*

TELCONE

Secretary Kissinger/Hugh Sidey

9:50 a.m. 1/21/74

S: What do you say, Henry!

K: Hugh, how are you.

S: Pretty good, What is up, heaven.

K: Hugh, I just walked into the office, I picked up Time and read that article on that alleged spying--you know these people spying on me.

S: Yeh. I haven't even seen it yet, you mean in our magazine?

K: Yeh.

S: Okay

K: And it says I ordered a wire tap on one of the suspects and it is totally
absolutely wrong.

S: Well, I'm going to have to find out about it, Henry.

K: Believe me there is nothing to find out. I had nothing to do with any
wire tap in any form directly or indirectly. They didn't criticize me
for it, because they say the guy did it, and they are just putting it in
as a sort of a throw away.

S: Yeh, but Henry didn't Laird testify publicly or somebody that there was
a wire tap on one of his generals that you ordered--

K: First of all, Laird wouldn't know about it, secondly, the only wire tap
they referred to, Laird testified that there was a wire tap on one of his
generals--as it turns out, that I didn't know it either, but that was in that
batch of wire taps that was made between 1969, May and 1970. Except for
that original batch, I had absolutely nothing to do with any wire taps.

S: Yeh, yeh, well listen, I'll have to get into this Henry, because I just
walked in--

K: You know I have testified name by name about the wire taps I knew anything
about before the Senate committee--and the records on that Quersely (sp?)
wire taps --that is one of the generals, that came about because he had
access to the information that leaked, but that was two years before this
event, the --a year and a half before this event

*

Page 2

S: And there was no such thing as this, okay

K: There was no such thing as this and that particular investigation, I had absolutely nothing to do with it. I'm not saying it was wrong investigate leaks of secret documents

S: Yeh, but this instance was not the case--would you specify that other guy --that original one the Laird general--

K: That original one--the FBI records are confused who did what, my name doesn't show on them, it is not inconceivable that we sent over a list of everyone who had access--he was the head man who handled the liaison to the NSC

S: Yeh, okay.

K: And he handled all the documents that at that time had leaked, but that was for a month in 1969 that we are talking about here

S: Yeh, huh.

K: Nor was that in the office either. To my knowledge Laird doesn't know anything more about than what he has read in the newspapers.

S: No, that's my impression too--just our people talked to him about this thing and he said you know--he brought it up again and it had been testified to as a public matter, but this is just a matter of being--

K: I have testified before the Senate committee as to w every person gk that either I or my office had any knowledge of, all of which occurred in the period between May 1969 and May 1970 as a result of that original decision to look into the question of the original leaks in May 1970, I dissociated from this and I never had anything to do with any internal security matter from then on.

S: Yeh. Henry what the heck is all this anyway--you've probably have told Mullikan, but I'm just curious

K: No, I haven't talked to Mullikan--you know it was--I'm calling you because you're the man I trust most

S: Well, we'll sure get in this and sure correct it

K: What it is, you may not believe, I never know any okk of the details that are now coming out--this was handled by Ehrlichman and I was told to stay the hell out of it--

*

Page 3

K: I never knew there was a 42 page report of Dave Young until I read it in the NYTIMES, so I could never tell whether this was super-bureaucratic gamesmanship, or something a little more sinister

S: Hm huh. hm huh. What is your feeling now?

K: My feeling is that, you know, bureaucratic empires always go up by knowing things, it got out of control, I mean it may have started as bureaucratic gamesmanship and he got out of control.

S: What was so sensitive about it though that it couldn't be revealed or is that something you weren't involved

K: I had absolutely nothing --I know there is such a bazaar quality about anything that goes on now, I have never seen the report--to this day I haven't seen the report--either the Buzhardt or the other report so I don't know what is in it.

S: Yeh. I

K: The part that I know isn't all that sensitive--but that is off-the-record.

S: Sure, I realize that. Sure. Well, that is the thing that baffles us, at least one of the elements that baffles us, you know Senator Baker and Erwin, talk about that extreme national security matter, and if this is it, you know it is rather unusual, because I don't find anything, I find this embarrassing to some people, but sure not a sensitive issue. Unless there is more to it.

K: There may well be, I don't want to mislead you, if there is--

S: You know nothing more at this point!

K: I know no more than what has been published; I have never seen the list of documents to this day--to this day I haven't seen the list of documents that was allegedly stolen from me.

S: Okay, Henry.

K: And of course, it sort of drives me up a wall, when every time, here now they have a picture in Time saying former Kissinger aide David Young,

S: Know.

K: He worked for Ehrlichman--he happened to get paid out of our payroll, because that's the way the WH works.

S: I understand that caption since--the documents came from your office and that.

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date: 4/8/89</td><td></td></tr></table>

*

Page 4

KN What is said is a sort of a throw-away. I'm not complaining about the motive, but it is totally wrong, I'll have apress conference this week on my trip, and I hope somebody will ask me a question, because I will show them the record.

S: (laughs). Okay, good.
That's another hell of a job over there.

K: You know, it is a pity, it really was a moving thing to see the beginning of trust develop between people who've been fighting for 30 years.
And we are so absorbed in every other thing, that we can't ever focus on it.

S: Yeh, yeh. Well, it is still-no I think people are aware of it, it leaked through the edges here.

K: I haven't seen you since I went over to State, why don't you come over and have breakfast or lunch--

S: I'd love it--I'd been trying to penetrate over there, but it is a little more difficult that it was at the WH

K: I'll call you--

S: Will you call me?

K: Let's do it this week--can we have breakfast

S: Okay--I'd like to. I'm going--I am in California today and Wednesday but I'm back Thursday and Friday.

K: Are you know in California?

S: No, I leave tonight--just got to talk out there till Thursday.

K: Thursday and Friday you're back.

S: Yes.

K: Why don't we say breakfast on Friday?

S: Great.

K: Can you make it as early as 7:45?

S: Sure.

K: Good at my WH office.
See you then and you'll tell--shall I tell Henry Grunwald about this?

<table><tr><td>By: <em>OT</em></td><td>NARA Date: <em>6/9/64</em></td></tr><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td><td> Authority: <em>EO 12958</em></td></tr></table>

TELCON

Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK

January 21, 1974 12:15 p.m.

D: Hello!

K: Hello, Anatol, one other thing -- the --now that Scali is back, Scali and Malik are at it again, and they deserve each other. Now Malik has called for a Security Council meeting this afternoon on two obscure issues--one having to do with __pay__ of the UNEF Force

D: Yeh

K: And the other having to do with the commander--

D: Really, Henry, I didn't know myself, but I called Malik on Saturday and he claims if it is even now---this is rather a closed meeting

K: See, the thing that Scali is worried about is how can you equalize the pay for ______ and Sweden

D: I don't know anything really (ahhuh) about--

K: It ought to be paid at whatever their national level is.

D: Yeh, so what is now the question.

K: I don't think we are ready for communism yet in the UNEF.

D: [laughs] Well really I don't have--

K: Oh hell, Anatol --I have talked to you now, I have done my duty, I will not escalate it to a high level.

D: [laughs]

K: I will tell Scali to be constructive if you can get Malik a little not to to be constructive we'll be all right.

D: [laughs] I already spoke with him. Malik said earlier that 5 dozen calls --if he is complaining to the White House, then I'm calling him--it becomes a long chain of communications--he is really angry because of this. I will try to do it with Malik and you do it with Scali.

K: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: N.W. Bureau of Investigation

TELECON
Professor Ralph Bates/Secretary Kissinger

January 21, 1974

2:45 PM

K: I called you because, as you know, I was in Syria yesterday. While I was there I had the opportunity to take up the issue of your son with President Sadat...that your son will be released in the next week or 10 days.

B: Wonderful, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Don't tell that to the press.

B: No. Thank you so much. I've admired your work.

K: This is one of my.....

B: I've admired everything you've done.

K: You're very kind to say this. This was one of my most pleasant__.

B: I'll write you to thank you.

K: I'm certain that in a week to 10 days your son will be released.

B: That you very much.

END

TELECON
Mr. Toth/Secretary Kissinger

January 21, 1974

3:00 pm

T: Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

T: You really did a job. I heard they applauded you at the
White House.

K: You're nice..

T: While you were away there have been a couple of stories on that
issue we talked about before. There was a Kraft piece and a Timmish
piece that uses the word perjury. I wanted to know if I could write
a piece -- but not attribute it to you.

K: What would you say?

T: There are some questions being raised as to whether or not you
had made final disclosure in your testimony. question goes to the
final line where you said, let's see on page 51 -- "Nor did I know that
that Young.." And the question has now been raised... the 4th plumber
operation.

K: Look, Bob. You know I have hardly to tell you how outraged I am
about this thing. We are talking off-the-record. Not only the humiliation
while I was out of the country... but it is 180 degrees off center. I did
not know Young had a report. I did not know Young was conducting an
investigation. The investigation was not under my.... I knew John
Erlichman was conducting an investigation but I was told to stay the hell
out of it.

T: The President said that?

K: No, Erlichman told me.. this is a total outrage.

T: But wasn't there a part you knew..

K: I knew one part of it. I knew the investigation of Wellender.. I was
called by Erlichman early in December.. that he was investigating leaks
to Anderson, and I was to stay the hell out and I would not be told the
conclusions. I thought they were out to get me.. Haig was told... Haig
called me and I told him to tell Erlichman so Erlichman knew one of my
staff men had been involved and I therefore got a report of that
investigation. That is the only part of the investigation I knew anything about.

<table><tr><td>By: NARA Date: 6/26/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr></table>

- 2 -

T: Well, can I write this without attributing it to you?

K: Can I think about it?

T: Well, I'll write it up and then read it to you and you can decide.

K: Well, I am trying to decide if I should make a public statement.

T: I think maybe you should... I have talked to some liberal democrats... You're all we've got... it should put to rest all of these stories. Kraft has a different interest and Timmish we can write off but I think these things are going to keep re-occurring... In the context they thought you were the...

K: Now, speaking to you as a friend, if you really think about the 4th Plumbers operation... in the context that my staff was riddled with leakers... I was not trustworthy...

T: Well, I think it would be worthwhile to do it.

K: I'll think about it.

T: Will you call me back tomorrow or should I bother you.

K: I'll call you back tomorrow or at the latest the next day.

T: You won't give it to anyone else.

K: No.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT<br/>NARA Date: 6/26/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED<br/>Authority: EO 12958</td></tr></table>

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

January 21, 1974

3:15 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry. I heard you found a nice reception from your staff when
you got back. They were applauding.

K: I'm having a staff meeting in a few minutes. I'll be talking to them
then. But I don't expect enthusiasm from my staff.

P: Deep down they have respect.

K: They know it's a big thing.

N: The reason we're having a NSC meeting is I think it's a good to pull
all those people together. I don't know what subject you want.
Just make it an hour, Wednesday at 3:00.

K: That's fine Mr. President. I'll make a note to you tomorrow as to
the _____. Maybe we can just have a review on the Middle East.

N: Or SALT.

K: Maybe SALT. Let's have SALT, Mr. President.

N: Middle East, they're just rehashing things. You can get running
on that in the meantime. Get ready to get back on your time clock
and just remember you've done a hell of a job. Keep fighting.

K: I am. No question about it, Mr. President.

END

*

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date: 6/8/64</td><td></td></tr></table>

*

TELECON

Secretary Kissinger/Marshall Wright

January 21, 1974, 5:18 p.m.

K: Policy Committee - whatever it's called - on
the 29th.

W: All right.

K: That can now stay as it is -- they don't have to switch it.
I'm willing to meet with the Congressional leaders on the 30th
for

W: The House leadership.

K: Keep it there.

W: I don't think we will have any

K: I thought the 29th was their regular day. I have no reason
to have it on the 29th.

W: The President has switched the State of the Union to the
30th.

K: But in the evening.

W: Let them make their own choice. I'll see if they've
already sent out their notices.

K: Just let me know what they want. If they prefer it on
their regular

W: still on the 30th.

K: Let me know -- soonest.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date: 6/8/84</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Professor Bates

January 21, 1974, 5:23 p.m.

K: ________ will be released on Wednesday.

B: On Wednesday?

K: Yes.

B: This week?

K: Yes.

B: Oh, how wonderful. Absolutely wonderful. Thank you
very much.

K: Well, I just thought you might want to have it.

B: I only want to say we realize the enormous burdens you've
had just now.

K: Not at all. This is one of the more joyful things.

B: We know all the complications that you have to face.
You have

K: Well, I'm delighted.

B: I'm terribly grateful. I shall write you, of course, in
due course.

K: That isn't necessary, but I'd be delighted to hear from
you any time.

END.

*

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

January 21, 1974

5:45 PM

D: Hello?

K: Hello Anatol?

D: Yes, Henry.

K: Before I go to sleep I wanted to tell you I don't think I can make it on the 7th and 8th.

D: What is a good date for you?

K: Let me look that over and talk to you tomorrow.

D: Would it be earlier?

K: Earlier is certainly impossible. I would like to do it when I am in Moscow or if he wants to meet me before...

D: In Cuba?

K: No, if he wants to meet me before in Geneva or if he wants to come over here.

D: Before you go over there he won't want to....

K: Is it that urgent?

D: Urgent?...well, it is his proposal...

K: I don't think it's that urgent. Well, tell him I suggest we do it in March in Moscow.

D: Alright, and on the second point...have you have a chance to look at the oil problem?

K: The oil problem-....your participation in a larger conference.

D: Yes or on a bilateral basis.

K: On a bilateral basis I can tell you now, we'll be prepared to do this.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
George Vest
1/22/74; 9:44 a.m.

K: Hello.

V: Sir, George Vest. When you left me yesterday on the press conference you said keep it tentative and I wanted to confirm whether you would be doing it or not at 12:00.

K: What do you think? Should I do it today?

V: I think you should do it today, sir. The sooner the better.

K: Okay. Do I have to make an opening statement or can I go right into questions?

V: I think you could go right into questions because the press this morning is so completely filled in on the Mid East and it leaves it to them to go on from there.

K: Okay, well let's see it.

V: Yes, sir.

K: Thank you.

V: Right.

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz

January 22, 1974, 11:34 a.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Good morning.

K: I did not tell Dayan that you could plant a question on the Suez Canal, and you are

D: I am sure you told him.

K: "BS". What the hell -- I'm not running Israeli domestic policy here. It's inappropriate to raise this.

D: There is a misunderstanding -- it's not in connection with the Canal.

K: Then what? What are you going to ask me?

D: You remember that Dayan said that the question of whether there should be an opening of the Canal or not from the Russian point of view

K: Excuse me. You are right. I apologize. What does "BS" mean in Hebrew?

D: We say in Hebrew "BS".

K: You are right. That I did say. I thought you were going to tell me that you were going on record

D: God forbid, not at all.

K: Don't say God forbid so often - I might think you are religious.

D: I would never have put you in that position.

K: Don't say that. You would try. You are smart enough to realize you couldn't put me in that position.

D: Not because I couldn't -- I wouldn't.

K: So the question is do I mind having the Canal opened?

D: From the point of view of the Russian fleet and the Indian Ocean.

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E012958</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date: 4/28/84</td><td></td></tr></table>

K: No, we can handle it. But I will say we can live without the
Russian Fleet in the Indian Ocean. It's not a

D: Under the circumstances, it's preferable. That's what you discussed with Dayan.

K: The speech of the Prime Minister got very good play on TV.

D: A good speech.

K: May I say something, Mr. Ambassador? So long as you wrote the speech, let somebody else praise it.

D: No, I put in one part, but she wrote it.

K: We all know you're modest. But this way

D: Whatever I say, it's no good.

K: That is absolutely true.

D: I wrote a long cable to the Prime Minister yesterday about the
Syrian move.

K: They have given us more conditions which I won't pass on to you because they will upset you. This would just make it worse after what they already proposed to you. But give us your counter-proposal. I really think the illusion of something happening is almost as important as something happening.

D: We'll wait now for the reaction after the Cabinet meeting on Sunday.

K: They have told me they will give you Leopoldville for Kineta (sp?).

D: I don't think we want it -- it's got too many Russians.

K: But it has a refinery.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT<br/>NARA Date: 6/8/84</td><td>DECLASSIFIED<br/>E012958</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Atherton

January 22, 1974, 11:48 a.m.

K: Have we heard from Akins today?

A: I haven't seen anything. He was to have seen the King at the earliest 10:00 their time.

K: 4:00 our time.

A: 3:00 a.m. here. He did not have a firm appointment. He said it was the earliest it would be.

K: I'm thinking of a very tough statement.... to the effect we could understand it at first, and it was becoming increasingly inappropriate that in the light of recent events it would be hard to reconcile a continuation of the embargo with friendship with the United States, and it would raise the most serious questions about whether we could continue our effort. What do you think?

A: In principle, I think we've got to begin to do this, but I'm reluctant until we get the King's word.

K: But if he doesn't, then you know...

A: If he doesn't, we have to do that. I think that doing it at noon today might be premature - might get his back up just when we may be getting over the hump. I feel we're going to get what we want, and we may hear in a day or two. Knowing the King's temperament,

K: Then I'll just stick to the inappropriate - increasingly so, and to a point that raises questions.

A: That I think you should do. Stop at that for today.

K: Thank you.

A: Yes, sir.

END

<table><tr><td>By<br/>NARA Date</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By<br/>NARA Date</td><td>4/8/64</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Don Kendall

January 22, 1974, 3:50 p.m.

Kendall: Congratulations.

K: Thank you.

Kendall: Jesus Christ, you're getting to be the negotiator of the century.

K: Why don't you let me get you a few Pepsi Colas?

Kendall: Which one would you like to start with?

K: You take me up on these sarcastic remarks.

Kendall: You suggested before you left that I give you a call and we could work out a lunch date. I've got a few things to talk to you about.

K: Next week sometime?

Kendall: Yes.

K: I don't have my calendar in front of me. Can I have Mr. Campbell call you tomorrow? Is any day next week all right with you?

Kendall: Any day. I've got a luncheon on Thursday. I can cancel that.

K: Thursday I can't do anyway.

Kendall: I'm giving a luncheon on Monday. I can do it Tuesday, Wednesday or Friday.

K: O.K.

Kendall: Have you heard of the ______ signatures ______ for the Presidency? The reaction is unbelievable. We're getting 90% replies. The letters are from people all over the country - running $7.00 a letter - so you know the kind of people we're talking to - not big contributors. We hit them regular mail.

K: That's fascinating.

Kendall: Our agency, BBD&O, says they've never seen anything like it. When you get out of this Eastern group and Washington, you find real support. Rostow was very helpful - Dean of the Law School, etc. I got

<table><tr><td>By: OT</td><td>Authority: E0 12958</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>NARA Date: 4/3/1974</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

January 22, 1974, 4:37 p.m.

K: Have we had any report from him?

A: We haven't had any report, sir.

K: Is he still there?

A: Yes, he's very much there.

K: I noticed you didn't put into the first paragraph of the cable, as I had wanted, that this came from both the President and me.

A: We put it in the talking points. I had understood

K: Yes, but the substance of it was approved by the President.

A: I see. I'm sorry. I misunderstood. I did put it into the first point.

K: ______ only that he expected ______. I just don't want to wind up as the villain in this thing.

A: I'm sure he'll be reporting the minute he is back from his audience.

K: O.K.

END

*

<table><tr><td>By: <em>PT</em><br/>NARA Date: <em>4/25/58</em></td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr></table>

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

January 22, 1974

5:21 PM

S: ______ stop for the period of visit and he will let me know immediately.

K: You will let Dobrynin know and only Dobrynin. That doesn't exclude me.

S: I understand.

K: You're the sneaky type. You're going to take my job, in a different way.

S: I'm happy.

K: You could be happier.

S: You don't get enough sleep for me.

5:25 PM

K: Everytime my back is turned you have a staff meeting.

S: Somebody's got to ______

K: Stop these things as of the 26th, until Breshnev has left. I don't want to cut these things too fine. He's going to continue ______ on the 28th.

S: I'll stop them on the 26th.

END

*

<table><tr><td>By: NARA Date: 6/25/64</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td> Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELECON

Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

January 22, 1974

6:01 PM

K: Mr. Ambassador.

D: I just wanted to tell you I got word of the ___ agreement.
___ 76 to 36. ___.

K: That means only the ___.

D: On only the left wing and the ___. I thought you would be
happy to hear this.

K: If we're having trouble getting the embargo lifted
would you be willing to hold up your withdrawal?

D: Sure.

K: You don't have to start withdrawal before Friday?

D: I don't think so.

K: Will you let me know?

D: I will check and you will let me know what you want us to do?

K: Yes.

END.

TELECON
Jack Valenti/Secretary Kissinger

January 22, 1974

8:07 PM

V: I want to thank you very much for calling me back. You got me all excited. I want to ask you something. I want to get your comment. I'm having a meeting of all the presidents of the motion picture company. I want to put forth a proposal that we take all motion pictures and charge oil companies for them in ______. The only country ______ is Iran. Most of that will go to Iran and we say "look you're chargin $11 a barrel for oil ______"

K: He hasn't ______.

V: ______ out of Iran and most is going to be made ______. I wouldn't have to quote you. But somebody is going to ask me what our government is thinking about this ______.

K: I don't object to it. My projection is ______ is going to ______.

V: ______ is saying "look we are American citizens, we think high prices of oil ______. We are not going to stand for it any more."

K: I have no objections to it. Can you get away with it. I don't think you can get away with it. There's no foreign policy problem.

V: I told these ______ the shits to get the hell out of here.

K: Maybe he'll pay. He's ______.

V: I didn't want to come out and make a statement, that would cause you embarrassment.

K: I appreciate it very much, Jack.

(The rest of the conversation was personal.)

TELECON
Bob Toth/Secretary Kissinger

January 22, 1974

K: In light of the way they're all handling this ____
I had no plan, I thought this would be a Middle East press
conference.

T: I really just wanted to tell you how I felt.

K: I would prefer sympathy to what's happened now.

T: I think that's impossible now.

K: I don't mean from you. I mean in general. All I can tell
you is I regret it. I meant to call you right after.

T: It's going to be a hard one to forget.

K: That's up to you Bob. I feel that there was no way I could
duck the question. For whatever it's worth, I feel I owe you
one, which doesn't change the present situation for you or me.

T: It was in your interest to do it today. I had it before.
I had it from other people. I respected your confidence all
the way through and I respected your promises.

K: I recognize this Bob. On the other hand I was faced with
a situation where somebody asked a very circumstantial question.
Had I refused to answer it would just be lying and ____.

T: You could have done it this afternoon, got it all out.

K: To refuse to answer it at a press conference ____.
You've been very decent about it Bob. Of course, I didn't have to
talk to you about it on the West Coast.

T: There are others who know enough about the story. I knew
about the interrogation of the Admiral which is what makes it
difficult for you.

K: Makes it difficult for me? As far as I'm concerned, I don't
give a God-damn. Here's a man who came to me with a ____ which
I was _____. Erlichman had Young take his statement and if you
can make something out of it you all just go ahead and do it.
Turn it into a God-damn _____. You know damn well I was a
victim of spying and turn it into perjury. I'm sorry. I am
truly sorry. You've always been decent to me. You've been
utterly decent to me. I'm sorry. I was forced into a situation

<table><tr><td>By: AT</td><td>NARA Date: 6/22/74</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: EO 12958</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

*

where I had to do it. I wasn't going to put it on the record.
______ you can't explain it at a press conference.

T: The message didn't come through about ______.

K: It was the loudest possible way to put it out. ______ very
circumstantial question being asked. I'll make a statement on
that later this week. ______ that something sinister is going on.

T: ______ Stennis committee is going to call you or ______ to call you.

K: It's fine with me. What the hell can I do? I can't tell
them any more than what I've said so far.

T: I think it will work out in the end.

K: Any fair-minded person will have to come to a conclusion
that I'm a victim of spying and a victim of the ______. Young's
interrogation of this ______. I frankly forgot it. I wouldn't
think this was done by an Erlichman staffman.

T: You explained that to me. You promised it was off the record. I could have broken it all ____ but I didn't.

K: Bob, you were one hell of a decent guy about this. If there's
anyway I can make it up to you.

T: They already think I'm a dope.

K: You're a decent guy. Maybe a hell of a lot more than all
this shit is going on now. You really think it's proper? I
shouldn't have to worry about this stuff today. What is the ____.

T: That you were ______ by the Senate committee.

K: Everything I said before the committee was in the context of
the plummers. The only thing on everybody's mind at the time.

T: It's too bad the whole thing couldn't be put out at once.
I have my ______ but I was told I was wrong. And the only one who
really knows ______.

K: Bob, all I want you to know is it's no consolation to me ______,
I couldn't get out of this. I have the highest regard for you.
If you can find an appropriate way I can make it up to you, I'll
do it, because you were decent and you bent over backwards to
be decent. If you can look at my situation. It's a disgrace
for the Secretary of State to have to do something in that
context ______ was the only way this could have ______. Now that
it's happened, it's happened. I don't know whether......

*

T: I just got a lot of shit.

K: From who?

T: From my people. I've been up to see ____.

K: Is there anything I can do, can I call ____ or somebody and tell him what happened? Seriously.

T: Maybe the next occasion you have to talk to him. I'm sure it hasn't got that high yet.

K: This is an example of what I consider extraordinary decent behavior. Do you want to think about it over night?

T: I think I'd rather just let it go.

K: OK. I'll certainly tell him on the next occasion I talk to him.

T: Good luck. Keep up the good work.

K: Why don't you think of something I can do, seriously. There's bound to be something in the next month or so. If you can think of some way or if I can get you advance information about something, I'll do it. That you can count on.

T: I'm kind of down, I don't sound very appreciative.

K: Why don't we get together next week sometime, in general.

T: Next week I'm on holiday. I'm taking the kids skiing. Maybe the following week.

K: We can talk about the energy conference before it takes place. Why don't we have the week after next. Why don't I give you a call when you get back.

T: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>By: OT<br/>NARA Date: 6/26/84</td><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E0 12958</td><td></td></tr></table>

TELCORN
Senator Javits - Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

12:50 p. m.

J: _________

K: Thank you Jack. I am so well organized I only now got the
message you called on Monday.

J: Anyway, it was a triumph and I just wanted to call and tell you
that and tell you hello, I'm glad you're back. Whenever you get a
chance I'd love to talk to you. Are you going to be here for awhile?

K: Yes, I'll be here for several weeks.

J: I'm off to California, but I'll be here next week and anytime you'd
like ...... you're coming up to us on Thursday, right.

K: Whenever the 29th...

J: Thursday. If you want to have a word with me before then
, of course you may feel you are adequately equipped.

K: How about Monday?

J: Sounds fine. I'll be back from California, I'm coming back on
the Red Eye and I'll be there.

K: How about 7:45 breakfast at the White House.

J: Great.

*

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>By: NARA Date: 6/26/64</td>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Authority: E012958</td>
    <td></td>
  </tr>
</table>

*

TELCORN

Ziffren/Sec. Kissinger

Wednesday, January 23, 1:00 p.m.

1974

K: Paul, How are you?

Z: Fine, but how are you?

K: Fine.

Z: I hope you have had some kind of rest -- my God, what a trip you have had.

K: I am getting back into the time zones.

Z: When are you going to get some rest.

K: I hope soon.

Z: You obviously are not going to go away on Friday, as you expected.

K: No I am not.

Z: Do you know when you will be going away.

K: In about two weeks.

Z: I cannot tell you how worried we are about -- I don't know
what you do, but thank God you do it. I talked to your office
when I realized you would not be back until Monday. I knew you
could not obviously meet with us this week. In the meantime,
I thought I would also tell you that Elmer Winter has been very
helpful in trying to get some movement on this Jackson Amendment.
As a matter of fact I had occasion to talk to Jackson myself
on something else and I needled him a little bit about being
frozen into a position. We are trying to accomplish something
and let's find out what and not sit back and make a symbol out of
something that has no substance. He said he wanted to talk to you
about it more. In the meantime, on the 29th the American Jewish
Committee is having a meeting out in Scotsdale where I think it
is going to be one of the matters on the agenda. Moss will be
out there and Winter has promised to talk to him.

K: I will tell you it is now absolutely -- if we want moderation
on the Middle East policy by the Soviet Union we have to get the
Jackson Amendment amended. We cannot keep the Soviets quet in the
Middle East and humiliate them constantly.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

Ziffren

Jan. 23

-2

Z: I noted they cut off arms to Syria.

K: To Egypt.

Z: I thought Syria.

K: I think Egypt.

Z: In any event I have been trying to do what I could to get something going on there. One of the problems is that Richey Moss who is apparently a relatively open minded person is going to be succeeded at the end of February as head of this Conference on Soviet Jewry by Stanley Lowell(?). Do you know him?

K: No.

Z: He comes out of the American Jewish Congress. He is less open minded. I have been telling them to get something moving before then. In any event I did want you to know that there was a good result of the meeting with Winter and he has been very helpful and we had a good meeting in New York after meeting with you. Everyone sent their congratulations. And in terms of another meeting the question is what is most convenient to you.

K: Next week would be fine.

Z: The one problem with next week is Riffkin is on his vacation. He will not be back until the second of February which means the week of the fourth. That would be the following week.

K: Let's aim for that week.

Z: How is Friday, the 8th of that week.

K: All right. Let's aim for that.

Z: Do you think...

K: I will be here

Z: Friday, the 8th, all right.

K: Right.

Z: In the afternoon about 2:30.

K: Let's say 3:00.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F.O.1458
NARA Date 6/9/01
By AB

January 23, 1974

3:10 pm

K: The Paracels has been sitting on my desk for 48 hours and now I understand all these cables from Graham Martin... we can't tolerate this.

S: I only know of one cable from Martin.

K: Can you get a suggestion for an answer for the one he send back channel to me and get it over in the next hour?

S: yes sir.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By: NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCON
Governor Holton - Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

3:30 p.m.

H: I have enjoyed it. Been looking at a portrait of a mind. Very fascinating and I'm looking very much forward to my job.

K: Well, we're just going through the procedures. It should be straighted out in a few days. You know they have to do the formal investigations, there's no problem about them, it just takes 2-3 weeks.

H: Fine. I'll just go on and shoot some birds or something and wait to hear from you.

K: Good. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/07

TELECON
Senator Scott/Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

3:46 pm

S: The President was talking to me last Friday. We went over a lot of things and one of them was he would like to do something about John Cooper and he said he wouldn't even make a note of it, for me to take it up with Henry. It was his feeling not to do a permanent thing.

K: I have been wanting to appoint him as an Ambassador.

S: He thought as a special mission or a roving Ambassador or a series of special missions. John may be more interested in a permanent position but that's not what the President was talking about.

K: Let me talk to the President and find out what he is willing to do. And we'll find something.

S: He was thinking of not tying him down for a position of 5 years or a nine to five basis.

K: I have the highest regard for John.

S: I think if John had the personal rank of Ambassador for travelling around.

K: Let me see what we can do.

S: Alright.

K: And we'll do something.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/1974

TELECON
Mr. Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

K: The schedule for that Mexican Foreign Ministers Conference -- what time do I have to be there?

Kubisch: You are expected to arrive on Wednesday, the 20th, late in the day and participate on Thursday, Friday and part of Saturday.

K: I have been trying to take a vacation and find a time to do it.

Kubisch: I know. What about going to the conference and staying on after that?

K: I can't because I have a speech to do on the 28th.

Kubisch: I had understood you were trying to go sometime in early February.

K: That I can't do either because I have to prepare for the energy conference.

Kubisch: You know you did offer to go to Panama on the 6th and 7th of February and on Tuesday the 5th we are having a seminar of all of the scholars and ex government officials and congressmen to discuss our Latin American policy just for a day.

K: Is it possible to move the Panama thing to the 7th and 8th?

Kubisch: I was going to suggest if you want to you can. They come back on Friday from an extensive trip. You could do it almost any day, any day next week if you wanted to.

K: No, no..let me do it on the 7th and 8th..let me think about it and I'll let you know.

END

Authority E.O.12958
ByAB NARA Date 6/9/74

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

4:25 pm

F: Have you recovered? Do you feel alright?

K: I feel fine.

F: Get some sleep.

K: I am caught up.

F: Good.

K: I called you about the stories with regard to my testimony before your Committee.

F: What stories?

K: Yesterday when I was asked at the press conference, I explained all the circumstances as I knew them.

F: This is what you told me on Monday.

K: Yes, but then there is an aspect that I considered minor that the New York Times is playing up in a particular way...the investigation was conducted by John Erlichman and I never saw it or knew its results but there was an admiral in my office, head of liaison of the Joint Chiefs, who came to General Haig when I was out of town and said he thought that internal evidence indicated that the documents had been leaked from his office. I told Haig to send that Admiral to Erlichman since he was conducting the investigation and since I had been told to stay out of it and Erlichman turned this Admiral over to David Young who was questioning him and afterwards they let me hear the tape of that questioning as it related of thefts of documents from my office. The argument being made by one office is because I said to the Committee that I didn't know about it, the existence of the Plumbers or the activities of Young in [__] with internal matters, that I mislead the Committee. The question was do I know anything about David Young's illegal activities of breaking and entering, conspiracy to burglarize or whatever. I was thinking entirely in the context of the P.umbers and I did not construe it...the fact that one of the staff members was questioning a man who I had sent there and was to keep a report..by that question which I generated, I know nothing about David Young's activities, nor did I know about this investigation nor did I know he had written a report. What I have told you is the literal truth and I wanted you to know this.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/74

*

- 2 -

F: I have been so busy, I am getting ready for election. I did not read it.

K: If your Committee wanted me to I would be glad to report this.

F: What I would like to do is to do whatever would be helpful to you. I don't propose to be a party to trying to embarrass you.

K: I know but I don't want there to be a sense that I mislead the Committee.

F: No one on the Committee has raised this with me. I noted that there are two telephone calls from Hirsch, they have asked me to call him but before I take a call I will take a look at the New York Times.

K: Today's times.

F: I'll take a look at it before I make the call.

K: You can read Murray Marder in the Post. .has a fair account. Seymour Hirsch is trying to make a dark thing out of it, no other newspaper is. that I am familiar with.

F: He is calling me.

K: If you want me to I can send over what I actually said to the press.

F: Is that fuller than what was in the paper?

K: Yes.

F: Why don't you do that. I think I have been around enough to understand how some of these things operate and I don't want to add fuel to this damn thing... are they seriously trying to embarrass you.

K: I don't think any other newspaper is and I don't know whether Hirsch is.

F: I have a little sense that some of our more radical community are not sure that what you are doing is in the interests of Israel.

K: I believe that that plays a role.

F: Between you and me, one of my constituents who used to be high in his praise of you is being standoffish and it makes me feel that they interpret what you're doing, which as you know I am in accord with, as against the interests of Israel. They're dead wrong.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By AB NARA Date 5/9/67

K: ... They would have been finished if they maintained defiance in the UN.
They would have had ... votes which we would have had to join sooner or
later.

F: You know I agree with you and I suspect some of these people do not
understand what you're doing and they accept blandly what Dayan says as right
for the security of Israel. And I think some of these people are trying to...

K: Why don't I send over the text of what I said.

F: OK.

K: I'll send you the relevant pages.

F: That's good.

K: I'll send it right over.

F: About the Committee, if you want me to bring it up I'll do it and if you
do not, I will not.

K: Why don't we arrange it on Tuesday, the day before I testify before your
Committee.

F: fine.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12558
By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

TELC:ON

Ambassador Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

4:45 p.m.

K: Have you seen the report of your two suicidal cabinet members?

D: It's a ridiculous thing. I have been on the telephone since last
night. It's a ridiculous story. I have appealed to NBC in Israel
to produce the facts or a denial of its own. (name) is known to
be an irresponsible guy.

K: I am not that crazy.

D: I know. Last night I issued an official denial and I called the
*Post* too, but they didn't use it.

K: Could you publish an official denial?

D: Of course, here in Washington we issued one last night but
they didn't use it.

K: But in Jerusalem?

D: In Jerusalem too. I will ask them to publish it and send it
again so we can use it too. I am sorry about it.

K: This is ridiculous.

D: Mr. Secretary, can I tell you something. I got a new cable
from Golda about some violation that is happening in the zone on
building installations for missiles on the eastern side of the Canal.
They had started to build them before the signing....

K: and now they are continuing it?

D: They are continuing it. Today the Chief of Staff asked Gamasy
to dismantle them but Gamasy said they couldn't because of the morale
of the army, they had to continue to build because of the morale.
Tomorrow the Chief of Staff will say to Gamasy we request all five
installations, which include underground firing controls, should
be discontinued or we will not stay in the timetable...

K: That's fair enough.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.1558
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/1974

*

2.

D: We wanted you to know. The Prime Minister didn't want us to say anything to them before telling you. Also the Prime Minister wishes to inform them that we have communicated with you about this and asked you to use your influence because it is contrary to the spirit and letter of the thing....

K: Yes, of course. Well, I'm supposed to hear from them tonight.

D: We had the feeling if they heard from you it will work, it is sort of a test case for them. If they hear it from you...

K: Let me see first what they are sending to me. They are probably, ... anyway don't worry about it.

D: I think if they get a reading from you they would be more ...

K: If we don't do it tomorrow let me know what happened at the meeting.

D: If you communicate with them, preferably tonight, it would be, ...

K: The thing is I don't want to communicate with them until they ... until I hear from them.

D: OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12/85g
By AB NARA Date 6/9/87

TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

4:52 pm

K: Would you do a paper on that conversation of what he has in mind on the economic side with the goal

S: He didn't really say...I gave you in my memo what he said.

K: Where is that?

S: I gave that to Larry before your meeting..he was eliptical.

K: He is willing to come to the conference. Will you get a cable out to all of the people giving our delegation.

S: Fine. I sent you a memo and I suggest that Win and I do a paper on ways to do it if we want to go one way or another on the gold and the flow.

K: Good. When are you going to put forward your best efforts on the energy conference.

S: The best effort is going on. The question is what comes out.

K: We have to beat that system. Do you think Donaldson can do it?

S: Winston, Hartman and I are hopefully steering him in that direction. I think so.

K: Don't steer him, handle him.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12/58
By AB NARA Date 6/9/68

TELCON

Ron Ziegler - Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

6:22 p.m.

K: ________ the thing about the President...if the President leaves and Ford takes over I will stay. The Israeli thing.

Z: Ford's denied that. (laughter) Common Henry, you've got to be a little quicker than that.

K: I have denied it. I wanted you to know the Israelis have totally denied it and demanded that NBC retract. I think Jerry ought to say this tomorrow.

Z: Right. Okay. The Israeli government denied it?

K: The Israeli government and the Israeli Embassy has called it to the attention of people.

Z: Ford said he was going to get a whole new team.

K: Oh, Christ.

Z: I'm just kidding you. There's another report you are involved in tonight though.

K: What's that?

Z: One of the former Hughes men, Mayhew, said the President offered to send you to Las Vegas to talk to Hughes about atomic tests.

K: That's true.

Z: Oh, shit.

K: No, it's true.

Z: I denied it. That's too bad.

K: Yes, it's true.

Z: I said it was not true. Boy, that screws me. I shouldn't have done it that fast.

K: Why don't you just let it ride.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1985
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/87

TELECON

Mr. Atherton/Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974

6:50 PM

K: ______ at least have it prepared. But I would go no further
than what is in the agreement. You call his attention to the text of
the agreement. We intend to get it lived up to.

A: Right.

K: You see ?

A: I think this overtakes the message to Sadat. Don't you?

K: Yes.

A: It sounds to me it will come out all right. I think Jim is
quite right.

K: You ought to do a letter that does pin it down. He must know by
next week so he can announce it at 9:30. Can you do that?

A: Yes sir.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/01