CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON THE MEETING OF THE PUGWASH-COSWA CONTINUING COMMITTEE - FEB. 8-10, 1963, LONDON

At the last meeting of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs held in early September, 1962 in London, the Continuing Committee was enlarged and charged with the planning of future conferences and instructed that these should deal primarily with disarmament and world security. The Committee meets annually for this purpose and the next meeting was eventually set for February 8-10, 1963 at the Ciba Foundation Guest House in London. It turned out that when this date arrived none of the American members could go. Rabinowitch was restrained by doctor's orders, Bentley Glass had the flu, and Harrison Brown had an unbreakable commitment on the 10th. Alex Rich, Ruth Adams, and I agreed at the last minute to replace them. We met with Brown, Glass (quite ill), Feld, Edsall, and Hoagland (President of the American Academy), in Cambridge on Friday, February 8 and proceeded that evening to London.

We arrived at the meeting at 10:30 Saturday morning where we found in attendance:

Secretary-General: Prof. J. Rotblat
United Kingdom: Sir Nevill Mott, Prof. C. F. Powell
USSR: Acad. D. V. Skobeltzyn, Acad. Artsimovitch, Acad. Blagonravov, Pavlichenko (interpreter)
Western Europe: Prof. E. Amaldi (Italy)
Eastern Europe: Prof. H. Marcovich (France)
Asia: Prof. L. Infeld (Poland)
Prof. V. Sarabhai (India)

Supek, a well known theoretical physicist from Zagreb, was present in order to discuss the Yugoslav meeting. He participated throughout and in keeping with what Weisskopf had told me about him, he seemed to be quite independent without any trace of party line except when circumstances forced conformity.

he seemed to be quite independent without any trace of party line
throughout and in keeping with what Meisakobt had told me about him,
present in order to discuss the Ungersav meeting. He participated

Subok, a well known theoretical physicist from Saarenp, was

Vais:
Brot. V. Sarphat (India)
Brot. R. Infield (Poland)
Brot. H. Mirovich (France)
Brot. E. Wyslak (Italy)
Vasg. Blagounsov, Pavlichenko (interpreter)
Vasg. D. A. Skopeltsyn, Vasg. Artimovitch,
U28R:
United Kingdom:
Secretary-General:
Brot. J. Rotplst

we found in attendance:

We arrived at the meeting at 10:30 Saturday morning where
evening to London.

Academy), in Cambridge on Friday, February 8 and proceeded that
Friday, Friday, Friday, and Friday (President of the American
the first minute to replace them. We met with Brown, Gissas (quite
commitment on the 10th. Alex Rich, Ruth Adsm, and I agreed at
Bentley Gissas had the flu, and Harrison Brown had an напрекъмъ
mempera could do. Raspinowitch was restrained by doctor's orders,
It turned out that when this date arrived none of the American
February 8-10, 1963 at the Cips Foundation Great House in London.
for this purpose and the next meeting was eventually set for
with disarmament and world security. The Committee meets annually
future conferences and instructed that these should desist immediately
tarning Committee was entrusted and charged with the scanning of
World Affairs held in early September, 1963 in London, the Con-

At the last meeting of the Brusson Conference on Science and
COMMITTEE - FEB. 8-10, 1963, LONDON
NOTES ON THE MEETING OF THE BRUSSEL-COSMO CONTINUING
CONFIDENTIALITY

[a]

HAK

Pugwash Comments

2.

It is interesting to note that all these persons are physicists and of quite high calibre. (Pavelchenko was present as interpreter for Blagonravov.

The actions taken thus far were reviewed for us. Nothing important or critical had happened. (Public correspondence on the black box had been covered and we decided to speak privately to Rotblat about the bias in his letter.)

Under item 8 - observers - it was agreed to allow a few observers to the Conferences, primarily government officials and persons from UNESCO, WHO, etc.

Under item 9 - regional conferences - Rotblat reported that a group composed of one person each from 15 central European countries under the leadership of Tollach (Netherlands), Thrilling (Austria), and someone else had been started in order to examine various schemes for disengagement in Europe. It was agreed that the Executive Secretary should note their activity and wish them success.

Under item 10 the membership of the Continuing Committee was discussed. The Soviets said that Skobeltsyn had replaced Topchiev as leader temporarily and the continuation of Fedorov was probable, but not certain. A new member would be added soon.

The Americans reported the expectation that one member of their group would be replaced annually.

The Americans reported the expectation that one member of
was proposed, but not certain. A new member would be added soon.
Topchiev as leader temporarily and the continuation of Lengorov
was discussed. The Soviets said that Skolotsov had replaced
Under item 10 the membership of the Continuing Committee
success.

the Executive Secretary should note their activity and wish them
various schemes for disengagement in Europe. It was agreed that
(Vantris), and someone else had been started in order to examine
countries under the leadership of Tolfsch (Netherlands), Thrilling
a group composed of one person each from 12 central European
Under item 9 - regional conferences - Rotplat reported that
barcous from UNESCO, WHO, etc.

opservers to the Conferences, primarily government officials and
Under item 8 - opervers - it was agreed to allow a few
to Rotplat about the rise in his letter.)

the black box had been covered and we decided to ask privately
important or critical had happened. (In私 correspondence on
The actions taken thus far were reviewed for us. Nothing
as interpreter for Bisboursnov.

bureaucrats and of quite high calibre. (Bavchevchenko was present
It is interesting to note that all these barcous are

Budanov Comments

Pugwash Comments

3.

The meeting then turned to item 3 - the death of Topchiev - Powell, Rich, and I spoke of the loss and Skobeltzen made a little speech, restrained and in good taste.

The problem of appointing an Executive Committee was then examined - item 11. Rotblat felt he needed a legitimized sub-group to confer with when contacting the whole committee was not justified or an emergency prevented it. Infeld suggested four members: the chairman or his representative, the general secretary, and one member each from the United States and the Soviet Union. Skobeltzen suggested contacting either of the three Soviet representatives. Blagonar suggested representatives from some other region. Sarabhai suggested adding one member from a particular region when it is relevant and Infeld agreed with Mott that the extra member should rotate. So, it was agreed to have a fifth member and Markovitch was chosen for that position. Therefore, the Executive Committee would consist of Rotblat, Powell, Skobeltzen, Bentley Glass, and Markovitch for a term of one year.

The next item taken up was that of the budget. The proposal submitted by Rotblat was discussed. It involves the setting up of an independent office in London and an annual budget of 7,300 pounds. Rotblat stated that sensing the high priority for the

boundaries. Rotplast stated that aiming the high priority for the
of an independent office in London and an annual budget of 7,300
summitted by Rotplast was discussed. It involves the setting up
The next item taken up was that of the budget. The proposal
of one year.

Powell, Skopeltsan, Bentley Giss, and Markovitch for a term
Therefore, the Executive Committee would consist of Rotplast,
a fifth member and Markovitch was chosen for that position.
that the extra member should rotate. So, it was agreed to have
ticular region when it is relevant and Inteld agreed with Mott
other region. Saraphist and abeated adding one member from a bar-
representatives. Blackouka and abeated representatives from some
Union. Skopeltsan and abeated contacting either of the three Soviet
tarly, and one member each from the United States and the Soviet
members: the chairman or his representative, the general secre-
 justified or an emergency prevented it. Inteld and abeated four
group to confer with when contacting the whole committee was not
examined - item II. Rotplast felt he needed a legitimised and-
The problem of appointing an Executive Committee was then
ab speech, restrained and in good taste.

Powell, Rich, and I spoke of the loss and Skopeltsan made a little
The meeting then turned to item 3 - the death of Topchiev -

Brusaw Comments

3.

Pugwash Comments

4.

office they had already moved in this direction by registering
a name of Pugwash Limited as a charitable institution and the
linkage between this and the actual Pugwash Committee would be
the result of having the membership of the board of directors
mainly from the British members of the Committee. He felt this
was needed to create a posture of continuity that would enable
them to attract proper staff. This procedure was generally
agreed to, but was not discussed with the utmost clarity. He
also reported that the present balance is about $5,000
Blagoravov said that it is clear that an office is necessary,
but the magnitude of its support would have to depend upon
funds available. Although we should start now we will have to
estimate the level of support from time to time. He is not,
at present, able to state what the Soviet contribution will be.
He indicated that they had depended upon Topchiev and his re-
lation to the Academy and will have to see how this can go on
in his absence. The problem is purely one of hard currency,
there would be no doubt that they could make an adequate contri-
bution in rubles.

In the end it was agreed to set up the London office, to
adopt the proposed budget for the first year, and to make an

adopt the proposed budget for the first year, and to make an
In the end it was agreed to set up the London office, to
situation in Russia.

there would be no doubt that they could make an adequate contri-
part in Russia.

The problem is briefly one of hard currency,
He indicated that they had depended upon Tobacco and his re-
lation to the Academy and will have to see how this can do on
present, apart to some extent what the Soviet contribution will be.
eatmate the level of support from time to time. He is not,
to be available. Although we should start now we will have to
put the weight of its support would have to depend upon
Bolshevov said that it is clear that an office is necessary,
sao reported that the present balance is about $2,000
agreed to, but was not discussed with the utmost clarity. He
to attract proper attention. This procedure was generally
was needed to create a posture of continuity that would ensue
mainly from the British members of the Committee. He felt this
the result of having the membership of the body of directors
inadequate between this and the actual Budweis Committee would be
a name of Budweis Limited as a charitable institution and the
office they had already moved in this direction by registering
Budweis Comments

4.

Pugwash Comments

5.

multiple approaches to foundations to see if a package of
foundation contributions could not be arranged.

The afternoon session was completed by setting dates for
the next two conferences. The first will be in Dubrovnic,
Yugoslavia on September 20-25, inclusive and the second in
India from January 27-February 1. The place would probably be
Udaibur which is near Dehli. Some discussion followed of the
possible items for inclusion in the meeting at Dubrovnic.
Because of certain differences of views it was left for
Artsemovitch, Supek, and Doty to report a slate of topics the
following morning. The difficulty was created primarily by
the Soviets insisting that we must have a ~~wide~~ number of general
topics with particular emphasis on the obstacles confronting
disarmament whereas the others tended to want quite specialized
items.

After dinner together at the Clifton-Ford Hotel and a
long sleep, we met again on Sunday morning. Between 9 and 9:30
the sub-committee quite easily reached agreement on a set of
topics for the two meetings in Dubrovnic and India. These,
as they were finally agreed upon with relatively little change
were as follows:

were as follows:

as they were finally agreed upon with relatively little trouble
topics for the two meetings in Duprovnic and India. These,
the sub-committee quite easily reached agreement on a set of
fond sleep, we met again on Sunday morning. Between 9 and 9:30
After dinner together at the Clifton-Ford Hotel and a
items.

diarrasment whereas the others tended to want quite specialised
topics with particular emphasis on the obstacles confronting
the Soviets insulating that we must have a number of general
following morning. The difficulty was created primarly by
Artamovitch, Anpeki, and Dofy to report a state of topics the
Because of certain differences of views it was left for
possible items for inclusion in the meeting at Duprovnic.
Udipur which is near Delhi. Some discussion followed of the
India from January 27-February 1. The place would properly be
Yugoslavia on September 30-32, inclusive and the second in
the next two conferences. The first will be in Duprovnic.

The afternoon session was completed by setting dates for
foundation contributions could not be arranged.
multiple approaches to foundations to see it a backgam of
Budapest Comments
2.

[cc]

Pugwash Comments

Subjects for the Dubrovnic Meeting

1. Problems of General Disarmament

a. Abolition of Delivery Systems

b. Inspection and Control in the First Stage of Disarmament

2. Consequence of the spread of nuclear weapons

3. Atom free zones, especially in central Europe and the Balkans

4. The role of non-aligned nations in disarmament and world security

5. The test ban and problems of detection of violations.
(No press, but it was agreed that London could announce the conference from England on September 18. It was agreed that the no statement policy would be explicit in the letter of invitation.)

In the general meeting it was agreed that every afternoon would be free at Dubrovnic for personal discussions. (One could hardly imagine the Soviets agreeing to this a couple of years ago.) It was further agreed that the opening session would last only one-half hour and that the speeches would be absolutely limited to 20 minutes and that the chairman would prepare a memorandum for the working groups based upon our discussion indicating that the major part of the working session was to be devoted to discussion and not to the preparation of written material for the plenary session. The actual assignment of

Pugwash Comments

7.

papers was as follows:

1. A paper from both the US and the USSR

2. A paper from France

3. A paper from Poland and some representative from the West, perhaps Tulloch in Holland

4. A paper from Yugoslavia

5. One paper from England and one from one of the eight neutrals, the countries at the Geneva Disarmament Discussions.

The title of the conference would concern Current Problems on Disarmament and World Security and the host would be the Council of Yugoslav Academies which I take to be a collection of the three academies of the three ethnic sub-divisions of Yugoslavia. A tentative list was made of the number of people to be invited, and from what countries.

9 - US

9 - USSR

5 - UK

1 - Austria

1 - Belgium

1 - Bulgaria

1 - Czechoslovakia

1 - Denmark

3 - France

2 - East Germany

2 - West Germany

1 - Greece

1 - Hungary

2 - Italy

2 - Netherlands

1 - Norway

2 - Poland

1 - Rumania

1 - Sweden

1 - Switzerland

4 - Yugoslavia

1 - Ceylon

2 - China

2 - India

1 - Indonesia

1 - Australia

1 - Canada

1 - Brazil

1 - Ghana

1 - UAR

<table><tr><td>1 - Hungary</td><td>1 - Yugoslavia</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Greece</td><td>1 - Indonesia</td></tr><tr><td>2 - West Germany</td><td>2 - India</td></tr><tr><td>3 - East Germany</td><td>3 - China</td></tr><tr><td>3 - France</td><td>1 - Ceylon</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Denmark</td><td>4 - Yugoslavia</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Czechoslovakia</td><td>1 - Switzerland</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Bulgaria</td><td>1 - Sweden</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Belgium</td><td>1 - Germany</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Austria</td><td>2 - Poland</td></tr><tr><td>2 - UK</td><td>1 - Norway</td></tr><tr><td>8 - U2R</td><td>2 - Netherlands</td></tr><tr><td>9 - U2</td><td>1 - Canada</td></tr></table>

Yugoslavia. A tentative list was made of the number of people of the three academies of the three ethnic and-distributions of Council of Yugoslavia Academies which I take to be a collection on Disarmament and World Security and the host would be the

Disarmament Discussions.

2. One paper from England and one from one of the

4. A paper from Yugoslavia

the West, perhaps Tiflosir in Holland

3. A paper from France

1. A paper from both the U2 and the U2R

papers was as follows:

Budowas Comments

7.

[cc]

[LJ]

Pugwash Comments

8.

The preliminary planning for the Indian meeting was as
follows. A group would assemble in Dehli on January 26, which
is a National holiday and would meet Nehru informally. The
title would be the same as that given the Yugoslav meeting and
the items to be discussed by working groups would be:

1. Organization for collective security (global and regional).

2. Implications for world security of a wider dispersion of military power (this wording was arrived at after the Soviets objected somewhat to the earlier effort which read "Problems of security in a world with more than two power blocs." This item was inserted in the first place, at Sarabhai's request, so that it would form a context in which Chinese and Indian relations could be discussed.).

3. Control of space for world security.

4. Relation between economic problems of developing nations and world security.

5. Priorities for science and technology in developing countries.

It was further agreed that at Dubrovnic the agenda would be further considered in the light of the disarmament situation at

further considered in the light of the disunment situation at
It was further agreed that at Dubrovino the agenda would be
further considered in the light of the disunment situation at
It was further agreed that at Dubrovino the agenda would be
further considered in the light of the disunment situation at

2. Priorities for science and technology in developing
and world security.

context in which Chinese and Indian relations could be
first broached, so that it would form a
than two power paces." This item was inserted in the
which read "Problems of security in a world with more
the Soviets objected somewhat to the earlier effort
of military power (this working was arrived at after
3. Implications for world security of wider寰球ations
regional).

1. Ordsination for collective security (global and
the items to be discussed by working groups would be:
title would be the same as that given the Ungolav meeting and
is a National holiday and would meet Meiru informally. The
follows. A group would sample in Dehi on tansury 26, which
The preliminary bisming for the Indian meeting was so
Brundavay Comments

Pugwash Comments

9.

that time. Sarabhai reported that 6,000 pounds was available
for travel on Air India and that as in the Yugoslav meeting
they expected a total of up to 70 people. In further discussion
it was considered that we would aim in both meetings for a total
of 60 invited people with room for 10 observers. Listed below
is the tentative list of invitees according to country. The
construction of this list is such that the smaller, less
developed countries are usually only on one list, that is
either the Yugoslav meeting or the Indian meeting. However,
it is expected that travelling funds will not be available for
everyone who wishes to accept the invitation and that re-
arrangements will therefore be necessary.

9- US

9 - USSR

5 - UK

1 - Czechoslovakia

3 - France

1 - East Germany

1 - West Germany

1 - Greece

1 - Hungary

1 - Italy

1 - Netherlands

1 - Poland

1 - Sweden

1 - Yugoslavia

1 - Outer Mongolia

2 - Ceylon

3 - China

1 - Indonesia

6 - India

2 - Japan

1 - Malaya

1 - Burma

2 - Pakistan

1 - Australia

1 - Canada

1 - Mexico

1 - Brazil

1 - Israel

1 - UAR

1 - Ghana

1 - South Africa

1 - East Africa

1 - Sierra Leona

The next item we discussed was the invitation from
A Academician Sorm to hold a meeting in Prague in September,
1964. It had apparently been agreed at the London meeting
that the general topic or theme for this meeting would be

that the general topic or theme for this meeting would be
1964. It had abrretly been agreed at the London meeting
Vencesmian to hold a meeting in Prague in September.

<table><tr><td>1 - Netherlands</td><td>1 - Bums</td><td>I - Sierra Leone</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Italy</td><td>1 - Malaysia</td><td>I - East Africa</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Holland</td><td>2 - Japan</td><td>I - South Africa</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Greece</td><td>2 - India</td><td>I - Gambia</td></tr><tr><td>1 - West Germany</td><td>3 - China</td><td>I - UAR</td></tr><tr><td>1 - East Germany</td><td>3 - China</td><td>I - Iran</td></tr><tr><td>3 - France</td><td>3 - Germany</td><td>I - Brazil</td></tr><tr><td>1 - Czechoslovakia</td><td>1 - Outer Mongolia</td><td>I - Mexico</td></tr><tr><td>2 - UK</td><td>1 - Yugoslavia</td><td>I - Cnsa</td></tr><tr><td>3 - U2</td><td>1 - Sweden</td><td>I - Australia</td></tr><tr><td>6 - U2</td><td>1 - Poland</td><td>2 - Pakistan</td></tr></table>

everyone who wishes to accept the invitation and that re-
it is expected that travelling funds will not be available for
either the Yugoslavia meeting or the Indian meeting. However,
developed countries are naturally only on one list, that is
construction of this list is ahead of that the smaller, less
in the tentative list of invitees according to country. The
of 60 invited people with room for 10 operators. Listed below
it was considered that we would aim in both meetings for a total
they accepted a total of up to 30 people. In further discussion
for travel on Air India and that so in the Yugoslavia meeting
that time. As such it reported that 6,000 pounds was available
in advance Comments

Brussels Comments

[rr]

Pugwash Comments

10.

the basic principals of peaceful coexistence. There was some
objection on my part to allowing the host to choose the title,
but it was insisted that this had been agreed to at the London
meeting. After further discussion, it was decided to wait for two months
to make the final acceptance of this date. By this time it
is expected that the French will have made an offer to hold a
meeting in Paris and they could be coupled together with
respect to timing and content.

The next item - item 16 - dealt with new activities and
the members of the committee had previously received a long
discussion paper from Rabinowitch which urged a breaking out
of the disarmament scientific cooperation theme to other
areas. The discussion was opened by Skobeltzyn who stated
that he wished to speak formally and for the record on one
particular point. He said that we understand that the propa-
ganda is not necessarily odious, but indeed our own activities
are a kind of propaganda based on a common purpose. However,
common to recognize other types of propaganda based on either
one view or another of the cold war. It is this
kind of propaganda we have eliminated from our meetings and he
must object to Rabinowitch's document in that it reintroduces
this kind of propaganda. He cannot accept what Rabinowitch says

this kind of propaganda. He cannot accept what Rappinowitch says
we must object to Rappinowitch's document in that it reintroduces
kind of propaganda we have eliminated from our meetings and he
one view or another, the cold war. It is this
common to recognize other types of propaganda based on either
are a kind of propaganda based on a common purpose. However,
dicts is not necessarily options, but indeed our own activities
particular point. He said that we understand that the broads-
that he wished to ask formally and for the record on one
area. The discussion was opened by Skolopetsyn who stated
of the disarmament scientific cooperation theme to other
discussion paper from Rappinowitch which asked a presking out
the members of the committee had previously received a found
The next item - item 1d - dealt with new activities and
respect to timing and content.
meeting in Paris and they could be coupled together with
is expected that the French will have made an offer to hold a
to make the final acceptance of this date. By this time it
meeting. After further discussion
but it was initiated that this had been agreed to at the London
opposition on my part to allowing the boat to choose the title,
the basic principles of peaceful coexistence. There was some
Brussels Comments

10.

Pugwash Comments

11.

on many points. His article may be satisfactory for the
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists where the two kinds of
propaganda are acceptable, but the kind of language he uses
on pages 1 and 20, for example, is not the kind of language
that has characterized our own meetings in this committee
and he thinks we should deal with this matter in some other
way and take upon ourselves the responsibility that future
documents submitted to the committee for its discussion
should recognize these limitations on propaganda for internal
use. All this does not mean that he objects to examining
the ideas of the document, but its form is something that he
could not accept without comment. Infeld suggested a resolu-
tion be made that documents should be so formulated as to be
inoffensive to either side. Amaldi pointed out that this
might be ambiguous, perhaps a recommendation is sufficient.
Rotblat said we should not take serious action without
Rabinowitch here and Powell found agreement by saying that we
need only reaffirm that the standards for the future should be
as those in the past and we should ask Rabinowitch to take this
into account.

Skobeltzyn then remarked on the essance of Rabinowitch's
paper. He thought his trend of thoughts, which was to divert

Pugwash Comments

12.

Pugwash activities from its present path is wrong. Rotblat interrupted to say that Rabinowitch does not urge this, but rather wishes us to recognize that beyond present programs we should seek to have other types of topics for conferences which will make disarmament possible, even though they do not direct themselves precisely to the disarmament problem. I believe, after further discussion, there was general agreement with Skobeltzyn on this point.

The next item was the study group of psychologists proposed by Dr. Bernard and the discussion on the point was very confused. Doty made two points. 1. We could not sponsor a working group that was dissociated from our conferences as we had no means of monitoring, or following, or even helping in its work and that we should not sell our name so cheaply.

2. On the other hand, I felt that we should gradually explore the possibility of East-West cooperation in social science problems, but this should be started gradually with groups that have become well known to scientists on both sides so that Pugwash COSWA can truly act as a midwife in generating a new kind of cooperation. Ruth Adams also spoke to the effect that this group is not widely recognized and that it did not represent the most promising group for this kind of work in America.

Sarabhai said that the need is clear and we should

Sarpeist said that the need is clear and we should
the most promising group for this kind of work in America.
group is not widely recognized and that it did not represent
of cooperation. Ruth Adams also spoke to the effect that this
Budweau COEMA can truly act as a wife in generating a new kind
that have become well known to scientists on both sides so that
problems, but this should be started gradually with groups
the possibility of East-West cooperation in social science
3. On the other hand, I felt that we should gradually explore
in its work and that we should not sell our name so cheaply.
we had no means of monitoring, or following, or even helping
a working group that was disassociated from our conferences so
confused. Duty made two points. 1. We could not sponsor
boad by Dr. Bernhard and the discussion on the point was very
The next item was the study group of psychologists pro-
skopeitsyn on this point.

after further discussion, there was general agreement with
themselves precisely to the disassembly problem. I believe,
will make disassembly possible, even though they do not direct
should seek to have other types of topics for conferences which
rather wishes us to recognise that beyond present programs we
interrupted to say that Rapinowitch does not agree with this, but
Budweau activities from its present bath is wrong. Kopfist
Budweau Comments 13.

ECC

Pugwash Comments

13.

give it our blessings, but Infeld said that we cannot give our
blessing to one national group /and Powell summed up the matter
by saying that all we can do is suggest that the American
members try to identify the interests of such an operation to
the national group and if they were willing to back them we
(the American group) should come to the continuing committee
to seek contact with other national groups. The next and
similar matter dealt with a West German economist, Baade, who
would like to gain Pugwash sponsorship for a meeting on
economic aspects of disarmament and this was dismissed with a
particular contribution being made by Infeld who did not hide
his anti-German bias.

The next item - number 19 - was the request from the
general director of UNESCO to help on several questions. For
example, what can science gain with disarmament and could this
be the subject of a conference, or part of a conference?
Nearly everyone agreed that this was not a function of Pugwash,
although the secretary general was in strong disagreement.
Again, Infeld insisted / that we simply tell UNESCO to do its own
job and we will do ours. With some general discussion this
brought the meeting to a close.

["brought the meeting to a close.", "top and we will go on. With some general discussion this\nwas, Intell initiated, first we simply tell UNECO to do its own\nthrough the secretary general was in strong disagreement.", "Nearly everyone agreed that this was not a function of Budweiser,\nbe the subject of a conference, or part of a conference?", "example, what can science gain with disagreement and confound this\ngeneral director of UNECO to help on several questions. For\nThe next item - number 19 - was the request from the\nthe anti-German phase.", "particular contribution being made by Intell who did not give\neconomic subjects of disagreement and this was demonstrated with a\nwould like to gain Budweiser sponsorship for a meeting on\nsimilar matter dealt with a West German economist, Bade, who\nto seek agreement with other national droubs. The next and\n(the American droub) should come to the continuing committee\nto the national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on", "the national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\npleasing to one national droub, and Powell seemed so the matter\ndive it on, pleaseinda, but Intell said that we cannot give on\nthe national droub and it they were willing to pack them we\nwould make try to identify the interests of such an operation to\nby saying that all we can do is agitate that the American\n

Pugwash Comments

14.

Observations on the Meeting Itself and Attendant Conversations

1. The meeting throughout was relaxed with a great diversity of views expressed spontaneously with very little alignment observable. Perhaps the only trend that could be picked out was Blagoravov's occasional effort to back up Infeld and this could possibly have meant nothing more than the courtesy of one old man for another man who is still older. The meeting profited greatly from the high calibre of the Russian participants and the presence of Amaldi from Italy and Supek from Yugoslavia. One should also commend who gave a very intelligent performance. It was by far a more pleasant and clearminded meeting than any I have previously attended.

formance. It was by far a more pleasant and clearheaded meeting
One should also commend [Sarkis] who gave a very intelligent ber-
the presence of Waidi from Italy and [abg] from Indonesia.

greatly from the high calibre of the Russian participants and
for another man who is still older. The meeting benefited
positively have meant nothing more than the courtesy of one's
Bladorsavov, a occasional effort to pack up Intel and this config
operavaple. Perhaps the only trend that could be picked out was
of views expressed abontaneously with very little sligbtment

1. The meeting throughout was relaxed with a great diversity
Operations on the Meeting itself and Attendant Conversations

Budapest Comments

14.

ELCJ

Pugwash Comments

15.

2. I ate beside Infeld at one meal and talked with him afterwards on a variety of subjects. He spoke at great length about China which he had visited in 1955 and had followed the development of their physics as far as he could. On one hand, he was quite insistent that they should be brought into the United Nations and into normal world intercourse, since keeping them in their present state was having an effect on the nation comparable to the effect of solitary confinement on an individual. By producing mad men by our own methods, we would bear some responsibility for how he acted once he was released from confinement. He praised the hospitality and gentleness of the Chinese he had known and yet, at the same time, he insisted very strongly this was the great danger. Their sense of discipline was far beyond that ever achieved in any other human society and the drive which was generated within that society could accomplish things that we would not believe possible. For example, he said he felt that they would get their first atomic bomb within a few months, perhaps only three, and that the rest of the world would become complacent about it because they would think that China would not be able to produce many more. Here they would be wrong because the Chinese have the ability to concentrate their resources to do a job once they have already learned how it will be very great indeed and that

stupidly learned how will be very great indeed and that
to concentrate their resources to do a job. They have
Here they would be wrong because the Chinese have the spillo
would think that China would not be able to produce many more.
of the world would become compensate for it because they
bump within a few months, perhaps only three, and that the rest
example, he said he felt that they would get their first atomic
accomplish things that we would not believe possible. For
and the drive which was generated within that society could
was far beyond that ever achieved in any other human society
strongly this was the great danger. Their sense of discipline
Chinese had known and yet, at the same time, he insulated very
tinament. He brised the hospitality and friendliness of the
reasonability for how he acted once he was released from con-
By producing much more by our own methods, we would bear some
comparable to the effect of solitary confinement on an individual.
them in their present state was having an effect on the nation
United Nations and into normal world interconferences, since keeping
he was quite insatent that they should be brought into the
development of their physics as far as he could. On one hand,
apart China which he had visited in 1922 and had followed the
afterwards on a variety of subjects. He spoke at great length
3. I ate beside Infield at one meal and talked with him
Budhist Comments
12.

Budhist Comments

12.

CFC

Pugwash Comments

16.

once the first atomic bomb is made hundreds more will follow
very rapidly.

He further remarked on how impossible it was for him to
get beneath the surface of these people. Their hospitality
and gentleness was still only skin deep and although he did not
in any sense compare them with the evil of Nazism he felt that
there was a kind of tyranny that we simply could not understand
or reach. The only way to correct this would be to bring them
out in contact with other people. He felt that dealing with
them would be the major problem of the world for the generation
after his and then said that by this he meant the generation of
people such as myself. In other conversations his hatred for
the Germans was clearly expressed. He said that this was
emotional, not rational, but he would never be able to think
differently about them being as he was - both a Pole and a
Jew. In other conversations he was very clear minded, generally
optimistic about the growth of freedom in Poland and gently chided the
Americans for hiring their poor/physics graduates at $9,000 a
year.
est

3. I was told that the Soviet group had on a previous day
the
discussed/test ban situation with Rotblat and expressed their
profound disappointment over the fact that it was doomed. This

protonic disabatement over the fact that it was doomed. This
discussed\test pan situation with Rotplat and expressed their
the

Dear.

Americans for hiring their book\payola graduates at $2,000 a
optimistic spont\Poland and gently guided the
tow. In other conversations he was very clear winged, generally
differently spout them being as he was - both a pole and a
emotional, not rational, but he would never be able to think
the Germans was clearly expressed. He said that this was
people auch sa myself. In other conversations his hated for
after his and then said that by this he meant the generation of
them would be the major problem of the world for the generation
out in contact with other people. He felt that dealing with
or reach. The only way to correct this would be to bring them
there was a kind of tyranny that we simply could not understand
in any sense compare them with the evil of Nazism he felt that
and gentleness was still only akin deep and strongly he did not
det penest the surface of these people. Their hospitality

He further remarked on how improbable it was for him to
very rapidly.

Pudman Comments

re.

Pugwash Comments

17.

was particularly hard felt by them because they had gained the impression, the clear impression, at the Cambridge Pugwash meeting that all that was needed was the acceptance of a very small number of inspections in principle in order for American agreement to be forthcoming. They then pressed this point very hard with their government and after great difficulty succeeded in getting it accepted and then found themselves embarrassed by the fact that what they had urged as the basis of acceptance was not true. There was a brief discussion of this Saturday night at dinner when they sat with Alex Rich and again on the following evening when they had dinner with me.

I checked the situation by telephone with Frank Long on Sunday and invited the four Russians to have dinner with me on Sunday night. The main purpose of this meeting was to discuss the planning for the joint disarmament study which has now become possible through the funding of the proposal by the Ford Foundation. However, to continue on the test ban point, they asked me why I thought it had not come to pass and was their impression in Cambridge wrong or have the actual requirements of the Administration altered. I said that I felt that a large component of our position went back to the history of the operation and could be summarized by what Congressman Hollafield had said to me previously (a few weeks ago). This

Hollings had said to me previously (a few weeks ago). This
of the operation and could be summarized by what Condreaaman
that a large component of our position went back to the history
requirements of the Administration altered. I said that I felt
was their impression in Cambridge where have the actual re-
point, they asked me why I thought it had not come to pass and
by the Ford Foundation. However, to continue on the test pan
use now become possible through the funding of the proboast
discuss the planning for the joint disarmament study which
on Sunday night. The main purpose of this meeting was to
Sunday and invited the four Russians to have dinner with me
I checked the situation by telephone with Frank Pong on
again on the following evening when they had dinner with me.
this Saturday night at dinner when they sat with Alex Rich and
of acceptance was not true. There was a brief discussion of
emphasized by the fact that what they had urged as the basis
succeeded in getting it accepted and then found themselves
very hard with their government and after great difficulty
agreement to be forthcoming. They then pressed this point
small number of inspections in principle in order for American
meeting that all that was needed was the acceptance of a very
impression, the clear impression, at the Cambridge Pollsaw
was particularly hard felt by them because they had gained the
Pollsaw Comments
11.

E.C.

Pugwash Comments

18.

was that in 1960 the Soviets were offering three on-site inspections and we were asking 20. In 1963 they are offering two or three and we are asking eight or ten. Who is going half-way to meet whom? They smiled at this rather sadly and said that they appreciated the argument, but it was false to think that going back from zero to two or three again was a maneuver. It was an extraordinarily difficult operation for them. Pavlichenko said in particular that they felt as Wiesner and the others must have felt in March, 1961 when after coming back from the Pugwash meeting and helping get adjustment in the Soviet requirement to the new position at Geneva, the Soviets turned the tables and presented a completely new set of requirements. He appreciated that this made for difficulty for us at that time and now the same thing has happened to them. It was apparent that all four of the Soviets joined in the point of view that they had been in part responsible for changing the Soviet position: By that I mean the Soviets who had been at the Cambridge COSWA Conference. They felt the matter was now quite hopeless from their point of view. I explained further about the difficulty of Senate passage of such a treaty and the importance which one could expect the Senate to attach to whether or not there had been a true compromise between the two

whether or not there had been a true compromise between the two
the importance which one could expect the Senate to attach to
about the difficulty of Senate passage of such a treaty and
due hopelessness from their point of view. I explained further
Combridge COSW Conference. They left the matter was now
positions. By that I mean the Soviets who had been at the
they had been in part reasonable for changing the Soviet
that all four of the Soviets joined in the point of view that
and now the same thing has happened to them. It was apparent
appreciated that this made for difficulty for us at that time
tables and presented a completely new set of requirements. He
ment to the new position at Geneva, the Soviets turned the
Bradwan meeting and helping get adjustment in the Soviet require-
ments felt in March, 1961 when after coming back from the
said in particular that they felt as Wileman and the others must
was an extraordinarily difficult operation for them. Pavlichenko
doing back from zero to two or three again was a maneuver. It
they appreciated the argument, but it was false to think that
to meet whom? They smiled at this rather sadly and said that
or three and we are making eight or ten. Who is doing half-way
elections and we were asking 30. In 1963 they are offering two
was that in 1960 the Soviets were offering three on-site in-
Bradwan Comments
18.

Bradwan Comments

18.

(51)

Pugwash Comments

original positions. They accepted this, but again said that
they did not think that anything short of a meeting of heads
of state could alter the number that they had now agreed to.

4. The remainder of our dinnertime conversation dealt with the planned disarmament study. They were pleased that it is now possible to go ahead and were anxious to know our tentative thinking on how to proceed. After I had explained to them our plan they found it most agreeable and were anxious to know what kind of people we would try to get and whether the scheme was satisfactory with our government and whether we would have any relationship to it. More precisely they asked, "How does your government feel about it?" I assured them that the government was not involved, but that they would be receptive to any ideas that we could bring to them as a result of our work. I mentioned Panofsky and Moseley and Purcell as the kind of people we thought we had a fair chance of interesting in part-time participation and that we were trying to get half the group made up of scientists and the other half non-scientists and looked forward to having about six people present at each of the main meetings followed by some cooperative work thereafter as it could be arranged. Artsimovitch said, in particular, that he felt that the kind of people one needed were both scientists and non-

Pugwash Comments

20.

scientists and that the scientists should be more than
scientists. That is, they should have a perception of world
and
affairs/<u>involvement</u> of what is possible and what is not
possible so that they can act in a useful way. In particular,
he gave his own philosophy as being one in which the diplomatic
viewed as
process is/much too slow and the understanding of the diplomat
too limited to explore all the possibilities for agreement on
any issue under study. He felt that he was basically re-
sponsible for introducing the black box and that he did it
merely to provide a catalyst which would enable the Soviet
government to get out of a dilemma of its own making. He had
jokingly that
said/he didn't want to claim authorship for this idea unless
it ultimately turned out to be successful and it was not at
all clear that that had happened yet. He said that he had had
particular difficulty explaining to his own government the
meaning of probability in different instances and in getting
them to understand that there was an area between being
absolutely certain and being completely at the mercy of random
events. One could with wise construction of an agreement have
reasonable safety. He also said how important it was to find
specific topics for our discussions and our work, that neither
generalities nor propaganda of any kind had any place in the
kind of effort we were considering starting. They brought up

Pugwash Comments

21.

very frankly the problem of whether we should ask representatives
of other countries to join us and when I said I thought that for
at least the first six months we should try to do it ourselves
as there are so many variables involved he gave a relaxed smile
and said, "Yes, I am certain you are right."

Skobeltzyn said that having heard a summary of our thinking ~~that~~ there was no doubt that they were now considerably behind us, that they would return home and undertake planning consistent with what I had said, and by the end of April would be ready to receive Shulman and myself in order to make detailed plans in Moscow. I described the case of Shulman to them in some detail and since he was the only member of the Academy Committee that they did not know, and since he was planning to go full-time, they were naturally curious.

Pavlichenko remembered Mrs. Shulman from his visit in Cambridge
and I told them that all the details had already been sent to
~~Glagolev.~~ AT the Printing House in the US they said that he had come back with an extremely interesting and enthusiastic report of his visit in the states.

while he was only of candidate standing, he was in their eyes a
very promising person. It was agreed that I should send to
Skobeltzyn any further statement of our plans that we might draw

Pugwash Comments

22.

up and in particular they were interested in the list of items
which we should like to discuss in detail. I also added that
we might well find it useful to have a seminar twice a week at
which some current paper on disarmament or some current
political event would be discussed and analysed by both sides
and they were all very agreeable to this.

Pavlichenko, who in the days of Topchiev, had been
occasionally insulting and cynical was a model of good behavior
and there was none of his previous needling in view. He
seemed to accept a lower status among these people. Artsimovitch,
in particular, seemed to ignore him on various occasions. I
should think that his future relationship with these people is
not at all settled. One might finally remark that Skobeltzyn,
who seemed rather sleepy in past conferences, was very wide
awake at this one, seemed to be in good health, and performed
very well as leader of the group. Of the three, Artsimovitch
made the impression of having the keenest, sharpest mind, in-
dependent, hard-driving, and very analytical. He is certainly
a person to be cultivated.

Paul Doty

Dictated February 11, 1963

- 2 -

It has even been advanced that French policy is throwing doubts on the
Alliance; I would not even mention this subject if it were not that very often
ridiculous things are said that find an echo and sometimes even some willing
 listeners.

The need for the Atlantic Alliance has been reaffirmed in the clearest,
Fash ion by General de Gaulle and by our Minister for Foreign Affairs. As long as
the peril facing us all exists, no country and especially ours can fight alone a
modern war. "To have allies is a natural thing for us in the historic period in
which we live." We know very well, moreover, that American presence and that of
her nuclear weapons remain--as our Head of State has said--the essential guarantee
of world peace.

The debate bears on the shape to give to our indispensable alliance, on
the way of combining our forces and of organizing our strategy. France intends
to possess a duly national defense which, when the supreme interests of the
country should be at stake, could discourage the blackmail of a possible enemy.
Nothing in that is a sign of mistrust towards our allies. France well knows
the commitments undertaken, but she feels that the circumstances existing today
may not be the same 10, 15 or 20 years from now; no one can predict what will be
the world's situation in such a distant future. In exceptional cases when our
interests would be directly involved--although those of our allies would not be
threatened--we must have our own means to reply to that blackmail; this in itself
identifies both alliance and independence.

At the same time as France is attempting to create her own atomic force,
and I want to emphasize this point, she is not excluding in any way of course the
fact that her forces could be combined with that of similar forces of her allies
and before all with the gigantic force of the United States. If she desires to
keep in extreme cases the decision to use her own atomic means, she does not re-
main at all to cooperate either technically or strategically with her allies, if
such is their wish. France's position can be summed up in this way: to the inte-
gration of Atlantic forces she prefers a cooperation among allied forces.

She has therefore started building a nuclear armament with her own means.
This armament will be most when compared to yours, but our objectives and our
means are more limited than yours. We believe all the same that our force will
have from the start a considerable capacity of destruction which will constitute
a factor of deterrence compelling a potential aggressor to think twice before
striking.

I would add that building a nuclear force with our own means enables us
to acquire in a field unknown to us before, an infinitely precious knowledge for
the training of our scientists and for the creation of modern industries.

Though we are willing to associate our means with those of our allies,
we have not in mini helping such or such a nation to acquire in turn an atomic
armament. The treaty of cooperation just signed with Germany does not, in our
view, include the atomic field. In 1954 Germany took the pledge not to produce
herself such an armament; we hope and we believe that she desires to maintain
this state of affairs.

this state of affairs, the training of our scientists and for the creation of modern industries, to secure in a field unknown to us before, an infinitely precious knowledge for us and an instrument we hope and we believe that the desires to maintain view, including the atomic field. In 1924 Germany took the lead not to produce arms. The treaty of cooperation just signed with Germany does not, in our view, not in mind helping nor, and an action to secure in this an atomic

Thease we are willing to associate our means with those of our allies, the training of our scientists and for the creation of modern industries, to secure in a field unknown to us before, an infinitely precious knowledge for us and an instrument we hope and we believe that the desires to maintain view, including the atomic field. In 1924 Germany took the lead not to produce arms. The treaty of cooperation just signed with Germany does not, in our

creation of Atlantic forces she betares a cooperation amount filled forces, and in their wish. France, a position can be assumed in this way: to the interest at all to cooperate either technically or strategically with her allies, it keep in extreme cases the decision to use her own atoms means, she does not record and before all with the Atlantic force of the United States. It she desire to leaf that per forces could be combined with that of similar forces of her allies and I want to emphasize this point, and if not achieving in any way of course the

justifies both alliance and independence. threatened--we must have our own means to rely to that principle; this in itself. Interest would be directly involved--either those of our allies would not be the world's situation in such a distant future. In exceptional cases when our own will not be the same 10, 12 or 30 years from now, no one can predict what will be the commitment undertaken, but she feels that the circumstances existing today nothing in that is a sin of matrimony towards our allies. France well knows country should be at stake, could discontinue the principle of a possible enemy, to base a quay national defense which, when the supreme interest of the way of computing our forces and of outstanding our strategy. France intends the debate pears on the eve to give to our independentable influence, on of world peace.

per nuclear weapons remain--as our Head of State has said--the essential principle which we live. We know very well, moreover, that American presence and that of modern war. "To have allies is a natural thing for us in the historic period in the barb leading us all exists" no country and especially ours can fight alone a campaign by General de Génie and by our Minister for Foreign Affairs. We long as The need for the Atlantic Alliance has been reissued in the cleared.

Allies things are said that find an echo and sometimes even some willing Viliette! I would not even mention this subject if it were not that very often It has even been advanced that French policy is throwing dots on the

- 5 -

Besides, one must recognize that while deploring the existence of an
independent French atomic force, the United States Government itself accepts it
as a fact that does not threaten the Western entente.

On the other hand, criticisms aimed at the European policy of France are
more pronouncements, especially since the interruption of the Brussels negotiations
for the entry of Great Britain in the Common Market.

First of all I would like to go back a little and recall that French
initiatives were at the origin of this great movement for European unification.
Thanks to our efforts and before all to the improvement of our finances and
economy, the first important steps were happily made toward the formation of a
European entity of 175 million inhabitants, a very wealthy and prosperous one.

At the very moment we conceived this idea, we did not fail to ask Britain
if she wished to join us. That was in 1950, when Mr. Schuman made his first statement about the coal and steel community; at that time Britain, for reasons that were
her own and which were related in particular to her ties to the Commonwealth, refused
to participate in the negotiation we started with our five partners in Western
Europe: Federal Germany, Italy and the countries of the Benelux. At the time we
perfectly understood her attitude although we regretted it. Later, European unity
went forward to the point of realizing a Common Market aiming at a free trade
between the six countries, exchanges of persons and of capital and harmonizing
social policies, financial policies, etc. Once more Britain was approached by us,
once more she did not feel able to answer our call. But for her part she had
created an organization somewhat competitive but different from ours, because it
did not involve a common tariff, nor a common policy in the fields that I have
just mentioned, and this organization grouped together the most diverse countries
of Europe. It was called EFTA.

As a matter of fact, whilst the Common Market was progressing satisfactorily,
EFTA remained more or less stagnant. At that point, Britain changed her policy
completely, and doubtless realizing the success of our endeavour, she asked not
to join us, but to study the conditions of her admission.

This was very satisfying to us; but from the start of the negotiation we
remained her the rules of the Common Market--the rules of the Club established with
great pains by the Rome Treaty, and of the operating agreements; we told her that
of course we wished to maintain for the new members the rules that the original
signatories had imposed upon themselves.

Britain seemed to accept these quite natural terms.

Then, as you know, the negotiation started in Brussels, it has lasted
fifteen months. It was conducted, I am glad to say, on both sides with entire
good faith. But it appeared that in spite of the desire expressed by Great Britain

Good faith. But it appeared that in spite of the desire expressed by Great Britain fifteen months ago, it was conducted, I am glad to say, on both sides with entire

Then, as you know, the negotiation started in Brussels, it has finished

signatures had imposed upon themselves.

of course we wished to maintain for the new members the rules that the original Great Britain by the Rome Treaty, and of the operating agreement we took per the rules of the Common Market--the rules of the club approved with this was very satisfying to read out from the start of the negotiation we to join us, but to admit the conditions of her elimination.

that mentioned, and this organization grouped together the most diverse countries did not involve a common tariff, nor a common policy in the fields that I have created an organization somewhat competitive but different from our own, because it once more did not feel safe to answer our call. But for per cent but per cent social policies, financial policies, etc. Once more Britain was approached by us, between the six countries, exchanges of policies and of capital and harmonizing want forward to the point of realizing a Common Market aiming at a free trade policy understood per attribute afforded we negotiated it. Later, European policy in Europe: Federal Germany, Italy and the countries of the Benelux. At the time we to participate in the negotiation we started with our live business in Western her own and which were related in particular to per cent to the Common Market, returned about the coal and steel community at that time Britain, for reasons that more it she wished to join us. That was in 1920, when Mr. Schuman made his last statement about the coal and steel community at that time Britain, for reasons that more

As a matter of fact, while the Common Market was brooding over negotiations, EFTA remained more or less stationary. At that point, Britain wanted per policy

of Europe. It was called EFTA. That mentioned, and this organization grouped together the most diverse countries did not involve a common tariff, nor a common policy in the fields that I have created an organization somewhat competitive but different from our own, because it once more did not feel safe to answer our call. But for per cent but per cent social policies, financial policies, etc. Once more Britain was approached by us, between the six countries, exchanges of policies and of capital and harmonizing want forward to the point of realizing a Common Market aiming at a free trade policy understood per attribute afforded we negotiated it. Later, European policy in Europe: Federal Germany, Italy and the countries of the Benelux. At the time we to participate in the negotiation we started with our live business in Western her own and which were related in particular to per cent to the Common Market, returned about the coal and steel community at that time Britain, for reasons that more it she wished to join us. That was in 1920, when Mr. Schuman made his last statement about the coal and steel community at that time Britain, for reasons that more

European entity of 152 million inhabitants, a very wealthy and prosperous one. Thanks to our efforts and before all to the improvement of our finances and initiatives were at the origin of this great movement for European unification. That of all I would like to go back a little and recall that French

On the other hand,criticism aimed at the European policy of France was as a fact that does not threaten the Western interest.

Besides, one must recognize that while dealling with the existence of an independent French atomic force, the United States Government itself accepts it as a fact that does not threaten the Western interest.

E.T.A.

nations. It may be thatillonities will arise for some baronial baronets, but has no intention of obtaining the desired development of trade between all existing in the world, it is trying to defend the interests of its members but that spirit that it is progressing. Quite naturally, like an economic entity it was in that spirit that the Common Market was conceived and it is in

and assumes an extension of trade within the Western community. By the play of reciprocal concessions, will make possible new tariff reductions. Great Britain and with all the countries of the free world, trade treaties which, are ready to extend the benefits of negotiating with the United States, with on all industrial products which were the chief obstacle to trade. Finally, we industrial goods. At the same time we have suppressed unitharmonic restrictions reduction of about 30 per cent in the tariff that existed on January 1, 1929 for six. Secondly, already we have brought about—in regard to outside countries—a custom tariff higher than the average of the national existing tariff within the first of all the Home Treaty itself, aside the establishment of a common

interior is not so at all. France as trying to create a protectionist and autarchic entity in Europe. This itself and to become a sort of a brake upon world trade exchanger. They represent Britain and the six means that Europe is going to aim upon herself, to facilitate who are attacking our buffer say that the interruption of the negotiations pertain a tendency to exasperate somewhat the so-called brevity of the situation. Those opinion, there is nothing dramatic in all this, and I believe that some people was in a liberal treaty to enable her to maintain and expand her trade with us. In my opinion the rules of the Common Market, France otters her an alternative which in other terms, feeling that for well-known reasons, England was not ready

whom we are tied by so many memories and shared trials. Great Britain, our ally for so many years, whom we respect and admire and to whom, it gives a boost that we do not want to change our buffer in regard to and for Great Britain to proceed with the unitharmonic evolution. This view it possible for the two sides not only to maintain but also to expand their trade, and Great Britain, which, without going as far as a formal memorandum, would be based as a provisional solution the idea of an agreement between the Common Market this time will come." It is because France is of that opinion that she has proposed not yet reached the moment when inevitable transformations shown acceptable, recently: "An evolution is taking place in England that should continue." It is not ant on Great Britain. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs was saying However, and I want to underline it in the clearest manner, the door is

to a deadlock, to a more severe and painful crisis than the one we are facing now. Paris. The French Government thought it was not to believe on a road leading have linked to carry on the negotiation put none of them could tell us on what we could not come to an agreement. Our two partners of the Common Market would agriculture and the extension to the EFTA countries of the common external tariff— the industrial producers of the Commonwealth, the structural reforms of Britain the one concerned with the elimination of the preferences granted by England to accept the principle of the Common Market, in many respects and especially in

- 5 -

but this always has been the case, and I am now thinking especially of agricultural products. We do not intend in this field to maintain excessively high prices through subsidies; at the same time we foresee and it is our wish that a study be carried out of the means for distributing through international agreements surpluses which weigh so heavily upon the economy and finance of so many countries, on the American as well as on the European continents.

French policy is therefore following the great traditions of my country by remaining liberal and by looking towards the rest of the world. Moreover this is confirmed by the facts. The economic report which a few days ago was sent by President Kennedy to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House notes that the volume of the sales of manufactured products from the United States to the six countries of the Common Market has greatly increased during the last few years; and I am quoting the President: "Total US exports of manufactures to the EEC in the four years following 1957, the year before the Rome Treaty went into effect, increased by 70%--from $1.1 billion to $1.8 billion--whereas US exports of manufactures to the rest of the world declined by 6%.

Our policy has been summed up in a striking way by the following sentences in a speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the National Assembly on January 24th. Speaking of the recent agreement concluded by France and Germany which put an end to ambitions which have led to two World Wars and which on two occasions have compelled your sons to fight with ours against tyranny, M. Couve de Murville said this: "Our European partners may, at any time, discuss with us the terms of their participation in this Franco-German treaty. We have no doubt that one day they will decide to join us. Then, on the basis of a strong economic union it will be possible to define and to follow a foreign policy and a defense policy which will be truly European. Then, Western Europe, which I am hoping Great Britain will have joined without restriction, will have become a coherent political entity capable of fully cooperating with the United States within the Framework of the Atlantic Alliance and of constituting this balanced element so necessary for a global settlement."

This definition of our policy which has passed somewhat unnoticed in your press deserves to be emphasized. Through a Europe economically and politically united—a Europe to which one day we hope Great Britain will belong by accepting its rules—and through a close cooperation between this Europe and America, we believe we can facilitate the realization of a modus vivendi between East and West which has always been one of the bases of French policy. But to come to this, General de Gaulle has often said that the threat from the East must cease, and a true détente must exist so that we can discuss in a new atmosphere the really serious problems: disarmament, the problem of the aid to be given in common to the developing countries, to those two billion human beings still living in a condition of moral and physical misery and that we too easily tend to forget.

["condition of more and biennially and that we too easily tend to forget, the development countries, so those two billion human people still living in a series of problems: Quartetment, the problem of the aid to be given in common to and a true defence must exist so that we can discharge in a new atmosphere the really due. General de Gaulle has often said that the direct from the State must cease. But which has always been one of the bases of French policy. But to come to believe we can facilitate the realization of a means available between State and States--and through a close cooperation between the Emirate and America, we united--a Emirate to which one day we hope Great Britain will belong, by accepting brass reserves to be assimilated. Through a Europe economically and politically this definition of our policy when we based somewhat unformed in our", "necessity for a global settlement.\" The framework of the Atlantic Alliance and of constituting this balanced system so political entirely capable of fully cooperating with the United States within the Great Britain will have joined without restriction, will have become a coherent policy which will be truly European. Then, Western Europe, which I am hoping to mention it will be possible to define and to follow a foreign policy and a defense that one day they will decide to join us. Then, on the part of a strong economic the terms of their participation in this Franco-German treaty. We have no doubt of Murville said this: \"On European standards, at any time, discussions with us occasions have combeified. On some to light with one another France, M. Corne which but an end to aspirations which have led to the World War and which on two January, 5thp. Shearing of the recent agreement concluded by France and Germany in a breach by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Marseilles Assembly.", "Our policy has been aimed up in a striking way by the following sentences of managements to the rest of the world declined by us: \"ECC in the long years following 1925,\" the year before the Rome Treaty, said info Yerai and I am quoting the President: \"No more exports of managements to the to the six countries of the common market has greatly increased during the last few years that the volume of the sales of manufactured products from the United States President Kennedy to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House confirmed by the facts.\" The economic report when a few days ago was sent by remaining lipers and by looking towards the rear of the world.\" Moreover, since the French policy is therefore following the great traditions of all countries by well as on the European continents.", "so heavily upon the economy and finance of so many countries, on the American as of the same time we foresee and if we are right that a small part be carried out separately at the same time we foresee and if we are right that

To maintain a duly national defense, preserve the Alliance with America, and safeguard the future of European cooperation, such are our guiding principles. Is there anything strange about those principles? Are they of a nature to engender fear or a lack of confidence? I would not think so.

France who has just granted independence to nearly twenty African Nations has no ambition of dominating Europe where she is linked to very old countries by the same civilization. Neither has she the intention of changing the old alliance that for nearly two centuries has united her with the United States of America.

In critical circumstances, for instance when the Soviet Union destroyed the hopes of a summit conference, or when she threatens in Cuba or Berlin, France has always proved to be the most resolute and the most decided among the allies. Her policy of firmness, her views regarding the organization of Europe and of the Western World, her determination to seek, when the moment comes, a global settlement, do not represent only the personal opinions of one prestigious man. They are supported by a freely elected Parliament and by the massive votes of her whole people each time this people has been consulted.