# The Future of Collective Security in the Free World

by Henry A. Kissinger

In the past decade, an important change has taken place in the nature of alliances. In the past, alliances have been created for three basic reasons: (1) To provide an accretion of power. With conventional weapons, overwhelming power could generally be assembled only by way of coalition. The wider the alliance, the greater its power to resist aggression. (2) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. It has often been argued that had Germany known at the beginning of both World Wars that the United States--or even England--would join the war, aggression would have been averted. (3) To express as a formal obligation what may otherwise be an inchoate interest in mutual assistance.

To be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons, there was some inconsistency among these requirements. The attempt to combine the maximum number of states for joint action occasionally conflicted with the desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation. The wider the system of collective security, the more various were the motives animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action. The more embracing the alliance, the more intense and direct had to be the threat which would produce a united response.

The traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age. Nuclear war requires tight command and control of all weapons. This is to some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states. Moreover, the enormous risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of traditional pledges of mutual assistance. Traditionally, alliances have been operative because it was believed that the *immediate* risk of conflict

been operative because it was believed that the *immediate* risk of conflict
traditional pledges of mutual assistance. Traditionally, alliances have
over, the enormous risks of nuclear war were affected the credibility of
to some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states. More-
Nuclear war reduces tight command and control of all weapons. True is
the traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age.
the threat which would produce a united reason.

The more embracing the alliance, the more intense and direct bad to be
animating it and the more difficult the task of operating common action.
the system of collective security, the more arrows were the motives
to desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation. The wider
maximum number of states for joint action occasionally conflicted with
some inconsistency among these requirements. The attempt to combine the
To be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons, there was
tion what may otherwise be an incipient interest in mutual assistance.
aggression would have been averted. (3) To express as a formal op posi-
World War that the United States--or even England--would join the war,
has often been argued that bad Germany known at the beginning of both
aggression. (3) To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. It
condition. The wider the alliance, the greater its power to resist
weapons, overwhelming power could generally be ascribed only by way of
basic reasons: (1) To provide an accretion of power. With conventional
nature of alliances. In the best, alliances have been created for three
In the best decade, an important change has taken place in the

by Henry V. Klausinger

was less than the _ultimate_ danger of facing a preponderant enemy alone.
But when nuclear war risks the lives of tens of millions, some allies
may consider the outbreak of a war the worst contingency and, in times
of crisis, act accordingly.

This is illustrated by the disputes now occuring in the Atlantic
Alliance. Many of the theories now current within the Western Alliance
have a tendency either to turn it into a unilateral U.S. guarantee or
to call into question the utility of the Alliance altogether. American
strategic thought verges on the first extreme; some French theorists have
hinted at the second.

As for the United States, official spokesmen have consistently em-
phasized that the European contribution to the over-all nuclear strength
of the Alliance is negligible. European nuclear forces have been des-
cribed as "provocative," "prone to obsolescence", and "weak."¹ For a
considerable period after the advent of the Kennedy Administration, some
high officials held the view that the allies might be induced to ask the
President to serve as the Executive Agent of the Alliance on nuclear
matters. Since then, the United States has made various proposals for
nuclear sharing, the common feature of which has been the retention of
the United States veto over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance.

However sensible such schemes may appear from the point of view of
the division of labor, they would perpetuate American hegemony in nuclear

¹ For the classic indictment of Europe's national nuclear forces
see Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor, June 16, 1962, Department
of State Bulletin (hereafter referred to as DOSE), July 9, 1962, Vol.
XLVII, No. 1202, pp. 64-69.

XIV. No. 1203, pp. 64-69.

of State Bulletin (hereafter referred to as BOMB), July 9, 1963, Aoi.
see Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor, June 16, 1963, Department
I. For the classic indictment of Europe's national nuclear forces

the division of Iapor, they would berate American testimony in nuclear
However sensible and schemes may abash from the point of view of
the United States over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance.

nucleariring, the common feature of which has been the retention of
matters. Since then, the United States has made various broCADES for
President to serve as the Executive Agent of the Alliance on nuclear
high officials held the view that the allies might be induced to ask the
considerable period after the advent of the Kennedy Administration, some
cried as "broadeconomic," "brute to opacification," and "weak." For a
of the Alliance is negligible. European nuclear forces have been des-
bustard that the European contribution to the over-all nuclear strength

As for the United States, officialROPPEmen have consistently em-
phasized at the second.

strategic thought over the first extremes: some French theorists have
to call into question the utility of the Alliance altogether. American
pave a tendency either to turn it into a milquetal of U.S. guarantees or
Alliance. Many of the theories now current within the Western Alliance
This is illustrated by the debates now occurring in the Atlantic
of crisis, act accordingly.

may consider the outbreak of a war the worst contingency and, in times
But when nuclear war takes the lives of tens of millions, some allies
are less than the ultimate danger of facing a breederderant enemy alone.

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matters within the Alliance. Allies seem to be considered necessary not so much to add to over-all strength as to provide the ability for applying power discriminately. Allies are useful because they permit resistance to aggression by means less cataclysmic than all-out war. In such a structure American decisions must continue to be paramount. The nuclear weapons of the Alliance have to remain under central control, which in effect means American control. The predominant United States view is a sophisticated elaboration of the situation of the late Forties and early Fifties. It is designed to make our hegemony more bearable, not to alter it.

According to the opposing view, alliances have lost their significance altogether. The French theorist, General Gallois, has argued, for example, that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete.² Faced with the risk of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries to their fate.

This formula would mark the end of collective security and would be likely to lead to international chaos. In the face of the growing nuclear arsenals of the major protagonists, it would be idle to deny that the threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its credibility. The Gallois Theory would, however, transform a degree of uncertainty into a guarantee that the United States would _not_ come to the assistance of its allies, thus greatly simplifying an aggressor's calculation.

² Piere M. Gallois, "U. S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," *ORBIS*, VII: 2 (Summer 1963), Pp. 226-249.

ORRIS, AII: 3 (Sumner 1963), pp. 336-349.

2. Pierre M. Gifford, "U. S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe,"

allies' time greatly shortening an aggressor's calculation. Guarantee that the United States would not come to the assistance of its Gifford Theory would, however, transform a degree of uncertainty into a threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its credibility. The arsenals of the major belligerents, it would be idle to deny that the likely to lead to international chaos. In the face of the growing nuclear This formula would mark the end of collective security and would be to their date.

defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete.3 Based with the risk altogether, The French theorist, General Gifford, has argued, for example, According to the obsewing view, alliances have lost their significance it.

Mittes. It is desired to make our analogy more precise, not to alter sophisticated elaboration of the situation of the late Borries and early effect means American control. The belligerent United States view is a means of the Alliance have to remain under central control, which in structure American decisions must continue to be paramount. The nucleus to aggression has means less catalytic than all-out war. In such a power discriminately. Allies are useful because they permit resistance so much to add to overall strength as to provide the sparsity for applying matters within the Alliance. Allies seem to be considered necessarily not

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Moreover, in order to protect itself in this new situation, each country would need to develop not only a nuclear arsenal of its own but also foolproof procedures for assuring the Soviets that a given nuclear blow did not originate from its territory. If Gallois is right, and each country is unwilling to risk nuclear devastation for any ally, it will also want to prevent itself from being triggered into nuclear war by a neighbor. Thus each country will have a high incentive to devise methods to protect itself against attacks based on misinformation. The Gallois Theory would lead to a multiplication of national nuclear forces side by side with the development of methods of surrender or guarantees of non-involvement.

The preponderance of nuclear power in the hands of the United States poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises another. In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or of surrendering. If it resisted, it had to be prepared to accept the consequences in terms of physical damage and loss of life. A distant ally could generally be helpful only if it was able to bring its strength to bear in the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants from an alliance is the assurance that an attack on it will be considered a *casus belli*. It strives for deterrence by adding the strength of a distant ally to its power. But, equally, each state has an incentive to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The range of modern weapons for the first time provides the technical possibility of combining these objectives. In 1914 Belgium could not base its defense on a strategy which transferred to Britain the primary risks of devastation. In the age of intercontinental rockets this is technically feasible.

In the age of intercontinental rockets this is technically feasible.
on a strategy which transferred to Britain the primary role of detonation.
of computing these objectives. In 1944 Belgium could not pass its defense
of modern weapons for the first time provides the technical possibility
reduce damage to itself to a minimum should detonation fail. The range
distant safely to its power. But, equally, each states has an incentive to
a causal effect. It strives for deterrence by adding the strength of a
from an influence to the assurance that an attack on it will be considered
Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country must
be poor in the area of conflict.

 safely could generally be helpful only if it was able to bring its strength
 consequences in terms of physical damage and loss of life. A distant
 or of surrendering. It is restated, it had to be prepared to accept the
 In the best, a threatened country had the choice either of retreating
 or bases one set of problems: the range of modern weapons rates another.

The preponderance of nuclear power in the hands of the United States
of non-involvement.

Side by side with the development of methods of surrender or guarantees
Gallipoli Theory would lead to a multiplication of national nuclear forces
methods to protect itself against attacks based on misinformation. The
war by a neighbor. True each country will have a high incentive to devise
it will also want to prevent itself from being triggered into nuclear
and each country is unwilling to risk nuclear detonation for any safety,
nuclear blow did not originate from its territory. It Gallipoli is right,
but also too broad procedures for assuring the safety that a German
country would need to develop not only a nuclear arsenal of its own
Moreover, in order to protect itself in this new situation, each

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Part of the strategic dispute within the Atlantic Alliance, therefore, involves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater of war if deferrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit). A conventional war confined to Europe must appear in a different light to Americans than to Europeans who remember the casualty lists of two world wars and on whose territory such a war would be fought. A nuclear exchange which spares their territory may appear to Europeans a more attractive strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent. Although the interests of an alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate sense, this does not guarantee that there may be sharply clashing perceptions about methods to reach common objectives.

Thus the deepest problem before any system of collective security is that the pressures of the new technology run counter to traditional notions of national sovereignty. The risks of nuclear warfare may be too great to be combined reliably with what has heretofore been considered a key attribute of sovereignty: the unilateral right of a sovereign state to alter its strategic or political views. The destructiveness and range of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and neutralism. A wise policy must take care that in dealing with one of these dangers it does not produce the other.

The nature of alliances has changed in yet another way. In the past, one of the reasons for joining a alliance was to impose an additional obligation for assistance in time of need. Were each country's national interests completely unambiguous, it would know precisely on whose assistance it could count; a formal commitment would be unnecessary. Both the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront

the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront
vice it could court; a formal commitment would be unnecessary. Both
interests completely unambiguely, it would know precisely on whose side
opposition for assistance in time of need. Were each country's national
one of the reasons for joining an alliance was to impose an additional
The nature of alliances has changed in yet another way. In the past,
these dangers it does not produce the other.

A wise policy must take care that in dealing with one of
of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and
to alter its strategic or political views. The destructiveness and range
of key attributes of sovereignty: the unilateral right of a sovereign state
great to be comprised relatively with what has heretofore been considered a
notions of national sovereignty. The risks of nuclear warfare may be too
far that the breaches of the new technology run counter to traditional

Time the gravest problem before any system of collective security
comes upon methods to reach common objectives.

While the interests of an alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate
strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent,
which shares their territory may abhor to Europeans a more attractive
ware and on whose territory such a war would be fought. A nuclear exchange
Americans than to Europeans who remember the casualty lists of two world
A conventional war confined to Europe must abhor in a different light to
of war if deterrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit).
Involves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater
of the strategic dispute within the Atlantic Alliance, therefore.

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and could act accordingly. Wars could not be caused by a misunderstanding of intentions. They would occur only if the protagonists calculated the existing power relationships differently.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unambiguous. Often the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined up against it; Germany in 1914 was genuinely surprised by the British reaction to the invasion of Belgium. Occasionally the defenders could not be certain of the extent of their potential support--as was the case with the Allies in both wars regarding U.S. participation. Historically, the existence of an understanding on this point, tacit or explicit, has often been the determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the decade prior to World War I, the staff talks between Britain and France which led to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean were one of the key factors in Britain's decision to enter the conflict in August, 1914. (Thus the talks achieved one objective of traditional alliances: to commit Britain to the defense of France. They failed in another: to make the opposing alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)

One of the distinguishing features of the present period is that ideology and technology have combined to produce a global confrontation. This in turn has rendered the national interest of the major powers less ambiguous. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can permit a major advance by its opponent regardless of whether the area in which it occurs is formally protected by an alliance or not. Neutral India was no less assured of American assistance when Communist China attacked than allied Pakistan would have been in similar circumstances. In these conditions, the distinction between allies and neutrals is likely to diminish.

tions, the distinction between allies and neutrals is largely to diminish
affected Pakistans would have been in similar circumstances. In these condi-
no less assured of American assistance when Committee China attacked them
occurs to formally protected by an alliance or not. Neutral India must
major advance by its opponent regardless of whether the area in which it
emerges. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can permit a
This in turn has reenforced the national interest of the major powers less
ideology and technology have confined to produce a global confrontation.
One of the distinguishing features of the present period is that

obbling alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)

The British to the defense of France. They relied in another: to make the
(These the tasks achieved one objective of traditional alliances: to com-
mon factors in Britain's decision to enter the conflict in August, 1914,
to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean were one of the
prior to World War I, the staff takes between Britain and France which led
them the determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the decade
existence of an understanding on the point, fact or explicit, the often
the Villes en paroies were regarding U.S. belligerent. Historically, the
pe certainly of the extent of their potential subport--as was the case with
reaction to the invasion of Belgium. Occasionally the detente could not
be against it; Germany in 1914 was generally embroiled by the British
Ottomans the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined
behind the aggressor, the national interest has not been maksupplementary.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unimportant.
existing power relationships differently.

of intentions. They would occur only if the broCADEOIST calculated the
and could act accordingly. They could not be caused by a misunderstanding

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A country gains little from being allied and risks little by being neutral.

This inevitably results in the weakening of allied cohesion, producing
what some have described as polycentrism. But polycentrism does not reflect
so much the emergence of new centers of physical power as the attempt by
allies to establish new centers of decision.

The relative strength of the United States vis-a-vis its allies has
not changed. What has changed is the use to which this power can be put.
The paradox of modern weapons technology is that states have an unprecedented
possibility to devastate their opponent, but their threats to use this
capability have only a limited credibility. This is because the ability to
destroy is not related to the ability to disarm--so that using one's
nuclear arsenal indiscriminately against a major opponent only guarantees
self-destruction. At the same time, those issues where nuclear threats are
credible are so clear-cut as to leave little doubt about the commitment of
the major partner.

Polycentrism is on the rise not because the world has ceased to be
bi-polar, but because with respect to nuclear weapons it essentially
remains so. More and more allies are convinced that those circumstances
in which the United States might be prepared to resort to its nuclear
weapons cannot be fundamentally affected by his actions. In other words,
the United States commitment need not be purchased by being conciliatory
and cannot be jeopardized by intransigence--within very wide limits at
least.

Thus, many allies see little risk and considerable potential gain in
political independence. In a curious way, it is possible for them to add
American power to their own in pursuit of policies contradictory to those

American power to their own in benefit of before contradictory to those
political independence. In a curious way, it is beautiful for them to accept
Time, many allies see little risk and considerable potential gain in
less.

and cannot be jeopardized by intransigence--within any wide limits at
the United States commitment need not be burdened by being councilatory
measures cannot be fundamentally affected by die actions. In other words,
in which the United States might be prepared to resort to its nuclear
remains so. More and more allies are convinced that those circumstances
pit-belter, put because with respect to nuclear weapons it essentially
polycentricity is on the rise not because the world has ceased to be
the major partner.

credibility are so clear-cut as to leave little doubt about the commitment of
self-destruction. At the same time, those issues where nuclear threats are
nuclear arms race indefinitely against a major opponent only guarantees
destroy it not related to the ability to dream--so that using one's
credibility have only a limited credibility. This is because the ability to
possibility to deviate from their opponent, put their threats to use the
The paradox of modern weapons technology is that states have an unrecogized
not changed. What has changed is the use to which this power can be put.

The relative strength of the United States via-a-ple its allies has
allies to adapt new centers of decision.

so much the emergence of new centers of political power as the attempt by
what some have described as polycentric. But polycentric does not reflect
the inevitably results in the weakening of allied cooperation, producing
A country gains little from being allied and risks little by being unaided.

of the United States. Measures opposed to those of the United States are thus in a sense supported by the American nuclear umbrella--a fact which adds to the irony of the situation and to the annoyance of some American policy-makers. Although traditionally a state's diplomatic influence corresponded roughly to its military strength, this is no longer inevitably the case. Influence can now be achieved by using another country's protection even for policies not in accord with the ally's preferences.

The frequent insistence of United States officials and commentators that in the nuclear age an isolated strategy is no longer possible misses the central point: precisely because an isolated strategy is indeed impossible allies have unprecedented scope for the pursuit of their own objectives. And the more the detente--real or imaginary--proceeds, the more momentum these tendencies will gather. We live in a curious world where neutrals enjoy most of the protection of allies and allies aspire to have the same freedom of action as do neutrals.

All of this suggests that the doctrine of collective security is in a state of transition. The old notions of collective security no longer suffice to cement alliances together. What is needed is an act of political construction: to move from collective security to a sense of community. The free peoples must create a structure in which all can share as equal partners. They therefore face a task confronted before by many societies in their domestic affairs: how to reconcile unity with diversity. The vitality of free peoples depends on how well they solve this problem.

vitality of free peoples depends on how well they solve this problem.
in their domestic affairs: how to reconcile unity with diversity. The
barriers. They therefore face a task confronted before by many societies
The free peoples must create a structure in which all can share as equal
construction: to move from collective security to a sense of community.
influence to cement alliances together. What is needed is an act of political
a state of transition. The old notions of collective security no longer
All of this suggests that the doctrine of collective security lie in
to have the same freedom of action as do neutrals.
where neutrals enjoy most of the protection of allies and allies share
more momentum these tendencies will gather. We live in a curious world
objectives. And the more the detente--real or imaginary--proceeds, the
unbearable allies have unbridled access for the pursuit of their own
the central point: precisely because an isolated strategy is indeed
that in the nuclear age an isolated strategy is no longer possible since
The frequent insatience of United States officials and commentators
tection even for policies not in accord with the fifty's preferences.
the case. Influence can now be achieved by using another country's bro-
corresponding roughly to its military strength, this is no longer inequitably
policy makes. Although traditionally a state's diplomatic influence
adds to the irony of the situation and to the annoyance of some American
time in a sense supported by the American nuclear umbrella--a fact which
of the United States. Measures opposed to those of the United States are

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THE NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL)

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December 21, 1964

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Thank you for sending me the article which we requested for our New Year's issue. I sent it to our headquarter in Tokyo immediately.

I believe that your esteemed views about the problem of collective security facing the free world, when reported on our newspaper, will be highly appreciated by our many readers who have a keen interest in the problem.

As a sign of our deep appreciation of your kindness, I am enclosing a check for two hundred and fifty dollars. I will send you a few copies of our paper which carried your article in Japanese. I expect it by 10th of January.

Thank you again and wish a Happy New Year.

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Nov. 17, 1964

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
The Harvard Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Prof. Kissinger:

Looking forward hopefully to a lessening of world tensions in the year ahead, The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic Journal) of Tokyo this year is keying its New Year's issue to the theme "The Problems We Have To Solve." Our editor, Accordingly, has instructed me to ask you if you would kindly contribute an article for this issue. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun is the only daily specializing in economic affairs and one of the most infulential journal in Japan.

The subject we would like to be discussed by you is "The Future of Collective Security in The Free World." We, Japanese feel that there would be a crisis in the collective security system because of recent collision of interests among concerned countries, particularly in NATO. So what we would like to know is your opinion about the future of NATO, and how we should try to make the collective security effective.

We would greatly appreciate it if you would write an article of around 1,500 words which we would like to receive by December 11th. We would like to pay two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) for sign of appreciation.

CABLE: NYNIKKEI NEW YORK

TELEPHONE 80 9-1092
80 9-1093

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It is the feeling of our editorial board in Tokyo that this New Year's issue will be especially meaningfull to our readers if they find your views on our " The problems we have to solve" theme. We would be most greatful if you would let us know, at your earliest convenience, whether we can count on receiving a contri-bution from you, so that we can make plans for giving it proper placement.