Henry:

I expected to have a chance to talk to
you about these chapters before you read the
marginal notes which I have added (in red) to
those of George's. For brevity I've been more
blunt than I actually feel and, in any case,
there's always a tendency to point out what seems
less good than *wh* to commend the strong.

I've only read these two chapters, so still
lack perspective but by all means call me and let's
talk a minute over the phone if you are so disposed

Meanwhile, slide that Silver Pen. Really,
that is great and I am delighted for you.

CHAPTER II

The Dilemmas of American Security - Part I

One of the most difficult challenges of a nation is to interpret correctly the lessons of its past. For the lessons of history, as of all experience, are contingent: they teach the consequences of certain actions but they leave us the task of determining which situations are comparable.

As long as the development of a nation is gradual, no particular problem arises. For new problems will be sufficiently similar to past experience so that even inaccurate analogies will have a certain validity. It is different, however, when events occur which transcend all past experience.

Then the very success of the past may inhibit an understanding of the present.

An era of unparalleled success may make it difficult to come to grips with a period of possible disaster. The fact that every problem has had a final solution may stand in the way of the realization that the period of the contingent has arrived.

This has been the case of American military doctrine since World War II.

Its dilemma can be defined as the conflict between the quest for absolute answers and the risks of the nuclear age; between the realization that we have

anawer and the risks of the nuclear age; between the realization that we have
its dilemma can be defined as the conflict between the threat for absolute

contingent has arrived.

solution may stand in the way of the realization that the period of the
a period of possible disaster. The fact that every problem has had a final
Vers of unbarrelled success may make it difficult to come to terms with
then the very success of the beat may inhibit an understanding of the present
different, however, when events occur which transcend all past experience.
so that even inaccurate analogies will have a certain validity. It is
sries. For new problems will be sufficiently similar to past experience
As long as the development of a nation is gradual, no particular problem
put them leave us the task of determining which situations are comparable.
experience, are contingent: they teach the consequences of certain actions
correctly the lessons of its past. For the lessons of history, as of all

The Dilemma of American Security - Part I

CHAPTER II

24

become infinitely vulnerable and our rebellion against it.

Because we have won two world wars by outproducing our opponent, we have tended to equate military superiority with superiority in resources and technology. Yet history demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as superiority in resources. Superior doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and use of artillery, a better relationship between fire and movement furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples were the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights. All these were victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all the more complete for facing the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Thus the key to a proper doctrine is the correct understanding of the elements of one's superiority; and to develop the capacity to apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous

more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous
strategy of one's superiority, and to develop the capacity to apply them

Thus the key to a proper doctrine is the correct understanding of the
continuing needs which he had never even considered.

of making the victory all the more complete for facing the antagonist with
ability to press the framework which had come to be taken for granted and
VII these were victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the
the Macedonian balance, of the English archers against the medieval knights,
victories. Similar examples were the victories of the Roman legions over

better relationship between tire and movement unfinished the base ofMbeteonia
an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior modifiy and use of artillery, a
Airredy army superior in numbers, at least annual in equipment but wedged to
reasons. Superior doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an
doprise has at least as often been the cause of victory as superiority in
and technology. Yet history demonstrates that superiority in strategic
pave tended to educate military superiority with superiority in resources
Because we have won two world wars by outpacing our opponent, we
become infinitely vulnerable and our repetition against it.

37

25

battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems.

But our effort is to assess the meaning of the new technology has been inhibited not only by our past, with its seeming lesson that security could be absolute, but by the lessons of military history in general. Throughout history, the military has sought for means to destroy their target completely although heretofore technology permitted only approximations to this goal. Modern weapons, however, seem to assure not only total destruction of the target, but also total duration of the "kill." Unfortunately the capability of total destruction brings with it collateral consequences which paralyze its use.

This paradox that the greater our power, the greater our inhibitions has given a frustrating quality to our quest for a military doctrine. Our past makes us more comfortable with technology than with doctrine and their training impels the military toward an all-purpose weapons system of maximum destructiveness. Yet this quest for absolute answers is inhibited, not only by the enormity of modern weapons, but also by their complexity. Traditionally weapons which

weapons which
by the enormity of modern weapons, put into their complexity. Traditionally
destructiveness. Yet this threat for absolute answers is inadmissible, not only
training impels the military toward an all-purpose weapons system of maximum
beat makes us more comfortable with technology than with doctrine and their
has given aetrating duality to our threat for a military doctrine. Our
This barbox that the greater our power, the greater our inadpellions
triumph brings with it collateral consequences which paralyze its use.
also total duration of the "kill." Unfortunately the capability of total des-
weapons, however, seem to assume not only total destruction of the target, but
therefore technology permitted only approximations to this beat. Modern
military has sought for means to destroy their target completely although
put by the reasons of military history in general. Throughout history, the
not only by our beat, with its seeming reason that security could be apodute,
But our effort to assess the meaning of the new technology has been inadpited
battletield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems.

EJ

52

26

were useful for offense were broadly useful for defense as well. Because in the past a superior technology almost inevitably led to victory all their training impels the military to a single all-purpose weapons system. But no longer today this equation between technological and strategic superiority holds to the same extent, partly because the battlefield has become global and partly because the new technology has brought about an unparalleled specialization of function. A superior tank could dominate the battlefield; but a superior bomber does not necessarily dominate the sky. For bombers do not fight each other. Their performance can be measured against each other only in terms of their杀伤力ability to reach the target. The test of a modern weapon is, therefore, not so much whether it is superior to its equivalent on the other side but whether it can perform its strategic mission.

During the hearings of the Symington committee on American airpower a great deal of effort was expended on the question whether the thrust of the engine of the Soviet long-range bomber, the Bison, was superior to the thrust of the engine of the B-52. Yet the only importance of this fact, even if true, would be what it reveals about the state of the art of aircraft design in the U.S.S.R. not because it affects strategic relationships. The

27

recipient of an H-bomb will find small consolation in the knowledge that
the delivery system which dropped it was inferior to that of his own country.
If two hostile bomber fleets pass each other in the sky, superior performance
will be meaningless if both can reach their targets. Even should the Soviets
develop an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile before we do, they would not

necessarily obtain a decisive advantage unless they could at the same time neutralize
that retaliatory our striking power. This is not to argue/we can afford to be technologically
inferior. It is simply to emphasize the complexity of the current strategic
The technological race is not between weapons which have problem. It is no longer sufficient to be ahead in one weapons system;
the same mission; rather it for the technological race is between offensive and defensive capabilities.
And because the offensive and defensive weapons systems have different cha-
racteristics, one of the most important problems for strategy is the weight
to be assigned to either and to decide on the "mix" which will provide
the greatest flexibility.

The complexity of weapons systems has inhibited the development of
do doctrine, moreover, because it has put a premium on interservice rivalry.
Almost up to the outbreak of World War II the division of functions
between the services followed logical lines. The Army was powerless

between the services followed in World War II. The Army was heavier than
Virtually all to the outbreak of World War II the division of functions
 doctrine, moreover, because it has but a premium on inter-service rivalry.

The complexity of weapons systems has inhibited the development of
the greatest flexibility.

To be assigned to either and to decide on the "mix" which will provide
reactoristics one of the most important problems for strategy is the weight
and because the offensive and defensive weapons systems have different ends
for the technological race is between offensive and defensive capabilities.
the same mixture of "mixes".

Problem. If it is no longer sufficient to do things in one weapons system
The technological race is not between versions which have
interior. It is simply to emphasize the complexity of the current strategic
our striking power. This is not to argue we can afford to be technologically
that
A significant

to obtain a decisive advantage unless they could at the same time neutralize
necessary

develop an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile before we do, they would not
will be meaningless if both can reach their targets. Even should the Soviets
It two hostile power fleets pass each other in the sky, an inferior performance
the delivery system which dropped it was inferior to that of his own country.
recipient of an H-bomb will find small conflagration in the knowledge that

EJ

27

28

on the sea beyond the range of its coastal artillery and the navy could
not project itself inland; the Air Force was not yet independent and the
range of planes was sufficiently short to permit the functions of naval and
army air to follow roughly the division among the senior services. But
the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the incomparable destructiveness of weapons have almost obliterated the traditional boundaries
among the services. The notion that the primary task of the air force is
to control the air, that of the navy to control the seas and of the army
to fight on land, which could still serve as the basis of the Key West agreement
of 1948 governing the division of functions among the services--has become
next to meaningless. Is the sea controlled by bombing ships from
carriers or by destroying the enemy's industrial potential? Is a land-battle
possible without having won the air supremacy and is it necessary after
the air battle has been won?

In the absence of a strategic doctrine each service will give its own
reply. And the reply will be not in terms of theory which has no immediate
pay-off, but in terms of weapons development which results in appropriations.

Is anti-aircraft analogous to artillery or to aerial warfare? - this is the
contention between the army and the air force. Is the carrier a naval

[y]

29

weapon or do the resources devoted to it detract from our long-range striking force?-- this is the argument between the Navy and the Air Force. Is a 1,500 mile ballistic missile a tactical or strategic weapon?-- in the absence of an answer each service is frantically pushing its own development in the hope that the service which gets there first will also control the weapon system.

This concern with the control of weapons systems is in fact the reverse side of the attempt to achieve a perfect division of functions. As long as each service has the primary mission of defeating its enemy counterpart, it cannot afford to leave in the control of another service a weapon it considers essential. For the navy's conception of what is essential to win control of the seas may conflict with the air force's notion of its requirements, striking force, for winning the Air battle. Thus each service runs the risk that it may have to repeat in combat the doctrinal arguments which have proved inconclusive before. And in view of the necessity for quick reaction imposed by the increasing speed and power of modern weapons, a duplication of weapons systems and a proliferation of partially conflicting doctrines is inevitable. Each new weapon has led to a bitter wrangle about

30

who should control its strike. It was thus with the A-bomb; it is now
the case with missiles. In each instance the doctrinal issue was evaded
by permitting each service to develop its own capability. This solution
is not only costly: it is bound to lead to an atrophy of strategic thought.

It is paradoxical that the chief impetus behind the formulation of
a military doctrine has come, not from a concern with strategy as such,
but because of a quest to escape its consequences. Periodically the national
Administration has announced that the greatest danger to our security was
not attack from abroad but bankruptcy and that our economy would collapse
under the burden of higher defense expenditures if they exceeded a hypothetical
ceiling varying from $11 billion in 1946 to $14.5 billion in 1949 to
$35 billion in 1953. Each economy drive has been justified with an argument
well attuned to our national psychology and indeed drawn from it: that there
existed an all-out solution to our military dilemma which made a diversified
capability unnecessary. Nothing has stimulated strategic thought as
these periodic economy drives. For it forced the services which were
hardest hit by the budgetary cut-- the Navy in 1949, the Army since 1953--
into a theoretical defense of their roles. Like dancers in a minuet, the
Navy and Army have changed places inveighing, often with the same arguments,

Navy and Army have changed places maneuvering, often with the same arguments, into a theoretical defense of their roles. Like dancers in a minuet, the target hit by the budgetary out-- the Navy in 1949, the Army since 1953-- these periodic economy drives. For it forced the services which were capability unnecessarily. Nothing has attenuated strategic thoughts as existed an all-out solution to our military dilemma which made a divergent well attuned to our national bafeology and indeed drawn from it that there $32 billion in 1953. Each economy drive has been justified with an argument ceding varying from $11 billion in 1949 to $14.2 billion in 1949 to under the purgex of higher defense expenditures if they exceeded a hypothetical not attack from abroad put pankruptly and that our economy would catabase Administration has announced that the greatest danger to our security was put because of a threat to escape its consequences. Periodically the national a military doctrine has come, not from a concern with strategy as such, It is paradoxical that the chief impetus behind the formulation of is not only costly: it is bound to lead to an atrophy of strategic thought. By permitting each service to develop its own strategy. This solution the case with missiles. In each instance the doctrinal frame was eased who should control its assets. It was done with the A-bomb; it is now

[x]

31

against an all-out strategy on the groundsof technology, morality and
national strategy. And their arguments made no less a contribution to our
which advanced them.
strategic thought for tending to coincide with the interest of the service
Only the Air Force has escaped, if not always budgetary cuts, an attack
almost alone among the Services
on its missions; for <u>at least</u> the Strategic Air Command has been able to
maintain the "pure" doctrine, the secret dream of American military thought:
that there exists a final answer to our strategic problem, that it is possible
"victory" was can somehow
be thought of independently of the consequence, if war
of policy.
I mean what you mean,
but I am
not sure it is
my purpose now, for that
matter, to get across
to the reader,

II

It has often been remarked that nothing stultifies military thought as
a victorious war, because innovation then must run the gamut of inertia legi-
timized by success. It was no different with U.S. military thought after
World War II. For the war had not only been won; its course had run true to
(its aggression had been unambiguous and on U.S. territory.)
the notion of what a war should be: Because we considered "peace" as the
normal relation among states we had always believed that war was an aberration
caused by malice or ignorance or a quest for world domination. Our aim,
therefore, was not to obtain a strategic transformation but to crush the
aggressor or to reform him. And World War II confirmed this notion:

32

We had brought to bear our superior resources and inflicted a terrible punishment. The enemy had been utterly defeated by a strategy of attrition unencumbered by political interference. No wonder that we tended to elevate a particular historical constellation into universal maxims and the strategy for defeating Germany into general military doctrine:

> "In case of another major war" testified General McLain in defense of the army appropriation for 1948 "the pattern would probably take the following form: First the blitz using all modern means. If this should succeed the war would be over...If the blitz, however, is stopped, the second phase would be a softening up process in which bases, industries and parts would be bombarded. The final phase would be a struggle between complete teams, air, sea and ground in which the accompanying attrition would point to the victor." 1)

Thus whatever the transformations of the post-war period we sought to fit them into a concept of war we had learned perhaps too well. Confronted with an unparalleled accretion to our strength, we could think of it only

1. House Appropriations Committee, p. 1241.

J. House Appropriations Committee, p. 1571.

with an unheralded accession to our strength, we could think of it only
if they into a concept of war we had learned perhaps too well. Contrived
技术ological
Whatever the transformations of the past-year period we sought to

Victor." (1)

air, see and ground in which the accompanying attrition would point to the
be pommarded. The final phase would be a struggle between complete teams,
would be a softening up process in which phases, industries andarta would
war would be over...It the pits, however, is strobbed, the second phase
form: First the pits making all modern means. It this should succeed the
army appropriation for 1948 "the pattern would properly take the following
"In case of another major war" testified General Mclain in defense of the
and the strategy for defeating Germany into General military doctrine:

we elevate a belligerent historical constellation into universal maxima
unencumbered by political interference. No wonder that we tended to
bunishment. The enemy had been utterly defeated by a strategy of attrition
We had brought to bear our superior resources and inflicted a terrible

33

as a means of self-defense. The assertion that we could never start a war
runs like a refrain through the pronouncements of our military leaders
from Secretary Forrestal to Secretary Wilson. Because we thought of war
as total we recoiled before the implication of using our power for any of
the objectives actually in dispute in the post-war world. Any discussion of
a policy of intermediary objectives was inhibited by posing alternatives
which left no middle ground between a war to resist aggression and a
preventive war. "If we or our friends are attacked, we will fight," wrote
General Bradley in 1949. "In the absence of such an attack, for us to
launch an atomic attack on another nation would be morally disastrous because
it would destroy the very foundations of decency and humanity which give this
country its strength. We Americans could never hold up our heads in the
world again. It would be politically impossible because the President, the
Congress and the American people would never stand for it. It would be
militarily suicidal because atomic bombs could not win a quick decision.
In the long run which ensued bad conscience would sap our morale. And the
great reservoir of friendship America has throughout the world would be
lost." 2) And to underscore the defensiveness of our notion of war, General
2. Article in the Saturday Evening Post. Quoted in B-36 Hearings p. 321.

2. Article in the Saturday Evening Post. Quoted in B-30 Hearings b. 33r. Joatf." s) And to underscore the defensiveness of our notion of war. General

Great reservoir of friendship America has throughout the world would be in the float run which evoked pad conscience would sap our morale. And the militarily anficial peacem atomic penta could not win a duck decaton. Congress and the American people would never stand for it. It would be world again. It would be politically impossible because the President, the country its strength. We Americans could never hold up our heads in the it would destroy the very foundations of democracy and humanity which give it launch an atomic attack on another nation would be morally diabolical people General Bradly in 1949. "In the absence of any an attack, for us to preventiae war." "If we or our friends are attacked, we will fight," wrote which left no middle ground between a war to resist aggression and a s policy of intermediate objectives was inapitted by baying alternatives the objectives actually in dispute in the beat-war world. And discussion of sa total we recoiled before the implication of making our power for and of from Secretary Forrest to Secretary Wilson. Because we thought of war rna like a refrain through the pronouncements of our militarily jespers sa a means of self-defense. The assertion that we could never start a war

33

34

Bradley defined a deterrent force as a military establishment which would
make it risky for the U.S.S.R. to attack us, but not so strong as to be
able to attack the U.S.S.R. 3)

To be sure, most nations tend to represent their wars as defensive. The distinguishing feature of their various notions of power is what is considered an attack. A power favored by geography or by a great material superiority can afford to let a threat become unambiguous; and the most unambiguous threat is overt military aggression against its territory. It can do so as long as the issue of a war cannot be decided against it by a single battle. A nation which does not have this margin of safety, whose fate, instead, depends on the first battle and not the last, is therefore forced to conduct a precautionary policy.

It cannot risk permitting a potential enemy to alter significantly the balance of forces, for to the degree that the equilibrium is disturbed it surrenders control over its security, indeed its survival. A precautionary policy resists the change in the balance, not the use to which this change is put.

It is directed against potential, not actual hostility. As a result the balance

3. *Op. cit.*, p. 317.

35

which may properly reflect a policy of precaution tend to a less exposed nation. It is to appear as overly subtle, petty and a contributing cause of war. This, in fact, has been the traditional U. S. reaction to European diplomacy. To be sure, the difference between our approach and that of the European states was a matter of degree: the increment of power required to upset the European balance was relatively small; the margin of safety of the individual nations was, therefore, correspondingly narrow; they tended to resist transformations which could only be marginal to our security. By contrast, under conditions of pre-World War II technology, the increment of power required to upset the world balance of power was considerable; it could be achieved only by overthrowing so many intermediary states that no doubt was left about the threat to our security. And because many other states had to be attacked long before the threat to our security became apparent we could always be certain that some other nations would bear the brunt of the first battles. Thus we came to develop a doctrine of aggression so purist and abstract that it absolved our statesmen from having to make ambiguous decisions.

The difficulty with our concept of power, then, has been that it was formed during a century and a half of security but that it has had to be applied in a period in which our margin of safety is constantly shrinking. This has been

in a period in which our margin of safety is constantly shrinking. This has been formed during a century and a half of security put that it has had to be applied

statements from having to make audacious decisions.

develop a doctrine of aggression so brutal and abstract that it apdovdied our
other nations would bear the brunt of the first battles. Thus we came to
threat to our security became apparent we could always be certain that some
security. And because many offer statements had to be attacked long before the
so many intermediary statements that we no doubt was felt about the threat to our
world balance of power was considered safe; it could be achieved only by overwhelming
of pre-World War II technology, the increment of power required to subdue the
which could only be marginal to our security. By contrast, under conditions
was, therefore, correspondingly narrow; they tended to resist transformations
balance was relatively small; the margin of safety of the individual nations
a matter of degree: the increment of power required to subdue the European
the difference between our approach and that of the European states was
has been the traditional U. 2. reaction to European diplomacy. To be ame,
to abhor as overly ample, heavy and a contributing cause of war. This, in fact,
to a less exposed nation.

of power whose intricate adjustments reflect a policy of preemption tend

36

due to two factors: the strategic transformation brought about by the two
World Wars and the growth of nuclear technology. The two world wars weakened or
eliminated the intermediary power which had heretofore served as our safety
indicators. Either too weak or too demoralized to resist, they created a vacuum
in which the two super powers had to contend for supremacy, the U.S.S.R. consciously,
we despite ourselves. In a world of two super powers there is no margin for
maneuver. Any strengthening of one side represents an absolute weakening of the
other. Moreover, nuclear technology for the first time in history makes it
possible to shift the balance of power entirely through developments within the
territory of another sovereign state. No conceivable territorial gain, not even
the occupation of Western Europe, could have affected the strategic balance
as the Soviet success in ending our atomic monopoly. Had a power in the past
sought to achieve a comparable strategic transformation through territorial
expansion, war would have been the inevitable consequence. But because the
growth of a nuclear technology can take place within sovereign territory, it
produces an armaments race as a substitute for war. The result of these develop-
ments has been that we no longer have any margin for error. We are now forced to conduct
a precautionary policy and any other course will only increase our dilemma.

a brazenly bold and any other course with only increase our difficulties.

ment has been that we no longer have any margin for error. We are now forced to conduct

proceeds an armament race as a substitute for war. The result of these develop-

growth of a nuclear technology can take place within sovereign territory, if

the occupation of Western Europe could have affected the strategic balance

possible to strengthen of one side represents an indefinite weakening of the

we desire ourselves. In a world of two amber bowers there is no margin for

in which the two amber bowers had to contend for hegemony, the U. S. A. R. consecutively,

good to two factors: the strategic transformation brought about by the two

30

37

In the immediate post-war period this was not apparent, however.

Our history and the ambivalent attitude towards power it produced had always tended to make us prefer legal to physical safeguards, an international agreement to an equilibrium of forces. Thus in the immediate post-war period we looked for protection less to our strength than to an international organization: "At the outset" said General Eisenhower in defending the Army budget for 1947, "we made certain assumptions on which we base our program...The first of these is that the United Nations will gain reception as a central factor in...world security. We make the assumption that that would increase our prestige; and therefore, we will be able to recede from this position of an armed camp...to something that approaches a reasonable posture." 4) The only threat to the balance of power we recognized was an attack on Europe, because we saw no other possibility for the U.S.S.R. to over-<u>industrial</u> come our military advantage: "It is my belief" said Secretary Forrestal, "that if we make plain and clear that the United States will not tolerate the destruction of the Western civilization, we shall have peace." 5) "The first line of defense" said Secretary Acheson, "is in Europe." 6)

4. Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee for 1947, p. 12.

5. UMT Hearings, p. 329.

6. Hearings on Military Assistance Program (1949), Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 7.

Committee, b. J.

c. Herding on Military Assistance Program (1960), Senate Armed Services

d. UNT Herding, b. 359.

e. Herding before the Senate Appropriations Committee for 1967, b. 15.

f. Line of defense, said Secretary Venceson, "is in Europe." (c)

g. Destruction of the Western civilization, we shall have peace." (2)

h. If we make plain and clear that the United States will not tolerate the come on this advantage: "It is my belief," said Secretary Forrest, "that attack on Europe, because we saw no other possibility for the U.S.A. to go over-

boatme." (4)

i. The only threat to the balance of power we recognized was an this boatload of an armed bomb...to something that approaches a reasonable would increase our prestige; and therefore, we will be able to receive from as a central factor in...world security. We make the assumption that that program...The first of these is that the United Nations will gain reception Army budget for I 75, "we made certain assumptions on which we base our

organization: "At the outset," said General Ehrmann in defending the

we looked for protection less to our strength than to an international agreement to an equilibrium of forces. Thus in the immediate boat-war period always tended to make us better off to physical security, an international

In the immediate boat-war period this was not apparent, however.

38

If war came, however, we assumed that it would take the most unambigous form and that the Soviet Union would draw the same lessons from World War II as we: "Whoever decides to fight us in the future," said James Forrestal in 1945 "will have read history and realize that we were the determining balance of power in this war and decide to knock us off first." 7) "Any nation seeking domination of the world" said General Eisenhower in 1947 "must defeat the United States and must defeat us before we achieve our maximum strength. Therefore if global war comes to us again, the first blow will be struck not at Warsaw but at Washington, not at London but at Los Angeles; not even at Pearl Harbor, but at Pittsburgh." 8) "Any war-like nation which may have the United States aligned against it must destroy the industrial capacity and depreciate the manpower of the United States," said General Spaatz. "For that reason I think it is reasonable to assume that any future war will be ushered in with large scale attacks on the United States..." 9) Thus was born the doctrine that a new war must start with a surprise attack on us, a notion compounded by inability to conceive

7. House Appropriations Hearings for Fiscal Year 1946 (Navy Dept), p. 8.

8. " " " " " 1948, p. 111.

9. Op. cit., p. 600.

["3. \"On \"eff.\" b. 200.\"", "8. \" \" \" \" \" \" \" \" \" \" \" \"

39

either a positive or an intermediary application for our power, and by our
concept of war as inevitably a contest of attrition: "It is inconceivable,"
said General Weyland "that the United States will start an aggressive war.
Hence it is obvious that at the start of a war we will be the recipient of
an all-out surprise attack. This attack will be directed against the industry
and economy of the continental United States." ¹⁰⁾ Nothing illustrates better
the abstractness of our concept of power than this notion of surprise attack.

For in any concrete application it turned out to be meaningless. The
*of this surprise attack was usually stated to be our*
target *are usually assumed to be our industrial facilities. But given the*
fact that the Soviet did not yet possess nuclear weapons, it would have
*number of planes -- Far beyond any foreseeable Soviet capability --* taken a staggering *armade to make a significant dent in our industrial*
potential. And nothing illustrates better the ambiguity of our strategic
*conclusions we drew from our conviction* doctrine than the reaction to our conviction that any war would start with
a surprise attack on the United States. For if the United States was the
first target, it might have been argued that we could not afford to let
any power break our atomic monopoly. Britain's security for 200 years had
not been assured merely by her insular position, but also by her willingness

10. op. cit., p. 642.

40

to fight for the supremacy of the seas without which her insular position would
have become a liability. But confronted by a power which never tired of
proclaiming the irreconcilability of its system with ours, we saw no means, except
negotiation, to prevent that power from developing a capability to destroy us.
Again since the U.S.S.R. was already in possession of the satellite orbit
and because it extended its control by quasi-legal means, we had difficulty
fitting Soviet expansion into our concept of aggression or to understand how
the satellite orbit could affect the security of the United States. Our
objections to Soviet post-war expansion, therefore, tended to turn
on ethics rather than strategy. Thus strategy and diplomacy came to be
considered separate; with strategy assigned the task of protecting the
United States against aggression and diplomacy to settle all other disputes
by negotiation, with neither able to reinforce the other. The objective of
war was victory, that of diplomacy peace and each began where the other left
off. "I would be loath," said General Marshall "to hazard American lives for
purely political purposes." 11)

If our military doctrine had difficulty in establishing a relationship
with our diplomacy, it had few doubts about the conduct of the war should

11. Quoted in Osgood, p.

If quoted in Osogbo, b.

with our diplomacy, if had few doubts about the combat of the war already
It our military doctrine had difficulty in establishing a relationship
bureaucratic burgherses." (11)

out. "I could be found," said General Marshall "to guard American lives for
waratively" that of diplomacy peace and each began where the other left
by negotiation with neither able to reinforce the other. The objective of
United States against aggression and diplomacy to settle all other disputes
considered separate; with strategy assigned the task of protecting the
on ethics rather than strategy. Thus strategy and diplomacy came to be
oppositions to Soviet post-war expansion, therefore, tended to turn
the satellite orbit could affect the security of the United States. Our
fitting Soviet expansion into our concept of aggression or to understand how
and became it extended its control by duper-regal means, we had difficulty
Again since the U.S.B.R. was already in possession of the satellite orbit
negotiation to prevent further from developing a dependency to dearth na.

it

proclaiming the irreconcilability of its system with ours, "View no means, we
have become a liability." But confronted by a power which never tried or

[4]

to fight for the supremacy of the sea without which per innumerable position would

41

were
it break out. If war would be global, it would be won by industrial capacity
and we would gain the victory both because of superior technology and through
our ability to eliminate the industrial capacity of any possible opponent. ¹²)

Since war would start with a surprise attack, our best defense lay "in our
ability to strike back quickly with a counter offensive, to neutralize the
hostile attack at its source or to discourage its continuance by striking
at the vitals of the aggressor." ¹³) The doctrine of instant retaliation
was not new when Secretary Dulles proclaimed it; it had been the basis of
all post-war U.S. military policy. The postulate that deterrence was
achieved by retaliatory power and that victory depended on maximum
destructiveness was never questioned. On the contrary, each service justified
its requirements by the contribution it could make to a strategy of attrition:

"At the beginning of hostilities," said Secretary of the Navy Sullivan in
1949 "and until the Air Force could acquire operating bases within flying
range of the enemy we must fight with whatever we have. In such a situation
carrier-based aircraft would deliver attacks that would certainly slow up
an enemy attack upon our homeland and might throw that attack off-balance." ¹⁴)

12. Among many examples, see Forrestal testimony on National defense establishment, p. 21ff.

13. General Spaatz before the House Committee on Appropriations, 1946, p. 401.

14. Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, p. 6.

IV. Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, b. c.

13. General Shafer before the House Committee on Appropriations, 10/2, b. 401. Pleafament, b. 511.

15. Wong many examples, see Forrester testimony on National defense assets.

an enemy attack upon our homeland and might throw that attack off-defence." IV)
carrier-based aircraft would deliver attacks that would certainly allow us
range of the enemy we must fight with whatever we have. In such a situation
10/20 and until the Air Force could acquire operating bases within flying
"At the beginning of hostilities," said Secretary of the Navy Sullivan in
its requirements by the contribution it could make to a strategy of attrition:
destruktiveness was never questioned. On the contrary, each service qualified
achieved by retaliatory power and that victory depended on maximum

all host-war U.S. military policy. The hostilities that deterrence was
was not new when Secretary Dulles proclaimed it; it had been the case of
at the vitals of the aggressor." 13)
The doctrine of instant retaliation

hostile attack at its source or to discourage its continuance by striking
rapidity to strike back quickly with a counter offensive, to neutralize the
Since war would start with a surprise attack, our host defense lay "in our
our ability to eliminate the industrial capacity of any possible opponent." 15)
and we would gain the victory both because of superior technology and through

it preclude it. It was not global, it would be no industrial capacity

71

42

[Y] "There is the requirement that we permanently possess and man bases at a distance from the United States," said General Eisenhower. "It is from these bases that we could launch our first interceptions of any attack directed against the United States...It is also from these bases that we would move to the counter-attack...[They] provide the cushion of time." 15)

to

The task of our military policy then was/enable us to fight a war of annihilation and our alliances were justified in terms of the bases they afforded us: "Plans for the national security" said General Bradley in 1948 "must consider the likelihood that the United States will be subject to air and airborne attacks at the outset. The likelihood and the practicability of this kind of attack increases daily...We will [therefore] immediately have to secure bases from which an enemy might attack us by air. Next we will have to launch an immediate counter-attack...predominantly through the air. To make our counterblows we will need bases which we do not have now.

The seizing and holding of these bases...will require Army combat elements...

Lastly, comes the phase of total mobilization and maximum offensive efforts.

In conjunction with the air and naval arms the army will engage in joint operations designed to carry the war to the enemy with ever increasing intensity. The closer we get to the enemy the more determined will be his resistance.."

15. House Appropriations Committee, 1947, p. 182.
16. Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, p. 4.

16

16. Treatyatory before the House Appropriations Committee, b. 4.

f2. House Appropriations Committee, 1943, p. 185.

intensity. The closer we get to the enemy, the more determined will be his resistance.

The seizing and holding of these passes...will require Army combat elements.

To make our counterflows we will need passes which we do not have now.

will have to launch an immediate counter-attack...blandishingly through the
air and airborne attacks at the outset. The likelihood and the practice-
will consider the likelihood that the United States will be subject to
attacked as: "If any for the national security," said General Bradley in 1948

will have to acquire passes from which an enemy might attack us if air.

Next we
will pick up this kind of attack increases daily...We will [hereafter] immediately

The task of our military below then was simple as to light a war of
to the counter-attack...[They] provide the means of time." (12)

against the United States...It is also from these passes that we would move
passes that we could launch our first interceptions of any attack directed
distance from the United States," said General Eisenhower. "If it is from these

There is the "requirement that we permanently possess and man passes at a

[y]

43

All the elements of post-war U.S. military doctrine are contained
in this statement: the war will start with a surprise attack, it will be
dealt with by instant retaliation, it will be an all-out struggle in which
the possession of foreign bases was essential and which will be decided
by air power. No goal of war was stated except the defeat of the enemy; the
war was described was an almost exact replica of World War II;
its only objective could be unconditional surrender. Several things are
remarkable about this notion of strategy: its separation from diplomacy,
its assumption that a strategy of all-out destruction which was acceptable
to us would be acceptable to our allies as well, the reiteration of surprise
attack coupled with an almost complete lack of concern with the consequences
of such an attack on the United States and above all the ambivalent attitude
toward nuclear weapons.

For the strategy developed in the immediate post-war period did not
depend on nuclear weapons; rather it added them almost as an afterthought
to a familiar military doctrine, as more efficient to destroy
 enemy industrial centers. Several reasons for this: a feeling of moral
revulsion, a fear that the weapons, if flaunted, would make impossible any

reality, a fear that the weapons it financed would make impossible any
ennemy industrial centers."\*Several reasons for this: a feeling of most
there were

to a familiar military doctrine, as more efficient explosive to destroy
depend on nuclear weapons; rather, it added them almost as an afterthought
For the strategy developed in the immediate post-war period did not

toward nuclear weapons.

of, and an attack on the United States and above all the amorphous attitude
attack coupled with an almost complete lack of concern with the consequences
to us would be acceptable to our allies as well, the reiteration of surprise
its assumption that a strategy of all-out destruction which was acceptable
remarkable apart from this notion of strategy: its separation from diplomacy,
its only objective could be unconditional surrender. Several things are
war withoutxxxkxxxkxxx described was an almost exact replica of World War II;
by air power. No goal of war was stated except the defeat of the enemy; the
the possession of foreign passes was essential and which will be decided
dest with by instant retaliation, it will be an all-out annihilation in which
in this statement: the war will start with a surprise attack, it will be

If the elements of post-war U.2. military doctrine are contained

43

44

understanding with the U.S.S.R. (this attitude was more pronounced in certain sections of the press than in the government) and real uncertainty about the meaning of the new technology. Above all, the nuclear weapons were used as a means of escaping harsh realities. For at least subconsciously they were taken as another indication of our inherent technological superiority and as long as we possessed our monopoly we could not conceive of an overt challenge. There was, to be sure, an awareness that our monopoly would be fleeting. But there was also an air of unreality about these prophesies. It was said in 1945 that the Soviets would break our atomic monopoly within 5 years, and the prediction remained 5 years with each passing year. 17) Hanson Baldwin's estimate in 1947 18) that the Soviets would produce one bomb sometime between 1950 and 1957, that it would then take her another 20 years to build up a significant stockpile and that in any case the U.S.S.R. was not likely to develop a delivery system for a long time -- reflected the realities of the national psychology, if not necessarily the intelligence estimates. 19) Coupled with the notion that war was likely to

17. See testimony by Dr. Rabi at the Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 452 ff.

18. *N. Y. Times*, November 9, 1947.

19. On the other hand, intelligence estimates often exaggerate nuclear perils because their author is not likely to get into trouble if a pessimistic prediction turns out wrong.

prediction turns out wrong.

16. On the other hand, intelligence estimates often exaggerate maximum berthing capacity. U. Y. Timoshenko, November 3, 1947.

17. See testimony by Dr. Rabi at the Oppenheimer Hearings, p. 425 ff.

intelligence estimates. 18)

reflected the ressenties of the national policy, it not necessarily the case the U. S. B. R. was not likely to develop a delivery system for a long time -- fake per another 30 years to build up a significant stockpile and that in any would produce one bomb sometime between 1960 and 1965, that it would then being year. 19)

monopoly within 2 years, and the prediction remained 2 years with each
prophesied. It was said in 1942 that the Soviets would preusk our atomic
would be fleeing. But there was also an air of unreality about these
an overt challenge. There was, to be sure, an awareness that our monopoly
and as long as we possessed our monopoly we could not conceive of
they were taken as another indication of our inherent technological under-
were said as a means of offsetting the ressenties. For at least subconsciously
about the meaning of the new technology. Above all, the nuclear weapons
certain sections of the press than in the Government) and rest uncertainty
understanding with the U. S. B. R. (this attitude was more pronounced in

45

start with a surprise attack on us, it lent a quality of abstractness and unreality to all thinking about military problems for it gave rise to this syllogism, psychologically, if not actually: 1) War must start with a surprise attack. 2) The Soviets will not possess an atomic capability for a long time. 3) Therefore, there will not be a war.

As a result, our thinking about nuclear weapons oscillated between exaggerating their horror (which was to some extent reassuring) and under rating their effect. The latter was particularly noticeable among the services, except strategic air, which were afraid that their role would be impaired. Both the Navy statement on nuclear strategy as well as that of the Army published in the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* in 1947 illustrate this. 20) Both insisted that nuclear weapons had not made their service dispensable. Although they admitted that our best strategy involved the nuclear bombardment of the enemy's industrial potential, they maintained that each service had a role to play in this task, the navy that of precision bombing and projecting our power visibly; the army through holding and

20. See Navy statement, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, July 1947; Army statement, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1947. These statements were written by Brodie but cleared by responsible officials in each department.

department.
were written by Brodie put cleared by reasonable officials in each
statement, *Buffetin of Atomic Scientists*, June 1947. These statements
30. See *Navy statement, *Buffetin of Atomic Scientists*, July 1947; *Navy
pomping and projecting our power effectively; the army through holding and
that each service had a role to play in this work*, the navy that of precision
nuclear bombardment of the enemy's industrial potential, they maintained
diabetespie. Although they admitted that our best strategy involved the
true. 30)
Both insisted that nuclear weapons had not made their service
of the Army piped in the *Buffetin of Atomic Scientists* in 1947 illustrate
be impaired. Both the Navy statement on nuclear strategy as well as that
services, except strategic air, which were afraid that their role would
rating their effect. The latter was particularly noticeable among the
exaggerating their horror (which was to some extent reassuring) and under-
As a result, our thinking about nuclear weapons facilitated between
a long time. 3) Therefore, there will not be a war.

The rest of us, however, know no reason to think so. In fact, there is no
a surprise attack. 3) The Soviets will not possess an atomic capability for
fireiology, psychologically, it not actually: 1) War what start with
moresity to all thinking about military problems for it gave rise to
start with a surprise attack on us, it lent a quality of apertivity and

46

garrisoning the bases from which strategic strikes could be launched.

Both assumed a prolonged period of nuclear monopoly; the army thought it would last from between 8 to 15 years. Neither service considered that nuclear weapons would affect its tactics fundamentally. The Navy, in particular, deprecated the implications of the new technology. A 1,000 mile missile, it argued, was almost impossible. It represented not simply an extension of the German experience with rockets in World War II; it required a new order of physics altogether. This merely reflected a statement previously made by Admiral Nimitz, that he did not expect to see intercontinental ballistic missiles in his life time. In short, any new war for the next 10 to 15 years would not only be fought with a World War II strategy, but with World War II weapons with the atomic bomb added to increase the power of our strategic arsenal.

Had technology remained static and had we not been challenged in Korea, an uneasy equilibrium might have been established between the claim of the Air Force that it possessed the decisive weapons and that of the other services that they were essential to make this weapon effective. But the advent

21. House Appropriations Committee, Navy, p. 9. (1947)

22. House Appropriations Committee, Navy 1949 (Admiral Noble) p. 743. Many similar statements exist by army and navy spokesmen.

47

of the long-range bomber, the B-36, upset the finely wrought concept of the "balanced forces" which permitted each service to do what they had always done only with more powerful weapons. For if deterrence was achieved by retaliatory power and if retaliatory power was identical with offensive striking power, the only justification for the other services was their utility in providing or holding bases. But if it was possible to launch long-range strikes from the United States the doctrine of balanced forces might represent a diversion of resources. Had defense appropriations been larger this argument might not have been pressed to its ultimate conclusion.

But with a new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, dedicated to the proposition that one of Stalin's aims was to force the United States into bankruptcy, 23) the allocation of missions and with it the amount of scarce defense dollars became a matter of overriding concern. When the Defense Department ordered cessation of the construction of the navy's 65-thousand-ton aircraft carrier and the procurement of an additional quantity of B-36's, the first post-war debate on strategic doctrine was inevitable.

23. Mac Arthur Hearings, p.2626.

S3. Mac Arthur Hearings, p.305q.

that host-war debate on strategic doctrine was inevitable.

aircraft carrier and the commencement of an additional quantity of B-30's, the Department ordered cessation of the construction of the navy's 62-thousand-ton defense dollars became a matter of overriding concern. When the Defense panelists (S3) the allocation of missions and with it the amount of source availability

But with a new Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, dedicated to the broader this argument might not have been pressed to its ultimate conclusion.

might represent a diversion of resources. Had defense appropriations been long-range strikes from the United States the doctrine of balanced forces utility in providing or holding passes. But it was possible to launch striking power, the only justification for the other services was their retaliatory power and its retaliatory power was identical with offensive done only with more powerful weapons. For it deference was achieved by "balanced forces" which permitted each service to do what they had always of the long-range power, the B-30, which was the finely wrought concept of the

47

48

The debate about the B-36 would have gained in significance had it not been connected so intimately with a battle for appropriations. As it was, the Navy case which turned on the efficacy of strategic bombing gave the impression of having been constructed out of pique at the decision to end its equivalent of long-range aviation: the super-carrier.²⁴) And the Navy case was further weakened by the fact that it had not dissented from any of the formulations of strategic doctrine during the post-war period. Nevertheless, the Navy case, ably marshalled by Admiral Radford, for the first time raised issues which have become the core of present disputes about military policy. It attacked the notion of a quick war; it emphasized the importance of a relationship between military and political objectives; it rejected the doctrine that a massive retaliatory attack represented our primary deterrent: "One member of the defense team asserts," said Admiral Radford "that the best guarantee for America's security lies first in preventing war by the threat of atomic annihilation and second, in prosecuting such a war of annihilation if we have to fight...This theory of warfare is not generally concurred in by military men. Aside from any moral or political considerations...many reject the theory on the grounds that it will not bring victory...The threat

24. This term has been hotly resented by the Navy--since it is part of common usage, however, it will be used here.

common usage, however, it will be need here.

ST. This term has been properly rendered by the Navy—since it is part of
reject the theory on the grounds that it will not bring victory...The threat
by military men. Value from any moral or political considerations...many
if we have to fight...This theory of warfare is not generally concerned in
of a atomic annihilation and second, in processing such a war of annihilation
guarantee for America's security lies that in preventing war by the threat
"One member of the defense team asserts," said Admiral Radford "that the best
dothing that a massive retaliatory attack represented our primarily deterrent
relationship between military and political objectives; it rejected the
It attacked the notion of a quick war; it emphasized the importance of a
issues which have become the core of present diabetes about military policy.
the Navy case, apply misapplied by Admiral Radford for the first time raised
conclusions of strategic doctrine during the boat-war period. Nevertheless,
was further weakened by the fact that it had not dissipated from any of the
equivalent of long-range aviation: the amber-carrier. ST)
And the Navy case
impression of having been constructed out of pingue at the decision to end its
the Navy case which turned on the efficacy of strategic pumping gave the
been connected so intimately with a settle for subordination. As it was,
the debate spout the B-30 would have gained in significance had it not

78

49

of instant retaliation will not prevent war, it may even invite it....

Moreover, future war will extend far beyond the province of the military
in planning to wage a war...we must look to the peace to follow. A war
of annihilation might possibly bring a Pyrrhic military victory, but it
would be politically and economically senseless... The results of two world
wars have demonstrated the fact that victory in war is not an end in itself." 25)

In the process, the Navy brought into the open for the first time the
inadequacies of our process at arriving at strategic decisions, with three
service chiefs whose primary task is the maintenance of the morale and
efficiency of their service also required to make over-all strategic judgments
which may run counter to this mission. As long as the views of the three
services concerning the most effective strategy is in accord this presents
few problems. If, however, they are at variance—as they have been since
1949—only two solutions are possible: in periods of budgetary plenty, as
between 1951 and 1954, they will cause each service to build up the weapons
system it considers appropriate for its mission without a too careful concern
with doctrinal harmony. In periods of relative budgetary scarcity it will

25. B-36 Hearings, p. 398. (See also subsequent statements by Admirals Offstie, Blandy, Nimitz, King, Denfald).

Ottlie, Blandy, Nimms, King, Dents).

52. B-3c Hennepin, p. 388. (See also Appendix statements by Admirals).

with doctrinal harmony. In periods of relative budgetary scarcity it will
system it considers appropriate for its mission without a too careful concern
between 1921 and 1924, they will cause each service to build up the weapons
1923—only two solutions are possible: in periods of budgetarily plenty, as
far problems. It, however, they are at variance—as they have been since
services concerning the most effective strategy is in second this presentation
which may run counter to this mission. As long as the views of the three
efficiency of their service also required to make over-all strategic judgments
service chiefs whose primary task is the maintenance of the morale and
inadequacies of our process at arriving at strategic decisions, with three
In the process, the Navy brought into the open for the first time the
wars have demonstrated the fact that victory in war is not an end in itself." 52)
would be politically and economically senseless... The results of two world
of annihilation might possibly bring a baronic military victory, put it
in planning to wage a war...we must look to the peace to follow. A war
Moreover, future war will extend far beyond the province of the military
of infant retaliation will not prevent war, it may even invade it....

49

50

lead to bitter rivalry about the assignments of these missions. And since the presentation of a budget is facilitated by the appearance of inter-service harmony, there occurs usually just enough compromise to prevent a resolution of the doctrinal conflict; the necessity of fighting doctrinal battles at budgetary intervals with appropriations as the prize, almost insures the perpetuation of the doctrinal disagreements, behind the scenes.

To be sure, the Navy position did no more than raise these issues.

For the proposed solutions demonstrated that the Navy's disagreement was not so much with doctrine as with the technical implementation of a strategy which could not envisage anything but all-out war. The Navy posed the question of the relationship between political and military objectives-but not because it doubted that every war would be a war of unconditional surrender. Rather it insisted that the unconditional surrender should be achieved by a strategy which did not impose too heavy a financial burden on the victor by forcing him to rehabilitate occupied enemy territory. It raised for the first time the issue whether our strategy should be nuclear or conventional and it opposed what it considered the over-emphasis on strategic airpower; but it did so primarily because carrier planes could perform the same missions more effectively and more economically. The B-36 was termed a billion dollar

effectively and more economically. The B-36 was termed a piffon dollar

did so primarily because carrier planes could perform the same missions more
obsoled what if considered the over-emphasis on strategic airpower? put it
the issue whether our strategy should be nuclear or conventional and if
him to repudiate coupled enemy territory. It raised for the first time
which did not impose too heavy a financial burden on the victor by forcing
itulated that the unconditional surrender should be imposed by a strategy
achieved by the Navy

it doubted that every war would be a war of unconditional surrender. Rather
of the relationship between political and military objectives-but not because
could not evaluate anything put all-out war. The Navy based the decision
much with doctrine as with the technical implementation of a strategy which
For-proposed solutions demonstrated that the Navy's disagreement was not so
FCS
To be sure, the Navy position did no more than raise these issues.

berhentuation of the doctrinal disagreements, *behind the scenes*,
pudgely intervals with appropriations at the brine, almost insinues the
of the doctrinal conflict; the necessity of fighting doctrinal battles at
harmony, there occurs suddenly that enough compromise to prevent a resolution
presentation of a budget is facilitated by the *aberrance* of inter-service
lead to bitter rivalry about the assignments of those missions. And since the

51

blunder, but only because Navy fighters and therefore presumably the
Soviet defense could outmaneuver it.

The B-36 controversy therefore did no more than sketch the outline of
the American strategic dilemma: our military policy was directed to only
two contingencies: a direct attack on the United States and a direct attack
on Western Europe. It offered no solutions either to Soviet moves in other
areas or to the gradual overturning of the balance of power through suversion,
or
guerrilla activity, indeed the breaking of our atomic monopoly; in fact, it
denied that these were the concern of our military policy. In its insistence
on a "pure" cause of war, it had developed a casus belli, a surprise attack
which did not happen to fit any of the issues actually in dispute from the
division of Germany to the satellite orbit to international control of the
atom. This was the incommensurability between our military policy and our
diplomacy and not the fact that victory in an all-out war would come about
at excessive cost to the enemy.

Thus the B-36 hearings are significant for affording yet another
forum for perhaps the most inclusive restatement of what had become truisms
of American strategy. So much were they in accord with the sense of the
country that they gained the support of almost the entire press and of even

country that they gained the advantage of almost the entire press and of even
of American strategy. So much were they in accord with the sense of the
form for berthing the most inclusive statement of what had become truisme
that the B-30 hearings are significant for affording yet another
at excessive cost to the enemy.

diplomacy and not the fact that victory in an all-out war would come about
atom. This was the incommensurability between our military policy and our
division of Germany to the satellite orbit to international control of the
which did not happen to lift any of the issues actually in dispute from the
on a "bume" cause of war, it had developed a <u>causeผล</u>, a excuse attack
demanded that these were the concern of our military policy. In its insistance
on the preeminence of atomic monopathy; in fact, it
urges the breaking of our atomic monopoly; in fact, it
ok

areas or to the gradual overturning of the balance of power through annihilation
on Western Europe. It offered no solutions either to Soviet moves in other
or two contingencies: a direct attack on the United States and a direct attack
the American strategic differences: mmr military policy was directed to only
our

The B-30 controversy therefore did no more than sketch the outline of

pmander, put only because Navy lighters and therefore breamaply the

27

52

so staunch an opponent of the Truman Administration as ex-President Hoover.

Secretary of the Air Force Symington denied that the Air Force was putting all its eggs in one basket. 26) He insisted that the United States could not hope to match the Soviets man for man and that it would have to place reliance on superior technology, the best instrument of which was the Strategic Air Force. He did not deny that such a policy would cause a heavy loss of civilian life but he defended it with the statement "that if civilians are to be killed, I would rather kill theirs than ours." 27) This too was the argument of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley. He insisted that our military policy was entirely defensive, a view which hardly required reiteration in view of the national objectives he defined: the preservation of peace and of our way of life; the raising of our standard of living and the achievement of world prosperity. His statement was notable for the fact that it listed the collapse of our economy under the burden of defense-budgets increases of $14.5 billion as a danger as real as the Soviet threat. And it contained perhaps the fullest exposition of our strategic doctrine yet made.

26. B-36 Hearings, p. 397ff.

27. Symington's testimony was noteworthy also for the rather disarming statement that the moral aspects of war concerned the Secretary of State, not of the Air Force.

NOT OF THE AIR FORCE.

27. Summerson's testimony was notably also for the rather diametric statement that the moral basis of war concerned the Secretary of State.

it contained perhaps the unmitigated exposition of our strategic doctrine yet made. Increase of $1.2 billion as a danger as real as the Soviet threat. And that it flattered the collabase of our economy under the burden of defense-purposes the achievement of world prosperity. His statement was notable for the fact of bases and of our way of life; the raising of our standard of living and reiteration in view of the national objectives he defined: the preservation that our military policy was entirely defensive, a view which hardly required of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley. He instated killed, I would rather kill them than ours."

This too was the argument title put he defended it with the statement "that it civilizes are to be Force." He did not deny that such a policy would cause a heavy loss of civilian hope to watch the Soviets man for man and that it would have to face refinance

on anterior technology, the best instrument of which was the Strategic Air

hope to watch the Soviets man for man and that it would have to face refinance all its egge in one basket." He instated that the United States could not

Secretary of the Air Force Summerson denied that the Air Force was buffing so to attack an opponent of the Truman Administration as ex-President Hoover.

25

53

All the truisms of American strategic thought were reiterated: the concern with Europe, the war won by superior productivity, the identification of deterrence with maximum destructive power: "We have assumed...that the only dangerous force in the world today is Communism, and the only nations whose post-war actions have indicated an opposition to the tranquility we seek are the Soviet Union and her satellites...Opposing this the North Atlantic powers...now combine in natural resources more of the vital factors for defense than the Soviet combination, except in the case of manpower... Geographically Russia and her satellites stand next door to Western Europe and which is undoubtedly a desirable commercial/ industrial and cultural prize. The American people have joined with allies to keep this prize from interests opposed to our own..."²⁸

"Let us first discuss the basic concept of our defense planning...

Our basic concept for defense includes protection of the United States in case we are attacked. It provides for early retaliation from bases which we hope to have ready at all times. This concept includes a decision that we shall have to be ready to seize other bases...so that we can attack the enemy at shorter range. Strategic bombing has a high priority in our

at shorter range. Strategic bombing was a high priority in our

interests opposed to our own..."S

brize. The American people have joined with allies to keep this brize from

and which is undoubtedly a desirable commercial industrial and cultural

Geographically remote and per seellfives and next door to Western Europe
defense than the Soviet domination, except in the case of manpower...

b罩era...now comprise in natural reaomes more of the vital factors for

the Soviet Union and per seellfives...Obsoating this the North Atlantic

bost-war actions have indicated an opposition to the fraudulity we seek are
dangerous force in the world today is Communism, and the only nations whose
difference with maximum destructive power: "We have assumed...that the only
with Europe, the war won by superior productivity, the identification of

All the truism of American strategic thought were reiterated: the concern

23

54

military planning because we cannot hope to keep forces in being of sufficient size to meet Russia in the early stages of a war. This is particularly true since we are never going to start a war...In addition we must realize that the first prize for any aggressor...is Europe...Finally, if the military continues to effect more economies in defense measure there will be little danger of our economic collapse and our over-all risk will be less and less." 28)

### III

This was the strategy of a satisfied power, content with its place in the world, eager to enjoy its benefits undisturbed. The concern with our economy was the attitude of a nation preoccupied with domestic problems and unacquainted with disaster, a nation to which a foreign danger, however explicit and however well understood in theory, was always somehow unreal. Our strategy reflected our desire to project the pattern of our domestic affairs abroad, to conduct international relations entirely on the basis of a power's intentions. But the tragic element of our contest with the U.S.S.R. was that they did not believe our intentions were peaceful intentions as either ignorance or hypocrisy and to seek by all

28. B-36 Hearings, p. 515ff.

58. B-30 Hearings, d. 2121.

behave in a manner which is either ignorance or hydrocarbyl and to seek pay off
resided in the insatiation of the Soviets to treat the protestations of our
a power's intentions. But the tragic element of our contest with the U.3.2.R.
attires abroad, to conduct international relations entirely on the basis of
Our strategy reflected our desire to project the pattern of our domestic
explicit and however well underatood in theory, was always somehow miscalc.
unaccounted with disaster, a nation to which a foreign danger, however
economy was the attitude of a nation broencoupled with domestic problems and
in the world, eager to enjoy its penalties undisturbed. The concern with our
This was the strategy of a satiated power, content with its place

III

danger of our economic collapse and our overall risk will be less and less." 58)

continues to affect more economies in defense measures there will be little
the first prize for any aggressor...in Europe...Einsally, if the military
since we are never going to start a war...In addition we must realise\ that
else to meet Russia in the early stages of a war. This is particularly true
militarily planning because we cannot hope to keep forces in being of sufficient

Thus the more we protested our horror of war, the more we removed
Soviet inhibitions in expanding their influence.

55

means to neutralize our potential. Because we could think of no positive
goals for which to use our power (two of the national objectives listed by
General Bradley concerned the preservation of the *status quo* and the other
two dealt with economic matters), our military policy became entirely defensive.

1947 (?)

"In the first place," General Bradley said on another occasion in outlining

the basis of our strategy " we will be attacked. I cannot conceive of our
starting a war by offensive. We must therefore be able to receive the first
stroke of an attack and repel any invasion of our country." 29)

If during our atomic monopoly we justified our military budget as
enabling us to repel an invasion of the United States, it was clear that
power to us was a risk and not an opportunity, a burden and not a challenge.
As a result there was a quality of abstractness about our military planning
which was only barely obscured by our concern with technical matters. Thus
during the B-36 hearings, Secretary Symington drew reassurance from the
fact that the B-36 as the best bomber, although the point at issue was not
whether the B-36 could outperform enemy bombers but whether it could out-

29. Universal Military Training Hearings, p. 352.

50. Universal Military Training Hearings, p. 325.

whether the B-30 could outperform enemy pompera but whether it could out-
fact that the B-30 was the best pomper, although the point at issue was not
novel, 1942

during the B-30 hearings, Secretary Summerson drew reassurance from the
which was only partly opined by our concern with technical matters. Thus
we a result there was a duality of apertness about our military planning
power to us was a risk and not an opportunity, a burden and not a challenge.
enlisting us to rebel an invasion of the United States, it was clear that
it dming our atomic monopoly we unjustified our military budget as
stroke of an attack and rebel an invasion of our country." 58)

starting a war by offensive. We must therefore be able to receive the first
the phase of our strategy " we will be attacked. I cannot conceive of our
"In the first place," General Bradley said on another occasion in outlining
1941(i)
two deaths with economic matters), our military policy becomes entirely defensive.

General Bradley concerned the preservation of the status quo and the other
gains for which to make our power (two of the national objectives listed by
means to neutralise our potential). Because we could think of no positive

Soviet inquisitions in expanding their influence.

Thus the more we protestated our horror of war, the more we removed

56

perform enemy fighters. "Everything the enemy has we must have bigger and better" said Representative Kilday druing the B-36 Hearings and his views reflected the attitude of the country. Our reaction to the Soviet explosion of a nuclear weapon was, therefore, as ambivalent as our doctrine of power. On the one hand, we postulated a nuclear stalemate which was still far from real and used it as one more justification for our inhibition against using force. 30) On the other hand, we hastened to create an even more powerful weapon, the thermo-nuclear bomb, which in turn caused us to defer the consideration of the strategic transformation wrought by the end of our atomic monopoly.

The tendency to think in terms of absolute power was reinforced by the necessity of justifying appropriations before an economy-minded Congress and Bureau of the Budget. This had two consequences: on the one hand, it made for doctrinal rigidity for each service was afraid that a change in doctrine would lead to a cut in appropriations. Thus there occurred a violent disagreement between the advocates of strategic airpower and a group of scientists at Lincoln laboratory of M.I.T. who were accused of advocating a cut in our striking force to build up our air defense. 31) The remarkable thing about this dispute was that the M.I.T. group explicitly denied underrating the importance of Strategic air power.

30. For examples of assertion of nuclear stalemate, see Admiral Radford, B-36 Hearings, p. 72; Marshall testimony at MacArthur Hearings, p. 489.

31. See *Oppenheimer Hearings*.

D. LS: Marquess of Macartney Herring, b. 1820.

30. For examples of attention of uncertain aftestate, see Vairiel Redford, 'B-30 Herring,'

the M.I.T. group explicitly denied underestimating the importance of Strategic air power.

build up our air defense. The remarkable thinking about this debate was that

Institute of M.I.T. who were accused of advocating a war in our striking force to
between the advocates of strategic airpower and a group of scientists at Harvard
led to a cut in appropriations. Thus there occurred a violent disagreement
doctrinal rigidity for each service was afraid that a change in doctrine would

Bureau of the Budget. This put two consequences: on the one hand, it made for
necessity of justifying appropriations before an economy-minded Congress and
The tendency to think in terms of absolute power was reinforced by the
strategic transformation wrought by the end of our atomic monopoly.

Thermo-nuclear bomb, which in turn caused us to defer the consideration of the
On the other hand, we had to create an even more powerful weapon, the
and need it as one more justification for our inflation against funding force.

30) the one hand, we postulated a nuclear aftestate which was still far from rest

a nuclear weapon was, therefore, as毋 Gapasent as our doctrine of power. On
reflected the attitude of the country. Our reaction to the Soviet explosion of

petech, said Representative Kilgley during the B-30 Hearings and his views
belong enemy fighters. "Everlasting the enemy has we what have bigger and

56a

their recommendations had been solely concerned with building up our air defense. Yet the partisans of strategic air force had psychology, if not logic, on their side: for with a fixed ceiling on defense expenditures it was clear that any new appropriation had to lead to the reduction of existing forces; a new capability could in practice be developed at the expense of an existing one. As a result, budgetary pressures compound the inherent conservatism of the military and lead to the subordination of doctrine to the battle for appropriations.

And the coupling of considerations of strategic doctrine with the budgetary process forced each service into justifying its requests by stating the Soviet threat in the most extreme terms. Thus the Navy in 1949 supported its appropriation by invoking a Soviet submarine fleet numbering 250.32) It became apparent only later, according to the testimony

32. Testimony of Secretary Sullivan before the House Appropriations Committee, p. 1352.

b. 1325.

35. *Testimony of Secretary Sullivan before the House Appropriations Committee,*

abpraptation by invoking a Soviet submarine fleet numbering 520. 35) It

judicious process forced each service into justifying its requests by affirming

abpraptations.

the military and led to the anordination of doctrine to the battle for

one. As a result, judicious breviation/combining the inherent conservatiam of

on their side: for with a fixed ceiling on defense expenditures it was clear
defense. Yet the barriais of strategic air force had psychology, it not logic,

their recommendations had been soley concerned with building up our air

26v