October 2, 1961

To: Henry A. Kissinger
From: Roswell B. Perkins
Subject: Senator Dodd

I seem to be on Senator Dodd's mailing list, and find his materials most thought-provoking, although somewhat extreme in many cases. Do you get this same stuff?

Is it worthwhile for me to ship the materials over to June Goldthwait after I am through with them?

over to June Goldthwaite after I am through with them?

Is it worthwhile for me to ship the materials
at once?

somewhat extreme in many cases. Do you get this same
and find the materials most thought-provoking, although
I seem to be on Senator Dodd's mailing list.

Subject: Senator Dodd
From: Roswell B. Perkins
To: Henry A. Klaasen

October 5, 1961

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

June 11, 1962

Mr. Roswell B. Perkins
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Mr. Perkins:

In going through our files during Mr. Kissinger's absence, I have found the enclosed memorandum to you from June Goldthwait, and am taking the liberty of returning it to you.

14 December 1961

TO: Mr. Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: June Goldthwait

SUBJECT: Handouts from Washington

As I said to you over the phone the other day I do not think that in foreign affairs or defense the handouts are of sufficient value to justify sorting and indexing them for the files. I have done it myself over a period of months and I do not think the game is worth the candle.

On individual departments -

State.

The Department of State Bulletin, which we receive, prints all major press releases of the Department, in fact virtually all of them. In addition the Bulletin prints a complete list of all press releases they put out with those not printed marked with an asterisk. It would be very easy to write them and receive anything not printed which we wanted, but I have never yet seen anything not printed that we *would* want.

Defense

DoD officials make six times as many speeches as those from State. I can well believe it. As for the other materials, it is almost always far too detailed for the kind of study I am doing. Major policy changes are very fully covered in the newspapers, and I would rather spend the time writing for the occasional one we miss than going through the whole pile every day.

Export-Import Bank

There might be some question on these, since Ann says she has used them on foreign aid information for Latin America. However, with isolated little bits of information like this, we never can be sure it is complete. On the whole, I think we could dispense with them without any great loss, getting information we need elsewhere.

World Bank

Same as Export-Import Bank

Pressure groups on trade

These groups are quite vocal and generally get pretty good press

- 2 -

coverage. I doubt if we get any more from the handouts than the material already in the fixx files.

Note: Under a totally separate arrangement we have been getting the material of the Disarmament Agency for several months. It comes by regular mail at no cost at all to us.

x x x

In view of the above comments I do not think it worth while to continue receiving and marking the foreign affairs and defense handouts. If we had another marker I think it would still be an operation of marginal value. Since we do not have another marker I do not see that it makes any sense to continue trying to do it.

The total foreign affairs research work at the moment is overextended for the number of people we have and what we are trying to do. I am considering cutting back on some of the topics on which we are trying to keep the Governor informed. This adds to my feeling that marking and filing the handouts is an operation we could well dispense with. The situation is probably quite different with regard to domestic affairs, and on this I make no attempt to offer any judgment.

December 7, 1961

TO: The Governor

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Idea of a "Freedom Ship"

Murray Snyder (ex-White House and Defense Department press aide) has presented to me the following idea to pass on to you:

Would you be willing to direct a study and make recommendations for the People-to-People Committee (of which ex-President Eisenhower is now Chairman of the Board) as to the desirability of sending a "Freedom Ship" (analogous to the "Freedom Train") to visit as many ports around the world as possible?

## 1. Background

Various proposals (as you will remember from Washington days) have been made for a traveling ship to dramatize the concepts of our free society. One idea -- to fit out a ship as a modern school -- was dropped. The health-oriented ship "Hope", financed by private funds, is an analogous idea.

Murray Snyder feels strongly that a ship fitted out like the "Freedom Train" which travelled across the U.S.A. would be an effective medium for reaching other peoples.

Murray has mentioned the idea to Eisenhower, who merely referred him to the headquarters staff of People-to-People.

## 2. Suggested Contents of Ship

Murray's idea is that the ship would contain exhibits dramatizing the history of free man; the freedom of religion, speech and the press; education of free people; free enterprise and economic progress in the free world, etc. He visualizes the exhibits being put into the language of the areas visited.

## 3. Your Relationship to the Idea

Murray has apparently not mentioned to anyone else his idea as to your participation, nor does he have the slightest authority to speak on behalf of the People-to-People Committee. He says he is thinking of you principally for the reason that (in addition

- 2 -

to the value of having your ideas) identification with the plan
would focus public attention again on your wide experience in the
foreign field, and would be in keeping with the areas of concern
you had as Special Assistant to the President in 1955.

Murray hates to hand the idea to the Kennedy Administra-
tion, and hopes that you would find it attractive. He believes
that your having studied the matter for the People-to-People
Committee, if asked to do so, and having presented a plan, would
clearly identify you with the original concept.

Murray does not think you should be financial supporter
in any way. Financial support would have to come from the
Government and national organizations.

4. Recommendation:

That we get the comments of Henry Kissinger, Berent Friele,
Emmet Hughes and Hugh Morrow on this (I am sending them copies of
this memo), and also any one else you suggest.

The idea at first seemed juvenile and silly to me, but I
became somewhat more interested as Murray talked, and particularly
when I saw that you could have a very limited role but could still
obtain identification with the concept. (In a sense, supporting
a dramatization of the concept of freedom around the world might
be like wanting to keep the Dodgers in Brooklyn -- and the latter
did you no harm!)

R.B.P.

cc: Louise A. Boyer

Henry Kissinger

Berent Friele

Emmet Hughes

Hugh Morrow

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

December 8, 1961

FROM: Hugh Morrow

SUBJECT: Rod Perkins' Memo on "Freedom Ship" Idea

I think this is worth serious consideration. As you have noted in speeches, we remain on the defensive in the cold war, we are not out selling and organizing for freedom. Adequately conceived and properly presented, the "Freedom Ship" could be an instrument of affirmative propaganda for democracy, freedom and, at least inferentially, socially-enlightened capitalism.

Numerous hazards come to mind, however:

1. The need for adequate conception: Just whom would we be trying to reach? Would Nkrumah or Nasser, for example, let the ship come to their countries? Would "the folks" be allowed to come aboard -- or just the local elite? How would we deal with local Communists who might picket, sabotage or attempt to wreck the exhibits in the ship? This would be overt propaganda -- and we might as well face at the beginning the prospect that the freedom ship would sail rough seas in many quarters.

2. The "silly and juvenile" hazard: Rod's initial reaction to this effect also struck me at the outset; I can just hear the speech Charlie Halleck would make on the appropriation for this ship if this whole notion were not thoroughly checked out in advance with the likes of him.

In short, the objective is unassailable, and the idea is imaginative and deserves further thought -- but I don't think Word One about this idea should come from us unless and until we were sure we had something that could be clearly presented as reasonable, feasible and a positive blow for the cause of the free West. It would, I think, have to be sold domestically in

December 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM

TO: Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller

FROM: Barent Friele

SUBJECT: Rod Perkins' memo on Freedom Ship Idea

The idea is appealing, but a ship is slow moving and confined to seaports. Why not consider one or several "Freedom Jets" to carry our message abroad with speed and the possibility of reaching many more people, especially in new-born nations some of which are land-locked. It is true that a jet airliner does not have the space of an ocean-going vessel, but there are other advantages which this modern means of transportation can offer.

Airports are scattered all over the world and are attractions to local populations everywhere. It should not be difficult to arrange for exhibition space at or near the airports, which would also permit people to inspect a modern aircraft of which the United States is the world's leading manufacturer. The Air Force should be willing to convert and staff three jets of the size of a Boeing 707 for the purpose under consideration. The airlines and manufacturers would most certainly wish to cooperate.

If the idea of "Freedom Jets" should be of interest, a thorough study of costs and technical details will have to be made. I doubt whether the cost of converting and operating three jets would be more than that for a good sized ship.

cc Mrs. Boyer
Mr. Hughes
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Morrow
Mr. Perkins

Mr. Burtin
Mr. Horro
Mr. Krieger
Mr. Hughe
Mr. Huxley
Mr. Huxley
Mr. Huxley

three jets would be more than enough for a good start off.

make. I doubt whether the cost of converting and operating

separately such a large and complicated aircraft will have to be

If the idea of 'freedom' were to be accepted, a

struggle and manufacturers would most certainly step to coöperate.

The size of a Boeing 707 for the business under consideration. The
Air Force should be willing to convert and start three jets of
using the United States Air Force's existing manufacturers. The
which would also benefit because to inspect a modern aircraft of
difficult to arrange for explicit space at an early stage the aircraft,
attractiveness to local businesses everywhere. It should not be
VitAlberta are scattered all over the world and are
advantageous to the modern means of transportation can offer.
not have the space of an ocean-bound vessel, but there are other
of which are found-forgotten. It is true that a jet strainer does
of reaching many more bodies, effectively in non-polar areas some
Time, to carry our message abroad with speed and the best efficiency
contributed to science. Why not contact one or several "freedom
Time" the idea to abating, put a ship to sea and start an

advantage of this modern means of transportation can offer.
not have the space of an ocean-bound vessel, but there are other
of which are found-forgotten. It is true that a jet strainer does
of reaching many more bodies, effectively in non-polar areas some
Time, to carry our message abroad with speed and the best efficiency
contributed to science. Why not contact one or several "freedom
Time" the idea to abating, put a ship to sea and start an

SUBJECT: Rod Kirtley's name on Freedom 25th idea

FROM: Benoit Lefebvre

TO: Governor Nelson V. Rockefeller

MIGRATION

December 12, 1981

PERSONAL

December 20, 1961

Dear Rod:

Quite frankly, I do not think much of the Freedom Ship idea. At this stage, with the Indians behaving as they are in Goa, and the uncommitted making a sport of anti-Westernism, it really seems to me that a certain amount of aloofness might be more appropriate.

Moreover, I cannot quite visualize what is going to be on such a ship. Perhaps I would change my mind if I could have a few more specifics. My basic feeling is that what we do not need now is publicity gimmicks. I think even less of freedom airplanes.

If you circulate this, I hope you will tone down my language.

Kind regards.

Draft--February 25, 1962

RESEARCH UNIT

# I. OBJECTIVES

## A. Information

(1) Keep NAR informed on national and foreign issues.

(2) Maintain adequate materials to be able to respond quickly to requests for information on national and foreign issues, and to be able to check draft NAR statements.

(3) Collect and present information useful for out-of-state trips.

## B. Positions and program

(1) Recommend positions to NAR on national and foreign issues.

(2) Coordinate positions with Republican leaders in Congress (particularly N.Y. Senators and Congressmen).

(3) Coordinate positions with Albany offices on matters affecting New York State.

(4) Maintain liaison with consultants who are experts in various fields.

(5) Conduct special sessions with consultants to develop affirmative programs in key areas.

(6) Prepare draft speech material.

## C. Washington liaison

(1) Supplement NAR's and GLH's direct contacts by keeping liaison with key Senatorial and Congressional offices on substantive issues. (See B-2 above.)

(See B-5 spade.)

Congressional offices on <u>supersubstantive</u> names.

(1) Supplement WAR's and OHR's direct contacts
by keeping <u>liaison</u> with key Senatorial and

C. Washington <u>liaison</u>

(c) Prepare draft speech material.

(2) Conduct special sessions with consultants
experts in various fields.

(4) Maintain <u>liaison</u> with consultants who are
matters affecting New York State.

(3) Coordinate <u>positions</u> with Albany offices on
Congressmen).

(5) Coordinate <u>positions</u> with Republican leaders
in Congress (partially N.Y. Senators and

(1) Recommend <u>positions</u> to WAR on national and
<u>foreign</u> names.

B. <u>Positions and program</u>

out-of-state trips.

(3) Collect and present information necessary for

to check draft WAR statements.

(5) Maintain adequate materials to be able to
readily quickly to requests for information

(1) Keep WAR informed on national and foreign

V. <u>Information</u>

I. <u>OBJECTIVES</u>

RESEARCH UNIT

Draft--February 52, 1965

(2) A "Current Position" notebook for NAR, giving
NAR input field.
(3) a short summary of recommended position in each area -- to be used for spot reference and
period of 6 months to a year in each major
periodic outline summarizing events over a
(1) for TA shows, press conferences, etc.
to avoid necessity of specifically prepared papers

B. Reporting methods

(c) Current books and non-Governmental studies

(2) Dounz Mitchell reports

Committee reports, copies of bills.

(4) Congressional Record, Congressional Quarterly.

Executive Departments and Agencies

(3) official documents and releases from

(5) Key magazines

(1) 2 major newspapers

V. Receipt of information:

II. METHOD OF OPERATION

develop reasons to same.

(2) During 1965 State campaign, kept alert to
attacks on NAR from national figures and

ssignments, e.g., straffon record.

(1) Underscore responsibility for special research

D. Special assignments

on House and Senate side

(c) Republican Campaign Committee offices

on House and Senate side

(p) Republican Policy Committee offices

(s) Republican National Committee

with:

(5) Maintain close liaison on <u>unilateral</u> issues

5

In trying to find: Good speech material (if it is true).
* This is a good example of something we should be constant-

improvement free only with the foreign age.
**onlines** -- and there is no objection here that the needed
**NOTE:** I could say the same thing about most of my own
work of them for the foreign language.

(q) It is passed largely on comments of others.

(c) It is good reporter and good analytical.

having his own team find none of

(iv) Csn MAB strike out at Kennedy for
he was in?

(iii) What? it said, defense area is
he was in?

(ii) Good job?
Kennedy has or has not done a

(i) his own brooms??
Kennedy did or did not fulfill

conclusion on these questions:

For example, is the reader supposed to have said
indication of recommended action or attitude.

(p) The reader comes across with

because of long barGraphs.
and in lines (from b. 1 on) is hard to resd

(s) It is much too long for a summary.

My comments:

critical review.
My sole purpose is to provoke your most
the foreign age.
Comment on the aspects of something on
the foreign side.
This is my first
na. I want to give you my reactions to the attached as a
At the risk of creating a misunderstanding between

Subject: Attached Summary: Defense Policy and Budget

From: RFB

To: HAV

Confidential

March 1, 1965

Report No. 1

Feb. 7, 1962

June L. Goldthwait

DEFENSE
<u>Policy and Budget</u>

January - December 31, 1961

Summary

I. JFK actions and policy statements

Since taking office JFK's principal actions on national defense have included an increase in defense programs involving both strategic nuclear forces and conventional forces. The increase in defense programs has resulted in $6.4 billion rise in the defense budget (new obligatory authority for FY'62) over the Eisenhower estimate for the same year and has been largely due to Presidential requests. At least half of the additional requests were made in July following the Khrushchev demands on Berlin. Although the Berlin crisis undoubtedly made the President's task simpler in getting Congressional action to sanction his requests, it has been commented that the President used the Berlin crisis to make defense changes which he intended to make anyway.

A. JFK Messages to Congress

There have been four messages during the year in which
the President has announced an increase in defense programs;
in three of these he has asked for budget increases:

1. State of the Union Message, Jan. 30, 1961

The message ordered, as immediate measures:

- an increase in airlift capacity; 129 new longer-range airlift aircraft to be procured in FY'62, instead of 50;

- a step-up of the Polaris program from 5 submarine starts in FY'61 to 10 and acceleration of delivery of all;

- acceleration of the entire missile program, by improved organization and decision-making.

- 2 -

## 2. Defense budget message, Mar. 28, 1961

a. The President requested an overall increase of about $2 billion.

- Increases of $2.7 billion were offset by reductions of $750 million.

(1) $1.9 billion of the increase was for strategic forces, principally Polaris (10 more submarines, and an increase in delivery rate of all under construction from 5 to 12 a year) and Minute-man (doubling of production capacity).

(2) $847 million of the increase was for limited war capability, including guerilla warfare training, development of non-nuclear weapons, increased airlift and sealift development of non-nuclear capacities of fighter aircraft, and increased personnel training and readiness.

(3) Savings of $750 million were to be accomplished by the phasing out of unneeded facilities or projects, principally elimination of the last 2 Titan squadrons originally contemplated, acceleration of the phase-out of B-47 bombers (this measure was cancelled in July), decision not to develop the B-70 as a full weapons system at this time, cancellation of the nuclear-powered plane as a defense budget item, and closing of 73 bases and installations in the U.S. and overseas.

b. Two omissions in the message were notable.

- There was no provision to change the Eisenhower decision not to continue production of B-52 and B-58 bombers beyond 1962.

- There was no decision to begin production and deployment of the Nike-Zeus anti-missile defense concurrently with its development, test and evaluation.

## 3. Message on Urgent National Needs, May 25, 1961

The President requested an additional $160 million for conventional forces to increase their flexibility and capacity to deter non-nuclear aggression.

- 3 -

- The orientation of existing forces was to be expanded rapidly and substantially for non-nuclear and unconventional war, with budget increases of $100 million to begin procurement necessary to re-equip the Army with the most modern materials and $60 million to increase Marine Corps strength.

## 4. Berlin message, July 25, 1961

The President requested almost $3.5 billion more.

- Of this sum $1.8 billion was for procurement of non-nuclear weapons, ammunition and equipment, and $207 million was for civil defense (transferred to the DoD budget).

Congress was also asked to authorize increases in the active duty strengths of all three services, as well as to authorize the President to call to active duty certain ready reserve units and up to 250,000 individual reservists.

## B. Other Administration actions

1. **15-minute ground alert of SAC B-47 and B-52 bombers.** The President announced as an objective in March an increase in the proportion of B-52 and B-47 forces on 15-minute ground alert to about **half the total force**. In the fall officials said they were continuing with the effort to establish a **one-third ground alert**, and the President announced that there had been a 50% increase in the number of bombers on ground alert, but did not say how far this went toward achieving the objective of such an alert for 50% of total SAC forces.

2. **Credibility of the nuclear deterrent.** The build-up in conventional forces and the attempt by the Administration to establish a basis for negotiation of the Berlin crisis have lead to growing criticism of the credibility of our strategic nuclear deterrent. These criticisms have been met by a series of carefully worded Administration statements announcing our determination to use nuclear weapons "if necessary" and culminating in a speech by Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric in October in which he said: "...we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as what the Soviets can deliver by striking first...our country has both the will and the weapons to join free men in standing up to their responsibilities."

- 4 -

(Note: Marshal Malinovsky, Soviet Defense Minister, stated in an interview in January, 1962, that the Soviet Union was stronger than the U.S., and that it could wipe off the face of the earth all industrial and administrative centers of the U.S. with a single nuclear-rocket attack. (NYT, 1/25/62)).

### 3. The military build-up

Since the Berlin crisis the President has called to active duty approximately 156,000 reservists. Tours of duty have also been extended, draft calls have been stepped up, ships and planes scheduled for retirement have been retained and others have been brought out of retirement.

One of the goals of the build-up has been to convert the 3 Strategic Army Corps training divisions in the U.S. to combat readiness, thus retaining in the U.S. a "central reserve" of 6 combat-ready divisions. Army units in Western Europe have been brought to full strength and approximately 50,000 troops have been sent to Europe, but major reinforcements in this area have not been ordered because of the President's desire to avoid the appearance of provocation.

Complaints of disgruntled reservists called up have caused the Administration one of its most serious political problems, since they have been taken up by free-wheeling Congressmen and in wide newspaper coverage.

More important has been a change in Pentagon thinking; it no longer considers it feasible to mobilize and demobilize reserves to deal with cold war crises. As a result it was decided at the end of 1961 to increase the regular Army from 14 to 16 divisions.

### C. Major changes in JFK defense policy and planning

1. Most significant has been the Administration objective of moving away from the doctrine of "massive retaliation" towards balanced forces able to deal with all levels of aggression.

2. There has been an increased emphasis on invulnerability: concentration on development of weapons of minimum vulnerability such as Polaris and hardened Minuteman; and stop-gap measures (e.g. increased 15-minute ground alert

atop-sab remeakes (6.5-kilometers) 12-minute ground effort

materiaility such as the 100-kilometer and 150-kilometer range

2. There has been an increased emphasis on invulnerability.

towards balanced forces, rules to deal with all levels of

moving away from the doctrine of "measurably retaliation."

C. Major changes in UK defense policy and plans

said it was decided at the end of 1961 to increase
modifications to deal with cold war armies. As a re-
last it no longer considered feasible to mobilize and de-


More important has been a change in Pentagon thinking:

trical problems, since they have been taken up by free-
caused the Administration one of its most serious holf-

of provocation.

because of the President's desire to avoid the appearance
major reinforcements in those areas have not been organized
approximately 20,000 troops have been sent to Europe, put
Western Europe have been brought to full strength and
reserve" of 6 combat-ready divisions. Army units in
to combat effectiveness, thus retaining in the U.S. a "central

One of the goals of the build-up has been to convert
retirement.

...and others have been brought out of
stepped-up, allpie and planes scheduled for retirement
duty have also been extended. Draft calls have been
active duty approximately 150,000 reservists. Tons of

Since the early 1950's, the Army has created the President has called to

3. The military budget.

attack. (NYT, 1/28/63)

The military budget of the U.S. with a single nuclear-rocket
off the 1963 date of the earth, all industrial and administrative
Union was estimated to be $1.8 billion, and that it could wipe
stated in September in 1963, that the Soviet
(Note: Murrell: "Mussolini's Soviet Defense Minister,"

[d]

- 5 -

for SAC bombers) to achieve greater invulnerability until
the long-range programs take effect.

3. JFK has spelled out more clearly than official utterances before a <u>second-strike</u> strategy, with a very specific ruling out of not only preventive but also pre-emptive war.

4. There has been a substantial build-up of _limited war capacity_, and of anti-guerilla and unconventional warfare units.

5. <u>Marginal programs</u> have been cut, even in the face of heavy Congressional or national criticism. Such criticism has been particularly heavy with regard to the decisions on B-52 and B-58 bombers, the B-70, Nike-Zeus, and the closing of defense bases (see below).

## II. <u>Congressional action</u>

Total defense appropriations enacted for FY'62 to date come to $47.6 billion. (These figures include appropriations for DoD military functions, DoD civil defense, and military construction funds. They do not include military assistance.)

The amount appropriated was:

- approximately $6.4 billion more than FY'61 appropriations;

- approximately $6.4 billion more than the Eisenhower estimate for FY'62;

- approximately $210 million (net) more than the Kennedy Administration requested.

It was also the largest sum voted for defense since the Korean War year of 1951.

Major changes in the President's requests consisted of:

- addition of $695 million for _long-range bombers_ (B-52, B-58 and B-70) (the Pentagon announced it would not spend the funds);

- authorization to proceed with construction of _Polaris_ submarines on a partially funded basis, making possible a force eventually larger than the 29 planned);

- addition of $85.8 million to funds for _Dyna-Soar_ (the Pentagon announced it would not spend the funds);

- addition of $82.8 million to funds for Doms-800 and Peking

eventually larger than the 30 planned);

- authorization to proceed with construction of polaris arms and B-70) (the Peking announced it would not spend the funds);

- addition of $693 million for long-range Bombers (B-23, B-28 and B-70) (the Peking announced it would not spend the funds);

Major changes in the President's requests concretized of:

War year of 1951.

ministration requested;

- approximately $210 million (net) more than the Kennedy Ad-

for FY'52;

- approximately $6.4 billion more than the Greenover estimate

- approximately $2.4 billion more than FY'51 appropriations;

The amount appropriated was:

Many functions, DOD staff defense, and military construction funds, $43.6 billion. (These figures include appropriations for DOD military defense, DOD staff defense, and military construction funds.)

Total defense appropriations enacted for FY'52 to date come to

## II. Congressional action

B-23 and B-28 Bombers, the B-70, Mike-Sue, and the clog- been particularly heavy with regard to the decisions on Congressional or individual criteria. Such criteria has been particularly heavy with regard to the decisions on

2. Marginal programs have been cut, even in the face of heavy

4. There has been a substantial build-up of limited war forces

ing out of not only preventive but also pre-emptive war. Before a second strike strategy, with a very specific rule, UK has specified out of nearly all the official utterances

the long-range program takes effect.

for BAC Bombers) to achieve greater insuranceability until

- 2 -

[c]

- 6 -

- addition of $59 million for Air Force and Army Reserves and National Guard;

- a 2% across-the-board cut in procurement funds, designed to encourage Pentagon cost-consciousness;

- a cut of $96 million in military construction appropriations.

- 7 -

[L]

### III. Political Comment

There has been far less controversy over the President's defense program than over many other issues. Early in the year there was some Republican comment to the effect that the Kennedy proposals differed little from those of Eisenhower. After the President's Berlin message in July there was almost unanimous bipartisan support for the increases in the defense budget, arising as much out of a wish to demonstrate American unity to the Soviets as out of approval for the measures proposed. As time wore on, however, the President's determination to use nuclear weapons if necessary was questioned by some Republicans, including Sen. Smith (Me.) and former Vice President Nixon. The controversy appeared to arise because of differing opinions as to what our nuclear policy should be, particularly with respect to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in defending Berlin; although the controversy in the Senate ended in agreement, the agreement seemed only to paper over the differences.

The severest attacks on the Administration came over the question of continued production of B-52 and B-58 bombers and the B-70. The Administration's position on B-52's and B-58's was attacked in committee in both houses, and when the Senate voted on the extra funds for bombers only four Senators (2 Republicans, Bush and Morton; 2 Democrats, Proxmire and Ellender) supported the Administration. The B-70 decision drew fire from Republican Sen. Goldwater, and Democratic Sens. Stennis, Russell and Humphrey.

Another controversial issue was the Administration decision not to launch production of Nike-Zeus. Opposition was led by Sen. Strom Thurmond and included both Republicans and Democrats.

The closing of defense bases brought objections from Senators and Congressmen in districts affected.

Some of the strongest attacks on the Administration came from free-wheeling Congressmen who chose to make a major issue of Administration mistakes and ineptitudes in the mobilization of reservists. Republican Reps. O'Konski and Laird (both of Wisc.) led the fray and were joined by Democratic Reps. Kowalski (Conn.), Huddleston (Ala.), Reuss (Wisc.), and, to a lesser extent, Proxmire (Wisc.). Republican Sen. Keating reported he was "disturbed," but a committee of Wisconsin Representatives, both Republicans and Democrats, who visited Fort Lewis, one of the principal points of controversy, expressed general approval of the whole operation.

- 8 -

[c]

## IV. <u>National Comment</u>

### A. <u>Defense strategy</u>

Most news comment on the overall defense program has been favorable, although a few conservatives considered early in the year that the Kennedy program was largely an extension of Eisenhower policies. Later, the President's movement toward the concept of balanced forces was generally well received, even among more liberal papers, such as the *Nation*, which are usually opposed to the large-scale defense spending entailed by such a concept. What opposition was expressed came more from the right, from persons who questioned the magnitude of defense spending; even these, however, tended to suggest that economies be made in non-defense rather than defense spending.

The Administration encountered some rather more serious questioning concerning the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and also concerning the use of nuclear weapons, especially tactical weapons, in the defense of Berlin.

Conservative opinion was jubilant at what appeared to be the closing of the *missile gap* controversy by the Kennedy administration and used the occasion to point up the responsibility of public officials not to play politics with defense.

### B. <u>Defense programs</u>

National comment echoed the Congressional controversy over extra funds for *long-range bombers*, with comment about evenly divided on either side of the issue. The Administration's decision on the B-70 met considerable criticism, as did its decision on the *Nike-Zeus*.

The grumblings of discontented reservists received heavy news coverage, and editorial opinion was divided as to whether or not the complaints were well-justified. Some suggestions were made for a revamping of the whole system under which reservists were expected to be available to meet Cold War demands, and the Pentagon apparently did some rethinking on this matter (see above).

- 9 -

C. <u>Defense budget</u>

The increases in the defense budget elicited considerable comment. Conservative opinion, however, tended not to criticize the defense increases, but to demand that they be offset by cuts in non-defense spending or financed by taxation. (Decreases in non-defense spending would naturally mean a decrease in programs opposed by conservatives for other reasons as well). More liberal opinion has expected that economic growth would take care of increased defense spending and has emphasized that the productivity of our economy and the extent of our unused resources would avert any danger from increased defense spending. (Note: the Kennedy budget for FY '63 is balanced, though precariously).

D. Military aspects of nuclear testing

Initial reaction to the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing was almost universally that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve its political objectives by a strategy of terror, but as Soviet testing continued it became increasingly evident that Soviet tests were motivated by military rather than psychological reasons. U.S. comment then shifted to a discussion of what the Soviets might have achieved by their tests and what U.S. countermeasures, if any, were required.

1. The Soviet test series. The areas in which the Soviets may have made progress through their test series have been said to be:

- improvement of the yield-to-weight ratio of weapons;

- development of an anti-missile missile;

- development of more explosive or more diversified warheads for missiles;

- explosions with a relatively small fission yield, which could raise the long-range threat of a Soviet neutron bomb;

- development of anti-aircraft missiles, of smaller tactical weapons for battle field use, and of an atomic depth charge;

[d]

L

- 10 -

- a study of the ability of multi-megaton bombs
temporarily to knock out electronic communications
over a wide area; and

- testing of entire weapons systems.

2. U.S. atmospheric testing. In sanctioning underground testing in early September the President had attempted to ensure weapons development while allaying concern over fallout. With the quantity and quality of Soviet testing, however, influential military and scientific leaders, backed by important political figures, have argued that underground tests are too costly and time-consuming, that a number of large-yield weapons can be tested only in the atmosphere or in space, and that a number of missile systems must be tested under actual field conditions. There has also been considerable controversy over the development of a neutron bomb.

Editorial comment on U.S. atmospheric testing has
with some notable exceptions, favored it to the extent
demanded by U.S. security and has cited the following
possible reasons for U.S. atmospheric testing:

- development of anti-missile defenses;

- development of the neutron bomb;

- assessment of the effects of high-altitude explosions,
such as the jamming of international communications or
warning systems;

- development of larger-yield warheads for our ICBM's;

- improvement of the yield-to-weight ratio of our nuclear weapons;

- proving or development of new tactical nuclear weapons;
and

- development of more clean and discriminate weapons.

- 11 -

There are two <u>basic arguments on the military value of atmospheric testing</u> used by its advocates and opponents:

- The <u>advocates</u> argue that the nuclear balance is not a stable, inflexible equation but one that can be upset or changed by planned or unexpected technological advances.

- The <u>opponents</u> argue that the nuclear deterrent power is too widely based and too destructive on both sides to be undermined by any weapons advance in the foreseeable future. Their conclusion is that the U.S. has time to make a further attempt to reach a test ban agreement before there is any pressing need to resume atmospheric tests and thus poison not only the atmosphere but chances for a test cessation.

Advocates include: Dr. Edward Teller, Arthur Krock, Marguerite Higgins, Time, Fortune.

Opponents include: Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. Linus Pauling, James J. Wadsowrth, (former U.S. representative to the U.N.), Walter Lippmann, the New Republic, the Nation.

Some commentators have expressed the view that public opinion is not well enough informed and does not have access to the information on which the decision must be made.

## E. <u>The military and politics</u>

There has been much heated controversy over the right of military leaders to give voice to political opinions. The battle has centered around two issues: the censoring of speeches of generals and admirals by civilian officials in the Pentagon and the State Department, and the case of General Walker, who was relieved of his command in Europe following charges that he was indoctrinating his troops with views similar to those of the John Birch Society. Gen. Walker's case raises a broader issue, the danger that military indoctrination programs for the troops have been getting into politics.

- 12 -

Comment on the issue has tended to vary according to
how closely the commentator agreed or differed with the
point of view of the military leaders "muzzled." Extreme
conservatives have fully backed General Walker and military
indoctrination programs in general, while extreme liberals
have even gone so far as to point out the danger of a
"Cromwell-like military establishment ... fully capable ...
of turning, in time of crisis, upon its civilian
authority..."

Those in the center have tended to emphasize that the
problem was not absolute but one of proportion, and that
military leaders had a right to their opinions but an
obligation to confine their public utterances within the
bounds of established national policy and most particularly
to avoid partisan politics.

There has also been some comment on the power of the
"military industrial complex," and on the extent of
influence brought to bear by the services, the contractors
and Congress on the immense proportion of the national
budget which is spent for defense. Before leaving office
President Eisenhower cautioned against undue influence of
the host of special interests which he saw ranged against
his view of the need for "security with solvency." However,
it has been commented that Eisenhower, in voicing these
views, may have been overly preoccupied with the budget.
Marquis Childs points to the dilemma of the puzzled citizen
confronted with conflicting statements as to defense needs
and concludes "if war, in the classic phrase, is too
important to entrust to the generals, defense is too vast
to leave to the storms of politics." (WP, 11/1/61).

DEBEVOISE, PLIMPTON & MCLEAN

320 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 22

CABLE ADDRESS:

DEBSTEVE

TELEPHONE: PLAZA 2-6400

ELI WHITNEY DEBEVOISE
EDWARD C. MCLEAN
MARVIN LYONS
SAMUEL E. GATES
SIDNEY G. EDWARDS
OSCAR M. RUEBHAUSEN
A. FAIRFIELD DANA
THOMAS T. RICHMOND
WILLIAM EVERDELL III
CHARLES I. PIERCE, JR.
EARLE J. STARKEY
D. BRET CARLSON
GEORGE N. LINDSAY, JR.
STANLEY R. RESOR
JAMES B. WELLES, JR.
ROSWELL B. PERKINS
ROBERT B. VON MEHREN
HAROLD H. HEALY, JR.
JOSEPH BARBASH
CHESTER BILLINGS, JR.
MICHAEL H. GOFF
WILLIAM B. MATTESON

CHARLES ANGULO
SPECIAL COUNSEL

March 6, 1962

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Enclosed herewith are the following:

(1) draft memo to staff of Research Unit from us, attaching a copy of the Restatement of Objectives and Methods of the Research Unit; and

(2) draft job description for Jay Iselin.\*

Jay is coming to New York to meet Nelson this Friday, March 9, at 5:00 P.M. I propose also to have him look over the Research Unit and to meet the staff. I would simply have to tell them he is considering joining us. While this will create uncertainty, I do not think it is fair to Jay not to let him look the situation over. Do you agree?

If there is any chance you can be here Friday, it would be wonderful.

Please give me your comments on the enclosures as soon as possible (preferably by phone).

Again, I should emphasize that your full and unreserved support for the new arrangement with Jay will be essential to its success, so please do not hesitate to raise any questions you have. And many thanks for making time to see him last Friday.

Enclosures

Draft--March 6, 1962

To: Research Unit Staff

From: Mr. Perkins and Dr. Kissinger

Subject: Organization of Research Unit

We wish to commend each of you for the quality of work being produced. We are both pleased with the performance in our respective areas of concern. With the objective of building on our present assets, we have concluded that, as a campaign approaches and the prospects grow for increasingly intensive work, we will need to tighten and strengthen the Unit organizationally. In some respects the proposed changes modify the realignments established experimentally last July.

The needs, as we see them, are:

(1) To bring the substance of the foreign and domestic research into much closer coordination.

(2) To relate all the research more closely and directly to the Governor's immediate needs, including particularly speech preparation.

(3) To check (and in some instances coordinate) the Governor's positions on a continuing basis with those of other key Republicans and with important Republican policy offices in Washington. In carrying out this objective, trips to Washington and personal acquaintance with certain key staff personnel will be essential.

(4) To maintain closer liaison with consultants in various fields and to schedule periodic meetings with them.

(5) To maintain closer liaison with other key staff members of the Governor, both in Albany and New York City.

(6) To provide a single authority for establishing priorities within the Research Unit. The most effective and economical use of staff will not permit the subdividing of personnel by "area" to the extent we have been.

Clearly these needs cannot be met without an additional person. Accordingly, we have decided to hire a joint assistant to us, Mr. Jay Iselin, with specific responsibility

satisfant to us, Mr. Jay Laelin, with specific reasonability
tionsl person. Accordingly, we have decided to hire a joint
Clearly these needs cannot be met without an addi-


been.

dialing of personnel dy "sides" to the extent we have
and economical use of staff will not permit the ap-
ties within the Research Unit. The most effective

(c) To provide a single authority forratsplating purport-
city.

(2) To maintain closer liaison with other key staff mem-
bers of the Governor, both in Albany and New York

(4) To maintain closer liaison with consultants in vartona

will be essential.
personal acquaintance with certain key staff personnel
ing out this objective, trips to Washington and
Repubican policy offices in Washington. In carry-

 Governor's positions on a continuing basis with
 those of other key Republicans and with important
 Republican policy offices in Washington. In carry-

currently a beehive preparation.

(5) To relate all the research more closely and directly
    to the Governor's immediate needs, including part-
    time of building on our present needs, we have conci
    nced
    mance in our respective areas of concern. With the op-
    cial-

(1) To bring the attendance of the foreign and domestic

experimentally last July.
the proposed changes modify the restitutions satisfied
strengthen the Unit organizationally. In some respects
increasingly intensive work, we will need to tighten and
that, as a campaign approaches and the broad aspects grow for
the use of building on our present needs, we have conci
mance in our respective areas of concern. With the ope-
work being produced. We are both pleased with the perfor-
We wish to commend each of you for the durslity of

From: Mr. Perkins and Dr. Krasinger

To: Research Unit Staff

Dratt--March 6, '76

to carry out the six objectives listed above and to serve
as the overall Director of the Research Unit. He will, of
course, be subject to our direction and guidance in the
respective areas of (1) domestic affairs, and (2) foreign-
defense affairs.

While Mr. Iselin will be in full charge, and while
all papers will be submitted to us through him, we anticipate
a continuation of close contact between us and those of you
who are working on particular topics.

We believe the addition of Mr. Iselin will make
it possible for each of you to devote more time, and more
effectively, to the substance of your work. He in turn,
will need all the help you can give him.

In order that the objectives and method of opera-
tion of the Research Unit will be clearly understood by all
of us, attached hereto is a restatement covering those
matters.

R.B.P.
H.A.K.

H.A.K.
R.B.P.

matters.

of na, attached hereto is a restatement covering those
of the Research Unit will be clearly understood by all
In order that the objectives and method of operas-

will need all the help you can give him.
effectively, to the assistance of your work. He in turn,
it possible for each of you to devote more time, and more
We believe the addition of Mr. Iaedin will make

who are working on particular topics.
a continuation of close contact between na and those of you
all papers will be submitted to na through him, we anticipate
While Mr. Iaedin will be in full charge, and while

defense staffs.
respective areas of (1) domestic staffs, and (2) foreign-
courts, be subject to our direction and guidance in the
as the overall Director of the Research Unit. He will, of
to carry out the six objectives listed above and to serve

Draft--March 6, 1962

# RESEARCH UNIT
## Restatement of Objectives and Methods

### I. OBJECTIVES

#### A. Information

#### B. Positions and program

#### C. Washington liaison

(1) Supplement NAR's and GLH's direct contacts by keeping liaison with key Senatorial and Congressional offices on *substantive* issues.
(See B-2 above.)

(1) Supplement WAR's and GH's direct contacts by keeping liaison with key Senatorial and Congressional offices on <u>unilateral</u> <u>fares</u>.

(See B-5 above.)

C. Washington station

(2) Conduct special sessions with consultants to develop affirmative programs in key areas.

(5) Coordinate positions with Republican leaders in Congress (particularly M.K. Senators and in Albany).

(1) Recommend positions to WAR on national and foreign <u>fares</u>.

B. Positions and program

out-of-state trips.

(3) Collect and present information useful for able to check draft WAR statements.
(5) Maintain adequate materials to be able to name.

A. Information

I. OBJECTIVES

Reinvestment of Objectives and Methods

RESEARCH UNIT

Draft--March 6, 1965

3

(2) Speech稿。

(4) Special notebooks for out-of-state trips.

(3) Special memos reporting on significance of major events.

(5) Periodic outlines summarizing events over a period of 6 months to a year in each major field, including a recommended position for WAR in that field.

(1) A "Current Positions" notebook for WAR, giving a short summary of recommended positions in each area -- to be used for spot reference and to avoid necessity of specially prepared papers.

### C. Reporting Methods

(3) From A(4)(2) and (6) above.

(3) Other files and bookshelves containing matter

Draft--March 6, 1962

JAY ISELIN

DIRECTOR, RESEARCH UNIT

To be in full charge of the operational aspects
of the Research Unit, subject to:

(1) The overall supervision of Mr. Perkins as
to such operational aspects, and

(2) The direction and guidance of Mr. Perkins
on domestic affairs and of Dr. Kissinger on foreign
and defense affairs.

Mr. Iselin will have general responsibility for
carrying out the objectives of the Research Unit, and the
methods of operation, set forth on Exhibit A hereto.

Specific responsibilities will include:

(1) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Kissinger ways of bringing the substance of the foreign and domestic research into closer coordination, and carrying out agreed steps.

(2) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Kissinger ways of relating all the research more closely and directly to the Governor's immediate needs, including particularly speech preparation.

(3) Checking (and in some instances coordinating), subject to guidance from Mr. Perkins and Mr. Hinman, the Governor's positions on a continuing basis with those of other key Republicans and with the Republican National Committee, the House and Senate Republican Policy Committee, and the House and Senate Republican Campaign Committee offices.

(4) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Kissinger methods of maintaining closer liaison with consultants in various fields, and carrying out agreed steps (such as scheduling periodic meetings with consultants).

(5) Maintaining closer liaison with other key personnel who are either on the Governor's own Albany or New York City staff or in other offices having a particular interest in his activities (such as the Rockefeller Brothers public relations staff).

["Rockefeller Brothers public relations staff).\n\n(2) Maintaining closer liaison with other key personnel who are either on the Governor's own staff or in other offices having a personnel issue.\n\n(3) Checking (and in some instances coordinating), barterily, a speech preparation, directly to the Governor's immediate needs, including ways of relating all the research more closely and (5) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen ways of relating all the research more closely and (6) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen ways of bringing the audience of the foreign and domestic research into closer coordination, and carrying out agreed steps.", "(4) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\nbarterily, a speech preparation,\ndirectly to the Governor's immediate needs, including\nways of relating all the research more closely and\n(5) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\nways of relating all the research more closely and\n(6) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\nin various fields, and carrying out agreed steps (such\nmethods of maintaining closer liaison with consultants\nand other key Republicans and with the Republican National\nthe Governor's positions on a continuing basis with those\nsubject to guidance from Mr. Perkins and Mr. Hinsman.", "(3) Checking (and in some instances coordinating), barterarily, a speech preparation.", "barterarily a speech preparation,\ndirectly to the Governor's immediate needs, including\nways of relating all the research more closely and\n(5) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen", "(5) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen", "ways of relating all the research more closely and\n(5) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(6) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(7) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(8) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(9) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(10) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(11) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(12) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(13) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(14) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(15) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(16) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(17) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(18) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(19) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(20) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(21) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(22) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(23) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(24) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(25) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(26) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(27) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(28) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(29) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(30) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(31) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(32) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(33) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(34) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(35) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(36) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(37) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(38) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(39) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(40) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(41) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(42) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(43) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(44) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(45) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(46) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(47) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(48) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(49) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(50) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(51) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(52) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(53) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(54) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(55) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(56) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(57) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(58) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(59) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(60) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(61) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(62) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(63) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(64) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(65) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(66) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(67) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(68) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(69) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(70) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(71) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(72) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(73) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(74) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(75) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(76) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(77) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(78) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(79) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(80) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(81) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(82) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(83) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(84) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(85) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(86) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(87) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(88) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(89) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(90) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(91) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(92) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(93) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(94) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(95) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(96) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(97) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(98) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(99) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(100) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(101) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(102) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(103) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(104) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(105) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(106) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(107) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(108) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(109) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(110) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(111) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(112) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(113) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(114) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(115) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(116) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(117) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(118) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(119) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(120) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(121) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(122) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(123) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(124) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(125) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(126) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(127) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(128) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(129) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(130) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(131) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(132) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(133) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(134) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(135) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(136) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(137) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(138) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(139) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(140) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(141) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(142) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(143) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(144) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(145) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(146) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(147) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(148) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(149) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(150) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(151) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(152) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(153) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(154) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(155) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(156) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(157) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(158) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(159) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(160) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(161) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(162) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(163) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(164) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(165) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(166) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(167) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(168) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(169) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(170) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(171) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(172) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(173) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(174) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(175) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(176) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(177) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(178) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(179) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(180) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(181) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(182) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(183) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(184) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(185) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(186) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(187) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(188) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(189) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(190) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(191) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(192) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(193) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(194) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(195) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(196) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(197) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(198) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(199) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(200) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(201) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(202) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(203) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(204) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(205) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(206) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(207) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(208) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(209) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(210) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(211) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(212) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(213) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(214) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(215) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(216) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(217) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(218) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(219) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(220) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(221) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(222) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(223) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(224) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(225) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(226) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(227) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(228) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(229) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(230) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(231) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(232) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(233) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(234) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(235) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(236) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(237) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(238) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(239) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(240) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(241) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(242) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(243) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(244) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(245) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(246) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(247) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(248) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(249) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(250) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(251) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(252) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(253) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(254) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(255) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(256) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(257) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(258) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(259) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(260) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(261) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(262) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(263) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(264) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(265) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(266) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(267) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(268) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(269) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(270) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(271) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(272) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(273) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(274) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(275) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(276) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(277) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(278) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(279) Recommending to Mr. Perkins and Dr. Klaasen\n(

DRAFT-2nd version March 12, 1962

Thank you for your various letters and for your outline about how
theresponsibilities within the research unit should be divided. I agree
with the objectives you have outlined and I am in favor of any organiza-
tional device which gives promise of achieving them. You can count on
my support if there should be any difficulties.

At the same time, it seems to me that this may be an opportune
moment to define my own position. It is clear that I have not come to
New York with any regularity (in recent months.) It is also true--as
you pointed out the other day--that I do not draw very heavily on the
research unit when my advice is requested by the Governor. The reason
is the same in both cases. I am concerned with foreign policy full-time.
On almost all of the issues on which my opinion is asked I am reasonably
well-informed and where I am not, my own research staff at Harvard is
better equipped than the New York office to bring me up to date. The

however?
research unit does perform an important role in summarizing major issues
for the Governor. I am happy to review these for accuracy and comprehensive-
ness. I do not, however, require its services too much for my own thinking.

It follows that my major contribution is in terms of overall
national policies and the specific means to attain them. I can respond
to queries--and I can initiate recommendations on what might be the
best course for the country in given areas or with respect to particular
problems. I do not focus nearly as well on how certain events can be
utilized politically. My conversations with the Governor are invariably
on the level of overall national policy. This suggests that to the
extent that there is a need for day-to-day political contacts, Jay Iselin--
or somebody in his position--should assume responsibility.

In order to leave no possible misunderstanding, it may also be
worthwhile to state my views about my relations with the Government.
As you remember, I was asked to join the White House staff shortly after
the new Administration took office. After I refused this position, I was
asked to be a consultant to the White House instead. I talked this over
with Nelson, and we both agreed that every citizen had a duty to do
what he could for the welfare of the country. Even though I am deeply
committed to Nelson and consider it a tragedy that he was not named in
1960, I feel that we face such a crisis internationally that I do not have

3

the right to refuse to give my views if the President requests them.

Any other course would be in effect to speculate on national disaster on
the basis of my personal preferences.

Between February and October of 1961, I maintained an office in Wahh.
and went there more or less regularly (on the average of about two days
a week). At the end of October I resigned because I believed my psotion
to be incongruous. In December I was asked to undertake a specific mission
having to do with our NATO planning. Except for that one mission, which
took about a we4k, I have had no relationship with the government since
the end of October.

In axdxxxto performing the mission I mentioned above, I was put on
the rolls as a consultant again. It would be too complicated to explain
the methods b which this was achieved. They form a rather interesting
techniques
commentary on the political *kreezyhikauuuk* of the New Frontier.

I go into this at some length because I want you to be perfectly
clear that although it has occurred only this one time, I may feel obliged
to respond to specific questions put to me by the White House at other times.
And when this occurs, I will no be able to participate in the drafting
of a position for the Governor when it touches upon the same specific issues.

This is no immediate problem because, as I have said, my connection
has been very tenuous and I plan for it to remain so. (But precisely be-
cause there is no ½ problem now, it is important to leave no doubt that I
will be unable to work for the Governor on any matter where I have had
access to government information within a reasonable time (afterwards?)
I will of course keep this in mind in judging whether I should undertake
any particular assignment for the White House.

The main point I wish to make is to express my conviction that
we are in a deep national crisis which obliges me to respond to
the Government's request for advice when I feel I can be useful. I need
hardly add that Nelson will always have a special claim on me because of
my friendship and devotion for him.

2

M

events could be utilized politically.

NO P- My general bias is to concentrate on the general direction of
United States foreign policy and of the major goals it should pursue.

NO P- Every one of.. has
All of my conversations with the Governor have been at this level.

P It would therefore seem to me that Jay Iselin should assume responsibility for the day-to-day political positions. I will of course be happy to give my opinion from a substantive point of view.

I think it is also important that my relationship to the
defined
government be clearly understood by everybody. NO P As you remember, I was
asked to join the White House staff shortly after the new Administration
took office. After I refused this position, I was asked to be a con-
sultant to the White House, I talked this over with Nelson, and we
instead
to
both agreed that every citizen had a duty/do what he could for the
welfare of the country. Even though I have been deeply committed
to Nelson and consider it a tragedy that he was not nominated in 1960,
crisis
I feel that we face such a crucial period in international affairs that
I do not have the right to refuse to give my views to the government if
the President
they are requested to do. Any other course would be in effect to speculate on

(L)

DEBEVOISE, PLIMPTON & MCLEAN

MEMORANDUM

March 13, 1962

To: M. K. B.

From: R. B. P.

Subject: "Current Positions" Notebook for N. A. R.

Thank you, Mary and Gigi for your joint thinking on the above.

I have decided on a modified version of #2: Send him a complete rewrite of the page, but with a covering memo flagging the change. The covering memo would not go in the Notebook. A sample of the kind of covering memo I have in mind is attached.

The far more difficult problem which I have not resolved, and want your joint thinking on, is the format of a position paper. This is what I really need help on. A possible outline is attached, using agriculture as an example. Please try your hand at various alternatives and come up with a recommendation.

cc: H. A. K.
J. G.

uniqueness of this part of the bill, this as evidence of the original market price. - You can now point to stocks in a way which would depress the of the Secretary to sell Government key provocation deleted is the authority and conservative Democrats. - The on him by a coalition of Republicans relations of his farm bill, forced Kennedy on July 2 accepted major

revelation reflects the following:

inverted in your "Current Positions Notebook". The
Attached is a revised page which has been

Subject: Agriculture - Kennedy Farm Bill

From: Research Unit

To: The Governor

July 8, 1985

March 23, 1962

To: Hugh Morrow
Emmett Hughes
Malcolm Moos

From: Roswell B. Perkins

Attached hereto is a copy of the incoming
letter from Mel Laird and my draft reply for the Governor's
signature.

I would appreciate your telephoning me Monday
as to how you think we should approach this. In a sense,
our task is to bring up to date the document prepared
for the Republican Platform Committee in 1960. In any
event, I think we have to get together as soon as possible
to give this project some real focus and direction.

Please do call me.

R.B.P.

Attachment

cc: The Governor
Dr. Kissinger ✓
Mary K. Boland
June Goldthwait

1962 JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES

1625 EYE ST., N.

NA. 8-6800 EX. 164

REP. MELVIN R. LAIRD, WISCONSIN
CHAIRMAN

SEN. BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA
CO-CHAIRMAN

SEN. GEORGE D. AIKEN, VERMONT

SEN. WALLACE F. BENNETT, UTAH

SEN. THRUSTON B. MORTON, KENTUCKY

SEN. KENNETH B. KEATING, NEW YORK

SEN. JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS

REP. PETER FRELINGHUYSEN, JR., NEW JERSEY

REP. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, CALIFORNIA

REP. CHARLES E. GOODELL, NEW YORK

REP. CATHERINE MAY. WASHINGTON

REP. JAMES E. BROMWELL, IOWA

WILLIAM B. PRENDERGAST
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

March 12, 1962

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor
State of New York
Albany, New York

Dear Governor:

The 1962 Joint Committee on Republican Principles is now engaged in drafting a statement for issuance in early June. The Committee hopes to produce a declaration reflecting the Republican consensus on the Party's present program for dealing with the major policy problems which confront our Nation. It will endeavor to stress the dominant themes for the 1962 Republican campaigns for the Senate and House of Representatives.

In order to perform its task, it needs the counsel of the sixteen Republican governors. Any suggestions which you care to offer to the Committee bearing on any aspect of its work will be welcome. It is particularly interested, however, in securing a statement of your views on what should be the content of two sections of its report. One of these is entitled, Basic Beliefs of Republicans; the other, the Federal-State Relationship.

I am hopeful that you will be able to send us any statement you wish to submit by April 1st so that the Committee will have ample opportunity to give consideration to your views at an early stage in its deliberations.

I am enclosing a statement on the reasons for the establishment of this Committee which I trust will be helpful in giving a focus to your effort.

THE 1962 JOINT COMMITTEE ON REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES

The 1962 Joint Committee on Republican Principles is not the first agency of this kind.

In 1920 an Advisory Committee on Policies and Platform was established by the Republican National Committee to make surveys of public issues and to submit a report for the guidance of the Resolutions Committee of the 1920 Republican National Convention. Again in 1937 a Republican Program Committee under the chairmanship of Doctor Glenn Frank was organized by the Republican National Committee, and in 1940 it submitted a report entitled "A Program for a Dynamic America." In 1943 a Republican post-war Advisory Council was established, which issued short declarations on Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy. In 1959 the Republican Committee on Program and Progress headed by Charles H. Percy was formed. His report entitled Decisions for a Better America was made in 1960. All four of these Committees were made up of prominent Republicans outside the Congress as well as of Party leaders within the Congress.

On two previous occasions, Committees composed solely of Republican Members of the Congress have formulated statements of Party policy. On both occasions the Committees were headed by Senator Robert A. Taft and Representative Charles A. Halleck. In 1945 a Statement of Principles, Policies and Objectives of Republican Members of Congress was approved in conference by the Republican members of the House and Senate. In 1950 a Statement of Republican Principles and Objectives was adopted by the Republican members of both houses of the Congress and concurred in by Members of the Republican National Committee.

Both the 1945 and the 1950 statements reaffirmed long-held Republican Principles and applied them to the present problems of the times.

There are two major reasons for establishing now the 1962 Joint Committee on Republican principles. One is a widespread impression that the Republican Party has only a negative program. Such an impression is held because of the slick monopolization of the news by the Administration and because of the failure of Republicans to affirm with a clear, persistent, and united voice the positive and constructive program which they are seeking to advance in the Congress.

The Joint Committee has a job, then, of dispelling the so-called negative image of the Republican Party by enunciating the principles on which the Republican legislative proposals, which have already been offered to the Congress, are based. The enunciation of such principles, we would hope, would encourage the future development of other specific proposals in the fields of public policy in which they are now lacking.

The second reason for the establishment of the Joint Committee is the need for investigation of the effect of changed circumstances on the application of Republican principles. The world of 1962 is different in many important respects from the world of 1960, which provided the setting in which the last official statement of Republican policy was formulated. Since 1960, for example, we have been plagued by an intolerably high level of unemployment. Since 1960 negotiations over a nuclear test ban have clearly failed; the Soviet Union has resumed testing, and we have tardily decided to do the same. Since 1960 significant and disturbing changes have taken place in our relations with our European allies.

-2-

March 1962

In the light of such changes as these, a careful re-thinking of party policy is in order for both major parties.

More than a decade ago, a distinguished committee of the American Political Science Association recommended that the major parties draft a declaration of policy in the off-years as well as in the years in which Presidential elections are held.* This was good advice at the time at which the recommendation was made. The swift and dramatic changes which have occurred in the course of the past two years make an effort of this kind even more useful and necessary today.

Melvin R. Laird, Chairman
1962 Joint Committee on Republican Principles

* A More Responsible Two-Party System (a report of the Committee on Political Parties of American Political Science Association, 1950)

Draft--March 23, 1962

Hon. Melvin R. Laird
1962 Joint Committee on
Republican Principles
1625 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mel:

Thanks very much for your letter of March 12
inviting me to offer suggestions and express views with
respect to the report the 1962 Joint Committee on
Republican Principles proposes to issue.

While I will not be able to meet the April 1
deadline because of the press of our legislative session
and 30-day bill signing period, I do want to prepare
something for you. I am asking Rod Perkins to call you
to get a better picture as to how we can be most helpful
to you.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Sincerely, John

With best regards,

to John.

To get a better picture as to how we can be most helpful
considering your. I am asking you please to call on
and 30-day bill signing period. I go want to breather
deadline because of the break of our legislative session
while I will not be able to meet the week I
Rebaptist Principles proposes to take.

Please to the report of the RBC to the Committee on
involving me to offer suggestions and express areas with
Thanks very much for your letter of March 15

Dear Net:

Washington, D. C.
1002 Eke Street, N.W.
Rebaptist Principles
RBC to bring Committee on
Horn. Maintain H. Lietz

Draft--March 32, 1985

March 28, 1962

To: MKB
From: RBP
Subject: Trip to Washington

I suggest that, when you find it possible to
do so, you might go to Washington and cover the following:

(1) Donna's entire set-up, and how we can
make even greater use of her, cutting back on our own
intake of material on the theory we can get items from
her on about 24 hours' notice.

(2) Meet key legislative staffs in the offices
of Sen. Javits, Sen. Keating and Rep. Lindsay.

(3) Go to C.Q. and get Jay Iselin to describe
their whole mechanism.

(4) Check in with staff of Republican Policy
Committees on House and Senate side.

You might wish to consider doing this on April
17-18 so you could hear NAR's luncheon speech before the
National Republican Women's Federation. I may be with
him at the breakfast on the 18th.

him at the breakfast on the 18th.
National Republican Women's Federation. I may be with
11-18 so you could hear WAR's innuendo about her before the
You might wish to consider doing this on April

Committees on House and Senate sides.

(4) Check in with staff of Republican Party
their whole mechanism.

(3) Go to C.G. and get lay opinion to describe
of Sen.ivaia, Sen. Kesting and Rep. Lindsay.

(3) Meet key legislative staffs in the offices
per on a point 54 honra, notice.

per on a point 54 honra, notice.
intake of material on the theory we can get items from
make even Greater use of her, cutting back on our own
(1) Downs's entire set-nb, and how we can

do so, you might go to Washington and cover the following:
I appreciate that, when you find it possible to

Subject: Trip to Washington

From: RBL

To: NKB

March 28, 1965

March 29, 1962

To: Research Unit Staff

From: Roswell B. Perkins

Subject: Meeting Spot Demands

It is obvious that as political and other
demands result in more and more requests coming in,
it will require our being more and more flexible as
to use of personnel.

Accordingly, if requests come to either
Mary K. or June (in the domestic and foreign fields,
respectively) which, because of unusual circumstances
of absences or workloads, cannot be met with the help
available at that moment (i.e., Mary MacAniff and
Gigi in the case of Mary K., and Anne and Pam in the
case of June), Mary K. and June will of necessity have
to call on the others to help out.

I would like a notation made as to each of
these situations and the time involved. On anything
likely to involve more than an hour or two of time,
I would appreciate your trying to check with me on it,
but this is not essential.

Thanks for all your cooperation.

cc: Dr. Kissinger ✓
Louise A. Boyer

Ronnie V. Deder
cc: Dr. Krausberg

But this is not essential.

I would appreciate your training to check with me on it, directly to involve more than an hour on two of time. These instructions and the time involved. On starting I would like a notation made as to each of

Case of June). Mark K. and June will of necessity have
Gist in the case of Mark K., and June and Sam in the
available at that moment (i.e., Mark MacVitt and
of presence or workforce, cannot be met with the help
respectively) which, because of mutual circumstances
Mark K. or June (in the case of and foreign fields,
Accordingly, it redrafts come to either

to use of collaborator.

It will require some time and more flexible as
demands result in more and more redrafts coming in.

Subject: Meeting Spot Demands

From: Howell B. Perkins

To: Research Unit Staff

Marlow 53, 1305