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characteristically low-profile(((okay? it was unclear what you meant by anonymous. mark))))
fashion. Each is jealously protective of its national sovereignty. But for the equilibrium to work, the United States must play the role of the balancer—much as Britain did in Europe for four centuries. It must also seek to overcome doubts about U.S. credibility raised by the collapse in Vietnam, the fate of America's friends in Iran, the ineffectual intervention in Lebanon and America's lagging economic performance.+

Japan: Of all the nations involved in the current balance, the most dynamic at this moment is Japan. In that remark-

[24]

able and unique country, resemblances to the West are deceptive. Its elections do not establish a claim to power. They confirm the reign of a ruling party that is actually governed by four or five feudally-organized factions. Its prime ministers can be predicted a

decade ahead (with only an occasional scandal upsetting the schedule). Its culture produces negotiators who make significant utter-

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ances only in their opening statements. Afterwards, they are
unable to modify their positions in any concrete way without
seeking a new consensus at home. Negotiations with Japan are
protracted and frequently interrupted; their pace is determined by
a consensus beyond the control of the non-Japanese negotiator.-

In the past, that consensus has been extraordinarily responsive
to changes in the balance of power. Japan reacted to Admiral
Perry's forced opening of the country by moving swiftly from
feudalism to centralized authoritarianism. It moved just as quickly
from centralized authoritarianism to its current species of democ-
racy under the impact of defeat in World War II. In each case, the
transition was accomplished with remarkable discipline-and
purely in response to external forces. At no time has Japan lost its
cultural uniqueness or been tempted by conversion to foreign
ideologies or abstract concepts.-

In the next decade [(okay? mark?)] the role Japan plays in the
world will depend

far less on American exhortations than on Tokyo's assessment of
political, military and economic trends. Tokyo is emerging as the
financial center of the world, and its investment decisions influ-
ence the distribution of global technology. Its own technology
increasingly dominates world markets, and its military establish-
ment is growing. Japan's traditional sensitivity to balances of
power will cause it to emerge as an increasingly assertive force-
although it will probably do so gradually and without calling

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12. 05. 89 01:23 AM

P14

((MORE))

throughout it will properly do so gradually and withoutMETTLEMENT
power will cause it to emerge as an increasingly assertive force-
ment in drawing. Taban's traditional sensitivity to balance of
increasingly dominates world markets, and its military eataplan-
ence the distribution of global technology. Its own technology
financial center of the world and the investment decisions of the
political, military and economic trends. Tokyo is emerging as the
far rear on American expenditures than on Tokyo's assessment of
world will depend

In the next decade (tomorrow's week)) the tole Japan brave in the

[11]

ideologies or extractive conceptions.

cultural uniqueness or been reformed by conversation to foreign

bute in taban to extricate forces. At no time has Japan lost its
trajectory was accomplished with remarkable discipline-and
racy under the impact of defeat in World War II. In such case, runs
from centralized authorization to its current species of democ-
trendium to centralized authorization. It moved just as quickly
berry's forced opening of the country by moving awfully from
to changes in the balance of power. Japan reacted to Admira
Win the best, that coussana pan been extraordinarily reasonable
[re]

a coussana beyond the control of the non-Japanese negotiator.
brogued andavadly intermingled; their pace is determined by
seeking a new coussana at home. Negotiations with Japan are
nugget to modify their positions in any concrete way without
wars only in their opening statements. Afterwards, they are
IN0451 Aisa
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attention to itself(((is this truly possible? do you want to end the sentence after 'gradually.'? maynard))). America's challenge is not to push this role on Japan but to contribute to conditions that will make that role compatible with the aspirations of other nations in Asia and around the world.+

[16] The U.S. relationship with Japan has become extremely complex. As Japan's ally, we are committed to responding to threats to

its security (though that role will diminish with the growth of Japanese military power.) Yet whatever our formal policy, most other Asian nations see the United States as a counterweight to Japan in the economic field. Whether we can continue to serve that role will depend on our ability to take measures outside the realm of formal foreign policy: to make American industry competitive; to focus our economic ingenuity on the creation of productive capacity rather than financial manipulation; to control our twin trade and budget deficits.+

[14] The first step should be to accept that unfair Japanese practices are not solely responsible for America's relative economic decline. Japan's economy is extremely disciplined,

(((MORE)))

12 05. 89 01:23 AM P14

E

((MORE)))

why is extremely disciplined,
nomadic decline. Japan's economy declines. Japan's economy for America's relative economic success are not soely reason-able that neither Japanese accept that neither Japanese

The first area should be to twin trade and budget deficits.

manipulation to control our currency rather than finance our creation of productive to focus our economic ingenuity

of formal foreign policy: to make American industry competitive! role will depend on our ability to take measures outside the realm Japan in the economic field. Whether we can continue to serve that other Asian nations see the United States as a counterweight to Japanese military power.) Yet whatever our formal policy, most of a security (though that role will eliminated with the growth of

Japan's a ally, we are committed to rebounding to curtail to The U.S. relationship with Japan has become extremely com-

[14]

around the world.

compromise with the aspirations of other nations in Asia and Japan put to contribute to conditions that will make that role is not to push a role

the Senkaku after 'stratagy' means ())) America's challenge attention to itself!!! (this is really接收 to you want to send

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influence in North Korea. But Beijing will cast a very eye on any
visit may ease the competition between China and the Soviets for
reflected on the Korean Peninsula. For a while, the Corportion
of

The rest of Asia: The new international relationships will also

[13]

from watching to its own drummer.+
relations. No conceivable shift in Soviet policy will keep Tokyo
and their mutual interests too far, for a fundamental change in
dead,

confrontation. But the historic dialogue between the two sides is too
war. For why else would Moscow after so many negotiations on the
side annexed at the end of the


northern islands that the Soviet
even a compromise on the four
et overture to Tokyo, probably
Japan's future. I expect a Soviet-
relatively subordinate role in
the Soviet Union will play a


[14]

domestic performance.+
future in Asia is to improve our
token, the key to America's in-
competitiveness. By the same
international power is its superior
the roof of Japan's growing eco-
sionarily quarantinatory. Enc
and its trade policies are occa-

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increased Soviet or Japanese role in Pyongyang. Of the major players in the region, the United States is probably the only one with no deep-seated historic reasons for opposing the emergence of a strong unified Korea. The others would just as soon preserve the status quo, provided it maintains their relative influence on the peninsula and does not lead to unwanted conflicts. For that reason,

both Koreas have enhanced their international roles (at still not

clearly exactly what this means, is there a better way of putting it? (It is clear to me that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are engaged in a serious attempt to prevent the outbreak of war in Asia. ...)

between them are likely to remain in uneasy equilibrium and may even ease marginally. But that process will require careful management, lest jockeying outside powers and the volatile Korean temperament combine to produce an explosion ((do you want to suggest more specifically what the u.s. might do--ie, troop reductions in the south; some sort of direct talks with the north; encouraging the south to talk to the north? may be OK)). +

Sino-Soviet rapprochement may well enhance America's role in southeast Asia. Countries like Indonesia-and to a lesser extent Malaysia-have always been wary of China. That apprehension is likely to be enhanced if they judge that China has less to fear from the Soviet Union. The United States should improve its relations with these countries, but take care to avoid the appearance of participating in an anti-Chinese cabal.

This process is bound to raise again the question that so

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12. 05. 89 01:23 AM F17

(((MORE)))

While Process is bound to take again the direction that so far as possible in an anti-Chinese capacity.

with these countries, but take care to avoid the appearance of the Soviet Union. The United States should improve its relations from

likewise to be enhanced if they judge that China has reason to fear Malaysia have always been wary of China. That abhorrence is southeast Asia. Countries like Indonesia and to a lesser extent Maino-Soviet rapportment may well enhance America's role in [33]

encouraging the south to talk to the north? may (if so)?

regretions in the sought some sort of direct talk with the north; indeed more specifically what the U.S. might do--ie., try to temptiment complicate to produce an exploitation ((do you want to deal with this? fast jockeying outside bowers and the volatile Korean even easier warfully. But that process will require careful management; they are likely to remain in uneasy equilibrium and may

((certainly)). Relations

Dear fellow statesmen, to these a further way of understanding your position with respect to international relations (if not your own) have enhanced their international status.

Beninants and does not lead to unwanted conflicts. For that reason, statesman dno, provided if maintaining their relative influence on the a strong unified Korea. The others would just as soon diSserve the with no debt-measured historic reasons for opposing the emerGence of players in the region, the United States is properly the only one to issue Soviet or Japanese role in Pionland. Of the major

EM04ST Veta

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12.02.89 01:43 PM *TOXA FAX

P18

["12. 05. 89 01:45 PM", "*TOXA FAX", "P19", "IN0421 Asia\n\ntragical-", "DEPT. IN", "PAGE-16", "ly divided America in the '60s and '70s: what to do about Vietnam\nand the other countries of Indochina? Some countries in southeast\nAsia would like to build up Vietnam as an obstacle to Chinese\ndesigns on the rest of the region. Meanwhile, Soviet military bases", "in Vietnam serve as a reminder to Beijing that Moscow has options\nother than reconciliation-and as a warning to Washington that\nthe Soviet Union is still determined to project its power onto\ndistant oceans.+", "For the United States, there is no region in the world that is\nmore\ndifficult to view objectively. Too many groups are still driven by\nthe passions of the war, even though they are largely irrelevant to", "the current problems of southeast Asia. At a minimum, it is\nimportant for American policymakers to remember that China\nwill always react neuralgically to the emergence of a major power\non its borders. The United\nStates must tread warily in its\nrelation with Vietnam, siding\nneither with those who would\nlike to refight the battles of the\npast nor with those that seek\nexpiation for sometimes imagi-\nnary transgressions. My own\nsense is that America should", (((MORE)))", "12. 05. 89 01:21 AM P18"]

["12. 05. 89 01:45 PM", "*TOXA FAX", "P20", "IN0421 Asia", "DEPT. IN", "not move faster than China in\nimproving relations with Ha-\nnoi—and that we would lose\nnothing by staying a step be-\nhind Beijing.→", "□Cambodia remains Ameri-\nca's biggest nightmare in Indo-\nchina. Each decade, with the\nbest of intentions, we seem to\ncontribute to deepening the di-\nlemmas. For a decade, Wash-\nington has correctly opposed\nthe Vietnamese occupation.\nBut it has concentrated on le-\ngal, political and moral support\nfor opposition forces. Both\nDemocratic and Republican ad-", "[22]", "ministrations have refrained from taking a military role even\nfrom supplying arms to the democratic forces fighting for inde-\npendence. The result is that as Vietnamese troops withdraw, the\nonly well-armed forces in the field are communist: the army\ncreated by the Vietnamese and the murderous Khmer Rouge. The\nmore democratically-oriented military forces have only received\nhumanitarian aid from the United States—an absurd evasion for\nwhich the price will now surely be paid.→", "□Support is belatedly starting to grow for supplying military aid", (((MORE))))", "12. 05. 89 01:23 AM F18"]

12. 05. 89 01:45 PM

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to

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the democratic resistance. But the proposed assistance is so tim-
id-it would consist only of rifles-that the result would probably
be another American embarrassment. It is an irony that of the two
adequately-armed forces(((took out the add about both armies being
communist, since you make that point in the paragraph above.
mark))), the one trained by the Vietnamese may

be the more benign. In any event, it is too late now for an
American
Insect B

military role. (((again, do you want to suggest more specifically
what the u.s. role should be--ie, should we stay out of any
cambodian negotiations; should we favor china and pol pot; should
we side with the vietnamese and sihanouk? would be nice if you
could strengthen but not as essential as in the korea graph.
maynard)))+

[16]

It has become commonplace to argue that the center of gravity in
world affairs is shifting to the Pacific. It is certainly true that
the

Pacific basin will gain in importance. But America's role in this
process will be crucially affected by intangibles: by our ability
to

define our national interest more consistently(((okay? thought
referring to a permanent national interest might be confusing,
since above you advocate maintaining a balance that will be
constantly shifting. mark)); by our willingness
shamefully altering
our

to keep domestic political changes from unduly affecting our

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12 05 89 01:23 AM P20

(((MORE)))

to keep domestic political changes from unacceptably occurring out
covertly and effectively attending

since agoed you advocate maintaining a balance that will be
retreating to a permanent national interest might be continuing

define our national interest more cohesively (((okay? thought
to

process will be crucially affected by intudividual by our ability
Pacific pain will gain in importance. But America's a role in this
the

It has become commonplace to argue that the center of gravity in
(19)

warlord))+

could thereafter put not as essential so in the case of war.

we side with the Vietnamese and silicones? would be wise if you
compodian negotiator should we favor china and bof bot? should
what the n.e. role should be--is, should we act out of any

military role (((again, do you want to add here more specifically
American

be the more benign. In any event, if it is too late now for an
mark))). the one trained by the Vietnamese way

communication, since you make that point in the paragraph above.

agreedly-armed forces(((took out the add about both armies being
be another American supparrtament. It is an trony that of the two
id-it would couple only of titles-that the result would properly
the democratic reatance. But the proposed anatance is so sim-
to

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international role((is this what you meant? it wasn't clear.

mark))); by our ability to sustain an economy that can
support our global responsibilities. In that sense, Gorbachev's
visit

to Beijing should be viewed not as a distant drama that has turned
America into a passive spectator. Rather it should be seen as a
challenge to rethink our own role in shaping Asia's future.

[19]

+

[1]

(((END))))

12. 05. 89 01:23 AM

P21

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pieces on the diplomatic chessboard have
been essentially rearranged since Nixon's
cantering to China and Carter's establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing.
This new arrangement is not inherently
disadvantageous to American interests
provided it is understood and managed in
the appropriate manner.

II((((at this point, you might want to quickly summarize the main
conclusions of the piece. one easy way to do it would be to move
up the four points you make at the end of the section on u.s.
-chinese relations, then add one about japan and one about vietnam
and the rest of southeast asia. mark)))).

[14]

II(((as you suggested, i cut the references to mao's fears about
chinese isolation, mark)))).For about a decade, the distrust between
~~Mao~~ B. B.

[5]

Moscow and Beijing created a classic diplomatic opportunity for the United States. All Washington had to do was position itself so that it was closer to each of them than they were to one another (with a tilt toward China, since it was the weaker, more vulnerable and less expansionist of the two.) That period of almost mechanical simplicity is coming to a close. Beijing no longer fears an imminent Soviet attack. It

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Jouder tears an imminent Soviet attack. It
simplicity is coming to a close. Belting up
the two.) That period of almost mechanical
more anuutrapie and less expeauncliar of
toward China, since it was the weaker,
than they were to one another (with a tilt
said so that it was closer to each of them
VII Washington had so go was position it-
atic opportunity for the United States,
Necesn and Belting overed a classic gipo-

chinese isolation, wark))) for whom a decade, the greater possible

[2] (((saon unaggeated, i anf the references to wao, a teare about the rest of southeast aata, wark)))

Chinese relations, then add one about Japan and one about Vietnam
nd the four points you make at the end of the section on n.a.

Originaiue of the piece, one easy way to do it would be to move
M(II)(at this point, you might want to quickly anmaitise the main

[14]

the abprate wanner

Brought it in agriculture and waned in
agriculture to Western interests

This item agreement is wet interally

ment of Diplomatic relations with Beijing

China's to China and China's expatriate

paua beautifully retraited statesmen

Disease on the diplomatic cheapairg have

DEBT.

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HAK :

MAY 16 1983 50:53 MEMBERS UNK

P.7

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calculates that the Soviet Union is too pre-
occupied with its domestic difficulties and
with the aftermath of Afghanistan war to
risk unpredictable adventures. Moscow is
overcoming the darkness -
losing the favor - which was never realis-
tic of a Sino-U.S. alliance aimed against
the Soviet Union.

In journeying to Beijing, Gorbachev is
seeking to apply in Asia the strategy that
has worked so well in Europe. He is trying
to break up American coalitions by remov-
ing the impression of Soviet bellicosity. At
the same time, he is doing little to alter an
underlying strategic relationship based on
the long Soviet border with China and Mos-
cow's large armed forces. In the near future,
no doubt the visit to China will be followed
soon by overtures to Japan.

None of this need be of concern so long as
the United States analyzes the new rela-
tionships properly. For in Asia, Gorba-
chev's special brand of bonhomie and flair
for dramatic gestures will have far less
impact than in Europe. The Asian nations
are less haunted by the two world wars and
face less domestic pressure to respond to

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[20]

[11]

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Gorbachev's bent for the September. Moscow's propagandistic overtures. Arms control is not an opiate for them. In Asia, Gorbachev must offer real concessions aimed at establishing a realistic political equilibrium. +

The reality in Asia is none of the major nations will run the risk of separating itself from the United States in order to gain the goodwill of Moscow. Nor will any of them challenge the Soviet Union simply to curry favor with the United States. These are limiting conditions for both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in Asia. +

China's attitude was summed up in a conversation I had with a leading official in Beijing about a year and a half ago. I observed that China was doing less with Moscow than some Americans feared-but more than Beijing was letting on. My interlocutor replied: "In any event, we will stop all short of the world's record which is held by Shults and Shevardnadze." In other words, China does not propose to be the last combattant on Cold War barricades that have been abandoned by the original warriors. Nor is it prepared to lead a soli-

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[13]

[8]

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11. 05. 89

["E14", "XAF AXOT* M4 41:20 66.20.11", "(((WORK)))", "warriors. Not in its best interests so far as a\nhostile force has been antagonized by the original\nhostile force. China does not propose to be the\nfirst to attack. China does not propose to be the\nfirst

MAY 10 '89 20:25 NEWSWEEK NWK

HAKCOP

DEPT.

tary charge on Moscow.

No doubt Beijing's immediate fear of Soviet invasion has receded. China therefore sees less need for a rigid anti-Soviet stance than it did a decade ago. Gorbachev has also met most of Beijing's conditions Beijing for an improvement in relations; withdrawal from Afghanistan; a thinning out of Soviet troops in Mongolia; withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

[14]

But while China's short-term fears may have eased, its strategic concerns remain. Beijing cannot forget the history of Russian expansion across Siberia and into the Maritime provinces throughout the 19th Century. It has no intention of being left alone in Asia with the Soviet Union and Japan. China will seek to use the United States as a counterweight-as long as it retains confidence that Washington sees the need to maintain a balance of power in Asia and has the capacity to do so.

[9]

For these reasons, Gorbachev's freedom of maneuver in Beijing will be severely circumscribed. China will try to settle issues that threaten to security-especially

[12]

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PAGE-6

Vietnam's presence in Cambodia. At the same time, Beijing will do its utmost to avoid weakening ties with America. Indeed, one consequence of the visit is likely to be a serious Chinese effort to improve ties with Washington in all probability.

Beijing will seek to improve its short-term relations with the USSR and its long-term relations with the United States.

[13]

The most interesting conversations between Gorbachev and Deng may deal less with foreign policy than with their respective experiences with modernization. For Beijing and Moscow have begun the process from opposite ends of the spectrum. China has made significant progress in moving towards what the West calls a market economy. A rudimentary credit and banking system has been erected. Agriculture has been largely privatized. Markets exist for many consumer goods. Economic progress is visible-especially in the countryside, but also in the cities.

China's economic revival has benefitted from several factors: a homogenous culture; the experience of Chinese who have

[14]

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lived overseas; the entrepreneurial zeal of
so much of the population. In fact, Beijing's
most immediate economic problem is an
overheated economy and the dilemma of
price reform. This is a huge problem in a
society where prices have been fixed and
subsidized for decades. The first attempt to
bring about realistic prices last year led to a
major inflation, corruption and popular
discontent. It has since been suspended.

Where China is suffering the painful political consequences of economic success, Moscow's economic reform is stillborn. Living conditions in the Soviet Union are probably worse than they were at the beginning of the Gorbachev period. Since only 51 percent of the population is Russian, economic decentralization increases the threat of nationalist uprisings. Above all, Gorbachev has obviously decided that he must first centralize political decision-making in his own hands-a process likely to take the better part of this year. Only then will it become clear whether the political policy of Glasnost was a tactic or a long-term policy-and whether the economic policy of perestroika can succeed.

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[17]

B

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The difference in priorities has had an ironic effect on Western perceptions. Gorbachev has received extraordinary credit for political changes while his economy declines. China, on the other hand, is faulted for not responding to growing pressures for political change. But those pressures have increased precisely because economic changes have taken place so rapidly. (Indeed, more rapidly than the Chinese leader ship expected.) Were Gorbachev and Deng to have a discussion about modernization, it would be fascinating to know whether they could agree on the appropriate mix of political and economic reform-or on whether such a mix is achievable in a

Communist society.

[16]

Is it suggested above, you might want to move these points to the top of the piece, mark it For the United States the following conclusions follow: For all these reasons

The geopolitical basis of Sino-U.S. relations remains firm. China remains a key component of the balance of power in Asia and, for the foreseeable future, the weakest of Asia's major powers. Hence, it continues to deserve American support, including in its efforts to modernize.

[4]

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[6]

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reassurances to the West are deceptive. Its
inadequacy, to the East, is alekspade, country, wres-
ponds, the west dynamic at this moment

[71]

Americas' lagging economic performance,+
Iran, Iraq, and the Middle East and
Austria, the state of America's friends in
N. A. creditability raised by the collaboration in
what also ask to overcome double standard
Britain did in Europe for four centuries. It
brings the core of the paradox—which is
Tibbium to work, the United States must
its national sovereignty. But for the adju-
tionarily protective of

[72]

[rel]

ity, +
tends to rely on specific formats for apportion-
ment too which change over the time-
moral superiority precedents. And they
societies would find Americas' claim to

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power. They confirm a ruling party which in turn is governed
by four or five factions whose leaders are appointed and
which are organized almost fraudally. Its prime ministers are
predictable a decade ahead (loaned only by the occasional
scandal). Its culture produces negotiators whose opening
statements are generally their only significant utterance;
afterwards they register the comments of their interlocutor
but they are unable to modify their positions in any signif-
icant way until they have consulted the consensuses which
they represent. Thus negotiations with Japan are both
protracted and intermittent; their pace is determined by a
consensus which is itself out of reach of the non-
Japanese negotiator.

The result is a social performance both disciplined and
adhesive, shaped by a consensus that in the past has been
extraordinarily responsive to needs in its perception of

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extraordinariness reasonable to measures in the situation of
effective, without by a comment that in the past was been
the result of a social performance both electrified and
Japanese negotiator.

conсенus which is itself out of context reach of the non-
extracted and interwitten; their face is determined by a
conclusion. Thus negotiations with Japan are both
inconsistent.

It must be until they have committed the consensus which
but they are unable to modify their positions in any direct-
aftermath they register the comments of their interlocutor
statements are generally their only significant utterance
(understood). Its culture produces negotiators whose opening
predictable a decade ahead (referred only by the occasional
which are organised almost randomly). Its primewinners are
by four or five sections whose leaders are appointed and
bolder. They confine a ruling party which in turn in governing

MAY 09 1989 10:51 KIISANER RESEARCHER M.Y.

MAY 10 '89 20:27 NEWSWEEK NWK

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elections do not establish a claim to power. They confirm the reign of a ruling party that is actually governed by four or five ~~fudally-organized factions. Its prime ministers can be predicted a decade ahead (with only an occasional scandal upsetting the schedule). Its culture produces negotiators who make significant utterances only in their opening statements. Afterwards, they are unable to modify their positions in any concrete way without seeking a new consensus at home. [16]

In the past, that consensus has been extraordinarily responsive to changes in the balance of power. Japan responded to Admiral Perry's forced opening of the country by moving swiftly from feudalism to centralized authoritarianism. It moved just as quickly from centralized authoritarianism to its current species of democracy under the impact of defeat in World War II. In each case, the transition was accomplished with remarkable discipline-and purely in response to external forces. At no time has Japan lost its cultural uniqueness or been tempted by conversion to foreign ideologies or abstract concepts. +

[16]

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[15]

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The role Japan plays in the world will depend far less on American exhortations than on Tokyo's assessment of political, military and economic trends. Tokyo is emerging as the financial center of the world, and it can therefore grow by its investment decisions influence the distribution of global technology. Japan's technology increasingly dominates world markets, and its military establishment is gaining ground. American exhortations that Japan play a more active international role are largely beside the point. Its traditional sensitivity to balances of power will cause it to emerge as an increasingly assertive force-although it will probably do so gradually and without calling attention to itself. America's challenge is not to push this role on Japan but to contribute to conditions that will make it a real role compatible with the aspirations of other nations in Asia and around the world.

The U.S. relationship with Japan has become extremely complex. As Japan's ally, we are committed to responding to threats to its security (though that role will diminish with the growth of Japanese military power.) Yet whatever our formal policy, most other Asian nations see the United States as a counterweight to Japan. Wheth-

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[19]

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Sino-Soviet rapprochement is likely to enhance America's role in southeast Asia. Countries like Indonesia—and to a lesser extent Malaysia—have always been wary of China. That apprehension is likely to be enhanced if they judge that China has less to fear from the Soviet Union. The United States should improve its relations with these countries, but take care to avoid the appearance of organizing an anti-Chinese cabal.

This process is bound to raise again the question that so tragically divided America in the '60s and '70s: what to do about Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina? Some countries in southeast Asia would

[11]

like to encourage tensions between Vietnam and China, in order to create obstacles to Chinese designs on the rest of the region

what you were trying to say? mask).).

Meanwhile, Soviet military bases in Vietnam serve as a reminder to Beijing that Moscow has options other than reconciliation—and as a warning to Washington that the Soviet Union is still determined to project its power onto distant oceans.

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[12]

for its power to direct affairs in the Soviet Union is still determined to broil-on-and as a warning to Washington that Moscow has options other than reconciliating us as a reminder to writing that secretary, Soviet militarily base in Asia--which was trying to sell war to China designs on the rest of the region--would beEncouraged to continue the war against Russia in order to cross the Pacific--like toEncourage the Japanese to attack some countries in southeast Asia would beencourage them to attack the rest of the countries in the region.

[11]

The process is pound to raise again the capay. The appearance of expanding an anti-Chinese these countries, but fake care to avoid the states should improve its relations with to fear from the Soviet Union. The United enhanced if they induce that China has fees of China. That apprehension is likely to be extended Malaysia-wave already been many countries like Indonesia-and to a lesser enhance America's role in southeast Asia. The Soviet abrogation of the right to

DEBT.

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MAR 10 '89 5:59AM
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For the United States, there is no region in the world that is more difficult to view objectively. Too many groups are still driven by the passions of the war, even though they are largely irrelevant to the current problems of southeast Asia. At a minimum, it is important for American policymakers to remember that China will always react neuralgically to the emergence of a major power on its borders. ~~The~~ United States must tread warily in its relation with Vietnam, siding neither with those who would like to refight the battles of the past nor with those that seek explanation for ~~self-inflicted~~ transgressions. ~~My~~ own sense is that America should not move faster than China in improving relations with Hanoi—and that we would lose nothing by staying ~~at a step behind~~ Beijing.

Cambodia remains America's biggest nightmare in Indochina. Each decade, with the best of intentions, we only contribute ~~a bit~~ a smattering of deepening the dilemmas. For a decade, Washington has correctly opposed the Vietnamese occupation. But it has concentrated on legal, political and moral support opposition forces. Both Democratic and

[19]

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Republican administrations have re-
frained from taking a military role-even
from supplying arms-to the democratic
forces fighting for independence. The re-
sult is that as Vietnamese troops with-
draw, the only well-armed forces in the
field are communist; the army created by
the Vietnamese and the murderous Khmer
Rouge. The more democratically-oriented
military forces have only received humani-
tarian aid from the United States-an ab-
surd evasion for which the price will now
surely be paid.+

Support is belatedly starting to grow for
supplying military aid to the democratic
resistance. But the proposed assistance is
so timid-it would consist only of rifles-
that the result would probably be another
American embarrassment. It is an irony
that of the two adequately-armed forces,
the one trained by the Vietnamese may be
the more benign. In any event, it is too late
now for an American military role.+

[21]

Dealing with the complexities of Asia
requires a serious assessment of our way of
thinking about foreign policy. We must re-

[10]

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alize that our endless technical and tactical
debates, our frequent changes of positions,
our reluctance to think in terms of power
are taking a growing toll. They risk turning
America into a nag on the sidelines, incapable
of shaping events in an area of growing
strategic and economic importance. Yet an
America more conscious of its international
role-both its scope and its limits-could
still contribute to a better future for Asia.
For of all the major participants in the
Asian drama, we are in the best position to
view the stage as a whole(((do you want to think about another
kicker? this strikes me as a weak ending to an otherwise strong
piece. mark ))).+

((END))

[14]

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Newsweek article 5/9/89

SECOND DRAFT

Few events so symbolize the change in international relations as the relaxed manner in which Gorbachev's visit to Beijing is being treated. Ten years ago such a journey would have seemed nothing short of a diplomatic earthquake, possibly as the beginning of a new Sino-Soviet alliance; and certainly as the defeat of one of the principal achievements of American diplomacy of the seventies - the rapprochement with the People's Republic of China.

Today we know that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with its domestic affairs and Beijing too wary for any such

a reversal to be either realistic or meaningful. Media hype
or imprudent public comment may still tempt the Soviets to
exaggerate their diplomatic opportunity and Beijing to
overestimate the bargaining leverage of rapprochement with
Moscow. But such setbacks would be the result of
emotionalism, not the realities of the diplomatic situation.

Gorbachev's visit to Beijing should bring home to
America not a sense of crisis but a realization that the
pieces on the diplomatic chessboard have been essentially
rearranged since Nixon's opening to China and Carter's
establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing. This new
arrangement is not inherently disadvantageous to American
interests provided it is first understood and then managed
in the appropriate manner.

To be sure, even at the beginning of the Sino-United
States relationships, sentimental relief at the rediscovery

-3-

of China often obscured the hard-headed realism on which it
was based and which has enabled it to endure through four
Administrations of both parties. The opening of China in
fact reflected two complimentary fears: the United States
was concerned about the relentless build-up of Soviet
long-range missiles and sought to overcome the paralysis of
the domestic travail of the Vietnam war; China decided that
the weakness induced by the Cultural Revolution might tempt
Moscow to the Brezhnev doctrine by which the Kremlin legiti-
mized imposition of ideological conformity on a fractious
Communist world. Indeed, Mao became obsessed by the fear
that an isolated China might invite a repetition of 19th
century imperialism: a coalition of all major countries
against Beijing. This was indeed a frequent theme in the
early Sino-U.S. contacts.

-4-

In other words, Washington and Beijing were seeking to break up hostile coalitions which in fact never had a chance of coming true: Moscow and Beijing had broken with each other nearly a decade before Washington understood what had happened. But once that fact was grasped early in the Nixon administration, the United States acted on the geopolitical principle that American security depended on supporting the weaker of the Communist giants against the stronger and more expansionist. In the summer of 1969 the Nixon administration not only rebuffed Soviet hints of a possible attack on China; it strongly implied that it would oppose such a move - even while Beijing seemed implacably hostile and its propaganda violently anti-American. The key figures of the Nixon administration were convinced that China was an essential component of the international equilibrium and that its weakening would, in the end, facilitate Soviet

vj

-5-

global hegemony. But neither was the United States prepared
to harass the Soviet Union by encouraging Chinese pressures,
in any event a forlorn enterprise.

For about a decade the extreme distrust between Moscow
and Beijing created for the United States an almost classi-
cally convenient diplomatic opportunity. So long as the
suspicion of the two Communist giants of each other was
unbridgeable the United States's role was to position itself
so that it was closer to each of them than they were to one
another with a general tilt toward China because it was
weaker, more vulnerable and less expansionist.

That period of almost mechanical simplicity is now
coming to a close. Beijing no longer fears an imminent
Soviet attack. It calculates that its strength is growing
and that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with its
domestic difficulties as well as the aftermath of

-6-

Afghanistan to risk unpredictable adventures. Moscow is losing the fear - which was never realistic - of a Sino-U.S. alliance aimed against it.

Gorbachev is journeying to Beijing as the first stage in applying in Asia the strategy that has worked so well in ______. To break up the American system of coalitions by removing the impression of Soviet bellicosity without altering too much the underlying strategic relationship which is in any event not so easily altered, given the Soviet Union's geographic propinquity and large ground forces. No doubt the visit to China will be followed soon by overtures to Japan.

None of this need be of particular concern so long as the United States properly analyzes the new international relationships. For in Asia the special brand of Gorbachev's bonhomie and impetuous spectaculars falls on much more

follow ground than in Europe. The nations of Asia are not emotionally exhausted by two world wars on their soil. Nor do they face domestic pressures impelling a response to dramatic propagandistic overtures. Arms control is not an opiate in Asia. In Asia, Gorbachev can not insist on concessions to his personality or his political survival; he must offer real concessions to interlocutors seeking to base a political equilibrium on underlying realities.

And the realities in Asia are that no nation will run the risk of separating itself from the United States in order to gain the goodwill of Moscow. On the other hand none of the major nations of Asia will challenge the Soviet Union simply to curry favor with the United States. These are the limiting conditions for both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in Asia.

-8-

This is illustrated by the immediate situation with
respect to China. The Chinese minimum objective can be
summed up in a conversation I had with a leading Chinese
about a year and half ago. To my observation that China was
doing less with Moscow than some Americans feared but more
than Beijing was letting on, my interlocutor replied: "In
any event we will stop well short of the world's record
which is held by Shultz and Shevardnadze." In other words
China did not propose to be the last combattant on barri-
cades of the Cold War abandoned by the original warriors.
Nor was it prepared to lead a solitary charge on Moscow.

No doubt Beijing's immediate fear of Soviet invasion
has receded. China therefore sees less need for a rigid
anti-Soviet stance than it did a decade ago. Also Gorbachev
has met most of the conditions put forward by Beijing for an
improvement of relations: withdrawal from Afghanistan,

-9-

thinning out troops in Mongolia, and withdrawal of
Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

But China has achieved the longest uninterrupted
self-government in history by a careful analysis of
long-term trends. Chinese short-term fears are eased but
Chinese strategic concerns remain. Beijing cannot forget the
history of Russian expansion across Siberia and into the
Maritime provinces throughout the 19th century - an expan-
sion whose ultimate aim was Manchuria and Korea. These
objectives would undoubtedly have been reached if Japanese
imperialism had not interposed itself and after defeating
Russia in 1905 seized those prizes for itself.

In those days the United States was not a significant
factor in Asia, and Britain, regarding Imperial Russia as
the principle threat to its security, was in alliance with
Japan. Beijing's strategic nightmares have not eased with

-10-

the passage of time. It has no intention of being left alone
in Asia with the Soviet Union and Japan. It will not risk
its survival on the continued good will of nations with
which it has had such perilous experiences. It will seek to
use the United States as a counterweight provided it retains
any confidence that the United States understands the need
for maintaining a balance of power in Asia and seems capable
of carrying out such a policy.

For these reasons Gorbachev's freedom of maneuver in
Beijing is in fact severely circumscribed. China will try to
settle those issues that threaten China's security: espe-
cially Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, which threatens
China with encroachment and the Soviet military build-up in
Mongolia. At the same time Beijing will do its utmost to
avoid weakening ties with America. Indeed one of the conse-
quences of Gorbachev's visit to Beijing is likely to be a

-11-

serious Chinese effort to improve its ties with the United
States. In all probability China will improve its short-term
relations with the USSR and its long-term relations with the
United States.

It is possible in fact that the most interesting
conversations between Gorbachev and Deng will deal less with
foreign policy than with their respective experiences with
modernization. For Beijing and Moscow have begun the process
at opposite ends of the spectrum. China has made significant
progress in moving towards what Beijing calls a commodities
economy and the West a market economy. A rudimentary credit
and banking system has been erected. Agriculture has been
essentially privatized. Markets exist for many consumer
goods. Economic progress is tangible especially in the
countryside but also in the cities. China has had the
benefit of a homogenous culture, the experience of overseas

-12-

Chinese, of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore and an entrepre-
neurial bent among its population. In fact its most immedi-
ate economic problem is an overheated economy and the
difficulty inherent in any move from centralized planning to
a market economy: how to have prices reflect real costs.
This is a huge problem in a society in which prices have
been fixed and subsidized for decades. The first attempt to
bring about realistic prices last year led to a major
inflation, corruption and popular discontent. It has since
been suspended.

Where China suffers the penalties of its economic
successes, Soviet economic reform is so far essentially
stillborn. Living conditions in the Soviet Union are now
probably worse than they were at the beginning of the
Gorbachev period. Since only 51% of the Soviet population is
Russian, a policy of decentralization balances economic

-13-

efficiency against the risks of nationalist uprisings. There
are no overseas Russians and not a single Russian model for
Soviet reform. Above all Gorbachev has obviously decided
that he cannot risk the upheavals inseparable from economic
reform until he has centralized political decisionmaking in
his own hands - a process likely to take the better part of
this year. At that point it will be seen to what extent
glasnost was a tactic or a long-term policy and whether
perestroika can succeed.

One ironical result of this relative priority of
political over economic reform is that Gorbachev receives in
the West extraordinary credit for political changes while
his economy declines. China, on the other hand, despite its
extraordinary economic tranformations, runs the risk of
losing Western supporters as a result of the political
pressures which the pace of its economic reform has made

-14-

inevitable - though it surely occurred more rapidly than the
Chinese leadership expected. Were such a discussion to take
place it would be fascinating whether the two leaders could
agree on the appropriate mix of political and economic
reform; indeed, whether such a mix is achievable.

(a) the geopolitical basis of Sino-U.S. relations remains firm. It is based on the reality that China is a key component of the balance of power in Asia and, for the foreseeable future, the weakest of Asia's major powers, hence most deserving - from the point of view of balance of power - of American support; (b) for the same reason the United States has a major interest in the economic progress of China (c) the United States cannot be consistent with its traditions without supporting human rights. But it has other interests as well and pluralistic democracy in a Confucian society is

-15-

a complex and long-term objective not reached by any Asian society except the Philippines; (d) the American position in Asia ultimately depends on its ability to identify what are its fundamental strategic and political interests in Asia on a long term basis.

This has not been the traditional American approach to foreign policy. The analysis presented here with its emphasis on an American role in maintaining a distant balance of power has been anathema to American intellectual and political figures alike. The American ideology has relied on superior moral ____ for preserving the peace and has rejected the relativism inherent in maintaining an equilibrium that in the very nature of change must be constantly shifting.

Yet no other role is possible for America in Asia whose ancient cultures would find America's claim to moral

-16-

superiority preposterous and which have seen too much change
over the millenia to rely on absolutist formulae. In some
respects, maintaining the equilibrium is easier in Asia than
in Europe. None of the major Asian nations looks to the
United States as its first line of defense. All are prepared
to undertake significant defense efforts. Each is jealously
protective of its national sovereignty. On the other hand
these civilizations are unforgiving in their judgment of
performance. And there is no doubt that the collapse in
Vietnam, the ineffectual performance in Lebanon, the fate
and conduct of America's friends in Iran, Nicaragua and the
Philippines and the lagging American economic performance
have depreciated the American currency. In this context the
future of Asia and the relative importance of Moscow,
Washington, Tokyo and Beijing will be forged in the crucible
of a series of decisions in the political, military and

-17-

economic field taken unilaterally in Washington as an
element of American domestic policy.

Peace in Asia depends to a considerable extent on a
balance of power between the USSR, China, Japan and the
United States with the United States as a result of history
and geography in the role of the balancer of the equilibrium
- much as Britain conducted itself towards Europe for four
centuries. Of these components of the balance of power, the
most dynamic at this moment no doubt is Japan. It is a
remarkable country whose institutions, though appearing
familiar, even analogous to Western counterparts, are at the
same time unique and impervious to outside influence or
accessible only by processes carefully filtered through a
disciplined, stylized and self-perpetuating leadership
group. Nothing in Japan is exactly what it appears to
Western observers. Its elections do not establish a claim to

-18-

power. They confirm a ruling party which in turn is governed
by four or five factions whose leaders are appointed and
which are organized almost feudally. Its prime ministers are
predictable a decade ahead (leavened only by the occasional
scandal). Its culture produces negotiators whose opening
statements are generally their only significant utterance;
afterwards they register the comments of their interlocutor
but they are unable to modify their positions in any signif-
icant way until they have consulted the consensuses which
they represent. Thus negotiations with Japan are both
protracted and intermittent; their pace is determined by a
consensus which is itself out of direct reach of the non-
Japanese negotiator.

The result is a social performance both disciplined and
cohesive, shaped by a consensus that in the past has been
extraordinarily responsive to nuances in its perception of

-19-

the balance of power and to little else. This enabled Japan
to move from feudalism to centralized authoritanism in
response to the forcible opening of the country and from
centralized authoritanism to a species of democracy under
the impact of defeat. In each case the transition was
accomplished with remarkable discipline shaped by a culture
which through all political and social changes preserved its
uniqueness and was driven not by some ideological conversion
to abstract concepts but by Japanese reaction to external
forces.

Thus the role Japan plays in the world as well as its
relationships with its neighbors and with the United States
will depend far less on American exhortations than on
Japan's assessment of political, military and economic
trends. Tokyo is emerging as the financial center of the
world. As the financier and therefore to some extent the

-20-

determinant of other countries' economic expansions, its
technology increasingly dominates world markets and its
military establishment is gaining in size. Japan's interna-
tional role cannot remain what it was for most of the
postwar period. Its traditional sensitivity to balances of
power will cause it to emerge in an increasingly assertive
role.

American exhortations that Japan play a more active
international role are therefore largely beside the point. A
more active international role for Japan is inherent in its
situation and its culture even though it will evolve gradu-
ally and indirectly, almost anonymously. America's challenge
is not to evoke that role but to contribute to conditions
that make it compatible with the aspirations of other
nations in Asia and the world.

-21-

The United States is thus in a complex relationship vis-a-vis Japan. We are Japan's ally with respect to threats to its serenity, though with the growth of Japanese military power that role will diminish. But, whatever our formal policy, most other Asian nations see in the United States a counterweight to Japan. It is, however, a stronger kind of counterweight because it depends importantly on American measures outside the realm of formal foreign policy; on whether American industry can remain - or become - competitive again; on whether American economic ingenuity is focussed on the creation of productive capacity rather than on financial manipulation; on whether America can control its twin deficits of balance of payments and ____. Such an awareness by America would bring with it at best a modification of the proposition that unfair Japanese practices are the principal cause of America's relative economic decline.

-22-

Japan's economic policies are indeed extremely disciplined and occasionally discriminatory. But the root cause of Japan's growing economic power is its superior competitiveness. And by the same token, the key to America's future in Asia is in many ways our domestic performance.

In the relations with Japan, the Soviet Union will play a relatively subordinate role. I expect a Soviet overture to Tokyo; probably even a compromise on the issue of the four northern islands annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of the war. But the historic distrust of both sides is too deep, their complementary interests too few, to bring about a fundamental change. Japan's relations with the United States may become increasingly complex. But Tokyo will march to its own drummer not impelled significantly by any Soviet _______. The growing Soviet activism in Asia will find its reflection as well in North East Asia. For a while the

-23-

Gorbachev visit to Beijing may ease the competition between Moscow and Beijing for influence in North Korea. But Beijing will cast a wary eye on a Soviet or Japanese role in Pyongyang. Japan, despite its alliance with the United States, will seek to enhance its role in North Korea if only because the division of Korea is no more anathema to it than to any of the other adjoining countries. Indeed, of the major players in the region, the United States is probably the only one that has no historic reluctance to see the emergence of a strong unified Korea. The others do not find the status quo intolerable - to put it mildly - provided it maintains their relative influence on the peninsula and does not lead to unwanted conflicts. These factors have enabled both Koreas to enhance their international roles. In the period immediately ahead, they are likely to produce a relaxation of tensions in the peninsula. But they require

-24-

careful management lest the competition of outside powers
interacting with the volatile nature of the Korean temper-
ament and Korean culture, produce an explosion.

Sino-Soviet rapprochement is likely to enhance Ameri-
ca's role in South East Asia. The historic fear of China of
countries like Indonesia - and to a lesser extent Malaysia -
is likely to be enhanced if they judge that China will be
less and less preoccupied by fear of the Soviet Union. The
United States should improve its relations with these
countries for the sake of their intrinsic importance but
take care not to have it appear as if it were organizing an
anti-Chinese cabal.

But in the process there will arise again that American
national nightmare of the Sixties and Seventies, what to do
about Vietnam and the other countries of Indo China. Some
countries in South East Asia see in Vietnam a convenient

means to create an obstacle to presumed Chinese designs on
South East Asia. And of course Soviet military bases in
Vietnam remind China that the Soviet Union has other options
than reconciliation and warn the United States that the
Soviet Union is determined to project its power onto distant
oceans.

[For the United States] there [is] no region in the
world with respect to which it is more difficult to form
objective judgments. Too many groups are driven by their
memories of a drama whose plot the younger generation in
America barely knows and whose passions are largely irrele-
vant to current issues of South East Asia. For American
foreign policy it is important to remember at a minimum that
China will always react extremely neuralgically to the
emergence of a major power on its borders. Thus the United
States must tread warily among these contending forces

-26-

reenacting neither the hostility of battles painfully
concluded nor the expiation of self-inflicted
transgressions. My own sense is that in Vietnam America
should not move faster than China in improving its relations
and that we would lose nothing by staying half a step behind
it.

But the ultimate Indo Chinese nightmare is Cambodia in
which in each decade America, with the best intentions,
contributes to deepening the dilemmas. For a a decade
America has correctly opposed the Vietnamese occupation of
that country. But it has concentrated on legal, political
and moral efforts; the trauma of military involvement has
been too great to permit in Administrations of both parties
a military role - even of supplying arms - to the democratic
forces fighting for independence. The result is that as
Vietnamese troops withdraw the only well-armed forces in the

-27-

field are Communist: the army created by the Vietnamese and
the murderous Khmer Rouge. The military forces of more or
less democratic orientation have been given humanitarian aid
by the United States - an absurd evasion for which the price
now will have to be paid.

Belatedly there are stirrings to give military aid to
the forces of the democratic resistance. But the proposed
assistance is so hesitant and so irrelevant - if one is to
believe that it is to consist exclusively of rifles - that
it is likely to lead to another American embarrassment. It
is an irony that at this point the forces trained by the
Vietnamese may be the more benign. In any event it is too
late now for an American military role.

The lesson to be derived however is that Asia challeng-
es us to a serious assessment of our way of thinking about
foreign policy. The endless technical or tactical debates,

-28-

the frequent changes of positions, the reluctance to think
in terms of power or to define what power is relevant will
cause America to become a nag on the sidelines incapable of
contributing to shaping events in an area of growing strate-
gic and economic importance. But by the same token an
America conscious of its international role, its scope and
its limits, can contribute to a better future because of all
the principal participants it is in the best position to
take a general view.

05-05-09 09:04

CLARIDGE'S

ID=01 6298860

P03

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Newsweek article 5/8/89

FIRST DRAFT

Few important events so demonstrate the change in international relations as the relaxed manner in which Gorbachev's visit to Beijing is being treated. Ten years ago, when the Soviet Union was still a new power, such a journey would have produced a diplomatic earthquake. It would have been treated possibly as the beginning of a new Sino-Soviet alliance, surely as the end of what had been considered one of the principal achievements of American diplomacy of the seventies - the rapprochement with the People's Republic of China.

Today we know that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with its domestic affairs and Beijing too wary for such a

with its domestic authorities and Beijing too wary for another war.

Today we know that the Soviet Union is too preoccupied with its domestic affairs and Beijing too wary for another war.

People's Republic of China.

diplomacy of the seventies - the rapprochement with the
collaboration of one or the另一party奉送的奖赏 or American

new Sino-Soviet alliance; either as the one of which

it would have been treated - possibly as the beginning of a

Gorbachev's visit to Beijing is being treated. Ten years ago
the new relations between the relaxed manner in which

new treaties events so demonstrate the change in interna-

Newweek article 2/8/89

Dr. Henry Klaasen

FIRST DRAFT

-2-

acceptance of the和平 terms or meaningful discussion

is not realistic. Exaggerated media hype or imprudent

public comment may still turn the Gorbachev visit into a

diplomatic setback by tempting the Soviets to believe in a
magnifierate this diplomatic

non-existent opportunity and Beijing to overestimate the

bargaining leverage of a rapprochement with Moscow. But

such setbacks (the scale of which)

the reason would be American emotionalism not the realities
of the diplomatic situation.

What Gorbachev's visit to Beijing should bring home to
America is not a sense of immediate crisis but a realization
that the pieces on the diplomatic chessboard have been

essentially opening

fundamentally rearranged since Nixon's trip to China and

establishment of diplomatic relations with
Carter's formal recognition of the Beijing government as the

governing authority

legitimate rule of all China. This new arrangement is

first

then

appropriate

ed it is understood and managed in the proper manner.

-5-

Communist giants of each other was unbridgeable the United
States's role was to position itself so that it was closer
of them [one another]
to each than they were to each other with a general tilt
toward China because it was weaker, more vulnerable and less
expansionist.

fears an imminent Soviet attack. It calculates that its
strength is growing and that the Soviet Union is too preocc
as well as the aftermath of risk unpredictable adventures
 cupped with its domestic difficulties. Moscow is losing the
which was
fear - never realistic - of a Sino-U.S. alliance aimed

against it. P. Krasovets is journeying to Beijing to remove the
last vestiges of these nightmares and, if possible, to speak
the United States with the worry of a possible reversal of
friendships.

None of this is a particular reason for concern so long
as the United States properly analyzes the new international

P01

ID=1 6298860

CLARIDGE'S

89-05-09 08:43

Asia will challenge the Soviet wrath simply to curry favor with the United States. These are the limiting conditions for both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in Asia. For the United States an understanding of the new conditions in Asia is especially difficult. For they are less ideologically based than our experience with the Cold War and more geared to perceptions of long-term national interest than make Americans comfortable.

This is illustrated by the immediate situation with respect to China. No doubt Beijing's immediate fear of Soviet invasion has receded. China therefore sees less need for a rigid anti-Soviet stance than a decade ago. Also Gorbachev has met most of the conditions put forward by Beijing for an improvement of relations: withdrawal from Afghanistan, thinning out troops in Mongolia, and withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

P02

ID:1 6298860

CLARIDGE'S

89-05-09 08:44

of Vietnam's forces from Cambodia.
Albanian, thinning out troops in Mongolia, and withdrawal
Beijing for an improvement of relations: withdrawal from
Gorbachev has met most of the conditions but forwarded by
for a rigid anti-Soviet stance than a decade ago. Vao
Soviet invasion has receded. China therefore sees less need
respect to China. No doubt Beijing's immediate fear of
This is illustrated by the immediate situation with
sane comfortableness.

Betrayals of few, few foreign Nationalists interest than make American
than our experience with the Cold War and more desired to
especially difficult. For they are less theoretically base
States an understanding of the new conditions in Asia is
both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in Asia. For the United
the United States. These are the limiting conditions for
Yale will challenge Soviet weakness simply to carry favor with

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achieved / achieved

Coming to the point or limit attempted
self-government in theory by a careful
analysis of long-term trends.

But while this eases Chinese short-term fears it does
are east
little to allay Chinese strategic concerns, the Soviet Union
remains heavily armed along a frontier of 4000 miles.

Beijing cannot forget the history of Russian expansion
across Siberia and into the Maritime provinces throughout
the 19th century - an expansion whose ultimate aim was
not exactly
Manchuria and Korea. These objectives would almost certainly
have been reached if Japanese imperialism had not interposed
itself and after defeating Russia in 1905 seized those provinces
for itself.

In those days the United States was not a significant
factor in Asia, and Britain, considering Russia the princi-
ple threat to its security, was in alliance with Japan.
Beijing's strategic nightmares have not eased with the
passage of time. It has no intention of being left alone in
Asia with the Soviet Union and Japan. It will not risk its

Yalta with the Soviet Union and Japan. It will not risk its
passage of time. It has no intention of being felt alone in
Betting a strategic nightmare have not eased with the
threat to its security, was in alliance with Japan.

In those days the United States was not a significant
factor in Yalta, and Britain, considering Russia the principal
influencer in the matter.

for itself.

itself and after defeating Russia in 1943 seized those islands
have been reached if Japanese imperialism had not interposed
Manchuria and Korea. These objectives would almost certainly
be achieved.

the 19th century - an expansion whose ultimate aim was
across Siberia and into the Maritime Provinces throughout
Beijing cannot forget the history of Russian expansion

remaining heavily armed - alone a frontier of 4,000 miles.

The Soviet Union
is the only
Chinese strategic concern

But what if this ease Chinese short-term fears it does
not vanish if long term trends are changed.

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survival on the continued good will of nations with which it
has had such perilous experiences. It will seek to use the
United States as a counterweight provided it retains any
confidence that the United States understands the need for
maintaining a balance of power in Asia and seems to be the
analytical Chinese leaders capable of carrying out such a
policy.

For these reasons Gorbachev's freedom of maneuver in
Beijing is in fact severely circumscribed. The Chinese
objective can be summed up in a conversation I had with a
leading Chinese about a year and half ago. To my observation
that China was doing less with Moscow than some Americans
feared but more than Beijing was telling us, my interlocutor
replied: "In any event we will stop well short of the
world's record which is held by Shultz and Shevardnadze." In
other words China did not propose to be the last combattant

other words China did not propose to be the least combatant
world's record which is held by Shufts and Shevergudze." In
replied: "In any event we will stop well short of the

tested but more than Beijing was Jeffing us, my interlocutor
that China was doing less with Moscow than some Americans
leading Chinese about a year and half ago. To my observation
objective can be summed up in a coveraption I had with a
Beijing is in fact severely circumscribed." The Chinese
miniature

For these reasons Corbachev's freedom of maneuver in
policy.

analytical Chinese leaders capable of carrying out such a
maintaining a balance of power in Asia and seems to the
confidence that the United States understand the need for
United States as a counterweight provided it retains any
has had such perilsous experiences. It will seek to use the
survival on the continued good will of nations with which it

-3-

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On the abandoned barricades of the Cold War. Nor would it be prepared to lead the charge towards Moscow. A policy

This is why it is possible that the most interesting conversations between Gorbachev and Deng will deal with the respective experiences of their two countries with modernization. For Beijing and Moscow have begun the process at

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against the risk of nationalist dyspressions.

conditions in the Soviet Union are provided, while were at the beginning of the Gorbachev period. The imperialistic nature of the Soviet system, with only 51% of the population a policy made by a balance of economic efficiency, Russian makes decentralization a hazardous course. There are and not a single no overseas Russians nor Russian models to follow for Soviet reform. Above all Gorbachev has obviously decided that he cannot risk the upheavals inseparable from economic reform until he has centralized political decisionmaking in his own hands - a process likely to take the better part of this year. At that point it will be seen to be at least a long-term policy + while Gorbachev was a tactician or a long-term policy + it has succeeded.

One ironical result of this relative priority of political over economic reform is that Gorbachev receives in the West extraordinary credit for political changes while his economy declines. China, on the other hand, despite its extraordinary economic tranformations, runs the risk of losing some Western supporters as a result of the political

-13-

Wherever a discussion to take place it would be fascinating to hear two leaders could agree on the approximate misgivings of political + economic reform, under which we must live for evermore pressures which the pace of its economic reform has made inevitable - though it surely occurred more rapidly than the Chinese leadership expected.

(a) the geopolitical basis of Sino-U.S. relations remains firm. It is based on the reality that *induced* President Nixon to support China when there were no diplomatic relations, that China is a key component of the balance of power + for the foreseeable future the means of + in Asia; (b) for the same reason the United States has a major interest in the economic progress of China (c) the United States cannot be consistent with its traditions without supporting human rights. But it has other interests as well and pluralistic democracy in a Confucian society is a complex and long-term objective not reached by any Asian society except the Philippines; (d) the American position in Asia ultimately depends on its ability to *identify* what

Asia's major concerns, some most deserving from the point of view of balance of power + American support

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09:16 05-05-89

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As already indicated, this is in some respects easier in Asia than in Europe. None of the major Asian nations looks to the United States as its principal line of defense. All are prepared to undertake significant defense efforts. Each is jealously protective of its national sovereignty. On the other hand, the United States will in the end be judged by its performance. And there is no doubt that the collapse in Vietnam, the ineffectual performance in Lebanon, the fate and conduct of America's friends in Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines and the lagging American economic performance have depreciated the American currency. In this sense, the future of Asia and the relative importance of Moscow, Washington, Tokyo and Beijing will be forged in the crucible of a series of decisions in the political, military and

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economic field taken in part unilaterally in Washington as an element in a part of American domestic policy.

Peace in Asia depends to a considerable extent on a balance of power between the USSR, China, Japan and the United States with the United States as a result of history and geography in the role of the balance of the equilibrium which Britain, Russia and Japan desire, and for their own reasons, desire to maintain. Of these components of the balance of power, the most dynamic at this moment is Japan. It is a remarkable country whose institutions, although very old, are appeared familiar and analogous to Western counterparts, are at the same time impervious to outside influence or accessible only by processes carefully filtered through a screen of highly controlled by a disciplined and self-perpetuating leadership.

Nothing in Japan is exactly what it appears to be, but the Japanese are very well established in their own way. They confirm the view that the role of the nation is to perform, and perform the role of opinion pollers for a ruling party which is governed by four or five factions whose leaders are organized almost exclusively on the basis of a few basic principles.

Appointed and which vote almost as a feudal voting bloc,

Western Europe

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whose prime ministers are predictable a decade ahead (leavened only by the occasional scandal). Its culture produces negotiators whose opening statement is gonorally their only significant utterance. afterwards they can register what their interlocutor says but cannot modify their positions in any significant way until they have consulted the consensus they represent. Thus negotiations with Japan are both protracted and intermittent; their pace is determined by a consensus which is itself out of direct reach of the mon-Japanese negotiator. The result is a social performance both better suited by a tat disciplined and cohesive. That Japanese consensus has shown itself in the past extraordinarily responsive to nuances in its perception of the balance of power. It enabled Japan to move from feudalism to centralized authoritarianism in response to the forcible opening of the country and from centralized authoritarianism to a species of democracy under the impact of

-17-

defeat. In each case the transition was accomplished with
remarkable discipline and caused not by some ideological
abstractive concepts

conversion but by Japanese reaction to external forces.

Thus the role Japan played in the world as well as its relationship with it as a major power in Tokyo emerged as the financial center of the world.

As the financier and therefore to some extent the determinant of other countries' economic expansions, its technology increasingly dominates world markets and its military establishment is growing in size.

emerges as the world's third-largest, Japan's international role cannot remain what it was for most of the postwar

period. Its very sensitivity to balance of power will cause it to emerge in an increasingly assertive role, causing major disquiet in China, most countries of South East Asia, and in the end the scariest union.

as well as with the United States, will depend for less on American authorization than on Japan's assessment of political, military and economic trends,

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situation and its culture even though it will evolve gradually and indirectly, almost anonymously. The challenge is not to evoke that role but to contribute to conditions how to relate that role to the aspirations of other nations that make it compatible with in Asia + the world

That means that the United States is in a complex relationship vis-a-vis Japan in Asia. We are Japan's ally with respect to threats to its serenity, though with the growth of Japanese military power that role will diminish. But most other Asian nations see in the United States a counterweight to Japan whatever our formal policy. But that role depends + on American measures outside the realm of formal foreign policy; it depends on whether American industry can remain - or become - competitive again; whether American economic ingenuity is focussed on the creation of productive capacity rather than on financial manipulation; whether America, in short, can control its twin deficits. This requires a tax +

balance of payments
+局部性

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tices are the principal cause of America's relative economic decline. Japan's economic policies are indeed extremely disciplined and occasionally discriminatory. But the root cause of Japan's growing economic power is its competitiveness.

Thus the key to America's future in Asia is in many ways our domestic performance. At the same time in the international arena, we have to learn to think in categories Americans have generally rejected. In the minds of most Asian nations this future is not determined by the category of American idealism but by assessments of relative power.

In North East Asia it is possible that (the Gorbachev will find its reflection as well) for a while, visit to Beijing will temporarily cease the competition between Moscow and Beijing for influence in North Korea. But

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Beijing will cast a wary eye on a Soviet or Japanese role in
Pyongyang. Japan, despite its alliance with the United
States, will seek to enhance its role in North Korea if only
because the division of Korea is no more anathema to it than
to any of the other adjoining countries. Indeed, of the
major surrounding countries, the United States is probably
the only one that does not have a historic relevance to see
the emergence of a strong unified Korea. The others do not
find the status quo intolerable - to put it mildly - provid-
ed it maintains their relative influence on the peninsula
and does not lead to unwanted conflicts. These factors have
enabled both Koreas to enhance their international roles and
period immediately ahead they are likely to produce
have produced a relaxation of tensions in the peninsula. But
they require careful management lest the competition of
controlling with the volatile
outside powers produces an explosion.

nature of the Korean temperament + Korean
culture produce an expiring.

-21-

The same balance of power considerations apply to South East Asia. Vietnam is a specially neuralgic point. In America it is so neuralgic, so bound up with a period of national travail that a objective approach is difficult to come by. Too many groups act out roles of a drama whose plot the younger generation in America barely knows and whose passions are largely irrelevant to their experience. For American foreign policy it is important to remember that China will always react extremely neuralgically to the emergence of a major power on its borders, and especially to the growth of foreign influence in that nation. At the same time the Soviet Union sees in Vietnam a means to pressure China and in its bases in Indo China a device to ployell power over hitherto impossible regions. Some countries of South East Asia, after a week in Vietnam a means to contain growing Chinese expansionism. Thus the United States must tread

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warily among these contending forces reenacting neither the
hostility of battles painfully concluded nor the expiation
of self-inflicted transgressions. My own sense is that in
Vietnam America should not move faster than China in improv-
ing its relations and that we would lose nothing by staying
half a step behind it.

But the ultimate India China's
India China seems destined to inflict a nightmare in-
which

a decade or so later. The nightmare is Cambodia, a
while in each decade America must be here, intervening and
intending to contribute to deepening the struggle.
For a a decade America has opposed the Vietnamese occupation
of that country. But it has concentrated on legal, political
and moral efforts; the trauma of military involvement has
been too great to permit in Administrations of both parties
a military role - even of supplying arms - to the forces
fighting for independence. The result is that as Vietnamese
troops withdraw the only well-armed forces in the field are
Communist: the army created by the Vietnamese and the

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The lesson to be derived however is that Asia challenges us to a serious assessment of our way of thinking about foreign policy. The endless technical or tactical debates, the frequent changes of positions, the reluctance to think

the frequent changes of positions, the reluctance to think
foreign policy. The endless technical or tactical debates,
esse to a serious assessment of our way of thinking about

The reason to be derived however is that Axis challenge
fate now for an American military role.

Vietnamese may be the more benign. In any event it is too
is an irony that at this point the forces trained by the
it is likely to lead to another American embarrassment. It
believes that it is to combat exclusively of rifles - that
assistance is so gratuitous and so irrelevant - if one is to
the forces of the democratic realignment. But the proposed
Belatedly there are attritions to give military aid to
now will have to be paid.

the United States - an absurd evasion for which the price
democratic orientation have been given humanitarian aid by
murderous Khmer Rouge. The military forces of more or less

-53-

take a general view.

the principal participants it is in the best position to
its limits, can contribute to a better future because of all
America's concerns of its international role, its scope and
gio and economic importance. But by the same token an
contributing to shaping events in an area of growing strate-
cially America to become a nag on the sidelines incapable of
in terms of power or to define what power is relevant will

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Newsweek article 5/8/89

FIRST DRAFT

Few if any events so demonstrate the change in interna-
tional relations than the relaxed manner in which

Gorbachev's visit to Beijing is being treated. Ten years ago
such a journey would have produced a diplomatic earthquake.
It would have been treated possibly as the beginning of a
new Sino-Soviet alliance; surely as the end of what had been
considered one of the principal achievements of American
diplomacy of the seventies - the rapprochement with the
People's Republic of China.

-2-

(Y)

prspect to be realistic. Exaggerated media hype or imprudent public comment may still turn the Gorbachev visit into a diplomatic setback by tempting the Soviets to believe in a non-existent opportunity and Beijing to overestimate the bargaining leverage of its rapprochement with Moscow. But the reason would be American emotionalism not the realities of the diplomatic situation.

What Gorbachev's visit to Beijing should bring home to America is not a sense of immediate crisis but a realization that the pieces on the diplomatic chessboard have been fundamentally rearranged since Nixon's trip to China and Carter's formal recognition of the Beijing government as the legitimate rulers of all of China. This new arrangement is not inherently disadvantageous to American interests provided it is understood and managed in the proper manner.

-3-

The nature of the Asian international framework can best be understood by comparing it to the situation ten years ago. Though the new U.S.-Chinese relationship was inaugurated with many sentimental toasts, it originated in two mutual fears: the United States was concerned about the relentless build-up of Soviet long-range missiles and the domestic travail of the Vietnam war; China decided that the weakness inducted by the Cultural Revolution and Moscow's claim to ideological supremacy might tempt a Soviet applica- tion of the Brezhnev doctrine by which the Kremlin laid claim to impose ideological conformity on the Communist world. Indeed, Mao became concerned lest his own ideological intransigence might lead to a coalition of all major coun- tries against Beijing - a frequent theme in the early Sino-U.S. contacts. Thus both Washington and Beijing sought to break up a hostile coalition which in fact never had a

-4-

chance of coming into being: Moscow and Beijing had broken
with each other nearly a decade before - incredibly - this
was understood in Washington. Washington was under no
circumstances prepared to support Soviet pressure in China.
In the summer of 1969 the Nixon administration not only
rebuffed Soviet hints of a possible attack on China; it
strongly implied that it would oppose such a move - even at
a time when Beijing seemed implacably hostile and its
propaganda was violently anti-American. The reason was the
conviction of the key figures of the Nixon administration
that China was an essential component of the international
equilibrium and that its destruction would facilitate Soviet
hegemony.

The extreme distrust of Moscow and Beijing of each
other gave the United States about a decade of a very
convenient diplomacy. So long as the suspicion of the two

-5-

Communist giants of each other was unbridgeable the United
States's role was to position itself so that it was closer
to each than they were to each other with a general tilt
toward China because it was weaker, more vulnerable and less
expansionist.

That period is now coming to a close. Beijing no longer
fears an imminent Soviet attack. It calculates that its
strength is growing and that the Soviet Union is too preoc-
cupied with its domestic difficulties. Moscow is losing the
fear - never realistic - of a Sino-U.S. alliance aimed
against it. Gorbachev is journeying to Beijing to remove the
last vestiges of these nightmares and, if possible, to spook
the United States with the worry of a possible reversal of
friendships.

-6-

relationships. The frequently heard speculation that
Gorbachev is stealing another march on President Bush is an
example of excessive personalization of policy. For in Asia
the special brand of Gorbachev's ____ and impetuous spec-
taculars falls on fallow ground. The nations of Asia are not
continually exhausted, as are the countries of Europe, by
two world wars. Nor are they driven by domestic pressures to
respond to propagandistic overtures. Arms control is not an
opiate in Asia. On his Eastern jaunt, Gorbachev has to pay
in the coin of balancing national interests not by implying
that his personality is the world's salvation. In other
words, the political equilibrium in Asia will emerge from an
understanding of underlying realities. And with respect to
these no nation in Asia will run the risk of separating
itself from the United States in order to gain the goodwill
of Moscow. On the other hand none of the major nations of

-7-

Asia will challenge Soviet wrath simply to curry favor with the United States. These are the limiting conditions for both U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in Asia. For the United States an understanding of the new conditions in Asia is especially difficult. For they are less ideologically based than our experience with the Cold War and more geared to perceptions of long term national interest than make Americans comfortable.

-8-

But while this eases Chinese short-term fears it does little to allay Chinese strategic concerns. The Soviet Union remains heavily armed along a frontier of 4000 miles. Beijing cannot forget the history of Russian expansion across Siberia and into the Maritime provinces throughout the 19th century - an expansion whose ultimate aim was Manchuria and Korea. These objectives would almost certainly have been reached if Japanese imperialism had not interposed itself and after defeating Russia in 1905 seized those parts for itself.

In those days the United States was not a significant factor in Asia, and Britain, considering Russia the principle threat to its security, was in alliance with Japan. Beijing's strategic nightmares have not eased with the passage of time. It has no intention of being left alone in Asia with the Soviet Union and Japan. It will not risk its

-9-

survival on the continued good will of nations with which it
has had such perilous experiences. It will seek to use the
United States as a counterweight provided it retains any
confidence that the United States understands the need for
maintaining a balance of power in Asia and seems to the
analytical Chinese leaders capable of carrying out such a
policy.

-10-

in the abandoned barricades of the Cold War. Nor would it
lead the charge towards Moscow.

This I am sure remains China's policy. It will try to
settle those issues that threaten China's security: espe-
cially Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, which threatens
China with encroachment and the Soviet military build-up in
Mongolia. It will do its utmost to avoid weakening ties with
America. Indeed one of the consequences of Gorbachev's visit
to Beijing is likely to be a serious Chinese effort to
improve its ties with the United States. Chinese policy in
all probability will improve its short-term relations with
the USSR and its long-term relations with the United States.

This is why it is possible that the most interesting
conversations between Gorbachev and Deng will deal with the
respective experiences of their two countries with modern-
ization. For Beijing and Moscow have begun the process at

-11-

(Y)

opposite ends of the spectrum. China has made significant progress in moving towards what Beijing calls a commodities and the West a market economy. There is a rudimentary credit and banking system. Agriculture has been essentially privatized. Markets exist for many consumer goods. Progress is visible especially in the countryside but also in the cities. China has had the benefit of a homogenous culture, overseas Chinese, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore and an entrepreneurial spirit in its population. In fact its biggest economic problem is an overheated economy and the difficulty inherent in any move from centralized planning to a market economy, how to have prices reflect real costs. The first attempt to do so has led to a major inflation, corruption and substantial popular discontent.

Where China suffers the penalties of successes, Soviet economic reform is so far essentially stillborn. Living

-12-

conditions in the Soviet Union are probably worse than they
were at the beginning of the Gorbachev period. The imperial
nature of the Soviet system with only 51% of the population
Russian makes decentralization a hazardous course. There are
no overseas Russians nor Russian models to follow for Soviet
reform. Above all Gorbachev has obviously decided that he
cannot risk the upheavals inseparable from economic reform
until he has centralized political decisionmaking in his own
hands - a process likely to take the better part of this
year.

-13-

(a) the geopolitical basis of Sino-U.S. relations remains firm. It is based on the reality that induced President Nixon to support China when there were no diplomatic relations, that China is a key component of the balance of power in Asia; (b) for the same reason the United States has a major interest in the economic progress of China (c) the United States cannot be consistent with its traditions without supporting human rights. But it has other interests as well and pluralistic democracy in a Confucian society is a complex and long-term objective not reached by any Asian society except the Philippines; (d) the American position in Asia ultimately depends on its ability to grasp its

-14-

As already indicated, this is in some respects easier
than in Europe. None of the major Asian nations looks to the
United States as its principal line of defense. All are
prepared to undertake significant defense efforts. Each is
jealously protective of its national sovereignty. On the
other hand the United States will in the end be judged by
its performance. And there is no doubt that the collapse in
Vietnam, the ineffectual performance in Lebanon, the fate
and conduct of America's friends in Iran, Nicaragua and the
Philippines and the lagging American economic performance
have depreciated the American currency. In this sense the
future of Asia and the relative importance of Moscow,
Washington, Tokyo and Beijing will be forged in the crucible
of a series of decisions in the political, military and