This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(ABM System)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER, SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; AND
RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO
THE PRESIDENT

11:10 A.M. EST

MARCH 14, 1969

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: Ladies and gentlemen, I am sorry for the early hour of this briefing.

Dr. Kissinger will review with you for a moment
the President's decision.

I would also like to call to your attention the
fact that Mr. Packard will have a press conference at 2:00
o'clock at the Department of Defense today. You may find
that of interest, also.

What are the ground rules, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: The ground rules, of course, are
<u>BACKGROUND</u>, attributed to "Administration Sources."

How about "White House Sources"?

MR. ZIEGLER: "Administration Sources." Everything
is embargoed until 12 Noon today.

DR. KISSINGER: I thought what I would usefully do
before you meet with the President is perhaps tell you some
of the considerations that went into the decision, and what
the intention of the decision is, and exactly what the pro-
posal is trying to do.

Everybody here, of course, is aware of the intense
feeling that has been generated, and of the wide variety of
arguments that have been advanced about the ABM system.

Let me first give a brief description of the
political and military problem, and then let me deal with
one or two of the arguments that have been made.

The SENTINEL system which this Administration
inherited was justified in terms of its suitability for the
defense against Chinese attack. It was composed of two basic
elements, the SPARTAN missiles suitable for the area defense
of the Continental United States, and SPRINT missiles which
are supposed to intercept warheads that have penetrated the
SPARTAN defense.

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The SPRINT missiles and the associated radars were supposed to be deployed near various American cities, and they were the ones that had caused some of the public concern. There were a number of problems connected with the system that we inherited.

First, it was oriented only toward the North, obviously the easiest route of attack, but it took no account of other threats that have developed in the meantime, specifically from submarines and from fractional orbital bombardment systems.

Secondly, a system deployed around cities had two problems, two foreign policy problems. I am not discussing the problem of domestic policy. The foreign policy problem was that, first, while a thin system could be overburdened by a coordinated Soviet attack designed to kill Americans, it might look different against a retaliatory blow after we had launched the first strike, and in such a case against a ragged, uncoordinated attack from the remainder of the Soviet force even the thin system might have been somewhat effective and, therefore, looked at from the Soviet Union, it could easily have appeared as a decision to move toward a first-strike capability.

The second attribute of the thin system was obviously that it was a stepping stone toward a thin system and a thick system clearly had the characteristic that whatever its utility in resisting a first strike, its utility in resisting a second strike was apt to be very large. In other words, the problem with the SENTINEL system was not that it might not work -- that is just a waste of money -- but that it might; that is, from the point of view of a first-strike capability. I will have a word to say about this argument of whether it will or will not work in a minute.

On the other hand, the other choice we had was to delay deployment, as we have been variously urged, by a year or more. The fact is that the word "deployment" is very badly used in connection with this issue. A decision today means missiles deployed in 1973. In other words, it will be four years before the decision that is made today has any operational consequence.

A delay of a year now, for reasons which Secretary Packard can explain, and which I have to take on faith, a delay of a year would mean a deployment delay of two to three years. In other words, to delay now would have meant closing down all production capabilities and would have, in effect, meant a decision that the United States would be without any missile defense through the better part of the 1970's.

This is a heavy responsibility to take. You have to consider this in relation to the argument that there is not now a threat sufficient to justify it. No one is saying three is in March 1969 a threat to justify it. People are saying that by 1973 it will be too late to make the decision and that we have to make decisions that will gear our response to foreseeable threats.

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The decision, then, was that there had to be, if there was to be any ballistic missile defense through the greater part of the 1970's, there had to be some construction decision this year. But there was also a decision to proceed in such a way that it would appear least threatening to a potential opponent, and that it would give the maximum possibility for diplomatic moves, including arms control negotiations, and the maximum possibility for reassessing the system in the light of technological changes.

For this reason, the following steps were taken:

First, the concept on which the system is based was completely reoriented. The system is now designed to protect the United States against, first, attacks on the retaliatory force; secondly, to protect the population against the primitive nuclear attacks such as the Chinese are likely to be able to mount through the 1970's and probably middle 1980's, and against the dangers of an accidental launch from any source.

For this reason, the SPARTAN deployment, the deployment of area defense, is relatively unchanged from the previous system, except that we are adding radars for the Southern part of the United States to give additional warning to the bomber force against submarine-launched missiles. But the SPRINT missiles that were supposed to defend cities will be moved to the defense of the MINUTEMAN.

As far as the actual construction is concerned, that is, the program for next year, over half of the budget will be -- first of all, the budget has been reduced by close to $1 billion, from the proposed budget of the Johnson Administration. It has been reduced by close to $1 billion. Of the remainder, more than half will go to research and development, and the rest of it will be devoted to, partly, the acquisition of sites for the whole system -- and this is not a large sum; I think about $40 million -- and the beginning of construction of the defense of two MINUTEMAN sites, one in North Dakota and the other in Montana.

I can understand the argument of those who are against any deployment.

O Did you say $40 million for the defense of these two centers?

DR. KISSINGER: No. $40 billion for the acquisition of sites for the whole system. But construction will start on only two MINUTEMAN sites.

O What will be the budget request?

DR. KISSINGER: About $800 million to $900 million. The Johnson Administration proposal was for $1.8 billion. Our request will be, I think, for $800 million. It will be give or take $100 million. Our request will be roughly $1 billion less. It might slip by $50 million, but it will be cut by at least half.

O For fiscal 1970?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

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O Are those new obligatory authority figures or spending estimates?

DR. KISSINGER: Frankly, you have me. New obli-
gational authority.

O Doctor, they had $1.8 billion. They were estimating roughly half of that was for continued research and development. By cutting this almost in half, you have a very token amount left for site acquisition.

DR. KISSINGER: I think you should ask all the
technical questions of Secretary Packard, because my answers
are likely to be misleading. You see, I don't know what the
categories are.

My understanding is that the research and develop-
ment funds are unaffected by the cuts we have made. At the
original proposal, construction was going to start at almost
every site simultaneously. Under our proposal, construction
is starting at only two sites, which are clearly for the
defense of MINUTEMAN; indeed, they are at MINUTEMAN. We are
acquiring the sites for the whole system, but not building
anything on them. We are continuing research and development.

O How many sites will be acquired?

DR. KISSINGER: Again, you will have to ask Packard.

O Are we talking about acquisition of sites for the cities originally proposed?

DR. KISSINGER: No. The cities are not going to be defended. Acquisition sites for the SPARTAN missile, which supply area defense for the radars which provide warning, and for the defense of the MINUTEMAN sites. There will be no sites acquired near cities.

O Do you know approximately where those will be?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but you will get that from
Secretary Packard.

O What do the SPARTAN missiles defend besides radar sites? Radar sites and MINUTEMAN?

O The existing MINUTEMAN sites?

DR. KISSINGER: Existing MINUTEMAN sites. Why don't you let me finish what I have to say and then I will answer a few questions.

If you start from the assumption that the President,
weighing all the factors, decided that there has to be some
construction and some deployment, then we have chosen a
deployment deliberately designed to provide the minimum
incentive for a spiraling arms race.

This deployment does not reduce the Soviet ability
to retali ate against the United States. It does reduce, if
it is carried through, the Soviet ability to launch a first
strike against the American retaliatory force.

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If the Soviets have no intention of attacking the American retaliatory force, they need to do nothing to their force to retain its effectiveness. If they do intend to attack the American retaliatory force, then it is good to know that and I don't think that our job should be to make their problem easier for them.

The President has asked the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which is a group of distinguished citizens, nonpartisan, outside of Government, to make an annual review of the developing threat prior to the decision as to what size additional deployment is necessary. In other words, we are not proceeding on the basis of some deployment decision which is made today and which will then be valid throughout the 1970's.

We are proceeding now with a decision to give us an option to proceed in relationship to the threat. If the Soviet threat does not develop as it is now conceivable, either because the Soviets are taking unilateral decisions to moderate the arms race, or because of the arms control agreement, then we will, on the basis of that, adjust the deployment of our ballistic missile defense.

If the threat materializes more rapidly than we now foresee, then, of course, we are also in a position to adjust the defense to that. But the major point to be made today is that the decision today means that we have an option to respond to threats; that the decision not to proceed would have meant we would not have that option.

Therefore, the President decided to go ahead on that basis. This deployment is not frozen into a rigid schedule, and it has attempted to provide the highest incentive for a responsible Soviet weapons policy. It tries to take into account the diplomatic context and, of course, it can be adjusted to that.

Let me make a few general observations and then perhaps answer one or two questions.

First, the argument will work. There are two things to be said about this: One, the best technical judgment is that it will work; second, the only way to find out whether it will work is to move from research and development to the installation of at least a few pilot installations; and thirdly, from the point of view of the other side, the effect of protecting the retaliatory force will be fairly considerable because they will have to operate on the assumption that it will work.

It is an axiom of military planning that you have to prepare for the worst contingency, and certainly any prudent planner on the other side would have to plan against the possibility that the system will work, particularly if his objective is to destroy the retaliatory force, where one wrong guess is fatal.

The next problem is, does this decision produce an arms race? Of course, there are many arguments to be made. We had several choices in the face of what is a developing Soviet missile capability developing faster than anyone had anticipated a few years ago, and the missile capabilities

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capabilities developing faster both in numbers and in the
multiple warhead design that is emerging, as well as in sub-
marine-launched missiles.

We could have increased the size of our retaliatory
force, but this is an ambiguous decision because that is as
conducive to defensive as to offensive interpretation. Therefore, we think the defensive missile defense route we have taken is more stabilizing.

Secondly, I think one must point out in fairness that
the Soviet Union has now deployed something like 70 operational
missile launchers in the area around Moscow, a number we will
not reach until well into 1974. We will not deploy a single
missile until 1973.

Much of the debate gives the impression that if the
President makes the decision now, missiles will spring up all
over the country next month or next year. That simply is not
the case. We have, therefore, built into the system a four-
year interval, a yearly review, and a decision which is
deliberately designed to produce the maximum stabilization in
the arms race, and a maximum possibility to adjust future deci-
cisions either to unilateral Soviet decisions and Chinese
decisions, or to developments in the arms race.

So if either there is a tacit understanding to moderate the arms race by simply not pushing deployment, or an explicit understanding to have limitations, in either of those two cases, of course, we have the mechanism and the policy to adjust future deployment.

I think this gives you enough. This is as much as
I think I need to say now. You have the statement. The
President will be speaking in about half an hour. He can
answer your questions.

O Can I ask a question about policy level? On
page 2, it speaks of the second option, to harden further our
ballistic missile forces. Should we read that, his statement,
as implying that the hardening will not be undertaken?

DR. KISSINGER: No. Some hardening will be undertaken, but the difficulty with hardening is that, first, there are two problems with respect to hardening. One, the Soviet warheads are very large; and secondly, no hardening can protect against increases in accuracy, to improve the effectiveness by a factor of three and, therefore, you are in a losing race if you try to harden against improvements in accuracy.

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Q Doctor, could I ask you why this will necessarily look different to the Soviets as you contended than the previous Administration proposal? I am not clear why it should look different.

DR. KISSINGER: It will look different because the SPARTAN missiles, while useful against a Chinese attack, can be clearly overwhelmed by a Soviet attack. The SPRINT missiles are not going to be located near cities. They are going to be located near the MINUTEMAN installations.

Therefore, just to take a hypothetical case, the Soviets know that if we attack them, they can retali ate against our cities and inflict enormous damage. So their retaliatory capability is not affected, and they can see that by the location of our radars and of our SPRINT missiles.

Q Dr. Kissinger, this can be read as a declaration that we will not ever build a thick system?

DR. KISSINGER: This can be read as a decision not to build a thick system under circumstances that are now foreseeable, yes. We have had criticisms on that score.

Q Along the line of Mr. Bailey's question about the hardening, there is another paragraph which immediately precedes it in the same context, in which he says, "We could increase the number of sea and land based missiles and bombers, and I have ruled out this course."

Should this be read as a statement that the United States is not going to increase the number of sea and land based missiles?

DR. KISSINGER: Ever or this year?

Q Both.

Q How would you interpret that? What is it intended to tell us?

DR. KISSINGER: Forever is an awfully long time. As against the threat we now foresee, the intention is not to increase the number of missiles and to protect against the threat that is now foreseeable, with the additional margin of the threat by the missile defense.

Now, if things change dramatically, I don't want to say that one would never go this way. The problem with a drastic increase in the number and characteristics of the offensive force is that though your intention may be defensive, it can be interpreted equally well as offensive by the other side.

If the other side then goes the same route of protecting its force by increasing its offensive forces, then you are in an arms race.

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The decision we have taken now, at least in
intention, has the characteristic that if the Soviet
Union has no intention of attacking us, it really needs
to do nothing to its offensive forces to offset what we
are doing.

If the purpose of the Soviet offensive force is to
prevent an American attack, that capability is in no sense
affected by it.

Q Where do you put MIRV in that equation?

DR. KISSINGER: The MIRV decision was made by
the previous Administration. It was not made by this
Administration. But quite frankly, MIRV is a good
illustration of what I am talking about. It was intended
as a defensive measure. It must look to an opponent as
also enhancing your offensive capability.

Q So that would go ahead as planned?

DR. KISSINGER: That will go ahead as planned,
but it will not be increased.

Q On that subject, you seem to imply, Doctor,
on the subject of the MIRV, that our intelligence judgment
is that the Russians have perfected a MIRV. Is that correct?

DR. KISSINGER: Our intelligence judgment is that
the Russians are embarked on a development that if they go
the same route that we did, that it is just prior to MIRV,
which is an intermediary step which has multiple warheads.
From there to MIRV is a very short step.

Q Another question on the same line. The
implication also seemed to be, at least in your pointing
out about the 70 sites around Moscow, that our intelligence
judgment is that the GALOSH system is effective.

DR. KISSINGER: No, I am saying something else.
The trouble with the defensive system is you don't know how
effective it is until you have tested it out and you can't
test it out unless you go to war. So there is always an area
of uncertainty about the effectiveness of a defensive system
that looks different to the defender than to the man on the
other side.

We did not rely in our analysis of why a defensive
system was needed in this country on the existence of the
Soviet defensive system. We mentioned that only primarily in
relationship to the argument that we are spiraling an arms
race. The defensive system around Moscow, in our judgment,
is the prototype of a new system that they are now testing.

Q If you didn't take that into account --

DR. KISSINGER: We did take it into account.

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Q -- in your decision, have the Russians
no defensive system at all, then we would not go back to
the old first and second strike thing as a deterrent?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q What would be the need for our ABM in that
case?

DR. KISSINGER: The Russian defensive system has
nothing to do with the need for us to protect our retaliatory
force. The need to protect our retaliatory force arises from
the design and growth of the Soviet offensive forces.

The Soviet defensive system is relevant to the
problem that they are emerging on one which may affect the
design of our offensive forces. The race is not between the
offensive forces, but between the offense of one side and the
defense of the other side. Those are the two things that
interact on each other.

The argument that we are making is that the Soviets
do not have to increase their retaliatory force because of
what we are doing in the defensive field if their intention
is clearly retaliatory.

Q I want to ask a question in the diplomatic
field related to the statement the President makes at the
bottom of Page 3, that he believes the Soviet interest in
arms talks will not be affected substantially by the present
decision.

Is that a theoretical judgment, Dr. Kissinger,
purely, or has there been some kind of indication from the
Soviets while this debate has been going on that they would
not be too upset about a modified system?

DR. KISSINGER: We can't go to the Soviets and ask
them how our weapons decisions would affect their decisions
to go into talks. But one can say the following: First,
since 1962, when the Soviets first started deploying defensive
systems, the United States pleaded with the Soviet Union
on innumerable occasions to stop deploying defensive missiles
because such a deployment would make arms talks more difficult.

The Soviet reply invariably was the defensive missiles
had nothing to do with arms talks, and, as such, would not make
arms talks more difficult, and, if anything, might make them
easier. Kosygin said this publicly in London in 1967
when he was there.

Secondly, the decision of the previous Administration
to proceed with a much larger program was announced prior
to the Soviet formal acceptance of their decision to
enter arms limitation talks.

Thirdly, the deployment we have chosen, precisely
because it seems to us to be so clearly defensive in orientation,
it is not just a theoretical argument, would seem to impose
no immediate decision on the Soviet Union to offset it by
increases in their offensive forces.

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So for all these reasons we believe that the
Soviet interest in arms talks is not likely to be affected.

Now, you can go beyond this, which I do not do formally,
but at least one ought to consider it. One must ask the
question: What, in fact, does produce an incentive for arms
talks, whether it is the danger of arms continuing to grow
without an agreement or self-imposed restraints?

As you know, Secretary Clifford used to argue
that proceeding with the previous, more ambiguous deployment
in fact gave the Soviets an incentive, or gave us a negotiating
target, whatever you want to argue.

We have not made that argument. We are making
a more modest claim that what we are doing does not reduce
the Soviet incentive. We are not saying it increases it,
though you can hear that argument, too.

MR. ZIEGLER: For those who came in late, this
information is embargoed.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 11:40 A.M. EST)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY
TO THE PRESIDENT, AND DR. HENRY
KISSINGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

5:00 P.M. EDT

MAY 2, 1969

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: There have been, of course, three things that have been somewhat on the top of peoples mind: ABM, the French situation, and Vietnam. The President wants those who are covering the White House to be informed of his thinking on these subjects, and has asked Dr. Kissinger to background those present on those subjects.

The information from this backgrounder will be for Sunday, A.M., which is 6:30 P.M. Saturday, and may be attributed to White House sources.

Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a few brief observations on each of the topics that Ron mentioned, the ABM, the French situation and the Vietnamese situation, just so we have something to react to, and then I will answer questions on those or any other topics that you may have or that you may wish to raise.

On the ABM, I don't want to say a great deal. People here are confident that the Senate will pass it. I have no independent judgment on the political side of this, but I would like to stress one point that perhaps hasn't been sufficiently made, which is: There are three reasons for the ABM system.

One, to protect against accidental or irrational attack; secondly, to protect against Chinese or ~~nth~~ countries' attacks, and thirdly to protect the MINUTEMAN against ~~a threat~~.

Only the last one of those deployments is directly affected by possible arms control attacks. The deployment which is relevant to Chinese and ~~nth~~ countries will have to be assessed with relation to the threats that these countries impose and will be assessed annually, but you should not think and I should not want to leave the impression that the entire program depends exclusively on what may happen in talks with the Soviet Union. Some of the analysis I have seen on the subject did not always make that point.

On the French situation, our position is that the President, on his visit to Europe, established a basis for close and friendly relations with France, and that we propose to have those with whatever government may emerge out of this process.

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Our own analysis indicates that the situation is reasonably, relatively fluid. Most people think that Pompidou is bound to win, but one can imagine other outcomes: in this election and a great deal will depend on parties, and what alignments the various parties make in the second go-around.

In any event, we have made a rather full study of the possible French evolution and the various possibilities that could develop. We are not gearing ourselves to any one particular outcome and we are prepared to work in harmony with whatever government emerges, recognizing that this is a primarily French matter.

Thirdly, Vietnam. The first thing I would like to say is to repeat what I have said to some of you privately and I think on one occasion in a backgrounder. The President and his prime advisors met on this subject last winter before the President assumed office. He charted his course the first month in office.

He is following a carefully thought-out strategy. He does not propose to let himself get panicked into decisions. What we are doing up to now follows more or less what we have been planned to do.

One of our objectives all along has been to make sure that we get all the elements of the American effort to work together in the same direction. We also wanted to make sure that when we began to make major initiatives that they would reinforce each other and that they would not simply be ploys for publicity.

We have always recognized that we were dealing with an extremely complex situation. It is our judgment that some progress has been made in Paris. We do not claim that this is progress that you can codify in terms of clauses in an agreement and anyone who looks for progress in those terms has to be disappointed.

The progress which we think has been made is in the type of elliptical indirect bargaining that is going on in which Hanoi, especially in the last four or five sessions, especially in the last one, has talked about possible negotiations with Saigon in a different manner than before in which they have talked about the constitution of South Vietnam in a manner which is different from the one they have used before.

I would have to say that the way one measures progress in those negotiations depends on a challenge to our whole conception of negotiations. We think of negotiations in terms of bargaining on an agreement. Hanoi tends to deal with us in an extremely elliptical way, which reflects their theoretical approach method of approaching problems and their preference for indirect methods in which every substantive move is preceded by some probe that is highly ambiguous.

In addition to what is going on in Paris, we have always had in mind, and we continue to have in mind, to take a number of initiatives on what may occur in Paris at the proper moment. We will take those when the time is right.

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The major point that I want to make is that we do not feel discouraged by what is going on in Paris. To the contrary, things have gone approximately as we had expected them to go. We are approximately on the timetable that we had expected to follow. And we will know within the next months and we will take steps which we had for a long time considered which are not all very dramatic ones, but this is roughly where we think we are in Vietnam.

It is, of course, a problem of relating the sequence of events in Vietnam to the degree of public support one can muster in the United States. The President's firm policy in this, as in other matters, is to deliver more than he promises and, therefore, do not make eloquent promises.

But this is our general thinking about it and I don't want to go into detail in these observations, but I will be glad to answer questions about this topic or any of the topics I raised, or anything else you have on your mind.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you talk about taking initiatives regardless of Paris when the time is right. Could you elaborate on the kind of initiatives you have in mind?

DR. KISSINGER: No. What I meant to say was that we will take initiatives at Paris and elsewhere when we think it is the appropriate moment to make a maximum degree of progress. We are constantly reviewing our negotiating position. We are constantly reviewing the other things we can do within Vietnam and elsewhere and we will be taking steps in all these areas over the next months.

Q What kind of initiatives are we talking about, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go beyond what I have said. The major point that I wanted to make was, we have a rather clear conception of where we want to be headed. It may not work, but at any rate, if it fails you have the consolation that we failed on the basis of a plan and not inadvertently. (Laughter.)

Q You said within a month you hope to know which way this will go.

DR. KISSINGER: No, I didn't say that.

Q That is what I wanted to check. You said we will know within the next months and we will take steps.

DR. KISSINGER: I did not say that. If I did, I didn't mean to say that. What I meant to say was that what we have done in the first 100 days is to take inventory of where we were because, as I have had an occasion to tell this group before, in almost every other policy issue, the differences concern judgments as to policy. Here the differences concern judgment as to fact.

We then had to restore our relationships to Saigon, and we had to get a coherent program for the Government and begin implementing it. We are finished with these preliminary phases and we hope to be in a position where these various efforts begin to reinforce each other and gain momentum.

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I did not mean to suggest that there is a deadline
in which it will be apparent by a certain time.

Q It sounded like that.

DR. KISSINGER: If it did, I am glad you gave me a
chance to correct it.

Q When Secretary Rogers goes to Bangkok, he will
be meeting with the troop-contributing countries for the first
time since there has been a question raised about the Manila
communique. Can you give us any idea of what he will be doing
there?

DR. KISSINGER: First, on the issue of the Manila
communique. I think Secretary Rogers pointed out something
that seems to me to be self-evident, that there seems to be
ambiguity in the Manila communique.

If you read the text of the communique, that says
that troops will be withdrawn after North Vietnamese troops
are withdrawn, and the level of violence declines.

I think you will agree that this is open to very
many interpretations. Does it mean that the level of violence
declines because troops are withdrawn automatically, or does
the level of violence have to decline in addition to troops
being withdrawn, or does the level of violence have to decline
as a result that the North Vietnamese troops have been
withdrawn, so the level of violence might decline.

I don't want to go on, but I wanted to show you it
is not a self-evidently realistic phrase, and Secretary
Rogers pointed out it was an ambiguous phrase. He thought
he was doing something self-evident. I don't think he was
trying to raise a question in addition to the ambiguities
in here.

On the talks with the troop-contributing countries,
we don't expect additional troop contributions from the troop
contributing countries, and we don't intend to ask for them.

Q Could you assess the return of Le Duc Tho
and would you think this would lead to any quickening of
the talks in Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: In the past, the return of Le
Duc Tho has indicated that a decision has been made in Hanoi
as to a specific course to be followed over an interim time
period. Now the same might be true again. On the other hand,
we would have to see what it brings.

I can't go beyond this, because it is plausible
that if Hanoi is going to speed up the negotiations, the
return of Le Duc Tho might be an indication.

Q Dr. Kissinger, where in your coordinating plan
does the allusion to troop withdrawal by the United States by
public officials fit?

DR. KISSINGER: The policy on troop withdrawals -- well,
there are two. The policy on troop withdrawals has been stated
by the President in his Press Conference. He has stated that
troop withdrawals depend on three circumstances, either mutual

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withdrawals, or an improvement in the military situation, and/or in each of these cases, an improvement in South Vietnamese military capabilities.

We are assessing at regular intervals whether any of these circumstances have arisen. When they arise, we will make our judgments on that basis. We do not have a specific deadline in which we plan to withdraw troops other than on the basis of a mutual agreement.

If the military situation improves, or if the training of South Vietnamese troops makes it clear that some American troops can be spared, then that judgment will be made, but there is no master plan other than the criteria that have been set by the President. The other allusions that have been made have to be seen in the light of the three criteria set forth by the President, which, as far as the official policy of the Government is concerned, is decisive.

Q Why should Hanoi negotiate if you have two or three of those three points, a mutual withdrawal of troops?

DR. KISSINGER: The two points other than mutual withdrawal are either an improvement in the military situation or a demonstrated South Vietnamese capability to take care of itself. If South Vietnam can take care of itself without American help, which we do not foresee in the immediate future, that it can take care of itself entirely, without American help, then obviously there is no reason for American troops to be there.

Hanoi would negotiate under those circumstances in order to get a settlement and still have some military assets in the country. In other words, if the military situation permits us to withdraw troops, this is not a sign of strength for Hanoi.

If South Vietnam becomes strong enough to take care of itself, that again is not a sign of strength for Hanoi, so I would say in circumstances other than mutual withdrawal, we are describing a situation in which the military events or political events in South Vietnam have turned decisively against Hanoi.

Q Do we see any of these things happening?

DR. KISSINGER: We are now in a phase which is ambiguous in this sense: American casualties are down very much compared to the peak of the offensive; I think. American deaths last week were 163. I may be wrong about the figure, but substantially less than half of what they were in the peak of the offensive.

Then what is not clear is whether this is due to the fact that the military situation has improved to a point where the other side is not capable of launching a major offensive or whether it means that they are regrouping for another major offensive.

This is what we are looking at now and the part which we are trying to come to some conclusion on.

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Secondly, most observers agree, and our judgment is that the South Vietnamese government has gained in strength and that the military capability of the South Vietnamese army has improved. We do not draw from this the conclusion now that these two factors have improved sufficiently to satisfy the President's criteria, but if you ask me the question of how, on May 2, the situation looks as compared to March 2, I would have to say we have improved in both of those categories.

I have picked arbitrarily a date. Let's say in the 100 days we have been in office, the situation in those two categories have improved.

Help Required

Q Back to the question of troop withdrawal, several Republican Senators are pressuring the President, including Senator Scott. Is this an embarrassment to the President or is it an aid to him in long-range planning?

DR. KISSINGER: The President has said in a number of occasions that in his recent political career he has had a tendency to pursue his course, even when there were many pressures to try to change it. He feels that he has set his course, he has made his best judgment, he can understand why Senators may wish to express their views, but he will not alter his course which reflects his best judgment.

This is not said with any criticism of those Senators who do not agree with him. The questions of timing and of whether to do certain things finally have to be made by the man who has all of the relevant information in the light of the purposes he is trying to achieve, and he will follow the strategy he has set.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the President expect to get in Paris a troop withdrawal understanding similar to that in effect last October at the time of the bombing halt?

In other words, an understanding rather than any public agreement, and furthermore, an understanding relayed and vouched for by the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: What form the agreement would take, we are not going to be dogmatic about, but it has to be explicit, That is, one has to be perfectly clear of what the obligations of the other side are, and there has to be a sufficient inspection and guarantee to make sure that it cannot be violated at will.

When we are talking about withdrawal, we are talking about a matter that will fundamentally affect not only the military situation, but the political future of South Vietnam, and all the parties must have the greatest assurance possible that whatever agreement is reached is going to be obeyed.

Now whether it is in the form of an understanding guaranteed by another power, whether it is a written agreement entered into directly between us and Hanoi, of that we may be reasonably open-minded, but it has to be explicit and unambiguous and it must have satisfactory guarantees. About this we are clear.

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Q By explicit, do you mean public, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but it has to be in such a form that there can be no debate afterwards whether there is an understanding.

Q Dr. Kissinger, taking account of your own remarks earlier about how this problem relates to the amount of support that can be mustered in the American public opinion, what incentive is there for the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front to reach some kind of agreement now rather than wait for, let's say, the end of the year, when the general thesis is that your support will be considerably less than it is now?

DR. KISSINGER: The incentive that Hanoi has is that our terms are not going to improve and that we have made the best judgments of what an honorable settlement is, taking into account, also, reasonable objectives for the other side.

Our terms are going to become apparent in the weeks ahead insofar as there is any ambiguity about them now. There is a point beyond which waiting will not do them any good.

Secondly, the fact is true that Hanoi is also under pressure. The military situation, while I am not claiming a victory for the United States, it is also clear that the capacity of Hanoi to mount a major offensive has been less this year than in previous years, and it is likely to be less in the time ahead.

I think the general international environment is such, with a rather moderate tone on the part of the Soviet Union, no major risk-taking attitude on the part of China which might suggest to Hanoi that the time has come for settlement. But, of course, ultimately Hanoi will have to decide for itself this particular calculus of whether it should wait for public opinion turning against the President. We believe that if we have a reasonable position, explain to the American people what is involved, if we make every genuine effort to settle the war, we will have enough public support for the requisite period of time to end the war honorably and be able to do all those things -- that is, explain to the American people why we are there, what our objectives are and to take every honorable way we can to end the war on reasonable terms.

Q You spoke of being able to set improvements in the stability and strength of the Saigon government and military in the last three months. What areas are you speaking of?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me go back to January 20. When we came in there had been, first of all, a three-month period of public recrimination between Saigon and Washington and a complete breakdown of communication.

Saigon was extremely reluctant to enter into negotiations with the NLF partly because it was afraid that it's international cohesion might not be accurate and partly because it felt rightly or wrongly that the processes in which it had been involved might not be proper for consultation.

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I think we restored a degree of confidence in our relationship with South Vietnam that made it possible to have a coordinated negotiating strategy in Paris, and thereby to take away one of the objectives Hanoi might have in Paris, namely, to use the negotiations to undermine the Saigon government.

Secondly, at the end of March, President Thieu offered to negotiate with the NLF directly. This has since been spelled out, that they would be recognized in the political light of the country, and this indicates a degree of self-confidence which any of you who have any experience in Vietnam know would have been unthinkable even six months ago.

Now, thirdly, President Thieu is attempting, and it is a very difficult process, to organize political forces in the country so that they can ultimately confront a peaceful political contest with the National Liberation Front, and in our conversations with the South Vietnamese we are now talking in terms of an ultimate political contest in the country, rather than a military contest.

Now these are major psychological and political changes. Again, nobody would claim here that the South Vietnamese government does not still confront major problems. Nobody would claim that we yet have defined with absolute precision what one means by political contests in a country which we can say does not have an extended experience in pluralistic democracy. Nevertheless, I think that progress has been made.

Here again, we are engaged in one of these races between the progress that has been made and what the total political environment in the nation is and the relationship between a political settlement and an international settlement of South Vietam to the political structure of South Vietnam.

Again, I do not pretend to you that that is easily involved. All we are claiming is that progress has been made and that we know the direction in which we ought to be moving and that we are moving in that direction.

Q Do I detect the statement there that eventually we might expect the Saigon government to move away from its demand that the National Liberation Front drop its identity in order to participate in a political contest?

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DR. KISSINGER: Let me put it this way: There have been discussions on that problem. Are you better off letting the National Liberation Front as a known Communist organization operate or do you go the Greek route in which the National Liberation Front name would be abandoned and a new grouping emerges with the same essential forces, but a different name?

I have heard South Vietnamese make the proposition that they could compete more easily if the National Liberation Front retained its name because then it would be clear what it was than if it changed its name and appeared as a seemingly non-Communist force.

All I can say is that there have been discussion on that issue and that minds are reasonably open on it and that I would not be surprised if Thieu's words did not prove to be the last ones on it.

Q You spoke of the records of times that achieved an honorable end of the war and the students who talked to you the other day came out of the meeting and told us that you spoke in terms of one year.

DR. KISSINGER: No. What I said to the students - it was a long conversation and I was a professor sufficiently recently so that I have considerable understanding for the tremendous concern of many of these students and I could see their problem.

Our problem is that you cannot win a chess game if you explain every move you are making while you are making it. Their problem is that they have heard Government make certain predictions year after year and they said to me -- and I could understand -- "Why should we believe you when others have always told us to be patient?"

I said to them, "I cannot give you an overwhelming reason why you should believe me, all I would say is that if you come back here a year from now and do not see significant changes" and I did not say an end to the war, "of a nature that indicate that we do have our own policy, then I will have no more right to ask any further confidence." This is almost a direct quote of what I said. I did not say the war would be over in a year and we will not nail ourselves to a deadline.

Q Doctor, I can understand your reticence about going into detail in these initiatives and steps you have talked of, regardless of developments at the Paris peace talks, but can you give us some kind of an indication of where in the steps an initiative might lie; that is, an area or something along those lines?

Q What areas can you deal with outside of the Paris talks?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you know the major areas where action is taking place; in Vietnam, in Paris, and diplomatically. The major point I was trying to make, and you must make some allowances for my obtuse way of expressing myself, which is the Harvard version of profundity -- the major point I was trying to make was that we were not moving in response to the very useful advice we are getting from many quarters, but that we have our own conception and that we will develop our moves in the sequence that we have judged to be useful.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, in terms of the capability of the South Vietnamese Army, are there any units of substantial size that will, within a few weeks or months, be able to take over increased roles?

DR. KISSINGER: This is not the way we are going to look at this. We are not going to try to identify one South Vietnamese division that is going to replace one American division. We have to look at this as the total picture. I cannot point out to you one division that is training at the Mekong Delta that is going to be coming north any day now to replace an American unit. It just doesn't work that way.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you helped Governor Rockefeller shape a four-point program last July. One point in that was cutting down on search and destroy missions. Are you still of that opinion that that would be a useful thing to do or not?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I think Governor Rockefeller has to speak for his program. I can't speak for Governor Rockefeller's program of last year. Let me speak about things that I have said. I have trouble enough defending those, rather than those of a political campaign.

I have written independently on the problem of the relationship of search and destroy operations to other missions and particularly to what concerned me in, say, 1965 and 1966, about attempting to defend the territories rather than the population.

Now, if you look at the deployment of American forces I think you will find that they are not deployed around the frontiers of South Vietnam and that they are attempting to be concentrated in a different manner than was the case a year and a half ago, let us say.

Now, the second question, of the type of operation that is being conducted, we have made a very careful study of what operations, where we incur most of our casualties, and in fact, this was one of the key questions we addressed in the factual survey that I have mentioned to you, and with the proviso that the statistics in Vietnam have ambiguous elements in them and therefore, I will not make excessive claims for statistics, nevertheless, insofar as statistics prove anything, the judgment that we came to was that the American casualty rate tends to depend more on enemy operations than on our own operations.

In other words, most of American casualties are caused in enemy initiated operations. Now, I will have to tell you in all fairness, because I don't want to play with numbers with this group, that the ambiguity in our analysis was that we could not get an absolutely conclusive determination of what is enemy initiated, that is, does it depend on who shoots first or who moves his unit into the other area. So there is a slight ambiguity, I think, in that there.

But, nevertheless, whatever evidence I have seen tends to show that our casualties are most responsive to enemy action and this is not too surprising. In other words, our casualties are down now because the offensive of the other side has declined and the casualties went way up when there was an offensive by the other side.

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Q That meeting this morning in the Treasury Department, was the question of re-evaluating the franc and the German mark and the British pound brought up?

DR. KISSINGER: When I am present at the economic meetings you can be sure that no major decisions are likely to be made. (Laughter.) It was a general review which the President had scheduled for a long time of tax policy and of general international monetary policy, unrelated, actually, to this immediate situation, and at the last minute he asked me to come along for whatever political contribution I might make to these discussions.

If you don't quote me, my contribution to these discussions is slight indeed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is what you said about the Vietnam situation as presently developed indicate that you do not see any significant decline in the enemy activity over there?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I am not saying that. I am saying that the decline in enemy activity at this moment is ambiguous. It could mean that they are regrouping for a new offensive, it could mean they are suffering a cutback on a military decision to go back.

This is what we will have to be assessing in the weeks ahead, whether this follows a pattern that has happened before or whether it is something more involved and you can be sure that this is one of the things we will be looking at.

Q Doctor, what is the greater problem in trying to work out a solution to a problem with Hanoi, the Saigon Government, military actions of the enemy or American public opinion? Which is your greater burden?

DR. KISSINGER: In working out an agreement, I know it is popular to lambast the Saigon Government, but a government in a country that has been ruined by civil war for 20 years has, in the best of circumstances, enormous problems.

If you look at other underdeveloped countries and you are observing the precarious margins at which governments operate, then I think the Saigon Government deserves some degree of compassion for the special problems of the civil war of many external forces from both North Vietnam and South Vietnam and the United States.

The President has felt very strongly and it has been one of his earliest directives that we would make every effort to establish a relationship of confidence with Saigon.

It is certainly time-consuming to go this route but we cannot complain that any major American initiative has been thwarted so I would not list Saigon as an obstacle to these negotiations.

American public opinion presents the problem that I have mentioned, not that American public opinion is not supporting us but that Hanoi may count on the fact that

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American public opinion is precarious and there is a war and it is a set of negotiations in which public opinion is in itself an element in the negotiations.

Military actions have an indirect effect on negotiations because either they may be started by the other side in order to hope that they will affect the American public opinion or maybe because they hope they will undermine our military situation but the real problem of our negotiations, about the negotiations is this: we are not sure whether Hanoi has made the decision in its own mind that one of the terms will have to be the continuation of an autonomous South Vietnam for a period of time that permits its people to determine their own fate.

Once Hanoi has made that decision, we will be in the real negotiation which is, how do you arrive at a process of self determination for South Vietnam but we believe that that process is soluble, this problem is soluble and we believe, also, that Hanoi will come to that other decision. But that seems to me to be the chief problem now in addition to the fact that the American character and the Vietnamese character was not necessarily meant to be compatible.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you see the approach at any time when the date might be set for the talks and what do you regard in general as the conditions precedent to the date of starting the talks?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the date obviously, we are constantly approaching the date and the time when a date will be set. If there were going to be talks this has to be true.

Secondly, we have not set conditions --

Q I just meant generally.

DR. KISSINGER: Generally, we are now engaged in the government in intensive review of the positions we ought to take in these talks.

When this review is completed, which will be soon, it will be put before the National Security Council in order to permit the President to choose among the various approaches that are possible to the issue of SALT talks.

After the NSC has met and the President has chosen the direction in which he wants to go we will then consult with the Soviets about the dates and locations, procedures.

The reason we are proceeding with such care is that the SALT talks are probably going to be the most important talks we have engaged in with the Soviet Union. They will affect the strategic landscape and the political landscapes more than anything else we have done as he pointed out to the NATO ministers.

The whole post-war position has been on the assumption of American superiority. What the SALT talks will do, is codify the American position of strategic equality. That position already exists to a greater or less extent to the extent to which we are not seeing it is going to bring it about.

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lesser degree but the legal institutionalization of this is
going to have substantial consequences which we have to make
sure we have looked at and which we have to make sure our
allies understand.

There is no reason why we should repeat with SALT
the problems as in the NPT in which the most discussion took
place after the treaty had been agreed to and under which we then
had to make a large amount of interpretations to the Senate
about what this treaty meant.

We believe the approach we are now making is going
to turn out to be a faster method and above all, a more
reliable method and with the most effort.

Q Would you assess the Soviet efforts to date,
particularly in light of the non-military May Day and con-
ciliatory speeches and so on?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet Union now, obviously --
let me say, first of all, that in a government as big as ours
you will have no difficulty getting assessments that do not
absolutely coincide with mine but then I can't expect everyone
to be right 100 percent. (Laughter.)

Our assessment would be this: The Soviet Union
faces a number of serious problems, one is the role of the
Communist Party in a highly developed industrial state. The
Communist Party can be dominant when it makes a revolution or
when it has to industrialize the society.

But when you have an elaborate bureaucratic society
the industrial sector tends to run by itself; the governmental
sector doesn't necessarily need the leadership of a political
party so you have in every Communist society the problem of
the function and role of the party under all these conditions.

I am not saying that this necessarily will make them
turn permanently into a more peaceful direction. I am just
saying it is a problem that has to be worked out.

Secondly, the Soviet Union must be struck by the
anomaly that its most intense disputes have occurred with
Communist states so that the spread of communism is not an
inevitable guarantee of Russian security.

Now, this fact must lead to some melancholy reflections
in a hierarchy trained in the belief that all problems of
international relations, including the problem of the spread
of socialism and the relationship between dominant ideology
and geo political realities is a serious problem.

Secondly, the Soviet Union has the problem of any
technocratic, bureaucratic society in the setting of national
priorities.

Fortunately, the Soviet Union must have the con-
viction that the risks of modern warfare are such that they
create an inconsistency between substantial peripheral
commitments and the penalties of a showdown. Therefore, the

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Soviet Union and many other states must ask themselves
what they want to risk in areas which are not essential to
its security as perhaps some of these are. The middle east.

So all of these factors make at least for a period
of non-adventuresness in Soviet foreign policy and they even
may lead to a situation where, with wisdom on all sides one
can conceive that some deeper settlements are possible than
those that have marked previous periods of detente.

This is certainly the effort of this Administration.
If you review previous periods of detente, there has been a
tendency to believe that an agreement was an end in itself,
to pick anything that was do-able and then assume that there
was some automaticity or momentum that would lead to other
things except that the other things never happened.

We are trying to address the political issues
together with the arms control issues and, again, it is one
of these things in which you cannot be sure which tendency
in the Soviet Union will ultimately prevail or if it is
possible for the Soviet Union to resolve the complexities
I have mentioned. We want to make it possible for them to
do so.

Q The tone of your discussion here is so
strikingly different than the public speeches of the
Secretary of Defense Laird that it is hard to believe that
he is not one of those who you were referring to a few
moments ago who may be in some disagreement with you in this.

DR. KISSINGER: No, I was talking to you gentlemen
in this room. If you mean in the Administration, I am not
talking about Cabinet officers.

Let me say this about Secretary Laird: Secretary
Laird, as Secretary of Defense, is properly talking about
Soviet capabilities. You have asked me about Soviet trends.

I subscribe completely to the assessment of Soviet
capabilities that Secretary Laird has made. Secretary Laird,
as I understand it, is not saying that he knows that the
Soviet Union intends to attack us today.

What I think he is saying is that the Soviet Union
is building a capability which, if you project it at its
present growth rate through a certain period in the 1970's,
may get a capability for offensive action, and that is true.

Stalin I say that the Soviet domestic structure exhibits
strength and perplexities, that is also true.

Stalin The problem, therefore, none of us can predict which
trend in Soviet policy is going to prevail, and which trend
in Soviet policy will prevail depends in part on our actions.

The chief argument that Soviet leaders have made in
the past for the desirability of peace is not that peace is
desirable, but that war is to risk it. Therefore, it seems to
me perfectly in keeping with our policy that the assessment
that I have made here of the trends of Soviet policy could be
correct and what Secretary Laird said could also be correct.

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I would think that Secretary Laird would essentially agree with what I have said and I agree with his assessment of the trends in Soviet weapons development.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you distinguished earlier three major areas where there has been activity in the Vietnam situation, one, Paris; two, Vietnam; and three, diplomatically. Can you say whether there have been talks between the two sides at Dien Bien Phu and why you distinguished between Paris and diplomatically?

DR. KISSINGER: I distinguished, first of all, it is obvious if there were talks in Vientiane, I would not tell you, but that is not what I meant.

Q Have there been talks?

DR. KISSINGER: If it puts your mind at rest, there have been no talks.

Q What did you mean by the third?

DR. KISSINGER: What I mean by diplomatically is, it is a fairly self-evident fact that we are not talking about Vietnam only Hanoi, and that there are other countries in the world which have an interest to which we are talking; and that there are many channels in which we are trying to explore the general context of a settlement in Vietnam if only because a settlement will have to be guaranteed by other countries.

Q Is President Nixon prepared to accept strategic equality, that condition, to the Soviet Union? You used those words.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me put it another way. I doubt that the Soviet Union would accept any agreement that codifies her strategic inferiority and, therefore, I would think that an agreement would have to start from the assumption that it will codify more or less a condition of parity.

Q Doctor, on that same question, you were asked whether the President will accept the strategic equality. The President himself said in a recent statement that because of the new situation in the world where we are on the threshold of codifying strategic equality that there must be progress in settling outstanding political questions before we are ready to codify a strategic equality, the outstanding political problems being Vietnam and the Mideast.

Then a moment ago you said there are not conditions with respect to the SALT talks. Now, what is it? Do we expect some political conditions about Vietnam and the SALT talks or do we not?

DR. KISSINGER: We are trying to move forward simultaneously on a number of fronts and so far we have not had to make this decision because it has proved possible to move forward, for us to begin preliminary talks on a number of fronts, therefore, it is a hypothetical question. We

haven't had to make that decision.

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Q. So there are conditions but you don't have to call them conditions because the Russians are cooperating so far, is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no conditions in the sense that we are saying that the Soviet Union has to make concessions to us in the Middle East in order for us to make concessions to seem on strategic arms litigations.

We recognize that any agreement must reflect the real interests of both sides in each area so we would assume that if an agreement is made on the Middle East it will reflect the interests on both sides.

We are trying to keep those negotiations in gear and so far that has happened.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will have two more.

Q. Is there anything that has happened in the last week or so that has made you feel more optimistic on the ABM? Somebody seems to have a better nose count than some of the opponents on the Hill?

DR. KISSINGER: I take the word of our political experts here on this question.

Q. From the overall picture, though, are there any developments that you think are of significance from the White House side?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I think that our case is essentially correct and that as people understand it they will recognize that it is the minimum program that the President should carry out consistent with security, that many of the objections of the critics are not so much directed to the program but to this interpretation of what the program might lead to and to their theory that the President may not be able to carry out what happens after the program has been accepted.

I think as people look into the issue more fully they will recognize first that in terms of the overall international situation this is the minimum that the President could do; and secondly, that he has built into the safeguards that give him full control over the future evolution of it. I think so far as I have confidence in this program it reflects this, the nose count is not my job but I have been told by the people here who specialize in that, that they are confident.

Q. I would like to ask whether in view of your introductory remarks ABM is negotiable in the SALT talks in view of the fact that it has other purposes besides Russians defense and also I would like to ask whether MIRV is negotiable.

DR. KISSINGER: The ABM has two major components, (1) an area defense which is primarily effective against

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China and n-th countries, which in this case is a shorthand
for any independent nuclear countries. Secondly, the
defense-for potential nuclear-missiles which present a
first strike.

The part of the program which is related to a defense
against the Soviet first strike capability is totally
negotiable insofar as this first strike.

It is our judgment that the area defense is not
directly related to the SALT talks partly because it presents
no threat whatever to any Soviet objectives. It is relatively
easily penetrated by a sophisticated defensive-force and;
secondly, because we think that the Soviet Union will be able
to do away with all of its ABM system for many of the same
reasons that I have given.

However, if the SALT talks and other talks that may
occur lead to a general relaxation of tensions such that
threats from all the quarters, maybe even including those
from Communist China cease, then we can look again at the
development which is a part of it but it is important to
keep in mind that there are several parts to the ABM program
and only the part that involves the defense of the Minutemen
sites is directly affected by the SALT talks.

Then you asked about the MIRV. MIRV is a subject
that can be appropriately included in the discussions, yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(6:20 P.M.

EDT)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(President's Address)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 5:05 P.M. EDT

MAY 14, 1969

WEDNESDAY

DR. KISSINGER: I thought perhaps the best way to do this would be for me to summarize what is in the speech and to tell you what we think is new in the speech, and finally to let you ask questions. Does that seem like a reasonable procedure?

The speech represents a report by the President of his attempt to bring peace to Vietnam and the steps that have been taken over the first four months of his Administration to achieve that objective. He lays out at the beginning the rationale for our being in Vietnam, stressing above all the point that it was possible to debate whether we should have entered, whether we should have intervened; it is possible to debate whether we should have conducted the war differently; but it is not possible to debate whether we should be there and that this imposes its own realities. In other words, the choices of 1969 are not the choices of 1963.

He discusses why unilateral withdrawal is unacceptable and he also states explicitly that we are not seeking a military victory, and there the major part of the speech is devoted to his description of the nature of a settlement.

The President lays out seven basic principles and eight specific measures.

Let me list the principles: They are, first, that we seek no bases in Vietnam. Second, that we insist on no military ties with Vietnam. Third, that we are willing to agree to the neutrality of Vietnam if that is what the South Vietnamese people choose. Fourth, we have no intention ---

Q Excuse me. The neutrality of South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, the part that we are in a position to agree about is South Vietnam, and incidentally, North Vietnam has already declared its willingness to accept neutrality, so this is not a contention point.

The contention point is that we are willing to accept neutrality for South Vietnam, and we are.

I will sum up the points in these proposals after I run through them.

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Four, we have no intention of imposing any form
of government upon the people of South Vietnam. Five,
which is the corollary of that, we believe we are prepared
to accept any government in South Vietnam that results
from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people. Six,
we believe that there should be an opportunity for full
participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all
political forces that are willing to abide by the political
process. Seven, we are prepared to accept reunification if
it reflects the will of the people of North Vietnam, and the
people of South Vietnam.

The thrust of these principles is that we have no
military aims in South Vietnam and that our only political
aim is to give the people of South Vietnam an opportunity
to determine their own fate, free from any outside supervision.

We then propose eight measures to achieve these
general objectives.

One, as soon as an agreement is reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces should begin their withdrawals from South Vietnam.

Two, over a period of twelve months, by agreed-upon
stages, the major portion of U. S., allied and other non-South
Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn. At the end of the
twelve month period, the small forces remaining, both from
North Vietnam and from the United States should be moved
to designated base areas and should no longer engage in
combat operations.

In other words, if this proposal is accepted, the
American part of combat will be over at the end of this
period.

Q This is all the second measure?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

Point three is that the remaining U. S. and allied
forces will move to complete their withdrawal as the North
Vietnamese forces are withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.
Let me stress that the North Vietnamese withdrawals have to
be to North Vietnam. We cannot accept North Vietnamese
withdrawals to Cambodia or Laos, since the Cambodian frontier
is only 35 miles from Saigon and the Laos frontier is only
25 miles from Hue.

Four, we propose the creation of an international
supervisory body which would be created for the purpose of
verifying withdrawals and for any other purpose agreed on by
the two sides.

Five, this international party would begin operating
in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate
in arranging supervised cease fires.

Six, as soon as possible after the international
body is formed, elections would be held under its supervision.

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Seven, arrangements will be made for the earliest
possible release of prisoners of war on both sides.

Eight, all parties would agree to observe the
Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding Vietnam and Cambodia,
and the Laos Accords of 1962.

Let me now make two other points, one having to do
with U. S. withdrawals and the other with the new elements
in this speech.

We do not consider the unilateral withdrawals that
you have read about in the press to be part of our negotiating
program. Those withdrawals are related solely to the military
situation, to General Abrams' judgment as to the readiness
of South Vietnamese forces to replace American forces, and the
judgment of that sort of withdrawal will be made in that context
and the President in his speech indicates that General Abrams
has told him that significant progress is being made in train-
ing South Vietnamese forces.

Now let me turn to the new elements in this proposal.
The first element is intangible. It has to do with the tone
and the spirit. We believe that this represents the most
comprehensive, the most forthcoming and the most flexible
statement of American peace aims that has been presented.

We repeatedly state that while the principle of
self-determination cannot be compromised, the methods
by which it is achieved is open to negotiation. We
specifically affirm our willingness to discuss the programs
of the other side insofar as it can be made consistent with
this immutable principle of self-determination and we mention
in this specifically the ten points.

Now going from this perhaps intangible element which
you will have to judge for yourself when you read the speech,
let me turn to specifics of what we know to be the new elements
in the speech.

First, with respect to mutual withdrawal, we have
been talking about mutual withdrawal for several months.
Here we are spelling out publicly, precisely and in a new
manner what we mean by it. The previous public statement
on mutual withdrawal had been the Manila Formula which
left vague the duration of the processes, which left vague
when the United States would start the process of withdrawal.
Indeed, it implied that the United States would begin withdraw-
ing only after the North Vietnamese forces had left the country
and after the level of violence had then subsided, having
there two conditions.

We are stating in this speech that we are ready
to begin a mutual withdrawal simultaneously with the North
Vietnamese. Secondly, we are proposing a specific time table.
Thirdly, this time table is short, a total of 12 months.

We are proposing that the remaining U. S. and
North Vietnamese forces be confined to designated base
areas, in effect bringing about a cease fire between the
United States and North Vietnamese forces.

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Can you tell us who will be left after the twelve month period or is that getting ahead?

DR. KISSINGER: Why don't you let me finish and then I will answer any questions you may have.

With respect to withdrawals--and this may not seem to you to be a big point, although it is one in practice--as you know, the North Vietnamese have never acknowledged that they have forces in Vietnam.

We are publicly stating in this speech that we do not care whether they publicly acknowledge whether they have forces in South Vietnam. We want to make sure that there are no forces there after a settlement and we are willing to confine our interest in the matter to guarantees against their re-entry. In other words, we do not demand from them a public acknowledgement that they have forces there. It is up to them to get their forces out and our interest is that they stay out.

This may not seem like a big point. It has turned out to be a stumbling block in all the previous negotiations.

Now then, let me turn to the new aspects of the political side. First, our previous position has been that we were competent to discuss only military issues, that the political issues had to be discussed among the South Vietnamese directly.

In this speech the President announces that if the South Vietnamese parties involved want us and Hanoi to participate in the political negotiations, we are prepared to do so, and we know that the South Vietnamese government is prepared to have us participate.

Secondly, we are announcing formally that we are prepared to accept the full participation in South Vietnamese political life of all elements that are willing to abide by the political process.

Another new element is that we are prepared to accept any new government that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people.

Finally, still talking about the political side, we have indicated that we believe that the guarantees for free political activity must have the confidence of all the political forces in South Vietnam; in other words, must be acceptable, also, by implication to the other side.

We are prepared to have the political process in South Vietnam under the supervision of an international agency.

Now a word about form, which is also new. We no longer insist that the settlement be a formal document -- written document. We are prepared to accept a de facto peace, providing that there is a clear understanding and adequate assurances.

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The President says in his speech that the form of
peace is less important than the fact of peace.

Finally, as I have already pointed out, we are specifically asserting that we are prepared to talk about anybody else's program, provided it is consistent to the essential principles that we have declared.

These, gentlemen, are the main points that the President will make. These are the new elements that we believe are in this proposal. We believe that it is the most forthcoming statement that could responsibly be made at this time.

It has been fully discussed with President Thieu. It has also been discussed with several of our other allies, and we believe that it is the result of the preparation that has gone on, both inside the Government over a period of months, and in relation to our allies over that period.

I am sorry I have talked so long, but I thought
that you should have our ideas and I will be delighted to
answer any questions.

Why does he make this speech now rather than
last week or next week?

DR. KISSINGER: The speech has been planned for this time period for at least four weeks, roughly. I can't give you an exact time, but those of you who have met with me before know that I have consistently said that we have a specific schedule, that we have to line up various elements, that we do not want to make a dramatic move just to catch headlines, but we want to be sure that we can get as much momentum as possible.

The process through which we went was, first, to
get, as I have said in background briefings before, a factual
assessment of the situation and to get the basic strategy.
This was done in February. At the end of March, we discussed
in the National Security Council a detailed negotiating
position which roughly reflects what we are putting forth here.
It is, of course, more detailed, and the language is more
bureaucratic, but it reflects essentially the major points here.

The next problem then was to engage in the proper pro-
cess of consultation with our allies. As the President has
said, it may be hard to make peace with Saigon. It is
impossible to make peace without Saigon.

Finally we wanted to be in a position where there
seemed to be some prospect of a possible response by the
other side. Now, it seemed to us, looking very carefully
at the kind of talks that had been going on in Paris, that
the time was not propitious before the beginning of May
for a major American initiative, that the other side was in no
position to respond to it and that our allies had not taken
the adequate preparatory measures, and for that matter, we
were not fully ready with a position.

So for all these reasons, it was decided, give or
take a few days, that this was the right time period in which
to make this proposal from the point of view of the maximum
impact on the negotiations.

Why do you think that the other side may be prepared to give a response now that it was not ready to give a short time ago?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, if you analyze the negotiations with the Vietnamese, you come to a number of conclusions. One, the turnaround time for Hanoi is three weeks on anything. It takes them that long to react.

Secondly, I would not be amazed if they thought the same thing of us. We tend to proceed in what I would call a legal way. They tend to proceed in a more methodological way; that is, they tend to proceed by elliptical references in which they test out the ground and then come forward again a few weeks later.

Through this complicated process in which we were putting forth our positions and they were putting forth theirs, it would be ridiculous to say we have come towards an area of agreement, but we have come towards a definition of what it is we are talking about and this process, as it turned out, seemed to us to be right for movement any time. It is not that in early February we said on May 14 the President is going to make a speech. It was rather after we had decided what the position was, it seemed to us from about the middle of April on, that sometime over the next four weeks - we had always had it in mind that when the movement was right, we would make a proposal.

We did not have a master plan which told us in February when the moment was right. That decision depended on events in Saigon and events in the battlefield. For example, to have to come up with a proposal a week after they started their offensive would have been taken as a sign of being pressured into it, so all of these factors taken into account jelled this general time period.

Q Can I ask you the question about the troops to be left after twelve months, to be sent to non-combat base camps?

DR. KISSINGER: Who or how many?

Q Who?

DR. KISSINGER: This would have to be negotiated. We say the major portion of the force will be withdrawn. What would be left would be a subject for negotiation. It would have to be a force that could serve as a counterweight to the remaining North Vietnamese forces and that could act as a sort of guarantee for a limited period for the observance of the agreement.

But we do not anticipate it would be a major force, and we do not anticipate its stay in Vietnam to be indefinite.

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Q You talked about international supervision. In view of the hard time and inefficiency of the ICC since the Geneva Conference of 1954, do you have any new ideas for that?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say something about this. This is a report to the American people and I think all of you who have seen this will admit and realize that if the President went into details of the ICC, international force, he would have great difficulty making people understand what he is talking about.

These are the general principles and the headings under which we seek to move. In these NSC studies I have talked to you about, we have dealt with questions such as you raised, in greater detail. We realize that the ICC, as constituted in 1954, is not the ideal instrument, and we have some specific ideas on how to have an improved supervisory machinery and indeed, I think you can take it, or I hope you will be able to take it as you get to know this Administration better, that we do not move without having made a study of the issues.

So if the other side should be prepared to accept the international supervisory machinery concept, we will put forward specific ideas which in our judgment will avoid some of the difficulties of the Laosian and Geneva agreements, keeping, of course, in mind that a supervisory machinery can only tell you what is happening. It cannot automatically produce the sanctions.

Q When you say you discussed this with President Thieu, does that imply that the South Vietnamese government accepts these points and principles, for example, the fact that points and processes in South Vietnam would be under the supervision of an international body?

DR. KISSINGER: The speech has been cleared by President Thieu.

Q Would this international supervisory body have any military force of its own at any stage of this?

DR. KISSINGER: Off the record, but for your information, we have in our thinking the notions of an international force, but it is one of these specific ideas that we would prefer to put forward at a negotiating session, and again, we have reason to believe that the South Vietnamese government would be prepared to go along with that.

Q Can you talk about how you think the business of mutual withdrawal might be received by the other side and also the political business of accepting troop participation of all elements? What sort of reaction might we get on those points?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe that this is the most forthcoming American proposal that could possibly be made at this time, and we hope very much that the other side will recognize that an honorable settlement has to be one that takes into account the essential requirements of both sides.

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Q How close or how far does this leave us and what are the major points that are separating us?

DR. KISSINGER: I would prefer not to go into that. Their document is a very ambiguous one. I would like to have them spell out in a little more detail what they mean by some of their clauses before I could make a judgment as to how close it is.

On a direct reading, without interpretation, it leaves us pretty far apart because they seem to imply that a particular form of government has to be imposed which we explicitly reject. They seem to imply that there has to be a unilateral American withdrawal. They seem to imply that the only withdrawal that can be talked about is the American withdrawal.

So, I think there has been a great deal more movement in our position than there has been in theirs.

On the other hand, it has not been unknown in negotiations that they have reinterpreted their points in a way that was different than the first reading suggested and therefore, I don't want to make an analysis now of where we differ since they have not really put forward an explanation of what they have meant.

Q You said the thrust of this is that we have no military solution, only a political one?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I said we are not trying to impose a military solution. In other words, we are not trying to impose a military defeat. On the other hand, we also explicitly reject a unilateral withdrawal and will not have a military solution imposed on us.

Q Do they give signs of having given up the idea of a military solution being imposed on them?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that they must realize that they cannot force the withdrawal of American forces by military means and therefore, a political solution. I think we intend to believe that the realization that they cannot have a military victory has also developed on the other side.

Q Did the Viet Cong ten-point program affect the form and content of this statement?

DR. KISSINGER: The form only in the sense that we have made a reference to the ten-point program. That indeed was unavoidable. But the preponderant thrust of this was developed before the NLF ten-point program and would have been made this week, regardless of the ten-point program of the NLF. From the point of view of those who were working on the program, the NLF program presented a drafting nuisance.

Q Has the Soviet Union been informed of these points or briefed in any way?

DR. KISSINGER: By the time you go on the air, yes.

Q There has been so much talk about the fact that you don't get very far except in secret negotiations. Really, when you thrash this out in public you don't really get an agreement. Why is this being done rather than go to the VC and the North Vietnamese in Paris?

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DR. KISSINGER: I have found two contradictory criticisms. In March we were being accused of not having private talks and last week somebody accused us of insisting on private talks.

Why it is being done in this manner is because we believe, the President feels very strongly, that he owes the American people an explanation of how he saw the war and above all, of how he saw the prospects for peace.

Therefore, in any event he could not expect the American people to continue to accept, without an explanation, the continuation of the negotiations.

Secondly, as it happens the other side, then, in some of the semi-public sessions at the Majestic Hotel, has repeatedly said, well, if you are sincere, why don't you state publicly what your position is.

Well, we are now stating our position publicly. If words can have any meaning, a formal statement to the American people by the President of the United States is as good a test of sincerity as you can get.

Finally, as I have said before, the details of this will have to be negotiated. We are prepared to negotiate them publicly or privately. We suspect that many aspects can be more effectively negotiated privately, but we are not going to make a settlement condition on one particular form of negotiation and therefore, we are willing to go along with any reasonable process that promises a result.

Q Has General Abrams made a decision as to whether American troops can be replaced by South Vietnamese troops?

DR. KISSINGER: Not yet.

Q Is it to come before long, likely?

DR. KISSINGER: We have indicated that we would make periodic reviews of this issue and I really cannot go beyond what the President is saying tonight, which is that General Abrams has reported that he is making progress in the training and, as Mr. Ziegler pointed out at his press briefing on Monday, that he will report to us again after he has been back in Saigon for some time in light of some of the discussions that he had here.

I want to stress here what I said at the beginning. The issue of unilateral withdrawal of American forces is related to the military situation and to the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces, and, of course, it can happen also as the result of mutual withdrawal, but if it does not come as a result of mutual withdrawal, we do not consider it as part of the negotiation process and therefore, we are not dealing with that aspect in this speech tonight.

Q Might not the other side figure that if 20,000 troops were withdrawn or replaced by South Vietnamese troops that it is some sort of signal to them?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem of the aspect of unilateral troop withdrawal, if and when it occurs, will be a sign of the growing strength of the South Vietnamese and one of the

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signals that Hanoi would have to reflect about is that if that
process continues indefinitely the South Vietnamese forces
may become strong enough to impose their own solutions.

It is no accident that they have taken increasing
exception. It is a curious situation, where Vietnamese are
objecting to the Vietnamesization of the war and are attack-
ing what used to be called "de-Americanization" of the war.

But I don't really want to talk tonight about that
problem because that is not what this speech is about. This
speech is an attempt to put before the American people, the
world and the other side a responsible program for peace in
Vietnam which we have made in good conscience, as forthcoming
as we could possibly make it, which we hope that people of
good will can support and which we also believe that the other
side can accept without sacrificing its basic principles.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your original timetable, did you calculate how long this so-called moratorium on public criticism might last and that the timing of this speech related to that?

DR. KISSINGER: No. In none of the discussions that I have attended on Vietnam was there any discussion ever of relating our negotiating approach to the American domestic pressures. Indeed, when we first developed this, one thought that the moratorium would last longer than in fact it has lasted. One thought then that one would be given six to nine months and nevertheless, we had always planned to do this in May.

Now, we are not so pedantic to say it has to be May
14th at 10 p.m., but we had always planned it in this time-
frame and those of you who have met with me before know I
have always told you that we have a timetable for these moves.
It does not mean they are right; it just means they are
planned.

Q What is the reason for changing the plan to
let the South Vietnamese and Hanoi negotiate political
questions while we negotiate military ones?

DR. KISSINGER: The other side has stated repeatedly
that this is a very objectionable feature to it. We have
wanted to indicate that we would not let procedural questions
stand in the way of a settlement. If the South Vietnamese,
both of the South Vietnamese parties concerned, the NLF and
GVN, request our participation and that of Hanoi, request
us to participate, we would, but we would expect that the
principal part of the responsibility be carried by the South
Vietnamese and we would still request that the South Vietnamese
elements request our intervention. But we will not let the
question of who will be in the room interfer with the
settlement. If Hanoi isn't worried about the fact that we have
participated in the political settlement of South Vietnam, and
if the Saigon government is willing to go along with it as it
is, we have no reason not to do this.

Q Has President Thieu accepted these principles?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

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No more pages in file copy

This Copy For

AT THE WHITE HOUSE
(The East Room)

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS.

AT 7:55 P.M. EDT

MAY 14, 1969

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You have had an opportunity to read the speech. I will give you the ground rules for this backgrounder. You can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to White House sources.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I assume you have read the speech and, therefore, there is no reason for me to repeat it in my ponderous way.

Let me, therefore, just make a few comments.
First, why the speech is being made now; secondly, what the
relationship of the speech is to the withdrawal issue, and
thirdly, what we consider to be the new elements in the speech.

Many of you have heard me, at no doubt tedious length,
on the proposition that we were following a definite concept
for bringing peace to Vietnam. It was important that we restore
a relationship of confidence with the government of Saigon,
because I am sure all of you will recognize that the sort of
proposal we are making tonight would not have any meaning
without the agreement of the Saigon government, which we have.

Secondly, it had to be made at a time when it seemed
that some momentum might be possible. This does not mean
that we know that momentum is possible, but our judgment is
that this is a propitious moment to attempt to move things
and if we are ever going to find out whether progress is
possible, this seems to us to be the moment.

We had intended to make this ever since we completed
our review of our negotiating position in March, and the
only question remaining was the timing, which we had pretty
well decided several weeks ago.

This is not a response to the NLF ten-point proposal.

Now, a word about the question of withdrawals on
which, of course, we have had a great deal of advice. The
President has indicated three criteria for withdrawal. He
will say in his speech tonight that General Abrams has told
him that the time is approaching when Vietnamese can replace
Americans in some of the fighting that is now going on in
Vietnam.

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Let me say this: No one could have followed the discussion in the United States over recent weeks and been unaware of the suggestion of some withdrawal of American forces. Our problem is to take that step at a moment when it is a sign of confidence and when we can responsibly do so.

I can tell you that we will do it as soon as we responsibly can, and at a rate as rapid as we can relate to the criteria that we have mentioned. It is not a measure that is, strictly speaking, related to the negotiations and it will, therefore, be handled in terms of criteria that I have indicated at the moment when we can responsibly do so.

Now then, let me speak of what we consider to be the new elements in our proposal. First, a question that may be intangible. This speech is the most comprehensive statement of American peace aims that has been put forward by anybody. It is, in our judgment, the most flexible statement of the American position that has been advanced.

That is to say, we have enunciated a number of principles and a number of measures. Of these principles only two are immutable, one negative and one positive. The negative principle is that we seek no permanent military relationship with South Vietnam. The positive principle is that we will not compromise on the right of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

The methods to achieve, particularly the second objective, are flexible. We are inviting counter-proposals to ours, specifically. We are not committed to any particular formula, but we do know the difference between an honorable settlement and a disguised defeat.

Now then, as to the specifics. First, on the issue of mutual withdrawal. As you know, the previous position made American withdrawals dependent on prior North Vietnamese withdrawals and on some other vaguely stated conditions, such as the level of violence, and it kept American forces in Vietnam for a period of time after all North Vietnamese forces had left.

In this speech you will notice we are stating that we are willing to begin withdrawals immediately and simultaneously with the North Vietnamese. Secondly, that the withdrawals should take place over a brief period of time. We are proposing twelve months.

Thirdly, that the small U. S. and North Vietnamese forces that remain in North Vietnam, after those twelve months, should be confined to designated base areas and should not engage in combat operations.

I am sure, ladies and gentlemen, that you recognize that this means automatically an end of military hostilities between the North Vietnamese and the American forces.

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A second point which is new is that we no longer ask
the North Vietnamese to acknowledge that they have forces in
South Vietnam which may be an obtuse point, but those of you who
have followed negotiations know that it has been a hangup for
a number of months.

What we are saying to the North Vietnamese is that
we do not care whether they acknowledge that they have forces
there, as long as they make sure that the forces leave there
and we will settle for supervisory arrangements which assure us
that there are no longer any North Vietnamese forces in South
Vietnam.

With respect to the political settlement, we have
made the following new proposals: First, you remember that our
position up to now has been that we were only competent to
discuss military issues while political issues had to be
discussed among the South Vietnamese. We are now saying that
we are prepared to discuss political issues simultaneously
with military issues, provided that the South Vietnamese
concerned invite our participation, and we know that the
South Vietnamese government is prepared to have us participate
in these negotiations.

In other words, it is now up to the other side
what kind of negotiations they prefer to conduct.

Secondly, we have stated explicitly, and this whole
speech has been cleared with President Thieu, that we accept
the full participation in the political life of South Vietnam
of all elements that are prepared to abide by the political
process.

Thirdly, we have stated that we will accept
any government that results from the free choice of the
South Vietnamese people.

Finally, with respect to this political issue, we
have offered, and again, not as a unilateral step, to put
the whole political process under an international supervisory
machinery, and we have stated that, of course, the guarantees
that the supervisory machinery is going to enforce must be
acceptable to all political forces in South Vietnam.

The final thing that is new is that we do not
insist on any particular form of agreement. It can be a
formal negotiation. It can be a de facto peace, as long
as there is a clear understanding and adequate assurance.
We are prepared to talk about any program, including the
NLF's ten points, that are consistent with the general principles
that we have stated.

It is our conviction that this program is the most
forthcoming position that can be responsibly stated at this
moment. We have deliberately avoided any polemic or any
discussion of the past. We believe that a relatively rapid
end of the war is possible. We ask only that the right
of self-determination of the people of South Vietnam is
respected.

We recognize that there are difficult problems connected
with this and we are open to counter-proposals, and therefore, the
next weeks and months will determine how serious the other side
is prepared to be. When we talked to Ambassador Lodge this

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, on Page 6, just the paragraph before the end, the President talks about "if this needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay."

Could you elaborate on that? Is there implied in that a threat of greater military activity?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it stands to reason that if this proposal is not accepted that we will have to make other decisions. So, I think it is a statement of the obvious and I don't want to speculate beyond what the language suggests.

Q. Is it correct to call it a threat, as the previous questionner did?

DR. KISSINGER: No. I think the language of it is perfectly clear. It says if this proposal is not accepted, this proposal which we consider the most conciliatory proposal possible; that we will have to think of other approaches.

Q. How long do you think you will allow the other side to decide whether or not to accept?

DR. KISSINGER: This is not an ultimatum. It has no time limit. It is not uttered, this proposal is not put forward as a threat. This proposal is put forward as the best judgment that has deliberately sought to take into account the serious concerns of the other side that are consistent with our basic principles.

We are not doing it on any "take it or leave it" basis or with any attitude of ultimatum.

Q. What is it that makes you think that this is the most propitious time to take this particular step?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe that this is a propitious moment because we are in accord about the basic program with our allies, because we are not under any immediate offensive, because there has been some chance of tone, if not yet necessarily of substance, by the other side, and because in the general context in which one has to evaluate the negotiations, it seemed to us that this was a moment where, while positions may appear to be frozen, if they were ever going to move a step forward by the United States was indicated.

Q. Does the ten-point proposal by the NLF make this a propitious time?

DR. KISSINGER: The ten-point proposal by the NLF confirmed in part a judgment which we had reached quite independently and this speech would have been delivered quite independent of the ten-point proposal of the NLF, which, in itself, is not such a major departure.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, has the substance of this or the text of it been transmitted in any form to the other side in advance of the President's speech?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

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Q The President talks about mutual withdrawals and your preliminary remarks do. Do I understand correctly that there is a possibility for a beginning of unilateral withdrawals?

DR. KISSINGER: There is a possibility within the framework of the criteria that the President has announced and within the framework of what he is repeating in this speech.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you called these new elements in the speech. Can we assume that none of these elements have previously been conveyed to the other side, either in private contacts in Paris or through third parties? Can you flatly state that?

DR. KISSINGER: In the complicated negotiating process that goes on it would be very difficult to say that no single element of these points that I have mentioned has ever been proposed in some way to the other side. I would really have to check the record very carefully in order to give you a flat answer. I think that the total impact of what I am saying and the formality and solemnity in which it is being said constitutes a new element that has never been put forward in any way.

Q Is it not obvious that if the other side does not respond to or accept in some way these proposals that have been advanced that the other decisions you make would necessarily have to be military? Would there be any other kind?

DR. KISSINGER: We specialize in developing many options.

Q On Page 4 and 5 of your text reference is made very carefully and deliberately, five times in one phrase, "all non-South Vietnamese forces". Would you define for us what precisely is meant by this phrase, "all non-South Vietnamese forces"?

DR. KISSINGER: What is meant by this phrase is: American, allied and North Vietnamese forces.

Q Not the NLF?

DR. KISSINGER: It does not mean that part of the NLF that is indigenous to South Vietnam. It does not mean the NLF, no.

Q

Q Are the other decisions affecting only Vietnam, the other decisions he talks about in Page 7?

DR. KISSINGER: You are engaging, if I may say so, in what in many respects would seem self evident to me.

Q Which sentence?

DR. KISSINGER: The question referred to "other decisions". I really don't want to speculate on what might happen because we believe that this is a very constructive proposal. We believe it goes far towards meeting many of the stated objections to our previous position. We believe that

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-7-

it presents a basis for negotiation and we therefore are
not speculating on what will happen when it is turned down
because we expect to negotiate on the basis of it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there are two questions on elections. The resident proposes elections, but he doesn't seem to insist on them. Are they essential or not?

Secondly, he proposes elections under agreed procedures. Does that mean it must be under the present constitution or not?

DR. KISSINGER: Under agreed procedures, under procedures agreed to by the parties in South Vietnam. I don't know how a President can do more than propose these elections. I don't know what "insists" would mean.

Q He uses a phrase "It must be free choice" several times. That would allow for it to be negotiated between the NLF and Saigon?

DR. KISSINGER: If Saigon and the NLF come to an agreement, our predilection would be, as we have stated in one of the principles, to accept that agreement.

Q Did General Abrams indicate that the present prospect was that there will not be another big offensive in the near future by the North Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: There are indications that there may be another offensive by the North Vietnamese and it is one of the indications we are watching. We would regret it if one of the responses to our proposal were another big offensive.

Q Is it also a new element in this proposal that requires specifically the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: The reason why we have to require the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Laos and Cambodia is, as you know, the Cambodian border is 35 miles from Saigon and the Laotian border is 25 miles from Hue. It would not be a withdrawal if they were within safe striking distance of two of the three principal cities in the country.

In response to your question, no, this is one of the proposals that has been conveyed to the Vietnamese in Paris. This will not come as a shock to them.

Q This new proposal that you describe as not being made before is being made not to the Communists, but to the American people. How do you think they will receive it?

DR. KISSINGER: How do we think the American people will receive it? We believe that when the President puts before the American people as full and as frank an account of his consideration and as serious a set of proposals as he has, that he will get the support of the American people.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, how do you distinguish in deciding non-South Vietnamese as between those elements, the NLF, that have been fleshed out by North Vietnamese? How do you separate that?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make two comments in response to this, a general and a specific one. His speech is deliberately put forward in somewhat general terms, partly because we want to leave some flexibility for the negotiating process and partly because when you get into the sort of detail which you raise, you will require a speech of Soviet length, something like three hours.

Let me say that we have studied this and other problems. Our conclusion is that we will not be able to catch every last North Vietnamese in every last Viet Cong unit, but the judgment of the people who have looked at this problem most carefully is that we will be able to determine a sufficient percentage of them so that what is left will not make a difference in the resulting situation.

If the other side should accept this proposal in total or in part, we would have specific suggestions on how each of these measures could be carried out.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is it possible to say how soon we might expect the first of the unilateral withdrawals?

DR. KISSINGER: I really don't want to speculate on it, except to say that it will happen as quickly as it can be done, consistent with these objectives and with our desire to have a positive result and not just a public relations point.

Q You say at the top of Page 2, the third paragraph, "In eight months of talks in Paris, there had been no negotiations directly concerned with a final settlement." What were the Americans doing over there?

DR. KISSINGER: The negotiations in Paris, until the beginning of this Administration, concerned two topics. The first topic was an end of the bombing of North Vietnam. That was the only topic that was discussed until the bombing halt or that was the only topic formally negotiated until the end of the bombing halt.

Between November and January, the only topic that was discussed was the procedural issue of the participation in the conference and the shape of the table. There were some private discussions that touched on other issues, but the formal agenda did not reach the substantive issue concerned with the settlement of the war until the beginning of the Nixon Administration.

I am not saying this as a criticism. I am stating this as a fact.

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This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(Vietnam)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

5:10 P.M. EDT

MAY 26, 1969

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: You can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to White House sources. This is for immediate use. There is no embargo.

DR. KISSINGER: There is one other restriction. I don't know how that works. I will give you some figures. But I would appreciate it if you didn't use those figures. I am using them for illustration. They are correct, but the purpose of this meeting is not to have detailed figures.

Is that a possible restriction?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is correct.

Q What does that mean? Does that mean that all figures are off the record or just use approximations?

MR. ZIEGLER: Those figures that he refers to in making his points are off the record.

DR. KISSINGER: You will see that my point ---

Q May we round them off to the nearest 200th?
(Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: What I am saying, I wanted you to know what we had been doing. But I didn't want the particular figures used and for the point that I am trying to make, the figures are irrelevant.

Q Will we be able to make the point as effectively without using any figures?

DR. KISSINGER: I think so.

Let me tell you what I want you to say and then we can start haggling. (Laughter.)

As long as we understand, that as of now these figures are off the record.

I thought we would have a brief BACKGROUNDER on one topic today, on the issue of de-escalation and casualty figures in Vietnam and on the relationship between our operation and the casualty figures.

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The President and I were talking about this this weekend. He decided that it was very difficult to deal with the subject as long as there were only abstract propositions confronting each other and that, therefore, I should put before you some of our thinking and above all some of the studies we have been making ever since February on this issue.

One could hardly have read a newspaper over the recent months without having one's attention called to the fact that de-escalation is the recommended strategy of some people.

We have looked at this problem very carefully since last February. We have tried to get some understanding of the relationship between the intensity of our operation, the level of our casualties and the degree to which we can control the level of our casualties by the nature of our operation.

Let me say again what I have said at these backgrounders before: Figures on military operations and figures on the war in Vietnam have always had an elusive quality and, therefore, I don't want to claim more for them than they can carry. All I can say is we have tried very hard for our own internal purposes to gain an understanding of this very complicated issue and what I am saying to you today was not intended -- was done for our internal use and not intended for publication.

Now, we have innumerable tables of every conceivable breakdown of type of activity--who initiated it, size of the units involved, casualties, rates of casualties and so forth. I cannot possibly go through all of those.

But I would like to put before you some of the judgments to which we have come. First of all, simply as an empirical statement, the number of battalion-size American operations has not increased since last November. It has been substantially constant. The figures are 63 for November, 55 for December, 56 for January. Then they increase somewhat in February because of the enemy offensive, 74 in February, 59 in March, 72 in April, and in May they are running to about 55 to 60.

In other words, the American battalion-size operations have remained roughly constant since November. There has been no increase in American battalion-size operations.

The figures for lower or smaller units are more difficult to come by. Insofar as we can tell, there is no significant increase in those.

There is an increase in the number of ARVN operations. That reflects the improvements in the ARVN capabilities and the increase in combat-ready ARVN units. It is exactly what you would expect if this program of training ARVN units to take over from American units, over a period of time, is to be effective. You would expect that more ARVN units become combat-ready. As they become combat-ready they will go into action.

Their increases have occurred. They have also remained fairly constant since this Administration came

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into power. Since January they have remained roughly at the
900 level; that is battalion-type ARVN operations, battalion-
sized ARVN operations.

Q A month?

DR. KISSINGER: We are talking about a month.

The ARVN figures you would have to say candidly,
are battalions of somewhat smaller than ours. First,
there has been no significant increase -- in fact, if you allow
for a ten-percent up and down each month, with no increase
in American battalion-sized operations, but every increase
that has occurred has been in ARVN battalion-sized operations and
this is inevitable if the program we have been talking about
in recent months is to become effective.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say the 900 figure represents
an increase. What is the base?

DR. KISSINGER: About 700.

Q Through November?

DR. KISSINGER: November. I don't know what the pre-November was. But above all there has been no increase. In fact, if anything, there has been a slight decrease since January 20. There has been no increase in ARVN battalion-sized operations. I don't want to say a slight decrease. The ARVN type, for all practical purposes, have been constant since this Administration came into office, so the total effect is there has been flatly no escalation of military activities of ground action by this Administration and, you know, of course, that there has been a slight decrease in B-52 operations by this Administration.

Q Slight decrease?

DR. KISSINGER: A slight decrease that was announced
by Secretary Laird a few weeks ago.

We have, for obvious reasons, made a prayerful
assessment of American casualties as we have been able to
make. This is a study that has been going on since last
February. But we have not been able to draw any final
conclusions about it because one needs to project it over a period of
time in order to see whether there were and what the variables
were.

The conclusion to which we have come, which I have
mentioned to you before, is this: The base line of enemy-
initiated attacks, if there is an average of a normal week,
that is in the absence of major offensive operations, the
typical week seems to be around 35 to 45 enemy-initiated attacks.

These again are broken down by various categories.
We don't want to go into that.

Q Per month?

DR. KISSINGER: No, that is per week; 35 to 45 per week
is an average.

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Q Does that include indirect fire?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. That includes indirect fire.

This is where we get into - it is attack by fire and it is anything other than terrorism, harassment. We don't include attacks on civilian population. We count everything that involves an attack on military units.

But it is difficult to measure and most of them are of below battalion size. But it is very hard to tell whether it is a squad or a platoon. It involves indirect fire and it involves attacks on military units. It does not include terrorism, harassment, and similar actions which we are breaking down separately.

Here, the facts seem to be as follows: In typical weeks, that is in weeks in which there are anywhere from say 35 to 40 enemy attacks, the American casualties are about anywhere from 150 to 200. This is the area where it is difficult for us to say how many of these 150 to 200 are caused by the 35 to 40 enemy attacks and how many of them are caused by the actions that we are conducting during that week.

Q Are you speaking of deaths?

DR. KISSINGER: Deaths. So in that week, in those typical weeks, we are making no claim as to how the casualties breakdown. That has been an elusive subject to determine, although I have some general observations to make about that.

How many of them are caused by the enemy-initiated attacks and how many are caused by our own actions, our guess is, as I will explain in a minute, that the majority of our casualties are caused by enemy-initiated attacks for reasons which I will explain.

When you get above the 150 level, there is an almost direct relationship between the level of enemy activity and there is a direct relationship all the way through between the level of enemy activity and American casualties.

Remember, our activities are relatively constant. For example, in the week where there are 29 enemy-initiated actions, there are 127 American casualties. When there are 43 enemy-initiated actions, there are 160 casualties.

I am giving you successive weeks now. When there are 62 enemy-initiated actions, there are 228 American casualties. When there are 54 enemy-initiated actions, there were 197 casualties, and then you went up to 211 enemy-initiated actions and American casualties rose to 453.

In other words, as you go through this chart, you will find that there is a direct relationship between enemy-initiated actions and the level of our casualties.

The factor that makes for fluctuation here is what the enemy does, not what we did. Because what we do, as I repeat, is roughly the same month after month in terms of the intensity of our operations.

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This was dramatically shown in the first week of the Tet offensive where our casualties went from 164 in one week to 453, 336, 351, all of them directly related to a commensurate level of enemy activity. It was, again, dramatically shown right after the NLF program was announced.

Q Are you talking about Tet last year or this year?

DR. KISSINGER: Tet this year. These figures are all of this year. I don't have the figures of last year. We started this in February and ran it back to November when this criticism started. It is a tough analytical problem to determine, first of all, what is an enemy-initiated activity and we really have every interest not to kid ourselves.

This is shown dramatically in the week prior to the NLF peace program. The week prior to the announcement of the NLF peace program there were 34 enemy-initiated actions and 184 American casualties. This is about the normal ratio. This is what you get over a period of a year. You get something like this ratio.

The following week, there were 180 enemy-initiated actions and 450 American deaths. I repeat, we did nothing different. In these 450, there are about half of the casualties of Hamburger Hill. The battle of Hamburger Hill extended over two reporting periods. All we know is the total figure of the casualties caused by Hamburger Hill, which is 46. I cannot tell you how many of the 46 were in the reporting period that reported 450 and how many will be in the next reporting period, which is roughly 330.

The best guess we can get is that it is roughly half and half. So let us assume it is 23 to 25 out of these 450 were caused by Hamburger Hill. It still leaves 420-odd that were caused by what are clearly enemy-initiated actions.

The direct correlation is the increase in enemy-initiated actions from 34 to 180.

In this past week, the number of deaths is likely to be around 330. We don't have the official figures yet and we do not have the official figures for enemy-initiated actions. But I am certain if they were not a direct relationship it would be the first time since this chart was put together -- it would be the first time since last November that there was not a direct relationship between enemy-initiated action and American casualties.

Q On this point of enemy-initiated actions, if American troops move out toward or into territories which they know have been Viet Cong and they come under fire there, is that an enemy-initiated action?

DR. KISSINGER: For those of you who have heard me talk about this in a general way before, note that I have given this as the uncertainty in our calculations. But to the best of our analysis, with this one qualification, to the best of our analysis, we attempted to determine by enemy-initiated action those actions which are genuinely initiated by the enemy and have not or do not occur because we happen to land some troopers on top of an enemy concentration or the situation which you described.

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But there is a slight gray area there which I cannot completely discount.

But let me make another point. Let me explain why, according to our analysis, what the figures tend to show is also supported by one's conception of the war. If we could make the other side fight at our initiative, then there is no way we could fail to win the war. If we could make the other side fight at our initiative - let me repeat this -- then there is no way we could fail to grind them down.

If this were a traditional war in which by advancing we forced the enemy to concentrate and if we could fight battles with them as with the Germans in World War II, then our superior fire-power could not fail to be effective.

The reason the war has not been decisively won until this moment is precisely because we have not been able to make the opponent fight at our initiative. Given the fact that we have artillery, air power, tanks, no Vietnamese army, no matter how courageous, could stand up to us if we could force them to fight. The reason the war has not been conclusively won is because we have not solved the problem of making them fight at our initiative.

Therefore, one's perceptions of the war would tend to confirm these statistics, that the dilemma of American strategy has been precisely the problem of whether we could impose losses on the other side that the other side was not willing to take.

Then, let us reverse: Why are we conducting the operations? Let me say one other thing in this connection. There is another reason why this theoretical analysis is likely to be correct. It is probably not in Hanoi's interest to make it cost less for American forces to stay in Vietnam. Therefore, you will find even in so-called tranquil periods a fairly constant average level of enemy activity in order to make sure that there is at least a minimum level of casualty that would make the war intolerable for us.

Why do we conduct so-called offensive operations at all? Our offensive operations are made necessary by the peculiarity of the Vietnamese, of the opposing strategy and supply system, which causes them to position their supplies ahead of their forces rather than behind their forces as in traditional armies. The typical pattern in Vietnam has been that there is an enemy offensive every three months, give or take a month.

In the intervening period, they may withdraw into Cambodia and Laos, but the prelude to an offensive is usually the positioning of supplies ahead of the units.

When we came into office, incidentally, on January 20th, which is the period that I am most concerned with, when we came into office the forward positioning of supplies was in full progress. Our offensive operations are an attempt to destroy these supply depots and to reduce our casualties by making it more difficult for the other side to launch an offensive operation and to thwart, so far as it is possible for us to do, coordinated offensive operations by the other side.

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I don't want to get into the arguments about the
particular hill, but the operation in Ashau Valley was
essentially an attempt to prevent offensive operations against
DaNang and Hue by destroying the supply bases that are being
built up in this valley.

Again, we have reason to believe that offensives are
being prepared and, again, I must stress, there has been this
dramatic increase in the number of enemy-initiated attacks
after the NLF program was announced and which have continued
despite the announcement of our peace program.

One answer to your question, incidentally, is that
since the level of our operations remains fairly constant --
the enemy-initiated action -- the figures we must have with
relation to enemy-initiated action must be fairly genuine because
at low levels our casualties drop down and when the level of
enemy initiated action increases the casualties go up dramatically.

But I recognize there are gray areas there which we have
in our own self-interest attempted, insofar as possible, to isolate
and on which we are continuing to do work.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on this point, you said that
our own levels have remained more or less constant?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, within ten percent.

Q How are we determining what a level is? What
does it mean? Does each encounter count as one?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the battalion-size operations.

Q Did Hamburger Hill, which was a battalion-sized
operation, still a very formidable one, count as just one and
does a battalion-sized operation, against a smaller adversary,
also count as one?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, a battalion-size operation. These
are tabulated by week. They are also tabulated by day. So,
actually, if one battalion fights seven days, you would count
seven battalion days of operations, I think. I will have to check
that. You can get that confirmed at the Pentagon just how they
count battalion-sized operations.

But, at any rate, this is for the period, and they would
not carry it over. If the battle goes on for two weeks, I
am certain they would count two battalions of operations.

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Q How do you categorize Hamburger Hill specifically? Is that a case in which we were successful in getting the enemy to engage us on our terms or is it an enemy-initiated action?

DR. KISSINGER: That would be one of the gray areas. I can tell you, I have that question very much in mind because that is going to give me an answer, too, to that problem.

I would say that that was one of the relatively rare cases where we have been able to make an opposing force fight when it might not have chosen to fight. Therefore, from that point of view, it was certainly a success. But my point in this briefing is not to second-guess the strategy of conducting the war. I think the details of some of this you ought to get from the Pentagon.

My major concern is to put before you our thinking on the issue of deescalation. This question of Hamburger Hill raises the following question: When you say we should deescalate, it then raises a very serious question of what exactly is it you are not supposed to do. Suppose we don't want to engage in such attacks as Hamburger Hill? Supposing we gave orders not to attack Hamburger Hill when they appear? How do we communicate this to the other side? Do we say henceforth when we enter the Ashau Valley our troops have orders not to attack hills on which there is an enemy battalion located?

In other words, when you confront a question of a logical tactical situation, how do you convey the decision to deescalate even assuming that this is a sensible approach. And, indeed, in looking at the problem of deescalation, we have come to the conclusion that really the simple way to deescalate is for the other side to accept our proposals on withdrawal.

If the other side accepted our proposal for withdrawal, well, most of the units would be withdrawn within a year and all of the few remaining units would then be confined to fixed areas. Deescalation would be taken care of automatically.

Since we have also to begin this withdrawal immediately, deescalation would begin immediately.

We then would not have to confront the problem of how do you measure deescalation when even the few questions we have here indicated the illusive nature of the problem.

We have offered a mechanism which is immediate, automatic and can be guaranteed. And the other aspects seem, according to our analysis, to be extremely complicated or almost impossible.

Again, I must stress that the big changes in military operations have occurred from the other side. They occurred first in February. They occurred again two weeks ago when the level of enemy action increased from 34 to 180, and American casualties increased from 184 to 450-odd, whatever the number was, and when our casualties have remained at a very high level, again, because in the last two weeks despite two peace proposals -- the level of enemy action has remained at the highest level since the beginning of the February offensive.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, do you have a thesis as to why the enemy activity is so high following the presentation of a peace proposal by them and a peace proposal by us?

DR. KISSINGER: I would not want to speculate why they are doing this. I can only note the fact that their activity has increased dramatically. Our casualties have correspondingly risen. Now, it is nearly two weeks since the President's speech and there has been no sign of slowing down.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in a previous briefing we were told that there had been a change in our strategy since this Administration took office, that we no longer were seeking engagements along the frontiers of South Vietnam and that we were now fighting actions closer to the population centers.

How does the Hamburger Hill battle fit into this?

DR. KISSINGER: I think in fairness I have to say the major change is due to General Abrams in the change of strategy. But if you compare the strategy now with what it was some time ago, I think there was a time when most of the battles were fought near the frontier.

Since then, if you look at the deployment of American forces, I would say a preponderance of them is in the Third Corps area, and in the more heavily populated areas.

This has not diminished, as it turns out, American casualties or the level of attacks.

The battle on Hamburger Hill, of course, has to be seen in relation to the Ashau Valley. The Ashau Valley is the supply area for attacks on DaNang and Hue. What started the operation of the Ashau Valley was not an attack on Hamburger Hill, but an attempt to push away what we judged to be an impending enemy offensive as far away from DaNang and Hue as we could.

In the process of trying to destroy the supply depots in the Ashau Valley, the battle of Hamburger Hill developed. It has to be seen in context of this and not in the context of a general strategy of holding a line of hills along the Laotian border.

Q Dr. Kissinger, may I ask a rather double-barred question? In the context of our operations going back even beyond January 20, if you will, in fact from the first, right after the bombing halt, isn't it possible that overall some of what the enemy might consider escalation on our part doesn't show up in the statistics of either a battalion or small unit sized actions?

I am thinking particularly of the accelerated pacification campaign, the increased bombing in Laos, and what some sources have called the bombing of VC concentrations of Cambodia.

Isn't it possible there that there has been some kind of an increase in which a response is forthcoming?

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DR. KISSINGER: I pointed out that these figures are not 100 percent conclusive. Therefore, it is possible that there are gray areas in these figures.

All I can say is the period that I can judge is from personal experience, which is the period since January 20. In that period, I think I can say flatly that we did nothing differently, that we did no escalation -- I don't want to say we did nothing differently -- that when we came in, we found an enemy attack in the process of preparation and, therefore, everything else aside it was possible not to permit spoiling operations against it.

In relation to these things, our judgement is that in general -- we may be off by 30 percent -- the judgments that are made here are essentially correct, that the casualties due to ground action are largely produced by enemy-initiated attacks.

We have never had a formal proposal from the other side on deescalation. I repeat, our proposal could not fail but to produce deescalation. If there were mutual withdrawal extending over a period of 12 months, deescalation would be inevitable.

Q Would it be correct to interpret your statement here as perhaps a new bid to Hanoi to accept the President's offer and to get deescalation in this way?

DR. KISSINGER: The President did not offer deescalation. The President offered an explanation in line with the policy of maximum candor of his Administration. The topic to which I have alluded before, we finally concluded was too elusive when presented in these general categories. We are attempting to put before you the reasons why we believe that the sort of deescalation that is talked about is either impossible to describe in any operational way, irrelevant, or both. Insofar as we can judge -- with the proviso that there may be a slippage there of 25 percent -- there exists the sort of relationship that I have described based on the figures which I have given you.

Q Doctor, could you clarify these two points: Over what period did the ARVN attacks increase from 700 to 900? You say they will remain constant in your period and the second one?

DR. KISSINGER: The trouble is I don't have any figures going back from November.

Q This was before November that the increase came, 700 to 900?

DR. KISSINGER: That occurred during, so far as I can recall, November and December. I wish you wouldn't use those precise figures. You can say there occurred some increase.

Q Some increase in November to December?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. There occurred no increase in our period. In fact, there probably occurred a slight

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decrease since we have come into office. But I don't want to
take credit for that since we didn't order it. What ARVN
has done in our period has been primarily a technical ---

Q The second one, have the B-52 sorties
actually gone down?

DR. KISSINGER: No, they will probably go down effective
July 1.

Q In other words, there will be less than an 1800 level

DR. KISSINGER: You know, that is my understanding.
I don't want to have this turn into a Pentagon briefing.

Q You said they had decreased.

DR. KISSINGER: We have indicated that we might decrease
them by something like 10 percent starting July 1.

Q I am not clear on your answer to a previous
question. Are you saying that the pacification effort
which had been on the upswing has now been decreased and that
the bombing of Cambodia and Laos have now been decreased?

I am talking about since January 20.

DR. KISSINGER: No, I am saying that the pacification
effort could not be shown in these operations. To the best
of my knowledge, it has not been increased. But I would
have to check that very carefully because I don't want to mislead
you. I don't think it has been increased in any significant
way to account for the increase in enemy activity.

Q At the same time, you are not making an apples
and apples correlation between U.S.-initiated military
activities because you have been talking only about ground
activity and Communist-initiated attacks.

What I am trying to get at, you leave open the
possibility that some of those Communist attacks ---

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't leave it open. I
think when I make a flat denial then I don't want to have
someone tell me that in Quang-Tri Province we increased it
by 20 percent.

Q But the point that the critics, if I could
pursue this point, because I do think it is critical --
the critics that you mentioned before at the outset
of your presentation try to make is that if we escalated
at all according to them, it is since November 1 and the
Administration since January 20 has not done anything to
deescale that punitive escalation.

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DR. KISSINGER: Our figures don't show this.
B-52 operations have remained constant and are going to go
down slightly.

Q From what date?

DR. KISSINGER: From over the period of a year.
I think they reached their present level about last March.
They certainly have remained constant since -- I think they
have remained constant for a year. Now they are going to go
down slightly.

The ground operations, I have given you the figures
for that. The Laotian operations may have increased slightly.
Frankly, I have not looked at those figures. I would rather
not speak about that.

Q Sir, is this inability on our part to get the enemy in to receive the brunt of the war where we want it to be, is that tied to policy, and if it is not tied to policy, does this not mean that we should change our strategy and maybe change our generals?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I think we have very good generals
there.

Q Aren't people very much concerned about this
and don't you think something has got to be different?
You seem to be more interested in getting over the point to the
public that there is no deescalation but aren't you more
concerned about the idea of getting something done differently?

DR. KISSINGER: It is not the fault of the generals.
It is the fault of the terrain and the nature of guerrilla
warfare. In a normal war, control of terrain is equivalent
to control of the population. Therefore, if you look at
traditional military history, the side that wanted to win the
war would advance at some point along the way, unless one
thought an enemy was an enormous territory like the Soviet Union
or like Russia. The opponent would have to defend. When he
defended, he would then be forced into expending resources
and, therefore, it was technically possible to grind down
the opponent.

In this war, control of territory is not equivalent
to control of population, because in a guerrilla war, the
loyalty of the population is what is at issue. Therefore,
the pattern has been that advances have not necessarily brought
about a commensurate degree of control and on the other side,
the enemy has felt no compulsion to defend any particular
territory unless it was a supply base like Hamburger Hill or
unless he wanted to inflict casualties on us and therefore chose
to stand at one particular point.

But as a general rule, it has not been possible to
find any one area which the opponent had to defend, say, at
all cost.

In these circumstances, the strategy of attrition is
very difficult to implement and this is what was meant.

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Q: Isn't there anything else you can do?

DR. KISSINGER: We are willing to listen to advice on this.

Q: Some of these figures I think are going to be quite meaningful. Would you reconsider your ban on use at all?

DR. KISSINGER: Why don't you give it as percentages, relationships?

Q: Could I get a clarification? In relation to the question about the post-November figures, there are reports from Vietnam saying that the enemy offensive in February was directly related to an increase in ground action beginning in November.

Doesn't that make the pre-November figures very relevant, battalion-sized operations?

DR. KISSINGER: To an increase in battalion operations before November?

Q: No, after the bombing pause, the stories from Vietnam said after the bombing pause ground action on the American side increased and that the enemy offensive in February was in response to that increase in ground action.

Q: Can you give us the September-October figures?

DR. KISSINGER: I see your point.

This includes the period -- when was the bombing pause?

Q: From November 1 to October 31.

DR. KISSINGER: I will see if I can get that for you, whether there was a sharp increase in the American battalion-sized activities in November.

But, of course, it was preceded by an enemy offensive in October.

Q: No, it was an enemy offensive that occurred during the time of the Democratic Convention and then before the election.

DR. KISSINGER: I will have to get those figures. I tried to establish a trend. The basic point that these figures still prove, I am not going into the motivations of why the other side starts an offensive. I didn't make a judgment on that.

All I am saying is that our studies indicate a direct correlation, whatever their motivation between enemy-initiated actions and our casualties -- the question of that motivation I will try to have some figures for you.

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Q Are the ARVN operations figures as reliable as the Americans?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q Why can't the figures you have given us today be used, because they make the point?

DR. KISSINGER: No, you can use them. Round them off to the nearest tenth. You can use them.

MR. ZIEGLER: So there is no misunderstanding, Henry Kissinger said you could use the figures.

DR. KISSINGER: Just to make sure we know what figures we are all using.

Q These are in relation to the enemy operations to our casualties?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, those figures you can use; not the number of our operations.

MR. ZIEGLER: So there is absolutely no misunderstanding on this, Dr. Kissinger, would you repeat that?

DR. KISSINGER: You can use the figures that explain the relationship of the number of enemy-initiated actions and our casualties. As far as our actions are concerned, I think the point is made, is officially made, if you say that they remain constant over this period. The numbers are really irrelevant and as far as the ARVN are concerned, you should not use the number. You can say they were constant since the Administration came into office.

Q So these other numbers are off the record?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, the other numbers are off the record, but the enemy-initiated action and our casualties you can use.

MR. ZIEGLER: Is there anyone in the room who is not clear about that?

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

AT 6:02 P.M. EDT

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER AND DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 12:35 P.M. EDT

MAY 27, 1969

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: Most of you who are present were at the backgrounder that Dr. Kissinger held last night. There were several questions that were addressed to Dr. Kissinger, and Dr. Kissinger indicated that he would obtain those figures for you.

The information that he gives to you today is on the same BACKGROUND basis as was the discussion last night in the Roosevelt Room.

Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: I just wanted to complete the discussion of yesterday.

Somebody -- I think it was you -- asked the question that the figures I gave yesterday started in November, and asked whether there was a substantial increase between October and November and whether that might account for the Communist attacks in February.

Now, I repeat, I am not qualified to judge Hanoi's motivation and I don't want to speculate on Hanoi's motivation, but I did get the figures that were requested, which I did not have yesterday, and which I think it might be worthwhile to give.

I am still talking about battalion-sized operations, and starting in April, 1968, there were 90 -- we are talking about U. S. There were 87 in May, 73 in June, 71 in July, 62 in August, 63 in September, 70 in October, 63 in November, 55 in December, 56 in January, 74 in February -- we are now in 1969 -- which are explained by the February offensive, and then it went back again to the levels which I have indicated yesterday.

In other words, on the level of battalion-sized operations, there has been no increase as far as we can determine between April of last year and through April of this year, with the fluctuations that I have indicated.

The change in battalion-sized operations did occur in ARVN batallion-sized operations and they increased by about 15 percent between November and December last year, and they have remained constant since.

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I must say that our figures on that, having stayed fairly constant in the period prior to that, are less reliable than our figures are for U.S. battalion-sized operations.

Now, I mention these figures with the same qualifications as the figures yesterday, but since the question was raised, I thought I should finish it, and this is really all I wanted to say today. In fact, I have to go back to a meeting.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I have one question. Are you prepared to tell us about the amount of bomb tonnage before November as opposed to after November?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have those figures here, but to my almost certain knowledge, there is no difference in the bomb tonnage.

Q Except that the targets were transferred south, just as many bombs were dropped on a smaller area?

DR. KISSINGER: I have a policy not to make assertions where I don't know the absolute facts. Let me get those facts for Ron. I don't want to keep coming back every day, but we can get those facts.

There would certainly be no increase in bomb tonnage. I would expect if you add everything together there has been some decrease over the period when North Vietnam was bombed, but obviously it is in different areas now, and this would be recognized.

Q The main question that some of us have in our minds as a result of last night's meeting, and other things -- I don't know whether it is for you or Mr. Ziegler or both of you -- why is the Administration going through this exercise with this kind of emphasis on a point which seems, as you, I think, indicated last night, difficult of proof, the figures are elusive, and it is susceptible to a lot of argument back and forth.

DR. KISSINGER: It is susceptible to some argument back and forth, but the reasons the President thought that we should put these figures before the public were: First, there have been a lot of discussions about the relationship between American military actions, American casualties and the possibility of affecting the negotiations through unilateral American action. Now, ever since February, we have tried to determine the validity of these comments and in agreeing with the fact that figures are elusive, nevertheless, it seemed to us that the public should understand that according to our best judgment the American casualties reflect primarily the opposing initiatives and not primarily our initiatives; that is, the fluctuations in American casualties are, insofar as we can determine, primarily due to enemy action.

Secondly, by putting before you some of the issues involved in escalation, we also intended to draw attention to the following fact: The easiest, most clear-cut, least ambiguous and surest way of de-escalation is to agree with the withdrawal of forces for which we have indicated a specific timetable, and that the other measures really, for the reasons I gave yesterday and which I don't want to repeat now, get into areas of great complication, and finally, while we do engage in offensive

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actions, the primary significance of those is usually to
spoil enemy offensives.

But I must say unfortunately, they are not the major
cause of our casualties. I say unfortunately for the reasons
I indicated yesterday, that there is no direct relationship
between our actions and forcing the enemy to fight. But I
don't want to get into that whole discussion again.

I thought I owed it to you to give you the facts which
I did not have a chance to give you yesterday, and I did not
mean to have another backgrounder. It simply seemed that we
cut off our figures in November and somebody here asked the
very good question of whether there had been a substantial
increase.

There has not been a substantial increase. In fact,
in battalion-sized operations they have been fairly constant
for a year. The highest level of U. S. battalion-sized operations
was during the Tet offensive.

Q May I ask a question I wanted to ask very much
last night and there was not time? What is the implication
of what you said last night and this morning in the event there
is no progress on the President's plan for mutual withdrawal,
since the whole thrust seems to be that de-escalation is
impossible on any other ground?

A moment ago you spoke of affecting negotiations
through unilateral American action. Is the fact going to be
that there will be progress in Paris or that it will remove
the possibility of unilateral troop withdrawals? Can you go
down the line a little bit?

DR. KISSINGER: No. The comment I made referred to
the sort of de-escalatory steps that have been mentioned.
First of all we have in no sense given up on progress in Paris.
In fact, we think the sort of discussion that has been going
on in no sense precludes progress in Paris.

Secondly, the President has stated criteria by which
to determine the possible unilateral American troop withdrawal.
He re-emphasized those criteria in his speech and we have looked
at that problem as one which would be primarily related to the
ability of the South Vietnamese to take over some of our functions
and the fact that South Vietnamese operations have increased indicates
that that capability is increasing.

Q In other words, you are not making any connection
between what you are saying about de-escalation and troop with-
d withdrawal?

DR. KISSINGER: Absolutely not.

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger has to get back to the
meeting with Prime Minister de Jong. He indicated he could give
you a brief rundown on that subject.

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DR. KISSINGER: It is a preliminary meeting at this point. The Prime Minister and the Dutch Foreign Minister are going to meet with the President again tomorrow, and they have a meeting at the State Department this afternoon.

We discussed first bilateral issues that affect the United States and the Netherlands, the problems of civil air routes and the possibility of some of the interest which the Dutch have expressed on various occasions in exploring nuclear propulsion for their submarines. We are in the process of discussing this and of taking a new look at some of the issues raised by this.

The second range of discussions has concerned multi-lateral issues, the problems of European unity, the impact on the situation in Europe produced by the change in French leadership, and there was a fair amount of discussion on the prospect of SALT talks, that is, strategic arms limitation talks, with the Soviet Union, in which the President reiterated the care with which we are preparing our position and the progress of full consultation with our European allies, both before and during negotiations.

Now these talks at this point are -- this is the first contact. They will continue at lunch and this afternoon in the State Department. There will be another talk tomorrow at noon, and I would expect that the President and the Prime Minister might meet the press for the usual statements.

MR. ZIEGLER: Thank you.

Q Is this portion on the record?

DR. KISSINGER: Say, "The White House said." But you can use those figures the way you did yesterday.

Q We are talking about the Dutch talks.

DR. KISSINGER: Just say, "A White House source said."

MR. ZIEGLER: The figures are on the same ground rule as last night.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:48 P.M. EDT.)