Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

Mr. Kissinger/U.A. Johnson
November 13, 1970 12:05 p.m.
jlj

(paraphrased)

J: I have a couple of things Henry. The Ky visit. It has been set of that he will tour military installations. The Embassy worked it out with Defense but Laird now said they would not pick up the tab for it.

K: I have already overruled that.

J: Have you seen the text on Cuba.

K: Yes, I like that. I think that is good. I talked to the Secretary on the plane yesterday, I don't know if you have talked to him or not, and I just gave him the gist of it. I did not have that exact text but we did talk about it.

J: I worked it out after we discussed it. Frankly, I had a little trouble with working out the wording. In connection with that. Fascell is pressing for hearings and wants an answer by Monday.

K: What do you think?

J: I think we have to go up. Question of who does it. I think the finger points at me but that is something we can work out.

K: You won't get any argument from me.

J: Ben Wells was around to see me yesterday. Times is doing a Cienfuegos article. Gist of it was we have been taken in badly and we built up the story and took credit for getting them out and now they are back in - whole thing back. He had the fact that I sent a memorandum to you on the subject.

K: When in hell did you send a memorandum to me.

J: Quite awhile ago. Only I and Ray Gartoff (phonetic) knew about it over here at State and you over there. Only the three of us knew that it existed.

K: Oh yes. You drew it up on a contingency basis and then we did not use it.

J: It actually never came about. He said they had from defense that a Y-class submarine had put in to Cienfuegos.

K: That's not true. A Yankee class submarine?

J: That's what he said. I told him before you go to press on it you better check with DOD and make sure that that tender is still there. I made it sound like there was a question whether it would still be there or not.

By KLC U NARA, Dale S/12/04

-2-

K: I just do not believe that they -- have you seen the latest Dobrynin memcon. I told Al Haig to send it over. I just cannot believe that they will be wanting a showdown at this point.

J: Unless they wanted to prove the ability to make "courtesy calls". I just checked. They are still in there this morning. I will be talking to him again. Everyone knows it is there. There will be a blow up about this in the press if it is going to stay. Perhaps it would be wise to call Dobrynin.

K: Call up Dobrynin?

J: Yes. Only thought I have.

K: Call him up or ask him in? I will ask him in late today or early tomorrow. I will report to you as soon as I have talked to him.

J: We still have the Portugese Foreign Minister in New York.

K: I will get him an appointment. The Secretary promised me he would do it and I should lay off. Because I broached it and got turned down.

J: Maybe he did. He is out with a bad cold today.

K: I do not think he was alone with the President on the plane. He had planned to talk to him in Key Biscayne.

J: You do not know anything about it. I'll talk to him. About the UN and Paul Hoffman and his replacement. I didn't know anything about it until today but I understand Fred Bergsten knew something about it. U. Thant is going to reappoint Hoffman in about a week. Sam DePalma and Fred were discussing it.

K: He can't do that. We have to get some names in. Martin was mentioned but I don't think it will go.

J: Dave Bell was suggested. I don't know the politics of it.

K: They are not good but we offered him the job Eliot Richardson got so I assume they are not impossible. Dave is a good man and I like him. I think that is a good idea.

J: We can talk about this later. You will check it out.

K: I will check with the President. I will check it this afternoon. That damned intelligence report on the standstill is still hanging fire. I am only interested to stop them from cooking estimate. Would they add missiles in the area -- 45 SAM 800K battalions and then deploy them when they should hide them. I just want to get an agreed statement before they start leaking it out of Defense.

Telcon
The President
November 12, 1970; a.m.

K: I just wanted to let you know where everything stood. We're releasing a statement and we've sent over the hot line a letter to Pompidou. There's a memorial service at 11 o'clock on Thursday and Watson has strongly recommended that you go.

P: Where is it going to be?

K: At Notre Dame in Paris.

P: Yeah, OK. We'll go.

K: And I think we ought to announce that fairly quickly because otherwise 50 African nations are going to get ahead of us and it will be announced.

P: Yeah. Now I don't want a delegation.

K: All right.

P: As we know it takes an enormous number of people and I don't want a bunch of jerks going with me.

K: Right.

P: Or did you have other views?

K: No.

P: In other words, I don't want any god damn Senators and Congressmen that I'll have to talk to on the way. I'll use the time to work, see.

K: Yeah, Right.

P: And my view is I would just go and we just won't say much about it.

K: All right. Should we take the Secretary of State?

P: Oh, yes, if he wants to go. I think he should go, and I think you should go, but perhaps, and I. But I don't think ... Haldeman should go.

K: Right.

P: On the other hand. On the Mexican, just ask him if he can do the luncheon on Friday in Washington. And we'll fly our plane to fly him up.

By: NARA Date 6/10/70

DECLASSIFIED

MD F0 12/58

Authority

Telcon - The President

- 2 -

K: All right. Do you think Friday, or should we try for Saturday? I'm just concerned that you might be pretty tired.

P: I don't give a damn about being tired. It's just a luncheon, you know, so since it's a luncheon I wouldn't mind doing it Friday. If he wants to do it Saturday, that's fine.

K: Good. You might want to call on Pompidou briefly and they might have a reception as you did for heads of state. So you might not be able to leave until the late afternoon.

P: Yes, but of course as you know, with the time break you get back here around.

K: You would be back...

P: If you left at 5:00 you'd be back by 8:00. Because you get a 6 hour time break. So you don't have really much of a problem that way. I guess you could do it Friday without a problem.

K: Alright. We'll offer him Friday. And we'll offer to fly him up in the plane.

P: Yes, and have it in Washington. Now, what is the situation with regard to women? I don't think...

K: No, I don't think any ladies should go.

P: Yeah, not with the French. They wouldn't...

K: That's not customary.

P: Yes, and I noticed when De Gaulle came. Wait a minute. Did he bring his wife?

K: No. For neither funeral. And no other head of state brought his wife.

P: Yes, fine. Alright, well now let's you call, uh. Be sure you call Bill.

K: I have a call to him right now.

P: Yes, and say I want to go. And say we should be very limited. I do not want Congressional people because I don't want them on my hands.

K: Absolutely.

P: Anyway, there's not gonna be room. You know what I mean. About 100 African nations, all those jackasses will be there, and so I think we ought to go, and if I go, that's enough.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: MW EO 12958
By: NARA Date 6/10/04

Telcon - The President

-3-

K: If you go, and the Secretary of State goes, that is as much...

P: And if you go, because of good reasons, and I, uh...

K: Yes, but I'd go as your staff man, anyway, so...

P: Yes, that's right. I can go - I don't want to fly over there alone. And that's, uh, ... as well as Rogers himself. That's a long flight, so I might take...

K: There's no problem about you taking staff members, Mr. President, if they're not part of your official...

P: I was going to say, I could take Ehrlichman and Shultz along, but let's don't raise that question yet. You just call Bill and tell him what the score is, but I don't want anything about sensitivity with the god damn Mexicans to stop this. They'll understand this.

K: Oh, of course, Mr. President. There's no problem.

P: They particularly would.

K: No, they fully understand that, and we'll handle that.

P: Oh, and don't suggest he go with me.

K: Echeverria?

P: Yeah.

K: Oh, no.

P: No. I've got to go by myself. And I'll fly up to Washington today or tomorrow.

K: Tomorrow is actually time enough.

P: And we'll get going. OK?

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Fine, fine. And you can call me back on Bill. I actually think Bill ought to go, don't you?

K: I think it would be nice.

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/05

Telcon - The President

- 4 -

P: And that would be the delegation that way. And, let's don't get into Hildebrand and people like that. I don't think we need to.

K: No, This should not be a working thing. Now, Ziegler pretends to ask me whether you will meet with the Paris delegation while you are there.

P: No, sir. Never.

K: Absolutely. I agree completely. I don't think it should have any connotation that you are using De Gaulle's...

P: I would have no objection though to naming Bruce as one of the members of the delegation.

K: That would be nice.

P: Because he's the former Ambassador to Paris. How would that be?

K: That is a very nice...

P: That way, I would have a chance to chat with him you see, privately, but under no circumstances do I go rushing - oh, that would be horrible to do business when a man's died.

K: No, that would be totally inappropriate.

P: Now, let's think about Bruce. But wouldn't that be alright?

K: I think that would be a very nice gesture.

P: Or does that look like we're making medicine?

K: Well, we don't know, of course, how many people they can put into Notre Dame.

P: Yes, they can limit it to me and Rogers.

K: That's it, certainly.

P: But Bruce would be the only one. I'm not going to go back and pick up Bohlen and a lot of other Ambassadors.

K: Absolutely not.

P: All right, would you do that?

K: I will do it. I'll work it out with Bill.

P: What else is new on the diplomatic front? Anything? The Generals got out, I see.

Telcon - The President

- 5 -

K: Yes, the Generals were released yesterday as Dobrynin told us. And we put out a rather friendly statement last night about it.

PP: When are you going to start your chats with him about agenda?

K: I thought next week, or whenever you say.

P: Sure. When do you think they want to have the talks about it?

K: He's already asked me when they are ready.

P: Yes. I noticed from reading the news...I mean, from reading your diplomatic things that they are dragging their feet on SALT quite ______ now. Do you think maybe that's because they're waiting for us?

K: No. Actually in SALT they are moving not in an extremely pace, but they're moving. They're revealing their position in a little more detail.

P: The other thing is that when do you think Dobrynin wants to talk about releasing the Summit thing?

K: I think we can schedule that for almost any time. Early next year. I think the way to start it is to begin talking agenda and have it exx emerge out of that.

P: Well, let me say this. It occurred to me that I don't want them to think:-- and I want the record to show that we were panting to have it released just because of an election. So I think that maybe you ought to have a meeting with him on the agenda items and say, now look, on this release of the time, and so forth, let's determine now when it's gonna be. As far as we're concerned there's no strain for us. Don't let them think we want to delay the release of the time and use that as a gimmick.

K: Right. Exactly.

P: See my point. I don't think it makes that much difference. A good bluff, but that's about all.

K: Well, it will be a substantial.

P: Yeah, it will be a story from there on, but I just (END OF TAPE)

ms

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/13/70 ca. 6:00 p.m.

L: Tell me something . . . Stennis wants . . . I've got a letter here . . . been having a problem on it. In the appropriations act that passed last year there was language that we cannot use ground forces troops in Laos, in Thailand. When he puts the bill out, he feels it will save him considerable difficulties and he feels he has it from the President and does not feel it will cause any problems if he adds the one word "Cambodia." This causes no problem except . . .

K: How about various operations like Storm House?

L: Storm House and Prairie Fire . . . we interpret that as not applying. I have testified that it is not a use of ground troops. They The amendment only applied to massive movements of ground forces. We've gone right ahead as far as Laos is concerned.

K: The President never committed himself to not going back in. He doesn't intend to, but he doesn't want the other side to think we won't.

L: I would like not to take a position on this, but if Stennis has to, let him do it on his own.

K: I hate to fix give them that much assurance always.

L: My problem is Stennis feels he can't win on that thing in the Senate and it may come out applying to other operations. I don't want to broaden it. The language would be exactly as it is: Laos and Thailand but it adds Cambodia.

K: And it prohibits us on . . .

L: "Combat ground troops." Because of the word "combat" we interpret it not to apply to intelligence personnel . . .

K: Let me check it wit the President. I have a call in to him now.

L: I don't want to say yes or no to Stennis. He feels we will get more restrictive language though if we don't let him handle it.

K: Let me check with the President.

L: We went ahead with a fairly strong statement.

K: Good. Has it been picked up?

By KCLW NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11/13/70 ca. 6:00 p.m. page 2

L: It's on AP.

K: Good.

L: Did you have a chance to look over that private memo.

K: Yes. I think it would be a good idea if you cleaned it up a bit -- taking out the parts that are personal to the President -- and then put it to other principals.

L: That's all right with me.

K: I have read it with the greatest interest. It's a very thoughtful paper.

L: Has the President . . .

K: It's in the President's reading. He would have read it in Key Biscayne, but the de Gaulle thing threw everything off. Let's give him a week to go over it.

L: Okay.

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

November 13, 1970 6:25 p.m.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

J.J. (paraphrased)

Y: I should like to give you the following message from my friend. It is now 8:30 a.m. here. He is holding a final meeting this morning in a half an hour time. He will make a decision. Then instructions will be sent and our counter proposal in concrete terms will be sent to our permanent representative in 6 hours time. It was to be done yesterday. Mr. M has been working day and night. My friend and his associates have made the decision to go ahead without the consent of the industry.

K: What does it mean without consent of the industry?

Y: Government will propose ...

K: But can they implement this without the industry.

Y: They will have to be. By legal means. That is the political price he will have to pay. Last night Mr. M had a final meeting with our industry. Plan drafted by Mr. M. Now my friend decided that it cannot wait any longer and my friend will exercise his power to make an agreement, including legal means so that the industry will have to go along. It will be no longer voluntary. Forced course by the Government. Industry will have to follow. This is the political price my friend will have to pay. In a free society like ourselves industry has a strong voice. . . if they do not listen there will be no agreement between us but my friend has made a decision.

K: That is very courageous.

Y: We will have a counter proposal for you which our ... probably early tomorrow morning your time. It will not be exactly as you proposed but it is now very clear. My own friend and M do ...

K: Is this final or is it something we can discuss?

Y: Certainly we can discuss it. And then we can come to terms with you. The timing on this. They would like to get something by Sunday night or Wednesday (couldn't hear this word clearly) night at the latest. My friend asked me to tell you that he was sorry that the presentation of our counter proposal was delayed by one day but in 6 hours time it will be presented. I hope that you, expert will be prepared to work the entire weekend.

K: I will call them immediately.

Y: This will not be the final one. Certainly to be discussed between us. The press had leaked ... it has to take the form of negotiations. But my friend is determined and determination of my friend is very firm so is the attitude of Mr. M. He said that in public we will reach an agreement.

*

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Let me get in touch with Mr. Flanigan.

Y: Will you do that. I should be getting in touch with you again. I am anxious to know the reactions of Mr. F to our counter proposal as soon as possible.

K: I will get in touch with you. Thank you for calling. Goodby.

Representee from the press...
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/The President
7:19 p.m., November 13, 1970

P: Henry, a late report today.

K: I have a few relatively minor things I wanted to run over with you.

P: Okay.

H: The North Vietnamese shot down a reconnaissance plane inside North Vietnamese today.

P: Has it been reported?

K: Laird made a very strong statement today.

P: ??

K: Don't do it now until that other operation goes into effect. I have
talked to Moorer about it.

P: What?

K: It's part of that whole sequence of events we are going to hit up and ...

P: Hit everything, the seven choke points and Binh. [We are going to get the blame anyhow, we may as well get the blame for everything.] We don't want to fool around, I'm not going to fool around anymore.

K: Hit every supply dump in that area.

P: Otherwise it is not a new signal, it is an old signal.

K: This can be very starchy. The press is starting to play around again with the Cienfuegos [thing and the fact that the ______ are still there.] I am going to meet with Dobrynin in the Map Room again tomorrow.

P: I wonder why they did that.

K: Just trying to prove ______ going out, there's no sense in it anyway. They are a petty bunch.

P: They are pretty small.

K: If they had gotten it over four weeks ago ....

TELECON

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

[paraphrased]

P: Whether they get it out or we put them __________.

K: I would like to convey something like that, if you agree.

P: You do it.

K: Paul Hoffman, head of ......

P: He's the 95-year old, isn't he?

K: Yes, U Thant is thinking of reappointing him.

P: Never.

K: Alex Johnson suggested David Bell might be a good man.

P: He is a carry-over from the Kennedy Administration, I don't want anyone from the Kennedy Administration. Goddamm, Alex knows better than that.

K: He just thought he might be a good man since he was one of those considered for the Under Secretary position that Eliot Richardson now has.

P: I'm not taking any hold overs.

K: There is the Portugese Foreign Minister, will you see him?

P: I will not see him.

K: ? ??

P: Rogers raised it with me too, and I will not see him under any circumstances, don't raise it with me again Henry. I won't see the Portuguese Foreign Minister, nor the Spanish, nor the ______ or any of the others.

K: I just wanted to raise it with you.

P: Don't raise it with me again, you've got to have rules and I've got the rule and I won't see them.

K: All right, okay, Mr. President.

P: Did you make the call to France?

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

K: Because of the difference in time, I haven't been able to but I will have the report for you by tomorrow afternoon.

P: When you see Dobrynin, take a hard line because we can't fool around with him now. We are going to know this affects our relations right down to the core.

K: Right, ????.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan

7:45 p.m., November 13, 1970

[synopsis]

K: Peter, where are you?

F: On the Florida/Georgia border shooting birds.

K: I'm glad I know someone from the upper class.

F: What about the Textiles? Wanted to make sure that they approved of what we proposed.

K: They are meeting right now to make their counter-proposal and will reach here by morning.

F: They were hoping they would be having a proposal tonight.

K: Here's the problem, they want to put before me, they are meeting at 6 o'clock and they are going to have their proposal in about six hours. They will not be able to get the agreement of their industry and this will not be their final proposal which I assume will not be acceptable. Something definitely by Monday night.

F: Here I've been sitting on my butt for three weeks and they come back and want to have it in two days ...

K: They have to have legislation, it can't be gotten voluntary. ???

F: I told the Ambassador today and I have a date with him for 3 p.m. on Sunday (or Monday -- couldn't understand).

K: Well, come back at 3:00 p.m. on Monday and say screw them. I just wanted you to know and be aware of what's going on. Don't use that Irish temper on me Flanigan, I have an Irish girlfriend and ....

F: I didn't mean it with regard to you but I meant it with regard to them.

K: The trouble with you is that you are a racist.

F: What?

K: You don't like yellow people.

F: What do you think?

K: I think it is outrageous, if the thing leaks out and they have to wait another two weeks, that is okay. (?)

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan

7:45 p.m., November 13, 1970

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

[synopsis]

F: ???

K: They are going to screw us anyway face it so they can't get it through their parliment...

F: If they want to meet on a weekend and I meet them on Sunday, it will have to be okay.

K: What are you doing anyway?

F: I'm down here with Bill Candle shooting birds ...

[Discussion followed about shooting birds, getting Mr. Kissinger to drink and sell pepsi colas]

Mr. Kissinger/Director Helms

November 14, 1970 9:20 a.m.

jlj

By KHC

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

K: Do not yell at me. (Director Helms had been addressing someone aside.)

H: I wasn't yelling at you. I was talking to Tom Karamessines.

K: Dick I just wanted to let you know on the state of play. . . .

H: I have been in touch with Moorer and Laird to see if they wanted a briefing on this. Apparently we have been proceeding in the wrong way on this. We have been meeting for the last 4-5 days. We assumed they would report to the principals but they haven't. Dick Kennedy was in for your staff. Dennis Dolan for Laird and Britain for the JCS. One of these things will work out.

K: We will get it settled by noon or else we will get them all in the situation room. I don't see this 3 battalions. I think 7 or nothing.

H: I have had Gen. Cushman take a hard look at this - being a Marine General and all - and he says they should hit hard and get out and not mess around with a show of little force.

K: I have not told the President but I know how he feels.

H: He has been pushing for the past two months.

K: He has been pushing you all summer. On this exfiltration - how crucial is this.

H: . . . got ideas too but I asked for more information on that.

K: This decision does not have to be done today does it.

H: That is correct.

K: It will be done today.

H: Henry, I deeply appreciate your support.

K: Well, you have it.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

U-Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger

November 14, 1970 11:10 a.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

I: Mel Laird called me on this NATO DBQ and I thought he would be calling you on it and I wanted to talk to you first. However, I have had my people get in touch with-your people and it all seems to be on the right track now.

K: He always threatens these things. I just think that if we put in the caveat that has not been in DBQ before they will regard that as a change of position.

I: . . . Congressional . . .

K: Why does he want it in?

I: Well, it is a factor involved. . .

K: It has been a factor for 10 years, why now?

I: His point was it would look as if the Administration had not made up its own mind. Various caveats. . .

K: . . . I know what he wants. He wants to pull forces out and when he doesn't get his way in the Administration he goes to the Congressional Committees.

I: In the meeting next week will be the big push as far as the question of a decision. Our people agreed with your people. One word change. I originally thought he would call you.

K: I haven't seen it so I don't have an opinion.

Ambassador John Freeman/Mr. Kissinger

November 14, 1970 11:25 a.m.

jlj

(paraphrased)

F: I wanted to give you enough time to recover from Paris and the Mexican President. I have three things I want to go over with you. One is rather delicate but just between ourselves. I have been asked to deliver a letter from Lord Mountbatten to the President. The letter refers to a conversation he had with the President and in the middle of the letter he refers to your Spanish foreign policy. I wanted to tell you that this aspect of your foreign policy - your relations with Spain . . . All I want to say is that since he owes the President a letter I cannot refuse to deliver it but the British Government would use other channels if it were trying to tell you something about your Spain foreign policy. This is a private letter and he does not hold any formal position in the government and is not speaking for the government.

K: I understand that completely of course. Mountbatten was under a misapprehension on a number of things we have done with relation to Spain but that is between Mountbatten and us and not your government.

F: I would hate for you to think that this was a subtle way in which Great Britain was trying to draw something to your attention. I will, of course, report this to Greenhill, exactly what I have done and what I am saying to you now. However, this is to be considered strictly a private communication.

K: I understand. John, as long as I have you on the phone. This is not an urgent matter. In the meeting of the Berlin Ambassadors they were discussing two texts. One you favored and the other was favored by the Soviets. While I do not pay much attention to the Berlin talks I was interested in knowing why you felt the way you did. The Soviet position and text seemed to me to be more moderate than the one you supported. I am interested simply for my education. . . . form of words that progress was being made when I cannot see it. This is a semi-official request.

F: I will have to do some backreading on that. I remember the cables but I will have to go back and read them before I answer your question. I will tell you the answer to that.

K: We have no displeasure or anything. I am just curious how you felt obliged to do it. Our and your analysis seem to be the same of these things.

F: Two other things Henry. I am just asking you these questions to find out the right channel. It is nothing we should be worried about. . . . John Thompson on the India . . . would like to meet on Monday, 7th of December. Who should he talk to about this.

K: Let him deal with Wayne Smith on my staff.

By NARA, Date 5/26

F: Right. We will not conceal this from the State Department that he is coming. They have been asking us about it ever since Chequers and when it was going to be followed up upon.

K: That is fine. I have not told them that John Thompson was coming but I have told them why I wanted the study done - the urgency of it - and told that this grew out of the Chequers meeting.

F: Fine. We will be dealing with Wayne Smith on it.

K: You must not count too much on the first effort of these people. Until I work them over and terrorize them a bit the ...

F: But I am sure that John Thompson will be helpful to you about it. Another similar question. The briefing you referred to. . . Lord Carrington (phonetic) . . . Men (phonetic - man's name) will be here and was wondering about the 25th of November. David Bendall (phonetic) will be here too. Who should we deal with?

K: Well, we could do this on various levels. I think you should deal with Sonnenfeldt on this.

F: If Bendall is in town and if Men is in town then we cannot keep them much of a secret.

K: They should have their normal contacts in Washington. This is not a secret visit and I assume they will have other appointments while they are here.

F: Then we should not conceal their presence. However, although their meeting in the White House will not be a secret what they hear and say in the White House will be. OK, Sonnenfeldt on this one and Smith on the other.

By NARA, Dalo

5/20

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

1:36 p.m., November 14, 1970

K: Hello, Bill. I wanted to find out how you were.

R: I'm lot better today -- my temperature is down.

K: You missed a fascinating lunch. It was hard to keep the conversation going for an hour. He is more energetic than his predecessor. It's just the nature of the situation that there isn't a lot to talk about. The only interesting thing was he is pretty much on our line on Chile -- but nothing overt.

I got hell from the President. I raised the Portuguese Foreign Minister issue again. He said you and I were in cahoots. He was good natured about it, but wouldn't do it. So we have laid on the Vice President. We will say the President isn't up to it -- he has a cold or something. It has nothing to do with him. Basically, the reason is that when he saw the Heads of State, he forgets they were all heads of state. So now he doesn't want to see Foreign Ministers.

R:] Maybe when he is over there, we will see if he can drop in. The President Xerox figures this guy merely wants to say he saw him.

K: You, Alex and everyone else who wants this is right.

R: He didn't stop in Portugal; he stopped in Spain. We worked out the Spanish bases; but we've done nothing about the Azores. But I think we have pushed enough.

K: If, when the Foreign Minister is here and if the President is in, I will call and say he is here. It may be good for a handshake.

R: Good.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Ben Wells (NYTimes)

November 14, 1970 2:00 p.m.

(paraphrased)

jlj

K: You called yesterday and left enigmatic references that it might be
too late for me unless I talked to you. I want to know what it is all about.

W: Max had asked me to call your office as a routine when we had a
story to check it out with you as you thought the Times was not being
responsive. We have written a story that US has understanding with the
Soviet Union not to base any nuclear missiles in the Caribbean waters
or nuclear missiles in the Western Hemisphere. We would not be
adverse if they want to use recreation facilities, service and maintenance
maintenance or calls at the ports. We have hopes that the missiles will be
there will be evidence in the next few (3 or 4) days of the removal of the
tender in Cienfuegos.

K: If we could avoid the last paragraph I do not think this is an outrageous
story . . .

W: That is the guts of the story. It is the pendant on which it is hung.

K: But it escalates it. It goes into a sort of public confrontation.

W: Only as going to be in the New York Times.

K: It is not an inconsiderable newspaper.

W: That will gladden many hearts in this office. May I quote you.

K: You have not had any problem with me.

W: Seriously let's talk about us being responsible.

K: This last thing - I do not know on what you base it. I certainly did
not say it.

W: (reading) next 2 or 3 days we have hopes that the tender will be taken
out.

K: I tell you as a fact I have no way of knowing that. I really don't.

W: We expect the removal of the tender?

K: If you say that it would be really unfortunate.

W: Then give me some guidance as to what I should say. Is this all
on background. Let's work together.

K: I do not want to give a time deadline. XXX

By NARA, Dato

5/26

-2-

W: ... my accurate source of information ...

K: You have no other source of accurate information. All you have is gossip. I do not know who gave you this information but this is just not right.

W: You say this will damage our policy. Will you give me some guidance in order to avoid that.

K: We consider the removal of the tender desirable. But we would like to treat it quietly.

W: Are the barges equally important?

K: No. Not without the tender.

W: One without the other.

K: Anything can be used the next time.

W: Where does this leave us? I do not want to be irresponsible.

K: I am not writing your story for you. I just do not want you to put a time limit on our considerations or permanent bases would not be possible given the current state of affairs in the area concerned with the understanding, that is one thing, but if you gave a deadline it could have unfortunate consequences.

W: If they take it out and sail it around and then return to Port that is all right?

K: If it was permanently in Caribbean waters we would have a problem. It would have to be determined by the length of stay and what it does.

W: Then our objections are based on permanency? ... support for nuclear missile submarines ... barges.

K: ... we are reasonably satisfied. Both sides know what it is that creates concern.

W: It is one thing if they bring in Y-class and bring crews ashore and dump affluent (?) out - do we consider it a concern.

K: It would have to be on a case to case basis. I cannot define every single instance. A lot of it depends on the spirit.

W: You mean you would trust Gromyko and Dobrynin after 1962.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By NARA, Dalo 5/26", "K: It is not a question of trust. We will know what they are doing.", "W: What would this mean in the terms of muscle.", "K: I do not want to speculate.", "W: You have given me nothing but you say it is irresponsible to put\nin a time limit.", "K: Do not have 2 or 3 days. The XX of X is the key to the XX of X and the XX of X is the key to the XX

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Max Frankel

2:05 p.m., November 14, 1970

K: I had a painful, semi-blackmailing conversation with Ben Wells who is doing the Cuba story. He wants to say that we have reason to believe that this tender will leave in two or three days. I don't think this can be said because (a) this isn't true, and (b) to say it at this point will jeopardize the whole complex back-and-forth on this issue. He says if I don't tell him what is true, he will have to go with what he thinks is true. Very few people in this government know what is true. This isn't true. It may come true but if it does, it would be a pure accident. When does he plan to publish this? Tomorrow?

F: Tomorrow.

K: For reasons which you don't know and cannot control and for which you are not to blame, it would be the worst possible timing and would jeopardize the whole thing. He can, if he wants, speculate about permanent stationing there. The true reasons I cannot give you now, but the article appears at an excruciatingly bad time. We can get this wound up only by keeping the profile low.

F: I think I get the picture.

K: I don't object to most of the rest of it, but lay off the tender to some extent.

F: Let me see if we can find some way of sluffing away from it.

K: In return, when the tender leaves, I will explain to you why this is so sensitive and give you a chance to do an article. If I have deceived you in this phone call, then you could slam me.

F: I wouldn't do that. You understand why this is an intriguing topic for us. But I will talk to him.

K: But it would be most unfortunate right now.

F: I understand.

lds

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird
November 14, 1970 2:45 p.m.
jlj

(paraphrased)

By NARA, Date 5/26

L: Henry, you called.

K: I do not have anything of overwhelming importance. On this
business the President is really driving me up the walls. He wants a
larger plan. He wants to include a port.

L: We have three carriers moving in there. We are bringing up as much
stuff as we can.

K: I think we should . . . the two areas we discuss yesterday.

L: Got those three in there. We have a drone going over today. We
might as well hit hard.

K: I would like to keep it ordered to the general vicinity to where
this thing came.

L: Take in all three of those base areas. I think that after the
Wednesday afternoon meeting we ought to show the attack plan and some
of the pictures to the President.

K: Good, why don't you plan on that.

L: We have told McCann not to say a word to anyone. Just get them
in there and don't answer any questions. We would not want him
talking to anyone. Give him a good hit on this one Henry.

K: Excellent

L: I am getting in touch with Goodpaster and asking him to fly over
for the meeting. Do you want him to bring Ellsworth with him.

K: We have already told Ellsworth. I mean we have already told
State that we want Ellsworth back.

L: I will handle it this way then.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger
late morning 11/16/70

K: That meeting the President wants with Laird and Rogers.

H: It's Laird and Rogers?

K: I think it is. You better check with him. Laird want it on Wed. or after because of security. Not before Wed. The President mumbled something about tomorrow.

H: It's a problem tomorrow. After Wed. or on Wed.?

K: Wed. will be better. Is the NSC on Wed.?

H: He kicked me out without any answers. I don't know what he is up to.

K: He says you will know what it's about.

H: Well, I don't. I think he was thinking of a press conference which he realizes he cannot do.

K: He is in an odd mood.

H: We will have to ease him back into routine. Post-election decompression and it's taking not taking well.

K: I thought perhaps it was just with me. He isn't focusing on my area.

H: He isn't focusing on anything. He is past the hashing of election results -- At least I have only had a couple of hours a day on that lately.

K: He didn't do badly.

H: Jos. Alsop is still with us.

K: He moved to the right. He should move confidently -- be a President. In two months people will forget the election time. Let me know as soon as you can on that. And also on the NSC.

H: Will do.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
Senator Allott

11/16/70 10:25 a.m.

A: I just got back last night and . . . did anyone ever get in
touch last weekend with your office about contacting Gerald Smith?

K: No.

A: Not your secretary or anyone in your office?

K: No.

A: You remember our conversation?

K: Yes, and I was waiting to hear from you.

A: I went over there. I was supposed to have gotten word to you.

K: I was ready to roll out the red carpet but I didn't hear anything.

A: I didn't learn enough to pay for my time going up there.

K: It's inexcuseable. When was I supposed to be told?

A: Last weekend?

K: Before this one?

A: Yes, Friday or Saturday.

K: By whom?

A: Apparently someone in the Defense Department. I left it to
this liaison captain. I'm going to check it there.

K: Let me chase it down at my end too.

A: I'm not sure I'll be at the leadership meeting tomorrow. I've
come up with a spasm in my back. But as soon as it is better I'll try to
get in touch with you. It will only take about 5 minutes.

K: It will be good to see you. I am sorry about this.

A: I think this liaison captain is a stupid jerk.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Joe Alsop

11/16/70 10:40 a.m.

A: How serious is this Cuban thing?

K: That's what we are trying to find out.

A: It looks as though we didn't sorted it out after all.

K: It's just part of this petty and mean-minded Russian bunch. We told them not to build a submarine base there so if they so that if they do so we have a better legal basis to act than before. It is certainly a sign . . . my own judgment is that they will still put that ship out but it is a mean move.

A: I have the darkest suspicions about the future. I don't see that we've got not any serious kind of deterrent capability or any play. And everyone says you can't be planning to go as far in the Middle East as you say. It's clear that they can't do anything in the Middle East till they put in 10 or 12 more squadrons of MIGs in Egypt and it won't surprise me a bit if I hear they do. And we are not doing a thing to stop it. It's very dangerous.

K: You know my views on that subject.

A: It's tough to do anything at the last minute about it. What are your chances of getting out of your engagement on the night Kennedy Clark is coming to dinner?

K: I will know this afternoon.

A: Splendid. And I am going off on Thursday and would like to see you before I go.

K: I'll call you and we'll work something out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Gerard Smith/Kissinger

11:00 a.m.

11/16/70

S: ?? ?? a communique between you and the President a couple of days ago. I just heard today that State Secretariat was asked for a copy by the WH. I sent it through backchannel and State Secretariat wouldn't know about it. Someone on your staff may have asked for an extra copy of it.

K: You sent it through a State channel?

S: I sent a backchannel to the President and didn't want State to have a copy of it. Some way State heard about it.

K: How could it be?

S: Someone on your staff may have asked for an extra copy.

K: I will check on it. I guarantee it will not happen again.

S: I wanted it out of State channels.

K: Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

11:17 a.m.

11/16/7-

K: I had an opportunity to talk about the Stennis matter with the President. He doesn't want Cambodia in there.

L: I will talk to him then and see what we can do.

K: He has no intention -- you know his theory.

L: He said perhaps after the election that if Cambodia was strong it would be a reason for compromise.

K: He was very strong on it.

L: We will take that position but we may get beat. Stennis thinks he has to do it. I will tell him we will oppose it.

K: Want me to call him?

L: No. I will tell you if we have to go beyond that.

K: The President is going to call us all together in the next day or two and he will tell Rogers himself.

L: Wait until Wed. Things leak like a seive. Even your meetings.

K: I was outraged.

L: No one over here even knows about those meetings.

K: It's awful and makes us look to the Russians like we are putting the arm on them.

L: We put out a battle statement over there and they have for years.

K: He doesn't want it any more.

L: We can't stop it.

K: Some people are keeping their own tally.

L: They have always done it but they are always wrong. When the deaths come out this week it will be 32 -- not 41. These reporters report on deaths and add totals and always come out wrong.

K: Will you get that straight. If they could be discredited --

L: Our reporters know it. They are always wrong. We can keep telling them our

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

11:17 a.m.

11/16/70

-2-

L: (cont) official report is on Thurs. Our report will be 32.

K: One other point, there was some feeling over here that Adm. Mack on commenting on the pot thing took a hardboiled attitude. "Sure, what are they going to do?" instead of xx showing concern.

L: I agree. I took care of that. The whole thing is bad.

K: They want to be sure we show concern about that.

L: I want to talk to you about the S. Vietnamese government on that. We have evidence that high officials in the SVN Government are involved in that. I don't know how to handle it. One is visiting here next week. I have shut off the investigators.

K: We will talk about it.

L: It would be bad if it focused.

K: I will see you soon.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
11/16/70 ca. 11:30 a.m.

R: I was just going over this CIA assessment of the missiles. They are trying to back away from it now. This is what we've said all along.

K: It is one of the most ________ things I've seen.

R: We're right back where we started. What we've all been saying.

K: Everything confirms what you've been saying.

R: I went over every picture myself.

K: Even if their notion were right it still would have been a violation. They said they could have been hidden under sand. Then I had a study made: they would have had to dig a hole as big as the White House and the Executive Office Building combined. . . .

R: This is exactly what we've been saying.

K: Absolutely. The reason I put it out from the White House is that once Defense submits a unilateral paper, they leak it. It wasn't directed to State at all.

R: I understand. I wanted it done.

K: But it confirmed everything we've been saying. If anything it shows you've been extremely moderate. But we had to go through three drafts to get this statement. They kept saying we can't be sure they weren't there to begin with. But to have them hidden up to that time and then uncover them doesn't make any sense.

R: It's just ludicrous when you look at the pictures. You could see that the sand hadn't been touched in the pictures.

K: The whole thing was absurd.

R: By looking at the pictures you could see the construction: they were bringing in trucks and pouring cement. I will see you tomorrow.

K: No, it's been moved to Wednesday.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
12:20 pm 11/16/70

H: It was the press conference he was holding off on so he says we can do the NSC on Wed. Do we have to do the leadership?

K: Yes.

H: Then it must be Wed. So we had better do the NSC Thurs.

K: How about getting with Rogers and company?

H: I said Laird wanted it on Wed. He said fine. How about after the leadership meeting?

K: Isn't he having breakfast with Rockefeller?

H: Have the bi-partisan leaders after.

K: It doesn't have to be after the leaders meeting. It can be anytime. The advantage to having leaders meeting afterwards would be that it would end the discussion. Sex before.

H: So before would be better. All right. How long do we need for Laird and Rogers?

K: 45 minutes.

H: Then -- okay.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
11/16/70; 6:45 p.m.

P: How did your meeting come off -- when I called you you were in the Situation Room.

K: I said what you had suggested. First I told him about Ivanov. I said why don't we start talking about the agenda. He said when he said we should talk about it I said in three or four weeks -- now he says he has authority to talk about it after December 1. He said he was going to communicate with Moscow. They are playing it cool.

P: We will play it the same way.

K: Casualties not 44 but 32.

P: Why the hell did they put out 44 then?

K: They get put out by two or three channels and some get counted twice. Actually, we are now at the average of recent weeks. I called Laird to raise hell about the daily count. He said it was wrong and the real figure was about 31 or 32. He said he was going to the press.

P: I suggested that you and Bunker come in tomorrow after I meet with the leaders. We will have a good hour to talk to him.

K: Excellent, I think that would be very good.

P: How is he feeling?

K: I have not seen him since he came back -- he was fine when I saw him.

P: We want him to spare himself and give us his judgment on this political thing.

K: He should tell Thieu that if we have anything to say to Thieu it should come through Bunker.

P: It would not be useful if he stayed for the Ky breakfast. We are not going to let that little son-of-a-bitch (Ky) spoil this -- the point is they can't go any place without us. He is going to know very hard where this stands.

K: That's the key thing -- we are too close now.

P: Did you get anything further done on Pakistan?

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: We will get the full package on Pakistan tonight and I can give you the proposal the first thing in the morning.

P: I don't need to see it but I want them to know we care and we care fast. Have you sent the message to ___?

K: That was done -- so I think we are going through -- we will have something tomorrow.

P: I have an idea about this but you will let me know about it tomorrow.

K: We will have it the first thing in the morning.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President
8:50 p.m., November 16, 1970

P: I wonder if Moorer is going to be prepared to go, a concrete plan.

K: Yes he is Mr. President. I have seen it. Actually there are two kinds of plans, the logistics constraints ________ related to where the firing came from and another one which would explain when. Logistics up near the border when they start an offensive.

P: I agree. Let's have him submit it on that basis. Is there good stuff to hit there?

K: Yes, there's good stuff.

P: Yeah. A Lot to hit huh.

K: That's their judgment yes. Then he will also be prepared to brief on that other operation.

P: Saturday, the 21st.

K: Assuming there is a full moon, assuming there is good weather that night. The morning after they go on after that operation, go after the supply dumps.

P: They are hitting the supply dumps second rather than first?

K: Yes, they will go on a state of alert if the supply dumps are hit first.

P: Think the best thing on the other operation with complete surprise.

K: Yes.

P: That seems to make sense and that would, well I think, yes we at least when we do the other operation whatever happens this will cover it. The other will involve ....

K: The other one will create so much noise anyway this won't attract so much attention.

P: I understand. Got to come very close together, yeah. Okay. And they will be ready to brief on that Wednesday?

K: We can, Mr. President. It would come on the 21st which is Saturday.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

P: Or the 22nd.

K: Or the 22nd, if the weather is good.

P: The 21st, 22nd or 23rd, any one of those nights.

K: One of those nights. If they get out with the number of prisoners
[they expect to get out with, they may get] out as many as 90 but
they are pretty confident to get around 50.

P: Based on simply letters?

K: Letters, photographs and considering that we have only got 9 prisoners
(out as long as the war has gone on].

P: If we get 9, that would be a hell of a thing.

K: If we get any, we will get more than 9 assuming their intelligence is
good.

P: We will take the risk on that. Another thing, I have a pencilled note,
I told -- Bentsen wanted to be briefed on foreign policy matters and
Buckley and obviously you will continue to do Humphrey on a selected
basis.

K: He has written me a letter [and I planned to raise it with you].

P: You can go ahead (with Humphrey) and do that with Bentsen. You can
be very forthcoming with Bentsen, he is like Stennis, he will play it
straight down the line. Let Haig give him the briefing on ABM. Give
both Bentsen and Buckley, send them over to State and let them get
a briefing on the world. ??? Don't want us to get into everything that
goes on, you arrange, your office will arrange for them to be briefed
on the national defense. ??? knows a hell of a lot anyway.

K: Let Sisco brief them and Sullivan brief them ? ? ? .

P: Sisco and Sullivan would be very good, the two of them would be very
good. ABM, national defense and our own shop, that's all that matters
to us. As far as the Republicans are concerned they are, it would be
good if you could brief them in a bunch. The five Congressmen, I had
in today....

K: And Buckley?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/The President
8:50 p.m., November 16, 1970

P: Don't include him, do him separately.

K: [Separately ?]

P: I see no objection really. Bentsen and Buckley together, you could do the whole bunch together on that point, they all think alike, then let Sisco and Sullivan do the other.

K: I'll take care of that Mr. President. [I just got a report], they lobbed 13 rockets into South Vietnam and killed three Americans. All this is grist to the mill.

P: Yeah.

K: It was 20 miles North of Saigon.

P: What this really is now is isolated acts of terror, none of this is meant ______.

K: They are trying to kick us, to try and make us look bad in public.

P: That newspaper report *casualties* would be 33 vs. 44. I hope Laird cleared it up.

K: He said he would, reporting from the various headquarters. If someone is transferred from one headquarter to another, they could be counted twice.

P: Couldn't stop those daily reports, loss profile.

K: Lousy story no matter how low the casualties are.

P: To the extent we can, let the things go and we will report them each week. The weekly report is the only one that means anything.

K: That's what I urged him to do.

P: Tomorrow I want to talk to you about Pakistan.

K: [I have something on Pakistan]. Have earmarked $10 million, don't want to move on any of it until we have their needs. We want to tell them what sort of things we have available and let them give us an indication of what sort of things they need. You asked for State's recommendation but don't [think it's] necessary.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger
9:55 a.m. 11/17/70‡

K: I have two problems, one major and one minor. I will give you the major one first. I had a call yesterday from Dobrynin, strintly between us, expressing total outrage at the Washington Post article on Sunday. He didn't mind the NYTimes story on Cuba.

J: I just saw the NYTimes this morning.

K: He said NYTimes is inaccurate. He says the Washington Post mentions 5 secret meetings between him and me. He wants to know if there's an agreement between State and them on what's a fact. I find that hard to answer. We have tried to work together cooperatively. Two senior respected journalists who said that the WH is over excited on Cuba and said give us the truth. When they said this is going to be written about one way or another, I refused to talk to them.

J: Did they imply it's coming out of here?

K: Yes.

K J: I can't think who it is.

K: Let me say right here that I don't think it's you.

J: I appreciate that. I can't think of who.

K: There was 5.

J: I didn't think of 5.

K: I thought I had him but it is 5. No, 4. I will have to check it. Be that as it may, he believes that the best way to kill the speculation is to say 5. It was 5. You have 5 memcons over there. The basic problem now is that whoever is doing this is playing with national interest. Two interpretations pex -- One is that we mean to invade and that's impossible. So a higher establishment believes the Soviets have a right to do what they are doing. I did talk to Dobrynin on Saturday.

J: You mentioned that.

K: He said, "I communicated to Moscow." He said, "You talk to me and then there are two stories"; -- they will read it as an ultimatum. It says State is beaten into line. It's in the Washington Post and LATimes. State beaten into line and carefully avoided understanding.

J: We did say understanding.

K: I approved it. It couldn't have started without someone starting it. It has nothing

By NARA, Dale 5/26

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. 11/17/70

-2-

K: (cont) to do with personal positions -- it's in the national interest. You know what the Russians must conclude.

J: I can't think of where -- it's never been gone beyond you and me and the Secretary. Not even my own office. I can't think of where it could be coming through. We have used understanding instead of an understanding because in previous years we made many letters to the Congress that there was no understanding or agreement.

K: Kennedy didn't want to appear soft on Cuba and we might invade. But no one today would believe that. So we are leaving open that they have a right to construct nuclear installations. The way the agreement runs that isn't even precluded (?). It's an agreement totally to our (or their) advantage.

J: Entirely so. McCloskey statement is clear on that.

K: One of these newsmen I have shut off that I must check with the President but he will write a major story. He will say there's total confusion and that State and the WH are at loggerheads.¹

J: I will find out from McCloskey what he is picking up.

K: He will write it. It's Chalmers Roberts.

J: I heard this morning that he was working on it at the same time that Ben Wells was working on it. Murray Marder picked it up and the Post story was done by Marder.

K: That's right.

J: Chal has an additional story?

K: He has 5 pages of notes.

J: Good God!

K: We can do a number of things. Zeigler could say something but it's raising a raping State. I think McCloskey should say that he omitted the participle in front of understanding.

J: Put that way --

K: And that would end it and it would come from you and with grace. We wouldn't be disciplining you.

J: You think that would kill it?

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

U.A. Johnson/Kissinger
9:55 a.m. 11/17/70

K: If he said there is an understanding, they will ask what it is.

J: And what the text is. Say it's contained in the public statement which he pointed out in previous ______.

K: The most gentlemanly low-key way. If it came from you it would be much better than one of us over here saying it.

J: I have no problem with that.

K: I have not told the President about this because I think it is important that we work together.

J: I have no problem with that and I can handle that.

K: Then I will tell Roberts there's nothing x to say anymore.

J: Should he say it to Chal or at the conference?

K: At the conference, then it will be on the record.

J: OK, lets.

K: That would be a great help. Any word? I am seeing Patrizio in a minute.

J: We offered PL 480.

K: He was run off the platform at Connecticut Univ. yesterday.

J: I didn't know that.

K: Maybe State would want to call him.

J: I didn't know. I have Freeman here to talk on Malta. Anything on that?

K: Just great Presidential interest in preventing the election of Mintov (?). Can I assume that McCloskey will do that at noon?

J: Yes.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
11/17/70 2:45 p.m.

R: In the interest of not having a misunderstanding I wanted to talk about . . . your discussion with the Portuguese Foreign Minister today. It was reported that you asked how things were going over here and said if they had any problems they could come to your staff.

K: I didn't say anything of the kind. I wanted to make him feel good about his not being able to see the President. I said his man could call Sonnenfeldt. I didn't mean to imply -- and will certainly correct it -- that if he had trouble with State . . . Your country director was sitting there.

R: I understand, but I don't think it is good to have ambassadors feel that they should deal directly with Sonnenfeldt.

K: I didn't know what to say. He was talking about Africa. We haven't dealt too much with the Portuguese problems here.

R: I don't think we should encourage a separate communication with the Ambassadors through the White House.

K: If he should call, which I consider most unlikely, we'll refer him to the appropriate person at State. There will not be a separate channel to the President through this office.

R: If an ambassador wants to talk to the President, he should have the right to, but I don't think we should encourage this channel.

K: No, absolutely not. The guy was such an excruciating bore that I just wanted to get rid of him. I just said, "If you have any additional problems, you can call Sonnenfeldt."

R: Okay. That's straightened out with McCloskey. I told McCloskey anything Henry wants is fine with me. There isn't a problem there.

K: No. On the bipartisan meeting, are you willing to talk about the Nixon Doctrine aspect of the supplemental and have Mel explain the figures? I thought you might want to do a part of it. Alternatively, we can do it.

R: I don't care. Any way you decide is fine with me. I think the best way to do it is the way we've done it before. Have the President do most of the talking. Have the President make a statement and we just underscore it for emphasis.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

11/17/70 2:45 p.m. page 2

K: That's right, and anything that is to be presented, we can do easily.

R: Was it mentioned at the Republicans' meeting this morning?

K: Yes.

R: What was the reaction?

K: They reacted generally positively, but they thought there would be a hell of a fight. Mansfield and ______ were for it.

R: Fight about the Cambodian part?

K: Yes, and the President said he wouldn't spend the Israel money unless the Southeast Asia money was voted.

R: That will be interesting. He's not going to have the Foreign Affairs Committee?

K: Apparently not. All I know of is the six leaders.

R: I'm not sure that's the best way to handle it, but I'm not going to try to talk him out of it. What time is it?

K: I think 10:00 in the morning.

R: Okay, see you then.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Dr. David/Mr. Kissinger

6:23 p.m., November 17, 1970

D: I got hold of a copy of NSSM 84 which you are going to discuss tomorrow. I looked at it fairly critically and have reservations that, before the President makes a decision, you should know about.

K: We won't go over it before Thursday. Let us see about tomorrow.

D: I will get my girl in touch with yours.

lds

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan
6:34 p.m., November 17, 1970

F: You playing it heavy, that was great Henry.

K: Where does that leave us with these sons-of-bitches?

F: [I gave them] a formula, a zero formula if you know what I mean.
.... I said to the Ambassador, Mr. Ambassador, why don't you
try to hand it to him. It was non-reflective of categories as you
heard. There are three things: (1) Willing to come up with some
______ (2) Growth had to be length of our ____
export ____ and (3) Response to my ____.

K: Should I call my guy?

F: Yes, I think you should.

K: I'll do that.

F: He was bleeding all over the place, mistaken negotiations...

K: That's why I'm so useful, I hate these bastards.

F: (laughter) Okay, Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Chalmers Roberts/Kissinger

9:30 a.m.

11/18/70

K: I haven't really had a change to discuss it with the President. My own instinct is that it's against the national interest to persue it.

R: You put something out yesterday.

K: That should clarify it.

R: Was that a result of what I did.

K: Partly.

R: How did this come about?

K: That's not answerable.

R: And how does it apply to freedom of ports of call?

K: I don't want to get into it. I know you are doing a serious job and if I talked to someone it would be you but he doesn't want to talk at this juncture.

R: How serious do you consider it if they stay there indefinitely?

K: It would depend on what they do. If that tender stays, it's not a port visit.

R: Or cranes and barrakcs on shore. So you have an unresolved question there in terms of what you said yesterday. I wonder if they are trying to see how far they can push us. On the other hand they don't want to show evidence of what they did which they were ______ to do.

K: That's why we would like to wait.

R: I can't with the speculation ? ? ? ? ?

K: I appreciate the way you go on this. If you continue to persue it -- I would prefer you wait 2-3 weeks.

R: It's the usual clash between diplomacy and the press.

K: And you have been honorable.

R: It's a piece of a pattern that is not very encouraging.

K: If someone wants to get on a business basis of confidence with the other side (they wouldn't say what we are doing) but show good faith.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Roberts/Kissinger

9:30 a.m. 11/18/70

-2-

R: They have different ways of operating, as history shows. You haven't had your meeting have you on the European thing?

K: Tomorrow.

R: Can you say anything afterwards?

K: I doubt it. Let's try to get together once a month for general review.

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN
Flanigan/Kissinger

morning

11/18/70

FL Yesterday I told Ushiba what we are doing on the trade bill-- taking quotas on textiles. I also said that if we get ______ and get quotas which was a new game. I said I didn't know if they would negotiate under these circumstances. After I left he said maybe he should get back to his government. I said he should. He called today and asked me to lunch.

K: I called Japan last night. No record of it because I was at a friend's house. I said I never understood this would start a new negotiation from scratch and that I don't see how we could still settle on that and time is wasting.

F: And relationships are eroding. I said I would have lunch with him. I will report our six position. The President cannot walk off on a commitment and what they offer doesn't meet the commitment.

K: I think they will give more but whether it will be enough I don't know.

F: At that point we will have to decide if the President' wants to act on his commitment.

K: I hate to let them get away with it but it doesn't pay to be principle.

F: You approach it that they give you a commitment and you want them to do it. My feeling is that I cannot imagine our government saying to our grain or auto industries how much to a certain country they can export.

K: I agree that we are in a hell of a position here because we haven't a lot to stand on. We are not giving them anything in return. You are right. Once they give everything they are going to give, we have to decide the President's attitude. It isn't our conciliatorism that's going to count so we might as well keep it tough.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Sen. Javits/Kissinger
10:45 a.m. 11/18/70

J: I had some word from your office that you are unhappy about representation on China. What I want to tell you is what I am doing and then I will send it over to you. I was the issue of U. S. position which I think I interpret correctly as opposing the Albanian resolution. We are opposed to expulsion of Taiwan and of China. Some fluidity in position. ???? whether Congressional move in this policy is desirable. I tried to provide stimulation. "The Congress of the United States expresses its approval (and continues to quote a paragraph)" By putting that in and speaking about it I would stimulate Congressional discussion.

K: Supporting what we have said we cannot object to. What I though we should let the vote go by and then you could introduce it.

J: I will not today then, I would like to send this over.

K: We want to avoid getting the vote confused and then as soon after the vote as you want we would have nothing against it.

J: Then I will do that after you look at what I have to say. I want to brief you on the NATO visit. Let me know on this at once because I am faced with saying it or not.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Kraslow/Kissinger

2:30 pm-ish 11/18/70

K: Tony is working on an editorial on VN.

HAK: If you people attack us again I will never pay a call on any of you.
Of course, I am joking.

K: Is there any hint of movement at all in Paris?

HAK: No. I can't in good conscience say there is.

K: If there were any private meetings you would think there was KREEX
encouragement.

HAK: I will not comment on private meetings.

K: No, I am referring to KREEX inferring there's no hint of movement because this
would include this kind of contact.

HAK: You are very skillful but I cannot comment on private meetings. I meant there are not a hint of movement in approaching each other but I am not speaking of procedures.

K: Then one cannot exist without the other.

HAK: The movement may be sudden and dramatic.

K: Then your response does not ______ out the idea of contacts.

HAK: I cannot discuss it.

K: Hope to see you soon. It's been a long time and I really feel I need it.

HAK: I have told David Young to do that.

K: I hope you are fine and I would like to see you soon. (I get dispondent when I don't have the chance to talk with you.)

HAK: I am fine and we will try to have a session next week.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

3:02 pm

11/18/70

L: On the situation with that 135 yesterday up there to the north. I think we should have a little more time to sort out the tracks. There's some evidence that the track is a different track and it may be close to where the Soviets are conducting submarine ____ testing. The only thing that happened here was that a cannon fired, not at the aircraft. We should check the tracks but we had better be sure the track is the same as usual.

K: Will we have it in 24 hours?

L: We have another going tomorrow.

K: That's irrelevant.

L: We should sort this out.

K: I want to know what they flew this thing.

L: Their track is different from ours. It could be a miscalibration on their radar.

K: Can we have that by tomorrow?

L: Yes. 24 hours. That's better and then we are sure. It's not conclusive now.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
6:25 pm 11/18/70

P: What happened on Monday's private talk?

K: It was nothing. More hot line than what they used with me.

P: Are we having another one? I don't think we should didle around.

K: Bruce suggested one and they said they would let us know when they are ready.

P: What we are planning later is on time. Nothing will change it now.
Thanks.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
11/18/70; 7:00 p.m.

P: I had one thought -- I don't know how to get around this. I want you to explore in Defense areas where we might go for a more expansive budget. One area I gave Weinberger on intelligence which I want cut -- $5-1/2 billion and there just isn't enough there. What we get out of it is minuscule. It just is not worth $5 billion here.

K: We are financing Laos operations . . .

P: That's fine. I told them we would finance all activist operations. What I want to see is those areas if we want to move in that direction we could have an expansion of the Defense budget.

K: I can get that done on a quiet basis.

P: I mean expanding it in ways that will be meaningful in what our needs are -- maybe in the Navy area. I don't know if we want to move in this direction but I want to have that option.

K: I think I can get that done easily and in a very responsible way.

P: Humphrey was talking very curiously but I thought it was clear -- would not let Defense get too low. Said if he happened to speak on this subject it would not be directed at me. I would not be surprised to see him, as he looks at Ted Kennedy and Muskie, move for a stronger Defense thing.

K: I think he will move to the right of the Party. He can never compete with Teddy.

P: Pre-empt the right--if he can. He will try it. The whole point is on this Defense area. This is one area where we are not going to allow . . . that's why I was lecturing the Senators. I think in terms of our relations with the Soviets . . . I think what will perk up relations is our moving in more strongly on the Defense line. I think if we move down it will hurt us.

K: I think we should consider using some provocation to do exactly that.

P: I think we can move on the Defense line. Let's move in certain areas. I would like to know something different we could be doing -- maybe naval -- we could consider aircraft -- there doesn't seem . . .

K: Except we have not had a new airplane for ten years -- could push P-1 (?) much faster. We could speed up modernization of the Army.

P: Modernization of the Army -- that's the kind of thing I want to talk about. We may just want to use some of our resources in that point.

NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

P: I think that out of this election has come a rather curious result. (I missed a sentence here). Tunney has tried to say since that Vietnam was the issue -- but he never mentioned it! I think the Democrats are going to be very leery about moving to the peace side.

K: I am not a political expert but I believe when this immediate analysis is over, the Democratic Party will now have to adopt a good part of your program in order to stay in. You are in the driver's seat.

P: The only thing I feel in our relations is that I would be a little more ______ on the small stuff -- I mean the attendance (?) stuff.

K: That was a State Department thing.

P: I know. It sounds like a State Department thing but it doesn't sound like me. I think we ought to do bigger things and I mean I think we ought to ignore the little things.

K: When we look back over the past two years, the most gains we made was when we were hard on the big things. When we laid it down to them on Jordan and Cuba they came to us with the Summit. When Hitler came to power they immediately offered him a deal and they kicked him in the teeth. They are a bunch of thugs.

P: You are right. Churchill's analysis was exactly that. Highway robbers, thugs, etc. But, coming back to the central problem -- I think just in terms of our diplomacy we cannot allow the situation to arise if like Russell said we are second most powerful -- we can never say that publicly.

K: You made a very strong point when you said ______ used an imaginary missile gap.

P: Yes. Did you get my message to Joe Alsop.

K: Yes. He was moved.

P: And you told him to come to dinner and you told him to follow your advice.

K: He said he would not do a thing.

P: He must not discuss it with anyone. Just act as if nothing has happened.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/President
11/18/70; 7:00 p.m.

P: Just for your information I am getting stuff on the leftists in the press corps. Not that we are going to use it -- I know how to play this game. They never said anything to him when he was supporting Kennedy. They better watch out -- if they play hard games we will play hard games.

K: That will be helpful and Alsop was very moved. I talked to a French professor ~~his~~ friend of mine, Stanley Hoffman, he was very impressed by your behavior over there. He watched you as you left the Cathedral and you seemed to be pensive and removed from everyone else. Bob Ellsworth showed me a letter from the French representative of NATO -- a close friend of mine and close friend of the US -- it said the French knew you were the first head of state to announce you were coming and without you there, there would have been less . . .

P: On this thing, work it out with Haig.

K: I will work on it with Admiral Moorer and Haig.

P: Tell them I would like to see how they would add $5 billion to the package -- up to 8 -- and what are the greatest needs that they have -- and not just adding personnel.

feg

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon

Yoshida

11/19/70 9:15 a.m.

Y: I met my friend a little more than two hours ago rather briefly. He's from our permanent representative. We discussed how to proceed from now on. Neither my friend nor myself is expert on the subject. In spite of mounting difficulties at home and strong resistance on the part of our industry in particular, my friend shares my advice that we must reach an agreement. We are fully aware that the time is very short. I myself do not understand the subject.

K: That is my problem too.

Y: But I do feel some compromise formula can be reached and must be found on the major and vital subject called "cutaways" (?). I wonder if you could take a position . . . in my personal feeling as a layman, for instance, six groupings for 17 items in a counter-proposal ________ item of yous. You could agree with our proposal of six groups or groupings, but you might shift the scope withing the group to satisfy your minimum needs.

K: My problem right now is that I have to go to a meeting. I wonder if I could have my friend, Haig, call you to get the specific suggestion in about half an hour and then I'll put it to my people. Haig will call you at around 10:00 my time.

Y: I see. It's close to midnight our time and I am at my office . . .

K: Okay, then Haig will call in 15 minutes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Yoshida

11/19/70 9:15 a.m.

K: That is my problem too.

Y: But I do feel some compromise formula can be reached and must be found on the major and vital subject called "cutaways" (?). I wonder why if you could take a position . . . in my personal feeling as a layman, for instance, six groupings for 17 items in a counter-proposal _________ items of yours. You could agree with our proposal of six groups or groupings, but you might shift the scope withing the group to satisfy your minimum needs.

By [signature] NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Yoshida/Haig

10:40 am

11/19/70

Y: A word in addition to what I said a moment ago. I met my friend last night and he is wrong under the very strong impression of the industry and public opinion at home to meet you need your further cooperation in modification of your position even just the posture. Just to give the general impression at home that we have at the least an agreement as a result of which the mutual concessions on both sides. Just as an impression. I would like you to take this fact into consideration and work out some formula as I have indicated. My friend would be greatly appreciate your cooperation.

H: I will give you via this channel what we think would be essential to safeguard within the groups. If your expert could make that proposal then we could have the formula adopted (adapted?) that way on mutual concessions on both sides. I will call you later today and suggest it to you. We are working on it now.

Y: Will you please let me know. Not to be -- later then afternoon or evening your time. I will be at my office.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Freeman/Kissinger

12:35 pm 11/19/70

K: In my capacity as tour director the proposal now is as follows: The President and Prime Minister go to Camp David together the morning of the second day and have their talk there. I still have to find out about a meal there. They will have a session there and the Prime Minister can stay for the weekend or night.

F: It's very generous. I don't know if he can.

K: I know Buz Mosbacher has designs on him in NY.

F: He is a popular figure among the sportsmen. He will appreciate the invitation.

K: I don't know who else goes. We can work that out. I will have to keep byxx myself busy.

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

2:35 pm

11/19/70

R: I thought that was a good meeting yesterday.

K: It was very good. We have now put the quietous on those plans. There's still some around that haven't surfaced on a private basis. They will. You saw that Fessenden cable.

R: Did the President see it?

K: It's in his file.

R: It will make him mad.

K: The risk one runs in foreign policy is not worth it.

R: I had a discussion with Eban yesterday and they are anxious to know what we are going to do in the next couple of years. They may call you.

K: I will check with you or Sisco if they do.

R: I don't want to be in the position of making a promise and the only leverage we have is our word.

K: I will get information from you or Sisco and if it's Eban I will call you.

R: I think Eban wants the negotiations started. They want us to pay as high price as we can for the negotiations. We may want to pay for an agreement and I will pay high (but not to get negotiations started).

K: When we talked last I had the impression their aid request would be processed separately for 71 and 72.

R: If we make a commitment for 71 and 72 and then along the line we say we are not going to do it, it will embarrass the President.

K: So more short term?

R: I am not sure but we should not make a commitment.

K: No aid commitments without you and no other promises we don't --

R: We should coordinate. If you will keep us advised and we will keep you advised. Joe feels they will wait until the first of the year.

K: If Dayan comes they may wait until he returns.

By [機] NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger

2:35 pm 11/19/70

-2-

R: They don't want him to look like he is ? ? ? ? ? to us.

K: That's true.

R: Eban and Meir on one side and he is on the other and they are annoyed with him.

K: The statement are ________ about. Sometimes it seems he is changing his views.

R: He said the American peace initiative doesn't fly. Then they said the opposite. Mrs. Meir in the Knesset the other day poked him in the eye a few times. Then a new plan of opening the Suez.

K: He did that on his own?

R: That's what Eban said. Never contemplated a ________ agreement.

K: Then they may do it as you say. If I get a contact from Israel I will call you or Sisco.

R: If it's something that she wants to discuss with the President that's different. They have been good lately.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/General Goodpaster

3:30 p.m., November 19, 1970

K: I just wanted to tell you you did a superb job. It was exactly
right and added concreteness to my theories.

G: I hope it will serve the purpose. There were one or two things I
did not cover, but I thought I was able to get most of the points on the
record.

K: We will draw liberally on them and prepare the directive.

G: That point about the psychology standing up -- you can use the
President's own performance in the Mediterranean as a model.

K: You were very helpful; especially the theme that we are aiming
for improvement. The second thing I wanted to discuss: That ad hoc
outsiders' group which has been studying Defense policy hasn't up to
now produced anything worthwhile. They are working on another one
which will be ready within about three weeks. I would appreciate it
if you could come back or we could get it to you. You haven't been
forgotten. Outsiders can't help as quickly.

G: It might be best if you send it to me privately with my name
on it.

K: I will send it by pouch or by messenger.

G: Marked for me alone.

K: Nothing will be done until you comment on it.

G: I am so happy to see a searching discussion of NATO. It is
sorely needed.

K: We have enough Presidential pronouncements to work from.

G: One point I didn't mention is if you do further work on the
MBFR, you might want to look at that different option.

K: Everytime I go to one of my meetings, I think of what you have
done for us. Without the military, we would be dead. They are the
only ones who have the concept of staff work and loyalty.

G: I'm sure the President knows he has a certain amount of
support in our direction.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Barbara Walters/Kissinger

6:20 pm

11/19/70

W: I have given you 10 days.

K: I know what you have in mind. I haven't got an answer. I will get it by Monday.

W: Am I pressuring you? I don't want to be.

K: I am not reliable. I haven't asked the public affairs people here yet.

W: If you're not very reliable, that frightens me. I should think if you want to do it --

K: I always ask if it's useful. What week?

W: I'maxx At your convenience. We will be in Washington the week of Dec. 7. That would be an optimum time. However, it doesn't have to be that week. If we do it that week we have to clear the time so we can do it in your office or in Layfette park or under a tree. Or someplace that is informal and not political. Or I will fly down ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: Unless we do it that week. Or you could film it that week and put it on the air another week.

W: I could film it the Sat. or Friday before and use it that week.

K: How long?

W: An hour for you and 1/2 an hour more for me.

K: For 15 minutes.

W: Yes. We might be able to do it in 1/2 an hour.

K: The thing I want control over is if you have an hour of questions and answers, I want a voice in the editing.

W: I realize that. I can do that.

K: I don't want to pick the question and answer.

W: I will read it to you after. What we did in Rusks interview -- he asked to play the whole question and answer and he didn't want me to edit the answer. I said fine but where it was repetitive he agreed to editing. I know what you want and no problem. Shall I call you or will you call me?

K: I will call you but if I don't then you call me. W: You can be sure.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
H. Klein/Kissinger
6:30 p.m. 11/19/70

K: I am staying away from your haunts.

HAK: That's good for me.

K: I had a call regarding the Pakistan thing --

HAK: From whom?

K: Haldeman and he said I should discuss it with you and Finch and Rumsfeld.

HAK: What?

K: In terms of getting what we have out there better known. I have Al Haig's memo. What about the Vice President going out and seeing what's required ahead and the feeling that he is more humane and getting attention to it.

HAK: We had better ask the Pakistanis if they want him. We have thought of Rumsfeld.

K: We have thought one or two WH people plus Congressional committee.

HAK: A committee is too much. Let me take them up. They are both good ideas.

K: We thought of Mrs. Nixon but don't that it's good.

HAK: Out of the question.

K: Because women don't do things out there. The V. P. is in Hawaii. In getting the story out he is the best available. Future requirements ? ? ?

HAK: Let's see what we can do. I will be in touch with you tomorrow.

K: You can reach me here in Los Angeles.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Anderson/Kissinger

6:35 pm

11/19/70

A: I am calling you because John Sheffey has been working on the Panama Canal for 5 years and before that for 5 years with ______. We cannot use our funds after July 1. I have tried to get him on State and Defense payrolls with no success. They will be proposals on this after the report comes out. John talked to Haig and Haig suggested we talk to you and perhaps you have a way that he can stay and be responsible for the follow up on the report.

K: Let me talk to Haig and I will do my best.

A: Thanks.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Laird/Kissinger

9:10 a.m. 11/20/70

L: Because of the weather situation we will know in 10 mins. if we can go.
I will be back in touch with you. Tome add I have to testify this morning.
We will have lunch -- 12:30.

K: That moves up everything.

L: We will have times and everything. You can wait until lunch.

K: Yeah. Just between us.

L: That's the only way.

K: I will bring Haig along. We have a back up.

L: Yes, it's good to bring him. How about 1:00?

K: 1:00. See you then.