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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

For Release

P.M.'s Aug. 24, 1959

Statement by

Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

before the

4th USAF BMD Symposium on Missiles and Space Technology

Los Angeles, California

August 24, 1959

It is my purpose this morning to discuss with you some
of the conclusions that we of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration have reached after almost a year of
operation. There could be no more appropriate forum for such
a discussion than this Fourth Technical Symposium on Ballistic
Missiles and Space Technology. The members of this audience
represent a solid core of the science-industry-Government team
that is responsible for the achievements of our national space
effort to date. I hardly need add that you make up the team
upon which the vital space work of the future must depend.

There is a tried and true formula for speech preparation
that runs something like this--tell them what you are going
to say--say it--and then tell them what you have said. I am
going to attempt to follow that format this morning as I speak

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out on basic problems that confront us--problems that are
common to all who labor in these missile and space technology
fields.

Specifically, I want soberly to examine with you the
present state of the art in these fields. While I yield to
no one in the extent of my enthusiasm about the future in
this business, I will not be painting a rosy, pie-in-the-sky
picture of manned space transports, civilian colonies and
manned military bases on the moon or other planets, warehouses
in space and the like. There seems to be a contest going on
in this country in which substantial numbers of people are
attempting to outdo each other in predicting exotic accomplish-
ments in space in the next few years. In my opinion, there is
need for more common sense and good technical judgment to be
injected into this picture. While there are others more able
than I to handle such an assignment, my position as Adminis-
trator of NASA compels me to state my convictions in these
matters as part of my responsibility of keeping the Congress
and the public fully and currently informed.

As you know, it was just one year ago last month that
the President signed the bill establishing the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration. Building on the foundation
of organization, personnel, plant assets, programs and problems
transferred from the NACA, ARPA and the military services, NASA
was a going concern from the day we announced that we were in
business, the first of October 1958. We lacked, as did all of
the others engaged in the space business, a full realization

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of the complexity of the technological problems facing us.
And we were neophytes--probably still are--in our understanding
of the costs to be incurred in a hard-hitting, broadly-based
national space program. But we had--and we still have--enthusiasm
and real zeal for the great adventure that still lies before
us: the discovery of new knowledge about our universe and the
application of that new knowledge and supporting technology
for the benefit of mankind everywhere.

Now, what have we learned from our successes and failures
of the past year? And what are we planning for the future as
a result of our experiences--both good and bad? Remember,
please, that I am speaking about the civilian space program--
not the military program. However, they are closely related--
and are inter-dependent in many ways and it is probable, there-
fore, that some portion of my remarks may have applicability in
the military area, as well.

In the first place, we have learned that we are not nearly
as far advanced in space technology as we had thought or hoped.
Our experiences in the space vehicle field have been less than
completely satisfactory. The ratio of successful launches to
what has been termed by some as "successful failures" has not
improved very much in the past year. And as soon as we began
to plan for second generation experiments we found that we
were facing some hard facts of life in the propulsion and guidance
fields. Even today, every shot we make--either by the military
or by ourselves in NASA--is a shot in which there is little or
no margin for even a slight deviation from planned performance

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parameters. In thrust capability, in guidance-injection, mid-course and terminal, --in thrust control--in all of these areas there is much that must be learned and applied before we undertake the difficult missions we all talk about so glibly.

Secondly, it is becoming clear that we cannot and should not attempt to undertake all of the hundreds of projects that are being recommended to advance our understanding of the space environment. We haven't the manpower, the facilities or the funds. More important than any of these, however, is the fact that it seems to me that we will make progress faster if we move at a rate that will enable us to understand a bit more about the things we have already done and the information we have already acquired from successful experiments that are behind us.

Probably more than any other single matter, the question that plagues all of us is one of reliability. When will we be able to count on being successful in launching and placing into orbit or on the desired trajectory in deep space as many as three out of four of our intended experiments? We should admit, quite frankly, that with distressingly few exceptions, we have not achieved complete success in any mission to date--success in the sense that the payload has been injected into orbit or into a deep space trajectory within reasonable limits of the planned flight objectives and in the sense that the payload has performed its mission satisfactorily.

Now lest you think I am being unduly harsh, let me hasten to say that our competitors in the USSR have reported only

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their successful flights to date. We know they have had
failures. We don't know, in any instance, whether even their
announced successes have really come any closer to the intended
objectives than have ours. And I am mindful of the truly great
accomplishments that the United States has managed in the past
two years in the space field. Indeed, I am proud to be one of
those associated in a responsible way with this national effort
where success or failure may well have implications far beyond
the immediate civilian or military utility of the experiments
we attempt.

We are the one nation in this world which has developed
its position of leadership through the application of science
and technology to the alleviation of man's back-breaking burdens
while continuing to protect the rights of the individual citizen.
For us to play second fiddle in this space business is to admit
that we have lost a part of our genius for experiment--for taking
a competitive risk--for searching out new facts about nature
that ultimately will improve the well-being of mankind every-
where. No, we cannot and I am sure we will not fail to demon-
strate once again that free men--when challenged--can rise to
the heights and overcome the lead of those who build on the
basis of the subjugation of the rights of the individual as
they dictate to him the path he must take in response to the
demands of the state.

Now that may seem to be a bit of histrionics to the
sophisticates in this audience but it is the creed by which
we must guide our actions in the days ahead. And we are not

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going to achieve our goals by wishful thinking about difficult
technical problems.

But I'm afraid I'm being carried away by my own convictions
about the basic capabilities that reside in our people while
the realities of this business await attention. Having told
you very, very briefly about the more important bits of realism
that have been impressed upon us during the past year, let me
now tell you something of our thinking about the future.

First, as to program--we have had to face up to the fact
that we simply cannot do everything that is proposed either
by members of the scientific community, other agencies or by
our own people. Some of the firing schedules we developed nine
months ago lacked the realism that now characterizes our planning.

Within the next year, I think you will be able to note an
orderliness about the attack our people will be making in the
space sciences area. Thus far we have been engaged in completing
experiments planned for the IGY. In fields such as astronomy,
meteorology and the physical sciences, we are developing a
determined and well planned program. Lead times for most of
these experiments will be long and will call for continuing
high levels of effort and support. Unless we can achieve this
goal, we will lack, ultimately, the underpinning for the entire
space program and may miss the really important discoveries
that now lie hidden from our view.

We plan to concentrate our initial efforts in deep space
on lunar missions--near miss, orbiting and hard and soft landings

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of payloads. In this program we will develop the techniques
necessary to accomplish missions into deeper space and will
use them for such missions as their reliability and the
opportunity permits.

Second--as to basic research and advanced technology--we
expect to support greater effort in the universities, other
non-profit institutions, and in industry in both basic research
and in advanced development of systems components. In the
development of better methods and devices in the fields of
guidance, control, telemetry, auxiliary power units and sensors
of all types--in all of these areas, we see the need for greater
concentration of effort. Through such actions we hope to improve
the reliability of the systems which will employ these components.

Third--as to booster systems--it is becoming increasingly
apparent that greater efforts must be placed on simplification
and reliability. As a corollary, it seems quite clear that
continued attention must be given to reduction in the number
and varieties of rockets and rocket booster systems for use
in the space business. It is unlikely that these systems will
become off-the-shelf production items in the foreseeable future.
With limited numbers of firings in prospect, reliability can be
expected only if the variety of systems is kept at a minimum.
It will be cheaper to waste payload space in using an oversize
booster that becomes reliable through continued use than to
tailor boosters for each specific mission with the attendant
lowered reliability that surely will result from infrequent use.

As we move ahead in our program, using newly developed

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vehicles of larger size and with more stages, the problems of achieving successful flights will increase. Recognizing the statistical success thus far achieved with the single- and two-stage missiles and the number of firings required in their development period, we must ask the question as to the probable success of a seven-stage vehicle required to land a man on the moon and return him to Earth. Clearly, major advances in research and development techniques leading to greater vehicle reliability must be accomplished. Both the cost and development time will be prohibitive if vehicle development depends, as it does now, so heavily on "trial by fire." As a part of our program we are currently studying methods for development that might lead to earlier success of our flight vehicles, and the progress we make here may well determine how long it will take to do the advance missions that we are all so anxious to accomplish.

Finally--as in most other advanced technologies--a vast new area of materials research is being opened up by our space exploration requirements. As you well know, many materials exhibit different properties when used in radiation fields and in the vacuum of space. These materials must be improved or other materials found or developed to replace them. Magnesium, for example, sublimates in a vacuum--and effectively disappears. Another phenomenon--two moving metal surfaces in a vacuum tend to weld together by molecular adhesion. Our engineers and scientists are facing many such problems, but the list is far too long to catalogue here.