Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
10/9/70 10:25 a.m.

K: You got my message about the Senate vote?

P: Yes, that was finr. It was unanimous?

K: Yes, and Mansfield maneuvered Fulbright off the floor so that they could vot on it without its being referred to committee.

P: I'm glad I praised Mansfield yesterday before the vote.

K: And ABC devoted half an hour to this. The whole program was on your speech and was extremely positive. They were all positive.

P: Not what we've got to do is keep the momentum going by having everyone make statements . . . the next news will be the opposition . . . you remember when we went through this before. When we make a move and the opposition turns it down; then they blame us. We must say this is fair and we will stick by it, and we expect a serious response and will keep pressing for it. We must say we will not be disappointed by an immediate rejection and we will leave it that private talks are still going on. We don't want the enemy turning it down and then the New York Times slobbering around about how the U.S. can make a better offer.

K: But today they had a new editorial attacking the enemy for turning it down. It was very good. And Reston had an article supporting us. The Washington Post is disgusting again.

P: Really, what do they say.

K: They say that there's nothing new and there were a lot of inconsistencies. But at this point, the better you do, the more they'll attack you.

P: Did you read Broder's piece in the Post yesterday that I mentioned to you?

K: No, I didn't see it. Which one?

P: The one about his going around the country and making polls and the majority of the people saying that they are not getting real leadership and they think they could from Lindsay.

K: Oh yes. I saw that. But I don't believe Broder.

*

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

10/9/70 10:25 a.m. page 2

P: You don't really?

K: No, he was completely taken over by the Harvard, MIT group.

P: Does that happen often?

K: It's a very seductive atmosphere, especially for someone who's only there for a year. They're all intelligent, articulate, and it's flattering for a newspaper man to be fawned over by intellectuals. Yarmolinsky has a 21 year old daughter who went around the country this summer. She was a total beatnik and when she got home she said "Daddy, there is a silent majority, and they're right."

P: Is that right? What about McNamara? What does he say?

K: He said it's great, outstanding. I had him in for breakfast today. There was total support.

P: How about Johnson?

K: He was out on his ranch when I called; he asked that I get the response from Tom Johnson. I haven't heard back from him yet.

P: That's okay; we've got that call in. What about Humphrey? Would you do me a favor? Please call some of these people like Percy, and call also John Cooper, Javits, and Republicans who've been good-guy types. Call even Mathias--he's not been a good guy, but call him--and also Hatfield.

K: I told you Hatfield made a statement supporting you and wrote me a note saying he was at our disposal.

P: Say the President is out on a boat today, for the first time in a month, but that he asked you to tell them personally how grateful he was and not to be discouraged. Our line will have to be, "We are not surprised at a rejection at first; it's going to be hard, but this is where we stand."

K: But the interesting thing is they haven't really rejected it. They have condemned it, but not rejected it.

R: And we don't know yet what the Russians are going to do?

K: No.

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

10/9/70 10:25 a.m. page 3

P: I noticed they took a strong line on missiles today.

K: I have worked out with the chiefs some clarification of the material from our friend. I think I should hand it to him and say this is our understanding.

P: Yes.

K: We should get an answer before you see Gromyko.

P: And I think we should get an answer on the summit thing from him. Do you follow me?

K: Yes.

P: Ofis Dobrynin supposed to answer you on it?

K: That will happen first, and then we will put it into channels.

P: And I will say nothing about it till he sees me.

K: Right.

P: And I hope we will continue to get as much as possible out of the trip.

K: Oh yes. I had in these people -- Arends, Ford, Russell, Stennis -- and gave them a briefing on the Cuban problem.

P: Good. Tell them we are being very strong.

K: Yes, and I told them to keep quiet. I told them the President wants all his ducks in a row but that he didn't want to force the Soviets to act out in the open.

P: Isn't that Russell a great man?

K: Yes, outstanding. They said whatever you want, they'll be there.

P: Maybe I should get in a group on the leaders and give them a report on the Mediterranean next week, on the trip. It was such a positive thing.

*

Telecon
The President

10/9/70 10:25 a.m. page 4

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Yes, that I would do. Excellent.

P: And then that keeps the peace initiative on our side. The thing here is that some of the press will try to follow the Washington Post line.

K: I don't think so. Another line I found effective with the Newsweek and others at Time: This is the man who was accused four months ago of dividing the country. But today he has achieved greater unity than anyone ever has on Vietnam, and secondly, without Cambodia we couldn't have done what we did. They were really very positive and impressed.

P: And also that they have a responsibility, that if they aren't positive Hanoi won't come around. The Times is being very responsible.

K: Yes, we talked to Kleiman.

P: You've done Times and Newsweek.

K: Yes. I haven't talked to Roberts, but I don't think it's worth it.

P: No, let them hack away. I'd still work the Los Angeles Times. Have you talked to them?

K: I've talked to Kraslow. But I'll be out there, the 20th and 21st.

P: Maybe you should give Bassett a call and say you'll tell their board about the trip and tell them that it's so important on this thing to show a unified front.

K: I will do that.

P: Thank you very much.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
10:47 a.m. 10/9/70

VP: We had a communications problem. I had a communication from Crane last night that (he didn't say the name but I think we had been referring to Gromyko - dcm) wanted to meet me on two days I will be out on the road. Crane suggested that to hold him until the next morning. I think it will call a lot of attention if he changes his schedule. I think we should say I am on the road.

K: You should meet him at some point but he is less influential than their Ambassador here.

VP: I just thought it could put us in a bad position. What does he want?

K: To talk to him, put their views before an increasingly important person.

VP: It would seem to me that nothing would be valuable for us in such a meeting if we can avoid it. If you think it's wise to meet with him, I will stay over.

K: I see no foreign policy reason to do it and you can judge whether it's politically useful.

VP: What do you think about the political utility? I don't think it would get attention.

K: They would see it got some attention.

VP: If there aren't any sticky things they can come up with --

K: There's no outstanding dispute right now. Maybe you should see him.

VP: OK. Will you tell Crane to go ahead and arrange it with the breakfast?

K: I'll take care of it Mr. Vice President.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Sen. Mansfield/Kissinger
12:26 p.m. 10/9/70

K: The President is on a boat but just before he went, he wanted me to call
;and tell you how much he appreciated --

M: He had a good proposal.

K: Your reaction was very statesmanlike. We will probably have some rocky
periods but we believe if we stick together we will make it now.

M: It's flexible and open and if they want to talk, it is there.

K: It's a privilege to work with you.

M: All the best.

*

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCONE
R. Evans/Kissinger
12:30 p. m. 10/9/70

K: What have I screwed up now?

E: I had lunch with Elan and sent to his kibbutz. Really exotic. How are you?

K: OK. Just get back?

E: A week ago.

K: I have been busy.

E: I read about your taking girls to lunch at Sans Souci and briefing 140 Republicans yesterday. The M.E. has gone down and VN is in better shape.

K: I think the M.E. is in better shape than 3 months ago.

E: Can I see you for 15 mins. today?

K: I doubt it but will keep in in mind.

E: I have some interesting stuff from Moscow. Xuan Xanx. One question -- When
Why the timing for the VN ceasefire? It wasn't political. Why that timing?

K: We had these things worked on for months. It wasn't improvised. We decided at the end of July to go ahead and do this. We wanted to do it fairly soon after Xuan Thuy came back to Paris and not get frozen into a posture there. Otherwise, we would be talking about 8 points for ever.

E: No indication from Hanoi?

K: We wouldn't have had that no matter how long we waited.

E: All these talks with Cy Vance to get the Democrats to favor this. You haven't
done that before.

K: You really don't think it's a partisan issue and after Cambodia we all want to get
out as a united country. How about first thing tomorrow morning? Breakfast?

E: Fine.

K: I will call you this afternoon.

E: I will plan on it but call me this afternoon.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/70

TELCOM
Prof. Huntington/Kissinger
2:28 p.m. 10/9/70

H: I wouldn't disturb you on a departmental matter --

K: You never disturb me --

H: It's a rather important one and concerns your field and we need your judgment.

SANITIZED

How are things with you?

H: OK. The speech was very effective in terms of American impact.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

K: It seems to have been.

H: It's hard to find criticism even around Harvard. Did you expect progress at Paris?

K: We got the response I expected. They couldn't have had instructions so I don't expect progress for several weeks. Keep in mind our conversation of last time.

H: I think may be seeing you next week. I understand Landes and ______ are coming down and I am coming down with them. We are to talk about the M. E.

K: I haven't seen it on my schedule. I have no reason to doubt it but they tell me these things at the last possible moment,

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mankiewicz/Braden

10/9/70 3:50 p.m.

M/B: It's nice of you to call. We think--we may be wrong--but we think everyone is maligning this <u>speak</u> speech. The Post <u>rejoice</u> editorial this morning was a shocker.

K: It was outrageous.

M/B: It was just terrible. Nobody believes anybody any more.

K: They are attacking Agnew but really they are just validating him. They are showing that there is nothing you can do to get the liberal community's approval.

M/B: You read this thing this morning, about the cease-fire in place, saying the President's definition was fine as far as it went. Well he went as far as you can go . . . What kind of statement is that.

K: What they said also is factually untrue in this sense: Our studies indicate that it will lead to some decline in governmental control.

MB: That's it. There is no way for a government to run into Viet Cong areas except by force. It will enlarge the writ of the NLF. What they were in control of at night they'll <u>make</u> . . . now control 24 hours a day. We wanted to go over once again about the election. We are saying that the great tragedy is that an American President is distrusted when he begins to talk about peace. We are going to talk about the significance of the elimination of the word elections. It's harking back to April 20. The significant thing is not that the President proposes a cease-fire but that he proposes <u>this</u> cease-fire.

K: And separating the military from the political outcome, and being willing to abide by the ends of a political process no matter what they are.

M/B: It's not that we are willing to abide only by an election in which just Thieu and <u>Nguyễn</u> Ky will run.

K: No.

M/B: The Viet Cong said in Mrs. Whosit's (Binh's?) statement that when we are talking about a new government in Saigon . . . He says that under no circumstances, he says with a nod to his right, will we ditch the whole crew.

K: What we have made clear is that we will not fight to maintain any people <u>except</u> if the political process yields some other result.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon

Mankiewicz/Braden

10/9/70 3:50 p.m. page 2

M/B: And in the political process, A may remain and B and C may not?

K: Right.

MB: Did Vance agree with you?

K: Yes, he made a public statement saying he needs to endorses the
President's proposal to stop the killing and asked all Americans to get
behind the President.

MB: Did you see what Barry Goldwater said today?

K: Yes.

MB: It's significant that Goldwater and others see the effect of this.

K: The fact is that this proposal creates a new situation. If the
other side wants anything other than a total American collapse, I see
enough points there to negotiate.

MB: What was the flap over withdrawal? The President didn't make it clear enough that they'd be mutual?

K: There was enough vagueness to permit differences in staging.

MB: Ziegler said the President was not talking about unilateral withdrawal; he meant mutual withdrawal.

K: That statement was written with great care.

mB: No unintentional ambiguities.

K: That is correct.

MB: We are writing today. We will decide Sunday whether to run it
Tuesday, if the Post shapes up. But they may not. I have yet to see an
analysis anywhere that talks about the two points.

K: It meant a lot to me that you understood the basic drift of it.

MB: I think somebody on our side has to say so.

K: And it's also important for future of the country. The idea that you
have to extort things from the President even when he's already given them
to you is terrible.

By KHLU

NARA, Dated 5/13/04

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Mark R. Nastri

October 9, 1970 4:10 p.m.

jlj

K: I wanted to tell you I mentioned to the President the statement you made and your little note on it and our conversation afterwards. He wanted me to tell you he very much appreciated this.

H: Thank you sir.

K: All of us here hope that we can go through this with as much unity as we can muster. We all want to get out of this with as much unity . . . get out of the war. He wanted me to tell you he very much appreciated your attitude and hopes we can work together in the future.

H: If there is an occasion where I can be of help to you please let me know.

K: Well, let's stay in touch. I want you to feel free to call me whenever you feel there is something you want brought up over here. I have respected what you have been doing.

I respect you very much, sir.

H: It is mutual in every respect. /If I can be helpful in any way . . . If there is any occasion you want me to do something, talk, please let me know.

K: Thank you.

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Mr. Kissinger/John Hightower

October 9, 1970 4:20 p.m.

jlj

K: How are you?

H: Fine. This is John Hightower. I had called you earlier to see if you had any guidance on this . . . The Goldwater story this morning. That there was a deal in the background.

K: Absolutely not.

H: Well, we got Rogers on the record a little while ago that there was no advance commitment. Do you have any thought where we stand now? Follow-up on the peace initiative.

Even

K: There has been nothing dramatic right away. After some movement they will harrass us publicly. However, we are going to persist. If they had any hope for dividing the country it is removed. We have international support - don't you think?

H: I think that is true. If it gets through to them in some way.

K: It will take a few weeks.

H: OK. Thank you for calling me back.

By: KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Santa Maria/Mr. Kissinger (Chilean Ambassador)

4:46 p.m., October 9, 1970

S: How are you? I was calling you because I was wondering if you have any time next week for lunch. I would like to discuss with you current events.

K: Yes; certainly, let me call you. Would you be willing to come here?

S: Or you can come here.

K: I have taken advantage of your hospitality too much. You come over here. I will have my secretary call.

S: The only day I am busy is Tuesday [Oct 13].

K: I will be out of town on Monday. How about Wednesday or Thursday? I will have my secretary call.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Lucet
7:00 p.m., October 9, 1970

K: Are you behaving yourself.

L: I am behaving.

K: There are two things I wanted to call you about. The first one is a personal one which I -- I read with ______ that the French Government is not taking me seriously.

L: That's absurb.

K: If I am not a friend of France, you are in trouble.

L: I was scandelized when I saw it. You can be sure there is nothing true in it.

K: I would be distressed if this were your view.

L: In my view ???

K: The second thing is that the President called me and told me to ask you to see whether your President or Foreign Minister could use whatever you thought prudent with the North Vietnamese to examine our proposal with some care. We have gone as far as we can go -- there will not be any other proposals.

L: Coming from the President, of course. We shall do our best to convince the North Vietnamese.

K: It would be received with great appreciation here.

L: I will call ______ and ask him to send a message.

K: Good.

L: Could I come to see you next week, will you be in Washington.

K: Certainly, you can always see me.

L: When I return next week, there are a number of reasons that I want to see you.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CIVILIAN Date Elton

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

10:20 p.m., October 9, 1970

D: You are not still in bed?

K: No

D: Oh good, you see I would like to clarify some points beginning on the Cuba paper you gave me dealing with nuclear and atomic things. One is the construction of submarines or surface repair facilities ashore in Cuba. You do not use any reference to nuclear or atomic in points covering this issue in the note. It refers in the heading to strategic systems, is that what is meant concerning repair facilities?

K: We are talking about ships in the above mentioned categories. (i.e. nuclear and atomic)

D: Just would like to be sure, they will ask me. I was under the impressing that this was so but I wanted to be sure.

K: Yes, that's correct.

D: This is important. Thank you. Have a nice weekend.

By: KHLW

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

D: You are not still in bed?

K: No

K: Yes, that's correct.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jim Cannon

10:53 p.m., October 9, 1974

C: Are you glad to be back from your European tour, was it good, a success? Looked good back here, don't know how much it accomplished.

K: Yes

C: Called you about three things, one of which is might give you my thoughts on the Governor's political position. Not particularly good, foreboding right now. In essence, already the Governor is saying he is neck-and-neck. Actually he is a couple of points behind.

K: Is he losing or gaining?

C: Just stagnant, that is the problem. We should move on the lead about this time and it doesn't look that way right now. Personally I think he will ultimately win because it makes sense for him to.

K: Where did we all think that he was so far ahead? Have the Agnew ______ as much defense as Nancy claims?

C: No, I was just upstate at Buffalo -- the people are very conversative up there ?? to this feeling, the Governor looks fine on the whole thing.

K: Has the Agnew intervention hurt?

C: No, has not hurt the Governor. ______ Goldberg but our concern principally is the Governor. We will just have to try harder and pray harder but since you are concerned [I wanted to let you know].

K: I have offered to give speeches for him but he wouldn't hear ot it. If anything associated with the President ?????

C: The President may come up to take an invitation that we had asked Agnew to do. If the President comes upstate, it would ______ the Governor substantially.

K: Gather ______ the Governor's campaign.

C: Doesn't look good at all. It is more than anything else, 12 years in office and whatever is happening that the people don't like they blame him for. Goldberg is a dreadful candidate. ______ and Jews will vote for Goldberg, Blacks for ______. The subway

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jim Cannon

10:53 p.m., October 9, 1970

and welfare people just plain mad at the Governor who are going
to vote against him.

K: That's very interesting.

C: Not anything that should be done right now.

K: If you think of anything that we can do, either me personally or
the President [let me know].

C: I have sent you a memo about Brazil. Was going to give it to the
Governor and ______ suggested that the Governor had so much on
his [mind] that I send it on to you. Also gave Arnie Nachmanoff
a copy. If you have 5 or 10 minutes, would appreciate your taking
a look at it.

K: What letter was this, the Freeley?

C: Yes

K: They have religious ______ unless they are communists.
Here we are the largest country ______ every left wing dictator.

C: Did this have State Department influence.

K: Yes

C: I respect Brazil, growing faster than any other in the western
hemisphere, more than France or ______ The third thing, Nancy
wanted me to mention that she would like ______ the White House
Fellows.

K: Why is she bugging me so much about these White House Fellows?

C: I thought it was important to you.

K: XXXXX I am for it, I am for it. If you can arrange it, I would be
grateful.

C: ?????

K: I'll tell you what I would appreciate. If you can see him for 1/2 hour,
he doesn't have to see them for one hour, take them on one of his
walking tours or something. Even 15 minutes would be enough.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon

Prof. Yoshida

10/10/70 10:05 a.m.

Y: What were the impressions of your two colleagues who visited my country?

K: I saw them and they liked it very much. They were very pleased.

Y: I am glad to here that. The reason I make this call is to discuss with you how to deal with the problem in the light of the forthcoming meeting of my friend with yours. As you know, my friend is still and more than ever anxious to find out a mutually acceptable solution for the problem if possible at all. I would like to do as much as I can with the time available. Could you frankly tell me the situation on your side?

K: As I understand it, Ushiba has been given instructions to talk to us and one of my colleagues will talk with him on Monday. Our feeling is that we will be very happy to try to come to an agreement but we don't want to start again on something that is going to fail.

Y: I feel terribly bad about the results so far.

K: We are in principle willing to try to come to some understanding about it.

Y: That's right.

K: If Ushiba is coming to see my colleague, Flanigan on Monday I will sit in for part of the meeting. We will try to be understanding, but we have to get something concrete. There is not enough time to go through a long process of talking around the subject.

Y: That's right. Would you kindly let me know the results of the conversation you are going to have on Monday, and from your point of view what are the specific issues.

K: I will call you Monday night.

Y: I am this time going to talk to my friend. Fortunately this time he listened to me. It is his own personal _________ that is required as far as our side is concerned. At long last industry here is in the mood for self-restraint. The general climate is more favorable than the time when the two men met their counterparts. I can't be too optimistic but it depends on the firm leadership of my friend. Time is short. My friend is leaving on the 18th. But before his departure I would like to get in touch with as many as possible. I will have a discussion with him on Monday. Please tell me the points you cannot accept.

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Prof. Yoshida

10/10/70 10:05 a.m. page 2

K: Why don't I reserve this until I call you Monday night.
The period must be at least Two and a half years--three years would
be best.

Y: This is a start.

K: If you can get your man here to come in with the best possible
proposal on Monday. If he comes in with a bad one, we've nothing to talk
about. But if he comes in with a good one I will call you and tell you
what must be changed.

Y: In either case, would you please call me?

K: All right. I will call you Monday night, my time.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Peter Flanigan

10/10/70 10:15 a.m.

K: I had a call from Japan. I think these guys are getting ready to cave. My contact said I should call him. The Prime Minister sees this as a test of his personal leadership.

F: The next move is for us to make proposals to them.

K: Why? I told them to have Ushiba make a proposal to you.

F: Oh you did? We had left it that when we met I would bring proposals to them.

K: The way I left it with my contact is that they better tell their man to make a proposal and it better be reasonable, and they I will call my contact and tell him what else we want. This is a tough bunch. If you tell him what you want, they'll start going down from there.

F: I can call my man and tell him I want you to tell him what you want, and it will be something less than we are willing to accept...

K: I wouldn't tell him that.

F: I can come back with a couple fewer and let them reject it.

K: But then they'll be more dug in. I don't much care about the tactics. I would give them something as close to our old proposal as possible if you have to come up with something. And then tell them it has to go back to the Prime Minister.

F: You still want to sit in?

K: I have got to, to show Presidential interest.

F: What do you mean?

K: Sato sees me as the representative of the President's interests. Why don't you give them...

F: The maximum number that we can.

K: Yes. You know I will be out of town on Monday, so make the appointment late in the afternoon, 5:30.

F: Okay. One other thing. The Japanese papers say we have

*

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Peter Flanigan
10/10/70 10:15 a.m. page 2

negotiations going. They have talked to Trecize.

K: I am persuaded as soon as Meyer hears about this he will go steaming in and take over; if Trecize hears about it, to goes to Meyer. What do you lose by not talking to them?

F: A lot of ability. He knows the Japanese.

K: He knows nothing; he knows the subject.

F: No, he knows the Japanese too.

K: Once you are inside on an agreement bring him in. But if you get Meyer in now, it will go in 50 copies all over State and be a formal negotiation. Maybe you want that.

F: No, but originally Miazawa suggested that Ushiba talk to Trecize.

K: Once there is an approximate meeting of the minds you'll get Trecize in.

F: Okay, I accept that guidance.

K: No you don't. You are a soft Irishman. I never thought I'd live to see you one.

By KCLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Percy
10/10/70 10:25 a.m.

K: I talked to the President yesterday. He wanted me to tell you again how much he appreciated everything you have done.

P: Thank you. I talked to him when he called me about the desirability of having Mrs. Ghandi come out with a statement. He thought it was a good idea. Rogers thought it would be best to call him direct because she's been a good friend. A lot of things we don't agree on; but she's been a good friend. I've known her for quite a while; John and Blanchette first introduced us. She's been on a tour in the provinces but she called me yesterday; I just talked to the Prime Minister. We had a good conversation and she said she isn't quite up to date yet from her trip. She wanted to know why Hanoi rejected some of the proposals. I said this was all to be expected and that we now expect that they will come back with a few different answers. But I said how soon they come back depends on strong voices like hers. I said the President has had cease-fire in mind for some time and he felt that this was the right time. I told her that the Senate is unanimously united behind the President and everyone agrees with that. I said we need now feel that her speaking out and doing everything she can with Hanoi would help do great deal of good for India and the world, more so than at any time in the last 15 to 20 years. I said I am calling as a personal friend with the knowledge and urging of the leadership here. She couldn't have been nicer. She said we are for a negotiated settlement.

K: Again, I want to tell you how much we appreciate it.

P: Then I talked with the Canadian Ambassador and said Canada as part of the ICC should speak now as this would be very important to them. He said that's why they can't, but that he would take it up with Ottawa. Poland is another. It may be tough, but if we can get these two, it might make Poland easier.

K: If you can get all of this you should have my job.

P: At least this gives us a bargaining position to say in the Senate that we are united. And Mansfield was great. Fulbright said he would hold hearings on it but Mansfield was tenacious. I said to Mike, if ever I have needed your help it's now. And he was magnificent. I guess Fulbright feels he's been end run, but it was a great effort.

K: Well thank you very much.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10/10/70 10:45 a.m.

L: I wanted to make sure there hadn't been any breakdown in the following through on that matter we discussed down south.

K: Oh no. I have gotten the briefing on it.

L: No, I'm talking about Chile.

K: Oh that. A cable went out. We also got it out through another channel.

L: I think that's darned important. There are some military contact that could be used same way as ________________.

K: You can use your channels any way you want in that connection.

L: Okay.

K: Another thing: You are going to be on Issues and Answers tomorrow?

L: Yes. I'm not too crazy about that. It's not a very good time. The World Series starting at the same time and all of that.

K: We cannot let the May 1 deadline on our timetable stand.

L: No, I'll back away from that.

K: We cannot say we are offering a 120month withdrawal but if you cannot accept that we'll give you 10 months. So can you back away from that?

L: Yes. I'll handle it.

K: Secondly, we shouldn't be that optimistic about their accepting it or three weeks from now everyone will be saying we created a credibility gap.

L: That's right.

K: We should say this is the best proposal we can make and we hope they'll accept it. Say we hope they'll see the light.

L: Don't worry about that; I'll hard-nose it. One problem I do have. I wish you'd take that joining State-Defense message on burden sharing and do something with it. The Germans are getting off free.

By KMW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

j10/10/70 10:45 a.m. page 2

They are sleeping with us and the Russians at the same time.

K: The President wanted to talk about this at the NSC on
Wednesday.

L: Okay. I'll be tough on that. I don't want to let them off the hook. Even our Ambassador seems jubilant that they don't have to do anything. But we want them to do something, first militarily and then the other way. Also, did you show the pictures?

K: Yes, you got debriefed on it didn't you?

L: Yes.

K: The President wanted to get them in about his trip. Then Mendel Rivers said "I love this man and I'll do anything for him, but you've got to let me in a little bit." So the President said why don't you use this occasion to show them the pictures.

L: They're talking about it up there to people I told couldn't see the pictures.

K: But we told them they couldn't.

L: But they are.

K: They promised they wouldn't. We told them this was done in full consultation with you and it was done at your urging. The only reason we did it here was so we wouldn't be hit by State wanting to show them to Foreign Relations. We showed them to your people.

L: Well, it has leaked out a little.

K: If you did sit on it a little it would help.

L: I knew you showed them the pictures of the ships but didn't know about the island.

K: Yes, showed them that one.

L: Did you show them the radar setup?

K: No.

L: K: Okay, we'll try to screw it up tomorrow. K: If you can't do it, it's unscrewable.