2

temptation is great to integrate it into what has come to seem natural: into a set of relationships where "peace" is the normal pattern of relationships, (which) is the lesson of a history of almost uninterrupted domestic growth; where war is considered a last resort and an aberration, (which) is the consequence of a century and a half of relative invulnerability; where good will and willingness to compromise are the modes of settling disputes (which) testifies to the absence of unbridgeable social schisms. A society as ours will have great difficulty in coming to grips with international relations in any case; it will be even more severely challenged by a revolution which prefers victory to peace and which prides itself not in its (conciliatoriness), but on its intransigence. (No)

The challenge to our understanding is all the greater because never before have so many different revolutions occurred simultaneously.

On the political plane the post-war period has seen the emergence into nationhood of a large number of peoples hitherto under colonial rule. To integrate so many new states into the international community would not be a simple matter at any time; it

8

In 1795 the German philosopher Kant foresaw just such a contingency. In his whimsical essay "Perpetual Peace" he predicted that world peace would be attained in one of two ways: by a moral consensus which he identified with a republican form of government, or by a cycle of wars of ever-increasing violence which would reduce the major Powers to impotence.

There is no evidence that Kant's essay was taken seriously in his lifetime, or indeed for a century and a half afterwards. But much of American thought about the impact of the new weapons of today carries a premonition of Kant's second proposition. Ever since the end of the war brought us not the peace we sought so earnestly, but an uneasy armistice, we have responded to the frustrations of the contemporary revolution by what can best be described as a flight into technology: by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater becomes the reluctance to use them. At a period of unparalleled military strength, President Eisenhower summed up the dilemma posed by the new weapons technology in the phrase "there is no alternative to peace."

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It is only natural, of course, that an age which has known
two world wars and any uneasy armistice since should have as its
central problem the attainment of peace. It is paradoxical, however,
that so much hope should concentrate on men's most destructive
capabilities. We are told that the growth of thermo-nuclear stock-
piles has created a nuclear stalemate which makes war, if not too
risky, at least unprofitable. The power of the new weapons technology
is said to have brought about a tacit
been interpreted as a non-aggression treaty: a recognition that war
is no longer a conceivable instrument of policy and that for this
reason international disputes can be settled only by means of
diplomacy. And it has been maintained that the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy have made it irrelevant many of the traditional
reasons for wars of aggression because each major power can bring
about a tremendous increase in its productive capacity without
annexing either foreign territory or foreign labor.

These assertions fit in well with a national psychology which
considers peace as the "normal" pattern of relations among states and
which sees in the legal method the magic solvent of all disputes.

But differences in history, in geography, in domestic structure have ensured that such a condition is rarely realized. To Great Britain free passage through the Suez Canal was thought to be a matter of life-and-death; to Egypt control of the Suez Canal seemed an uncontestable "right" of sovereignty. Because Britain considered its survival to depend on access to Middle East oil and because it identified this need with its quarrel with Colonel Nasser, it was prepared to run the risk of war; because to us control of the Suez Canal was a less "vital" interest, we were not willing to go to such lengths. The typical conflict of international relations are for this reason produced by misunderstandings, as was assumed by turn-of-the-century pacifism; rather they are caused because the opponents understand each other only too well. The dispute between Egypt and Great Britain over the Suez Canal proved so intractable because the two positions were irreconcilable: the measures Great Britain believed essential for its security were considered by Egypt an intolerable invasion of its sovereignty. Similarly India and Pakistan have found it impossible even to agree on a negotiating basis over the possession of Kashmir, because both parties identify their vital interests with possession of it. They illustrate the cynical phrase of Emperor Charles V that he was at one with his brother the King

phrase of Emperor Charles V that he was at one with his brother the King
their vital interests with possession of it. They illustrate the canical
ting parties over the possession of Kashmir, because both parties identify
with each other. The King's title is "The Great and Universal Sultan".

**Background**

A century ago, the British East India Company had found it impossible even to agree on a negotiator. The British had an intolerable invasion of its sovereignty. Similarly the measures Great Britain believed essential for its security were proved so intractable because the two positions were irreconcilable: well. The dispute between Egypt and Great Britain over the Suez Canal they are caused because the opponents understand each other only too understandingly, as was assumed by turn-of-the-century pacitism; rather conflicts of international relations are for this reason produced by misunderstandings. We were not willing to go to such length. The typical conflict was not the one between the Suez Canal and Egypt, because Egypt considered its survival to be and death; to Egypt control of the Suez Canal seemed an uncontestable free passage through the Suez Canal was thought to be a matter of life-and death. To Great Britain have ensured that such a condition is rarely realized. To Great Britain But differences in history, in geography, in domestic structure