nevertheless Isolated the decalogue that was needed in a leader.
in office mask that while he possessed dignity and administrative skill, he
who had ascribed to be an extremely capable man, but who had demonstrated
served. As an example he cited the case of former prime minister Ques
bienfaible predict ahead how a man would perform before he had actually
contacts. Pman declined to do so. He pointed out that it was difficult to
be able to take the steps he believed necessary. As all my other Vietnamese
he had in mind. I asked him if he could identify any government which might
develop among from encountering social problems to achieving the social changes
Pman was not explicit as to how he envisions envisioned the process would
transformation were evident, as ascribed elsewhere in Vietnamese society.
that within the Buddhist movement the same internal transformation and
Buddhists were working hard to improve their team spirit. He acknowledged
congratulated a very important social group in themselves and he said that the
including even exports of rice. Of course, he said somewhat akh, Budhists
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I noted that I had gained the impression that the Buddhists were planning to form a national political or ganization with some apparently reluctance Phuan confirmed that this was indeed the intention and it observed that any national organization would have to be centered in Saigon, and not in HUe.

I then turned to the question of negotiations with the Communists, and asked Phuan how he visualized an end to the current conflict. Phuan said that he thought that negotiations might take place either publicly or privately. Public negotiations would be unfortunate for the anti-Communist cause. Had the other side been wiser they would accept a public call for discussions; they would in fact have done so many months ago. Phuan did not understand why they had not done this, since he believed it evident that South Vietnam was not now prepared for negotiations with the Communists in view of its lack of social cohesion. Asked him if he thought that South Vietnam might in the near future achieve such cohesion. Phuan did not respond directly but appeared highly sceptical of this prospect. As to negotiations held in

but ascribed highly acceptability of this broadcast. As to negotiations held in
might in the near future achieve such cession. Pusan did not respond directly
of its lack of social cession. Asked him if he thought that South Vietnam
Vietnam was not now prepared for negotiations with the Communists in view
understand why they had not done this, since he believed it evident that South
dramatic? they would in fact have done so many months ago. Pusan did not
come. Had the other side been wiser they would accept a firm public call for
privately. Public negotiations would be uninformative for the anti-Communist
said that he thought that negotiations might take place either firm publicly or
and asked Pusan how he visualized an end to the current conflict. Pusan
I then turned to the question of negotiations with the Communists.
Here.

that any national organization would have to be centered in Saigon, and not in
refinance Pusan confirmed that this was indeed the intention and it observed
planning to form a national political organization with some apparent
inability

I noted that I had gained the impression that the Communists were

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privately, secret, Phuan first stated that the United States could do this
without Vietnam. I pointed out to him that if the United States could not do
this, that we could not use small countries as pawns and that any discussion
with the other side would have to involve the GVN. Phuan accepted this
statement with what appeared to be full agreement. Asked who he thought the
Communist participants in any such discussions should preperly be, Phuan
replied that he thought that Peking, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front
not
should/be regarded entities, but rather as elements of a single apparatus.

This, however, did not mean that the NLF could be accepted as negotiating
agent for the others. No government of Vietnam could accept this, and Phuan
personally thought that any such action would be most unwise, since it would
legitimize the Front. I asked him what he thought a desirable outcome of
negotiations would be. Phuan referred to public statements on the subject
and stated that he thought the goal should be a South Vietnam independent of
North Vietnam and free of the violence of war. Economic ties with the North
might be envisaged. European Broader questions of the reunification of the

might be envisaged. Rappaport Broeder questions of the ramifications of the
North Vietnam and tree of the violence of wsr. Economic ties with the North
and stated that he thought the cost should be a South Vietnam independent of
negotiations would be. Pusan referred to public statements on the subject
legitimize the front. I asked him what he thought a desirable outcome of
belligerently thought that and such action would be mostwise, since it would
aident for the others. No government of Vietnam could accept this, and Pusan
This, however, did not mean that the NLF could be accepted as negotiating
an should be redefined entities, put rather as elements of a single apparatus,
not
replied that he thought that Peking, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front
Communist participants in such such discussions should preclude Pusan
statement with what appeared to be full agreement. Asked who he thought the
with the other side would have to involve the GVN. Pusan accepted this
title, that we could not use any small countries as belligerents and that any diacritic
without Vietnam. I pointed out to him that if the United States could not do
belligerent secret, Pusan first stated that the United States could do this
personat and confidential

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country could be left to the more distant future. At the close of the conver-
sation Phuan volunteered the belief that changes in educational policy were
an important element in the social revolution he desired. He identified three
fundamental errors in current educational policy: (1) It rewarded the
wrong course of action from a national point of view; that is, students who
contributed nothing to the nation lived a life of safety and leisure and had the
affluent positions in society reserved for them, whereas the combattants who
suffered and sacrificed were unable to achieve the means of advancement
and were therefore condemned to lower ranks on the social scale. (2) In its
current tuition practices educational policy favored the rich. Phuan desired
a system in which tuition was made higher and the money used to institute
a broader scholarship program for the poor. The wealthy could easily afford
to pay more for their children's education and than they were. Even at the
elementary level though tuition was free in theory, it was often expensive for
parents to support a child in school. Higher tuition and broad scholarships
would help give children of the poor more equal opportunity. (3) The

would help give children of the poor more equal opportunity. (3) The
parents to afford a child in school. Higher tuition and paid scholarships
elementary level through tuition was free in theory, it was often expensive for
to pay more for their children's education than they were. Even at the
a system in which tuition was made higher and the money need to institute
current tuition practices educational policy favored the rich. Pusan earned
and were therefore condemned to lower ranks on the social scale. (3) In its
amended and sacrificed were made to achieve the means of advancement
afford positions in society reserved for them, whereas the competitors who
corrupted nothing to the nation lived a life of safety and felicity and had the
wrong course of action from a national point of view; that is, students who
faced fundamental errors in current educational policy: (1) It rewarded the
an important element in the social revolution he desired. He identified three
issues Pusan volunteered the theme that changes in educational policy were
possible could be left to the more distant future. At the close of the conver-

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system of education stressed the wrong subjects. University education was aimed at producing a group of men trained in literature and the liberal arts who could do little that was useful. The nation had a great need for technically trained men who would emerge from school with badly needed, but the current system was not producing them. I asked Phuan whether he thought it might be helpful if American universities established direct relations with Vietnamese universities. Phuan said, of course, this would raise suspicions, but it should be done nevertheless.

I then spent the rest of the morning getting together documents that had been stolen from me. I had lunch with Roy Wurley, the director of programs for USAM. Wurley is a brilliant economist who previously served in Laos. We spent most of our time reviewing the situation in South Vietnam and he tended to confirm all the points that most others have also told me. For example, He said that there were four basic problems in Vietnam: (1) the conduct of military operations; (2) the problem of pacification on the village level; (3) the problem of political stability in Saigon; (4) the problem

village level; (3) the problem of political stability in Saigon; (4) the problem
(1) the conduct of military operations; (2) the problem of pacification on the
me. For example, He said that there were four basic problems in Vietnam:
and he tended to confirm all the points that Example most others have also told
in Laos. We spent most of our time reviewing the situation in South Vietnam
program for USAM. Murley is a brilliant economist who previously served
had been stolen from me. I had lunch with Roy Murley, the director of

I then sent the rest of the morning getting together documents that
but it **must** be done nevertheless.

Vietnamese universities. Pusan said, of course, this would raise arabicists,
might be helpful if American universities established direct relations with
current system was not producing them. I asked Pusan whether he thought it
nically trained men who would emerge from school with badly needed, but the
arts who could do little that was necessary. The nation had a great need for tech-
nology aimed at producing a group of men trained in literature and the liberal
system of education addressed the wrong aspects. University education was

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of economic reconstruction. He thought that the first and fourth of these
items could be handled reasonably effectively, because the United States would
simply saturate the country with its economic resources. He had his doubts
however, about the second and third items. He felt that the structure of civic
administration had gone completely to pieces in the last year under the impact
of repeated changes of government and that to all practical purposes there did
not exist any village authority. American programs were competing with each
other and there was no effective means of telling which areas were pacified
and which were not. I asked that to me it was interesting to find out who
governed where at night. He said even though those figures might be mis-
leading because in many cases a village chief stayed in office through a tacit
bargain with the VC, wek looking the other way during VC operations, and
they in turn permitted him to operate as long as he did not get in their way
too much. As for political stability in Saigon, he thought that the situation was
still highly unstable. He believed that the vestige of colonial rule was still
very strong. The Vietnamese were born intriguers and having had to maneuver

very atrious. The Viennese were born intriguers and having had to maneuver
still highlyRKable. He believed that the neatle of colonial rule was still
too much. As for political stability in Saigon, he thought that the situation was
they in turn permitted him to operate as fond as he did not get in their way
parliament with the AC, looking the other way during AC operations, and
leading because in many cases a village chief atached in office through a tacit
doverned where at night. He said even those figures might be mis-
and which were not. I said that to me it was interesting to find out who
other and there was no effective means of telling which areas were pacified
not exist any village authority. American programs were competing with each
of retested changes of government and that to all practical purposes there did
administration had done completely to pieces in the last year under the impact
however, apart the second and third items. He felt that the structure of civic
simply ascribe the country with its economic resources. He had his doubts
items could be handled reasonably effectively, because the United States would
of economic reconstruction. He thought that the first and fourth of these

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through 100 years of French rule had fragmented them even further and turned every politician into a kind of conspirator. He thought that it was essential to conduct programs in a manner that would enable direct appeal to the countryside, because otherwise he feared that the impact of programs might be lost through changes of government which he considered unavoidable.

I asked him about negotiations and he said that this was not his field, but that he doubted that the government could now withstand political competition with the National Liberation Front. In face, if negotiations were strated the Vietnamese Army would collapse as a functioning unit and the United States would have to do all the fighting. He did not think we could afford a ceasefire because we would confirm the Viet Cong in control of 90% of the country.

I spent the afternoon making farewell calls to Mr. Jorgenson, and Bill Porter and then I worked with Lodge for an hour on a letter which he is sending to Washington on the subject of negotiations. Porter said that he was afraid of the lack of coordination and the different approaches that were

Bill Porter and then I worked with Rodde for a hour on a letter which he
was straid of the lack of coordination and the different approaches that were
is sending to Washington on the subject of negotiations. Porter said that he
I abent the afternoon making farewell calls to Mr. Jordenaur, and
of the country.

because we would confirm the KOREA-ROKEX Viet Cong in control of 80%
would have to do all the fighting. He did not think we could afford a cessation
Vietnamese Army would collaboe as a functioning unit and the United States
the National Liberation Front. In face, it negotiations were atrasted the
he doubted that the government could now withstand political competition with
I saked him about negotiations and he said that this was not his field, but that
I might be lost through changes of government at which he considered unavoidable.
to the countrywide, because otherwise he feared that the impact of programs
eaaential to conduct programs in a manner that would enable direct abeesi
turned everybody politician into a kind of conspirator. He thought that it was
through 100 years of French rule had traughted them even further and

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being pushed by different people in the Embassy, and he was worried about
being able to pull all of them together. He said, remember, I am only a
Vice President, I can only do what the Ambassador asks me to. He said
every time he turned a stone some worm was squirming away underneath it.
He cited as an example the experience of General Tang, the minister of
reconstruction, who had drawn up tremendous plans, but when all was said
and done all he wanted was to take over cadres which the political actions
teams had already created, While he thought these should be turned over to
the Vietnamese sooner or later, the problem was to create cadres not in the
paramilitary field, but in the field of agriculture, social services, and so forth.

He also mentioned the jurisdictional disputes between the Army and
USOM about control of the police. He urged that I came back in one of
two cases--in any event in six months to see whether any progress has been
made--Immediately if negotiations were started because they would need a
strong hand to pull things together. He urged me to take this up with Lodge.
I am not so sure that I am eager to follow the advice. So Now I've come to
the end of nearly three weeks in Vietnam. I came with the conviction that it

the end of nearly three weeks in Vietnam. I came with the conviction that I am not so sure that I am easier to follow the advice. So now I've come to attrition and to bull things together. He asked me to take this up with Lodge. Immediately it negotiations were started because they would need a two cases--in any event in six months to see whether any progress has been U.S. military control of the police. He asked that I came back in one of

He also mentioned the jurisdictional disputes between the Army and
barrelwart field, put in the field of agriculture, social services, and so forth.

the Vietnam era cover or later, the problem was to create cases not in the
temple had already crested. While he thought these should be turned over to
and done all he wanted was to take over cases which the political actions
reconstruction, who had drawn up tremendous plans, put when all was said
He cited as an example the experience of General Tan, the minister of
every time he turned a stone some worm was appearing swasthya underneath it.

Vice President, I can only do what the Ambassador says to me to. He said
being able to bull all of them together. He said, remember, I am only a
peasant brushed by different people in the Empress, and he was worried about

He said so an example the experience of General Tan, the minister of
every time he turned a stone some worm was appearing swasthya underneath it.
Vice President, I can only do what the Ambassador says to me to. He said
being able to bull all of them together. He said, remember, I am only a
peasant brushed by different people in the Empress, and he was worried about

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area
was the most important/in which the United States was now engaged, if only
because so much of our honor had been staked on it. I am still convinced of
this. I came also with the expectation that while the struggle might be difficult,
with patience and fortitude we would be able to see it through. I had expected
the Vietnamese administration to be/efficient, but I had thought that there
in
to
would be some people in the country dedicated/the cause that for which they
were fighting and who might, with patience and understanding, become the
basis of future efforts. Indeed, I was worried that the major problem was the
mercurial attitude of Washington, rather than the Vietnamese. It would be
idle to deny that the visit here has been a shattering experience from this
aspect. I believe we have to come out honorably in Vietnam. I think we
should not kid ourselves about what honorable is, No matter how clever our
solution, five years from now if a Communist government exists in Saigon
or in South Vietnam, no one will ever trust the United States again. Even
our present critics will have to remember that went we made our most
solemn commitment and when we engaged over a quarter million Americans
forces, we did not know or were not able how to achieve what we wanted.

forces, we did not know or were not able to achieve what we wanted.

A solemn commitment and when we engaged over a quarter million American

on, present critics will be able to remember that we made our most

solution, five days from now it a Communist government exists in Saigon

should not kid ourselves apart what honorable is. No matter how clever our

respect. I believe we have to come out honorably in Vietnam. I think we

idle to deny that the Vietnai here has been a disappointing experience from this

past of future efforts. Indeed, I was worried that the major problem was the

would be some people in the country dedicated the cause that for which they

to

the Vietnamese administration to be efficient, but I had thought that there

in

this. I came across with the expeetion that while the struggle might be difficult,

was the most important in which the United States was now engaged, it only

besides

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And yet committed as I am to success here, it would be idle to deny that the problems are enormous, Even making allowance for the fact that there are many soreheads, even granting that in an underdeveloped country one cannot expect standards of efficiency, the situation here is serious indeed. There is, for all practical purposes, no central government. What exists is a group of individuals who are doing paper-planning and who command an army--an army which rarely fights unless it is attacked and which has is in itself in danger of dissolution. The provincial administration is rapacious or incompetent. The American advisers are here for such a short time that they cannot possible learn the intricacies of the situation. Moreover they are in competition with their own reporting system and they cannot face the fact that all this effort has been in vain. Finally they must get along with corrppct and venile province chiefs, and if they try to carry out their jobs they would find themselves in constant difficulty, which in turn would get them in trouble with their agencies. All of this is a grim picture, which is not relieved by the fact that I cannot think of a brilliant remedy. I suppose that

relieved by the fact that I cannot think of a brilliant remedy. I propose that
trouble with their agencies. All of this is a dim picture, which is not
find themselves in constant difficulty, which in turn would get them in
and angle province chiefs, and it they try to carry out their jobs they would
that all this effort was been in vain. Finally they must get along with corrapt
in competition with their own reporting system and they cannot face the fact
they cannot possible learn the intricacies of the situation. Moreover they are
or incompetent. The American advisees are here for such a short time that
in itself in danger of disaffection. The provincial administration is rabaciona
an army--an army which rarely fights unless it is attacked and which is
exists is a group of individuals who are doing better-planning and who command
indeed. There is, for all practical purposes, no central government. Must
expect
standards of efficiency, the situation here is a serious
many soreheads, even dissenting that in an underdeveloped country one cannot
problems are enormous. Even masking allowance for the fact that there are
And yet committed as I am to success here, it would be idle to deny that the

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at this point having gone this far, we have no choice except to go down the
road further. It is not impossible that our military superiority will simply
overwhelm the Viet Cong. Also, if we deal perhaps directly with the pro-
vincial administration on major subjects, we can impose some standards of
performance. The Lansdale operation might bring fruit. Yet I have to say
with great sadness that all of these are hopes, not realities. If I were a
dictator here I would not know where to begin, because it is not simply a
matter of giving orders, it is also a matter of building a nation in the middle
of a vicious civil war. Perhaps one is too hard on a country, whenever
the government
where every evening one hears artillary; where every morning the
windows shake because of B-52 raids close by; where one cannot fly into
airports because of danger of snipers in the surrounding countryside; where
the roads are impassable because the VC controls the government countryside.

The other day I spoke to the American Vice Consul from Laos who was here
madly enough for a weekend of rest and recuperation, which I suppose, given
the proliferation of nightclubs in Saigon, is not too hard to attain. He went

["the proliferation of nightclubs in Saigon, is not too hard to attain. He went\nmadly enough for a weekend of rest and recuperation, which I submitted, given\nThe other day I spoke to the American Vice Command from Las Vegas who was here\nto control the狂野的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIGON协约国的SAIG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[Y]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

14

Frenchmen down with a group of xiangxiao to Cape San Jac about 50 xiangs 15 miles from Saigon to the beach resort. On the way back his car was stopped at a regular VC roadblock. He escaped only because his French friend, a written friend identified him as a Frenchman. It is the kind of city where one can joke that if one gets into a car and if the driver has been bought by the VC one might be taken to a suburb and never emerge again. One can joke about it and yet it isn't very real. After the first week, xiang when I did feel somewhat jumpy, I felt no more insecure here than in New York. And I would suppose the danger of Viet Cong attacks in the cities are no greater than of mugging in New York. This is in self eerie. There must be tens of thousands of Viet Cong in Saigon who have arms, yet there is never an unpremeditated attack. All attacks are meticulously planned so that those who are assassinated at least have the consolation that they were not the victim of a random move.

As for the government, it is hard to know where to go. On the one hand, it is easy to say that the military should give way to civilian government sooner or later, but I do not think a civilian government would have any more support

or later, but I do not think a civilian government would have any more approval
as easy to say that the military should give way to civilian government sooner
As for the government, it is hard to know where to go. On the one hand, it
at least have the consolation that they were not the victim of a random move.

Viet Cong in Saigon who have arms, yet there is never an unmediated
attack. All attacks are intentionally planned so that those who are assassinated
Jumbly, I felt no more insecurity here than in New York. And I would ambuscade
in New York. This is in self-efficacy. There must be tens of thousands of
the number of Viet Cong attacks in the cities are no greater than of mudsling
or later. I felt no more insecurity here than in New York. And I would ambuscade
in New York when I did feel somewhat
and yet it isn't very restful. After the first week, I was when I did feel somewhat
might be taken to a suburb and never emerge again. One can joke about it
that if one gets into a car and if the driver has been potted by the VC one
identified him as a Frenchman. It is the kind of city where one can joke
VC roadlock. He escaped only because his French is not so good; friends
Saigon to the beach resort. On the way back his car was stopped at a red light
and yet it isn't very restful. After the first week, I was when I did feel somewhat
down with a drop of assignment to Cape San Jacinto about 16 miles from
Frenchmen

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

14

[A]

PERSONAL AND VONDIENTIAL

15

[Y]

than the current military government. Moreover the military at least
control an instrument of power and one which on an international
basis. The civilians, as far as I can tell, have no following at all, even in
Saigon and certainly none in the countryside, with the possible exception of
some Buddhists, who do not have a general following either, but who can at
least, if they get the Buddhist monks on their side, have the ability to create
some . How can one build a nation among a people that
have a great sense of individuality that is most . I do not
know. How does one win a war .

These are some of the problems with which we will have to deal.

Three weeks ago it seemed to me that we needed above all fortitude and

. Today I think we need understanding, wisdom and

fortitude.

cartridge.

Today I think we need understanding, wisdom and
Three weeks ago it seemed to me that we needed above all fortitude and

know. How does one win a war
have a great sense of individuality that is most
not

some
How can one build a nation among a people that
lesst if they let the Buddhist monks on their side, have the ability to create
some Buddhist, who do not have a general following either, but who can at
Saidon and certainly none in the country, with the possible exception of
passers. The civilians, say so, I can tell, have no following at all, even in
control an instrument of power and one which
on an international

PERSONAL AND NONIDENTICAL

19

[A]