# With Faint Praise

A biographer finds traces of clay on the great statesman's feet.

## CHURCHILL

The Unruly Giant.

By Norman Rose.

Illustrated. 516 pp. New York: The Free Press. $25.

By Henry A. Kissinger

UR age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. The political leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to be superstars rather than heroes. The distinction is crucial. Superstars strive for approximation; heroes walk alone. Superstars crave consensus; heroes define themselves by the judgment of a future they see it as their task to bring about. Superstars seek success in a technique for eliciting support; heroes pursue success as the outgrowth of inner values.

The modern political leader rarely ventures to comment in public without having tested his views on focus groups, if indeed he does not derive them from a focus group. To a man like Churchill, the very concept of focus groups would have been unimaginable.

Thus in the space of a generation, Churchill, the quintessential hero, has been transformed from the mythic to the nearly incomprehensible. Twice in his career he crossed to the other side in the House of Commons, in effect joining the opponents of his previous associates. Such an act is generally considered political suicide if undertaken even once. Out of office for nearly a decade, he returned as the embodiment of British determination during his country's ultimate crisis. How is one to explain such a career? Deep conviction or unbridled ambition? Principle or opportunism? Our time leans to the second interpretation, all the more so as it has little understanding for the certitudes of the generation whose formative experience took place before World War I.

The 20th century has dealt cruelly with these certitudes. Faith in uninterrupted progress and in the essentially benign operation of human intelligence was succeeded by two world wars, ruthless dictatorships and ethnic exterminations. The result has been a growing proclamation of the relativity of all beliefs, and questions about the validity of Western civilization itself.

Few such doubts assailed the statesmen who grew up before World War I. To them, patriotism was not a blight but the condition of their creativity; the belief that their societies needed to be improved never reached the point of challenging basic values. It was no accident that in the hour of their peoples' travail these leaders provided a reservoir of statesmanship that accomplished the recovery of Europe. For great tasks are rarely achieved by cynics. All the key architects of European post-World War II reconstruction had been brought up in the certitudes of the Edwardian age: Churchill, Adenauer, de Gasperi, de Gaulle.

Our age, embarrassed by such inward assurance, is tempted to deconstruct the heroic element of policy, to reduce successes to components and to take the clock apart to see what makes it tick. It has become fashionable to debunk Churchill, even to assert that Churchill's most singular achievement, holding Britain together to fight alone against Nazi Germany, may well have been contrary to Britain's long-term interest.

Norman Rose's biography, "Churchill: The Unruly Giant," belongs to this genre. It represents a point of view I do not share, and I state my bias early. Mr. Rose, the Chaim Weizmann Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has produced a comprehensive and readable biography that adequately sums up the key aspects of Churchill's life. What it lacks is any appreciation for the meaning of Churchill's purposes. Jean Monnet once said that all people of great achievement are ambitious. But the key question is whether they are ambitious to be or ambitious to do.

Mr. Rose never addresses that question, though he clearly leans to the first Interpretation. Given his basi-

cally debunking premises, he does make a serious effort to be fair, presenting positive assessments together with significant criticisms. But negative comments are generally provided in much more detail. Thus the reader is more likely to have fixed in his mind the charge that Churchill abandoned two fellow officers in escaping from a Boer prison than the fact that he hid out near the prison to enable them to join him. No seemingly fair description of events can fail to pale after a comment like this: "To the untrained public eye, and naturally to that of his more jaundiced colleagues, his image as an adventurer bent on self-glorification was more than confirmed by his flamboyant behavior. No doubt, he thrilled to the ride on a perilous merry-go-round, believing that he would be able to descend gracefully to general applause." Or: "No record of these meetings exists. But Churchill found it difficult to keep his mouth shut at any gathering."

It is in fact nearly impossible to find unqualified appreciation for any of Churchill's actions in this volume. Churchill's warnings about Nazi Germany's purposes in the 1930's are belittled on the ground that at first his views on Hitler were less than clear and that by the time he had fully formulated them they represented little more than an advanced version of the conventional wisdom. Even when Churchill rallies Britain to stand alone, he is treated to half-praises. Mr. Rose concentrates above all on Churchill's rear-guard action to preserve Britain's influence disproportionate to its power, demonstrating that along the way he was increasingly cold-shouldered by his stronger allies.

So it is almost inevitable that this book concludes with the question of what Churchill's life actually accomplished. Mr. Rose cites as many shortcomings as he does contributions, and even questions whether the great months of the summer of 1940, when Churchill rallied Britain to stand alone, were an aberration when measured against the rest of Churchill's life. In the end, the cumulative impact of the book is as if an art critic, in analyzing a portrait, had dissected the adequate rendering of every limb but never got around to conveying the overall impact of the personality.

The ultimate test of statesmanship — and Churchill was the dominant British statesman of his period — is a combination of insight and courage. Insight leads to

assessments that define a society's freedom of action, while courage enables the statesman to act on his convictions before they are generally understood. Great statesmen operate on the outer margin of their society's capabilities; weak statesmen tend to be overwhelmed by events.

In my view, Churchill met the test. His judgments of the trends of history were uniformly perceptive and often profound. Sometimes the practical applications he drew from his insights were vitiated by impetuosity, but equally frequently by bungled execution for which he was not responsible. A product of the Edwardian age, Churchill believed that peace required a balance of power, and so long as Britain was strong enough to tip, or at least to maintain, the scales of that balance, his prescriptions were generally prescient.

Before World War I, Churchill recognized that France was no longer capable of standing up to Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its historic isolation in favor of an alliance with France. In the 1920's, he wanted to involve Germany in building a world order by propitiating Berlin's resentments over the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930's, he recognized the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge; Mr. Rose misses the point when he presents it as a largely technical debate about various levels of rearmament.

IN 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness and romanticism to which Mr. Rose ascribes it. True, Churchill had attitudes our age would consider romantic. But had he been the ultimate practitioner of Realpolitik, he would almost surely have come to the same conclusion. From the point of view of Realpolitik, Britain's choice was between the postwar hegemony of Germany and that of the United States. Churchill chose the United States as the far more compatible partner. The persistence with which he pursued that course, the magnanimity with which he turned the other cheek to American rebuffs, reflected the knowledge — surely unwelcome — that Britain had lost the power to shape the world order. Henceforth, it needed to achieve its aims through persuasion. The "special relationship" with the United States was a practical conclusion and a major achievement — unique because the weaker partner held up its end by the merit of its advice and the loyalty of its conduct.

To be sure, there are realities of power not to be overcome by eloquence, consultation or diplomatic skill. Churchill could not convince his American allies that the political shape of the postwar world would be importantly affected by the position of the armies when the war ended. But he left a residue of trust and a relationship solid enough to overcome differences in perspective until the architecture of the cold-war period was accomplished, with the two allies again in substantial harmony. In the late 1940's, Churchill greatly contributed to the intellectual structure of the cold-war world by a series of speeches that were as farsighted as any in the 1930's — though they are slighted by Mr. Rose. By the time Churchill had returned to office in 1951, it was too late to achieve his last great dream of transcending the cold war and shaping a new world order, a task that had to wait for another generation.

For readers interested in an account of what Churchill did, Mr. Rose's book offers a workmanlike, if not very generous, treatment. For those who are concerned with the import of Churchill's life, one is tempted to invoke the judgment once made about graduates of the French hautes écoles: "They know everything. Unfortunately they don't know anything else."

HULTON DEUTSCHOF FROM "CHURCHILL, THE UNRULY GIANT"

Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, inspecting naval recruits, 1912.

Henry A. Kissinger is the author of "Diplomacy."

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

7

With Faint Praise

CHURCHILL

The Unruly Giant.

By Norman Rose.

By Henry A. Kissinger

NY TIMES BOOK REVIEW

Sunday, July 16, 1995

OUR age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. The political leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to be superstars rather than heroes. The distinction is crucial. Superstars strive for approximation; heroes walk alone. Superstars crave consensus; heroes define themselves by the judgment of a future they see it as their task to bring about. Superstars seek success in a technique for eliciting support; heroes pursue success as the outgrowth of inner values.

Mr. Rose never addresses that question, though he clearly leans to the first interpretation. Given his basi-

With Faint Praise

CHURCHILL

The Unruly Giant.

By Norman Rose.

By Henry A. Kissinger

OUR age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. The political leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to be superstars rather than heroes. The distinction is crucial. Superstars strive for approbation; heroes walk alone. Superstars crave consensus; heroes define themselves by the judgment of a future they see it as their task to bring about. Superstars seek success in a technique for eliciting support; heroes pursue success as the outgrowth of inner values.

[lc]

JUN-27-1995 10:10

212 556 1320

99%

P.02

SL: KISS2 QU: BAGEWE-BKS

HJ: Y029.92/0202

FM:

FG: xbk

BY: PC ;05/31,11:41 OP: BAGEWE;06/27,09:49

FR: COPY-BKS ;06/26,14:59

NOTE: BOOKS/KISSINGER 31.6bg tf?

PRINTED: 09:59 27-JUN-95

<gfauthor>Henry A. Kissinger needs id.

<gfreview>CHURCHILL[MC]

The Unruly Giant.

By Norman Rose.

The Free Press. $25.[MC]

<gfbyline>By Henry A. Kissinger[MC]

<gfd>0[MC]UR age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. The political leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to be superstars rather than heroes.

The distinction is crucial. Superstars strive for appro-
bation; heroes walk alone. Superstars crave consensus;
heroes define themselves by the judgment of a future
they see it as their task to bring about. Superstars seek
success in a technique for eliciting support; heroes
pursue success as the outgrowth of inner values.

The 20th century has dealt cruelly with these certi-
tudes. Faith in uninterrupted progress and in the essen-
tially benign operation of human intelligence was suc-
ceeded by two world wars, ruthless dictatorships and
ethnic exterminations. The result has been a growing
proclamation of the relativity of all beliefs, and ques-
tions about the validity of Western civilization itself.

P.2

JUN 27 '95 09:14AM NY TIMES-BOOK REVIEW 212 5561320

[L]

JUN-27-1995 10:11

212 556 1320

9%

P.03

PAGE: 2

SLUG: KISS2

up before World War I. To them, patriotism was not a
blight but the condition of their creativity; the belief
that their societies needed to be improved never
reached the point of challenging basic values. It was no
accident that in the hour of their peoples' travail, these
leaders provided a reservoir of statesmanship that
accomplished the recovery of Europe. For great tasks
are rarely achieved by cynics. All the key architects of
European post-World War II reconstruction had been
brought up in the certitudes of the Edwardian age:
Churchill, Adenauer, de Gasperi, de Gaulle.

Our age, embarrassed by such inward assurance,
is tempted to deconstruct the heroic element of policy,
to reduce successes to components and to take the clock
apart to see what makes it tick. It has become fashion-
able to debunk Churchill, even to assert that Churchill's
most singular achievement, holding Britain together to
fight alone against Nazi Germany, may well have been
contrary to Britain's long-term interest.

Norman Rose's biography, "Churchill: The Unruly
Giant," belongs to this genre. It represents a point of
view I do not share, and I state my bias early on in order
to avoid what I have experienced often enough -
having a reviewer's philosophical disagreement pre-
sented in the guise of objective truth.

Mr. Rose, the Chaim Weizmann Professor of Inter-
national Relations at the Hebrew University in Jerusa-
lem, has produced a comprehensive and readable biog-
raphy that adequately sums up the key aspects of
Churchill's life. What it lacks is any appreciation for the
meaning of Churchill's purposes. Jean Monnet once
said that all people of great achievement are ambitious.
But the key question is whether they are ambitious to
be or ambitious to do.

Mr. Rose never addresses that question, though he
clearly leans to the first interpretation. Given his basi-
cally debunking premises, he does make a serious
effort to be fair, presenting positive assessments to-
gether with significant criticisms. But negative com-
ments are generally provided in much more detail.
Thus the reader is more likely to have fixed in his mind
the charge that Churchill abandoned two fellow officers
in escaping from a Boer prison than the fact that he hid
out near the prison to enable them to join him. No
seemingly fair description of events can fail to pale
after a comment like this: "To the untrained public eye,
and naturally to that of his more jaundiced colleagues,
his image as an adventurer bent on self-glorification

P.3

JUN 27 '95 09:15AM NY TIMES-BOOK REVIEW 212 5561320

[L]

JUN-27-1995 10:11

212 556 1320

99%

P.04

SLUG: KISS2

was more than confirmed by his flamboyant behavior. No doubt, he thrilled to the ride on a perilous merry-go-round, believing that he would be able to descend gracefully to general applause.'' Or: ``No record of these meetings exists. But Churchill found it difficult to keep his mouth shut at any gathering.''

It is in fact nearly impossible to find unqualified appreciation for any of Churchill's actions in this volume. Churchill's warnings about Nazi Germany's purposes in the 1930's are belittled on the ground that at first his views on Hitler were less than clear and that by the time he had fully formulated them, they represented little more than an advanced version of the conventional wisdom. Even when Churchill rallied Britain to stand alone, he is treated to half-praises: ``Churchill's natural inclination was to fight on, to be acclaimed as an illustrious war leader.'' From there, Mr. Rose concentrates above all on Churchill's rear-guard action to preserve Britain's influence disproportionate to its power, demonstrating that along the way he was increasingly cold-shouldered by his stronger allies.

The ultimate test of statesmanship - and Churchill was the dominant British statesman of his period - is a combination of insight and courage. Insight leads to assessments that define a society's freedom of action, while courage enables the statesman to act on his convictions before they are generally understood. Great statesmen operate on the outer margin of their society's capabilities; weak statesmen tend to be overwhelmed by events.

JUN 27 '95 09:16AM NY TIMES-BOOK REVIEW 212 5561320

P.4

[L]

JUN-27-1995 10:12

212 556 1320

99%

P.05

SLUG: KISS2

Before World War I, Churchill recognized that France was no longer capable of standing up to Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its historic isolation in favor of an alliance with France. In the 1920's, he wanted to involve Germany by propitiating its resentments over the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930's, he recognized the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge; Mr. Rose misses the point when he presents it as a largely technical debate about various levels of rearmament.

In 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness to which Mr. Rose ascribes it. Britain was certain to emerge from the war in a much diminished position. Its real choice was between the postwar hegemony of Germany or of the United States. Churchill chose the United States as the far more compatible partner. An element of romanticism may well have been involved, as Mr. Rose asserts. But the persistence with which Churchill pursued that course, the magnanimity with which he turned the other cheek to American rebuffs, reflected the knowledge - surely unwelcome - that Britain had lost the power to shape the world order. Henceforth, it needed to achieve its aims through persuasion. The "special relationship" with the United States was a practical conclusion and a major achievement - unique because the weaker partner held up its end by the merit of its advice and the loyalty of its conduct.

To be sure, there are realities of power not to be overcome by eloquence, consultation or diplomatic skill. Churchill could not convince his American allies that the political shape of the postwar world would be importantly affected by the position of the armies when the war ended. But he left a residue of trust and a relationship solid enough to overcome differences in perspective until the architecture of the cold-war period was accomplished, with the two allies again in substantial harmony. In the late 1940's, Churchill greatly contributed to the intellectual structure of the cold-war world by a series of speeches that were as farsighted as any in the 1930's - though they are slighted by Mr. Rose. By the time Churchill had returned to office in 1951, it was too late to achieve his last great dream of transcending the cold war and shaping a new world order, a task that had to wait for another generation.

PAGE: 4

P.5

P.02

66

0231 955 212

01:01 9661-22-NDC

FOR PUBLICATION JULY 16

SL: KISS2 QU: BAGEWE-BKS

HJ: Y029.92/0202

FM:

FG: xbk

FR: COPY-BKS ;06/26,14:59

PRINTED: 09:59 27-JUN-95

<gfreview>CHURCHILL [MC]

The Unruly Giant.

By Norman Rose.

The Free Press. $25. [MC]

<gfbyline>By Henry A. Kissinger [MC]

<gfdo>O [MC] UR age finds it difficult to come to grips with figures like Winston Churchill. The political leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to be superstars rather than heroes.

[Y]

JUN-27-1995 10:11

212 556 1320

9%

P.03

SLUG: KISS2

PAGE: 2

LZ

JUN-27-1995 10:11

212 556 1320

9%

P.04

SLUG: KISS2

P.05

9%

212 556 1320

JUN-27-1995 10:12

[Y]

SLUG: KISS2

PAGE: 4

Before World War I, Churchill recognized that France was no longer capable of standing up to Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its historic isolation in favor of an alliance with France. In the 1920's, he wanted to involve Germany by propitiating its resentments over the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930's, he recognized the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge; Mr. Rose misses the point when he presents it as a largely technical debate about various levels of rearment.

CHURCHILL, AN UNRULY LIFE

By Norman Rose.

450 pp. New York:

The Free Press. $25.

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

Our age finds it difficult to come to grips with
figures like Winston Churchill. For the political
leaders with whom we are familiar generally aspire to
be superstars rather than heroes. The distinction is
crucial. Superstars strive for approbation; heroes
walk alone. Superstars crave consensus; heroes define
themselves by the judgement of a future they see it as
their task to bring about. Superstars seek success in
a technique for eliciting support; heroes pursue
success as the outgrowth of inner values.

The modern political leader rarely ventures into
public comment without having tested his views on
focus groups, if he does not derive them from a focus
group. To a man like Churchill, the very concept of
focus groups would be unimaginable.

Thus in the space of a generation, Churchill, the
quintessential hero, has been transformed from the
mythic to the nearly incomprehensible. Twice in his
career, he crossed to the other side in the House of
Commons, in effect joining the opponents of his

1

[L]

previous associates. Such an act is generally considered political suicide if undertaken once. Out of office for nearly a decade, he returned as the embodiment of British determination during his country's ultimate crisis. How is one to explain such a career? Deep conviction or unbridled ambition? Principle or opportunism? Our time leans to the second interpretation, all the more so as it has little understanding for the certitudes of the generation whose formative experience was prior to World War I.

The Twentieth Century has dealt cruelly with these certitudes. Faith in uninterrupted progress and in the essentially benign operation of human intelligence was succeeded by two world wars, ruthless dictatorships, and ethnic exterminations. The consequence has been a growing proclamation of the relativity of all beliefs, and questions about the validity of Western civilization itself.

Few such doubts assailed the statesmen who grew up before World War I. To them, patriotism was not a blight but the condition of their creativity; the belief that their societies needed to be improved never reached the point of challenging basic values. It was no accident that, in the hour of their people's travail, these leaders provided a reservoir of statesmanship that accomplished the recovery of

2

[LC]

Europe. For great tasks are rarely achieved by cynics. All the key architects of European post-World War II reconstruction were octogenarians who had been brought up in the certitudes of the Edwardian Age: Churchill, Adenauer, de Gasperi, de Gaulle.

Our age, embarrassed by such inward assurance, is tempted to deconstruct the heroic element of policy, to reduce successes to components, and to take the clock apart to see what makes it tick. It has become fashionable to debunk Churchill: John Charmley's biography goes so far as to assert that Churchill's most singular achievement, holding Britain together to fight alone against Nazi Germany, may well have been contrary to Britain's long-term interest.

Professor Rose's biography, *Churchill, an Unruly? Life*, belongs to this genre. It is a point of view I do not share, and I state my bias early on in order to avoid what I have experienced often enough - having a reviewer's philosophical disagreement presented in the guise of objective truth.

Professor Rose has produced a comprehensive and readable biography which adequately sums up the key aspects of Churchill's life. What it lacks is any appreciation for the meaning of Churchill's purposes. Jean Monnet once said that all personalities of achievement are ambitious: but the key question is

3

[Lc]

Professor Rose never addresses that question,
though he clearly leans to the first interpretation.
Given his basically debunking premises, he does make
a serious effort to be fair, presenting positive
assessments together with significant criticisms. But
negative comments are generally given in much more
detail. Thus the reader is more likely to have fixed
in his mind the charge that Churchill abandoned two
fellow officers in escaping from a Boer prison than
the fact that he hid out near the prison to enable
them to join him (pp. 52-3). No seemingly fair
description of events can fail to pale after a comment
like this: "To the untrained public eye, and naturally
to that of his more jaundiced colleagues, his image
as an adventurer based on self-glorification was more
than confirmed by his flamboyant behavior. No doubt he
thrilled to the ride on a perilous merry-go-round,
believing that he would be able to descend gracefully
to general applause." (p. 135) Or: "No record of these
meetings exist. But Churchill found it difficult to
keep his mouth shut at any gathering." (p. 153)

It is in fact nearly impossible to find
unqualified appreciation for any of Churchill's
actions in Professor Rose's volume. Thus Churchill's
warnings about Nazi Germany's purposes in the 1930s

4

[LC]

are belittled on the ground that Churchill's early
views on Hitler were less than clear-cut and that, by
the time he had formulated them, they represented
little more than an advanced version of the
conventional wisdom. Even when Churchill rallied
Britain to stand alone, he is treated to half-praises:
"Churchill's natural inclination was to fight on to be
acclaimed as an illustrious war leader." (p. 324) And
Professor Rose denigrates even that ambition by
dragging up this obscure Churchillian quote: Britain,
Churchill allegedly said though it is not clear to
whom, "had to hold on for another two or three months
to demonstrate to the world that Germany had not
beaten us." (p. 324) From there, Professor Rose
concentrates above all on Churchill's rear-guard
action to preserve British influence disproportionate
to its power, demonstrating that, along the way he was
increasingly cold-shouldered by his stronger allies.

So it is almost inevitable that Rose's book
concludes with the question of what Churchill's life
actually accomplished. It cites as many doubts as it
does contributions, and even questions whether the
great months of the summer of 1940, when Churchill
rallied Britain to stand alone, were an aberration
when measured against the rest of Churchill's life. In
the end, the cumulative impact of the book is as if an

5

[10]

The ultimate test of statesmanship - and
Churchill was the dominant British statesman of his
period - is a combination of insight and courage.
Insight leads to assessments which define a society's
freedom of action, while courage enables the statesman
to act on his convictions before they are generally
understood. Great statesmen operate on the outer
margin of their society's capabilities; weak statesmen
tend to be overwhelmed by events.

In my view, Churchill met both of these tests.
His judgments of the trends of history were uniformly
perceptive and often profound. Sometimes the practical
applications he drew from his insights were vitiated
by impetuosity; but equally frequently by bungled
execution for which he was not responsible. A product
of the Edwardian Age, Churchill believed that peace
required a balance of power and so long as Britain was
strong enough to tip, or at least to maintain, the
scales of that balance, his prescriptions were
generally prescient.

Before the First World War, Churchill recognized
that France was no longer capable of standing up to
Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its

6

[L]

historic isolation in favor of an alliance with
France. In the 1920s, he wanted to add Germany to the
balance of power by propitiating its resentments at
the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930s, he recognized
the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge;
Professor Rose misses the point when he presents it as
a largely technical debate about various levels of
rearmament.

In 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on
reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness
to which Professor Rose ascribes it. Britain was
certain to emerge from the war in a much diminished
position. Its real choice was between the post-war
hegemony of Germany or of the United States. Churchill
chose the United States as the far more compatible
partner. An element of Romanticism may well have been
involved, as Professor Rose asserts. But the
persistence with which Churchill pursued that course,
the magnanimity with which he turned the other cheek
to American rebuffs, reflected the knowledge - surely
unwelcome - that Britain had lost the power to shape
the world order. Henceforth, it needed to achieve its
aims through persuasion. The "special relationship"
with America was a practical conclusion and a major
achievement - unique among societies in which the
weaker partner held up its end by the merit of its

7

[L.C.]

To be sure, there are differentials of power not
to be overcome by eloquence, consultation, or
diplomatic skill. Churchill could not convince his
American allies that the political shape of the
postwar world would be importantly affected by the
position of the armies when the war ended. But he left
a residue of trust and a relationship solid enough to
overcome differences in perspective until the
architecture of the Cold War period was accomplished,
with the two allies again in substantial harmony. In
the late 1940s, Churchill greatly contributed to the
intellectual structure of the Cold War world by a
series of speeches that were as farsighted as any in
the 1930s - though they are slighted by Professor
Rose. By the time Churchill had returned to office, it
was too late and Britain alone was too weak to achieve
his last great dream of transcending the Cold War and
shaping a new world order, a task which had to wait
for another generation.

For readers interested in an account of what
Churchill did, Professor Rose's book offers a
workmanlike, if not very generous, account. For those
who are concerned with the import of Churchill's life,
one is tempted to invoke the judgment once made about
graduates of the French haute ecoles: "They know

8

1663 WORDS

KISSINGER *NY TIMES BOOK REVIEW* 5/28/95 - PM

[Y]

2
focus groups would be unimaginable.

Thus in the space of a generation, Churchill, the quintessential hero, has been transformed from the mythic to the nearly incomprehensible. Twice in his career, he crossed to the other side in the House of Commons, in effect joining the opponents of his previous associates. Such an act is generally considered political suicide if undertaken once. Out of office for nearly a decade, he returned as the embodiment of British determination during his country's ultimate crisis. How is one to explain such a career? Deep conviction or unbridled ambition? Principle or opportunism? Our time leans to the second interpretation, all the more so as it has little understanding for the certitudes of the generation whose formative experience was prior to World War I.

[Y]

3

[Y]

4

[Y]

5

do not share, and I state my bias early on in order to
avoid what I have experienced often enough - having a
reviewer's philosophical disagreement presented in the
guise of objective truth.

Professor Rose has produced a comprehensive and
readable biography which adequately sums up the key
aspects of Churchill's life. What it lacks is any
appreciation for the meaning of Churchill's purposes.
Jean Monnet once said that all personalities of
achievement are ambitious: but the key question is
whether they are ambitious to be or ambitious to do.

[Y]

6

CYJ

7

It is in fact nearly impossible to find unqualified appreciation for any of Churchill's actions in Professor Rose's volume. Thus Churchill's warnings about Nazi Germany's purposes in the 1930s are belittled on the ground that Churchill's early views on Hitler were less than clear-cut and that, by the time he had formulated them, they represented little more than an advanced version of the conventional wisdom. Even when Churchill rallied Britain to stand alone, he is treated to half-praises: "Churchill's natural inclination was to fight on to be acclaimed as an illustrious war leader." (p. 324) And Professor Rose denigrates even that ambition by dragging up this obscure Churchillian quote: Britain, Churchill allegedly said though it is not clear to whom, "had to hold on for another two or three months

[Y]

8

So it is almost inevitable that Rose's book
concludes with the question of what Churchill's life
actually accomplished. It cites as many doubts as it
does contributions, and even questions whether the
great months of the summer of 1940, when Churchill
rallied Britain to stand alone, were an aberration
when measured against the rest of Churchill's life. In
the end, the cumulative impact of the book is as if an
art critic, in analyzing a portrait, had dissected the
adequate rendering of every limb but never got around

[Y]

9

10

Before the First World War, Churchill recognized
that France was no longer capable of standing up to
Germany alone and that Britain needed to abandon its
historic isolation in favor of an alliance with
France. In the 1920s, he wanted to add Germany to the
balance of power by propitiating its resentments at
the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1930s, he recognized
the geopolitical nature of Hitler's challenge;
Professor Rose misses the point when he presents it as
a largely technical debate about various levels of
rearmament.

CYJ

11

In 1940 Churchill's decision to fight on reflected something far deeper than the pugnaciousness to which Professor Rose ascribes it. Britain was certain to emerge from the war in a much diminished position. Its real choice was between the post-war hegemony of Germany or of the United States. Churchill chose the United States as the far more compatible partner. An element of Romanticism may well have been involved, as Professor Rose asserts. But the persistence with which Churchill pursued that course, the magnanimity with which he turned the other cheek to American rebuffs, reflected the knowledge - surely unwelcome - that Britain had lost the power to shape the world order. Henceforth, it needed to achieve its aims through persuasion. The "special relationship" with America was a practical conclusion and a major

[Y]

12

achievement - unique among societies in which the weaker partner held up its end by the merit of its advice and the loyalty of its conduct.

CJD

13

For readers interested in an account of what Churchill did, Professor Rose's book offers a workmanlike, if not very generous, account. For those who are concerned with the import of Churchill's life, one is tempted to invoke the judgment once made about graduates of the French haute ecoles: "They know everything. Unfortunately they don't know anything else."

MAY-28-1995 19:37 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.02

Thus in the space of a generation, Churchill has been transformed from the mythical into the nearly incomprehensible. Twice in his career, he crossed to the other side in the House of Commons, in effect joining the opponents of his previous associates. Such an act is generally considered political suicide if undertaken once. Out of office for nearly a decade, he returned as the embodiment of British determination during his country's ultimate crisis. How is one to explain such a career? Deep conviction or unbridled ambition? Principle or opportunism? Our time leans to the second interpretation, all the more so as it has little understanding for the certitudes of the generation whose formative experience was prior to World War I.

P.02

FAX NO. 4077450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:50

MAY-28-1995 19:38 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.03

P.03 FAX NO. 4077450358

GOLDHAMMER MAY-28-95 SUN 17:50

MAY-28-1995 19:38 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.04

[Y]

architects
All the key figures of European post-World War II
*European construction* / 
recovery were octogenarians who had been brought up
in the certitudes of the Edwardian Age: Churchill,
Adenauer, de Gasperi (p77), de Gaulle.

Our age, embarrassed by such inward assurance,
is tempted to deconstruct the heroic element of
policy, to reduce successes to components, and to take
the clock apart to see what makes it tick. It has
become fashionable to debunk Churchill: John Charmly's
(p77) biography goes so far as to imply that
Churchill's most singular achievement, holding Britain
together to fight alone against Nazi Germany, may well
have been contrary to Britain's long-term interests.

Professor Rose's biography,

'Please give name of the book.

P.04

FAX NO. 4077450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:50

MAY-28-1995 19:38 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.05

5

Professor Rose has produced a comprehensive and readable biography which adequately sums up the key aspects of Churchill's life. What it lacks is any appreciation for the meaning of Churchill's purposes. Jean Monnet once said that all personalities of achievement are ambitious: but the key question is whether they are ambitious to be, or ambitious to do.

Professor Rose never addresses that question though he clearly leans to the first interpretation. Given his basically debunking premises, he does make a serious effort to be fair, presenting positive

P.05

FAX NO. 4077450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:50

MAY-28-1995 19:39 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.06

[Y]

7

It is in fact nearly impossible to find
unqualified appreciation for any of Churchill's
actions. Thus his warnings about Nazi Germany "are
belittled on the ground that Churchill's early views
on Hitler were less than clear-cut and that, by the
time he had formulated them, they represented little
more than an advanced version of the conventional
wisdom. Even when Churchill rallied Britain to stand
alone, he is treated to half-praises: "Churchill's
natural inclination was to fight on to be acclaimed as
an illustrious war leader." (p. 324) And Professor
Rose denigrates even that ambition by dragging up this
obscure Churchillian quote: Britain, Churchill
allegedly said though it is not clear to whom, "had to
hold on for another two or three months to demonstrate

P.07 FAX NO. 407450358

GOLDHAMMER MAY-28-95 SUN 17:51

MAY-28-1995 19:39 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.07

CZ

8

From there, Professor Rose concentrates above all on
Churchill's rear-guard action to preserve (British)
influence disproportionate to its power, and (that),
on the way, he was increasingly cold-shouldered by his
stronger allies.

P.08

FAX NO. 407450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:51

MAY-28-1995 19:40 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.08

9
to conveying the overall impact of the personality.

The ultimate test of statesmanship - and
Churchill was the quintessential British statesman of
his period - is a combination of insight and courage.
Insight leads to assessments which define a society's
freedom of action, while courage enables the statesman
to act on his convictions before they are generally
understood. Great statesmen operate on the outer
margin of their society's capabilities; weak statesmen
tend to be overwhelmed by events.

P.09

FAX NO. 4077450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:51

MAY-28-1995 19:40 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.09

11

P.11

FAX NO. 4077450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:52

MAY-28-1995 19:40 FROM

TO

14077450358 P.10

12

To be sure, there are differentials of power not
to be overcome by a consultation and diplomatic skill.
Churchill could not convince his American allies that
the political shape of the postwar world would be
importantly affected by the position of the armies
when the war ended. But he left a residue of trust and
a relationship solid enough to overcome differences in
perspective until the architecture of the Cold War
period was accomplished, with the two allies again in
substantial harmony. In the late 1940s, Churchill
greatly contributed to the intellectual structure of
the Cold War world by a series of speeches that were
as farsighted as any in the 1930s - though they are

P. 12

FAX NO. 407450358

GOLDHAMMER

MAY-28-95 SUN 17:52