Copy No. 4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 28, 1963

Lunch with General Paul Stehlin, Chief of the French Air Forces - May 25, 1963

General Stehlin began the conversation by recalling our talk of last
January. Things had certainly gone from bad to worse since then. De Gaulle's
nationalism was becoming more and more pronounced. People like Gallois were
simply crazy. On the other hand, the practical effect of U.S. policies for
all our good intentions was to magnify the divisions of Europe. The U.S. was
suffering from a sense of superiority; De Gaulle was obsessed with a theoreti-
cal concern with national integrity. The Americans never engaged in a serious
dialogue; our representatives always arrived with fixed ideas as salesmen for
some preconceived scheme. Almost every American emissary with whom he talked
gave the impression that fallibility was not a quality to which Americans might
be subject. The possibility that they might change their mind or could be
reached by the arguments of Europeans never seemed to enter the discussion.

De Gaulle, on the other hand, refused to talk at all or simply did not
know how to negotiate. If it was any consolation to us he treated his own
people the same way. No one knew how he made up his mind. For example, until
three days before the press conference in January Stehlin thought that De Gaulle
would be if not receptive at least noncommittal with respect to the Nassau offer.
Then Secretary Ball had come to Paris with the proposed multilateral force. Us-
ing the word multilateral is like waving a red flag before De Gaulle. From
then on De Gaulle permitted no further discussion of the Nassau offer.

Now De Gaulle seemed embarked on an extremely nationalistic course. In
internal French governmental discussions De Gaulle treated forces "assigned"
to NATO as lost to French control. He therefore tried to keep such assignment
to an absolute minimum. Recently De Gaulle had decided to abolish the category

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of forces designated as "earmarked for assignment to NATO." This would become
apparent during the next NATO annual review when France would simply fill in a
zero for this category. Stehlin said that the units most immediately affected
were several units earmarked for convoy duty in the Atlantic under SACLANT.
However, he felt certain that none of the ground forces being built up in France
would be earmarked for NATO. This did not mean that De Gaulle would try to stay
neutral in case of war. However, he wanted to retain political control over
France's armed forces and not be forced to go to war by an American general. I
asked whether De Gaulle would feel happier if a French general were NATO commander.
Stehlin smiled and said that De Gaulle distrusts French generals even more than
American ones.

Stehlin thought De Gaulle was now going much too far. This is why he had
refused De Gaulle's offer to be reappointed Chief of Staff of the Airforce. He
did not think it was a good precedent to stay in office beyond the usual term
and thus bloc somebody else's advancement. But above all he disagrees with
the excessive effort to do everything on a national French basis. Stehlin
agreed with De Gaulle that it was necessary to have another center of nuclear
decision in the West in addition to Washington. However, France by herself
could not achieve this.

The present French program was staggering along. The Mirage program was
on schedule. Some trouble had developed with respect to the contour flying
capability. But he was confident this could be remedied.

The real problem was in the missile field. French planes would have to
rely for the foreseeable future on free-falling bombs. Air-to-ground missiles
consisted only in the blueprint stage.

The problem was even more serious with respect to the second generation

The problem was even more serious with respect to the second generation
consisting only in the pinpoint stage.

Key for the foreseeable future on free-flying pomea. Air-to-ground missiles
The real problem was in the missile itself. French planes would have to
 능ability. But he was confident this could be remedied.

on schedule. Some trouble had developed with respect to the concern flying
The present French program was staggering along. The Mirage program was
 could not advance this.

decided in the West in addition to Washington. However, France by herself
agreed with De Gaulle that it was necessary to have another center of nuclear
the excessive effort to do everything on a national French basis. Stéphin
and time plus somebody else's advancement. But above all in the degree with
which not then it was a good precedent to easy in office beyond the usual ear
rused De Gaulle's offer to be resubordinated Chief of Staff of the Army. He
Stéphin thought De Gaulle was now going much too far. This is why he had
American once.

Stéphin said and said that De Gaulle demonstrated French Generala
even more than the
agreed whether De Gaulle would feel padder if a French General were NATO commander.
France's strong force and not be forced to be so weak in American General. I
know in case of war. However, he wanted to retain political control over
would be established for NATO. This did not mean that De Gaulle would try to elay
However, he felt certain that none of the ground forces being put up in France
were several units established for combat duty in the Atlantic under SACRAMENT.

ero for this category. Stéphin said that the units most immediately affected
abherent during the next NATO annual review when France would already fill in a
of force designated as "emphasized for assignment to NATO." This would become

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

French strategic weapons. De Gaulle had recently decided that these should be submarine-based. The French program projected five Polaris-type submarines with sixteen missiles each. These submarines were to be nuclear-powered and have their own communications network. Five billion new francs had been budgeted for this force including research and development costs.

Stehlin considered this scheme wildly unrealistic. France had not tested a single component of such a system from nuclear power plant to guidance. All the designs were simply blueprints. If anything went wrong anywhere along the line the most fantastic delays and breakdowns would result. France simply did not have the industrial base for such a program. Everything had to go right for it to succeed. This was unlikely. And he thought the financial estimates ridiculously low.

I said that if France was going the Polaris route why did it not accept the Nassau offer. Stehlin replied that he agreed with De Gaulle that the conditions had been too restrictive. I said that I did not understand this. As far as I could see the British Polaris force would remain under British command and the "emergency" clause covered the only condition in which a European nuclear force might be used. Stehlin replied that he might then ask me why we insisted on the Nassau terms. In any event, De Gaulle would never accept even a symbolic derogation of French sovereignty.

I asked Stehlin about his alternative to a French nuclear program. He replied that he favored a European nuclear program closely coordinated with that of the United States in some kind of Atlantic scheme. He objected to the narrow nationalism of De Gaulle not only because it was technically unsound but because it led to a split in Atlantic relationships. However, the United States would have to give up its insistence on a veto over nuclear strategy if his concept were to prevail.

name to breviate.

plans to give up its instance on a auto over nuclear strategy if he conceives it led to a split in Atlantic relationships. However, the United States would nationalize of De Galle not only because it was technically unamend but because of the United States in some kind of Atlantic scheme. He objected to the narrow replied that he favored a European nuclear program closely coordinated with that he said Stelvin about his alternative so a French nuclear program. He delegation of French severance.

on the Messrs. terms. In any event, De Galle would never accept even a symbolic force might be used. Stelvin replied that he ought then ask me why we indicated the "emergency" clause covered the only condition in which a European nuclear so I could see the British Foreign Office would remain under British command and close up been too restrictive. I said that I did not understand this. Ve fer the Messrs. other. Stelvin replied that he agreed with De Galle that the coust- I said that if France was going the Foreign route why did it not accept rationally low.

it to unseem. This was unreasonably. And he thought the financial assistance not gave the industrial peace for and a program. Everything had to be right for future the most fantastic delays and prevarieties would result. France already did the quite were already pinprinze. It axinging was wrong anyway along the a single component of and a system from nuclear power plant toience. Will Stelvin considered this scheme wholly unrealistic. France had not tested for this force including research and development costs.

pave their own communications network. Five fifteen new France had been bugbested with six teen missiles each. These subarmies were to be nuclear-powered and the submarine-powered. The French program projected five Polenta-fide subarmies French strategic weapons. De Galle had recently decided that these should

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Stehlin added that things had never seemed worse for European nuclear cooperation than at the moment. Everybody was to blame: De Gaulle's bull-headedness; British trickiness and ambivalence about Europe; and America's lack of understanding of Europe. I asked him what he meant by British trickiness. He replied that the meeting between De Gaulle and MacMillan at Rambouillet had to be seen in the context of a previous meeting in the summer at Chantilly. (I am not sure I got the name of the place right). On that occasion there was reason to believe that Britain's entry into the Common Market would be accompanied by an offer of nuclear cooperation with France. During the following months the British dropped occasional hints to that effect but always in a way that was as consistent with a fishing expedition as with a serious offer. MacMillan's reserve at Rambouillet followed by Nassau capped the process.

When British nuclear cooperation seemed unattainable, Stehlin had begun advocating a Franco-German nuclear effort. In November he had even sounded out his friend General Speidel about this informally. He had also worked out an agreement with the Chief of Staff of the German Airforce for joint training of aircrews. The French Foreign Office had objected to a Franco-German arrangement as contrary to the Paris treaties of 1954. Finally, De Gaulle had given strick orders that there was to be no collaboration with Germany in the nuclear field.

As for the agreement between the French and German airforces, the Germans had been extremely evasive about it. Stehlin ascribed this to American pressures after De Gaulle's press conference and to the new German defense minister. One day the U.S. would regret having encouraged the Germans to maneuver between various groupings in the West. We would live to see the day when they would do this with the U.S.S.R. as well.

with the U.S.A.S. as well.

One Groeninghaus in the West. We would like to see the day when they would do that day the U.S. would regret paying any compensation to the German to maneuver between various after De Garlie's brain conference and to the new German delegate in question. One had been extremely active about it. Stefflin signed this to American press release.

We for the agreement between the Branch and German strikeworke, the German Field, strict order that there was to be no collaboration with Germany in the nuclear race as contrary to the Bata treaties of 1924. Hurelly, De Garlie had St even of strikeworke. The French Foreign Office had objected to a Franco-German arrangement with the Coup of St even of the German strikeworke for joint training out the French General Staff about this uniformly. If he had also worked out advocating a Franco-German nuclear effort. In November he had even suggested when British nuclear cooperation would startable, Stefflin had begun

When British nuclear cooperation would startable, Stefflin had begun
McIntosh's reserve at Eupenfliet followed by Messrs capped the process.
that was as consistent with a fighting expedition as with a serious offer.

made the British capped occasionalinte to that effect put already in a way
banned by an offer of nuclear cooperation with France. During the following
reason to believe that Britain's entry into the Common Market would be accom-
pany to be seen in the conduct of a衡taneous meeting in the manner atGHennigly.
(I am not sure I got the name of the block right). On that occasion there was
not to be seen in the conduct of a衡taneous meeting in the manner atGHennigly.
He replied that the meeting between De Garlie and McIntosh at Eupenfliet
just of understanding of Europe. I asked him what he meant by British talent-
peseguemental British treatment and appreciation about Europe and America's
cooperation then at the moment. Everybody was to please: De Garlie's self-
Stefflin added that there was never seen before for European nuclear

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The chief hope Stehlin saw now was in a less intransigent French policy coupled with a more understanding American one. France should take the lead in a European nuclear effort as an explicit step towards Atlantic partnership. This was impossible with De Gaulle. Stehlin was therefore looking to a new political grouping of the Center as an alternative. A group composed of Pleven, Maurice Favre, and Pflimlin with the friendly counsel of Jean Monnet was trying to bring this about. Stehlin had been asked to become the defense expert of this group and for the event that it came into power he was likely to be its chief defense planner.

The orientation of this group was close to Jean Monnet's European and Atlantic concept. However, this required a change of tone on the U.S. side of the Atlantic as well. The condescending procedure of always talking from American blueprints had to be abandoned. The Europeans had to be given real responsibility free of an American veto. This was the best, indeed the only, basis for durable partnership.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

General Stehlin began the conversation by recalling our talk of last
January. Things had certainly gone from bad to worse since then. De Gaulle's
nationalism was becoming more and more pronounced. People like Gallois were
simply crazy. On the other hand, the practical effect of U.S. policies for all
*our* good intentions was to magnify the divisions of Europe. The U.S. was suffering
from a sense of superiority; De Gaulle was obsessed with a theoretical concern with
national integrity. The Americans never engaged in a serious dialogue; our
representatives always arrived with fixed ideas as salesmen for some preconceived
scheme. Almost every American emissary with whom he talked gave the impression
that fallibility was not a quality to which Americans might be subject. The
possibility that they might change their mind or could be reached by the arguments
of Europeans never seemed to enter the discussion.

De Gaulle, on the other hand, refused to talk at all ~~as~~ or simply did not know how to negotiate. If it was any consolation to us he treated his own people the same way. No one knew how he made up his mind. For example, until three days before the press conference in January Stehlin thought that De Gaulle would be if not receptive at least noncommittal with respect to the Nassau offer. Then Secretary Ball had come to Paris with the proposed multilateral force. Using the word multilateral is like waving a red flag before De Gaulle. From then on De Gaulle permitted me no further discussion of the Nassau offer.

Now De Gaulle seemed *emphatically* in an extremely nationalistic course. In
internal French governmental discussions De Gaulle treated forces "assigned" to
NATO as lost to French control. He therefore tried to keep such assignment to an
absolute minimum. Recently De Gaulle had decided to abolish the category of forces
designated as "earmarked for assignment to NATO." This would become apparent

["during the next NATO annual review when France would simply fill in a zero for this\ncategory. Stehlin said that the units most immediately affected were several\nunits earmarked for convoy duty in the Atlantic under SACLANT. However, he felt\ncertain that none of the ground forces being built up on France would be earmarked\nfor NATO. This did not mean that De Gaulle would try to stay neutral in MEX case\nof war. However, he wanted to retain political control over France's armed forces\nand not be forced to go to war by an American general. I asked whether De Gaulle\nwould feel happier if a French general were NATO commander. Stehlin smiled and\nsaid that De Gaulle distrusts French generals even more than American ones.", "Stehlin thought De Gaulle was 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Stehlin considered this nuclear scheme wildly unrealistic. France had not tested a single component of such a system from nuclear power plant to guidance. All the nuclear designs were simply blueprints. If anything went wrong anywhere along the line the most fantastic delays and breakdowns would result. France simply did not have the industrial base for such a program. Everything had to go right for it to succeed. This was unlikely. And he thought the financial estimates ridiculously low.

I said that if France was going the Polaris route why did it not accept the Nassau offer. Stehlin replied that he agreed with De Gaulle that the conditions had been too restrictive. I said that I did not understand this. As far as I could see the British Polaris force would remain under British command and the "emergency" cause covered the only condition in which a European nuclear force might be used. Stehlin replied that he might then ask me why we insisted on the Nassau terms. In any event, De Gaulle would never accept even a symbolic derogation of French sovereignty.

I asked Stehlin what his alternative was to a French nuclear program. He replied that he favored a European nuclear program closely coordinated with that of the United States in some kind of Atlantic scheme. He objected to the narrow nationalism of De Gaulle not only because it was technically unsound but because it led to a split in Atlantic relationships. However, the United States would have to give up its insistence on a veto over nuclear strategy if his concept were to prevail.

Stehlin added that things had never seemed worse for European nuclear cooperation than at the moment. Everybody was to blame: De Gaulle's bull-headedness, British trickiness and ambivalence about Europe; and America's lack of understanding of Europe. I asked him what he meant by British trickiness. He replied that the meeting between De Gaulle and Mac Millan at Rambouillet had to be seen in the context of a previous meeting in the summer at Chantilly. (I am not sure I got the name of the place right). On that occasion there was reason to believe

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that Britain's entry into the Common Market would be accompanied by an offer of nu-
clear cooperation with France. During the following months the British dropped
occassional hints to that effect but always in a way that was as consistent with a
fishing expedition as with a serious offer. MacMillan's reserve at Rambouillet fol-
lowed by Nassau capped the process.

When British nuclear cooperation seemed unattainable, Stehlin had begun
advocating a French Franco-German nuclear effort. In November he had even sounded
out his friend General Speidel about this informally. He had also worked out an
agreement with the Chief of Staff of the German Airforce for joint training of
aircrews. The French Foreign Office had objected to a Franco-German arrangement as
contrary to the Paris treaties of 1954. Finally, De Gaulle had given strick orders
that there was to be no collaboration with Germany in the nuclear field.

As for the agreement between the French and German airforces, the Germans
had been extremely evasive about it. Stehlin ascribed this to American pressures
and after De Gaulle's press conference and to the new German defense minister.
One day the U.S. would regret having encouraged the Germans to maneuver between
various groupings in the West. We would live to see the day when they would do
this with the U.S.S.R. as well.

The chief hope Stehlin saw now was in a less intransigent French policy coupled with a more understanding American one. France should take the lead in a European nuclear effort as an explicit step towards Atlantic partnership. This was impossible with De Gaulle. Stehlin was therefore looking to a new political grouping of the Center as an alternative. A group composed of Pleven, Maurice FAVRE and PFLIMLIN with the friendly counsel of Jean Monnet was trying to bring this about. Stehlin had been asked to become the defense expert of this group and for the event that it came into power he was likely to be its chief Defense planner.

The orientation of this group was close to Jean Monnet's European and Atlantic concept. However, this required a change in policy.

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