B-4

overwhelming danger of a nuclear confrontation it is
incumbent on any leader to attempt to restrain the
outbreak of nuclear war.

Therefore, our concern with detente has been
directed to moderate Soviet foreign policy behavior.
And that has been on the whole substantially successful
with occasional aberrations, as is inevitable when nations
have flying space all over the world. This is why we are
concerned with moderating the arms race. This is why we
are concerned with forging certain links in commercial
and cultural fields. It does not mean approval of the
domestic structure of the Soviet Union. Where appropriate
we have used our influence, and successfully, as in the
case of Jewish emigration, to bring about an amelioration
of these conditions. But we should not play with the
danger of nuclear war, and we should not turn this into
an issue of domestic debate. Whether we succeed in it this year
or next year, the problem of nuclear war must be solved if
mankind is to survive.

[Applause]

I'll take one more question.

B-5

Q In light of your answer to the first question, and in light of the news that Syria has persuaded Saudi Arabia not to lift the oil embargo until Israel withdraws to its '67 borders on the Syrian front, do you feel the U.S. is currently being blackmailed? And, if so, by which country or countries?

[Laughter]

A We have not received any official information to the effect that Syria requires Israel to withdraw to the '67 border. But I have stated our general position. The United States has declared, because of its interest in peace in the Middle East, because of its conviction that a continuation of the conflict there has danger for all of mankind, for these reasons the United States has declared its readiness to help bring about the implementation of the relevant United Nations Resolution. And the United States has made major efforts, I would say exclusive efforts, to bring about every political improvement in the Middle East that has occurred since October.

If now pressure tactics are continued, it can only be construed as blackmail, and it can only be construed as blackmail by whichever country uses them.

[10]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 7, 1974

No. 42

NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, TRANSMITTED, OR USED IN ANY WAY BEFORE 3:30 P.M. E.D.T., FEBRUARY 7, 1974

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT PANAMA

February 7, 1974

We meet here today to embark upon a new adventure together. Our purpose is to begin replacing an old treaty and to move toward a new relationship. What we sign today hopefully marks as well the advent of a new era in the history of our Hemisphere, and thus makes a major contribution to the structure of world peace.

Meeting as we do on this Isthmus which links North with South and Atlantic with Pacific, we cannot but be conscious of history -- a history which has profoundly changed the course of human affairs. Four centuries ago the conquistadors landed here bringing faith and taking booty. They were representatives of the traditional style and use of power. Seventy years ago, when the Panama Canal was begun, strength and influence remained the foundation of the world order.

Today we live in a profoundly transformed environment. Among the many revolutions of our time none is more significant than the change in the nature of world order. Power has grown so monstrous that it defies calculation; the quest for justice has become universal. A stable world order cannot be imposed by power; it must derive from consensus. Mankind can achieve community only on the basis of shared aspirations.

This is why the meeting today between representatives of the most powerful nation of the Western Hemisphere and one of the smallest holds great significance. In the past our negotiation would have been determined by relative strength. Today we have come together in an act of conciliation. We recognize that no agreement can endure unless the parties to it have a stake in maintaining it. Participation in partnership is far preferable to reluctant acquiescence.

What we do here today contains a message, too, for our colleagues in the Western Hemisphere who, in their recent meeting in Bogota, gave impetus to this negotiation. The method of solution and the spirit of partnership between Panama and the United States as embodied in this agreement are an example of what we mean by the spirit of community in the Western Hemisphere -- it can be the first step toward a new era which we believe will be given fresh hope and purpose when we meet again with the Foreign Ministers of all the Hemisphere in two weeks' time.

For further information contact:

PR #42

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The United States and Panama

The relationship between Panama and the United States is rooted in extraordinary human accomplishment -- the Panama Canal, a monument to man's energy and creative genius. But as is so often the case, man's technological triumph outstripped his political imagination.

-- For sixty years the safe, efficient and equitable operation of the Canal has given to Panama, to the United States and to all nations, benefits beyond calculation;

-- Yet, the Canal still operates under the terms of a treaty signed in 1903, when the realities of international affairs were still shaped by traditional precepts of power.

-- The tensions generated by these contradictions -- the endless debates over the costs and benefits of the Convention of 1903 -- have jeopardized the ability of our two countries not only to work together to meet future demands upon the Canal but also to develop a constructive relationship as friends.

We must assess the document we have just signed against this background of reward and frustration. Above all we must judge it in the context of what it means for the peoples of the United States and Panama and what it can mean for the people of the Western Hemisphere.

The eight principles in this agreement constitute, as General Torrijos has said, a "philosophy of understanding." Sacrificing neither interest nor self-respect, Panama and the United States have made a choice for partnership. Meeting in dignity and negotiating with fairness, we have acknowledged that cooperation is imposed upon us by our mutual need and by our mutual recognition of the necessity for a cooperative world order. Foreign Minister Tack and Ambassador Bunker have shown that Panama's sovereignty and the vital interests of the United States in the Panama Canal can be made compatible. They have engaged in an act of statesmanship impelled by the conviction that we are part of a larger community in the Americas and in the world.

In that spirit of partnership the United States and Panama have met as equals and have determined that a just solution must recognize:

-- First, that Panama and the United States have a mutual stake in the Isthmus: Panama in its greatest natural resource -- its strategic location -- and the United States in the use and defense of the Canal;

-- Second, that the arrangement which may have been suitable seventy years ago to both the United States and Panama must be adjusted to meet the realities of the contemporary world.

-- Third, that a new treaty is required which will strengthen the relationship between us while protecting what is essential to each. A new agreement must restore Panama's territorial sovereignty while preserving the interests of the United States and its participation in what is for us an indispensable international waterway.

PR #42

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Our agreement is the culmination of a long and difficult negotiation.

While we have taken a great stride forward, we must still travel a difficult distance to our goal. There is opposition in both our countries to a reasonable resolution of our differences. Old slogans are often more comforting than changes that reflect new realities. It is the essence of revolutions that to their contemporaries they appear as irritating interruptions in the course of a comfortable normalcy. But it is equally true that those who fial to understand new currents are inevitably engulfed by them.

We are determined to shape our own destiny. Our negotiators will require wisdom, purposefulness, tenacity. They will meet obstacles and disagreements. Yet, they will succeed - for our relations and our commitments to a new community in this Hemisphere demand it.

In the President's name, I hereby commit the United States to complete this negotiation successfully and as quickly as possible.

PR #42

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The Western Hemisphere Community

We are here today not just as two sovereign nations but as representatives of our Hemisphere. We meet at a point of time between the meetings of Foreign Ministers in Bogota and Mexico City which can mark an historic turning point in Western Hemisphere relationships.

I know that many of my country's southern neighbors believe they have been the subject of too many surveys and too few policies. The United States is accused of being better at finding slogans for its Latin American policy than at finding answers to the problems that face us all.

Some of these criticisms are justified. At times rhetoric has exceeded performance. But the United States has been torn by many problems; only from afar does it appear as if all choices are equally open to us. We have not been willfully neglectful. And in any case, we have recognized that the time for a new approach is overdue.

I have come here today to tell you on behalf of our President that we are now fully committed to a major effort to build a vital Western Hemisphere community. We understand our own needs:

- To live in a hemisphere lifted by progress -- not torn by hatreds.

- To ensure that the millions of people south of us will lead lives of fulfillment not embittered by frustration and despair.

- And, above all, to recognize that in the great dialogue between the developed and the less developed we cannot find answers anywhere if we do not find them here in the Western Hemisphere.

For with all our differences, the nations of this Hemisphere share similar histories and comparable aspirations. They have a common view of the dignity of man. They have the human and economic potential for great acts of common creation.

It is in this spirit that I shall meet my colleagues in Mexico City later this month to deal with the issues posed by them in their Bogota meeting. We attach particular significance to the fact that the meeting in Mexico City -- its substance and its impetus -- is the product of Latin American initiative. It is a response to the necessities of the times such as the United States had hoped to achieve with partners elsewhere in the world.

The United States will not come to Mexico City with a program that presumes to have all the answers. Nor will we pretend that our lost opportunities can be remedied by yet another freshly-packaged program labelled "Made in the U.S.A." But we shall come with an open mind and, perhaps more importantly, with an open heart. We are at a moment of truth, and we shall speak the truth.

We know that our neighbors are worried about the blackmail of the strong. We want them to know that we are sympathetic to this concern. At the same time blackmail is no more acceptable from any other source. We need each other. So let us all seek solutions free of pressure and confrontation, based on reciprocity and mutual respect. In Mexico City we can but lay the foundations for the future. But building

PR #42

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upon what we achieve in Mexico City we can, over the months and years
ahead, erect an edifice of true partnership, real trust, and fruitful
collaboration.

Thus we approach the meeting in Mexico with but one prejudice: a pro-
found belief that the Americas, too, have arrived at a moment of basic
choice, a time of decision between fulfillment together and frustration
apart. Our choice will be found in the answers we give to these critical
questions:

-- Can we make our diversity a source of strength, drawing on the richness of our material and moral heritage?

-- Can we define together, concretely and realistically, the role
for the United States in support of Latin American efforts to
build a better Western Hemisphere?

-- Can we together determine how Latin America's new identity and
strength can contribute to a hemispheric community?

-- In short, can the countries of Latin America, the Caribbean, and the United States, each conscious of its own identity, fashion a common vision of the world and of this Hemisphere -- not just as they are, but as they are becoming and as we feel they should be -- so that we can move together toward the achievement of common goals?

We will conduct the broader dialogue we have all set for ourselves in
Mexico City with the same commitment to reciprocity, the same consideration
of each other's interests, that marked the negotiations between the United
States and Panama.

Thus in Mexico, we seek to initiate a process. We want to shape a new
relationship harnessing the political and economic forces of our time to
move us toward beneficial cooperation rather than apart into destructive
confrontation. Justice -- not size or strength -- should be the test of
our relations.

We begin the quest aware that we are old friends. If we cannot
creatively arrive at a modern relationship, the implications will be somber
indeed for a global community which shares neither our sense of common
destiny nor our history of collaboration.

For centuries men everywhere have seen this hemisphere as offering
mankind the chance to break with their eternal tragedies and to achieve
their eternal hopes. That was what was new about the New World. It was
the drama of men choosing their own destinies.

An American poet has written:

"We shall not cease from our exploration,
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time."

Panama and the United States have now begun this exploration. Our
sister republics can make the same choice. Our creativity, our energy and
our sense of community will be on trial. But if we are equal to the

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 8, 1975

No. 53

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT 4:00 P.M. E.S.T. SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1975.
EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION AT 12:00 NOON E.S.T. SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1975. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM, OR USED IN ANY WAY.

INTERVIEW OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

BY THOMAS W. BRADEN AND KLAAS J. HINDRIKS

(To be broadcast on the Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (N.O.S.) Sunday, February 9, 1975, beginning at 10:00 p.m. Netherlands time.)

MR. HINDRIKS: Mr. Secretary, a lot of people nowadays in Europe believe that in foreign policy, in Washington, that you are setting the tone. Is it possible for you to give us your assessment of the role of Europe in major foreign policy now and for the future?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think that the contribution that Europe can make in foreign policy is essential, because many of the issues that we are now discussing, in fact in all of them, the dominant fact is the interdependence of the industrial world, and without the cooperative efforts of all of the industrial democracies, the problems cannot be solved.

Now, where the ideas originate is really not as important as whether in fact they are accepted with the conviction of the people that have to execute them.

2

It is true that some of the ideas have originated here.

It is also true that some others, such as in conservation,
Europe has been way ahead of the United States.

But to me, the encouraging thing about the
last year is that in various fields, Europe and the
United States have moved together through a free exchange
of views and developed a consensus.

MR. HINDRIKS: Well, after the Washington Energy
Conference last year in February, it seems to us that there
was a lot of division between Europe and the United States.
What in fact did you do? What were you trying to achieve?
You got the French more or less on your side.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, there
have been several changes of government since then. And
I thought, in any event, that the disagreements of the
Washington Energy Conference were really between one
country and all the others, and that they were made too
melodramatic.

I believe that the underlying necessity of the
Western countries working together was bound to reassert
itself.

MR. BRADEN: Mr. Secretary, you are about to enter
into very serious negotiations in the Middle East, and
you seem to be under increasing attack at home. Senator
Bentsen said you wear too many hats. Senator Stevenson
says that you are too secretive, and Mr. Colson says the

A-3

the former President thought you were precipitous. Do
you feel hampered as you go off on an important journey?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to put Mr.
Colson in the same category as the other two gentlemen.

MR. BRADEN: He just got out of jail, you know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to deal with
Colson at all.

I think it is inevitable that as a result of
Watergate, which had the curious effect of insulating
foreign policy from the national debate for a while, that
there should now be a number of comments to bring foreign
policy back into the mainstream of the debate.

I don't happen to agree with the particular
comments that were made, because I think if one looks at
the requirements of foreign policy in the present period,
one will find that some things must be done secretively.

On the other hand, I have met over 110 times with
Congressional groups in 16 months in office. So I have
made an effort to explain as much as I could, what was being
done.

On the number of hats that are being worn, I think
one should judge that by the results rather than by

3-4

administrative theory.

But I understand that foreign policy has to be
part of the democratic debate, and I can handle what needs
to be done.

MR. BRADEN: But is it not difficult to go off
on serious negotiations with this trumpeting at home?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is a new experience.

MR. HINDRIKS: Well, if you go to the Middle East,
what if your mission fails? We supported in Europe,
especially in the Netherlands, the step-by-step approach
as one of the solutions possible. Will that mean that
you will go to Geneva?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I don't expect the mission to fail. Secondly, I have never looked at Geneva as an alternative to the step-by-step approach. I have always said that at some point, Geneva should be reconvened. That everything depends on the framework within which Geneva should be reconvened. It is what the expectations of the various parties at Geneva will be. We believe, of course, that a successful next step would create a better framework for Geneva, and so I don't consider the two approaches contradictory. Nor is it so difficult to reassemble Geneva. The question is what is going to happen when we get there.

5

MR. BRADEN: What will be the signs of a successful mission?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the next trip is exploratory. The trip on which I am starting does not in itself -- will not yield results. I am making only one stop in each capital, except I am going twice to Israel, in order to get a feel for the real convictions of the chief protagonists, who might be reluctant to put their thoughts down in writing.

After I've had this, I will come back here, formulate an American view on the matter, and then return to the Middle East, and conclude the negotiations.

MR. HINDRIKS: Can you see at a certain moment -- let's say a point of view, saying it's impossible to meet the criticism at home and conduct foreign policy in the way you have done it in the last couple of years?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't expect that to happen.

MR. HINDRIKS: One more question, Mr. Secretary. I am here as a Dutchman, and the relationship between Holland and the United States has one problem in Holland's foreign policy, that the United States might curtail our airline. Is there any solution?

6

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have had extensive talks with your Foreign Minister on the subject. I have seen few subjects which have so moved the Dutch as the issue of KLM. So he isn't the only Dutch friend who has approached me.

The problem is that looked at from a strictly technical point of view there is considerable merit in the view of our technical agencies. Your leaders have convinced me that it is not simply a technical issue. And I have, therefore, agreed to reopen the negotiations from a wider perspective. And while they are going on, I don't want to discuss the outcome except to say that I personally am aware of the particular sensitivity of the KLM issue to Holland, to the Netherlands, and that I will conduct my discussions on it with your Foreign Minister, Mr. van der Stoel in a very intimate way, with an attitude very constructive. And I consider him in any event a good friend and a courageous man.

MR. HINDRIKS: Anyway, some kind of detente between the United States and Holland. But just to mention the word "detente," do you have the feeling that detente, for the European countries has had a setback?

7

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have said publicly that it has had a setback as a result of the discussions on the Trade Agreement. I believe that it can be restored.

As you know, I am meeting Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva. And while the original impetus that brought us together is the Middle East, I am positive that we will be reviewing the whole problem.

MR. BRADEN: One more question on detente. There seems to be, as you are going to meet with Mr. Gromyko, the NATO Alliance seems to be leaning a little on both ends, one in Portugal and one in Turkey. Can you prop this together? Can we?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not with Mr. Gromyko.

(Laughter)

We'll have to do our best to bring it together.

MR. BRADEN: What is your opinion right now, how do you judge?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the problem with Turkey is a self-inflicted wound, and we are now talking with the Congress in order to work out what I hope will be a constructive solution.

8

[LC]

MR. BRADEN: You mean it is a self-inflicted wound
by this country, by this Congress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. In Portugal it's the
legacy of a generation of authoritarian rule. We will do
our best to be helpful there, but that is less subject to
direct American influence.

MR. HINDRIKS: What can all nations -- and this is,
in effect, my last question, to touch a little bit on your
vision for the future -- what can all nations, in fact, do
for the future to lessen the danger of war? How do you
see what is growing around us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is
necessary first to bring the arms race under control. This
is why we have made major efforts in SALT --

MR. HINDRIKS: The SALT Agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right, the
Vladivostok Agreement, Mutual Force Reduction, and other
negotiations on the limitations of arms, the Threshold
Test Ban, and the whole series of similar measures.

Secondly, we have to develop in so far as we can
cooperative relationships with the communist world in order
to give them a stake in a peaceful world.

9

Thirdly, industrial democracies have to restore
their vitality so that their weakness don't carry out
all over the world.

Those will be the major objectives.

MR. HINDRIKS: Do you see this as a permanent line
of American foreign policy for the future?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the basic
principles of the foreign policy that we are now conducting
will be carried out by other Administrations.

I would like to say that whatever noise is going
on in the United States right now, it is my profound
conviction that our foreign policy is essentially bi-
partisan.

MR. BRADEN: Thank you.

MR. HINDRIKS: Thank you very much.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

February 11, 1974

No. 46

OPENING REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEBRUARY 11, 1974

On behalf of the President of the United States, I welcome you to this conference.

My great predecessor, Dean Acheson, once observed that "sometimes there is nothing man can do to avert disaster but more often our failure lies in meeting big bold demanding problems with half-measures, timorous and cramped." The nations gathered in this room are confronted with an unprecedented challenge to our prosperity, and to the entire structure of international cooperation so laboriously constructed over the last generation. The impact of the energy crisis reaches around the world, raising fundamental questions about the future of the developing countries, the prospects for economic growth of all nations, and the hopes for global stability.

The dimensions of the problems were recognizable at least a year ago — indeed we addressed them as part of our original proposal for a new relationship with Europe and Japan. The challenge will be with us for at least the rest of this decade and perhaps beyond. The seriousness of the problem, its pervasiveness, and the impossibility of national solutions, all compel international cooperation: among major consumer nations, among developed and developing nations, and among producer and consumer nations.

The United States has called this conference for one central purpose: to move urgently to resolve the energy problem on the basis of cooperation among all nations. Failure to do so would threaten the world with a vicious cycle of competition, autarky, rivalry and depression such as led to the collapse of world order in the Thirties. Fortunately, the problem is still manageable multilaterally: national policies are still evolving, practical solutions to the energy problem are technically achievable, and cooperation with the producing countries is still politically open to us.

Let me summarize the United States' views on the major issues confronting us:

First, the energy situation poses severe economic and political problems for all nations. Isolated solutions are impossible. Even those countries, like Canada and the United States, capable of solving the energy problem by largely national means, would still suffer because of the impact on them of a world economic crisis. Consumer or producer,

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PR #46

affluent or poor, mighty or weak — all have a stake in the prosperity and stability of the international economic system.

Second, this challenge can be met successfully only through concerted international action. Its impact is controllable if we work together; it is unmanageable if we do not.

Third, the developing countries must quickly be drawn into consultation and collaboration. Their futures are the most profoundly affected of all. Unable to meet present prices for oil and fertilizer, they face the threat of starvation and the tragedy of abandoned hopes for further economic development. In the name both of humanity and common sense we cannot permit this.

Fourth, cooperation **not** confrontation must mark our relationships with the producers. We each have legitimate interests. We each face looming dangers. We need each other. If we move rapidly and cooperatively toward collective action, all will benefit.

Fifth, the United States recognizes its own national responsibility to contribute significantly to a collective solution. While we are less immediately affected than others, we see it as a matter of enlightened self-interest — and moral responsibility — to collaborate in the survival and restoration of the world economic system. Project Independence, which will reduce the American demand for world supplies, can be a way station on the road to a new Project Interdependence. We are willing to share American advances in energy technology, to develop jointly new sources of supply and to establish a system of emergency sharing. We are prepared to make specific proposals in these areas in the follow-on work of this conference.

## The Energy Problem

The energy crisis has three dimensions — first, the oil embargo; second, the shortage of supply; and finally, the quantum increase in prices.

The embargo now is directed largely at the United States. We will deal with this issue and ask for no assistance. But, while the embargo's immediate economic impact may be selective, its political dimension should be of more general concern. For it carries profound implications for the world community — the manipulation of raw material supplies in order to prescribe the foreign policies of importing countries.

The basic economic problem goes deeper, however. The explosion of demand has outstripped the incentives of producers to increase production. Inflationary pressures in the consumer countries have tended to create incentives to withhold production. This is especially true in a seller's market where the producing countries can increase their income by raising prices rather than output.

But there are hopeful signs. World demand has been reduced in recent weeks — partly because of rising prices — and may well remain below last September's level. Thus, we may be at the beginning of a dramatic change in the long-term outlook for the world petroleum market. Determined conservation efforts in the consuming countries and vigorous pursuit of alternative energy sources can further reduce the rate of growth in demand for oil.

The most immediate and critical problem concerns price. Current price levels are simply not sustainable. At these levels, the industrial countries alone will incur a current account deficit of $36-40 billion in 1974. Such large increases in costs would seriously magnify both unemployment and inflation in the importing countries, while the effect on domestic production would be deflationary. Pressures for import quotas will become irresistible; a general decline in world trade will follow inevitably.

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PR #46

The threat to the world's poorer nations is even more profound. At present prices the less developed nations will face a current account deficit of $25-30 billion in 1974, of which more than $10 billion is caused by the increase in oil prices. This deficit is three times the total aid flow of the entire world in recent years. Neither the developing nations nor traditional aid donors can finance such a sum. Even the attempt would destroy two decades of hard-won progress, leaving in its wake a legacy of political tension, social turmoil and human despair.

Moreover, as a direct result of the oil price hikes the poorer nations' supply of crucial fertilizer has been severely reduced in recent months. Fertilizer prices have at least doubled, raising the spectre of famine. We cannot permit this to happen.

The producing countries themselves will not be spared these consequences. Their unprecedented opportunity for dramatic and rapid economic progress cannot escape the effect of global deflation, mounting restrictions in the world's trading and monetary system and the political tensions of unbridled competition. A major task before this conference is to begin creating a framework of cooperation that will fulfill both the hopes of the producing and the needs of the consuming nations.

These global dilemmas cannot be avoided through exclusive bilateral arrangements. We do not dispute the right of sovereign nations to make individual arrangements. But we believe that it is essential that these arrangements follow agreed rules of conduct. In their absence, unrestrained bilateralism is certain to produce disastrous political and economic consequences.

No conceivable increase in bilateral trade with the producing nations can cover the massive payments deficits that each nation faces. The only result of unmanaged bilateralism will be to bid up prices, perhaps even beyond present levels, and to stabilize them at levels that will ruin the countries making the bilateral arrangements before they ruin everyone else.

Thus the ultimate challenge is to the fragile fabric of international principles and institutions. If we fail to achieve a cooperative solution, each of us will be tempted to transfer the problem onto others. This was the approach the industrial world followed during the "beggar thy neighbor" policies of the 1930s. We all know the consequences.

## An Approach to Cooperation — A Seven Point Program

The great goal of American policy for the past quarter century has been to try to achieve a more cooperative world, to put permanently behind us the narrowly competitive approach which has traditionally ended in conflict — economic or military or both. We maintain our faith in the validity of this goal. In pursuit of the common interest, the United States is willing to make a major contribution, in effort, in science, in technology and in resources, to a common solution to the energy problem.

The United States is prepared to join with the nations assembled here, and later with the producers and other consumers, to make a truly massive effort toward this major goal: the assurance of abundant energy at reasonable costs to meet the entire world's requirements for economic growth and human needs.

To this end, we suggest that this conference consider seven areas for cooperative exploration: conservation, alternative energy sources, research and development, energy sharing, international financial cooperation, the less developed countries, consumer-producer relations.

1. **Conservation:** The development of a new energy ethic designed to promote the conservation and most efficient use of existing energy supplies is crucial. We need a basic commitment to share the sacrifices and costs of conservation and thus reduce pressures on world supply. The United States recognizes that it is the world's most profligate energy consumer. Yet our own national program has, within the past

PR #46

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four months, reduced government energy use by 20 percent, industrial consumption by more than 10 percent, gasoline consumption by 9 percent, and natural gas and electricity consumed in residential and commercial buildings by 6 and 10 percent respectively. We shall continue to expand this program. We are prepared as well to join other consumers in pledging a sustained conservation effort. The United States is willing to collaborate in a review of the national programs of each consumer country, in an appraisal of their effectiveness, and in recommendations to governments for additional measures.

2. **Alternative Energy Sources:** The demands of this decade cannot be met unless we expand available supplies through vigorous development of alternative energy sources.

To produce quick results, we must concentrate on known fuel resources. Coal is in abundant supply, but we need to develop the technology neglected during the period of low-cost oil. Continental shelves and non-conventional deposits -- coal, shale and similar resources -- need to be developed rapidly.

The United States is prepared to explore the following possibilities for consumer cooperation:

- A collective commitment to develop the fossil fuel resources that are available within our respective borders.

- Coordinated policies to encourage the flow of private capital into the new higher cost energy industries, such as synthetic oils and gas from coal and shale.

- Governmental arrangements to accelerate the global search for new energy sources such as off shore oil.

- International programs to reduce the vulnerability of the major industrial countries to the interruption and manipulation of supply -- such as the orderly conversion of key sectors away from petroleum.

3. **Research and Development:** New technologies, and not only new explorations, can provide us with additional sources of energy. Many of our countries are launching large new programs. Our own national program contemplates the expenditure of more than $11 billion in government funds over the next 5 years, and an expected investment of $12.5 billion in private funds in the same period. But we have no monopoly on the most advanced and promising approaches. It is to our mutual benefit to coordinate and combine our efforts. Thus, the United States is prepared to make a major contribution of its most advanced energy research and development to a broad program of international cooperation in energy.

Without a doubt, a significant portion of new energy will be supplied from nuclear reactors for which increased quantites of enriched uranium will be needed. Within a framework of broad cooperation in energy, the United States is prepared to examine the snaring of enrichment technology, diffusion and centrifuge. Such a multilateral enrichment effort could be undertaken in a framework of assured supply, geographic dispersion and controls against further proliferation. We shall submit principles to guide such a cooperative enterprise for the follow-on work which we are proposing.

4. **Emergency Sharing:** The allocation of available supplies in time of emergencies and prolonged shortages is essential.

None of us can be certain how the world balance of supply and demand for petroleum will develop or what political contingencies may arise. But we cannot leave our security or our national economies to forces outside our control.

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The United States declares its willingness to share available energy in times of emergency or prolonged shortages. We would be prepared to allocate an agreed portion of our total petroleum supply provided other consuming countries with indigenous production do likewise. As we move toward self-sufficiency, our ability for sharing would of course increase.

Building on the earlier work done in the OECD, definite recommendations should be submitted to governments including:

-- a sharing formula;

-- criteria to determine when a supply shortage exists;

-- a mechanism which would implement and terminate the sharing arrangement; and

-- complementary programs such as stockpiling and standby rationing schemes.

5. **International Financial Cooperation:** The structure and strength of the world's trading and monetary system must be restored and strengthened. If there is no way for the industrial countries collectively to eliminate the trade deficits created by their higher oil import bills, they can attempt to do so individually only at the cost of enlarging someone else's problems. In addition, the producing nations are accumulating financial claims against the consuming nations at a rate unprecedented in history.

In the past, the various national and international money markets have efficiently recycled oil revenue funds back into the economies of the consuming countries. At least for industrial countries, these markets can in large part continue to perform that function. The removal of our capital controls and the easing of controls in other countries should help. But the magnitude of the new flows could put serious strains on the operations of these markets. The funds flowing to particular consumer countries may not reflect their needs for balance of payments financing; severe instability could result if these funds were repeatedly shifted across currency boundaries without adequate financial cooperation among the industrialized countries. Here again there is a crucial congruent interest between the producers and consumers and an urgent need for cooperative solutions.

Measures to deal with the economic effects of high oil prices must be adopted on a broad front. Recommendations should include:

-- New mechanisms to facilitate the distribution of international capital flows from oil revenue surpluses.

-- Means for producers and consumers to cooperate in building confidence in investment policies and the integrity of investments.

-- Steps to facilitate the fuller participation of producing nations in existing international institutions and to contribute to the urgent needs of the developing consumer countries.

6. **The Less Developed Countries:** The needs of the developing countries are a particularly urgent dimension of the energy crisis. Massive increases in oil import costs are occurring at a time when the export prospects of

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many less developed countries have sharply diminished as a result of the slowdown in world economic activity. Even at lower oil prices, the balance of payments problems of the less developed countries would require sustained attention.

Our approach to this human and economic challenge should be based on
several principles:

-- The developing consumer countries should be invited to join the
next stage of our deliberations.

-- Developed countries should avoid cutting their concessional aid programs in response to balance of payments problems. In this regard, the United States will urge the Congress to restore our contribution to the International Development Association (IDA).

-- The wealth of the producer nations opens up a potential new source of large-scale capital assistance for development. The producer nations should have a special understanding for the problems facing the poorer nations. We should encourage and facilitate their participation in international and regional institutions.

-- Urgent measures must be taken to assure sufficient fertilizer supplies for the coming year. The immediate problem is to provide oil at a price that will allow existing fertilizer production capacity to be fully utilized. The longer-term problem is to create sufficient capacity to meet the world's rapidly growing needs. The United States would be prepared to contribute its technological skills to such a joint enterprise.

7. Consumer-Producer Relations: Our ultimate goal must be to create a cooperative framework within which producers and consumers will be able to accommodate their differences and reconcile their needs and aspirations. Only in this way can we assure the evolution and growth of the world economy and the stability of international relations. We must work toward the objective of preventing coercion of the weak by the strong as of the strong by the weak; the producing nations must be given a secure stake in an expanding world economy and the consuming nations a secure source of supply.

It seems clear that enlightened self-interest of consumers and producers need not and should not be in conflict. Future generations may not enjoy a permanent source of petroleum. Excessively high prices are already calling forth massive investments in alternative energy sources, which raises the prospect of lower prices and shrunken export markets for the producers in the future. But stable oil earnings, at just prices, wisely invested and increasing by the principle of compound interest, will be available as a long-term source of income.

Thus the producers must have an interest in a "just" price and in stable long-term political and economic relations. Therefore at the consumer-producer conference for which we are heading let us discuss what constitutes a just price and how to assure long-term investments. A well-conceived producer-consumer meeting, in which the consumers do not seek selfish advantages either as a group or individually, far from leading to confrontation, could instead lay the basis of a new cooperative relationship. But it will do so only if it is well-prepared -- and if the consumers have first constructed a solid basis of cooperation among themselves.

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## The Next Steps

The United States is not interested in establishing new institutions for their own sake. We are solely concerned with practical results. Some of the tasks I have suggested can be carried out by existing international mechanisms; other will break new ground. The essential requirement is to see that concrete recommendations are submitted to the next conference.

In order to carry our work forward, we believe a coordinating group should be established with the following responsibilities:

- to relate the tasks that are assigned to existing bodies to our future work.

- to undertake those tasks for which there are presently no suitable bodies.

- to prepare for the next meeting.

Another conference of consumers should then be called at the foreign-minister level to assess the work in all seven areas. This conference could include representatives of the less-developed countries.

This meeting would lead to a third conference of consumers and producers.

We are open to suggestions about the locale of these next conferences.

We should aim to complete the entire process by May 1.

The approach to global cooperation outlined here has prompted the President's invitations to you to join us here today.

This conception is ambitious, but the need is great.

Therefore let us resolve:

- To meet the special challenges and opportunities facing the major consuming nations with a program of cooperation.

- To bring the developing nations into immediate consultation and collaboration with us.

- To prepare for a positive and productive dialogue with the producing nations.

As we look toward the end of this century we know that the energy crisis indicates the birth pains of global interdependence. Our response could well determine our capacity to deal with the international agenda of the future.

We confront a fundamental decision. Will we consume ourselves in nationalistic rivalry which the realities of interdependence make suicidal? Or will we acknowledge our interdependence and shape cooperative solutions?

Our choice is clear; our responsibility compelling. We must demonstrate to future generations that our vision was equal to our challenge.

* * * * *

Department of State

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UNCLAS JERUSALEM 0228

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY -.)
SUBJECT: KISSINGER, ALLON DEPARTURE STATEMENTS AT
BEN GURION AIRPORT FEB 12, 1975

DEPT PASS NSCE FOR GEN SCOWCROFT; WHITE HOUSE FOR NESSEN

1. KISSINGER: QUOTE: I WANTED TO THANK THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM -- THE PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER, ALL THE OTHER FRIENDS WITH WHOM WE DISCUSSED HERE -- FOR WHAT I CONSIDER VERY CONSTRUCTIVE, VERY USEFUL TALKS. WE DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REACH ANY FINAL CONCLUSION ON THIS TRIP, BUT RATHER TO EXPLORE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CATEGORIES OF A POSSIBLE INTERIM SETTLEMENT AND I WILL NOW GO TO EGYPT AND I WILL HAVE SIMILAR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN LEADERS. THE AREA NEEDS PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE. ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA NEED IT. THE UNITED STATES WILL DO WHAT IT CAN TO PROMOTE IT AND THE TALKS HERE WERE A VERY USEFUL AND IMPORTANT STEP IN THAT DIRECTION. THANK YOU. END QUOTE.

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2. ALLON QUOTE: THANK YOU VERY MUCH MR. SECRETARY FOR YOUR KIND WORDS. I TOO CONSIDER YOUR VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY AS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE AND INDEED VERY SUCCESSFUL. WE DIDN'T EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM THE FIRST MOVE. NEVERTHELESS, AS A PRELIMINARY MOVE IT WAS A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE ONE. I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS BADLY NEEDED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED -- BY ISRAEL, BY EGYPT -- AND I AM HAPPY THAT THIS COUNCILS ALSO WITH THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. I CAN UNDERSTAND THAT THERE MAY BE DIFFERENT APPROACHES AS TO HOW THIS INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED AND WHAT SHOULD BE THE RESULTS OF IT, BUT ONCE WE START WE MUST STICK TO THE INITIATIVE UNTIL WE GET POSITIVE RESULTS, WITH GREAT PATIENCE AND GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES. I WISH YOU A VERY SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO EGYPT AND COME BACK AS SOON AS YOU CAN. END QUOTE.
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DEPARTMENT PASS TO NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT; WHITE HOUSE
FOR NESSEN

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: KISSINGER-YAMANI DEPARTURE STATEMENTS AT RIYADH INTERNATIONAL AIR PORT, FEBRUARY 15, 1975

FOLLOWING ARE DEPARTURE STATEMENTS BY SECSTATE KISSINGER
AND MIN PET YAMANI-RIYADH, FEBRUARY 15, 1975:

KISSINGER: (BEGIN QUOTE) REALLY, I CAN RECORD ONLY THAT I REVIEWED WITH HIS MAJESTY AND HIS ADVISORS THE STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO THE ADVICE OF HIS MAJESTY, THAT WE TAKE, ALWAYS, EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY. WE ALSO REVIEWED BILATERAL RELATIONS AND OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST. THE TALKS WERE WARM, FRIENDLY, AND CONSTRUCTIVE. AND MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE RECEPTION WE HAVE HAD. (END QUOTE)

YAMANI: (BEGIN QUOTE) WELL, EVERY TIME WE RECEIVE OUR FRIEND, DR. KISSINGER, HE LEAVES WITH US MORE CONFIDENCE

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E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: OVIP: (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INTERVIEW WITH THE SECOND NATIONAL GERMAN TELEVISION (ZDF) ON FEB 16, 1975.

1. FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SUBJECT INTERVIEW TO BE BROAD AST AT 1900 HRS BONN TIME (1300) EST) SUNDAY, FEB 16, 1975:

QUOTE: QUESTION: HAVE YOU MADE PROGRESS IN PURSUITE OF YOUR POLICIES IN THE NEAR EAST?

SECRETARY: I THINK THAT MY TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST OUTLINED THE MAIN POSITIONS WITH A MUCH

GREATER PRECISION THAN I HAD UNDERSTOOD THEM BEFORE.

IT INDICATED THE DIFFICULTIES, BUT IT ALSO INDICATED THE POSSIBILITY, AND THEREFORE, I SHALL RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST WITHIN A FEW WEEKS WITH HOPE THAT SOME PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.

QUESTION: HAS YOUR TRIP PLACED YOU IN A GOOD POSITION FOR YOUR TALK WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN REGARD TO IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

SECRETARY: THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT A FINAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION, COOPERATION AND POSSIBLE GUARANTEE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND I WILL TALK TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO THIS EVENING IN THAT SPIRIT. WE HAVE BOTH TAKEN TRIPS TO THE AREA, AND WE WILL EXCHANGE IDEAS AND WE WILL DO SO FROM THE ATTITUDE, CERTAINLY ON THE AMERICAN SIDE, THAT GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ARE AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF OUR POLICY.

*WHSR COMMENT

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 25, 1975

No. 103

#49

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will go straight to the questions. Mr. Davis?

Q Mr. Secretary, the reports coming from Cambodia and Viet-Nam are becoming very bleak. One of your top aides estimates only two more months of survival for Cambodia if they do not receive supplemental assistance. The question is: What good would further supplemental assistance be when so many billions in past assistance has not helped; and, secondly, what is your appraisal on a new American peace initiative that might stop the fighting?

A Let me first separate the problem in Cambodia from the problem in Viet-Nam. In Cambodia, we have an

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immediate emergency. We have a situation where, if a supplemental is not voted within the next few weeks, it is certain that Cambodia must fall because it will run out of ammunition. Therefore, the decision before us is whether the United States will withhold ammunition from a country which has been associated with us and which, clearly, ~~is~~ to defend itself. This is a serious responsibility to take.

With respect to Viet-Nam, we are facing a more long-term situation of the same order. The long-term problem in Viet-Nam is this: throughout the period of the American involvement in Viet-Nam and during the negotiations that were going on, it was never suggested that Viet-Nam would be able to stand by itself without American assistance. The argument at that time was to withdraw American military forces and to enable Viet-Nam, without assistance, to stand on its own. There are many situations in the world which have no outcome as long as there are neighbors that continue to pursue aggressive designs.

If you go around the world and ask whether the United States can give support only where there is a clear

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terminal point, there will be many countries that will
be in the most severe jeopardy.

Now, in Cambodia the situation is imminently
critical. In Viet-Nam, the situation will be critical
over a long period of time if we do not give adequate
support. If we do give adequate support, then there is
the possibility of Viet-Nam defending itself.

With respect to negotiations, the United States
has engaged in, and is supporting now, efforts at
negotiations both in Cambodia and Viet-Nam. It has
been our experience, however, that negotiations cannot
be a substitute for a situation on the ground but that
they will reflect a situation on the ground. And, therefore,
we have urged the Congress to look at the problem, recognizing
the many pressures to which they are exposed -- recognizing
that the American people may well be tired of many years
of exertions, but keeping in mind also that sometimes to
give in to the mood of the moment may lead to profound
regrets later on.

And I would also like to say that this debate,
which is a rather solemn one, should be conducted without
reference to motives -- which seems to become so much
of a staple of the Viet-Nam debate.

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Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you a question which appears to concern not only the relations with the subcontinent of India but the detente between the United States and Russia -- if you could put it in that context -- and that is the somewhat bitter criticism that India has made at the decision to lift the 10-year-old arms embargo out there, and the allegations that this would start an arms race and the implication that you somehow are guilty of bad faith in this whole thing.

A I think there are two types of comments that have been made from India. One is the comments of the Indian Ambassador in Washington; and the second, the statement of the Foreign Minister of India in the Indian Parliament.

We believe that the statement of the Foreign Minister is restrained and statesmanlike and continues the basis for the improving relationship that has characterized Indian-American relations in recent months.

The statements made yesterday by the Ambassador are unacceptable.

Now, with respect to the relationship between India and the United States: in a speech in New Delhi last

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October, I pointed out that India, because of its size and its position, has a special role in South Asia which the United States recognizes.

I have also pointed out that the United States has no interest and will not support or engage in an arms race in South Asia.

We maintain both of these statements. It seemed to us, however, that to maintain an embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship, while its neighbor was producing and acquiring nearly a billion dollars' worth of arms a year, was morally, politically and symbolically improper.

I repeat: the decision to lift the arms embargo does not mean that the United States will engage in a massive supply of arms to Pakistan or that the United States will engage in arms deliveries that can affect the underlying strategic balance. But it seemed to us an anomaly to embargo one country in the area, to be the only country in the world to be embargoing this country, when its neighbor was not exercising a comparable restraint. But, even with this, we will not engage in massive deliveries

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of arms.

And, secondly, we place great stress on the improving relationship with India. We maintain all the principles that we have asserted with respect to India; and we believe that with wisdom and statesmanship on both sides, the natural friendship between these two great democracies can not only be maintained but be strengthened. This is certainly our attitude.

Q Are you going to ask for the recall of the Ambassador who made the unacceptable remarks?

A No, we will not ask for his recall.

Q Mr. Secretary, in recent months the Administration has been conducting foreign policy in one way, in one manner, and Congress has been conducting foreign policy in another. And wherever there appears to be a conflict, Congress usually wins. How are you adjusting to this reality?

A Well, it is inherent in our system that the Congress, having the power of the purse, can impose its will. I believe that in a conflict between the Executive and the Legislative, neither side wins. I believe, as I pointed out in Los Angeles, that it is imperative for a

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new consensus to develop on American foreign policy because nobody wins these conflicts.

The difficulties have arisen for a variety of reasons: the effects of Watergate; the internal changes in the Congress; the legacy of many years, in which Congress feels that perhaps the Executive had been granted too wide-ranging authority.

We are prepared to work out a new relationship with the Congress to avoid these conflicts. We believe that is essential in the national interest. And we believe that there can only be an American foreign policy, not an Executive or a Legislative foreign policy.

Q I'd like to follow up. Are you prepared to take Congress into your confidence on the initiation of foreign policy from the outset, or will you continue to put --

A Mr. O'Leary, I think there is a misconception about the degree of Congressional consultation that has previously taken place. Since I've become Secretary of State, I have met in 17 months -- I've testified over 40 times before Congressional committees, met over 25 times with Congressional groups outside the formal

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testimony and over 75 times with informal Congressional
groups.

The difficulties exist, in part, because the
nature of Congressional leadership has also changed
in the recent year so that the traditional relationship
between the Executive and the Legislative, exercised
through the organized leadership of the Congress, has
to be modified so that there is a more wide-ranging
consultation than previously.

I'm prepared to undertake this, and I have been
in touch with various Congressional groups and various
Senatorial groups asking for their advice -- with whom
it is possible to consult, and in what manner -- in order
to achieve this partnership.

The question of advance consultation is easy.
Of course we will do this.

In the past, my practice has been, before every
trip, to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to tell
them about what I was planning to do and to report to
them within a week of my return. I recognize that these
forums are no longer sufficient and that a wider range must

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be found.

I have been meeting regularly, for example -- I plan to meet regularly; I've met twice -- with a group headed by Congressman Fraser that is particularly interested in the problem of human rights. But it is partly a question of Congressional organization as well; and I'm prepared, and the Administration is prepared, to work this out in a cooperative spirit and with the attitude that "of course we will consult ahead of time."

But there are also some matters that must be left to the Executive, with full knowledge of the Congress, but the day-to-day tactics are very difficult to handle by Congressional decisions.

PR #1C3

10.

Q Mr. Secretary; if I understood your previous answer correctly, you were saying that as long as North Viet-Nam continues its aggressive policy, the United States should give a billion or a billion and a half dollars a year to South Viet-Nam and Cambodia in aid in an open-ended way. One, is that correct; and, two, what would be the consequences if Cambodia did fall, or if South Viet-Nam did fall?

A As I pointed out, I made a distinction between the situation in Cambodia and the situation in Viet-Nam.

In Cambodia, as I have pointed out, we face an immediately critical situation. What will be the consequences if Viet-Nam and Cambodia did fall? It is a debate which has been going on for a long time. I believe, and the Administration believes, that if Viet-Nam falls as a result of an American decision to cut off its aid that this will have, over a period of time, the most serious consequences for the conduct of our foreign policy. This will not be immediately apparent, but over a period of years it must raise the gravest doubts in the minds of many countries that have been associated with us, or of many countries to which the threat cannot be given a terminal

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Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the statement in an interview by Syrian President Assad that he would be willing to sign a formal peace treaty is helpful to your step-by-step approach? And if I may just follow that up with one question, do you necessarily exclude an additional step after the one that you are about to leave on, on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel?

A I think the statement by Syria that it is willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel is a major step forward. I remember the first time I visited Syria in December 1973, the newspapers reported that the Secretary of State arrived from occupied territory-- "occupied territory" at that time being Tel Aviv. So I think that this is a hopeful sign.

With respect to negotiations between Syria and Israel, we have always believed that a peace, to be lasting, must involve all the fronts and must involve a general settlement, and I am certain that Israel shares this view.

Q Mr. Kissinger, the United States has been involved for some time now in the efforts to achieve a settlement on Cyprus. Can you tell us where you think those efforts are now, and what the possibilities are for reconvening a negotiating session between the two sides?

PR #103

A Well, it is important to remember that the communal talks only began effectively on January 14th, so that there were only three weeks of negotiations before the aid cut-off to Turkey that led to an interruption of these negotiations.

The United States strongly supports these communal talks. The United States has offered all the assistance it can to the parties to bring about a settlement that all parties can live with. We believe that progress is possible. It is our impression, based on very frequent exchanges, that it will be very difficult for the United States to play a useful role in Ankara as long as the aid cut-off continues. And therefore we have urged the Congress to give us the possibility to continue these negotiations by suspending the aid cut-off.

In addition, I have to stress that aid to Turkey and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean transcends the Cyprus problem, and that the security of the eastern Mediterranean is being jeopardized by the cut-off of aid to Turkey.

But with respect to the Cyprus negotiations, we favor the resumption of these negotiations, with or

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without the resumption of aid.

We strongly support a settlement, but our own
influence is being weakened by the aid cut-off.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been some reports
that the request by the Ethiopian Government for ammunition
was on the point of being accepted by the U.S. Government.
Can you comment on that?

A Well, I read an article today that said that
tomorrow there will be a meeting of the Washington Special
Action Group which will make a decision. The Washington
Special Action Group doesn't make decisions. It analyzes
options and submits them to the President for consideration.

The issue that is presented to us by the Ethiopian
request is that we have had a military relationship with
Ethiopia since 1953. The Eritrean rebellion or independence
movement has been going on since 1962. And the
United States takes no position on the merits of the
particular conflict.

The problem that we have to decide is whether a
country whose military establishment has been based on
American arms should be cut off from support at the precise
moment that it most needs it. It is a difficult decision

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for us, and we have not come close to making it. And
tomorrow's meeting is not to make a decision. Tomorrow's
meeting is to sort out what the issues are. Mr. Kraft.

Q Mr. Secretary, a major issue in the various
energy proposals that are being surfaced now is that some
of them propose restricting imports by a tariff -- imports
of petroleum -- and others propose restricting imports by
a quota.

From the foreign policy standpoint, which of
those two avenues does the Department favor, and why?

A Well, the Department has not been formally
asked to take a stand on the difference between a tariff
and a quota.

The basic position of the Department, from a
foreign policy point of view, is that conservation of a
certain quantity is essential in order to achieve the
long-term objective of our energy policy. And within the
International Energy Agency the United States has supported
goals to which it must make a major contribution that would
achieve those general objectives.

Obviously, as a member of the Cabinet, I support
the President's energy plan. I have not personally studied

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the quota proposal, and therefore I don't feel that I
should comment on that.

Of the plans that I have seen, at the time that they
were being considered, it seemed to me that the fee system
seemed the most efficient.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions on U.S.-Soviet
relations. Are U.S.-Soviet relations impaired by the
breakdown of the trade agreement? And, secondly, are there
new obstacles to a SALT agreement in the verification
negotiations?

A The state of Soviet-American relations
is that in the political negotiations that are now going
on, and in the arms control negotiations that are going on,
progress is about what one would have expected.

The SALT negotiations are in a very preliminary
phase, and therefore it is too early to tell whether there
are any unusual obstacles. My impression is that they are
going along in a normal way, but it is a little too early
to make a conclusive judgment.

The difficulty that is caused by the interruption
of the economic relationship, or by the jeopardizing of the
economic relationship, is that the political relations

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must carry a perhaps undue burden, and that therefore the incentives for restraint that might otherwise exist in particular negotiations are being weakened. So, in the long term, I feel that the removal of the economic pillar of our relationship cannot but weaken the long-term trends of detente. In the immediate present, it has not yet visibly happened.

Q What are your plans for repairing the damage?

A Well, I have had preliminary discussions with members of the Senate and the House to see what the Congressional attitude would be. I also had some preliminary discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko when we met in Geneva. I think we should move carefully and thoughtfully in order to avoid another misunderstanding arising between the two branches of our government, and between our government and the Soviet Union.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of reports in recent weeks that you might consider resigning by the end of the year to avoid becoming a focal point of a partisan debate as the '76 campaign gets underway. Are these reports correct?

A I think this is a permanent story that appears every year. I believe that one's service should be tied

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to the period in which one can be useful, and that is a
decision that has to be made largely by the President.
And I have not made any such decision as these reports indi-
cate.

Q Mr. Secretary, it was reported after your
recent meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
Geneva that he raised the possibility at this meeting of an
accord to limit arms to the Middle East.

Are the Russians prepared to cooperate in re-
straining the flow of arms to the Middle East? And if so,
are we going to talk to them about it?

A Well, I do not believe that this report
is exactly accurate. But, in principle, the United States
has been willing to discuss the principle of a limitation of
the flow of arms into the Middle East. Given the inter-
connection, however, of the Arab world, one now would have
to draw the line rather widely, and one could not confine
the limitation of arms imports only to the states neighboring
Israel; but one would have to include all the states that
could possibly transfer their arms into areas where a con-
frontation might be possible. But as part of a settlement,
we would be prepared to explore this, yes.

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18

Q What is the Russian view towards that
possibility?

A As I understand the Soviet view, they are
prepared to discuss this as part of an over-all settlement.
They are not prepared to discuss it at the moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, of the vast amount of aid we
have sent to Southeast Asia, and our own involvement, why
would any country in the world ever have grave doubts about
American commitments?

A Because if the collapse of Southeast Asia
is caused by an American decision to withhold aid under
conditions in which such a decision can have only one
outcome, the conclusion will be inevitable that it was the
United States which has the responsibility. There is no
possible way that Viet-Nam can acquire the arms that are
needed to defend itself until its economy has reached a
point where perhaps there is sufficient surplus from oil
income or other economic developments. And there are many
other countries in the world that find themselves in
analogous circumstances.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it reasonable to talk
about any finite period of time -- the three years, for

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example, that has been suggested by the Administration?

A It is the second-best course. Very often, in these exchanges between the Executive and the Legislative, one is driven into positions which reflect the best that may be attainable. There is an argument that can be made that if aid is continued for three years at a sufficiently high level that at that period the economy of Viet-Nam could develop to a point where it would have enough surplus revenues to pay for the import of arms by itself.

I have seen these arguments. They seem plausible to me, and I would support them. I must say, quite candidly, that the preferable course is to go the route that I indicated. But, if necessary, we will accept a three-year term with adequate sums.

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Q Mr. Secretary, when you were in Israel on this last trip you said that Israel couldn't be expected to give up its territory without a *quid pro quo*. Did you come away from your talks with President Sadat feeling that he acknowledges this principle?

A The fact that I am returning to the Middle East indicates that I believe there is a chance to implement this principle, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, following up on that, do you think that it will be necessary for there to be American guarantees for the next stage of the disengagement?

A No. The question of an American guarantee can arise only in connection with a final settlement, and then not as a substitute for a final settlement but as a backup position to enhance the security of the parties.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow that, if I may, briefly, do you have in mind something that would have to be ratified by the Congress, a treaty?

A Well, I have not any specific idea in mind, but it has been axiomatic in all the discussions about peace in the Middle East that a final settlement would have to have some sort of a guarantee. Some people have suggested a Soviet-American guarantee. Others have suggested a

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Security Council guarantee. Others have suggested a
unilateral American guarantee. All that I have suggested
is that the United States is studying the problem of what
guarantees would be adequate for a final settlement, I
repeat, not as a substitute for the sense of security and
justice of the parties concerned, but as a reinforcement of it
once the negotiation has been concluded.

It is inconceivable to me that there could be any
American participation in a guarantee that did not have the
full support of the Congress of the United States. By what
means that is achieved would depend on the nature of the
guarantee and on the commitments that it would involve.
But there does not yet exist an Administration position
either on the nature of the guarantee or on the commitment;
nor have we had any discussions with the Israeli Government.
All I indicated is that this is a subject we are studying
within our Government, as we are duty-bound to do in the
process of moving towards a final peace.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you speak of a *quid pro quo*, would that be expressed at this step or at some future stage? And secondly, would it be something directly given to Israel by Egypt or indirectly? And indeed, if it's indirect is that a *quid pro quo*?

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A Well, I think that Israel has to be the judge of what it considers an adequate arrangement. And that is not for me to say at this moment. It stands to reason that a settlement is not possible until both sides are satisfied with it. It is also clear that Israel being a democracy, any agreement that is made must have visible parts that can be presented to the Israeli domestic opinion and to the Israeli Parliament.

What combination of direct and indirect assurances will be given must be left to the process of negotiation. But it goes without saying that any settlement to have any meaning must be acceptable to both parties.

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back for a moment to the Viet-Nam problem and the grave doubts that you referred to. You seem to be saying that it is more important for the United States to enjoy credibility abroad than to have credibility at home.

A No. I'm saying that the security of the United States and the security of the many countries in the world that depend on the United States is a matter of the gravest importance to the American people as well. And I, therefore, believe that however painful the discussions, however anguished the experiences, that the American people

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over a period of time will recognize that this distinction
cannot be made.

I am as subject to the correspondence as many of
the members of the Congress. It is my belief that those
who are responsible for national policy are accountable not
only for the moment but for how it will look several years
from now. And three to five years from now when the
consequences are apparent I believe that there will be no
distinction between credibility at home and credibility
abroad.

Q Mr. Secretary, in a series of uncomplimentary remarks about you by former associates of President Nixon, how do you account for these comments? Do you think it's a concerted effort? And what's your reaction to what Mr. Safire and Mr. Colson have been saying about you?

A Well, I think the two individuals you
mentioned represent different phenomena. I don't believe
it is a concerted effort. And in the case of one of them
I don't believe that what is being said today is any
different from what was being said when we were colleagues.
(Laughter)

Q Mr. Secretary, when in Geneva you talked with
Foreign Minister Gromyko. You talked about the European

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Conference too. From here it looks as if the European
Security Conference might be wound up this summer, not
so much because of the results it will achieve but because
many of the participants are impatient now to wind it up.

I would like to ask you what your view is of the
timetable. Is there any chance of any firm link with
progress in the MBFR talks?

A Well, it is my impression that the overwhelming
majority of our European allies is opposed to having any
linkage between the European Security Conference and the
force reduction talks, and therefore this is not an issue
that is likely to arise.

As far as the timetable is concerned, the United
States favors -- as do all the other participants -- an
expeditious conclusion of the Conference. The issues have
become so abstruse and esoteric, reaching sometimes such
issues as the placement of a comma, that it is hard to
explain all of the issues that are now before the
Conference. And I wouldn't want to speculate in what month
there will be a conclusion. The United States will support
a rapid conclusion of the Conference.

Q Mr. Secretary, 'could you bring us up to date
on the U.S. base agreements with Spain and Portugal? Are

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we being asked to vacate Torrejon? And how do we stand
with the U.S. base in the Azores?

A. Well, these negotiations are conducted, as you know, by the new Assistant Secretary for Congressional Liaison.* We have not been asked to vacate any of the Spanish bases. And, therefore, this report seems to us at least premature. In fact, it seems to us inaccurate. The discussion has concerned mostly what sort of security assurances the United States might give Spain in return for the continuation of its bases in Spain.

With respect to the Azores, we have not been asked to vacate the base in the Azores. The agreement has not yet been renewed, but under the agreement we can maintain our base there until a new agreement has been made or it is clear that no agreement can be made.

Q. Could I just follow that up? The security arrangements that Spain is asking for, is that the sort of thing that you mean other countries will begin to doubt if an American decision lets Viet-Nam and Cambodia go down the tube?

A. I was talking about the general ability of other countries to rely on the word of the United States or on the ability of the United States to bring about the
* (Ambassador Robert McCloskey, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations)

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the security of those countries that rely on it. This has serious consequences. I know it is fashionable to sneer at the word "domino theory." I think this is a very grave matter on which serious people have had a divided opinion. And we've been torn apart by the Viet-Nam War long enough. But I do not believe we can escape this problem by assuming the responsibility of condemning those who have dealt with us to a certain destruction.

The answer to your question is, yes, this is one of the things. But I was talking of a more general problem.

Q More specifically, the country that's most often discussed in the context of American security is Israel. Do you think Israel perhaps is exempt from this problem because of support in Congress?

A I do not think it is appropriate for me to go around the world asking which countries would be particularly threatened by this attitude. I would say that the questions that are now being asked can be applied to almost any country as far as terminal date is concerned, as far as the end process is concerned. I do not want to apply it to any particular country. And it is, of course, clear that there has been a special relationship between Israel and the United States that can withstand strains

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that other relationships might not be able to withstand.
But it is not a trivial matter.

Q Mr. Secretary, within the spirit of meaningful
detente why haven't you put more pressure on the Russians
and the Chinese not to supply Hanoi so abundantly?

A First of all, I am constantly being asked
why don't we bring pressure here, bring pressure there,
as if the word "pressure" had a concrete significance.
When you ask about pressure, you have to ask yourself
what concretely the United States can do, what is the "or
else" that we are threatening.

Secondly, it has been our policy throughout not
to turn these issues into public confrontations on the
theory that countries can go along more easily if it is
not turned into a public confrontation. I believe that the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China know what
our view of this matter is. I think it is also important
to point out that the scale of the North Vietnamese
offensive in the South is not only related to the amount
of arms that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
are supplying, it is also related to the fact that, now
that there is no longer any interdiction and that the
communications system has been improved so enormously,

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almost the entire input into North Viet-Nam can be moved
rapidly to South Viet-Nam together with all of the stockpiles
that existed at the end of the war.

Q Mr. Secretary, this morning in New York City the Anti-Defamation League charged that the Army Corps of Engineers is using discriminatory practices by requiring individuals applying for work on projects in Arab countries to state their religion. Would you comment on that, and also state what the Administration's policy is and attitudes are on U.S. private investment in Arab countries?

A I do not know about this particular charge.

And I do not know about the particular practice of the Army Corps of Engineers, which is a question which should be addressed to the Defense Department. I know, however, that the basic policy of the Administration is totally opposed to discrimination in any form.

As far as the Department of State is concerned, for which I am responsible, I know that officers are assigned without regard to race or religion, and that we don't even know their race or religion in making the assignments.

With respect to the U.S. policy of investment in Arab countries, the United States basically favors it. The United States is strongly opposed to any discriminatory

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practices by the recipient countries as to the firms that
might do business. And we are looking into the legal
remedies that may exist, together with whatever moral
influence we can bring to bear on the banking and other
communities to abolish discrimination, which we consider
reprehensible.

Q Is the Chase Manhattan Bank one of those
corporations that are being looked into?

A We are not looking into particular corporations.
We are looking into the general problem that has been
brought to our attention of discrimination against particular
firms or banking houses. And we have not yet reached a
conclusion either as to the remedies that are available to
us or whether there are any particular offending firms.

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Q Mr. Secretary, in your earlier responses on
the future of Indochina, you dwelled mostly on South Viet-
Nam. Is there anything more hopeful that can be looked
to in Cambodia, apart from staving off collapse?

A We would do our utmost in Cambodia, if
collapse can be staved off, to promote a negotiation.
And it is difficult to know whether such a negotiation is
possible.

We have, over the past year, made major efforts
to promote a compromise settlement, which it would be wrong
to detail now. We would continue these efforts, but I
will not make any misleading statements as to what is
possible. I am putting the issue: whether the United
States wants to take the responsibility of cutting off
ammunition at this particular moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, I didn't quite understand
your answer to Mr. Gwertzman's question.

Were you saying that the Congress might now,
indeed, take a harder look at providing military aid to
Israel?

A I do not want to be put into
a position in which I am asserting that the lessons of

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Viet-Nam are going to be applied in any particular area.
I see no evidence that the Congress is applying a
harder look to aid to Israel now, and I am not bringing
these two matters into a relationship.

Q Mr. Secretary, will you comment on the foreign
policy implications of the tariff, versus the quota, with
particular reference to the suggestion that one would be
indiscriminate and the other might be used selectively?

A I have really not thought this particular
issue through, and I will make sure that our Spokesman
will say something about it during the week.

Q Mr. Secretary, a related question:

You are reported at continuing cross purposes
with the Treasury Department on international oil policy.
Is there an "Administration" policy or is it a "Kissinger"
policy?

And is there going to be a consumer-producer
conference in March?

A First, the speech that I delivered-- on
I believe it was February 3rd -- was done at the request of
the President. It was approved in all its particulars by
the President. It was gone over by the White House officials

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that are responsible for economic policy. It was gone
over by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury -- the
Secretary of the Treasury being out of the country, in
England, on that particular weekend. The speech on
February 3rd reflected the views of the President and
reflected the views of the Administration.

Since then, and I have had occasion to review
this whole matter with the President again this morning,
there is no question that the United States supports a
guaranteed price for alternative sources of energy.

Whether this price is achieved by subsidy or
by tariff, or by some other method, is a matter for
negotiation and is, indeed, a matter which we would leave
to the decision of each country. And as far as the
Department of State is concerned, we have no particular
interest in how this guaranteed price is achieved -- as
long as it is achieved.

It is our conviction that without such a guaranteed
price, there will not be a sufficient investment in alternative
sources -- that without an investment in alternative sources,
even if there is a break in prices temporarily, that break
in prices will only serve to increase the dependence of the

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consumers on the producers, and make them even more subject
to a rapid increase in prices.

So the official policy of the Administration,
the President's policy, is to have a guaranteed price.
The method by which this price is achieved is to be left
to each country and is a matter on which no final decision
has been taken in this country. But this is a totally
secondary issue.

The primary issue is whether the United States
favors a guaranteed price -- and I can only repeat --
when it was proposed, it was the policy of the President;
and when it is reiterated today, it is the policy of the
President.

And therefore, I don't know what conflict you
are talking about.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q There were two other elements there.

A That's right. Excuse me, I'm sorry, I
didn't answer the question.

On the consumer-producer conference, there will
be another meeting of the IEA early in March, in which

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we believe that progress will be made on the alternative
sources.

Once this progress has been achieved, we believe
that the essential prerequisites for a preparatory meeting
of consumers and producers may be met, and we, therefore,
think that good progress is being made towards a consumer-
producer preparatory meeting -- if not in March, shortly
afterwards.

Q Thank you very much.

[Whereupon the briefing was concluded at 12:50 p.m.]