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MAR 02 1994

CNN CROSSFIRE Transcript #1033

Air Date: February 21, 1994

Holding the Line in Bosnia

Pres. BILL CLINTON: The NATO decision stands. We will continue to enforce the exclusion zone. Any shelling of Sarajevo or the appearance of heavy weapons in the exclusion zone will bring a certain and swift response from the U.N. and NATO.

ANNOUNCER: From Washington, Crossfire. On the left, Mike Kinsley. On the right, Pat Buchanan. Tonight, Hold-
ing the Line. In the crossfire, former National Security Ad-
viser Zbigniew Brzezinski. And in New York, former Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger.

PAT BUCHANAN: Good evening, and welcome to Crossfire. Twenty-four hours after the expiration of NATO's ultimatum to the Serbs to move or silence their guns around Sarajevo, no NATO air strikes have been called in, and no shells have fallen on Bosnia's capital. The White House is claiming victory, and West Europeans are urging the U.S., to extend to ultimatum to other besieged Bosnian cities, but President Clinton is wary that NATO may not have the means on hand. Meanwhile, Bosnia's Serbs are jubilant at the arrival of Russian troops, while some Muslims fear the cease-fire will lock in a permanent division of their capital city, Sarajevo. Has Mr. Clinton started Bosnia on the road to peace, or has America taken the first step into a Balkan quagmire, where either the U.S. or Russia is going to end up a loser? Michael?

MIKE KINSLEY: Henry Kissinger. it's always interesting to hear Pat's spin on stories like this. It's not merely that the shells have stopped falling, but the Serbs have actually turned in some of their guns and removed others away— all their big guns are now out of their own control, at least within shelling distance of Sarajevo. People were saying for months, air strikes wouldn't work. They've worked, haven't they? Even the threat of air strikes and the Serbs caved in immediately.

HENRY KISSINGER, Former Secretary of State: Air strikes have worked to lift the siege of Sarajevo, and I be-
lieve that the threat of intervention can work to maintain the existing lines. I think if we're going to try to get invol-
ved in restoring the previous situation, then it will not be done by threats, then there has to be actual action.

KINSLEY: Well, Sir Michael— what’s his name? The Brit-
ish General—

Dr. KISSINGER: Rose.

KINSLEY: —Sir Michael Rose wants to repeat this pro-
cess in the other besieged areas of Bosnia, and he hopes
that will, not merely relieve the suffering in those cities,
obviously, but also put pressure on the Serbs to cut a deal,
and President Clinton's expressing great reluctance. What
would you advise?

Dr. KISSINGER: I think we should try to bring about an end to hostilities, and if we have the means, which I cannot judge, but which I cannot believe we don't have, I would on the whole repeating the same process as in Sarajevo. I would warn against going beyond it.

BUCHANAN: All right. Zbig Brzezinski, do you recom-
mend repeating the process in other besieged cities in Bos-
nia? And if they impose a cease-fire, doesn't that simply
leave the Serbs with control of 70 percent of Bosnia?

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Former National Security
Adviser: I have favored doing this about a year ago, but I
favored doing it as part of a larger effort, one in which we'd
also lift the arms embargo on the Bosnians, because that
would create the preconditions for a stalemate on the
ground between the warring parties, and a stalemate on
the ground can be the basis eventually for some accom-
modation. Given the fact that this threat, which we have
finally, after many hesitations, issued, has worked up to a
point in Sarajevo, I certainly do favor doing it elsewhere.
provided we have the means; and General Shalikashivili
was asked about that today, and he said he was absolutely
convinced, and I'm quoting him, he's absolutely that the al-
lies have the air power to do this kind of job effectively,
and I take his word as his professional judgment.

BUCHANAN: All right. Let's suppose we follow Zbig's ad-
vice, we issue these ultimata and to try to stop the fighting
around the cities, and then we start allowing guns and
weapons to pour into the Bosnians, and they launch what
one commander said they're about to launch, which is a
spring offensive to take back lost territory. You're going to
have an American—I mean, a NATO threat to go to war at
the same time that the war heats up again. Isn't the
United States going to be involved in this war?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI: No, I don't think so, because the air strikes are essentially of a punitive character, if they're employed at all, essentially used to lift the most damaging aspect on the Serbian military operations, that is to say, concentrated fire against civilian centers. Helping the Bosnians acquire arms would simply produce a stalemate, because the Bosnians are not strong enough to push the Serbians out, but they will be strong enough to defend themselves. Otherwise—

BUCHANAN: Well, suppose the Serbs start—I mean, pouring in or coming in clandestinely from Serbia, and they start going all out using their equipment that they pulled away from the cities to start defeating and crushing the Muslims again?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI: The Serbians haven't exercised self-
restraint till now. They have done what they can. The
point is they have felt all along that they can prevail.
That's why there was the siege of Sarajevo. That's why
other places are under siege. If we want the war to peter
out, we have to create the conditions whereby both parties
to the war conclude that neither can win.

KINSLEY: Should we lift the arms embargo, Henry Kissinger?

Dr. KISSINGER: I think, on balance, yes, but I would
make a distinction between a stalemate and trying to keep
an open-ended war going in that region. We have a human
rights interest in avoiding ethnic cleansing and other
atrocities. We do not have a national interest in the parti-
cular dividing lines that exist in Bosnia, and we should not
get involved in the civil war in Bosnia other than putting
an end to it.

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**KINSLEY:** Well, I think that's— that sounds exactly right to me, and in light of that, the United States' policy now in terms of what we say to the Bosnian Muslim government is that we have promised to ask them about their minimal requirements. Shouldn't we be telling them what their minimal requirements ought to be? In other words, if we're going to intervene on their side, shouldn't we now say to them, "It's time to cut a deal," and put pressure on them, which we've resisted doing up till now?

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** In my view, we should not intervene on their side militarily. We should intervene to stop the shelling of cities and military attacks on them from the present position. I think we should support diplomatically an outlet to the sea for them, and we should support diplomatically a greater degree of territory. In 1991 an agreement was made in which the Muslims were going to get about 41 percent of the territory. Now they're down to about 32 percent, and in '41— in '90, '91 we stopped this first agreement, and I think we should try to see what we can do with diplomatic and economic pressure, and by preventing any further attacks, to see how much more territory we can get them, but we cannot go to war on this issue.

**KINSLEY:** Yes, but as a realistic measure, we have intervened to affect the balance of power in their favor, simply by what we've done so far, haven't we?

**Dr. KISSINGER:** Yes, we have, but to the greatest degree possible, I would make a distinction between our interest in ending human suffering and our interest in the dividing lines of Bosnia. I happen to believe that Bosnia should never have been created as a state. I think it was an absurdity to try to create a nation that has never been a nation that is composed 51 percent of people who don't want to live there, and if the Serbs and Croats couldn't live together in Yugoslavia, I don't know why anyone ever thought they could live together in Bosnia.

**BUCHANAN:** All right, Zbig Brzezinski, listen, the Russians— we spent 45 years getting the Russians out of Germany and Central Europe and Eastern Europe. Now they are back in Sarajevo, just outside Sarajevo. They're being celebrated and hailed by the Serbs, their Orthodox and Slav cousins. Is this a wise thing, and adding to that, the Russian defense minister today, just this afternoon, had an open television phone call— televised phone call to the U.S. defense minister— U.S. secretary of Defense, urging American ground troops, peacekeepers be put into Bosnia.

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** Well, I don't believe we should put American troops on the ground in Bosnia, for reasons that I have explained many times. I don't think we should be engaged in the actual combat on the ground, but the combat on the ground will come to an end in one of three ways. Either one side wins, in which case it would be the Serbs, and I don't think that would be morally or geopolitically desirable; or we impose a settlement, and I don't think we should try, because it would get bogged down; or we create the preconditions for some sort of a stalemate between the parties, and this is why I think we're right not pointed in the correct direction. We have intimidated the Serbians,

we should provide arms to the Bosnians, but there is a growing danger now that the Russians will begin to take a more active pro-Serbian position, and this is why I so much regret the loss of one full year, because a year ago the Russians wouldn't have been as active. Now they are likely to inject themselves to a degree that will limit our freedom of action.

**BUCHANAN:** Exactly. Now, this is the point I was getting at at the beginning. The Russians have made themselves de facto allies of the Serbs. They're taking up their cause and their case. The Americans are de facto allies, right now, of the Muslims, if we're going to use this threat to enable them to win back land and territory. Aren't we going to end here with the Americans or the Russians, either of them looking like the diplomatic loser here, who backed the wrong horse or the losing horse?

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** No, we may have no choice, because we have wasted a whole year, and we have been very ambiguous in regards to Russia's conduct, vis a vis Central and Southeastern Europe. We have been ambivalent on the question of the expansion of NATO. We have sent signals to the effect that we are prepared to live with a geopolitical vacuum in the heart of Europe, and this has encouraged the Russians to do what they're now doing in Bosnia. This is very serious.

**KINSLEY:** Dr. Kissinger, should we be alarmed or pleased that the Russians are now so involved? And I mean, Pat says they're allies of the Serbs. They actually came in and helped pressure the Serbs to lift the siege.

**Dr. KISSINGER:** No, but they also have created a condition in which for us to bomb in areas where the Russians are located is going to involve risks, which would not have existed a year ago. I think the main point with Russia is not what they're doing in Serbia, but the role they're beginning to assert in the former territory of the Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe and now in Serbia, which is the traditional Russian expansionist road, and it is an absolute illusion for the United States to pretend that they are our partners in these enterprises. They are strategically trying to block our influence.

**KINSLEY:** All right. Let's take a break. When we come back, we'll try and get these two geostrategists to settle this thing.

**HARIS SILAJDZIC, Bosnian Prime Minister:** Two hundred thousand people died in Bosnia. We have terrible suffering. We have Stone Age in Bosnia. In order to come to peace, we are ready to compromise, but we are not ready to capitulate.

[Commercial break]

**WILLIAM PERRY, Secretary of Defense:** The history of the Balkans does not provide a great deal of encouragement, but these events, weighed against that history, do provide some hope. This is the first time in the history of this fighting and fruitless negotiations that we have not had the worst outcome.

**KINSLEY:** Welcome back to Crossfire. Under the threat of NATO air strikes, the Serbs have lifted their 22-month siege of Sarajevo, and President Clinton is claiming success for an American foreign policy initiative. We're talking

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with two gentlemen who have some hands-on experience on the subject of American foreign policy: former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Pat?

**BUCHANAN:** Zbig, let's get to that outcome you call desirable. That means the Serbs can't keep the 70 percent now. They're going to have to give up their territory, it's a lot of the territory they've taken. The Bosnians are going to have to be armed. You're going to have lift the embargo, and the American air strikes have got to be threatened in there and used, in case the Serbs use their guns. Looking at President Clinton today, who looks like a fellow who would like to pick up his small winnings from the table and take them home, do you really think he's going to drive this that far?

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** If he doesn't, he's going to have a seriously deteriorating situation in Central Europe, because we're dealing not only with a very difficult Balkan problem, but we're beginning to deal with the reinjection of Soviet geopolitical presence in Central Europe. We have to see what has happened the last few days in Bosnia as part of the larger Russian effort to establish its political presence in Central Europe, veto the expansion of NATO, now stop NATO intimidation of the Serbs, be part of some sort of a condominium dealing with the responsibility for peace in that part of the world.

**BUCHANAN:** But do you mean—the only way to stop this type of thing—you're asking Bill Clinton, in effect, to start going head to head with the Russians' clients, the Serbs in Bosnia, to keep this threat or expand this threat of air power, then to start shipping weapons into the Muslims or allow them to go into the Muslims. Is there anything in the last two years that indicates that Bill Clinton is interested in going in that direction?

**KINSLEY:** Or Pat Buchanan for that matter.

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** Well, the last two weeks are a little more encouraging on that score than the previous year, but the point, the key point is that the President has to realize that he's at a very critical, very sensitive juncture in the American-Russian relationship. If we do not stabilize it on the basis of Russia becoming part of the community of nations, accepting the fact, the stability of Western Europe and Central Europe is the responsibility of NATO and not of Moscow, if we do not get the Russians to accept this now, we'll certainly have a much more difficult time with them a year from now or two years from now and even perhaps six months from now.

**KINSLEY:** Let me ask Dr. Kissinger more or less the same question. NATO has always been a purely defensive alliance. Is this new role for NATO a good thing, and do you see it as part of the larger continuing defensive responsibilities of NATO or is something new?

**Dr. KISSINGER:** First of all, I substantially agree with Zbig's analysis of the strategic problem. Tactically I might have nuances of difference, but first, I do not believe it is necessary to push the Serbs out of all the territory that they have conquered. I think that dividing lines ought to be stabilized more or less along the ethnic lines that now exist, which means probably that the Serbs would have to

give up some of the territory that they have acquired, but I would not think it is an American national interest that warrants the use of force to push them out of all of the territory.

**KINSLEY:** Do you think it is America's national interest to essentially restore the original borders of Bosnia?

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** No, I agree with what Henry is saying. I think we'll probably have to find some formula between the 41 percent that was being offered a year ago and the 30 or so percent that the Bosnians are hanging on to right now.

**Dr. KISSINGER:** That's roughly—that is more or less—
**BUCHANAN:** All right.

**Dr. KISSINGER:** Secondly, on arming Bosnia, that is not an end in itself. I think the Bosnians are receiving quite a few arms now from Muslim countries, and in any event, they're landlocked, so arrangements would have to be made to get the weapons in through Croatia or some other territory. I would gear the arming of Bosnia to the threat of military action, and I would certainly let the Serbs clearly understand that if they start an offensive that—I would lift the embargo, but I would not supply large quantities of arms unless the war starts again.

**BUCHANAN:** All right. Let me ask you this, Henry Kissinger. Assume that this all goes very, very well, that Clinton moves the ultimatum to the five other cities, that the Serbs give up a little bit more than they're already willing to give up to get peace, and the Muslims you can get them or persuade them to accept it. What guarantees do you give to the Muslims in Bosnia against a future assault from the Serbs, and should the United States go ahead with those 25,000 peacekeeping troops which President Clinton has promised, assuming certain conditions are met?

**Dr. KISSINGER:** I'm absolutely opposed to the sending of American ground troops to Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslavia, specifically to Bosnia. I think the United States needs to examine which are its fundamental national interests that it will defend by force, where it has an interest that it will support diplomatically, and where it cannot get involved at all; and I do not believe that Bosnia—that a renewed attack by Serbia in Bosnia should necessarily be met by American ground forces. On the other hand, we don't have to spell everything out in advance. The fundamental problem we're facing in Europe right now is the resurgence of Russia, and the mistake that we are making is to treat as a partner somebody who is beginning to act in a traditional adversarial role and that we are not warning the Russians about the consequences of what they're engaged in, not just in Serbia, but all over Eastern Europe.

**KINSLEY:** Dr. Brzezinski, if our purpose in Bosnia is, as Henry Kissinger says, and I think he's right, not to restore the original borders of Bosnia, however justified that might be, but simply to end the human rights abuses, the ethnic cleansing, the shelling and so forth, doesn't that mean that, since we have now intervened on the behalf of the Bosnians, whether we care to define it that way or not, we should now pressure them to take a deal along the lines that may be appealing to you but not very appealing to

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them?

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** I don't think we should pressure anybody to take any particular deal. I think the deal has to emerge, so to speak, on the ground, out of the correlation of forces, because any deal that is pressed on the parties will have to be sustained by whoever pressed them to accept it.

**KINSLEY:** Yes.

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** If they reach an accommodation because they can't win, the lines that will be drawn, de facto, are much more likely to endure.

**KINSLEY:** But the critics of this intervention, even of the air strikes, say that as much as you're going to discourage the Serbs, you're going to encourage the Muslims, and unless you prevent that, that counterweight from happening, you're never going to get anyone to take a deal.

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** Neither side is omnipotent. Neither side has unlimited resources of manpower or money. The point is, at some stage, fatigue will begin to preponderate.

**BUCHANAN:** All right, Henry Kissinger—

**Dr. BRZEZINSKI:** But we have to maintain an equilibrium between the parties concerned.

**BUCHANAN:** Henry Kissinger, looking at it right now, and the possibility, if not the probability, that they're going to extend these ultimata to these five other cities, do you anticipate that before this thing is resolved, the United States is going to have to use its air power against Serbian guns or Serbian positions?

**Dr. KISSINGER:** If we define our political objectives in the limited way we've been describing here, that is, a solution somewhere between the 32 and 41 percent of a few years ago, I do not believe it. If a serious effort is made to go beyond that, then I think it will require force, and then I would, in fact, oppose American participation.

**KINSLEY:** OK. We're out of time. Thanks very much, Dr. Kissinger. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. Dr. Buchanan and I will be back in just a moment.

*[Commercial break]*

**KINSLEY:** Pat, I've got to ask you, Dr. Brzezinski and Dr. Kissinger both see this NATO involvement in Bosnia as, not merely a humanitarian effort, but actually important for America's national strategic interest, because they see a rising Russia as a threat. You seem to agree with them about Russia as a threat, but why don't you agree with them, therefore we have to do something about it?

**BUCHANAN:** Michael, the Russians are in there because we issued that ultimatum, and I'll tell you what. I think right now Bill Clinton has got himself in a situation where he's going to issue these ultimata and the Serbs will say, "Fine, cease-fires all over Bosnia, and we'll keep what we got." Who is going to push them out, then? Then it's going to—the Muslims are going to be outraged, the Americans are going to be perceived as having sold them down the river unless we help them.

**KINSLEY:** No, the Muslims have to be told, "Cut a deal now. We're going to help you out. We have helped you out. Cut a deal now," and that's the other element in this equation.

**BUCHANAN:** And you know what? A lot of neo-cons and other people will say, "Bill Clinton is the Neville Chamber-

lain of our time," forcing peace upon people who wanted to fight.

**KINSLEY:** Well, I'll disagree with them about that, if they say that. From the left, I'm—

**BUCHANAN:** That won't help him much, Michael. From the right, Pat Buchanan.

**KINSLEY:** Hey, what about me? I'm Mike Kinsley, from the left.

**BUCHANAN:** Join us tomorrow night— yes, he is. Join us tomorrow night for another edition of Crossfire.

**KINSLEY:** *PrimeNews* is next. Let's check in for a quick look at what's coming up.

**BERNARD SHAW, PrimeNews:** Thank you, Michael. Ahead on *PrimeNews*, emotions run high outside a Florida courtroom. We'll tell you how the first day of jury selection went in the trial of a man accused of killing an abortion doctor. And fed up with graffiti? We'll tell you what some in Los Angeles are doing to combat the unwanted decorations. *PrimeNews* is next.

Copyright © 1994 by Cable News Network, Inc.

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