November 4, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Background information on the "Opening to the Left"

On several occasions, you have mentioned "the Opening to the Left" in your criticisms of the Kennedy Administration. As you know, I agree with you. This memorandum is to give you background information about the term and make clear the context in which it applies.

cc. John Deardourff
    William J. Ronan
    Douglas Bailey
    June Goldthwait
    Roswell B. Perkins

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## Background Information on the "Opening to the Left"

Technically speaking, the term "Opening to the Left" can be applied only to Italian politics. It was originally used by former President Gronchi. The stated purpose was to wean the Left Wing Socialists away from a coalition with the Communists and make them part of the government. The Left Wing Socialists in Italy are allied with the Communists on the local level. A number of major cities, such as Bologna, are being run by a Communist mayor with Socialist support.

Gronchi's policy was steadfastly opposed by the previous Administration.

This Administration has encouraged the "Opening to the Left", although the nature of the encouragement is very elusive. It has consisted mostly in letting it be known that we would not oppose such a structure. And we encouraged Italian political leaders, such as Fanfani, who are in favor it. Thus when Fanfani visited the White House, the President in a speech compared him with Lincoln because both Lincoln and Fanfani conciliated their enemies. In Italy this was construed as support for the Opening to the Left. But direct American support is not easy to prove.

The result of the Opening to the Left has, in my view, been disastrous. The Socialists have not broken with Communists on the local level. Indeed about 45% of the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist Party are in favor of a coalition with the Communists even on the

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national level. The Socialists have now stated, as a condition of their
coalition with the Christian Democrats, opposition to nuclear weapons
and an avowed policy of neutralism even though they have argued for Italy
to stay in NATO. (What this formula means is not clear.)

Domestically the result has been a tremendous gain in the Com-
munist vote and also it has made the Socialists the arbiter of Italian
politics. Far from isolating the Communists, it has raised the specter of
a popular front government.

I think we could make a criticism of the Administration for having
a tendency to believe the slogan which was popular in Europe in the '30's:
"The enemy is always on the right." It is also possible to say that the
same pressure that led to the encouragement of an "Opening to the Left" in
Italy causes us to encourage negotiations of the West Germans with the East
Germans. Strictly speaking, however, this would not be called "Opening to
the Left."

October 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Governor

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

Newspaper reports quote you as having stated that Goldwater
made a serious mistake in opposing ratification of the Test Ban
Treaty. I would recommend going easy on this line of argument. We
endorsed ratification of the Treaty rather lukewarmly. I do not
think we should be in a position of implying that the Test Ban was a
good thing.

As a general proposition, I would recommend drawing the line
with Goldwater on domestic issues. On foreign policy I would not
stress my differences unless there are clear questions of principle,
such as foreign aid. If you win the primaries, it will be necessary
to get the support of some of Goldwater's backers, and I think you
might agree most easily on a foreign policy line.

cc. Mr. Perkins
Mr. Hinman
Miss Goldthwait

Mr. Goldwater
Mr. Human
cc. Mr. Perkin

might agree most easily on a foreign border line.
To set the border of some of Goldwater's packets, and I think you
should be foreign etd. If you win the bristols, it will be necessary
at least a difference unless there are clear directions of principle,
with Goldwater on domestic issues. On foreign border I would not
be a General proposition. I would recommend drawing the line
through.

As a General proposition, I would recommend drawing the line
through.

I think we should be in a position of implying that the Test Ban was a
encouraged ratification of the Treaty rather immediately. I do not
Treaty. I would recommend going easy on this line of argument. We
made a serious mistake in objecting ratification of the Test Ban

FROM: Henry V. Kieferling
TO: The Governor

MEMORANDUM

October 23, 1963

November 6, 1963

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

Dear Nelson:

Enclosed please find a draft statement on Vietnam. My recommendation is to release it as soon as possible, no later than Sunday or Monday.

My reasons are as follows:

a) There is a vague moral uneasiness about Vietnam which it seems to me somebody has to crystallize.

b) Our policy has been shameful and you would perform a great service to be the first national leader to speak out against it.

c) Conditions in Vietnam will, in my judgment, get worse. It would be important to warn against this.

d) You would have picked an issue on which you are morally right and at the same time should be able to unite many Republicans.

The counterargument is that Lodge will undoubtedly support the Administration. But if we take this seriously we are debarred from ever raising the Vietnam issues-one of the most effective issues we have.

With warm regards.

Henry V. Kietzgen

Genuinely home.

With warm regards.

ever relating the Vietnam issue-one of the most effective issues we have
the Administration. But if we take this seriously we are separated from
the contestment is that Lodge will undoubtedly support

right and at the same time should be able to write many Republi cans.

q) You would have picked an issue on which you are more likely

It would be important to warm against this.

a) A great service to be the first national leader to ask out against it.

p) Our policy has been straightforward and you would better

a) There is a value more meaningful about Vietnam

My reasons are as follows:

Samuel or Monday.
recommendation is to release it as soon as possible, no later than
enclosed please find a draft statement on Vietnam. My

Dear Nelson:

New York, New York
33 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler

November 6, 1963

November 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO:
Jerry Danzig
John Deardourff
George L. Hinman
Robert McManus
Hugh Morrow
Roswell B. Perkins
William J. Ronan

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Statement on Vietnam

My reasons are as follows:

b) Our policy has been shameful and the Governor would perform a great service to be the first national leader to speak out against it.

d) The Governor would have picked an issue on which he is morally right and at the same time should be able to unite many Republicans.

The counterargument is that Lodge will undoubtedly support the Administration. But if we take this seriously, we are debarred from ever raising the Vietnam issue -- one of the most effective issues we have.

Of course, you must make the judgment whether this is politically wise -- a judgment I am not competent to make.

VIETNAM STATEMENT

Recent events in South Vietnam must be of profound concern
to all Americans. The government of an allied country -- which had been
established originally with strong U.S. support -- has been overthrown by a
military coup encouraged by our government. Its leaders have been assassinated.

The brother of the executed men, the former governor of the central coastal
region of Vietnam, has been refused asylum in the U.S. Embassy and tunned over
to the authorities which killed his brother (this despite the fact that two leaders
of the Buddhist revolt against the Diem regime had been granted asylum there).

A thinly disguised military dictatorship has been established.

The conduct of a guerrilla war is, of course, desperately difficult.

And we face a tragic dilemma about finding groups with which we can identify our-
selves morally as well as ally ourselves militarily. I do not wish finally, to
condone all actions of the Diem government or to excuse the tactless statements
of the Diem family.

Nevertheless even making allowance for all these problems, I am deeply
worried about a U.S. policy which has given rise to such methods. The honor and
the moral standing of the United States require that a relationship exists

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between ends and means. In Indo-China, within the space of two years, two govern-
ments, in whose installation we had a major responsibility, have been sacrificed
under American pressure -- the one in Laos to a so-called coalition regime with
the Communists, the one in Vietnam to a military junta. Whatever may be thought
of the merit or quality of these governments, it is well to remember that the
Kennedy Administration made a formal mutual-support arrangement in December 1961
with the Diem government when it had been in office seven years and its character
was obvious. The role of our government in the destruction of two allied regimes
must give pause to any other threatened leader considering the validity or the
consequences of United States assistance. It must raise serious questions in the
mind of any American about the validity of America's word which should transcend
the fortunes of particular political parties.

Our responsibility for recent events is inescapable. With 16,000
American personnel assigned to Vietnamese forces down to the batallion
level, is it conceivable that the troop movements leading to the coup
could have occurred without our knowledge? Would the leaders of the
junta have revolted had they been given to understand, in their talks

with Secretary McNamara less than a month ago, that our abhorrence
of military coups was not confined to Latin America?

But whatever the advance knowledge of our government, it is
responsible for systematically undermining the Diem regime in the
last two months. At the end of August 1963, the Kennedy Administration
became publicly embroiled with the Diem government to whose support
it had been publicly committed for over two years.

a. On August 6 the monks who led the Buddhist revolt against the Diem regime were given asylum in the United States Embassy. The significance of this measure is underlined by the fact that the United States as a general rule neither recognizes nor grants asylum.

On January 30 of this year a group of 32 Soviet citizens from Siberia, seeking haven from Soviet religious persecution in the U.S. Embassy, were turned over to the Soviet police. Only last week, the brother of President Diem was refused asylum in the United States Consulate in Hue and turned over to the authorities that had executed his two brothers.

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b. On August 26th, the Department of State issued a statement absolving the Vietnamese Army from responsibility for the raids on the Buddhist pagodas. The purpose of this statement was to encourage a military revolt. The statement was broadcast into South Vietnam by the Voice of America.

c. On September 2nd, in a television interview the President called for changes of personnel in the Diem regime. This statement was also broadcast into South Vietnam by the Voice of America.

d. On September 12th, the _New York Times_ reported that the United States Ambassador in Saigon had been instructed to press for the removal of President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, from office.

e. On October 2nd, a White House statement announced that 1,000 United States military personnel would be withdrawn by the end of 1963 and the major part of the remainder by 1965.

f. On October 21st, it was revealed that U.S. support to the Vietnamese Special Forces (an internal security force) had been cut off and that the United States had suspended the monthly dollar allotment

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for financing commercial imports by Vietnam.

g. On October 31st, the day preceding the coup d'état, the President reiterated that 1,000 U.S. forces would be withdrawn before the end of 1963 and most of the rest of the U.S. forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1965.

On November 1st, the Diem regime was overthrown by a military coup by members of the military forces of South Vietnam:

a. President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated:

b. The leader of the South Vietnamese Special Forces was executed.

As has been widely reported in the press, the Special Forces until October had been supported by funds from the United States Central Intelligence Agency. Its leader was chosen by that Agency and its personnel trained by it.

This brief history leaves no doubt that the military takeover was encouraged, if not directly sponsored, by the Kennedy Administration and that its victims were individuals who until shortly before had been

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closely identified with us. For the Diem regime was not just any
government. The United States was largely responsible for its
establishment in 1955 and backed it in its struggle to establish a
viable state in a partitioned country.

These somber events have been justified with the argument
that the Diem government was losing the war against the Communist
guerrillas. This contrasts strangely with repeated, highly optimistic

from the Administration
accounts/about the struggle against the Vietcong. Thus:

-- On July 24, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara said that the South Vietnamese were "beginning to hit the Vietcong insurgents where it hurts most -- in winning the people to the side on the government."

-- On September 28, 1962, General Harkins said that the war could be won "within one year after the army attains a fully offensive footing."

-- On December 12, 1962, President Kennedy said that the situation in Vietnam was "in some ways lighter" than it had been a year before.

-- On April 12, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk said that "an important corner has been turned" in the war in Vietnam.

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-- On September 25, 1963, Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester said that military events in Vietnam were "getting better and better" and that reports showed that the government was "rapidly approaching" militarily the point where "the goals set will be reached relatively shortly."

-- On October 31, 1963, the day before the overthrow of the Diem regime, General Harkins said that victory, in the sense it applies to this kind of war, was only months away.

The statement about the ineffectiveness of the Diem regime is also utterly inconsistent with the White House announcement of October 2 that the war was going so well that 1,000 U.S. military personnel could be withdrawn before the end of this year and most of the remainder before the end of 1965.

**Difficulties of the Vietnamese Situation.** It is impossible for an outsider to judge the effectiveness of the war effort of the Diem regime. It is crucial to recognize, however, that there exist certain objective obstacles to an effective policy in South Vietnam, regardless of which government is in power.

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Some of these conditions are the result of U.S. policies, particularly
in Laos; others are due to the impact of the guerrilla war on an under-
developed country. These are:

a. **The Impact of the Settlement in Laos:** In 1961 when the present Administration took office, the United States was backing a pro-Western government in Laos. The Communist Pathet Laos controlled only one-fifth of the area. On March 23, 1961, in the face of a Communist advance, President Kennedy announced that "the safety of Laos runs with the safety of all of us." U.S. troops moved into the Gulf of Siam.

When the Communists continued their advance, despite our "show
of strength", we came up with a scheme for the "neutralization" of Laos.
We abandoned our support for the pro-Western government and insisted
on a coalition government in which the Communists play an increasingly
powerful part. Today the Communist Pathet Lao control over half of
Laos including the entire area contiguous to the Vietnamese border,
extending over 260 miles, thus opening up a new supply line and a sanctuary
for the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam.

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In December 1961, while Laos was being "neutralized," the United States formally committed itself to a major effort to defeat the Vietcong guerrillas. Over ten thousand U.S. military personnel were sent to Vietnam as instructors. Military assistance was stepped up. It was announced that Vietnam was "different" from Laos.

The "neutralization" of Laos was inconsistent with our Vietnam policy on two counts: Psychologically, it spurred on the Vietcong (Communist guerrillas) and demoralized our friends. It set the precedent that we were capable of sacrificing a government we had been instrumental in establishing. It thus must have created the hope in some and the fear in others that if the war in Vietnam was sufficiently prolonged, we would tire of it as we had in Laos. Militarily, our Laotian policy opened up a frontier of 260 miles to guerrilla infiltration and enabled the Communists to establish sanctuaries and supply lines into Vietnam.

b. <u>The Nature of Guerrilla War.</u> The existence of guerrillas is not necessarily due to government repression. There are various

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-- The new regime is in an ever stronger position to be intractable towards us than its predecessor. Having been publicly embroiled with one Vietnamese government, we are in a poor position to bring pressure on its successor.

-- The new regime runs the risk of being branded a U.S. puppet -- indeed Communist propaganda to this effect has already started. This may undermine the popular support essential to the successful prosecution of a guerrilla war.

-- The composition of the three-man junta gives reason to doubt the motivation of some of those engaged in the coup. General ______ had been commander of the troops in the Saigon area during the raid by the Diem government on the pagodas. On August 23 (CHECK) -- two days after the raid -- while Saigon was under martial law he was made military governor of that city. On August 29, he publicly took full responsibility for the raid on the pagodas. The *New York Times* of ______ has reported that General ______ broke with President Diem only after having been refused in his request to be made Interior Minister.

## Other Effects of the Vietnamese Coup:

In addition to the effects of the Vietnamese coup in that country, the U.S. role in it will have a substantial effect outside that country.

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-- Our encouragement of the military coup and the speed with which we have moved to recognize it casts a curious light on our condemnation of military coups in Latin America.

-- Our abandonment of two friendly governments in the space of two years may cause other threatened leaders to wonder whether American support is worth the price or whether their best course is not to accommodate to Communist pressures almost at any price.

-- The actions of this Administration in Laos, Vietnam, and New Guinea, to take but three examples, show a consistent willingness to sacrifice our friends to the pressures of the moment. Of course, there were always "good" reasons. But my concern is not that the Administration is capricious; rather that it tends to sacrifice principle to expediency.

-- Whatever our motives, no American can take pride that our government should have been associated with events leading to the assassination of two leaders with whom we were formally allied. I do not like our country to be thought of in terms of the cynical use of power. Our strength is principle not manipulativeness. Our historical role has been to identify ourselves with the ideals and deepest hopes of mankind. If we lost this asset, temporary successes will be meaningless.

We can do nothing about the past. As for the future, the Administration is now fully responsible for what may happen in Vietnam.

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The prestige and good faith of the U.S. is irrevocably engaged. The
test of our policy will be two-fold: a) Whether a new government,
responsive to popular needs and aspirations, can be established.

b) Whether the war against the Communist Guerrillas can be won.

Both tasks require major efforts. All Americans must hope that the
next chapter in the heretofore tragic story of South East Asia will
be a happy one.

December 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Your attacking Nixon for his violation of the "Fifth Avenue Compact"

You mentioned the other day that one of the attacks on Nixon might be his violation of the "Fifth Avenue Compact." I am not sure that this will be a very effective argument with most Republicans for the following reasons:

1. Most Republicans feel that the "Fifth Avenue Compact" should not have been made.

2. It will remind people of what many consider an attempt to split the Republican Party.

3. It will lead to extremely complicated argumentation.

4. I suspect there are more people who believe that what lost Nixon the election was the making of the Compact rather than the breaking of it. If it is used at all, it should be done in connection with the general shiftiness of Nixon.

My strong advice is to ignore Nixon completely until he declares himself and then to force him to attack you by staking out your program before he gets going.

cc. John Wells
    Charles Moore
    Roswell Perkins

Roanell Perkins
Charles Moore
cc. John Wells

before he gets going.

My strong advice is to ignore Nixon completely until he declares
aplicity of Nixon.

4. I suspect there are more people who believe that what
   rather than the breaking of it. It is used at all,
   last Nixon the election was the making of the Contract

to split the Republican party.

2. It will remind people of what may consider an attempt

should not have been made.

1. Most Republicans feel that the "Bitch Avenue Combat"

Repubiicans for the following reasons:

are not able that this will be a very effective argument with most
Nixon might be the violation of the "Bitch Avenue Combat." I
You mentioned the other day that one of the attacks on

Vauve Combat."

SUBJECT: Your attacking Nixon for his violation of the "Bitch
FROM: Henry V. Krasner
TO: THE GOVERNOR

MEMORANDUM

December 10, 1963

December 16, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Draft of a post-moratorium speech or statement

I am enclosing a draft of a statement or an outline of a
speech which you might consider making fairly soon after the end of
the moratorium.

It was drafted by my associate, Douglas Bailey, and myself
(with Bailey deserving most of the credit).

(with Bailey desiring most of the credit).

If we drafted by my associate, Douglas Bailey, and wheat
the moratorium,

FROM: Henry V. Kiebler

TO: THE GOVERNOR

MEMORANDUM

December 19, 1963

January 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Goldwater's Charge of "Me Too"

I would like to make a suggestion about Goldwater's charge of "Me Too." My recommendation would be not to defend yourself against the charge. Rather I would suggest that you take something like the following line:

I have stated repeatedly that labels are not a substitute for thought. I have stated my own program and will continue to do so in the months ahead. Senator Goldwater should indicate which part of the program he disagrees with. We should then give the voters of New Hampshire the opportunity to hear both views -- slogans only confuse the issue.

January 6, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Senator Goldwater's Appearance on Meet the Press

On Meet the Press Senator Goldwater said that he will use the threat of withdrawal of recognition of the Soviet Union as a threat in any negotiation. If you are asked about this suggestion, you might make the following point:

Senator Goldwater seems to confuse two points, the withdrawal of recognition from the Soviet government and the breaking off of diplomatic relations.

With respect to the withdrawal of recognition, this is usually done when an alternative government exists which is considered to be a more effective negotiating partner or which better represents the wishes of the people of the other country. If Senator Goldwater has withdrawal of recognition in mind, the first thing to remember is that no alternative government exists in Russia or even in exile. Withdrawing recognition from a government with which we have maintained diplomatic relations for thirty years is a gesture without any meaning. It would not only be ineffective in our dealings with the Soviets, it would make us look ridiculous in the eyes of other countries and it would mean that our dealings with the Soviets would have to be conducted through third parties.

If Senator Goldwater wants to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but continue to recognize it, it is important to point out that this step in the past has usually been considered as a measure just short of war. It would make any kind of diplomatic relations impossible. In the nuclear age the two great nuclear countries should not be out of contact -- the danger of miscalculation is too great. I therefore strongly oppose Senator Goldwater's suggestion short of a very grave Soviet provocation.

January 8, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

I have talked to Oscar Ruebhausen about how we might build on the dinner with the former Special Studies Group and also how we might most effectively broaden your contacts in the intellectual community. The recommendations growing out of this conversation are as follows:

1. We should have a dinner with some of those present on December 19th about once a month. Each dinner should be devoted to a particular topic for which one of the participants might take responsibility, including the bringing in of additional people. For example, John Gardner and Jim McCormack could do something extremely useful about the problems of the lower third of the educational structure and its relationship to general economic conditions. If you agree with this idea, I could work out dates with Louise Boyer.

2. As for your contacts in the intellectual community, it would seem to me very important that in every visit to a city an hour or so be put aside for a meeting with some of the leading intellectuals. This could be arranged by asking the president of the local university to get several of the faculty members together. This would give you an opportunity to get the thinking of this group, and it would also give them a sense of participation in your efforts.

If you are agreeable, I will work with Louise Boyer, or anybody else you may designate, on this.

Oscar has not seen this memo, but I am inclined to think he agrees with it. I am sending a copy to him.

Oscar has not seen this memo, but I am inclined to think he
else you may designate, on this.

It you are agreeable, I will work with Louise Boxer, or anybody

and it would also give them a sense of participation in your efforts. This would give you an opportunity to get the thinking of this group, the local university to get several of the faculty members together. Intercultural. This could be arranged by asking the president of your or so be put aside for a meeting with some of the leading would seem to me very important that in every visit to a city an

3. As for your contacts in the intellectual community, it

with Louise Boxer.

with Louise Boxer.

conditions. It you agree with this idea, I could work out dates

for example, John Gardner and Jim McCormack could do something

reasonability, including the printing in of additional pages.

December 18th apart once a month. Each dinner should be devoted

1. We should have a dinner with some of these present on

are as follows:

are as follows:

we might most effectively proceed your contacts in the intellectual

on the dinner with the former Special Studies Group and also now

I have talked to Oscar Kneppenius about how we might put it

FROM: Henry V. Kiebler

TO: THE GOVERNOR

MEMORANDUM

January 8, 1964

January 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Goldwater's Article on Foreign Affairs in Life.

Goldwater's article in the January 17th issue of *Life* made the following points. Where appropriate I have included relevant recommendations concerning your own position.

1. The basic point of Goldwater's article is to stress that "the Communists' undeviating pursuit of a Communist world is a fundamental fact of world politics here and now. An American foreign policy which does not come to grips with this fundamental fact is about as meaningful as a production of Hemet without the Danish Prince." In explaining this proposition Goldwater correctly warns that the West can take little comfort from the internal Communist split and that, in fact, the split "could as easily double our problems as halve them."

2. Goldwater criticizes U.S. policy as "a series of unrelated programs, nervous reflexes and unvarnished assumptions." In doing so he makes many of the same criticisms that you have: for example, that our nuclear policies seem to "place more trust in our enemies than in our friends" and that our Soviet and Vietnamese policies are contradictory.

["and that our petition and arguments before are considered.\n\nBefore seem to \"puree move\" that in our absence from in our absence seem to

[y]

He is critical of our "dollar-stitched patchwork" of Latin American policy and of our willingness to define the Cuban issue in terms of Soviet troops rather than in terms of Communism. Without being any more specific than this, he suggests that Western leadership could turn the turmoil in Africa "in the direction of rising responsibility."

3. Goldwater is specifically critical of the American policies which have brought about the "present disarray in the Atlantic Alliance." In words highly reminiscent of your own speeches on the subject he has pointed out that "there is no use telling ourselves . . . that we still hold a nuclear monopoly in the alliance and will hold it in the future." Similarly he criticizes the tendency toward bilateral negotiation without consultation with the allies.

Goldwater suggests that:

"the crux of the Alliance problem is the failure of the Democratic Administration since 1960 to provide for the full participation of our allies in planning and deployment of the most modern weapons systems, including appropriate nuclear weapons.

"In this, the Democratic Administration has been pursuing the most potentially disastrous course of isolationism in our history. . ."

Goldwater proposes that all NATO forces in Europe should be equipped with nuclear weapons, particularly of the tactical variety. He also proposes that "the Supreme Commander in Europe be given authority over the tactical nuclear weapons appropriate to NATO's defenses. The best authorization ultimately must be worked out with NATO itself."

ultimately must be met out with NATO itself."

unfairer message corroborates to NATO's defense. The past expropriation ties "the German commander in Europe be given authority over the军事

interference in our state"... 

bemanning the meat benefitarily directions comme of "In this" the Democratic Washington pass through the abstracted material. 

and deduction of the meatier meatbone system, for the lift benefit of our allies in beginning the Democratic Washington since 1900 to provide "the arm of the Alliance framework to the formation of

Golwasser suggests that:

with the allies.

be criticizes the tendency toward polarized negotiation without consideration of the matter in the effusion and still hold it in the future." Similarly, out of "there is no one selling omnesfao . . . that we still hold a right reimbursement of them our theories on the subject do not hold good" proposed for the "present danger in the Atlantic Alliance." In words Golwasser is specifically critical of the American policies which pass theганit in Africa "in the direction of raising responsibility." more specific than this, he suggests that Western rationality could sum of Soviet troops refer again in terms of Communism. Without point and American policy and of our affinigness to deal with the Caporal items in terms He is critical of om. "goffer-attached detours" of Latin

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NOTE: Recommended Position

a. Agree with Goldwater about disarray in the Alliance. Also agree that the nuclear control in the Alliance is a mess. Refer to your own statements. However, Senator Goldwater's specific remedies are not very meaningful.

b. The United States Commander in Europe, General Lemmitzer, should remain subject to the order of the President. In that capacity he can use neither conventional or nuclear weapons without the authority of the President. All our weapons should remain ultimately responsive to civilian control -- the whole purpose of the Constitutional doctrine of civilian control over the military.

c. Under Goldwater's proposal, General Lemmitzer, in his other capacity as Allied Commander, would have the authority to use nuclear weapons at his own discretion. This would bring about the absurd situation that General Lemmitzer, as U.S. Commander, might be prohibited from doing something with the American forces that he is authorized to do as Allied Commander.

d. Senator Goldwater does not seem to understand the command situation in NATO. Is Senator Goldwater recommending that the decision to go to nuclear war could be in the hands of a foreign military man? In other words, does Senator Goldwater mean that General Lemmitzer should have the authority or does he mean that the NATO Commander should have the authority? Would he be willing to give the same authority to the NATO Commander if that Commander happened to be a European?

Commander responded to be a Groomeet.

be put off to give the same authority to the NATO Commander. It is
not, does he mean that the NATO Commander should have the authority?
Should NATO Commander mean that General Lemaitre should have the authority
can be in the hands of a thoroughly military man? In other words, does
NATO? Is a General Goigwater recommending that the quote be Go to General
Villed Commander, who gave the authority to use another medeuse at the
under Goigwater, a Groomeet? General Lemaitre, in his own capacity as
of a station control over the military.

To station control -- the whole business of the constitutional government
of the President. Will our medeuse should remainsteinsoft, responsive
can see neither communication or nuclear medeuse apart from the authority
remain intact to the order of the President. In that capacity be
p. The United States Commander in Europe, General Lemaitre, should
not say meaningful.

our statements. However, General Goigwater's specific remeige is
first the nuclear control in the Vittence in a sense. Related to him.
u. Use with Goigwater should disappear in the Vittence. Vice versa

NOTE: Recommended Position

M

[y]

e. Tactical nuclear weapons should not be used without reference to our state of readiness to use strategic nuclear weapons. This could be disastrous. For this reason, it is important that the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons be made by the President of the United States, who has full information on our ability to follow up -- if need be -- with our strategic striking force.

f. I have in the past argued that the Europeans should have a significant voice in the control and ownership of NATO's nuclear forces. But this is primarily a political question. The Use of weapons of such consequence must always be subject to civilian control and not be a purely military decision.

g. Goldwater suggests that in NATO and the other Western Alliances we should work out common trade and political policies. He is particularly interested in an economic warfare "against the problem-ridden Communist countries."

He briefly criticizes the wheat sale as the type of policy which enables the "Communists to make up for economic shortfalls which otherwise would weaken their power and very probably destroy it eventually."

NOTE: Recommended Position

a. U.S. government-backed credit should not be extended to a sale of wheat to the Soviet Union.

b. I favor the cash sale of wheat to the Soviet Union only if the following conditions are met:

1. An agreement with the Soviet Union on the principles of trading;

2. A common understanding with our allies on a Western trading position toward the Communist bloc before we agree to trade with the Soviet Union;

["with the Soviet Union;", "position toward the Communist parties in Europe we agree to take", "5. A common understanding with one side on a general trading", "1. An agreement with the Soviet Union on the principle of sharing", "free conditions are not:", "p. I favor the same rate of exchange to the Soviet Union which the Soviet Union", "e. U.S. Government-backed credit should not be extended to a state\nNOTICE: Recommended Policy", "should have power and should properly control its economy.", "the \"Committee to make it for economic export-tariffs which do not\nbe significantly increase the export rate of the Soviet Union.", "r. Goldwater suggests that in NATO and the other Western Nations we should\nbroadly follow this policy.", "consequence must be that we must adopt a position which does not be a\ndecree whichbrings a political situation. The use of weapons of such\nforce is clearly a political question. The use of weapons of

[y]

- 5 -

3. Grain should not be sold to the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union is supplying grain to its allies as a political tool.

5. Goldwater pleads for psychological warfare designed to "drive home" the fact that "Communists are alien rulers even in their own countries." He points out that we had the psychological advantage in Greece and Korea under Truman and in Lebanon and the Formosa Straits under Eisenhower. He suggests, however, that we abandoned the strong course too quickly in Cuba and missed an opportunity to justifiably and securely dismantle the first barbed-wire Wall at the Berlin checkpoint.

He proposes that we discredit Communist ideology and leaders in the eyes of their subjects and try to drive wedges between them: by engaging in a "systematic intellectual and organizational counter-attack against the Communists" in non-Communist countries; by reviving international discussion of issues such as the Hungarian Revolt which damaged the Communists; by never discussing internal affairs of Western nations such as South Africa without raising internal Communist oppression. He urges that we recognize that a policy of neutrality represents an attitude of the indifference and is repugnant to freedom.

NOTE: Recommended Position

Agree. Point to your own record on the Open skies proposal and on Psychological Strategy Board.

[y]

- 7 -

of man's highest hopes for peace and international stability.
It is also able to serve the vital purpose of dealing effectively
with threats to the peace where the major world powers are not
in conflict.

d. One of the great strengths of the United Nations is reflected in Article 51 of the present Charter, which allows for the creation of regional political and economic groupings for the defense, for example, of the North Atlantic and Western Hemispheric areas. Through recognition of the importance of this U.N. provision, and by taking full advantage of it to create a Union of the Free, the United States can give increased strength to the United Nations.

["to the United Nations.\n\nUnion of the States, the United States can give increased strength to the United Nations, and by making full advantage of it to create a better world. Through recognition of the importance of this problem, for example, of the North Atlantic and Western Hemispheres, to represent better and concrete advantages for the United States of the United States, which efforts for the creation of a world of complete equality and justice for the human race, for example, of the North Atlantic and Western Hemispheres, for the maintenance of the principle of majority rule and the maintenance of the freedom of the States, and for the maintenance of the principle of majority rule and the maintenance of the freedom of the States, can be made. One of the greatest problems of the United Nations is reflected in the conflict.\n\nAir force to the best advantage of the major belligerent states not only able to serve the air force of the belligerent states, but also to serve the air force of the belligerent states, and to serve

February 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: New Draft of the Cuba Statement

I am enclosing a new draft of the statement on Cuba
to replace the draft of January 31st.

The new draft restates more fully your views on
multilateralism.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: New Draft of the Cupa Statement

BY: HENRY V. KIRRINGEN

TO: THE GOVERNOR

I am enclosing a new draft of the statement on Cupa

multilaterally.

February 18, 1964

April 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Elapsed Time Between First and Second Coup in South Vietnam

In several press conferences you have mentioned that another
coup followed the overthrow of Diem in Saigon within two weeks. In
fact the second coup occurred about three months later.

tact the second comb occurred a spot three months later.

comb followed the over-all of Diem in Selang within two weeks. In

SUBJECT: Trapped Time Between First and Second Comb in South Vietnam

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

TO: THE GOVERNOR

MEMORANDUM

Vpril 13, 1967

April 21, 1964

The following telegram was sent to the Governor today at the Jung Hotel, New Orleans, and then dictated by phone to this office. It had been previously sent to the Governor at El Cortez Hotel, San Diego on Monday, April 20, but was returned, undelivered. IKS

April 20, 1964

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller

United Press International reports your concern about the cutback in uranium production which the President announced today. We believe that after the cutback, the inventories of uranium will substantially exceed the total requirements of that material for both weapon and non-weapon uses.

I shall be happy to review with you at any time at your convenience the classified information on which our estimates of requirements are based.

/s/ Robert McNamara
Secretary of Defense

May 21, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: California Strategy

I would like to take the liberty of making a strategy suggestion for the last week.

In my view, your victory in Oregon was due in part to the fact that your campaign was extremely positive. A good example is the very favorable reaction to your Vietnam speech.

I think the same approach should be followed in California. Most people know what Senator Goldwater stands for. The undecided are, therefore, in that category because they probably have some reservations about supporting you. The best way to handle this, in my judgment, is to keep stating what you stand for, and to call on people to decide whether this is the kind of program they want. I would recommend also that you use as many of the foreign policy statements as possible. This is the area where your differences with the Administration are most obvious. It counteracts the likely Goldwater strategy of labeling you as close to the Democrats.

All the best.

VII the seat.

Democrat.

Compete the itself. Go to water, strategy of repeating your close to the shore. Born differences with the Administration are most obvious. If many of the foreign border statements are false, false is the case.

The kind of program that was. I would recommend also that you see as far as possible your own, and to get on board to decide whether this embarking ton. The seat as to handle this, in my judgment, is to keep tone, in that category because that properly have some reservations upon board. Know what Senator Googwater says about ton. The expected one, there-

I think the same approach should be followed in California. Most favorable reaction to Born. Aeternum abeep.

First Born certainly was extremely bohemian. A good example is the card.

In Mr. Area, Born, avenged in Oregon was gone in bent to the last lot for the last year.

I would like to take the liberty of making a strategy suggestion for the first year.

SUBJECT: California Strategy

FROM: HENRY V. KIRRINER

TO: THE GOVERNOR

MEMORANDUM

No. 51, 1947

June 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Use of Middle East Speech as Article for Jewish World.

It has been brought to my attention that the speech on the Middle East, drafted for possible use in the California Primary, is now to be reduced to 800 words as an article for the magazine *The Jewish World*. This magazine, which is published by the American Jewish Community Incorporated, reportedly has a circulation of twenty-five thousand.

I would like to recommend reconsideration of this decision:

1. The speech was written as a major statement criticizing the Administration's Middle East policy concentrating on Administration vacillation in Yemen, towards the United Arab Republic, and insufficient backing for Britain's interests. I am certain that it would receive more attention being released from Albany than in a small-circulation magazine of a particular ethnic group.

2. Moreover, as an article in a Jewish magazine, the statement inevitably appears as an effort to curry the favor of a minority group. Although, if it had been released in the proper context, the statement might have had a useful impact on the Jewish vote in California, it was not written for this purpose. It was designed to warn of a serious crisis in the Middle East and to provide a basis for follow-up in an eventual campaign.

3. These qualities make it not very suitable for publication in a Jewish journal. The readers will notice that there is almost no reference to Israel, and they will not welcome being linked by implication with Yemen.

4. If the decision stands, the copy which Harry Paxton will eventually turn out should be checked by a member of the Research Staff for accuracy.