In the great periods of European &abinet diplomacy between the
Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution and between the Congress
of Vienna and the outbreak of the first World War, wars were limited
but not through an agreement on the battlefield. Rather there existed
a political frame-work which led to a general consciousness of limited
risks. This political frame-work was due to several factors: There was
to begin with a conscious decision that the upheavals of the Thirty Year's
War and of the Napoleonic wars should not occur again. This decision
proved most effective in the period immediately following the wars, but
but it gave the international orders created by the Treaty of Westphalia
and the Congress of Vienna the breathing spell necessary to convince the
major powers that none of the outstanding disputes involved their survival.
More important was the fact that the international order did not contain
a revolutionary power. No state was so dissatisfied with the peace settlement
that it sought to gain its ends by overthrowing it and no power considered
its domestic notion of justice as incompatible with that of the other
components of the international order. Finally, in an era of relatively
stable weapons technology, both the strength of the powers and the assessment

that we are living in a revolutionary period. For the justification of
peaceful coexistence advanced by the Soviets is precisely their conviction
that it will enable them to subvert the existing structure by means other
than an all-out war. ①

Nor is the nature of power relationships more reassuring. Even
with a less volatile technology a two-power world would have an inherent
element of instability because an increase in strength of one side cannot
be made up by superior political dexterity but is tantamount to an
absolute weakening of the other side. Moreover, the weapons technology
is far from stable. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons
system would be good for a generation at least, while today it may be
out-dated when it has barely passed the blue-print stage. Yet the failure
to plan on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons might at any given
point of time create a vital weakness. In the technological race, moreover,
the side which has adopted the military doctrine that its opponent can
routine of strength. On the contrary, strength is ephemeral; it must be
always strike the first blow is at a distinct disadvantage, for it cannot
afford a single mistake; it cannot afford to fall behind even for an instant.

The side which has adopted the opposite doctrine must phase its planning and procurement over an indefinite period while it has time to prepare for the war. Its opponent, if he is determined on a show-down, can plan for a target date and need prepare only for the war. It is planning to win.

① For an expansion of these ideas see Lukan Ch.