KISSINGER SPEECH

May 7, 1985
International Councillors
Phillips Collection

DRAFT

.....I will speak with you quite informally about three topics:

One, the current state of these Western nations as I see them. Secondly, some of the choices that I think we need to make in Central America; and third, some longer term problems which really, as a nation ought to be thinking about and for which I don't really think we have mechanisms to think at this moment.

First, East-West relations. There has developed a, sort of a style now in which each Soviet succession. Uh, the leader dies, Western statesmen rush to Moscow, they meet the new leader and they announce that he is dedicated to peace, that they've been very impressed and that a new great opportunity to make progress exists.

I've always been puzzled how they arrived at this conclusion because since the maximum of time that is available for a meeting with a briefing with a Head of State is thirty minutes and since common decency requires that you say a few words about the unfortunate departed, that you then assume you get past three minutes, give the translator three minutes, that means you have twelve minutes of real conversation to determine the intentions of the new Soviet leader. When the new Soviet leader is old, we are told that he, that old men are very cautious. When the new Soviet leader is young, we are told that young men are dedicated to progressive ideas.

-13-

strong attenuation of the Sandinista government? And I
really would like to appeal to the Congressional groups here
to try to get a resolution of these issues rather than this,
if you forgive me, petifogging debate on whether one should
give humanitarian aid to guerrillas or lethal aid to guerrillas
or if $14 million is adequate to defend our vital interests.
If the interests are vital, it cannot be...it would be
amazing if $14 million were the right sum. Of if it is,
maybe we should apply to some foundation. And get the
agony over with.

Now, I wanted to mention a few issues that go beyond
these immediate ones. I have mentioned one - what kind of
a world do we visualize in the year 2000 not only in terms
of east-west relations but in general. For example, nobody
is more sentimental about China than I am or more dedicated
to close relationships. Yet, it would be naive to believe
that if China succeeds in its industrialization program and
if it becomes as powerful as, say, Japan was in the 1960s,
that this will not have strategic consequences. It would
be unprecedented that a nation of that size and of that
history would not want to translate its potential into some
political benefit. I will not get the answer here to what
this means but that's only 15 years away.

We talk a lot about the event of democracy in the
Western Hemisphere as if this automatically produced con-

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ciliation, peace and progress. But it is precisely democracy
that imposes the obligation that these governments have
something to show other than austerity.

I am very impressed with what de la Rosiere (sp?) said yesterday. I just question whether the political process American in every Latin American country will give us the time to let it work itself out. What, in my view, is needed is some dialog with the major countries of the Western Hemisphere that states some positive goal other than interest repayment, and that contributes to fulfilling the aspirations of their people.

I know we cannot make grants as in the Marshall Plan, period but there must be some close strategy industrial democracies can develop that supplies an answer to that question.

And finally, we are all going to be living in a
world that is much more familiar to Akio than it is to me--
the world of rapid communication exchanges, which is,
incidentally, one reason why I believe the Soviets are
doomed to fall further and further behind us. Because even
if they master computer technology, I don't see how they
can agree to give access to the numbers of people that are
required to master the modern system.

But I believe there is something else involved to which
I really don't have the answer. There aren't many audiences

-15-

(garbled). I believe that a new
type of person is developing under the impact of this
new technology. My generation, and most of the people
in this room, were brought up on books and in books
you can really....and you had to have an imagination
of
because the scenes described...and it develops a sort of
leisurely approach to making up your mind.

By the end of the century, an increasing number
and soon a majority will have been brought up on visual
will
presentations and they/have acquired their information
and their knowledge from pictures, or at any rate, read
from visual presentations. They will be more literal
minded, more emotional because they are much more dependent
on the mood that is conveyed, than the generations we
have known.

What this means for politics in all countries
and for foreign policy is something which I don't think
has been analyzed and that takes me to my fundamental
worry which is that I don't see anyplace where long-
range questions or semi-philosophical questions can be
philosophically discussed these days. And I think that
our national debate is sort of degenerating into a
series of petty expedients. And that's not such a
trivial matter. If Gorbachev takes the offensive option

-16-

that I've described, or even if he drags us into prolonged substantive negotiations - a negotiation hanging on Star Wars, how are we going to get through this when the impression is created that negotiations are like a detective story in which one side shows all their clues and it is our duty to guess at the answer and if we guess wrong, we will then be forever after accused of having missed a great opportunity.

It is possible, of course, that every Administration who has dealt with the problem is wrong, but it isn't self-evident to me that an area 500 miles from our Southern border is not vital. And who can take the chance that it is. And then of course there are the longer term problems that I have hinted. Now these seem to be issues that we confront right now. I think there is the opportunity in the Soviet system...in the Soviet relationship...not because of the peaceful intentions of Gorbachev, which I don't know, and for all I know, he doesn't know. And it would anyway depend on how he defines peace. But in the fact that for the first time in God knows...in decades, there will be an almost entirely new Politburo and massive internal pressures of the Soviet Union plus a reasonable prediction that trends are not in their favor that could produce a serious dialog, provided we know what we want to talk about.

-17-

So, I think we have a great opportunity in that respect.
I think myself that if we do not bring about in Central
America by the fall of 1986 a fundamental change at least
on the military side of the Nicaraguan situation that Central
America will deteriorate rapidly after that...that there is
no way around that issue, and I put aside now the issue of
the survival of the Sandinista regime, and I do not see
how this can be done unless there is a combination of
incentives and pressures. It cannot be done by
______ diplomacy. And even if we solve all these problems, we must
build in the Western Hemisphere a positive relationship and
we cannot exhaust our energies in avoiding catastrophe in,
country after country in quarterly installments.

That's what seems to be before us.

He now takes a few questions

KISSINGER SPEECH

May 7, 1985

CSIS International Council
Phillips Collection

DRAFT

-13-

strong attenuation of the Sandinista government? And I
really would like to appeal to the Congressional groups here
to try to get a resolution of these issues rather than this,
if you forgive me, petifogging debate on whether one should
give humanitarian aid to guerrillas or lethal aid to guerillas,
or if $14 million is adequate to defend our vital interests.
If the interests are vital, it cannot be...it would be
amazing if $14 million were the right sum. Of if it is,
maybe we should apply to some foundation. And get the
agony over with.

Now, I wanted to mention a few issues that go beyond
namely
these immediate ones. I have mentioned one - what kind of
a world do we visualize in the year 2000 not only in terms
of east-west relations but in general. For example, nobody
is more sentimental about China than I am or more dedicated
to close relationships. Yet, it would be naive to believe
that if China succeeds in its industrialization program and
if it becomes as powerful as, say, Japan was in the 1960s,
that this will not have strategic consequences. It would
be unprecedented that a nation of that size and of that
history would not want to translate its potential into some
political benefit. I will not get the answer here to what
this means but that's only 15 years away.

-14-

ciliation, peace and progress. But it is precisely democracy
that imposes the obligation that these governments have
something to show other than austerity. I am very
very impressed with what de la Rosiere (sp?) said
yesterday. I just question whether the political process
American
in every Latin country will give us the time to let it work
itself out. What, in my view, is needed is some dialog
with the major countries of the Western Hemisphere that
states some positive goal other than interest repayment,
and that contributes to fulfilling the aspirations of their
people.

I know we cannot make grants as in the Marshall Plan
period but there must be some close strategy industrial
democracies can develop that supplies an answer to that
question.

-15-

By the end of the century, an increasing number
and soon a majority will have been brought up on visual
presentations and they have acquired their information
and their knowledge from pictures, or at any rate, read
from visual presentations. They will be more literal
minded, more emotional because they are much more dependent
on the mood that is conveyed, than the generations we
have known.

What this means for politics in all countries
and for foreign policy is something which I don't think
has been analyzed and that takes me to my fundamental
worry which is that I don't see any place where long-
range questions or semi-philosophical questions can be
philosophically discussed these days. And I think that
our national debate is sort of degenerating into a
series of petty expedients. And that's not such a
trivial matter. If Gorbachev takes the offensive option

-16-

[y]

-17-

He now takes a few questions

KISSINGER SPEECH

May 7, 1985
International Council
Phillips Collection

DRAFT

C1

-12-

to compensate for some conservative domestic policies but by
radical domestic rhetoric praying that we would not take their
advice all that seriously.

Columbia has attempted to keep its guerrilla movement
under some sort of control by not challenging Castro too
overtly. And my impression, and ________ can correct me,
is that the Venezuelan government does not disagree radically
with our analysis. But I will not pursue the subject further
except to say that what the Contadora process produces is
entirely a result of our promises. Contadora does not want
us to agree with it in my view. Contadora wants us to take
a position which enables them to take a middle position
between whatever it is that we advocate and whatever it is
that the radical side wants. And, therefore, we cannot turn
over the process to Contadora. We can take a thoughtful
position which produces a parallelagram of forces in which
the predictable Contadora position, and if we are very skill-
ful, the agreed Contadora's position is close to what we
really want,...is as close to what we can live with as
possible. That seems to be the challenge.

But we cannot get to that if we are not prepared to
answer the first question -- what are we prepared to pay
for reducing military and intelligence potential of Nicaragua?
Or the second question, are we after a military
solution or do we also insist on the removal or at least

-13-

I am very impressed with what de la Rosiere (sp?) said yesterday. I just question whether the political process American in every LatinX country will give us the time to let it work itself out. What, in my view, is needed is some dialog with the major countries of the Western Hemisphere that states some positive goal other than interest repayment, and that contributes to fulfilling the aspirations of their people.

-15-

-16-

-17-

So, I think we have a great opportunity in that respect.
I think myself that if we do not bring about in Central
America by the fall of 1986 a fundamental change at least
on the military side of the Nicaraguan situation that Central
America will deteriorate rapidly after that...that there is
no way around that issue, and I put aside now the issue of
the survival of the Sandinista regime, and I do not see
how this can be done unless there is a combination of
incentives and pressures. It cannot be done by ______
diplomacy. And even if we solve all these problems, we must
build in the Western Hemisphere a positive relationship and
we cannot exhaust our energies in avoiding catastrophe in
country after country in quarterly installments.

He now takes a few questions