*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Shultz

2/1/73 9:35 a.m.

HK: George?

GS: Hi, Henry. Say yesterday, Dobrynin called here and wanted very much to come and see me or have me come to lunch or what not--

HK: Why don't you--

GS: And it was checked through the NSC as I understand it and heis now scheduled to come over heretomorrow sometime--

HK: Okay.

GS: Now that is something you approve of--

HK: I approve of it yes.

GS: And what--

HK: Another possibility is I am having breakfast with Dobrynin you could go in on that if you wanted to--

GS: That's tomorrow?

HK: Yes. It means, you would have to listen to a lot of stuff that isn't in your field. Which doesn't both me. I have no objection whatever to having him come see you.

GS: I just want to be sure we are on the right line as far as the--he want to talk about the oil and gas business - at this point as far as I know there is no decision on whether or not I am going to be chairman of this commission.

HK: Yes, you are going to be chairman of that commission.

GS: O--The thing that Peterson was the chairman of that you and I--

HK: You will be chairman of that commission. I have already told the Russians you would be chairman of that commission, so you are going to be chairman. Unless you don't want to be.

HK:
&: We just haven't done the bureaucratic work--no, you will not be chairman. --I have talked to the President of it.

REDACTED
Authority Fc 12/58
By: B.C. NARA Date: 01/15/59

*

Page 2

**GS:** Now our line on the oil and gas deal is that we are anxious to pursue it aggressively and we think there are lot of facts to be determined as yet--but we are interested and moving and as soon as we get ourselves organized, reorganized right with our companies, we are in motion and --

**HK:** And we are making major efforts to organize ourselves. You must know that Connally is seeing him today, claiming that he represents the organization.

**GS:** The private organization --
For the whole United States.

**HK:** He represents a consortium of all interests with private organizations. I told what he did in his private capacity was his business, but he couldn't say he represented us.

**GS:** Okay.

**HK:** I just want you to be aware of that.

**GS:** Yeh. It might be a littler easier in my first meeting with Dborynin if I do come to your breakfast.

**HK:** If you come to my breakfast, do you mind if we do a lot of our other work first and then turn to yours--it wouldn't hurt because that would give you a feel for what we do-- is that okay?

**GS:** eh, all right. What time is your breakfast--

**HK:** 8:15 a.m. in the Map Room in the White House

**GS:** All right. I'll be there. Now on these two dinners--if I would-- since I am not on the invitation list, I'd prefer not to be inserted at this point and I don't want to be in the posture of giving a hoot about it for that--

**HK:** No, no, no--you know how these things are done, it's stupidity, not ill will.

**GS:** At this point, I am scheduled to go to dinner tonight with John Sparkman who is chairman of the banking committee--an important committee--

**HK:** How about tomorrow in Camp David --no one knows who is on that list.

**GS:** I am scheduled to go to a Nicks/Bullitts Basketball game with people from the Finance Committee--and the Ways and Means Committee

*

Page 3

(laughs) so it's all a big lobbying activity, that we've organized
here in the Treasury.

HK: Should I drop both of the ideas--

GS: Why don't you just drop it and I don't--

HK: I'll keep an eye on it in the future George--Rose Woods does these
idiot things

GS: The only concern that I have is that at some point, I will
---travel around Europe and people will think--people are supposed
to think that I am involved in these things--

HK: You should as a matter of course be invited to every State Dinner
for foreign guests. Because after all you are handling the foreign
economic part.

GS: I think that's right. It has been a startling omission--at this point,
I don't like to be in the position of complaining about such stuff,
because I feel like I am more like Bill Rogers which I'm not.

HK: No one is ever going to mistake you for Bill Rogers--I'll take care of it.

HK: Why aren't you at the prayer breakfast?

GS: I just returned from the prayer breakfast--

HK: Okay, I'm just establishing my alibi--was I missed?

GS: Everybody was looking around for you and there were several psuedo-
Kissinger's around with wigs and glasses trying to masquerade as you.
Nobody was fooled. I学习 earned gave, I thought, a rather outstanding
strong statement, as he is capable of doing, and the President was
very good.

HK: Good.

GS: Okay, we will see you at breakfast tomorrow.

HK: Right.

REDACTED
Authority E012958
By: CAPT. NAP'S Date 01/05/04

*

TELECON
Richard Neustadt

2/1/73 12:35 p. m.

N: Listen I have one small specific to bother you about. Lot of other things like I think your press conference was superb, really superb. They've all been saying it. I have been an admirer of all three, but the last was a glorious thing to have accomplished. You know my sentiments about Jim Wilson. The specific is that I have had a letter from David Klein whom I will identify in a minute.

K: No, I know him.

N: Saying he is now ready to retire and what's going on in academia. I wanted you to know these thoughts of his and to tell you that in 1963 - 65 when he was Mac's Europe man I thought he was splendid.

K: I always thought very highly of him.

N: I don't think the government ought to let him go.

K: I talked about him to Alex Johnson to get him into the SALT talks but if that doesn't work I'll talk to him. We should keep him in the government.

N: Okay, then this is a redundant call then.

K: No, I wanted to talk to you. When will you be coming down?

N: Spring, there's nothing to bring me until then.

K: Well let me see if I can bring you. I would like to talk to you after I'm back from Hanoi.

N: You let me know and I'll come.

K: Good. I have to go, the President's calling.

REPRODUCIBLE
 Authority Eo. 2458
 By NAF Date 6/15/84

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:00 pm, February 1, 1973

D: Well, well, well, what are you doing. I was praying very strongly as far back as 7:30 I was beginning to pray.

K: By God, Anatol, you are really hard to get. Oh, in the four years I've been here I have never gone to a prayer breakfast.

D: You did not pray. This was my strong impression, and now I have proof. I'm ashamed of you.

K: Anatol, one thing is that someday you must let me read your intelligence reports about me.

D: In Moscow maybe we have nice dinner and have a special reading which you can correct.

K: (Laughter) One thing, I told you if I went to China on this trip I would tell you. Well, now, I'm going to China and stopping elsewhere.

D: When you are going?

K: I'll be there on the 15th to 19th, coming back on the 19th, that is arriving there on 15th and leaving on 19th.

D: Nobody knows what you will be doing next.

K: I'll be stopping in the Philippines or Hong Kong to rest.

D: Hong Kong is better.

K: I may go to Hong Kong then.

D: You depart when?

K: Saturday or Monday, two days from now.

D: Fine.

K: Next, I have ~~reviewed~~ invited Shultz to come to the breakfast tomorrow.

D: This idea, is it good. Is he nice man.

K: Yes, we can talk frankly with each other--you can speak frankly in front of him. I want him to get a fair idea of the nature of our relationship. We don't want him heavily involved.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12575
By N.W. Ballarрат 02/04/73

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: N.W.APA 5/30/78

D: I understand.

K: Third, I have heard from Bahr. His view is we should just have headings and no descriptions.

D: Just headings--why bother -- after all--

K: Let everybody put in their own descriptions and let the Conference sort it out.

D: In general then--

K: Then each side puts in--

D: Give to each whom--when they going to decide--

K: Give to the Conference. I told him I intend to agree with your approach.

I asked what he was willing to do with other European countries in developing foreign policy. No answer.

Just wanted you to know where we stand.

Everyone will submit his mandate.

D: To each other to think it over.

K: Yes, I think they will read it at the Conference. Our view is that we agree with your approach. Tomorrow at Camp David we will give them a copy of this thing.

D: I understand. A good idea. Well I'll mention to Gromyko to continue to discuss, but no conclusion. I'm not clear how to handle. Maybe he will have suggestions to make.

K: I just wanted you to know we are active. Connally saw it today.

D: I was with him today.

K: Our view is we will push matters here. He can see certain advantage in getting the information to Connally. He has enough political pull, he, if he comes into the program, he can work on the private side unofficially.

D: This is your position. ________ wabts to see something around March or April.......... start of agreement, for balance of payments. Some companies with materials should be interested; may be good idea about some kind of money involvement, joint so to speak.

K: We discussed that yesterday.

D: I will continue to work with these companies. I will be in touch with them.

K: Good, it might be a good idea. That is an aspect we don't discuss tomorrow.

D: A certain fellow you have, Col. Gorman, going to Moscow in a few days.

K: I don't know anything about it.

D: This is the point. State Dept. called us to get visa for man of the President today, a personal man of the President, you take care?

K: The only man who is personal friend of the President. You are checking with me.

D: Tell me if you know him.

K: Gorman? I'll just look into it. I don't know anything about it.

D: Okay. Everybody claims he knows the President.

K: Never heard of him.

D: What was fellow you mention the other day.

K: DiBona. Anatol you check with me from now on.

D: I will act accordingly.

K: We will have breakfast tomorrow with general talk, talk frankly, and then we talk economic matters.

D: We can discuss in his presence our foreign policy?

K: Yes, I want to give him the feeling that what we are doing is important. The way we run our business. That will convince him so much, he'll give away our national interests.

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:00 pm, February 1, 1973

D: When you are going?

D: Hong Kong is better.

D: You depart when?

D: Fine.

K: Next, I havearrived invited Shults to come to the breakfast tomorrow.

*

August 5 1973

P.O. BAGUETTE DEPT. 25150 BORDEAUX

*

2

D: I understand.

D: In general then--

K: Then each side puts in--

D: Give to each whom-- when they going to decide--

D: I was with him today.

3

*

D: This is your position. ________ waits to see something around March or April. ________ sort of agreement, for balance of payments. Some companies with materials should be interested, may be good idea about some kind of money involvement, joint so to speak.

D: Tell me if you know him.

K: Never heard of him.

D: I will act accordingly.

TelCon
Secretary Richardson/Mr. Kissinger

7:15 pm, February 1, 1973

K: I wanted to talk to you before we get into too much of an issue on these NSSMs, so I'm calling to let you know what I can or cannot accept. I never move on this with the President. First I held up those for six weeks to give you a chance to make substantive comments, but we cannot let one Department clear it or have exclusive rights to do the papers.

R: I had no intention of making any such claim.

K: Our fellow got it from Jonathan.
It is still restricted to DoD and that you can understand.

R: Okay. How much do you want to go into now.

K: I just want to know what I have to take an adequate position on.

R: In general (1) I want to cooperate in NSC processes. No question as to the importance of our stand or the Presidential interest in having these things. That is not the issue. The only thing is with respect to some of these things I have an institutional level in the Department on some of the inputs in the proposals which shows the Department I want to get this work done. I am being told by the White House to do this. Would like to negotiate with you some understanding whereby you would know we are getting started on this and you could follow with the actual publication of NSSMs late r on.

K: It's in my interest to have you act effectively if possible. I favored your appointment because we worked well together before. Why we don't take it Saturday--cannot ~~proceed with~~ permit justification of exclusion of one department

R: I understand that. I'm concerned with this.

K: You should be able to show that you thought of it yourself.

R: I would.

TELCORN

Jerry Weisner/Mr. Kissinger

7:35 p.m., February 1, 1973

W: First of all, let me say "congratulations!"

K: Thank you, Jerry.

W: I was calling -- I don't know whether you have time to think about what's going on domestically anymore. . . . . . . . . feedback assets likely to be law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . technological policy because the NSF won't know how to deal with them. I wanted to be sure that you were aware of it and perhaps the NSC could pick this up.

K: How would we do it though?

W: Do you know Vince (?) McRae?

K: Yes.

W: He could probably help on this. Otherwise, all other clearances . . . . . . .

K: That's a very good thought. I have been so absolutely . . . .

W: I understand. Maybe you ought to pick up Vince on the NSC, at least until . . . . .

K: Let me do something about it tomorrow. Jerry, you have made a number of efforts and I really should be freer now. Will you keep after me.

W: It is certainly in the country's interest to do it. I have certainly understood what you have been up against.

K: Will you keep after it? I really will make a major effort the next time you call.

W: You are going off?

K: I am going off to Hanoi on Wednesday.

W: I'll see you when you get back.

K: Okay, Jerry.

*

REDACTED
Authority: E012958
By: Tef
NAPAS Date: 01/05/94

*

TELCORN

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

7:37 p. m., February 1, 1973

DK: How are you?

HK: Okay.

DK: Sorry to trouble you. I have just a brief query. I'm a little uncertain about the point of reference when you mentioned that you would discuss with the President.

HK: To do a history of what happened.

DK: Reconstruction?

HK: That's right.

DK: This would be an interview with myself, Ozzie and George?

HK: It is not definitely settled yet. I just wanted you to know that I would take it up with him.

DK: Did he seem to react favorably?

HK: That's right.

DK: And I should get in touch with you when you get back from Hanoi?

HK: That's right.

DK: How did the interview go today?

HK: I don't know, you know. My father will undoubtedly think I detroyed Marvin Kalb.

DK: [Laughter] Did you cover the same ground as you did yesterday?

HK: Some of it.

DK: I'll look forward to watching it. Have a good trip.

HK: Thank you, Dave.

wgh

Authority Eo.12958

By: [REDACTED] NARA Date: 6/15/89

*

TELCORN

Prof. Paul Doty/Mr. Kissinger

10:19 a.m., February 2, 1973

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Paul, how are you?

D: That was a first-rate performance last night.

K: Oh, was it? Thank you.

D: Oh, that was really very well done. . . little bit about the December bombing.

K: [Laughter] Well, I was just getting ready to write you a blistering letter about your letter to the President.

D: I see.

K: When your letter arrived from London that same night.

D: Okay.

K: I saw! it was all understandable.

D: Yeah. No, I thought that what one didn't know in December was the low casualties and that does make a difference.

K:

K: No, because really, you know, the instructions were that they couldn't bomb within a thousand feet of populated areas. Even that hospital -- You know, the hospital happens to be located about 800 feet from two targets and I think - not in a built-up area. Now, of course, the idiots should have told us that.

D: Now that does make a real difficult load. I always hate to see the population being numbed into civilian bombing and that's certainly what I thought was going on.

K: Yeah. No. Well, at any rate, the major problem that we had was at least as much as I tried to make to ____ yesterday is to sock Saigon too.

Of course,

D: Yes. That was the other half of the story. And I think probably would have been that -- It was very hard for the President to go on the air but boy it was a real ...

Prof. Paul Doty/Mr. Kissinger

10:19 a.m., February 2, 1973

- 2 -

K: Look, it was the toughest emotional period I've gone through.

D: Yeah, I can imagine. Yeah.

K: I mean, for me. Because all the people I believe in, you know -- there's no sense in conducting national policy if you don't have the moral consensus.

D: Yeah. Well, anyway, we can all be the easier.

K: Well, I think we with a little luck now -- with my trip to Hanoi, we can make some -- If they have 50% of the ability of the Chinese, we ought to be able to get a new relationship started.

D: Well, okay. The one thing I wanted to speak to you about while Heath is here -- I don't know how I can say it on the phone but I had a long confidential with de Bondeis (sp?) when I was there and I guess what they would like -- as he sees it, what they would be a little sympathetic discussion that would involve you on the future of their deterrents because they are internally very divided. And for what they think are rational reasons, which exist because they don't understand the larger picture. To put it briefly, the one side would like to keep things just as they are.

K: Yeah.

D: But, of course, they don't know how long that will be possible in terms of our continuing ..... old ships. On the other hand, the Navy wants to go to upgrade things as to size the Americans would let them but they fear -- and this is where I have no judgment and maybe they are just off base -- but they fear that if they went that way, or at least some of them fear, that it would ultimately threaten the May Treaty.

K: What do you think I should do?

D: Well, I think it's just a matter of listening to them and counseling them. I don't know myself which is the better way out. It really depends upon the assessment of the stability I suppose.

K: What is Bondeis (sp?) advice? What does he want?

D: Well, he's going to come over on February 11th and 12th and maybe the real discussions could be gone on then.

K: Yeah.

*

Prof. Paul Doty/Mr. Kissinger

10:19 a.m., February 2, 1973

- 3 -

D: But they -- he really fears that, you know, if they don't get a fairly agreed upon position on this that there may be not too far off a temptation to give it all up. And he thinks the consequences of that on the West Germans would be very bad. That's really, from his point of view, the reason to keep the whole thing going. So it's a fairly complex matter but I thought I could say that much.

yet

K: They have not formally raised it with us. There was some mumbling in November before they were coming -- when they thought they were coming in December. But we're going up to Camp David. Maybe they will raise it then.

D: Um-humm.

K: Okay.

D: But it's very much 50-50 inside, according to him. And they just don't know.

K: What is Bondéis (sp?) position? Is he in the government?

D: Oh, yes. He is the Chief Science Advisor to the Ministry of Defense.

K: Right.

D: So he's out on their own Polaris testing now and will be here in a week.

K: Okay. This is very helpful.

D: Very good. I don't suppose we have time to do any SALT work before you go?

K: Not with outsiders. But I'd like to see you when I'm back which will be the week of the 18th.

D: The week of the 18th. Okay.

K: Cause we've deferred it until the 12th.

D: I heard, yes.

K: So I will work something out with our group for that week.

D: All right, very good.

EDISON FIELD
Authority E0 12/25/8
By: BCT NARA Date: 01/15/84

Prof. Paul Doty/Mr. Kissinger

10:19 a.m., February 2, 1973

- 4 -

K: And what I'm particularly interested in is approaches to the MIRV problem.

D: Uh-huh. You mean, just the terms of -- I mean, in our studying it I suppose we ought to do both in terms of a small package --

K: That's right.

D: And also a large one. But not to get them mixed up.

K: Well, I consider a total ban impossible from the Soviet point of view.

D: Yeah, yeah.

K: So we have to think of intermediate packages.

D: Um-humm. Okay. Very good then.

K: See you soon.

D: Yes. Up here I wish the damn Government Department were not so parochial. Between you and me, I think Bok ought to offer you University professorship whenever you can come back.

K: Well, you know, between you and me, Bok called me a few months ago -- a few weeks ago, and said that if I needed his help to get back into the Government Department, I should approach him. On that basis, I'll never approach him. You know, I'll just never approach him. Harvard has to formulate a proposition if they want.

D: Yeah. I'm really surprised how the Government Department does work. I think the President only would keep one open but they have everybody's prodigy all lined up for the next 10 years. And I think that's a hell of a way to run a Department.

K: Yeah. Well, that's up to Harvard.

D: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you, Paul.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

*

TELCOM

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

10:27, Feb. 2, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Henry, that was a very effective hour on television I thought.

K: Thank you, I appreciate it.

S: It was really well done.

K: Thank you. Joe, I just saw that cable you fellows sent out of Cairo.

S: Which one was that.

K: (Where the hell is it) Ah--

S: The Holding cabl e.

K: Well, it's the--why the hell don't you clear stuff like that with us?

S: Well, I agree with you, and let me just say something else, there just aren't going to be anymore cables going out.

K: No one has ever won that sort of a battle with me and I don't know why you guys keep--one way or the other, the President is going to get hold of this.

S: That's right.

K: And you are just going to have to cut off your water completely. We are just going to tell the Arabs to ignore you, if you keep this up.

S: Well, Henry, I agree with you and as far as I am concerned I'm ready to work with whomever is going to run this thing and I have no quarrel with what you have to say at all.

K: You see, if we are going to try to do what you and I discussed the other day, how the hell can we not confuse them when this sort of stuff goes out.

S: By the way, that is what we've been saying for two years, so nobody is going to go anywhere with that, but, and it was intended to be sure that we keep Mr. Green in check rather than anything else after Green had consultations here, but Henry, look, I accept your point there is no doubt about it, and in fact I'm about half way along on what I promised you.

2

*

K: Okay, good.

S: You know, you don't have to make the point--

K: And I have had a preliminary talk with the President about it.

S: About the middle East?

K: Yes, and about our conversation.

S: Oh, yes. Well if he concludes that I have a role here, why I'm ready to play a role here too, but it's just that, Henry, I don't know whether I'm coming or going, I'd like to be helpful to whoever is going to be involved in this, and if there is any way I can be helpful, it's just that--

K: Oh, you're the only Assistant Secretary with whom I'm working directly.

S: Yeah, well Henry I'll have this for you and then the President really has to decide how this has got to be played and it can't be played without you and the President, that's all there is to it.

K: Well, we've demonstrated that to everybody's satisfaction.

S: Not quite to everybody's, not everybody is convinced. I'm convinced of it )laughter).

K: Okay.

S": Thanks Henry.

K: Bye.

REPRODUCIBLE
 Authority Eo.2958
By: Bt. NARA Date: 6/15/69

*

TELCORN

Scotty Reston/Mr. Kissinger

11:02 a.m., February 2, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Good morning, Henry.

K: Scotty, how are you?

R: Fine.

K: I tried to reach you yesterday and never seemed to connect.

R: Well, I was calling back and you were away and vise versa I guess.

K: Well, what I wanted you to know was that I had submitted a list of requests to our people. They had put them into categories -- for TV and for newspapers -- and there had been a long standing commitment to CBS, which we cancelled in April. Be that as it may, after we talked I got in touch with Marvin and urged him to keep the interview on as non-competitive a basis of anything that you and I had discussed as possible. I didn't put it to him on that basis. And I don't think it really got into a great deal of the reflective material that I thought you had had in mind.

R: Yeah. Well, I unfortunately was speaking while you were on last night so I missed it. And I haven't seen the text --

K: I think if you see the transcript, you'll see that about half of it dealt with Vietnam and was really an elaboration or in fact a repetition of my press conference.

R: Yeah.

K: Then there were two questions on the balance of power. Then there was a lot of antidotal material about strips. And then there was a very brief question at the end why we were interested in a negotiated settlement. So in the whole list of things there were only really three questions that could be called philosophical. And I had urged Marvin to push it in that direction and he did.

R: Well, why don't I look at the transcript when I get back and then look at the stuff our people have put together and let's talk at the beginning of the week. You're going off when?

K: I don't really think I can do anything before I come back from Hanoi.

R: I think it would be better to do it after you come back anyway.

Authority Eo.1258
By: Tef NARA File 615/94

*

TELCORN

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

11:15, Feb. 2, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Henry?

K: Yes, Jerry.

S: It was a nice performance last night I thought.

K: Thank you.

S: Say, I talked to Ron about going with you, and he said nothing doing. But, as I told you, I've been in touch with the North Vietnamese and I talked with their people in Paris on the phone and, they said that they had recommended me, and I talked to a couple of other people by cable. Now, I'm told apparently that they've cancelled all private American groups in February, obviously because of your visit, but I-- if you somehow could tell them that you had no objection to me being there while you're there, I think they would probably say yes at this point.

K: Okay, let me see what I can do.

S: Well, I'd sure appreciate it, Henry, I think somebody should be there and I think we could do it right.

K: Okay, it would be the first time.

S: Yes (laughter).

K: So, I would like to have somebody there from our press, and you've really always been understanding. Let me see whether I can get a message to them saying that we have no objections.

S: Well, if you could mention my name specifically, it would really be great.

K: Right.

S: You know at this week, talking about reconstruction and so forth, him.

K: Right.

S: Okay, thanks a lot.

K: Right, bye.

RECEIVED
Authority Eo 12458
By: Bt NAP Date 01/15/84

TELCONE

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

11:55 a.m. - 2/2/73

K: Hello.

S: Hi, that was a great performance.

K: Thank you, Bill.

S: My wife said you looked very humble.

K: (Laugs) Mock humility.

S: I told her that to maintain the semblance of humility for one hour was the greatest thing you've ever experienced.

K: (Laugs) Listen Sullivan if I have any self-confidence left after your constant assaults.

S: Henry, it was great. You danced around some tough ones too.

K: What I wanted to ask about was on that final act of yours.

S: Yeh, I've made some changes.

K: Can we also put in some stuff about restraint on the part of all parties or something like that? Call on all countries to exercise restraint.

S: Restraint, yeh. I don't have the damn thing in front of me right now. I did make that - I did have some reference to calling on all countries to - what the hell was it. Hold on just a second, maybe I can get it. I did have something in there after all countries - other countries who were not signatories or not participants to __________, but I haven't got the word restraint. How did you want to put restraint in?

K: In their actions to contribute to peace and to exercise restraint in matters that might exacerbate conflict.

S: Yeh. OK. I don't think I have anything specifically - let me just look to see what I have here. No, I don't have - I'll add something. I sent the whole thing over to you as part of a - I guess it hasn't gotten to you yet, as a reply to that NSSM that you sent. NSSM 67 I have appended it as the action paper.

REDACTED
Authority Eo. 1258
By: NARA Date: 6/15/69

12:04, February 2, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Yes, hello Henry.

K: How are you.

D: Okay.

K: Ah, Anatol, we have redone that communique a little bit to make it easier for you not to send bombs into North Vietnam.

D: (laughter)

K: Which I know is your principal preoccupation

D: Well

K: And we are sending it over this afternoon.

D: To me.

K: To you.

D: Is it part of this one, or--

K: No, no, just ignore the one I gave you this morning and use the one we will send over this afternoon.

D: Oh, it will be from the very beginning you have redone.

K: Yes.

D: You will send not one page but the whole set.

K: The whole set.

D: And I will let you see notations where I just looking through the text and you see, you made a mistake, you said November. So it was the word November that bothered me. You said first the agreement signed by parties in November--

K: Yes, that's because we were drafting this thing in November, when we thought there would be an agreement.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012658
By: MWB Date: 03/04/87

2

D: So it would be better to take it off.

K: Yeah.

D: Because otherwise it confuses--

K: At any rate, this is really only for your leadership.

D: No, no, I understand, because you are going discuss it in February, because you discuss it while in Hanoi of course.

K: I will discuss it in Hanoi.

D: You must be in communication with them because you understand it also concerns them so they have to make their own mind.

K: No, no, but it would be a little embarrassing to me to have them learn it from you.

D: No, You never embarras why I am this way, I may assure you, you do not worry.

K: Okay, and you will get a letter to Brezhnev this afternoon, it's already drafted.

D: Okay.

K: And it's in terms of what I told you this morning. We will discuss all these matters in the first half of March.

D: That will be good.

K: And that we will be constructive in the European situation.

D: Yeah, I see what you do, fair enough. You just mention, just maybe about the ______ you mention, it will probably be in March, the first part, maybe.

K: That's exactly what the letter says.

D: Okay Henry--

K: And no crisis while you and I are gone.

D: That will be bored while I'm gone.

K: Sonnenfeldt had Drambuie, so don't you try it, it's too dangerous

3

D: Yeah, on a salad it's nothing really, except what I will send you, I will: bring you some.

K: Good. Anatol, we will send you the communique.

D: Yes, okay Henry, the very best. And thank you very much, and I hope you enjoy the book I gave you, and we'll have another discussion should you read it.

K: I'm counting on it.

D: Oh, yesterday, you know what program you pre-empted.

K: What?

D: On CBS.

K: Which one.

D: I was supposed to be the Last Link of America.

K: oh, really.

D: Exactly. It was supposed to play.

K: I think you are absolutely correct. Good, Anatol, I have to run.

D: Yes, thank you very much.

K: And we'll have a constructive spring, I'm sure.

D: Yes, I think so too.

K:q Good.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: 8577010017
Date: 10/2/70
By: ANATOL

*

12:04, February 2, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Yes, hello Henry.

K: How are you.

D: Okay.

D: (laughter)

D: Well

D: To me.

K: To you.

K: Yes.

K: The whole set.

*

2

K: Yeah.

D: Okay.

D: That will be good.

D: Yeah, I see what you do, fair enough. You just mention, just maybe about the time you mention, it will probably be in March, the first part, maybe.

D: Okay Henry--

3

D: Yeah, on a salad it's nothing really, except what I will send you, I will bring you some.

K: I'm counting on it.

K: What?

D: On CBS.

K: Which one.

K: Oh, really.

K: I think you are absolutely correct. Good, Anatol! I have to run.

D: Yes, thank you very much.

D: Yes, I think so too.

K: Good.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

P.O. Box 1141

Amherst, MA 01017

By: J. B. SAPÓ, Date: 6/15/04

*