AUG-22-2006 14:21

KAI

212 759 0042 P.10

end in itself - has yet to be resolved. How to merge the two strands

so that military force and diplomacy are mutually supportive and so

that national strategy becomes a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy.

Beisner shows how the failure to do so with respect to the
Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson's
tenure: the inability, after the crossing of the 38th parallel, to
correlate military operations with some achievable diplomatic
objectives. That error aside, Acheson stands as the greatest Secretary
of State of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to
implement it, the extraordinary associates with whom he surrounded
himself, and the sense of honor of his personal conduct. Mr. Beisner
emphasizes these qualities and provides detailed examples of both
design and execution.

P. 9

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 22 2006 05:03P

AUG-22-2006 14:22

KAI

212 759 0042

10

But for someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always fully capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges too much as a list of eccentricities. Especially his relationship with the Nixon White House, and to President Nixon himself, is too cavalierly dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. As a participant in all these meetings, [I considered it] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for Senate. But when he reached out to Acheson, it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to the office, as a form of duty to the country. Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service.

The basic theme of the book is contained in a speech by Acheson at the War College in August 1951, quoted as follows: "There was not

P.10

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 22 2006 05:03P

AUG-22-2006 14:22

KAI

212 759 0042 P.12

11

'one more river to cross' but countless problems stretching into the
future: Americans must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and
work in congress with others for an essential part of American power
was the 'ability to evoke support from others — an ability quite as
important as the capacity to compel.""

The relevance of that lesson has not changed with the passage
of time.

TOTAL P.12

1,576 WORDS

#3 - 8/22/06

Stape has "no further substantive comments"-
just a revision of garbled sentence on
following p.5.

Review of Robert L. Beisner's
**Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War**
for **The New York Times Sunday Book Review**

Dean Acheson was perhaps the most vilified Secretary of State of modern American history. Robert Beisner, in his sweeping and thoughtful account of Acheson's tenure, cites a scholar who discovered, in an [excess] of meticulous pedantry, that during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements on the Senate floor about him and only seven favorable ones (one wonders for what).

History has treated Acheson more kindly. Accolades for him have become bipartisan. Even Secretaries of State appointed by the party of his erstwhile tormentors have described him as a role model.

Stape

1,576 WORDS

#3 - 8/22/06

Review of Robert L. Beisner's
[Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War](https://www.nytimes.com/eastern/united-states/foreign-affairs/dean-acheson-a-life-in-the-cold-war.html)
for [The New York Times Sunday Book Review](https://www.nytimes.com/eastern/united-states/foreign-affairs/dean-acheson-a-life-in-the-cold-war.html)

2

Condoleezza Rice is the most recent example. Thirty years after his death, Acheson has achieved icon status.

This is all the more remarkable in view of Acheson's out of scale personality, so at odds with a period in which eminence seems to be tolerable only in the garb of the ordinary, if not the banal. The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the Bond Street tailoring, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill, the refusal to turn the other cheek bespoke an insistence on the individual rather than the conventional. He was a man of high principle and sense of honor shaped by the nineteenth century, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes, a Boston Brahmin, and whose personal friend was Felix Frankfurter, the brilliant son of Jewish immigrants. Though Acheson served during the transition when America emerged as a world power and still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of government was as yet relatively [small], and Washington was still a comparatively

3

provincial city. Its political conflicts were therefore highly personal and
[not shaped] by public relations focus groups. That senior officials
must be bland and turn the other cheek while their veracity is being
systematically challenged was not part of the Acheson code. This
explains the scene, unimaginable today, described by Mr. Beisner
when Acheson admonished Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing
before the Senate Appropriations Committee not to shake his dirty
finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched
a roundhouse swing at his senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the
last moment because the legal advisor of the State Department
wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat.

All this was possible because America had only just started its
journey towards global involvement. The debate was not over
aspirations to hegemony but over whether America should engage
itself at all, never mind permanently. The impetus behind foreign

policy was to defend [America's] values. Crusading on their behalf in
every corner of the globe was as yet unimaginable.

The position of Secretary of State is potentially the most fulfilling
in the government short of the presidency. Its scope is global; it
addresses an ultimate philosophical inquiry into the nature of world
order and the relationship of order to progress and national interest.
Lacking such a conceptual framework, the daily task of dealing with
the thousands of e-mails from nearly 200 diplomatic posts and a
constant flow of communication from the Executive Department
compiled with the need for congressional liaison that daily demand
attention, by which America's relationship to the world is constantly
redefined, runs the risk of turning incoherent.

Acheson served as Undersecretary of State and then as
Secretary during the period when a people that had known no direct
permanent threat to [its] security since the early days of the republic

5

and that had grown up with the conviction that such challenges as
arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's
strength, had to be brought to recognize that its participation was
indispensable for peace and security and that [it] would have to do so
on a permanent basis. Inevitably this realization was painful and slow
in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why
Acheson was assailed from both political wings by those who
convinced by
a desire for an end to involvement as soon as an immediate threat had
been overcome, [from those who sought a final victory over the threat
followed by withdrawal] and, on the other wing, by those who thought
there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required
Acheson's militant response.

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks of
any Secretary of State: the identification of the challenge; the
development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing and motivating

6

the bureaucracy, both in the State Department and in other agencies;
persuading the American public; and conducting American diplomacy
towards other countries. These tasks require the closest collaboration
with the President. Secretaries of State who seek to base their
influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become
marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flow
charts; for a Secretary of State to be effective, he [or she] has to get
into the President's head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a
point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and
meticulously kept him informed.

No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill – though
Acheson came closer than any other of the modern period. He was
the first to face the need to define a conceptual framework on which to
base America's involvement in global affairs. He turned George
Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an

7

operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create situations of strength around the Soviet periphery to deter any temptation for Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be deferred until these situations of strength had come into being; any attempt to launch diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task. Kennan was later to reject this approach, which he considered the militarization of his policy, launching a debate that has not ended to this day.

Acheson's overriding priority, in the years immediately following World War II, was to restore Western Europe and create a political community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. Acheson created the structure that sustained the free countries during the Cold War via the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, the return of Germany and Japan to the community of nations; without it, the

8

ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached –
aside from the fact that Acheson foresaw not so much the collapse of
the Soviet Union as its ultimate transformation into a normal state.

But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy needed to follow the
culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan represented the other strand of American thinking.

Acheson implicitly believed that situations of strength would be self-
enforcing, thus lessening the importance of diplomatic engagement
with the adversary. Kennan raised the question [of] how to gain
Soviet acquiescence in the situations of strength and what a
negotiation based on it would involve. The danger of the Acheson
approach has been conflict through miscalculation. The danger of the
Kennan approach was that diplomacy might shade into appeasement.

The tension between the two schools of thought – the one that treats
diplomacy as a means to a strategic end and those who see it as an

9

10

For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always
fully capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges too much
as a list of eccentricities. Especially his relationship with the Nixon
White House, and to President Nixon himself, is too cavalierly
dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. As a
participant in all these meetings, [I considered it] an example of
Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially
unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for Senate.
But when he reached out to Acheson, it was received with the
consideration Acheson felt he owed to the office, as a form of duty to
the country. Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him
thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of
his conception of national service.

11

'one more river to cross' but countless problems stretching into the
future: Americans must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and
work in congress with others for an essential part of American power
was the 'ability to evoke support from others — an ability quite as
important as the capacity to compel.'"

1,576 WORDS

#3 - 8/22/06

DRAFT

Review of Robert L. Beisner's
<u>Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War</u>
for <u>The New York Times Sunday Book Review</u>

2

3

4

5

and that had grown up with the conviction that such challenges as
arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's
strength, had to be brought to recognize that its participation was
indispensable for peace and security and that [it] would have to do so
on a permanent basis. Inevitably this realization was painful and slow
in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why
Acheson was assailed from both political wings by those convinced by
a desire for an end to involvement as soon as an immediate threat had
been overcome, [from those who sought a final victory over the threat
followed by withdrawal] and, on the other wing, by those who thought
there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required
Acheson's militant response.

6

7

8

Acheson implicitly believed that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, thus lessening the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary. Kennan raised the question [of] how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the situations of strength and what a negotiation based on it would involve. The danger of the Acheson approach has been conflict through miscalculation. The danger of the Kennan approach was that diplomacy might shade into appeasement.

9

10

11

Aug 21 06 12:18a

p. 1

1,564 WORDS

8/20/06 - #2

Review of Robert L. Beisner's
**Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War**
**for The New York Times Sunday Book Review**

Dean Acheson in office was perhaps the most vilified Secretary of State of modern American history. The author of this book is sweeping a review of Acheson's life and work. He finds that Acheson is a comprehensive and thoughtful work cites a scholar who found that in an area of meticulous pedantry such as during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State,

Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements on the Senate floor (one wonder for every two). [about him] and only seven favorable ones. History has treated Acheson more kindly, giving some hope for indication to his successors that three Republican Secretaries (Lawrence Eagleburger, Condoleezza Rice, and I) have cited Acheson as the model they desired to emulate. The accolades have become essentially bipartisan.

Even Secretaries of State appointed by the party of the President have described him as a role model. Condoleezza Rice is the most recent example. Thirty years after his death, Acheson has been accorded a role status.

Aug 21 06 12:18a

p. 3

turn, test their advice on focus groups. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, described by Mr. Beisner when Acheson was

confronted by Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee and told the Senator not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a roundhouse swing at his senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because the legal advisor of the State Department wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat.

Acheson, in short, was an original, whose personality matched

the challenges he faced.

government. Its scope is global; it addresses an ultimate philosophical

inquiry into the nature of order and its relationship to progress.

Without such a concept, the daily task of dealing with the thousands of

cables that daily demand attention, which is the mechanism by which

Aug 21 06 12:18a

p. 4

4. *constantly revisited*

America's relationship to the world is defined; runs the risk of turning incoherent.

This is a special problem for an American Secretary of State. He [or she] is the representative of a society that, until the post-World

War II period, never has had to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations do. Americans had known no direct permanent threat to their

security since the early days of the republic. Such challenges as and that had been with

arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's
*struggle*
*growing strength, soon to become paramount.* Acheson served as

Undersecretary of State and then as Secretary during the period when
*a*

this people had to be brought along to the recognition that history
that its participation was indispensable for peace
had set them the task of peacemaker, if peace was to be achieved;
+ security

and as guarantor of security, and that they would have to do so on a

Aug 21 06 12:18a

p. 5

permanent basis by measures major in magnitude yet not capable of

final solutions.

Inevitably this realization was slow in coming, if indeed it has

both wings of the national nostalgia for an end to involvement from

and, on the other wing, those who thought there was no threat to

begin with, or at least none that required Acheson's response.

any Secretary of State confronts: the identification of the challenge;

the development of a strategy to deal with it; organizing; and

motivating the bureaucracy, both in the State Department and in

the diplomacy towards other countries. These tasks require the

Aug 21 06 12:18a

No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill - though
Acheson came closer than any other ~~with whose tenure I am familiar~~
~~inceptual framework~~
He was the first to face the need to define a ~~theory~~ on which to base
~~Hobo He Cunnet~~
America's involvement in global affairs, ~~striving to turn George~~
Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an
operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to
mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create ~~military actions~~
~~of strange, deter~~
situations around the Soviet periphery to resist any temptation for
Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be

Aug 21 06 12:18a

P. 7

[Y]

7

deferred until these situations of strength existed; any attempt to

Kennan was later to reject what he considered the militarization of his policy, launching a debate that has not ended to this day.

Acheson was probably right in the conditions of his time. The overriding priority was to restore Western Europe and create a political community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. In time, Kennan's challenge implied the question[s] of how the situation was to be conveyed to the other side and what a negotiation based on it would involve. Acheson created the structure which sustained the free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached - aside from the fact that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union as its transformation, But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy mediated by the

Aug 21 06 12:18a

p. 8

[Y]

Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of

simply believed!

American thinking. If Acheson implied that situations of strength

thus limning the importance of diplomacy, it is apparent that Acheson

would be self-enforcing, Kennan conveyed that diplomacy had its own

resist the question how & fair is it

beginning [2] almost independent from the strategic environment. How

The strategy of the韩军 approach to the problem
influences the strategy of the enemy

to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy is still not

The turning between the two solutions is not clear.

yet completely resolved, between the school of thought [that]

that treats diplomacy as a means to a strategy
and those who see it as an end in itself.

Consider [3] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation and those

who see it as an essentially autonomous means of solving dispute.

How to merge the two strands so that military force supports

an

are mutually supportive & to each other

diplomacy without being identified with it and diplomacy can build

heaven

national strategy as a seamless web is the essence of a continuing

the fabric of the

national controversy. The neglect of doing so with respect to the

the Kim Il-sung theory

luncheon

correlate

policy: the inability to discipline military operations, after the crossing

the Kennan approachves
that diplomatic maneuver
with appearance

Aug 21 06 12:19a

p. 9

9
with some achievable diplomatic
of the 38th parallel, into some relationship with feasible diplomatic
objectives.

That error aside, Acheson stands [as] the greatest Secretary of State of the postwar period in the sweep of his design, his ability to implement it, the extraordinary associates with [whom] he surrounded himself, and the honor of his personal conduct. Mr. Beisner emphasizes these qualities and provides detailed examples of both design and execution.

For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always
fully capture the vividness of his personality, which emerges more as a
quite catch list of eccentricities
than as the elemental character it was. Especially
a list of his relationships with [the] President Nixon
his assistance to the Nixon White House, and [to] the President
cautiously himself, is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's
As a participant in all these meetings is his vanity.
considered [as] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit.
Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his

Aug 21 06 12:19a

10

Le

1952 campaign for Senate. But when Nixon reached out to Acheson, it

was from genuine respect, and it was received with the consideration

the administration of the office

Acheson felt he owed to any President. I was present at those

meetings during which Acheson conducted himself with respect but as

duly

a form of service to the country. His value to the administration was

not, as the author claims, to "repel uprisings by former internationalist

Democrats." I recall only [one] such occasion when, at the very end

of his life, Acheson chaired a group opposing the Mansfield

Amendment seeking to remove American troops from Europe. At

other meetings, Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him

his conception of national service. The same was true of his more

Frequent meetings when I sought his advice or had [my then assistant]

Larry Eagleburger brief him.

Aug 21 06 12:16a

A speech at the War College in August 1951 is quoted by Beisner

as follows: "There was not 'one more river to cross' but countless

compel.'"

The applicability of that lesson has not changed with the passage

of time.

Stape's Comments

1,512 WORDS

#2 - 8/21/06

Dean Acheson in office was perhaps the most vilified Secretary of State [of] in modern American history. The author of this comprehensive and thoughtful work cites a scholar who found that, during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements [about him] on the Senate floor and only seven favorable ones. History has treated Acheson more kindly, giving some hope for vindication to his successors. Three Republican Secretaries – [Lawrence] Eagleburger, [Condoleezza] Rice, and I – have cited Acheson as the model they desired to emulate. The accolades have become essentially bipartisan.

How did Acheson achieve this **exalted** status? The admiration for him surely owed something to Acheson's extraordinary personality: the debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the English suits, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill. He was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes and whose personal friend was Felix Frankfurter. Though Acheson served during the **final stages of America's emergence** [transition when American emerged] as a world power, and **when it still enjoyed a commanding lead in nuclear weapons**, {Note: Acheson served as secretary from 1949 to 1953. The first Soviet nuclear test was in August 1949, and the second in September 1951. So the Soviets had achieved nuclear status during most of the period that Acheson was Secretary.} [**still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly,**] the scale of its government was [as yet] relatively small. Its **political** conflicts were **highly personal and not shaped not shaped** [between actual human beings rather than contrived symbols sent into battle] by public relations advisors **and tested** [who, in turn, test their advice] on focus groups. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, described by Mr. Beisner. [when] Acheson was confronted by Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee and told the Senator not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a roundhouse swing at his senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because the legal advisor of the State Department wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat. Acheson, in short, was an original, whose personality matched the challenges he faced.

The position of Secretary of State is **potentially** the most fulfilling in the government **short of the presidency**. Its scope is global; its **responsibilities require** [addresses an ultimate] philosophical inquiries

2

**{or perhaps "reflections on"} [y] into the nature of order and its relationship to progress and national interest.** Without such a **conceptual framework** [concept], the [daily] task of dealing with the thousands of cables that daily demand attention, which is the mechanism by which America's relationship to the world is defined, runs the risk of turning incoherent.

This is a special problem for an American Secretary of State. He [or she] is the representative of a society that, until the post-World War II period, never has had to conduct a foreign policy as most other nations do. Americans had known no direct permanent threat to their security since the early days of the republic. Such challenges as arose.[?] America grew up with the conviction that such challenges as arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's growing strength, soon to become paramount. Acheson served as Under Secretary of State, the number two position, and then as Secretary during the period when **the American people** [his people] had to [be] brought [along] to the recognition that history had set them the task of peacemaker, if peace was to be achieved, and as guarantor of security, **if conflict could not be avoided.** [and that] They would have to **play this role** [do so] on a permanent basis by measures major in magnitude yet not capable of final solutions.

Inevitably this realization was slow in coming, if indeed it has been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from both wings: **by those consumed by** [of the national] nostalgia for an end to involvement **as soon as the immediate threat had been defeated;** [from those who sought a final victory over the threat followed by withdrawal] and, on the other wing, **by** those who thought there was no threat to begin with, or at least none that required Acheson's response.

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks any Secretary of State confronts: the identification of the challenge; the development of a strategy to deal with it; **organiz[ing] and motivating** [convinc[ing]] the bureaucracy, both in the State Department and in other agencies; **persuad[ing]** the American public; and **conduct[ing]** the diplomacy towards other countries. These tasks require the closest collaboration with the President. Secretaries of State who seek to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by administrative flow charts; for a Secretary of State to be effective, he [or she] has to get into the President's head, so to speak. This is why Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in town together and meticulously kept him informed.

No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill – though Acheson came closer than any other with whose tenure I am familiar. He was the first to face the need to define a theory on which to base America's involvement in global affairs, striving to turn George Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an operating principle of

3

American foreign policy. He interpreted it to mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create military **positions** [situations] around the Soviet periphery **sufficient** to **deter** [resist] any temptation for Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be deferred until these situations of strength **had been created** [existed]; any attempt to launch diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task. Kennan was later to reject **this approach, which** [what] he considered the militarization of his policy, launching a debate that has not ended to this day.

Acheson was probably right in the conditions of his time. The overriding priority in the years immediately after World War II was to restore Western Europe and create a political community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. Acheson created the structure which sustained the free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached – aside from the fact that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union as its transformation. In time, the issues implicit in Kennan's challenge had to be addressed: how to gain Soviet acquiescence in the US position of strength [implied the question[s] of how the situation was to be conveyed to the other side] and what a negotiation based on it would involve. [But] Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy that needed to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of American thinking. If Acheson implicitly believed [implied] that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, thus lessening the importance of diplomatic engagement with the adversary, Kennan saw intrinsic value in [conveyed that] diplomacy [had its own beginning[?] almost independent from the strategic environment. The danger of the one is that it risks conflict through miscalculation; the danger of the other is that it seeks stability through appeasement. The role of diplomacy in grand strategy [How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy] is still not [yet] completely resolved, reflecting the tension [the] between the school of thought [that] consider[s] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation, as a means to an end, and those who see it as an end in itself. [in it an essentially autonomous means of solving dispute.] How to merge the two strands so that military force and [supports] diplomacy are mutually supportive so that national strategy becomes a seamless web [without being identified with it and diplomacy can build national strategy as a seamless web] is the essence of a continuing national controversy. The failure to do so [neglect of doing so] with respect to the Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson's policy: the inability to correlate [discipline] military operations, after the crossing of the 38th parallel, to the achievement of [into some relationship with] feasible diplomatic objectives. {Note: it also illustrates that Acheson was more comfortable dealing with Europe than with

4

Asia. I read somewhere that Acheson made seven trips to Europe while he was Secretary but only one to Asia, even though we were in active combat with communism in Asia. I haven't checked these statistics, but they roughly illustrate that Acheson's greatest impact was in Europe, while MacArthur was a more dominant factor in East Asia until he was removed from his position in 1951.

For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always quite catch the vividness of his personality, which emerges more as a list of eccentricities than as the elemental character it was. Especially his assistance to the Nixon White House, and [to] the President himself, is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. I considered [it] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his 1952 campaign for **the** Senate. But when Nixon reached out to Acheson, it was from genuine respect, and it was received with the consideration Acheson felt he owed to any President. I was present at those meetings during which Acheson conducted himself with respect but as a form of service to the country. His value to the administration was not, as the author claims, to "repel uprisings by former internationalist Democrats." I recall only [one] such occasion when, at the very end of his life, Acheson chaired a group opposing the Mansfield Amendment seeking to remove American troops from Europe. At other meetings, Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service. The same was true of his more frequent meetings when I sought his advice or had [my then assistant] Larry Eagleburger brief him.

A speech at the War College in August 1951 is quoted by Beisner as follows: "There was not 'one more river to cross' but countless problems stretching into the future: Americans must reconcile themselves to limited objectives and work in congress with others for an essential part of American power was the 'ability to evoke support from others — an ability quite as important as the capacity to compel.'"

The applicability of that lesson has not changed with the passage of time. **{Note: this is an excellent ending.**}

***************************************************************** -COMM. JOURNAL- ***************** DATE AUG-21-2006 **** TIME 18:04 ****

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=AUG-21 18:02

END=AUG-21 18:04

FILE NO.=313

| STN NO. | COMM. | ONE-TOUCH/ ABBR NO. | STATION NAME/TEL NO. | PAGES | DURATION |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OK | <03> | KENT SECURITY | 006/006 | 00:01:00 |

-KAI

212 759 0042-

1,512 WORDS

#2 - 8/21/06

Dean Acheson in office was perhaps the most vilified Secretary of State of modern American history. The author of this comprehensive and thoughtful work cites a scholar who found that, during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements on the Senate floor [about him] and only seven favorable ones. History has treated Acheson more kindly, giving some hope for vindication to his successors. Three Republican Secretaries - [Lawrence] Eagleburger, [Condoleezza] Rice, and I - have cited Acheson as the model they desired to emulate. The accolades have become essentially bipartisan.

How did Acheson achieve this status? The admiration for him surely owed something to Acheson's extraordinary personality. The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the English suits, the biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill. He was a man of high principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes and whose personal friend was Felix Frankfurter. Though Acheson served during the transition when American emerged as a world power and still enjoyed a nuclear monopoly, the scale of its government was [as yet] relatively

t.p.

7/87/77-202

WILLIAM D. ROGERS

Aug 21 06 05:54PM

1,512 WORDS

#2 - 8/21/06

Dean Acheson in office was perhaps the most vilified Secretary of State of modern American history. The author of this comprehensive and thoughtful work cites a scholar who found that, during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State, Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements on the Senate floor [about him] and only seven favorable ones. History has treated Acheson more kindly, giving some hope for vindication to his successors. Three Republican Secretaries – [Lawrence] Eagleburger, [Condoleezza] Rice, and I – have cited Acheson as the model they desired to emulate. The accolades have become essentially bipartisan.

[M]

p. 1

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 21 06 05:46p

1

[Y]

small. Its conflicts were between actual human beings rather than contrived symbols sent into battle by public relations advisors who, in turn, test their advice on focus groups. This explains the scene, unimaginable today, described by Mr. Beisner when Acheson was confronted by Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee and told the Senator not to shake his dirty finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched a roundhouse swing at his senatorial gadfly, which was stopped at the last moment because the legal advisor of the State Department wrapped his arms around Acheson and pulled him down into his seat.

Acheson, in short, was an original, ~~His was a~~ whose personality matched ~~the challenges he faced.~~

The position of Secretary of State is the most fulfilling in ~~the~~ all government. Its scope is global; it addresses an ultimate philosophical inquiry into the nature of order and its relationship ~~to progress,~~ and change. Without such a concept, the daily task of dealing with the thousands of cables that daily demand attention, ~~which is the mechanism by which~~ America's relationship to the world is defined, runs the risk of turning ~~incoherent.~~ ~~constantly redefined~~.

P.2

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 21 06 05:46P

convinc[ing] the bureaucracy, both in the State Department and in
other agencies; persuad[ing] the American public; and conduct[ing]
the diplomacy towards other countries. These tasks require the
closest collaboration with the President. Secretaries of State who seek
to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably
become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by
administrative flow charts; for a Secretary of State to be effective, he
[or she] has to get into the President's head, so to speak. This is why
Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in
town together and meticulously kept him informed.

No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill - though
Acheson came closer than any other with whose tenure I am familiar.

He was the first to face the need to define a theory on which to base
America's involvement in global affairs, striving to turn George
Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an
operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to
mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create military
situations around the Soviet periphery to resist any temptation for
Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be
deferred until these situations of strength existed; any attempt to
launch diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task.

P.3

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 21 06 05:46p

4

Acheson was probably right in the conditions of his time. The overriding priority was to restore Western Europe and create a political community to resist what then appeared to be the Soviet colossus. In time, Kennan's challenge implied the question[s] of how the situation was to be conveyed to the other side and what a negotiation based on it would involve. Acheson created the structure which sustained the free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached - aside from the fact that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union as its transformation. But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of American thinking. If Acheson implied that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, Kennan conveyed that diplomacy had its own beginning[?] almost independent from the strategic environment.

How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy is still not yet completely resolved, between the school of thought [that] consider[s] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation and those who see in it an essentially autonomous means of solving disputes,

P.4

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 21 06 05:46p

How to merge the two strands so that military force supports diplomacy without being identified with it and diplomacy can build national strategy as a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy. The neglect of doing so with respect to the Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson's policy: the inability to discipline military operations, after the crossing of the 38th parallel, into some relationship with feasible diplomatic objectives.

But for someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always quite catch the vividness of his personality, which emerges more as a list of eccentricities than as the elemental character it was. Especially his assistance to the Nixon White House, and [to] the President himself, is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. I considered [it] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his

[Y]

p. 5

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 21 06 05:46p

1952 campaign for Senate. But when Nixon reached out to Acheson, it
was from genuine respect, and ~~it was received with the consideration~~
Acheson felt he owed to any President. I was present at those
meetings, ~~during which Acheson conducted himself with respect but as~~
a form of service to the country. His value to the administration was
not, as the author claims, to "repel uprisings by former internationalist
Democrats." I recall only [one] such occasion when, at the very end
of his life, Acheson chaired a group opposing the Mansfield
Amendment seeking to remove American troops from Europe. At
other meetings, Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him
thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of
his conception of national service. The same was true of his more
frequent meetings when I sought his advice or had [my then assistant]
Larry Eagleburger brief him.

p. 6

202-337-7667

William D. Rogers

Aug 21 06 05:47p

1,512 WORDS

#2 - 8/21/06

2

How did Acheson achieve this ____ status? The admiration
for him surely owed something to Acheson's extraordinary personality.

The debonair conduct, the bristling mustache, the English suits, the
biting wit, the extraordinary analytical skill. He was a man of high
principle, whose hero was Oliver Wendell Homes and whose personal
friend was Felix Frankfurter. Though Acheson served during the
transition when American emerged as a world power and still enjoyed
a nuclear monopoly, the scale of its government was [as yet] relatively
small. Its conflicts were between actual human beings rather than
contrived symbols sent into battle by public relations advisors who, in
turn, test their advice on focus groups. This explains the scene,
unimaginable today, described by Mr. Beisner when Acheson was
confronted by Senator Kenneth Wherry at a hearing before the Senate
Appropriations Committee and told the Senator not to shake his dirty
finger in his face. When Wherry persisted, Acheson rose and launched

3

The position of Secretary of State is the most fulfilling in the
government. Its scope is global; it addresses an ultimate philosophical
inquiry into the nature of order and its relationship to progress.
Without such a concept, the daily task of dealing with the thousands of
cables that daily demand attention, which is the mechanism by which
America's relationship to the world is defined, runs the risk of turning
incoherent.

4

nations do. Americans had known no direct permanent threat to their
security since the early days of the republic. Such challenges as
arose.[?] America grew up with the conviction that such challenges as
arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's
growing strength, soon to become paramount. Acheson served as
Undersecretary of State and then as Secretary during the period when
his people had to [be] brought along to the recognition that history
had set them the task of peacemaker, if peace was to be achieved,
and as guarantor of security, and that they would have to do so on a
permanent basis by measures major in magnitude yet not capable of
final solutions.

Inevitably this realization was slow in coming, if indeed it has
been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from
both wings of the national nostalgia for an end to involvement from
those who sought a final victory over the threat followed by withdrawal

5

In this maelstrom, Acheson dealt with the five principal tasks
any Secretary of State confronts: the identification of the challenge;
the development of a strategy to deal with it; organiz[ing] and
convinc[ing] the bureaucracy, both in the State Department and in
other agencies; persuad[ing] the American public; and conduct[ing]
the diplomacy towards other countries. These tasks require the
closest collaboration with the President. Secretaries of State who seek
to base their influence on the prerogatives of the office invariably
become marginalized. Presidents cannot be constrained by
administrative flow charts; for a Secretary of State to be effective, he
[or she] has to get into the President's head, so to speak. This is why
Acheson made it a point to see Truman almost every day they were in
town together and meticulously kept him informed.

6

Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an
operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to
mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create military
situations around the Soviet periphery to resist any temptation for
Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be
deferred until these situations of strength existed; any attempt to
launch diplomacy prematurely would undermine the primary task.

7

community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. In time, Kennan's challenge implied the question[s] of how the situation was to be conveyed to the other side and what a negotiation based on it would involve. Acheson created the structure which sustained the free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of the Cold War would never have been reached – aside from the fact that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union as its transformation. But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of American thinking. If Acheson implied that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, Kennan conveyed that diplomacy had its own beginning[?] almost independent from the strategic environment. How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy is still not yet completely resolved, between the school of thought [that]

consider[s] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation and those
who see in it an essentially autonomous means of solving dispute.
How to merge the two strands so that military force supports
diplomacy without being identified with it and diplomacy can build
national strategy as a seamless web is the essence of a continuing
national controversy. The neglect of doing so with respect to the
Korean war was the cause of the single greatest mistake of Acheson's
policy: the inability to discipline military operations, after the crossing
of the 38th parallel, into some relationship with feasible diplomatic
objectives.

9

[Y]

For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always
quite catch the vividness of his personality, which emerges more as a
list of eccentricities than as the elemental character it was. Especially
his assistance to the Nixon White House, and [to] the President
himself, is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's
vanity. I considered [it] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit.
Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his
1952 campaign for Senate. But when Nixon reached out to Acheson, it
was from genuine respect, and it was received with the consideration
Acheson felt he owed to any President. I was present at those
meetings during which Acheson conducted himself with respect but as
a form of service to the country. His value to the administration was
not, as the author claims, to "repel uprisings by former internationalist

10

Democrats.” I recall only [one] such occasion when, at the very end of his life, Acheson chaired a group opposing the Mansfield Amendment seeking to remove American troops from Europe. At other meetings, Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of his conception of national service. The same was true of his more frequent meetings when I sought his advice or had [my then assistant] Larry Eagleburger brief him.

1,564 WORDS

8/20/06

Review of Robert L. Beisner's
**Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War**
for The New York Times Sunday Book Review

Dean Acheson in office was perhaps the most vilified Secretary
of State of modern American history. The author of this
comprehensive and thoughtful work cites a scholar who found that,
during the four years that Acheson served as Secretary of State,
Republicans made 1,268 antagonistic statements on the Senate floor
[about him] and only seven favorable ones. History has treated
Acheson more kindly, giving some hope for vindication to his
successors. Three Republican Secretaries — [Lawrence] Eagleburger,
[Condoleezza] Rice, and I — have cited Acheson as the model they
desired to emulate. The accolades have become essentially bipartisan.

In my period in office, I had the auditorium in the State
Department named after Dean Acheson - one of the few honors it is in
the power of the incumbent Secretary to bestow: [those] who have
not pronounced themselves on the subject hold very positive views.
The same is true of Acheson's Democratic successors.

The position of Secretary of State is the most fulfilling in the
government. Its scope is global; it addresses an ultimate philosophical
inquiry into the nature of order and its relationship to progress.
Without such a concept, the daily task of dealing with the thousands of
cables that daily demand attention, which is the mechanism by which

ables that daily demand attention, which is the mechanism by which
Without such a concept, the daily task of dealing with the thousands of
indigency into the nature of order and the relationship to progress.
Government. It's scope is global, it addresses an ultimate philosophical

The position of Secretary of State is the most fulfilling in the
the challenges he faced.

Adreson, in short, was an original, whose personality matched
wrapped his arms around Adreson and pulled him down into his seat.
last moment because the legal advice of the State Department
a roundhouse swing at the sensorial gridly, which was stopped at the
finger in his face. When Whenny persisted, Adreson rose and launched
Appropriations Committee and told the Senator not to shake his dirty
contributed by Senator Kenneth Whenny at a hearing before the Senate
unimpressable today, described by Mr. Belanger when Adreson was
in his test their advice on focus groups. This explains the scene,

4

This is a special problem for an American Secretary of State. He
[or she] is the representative of a society that, until the post-World
War II period, never has had to conduct a foreign policy as most other
nations do. Americans had known no direct permanent threat to their
security since the early days of the republic. Such challenges as
arose.[?] America grew up with the conviction that such challenges as
arose could be overcome rapidly by the mobilization of America's
growing strength, soon to become paramount. Acheson served as
Undersecretary of State and then as Secretary during the period when
his people had to [be] brought along to the recognition that history
had set them the task of peacemaker, if peace was to be achieved,
and as guarantor of security, and that they would have to do so on a

Inevitably this realization was slow in coming, if indeed it has
been fully achieved to this day. This is why Acheson was assailed from
both wings of the national nostalgia for an end to involvement from
those who sought a final victory over the threat followed by withdrawal
and, on the other wing, those who thought there was no threat to
begin with, or at least none that required Acheson's response.

6

No Secretary can fulfill all these tasks with equal skill – though
Acheson came closer than any other with whose tenure I am familiar.
He was the first to face the need to define a theory on which to base
America's involvement in global affairs, striving to turn George
Kennan's seminal article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" into an
operating principle of American foreign policy. He interpreted it to
mean that the task of American foreign policy was to create military
situations around the Soviet periphery to resist any temptation for
Soviet aggression. Negotiation with the Soviet Union was to be

7

Acheson was probably right in the conditions of his time. The
overriding priority was to restore Western Europe and create a political
community to resist what then appeared as the Soviet colossus. In
time, Kennan's challenge implied the question[s] of how the situation
was to be conveyed to the other side and what a negotiation based on
it would involve. Acheson created the structure which sustained the
free countries during the Cold War; without it, the ultimate outcome of
the Cold War would never have been reached - aside from the fact
that Acheson envisioned not so much the collapse of the Soviet Union
as its transformation. But Acheson was less clear about the diplomacy
to follow the culmination of his architectural phase.

Kennan, on the other hand, represented the other strand of American thinking. If Acheson implied that situations of strength would be self-enforcing, Kennan conveyed that diplomacy had its own beginning[?] almost independent from the strategic environment. How to establish the relationship between strategy and diplomacy is still not yet completely resolved, between the school of thought [that] consider[s] diplomacy as an aspect of a strategic situation and those who see in it an essentially autonomous means of solving dispute.

For someone who knew Acheson, the portrait does not always quite catch the vividness of his personality, which emerges more as a list of eccentricities than as the elemental character it was. Especially his assistance to the Nixon White House, and [to] the President himself, is too easily dismissed as the result of ego and an old man's vanity. I considered [it] an example of Acheson's generosity of spirit. Nixon had made essentially unforgivable attacks on Acheson during his

10

1952 campaign for Senate. But when Nixon reached out to Acheson, it
was from genuine respect, and it was received with the consideration
Acheson felt he owed to any President. I was present at those
meetings during which Acheson conducted himself with respect but as
a form of service to the country. His value to the administration was
not, as the author claims, to "repel uprisings by former internationalist
Democrats." I recall only [one] such occasion when, at the very end
of his life, Acheson chaired a group opposing the Mansfield
Amendment seeking to remove American troops from Europe. At
other meetings, Acheson dealt with the issues Nixon put before him
thoughtfully, precisely, without any attempt at flattery, in pursuit of
his conception of national service. The same was true of his more
frequent meetings when I sought his advice or had [my then assistant]
Larry Eagleburger brief him.

11

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