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UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Foreign Relations

OCT 04 2002

October 1, 2002

TO: Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

ATTN:

Attached is the stenographic transcript of the
September 26, 2002 "Hearing on Iraq" hearing. Please
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Changes in diction, expression, accuracy, or to correct
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David Evans
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CONTENTS

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2 STATEMENT OF PAGE

3 HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 3

4 HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 5

5 HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE,

6 CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 8

7 HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE, CEO,

8 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NEW YORK 17

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Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005

IRAQ

Thursday, September 26, 2002

United States Senate

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Wellstone, Boxer, Nelson, Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Frist, Chafee, Allen, and Brownback.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

2 SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

3 The Chairman: The hearing will please come to order.

4 Starting in July, the committee has held a series of
5 hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq, and we have heard from a
6 broad range of experts and witnesses, former senior officials
7 on the basic questions before the country, which is, what
8 threat does Iraq pose to the United States? What are our
9 possible responses? How do our allies around the world and
10 our friends in the region see the problem? What would be our
11 responsibilities the day after? What is the goal that we have
12 here?

13 I think the President is dead right about the danger of
14 Saddam Hussein. The witnesses and my colleagues are tired of
15 hearing me say this. I think no matter how well formulated a
16 foreign policy, it will not be sustained very long without the
17 informed consent of the American people.

18 So one of the questions I have been asking is, at what
19 point, if it gets to this that we "take down Saddam," do the
20 Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State turn to the
21 President and say, we are done here, Mr. President? We have
22 met our goals and we can go home. I think we should be
23 talking about that.

24 This morning we continue our inquiry with two Americans
25 who have had an extraordinary impact on our country's foreign

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1 policy and security problems: former Secretary of State

2 Madeleine Albright, and former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger. This committee has heard from them on many occasions in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

3 Kissinger. This committee has heard from them on many occasions in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

4 occasions in the past and I am pleased to welcome them both here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

5 here again to help us work through a difficult challenge posed by Iraq.

6 by Iraq.

7 This afternoon we are going to hear from the current Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and I will have a lengthier statement at that time.

8 Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and I will have a lengthier statement at that time.

9 statement at that time.

10 For now, let me simply welcome our two witnesses and tell them how pleased we are they are here for this important process and yield to my very good friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms.

11 them how pleased we are they are here for this important process and yield to my very good friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms.

12 process and yield to my very good friend from North Carolina, Senator Helms.

13 Senator Helms.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. JESSE HELMS, U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA

2 CAROLINA

3 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

4 You have rung the bell this morning by bringing these two leaders here this morning. I join in welcoming them here. If I had been a little closer, I would have hugged you, but it is hard to do it with a barricade like that.

8 We could not have, I think, two finer examples of naturalized citizens. I have thought about that a lot. They are a tribute to the opportunities offered by our country to all citizens. And certainly I join you and the rest of the committee in welcoming both of them.

13 An international consensus to rid the world once and for all of Saddam Hussein is developing, I think, and the President's speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations 2 weeks ago presented the clearest possible case for action against the Iraqi regime of Hussein.

18 Tony Blair. My affection for that guy rose all the time because he has really stuck with us in thick and thin. His speech and his report to the British Parliament also laid the case out clearly and succinctly.

22 Yesterday Ambassador Holbrooke sat where you are sitting this morning, ma'am. He called Turkey our indispensable NATO ally. I could not agree more, and that country's assistance is noteworthy.

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1 The Washington Post reported last week that Qatar and

2 Jordan and Saudi Arabia are coming around, even at the expense

3 of criticism and possible -- possible -- unrest within their

4 jurisdictions.

5 In any case, it is certainly good to see you here this

6 morning, and all of us will be interested in your assessment

7 of the further steps we can take to solidify the key support

8 of our key allies. And I thank you for being here, both of

9 you.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman: Thank you very much.

12 Let me suggest to our witnesses something that we do not

13 often suggest. I am not asking you to be limited by time.

14 This is such an important issue. I mean this sincerely. We

15 have two incredibly knowledgeable people and we will benefit

16 from whatever time you think is necessary for you to make the

17 points that you make. So I am going to ask the staff not to

18 turn on this light and apologize to my colleagues. I do not

19 expect that the witnesses will take an inordinate amount of

20 time, but your statements are so important I do not want you

21 to feel rushed to say I am summarizing my statement in 3

22 minutes or 5 minutes and move from there, unless that is what

23 you prefer to do. I just want you to know we are anxious,

24 truly anxious, to hear from you both.

25 Only in order of recent occupants of the chair, I would

CJ

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, FORMER

2 SECRETARY OF STATE, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE,

3 WASHINGTON, D.C.

4 Secretary Albright: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much,
5 and Senator Helms, thank you for your kind comments. It is
6 very nice to see you.

7 I am delighted to be here as you exercise your patriotic
duty to ask questions about the substance and direction of
8 American policy towards Iraq. To me this committee is kind of
9 like a second home, and it is a special honor to be
10 accompanied by my very distinguished and charismatic
11 predecessor and especially very good friend.
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13 I think I speak on behalf of both of us, Senator Helms,
14 that there is no greater honor than to serve this country,
15 especially for those of us who were not able to be born here
16 but have benefitted from the great generosity of the American
17 people.

18 Mr. Chairman, the President's speech to the UN 2 weeks
19 ago paralleled many of the statements that I made when I
20 served as UN Ambassador and as Secretary of State. The
21 details of Saddam's noncompliance with Security Council
22 resolutions were not new, nor was the President's challenge
23 for the council to respond firmly or face a forceful American
24 response.

25 The difference now is that weapons inspectors have been

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1 absent from Iraq for almost 4 years, and the risk that Saddam

2 Hussein will succeed in reconstituting deliverable weapons of

3 mass destruction has increased. It is in the interest not

4 only of the United States but also of the entire international

5 community to act.

6 So I strongly support the administration's decision to

7 back the return of UN inspectors to Iraq without any

8 conditions. The path of inspections is all too familiar, but

9 it is worth traveling one last time. If the Iraqis break

10 their promise, the case for military action will be stronger.

11 If they keep it, the UN inspection and monitoring regime will

12 resume, and that is good. Before the inspectors were kicked

13 out, they had destroyed more weapons of mass destruction

14 capacity than the Gulf War itself had. Unfettered inspections

15 and monitoring will make it far harder for Iraq to continue

16 developing advanced arms.

17 So we must be willing to take a "yes" for an answer. But

18 we must also be prepared for a negative response.

19 The President has asked Congress for the authority to use

20 all means necessary to enforce Iraq's compliance with UN

21 Security Council resolutions. He should have this authority

22 and members of the Security Council should join us in the

23 enforcement effort. And I refer particularly to permanent

24 council members France, Russia, and China. You know, we speak

25 about the UN, but ultimately it is the individual members who

(v)

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1 make the decision. These are the countries that most

2 vigorously promote the council's prerogatives, and they should

3 be the countries most determined to see that its resolutions

4 are enforced.

5 If Saddam continues to behave like Saddam, we have

6 legitimate grounds for acting on behalf of the Security

7 Council to bring Iraq into compliance. This answers the

8 question of why a confrontation might be necessary.

9 It does not, however, answer two other questions. The
10 first is how and the second is when.

11 The question of how has two parts. One is military,
12 which I will leave to my friends in uniform. The other is the
13 problem of planning for a post-Saddam era. This is
14 complicated because we could be confronted with a no-win
15 choice. One option might be a prolonged U.S. military
16 occupation of the country that served as the cultural capital
17 of Islam during that civilization's Golden Age. This would
18 hand a new organizing tool to anti-American terrorists
19 worldwide.

20 The other option is to withdraw promptly and risk
21 plunging the country into factionalism and civil war. It is
22 naive to think that a peaceful and democratic Iraq will
23 automatically emerge from the ashes of our invasion. It is
24 crazy to believe we can run postwar Iraq alone. And it is
25 essential that the administration think through the

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1 consequences of all this in advance, which it is not evident

2 to me that they have done. One thing is certain. We may be

3 able to win a war against Iraq without a broad coalition. But

4 there is no way we can win the peace without help from many

5 others.

6 As for when to confront Iraq, the answer should be at a

7 time of our own choosing. In making that choice, several

8 factors should be borne in mind.

9 As evil as Saddam Hussein is, he is not the reason

10 anti-aircraft guns ring this city and a Department of Homeland

11 Defense is being created. Saddam Hussein remains the enemy we

12 know. His military is far weaker than it was a decade ago,

13 and he knows that he will be obliterated if he ever tries to

14 attack another country again. As a rule, people who build

15 statues to themselves are not suicidal.

16 [Laughter.]

17 Secretary Albright: The more urgent threat remains al

18 Qaeda and related groups because deterrence is ineffective

19 against those who embrace death. More than a year after

20 September 11, only a handful of al Qaeda's top leaders have

21 been eliminated and its funding sources have not dried up.

22 Terrorist attacks continue to take place and al Qaeda members

23 are reportedly filtering back into Afghanistan.

24 Defeating al Qaeda is not a part-time job, and we will

25 need the sustained help of governments everywhere and

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1 especially in the Islamic world. And we must make an

2 undivided commitment of our own military power, diplomatic

3 capital, intelligence, and law enforcement resources.

4 This is not the time or place for short attention spans.

5 The fight against al Qaeda must remain our top priority.

6 I did note that yesterday, Dr. Rice in an interview

7 talked about the fact that they can now link some al Qaeda

8 people and Iraq. This kind of information is just dribbling

9 out and I am not sure that we fully understand what it means

10 or that we have enough information about it. And I hope very

11 much that that is something that we can all explore.

12 In his memoirs, one of our most illustrious predecessors,

13 Secretary of State Acheson, wrote that it is sometimes

14 necessary to over-dramatize a threat in order to arouse public

15 support for a policy. This administration is now doing just

16 that by trying to claim September 11 as a primary reason to go

17 to war against Iraq. Officials say that September 11 created

18 a new reality, which is that terrorists might be able to

19 obtain weapons of mass destruction. That is, of course, a

20 reality but hardly a new one. There are perhaps half a dozen

21 other countries that are thought to have weapons of mass

22 destruction programs and links to terrorism that are at least

23 as extensive as Iraq's.

24 Certainly the danger is real, but eliminating Saddam will

25 not eliminate the threat. It might even make it worse if

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1 anti-American extremists elsewhere are energized by an assault
2 on Baghdad.

3 There is a valid case for using force against Iraq, but
4 timing matters. At a minimum, the administration still needs
5 to develop a coalition, strengthen Iraqi opposition groups and
to develop a coherent blueprint for the post-Saddam era. It must
6 also conduct diplomacy aimed at cooling tensions in the Middle
7 East and make certain that a war with Iraq does not result in
8 attacks against Israel and a broader regional conflict.
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10 To buy this time, we should give notice that if UN
11 inspectors are again rebuffed by Iraq, we will destroy,
12 without warning, any facilities in that country we believe are
13 being used to develop prohibited arms. Even if those
14 suspicions prove wrong, the blame should fall on Iraq for
15 denying access, not on America for enforcing the Security
16 Council's will.

17 Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that I expect
18 Congress to authorize the President to use force against Iraq.
19 I hope, however, that it will not be necessary to use the
20 authority in question. America must respond firmly to Saddam
21 Hussein, but I do not share the irrational exuberance for
22 conflict that is present among some pundits and perhaps even a
23 few administration officials. It is not an American trait to
24 want war, and it is not a sign of sound leadership to
25 understate the risks of war or to offer constantly shifting

(Y)

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rationales, as this administration has, for undertaking such a venture.

I also question the administration's wisdom in publicly adding new and hegemonic language to our national security strategy. This document brags unnecessarily about American strength and gives ammunition to those who accuse us of pursuing our interests without regard to international norms.

More than 200 years ago when the British Empire was at its height, Edmund Burke wrote, "I dread our own power and our own ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded. We may say that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto unheard of power. But every other nation will think we shall abuse it. Sooner or later, this must produce a combination against us which may end in our ruin."

Mr. Chairman, there is a gathering danger that America will be perceived as a nation uninterested in the concerns of others at the precise moment we most need global cooperation to fight terrorism, proliferation, and menacing dictators such as Saddam Hussein.

We must, therefore, be strong but also smart in articulating the why, planing the how, and choosing the when of actions directed against Iraq and other challenges we face. And we must be clear not only about what America is against, but what America is for. We are against terrorism and Saddam Hussein; that is a given. But we are for democracy and

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1 development, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

2 These priorities must not be lost amidst the sound and fury of

3 some parts of this present debate.

4 I salute you and the committee for these hearings because

5 I think that they are providing a very important place to

6 debate, as calmly as we can, what is the most difficult

7 decision any President and Congress has to make, to go to war.

8 I will not take more advantage of your time and hope very

9 much that a lot of the issues that we have will come up in

10 questions. I am very, very pleased now to turn to the floor

11 over to my good friend, Secretary Kissinger. I am sure that

12 he agrees heartily with everything I have said.

13 [Laughter.]

14 [The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

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1 The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger, you are probably the single
2 most listened-to voice in the last 30 years in American
3 foreign policy. It is an honor to have you here and it is a
4 pleasure. It is almost 30 years to the day since the first
5 time I met you at a similar hearing. At least we have now got
6 each other's names straight. It is a long story. But at any
7 rate, welcome, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Secretary. Happy to have
8 you here.
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY
2 OF STATE, CEO, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NEW YORK

3 Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and members of the
4 committee, like Madeleine, I would like to express my pleasure
5 at being here the recollections I have of many meetings in
6 this room, the different chairmen and issues that deeply
7 affect our country.

8 Madeleine and I have been friends for decades and we have
9 discussed these problems between us when we were in office,
10 when one of us was in office and when both of us were out of
11 office. And we share, as she pointed out, the experience of
12 having had the great good luck of being safe from
13 totalitarianism by finding refuge in this country. That then
14 created a very special sense of obligation and concern for the
15 role that America plays in the world.

16 ~~The Senate and the Congress have been asked to~~
17 express themselves on what action the United States should
18 take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of
19 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential
20 growth.

21 President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a
22 cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to
23 rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of United Nations
24 resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles, as
25 well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a

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1 condition for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But If

2 the world community, by fudging its response, opts for the

3 risk of a greater threat in the future, the issue will becomes

4 whether America and a coalition of the like-minded can Should

5 acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in

6 Iraq.

7 I do not believe that the issue of America acting alone

8 will arise. Whatever happens, the United States will have a

9 significant number of countries that will support, and maybe a

10 larger number that will welcome an American action. I think

11 that Secretary Albright and I agree that the authority for

12 such action exists, whether or not the UN passes a resolution

13 (in the previous resolutions).

14 But there is a question as to the when and the how. I

15 would like to stress, first, the integral connection between the

16 Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the

17 terrorist threat. I do not believe it is possible to separate

18 these two issues and deal with them in sequence. For

19 with Iraq will affect the ability to deal with the terrorist

20 threat.

21 On September 11th, 2001, the world entered a new period

22 in which private, non-state organizations undertook to

23 threaten national and international security by stealth

24 attacks. Highly disciplined operatives were scattered around

25 the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and

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1 some even ~~within~~ America itself. Having no territory to

2 defend, these terrorists are not subject to the deterrent

3 ~~familiar~~ threats of the Cold War. Having as their aim the destruction

4 of social cohesion, they are not interested in the

5 conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional

6 diplomacy.

7 Modern technology in the service of terror gives no

8 warning, its perpetrators are capable of inflicting

9 catastrophic damage and vanishing with the act of commission.

10 ~~so~~ the relationship of international politics to the

11 traditional notions of sovereignty is inherent in the nature

12 ~~of the challenge, ~~and, therefore,~~ to the accumulation of

13 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. ~~And~~ Moreover, ~~of UN~~

14 resolutions cannot be separated from the war against

15 terrorism.

16 ~~In~~ The Cold War world reflected a certain uniformity in the

17 assessment of risk between the nuclear sides. But when many

18 different states threaten each other for incongruent purposes and when

19 they acquire weapons of mass destruction, who is to do the

20 deterring and in the face of what provocation? ~~And~~ This is

21 especially true when what has to be deterred is not simply the

22 use of weapons of mass destruction, but the threat of them.

23 In the discussion that is going on today, one hears a

24 great deal about the possible danger of American and allied

25 might action in provoking the use of the existing stockpiles of

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1 weapons of mass destruction against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or

2 other targets. But if that is a danger today, how much more

3 will it be some years from now? This illustrates the

4 complexity of the challenge rather than the obstacle to

5 dealing with it now.

6 Therefore, when the question is asked, why now, I would

7 like to ask the question, why not now? What is the reason for

8 not dealing with it?

9 Global terrorism cannot flourish ~~except~~ without the support

10 of states that either sympathize with ~~us~~ or acquiesce in its

11 actions. To the extent that these countries observe the

12 flouting of United Nations resolutions, the weakening of

13 international norms, and the defiance of America, they feel

14 less restrained in acquiescing ~~to~~ or ignoring terrorist

15 activities. For ~~the~~ nations of the world to accept the ~~presence~~
~~very~~ ~~this~~ of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

16 in the region where ~~the~~ new form of terrorism has originated

17 is to undermine restraint with respect ~~not only~~ to the weapons

18 proliferation, ~~but to~~ the psychological impulse towards
terrorism altogether.

21 In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation, ~~the~~ and

22 global dangers which it involves, the rejection or

23 infeasibility of establishing a viable inspection system, and

24 the growth of terrorism require action ~~by~~ preferably by the

25 international community, but as an ultimate resort ~~of~~ America

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1 together with those countries that have been prepared to support

2 it.

3 It is argued and has been argued by my friend that

4 dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the

5 war against terrorism. It is not clear to me what measures

6 that are required in the war against terrorism would be either

7 interrupted or weakened by the actions that might be imposed on

8 us if it is not possible to do away with the stockpiles of

9 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by other means.

10 One can make the opposite argument that by showing our

11 determination to prevent such threats, we will strengthen the

12 war against terrorism.

13 At any rate, my basic point is that the two issues are so

14 closely related that they cannot be separated, and that the

15 attempt to separate them will make it difficult to achieve

16 both. The war against terrorism will take many years.

17 Dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot wait

18 for many years. So one can only argue about how many months one

19 can defer action.

20 At the same time, while reserving the option to act in

21 concert with only those nations it can convince me I strongly

22 support the United States' appeal to cooperative action by the

23 world community. As the most powerful nation in the world,

24 the United States has a special unilateral capacity and,

25 indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its convictions.

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1. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by
2. principles that transcend the assertion of preponderant power.

3. It cannot be either in the American national interest or the
4. world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation
5. an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition
6. of threats to its security.

*derives from*

7. The case for enforcement of established resolutions *does not* 
8. *based on* the special danger *POSES* to Iraq in the *by its*
9. *violations of the United Nations resolutions. This* does not
10. *require a universal principle. Indeed, I would favor a*
11. *discussion* led by the United States of *those* principles of
12. *preemption* is *that* compatible with the operation of an
13. *international system* separate from the case of Iraq which
14. *does not require such a debate.*

15. Secondly, if military action *becomes most important* to address the *issues* of reconstruction and
16. the future of the region.

18. Iraq is a country of strategic importance to the
19. equilibrium *in the region*, *and* it is composed of a combination
20. of at least three *and maybe several more ethnic* groups. A
21. federal system *to enable these groups to live together without*
22. domination and oppression is surely desirable, but how this
23. can be achieved *and* with what degree of American involvement, is
24. a matter that requires serious thought.

25. And I believe *also* that when military action proves

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1 necessary, ~~that however many nations may~~ hesitate to support encounter

2 it explicitly, we will find a larger degree of support in ~~by~~

3 inviting them into a program of postwar reconstruction which I

4 believe is in the interest of the region and in the interest
5 of the world.

6 ~~So, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Congress has an opportunity to vindicate a system of international order. I urge you to give the President the authority to enforce the appropriate UN resolutions, together with the world community, if at all possible, in concert with like-minded nations if necessary. Thank you.~~
12 [The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]

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2 With the permission of Senator Helms, we will go 7-
3 minutes rounds. Does that make sense?

4 Senator Helms: Yes, sir. That would be fine.

5 The Chairman: Let me again thank you both.

6 There are a number of questions, as you can tell by the
7 attendance here. I would like to focus on just one aspect,
8 and I apologize for being parochial in the sense of
9 articulating my view.

10 I arrive at the same spot that you both do, which is that
11 it is not a question of if, it is a question of when and how
12 we deal with this problem of Saddam Hussein. I for one think
13 that the distinction made by Dr. Kissinger is a very important
14 one and implied by the comments of Secretary Albright, that we
15 need not yield to a newly and not fully articulated doctrine
16 of preemption to justify action against Saddam Hussein.

17 I am operating on the premise that I am likely to be
18 faced with voting for a resolution that I think is not a good
19 resolution, because I believe that the President will not go
20 alone. I believe there are other nations in the world,
21 whether it is a Kosovo model or a UN model, that we will not
22 be alone. And I am quite confident of that. But I do worry
23 about a resolution that sets a precedent for future
24 Presidents, Democrat and Republican, that they will be able to
25 turn, assuming I am here after November, and say, well, Biden,

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1 you voted for a resolution that said the following.

2 We all have a resolution in front of us that I think is
3 so broad, and unnecessarily broad, without articulating the
4 rationale for action and a conclusion that I have reached, as
5 a matter of policy, that the President should be in a position
6 to be able to enforce the UN resolutions, preferably with the
7 UN stepping up to the ball, clearly with some outside help,
8 but if need be, reserving the right to enforce them alone.

9 But we have kind of put the cart before the horse here in
10 a sense. The President keeps saying that he has not made a
11 decision about war. I believe him. He said that privately
12 and he said that publicly. Yet, he is asking us for an
13 equivalent of a declaration of war. I cannot think of any
14 time in American history where there has been a resolution
15 sought authorizing the use of force at the discretion of the
16 President against an individual country before the President
17 has come to the American people and us and said, this is what
18 I intend to do. That disturbs me.

19 It further disturbs me that there is no clear
20 articulation as it relates to precedent, based on the
21 administration witnesses, as to what the legal rationale for
22 action is. In the Armed Services Committee, some of the
23 testimony was, as I understand it -- I did not attend at all,
24 but just on the reading of the news excerpts -- that it fits
25 within this doctrine of preemption.

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1 I for one would like to see a resolution make it clear

2 that that is not the basis upon which we are giving the

3 President authority, adopting an non-articulated or, I think,

4 poorly articulated doctrine of preemption that warrants the

5 debate Dr. Kissinger refers to, led by the United States, as

6 to whether or not the world should change its attitude.

7 If I am not mistaken, you have pointed out, Dr.

8 Kissinger, it was back as far as the first half of the 1600s

9 that after the religious wars, we agreed on a modus operandi

10 of how we proceed, as to what constitutes a legitimate action

11 on the part of one nation state moving against another nation

12 state. And to change that blithely is, I think, a very

13 dangerous precedent.

14 So it leads me, believe it or not, to a question coming

15 from a Senator who is likely to vote for what is probably

16 going to be an imperfect resolution, but because I think the

17 President should be in a position to be able to enforce the UN

18 resolutions.

19 Now, here is my question. Given the sequence of events

20 that got us to this moment, this hearing, and the primary

21 rationale being offered by the administration at the moment

22 for wanting us to act, the United States Congress, is that it

23 strengthens his hand at the United Nations to get the United

24 Nations to do the thing that they should do, and that is

25 jointly enforce a violation of what effectively are the

27

1 conditions of surrender of a country that invaded another

2 country, lost the war, and agreed to a set of conditions in

3 the wake of that loss, the UN resolutions, and that this would

4 strengthen the President's hand.

5 If that is the case -- and I think it is a legitimate

6 case -- then it seems to me we should be saying to the

7 President in a resolution, Mr. President, we authorize you to

8 act in conjunction with a UN resolution, a Security Council

9 resolution, authorizing force in the absence of Saddam

10 agreeing to unfettered inspection. And if the Security

11 Council does not give you that or if that is granted through

12 the Security Council and Saddam resists, then we authorize

13 you, with some further conditions, to use force independently

14 if need be.

15 Can either of you tell me why that is not a more rational

16 way for us to do this in terms of making two cases? One,

17 giving the President sufficient authority; and two, not

18 leaving the impression around the world and allowing us to be

19 subject to the criticism that comes from many quarters of the

20 world that we are ignoring international law, that we are

21 ignoring the United Nations, that we are acting independently

22 and we are acting without any serious consideration of what

23 the rest of the world thinks.

24 Because nobody that I know suggests we can win the second

25 war -- and I agree they are inseparable, although there is no

28

evidence that al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were united in their
effort in 9/11, none that I have heard, no matter what is
implied, none that I have heard. We need the cooperation of
the intelligence services from Beijing to Moscow, to Berlin,
to Singapore in order to win that second fight.

So in the waning seconds of my time here, would it not be
a better way to sequence, not condition -- not condition, but
to sequence -- any resolution we have, rather than give a
broad declaration to the President, when you have in the New
York Times today, whether it is true or not, an article saying
that there is a disagreement still within the administration
as to whether or not we want the UN involved and one unnamed
spokesperson saying, all we need is the congressional
declaration and we can go? It does not matter what the UN
does.

Can you speak to that? I realize that is a long
question, but it is fairly basic. Does it make more sense to
sequence, not condition? Or should we just go the other way?

Secretary Albright: If I might, Mr. Chairman. I think
you have asked a key question here because it goes to the
relationship between the role of Congress and our
participation in an international organization.

I have I think the dubious honor on having spent more
time dealing on Iraqi resolutions, both as UN Ambassador and
as Secretary of State, than anybody else. When I went to New

29

1 York first in 1993, we had these resolutions on the table, and
2 we worked very hard to try to get compliance with them through
3 a variety of means, which I will not go through, that you all
4 know. I am the first one to testify to the fact that it gets
5 harder and harder to get coordination and compliance by
6 everybody on the Security Council. It was there initially.
7 It is harder and harder to get. But when you get it, it is a
8 really big deal because it does allow you to have more
9 legitimacy behind the way you operate abroad.

10 Obviously, when you cannot get it, as we did not on
11 Kosovo, we took another route, but at least we could see
12 whether we were trying that particular approach.

13 If I might just say this, when I sat at the UN, I used to
14 sit there and think, in my political science professor mode,
15 that this is the most fascinating thing in the world, that you
16 actually are talking about what is going on inside another
17 country and that you have the right to do that. That is a
18 very different concept that came into existence. And as
19 Secretary Kissinger said, we are in a very different phase
20 where there are non-state actors and you have to look at
21 things in a different way. Nobody is denying the complication
22 of this.

23 But it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that your suggestion
24 makes a great deal of sense. I also know that when I was at
25 the UN and as Secretary, it helps a lot when you have the

30

1 power of Congress behind you. It is a big plus in your

2 pocket. So I think a resolution -- I am not going to get into

3 the wording of it -- makes sense.

4 The Chairman: No, I am not either. Just conceptually.

5 Secretary Albright: But the other thing I must say that

6 bothers me, if I might say this, I think we are loading too

7 much onto this issue. There are many people within or outside

8 the administration that had a different agenda from the very

9 beginning, and I think they are finding this, in some ways, a

10 useful horse.

11 And I think the issue of preemption is a huge issue, and

12 I would definitely agree with Secretary Kissinger that it is

13 worth discussing. It is a huge deal. It is a totally

14 different way of operating. It is one thing for self-

15 defense, and I think that becomes a complicated issue of how

16 quickly do you move when you believe you are being attacked.

17 But I think to load this issue now with a major discussion of

18 change in our whole strategic policy is a mistake, and I think

19 we need to deal with this issue as you have presented it, and

20 as I have heard the discussion. But we do not need to load it

21 with ideological issues that had nothing to do with this in

22 the first place.

23 The Chairman: Dr. Kissinger.

24 Secretary Kissinger: When the President spoke at the

25 General Assembly, he did not base the case on a general

iraq's

31

1. doctrine of preemption. He based the case on the violations of Iraq's related to UN resolutions and agreements.

2. by the Gulf War. of a whole series of UN resolutions and agreements

3.

4. The Chairman: I agree.

5. Secretary Kissinger: Therefore, the issue of

6. preemption is inherent in the terrorist challenge because you have non-state actors operating from the territory of states in pursuit of objectives that go beyond national borders.

7.

8.

9. this is not an issue, however, that needs to be settled theoretically now.

10. In order to justify action against Iraq, it is sufficient to examine the behavior of Iraq and the system of UN resolutions.

11. the violation of its undertakings and of UN resolutions.

12.

13. Secondly, in order to establish a relationship between terrorism and violations of UN resolutions in Iraq, it is not necessary to demonstrate a specific connection between al Qaeda and Iraq.

14.

15. It is sufficient to point out that one of the motives of the terrorist groups is to convey their belief to the West and of the United States is flagging that they can assert their claims by # ruthless demonstration of power.

16.

17. of the terrorist groups is to convey their belief that the will of the West and of the United States is flagging and assert their claims by # ruthless demonstration of power. And to the extent that a country is surrounded by nations that are acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting away with a violation of the international system.

18.

19. And to the extent that a country is surrounded by nations that are acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting away with a violation of the international system.

20.

21. Overall, that extent, the psychological support for terrorism will only grow.

22.

23.

24.

25. So the reason why I believe that the two issues cannot be

32

1. separated is that psychological and geopolitical connection

2. It is also because of taking and parcel

3. resolutions is not part of the war against terrorism, and

4. independent of whether al Qaeda had connections in Baghdad, of

5. which I have no personal knowledge. media

6. I would also think that the newspapers tend to emphasize whatever disagreements may exist at middle and lower levels.

7. My impression is that and the Secretary of State will,

8. undoubtedly, express himself more convincingly on this than I can

9. is that on the basic principles we are discussing here, indeed

10. the administration is united and that the basic principles

11. that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national

12. interest.

13. The Chairman: Thank you very much.

14. Senator Helms.

15. Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a give

16. and take between these two distinguished Americans. Do you

17. agree with Secretary Kissinger, Ma'am?

18. Secretary Albright: Well, I agree with part of what he has said. I think that there certainly is the question, the

19. way he has redefined it, on preemption that makes sense to me,

20. that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not

21. apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate

22. resolutions that are already in place.

23. I have a disagreement, somewhat, not in the fact that

34

1 that we cannot take a measured approach to what we are doing.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Could I make two points?

3 Senator Helms: Yes, sir.

4 Secretary Kissinger: The first ~~is~~ when one talks about ~~there~~ timing, when is a better time to deal with Iraq than at this moment~~is~~ when the major nations of the Security Council are not ~~in open opposition to us and can be brought along?~~ But above all, the war against terrorism will take many years~~and~~ the decision one has to make is whether ~~one waits~~ and permits ~~the timing~~ the growth of stockpiles for many more years ~~and then~~ addresses the issue of ~~ Iraq under quite different international circumstances.~~ Secondly

13 The second point is when nations ~~help us~~ or help in the fight against terrorism, they are not helping us; they are helping themselves. Russia has a major interest in not permitting fundamentalism to become a dominant force in the Muslim world. And ~~the war against terrorism must be conducted~~ on the basis ~~that the participants in it have a common interest~~ and ~~not~~ a special challenge to the United States. ~~Therefore,~~ to the extent that other nations believe in the importance of a strong America, they will not stop cooperating with us on something that is so much in their own interest because ~~we are enforcing UN resolutions.~~

25 But I do believe that we must go through a process that

(Y)

33

1 what is going on in Iraq is terrorism and that it links to

2 terrorism generally, but that I am concerned about the timing

3 on this because, as Chairman Biden said, there are certain

4 aspects of the war against terrorism that require cooperation,

5 even among countries that we do not particularly agree with,

6 on intelligence, on tracking the money of al Qaeda and Osama

7 bin Laden, and on law enforcement when the people come into

8 their various territories. And I think this is not the time

9 to disrupt that.

10 I think one of the things -- actually Henry and I have

11 talked about this a lot -- we do talk to each other. And by

12 the way, may I say the only time that there was not

13 disagreement between the State Department and the White House

14 was when Henry Kissinger was both National Security Advisor

15 and Secretary of State.

16 [Laughter.]

17 Secretary Albright: Otherwise, it is hard wired.

18 But I think that there is this question about what is the

19 right timing on this. What you pointed out, Henry, is that

20 having unsheathed the sword here, if we in fact do not use it

21 immediately, do we lose credibility? I do not think so

22 because I hope very much that we would continue to be robust

23 in our fighting of terrorism in Afghanistan, where I pointed

24 out we have not finished, and also make clear what we believe

25 in. So I hope we are not in this position, having threatened,

35

1 is now underway which will make clear what support we can

2 generate and what coalitions we can create. And I am sure the

3 Secretary of State will talk about this this afternoon.

4 Secretary Albright: I think that I do not believe, nor

5 did I say, that the war on terrorism would have to be

6 finished. First of all, I think it will not be finished for a

7 long time. It is unfortunately what we have to live with for

8 most of our lives and our children's lives. So there can be

9 no termination to our effort on it.

10 But I think that we are in a crucial phase as far as

11 finishing the job in Afghanistan. Just to use an image here,

12 I think that we do have Saddam in a box, a strategic box. We

13 do not know a lot about it, but I have a feeling that if we

14 blow up the box, that as the sparks fly out, they will have an

15 effect already on a region that is inflamed and we cannot

16 forget what is happening or not happening in the Middle East.

17 So I actually think we are probably not as far apart as

18 might seem. It is a matter of timing and our favorite

19 diplomatic word, "nuance," in terms of when we do things. I

20 agree with Henry that we cannot persuade other countries to

21 think that fighting the war on terrorism is only in our

22 benefit. It has to be in their benefit also, obviously.

23 But I think it is just unnecessary to do this

24 moment, and what I am advocating is that we play out the UN

25 string with the support of Congress in the pocket of the

(y)

36

1 President and the Ambassador, and we will have a better chance
2 of getting support by the other countries if it is evident to
3 everybody that the Iraqis stiffed us. And that is where my
timing comes in.

5 Senator Helms: Do you have any further comment?

6 Secretary Kissinger: It really is a question of whether
7 we are talking about a few months or a few years. The
8 process, as it now seems to evolve, seems to me to require
9 some months of clarification and that seems to me also
10 perfectly consistent with what the administration is doing and
11 saying. So I do not think there is a fundamental difference,
12 if that is what we are talking about.

13 The Chairman: You are both talking about a few months,
14 are you not, as opposed to a few years?

15 Secretary Kissinger: Then there is no difference.

16 Senator Helms: What was your answer to his question?

17 The Chairman: I said you are both talking about a few
18 months, and your response was, yes, if that's the case, there
19 is no difference. Right? Is that correct?

20 Secretary Kissinger: I am talking of a few months.

21 The Chairman: And I understand, Madam Secretary, you are
talking months, not years.

23 Secretary Albright: Correct, but I think that we have to
24 run out the string.

25 The Chairman: No, I understand.

37

1 Secretary Albright: And may I just say this. The
2 inspectors have to get in. They have to have a chance to work
3 it, et cetera.

4 Secretary Kissinger: May I say something about that?

5 The Chairman: Sure.

6 Secretary Kissinger: I think ~~before~~ inspectors go in ~~or~~
7 as inspectors go in, we require for ourselves some definition
8 of what is considered an adequate inspection system.

9 The Chairman: Absolutely.

10 Secretary Kissinger: The previous inspection system was
11 ~~clearly~~ not workable. My understanding is that an inspection
12 system needs to have some assurance that inspectors can talk
13 to potential informants without interference from local
14 authorities. I do not know how you bring this about, but
15 ~~Since we~~ those concerns need to be answered ~~because one~~ its know that the
16 previous inspection system has not worked. One must not
17 permit the word "inspection" to be used as a subterfuge for ~~And~~ ~~its~~ ~~s must be tried~~
18 endless procrastination. ~~One must~~ a ~~ inspection/~~ to a system
19 that gives ~~have been going~~ a major assurance that we will not see a repetition
20 of what we ~~went through for the last~~ the last 10 years.

21 Secretary Albright: You have given us unusual leeway,
22 and I do not want to take advantage of it. But I think the
23 timing also depends on whether we hear from the administration
24 what a day-after plan looks like. It is the getting the
25 inspectors in and going through that string, but I think it is

38

1 irresponsible to go in without knowing a little bit more than

2 at least I know about what their plans are afterwards. So for

3 me the timing depends a lot on the information that comes out

4 on the UN string, and on what very detailed plans are -- not

5 on the military side, because that is not my job and never

6 was, but more on the process of not leaving a vacuum there.

7 The Chairman: Senator Sarbanes.

8 Senator Sarbanes: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

9 Secretary Kissinger, is it your position the war against
10 Iraq is necessary and inevitable?

11 Secretary Kissinger: My position is that military action
12 to enforce the UN resolutions is necessary if they cannot be
13 implemented any other way. And I think it is likely.

14 Senator Sarbanes: Therefore, should we move to military
15 action?

16 Secretary Kissinger: We should not move to military
17 action until we have run out the string on the diplomatic
18 process that is now underway.

19 Senator Sarbanes: Is there a peaceful path by which this
20 matter can be solved?

21 Secretary Kissinger: I have difficulty visualizing how
22 an inspection system can operate while Saddam Hussein is in
23 unimpaired power. ~~So it would require ~~will certainly~~ believe some
24 political changes in Iraq. But I would be open-minded to ~~enough to allow~~
25 ~~for the possibility that~~ somebody could produce an inspection system that can operate.

39

1. I do not think the issue should be defined in terms of
2. who is, for war and who is against war.

3. Senator Sarbanes: Well, that is a pretty fundamental
4. question, is it not, whether we are going to go to war or not
5. or whether there is a peaceful path? I take it your position
6. is you do not think there is a peaceful path. You just sort
7. of dismissed the inspection path. So if we do that, what is
8. left? War.

9. Secretary Kissinger: No, no. I think there is a
10. peaceful path.

11. Senator Sarbanes: Well, what is that peaceful path?

12. Secretary Kissinger: Theoretically, if the UN passes a
13. strong resolution and if an inspection system is devised that
14. meets the objectives of the UN resolution, it is ~~theoretically~~ it
15. possible that they will agree to ~~that~~ and ~~under those~~
16. conditions, I think that ~~would be a peaceful solution.~~ I think ~~that~~
17. ~~it is unlikely that~~ this will happen, ~~but that~~ is a judgment,
18. not a course of action, ~~I think~~ we should run out of the ~~full~~
19. diplomatic string.

20. Senator Sarbanes: Well, because you think it might work
21. or just as a matter of appearance?

22. Secretary Kissinger: Not as a matter of appearance. I
23. would like it to work. I think it is unlikely to work, but I
24. would be delighted if it worked.

25. Senator Sarbanes: You say in your statement that we have

40

1 to entertain a program of reconstruction for Iraq.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Are you talking to me?

3 Senator Sarbanes: Yes, and that is on page 5 of your

4 statement.

5 Secretary Kissinger: Right.

6 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think about the program of

7 reconstruction in Afghanistan?

8 Secretary Kissinger: Afghanistan is a notoriously

9 difficult country for foreigners to reconstruct to deal

10 with. I strongly favor economic aid to Afghanistan.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Do you think we are paying adequate

12 attention to the question of reconstruction in Afghanistan?

13 You argue here in Iraq, we are going to go in, and then we are

14 going to do a major reconstruction program in order, in

15 effect, to deal with the aftermath. What about the

16 reconstruction program in Afghanistan? If we are going to

17 look at say, well, what kind of reconstruction program would

18 we do, how committed have we remained in Afghanistan in order

19 to reconstruction?

20 Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how you define

21 reconstruction.

22 First about Iraq. I believe reconstruction in Iraq

23 should be undertaken not just by the United States, but by an

24 international consortium, international community, and a group

25 of major interested countries.

41

I believe ~~something like~~ that should be done in ~~though~~
Afghanistan, too, ~~but Afghanistan has the additional~~
difficulty that the country is run by a group of warlords
~~would require~~
whose subjugation is a major military effort, and ~~In the past,~~
~~attempts to that have~~
had produced a situation in which the warlords, who normally
fight each other, unite against the foreigner ~~who is trying to~~
curb their power. So I would be uneasy about a major military
~~whatever~~
effort to pacify the whole country, ~~but anything that we can be~~
do~~ with a reasonable military effort and a significant~~
economic effort, together with other nations, I would favor.~~
But I do have a question in Afghanistan, ~~which would not arise~~
to the same extent in Iraq.

Senator Sarbanes: Is the effort underway in Afghanistan
for reconstruction up to the standard that you think it should
be? Are we falling short, perhaps woefully short, in
Afghanistan? There are some who think we are risking turning
a success into a failure by not following up on the
reconstruction.

Secretary Kissinger. The first thing one has to
consider, Senator, ~~is if~~ that, were
said we are ~~going to have an expeditionary force in~~
Afghanistan, we are going to overthrow the Taliban, ~~we are~~
~~going to operate all over the Middle East, and we will do all~~
~~of this within 6 weeks, that would have been considered~~
incredible. So considering that the magnitude of the

42

1. challenge that we have faced and the unusual cast of thinking

2. that is required in terms of American tradition, I think we

3. have done well in Afghanistan. As things continue --

4. Senator Sarbanes: You think at this point that our
5. reconstruction effort is adequate and meets the standard? You
6. do not think we should be doing more?

7. Secretary Kissinger: I think we have done the best that
8. could be done under present circumstances. As time goes on,
9. we will probably want to strengthen the reconstruction effort.

10. Senator Sarbanes: Could I hear from Secretary Albright
11. on these points?

12. Secretary Albright: I disagree. I think that we have
13. done a halfway job in Afghanistan and we need to keep our
14. attention on it. I know that I certainly have met with some
15. Afghan officials, and they are grateful to us, but they
16. understand that there is a lot more to do and that there is
17. reconstitution there potentially of some al Qaeda groupings,
18. and Pakistan continues to be a haven for some of these issues.
19. So I think it is very hard. We have not finished the job and
20. this concerns me.

21. And I might say that I think we have to deal with
22. something very serious here. The issue of Afghanistan is as a
23. result of unintended consequences of previous foreign policy
24. decisions, and I think we have to be very careful about the
25. unintended consequences of whatever decision we make on Iraq.

43

1 And Iraq at the moment, as I have said, I think is in a

2 strategic box. We need to be careful about blowing it up and

3 seeing what the problems are.

4 And to answer your previous question, I do think there is
5 a possibility here that there could be some working of the
6 issue if in fact the international community is mobilized. We
7 did it once, and the problem was that it dissipated over the
8 years. We do continue to bomb. We have authority to do that.
9 And I think we have got to be careful about making this a war
10 versus the fact that 40 percent of Iraq is already under a no-
11 fly zone. So it is a matter of enforcing issues and giving
12 strength to the United Nations resolution, that maybe the
13 threat of this will, in fact, make it possible to have a
14 different solution.

15 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and
16 I appreciate it. I hope we will have a second round because I
17 want to address this issue.

18 The Chairman: We will. I realize I am frustrating my
19 colleagues at the end here on both ends, but I am going to let
20 the witnesses go on, otherwise I will go to a 15-minute rule
21 for each Senator.

22 Senator Sarbanes: I just want to say I do want to come
23 back to the preemption issue. I see Secretary Kissinger has
24 put Yemen, Somalia, Indonesia, and Iran on the agenda here,
25 and I want to explore that with him.

44

1 The Chairman: Senator Lugar.

2 Senator Lugar: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 Dr. Kissinger in his testimony says the United Nations
4 is, therefore, challenged to come up with a control system
5 that eliminates the existing weapons of mass destruction in
6 Iraq, together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt.

7 This follows his discussion of the violation by Iraq of United
8 Nations resolutions dealing with weapons of mass destruction.

9 And certainly he is right. This is at the heart of our
10 problem, but it is obviously very difficult to think through
11 how the United Nations is going to have this ability under
12 current conditions or even with Hans Blix and inspectors going
13 back in. This does not negate the discussion we have had of
14 timing, but it is at the heart of the matter. How in the
15 world do you ever find weapons of mass destruction and then,
16 as Dr. Kissinger said, have a control system not only that
17 destroys them but that makes sure that no one ever rebuilds
18 them? That is a degree of invasion of sovereignty that is
19 very substantial.

20 Secretary Albright mentions it is naive to think that a
21 peaceful and democratic Iraq will automatically emerge in the
22 ashes of our invasion. It is crazy to believe, she says, we
23 can run postwar Iraq alone. It is essential that the
24 administration think of the consequence of all this through in
25 advance. But she says, which it has not yet done.

45

1 Now that is at the heart of our dilemma. There is a big
2 dilemma as to whether we ought to have war and peace. But I
3 think as the Chairman has said, we are heading toward a
4 resolution, a very imperfect one, in which many Senators may
5 vote in favor of authorizing our President to have this
6 authority so that he has some bargaining ability with the rest
7 of the world.

8 But the consequences of this are if, Secretary Albright,
9 this is true and she is saying that, in essence, they have not
10 done this yet -- and I have certainly not heard any discussion
11 whatever of Secretary Kissinger's thought about how the United
12 Nations or anyone else comes up with a control system. We
13 need to hear about this rapidly.

14 And the Chairman and I, about 5 o'clock last night, were
15 having a dialogue between the two of us, and Mr. McFarlane who
16 was left as a survivor at the witness table at that point,
17 essentially saying we are trying to send messages. We are
18 asking somebody. Now, this afternoon we will have our
19 Secretary of State, and we will ask him. Is there a plan? Do
20 we have any idea what we plan to do in Iraq after we win the
21 war? How do we stop the fragmentation of this box that
22 Secretary Albright has talked about?

23 All the testimony we have had from the Iraqis who came
24 before us before was simply to confirm it is a very complex
25 country with many nationalities and divisive groups, Iran

46

1 coming in from one area, Turkey from another. This is very

2 tough business right now.

3 The Chairman: If the Senator will yield. And every one
4 of those witnesses said the United States has to be the one to
5 manage this.

6 Senator Lugar: Yes, so we come back to that. Now, maybe
7 the United Nations.

8 And you are probably both right. We ought to try to make
9 sure there are a lot of other helpers to help pay for this as
10 well as sustain it for a period of time.

11 But let us take the worst case scenario. It is us. Do
12 we have any idea, any plan for how to bring about peace in
13 Iraq, the territorial integrity, peace with the neighbors, to
14 get the weapons of mass destruction?

15 Now, maybe somebody in the administration does. Maybe
16 even as we speak there are people who will come and say, we
17 have thought of those things. We have not told you about them
18 and they are highly classified. That would be reassuring.

19 But I simply use this opportunity to ask either of you.
20 You do not know what the administration is doing, but
21 Secretary Albright, what would you do? How would we begin to
22 think through the situation at the end of the war in the worst
23 case scenario that we are there? Now, you said we enlist
24 other people. We try to do that. But what are the elements
25 of a plan for a post-war Iraq?

47

Secretary Albright: Well, first of all, I think that we
do have to recognize, while I agree with Henry that
Afghanistan is full of warlords and a real problem, Iraq is
not exactly a unified place. And everything that we have ever
heard is that it is a country that was created by outside
powers that put together at least three groups, the Kurds, the
Shiites, and the Sunnis. And that is the least of it. So the
integrity of the country is an issue.

I met previously many, many times with the Iraqi
opposition, and as somebody whose father was part of an exile
movement, I applaud those people, but I also know how
difficult it is. Everybody has a different view, and believe
me, the Czechoslovak exile movement had nothing in common with
the Iraqi one.

So I think that there are very many different kinds of
groupings. When I met with them, they all had a different
idea about what to do. And I think the first thing that has
to happen is to try to bring them together in some particular
way.

The reason that I also believe that it is essential to
get more international support is while it has not been
perfect, Bosnia and Kosovo have, in fact, provided a model of
what happens with you work with an international organization
in terms of getting a high representative and various
countries participating in not only the reconstruction, but

48

1 the modeling of local elections, et cetera. We cannot do that

2 alone. So that is one of the reasons I think it is important

3 to have UN support because it does provide some kind of model.

4 That is a beginning.

5 But I was plagued always whenever I suggested using

6 force -- and I did -- with what is the exit strategy. As far

7 as I have heard, none. And I do think that the

8 administration, while there is no way they can give us all the

9 details on this -- I think that is impossible -- they do need

10 to give us a better blueprint for what is out there after the

11 day after.

12 Senator Lugar: Secretary Kissinger, do you have any idea

13 as to how the control situation might work with regard to the

14 nuclear weapons, how we would get to something that is

15 satisfying?

16 Secretary Kissinger: I think this is a question that

17 should be addressed to the Secretary of State.

18 At some point in this process, we have to make clear what

19 we would consider an adequate inspection system or, at least,

20 what we do not consider an adequate inspection system.

21 Otherwise, there will be no criteria on which to base our

22 actions. I have put down here some general ideas, but I have

23 not studied in detail what you would require.

24 At the same time, I want to warn against the danger of

25 using the imperfection of any solution that you can offer as

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1 an argument for doing nothing. And where we are now, we are

2 faced with the choice of will there be an enforcement of the

3 UN resolutions or will these stockpiles continue to grow. I

4 think the danger of acquiescing is greater than some of the

5 concerns that have been raised, but I also think we have to

6 answer this question.

7 Now, about a post-war Iraq and its political

8 organizations that requires really a lot of thinking because

9 it is easy to say you have a democratic government. The

10 question is, how quickly can you create this and what are the

11 interim arrangements that have to be made. And one has to

12 keep in mind that there will be great temptations on the part

13 of Iran to wreck any political structure in order to shift the

14 balance of power in the region, that and there will be other

15 neighboring claimants. So this is not a vacuum in which one

16 can operate politically with an unlimited time span, this is but

17 an issue that has to be dealt with.

18 Senator Lugar: Mr. Chairman, I would just add yesterday

19 one of our witnesses suggested, as Dr. Kissinger has, we may

20 not have the perfect solutions and that should not defeat

21 action. But the administration ought to report to the

22 Congress at least every 30 days on how it was going. In other

23 words, if you are still trying to perfect the solutions, that

24 one resolution to go to war ought not to suffice for the next

25 8 years, given all the ramifications that we are discussing

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1 that would follow.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Also the power of improving what

3 exists now is not too high. We do not have to achieve

4 perfection to have the people of Iraq live under better

5 conditions than they live now.

6 The Chairman: The interim solution will be a MacArthur

7 in Baghdad.

8 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent

9 that a letter relevant to what we are discussing right now

10 from the State Department be printed in the record.

11 The Chairman: Without objection, it will be placed in

12 the record.

13 [The information referred to follows:]

14 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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1 The Chairman: Senator Feingold.

2 Senator Feingold: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly

3 appreciate Senator Lugar's line of questioning.

4 To get some initial answers about some of these basic
5 questions about the day after is not to suggest that any of us
6 are in a do-nothing posture. The administration is passionate
7 about regime change in Iraq, and I subscribe to a policy that
8 supports regime change by reasonable means. It does not mean
9 I will sign off on any proposal aimed at that end. I cannot
10 imagine any American would not support the overall goal.

11 Saddam Hussein's rule has been brutally violent.

12 So I guess I would like to just assume, in terms of my
13 questions, that a military operation has been successful in
toppling Saddam Hussein, and I would like to see if we could
15 get you to at least speculate on a couple of specific points,
16 following on Senator Lugar's question.

17 The Iraqi people have suffered terribly from years of
18 deprivation. Of course, they have been consistently told that
19 it is American support for sanctions that is responsible for
20 their plight.

21 If widespread civil conflict breaks out in the wake of
22 military action, a significant military presence, obviously,
23 might be required for some time, particularly given the
24 reality of weapons of mass destruction in the country. What
25 kind of reaction can we expect from the Iraqi people if the

52

1 U.S. moves to invade and then for some period of time has to

2 occupy the country? Secretary Albright?

3 Secretary Albright: I have to tell you frankly we do not

4 know because we have been told that there are many people who

5 would welcome us with open arms on the assumption that they

6 have lived under the terrible boot of a dictator and that they

7 know that he is responsible for this and that the United

8 States is not. But in our lives I think we have all dealt

9 with people who have been heavily propagandized for a number

10 of years, and they have, as you have said, Senator, been

11 basically told that the sanctions are the fault of the United

12 States. Some of them will definitely not be pleased to see us

13 there.

14 Plus, I think as I said in my testimony, Baghdad is a

15 very special place to the Islamic religion, and the question

16 is how others would react to a United States occupation of

17 that country.

18 Then there is the whole issue of the divisions within

19 Iraq itself.

20 I think we all need to ask these kinds of questions so

21 that the people at the State Department who are working on

22 this know. What would we do if a civil war developed in Iraq

23 between the Sunnis and the Shi'as, or what if the Kurds take a

24 different position vis-a-vis each other? They are not also

25 totally united. So I think these are the kinds of questions

53

1 that have to go down.

2 But we cannot assume that this is like liberating central

3 Europe after Hitler. This is a different situation, and so we

4 have to look at that very carefully.

5 Senator Feingold: Let me follow that. Then I want to

6 hear Dr. Kissinger's remarks. Can you say anything more
7 specifically about what kind of threat conditions our U.S.

8 soldiers might be facing for months on end and what we could
9 do to reduce the threat? I wonder if you would follow with

10 that, Secretary Albright.

11 Secretary Albright: I think, again, this is something we
12 do not know because it depends if it is the Republican Guard
13 or the people that have been very close to Saddam Hussein --
14 if we are in Baghdad with hand-to-hand fighting from block to
15 block, I think there would be a threat. And I think that the
16 number of forces that will have to stay there and should to
17 protect our own forces as a result of our own experiences in
18 this, we would have to assume that there would be a threat to
19 our military. Whether it exists or not, we cannot take the
20 chance of sending them in without assuming that there would
21 be.

22 Senator Feingold: Dr. Kissinger.

23 Secretary Kissinger: First, as to the political outcome
24 in Iraq, I do not pretend to be an expert on the Iraqi
25 conditions. I think a lot of *it* depends on what kind of