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During the first stage:

1. North Vietnamese regular forces would move back toward frontier areas of South Vietnam while U.S. forces would be deployed around the populated areas.

2. An international peace-keeping force composed of neutral nations -- Asian, if possible -- would be interposed as a security buffer between American and allied forces on one side and North Vietnamese forces on the other. This would automatically represent a major escalation. It would sharply curtail -- if not eliminate -- the kind of military operations which cause most casualties. It would be a big and realistic step toward a cease-fire.

3. As soon as the North Vietnamese movement back to the frontiers starts, the United States would withdraw 75,000 troops from South Vietnam as a token of its good faith.

During the second stage:

1. As North Vietnamese regular forces, as well as North Vietnam "fillers" in Viet Cong guerrilla units, withdraw from South Vietnam, we would undertake simultaneous withdrawal of the bulk of our remaining forces.

2. The small United States forces left in Vietnam would be confined to fixed installations as long as North Vietnam carries out its commitment.

3. As the National Liberation Front ceases guerrilla operations and agrees to abide by the democratic process, it will be guaranteed participation in the political life of the country.

4. An enlarged international peace-keeping force would gradually be introduced into the populated areas, to monitor the withdrawal of forces as defined above, the effecting of local cease-fires, and the guaranteeing of free political activities.

During the third stage:

1. Free elections would take place in Vietnam supervised by observers from the international force trained for this function.

2. The United States would withdraw its small remaining forces.

3. The international peace-keeping force would remain.

During the fourth and final stage:

1. The two parts of Vietnam would decide whether to unite or remain separate by direct negotiations.

2. Following this, the international peace-keeping force would be withdrawn.

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This four-stage plan should be put forward after full consultation with the governments of South Vietnam and our other allies. Its guarantees and international supervisions should be worked out by an international conference of all interested nations -- perhaps the Geneva Conference Group of 1954. And the United Nations should be asked to aid, wherever practicable, in expediting details and communications.

## IV

Such a plan for peace would directly and immediately serve our stated goals and national interest.

It would dispel any uncertainty about our intentions that might now contribute to deadlock in the negotiations -- thus quickening chances for a political settlement.

It would achieve our purpose of enabling the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate without outside interference and through free elections.

It would introduce an international presence of concerned neutral countries to supervise compliance, and so minimize any dangers of future unilateral intervention.

It would enlist the self-interest of all nations directly concerned to sustain the agreement, for these nations, which have learned the dangers of war in Southeast Asia to world peace.

It would both avoid the disasterous consequences of our unilateral withdrawal and lead to the end of this tragic war.

## V

We must face one final, obvious question: What should we do if North Vietnam rejects such a program? It is true that any plan, however reasonable, might now be scorned. We can only test Hanoi's good faith, not guarantee it.

The answer is: Whatever Hanoi's response, we can and should change our own Vietnam strategy. For the Administration's policy -- which has Americanized the war and has lacked a definable goal -- has convinced Hanoi that time is on its side. Therefore, we can and should move toward de-Americanizing the war. This would not only reduce our casualties, it would also speed the more vigorous assertions of responsibility by the South Vietnamese -- the development most likely to convince Hanoi that it cannot win its objectives by force.

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We can work to this specific end with the following measures:

1. American forces should be deployed where they will do the most good at the least cost. Most American casualties have been incurred in "search and destroy" operations and in static frontier defense. Ninety percent of the population lives in sixty percent of the territory. Our troops should be moved to protect this area.

2. The Army of South Vietnamese forces should be given increasing responsibilities and adequate equipment and training. Today, the Army of Vietnam is still largely equipped with World War II weapons. It has only ten percent of the artillery and air-power to equivalent U.S. units. This must be remedied immediately.

3. As the Army of Vietnam is re-equipped and gains in strength, American forces can be withdrawn for the period of a year at a regular rate on the order of 10,000 a month -- provided North Vietnam does not increase its rate of infiltration. After this time, a reassessment would be necessary.

4. As much as one half of the swollen American civilian staffs engaged in the pacification program seem dispensible. These staffs suffocate the Vietnamese sense of responsibility by gearing programs to an American scale, American staffing procedures and American preferences. They cause resentment without enabling the South Vietnamese Government to relate itself more closely to its people.

5. We should advocate more vigorously than ever a broadening of the base of the political life of South Vietnam including the widest possible grouping of non-Communist political forces. For this is the essential prerequisite for shifting from military to political competition with the National Liberation Front.

6. We should reiterate -- despite any initial rejection of such a plan by Hanoi -- our commitment to it as a true and honorable path to peace.

## VI

I herewith pledge that, as President, I will carry out this plan and these actions.

I also pledge that we will not again find ourselves with a commitment looking for a justification.

I pledge that we will support our allies, but not substitute for them.

I pledge that we will carefully allocate our resources according to well-defined priorities.

I pledge that we will face our future challenges by trusting our people. We will tell them the whole truth and the whole risk.

I pledge that finally, I will work with all my strength for peace and justice not only in Asia, but for all nations and peoples of the world.