1/9/84

TIME ARTICLE

The Atlantic Alliance is today in a curious position.

The governments of the key allies are more compatible
than they have been in a long time. The day-to-day
business is being conducted in an efficient manner
and without visible signs of friction. Yet underneath
the placid surface matters are far less encouraging.

There is the growth of a vocal and well-organized peace
movement in Europe which pushes government in its direction
even when they disagree with many of its premises.

At a minimum it forces European leaders--especially in
Germany, Scandinavia and the Low countries--into constant
efforts to demonstrate their peaceful intentions, a goal
most easily achieved by pretending to moderate an intransigent
America. There is a genuine confusion about the role
of the intermediate range weapons and a genuine disagreement
with at least the European version of the Reagan

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Administration's confrontational styles in East-West relations.

At least three unsolved problems are gnawing the Atlantic Alliance.

**_The issue of strategy._** The present situation is anomalous: There are insufficient conventional forces to repeal an all-out Soviet conventional attack--a situation that has existed for all of the Alliance's existence. NATO strategic reality impels nuclear defense. But public opinion is moving inexorably against nuclear weapons. The Alliance is thus left with a precarious combination of reliance on nuclear weapons under conditions of strategic parity, growing nuclear pacifism and continued inadequacies in conventional forces. Left with no coherent defense policy the Alliance is in danger of disarming ourselves unilaterally while sitting on the most destructive stockpile of weapons the world has seen.

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Arms Control and Intermediate Range Weapons. The Alliance
has recently celebrated what is considered a great
success: the first American intermediate range missiles
in fact arrived in Europe. To be sure, had massive
demonstrations and Soviet pressure succeeded in blocking
deployment it would have been a huge defeat. But
the mere deployment of a small number of missiles is
not yet a victory. For the basic European attitude
towards the missiles is that toward an unwanted visitor
whose dinner invitation it would be too embarrassing
to withdraw. This is why they are so eager for arms
control negotiations to provide a framework for their
withdrawal. But the very eagerness works against success.
The Soviets have rejected any proposal that would leave
American intermediate range missiles in Europe. Their
goal is to leave Europe subject to nuclear blackmail;
but significant segments of European opinion seem to

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blame us for the deadlock. Sooner or later this will
erode the basis for the intermediate range missiles
both in Europe and in the United States.

**East-West Relations** Without going into the merits of the various issues there is an underlying difference in perception. Far too many Europeans seem convinced that America is run by belligerent cowboys. Several European leaders like to pretend that their foreign policy justifies itself by the ability to domesticate the Reagan administration. Many Americans are convinced that this attitude coupled with pacifist and neutralist demonstrations tempt the Soviets to seek to manipulate Western public opinion and to exploit the divisions within the Alliance.

For present purposes it is not necessary to discuss
the merits of these arguments. In my view they have
gone on for too long; they have, after all, lasted

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the better part of a decade over several administrations
of both of our political parties. They reflect a deeper
problem than disputes over policy: The fact seems
to be that the NATO structure is no longer working
because it fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally
and responsibly about the common problems of the nature
of Allied security and the purposes of Allied diplomacy.
Neither side has an incentive for a long-range objective
study of the choices before it.

Existing arrangements are unbalanced; they encourage
unilateralism in America and a kind of de facto neutralism
in Europe. There are three partially contradictory
reasons for this state of affairs: Europe has become
convinced--despite occasionally expressed fears to
the contrary--that the United States will defend it
against a Soviet attack, indeed that we have no choice
in the matter. Hence European leaders consider it

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safe to dissociate from the United States in situations
that do not reflect the security of Europe immediately.

Charles de Gaulle as French President pioneered this
attitude; it has since become common. At the same
time Europe seeks to avoid other issues because it
fears that a restless, bellicose or immature America
might drag it into a conflict that does not affect
its immediate interests. The gap in this respect has
grown wider because the generation of leaders which
built NATO has disappeared from the scene or will

soon do so. Brought up when Europe was still the center
of world affairs they considered it natural to assume
major responsibility for their own foreign policies.

The new leaders nurtured by a preeminent America in
effect turn over their security problems to us and
for the rest emphasize domestic politics which place
a premium on trying to place themselves somewhere

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between the superpowers --the first step towards at least psychological neutralism. And only the self-deluded would deny that neutralism in Europe is on the march among European publics.

Washington's problem is not so much neutralism as unilateralism--the tendency to act without adequate consideration of allied views. Accustomed, by a generation of dominating the Alliance, to getting our way Washington too feels free to adjust its policies to domestic imperatives or changing intellectual fashions. Our policies too often emerge from bureaucratic infighting almost impenetrable to outsiders or electoral battles equally arcane to Europeans. The results are then communicated to our allies in a procedure more akin to briefing than to traditional diplomacy. The allies have had to adjust in a matter of months from the passionate advocacy of SALT II to its rejection from a strategic

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doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response
and from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation--
in addition to the reassessments that seem to occur
automatically when a new Administration comes into
office. Confidence in American decisionmaking is not
enhanced when Secretary McNamara who in 1961 authored
the doctrine of flexible response which was based on
the use of nuclear weapons, announced recently that
he had urged the Presidents he served never to use
nuclear weapons.

Ironically, both European neutralism and American
neutralism are nourished by the same conviction that
the alliance will survive these tendencies. Deep down
Europeans count on our defense and Americans would
not change policies and doctrines so readily were we
not convinced that in the end our allies will have
no choice except to go along.

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All this creates a special sense of impotence
which is beginning to turn into testy irritation. European
diplomacy is heavily shaped by domestic pressures hostile
to realistic security policies and eager for rapprochement
with the East. American policy tends to oscillate
wildly between excesses of intransigence and excesses
of conciliation. Neither side has an incentive to
study policy as an *allied* enterprise.

The condemnation of our actions in Grenada by so
many of our allies is a case in point. What could
the leaders who authorized votes of opposition or abstention
in the United Nations have been thinking? They could
not have wanted our failure--whatever their view of
the wisdom and necessity of our actions--because this
would have surely affected our willingness to run risks
in defense of other areas--including ultimately even
Europe's. They must have assumed that their actions

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were irrelevant; that we would not be deterred; that
we would exact no penalty and that it was therefore
safe to use the incident to score a few points with
"progressive" constituencies at home and Third World
radicals abroad.

When all major issues are thoroughly dominated
by one country, which decides weapons and deployments,
conducts arms control negotiations and sets the tone
for East-West relations, there is little incentive
for a serious European security policy. To be sure
we are usually meticulous in consultation. But consultation
functions in the long run only if the interlocutor
is thought to have an alternative and a capacity for
independent action. In their absence consultation
too often degenerates into briefing and agreement reflects
as much acquiescence for want of an alternative as
it does real conviction.

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The time has come for the Alliance to return to
first principles. For the entire period it has been
an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary
irritation it might cause us, a united, strong Europe
would be a better partner than an impotent, divided
continent. We have applied that principle with dedication
to imagination--in so far as it depended on American
actions--in all areas except security. With respect
to defense the United States has on the whole discouraged
an autonomous European organization, apparently on
the theory that a militarily unified Europe might give
less emphasis to Atlantic relations. It is a paradoxical
state of affairs. In the economic field, integration
was bound to lead to competition and a degree of discrimination--
as indeed it has. What defines a Common Market after
all is that its external barriers are higher than its
internal ones. It was a price we obviously considered

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worth paying for the other benefits of the integration
of Europe; but it would be idle to deny that it is
a price.

By contrast greater responsibility and unity for
Europe in the defense field would almost necessarily
promote closer cooperation with the United States.
It is almost impossible to conceive the circumstances
in which a Europe looking after its own security in
a rational manner would not find association with the
United States advantageous. In these circumstances
Europe could choose to go it alone only if it has lost
its reason or it has made a political decision to turn
neutralist. Neither of these contingencies can be prevented
in the long run by insisting on American preeminence.
Indeed I would argue that the perpetuation of the current
state of affairs is far more likely to accelerate
to European abdication from world affairs.

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For the sake of the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance, Europe must add national security to the existing economic and political integration and it must assume a greater share of the responsibility for its own defense. I am not talking about "burdensharing", of paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind a more rational division of labor between the two sides of the Atlantic.

It is not that the financial burdens are unfairly distributed --although that too is the case. It is that the allocation of responsibilities makes no sense and that it cannot change under present conditions because no one has an incentive to do so. Ideally Europe should concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent with the air and naval forces appropriate to it. We should specialize in Rapid Deployment Forces in the conventional field either to back up Europe or to help defend against Third World aggression. And of course we necessarily

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retain the overwhelming responsibility for nuclear
defense.

Nothing in the present NATO structure or concept
provides incentives in that direction. We have five
conventional divisions in Europe, an area which is
surely not short of manpower or resources to defend
itself against a Soviet Union that must divide its
forces on two major fronts. But even with five American
divisions NATO is not strong enough to repel an all-
out Soviet ground attack. Part of the reason is European
ambivalence; most of our allies want the Alliance forces
strong enough to require a major Soviet attack but
not so powerful as to provide an alternative to the
American nuclear deterrent (even while their public
opinion flees from that concept). Moreover the present
NATO deployment is a legacy of the occupation of Germany
nearly forty years ago. The various national contingents

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remain more or less in the areas they occupied then.

There is little standardization of equipment or even an agreement on consumption rates of ammunition. Thus a conventional defense would be a logistical nightmare even were it not explicitly rejected by NATO doctrine.

Evasions can be sustained for a long time. But sooner or later, a price must be paid. Down the present road lies growing European neutralism and pacifism. Precisely because there is no urgent crisis before us the nations of the Atlantic Alliance should use the opportunity for a major act of creativity and restructure the Alliance between themselves. NATO should be transformed into a more traditional alliance between the two sides of the Atlantic. Each side should assume strictly defined reciprocal obligations. Unity would then result from shared political purposes rather than from organizational devices like formal integration--though military logic requires an integrated command even in the new

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circumstances. This will not be possible unless Europe assumes a role in which its views on security and East-West diplomacy (and other matters) emerge from its own analysis, rather than as a response to American initiatives. The result will be a more difficult diplomacy but a far more coherent policy for the Alliance as a whole than exists today.

To be sure organization cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. But organization can produce incentives to foster these qualities. In Lord Carrington the Alliance has just appointed a new and wise Secretary General; I can think of no one I would trust more to help shape a fundamental reform.

Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume responsibility for its own conventional ground defense. There is no reason why a continent with nearly twice the population

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and one and a half times the GNP of the Soviet Union
should not be able to do so.

The Europeans have the choice of greater integration
in the defense field or a closer coordination of national
policies--the choice would be up to them though the
former is more likely to be effective. Whatever the
method of cooperation it would surely be highly desirable
for Europe to bring about a standardization of its
equipment and a rational division of labor between
countries none of which has the capacity to maintain
the full panoply of modern army, navy and air forces
and which now weaken the common defense by their attempt
to do so.

2. The United States would undertake to back
up Europe with air and naval power at a higher level
than at present. We would continue to make ourselves
responsible for strategic nuclear defense and for tactical

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nuclear defense assuming that the Europeans and we
can agree on a viable strategy. American intermediate
range missiles would remain in Europe again assuming
that the Europeans do not request their removal.

3. Since the creation of NATO, the Supreme Commander has been an American. Well before 1990, to reflect the new responsibilities, the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe should become European with an American deputy. That step would not only symbolize the new relationship; it would give a new perspective to strategic planning. The United States has been fortunate in being able to wage its wars by attrition; we wore down our opponents by the weight of equipment. Inevitably this has given a heavy logistical cast to our strategic thinking which in turn has heavily influenced Europe. Europeans have rarely enjoyed such a margin of superiority over their adversaries; they have had

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to plan strategy to overcome essentially equal forces
through superior tactics and leadership. That is
precisely the emphasis NATO needs in its new phase.

4. Since the beginning of NATO, too, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO and its coordination--has been European.

In the new allocation of responsibilities it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American.

This would symbolize that henceforth the Alliance would rely on political coordination of the policies of the two sides of the Atlantic.

5. Until now the INF negotiations with the Soviets (dealing with intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (dealing with ground forces) have been conducted by American delegations, obviously headed by an American. When the new arrangement goes into effect, Europe should take over the arms control negotiations

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that affect its security directly. The Chairmanship
and the predominant membership of both MBFR and INF
negotiations should be turned over to a European, with
an American deputy. (This would obviously not apply
to INF talks if a rapid agreement were to be achieved
this year.) I can think of no other device that would
test more quickly whether a common nuclear strategy
is possible between us and Europe and which would more
decisively end the bickering about who is responsible
for the stalemate in negotiations.

The organizational changes should be accompanied
by a modernization of deployment. I know this is a
sensitive subject which sets off alarm bells all over
Europe--especially when raised by a former Secretary
of State known for his passionate devotion to NATO.
But if the issue is not raised by statesmen it will
be forced on us by crises or domestic pressures. In

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the absence of an agreed NATO doctrine and arms control
position with frequent controversies on East-West relations,
it will be impossible to sell the existing deployment
indefinitely to the American public. Sooner or later
the issue will be raised and if it occurs in a political
context adjustments will be arbitrarily imposed by
the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might
see a psychological wrench away from Europe in America
and a panicky resentment in Europe against the United
States. A sudden withdrawal might shock our allies
into neutralism; a total withdrawal might mislead our
adversary and tempt aggression. I therefore would
recommend a gradual withdrawal of about half of our
present ground forces from the integrated command in
Europe over a period of five years, leaving at least
two American divisions under the Supreme Commander.
If Europe finds this too difficult psychologically

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we could keep the forces withdrawn from the integrated command in Europe in a status analogous to that of the French forces, provided our allies agreed in advance not to impede their use in emergencies outside of Europe.

At the same time we would commit ourselves to maintain the remaining forces under the NATO command indefinitely.

It goes without saying that a great deal would depend on the wisdom and patience with which discussions on this delicate subject would be conducted on the American side.

The proposed structure would create an incentive for Europeans to deal with a whole series of issues that have defied resolution for the past decade—as their own decision—and not in reaction to American briefings: the precise definition of European conventional defense; the nature of the nuclear threshold; the European conception of the relationship between strategy and

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arms control. With a European SACEUR and ground commander, Europe, if at all serious about defense, will have to come to grips with the requirements of its conventional defense. It will be relieved of the liability of having to justify exertions as a response to American pressure.

Since nuclear weapons would hopefully be used only if conventional defense fails, Europe would be in a position to set the threshhold by its own choices and its own efforts. It could relieve its nuclear anxieties by increasing its conventional defenses. And if it did not, increased reliance on American nuclear deployment would be clearly seen as Europe's choice. As for the United States it would of course participate in these deliberations through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, the retention of two divisions in Europe and its commitment to provide substantial air and naval

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forces.

At the same time, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility for the intermediate range missile deployment where it belongs. The intermediate range missiles in Europe make sense only if they are perceived as linking the nuclear defenses of Europe and the United States. If our principal allies do not share this conviction-- if they agree to these missiles only as an admission price to our general commitment to European defense-- the grudging deployment will inevitably accelerate the trend towards pacifism and neutralism rather than to a sense of common destiny or common security. European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would force the Europeans to express their conviction on this issue; they could get rid of these missiles if they chose but if they did not--as they should not--it would erase the argument that American intransigence is the obstacle

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to progress towards arms control.

It goes without saying that my purpose in advancing
these propositions is to strengthen the Alliance, not
to weaken it; to give America a new stake and Europe
a new responsibility for charting a future which I
deeply believe must remain common.

When a major reform is imperative, delay makes
the inevitable adjustment increasingly painful. The
Atlantic Alliance needs a new sense of direction and
it cannot achieve it without a division of labor based
on a division of responsibilities. A point can be reached
in the relations among states where less is more, where
unity can best be strengthened by trusting the sense
of responsibility of a partner who is being encouraged
to assume the capacity for more autonomous action.

The decision to redeploy part of our ground forces
is not a punishment for European inadequacies; nor

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should it be reversed by a larger European effort.

It is necessary on its own merit to revitalize the Alliance. Conducted in the proper spirit and the appropriate timing it should achieve that goal. It will force a rationalization of the conventional defense, make progress towards a consensus on nuclear matters, while at the same time enhancing the Western capacity to discharge global responsibilities.

A useful by-product of redeployment--though not the reason for it--would be a systematic reevaluation of the existing hodge-podge of the very short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war (even though it would be idle to deny that this adds to deterrence if at high risk).

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The scheme outlined here can reinvigorate existing ties in a rational, hence sustainable manner. It relies for allied cohesion less on machinery than on creating incentives to think about common interests and strategic perceptions by defining a clear set of responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic. If the new arrangements are developed gradually and compassionately so that confidence in them can grow at each step, a new era of allied creativity and American dedication could inspire a new generation grown up since World War II and without a memory of what formed NATO or a commitment to it comparable to that of the founding generation.

Of course pacifists and neutralists will no doubt try to turn such a new approach for their own ends.

The suggested revision of the NATO structure and allocation of responsibilities would surely impose a temporary strain on Allied governments. But we must remember that these trends are growing under present arrangements.

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In the long run governments will not be able to avoid
fighting the trends towards pacifism and neutralism;
the present temptation to seek to defuse them by accommodation
is hopeless. And they can do so best by putting before
their publics a new future, not simply the momentum
of existing institutions. If European governments
are obliged to continue the endless guerrilla warfare
to defend what are seen as purely American decisions,
they will sooner or later be engulfed by a wave of
abdication; they will be tempted to give hostages to
their critics. The proposals I have outlined here
would allow Europe to vindicate as its own conviction
the crucial importance of cooperation with the United
States. And if its leaders are either unable or unwilling
to do so, persistence in the status quo will be unable
to prevent a gradual erosion of Western will.

I have thought a long time about whether it was

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appropriate for a former Secretary of State to put
forward such drastic proposals. In the end--appalled
by the tone and nature of the transAtlantic controversy--
I thought it better if a son of Europe and a devotee
of Western cohesion advanced a new approach rather
than have it emerge from erosion and exhaustion by
those fundamentally opposed to joint efforts. One
way or another we must head towards a rethinking and
restructuring of the alliance. Our real choice is
whether we get there by leadership or are driven to
it in response to crises. The time has therefore come
to start a debate which will become inevitable as the
decade proceeds--surely under worse circumstances when
less compatible governments are in power in the NATO
countries.

Those who are dismayed by my remarks can console
themselves. I know no one in the Americna government

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who holds my views; readers will be able to judge for
themselves by the speed with which I will be disavowed.

Whatever happens I do not intend in this article
to give aid and comfort to the neutralists, the pacifists,
the nationalists and those who make a profession of
establishing a spurious moral equivalence between us
and the East as an alibi for abdication. I believe
that the industrial democracies possess the will, the
creativity and the resources not only to survive but
to prevail in the historical competition. All they
need is faith in themselves; they must resist the siren
calls of those who use fear and panic as a weapon.
Should these proposals not find favor I will work to
strengthen the Alliance, if necessary within the existing
framework. For the North Atlantic Alliance continues
to incarnate the hope of human dignity and decency
in our world.