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To achieve these objectives, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent must meet at least three requirements: (a) its mission must be redefined; (b) its vulnerability must be reduced; and (c) its deployment must be changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use of battlefield weapons according to purely military criteria would surely obliterate the combat zone. Thus the mission of the tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered in isolation from the other, primarily strategic, operations which will be taking place. This makes it necessary to redefine some traditional military missions. For example, given the range of modern weapons, it is impossible to obtain air superiority without deep penetration of hostile territory on a scale indistinguishable from general nuclear war. Such operations should not be conducted by a theater commander fully occupied with the land-battle and complete air superiority may in any case be a meaningless concept in the face of the Soviet MRBM arsenal. This is why all weapons above a certain range (say three hundred miles) should be put under the Allied Nuclear Force described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons which remain under SACEUR's command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine the requirement or relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. Weapons not adequate for that role should be eliminated. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the

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tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, is impossible when close to ten thousand weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communication system could withstand such a strain.

During the Presidential campaign of 1964, it was proposed that one way of solving this problem would be to delegate authority to a military commander, specifically to SACEUR. This was justified with the argument that communications between Washington and Paris might be interrupted. But this proposal creates more problems than it solves. For one thing no other member of the Alliance would be prepared to make such a delegation of authority. Then again SACEUR would be extremely ill-advised to resort to nuclear weapons without making sure that SAC is alerted. But if communications are adequate for that purpose, they should also be adequate for political control to be exercised. Moreover, the real communication bottleneck is not between Washington and Paris, but between NATO headquarters and the field commanders. On the other hand, delegating authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to field commanders would mean that nuclear war could be started by officers least familiar with the strategic context and most subject to immediate pressures which may or may not be symptomatic of the over-all situation. Field commanders do not have access to strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union or to American plans about the

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contingency of general war. Thus the initial decision whether to use
tactical nuclear weapons will have to be made by Washington (or by the
Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below). Once the
decision is taken, it will not be possible to control every single
tactical weapon. They will have to be released by category of range, yield
and, above all, geographic location. This underlines the urgent need for
an agreed NATO strategic doctrine.

Another subject requiring careful re-examination is NATO deployment.
Currently it is an uneasy compromise between the attempt to retain a
conventional option and the reality that nuclear weapons have become an
integral part of the equipment of all military units. This reflects a
real dilemma. To fight a conventional war, military units must concentrate;
to be effective during nuclear operations, they must disperse. Units
deployed for conventional operations present tempting targets for nuclear
attack and may thus invite it. Units deployed for nuclear war are too
dispersed to resist an attack with conventional weapons. In all likelihood,
it will be impossible to shift from one mode of deployment to another
during military operations, particularly if the opponent has introduced
nuclear weapons first. But current NATO deployment involves precisely
this danger. Units are concentrated as if the likely attack would be
conventional. At the same time, even their forward echelons are equipped
with nuclear weapons. This concentration coupled with the ambiguity of
NATO doctrine and the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons gives an
aggressor a high incentive to use nuclear weapons first.

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It has become abundantly clear that NATO will not raise sufficient troops for a purely conventional defense of Europe--all trends, in fact, are in the opposite direction. It is therefore crucial that deployment on the Continent take into account the realities of NATO in the next decade. NATO's conventional forces are suitable for two major roles: (a) To act as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack is, in fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures of NATO territory. (b) To furnish a reserve to resist aggression on the flanks of NATO or in areas outside of Europe where the Alliance might agree on joint action.

NATO deployment should reflect this. There should be a screen of conventional forces deployed forward and organized for purely conventional combat. These units do not require nuclear weapons. The size of this screen would depend on the total NATO forces which are available and on a military estimate of what is required to force a major Soviet concentration before aggression can have any chance of success. Behind this screen the remainder of NATO's divisions should be deployed. Except for a strategic reserve, they should be equipped and organized for nuclear war. With such a deployment, it would be obvious to any aggressor that once operations reached a certain magnitude nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsibility for operations should be assigned no lower than the corps level and weapons should be released only by an appropriate political authority (preferably the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).

10

See Chapter VIII, p.

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In addition, there should be a strategic reserve capable of conducting either conventional or tactical nuclear war and organized to intervene rapidly either in a land battle in Europe or in distant theaters.

### C. Conclusion--The Military Organization of the Alliance

The military organization of the Alliance would then appear as follows:

(1) There would be an Allied Nuclear Force. It would be constituted from existing NATO weapons above a range of, say, three hundred miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States together with an eventual French contribution. If the MLF proposal survives the re-examination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should also have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.¹¹

(2) SACEUR would retain tactical nuclear weapons up to a range of, say, three hundred miles. However, their deployment would be altered in order to create real conventional and nuclear options. Their number would be related to the existing missions.

11

See below Chapter VIII, P.

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(3) The deployment of conventional forces would clearly reflect their primary mission of acting as a screening force and furnishing a strategic reserve.

However, no arrangement of military forces will, of itself, solve the problems of the Alliance. The ultimate challenge lies in the political field. It is whether NATO can develop common purposes and whether it can devise a political structure which combines community with flexibility.