# Kissinger Briefs, Goes to Paris

(Continued from Page 1)

both sides of the nature of the
problem has greatly improved,"
he told a news conference before
leaving Brussels.

Arriving at Orly Airport, Mr.
Kissinger said he had come to
see the French in "the spirit of
consultation that we are trying
to introduce into our relation-
ship."

He added: "We always meet as
allies on a basis of equality and
independence."

Mr. Kissinger will have break-
fast tomorrow with President
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing before
going to Rome for lunch with
Italian President Giuseppe Leone
and talks later in the day with
Premier Mariano Rumor and
Foreign Minister Aldo Moro.

In Brussels, Mr. Kissinger also
met Belgian Premier Leo Tinde-
mans. Their working breakfast
meeting was their second get-
together within 12 hours. Last
night, they shared a plane to
Brussels after watching the
Netherlands beat Brazil in World
Cup soccer in West German.

"Mr. Kissinger appeared to be
very satisfied," Mr. Tindemans
said.

Cholera Kills 50

DACCA, July 4 (Reuters).—
Fifty persons died from cholera
in Chittagong, Bangladesh, last
week, it was reported here to-
day.

He said that Mr. Kissinger had
expressed astonishment at the
fact that the press in general had
somewhat played down the im-
portance of the outcome of Presi-
dent Nixon's Moscow summit
meeting.

Mr. Tindemans said his talks
covered U.S.-European relations,
including a planned European
summit session that could take
place in the fall at France's in-
itiative. He said Mr. Kissinger
had welcomed the idea of the
session.

Officers at NATO headquarters
appeared to be mildly satisfied
with the results in Moscow.

One of them said that the ac-
cord on limiting anti-ballistic
missiles seemed reasonable be-
cause of their tremendous cost.

"After all," he said, "no one
knows if they will really work.
And even if they succeed in stop-
ping eight out of 10 missiles, the
damage would be tremendous
anyway."

He also thought the limitation
on big underground nuclear ex-
plosions to be in the interest of
both sides, noting the importance
of this for the protection of na-
ture.

Some NATO officials felt that
too many agreements in Moscow
would have been badly received
in the United States, with some
Americans suspicious that Mr.
Nixon had made concessions be-
cause of his weakened position
at home.

According to these reports, the (Continued on Page 2, Col. 8)

# Argentine Army Chief Vows Forces' Loyalty at Peron Bier

By Jonathan Kandell

BUENOS AIRES, July 4 (NYT).

—The commander in chief of the Argentine Army vowed today at the bier of Juan Peron that the armed forces would remain loyal to his widow, President Isabel Peron.

"Before your body present here, and as commanding general of the Argentine Army, I reiterate our pledge to support with all means within our reach the continuity of the constitutional process," Gen. Leandro Anaya said at a funeral service held in Congress for the chief of state.

Gen. Anaya asserted that he spoke with the support of the commanders in chief of the navy and air force.

The funeral service was held at 9 a.m. in the Chamber of Deputies, and Argentine congressmen, labor and military leaders and foreign diplomatic delegations attended.

## U.S. Delegation

The U.S. delegation, led by Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent and Jack Kubisch, the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, arrived this morning from Washington and barely made it to the service on time. A previous announcement by the Argentine government had indicated that the ceremony would be held tonight.

The Argentine military has acted quickly to stifle rumors that it would never accept the presidency of the politically inexperienced Mrs. Peron, who is legally empowered to complete the three years and three months of her husband's four-year term.

There have been rumors of a coup, fed by widespread doubt that the 43-year-old Mrs. Peron could hold together the volatile Peronist movement, broadly divided as it is between conservative trade unionists and left-wing youths.

The new chief of state also has historic tradition going against her: During the last three decades, only one Argentine president has completed a term in office, and that was Peron in his first term, 1946-1952. The rest of the time, the military either ruled outright or lent tenuous support to civilian governments before overthrowing them.

Mrs. Peron received two pledges of support at the funeral service, one from Gen. Anaya and another from Ricardo Balbin, the leader of the Radical Civic Union. This

(Continued on Page 2, Col. 7)

United Press International.
Rome, this picture might
be delivered mail at Rome
and disorganization.

## Rome Weaknesses

advantage in total numbers of
missile launchers.

The U.S. purpose was to strike
a balance that would prevent the
Soviet Union from putting enough
multiple warheads on its larger
missiles to overtake the United
States.

Neither side disclosed the key
factor: The numbers of warheads

 Transportation
port concludes.

The report says the plane noise
will probably not sound much
louder than the noisiest conven-
tional jets but that frequency
levels produced by the SST engine
will probably cover a greater dis-
tance.

"Substantial adverse public re-
action is expected," the report
warns, if the federal government
allows either plane to begin
scheduled flights at any U.S.
airport, except possibly the new
Dallas-Fort Worth regional air-
port. That airport is surrounded
by sparsely populated land.

The Concorde already has
made several demonstration
flights into U.S. airports, and its
builders currently have pending
with the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration a request for ap-
proval of 36 promotional flights
from London to U.S. cities. The
plane could begin regularly
scheduled service as early as the
end of 1975.

Dec. 11 Report

The department's report, dat-
ed Dec. 11, 1973, was turned over
to lawyers for the Environmental
Defense Fund as the result of a
court suit. EDF made the docu-
ment available to the public.

The report says the Concorde,
using the recommended landing
strip at Kennedy International
Airport in New York City, would
expose 55,000 persons to noise
levels of 100 effective, perceived
noise decibels (EPNDBs)—or
about the same sensation of noise
a person would get while stand-
ing 50 feet from a highway.

Concorde (and the Tu-144) do not
accurately represent the impact
of that aircraft relative to sub-
sonic aircraft, however . . ., " it
said.

The study said there is "no
known or predicted technical
means to reduce significantly the
noise of the Concorde . . ."

## Arab League
Offers Beirut
Financial Aid

(Continued from Page 1)

United States has been warning
Israel about the political con-
sequences of repeated strikes
causing civilian casualties in
Lebanon, and Egypt and Syria,
among other Arab countries, have
been counseling restraint to the
Palestinians.

Although these reports could
not be confirmed from any offi-
cial source, they seemed to fit in
well with the Arab Defense Coun-
cil's discreet moderation today.

A sharp exchange occurred be-
tween the delegates of Iraq and
Syria, according to conference
sources, when Iraqi Foreign Min-
ister Shazel Taqa attributed the
plight of Lebanon and the Pales-
tinians in Lebanon to the troop-
disengagement agreements sign-
ed by Egypt and Syria. Syrian
Foreign Minister Abdel Halim
Khaddam retorted that if the
Arab world were to fight it

Department of State
AMEMBASSY·ROME

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UNCLAS RUDO
S/S-S FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PARTY
COPY TO AG
PRESIDENT TRYING TO MAKE HIS IDEA OF WORLD 'INTERDEPENDENCE'
WORK
L051114 FIRST OF TWO TAKES--BARBER ARTICLE
LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH IN ENGLISH 5 JUL 74 P 16L

((STEPHEN BARBER ARTICLE: "NIXON THE PEACE SALESMAN"))

((EXCERPTS)) PRESIDENT NIXON HAS COMPLETED HIS LATEST
HECTIC ROUND OF HIGH-POWERED DIPLOMACY. ON MONDAY HE RETURNS
TO EARTH IN WASHINGTON WITH HIS WATERGATE TROUBLES LOOMING AS
LARGE AS EVER.

HIS THIRD SUMMIT WITH MR BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW AND AT YALTA
WAS, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, A RESPECTABLE SUCCESS. THE RUSSIANS
COULD HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO MAKE BIG CONCESSIONS IN THE SEARCH
FOR A FORMULA TO END THE PERILOUS AND COSTLY RACE OF MULTIPLE
WARHEAD NUCLEAR ARMS TO A MAN UNDER THREAT OF IMPEACHMENT BY
CONGRESS. IF HE SURVIVES, OR IS SUCCEEDED BY MR GERALD FORD,
WITH DR HENRY KISSINGER, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, STAYING
ON, THEY MAY BUDGE SOMEWHAT.

IN THE MEANTIME, BY REVIEWING THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION
TALKS (SALT), THE MOMENTUM OF DETENTE IS MAINTAINED.
SUMMIT-THREE'S BIGGEST NEWS WAS PROBABLY TO HERALD SUMMIT-FOUR.
MR NIXON GAVE NOTHING AWAY THAT MIGHT UPSET THOSE 34 KEY
CONSERVATIVE SENATORS WHOSE VOTES COULD BLOCK HIS
CONVICTION IF IT COMES DOWN IN THE END THIS AUTUMN TO AN
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL. TIME HAS BEEN BOUGHT. NUCLEAR
ESCALATION MAY YET BE AVERTED.

WATERGATE CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, MR NIXON COULD NOT HAVE
CALLED OFF THE SUMMIT ANYWAY--NOT EVEN TO SUIT THE LIKES OF
SENATOR JACKSON, WHO HANKERS AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE IN 1976
SEVEN SIX--BECAUSE, AS DR KISSINGER EXPLAINED WITH THAT
CANDOUR THAT ENDEARS HIM TO REPORTERS: "IF WE DID NOT GO IT
WOULD BE SAYING WE ARE NOT A FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT."

IT MAY BE FASHIONABLE TO MOCK MR NIXON'S TASTE FOR SPECTACULARS.
BUT THAT, AS THEY SAY, IS "SHOWBIZ." TO BE TRAILED EVERYWHERE
BY TWO AIRLINER LOADS OF PRESS, CAMERAMEN AND TV PEOPLE IS THE
AMERICAN WAY. IT IS RIDICULOUS TO SUGGEST THAT MR NIXON LOVES
TO BE "ON CAMERA"--HE IS A GAUCHELY SHY MAN--BUT WOE BETIDE
THE PRESIDENT WHO DENIES HIS JOURNALISTIC TORMENTORS
COVERAGE FACILITIES.

THE MAIN THING WAS TO END THE TRANS-ATLANTIC SQUABBLING
THAT BROKE OUT DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND WITH THE ONSET
OF THE ENERGY CRISIS BEFORE GOING ON TO DEAL WITH THE

0416

VII 5 01 16:20

KREMLIN. THIS WAS DONE.

THE MIDDLE EAST TRIP, THAT PRECEDED THIS ONE, ALBEIT PHYSICALLY PUNISHING DUE TO ITS FRANTIC PACE, WAS REALLY SUCH A SUCCESS FOR MR NIXON THAT IT IS A WONDER IT DID NOT DO MORE TO SOUR RUSSO-AMERICAN DETENTE THAN THE SPECTRE OF WATERGATE. PERHAPS, INDEED, IT DID. THE RUSSIANS HAVE LOST PRESTIGE BADLY IN THE ARAB WORLD.

IT IS MOSTLY THEIR OWN FAULT THIS IS SO. THEY ARE ABRASIVE TOWARDS THEIR CLIENTS AND, APART FROM MODERN WEAPONS, FOR WHICH THEY NOW DEMAND HARD CASH--THEY JUST DO NOT HAVE "GOODIES" TO OFFER. KUNCE RUSSIA ITSELF IS HUNGRY FOR WESTERN INDUSTRIAL KNOW-HOW, IT IS PLAIN TO A LEADER LIKE EGYPT'S PRESIDENT SADAT (WHO ALSO WANTS IT) THAT HE CAN GET IT DIRECT, RATHER THAN SECOND-HAND, FROM THE SOURCE. MR NIXON'S BASIC THEORY IS THAT IF YOU COULD ONLY ENMESH PEOPLE IN A WHOLE SERIES OF JOINT UNDERTAKINGS, AND GET THE WORLD'S BUREAUCRACIES LOCKED INTO CONSTRUCTIVE, PEACEFUL UPLIFT PROGRAMMES ON AS MANY FRONTS AS POSSIBLE, THEN THERE IS A REAL CHANCE THAT YOU COULD SO ENGAGE LATENT CREATIVITY AS TO GIVE ALL A VESTED INTEREST IN THE FRUITS OF PEACE.

THIS PATTERN--IDEALISTIC AND EVEN CORNY THOUGH IT SOUNDS TO SOME--EMERGES VERY CLEARLY WHEN YOU FOLLOW THE MAN, ATTENDED BY DR KISSINGER AS HIS SANCHO PANZA, PEDDLING THE IDEA FROM CAPITAL TO CAPITAL. EVERYWHERE HE WENT, FROM CAIRO TO MOSCOW, HE WAS SIGNING AGREEMENTS TO SET UP JOINT COMMISSIONS AND WORKING PARTIES TO STUDY THIS AND THAT, TO SPEED INDUSTRALISATION, TECHNOLOGICAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH. COSMONAUTS AND ASTRONUTS ARE TO STAGE A SOYUZ-APOLLO LINK UP IN SPACE NEXT YEAR, FOR EXAMPLE. TRADE EXPANSION IS TO BE PUSHED--CONGRESS PERMITTING OR NOT. THE LIST OF INTERTWAINING CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS IS LENGTHENING TO A POINT WHERE IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE ME TO LEARN OF ONE FOR THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF JUMPING FROGS.

OIL DOLLARS ((SUBHEAD))

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OR COURSE, MR NIXON UNVEILED ONE OF HIS BOLDEST VENTURES YET. IT ALMOST GOT LOST IN PUBLICITY TERMS BECAUSE EVERYONE WAS EITHER FOCUSSING ON WATERGATE OR DR KISSINGER'S TANTRUM OVER THE WIRETAPPING AFFAIR. WHAT HAS BEEN LAUNCHED IS, IN EFFECT, A SECOND MASHALL PLAN OF TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC AID FOR THE AREA, WITH THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE THAT THIS TIME, UNLIKE IN PROSTRATE EUROPE IN 1948 FOUR EIGHT, THE RECIPIENTS SUPPLY THEIR OWN DOLLARS. ((PASSAGE OMITTED)) 5 JUL LOWCOCK/JC 05/1257Z JUL

BT

#8463

ACTION:

Foreign Service of the
United States of America
TELEGRAM

INCOMING AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONTROL:

JUL 4 1974

RECEIVED:

ORIGINATING POST:

POST MRN:

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UNCLAS STATE 145045

TOSEC 319, ZFF PARIS ONLY

IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: KALB, CBS, FIRST LINE REPORT EX BRUSSEL, THURS A.M.

FOR BREMER FROM S/PRS

LONDON FOR AMB MCCLOSKEY FROM S/PRS

PRESIDENT NIXON GAMBLES ON THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS, HIS EYE MUCH MORE ON THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPEACHMENT THAN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST MIRV.

PRESIDENT NIXON H-; RETURNED TO US, THE SUMMIT NOW A MATTER OF HISTORY. ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF US-SOV AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED, THE AGREEMENT THAT WOULD HAVE MADE A MAJOR DIFFERENCE WAS NOT: THE AGREEMENT IN FACT OR IN PRINCIPLE TO PUT A CEILING ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS.

THAT WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE BECAUSE BOTH SUPERPOWERS ARE NOW ON VERGE OF A NEW CYCLE IN THE ARMS RACE. AN AGREEMENT ON MIRVS WOULD HAVE BEEN HAILED AS A SUPERIOR ACHIEVEMENT, A BREAK ON A COSTLY SPIRALING-UP OF ARMS, MISSILES, BUDGETS AND THE LIKE. BUT THERE WAS NO SUCH AGREEMENT FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS.

FIRST, THERE WAS NO UNIFIED AMERICAN POSITION. THE PENTAGON AND DEFSEC SCHLESINGER HAULING IN ONE DIRECTION, THE SEC-

STATE IN ANOTHER, AND THE PRESIDENT ABOVE BOTH BUT UNWILLING TO RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM.

THERE WAS WATERGATE TOO: THE PRESIDENT UNABLE TO MAKE ANY DRAMATIC MOVES TOWARDS THE MIRV AGREEMENT BECAUSE TO HAVE MADE SUCH MOVES WOULD HAVE INVITED CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION ON CAPITAL HILL, AND MR. NIXON IN HIS DRIVE TO HEAD OFF IMPEACHMENT COULD NOT AFFORD TO ALIENATE THE RIGHT, THE BASE STILL OF HIS POLITICAL SUPPORT.

THERE WAS AS WELL THE DESIRE TO PULL OFF A DIPLOMATIC COUP SIMILAR TO THOSE HE HAD AT EARLIER SUMMITS. THERE WAS NO COUP POSSIBLE OTHER THAN MIRVS, HOWEVER, MAKING THE THIRD SOV-AM SUMMIT LESS SPECTACULAR THEN THE FIRST TWO. BOXED IN BY IMPEACHMENT ON THE RIGHT, THE PRESIDENT WAS OBVIOUSLY TEMPTED TO REACH FOR THE STARS. BUT HE RESISTED. HE OPTED FOR THE LESSER OF THE TWO EVILS. HE STOPPED FAR SHORT OF ANY KIND OF MIRV OR MISSILE DEAL WHILE DRAWING S MUCH PUBLICITY AS HE COULD OUT OF THE SIMPLE FACT OF SUMMITRY. HE WAS READY TO SUFFER THE SLINGS OF DISAPPOINTED AMERICANS SO LONG AS HE DID NOT MAKE A DEAL THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE HIS IMPEACHMENT PROSPECTS, WHICH APPEAR TO BE RISING A BIT AFTER HIS RECENT BOUT OF FOREIGN TRAVEL.

UNCLASSIFIED

<table><tr><td>AMB</td></tr><tr><td>CHARGE</td></tr><tr><td>MIN</td></tr><tr><td>POL</td></tr><tr><td>OSA</td></tr><tr><td>S/ATT</td></tr><tr><td>MINECON</td></tr><tr><td>FTN</td></tr><tr><td>CEP</td></tr><tr><td>COMAFF</td></tr><tr><td>LABATT</td></tr><tr><td>TRC</td></tr><tr><td>AGRIC</td></tr><tr><td>USTS</td></tr><tr><td>PRESS</td></tr><tr><td>MAAG</td></tr><tr><td>LEGATT</td></tr><tr><td>DAO</td></tr><tr><td>OSCD</td></tr><tr><td>ST</td></tr><tr><td>AMB/A</td></tr><tr><td>DEA</td></tr><tr><td>NARC</td></tr><tr><td>CUSTOMS</td></tr><tr><td>ADMIN</td></tr><tr><td>PER</td></tr><tr><td>CA</td></tr><tr><td>B&F</td></tr><tr><td>GSO</td></tr><tr><td>SY</td></tr><tr><td>RFC</td></tr><tr><td>POUCH RM</td></tr><tr><td>CONGEN</td></tr><tr><td>VISAS</td></tr><tr><td>PFT/SCS</td></tr><tr><td>UNESCO</td></tr><tr><td>FAA</td></tr><tr><td>JEC</td></tr><tr><td>MARATT</td></tr><tr><td>CRO</td></tr><tr><td>CUSUPVR</td></tr><tr><td>CEOC</td></tr><tr><td>TMO</td></tr><tr><td>AFR</td></tr><tr><td>NASA</td></tr><tr><td>MSG</td></tr><tr><td>PRC</td></tr><tr><td>USTS</td></tr><tr><td>FBO</td></tr><tr><td>ECON-ID</td></tr><tr><td>USSS</td></tr><tr><td>TSC</td></tr><tr><td>DUTY OFF</td></tr><tr><td>POUCH TO:</td></tr><tr><td>EF</td></tr><tr><td>COPIES</td></tr><tr><td>ROTER NO.</td></tr></table>

UNCLASSIFIED

SO TO WHATEVER DEGREE IMPEACHMENT OR WATERGATE HAVE INTRUDED INTO FOREIGN POLICY, PERHAPS IT WAS INEVITABLE. AS SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS STATED MANY TIMES, NO COUNTRY CAN GO THROUGH SUCH A HUGE INTERNAL UPHEAVAL WITHOUT PAYING A MAJOR PRICE.

THERE IS AN IRONY HERE: NOT ONLY IS THE US PAYING A PRICE, RUSSIA IS TOO. SOV PARTY CHIEF BREZHNEV OBVIOUSLY WANTED MORE THAN HE GOT OUT OF THIS SUMMIT, BUT COULD NOT PUT THE PRESIDENT IN THE POSITION OF GIVING MORE THAN THE AMERICAN TRAFFIC COULD BEAR.

MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO SOVIET SOURCES, BREZHNEV COULD NOT MAKE A MAJOR DEAL WITH THE PRESIDENT WHOSE GRIP ON HIS JOB IS STILL A MATTER OF DISPUTE. STRATEGIC ARMS IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE NEGOTIATED WITH A SHORT-TIMER, THE RUSSIANS SAY, A SHORT-TIMER WHO APPEARS TO BE SO PREOCCUPIED WITH HIS LEGAL DEFENSE THAT HE HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIS TWO PRINCIPAL ADVISERS.

THE RUSSIANS TALKED CONSTANTLY ABOUT WATERGATE, AND SO TOO DO THE AMERICANS. AND FOR BOTH IT WAS AN INTRUSION INTO THE LEGITIMATE BUSINESS OF DIPLOMACY. FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER, A BIG INTERNAL BATTLE NOW EMERGES BEFORE HE

CAN PRODUCE AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL ON MIRVS, PERHAPS IN ANOTHER TWO MONTHS. SISCO
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# Most Iowans in Poll Laud Job Kissinger Is Doing

This article was written by The Register's Richard Somerville, based on the Iowa Poll, Glenn Roberts, director.

Most Iowans feel that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as a diplomat, is "strong," "level-headed," "miraculous," "honest" or "wonderful."

In an Iowa Poll taken June 19-22, an overwhelming number of Iowans — 82 per cent — said

they approve of the way Kissinger is handling his job as America's No. 1 peacemaker.

## Threat to Quit

However, the secretary's high job rating was diminished by

his recent threat to resign unless he is cleared in a wiretapping controversy.

Riding the crest of his recent success as peace mediator in the Middle East, Kissinger returned to Washington last month to become embroiled in the case of the bugging of some of his subordinates and newsmen in 1969 and 1970. New evidence came to light that Kissinger may have initiated the wiretaps — a charge that he had denied during Senate confirmation hearings.

Then, in the emotional news conference in Salzburg, Austria, Kissinger said he would resign unless his name was cleared. He urged the Senate to reopen an in-

POLL—

Please turn to Page Seven

DES Moines Register 7/4/74

WASH. POST 7/3/74

By Charles Del Vecchio—The Washington Post

The Nebraska Avenue estate of the Wiley Buchanans, which Secretary and Mrs. Henry Kissinger will occupy until mid-October.

VIP

# A Home for
The Kissingers

By Maxine Cheshire

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who wanted a place with a swimming pool while his two children are visiting him here this summer, has rented the four-acre Nebraska Avenue NW estate of former United States Chief of Protocol Wiley T. Buchanan Jr.

The Kissingers will occupy the Buchanan mansion until mid-October, when they plan to move to 3018 Dunbarton St. NW in Georgetown, a three-story townhouse once occupied by the late Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.

The Secret Service moved onto the Buchanan property Monday to secure it before the Kissingers move in. Both are still away. He is still abroad with President Nixon and Mrs. Kissinger was in New York, where she commutes to work for former New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's Committee for Critical Choices.

The Buchanans are in Newport at their own summer home, "Beaulieu," which is featured in the current issue of Town and Country magazine.

Buchanan, reached by phone yesterday, refused to discuss the amount of rent the Kissingers are paying.

See VIP, B7, Col. 3

PEOPLE / COMMENT

# A Home for the Kissingers

VIP, From B1

"It's a two-way deal," he said. "I was delighted to do it because I get my property protected while I'm away. With the rampant crime, it was a great factor in my decision to rent to them."

The Nebraska Avenue estate, where the Buchanans have lived for 33 years, is an ideal spot for people who have to spend the hot-weather months close in town and can't get away.

Heavily planted with beautiful gardens, the grounds have privacy, even though they are only minutes from the State Department.

There are bath houses and outdoor barbecues and

play areas designed for the Buchanans' seven grandchildren. A lower-level "safari room," filled with African big-game trophies, has movie projection facilities.

The main part of the house is quite formal, with a massive antiques-filled French drawing room and a dining room that seats 24 at one table and can squeeze in 40 at smaller round tables.

There is an informal garden room where the Kissinger youngsters can romp in wet bathing suits.

The Kissingers will have to solve their own servant problem. The Buchanans took their staff with them to Newport, leaving behind only the grounds superintendent who lives in the gate house.

© 1974. The Washington Post — Chicago Tribune — New York News Syndicate

Clayton Fritchey

Wash. Post 7-1-74

# Peace in the World: Nearly at Hand in 1974

Richard Nixon may not yet have achieved the "generation of peace" he so often talks about, but it can hardly be denied that 1974 has become the most peaceful year since the end of World War II.

Some of the President's critics are still contending that, because of Watergate, it is a bad time for him to be holding another Moscow summit meeting with Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev. Actually, however, considering the present comparatively relaxed state of the world, there could hardly be a more propitious moment to get on with detente, of which arms limitation is only a part.

Now that the shooting has stopped in the Mideast, the world for once is without a major war. In Cambodia there is still some insurgent action, and in South Vietnam there is an uneasy truce, but these are now local situations which, fortunately, no longer pit the superpowers against each other and hence no longer threaten the general peace. The climate for negotiation is about as favorable as we are likely to get in the foreseeable future.

The President and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, have not promised any miracles in Moscow. Neither has Chairman Brezhnev. Yet there is good reason to believe that both parties to the summit are genuinely eager to advance the detente that was begun in the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow meeting in 1972. So why cynically denigrate the new effort in advance? Why not wait and see what comes of it, even if it takes some time, and meanwhile hope and work for the best?

How does the Conservative-Republican

> "But today, for a change and hopefully for an extended time, it's mostly quiet on the world front. Coincidentally, the climate inside the Kremlin seems benign for the moment."

Senator from New York, James Buckley, know that the mission to Moscow is a "mission in futility"? How does The Wall Street Journal know that "no worthwhile arms agreement is currently within reach"? How does Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the dissident Russian writer, know that Mr. Nixon "does not have sufficient strength to demand proper control of these treaties"?

There is little doubt that Watergate has impaired Mr. Nixon's leadership on the domestic front, but there is no evidence that the Nixon-Kissinger combine has lost its effectiveness internationally. Quite the contrary. The ceasefire in the Mideast is a testimonial to administration diplomacy.

The President and Dr. Kissinger may not pull any rabbits out of a hat on their current trip, but now is the time to lay the groundwork for further development of a detente that has already played a part in bringing about the relatively benign conditions of 1974. As Kissinger says, the object of this summit meeting is "to maintain a dialogue, to contain the danger of

nuclear concentration and to create positive incentives for a peaceful world."

That is a lot, and it should not be unattainable. If, however, the opponents of detente succeed in derailing it and in reviving the cold war, it may be a long time before the climate is again so favorable for cultivating peaceful coexistence.

This is really a rarer moment than is generally realized, for, ever since the beginning of the cold war more than 25 year ago, the world situation has been exacerbated by an unbroken chain of conflicts and confrontations, nearly all affecting the United States in one way or another.

In the late 1940s there was the Berlin blockade, the great Chinese civil war, the first Arab-Israeli war, the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Greek-Turkish crisis. From 1950 to 1953 the Korean war held the stage, followed by the defeat of the French in Indochina in 1954 and another Mideast crisis in 1955-56, culminating in the second Arab-Israeli war which finally involved all the great powers.

The mid-1950s were also marked by the bloody revolts in Hungary, Poland and East Germany. The United States openly sent troops to Lebanon, while secretly involving itself in Vietnam. The French-Algerian war reached its climax. The 1960s became a still worse decade, torn by the Congo war, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban missile crisis, the Berlin wall, India's clashes with both Pakistan and China, the third Mideast war in 1967 and, above all, America's full-fledged military intervention in Vietnam, which lasted until 1973.

The 1970s also began inauspiciously, with Vietnam threatening confrontations between the United States and Russia and China, plus the war over Bangladesh, plus the fourth Arab-Israeli war last October, plus the tensions between Russia and China, now somewhat relaxed. But today, for a change and hopefully for an extended time, it's mostly quiet on the world front.

Coincidentally, the climate inside the Kremlin as well as out seems benign for the moment. Just a few days before Mr. Nixon's arrival in Moscow, Chairman Brezhnev noted that critics of detente think arms limitation agreements are risky. But in practice, he said, "It is an immeasurably greater risk to continue unbridled accumulation of arms."

Los Angeles Times

William Raspberry is on vacation. His column will resume upon his return.

KISSINGER... CONTINUED

After being apprised of the wiretap on General Pursley, Laird made this comment: "There was a wiretap, as I understand it, put on my military assistant back in 1969. That particular wiretap was perhaps on a list that Dr. Kissinger had suggested to the F.B.I. I was not aware of the wiretap on my military assistant at the time, but I can assure you that that disappointed me at the time....[He] was in very close touch with me night and day."

In Salzburg, Kissinger repeatedly developed news leaks. But, as every diplomatic correspondent knows, Kissinger is the capital's chief leaker. None of his leaks were ever directly attributed to Kissinger, a grand master of news management. During the Vietnam peace negotiations in 1972, for example, Kissinger used leaks and other forms of news management as part of his secret diplomacy. The extraordinary thing is that the most prestigious correspondents and editors allowed themselves to be used by "Henry." Indeed, they were usually grateful for his attention.

Aside from Vietnam, nothing illustrates better Henry Kissinger's devious diplomatic techniques than the Middle East crisis of 1973-1974. As in the case of the Vietnam peace negotiations, Kissinger has provided his own scenario of these events to selected Washington writers-on a background basis-to stand as the official version. It happens that Kissinger's version does not match other credible accounts. These are the facts as reconstructed from responsible sources in Washington and elsewhere:

The Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel on Saturday, October 6, 1973, came as a total surprise to the secretary of state even though as early as May he had in hand a detailed State Department study based on the Egyptian battle plan secretly obtained by U.S. intelligence, predicting an offensive in the early autumn. Late in September, the Syrian plan was likewise made available to the United States.

In part because Israeli intelligence services, famous for their skill, tended to minimize these reports, Kissinger, too, refused to take them seriously. Even as late as the last week of September, Washington had no thought of launching aerial reconnaissance over Egypt and Syria to determine their military deployments. Kissinger, busy discussing a new Middle East peace plan with Arab and Israeli foreign ministers at the United Nations in New York, was convinced that in the name of détente the Soviet Union would not equip the Arabs for a new war.

This was a fatal blindness, an example of how a man in Kissinger's position can become the intellectual prisoner of his own concepts. Having gained Soviet cooperation during the secret Vietnam peace talks, he simply rejected the idea that the Russians would now help to start a conflict in the Middle East. Because Kissinger was lured into this false sense of security, the United States was unaware that Moscow had provided the Egyptians with lethal anti-tank Sagger missiles and SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles that were to take a terrible toll of Israeli tanks and planes.

When the war broke out, Kissinger accepted the Pentagon view that Israeli air superiority and the quality of Israel's armed forces would halt the two-pronged Arab attack in a matter of days. This, in fact, was the undisputed judgment in the U.S. Government. Kissinger's and all the other versions agree on this point.

However, by Tuesday, October 9, it became clear that the Israelis were taking frightful losses. The Israelis were expending their ammunition at a devastating rate and shortages were developing. Soon, the Israeli ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, was urging Kissinger to initiate an airlift to Israel to resupply its forces and to speed up deliveries of Phantom jet fighters in the light of mounting aircraft losses to the SAM-6's.

It is at this point that the Kissinger version is increasingly at variance with all the other accounts. Thus Kissinger claims that he informed Ambassador Dinitz that he was doing everything in his power to launch a resupply airlift, but was running into the opposition of the Pentagon bureaucracy and notably of the defense secretary, James Schlesinger, his principal administration rival.

This, however, was not the whole truth. Schlesinger favored in principle a resupply airlift flown by American military aircraft, but he was paralyzed by a White House policy directive, drafted by Kissinger, ordering a hold on such operations. The written directive was a Kissingerian masterpiece of devious diplomacy. Its thrust was that the Pentagon would be represented to the Israelis by Kissinger as the "bad guys," refusing help, while the White House and the State Department would appear as the "good guys," fighting a bureaucratic battle to aid Israel.

This directive prevailed during the crucial first week of the war. Several policy concepts were involved. For one thing, Kissinger believed he needed the diplomatic flexibility to cope with the Russians. He did not want to provoke them by authorizing a massive airlift and he continued to place considerable faith in the spirit of détente. Nor did he want to provoke the Arabs and court an oil embargo. This view was shared to an important degree by James Schlesinger, which may explain his acceptance of the "bad guys" role for the Pentagon.

Kissinger also developed the notion that the long-range interest of Middle East peace required a painful spasm on the battlefield. As in the case of Vietnam, he concluded that political solutions can be obtained in otherwise intractable situations only after a period of high-intensity fighting. Since Moscow took the same view, no serious attempt was made in the U.N. Security Council during the first week to push for a truce.

While the Israelis kept pressing Kissinger for assistance-and receiving the answer that the Pentagon still opposed an airlift-a parallel drama was developing in the administration, affecting U.S. relations with Britain as well as the course of the Middle East war.

Late Tuesday, October 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally realized that they had no clear picture of the battlefield situation and that, therefore, they could

make no valid policy recommendations. They proposed to Kissinger that an air reconnaissance mission be ordered at once to bring back aerial photographs. (There were no Samos satellites in orbit over the area.)

An initial plan to dispatch a U-2 spy plane was quickly discarded on political grounds; memories of C.I.A. overflights of 1960 are still fresh. Instead, the chiefs proposed a mission by an SR-71 Air Force reconnaissance plane, in fact superior in performance to the U-2. They suggested that the SR-71 fly from Achmacarry, a Royal Air Force base on Cyprus, if Britain agreed, or from bases in Britain. Achmacarry had been used by SR-71's in 1970 in policing the Suez Canal truce arranged by the United States.

A quick consultation with London showed that Prime Minister Heath would permit the use of the R.A.F.'s base in Cyprus if the United States could come up with a "cover story" that would stand and not be blown in a matter of days. Early in the evening of Wednesday, October 10, the State Department drafted a telegram to the London Embassy with a formal request for clearance for the SR-71. The telegram was taken to Kissinger in his seventh-floor office suite. At once, he flew into a towering rage, denouncing the British as unworthy allies because of Heath's demands for a "cover story." "It was a real tantrum," an aide recalled. Kissinger threw the official who brought the telegram out of his office and ordered the cancellation of the SR-71 mission.

Because the Air Force had dispatched aerial tankers over the Atlantic from U.S. bases and deployed others, stationed in Europe, over the Mediterranean, the SR-71 could have flown directly from Egin Air Force Base in Florida to the Middle East without depending on British facilities. It could be refueled in midair. But Kissinger, still fuming over the British, forbade the mission altogether for reasons that remain unclear.

State Department officials believe that Kissinger's anger with Britain dated back to London's cool reception of his proposal, six months earlier, for a new "Atlantic Charter." He proved his anger by ordering the intelligence community to curtail the flow of American intelligence to the British, notwithstanding an exchange agreement in effect. (The intelligence ban has not yet been lifted.) The immediate effect was that Washington remained in the dark about the battlefield situation.

By Thursday, October 11, Kissinger, responding to Ambassador Dinitz's desperate appeals; had authorized El Al Airline Boeing 707's to land in Norfolk, Virginia, to pick up limited amounts of war materiel. El Al, short on planes, was also forced to paint over Israeli insignia; the United States still wanted to appear even-handed in the war. Kissinger also told the Israelis and the Department of Transportation that more materiel would be sent if Israel could charter planes from U.S. airlines. But the Israelis were turned down by every

(See KISSINGER, Pg. 10-F)

9-F

KISSINGER... CONTINUED

airline; the airlines feared Palestinian terrorist reprisals.

Friday morning, October 12, Secretary Schlesinger informed Kissinger that the only solution for the Israelis was a U.S. military airlift. A massive Soviet airlift was bringing supplies to Cairo and Damascus, and the Pentagon felt that the United States was no longer obliged to exercise restraint. The Israelis were in desperate straits.

But Kissinger still held out. He told Dinitz that it was the Pentagon that continued to block the resupply operation although, in reality, Schlesinger was already busy staging cargo aircraft and assembling weapons and ammunition for the Israelis. Later, Kissinger kept blaming Schlesinger for the delay, actually suggesting that the defense secretary was ignoring Presidential orders.

He also told Schlesinger that permission was needed from Portugal to refuel U.S. aircraft at the Lajes Air Force Base on Terceira Island in the Azores. Another Kissinger notion was that American planes should deliver their cargo at Lajes, where it would be transferred by boat to the island of Santa Maria, the Azores' commercial airport. From there, he said, the Israelis could pick up the arms with El Al airliners. The Pentagon told Kissinger that there were no boats available in the Azores and, anyway, there was no time for such a complicated operation.

At 1 A.M. on Saturday, October 13, Nixon instructed Schlesinger to launch an American airlift. Since Portugal had not yet authorized the refueling at Lajes, Schlesinger said the giant C-5 cargo jets and the C-150's could fly nonstop from the United States to Tel Aviv—carrying extra fuel and less cargo.

The Portuguese clearance actually came during Saturday, but bad weather delayed for a number of hours the takeoff by the first planes of the airlift. At that point, Kissinger also authorized the SR-71 to fly its reconnaissance mission from Eglin to the Middle East—three days after it should have gone.

According to a version apparently inspired by Kissinger, the launching of the airlift marked his victory in the battle of "1600 Pennsylvania Avenue." This, however, was quite different from the impression gathered by others involved in the week-long controversy over aid to Israel.

American assistance clearly made it possible for Israel to go to the offensive and for her forces to cross the Suez Canal into Egypt, trapping two Egyptian armies. Only then did the two superpowers try active diplomacy.

The U.N. Security Council ordered the cease-fire on October 22, but the fighting continued past October 24 as the Israelis tried to destroy the entrapped Egyptians and the Arabs fought back. Egypt's President Sadat in desperation appealed to Moscow and Washington to dispatch their own forces to enforce the truce. This led to more

Kissingerian diplomatic legerdemain.

At dawn on October 25, a Thursday, Kissinger held a National Security Council meeting at the White House with Schlesinger and C.I.A. Director William E. Colby. Their decision, reportedly ratified by Nixon two hours later, was to order a worldwide alert of U.S. forces.

At his news conference later in the day, Kissinger told newsmen that the alert was called because "we became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units and we were puzzled by behavior of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place." Pressed for a clearer explanation, he said: "Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic effort, one way or the other, we will make the record available and we will be able to go into greater detail."

But eight months later, no further explanation had been delivered by Kissinger. White House leaks at the time made it appear that U.S. intelligence discovered that seven Soviet airborne divisions were being readied for a drop in the Middle East and that Brezhnev had sent Nixon something along the lines of an ultimatum to stop the Israelis or face a "unilateral action."

What really happened is one of Kissinger's secrets. But top intelligence officials say there was nothing to indicate that the Soviets were preparing an invasion. If anything, they said, the Russians may have been pulling together a force requested by Sadat to join with the Americans in a peace-keeping operation. When Washington turned down the idea, the Russians sent 60 paratroopers in civilian clothes to act as observers in Egypt. The United States sent 60 of its troops to Israel on a similar mission.

State Department officials now believe that Kissinger, who often tends to panic, used the reports of Soviet military movements to scare the Israelis into observing the cease-fire. Subsequently, Kissinger ordered the department to prepare a blow-by-blow account of the events that precipitated the alert. But the project was quietly dropped when it developed that no convincing material was available.

Kissinger occasionally admits that he makes mistakes. But, as a friend of the secretary's put it recently, he looks on them the way Nietzsche did: "The errors of great men are venerable because they are more fruitful than the truth of little men."

The new mood greeted Henry Kissinger on the day he returned to Washington from his 34-day Middle Eastern tour de force on the Syrian disengagement. He was stunned that instead of being welcomed as a hero, he was subjected to his first news conference to wiretap questions! He was even asked whether he had retained counsel for possible perjury proceedings against him. This was when Kissinger lost his

cool and his sense of humor, normally his greatest public assets.

Washington, of course, is a vicious town. Once blood is smelled, political hound packs go after the potential victim. The June 6 news conference at the State Department suddenly shattered the myth of Kissinger's untouchability. Then came Salzburg. Influential people began wondering aloud whether the Middle East negotiations were all they were cracked up to be, or whether, as in the Vietnam negotiations, he hadn't been over-committing the United States and engaging in dangerous deviousness. Others started worrying about the forthcoming Moscow summit; Paul Nitze, one of the most respected defense experts, abruptly quit the SALT delegation, fearing that in the present climate Nixon and Kissinger might give away too much.

Quickly, Kissinger became the subject of harsh public polemic—on Nixon, wiretaps, Vietnam and the Middle East, and his stewardship of the State Department. For Kissinger, it was a wholly new experience. In consequence, he has become vulnerable for the first time in his meteoric career.

Henry Kissinger will, of course, be remembered for helping to engineer the détente with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Both were historic moves and, the hope is, they will help to keep the world at peace. The judgments on his performance over Vietnam and the Middle East may be less admiring with the passage of time.

The Palestinian question remains totally unresolved, and King Faisal warned Nixon this month that there will be no lasting peace until East Jerusalem is returned to the Arabs. Still, Kissinger's efforts produced the first diplomatic breakthrough in 25 years.

For five and a half years, Kissinger symbolized the U.S. foreign policy, running it almost single-handedly under the mandate of Nixon. But there are men for all seasons, and possibly Henry Kissinger's season will soon have run its course.

Evidently, the United States will have a foreign policy after his departure, but chances are that no other man as spectacular as Kissinger in so many ways will soon emerge. He is a phenomenon, genuinely unique.

Who, then, might be the next secretary of state under Nixon or Gerald Ford? The most experienced among potential candidates—Elliot L. Richardson and Nelson Rockefeller—have Presidential ambitions for 1976, and are unlikely to wile their time away at Foggy Bottom. Kenneth Rush, the recent deputy secretary of state, or Robert S. Ingersoll, just designated as deputy secretary, may provide the transition. In Nixon's cabinet game of musical chairs, would you believe James Schlesinger or William Simon?

10-F

MONDAY MORNING, 1 JULY 1974

NEW YORK TIMES - 1 JULY 1974 Pg. 12

# Amid Detente, Soviet Military Expansion

By DREW MIDDLETON

Since 1972, in a period of détente to many in the United States and Western Europe, there has been a methodical improvement and expansion of nuclear and conventional military power in the

News
Analysis

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

At the same time a barrage of official speeches and

writings have warned the Soviet people that despite the agreements on limiting strategic arms and despite Soviet-American exchanges such as President Nixon's visit to Moscow, the struggle against capitalism continues.

Foy D. Kohler, former Ambassador to Moscow, told the House subcommittee on foreign affairs that the Soviet version of peaceful coexistence "sounds more like the Western definition of cold war."

He cited an editorial from Krasnaya Zvezda, the newspaper of the armed forces, on August 14, 1973, that said: "We have been and still are the opponents of imperialism and bourgeois ideology and morality. Class peace between Socialism and capitalism and peaceful coexistence between the Communists and bourgeois ideologies have not existed and do not and cannot exist."

There has been no evidence since 1972 of any reductions in Soviet military strength. The consensus among Western experts is that high force levels will continue to be a basic feature of Moscow's planning and that Soviet leaders agree that military force, active or potential, is an effective instrument of policy.

Because of the importance of the arms agreement, which affects only strategic nuclear weapons, American public opinion has overlooked the significant build-up of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe.

Prof. John Erickson of Edinburgh University, an authority on Soviet defense, reports that Russian nuclear munition stocks are "now attaining the U.S.-NATO level of some 7,000."

## Exercise in Germany

He and other qualified Western sources say that the number of Frog and Scud surface-to-surface nuclear missiles in Central Europe has increased by 25 per cent and that a new missile, Scaleboard, has been moved from the Soviet-Chinese frontier to Czechoslovakia.

Scaleboard, as NATO has named it, has a range of 500 miles, compared with Frog's 10 to 45 miles and Scud's 185 miles. Scaleboard also has a nuclear explosive power in the megaton range.

This recent expansion of tactical nuclear capability has been accompanied by increasingly frequent exercises in the transfer and loading of nuclear munitions in East Germany.

The Russians have also carried out an intensive program to improve their strategic nuclear

position within the numerical limitations imposed by the arms agreement of 1972—1,610 launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBM's, and 950 launchers for submarine-based ballistic missiles or SLBM's.

Moscow's primary concern, apparently, has been to develop multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles or, MIRV's, for their ballistic missiles. Since late 1972 four new ICBM's, SS-16, SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, plus a new SLBM with a range of 4,000 miles have been tested on the Tyuratam and Plesetsk ranges.

## The Soviet View

The SS-17 and SS-18 have been flight-tested with two, to six MIRV's. The SS-17 is comparable to the American Minuteman, the SS-18 is believed to be the successor to the huge Russian SS-9, which carries a 25-megaton warhead. Defense Department tests say that the new weapon will be even more powerful.

Mr. Kohler, in a paper written for the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami, contends that Moscow "continues to see nuclear weapons and forces, and particularly nuclear rocket forces, as central to all phases of Soviet military power."

The former ambassador adds that he and his colleagues, scrutinizing Soviet statements and publications, "have found no evidence that agreements reached at the Moscow and Washington summits" of 1972 and 1973, or the general relaxation of tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have brought any changes in Soviet positions."

He added that neither the talks that produced the 1972 agreement on limiting strategic arms nor the current talks on further limitation "have had any discernible impact on overall Soviet postures, activities or plans relative to the further development and possible utilization of nuclear weapons."

The improvements in Soviet conventional forces since 1972 has been most marked in ground and air forces in Central Europe and in naval capabilities, particularly in the deployment of new surface ships armed with surface-to-surface missiles.

## Degree of Superiority

For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the question posed by the Russian program is not whether Soviet forces have achieved superiority over the West in Central Europe but what degree of superiority they have and intend to attain.

As in the case of strategic nuclear forces, expansion of power in conventional forces has been kept within 1972 limits. There are no more divisions in the Soviet order of battle today than there were two years ago, but, according to Professor Erickson, "armored strength has been increased by one third, artillery has been doubled, tactical-nuclear-warhead strength doubled and, in some respects, logistics capaci-

ty has also doubled."

Meanwhile, Western experts agree, détente has been underplayed in official Soviet speeches and articles and the "aggressive designs" of NATO have been emphasized.

The most conspicuous example of Soviet expansion has been in tanks. The number of T-62's, the most modern Soviet tank, has risen from 5,040 to 6,500 among Soviet forces in East Germany. The Soviet Union and its allies now have 19,000 tanks in Central Europe, compared with 6,700 for NATO. Some 20,400 T-62's and 24,300 T-55's have been produced since 1968. A new tank is being tested, and a tank that can be dropped from the air is coming into service.

## More Personnel Carriers

Concurrently, there has been

a steady increase in the number of armored personnel carriers reaching Soviet forces in Central Europe, an increase estimated at 4,000 vehicles in the last four years.

Another development worrying NATO planners is the Soviet improvement in logistics and support strength.

A new seven-ton truck has been introduced, stocks of heavy folding bridges have been increased, and 30 or more amphibious trucks and 20 heavy amphibian ferries have been sent to the six river-assault battalions in East Germany.

The Soviet forces there also have been reinforced by two helicopter regiments at Parchim and Stendal and by the formation of "reidoviki," or helicopter-borne commando units, which now form the first company of each rifle regiment.

NEW YORK TIMES - 1 JULY 1974

# For a Total Test Ban

For more than a decade, most efforts to curb nuclear arms have focussed not on the weapons but on the missiles and the delivery systems that place atomic bombs on target. Recently, however, there has been a growing realization that, as the nuclear era began with an explosion in 1945, the arms race cannot be halted nor can the nuclear power balance be stabilized without ending nuclear explosions.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban, barring underground as well as atmospheric explosions, would discourage the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries, a danger pointed up anew by India's recent underground bomb test. It would also hinder proliferation by the United States and the Soviet Union—the steady introduction of new types and generations of warheads, along with improved missiles and aircraft to deliver them.

The limited underground test ban being discussed by President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Russia would be welcome but of strictly limited utility in preventing proliferation. The 200-kiloton "threshold" proposed by the United States Defense Department would not prevent tests such as India's (15 kilotons), nor would it impede the testing program projected by the Pentagon for increasing the power of MIRV multiple warheads.

What is most essential now is to move toward a total cessation of testing within a limited number of years. Fortunately this view is being pressed on President Nixon by a bipartisan group of Senators with additional support from concerned House members. The lawmakers fear that a threshold test ban alone at this point will take the steam out of the drive for a comprehensive ban—as did the limited test-ban treaty of 1963—and again bring an increase in testing.

Many scientists believe unilateral verification techniques already are good enough to detect any evasions of a test ban; and the risks could be diminished further with five more years of research. Meanwhile, military opposition in both this country and the Soviet Union would be eased by having a few more years in which to complete tests deemed essential.

Mr. Brezhnev appears ready to fix a date as early as 1980 for a total ban on testing. With the substantial Congressional support already mobilized, President Nixon should join him in this commitment. A quota of annual tests, gradually declining to zero, offers the best way to solve the problem and to head off a fresh spasm of underground testing that might well follow the conclusion of a threshold test ban.

4

# Are Nixon and Henry Split?

By STAN CARTER
Diplomatic Correspondent of the News

Yalta, USSR, June 30 — Henry Kissinger, walking along the Black Sea beach behind President Nixon and the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, was asked today how the summit talks were going.

The secretary of state shrugged his shoulders, smiled, and replied:

"Nobody tells me anything. I just follow 10 paces behind."

This was a typical Kissinger joke that the secretary used to deflect the reporter's question without giving a substantive answer or being rude. But it may have contained a kernel of truth.

Kissinger has kept much in the background during the latest round of U.S.-Soviet summit talks, as he did during the presidential tour of the Middle East earlier this month. Nixon and

Brezhnev have spent a surprising amount of time with only an interpreter present.

## An Analysis

Today, the President and the Communist Party general secretary met

continuously for four hours and 25 minutes. Their advisers, headed by Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, did not join the meeting until the last two hours.

## Why the Difference?

The pattern is different from that of previous summits, when Kissinger sat in on nearly all the President's meetings. The reason may be merely that Kissinger has since become secretary of state, in addition to being the President's national-security adviser.

At the previous meetings with Brezhnev, and with Chinese leaders in Peking, Secretary of State William P. Rogers held separate meetings with foreign ministers while Nixon and Kissinger were conferring with the top leaders. Now Kissinger is performing two functions.

But the change comes amid rumors of a rift between Nixon and Kissinger. How much substance there is to the rumors is not known. White House aides deny them flatly. It is known that Nixon was incensed by Kissinger's threat in Salzburg, Austria, three weeks ago to resign if he were not cleared of any taint of scandal stemming from White House wiretaps. The President was said to have calmed down quickly, however.

There appear to be differences between the President, or at least some of the men around

him, and the secretary of state over how far or how fast to go to obtain a second-stage strategic-arms-limitation agreement with the Russians.

A widely accepted theory is that the President, with the impeachment issue unresolved, is hesitant to make any concessions that might anger his conservative supporters in Congress.

## Henry's Warning

Kissinger, at a press conference in Brussels before he flew with Nixon to Moscow, appeared to be trying to push the President along on a SALT agreement. The secretary warned of a possible U.S.-Soviet arms race if at least a partial agreement to limit missiles with multiple warheads was not reached quickly.

Kissinger said bluntly that it was Nixon's "duty" to act decisively on arms control no matter what "controversy" such action might provoke in Washington.

"Arms race' is just not the kind of term that Henry uses in ordinary conversation," a veteran Kissinger-watcher said. "It sounded like he was warning the President, from a public forum, that this had to be settled quickly."

But the betting in the White House entourage is that Nixon will not bring from the summit any agreement that might further erode his base of support on Capitol Hill.

Associated Press Wirephoto

Brezhnev ponits out the sights during cruise.

NY DAILY NEWS

JULY 1, 1974

P. 20

house, Kykuit. "All on one floor, thank goodness," she said. Part of the 3,000 Pocantico Hills Rockefeller estate will become a state park.

### WHITE HOUSE FOR KISSINGER
The house Henry and Nancy Kissinger have rented in Washington may have once belonged to Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, but is singularly unimpressive. Even the present owner was surprised the Kissingers selected it. "It's just a small high-rise house," she said. "I told the Kissingers it was not terribly suitable for them, it has such a small garden and little entertaining space, but he said it was good for security reasons." The three-story off-white brick house with black shutters and ivy is on Dumbarton Ave., a one-way street that is peaceful and not often trafficked. There is no through-alley to the rear, which makes surveillance easier. Supreme Court Justice Brennan lives across the street; Congressman William Moorehead lives on the corner, and columnist Joe Alsop lives down the street about three blocks.

Inside, the house is unpretentious. "I was surprised they took this house," said the owner, "but then I guess, they don't have all the money in the world."

### ADDITION: St. Germain and a blow at the California store with sips of Pinot elle told Eye: "California frowned particularly on knit pants with dumpy ja shop of men's and women's store will take a "more c was bought that same night."

### DIOR SHIFTS: Dior will house Paris boutique in ready-to-wear; Marc Bébé in the Rue Boissy d'Aubourg St. Honore, T move its rtw boutique, the ground floor; Bohan "less-enticing location."

### THE PURITAN: Carl R. facturer, who likes to c ties and name horses aft celebrate in New York

Cunn Trigere and Nancy Olson Livingston; Martine Fields; Natalie Schaeffer; Kay Gable; Miriam Marshall Boyriven and Mervyn Leroy.

### BEJEWELED: The jewelry lovers out in force for the opening of Miriam I Port of Call boutique at Ciro in Beverly Hills ... not so strictly social when w

NEW YORK

July 1, 1974

# Is He Indispensable?
## Answers to the Kissinger Riddle

By Tad Szulc

> "...His identification with Watergate politics and new questions about his diplomacy presage the fading of his brilliant star..."

Secretary of State Henry Alfred Kissinger may well be the most successful and intellectually accomplished diplomat in modern history. But his standing in Washington is now, at the very moment of his worldwide acclaim and glory, suddenly in question. His star is sliding into eclipse in the Washington firmament, almost imperceptibly, perhaps, but inexorably. It is not a matter of mere wishful thinking by envious enemies. It is, rather, the result of some observable and probably inevitable facts of political life.

At his startling Salzburg news conference Kissinger firmly linked himself with Richard Nixon's political fate, something he had studiously avoided during the two years of the Watergate trauma. And doubts are now emerging over the long-range validity of many of his policies, most recently those in the Middle East and particularly at the time of the October war and its aftermath. Though his skillful diplomacy has brought an unprecedented measure of stability to the region, its foundations remain fragile and the price uncertain. Israeli planes are still bombing Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanese sanctuaries.

As a foreign policy practitioner, Kissinger had long and wisely sought to keep foreign affairs separated from the quicksands of Watergate—this is presumably why he moved the center of gravity of policy-making from the White House to the untarnished State Department. But at the last, Nixon seems to have succeeded in forcing a political linkage on Kissinger because impeachment politics urgently required that the President be por-

trayed as a world statesman whose removal would threaten global peace. Hence, Nixon's triumphal Middle Eastern tour in the footsteps of Henry Kissinger's trail-blazing diplomacy.

Paying the price for his share of power—perhaps not all that reluctantly, inasmuch as his personality thrives on it—Kissinger embarked during this whole period on brinkmanship.

As some of the facts of Kissinger's obsessively secretive *modus operandi* are becoming known, there are reasons to believe that, instead of triumphs, his wartime Middle East policies could easily have led to unmitigated disaster. They were certainly rich, following his Vietnam negotiating pattern, in acts of misleading, if not deceiving, foe and friend alike. And his most recent diplomatic triumphs—military disengagements on Israel's Egyptian and Syrian fronts, “new diplomacy” toward the Arabs, the apparent diminishing of Soviet influence in the Middle East—may now be perceived as leading to new dangers and deceptions.

A quick reconstruction of recent events, based on fresh material from sources intimately familiar with the situation, suggests these points of peril:

☐ Kissinger, largely misinformed over the battle conditions in the Middle East last October, opposed for a full week a resupply airlift for Israel.

☐ Furious with the British government over its insistence on an ironclad “cover story” for the refueling of American aircraft at British facilities, Kissinger blocked for three days a critical secret reconnaissance mission by high-flying SR-71 planes over the Middle East battlefield. Still angry with

Britain, Kissinger has severely restricted the flow of secret intelligence to the British, despite an existing Anglo-American intelligence agreement.

☐ For two weeks, Kissinger refused to launch serious diplomatic efforts to bring a Middle East cease-fire on the theory, according to insiders, that a long-range political settlement would be facilitated if both the Arabs and the Israelis made each other suffer. When Israel trapped two Egyptian armies and moved into Syria, things nearly got altogether out of hand.

☐ During the night of October 24/25, Kissinger caused the calling of a worldwide alert of United States forces on the excuse that the Russians were preparing to land seven airborne divisions in the Middle East to rescue the trapped Egyptians and that Chairman Brezhnev had sent a threatening note to that effect. Top intelligence experts say there was *no* evidence of such Soviet plans and that the Brezhnev note, described as “brutal,” concerned an effort to organize a United States-U.S.S.R. peacekeeping force.

☐ Kissinger's success in the frantic efforts to obtain the Syrian-front disengagement was linked to a larger effort to improve the U.S. political position in the Arab world. His diplomacy centered on persuading Arab leaders in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere to “make a deal” based on promises of sizable American economic aid (including nuclear technology for Egypt as well as Israel, though the latter already possessed it) and pressures for further Israeli withdrawals from lands occupied in 1967.

The problems created by Kissinger's

> "...A prisoner of his own concepts, he rejected the idea that the Russians would help start a conflict in the Middle East..."

diplomacy are serious. They range from the risk that the Congress, painfully aware of the new Arab oil wealth, may refuse economic aid—notably the nuclear reactors for Egypt—to the possibility that the new Israeli government may refuse to withdraw from Arab territories pending a foolproof peace settlement.

We do not know, of course, what secret commitments, if any, Kissinger may have made in the Middle East. It took nearly eighteen months before we learned of secret commitments made to the North Vietnamese in the course of the long truce negotiations in Paris in the fall of 1972—such as assurances that all U.S. civilian employees attached to South Vietnam's armed forces would be withdrawn within twelve months of the signing of the accord. (It did not happen, partly because the truce has been repeatedly violated.) Nixon's triumphal tour of the Middle East notwithstanding, there are serious reservations in the Congress and elsewhere about the real nature of Kissinger's promises and commitments to the Arabs.

Congress is already disturbed by the administration's 1972 commitments to the Soviet Union for vast development credits and by the political climate that made possible the disastrous grain sale to the Russians. It is carefully weighing the price of détente. When the Middle East headlines have receded, Kissinger and his policies may become highly vulnerable to Washington scrutiny. For one thing, both he and Nixon failed to win assurances of a steady flow of Arab oil.

As the mood changes in the capital, the indispensability of Henry Kissinger is no longer an article of faith. And as Ohio's influential Democratic Congressman Charles A. Vanik remarked recently in the context of proposed export-import bank credit to Moscow, "The question is whether we can afford Henry Kissinger." These elements—Kissinger's identification with Nixon in terms of Watergate politics and the new questions about his secret diplomacy—thus seem to presage the fading of his brilliant star.

It is, of course, impossible to predict when the Kissinger star will burn out. Long months may pass before his extraordinary power and influence wane and he reverts from his present status of Nietzschean superman to the role of ordinary mortal. He still commands wide national support: he was recently declared the most admired public fig-

ure in the United States on the basis of an opinion poll—Americans in the seventies are starved for heroes—and at least one congressman has proposed a constitutional amendment to change Section One of Article II, which bars a naturalized citizen from the Presidency of the United States.

But nothing is permanent in Washington politics, and there are many reasons why Kissinger's exclusive domination of U.S. foreign policy for five and a half years may soon end.

His departure could come suddenly, through an irate act of resignation—something he threatened to do in Salzburg, Austria, two weeks ago in the course of the most stunning histrionic performance of his entire public career—or gradually, through a progressive erosion of his universal image as the diplomatic miracle worker as his successes and methods are increasingly questioned in the light of cold reality. This process has already set in quietly.

For the truth is that Henry Kissinger, the owner of one of America's most monumental egos, can function effectively only as a superman and superstar in his own right. The early days when he was simply President Nixon's éminence grise in foreign affairs are far behind him. He is now the "President for Foreign Affairs."

If there ever were any doubts about how Kissinger regards himself, they were dispelled when he announced at his dramatic Salzburg news conference, en route to the Middle East with Nixon, that "I do not believe it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States under these circumstances when the character and credibility of the secretary of state is at issue. . . . And if it is not cleared up, I will resign."

In defending his honor, as he issued his Salzburg ultimatum, Kissinger was specifically referring to the latest controversy over his part in "national security" wiretaps on his associates and Washington newsmen. But, clearly, he was also addressing himself to the problems of his diplomatic credibility, the object of a much more serious controversy now moving to the fore.

Kissinger has such a thirst for applause and adulation that he can brook no questioning or criticism in any area of his activities. It was the very fact that newsmen (perhaps not in the most elegant ways) have publicly raised questions about the accuracy of his testimony on the wiretaps during his confirmation hearings last September be-

fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that led Kissinger to declare that his "honor" was at stake.

It remains uncertain why Kissinger, always poised in public thought given to frequent temper tantrums in the privacy of his office, chose to put on the bewildering Salzburg performance. Washington is full of theories on the subject—none of them flattering.

One theory is that Nixon prevailed on him to chastise the "leakers" in the House Judiciary Committee, now holding impeachment hearings, along with persuading the media to identify Kissinger, the hero of the hour, with his own cause. Another theory has it that the secretary of state decided on a showdown because he really believed that his honor was impaired and his diplomatic effectiveness damaged. It is known, however, that Kissinger acted against the advice of his closest State Department counselors and friends. (No other embattled secretary of state ever dreamed of asking for a congressional vote of faith in his integrity.)

Finally, there is the theory that Kissinger deliberately used the wiretap. issue to extract from the Congress carte blanche for whatever future policies he may wish to pursue. This, quite obviously, is unthinkable in our system of checks and balances. Though scores of senators (including Teddy Kennedy) signed the "Kissinger-Is-Honest" resolution and such newspapers as *The Washington Post* reported that readers' mail was running 2-to-1 in Kissinger's favor, the town does not care for ultimatums. In the end, the Salzburg exercise may boomerang.

The question of whether Kissinger told the full truth when he testified last year that he had not "initiated" the seventeen controversial wiretaps will presumably be settled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in good time. But in the end, it matters little whether Kissinger came up with the idea or simply submitted names of candidates for wiretapping.

What does matter, however, is the moral implication of going along with the notion that one's closest associates should be subjected to secret eavesdropping. Kissinger's stated excuse was "national security"—the argument invoked by the White House for the establishment of the Watergate Plumbers—on the ground that his hand-picked assistants were leaking secrets to newsmen, or thinking about it.

Even the rationale for the anti-leak measures was absurd. The wiretaps be-

Kissinger negotiating in Geneva: After the brilliant success, new dangers and deceptive

34 NEW YORK

> "...Neither Defense Secretary Laird nor Secretary of State Rogers knew his closest aides were bugged, for Kissinger's benefit..."

gan after *The Times* of London, followed by *The New York Times*, reported in May, 1969, that American B-52's were secretly bombing Cambodia. Was the White House trying to keep this knowledge secret from Cambodian peasants or their government?

But, it now appears, Kissinger was more motivated by his determination to control every aspect of foreign policy planning and execution than by leaks to the press. This, in turn, relates to his obsession with secrecy at all costs—not only in terms of foreign governments, which would be understandable, but also of other members of the U.S. Government, with the possible exception of President Nixon.

Without total secrecy, Kissinger would have been unable to conduct diplomatic affairs according to his own lights and without consulting anyone in the administration. Even before he became secretary of state and while he served as the President's special assistant for national security affairs, Kissinger succeeded in cutting out members of the National Security Council, men of cabinet rank, from the policy planning process. The secretaries of state and defense and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency often had no idea what Kissinger was up to.

An ancillary reason for secrecy—and Kissinger's fear of leaks—was his perceived need to protect himself from Nixon's palace guard (the Ehrlichmans, Haldemans, etc.) who always suspected and detested him. Thus, the whole pervasive White House climate affected Kissinger from the very start. As it turned out, John Ehrlichman became the possessor of wiretap transcripts on the persons recommended by Kissinger for that treatment, and Ehrlichman's own defense at his forthcoming trial may well touch upon material in them.

Kissinger has a rather arrogant view of the process of government. Stated simply, it is that the bureaucracy, no matter on what level, stands in his way and must be curbed before it can raise its ugly head to question his views. If nothing else, Kissinger was one of the initiators of the cult of secrecy in the White House.

It may be argued, up to a point, that Kissinger felt responsible for security in his office and thus agreed to the wiretapping of his principal aides. At his Salzburg news conference, he listed three categories of persons whose names were submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for possible wiretapping: "Individuals who had

adverse information in their security files; individuals who had access to information that had leaked; and individuals whose names had appeared as a result of the investigation that submission of the previous two lists might entail."

But new information obtained on these "national security" wiretaps suggests that Kissinger's interest in surveillance transcended these concerns and went to the heart of his preoccupation with secrecy.

Thus on May 12, 1969, three days after Kissinger allegedly discussed the matter with J. Edgar Hoover, the late F.B.I. director, a wiretap was installed on the home telephone of Lieutenant General (then Colonel) Robert E. Pursley, then the principal military assistant to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. It was maintained for a number of months, then discontinued, and installed again on May 4, 1970. On the latter date, another wiretap was placed on the home telephone of Richard F. Pedersen, then counselor of the State Department and now U.S. ambassador to Hungary.

General Pursley, now retired, and Ambassador Pedersen were, respectively, the closest personal associates of Secretary Laird and Secretary of State William P. Rogers. In this sense, these were indirect taps on Laird and Rogers themselves, who often conferred with their top aides after hours. The presumption is that Kissinger had access to material, in summary or otherwise, obtained from these taps.

Inasmuch as General Pursley and Ambassador Pedersen were not Kissinger's personal security responsibility and were the most unlikely sources of leaks, it is a fair assumption that the White House wanted to keep track of what Secretaries Laird and Rogers might have known about secret foreign planning in the White House. Both were statutory members of the National Security Council and, under normal circumstances, entitled to top secret information. But neither Laird nor Rogers was ever informed that his immediate associates were bugged. For Kissinger's benefit.

Laird, who learned about the wiretap on General Pursley only last January, said that he was continuously in touch with his military assistant on a whole range of issues. The tap may have told the White House a great deal about Pentagon thinking on such controversial issues of the day as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Viet-

nam, and Cambodia. It should be noted that Kissinger often disagreed with the Pentagon over SALT and that both Laird and Rogers opposed the 1970 Cambodia invasion.

After being apprised of the wiretap on General Pursley, Laird made this comment: "There was a wiretap, as I understand it, put on my military assistant back in 1969. That particular wiretap was perhaps on a list that Dr. Kissinger had suggested to the F.B.I. I was not aware of the wiretap on my military assistant at the time, but I can assure you that that disappointed me at the time.... [He] was in very close touch with me night and day."

In Salzburg, Kissinger repeatedly explored news leaks. But, as every diplomatic correspondent knows, Kissinger is the capital's chief leaker. None of his leaks were ever directly attributed to Kissinger, a grand master of news management. During the Vietnam peace negotiations in 1972, for example, Kissinger used leaks and other forms of news management as part of his secret diplomacy. The extraordinary thing is that the most prestigious correspondents and editors allowed themselves to be used by "Henry." Indeed, they were usually grateful for his attention.

Aside from Vietnam, nothing illustrates better Henry Kissinger's devious diplomatic techniques than the Middle East crisis of 1973-1974. As in the case of the Vietnam peace negotiations, Kissinger has provided his own scenario of these events to selected Washington writers—on a background basis—to stand as the official version. It happens that Kissinger's version does not match other credible accounts. These are the facts as reconstructed from responsible sources in Washington and elsewhere:

In part because Israeli intelligence services, famous for their skill, tended to minimize these reports, Kissinger, too, refused to take them seriously. Even as late as the last week of September, Washington had no thought of launching aerial reconnaissance over Egypt and Syria to determine their mili-

36 NEW YORK

Kissinger at the White House: The price of power was a willingness to try brinkmanship.

This was a fatal blindness, an example of how a man in Kissinger's position can become the intellectual prisoner of his own concepts. Having gained Soviet cooperation during the secret Vietnam peace talks, he simply rejected the idea that the Russians would now help to start a conflict in the Middle East. Because Kissinger was lulled into this false sense of security, the United States was unaware that Moscow had provided the Egyptians with lethal anti-tank Sagger missiles and SAM-6 anti-aircraft missiles that were to take a terrible toll of Israeli tanks and planes.

NEW YORK 27

> "... It matters little whether Kissinger initiated or merely went along with the wiretapping. The rationale for it was absurd ..."

While the Israelis kept pressing Kissinger for assistance—and receiving the answer that the Pentagon still opposed an airlift—a parallel drama was developing in the administration, affecting U.S. relations with Britain as well as the course of the Middle East war.

An initial plan to dispatch a U-2 spy plane was quickly discarded on political grounds; memories of C.I.A. overflights of 1960 are still fresh. Instead, the chiefs proposed a mission by an SR-71 Air Force reconnaissance plane, in fact superior in performance to the U-2. They suggested that the SR-71 fly from Achnacarry, a Royal Air Force base on Cyprus, if Britain agreed, or from bases in Britain. Achnacarry had been used by SR-71's in 1970 in policing the Suez Canal truce arranged by the United States.

Because the Air Force had dispatched aerial tankers over the Atlantic from U.S. bases and deployed others, stationed in Europe, over the Mediterranean, the SR-71 could have flown directly from Eglin Air Force Base in Florida to the Middle East without depending on British facilities. It could be refueled in midair. But Kissinger, still fuming over the British, forbade the mission altogether for reasons that remain unclear.

By Thursday, October 11, Kissinger, responding to Ambassador Dinitz's desperate appeals, had authorized El Al Airline Boeing 707's to land in Norfolk, Virginia, to pick up limited amounts of war materiel. El Al, short on planes, was also forced to paint over Israeli insignia; the United States still wanted to appear even-handed in the war. Kissinger also told the Israelis and the Department of Transportation that more materiel would be sent if Israel could charter planes from U.S. airlines. But the Israelis were turned down by every airline; the airlines feared Palestinian terrorist reprisals.

But Kissinger still held out. He told Dinitz that it was the Pentagon that continued to block the resupply operation although, in reality, Schlesinger was already busy staging cargo aircraft and assembling weapons and ammuni-

At 1 A.M. on Saturday, October 13, Nixon instructed Schlesinger to launch an American airlift. Since Portugal had not yet authorized the refueling at Lajes, Schlesinger said the giant C-5 cargo jets and the C-130's could fly nonstop from the United States to Tel Aviv—carrying extra fuel and less cargo.

The U.N. Security Council ordered the cease-fire on October 22, but the fighting continued past October 24 as the Israelis tried to destroy the entrapped Egyptians and the Arabs fought back. Egypt's President Sadat inoperation appealed to Moscow and Washington to dispatch their own forces to enforce the truce. This led to more Kissingerian diplomatic legerdemain.

38 NEW YORK

Kissinger confronts the press: *His indispensability was no longer an article of faith.*

At his news conference later in the day, Kissinger told newsmen that the alert was called because “we became aware of the alerting of certain Soviet units and we were puzzled by behavior of some Soviet representatives in the discussions that took place.” Pressed for a clearer explanation, he said: “Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic effort, one way or the other, we will make the record available and we will be able to go into greater detail.”

But eight months later, no further explanation had been delivered by Kissinger. White House leaks at the time made it appear that U.S. intelligence discovered that seven Soviet airborne divisions were being readied for a drop in the Middle East and that Brezhnev had sent Nixon something along the lines of an ultimatum to stop the Israelis or face a “unilateral action.”

The new mood greeted Henry Kissinger on the day he returned to Washington from his 34-day Middle Eastern tour de force on the Syrian disengagement. He was stunned that instead of being welcomed as a hero, he was subjected at his first news conference to wiretap questions! He was even asked whether he had retained counsel for possible perjury proceedings against him. This was when Kissinger lost his cool and his sense of humor, normally his greatest public assets.

Once blood is smelled, political hound packs go after the potential victim. The June 6 news conference at the State Department suddenly shattered the myth of Kissinger's untouchability. Then came Salzburg. Influenial people began wondering aloud whether the Middle East negotiations were all they were cracked up to be, or whether, as in the Vietnam negotiations, he hadn't been over-committing the United States and engaging in dangerous deviousness. Others started worrying about the forthcoming Moscow summit; Paul Nitze, one of the most respected defense experts, abruptly quit the SALT delegation, fearing that in the present climate Nixon and Kissinger might give away too much.

Books/Eliot Fremont-Smith

# THE 57 VARIETIES OF HEINZ

JULY 1 1974

> "...In regard to Kissinger's triumphs, the Kalbs give a major share of credit to Nixon. This is an important corrective..."

Kissinger, a lengthy career biography by CBS correspondents Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb (Little, Brown, $12.50), is being published on August 23, which means, in the normal course of publishing events, finished books should be in the stores around the end of July. For a variety of good reasons, and a couple of venial ones, it is considered poor practice to review a book before it is publicly available. For one thing, very early reviews tend to undermine a publisher's efforts to orchestrate publicity on a book's (and its author's) commercial behalf. For another, people should be able to check for themselves a reviewer's assertions and opinions—hard to do when there are no books. Nonetheless, certain books—particularly those of intense political interest—are thought newsworthy enough to be discussed in print far in advance of publication. It is regularly done, and no one squawks so long as such commentary is labeled “news” and not “review.” Kissinger clearly fits the current newsiness bill, or should—the hint of reservation because it shows how much books are at the mercy of the onrush of events. A further fair warning should be added: the reporting here is based on a set of uncorrected page proofs. Assuming the authors don't make major changes, which would delay publication, this is close to what the finished book will be, missing only illustrations (about 40 of them), index, thread, glue, covers, jacket, and, from my reading, a few very minor corrections (e.g., the erroneous suggestion, due to careless syntax, that Ron Ziegler “was toppled by Watergate”). Close is close; it's not the real thing.

Even so, Kissinger is already severely dated. The text, completed last winter (acknowledgments are dated April 9), recounts Kissinger's Israeli-Egyptian disengagement negotiations, but not the subsequent Syrian negotiations; it also misses, of course, the Nixon-Kissinger Middle Eastern tour and the brouhaha over Kissinger's threat of resignation. These, particularly the resignation threat, are important omissions because they bear so heavily on what is in the book; they are events that seem unan-

ticipated by the Kalbs, who state in a concluding note that “the days of the spectacular are over.” Hardly the Kalbs’ fault that their crystal ball was cloudy, but hoot-hoot all the same. If Kissinger himself had a hint of the future—he apparently shared considerable time and knowledge with the authors—he kept it to himself.

Otherwise, the book does the expected, and does it, though in pedestrian style, for the most part very well. It traces, very briefly, Henry (born Heinz) Alfred Kissinger's formative years—his emigration with his family from Germany to New York in 1938, the first recognition of his talents (in the Army), his career at Harvard, his involvement with the Council on Foreign Relations and other contact-rich organizations, his advisory roles to several administrations and to Nelson Rockefeller, his first meeting with Nixon (Clare Boothe Luce brought them together). His private “life—marriage, two children, divorce, second marriage—is mentioned only in passing; his reputation as a swinger is down-graded and viewed, probably correctly, as a creation of the media that he rather enjoyed and, more important, found extremely useful—to enhance a charming public image and (a colleague suggested, only partly in jest) as a “cover” for his professional life. The characteristics of his personality—his drive,

egocentricity, tenacity, disarming wit, suspiciousness, intellectual focus, sensitivity to criticism, etc.—are taken at face value and considered exclusively in terms of his political personality, both actual and calculatedly projected. It is noted that Kissinger is very much a “loner,” a quality he shares with Nixon, but with a capacity to convey loyalty to higher authority; the star of his ambition has risen through successive roles as protégé. But this is no psychobiography; the traits are important here only as they have affected his work, his intellectual and political outlook, events in which he played a role.

The focus of the book is on his career with Nixon, as assistant to the President, mover and shaker of the National Security Council (which Kissinger, with Nixon's backing, fashioned into “the only forum for reviewing and making policy”), and secretary of state. The recounting of the major Kissinger spectaculars—the SALT agreements that opened the wedge for détente, the long and painfully frustrating Vietnam disengagement negotiations, the dousing of matches in Jordan and Cuba, the great China expedition, and the Aswan-Jerusalem shuttle negotiations are, of course, fascinating and fairly well detailed. The authors' assessment of Kissinger's statecraft is traditional, and traditionally favorable: very high marks for his realpolitik diplomacy (plus stamina, plus press relations), and for ending Cold War policeman-of-the-world moralism, high marks for most of the negotiating efforts above, rather low marks on such matters as international economics, food, energy, human rights (Greece, Chile), institutionalizing policy (he has far more successfully institutionalized himself), and his stewardship of the State Department.

Yet even in regard to his triumphs, the Kalbs give a major share of credit to Nixon. This is probably an important corrective: far more often than not, the critical initiatives are depicted in this book as the President's, and throughout, it is the President who controls foreign policy and makes the decisions that matter, and Kissinger who advises, agrees, and, most ably,

62

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enacts the decisions. Another corrective has to do with Vietnam: Kissinger went along with the bombing and invasion of Cambodia, the mining of Haiphong Harbor, and the Christmas bombing, in order to get an agreement that would somehow "transcend" (or seem to transcend) a conflict "where victory is meaningless and defeat is unbearable." In the Kalbs' account, the North Vietnamese were virtually impossible to deal with until extreme pressures were repeatedly applied; moreover, it is part of Kissinger's view of diplomacy that even "an occasional show of 'credible irrationality' may be instructive."

Throughout the book there are snippets (not quite enough) of Kissinger's beliefs about power and policy. Power is morally neutral. Opportunities, however, must be constantly seized; otherwise they become irretrievable. (A raised eyebrow may be appropriate here.) Since total security is impossible of achievement, a Metternichian balance should be the constant goal and be made to be seen as the common goal so that concessions appear not as surrenders, but as sacrifices to a common cause. "It was always clear," Kissinger said in reference to Vietnam, "that a lasting peace could come about only if neither side sought to achieve everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties concerned." It is vintage Kissinger, and a constant theme: stability is peace; stability involves partial satisfactions to all and the recognition from all that partial satisfaction is the most that can be achieved. Yes. And it's what children are supposed to learn in kindergarten playgrounds.

Finally, on the wiretaps, Kissinger is depicted as being at least as much concerned with protecting himself with Nixon and against Haldeman (always out to "get" him) as genuinely incensed by the leaks. This was early in the administration; he was the new boy and in many ways politically suspect. The suggestion is that he had no choice but to prove loyalty through zealous and visible cooperation in tracing the leaks. (It follows that his later Senate testimony may well have been incomplete: it is hard to see how he could have gone deeply into these motivations and remained in government.) It's a sympathetic view, particularly since one of the wiretapped newsmen —it's mentioned once, in a footnote— was Marvin Kalb. It does not, however, explain Kissinger's calling world attention to the matter once again. Who knows? Perhaps it will all be clear by the time this book is published.

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SIGNATURE'S Picture Caption Contest No. 59

Brazil's Foreign Minister da Silveira is welcomed by Secretary of State Kissinger in Washington, D.C.

Write
Off

Contest No. 57 Winners

FIRST PRIZE $50

Charles W. Leek, Bethpage, N.Y.

SECOND PRIZE $20

"I demand to see the manager. The guy on my right just ate my ice cream cone."

Don Bramham, Crystal Bay, Nev.

THIRD PRIZE $10

"I want my Maypo!"

Pat Nario, Calumet Park, Ill.

RUNNERS-UP $5

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F. J. Paolantonio, Johnston, R.I.

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CONTEST RULES

1. Caption it; 2. Send it; 3. Collect cash for it.

First prize $50

Second prize $20

Third prize $10

Next 10 prizes $ 5

Winning captions for Contest No. 59 will be published in the September issue of *Signature*. A new contest will appear each month. Send captions by postcard only, and be sure to include contest number with your entry. News photographers are invited to submit photographs for consideration. Prevailing space rates will be paid if used. Contest No. 59 closes July 20, 1974. Send captions to:

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Entries will be judged on originality of content. Duplicate prizes will be awarded for identical winning entries. Editors' decisions are final and no entries will be returned.

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64 Signature July 1974

Punch Line

"Darling," I said to my wife Judy a couple of weeks ago, "what would you say if I told you that we're going to take a vacation without the children?"

"I'd say you're a liar," she replied.

"And usually you'd be right, but Mom just offered to take them so we can roam around for a week and get to know each other again-unless there's someone else you'd rather get to know."

"No, you'll do. But you've always said it's more fun with the kids."

"So it won't be our greatest vacation; at least it'll be all ours, just the two of us dancing away from Sesame Street."

As the great leave-taking approached, Judy and I worked out some rules for our romantic escapade:

* No photographs, recordings or report cards of the children could be taken along.

* There was to be no mention of them for the first two days. On the third day, brief passing references-such as "You have two daughters, don't you?"-would be allowed.

* No one could become pregnant or in any other way involved with kids.

And so one summer evening, we delivered the girls to their grandmother and drove through Long Island to the Old Shore Inn. We were given a tiny room in the back of a hot, stuffy bungalow.

"You know," I said as I sat on a mattress that dipped halfway to the floor, "this could be a romantic little place." Judy just stared in silence at a piece of peeling paint. "Thank God," she finally said, "that the children aren't..." She quickly put her hand over her mouth.

"I'll pretend I didn't hear that," I said.

"I'm sorry, honey. I've forgotten them, I really have. I can't even remember their names."

"What we need is dinner."

"Yes, anything to get out of this room."

"You look so young and lovely," I said as I zipped up the back of her dress. "No one could ever tell that you have two...uh...elbows. Sorry."

"That's okay," she said. "I miss them too, those precious little elbows." "Courage," I prompted.

As we sat in the dining room, I was desperately trying to think of other things to talk about. So far I had only managed to bring up inflation and the plight of the modern whale. After an awkward silence of 15 minutes, I said, "Have I ever told you, darling, that

On the Beach with Parents Anonymous

by Ralph Schoenstein

the dollar shouldn't float."

"I don't think you have," she said.

"And speaking of floating, this is a tough time to be a whale, wouldn't you say?" She smiled helplessly. After another memorable pause, I said, "You look so young and lovely tonight."

"No fair using reruns," she said.

I was feeling the pressure now. How *did* you talk about something besides your children? It was clearly a special gift. Once our appetizers came, things were easier: we chewed our way through lull after lull.

By the time we had finished the meal a romantic mood was upon us, so we decided to stroll on the beach. "Just think," I said, "at this very moment, under these very stars, Debbie is wetting her bed." And then I piteously cried, "Oh honey, I *tried*! You don't *know* how hard I tried!"

"Don't hate yourself," she said. "I was about to suggest that we gather some shells for them."

"Maybe we're still too close to them. Maybe it would be better if we moved to Montauk."

And so the following day, we drove farther east and took a lovely cottage by the sea at Gurney's Inn. The only flaw at Gurney's was that a number of children were about. They made my hands shake like an alcoholic's at a wine festival, but I drew strength from Judy and she from me. Only 18 times did I wonder if we should call the children.

In the afternoon, we met a couple named Harry and Ann on the beach. The four of us gaily discussed favorite American themes-tax evasion, the weather, and smut-until Ann said, "Have you any children?" Our moment of truth had come.

"No," said Judy while I simultaneously said, "I don't recall...oh yes, we *do* have two girls; for a moment it slipped my mind because we're taking a vacation without them."

"Oh, so are we," Ann said.

"How many days have you held out?" I asked her.

"This is our fourth, but we slipped a bit today. Harry patted a little girl's head and this morning we watched part of *Captain Kangaroo*."

Thus began a seaside meeting of Parents Anonymous. On and on we talked, finally deciding that there *should* be such an organization, a place where addicts could taper off with a kind of filial methadone, first looking at pictures of your own children, then gradually at someone else's, and finally at Hummel figurines.

Judy and I lasted 10 more hours at Gurney's Inn. The following morning, we summoned our missing parts. When my mother arrived with the little angels, she said, "They've both been wonderful. They didn't mention you once."

Signature July 1974 63