Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger

11:55 am 3/11/70

(Holes in this conversation are due to the speed of Sisco speaking and the noise and confusion in the office which prevented hearing adequately -- and in some measure, I'm sure, to the inefficiency of the notetaker.)

S: Have we had any further word on this question on arms? I've gotten something indirectly.

K: What have you gotten indirectly?

S: I got it from Ted Eliot after a discussion with Al Haig. I understand there will be something in writing.

K: You will get something this afternoon and he will probably do it next Tues or Wed. He wants you to do it -- State.

S: Two things -- what about the subject of touching base with members of Congress? Will the Secretary do this?

K: Probably but I haven't gotten the word so don't say anything.

S: How about the Jewish community?

K: Nothing. Talk to the Ambassador to get ______. When will you need it -- Monday?

S: If you want us to go on Tues. The sooner the better. You will just keep getting articles. Secondly, perhaps our firmness with the Soviets paid off. Dobrynin came in to see the Secretary and left some paper. I haven't seen it but will later today. They have suggested a resumption of bilateral talks. The Secy. said he would look at the paper first and let them know.

K: Excellent. Any specific proposals?

S: I've heard of one -- willingness to be more precise on peace business. They want to agree to be clear in mind that we give Shama Shiek over to UAR sovereignty.

K: Do we care? As long as they leave a force there.

S: No. (They)agree to UN forces in Shama Sheikh. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? U.N peace ever comes up. From our point of view this is not a bad proposal. But Israel thinks it's a red flag.

K: It's not a bad proposal.

S: Make it implicit what we have in mind. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

By KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Sisco/Kissinger

11:55 am 3/11/70

-2-

K: They don't care which Arab.

S: No. Nothing different in mind but what the Israeli reaction is.

K: If we find positive nuggets and resume them, the announcement will be a double blow.

S: It will be in the sense that they don't want us to resume. They are happy we have not made a decision. We should make no decision until after the decision on arms and then well after.

K: Your firmness may have paid off.

S: I told the Secy. this govt. has the worst time standing still. We have had to slap down proposals.

K: Any main proposal you would not have gotten by moving.

S: It's intended to influence our decision on arms. I honestly feel that ? ? ? ? ?

K: They may think it's their VN.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

Richardson/Kissinger

12:15 pm

3/11/70

R: You are returning my call? I wanted to discuss the paper on the Mathias Resolution.

K: I'm against it. I'm joking. I have something here for you on that, labeled priority. It's in effect what we agreed to.

R: You will send it over?

K: Yes. It doesn't go into detail. What you and I decided is essentially right. Let me read you the policy -- he wants to take the attitude that we will not go to lobby and we will not veto and we will testify on it if we are subpoenaed. Our testimony will only answer questions and it will be coordinated with the WH working group and we must be prepared to deal with the foreign problems if they happen. And other nitpicks.

R: Two things I don't recall discussing with you. I have some question --one on subpoena. I don't think as far as distinguished from a request. We wouldn't volunteer. The other thing is that since committee members will not ordinarily read an administration report it might be useful other than otherwise to give as an opening statement a paraphrase of the report.

K: What report? The draft letter?

R: Yes. That's a technicality. I would like to suggest as far as modification that any Dept. witness lead with a summary of that letter. Do you see a problem?

K: No.

R: This puts the committee members on an equal footing.

K: Right.

R: The questioning could better proceed from there because you cannot assume they have read the letter. That's my only procedural suggestion.

K: I will send the memo over. I saw a cable in which the Dept. transmitted a directive signed by me literally to the best Paris. I have not seen it before. When the President orders it the Dept. assumes responsibility and not just passes on the instruction.

R: What was that about?

K: I have a handwritten note from the President. ?? the following directive from the President with no particular endorsement. We can send an order directly.

I*

Richardson/Kissinger

12:15 pm

3/11/70

-2-

R: They thought it added to it's clout.

K: I'm not sure it derogates from our position but it seemed odd.

R: It's better to do it as a Departmental instruction.

K: Fred Bergston tells me that the Spanish thing lead to a great hassle and what has been decided may cause trouble. I talked to the President on his attitude towards Spain and he is fully behind any amelioration -- he wants the negotiations with the Spainards to succeed.

R: I was underestimated the counter attack.

K: If you need help here, I will get you help.

R: We missed the opportunity in Brussels, that's our problem.

K: You can't get it agreed short of a Presidential c bout. Can you?

R: We think we can.

K: OK

R: Our new deadline is the prospective visit of Lopez-Bravo, if he comes.

K: We don't want it lost in an internal arguement.

R: I will keep it up -- (I won't allow it to sink)

K: I don't mind making a few more enemies.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON

Laird/Kissinger

12:25 pm

3/11/70

L: I thought that went well last night.

K: I don't exactly know where it leaves us. Where do you think?

L: I know where it left me -- Bill said he was going to tell Symington that on sorties it's up to the Secy. of Defense. For awhile he will keep a ______ on it.

K: That's right. I talked to the President last this morning.

L: Bryce's point is good but if it doesn't get public support -- but sometimes you have to do things without public support.

K: If we stop on Laos our threat in VN is down the drain.

L: We reduce our rate (particularly?) -- Our gun ships on the Ho Chi Minh trail are doing a hell of a job. They are moving in the day time. The kill ratio with those is the best.

K: You know the big ball game is in VN and we look at it in terms of that.

LL: They may go public with the figures but until I hear from the President, I will say they are classified.

K: We have a DPRC meeting this afternoon and I wanted to check with you on procedures. I don't want to move before I understand each other. The first item is to put together the priorities on Spanish bases with a negotiating package that State has. That's not a major problem. You have no problem with that?

L: My only problem is that I don't understand why it's in the DPRC. I have no problem with what you outline.

K: That's only a 15 min. exercise. The next issue is the budget review -- there were a number of issues the President wanted taken up. Man (?) bomber, continental air defense. I wanted to get on that. The major posture would be done by DOD.

L: If we get our budget and the amount we can anticipate those decisions are based on what we can expect from the standpoint of the manned (?) bomber. The XEX Joint Chiefs will recommend that and ?? ? ? ? on it at the same time. My priorities would put the mobile minute man at the last, ALMS number one, and manned bombers number 2. If you get to the second item depends on the resources available.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-2-

Laird/Kissinger

12:25 pm

3/11/70

K: The 5 year fiscal ______. That's limited to threat also. The President has said he is not going to look at Defense entirely as a budgetary problem. An analysis of what we are trying to do. So we have to get guidance worked out. When you say we put down this problem of aircraft carriers -- DPRC -- on manned bombers -- we are not in a peak position to suggest what design you should pick. But we can get into a discussion of the role of threats. Once that judgment is made the execution is with you.

L: The fiscal guidance we have now is the guidance I have to use at the present time. That's the last I have been given. Personally, I think that guidance is a higher level then he will probably approve. The DPRC has not looked at that on the standpoint of jobs and employment.

K: I have no problem with that aspect of it but we have to look at the doctrinal issue and bend ? ? ? ? ? . I propose we make that the first priority and then look at the specific items which the President said should be look at before the next budget review. Any proposal on systems will come from you.

L: What I am working at was this very thing. All the resources -- as far as asthe domestic side is concerned and you take out the total take, then you look at the legislative effect -- if it passes you will see only 25 % are controllable. 95 % of our budget is controllable.

K: How?

L: Through employment and reduction of jobs. So if I project out the domestic program for 5 years and then you project out the revenues for 5 years, I know where I am coming out.

K: It's controllable only if you don't pay attention to foreign policy and threat. If you look only at the budget, you will lose your shirt.

L: I have lost my shirt on commitments already made. The domestic thing is getting priority.

K: I'm trying to stop that.

L: That's great. This paper I am preparing is trying to stop it. They are making allocations first and tying us up for 5 years. the DPRC hasn't looked at it.

K: We must look at the requirements from the national security side. ? ? ? ? then you and I can go to the President and say that you have ______ consideration and the DPRC agrees.

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

12:25 pm

3/11/70

-3-

L: This is very important and I am all for that. You can have high level studies on this system and that and if you have divided up the assets, national security will come out last.

K: Tell your man today to work together to get the general approach on national security grounds we can relate to general analysis. Otherwise you will loose your shirt.

L: If the President is willing to go on two carriers in the Pacific and two on the Atlantic, we have no problem.

K: The President cannot make decisions without knowing what is implied. That's what I want discussed. I am in no position to tell you. If we could get an analysis that we need such a degree of force we could get the carriers. Now he is flying blind. From the political point of view we xxx will have a judgment we can give the public.

L: You have people who want to talk but don't want to talk on resources. The best economist that we have will have to help us on this and we will need the Council on Economic Advisors on this.

K: We have them but we have to have national security considerations in. We will look at it simultaneously.

L: This memo deals with this problem but I have worked on budgets on other departments. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: I agree with you and that's why I want the DPRC to be working on it.

Further conversation 12:45 pm

K: Just one other point about the meeting. I think we are squared away but the thing is that your representative should work it out afterwards rather than at the meeting.

L: One thing. We are sending over that list.

K: You got my note?

L: yes, but I don't need notes. You don't need to send things to the President. We are sending you a list of names that were killed in Laos. It's the best and most accurate we can find. There are so many coverups and each day we found more. When we were told to cover up everything in Laos they used as many covers as they could. I hate to be responsible for it. We need the best information we can. There are more names than we thought.

By: K.L. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Cong. Morton/Kissinger
12:55 pm 3/11/70

M: Hate to keep bugging you.

K: I have been out of town.

M: The Naval Academy has a foreign affairs conference and they bring in 300-400 people from various universities. They had scheduled Sargent Shriver for their keynote speaker because he was Ambassador to France. But now with his running for Governor and for the Administration's sake -- It's April 7 and Adm. Calvert is upset about it. If we can avoid Sargent Shriver right under our noses it would be good. It's very highranking and Navy. I told the Admiral it was political dynamite. He said he could get out of it since Shriver was asked as Ambassador to France and he is no longer. I was asking you to do it and if you can't then someone from the Administration.

K: I don't give any public speeches. People might think I was speaking for the President. I will do what I can off the record.

M: I need somebody -- not just down the line. Who do you suggest?

K: Elliott Richardson?

M: The Secretary? Wouldl he take advantage of this (deal)?

K: I don't know.

M: I just don't want to hand this thing to Shriver.

K: You would get the best speech from Richardson. He has more time than the Secretary to prepare something.

M: I will try him and maybe you could advise him on what to say. I'm going to Europe and need meet with the American community and I would like to come for 10 mins. to see you.

K: When are you going?

M: In two weeks -- Good Friday.

K: We will set something up.

M: Warren Adler is upset about closing ______ to Jewish groups.

K: What are we closing off?

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

-2-

M: He says the WH has put an embargo on communications with Jewish groups. "It was explained that because of the delicacy of the Mid-East situation." He has been calling me every hour.

K: You had better call through Haldeman. I haven't seen anything on it. It hasn't come from me but then I don't send messages to Jewish groups.

M: I will do that. I will be in touch when I have 10 mins. to get over there.

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/94

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger

4:10 pm

3/11/70

R: Has the President made up his mind on the Middle East thing on timing.

K: I'm sending something over -- from Wed. on.

R: I was thinking of having a press conference but I will wait. next If he doesn't and I have a press conference, it will take the heat off him.

K: He thinks the announcement should be made at State.

R: However he wants it is fine with me. I could do it and have a press conference at the same time.

K: That might not be bad. He might go for that.

R: It's going to be unpleasant.

K: He is willing to go with the statement "The President has decided that..."

R: I might as well do it in a press conference. McCloy said he presented his report to the President. I don't have a copy.

K: I sent a note to the President saying it should be made available to you and Gerry. I will send it to you without waiting.

R: Gerry was embarrassed at the meeting.

K: I will release it this afternoon.

R: On the chrome business in S. Rhodesia, I think we should wait. I think we are doing well and while the Security Council is meeting we shouldn't do anything. Haile Selassie raised a highly (complimentary) statement today.

K: I will bring it to his attention.

R: On that we will hold it up.

K: 2 - 3 weeks? OK.

R: If we do it now we will take off the credit we are getting.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

4:30 pm

3/11/70

K: I know what you want and it's being done.

S: Jablocki

K: Oh, I thought -- you are getting a copy of the McCloy report. I don't know why people write the President saying this is only for you and then tell people it's there. I wrote a memo to the President 3 days ago. I will send you a copy of the report. We did it in deference to McCloy.

S: Can you see any reason why I shouldn't talk before the Jablocki committee on how MIRV deployment relates to SALT?

K: If you don't oppose it.

S: I will say the Soviets knew about that

K: I see no objection to that.

S: At some point we would like from the WH Congressional people a response on whether we are going to brief on Vienna.

K: You will have to but wait until after the NSC meeting. You don't have to ask the Congressional people; I can tell you that you have to.

S: You are invited to be there.

TELCORN
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:55 pm

3/11/70

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

K: I am sure this is unnecessary but I wanted to point out to you that on that very last subject we discussed, you, I and the President are the only three people who are aware of it.

D: I understand.

K: We will make you an honorary member of the WH staff. I don't want you to make a remark of move (?) that does not exist.

D: I want you to be sure that I never discuss our conversations.

K: I was sure you wouldn't. I just wanted you to know that you are now an honorary member of the WH.

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:55 pm

3/11/70

K: I am sure this is unnecessary but I wanted to point out to you that on that very
last subject we discussed you, I and the President are the only three people who
are aware of it.

D: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASZS
By CP NARA Date 03/11/70

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

President/Kissinger

7:45 pm

3/11/70

P: I tdd Bill tonight as I was leaving that reception that our line was that we were going to have something and that we are working out the final details and we will have something next week.

K: I told him that.

P: He said that was fine and he would postpone his press conference. It's important that they make the announcement.

K: Absolutely.

P: The more I think of it, this could be a very acceptable one and give us leverage to make a deal.

K: It's extremely ingenious. The only thing I would like to avoid is a paper that states only an obligation that you are willing to do. They can raise it at any point.

P: Very good.

K: One thing we might need to set it up as a memo of conversation with Mrs. Meir. If they showed understanding for the diplomatic considerations you would show understanding of their military needs.

P: They have to play our game.

K: If we can get them to stop bombing we can get that into the discussions with the Soviets and that will make a promise academic. It's a dangerous game. I was very uneasy about the other course which would either trigger a war or make you have to keep considering the question.

P: ______ has a clear understanding between us. They will keep the secret, won;t they?

K: I think so.

P: Point out if it blows it will be hard to keep it. You will call Rabin in the morning?

K: Either in the morning or tonight.

P: I saw Cyrus Eaton -- he said the Premier of NVN would agree to meet with me.

K: Our information is they told him nothing.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Roland Evans/Kissinger

8:55 pm

3/11/70

K: What can I leak to you?

E: I was working on a piece.

K: I was in a meeting

E: I didn't expect you to. I did a piece on Laos pointing out the problems in Loas. I didn't take sides.

K: If anyone admits there are deeper problems we are in better shape.

E: The column has gone out and c'est la vie. I would like to see you next week. I am going to New Orleans tomorrow. Do you have a breakfast next week?

Kw I will call you next week

E: Is there something on Israel next week?

K: I don't know. What is it, 100 jets? There, I've given it away.

E: Have you read Joe's stuff lately? His stuff is very sentimental. He is going to VN next week but he is not going to visit any more Arab countries). That isn't eminent is it?

K: It will not be tomorrow.

E: Then it is. Next 10 days? If you see a chance next week early -- I will call my secretary on Monday. It's time you went home. I have a large investment in your good health. I am an American citizen and I don't want you working this late.

K: I appreciate it very much.

E: I will call your secretary on Monday morning and hope you can break free for breakfast.

K: We will see if we can pencil you in.

E: I thought I might tell you I have heard of a little unhappiness with one Western ambassador because you have had to cancel him three times because of appointments with the President.

K: Who? The Dutch?

E: Yes, but he didn't tell me.

K: I will act on that next week.