TELCONE
Lord Cromer/Secretary Kissinger [in Sit Rm]

1:03 a.m., October 25, 1973

K: Hello, Rollie.

C: Yes, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. We have had some disturbing information from the Soviets in a letter from Brezhnev to the President in which he asked us to dispatch Soviet and American military contingents to the Middle East and that if we don't agree -- [Reads] "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel.

C: Oh, no.

K: Our own information is that none of this is supported by [actions] on the ground, things in Israel are quiet, the Security Council meeting this evening was very desolatory. I just wanted to tell you what our policy is and I hope in this grave situation we will get your support. We feel that the only chance we now have which will be ............ is defense readiness around the world.

C: q Globally?

K: Globally, yes.

C: Sure.

K: We are going to what they call our Def Con three alert -- cancel leave, alert planes and so forth; one carrier from the Eastern Atlantic is moving into the Mediterranean and one carrier to the Mediterranean; alerting the 82nd air division and our forces in Europe.

C: They are having a hell of a buildup down in the Mediterranean.

K: We will not inform our Allies of the Brezhnev letter because we don't want it to leak but we will have to inform them of what we are doing. ............ But we would like your very strong support.

C: What would you like us to do?

K: Well, don't say the Americans have gone crazy.

Lord Cromer/Secy Kissinger

2

C: Of course. This letter says if we do not get this support -- Let me just get this letter down.

K: "If you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel." What they are asking us to do is to join forces . . . . . . . . . forcing Israel to comply.

[Re-reads message to Cromer]

C: Thank you for letting me know, Henry.

K: I just wanted you to know what we are doing.

C: Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED

January 5, 1988

By: OJ BARA: Date 6/16/88

TELCONE
Dinitz/HAK

October 25, 1973/2:09 a.m.

K: HelbMr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, Dr. Kissinger

K: We are drafting a very tough reply and we are sending a copy of it, they are delivering it at 5:30 in the morning to keep Dobrynin up all night.

D: He is keeping us up why not him too.

K: If you want to come over and pick up a copy you can have it. We will not make you a proposal because we don't think this is the time to offer any complicated solutions. Besides they will never accept it. They won't accept the demilitarized zone. What we should consider is... What I'd like from you is your military assessment, your assessment of your military capabilities if the Soviets come in whether you can clean up that pocket quickly.

D: Clean up what Dr. Kissinger?

K: Get an Army quickly. And for God sakes be honest with me.

D: I have always been.

K: Get that to me in the morning.

D: Then I come now and pick it up. To which office Scowcroft.

K: Yes, and you'll see we're not offering anything. All we are offering is that if they want to send up service in there we are willing to join together with them an observer force. As long as they are not combat troops and as long as there is a very small force. But we are not, and we're very threatening and in addition we are moving the second carrier in the Mediterranean East, the one that was near Sicily is moving to Creet, the one that was in the Atlantic is moving into the Mediterranean. And we have increased, we are alluding our 82nd Airborne Division and our forces in Europe and we are moving things into a worldwide readiness posture and we'll see now what happens.

D: Fine. So I'll be coming now.

TELCONE
Cromer/Kissinger

10:01 a.m. - 10/25/73

K: Hello.

C: Oh, Henry, good morning.

K: Yes, Rowley, how are you?

C: I thought you'd like to know I got a small exchange from London with regard to the letter you gave us last night and I've been asked to say that they certainly take Brezhnev's message just the same as you do and it goes on to say "I long believe that the Russians could not accept another Arab humiliation. If Brezhnev really believes that this is imminent as a result of the Israeli posturing after the Egyptian forces (to consolidate) at the Canal, he may have well been obliged to intervene unilaterally to save the Egyptians as well as his own prestige." Then he goes to say that he suggests there are three things that might be done urgently to hold the conflict situation down. First is to dispatch to the Secretary General of the United Nations as many observers as possible. Secondly, at the start of the negotiations as envisaged in para 3 of 338 and thirdly, the resolution of the negotiations as the first type of a problem which endangers the whole situation namely the __________ of the Third army. Now I don't know whether there's any possibility of being able to do any deal between you and the Russians.

K: We are in communication with the Egyptians and they have now indicated that they would settle for an International force. If that is true we will support that.

C: Support an international force. I see, but we have the intention of supporting the non-aligned draft . . . with the international force.

K: You have that intention?

C: Yes.

K: So do we.

C: Of course. I suppose at the moment it's a sort of putting in a resolution. This is me, it's not London. A call to countries not involved to keep out.

K: No, we will put an international force only in the context - we will only accept it if it excludes the permanent members.

Telcon
Lord Cromer/HAK

Oct. 25, 1973; 10:06 a.m.

K: Hello.

C: Sorry to bother you again. It's just another telegram's come in.
It's merely instructions to our Ambassador in Moscow telling him
to make the points that I made to you to Brezhnev.

K: What are those points?

C: Well the points that dispatch to the ______ area of the battlefield
as many UN truce observers as can be mustered.

K: OK, fine.

C: The start of negotiations under auspices, and that...

K: Well, that's in train and that's totally irrelevant to the problem.

C: I see. Anyhow, he will be basing his position on agency reports,
not what you've told us.

K: No, no, but that isn't the point. The point is the negotiations are
not the slightest problem. The Soviets and we had agreed in principle
on how to start those.

C: Well that's fine. Then there's no problem there. Fairly imminently?

K: I beg your problem.

C: Fairly imminently, fairly soon.

K: Well, first we've got to get this situation quieted down, Rollie, rather
than scratching it up with a lot of other matters.

C: Oh, I quite agree.

K: Within two weeks.

C: Yeah, fine.

K: Okay.

Telcon

Ambassador John Scali/HAK
October 25, 1973; 10:13 a.m.

K: John, how are you?

S: All right.

K: Where are you?

S: I'm in the office.

K: Here is what we would like you to do. The first paragraph should read - you've already got the first paragraph. The third paragraph should read "decides to set up immediately under its authority a UN emergency force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations, except Permanent Members of the Security Council..."

S: Yeah.

K: "...and requests the Secretary General to report within 24 hours."

S: Right.

K: In other words, the only claims we are making is we want to exclude Permanent Members of the Security Council because we don't want a Soviet parachute division to show up there tonight as the United Nations force.

S: I understand. You want to end it at the word "24 hours?" How about...

K: "within 24 hours on steps taken to this effect."

S: All right.

K: Okay?

S: Yeah, I think we can sell that. Do we have a change in paragraph 1? Substitution of the word "return" for the word "withdraw?"

K: Yeah, "return."

S: And the time is 1750 GMT?

K: That seems all right to me. In fact, 1752. [Laughter] Never mind, we'll give them those two minutes.

Telcon
HAK/Lord Cromer

Oct. 25, 1973; 10:40 a.m.

K: We have just gotten word that your representative in New York is introducing a resolution that would prevent the British forces from participating in the peacekeeping.

C: I don't think that is right.

K: It is true it means he would open up the door to Soviet participation.

C: He did not give me that indication at all. What he did say was to go along with the suggestion you and I discussed to exclude other members. He did not necessarily exclude the...

K: We are not asking him to exclude them. Will you please confirm this. I will just talk to the President. If we split on this we have a permanent change in our relationship.

C: I will confirm it and will be back in touch with you.

K: Good.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>According to <u>ABC</u> 6/25/73</td></tr><tr><td>By <u>CH</u>, Cate 6/25/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Secretary General Waldheim - Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

1:18 p.m.

K: Mr. Secretary General, how are you?

W: Thank you, well, quite busy. I am very grateful for returning the call. I have, of course, spoken to Joe Sisco and informed him, but I wanted to keep you informed of the situation here. The situation is that as you know, the Russians got instructions to accept the new American amendment. Only the French position is reluctant. The French Ambassador was just here and he said they would ask for a separate vote on the amendment. ..... excludes the permanent members. They will vote for the resolution, but ask for separate vote on the amendment in order to show they are not in agreement with this.

K: You are in no doubt, Mr. Secretary General, that we will veto any resolution which doesn't have it in it?

W: Yes, I was informed of this by Joe Sisco.

K: We will not compromise on this.

W: Yes, that is understood. No problem. Any more, non-alligned ..... change and the Russians, only the French want a separate vote

K: Well, that's their privilege.

W: But, after that, the French will vote for the resolution as it stands.

K: Excellent. There is one other thing that concerns me, Mr. Secretary General. We are fundamentally opposed to the introduction of any East European contingents, any communist countries. There must be enough neutrals in the world to do it. If there were Eastern European countries it would produce a crisis of confidence here, if any contingents from communist countries were included.

W: Well, there is a strong trend to have in addition to the Nordic countries one African, one Asian like Malaysia, African like Nigeria.

K: Well, we have no objection to that as long as it isn't a East European country.

W: There is an idea of including Poland.

K: We think it's a great concession to permit Sweden.

2.

W: How is it with the Russians?

K: ...can't accept any Eastern Europeans.

W: Could lead to situation where we would have a problem with Canada.

K: Canada?

W: Yes, because of NATO

K: That's all right with us.

W: Neutral countries.

K: We will trade Canada. Also won't accept Yugoslavia.

W: There was no question of taking them.... but I take note of your information and I hope we can proceed on that line.

K: Mr. Secretary General, when this is all over, and I hope it will be soon, you and I must have a drink together and reminisce.

W: Certainly look forward to that.

K: Now, if you think it necessary to obtain airlift and logistic support, you can call on us.

W: I am very grateful. That will be particularly needed. The latest development which I discussed with Scali here. Egypt wanted another meeting after the resolution was adopted, which should be in the next hour, to discuss my role in implementation of the resolution. I agree with Scali that it's not a very good idea to have this evening another meeting. Instead, I intend to write an interim report, in the form of a letter to McIntyre and..., proposing as an immediate measure, I could send...to the Middle East, Cairo...dispatch quickly to the area three contingents, three neutral contingents from Cyprus, that is the Finnish, Austrian and Swedish, each battalion has about 200-280 people.

K: That sounds reasonable to me, if they're from Cyprus, and that's on the regular budget.

W: That's right. ...unique operation, paid out of the regular budget and since the Russians and French also voted for it, there will be no excuse and we will proceed on those lines.

TELCON
Haig/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, Oct. 25, 1973

2:35 p.m.

H: You did a hell of a job.

K: Was it all right?

H: Superb.

K: We have won. They have accepted the SC resolution without
permanent members and we have just had a message from Brezhnev
saying they are sending 70 observers to Cairo and they will be glad
if we send 70 observers too.

H: WELL, well, well. And her staredown, Henry.

K: And one move less and we would have had it.

H: I think you are exactly right.

K: And you and I were the only ones for it. These other guys
were wailing all over the place this morning.

H: You're telling me. Last night it seemed like someone had taken
their shoes away from them. You really handled that thing
magnificently.

K: I think I did some good for the President.

H: More than you know. Bayh called with tears in his eyes
(mentioned something about the special prosecutor).

K: We would have had a Soviet paratroop division in there
this morning. That decision was made. That letter was a final
note.

H: You know it, and I know it. Have you talked to the Boss.

K: No. I will call him. Let's not broadcast this all over the
place otherwise it looks like we (cooked) it up.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authorship</td></tr><tr><td>By: J.G. SARGENT</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELECOM

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Klassinger

October 25, 1978

8:00 p.m.

K: Anatoly?

L: Hello Henry. I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the President and then I will send you. Have it now in writing, I mean handwriting.

K: Is it going to calm me down or make me go into orbit again?

D: No, not orbit. ... Prefer to stay in orbit quietly. "I have received your letter in which you alleged once again the Israelis have cause firing... contradictory to the facts we have received in Moscow. ... Israel was bombing the city of Jerusalem, and fighting was continuing in the straits of ..., which has until this moment not been a scene of military action. ... President of Egypt, Mr. Sadat in which addressed. ... We have already dispatched on October 25, Soviet ... which counted 70 persons at the Egyptian/Israeli front, of observers of Security Council decision. Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question. Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a businesslike operation with the US group of observers, with the American group as soon as they arrive in Egypt, and without delay and discharging their tasks ... In the situation without delay. We are ready to cooperate with the American side in taking other measures which will be dictated by the situation, to insure immediate ... implementation of the Security Council resolution of the 23 and 24 of October. ... following dispatch of observers, we in an urgent memo, will continue also other political measures and corresponding to decision of the Security Council and ... to the understanding in Moscow with Klassinger who conducted negotiations on your behalf, on part of US really effective steps will be taken to guarantee implementation by Israel of decisions of the Security Council about what you, Mr. President writes in your letter. Respectfully, Brezhnev. That's all.

K: OK, Anatoly. Did you hear my press conference?

D: Of course, I hear Henry. I couldn't miss you. I see on television.

K: I tried to be gentle with you, so...

D: Yes, so I noticed, from yesterday 4:00 in the morning.

Authority
By: M.W. Tepe

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

2:40 p.m.

K: Anatoly?

D: Hello Henry. I would like to read to you a letter from Brezhnev to the President and then I will send you. Have it now in writing, I mean handwriting.

D: No, not orbit. Prefer to stay in orbit quietly. "I have received your letter in which you alleged once again the Israelis have ceased firing...contradictory to the facts we have received in Moscow. Israel was bombing the city of Ismail, and fighting was continuing in the straits of __________, which has until this moment not been a scene of military action. President of Egypt, Mr. Sadat in which addressed....We have already dispatched on October 25, Soviet which counted 70 persons at the Egyptian/Israeli front, of observers of Security Council decision. Since you are ready now, as we understand it, now to send to Egypt a group of American observers, we agree to it jointly in this question. Soviet group of observers instructed to get into contact immediately in a businesslike operation with the US group of observers, with the American group as soon as they arrive in Egypt, and without delay and discharging their tasks ...in the situation without delay. We are ready to cooperate with the American side in taking other measures which will be dictated by the situation, to insure immediate ...implementation of the Security Council resolution of the 22 and 23 of October. following dispatch of observers, we in an urgent memo, will continue also other political measures and corresponding to decision of the Security Council and ...to the understanding in Moscow with Kissinger who conducted negotiations on your behalf, on part of US really effective steps will be taken to guarantee implementation by Israel of decisions of the Security Council about what you, Mr. President write in your letter. Respectfully, Brezhnev. That's all.

K: I tried to be gentle with you, so....

TELCON

Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, October 25, 1973

2:45 p.m.

K: I think it is working.

S: You think you have won.

K: Yep. They have agreed to the SC Resolution.

S: Have we heard back from them directly.

K: Yes, and it is conciliatory. Keep that quiet for the time being.

S: Good.

K: Otherwise it looks as if we ginned this thing up.

S: O.K. I am exploring with Tom and Bill here. We have a
world-wide DefCon and I think there are some places that we can
relax now after this vote.

K: I think we should hold it until midnight.

S: We have the Alaskan Command which is sort of irrelevant to
this thing and a few other places. I'm not talking about SAC or
EUCOM.

K: Do not relax after the vote. It looks as if it is a pressure play.

S: Do it at midnight.

K: Start standing down at midnight and tomorrow let's talk at
8:00 in the morning. Do Alaska at midnight and we will talk
in the morning and standown the rest then.

S: Very good.

K: You all were great last night and this morning.

S: I think your press conference was very good. Although I think
rather painful for you.

K: I think we will come out of it all right.

S: OK.

TELECON

Joe Kraft/Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

2:50 pm

K: How are you?

JK: Fine. Can I ask a few questions? Some of which arose out of today's session.

K: Sure, as long as it is on a non-attributable basis.

JK: There was a phrase about puzzeling behavior about Soviet representatives. Can you tell me what that was about?

K: It seemed to verge on the threatening.

JK: Of the negotiations? You're not talking about Malik, are you?

K: No, no. When this they unravels and I think it is beginning to resolve itself, I will tell you exactly what I meant.

JK: I take it that it was the Israelis who broke the cease-fire and whatever happened, they used the break to make a significant advantage in their position.

K: That's the case.

JK: I would imagine the Soviet leaders were very angry about that. A terrific blow to Breshnev.

K: Right. Still, doesn't mean we could accept unilateral intervention by them. I agree that it was not provoked and I think there were deeper causes.

JK: Could you say what they were?

K: They are in a touch position in the Arab world.

JK: Do you think there was internal opposition.. the three paragraph formula a concession on their part.

K: An enormous concession on their part. We gave nothing. In paragraph

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Origin</td><td>5.03.</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>Of</td><td>11/16/73</td></tr><tr><td>Date</td><td>11/16/73</td></tr></table>

one, a cease-fire in place, Israelis having more territory than they started with. Paragraph two, reconfirm Security Council's resolution that's six years old. And paragraph three... direct negotiations...

JK: That..enormous concession. But wasn't their internal opposition to that?

K: I had the impression that they were very tense and grave when I was there. I had the impression that if there was an 8-7 vote on Sunday, it could have gone the other way yesterday...

JK: The Israelis were very emotional.. at seeing

K: They were pleased. They expressed regret that they couldn't
point four, which is exactly at the other end.

JK: I know, .. did you.. it looked to me that when you first made the announcement it would be extremely difficult to hold in place.

K: I expect some commotion, but you have to expect that with a cease-fire in place.

JK: Have you got that from the Security Council yet?

K: It seems to be shaping along. I have the impression that the Soviets are going along.

JK: But you can't tell me what?

K: I can assure you there was a good reason.

JK: I know you well enough and I believe you -- I know you better than most of my colleagues..

K: There was a grave reason. We may have read it wrong, but at midnight you can't take chances.

JK: You spoke to Jackson about this this morning, didn't you?

K: No. I talked to him at 6:00 last night.

JK: Oh, he led us to believe that..

K: I told him there would...

TELCORN
Reston/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 25, 1973
3:00 p.m.

R: (On your press conference) you looked awfully tired. You must
be exhausted.

K: I was up until 4:00.

R: I have had great difficulty with this decision last night and I
guess my difficulty with it is this -- it was put to you at the
end and I understand that you cannot really answer the thing
in public. The question that I thought was the critical one and the
one that bothers me is the evidence given for so important an act
seemed so flimsy as not to be credible. Here it seems to me that
there is a real problem.

K: That may be but if our country has reached the point where people
think that the government orders an alert for other than overwhelming
reasons then we are in an impossible situation.

R: That is the prior question. That is not my question. I am
assuming that you had reasons and that you had justification and you
did not give them and you probably could not give them.

K: Let me tell you why I did not give them. That would have produced
a direct confrontation between Brezhnev and the President in which
we would have a score card of winners and losers of the record
which I did not think proper in the situation. Since we are still
in the situation although it is easing now in which we wanted to
prevent an irrevocable Soviet act -- if you read what I said -- it is
clear that I was trying to prevent an irrevocable Soviet act by my
press conference.

R: I think that was clear and at that point I think you got over
quite effectively. I am saying now that the vote has been taken now
and they voted for the resolution.

K: We had very strong reason to believe that there was a
good possibility that they would put their own combat forces into
Egypt and early next week I will be glad to give you the evidence.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Original</td>
      <td>EO 1983</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>By: CH</td>
      <td>CH/AR, Date 6/10/73</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

2
Reston
Oct. 25

R: Don't you think it should be done now without any involvement of the government. If we could say on our own authority, I think it very important.

K: There is no way I can give it to you. I can give you one piece of evidence which you could have gotten from others. They alerted 7 of their 8 airborne divisions and pulled all of their transport planes to where these divisions were but there was some collateral evidence on top of that that made it extremely ominous.

R: Seven of their eight airborne divisions were alerted. Were they moved?

K: No. They were put on high alert. You don't have to move them. Once they move them, it is gone.

R: Then suddenly the transport into the Middle East which led us to believe their air transport was to be with those divisions and

K: And there was another conclusive piece of evidence which I cannot give you.

R: In other words the transport would have stopped the actual transport into the Middle East. This looked like diversion of that transport to airlift the troops.

K: Right.

R: We cannot name places.

K: No.

R: That is something.

K: I tell you even that is the less conclusive part of what concerned us. That I would like not to talk about for a bit. I think and I am confident you will recognize why I won't when I talk to you about it sometime.

R: Thank you Henry. All the best.

K: Don't ascribe this to me.

R: Not at all.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 6/23/83</td></tr><tr><td>By CHARA. Date 6/24/83</td></tr></table>

94-D

UNCLASSIFIED

2
President
Oct. 25, 3:05

K: I treated Kalb contemptible at the press conference.

N: What about Scotty?

K: I gave him a few facts. I said what would you do if 7 of 8 airborne divisions were put on alert. I did not tell him about the Brezhnev letter.

N: Why does he think the President is up until 3:00 this morning.

K: I said, you think we staged all of this. He said no but we had to give all of the information.

N: I thought you had.

K: I had but I did not tell them about the Brezhnev letter and the air alert. We don't want to force him to hit you back. What you did was just another one of these moves.

N: Just as well I will not be doing the press conference. I am not in the mood to do it tonight.

K: Absolutely not. I think I would do it tomorrow or Monday.

N: I don't think I can wait until Monday.

K: Do it tomorrow night. I would treat the bastards with contempt, Mr. President. They asked me about Watergate. I said you cannot play with the central authority of the country without paying a price.

N: You are rather confident that this is going to do it.

K: Mr. President, you were prepared to put forces in way before you knew what was going to happen. I told Kalb that the President is attempting to conduct foreign policy of the US regardless... that it would be suggested that the US would alert its forces for domestic reasons....

N: Good. Al told me you slaughtered the bastards. Keep it up.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 05-08-83</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHA. Date 10/15/83</td></tr></table>

SANITIZED

TELECON

The President/Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

3:13 pm

K: Mr. President

N: Henry, will this be announced in time, that is, the UN resolution has it been announced yet?

K: It has not been voted on yet.

N: Do you think it will be voted on?

K: Yes, in time for the evening news.

N: Yes.

K: No question.

N: I was thinking of going up to Camp David.

K: I think you can safely go now. The Soviets have agreed and it has been announced.

N: You don't think you could go up too?

K: I, uh, uh,

N: No, I understand. You think there is no problem then.

K: No problem. It would be normal for you to go up there. It is now known by the press.

N: Don't you think you should call a few of those damnable leaders and tell them?

K: I will do that now Mr. President.

N: Good boy.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By: J. Kissinger</td></tr></table>

TELECON

The President - Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

3:30 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: I think it would be well for semantics, no semantics, I mean, if you could come over here, make an appearance, dash over to say hello. You know, to sort of, what are you doing now?

K: I was having a staff meeting.

N: Well, what time will you be through?

K: About 15 minutes. I can come over, I've got the Chinese coming in but I can shift them half an hour. I'll come over in about 20 minutes.

N: Well, I don't want to, you name the time. You could have them over here.

K: No, I'll be over in about 20 minutes.

N: OK.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>originally</td></tr><tr><td>By: OHARA, Date: 10/25/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Sen. Mansfield - Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

4:45 p.m.

M: I hate to bother you so soon again....Senator Griffin came in to the office about an hour ago. He said he had been solicited by television to come over and make a statement. He decided he was not the proper one to do it and he came to me....Most unusual, coming from Griffin. Never done that before. He said I would be a better person to go explain I was supporting what's going on there, etc. I didn't want to do anything until I checked with you.

K: If you would do that it would be a very good thing to do. Let me bring you up to date. The Security Council voted 40 to nothing, I mean 14 to nothing, so the resolution has passed.

M: Did somebody abstain.

K: The Chinese.

M: Uh, huh.

K: Also, and this is strictly for you and you cannot refer to this now, We had a note from the Soviets saying they accepted the proposal to send observers and they are sending 70.

M: 70.

K: Yes, so the crisis is practically over. I mean, last evening they were talking about military intervention, and ...

M: Yah. Well, if you think it would be useful, I will.

K: I would not yet say the crisis is over, wait a day to see who they interpret the resolution. You can say you are hopeful, you support it, if you felt you could say that...

M: I do, certainly. One other detail they may ask about, what to expect about negotiations....are they expected to start forthwith.

K: In the earlier one, not in today's.

M: Not today?

K: In today's....a matter of weeks.

M: Should I say it will be in Geneva, or it is indefinite.

2.

K: Not yet formally agreed to, your understanding is that the
locality has been discussed.

M: I was amazed at Griffin ... that he would get this. I was told,
at least he had the impression this was sort of alert, to steer people
... implying that this was, you know, an effort on your part to turn
attention from the domestic thing.

K: I noticed.

M: He told me Jackson gave the Press ... a memorandum, I didn't
know, you didn't say that, did you?

K: Absolutely not.

M: Griffin said he understood Jackson had given the Press ... a memo
in effect containing substance... what's called ... communication
from the Soviets.

K: I refused to confirm that in the press conference. ... said Jackson
was not part of the negotiations.

M: Well, Jackson said..

K: Jackson made a statement to that effect.

M: He did? Oh. I didn't put it quite together. What should I say about
that?

K: I would say outsiders can never exactly judge what communications
are, you noticed the Secretary in his press conference didn't characterize
anything.

M: Any other suggestions?

K: To the extent you can contribute the sense that this is a serious
situation which is in the process of being overcome it would be very
helpful.

M: I hate to bother you with this but Griffin asked me....

K: I think you are the best man to do it.

M: OK.

K: Many thanks Mr. Chairman.

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 25, 1973

5:35 p.m.

K. We have now had a reply from the Soviet Union. All they are
doing is offering 70 men as individual observers. So we have
managed to face them down again.

D. You are going to offer....

K. We will be going to tell them we don't think it requires 70.

D. Yes, I see. These observers will be strictly... We will have
an observer force as well as a... force. The Russians will be
coming in the framework of the observer force, and you are going
to tell them they don't need to offer that many. Do you have any idea
what was in the five planes that landed in Cairo today?

K. No.

D. Maybe the 70 observers have landed today.

K. Yes, that is my impression.

D. All right. I will pass it on. Our policy will be the less of
them that come the better.

K. That is exactly our policy too.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator</td></tr><tr><td>By: AH</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 10/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

George Springsteen - Secretary Kissinger

October 25, 1973

6:55 p.m.

K: After looking over the cable from the Norwegians, I am wondering whether it might not be wiser just to accept the award in the Norwegian Embassy here.

S: Does that mean you lose the money in the process.

K: Well, if it does or not, I was probably going to give it away anyway.

S: Canvas the possibility for you?

K: I didn't think the Norwegian government ever found it possible to express anything yet and haven't offered participation of their own.

S: No, I thought the ...... was a little fullsome.

K: Swedes normally invite you, they haven't said anything and what's the use of going up there to massive demonstrations.

S: I agree. Would you be willing to go back later and make a lecture when things calm down, or...

K: Why don't you canvass it without indicating....

S: I will get a cable out asking them to canvass possibilities quietly...

K: I don't think I'll lose the money, but it's not a major consideration.

S: I was just reading how Le Duc Tho lost the money by turning it down.

K: Yes, but he turned it down. As for receiving the award, Solzelnitsin got it at the Embassy in Moscow. I have the impression there is the possibility of receiving it here.

S: Very good.

TELECON
The President/Kissinger

October 25, 1973

7:15 p.m.

K. Hello, Mr. President.

N. I thought you should know that Mrs. Nixon and Tricia thought you did a hell of a job. They are pretty good critics.

K. Well, Mr. President, you rate the remarks.

N. I talked to Al and I want you to do this on a crash basis to follow up. This is the group I want you to fly down tomorrow from New York. (He named off the heads of CBS, NBC, ABC, the New York Times and the Washington Post).

K. Right, Mr. President.

N. I think you can have an enormous influence on them. Their major concern is Israel. Who saved Israel? Would anybody else have saved it? You have to tell them that. And with the fact that if Albert had been faced with it....It has to be done on a crash basis.

K. One thing for sure if we can't do it tomorrow, we can do it Monday. I will call them. We have completely dominated the news. They gave about 15 minutes.

N. I understand there was over 6 minutes with regard to the fact that we faked this whole thing on CBS. That we made it all up. Do you remember the....Kalb and R____ were both shocking.

K. I killed them with the answers.

N. Anyway they used 6 minutes on that bad point which plants in the public's mind that we made it all up. Ziegler has to make sure that that line doesn't get through. You know we were close to a nuclear confrontation this morning.

K. Mr. President, I have seen the CBS news and I think it was very good for us. They presented all the tough answers to these charges.

N. Do they point out the fact that the President....

K. No, as a leadership role.

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger

October 25, 1973

7:19 p.m.

K. Al, how are you?

H. Good. I wonder why. Listen, Henry, the President is at
Camp David.

K. Yes, I know. He is harrassing the hell out of me. He wants
me to call the Jewish leaders.

H. Not the Jewish leaders--

K. Well, the Jewish heads of organizations. You know that this
is going to backfire.

H. Of course it's going to backfire. He had another item that I
thought was a good one. As I look at this damn news tonight Jackson
really helped us there.

K. I am beginning to think that Jackson is a menace.

H. I agree. The President said to "Tell Henry to send a message
from me to Brezhnev.

K. Not at all. Let them sweat.

H. I agree.

K. They played chicken with us and they lost.

H. Have you seen that report about the amphibious force going in.
They had a whole flotilla going in to Egypt and they pulled away.

K. We came so close to Soviet military intervention as we can get.
Have you seen the Brezhnev letter?

H. No.

K. All he even wanted was to send 70 observers. He cannot see why
we are so excited, and he wants us to send 70 too. I told him we
will take 20.

-2-

H. This came out very well.

K. I don't think they should come up for air all that fast. We faced them down.

H. They had terrific excerpts from your press conference today.

K. On TV? Did it play all right.

H. The three clips were the lousy questions they asked. All three were great.

K. As I remember I gave them some tough answers.

H. ... The last guy did it. That was just great where you took the media on.

K. About undermining the country?

H. Yes, it was really a first-class success. I just wish we had a spokesman as soon as you with some sense.

K. I think he came out fine on this.

H. Thanks to you. Last night was something. I got home and told Pat...

K. Nothing compared to this morning. The President called me out of the leadership meeting and they wouldn't leave. Schlesinger said they just sat around bitching until I kicked them out and said when I leave a meeting it ends. Off they went and bitched in their own Departments.

H. I bet. Well, those were the two items he wanted me to bring up.

K. What was the second?

H. The second was to send a message from him to Brezhnev to tell him that Jackson has blown this out of control and wants him to know it doesn't come from us.

K. Jackson is disgraceful. I may call Dobrynin later this evening and discuss it with him. You know, if they had moved it would have been more dangerous than '62.

H. Right. Good job! Good night.

TELECON
Rockefeller/Kissinger

October 25, 1973

7:26 p.m.

R. Listen, how are things?

K. We faced them down.

R. You got them not to put in troops?

K. That's right.

R. I don't know how you did it. I was so worried this morning when I heard this. You got it in hand.

K. Yes, unless they break loose again.

R. That is fantastic. I heard that you had mobilized the military forces the world over.

K. They sent us a note last night saying they would put in forces unilaterally if we didn't go in with them. We refused to reply for 10 hours, mobilized, and sent them a reply.

R. Well, if you ever deserved a treat from Kenny Riland.....
(The rest of the conversation was about having a treatment from
Dr. Riland, when he was arriving from New York, and the fact
that he could come over the State Department or to the Secretary's
home any time he wished.)

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr><tr><td>10-25-73 5:26 PM</td></tr><tr><td>By: OJ</td><td>Date: 11/01/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Robert Toth/Kissinger

October 25, 1973

7:45 p.m.

T. I was just wondering whether you could give me some guidance on if the Israeli humanitarian thing can help to bring this around.

K. I think the humanitarian thing helped with Sadat. I think the alert was the typical factor.

T. I understand that the thrust of the Soviet note was they would have to comply with Egypt in sending in troops.

K. I am not going to do any of it.

T. ...alerting of Soviet forces would...the movement of some of their troops back into....They didn't put on alert their nuclear forces?

K. That was not the principal factor at this point. It was the airborne alert.

T. Inside the Soviet Union?

K. Yes.

T. O'k. Finally how do you see now their turn around at the UN? Is the crisis in effect been calmed.

K. Let's wait a week.

T. They haven't stood down that alerted force.

K. We would not notice that right away. If the ceasefire takes hold and forces go in immediately...protest will be removed.

T. WAX Why do you think they acted?

K. I don't want to speculate on that.

T. Did you get my note about Erlichman and Haldeman?

K. Yes.

T. I finally did a piece about you and the Jewish Community.

K. Oh, in the Times?

TELCORN

October 25, 1973

8:45 p.m.

K: One other matter it is important for Moscow to understand, if this matter of our introducing airplanes becomes enormous issue, I'm sure it is obvious to you it will be necessary to (a) explain the delay, (b) prevent exacerbation of relationship. Don't have to do it before Monday, but...

D: Henry, we know this quite well, the trouble is with American public opinion.

K: Don't treat it as a threat now.

D: I didn't intend it as a threat. But Henry tell me, what do we do, realistically? What do we really do? Put yourself on our side. What do they, we do in the framework of the bigger relationship?

K: I will tell you what could be done now. ______ Resolution first, second should be guarantee withdrawal until '67. Israel has stated clearly they would not accept '67.

D: What about in the UN?

K: We think it would be better to negotiate it directly. Otherwise it will force the U.S. to betray allies in the UN or get into a totally violated position.

D: But Henry, we should say to Arabs you should accept Israeli or American resolution? What do you do?

K: If you had not sent in all those airplanes....Now Podgrony and Gromyko made imflammatory remarks to the Arab Ambassadors and we know about Brezhnev's message to Boumedianne. And sending 40 airplanes does not help the problem, it only exacerbates the situation.

D: Henry, I want you to know we have talked to no government against you. We have done nothing to exacerbate the situation.

K: Obviously you have exacerbated the ah...situation. No limit to what can be done. Do you think the Israelis like to be told to go along with a cease fire in place, should they agree?

K: There was no sense in abstaining if the resolution ...if Israel rejects it.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>AR: Date 6/10/73</td></tr></table>

2.

D: What could we do?

K: Sen. Jackson implied ______. not break down in National
Security policy.

D: What he is doing now?

K: He's introducing a resolution some time soon. He called this morning, and Israel must have talked to him. Sen. Javits must have talked to him. Much more comfortable to say we tried to work with the Soviet and the Soviet Union violated the proposals. So far no European.

D: Anyway the question is really about the resolution, so we don't agree.

K: We can go back to what we had agreed ... back to the 242... say something about negotiations. I have no idea, but if haven't done something by 4:00 this afternoon, we plan to go ahead as planned. I've something I've never done before, I have no alternative plans.

v Nobody believed me and they were right. My ______ forcing the
Israelis to accept this.

D: 242... you are not prepared.

K: We could refer to Resolution 242.

D: Combined, cease fire and resolution 242?

K: That we can do.

D: This is not in my instructions.

K: Nor have I any authority to make a commitment, but ______
we will definitely veto and get very nasty.

D: Say I can, if any, 242, we can agree to.

K: `wx 242` we can agree to.

D: So, I'll mention this when I send to Moscow.

K: That will... we have to hold things together, but you don't
have to say anything until tomorrow.