- 14 -

still prides itself on the Glorious Revolution of 1688...
even in our own state we cannot escape using institutions
of revolutionary origin...Before the French Revolution not
even the most Christian and conscientious statesman ever
conceived the idea to subordinate all his political efforts
...to the fight against the Revolution...and this despite
the fact that the Americas as well as the British Revolu-
tions represented the same principles which brought about
an interruption of legal continuity in France. I cannot
believe that there should have existed before 1789 a few
statesmen equally Christian and similarly conservative as
we and just as capable of recognizing evil. Nor that the
truth of a principle which we assert to be the basis of all
policy should have escaped them."⁷

This cynical paragraph demonstrated both Bismarck's strengths and weaknesses. To be sure the 18th century had conducted policy cold-bloodedly and with a precise calculation of factors, but not because domestic transformations were in fact irrelevant. Rather it could afford to be indifferent to Revolution because on the one hand neither the British nor the American Revolution claimed a universal scope and on the other the governments felt sufficiently secure to be able to ignore internal upheavals abroad. Whenever these conditions did not coincide, Europe learned the "truth" of the postulate which Bismarck derided,

7. L. G. p. 328, May 30, 1857.

- 15 -

that opposing systems of legitimacy will not be able to escape
a conflict as long as one of them claims universal applicability.
The statesmen of the 17th century could not avoid the 30-Years
War and the same diplomats whose intricate maneuvers had domi-
nated the 18th century proved unable to limit the wars of the
French Revolution. Bismarck undoubtedly was right in denying
in another part of the letter that Napoleon III represented
the same phenomenon as his great namesake. And the events of
1848 had clearly demonstrated that the liberal Revolution had
lost its elan. But it was a dangerous simplification to con-
clude from this that <u>all</u> Revolutions could be death with by
the methods of diplomacy, that maneuver could always substitute
for commitment and that a sober calculation of risks would
invariably animate the protagonists. Bismarck was to learn
later in his domestic policy that revolutions are not neces-
sarily satisfied by granting them the substance of their de-
mands, that they may be as much concerned with the doctrine
which <u>legitimates</u> their achievement; and in his foreign policy
that Revolutions once unleashed are not always restrained by
announcing their end, that the methods by which their gains
were achieved may make impossible their consolidation.

But before Bismarck's impetuous formulations Ger-
lach's replies became increasingly dogmatic. What was there
left to say when one after another of his maxims was demolished
by the man he had sent to Frankfurt as the guarantor of con-
servative interests? "A policy of unimaginative stagnation
is impossible in the center of Europe," thundered Bismarck.

in imhoastle in the center of Europe," thundered Biamarck. He was a rebuke because increasingly dramatic. What was there in a policy of unmitigative aggression by the man he had sent to Frankfurt as the Ambassador of cool to say when one after another of his maxims was demobilized is a rebuke because increasingly dramatic. What was there

But before Biamarck's imhoastle formulations were确立 may we make imhoastle their consideration. announcing their end, that the methods by which their gains that Revolutions once unleashed are not always restrained by which legitimizes their achievement; and in his foreign policy which they may be as much concerned with the doctrine that the methods of diplomacy, that maneuver could always anticipate enge from this that all Revolutions could be dealt with by force its own. But it was a dangerous ambition to confine 1848 had clearly demonstrated that the liberal Revolution had the same phenomenon as his great measure. And the events of in another part of the letter that Napoleon III represented French Revolution. Biamarck undoubtedly was right in denying that the 18th century proved maple to limit the wars of the War and the same diplopoma whose intricate maneuvers had dominated the statements of the 17th century could not avoid the 30-years' conflict as long as one of them claims universal supremacy. that obsoiling albatras of legitimacy will not be able to escape

- 12 -

- 16 -

"If we do not wish to be the anvil, we must be the hammer." As to the confidence of the other German states "any glance at the map makes it impossible. A visit of Napoleon would not awaken more distrust than already exists...In any case 'confidence' will not bring a single man into the field on our side in case of need; but fear, if we know how to use it, will place the whole Confederation at our disposal."⁸ All Gerlach was capable of replying was another invocation of the truisms that nothing good could come from sin and that Napoleon was the incarnation of evil.⁹

The debate about the nature of legitimacy was broken off by Bismarck for the time being because events soon outstripped Gerlach's protestations. When it was resumed two years later by Gerlach, Frederick William had abdicated, Gerlach was in retirement, and Bismarck has been transferred to St. Petersburg. It is only appropriate that Gerlach's letter should be lost and that a page should be missing in Bismarck's reply heightening its abruptness. For now Bismarck no longer saw any need to protest his agreement on principles in the face of his incapacity to implement them. On the contrary he announced his disagreement on principle even while concurring with the specific course advocated by Gerlach. With an impatience reminiscent of his nihilistic youth, and with a force of language which emphasized the gulf between them, Bismarck proclaimed that the inhibitions of the generation of 1875 were transcended, that, if given

or the Generation of Youth were transfigured, that it should be
sifted between them, Bismarck bro碼ded that the impetuous
youth, and with a force of language which emphasized the
Gerlsch. With an indolgence reminiscent of his suffidio
even while concerning with the specific cause advocated by
On the contrary he announced his declaration on bristle
bristle in the face of his insubmissivity to implement them.
Marck no longer saw any need to protest his agreement on
Bismarck's reely heightening its sprightliness. For now his
letter should be lost and that a bade should be missing in
to St. Petersburg. It is only appropriate that Gerlsch's
Gerlsch was in retirement, and Bismarck has been transferred
two years later by Gerlsch, Frederik William had applied
ontatributed G. Risch's protestation. When it was resumed
proven ott by Bismarck for the time peak because events soon
The debate spont the nature of leftism was
bomeon was the incursion of oil.
Gerlsch was cabble of rebelling was another inquisition of the
will bruce the whole Confederation at our diabolus."⁸
VII
our side in case of need; put them, if we know how to use it,
'contingence, will not bring a single man into the field on
not awaken more glutinous than already exists... In any case
at the end makes it impossible. A visit of Bismarck would
be to the confidence of the other German states" and France
"It we do not wait to be the first, we must be the last."

- 10 -

(1)

- 17 -

the opportunity he would force Prussia to conform to his
vision of its essence, whatever the hesitations of his
contemporaries: The difference between us is that you
do not wish to have anything to do with Napoleon or Cavour
while I do not wish to go with France or Sardinia. Who
rules in France or Sardinia is a matter of indifference to
me once the government is recognized and only a question
of fact, not of right. I stand or fall with my own Sovereign,
even if in my opinion he ruins himself stupidly, but France
will remain for me France, whether it is governed by Na-
poleon or by St. Louis and Austria is for me a foreign
country (/Bismarck's italics/)...I know you will reply that
fact and right cannot be so separated, that a properly con-
ceived Prussian policy requires chastity in foreign affairs
even from the point of view of utility. I am prepared to
discuss the point of utility with you; but if you pose
antimonies between right and revolution; Christianity and
infidelity; God and the devil then I can argue no longer
and can merely say 'I am not of your opinion and you judge
in me what is not yours to judge.'"

And even this bitter declaration of faith paled
before the cynical avowal whose wounding quality was only
heightened by its remainder of Gerlach's role in Bismarck's
career and by being couched in the religious categories of
Gerlach's Pietism: "I did not seek the service of the King...

8. L. G., p. , May 2, 1857.

9. J. B. II, page 245, June 5, 1857.

8. J. R. II, b. 542, June 2, 1821.
G. R. G., d., e., f., MsA S., 1821.

Gerisch, a. b. et al.:
"I did not seek the service of the King...
career and by being composed in the religious categories of
heightened by its reminder of Gerisch's role in Biamarck's
before the chivalrous example whose funding specificity was only
and even this bitter declaration of faith based
in me what is not yours to judge."

and can merely ask: "I am not of your opinion and you judge
individually; God and the divine then I can arrange no further
influences between right and revolution; Curiosity and
discipline the bound of individuality with you; put it you both
even from the point of view of individuality." I am broached to
certain brushts below requires quantity in foreign states
right and right cannot be so saturated, that a properly con-
cern country Biamarck's itself... I know you will rebuke that
bohem on p. 24. Ponsia and Ventrila is for me a tolerable
will remain for me France, whether it is governed by us-
even if in my opinion he remains primarily apathetic, put France
or last, not or right. I stand or fall with my own sovereignty,
me once the Government is recognised and only a question
rates in France or Sardinia is a matter of individuality to
while I do not wish to go with France or Sardinia. Who
do not wish to have an ending to go with Napoleon or Cavour
contemporaries: "The difference between us is that you
alike of its essence, whatever the expectations of us
the opportunity we would force brushts to conform to fit

- 11 -

- 18 -

and the God who unexpectedly placed me into it will probably
rather show me the way out of it than let my soul perish. Or
at least He will listen to my daily prayer and send me
friends to help me do so. I would overestimate the value
of this life strangely ... should I not be convinced that
after 30 years it will be irrelevant to me what political
successes I or my country have achieved in Europe. I can even
think out the idea that someday 'unbelieving Jesuits' will
rule over the Mark Brandenburg together with a Bonapartist
abolutism...I am a child of different times as you, but as
honest a one of mine as you of yours."¹⁰

This was the last letter ever exchanged between
Bismarck and Gerlach.

With the exchange with Gerlach the main lines of
Bismarck's thought were established: One by one he had ex-
ploded the myths of the "metternich system"; he had declared
the German Confederation as a fetter to the development of
Prussia's power and the Holy Alliance as a means to perpe-
tuate the disparity between Austria and Prussia; Austria,
the traditional ally had been asserted as Prussia's antago-
nist and France the "hereditary" enemy as a potential ally.
And the unity of conservative interests, the truism of policy
for over a generation, had been exposed as subordinate to
the requirement of national interests. The state and not
its fleeting embodiments nor its various forms of govern-
ment was the basic unit with which the statesman had to deal.
10. L. G., p. 345f, May 2, 4, 1860.

10. L. G.* b. 342c, May 5, 1860.

ment was the date must with which the statesmen had to deal.
the tie between embassies or the various forms of Government
the requirement of national interests. The state and not
tor over a Generation, had been exposed as subordinate to
And the much of conservative interests, the truism of benefit
and France the "hereditary enemy as a potentiate ally.
the traditional ally had been asserted as France's sucrose-
trose the割据 between Venafris and Brabançat Venafris,
Brabançat's power and the Holy V INFUSION as a means to berbe-
the German Confederation as a letter to the development of
brought the main of the "metternich system"; he had declared
Bismarck's thought were espoused: One had one he had ex-
With the exchange with Germany the main lines of
Bismarck's and Germany.

This was the last letter ever exchanged between
pioneers a one of mine as Don of Donna."¹⁰
apostles...I am a child of different times as Don, put as
rule over the Mark Brandenburg together with a Boulogne
think out the ideas that someone, supposing Jeanita, will
encourage me or my country have acquired in Europe. I can even
after 30 years it will be irrelevant to me what benefit
of this life astranger... should I not be convinced that
I will be behind me go so. I would overestimate the air
at least He will lie to me as directly braver and send me
rather show me the way out of it than let me know berley. Or
and the God who unexpectedly placed me into it will drop me

- 18 -

- 19 -

The significance of Bismarck's criticism did not, of course,
lie in the fact that it was made — the enuousness of the
Metternich system was a shibboleth of the mid-19th century
— but in the manner in which it was justified. Heretofore
the attacks on the principle of legitimacy had occurred in
the name of other principles of presumably greater validity
such as nationalism, liberalism, etc. But here was a chal-
lenge which declared the relativity of <u>all</u> beliefs, which
translated them into forces and evaluated them only in terms
of the power they could generate. To be sure, Bismarck had
a personal preference for certain forms of government but
they rarely interfered with his exploitation of the tacti-
cal requirements of the situation. Bismarck therefore
marked the transition from the personal to the formal prin-
ciple of political obligation. The 18th century had per-
sonalized its principle of obligation in the Divine right
of Kings and thereby limited it, for there is a necessary
point beyond which the exercise of personal authority is
inconceivable. To Bismarck, on the other hand, the only
unvarying end was the state; it was the sole absolute and
before it the individual desire was reduced to subjective
preference.

Bismarck's thus was the ultimate application of
that skeptical philosophy which the 18th century had pro-
duced but whose import it had failed to grasp. If all
faith was a euphemism for self-interest, it became a datum

faith was a encomium for self-interested, it became a datum
quod put whose import it had failed to grasp. It is all
that dialectical fabulation which the 18th century had bro-
ken up the last time it had failed to grasp. It is all
that the significance of the 18th century had be-
fore it the individual centre was reduced to subjective
uniquely end was the state; it was the sole substance and
inconceivable. To Biomarck, on the other hand, the only
point beyond which the exercise of personal authority is
of King and thereby limited, for time is a necessary
condition of political obligation. The 18th century had be-
markd the transition from the personal to the formal brin-
cal requirements of the situation. Biomarck therefore
they rarely interfered with his exploitation of the tacti-
ous personal preference for certain forms of government put
of the power they could generate. To be sure, Biomarck had
translated them into forces and evaluated them only in terms
of which declared the relativity of all perfections, which
such as nationalism, liperalism, etc. But here was a sys-
the name of other branches of brawlsmply greater affinity
to the attacks on the principle of legitimacy had occurred in
-- put in the manner in which it was justified. Heretofore
Mettmann system was a supposition of the mid-18th century
fire in the last that it was made -- the consciousness of the
The significance of Biomarck's criticism did not, at least,

before it the individual centre was reduced to subjective
uniquely end was the state; it was the sole substance and
inconceivable. To Biomarck, on the other hand, the only
point beyond which the exercise of personal authority is
of King and thereby limited, for time is a necessary
condition of political obligation. The 18th century had be-
markd the transition from the personal to the formal brin-
cal requirements of the situation. Biomarck therefore
they rarely interfered with his exploitation of the tacti-
ous personal preference for certain forms of government put
of the power they could generate. To be sure, Biomarck had
translated them into forces and evaluated them only in terms
of which declared the relativity of all perfections, which
such as nationalism, liperalism, etc. But here was a sys-
the name of other branches of brawlsmply greater affinity
to the attacks on the principle of legitimacy had occurred in
-- put in the manner in which it was justified. Heretofore
Mettmann system was a supposition of the mid-18th century
fire in the last that it was made -- the consciousness of the
The significance of Biomarck's criticism did not, at least,

- 13 -

(M)

- 20 -

to be manipulated. If all conviction was a means of self-
assertion, then it became the proper tool for whomever
understood its true essence. But however hard-boiled Bismarck's
philosophy appeared, it in its turn was built on an
article of faith no more demonstrable than the conviction
of the self-evidence of the principle of legitimacy: the
belief that power was self-validating -- that a proper
analysis of it would necessarily yield the same conclusions.
That the principle of legitimacy was capable of contingent
interpretation was inconceivable to Gerlach. That states-
men might variously understand the requirements of national
interest once they had grasped its unvarying canons was be-
yond the comprehension of Bismarck. Because of his magnif-
icent grasp of the nuances of power-relationships, Bismarck
saw in his philosophy a doctrine of self-limitation. Because
these nuances were inaccessible to his successors and imita-
tors, the application of Bismarck's lesson unleashed an
armament race and a World War. The nemesis of doctrines
is dogmatism; the nemesis of power is that except in the
hands of a master, it is easier to demonstrate its limits
through a contest at arms than through self-restraint.

But it is too much to ask of genius to forego its
vision because it might reflect an inherent fatality. There
could be no concern with the penalties of success when its
preconditions were not even recognized. Having exploded the
myth of legitimacy, Bismarck therefore returned to the field

- 21 -

where by his own account lay the ultimate rewards of Prussian
diplomacy: the question of Germany. Concurrently with his
exchange with Gerlach he had been advocating a policy with
Manteuffel which had Gerlach known of it would have completed
his disillusionment. For although Bismarck was not prepared
to limit Prussia's option in deference to domestic considera-
tions, he was more than ready to utilize Prussia's internal
policy to exert pressure abroad. The corollary to his dis-
belief in Napoleon's revolutionary quality was his conviction
that Prussia could pursue a revolutionary policy with impunity.
If Prussia was not vulnerable to the revolutionary views, or
at least less vulnerable than the other German states, it
could use the fear of revolution to exact concessions abroad.
Already during the Crimean war he had urged Manteuffel not to
be stampeded by the fear of revolution: "The Western powers
are not in a position to unleash or arrest a revolution as
they see fit... And Louis Napoleon will suffer more from it
than we."¹¹ Now with the Holy Alliance dissolved and Austria
dependent on the backing of the German Confederation, Bis-
marck more and more boldly advocated using the liberal trend
of the century to paralyze Austria. When Saxony proposed
that the German Confederation develop uniform regulations for
the press, Bismarck wrote to Manteuffel: "We should propose
objectives...of such scope that Austria cannot possible agree.
We can stand more in this connection than the secondary states

11. W. I. p. 446.

IT. M. I. b. 446.

We can stand more in this connection than the secondary states objectives...or such scope that Austria cannot bonyipie aee.
the bres. Biamarck wrote to Mantuttel: "We should brooke
that the German Confederation develop uniform regulations for
of the century to barakize Austria. When Saxony brooke
mark more and more popd advocated making the fiscal trend
dependent on the packing of the German Confederation. Bia-
than me." "If
Mom with the Hofh Affiance dissolved and Austria
they see it...And Ronja Nebojeon will snorter more from it
are not in a position to release or arrest a revolution as
be attempted by the tear of revolution: "The Western bowels
Vireadg during the Crimean war he had marked Mantuttel not to
conflict the tear of revolution to exist concessions abroad.
at least less arbitrary than the other German states, if
It Prunais was not arbitrary to the revolutionary views, or
that Prunais could burke a revolutionary policy with immunity.
prefet in Napoleon's revolutionary quality was his conviction
belliger to exert pressure abroad. The corollary to his dia-
tions, he was more than ready to utilize Prunais's internal
to limit Prunais's option in deference to domestic considers-
ples reaffirmment. For aftongh Biamarck was not prepared
Mantuttel which had Gerlach he had been advocating a policy with
diplomacy: the creation of Germany. Concurrently with his
where by his own account lay the ultimate rewards of Prunais

- SI -

- 22 -

not to speak of Austria and the present subject is well
suited for us to drop a hint that Austria should think twice
before challenging us to a contest in proselyting the national
and liberal sympathies of Germany,... for we would very soon
outdistance it."¹² And in another report he paraphrased his
letter to Gerlach: "Gratitude and confidence will not bring
a single man into the field on our side; only fear will do
that, if we use it cautiously and skillfully."¹³

All of the strands of Bismarck's though thus culmi-
nated in Germany. Not, to be sure, out of agreement with doc-
trines of linguistic unity -- this is the interpretation of
posterity confusing cause and effect -- rather from a desire
to give Prussia a sphere of influence commensurate with its
real strength and with the dangers confronting it. Bismarck
advocated German unity not because of the maxims of nationalism,
useful though these were to appeal to but as a means to assure
Prussia's security. It was the state as a historical unit,
not the nation as a linguistic and cultural group, which was
the basic unity of Bismarck's thought. No document expresses
this more clearly than an extensive memorandum written to the
new Prince Regent at the end of March 1858, after his mental
illness forced Frederick William IV to relinquish the reins of
office.¹⁴ Dispassionate and incisively written, it performs
for German problems what the "master-report" does for the field
of European diplomacy: it furnished an outline of Bismarck's
later policy.

12. W. II, p. 239, July 1857.

13. W. II, p. 227.

13. M. XII. b. 551.
15. M. XII. b. 530, 17.11.1921.

further below.

of Eurobeau Commission: it mentioned an outline of Bramarock's
for German problems what the "master-report" does for the field
office.¹⁴ Diabasouate and initially written, it belongs
influence forced Frederick William IV to return from the relief of
new Prince Regent at the end of March 1828, after his mental
crisis more clearly than an extensive memorandum written to the
copy of unity of Bramarock's thought. No document expresses
not the nation as a linguistic and national group, which was
Branais's security. It was the state as a historical unit,
neither though these were to abase to put as a means to assume
advocated German unity not because of the maxima of nationalism,
rest strength and with the danger confronting it. Bramarock
to give Branais a sphere of influence commensurate with its
boosterily continuing cause and effect -- rather from a gear
trains of linguistic unity -- this is the interpretation of
nated in Germany. Not to be

- 55 -

- 23 -

The memorandum began with the familiar catalogue
of Prussia's grievances: the system of majority votes which
gave the minor states a disproportionate voice, the interest
of Austria in perpetuating this arrangement, the danger that
the Confederation might utilize any moment of danger for
Prussia to humiliate it. Nor was it possible to improve
the constitutional arrangements of the Confederation through
the cooperation of the other states: "The secondary states...
find in the Assembly of the Confederation a pedestal from which
they can discourse about the affairs of Germany and Prussia,
indeed even about European policy more loudly than would be
permissible were they in immediate contact with the facts of
world affairs ... It is not surprising then that they are
interested in developing an institution in which with a
minimum of effort they obtain not only security but an accre-
tion of influence. Thus in case of war Hessen-Darmstadt has
the right to claim the assistance of the Prussian army in re-
turn assists Prussia with 6200 men..."

On the other hand Prussia could not continue to
accept such a relationship: "In this system there is no room
for Prussia unless Prussia is prepared to relinquish its place
as a European power. A great power desirous of conducting its
own foreign policy on the basis of its intrinsic strength can
agree to a greater centralization of the Confederation only if
it assumes its leadership and is capable of insisting on the
adoption of its own program." Austria, however, would never

14. W. II, p. 302f. (Called in German historiography the "little book")

"Little Book"

opposition of its own program." Anatria, however, would never
it sanctions its federation and is capable of initiating on the
agree to a greater concentration of the Confederation only if
own foreign buffer on the parte of its intrinsically strong can
be a European power. A great power desire one of confining its
tor brusels unless brusels is prepared to reinvigorate its base
acquired and a relationship: "In this system there is no room
On the other hand brusels could not continue to
turn against brusels with 6500 men..."

the right to claim the assistance of the Prussian army in re-
tion of influence. Thus in case of war Hessen-Darmstadt has
minimum of effort they obtain not only security but an acco-
interested in developing an institution in which with a
world assistance ... It is not ambling then that they are
bermudaile were they in immediate contact with the face of
indeed even spontaneous European buffer more largely than would be
they can discourage spontaneous the assistance of Germany and Prussia,
ting in the Vlaander of the Confederation a beggar from which
the cooperation of the other states: "The secondly states...
the constitutional arrangements of the Confederation through
brusels to ameliorate it. Now was it possible to improve
the Confederation might utilize any moment of danger for.
of Anatria in berating this arrangement, the danger that
Save the minor states a disproportionate voice, the interest
of Prussia's grievances: the system of majority votes which
The memorandum began with the familiar categories

- 53 -

(A)

- 24 -

accept this solution, not because of personal ill will but
because it required the resources of the Confederation to
defend its European position. In this manner, "the limits
of the competency of the Confederation disappear in the fog
in which the diplomats of the Confederation reinforce each
other's illusion that the treaties bringing about the Con-
federation possess a greater degree of sanctity than inter-
national treaties in general."

But if it was Prussia's task to make explicit the
tenuousness of the German Confederation, what had become of
Prussia's German mission? What of the hopes of the genera-
tion of the War of Liberation that Prussia spearhead the
drive for German unity? The destruction of the German Con-
federation, Bismarck replied, was the ultimate realization
of Prussia's German mission, for only the particularist self-
will of the governments, not the people, stood in Prussia's
way: "Prussia's interest coincide with those of most German
states, except Austria, but not with their governments and
there exists nothing more German than the development of
rightly conceived Prussian interests. For this very reason
Prussia finds itself opposed by the majority of the govern-
ments which are alone represented in the Assembly of the Con-
federation and which institute the main obstacle to the force-
ful development of Germany. Prussia will achieve freedom of
action for its German mission only if it ceases ... to cater
to the governments of the secondary German states."

to the Governments of the secondry German states."

action for its German mission only if it ceases ... to enter
the development of Germany. Prussia will achieve freedom of
teteration and which institute the main objective to the force-
ments which are alone represented in the Assembly of the Con-
Prussia tings itself opposed by the majority of the Govern-
rightly conceived Prussian interests. For this very reason
there exists nothing more German than the development of
states, except Austria, but not with their Governments and
my: "Prussia's interest coincide with those of most German
will of the Governments, not the people, a stock in Prussia's
of Prussia's German mission, for only the particularist self-
teteration, Bismarck replied, was the ultimate realization
drives for German unity? The destruction of the German Con-
tion of the War of Lipidation that Prussia absorbed the
Prussia's German mission? What of the nobles of the Gener-
temongues of the German Confederation, what had become of
But it was Prussia's task to make explicit the
nations' treaties in General!"

federation besees a greater degree of anarchy than inter-
other's inflation that the treaties prging apart the Con-
tin which the diplomata of the Confederation reinforce each
of the competency of the Confederation dashbear in the log
delend its Europeanition. In this manner, "the有限
because if required the resources of the Confederation to
accept this solution, not because of berausul till will put

- 54 -

- 25 -

Thus German unity was made necessary by the diffi-
culty of Prussia to conduct the policy of a great power in
the present framework. It was not a theoretical but a pract-
ical goal, not justified by doctrines of liberalism but of
power, even if the means to achieve it were through an appeal
to the people against their governments. For four decades
Prussian policy had been stymied by the paradox that it would
have to ally itself with its domestic opponents in order to
defeat its adversaries with Germany. It remained for Bismarck
to declare that the paradox was only apparent, that Prussia
was strong enough to appeal to liberal elements in the rest
of German without weakening its own domestic structure: "The
sense of security that the King remains master in his country
even if the whole army should be abroad is not shared with
Prussia by any other Continental state and above all by no
other German power; it provides the opportunity to accept a
development of public affairs much more in conformity with
the requirements of the present. The degree of acticity
consistent with the maintenance of authority is much greater
in Prussia than in the rest of Germany ... The royal authority
in Prussia is so firmly based that the government can without
risk encourage a much more lively parliamentary activity and
thereby exert pressure on conditions in Germany."¹⁵

This then was the culmination of the hints contained
in the first parliamentary speeches, developed in the early
15. See also letter to Manteuffel, W. II, p. 323, April 10, 1858.

12. See also letter to Montenegrif, W. II, b. 253, April 10, 1938.

in the first parliamentary assembly, developed in the early
The first then was the culmination of the finds contained
thereby exerting pressure on conditions in Germany."¹²

Risk encounter a much more lively parliamentary activity and
in Prussia in so firmly based that the Government can without
in Prussia than in the rest of Germany ... The royal authority
consistent with the maintenance of authority is much greater,
the requirements of the present. The degree of acidity
development of buphile allotria much more in conformity with
other German power; it broadens the opportunity to accept a
Prussia p and other Continental state and above all p no
even if the whole army should be abroad is not assured with
sense of security that the King remains master in his contract
of German without weakening its own domestic structure: "The
was a strong enough to abate to Lipperian elements in the rest
to secure that the baroque was only abherent, that Prussia
deleets its adversaries with Germany. It remained for Bismarck
have to ally itself with its domestic opponents in order to
Prussian policy had been attributed by the baroque that it would
to the people against their Governments. For four decades
power, even if the means to achieve it were through an abhor-
red power, not justified by doctrine of lipperianism but of
the present framework. It was not a theoretical but a brusqu-
ent of Prussia to conduct the policy of a great power in
Tum German unity was made necessary by the difficult-

- 52 -

(4)

- 26 -

reports from Frankfurt, ripened during the Crimean war and
given a theoretical justification in the exchange with Ger-
lach: The Archimedean point for Bismarck was Prussia, the
state whose sense of obligation was strong enough to combine
a repressive policy at home with a revolutionary policy abroad,
the society capable of producing a Bismarck whose withering
cynicism nevertheless always stopped short of one question:
Whether any state had the right so to manipulate the beliefs
of a generation; why it should have been Prussia that played
the role of fate for Germany. The postulate of Prussia's
uniqueness was implicit in this most inclusive statement of
Bismarck's views on the German question as it had been ex-
plicit in his early speeches. That Prussia had to absorb
Germany rather than the opposite was an act of faith not of
knowledge, proving that the condition of cynicism is a strong
belief.

The course for Prussia was thus charted as opposition
to Austria throughout all the fluctuations of European poli-
tics, to wait for the inevitable embarrassments of Austria
and then to use all available means to achieve Prussia's ob-
jectives. All that remained was the opportunity to put these
maxims into effect.

And Austria had mortgaged its future too severely
during the Crimean War to escape its dilemmas by a rigid ad-
herence to the status quo. The complications in Italy fore-
seen by Bismarck in 1856 finally occurred in 1859 when Sardinia

seen by Biamarck in 1820, firmly occurred in 1829 when Bardin
 preference to the actual dno. The complications in Italy fore-
during the Crimean War to escape its dilemma p[ro] a right ap-
And Vinacri had mortgaged its future too severely

maxima into effect.

tives. If that remained was the opportunity to but these
and then to see all available means to subdue Prunata's op-
tion, to wait for the inevitable emplacements of Vinacri
to Vinacri throughout all the fluctuations of European boif-

The course for Prunata was thus charted as obcession
perfect.

knowledge, proving that the condition of civilisation is a strong
Germany rather than the obsolescence was an act of faith not of
benefit in his early acquisitions. That Prunata had to spend
Biamarck's views on the German question as it had been ex-
clusive was implicit in this most inclusive statement of
the role of late for Germany. The boast of Prunata's
of a Generation; why it should have been Prunata that based
Whether any state had the right to manipulate the perfects
civilisation nevertheless always atobbed adort of one question:
the society capable of producing a Biamarck whose withering
a repressive boifc at home with a revolutionary boifc abroad,
a state whose sense of obligation was a strong enough to compine
Jach: The Vronimmedan point for Biamarck was Prunata, the
Given a theoretical justification in the exchange with Ger-
reports from Frankfurt, ribened during the Crimean war, and

- 5c -

- 27 -

challenged Austria with French support. As in the Crimean
War Austria added to its embarrassments by a policy of con-
fused inaction while Sardinia mobilized its forces only to
follow it with an ultimatum which cut the ground from under
a British effort of mediation. And the isolation of Austria
which Bismarck had foreseen became a reality. Napoleon had
protected himself through a secret treaty with Russia which
thereby gave up its rigid adherence to the territorial settle-
ment of 1815. And Prussia, as always torn by indecision,
demonstrated the enousness of Confederate relationships
through its paralysis of will. To be sure, Austria's war
against France paradoxically rallied to its side all the
national elements which had seen in it the chief obstacle
to German unity. It seemed easy to equate the war over the
possession of Lombardy with the ascent of the first Napoleon
on Italy and even so Prussian a figure as the later Chief of
Staff Moltke saw in the war in Italy only a prelude to a
later attack on the Rhine.<sup>16</sup> But the ambiguous attitude of
Russia, the protestations of good faith of Napoleon and per-
haps the impetuous reports of Bismarck induced the precise
degree of delay which caused events to outstrip Prussia's
hesitations. The extent to which old myths had disintegrated
was demonstrated by the fact that Austria did not make any
appeal to the German Confederation for assistance, preferring
instead to rely on a direct understanding with Prussia.

16. EYCK, I, p. 237.

ie. MCK, I', b. S21.

instead to rely on a direct understanding with Prussia.
aboard to the German Confederation for anafassance, brottering
was demonstrated by the fact that Anatria did not make any
reialisations. The extent to which old mythe had disintegrated
degree of delay which caused events to outside Prussia's
paps the indebtedness of Biamarck induced the brocade
Hua's, the protestations of good faith of Napoleon and ber-
fater attack on the Rhine.1c But the ambiguous attitude of
Stell Mofke saw in the war in Italy only a brevade to a
on Italy and even no Prussian a figure as the later Chief of
benevolence of Lompard with the ascent of the third Napoleon
to German unity. It seemed easy to edicate the war over the
national elements which had seen in it the outlet opatente
afoul of France bensodoxically railed to its side all the
through its baryphiles of will. To be sure, Anatria's war
demonstrated the enmity of Confederate relationships
ment of 1812. And Prussia's, na always town dy indissipation,
thereby gave up its rigid adherence to the territorial settle-
protected himself through a secret treaty with Hua's which
which Biamarck had foreseen became a reality. Napoleon had
a British effort of mediation. And the isolation of Anatria
follow it with an ultimatum which out the ground from under
turned inaction while Sardinia mobilized its forces only to
war. Anatria added to its emplacements py a buffer of con-
challenged Anatria with French anborst. As in the Crimean

(c)

- 28 -

But once more this concession to all he had been advocating did not placate Bismarck. On the contrary he saw in the war in Italy a unique opportunity for undermining Austria's power. While German patriots were speaking of a national war against Napoleon, Bismarck was more afraid of Austria's victory than of its defeat. Just as in the days of Austria's invasion of the Danube Principalities, he insisted that Prussia could not permit an Austrian victory which would make it the master of the national movement.¹⁷ He repeated his arguments that on the side of Austria, Prussia had no war aim and he added a significant hint of his later tactics: "The present institutions of the German Confederations are for Prussia in peacetime an oppressive, in wartime a perilous fetter ... We must therefore use every opportunity to assume the role of the injured ... in order to bring about a revision of existing institutions ... I see in the Confederation a disease which sooner or later we must heal *ferro et egni* unless we take a cure against it in time."¹⁸ Here was the first utilization of the phrase which was to be identified with Bismarck, the method of blood and iron and its disregard of Confederate relationships was only the reverse side of his renewed insistence on using parliamentary debates to paralyze Austria. And as in the Crimean war there came one more the demand for a maximum of ruthlessness: "The present situation once more presents us with the great prize if we let the war

17. W. III, p. 28.

18. W. III, p. 35, May 12, 1859.

["18. N. III, b. 32. May 15, 1828.\nII. N. III, b. 58.", "once more breviate us with the great prize if we let the war\nguang for a maximum of four months. \"The broken situation\nAustria. And as in the Crimean war there came one more the\nrenewed instability on making belligerently departs to baronze\nof the Confederate relationships, we only the reserves edge of the\nwith Bismarck, thenpop of proof and iron and its diatribe\nthe first utilization of the症症症 which was to be identified\nand unless we take a course against it in time.\"¹⁸ Here was\na revision of existing institutions ... I see in the Confeder-\nto resume the role of the injured ... in order to bring about\na belligerent letter ... We must therefore use every opportunity\nfrom our war aim and he added a significant point of view later\nbeated his arguments that on the side of Austria, Prussia\nwould make it the master of the national movement.\"¹⁹ He re-\nported that Prussia could not permit an Austrian victory while\nof Austria's invasion of the Danube Principalities, he in-\nVon Austria's victory than of its defeat. Just as in the case\nof the war in Italy a unique opportunity for maneuvering\nadvancing did not arise Bismarck. On the contrary he was\nbut once more this concentration to all he had been", "But once more this concentration to all he had been\nsaid that Prussia could not permit an Austrian victory while\nof Austria's invasion of the Danube Principalities, he in-\nVon Austria's a invasion

- 29 -

between Austria and France become well-established and then
move south with our whole army, taking the border-posts in
our field-packs not to impale them again until we reach Lake
Constance or at least the limits where the Protestant confes-
sion ceases to predominate."¹⁹

Distrustful of the German Confederation, isolated
from Russia, with Prussia vacillating between tentative ef-
forts of mediation and uncertain promises of support, Austria
suddenly made peace directly with Napoleon at Villafrance.
Nothing could have demonstrated more clearly the impotence
of the national movement than the fact that neither Prussia
nor the German Confederation heeded its calls. But equally
nothing could have discredited further the Frankfurt Assembly
than the manner with which it was completely ignored by the
two major German powers during a European crisis. And the
loss by Austria of Lombardy to Sardinia was another breech
of the Vienna settlement, another warning of what might be
in store for the Central Empire of Prussia should ever succeed
in matching its will with its opportunities.

But the man who had no doubt of his ability to do
so was temporarily in eclipse. For with the advent of the
Prince Regent, a new group of ministers took over at Berlin.
Although far from liberal, the new ruler had been outraged
by the arbitrariness of the Manteuffel ministry and a week
after taking the oath of office, he dismissed Manteuffel. And

19. W. XIV, p. 517.

19. N. XVA. b. 21A.

after taking the oath of office, he demised Nauvotels. And
by the arbitrariness of the Nauvotels miniatry and a week
through the tax from federal, the new ruler had been outvoted
by the Nauvotels, a new group of miniatres took over at Berlin.
so was temporarily in office. For with the advent of the
But the man who had no doubt of his ability to do
in matching its will with its opportunities.

in store for the Central Empire of Prussia should ever succeed
of the Vienna settlement, another warning of what might be
loss by Anatira of Loméry to Zarginis was another preord
two major German bowers during a European crisis. And the
than the manner with which it was completely ignored by the
nothing could have qiacredited further the Frankfurt Assembly
nor the German Confederation needed its calls. But easily
of the national movement than the fact that neither Prussia
Nothing could have demonstrated more clearly the impotence
andignity made hence directly with Napoleon at Alliance.
torte et mediation and mucensin brooms of England, Anatira
from Prussia, with Prussia oscillating between tentatives et-

Distribution of the German Confederation, isolated
from causes to bregdominate."[19]

Constance or at least the limits where the Protestant coule-
our field-backs not to impale them again until we reach the
move south with our whole army, taking the border-boats in
between Anatira and Prussia become well-estranged and then

- 50 -

- 30 -

Bismarck's position, too, had become untenable. Not only had he clashed with the then Prince of Prussia during the Crimean War but the Prince Regent's wife Augusta had not forgotten their encounter during the revolution of 1848.²⁰ It did not help that Bismarck wrote his long treatise on the German question to inspire the new ruler, nor that he wrote a subtle report to the new foreign minister, Shlimitz, placing his own misgivings into the mouth of his colleagues.²¹ In February 1859, he was transferred to St. Petersburg as Prussian ambassador.

To be sure, according to the protocol of Prussian diplomacy, St. Petersburg was a promotion. But the German question was decided at Frankfurt and it was in Germany that Bismarck saw Prussia's real opportunities. There was no occasion to write fundamental reports from Russia except during the Sardinian crisis. Bismarck did not fail to state Russia's reservations in the most abrupt terms and he even hinted that Russia would make war with Prussia rather than permit an Austrian victory, a report to which the Prince Regent added a plea for peace in a marginalia.²² After the Sardinian crisis, however, Bismarck's stay in St. Petersburg played the role of the retreat into the wilderness in the lives of so many great men. It was there while waiting for fate to return him to the center of events that he prepared

20. O. P. c. T.

21. W. II, p. 39.

22. W. III, p. 47.

SS. M. III, b. 4d.
SI. M. II, b. 30.
SO. O. P. c. T.

late to return him to the center of events that he breveted
five years of so many great men. It was there while waiting for
belayed the role of the retreat into the wilderness in the
Sarqinian orials, however, Biamarck's exit in St. Petersburg
Regent added a tie for peace in a warlike era.
SS
After the
permit an Austrian victory, a report to which the prince
planted that Russia would make war with Prussia rather than
Russia's reservations in the most abrupt terms and he even
during the Sarqinian orials. Biamarck did not tell to a state
occasion to write fundamental reports from Russia except
Biamarck saw Prussia's real opportunities. There was no
direction was decided at Frankfurt and it was in Germany that
diplomacy, St. Petersburg was a promotion. But the German
To be aware, according to the protocol of Prussian
Prussian annexation.

In February 1848, he was transferred to St. Petersburg as
ing his own magistracy into the month of his colleagues.
SI
a separate report to the new foreign minister, Schliemitz, bla-
german question to investigate the new order, nor that he wrote
It did not help that Biamarck wrote his fourLetter on the
torotten their encounter during the revolution of 1848. SO
Crimoe War put the Prince Regent, a wife who was not
used he crasped with the then Prince of Prussia during the
Biamarck's boating too, had become miscalculation. Not only

- 30 -

(N)

- 31 -

himself to acquire the quality which supplies the balance to
genius: the virtue of patience.

If Bismarck left Frankfurt with a feeling of bitterness about the futility of his effort, he was mistaken, however. For we owe to his stay in Frankfurt the reports analyzed in the previous chapters where now with impetuosity, now in the pedantic jargon of official Prussian, but always with rare dialectical skill and great eloquence, Bismarck charted the course of his later policy. Seldom has a statesman prepared so imposing a blueprint, never has he followed it more consistently. It was not, to be sure, a comprehension of the content of Bismarck's thought which led to Bismarck's accession to power. For Bismarck was too out of scale to be understandable to so limited, if honorable, a personality as the new ruler of Prussia. Great men can achieve recognition only through a period of crisis which obliterates all inhibitions. It was not then because Bismarck had succeeded in persuading that he came into office; rather it was as a measure of despair, a last resort when no one else was willing to deal with an impasse which the new King had reached with his Parliament.

an imbalance which the new King had reached with his Parliament.

bairn, a first resort when no one else was willing to deal with
that he came into office; rather it was a measure of des-
trast through a period of crisis which oppresses all institutions.
new era of trials. Great men can achieve recognition only
attracting so limited, if honorable, a benevolence as the
alon to power. For Biamarck was too out of date to be under-
content of Biamarck's thought which led to Biamarck's acces-
sion. It was not, to be accurate, a comprehension of the
so imitating a pineprint, never has he followed it more con-
trary to his later policy. Seldom has a statesman prepared
disorganised skill and great erudition. Biamarck charted the
the semantic target of official bromance, put smoke with rare
in the previous chapters where now with imbecility, now in
ever. For we owe to his stay in Frankfurt the reports alluded
meas upon the utility of his effort, he was mistaken, pow-
erful: the virtue of justice.

It Biamarck left Frankfurt with a feeling of bitter-
hatred: the virtue of justice.

himself to acquire the quality which abhies the balance to

- 31 -

IV. The Art of the Possible

Of all the creations of the Vienna Settlement none
was more intricate than the German Confederation. It was
born of a set of contradictory desires: to answer to a de-
gree the hopes for national unity awakened during the Napole-
onic period, but without weakening the power of the legiti-
mate rulers; to prevent Prussian hegemony in Germany while
retaining the backing of Prussia's power in case of need.
The result had been a structure of such subtlety that its pre-
cise constitutional arrangement would require almost a sepa-
rate volume. Even the membership was amorphous: Austria be-
longed to the Confederation only with its German third; nor
did the writ of the Confederation run in the Polish provin-
ces of Prussia. On the other hand, the Netherlands was re-
presented because of its possession of Luxembourg and Denmark
because its King was also ruler of Schleswig-Holstein. This
alone would have insured that everything made for particular-
ist self-will. Prussia, the largest purely German state had
only one vote in 17 in the Assembly of the Confederation and
it was theoretically possible that a grouping of states com-
prising less than a quarter of the population of resources
of Germany could out-vote the two major powers, Austria and
Germany.

But this was not the usual occurrence. The inter-
ests of Austria ran much too parallel with those of the minor

state of Austria ran much too barrieff with those of the minor
But this was not the main cause. The inter-
Germany.

of Germany could out-pace the two major powers, Austria and
briaring less than a quarter of the population of reason-
It was theoretically possible that a Groenburg of states com-
only one vote in 11 in the Vaasenly of the Confederation and
that a sort-of. Prussia, the largest country in German state had
alone would have funned that everything made for bantuan-
Because its King was also a son of Schleissig-Holstein. Tula
presented because of its bosseasen of Lixempom and Denmark
of Prussia. On the other hand, the Netherlands was re-
did the work of the Confederation run in the Polish界-
longed to the Confederation only with its German third; nor
rate volume. Even the memperabia was amorphous: Austria pe-
ose constitutional arrangement would require almost a sebs-
The result had been a structure of such entanglement that its bre-
retaining the packing of Prussia's power in case of need.
Made rulers; to prevent Prussia an hegemony in Germany while
once period, put without weakening the power of the legiti-
mate the国家 for national unity awakened during the Napole-
pon of a set of contradictory deals: to answer to a de-
was more inaccurate than the German Confederation. It was
Of all the creations of the Vienna Settlement none

IV. The Art of the Possible

- 2 -

states for divergences between them to arise frequently. Both Austria and the minor states were interested in maintaining the status quo; both were concerned with preventing Prussian hegemony. And they both wanted to achieve their goals without open conflict. The Assembly of the Confederation was therefore primarily designed to inhibit decisive action except in cases of over-riding foreign danger. The very complexity of its proceedings was well-suited to delay, to ameliorate, to evade. And this was magnified by the strategic position of Austria. For the Austrian representative was ex-officio president of the Assembly; the Assembly met in the Austrian Legation at Frankfurt; its secretariat was under Austrian control and until 1848 the seal of the Confederation was the Austrian seal. In these circumstances it was not too difficult to transform the Assembly of the Confederation into a diplomatic congress bound by the instructions of its component governments, its very proceedings refuting the aspiration towards national unity.

Nevertheless, the Confederation was not simply a diplomatic Congress. To begin with, it owned directly five fortresses facing France. It could receive as well as credit ambassadors. It had the power to delcare war. It was therefore perfectly possible that a German state pursued two contradictory policies at the same time: one as an independent power, the other in its capacity as a member of the Confederation. Or that there existed within Germany four

Confederation. Or, that there existed within Germany four
bengent power, the other in its capacity as a member of the
two contradicted bodies of the same time: one as an inde-
ward therefore necessarily possible that a German state burled
credit emphaesia. It had the power to deface war. It
torpedoed facing France. It could receive as well as so-
diplomatic Congress. To begin with, it owned directly five
Nevertheless, the Confederation was not simply a
resulting the abdication towards national unity.
attractions of its component governments, its very proceedings
Confederation into a diplomatic congress pound by the in-
fluence was not too difficult to transform the Assempty of the
Confederation was the Austrian seat. In these circumstances
was under Austrian control and until 1848 the seat of the
met in the Austrian Legation at Frankfurt; its secretary
attive was ex-officio president of the Assempty; the Assempty
strategic position of Austria. For the Austrian represent-
tative to smeliorate, to evade. And this was magnified by the
very complexity of its proceedings was well-suited to delay,
action except in cases of over-riding foreign danger. The
action was therefore primarily designed to inculpate decisive
 Goals without open conflict. The Assempty of the Confeder-
ated the status quo both were concerned with preventing
Both Austria and the minor states were interested in main-
states for divergences between them to arise frequently.

- 5 -

(A)

- 3 -

foreign policies concurrently -- as happened during the Crimean War and again during the Schleswig-Holstein crisis -- that of Austria, that of Prussia, that of the minor states and finally the attainable consensus expressed in the policy of the Confederation. Little wonder that to a century seeking its ultimates in nationalism, constitutionalism and rationalized administration, the German Confederation became the symbol of everything backward. Its cumbersome machinery, its pedantic disputes, its intricate and "illogical" arrangements soon turned into the objects of bitter jokes and were defended without enthusiasm even by its advocates -- primarily because they could not think of an alternative. The ease with which the German Confederation was overthrown in 1848 only underlined that the Vienna settlement had been able to confer existence, but that not even three decades of duration had succeeded in bringing about understanding, much less acceptance.

So the German Confederation has marched through history-books as a hopeless anachronism, a horrible example of a reactionary conception. It is the fate, of course, of institutions whose legitimacy has been superseded that they appear rigid, irrational and even degenerate to succeeding generations; all the more so as posterity only remembers the formal arrangements and not the spirit which animated them, nor the function which they performed. But while it is easy to ridicule the German Confederation, the century which has known two world wars might do well to take another look. For then it might come to

might do well to take another look. For then it might come to
German Confederation, the century which has known two world wars
which they performed. But while it is easy to question the
ments and not the spirit which animated them, nor the function
all the more so asosterity only remembers the former strange-
rigid, irrational and even degenerate to succeeding generations;
titious whose legitimacy has been underscored that they abhor
a reactionary conception. It is the late, of course, of insti-
historia-pooks as a noblest anachronism, a horrible example of
so the German Confederation has marched through
it's, much less acceptance.

decades of duration had succeeded in prging apart understanding had been able to confer existence, but that not even three was overthrown in 1848 only underlined that the Vienna settlement was an alternative. The ease with which the German Confederation by its advocates -- primarily because they could not think of objects of bitter jokes and were defended without enthusiasm even infirmate and "illogical" arrangements soon turned into the op-
packward. Its emperorsome machinery, its beguiling diabolites, its
tion, the German Confederation became the symbol of everything
in nationalism, constitutionalism and rationalized administra-
ration. Little wonder that to a century seeking its ultimate
the attainable consensus expressed in the policy of the Confed-
Vania, that of Prussia, that of the minor states and finally
War and again during the Bonnefair-Holstein crisis -- that of
foreign policies concurrently -- as happened during the Crimean

- 3 -

(k)

- 4 -

realize that although this cumbersome, intricate, antiquated institution may have failed in living up to the ideals of a century, it may have represented the only means to being to Europe a stability it has never known since.

The basic problem of European politics has always been how to reconcile the quest for universality with the requirements of the equilibrium. It is in the nature of ideals that they claim universal applicability; but it is the essence of an international order based on a state system that its members can feel secure only if there exists a balance of power which makes it impossible for one state or group of states to obtain dominion over the remainder. And the root dilemma of European politics has derived from the insistence on legitimizing governments domestically by a notion of "justice" making universal claims; while constructing an international order on the principle of the equality of sovereign states which is tantamount to an assertion of the contingency of the domestic notions of justice. In such a scheme stability depends on two factors: that the difference in domestic notions of justice be compatible and that the components of the international order be made to feel secure by its arrangements. If the domestic legitimizing principles are incompatible, all disputes are transformed into revolutionary contests. When there is no agreement on what constitutes a "just" or a "reasonable" claim no basis for negotiation exists. Then the emphasis will be less on the settlement of disputes than on the subversion of loyalties to bring about

diabutes than on the supereratlon of loyalties to bring about
existat. Then the embaſſa will be few on the setſament of
a "that" or a "reasonable" claim no paſa for negotiation
arſy contexta. When there is no agreement on what constitutæ
are incombatible, all diabutes are transformed into revolufion-
py its arrangetæms. It the domestic ſegitimizing brinčables
componenſa of the international order be made to feel secun
in domætic noſtions of justice be combatible and that the
scheme atſpiffity debenta on two ſactors: that the difference
conſingency of the domætic noſtions of justice. In an ſa
sovereign atſata which is tantamount to an anſertion of the
international order on the brinčable of the eduality of
"justice," making universal claims; while constructing an
on ſegitimizing Governmenta domætically by a noſon of
dilemmas of Eurobean boſſica has derived from the inſatience
aſtata to obtain dominion over the remainder. And the root
boſſa which makes it impoſsible for one atſa or Groß of
mempers can feel secun only it there exisſa a paſſance of
of an international order based on a atſa system that its
that they claim universal abſpiffity but it is the esence
duirements of the eguifiprium. It is in the nature of ideala
been how to reconcile the ducat for universality with the re-
The paſſe broſſem of Eurobean boſſica has always
Eurobe a atſpiffity it has never known since.

century, it may have repreſented the only means to bring to
inſtitution may have failed in living up to the ideala of a
realize that although this embaſſa, inſtricate, antipuſted

- 4 -

(A)

- 5 -

the degree of compatibility which will permit statesmen to
"understand" each other. But no matter what the degree of
harmony of the domestic notions of justice, no major power
will accept a settlement in which its survival depends en-
tirely on the continued good will of another sovereign state.
For too great a disproportion of strength undermines self-
restraint in the powerful and induces in the weak the irre-
sponsibility brought about by the consciousness that events
cannot be affected by one's actions.

This then was the problem of the statesmen who
created the Vienna settlement and of Metternich on whom fell
the main burden of organizing Germany. No one familiar with
European history could be blind to the fact that the greatest
threat to European tranquillity was the existence of an im-
potent Central Europe which would whet the ambitions of the
two great continental powers: France in the West and Russia
in the East. Four generations of French rulers had used the
dissensions of Germany to expand France's power and Russia
had exploited each such opportunity to advance further into
Europe. But equally a too powerful Germany might bring about
the very coalition of Russia and France which had proved so
pernicious to the peace of Europe heretofore. Metternich
therefore sought to create a Central Europe strong enough to
resist attacks from both the East and the West, but not so
powerful as to disquiet its neighbors; sufficiently unified
to be able to mobilize its forces but not so centralist as to

to be able to modify its forces but not to centralize so to
bowlout so to gratulate its neighbors; sufficiently unified
realist attacks from both the East and the West, but not so
therefore sought to create a Central Europe strong enough to
bemotives to the base of Europe therefore. Metternich
the very coalition of Russia and France which had proved so
Europe. But equally a too bowerful Germany might print apart
had exploited each and every opportunity to advance further into
disturbances of Germany to expand France's power and Russia
in the East. Four generations of French rulers had used the
two Great continental powers: France in the West and Russia's
botent Central Europe which would meet the ambitions of the
threat to European tranquillity was the existence of an im-
European history could be found to the fact that the greatest
the main purport of organizing Germany. No one familiar with
created the Vienna settlement and of Metternich on whom he fell
This then was the problem of the statements who
cannot be affected by one's actions.
abundant power brought about by the consonance that events
restrain in the bowerful and induce in the weak the irrat-
ion too Great a disorientation of strength underlies a self-
tiredly on the continued good will of another sovereign state.
will seeopt a settlement in which its survival depends en-
harmony of the domestic notions of justice, no major power
"understand" each other. But no matter what the degree of
the degree of compatibility which will permit statements to

- 2 -

- 6 -

overthrow its historic components and thereby put into question
the legitimization of the settlement. However cumbersome the
machinery of the German Confederation and however little it
corresponded to the predominant trends of the century, it was
well designed for the task that had been set for it. The very
intricacy of its structure guaranteed that united action could
be brought about only by an overriding danger. And even the
barest acquaintance with its constitutional arrangements could
leave no doubt among its neighbors that the German Confedera-
tion might prove a formidable enemy in a defensive war but that
it was incapable of engaging in any aggressive action. The
German Confederation, then, was the macrocosm of the Vienna
settlement. Like the international order it epitomized, its
stability depended on the general acceptance of the sanctity
of historical rule and the balance of forces within. As long
as Prussia remained convinced that its chief threat was do-
mestic upheave it would accept the fetters of institutions
so foreign to its expansionist ethos. And as long as the
minor German states saw in the Hapsburg dynasty the guarantee
of their legitimacy, Austrian leadership of the Confederation
was assured.

Thus Austria's position within the Confederation was
no stronger than its moral influence. For Austria was not
wellplaced geographically to attempt the physical domination
of Germany nor were her resources adequate to that task. In
the protection of the dynasties against the popular will, in

["the protection of the dynamics against the barbarian will, in\nof Germany nor were her reasons adequate to that task. In\nwellplaced biographical to attempt the historical domination\nno stronger than its moral influence. For Austria was not", "Thus Austria's reaction within the Confederation was\nwas assumed.", "of their legitimacy, Austrian leadership of the Confederation\nminor German states saw in the Habsburg dynasty the guarantee\nso foreign to its expansionist egoism. And so long as the\nmeioticभारतीय तथा उत्कृष्ट तथा अनुभव तोड़का तोड़का\nसामाजिक राष्ट्रीय तथा अनुभव तोड़का त

- 7 -

the guarantee of the secondary states against the claims of power
resided the moral strength of Austria's position. But whatever
else the events of 1848 had demonstrated they had shattered the
myth of the self-evidence of Austria's leadership. The German
Confederation had proved unable to stem the revolutionary tide
and in their hour of greatest need the secondary states had seen
the Austrian Empire totally absorbed in its own domestic dilemmas.
More, the specter of a unified, national Germany had emerged
with Prussia as its representative and its failure was due as
much to the irresolution of the Prussian monarch as to the be-
lated Austrian opposition. Nothing could eradicate the memory
of those years which had made clear that the German Confederation
was kept in being primarily by the self-restraint of Prussia.

Nor was Austria's policy designed to heal the wounds
of the past. Having humiliated Prussia with the aid of the
Tsar, it overlooked that victory is not the end of policy but
its condition. Not content with having averted disaster,
Schwarzenburg sought to transform Austria's embarrassments into
an asset by formalizing Prussia's secondary status within the
Confederation. No face-saving formula was offered to Prussia
after Olmutz; not even the formal concession of sharing the
Presidency of the Confederation was vouchsafed to the state
which but for the vacillations of its monarch might have emerged
as the leader of a unified Germany. But however it might try,
Austria could not return to the situation of before 1848 by an

Anatolia could not return to the situation of before 1848 by so
as the leader of a united Germany. But however it might try,
which put for the alterations of its monarch might have emerged
prevalency of the Confederation was vouchsailed to the state
after Olmutz; not even the formal concession of sharing the
Confederation. No face-saving formula was offered to Prussia
an asset by formulating Prussia's secondary status within the
Schwarzburg sought to transform Anatolia's emballaments into
its condition. Not content with having averted disaster,
Tartars, it overlooked that victory is not the end of belief put
of the beat. Having annihilated Prussia with the aid of the
Non was Anatolia's policy designed to heal the wounds

was kept in being gradually by the self-restraint of Prussia.
of those years which had made clear that the German Confederation
faced Austrian opposition. Nothing could erode the memory
much to the irrefutation of the Prussian monarch as to the pe-
with Prussia as its representative and its failure was due as
More, the abjector of a united, national Germany had emerged
the Austrian Empire totally absorbed in its own domestic dilemmas.
and in their hour of greatest need the secondary states had seen
Confederation had proved unable to stem the revolutionary tide
which of the self-evidence of Austria's leadership. The German
ease the events of 1848 had demonstrated they had shattered the
reformed the moral strength of Austria's position. But whatever
the guarantee of the secondary states against the claims of power

- 1 -

- 8 -

act of will. Although the Assembly of the Confederation met
again in Frankfurt in 1851 after an interruption of nearly
three years as if nothing had happened, it had lost its spont-
taneity. And although all members were vociferous in their
protestations of the unity of conservative interest, they
could never quite lose the consciousness of being at the edge
of a precipice.

And the new Prussian ambassador who appeared in Frank-
furt in June 1851 could only add to their uneasiness. Bis-
marek might have been selected over the heads of a score of
senior Prussia diplomats, because of the believe of the
"Camarilla" that he wouldprove as uncompromising a fighter of
the revolution in Frankfurt as he had in Berlin. But they had
failed to understand that Prussia's very success in defeating
the revolution domestically freed their protege to conduct a
policy abroad of realizing his vision of Prussia's historic
mission. As Bismarck had already announced in his speech de-
fending Olmutz, he considered egotism the only possible basis
of policy and Prussia's greatness the sole justification for
its diplomacy. The basic unit of Bismarck's thinking was the
state, not as an historic unit restrained by the maxims of
legitimacy as Metternich had imagined, but in the Spinozist
sense of <u>conatus</u>, of preservering in its own being to the limit
of its real strength. And it was the statement's task to guage
correctly the power of the state entrusted to his care in re-
lation to that of other states. To conduct a policy beyond

To conduct a boltoł beyond
convenience of other states. To conduct a boltoł beyond
the power of the state entrusted to its care in re-
mark, not as an independent unit, but as the maximum of
its dibomach. The base unit of Biamarok's thinking was the
boltoł and Prunata's greatness the sole justification for
ending Olmutz, he considered Skotiam the only possible base
mission. As Biamarok had already announced in his abovemento-
boltoł spread of resulting fire axion of Prunata's historic
revolution homogenously freed their brocade to conduct a
failed to understand that Prunata's very success in defeating
the revolution in Brankut as he had in Berlin. But they had
"Camarilla" that he would prove an uncombining a lighter of
senior Prunata dibomata, because of the perfidy of the
warrior might have been selected over the heads of a score of
Brankut in June 1821 could only add to their unseasiness. Bi-
And the new Prussian ambassador who abhorred in Brank-
ot a breath.

Could never quite lose the consciousness of being at the edge
protestations of the unity of conservative interest, their
tantivity. And although all members were vocalous in their
tirees born as it nothing had happened, it had left its abou-
again in Brankut in 1821 after an interruption of nearly
set at will. Although the Assemblée of the Confederation met

- 8 -

- 9 -

the resources of the state was suicidal, but to fail to realize its full potentialities was at best foolish. ¹ There was no likelihood that Bismarck would play the role assigned to Prussia in the "Metternich system," to fail to utilize its superior position for the sake of an illusory legitimacy. To Metternich the stability of international order had had the quality of a minuet in which the tune prescribed precisely the orbit of the partners. But to Bismarck the tune had lost its compelling quality; he saw the international order as a statistical balance of forces in flux, more akin to the impact on each other of atomic particles impelled by their inner dynamism whose pressures if properly arranged tended to cancel each other out. Policy, therefore, was the art of the possible; the science of the relative. ²

Bismarck's very first reports indicated that no sentiment of reverence for a venerable institution would becloud his judgment of Prussia's opportunities: "Count Thun", he wrote regarding his Austrian colleague, the President of the Assembly, "affects collegiate manners, mixed with a touch of the Viennese roue. For the sins which he may commit in this latter capacity he attempts to compensate by the strict observance of the prescriptions of the Catholic Church. He dances passionately from 10 at night until 5 in the morning and flirts with the pretty ladies of the bourgeoisie with an ostentation which gives rise to the thought that he is more concerned with the impact on the spectator than with his own
1. On Bismarck's view of the state, see Zechlin, p. 93 f.

2. W.I.

S. M.T.

I. On Bramarck's view of the state, see Secellu, b. 33 t.
concerned with the impact on the abacus than with his own
orientation which gives rise to the thought that he is more
and less with the brettly ladies of the pompeiiate with an
discipline baronately from 10 at night until 2 in the morning
opariance of the prescriptions of the Catholic Church. He
took latter capacity he attempts to combine with the strict
of the Avicennae none. For the aims which he may commit in
the Vaasemyr, "affects colleague manners" mixed with a touch
he wrote regarding his Austrian colleague, the President of
the judgment of Bruxa's obITUmities: "Count Tinn".
sentiment of reverence for a venerable institution would pe-
Bramarck's very first reports indicated that no
boastful the science of the relative.

2. of each other out. Policy, therefore, was the art of the
dynamism whose brevания it properly arranged tended to can-
void on each other of atomic barbitures indelible by their further
at statistical balance of forces in flux, more skil to the im-
its compelling duality: he saw the international order as a
the orbit of the baryna. But to Bramarck the tune had lost
duality of a minuet in which the tune prescribed brieferly
Metternich the stability of international order had had the
anterior position for the sake of an inflammatory rigidity. To
bruxis in the "Metternich atom," to fail to utilize its
no likelihood that Bramarck would play the role assigned to
its full potentialities was at best foolish. There was
the resources of the state was unselfish, but to fail to real-

- 2 -

- 10 -

pleasure."³ "Count Thun presides," he reported soon thereafter, "and since he does not look at the documents beforehand he acquaints himself with them by reading them aloud to the Assembly, an operation which sometimes requires several hours. And while the count reads with an enviable lung-power, Herr von Scheele falls asleep, Herr von Nostiz, just like a school-boy, reads a book on his knees underneath the table, and General Xylander, next to me, draws new and fantastic cannons on his blotting paper."⁴

The man who in his youth had written that he would never be able to tolerate superiors was not now prepared to sanction the preeminence of another power by an act of Prussian forebearance. No measure was trivial enough for him to demonstrate that Prussian cooperation was not a matter of course, that it had to be purchased by an "equivalent," a favorite Bismarck word. And neither the ties of nationality nor those of legitimacy would suffice to placate him, only a tangible increase in Prussia's power or prestige. "We can do many a favor for Austria," he wrote, "as long as we do not do it for nothing."⁵ Austria was a confederate and an ally only to the extent that it gave Prussia a veto over its actions. The intricate Metternich system was thus put to a test beyond its capacity because it had been designed to avert, but not to withstand a revolutionary contest.

3. W. I., p. 3, May 26, 1851.

4. W. I., p. 39, September 6, 1851.

5. W. I., p.

2. M. I., b.

4. M. I., b. 39, September 6, 1821.

3. W. I., b. 3, May 5d, 1821.

sawent, but not to withstand a revolutionary contest.
test beyond its capacity because it had been designed to
actions. The intricate Metternich system was thus but to a
suff only to the extent that it gave Prussia a veto over its
not do it for nothing."²
Anatolia was a confederate and an
so many a favor for Anatolia," he wrote, "as long as we do
tangible increase in Prussia's power or breath." We can
not phone or legibly would autograph to breathe him, or
a favorite Bismarck word. And neither the ties of nationality
course, that it had to be purchased by an "edulousent," a
demonstrate that Prussian cooperation was not a matter of
eternal coexistence. No measure was trivial enough for him to
anacton the breemineuce of another power by an act of bana-
never be able to tolerate anbertors was not now prepared to
The man who in his youth had written that he would
fantastic canons on his plotting baber."⁴

the table, and General Xylander, next to me, draw me now and
that like a school-pool, reaches a pool on his knees numerous
trium-bower, Herr von Scheele, tilts saleeb, Herr von Moellix,
several pome. And while the count reaches with an envious
hand he insubtintas himself with them by reading them a long
stutter, "and since he does not look at the documents before-
blessame."³ "Count Tymn breages," he reported soon there-
- 10 -

(M)

- 11 -

In these circumstances Bismarck's earliest en-
counters with his Austrian colleague were characterized by
a sharpness heretofore unknown in the pedantic deliberations
of the German Confederation. When on the occasion of their
first meeting Thun greeted Bismarck in shirtsleeves, Bis-
marck immediately countered by taking off his coat with the
statement: "I agree, it is hot in here." And when Thun exer-
cised one of the petty prerogatives of the Presidency, that
he alone was permitted to smoke at meetings of the Assembly,
Bismarck eliminated this tradition by the simple expedient
of taking out a cigar and lighting it.

And this policy of pinpricks was carried over into
the discussion of substantive issues. The Confederation had
known disputes before, but it had always been assumed that
the requirement of unity outweighed all other considerations.
It was true enough, as Bismarck never ceased insisting, that
up to 1848 decisions had rarely been taken by a majority and
almost never against one of the major powers. But the in-
creasing use of such a procedure after 1851 was due as much to
the intransigence of the Prussian envoy as to the desire he
tended to ascribe to Austria to humiliate Prussia. For Bis-
marck had not come to Frankfurt to pay deference to a unity
that had proved illusory in 1848. "We will obtain results
less from the good intentions of our friends than by unyielding
perseverance in our decisions,"⁶ he wrote in one of his very
first reports. With such an attitude Prussia in effect re-

6. W. I., p. 22, July 3, 1851.

C. W. R., b. 25. July 3, 1821.

first reports. With each an attitude toward in effect re-
assurance in our decations," he wrote in one of his very
less from the good intentions of our friends than by underlying
that had proved invalid in 1848. "We will obtain results
which had not come to Frankfurt to bad reference to a nation
tended to score to Anatria to annihilate Prussia. For Bia-
the intransigence of the Prussian environs as to the desire he
creating one of each a procedure after 1821 was one as much to
almost never against one of the major powers. But the in-
out to 1848 decations had rarely been taken by a majority and
It was true enough, as Biamarck never ceased fighting, that
the requirement of unity outweighed all other considerations.
known debts before, but it had already been summed up that
the discussion of independent issues. The Confederation had
And this policy of bismarck was carried over into
of taking out a cigar and fighting it.

Bismarck eliminated this tradition by the simple expedient
he alone was permitted to smoke at meetings of the Assembly,
caused one of the betty brerogetives of the Preussich, that
statement: "I agree, it is not in here." And when Tum exer-
march immediately countered by taking out his coat with the
first meeting Tum greeted Bismarck inșiάτεενα, Bia-
of the German Confederation. When on the occasion of their
a serenity percolate unknown in the beguile defilements
counters with his Austrian colleague were characterized by
In these circumstances Bismarck's exultant en-

- 11 -

- 12 -

served to itself a veto over the decisions of the Assembly
and in practice tended to transform the German Confederation
into an extension of Prussian policy. Until Bismarck appeared
in Frankfurt, it had been believed that the continued exist-
ence of the Confederation was more important than any momen-
tary disputes and that none of the German states was strong
enough to stand alone. But this very postulate was denied by
the new Prussian envoy; in fact, he used it as a negotiating
weapon to bring the other powers to heel: "I do not believe I
am mistaken if I assume that sooner or later we will come to
regard the Confederation as a tool for certain police or mil-
itary measures, but that we will renounce pursuing an organic
German policy in it while seeking satisfaction for the latter
by means of separate arrangements ... in the territory geography
has reserved for us ... Every minor court seems to expect much
from the Assembly while doing very little in return ... An
agreement to our proposals is obtainable only after I hint
that, Prussia, if it encounters unnecessary opposition, might
retire within its own center of gravity. The threat of such
eventualities ... gives us the negotiating weapons which we
must substitute for the lack of understanding of our common
interests on the part of our allies. We have no right to ex-
pect anything from their good will; the limit of their cooper-
ation will on the contrary be traced by the advantages or dis-
advantages which it is in our power to promise or to threaten."⁷

7. W. I., p. 17, June 29, 1851.

J. W. I., b. 11. June 50, 1821.

advantages which it has in our power to brown or to threaten."¹⁴

The�at will on the contrary be traced by the advantages or dis-
advantages of the part of our allies. We have no right to ex-
press our opinion on the lack of understanding of our common
eventualities ... Given the negotiating weapons which we
retire within its own center of gravity. The threat of an
enactment, it it encounters unnecessarily obsequious, might
agreement to our proposals in optimal scope only after I put
from the Assemblay while going very little in return ... An
has reserved for us ... Every minor count seems to expect much
of means of abating arrangements ... in the territorial geography
German border in it while seeking accommodation for the latter
itsy means, but that we will renounce burning an ongoing
regard the Confederation as a tool for certain border or will-
sum mistaken. It is assumed that sooner or later we will come to
reason to bring the other powers to heel: "I do not believe I
the new Prussian enemy in fact, he need it as a negotiating
enough to stand alone. But this very boastful was denied by
fury diabolus and that none of the German states was a strong
ence of the Confederation was more important than any women-
in Frankfurt, it has been believed that the continued exist-
ing to an extension of Prussian border. Until Bismarck abdicated
and in practice tended to transform the German Confederation
served to itself a veto over the decisions of the Assemblay

- 15 -

- 13 -

Here barely four weeks after his arrival in Frankfurt, in one of those reports to the Minister-President Manteuffel which leave open the question who is the superior and who the subordinate, Bismarck revealed his conception of Prussia's foreign policy. The unity of conservative interests might be invoked in these reports, but only as a token of good faith and always in connection with a proposal which could only weaken the Confederate ties. The more the superior claims of Confederate unity could be eliminated, the more telling Prussia's greater strength would become. And the more the tenuousness of Austria's pre-eminence could be demonstrated, the nearer Prussia could come to its goal of hegemony. Of course, none of these aims were avowed directly; Bismarck did not have sufficient confidence in the daring of his own government for that. But the very insecurity of the Manteuffel ministry and the vacillations of the king, gave the greater scope to a determined ambassador with his own ideas. Thus there began at Frankfurt what amounted to a diplomatic civil war, none the less bitter for being conducted amidst protestations of Confedereate unity. For this, it became soon apparent, was not a dispute about specific grievances but about the whole nature of Confederate relationships. Bismarck might insist that no major power could submit to the majority of the vote of a diplomatic assembly composed primarily of the states of the second order. But his tactics left the Assembly no other choice, except to confess its bankruptcy. No issue was too small for

except to confuse its bankrobbery. No finance was too small for
second order. But his tactics fell the Vassarly no other choice,
a diplomatic asymmetry composed primarily of the states of the
that no major power could admit to the majority of the vote of
nature of Confederate relationships. Bismarck might insist
not a debate about specific Grievances but about the whole
Confederate unity. For this, it became soon apparent, was
the less bitter for being conducted amid protestations of
gain at Frankfurt what amounted to a diplomatic cession was,
none to a determined ambassador with his own ideas. Thus there pe-
fatly and the oscillations of the King, gave the greater scope
ment for that. But the very inconstancy of the Mantiellie min-
not have sufficient confidence in the daring of his own govern-
congress, none of these aims were avowed directly. Bismarck did
the nearer Prussia could come to its goal of hegemony. Of
tensionness of Austria's pre-eminence could be demonstrated,
Prussia's greater strength would become. And the more true
of Confederate unity could be eliminated, the more telling
onlywenken the Confederate ties. The more the underlor claims
might be invoked in these reports, put only as a token of
Prussia's foreign policy. The unity of conservative interests
and who the subordinate, Bismarck revealed his conception of
Mantellie, which leave open the question who is the underlor
gent, in one of those reports to the Minister-President

Here pretty long weeks after his arrival in Frank-

- 13 -

(M)

- 14 -

Bismarck not to contest it with a tenacity more appropriate
to a courtroom than to a diplomatic congress and with a mas-
tery of procedural detail which hamstrung his opponents in
their own frustration. Whether the problem concerned the
power of the Presidium to receive foreign envoys without ob-
taining for each case the concurrence of all the other powers
or whether it dealt with the location of the troops guarding
the Assembly; whether the Assembly considered the composition
of the committee which passed on the publication of its de-
bates or the German fleet, in each instance it could expect
an untiring effort to exact the maximum advantage for Prussia,
an ironic attack on the supposed claims of German nationality,
"which meant something else to whoever uses the term," a
Prussian agreement only after a contest which foreshadowed
a later Prussian claim. 8

And Bismarck proved all the more effective for ap-
pearing to his adversaries as an offense against reality.
Trained in the traditions of cabinet diplomacy, they had
learned to ameliorate, to avoid unbridgeable schisms, to keep
disputes within the limits set by the consciousness of a con-
tinuing relationship. That a diplomat might use the letter
of treaties to defeat their spirit was not unknown, but that
in the process he would leave no consequence undrawn, no op-
portunity lost to demonstrate his opponent's impotence, this
was something Europe had not experienced since the French

8. See f.e., W. I., p. 32, p. 37, p. 51.

8. See t.e. M. I., b. 35, b. 31, b. 21.

was something Eurobóle had not experienced since the French
diplomacy lost to demonstrate his obsolescence, this
in the process he would leave no consequence (nouveau), no ob-
ot of treaties to defeat their spirit was not unknown, but that
tinuing relationship. That a diplomat might see the letter
disgrace within the limits set by the consciousness of a con-
learned to ameliorate, to avoid unprudential sanctions, to keep
trained in the traditions of capital (diplomacy), they had
bearing to his adventures as an outlet against reality.

And Biamarck proved all the more effective for ab-
senting Prussia's claim.

Prussia's agreement only after a contest which tore apart
"which meant something else to whoever was the term," a
anenko attack on the unsubstantiated claims of German nationality,
an uniting effort to exact the maximum advantage for Prussia,
popes or the German fleet, in each instance it could expect
of the committee which based on the buplication of its de-
the Assembly, whether the Assembly considered the combination
or whether it dealt with the location of the troops basing
taining for each case the concurrence of all the other powers
beneath the precept to receive foreign envoys without op-
their own transmission. Whether the problem concerned the
terms of procedural retail which hampered his obsolescence in
to a courtroom than to a diplomatic congress and with a mas-
biamarck not to contest it with a tendency more appropriate

- 14 -

- 15 -

Revolution. Not even success satisfied Bismarck, unless it
had its proper legitimization, unless it occurred in the
name of Prussia's power. No wonder that the other delegates
in Frankfurt were at a complete loss how to deal with their
demonic Prussian colleague, whose physical vitality and ex-
traordinary debating skill transformed all issues into bitter
contests of strength. Nor that they were even more baffled
by their first acquaintance with one of Bismarck's most
characteristic tactics, his tendency to tell his adversary
his real intentions. To be sure Bismarck was well capable
to obscure his aims in the best traditions of cabinet diplom-
acy, but he used these traditions even more effectively by
violating them, certain that this would confuse his opponents
even more effectively. "I confront the would-be shrewdness
of the diplomats with the astounding truth,"⁹ he said once.

Bismarck was given his opportunity by the pedantic ef-
forts of his colleagues to restore him to "reason," as if only
a misapprehension of reality could account for his impetuosity.
But their effort to divine Bismarck's "ture" grievance only
led to a sharper formulation of his claim of Prussian domi-
nance. When the Saxon envoy expressed his misgivings in the
understatement that apparently Prussia was not interested in
revitalizing the institutions of the Confederation, Bismarck not
only agreed but elaborated on it. The behavior of the majority
of the governments, he insisted, was not such that Prussia

9. Zechlin, p. 125.

["6. Neocirin, b. 152.", "of the Governments, he initiated, was not used that Prussia\nonly agreed put evaporated on it. The behavior of the majority\nrevitalizing the institutions of the Confederation, Bismarck not\nunderstatement that abhorrently Prussia was not interested in\nnuance. When the Saxon envoy expressed his expectations in the\nled to a harsh termination of his claim of Prussian dom-\nBut their effort to divine Bismarck's "tune" Erreavance only\na misbreveuation of reality could account for his imbecility.\ntorts of his colleagues to restore him to \"reason,\" as it only\nBismarck was given his opportunity by the beguile of el-", "of the diphnomata with the accompanying truism,\" he said once,\neven more effectively. \"I controul the would-be answerness\nviolating them, certain that this would continue his obsoles-\nsion, put he need these traditions even more effectively by\nto open up his aims in the past traditions of cabinet diplo-\nmacy real intentions. To be sure Bismarck was well capable\ncharacteristic tactics, his tendency to sell his adversary\nby their first coosistance with one of Bismarck's most\ncontends of strength. Nor that they were even more pugnac-\ntr逳ingly depositing skill transmogrified all issues into bitter\ngeneric Prussian colleague, whose basic attack and ex-\nin Frankfurt were at a complete loss how to deal with their\nname of Prussia's power. No wonder that the other delegates\nhad its brother legitimization, unless it occurred in the\nRevolution. Not even success satisfied Bismarck, unless it", "- 12 -", "(A)"]

- 16 -

could feel encouraged to give a majority of them a greater
influence on its decisions than heretofore.¹⁰ In short,
the road to strengthening the Confederation lay by way of
Prussian hegemony. And lest this point be missed at Berlin,
Bismarck's report of the conversation contained the follow-
ing plastic phrase: "I cannot deny that I do not consider
the Assembly of the Confederation in its present shape as
the last word of our foreign policy. On the contrary, I see
in it only a husk within which the healthy and practical ele-
ments of our national policy can mature and which will fall
off by itself when the kernel is ripe."¹¹

Bismarck's behavior at Frankfurt had not been an
accident, then, nor due to inexperience as so many of his
colleagues believed but the reflection of a sober calculation.
Nor was it based on any illusions about the nature of his
real antagonist. That Austrian influence in Germany had to
be broken if Prussia was to play the role Bismarck had re-
served for it, could not be doubted by anyone who had under-
stood recent history. But Bismarck was not the man for rash
adventures. The postulate of the reality of power meant not
only that power should be used when the moment was propitious
but also that it should be kept in abeyance until that time.
Just as he had opposed a German constitution which would have
diluted Prussia's essence, because he was certain the oppor-
tunity would recur, just as he had supported Olmutz because

10. W. I., p. 98. November 19, 1851.

11. W. I., p. 99, November 19, 1851.

IT. M. I., b. 69. November 19, 1821.
10. W. I., b. 68. November 19, 1821.

unify would result, that as he had undertaken Olmütz because
inflicted Prussia's essence, because he was certain the obser-
ving that as he had obviated a German constitution which would have
put also that it should be kept in suspense until that time,
only that power should be used when the moment was propitious
adventures. The抱tustate of the reality of power meant not
at all recent history. But Bismarck was not the man for such
served for it, could not be composed by anyone who had under-
peaked into Prussia was to break the role Bismarck had re-
alized autocratist. That Austrian influence in Germany had to
Nor was it passed on any influences apart the nature of his
collaborates believed put the reflection of a proper orientation
incident, then, nor due to experience as so much of his
Bismarck's behavior at Frankfurt had not been an
out of itself when the kernel is taken.
If
ments of our national policy can mature and which will fall
in it only a peak within which the health and practical ele-
the last word of our foreign policy. On the contrary, I see
the Anabaptism of the Confederation in its present stage as
ing biologic basis: "I cannot deny that I do not consider
Bismarck's report of the conversation containing the following
Prussian hegemony. And feel this point be made at Berlin,
the road to strengthening the Confederation is via way of
influence on its decisions than perestroika." In short,
could feel encouraged to give a majority of them a greater

- 10 -

- 17 -

the time was not yet ripe for a showdown, so he now concluded
his dispatch with a renunciation which nothing could deprive,
however, of its ominous rumblings: "As long as the present
political situation vis-a-vis the revolution commands close
cooperation with Austria ... and therefore a prorogation of
the _inevitable_ disputes, we are probably under the necessity
not to _reveal_ (my italics) plans which might threaten our al-
liance with Austria." The only concession, then, was against
>_avowing_ Prussia's ambitions and even this was qualified by an
insistence on the strictest reciprocity: "Should this not
happen / the reciprocity/, I would let myself only be guided
by the undeniable fact, that in the near future the Imperial
Cabinet will require the Prussian alliance to a higher degree
...than we the Austrian".

Here was the first hint that Prussia should utilize
Austria's European involvements to profit within Germany. The
international situation was still tranquil, however; the op-
portunity for an open showdown not yet at hand. But if Aus-
tria's German position could not be overthrown by direct as-
sault it might be eroded by a continuation of the wearing-
down process of utilizing the machinery of the Confederation
to paralyze it. Count Thun, who had expected an ally and
suddenly found himself confronted by an antagonist whose as-
saults were all the more telling because they almost invariably
were conducted under the color of formal right, now attempted
to reassure his Prussian colleague. The predominant influence

["to reassure his Prussian allies. The predominant influence\nwere conducted under the color of formal right, now attempted\nas units were all the more tefiling because they almost invariaibly\nannually found himself confronted by an autocrat whose as-\nto barrelize it. Count Thun, who had expected an exit and\ndown procedure of utilizing the machinery of the Confederation\nasult it might be eroded by a continuation of the wearing-\ntria's German succession could not be overthrown by direct au-\nbority for an open showdown not yet at hand. But it was-\ninternational situation was still turbulent, however, the ob-\nAnatolia's European involvements to broil within Germany. The\nHere was the first hint that Prussia should utilize\n...than we the Austrian\".", "Capitol will require the Prussian alliance to a higher degree\nby the undeniable fact, that in the near future the Imperial\nhappen the reciprocity. I would let wheat only be bridged\ninsistence on the strictest reciprocity: \"Should this not\nshowing Prussia's ambitions and even this was unshifted by an\nFrance with Anatolia.\" The only concession, then, was against\nnot to reveal (my italics) plans which might threaten our af-\nthe inevitable drabness, we are properly under the necessity\ncooperation with Anatolia ... and therefore a brocade of\npolitical situation via-s-via the revolution commands close\nhowever, of its 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- 18 -

of Austria, he asserted, did not result from any selfish de-
signs but was the result of history; it was natural as long
as Austria conducted a selfless policy within Germany. It
was Prussia's task to show a similar degree of forbearance
and to renounce the heritage of Frederick the Great. These
were the axioms of the "Metternich system" and since they had
proved infallible for over a generation, Thun can be forgiven
for repating them. But he could hardly have used them on a
more unlikely subject. Selflessness in politics to Bismarck
was either hypocrisy or stupidity and Frederick the Great the
epitome of a Prussian sovereign, precisely because he had
known no other guide for his policy than the national interest
of Prussia. Bismarck therefore replied coolly that the exist-
ence of Prussia was a fact, perhaps regrettable but above all
unchangeable. And it was the task of the statesman, he con-
tinued, to calculate with facts, not with ideals. A Prussian
which renounced the heritage of Frederick the Great did not exist
and rather than advise his government to pursue such a policy,
he would prefer a contest at arms. And when Thun attempted to
make light of the threat by comparing Prussia to a man who
has once won a lottery and now arranges his affairs in antic-
ipation of a yearly repetition of that event, Bismarck reiter-
ated his warning: "If these same views are held in Vienna,
then I foresee that Prussia might have to try its luck again
in that lottery; whether we win will be in the hands of God."¹²

12. W. I. p. 104, November 1851.

15. W. I. b. 104, November 1821.

in that lottery? whether we win will be in the panda of God." "IS
then I losesee that Prunais might have to try its luck again
said his warning: "It these same views are held in Aifena,
ibation of a heavy repetition of that event," Bramarok reiter-
has once won a lottery and now arranges his affairs in auto-
make fight of the current p& comparing Prunais to a man who
he would brelen a contest at arms. And when Tinn attempted to
and rather than advice his Government to burrate ane a boffey,
which renounced the heritage of Frederik the Great did not exist
tinued, to calculate with tata, not with ideala. A Prunais
unchangesable. And it was the task of the statesman, he con-
ence of Prunais was a tao, boraas regrettable but spoke all
of Prunais. Bramarok therefore rebified accordingly that the exis-
known no other guide for his boffey than the national interest
ebitome of a Prunais sovereign, breciafa because he had
was either hydrocarby or anubidity and Frederik the Great the
more unifex anpeet. Beifeneasen in boffice to Bramarok
tor rebating them. But he could hardly have need them on a
brought intafliple tor over a Generation? Tinn can be longives
were the axioms of the "Metterich system" and since they had
and to renounce the heritage of Frederik the Great. These
was Prunais's task to show a similar degree of tolerance
as Vatniria conducted a selfless boffey within Germany. It
signs put was the result of history! It was natural as long
of Vatniria, he asserted, did not result from such selfden-

- 18 -

- 19 -

Thun's nerves did not prove equal to this never-ending contest. In his impotent frustration he increasingly tended to lose his temper and thereby merely played into Bismarck's hands. Matters finally came to a head in an exchange of letters which became the model of many similar encounters between Bismarck and Austrian statesmen incapable of believing that Bismarck might mean what he said and clutching at straws in their effort to stave off the doom of their Empire. The occasion for the exchange was one of the issues left over from the revolution of 1848 which in the nature of things could not be solved without Prussia's good will and which was therefore ideally suited for dilatory tactics: the German fleet, which it had been created in 1848 as the expression of the national enthusiasm of those days. Since Austria had been absorbed in its own affairs it had made no financial contribution, while Prussia had provided nearly half its budget. It was therefore a nice juridical question whether the fleet was the property of the Confederation or of the individual states which had financed it. It was natural that Austria with its majority of the Assembly votes should insist on the former solution while Bismarck argued for either the dissolution of the fleet and its division among the states in proportion to their contribution or, alternatively, for the creation of a North German Naval League to the exclusion of Austria. But since Bismarck denied the competence of the Confederation to make any arrangement without Prussian concurrence, his dilatory tactics could only end in the

Russian concurrence, its dilatory tactics could only end in the
competence of the Confederation to make any arrangement without
to the exaltation of Anatria. But since Bismarck quelled the
ceremonially, for the creation of a North German Naval League
among the states in proportion to their contribution on, si-
gned for either the dissolution of the fleet and its division
voting should float on the former solution while Bismarck
was natural that Anatria with its majority of the Vassal
tion or of the individual states which had financed it. If
direction whether the fleet was the property of the Confeder-
nearly half its budget. It was therefore a nice truism that
had made no financial contribution, while Prussia had provided
days. Since Anatria had been apportioned in its own shares it
in 1848 as the expression of the national entumnamum of those
dilatory tactics: the German fleet, which it had been created
Prussia's a good will and which was therefore ideally suited for
1848 which in the nature of things could not be solved without
enquiry was one of the fews felt over from the revolution of
acte ot the doom of their Empire. The occasion for the ex-
mean what he said and confiding at arms in their effort to
Vatrian statesmen incapable of believing that Bismarck might
become the model of many similar encounters between Bismarck and
Matters tinsify come to a head in an exchange of letters which
Joachia via tember and thereto merely blazed into Bismarck's hand.
content. In his immanent transmission he increasingly tended to
Tum's nerves did not prove equal to this never-ending

- 13 -

- 20 -

financial strangulation of the fleet. For the budget of the
Confederation depended on the contribution of its members
and it was another interesting juridical question whether its
various items could be voted by a majority or required unani-
mity. In order to evade this problem a majority of the Assem-
bly voted to float a loan with the house of Rothschild to
pay the complement of the fleet until the question of its
ownership had been settled,

Up to this point the dispute had gone a normal
course: a debate of almost theological subtlety, a tenacious
Prussian opposition not free of the threat of leaving the
Confederation¹⁴ and finally a majority decision for a make-
shift solution to gain time for Prussia to return to reason.
But Bismarck's reaction to this procedure was individual and
unforeseeable and it could not have made clearer his disdain
for an institution which attempted to substitute quasi-
parliamentary resolutions for the reality of power-relation-
ships. He learned of the decision in Berlin where he attended
a meeting of the Parliament in which he still held a seat. He
was furious, for to solve the financial problems of the fleet
even temporarily deprived Prussia of its most effective ne-
gotiating weapon. But instead of protesting to the Assembly
or to its President, he directed his wrath at the innocent by-
stander, the House of Rothschild. A Prussian official was
dispatched to the Rothschilds with a stern warning that they

13. For good summary of dispute, see EYK, I., p. 194f.

14. See f.e., W. I., p. 113.

14. See I.e., M. I., b. 1f3.

15. For Boog summary of debate, see RAK, I., b. 104t.

diabatoped to the Redneeffs with a clear warning that they
atstand, the House of Redneeff. A Prussian official was
or to its President, he directed his work at the innocent dy-
rotating mewou. But instead of protecting to the Vassemp
even temporarly deprived Prussias of its most effective ne-
was turons, for to solve the financial problems of the fleet
a meeting of the Parliament in which he still held a seat. He
sings. He issued the decision in Berlin where he attended
parliamentary resolutions for the reality of power-relation-
tor an institution which attempted to supplant dual-
unilateralism and it could not have made clearer the debate
But Bismarck's reaction to this procedure was individual and
united solution to gain time for Prussia to return to reason.
Confederation¹⁴ and tinsify a majority decision for a make-
Prussian objection not free of the threat of leaving the
course: a debate of almost theoretical意义, a consensus
up to this point the debate had gone a normal
ownership had been settled.

but the compromise of the fleet until the decision of its
dy voted to float a loan with the House of Redneeff so
mitly. In order to ease this problem a majority of the Vassam-
various items could be voted by a majority or required unan-
and it was another interesting juridical question whether its
Confederation depended on the contribution of its members
financial straggulation of the fleet. For the purpose of the

- 50 -

- 21 -

would be held personally responsible for any losses suffered by Prussia. And in order to complete the demonstration of Austria's impotence, Bismarck used a relic of happier times, the tradition that the Austrian and Prussian ambassadors substitute for each other in their absence, to ask Thun to communicate a copy of his protest to the Assembly.

The indignity that a German government would protest against a decision of the Confederation to a private individual caused Thun to lose all self-control. And his frustration was all the greater, because to react to Bismarck's measure officially would only be to make a Jewish banking-house an equal partner in the deliberations of the Assembly. The result was a personal appeal to Bismarck, plaintive, somewhat helpless, as if the maximum of forebearance on the part of Austria might restore the tranquillity of the period before 1848 and a last desperate effort to remove the causes of a behavior which could only be produced by personal ill-will: "The great confidence I repose in your character and in the righteousness of your views," so Thun's letter began, "causes me to appeal to you at this difficult moment and most confidentially. I beg you to seek in this step neither the President of the Assembly nor the envoy of Austria ... but solely an individual who will leave nothing undone to satisfy his conscience so that later -- however things may turn out -- he may tell himself: The responsibility if not mine." This passive appeal was followed by a long analysis of the issues

theic abbest was followed by a long analysis of the fames
may fell himself: The reasonability it not mine." This be-
conscience so that later -- however things may turn out -- he
an individual who will leave nothing undone to satisfy his
dent of the Asaemply nor the envoy of Anatria ... put solely
gentilly. I beg you to seek in this abe neither the best-
me to abbest to you at this difficult moment and most confi-
righteousness of your views," so Tinn a letter began, "causes
"The Great confidence I reboake in your character and in the
of a pedantor which could only be broquired by a berousf fiff-wiff:
before 1848 and a fast deliberate effort to remove the cause
part of Anatria might restore the tranquillity of the period
somewhat perhapes, as it the maximum of tolerance on the
The result was a berousf abbest to Biamarck, "bienfiea".
home an edual beruer in the deliperations of the Asaemply.
measure offioerlity would only be to make a jeweil parking-
transitration was all the greater," because to reset to Biamarck's
individual caused Tinn into tone all self-control. And his
tat affirming a decision of the Confederation to a brivate
The inquifity that a German Government would bro-
unicate a copy of his protact to the Asaemply.
attribute for each other in their apence, to ask Tinn to com-
the tradition that the Anatrian and Biamarck ampaagons and-
Vauris's imbotence, Biamarck need a reflo of pabber times,
p by Briaais. And in order to complete the demonstration of
would be held berously reasouaple for and fosen anllered

- 51 -

- 22 -

in the debates about the fleet, of the efforts of the Assem-
bly to come to an understanding and culminating in the asser-
tion that Bismarck's attitude was consistent only with a con-
viction that the Assembly would have to obey blindly that
commands of Prussia.

It was clear that Thun advanced this idea as a re-
ductio ad absurdum, which needed only to be exhibited to a
reasonable man for him to recoil before its implications.
But because Bismarck had precisely understood these implica-
tions and indeed desired them, both this phrase as well as its
successor had to remain beside the point: "That things could
ever have reached the point where a German government could
so drag the prestige of the German Confederation through the
mud, that it would protest against a decision of the German
Confederation to a Jew, this will cause me to blush with shame
as long as I live. On the evening that Legationsrat Wentzel
Bismarck's deputy showed me the protest, I could have cried
like a child ... what does Prussia want? As much as I in-
wardly resist it, the answer seems inescapable: that the Con-
federation commit suicide through weakness or subservience
... or that an unhealable breach occur." And Thun concluded
with a plea that he be spared communicating Bismarck's pro-
test to the Assembly: "I implore you to end this unheard-of
anomaly with all means at your disposal."15

But it was to no avail. Thun thought that Bismarck's
actions were the product of a specific grievance or a lack of
15. Kohl, B.J., III, p. 58f, January 15, 1852.

12th. Key, B. P., III, b. 28t, January 12, 1825.

sections were the subject of a specific grievance or a lack of
But it was to no avail. Tinn thought that Bismarck's
anomaly with all means at his disposal."¹²

test to the Anonymity: "I implore you to end this unseemly
with a brief that he be abridged communicating Bismarck's bro-
tering, restating it, the answer seems inexcusable: that the Con-
tention commit an infraction through weakness or unprovokability
and that an unreasonable person can be so bold as to be a
Bismarck's geburth? showed me the benefit. I could have cried
as long as I live. On the evening that Legation at Wetzlar
Constitution to a term, this will cause me to praise with all
my heart the benefit against a decision of the German
no doubt the breath of the German Confederation through the
even has rescued the point where a German Government could
encourage him to remain passive on the point: "That thing could
fiorish and indeed desired them, though this burlesc as well as its
But because Bismarck had broached this topic, these embroils-
reasonable man for him to recall before its implications,
quito ad apuntum, which needed only to be expensed to a
It was clear that Tinn advanced this idea as a re-
commence of brawls.

action that the Anonymity would have to open publicly the
lion that Bismarck's attitude was consistent only with a con-
pit to come to an understanding and eliminating the issue-
in the debate about the free, of the efforts of the Anonym-


- 55 -

(A)

- 23 -

comprehension and that a patient reiteration of the true canons of righteousness might induce Bismarck to return to the pattern of international relations which for over a generation had come to seem "natural." He thus became the first of what grew to be a pattern of Austrian diplomats dealing with Bismarck, who either mistook his tactics for the underlying cause and desperately attempted to mollify him, or who refused to believe that he was serious and insisted on making excuses for him. But, however passionate Bismarck's conduct, it was the product of sober calculation. And however he might protest the injuries done to Prussia, these were merely tactical devices to bring about the more surely Prussian preeminence in Germany. To appeal to Bismarck in the name of legitimacy merely demonstrated the incapacity of stagnant societies to comprehend a revolutionary, for to Bismarck the word _legitimacy_ added nothing to the existing power relationships. And to appeal to Bismarck on the basis of personal good will was to mistake completely his conception of the nature of statesmanship: that the interests of states were determine, that it was the statesman's task to assess them properly and then to achieve them without sentimentality by using all available factors.

For these reasons Bismarck's reply to Thun was therefore more telling in its calm matter-of-factness than the Austrian's pathos. Bismarck began with an insistance that personal feelings had nothing to do with the conduct of policy,

Berausel feelings had nothing to do with the conduct of both
Anatira's baton. Biamarck began with an instance that
bore more telling in its calm matter-of-tactiveness than the
por these reasons Biamarck's reply to Tinn was there-
using all available factors.

broadly and then to achieve them without sentimentality by
terminate, that it was the statesman's task to see sense in them
ture of statesmanship: that the interests of states were de-
GOOQ will be to mistake completely his conception of the us-
peas. And to abeam to Biamarck on the basis of berausel
word *legitimacy* added nothing to the existing power relation-
societies to comprehend a revolutionary, for to Biamarck the
legitimacy merely demonstrated the insubility of at least
eminence in Germany. To abeam to Biamarck in the name of
tactical devices to bring about the more aruly biamarckan bre-
light protest the injuries done to Prussia, these were merely
it was the product of a proper calculation. And however he
exonerates him. But, however balanced Biamarck's conduct,
returned to believe that he was serious and sincere on making
flying cause and deliberately attempted to miffify him, or who
with Biamarck, who either mistook his action for the under-
ot what grew to be a pattern of Austrian diplomat dealing
eration had come to seem "natural." He thus became the first
the pattern of international relations which for over a gen-
canons of righteousness might induce Biamarck to return to
comprehension and that a patient reiteration of the true

eration had come to seem "natural." He thus became the first
to the pattern of international relations which for over a gen-
canons of righteousness might induce Biamarck to return to
comprehension and that a patient reiteration of the true

- 53 -

(M)

- 24 -

and therefore by implication that the opposition between
Austria and Prussia was more fundamental than the opinion
of individuals: "It is my task to conduct Prussian policy,
just as it is yours to advance that of Austria. That these
do not aim for the same results, is a necessity produced by
history, not to be completely eliminated either by ourselves
or by our Cabinets. If you constantly remember this, I am
inclined to believe that our relationship can be freed of
the painful personal impressions you describe, even in the
face of more substantial divergences. Had you been born a
Prussian you would defend the interests of my country with
the same liveliness with which you now oppose them ..."

Every word was chosen for maximum effect in this statement
of seeming conciliation: the basic Austrian-Prussian antago-
nism, the alleged Austrian provocation of Prussia, all de-
livered in the dispassionate tone of a scientist noting re-
grettable data. And in order to underline his argument Bis-
marck concluded his analysis of the point at issue with the
following epigrammatic sentence: "In the system of majority
votes used against a weaker confederate would be merely
unjust; used against us it must break up the Confederation."¹⁶

Here, then, was the proof that Thun's reductio ad
absurdum only reflected the true situation. Bismarck was de-
termined to transform the Confederation into an extension of
16. W. I., p. 128f, January 19, 1852.

Jr. W. I., b. 1861, d. 1925.

treated to transform the Convention into an extension of
spannung only reflected the true situation. Bismarck was ge-
Here, then, was the brook that Tummla's request to ad-
justment; need against us if we must break up the Convention." I'd
vote against a weaker delegate would be merely
to following epigrammatic sentence: "The system of majority
parliament concluded by annulls of the point at issue with the
unattainable data." And in order to underline the argument Bla-
fielded in the debatationate tone of a scientist noting re-
summ, the affected Austrian brocation of Prussia, if ge-
ot ceasing conciliation: the past Austrian-Prussian antago-
Every word was chosen for maximum effect in this statement
the same viveliness with which you now observe them..."

Prussian Bon would belong to the interests of my country with
tact or more substantial divergences. Had Bon been born a
the beautiful personal intuitions Bon describes, even in the
inclined to believe that our relations should be free of
or by our Capitula. It is not constantly remember you, I am
historically, not to be completely eliminated either by our relations
so not aim for the same results, is a necessarily consequent
that as it is known to advance that of Austria. That these
of individuals: "If it is my task to conduct Austrian policy,
Austria and Prussia was more fundamental than the opinion
and therefore by implication that the objection between

- 54 -

- 25 -

Prussian policy, to "command to Germany what should be its constitution,"¹⁷ as he had said earlier. If this was true relations between Austria and Prussia were at best an armistice for Austria could not possibly consent to be excluded from Germany, the source of its historical strength. And in an armistice the rules of war apply with victory going to whoever can use all available resources regardless of whether he approves of them or not. From the very beginning of his stay in Frankfurt Bismarck, therefore, sought to mobilize all the pressures possible against his antagonist, including an appeal to popular currents. His pleas for a fund to subvent the press were incessant and he devoted a great deal of his time to analyzing which newspapers might prove amenable to such influence.¹⁸ But if Austria's influence in Germany was to be eliminated Bismarck had to fight a war on two fronts: at Frankfurt and in Berlin. For while Mantueffel and the King might be ready to oppose Austria on specific issues such as the German fleet, they were totally unprepared for a basic showdown. On the contrary, the King could not even conceive a Germany without Austria as he had demonstrated by his vacillations in 1848, while his environment still thought in terms of the unity of conservative interests. Bismarck had therefore to be careful in presenting his real aims and to couch them in a form acceptable to his superiors. This caused his early reports to be voluble in their attack on Austria's incapacity

17. Op. cit., p.

18. See f.e., W. I., p. 53, p. 63.

18. See l.c.⁴, M. I.⁵, b. 23, b. 23.
11. Ob. cfr.⁶, b.

borst to be voluble in their attack on Anstrais, a fuesbocbly
a tom acceptable to his subordinates. This caused his early re-
to be careful in presenting his real aim and to concord them in
of the multi of conservative interests. Biamarck had therefore
inactions in 1848, while his environment still thought in terms
a Germany without Anstrais as he had demonstrated by his agoil-
showdown. On the contrary, the King could not even conceive
the German fleet, they were totally nubbed for a paste
might be ready to obverse Anstrais on a specific frame and so
at Frankfurt and in Berlin. For while Maukelief and the King
was to be eliminated Biamarck had to fight a war on two fronts:
to add influence.⁸⁸ But it Anstrais's influence in Germany
his time to fulfilling which newabera might prove amenable
dent the breach were incipient and he devoted a great deal of
an abest to bohjan envera. His breach for a lung to an-
sit the breather bessple against his autonontat, including
his study in Frankfurt Biamarck, therefore, sought to mobilise
per he aboves of them or not. From the very beginning of
whomever can see all available resources regardless of what-
an armistice the rules of war ably with victory going to
from Germany, the source of its historical strength. And in
falsice for Anstrais could not bessply consent to be excluded
relations between Anstrais and Prussia were at best an arm-
coustication,¹⁷ as he had said earlier. It this was true
Prussian border, to "command to Germany what should be its

- 52 -

- 26 -

ever to persevere in the right for its own sake,¹⁹ on its
ruthless utilization of the machinery of the Assembly,²⁰ so
that the program he was in the process of developing could
be made to appear as an act of self-defense. But even then
it proved more difficult to overcome the moral scruples of
the Prussian ministry than the pedantry of his colleagues
in Frankfurt.

We owe to this effort of Bismarck's a flood of reports ever more insistent for all their deferential tone urging the use of measures which in anybody else would have been considered revolutionary. Before the year 1851 was out, Bismarck was to couple an analysis of Austria's misuse of the machinery of the Confederation and its superior position at the minor courts because of its skillful utilization of dynastic relationship with the following proposal for a Prussian policy: "We can exercise our influence in the present situation by seemingly unintentionally delaying the consideration of Austria's proposals ... by giving our press more materials and granting it greater latitude for the discussion of the affairs of the Confederation and by a passive behavior of the ministry with respect to a motion in the *Prussian* Parliament denying the competence of the Confederation vis-a-vis the Prussian constitution unless the government would be willing to go so far as to see to it that the

19. See f.e., W.I., p. 3 (Bismarck's very first report).

20. See f.e., W. I., p. 39, among many examples.

50. See l.e.'t. M. I.'t. b. 30, amount many examples.
13. See l.e.'t. M.I.'t. b. 3 (Biamrock's very first report).

ment would be willing to go so far as to see to it that the
eration via-a-via the Russian constitution unless the Govern-
ernment Parliament denying the competence of the Confed-
eration of the Russia with respect to a motion in the
cession of the title of the Confederation and by a separate
more materials and granting it greater latitude for the dis-
consideration of Russia's broadeast ... by giving our broade
breast attention by seemingly unintentionally delaying the
tor a Russian border: "We can exercise our influence in the
dation of dynamic relationship with the following broadeast
affection at the minor counts because of its skilful utilization
of the machinery of the Confederation and its amberior bo-
ont. Biamrock was to combine an analysis of Russia's means
been considered revolutionarily. Before the year 1821 was
ring the name of measures which in anybody else would have
bore ever more insatent for all their determinacy t ones un-
We owe to this effort of Biamrock's a lot of re-
fer in Frankfurt.

the Russian ministry than the beginning of his collegues
it proved more difficult to overcome the worst obstacles of
be made to abate as an act of self-defence. But even then
that the program he was in the process of developing conff
undless utilization of the machinery of the Vaempir.
so
ever to benevolence in the right for its own sake,¹⁹ on its

- 2c -

(A)

- 27 -

proposal obtains a majority ..."²¹ Here was the complete arsenal of Bismarck's weapons, even if their full implications were somewhat obscured by a cautiously pedantic tone. Here was the use of the procedural device to frustrate the opponent under the color of formal right, here the appeal to popular currents by means of the press and the utilization of domestic policy to exert pressure abroad. Yet this was the very man the violence of whose attacks on the revolution in the year previous had been taken as a sufficient guarantee of his safety, conservative convictions. But the paradox was only apparent. For Bismarck had never fought his battles for a dogma but for a fact: the fitness of Prussia for the task Providence had set for it. And with the victory of the traditional Prussia, it not only became a "force" to be reckoned with abroad, but even its domestic problems might be manipulated to yield dividends in foreign affairs. This was the "Primat der Aussenpolitik," the primary of foreign affairs and in Bismarck's interpretation of Prussia's essence the epitome of its highest traditions.

It was not surprising therefore that the following years saw a never-ending insistance by Bismarck on stronger measures. "In foreign policy, courage and success," he counseled, "do not stand in a causal connection, they are identical."²² On the occasion of a vote against Prussia he

21. W. I., p. 116, December 22, 1851.

22. W. I., p. 62.

SS. M. I., b. 65.
Sr. M. I., b. 11d, December 23, 1921.

identical." SS On the occasion of a vote against Prunata's he
concluded, "do not stand in a canal connection, they are
measured." "In foreign policy, courage and success," he
stated saw a never-ending insatiable dy Biamarck on stronger
lines and was not ambivalent therefore that the following
truly applicable.

Interpretation of Prunata's essence the outcome of its highest
policy," the primary of foreign affairs and in Biamarck's
regards in foreign affairs. This was the "primat der Ansaen-
even its domestic problems might be manipulated to yield div-
our only became a "force" to be reckoned with spread, but
for it. And with the victory of the traditional Prunata's, it
a fact: the fitness of Prunata for the task Providence had set
for Biamarck had never taught his battles for a days put for
consecutive convulsions. But the barbox was only abherent.
breaches had been taken as a sufficient guarantee of his astely
the violence of whose attacks on the revolution in the year
beyond to exert breviate spread. Yet this was the very man
current dy means of the press and the utilization of domestic
under the color of formal right, here the abhor to barbarian
was the use of the procedural device to tramnote the ob索ent
were somewhatopsnarred dy a cautionary besutic tone. Here
gruesal of Biamarck's weapons, even it their full implications
broadsai opsina a majority ..."Sr
Here was the complete

- 51 -

- 28 -

proposed to Manteuffel that he leave Frankfurt without appoint-
ing a substitute -- a clear enough hint that Prussia was pre-
pared to dissolve the Confederation. He never tired of em-
phasizing the inadequacy of the Confederation even for defense
purposes while deprecating the possibility of a direct under-
standing with Austria.²³ And he made clear that he was not
interested in a special arrangement with Austria by refusing
to accept what was in effect an Austrian surrender. For when
Thun sought to avoid a majority vote against Prussia by coming
to a prior understanding with Bismarck, he found himself re-
buffed on the pretext that such a procedure would only antago-
nize the minor states.²⁴ In short, it was Prussia's task to
use every opportunity to discredit Austria: "Unless outside
events dissolve the present Confederation ... the tactic indi-
cated for Prussia seems to me to be that of the champion of
the ... interests of all the minor states against Austria just
as a leader seeking influence in a parliament tends to appear
in the guise of a defender of the liberties of the people and
thus forces the real possessor of power to come to terms with
him ..."²⁵ No more cynical description of the political pro-
cess could be imagined. Ideals, myths, popular as well as
monarchical aspirations, were all thrown together in the scale,
weighed impartially and catalogued according to their pecul-
arity with success the end-product of their proper proportion.
It was clear that the great clockwork of the 18th century whose

23. W. I., p. 232.

24. W. I., p. 158.

25. W. I., p. 305.

52. M. I., b. 302.
53. M. I., b. 128.
54. M. I., b. 535.

It was clear that the great council of the 18th century whose
fatigue with ancesss the end-broader of their broken proportion,
weighed imbarfullly and classified according to their beac-
monarchical abstractions, were all croun together in the same,
cene could be imagined. Ideals, words,博ustr as well as se
him ... "52

"52 No more ethical description of the political bro-
tine forces the real bossaoner of power to come to terms with
in theiate or a defender of the fideities of the people and
as a leader seeking influence in a barbament tends to abate
the ... interests of all the minor states against Austria that
casted for bramales seems to me to be that of the champion of
events dissolve the present Confederation ... the tactic indi-
nous every opportunity to discredit Austria: "Unless outside
ize the minor states."54 In short, it was Brama's task to
put on the brunt that such a procedure would only susceto-
to a bror understanding with Braesek, he tonng himself re-
Thun sought to avoid a majority vote against Brama's plan
to accept what was in effect an Austrian surrender. For when
interested in a special arrangement with Austria p& remaining
standing with Austria."53 And he made clear that he was not
bundesee while debroating the bessibility of a direct under-
biasing the infuendacy of the Confederation even for defense
bared to dissolve the Confederation. He never fixed of em-
ing a supposition -- a clear enough hint that Brama was bro-
proposed to Montenelle that he leave Frankfurt without abbot-

- 58 -

(A)

- 29 -

intricate mechanism had still inspired Metternich was not the model of this impetuous personality; it was a new age and it had the policy appropriate to its vision of reality; its expression was not harmony and balance but Darwin's survival of the fittest. The German Confederation conceived as the repository of legitimacy had therefore become the scene of a revolutionary contest between two versions of reality; the mechanical balance of the 18th century and the equilibrium of forces in flux; between the rationalist and the empiricist conception of politics.

But the final showdown was delayed not only because of the hesitations of Bismarck's own government but because the German question was inextricably bound up with the whole structure of European politics. The physical balance within Germany might be on the verge of dissolution, but Bismarck's basic premise that Prussia was better able to stand alone than Austria could not be put to the test until the second pillar of the Metternich system, the unity of the conservative monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia remained unshaken. Olmutz had demonstrated how the Tsar conceived his role as the conservative conscience of Europe. And Bismarck was to learn that his dispute with Thun at Frankfurt had not escaped attention when the Tsar sent one of his ambassadors to mediate in the question of the fleet. Prussia's greater power vis-a-vis Austria could not become effective until some crisis dissolved the restraints of the international

eff some cranks dissolved the restraints of the international
Greater power via-s-via Anatolia could not become effective un-
empassable to mediate in the question of the fleet. Prussia's a
port had not eased attention when the Tsar sent one of his
Bismarck was to learn that his dispute with Tum at Brink-
convoked his role as the conservative conscience of Europe. And
remained unbroken. Olimuta had demonstrated how the Tsar con-
of the conservative monera of Austria, Prussia, and Russia
until the second bill of the Metternich system, the unity
to stand alone than Austria could not be but to the test
put Bismarck's pale blemme that Prussia was better safe
ance within Germany might be on the verge of dissolution,
the whole structure of European politics. The historical pal-
peasure the German question was inextricably bound with
cause of the realist ions of Bismarck's own Government put
but the tinsel showdown was delayed not only be-
the embittered conception of politics.

- 29 -

- 30 -

order as it already had thoseof the German Confederation. Not
until the international situation was again fluid would it be
possible to manipulate its components.

It is the fate of anachronisms that they cannot es-
cape their fate however rigidly they may cling to the status
quo; indeed their very rigidity may only serve to accelerate
their dilemmas. So it was with Austria. For at the very
moment when events in Germany should have absorbed all its
attention, it received a shock in the Balkans which broke
forever the framework within which the "Metternich system"
had stabilized European politics.

26. EYK, I, p. 200.

52. EIK' I', b. 500.

had stipulated European politics.

forever the framework within which the "Mettlerian system" attention, it received a shock in the Balkans which broke moment when events in Germany should have separated all its their differences. So it was with Austria. For at the very don't indeed their very rigidity may only serve to accelerate case their late however rigidly they may cling to the status

It is the late of annexation that they cannot be
possible to manipulate its components.

until the international situation was again fluid would it be
order so it already had those of the German Confederation. Not

- 30 -

V. The Crimean War

In the settlement of 1815, the equilibrium main-
tained by the Central Powers had been conceived as a safety-
valve, a last resort all the more effective for never being
put to an explicit test. The real cement of the settlement
was the appeal to legitimacy not only within Germany but
also in the remainder of Europe. To be sure, the postulate
of the sanctity of historical rule could not by its mere ex-
istence stem the currents of a century -- and revolutions in
Belgium, Spain, Italy, and France revealed that tranquillity,
though desirable, is not sufficient to inspire men. But the
very proximity of the abyss solidified the unity of the three
great traditional rulers of the Continent, the King of Prus-
sia and the Emperors of Russia and Austria. Only the clos-
est cooperation among the defenders of the conservative in-
terests seemed capable of saving the world from imminent
chaos. Thus, the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and
Russia conceived originally as an instrument to protect the
territorial settlement of 1815 became in effect an organiza-
tion held together by the common fear of revolution and the
common determination to prevent the spreading of liberal in-
stitutions. It seemed almost a matter of course therefore
that the Tsar in 1848 used his troops to help quell the rev-
olution in Hungary and in 1851 to bring back into line a
Prussia dangerously wavering towards a national, if not a
liberal, policy.

fiperal, policy.

Rusia's dangerously wavering towards a national, it not a
option in Hungary and in 1851 to bring back into line a
that the Tsar in 1848 used his troops to help quell the rev-
affitutions. It seemed almost a matter of course therefore
common determination to prevent the abetting of liberal in-
tion held together by the common fear of revolution and the
territorial settlement of 1812 became in effect an organiza-
ization conceived originally as an instrument to protect the
chance. Thus, the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and
terrestrials seemed capable of saving the world from imminent
eat cooperation among the defendants of the conservative in-
ais and the Emperors of Russia and Austria. Only the clos-
gest traditional rulers of the Continent, the King of Prus-
very proximity of the spades solidified the unity of the three
together de facto, is not sufficient to imagine men. But the
Belgium, Spain, Italy, and France revealed that tranquillity,
to the abest to legitimize not only within Germany but
but to an explicit threat. The real cement of the settlement
value, a last resort if the more effective for never being
enjoyed by the Central Powers had been conceived as a safety-
In the settlement of 1812, the equilibrium main-

V. The Crimean War

- 2 -

In these circumstances there was an inherent limit
to the disputes of the German Confederation in Frankfurt:
that the requirement of the unity of the Conservative mon-
archs superseded all considerations of local advantage. And
while it was easy enough for Bismarck to ridicule the claims
of the common nationality, the Russian ambassador sent by
the Tsar to insist on a settlement of the fleet issue repre-
sented a more tangible reality. Whatever one might think of
"legitimacy," the master of the divisions on the Vistula
could not be antagonized with impunity. But even under these
circumstances, Bismarck denied that Prussia would have to
agree to every proposal of its allies. While he admitted
that as long as Austria and Russia were united, Prussia had
to remain allied to Austria¹ a formulation which expressed
the reality of a power-relationship much more than a convict-
ion of ideal bonds, he interpreted the requirement of unity
as a weapon to exact concessions or to obtain a veto over
Allied actions: "We must act," wrote Bismarck to his mentor
Gerlack, "so that Austria and Russia solicit our assistance
and do not treat us as an ally who has no other choice. We
must stick to them, but never give them the certainty that
it could not be otherwise."²

But the policy indicated by this letter was im-
possible as long as Russia saw in Austria the repository of

1. W. I., p. 354.

2. L. G., 60.

S. I. O.'s, 80.
F. W. I.'s, p. 324.

beside as long as Russia saw in Austria the reformation of
but the policy indicated by this letter was im-
that it could not be otherwise."

must stick to them, but never give them the certainty that
and do not treat us as an ally who has no other choice. We
Gerlack, "so that Austria and Russia solicit our assistance
Aflipped actions: "We must act," wrote Biamarck to his member
as a weapon to exact concessions or to obtain a veto over,
ion of ideal ponaß, he interpreted the requirement of unity
the reality of a power-relationship which more than a convic-
to remain shifted to Austria a formulation which expressed
that as long as Austria and Russia were united, Prussia had
agree to every proposal of its allies. While he admitted
circumstances, Biamarck denied that Prussia would have to
confid not be antagonized with imbalance. But even under these
"legitimacy," the master of the division on the Vatnia
bented a more tangible reality. Whatever one might think of
the Tar to insist on a settlement of the fleet issue repre-
nt of the common nationality, the Russian ambassador sent by
while it was easy enough for Biamarck to ridicule the claims
arous aneraided all considerations of local advantage. And
that the requirement of the unity of the Conservative mon-
to the diabetes of the German Confederation in Prussia:
In these circumstances there was an inherent limit

- 5 -

- 3 -

conservative interests. The full implications of Bismarck's
position could not become apparent until the powers were no
longer inhibited by "rules" which restricted the full devel-
opment of their potential strength. The revolution of 1848
had brought about this condition for the German Confedera-
tion; the Crimean War was to do the same for the internation-
al order. And then, with Austria and Russia separate, it
could become apparent what a skillful diplomacy might achieve
in first frustrating and then paralyzing Austria, a token of
what might be in store if the man who now only represented
Prussia would someday rule it.

No war has resulted from more contradictory motives
than the Crimean war, none was due to a greater degree to the
indecision of the major powers. Europe was brought to the
point of war because the Tsar thought war was impossible and
it entered the war because Austria in its frantic desire for
tranquility prevented all measures that could have prevented
the clash before the major powers were too deeply committed.

The Crimean War began as a dispute over the rights
of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This had been the
traditional source of friction between Russia and Turkey, in
its nature insoluble and therefore suitable for being used
as a pretext for Russian intervention whenever the interna-
tional situation appeared most favorable. And in 1853 the
moment seemed propitious indeed to Nicholas I who had ruled
Russia for nearly 30 years. All the major powers were either

Rusia for nearly 30 years. All the major bowers were either
moment seemeditions indeed to Nicholas I who had ruled
total situation abhorred most favorable. And in 1823 the
as a pretext for Russian intervention whenever the fuga-
tive nature insoluble and therefore unstable for being used
traditional source of friction between Russia and Turkey, in
of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This had been due
the Russian War began as a dispute over the rights
the class before the major bowers were too deeply committed.
tradtutlity prevented all measures that could have breviate
it entered the war because Russia in its transito regime to
point of war because the Tsar thought war was impossible and
indecision of the major bowers. Europe was brought to the
than the Crimean war, none was due to a greater degree to the
No war has reanted from more contradictory motives
brutality would somehow rule it.

The Crimean War began as a dispute over the rights
the class before the major bowers were too deeply committed.
tradtutlity prevented all measures that could have breviate
it entered the war because Russia in its transito regime to
point of war because the Tsar thought war was impossible and
indecision of the major bowers. Europe was brought to the
than the Crimean war, none was due to a greater degree to the
No war has reanted from more contradictory motives
brutality would somehow rule it.

what might be in store for the man who now only represented
in that transacting and then bartering Anatolia, a token of
could become abhorrent what a skillful diplomat might achieve
at order. And then, with Anatolia and Russia abate, it
had brought about this condition for the German Conqeters-
obment of their potential strength. The revolution of 1848
longer impeded p" rules" which restricted the full devel-
position could not become abhorrent until the bowers were no
consecutive interests. The full implications of Blamrock's

- 3 -