on Survival

(Continued from Page 1)

problems that must be
thought about. They must
be thought about because
peace will pose new issues
not only for Israel but also
for the Arab nations in the
Middle East. They, no more
than Israel, cannot continue
to live on the fact or imagi-
nation of external danger.
And even more than Israel,
much more than Israel, they
will face such challenges
that this development
brings to this location, that
this location requires new
political forms. Indeed,
what is a problem to Egypt's
being a society separately
may provide a means of
cooperation for them
jointly, especially as the
Middle East as a unit is now
faced by a Soviet strategy
that has bypassed, for the
time being, the countries
within the area, but the
Soviet has attempted to
encircle them through bases
just to the south of them
and therefore the former
enemies may find common
interest and common pur-
poses.

So you have honored me,
on an occasion that is close
to the realization of what
were dreams in 1973, on
that day when the Armi-
stice was signed and I vis-
ited Tel Aviv and we started
on the road to Peace.

This road has been ex-
tended and broadened by
successors, but through the
centuries of their disper-
sion, the Jewish people have
prayed and hoped that next
year they be in Jerusalem.
We meet on an occasion
when we can say with confi-
dence and with hope that
next year in Jerusalem,
which will live at peace and
that can work for a coopera-
tive future.

Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United States

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

Ohio has been described as the heart of
Middle America and the breeding ground of
Presidents. So it is not surprising that we
have here today such outstanding represent-
atives of the people of the Midwest as Con-
gressmen Clancy, Kindness, and Gradison
and two Senators who have so distinguished
themselves in public service as to merit men-
tion as potential nominees for the highest
position in the land.

It is a great honor to be here with Sena-
tor Taft, who in every respect brings credit
and added distinction to his esteemed family
and his beloved city.

John Glenn made a great contribution to
his country and to mankind before he came
to Washington and is destined for another
distinguished career in the service of the
nation.

And as for me, the privilege of talking to
five Members of Congress who have no op-
portunity either to talk back or to question
me makes the trip alone worthwhile. [Laugh-
er and applause.]

As America enters its 200th year as a
free nation, our role has grown central to
the peace and progress of the world. We
have become the engine of the global econ-
omy, the rock of security for those who
share our values, the creative force in build-
ing international institutions, and the pio-
neer in science and technology.

Americans have carried the burdens of
world leadership for a generation. They have
done so with dedication and good will but,
understandably, they ask when and if their
labor can cease. They want to know what
our purposes are in international affairs.
They sense that the world needs us, but they
ask: Do we need the world?

The past three decades have taught us
that our commitment to global leadership is
not an act of choice, but a recognition of
reality. Awesome weapons can span conti-
nents in minutes. The international economic
system thrives or declines as one. Conflict in
faraway regions has vast political, security,
and economic repercussions here at home.
Communication makes us instantly aware of
developments in every corner of the globe—
of the travels of diplomats, the movement of
troops, or the hunger of little children. World
peace and American security, global well-
being and American prosperity, have become
virtually inseparable.

The past three decades have also taught
us that our contribution is indispensable.
We cannot solve every problem, but few so-
lutions are possible without us. Other coun-
tries must do more, but we cannot ignore
the responsibility that rests on us. If we do
not help resist aggression, if we do not work
for a dynamic world economy, if we do not
promote liberty and justice, no other nation
can—at least no other nation that shares our
values.

Americans have a right to be proud of how
they have met this challenge. Through five
Administrations of both political parties we

¹ Made on Sept. 16 at Cincinnati, Ohio, before a dinner meeting sponsored by the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and 11 other area organizations (text of the four introductory paragraphs from press release 482A; balance of address from press release 482).

October 6, 1975

493

led in assisting Europe and Japan recover from the devastation of the Second World War. We helped create a trading and monetary system that has spread prosperity in our own land and around the world. We forged alliances with the major democracies that have kept the global peace for a generation. We have mediated and helped resolve conflicts. We have fed the hungry, educated men and women from other lands, and welcomed those who fled oppression to our shores. With all humility we can say that no other nation in history has made comparable efforts on such a scale.

## The Design of Global Peace

But history has rewarded our exertions with new challenges. The world has been transformed over the 30 years since World War II partly because of the success of this nation's policies.

In the early years of the postwar period, we were militarily and economically the world's predominant power. Our allies were recovering; new nations were just coming into being; potential adversaries were restrained by our nuclear supremacy.

Today's world is radically different. The industrialized nations are strong and self-confident; our alliances are cooperative endeavors between equals. We have preserved the world balance of power—but in the process both superpowers have acquired the capacity to destroy civilized life in a matter of hours. The growth of the world's economic system has spread economic power more widely among the new nations; they seek a greater role in international affairs and a larger share of the world economy.

The United States remains the largest single factor in international affairs. But we must learn what most other nations in history have known: that one country can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. We can no longer overwhelm problems with our resources. We no longer have the luxury of simple choices.

Thus, beyond the issues that make daily headlines, we have sought to conduct a foreign policy that takes account of the fundamental changes in the international order.

We cannot afford oscillation between extremes of crusading and isolation. We must maintain a steady course which offers hope for long-term international stability and progress, a course which Americans can support, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries.

Our first priority is the vigor of our alliances with the great democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. We formed these ties a generation ago to protect weaker friends against military danger. Today we work together as equals on issues going far beyond security. We have coordinated our efforts to ease tensions with the East; we have built new institutions of energy cooperation; we have developed common approaches to the developing countries. And we have begun to harmonize our economic policies to move together toward noninflationary economic recovery. The vitality of Western democracy and the solidarity of our alliances are an essential factor of global stability.

On the basis of allied cohesion and strength, we have also sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. For 30 years, mankind's hopes for peace and its fear of war have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today strategic nuclear parity has transformed international politics. Your government—in any Administration—must manage a basic conflict of values and interests with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history have the weapons of war been so devastating—and so ill suited to the pursuit of specific policy objectives. Therefore the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We have solved political disputes such as Berlin and restrained great-power conflict in the Middle East to give both sides a continuing stake in positive political relations. We have begun more normal contacts in trade and scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. And we have regularized our consultations at the highest level.

The necessity of coexistence in the shadow

494

Department of State Bulletin

of nuclear peril does not mean a coincidence
of moral purpose. This country knows the
moral difference between freedom and tyr-
anny. But we shall also never lose sight of
the fact that in the age of nuclear weapons,
peace, too, is a moral imperative. We shall
insist on reciprocity, but we believe that in-
centives for cooperation and penalties for
intransigence are more effective than rhe-
torical posturing. We shall keep our military
strength second to none; but we will not
succumb to the illusion that military power
offers the final answer to international prob-
lems.

On the basis of firmness and flexibility,
strength and willingness to negotiate, we
shall strive to moderate conflicts and to bring
a more secure world to future generations.

As we have maintained alliance cohesion
and begun to ease tensions with the Com-
munist powers, a new dimension has been
added to the spectrum of international issues
before us: the future of the relationship be-
tween developed and developing countries.
The vast and growing problems of energy,
food, raw materials, and economic develop-
ment now face us in all their complexity, as
the fundamental issues of the last quarter of
the 20th century.

These problems are not technical, or at
bottom even economic. They go to the heart
of the question of international order:
whether the world can accommodate the
needs of all nations, whether countries will
regulate their affairs by cooperation or by
confrontation, whether international rela-
tions will reflect the search for mutual bene-
fit and common progress or turn into tests
of strength. The United States is in a better
position than any other nation to go it alone
or to face such a test of strength, but we
know that ultimately the whole world will
suffer.

The United States has made its position
clear. At the U.N. special session called to
discuss these issues two weeks ago, I pledged
our country to a cooperative, understanding
approach. I said that we are prepared to work
with other nations to put the technological
and economic genius of the modern age into
the service of all mankind. The United States
is convinced that the developed and the

developing nations working together can
achieve through cooperation what neither
can extort through economic warfare or ideo-
logical pressure—economic advance for all
our peoples.

In this spirit, the United States presented
a comprehensive and detailed program for
economic and social cooperation to the spe-
cial session. These proposals and this atti-
tude will guide us in future discussions with
the less developed nations. The results at
the special session which just concluded to-
day were constructive. Discussions took place
in a conciliatory spirit, and the final docu-
ment produced considerable convergence be-
tween the developed and the developing
countries and the outlines of a consumer
program of action.

Cooperation must remain a two-way street.
If nations wield their special strengths as
weapons, the promise of global progress will
give way to the perils of global confronta-
tion.

The most critical immediate issue, of
course, is the question of the price of oil.
We and our partners in the International
Energy Agency have already taken major
steps to conserve oil and to establish finan-
cial structures that will help us cope with
the impact of rising oil prices. Much still
remains to be done; but the United States,
in cooperation with other industrial nations,
will make a determined effort to reverse the
conditions that have enabled oil prices to be
set unilaterally. The United States can not
and will not entrust its political and eco-
nomic destiny to decisions made elsewhere.

At the same time, we are ready to seek
a new relationship with the oil-producing na-
tions. We ought to be partners, not adver-
saries. Consumers must have reliable access
to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest
their new oil wealth, the producers must be-
come major importers of our products. We
are ready to cooperate with the oil producers
in linking our economies on equitable terms.

Next month the oil producers, developing
countries, and industrial countries will meet
to launch a dialogue on energy, raw mate-
rials, development, and finance first proposed
by President Giscard d'Estaing of France.
We have worked hard to make these meet-

October 6, 1975

495

ings possible. We will work hard to make them a success. They provide us the opportunity to shape new constructive relationships in the world economy.

But another oil price rise would severely jeopardize these hopes. It could set off a relentless sequence of action and reaction, to the detriment of all countries, developed and developing. This vicious cycle must be avoided. The possibilities of a cooperative world order depend upon it.

## Peace in the Middle East

There is no more vivid example of the stake that we have in the world around us, and the decisive contribution that this nation can make, than the conflict in the Middle East.

The Congress is now deliberating on the recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement. As it does so, it is important for the American people to understand why the United States is involved, what strategy we have pursued, the significance of the agreement, and where we will go from here.

The Middle East lies at the crossroads of three continents. Because of the area's strategic importance and because it provides the energy on which much of the world depends, outside powers have continued to involve themselves in its conflicts, often competitively.

For the United States a diplomatic role in the Middle East is not a preference, but a matter of vital interest:

- Because of our historical and moral commitment to the survival and security of Israel;

- Because of our important concerns in the Arab world, an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world's largest oil reserves;

- Because perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies in Europe and Japan;

- Because upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being of the industrial nations and the hopes of the developing world; and

- Because tension in the Middle East increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk.

Each successive Middle East crisis has presented us with painful choices between our many commitments and interests. And each successive crisis accelerates the trends of radicalism in the area, putting greater pressures on America's friends in the moderate Arab world, and heightening all the tensions and dangers.

The stake of every American in peace in the Middle East was dramatically and concretely illustrated by the Middle East war of 1973:

- The oil embargo, coupled with the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price increases, cost Americans half a million jobs and over $10 billion in national output. It added at least five percentage points to the price index, contributing to the worst inflation since World War II. It set the stage for a serious worldwide recession, from which we are only now recovering two years later.

- Partly because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil, our principal allies in Western Europe and Japan separated from us over Middle East policy, in the most serious strain in our alliances since they were founded.

- The 1973 crisis tested the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, leading us briefly to the verge of confrontation in the October 24 alert.

The October war also set in train momentum that is now irreversible. Events can be channeled toward diplomatic progress, or they can pull us headlong toward another war.

This is why the United States since October 1973 has been actively engaged in promoting a peaceful solution.

We have no illusions about the difficulties. The Middle East has seen more than its share of dashed hopes and disappointment. But progress depends crucially—even decisively—on the United States. Time and again the parties have turned to us for mediation. Time and again we have acceded

496

Department of State Bulletin

to these requests because we are convinced
that stagnation invites disaster. The next
Middle East war will pose greater risks,
complexities, and dangers and cause more
dislocations than any previous conflict.

What, then, has been our approach?

For nearly three decades it was axiomatic
that *all* issues pertaining to *all* the countries
involved had to be addressed comprehen-
sively: the final frontiers of Israel and the
reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab
states, the future of the Palestinians, the
status of Jerusalem, and the question of in-
ternational guarantees should all be con-
sidered together.

But for 30 years it proved nearly impos-
sible even to begin the process of negotia-
tion. Every attempt to discuss a comprehen-
sive solution failed—from the partition plan,
to the Lausanne conference [1949], to the
Rogers plan and the Four-Power talks of
1969 and 1970, to the U.N. Security Council
deliberations. To discuss simultaneously is-
sues of such complexity, between countries
whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even
the concept of compromise, was futile until
a minimum of confidence had been estab-
lished. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, it is a new and relatively recent de-
velopment that opinion in the Arab world
has begun to think in terms of recognizing
a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun
to see peace as a tangible goal rather than
a distant dream.

The United States therefore concluded that
instead of seeking to deal with all problems
at once, we should proceed step by step with
the parties prepared to negotiate and on
the issues where some room for maneuver
seemed possible. We believed that once the
parties began a negotiating process they
would develop a stake in success. Solutions
to problems more easily negotiable would
build mutual confidence. On each side a sense
would grow that negotiations could produce
benefits and that agreements would be kept
—agreements that could become building
blocks for a final peace.

Ultimately we expected that the step-by-
step process would bring about, for the first
time, the basic political conditions needed for
the overall settlement called for by Security

Council Resolution 338. This remains our
goal.

Progress since the October war has been
without precedent since the beginning of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council
Resolution 338 launched a negotiating proc-
ess and the first Geneva Conference. Agree-
ments to separate the opposing forces and
establish U.N. buffer zones to strengthen the
cease-fire were successfully negotiated be-
tween Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and
between Syria and Israel in May 1974.

The role of the United States was crucial
in helping the parties reach these agree-
ments. It reflected the fact that only we had
developed strong relationships of trust with
all parties. Major Arab countries that broke
diplomatic relations with the United States
in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore
their ties with us, creating a new climate of
confidence and thereby the conditions for
progress. And our traditional friendship with
Israel has been reinforced in the crucible of
crisis and the long months of close associa-
tion in negotiations.

The momentum of progress was inter-
rupted in the summer and fall of 1974: first
by our Presidential succession, then by the
decision of the Arab summit at Rabat which
made negotiations over the West Bank im-
possible.

When negotiations were resumed in March
of this year, they first ended in deadlock.
We therefore reexamined our approach, ask-
ing whether we should continue the step-by-
step strategy or move directly to the Geneva
Conference and a comprehensive approach.
The imminent crisis we feared as a result of
the March deadlock did not materialize—
almost solely because everyone expected that
the United States, in one way or another,
would resume its effort.

The President consulted widely—with con-
gressional and civic leaders, with our Ambas-
sadors from the area, and with the Middle
East parties. He met with King Hussein,
President Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin, and
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. We bene-
fited from the views of the new Saudi lead-
ership, which is continuing the policy of the
highly respected late King Faisal.

The President concluded that the time was

October 6, 1975

497

still not ripe for a comprehensive approach. In the wake of an apparent failure, the intractability of the issues would only be compounded by their being combined. Bringing all the parties, including the most irreconcilable, together in one dramatic public negotiation was an invitation to a deepened stalemate. This could discredit the whole process of negotiation and create a slide toward war. It was widely understood that the momentum of diplomatic progress had to be restored before Geneva was convened to consider the broader issues.

## New Egypt-Israel Agreement

Therefore, at the request of both sides the United States resumed its step-by-step effort. The result was the new agreement between Egypt and Israel which was signed in Geneva on September 4.

The agreement is fair and balanced:

- Territorially, it provides for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic Sinai passes. Egypt recovers a significant portion of its territory, including the economically important oilfields.

- Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the cease-fire. It widens the buffer zone and extends the limitations of forces that were negotiated in the disengagement agreement of January 1974. These balanced provisions markedly reduce the danger of surprise attack that figured centrally in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

- Politically, the agreement, which remains in force until it is superseded by another one, commits both sides to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict and to refrain from use or threat of force or of military blockade. It permits nonmilitary Israeli cargoes to go through the newly reopened Suez Canal.

Both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have hailed the agreement as a possible turning point. It represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace—political, military, and psychological—in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, Israel and an Arab state have taken a

step not just to halt fighting or to disentangle forces but to reduce the danger of future war and to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of the conflict. The effort that went into it and the inhibitions that both sides had to overcome reflect a serious determination to end a generation of violence. And both sides have affirmed that the agreement is a significant step in a process that must be continued toward a just and durable peace.

The achievement owes much to the courage of leaders on both sides.

President Sadat and his government moved Egypt on the path of moderation and development; they have understood that a political process offered the only realistic hope for the achievement of *all* Arab interests.

Credit is due equally to the courage of Prime Minister Rabin and the Government of Israel. Israel's dilemma is that to obtain peace it must give up tangible assets such as territory for intangible concessions such as assurances and recognition. Israel's leaders realized that only negotiation offered a hope to achieve what Israel has sought for 27 years—new political conditions that would mean acceptance by its neighbors, in return for withdrawal from territory. They had the wisdom to recognize that the time had come to start this difficult, even painful process.

The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the early-warning system in the small area of the passes is a limited—but crucial—American responsibility. It was not a role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides only when it became totally clear that there would be no agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the United States.

In the aftermath of Indochina the concerns of some Americans about this presence are understandable. But the two cases are totally different. The American presence in the Sinai is not a step *into* conflict; it is a move which gives added insurance *against* conflict. It is limited to 200 volunteer civilians by agreement with both sides. They will be stationed in a small but important sector of the U.N. neutral zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers engaged on *one* side

Department of State Bulletin

498

of an ongoing war. They serve both sides at
their request and complement the U.N. pres-
ence from such countries as Canada, Sweden,
Austria, and Finland.

Our presence in the area is not new. In-
deed, 36 Americans are at this moment serv-
ing with the United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organization in the Middle East.
Americans have been serving in this capac-
ity for over 25 years.

The agreement provides the President the
right to withdraw the American personnel if
they are in jeopardy. We are prepared, as
well, to accept a congressional proposal mak-
ing the withdrawal mandatory in case of
hostilities.

In short, what we have proposed to the
Congress and the American people is not an
engagement in war, but an investment in
peace,

Military and Economic Assistance

There will also be deliberation in the Con-
gress over military and economic assistance
to the parties. We will submit our recom-
mendations within a month. This assistance
is not part of the agreement itself. Indeed,
most of the assistance we shall request would
have been sought even if there were no
agreement. But in the present context our
aid takes on new significance; it is central to
our policy and vital to the chances for a
lasting peace in the Middle East.

Economic and military support for Israel's
security has been American policy during
five Administrations. Last May, 76 U.S. Sen-
ators wrote to President Ford urging that
the United States "be responsive to Israel's
urgent economic and military needs." The
Administration's request for new assistance
to Israel is responsive to this call; it will re-
flect longstanding criteria of assistance; only
a small part grows out of new requirements
arising from the agreement.

The case for aid to Egypt is equally strong.
Egypt has taken important steps toward
peace and closer relations with the West.
Egypt deserves our encouragement. Ameri-
can technology and capital, public and pri-
vate, can strengthen all the constructive tend-

encies in the Middle East. The symbolic and
substantive significance of American support
to Egypt is immeasurable.

Thus, the additional burden of U.S. assist-
ance is modest, infinitely smaller than the
demonstrated costs of another war—which
in 1973 required direct appropriations to
Israel of $2.2 billion in addition to the indi-
rect costs. But its role is crucial. It reduces
the incentives for war; it, too, is an invest-
ment in peace.

Continuing Process Toward Peace

Where do we go from here?

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step
in a continuing process. The agreement states
explicitly that the parties shall continue the
negotiating efforts to reach an overall final
peace settlement in accordance with Resolu-
tion 338.

The path ahead will be difficult. In the im-
mediate future, we must begin the imple-
mentation of the Egyptian-Israeli agree-
ment. This must await the deliberation and
decision of the Congress. When this is set-
tled and if the agreement goes into effect,
we will start our consultations with all con-
cerned to assure that there is consensus on
the next step. We will not move precipitously,
because we want confidence to build. We will
not move without careful preparation, be-
cause we want the process to continue to
succeed.

But the effort to achieve a lasting peace
must resume. The Egyptian-Israeli agree-
ment has created new opportunities for the
future—but these opportunities must be
seized, or they will disappear. The United
States did not help negotiate this agreement
in order to put an end to the process of peace,
but to give it new impetus. There can be no
stagnation, for the area remains tense and
volatile.

For our part, we stand ready to assist
as the parties desire. We will seriously en-
courage a negotiation between Syria and
Israel. We are prepared to consult all coun-
tries concerned, including the Soviet Union,
about the timing and substance of a recon-
vened Geneva Conference. And we are fully
aware that there will be no permanent peace

October 6, 1975

499

unless it includes arrangements that take
into account the legitimate interests of the
Palestinian people.

The United States seeks no special ad-
vantage in the Middle East. It has always
been our policy that the nations of the re-
gion should be free to determine their own
relationships with any outside power. There-
fore the United States would not understand,
and would be obliged to oppose, efforts by any
outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli
agreement.

In the search for a final peace, the United
States is prepared to work with the Soviet
Union. We are cosponsors of the Security
Council resolutions that launched this hope-
ful course of negotiation; we are cochairmen
of the Geneva Peace Conference, which met
at an early crucial phase. While we have had
important differences with the Soviet Union
over the substance of a settlement, our two
countries have held parallel views that the
Middle East situation poses grave dangers
and that partial steps must be part of, and
contribute to, progress toward a comprehen-
sive solution.

In the Middle East there is a yearning for
peace surpassing any known for a genera-
tion. Let us seize this historic opportunity.
The suffering and bravery of the peoples of
the Middle East demand it; the highest in-
terests of the United States require it.

This is why the American people, their
Congress, and the President are, to an ex-
traordinary degree, united on the course of
our Middle East policy. And this is why we
will not cease our effort.

American Leadership and American Unity

Ladies and gentlemen, we Americans have
spent the better part of a decade apologiz-
ing to ourselves and the world for what we
thought we had become. We have spent most
of the last three years enmeshed in a na-
tional tragedy that caused many to lose sight
of what our country has meant, and con-
tinues to mean, to the billions abroad who
look to the United States as a beacon of free-
dom and hope.

Today the issues that threatened our unity
and confidence are in the process of being
put behind us. A world of turmoil, danger,
and opportunity cries out for our purposeful
leadership. There is no doubt of our physical
capacity and technical skill. But we must
put them in the service of a common pur-
pose.

After a decade of challenge and crises, we
must strive to insure that our government
will be united, that our people will have con-
fidence, that our country will be strong, and
that our freedoms will flourish. As we enter
the year of a political campaign at home—
in an era of unprecedented challenge abroad
—a spirit of unity and bipartisanship be-
comes our international as well as national
duty. We cannot afford a year and a half of
partisan warfare. Our foreign policy must
be a common enterprise of all Americans, for
what we do—or fail to do—will inevitably
affect events for many years to come.

If the past two years of effort in the Mid-
dle East have lessened the dangers of war
and set that part of the world on the road
to peace—as I pray they have—it is the
United States that has made the difference.
It is the United States alone among the
world's nations that Israel and its Arab
neighbors were prepared to trust. It has been
deeply moving for me to observe, after all
the travails and self-doubts of the last dec-
ade, the confidence that others have in us.
The nations of the Middle East have thus
done us a service, in reminding us of how
in serving our international responsibility we
also serve our own highest goals.

In the final analysis it is our own prin-
ciples and hopes that define our obligation.
America has always stood for something be-
yond our own material success: we have al-
ways believed—correctly—that we meant
something to others. Our Founding Fathers
spoke of the rights and hopes of all men.
Our belief in the inalienable rights of man
is no less compelling today—no less worthy
of sacrifice—than it was 200 years ago when
a few dreamers came together in Philadel-
phia to proclaim history's only truly perma-
nent revolution.

500

Department of State Bulletin

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This is a verbatim transcript of an interview
of The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State,
by Mr. Amos Ettinger of Israeli Television, held on
Tuesday, 17 August 1976, in the Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

1

MR. ETTINGER: Mr. Secretary, how would you describe Mrs. Meir amongst the different world leaders you have been in touch with?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that Mrs. Meir is an original. She can't be compared to any other leader that I have dealt with. She is a woman of great conviction, great inward strength, great personality, and she is unique.

MR. ETTINGER: Did you sometimes have the feeling that you were dealing with a representative of a small and poor country?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think one of the great strengths of Mrs. Meir was that thought never crossed one's mind. She understood that Israel's real relationship with the United States depends on the moral quality of the ties that have been forged. And she took great pains in developing them. And therefore we always thought of her in terms of these moral and human ties, and never in terms of the traditional power relationships among sovereign states.

MR. ETTINGER: Golda Meir is known in Israel as being a tough negotiator. Did you have the same feeling?

2

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Golda Meir is an extremely tough negotiator. On the other hand, when Golda Meir gave her word, you could absolutely count on it. And once she had made up her mind to do something, even if it was difficult, she did it with great courage, and so it was always -- I can't say it was a pleasure to negotiate with her, but it was inspiring to negotiate with her.

MR. ETTINGER: Did it disturb you that you were conducting high level negotiations with a woman?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not at all. Of course, I have never hidden my great personal affection for her, but I never thought of it in those terms. She is a unique and remarkable personality.

MR. ETTINGER: I am going to show this stuff to Mrs. Golda Meir before we are going to screen it on the TV, so I believe she will watch us before. What would you like to tell her, like she is watching us now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that in one's public life, one has to do so many day-to-day things that are imposed on one. But there are a few events that one remembers that have human and moral stature.

3

And many of my memories of those occasions are tied to
Mrs. Meir, who never did a second-rate thing.

MR. ETTINGER: I believe that is all, thank
you, very much.

[Y]

kissinger

World Jewish Congress luncheon, Washington, Nov. 3, 1977

I came here to speak to you at the moment of ...

When I left office I said that I will not speak on tactical situations for at least a year, and I am sure you will understand that I cannot for this reason go into this or that aspect of the current negotiation.

But we all know that the present situation is one that must fill all Jews with a sense of responsibility and a sense of concern. All Jews must be for peace, for no people has suffered so much from its absence as the Jewish people. And all Jews know that peace cannot rest only on professions and on verbal statements, because they have seen too much of the transitoriness of human intentions. All Jews know that in time of crisis and of frustrations they can easily become the target of popular emotions and they therefore feel deepening the responsibility that they must not be seen as the

cause of international difficulties. And yet all Jews have seen too much suffering and too many people killed to be able to abandon their own judgment as to what is necessary for peace and for survival. And therefore the contemporary conditions are of great importance not only for the leaders of Israel but the leaders of the Jewish communities and to all individual Jews wherever they may live. This is why I take the liberty of speaking to you a little on some general reflections on contemporary conditions, as I see them. One cannot separate the destiny of Israel and the destiny of the Jewish people from the destiny of mankind. The principles applied to peace in the Middle East are the same as the principles that apply to peace anywhere else. To be sure, conditions in the Middle East are peculiar in their intractability and have aspects that are hard to understand for people like ours that have no experience with tragedy. But there are a number of fundamental principles that I believe Jews must stand for in all the countries in which they live, and [in America]

kissinger---22

which they can therefore defend also in relation to Israel and the peace in the Middle East.⁹ For example, peace must reflect an equilibrium of strength; no nation can entrust its destiny simply to the good will of other states [applause]. To do this is an abdication of statesmanship and responsibility for the future of one's country. And therefore all foreign policy must be based on a concern for the balance of power and on security. Therefore the Jews must stand on that in the countries in which they live. They cannot attack the defense programs of their own countries and stand for a strong defense program for Israel.¹⁰ Precisely, when they also stand for the strength of America they also must stand for the strength and the ability to defend herself of the state of Israel. This is a necessity that should be beyond discussion. It is why when I was in office, whatever the difficulties, we saw to it that there was massive supply of military equipment to Israel, and every American administration, point, whatever may be the disagreements on this or that, must see in this relation to the state of Israel as long as it exists; it will be for all time.¹¹ Secondly, peace must be based on justice. No people in the world has suffered as much from arbitrariness and from injustice as the Jewish people. No Jew anywhere can be safe except in a world that is based on some fundamental human and moral principles. And the state of Israel can exist best in a world in which all nations are recognized not only as tolerant but as having a right to existence and to their expression. A just peace is a peace that is freely accepted by all participants. A just peace cannot be an imposed peace, and a just peace must be one in which all nations have a stake in maintaining it and in preserving it.

kissinger---33

by

And therefore the process **mm** which peace is **mmix** made is almost as
important as the final result. **At each stage the parties must feel**
that it was **mm** their decision and not somebody else's decision
that brought about the final conclusion. **Thirdly, peace must involve**
an element of cooperation. **It is not possible** **^A^** to talk about peace
when there is no exchange, when there is only the most grudging
recognition. **The problem in the Middle East is to go beyond**
a balance of power to a sense **mm** which all the people of the area
feel **mm** that they **mm** be long and can cooperate. **Fourth, it is**
important to know that there are some matters that go beyond
intentions and cannot be defined by intentions. **I mean by it that**
there are some realities that develop their own logic. **It was**
said for example that the fundamental decisions**^B^** in the Algerian war
was the first meeting between the **^B^**National Liberation Front of
Algeria and de Gaulle; once that principle was accepted, everything
else flowed from it**^C^** more or less automatically. **I believe**
and **I have** always stated that **separate Arab state on the West Bank,**
whatever the declaration, whatever the intention, inevitably must
have as its objectives**^D^** that cannot be compatible with the tranquility
of the Middle East. **It has nothing to do with professions, guarantees,**
**assurances, promises; this is inherent in the logic of the situation.**
Fifth, as **I have** already indicated in my example of **mm** the French
relationship with Algeria, procedures**^E^** sometimes as **important as**
substance because there are some procedural decisions that imply the
substance. **It makes a great deal of difference who participates in**
the negotiations, what the purposes of the various countries are,
and in what sequence**^F^** issues are addressed.

Kissinger-- 444

These are not trivial issues; they are central issues. I will confine
myself to a statement of general principles and not answer the
[of concern to]
issues each of us except to say I believe that for peace in the
middle east to be lasting it must be achieved in the closest cooperation
between Israel and the United States. It is not enough to get
grudging acceptance and constant need for reassurance. It is
essential that there is real understanding of what is possible and
what is unreasonable, to understand the real concerns of both sides.
We are a superpower in the United States, but for Jews in general and
for Israelis in particular the margin of safety are very narrow. The
United States can afford certain experiments because if we are wrong
our worst penalty is to redouble our efforts. For
because
Israel certain experiments cannot be tried, Israeli leaders get
only one guess. If they are wrong it may involve the survival of
their people. To be sure, Jews in America and around the world
can assure their interests best by understanding the interests of
the country in which they live, but similarly the United States and
other countries have an understanding of the insecurity
and the traumas of a people that has survived barely the Holocaust
and it has not known a day of peace in its entire history and knows
that in the final analysis it is no good to any country unless it is
meaningful to itself. It therefore must maintain its faith in itself
and its confidence that it is a master of its own destiny and not
just the protector of some other country, however well-intended that country may be.

kissinger---555

This seems to me to be the crux of our fate. I might also say, I must say that the Jewish people, around the world will know that they face a serious period in their destiny of their people. And I know that as cantankerous as this people is---as God knows no one knows it better than I---has shown its greatness always in its hour of need. It will deal with its necessities without allusion, with the dedication born of long historical, wisdom and with the knowledge that this of us who, whom destiny has given some prominence will always understand and always be supportive.

end.

Man of the Year

# They Are Fated to Succeed

*"The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously"*

BY HENRY KISSINGER

On a bare hill at Giza, some three miles from downtown Cairo, stands a simple rest house occasionally used by President Sadat. Its principal feature is a wide veranda that overlooks the Pyramids. The light and shadows constantly change the shape of these massive triangles leaning against each other. These are structures at once simple and monumental; they have endured the elements and man's depredations for as close to eternity as man can reach by his own efforts. In no other place in the world is man forced into humility so exclusively by one of his own accomplishments. In this sea of sand split by the green valley of the Nile stretching a man's vision in a thin straight line for hundreds of miles, there is no national monument to dwarf him. The most breathtaking landmarks are all man-made, defying time and human fallibility. The Egyptian has reared tremendous edifices to remind him of both the finiteness of the human scale and the reach of human aspirations through recorded history.

One wonders whether Anwar Sadat sat on that veranda as he first began to contemplate his journey to Jerusalem—a move at once simple and awesome like the Pyramids themselves. We do know that not far from this resthouse Israeli and Egyptian negotiators have been meeting now for two weeks in an old hotel. It is in keeping with the spirit of a region where mirage and reality blend that the negotiators are at a bureaucratic level, which guarantees that no significant progress could be made

until Premier Begin and President Sadat had met in Ismailia. But the mere presence of Israeli diplomats in Cairo has lent itself to the symbolic manifestations of public feeling so dear to the Arab heart; the massive demonstrations are significant whether they are spontaneous or government-sponsored. Two great peoples have met again as equals. Through the millennia both have suffered and endured; both have been obsessed with permanence, the Egyptians in architecture and the Jews in moral law. Both have now embarked on the quest for that most elusive of all permanencies: a lasting peace.

And these two eternity-obsessed nations are likely to realize their dreams. The very audacity of Sadat's act, like the artificial mountains which are the Pyramids, dwarfs the small calculations of the recent past. Ups and downs are inevitable in the process; there will be complicated negotiations, but the parties have fated themselves to success.

One need only recall the situation of two months ago: then all was preparation for a Geneva conference. But that con-

ference was distrusted by Egypt and Israel alike. Major procedural problems were unresolved: the scope of the plenary and the working groups, the nature of Palestinian participation, the precise role of the Soviet Union. The procedural deadlock would in all likelihood have been followed by a substantive stalemate as the irreconcilability of the opposing publicly stated positions became apparent. All the most intractable issues were thrown together.

The danger was real that in the very process of organizing the conference the most radical elements would achieve a veto, since no progress could take place without them. In turn, the Soviet Union would be able to exercise a veto over any plausible moderate solution. All the while, Israel, maddened by isolation and the fear of an imposed peace, would withdraw intoaden intransigence. Progress at Geneva would have depended on American pressure on Israel to a degree probably incompatible with U.S. domestic political realities. We ran the risk of being caught between the parties: accused by the Arab side of insufficient exertions and by Israel of excessive pressures. The Soviet Union would have gained an increasing voice as the frustration of all parties came to focus on us. Egypt—the most eager for peace of the Arab countries, yet treated as just one of a number of participants—was threatened with being reduced to passivity, with losing control over its destiny in a welter of unmanageable and unpredictable claims.

Considerations such as these must have been in President Sadat's mind when he decided to cut through the Geneva minuet that was getting as complicated as it was irrelevant, and go to the heart of the problem—the psychological gulf that had separated Israelis and Arabs since the creation of the Jewish state.

In a recurring irony of history, the Jewish people, persecuted and ostracized for centuries, found itself again condemned to a ghetto existence of international isolation at the very moment when it had built its own state. The Arabs, their pride stung by the creation of Israel and convinced from the beginning that Israel was occupying their national territories, had refused to accept the very existence of the Jewish state. This created a vicious circle: Israel saw security in purely geographic concessions as the price of a legitimacy that diplomacy turned into legal formulas so esoteric as to be almost meaningless. Intermediaries could help to a certain point. They could lay a foundation. But no nation or leader will ever be totally certain wheth-

Sadat embraces shuttle diplomat Kissinger at a meeting near Alexandria

34

TIME JANUARY 2, 1978

or an intermediary's account of the views of the opposing side reflects reality, gullibility, or his own preference. The mere fact that an intermediary was necessary, that direct talks were rejected, reflected and fueled the prevailing distrust.

By going to Jerusalem, President Sadat cut through the mind-set of a generation. He allowed the people of Israel to judge for themselves his commitment to peace; he could see for his part the trauma of a people that had never known a day without war in its national existence. Sadat was right that the heart of the problem was psychological. By grasping the essence of the issue, Sadat has done more to resolve it than all the wars and negotiations of the last three decades. Matters in the Middle East now can be reduced to a few fundamentals:

**There is no alternative to the Sadat-Begin negotiations. Geneva as a negotiating forum is dead.** This is just as well. It could only have led to a deadlock or to an imposed settlement, and in either case to an enlarged Soviet influence. Were Sadat and Begin somehow to fail to find solutions, lower-level diplomats meeting around a conference table in Switzerland later could scarcely be expected to succeed. In short, failure now would make conflict later inevitable. Israel would return to its ghetto existence; Egypt would face a war its people dread.

The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. Major progress is therefore likely. Geneva could be useful later in ratifying what has been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties to join the negotiating process.

**An Egyptian-Israeli agreement is not inimical to an overall settlement but the condition for it.** The choice has never been between an overall and a partial settlement, but between a partial settlement as a first step and no settlement at all. A step toward peace is better than the continuation of conflict, all the more so since both President Sadat and Premier Begin have committed themselves to an overall settlement.

**An Egyptian-Israeli agreement should involve principles applicable to the other parties.** Sadat and Begin are too wise not to base progress between Egypt and Israel on principles that have wider application. They know from history that to be lasting a peace must in time reach out to all principal parties and that those parties will support it only if they participate in making it. The day will come when Arab leaders who now denounce the Sadat initiative will be grateful that the largest of Arab nations took on its own shoulders the burden of the first and most difficult decision for peace. By solving the psychological problem, Egypt has now made it possible to overcome the other obstacles to peace everywhere in the Middle East. This is why coupling the Egyptian negotiations with the Palestinian issue is important both substantively and symbolically. At the same time, on this issue where distrust and hatred have gone so deep, it may be best to set a general course and leave details for later negotiations.

Having had the privilege of working closely with the President of Syria, I am convinced that he will not turn his back on a genuine peace. In the context of Syria's turbulent history and its internal pressures, in the light of its perception of itself as the embodiment of true Arab nationalism, President Assad has sought to keep open the option of negotiation. This attitude should be nurtured.

**The current negotiations will be a test of Soviet policy.** If the Soviet Union genuinely favors a relaxation of tensions throughout the world, it will in the Middle East allow the processes toward peace to occur and not press for formal participation in negotiations which are already under way and to which it can make no contribution. The Soviet Union has nothing to lose from a peaceful solution; indeed, a normalized Middle East should enable all countries to pursue their global policies on the basis of equality. If the Soviet Union encourages intransigence, the motive must be either hurt vanity or an attempt to foster tensions and to improve the opportunities for Soviet penetration. There is no reason to assuage the former, and it is in the interests of all nations to resist the latter.

If the process now under way succeeds—as is likely, even

The search for peace: Geneva Conference in December 1973...

...the Sinai I talks at Kilometer 101 in January 1974...

...and in 1975, Sadat and Kissinger meet in Egypt prior to Sinai II

*A barren region is once again the focal point of humanity's hopes.*

with occasional disappointments—Americans of every persuasion and party will have reason to be proud. We contributed a military balance which foreclosed a military solution. Our nation, because it was trusted by both sides, helped shape a negotiating process which culminated in the breakthrough of Sadat's historic journey. President Carter has handled the sequence of events growing out of the Sadat initiative with wisdom and delicacy, offering assistance but not intruding on the process of negotiations.

The ultimate credit should of course go to the audacious President of Egypt who dared to smash the psychological mold of a generation; to the courageous Premier of Israel who seized a unique moment of history; and to all the peoples of the Middle East whose inarticulate aspirations, prayers and sacrifices have created the prevailing climate for peace. Appropriately enough for this season, the barren region of the Middle East, which has spawned in its lonely spaces three great religions, has become once again the focal point of humanity's highest hopes.

TIME, JANUARY 2, 1978

35

Senator Taft, Senator Glenn, Congressmen, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

As America enters its 200th year as a free nation, our role has grown central to the peace and progress of the world. We have become the engine of the global economy, the rock of security for those who share our values, the creative force in building international institutions, and the pioneer in science and technology.

Americans have carried the burdens of world leadership for a generation. They have done so with dedication and good will, but understandably they ask when and if their labors can cease. They want to know what our purposes are in international affairs. They sense that the world needs us, but they ask: do we need the world?

The past three decades have taught us that our commitment to global leadership is not an act of choice but a recognition of reality. Awesome weapons can span continents in minutes. The international economic system thrives or declines as one. Conflict in faraway regions has vast political, security and economic repercussions here at home. Communications make us instantly aware of developments in every corner of the globe -- of the travels of diplomats, the movement of troops, or the hunger of little children. World peace and American security, global well-being and American prosperity, have become virtually inseparable.

The past three decades have also taught us that our contribution is indispensable. We cannot solve every problem, but few solutions are possible without us. Other countries must do more, but we cannot ignore the responsibility that rests on us. If we do not help resist aggression, if we do not work for a dynamic world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no other nation can -- at least no other nation that shares our values.

Americans have a right to be proud of how they have met this challenge. Through five Administrations, of both political parties, we led in assisting Europe and Japan recover from the devastation of the Second World War. We helped create a trading and monetary system that has spread prosperity in our own land and around the world. We forged alliances with the major democracies that have kept the global peace for a generation. We have mediated and helped resolve conflicts. We have fed the hungry, educated men and women from other lands, and welcomed those who flee oppression to our shores. With all humility we can say that no other nation in history has made comparable efforts on such a scale.

## The Design of Global Peace

But history has rewarded our exertions with new challenges. The world has been transformed over the thirty years since World War II, partly because of the success of this nation's policies.

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PR 482

Today's world is radically different. The industrialized nations are strong and self-confident; our alliances are cooperative endeavors between equals. We have preserved the world balance of power -- but in the process both superpowers have acquired the capacity to destroy civilized life in a matter of hours. The growth of the world's economic system has spread economic power more widely among the new nations; they seek a greater role in international affairs and a larger share of the world economy.

The United States remains the largest single factor in international affairs. But we must learn what most other nations in history have known -- that one country can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. We can no longer overwhelm problems with our resources. We no longer have the luxury of simple choices.

Thus, beyond the issues that make daily headlines, we have sought to conduct a foreign policy that takes account of the fundamental changes in the international order. We cannot afford oscillation between extremes of crusading and isolation. We must maintain a steady course which offers hope for long-term international stability and progress -- a course which Americans can support, which gives courage to our allies and pause to our adversaries.

Our first priority is the vigor of our alliances with the great democracies of the Atlantic Community and Japan. We formed these ties a generation ago to protect weaker friends against military danger. Today we work together as equals on issues going far beyond security. We have coordinated our efforts to ease tensions with the East; we have built new institutions of energy cooperation; we have developed common approaches to the developing countries. And we have begun to harmonize our economic policies to move together toward non-inflationary economic recovery. The vitality of Western democracy and the solidarity of our alliances are an essential factor of global stability.

On the basis of allied cohesion and strength, we have also sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. For thirty years, mankind's hopes for peace and its fear of war have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today, strategic nuclear parity has transformed international politics. Your Government -- in any Administration -- must manage a basic conflict of values and interests with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. Never before in history have the weapons of war been so devastating -- and so ill-suited to the pursuit of specific policy objectives. Therefore, the United States has engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We have solved political disputes such as Berlin and restrained great-power conflict in the Middle East to give both sides a continuing stake in positive political relations. We have begun more normal contacts in trade and scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges. And we have regularized our consultations at the highest level.

The necessity of coexistence in the shadow of nuclear peril does not mean a coincidence of moral purpose. This country knows the moral difference

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PR 482

between freedom and tyranny. But we shall also never lose sight of the fact that in the age of nuclear weapons, peace, too, is a moral imperative. We shall insist on reciprocity, but we believe that incentives for cooperation and penalties for intransigence are more effective than rhetorical posturing. We shall keep up our military strength second to none; but we will not succumb to the illusion that military power offers the final answer to international problems.

As we have maintained alliance cohesion and begun to ease tensions with the Communist powers, a new dimension has been added to the spectrum of international issues before us: the future of the relationship between developed and developing countries. The vast and growing problems of energy, food, raw materials and economic development now face us in all their complexity, as the fundamental issues of the last quarter of the 20th Century.

These problems are not technical, or at bottom even economic. They go to the heart of the question of international order: whether the world can accommodate the needs of all nations; whether countries will regulate their affairs by cooperation or by confrontation; whether international relations will reflect the search for mutual benefit and common progress or turn into tests of strength. The United States is in a better position than any other nation to go it alone or to face such a test of strength; but we know that ultimately the whole world will suffer.

The United States has made its position clear. At the UN Special Session called to discuss these issues two weeks ago, I pledged our country to a cooperative, understanding approach. I said that we are prepared to work with other nations to put the technological and economic genius of the modern age in the service of all mankind. The United States is convinced that the developed and the developing nations working together can achieve through cooperation what neither can extort through economic warfare or ideological pressure -- economic advance for all our peoples.

In this spirit, the United States presented a comprehensive and detailed program for economic and social cooperation to the Special Session. These proposals and this attitude will guide us in future discussions with the less developed nations. The results at the Special Session, which just concluded today, were constructive. Discussions took place in a conciliatory spirit, and the final document produced considerable convergence between the developed and the developing countries, and the outlines of a consumer program of action.

Cooperation must remain a two-way street. If nations wield their special strengths as weapons, the promise of global progress will give way to the perils of global confrontation.

The most critical immediate issue, of course, is the question of the price of oil. We and our partners in the International Energy Agency have already taken major steps to conserve oil and to establish financial structures that will help us cope with the impact of rising oil prices. Much still

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PR 482

remains to be done, but the United States, in cooperation with other
industrial nations, will make a determined effort to reverse the conditions
that have enabled oil prices to be set unilaterally. The United States
cannot and will not entrust its political and economic destiny to decisions
made elsewhere.

At the same time, we are ready to seek a new relationship with the oil-
producing nations. We ought to be partners, not adversaries. Consumers
must have reliable access to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest
their new oil wealth, the producers must become major importers of our
products. We are ready to cooperate with the oil producers in linking
our economies on equitable terms.

Next month the oil producers, developing countries and industrial countries
will meet to launch a dialogue on energy, raw materials, development and
finance first proposed by President Giscard d'Estaing of France. We have
worked hard to make these meetings possible. We will work hard to make
them a success. They provide us the opportunity to shape new constructive
relationships in the world economy.

But another oil price rise would severely jeopardize these hopes. It could
set off a relentless sequence of action and reaction to the detriment of
all countries, developed and developing. This vicious cycle must be avoided.
The possibilities of a cooperative world order depend upon it.

## Peace in the Middle East

There is no more vivid example of the stake that we have in the world
around us, and the decisive contribution that this nation can make than the
conflict in the Middle East.

The Middle East lies at the crossroads of three continents. Because of the
area's strategic importance, and because it provides the energy on which
much of the world depends, outside powers have continued to involve themselves in its conflicts, often competitively.

For the United States a diplomatic role in the Middle East is not a preference but a matter of vital interest:

- because of our important concerns in the Arab world -- an area of more than 150 million people and the site of the world's largest oil reserves;

- because perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies in Europe and Japan;

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PR 482

-- because upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery, threatening the well-being of the industrial nations and the hopes of the developing world; and

-- because tension in the Middle East increases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk.

-- The oil embargo, coupled with the OPEC price increases, cost Americans half a million jobs and over ten billion dollars in national output. It added at least five percentage points to the price index, contributing to the worst inflation since World War II. It set the stage for a serious worldwide recession, from which we are only now recovering two years later.

-- Partly because of their greater dependence on Middle East oil, our principal allies in Western Europe and Japan separated from us over Middle East policy, in the most serious strain in our alliances since they were founded.

-- The 1973 crisis tested the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, leading us briefly to the verge of confrontation in the October 24 alert.

The October War also set in train momentum that is now irreversible. Events can be channeled toward diplomatic progress, or they can pull us headlong towards another war.

We have no illusions about the difficulties. The Middle East has seen more than its share of dashed hopes and disappointment. But progress depends crucially -- even decisively -- on the United States. Time and again, the parties have turned to us for mediation. Time and again we have acceded to these requests because we are convinced that stagnation invites disaster. The next Middle East war will pose greater risks, complexities, and dangers, and cause more dislocations than any previous conflict.

For nearly three decades it was axiomatic that all issues pertaining to all the countries involved had to be addressed comprehensively: the final frontiers of Israel and the reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab states, the future of the Palestinians, the status of Jerusalem, and the question of international guarantees should all be considered together.

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PR 482

But for 30 years it proved nearly impossible even to begin the process of negotiation. Every attempt to discuss a comprehensive solution failed -- from the Partition Plan, to the Lausanne Conference, to the Rogers Plan, and the Four Powers talks of 1969 and '70, to the UN Security Council deliberations. To discuss simultaneously issues of such complexity, between countries whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even the concept of compromise, was futile until a minimum of confidence had been established. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is a new and relatively recent development that opinion in the Arab world has begun to think in terms of recognizing a sovereign Israel, and that Israel has begun to see peace as a tangible goal rather than a distant dream.

PR #482 (c)

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The United States therefore concluded that instead of seeking to deal with all problems at once, we should proceed step by step with the parties prepared to negotiate and on the issues where some room for maneuver seemed possible. We believed that once the parties began a negotiating process, they would develop a stake in success. Solutions to problems more easily negotiable would build mutual confidence. On each side a sense would grow that negotiations could produce benefits and that agreements would be kept -- agreements that could become building blocks for a final peace.

Ultimately we expected that the step-by-step process would bring about, for the first time, the basic political conditions needed for the overall settlement called for by Security Council Resolution 338. This remains our goal.

Progress since the October War has been without precedent since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council Resolution 338 launched a negotiating process and the first Geneva Conference. Agreements to separate the opposing forces and establish UN buffer zones to strengthen the ceasefire were successfully negotiated between Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and between Syria and Israel in May 1974.

The role of the United States was crucial in helping the parties reach these agreements. It reflected the fact that only we had developed strong relationships of trust with all parties. Major Arab countries that broke diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore their ties with us, creating a new climate of confidence and thereby the conditions for progress. And our traditional friendship with Israel has been reinforced in the crucible of crisis and the long months of close association in negotiations.

The momentum of progress was interrupted in the summer and fall of 1974: first by our Presidential succession; then by the decision of the Arab Summit at Rabat which made negotiations over the West Bank impossible.

When negotiations were resumed in March of this year, they first ended in deadlock. We therefore reexamined our approach, asking whether we should continue the step-by-step strategy or move directly to the Geneva Conference and a comprehensive approach. The imminent crisis we feared as a result of the March deadlock did not materialize -- almost solely because everyone expected that the United States, in one way or another, would resume its effort.

The President consulted widely -- with Congressional and civic leaders, with our Ambassadors from the area, and with the Middle East parties. He met with King Hussein, President Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin, and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. We benefitted from the views of the new Saudi leadership, which is continuing the policy of the highly respected late King Faisal.

PR #482 (L)

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The President concluded that the time was still not ripe for a comprehensive approach. In the wake of an apparent failure, the intractability of the issues would only be compounded by their being combined. Bringing all the parties, including the most irreconcilable, together in one dramatic public negotiation was an invitation to a deepened stalemate. This could discredit the whole process of negotiation and create a slide towards war. It was widely understood that the momentum of diplomatic progress had to be restored before Geneva was convened to consider the broader issues.

- Territorially, it provides for withdrawal of Israeli forces from the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic Sinai passes. Egypt recovers a significant portion of its territory, including the economically important oil fields.

- Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the ceasefire. It widens the buffer zone and extends the limitations of forces that were negotiated in the Disengagement Agreement of January 1974. These balanced provisions markedly reduce the danger of surprise attack that figured centrally in the wars of 1967 and 1973.

- Politically, the agreement -- which remains in force until it is superseded by another one -- commits both sides to a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict, and to refrain from use or threat of force or of military blockade. It permits non-military Israeli cargoes to go through the newly reopened Suez Canal.

Both Prime Minister Rabin and President Sadat have hailed the agreement as a possible turning point. It represents the most far-reaching practical test of peace -- political, military and psychological -- in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first time, Israel and an Arab state have taken a step, not just to halt fighting or to disentangle the forces but to reduce the danger of future war and to commit themselves to peaceful settlement of the conflict. The effort that went into it and the inhibitions that both sides had to overcome reflect a serious determination to end a generation of violence. And both sides have affirmed that the agreement is a significant step in a process that must be continued toward a just and durable peace.

The achievement owes much to the courage of leaders on both sides. President Sadat and his Government moved Egypt on the path of moderation and development; they have understood that a political process offered the only realistic hope for the achievement of all Arab interests.

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Credit is due equally to the courage of Prime Minister Rabin and the Government of Israel. Israel's dilemma is that to obtain peace it must give up tangible assets such as territory for intangible concessions such as assurances and recognition. Israel's leaders realized that only negotiation offered a hope to achieve what Israel has sought for 27 years -- new political conditions that would mean acceptance by its neighbors, in return for withdrawal from territory. They had the wisdom to recognize that the time had come to start this difficult, even painful process.

The presence of 200 civilian Americans to assist with the early-warning system in the small area of the passes is a limited -- but crucial -- American responsibility. It was not a role we sought. We accepted it at the request of both sides only when it became totally clear that there would be no agreement without it and only on carefully limited terms. We agreed because failure would have posed grave risks for the United States.

In the aftermath of Indochina the concerns of some Americans about this presence are understandable. But the two cases are totally different. The American presence in the Sinai is not a step into conflict; it is a move which gives added insurance against conflict. It is limited to 200 volunteer civilians by agreement with both sides. They will be stationed in a small but important sector of the UN neutral zone. They are not combat personnel or advisors engaged on one side of an ongoing war. They serve both sides, at their request, and complement the UN presence from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria and Finland.

Our presence in the area is not new. Indeed, 36 Americans are at this moment serving with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The agreement provides the President the right to withdraw the American personnel if they are in jeopardy. We are prepared, as well, to accept a Congressional proposal making the withdrawal mandatory in case of hostilities.

In short, what we have proposed to the Congress and the American people is not an engagement in war, but an investment in peace.

There will also be deliberation in the Congress over military and economic assistance to the parties. We will submit our recommendations within a month. This assistance is not part of the agreement, itself. Indeed, most of the assistance we shall request would have been sought even if there were no agreement. But in the present context our aid takes on new significance; it is central to our policy and vital to the chances for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Economic and military support for Israel's security has been American policy during five Administrations. Last May, 76 US Senators wrote to President Ford urging that the United States "be responsive to Israel's

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urgent economic and military needs." The Administration's request for new assistance to Israel is responsive to this call; it will reflect long-standing criteria of assistance; only a small part grows out of new requirements arising from the agreement.

The case for aid to Egypt is equally strong. Egypt has taken important steps towards peace and closer relations with the West. Egypt deserves our encouragement. American technology and capital, public and private, can strengthen all the constructive tendencies in the Middle East. The symbolic and substantive significance of American support to Egypt is immeasurable.

Thus, the additional burden of US assistance is modest -- infinitely smaller than the demonstrated costs of another war, which in 1973 required direct appropriations to Israel of $2.2 billion in addition to the indirect costs. But its role is crucial. It reduces the incentives for war; it, too, is an investment in peace.

Where do we go from here?

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step in a continuing process. The agreement states explicitly that the parties shall continue the negotiating efforts to reach an overall, final peace settlement in accordance with Resolution 338.

The path ahead will be difficult. In the immediate future, we must begin the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. This must await the deliberation and decision of the Congress. When this is settled and if the agreement goes into effect, we will start our consultations with all concerned to assure that there is consensus on the next step. We will not move precipitously, because we want confidence to build. We will not move without careful preparation, because we want the process to continue to succeed.

But the effort to achieve a lasting peace must resume. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement has created new opportunities for the future -- but these opportunities must be seized, or they will disappear. The United States did not help negotiate this agreement in order to put an end to the process of peace but to give it new impetus. There can be no stagnation, for the area remains tense and volatile.

For our part, we stand ready to assist as the parties desire. We will seriously encourage a negotiation between Syria and Israel. We are prepared to consult all countries concerned, including the Soviet Union, about the timing and substance of a reconvened Geneva Conference. And we are fully aware that there will be no permanent peace unless it includes arrangements that take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

The United States seeks no special advantage in the Middle East. It has always been our policy that the nations of the region should be free to determine their own relationships with any outside power. Therefore

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the United States would not understand and would be obliged to oppose efforts by any outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli agreement.

In the search for a final peace, the United States is prepared to work with the Soviet Union. We are co-sponsors of the Security Council Resolutions that launched this hopeful course of negotiation; we are co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference which met at an early crucial phase. While we have had important differences with the Soviet Union over the substance of a settlement, our two countries have held parallel views that the Middle East situation poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of, and contribute to, progress towards a comprehensive solution.

In the Middle East there is a yearning for peace surpassing any known for a generation. Let us seize this historic opportunity. The suffering and bravery of the peoples of the Middle East demand it; the highest interests of the United States require it.

This is why the American people, their Congress, and the President are, to an extraordinary degree, united on the course of our Middle East policy. And this is why we will not cease our effort.

## Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, we Americans have spent the better part of a decade apologizing to ourselves and the world for what we thought we had become. We have spent most of the last three years enmeshed in a national tragedy that caused many to lose sight of what our country has meant, and continues to mean, to the billions abroad who look to the United States as a beacon of freedom and hope.

Today, the issues that threatened our unity and confidence are in the process of being put behind us. A world of turmoil, danger and opportunity cries out for our purposeful leadership. There is no doubt of our physical capacity and technical skill. But we must put them in the service of a common purpose.

After a decade of challenge and crises, we must strive to ensure that our Government will be united, that our people will have confidence, that our country will be strong, and that our freedoms will flourish. As we enter the year of a political campaign at home -- and an era of unprecedented challenge abroad -- a spirit of unity and bipartisanship becomes our international as well as national duty. We cannot afford a year and a half of partisan warfare. Our foreign policy must be a common enterprise of all Americans, for what we do -- or fail to do -- will inevitably affect events for many years to come.

If the past two years of effort in the Middle East have lessened the dangers of war and set that part of the world on the road to peace -- as I pray they have -- it is the United States that has made the difference. It is the United States alone among the world's nations that Israel and its Arab neighbors were prepared to trust. It has been

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 4, 1976

No. 159

As Prepared by Delivery

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
L'ENFANT PLAZA

APRIL 4, 1976

Rabbi Hertzberg, Dean Rosovsky, Mr. Wilkins, distinguished guests, friends:

I am honored by this award, and by your most generous introduction.

The greatness of America has been not so much its physical strength as its moral significance. Since its birth this nation has stood for something larger than itself. Americans have always had a sense of mission; we have been inspired by the knowledge that we were champions of liberty and progress for all mankind. We have been not only a refuge for those fleeing persecution, but the defense of democracy, and bulwark for others in time of need, a feeder of the hungry and a solace to the suffering. And history continues to present us these challenges and more. Today we bear a central responsibility for maintaining peace and shaping a global structure which can help realize mankind's dream of an end to conflict and hatred.

These are the qualities and responsibilities and hopes which tie America to Israel. No people knows more vividly than the Jewish people that morality must be more than a theory -- it must be a quality of human conduct. No people yearns more for tranquility than those who historically have been the first victims of its loss. And no people perceives more acutely that peace depends ultimately not on political arrangements but on the conscience of mankind.

History is often cruel, but the wisest are those who know that fate can be shaped by human faith and human courage. The true realists are those who recognize that all great achievements were a dream before they became a reality. These are qualities that have enabled the Jewish people to survive their tragedies. These are the qualities that brought about the state of Israel. These are qualities that guarantee the future of the people of Israel. And these are qualities which peoples and nations everywhere must possess if they are to be free.

## The Moral Basis of Foreign Policy

History challenges us amid the world's ambiguities to shape events by our own purposes and ideals. If democratic societies like America and Israel are to prosper, we must summon the unity and resolve to be masters of our futures on the basis of our values.

The decisions that must be made are always difficult -- for foreign policy deals with the interaction of sovereign entities. No country, no matter how strong, can impose its will on the world. Today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons, diffusion of power and growing interdependence, foreign policy is more than ever an enterprise of incomplete and imperfect solutions. Tension is unavoidable between moral values, which are invariably cast in absolute terms, and efforts to achieve them, which of necessity involve compromise.

For further information contact:

PR #158

This accounts for much of the foreign policy debate in democratic societies, which to some extent is a rebellion against the contemporary world. In all democratic societies the temp-tation is great to deny the circumstances of the contemporary world and to blame them on individuals, to confuse optimism with the shallow projection of the desirable.

But we cannot escape the conditions around us. Morality without pragmatic action is empty, just as pragmatism without moral direction is like a rudderless ship. The true optimists are those who are prepared to face complexity and who have the faith that their people can master it by dedication and vision.

If democracies like America and Israel are to survive and flourish in a world of sovereign states and competing wills, they must stand firmly for their belief in human dignity; otherwise we will lose our bearings. There is no way to make these choices, and to navigate between the shoals of temptation and danger, without a strong inner moral conviction. Equally, we need a mature and hard-headed understanding of the difficult choices that must be made, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival.

For Americans, foreign policy has always been more than the search for stability. Americans have a vision of a world of justice that drives all our efforts. A pragmatic policy, alone would be empty of humanity; it would lack direction, and roots, and heart.

But equally if policy becomes excessively moralistic, it can turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on virtue can make impossible any solution or negotiation. Good results may be given up or sabotaged in the quest for the elusive ideal. Some of this country's most serious errors — of both involvement and abdication — were driven by misguided moral arguments. Some intervention began as crusades to reform other societies; and we were isolationist in the 1930s to preserve our purity and register our distaste for the balance of power.

Our responsibility to conduct a moral, far-sighted and realistic policy has grown in recent years. In a world made smaller by technology and communications, events anywhere are instantly known and have effects in distant places. Never before have the destinies of nations been more intertwined — not only practically but morally.

And so we have a stake in a peaceful world and an environment where man's aspirations for justice and liberty and dignity have the greatest chance of fulfillment. The ultimate safety of every minority, every oppressed people, lies in a world where respect for human dignity governs the affairs of nations. Peace can be said to exist only when the insecurity of nations is eased, the hopes of people for economic advance are fulfilled, international habits of restraint and conciliation are nurtured, and men experience at last the blessings of a world of justice and progress.

## Peace in the Middle East

I have spoken at some length about the moral foundation of our foreign policy to this group which is so concerned and serious about the survival of Israel. For the relationship between America and Israel depends ultimately not on formal assurances but on the links of our peoples and the reality of our values.

The survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States. Israel is a loyal friend and a fellow democracy, whose very existence represents the commitment of all free peoples. The moral strength of the people of Israel, which has so often meant the margin of victory in war, gives us confidence that Israel will also win peace. No people has earned it more.

Time and events have brought us to a threshold in Middle East history — an unprecedented opportunity to realize the peace of which we all have dreamed; a peace in the interest of all the peoples of a region that has experienced enough anguish for this generation.

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— Israel, having proven by its own courage that it is here to stay, has taken equally courageous steps toward peaceful resolution of the conflict.

— Some of her Arab neighbors, for the first time ever, are now speaking openly and wisely of making peace and ending generations of conflict.

— The United States has demonstrated to both sides its commitment to continue to promote a just and enduring solution.

— The relationships among the major outside powers, if conducted with reason and firmness, can create a global environment of restraint that will enhance security and the possibilities of peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

Israel obviously faces profound problems — not the least of which is that in any negotiation with her neighbors, she will be asked to yield the physical buffers of territory in exchange for intangible pledges. Indeed, Israel's gains will be intangible even as she achieves her own stated objectives of a formal peace treaty and diplomatic recognition by her neighbors. So the process of peace inevitably presents her with many anguishing decisions — and the pain is shared by all of us who are friends of Israel and who are dedicated to further progress towards peace. Throughout this process we owe Israel our compassion and support.

The risks and obstacles are many. Steps taken must be carefully thought out and realistic. But we must move together, with courage and with a vision of how reality can be shaped by a vision of peace. And we must not paralyze ourselves by a suspiciousness that deprives our relationship of dignity and our cooperation of significance.

The United States will help keep Israel strong — to ensure that peace is seen clearly to be the only feasible course. We will never abandon Israel — either by failing to provide crucial assistance, or by misconceived or separate negotiations, or by irresolution when challenged to meet our own responsibility to maintain the global balance of power.

We will never forget that America's responsibility for peace includes, above all, responsibility for the fate of smaller nations who rely upon us as the ultimate defender of their survival and freedom and that Israel's fate is inseparable from the future of human dignity. America will not abandon a friend because to do so in one part of the world would shake confidence in every part of the world. There will be no American weakness or abdication for this can only tempt adversaries, confuse allies, and undermine security in the world, ultimately to the grave peril of our country.

Moral ideals and practical interest thus come together. Peace in the Middle East is a goal shared by Americans and by Israelis alike. The road towards it will be a common one. And so, in truth, as we pursue the course of peace, our guarantees rest not so much in any formal agreements or reassurances endlessly repeated but in the deeper ties of emotion and morality, history and principle, that can never be sundered.

The dream of peace is the dream of the prophet Isaiah — that "nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore." It is the benediction of Leviticus — that "the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee and grant thee peace." This dream is both an inspiration and a duty. And those who strive for it know both the pain and the exhilaration of man's noblest endeavor.

The United States and Israel will have the courage and the faith to seek this dream and fulfill it.

********

As prepared for delivery

Remarks by Henry A. Kissinger

Presentation of Wise Award to

Golda Meir

Sunday, November 13, 1977

We are privileged tonight to be in the presence of an extraordinary human being. Golda Meir led her people with wisdom and courage in their hour of need, and left her mark on history.

I have always admired Golda and loved her for her strength, for her wisdom and for her humanity. Her life is testimony not only of the history of an individual but of the destiny of a people. It is marked by the faith that made idealists of ordinary men and women and drove them to a wasteland to fulfill an historic vision. It is etched with the fortitude of the survivors of the holocaust determined that never again would they surrender the ultimate decision over their destiny. And it has been suffused with the compassion and humanity born of the suffering of millenia and the deep instinctive knowledge that man is the ultimate measure of all things.

We love Golda because her values go beyond the bounds of her people. They speak of the worth of all humanity. They remind us that the fundamental aspirations to liberty and justice and service are not realized finally for the Jewish people unless they are realized for all men and women and conversely that they are not secure for mankind unless they are secure for the Jewish people.

Golda always recalls us to fundamentals. She shames the expedient and the second-rate. She reflects a universal conscience -- the need for a world in which the weak are protected by a general order, in which justice is not a subterfuge for the dominance of the powerful and in which peace is based on true trust and reconciliation.

All of us here know that history will record that her term as Prime Minister was a turning point. With sublime courage she led her people through a period of tragic war, and with tremendous vision through two crucial negotiations with Egypt and Syria that will be seen, I am confident, as the beginning of the journey toward real peace.