DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers/Dr. Kissinger
4/6/71; 9:35 a.m.

R: I wanted to talk about that goddam message from our people in
Dacca. Did you see it?

K: No.

R: It's miserable. They bitched about our policy and have given it
lots of distribution so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable.

K: And it will probably get to Ted Kennedy.

R: I am sure it will.

K: Somebody gives him cables. I have had him call me about them.

R: It's a terrible telegram. Couldn't be worse/says we failed to
defend American lives and are morally bankrupt.

K: Blood did that?

R: Quite a few of them signed it. You know we are doing everything
we can about it. Trying to get the telegrams back as many as we can.
We are going to get a message back to them.

K: I am going in these two days to keep it from the President until he
has given his speech.

R: If you can keep it from him I will appreciate it. In the first place
I think we have made a good choice.

K: The Chinese haven't said anything.

R: They talk about condemning atrocities. There are pictures of the
East Pakistanis murdering people.

K: Yes. There was one of an East Pakistani holding a head. Do you
remember when they said there were 1000 bodies and they had the gxxx
graves and then we couldn't find 20?

R: To me it is outrageous they would send this.

K: Unless it hits the wires I will hold it. I will not forward it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

R: We should get our answers out at the same time the stories come out.

K: I will not pass it on.

R: How was the boss?

K: It is somewhat a tense period. He was all right until he came back and someone got to him.

R: I also wanted to talk to you about a personal matter. Chuck Colson called about my going on Meet the Press Sunday. I am prepared if the President thinks it wise. I would like to want to see how the broadcast goes. And, too, I am not sure that answering questions about it right now is wise.

K: Any time you say something there is something that people will twist.

R: My thoughts would be to wait a while. There would be a hell of a lot of questions they would ask that I could not answer. My own thought would be to wait a week.

K: Do you mind if I talk to Haldeman, stating that some of these views are my own? I will put it on the basis there is no question of your being willing to do it, but the general question of whether we shouldn't just shut up after this.

R: ...when I testified on Laos.

K: Did Wilke (?) really go this far?

R: Yes. He got enthusiastic and carried away.

K: All the agreed public relations was that we would not state an obvious .... He did not state it that way. ... Excuse me, the President is calling. I will call you right back.

(9:45 - HAK returned call)

K: I have to go in to see him. Let me put it on that basis.

R: All right.

K: On the basis that obviously you would be happy to do it, but just raising the general policy issue whether having spoken we shouldn't just keep quiet.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger

11:59 a.m.

4/6/71

B: Lou Harris is in close touch with Katcharian in the Soviet Secretariet at the UN. Katcharian is also the outlet to non-governmentals in NY. He saw Harris last week and I heard about it yesterday. Very emphatic on the warm side of the Brezhnev speech.

K: I have had some from Dobrynin but I would like to see the memo.

B: If you want to use fire -- I will cover my concern in my note.

K: I will tell you something and if I could have it quikly as possible.

B: I will send it airmail special xingix right now.

K: Only to me. of course.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
McGregor/Kissinger
12:03 p.m. 4/6/71

M: A couple of Senators have called wondering whether Aiken's information is correct and where he is getting it. He says withdrawing troops at 30,000 for the last two weeks.

K: Nonsense.

M: I thought so. People are asking me.

K: Don't confirm or deny.

M: Aiken isn't calling.

K: No but they are trying to get a figure. They will keep asking until they have found out the figure.

M: I am only telling people who are loyal supporters when they are calling whether the information is being given.

K: Not getting any information.

M: Did any member of Congress get special information from you this morning?

K: I saw Javits on the M.E. That's all. To settle that question, no member of Congress will get special information from me or anyone else.

M: Thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

2:52 p.m.

4/6/71

S: I have 3 quick ones. One is that Vance Hartke has given a press conference in Paris. He met with NVN and VC. He is confident with talks that if we have a date for removal of forces there would be an immediate ceasefire for our forces to withdraw; and all prisoners home before Christmas. Habib is sure it's Hartke extrapolation (?) on the old NVN line. It will come through in the next couple of hours. Second thing is in connection with Paris. No response on meeting on the 8th. They owe us an answer and Phil will remind them tomorrow and if they say there's no answer then he will say it takes two to agree and therefore we will assume there will be no meeting. The possibility is that the meeting will be at a low level. David may stay away. After the President's speech so I think David should be there.

K: I agree.

S: Finally, Ellsworth wants to take leave from 23-??. To Katmandu to see Carol.

K: I think that's fine. Are you going on TODAY Thurs. morning? I think you should.

S: I will talk with Bob McCloskey about it. He and Klein can I should think the following morning and give it a change to ride.

K: That's a good point.

S: It seems that Thurs. morning it should be the President's statement.

K: That's a good point.

S: I will talk with Bob McCloskey about it. He and Klein can get together.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Secretary Rogers Morton
Mr. Kissinger
4/6/71, 3:00 p.m.

M: Hello Henry.

K: Hello Rogers.

M: We are down to the line on trying to work out just exactly what instructions are to be given Ambassador Williams so that we can establish what his relationship is to the Department, what his mission is with regard to Micronesia, so that we can be of service to him. I hoped that this week we could get the parameters worked out. I hoped that I could get someone from your staff with Harrison Lesh of my staff (Assistant Secretary).

K: How would you like to work that out?

M: I would like you to have someone from your office get in touch with Lesh and work this out.

K: I will have John Holdridge of my office call Lesh this afternoon and we will put out a directive which lays out his instructions exactly and I will assume that this directive will have been worked out with you ahead of time.

M: We can discuss policy at a subsequent time. Right now we just want to talk administrative matters.

mlh

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
Ron Ziegler/HAK
4/6/71; 3:30 p.m.

(Missed opening remarks)

K: He is going to show the increase in the rate of Vietnamese-American marriages.

Z: No, seriously.

K: He is going to use one or two.

Z: It is on the level?

K: Yes. I don't want any reference..

Z: We just got a call from CBS saying he will use charts. Mark Wood saying 1 or 2.

K: We will have a statement made just in case. He may use one or two.

Z: When will that be decided?

K: Tomorrow.

Z: Can I take a look at the speech?

K: No. I am under orders not to show it even to Haig. It isn't in final form yet. Tomorrow morning.

Z: OK.

K: Is anyone putting together a briefing pattern?

Z: We must know first whether the President wants to do a briefing.

K: I know he does.

Z: Well, then, we will put together a pattern. You work the Alsops and those types the way you want them. On your own. But let's not set up a big program thing where we are running people in and outdoors.

K: I want one just for the press.

Z: And one for TV.

K: Yes, but it is generally better if the TV comes first.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Jos. Alsop/Kissinger
3:50 p.m 4/6/71

K: The remaining member of the Alsop who hasn't deserted the ship. You tell Stu he has hurt us at a bad moment.

A: He is so up and down.

K: I called about your dinner on the 13th.

SANITIZED

A: Would it be a great favor to ask you to stay that night? It means a lot in a business way. Mrs. Chandler very much wants to see you. I don't normally ask.

SANITIZED

A: So the question is whether you are going on the 12th or 13th.

SANITIZED

A: I long to see you anyway. How about breakfast tomorrow?

K: Let's wait until after the speech.

A: I thought I might write about the speech.

K: I have to hold the staff together. I have them together.

A: When can I see you tomorrow afternoon?

K: I will call you.

SANITIZED

A: Then you had better do it. I will see you tomorrow.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON

John Sherman Cooper/Kissinger

4:03 p.m.

4/6/71

C: I hate to bother you.

K: You never bother me.

C: I know you are in great consultation and work.

K: You can always call me.

C: I was on a program Sunday. The newspaper report was garbled. Church was on too. We didn't propose a date. We suggested that the President decide on a date for POW Max and settlement. I did say it was difficult to have other countries' assessment assumed responsibility until we are all the way out. I believe that. I had a briefing from Gen. Zais. I said I don't consider it a success so far. I hope if I may be presumptuous that you make it too big a success. I think a --

K: I understand what you are saying.

C: I don't know what he will say and I won't ask but I think Max at some point he will have to say they are going to come out. It keeps tension in the country up. That's one of the problems. The Calley thing hasn't helped.

K: No.

C: That stirs up a storm. I said in my statement I thought he had had the protection of the law and I will stand by the rule of law. To make good too big is not too helpful (?). Get rid of tension and shouting and say they are all coming out.

K: John, I will be seeing the President in 10 mins. and he is writing the speech himself and you can be sure it will be perfect. Where are you tomorrow?

C: Away. I wish I was going to stay. I am going to NATO.

K: What time are you leaving?

C: 7:00 at Dulles.

K: I just wanted to see if I can get you advance word.

C: I will hear what's said.

K: I will try to call in an hour.

C: I will make a statement. My home number is 965-2883

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon

H. J. Heinz/HAK

4/6/71; 5:40 p.m.

H: Henry, sorry to bother you. I hope to see you maybe on Thursday. Some of the fellows are being invited to come and talk with the White House about economic policies. Your bill is being presented after lunch -- for sometime after lunch.

K: No one has told me that yet. Who does that, Flanigan?

H: Yes, Flanigan. Changing because of the meeting you are having with the boss in the morning. You and Ehrlichman and the Chairman of the Council of the Economic Advisors will be there to listen to the questions about government policy, particularly economic policies. That was the way it was billed. Two other meetings subsequent to that. But if you are busy.

K: I will be there if somebody tell me about it. I have just gotten back from San Clemente with the President so am not up on all the details.

H: A small word. The Bilderberg meeting -- I hope you can still manage on the evening of the 22nd, 23d and 24th.

K: I am not planning to be there the evening of the 22nd. But I do plan to be there the 23rd.

H: Our man has been in touch with your Mr. Young, and made appropriate security arrangements.

K: Right. I will have to have the Secret Service man with me.

H: Unless things go badly the Prince will have a press conference in Boston the ~~evening~~ afternoon of the 22nd on his arrival. The list of the people will be given out then. If there is one ugly Spiegler-like fellow we are trying to duck we are not announcing we will have a press conference until the last minute.

K: I am not worried about the press, but the Secret Service has to be with me at all times.

H: Of course, we know that. That is all right. Everyone is being asked not to say they are going to...

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: Yes, I see, you are making a tactical point.

H: We are cueing everybody to say the least they can. We have an
innocuous statement to say what the Bilderberg is. The Prince is jolly
good and does a press-TV appearance. Brief, of course, and staggers
through a few appropriate lines. That has, generally speaking, satisfied
him and then he gives a little release afterwards.

K: You can be absolutely certain I won't....

H: Yes, I know you. It is so much more sensitive in our country than
it is abroad.

K: You can be absolutely certain I will say nothing to the press -- neither
before nor after. I never do.

H: I know you don't. I hope you are well, and I am looking forward to
tomorrow night.

K: Oh, yes.

ms

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
5:50 p.m. 4/6/71

P: On page 9 of the draft. I-wonder if we have already discussed this thing about betting to death the idea of negotiation. Maybe we should take out that parggraph.

K: That's fine. It's a double-edged offer. It's a little tricky.

P: I am still trying to find something on the POW thing. Why not right there?

K: My recommendation is not there.

P: The other follows in so nicely.

K: At the end of the previous paragraph. 

P: See if we want to be rougher on them.

K: "Let them stop using prinsoers as bargaining pawns and free theirs and ours."

P: Tell Rose to put that in. Give her that section on POWS to put in. That's a good substitute. So they can't say we don't cover it adequately. Read it again.

K: "I particularly call on Hanoi to agree to the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war. This anguishing problem should not await the resolution of other issues. Let them stop using prisoners as bargaining pawns and free theirs and ours."

P: Leave "this anguishing problem" out. It's time for them to stop the savage and inhumane or barbaric -- "it's time to stop the barbaric use of prisoners of war as gax bargaining pawns."

K: And "to join us in a humane act to free their men as well as ours."

P: I think that's good. It will give the ______ that we are thinking of. The next big ploy -- it's hard for people to say we will trade a ceasefire -- they don't say ceasefire. Loose everything for prisoners. It's a hell of a point to fight so that's why we haveto ? ? ? ? .

K: As soon as we have -- We can ask for anything in two weeks.

P: It depends on the evidence. You could speed up your trip.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

P: On page 9 of the draft. I wonder if we have already discussed this thing about betting to death the idea of negotiation. Maybe we should take out that paragraph.

K: At the end of the previous paragraph. "?? and I particularly call on Hanoi." I have some text here. Hold on half a second -- "I particularly call on Hanoi to agree to the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war. This anguishing problem should not await the resolution of other issues."

P: Leave "this anguishing problem" out. It's time for them to stop the savage and inhumane or barbaric -- "it's time to stop the barbaric use of prisoners of war as gxx bargaining pawns."

P: I think that's good. It will give the ______ that we are thinking of. The next big ploy -- it's hard for people to say we will trade a ceasefire -- they don't say ceasefire. Loose everything for prisoners. It's a hell of a point to fight so that's why we have to ? ? ? ? .

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: I was planning on taking a vacation at the end of the month and I could tack it onto the vacation. No one would wonder where I am. It would be helpful to let Dobrynin get back because he might have somethihng too.

P: Send that paragraph to Rose.

K: I will go right over to here.

some problems should not await
let them stop using prisoners as bargaining

ern" out. It's time for them to stop the savage
a time to stop the barbaric use of prisoners

I think it's good. It will give the ______ that we are thinking of.

The next big problem -- it's hard for people to say we will trade a ceasefire --
they don't say ceasefire. Loose everything for prisoners. It's a hell of a point
to fight so that's why we haven't to ? ? ? .

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Sen. Cooper/Kissinger
6:18 p.m. 4/6/71

K: Well, I got you at the last minute.

C: It's a snow storm out here.

K: I wanted to tell you. I talked to the President about your call. You will see that both your ideas are reflected in his speech. It's strictly (?) for you.

C: I won't talk. They had an article in TIME pleading with me on SST. I ~~basically~~ never talk with the press. I wrote you a letter on the way out. It's on yellow bad. It will be delivered to you. That ok?

K: Good. You will be in Bonn?

C: Tomorrow afternoon. Seeing Fessenden, Smidt and the Minister of State.

K: I would like to get a text to you of the speech.

C: Will it go to the Embassy?

K: Yes. I will see that it gets to you. And if you could say an encouraging word we would appreciate that.

C: I think you have to do little more than what's expected.

K: We are trying now. Final phase of war not to tear ourselves to pieces.

C: You will get my message on yellow paper. Someone will be there?

K: Always here. Give Lorraine my affectionate regards.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Tom Braden

7:31 p.m., April 6, 1971

B: Are you okay?

K: I am great.

B: I have been worried about you. Totally apart, off-the-record, the last couple of weeks haven't been very good and I said to Frank I wondered how you made it.

K: You are very sweet.

B: I have a very simple request, would you go on television on Friday for taping for a show on Sunday saying why the President did this.

K: I don't think I better do it, really think I would be in more trouble.

B: I understand but we wouldn't --

K: If I were ever to do it again, I would do it with you.

B: Frank and I --

K: Oh, no, you would be sympathetic and you would be friends, you wouldn't roll over and play dead but you wouldn't embarass me either. I am okay but I don't think I should do it.

B: I thought that would be your answer, that would be my answer, but I really had to ask you or I really wouldn't be doing my job.

K: I understand.

B: Thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Herb Klein/Mr. Kissinger

11:00 a.m., April 7, 1971

(Picked up late on the IO) Klein was asking Mr. Kissinger about briefing columnists.

K: Can't we establish a central clearing house for that.

Kl: I know you are going to do the 7:00 and 7:45 ones tonight. Ron and I discussed the columnist thing.

K: Couldn't we get a fairer representation instead of captive columnists. In principle, I would be glad to do it. Can you work it out with Ron? Work out a list and set a time with David Halperin.

Kl: All right.

lds

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Gov. Rockefeller Kissinger
1:50 p. m. 4/7/71

R: I feel for you these days.

K: We have one of our ________ again.

R: Friends love you and despite Emmett Hughes it was not my ________.

K: Emmett Hughes has not failed to betray any one who he has worked for. He let you off easy.

R: That's right.

K: You are terribly nice.

R: I felt badly about it. Just read it. Emmett Hughes had gone out of sight. Hughie told me I should read it.

K: It's second rate. It's really not an important matter.

R: I wanted you to know. I had Hughie call the press man down there to handle it down there.

K: That's nice.

R: It's a rough one.

K: I knew when I stayed in January I would be the focal point of the attack.

R: You had wonderful courage to stay. I am sure it will work out because the NVN took such a beating they had to save face.

K: Militarily this is better than Cambodia. Now the question is whether this country has moral stamina. A friends says his imperical sense says it's lost but his ________ sense says after 200 years we cannot be destroyed. If we are destroyed it has to be known that some people stood. It was the right thing to do and only thing that had a chance. It gained 70% of what we are after.

R: I felt bad about not being there last week. We nearly got clobbered in our budget hearings.

K: I was in S. C. But when you come down it's really a question now -- we are within sight of making it in a way that the NVN will not have enough to keep going at the marginal rate if this country doesn't panic.

R: I presume it depends on the President's speech tonight.

Sick. On

By NARA, Date 5/26

Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger
1:50 p.m. 4/7/71

-2-

K: And how the leaders support it.

R: Aiken didn't help.

K: He is stepping up withdrawal rate slightly but that's not the issue. We can play the numbers game. Do we get out now or responsibly? The worst thing we can do is step it up and force us to collapse. The difference between 18 and 14, 000 collapses Thieu but makes no difference here. The opponents -- so many people have a vested interest in failure. The gloating when our country loses is not to be believed.

R: Exactly. Kx

K: It's a traumatic period in our history. 2-3 years from now we will look back and wonder how we could do this.

R: Thank God you can see it from the perspective of a few years.

K: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? just head for the ships.

R: However, Whoever is President in the next 4 years will have to get out and go down as a traitor to the country. But we won't because of you.

K: That's nice.

R: No one has the capacity to do it.

K: No one has talked about the WH ______ in the last 3 weeks. Could I ask you -- would be a nice gesture if you could call after the speech. It won't get out.

R: We are flying down to NY tonight. I am waiting on 10 welfare reform bills.

K: I know you have many pressures on you but if you could say something privately to him it would be a great gesture.

R: The pressure must be tremendous.

K: We have talked about some characteristics (?). Here he has been all alone again with no one with him or anyone calling to say they are with him. He is President of the U.S. No one else will see us through. With the Russians and Chinese and M. E., I don't see how people can afford to destroy the President.

R: I almost went down on the budget last week.

K: We were on the West Coast because it didn't make a difference. On

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Gov. Rockefeller/Kissinger
1;50 p.m. 4/7/71

-3-

K: (Cont) Emmett Hughes it's a travesty (or tragedy).

R: The NYTimes will print anything they can against the President.

K: Established policy and since so few of the Cabinet will stand up for him I am the guy the knock over. So I understand what Hughes was doing. You and I are close friends and you have been a tremendous support.

R: It's always darkest before the dawn.

K: If we get through without getting knocked off stride, there's a lot going on so this could be a good year. But without authority it's hard to govern.

R: I talked with Bridges -- leader in our Senate -- yesterday and we agreed the President will pull it out.

K: Others have no alternative and we will not yield.

R: Isn't the enemy exhausting himself?

K: They have lost more supplies than ever and plus. No strength left.

R: These attacks now --

K: Just hit and run. Not big. Last 2-3 days. That's in the 3rd and 4th Corps where 75% of the population lives and there's no war. It's in the highlands -- like northern Montana. No population and attacking isolated fire bases. That one a couple of weeks ago was negligence on part of the commander. They tried this on Khe Sanh and it didn't work and they lost. Done by 30 people. Not a big attack.

R: A scout operation. How about Abrams? Raised a question about his --

K: Serious ones. I will go into it with you when I see you.

R: I will get down when I can. It was only a case of survival that I wasn't down. You tell the President we survived.

K: We will ride it out. We have been out and this too. Everyone panics but 6 months from now they won't know why. We will handle it.

R: I will keep in touch.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., April 7, 1971

P: I'm starting to work on the final copy. Do you have any changes?

K: There are a few -- I have to get them and I will come over.
There are a few other minor things I wanted to tell you. I will be right
over.

-------

The President

4:10 p.m., April 7, 1971

P: I was looking here toward the last of the speech. We have two
"long and difficults" at about page 14 of your draft. We say, "That is
why I have charted the course tonight to end this war..." In the next
paragraph, I think maybe we can drop that.

K: I wouldn't mind dropping the next paragraph.

P: "The course we are following is not an easy one..." We talk
too much about that. Would you mind taking that out? Do you see my
point? Later on, I use "long and difficult" in the next paragraph.

K: We can certainly drop the sentence containing "long and difficult trial."

P: Let's take that sentence out.

K: That sentence should certainly go.

P: You can go directly into the next paragraph.

K: That sentence can certainly go, but I'm wondering whether the
paragraph can go.

P: Say, "I can assure you tonight..." Ending in an upbeat way
rather than going back again over how tough things are.

K: I'm wondering whether you shouldn't give the doubters a way of
climbing out, but there's a lot to say for keeping it upbeat.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

The President/Mr. Kissinger

4:10 p.m., April 7, 1971

P: Why not take it out.

K: Take that paragraph out. There may be a problem with the press copy, but I think we can still do it.

P: I told Rose to check it.

K: It hasn't been given to the press yet, and they can rerun it.

P: I think we should leave it on an upbeat. The conclusion has a lot about sorrow in it. People don't want to hear about sorrow so much. You can call Rose and tell her to cut that.

K: I will get it done this minute.

P: I told her to hold it until she heard from you.

K: I have called Connally. He is fully with you. He said, "I am glad he is not getting the boat with McGovern -- it's too full already."

P: How about the number?

K: He said fine. He is 100 per cent behind you. You won't have to worry about him.

P: He is the only Cabinet officer there is.

K: Agnew is on the West Coast; I have a record of having tried him.

P: I would try to reach him about 7:30. Okay, we will take that paragraph out.

lds

By. NARA, Dale

5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., April 7, 1971

The President

4:10 p.m., April 7, 1971

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

The President/Mr. Kissinger

4:10 p.m., April 7, 1971

P: Why not take it out.

P: I told Rose to check it.

P: How about the number?

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Atty. Gen. /Kissinger
4:22 p. m. 4/7/71

AG: You are having a busy day?

K: I sure am.

AG: Bob Anderson came back from North Africa. Two things of interest. No further attempt at contact but he had discussion with the N. African nationals. It's their opinion that the NVN are in trouble. They pointed out in their opinion a ceasefire and such other activity would be impossible because the army would disintegrate. Having trouble holding it together. Something will have to be worked out to let them continue on in some frame because of the Chinese. He said that the Algerians thought it was a different attitude because the Algerians will start accepting families of war prisoners.

K: Excellent to know.

AG: Close liaison between NVN and Algerians.

K: I would take them seriously.

AG: That's the story.

K: I wanted to tell you about the President's speech. He is going to announce 100,000 by Dec. 1. 12,500 - 14200. No deadline. Making the strong ______ pitch as to why he will end the war. We want to make play on the negotiations. If what you say is right, we might have a chance.

AG: I presume that might be the case and the big *ux* problem will be with friends in Congress. Quite a play of Laird's and ? ? that's in the wires

K: You think Laird did it deliberately?

AG: I can't conceive of it happening.

K: Laird said nothing will work so you might as well do this.

AG: Point is that your people in the WH who are doing the briefing have to get hold of Scotts and Schwikerts and keep them together.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Governor Reagan

5:45 p.m., April 7, 1971

K: How are you? I take it you got that note?

R: Yes, and the subsequent material.

K: You don't have anyone listening in on this conversation, except for the usual wire taps? I wanted to give you a preview of the President's speech tonight. The only people who are bugging me are probably the Russians. The President is going to announce he will withdraw another 100,000 this year between now and December 1. That's an increase from 12,500 to 14,000.

R: That should jolt our feathered friends.

K: He will give a tough speech. This is a test of the character of the American people. Do we want to turn South Vietnam over to the Communists? That in short will be the theme.

R: Well, good.

K: I think you will be in accord with it. If there is anything you can find public to say to support us, you will do a service to the country.

R: All right.

K: You haven't been our problem to put it mildly.

R: This is just great. It is a direct refutation for some of our friends on the other side including McCloskey.

K: He decided there is no sense adopting the McGovern program at a slower rate. I think you will be with us on it.

R: Good.

K: You have seen the statistics which I gave you. We can go faster but still responsibly.

R: Then you come down to the nub on the prisoners. That is why we can't have a terminal date. McCloskey tied his impeachment blast to the President's declaration that he would not get out and abandon the prisoners. In my speech I said how many Americans would impeach a President who would abandon even one prisoner. My only disagreement is the Family Assistance Plan.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

7:00 p.m. 4/7/71

K: I am on the way to the President's office.

L: Call when you get back.

K: Can I talk now?

L: I met with the Chiefs and they want along in good shape. We have a problem. Don't want to get in so we have to prove everything in Laos in next few days. We will know that best later on. You got that memo last night?

K: We are relaxed about that. I briefed a group of TV commentators. They asked about Laird's statement that we will phase out of combat role on May 1.

L: Bill said May 1. I said ______ out of combat responsibility this summer. We will have troops there but they will have a ground combat responsibility around the installations.

K: We shouldn't repeat that if we can avoid it.

L: The SVN will have ground combat responsibility this summer. They said. That doesn't mean we will have ground combat troops but they will have reponsibility conducting operations keeping security.

K: I have to run to the President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Marty Schramm (Newsday)

8:45 p.m., April 7, 1971

S: I am writing a piece that is going to be in tomorrow's paper, this
is the Administration's scenario for a war for election -- by fall
campaign of 1972. Would it be fair to say that the scenario is taking
down a residual by the fall of 1972?

K: Marty, I do not want to play this game. You will find many senior
officials around Washington who will.

S: Think I have already found some.

K: The President makes this decision alone. It will not make tomorrow's
headlines. If we make it, we all make it and we will all benefit. It
does not help to give this indication of where we will be -- I
just don't want to do it. We have indicated our policy and I wish I
could be helpful more helpful. All I can tell you is don't go completely
overboard with some people who do not know.

S: It would be better --

K: I don't want to advise you on it, by advising you I am really answering
your question.

S: When the President said you should hold me accountable if I fail to
end the American involvement --

K: I would think that they would also judge him by what he has accomplished.

S: By what he has done down.

K: If it is a substantial, they will judge him by that too.

S: In a statement made to the effect prime combat function by this
date, that date or the other date.

K: I am terribly leery of a thing like that, we want to say when we have
done it rather than some months before we have done it.

S: Thanks again.

K: Okay, Marty.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
4/7/71; 9:30 p.m.

K: Mr. President, this was the best speech you delivered since you have been in office.

P: November 3rd was better. But we will never have another like that again.

K: November 3rd was not well delivered, if your remember, Mr. President. It was a powerful speech. I don't know if you saw the commentaries?

P: No, I don't care what the bastards say!

K: John Chancellor was very favorable. Everyone was saying he is a strong man sticking to his guns and carrying out his policy. And Dan Rather . . . The only guy who was fly-specking it a little bit was the Pentagon correspondent.

P: How about Howard Smith?

K: He was not on -- at least I did not see him.

P: This speech was a work of art. It was not an act because not an actor in Hollywood could have done it.

K: No actor could have written it either. I had a lump in my throat.

P: It brought a lump in my throat. When I saw that little guy I almost broke up.

K: Haig and Lord were moved -- overwhelmed.

P: Haig. Lord, too!! Haig liked our defense of the armed forces.

K: Very much. The TV guys who treated me rough in the question period gave back exactly what we gave them. You impressed on them a great deal of respect. This was the most favorable commentary I have heard. The most respectful one.

P: How was the delivery?

K: It was by far the best. It was dignified, strong and not ingratiating.

P: Those leaders were a miserable lot. I meant Scott. Ford is fine. Griffin was sucking around. After you left I put it to them. I said if Congress wants to take off, fine but they have to take the responsibility if this goes down the drain.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: You are saving this country!

P: Screw the Cabinet and the rest of them. If they like it, fine -- no more sucking around.

K: This is a speech we could all be proud of. It was magnificently done.

P: The thing at the last was a good idea.

K: It was the way you put it that was effective. John Chancellor said you gave the entire speech without notes. He gave an absolutely favorable summary of it. So did Rather.

P: They are probably afraid Agnew will jump on them (laughter). It was a god damn good speech.

K: Deep down they know you are right. The others are cowards and publicity seekers.

P: The staff - Haldeman, Ehrlichman. . . The staff generally -- screw them. You were right. As far as the Cabinet, except Connally, the hell with them. If it doesn't work, the hell with it. If it doesn't work, we will bomb those bastards off the earth. You agree, don't you.

K: I think, Mr. President, we will have to make fundamental decisions in the next weeks.

P: Assuming they don't negotiate then we will turn right hard, Henry!!

feg

just as we were a success in gettin' 'em around. After you fine but they have to take

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
William Buckley
4/7/71; 9:50 p.m.

K: Bill, how are you? We are again in the middle of a hurricane.

B: What's your feel?

K: We have no choice. We have to go through with it.

B: I had a feeling of expectation which resulted in a tremendous disappointment.

K: Well, he had never said it. What is there -- there is no gimmick?

B: There should have been something -- nobody will be sent there again that doesn't volunteer for service . . .

K: If we could do it, but the numbers are still too high. That is our plan. This is the first thing we will do when we are at the number that permits it.

B: It is awfully hard for the amateur to understand the mathematics of that. It ought to be worth somebody's effort to explain why it doesn't work. I thought it was very moving on tenacity of it. How about that Calley thing? I analyze it as frustration of people that are not allowed to . . .

K: Frustration of people whose children they are criminal and whose newspapers tell them leaders are boobs. They just don't want to hear about it.

B: I will write about it tonight and say the things you want to hear.

K: Are you coming down?

B: I miss you. I called you last week when you were in San Clemente. When are you coming back?

K: I am in Washington.

B: I will plan to come down and see you.

K: I'd like to have lunch or dinner with you.

B: I read with revulsion that Village Voice thing.

K: I haven't read it, but the things people have told me about it. It is incredible to me -- if the National Review had written this about Arthur Schlesinger the

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

outrage of the liberals would have been great.

B: That's precisely correct. Do you know who the major owner of the paper is? Carter Burton -- the artistocrat son-in-law of William Pailey (sp. ?).

K: I know Carter Burton.

B: He is bright, ambitious. The idea that he would be the major stockholder of a paper that would perpetrate that. It is absolutely inexplicable.

K: Emmet Hughes did his bit in the New York Times Magazine. He took a slight crack at Rockefeller. He singles me out as the perfect man for Nixon -- just as unprincipled.

B: Maybe I can knock them both off with a single shot. What do you think?

K: I just don't know. I have not read the Village Voice.

B: After the fifth paragraph it became so revolting that not only did I not read it because I have esteem for you but I don't think I would have finished reading it under any circumstances. I don't see how anybody should be allowed to get away with that. Where did you meet Carter Burton?

K: I had dinner with him at the home of Tom Braden at Oceanside, California. We had a long evening together so he knows better.

B: I think it should be raised publicly what steps he is taking if this was done without his acquiescence. Maybe I will write him a letter and ask him point blank if he had foreknowledge of it.

K: That would be very interesting.

B: Maybe it would be better if I called him and caught him by surprise.

K: That might be better.

B: It is a perfectly orthodox thing to do under the circumstances.

K: If this were done on the liberals, the liberal press would be *支持* beside themselves with outrage.

B: Have you received no sympathy?

K: No, but I have not had the opposite either. I have not had anyone write to me saying a monster like this is unfit for public office.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
William Buckley
4/7/71; 9:50 p. m.

-3-

B: Leave that to me. Let me see what I could do with it.

K: On the draft business, you can be assured we will get to it. I have seen the Army and am convinced that a major change is needed. Really on the big things he has been heroic (meaning the President?)

B: Did you see the full speech that Fulbright gave at Yale?

K: No.

B: It was absolutely shocking. I wrote about it today and I will send you a copy.

feg

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/The President

10:20 p.m., April 7, 1971

P: I just wondered if you had had a chance to get any further reactions or if you have been busy.

K: Around here there is exultation. I talked to Bill Buckley and he said it was very outstanding, very, very moving and done with great courage. Of course, he wants us to end the draft.

P: But we are going to do that, tell him we are going to do that.

K: I told him. I am going to put the military to the torch, they are worried that it will make the volunteer Army not work.

P: Ending the draft will ______ in Vietnam.

K: Going to an all volunteer Army in Vietnam is what we ought to do.

P: Um-humm.

K: Get a figure and perhaps announce it in June but all the reactions have been --

P: Have you heard from the Alsops or the rest?

K: I will call Joe.

P: Give Joe a call and let me know what he thinks. I probably shook him a little.

K: It was your greatest speech, whether it has the same impact as the others.

P: It won't.

K: It comes across. Have you seen the news tickers?

P: I don't look at that $#@*!

K: He held his course. Did you see the Rathers commentary afterward -- I hear if we could have written it, it couldn't have been better written. He said where you said you would reduce 20,000 (?), you reduced 30,000 and where you said 40,000 you reduced 50,000. He said you exceeded every promise you ever made --

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:20, April 7, 1971 -- page 2

P: And 100,000.

K: He also said when you got through you would keep that too and he had a chart there with very large men when you came in and then very small men.

P: How did you like the conclusion?

K: It gave everybody goose pimples.

P: It was damn good if I do say so myself.

K: It was delivered with sincerity and strength.

P: And no support.

K: I believe you will get support from the American people.

P: And the Cabinet -- $#@*! I don't care -- Mitchell of course was behind me from the beginning and I talked to Agnew, he was ecstatic.

K: Laird called.

P: You talked to him?

K: No, he called Haldeman.

P: I won't call him back, I didn't like his attitude today.

K: That was cowardly.

P: He waited too late.

K: He was copping his best and scared out of his mind. Mr. President, it read all right but the way you delivered it was an absolute masterpiece.

P: They will all know who Keven and Carl are.

K: They are leading with that.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELCOM
The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:20 p.m., April 7, 1971 -- page 3

P: I hope the mother stands up and -- I haven't checked that with her but she will do the right thing, she was a Marine's wife. You know I checked on what he did -- he took on an enemy machine gun single-handed and saved 30 WHHH Marines that were wounded. Why don't we be proud of that instead of this goddamn Calley -- nobody is proud anymore Henry. I think Haig was pleased with the way I

K: Haig called General Bennett who had to leave the room because he was so overwhelmed and he had tears in his eyes.

P: Yeah, sure.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

10:33 p.m., April 7, 1971

K: ... and he said he would write you a note tomorrow. (Alsop)

P: Think I should call him at his house tonight?

K: I wouldn't do it tonight.

P: Okay, I won't do it.

K: He thought it was marvelous and immensely brave and he was proud to be an American. He said it just reminds him of Grant -- fight on this line if it takes all summer. He had some people for dinner in -- sympathetic but enormously impressed.

P: That's interesting, that his friends would say that.

K: He thought it was favorable, immensely brave, just right. Did he think

P: The last was too emotional? I may have underplayed it a bit but I felt it very deeply but I couldn't let the people know how deeply I felt.

K: Somebody just brought me a news ticker saying that Byrd and Scott are supporting you.

P: Byrd is important, Byrd is particularly important because he is a Democrat.

K: Right, right. Alsop's dinner guests were profoundly impressed.

P: Okay, Henry.

MSS DIV LIB CONG.

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:02 p.m., April 7, 1971

NARA, Date

K: I thought you might like to hear a cable from Bunker which we received.

P: Yeah.

K: (Read the cable -- attached)

P: That's nice, that's nice, very, very nice. What the hell, we have heard nothing from McGregor, Rumsfeld, Finch, I suppose they are all off cowering someplace.

K: McGregor called Haldeman.

P: What did he say?

K: He said he was disappointed with the withdrawal but thought otherwise --

P: Guess we'll shake him up a little bit too -- the hell with the rest -- I talked to Rockefeller.

K: Rockefeller --

P: Oh, hell, he talked very nice. His own future is at stake too you know, if I ever go down, he might go up but --

K: He would never go against you, he might not say as much publicly as we would like for him to say but he would never go against you.

P: And Reagan and Johnson --

K: Reagan called in.

P: What did he say?

K: Very moving, outstanding, the best Republican to all these softies or whatever.

P: Okay, thank you.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:10 p.m., April 7, 1971

P: Henry, I don't know whether -- you may have thought of this before -- somebody ought to get a hold of Mrs. Taylor, the press will be after her. Will you have Haig or somebody call her and --

K: I will do it.

P: Tell her the President mentioned it, he was greatly moved by it, that he asked you to call and then call me back.

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:45 p.m., April 7, 1971

Brought in April 9, 1971

K: Mr. President.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: I called Mrs. Taylor

P: Yeah, good.

K: And she said she was honored and proud.

P: Did she hear it?

K: Oh, yes, and she was so overwhelmed that her sons had the privilege of being mentioned by the President of the United States.

P: She will stick with us.

K: Oh, she --

P: All the way.

K: Oh, she will be -- she was so proud and so overwhelmed.

P: Good, good, good.

K: And she said she just hopes they will all be worthy of their father; it was really very moving to talk with her.

P: Good. Well, they are great people. I'm glad you called her.

K: Well, there's still a healthy element in this country.

P: Well, we've done it now, Henry; we've done everything we can.

K: Mr. President, if that speech can't do it, nothing can.

P: I talked to Haldeman and told him -- I said, you know you haven't heard from Rumsfeld and you haven't heard from Finch and you haven't heard from -- well, McGregor was disappointed because we didn't announce a bigger withdrawal.

K: It's so silly, you know; if you had jacked it up by a 1,000 you might have brought down Thieu and all it would have meant was 8,000 difference.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD FEO 12958

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
11:45 p. m., April 7, 1971
Brought in April 9, 1971

Page 2

P: Be that as it may, don't blame them, but my point is we now know and you go to the staff meeting tomorrow and just listen and find out where everybody stands, you know.

K: Right.

P: And crap, they may not want to see where they stand. If they have got the guts, we want to know now, right?

K: Exactly, Mr President.

P: Cause we have done everything we can, Henry; there's no more that can be done.

K: You have done everything that can be done; I think if it holds -- this is a jolt to Hanoi that you haven't buckled again and I think the only thing that can defeat us now is the homefront. I'm really quite optimistic about negotiations -- I mean, they attacked that Fire Base again today --

P: Oh.

K: And they lost 250 men, and their troops just aren't that much good anymore.

P: And we held the base.

K: And we held the base.

P: Good, Well, we will fight it off.

K: I haven't seen any negative reaction yet.

P: Oh, they will go after the business about being too emotional and all that crap.

K: Yeah, but remember, Mr President --

P: We are talking to the people; I don't give a shit about --

K: The New York Times the day after your November 3rd speech, Reston nearly had a heart attack.

P: Yeah.

MJD FEO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELCOM (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:45 p.m., April 7, 1971

Brought in April 9, 1971

K: And this won't have that same impact.

P: Oh, well, he'll have a heart attack about this because of the emotional
so forth and so on; that's all right.

K: It doesn't make any difference -- Ellsworth Bunker out there is closer
to where we sit.

P: And he was pleased.

K: Oh, and this -- he must have sent that cable within minutes of hearing
the end of the speech because by the time they coded and uncoded, a
couple of hours go usually.

P: Well --

K: Well, it was a --

P: At the staff meeting you just watch; don't say much.

K: Oh, no, I won't.

P: Just let it come, smoke them out. They will be whining around, let
them whimper and whine and we'll find out who's who.

K: It was a privilege --

P: They have got to, by God, if this staff can't stand up, the hell with them.

K: Well, your key members --

P: Connally was all for it, right now he's all for it. He was out at his
dinner tonight but he said he was all 100% for it.

K: Right. Well, he told me that already this afternoon.

P: Before we did it but also after he heard it, he felt the same way.

K: The same way, marvelous; well, he's a strong man. Well, then your
key people in the White House were sturdy in this, Mr. President.

P: Oh, sure, of course.

DECLASSIFIED

MD 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

Page 4

K: Haldeman was like a rock as always and Ehrlichman was --

P: Ehrlichman was like a rock.

K: He's been good through this.

P: He's had a hell of a lot of heat; he really stood up.

K: That's right and he stood up.

P: More than he did before.

K: That's right, and he stood up at the staff meetings so he's been good.

P: But tomorrow -- are you going to have a staff meeting tomorrow?

K: Sure, we'll have a staff meeting tomorrow.

P: Just listen _______________ try to smoke them out; okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President, and again it was a privilege to have been --

P: _______________

K: No, it was one of the most --

P: The people will never know how much time I spent on this speech.

K: Well, Mr. President, no one could have faked this one, no one could have read somebody else's words here; if you didn't feel every word of this, this couldn't have come off.

P: Mrs. Taylor was really pleased.

K: Oh, she was a little bit overwhelmed, she had never been called by an Assistant to the President, she had never been mentioned obviously on television but she said she was honored and proud. I put it on the basis that I wanted her to know the President felt sorry -- I said you had asked me to call and that you felt sorry that you couldn't have warned her ahead of time but I'm sure she understood why I asked her permission; that you felt it so important and she said it was an honor and a privilege and we just hope we'll be worthy of him.

P: Good, that's just what we want to hear.

K: Exactly.

P: Okay, Henry. K: Goodnight, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
Authorized

By NARA Date 6/9/71

✓ LIB CONG.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

080300Z April 1971 VIA CAS CHANNELS

FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SAIGON 0069

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

1. We have just heard the President's moving and courageous speech. It has inspired us all with a renewed sense of dedication and determination.

Please say to him that all of us here are resolved to achieve the goals he has so eloquently stated. Please express to the President my admiration and respect for his great personal courage.

2. My congratulations go to you also for the great share you have had in all this.

3. Warmest personal regards.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Cline/Kissinger

10:45 a.m. 4/8/71

C: The world isn't falling apart but I have a problem. You remember the committee you authorized ______ to set up on Social Science Research on Foreign Affairs? The State Dept. wants to send out a press release on the forming of the committee and what it's doing. Everything is unclassified except the NSDM which is Limited Official Use. Can we put it all out?

K: I would like to see what you are putting out.

C: It's all taken from the Ad Hoc Committee report.

K: I have no problem with that.

C: I suggested a few days ago and they wanted to do it today. I wanted to check with you. I do want to talk about intelligence problems with you.

K: Let's do it in the next few weeks.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

10:50 a.m.

4/8/71

L: I want to make -- I am concerned about the Pierce report transmittal to the WH. I don't want it to get out that it's over there. How do you think?

K: Send it to Ehrlichman through my office.

L: Do you think it's better not to put it in the WH and he can read it over here?

K: That's better.

L: I am afraid that someone is talking too much over there. I don't want them to say it's over there and then pressure on the President to release it. Rather keep it here.

K: I will tell Ehrlichman to read it over there. You are doing a great kindness.

L: How the hell -- too much talk about that now.

K: Another thing. Why don't you and I have breakfast next week? Part of the time alone. I would like to straighten out the crossed wires. I want to see what we can do to help out.

L: How about Tues. morning? I think it's most helpful.

Further conversation: 10:55 a.m.

K: One thing I forgot to mention. Could we have a paper over here when we could go to all volunteer army in VN and under what circumstances. We might not be able to do it.

L: Worldwide and VN cannot be done together. We have to choose one or the other

K: Suppose the President -- Can we do it on two assumptions? That we maintain all volunteer worldwide and if he puts it off a few years?

L: You could but not all volunteer force in '73.

K: We will not do anything.

L: At the time we set the goal world wide we thought about VN. They wanted then to go worldwide.

K: Let's look at the VN option again.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Ron Ziegler

4/8/71 2:00 p.m.

Z: I will be asked about the Carl Taylor thing -- I already have been. I'm going to say no one but the President knew he was going to use it.

K: You can say it but it won't be true.

Z: You knew?

K: Yes.

Z: Anybody else?

K: I knew the day before and Haldeman knew three hours before.

Z: Well, will you allow this to be established in the history books that you didn't know.

K: Yes, just tell me what you are going to say.

Z: ...

K: Let me tell you the truth. He actually wrote it during the night of Monday night and then he told me Tuesday morning that he was going to delete our last paragraph. And then Tuesday afternoon he read me that part of it. But the major point for historical record is that he wrote it Monday night.

Z: I'll say he put down his thought -- I won't say he wrote it all out. And I will say that no one knew.

K: That's right, say as he woke up at 2:00 a.m.

Z: No, no, no. I'm not going to say that! Who have you got in there?

K: No one. [Actually Robert McNamara.]

Z: All right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Chalmers Roberts/Kissinger

4:05 p.m.

4/8/71

R: I take it you didn't like the story being called John Scali. I was kidding you because a story said he was working for you.

K: He is so busy measuring my office.

R: The other story is he can't pass an FBI check up. It's a gag.

K: He won't be a______. He is supposed to help. General areas of TV on both domestic and foreign side.

R: Who's he under?

K: Haldeman, I think.

R: I was kidding. I was more interested in what you said.

K: I talked to the President about your wanting an interview with him and he agreed in principle.

R: Good.

K: Particularly if you are retiring, he felt it would be -- he said he expected it to be fair. I said sure. You can't make a treaty on that.

R: I should think I would be thinking of May or sometime like that.

K: I think so. When are you retiring?

R: End of June.

K: Give me two weeks warning.

R: Around that time.

K: Don't talk about it. If it gets into the formal channels it might be killed.

R: Circle May 22.

K: That great Roberts party?

R: That's it. It will be the last one.

K: It's the great institution and it's fun.

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

C. Roberts/Kissinger

4:05 p.m.

4/8/71

R: It hasn't rained in 15 years. Let me ask you a practical question. Shultz had the pacification memo. He got the whole thing. It sounds like an up-date version of this year's version of counter insurgency. Capturing VC evidence. Peoples' intelligence network.

K: I haven't read it.

R: Haven't seen it?

K: No.

R: Thinking about your problem as you go down on troop level and assuming you get past the October elections in SAigon without problems whether the people in the countryside will stick with the government and this document says that some local politicians don't resist the enemy out of fear. This type of problem will grow as present demands. This sounds like the other side of the coin.

K: Our studies show that in 3 and 4 we expect continued specific gains. All American troops out of there. In one we expect gains and in 2 some losses.

R: This document and he has a lot in quotes says it acknowledges that VN apparatus remian a problem which include 4 in the Delta. It was on the front page of yesterday's TIMES.

K: I will read it and talk to you tomorrow.

R: What's the feel-out on the speech.

K: I don't know.

R: Anything on SALT?

K: No.

R: Still on same center?

K: That's right.

R: I take it coming back from Calif. you thought the Party Congress was less negative than it might have been. Noting gutsy.

K: Just a question of tone.

R: If you have any thoughts on this I wish you'd call me back.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Sally Quinn/Kissinger

4:50 p.m.

4/8/71

K: What do you want, you barracuda?

Q: I am doing a peice on Barbara Howar. Bill Safire came up with a long Agnew speech. "Irreverent without being irrelevant ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?"

K: That's pretty clever. I could never be that intelligent. You have all my
____ already.

Q: They are in the public domain.

K: That's because I can't talk to you without being in the public domain.

Q: I want you to know that those two articles in the 'Village Voice' were most unfair and every one I talk with agrees. They are most unfair.

K: I didn't read them. They were pointed out to me.

Q: They will make you mad.

K: I decided they were not uniformly favorable.

Q: Or factual. The last I read about Barbara and how people refer to you both as the Kissingers in Washington.

K: Barbara and me?

Q: How you imitate people at parties. ? ? ? ? ? ? One night you were supposed to start crying and walked out of the party. I read it to Barbara and she laughed and said they have to give the guy credit -- he has great imagination.

K: I will try to think of something. She is really one of the worlds great human beings. If I can come up with a brilliant remark I will do so.

Q: If you can I would appreciate it if you could do so by tomorrow evening.

K: I will.

Q: You probably want time to think it over.

K: Let Barbara tell you how she met me.

Q: At Evangeline Bruce's. She didn't go into detail.

K: I was being assailed by men on VN and she beckoned me and said sit next to me on the couch where we can touch knees.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

S. Quinn/Kissinger

4:50 p. m.

4/8/71

-2-

Q: Anything you can think of --

K: I assume this is a favorable article.

Q: Absolutely. She is my best friend in Washington. We kept putting it off. So last week we started doing it and we gossiped instead but that next day we did it. She said we don't have to put on an ant for one another. But I try to make sure she isn't hurt and try to protect her and so it's the hardest interview I have ever done. And it's hard for her too.

K: I can believe that. I will try to call you back.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON
Naughton/Kissinger

5:00 p.m.

4/8/71

K: You want to call to get their terminal date or the number.

N: I was trying to determine what the President meant when he said SVN casualties dropped in the last two years. I have a the Pentagon figures and they show that in the course of the year they've gone up.

K: We compared the first two months of this year and the first two months of '69 and showed decrease.

N: But g figures for 1969 and 1970 they are up.

K: I will have to check that.

N: The President was referring to Jan. and Feb. of this year vs. Jan. and Feb. of '69? That's before the Loas operation.

K: A month of Loas operation.

N: But not the bitter fighting.

K: About half of bitter fighting.

N: OK. Thanks. If you want to tell me the terminal date -- ?

K: Why spoil you?

N: Sen. Scott thought the President was referring to a specific objective of ending American involvement by the end of his term. How would he have gotten that impression?

K: I will not speculate on how Senators get impressions.

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Phil Potter/Kissinger

5:22 p.m.

4/8/71

P: I am confused after this session this morning to come back and find UP quoting Scott.

K: I was at the meeting. It makes no sense for the President to say there's no deadline and then give it to Scott. He doesn't keep things to himself.

P: He didn't say there's a date but that the President has one in mind.

K: Go with what I said told you this morning and we will be right.

P: I read what you said several times. I have been thinking and others thinking about leaving an x residual force. About 50,000.

K: I don't want to go into figures.

P: Laird said less than that.

K: When, today?

P: No, sometime back.

K: What I told you this morning goes. There are a number of people who play games with force levels and we spend 3/4 of our time negotiating with ourselves.

P: In terms of residual force we are thinking of advisory group?

K: No.

P: A force?

K: Yes.

Kx P: Another thing that interests me is when you said as an individual and went off the record that we would wonder in 3-4 years what possessed us all.

K: In 3-4 years the outcome will have crystalized and the ______ will be over.

P: I did get the impression that you rule out the Korean thing because that was an armistice.

K: We don't want to rule out the future because of PR exercises now.

P: You still feel negotiations are a possibility?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Phil Potter/Kissinger

5:22 p.m. 4/8/71

-2-

P: The President seemd to throw those down at the news conference in his office. The implication was --

K: I agree with him but time is running out because if our forces approach residual levels there's not a lot to negotiate with.

P: I see. Thanks.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

F. Mankiewicz/Kissinger

5:28 p.m. 4/8/71

K: You look particularly craggy on TV doing x instant analysis.

M: I pointed out you? ? ? ? ? . Did you hear what happened to Dolf Droge?

K: That he couldn't speak?

M: They moved the location of the speech because of violence. We were going to do him live with his answering students before and after the speech. They panicked at Amherst. They moved it to a chapel. His speech was dull.

K: No, it wasn't. You mean Dolf's or the President's.

M: Dolf's.

K: I was afraid you trapped me into a comment on the President's speech.

M: I thought his was dull too. How adlib was that stuff at the end?

K: It was pretty ad lib.

M: Everyone was surprised on TV. You know our conversation on seeing people and I called in the information. I think you should talk with those 2 VN Senators.

K: I will see what I can do next week.

M: I said that the young fire eaters thought only certain replacement would do the trick and they said no because it would favor outside. They have other ideas on how it could be done so it's a fair election.

K: That's a good point. I will see what my schedule is next week.

M: They could perhaps stay over.

K: I don't want to be in a position that seems I am interfering with the election.

M: They are here and seeing Senators. You only have to hear their views. You are not even the principle foreign policy advisor.

K: And you xxx will straighten them out if they have apprehension. I will call you tomorrow re Monday.

M: I will say there's a possibility of Monday.

K: I will let you know by xxx noon.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

F. Mankiewicz/Kissinger

5:28 p.m. 4/8/71

-2-

M: I am incommunicado from 9:00 - 11:30. Just leave a message here. I will be here by 11:30. If you have the message just call it in and I will get it.

K: I haven't seen you in too long.

M: And when I did you were talking with the President and V. President.

K: I have to impress you.

M: Could we have a breakfast and dinner soon. I have a lot of ideas.

K: How about Tues. breakfast? 8:00 at the Metropolitan Club.

M: That's fine. You will let me know about these two fellows.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Henry Hubbard

4/8/71 5:35 p.m.

H: ... slightly higher than the rate we got from last night.

K: Then I lied to you.

H: When was the figure finally ...?

K: If someone would explain to me the following ... everyone plays these games. Supposing we go to 16,000. That, over eight months, amounts to only 12,000 more. If we just wanted to play numbers games we could do that endlessly.

H: Of what significance is 14.3?

K: Just that that is the fastest responsible rate. We can either get out quickly, that is completely, or we can go at the most responsible rate.

H: You said we could do 12,000 more.

K: But we can keep sayint that.

H: How did Thieu feel about it? A little nervouxs?

K: Yes. This is just about the limit that the traffic will bear

H: I see.

K: In our analysis of it.

H: Ahhhhh.

K: What did you call me about?

H: That.

K: You think I gave you the correct guidance?

H: I think you gave me superb guidance. The mood, the idea of coming out of a searing experience with a measure of pride.

K: It just proves that sometimes I guess right.

H: When was the figure decided on?

K: It's a complicated problem. We didid the number of troops by the num-
ber of fire bases, and multiplied by the average number of hills in the Delta.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Henry Hubbard
4/8/71 5:35 p.m.
page 2

H: Can I arrive at the formula for a deadline by the same way?

K: No, we've got a formula for that but it's different.

H: When did you arrive at the figures sir?

K: Over the weekend.

H: What went into it -- you talked about painstaking analysis.

K: I gave you the analysis.

H: You mean by analysis your best judgment of the impact of the Laotian
operation?

K: And the capabilities of the enemy over the next year or year and a half. OK?

H: No, not okay. Have you got another two minutes?

K: Yes.

H: To what extent was it a response to the Calley thing?

K: None whatsoever. Not even related.

H: He does allude to it.

K: No, the basic outline existed before. The only thing that could have
been affected was his affirmation of confidence in the soldiers. This second
paragraph was perhaps more prominent than it would have been otherwise. But
that will be judicially determined. What was more on his mind is the argument
that the war itself is an atrocity.

H: But the basic outline of the speech existed before Calley?

K: Yes.

H: It was understated, firm. You didn't know he would talk about Taylor?

K: No. I knew he would do something a couple of hours before in general,
but I didn't know the actual words.

H: Okay. The Pentagon is somewhat surprised at the low figure.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Henry Hubbard

4/8/71 5:35 p.m

page 3

K: You're joking. Cut it out; you make me cry. Do you think they recommended a higher figure?

H: There was some claim . . . Some talk that Laird recommended a higher one. You can't talk about that though.

K: God dammit. Some of these guys never quit.

H: What would you do if Hanoi offered tomorrow all the POWs back in exchange for a date, with the proper assurances of course.

K: I would ask for a naval base in __________.

H: Are you vulnerable to an offer?

K: No.

H: No?

K: No. We want it, but not along these lines.

H: Then the POWs are not enough? . . . . . You can trust what he [the P.] says. He generally does what he says. I keep saying that. This was very like the November 3 speech, but firmer and more presidential. You left me last week with the impression that the only reason for not going to a deadline is this small percentage.

K: That is one of the principal reasons.

H: Are any others valid? We can now predict when the U.S. will be no longer a factor.

H: Okay. Thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Ziegler/Kissinger

early afternoon 4/8/71

Z: It would be a good move for you to call Peter Lisagore. He said he is a friend of yours and talked with you personally. Concerned he didn't talk with you like the others did this morning.

K: I didn't make the list.

Z: I know. It would be a good move to call him and say perhaps he could come in. He isn't up set with you but it might be a good move.

K: I will call him this afternoon,