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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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<table><tr><td>Preface</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Part I: The Triumph of Indecision</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Part II: Contingency Planning: Elements of Pressure Politics</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>A. International Political Pressures</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>B. National Political Pressures</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>C. Doctrinal Inadequacies</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>D. Intra-Governmental Restraints</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Part III: Alliance Ethics In Power Politics: The Strategic Balance</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>Part IV: Inevitable Compromise --- The Airlift</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>A. Responding To The Berlin Blockade, June 24-June 28, 1948</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>B. The Airlift Entrenchment Through July 22, 1948</td><td>51</td></tr></table>

Note Regarding Sources

Supplemental Bibliography

Bibliography

A. Public Documents.

B. Memoirs.

C. Manuscripts.

D. Brookings Institution Projects.

E. RAND Corporation Projects.

F. Periodicals.

G. Newspapers.

H. Pamphlets, Special Issues, And Other Sources.

I. Secondary Works.

PREFACE

To allay expectations that the following work is the
<u>magnum opus</u> regarding the Berlin Crisis of 1948, it is best
to outline the scope and intention of this study. The sub-
ject matter by no means constitutes the entire "crisis"
over Berlin; the various western alternatives to the Soviet
threat in Berlin are only followed through the firm estab-
lishment of the <u>Airlift</u> as the western <u>guid pro quo</u> in
Berlin. Ramifications of the Great Powers' struggle after
July 22, 1948 are left in mid-air, since Anglo-American
policies were firmly entrenched by this time. Chauvinism,
parachialism, or both -- in combination with limitations of
energy and length -- limit the study to the policy-making
process of the United States' government, and only to the
extent that other powers, allied or adversary, infringed
upon American decisions, are their motivations or actions
considered.

As a "case study" within the context of a general
theory of limited war, this paper attempts to establish the
"facts" of decision-making as well as educated guesses on
imprecisely-documented events, with an indication of the
reliability of the estimation, and where possible, the source
of information or evaluative process. From this skeletal
form the quantum jump to generalizations (overgeneralizations?)

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proceeds, but in apology and self-defense, the observations concerning decision-making, coordination, and restraints apply only to the period of the 1948 Berlin crisis. It is left for others to assemble and select the data appropriate to general theories of limited war. Embodying the prejudices of an amateur historian, I tend to disavow the possibility of comprehending decision-making outside its historical context as anything other than mere exercise. My prejudice is particularly strong in the case of Berlin, wherein the dilemma of Germany and Central Europe of the post-war era have drawn upon the complexities of wartime negotiations and maneuvers.¹

There may be, nevertheless, some interest in crisis "automata-tons" *per se*, so that a balance between the two may not be unhealthy.²

The following pages attempt to demonstrate the profound influence of domestic pressures, feuds, and organizations -- what I have termed "pressure politics" -- in conjunction with a troubling strategic balance and a fearsome alliance problem to produce the Berlin Airlift. Despite the prevalent notion that the airlift was a diplomatic "coup" in the Cold War, I hope to demonstrate that lapse into reliance upon the Airlift was a bungled but fortuitous compromise in the gradual constriction, or cramping, of American and Allied alternatives in the Berlin crisis of 1948.

¹Recent and outstanding works providing background to the Berlin crisis are: Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton, N.J., 1957); John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma Over Germany* (New Orleans, 1959); Manuel Gottlieb, *The German Peace Settlement And The Berlin Crisis* (New York, 1960); Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy In The Second World War* (London, 1962).

²Charles A. McClelland, *The Reluctant Automaton In The Quemoy Crisis* (San Fran. State College, 1961), mimeo, *passim*, and *Tacit Communication By The Physical Act At Berlin And Quemoy* (n.p., 1961).

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PART I: THE TRIUMPH OF INDECISION

As the four-power nerve center of Central Europe,
Berlin was particularly sensitive to changes in the inter-
national climate. Without precise rights of land access
from the West and geographically vulnerable to Soviet con-
ventional military strength, the western powers foresaw the
political lever which Berlin might be for the Russians.¹ Wes-
tern estimations of expected Soviet action and precautionary
measures which were contemplated by the Allies compose the
first stage of policy-making, influential in the Berlin
crisis of 1948.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1947 the Soviet-
controlled press in Eastern Germany forecast western with-
drawal from Berlin.² Because of the British dollar shortage,
the U.S. Departments of State and Treasury arranged a meet-
ing in Washington to discuss easement of the sterling crisis
aggravated by British payments in the Bizone,³ with General
Lucius D. Clay joining the American delegation on October 8,
1947.⁴ Three days earlier Moscow had ominously created

¹The obvious possibility of a Soviet squeeze on Berlin is particularly apparent in the light of negotiations and actions since the Casablanca conference in 1943. The developments between 1943 and 1948 are not treated here. [Of. William R. Harris, "Domestic Pressures In International Crisis: Berlin Airlift — 1948," B.A. Thesis, Harvard University, History, 1962, MS, pp. 4-43.]

²The New York Times, August 22, 1947.

³The Bizone was the jointly-administered Brit.-Am. zonal area.

⁴Lucius D. Clay, _Decision In Germany_ (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), p. 177.

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a Communist Information Bureau, which would coordinate activities throughout the satellite countries, in Italy, France, and elsewhere.⁵ General Clay, military governor of the U.S. zone of occupation in Germany, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Clay's political advisor, and Ambassador W. Bedell Smith, from Moscow, appeared before one of the first meetings of the National Security Council to discuss Bizone financing and the alliance problem in relation to the Soviet Union. This NSC meeting took place prior to the four-power London Conference of November and December, most likely in the second week of October 1947.⁶ With President Truman and the heads of major government finance agencies present, Clay and Smith "both expressed the view at that meeting that we must be prepared for Soviet action to force our withdrawal from Berlin and that we must remain."⁷ At the Cabinet meeting on October 10, measures to counteract the Cominform were discussed, with a post-Cabinet discussion following among Defense Secretary Forrestal, Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, Ambassadors Smith and Murphy, and General Clay. Recognizing the danger of America's post-war demobilization, Ambassador Smith cited a retort of Stalin:

⁵Walter Millis, (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 326-7.

⁶Clay has placed this meeting in the "fall" of 1947, *op. cit.*, p. 239. More specifically, subject matter and persons present indicate that this meeting took place on or about October 9, 1947. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 177 and *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 327. General Clay, in another work, mentions an extraordinarily coincidental meeting in "November" of 1947. Cf. Lucius D. Clay, *Germany And The Fight For Freedom* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 36. Clay has most likely misplaced the meeting one month; the possibility still exists that there was also warning of Berlin trouble during November 1947, in which case the subsequent inaction would appear even more ludicrous than before.

⁷Clay, *Decision*, p. 177.

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"Stalin said," in the paraphrase of Forrestal, "we do not want war but the Americans want it even less than we do, and that makes our position stronger."⁸

At this time the question of withdrawal from Berlin may have drawn discussion; within the American government opinion was divided on the strategy for Berlin, exhibited by rumors at United States Military Government headquarters in Germany. General Huebner's denial that withdrawal from Berlin was under consideration convinced only some of the observers:

> The denial by General Huebner, however, does not fit in with general sentiment among many Military Government employees...many Military Government officials openly discuss the probability of a three-power withdrawal from this city.⁹

Throughout the fall of 1947 ambiguities such as these prevailed in the western camp, in anticipation of elaborate orations at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, with the British and Americans resigned to _de facto_ partition and the revival of a Western German state. A major problem, obvious to men working on German affairs, would be arrangements to avoid the contingency of Soviet blackmail over Berlin.¹⁰

By the third week of December, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), finished an intelligence report whichascertained that the Russians were projecting an operation to drive the Western powers from Berlin. CIA's "high-level foreign positive intelligence" provided details of Soviet plans to

⁸Forrestal Diaries, p. 327.

⁹The New York Times, October 12, 1947.

¹⁰John C. Campbell, (ed.), *The United States In World Affairs*, Council On Foreign Relations (New York, 1949), p. 459.

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blockade the former German capital.¹¹ It is presumed that this report reached officials in London, where the problem of Berlin was under consideration. After the breakdown of the London Conference in mid-December, the American future in Berlin received the attention of "our highest officials" who "thrashed out" the situation in private sessions.¹² The discussions extended to top British diplomatic and military officials; those American officials "directly concerned with this problem" urged a speedily and precisely defined answer — plans should be made to stay or withdraw. If the Allies were to remain, they had best prepare to enforce their rights through a bolstered military position; if they wished to avoid danger through withdrawal, they had best prepare to leave before the loss in prestige would overwhelm them and before the Berliners were compelled to commit themselves in East-West disputes.¹³ General Clay discussed the matter with General Marshall, now Secretary of State. In addition, during a long luncheon at Ambassador Douglas' residence, General Clay reviewed for Marshall, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, "and several other dignitaries" measures which would put Germany on the road to recovery, and possible consequences in Berlin.¹⁴ General Clay's memoirs hint at these discussions:

¹¹Donald Robinson, "They Fight The Cold War Under Cover," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 221, No. 21 (November 20, 1948), 191.

¹²Demaree Bess, "What Did The Airlift Really Prove?", *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 221, No. 52 (June 25, 1949), 28.

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

¹⁴Theodore H. White, *Fire In The Ashes, Europe In Mid-Century* (New York, 1953), p. 144.

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The London conference had also provided Murphy and me with an opportunity to discuss German problems with Marshall and his staff, and for Robertson [British Military Governor In Germany] and me to discuss them with Marshall and Bevin. At the same time, it gave Douglas background information necessary to the active role he was to play in German affairs.¹⁵

Although top officials agreed that a decision should soon be made regarding the Allied position in Berlin, they could not reach that decision — at the talks following the London fiasco, or during succeeding months. News dispatches from Berlin carried intimations that both Generals Clay and Robertson were aware of possible Soviet blockade.¹⁶ Three months earlier, Colonel Frank L. Howley, Commandant of the American Sector in Berlin, established a supply of powdered milk because he felt that the Russians might manipulate food supplies for political ends. At that time a new currency was secretly shipped to Western Germany in the event of a Soviet currency reform, and later, for use in the Western reform.¹⁷ The first overt signs of blockade came in January, with Russian cargo restrictions on January 6, a Soviet protest against the Anglo-American Bizone arrangements on January 20, and restrictions on German civilian train movement to the city of Berlin on January 24. The forthcoming three-power London Conference opening on February 23 would certainly antagonize the Russians, as it would move toward a strengthened Western bloc and the revival of a Western German state; yet indecision prevailed.¹⁸

¹⁵Clay, *Decision*, p. 349.

¹⁶The *New York Times*, January 12, 13, 18, 1948; W. Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade, A Study In Cold War Politics* (Princeton, N.J., 1958), p. 72.

¹⁷Frank L. Howley (as told to J. P. McEroy), "I've Talked 1600 Hours With The Russians," *Reader's Digest*, Vol. 54, No. 325 (May 1949), 75-76.

¹⁸John Mander, *Berlin: Hostage For The West* (London, 1962), p. 44.

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At least five sets of intelligence estimates were avail-
able to American policy-makers in the spring of 1948, with
different interpretations of Soviet "capabilities" and "inten-
tions."19 By January, perhaps February 1948, reports of G-2
(Army Intelligence) varied substantially from those of CIA;
Both CIA and G-2 agreed that there were extensive troop move-
ments (Soviet) throughout Eastern Europe, with a resulting in-
crease in military manpower levels. Apparently these two in-
telligence services agreed upon Soviet capabilities, which may
have been estimated as an ability to overrun Western Europe in
forty-five days.20 On Soviet "intentions" CIA and G-2 disagreed.
Army Intelligence, with the backing of General Clay, insisted
that Soviet troops in Eastern Europe were massing for use in
an attack on Czechoslovakia, while CIA insisted that these
troops were meant for "action in the Eastern zone of Germany."21
According to Hanson W. Baldwin, General Clay and the Army were
"wrong" in their estimate of Soviet intentions, while the jud-
gement of Central Intelligence "was far closer to being correct
than the Army's was."22 Baldwin commented wryly upon the Army's
political capabilities in this so-called "spring crisis": the
estimation of intentions "must imply political as well as mil-
itary judgement, and the services are not particularly compe-
tent to make such judgements."23 Intelligence fostered inaction.

19A-2(Air Force Int.), G-2(Army), ONI(Off. of Naval Int.), Foreign Service, and Central Intelligence. The British Military Intelligence (through M.I.-5 and M.I.-6) was presumably another source of intelligence, even if not particularly helpful.

20Hanson W. Baldwin has cited this time period, but possibly as a hypothetical ex., "Intelligence, III," *New York Times*, July 23,1948.

21Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1954), p. 231.

22Baldwin, *loc. cit*.

23Ibid.

Unfortunately for American decision-making, the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia on February 24 did not resolve the intelligence feud between G-2 and CIA: the decision was a draw. On the one hand, G-2 had correctly predicted trouble in Czechoslovakia and had given cognizance to the massing of Soviet troops on the Czech border; on the other hand, CIA had been correct in predicting that the Soviets were not preparing for the use of troops in Czechoslovakia, and indeed the *coup* progressed without the involvement of Soviet troops. Although the Soviet troop movements were, as CIA continued to proclaim, a prelude to the blockade of Berlin, G-2 continued to regard them as an appendage to the Czech operations. Army officials respected the verdict of their own intelligence service, and apparently the United States government came rather close to adopting the Army view as "the" definitive outlook.²⁴ Only with effort did Central Intelligence prevent complete acceptance of the Army's "blunder in 1948 concerning troop movements in the Soviet zone of Germany."²⁵

General Clay sensed impending trouble, but he recalled that "the intelligence reports which came to my desk contained nothing to arouse suspicion...I had no confirming intelligence of a positive nature...."²⁶ General Clay, nevertheless, sent an intelligence dispatch to the Army General Staff, Chief of

²⁴Snyder and Furniss, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 235.

²⁶Clay, *Decision*, p. 354.

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Intelligence, and according to Walter Millis, this top-secret
cable "fell with the force of a blockbuster bomb" when it hit
the Pentagon on the morning of Friday, March 5. Even a block-
buster bomb, it appears, was insufficiently powerful to inspire
remedial action:

FROM CLAY EYES ONLY TO CHAMBERLIN

FOR MANY MONTHS, BASED ON LOGICAL ALALYSIS, I HAVE FELT
AND HELD THAT WAR WAS UNLIKELY FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS. WITHIN
THE LAST FEW WEEKS, I HAVE FELT A SUBTLE CHANGE IN SOVIET AT-
TITUDE WHICH I CANNOT DEFINE BUT WHICH NOW GIVES ME A FEELING
THAT IT MAY COME WITH DRAMATIC SUDDENNESS...I CANNOT SUPPORT
THIS CHANGE IN MY OWN THINKING WITH ANY DATA OR OUTWARD EVI-
DENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS OTHER THAN TO DESCRIBE IT AS A FEELING
OF A NEW TENSENESS IN EVERY SOVIET INDIVIDUAL WITH WHOM WE
HAVE OFFICIAL RELATIONS. I AM UNABLE TO SUBMIT ANY OFFICIAL
REPORT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUPPORTING DATA BUT MY FEELING IS
REAL. YOU MAY ADVISE THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THIS FOR WHATEVER
IT MAY BE WORTH IF YOU FEEL IT ADVISABLE.²⁷

For three solid days and nights the CIA followed up Clay's
telegram with an intensive study of Soviet intentions. When
President Truman began work on Monday morning, he read the CIA
verdict: "The Russians are definitely not going to start a war
for the next sixty days, and in all probability not for a year."²⁸

²⁷*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 387.

²⁸Robinson, "They Fight The Cold War...," loc. cit., p. 191.
This "no-war" period of sixty days was alarmingly short; it should
be noted that implicit in the estimate was the assumption that
any outbreak of war would be all-out, general war. The assumption
that a Berlin skirmish could not remain limited was so universally
held that there was no need to state the implicit assumption.

Shortly thereafter, between March 11 and 14 Secretary of
Defense Forrestal chaired a conference of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff at Key West, Florida, where "roles and missions" were
apportioned in a temporary truce among the services. Secretary
of State Marshall sent a telegram to Forrestal at Key
West, communicating the apprehensions of Foreign Minister
Bevin and his suggestions for "Atlantic security" arrangements,
especially in the face of Soviet pressure on Norway.²⁹ Within
the framework of service disputes and international anxiety,
"the intelligence community" under the fledgling leadership of
CIA achieved an accord on the CIA estimate concerning Berlin
and the threat of war. Eight days had passed since CIA's
purple-ink report had been presented to the President, when on
Tuesday, March 16 State, Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence
authorities agreed to a brief combined intelligence estimate
along the lines of the original CIA report.³⁰

While the "Cold War" hardened, Berlin remained without
any agreed Western position on meeting dire contingencies.
Congress approved additional defense expenditures, most of
which would be ineffectual until the summer of 1949, and on
March 17 Britain, France, and the Benelux countries signed a
fifty-year Western Union defense pact (The Brussels Treaty).
A clear sign of projected Soviet reaction to Western resolve
was the action of Soviet Marshal Sokolovsky, who stalked out
of the Allied Control Council for Germany (ACC) on March 20.³¹

²⁹Forrestal Diaries, p. 392.

³⁰Ibid., p. 395. Millis, editing the Diary summary report of the March crisis, presents the combined estimate as if it were the first U.S. intelligence estimate following Clay's telegram. The implication is that the government functioned for 10 days with no clear idea of the dangers involved, which is not the case.

³¹Clay, *Decision*, pp. 354-55.

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With the unilateral Soviet abrogation of the Control Council machinery, four-power administration of Germany was brought to an effective halt. In March, as in December, prior to, and after the Czech coup, intelligence reports again forecast a blockade of Berlin as a tangible possibility; presumably the reports were those of CIA, since the Army held to its troops-for-Czechoslovakia theme.32 Because the Russians would attend only ACC committees of their choosing, those on currency and insurance, General Clay ordered that American officials attend only meetings of the Allied Secretariat and the Kommandatura. General Clay's action was undertaken without consulting Washington, resulting in ill-feelings from the State Department, where the move was considered hasty and inadvisable.33 Despite friction between State and the Army, the deteriorating situation required firm and continuous administration in Germany, so that after a teletype conversation (telecon) on March 23 among Clay, Army Chief of Staff Omar N. Bradley, and Army Secretary Kenneth C. Royall, the President released a statement that the Army would continue to govern the American zone in Germany past the July 1 deadline at which time the State Department had been expected to assume responsibility.34 Feelings were mixed in the State Department, where General Clay was often distrusted.35 At least, it was felt, the General would have to

32 Joseph Alsop, "Berlin Airlift," The Washington Post, January 3, 1949; Dwight Boyd Mitchell, "The Berlin Problem, 1943-1949, A Study In International Relations," M.A., Univ. of Illinois (Urbana, 1949), MS, p. 59. In *ung the source you find if possible, give his source*.

33 Ibid., p. 45; OMGUS, Monthly Rept. of the Mil. Gov. for Ger. No. 33 (March 1948); Robert Rodrigo, *Berlin Airlift (London, 1960)*, p. 17.

34 OMGUS, "Army To Continue Control In Germany," (OMG) *Information Bulletin*, No. 133 (April 20, 1948), 1.

35 Personal interview; Mitchell, op. cit., p. 45.

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extricate himself from difficulties which, as seen from State,
were partially of his own making.

Despite Army intelligence reports, some evidence of concern -- even scattered evidence of preparation -- were apparent during late March 1948. Drew Pearson reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff saw in Russian territorial expansion the goal of removing the Soviet homeland from the range of American bombers, excepting those based in Alaska and Japan. The JCS had analyzed the atomic bombing of strategic Soviet cities, "if we have to."³⁶ On the local level Colonel Howley, one of the first officers to expect a Soviet blockade of Berlin, worked with his experts on a contingency plan, "Basic Assumption," which would establish "Operation Counterpunch" on the assumption that the Soviets would split their zone from those of the West. Howley asked the British and French Commandants to appraise his March 25th plan. General Jean Ganeval was shocked at the thought of such Soviet barbarity but pleased at the insurance policy; General E. O. Herbert was not startled at the projected Soviet intervention but thought an airlift was technically unfeasible. His estimated washout date was October 1, 1948, despite Howley's plan to stockpile critical materials.³⁷ Nevertheless, indications of blockade were discounted in higher quarters.³⁸

³⁶Drew Pearson, *The Washington Post*, March 22, 1948.

³⁷Colonel Howley expected a Soviet blockade ever since his arrival to Berlin in 1945; when his fears approached realization, the cry of "wolf, wolf," presumably echoed in the ears of G-2 and State Department officials with whom Howley was in contact (Riddleberger, Murphy) so that the Colonel was limited to advice and precautions on the local level. Cf. Frank L. Howley, *Berlin Command* (New York, 1950), pp. 201-3.

³⁸Cf. *supra*, footnote 37; Interview, W. Phillips Davison, Council On Foreign Relations, New York, March 30, 1962.

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On March 30, 1948 the Soviet government created a minor flurry over Berlin, serious enough to cause official Washington concern, and <u>almost</u> serious enough to crystallize diverse opinions on holding Berlin into a cohesive national policy. Soviet Deputy Military Governor Dratvin presented notice of further travel restrictions, including Soviet inspection of British, French, and American military trains, to be effected on April 1.<sup>39</sup> Within the Department of the Army the Soviet note spirited debate over withdrawal from the city of 3.3 million people. Plans for withdrawal of dependent personnel were sent by cable to General Clay, who thought the move a political disaster (and possibly a wedge of the pro-withdrawal faction in the Army Department):

> Withdrawal of dependents from Berlin would create hysteria accompanied by rush of Germans to Communism [sic] for safety. This condition would spread in Europe...and particularly in Italy [with its crucial elections in April].<sup>40</sup>

When it became clear, next day, that the Soviets were issuing inspection orders for border personnel, General Clay cabled Washington for instructions, asking permission to offer a compromise by which he would furnish passenger lists but refuse inspection of military trains. Approval was granted, but the proposal was quickly turned down by the Soviet General Dratvin.<sup>41</sup> Worried by the impending threat of blockade, General Clay sent word of Dratvin's refusal, and proposed an armed convoy with orders to shoot if halted. The Joint Chiefs of Staff joined

<sup>39</sup>U.S. Dept. of State, *The Berlin Crisis, A Report Of The Moscow Discussion* (Washington, 1948), 1-2; U.K., *Germany: An Account Of The Events Leading Up To A Reference Of The Berlin Question To The United Nations* Cmnd. 7534 (London, 1948), 15-16.

<sup>40</sup>Clay, *Decision*, p. 358.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 359.

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in a conference with Defense and State Department officials.⁴²

The text of General Dratvin's reply arrived during the meeting, and it was immediately apparent that the language was much milder than General Clay had implied. General Clay was authorized to assign guards to military trains on the understanding that they would only shoot in self-defense. There was no need to discuss the situation with the British, since they had reached a decision ahead of the Americans, and were planning to assign defensive guards to their regularly-scheduled trains.⁴³ Secretary of the Army Royall called a telecon with General Clay, who interrupted his dinner to learn the decision. Clay thought he "detected some apprehension on the part of Secretary Royall," and pressed for offensive train guards:

> If war were desired by the Soviet Government it would not be averted by weakness...I do not believe this means war...Please understand we are not carrying a chip on our shoulder and will shoot only for self-protection. I do not believe we will have to do so.⁴⁴

That evening two inward-bound trains passed unhampered, but two outward-bound trains from Berlin to the West were halted. There are indications that General Clay interpreted the clause on "self-defense" liberally so that the officer in charge might have forced his way through, but "the young officer in charge chose discretion to valor,"⁴⁵ and the trains were shunted to a siding.

⁴²Sec. Army Royall, Sec. Air Force Symington, Army C/s Bradley, former Army C/c Eisenhower, Air Force C/s Spaatz, CNO Denfield, UnderSecState Lovett, Chief, Div. Central Eur. Affairs, State, Jacob Beam, and Chief, Div. Eastern Eur. Affairs, State, Llewellyn Thompson.

⁴³Clay, *Decision*, pp. 358-9; *Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 407-8.

⁴⁴Clay, *Decision*, p. 359.

⁴⁵Mitchell, op. cit., p. 59; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "How Our Foreign Policy Is Made," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 221, No. 44 (April 30, 1949), 30-31. Mitchell, as I have done in my thesis, maintains that the halted trains were Eastbound. They were Westbound. Cf. *Monthly Report of the Control Council For Germany (British Element)*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April 1948), 5. Also, *Vol. 3, No. 3* (March 1948), 18.

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That General Clay was willing to risk war over such a minor incident irritated the Department of State, which intervened through the Department of the Army to assure that such incidents would not re-occur in the future.⁴⁶

Anglo-American trains to Berlin were cancelled, and with pressure from General Clay, the French reluctantly agreed to halt their runs to Berlin. On April 1st or 2nd General Clay ordered the supply of the Berlin sector military government by air, and on April 2 thirty C-47s arrived with supplies.⁴⁷

Immediately after the trains from Berlin were halted, Clay cabled Washington for assurance that his uneasy telegram of March 5, which he began to regret more and more, was no longer valid: "This was the action I had anticipated...military action [is] not likely."⁴⁸ General Clay's concern that withdrawal might become official policy grew in the first weeks of April, and as Secretary Royall noted, "while there was no change in the Department's position that we should remain in Berlin, the question was under constant discussion in Washington."⁴⁹

From the American Embassy in Moscow came a State Department summary of April 1: "The Soviet Union will not deliberately resort to military action in the immediate future but will continue to attempt to secure its objectives by other means."⁵⁰ Next

⁴⁶Mitchell, op. cit., p. 59.

⁴⁷Sources are split between April 1 and 2 for ordering of military airlift, but planes began arriving on April 2 according to all reliable sources. Cf. Lowell Bennett, *Berlin Bastion, The Epic of Post-War Berlin* (Frankfurt/Main, Germany, 1951), p. 29.

⁴⁸Clay, *Decision*, p. 355.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 361.

⁵⁰*Forrestal Diaries*, p. 409.

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day the intelligence community produced a new combined intel-
ligence estimate under the direction of CIA, extending the
sixty-day "no-war" prediction of March 16 for a new sixty-day
period. A-2, Air Force Intelligence, "took a footnote" in
dissent from the combined report; apprehensions over Soviet
intentions may have fused with Air Force perception of a
Soviet danger which would require the seventy-group Air Force
under consideration at the time.⁵¹ During intense consideration
of Berlin withdrawal, General Clay fought for firmness, even
daring, towards the Soviets. On April 2 he argued with the
Army Department that evacuation was "unthinkable";⁵² on April
10 he pleaded against withdrawal:

> We have lost Czechoslovakia. Norway is threatened. We retreat from Berlin. When Berlin falls, western Germany will be next. If we mean...to hold Europe against Communism, we must not budge...If we withdraw, our position in Europe is threatened. If America does not understand this now, does not know that the issue is cast, then it never will and communism will run rampant. I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay....⁵³

General Clay argued too persuasively for firmness to allow
Washington to decide upon withdrawal, but not firmly enough to
produce the military backing which a reasoned convoy plan would
require. While the British and French evacuated most of their
personnel and dependents from Berlin, General Clay proposed a
squadron of B-29s fly up and down the air corridor to "scare
'hell' out of the Russians."⁵⁴ State, in rage, had this plan vetoed.⁵⁵

⁵¹Ibid., p. 409.

⁵²Clay, *Decision*, p. 360.

⁵³Ibid., p. 361. Cf. remark attributed to Lenin forty years ago: "Whoever holds Berlin, holds Germany. Whoever holds Germany, holds Europe." Mander, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

⁵⁴Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁵⁵Reports of Clay's scheme leaked to the Press, at which point the State Department discovered it, and transmitted "orders" to Clay through the Army. Cf. *New York Herald Tribune*, April 30, 1948.

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When the restrictions on train inspection eased during the second week of April, the resumption of ground transportation was swiftly followed by discontinuation of the air shuttle on April 11. The western powers could lapse into what they hoped would become the *status quo ante*; only the British undertook minor preparations for siege, in particular, the reconstruction of a power generator in their sector which would prove invaluable during the first few days of the June blockade.⁵⁶

Between April and June political events moved with rapidity; that the impending crisis in Berlin remained obscure at the time seems almost incredible, with hindsight. In April the United States exploded its second series of (unannounced) atomic tests since 1945, while the Brussels Pact signatories re-examined their defenses and the Western powers prepared for the creation of a Western German state. Marshall Aid (E.R.P.) passed through the Congress and the three-power London Conference resumed. After the Moscow discussion of early May failed to produce more than preliminary agreement, the Anglo-Saxons dragged the French government of M. Schuman toward acceptance of a West German state, culminating in the London Communiqué issued on June 7.⁵⁷ A few days later the U.S. Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution which looked toward an Atlantic Security Pact, as a defense against the Russian advance in Europe. Finally, the decision of the Anglo-American authorities to undertake Western German currency reform provides the Soviets with a pretext, and ensured a Berlin crisis. Set for June 1, the reform was delayed until the 18th to

⁵⁶Rodrigo, op. cit., pp. 1, 157; Jacques Robichon and J. V. Ziegelmeyer, *L'Affaire de Berlin, 1945-1959* (Paris, 1959), p. 186.

⁵⁷Peter Calyocoressi (ed.), *Survey of International Affairs* (London, 1952), p. 242ff; D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War And Its Origins* (London, 1961), I, 504.

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secure French approval and participation.⁵⁸ On top of the June 16 Soviet move terminating four-power <u>Kommandatura</u> meetings in Berlin and the June 18 announcement of Western currency reform which excluded Berlin, the Soviets rejected a French proposal for four-power finance discussions on June 19.⁵⁹ Moreover, after the three Western governments sent the Soviet general a joint-letter on June 21,⁶⁰ General Sokolovsky accepted the four-power meeting for the next day, when he refused to talk about joint currency control and set in motion the Soviet reform including the Berlin area.⁶¹ The stage was set, so that when the West responded in kind with currency reform in Berlin, Molotov, with the half-hearted consent of Stalin, aided by General Sokolovsky in Berlin under the command of General Bulganin, inaugurated the Berlin blockade in the early morning of June 24, 1948.⁶² Restrictions and inconveniences which had been cumulating for several months led inexorably to the total land blockade of the city. That a series of Soviet moves of such proportions could pass without any major formulation of Western response, without provoking large-scale concern, and without the most trivial preparation is remarkable.

⁵⁸Harry S. Truman, *Years Of Trial And Hope* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), p. 244ff; Jack Bennet, "The German Currency Reform," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political And Social Sciences*, Vol. 267, (January, 1950), pp. 43-54.

⁵⁹U.S., Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Foreign Relations Committee, *Background Documents On Germany, 1944-1959, And A Chronology Of Political Developments Affecting Berlin, 1945-1956* (Washington, D. C., 1959), Appendix II, p. 446.

⁶⁰"Le Conflit De Berlin," *La France En Allemagne*, No. 10 (October 1948), Commandement en Chef, Division De L'Information, p. 47.

⁶¹Bennet, op. cit., pp. 43-54. Robichon, op. cit., pp.192-3n.

⁶²J. Bernard Hutton, *Stalin-The Miraculous Georgian* (London, 1961), p. 311.

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An urgent call from Colonel Howley's office to the U.S. Army quartermaster in West Germany several days before the blockade had resulted in the stocking of 117 tons of whole powdered milk and 65 tons of canned concentrated milk.⁶³ And yet, were not there preparations of greater significance which might have been undertaken? Fortunately the food trains on June 21 managed to reach Berlin, and from June 21 a trickle of needed supplies was sent by air; nevertheless, the Western powers faced the blockade on the morning of June 24 almost totally unprepared.⁶⁴

Militarily there had been no support, excepting some evacuation plans which had been prepared. No indications exist that any logistics studies of airlift capability had been undertaken, and no airlift support had been sent to the USAFE Command. Requirements for the civilian needs of Berlin were unknown, and in all of Washington there was not a study on access rights to Berlin which was quickly available for high-level discussions. National policy on the Berlin question had not been ascertained, not to mention the coordination of objectives within the growing Western alliance. General Clay had decided that while a blockade "might succeed in forcing us out...I doubted if the Russians would be so foolish as to make a move which would alienate the German population completely."⁶⁵

⁶³Bennett, op. cit., p. 76

⁶⁴Clay, *Decision*, pp. 211-3, 362-5; Oliver J. Frederiksen, *The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953*, U.S. Army, Historical Division, HQ (Darmstadt, Germany, 1953), p. 196; Paul Fisher, "The Berlin Airlift," Special Issue of United Aircraft Quarterly, *The Bee-Hive*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Fall, 1948), 6; *Journal of the Royal Service Institution* (London), Vol. 93, No. 571 (August, 1948), 464.

⁶⁵Clay, *Decision*, p. 361. Underscoring added.

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General Clay apparently limited his horizons to the effects within Germany, but to many observers the stakes were those of the Western alliance and the Soviet desire to prevent the revival of a German state through the Constitutional Convention planned for September 1, 1948; or indirectly through German distrust of a state without Berlin, and thus a hope of reunification, the Russians might weaken the West. General Clay himself had argued that Berlin represented "the future of democracy" but saw no reason for a Soviet blockade. Army intelligence reports may have inflicted much of the damage, since they bred complacency over the future of Berlin. Until the blockade itself, high officials in military government were divided on the likelihood of a blockade, and most of them were caught by surprise when the blow came.⁶⁶ Pentagon officials were unsure, and on the Army General Staff there was division on the prospects of blockade and also on the best course of action in that contingency. In the State Department the entire affair was regarded as a problem which General Clay had better handle, and among those who were concerned there was a tendency to disregard intelligence reports, including those which continued to forecast the likelihood of a blockade. In the germinating stages of crisis one would not expect executive interest or leadership, especially in the midst of the looming electoral struggle through November.⁶⁷ James P. Warburg who had predicted the blockade in 1947 noted "the extraordinary frivolity with which Britain and the United States have walked into a clearly foreseeable crisis,

⁶⁶Davison, op. cit., p. 77; Mitchell, op. cit., p. 58; Personal Interview.

⁶⁷Hoover Commission Report, Appendix G; Personal Interview.

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without any idea of how they were going to get out of it."⁶⁸
Put in another way, by _The Economist_:

> What is alarming is to discover how little the Western Powers had — apparently — foreseen such a siege or prepared for it. They have apparently for weeks been playing poker with the Kremlin without properly examining their own hands.⁶⁹

> Possibly _The Economist_ has been too kind; perhaps a few of the players had peeked at their hands, and disappointed by what they had quickly glimpsed, slammed the cards on the table so that they could play without the restraints which knowledge would have brought them. Possibly this approach gives General Clay too much credit, but he must have been keenly aware of the strength within the Army Department of the pro-withdrawal faction. Regardless, the situation at the outset of the blockade deserves some attention. How had the policy-making process dealt the hand which it deposited, and what was the composition of it? Only after a look at these questions, can the process of play be adequately developed.

⁶⁸James P. Warburg, "The Berlin Crisis," Address to the Council on World Affairs, Providence, Rhode Island, December 7, 1948, pamphlet (n.p., 1948), p. 8.

⁶⁹*The Economist* (London), July 3, 1948, p. 1.

## PART II: CONTINGENCY PLANNING:
ELEMENTS OF PRESSURE POLITICS

No clearly satisfactory explanation is available for the trend of American policy-planning during the months of growing tension prior to the blockade. Perhaps a few key men faced difficult choices which resulted in procrastination on the key question: whether to reinforce our position or to prepare an orderly withdrawal from Berlin? What major influences shaped the rewards of indecision? Or rephrased, why were there incentives in procrastination? Inter-action among political interest groups, what might be termed "pressure politics," when examined in its major components, may provide a partial account of the decision-making process in the prelude to the Berlin blockade. These foundations of American policy-making for Berlin make plausible the situation which arose on the morning of June 24 and offer guidelines to the process by which an airlift became the cornerstone of American-policy for Berlin---from July of 1948 through the lifting of the blockade in May of 1949. Four of the elements which shaped the trend of pressure politics were: (1) International Political Pressures, (2) National Political Pressures, (3) Doctrinal Inadequacies, and (4) Intra-Governmental Restraints.

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"Patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies," which would require "adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points" would be particularly difficult in the event of withdrawal from Berlin. By early 1948 the U.S. National Security Council had approved the containment policy of NSC 20, but except for British enthusiasm at renewed American vigor, there was little evidence that withdrawal from Berlin would not undermine the defense of Western Europe.¹ Communist pressure in Scandinavia, the Czech coup as a last blow in Eastern Europe, and critical domestic crises in Italy and France provided the framework for any decision on Berlin. The onus of retreat, with all its uncertainties, would be a grave undertaking. If America were to assume Free World leadership, it would require a policy of firmness rather than a course of action which might have lost Italy to the Communists in the April elections, toppled the friendly French government under M. Schuman, and demolished plans for a Western German state, European Recovery and defense.² Major international political consequences of a withdrawal policy would follow the announced retreat; consequences of attempting to reinforce the Western position in Berlin would wreak international discord that might eliminate the plan before any significant military additions.

¹Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC 68: Prologue To Rearmament," MS, p. 26, to be published in, Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Making National Security Policy: Three Case Studies* (New York, 1962, in press); George Kennan, *Amer.Diplomacy(N.Y.,1951)plb*.

²The stability of the Western governments in France and Italy, Marshall Aid, revitalization of the Ruhr, and political stability in Western Germany were crucial in the trend to Western Union & NATO.

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Although there would be little objection to America's an
buttressing of the Western position in Central Europe, any
further sacrifice on the part of the European powers was an
entirely different question. Any request for sizeable conti-
nental assistance might leave the Anglo-Saxons further isolated
than they wished, especially if the contemplated burden of
early sacrifice would torpedo the painfully-emerging plans for
Western Union, a European Defense Community, and eventually
a trans-Atlantic security agreement (NATO). The risks of nip-
ping-in-the-bud a mutual security program of far-reaching con-
sequences were considerable, while the prospects of trouble in
Berlin were not at all certain.

Only the Great Powers, with a direct stake in the future
of German affairs, could expect to alter the power balance over
Berlin. The considerable financial sacrifices of mobilization
-- even limited mobilization -- led Britain and France to allow
the Russians a vast conventional military superiority on the
Continent. Britain was not in a position to offer leadership
for an increased Western defense effort on a short-range basis,
although she set the pace for Western Union and a North Atlantic
treaty. France, with her fear of renewed German invasion, an
economic competition and political decline, would not undertake any
further military obligation to Germany, even if the United States
would offer proposals of urgency for the protection of Berlin.
Both countries confronted balance-of-payments difficulties, es-
pecially the British after the sterling crisis of 1947. If they
would station additional divisions on German soil, both countries

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would aggravate their dollar shortages, while encouraging the already stupendous inflation problem which a manpower scarcity and growing consumer demand presented. Under pressure from General Montgomery, the British Labour Government had attempted a peace-time military service obligation, but with its platform of welfare legislation, the government reckoned with limited resources. Demands which appeared superficial or asked extreme sacrifice in the aftermath of the war would only throw the Labour Government out of office. As for the Quai d'Orsay and the Schuman government, any further aggravation of the French role in Germany would only assure the early demise of the coalition government. As it was, the government collapsed under the tension of the Berlin crisis. The United States could not expect French support over Berlin, especially since the French were more concerned about a Soviet-American <u>detente</u> than about the preservation of their bitter enemy's former capital. Because the Foreign Minister was accused of acting as a puppet, with the strings pulled in Washington, even the suggestion of French efforts for Berlin's security might have led to collapse of the Schuman-Bidault régime. In short, international political pressures offered a bonus for inaction over Berlin, since both of the alternatives which were considered after the London Conference in December 1947 were unpalatable for a variety of reasons. Firm and determined leadership might have resulted in a bolstered Western position, but the United States' government, also, faced domestic pressures which could not be averted.³

³For much extended discussion of international pressures and complexities, and for footnotes and references, cf. William R. Harris, "Domestic Pressures In International Crisis: Berlin Airlift — 1948," Thesis, B.A., Harvard University, 1962, MS, pp. 21-32.

National Political Pressures

1948 was an election year. The decisive effect of a
national election was so obvious to all, including the Russians,
that the precaution was taken, after the Wallace talks in May
1948, to inform the Soviets that, elections notwithstanding,
there was an American concept of "bipartisanship in foreign
policy." The entire Berlin crisis serves as an example of that
bi-partisanship; the Republicans acted with considerable re-
straint.4 Once the crisis broke there was almost no criticism
of the Administration's approach, and while solidarity was noth-
ing of the substance displayed in the House of Commons on June
30, it was impressive, especially in the months before November.
And yet, upon examination, there was little that the Republicans
could very well attack after the blockade had begun. The most
vulnerable point, the failure of Eisenhower, Clay, Murphy, and
Deane to secure written access rights to Berlin, was one which
could backfire on those who weakened the nation in time of crisis.
It is prior to the outbreak of crisis that party politics and
political temperaments played a vital role in policy-making.
President Truman faced a bolt within the Southern flank of the
party, a Gallup Poll which had declined since 1947, the drain of
liberal votes to Wallace, and the staunch conservative criticism
of Taft, Vandenberg, and Dewey, one of which would be his opponent
in November. Even the threat of Eisenhower did not fade until
his announcement of ineligibility on July 5. Either of the two

⁴Of. H. Bradford Westerfield, *Foreign Policy And Party Politics* (New Haven, 1955), *passim*. For extended discussion and references, cf. Harris, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 34, 36, 43. A recent work of assistance is, Alfred Steinberg, *The Man From Missouri, The Life And Times of Harry S. Truman* (New York, 1962), pp. 241ff, 307ff.

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major alternative preparations for the contingency of crisis in
Berlin were potential political disasters. One would lose the
liberal vote to Wallace and provide the Republicans with power-
ful ammunition; the cost of a speedy military build-up would
unbalance the budget, and undermine Truman's politically-moti-
vated $40 per household tax-cut. The other, while it might
regain some of the votes lost to Wallace, would add flames to
the growing fire of "sell-out at Yalta" and "Communist-infiltra-
tion." It might forge a viable candidate within the "Stop
Truman" movement, and would enhance the already optimistic po-
sition of the Republican candidate. Neither of these possibi-
lities was inviting, and thus emerged the danger of ending
consideration on a subject because of its unpleasant aftertaste.
Still, there was the possibility of searching for a middle ground
in Berlin, for studies on airlift capability, or legal rights in
and to the island city. International and national pressures
cannot explain away the desirability of contingency planning.
Doctrinal and intra-governmental restraints may explain, if not
defend, the scope of the problem.

## Doctrinal Inadequacies

Through the Berlin crisis and the Korean War the concept of
"limited war" was not understood; in Berlin, unlike Korea, the
critical nature and geographical vulnerability of the Western
position made "limited war" so unlikely that the confusion in
doctrine was secondary. Nevertheless, the mutuality of "deterrence"

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Why were CIA intelligence reports, known to warn of
possible trouble in Berlin from December 1947 at the latest,
disregarded? Before and after the Czech coup and through the
blockade itself, CIA reports forecast trouble. Troop movements
throughout the Eastern zone of Germany with massing near Berlin
and the Western border, and Atlantic activity of the Soviet
submarine fleet indicated serious trouble. Since G-2 was able
to convince a majority of policy-makers of its version, there
must be some (account of) reasons for discrediting the CIA reports.
Firstly, G-2 worked intently upon its reports and was known to
have a large and old operation extending through all of Eastern
Europe. Secondly, G-2 had special motives to discredit CIA,
beyond the level of intelligence accuracy, because for eleven
months G-2 was in the process of warding off CIA attempts to gain
control of G-2's "covert operations." Thirdly, CIA was under-
staffed, and in the opinion of some, was badly-staffed and poorly
run until Ambassador Smith acquired its control. Fourthly, CIA
in its first years faced general resentment in what could not
yet be called an intelligence "community," with charges of "empire-
building." Fifthly, CIA's relations with State were poor, since
there was squabbling over whether State's Ambassadors had juris-
diction over CIA personnel under embassy "cover." Sixthly, it
is believed that CIA's vast reservoir of information on Germany and
Eastern Europe came from a CIA-financed agency in Germany (O.G.)
which, because of its Abwehr and German orientation, was often
discredited among "intelligence consumers."⁷ Seventhly, certain

⁷George Fielding Eliot, "Is Our Intelligence System Reliable?" U.S.A., Vol. 1 (June, 1952), p. 30; Sherman Kent, "How Effective Is Our Intelligence?" The Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 6 (Sept. 12, 1950), 19; Personal Interview.

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unspecified geographical desks of State disregarded intelligence
reports or treated them with disdain, as alleged by the Hoover
Commission Report (Appendix G). Lastly, differences of inter-
pretation (and these, rather than substantive differences on the
basic facts, seemed to be the major source of disagreement) were
not handled by any Office of National Estimates or Evaluation
Committee which could have merged the various reports and defined
areas of divergence. Only after the blockade fiasco were remedial
structural changes undertaken, within the intelligence process.

Rivalry among the military services resulted in the vetoes
within the Joint Chiefs of Staff or in private "horse-trading"
which assured that any contemplated military policy be negotiated
to provide a distribution among prospective customers. If the
Army, Navy, and Air Force could agree on a $30 billion FY 1950
budget, cut to $23.5 billion, while the budget ceiling set shortly
before the blockade would be $15 billion, the pressures to share
equally must have been enormous. While the Army's requests,
especially those for FY 1948 and FY 1949 because of the time lag,
might have strengthened America's diplomatic hand in Berlin, the
Air Force and Navy Chiefs of Staff, seeking seventy wings and
super-carriers respectively, recognized the appropriations problem
as a "zero-sum game." Compromise abounded in the Berlin crisis,
prior to the crisis as exhibited by the strategic balance, and
during the crisis by the non-drastic moves and sharing of roles,
first by the Air Force and Navy to stop the Army convoy, and then
by the Air Force, which opposed an airlift to express concern over
its inadequate budget level, but offered no viable alternative to
an airlift.

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With the myriad of pressures dispersing and degrading the planning function, the chasm between the Army and State Departments assured indecision on the Berlin question. State was to have assumed responsibility for the American Zone in Germany at the beginning of July, but because the Army had occupied the area and had predominated during the close of the war, it was only natural that the State Department had assumed a junior role in the governance of the zone. As the State Department regained the leadership of American foreign policy the Army's role in Germany assumed vestigial proportions. Impending crisis, however, necessitated continuity which maintained dual channels to Berlin. General Clay, accused of acting as "pro-consul," disagreed with the State Department on numerous issues: Germany's share of Marshall Aid, participation in ACC and Kommandatura machinery after the Soviet disruptions, four-power currency in Berlin, use of B-29's in the air corridors, and the desirability of an armed convoy to Berlin during the "little blockade" of April, among them. Liason on-the-spot was ineffective because Ambassador Murphy was picked by Clay, and as Clay recalled, never disagreed with the General on any major issue in their four years together. The resulting disharmony, stemming from a tradition of vigorous State and War Department disagreements, led to what was tantamount to State Department withdrawal from the affairs of General Clay, except when Clay's schemes threatened to draw the nation to the brink of war. Neither, it seems, could understand the other. State left Berlin to the General, and the General, apprehensive over seeming weakness at State and at Army headquarters, preferred indecision to withdrawal. He couldn't expect support.

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PART III: ALLIANCE ETHICS IN POWER POLITICS:
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

American defense expenditures dropped from $80.5 billion
in 1945 to a de-mobilized $11.1 billion in 1948, an austerity
budget which marked the nadir of Cold War defense expenditure
levels.¹ The strategic balance would vitally influence policy
during the blockade, but hurried expenditures of apprehension,
such as those in spring of 1948 could only redress the balance
in 1949. Dissatisfaction was unanimous in the Pentagon. The
Air Force would not receive its seventy groups, the Navy its
new carriers, and the Army its authorized troop strength. The
Army's Reserves totalled only two-and one-third poorly-trained
divisions, and on February 1, 1948 Army strength was only
552,000 men, while European Command had 98,000 against a re-
quirement of 116,000.² Existing groud strength was "critical"
and required "drastic action" in the appraisal of General Albert
C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations.³ With a force
level that ranked only sixth among nations, the United States
could provide just one division without partial mobilization.⁴
In the South of Germany were the equivalent of two American
divisions, but they were deployed and trained to police Germans
rather than fight Russians, and they were scattered over three
hundred miles of front. As with those of the British, American

¹Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., "Unification Of The Armed Forces," in Doct. Diss., Harvard University, March, 1951, MS: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York, 1961), p. 39.

²The *Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 375, 389.

³The *New York Times*, April 7, 1948.

⁴The *Forrestal Diaries*, op. cit., p. 376.

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lines of communication ran South from Bremen and Hamburg, so closely parallel to the front that a Russian raid might well have scissored them within forty-eight hours.⁵

True, the United States was not alone in capability to defend Western Europe, but how much assistance could she expect? Western forces consisted of 12 under-strength and poorly trained divisions ready to fight in Europe.⁶ Defense forces in Germany consisted of somewhat less than 200,000 badly organized men.⁷ There were two British divisions armed with wartime Churchill tanks (obsolete) and poor logistic support, guarding the North. Three extremely weak French divisions (some armed with old Sherman tanks, obsolete) guarding the center, and the two American division-equivalents guarding the South, completed the forward defense line. Reserves included a possible British division, a possible Belgian division, two under-strength French divisions, and six battalions of combat-ready U.S. troops one month away.⁸

Considering the rapid de-mobilization of the West, the Soviet Union had cut its manpower level from 11 to 3 million, still a considerable advantage. Within Eastern Germany the Soviet troops numbered about 300,000, while Western troop strength in Berlin was only 6,000. In addition to the 22 Russian divisions on the forward line, the Russians kept 140 of 175 divisions at battle strength (not including the various satellite divisions).⁹ In Central Europe Russian fighting

⁵Theodore H. White, *Fire In The Ashes, Europe In Mid-Century* (New York, 1953), p. 295.

⁶The Forrestal Diaries, op. cit., p. 460; Robert Endicott Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, 1962), p. 29.

⁷White, op. cit., p. 295.

⁸Ibid., p. 295.

⁹Osgood, op. cit., p. 29; White, op. cit., p. 303.

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strength outweighed Western fighting strength by more than three-to-one.¹⁰ The Soviets enjoyed a disparity of immediately available divisions on the critical Central European front on the order of 100,¹¹ with at least a 10 to 1 ratio of numerical superiority in standing divisions and an even greater superiority in ready and trained reserves.¹²

As the Berlin crisis reached a head, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.) Montgomery informed the Prime Minister of the "parlous state" of the British Army and its "complete state of unreadiness and unpreparedness for war."¹³ The same could be said for the conventional strength of the other Western nations, although the British situation was particularly bad, with a budget ceiling of £600 million and only half a million troops of which 10% were deployed in Palestine.¹⁴ A prominent American military statesman said at the time of the blockade, in what may best summarize the balance of conventional forces in Europe, "All the Russians need to get to the Channel is shoes."¹⁵ Within a few weeks it was expected that the Allies would have to withdraw to the Pyrenees. It was "generally assumed" that 50 to 70 divisions would be necessary to defend the line at the Elbe or even the Rhine, and military plans devised by the Brussels Treaty powers in collaboration with the U.S. called for 80 to 85 divisions, about 1/3 reserves, in order to hold the Rhine line. 15 more divisions would hold the Italian and Scandinavian flanks.¹⁶

¹⁰White, *Ibid.*, p. 295ff.

¹¹Osgood, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹³Viscount B. L. Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field-Military Montgomery* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1958), pp. 430-433.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 427-433.

¹⁵White, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

¹⁶Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 35, 48; Roger Hilsman, "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context," in Klaus Knorr(ed.), *NATO And American Security* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 14-16.

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General Clay's assessment of the situation was that "twenty good Western divisions" could hold the Rhine line, but his estimates were considered optimistic, to be polite, and may have been influenced by the policy decisions for which he was fighting. Even granting the Generals dubious assumption, one could not equate the state of the twelve Western divisions with "twenty good divisions."¹⁷

When queried by Defense Secretary Forrestal about the use of the atomic bomb if war broke out, General Clay seemed to place great emphasis upon it, which he "would not hesitate to use."¹⁸ Possibly General Clay attached excessive weight to the American nuclear capabilities of summer, 1948. In 1945 and 1946 production of fissionable materials was virtually at a standstill, with almost no research on new weapons devices, and extremely limited production of 1945-type bombs the apparent post-war policy of the JCS.¹⁹ The only two tests from the summer of 1945 through the spring of 1948 were the Bikini Able and Bikini Baker shots of the Navy in 1946; neither advanced the "state of the art" since they were 1945-type bombs to test effects on Naval installations for post-war planning.²⁰ There may have been about three nuclear weapons in the stockpile during 1947, the year during which the production of fissionable materials quickened.²¹ It would appear inefficient for the U.S. government to manufacture large quantities of early-style bombs, it could be surmised, when new designs were

¹⁷The Forrestal Diaries, op. cit., p. 460.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 488.

¹⁹Ralph E. Lapp, *Atoms And People* (New York, 1956), p. 97; Ralph E. Lapp, *The New Force* (New York, 1953), pp. 116-118; J. Stefan Dupré and Sanford A. Lakoff, *Science And The Nation, Policy And Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962), p. 115; Personal Interview.

²⁰Lapp, *Atoms And People*, op. cit., p. 97ff.

²¹Personal Interview.

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strategic bombing damage would inflict tremendous, but not
decisive damage, upon the Soviet Union. Western Europe would
still be over-run, and thus two appraisals by persons with
access to stockpile statistics at the time are, "a <u>very, very</u>
limited number of atomic bombs," and "an <u>inadequate</u> number of
bombs, that's all I can say."<sup>27</sup> While America might be safe
in the initial stages of the war, the loss of Europe with its
industrial potential might prove disasterous.

Although the strategic balance in summer of 1948 presented
an asymmetrical stalemate, it introduced "ethical" considerations
into American policy-making because of the expanding Western alli-
ance. French national interest required peace in Europe, for as
Premier Henri Queuille told a reporter in 1949, "Eventually we
would again be liberated, but the process would be terrible. The
next time you probably would be liberating a corpse...even 15 days
after the invasion will be too late."<sup>28</sup> The French could not
control the military situation, since even a solely American con-
voy to Berlin, if it led to war, would inevitably draw the French
into a defense of their homeland. Quai d'Orsay officials acted on
the basis of recognized American "fate control," and American
officials, particularly in the State Department, recognized the
ethical dilemma which a convoy to Berlin would present. Cynical
interpretation of ethical elements in decision-making might allow
the classification "long-range national influence." If America
were to successfully risk French survival on the Berlin issue,
the growing alliance might crumble before it was formalized. Brit-
tain, recognizing her dependence on U.S. power, empathized with France

<sup>27</sup>Personal Interviews.

<sup>28</sup>*The New York Times*, March 3, 1949.

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PART IV: INEVITABLE COMPROMISE --- THE AIRLIFT

Inevitable is a harsh word. To appraise an event as "inevitable," worse yet, to appraise the event on hindsight as inevitable, is both trite and dangerous. Trite, because of the hindsight, and dangerous, because fluidity and intangibles in history make any course of events uncertain at best. Still, within the framework of pressure politics, prior indecision, and an umbrella of asymmetrical deterrence, an airlift was the only plausible alternative for the West. That the process of decision-making would arrive at consensus, necessarily an airlift, does not prove that the end result was necessarily optimal; indeed, a good case can be built for either withdrawal or convoy, for breaking diplomatic relations, presenting an ultimatum, or preparing suprise preventive war, all of which were considered.

Success of the airlift was not inevitable. In June of 1948 it was impossible to ascertain the strength of Berlin's morale, the extent of black-marketing, mildness of winter weather, or the technical proficiency of the airlift itself, all of which contributed to the success of May 1949. The working of pressure politics, inter-acting goals and demands, assured a middle course of negotiation based on the airlift's bargaining strength. Even if the airlift were to fail, it would have bought time. Time would have extended the flexibility of negotiation, enabled the U.S. to put its military machine in readiness and to manufacture many of the new atomic devices. Time would have convinced West

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and East alike that America was determined to fulfill her obligations, and time would tide the Administration through a potential election disaster-over-Berlin in the November contest. Possibly withdrawal would have eliminated the danger of future embarrassment over the Berlin thorn, possibly a convoy or preventive war would have eliminated the Cold War threat in its most advantageous stage. Nevertheless, the middle road seemed the safest way out, and safety was an irresistible attraction. C. L. Sulzberger has described "Clay's proconsular technique" in negotiating policy, a technique which applied to the pro-withdrawal bloc as much as to Lucius DuBignon Clay:

> Sometimes he asked for more than he expected to get. But this was a deliberate device employed by a man who knows democracy's methods. Sometimes one must ask too much to get enough.¹

After the first four weeks of blockade the United States government, through the National Security Council, had determined that the airlift was "enough." The main outlines of decision are set forth below:²

## Responding to the Berlin Blockade, June 24 - June 28, 1948

Thursday, June 24, was a day of confusion, with all eyes in Washington turned to the Philadelphia convention hall where Dewey received the Republican nomination. Ambivalence throughout U.S. Military Government in Germany, State, and the Army, was shattered

¹C. L. Sulzberger, "A Remarkable Feat As Proconsul," *The New York Times*, April 28, 1962. Although this remark applied to the Berlin Crisis of 1961-1962 with all its dis-similarities from that of 1948, the basic pro-consular technique is reminiscent of its earlier shade.

²For an extended discussion of the first four weeks in Berlin, cf. W. Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade* (Princeton, N.J., 1958), Chapter entitled "The First Four Weeks," and the author's thesis for extended discussion on broader aspects of Western decision-making.

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with the halting of all road and rail traffic between Berlin and the West by 6 a.m. The land blockade was complete. During the first two days of the blockade officials in Military Government were divided on the question of withdrawal. General Clay and his political adviser, Murphy, and Colonel Howley, the Berlin Commander, were committed to maintaining the Western outpost in Berlin; others, including top officials on Clay's staff and members of the State Department staff in Berlin, favored withdrawal.³ A high American official in Berlin warned Washington that the blockade would soon turn the population against the West, making occupation untenable.⁴ Some financial experts argued that the Soviet currency would not affect Berlin because of the favorable currency flow from the Eastern zone; moreover, Berlin was a deficit area costing $250,000,000 per annum to feed and supply. Radio stations along the zonal frontier could reach the Germans in the East. But most important was the need to make a clean break, perhaps for concessions by the Soviets in Austria. Why complicate an already disturbed peace settlement with troublemaking enclaves and corridors, particularly since there were no written access rights to Berlin other than by air?⁵ It was clear that American intransigence would only risk French survival, and shortly after Clay and Howley expressed their determination to hold Berlin on June 24, French spokesmen, official and unofficial, expressed their alarm and generally confirmed the American view in Berlin that the French position was "soft."⁶

³W. Phillips Davison, *The Berlin Blockade* (Princeton, 1958), p. 149; Personal Interview.

⁴Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 75n.

⁵Jack Raymond (Heidelberg), *New York Times*, June 25, 1948; Frank Howley, *Berlin Command* (New York, 1950), pp. 197-201; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision In Germany* (Garden City, 1950), p. 365; Manuel Gottlieb, *Memo to Gen. Clay and His Econ. Adviser*, L. Wilkinson, "The Currency Reform Crisis In Berlin," and Manuel Gottlieb, *Berlin Crisis and an Honourable Ger. Peace Settlement*, Oct., 1948, privately mimeoed; *Ger. Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis* (N.Y., 1960), pp. 194-5.

⁶Harold Callender (Paris), *New York Times*, June 25; *Le Monde*, June 24, 25

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Events in London may have aided Washington officials in deciding upon a position of firmness. On June 24 the British Cabinet held an unannounced meeting on Berlin. Prime Minister Attlee usually relied upon Foreign Secretary Bevin in such matters, and Bevin was known to be unwavering from the outset of the crisis. Soviet restrictions were interpreted as a "challenge to the continued presence of the Western powers in the City," thus to be met with firm opposition? In Washington, indications of Soviet troop massings near the Western borders and Atlantic-based submarine activity, led intelligence analysts to warn the President of possible war.⁸ Possibly on this date, June 24, word came from Moscow to Washington that the Russians would rescind the order to blockade Berlin if President Truman would cancel the currency reform. Truman refused (though the date may have been later than the 24th)?⁹ The return message from Moscow was an arrogant statement that the Western powers had no right to be in Berlin.¹⁰

It is unclear whether General Clay proposed an armed convoy to Berlin during June 24 or June 25, except that the lengthy hesitation in Washington suggests that the proposal came on June 24 and the response on June 25.¹¹ In a telecon (teletype conference) with Washington, General Clay stated:

> My feeling from here is that the Russians are bluffing. I cannot believe they will go to war if we call their bluff. I therefore propose that an armored train be prepared in the West of Germany; that this train be loaded with normal supplies which we have been receiving. And that a company of well-armed troops be placed aboard the train.¹²

⁷The London Times, June 25, 1948; Clifton Daniels(London), New York Times, June 26, 1948.

⁸Donald Robinson, "The Airlift That Saved Berlin," *Air Force Blue Book* (New York, 1961), II, 72; Bernard G. Bechhoeffer, *Postwar Negotiations For Arms Control* (Washington, D. C., 1961), p. 149n.

⁹Date and reliability are questionable. Alfred Steinberg, *The Man From Missouri, The Life And Times of Harry S. Truman* (N.Y., 1962), p. 313.

10Ibid., p. 313.

11Lowell Bennett, *Berlin Bastion* (Frankfurt/Main, 1951), pp. 42-43.

12Ibid., p. 43.

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..... This is a calculated risk. We feel in Berlin that the Soviets will not face a showdown. They will not dare to interfere with the train, for we will announce our intention publicly well in advance, and the blockade they have imposed will be broken.¹³

General Clay's proposal was passed "to the highest levels" in Washington, and the delay in response was cause for apprehension in Berlin headquarters of Military Government.¹⁴ With the time difference, the results of the British Cabinet meeting on June 25 may have influenced actions in Washington; having flown back from Germany to report on Berlin, Deputy Military Governor Brownjohn discussed the crisis.¹⁵ Clay's convoy proposal appeared in Cabinet debates, perhaps at this time. Aneurin Bevan, later to advocate British neutrality, urged a convoy, but Secretary Bevin is thought to have decided against any extreme measures.¹⁶ Because of increased British airlift (for troops only) beginning on June 26, it would appear that withdrawal had been eliminated as a possibility at least by this meeting on June 25.¹⁷ Influence upon Washington's decisions may have been communicated through the "Standing Committee" which held its first Berlin crisis meeting on the 25th.¹⁹ Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas (U.S.), Ambassador René Massigli, (Fr.), and Sir William Strang, Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office (in charge of German and Austrian Affairs) coordinated and exchanged national viewpoints throughout the crisis.

¹³Ibid., p. 43.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 43; Personal Interview.

¹⁵The *London Times*, June 26, 1948; Clifton Daniels(London), *The New York Times*, June 26, 1948.

¹⁶Willy Brandt, *My Road To Berlin* (Garden City, 1960), p. 192; Davison, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁷Davison, *Ibid.*, p. 151.

¹⁸'Standing Committee' was called "The Permanent Committee For Germany" by the French, cf. Maurice Ferro, *Le Monde*, July 21, 1948, and occasionally "The Berlin Committee", cf. *Chronological Tables Regarding Germany* (De-classified, 9-7-59), 1947-1948, Part I, 15 May 1949, CFM Secretariat; *Civil Aff. Div.*, CMGUS (Berlin, 1949), p. 82.

¹⁹Drew Middleton(London), *New York Times*, June 27; Daniels, *loc.cit.*, June 26, 1948.

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While awaiting Washington's reply on the convoy proposal, General Clay apparently directed an increase in the military airlift operation which had proceeded slowly since June 21. On June 25 a substantially larger tonnage was delivered to Berlin, but the sustenance of the civilian population was not yet national policy.²⁰ At the regular Friday Cabinet meeting, President Truman brought up the Berlin situation, at which time he asked Secretary of the Army Royall to "inquire from General Clay whether the situation was serious enough to consider the removal of the families of our personnel in Berlin."²¹ After the meeting Forrestal, Royall, and Lovett stayed to discuss the situation at greater length. There was no available study on American legal rights in Berlin, and the situation was uncertain so that a decision was made to postpone consideration for a day, but postponement only applied to the question of withdrawing from Berlin, not to the question of undertaking a convoy.²² It appears quite likely that the "regular meeting" at which the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered Clay's convoy proposal was the regular meeting on Friday, June 25. Clay's proposal for a convoy was considered too risky, on military grounds, and was rejected by the JCS.²³ However, because General Clay felt that the Russians were bluffing and that the risk of war was less than one chance in four, the JCS was quite willing to authorize General Clay's convoy under the specific condition, that

20. Chronological Tables Regarding Germany, 1947-1948, op. cit., p. 68

21. Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y., 1956), p. 123.

22. Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 452, 460.

23. No single source provides this information; careful examination of the following sources should indicate this JCS action on June 25: *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 452; Eugene Davidson, *The Death and Life of Germany* (New York, 1959), p. 212; Demaree Bess, "What Did The Airlift Really Prove?" *Sat.Ev.Post*, Vol. 221, No. 52(June 25, 1949), 29; Stewart and Joseph Alsop, "How Our Foreign Policy Is Made," *Sat.Ev.Post*, Vol. 221 No. 44(April 30, 1949), 115; Flora Lewis, "Clay-Back At The Barricades," *New York Times Sunday Magazine* (December 3, 1961), 31; Robinson, *op.cit.* 71; Robert Endicott Osgood, *NATO, The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, 1962), pp. 28-29.

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the convoy embarked with orders to withdraw if halted by Soviet troops. General Clay's proposal, most likely after consideration by the President, Forrestal, Lovett, and Royall, and after JCS discussion, necessitated a reply.

The Department of the Army, through Secretary Royall, would transmit Washington's vaguely-worded directive to General Clay, in a telecon which called General Clay away from dinner (early afternoon, Washington time). It is believed that Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's special Chief of Staff, favored withdrawal.²⁴ He attended the crucial JCS meeting, and while the JCS would not authorize Clay's version of a convoy, they side-stepped the touchy withdrawal question, calling it a "political question" which was "beyond their competence."²⁵ When the JCS proposal was offered to General Clay, he declined to accept a convoy on those grounds: "I'll never order troops of mine to run from the Reds without a fight."²⁶

Clay was informed that a convoy which would not halt, involved "too grave" a risk with an atomic conflagration "too imminent."²⁷ Clay, himself, admitted "some risk" in firmness, and accepted the directive which he was given. His orders were vague, including such phrases as "...hold on...as long as possible...without undue provocation" to the Russians.²⁹ Clay understood the score; he would

²⁴D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War And Its Origins* (London, 1961), I, 507, citing Drew Pearson, *The Nashville Tennessean*, September 11, 1948.

²⁵Alsop, *loc. cit.*, p. 115.

²⁶Robinson, "The Airlift That Saved Berlin," *loc.cit.*, p. 72.

²⁷Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

²⁸Clay, *Decision, op.cit.*, p. 366.

²⁹Bess, "What Did The Airlift Really Prove?" *loc.cit.*, p. 29.

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require some maneuver to defeat the pro-withdrawal group in the State Department, Army headquarters, and the JCS. Indecision favored Clay, just as it had done before the crisis came to a head, because every additional day of crisis focussed more world attention on Berlin, and therefore made withdrawal less and less palatable. Indecision also worked against any move which would deal Soviet prestige a crippling blow; public notice limited Soviet flexibility just as it did that of the West. Clay's search for some middle ground was not entirely a Machiavellian scheme to defeat the pro-withdrawal group. It should be recalled that General Clay had refused to accept his own statement that the Soviet blockade was a "bluff" — the General had turned down a JCS offer to run a convoy-test. In a sense, the JCS had called Clay's own "bluff."30

On the evening of June 25 General Clay reflected upon the JCS refusal with General Albert Wedemeyer, who was visiting Clay in Berlin. Wedemeyer offered a suggestion which had made the rounds in British and American Military Government headquarters for several months — an airlift. Clay called a full-blown meeting of his staff on immediate notice.31 Despite disagreement about its feasibility, it was decided to undertake supply of Berlin's civilian population by air, when a consensus was reached in the early morning hours of June 26.32 General Curtis E. LeMay was notified by telephone in Wiesbaden, and on that day, June 26, old Gooney Birds (C-47's) delivered 80 tons of supplies.33 At least the pro-withdrawal group would be stopped, and then again, there was the remote chance

30cf. Lewis, loc.cit., 31ff. In 1961 General Clay reflected that his decision to reject the JCS proposal may have been unwise. Still, in summer of 1948 his uncertainty about Soviet firmness deterred the General from attempting a "bluff" convoy.

31Bennett, op.cit., p. 45.

32Davison, op.cit., p. 105; "A Special Study of OPERATION VITTLES, The Story of the Berlin Airlift," Aviation Operations Magazine, special issue (April, 1949), p. 8.

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that the airlift would succeed, although General Clay did not expect much from it at first. When Clay announced the start of the experiment to the editor of *Neue Zeitung*, he said as he snapped his fingers, "I wouldn't give you that for our chances."³³
In Washington there was the threat of the evacuation advocates. One of them expressed the sentiment: "If

If you're damned fool enough to let somebody slam a door on your finger, the first thing to do is to pull your finger out.³⁴

In addition, it had been General Clay who had let the door slam shut in 1945; the pro-withdrawal group saw this as another reason to quit Berlin, but General Clay drew upon his previous laxity as further reason to maintain the freedom of Berlin:

> I didn't ask Washington. I acted first. I began the airlift with what I had, because I had to first prove to Washington that it was possible. Once I'd proven it, it was no longer hard to get help.³⁵

General Clay and General LeMay, Commander of USAFE, passed from the first day of supplies into the general scheme of supplying Berlin by air. On his return from lunch during the early afternoon of June 26, General Joseph Smith received a surprise assignment from General LeMay to organize an airlift on a 45-day basis.³⁶ With only 100 (102?) C-47's in the USAFE Command, outside assistance would be essential. By Saturday evening (afternoon, Washington time) the requirements were transmitted to Washington Air Force HQ, and General Clay undertook another telecon with his superiors.³⁷

³³Eugene Davidson, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203, footnoted as a Personal Interview.

³⁴Alsop, "How Our For.Policy Is Made," *loc. cit.*, p. 115.

³⁵Curt Riess, *The Berlin Story* (New York, 1952), pp. 164-165.

³⁶Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 104; Personal Interview.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 54.

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We believe now we can supply Berlin by air. This will be an unprecedented attempt. From a practical, economic point of view it is entirely impractical. But the political and human stakes are so high that we feel here that it must be done. We will need planes, the biggest you possess and as many as you will let us have, to achieve our goal. We are determined to destroy the Soviet attempt to murder Berlin. Will you support us?³⁸

The proposal was sent up to the President, for the implications of this decision would be far-reaching. A "hastily assembled White House meeting" was called.³⁹ This meeting has been described by one source as a meeting of the National Security Council, although it is unclear whether all NSC members were present or whether it was a formal NSC meeting.⁴⁰

One restraining factor in this high-level meeting may have been the French government's unannounced and identical notes delivered in London and Washington. They asked that no unilateral military action be undertaken by any one of the occupying powers, probably a polite manner of indicating violent opposition to an armed convoy.⁴¹

At this policy meeting Under Secretary of State Lovett, who was known to incline toward the French position, asked, "Are we going to stay in Berlin or not?"⁴² President Truman replied, "We are going to stay. Period!"⁴³ Secretary of Defense Forrestal apparently favored Clay's convoy proposal with armored trains, "others" a preventive war, and some a rupture of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ President Truman declared that

³⁸Bennett, *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³⁹Steinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

⁴⁰Hans Herzfeld, "The Splitting of Berlin in 1948," in Charles E. Robson(ed.), *Berlin-Pivot of German Destiny* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960), p. 50.

⁴¹This note remains unpublished. Misdated, June 30 in *The World Today* (London, August, 1948), p. 318, date of note's rumors in Paris. correctly dated and described, *The London Times*, July 1, 1948.

⁴²Not to be confused with June 28 mtg though similar, cf Forr. Diaries.

⁴³Steinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 313.

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the basis upon which Berlin alternatives should receive consideration was, "that we must remain in Berlin; we have only to discuss the ways and means through which this purpose can be accomplished."⁴⁵ President Truman rejected the alternatives which strayed from the safety of middle ground: "As long as the Russians are willing to continue talks — however futile — there will be no shooting."⁴⁶ President Truman concluded that Berlin should be supplied by air, at least to buy time, and as it turned out, to successfully break the blockade. As Truman recalled his decision of June 26,

> I directed that this improvised "airlift" be put on a full-scale organized basis and that every plane available to our European Command be impressed into service. In this way we hoped that we might be able to feed Berlin until the diplomatic deadlock could be broken.⁴⁷

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, objected to this move because he considered Air Force strength inadequate to "cover" the loss of these air corridor planes in renewed crisis. "An emergency would find us more exposed than we might be able to afford," as Vandenberg's argument ran, but President Truman justifiably rejected the argument as specious.⁴⁸ Did the Air Force Chief favor an Army build-up for a convoy? No. Did he propose preventive war or withdrawal? The answer was obvious; Vandenberg saw an opportune moment to stress the budgetary inadequacies which the Air Force met, as he would do again in the weeks which led to the airlift as official NSC policy.

⁴⁵Herzfeld, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴⁶Steinberg, op. cit., p. 314.

⁴⁷Truman, op. cit., p. 123.

⁴⁸Steinberg, op. cit., p. 314.

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Following the paraphrase of this meeting in *The Forrestal Diaries*, Walter Millis has inserted a note which deserves comment because of its influence upon and damage to a proper perspective on decision-making, as exhibited in the Berlin crisis:

> Where, one is forced to ask, was all the elaborate machinery which had been set up to deal with just such situations—the CIA, which was supposed to foresee and report the approach of crisis; the National Security Council, which was supposed to establish the governing policy; the War Council, which was supposed to transmit the policy to the military so that they should have their plans set up to meet the requirements?

> The Berlin crisis had been long in the making; but when finally it broke, the response was this ad hoc meeting at 4:00 p.m. on a Sunday afternoon in the Pentagon, which by-passed the formal machinery of the Security Act to take large (if rather vague) politico-strategic decisions—incidentally overlooking in doing so the potentialities of the airlift, which was actually to be decisive....56

Mr. Millis has diagnosed the situation incorrectly in almost all respects. If one is forced to ask, another is forced to answer. As has been shown, the CIA did its best to convince policy-makers that a blockade was imminent, in December 1947, before and after the Czech coup and until the blockade itself, as well as performing an intelligence evaluating function on the danger of war at the outset of the blockade. G-2 had wrought the damage and coordination had been dismal, but CIA had performed. As for the National Security Council, it had performed a vital function of coordination on June 26 and had helped to establish the airlift as the President's choice. The "response" was not one which totally overlooked airlift potential, since it was just that — an airlift — which had been established. Concerning the War Council, the group meeting in Royall's office was the War Council, with the exception of three members who were not vitally concerned by the decisions to be undertaken. Prior to this Sunday

56Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 454.

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afternoon meeting, (which Millis has termed "the response" to
the Berlin crisis, "when it finally broke,") the consolidation
of responses had taken a central pathway,⁵⁷ which despite later
challenges would form the basis for the American stand in Berlin.
On the basis of Mr. Millis' remarks on the by-passing of formal
Security Act machinery, Timothy W. Stanley had mistakenly con-
cluded that the Berlin Blockade decision was "not formally pro-
cessed through the Council,"⁵⁸ As was customary, initial NSC
reccommendations were not prepared formally, but their effect
was none the less powerful, and eventually the NSC decisions
underwent formal processing, in the case of the blockade, five
to six weeks after the original decision of June 26.⁵⁹

By the third day after the blockade the airlift had been
established as national policy, and since no major change was
made at the working-level meeting on Sunday, the report to the
President next day contained no startling alterations in plan.
When Lovett, Royall, and Forrestal met with the President that
Monday, Truman cut Lovett's recitation of alternatives short —
"there was no discussion on that point, we were going to stay
period."⁶⁰ Clay would receive 2 squadrons of B-29's (without
atomic bombs, most likely, but the Russians could not be sure),⁶¹
and Britain's permission to allow B-29 bases would be considered.
Coordination on an Allied note and talks in Berlin continued.

⁵⁷For interim period between the blockade and "the response," cf. *supra*, pp. 39-48.

⁵⁸Timothy W. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security* (Washington, D. C., 1956), p. 60, footnoting Millis, p. 454.

⁵⁹cf. Alsop, *loc. cit.*, p. 115ff.

⁶⁰Truman's mind may have been in a rut, but this meeting is not the same as that of June 26, cf. *supra*, p. 43. Only four men are mentioned as being in attendance at this June 28 mtg. Cf. *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 454

⁶¹*The Forrestal Diaries*, p. 455. Cf. *supra*, p. 25 & ftnte. 26.

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What alternative existed for American policy, other than an airlift which would strengthen negotiating power? There was none, and except for occasional thrusts, quickly parried, the airlift approach predominated through its final test of July 22. With public Anglo-American commitment to the "air bridge" venture, the pro-withdrawal faction was virtually defeated, as the French sorrowfully realized. The British stand, Government and Loyal Opposition combined, was indeed dignified, as Herbert Mathews noted in the Foreign Affairs debate of June 30:

> There was no hysteria, no flag-waving, no rhetoric, but a quiet gravity that was immensely impressive to all who know Britons.⁶²

Then, on July 1 a crisis seized "The Standing Committee" and momentarily appeared to sweep away the airlift policy, although the alternative is shrouded in mystery. July 1 was the first Thursday of the month, and if schedules were not upset would have signalled a 3:30 p.m. regular meeting of the National Security Council. There are no indications that an NSC meeting took place. About the time that the NSC meeting might have ended, Ambassador Douglas in London was called to the Embassy to read an urgent cable from the State Department in Washington, contents unknown. "The Standing Committee" was called into action, meeting for four hours into early morning of July 2, and again at the Foreign Ministry later in the morning (while Ambassador Douglas reneged on an honorary degree which had been scheduled). Herbert L. Mathews was impressed: "The three powers are poised for one of the most momentous acts in contemporary history."⁶³

⁶²Herbert L. Mathews(London), *The New York Times*, July 1, 1948.

⁶³Herbert L. Mathews, *New York Times*, July 3, 1948.

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Severing diplomatic relations might not have been, but a
convoy by the three powers or a nuclear ultimatum to the Soviet
Union might well have qualified as "one of the most momentous
acts in contemporary history." It has been suggested by _The New
Statesman and Nation_ that the latter course, a nuclear ultimatum,
had been contemplated by American officials, but that Secretary
of State Marshall had been dissuaded by his European allies.
French Foreign Minister Bidault having convinced Foreign Secretary
Bevin of the grave consequences for France, the two were allegedly
successful in convincing Marshall that the risks were beyond those
of any reasonable course.⁶⁴ Whatever the crisis, it soon subsided.

After negotiations on the local level broke down on July 3,
a three-power note was delivered (with minor unilateral varia-
tions) on July 6, with no backbone; the formal protest merely
confirmed Allied resentment and the blockade-airlift stalemate.⁶⁵
General Clay cabled Washington on July 10 to re-assert his convoy
proposal, but the Army Department which understood the pressures
surrounding any alteration of policy, forestalled the General
by insisting that all peaceful means of solution, including the
United Nations debate and a Soviet reply, came before a convoy.⁶⁶

With an unsatisfactory Soviet reply on July 14, the National
Security Council approved next day the sending of 2 B-29 groups
to a forward position in England, with A-Bombs for some.⁶⁷

⁶⁴cf. *The New Statesman and Nation*, July 10, 1948, p. 21.

⁶⁵U.S. Dept. of State, *Germany:1947-1949*, The Story In Documents (Washington, D. C., 1950), pp. 205-6.

⁶⁶Clay, *Decision In Germany*, op. cit., p. 374.

⁶⁷Gottlieb, *German Peace Settlement..., op. cit.*, p. 202, is clearly wrong in stating that 200 bombers were sent with A-bombs; John G. Norris, "Airpower In The Cold War," *Air Force*, Vol. 31, No. 9, (September 1948), 25-26, thinks none were sent; Thomas R. Phillips, *The New Republic* (October 2, 1961), p. 39, maintains that "some" atomic bombs were available in England. Phillips did not reply to a written request for elaboration or source on his information, during spring of 1962, but his judgement seems best of the three.

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The hardening of American policy in Berlin, symbolized by the arrival of the Superfortress bombers on July 17 and 18, led to a final but half-hearted attempt by General Clay to secure permission for an armed convoy. From Army headquarters in Frankfurt and Berlin came rumors that the State Department was reputedly testing the Allies on use of a three-power convoy. On July 19 General Clay sent another cable to Washington and Under Secretary of the Army William Draper flew from Berlin to explain Clay's views at Army headquarters. Meanwhile the State Department leaked "rumors" that State Department officials in Washington considered convoy talk both irresponsible and dangerous to the Western alliance.⁶⁸

As the French government of M. Schuman fell on July 19, and while the Benelux countries urged caution over Berlin at the Brussels Fact meeting (The Hague, July 19-20), the airlift underwent final scrutiny. Britain's Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, discussed the Berlin situation with Lovett; Marshall, and Truman, later joined by Forrestal, Draper, Royall, and Lovett, conferred on the difficulties and left the White House in "an unusual tight-lipped silence."⁶⁹ General Clay received orders to report to Washington with his adviser, Robert Murphy, on less than twenty-four hour notice for a final showdown. Clay knew that his primary mission was to secure additional air transport, but he came with his convoy proposal, which he discussed with Forrestal on the evening of July 21.⁷⁰

⁶⁸William Harlan Hale, "General Clay—On His Own," *Harper's*, Vol. 197, No. 1183 (December 1948), pp. 86-94.

⁶⁹The *New York Times*, July 18, 19, 20; *London Times*, July 21, 1948.

⁷⁰Clay, *Decision, op. cit.*, p. 368 asserts NSC mtg. in Washington on July 20, but Clay was still in Germany, as he writes on p. 410, and as confirmed in *The London Times*, July 21, and *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 459.

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"Pressure politics" applied to the National Security Council meeting of July 22 as much as to any other event in the first stages of the Berlin crisis. Without any voice, the French ex-Foreign Minister Bidault relied upon the British to express French concern over the new stirrings in Washington. Wary of any imprudent developments himself, Foreign Minister Bevin rushed his draft of a new protest note to Sir Oliver Franks in Washington. Sir Oliver conferred with Marshall before the NSC meeting. Presumably Marshall was well-aware of the consequences which disregard of alliance "ethics" might reap in future years.⁷¹

Before the NSC meeting the Air Force and Navy Chiefs of Staff had decided that a convoy was inadvisable, particularly since it would re-assert Army precedence in strategic planning. An airlift would lessen the risk of increased Army expenditures in Europe, provide training for air crews, and provide the public relations for long-term budgetary needs through a demonstration of "air power." Both the Air Force and the Navy had an interest in glamorizing air operations to win public support and then Congressional appropriations. Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg listened to arguments for a convoy, since the trend in power over the next ten years might very well shift favorably for the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was throwing a series of crises at us, and we would have to face more of these Berlin crises later, if we weathered this one. It seemed that *that* was the time to send in tanks...no one would answer that one question, "What is the likely trend of Soviet Union and United States power over the next ten years?" 72

⁷¹Jean Lequiller, *Le Monde*, July 23, 1948; Maurice Ferro, *Le Monde*, July 24, 1948.

⁷²W. Barton Leach, lecture, Harvard Defense Policy Seminar, May 1, 1961 and November 8, 1961; John R. Summerfield, *The Peacetime Use of Military Aircraft*, RAND Paper,P-1517(14-9-58); Personal Interview.

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[LC]

General Clay, at the invitation of President Truman, opened the National Security Council meeting of July 22 with a summary of developments in the Berlin crisis, and a plea for firmness. He asked for 75 additional C-54's so that 3500 tons per day could be brought to Berlin in the summer, and more planes for a minimum of 4500 tons per day in the winter months. General Vandenberg took the opportunity afforded by Secretary Marshall's question on risks to emphasize the inadequacy of American air power, and therefore his objection to sending additional planes.⁷³ The President inquired about risks of a convoy and Lovett asked about the risk that planes be shot down in the air corridor. General Vandenberg took another opportunity to extoll the virtues of additional air power, and the deficiencies which the airlift would cause America in other parts of the world. Truman recognized the specious nature of Vandenberg's remarks, since as expected, the Air Force Chief proposed no alternative to an airlift. After further discussion, Truman reaffirmed his commitment to the airlift and left the room, while the others remained to settle the exact requirements of planes, airfields, and ground support. Only the airlift remained as a tenable national policy, possibly not the best policy, but the only one which could achieve sufficient support. "Frank Merriwell stuff," as James Reston observed, "was out of the question."⁷⁴

to no avail, and in August 1960, the Berlin crisis led to further developments to Clay's demand for more planes were "vigorous" and apparently straightforward. Without any alternate policy, his exhortations were cut short by the President. Main emphasis was (a) risk of general war with Russia, (b) minimal airlift capability was symptom of general stinginess with Air Force's budget.

⁷³Walt W. Rostow, *The United States In The World Arena* (New York, 1960), p. 228; has surprisingly suggested that Vandenberg's objectives to Clay's demand for more planes were "vigorous" and apparently straightforward. Without any alternate policy, his exhortations were cut short by the President. Main emphasis was (a) risk of general war with Russia, (b) minimal airlift capability was symptom of general stinginess with Air Force's budget.

⁷⁴Truman, *op.cit.*, pp.124-6; *Clay, Decision*, p.368; *Riess, op.cit.*, p.165; Lewis, "Clay...," *loc.cit.*, p. 117; Reston, *New York Times*, July 18, 1948; *New York Times*, July 23, 1948; *London Times*, July 23, 24, 1948.

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[LC]

While the process of determining national policies is at best difficult to follow as an outsider working with open literature, the glimpses which are caught point in several directions. Firstly, the quality of coordination and the prize for indecision are somewhat disheartening. Secondly, the American policy-making process in crisis reveals aspects of the Soviet policy-making process, even without direct study. An airlift conceived with little forethought and almost no confidence could only succeed because the Soviet policy machinery allowed the Allies four months of good flying weather in which to organize the operation. Thirdly, and most important in this study of the airlift decision, any study of limited conflict inter-action should not under-estimate the influence of domestic pressures and intra-alliance pressures upon policies which may at first appear only as strategic moves in the larger international game of limited conflict. If the Berlin crisis of 1948 is any indication of policy-making in a more general sense, then the contraction of policy alternatives as directed by intra-governmental factions is crucial in the development of local wars or limited crises. When national survival is not directly at stake, the stop-gaps may be opened to the flood of pressure politics.

#

Note Regarding Sources:

May 3, 1962:

The attached case study is based upon the following material:

1. Published Memoirs.

2. Brookings and RAND publications.

3. Unpublished manuscripts and dissertations.

4. Newspapers and Periodicals.

5. Pamphlets, Special Issues.

6. Harvard Defense Policy Seminar Discussions.

7. Unclassified or de-classified Public Documents.

8. Secondary Sources.

9. Author's Thesis, Harvard University, 1962.

10. Occasional Interviews.

As indicated above, the author has based this paper solely upon open literature; moreover, the author has not had access to any sources of a classified nature.

An Appreciation: Thanks are extended to the several persons who have given of their time for interviews, during the fall of 1961 and the spring of 1962, as footnoted or otherwise, where anonymity was preferable.

[Lc]

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[LC]

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