MAX N. OSEN
ATTORNEY AT LAW

HA 1-2395

COPY

JAN 11 1969
KISSINGER, HENRY A

1414-6TH
510-MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22. N. Y.

December 30, 1968.

Mr. Parker T. Hart
State Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I wish to protest your own "protest" to the Israeli government on the
Beirut bombing. It was extremely unfair.

It is because such an outcry can be expected that reasonable people can
have some doubt about whether or not this retaliatory attack was dis-
proportionate or note. I should like to point out some points that re-
quire mentioning:

1. Our government did not "protest" the murderous attack in Athens.

2. I think it is extremely unfair to make a distinction between so-
called regular troops of the Israeli Defense Forces and the so-called
irregular troops or terrorists from the Arab countries. By so doing
you either -

a) ignore the simple fact that the Arabs modus operandi is guerilla
warfare, or

b) are insisting that the Israelis simply go through the sham of
putting on different uniforms on some of their troops every time
a retaliation becomes necessary.

3. The terrorists in Athens came to kill "Jews" thus omitting their oft-mentioned theme that they are only anti-Zionist but not anti-Jewish.

4. Lastly, but perhaps most important for this particular incident,
the Arabs made some statement about "Rome, Athens, """ and then stated
that "Washington, New York and London" were also on the list.

This threat to carry the terrorism to our shores cannot be taken lightly.
We still do not know whether the assassination of Sen. Robert Kennedy
is connected with Arab terrorism. We certainly have a foretaste of such
action in Athens and Rome. Perhaps the attack on Beirut was motivated,
in part, to discourage further such attacks and let us hope the U.S.A.
will be spared.

MNO.MS

RECEIVED
FEB 21 1969

GENERAL

The White House
KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Washington

WHD025 WAC043(0853)(2-119553E122)PD 05/02/73 0853

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

1973 May 2 AM 10 19

2128294701 TDMT NEW YORK NY 84 05-02 0853A EST

PMS DOCTOR HENRY KISSINGER

WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC

RABBINICAL BOARD OF GREATER NEW YORK APPEALS TO YOU TO INTERVENE

ON BEHALF OF RENOUN FAMILY OF WILNA, LITHUANIA, USSR, TAIBA KACEVA, TO HELP FAMILY RECEIVE VISA TO IMMIGRATE TO ISRAEL.

THEIR DAUGHTER RAYA, BROTHERS AND SISTERS WERE PERMITTED TO LEAVE. THE PARENTS ARE OLD AND SICK AND LIVE ON PENSION. THE FAMILY IS NOW BROKEN. THE PARENTS ARE DESPONDENT AND MUST JOIN

DAUGHTER IN ISRAEL

RABBI EPHRAIM OSHRY PRESIDENT RABBINICAL BOARD OF GREATER NEW YORK 212 EAST BROADWAY NEW YORK CITY

RECEIVED

MAY 25 1973

CENTRAL FILES

GENERAL

WHO / KISSINGER, HENRY A.
KISSINGER, HENRY A. / O *

THE KYODO NEWS SERVICE

2 Akasaka Aoi-cho, Minato-ku
Tokyo, Japan

TELEPHONE : TOKYO (584) 4111
CABLE ADDRESS : KYODO TOKYO

August 10, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
the White House

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I would like to congratulate you on your recent historical and crucial mission to China and to express my deep-felt admiration for the gigantic task you have undertaken.
I believe that you should be extremely busy and undergoing great strain since the challenge of the task has only begun and is about to enter a decisive stage.

I am aware that, faced as you are with the super-human tasks that must be dealt with prior to President Nixon's coming visit to Peking, your schedule is extremely tight. However, I am writing this letter in the hope that you would be able to spare some of your precious time and grant me an opportunity to have a short appointment with you during my visit to your capital in late August.

I am already on my way to your country via Europe. My current assignment was decided only several days before my departure in a meeting with the president of our news agency, Mr. Shintaro Fukushima. Under a hastily arranged schedule, I am now visiting Moscow to have talks with my old friends in journalism and some of party and government leaders of the Soviet Union. I will then proceed to Paris where I hope to see Madam Bihn--whom I have met before-- and then arrive in Washington via New York.

In connection with this visit, I would like to stress the fact that this is strictly a fact finding mission. All of our talks will be conducted on off-the-record basis and there is no intention on the part of our agency to send out stories directly based on my talks with you or any other important persons. I can boast a clean record as regards to adherence to rules and promises concerning off-the-record and I can state with confidence that my friends in Washington, Ambassador Ushiba and Minister Ohgawara, will vouch for my integrity and adherence to promises not to divulge the contents of off-the-record talks.

AUG 25 1971

As to the questions I have in mind, the most intriguing one to me at this moment is this: will the Nixon Doctrine of "aiding the self-help efforts" be maintained really effectively in Asia? In this connection, it is regrettable that few in Japan seems to understand the real intent and true meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. I would even fear that only China would understand "the true intent" behind the Doctrine. This is one of the vital matters on which I would like to ask your opinion and guidance during my stay in Washington.

As I stated above, I will be arriving in New York on August 20 and proceed to your capital on 25 and stay there until September 2. I would be most gratified if I can see you during this period including the stay in New York.

I actually missed the chance to see you in my last visit to Washington two years ago. So this is my second venture. I hope you understand what it means to me and my agency.

I believe that my request will also be transmitted to your office via the State Department. However, I intend to contact you from our news bureau as soon as I enter your country.

Thanking you in advance

For your kind consideration

Yours sincerely

Yasumasa Ota
Director
Chief Editorial Writer

NNNNVV FHH639FJP422
PP RUFNPS
DE RUFJCS #0002 PTT 1382335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
BT

UNCLAS FOLL RCD COMMERCIAIIY PLSE PROTECT:

PSW836/036 FPRA HL UWNX 034
TDBN COLUMBUS 0H 87 13 0416

LT DOCTOR KISSINGER CARE AMERICAN EMBASSY PARIS

AMERICAN EMBASSY

MAY 19 01 07 '73

PARIS, FRANCE

URGENT CANCEL FURTHER PEACE NEGOTIATIONS RETURN TO COLUMBUS
OHIO BRING JILL ST JOHN WITH YOU JEAN DIXON PROPHESIED THAT
YOU WOULD ADMIRE A PHYSIC AS MUCH AS JILL ST JOHN THE THREE
OF US TOGETHER WITH JOHN CONNALLY OR ANYONE WHO BELLIEVES THAT
AMERICA IS FREE I WANT TO MAKE MEMORIAL DAY EOW DAY I WANT TO
SEE FURTHER POSTPONEMENT ON THE ASTRONAUTS TAKING OFF MAY 25
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE THE INDIANAPOLIS RACES CANCELLED
MILDRED MARY COTOOLE

BT
#0002

RECEIVED

JUN 5 1973

CENTRAL FILES

NNNN

## WHAT IS JUNIOR ACHIEVEMENT?

It is an international business education program in which high school students organize and manage their own small-scale companies under the guidance of adult advisers from business and industry.

## WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF ADVISERS?

Adult businessmen, specialists in production, administration or sales, provide the benefits of their experience to the teen-age executives who operate the company. While advisers explain the factors involved in decisions, they do not make the decisions for the youngsters.

## HOW DO THESE J.A. ENTERPRISES OPERATE?

Each Junior Achievement company is organized in the fall as a miniature corporation.

* There are usually 20 students in each company.

* They are the board of directors, the working force and the sales staff.

* They elect their own officers.

* They choose a business, either a manufacturing or a service operation.

* They capitalize their business through the sale of stock at $1.00 a share.

* They set up production lines and plan distribution.

* They advertise, promote and sell their company's product or service.

* They pay themselves salaries and wages as management and as the working force. They decide on sales commissions for themselves as salesmen.

* They keep company books and records.

* They pay rent for their work space and equipment, and must meet depreciation charges on equipment and machinery.

* They pay taxes.

* They pay dividends to their stockholders if their enterprise is profitable.

* They liquidate their companies at the end of the program year and issue stockholder reports.

## WHAT HAPPENS IF A COMPANY LOSES MONEY?

The same thing that happens when an adult company is liquidated. After all the bills are paid the remaining assets are pro-rated among stockholders. Special effort is made to teach the teen-agers the reason for their loss so that they might benefit from this experience. However, between 75 and 80 per cent of the companies show a profit.

## WHAT ACTUAL PRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE DO THE STUDENTS GET?

They acquire the skills necessary to manufacture a product that will sell profitably. They learn the importance of assembly lines, quality control, interchangeable parts, and low absentee rates, because they see how production costs affect the selling price of their product.

## HOW DOES J.A. RELATE TO SCHOOL AND BUSINESS?

Teachers often comment that students in J.A. become more conscientious about their school work. Some school systems actually grant academic credit for J.A. participation, recognizing that it supplements learning time. Also, J.A. experience can be a valuable reference when the teen-ager applies for employment.

## WHAT BENEFITS DO THE JUNIOR ACHIEVERS DERIVE FROM THEIR EXPERIENCE?

* They develop a realistic understanding of the organization and operation of a business enterprise.

* They build self-confidence and develop leadership ability.

* They gain understanding, based on personal experience, of the responsibilities and rewards of enterprise.

* They receive the opportunity to measure their vocational desires in real-life business activity.

## TO WHOM ARE SHARES OF J.A. COMPANY STOCK SOLD?

To parents, friends, relatives, neighbors, teachers, the general public. For many it is their first experience in stock ownership. More than 700,000 shares of stock were sold this year.

## WHAT SORT OF RECORDS DO JUNIOR ACHIEVERS KEEP?

Every company uses a standard record system developed for Junior Achievement by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The system includes an operating budget, balance sheet, profit and loss statement, inventory and payroll records, and stockholder and liquidation reports.

## WHAT WAGES DO THEY PAY?

As the board of directors of their own Junior Achievement company, the young people set their own salaries or wages and determine their own sales commissions. Wages usually start at 25 cents an hour for the two hours' work performed at the company's weekly meeting. These wages reflect the miniature scale upon which the companies operate.

## WHAT TAXES DO THEY PAY?

J.A. companies pay sales, excise, and other local and state taxes where they are applicable. Included in each company records system is a special "profits tax" form on which surtax payments are figured upon net income over the first $25 instead of the first $25,000 used in Federal calculations. The "tax" so computed is paid into a local J.A. fund which is used for scholarships and other activities for the teen-agers themselves.

## WHY ARE J.A. COMPANIES FORMED AND THEN LIQUIDATED WITHIN A YEAR?

So that the maximum number of students can learn the whole picture of business. If the business continued from year to year, those who joined a company the second year would miss the experience of raising capital, selecting a product, and setting up production.

## WHAT ARE THE J.A. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE?

To grow within localities where J.A. is already operating and to introduce the program to communities where it does not exist. J.A. will continue to create positive attitudes toward our business system in the coming generation.

## WHO SUPPORTS JUNIOR ACHIEVEMENT?

Financially, over 70,000 subscribers, including the largest corporations and the very smallest firms, contribute to J.A. Business executives, professional people and many others give their personal financial support as well. Besides financial aid, thousands of business men and women contribute their time and experience as advisers to J.A. companies. Educators' continued interest and encouragement have added strength to this unique organization.

## WHY J.A.?

Because Junior Achievement is an investment in the present and future well-being of the private enterprise system.

## WHY J.A.?

Because Junior Achievement is a practical program appealing to the constructive ambitions of youth.

## WHY J.A.?

Because Junior Achievement is an activity that has the endorsement and active cooperation of educational and civic leaders everywhere.

## WHY J.A.?

Because Junior Achievement is giving business leadership experience to those who will be called upon to accept the responsibilities of the future.

## WHY J.A.?

Because Junior Achievement offers business the opportunity to demonstrate its interest in youth.

## WHY J.A.?

Because each year Junior Achievement develops in hundreds of thousands of high school students and in their families, friends and neighbors, an understanding of our business system, vital to America's growth.

## HOW DO STUDENTS BECOME INVOLVED?

Each fall members of the J.A. staff and volunteers from business firms give presentations in thousands of high schools across the country. The speakers discuss our business system and explain the J.A. program. Students are able to apply for membership at this time.

## HOW IS J.A. ORGANIZED?

Junior Achievement operates in hundreds of communities with the strong support of businessmen who form local boards of directors. Trained professionals serve the communities by organizing and administering the programs as well as operating the business centers. These men and women are responsible to their local Junior Achievement board of directors.

The national office of Junior Achievement is responsible for the overall organizational policy pertaining to program, fund raising and public relations. In addition, the national staff works to support the local Junior Achievement operation by recruiting and training personnel, providing program materials and publishing promotional literature.

## WHAT ABOUT J.A. LOCALLY?

If you wish information about Junior Achievement write your nearest program center or write the national office, Junior Achievement Inc., 909 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022.

KISSINGER, HENRY A. 7/30/71

AUG 2 1971

Dear Mrs. Overman:

Thank you for your letter dated July 1 regard-
ing the "Celebrity Cookbook" being produced
by the Junior Achievement Company. Your
project sounds most interesting and I am pleas-
ed that you wanted to include me in it.

Unfortunately, the pressures and long hours
of my job are such that I have no time for
cooking for myself, much less for having a
favorite recipe.

I wish your undertaking well and wish that I
could help you with it.

Mrs. Jacquelyn Overman
Junior Achievement Company
of Augusta
2823 Junior Achievement Road
Augusta, Georgia 30904

jlp:7/30/71

Lowering Profile
Isn't That Simple

By Henry Owen

THE President's recent report on foreign policy makes clear that the next phase of that policy won't be as easy as some people have assumed. The conventional wisdom has been that moving to a lower U.S. profile would pose no great problem, that all that's required is for the United States to do less. We'll save money and effort; we'll cause less trouble abroad; and everybody will be happier.

But the President's report takes a different view. It suggests that the economic and security needs which the United States has hitherto met through unilateral action still exist: It speaks of "compelling" needs for aid to developing nations; it says that "we aim for a world in which the importance of power is reduced; but that world is not here . . ."

The report recognizes that these needs cannot now be met through U.S. "dominance," or "leadership," or whatever the right word is. It calls instead for multilateral effort. But in almost every case, it turns out, U.S. participation will be essential to that joint effort's success. In short, the United States will still be saddled with substantial responsibilities, but it will have to discharge them through institutions in which its views won't necessarily prevail. If anyone thinks that this is a recipe for an easy foreign policy, he's living in a dream world.

MR. NIXON speaks frankly about some of the problems that this approach will pose.

In Atlantic affairs, he stresses the need for a new relation between the United States and whatever entity emerges in Western Europe, and suggests that this may involve painful changes for the United States: "We may have to make sacrifices in the common interest." Presumably, this means not only the "possible economic price of a truly unified Europe" to which he refers explicitly, but also the fact that we will no longer have a determining voice in Atlantic defense or in East-West negotiations regarding Europe, even though some U.S. troops remain in Europe.

In Latin America, the report calls for moving away from a dominant U.S. role, based on bilateral relations, to a lesser U.S. role, based on multilateral programs. The President says plainly that we will have to "accommodate the desire of the Latin Americans to consult among themselves and formulate positions which they can then discuss with us . . . We must recognize national interests may indeed diverge from ours rather than merge." Which is a polite way of saying that the Latin Americans will reach a common view with each other, and that this view may carry the day in joint institutions which we help to support, even when we don't agree with it.

In Asia, the President indicates that the United States will look to regional associations and Japan to play a growing role in the economic field. He recognizes frankly the difficulties involved in this policy—in sustaining regional cooperation "without supplanting Asian direction," and in getting Japan to do more without asking "Japan to assume responsibilities inconsistent with the

The Washington Post

March 8, 1970

IN DISCUSSING international economic policy, too, the President stresses that multilateral institutions must play an increasing role—particularly in providing development aid. But nowhere does he suggest that this means a reduced burden on the United States. On the contrary, he calls for a new U.S. contribution to the Asian Bank and fore-shadows further U.S. help for the World Bank complex. The end result, in short, may be more U.S. aid and less U.S. control. This approach makes sense, in terms of effectiveness and of eliciting increased contributions from others, but it will surely require a different congressional view.

In short, his report adds up to not only an impressive list of international efforts which will be needed to replace the U.S. unilateral role, but also to a perceptive list of the problems that will have to be overcome in trying to persuade Americans and other peoples to take part in these joint efforts without a clear and monolithic Communist effort to spur them on.

What happens if these problems cannot be overcome, and the new U.S. foreign policy falls flat on its face? The answer may be found in the 1920s. Then, too, there were no imminent threats. So the Western countries gave up having foreign policies, except for spasmodic pronouncements (in the Locarno and Kellogg-Briand pacts) that the goodwill was here to stay and war was out. Nobody worried about future international economic problems or the need to re-integrate Germany on a basis of equality into the European system. These unsolved problems grew and finally destroyed a precarious world order in the early 1930s—bringing to power new governments which utterly transformed the scene.

NO ONE can foresee what changes would be wrought by collapse of joint efforts which the President has proposed. All that can be said with certainty is that the world will be a safer place if the attempt to create a community of developed nations, and to work out mutually beneficial economic relations between this community and the developing world, prospers than if it doesn't.

The President rings down the curtain on one era of foreign policy to usher in another. The new era will call for qualities which are hard to come by: patience, subtlety, and a willingness to carry out common ventures, even if the United States can't dictate their details. This task will be the harder because, although we know that change is overdue, we can only see dimly what will emerge. In Teilhard de Chardin's words, "What we are up against is the heavy swell of an unknown sea which we are just entering from behind the cape that protected us . . . We are, at this very moment, passing through an age of transition." The President's message faces, more honestly than most public documents, the difficulties of this transition.

New Aid Report:
Keyed to New Ideas

By Henry Owen

A FUNNY thing happened the other day. A presidential committee on foreign aid produced a report worth reading.

This is directly contrary to the approved and established rules for such committees—of which there have been a score since 1950. These rules provide that the committee should issue a ringing endorsement of U.S. aid; call for doubling or tripling its resources; catalogue its benefits in terms sufficiently diverse to attract support from every quarter; and prescribe a few minor changes in tactics or organization—that thus in language designed to repel readers and mercifully obscure meaning, at one and the same time.

Most presidential committees have rigidly followed the rules. This helps to explain why appointment of Rudolph Peterson, retiring head of the Bank of America, to head still another committee last year was greeted with restrained enthusiasm, to put it mildly.

But Mr. Peterson apparently didn't read the rules. Or the President told him to ignore them. He recruited a staff noted for its independent view of aid and decided—in Mr. Acheson's words of almost two decades ago—to pull the plant up by its roots in order to examine it thoroughly. His principal recommendation is as unexpected as it is drastic: The past comprehensive bilateral U.S. aid role should be abandoned and its principal instrument—AID—disbanded.

This recommendation clearly reflects an assessment of future needs, not past performance. AID in the 1960s managed its business better than any of its predecessors since the Marshall Plan—by a wide margin. But the premises upon which this business was founded have changed: many developing countries no longer need or want detailed bilateral U.S. guidance; other industrial countries have acquired a growing capacity for supplying aid; international and regional instruments for providing that aid are at hand; and U.S. public and congressional attitudes toward the U.S. role in developing countries have profoundly altered.

MR. PETERSON focuses, first and foremost, on what these changes mean for the purposes of foreign aid. Is development aid intended to sustain our foreign policy on a day to day basis, by rewarding and assisting the faithful; or is it intended primarily to advance our long range interest in a safer and more humane world, by promoting economic development? Is it a spigot to be turned on and off as changing political conditions in the receiving countries dictate, or is it a long range investment in the future, to be provided regardless of day to day political shifts?

Mr. Peterson comes down hard, in each case, for the second view. This is a welcome adjustment to changing reality and to the waning of the cold war. Although this conclusion tends to get short shrift in most press and TV accounts, everything else flows from it.

The Washington Post

March 17, 1970

It is this conclusion which explains the committee's desire to break up AID. Development aid is to be separated from military aid and from economic aid in support of security programs, because these are directed to short term purposes. Development aid is to be increasingly provided under the leadership of international organizations, which cannot be used or controlled by the United States for short term political purposes. Remaining U.S. bilateral development aid is to be extended by two new U.S. agencies—a bank and a foundation-type institution, which will be managed by mixed public-private boards drawing heavily on private resources, and thus guided by long term development goals, rather than short term political considerations.

THE Peterson committee will be criticized because it does not recommend any given level of financing for this new aid program; it says merely that the recent declining trend in aid should be reversed. This only proved that its members have taken the trouble to look around them at the real world. There isn't going to be greatly increased U.S. financing for aid until three things have happened: until the U.S. military role in Vietnam is largely ended; until a better start has been made toward meeting expanded domestic needs; and until the churches and other private groups have created a more effective public constituency for aid. In the meantime, our priority task is to reshape the aid program so that it will be an effective means of spending more money, when that money becomes available.

The fact that the Peterson committee tackled this task effectively makes what happens to its report of more than ordinary interest. The outcome depends on two things:

First, what the President proposes. When he decided on welfare reform, the President is said to have remarked that he refused to take one more step down the old and outworn path. He evidently has a keen feel and zeal for institutional reform, which should stand him in good stead in the present case.

Second, how the Congress disposes. This report responds to many criticisms of aid in the Senate. But views in the House have sometimes differed. The net congressional reaction is hard to predict.

These two variables are closely related. Even the strongest supporters of aid on the Hill will hesitate to stick out their necks unless the President is well out in front. And any President will look for some indication of congressional views before he commits himself to drastic change in a large ongoing U.S. program, particularly one which spells a clear diminution of U.S. government control.

A good deal hangs on the outcome. Most other industrial countries now provide a larger percentage of their national income to aid than the United States. Falling large and dramatic change in U.S. programs, the decline in public and congressional support will continue; and eventually, other donor nations may follow suit. But if the United States resumes its leadership in this field, a major turning point in the international aid effort could be at hand. The Peterson report opens the door to this possibility.