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December 22, 1957

A WORD BY THE PANEL

This Report is the result of a group effort by Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although not every member subscribes to every detail, it reflects our substantial agreement.

Starting in the fall of 1956, we were charged with exploring the military aspect of the United States' security problem, the strategies most likely to achieve our security and the challenges in this field which may face the country during the next ten to fifteen years. We have had the benefit of specially prepared papers. We have heard testimony of numerous experts in relevant security areas. We have sought to make our report as specific as possible, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they become critical. On the other hand, too much of the raw material of our consideration will be shaped by events in science and human affairs which have yet to happen for us to have attempted to blueprint every detail of our military posture.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U. S. security policies and operations. The overall U. S. strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense organization in major ways is unrelated to critically important military missions. Governmental systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management are painfully out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military developments. The United States system of alliances must be adapted to rapidly changing strategic requirements. United States strength is inadequate with respect to important challenges with which we may be confronted.

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We are convinced that sizeable corrective steps can be taken now.

We believe that the security of the United States supersedes any
budgetary considerations.

Our Panel therefore hopes that the most important result of recent
Soviet advances in the field of earth satellites may be that they will serve
as a catalyst for a genuinely deep review of the basic attitudes and policies
affecting the security of our country.

For the U. S. lag in missiles and space machines, however worrisome,
is a symptom and not a cause. It reflects a general complacency over the
past dozen years. It is now vitally important to the U. S. to calculate its
strategy and security requirements on an integrated and long-range basis,
and to set about correcting all significant deficiencies.

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# I - FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The world is living through a period of swift and far-reaching upheavals. Standards and institutions which have remained unchanged for centuries are breaking down. Millions who have hitherto accepted their place in life are clamoring for a new and meaningful existence. Western Europe, the fountain-head of our civilization, has lost its position of pre-eminence in world affairs. Across the great land-mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa new nations are rising in the place of colonial empires.

The world is yearning to realize its aspirations in peace. But it is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to exploit all dissatisfactions and to exacerbate all tensions, and the new weapons technology capable of obliterating civilization.

The United States has thus been placed into a fateful position. Our whole tradition impels us to desire peace. Relatively invulnerable behind two great oceans, we have until the end of World War II asked little of the world save to be free to work out our destiny undisturbed. But we have been forced to realize that our security is inextricably bound up with the safety of the rest of the non-Communist world and that freedom everywhere depends on our strength and resolution. Force alone will not supply the answer to the hopes of humanity. Yet our power can help bring about a framework of security in which these aspirations may be realized in freedom and without fear.

Looking at the world from the perspective of our past isolation, perhaps the most difficult thing for us is to accept the reality of our peril. Other and

[4]

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more exposed nations have had to learn to live over a period of centuries with the consciousness that their existence might be imperiled by foreign attack. It is a new experience for us.

A new technology of unprecedented power and destructiveness has placed <u>all</u> nations of the world into dire peril. The largest "conventional" bomb of World War II -- the famous blockbuster -- had an explosive power of 20 tons of TNT. The first atomic bomb had an explosive equivalent of 20 thousand tons of TNT, a thousand fold increase. Today weapons with an explosive equivalent of 20 million tons (20 megatons) have been tested and there is no theoretical upper limit: it is possible to construct weapons of almost any desired explosive power.

As the weapons have become more powerful, their speed of delivery has grown ever faster. Soon missiles will be able to travel intercontinental distances and wipe out whole cities in one blow. An attack on 50 of our most important metropolitan areas would bring under five 55 per cent of our population and 75 per cent of our industry. Moreover if the fireball of a megaton weapon touches the ground, it sucks up particles of earth and buildings and deposits them downwind as radioactive material. The area of this "fall-out" will depend on meteorological conditions, but it may cover an area of 10 thousand square miles or the size of the State of New Jersey. An attack on 50 of our most important urban centers would, in the absence of effective defensive measures, produce at least 10-15 million dead and 15-20

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offense and defense will improve -- and improve enormously. However, foreseeable new offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles -- sudden in action, massively destructive, difficult to destroy either before launching or in flight -- will greatly aggravate the problems of strategic defense and enormously increase its costs.

3. The U.S.S.R. and Communist China will continue to gain in overall military strength. Although the rate of economic growth of these countries may slow down, the economic superiority of the West will become increasingly less significant militarily (at present levels of effort). By sacrificing the civilian sector of its economy, the U.S.S.R. has already caught up with the United States in many major fields of military technology. In certain areas assigned high priority by the Kremlin the Soviets have surpassed us, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Unless we greatly increase our pace and level of effort, they will achieve superiority in many other fields as well.

4. The concept of "scarcity" in nuclear weapons will disappear from the calculations of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and to a lesser extent Britain.

The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain will continue to increase the number and variety of their atomic weapons. Other countries will in due course have their own atomic arms if on a more limited scale.

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## Soviet Capabilities

Ever since World War II, the United States has suffered from a tendency to underestimate the military technology of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet Union produced its first long-range bomber we comforted ourselves with the belief that it was just a copy of our B-29. When it developed jet fighters we dismissed it as the imitation of a British design. When our atomic monopoly was ended we took it as a reflection on our security methods against espionage rather than as an indication that our technological lead was inherently ephemeral.

In the meantime the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its achievements in the immediate post-war period were far from accidental. Today Soviet science is at least equal to our own in many strategically significant categories. In the military field, the technological capability of the U.S.S.R. is increasing at a pace obviously faster than that of the United States. If not reversed this trend alone will place the free world in dire jeopardy.

The result of the Soviet concentration on military technology is an impressive military establishment which already poses a mortal threat to the free world and which is growing larger. Its main features can be summarized as follows:

The Soviet ground forces, far superior numerically to our own, have been reorganized and re-equipped for atomic war. New rockets and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads add to their atomic capability; new

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tanks, artillery pieces, and light weapons give them a powerful conventional strength. Vehicles and communications equipment have been markedly improved. The Soviet Army not only is far superior numerically to available ground forces in Western or Southern Europe, but is progressively increasing its margin of superiority. In addition to these substantial forces-in-being, the U.S.S.R. possesses a vast and readily mobilizable reserve.

The Soviet Union now has the second largest navy in the world. While producing large numbers of light vessels, the Soviet Union has long concentrated on submarines. A fleet of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the German force which severely menaced Allied surface shipping during the early years of World War II. There is no doubt about the capacity of the U.S.S.R. to develop naval atomic power plants, or to adapt ships and submarines to launch short and medium-range missiles; in fact Soviet leaders have pointedly discussed the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor aircraft, an increasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are a major element of the air defense of important areas, and this system is being progressively extended.

Over the last ten years the U.S.S.R. has not only maintained the largest air force in the world, but has progressively re-equipped it with new

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and modern aircraft. The Soviet Union now produces many aircraft at least as advanced as our own -- and produces them in large numbers. Moreover, the Soviets have impressively demonstrated their ability to manufacture modern electronic equipment and to master the techniques required to guide and direct defensive and offensive aerial operations.

The Soviet weapons program has given high priority to the development of rockets and missiles. A medium range ballistic missile within range of Japan, Taiwan, and most of Western Europe from Communist bloc bases is already operational and missiles of intercontinental range will soon follow.

In all of its programs the Kremlin has apparently given high priority to the development of a long-range air-atomic capability. From what is known of the present Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons it is inferior to that of the United States, but it is already enormous and it is growing rapidly. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. possesses a long-range delivery system which, although second to ours, is considerable. Soviet nuclear attacks of great severity are possible now; within a few years the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering massive air and missile attacks against all major targets in the non-communist world. In short Soviet military strength is already enormous and is growing rapidly.

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U.S. Capabilities

As compared with the U.S.S.R., the United States now has these
military advantages:

We have a superior industrial base and production know-how, which,
providing we use it properly, should enable us to assign high priority to a
greater variety of projects than the U.S.S.R.

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range
manned airplanes and geography favors our system of advanced bases.

We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially surface
naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some of these advantages must be qualified, and others
are only temporary. For example, our long-range bomber force is always in
competition with the improving defenses of our potential enemy. And our
advantage in training is transitory because missiles will increasingly take
over missions heretofore performed by manned planes. Moreover some U.S.
forward bases will continue to be exposed to the instability of the areas in
which they are located and all of our air bases are vulnerable to surprise
attack, particularly from Soviet missiles.

Nor can we afford to take for granted an indefinite continuation of
our present superiority at sea. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval
power is built, faces a problem of limited refueling facilities, particularly

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Thus against a nuclear power we must always be prepared to fight a
limited nuclear war. Even should we decide to use conventional weapons
in certain circumstances, we would not dare to do so without a nuclear
establishment ready at hand. And in a war in which the U.S.S.R. is a
war in which the U.S.S.R. is a direct participant, nuclear weapons will
have to be used almost by necessity. In their face the huge Soviet con-
ventional armament becomes obsolescent. In their absence the Soviet Union
will have the choice of seeking to prevail with its large ground army and
failing that could still introduce nuclear weapons at a moment of maximum
difficulty for us.

That the Soviet Union is well aware of this is shown by its persistent
"ban the bomb" propaganda. Even an equality in nuclear weapons will not
change the fact that nuclear weapons complicate the tasks of an aggressor
and reduce the blackmail value of Soviet World War II type forces.

No one can look at the prospects of nuclear war with equanimity.
It raises many issues from "fall-out" to bomb testing to its moral aspect.
We shall deal with the issue of bomb testing in a later chapter. The
argument for not renouncing the use of nuclear weapons is that it represents
our best chance to maintain the peace and of reducing the Soviet advantage
in conventional forces. It is the price of our liberty and of our values.

22 WEST 55TH STREET

24th December

1957

TO: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: Charles Kline

Very brief changes in the attachment
as to the choice of words would,
I persist in believing, ~~improve its readability without~~
trespassing upon either intent
or accuracy. Suggested new wordings
are shown in ink.

[Y]

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December 23, 1957

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VI - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Because of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center
in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably
concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the
Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been a preoccupation of successive
administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment
ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found
the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

While detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments
outside the scope of this panel's undertaking, we have nevertheless sought to
identify the critical areas of weakness and to advance several broad principles
which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. It
seems to us that the major defects in the present organization are inherent and
organic, and will be further aggravated by the passage of time. These defects
are three in number:

1 - As now defined, the roles and missions assigned to the
individual military services are competitive, rather than
complementary; moreover, they are out of accord with both
weapons technology and the principal military threats to
our national safety;

2 - The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff precludes the development of a comprehensive
and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States;

and consistent strategic doctrine for the United States;

Chiefs of Staff precede the development of a comprehensive

8. The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint

our national security.

mechanics technology and the principal military threats to
complementarily, moreover, they are out of accord with both
individual military services are competitive, rather than

I. As now defined, the roles and responsibilities assigned to the

are these in number:

organic, and will be further aggravated by the passage of time. These defects
seems to us that the major defects in the present organization are inherent and
which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. It
identify the critical areas of weakness and to advance several broad principles
outside the scope of this panel's undertaking, we have nevertheless sought to

While detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments
the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found
administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment
Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been a preoccupation of successive
concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the
in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably

VI - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

December 33, 1963
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3 - The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the negative tasks of arbitrating and controlling inter-service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.

These points will be discussed in order.

## The Problem of Roles and Missions

The range and destructiveness of modern weapons have tended to overleap the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our effort to develop an adequate strategic plan has been beset by interservice rivalry. This rivalry is not due fundamentally to "parochialism" on the part of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and missions, and so preserved by law.

Ten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense organization, one result was expected by the public: that through joint planning by the Chiefs of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the authority of the Secretary of Defense, we would develop in concert our potential in all three media of operations: land, sea, and air. Such has not occurred. With the advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that the organization itself doomed this important goal.

However one judges the wisdom of this initial assignment of roles and missions, one fact is self evident: the stage was set for rivalry. The only

mitations, one fact is self evident: the state was act for rivalry. The only
important goal.

Advantage of principle, it is now clear that the organization itself deemed this
media of operations: land, sea, and air. Such has not occurred. With the
Secretary of Defense, we would develop in concert our potential in all three
by the Chiefs of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the authority of the
organization, one result was expected by the public: that through joint planning
ten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense
military.

To the military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and
of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and
ritual. This rivalry is not the fundamentally to "barochialism," on the part
effort to develop an adequate strategic plan has been devoted by interagency
oversee the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our
to the rule and destruction of modern weapons have tended to
ritual.

The institution and development of high military policy.

Service disputes that he cannot play his full part in
negative tasks of arbitrating and controlling inter-

3. The Secretary of Defense is so puritanized with the

December 23, 1925
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question in this regard was whether the competition could be kept at a healthy level and prevented from becoming destructive of efficiency (cf. The "B-36 Hearings").

Then came the new capabilities inherent in guided missiles. The army, never content with the quantity on the organization of its tactical air support saw the possibility of again having its own tactical air power. It also saw its short range air defense missiles developing into replacements for manned interceptor aircraft, and capable further of destroying enemy ballistic missiles in flight. The navy saw the possibilities of missiles launched from ships and submarines enlarging its role in strategic air warfare. Needless to say, the air force saw in all of this an undermining of the integrity of its mission and the unity of air power which had supplied the very reason for its creation.

More importantly, the assignment of roles and missions among the Army, Air Force and the Navy has become increasingly incommittent with the new technology. Each of these services has had the mission of defeating its enemy counterpart: the Army has had primary responsibility for the land battle, the Navy for control of the seas and the Air Force for the control of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of locomotion with everything moving by water assigned to the Navy, everything moving by land assigned to the Army and everything moving through the air assigned to the Air Force.

Ten years ago this assignment of roles still represented distinguishable strategic tasks. Each service was, therefore, able to control exclusively the

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weapons considered essential for achieving its mission. In general it could
develop its own strategy without too much risk of duplicating the tasks of a
sister service, and without too much risk of conflict over the issue of what
constituted essential targets.

But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the overwhelming
destructiveness of the new weapons have almost obliterated the traditional
boundaries among the services. Today, no service can achieve its primary
mission without either trespassing on the role of the other services or calling
on them for assistance. Some services, like the Navy, operate in all the media -
sea, land and air. Other missions are shared by two or more services, such as
tactical air support. Thus we have three services with airpower and two with
armies; the Air Force responsible for coordinating air defense but the Army
responsible for the air defense of specific targets.

As a result the division of functions which worked without fundamental
frictions until the end of World War II has become a source of bitter rivalry
in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a wrangle as to which service
should control it. It is inherent in the philosophy and training of each service
that it should see in the developing enemy threat predominantly those elements
which its own particular organization seems best adapted to counter. And each
service by a natural rationalization, judges the proper balance of forces to be
that one which maximizes its own role.

Such a procedure is costly and inefficient. It leads to a duplication of

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weapons systems. It prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and in every crisis confronts our policy makers with needlessly conflicting advice. New weapons are pressed into the strait jacket of obsolescent missions instead of refashioning missions to conform to revolutionary departures in technology and to new military problems.

Conversely, where there is no competition or duplication of mission, and little glamor in the tasks, the present organization may neglect certain vital tasks. An example is the problem of airlift for the ground forces. Providing such facilities our airforce responsibility is very expensive. When budgets are tight, the airforce is not likely to favor this mission at the expense of its primary task of defeating the enemy in the air, especially against the background of growing Soviet strength in planes and missiles. On the other hand the enemy is prevented by our mechanistic assignment of functions from developing and operating the transport aircraft it must have to move its forces swiftly to the combat zone.

## The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Except for the Chairman, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the senior officers of the military services. Therefore, even with the best will in the world, they must be, in considerable part, advocates of a service point of view. Each has risen to his position through a lifetime of dedication to his service. He is primarily the product of its training schools, its problems, its environment. Maintaining the status and morale of his service can never be far

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from his mind. Thus under the present organization most of the decisive
pressures on the JCS organization are imposed by the individual services, and
it functions too often as a committee of partisan adversaries
engaged in advancing service positions and compromising service differences.
Too little in present arrangements permits the Chiefs of Staff time and opportun-
ity to think spontaneously or comprehensively about overall strategic problems.
The result is that our military plans for meeting foreseeable threats are a
patchwork of compromise between conflicting strategic concepts or simply
completely uncoordinated <u>service</u> war plans. The readiness of our forces for
the time of dire emergency cannot be allowed to rest solely on committee action.

The Role of the Secretary of Defense

The organization of the military establishment into three competing
services, and the aggravation of this difficulty by obsolete roles & missions,
have shaped the role of the Secretary of Defense in ways not foreseen when
the office was created in 1947. To a great extent these conditions have con-
fined him to the essentially negative functions of adjudication and discipline.
He has become the referee in disputes over policy issues originating in the
services or in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the essence of a referee's position
that disputes reach him only <u>after</u> positions have hardened. The Secretary of
Defense has, in consequence, found it difficult to play the positive, creative
role which befits the cabinet officer who is a full member, with the President
and the Secretary of State, of the high policy triumvirate for foreign and military
affairs.

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In order to exercise the functions of adjudication and discipline, the Secretary of Defense and his staff are overwhelmed with many housekeeping and management functions which, were it not for deep-seated interservice rivalry, could be better handled by the individual services. This condition is reflected in a proliferation of Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the elaborate organization of the Secretary's office as a vast business concern with heavy emphasis on financial controls. We certainly do not dispute the need for financial controls, nor for the nation's largest enterprise to be run in a business-like manner. Nevertheless a principal objective of any reorganization plan should be to create conditions in which the Secretary of Defense can play a larger, more positive role in the initiation and formulation of broad military policy, and can delegate to the substructures of the defense organization a substantial portion of his present administrative burden.

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Proposed Remedies

The foregoing analysis indicates that the difficulties described are inherent in the present organization of the Defense Department, that they cannot be removed merely by adjustments of the present structure. The obstacles to correcting these deficiencies are formidable indeed, and no quick remedy panacea is at hand. Yet the growing increase in technological complexity, the foreseeable rise in the cost of maintaining first-line weapons systems, and the interdependence of foreign policy and military capability make it clear to us that our future security -- which is to say, our survival as a nation -- will require a far more efficient system for military planning and military decisions than now exists.

To remedy the central weaknesses, we feel competent to put forward certain general proposals for consideration. In our judgment a plan for reorganization of the Defense Department should include the following elements:

a) The military services, as such, should be removed from the channel of operational command. They should cease to be individually responsible for carrying out particular combat missions. Their responsibility should henceforth be to provide administrative support for the combined functional commands (to be described below) in matters of recruitment, training, research, procurement and supply. Freed from the responsibilities for operational commands, the service chiefs and their civilian superiors could concentrate on tasks of management and logistics.

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b) All of the operational military forces of the United States should be organized into functional commands to perform the missions which seem called for by our strategic requirements. No foreseeable conflict will fit the category of land, sea or air battle. As a result, unified commands are essential for the conduct of military operations as in fact they have been both in World War II and in the Korean War. Each such command should be composed of the appropriate elements from each military service brought together under a single commander. The units assigned to each functional commander should be organic to his command and not simply placed temporarily under his operational control. As units completed their training within the existing services they would be assigned to a functional command. Each command would be, in effect, a combined force with its own doctrine and trained to carry out distinctive tasks.

The composition and mission of these commands should not be frozen by legislation. They should be determined from time to time in the President's discretion, so that they remain *congruent with technology* and with the tasks an evolving strategy *will require to be performed*.

In such an organization officers would be brought more naturally to address themselves to strategic doctrine. To be sure, there will be rivalry between the functional commands; competition is a healthy concomitant of high morale. But with each functional area representing a distinguishable strategic *option*, the requirements of self-interest and of strategic doctrine would be much more in harmony than now.

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c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be given a **stronger role, specifically by giving him control over the staff. He should also be designated Principal Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the only member who can give his full-time attention to problems of overall strategic doctrine. It is therefore logical that he be the **Principal Military Advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense** instead of the Joint Chiefs collectively. At the same time he should be in a position to shape strategic planning. One major obstacle is the situation in which officers on inter-service committees are negotiators rather than planners and tend to represent the point of view of a service rather than the overall approach. A unified staff under the direct control of the Chairman would remove at least some of the service pressures on the members of the staff.

d) The chain of operational command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of **Staff**. Any modern war requires a **rapid reaction time** and this can be achieved only if there are a minimum number of organizational layers. Since the present division of functions among the military services often represents no distinguishable strategic **option**, the separate military departments should be relieved from responsibility for military operations. At the same time this proposal recognizes that the Secretary of Defense is the deputy commander-in-chief. His position in the line of command should thus serve to safeguard civilian control over the armed forces.

[Y]

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e) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the existing military departments. This recommendation is an application to logistics and manpower of the previous recommendation. The recruitment and training of officers in the earlier

f) All officers above the rank of Brigadier General or equivalent should be absorbed into a new and separate service (which might be called the Armed Service of the United States). For effective overall planning, it is essential that we develop a group of officers who throughout their careers have been encouraged to concern themselves with questions of strategic doctrine.

The procedure recommended here would retain the specialization necessary to command specific units and the morale which goes with membership in a service. At the higher levels, however, where the requirement is for an overall view there would exist a group of officers whose primary loyalties transcend service boundaries. Since entry into this group would be the goal of all officers throughout their careers, junior officers would have an incentive to take an overall view. Their future would depend on their ability to consider the whole, not as is so frequently the case today on the ability to defend the point of view of their service on interdepartmental committees. This proposal takes cognizance of the great impetus derived from service experience and motivation; but service experience will be most effective if it can be freed from the necessity of adhering to current instructions of individual services.

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g) The Secretary of Defense should be given authority to cancel
or transfer development and procurement programs among the services.

He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of long-range research and development programs not carried out by any of the services. One of the outstanding characteristics of the present period is the *basic relationship* between strategy and technology. When technology was relatively stable, the technical aspect of military planning usually involved problems either of procurement or of engineering. But today with technology developing at an explosive rate, the direction of its change is itself a primary strategic concern. As a result, the next war may well be won or lost in the laboratories and on the drawing boards. As long as the Secretary of Defense cannot shape the direction of research and development, his role will be the essentially passive one of arbitrating disputes formulated elsewhere. Where so much depends on keeping up and staying ahead in the technological race, it is essential that our weapons development reflects a clear sense of direction and not a compromise.

Research and development poses another challenge to our military
establishment. In the fields of engineering and procurement where most of
its experience lies, goals are fixed and progress can be gauged by well under-
stood criteria. By contrast, it is the nature of basic research that its results
are uncertain and that together with its very discoveries it produces the
criteria for judging them. A bureaucratic approach to it can only stifle creativ-
ity. The mode of organization and the pattern of creativity therefore tend to

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clash and when they do bureaucratic norms should be subordinate. With
respect to our fundamental problem of assuring our technological supremacy,
it is the task of our military establishment -- as of the national government --
to bring about an environment conducive to real creativity. As our government
has grown, it has followed the familiar course into a system of rewards that
favor caution and mediocrity. Seldom is anyone punished for inaction, but
often for measures that were risky and failed. It is especially important that
this pattern be reversed in research where there is an inherent uncertainty
and where great achievement is particularly inseparable from great risk.

The Problem of Lead Times

Lead time -- the interval between conception and execution -- has
never been more crucial. The best plans will be fruitless if they cannot be
implemented sufficiently quickly. The best production apparatus will be
ineffective if it requires too long to produce the necessary implements of war.
A nation can score a basic advantage if it can either develop or produce
weapons more rapidly than its opponent.

One of the major weaknesses in our strategic posture has been our
inordinately long lead times. They have been produced in part by the cumber-
some machinery in the Department of Defense and the National Government.
In part they have been caused by a quest for perfection in development and its
corollary an overconcern with the avoidance of mistakes. It is essential that

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we compress our lead times and the recommendations in this report should
help in this direction. At the same time there has to be a greater willingness
to run risks both in procurement and in development. Speed is of greater
importance than ~~security.~~ excessive caution.

## Strategy and Psychology

~~Another~~ One of the great weaknesses in the organization of our national government is the absence of a clear focus to assess the psychological impact of our actions. Whatever the wisdom of the decision not to engage in a race with the Soviets in the satellite field, it does not appear that the psychological impact of a Soviet breakthrough in this field had been sufficiently analyzed. Yet the riskier the more revolutionary developments of technology, the more their significance depends on the interpretation placed on them. Since very few of the modern weapons have ever been used in wartime, a great deal depends on what people think with respect to them. It is therefore essential that within our national government there exist a mechanism to assess the impact both at home and abroad of our actions in the military field as in others. This is a problem far transcending the organization of the Department of Defense. Is is mentioned here only because a section on organizational remedies would be incomplete without it.

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- 45a -

## Summary

If adopted together, the proposals in this chapter give promise of achieving the following objectives: (1) they would eliminate the root causes of interservice rivalry while fully utilizing the reservoir of leadership and special skills which each service represents; (2) through the device of functional combatant commands, the U.S. armed forces would be organized to carry out the distinguishable strategic and tactical tasks which correspond to the actual military threats which confront us; (3) through creation of a separate service for senior officers and provision for its administration by the Secretary of Defense, the motivation of the entire officer corps would be basically changed, for the goal of high rank and broad command could be reached only by transcending the boundaries of a particular service; (4) responsibility for strategic planning and for strategic direction of the armed forces would be clearly fixed in a high professional officer responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and supported by a strong staff drawn from all of the services. Achievement of these objectives would provide a unity and a coherence that are now absent from our Defense organization.