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# SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TESTIMONY

## Introductory Note

The following is drawn from articles published in The Washington Post on August 19th and in The New York Post on September 25th and November 6th. It is intended to focus discussion rather than serve as a full discussion.

## Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is--were prepared to do in concert; or it could take the lead in opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal burden.

NOV. 26 '90 18:08 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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The Administration ~~must~~ have concluded that anything other than a leadership role for the United States would have ended with making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and led to the collapse of the moderate governments in the region including Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role, President Bush made another crucial decision. The American military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They ~~must~~ have concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if necessary.

In short, early in America's involvement there was some argument as to whether American vital interests justified a massive deployment in the Gulf. That debate has since been

NOV. 26 '90 18:09 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

3

overtaken by the scale of our deployment and the number of
countries that have followed America's leadership in the Gulf.

The perception of American failure would shake international
stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be
gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not
survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of
radicalism and fundamentalism.

The fundamental question therefore is what are we trying to achieve?

## Current situation: Sanctions or Military Action?

The United States is approaching the point in the Middle
East crisis where a choice must be made.

According to official pronouncements, the UN goals are to be
achieved by sanctions leading to negotiations if possible but, as
a last recourse, by military means.

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The two approaches have been presented as if they were successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove mutually exclusive because by the time it is evident that sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will probably no longer exist.

To achieve the proclaimed objectives by sanctions, at least five hurdles must be overcome:

* The sanctions must bite.

* They must be maintained throughout any negotiations.

* Once the UN terms are achieved, arms control objectives must be addressed.

* The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically and diplomatically during the entire course of the negotiations.

* There must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesion.

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President Francois Mitterrand has suggested that as soon as
Iraq accepts the principle of withdrawal--in other words, before
it actually withdraws--its grievances against Kuwait could be
negotiated. Primakov?

The common feature of all these schemes is that they weaken
the military option by consuming time, exact no penalty for
aggression, looting a country or taking hostages, and leave as
the only disputed issue the extent of the aggressor's gains.

And having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of
the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make
concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms
control negotiation.

To be fair, many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations
that sanctions will not solve but will achieve a tolerance of
recognize this dilemma. They propose to protect a settlement by
a new regional security system based on a significant American
military presence in Saudi Arabia.

NOV. 26 '90 18:12 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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I consider this a dangerous mirage. If, after the adamant pronouncements from Washington and the deployment of a large expeditionary force, the stated US objectives could not be reached, no Gulf state would easily entrust its fate to a long-term American presence.

The often-heard argument that America proved its staying power in Korea and Europe misses the point. The issue in Arabia is not American staying power but the host country's domestic stability.

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to domestic stability; in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

A substantial American ground establishment would soon become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. Once Iraq has faced down US and UN terms, such a force would sooner or later become hostage to revolutionary Iraq, fundamentalist Iran and events substantially out of our control.

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In short, the route of sanctions and the military option can be pursued up to a certain point simultaneously. At some point, however, trying to pursue both courses will turn into an evasion incompatible with reaching our stated objectives. At that point the US must choose a strategy appropriate to its objectives or else choose objectives achievable by whatever policy we are willing to implement.

DECISION TIME IN THE GULF

FROM the initial deployment of U.S. forces to the skillful weaving of international support, the management of the Gulf crisis by the Bush administration has been flawless.

But foreign policy is remembered for its end games, not the opening moves. And the most difficult decisions remain to be made.

Too many commentators are reducing these choices to either a quick strike or successful sanctions. But no serious person favors military action for its own sake; a solution through sanctions would clearly be preferable.

At the same time, rhetoric will not determine whether sanctions will depend on Iraqi stockpiles of critical supplies and on the impact of shortages on Iraqi morale. That particular assessment must be made by intelligence experts.

But laymen can ask whether, assuming sanctions can be made, they will be sustained by the international community, especially among the democratic countries.

Sanctions are designed to impose hardship. Iraq's people have been habilitated to hardship by a decade of conflict. It is thus possible that only a successful food blockade will work.

But what is the tolerance of democratic publics for television and other media depictions of starving women and children?

Yet any "humanitarian" shipment providing significant relief would undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions and contribute to a stalemate.

FOR economic and political reasons, I doubt a stalemate can be sustained either by our associates or by the United States for many months.

The rise in oil prices has already reduced growth projections in the industrial democracies by 1 percent and greatly increased the danger of inflation.

A cold winter or sabotage in Gulf oil fields would magnify this rise in oil prices. And the more prices increase, the more oil inventories will be hoarded, accelerating the vicious spiral.

No one can know at what oil price support for sanctions would erode. But it would be reckless to ignore the prospect.

On the political front, a prolonged stalemate is likely to undermine the domestic stability of our Arab associates.

Large numbers of foreign forces on Saudi soil — however well-meaning — must be grating to a population carefully shielded heretofore from contact with the outside world. As time passes, radical propaganda labeling foreigners as occupiers will become increasingly plausible. Harassment and sabotage will mount — as was the case with the American forces in Lebanon in 1982-83.

The same factor that led to the rapid American deployment — the need to sustain moderate governments in the Gulf — makes it imperative to create the right conditions for an equally rapid withdrawal.

The key decision before the administration is thus to define what constitutes a tolerable outcome.

But this is muddled in too much of the current debate, which treats diplomacy as a self-contained exercise equated with compromise and with saving the other side's face. Yet these slogans drawn from the experience of a society that has rarely known irreconcilable differences, are not relevant to Saddam's Iraq.

IRAQ'S use of hostages is without precedent.

When hostages were first taken two decades ago, the culprits were outlaw groups not avowed even by the governments that encouraged them. Terrorism then evolved into tacit government support targeted mostly on government personnel.

Saddam has now escalated tovert actions by a head state against thousands of innocent civilians from all over the world, most of whom had not even resided in Iraq.

In these circumstances, saving Iraq's face is the exact opposite of what is needed. For it would enable Saddam to claim some gain from his aggression; the goal of Gulf strategy must be to demonstrate its failure.

The test of that demonstration will not be the cleverness of formulas put forward in columns and talk shows but how the outcome is perceived by actual or potential盟盟。

Early in America's involvement there was some argument as to whether American vital interests justified the deployment in the Gulf. I believe the administration was correct in continuing the policy of two prede-

cessors from both major parties, which commits America to preventing the domination of the Gulf by a hostile nation.

In any event, that debate has since been overtaken by the scale of our deployment and the number of countries that have followed America's leadership in the Gulf.

This international support can only be due to two factors: The other nations either agree with the American analysis of the need to stop the Iraq aggression, or they consider whatever reservations they have to be outweighed by their need for America's long-term support.

The perception of American failure would therefore shake international stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of radicalism and fundamentalism.

PRESIDENT Bush was right in insisting — and the Helsinki commune with Gorbechev in reaffirming — that no compromise of the U.N. resolutions is possible, namely Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, unconditional release of all hostages and restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.

Any modification of these terms would amount to an Iraqi gain and a defeat for the United States and its associates.

It is important to keep this argument in view of the facile argument that the United States must not run risks on behalf of the emir of Kuwait.

By insisting on a restoration of pre-invasion conditions, neither the United Nations nor the United States is passing judgment on the emir's qualities. They are asserting that the most representative regime in the region does not have the right to sit in judgment over the domestic legitimacy of its neighbors.

Indeed, from an analytical point of view the U.N. terms already represent a compromise with what is really needed for the peace of the area and with what is compatible with the massive international deployment.

(Were Saddam suddenly to accept the U.N. terms, he would in fact preserve the essence of his power, although it would represent a huge loss of prestige for him.)

Such an outcome would be as understandable as it would be precarious. It must be entered into — if at all — with the knowledge that it would require a much higher degree of continued vigilance and a larger American presence in the area than is basically desirable.

Reducing Iraq's disproportionate military capacity is especially important if U.S. forces are to be withdrawn rapidly from the Gulf, as I believe they should be.

Paradoxically, it would be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to the temperature of a military vacuum.

The democracies' support for Iraq during the war with

Iran was a reflection of their commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity. What they are resisting now is having their economies and their peace held at ransom by a megalomaniacal ruler.

For all these reasons, I would feel more comfortable if the United States sought to strengthen the U.N. resolutions to remove the underlying threat to the peace of the area by insisting on international monitored reductions of Iraq's military capabilities.

But were Saddam to yield to sanctions without war, President Bush might well decide that he could not go beyond the existing U.N. resolutions without which the sanctions would never have been implemented in the first place.

On the other hand, if a military clash occurs, the United States should seek an outcome more consistent with long-term stability.

The administration must therefore decide at some point for how long it is prepared to wait for sanctions to work and how far it is prepared to go without unanimous international support.

Outsiders cannot establish arbitrary deadlines. I do not know whether the decision must be made in October or November. I would be very uneasy were it to be delayed

into the new year, for I believe the entire enterprise might then begin to unravel.

How much international support is required for military measures? It is lightly stated that the United States would be isolated in a military crunch. I do not believe this.

The moderate Arab states would welcome a decisive American move if it were demonstrably the only alternative to Saddam's succeeding.

As for our allies, conditions are in fact unusually favorable for an American initiative.

Britain would agree to such a step. France would probably not want to jeopardize America's role in maintaining the European equilibrium after German unification. Germany has the same goal, if for different reasons, Japan will not lightly jeopardize its economic ties to the United States.

As for Gorbachev, the economic weakness of the Soviet Union requires a concentration on domestic affairs.

In short, the United States is not likely to find itself isolated were it to decide after an appropriate testing period that sanctions are not working; indeed, the most likely road to isolation is by way of a protracted crisis.

In the flush of rediscovered multilateralism, the United States must not subordinate all long-range policy to the heavy glow of internationalism or to the tactics of the moment.

Even though I have consistently urged the inclusion of Syria in the Middle East peace process, I cannot re-

The New York Post [LC]

Tuesday, September

by

25, 1990

HENRY A. KISSINGER

(cont'd)

NOV. 26 '90 12:17 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important
if US troops forces are to be substantially withdrawn from
the Gulf as I believe they should be. At the same time, it would
be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed
for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their
past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to
the temptations of a military vacuum.

NOV. 26 '90 12:18 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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fragile international consensus that may in any event crumble in
a protracted crisis.

To invoke Article 51, the Administration needs to prepare
the American people and involve Congress.

The president would have to spell out why he insists on the
UN terms, why they may lead to military action, and why an
important objective of such a conflict would be to establish a
stable balance of power in the Gulf.

None of this, he must make clear, will be easy or cost-free.

## What Military Strategy?

It is to be hoped that military strategy remains related to
realistic political objectives.

Outsiders should not play field marshal. But America has no
national interest in weakening Iraq to a point where it becomes a
tempting target for covetous neighbors.

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If war does prove unavoidable, our objective should be not to destroy Iraq, but rather to raise the cost of occupying Kuwait to unacceptable levels while reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors.

The destruction of the Iraqi military/industrial complex, especially its chemical and nuclear facilities as well as its air and missile forces would improve the military balance in the Gulf and would speed up the effect of sanctions.

Such a strategy would rely on air and naval power and use ground forces primarily to overawe a response.

As the government of Iraq, which is after all a military dictatorship, sees its principal source of power erode, a negotiation more compatible with stated US objectives could result.

Even if one of the compromises sketched above came eventually to be adopted--a contingency I would regret--the setback would be eased by the reduction in the Iraqi military

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11/26/90

Draft 1

Early Choices

The Administration must have concluded that anything other
than a leadership role for the United States would have ended
with making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and led to the
collapse of the moderate governments in the region including
Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role,
President Bush made another crucial decision. The American

NOV. 26 '90 12:13 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.03

2

President Bush and his advisers must have concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if necessary, but the administration needs to calculate very carefully the window of opportunity [it has available to achieve its objectives].

That debate has since been overtaken by the scale of our
deployment and the number of countries that have followed
America's leadership in the Gulf.

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Current Situation--Sanctions or Military Action?

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* The sanctions must bite.

What terms should be set?

Many who have urged the route of sanctions seem to have accepted that their strategy cannot reach the stated goals. Hence they are watering down what were heretofore common objectives.

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President Francois Mitterrand has suggested that as soon as
Iraq accepts the principle of withdrawal--in other words, before
it actually withdraws--its grievances against Kuwait could be
negotiated. Editorials in leading newspapers have urged direct
negotiation between Kuwait and Iraq coupled with some vague arms
control negotiation for the Gulf.

To be fair, many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations
recognize this dilemma. They propose to protect a settlement by

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1

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Draft 2

## Introductory Note

The following is drawn from articles published in *The Washington Post* on August 19th and in *The New York Post* on September 25th and November 6th. It is intended to focus discussion rather than serve as a full discussion.

## Early Choices

2

The Administration must have concluded that anything other
than a leadership role for the United States would have ended
with making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and led to the
collapse of the moderate governments in the region including
Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role,
President Bush made another crucial decision. The American
military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and
a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi
oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President
Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They must
have concluded that once they committed military forces, the best
hope of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming
force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if
necessary.

3

4

* The sanctions must bite.

[Y]

5

What terms should be set? In my view they must include fulfillment of stated UN objectives. It should also provide for a reduction of Iraq's offensive capability overshadowing its neighbors without destroying its capacity to defend itself against its neighbors.

Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important if US forces are to be substantially withdrawn from the Gulf as I believe they should be. At the same time, it would be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to the temptations of a military vacuum.

[4]

6

To be fair, many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations
recognize this dilemma. They propose to protect a settlement by
a new regional security system based on a significant American
military presence in Saudi Arabia.

7

[Y]

8

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Early Choices

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In short, Early in America's involvement there was some argument as to whether American vital interests justified the deployment in the Gulf.

NOV 26 '90 18:54 212-759-0042

NOV. 26 '90 12:13 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, DC

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* The sanctions must bite.

What terms should be set?

NOV 26 '90 18:56 212-759-0042

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P.606

President Francois Mitterrand has suggested that as soon as
Iraq accepts the principle of withdrawal--in other words, before
it actually withdraws--its grievances against Kuwait could be
negotiated. Pumakw? Editorials in leading newspapers have urged direct
negotiation between Kuwait and Iraq coupled with some vague arms
control negotiation for the Gulf.

NOV 26 '90 18:57 212-759-0042

NOV 26 '90 18:58 212-759-0042

ES, WASH. DC

P.8.08

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1

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## Early Choices

[x]

2

3

[y]

4

* The sanctions must bite.

What terms should be set?

5

6

7

Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important
if US [troops? forces?] are to be substantially withdrawn from
the Gulf as I believe they should be. At the same time, it would
be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed
for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their
past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to
the temptations of a military vacuum.

8

What Kind of UN Action?

Two methods are available: authorization by the United Nations and a unilateral invocation of Article 51, which defines the right of self-defense.

If we seek Security Council approval, we are likely to discover the limits of collective security.

It may well happen that some nations will not want to assume responsibility for actions which they otherwise recognize as necessary.

Others, though agreeing in substance, may be reluctant to elaborate a theory of great-power military intervention. Still others will disagree with both substance and execution.

And any authorization will almost surely be hedged with restrictions that may defeat its purpose. At that point the decision must be made to what extent the United States can subordinate its carefully considered national interest to a

9

## What Military Strategy?

10

11

threat. I am extremely skeptical about a full-scale ground
assault.

## Conclusion

It is to be hoped that a united America can find a way that avoids both a military strategy of total destructiveness and a diplomatic strategy committed to amassing UN resolutions--the progressive disregard of which will at some point demonstrate the UN's impotence rather than an international consensus.

But whatever our destination, we must arrive at it by design rather than as captives of circumstances.

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# U.S. MUST AVOID STALEMATE

BY HENRY KISSINGER

America simply cannot afford to let its first post-Cold War act of global leadership drift into a stalemate between a war of controversial purpose or the abandonment of goals adamantly reiterated by both President Bush and the international community.

The American objectives have been affirmed repeatedly in United Nations resolutions: unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; restoration of its legitimate government, and unconditional release of all hostages.

Yet the administration has been strangely reluctant to explain what/why these objectives reflect the American national interest.

Americans must not be given the impression that they have a duty to go to war against every evil leader in the world and against every transgression of the international order—which would make us the world's policeman.

The American people need to understand why this specific aggression by this particular leader, if unchecked, will in time threaten their own security and pose ever more difficult choices down the road.

In fact, President Bush's speech of Aug. 3 defined stability in the Gulf as a vital American interest, following the precedent of his two immediate predecessors. But since then little has been done to spell out why this is so.

THE reluctance to define the American national interest has been matched by vagueness as to what means are required to reach the stated objectives.

According to official pronouncements, the U.N. goals are to be achieved by sanctions leading to negotiations if possible but, as a last recourse, by military means.

To achieve the proclaimed objectives by sanctions, at least some hurdles must be overcome.

■ The sanctions must bite.

■ They must be maintained throughout any negotiations.

■ Common sense cannot be achieved.

■ Once the U.N. terms are achieved, arms-control objectives must be addressed.

■ The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically and

■ There must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesions.

To state these hurdles is to set forth the practical impossibility of clearing them.

For one thing, upheavals in the Middle East are a way of life. In one recent week, the second highest ranking official in Egypt was assassinated, Syria battled Christian forces in Beirut, and 21 Palatinians died in Jerusalem.

If the sanctions do bite within a time frame relevant to political processes, Iraq is more likely to offer to negotiate than to surrender.

In that case, pressures to ease the sanctions will be difficult to resist. Which democracy will want to be responsible for starvation in Iraq and Kuwait once negotiations are under way?

The fundamental dilemma is that the U.N. terms leave no real room for negotiation — except perhaps the staging of the Iraqi withdrawal.

Thus all so-called diplomatic solutions effectively dilute the case, while maintaining Iraq's war-making potential and thus confirming Iraq as the supreme military power in the Middle East.

For example, even if Sad- dam accepts the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait, he has already hinted — and Soviet presidential aide

Yevgeny M. Primakov has confirmed — that he would define Kuwait as excluding a strip of land containing a major oil field as well as two islands controlling access to the Shatt el-Arab.

Would America or the U.N. be prepared to go to war over such a distinction, especially in light of the hints we seem to have given to Sad- dam before the invasion that we had no strong views about his border dispute with Kuwait?

Saddam's Arab neighbors will surely note that none of the proposals in the public discussion would reduce Iraq's military pre-eminence or restore Kuwait completely.

If they conclude that they will be condemned to live with a dominant Iraq, they will begin their own negotiations. Recent remarks by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan suggest that the haggling has already begun.

But will the psychological basis for a military option still exist after months of such inconclusive maneuvering? And without a realistic military threat, how can the U.S./U.N. objectives be achieved?

Many who had argued the route of sanctions seem to have accepted that their strategy cannot reach the stated goals. However, rather than ignore the strategy they are watering down what were heretofore common objectives.

President Francois Mitterrand has suggested that as soon as Iraq accepts the principle of withdrawal — in other words, before it actually withdraws — its grievances against Kuwait could be negotiated. Editorials in leading newspapers have urged direct negotiation between Kuwait and Iraq coupled with some vague arms-control negotiation for the Gulf.

THE common feature of all these schemes is that they undermine the military option by consuming time, exact no penalty for aggression, looting a country or taking hostages, and leave as the only disputed issue the extent of the aggressor's gains.

And having faced down the combined might of U.N. forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms-control negotiation.

I consider this a dangerous mirage. If, after the adamant pronouncements from Washington and the deployment of a large expeditionary force, the stated U.S. objectives

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to domestic stability in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

A substantial American ground establishment would soon become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. Once Iraq has faced down U.S. and U.N. terms, such a force would sooner or later become hostile to revolutionary Iraq, fundamentalist Iran and forces substantially out of our control.

IF the United States is to emerge intact from the Middle East, it must choose a strategy appropriate to its objectives or else choose objectives achievable by whatever policy we are willing to implement. And we should have no illusions.

In the immediate aftermath of Iraq aggression, it was perhaps possible to limit damage by a policy of stabilizing the Kuwaiti-Saudi border.

But after the deployment,

of a vast expeditionary force and the administration's unqualified call for unconditional withdrawal, merely stabilizing the Saudi Kuwaiti border would undermine America's relevance to the Middle East and shake moderate Moslem governments from the Gulf to Morocco, including Egypt and even Turkey.

The administration must decide at what point the sanctions will turn into an ability to dilute our objectives.

Choosing war will be neither easy nor attractive; this is, in fact, the president's lemma. But that such a decision have been implicit in the administration's actions and pronouncements throughout.

Reports suggest that Washington is waiting for a suitable provocation. It is hard to see what more Iraq might do to justify military action than to engage in naked aggression, to systematically violate human rights, to loot and destroy the nation of Kuwait and take a thousand American hostages.

The diplomatic scenario by which military action can be implemented requires especially thoughtful preparation. Two methods are available: authorization by the United Nations and a unilateral invocation of Article 51, which defines the right of self-defense.

If we seek UN approval, we are likely to discover the

(continued)

NY Post

Tuesday,

November 6, 1990

(12)

Security
Incident