REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FOLLOWING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SFRC

OCTOBER 3, 1975

**Secretary Kissinger:** We had a very fruitful discussion and we are moving towards a resolution of problems. The really only issue is in what form there will be a public statement of all the relevant undertakings and commitments which have been before the committee for several weeks. And we have have had a very detailed and I repeat, very useful discussion going through all of the relevant documents. And we are dealing with this in the spirit of partnership and not confrontation -- if I may so -- on both sides.

**Question:** Are you coming back here, Mr. Secretary, or are you finished as far as the closed session is concerned?

**Secretary Kissinger:** The committee is now in Executive Session and they know that I am available to come back. There is no time fixed for my return.

**Question:** Did you discuss with them this morning what might be disclosed and what might not? Did they discuss this with you?

**Secretary Kissinger:** We discussed it, and they are meeting in Executive Session now. But I repeat, we think that the agreement is important. We think progress towards peace in the Middle East is of vital interest to all Americans and I think both the committee and the Executive branch agree that this can only be done in partnership between the Congress and the Executive branch. And that was the spirit that prevailed in the committee today.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, if the committee should so decide, would you agree to publication of documents in the report that the committee publishes?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I don't want to say what our reaction would be to various committee decisions. We are not in favor of declassifying documents which we submitted on a classified basis, but we are hopeful of finding a solution.

**Question:** Would it disturb you if the committee published documents that had been published in the newspapers without your then agreeing that they were the documents?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I don't want to go through all the various formulas that human ingenuity can devise.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, is it true as Secretary Schlesinger

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indicates that there will be no Pershing missiles delivered
to Israel?

The
Secretary Kissinger: /issue of the Pershing missile is
under study by the NSC group. We had agreed to study them
and we are studying them. There has been no final decision
taken but there was never any plan of making an immediate
decision. So, this is an issue that has been blown out of
all proportion; they have been studied since August 1974 and
they continue to be studied. And there will be many
opportunities for an exchange of views before a final
decision.

Question: Mr. Schlesinger said they would destabilize the
whole situation over there. That's the Secretary of
Defense's view.

Secretary Kissinger: At some point these views are going
to be fed into the NSC system, and when they are, we will
consider them.

TOAST AT METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART [FINAL]
DINNER IN HONOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS DIPLOMATIC
CORPS

[LC]

October 4, 1973

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished representatives of the world's nations, ladies and gentlemen:

As I welcome you to this hall, let me also issue a word of warning. To those of you who are diplomats, be mindful of what you say, for you are surrounded by members of the press.

And to those of you who are members of the press, be careful not to take too seriously everything you hear, for you are surrounded by diplomats.

But let me hasten to add that I mean no offense to the honored profession of diplomacy. I am now, by nomination of the President and confirmation of the Senate, a diplomat myself.

And as a former historian I know that 16th Century scholars believed that the world's first ambassadors were angels -- messengers from heaven to earth.

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Present on this occasion is a glorious mix of
tongues, creeds, and races.

Here also are the leaders of an institution designed
to serve all peoples of the world, not a particular people
or culture or national policy.

And here are leaders of the United States Congress,
men who remind us that, from the days of Warren Austin
and Arthur Vandenburg, Americans -- no matter what
their party -- have always supported the United Nations.

Finally, we are honored by the artists, academics
and journalists who are with us tonight, for they are all
guarantors of our diversity and trustees of our common
humanity.

Thus, this assemblage symbolizes the world as it
is. But more, it symbolizes the world as it can be. For
here in the United Nations, and at these tables tonight, we

have come together, across the boundaries of our differences,
because of our common goal -- our hope for peace and a
better world for all mankind.

Ralph Waldo Emerson once cited a fable from an
unknown antiquity:

The Gods, in the beginning, divided Man
into men, that he might be more helpful to
himself; just as the hand was divided into
fingers, the better to answer its end.

This is a wisdom that neither men nor nations have
yet understood or practiced. Over the centuries we have
emphasized our philosophic and political varieties rather
than our common destiny; we have been more given to conflict
than cooperation. Of the species on this planet, man alone
has inflicted upon himself most of his own suffering.

In an age of potential nuclear cataclysm, in an age of
instant communication amidst ideological conflict, our most

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urgent task is to overcome these apparently iron laws of history. The vision of a world community based on justice, not power, is the necessity of our age.

So let us hold to values worthy of our goals, remembering that great works are not possible without deep commitment.

Where there is oppression, let us seek justice.

Where there is hunger, let us seek abundance.

Where there is inhumanity, let us have compassion.

Where there is distrust, let us strive for good faith.

Let us learn, as well, the difference between truth and self-righteousness. Let us recognize that no nation or group of nations can demand understanding for its own problems alone. Let us make sure that the best does not become the enemy of the good. Let us recall that the ideal can be reached only by stages that define the attainable. We will be judged finally by our deeds not our proclamations.

I pledge you that the United States is ready to begin
the journey toward a world community. Our sights will
be raised even when our tread must be measured. We will
make no excessive promises, but we will keep every
promise we shall make. We look upon stability as a
bridge to the realization of human dreams, not as an end
in itself. We know that peace will come when all -- the
small as well as the large, have a share in its shaping,
and that it will endure when all -- the weak as well as the
strong -- have a stake in its lasting.

Hope has been likened to a road in the country: It
is not there to begin with; but as it is travelled more and
more, it comes into existence.

So let us work together to change our practices,
not our ideals. In our daily labors let us travel the road
of our hopes until what is now unfamiliar becomes natural
and what is now our vision becomes our reality.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

October 7, 1975

No. 522

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON THE
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT

OCTOBER 7, 1975

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to appear before your Committee to testify on the recent agreement between Israel and Egypt. That agreement -- if carried out in good faith by both parties -- may well mark an historic turning point away from the cycle of war and stalemate that has for so long afflicted Israelis and Arabs and the world at large. I am here to urge prompt and positive Congressional action to help further the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

For more than thirty years the issues in dispute in that troubled region have been recognized by successive American Administrations as having pro- found consequences for America's own interests. The United States diplomatic people in the Middle East is a matter of vital national importance:

We have an historic and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel.

We have important interests in the Arab world with its 150 million people and the world's largest oil reserves.

We know that the world's hopes, and our own, for economic recovery and progress could be dashed by another upheaval in the Middle East.

We must avoid the severe strains on our relations with our allies in Europe and Japan that perpetual crisis in the Middle East would almost certainly entail.

We face the dangers of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation, with its attendant nuclear risk if tension in the Middle East should increase.

The October War of 1973 brought home to every American, in concrete and dramatic ways, the price we pay for continued Arab-Israeli conflict. The oil embargo triggered by that war cost us 500,000 jobs, more than $10 billion in national production, and a rampant inflation. The 1973 crisis put our alliances with Western Europe and Japan under the most serious strain they had ever known. And it brought us to the verge of a confrontation with the Soviet Union requiring us to place our military forces on a global alert.

Thus for the most basic reasons of national policy we owe it to the American people to do all we can to ensure that the Middle East moves towards peace and away from conflict.

For further information contact:

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PR 522

If the past two years of vigorous diplomatic endeavor have promoted the prospects of peace -- as I believe they have -- the United States has made the difference. We have maintained our special relationship with Israel, while at the same time dramatically improving our relations with the Arab world. It is the United States alone among the world's nations that both Israel and its Arab neighbors have been prepared to trust. This link of confidence must be maintained. Without it the Middle East will have lost the key element of its stability. Without it the period ahead -- difficult at best -- may well grow unmanageable.

It is our strong conviction that the Sinai Agreement is indispensable to the process of peace. Were I here today to report that we had failed to obtain a Sinai Agreement, I would have to tell you, as well, that the prospects of still another Arab-Israeli war were infinitely and imminently greater. Instead, I can state that the prospects for peace in the Middle East have been significantly advanced, and that good chances exist for even further progress -- if we have the wisdom and the national will to seize the opportunity before us.

Hailed by both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat as a possible turning point, the Sinai Agreement represents the most far-reaching, practical test of peace -- political, military, and psychological -- in the long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time in more than two decades, Israel and an Arab state have agreed, not just to disentangle their forces in the aftermath of war, but to commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of the differences that for so long have made them mortal enemies.

Thus, what we are proposing to the Congress-- as we seek approval for the stationing of no more than 200 technicians in the Sinai -- is an investment in peace. But we must never forget that the most precarious part of the road toward a just and lasting peace still lies ahead. We will require national unity and a sympathetic understanding for the delicacy of the process if we are to continue the journey.

With these considerations in mind, Mr. Chairman, I urge this Committee and the Congress to respond promptly and sympathetically to the President's request for approval of the stationing of up to 200 Americans in the Sinai -- a request that has now been before the Congress for more than four weeks.

The proposed American presence is a limited but crucial American responsibility. It is not a role we sought; it is a role we accepted reluctantly at the request of both sides -- and only when it was clear that there would be no agreement without it. The American personnel will be volunteers, and they will be civilian. Their function is to assist in an early warning system in the small area of the Sinai passes in the UN buffer zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers for one side; they will serve both sides at their request. They will complement the UN military contingents already there from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria and Finland whose responsibility it is to protect the buffer zone. Nor is our own presence in the area new -- thirty-six Americans are serving there at this moment with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The proposal we ask you to approve provides that the President may withdraw these volunteer technicians if we believe them to be in jeopardy or are no longer necessary. We are prepared, as well, to accept the Congressional proposal to make withdrawal mandatory in the event of hostilities.

Mr. Chairman, I am well aware of, and respect, this Committee's desire to be certain that it has before it all undertakings relevant to its consideration and approval of the proposal for U. S. participation in the Sinai early warning system.

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PR 522

We have made an unprecedented effort to meet the Committee's concerns. Within days of my return from the Middle East we voluntarily supplied to the Committees of Congress, on a classified basis, highly sensitive material relevant to the negotiations of the Sinai Accord. Included in this material was information from the record of the negotiations of the very category which President Washington declined to furnish to the House of Representatives in 1794, and which no Administration has supplied since.

Four weeks ago, we provided four sets of documents to the appropriate Congressional Committees. They are:

First, the United States Proposal for stationing technicians in the Sinai.

Second, the unclassified Agreement between Israel and Egypt, and its military annex.

Third, the classified documents which the Administration has certified include all of the assurances, undertakings, and commitments which we consider to be legally binding upon the United States. These documents also contain many provisions which are not considered legally binding, they were submitted because they were contained in documents which include binding clauses and which were initialed or signed by the United States and one of the parties.

Fourth, extracts from other classified documents in the negotiating record which the Administration believes are legally binding assurances, undertakings, or commitments. We have included in this category certain provisions which, although not regarded by the Administration as binding, might be so regarded by others.

Finally, the Legal Adviser of the State Department submitted yesterday to this Committee on a classified basis a memorandum which provides his assessment of the legal character of all the documents previously given to the Congress.

We presented these classified documents on the assumption that they would be treated as if they had been transmitted under the Case Act, which provides for submission of executive agreements to the Congress, but with "an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President."

Mr. Chairman, the Executive Branch has complied with both the letter and spirit of the Committee's resolution requesting the President to inform the Committee "of all the assurances and undertakings by the United States on which Israel and Egypt are relying in entering into the Sinai Agreement..." I am authorized on behalf of the President to state that there are no other assurances or undertakings, beyond those already submitted to the Congress, which are binding upon the United States. We will make no contrary claim in the future; nor can any other government.

Mr. Chairman, if there has been a disagreement between this Committee and the Executive Branch over the past several weeks, it has concerned not disclosure to the Congress -- which has been complete -- but the form of disclosure to the public.

We had hoped that a summary could be worked out with the Committee which could have been certified as containing all commitments so that the full Senate would feel free to vote unreservedly on the U. S. technicians.

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PR 522

This procedure was intended as a means of satisfying the needs of the
Congress and the rights of the American people to know, while at the same
time maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of the diplomatic process.
We believed that we were following the precedents set in previous negotia-
tions in the Middle East when classified documents were submitted to the
Congress but not made public. Our purpose was to avoid a situation in which
other governments would feel compelled to take a public position and to
protect our ability to act as a mediator in the future.

This plan became problematical when the confidential documents were leaked.
This created a new and very difficult situation. The Administration disagrees
with the decision of the Committee to publish these documents and maintains
that it in no way sets a precedent. We consider that the provisions of
the Case Act regarding classification remain valid; they should be respected
in the future.

We recognize that the Committee faced an unusual problem to which no good
answer existed. We are prepared to work with this Committee to develop
procedures for future negotiations which will permit ground rules to be
clearly established in advance so that all parties will know what to expect.

With regard to the U. S. undertakings, the Administration is particularly
concerned about two points:

First, that Congressional approval of the proposal on the technicians
not link the Sinai Agreement to the U. S. undertakings -- which are distinct
and separate; and

Second, that U. S. statements of intention not be given a legally
binding character which was never intended and is not inherent in them.

The Administration is convinced that Congressional approval of the proposal
to station technicians in the Sinai does not import or imply approval of
anything more.

The United States is not a party to the Sinai Agreement. That Agreement
is between Israel and Egypt; they are the only signatories and the only
states bound by it. The Agreement repeatedly speaks of the obligations of
"the parties"; it is beyond dispute that "the parties" are Egypt and Israel,
and *not* the United States.

The Agreement provides, in an annex, that in the buffer zone between Egypt
and Israel -- in which the United Nations Emergency Force will continue
to perform its functions -- there will be established an early warning
system entrusted to United States civilian personnel. The proposal of the
United States, for which approval of the Congress is being sought, provides
details of that early warning system. That proposal is described as a *part
of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, but that does not imply that
the United States is party to this Agreement. By the same token the U. S.
assurances and undertakings before this Committee, while given on the
occasion of, and concordant with the conclusion of the Sinai Agreement
between Egypt and Israel, are not in any sense part of the Sinai Agreement.*

Thus, even if the United States were unable to fulfill all of the intentions
we have expressed, the parties -- Egypt and Israel -- would nonetheless
remain bound by the Sinai Agreement. The obligations of the Egyptian-
Israeli Agreement are clear, direct and unqualified; they stand on their own

A vote in favor of the specific, limited U. S. role in the early warning
system will not thereby commit the Congress to a position on any other

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PR 522

issue -- whether it be the question of undertakings and assurances to the parties involved; our continuing relations with various countries of the area; a given level of budget support; or our policies and programs in the Middle East. Those are separate issues which you will want to consider carefully at the appropriate time. Many will come up in the normal authorization and appropriation process; they are not an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement.

Let me turn now to the question of the nature of American assurances and undertakings to Israel and Egypt.

The special position of trust enjoyed by the United States inevitably means that both sides attach great significance to our views. Statements of our intentions, therefore, served as a lubricant in this most recent negotiation just as they have in every previous mediation effort. But they must be seen in perspective and in the light of historical practice. It is extremely important, therefore, that in approving the sending of U. S. technicians the Congress should take care not inadvertently to create commitments that were never intended.

We have submitted all documents containing U. S. commitments. Not all provisions in these documents amount to binding undertakings. They include:

First, assurances by the U. S. of our political intentions. These are often statements typical of diplomatic exchange; in some instances they are merely formal reaffirmations of existing American policy. Other provisions refer to contingencies which may never arise and are related -- sometimes explicitly -- to present circumstances subject to rapid change.

Second, undertakings or assurances by the U. S. which are conditional on existing or prior authorization and appropriation of the Congress or which fall within the constitutional authority of the President to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.

Thus to speak of Memoranda of Agreement as Executive Agreements is by no means to say that each of their individual provisions is binding upon the United States. That depends entirely upon the content of the specific provisions in question. Moreover, nothing in these particular documents constrains Congressional action in any issue involving the future legislative process.

The fact that many provisions are not by any standard international commitments does not mean, of course, that the United States is morally or politically free to act as if they did not exist. On the contrary, they are important statements of diplomatic policy and engage the good faith of the United States so long as the circumstances that gave rise to them continue. But they are not binding commitments of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude with this thought: the Sinai Accord could prove to be an historic milestone. It is not a peace agreement, but it can be an important step in that direction.

The United States remains committed to helping bring a just, durable and comprehensive peace to the Middle East. We do not consider the Sinai Agreement as permitting stagnation in the process of negotiation; its purpose is to give impetus to that process. We are prepared to work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining -- including the issue of the future of the Palestinians.

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PR 522

Whether the Sinai Agreement fulfills its promise depends crucially on the confidence and trust America inspires. Yet we cannot gain -- nor retain -- confidence abroad if we lack it at home. Whether there will be peace or war in the Middle East depends importantly on whether America is at peace with itself; whether America is united in its purpose.

The challenge now is to build on the progress that has been made. So let us get on with the job, for there will be no Sinai Accord unless the Congress of the United States takes positive action to approve the proposal to place up to 200 technicians in the Sinai. And if there is no accord, then all that America has worked for, and all that the Middle East has hoped for, may well be lost.

So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully ask that this Committee act now to approve the resolution before it, so that Israel and Egypt can get on with the business of implementing the Sinai Accord, and so that the march toward peace can be resumed in the Middle East.

* * * * *

PROPOSED TOAST

FOR

THE SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON
IN HONOR OF THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

October 7, 1975

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished guests: We are pleased to have you with us in Washington. Personally, I feel I am something of a novice at understanding the inner workings of the Commission and the subcommissions. In this I will have to defer to you, Mr. Minister. After all, you are now energetically discharging the responsibilities of your fourth Cabinet post while I am still on my first.

Seriously, I think we can be proud of the accomplishments of the Joint Commission. The three subcommissions have been active since holding their successful initial meetings in January and February, and the groundwork for an ambitious and varied program of activities has already been laid.

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The Joint Commission, of course, will only be what we make of it. It was not created as a substitute for more traditional channels of relations between our countries.

Rather, it is meant as a catalyst, to facilitate, to encourage, and to suggest new ways of extending those ties and creating new ones, and it should reflect in its work the very special blend of public and private sectors evident in its make-up.

I am sure you will agree with me, Mr. Minister, that the Joint Commission represents the type of undertaking we want to encourage. It is a cooperative enterprise to which both our nations are giving their special resources -- whether they be material, cultural, scientific or commercial-- for their mutual benefit. It is also an endeavor with implications

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reaching beyond the borders of India and the United States.

For joint commissions such as ours, if successful, can become
important, if unheralded, factors in bringing about the
changes and accommodations in the world which will help
close the gap between rich and poor, developed and developing,
consumer and producer.

It is our mutual responsibility to seek practical ways
to address world economic problems. The United States in
recent weeks has made a number of concrete proposals for
action. India, for its part, has spoken to the issues with wisdom
and moderation. I am hopeful that this example of common
purpose, cutting across lines of geography and background,
will serve as an inspiration in coming months to all who will
be discussing the future directions of the world economy.

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Mr. Minister, during the past two days you have had
occasion to hold friendly and far-reaching discussions with
the President, with me, and with other senior American officials
including members of Congress. It is no surprise that there
were some issues on which we differed. This is altogether
natural and healthy. The important point is that we were
able to find so much of mutual interest. It augurs well for
the future and for the mature and productive relationship we
wish to build between India and the United States.

May I now offer a toast to you, Mr. Minister, and to
the success of the Joint Commission, and to the spirit of
cooperation it both fosters and represents.

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 7, 1975

NO. 523-A

REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER
AND
INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER Y. B. CHAVAN
UPON THE SIGNING OF THE
AGREEMENT OF THE INDO-U.S. JOINT COMMISSION
OCTOBER 7, 1975

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

I think the signing of this agreement is an
auspicious occasion which symbolizes the work that has
been done during the past year by the Joint Commission
and the work that still lies ahead.

The United States and India agreed last
year, on the occasion of my visit to New Delhi, to
place our relationship on a more long-term and more
effective and more permanent basis, free from some of the
emotional swings that had characterized some of our relationship
previously.

In this new and more mature relationship, both
sides have come to understand their permanent
common interest in peace, stability and progress, and
they can cooperate on global problems from the point of
their different perspectives but, nevertheless, keeping
always in mind that they have a common stake in world
peace and a common interest that development take place
on the basis of cooperation and not confrontation

PR 523-A

2

We agree with what the Foreign Minister said to the United Nations -- that nations should begin confronting problems and not each other. This is the spirit in which the relationship between the developed and the developing nations should take place, to which India and the United States can make an important contribution.

I'd like to thank the Chairmen of the Sub-commissions that have done such effective work. We will continue our exchanges on the subjects that the Commission deals with as well as on other political problems of common interest, and we hope to have another meeting of this Joint Commission next spring in India.

Thank you very much.

FOREIGN MINISTER CHAVAN: Thank you.

(Applause.)

FOREIGN MINISTER CHAVAN: Mr. Secretary of State and friends:

I consider this a significant occasion. Today we have signed a document which encompasses the work put in by three Subcommissions of the Indo-U. S. Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation in working out a program

PR 523-A

3

for the coming years.

I'm glad that both our sides have been able to
reach agreement on a wide-ranging area in each of the
specified fields.

What we have tried to achieve in the document
we have signed today is to lay down guidelines for an
action-oriented and time-borne program which we expect will lead
to tangible results in the years ahead. The Joint
Business Council, which has been set up under the auspices
of the Subcommission on Economic and Commercial Affairs
will, we hope, serve as a useful body, enabling a
fuller exchange of views and practical cooperation
between business leaders of both countries.

A significant organizational aspect of the
Joint Business Council, from our viewpoint, is the
participation of Indian public-sector organizations in
the work of the Council.

Another important body which has been agreed to
is the Working Group on Industrial Cooperation, which
will be entrusted with the task of identifying and promoting
joint industrial interests in third countries involving
Indian manufacturing and consultancy services. And the

PR 523-A

4

earnestness of our two governments to secure maximum benefit
to both sides from such cooperation is highlighted by
our agreement to hold initial discussions with a view
to conclude a treaty to a wide and double taxation.

I would like to make a special mention here
of the very useful exchange of views which I have had
with Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger, as well as with
other colleagues in the United States Government.

I also have had the privilege of meeting
President Ford and to view Indo-U. S. relations in broad
perspective.

I share your view, Mr. Secretary, that the
Joint Commission provides an institutional framework for
developing our relations on a mature, a realistic
and stable basis -- free from day-to-day fluctuations

I take this opportunity to express my thanks
to the Government of the United States -- and, in particular,
to Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger -- for the excellent
arrangements made and the warm hospitality extended to me
and the members of delegations.

Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

[LC]

The Secretary
of State

Interview

October 12, 1975

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger interviewed on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press." Moderator: Lawrence E. Spivak. Panel: Clifton Daniel, The New York Times; Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News; Robert Keatley, Wall Street Journal; Richard Valeriani, NBC News.

Mr. Spivak: Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is the Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who recently completed his second year in office. He serves concurrently as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, a position he has held since 1969. Secretary Kissinger was born in Germany in 1923 and came to the United States in 1938. He received his undergraduate and graduate degrees from Harvard and was a member of the faculty from 1954 until 1971. Among his many awards is the Nobel Peace Prize, which he won in 1973.

We will have the first questions now from Richard Valeriani of NBC News.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, Egyptian President Sadat has said that he will ask for American military aid when he comes to Washington later this month. What will be the Administration's response?

Secretary Kissinger: President Sadat has indicated to many visitors that he would ask for military aid, having interrupted his relationship with the Soviet Union. We don't know whether in fact he will have a specific shopping list or will ask for it in general. I don't think we will be prepared at this moment to make any specific commitments of

military aid, but we will be prepared to discuss the problem with him in general terms.

Mr. Valeriani: Have you given him any assurances that you will give such a request sympathetic consideration or serious consideration?

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to discuss it with him but at this time not in terms of specific shopping lists.

Mr. Valeriani: On the other side of the equation, Mr. Secretary, by making so many promises to Israel, in order to get Israel in the right mood to make certain concessions in the Sinai Agreement, haven't you really given up most of your leverage for getting Israel to make tougher concessions down the road in negotiations on the Golan Heights, or the Palestinians?

Secretary Kissinger: Well first of all, the so-called concessions to Israel, or assurances to Israel, have to be seen in the historical context; and the assurances that were given in connection with this most recent agreement were not substantially different from assurances that have been given in connection with other agreements. When you are dealing with a country which has only one steady ally, assurances are of very great consequence.

2

Secondly, the relationship with Israel should not be conceived in terms of a pressure operation in which we must be able to pressure Israel before every negotiation. And finally, our basic relationship with Israel depends on a continuing need for close consultation and close cooperation between us and Israel. And that fact is going to weigh heavily in Israeli considerations, whatever decisions may have been made on this or that item.

So I believe the nature of our relationship with Israel gives us sufficient opportunity to have our views heard sympathetically.

*Mr. Valeriani: Why was it necessary to put all this in writing in specific terms now? So that Israel can avoid pressure in the future?*

Secretary Kissinger: It is—the sort of understandings that have been published have been characteristic of America's Israeli relations through the whole history of American-Israeli relations.

The only difference is that in the past, at least in recent years, these documents have been submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a classified basis. This time they were published; and their being published gave them a formality and subjected them to a kind of textual analysis that was never intended and which, if one had brought them into the context of the overall and long-term relationships, would have made it clear that it was not an unusual event in our relationship.

*Mr. Keatley: Mr. Secretary, the second Soviet-American strategic arms control agreement is about a year or so behind the schedule once expected. What are the prospects for concluding it any time during '75?*

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't say it is a year behind schedule. It may be a few months behind the most optimistic schedule which was June-July of this year.

I think the prospect of having a second strategic arms limitation agreement within the next months is good. Whether it will be in 1975 or in the early part of 1976, we will know more clearly after I receive a response to the propositions that we made to Foreign Minister Gromyko when he was here in October.

*Mr. Keatley: Some people think delay is due to a Soviet effort to limit American weapons while not restraining seriously its own programs. What convinces you that the Soviets do want an agreement that restrains both sides in roughly comparable ways?*

Secretary Kissinger: I think in fairness one has to point out that most of the significant concessions over the last 18 months in the negotiations have been made by the Soviet Union: with respect to equal aggregates; with respect to taking forward-base systems out of the negotiations, which means that several hundred or close to a thousand American airplanes are not counted; and with respect to the verification procedures. I do not think it is fair to say that the issue is to limit our systems while not limiting the Soviet systems. The issue is that the two forces have been designed in a way which makes it difficult to compare the weapons on both sides and to know how to bring them into relation with each other.

Finally, we are down to only two or three issues and they can be settled at any time, after which it will take about 4-6 weeks of technical discussions to work out the final details.

About 90 percent of the negotiation is substantially completed.

*Mr. Daniel: Mr. Secretary, you have remarked that our pledges to Israel have been published, but they were not published by the State Department. This latest agreement in the Middle East is going to cost us Americans billions of dollars and may involve us in highly dangerous commitments. Why can't we know formally, officially, and fully what has been promised in our names?*

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, everything that has been published was submitted by the State Department within 3 days of the completion of the negotiations to the Congress, so there was absolutely no attempt to keep anything from the Congress.

Secondly, we were prepared to work out with the Congress an agreed summary that would have put before the public the essence of the American commitment, so that the American public would have known precisely what it was we were really committed to. What we attempted to avoid was

formulations that in themselves were not legally
binding, but indicated a general guidepost of
policy, and to avoid forcing other governments to
take a formal position with respect to understand-
ings that in the past had always been handled on
this basis.

Finally, I do not agree that this recent agree-
ment cost the American public billions of dollars.
Last year the Congress voted, in a combination of
emergency and regular aid, $3 billion for Israel
without the agreement. Before the agreement Israel
requested $2.6 billion as its regular need for eco-
nomic and security assistance, and we had set aside
in our planning a certain amount to be asked for
Egypt. In fact, we will ask for less than the Israeli
request when we submit our aid package to the
Congress; and the additional sums that this agree-
ment costs are, if anything, relatively small.
Beyond that, we have taken no commitments that
involve actions by the United States that involve
the threat of war, or the risk of war. I think these
are facts that have to be understood.

I repeat: We have put everything before the
Congress that was later published; and the only
disagreement concerned the form of publication
and whether we could work out with the Congress
a form of publication that would [not] risk the
foreign policy dangers.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, quite apart from
the amounts involved, given the mood of the Con-
gress, have you made commitments or promises or
assurances in the Sinai negotiations that this
Administration, or possibly the next Administra-
tion, will not be able to fulfill?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic commitments
of the United States have been put before the Con-
gress. There are two categories of actions: those
that can be done on Presidential authority and
those that require congressional authorization and
appropriation.

Those that can be carried out on the basis of
Presidential authority, we are certain we are able to
fulfill either in this Administration or in succeeding
Administrations.

Those that require congressional action have
been carefully limited in all the documents we have
agreed to, as being subject to congressional action.

No specific amounts were mentioned, and there
the mood that you describe may in fact be a
factor. But we think it is terribly important that
the American people understand that it is not the
agreement that provides the need—that creates the
need for assistance to the parties—but the long-
term national interests of the United States and
that the assistance to the parties antedates the
agreement.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, you have been
met with a great deal of skepticism and suspicion
in the Congress in the debate over the Sinai nego-
tiations in your own testimony. Has this been a
recoil against the secrecy that has gone on in the
recent past and the lack of consultation that went
on in other foreign policy matters recently?

Secretary Kissinger: I think in fairness to the
Congress one has to point out if one reads the
whole transcript of all the sessions, executive and
public, there was overwhelming support for the
agreement. Its basic attitude—maybe not in front
of television cameras—but the basic attitude in the
relationship between the congressional committees
and the executive was one of dealing with a
common problem in a joint way.

However there is profound concern in the
Congress, much of which I can understand, that
the pendulum had swung too far in the fifties and
sixties in the direction of executive discretion; and
the Congress wants to make very sure that it is not
giving a blank check to the executive for conse-
quences that the Congress never intended, as it
believes it did in the case of the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution. That intention, I think, is justified, and
we are prepared to cooperate with it.

There is concern with excessive secrecy
which, too, we are attempting to meet.

On the other hand, one has to understand
that a certain amount of confidentiality is essential
or the diplomatic process will stop. So somewhere
between those two extremes one has to find a joint
position between the Congress and the executive.
But we are not complaining about what happens in
the Congress.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, in his New York
Times column of August 15, James Reston writes

(Lc)

4

that you believe "the capitalist and Communist worlds are two bankrupt systems in conflict now, neither adequate to the requirements and possibilities of a safe and decent world." Does that accurately describe your analysis of the world situation today?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think it is too abbreviated a formulation. I was struck, on the trip to Europe with the President, on the occasion of the European Security Conference, at the problems that it seemed to me the East European countries had in establishing widespread support.

One is also struck by the debates that are going on in Western Europe about the stability of the government, and so I feel that the modern industrialized states have a basic problem of how to relate the complexity of their problems, the difficulty of the issues that the people face, to an overall national purpose that gains long-term support. Basically I believe that the Western capitalist systems are more dynamic, with all their debates, than the ones on the other side; and therefore I am basically optimistic about the potentiality of the democratic systems to prevail and to defend themselves.

Mr. Valeriani: Another question on the agreement, Mr. Secretary. In the confidential assurances to Egypt, the United States promises to consult with Egypt in the event of an Israeli violation of the agreement on the significance of the violation, and possible remedial action. Now, what does "remedial action" mean? Would that involve holding up supplies to Israel in the case of an attack?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, exactly the same assurance was given to Israel; and both sides knew that the same assurance was given to the other side. What it meant was that the United States as the party that was the principal mediator in the negotiations, that knew the record of the negotiations, would make an effort, in case of a violation, to point out what its judgment was of the significance and of the possible cause of the violations.

What remedial action we would take—that has not been discussed with either side.

In the other two disengagement agreements,

those between Syria and Israel and those between Egypt and Israel, what happens is that a violation will be brought to our attention and we then bring it to the attention of the side that is accused. In every case that I can remember a remedy has been found. This is one of those clauses that codifies existing practice and is not a novel departure.

Mr. Keatley: Next week you will be in Peking and next month President Ford will go there. Will these visits result in diplomatic recognition of the Peking government by the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: The basic purpose, the basic relationship between us and the People's Republic of China is the result of the congruence of some perceptions of the international environment; and therefore, on many of these visits, a significant part of the discussion concerns a review of the international situation and to see to what degree we agree or disagree.

The process of normalization of relations between the People's Republic and the United States has been established in the Shanghai communique. We intend to live up to this and we intend to continue the process of normalization to its ultimate conclusion. I do not anticipate that it will be completed on the next visit, but I do not exclude that some progress would be made.

Mr. Daniel: Mr. Secretary, Warren Nutter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has published a study in which he says your diplomacy in Russia has created too much detente and overrelaxation of tension, that the United States is giving away too much for too little. As you know, many conservatives are consequently very suspicious of detente. Does this mean that the Ford Administration is going to retain its full faith in detente or will there be some change under the pressure of 1976 politics?

Secretary Kissinger: The impression is created that detente, which is a bad word anyway, is something that we grant to the Russians as a favor and that we withhold as a punishment.

The fact of the matter is that there are certain basic conditions that bring about this policy: the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States possess nuclear weapons capable of destroying

5

humanity, the fact that we impinge upon each other in many parts of the world, so that we are, at one and the same time, rivals and yet we must regulate our conduct in such a way that we do not destroy humanity in conducting our disputes. We are ideological opponents, yet in a way we are doomed to coexist.

Those are the realities. They cannot be removed by rhetoric, and those are realities to which every President has been brought back throughout the history of the postwar period.

The foreign policy of this country will be conducted with concern for the national interest and for world peace, and it will not be affected by the Presidential campaign.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, you are known for playing diplomacy close to the vest. And some former intelligence officials in the government have said that what you and the President, President Nixon as well as Ford, have talked about to foreign leaders, never got communicated through the system so that they could make expert appraisals of that. Are those charges true?

Secretary Kissinger: I sometimes suspect that if I started reading the most top secret documents from the top of the Washington Monument, we would still be accused of playing diplomacy close to the vest. To some extent a certain amount of confidentiality is essential. This depends entirely on the relationship of confidence that exists between the head of the State Department Intelligence, for example, and the Secretary of State.

The current Director of Intelligence in the Department of State attends every top level meeting with Soviet and other key leaders; and he has no problem of receiving access.

There are some—in every administration there have been some—extremely confidential documents that were not necessarily distributed to every intelligence analyst in town. They are always distributed to some key advisers. Who the key advisors are depends on whom the Secretary of State and the President have confidence in; but it is in the interest of the President and the Secretary of State to get the widest possible relevant advice, so I would reject this particular charge.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the President has just lifted the embargo on grain sales to Poland. Can you tell us what is holding up the decision on grain sales to the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: We are still discussing a long-term grain deal with the Soviet Union and until that is completed we are not in a good position to judge the total availabilities in relation to the demands, but as the President indicated yesterday, we are making progress in that long-term grain deal.

Mr. Spivak: Are you certain that a deal will go through?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not certain, but I am optimistic.

Mr. Spivak: Will the United States be likely to attach any significant reciprocal conditions to a deal?

Secretary Kissinger: The context in which a deal is made is always clear. The conditions of the agreement themselves as they now stand and as they will be negotiated are, in our view, very favorable to the United States.

Mr. Valeriani: How close are you to making a deal, Mr. Secretary, and in that connection, do you think you can make a deal for buying Russian oil?

Secretary Kissinger: We are discussing both of these issues, not directly linked, but in a parallel framework. We are quite close to making a deal on grain. We still have some additional considerations to discuss in the case of oil but we have made progress on that too.

Mr. Keatley: If President Ford is elected next year and if he asks, will you stay on as Secretary of State?

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't—first of all, I haven't been asked yet, and that is a decision I will make then.

Mr. Daniel: Mr. Secretary, you seem to agree that we are now coming to the end of the step-by-step process of maintaining peace in the Middle East. Where do we go from here?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we then have to find some larger frameworks which com-

1

MR. SCHECTER: Let's talk a little bit about you and Congress and the state of the nation, if we can.

Mr. Secretary, do you think that it is inevitable that the tension between you and Congress is going to continue between now and the election? And how is that going to affect American foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, I don't think that there is tension between me and the Congress on a personal basis. I have, I think, extremely good personal relationships with most members of the Congress. And that isn't the issue at all. I think we are going through a period right now in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate where the Congress is attempting to shift the balance between executive and congressional power. Secondly,

2

there is a profound feeling of distrust in the Congress
of executive assertion, which causes them to insist on a
kind of documentary evidence which no congressional committee
ever asked before. And then the structure of the committees
has disintegrated to such an extent that the documentary
evidence becomes public, creating new foreign policy problems.

So I believe that it is a tension that is inherent
in a process of change.

Now, to some extent I favor it. I think the
balance swung too far towards executive authority in the
sixties. But there is a danger that it may shift, swing
too far towards congressional authority in the seventies.
And this will tend to paralyze foreign policy.

MR. SCHECTER: What can you do to prevent that?
Do you think it would help, for example, if you took
leading congressmen along with you, say, to Peking, or to
Geneva, or to the International Economic Conference in
November. Would that help to restore bipartisanship? Or
do we face a new era in which there can no longer be a
bipartisan foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is absolutely

3

imperative that we have a bipartisan foreign policy.

The foreign policy of the United States, as of any other country, depends on authority. Authority doesn't mean the decision of a single individual, but it does mean that what is done and said reflects actions that can be taken. Therefore, when the government is divided, for whatever reason, whosoever fault it is, it means that the capability of the United States to make its views prevail is diminished.

Now, can this problem be solved by taking congressmen into negotiations?

I don't want to exclude this totally. But the problem is in a system of separation of powers there must be some things that the executive does peculiarly and some things the legislative does peculiarly.

It is not enough, for example, to have somebody in on a negotiation unless he knows all of the cables that preceded it, all of the strategy that went into it. And it raises the issue of what happens if there is no complete agreement as to the tactics when you have somebody along.

Moreover, these negotiations are extremely arduous.

And finally, there is a question of whom you would

4

select.

One of the difficulties that exists in the contemporary Congress is that while there has been a shift between the executive and the legislative, there has also been a shift within the Congress to take power away from the committee chairmen and to give it to the general membership, to a point where people like Senator Russell, Senator Johnson -- when Lyndon Johnson was Senator -- who could dominate the Senate, no longer exist. So you have to deal with a hundred different Senators rather than with five or six who represent an ability to produce votes.

MR. SCHECTER: In those days, Mr. Secretary, wasn't there a trade-off between domestic and foreign policy, which doesn't exist any more? Aren't we into a new --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I understand. I agree that a new balance has to be established. I agree that the Congress must be given a greater participation. I also believe that this participation has to stop short of the Congress getting into every tactical decision, because the Congress is not organized to make tactical decisions. And I do not think foreign policy can be conducted even the way domestic legislation is. Domestic legislation usually involves a series of discrete individual decisions expressed

5

in laws that are not inevitably one related to the other.
They can be done on their merits, through the play of pressure
groups.

In foreign policy, unless you have an overall
design, you have to get random --

MR. SCHECTER: Have to get what, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Random. And it is as if,
when you are playing chess, a group of kibitzers keep making
moves for you. They may be better chess players than you are;
any one of them may be. But they cannot possibly get a
coherent game developed. And especially if, at the same time,
you have to explain each of your moves publicly so that your
opponent can hear it.

Now, I don't know exactly what the solution is.
I know I am spending over half of my time now before
congressional committees. And that, too, is getting to be
a problem in policy making.

MR. SCHECTER: But isn't that opening up the whole
process? I mean you talk about kibitzers. But isn't that
the democratic process, of an open democracy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is no parliament in
the world that has the access to policy making that the
Congress of the United States has -- not in Britain, not in

6

France, not in any of the democracies of the world. The
process of democracy is to decide what it is. The people
must have an opportunity to vote and express themselves on
the main directions of policy. The key decisions have to
be subjected to congressional approval. But what of the
day-to-day tactics has to be cleared ahead of time, that
is a question that has to be decided.

MR. TALBOTT: Mr. Secretary, following up on that,
in your Los Angeles speech calling for a new partnership
of the executive and legislative branches, you welcome
Congress to help set guidelines for foreign policy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

MR. TALBOTT: But cautioned against Congress
interfering in what you call day-to-day conduct of policy.

MR. TALBOTT: Since then there have been tensions
between the branches over the Middle East, Panama and Turkey.
In the light of that, could you amplify a little bit
perhaps where you think the dividing line should be between
those matters best left to professionals and those
matters --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think any matter you

7

can say should be left only to the professionals, because
at some time in the process, the democratic process must
operate. If a policy is clearly not working, then those
who are responsible for it must either be replaced or
be made to change course.

Secondly, any significant foreign policy move
at some period will require appropriations. So it isn't a
question --

(At this point, the interview was temporary
suspended, and resumed as follows.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I think it is a sort of a
platitude to say the democratic process requires that
anything that is put before -- that is requested by
any congressional committee is therefore a valid exercise
of the democratic process.

It is the essence of the democratic process to
have some relationship between purpose and process and to
conduct the democratic deliberations so that they permit
a national purpose to be exercised. And the democratic
process involves, on the one hand, an approval of the general
direction in which a country is going, as well as an
approval of specific individual steps. But to attempt to

(L)

8

subject ever single decision to individual procedures will
lead to the fragmentation of all effort and will finally
lead to chaos and no national policy.

MR. TALBOTT: Well, there have been welcome votes
on Panama, Turkey and the Middle East now. Do you think
things are getting a little better in this regard?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I will also say, as I
have said publicly, that much of the debate on the Middle
East was conducted in a very constructive spirit. And I
am not considering -- I have no bad feelings about my
sessions with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for
example. They were enormously time-consuming. I regret
that the documents became public, even before the Senate
acted, because we paid a price for that out of proportion
to any public enlightenment that was achieved. I think
the public enlightenment could have been achieved without
publication of the documents.

MR. SCHECTER: But isn't this process perhaps
some part of a broader national condition that we are
facing now? In an article in *Public Interest* Ambassador
Moynihan is quoted as saying that "Liberal democracy on
the American model tends to the condition of the monarchy

9

in the 19th century, a holdover form of government, one
which persists in isolated or peculiar places here and
there, and may even serve well enough for special
circumstances, but which has simply no relevance to the
future. It is where the world was, not where it is going."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't agree with Moynihan
at all. Whether it is where the world was or where the
world is going depends importantly on the United States.

In the 1950s, every new country wanted to be
democratic because we were impressive or looked impressive,
powerful and purposeful. In the 1970s, after all we have
gone through, that condition no longer exists. And I don't
agree that this is an inevitable result. It may
well be that democracy is not going to make it. But if
democracy isn't going to make it, this is going to mean
such a monumental change in the American perception of the
world and of itself that it will have the profoundest
consequences within America over a period of time.

MR. SCHECTER: But do you think that democracy
is changing? For example --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think democracy -- excuse me.

MR. SCHECTER: I'm sorry.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Democracy is facing massive

10

problems around the world for a variety of reasons. One,
because democracy in the 19th century, when it began to
flourish, was an essentially aristocratic phenomenon. You had
limited ruling groups in most countries. This is not true
of the United States. You had restrictive franchises, which
is true of the United States. And you had above all a
doctrine of limited government and relatively simple issues.
So you could fight your campaigns on a simple issue --
the issue of silver, the issue of free trade, the issue
of the income tax.

Now you have the government involved in every
aspect of life. The issues become unbelievably complex.
The premium is on over-simplification, which gives rewards
to demagogery. It is very difficult for the average person
to understand the complexities of even one or two pieces
of legislation, much less all of them. And therefore at a
time when life is extremely complex, and therefore the demands
for leadership are greatest, leadership often tends to be
paralyzed.

And another problem is that in almost every
democratic country, so much energy is absorbed in getting
into office, that once people are in office, they are not

11

always the best prepared that could be and have to learn
their job by doing it.

All of this has created a crisis of leadership in
many democratic countries. But it is a crisis that we must
solve.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you think we are better off
than European countries? For example, you have travelled --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Far better off than European countries. I think that the American body politic is basically healthy. Our people are confident. They want to believe in their government. There is not the division you have in many foreign countries where, after all, the explanation of the Communist vote is that a significant segment of the population has opted out of the democratic process and has opted out of any confidence in their government. This is not true in America. Our people want to believe in their government and are basically confident that we are strong and able to master our fate.

MR. TALBOTT: In terms of the phenomenon you were describing, are the totalitarian countries at a great advantage over us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, because if you look --

12

the totalitarian countries are at an advantage over us with
respect to any one decision they may want to make. However --

MR. TALBOTT: The quality of leadership.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The quality of leadership

in most totalitarian countries is even worse, because they

have a problem of rotation.

You have two problems in the world -- the problem
of the modern industrial state, which has not been effectively
solved in any modern industrial state; and secondly, the
problem of democratic government.

The totalitarian states have a problem of how
to replace leaders at the very top, how to rotate leaders
at middle levels.

At least we have a rather good system, where
every eight or twelve years there is a substantial
replacement of key personnel. And I think that is on the
whole invigorating to the political process.

MR. TALBOTT: So while you see democracy as
getting more complicated, you don't see it as losing
necessarily in a sort of Manichean struggle.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think the
Communists are gaining by their own merit. I think
non-democratic forms are gaining, because, since much

13

of the world has its origin in some form of revolution --
we had never understood fully that our revolution was very
peculiar, that on the whole it was made by people who knew
who they were to begin with, and who thought they were carrying
out an existing tradition. On the whole, revolutionaries
don't make revolution in order to give up power after they
have seized it. And therefore, in many parts of the
world, there is a tendency towards totalitarianism simply
because the generation that seized power did not go through
all that suffering in order to yield it easily.

MR. SCHECTER: What about in Western Europe?

We now have a situation where it looke like within five
years maybe there will be Communists in the government of
Italy or in France. How can we live with that? What are
we trying to do to prevent it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if you deal with
a modern complicated democratic state, like Italy and
France -- we cannot directly -- it is not directly in
our power to prevent it. It must be in the overwhelming
instance the responsibility of the governments concerned
to prevent it. The alienation from government, which is
perhaps more noticeable by far in Italy than in France,

14

cannot be remedied by the United States. At the same time, insofar as we can, it is necessary for the western democracies to recapture the sense that the governments are in control over the destiny of the people, rather than the subject of blind forces.

I think this is important for France. It is also important for Italy.

I think the economic summit we are planning is important for that purpose.

MR. SCHECTER: But aren't you talking about basic structural changes in the economy of the western world? For example, in your --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We need basic structural changes. We have a problem in every industrial country in which inflation occurs in the middle of recession.

MR. SCHECTER: But isn't that a basic change away from the classic market economy? For example, our long-term wheat deal with the Soviet Union -- doesn't that change the traditional free market mechanism in this country?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, that doesn't change the free market mechanism. But the classic 19th century market economy is not being implemented anywhere in the world today. There is governmental intervention to some degree

15

or other. Our tendency is to keep governmental intervention
to a minimum. But a classic free market economy
doesn't exist anywhere.

MR. SCHECTER: But isn't the role of government
increasing as part of this structural change?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The role of government is
increasing. But I have become convinced that if the role of
government gets beyond a certain point, it will stifle
initiative and eventually freedom. Because then alliances
form between the governmental bureaucracy and the economic
bureaucracy that become very hard to break.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you look forward to this economic
summit as a major turning point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't look at it entirely
as an economic summit. I look at it as an attempt to
bring economic goals and political goals into relation with
each other and to have an explicit examination of these issues.

16

MR. SCHECTER: You said in your explanation that you think that as a result of demagoguery, the debate has suffered.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I say the political processes encourages demagoguery, and that makes the debate suffer.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you think that applies to detente, and how it is perceived by the American public?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the detente policy -- and perhaps we will stop after that and take it up tomorrow -- I think the detente policy suffers from a number of -- not the detente policy, the detente debate -- suffers from a number of misconceptions. One is that much of the debate is carried on as if detente is a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, or that we can withhold it as a punishment. While the fact of the matter is that we are attempting to carry out a foreign policy that is geared to the realities of the period.

So then the question is, the question that should be debated, is our perception of realities correct? What is our perception of realities?

One, that the Soviet Union is now and will be

(le)

17

for the foreseeable future a nuclear superpower, whose military potential cannot be effectively wiped out in a surprise attack. This being the case, any war between us will have colossal damage.

Second, which follows from that, that the United States is no longer predominant, though still probably the strongest nation in the world.

Third, that the containment of Soviet expansion, which remains a primary objective of American policy, therefore has to be carried out in a much more complicated way than in the 1940's and '50's, because it depends now on political factors, and on military factors, of infinitely greater complexity.

Fourth, the world is no longer so monolithic, in which we can give orders, or in which we can dominate a Western group and the Soviets dominate an Eastern group. That has to be taken into account.

And, fifth, we have to consider what this country has gone through with Viet-Nam, Watergate, and the attendant Congressional restrictions. For us to run the risks of a confrontation which will be considered by our people as unnecessary is to create a condition in which we will suffer massive foreign policy defeats.

18

Therefore, I believe that the policy we are carry-
ing out with the Soviet Union has us in the best position
to resist Soviet pressures, in the best position to exploit
possibilities for changes in the Soviet system, and in the
best position to take into account the reality that a
war between us and the Soviet Union would destroy at least
our two societies -- it might benefit some third societies.
It cannot benefit us or any other of the Western countries.

Now, then, however, the debate gets carried on as
if we are giving away things to the Soviet Union. What
specific things have we given away to the Soviet Union?
Where has the Soviet Union made a unilateral benefit? This
is the issue in which the over-simplification of our
debate is dangerous. And I do believe there has been
vast over-simplification.

MR. SCHECTER: The standard criticism is that we
have given away wheat in the first wheat deal, and that at
Helsinki the Soviet Union basically ratified its position
in Eastern Europe, and prevented any kind of mobility and
forward change in any of the Eastern European countries.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The wheat deal is generally
recognized today as a bureaucratic mistake. It so happens
that it had absolutely nothing to do with detente. It

19

was never discussed at a political level. From the early
sixties on, the idea of selling wheat to the Soviet Union
was considered to be desirable from an economic point of
view, and in the interests of our farmers.

Through a series of bureaucratic misjudgments,
more wheat was sold in 1972 on too favorable terms. There
is no question about this. That was a mistake. But it was
a mistake that was unconnected with detente. No one made
the argument, let's sell them wheat in order to strengthen
detente. The argument was made, let's sell them wheat,
because it is a good thing for our farmers to sell wheat.
And for that reason, it wasn't watched sufficiently at the
political level. So I categorize this as a mistake, but
not a mistake of detente.

The other issue, the so-called Helsinki issue,
the European Security Conference was under negotiation
for three years. It has to be seen in the entire context
of the evolution of East-West relationships.

We used it as a lever to get a Berlin Agreement,
by saying that we would agree to go to a European Security
Conference, only after a Berlin Agreement. And that in
turn quieted down a very explosive situation, at least for

5

(c)

20

the last four to five years, and we hope for the foreseeable
future.

Then, if you look at the specific terms of Hel-
sinki -- there are two things it can ratify. One is fron-
tiers; second is the Soviet political position in Eastern
Europe.

With respect to the frontiers, Helsinki ratified
nothing that had not existed -- that had not been ratified
before. The frontiers of the Balkan States were ratified
in formal peace treaties to which we were a party. The
frontiers of Eastern Poland were established at Yalta. The
frontier of Western Poland was established temporarily in
Potsdam, afterwards acquiesced, agreed to, by both East and
West Germany. There are no contested frontiers in Europe.
Every frontier in Europe has been agreed to by bilateral
agreements to begin with.

With respect to the Soviet political position in
Eastern Europe, that depends on military predominance, and
on the history since 1950, which has made it clear that
the Soviet Union would not tolerate a break-away from its
form of government, and that the West would not intervene
if the Soviet Union asserted itself militarily.

21

6

Therefore, the general fact has been that what-
ever political mobility exists in Eastern Europe, it is
best carried out under conditions of relaxation of tension,
and therefore it is precisely those East European govern-
ments that have been most independent that have also been
most active in defending or in advocating the European
Security Conference.

So if one doesn't look at the real alternatives,
then of course one can say that unilateral concessions
were made. But except for the wheat deal, which was, I
repeat, a bureaucratic mistake, I don't agree to it.

MR. SCHECTER: Thank you.

---

22

MR. SCHECTER: Mr. Secretary, let's go on from where we stopped yesterday.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You're assuming I remember that. Where did we stop?

MR. SCHECTER: We talked about detente --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Go ahead.

MR. SCHECTER: -- and we ended where you explained that detente wasn't a one-way street. And you talked about the wheat deal, the '72 wheat deal, as a bureaucratic mistake and then explained the Helsinki Conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. SCHECTER: I'd like to ask you this morning: What would happen if we don't have a SALT agreement this year or early next year? Would that basically change the relationship?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to say -- give a specific deadline for the SALT agreement. But if the SALT negotiation should fail, both sides will be forced to build their strategic forces in anticipation of what the other side might do.

In our case it would mean that rather than the

23

Soviet Union reducing their strategic forces
from the approximately 2600 units they have now to 2400,
we would have to calculate that they will stay at
2600, at least -- or maybe go on beyond that. This
would involve a significant increase in our strategic
defense budget, as the President has already pointed out.
That, in turn, can only be justified on the basis of a
permanent danger. So the rhetoric of both sides will become
more and more confrontational, and I would think that it
would lead to a substantial -- if not return of the Cold
War--to a substantial chilling in the relationship.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you think it's possible to have
a SALT agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it's possible to
have a SALT agreement.

MR. SCHECTER: But how can the positions
with inside of the U. S. Government be reconciled?
Right now there's a basic difference between the Pentagon
and the State Department.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. Just a minute. If
there is a basic difference, I know about it only from the
newspapers. It has not been presented to the National

24

Security Council. The last position that was given to
Foreign Minister Gromyko was jointly worked out by the
Secretary of Defense and myself and representatives,
in the presence of two associates. And, therefore, it
represented a joint position -- that is, the proposal
that is now before the Soviet Government. And if there
should be a disagreement -- and the disagreement is
always much more in the press than in reality -- then it
will be settled by the President.

MR. SCHECTER: And do you expect that there
will be an agreement this year?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's now getting rather late
in the year. It would take about six to eight weeks,
even after an agreement in principle, to work out all the
technical details. So it may slip beyond the end of
this year. But I believe an agreement is possible.
I also believe an agreement is necessary.

MR. SCHECTER: Right.

Do you see the Soviet Party Congress in February
as a timetable?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been a lot of loose
talk that they must have a SALT agreement by the Party

25

Congress. Maybe this is true. I have seen no evidence
of their conduct that this is the case. And I don't
believe that they would gear their major decisions that
affect them for a decade to one particular event
on their Party calendar.

MR. SCHECTER: Right. In other words, because
of the gravity of this decision, we're not going to press
for a timetable of the end of this year or --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we would like to have it as urgently as possible, but it is a major decision for both sides to constrict their strategic armaments programs for a decade. And if that succeeds, it would mean that for a period of 15 years, or nearly 15 years, the strategic forces of both sides would have been under agreed constraints. This would be an unprecedented event in the relations between us and the Soviet Union, and I believe in the relations of major powers to each other, so obviously it is being done thoughtfully and carefully by both sides.

MR. TALBOTT: Would it be possible for Mr. Brezhnev to come to the United States before a SALT agreement is worked out?

26

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would think it's unlikely.

MR. SCHECTER: The talk about --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think his visit would be tied to a SALT agreement.

MR. SCHECTER: Yes.

You have said that the SALT agreement would regulate the relationship between major powers.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the strategic field.

MR. SCHECTER: In the strategic field.

In his United Nations speech recently, Ch'iao Kuan-hua insisted that rhetoric about detente -- to quote him -- "cannot cover up the stark reality, the danger of war is visibly growing." And then he went on to say that the source of a new world war is the super-powers. And he added that the danger comes primarily from the "wildly ambitious social imperialist" -- which is a euphemism for the Soviet Union. Do you see the danger of war increasing in our relationship with the Soviet Union? How do you --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not see the danger of war increasing in our relations with the Soviet Union. I think that in the next decade, as Soviet power grows -- and

27

it will grow not as a result of detente but as a result
of technology and economic development -- nor can its
power be reversed by a return to the Cold War -- as
Soviet power grows, the temptation to achieve political
positions commensurate with that power may also grow.
And in that sense there could be a danger of increased
conflicts, if we do not, prior to that event, regulate
our relationships in some manner.

So the danger always exists, and we have to be
vigilant and we have to be prepared. But I see no
indications that the danger of war is increasing.

MR. TALBOTT: Given the vehemence of Mr. Ch'iao's
remarks, do you see the danger of increased Sino-Soviet
conflict increasing?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, they have been unfriendly
to each other for over a decade, and I don't want to
speculate about the possibility.

MR. SCHECTER: But it would be in our strategic
interest if there was war between the Soviet Union and
China, wouldn't it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It would not be in our

28

in our interest if there was war between the Soviet Union and China. It is not in our interest even that there is-particular rivalry. We are not stimulating the rivalry; we are doing nothing to encourage that conflict. It exists; it is a fact of political life. But it is not anything in which we can ourselves get involved. But a war between those two countries would be unfortunate.

MR. TALBOTT: If, as the statements of both Chinese and Soviet officials indicate, the rivalry is increasing right now, does that complicate what you're trying to do in improving relations between the United States and China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We're trying to improve relations with both. And, of course, each might prefer it if we did not have a relationship with the other. For our purposes, it is better to have a relationship with both.

MR. SCHECHTER: Well, Mr. Secretary, in 1961 in the *Necessity for Choice*, you wrote that "The constant international travels of Heads of Government without a clear program and purpose may be less an expression of statesmanship than a symptom of panic."

29

There have been a lot of questions about why should the President go to China this year.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, I believe that we have a clear program and that we have a well-defined strategy. The reason the President is going to China is because the essence of our relationship with China depends on a mutual understanding of each other's perceptions of the world. And, therefore, the coincidence of views, when it exists to guide policy -- that requires a periodic exchange at the highest level. There hasn't been a meeting between the top Chinese leaders and an American President for nearly four years. And precisely in a relationship in which so much depends on the conceptual and on intangibles, an occasional meeting is quite important.

MR. TALBOTT: Critics of the President's travel schedule in general -- on his forthcoming trip to China, in particular -- have said that the trip will be probably just ceremonial and will produce no concrete results. Is that a fair criticism?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It will certainly not be just ceremonial. And what you mean by "concrete results"

depends on what results you're looking for when the leaders of the most populous nation and the most powerful nation meet and discuss their perceptions of foreign policy -- that is not a ceremonial result, even if nothing spectacular is announced.

MR. SCHECTER: Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested that one of the Chinese perceptions of the world is that they are subject to a surprise attack by the Soviet Union and that they have discussed in a general way the prospect of buying defensive or passive weapons systems from the United States, like a military reconnaissance system or over the horizon radar system, that make them less vulnerable to surprise attack. Is that --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There have been no such requests.

MR. SCHECTER: Is that a possibility?

MR. SCHECTER: Would we consider something like that as stabilizing to --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I can't speculate about something that hasn't happened.

MR. TALBOTT: Short of request, has the possibility

31

been discussed between American and Chinese officials?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There have been no discussions.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you expect the question of normalization of relations, and short of complete diplomatic recognition --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the issue will certainly come up and will certainly be discussed; and we'll discuss it in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique, which provides that the purpose of our contacts is to achieve full normalization.

MR. SCHECTER: With what kind of timetable in mind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We don't have a timetable right now.

MR. SCHECTER: Do you think the Chinese have a timetable?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I doubt it -- I don't know. If so, they haven't told it to us. Well, they've stated publicly that they're patient.

Are you (referring to Mr. Schecter) going to China with me?

32

MR. SCHECTER: No. Strobe is going.

--SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, you. We'll get you in there. It will be a great era.

MR. TALBOTT: I won't have to get off in Anchorage.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Have you been there?

MR. TALBOTT: No, I haven't. I'm very much looking forward to it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You'll see a Communist country that operates very much with the appearance of spontaneity. (Laughter.)

MR. SCHECTER: Mr. Secretary, are you looking forward to a meeting between President Ford and President Ford as perhaps breaking the stalemate on the next move in the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know whether it will be possible to arrange a meeting between the two Presidents in the immediate future, nor do I accept the proposition that there's a stalemate in the Middle East. I think it is obvious that after an event of the magnitude of the Sinai agreement that all parties have to consider

33

their positions. And I didn't expect anything to happen
for a period of several months. So if the two should
meet at some point, it should not be conceived as an
emergency meeting that must lead to an immediate result.

I doubt that it would lead to an immediate result.

But it would lead to a substantial exchange of views.

As you know, I have a high regard for President
Asad.

MR. SCHECTER: Well, there's been a suggestion
that that might happen in November when the President goes
to Europe.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I've seen the news-
paper accounts; and all I can say is no agreement has
been reached. If anything like this should develop
before this goes to press, I'll let you know.

MR. SCHECTER: In principle, are you
thinking about --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Although my personal estimate --
(discussion off the record at Secretary's request).

MR. SCHECTER: There have also been reports that
you've committed yourself in principle to make a visit
to Israel and Syria in December.