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the system. This is not to say that their plans are faulty -- merely that they do not appear to have been completely explored for feasibility by hypothetical testing under unfavorable conditions. We should insist on more assurance that the suggested organization would operate efficiently in the real-world environment of competitive national self-interest that will infest any alliance of sovereign states.

One must grant the desirability of reaching political-military accord, particularly on such vital matters as nuclear policy. We should explore the hypothesis that Europeans would be content merely to exert more voice in the planning and supervision of nuclear activities, leaving implementation measures primarily in American hands. Yet, even if this presumption were true, it would be overly sanguine to assume that nuclear accord has heretofore been lacking primarily for want of an organizational vehicle to carry out the planning and supervisory functions.

Revisionists could err by selling the present system short because it does not have the appearance of regularity we revere in an organizational structure. For one thing, the very suspicion that NATO is not all we would like it to be inclines us against undue reliance on corporate action and leads us to resort pragmatically to individual or splinter-group

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action. The existing network does not preclude the growth
of more cohesive ties. The mechanism for political and
economic co-ordination has never really been exploited by the
membership.

Many people believe that a viable alliance cannot be
ordained but must evolve through a mutual recognition that the
interest of each nation would be better served by a common
course, even at the expense of occasional self-sacrifice. On
this premise it is reasonable to conclude that the present
relationship will continue to grow silt-like as daily particles
of routine collaboration build up a delta of trust and inter-
dependence. The robust Europe of 1962 testifies to the vigor
of free enterprise and voluntary associations. Although it
would be farfetched to attribute the fantastic increase in
economic and political strength to NATO, it is not unreasonable
to contend that the development would have been less vigorous
had it not been for the sense of confidence and security
instilled by the stabilizing presence of the alliance.

No one can say for certain whether the NATO allies should
strive now for a new order of legalistic consolidation via
structural reform, or whether they should content themselves
with a somewhat slackened pace of united growth through de
facto cohesion. It would seem, offhand, that a period of

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rather intense discord would not present the most propitious
time for attempts at institutional remodeling. But, in any
case, a decision to change the organization structure must
be based on consideration of all factors. What we need now
is more than a concept; we need detailed organizational
expositions of how each scheme would work to provide the
central planning and policy direction we seek through a more
adhesive alliance.