diplomacy, our will to react
in crises, and the confidence of our allies. Our policies,
therefore, must be designed to ensure that our real as well
as our perceived strategic capability does not expose us to
miscalculations.

Thus, in this debate, we must settle the question of a
so-called American inferiority in SALT, lest a false

- 18 -

perception in this country lead to an unnecessary and
dangerous acceleration of certain strategic arms programs,
possibly to the detriment of military programs in other
areas where continued efforts are required.

It is argued that the SALT I agreements gave the Soviet
Union a major advantage. In fact, the current interim
agreement was a significant achievement in breaking the
momentum of the Soviet strategic buildup and preventing a
numerical gap from widening.

Since 1967 the United States has had no program for
deploying additional land-based missiles, and no immediate
program for building any sea based missiles. Our ICBM and
SLBM force had stabilized at 1710 missiles, and our main
effort was in the program to convert a part of these forces
to multiple warheads. The Interim Agreement therefore
stopped no active or planned US program.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union was engaged in a
vast buildup of both its ICBM and SLBM forces. By 1977 it
could have reached a level of over 3,000 ICBMs and SLBMs
if the Interim Agreement had not frozen that level at about
2360. Even in this case, in 1977 our MIRV program would
have neutralized any purely numerical Soviet margin, but
there is no doubt that the popular appreciation of our position
would have been a source of growing concern.

- 19 -

It is argued that we nevertheless conceded too large a numerical gap. The basic fact is this: if the strategic balance is analyzed in terms of warheads, the US lead since 1972 has widened substantially to a three-to-one advantage over the Soviet Union.

At the same time we must look not only at our short term capabilities, but at each side's longer term potential. We must necessarily do so in the most conservative way, consistently stressing the maximum capacity for the other side. But we must also take account of the full range of our forces and not become obsessed by one or two isolated criteria.

The basic fact is this: our warhead advantage will continue to be overwhelming for the entire period of the Interim Agreement.

It is this fact rather than our so-called disadvantages that poses a major problem in SALT negotiations. As long as the Soviets remain substantially behind in the number of warheads, which in their calculation includes forces we consider tactical rather than strategic, we can only expect a determined Soviet effort to close the gap. The problem is that this effort has the potential of creating a momentum and temptation in the USSR to acquire a temporary advantage in the next decade. Thus, some of our planners foresee a

- 20 -

theoretical Soviet advantage, urge that we either abandon SALT or reduce it to a minimum and seek our security in an accelerated rearmament program to recapture the outright superiority of the 1970s.

When put in the context of other policies toward the USSR currently being advocated -- the virtual curtailment of trade and exchanges and the insistence on major changes in the Soviet domestic order as a pre-condition for better relations -- this line of advocacy seems to lead us to a combination of the policies of massive retaliation and liberation of the 1940s and 50s. But carried to such extreme, such policies in their cumulative effect mean paralysis and cannot be sustained either by our own body politic or by our alliances. Their effect on the USSR will almost certainly be the return to the rigidities, isolation and adamant hostilities of the Stalin era -- except that

- 21 -

The Moscow talks in July were of profound importance
in this regard. For the first time each side seemed to
understand the longer term fears, concerns and perceptions of
the other. What at first seemed to us grossly exaggerated
Soviet statements about the military threat to them, proved
more plausible if it were assumed that the United States
would strike first. We are accustomed in our own analysis
to count what we would have left after a first strike by the
other side; the Soviets have done the same.

The candor and detail of our discussions was unpre-
cedented in Soviet-American relations, and surprising when
one considers the sensitivity of the issue.

We realized that we could not come to an agreement in
Moscow because, on the one hand, a truly permanent agreement
would inevitably face the many uncertainties of technology
change, and thus would have to have far too many hedges
built into it. On the other hand, perpetuating the five-year
current agreement for a year or two more would allow us to
address only the current cycle of weapons decisions. By
1978-79, just after the end of the five-year Interim
Agreement, the United States and the USSR will both be
potentially on the edge of a period of vast increases in

- 22 -

## The Global Meaning of Detente

Thus our debate must extend beyond the nuclear relationship to the meaning of Soviet-American detente for the environment in which all nations must act. Can we sustain the more hopeful international climate for peace if the two super powers return to a period of hostility? Is there a rational alternative to detente in an increasingly interdependent world? What would the impact be on our alliances of an American retreat from the path of negotiation and cooperation?

- 23 -

This Administration has never had any illusions about
Soviet intentions and perspectives. We have maintained
a strong military balance and a flexible defense posture
as a buttress to stability. We have acted decisively
whenever Soviet actions have threatened the peace.

We have been guided by these principles:

-- We will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve
a position of predominance either globally or regionally.

-- We will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of
detente to weaken our alliances.

-- We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as
a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble
spots.

The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any
area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship
with the United States. But through restraint and mutual
accommodation, it can deepen and broaden that relationship.

-24-

The final issue on this debate is the relationship
of foreign policy and the internal policies of the USSR.

We cannot condone the repression of fundamental
liberties. We must always urge humane principles and
use our influence to promote justice. But the issue
comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can
we press without provoking Soviet leadership into a return
to those practices in its foreign policy that increase
international tensions? Would new Cold War encourage
full emigration from the Soviet Union or nourish the hope
of liberty of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Has
detente increased repression or has it helped generage
the pressures and demand for openness we are now witnessing?

There are sharp limits to what we can insist upon as
part of our relationship. We have a right to demand
responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union.
But with respect to basic changes within the Soviet Union
the issue is not whether we condone what the USSR does
internally; it is the extent to which we can condition
other objectives on domestic changes.

Excessive demands on this score would obscure and
ultimately defeat what must remain our overriding objective --
the prevention of dangerous crisis and ultimately of
nuclear war.

-25-

These issues have been principally linked in the question of normalization of trade relations between our two countries. As I have said, when this Administration assumed office it was under great pressure to relax restrictions upon East-West trade. Arguments at that time -- when our trading position with other parts of the world was deteriorating and our friends in other industrialized countries were moving energetically into Eastern markets -- emphasized not only the economic benefits to us, but also stressed that expanded trade would improve relations where diplomacy had failed to do so.

The Administration then took the view -- which it has never abandoned -- that intensified trade should follow a generally improved relationship -- in short, that our relations with the USSR should proceed on a broad front. We were often criticized for failing to move fast enough on trade, for linking trade to other international developments, and for depriving the US business community of lucrative opportunities. Not once did anyone raise questions about the relationship of trade to the Soviet domestic system.

-26-

The communique of that first Moscow Summit clearly indicated that the normalization of trading relationships would be an important task in the months ahead. When the President reported to the Congress immediately upon his return from Moscow, he explained his philosophy and purposes, and discussed the accomplishments of the visit. In none of the commentaries on the Moscow Summit was there any significant opposition voice raised against the course we were pursuing in the economic sphere. It seemed to command the most widespread understanding and approval. Certainly, the question of the Soviet domestic structure was not cited as an obstacle to the processes we had set in motion. Thus bringing the issue to the fore now involves profound questions of whether we negotiated in good faith.

-27-

Granting most favored nation status is not a privilege. It is the removal of a discriminatory aspect of our policy without which we cannot claim to be moving toward more normal trading relations with these countries. The extension of non-discriminatory tariff treatment would, for some time to come, have only a modest impact on Soviet exports to the United States, which are largely raw materials not now subject to substantial tariffs.

Thus, the major impact of the continued denial of MFN status to the Soviet Union would be political, not economic. MFN was withdrawn in 1951 largely as a political act. If there are to be penalties for confrontation there must also be incentives for cooperation. Our unwillingness to remove this discrimination now would call into question our intent to move toward an improved relationship. It would jeopardize a moderate evolution in all areas, including the Middle East. It would prevent the implementation of the U.S. Soviet Trade Agreement. It has already blocked fulfillment of the Lend-Lease Accord -- involving repayment of over $700 million to the United States.

And we must ask whether further delay of trade normalization would achieve its goal -- liberalization in the Soviet Union, particularly as regards permission to emigrate. The record suggests that it would not.

-28-

We have accomplished much over the past five years.
The attitude of the American people has been made clear
on countless occasions, in ways that have produced effective
results:

But there are those who say this is not enough. They
argue that the Soviets must massively reshape its emigration
practices. What they seek is in fact a sudden reversal of
five decades of Soviet history and of centuries of Russian
history.

The goal is a noble one but they have chosen to seek it
through the wrong vehicle at the wrong time. Fundamental
changes in Soviet society will come, if they come at all,
through an evolutionary process that can only take place
in an environment of decreasing international tensions.

As pressure in this country put MFN in doubt the
gradual change we witnessed in Soviet emigration rates has
slowed, and even slipped backward. Now we must acknowledge

-29-

in this country that our ability to affect emigration is
real but limited and that there is no difference about
objectives. Proceeding from that basis I believe we can
move in the near future to a resolution which assures
both greater emigration and greater trade.

But let me make these further basic points concerning
trade. The critique of Administration policies in this
field and with respect to various contacts and cooperative
ventures focusses not only on the link to Soviet emigration
and other practices. It holds also that these policies
in effect result in net advantages to the USSR -- through
credits, technology transfers, capital investments and
general contributions to Soviet economic growth. But we
do not accept that these results must or should be solely
to the one-sided advantage of the Soviet Union. There are
bound to be certain advantages to it since the essence of
trading relationships is mutual advantage. This should not
be construed narrowly in the commercial sense, that is
that our business dealings with the Soviet Union should
yield a satisfactory return and that our firms should earn
appropriate profits.

Clearly, we must operate on sound business terms. But
the government's policy must go beyond that narrow construc-
tion. We have an interest in seeing the Soviet economy

-30-

become steadily associated with the economy of the world
at large. We should not assume that dependence runs only
in one direction: indeed it must be our goal, as indeed
it is, to encourage the Soviet leaders to value the
benefits of interdependence, of obligations running in
both directions, of goods, services and funds flowing into
as well as out of the Soviet Union. It is precisely this
kind of two-way association, rather than simple kinds of
barter or cash trade, which we believe strengthens the
process of normalization and serves to build deterrents
to hostile and irresponsible political and military conduct.

We are not so naive as to think that complex economic
and cooperative relationships in and of themselves serve
these ends. But that is precisely why we did not begin
to enter into them until broad political relationships had
begun to evolve; and that is precisely why we seek to keep
these functional aspects of our relations in broad harmony
with political and security relationships. And by the
same token, our policies would be unbalanced and incoherent
were we to pursue the goals of more stable political and
security relationships without reinforcing them by more
normal connections between our two societies.

-31-

## Conclusion

We face a vital opportunity, one that will not soon return:

- First, to ensure that a history in which five brief moments of improved Soviet-American relations gave way to five prolonged periods of confrontation is replaced by an irreversible process of growing bilateral contact and restraint.

- Third, to create an environment in which problems ranging from energy to peace can be addressed outside the rigidities of stark confrontation.

- Fourth, to build a network of East-West cooperation that by reducing international tensions may gradually ameliorate conditions in the East.

-32-

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union --
in our values, our methods, our vision of the future.
But it is these very differences which compel any respons-
ible administration to make a major effort to preserve
detente. In the nuclear era there is no rational alter-
native to a peaceful relationship between the two powers
which have the capacity to destroy mankind.

Dealing With Moscow:

# East-West Experts View Value and Risks

Last month, following the summit meeting between President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, Secretary of State Kissinger said that he expected a national debate on the meaning of security in the nuclear age and on the value and risks of closer ties with the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, that debate in effect begins when Mr. Kissinger testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In advance of that discussion, The New York Times invited four public figures with interests in East-West relations to its Washington Bureau last Friday to consider some of the issues.

The discussion preceded President Nixon's latest Watergate disclosures Monday, but the participants already had assumed that the impeachment inquiry might result in Mr. Nixon's departure from office. They also discussed what implications a change of leadership would have for United States policy.

The participants were Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Trilateral Commission, a nongovernmental group focusing on common problems of the United States, Japan and Europe, and professor of government at Columbia University; McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation and former adviser on national security to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, a frequent critic of the Administration.

Clifton Daniel, Washington Bureau chief of The Times, moderated, assisted by David Binder and Bernard Gwertzman of the bureau.

leadership is aged, quite
aged. It is one of the oldest
leaderships in the world. We
do know in the past at least
that leadership changes in
the Soviet Union produce
periods of instability and
rather dramatic shifts in for-
eign policy as well.

The second reason is more
basic and worth considering
in the general context of
what is meant by national
security. I think we are on
the eve of a very major crisis
of international systems as a
whole.

We may have national bankruptcies of a number of America's allies. The whole international situation is becoming unstuck. In that context, I think it is only reasonable to expect the Soviet Government to reassess its own stake in a détente relationship which is predicated to some extent on stability.

SENATOR JACKSON: I do not think it is a question of whether we should or should not have a détente. Everyone wants peace. The question is what kind of détente. You can have a good détente; you can have a bad détente. It seems to me that it boils down to the basic question of how should we conduct American foreign policy.

I think first that we should
engage in hard bargaining
with the Soviets, just as the
Soviets do on every trans-
action. If you only put for-
ward the proposals that you
know in advance are accept-
able to the Soviets, you end
up negotiating on Soviet
terms.

Second, each agreement
that we enter into should
reflect reciprocity, a two-way
street.

The grain deal is the clas-
sic example of a one-way
street. The Administration
announced it as being part
of détente. The official po-
sition now is that it was
never a part of détente. That
change came after the in-

vestigation of the grain deal
was completed.

I would point out, too,
that in this area of reciproc-
ity there is a lot to be done
in improving the accessibility
of the American press in
Moscow to their citizens as
the Russian press moves
freely in this town. Somehow
we are reluctant to insist on
reciprocal terms.

I think the whole world
had a chance to see how
reciprocity is handled when
the Soviets cut off the inter-
views in the middle of the
summit conference, over the
three great networks.

Another key point here is
the need for early progress in
the critical area of mutual
arms reduction.

To the man in the street,
I suspect, and it has been my
own experience in talking
with audiences that if he
would see some movement
toward a mutual reduction in
arms leading to disarmament,
this more than anything else
would give credibility to a
better relationship with the
Soviet Union.

The same applies in the
area of progress in human
rights. That is why I intro-
duced my amendment on the
right and opportunity to emi-
grate that is being debated
too in this context.

Phosphates Exported

There is also the need to
promote genuine trade not
economic subsidies disguised
as trade.

Let me just illustrate how
far the Administration has
wandered in the handling of
trade, in the handling of ex-
ports. We are sending a lot
of phosphates to the Soviet
Union. The bulk of the phos-
phates come from Florida.
We are sending so much now
that we are being required
to open up an important en-
vironmental area, one of the
national forests in Florida,
to mine phosphates because
we are going to be short of
phosphates for our own
needs.

I do believe that we should
have the kind of trade with
the Soviet Union that is a
two-way street. Now the
facts are that the Soviets
have very little to offer us
in the way of goods and
services unless we are will-
ing to spend billions of dol-
lars in capital Investment in
the Soviet Union.

I would be willing to make
some special concessions in
commerce and trade, recog-
nizing that our trade with
the Soviet Union will not
inure directly to our com-
mercial benefit if we can
work out satisfactory ar-
rangements in other fields
with them.

I think another element in
a genuine détente that is of
critical importance is the re-
straint on the part of both
countries — it has not been
exercised by the Russians of
late — in the delivery of
sophisticated weapons to
areas of tension. The Middle
East is a classic example of
this.

Better relations with the
Soviets requires less empha-
sis by the Soviets on the
ideological struggle.

MR. DANIEL: Do any of
you feel that détente with
the Soviet Union depends on
the personal relationship be-
tween President Nixon and
Mr. Brezhnev to the extent
that Mr. Nixon indicates?
Secondly, is détente a parti-
san matter in your view, as
between Republicans and
Democrats?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't think it is partisan. I do think the personal relations can have a great effect. You asked a moment ago why Mr. Nixon could do this. I think one of the reasons is the fact that he has such a reputation for being anti-Communist.

If the Democrats did the
same, they would be accused
by the Republicans of being
subversive.

I think much of it has
to do with our ancient feel-

ing about the Russians being
atheistic Communists and
bad people.

MR. BUNDY: I would just
say that I don't think Presi-
dent Johnson felt inhibited
on the Soviet side. I do
think Senator Fulbright's
remark about Mr. Nixon's
special advantage is impor-
tant in the context of China.

SENATOR JACKSON: I might make one observation. I think Communist states tend to speak in terms of top personalities of other governments. I have found this generally to be true. I don't think it follows from that, however, that the departure of a top representative of any of the states will in itself cause a change in relations.

I think this points up the
need to institutionalize our
relationships more effective-
ly between the United States
and the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: It seems to me that the central question about détente is whether our policies are reinforcing the worst tendencies in the Soviet system or are they encouraging the best. It seems to me that a meaningful détente, one which offers real prospects for the future, is obviously the one which engages the Soviet Union in more extensive, more collaborative effort in regard to all of the central issues that are now becoming important.

It is this kind of détente
which I believe this Adminis-
tration has not been success-
ful in mounting.

Transfer of Know-How

The fact of the matter is
that the economic relation-
ship today amounts to nothing
less than a fairly sizable
Americanized science-tech-
nology transfer to the Soviet
Union. This I think is the
kind of détente which does
not encourage the best and
which is some respects re-
inforces the worst because
it delays internal reform in
the Soviet Union. It makes
it impossible for the Soviet
system to maintain a highly
centralized economic system
on the basis of a highly cen-
tralized political system. It
impedes the kind of pressures
from within the economy
which in time will spill over
into the political realm. In-
deed it even encourages a
certain measure of domestic
repression when external
costs are not too high.

MR. BUNDY: 'Are you suggesting that not to have economic relations would lead to an increased diversity in the Soviet economic system?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: What I am suggesting is that the economic relationship ought to be calibrated very closely to the development of other relationships and should not outpace it on the basis of one-sided arrangements.

SENATOR JACKSON: I will break in here by saying that this is where hard bargaining comes in. The Soviets have a serious need for our science, our technology, our business-management technicians and a vast amount of our agriculture and agricultural know-how. All I am suggesting is that in light of this situation we should in our bargaining relate this to a reordering of priorities in both countries.

I don't see why we should subsidize their military-industrial complex. I would be willing to make some economic and some technological concessions if I could see a movement away from the Soviet arms build-up to an arms reduction.

MR. DANIEL: Senator Fulbright, a short while ago, Senator Jackson outlined what might be described as a negotiating posture toward the Soviet Union. Do you agree with that attitude and posture?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: No. Just two incidents I want to remark on. When he says that the grain deal was part of détente, I never conceived that it was part of détente. It was part of the elections of 1972 to create an image of tremendous effectiveness on the part of President Nixon to get rid of a surplus.

What was wrong with it was selling it at such a cheap price. We had had a policy for 20 years of helping our farmers by getting rid of our surpluses to the extent of giving it away under P. L. [Public Law] 480. What was wrong with that is the price. If we had gotten $2.50 a bushel, it would have been a good grain deal. Giving it to them at $1.65 was stupidity, but it was our stupidity. We didn't have to give it at $1.65.

Now, if you come down to attitude, I think the attitude is basic to it in the matter of arms. The overriding, single most important one is the control of strategic arms. I can't see where we have been very forthcoming. The Secretary of State says we have three times as many nuclear warheads as the Russians today.

We have the forward bases, we have the aircraft carriers, all with nuclear weapons. We have our nuclear weapons on the borders of Russia, all the way from Turkey, Germany, and all around their periphery except, I guess, on the Arctic Circle.

I think they have taken the position that we meant it when we said "parity" and they have not achieved parity. I don't think they are going to be satisfied in agreeing to a permanent inferiority which they believe they have.

Now, you get into all kinds of minute descriptions of "throw weight" and so on in this argument, but I just sum it up by saying the Secretary believes that we have —I think he said we have 36 warheads for each 218 cities in the Soviet Union. We could, if they were perfect in their delivery system, deliver that many on each city.

We have, all along, been ahead of them, back to the missile gap of the Kennedy era, when President Kennedy alleged there was a missile gap. There was a missile gap but it was in reverse. We had about 1,000 weapons and they had about 80, whereas he made the country believe that we had 80 and they had 1,000. It just was not so. But the public believes that we are behind.

We have had Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt going about recently—of course, this always happens; this is an annual ritual just before appropriations time—saying we are suddenly inferior, our fleets are inferior, everything is inferior, we are in terrible shape militarily, and therefore we need more money.

I think when it comes to the nitty-gritty of doing something, we are never quite willing to do it. We began MIRV, we have advanced the Trident, which is twice as large as their biggest submarine. We are going into the B-1, which they have nothing comparable to.

SENATOR JACKSON: May I just make a brief comment to my colleagues. I think we should all agree that reduction of arms to a new and lower lever of equality should be our main objective. What is being said is that there is too much armament on both sides. My answer is very simple. Let us start reducing on both sides.

MR. DANIEL: Although you make that suggestion, it seems that the military on both sides are opposed to this. Both Washington and Moscow, think they must approach détente from a strong military position. How are we going to deal with that problem?

SENATOR JACKSON: This is not correct on the American side. I have seen the official papers. The Secretary of Defense supports—and I am advised the Joint Chiefs join in that— a mutual reduction of strategic arms based upon the amendment adopted by the Senate and the House two years ago for equality.

Certainly we will always have the problem within the military services of one service wanting to keep bombers or missiles and another service wanting to keep ships. You will always have that.

But the official position of the Department of Defense is for a mutual reduction in strategic arms.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I suggest there is a great difference between the official position and what they do. That is all I suggest.

SENATOR JACKSON: That is their negotiating position. I stand on that statement.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think one of the major factors of strategic instability in the American-Soviet relationship is the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding Soviet planning, development, and deployment.

However, one judges the scale of the American effort and however critical one may be of its scale, the fact is that our rival knows pretty much what we intend to do in the strategic realm.

We have absolutely no knowledge of long-term Soviet strategic planning. We have no idea whether it is geared to permanent relationship of party, whether it is

geared to something which might be called political-military superiority.

Our knowledge becomes reasonably extensive, though not foolproof, only on the level of deployment.

I should think that one major contribution which could be made to strategic stability would be for the Soviets, in the context of something which now approximates parity, to begin to indicate more explicitly and overtly what their strategic planning is, what their long-term development proposals and plans are.

Senator Fulbright might feel that we exaggerate the Soviet threat, and we might well be doing so. We certainly have done so in the past. He is absolutely right when he said that we exaggerated it in the early sixties. The reason we exaggerated the Soviet threat in the early sixties is not because every man in the United States was running around howling about the missile gap. The fact is that the Soviets went out of their way in 1960 to claim that they had missile superiority, to operate as if they had it, and even to engage in a little bit of deliberate deception to pretend they had it. It was a miscalculation for which they paid in Cuba.

MR. BUNDY: I agree with Senator Jackson that, if we can get balanced reduction, substantive reduction, in numbers of warheads, "throw weight," any measure you want, that would be excellent. I think that is a long way away.

None of the agreements that we have made at any time with the Soviet Union in this area has involved their giving up something they already had that they still really wanted. I think it will be quite a while before the Soviet military will agree to the dismantling of a "Grade A" force. The most we can expect them to do on the basis of past experience is not to deploy things that they have come to believe are not really valuable, like the ABM, or to agree to an eventual implied scrapping of obsolete or obsolete forces.

This is really our own position, too. I know of no real readiness in our military to give up the prospect of developing and deploying forces which they regard as of first-class strategic importance.

It is one reason for being patient about the progress of Salt II and one reason for being skeptical about the speed which the Administration has tried to put behind this phase of the bargaining. I really think it just takes longer. This is harder than the ABM agreement, which was an agreement to give up ineffective defensive systems.

I also think that it is going to be a long time—I suspect Professor Brzezinski will agree—before the Soviets engage in the kind of relatively open discussion of their defense planning or defense development and research that we have been accustomed to in some measure here.

So it does seem to me that we need to be very patient about strategic-arms limitation and we need to look to the question of the way in which our own behavior, which is within our control, and does and does not contribute toward increased understanding and eventual limitation.

And here I would have to say I am seriously disturbed by the intermixing of targeting doctrine with SALT negotiations which has been a consequence of the Pentagon position and secretary Schlesinger's otherwise extremely intelligent and helpful contributions to the discussion.

I think he is right that American strategic targeting

needs to have something other than a doomsday plot to it. I think that has, in fact, been a problem for 15 years anyway. I think it, is also right that we should be very careful about assuming that there could never be a use of nuclear power to try to affect political results.

But I think it is very dangerous to connect those questions to the potential development of a wholly new strategic system which could be perceived as a counterforce system, which, in that connection, in spite of the Secretary's disclaimers, does exist.

That perception, I believe, has been seized upon in Moscow and has seriously impeded the discussions of SALT II, and it is this kind of question, it seems to me, that needs clarification. I believe that is not the cost of strategic weapons that is so serious. The danger of nuclear war, if it ever came, is so massive that insurance policies should not be measured by the kind of cost that is now associated with our strategic-weapons system, a cost which is lower than it was a decade ago.

But I think the character and make-up of those courses, the doctrine which justifies them and the things we do and do not seem to be planning to do on our own are potentially very destabilizing, and I do not myself believe that there is any urgent need for major change at any early time in the current strategic posture of the United States.

MR. DANIEL: When you speak of patience and time, what sort of time frame do you have in mind?

MR. BUNDY: I should be inclined to agree with Jerry Smith, who was the principal negotiator under the President and Henry Kissinger in SALT I, and his last suggestion that it may take at least as long to do SALT II as it did SALT I. That means it could go another two or three years and perhaps

longer because this is much harder.

MR. DANIEL: Has international stability and security been enhanced by what we have agreed upon?

MR. BUNDY: I think the agreement on ABM was a very stabilizing agreement. I think, as Senator Fulbright said, it did give treaty recognition to the proposition that there is no such thing as protection between superpowers in the event of major nuclear war.

SENATOR JACKSON: I think the significance of the ABM agreement lies in the fact that they have recognized equality, and that is: each side is to have one site. I think that is the direction we should be moving.

I would just like to make a point, in response to Mr. Bundy's comment about the new targeting doctrine. First, let us remember that this is only a research-and-development effort. It is an option that we can examine later on. This move, I think, was made in a restrained and responsible way.

What we have said is that no American President should be allowed to have only the inhumane option of killing all human beings in the Soviet Union. The doctrine of assured destruction may have had some validity when we had overwhelming superiority but I don't think it has validity in the context in which we now face the Soviet Union.

Finally, I think the point needs to be made that the Administration has not pushed arms reduction. I want to emphasize that very strongly. The President has not gone to the country and to the world and said our objective is to reduce arms to new and lower levels of equivalence.

I disagree with the Administration in their whole negotiating approach.

If you only put forward proposals that you know in advance the Soviets are going to accept, you wind up negotiating on their terms. I disagree on this basic issue. I think it is a central issue in the whole negotiation process.

MR. DANIEL: Are you suggesting that the President is doing this sort of thing in order to enhance his own image as a peacemaker, as a success in international relations?

SENATOR JACKSON: I long ago have given up determining the intent of the White House in many different areas.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: One of the purposes of these arrangements is to not only reach specific agreement but also to set in motion a prolonged process of mutual edification. I think one of the great importances and even accomplishments of SALT was that it did result in better mutual understanding of the relative strategic political positions of both sides.

In this connection I would like to make a very modest proposal. We have now had more than a decade at different stages of American-Soviet talks. Perhaps the time must come for both sides by joint agreement to begin to release to the public the protocols of at least some of the talks.

The fact of the matter is that they have been conducted in great secrecy. I think this secrecy is first of all in the long run incompatible with the nature of our society. We are entitled to know more about the nature of some of these discussions.

In the longer run, I think public knowledge would contribute also to greater Soviet understanding of the issues involved. I am aware of the fact that you cannot conduct sensitive ongoing negotiations if you expect them to be published quickly. Hence I would not recommend that

anything that transpired recently be made part of the public record.

MR. DANIEL: What about the possibility of that?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't think there is much possibility on it on both sides.

MR. BUNDY: I must say I would be strongly in favor of it.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I would too.

SENATOR JACKSON: A condition precedent to that, however, gentlemen, is the need to get the Administration voluntarily to make public the understandings entered into in connection with SALT I which were kept secret from the chief of SALT negotiations for our Government from July 24, 1972, until June 20, 1973, kept secret from Secretary of State Rogers and the Secretary of Defense. I refer to two important documents that the Congress knew nothing about.

I hope that the one that was agreed to in Moscow that modified the July 24, 1972, agreement will voluntarily be made public. This business of entering into agreements with the Soviets and keeping them secret astounds me. I can't for the life of me understand what useful purpose the Administration hopes to further by that kind of procedure.

I would agree, I think all of us can agree, that a bilateral agreement to release the discussions in the areas that Professor Brzezinski has referred to would be useful. I think it is some way down the road yet.

MR. BUNDY: I really do think that this Administration is not unique in this—that administrations tend to underestimate the value of the precise expositions of what they themselves are thinking.

L/C

5/

August 5, 1974

Mr. Secretary:

Attached are two paragraphs that I suggest you consider as
inserts for the statement on Detente and the Nuclear Balance.

The second, longer paragraph is intended to take account of a
comment you made in the margin of P. 8, alongside a paragraph
that said, in effect, we could use detente dynamically in order to
lick inflation. Your comment was "good point but not fully worked
out." The new language should bolster it, and would follow that
language on P. 8.

The shorter paragraph is intended to prepare your audience
a bit more for the "transition" idea that comes up twice on P. 7
(and in a way at the end). It would go on P. 2, middle of the page.

John Newhouse

Insert P. 2 - middle of page.

We are taught that every period is one of transition. We do not know what lies ahead of us. We do, or should, know that in the nuclear age national policy must be anchored to the requirements of the more stable environment on which the survival of our civilization will depend. Thus, nuclear weapons and their related dynamics must be linked to, or indeed made to serve, our larger interests, because there is no admissible alternative.

Insert P. 8 - middle of page

Let me put the complex inter-relationship of security and
economic policies in a wider perspective. As we leave behind the
harshest rigors of confrontation, our efforts to develop this more
stable political environment must be fully responsive to an equally
volatile economic environment. It is easy to say that for too long
we took for granted the economic stability that grew out of the post
World-War II system of joint arrangements and institutions. Or
that this system, like any other, has tolerances which could be
overcome by the pressure of time and change. We know that the
international financial structure has been put to very severe tests
over the past few years; and we are acutely aware that steady
erosion of the system would at some point begin to frustrate
our more political purposes. It is just as true that a decline in
political stability would hasten the erosion of our financial
system. In short, deterioration at the political and economic levels
would be mutually re-inforcing. Thus, the financial system may
require broad structural alterations, just as our political relation-
ships are being gradually restructured. But as in the case of
political relationships, changes deeply affecting the currencies and
currency relationships of the major trading countries of the world
can not be made quickly or easily. Time is an essential ingredient.
A period of what we call detente may give us the time we need.

- 14 -

Thus our policy towards the Soviet Union has had three
strands:

a. To resist every attempt to gain unilateral
advantages, to abandon restraint or to undermine the
international system. We sought to emphasize the
imperative of detente by demonstrating the futility of
intransigence.

b. To build incentives for a moderate course
through agreements on principles of international conduct,
through regular meetings of heads of government, and
through building a web of cooperative relationships.

c. To limit and ultimately to reverse the arms
build-up which adds its own instabilities to the
international environment. The argument that arms
races produce wars has often been exaggerated. The
nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril.

## II. The Balance of Risks and Incentives -- The Period of Confrontation

In the years immediately following 1969 U. S. -Soviet
relations were ambiguous and uncertain. Negotiations began
on Berlin and on SALT, but the main thrust of Soviet policy

- 15 -

seemed to be to achieve a changed relationship with our
allies in Western Europe while freezing U. S. -Soviet
relations. Thus, the Berlin negotiations involving
four-power responsibilities made little progress, while
negotiations on the Soviet-German treaty were concluded
in 1970. The SALT talks were deadlocked over the
question of whether to conclude an ABM agreement alone,
or link it to an agreement on offensive weapons.

In this period we were also challenged by Soviet
conduct: during the Middle East ceasefire, the Syrian
invasion of Jordan, in the matter of a possible Soviet
submarine base in Cuba, in various actions around Berlin,
and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Our position then, as
it is now, was to respond with extreme firmness when our
interests were challenged. In Jordan and in Cuba we made
it clear that we were prepared to resist by force even
while engaged in a costly war in Southeast Asia. We made
it clear by our actions that:

-- We would oppose the attempt by any country
to achieve a position of predominance either
globally or regionally.

- 16 -

-- We would resist any attempt to weaken our alliances.

-- We would react if conflicts in international trouble spots were exacerbated.

-- We would refuse to expand economic relations in the absence of demonstrated restraint in Soviet conduct.

During 1971 the Soviet Union learned that selective detente was impossible. The Federal Republic, with our support, linked ratification of its treaty recognizing East Germany with a solution of the Berlin question. We refused to proceed in SALT on the basis of defensive limitations alone. Our firmness emphasized the risks of hostility. Uprisings in Poland underlined the need for a peaceful solution.

As a result, starting in 1971 we witnessed a breakthrough on several fronts -- in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, the agreements on reducing the danger of accidental war and seabed arms control -- which we believe proved the validity of our approach even in periods when Soviet conduct raised doubts over their intentions.

- 17 -

### III. The Balance of Risks and Incentives -- The Period of Cooperation

#### A. The Elaboration of Principles

By the time of the summit in May 1972 it was possible to examine the more basic aspects of Soviet-American relations and to determine the principles for conducting relations in the future. Consistent with the basic strategy we insisted that we affirm in a solemn document the necessity of avoiding confrontation and exercising mutual restraint. It was an attempt to overcome the miasma of suspicion and self-enforcing preemptive actions which had characterized the previous period.

We were not so naive as to believe that principles would be self-enforcing. But we regarded this agreement as a symbolic turning point; if at the highest level both sides were willing to adopt a code of conduct and followed it in their policies, the results could be profound changes in the course of relations between the two strongest nuclear powers.

In 1973 we were able to take a further step in applying this principle specifically to the question of reducing the dangers of nuclear war. We stated our common determination to prevent nuclear war; but we made clear that this objective presupposed the renunciation of *any* war or threat of war against each other, our allies or third countries. We believed

- 18 -

then, as we continue to believe, that it is a major step
when two countries, whose confrontations and conflict
dominated 25 years are able to formalize a series of
restraints toward each other and toward third countries.

By the time of the summit this year, both sides met
under pressures to alter their policies. The meeting was
held and agreements of some significance were reached;
the commitment to the process of improvement was
deepened. Despite the unique circumstances of that
meeting, the two leaders were able to speak of making
the process of improving Soviet-American relations
irreversible.

These results reflected the fact that a dialogue of
unprecedented ease and intimacy has been established
between the two countries that can decide the fate of
mankind. In 1969, the United States took the position
summit meetings
that they had to be adequately prepared, so that the summit
could be used to resolve remaining issues and, more
important, to define with some precision the future course
of relations. The summits have been the occasion to give
impetus to negotiations that might otherwise consume years

- 19 -

at lower levels; the three meetings have also led to a breadth
of understanding of each side's policies that enable both to
understand with greater clarity what the position of the
other will be in a crisis and thereby reduced the danger
of war.

The net result is that, whereas in the past the Soviet
Union might well act or react under the impact of the
now
confusing information inherent in critical situations, / consultation
often on a daily basis has become the rule. This does not
guarantee our policies will be compatible, but it provides
the mechanisms for resolving differences before they
escalate to the point of a public confrontation committing
the prestige of both sides.

The Economic Dimension

In 1969 it was difficult to speak of a bilateral
relationship: trade was negligible, contacts between various
institutions of our societies and between the nationals of the
two countries were at best sporadic, cooperation on problems
common to industrial societies was virtually non-existent,
cultural exchange was modest. Above all, there was nothing
that could be described as political dialogue. One consequence

- 20 -

was that if there was no particular penalty for aggressive
behavior, neither was there any incentive for cooperation.

If we consider the scope and content of the bilateral
cooperative effort established over the past five years, in
this area alone the change in relations has been profound.

We have reached cooperative agreements in a great
number of diverse fields of mutual interest. They reflect
the fact that as major industrial societies we face many
common problems that transcend ideology. These projects
include cooperative efforts in science and technology
including environmental protection, medical research,
studies of ocean resources, and peaceful uses of atomic
energy, as well as exchanges of experience in urban
construction, transportation systems, agricultural methods,
and agreements on preventing incidents at sea and a joint
rendezvous and docking of spacecrafts in 1975. These
agreements may not be decisive to political relations, nor
are they necessarily a permanent state of affairs.

What we achieved is a number of commitments to
cooperate that involve an increasingly broad spectrum of the
institutions of both countries. These agreements greatly

- 21 -

Until the present period a relaxation of tensions with
the USSR has had no economic element. The wheat sales of
1963 following the test ban treaty, for example, were an
isolated transaction. While many have advocated using our
overlapping economic interests as the opening to a political
accommodation, no coherent program was adopted. Many
responsible Americans ask why we should trade with the
Soviet Union at all, or whether trade and economic credits
do not merely subsidize their armament program, or, more
broadly, whether access to Western economies does not simply
permit the Soviet leaders to avoid the necessity of
liberalizing their society. Recently questions of trade have
been linked to the moral issue of dealing with totalitarian
regimes, and specifically, greater freedom of emigration for
Soviet Jews.

- 22 -

The Administration from the outset took the view -- which it has never abandoned -- that an intensified economic relationship could not proceed without a general political improvement. Indeed, we were often criticized for failing to move fast enough on trade and for depriving the US business community of lucrative opportunities that were being exploited by firms in Europe and Japan. We believed that isolated transactions would provide no incentive for a broader economic relationship, and that economic progress would be subject to setbacks whenever the political relationship degenerated.

The Administration pursued this strategy until the 1972 summit demonstrated that both in tone and substance relations had undergone a significant change and a process of normalization committing the top leaders on both sides had been initiated.

- 23 -

trading relationships was a logical step that could serve to provide
a new area of incentives for maintaining the course which both sides
had set for themselves. In October 1972 we negotiated a basic
agreement that settled the question of the USSR's lend-lease debt,
and provided for extending most-favored-nation treatment to trade.

At that time, this approach seemed to command the most widespread
understanding and approval. The question of the Soviet domestic
structure was never invoked as an obstacle.

Bringing the issue to the fore now inevitably raises questions
of whether we negotiated in good faith. But more fundamentally
penalties for confrontation are effective to the extent that these
are also incentives for cooperation.

Several points need to be clarified about economic relations
with the Soviet Union:

First, granting most-favored-nation trading status to the USSR
is not a privilege. It is, in fact, a misnomer, since we have such
agreements with more than 100 countries. Granting most-favored-
nation status to the USSR thus removes a discriminatory aspect of our
policy. We established most-favored-nation trading relations in
1933 when we recognized the USSR; we withdrew it in 1951 during
the Korean War, largely as a political act.

Second, the major impact of the continued denial of this status
to the Soviet Union would be political, not economic. We cannot claim

- 24 -

to be moving toward more normal relations with these countries if,
at the same time, we rule out any resemblance to normal economic
intercourse.

Third, the granting of MFN was part of a general agreement.
Its denial has already blocked fulfillment of the Lend-Lease Accord --
which has been sought by every administration -- involving repayment
of over $700 million to the United States.

It is quite true that, in the course of expanding economic
relations, the Soviet Union could gain access to some of our technology
that might have military applications; but it is also true that in the
last ten years they have had, and will continue to have, access to
much the same technology from other countries in the West and
from Japan. Moreover, in the past two decades the USSR, with
no appreciable economic contact with the U.S., has developed
highly sophisticated military technology.

In any case, we do not intend to relax restrictions on the
export of technology that might have military applications.

This government's policy must go beyond narrow construction
of whether each and every transaction is economically profitable,
or whether one side obtains an advantage. We have a larger interest
in seeing the Soviet economy become steadily associated with the
economy of the world at large. In this context, while the extension
or continued denial of MFN at present are largely political acts,
it is worth noting that over the longer term the removal of tariff

- 25 -

discrimination would provide opportunities for the Soviet Union to
export more extensively to our markets. These opportunities, in
turn, could provide incentives for allocating high quality resources
in the Soviet Union to manufacturers meeting the standards of
quality and sophistication of our markets and providing the USSR
with hard currency earnings not now available to it.

In short, we favor an economic strategy that involves not a
unilateral input of American goods, capital, technology and know-
how, but a balanced relationship that encourages the Soviet leaders
to value the benefits of interdependence; a relationship involving
obligations running in both directions, of goods, services and
funds flowing in both directions, based on the principle of mutual
advantage.

We are not so naive as to think that complex economic and
cooperative relationships in and of themselves serve to strengthen
the process of normalization and to build deterrents to hostile and
irresponsible conduct. That is precisely why we did not begin
to enter into them until broad political relationships had already
begun to evolve; and that is precisely why we seek to keep these
aspects of our relations in broad harmony with political and
security relationships. By the same token, our policies would
be unbalanced and incoherent were we to pursue the goals of more
stable political and security relationships without reinforcing them
by more normal connections between our two societies and by incentives
to broaden and deepen these connections.

- 13 -

relations and increased emigration.

If, on the other hand, the debate is over the principle of making internal change a precondition to the pursuit of our foreign policies, and, indeed, subordinating other aspects of policy to its achievement, then we have a major issue that involves a fundamental reorientation of American foreign policy.

Hyland-(Possible substitute for section entitled Major Points at Issue)

Is There an Alternative?

This Administration believes that the policies I have discussed must be continued. We believe there is no rational alternative that will be supported by our people, that meets reality and contributes to world peace.

But as the relaxation of tensions tends to be taken for granted and loses some of its dramatic impact, we risk jeopardizing progress by focusing only on criticism.

Among the more general charges that should be addressed and clarified are whether all the gains from detente have been in favor of the Soviet Union, whether we are merely witnessing a lull in the cold war subject to early reversal, and whether we have ignored basic moral issues in dealing with Moscow. It is also alleged by others that we have neglected our alliances, and allowed detente to create a euphoria that hampers an adequate defense.

-- First, it is clear that the USSR benefits from detente, otherwise it would be unthinkable that the tough-minded members of the Soviet Politburo would sustain a policy in which there were no gains for the Soviet side.

-- The basic issue is not whether the Soviets bought wheat at a favorable price, but what is the overall benefit in terms of the reduction of tensions, and the danger of confrontation; in this sense, the benefits are clearly mutual and clearly in the world interest.

We believe that it would be shortsighted and indeed
reckless to treat a national policy as an accounting
exercise of gains and losses, while ignoring the validity
of the entire process.

Second, we cannot remain obsessed with the rationale of
the Soviet leaders, nor can we allow decisions on national
policy to degenerate into endless speculation about the
innermost thoughts of the Soviet leaders or who will take
power in the Kremlin. That we will never know with
certainty, nor is it the central issue. Even if we could
produce conclusive proof that current Soviet policy was
designed as a temporary tactic, would we simply lapse into
total passivity, mesmerized by anticipation of the next
move of the Kremlin, or would we have to pursue our own
aims?

Third, we have never taken the position that the policy
of detente which is produced by the necessities of the
nuclear era is meant as an approbation of the Soviet system.

Our position has been stated on many occasions, and I
wish only to make two points:

-- There are sharp limits to the pressure we, as a
government, can exert on a major power concerning its internal
regime. We can expect responsible international behavior,
but can we realistically pose demands for massive internal
changes that for decades we believed would be most likely to
occur in an evolutionary manner and in an atmosphere of
relaxation?