Präsident wäre... « - stand der in Fürth geborene Amerikaner STERN-Journalisten mehrfach Rede und Antwort. Seine Ansichten über Vietnam, Abrüstung, Nato, sorgten dabei für Wirbel. Was Kissinger zu sagen hat und was sein Wort nach wie vor bewirkt, können STERN-Leser demnächst aus erster Hand beurteilen. Exklusiv für den deutschsprachigen Raum wird der STERN vom 27. Juni an Henry Kissingers Kommentare zu aktuellen politischen Problemen veröffentlichten.

Beim Gespräch vergangene Woche in Kissingers Büro trafen die STERN-Redakteure Wibke Bruhns und Uwe Zimmer auf einen abgeklärten »elder Statesman«, der seinem Präsidenten Ronald Reagan, was Abrüstung und Mittellamereika-Politik betrifft, kritisch gegenübersteht. »Keiner hört in dieser Regierung auf mich«, scherzte er, »deshalb nur keine Aufregung, wenn Ihnen meine Antworten Sorge bereiten.«

STERN: Dr. Kissinger, hat Kanzler Helmut Kohl - und mit ihm die gesamte Bundesrepublik - in den USA durch das Beharren auf dem Bitburg-Besuch des amerikanischen Präsidenten an Ansehen verloren?

KISSINGER: Ich glaube nicht. Grundsätzlich müssen die Beziehungen zwischen den USA und der Bundesrepublik auf die dauernden gemeinsamen Interessen beider Länder gegründet sein und nicht auf temporäre Irritationen, die von eher technischen Problemen verursacht werden. Würde Reagan nicht eine so große Achtung vor Kohl haben, dann hätte er ihm auch nicht die letzten Entscheidungen für seinen Besuch überlassen. Dauerhafte Nachwirkungen von Bitburg gibt es nicht.

STERN: Aber die deutsch-amerikanischen Probleme haben zugenommen...

KISSINGER: ... das hat aber nichts mit Bitburg zu tun.

STERN: Eines der Probleme ist die Beteiligung an Präsident Reagans »Strategischer Verteidigungs-Initiative« (SDI).

KISSINGER: Ob sich die Europäer daran beteiligen oder nicht, ist allein deren Entscheidung. Ich unterstütze das Konzept einer strategischen Verteidigung. Es ist doch absurd, den Sowjets Zehntausende von Anti-Flugzeugraketen und Abfangjägern gegen unsere Bomber zuzugestehen und den USA das Recht zu bestreiten, sich gegen Atomsprengköpfe zu schützen. Aber ich würde, anders, als

es die Reagan-Regierung will, SDI schon jetzt in unsere Vorschläge zu Abrüstungsvereinbarungen einbeziehen und die Trennung zwischen Forschung für und Aufstellung von Weltraumwaffen fallenlassen.

STERN: Versucht Washington die Europäer nicht genau damit zu locken: Erst einmal gemeinsam forschen und später entscheiden, ob tatsächlich Weltraumwaffen gebaut werden?

KISSINGER: Ja, ich weiß. Jeder Regierungsvertreter sagt mir: Wenn wir die Mitarbeit der Europäer an SDI wollen, dann rühre nicht an diesen wunden Punkt. Da ich aber kein Regierungsvertreter bin, sage ich, daß es besser ist, wenn der Öffentlichkeit ein Gesamtkonzept vorgelegt wird, das Bau und Begrenzung offensiver und defensiver Waffen gleichermaßen enthält.

STERN: Aber ist es denn nicht vernünftig, wenn sich die Politiker nach Abschluß der SDI-Forschungen zusammensetzen und fragen: Wollen wir das überhaupt?

KISSINGER: Das würde das Dilemma um die Aufstellung der Pershing II nur wiederholen. Erst würde geforscht, dann hätten wir Verhandlungen mit den Europäern, dann mit den Sowjets. Das dauernde zehn Jahre und brächte endlose Auseinandersetzungen. Unsere Position sollte sein: Sich zu schützen kann man nicht verbieten. Aber die Aufstellung von defensiven Waffen hängt von der Zahl der aufgestellten offensiven Waffen ab. Je weniger offensive Raketen, um so weniger defensive Systeme im Weltraum. Eine Begrenzung der Offensivwaffen läßt sich allerdings meiner Meinung nach nicht erreichen, solange Mehrfachprengköpfe auf Raketen montiert sind. Deshalb würde ich diese, über die Vorschläge der Reagan-Regierung zur Rüstungskontrolle hinausgehend, auf beiden Seiten abschaffen lassen.

STERN: Durch SDI könnte sich Amerika unangreifbar ma-

chen. Wie kann dies im euro-päischen Interesse sein?

KISSINGER: Ich glaube nicht, daß wir einen hundertprozentigen Schutz erreichen können. Aber es wäre doch keine schlechte Errungenschaft, wenn sich durch SDI die sowjetischen Berechnungen, mit vielviel Raketen ein Angriff erfolgreich sein könnte, erheblich erschweren. Und gäbe es je ein unangreifbares Amerika, dann würde dies unseren Willen verstärken, Atomwaffen für die Verteidigung Europas einzusetzen.

STERN: Schöne Aussichten. Während sich die USA und vielleicht später dann auch die Sowjetunion unter ihren strategischen Schirmen in Sicherheit bringen, tobt in Europa der Atomkrieg.

KISSINGER: Ich sagte schon, es wird keinen hundertprozentigen Schutz geben. Außerdem sind mehrere Arten von SDI-Systemen vorstellbar und wohl strategisch als auch politisch sinnvoll. In Europa ließen sich damit zum Beispiel Pershings und Cruise missiles gegen Raketenangriffe schützen. Daß der Schutz unvollkommen sein wird, ist kein Argument gegen den Bau einer solchen Schutzvorrichtung. Und wenn

Sie nun behaupten, dann weder die andere Seite aber keine Rüstungskontrollvereinbarungen abschließen, die deren Ofensivkräfte limitiert, dann heißt dies, daß Sie solche Vereinbarungen generell für unmöglich halten.

STERN: Offensichtlich sind solche Vereinbarungen unmöglich. Oder zeichnet sich bei den Genfer Verhandlungen etwas ab, von dem die Weltöffentlichkeit nichts weiß?

KISSINGER: Ich glaube, daß wir die Verpflichtung haben, mit den Sowjets über ernsthafte Rüstungskontrolle zu reden. Und ich halte auch den Abschluß von konkreten Vereinbarungen für möglich. Freilich wird die Furcht vor Massenvernichtung nicht dadurch verrinrigert, daß man die Zahl der Langstreckenraketen von 2200 auf 1800 reduziert, strategischen Schutz verbietet und Vielfachsprengköpfe erlaubt.

STERN: Aber die Befürchtung, daß Washington mit Weltraumwaffen das Wettrüsten beschleunigt, ist doch nicht von der Hand zu weisen?

KISSINGER: Wenn wir nicht eine militärische Struktur schaffen, die den Einsatz von offensiven Waffen erschwert, verurteilen wir uns selbst dazu, in einer Welt der ständigen atomaren Erpressung zu leben. Sie können nicht auf alle Ewigkeit den Menschen klarmachen, daß die Möglichkeit der totalen Zerstörung die Garantie ihres Überlebens ist. Ich kann sehr gut verstehen, weshalb unsere gegenwärtige Verteidigungsstrategie so viele Leute, die ich für anständig und einsichtig halte, zu Pazifisten gemacht hat.

STERN: Halten Sie denn die Vorschläge der USA, die in

> „Weshalb so viele anständige Leute Pazifisten geworden sind, kann ich gut verstehen“

56 stern

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Genf auf dem Tisch liegen – und die praktisch SDI ausklammern –, für erfolgversprechend? KISSINGER: Ich glaube nicht, daß die Genfer Konferenz einen Durchbruch bringen kann. Was wir brauchen, ist eine politische Grundsatz-Diskussion mit der Sowjetunion, bei der wir uns erst einmal darüber klar werden müssen, was wir überhaupt wollen, bevor wir uns am Konferenztisch gegenseitig Zahlen und Waffensysteme um die Ohren schlagen. Wenn wir eine solche Diskussion nicht führen, werden die Generäle und Sachverständigen auf beiden Seiten die Gespräche dominieren.

STERN: Was soll denn mit Moskau politisch grundsätzlich diskutiert werden?

KISSINGER: Ich denke an eine eher philosophische Diskussion über das Verhältnis von Angriffs- und Verteidigungswaffen und über Rüstungskontrolle, die tatsächlich die Gefahr eines Atomkriegs verringt. Der Sonderberater des Außenministeriums Paul Nitze will ebenfalls eine solche Diskussion, aber erst in zehn Jahren, wenn wir SDI haben. Ich möchte, das dies jetzt geschieht. Erst dann können beide Seiten ihren Unterhändlern in Genf konkrete Anweisungen geben.

STERN: Wer soll die Grundsatz-Diskussion mit Moskau führen?

KISSINGER: Das könnte Paul Nitze. Und um es gleich zu sagen, bevor Sie mich fragen, ich würde für diesen oder einen anderen länger dauernden Regierungsauftrag nicht zur Verfügung stehen.

STERN: Sie haben mit den Sowjets 1972 das Verbot für Antiraketenwaffen ausgehان-

delt. Verbietet das ABM-Abkommen nicht die Aufstellung defensiver Weltraumwaffen?

KISSINGER: Zu diesem Abkommen haben wir eine Stellungnahme abgegeben, daß es ab 1977 schwierig sein wird, es einzuhalten, wenn nicht die Offensivwaffen drastisch reduziert werden. Wir sollten jetzt darüber nachdenken, ob und welche Änderungen des ABM-Abkommens wir wollen.

STERN: Helmut Kohl will überhaupt keine. Er macht die Bonner Beteiligung an SDI ja gerade davon abhängig, daß der ABM-Vertrag nicht verletzt wird.

KISSINGER: Wir können nicht in Genf verhandeln, ohne uns über die Mischung von Defensiv- und Offensivwaffen klarzurufen, die wir haben wollen. Erst dann können wir entscheiden, ob der ABM-Vertrag geändert werden muß oder nicht. Erst dann kann Helmut Kohl auch sagen, daß er ihn nicht geändert wünscht. Heute darüber zu sprechen ist einfach voreilig.

STERN: Das auch von Ihnen kritisierte SALT-II-Abkommen, das die Zahl strategischer Waffen begrenzt, läuft dieses Jahr aus. Soll sich Washington

„Zwischen Mitteln und Zielen von Reagans Nicaragua-Politik besteht für mich kein Zusammenhang“

nach Ihrer Meinung auch weiterhin an die Bestimmungen des nie ratifizierten Vertrags halten?

KISSINGER: Die Frage ist, sollen wir ein Poseidon-Unterseeeboot aus dem Verkehr ziehen, wenn demnächst ein Trident-U-Boot in Dienst gestellt wird, damit die vereinbarte Raketenzahl nicht überschritten wird? Ich würde, um der öffentlichen Meinung willen, das Poseidon-Boot stilllegen. Aber es ist schon absurd, daß wir in einer Situation sind, in der die Einhaltung eines nicht ratifizierten, fehlerhaften Abkommens, das von der anderen Seite nicht in allen Punkten beachtet wird, zu einem großen Problem in der Allianz wird.

STERN: Sie haben als Vorsitzender einer überparteilichen Kommission dem Präsidenten Empfehlungen für eine amerikanische Friedenspolitik in Mittelamerika gegeben. Wie beurteilen Sie, was dort gegenwärtig geschieht?

KISSINGER: Zwischen den Mitteln und den Zielen der amerikanischen Politik besteht für mich kein einsichtiger Zusammenhang. Mein Vorschlag zur Lösung des Nicaragua-Problems wäre: alle ungenutzten Bände dieses Kissinger-Reports über Nicaragua abzuwerten, wenn nicht die Menschenrechtsabteilung im State Department den Abwurf von so viel Tonnen Papier als unvereinbar mit den Menschenrechten der Nicaraguaner betrachtet. Ich denke, das beantwortet Ihre Frage hinlänglich.

STERN: Eigentlich nicht. Was kritisieren Sie an Reagans Nicaragua-Politik konkret?

KISSINGER: Wir müssen definiieren, was wir dort erreichen wollen und welche Mittel wir dazu einsetzen. Wollen wir einen Regierungswechsel? Weniger Soldaten? Die Ausweisung der Kubaner? Und was unsere Unterstützung für die Contras betrifft: Ich habe große Schwierigkeiten, zu verstehen, was »humanitäre Hilfe« für Guerilleros eigentlich bedeutet. Aber weiter will ich gegenüber ausländischen Journalisten nicht gehen.

STERN: Wer wird nach Ihrer Meinung in der republikanischen Partei versuchen, 1988 das Erbe von Ronald Reagan anzutreten?

KISSINGER: Die Hauptberberer sind für mich Vizepräsident George Bush und der Kongreßabgeordnete Jack Kemp aus New York. Beide sind gute Freunde von mir.

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IBM

Mr. Kissinger: I don't have to worry so much about speaking with perfect precision: I can speak my Germanic English with endless sentences. I have a chance to edit this and take out sentences and modify sentences. I mean, it can't be in your interest that I say something that I don't want to say.

[Laughter]

Mr. Kissinger: It's not in my interest. I mean, that is how we did it with all other interviews.

Male Interlocutor: We did it last time the same way. But you edited the German version.

Mr. Kissinger: I would rather edit the English version and trust you to do a good job on the German.

Male Interlocutor: We will get the transcript by tomorrow.

Mr. Kissinger: Okay. And I'll have it back to you Monday. I'll do it over the weekend. I don't make many changes. I will tighten it up. I may put in a clarifying sentence; I may expand a sentence. I will not change the ideas.

Female Interlocutor: Yeah, sure. I mean, we normally do this, that whoever we interview surely should have a look at it and confirm that this is what he wants to say.

Mr. Kissinger: What is your job at Stern now?

Male Interlocutor: Foreign Editor.

Mr. Kissinger: And yours?

Female Interlocutor: I'm the Washington correspondent. And that's the Editor-in-Chief.

HK: You have a local correspondent here, too, that I've met once.

Female Interlocutor: We have several here.

Male Interlocutor: You met Ivan [Luther?].

Mr. Kissinger: No, I met a girl.

Male Interlocutor: Eva [Witmuller]?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes.

Female Interlocutor: Eva [Witmuller]. Well, we have people here, and we have people in Washington. I'm running the office from Washington, I'm his successor.

Mr. Kissinger: Oh, that's where we met. Okay.

Male Interlocutor: Since we start with this interview, presenting Henry Kissinger to the German public for the first time, we would like to ask some personal questions. First, you are consultant to ABC?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes.

Male Interlocutor: To other medias as well?

Mr. Kissinger: No. Well, I write that column --

Male Interlocutor: That column which we will carry next year.
And you're doing your speeches?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes.

Male Interlocutor: To be a consultant to foreign governments?

Mr. Kissinger: No. I don't take any foreign governments -- I don't take any governments at this time, as clients

Male Interlocutor: And as I learned from U.S. News and World Report, Mr. Rodgers is working with you?

Mr. Kissinger: Bill Rodgers?

Male Interlocutor: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Not the former Secretary of State?

Male Interlocutor: It's not the former Secretary of State?

Mr. Kissinger: No.

Male Interlocutor: Another mistake.

Mr. Kissinger: It is the man who was Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs when I was in the State Department. He is a senior partner of Arnold & Porter, and he's on our Board of Directors and occasionally does projects for us.

Male Interlocutor: And who else? After [???] left?

Mr. Kissinger: [DAVISON] is on our Board of Directors.

Female Interlocutor: [Eagelburger?], is that right?
[Eagelburger.]

Mr. Kissinger: [Eagelburger] is president of the company, and he's a full-time employee.

Male Interlocutor: And you are living here in New York?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes.

Male Interlocutor: You don't have a home in Georgetown?

Mr. Kissinger: I did until last summer, but I gave it up.

Male Interlocutor: And do you have a summer home somewhere else?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. In Kent, Connecticut. It's sort of a weekend home.

Male Interlocutor: You moved in here recently, because we have a story here from May, where it says, Suite 1100, and there is no...

Mr. Kissinger: That's right. We moved because ~~I got too~~ crowded. And actually, too expensive, in that other building.

Male Interlocutor: You are working with the Chase Manhattan Bank as well?

Mr. Kissinger: Well, "working with," I'm on their International Advisory Board, which meets twice a year, and I meet with their Risk Committee three or four times a year.

Male Interlocutor: But the bank is the owner of this house?

Mr. Kissinger: No. The bank has nothing to do with this building.

Male Interlocutor: But the bank is in the building.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it?

Male Interlocutor: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, at any rate, the bank has nothing to do with this building.

Female Interlocutor: But I heard you had signed or something with Burton-Marsteller as well?

Mr. Kissinger: No. Burton & Marsteller, that was an erroneous news story. What we have said is, if they have a problem that is not public relations, they would keep us in mind. We have said that if we get a problem that is public relations, and since we don't do public relations, we will keep them in mind. It's a mutual accommodation. We are not associated except in the very general way that we will try to be friendly to each other. But we are not working for them, and they are not working for us.

Male Interlocutor: And the former Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, is working --

Mr. Kissinger: He is not working with us at all. He's a close personal friend, but he's not working with us.

Female Interlocutor: He's not a member of Kissinger Associates?

Mr. Kissinger: No.

Female Interlocutor: Oh.

Male Interlocutor: But he is delivering speeches, as you are. For another company.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, this company I deliver speeches in my private capacity, not for this company. He delivers speeches in his private capacity. We are very good friends, but we have no business relationship with each other.

Male Interlocutor: OK. Dr. Kissinger, where are the German-American relations after Bitburg?

5

Mr. Kissinger: I do not think that Bitburg was a permanent event in U.S.-German relations. It created a great deal of excitement for a month; it brought to the surface some memories, particularly for the Jewish community here. I do not think it did any damage. And in a way

[Interruption by telephone call]

HK (cont'd): I think that German-American relations are fundamentally good. I think Bitburg has had the purifying effect of teaching both sides the importance of the fundamentals, again. And I think it will be forgotten in a very short time.

Male Interlocutor: Wasn't it a, to say the least, a very bad idea to put Bitburg in this itinerary?

Mr. Kissinger: I think the motives of everybody concerned were good. Nobody intended anything I think the intention of symbolizing a reconciliation was an honorable intention. People can argue how necessary it was. I think, then I suppose the presence of the SS graves had a different connotation in the Federal Republic than it did in the United States. So as the dialogue developed, it had many unfortunate aspects. As you know, I, in the last week, endorsed the President's going to Bitburg, because I thought that the symbolism of not going was worse than the symbolism of going. I would have preferred it if the issue had not arisen.

Female Interlocutor: You mean, after it had come so far, that he really couldn't retract?

Mr. Kissinger: After it had reached a certain point, I thought
it would do much more damage than good to cancel

Male Interlocutor: Our Chancellor could have solved the problem,
releasing the President.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, you are Germans; you will -- I noticed that
four hundred out of your Parliament, as against twenty-three,
asked for the visit to go forward, which would suggest that there
was a strong public opinion inside Germany that it should go
forward.

Male Interlocutor: But it didn't serve well for the President,
and for Chancellor Kohl, as the elections showed.

Mr. Kissinger: I can't judge what it did for Kohl, and I can't
judge whether the elections were affected one way or the other by
Bitburg. I think it caused our President a few weeks of
controversy; I do not think it did him any permanent damage.

Male Interlocutor: So what you are saying in effect is, there is
no lasting damage being done by this unfortunate event?

Mr. Kissinger: No. I wouldn't even call it -- you know, I'd
call it a regrettable -- I'd call it a pity that this turned into
such an issue. But it sometimes happens that with the best
intentions, things get beyond the point where remedial measures
don't do more damage than good; which, it seems to me, is what
would have happened in this case.

Female Interlocutor: Do you think that Helmut Kohl has suffered
something in the respect of the American President or the
American Administration?

7

Mr. Kissinger: I don't think so.' I think that fundamentally, the relations between the United States and the Federal Republic have to be based on the permanent interests of both countries, and not on temporary irritations caused by technical problems. If Reagan did not pay great attention to Kohl, he wouldn't have let Kohl make the final decision. So to him the relationship matters. Now, what various subordinate officials may have said at various stages of the controversy isn't as important as what people will think in June, and by June, I think there will be no real permanent effect.

Male Interlocutor: No, but there will be still problems.

Mr. Kissinger: Oh, yes --

Male Interlocutor: For example, SDI.

Mr. Kissinger: Certainly, but that will not be affected by
Bitburg.

Male Interlocutor: How do you think is this Government here
handling the SDI proposal?

Mr. Kissinger: I have a different view about handling the SDI proposal from this government. I favor SDI. That is to say, I favor a concept of strategic defense. I think it is absurd to say that the Soviets can have ten thousand anti-aircraft missiles and uncounted thousands of fighter planes against bombers, and that that is not destabilizing. But one cannot have defense against missile warheads. That is an intellectual absurdity. Secondly, I believe that it is impossible, for the indefinite future, to base the security of

8

the West entirely on unopposed offensive forces. It will
demoralize the public. Where I differ with the Administration
is, one: they must explain just what kind of SDI they really
from both the point of view of strategy and arms until
want; secondly, whether the Europeans participate or not, it
seems to me entirely a European decision. It is not something
for which we should expend a huge energy. Third, I would favor
building SDI into arms control proposals now, and not separate
the issue of research from the issue of deployment. That
separation can only repeat the same dilemmas that arose with the
INF: that we first have research; then a negotiation with the
Europeans; then a negotiation with the Soviets. Our position
should be defensive deployments will be related to offensive
deployments. The lower the offense, the lower can be the
defense. We are prepared now to accept limitations on defense,
provided there are no limitations also on offense. The more
severe the limitations on offense, the more severe the
limitations on defense. I, finally, don't believe that the
offensive limitation problem can be solved as long as there are
multiple warheads on missiles. And I would therefore favor
abolishing multiple warheads. So it's in these respects that I
would, in some categories, go further than the Administration in
the arms control side. But I would also go further than this
artificial separation between research and deployment.

Male Interlocutor: Which is in Europe a big issue. Because even
the SPD just told us, Oscar La Fontaine, that they would
participate in research, but not in building new strategic
weapons systems.

Mr. Kissinger: I know; every expert tells me that if we want
European cooperation, we must not raise the issue of distinction
between research and deployment. Since I'm not in government, what I would do if I were in government, I don't know. Since I'm not in government, I must say that I believe it is better to
explain to the public in one lump or one total approach, how
offense and defense are related to each other, and how we propose
to build and to limit each.

Male Interlocutor: Do you think it's in the Europeans' interest to have a fortress America?

Mr. Kissinger: Well, first of all, you know, there are two
totally contradictory arguments. One is that SDI will not work,
and the other is that it will work so well that you will have a
fortress America. One, that it is ineffective; the other that it
is destabilizing. First of all, I don't think that it is
possible to have a perfect defense. And I do not think it makes
any sense to say that unless you can have a perfect defense, you
can have no defense at all. I think to complicate Soviet
calculations, or any aggressor's calculations, to force a level
of attack of a size that countries will be very reluctant to
undertake, it would be a mean achievement, if they want to get
anything through. But assuming that you could get a fully
protected America, that would certainly be in the European
interest, because it would certainly increase our willingness to
use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.

C Y J

Male Interlocutor: But do you criticize the position of the [Bundestag?], for example, now? That they are not able to get a position together with the French?

Mr. Kissinger: Whether the Europeans do it separately or with us, or whether they do it at all or not, I think that's essentially a European decision. Now, from a technological point of view, from the little I understand of the subject, of all the military areas which do not lend themselves to a totally separate European effort -- I think SDI seems to be one of them, since -- it seems to me that the information and the weapons ought to be tied together, for a strategic defense. I have favored a much greater autonomy for Europe in conventional defense, and I favor even autonomy for Europe in the Franco-British nuclear forces.

In SDI, if somebody can figure out how to do an autonomous European defense that doesn't duplicate everything we're already doing, I have no objection to that.

Female Interlocutor: It doesn't mean -- I mean, the biggest fear in Europe concerning -- well, of several ones -- concerning SDI in Europe is this decoupling. It's the question that you --

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but I think it's nonsense.

Female Interlocutor: But when you say you don't really care, or it doesn't play any role if the Europeans take part --

Mr. Kissinger: No, I -- If I were a European, I would first of all, as an American, I would welcome European participation. If I were a European I would accept the offer. But if European statesmen prefer their populations vulnerable, it is not up to us to give them great lectures on whether they

11

[Y]

protect them or not, ~~protect them.~~ I think from a moral, political and military point of view, it is better to have some defense. I don't, however, think that it is our duty to insist on it. Now, the decoupling ~~is~~ is based on the argument that if the United States is relatively less vulnerable, it is relatively less likely to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. That argument, I think, is nonsense; because that seems to imply that ~~America~~ when ~~Europe~~ had an atomic monopoly, and was therefore invulnerable, it was less likely to defend Europe than when its cities were open to attack, which, on the face of it, is ridiculous. If we had an atomic monopoly, ~~we would certainly be~~ more likely to defend Europe than if we didn't. The obstacle to American assistance to Europe must be the fear of the devastation of America. To the extent that that fear can be reduced, to that extent we should be more willing to use nuclear weapons.

Male Interlocutor: But SDI is not working for Europe, besides for bombers and so on.

Mr. Kissinger: To begin with, ~~you cannot get~~ a one hundred ~~is not likely.~~ percent effective defense. Nor is it working for cruise missiles and bombers, necessarily, for the United States. If you can make ~~Nevilleles~~ the calculations more complicated -- first of all, there are many kinds of SDI that you can imagine. One is a protection of retaliatory forces. Or, in Europe, a terminal defense of the Pershings and Cruise missiles, for example. The second is ~~an attack against small-scale~~ a protection against small-scale attacks, ~~or [?? third]~~ countries. That would have the advantage that nobody could do a demonstration use of nuclear

12

["weapons. And would have, if he wanted to use nuclear weapons, have to do it so massively that this would, theoretically at least, increase the reluctance. The third is to try to build a defense even against a massive attack. Now, if one did that, one would of course have to do something about cruise missiles and bombers, also. But to say that one will build no defense because one can have no perfect defense; to assume that the other side will never negotiate an arms control agreement that puts serious limitations on their ability to affect a capacity of total destruction, really means that one doesn't believe any arms control is possible.", "Female Interlocutor: Do you believe it is possible?", "Mr. Kissinger: Arms control? Yes, I believe that we have an", "obligation to try to talk to the Soviets about serious arms control. But their view is impossible without a serious attempt to reduce their number of missiles from twenty-two hundred to eighteen hundred, or from twenty-five hundred to eighteen hundred or to fifteen hundred, and you permit multiple warheads, and you have no defense, will not affect the fear of mass extermination or the capacity of mass extermination. It has", "the utility that the superpowers have proved that they can make some agreement with each other. And it can therefore perhaps relax the atmosphere; and I would therefore support even such an agreement. And, after all, I negotiated the only agreements that exist at this moment. So yes, I believe in arms control agreements; but I also believe that at this moment, we should not repeat the categories of the late '50s and early '60s, when current arms control theory was created, and when assured", "of the better understanding that we have reached in our efforts to reduce our number of missiles and to increase the effectiveness of our armed forces, and to prevent any such action from being taken by other powers. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask the other Powers to do the same. I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that we have a very good chance of accomplishing these objectives. I believe that the superpowers will act in unison to further the interests of peace and to further the efforts of the United Nations to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that the United States will play a leading role in this effort, and I ask especially the Powers that have not already done so, to come forward at once to help us in this effort. I ask also the United Nations to take action to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons, especially in the Far East, and to take such action as will ensure the安全 of the United States and the other Powers in their efforts to maintain a strong and effective international order based on the principles of law and of Reasonable Diplomacy. I believe that

destruction was the basic theory. Because weapons have become
more accurate, warheads have become more numerous, and the
psychological impact of totally vulnerable populations has become
more evident.

Male Interlocutor: But isn't SDI basically just another step in
what people call the arms race?

Mr. Kissinger: It depends entirely how one visualizes and
presents it. It can be that, and it can also be a step towards
real arms control.

Male Interlocutor: Well, let me put it another way. Isn't SDI
exactly the opposite of what Geneva was meant to be?

Mr. Kissinger: No, not in my view. In my view, supposing SDI
had never been invented or thought of. And people forget that
the actual budget of the Reagan Administration for SDI is only
marginally larger than the budget that Carter had already
allocated ~ asked for !
created. ~ Carter had nineteen billion dollars, and I think Reagan
has twenty-six billion dollars, and I'll bet the Congress will
cut some out of that too. So if we talk of actual expenditures,
the difference isn't ~~and that's for five years~~. Many of the
scientists and intellectuals who developed original arms control
theory, to whom I belong, have got themselves into this frame of
mind that ~~they must oppose~~ any new weapon, because any new weapon
~~just fuels the arms race. And at a minimum, they should freeze~~
things more or less where they are. I believe that if we do not
reverse their thinking about it, and unless we can create a
military structure which makes the use of offensive weapons less

CY2

14

plausible, we will be living in a world, in one way or another, of nuclear blackmail, which will demoralize our publics. It is not easy to keep explaining to the publics that the capacity to destroy them is a guarantee of their security. That is a novel event in history; and it explains why many sensible, decent people have become pacifists. In the past, the consequences of defeat were worse than the consequences of war. With unopposed nuclear offensive forces, this is not necessarily self-evident.

And so, while as a statesman I cannot accept the proposition of unilateral disarmament, I can understand how many people whom I consider decent and thoughtful and serious are caught up in this dilemma. Of course, there are also groups that are encouraged by the Soviet Union, and groups that are anti-U.S. no matter what we do; but those we can't reach regardless.

SM: But while the [inaudible] proposal from Geneva rots from the Reagan Administration on the table, I think it's obvious, as Mr. Gorbachev said, the consultations and conversations are fruitless.

Mr. Kissinger: The mere fact that the Soviets have said something is fruitless doesn't mean that they will not negotiate. Every negotiation what the Soviets have attempted to do in recent years the Soviets have gone through various stages in their negotiation. In the late '60s, they were asking for equality because they were behind, so we were talking about equal numbers. Then in the late '70s, they were asking for equal security. By that time, when they were numerically ahead in several categories, each side should reduce by the same

CY2

15

amount, so theoretically we would reach zero and they would have
something left. But at any rate, their margin would be frozen permanently.
Now they are beginning every negotiation by asking us to give up
something unilaterally -- SDI now, INF a few years ago. The mere
fact that Gorbachev says something is fruitless doesn't mean that
it is. Now, I have never believed -- I do not believe the Geneva
conference
border is the best place to achieve breakthroughs. I think we
need a conceptual discussion with the Soviets, in which we try to
discuss with each other what we are trying to achieve before we
start throwing numbers and weapons systems at each other at a conference
table
Because otherwise the colonels on each side, and the experts, are
going to dominate the procedures.

Male Interlocutor: What exactly do you have in mind?

Mr. Kissinger: I have in mind a philosophical discussion, or a
conceptual discussion of the relation between offense and
defense. Now, Nipser has said this should happen, but he wants
to do it in ten years, when we have the defensive weapons. I
want to do it now. We can discuss now what the relationship
an arm should be. Then each side can give instructions to its
until negotiators that mean something.
It's generally

Male Interlocutor: Who could discuss this?

Mr. Kissinger: NIPSER could discuss it. Every time I make such
a proposal, people think I'm putting myself forward.

Male Interlocutor: That's what I was just about to ask.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to make absolutely clear I will accept no
operational job in this Administration. I am happy to give

C.Y.D.

16

advice, and I do it occasionally; I'm happy to do an errand for a
week or so. I would not be available for this ~~assignment. So I~~
~~recommended~~ I've been telling this to the press for six
months/ nobody will print it. I hope you will print it.

[Laughter]

Female Interlocutor: How do you see the future of the ABM --

Mr. Kissinger: I definitely do not think that -- I will not be part of that.

Female Interlocutor: [unintelligible]

Mr. Kissinger: What do I think of the future of the ABM treaty?

People forget that at the time of the ABM treaty, we filed a
unilateral statement saying that if there were not a significant
reduction of offensive forces by the end of the interim
agreement, and it ended in '77, it would be difficult to maintain
the treaty. I think we should begin now discussions of how to
relate ABM to a comprehensive offensive agreement, and to see
what we would want to change.

[End of Side One]

[Side Two]

Formulate a question relevant to answer and
entailing at least two issues.

Mr. Kissinger: There are two issues. We have signed an
agreement we refuse to ratify. The Soviets are not keeping some
of its provisions, ~~specifically~~ to reduce from ~~two thousand and two~~ to
twenty-two-fifty. We have observed an agreement which we have
refused to ratify, and part of which the Soviets are not

17

observing. That's a sort of a paradoxical position. Now this
agreement is going to lapse at the end of this year. We are
being asked now to extend a non-ratified agreement that has
lapsed, and that the Soviets are not observing. So that is a
ridiculous position. Now, the concrete issue is: Should we
scrap one Polaris submarine, that is due for retirement at the
end of this year? Because Polaris submarines have weapons aimed
primarily at civilians, and because we have too many weapons
aimed at civilians as it is, I would for the sake of public
opinion retire that submarine from the fleet; maybe put it in dry
dock, or do something to take it out of action. Or scrap it.
That's not a major thing. But I think it is absurd to find
oneself in a position where the implementation of a non-ratified
lapsed agreement that the other side is not observing becomes a
huge issue. And we ought to address that problem. I would not
address it on the issue of one Polaris submarine.

Female Interlocutor: The deployment has to go into practice --

Mr. Kissinger: Yes. And therefore I would probably do what is required.

Female Interlocutor: But people say it sends the wrong signal.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, it does send an absurd signal. But not doing it would create such a storm that we would probably do it.

Male Interlocutor: One step back to SDI: you said you would prefer new negotiations about ABM, and Helmut Kohl is saying without plying to ABM, Germany could not participate in research.

Mr. Kissinger: Without what?

EYD

18

Male Interlocutor: Sticking to the limits, or within the limits of ABM.

Mr. Kissinger: At this point, we don't have to face that issue, whether we stick to the limits of ABM or not. All I'm saying is that Paul Nipsed has stated publicly that once the research has reached a certain point, we will have to begin negotiations both with our allies and with the Soviets, about the relationship of defense to offense. I believe that this will create a nightmare, because what are we then going to negotiate about in Geneva? Just offensive limitations? Offensive limitations without knowing what the defensive limitations are, in a total vacuum. I would begin the negotiations now; we can then decide whether ABM has to be changed or not. Then Helmut Kohl can say it should not be changed, once we know what the issue is. At this point, that is premature. I just would like to start the discussion of how we would conceive that relationship. Or at least, the internal Allied discussion.

Male Interlocutor: Is somebody listening in this Government to your advice?

Mr. Kissinger: No. If you want my [practical opinion?].

[Laughter]

Mr. Kissinger: So, if you are worried about what I'm saying, relax.

Female Interlocutor: Well, talking about advice, I mean, if you -- at least, where I've heard advice concerning Central America -- can we go on to this subject now? So what is your...?

CYJ

Mr. Kissinger: I have been filed a report that was unanimous in an election year -- which I think is a great tribute to the American political process, that leading Democrats would join a Republican group in a report that wanted to support every aspect of the Administration policy. It was not inconsistent with the Administration policy. Since that report, I have stayed out of Central American discussion.

Female Interlocutor: So what's your judgment about the developments since?

Mr. Kissinger: My judgment is that there is no obvious relationship between ends and means.

Female Interlocutor: Could you figure out where this Government is heading, in fact? In Nicaragua?

Mr. Kissinger: No, I don't want to go too deeply into it. I made a speech the other day, I think, part of which was printed, but not widely, and certainly not in Germany, on a forum in which the Secretary of State was present. It was to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Norman Podhoretz's -- the editor of Commentary, -- and I said that my solution to the Nicaragua problem was to drop all the unused copies of the Kissinger Report on Nicaragua, unless the human rights division considered such a tonnage incompatible with the human rights of the Nicaraguans.

[Laughter] I think that answers your question.

Male Interlocutor: Well, what do you think about the --

Mr. Kissinger: You can quote. This is a quote from the speech.

20

C7J

Male Interlocutor: What do you think about the privatization, if the word is correct, of American foreign policy; that now the Washington Times is sending help to the Contras; in Europe, social forces are a kind of -- are going to Nicaragua?

Mr. Kissinger: I have great difficulty understanding the relationship between the vital interest and a request for fourteen million dollars. And I have great difficulty understanding the concept of humanitarian aid for guerrillas.

Male Interlocutor: Could you explain this a little bit further?

Mr. Kissinger: I think there is an incompatibility between ends and means. And we have to define what we want. Do we want a change in the military situation in Nicaragua? It's a lowering of the army, the expulsion of foreigners. Do we want a change in the government? Do we want the participation by other groups in the government? And then we have to find means that are appropriate to each objective. Further than that, I don't want to go in a foreign journal.

Male Interlocutor: Then we have to go back to the East-West problem. What about it? The summit between Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan -- how do you judge this young man in the Kremlin?

Mr. Kissinger: I would say it doesn't do Gorbachev a great favor to pretend that he is a great revolutionary. You would have to assume that somebody who gets put in as General Secretary by the leading people of the Politburo is considered reasonably orthodox by them. Now it is of course possible that they make a mistake, and that he will change things dramatically. And he will have to change some things dramatically, out of necessity.

21

Male Interlocutor: For example, what?

Mr. Kissinger: I think the not-running of the economy cannot go on as it is. And I think the running of the government cannot go on, on this personal, feudal basis on which it is now being conducted. But I think he will have his hands full taking care of his domestic problems for a year or so. At a minimum. I am very dubious about a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, an early meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. When I was in office when anybody is in office, one has to prepare talking points for such a meeting. I can't quite visualize what these talking points would say, at this stage. Maybe a year from now there will be some variation. I don't think heads of government should meet just to get acquainted. That is a personalization of issues. I think once negotiations have reached a certain point, I could see a sort of utility in a meeting between the U.N. anyway, I would certainly favor a meeting in that context. I would not say we should avoid him. But to schedule a separate, special trip by Gorbachev to the United States before we know what we want to achieve, or can achieve, I think has so many dangers as promises. Almost all unprepared summits have failed.

Male Interlocutor: What is the obstacle in Washington that the Government is not knowing what to do in Central America, and arms control, and East-West relations?

Mr. Kissinger: I'm not saying the Government doesn't know what to do. I agree with the Government on most things; we've

obviously discussed those things on which I have no answers of
difference. It's difficult to run our government with so many
semi-autonomous departments, and that insits on
assuming executive functions.

Male Interlocutor: But the President has to decide.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, and so far, you have to say that the
President, while he does not operate the way intellectuals
visualize Presidents operate, has an extraordinary record of
achieving what he has set out to do. And it's too early in
foreign policy to judge how this will end up.

Male Interlocutor: But you said in an earlier speech that the
first month of the second term would be the most important in
East-West relations, international relations, so nothing has
happened yet.

Mr. Kissinger: No, and I don't expect anything to happen yet. I expect, if something happens, it will happen next spring. I think they will have to go through one or two more rounds in Geneva, and I'm assuming that there are private exchanges going on between the President and Gorbachev. I don't know that, but I would hope that.

Male Interlocutor: But from what one sees, isn't it a fair
assessment to say that the American-Soviet relationship are in
pretty bad shape? With the "empire of evil" and all?

Mr. Kissinger: Oh, but that was said three years ago, two years
ago, to a group of preachers. And I think one also should keep
in mind that -- I mean, this idea that the Soviets get deeply
offended because of one phrase --

23

Male Interlocutor: But it's a very useful --

Mr. Kissinger: -- irremediably offended -- ~~and~~ take any month's issue of _Pravda_ and see what they say about us, and I guarantee you that there are more phrases insulting to the United States in one week's issue of _Pravda_ than in that one phrase of the President. I would not, if he had asked my opinion, have recommended that he use that particular phrase. But I don't think that it had any permanent impact.

Male Interlocutor: Then what you're saying in effect is the American-Soviet relationships are basically unchanged from the Carter times, for example?

Mr. Kissinger: I don't think they were that great in the Carter times. After all, in the Carter times, the Soviet Union challenged us in many parts of the world. What you have to say in the Reagan period is that the rhetoric has been worse than in many previous periods, but the Soviet actions have been extremely cautious, maybe because they've had so many changes of leadership. But maybe also because they did not want to risk a confrontation.

Male Interlocutor: Politics of "strength does pay", is that it?

Mr. Kissinger: I'm not saying that I'm simply stating the empirical fact that there has not been an actual confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union except in rhetoric. And I'd rather have it in rhetoric than in action. And in the Carter period, if you think of the Soviet troops in Ethiopia, the invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of

Cambodia, which was not done by the Soviets but which was certainly encouraged by the Soviets, and I think there was infinitely more turmoil in that period than there was and has been so far in the Reagan period. Now, I think we are in a pre-period of negotiation with the Soviets. The Soviets will not give up their posture of intransigence, which gives them a chance to strain the relation between the United States and Europe, until we are further along in the process of negotiation. The other hand, I think the mere fact that they sent Gromyko to see Reagan before the election indicates to me that they are interested in a negotiating basis. Whether it is possible for either side to break through the encrusted positions of nearly a decade, that I don't know. But I am not pessimistic; I expect that we will make significant progress by next year. The thing that concerns me more -- I can conceive agreement on offensive limitations quite easily. What I have trouble is, will we actually make a breakthrough at the end of which we can say not just "we have an agreement," but "we have significantly reduced the danger to civilian lives and for the use of nuclear weapons"? That is the big intellectual jump.

Male Interlocutor: Has Reagan the lame duck problem?

Mr. Kissinger: Not yet. But he will have it, increasingly, in the last two years of his term.

Female Interlocutor: Do you think that the deficit is going to contribute to difficulties increasingly, or do you think that he's going to handle this problem?

25

Mr. Kissinger: We will know more by the end of the year. I think he'll handle it. I, unfortunately, have to leave you. I've given you enough to raise a lot of --

Male Interlocutor: The last question should be: Who will be the successor? For Mr. Reagan, in your opinion?

Mr. Kissinger: I -- just as I'm staying out of operational politics, operational foreign policy, I'm going to stay out of politics. To me, it seems as if the main contenders are Bush and Kemp; maybe Dole can emerge. I don't see any other visible contender at this moment. Now, Jeane Kirkpatrick might become a Vice-Presidential candidate; and there are some people who think she'll become a Presidential candidate.

Male Interlocutor: Did Mr. Kemp call you for foreign policy advice yet?

Mr. Kissinger: I've known Kemp for a long time, and I've known Bush for a long time. They're both friends of mine; I've occasionally talked to both of them. But again, I don't want to give you the wrong impression. I'm not a major factor in their campaign. Or in their positions. And I'm going to stay out of the in fact, I have let both of them know that while I'm prepared to give them my opinion before they have declared their candidacy, I will stay out of after they have declared their candidacy.

Male Interlocutor: Thank you very much, Mr. Kissinger.

FROM L.A. TIMES SYNDICATE INT'L
AVAILABLE BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT ONLY
WORLD RIGHTS. (3300 WORDS)

FOR RELEASE, THURS. JUNE 13th, 1985

PLS CONTACT JESSE E. LEVINE, DIRECTOR, LA TIMES INT'L
145 EAST 49 STREET, SUITE 9C, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017
TLX: 177145 LATS MUT; TEL: 212-644-3355

This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized
only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the
exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not
under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized,
paraphrased, or in any way published, in whole or in part.
Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the
contents of this material to third parties prior to
publication.

DER STERN INTERVIEW WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER
For release Thursday, June 13, 1985

by DER STERN correspondents ROLF WINTER, UWE ZIMMER, and WIBKE BRUHNS.

Q: Where are German-American relations after President
Reagan's visit to Bitburg?

A: I do not think that Bitburg was a permanent event in U.S.-German relations. It created a great deal of excitement for a month; it brought to the surface some memories particularly for the Jewish community here. I do not think it did any damage. I think that German-American relations are fundamentally good. Bitburg had the purifying effect of teaching both sides the importance of the fundamentals, again. And I think it will be forgotten in a very short time.

Q: Wasn't it, to say the least, a very bad idea to put
Bitburg in his itinerary?

A: I think the motives of everybody concerned were good. I think the intention of symbolizing a reconciliation was an honorable intention. People can argue how necessary it was. I suppose the presence of the SS graves had a different connotation in the Federal Republic than it did in the United States. So as the dialogue developed, it had many unfortunate aspects. As you know, I, in the last week, endorsed the President's going to Bitburg, because I thought that the symbolism of not going was worse than the symbolism of going.

I would have preferred it if the issue had not arisen.<

Q: Our chancellor could have solved the problem, releasing the President.<

A: Well, I noticed that 400 members of your parliament, as against 23, asked for the visit to go forward, which would suggest that there was a strong public opinion inside Germany that it should go forward.<

Q: Do you think that Helmut Kohl lost respect with the President or the Administration?<

A: I don't think so. I think that fundamentally the relations between the United States and the Federal Republic have to be based on the permanent interests of both countries, and not on temporary irritations caused by technical problems.<

Q: But there will be still problems, for example, SDI.<

A: Certainly, but that will not be affected by Bitburg.<

Q: How do you think the Administration is handling the Strategic Defense Initiative proposal?<

A: I have a different view about handling the SDI proposal from this government. I favor a concept of strategic defense. I think it is absurd to say that the Soviets can have 10,000 antiaircraft missiles and uncounted thousands of fighter planes against bombers, and that that is not destabilizing. But one cannot have defense against missile warheads. That is an intellectual absurdity. Secondly, I believe that it is impossible, for the indefinite future, to base the security of the West entirely on unopposed offensive forces. It will demoralize the public, Where I differ with the Administration is one, they must explain, just what kind of SDI they really want. Secondly, whether the Europeans participate or not, it seems to me, is entirely a European decision. It is not something for which we should expend a huge energy. Third, I would favor building SDI into arms control proposals now, and not separate the issue of research from the issue of deployment. Our position should be defensive deployments will be related to offensive deployments. The lower the offense, the lower can be the defense. We are prepared now to accept limitations on defense, provided there are to be limitations also on offense. The more severe the limitations on offense, the more severe the limitations on defense. Finally, I don't believe that the offensive limitation problem can be solved as long as there are multiple warheads on missiles. And I would therefore favor abolishing multiple warheads. So it's in these respects that I would, in some categories, go further than the Administration in the arms control side. But I would also go further than this artificial separation between research and deployment.<

Q: But in Europe that is a big issue.<

A: I know. Every expert tells me that if we want European cooperation, we should not raise the issue of distinction between research and deployment. I must say that I believe it is better to explain to the public in one lump sum, one total approach, how offense and defense are related to each other, and how we propose to build and to limit each.<

Q: Do you think it's in Europe's best interest to have a fortress America?<

CYJ

A: Well, first of all, you know, there are two totally contradictory arguments. One is that SDI will not work, and the other is that it will work so well that you will have a fortress America. One that it is ineffective; the other that it is destabilizing. First of all, I don't think that it is possible to have a perfect defense. And I do not think it makes any sense to say that unless you can have a perfect defense, you can have no defense at all. I think to complicate Soviet calculations, or any aggressor's calculations, to force a level of attack of a size that countries will be very reluctant to undertake, (not a mean achievement, if they want to get anything through. But assuming that you could get a fully protected America, that would certainly be in the European interest, because it would certainly increase our willingness to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.)

Q: But when you say you don't really care whether the Europeans take part --

A: First of all, as an American, I would welcome European participation. But if European statesmen prefer their populations vulnerable, it is not up to us to give them great lectures on whether they protect them or not protect them. I think from a moral, political and military point of view, it is better to have some defense. I don't, however, think that it is our duty to insist on it. Now, the decoupling is based on the argument that if the United States is relatively less vulnerable, it is relatively less likely to defend Europe with nuclear weapons. That argument, I think, is nonsense; because that seems to imply that when the United States had an atomic monopoly, and was therefore invulnerable, it was less likely to defend Europe than when its cities were open to attack, which, on the face of it, is ridiculous. If we had an atomic monopoly, we would certainly be more likely to defend Europe than if we didn't. The obstacle to American assistance to Europe must be the fear of the devastation of America. To the extent that that fear can be reduced, to that extent we should be more willing to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe.

Q: Do you believe arms control is possible?

A: Yes, I believe that we have an obligation to try to talk to the Soviets about serious arms control. Now whether you reduce missiles from 2,200 to 1,800, or from 2,500 to 1,800 or to 1,500, and you permit multiple warheads, and you have no defense, will not affect the fear of people of mass extermination or the capacity of mass extermination. It has the utility that the superpowers have proved that they can make some agreement with each other. And it can therefore perhaps relax the atmosphere; and I would therefore support - even such an agreement, And, after all, I negotiated the only agreements that exist at this moment. So yes, I believe in arms control agreements; but I also believe that at this moment, we should not repeat only the categories of the late '50s and early '60s, when current arms control theory was created, and when assured destruction was the basic theory. Because weapons have become more accurate, warheads have become more numerous, and the psychological impact of totally vulnerable populations has become more evident.

Q: Isn't SDI just another step in what people call the arms

race, exactly the opposite of what Geneva was meant to be?<

A: Not in my view. Supposing SDI had never been invented or thought of. And people forget that the actual budget of the Reagan Administration for SDI is only marginally larger than the budget that Carter had already created. Many of the scientists and intellectuals who developed original arms control theory have got themselves into this frame of mind that they must oppose any new weapon, because any new weapon just fuels the arms race. And at a minimum, they should freeze things more or less where they are, I believe that if we do not reverse the thinking about it, and unless we can create a military structure which makes the use of offensive weapons less plausible, we will be living in a world, in one way or another, of nuclear blackmail, which will demoralize our publics. It's not easy to keep explaining to the publics that the capacity to destroy them is a guarantee of their security. That is a novel event in history; and it explains why many sensible, decent people have become pacifists. In the past, the consequences of defeat were worse than the consequences of war. With unopposed nuclear offensive forces, this is not necessarily self-evident. And so while as a statesman I cannot accept the proposition of unilateral disarmament, I can understand how many people who I consider decent and thoughtful and serious are caught up in this dilemma. Of course, there are also groups that are encouraged by the Soviet Union, and groups that are anti-U.S. no matter what we do; but those we can't reach regardless.<

Q: But Mr. Gorbachev says the consultations and conversations are fruitless because of the Administration's position on SDI.<

A: The mere fact that the Soviets have said something is fruitless doesn't mean that they will not negotiate. The Soviets have gone through various stages. In the late '60s, they were asking for equality because they were behind, so we were talking about equal numbers. Then in the late '70s, they were asking for equal security. By that time, when they were numerically ahead in several categories, each side reduce by the same amount, so theoretically we would reach zero and they would have something left. But at any rate, their margin would be frozen. Now they are beginning every negotiation by asking us to give up something unilaterally -- SDI now, INF a few years ago. The mere fact that Gorbachev says something is fruitless doesn't mean that it is. Now, I have never believed - I do not believe that Geneva is the best place to achieve breakthroughs. I think we need a conceptual discussion with the Soviets, in which we try to discuss with each other what we are trying to achieve before we start throwing numbers and weapons systems at each other. Because otherwise the colonels on each side, and the experts, are going to dominate the procedures.<

Q: What exactly do you have in mind?<

A: I have in mind a philosophical discussion or a conceptual discussion of the relation between offense and defense. Paul Nitze has said this should happen but he wants to do it in 10 years, after we have defensive weapons. I want to do it now. We can discuss now what the relationship should be. Then each

side can give instructions to its negotiators that mean something.<

Q: Who could discuss this?<

A: Nitze could discuss it. I want to make it absolutely clear that I will accept no operational job in this Administration. I am happy to give advice, and I do it occasionally; I'm happy to do an errand for a week or so. But I would not be available for this assignment. I've been telling this to the press for six months; nobody will print it. I hope you will print it.<

Q: How do you see the future of the ABM treaty?<

A: People forget that at the time of the ABM treaty, we filed a unilateral statement saying that if there were not a significant reduction of offensive forces by the end of the interim agreement, and it ended in '77, it would be difficult to a maintain the treaty. I think we should begin now discussions of how to relate ABM to a comprehensive offensive agreement, and to see what we would to change.<

HAK: There are two issues. We signed SALT II, an agreement we refuse to ratify. The Soviets are not keeping some of its provisions, ~~namely~~ to reduce the number of weapons from 2,550 to 2,250. We have observed an agreement which we have refused to ratify, and part of which the Soviets are not observing. That's a sort of paradoxical position. Now this agreement is going to lapse at the end of this year. We are being asked now to extend a non-ratified agreement that has lapsed, and that the Soviets are not observing. ~~So that is~~ a ridiculous position. Now, the concrete issue is: should we scrap one of the Soviet submarines, ~~that is due for retirement at the end of the year?~~ Because Soviet submarines have weapons aimed primarily at civilians as it is, I would, for the sake of public opinion, retire that submarine from the fleet. But I think it is absurd to find oneself in a position where the implementation of a non-ratified lapsed agreement that the other side is not observing becomes a huge issue. And we ought to address that problem. I would not address it on the issue of one Soviet submarine.<

MISSILES

POSSESSION

Formulate A question whether to answer about continuing ABM treaty.

When the next Trident submarine goes to sea, will itaris?

Fundamentally,

Intellectually, that is a ridiculous position. Now, the concrete issue is: should we scrap one of the Soviet submarines, ~~that is due for retirement at the end of the year?~~ Because Soviet submarines have weapons aimed primarily at civilians as it is, I would, for the sake of public opinion, retire that submarine from the fleet. But I think it is absurd to find oneself in a position where the implementation of a non-ratified lapsed agreement that the other side is not observing becomes a huge issue. And we ought to address that problem. I would not address it on the issue of one Soviet submarine.<

Q: You said you would prefer new negotiations about ABM, and Helmut Kohl is saying that Germany could not participate in research without sticking to the limits of ABM.<

A: At this point, we don't have to face that issue, whether we stick to the limits of ABM or not. All I'm saying is that Paul Nitze has stated publicly that once the SDI research has reached a certain point, we will have to begin negotiations both with our allies and with the Soviets, about the relationship of defense to offense. I believe that this will create a nightmare, because what are we then going to negotiate about in Geneva? Just offensive limitations? Offensive limitations without knowing what the defensive limitations are, in a total vacuum? I would, begin the negotiations now; we can then decide whether ABM has to be changed or not. Then Helmut Kohl can say it should not be changed, once we know what the issue is. At this point, that is premature. I just would like to start the discussion of how we would conceive that relationship. Or at least the internal Allied discussion.<

in the meantime?

Think we should begin comprehensively

["Q: Is somebody listening in this government to your advice?<\nA: No. If you want my personal opinion. So if you are worried about what I'm saying, relax.<", "Q: Can you figure out where this government is heading in\nNicaragua?<", "A: No, and I don't want to go too deeply into it. I made a speech the other day in which I said that my solution to the Nicaraguan problem was to drop all the unused copies of the Kissinger Report on Nicaragua, unless the human rights division considered such a tonnage incompatible with the human rights of the Nicaraguans. I think that answers your question.<", "Q: What about the summit between Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan --\nhow do you judge this young man in the Kremlin?<", "A: I would say it doesn't do Gorbachev a great favor to pretend that he is a great revolutionary. You would have to assume that somebody who gets put in as General Secretary by the leading people of the Politburo is considered reasonably orthodox by them. Now it is, of course, possible that they made a mistake, and that he will change things dramatically. And he will have to change some things dramatically, out of necessity.<", "Q: For example, what?<", "A: I think the not running of the economy cannot go on as it is. And I think the running of the government cannot go on, on this personal, feudal basis on which it is now being conducted. But I think he will have his hands full taking care of his domestic problems for a year or so. At a minimum. I am very dubious about a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev, an early meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. One has to prepare talking points for such a meeting. I can't quite visualize what these talking points would say, at this stage. Maybe a year from now I would change my mind. I don't think heads of government should meet just to get acquainted. That is a personalization of issues. Now if Gorbachev came over here to the U.S. anyway, I would certainly favor a meeting in that context. I would not say we should avoid him. But to schedule a separate, special trip by Gorbachev to the United States before we know what we want to achieve, or can achieve, I think has so many dangers as promises.< more", "Q: What is the obstacle in Washington that the government does not know what to do in Central America, in arms control and East-West relations?<", "A: I'm not saying the government doesn't know what to do. I agree with the government on most things; we've obviously discussed those things on which I have no answers. There are nuances of difference. It's difficult to run our government with so many semi-autonomous departments, then with a Congress that exists, and that exists in name only, and that exists in name

would be the most important in East-West relations and nothing
has happened yet.<

A: No, and I don't expect anything to happen yet. I expect, if something happens, it will happen next spring. I think they will have to go through one or two more rounds in Geneva, and I'm assuming that there are private exchanges going on between the President and Gorbachev. I don't know that, but I would hope that.<

Q: What you're saying in effect is the American-Soviet relationships are basically unchanged from the Carter times.<

A: I don't think they were that great in the Carter times. After all in the Carter times, the Soviet Union challenged us in many parts of the world. What you have to say in the Reagan period is that the rhetoric has been worse, than in many previous periods, but the Soviet actions have been extremely cautious, maybe because they've had so any changes of leadership. But maybe also because they did not want to risk a confrontation.<

Q: "Politics of strength" does pay, is that it?<

A: I'm not saying that, but I'm simply stating the empirical fact that there has not been an actual confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union except in rhetoric. And I'd rather have it in rhetoric than in action. And in the Carter period, if you think of the Soviet troops in Ethiopia, the invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Cambodia, which was not done by the Soviets but which was certainly encouraged by the Soviets, and I think there was infinitely more turmoil in that period than there was and has been so far in the Reagan period. Now, I think we are in a pre-period of negotiation with the Soviets. The Soviets will not give up their posture of intransigence, which gives them a chance to strain the relations between the United States and Europe, until we are further along in the process of negotiation. The other hand, I think the mere fact that they sent Gromyko to see Reagan before the election indicates to me that they are interested in a negotiating basis. Whether it is possible for either side to break through the encrusted positions of nearly a decade, that I don't know. But I am not pessimistic; I expect that we will make significant progress by next year. The thing that concerns me more -- I can conceive agreement on offensive limitations quite easily. What I have trouble with is, will we actually make a breakthrough at the end of which we can say not just "we have an agreement," but "we have significantly reduced the danger to civilian lives and for the use of nuclear weapons"? That is the big intellectual jump.<

(c) 1985, Los Angeles Times Syndicate