DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NARA, Date 5/20

TELCONE
Fred Brisson/Kissinger

10:37 a.m. 11/1/71

Brisson said his new play is opening in NY on NOv. 14 -- HAK invited and
can bring anybody. HAK indicated he would like to come and bring N. Magginnes.
He asked FB if he and his wife would be coming to Washington soon but FB said
not until the beginning of Dec. FB suggested that if he did come for the opening,
why didn't they get together on the Sat., the 13th, for dinner -- as he never
goes to his own openings. HAK agreed and said he would have them down for
dinner in the beginning of Dec.

By.

NARA,

Dato 5/20

TELECON
Dr. Kenneth Riland
11/1/71 4:30pm

R: I'm seeing the President in half an hour.

K: Are you here?

R: Don't you tell anybody. Then I get a 6:30 plane. How would you like me to see you after the President?

K: In half an hour?

R: No, I'm seeing the President in half an hour. I could see you after.

K: I'm free now.

R: Max right now?

K: Yes.

R: Get on your little German ice skates and get the hell over here.

K: Okay.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mike Wallace
11-1-71; 9:10 p.m.

W: Thank you for calling back. Welcome home and congratulations on what seems to be a successful trip. I am watching Chinese film on NET. When are you going to sit with me?

K: They still have not made a decision here.

W: While you were gone I talked to Ziegler. I mentioned second of November and he said that's too soon. When will they make a decision?

K: Why don't you bug Ziegler again?

W: Ziegler is the man then?

K: Haldeman is the man but I don't know if you can get through to him.

W: Ziegler said Henry just wants to say no to everyone.

K: If I do it with anyone, I would like to do it with you.

K: Where did you send Meg Osmer?

W: Over to Sweden -- trying to get Venerstrom (?). Here piece was on last night -- not very good -- Survival in the City.

K: She would be too earnest.

W: That's exactly right. She has not done enough on the air to get enough polish, enough flair. She is a good researcher, producer but she is not a performer yet. I have tried to persuade her to go on the desk and do apprentice work then I am sure she would be fine. She is a very determined girl -- as I am sure you know.

K: When is she coming back?

W: Who knows -- she will probably stay until she succeeds in getting it. Did you gain weight?

K: About five lbs, which is disgraceful.

TELECON
J. e Alsop

11/1/71 p.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

A: A: I was tempted to give Julie a message that if you can lunch with Jaon Braden at Sans Souci, you can give me a 30-second telephone call. How are you?

K: Fine, but unbelievably busy.

A: I long to see you. When can we get together for a talk? I have got
many things to talk to you about, and Frankly, I'm worried.

K: All I can say is if you knew what I know, you'd be more worried.

A: I know.

K: God, someone put that borexino on my schedule.

A: Why don't you kick him?

K: That's what I'm going to do.

A: How about lunch some time this week?

K: Lunch isn't good. I've got a White House dinner tomorrow night and
your dinner Wednesday night. But is he out of danger?

A: Not completely, but about 95 percent.

K: That's wonderful. Let's aim for Wednesday afternoon.

A: Good, Good.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
11/3/71 9:05a.m.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

R: There's a problem. They are going to say on the Hill . . . that the President told Scott he would veto the Cooper-Church Amendment, and he used that to defeat it, and they are going to say "if that is the case, why are you so excited about the defeat of it?"

K: What happened is this: McGregor got together about 20 Senators the day I was back. They heard what I said. I didn't use the word "veto"; I just said we couldn't agree with it

R: You said the President said he couldn't sign the bill in its present form.

K: I talked with MacGregor and this was not his recollection. Scott wanted to take three words out of it and I pointed out that that still didn't make it acceptable. My talk was on the substance of the thing.

R: The problem is Scott used it on the floor as an argument against the amendment. He said he'd been told the President would veto it.

K: Unless he construes the word "unacceptable" to mean we'll veto it . . . They wanted me to say it was all right. Then when I said it wasn't from an Executive point of view that doesn't determine legislative strategy.

R: In this case though the tough fighter is the Republican Leader who said that. So either I have to say he was not authorized to say it, or he didn't. They were all construed it the same way. Aiken talked to me yesterday and said this is what the White House said.

K: But I don't understand, even if we threaten a veto how that authorized them to kill the bill.

R: Well, the President said in effect if you amend Cooper-Church I will veto it -- shows he doesn't think it is vital.

K: No, it shows the provisions for Southeast Asia they were emasculating were vital.

R: Cooper-Church doesn't emasculate. It says only that ________.

K: And that you could use air power for American troops and nothing else.

R: The argument they make is if the President was going to veto it under these circumstances, then it is not vital to the whole foreign policy. How can you say it's vital if the President is prepared to veto it. And Scott didn't mince any words on the floor. He made the doves ________ with the conservatives.

K: How about saying we consider this unacceptable in relation to the foreign security and assistance which is a major part of the bill.

R: That's not what they'll tackle me on. But you were saying it was so unacceptable that the President would prefer not to have any.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By NARA, Dalo 5/26", "TELECON\nSecretary Rogers", "11/3/71 9:05a.m. p. 2", "K: I came back. I was told by MacGregor we didn't want to compromise on Cooper-Church. And that is what was done.", "R: MacGregor said Scott asked you a question: \"Henry, will the President sign this bill if Cooper-Church is included in it?\" and you said under the present language he would not sign it. He construed that to mean he would veto it, and he used it on the floor to defeat the bill.", "K: Who said this, Scott or Clark?", "R: MacGregor.", "K: Oh, then it must be right.", "R: And Aiken said you said it. What I am trying to figure out is what I can say. It seems to me the best thing is \"did the President day he wanted us to veto it?\"", "K: First of all, we considered Cooper-Church absolutely unacceptable. It was gutting the whole program. So if you choices are an unacceptable bill or no bill and they take the choice to give them no bill, that makes them more responsible? That is not an argument I can follow.", "K: You could protect yourself by saying \"I'm not sure what the President would do\" but hedge a little. I'm going to say that was what you were trying to convey.", "K: I'm not sure he would sign it.", "R: I know. It's just that, the leader of the Republican party said that the President would not sign this bill. Normally the President doesn't put himself in that position. In this case, if Scott had said the President might veto it, it would have been okay. But he said he will veto it -- that's a little different. The President usually hedges on these things.", "K: There are two problems: first, it could have been phrased more falcitiously. But second, it alwyas is remarkable to me . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

11/3/71 9:05 a.m. p. 3

K: The strategy Clark MacGregor outlined to me was that we would rather operate on a continuing resolution than on a foreign aid bill plus Cooper-Church.

R: If the President had said "I would rather have no foreign assistance bill and I would veto it if Cooper-Church were attached, then I am prepared to say that. I don't think he would have said that. I'll take a look at what Scott said, and see how he feels. I don't want to pull the rug out from under him and I don't want to embarrass you. I don't want to make the Hill mad either because we may have trouble getting a continuing resolution. I'll check on it.

11/3/71 9:25 a.m.

R: I talked to Hugh Scott and he was pretty categorical. I think the only position we can take is to say "yes, Scott expressed the view of the Administration; the president felt a veto would be employed to defeat Cooper-Church. He also feels foreign assistance bill is of fundamental importance to our foreign policy, and in the unlikely event that he felt he had to veto it he felt the Senate would act responsible in passing a bill without it.

K: That's okay. They loaded this with unacceptable amendments and they can't just offer us an unacceptable bill or no bill.

R: If Scott had been a little bit more responsible and just said "I feel sure? but I think this is the only way to do it since he spoke out in the debate. Fulbright is trying to get a bill out of the committee quickly so he can get his way in the Russia negotiations. It seems to me we have to argue against it, try to slow it down. Because they are going to have a continuing resolution of some kind. All hell will break loose if we have to fight these people, and the whole damn world community would be up in arms.

K: It seems to me we have to make a fight of this foreign aid thing. There is a lot of sanctimonious propaganda being put out. After all, we've voted on Cooper-Church four or five times. It wasn't there for the first time, and we have always opposed it.

R: I think we can make a fight. It's going to be a painful fight. You can't get anyone to line up. They are all against us for various reasons

K: I know.

R: Okay Henry.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger
9:43 a.m. 10/3/71

K: Wanted you to know I am thinking of you. I am sure you will find some way out. Little Nelson said "Daddy, you can't win them all." I am here to serve the people. I thought they should do it and they didn't so we will make the cut. I appreciate it. We have to deal with the realities too.

K: I am having more trouble from my own people than the Chinese. We have the semi-annual State Dept. attack on the WH.

R: What are you going to do on planes for Israel? Can I say at a Jewish dinner tonight that I agree with Golda Meir that there is no sense in talking until she has the planes? Don't anser if --

K: You are a man of conviction. (I cannot tell you what to say.)

R: I hope the President when he is in Moscow will say that he will ask for the release of Jewish prisoners.

K: I think the Israelis are happy about those that the Russians are letting out. They are leeting out 10,000 a year. So go soft on that.

R: That's very helpful. That's more then a trickle.

K: You asked me to dinner next Wed. No particular occasion?

R: Just some friends of yours. A friendly party. We take for granted you are away and then we thought you might like to come.

K: Could I let you know next Monday?

R: Sure. Thanks for calling. You are nice. Do you have plane facilities?

K: If I didn't have to use them it's easier.

R: I could send down a jet. It takes 30 mins. I have to go. I have Sen. Bridges on the phone.

K: Some on is keeping a log. I will check with Ann Whitman.

k

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON.

Kandy Stroud

11/3/71 9:48am

S: I want a picture of you in your Mao jacket by the Great Wall. That was a marvelous picture of you with the group, but you're starting to look yellow. How was it?

K: It was great.

S: Did you eat too much Peking duck?

K: Too much of everything.

S: Did you?

K: I gained four pounds.

S: That's not so bad. I wanted to tell you one thing and ask you another. I just got a copy of a new paper we are doing called "W".

K: About women?

S: It's an extension of Women's Wear, but cuts out all the retail angle. The first edition went to 300,000 and the first and back page has a story on you.

K: Which you did?

S: Yes. I'll send you a copy. Second, CBS-TV just called and asked if I am going to China. I said I don't know.

K: I don't know. I am not making up the list. It hasn't been made up yet. But the figure varies between 8 and 12

S: Planeloads?

K: No, people.

S: Seriously?

K: No, it hasn't been decided yet.

S: I wonder if you can still help me to get on.

K: If there is a chance I will put in a good word for you.

S: That would be very nice. It's an important trip to do obviously.

K: They will take the maximum number they can handle.

S: I know. I know that I would never be able to do it without you.

K: That's the way; inflate my ego.

S: No, seriously.

K: I shall do what I can.

S: Good. Thank you. Can you have lunch one of these days? S: Yes.
K: Not before next week. Can you call me early in the week?

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Cromer/Kissinger
9:52 a.m. 11/3/71

C: How was the chop suey?

K: They don't have it there.

C: What I am calling about. When the Foreign Secy. saw the President he
under took to tell the President of Mrs. Gandhi's visit. My Minister Tebit
saw Sisco yesterday and gave him a run down.

K: Is it something I should know because Sisco hasn't yet established diplo-
matic relations with me.

C: The State Dept. has it. You can call on them.

K: Anything significant?

C: No, but more encouraging then we thought. She was reasonable.

K: Let me get it.

C: It's there for your asking.

K: And is it in wind writing?

C: We didn't leave anything in writing. Hope to see you soon.

K: I would like to lunch with you next week. I would like to discuss our bilateral relations -- not yours and mine but --

C: I would like that.

K: I think it needs it.

C: Ask the Secretaries to get in touch.

K: I will have my people call yours this morning.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON
The President

11/3/71 3:24:5pm

P: Is your luncheon over?

K: Yes.

P: How did it go?

K: Very well, and she will be delighted to serve on some board. She is over to see Mrs. Nixon now.

P: Fine. Fine. Okay, fine. Anything else new?

K: No, it's quiet at the moemnt.

P: I was just looking at the date. It was two years ago today we did the November 3 speech.

K: That's right. A lot has happened. If you had predicted two years ago all the things that have happened, they would have accused you of a tremendous credibility gap.

P: The November 3 thing had to be done.

K: It saved us a year. Not only saved us a year; it turned it completely around. Clair Luce is fully behind you. She said in all this uproar about Taiwan we should just keep our cool. And she was a member of the Committee of a Million.

P: Sure, so was I.

K: She said we should just keep out cool.

P: She sees through them, huh?

K: She says it's no problem, not only no problem, she says it was a positive thing.

P: Okay, good.

TELECON
Kirk Douglas
11/3/71 2:55pm

By. NARA, Date 5/26

D: Have you recovered from your trip?

K: Yes.

D: With an optimistic, positive viewpoint?

K: Yes, it was a great trip. On a personal level it was more exciting than the first.

D: I just wanted to make sure you were all right. You didn't gain any weight?

K: I gained five pounds.

D: I don't want to see you till you lose it.

K: I'll be out at the end of November for a few days.

D: Good. I hope we have a chance to see you. We may be east at that time.

K: Let me know when you come east, and we'll get together either in New York or here.

D: We will definitely call you; would love to see you again. And when you come here give us a call.

K: I'll do that. Good, Kirk.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN

Ann Black/Kissinger/Lucy Jarvis

4:02 4:02 p.m.

11/30/71

B: I am sorry to keep bothering you.

K: Now what happened?

B: Victor Louis is here and Lucy wanted to talk about a lunch or meeting.

K: Is he here now?

B: In Mexico and could come to Washington within a week to 10 days if you
can see him. Not before a week. I'll let you talk with Lucy.

J: Welcom back! I had a call from our friend and he said that he would like to stop here in a week or 10 days to see you. Ann and I are the only ones who know. He would appreciate it if no one discusses it with their ambassador.

K: How about -- I will call you tomorrow. Let's aim for a week from this Friday. He couldn't make it this Monday?

J: I don't know. I can find out.

K: Let me see. I will find out. I will call tomoorw. In the meantime can you find out if Monday is possible?

J: I will and leave word --

K: With Mr. Hicks.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Secy. Packard/Kissinger

4:25 p.m.

11/3/71

K: We sent over 4 months ago a paper on the increase of weapons systems for comment and on which the President wanted DOD's views. We have periodically asked Pursley to send it back and told we will get an answer. What cost in World War II and in the '50's and '60's. It came to the President's attention and he would like a reaction.

P: We discussed it here recently.

K: We would like an explanation and reaction to the briefing. One arguement they make that the Soviets keep increases to smaller proportions then we do.

P: Who gave you that briefing?

K: A paper that was drawn from a briefing that showed up here today that the President read. You have the whole text.

P: I will take care of it.

K: Pursely will know because he is sitting on it.

Further conversation

K: On the other thing, I will send you a letter that the President sent Mel and another copy on the paper.

P: I haven't seen the briefing.

K: It wasn't a world-shaking briefing and not given to anyone. It's a paper with tables.

P: Have you a copy?

K: Yes. I will send it. If the President wanted to put into the budget the thing to 77.

P: I will have that for you.

K: Boat as well as the missile.

P: I will have it. I can give you a tentative figure.

K: Can you give me an order of magnitude? I am here with Geo. Shulta.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Packard/Kissinger

4:25 p.m. 11/3/71

-3-

P: Not much in expenditures in '73. About 30 million. Wait a minute. I have a figure here.

K: We have a figure here that 4 more Poseidon submarines with Olms (? ) missles is 80.

P: The proposal is to have one Olms boat which is bigger. 30 thousand horsepower, 32 feet diameter boat. One ____ 77 and 2 or 3 per year there after. We need authorization of 360 million and expenditures 50. That's on top of what we have in the program.

K: 360 million

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

John Rockefeller/Kissinger

4:55 p.m. 11/2/71

K: I am glad you are talking to me.

R: You did let me down.

K: I did and I apologize.

R: I have another. You are taking on Mrs. Gandhi and that seems the toughest in all of Asia now and I only hope that on the political front the three key people are Bhutto, Mujib and Yahya. Just somehow that has to be worked out and I have been out there a few times and the only outcome that gives promise of significant results would be if Bhutto and Yahya would let Mujib, who is in jail, back into E. Pakistan in some kind of leadership position. I know you can't do this with Mrs. Gandhi but it will bring the whole subject up.

K: We are willing to do anything if the Indians will give us 6 months to turn around in but what they want is to overthrow all structure in W. Pakistan. They have shown no interest in any point of view.

R: You say 6 months but what she said in London, she is sitting on a volcano.

K: We are trying to do what we can.

R: It's tough what she has.

K: So is the subcontinent and the ________ situation. If she starts a war the Chinese may come in.

R: But if Mujib can come into the picture that will give a new confidence in E. Pakistan which I think means pulling refugees back off her neck. You go from one tough one to another. Your China one is moving nicely. You are wonderful to survive.

K: I appreciate your calling me. I really had no choice.

R: This other thing caught up with you.

K: If you arrange something similar again you have a heavy claim on me.

R: You are awfully nice.

By.

NARA, Date

5/20

TELCORN

November 2, 1971

7:05 - 7:07

President/Dr. Kissinger

...RN: respond as to the date.

HAK: They will not be able to do it until the 15th because their man is in Peking.

RN: That's right. That is when he gave Rogers the message.

HAK: There is no problem with it.

RN: I don't think so---it looks pretty good. We suggested the 23rd?

HAK: No, we had agreed to do it between the 20th and 25th and I said I would check with you which was most convenient. They said that would be all right.

RN: There isn't something where they would come back and say "Let's make it the 23rd?"

HAK: This isn't an issue of principle for them.

RN: They will be back the 15th?

TELECCN

Dr. Walker

11/3/71 ca. 5:30pm

By. NARA, Date 5/26

W: Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

W: I'm calling about expropriation statement. Three quick points. One on legislative authorization for the International Development Bank, we got it all the way through the Senate, but the full committee is not going to act till they see what it changes on expropriation policy.

K: The problem is the President, on the urgent appeal of Finch, doesn't want to make public until Finch is back.

W: I just saw Finch; he didn't say that.

K: That may reflect on his heroism, but not on what he told the President.

W: Connally wanted it put out before, so he doesn't get accused of being dumb, or sandbagging the Latinos.

K: Well, Finch would like to sandbag the Latinos. I don't give a damn.

W: I didn't think you did.

K: If you can get Finch to agree to it, I have no problem with it, but don't tell him I said that.

W: I won't.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Bernard Collier/Kissinger

5:50 p. m. 11/3/71

K: I think there's been a misunderstanding. I don't want to see the article
I want to see the quotations. You said you wouldn't use any <u>ax</u> without approval.

C: I don't know what will be used. When I get the galleys back I will come
see you.

K: Then when it's in print won't there be a debate?

C: I will scratch them out.

K: You understand I may delete them all.

C: No.

K: My understanding was I was talking freely and that none used
unless I approved them. How many are you using?

C: I am using a few. What we discussed. When I get the galleys back to see
what they are using. They are editing it. Then we can discuss it.

K: For all <u>ax</u> I know I will agree to all.

C: We will agree when we get to it. Wherever I am I will have galleys and
then I will call you immediately.

K: Where did I go wrong?

C: You didn't go <u>was</u> wrong anywhere.

K: You said you would call <u>ax</u> before you sent them in.

C: Everything you said "don't say", I didn't use those. Other things if you
object we will take them out. I am sure you will have no problems.

K: You really gave Kramer an attack.

C: We talked for 7 1/2 hours. He is an extraordinary man.

K: Some people laugh at him --

C: I didn't. I wouldn't have called him but since your office didn't say it wasn't
worth talking to him --

K: He said he didn't want me to let you do it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Bernard Collier/Kissinger

5:50 p.m. 11/3/71

-2-

I

C: And he didn't want to get into the middle and since you were naive about the fact about the written permission --

K: I wouldn't give that.

C: I said I wouldn't get in the middle of you two old friends. He is a remarkable man. When I get this I will call you.

K: When will it appear?

C: Either two or three Sundays from this one. The deadline for the pictures is much sooner.

K: So I can hold out on the pictures.

C: Nothing to be gained by that.

K: That's how the article came to my attention.

C: There's nothing to be gained by that.

K: I won't do that.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

6:30 p.m. 11/3/71

Z: Helen is going to do a cute story of you keeping Clare Luce waiting for lunch. You were with the President and you started wiggling and looking at your watch and the President asked and you said you were keeping Clare Luce waiting. He said to go. The moral of the story is don't keep a lady waiting. Apparently Sans Souci tipped Helen off.

K: That's interesting. I don't want them to talk so much.

Z: Or maybe Clare did. I didn't want you see it and wonder where it came from/

K: She (H. Thomas) doesn't appear in the Washington papers anyway.

Z: Well, some pick it up.

TELECON
Governor Rockefeller

11/3/71 7:00 p.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

R: I am taking the liberty of calling you because Madame Gandhi is in New York and she asked me to come up. I have just spent an hour with her. She was telling me what is going on.

K: I wouldn't believe half of it.

R: No, but you know, you listen in this world. I tried to explore what she saw as the solution.

K: What did she say?

R: It's none of my business . . .

K: I'm delighted to hear it.

R: I'm embarrassed to call.

K: You should never feel embarrassed to call,

R: I tried to find out what she thought was the situation. She doesn't know how many they have got, but they claim they are coming in at 30,000 a day. They are getting fed to the teeth, but there is nothing she can do about it. So I told her . . . she said that if the UN enlarged their study to internal problems as well as between the two nations she would be de-lighted. But politically at home she can't accept UN ________ when she feels the Pakistanis brought this on themselves. She feels the only possible way of this being ________ out is . . . . She had two guys with her there, I don't know who they were. One very smooth guy, and the other . . .

K: Very nervous, blinking his eyes all the time?

R: I didn't notice that, but her feeling is that the Pak government, the only way they can settle is to undertake negotiations for a settlement with those who were ________. She didn't believe that an independent nation was going to settle this, but she really got down to whether Ayub Kahn was going to negotiate, and not what they call puppets. They are looking for some assistance from the U.S. encouraging him to negotiate.

K: That we have done, and had it arranged, and she then sabotaged it by escalating her demands.

R: She is not involved.

K: No, but most of her representatives who are in Calcutta.

TELECON
Governor Rockefeller

11/3/71 7:00 p. m. p. 2

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

R: What I would think then -- please forgive me; it's none of my business . . .

K: No, no. Anything that concerns you is your business.

R: I think it is pretty hot. She thinks it's beyond her control, and if it blows it's bigger than she is.

K: That's the truth.

R: That's my impression. I think a frank talk would be helpful.

K: That's what she'll get. If they can settle East Pakistan, that would help. But if they ______ then we can't because then we get into trouble with the Chinese.

R: My impression is that she is damned scared about what she has got. Her Minister of Foreign Affairs took a position . . .

K: And they nearly killed him.

R: But she sympathizes with that. She thought he did a beautiful job but he got himself in a lot of trouble.

K: That is interesting; that is new.

R: This is just what I was told.

K: That is interesting.

R: It is impossible for her politically and domestically. The four states are tremendously restive. Her officials are sore, and that makes an incident. She doesn't feel she can handle it.

K: That is interesting. Now all I have got to do is get the President to read his papers, but that is my problem.

R: Here is somebody who is worried, and ready for a settlement.

K: Very interesting.

R: She said the Bengali people in her country were sore when he made this speech, but she thought he was right.

K: That is very interesting and I am going to pursue it or get the President to pursue it with her.

TELECON
Governor Rockefeller
11/3/71 7:00p.m. p. 3

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

R: I feel she got nowhere in London. She thought the demonstrations were good for Gengali morale, but they didn't mean anything and are not contributing to a settlement.

K: I don't find this very interesting, and will use a lot of it tomorrow.

R: And I think they are looking for help. I don't know what their was, but this is someone reaching out in desperation.

K: I appreciate it. And I am going to do my damnedest to get down on Wednesday.

R: This is just gay and light.

K: That's what I would like

R: Kitty Carlisle...

K: She is a lovely person.

R: You were so nice to call this morning

K: Not at all, and what you said about the Foreign Minister is very helpful.

R: It's not meaningful to me. I don't know about these things. But she is worried about the situation in the west because she said "If we withdraw our troops and the Paks do, we have to withdraw way back and they have to withdraw a very little distance."

K: I have studied Indian Foreign Policy, and these characters have an enormous ability to get themselves into messes by letting events run away from them.

R: That's right, and I said it's a shame you had to abandon your policy of neutrality. She said it's not a policy of neutrality; it's a policy of non-alignment, and was a matter of expedience.

K: I have told Dobrynin some day they will be surprised to learn the depths of Indian ingratitude.

R: I said "why do you put all your eggs in one basket?" She said "we won't if there's another basket."

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Hugh Sidey

11/3/71 p.m.

K: It's about time you got me on the cover.

S: You and Ed Muskie -- you're moving up. Ron gave us three pictures. They're you at the Great Wall and a couple of other pictures. I just need a couple of innocuous . . .

K: Don't get insulting; I'm not capable of anything innocuous.

S: I need weather, that kind of thing.

K: On the Great Wall, I don't know if you can tell from the picture, it was perfectly calm in Peking, but on the Wall it was extraordinarily windy. And I am told it's common there. It's on the mountain range beyond which there's Mongolia about 100 miles away.

S: You go into desolation there?

K: Yes.

S: How long were you there?

K: An hour or so.

S: Did you walk along it?

K: Yes, it was so windy -- we were going to walk to the top of the hill there, but stopped half way.

S: It's in good shape?

K: Extraordinarily good shape.

S: I suppose they keep it that way.

K: I had been thinking "you see one wall; you've seen them all." And you think "what the heck, a wall." But when you see it marching across mountain tops and think it was built 2000 years ago . . . It's bigger than any wall I've seen in Europe. It must be 20 feet wide.

S: And how was life around the palace?

K: What's that?

S: Is that where you stayed?

K: No, it was a visit. That was the first time we were exposed to normal sightseeing crowds. The people started clapping.

XXXXXXThat's the first time

S: Oh really?

K: Yes, up to then they kept a respectful distance.

TELECON
Hugh Sidey

11/3/71 p.m. p. 2

By. NARA, Date 5/26

S: There was recognition?

K: They had that Marshall with us. A group of senior people. There was a group of school children there. I walked over and shook hands and they started clapping, and we clapped back, which is what you do in China. So at least there was recognition.

S: Smiley? Respectful?

K: Respectful and friendly.

S: And they supplied you with a fur coat?

K: Yes, when we went to the Wall.

S: Did they know your size?

K: These things are so big . . . but if they depended on size, there were so meticulous they would have known everyone's size.

S: And you got an explanation? Someone there to give background?

K: Always.

K: Okay, I think this is what I need. How is everything else?

K: Fine.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN

Secy. Volker/Kissinger

10:32 a.m.

11/4/71

K: I had a talk with Arthur Burns this morning who is weeping all over me about your refusal to see the Dutch Central banker.

V: It's not my decision.

K: I know Connally's views. If you could see him for 20 minutes until Connally gets back so we can have peace here.

V: It's not my decision. I am under orders.

K: Can you reach Connally? To start a ________ when Connally is out of the country.

V: He has a powerful m reaction but I will go back to him.

K: I do not agree that that fellow should be the intermediary.

V: I agree.

K: Can't we turn him off by listening to him?

V: I think that's the easiest course.

K: I don't think so. Instead of saying Treasury kicked him in the teeth.

V: I will get my head knocked in again.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCON

Jos. Alsop/Kissinger

3:00 p.m. 11/4/71

A: I thought I might call you because I think the President should know. I luncheoned today with Hale Boggs and the House speaker two days ago and they both said the situation in the House is harder and harder. They are going with the Democratic leadership in the Senate. Hale also said the left wing in the House attempted to serve an ultimatum saying that they would be in trouble if they didn't support Mansfield Amendment. I asked Hale how he can hold the line. He said through now but didn't know about next year. He asked what the President could do and he said there's a lot in a statement that's coming up on Nov. 15. I am in business that's no business of mine. I know the man well and they are courageous.

K: They think a statement by the President on the 15th would help them.

A: A statement on troop withdrawals coming up. I think the President would reward them that they deserve.

K: Advance warning.

A: Not waste of time and insure their future support while they can hang on and they could give advice if he called them in and said we have this problem and this is what I must do.

K: Hale Boggs and the Speaker.

A: Key figures. They are feeling the heat in their party. It's to be to compliment them on resisting the heat and how the President appreciates that and get their advice on what can reduce the heat.

K: We will do that.

A: They don't like the President but in this area they thought he did a good job and they thought he deserved support. They are being brave and when they are this kind of approach is good.

K: We have had Sen. Ford and Arends on that basis.

A: These people are more important than them. It's something to do on a private drink after dinner.

K: That's extremely helpful.

A: I am not in where I shouldn't be.

K: It's extremely helpful and we will do it. It's the best proof that you are where you should be.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE

Rabin/Kissinger

3:45 p. m. 11/4/71

R: I wanted to be sure that Thursday you get a report on the what the PM said to your Ambassador.

K: I thought it was very clear.

R: Because I hope it's clear.

K: This time it is.

R: It's clear.

K: I think so.

R: Basically we don't give a positive or negative answer.

K: Very well done.

R: All right. If you want me --

K: I would like to talk with you in a few days about some matters. Let me call you tomorrow morning on an available time. It is important that before the next onslaught we talk.

R: Yesterday Sisco asked me if he is right in reading that Israel has become less interested in an interim settlement. I said no. Our position is that we are for but *under* a certain *on* terms. Isreal doesn't want it *under* every circumstances. There is no change. In our policy. We see *d* change in American policy and not Israels.

K: He hopes to catch you unaware and get you to sign something.

R: It won't happen. '

K: I wouldn't think so either.

R: If he believes this is a possibility I doubt it.

K: He will come at you again.

R: All he needs is a smokescreen to come up with his own position and then face us with a problem but this time he doesn't believe in tricks. He wants a trick for __________, number 2 and then we want ????uber. It's not a trick, it's a power struggle.

K: Let's talk soon. I will call you tomorrow or day after.

By_ NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
3:53 p.m. 11/4/71

P: I need your help with the Russians on one thing. Colson was about to work out with the Maritime people that they will ship that corn. The half American bottoms things is out. The Russians said this is the only hang up. Peterson is talking with the Russian Embassy about it. I want to call Alex Dobrynin and say this is terribly important. Is there any reason not to?

K: I will raise it when I talk with him later today.

P: If we can get that break it can have an enormous effect in the corn belt. We want to announce it tomorrow if we can. It's something the Russians have offered.

K: It usually takes a few days in their government

By.

NARA, Dato_5/26

TELCORN

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

5:22 p. m. 11/4/71

S: I appeared before Jackson yesterday. Did he say something last night.

K: Said politically not acceptable to make deal you have in mind.

S: prefer a ______ 2-1.

N: As much as I like you on this issue you are an addict.

S: I want to report to you what leading senators say. I am not advocating anything.

K: He is violently opposed to offensive. He doesn't see why we make a treaty on offensive and nothing on defensive.

Kc

S: Ask him why a moratorim on submarines.

K: I don't doubt he said it. I am sure this is his view.

S: I don't think unacceptablity of other is much.

K: I am on your side on this arguement with Defense. I wouldn't say that anything like that is acceptable.

S: I don't think Defense thinks so either.

TELCONE

Killian/Kissinger

7:15 p.m. - 11/4/71

By. NARA, Date 5/20

HAK: Hello.

K: Hello. There is a matter that it might be important for you to be aware of. Do you know about this Aussa (?) report. I must say I personally read the review and it is an outrageous report.

HAK: I never read it.

K: I have a copy of a letter that is in the hands of a number of people signed by Donald Rumsfeld, Counsellor to the President that was written to the President of the Aussa Organization, Robert McCall, which I think is outrageous.

HAK: What does it say?

K: (At this point, Dr. Killian read a letter from Mr. Rumsfeld to Robert McCall, in which he praises the work of the organization and states what a magnificent service they do. He congratulates Mr. McCall on the important part he plays in the organization.)

HAK: Of course, a lot would depend on how bad that report is. I haven't read the report; just the news stories about it.

K: Well, apparently copies of this letter are in the hands of a lot of people now. I have this copy and I don't know if it is authentic, but it has the makings of an Oppenheimer case that can be damaging all the way around.

HAK: Why the Oppenheimer case?

K: One can interpret on the basis of this letter that the Government is involved in the Aussa report.

HAK: I can't judge not having read it. You know I personally have a high regard for Weisner and Pornofsky, but I frankly did not read the report other than the news stories. If in your judgment it is outrageous, you know I have always had a high regard for your judgment.

K: I also understand the Congressional Committees are getting involved here. There is a letter going out to all the Congressional committees to give their appraisal of the report.

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TelCon:10:35-11/5/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Dr. Weisner

K: How are you?

W: Good, pretty good and you?

K: Good.

W: I am calling you about the big Alaskan shot. I am getting a lot of pressure from people from this country, Canada and the UK. I am taking a low position, not talking out of the Government's position. To take a more constructive position I have refused to participate in any of the going ons but I do feel very strongly that the shot is unnecessary and the way AEC is proceeding with this. I also feel that it is doing the President and the country a great deal of harm so I thought I should try to get to you or the President. If there is any flexibility in which I can change his mind - like he changed his mind in the __ (?) decision, he should. It seems to me he has one of those situations where both nationally and internationally a tremendous number of people are very upset and at least in my judgment that the technical facts could make him move.

K: I appreciate your calling and of course you know nothing you say is going to be discarded.

W: I would be willing to talk to the President.

K: Let me talk to him on the plane today and see what he says about it.

W: I would be willing to talk to him privately - I will talk to him about the technical things. Like China, he made an important step when he made his decision to go to China. This is also a very important decision.

K: I appreciate it enormously and I will talk to the President today on the plane.

W: This coming Monday I will be down for the ______? meeting. I should like to see you. Should I stay for dinner?

K: No, not dinner but how about lunch. I would like to see you.

W: Good.

K: Good, lets have lunch that day.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TelCon:2:55-11/5/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Ambassador Shen

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

S: I am sorry I have to bother you. I was hoping to see you personally.

K: No, I bother you, you don't bother me.

S: I got a message today from the Minister on what he talked to you about a week ago.

K: But he hasn't had a press conference so I think we should plan something that Ziegler can say.

S: When will that be?

K: Probably next week.

S: Do you know when he will have a press conference?

K: No, I am not sure.

S: I see you are going out of town tonight for a few days. I will be out of town next week so I will not be able to see you on the 9th.

K: But I am seeing you on the 15th.

S: Yes.

K: Where are you going?

S: I am going to Detroit and ____

K: If I get any more hate mail from those places, I know who I will have to blame. We will get that question planted and have an answer next week.

S: Yes.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Vice President/Kissinger

11/5/71 - 3:00 p.m.

VP: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President.

VP: While you were away I had a chance to report personally to the
President on the trip and I gave him two memoranda.

K: I saw them.

VP: I noticed today there is a confidential report from Lodge on a con-
versation with Constantine that is really quite interesting. What I
was wondering was did the President have any reaction to the Greek
situation as far as the King is concerned?

K: I frankly don't know what there was to react to.

VP: Well, it was simply a matter that is a desire on the part of the King
to have certain information related that I did relate. Now apparently
he subsequently said to Lodge that he can't seem to get this information
to them, but I did get it to them. What I was thinking about was the
possibility to indirectly contact him and tell him we did get it to him.

K: I think we should do that. Do you have a way to do it?

VP: Yes.

K: Well, then I think we should.

VP: Do you have any sense of anything moving there as far as the govern-
ment is concerned?

K: I haven't had any report.

VP: OK

K: Well, I hope you and I can get together next week. I would like to
hear about your trip personally.

VP: All right.

TELECON
Nancy Ball

**11/5/71 3:30pm**

By. NARA, Dalo 5/20

B: B: Regarding the Washington Press Club -- it used to be the Women's National Press Club. You accompanied me in Newsweek a year and a half ago. That was similar. This is the annual Congressional dinner. It's the same group of people. What we would like is for you to give some sort of light and humorous talk about anything at the dinner.

K: For how long?

B: About 1/20 minutes

K: Who else is going to speak?

B: We haven't firmed it up yet; maybe someone to tie in with the Congress and give a rye retort. Fulbright or someone like that. The China trip would be a good point of departure.

K: But you want it humorous?

B: Yes.

K: And for how long?

B: 1/20-10-15 minutes.

K: Why don't I say I'll do it.

B: Oh, we love you.

K: But I don't want to be the straight man for someone.

B: I can't imagine you being the straight man to anyone.

K: You know how to flatter a man.

9 B: But you really think you can do it?

K: Yes.

B: I'll phone the good news to our President, Vera Glasser, right away. If you want help writing it, around mid-December we can help you.

K: I have to have it written by mid-December?

B: No, we can help you about then.

K: On ho, I'll write it myself. If you can give me an idea who will be there it will help.

B: Sure, senior and union members of the Senate and the House. Cabinet members and other powerful people in Washington.

K: What made you think cabinet members had any power?

B: I said and <u>Other</u> powerful people.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON
Ambassador Annenberg

11/5/71 5:15 p.m.

A: Good evening.

K: How are you?

A: Very well, and yourself?

K: Fine.

A: On November 11, I am having a small dinner hwer with Queen Elizabeth. I think it would be delightful if I were to get you to come over for the dinner.

K: That's quite a suggestion.

a: She is a great individual, and I think she would enjoy having an opportunity to visit with you, as I think would Prince Phillip.

K: May I call you about it Monday?

A: Yes, but I can't delay beyond that. I've got to round out my table and inform p______ who will be here.

K: Monday without fail, and I am flattered you asked me.

A: I think it would be a unique and interesting experience for them and you would enjoy it also.

K: Sure.

A: I'm having 8 16 Americans. The young Grosvenors, from National Geographic, the RPLEYS -- he's at the Smithsonian, ________ the head of the Rockefeller Foundation. Quite a variety, but you would be the frosting on the cake. Get back to me Monday afternoon.

K: I shall do that.

A: That's the evening of the 11th . . .

K: November 11?

a: Yes, here at Winfield House.

K: Good. I'll let you know.

(HK subsequently told jlp to regret that "ridiculous" invitation.)

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCONE

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

6:15 p. m. - 11/5/71

S: Henry, would you have a few minutes to see me sometime?

K: Sure, but I am going to Key Biscayne tonight. Is it urgent?

S: No, I would like to see you before I get away.

K: Oh, sure. When are you leaving?

S: On Friday.

K: Certainly. How about Tuesday or Wednesday? Can my office
call your office?

S: Yes.

K: What is it about?

S: I would like to talk to you about the possibility of a certain
in Vienna.

K: Oh sure.

By.

NARA.

Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Pete Peterson
7:00 p.m. 11-5-71

HAK"" I got caught in a meeting, but no one bothered to tell you. I
cancelled the Young President's Meeting to see you.

PP: Oh, really?

HAK: I am not into anything in the economic international field.

PP: Some of these old problems are getting urgent. I could see
you Tuesday morning.

HAK: But let's have breakfast after the staff meeting. No let's skip
the staff meeting and just meet together.

PP: Okay. I hope to fill you in on these problems.

HAK: I have not reached the view that I am willing to fight Connally.

PP: Well, I am now in the course of writing something. I have
come to the conclusion too that we are embarking on a very bad course.

HAK: The only reward in domestic policy is success. If Britian,
France and Germany are in an uproar because of a depression, they
will be furious.

PP: Yes, we are burning the bridges of our friends; and the
Chinese and Japanese will sense this disaster.

HAK: Yes.

PP: Another urgency--he met in private talks with the Senate Finance
Committee to give Treasury authority to put quotas and additional
surtax. Proposals submitted for the President to put quotas and tarrifs
unilaterally.

HAK: This put the pressure on him. The only thing I want to know is
whether you are going to keep me in mind in '73.

PP: Oh yes, maybe with a PR firm.

PP: But now the Senate Finance Committee has passed this and the
problem is very delicate.... what is this, you are submitting proposals
and the President hasn't seen it? There was nothing in writing that
indicated what you were talking about, and you're telling me the

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Page 2

President agreed to it." So now we have an extraordinarily delicate problem here.

HAK: I have got to run. See you at 8:15 Tuesday for breakfast.

PP: I will be goddamn for whatever small place I have in history. We have to raise hell, and to be willing to take risks and confront the President with it.

HAK: I love my job--what are the girls going to do if I don't have this job. I will do anything that doesn't take on the President. I will take on the Connelly. Something must happen. We cannot give verbal reassurances.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:50 p.m., November 8, 1971

P: I was just looking at the <u>Star</u> headline.

K: We have been pushed out of the --

P: The Union.

K: More State on this version. The Indians sort of leaked a little.

P: No misunderstanding with the Pakistanis is there?

K: No misunderstanding but Paks are up the creek and have no choice. In August Rogers asked if you minded if they explored with the Paks cutting off ________. Sisco gave them a deadline and I extended that deadline. Paks told Haig this morning: (1) They were never told that we would tell the Indians and (2) they are worried that Indians will cut off pipeline in countries like France.

P: What is the situation about telling the Indians? It was in the talking paper.

K: That's right. We should have told the Pakistanis which I thought they had done.

P: State to tell them?

K: That's right. State handling this whole business. That's not so important as the other one with the French. I am going to tell Walters to tell Pompidou's man not to do this -- to bring pressure on any other country.

P: That's right.

K: You know you turned this down 4 or 5 times and they have played it.

P: Thought the Paks understood the pipeline is finished except for $______ million.

K: In a low key way.

P: The thing is I hate to see our own people play it up. The Indians have screwed us.

K: That's right. The Pakistanis --

By. NARA, Date 5/20

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:50 p.m., November 8, 1971 -- page 2

P: What did you tell Haig to tell them?

K: Haig implied no change in our policy, no change in the bureaucracy, our friendship to them was unimpaired and we would do what we could at the economic front. An example of how the dame bureaucracy is is we have told them what your policy is. The first step they took in September was against your policy. The next thing you knew they had given a deadline. That Sisco is just so energetic these things keep happening. I will get the Pakistani Ambassador in tomorrow and tell them --

P: Tell him ...... inform other countries and get word off to the Chinese so they know we haven't changed our mind.

K: I will get word to the Chinese. ... under enormous press ure on the military side but ......... I also tol d them it would help us if their views were more clearly known and they have done it. How they will react and what will occur -- that they might go the opposite way.

P: Don't let time elapse; do it fast. I mean a message to the Chinese.

K: What worries me -- the damn thing is they don't have an Ambassador there.

P: Give them a written message. Maybe you ought to use the Canadians.

K: They have made it clear to us that they want us to use the Paris channel. The thing is I asked them once if in an emergency I could use the Canadians and they said no.

P: Tell them we are distressed that it has blown up on the Indians.

K: Right.

P: Very hard game on that. Get it out even though they don't have an ambassador there.

K: I will get it out tonight. If we get it to them in writing, they can just transmit it on.

P: That's the way to handle it. It would be subject to misunderstandings if we don't say something.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Raza (Pakistan)

8:15 p.m., November 8, 1971

K: You and I must find a way of communicating just between the two of us. Apparently Mr. Farooqi called the State Department right after I talked to him. I just talked to the President who saw the evening headline in the news and he wants to express his extreme displeasure. This was not his intention. He talked to you privately --

R: Yes

K: And he wants to make sure your President understands this.

R: I understand and I have conveyed it.

K: For any embarrassment that has been conveyed.

R: I know it wasn't intentional.

K: It wasn't intentional from here but I am not sure it wasn't intentional.

R: When are you coming back?

K: I am back, and I hope to sit down with you and talk.

R: You and I must have a little talk and lay down procedures.

K: Let us treat every conversation between you and me as private.

R: I will make a note of it.

K: And if your President should feel like informing Peking of what has happened and that it was not intended as an anti-Pakistan move on this matter, we would very much appreciate it.

R: I understand. Thank you for calling.

TELECON
Paul Doty

11/9/71 9:15 a.m.

NARA, Dato 5/26

D: You've been around the world since we last talked.

K: By God, yes. I'm sorry we haven't managed to get together.

D: You've been busy.

K: I would like to, but there's been a problem with all these trips.

D: I understand. I am down Thursday and Friday, and Dorothy is there also. If you have time, we might have a drink.

K: Let's aim for 6:00 on Thursday.

D: Good. I am staying at the Carlton. Did anything happen on the schistosomiasis or should I put that through my normal channels?

K: We proposed it and they are studying it.

& D: Okay. I sent an article down . . .

K: I saw it, and I took it along. I don't think anything will happen until after the President's trip.

D: I see. How was the trip?

K: In many ways, this was less new, but more substantive than the last time.

D: I spent last night with Frank Yang (?).

K: What did he say?

D: Lot's of things.

K: These people have brainwashed me -- I have never seen such people . . .

D: He said never in his wildest imagination could he believe any society could have changed that much in one generation.

K: But it retains its grace. Let's aim for 6:30 someplace. How about the Metropolitan Club?

D: That would be fine, yes.

K: 6:30 at the Metropolitan Club, and they take women in the evening.

D: Very good. That's a tricky point.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCONE

Bill Safire/Kissinger

11/9/71 - 9:35 a.m.

S: As you know the President is thinking of putting out some information on a need-to-know basis. Could you have a briefing book for me tomorrow or does it come to me to go into the book?

K: No, I will get it to you tomorrow. He talked to me on the plane yesterday and said he wouldn't need it before Friday.

S: Is it done in this question and answer form?

K: Yes, we will send you the proposed questions and answers and you can get them into better English.

S: OK. I have been working with Janka in your office on a whole variety of questions. He is really good. He gets things up to me in a flash.

K: Yes, he is very good. Like what questions, for example.

S: Have we screwed up our relations with Japan and Canada with the surcharge. The usual questions about China and Taiwan.

K: I see. Well, Bill, I'll get the book to you tomorrow.

S: Fine.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Rabin/Kissinger

11/9/71 - 10:25 a.m.

K: Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

R: Good morning. It was decided by my government that I would come to the residence for certain consultation. I am leaving tomorrow night and I think it is very essential that I see you.

K: All right. Is this public knowledge that you are going?

R: Yes, of course, it was published yesterday. I told Joe Sisco that about two weeks ago I asked my government to allow me to come to Israel. It took them about 10 days to decide. I explained that since we don't want to create a crisis, which is normally what happens or what is considered by the United States and Pakistan to happen, whenever I am called to my country, the public explanation will be that I am going for private talks. I let him know yesterday morning.

K: Do you want to come in this afternoon?

R: At 3:00 I am at Joe Sisco's office with the Israeli General who is visiting in the United States.

K: Do I know him?

R: I am not sure. He is General Elizor (sp. ?)

K: Is Parlett (?) leaving?

R: Not officially, but his four years is completed and our policy is to change after that time.

K: I see. How about 4:00 o'clock or won't you be finished?

R: I am not sure. I would like it a little later.

K: Well, let me shift something around. How about 5:00 o'clock?

R: That would be good.

K: Well, I will see you at 5 in the usual place. The Map Room.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Stu Alsop/Kissinger
1:15 p.m. - 11/9/71

(Came in late)

K: Stuart, you are something!

A: Am I lunching with you tomorrow?

K: Well, I found that I made double luncheon dates. These other guests are from out of town. How about breakfast one day?

A: Tomorrow?

K: Friday is no good?

A: Friday is fine. I am not much of a man at breakfast unlike my brother Joe. At your office?

K: Let's go to the Metropolitan Club, 8:15.

A: You would make it 8:15. OK, I look forward to seeing you there.

TELECON
Secretary Laird

11/9/71 2:35pm

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

K: Did you have a good trip?

L: Yes, a very good trip. It went along all right. Most encouraging.

K: I am delighted.

L: Abe and Bunker are getting along well. I spent four hours with Thieu. He brought in the whole damn cabinet for one meeting. They are all very concerned about economic aid package, not the military aid package because they know that's in our bill. I quieted them down a bit though.

K: Good. What I called you about is this.

SANITIZED

K: That's right.

L: He is going to join my old friend, Justin . . .

K: The President is calling; I'll call you back.

11/9/71 2:45pm

L: Yes.

K: This was just to impress you.

L: Yes I know. But I understand Smith is going to take Bill Brimm's and he went out and joined Justin. He moved up to Vice President.

K: Really? I just hope you will think of me when I need a job.

L: I take care of everybody.

K: I'll get you Gloria Steinem's telephone number.

L: The hell with that; I'd want more than that.

K: There are lots of people who would get me a job just to get me out of here.

L: I don't feel that way, but you did pull a trick on me I see.

K: What trick?

L: You pulled a trick on me -- this god-damned intelligence business.

K: This was Shultz; I thought you knew.

X

["TELECON\nSecretary Laird\n11/9/71 p. 2", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NARA, Dale 5/26", "L: Never. I don't know what makes people think Helms has anything to do with this. I have to support ...", "K: You ought to raise hell with Shultz.", "L: I'm not going to raise hell with anybody; I'm just not going to cooperate.", "K: Come on Mel.", "L: God-damn right I'm not.", "K: What do you mean you're not going to cooperate?", "L: I just won't. My committee up there ... You have to\nin the House and the Senate. They weren't even told. They're so god-damned\nmad. I'm up there trying to straighten it out, and how they can be so x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x

TELECON
Secretary Laird
** 11/9/71 p. 3

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: But then I turned that off.

L: I'll tell you something Henry. These people who work for me always tell me who talks to whom, because that's the kind of place I run.

K: I have an iron principle Mel -- I can't put anything over on you so I don't try.

L: Phil is a good man. I hate to lose him. But I think it would be a good idea for you to talk to him. I think you'll like him because he's a good man.

K: Good, and then there would be a tie-in with our two shops. And on this intelligence thing, I have alwyas insisted that everyone be on board on these things . . .

L: It just takes a little bit to do these things. No one else goes over there to testify. Helms wouldn't get a dollar. I was on that committee for 17 years. I am used to how these things word. I have had a rapport with these man and they think I double-crossed them.

K: You mayhave to see Ellender's movies again.

L: Yes, but . . .

K: Iget your point. I just assumed you knew about it.

L: I knew about Schlesinger six months ago. We talked about it, but then someone from the Bureau of the Budget calls on it to my department . . . I just said none of them can go.

K: I don't see your point, and the mistake I made was to assume you were on top of this . . . that you were informed of this. It actually doesn't do anything to you.

L: No, but it hurts the Administration. I have been to that luncheon with Rogers and the Senators.

K: What side is he on?

L: We'll get it worked out, but it was a comedy of errors.

K: You think we could have passed it if we had been on top of it?

K: Sure. If it had been a bill of mine, I would leave town.

K: Yes. It's disgusting.

L: The thing I mentioned to you -- we have special groups that handle this, especially on NRO programs. They said they talked with Helms. The god-damned shame is I don't think they know how it works.

K: I'm glad you came back in a fighting spirit, and I will stop by your office on withdrawal leaks.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird
11/9/71 p. 4

L: There won't be any god-damned leaks on the withdrawal rates. But the thing is the longer we go the easier it is to see what's happening.

K: You talked the President out of the draft thing, which was a good thing to do.

L: These god-damned people won't know where we are going. I understand Al called over here and said everyone was upset about something Sevareid said. Why don't they read what I said? That god-damned Cornell Study isn't ______.

K: That's not what Sevareid said; he said you were pushing for a higher sithdrawal rate.

L: All you need to do is read what I said, and every god-damned stop I made I said the same thing.

K: I tell you, the language you are using to the Assistant to the President. It's a good thing I'm not at Harvard. Here I go praising you to Rowland Evans, which I don't need to do because you've got him in your hip pocket anyway.

L: I don't know when in the hell you've done that late.

K: It's good to know you're back Mel -- it's good to talk to you again.

L: Okay Henry.