BC/12 Apr

Magazine Report

France & the USA

Ray Vicker, in today's Wall Street Journal, characterizes French-US relations as beginning to thaw: Vicker thinks that the French are taking the initiative, qualifiedly, to improve their relations with their European partners, but are not yet, again qualifiedly, doing so in nuclear matters with the US. The latter qualification is that while France still continues to work for their own nukes, they, now, will at least politely listen to the Americans, Vicker says. And on closer cooperation with fellow continental powers, Vicker adds, there have been four actions which show France more willing to win friends and influence people -- actions that France did not have to take. (These are: agreement with EEC to negotiate tariff reductions with the US, agreement to a July EEC tariff harmonization meeting, agreement with EEC members to outline an open door policy for African nations including the former British colonies, and an agreement to reduce the tea tariff from 18% to zero -- Vicker apparently likes this figure.)

French willingness to be more polite, Vicker continues on the nuclear score, "may not mean much. Then again, it could be the first signs of a French change in nuclear matters, too. So it isn't surprising that rumor a mills have started to produce tales of French review of nuclear policies. French government officials have been quick to emphasize that there has been no policy change to date, and that the country is indeed الاستمكال pressing its program for developing its own nuclear bombs.

"There is no reason to question their word, nor to doubt that France has the ability to produce a nuclear arsenal able to kill a lot of people. But it does appear in that some Frenchmen are concerned about the possible inflationary effects on the economy of the expensive new nuclear program."

Vicker thinks France might be 'fishing' for nuclear know-how, too, getting the US to sweeten its bid for French cooperation in the US-European deterrent.

2

[c]

Mr Wilson

This is *Time's* (12 Apr) account of Mr Wilson's recent trip to Washington: "What Administration officials got last week was ample demonstration of the fact that since Gaitskell's death, the flinty, quick-witted Yorkshireman has had to move closer to the political center to hold the party together and take hard and fast stands on which Britain's electorate can weigh the merits of a Labor government." While noting that Mr Wilson impressed Washington, *Time* cautions that "older heads have still to be persuaded that Wilson's convictions will not shift again -- as they have so many times before."

Timothy Green, in *Life* (12 Apr), places them same emphasis on Mr Wilson's shiftiness and/or opportunism, and his political position: "Wilson has had the support of this left wing, while walking his own political road nearer to the center of the party."

*Newsweek* (15 Apr) definitely thinks Wilson is the harbinger of the future European governments of the left: "he will be the first of a new generation of moderate-socialist leaders in Europe to gain power." The article runs down the various countries: "Adenauer's successors will have to contend with at the polls with the bright, young image of the Socialist leader Willy Brandt. In Italy, the governing coalition of Christian Democrats and socialists has produced what is known as the *apertura a sinistra* (opening to the left), and its youthful leaders are called *i Kennediani della DC* — the Kennedys of the Christian Democrats. Socialists also share the government in Austria and Belgium; Scandinavia has long been a solid Socialist stronghold. Dutch elections in May are expected to give Socialists a governing role. Only Gaullist France stands alone in authoritarian grandeur."

After favorably noting this movement to the left, *Newsweek* describes Mr Wilson's policies and various stands, and concludes that it is his character that remains in question — because of his intellectual flexibility.

Sino-Soviet rift

Max Frankel, in the Saturday Evening Post (13 Apr), investigates the US reaction to the widening Sino-Soviet split. "Some of the most intriguing evidence of conflict is in the hands of the United States," he writes, "but it remains unpublished because Washington has not yet decided how or whether to exploit the situation. The Administration has seen the Russians attempt to learn in Washington how soon the Chinese may get a nuclear bomb. It has heard them express dismay when told the Chinese may achieve this soon. Soviet diplomats have on many various occasions praised Americans for their anti-Chinese remarks. Communist China's only European ally in the dispute, Albania, has indirectly applied to the West for aid against Soviet economic sanctions. Washington has received a variety of indications from Moscow that the Russians do not intend to support Chinese revolutionary or military objectives in the Far East. The Government has also learned of bitter arguments between Fidel Castro, whom the Chinese supported in his hopes of maintaining offensive weapons, and Anastas I Mikoyan, whom Khrushchev sent to justify the evacuation of missiles.

"No one yet claims to know how long and far the Chinese-Soviet feud will run. Most Western experts have hesitate even to guess how it will come out. Western governments, including our own, have been unable to decide whether a divided Communist adversary would be ultimately more dangerous than a united one, or whether the West should actively support one side against the other."

Frankel traces the roots of the dispute, and its course, and speculates that talks between the two powers "seem unlikely to produce anything more than, possibly, an agreement to conduct the contest more privately."

"There is general agreement that, although Moscow and Peking remain allied for defense," he continues, "they have lost virtually all capacity to cooperate on offense. They have failed in attempts to divide the world into two Russian and Chinese spheres of influence, and yet neither will defer to the strategy of the other. Moscow and Peking must clearly have become competing

centers of power, and each successive crisis, such as Cuba or the Chinese
attack on India, worsens their conflict." Frankel suggests that China's
expansionist aims in the Far East will soon follow from their increased economic
strength, and that they will continue to support subversion in the underdeveloped
countries, and will demand a larger voice in the planning of Communist strategy
when they finally get the atomic bomb.

Frankel gives the pros and cons for the USA's proper reaction: doing
nothing is suggested because Mr Kennedy can count on Mr K to "retreat from
war" when confronted with a clear challenge," and because the aims of both Mr
K's do coincide (in preventing China from possessing nukes). Moreover,
Frankel reports, Washingtonians believe that any interference will bind the
two powers closer together, while others, he continues, "argue that a consistently
tough Western policy will justify Khrushchev in his caution and therefore keep
the feud alive, but they also warn that attempts to humiliate Khrushchev
altogether would backfire by driving him toward Peking again."

The conclusion Frankel reaches is that the President is right to accept
the advice of Mr Brzezinski: 'one cannot promote a heresy within a church to
which one does not belong,' and, 'no empire or church has ever maintained
itself with two capitals.'

After this, the *SaturnPost* provides some editorial comment: the editorial
points out the contradictory attitudes toward Stalin, and how they use him,
his
or his dead body if not a ghost, in their own aims, and then they write,
just
"There is no limit to the Communists' ingenuity. They have discovered,
20 years after the event, that the hero of the Battle of Stalingrad was Nikita
S Khrushchev. By the time they made this discovery history had gone through so
many rewrites that Stalingrad wasn't Stalingrad anymore. It was Volgograd.

"Now that Stalin is respectable again, perhaps they will want to change
the name of Volgograd. We have a suggestion: Stalingrad. And let Mr Khrushchev
be the hero of Volgograd."

Space

The New Republic (13 Apr) casts questions on the man in the moon project; they run down the ~ various criticisms about our program -- 1) that the money could be better spent on earth, 2) that the scientific value of sending a man to the moon is dubious, 3) that the cold war race has made our program ~the most expensive and inefficient and dangerous in terms of human life -- and then comment: "The crucial question that Congress must decide when the space budget comes to a vote is whether the US dares to set its own pace, irrespective may of what the Russians/do. Those who think in intangibles like national prestige insist that we cannot afford to de-emphasize the moon. But can we himself afford not to? The President/has said candidly that we may not win the moon race. Despite the panicky crash xxx projects inspired by the mythical 'missile gap,' we still have not caught up with Soviet rocket technology. We could gamble $20 billion and our national prestige and lose. And if we win, will the victory establish that the American xxx nation, or our economic or social system, is superior to that if the USSR?

"The moon race will not be the last. The loser is almost certain to challenge the winner to another race, perhaps to moon Mars, and the context will continue.... Sooner or later Congress, with the Administration and the public will have to concede that our rank as a great power does not depend on staging spectacular stunts in space...." The editors believe that there has been a hint of this attitude in the recent words of C Brainard Holmes.

Newsweek (15 Apr) reports on the big unknown in our space program -- the "structure of the moon's xxx crust, particularly the maria where astronauts will land." Here are five scientists, with their own ideas:

Thomas Gold (Cornell) believes that the surface has been "pulverized into a fine dust."

Gerard Kuiper (Arizona) thinks "the surface layer is only a few inches thick with a matted, fibrous design similar to reindeer moss."

[L.C.]

David Cudaback (Berkeley) envisions the surface "as fine rock filaments, creating a smooth surface layer somewhat like fine-spun cotton candy."

John Salisbury (Arthur D Little, Inc) believes the moon's crust "might more nearly resemble concrete in texture."

And Edward Markow (Crumman Aircraft) thinks the surface might be "spongy chunks of rock."

Only these last two hypotheses, *Newsweek* says, promise the moon voyagers "a pleasant landing strip." Meanwhile, controversy and investigation continue.

*USNews* (15 Apr) lists the various areas where setbacks have taken place in our space program. (The list includes seven specific projects.) And they note that there is a "rapidly fading optimism about conquering space in a hurry."

But they report that the Administration has pinpointed four main trouble areas, and that they are working on corrections for them:

1. Stop-and-go planning (the moon project has been changed three times)

2. Money-handling (NASA has enjoyed leeway spending; GAO will stop this)

3. Misjudgment (both Gemini and Apollo were grossly underestimated; $s)

4. Neglect of research (moon madness is cutting out pure research)

*USNews* also prints an interview with Arthur R Kantorwitz, formerly at Cornell (re-entry problem was his forte), now/president of Avco Corp, director of Avco-Everett Research Lab, and visiting Prof at MIT: he thinks that the moon project should not have first priority, but that we should send up a space station, so as to discover how to live in space.

Foreign Aid

<u>Life</u> editorially (12 Apr) supports Clay's and Bell's tough approach to foreign aid, one which does not question whether we should continue to give but rather questions "the amount, criteria and efficiency of its administration." Emphasizing the self-help aspect of aid pleases <u>Life</u>, so does terminating it in some areas; encouragement of private investment and and coaxing Japan the European nations to give more are also mentioned.

"Bell's plans and policies deserve the kind of appropriation from Congress that will give them a real chance to work — is, around $4 billion. If they show results, perhaps Congress, instead of treating foreign aid as an annual emergency, will come to accept it as a proven tool of Western diplomacy and a long-term commitment like the Alliance for Progress, whose goals are finite but not to be achieved overnight."

William V Shannon, in <u>Commonsial</u> (12 Apr), offers this criticism of
<u>Committee</u>
the Clay report: "The Clay report is not helpful because it fails to make
the mk distinction between military assistance and economic development,
and because it fails to distinguish the three kinds of aid recipients: those
in the front lines of the cold war (such as South Vietnam and South Korea),
those which are engaged in major economic development programs (such as
India and Venezuela), and those in which our interest is chiefly political
and opportunistic (such as Guinea and Indonesia)."

The **_Nation_** (13 Apr) sounds angry and frustrated: "It is entirely possible that the President himself is not seriously devoted to foreign aid and is perfectly willing to see it interred after a decent interval. Such a view is not inconsistent with the skill in manipulation with which he has been credited. The appointment of the Clay committee was the first step.... He solicits a continuation of aid for those sister nations of us who so deserve it, but by all indications most of them will have to get along with less and less, and, finally, nothing."

8

[L.C.]

US Defense

Look (23 Apr) publishes Theodore N White's inside story on McNamara's
'Revolution in the Pentagon.' This revolution, White maintains, has taken
three forms: first, civilian authority has been restored; second, the
purpose and use of power have been redefined; and third, American striking
is
power/in the process of multiplication and change.

By White's account, at "the end of the Eisenhower Administration, control
of American strategy lay not in the hands of civilian leadership, but in
the hands of the uniformed Chiefs of Staff." White then proceeded to recount
how McNamara's men (individually described) have recaptured their constitutional
control: he divides them into two main groups -- the Yale gentlemen from the
East Coast, and the Rand thinkers from the West Coast. In this connection he
also mentions the changes in the military hierarchy, changes consistent with
McNamara's ideas of strategy.

White adds little to this discussion of strategy: he emphasizes that
McNamara's method is the questioning one, and he intimates that the whole
strategy got a strong and healthy review. He emphasizes the increased strength
of the USA as well as our flexibility.

He describes the new STUICOM (Strike Command), which has successfully
integrated the various commands of the services into an instantaneous whole,
as the key link to McNamara's change: "The paper language," he writes, "of the
laws that describe America's military leadership has finally become reality.
The Army, Navy and Air Force are now service organizations -- they train,
equip, procure and make ready armed forces that they no longer command. The
forces they make ready are handed over to nine great Unified and Specified
Commands, which alone operate our military machine. These commands act only
at the direct command of the civilian Secretary of Defense, who is advised by
uniformed Chiefs of Staff beneath him and directed by the President above him."

His conclusion emphasizes McNamara's satisfaction with
these changes, in the

9

Cuba

Gertrude Samuels, on the staff of the New York Times Sunday magazine, writes on James Donovan in The "nation" (13 Apr): she is very warm and sympathetic to what he is doing, and she believes that he is actually working for some sort of conciliation between the American and the Cuban people." All his trials and tribulations in his endeavors are described, and the results are called beneficial and lasting — improved public opinion for the US since we began 'humanitarian' work at getting our prisoners out by bartering with drugs.

The Economist's staff member, Barbara Smith, also has a piece in The New Republic (13 Apr): she honestly and enthusiastically thinks that Castro's revolution is good, an opinion she makes after a 2½ week stay in Cuba. Her only comment in her impressionistic article: "The economic muddles and catastrophes are obvious; the infringement on personal liberties is no less serious for being under the surface. It might have been possible to have done everything in a less destructive way. But even as things are, Cuba's stride towards social and racial equality is real and lasting."

Life has a short editorial (12 Apr) on the good works of a certain Constantine W Boldyreff, the son of one of the Czar's generals; every day, three on fixed short-wave frequencies, and five standard AM frequencies, he and his group (National Alliance of Russian Solidarists) broadcast to Cuba in Russian, hoping to convince the Russian soldiers there that they shouldn't kill Cubans, or at least trying to sow seeds of doubt over the wisdom of Russian presence in Cuba. The editorial likes this type of anti-communism.

10

Malaysia

Time's cover story (12 Apr) is too short and too thin, and the best part about it is the eight pages of color photographs. Their conclusion is also somewhat strained: "From the standpoint of language, religion, culture, and geography, Malaysia is not a natural nation. But Abdul Rahman has faced problems similar to Malaysia's in his own Malaya — and there is a decent society has flourished. He does not promise the moon to his new nation, only a sane, humane, workable government. Under his leadership, Malaysia can be, as John F. Kennedy has said, 'the best hope of security in that vital part of the world.'"

The article mentions the successes the Prime Minister of Malaya has had in meeting his nation's problems, and describes his design for the new nation of Malaysia as a move to protect himself from Communist expansion. The trouble from Indonesia and the Philippines are down graded: the former is lanpooned and the later is described as capable of a settlement of their issues claims on North Borneo. Throughout, Abdul Rahman gets good marks for being 'in touch' with the people, generally just a good guy.

Newsweek (15 Apr) reports that Sukarno feels insulted that the date of foundation of the new Federation of Malaysia is 31 August; this is the birthday of the late Queen Wilhelmina. "Sukarno feels the date was picked as a deliberate sixth anniversary insult to Indonesia." Actually, this date is theanniversary of Malaya's independence. Sensitive ass.

11

[Lc]

US Politics

The big editorial in the *SaturnenPost* (13 Apr) blasts Mrennet J Hughes's book The Ordeal of Power, and the author himself, as "kiss-and-tell journalism." They are particularly incensed about the idea of Hughes impugning the men around Ike. I mention this only for the growing editorial point of view of this refurbished magazine.

*Newsweek* (15 Apr) examines a small little spit of land off the San Diego Bay harbor in California — Coronado, the encampment of many retired admirals and generals who have made the area a hot-box of the right-winging John Birch Society (largest percentage there in the whole USA).

The article, while not sympathetic to them by any means, does provide some explanations for their beliefs: their past military heritage, the need for self-protection in the face of an expanding Southern California, the need for no public improvements due to their retired/fixed income, and their dislocation from the mainstream of US society, including the so-called individualism which they espouse, but have never fought for. Since the scare is over, it's refreshing to read an analysis of these animals which maintains a respected amount of balance.

Walter Lippmann gives his wisdom on managed news, in *Newsweek* (15 Apr).
"Because the raw facts are indigestible, news has to be and will be managed. It will be selected, played up or played down, clarified, sometimes obfuscated, emphasized — sometimes for good reasons, sometimes for bad reasons, sometimes for no reason at all. And this great democracy will depend for the truth on the unending pulling and hauling between the good reporters writing a true story and the officials who believe, as the saying goes, that they are protecting the public interest.

"in a free society, things are rarely neat and orderly."

12

[Lc]

Barry Goldwater holds forth in the 'Speaking Out' section of the SATTEN POSTON the Republican invasion of the South. There's his evidence that such has already been accomplished: Since the November 1962 elections

"1. Five new Republican congressmen were elected, two of them in districts where Republicans didn't even nominate candidates in the 1958 elections.

"2. All Republican incumbents in Congress were reelected with sizable majorities, despite intervention by the Kennedy Administration and the gerry-mandering of some Republican-held districts.

"3. In the 11 states of the old South, Republicans tripled the vote they registered in 1958, the last mid-term congressional election, and they doubled their share of the total vote.

"4. Republican victories were registered in a long string of state, county, and local elections, ranging all the way from state senators to hospital-board members.

"5. Republicans won 'moral' victories in many contests where candidates challenged entrenched Democrats and came within an eyelash of gaining election."

In the face of these supreme victories, Goldwater is pushing hard for the idea that the Republican revolution in the South makes the Republican victory in the near future seem certain. He claims that this revolution has come about as a result of the mercantile, commercial, and economic growth of the area; and he believes that they as the new industrialists have more in common with the national conservatism of the Republican party than with the sectional, federal spoon-in-the-mouth Democrats. Also, redistricting will mean more power to the urban and suburban areas -- again the growing strongholds of the chest-beating new repubs. He calls the whole phenomenon a new opportunity and a new challenge for the GOP, and he makes clear that he expects the next Republican platform to contain planks which these Republican southerners will support.

While he's redundant in this article, he's not always wrong.

13

Catholicism

*Time* (12 Apr) sheds very big tears for Cardinal Mindzenty, due to the policies of Pope John. They feel that the Pope will have him sneak out of Hungary, like the Ukrainian Archbishop Josyf Slipyi did last January, and they are against this because they feel that Mindzenty should have the 'proud right to answer no' to the Pope's idea. This is somewhat confusing, because *Time* has consistently supported the Pope's peaceful aims, and his liberalizing of Catholicism in the Ecumenical Council; but this attempt at the Pope's "active neutrality" in the cold war wins no praise from *Time*.

*Look* (23 Apr) has a long color picture section about what the Catholic service will look like if the liberalizing tendencies in the next meeting of the Ecumenical Council bear fruit. And the section of the magazine is prefaced with a one page 'article/editorial' on this trend, and the American part of it. Here's the last, and operative, paragraph:

"Presumably, when the Council reconvenes, the clash of conflict in the Church will be heard again as the Curia makes its fine Italian hand felt and the American bishops are urged to arrest their ecumenical drift to the left. The resulting division of the disputants into liberals and conservatives is a semantic convenience, but it took one of the US liberals to suggest, with a perfectly straight face, that a better division might be between the open-minded and the closed. For the most part, the hierarchy in the United States seems largely openminded now. And the Skz Church in this country seems all the more sanctified for it."

14

[lc]

# US Labor Strikes

Max Lerner, in *Look* (23 Apr), wrote that the liberals are undergoing a crisis of confidence conviction on their attitudes toward strikes, because the old psychology of pre-union sentiment and the new reality of union's needs are in conflict. He describes these new needs as: dealing with inflation, getting more fringe benefits, and maintaining job protection in the face of automation. Since he concludes that court injunctions, conciliation, compulsory arbitration, and a national wage and price planning commission haven't or won't work, he makes his own proposal:

1. Labor and management set up *continuing committees*, paid for by both sides, to plan and negotiate all through the year, instead of waiting for the end of a contract.

2. These committees deal with the core problem of automation by some of the formula for sharing cost-savings....

3. Both labor and management submit any unsolved problems to an agreed-upon panel of what I should like to call 'labor courts,' rather than arbitrators. I propose labor courts because we need an agency that(in the few cases where the differences will be bitterly disputed) can hear testimony, subpoena records, study the economies of a total industry, develop principles, set precedents, have those precedents studied by the public as a whole and build up a body of public knowledge and opinion that will create a climate in which the courts can carry on their work."

Lerner assumes it up himself: "There are crucially only two things needed for labor peace in America. One is the institution of the continuing tripartite committee to take the place of the end-of-contract, class-war psychology. The other is the incorporation of economic reporting and judicial procedures in voluntary-arbitration agreements, and the building of general support for the decisions reached, which themselves will not have the force of law."

15

## Black Muslims

The Midwest correspondent for CBS, Bernard N. Wismann, has a short but cleanly written piece in *FOCUS/Midwest* (Mar-Apr 1963). He digs deeper into the background of the muslim movement than other writers, and he specifically focuses on *fazaa* on the WWII period of the movement, when Muhammad praised Hitler and attempted to collaborate with Japanese agents in building an axis fifth column. Obviously Wismann thinks of the movement as dangerous, and he points out that the financial burdens of the members ($8.30 per week, $65 per year, and $30 when any member gets into trouble), the extensive real estate holdings and merchant shops, and the *fazaa* physical training (judo and karate) are keeping the movement strong.

Analyzing the future of the movement, Wismann next writes that the leader has passed over him his five sons, to appoint New York's Malcolm X as the next head of the Black Muslim organization. "Muhammad's choice," Wismann says, "is a polished, articulate, and urban man in his mid-thirties whose racist hatred expressed in polished English seems even more chilling than the % rantings of his master."

## US Negroes

Chester Bowles, in *Saturday Review* (13 Apr), discusses the changed attitude among Negroes in the US today -- those fighting for their constitutional and moral rights. Interesting is his opinion that the US cannot deal pragmatically with this moral question, and that the US has "developed an appalling gap between the moral beliefs to which % we subscribe and our day-to-day performance."

In this context, Bowles thinks US Negroes have a special responsibility and opportunity to "force every American of good conscience to re-examine his own sense of values," thus bridging "the chaos that increasingly exists between beliefs and actions."

He says that the time "for action is here."