therefore, no body of experience on which to draw. To a considerable extent the impact of the new weapons on strategy, on policy, indeed on survival depends on our interpretation of their significance.

## II

It is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy. Whether the goals of a state are offensive or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve a transformation or to prevent it, its strategic doctrine must be able to define what objectives are worth contending for and to develop the degree of force appropriate for them. As a status-quo power the basic strategic problem for the United States is to be clear about what strategic transformations we are prepared to resist. The crucial test of our strategic doctrine is therefore what it defines as a threat.

In assessing what transformations to resist, our strategic doctrine has been inhibited, however, by the seeming lessons of our history, our concept of power and the complexity and the enormity of the new weapons. We have confused the security conferred by two great oceans with the normal pattern of international relations, we have overlooked that concepts of aggression developed in a period of relative may become dangerously inadequate in the face of the contemporary challenge, safety, when our margin of safety is constantly shrinking. A power

safety, when our merger of safety is constantly shrinking. A power

may power gradually in the face of the contemporary challenge
overlooked that concepts of abnegation developed in a period of relative

occurs with the normal bater of international relations, we have
the new weapons. We have confused the security concern by two great
histories, our concept of power and the complexity and the enmity of
docility has been inhibited, however, by the seeming reason of our

we are prepared to resist. The crucial test of our strategic doctrine
United States is what we want to be clear about what strategic transformations
for them. As a status-quo power the basic strategic problem for the
worth contending for and to develop the degree of force appropriate
it, its strategic doctrine must be able to define what objectives are
or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve a transformation or to prevent
belligerent.

II

on arrival debues on our interpretation of their significance.

extent the impact of the new weapons on strategy, on policy, indeed
therefore, no body of experience on which to draw. To a considerable

favored by geography or by a great material superiority, as we have been
through most of our history, can afford to let a threat become unambigu-
ous before it engages in war; And the most unambiguous threat is overt
military aggression. It can do so, long as the issue of a war cannot be
decided against it by a single battle, or by the loss of an objective
located outside its territory which would cause national catastrophe, such
as the loss of Middle East oil for Western Europe. A nation which does
not have this margin of safety, whose fate, instead, depends on the first
battle and not the last, is forced to conduct a more precautionary policy.
It cannot risk permitting a potential enemy to alter significantly the
balance of forces, for to the degree that the equilibrium is disturbed,
it surrenders control over its security, indeed over its survival. A
precautionary policy resists the change in the balance, even if this
change is not put to any immediately hostile use.

As long as the European Powers dominated world affairs, any accre-
tion in the strength of one of them led to an ever-wider circle of ad-
justments, either until all nations had followed suit and made an equiva-
lent gain, or until the old balance was restored by depriving the just
Power of its spoils through war.

Power of its abode through war.

Tent again, or until the old balance was restored by depriving the just
justments either until all nations had followed suit and made an adjuv-
tion in the strength of one of them led to an ever-wider circle of ad-
As long as the European Powers dominated world affairs, any accretion

As long as the European Powers dominated world affairs, any accretion
change is not but to any immediately hostile use.

Precautionary policy restates the change in the balance, even if this
it amends control over its security. Indeed over its arrival. A
balance of forces, for to the degree that the edulprium is disturbed...
It cannot risk permitting a potential enemy to alter significantly the
battle and not the last, is forced to conduct a more precautionary policy.
not have this margin of safety, whose fate, instead, depends on the first
as the loss of Middle East oil for Western Europe. A nation which does
located outside its territory which would cause national catastrophe, and
decided against it by a single battle, or by the loss of an objective
military aggression. It can do so long as the frame of a war cannot be
one before it engages in war. And the most unambiguous threat is overt
through most of our history, can afford to let a threat become unambigu-
favored by geography or by a great material superiority, as we have been

21a

This strong resistance to seemingly minor changes in the balance of power tends to appear as petty and a contributing cause of war to a less exposed nation, as is demonstrated by the traditional U.S. reaction to European diplomacy.