3, BLDG. RICHARD WALLACE
NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington DC

January 10, 1971

Dear Henry,

I am preparing a big show for the French television, entitled "My dream society". A young worker describes his dream society, and goes around the world in order to discover it.

The worker I selected ( 2I, charming, an electronician on the Concorde plane ) asked to visit Cuba, Japon and the USA, and to discuss "happiness of the mankind" with Fidel Castro and president Nixon...

So having to arrange everything in advance, I intend to stop in Washington from January 23 to 26, on my road to Cuba.

If it is possible to meet you even for a short chat, I'll be delighted.

Amicalement à vous,

Danielle Hunebelle

RECEIVED
JAN 27 1971

CENTRAL FILES

If the Chamberlain cabinet had known they would create the "Munich analogy," they probably would have regarded that as their greatest defeat. It seems strange that inspite of the great variety of books on the period such oversimplification persists. This is an oversimplification connected both with anachronistic thinking and with a view of life which prefers the factual and ignores the human element of international affairs.

My own analysis will concentrate on the concept of appeasement, a concept which underlay much of British policy including the Munich agreements. I do not intend to search for the final fact to settle any argument. What I rather hope- and intend- to do is to present some of the aspects of this broad term as it came to be applied in an actual government in the late 1930's. By trying to eliminate some of the less useful and obvious hindsight to the period, we may then proceed to a realistic critique of the underlying assumptions which may have made disaster more likely.

British policy makers in the late 1930's were faced with a number of already strong trends, some of which were their own creations, others of which were not. First, in the aftermath of the Great War both the British and the Americans had decided that the continent of Europe was not a very healthy place to involved with. The Americans, behind thousands of miles of ocean, removed anything resembling a political presence from the area, not to return until after yet another war was raging out of control. The British, being unable to stretch the Channel into the Atlantic, realized that in some sense they would always be affected by events on the continent. This interdependence was limited, however, for Britain's policy saw her world empire as her source of strength and turned away from Europe in her search for security. This attitude had been translated into a policy which limited all positive commitments to Europe; slowly the conviction spread

Page 2

that inaction was the best kind of action, no matter what the occasion-
if it involved Europe.

This tendency to refuse to act depended on, and was made necessary
by, an increasingly strong pacifist sentiment in the country. Though
not as badly destroyed as neighboring France, the British had taken heavy
losses in a war where the Empire's money had proved insufficient for the
human price demanded. Just as policy makers felt (or tried to manipulate)
the pressures of pacifism, so they found that the pressure was stronger and
the manipulation more difficult. With many men killed in the war, women
had their chance to penetrate previously all male fields of employment.
As they did, their economic power became political power and they demanded
the vote. By the final retirement of Baldwin as Prime Minister, both men
and women were given the vote at the same age and regardless of property
qualifications. No longer could All Souls discuss politics as if its
collective opinion was all that mattered. Others now had to be persuaded,
cajoled, flattered- or deceived.

The continental situation by 1937 was not exactly comforting either.
The rise of an efficient German militarism, legitimized internally by the
injustices of Versailles, contracted alarmingly with a fearful and instable
Third Republic in France. Despite an apparently powerful army and imoreg-
nable defenses, the French had essentially relinquished an independent
foreign policy in favor of hanging together with the British. But although
they produced no new initiatives, they were like yet another constituency
whose interests had also to be catered to- for Britain had acknowledged
a somewhat vague relationship between British and French security.

Lastly, if this wasn't enough, the Empire itself was showing signs
of age. There was never any great certainty as to what Canada, Australia,
and India would do in the event of renewed European war. They, like the

Page 3

British, were tired of war. Unlike the British- but like the Americans-
it was doubtful that any European conflict would be a direct threat to their
security (although Japan's expansionism increased a possible common interest
in this area.) Lord Vansittart, Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign
Office during much of the period, said he never really felt the Dominions
were behind him- until 1939,¹ when it was almost too late. We have Mr.
Butler, Premier of South Australia, saying in debate that "he agreed with
Mr. Lyons that the Empire must stand solidly together, but at the same
time the Dominions should undoubtedly have the right to express their view
on the present crisis before they were drawn into war."² A reasonable
request, yet not such as to make one confident of support.³

It was this situation which faced Neville Chamberlain as he took over
from Baldwin in May, 1937. A reshuffling of the cabinet, and several
subsequent resignations, meant slight changes in policy, yet the real
decisions were tightly in Neville's hands throughout the period, especially
in foreign affairs. In beginning to understand appeasement, therefore,
we must understand something about its chief policy maker and spokesman.
In ending his biography of Chamberlain, Feiling says something which we may
take as a beginning: "... that literal never failing integrity... seen in
the exact correspondence between intimate thought and public deed, had
existed long before those deeds, was superior and anterior to them...."⁴

Even his adversaries admitted his character- but one finds early
indications that within this character were predispositions which expressed
themselves in unfortunate ways. Being "predominantly a moralist, and an
intellectual," Chamberlain was "very representative of the nineteenth
century British ruling class."⁵ Apparently his extended family suited
most of his needs- he was known to be oregarious inside it, while with
strangers he was somewhat less open. In later life he was known to be

Page 4

formal to the point of coldness outside a close circle of associates.
This method of working with a small group- whether the "Inner Cabinet"
(usually Hoare, Simon, Halifax, Chamberlain- and Wilson) or the "Cliveden
Set"- was a great irritant and hampered the flow of ideas, as we shall
see.

In this realm of ideas, he early became interested in Darwinism, and
would read on the subject throughout his life. He drew the selection
analogy for the nation, arguing that there were qualities in the populace,
such as character, which could make the difference between survival and
failure. His Darwinist leanings can also account for early statements such
as the following: "For the old ahorism 'force is no remedy,' I would
substitute 'the fear of force is the only remedy.'"⁶ From the architect
of Munich this sounds odd- until one remembers that it was Chamberlain
who urged rearmament under Baldwin. It was only after "S.B." retired
that a significant buildup could begin.

This is perhaps a good point at which to separate the issue of rearm-
ament from its seeming antithesis, appeasement. Neville Chamberlain him-
self never believed that war was inevitable: "War, he believed, might be
stopped, if Germany could be convinced not merely that her abuse of force
would be instantly resisted, but that she would get consideration for any
reasonable demand by way of peace."⁷ He had seen earlier than most, how-
ever, that the force to resist Hitler had to be built; the problems which
resulted from acceding to "rational demands" without feeling the capability
to resist- these are the problems of appeasement. Neither the accession
nor the feeling can blind us to Great Britain's great weakness- a weakness
so disastrous in 1935 that Vansittart had to warn against British military
action in the Mediterranean.⁸ For this Chamberlain was somewhat less to
blame than most of his countrymen.

Page 5

Chamberlain was to blame, however, for two feelings in which he trusted to an almost fatal degree. His intellectuality led him to ascribe tp Hitler his own rationality. He found it difficult, even though he described the ex-corporal as a "madman," to believe that he actually wanted war. When he weighed the possible gain of negotiation and the probable loss of war, it seemed preposterous that anyone could ever take the latter path. It was unfortunate that Chamberlain never considered Clausewitz's definition of war as a "continuation of policy by other means." He failed to see that war, threat of war, and negotiation can all be part of the same process if one is willing to go to war to achieve one's ends.

The Prime Minister's second mistake was perhaps less serious in the long run, yet it greatly colored his perceptions. As a very successful Health Minister, he had been pursuing his life long wish in the earlier years before he became Chancellor of the Exchequer and heir-apparent to S.B.'s position. Chamberlain seems to have always been interested, from his Olympian aloofness, in taking care of the working people. Perhaps it was some close elections in Birmingham or perhaps the emotional reaction he had to the crowds of Munich; in any case, he always assumed the people in each country had great power and influence over their rulers. He was peculiarly blind to the nature of the modern totalitarian state. To him the warm greetings, letters, and telegrams from all over the world were convincing evidence that no one wanted the nightmare of war. It was an easy step for him to see that therefore no ruiner would- or could- want war either. The results of this reasoning were to continue to plague British policy, and were sometimes specifically responsible for errors in judgment. He became convinced, for example, that Hitler would not turn the Maginot Line by an attack on the Low Countries. Hiter would fear, he thought- using his own reasoning- "the political reactions of a breach

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of neutrality so flagrant and unscrupulous."⁹

Another Chamberlain weakness seems to have been his choice of men-or maybe it was just his lack of interest in arguments which did not support his policy. We shall discuss this later, but in analyzing appeasement several other government officials orchestrated the Prime Minister's themes with interesting harmonies. Neville Henderson, British Ambassador to Berlin, was one such official. When Henderson writes that in September 1938 "... I was a sick man and had been for some months past,"¹⁰ we could laugh and agree with him- if the results of his illness hadn't been fatal for so many others as well.

Phipps had been removed from Berlin- they needed someone with more understanding of the Germans. Understanding in appeasement terms became synonymous with sympathy, and Henderson played his part perfectly. Coming to Berlin on April 30, 1937, he set himself two rules; 1) "... to associate with the Nazi leaders, and if possible to win their confidence and even sympathy;" and 2) "... to study the German case as objectively as possible and, where I regarded it as justified, to present it as fairly as I could to my own government."¹¹ From studying "the case" he soon became its full-fledged advocate. In May, 1938, in a Berlin discussion of the Czech question, he put France on the Czech side, with Germany and Great Britain both on the Sudeten side!¹² Such antics may not have been appreciated in London, but his reassuring dispatches concerning German aims were very welcome reassurance indeed.

Henderson supported "the case" in Austria, Memel, and Danzig as well¹³ until he finally became known as the "British Nazi Ambassador in Berlin." This all culminated in his advice to Lipski, Polish Ambassador to Berlin, that the German "proposals" of August 29, 1939 "were not on the whole too unreasonable."¹⁴ One would have hoped that the two Nevilles, one dis-regarding the content (N.C.) and the other the form, might have finally

Page 7

disregarded everything about German demands- but this, an idiocy in itself,
was a height they never reached.

It is perhaps only fair to note that if Henderson had a peculiarly
pro-German bias,¹⁵ which in itself Chamberlain seemed not to have, both the
Prime Minister and his ambassador were aware of Great Britain's incomplete
rearmament. The question in August, 1938, was "whether we were to impose
a solution by insistence on the Czech or by force on the German Government."¹⁶
Henderson believed that substantively Great Britain, with its empire, was
in a bad moral position any time the Germans could base a claim on the
right to self-determination. Czechoslovakia was a case in which he acknow-
ledges, however, that the argument of force was a much more important
determinant- especially after the meeting at Godesberg. The only thing
left unexplained was how this threat of force was to produce "peace in our
time."¹⁷

Another element in the Prime Minister's entourage also deserves note,
for he was of probably more powerful than any cabinet member except the Prime
Minister, yet wasn't even in the cabinet. Geoffrey Dawson, as editor of
*The Times*, possessed a means of influencing not only popular and govern-
mental opinion around the world, but also relations between governments.
The results were sometimes disastrous. On September 7, 1938 a *Times*
leader suggested that Czechoslovakia might be much stronger if she ceded
the Sudetenland. Written artlessly by Dawson, this was taken- as many
*Times* articles were- to reflect government opinion. Despite official
denials at the time, there is little doubt that such a suggestion made
quite an impression in Berlin.¹⁸ Later, on April 1, 1939, an apparent
attempt to dilute the British guarantee to Poland caused similar troubles.¹⁹

There was some reason to believe that these columns were officially
inspired, since Dawson was a very close friend of both the Prime Minister
and his Foreign Secretary. He was furthermore a Fellow of All Souls

Page 8

College, as were Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Halifax. This
group, along with the Cliveden Set²⁰, were supposed to be running England
much as the infamous "200 families" were running France- though where they
were running was another question. Dawson's official attitude at *The Times*-
where he had been both editor and foreign editor since William's death
in 1928-²¹ was to aid the government's policy in any way possible. To
affect policy he frequently saw the P.M. personally, but disagreement was
rare. To effect policy he tried to prevent anti-German material ("pro-
vocative" he called it) from being printed. To this end he toned down or
rewrote many of the dispatches from *The Times'* Berlin correspondent, Norman
Ebbutt.²² Dawson's general attitude is not hard to find. When an out-
break of *Times*-hating hit Berlin, he wrote to the special correspondent
there, asking for an explanation "... for I have always been convinced that
the peace of the world depends more than anything else on our getting into
reasonable relations with Germany."²³

Appeasement as a policy was expressed not merely through each individual
but also, and more importantly, through the institutions of British
government. With the coming of Chamberlain, "the vacancies of a modd became
the realities of a policy."²⁴ Dirksen, the German ambassador to London,
wrote: "The present British cabinet is the first post-war cabinet which
had made agreement with Germany one of the major points of its programme...."²⁵
Such a different emphasis as it developed seemed to imply a necessary change
in the working of the government as well.

The most interesting aspect of this institutional change was in the
communications field. In modern scientific terms, what sort of "feedback"
were high officials getting from the lower levels? This feedback is often
the only method available to evaluate policy. One of the problems met
immediately has already been referred to. Chamberlain, by allowing warm

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welcomes and thanks to act as feedback for his policy at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich, thought his policy a success. Information more relevant to his purpose of "peace in our time" might have told him a different story. In this connection one is forced to ask if he really wanted to hear a different story. The P.M. seems to have almost systematically rejected what one would feel were the most relevant sources, his diplomats on the scene. Either this, or he replaced these representatives so he could hear his own voice on the other end of the line!

The Times, having been co-opted into the government, suffered a similar malady. It had developed the finest system of correspondents in the world and should have been a good source of information- if not for the government then for its opposition. The very closeness of Dawson and Chamberlain destroyed part of The Times' capacity for independent information gathering. This explains the constant redrafting and deletion of dispatches, already referred to. What it does not explain is the rejection of this information for private government use. Chief of the foreign affairs section, though not editor, was Barrington-Ward (or "B.W.", even though he never became P.M.). He too relied on irregular channels and the personal communications system with Chamberlain and Halifax.²⁶ A more incestuous situation was never tolerated in an official family.

As if this weren't bad enough, on the output side of foreign relations the same sort of affair was going on. Both Rumbold and his successor, Phipps, were or became anti-German during their appointments as ambassador to Berlin. During this period (including Baldwin's term) conferences were held outside the normal embassy channels. The result, of course, was a tremendous mix up in communication and no continuity in policy. Thus it was that Lord Lothian, in a "private" talk with Hitler, told him in May 1937 that "Britain had no primary interests in Eastern Europe"- and that

Page 10

she was no "obstacle" in Austria!²⁷ In one of the Dirksen-Hoare conversations, Hoare brought up a possible attack on the Germans by the U.S.S.R. and spoke of possible British-German guarantees- and this on October 31, 1938!²⁸ Even Halifax didn't like Chamberlain's own unilateral policy statements, which he sometimes found embarrassing.²⁹

This sort of confusion can prevail in any organization, yet an isolation from fact and a disregard for any formal mode of negotiation was a combination of the worst possible qualities. As Chamberlain flew to Berchtesgaden, *The Times*, in an editorial entitled "A Bold Initiative," neatly capsulized appeasement diplomacy: "The Prime Minister, it can be said with complete assurance, goes to Germany without taking any preconceived plan and without having reached any definite conclusion as to the best possible solution of the problem in Czechoslovakia."³⁰

One of the problems which further complicated matters was that the opposition- both within and without the Conservative Party- was rather ineffectual itself. On a purely political basis it was surprising that Chamberlain succeeded, through several reshufflings, in keeping Churchill out of the cabinet. As one of the most experienced and respected figures in Britain, Churchill was also- not surprisingly perhaps- a much distrusted and disliked figure. The P.M. wanted a rearmament which he could control and Winston and his followers were anything but controllable on the subject of Germany. In fact the government was greatly weakened, in the organizational terms to which we have alluded, by its failure to be able to include these people.

This is not a fault which we can blame on Chamberlain entirely. If the advocates of appeasement seemed to have a one-sided policy, so did the critics in an opposite sense. Part of the reason why neither Vansittart nor Rumbold were successes must be laid to their own irrationality and racism. In this situation there can be a tendency to overstate the case

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to balance claims of the other side. This need not be too dangerous if
carried on in private negotiations; in the pages of the nation's papers
and inside its government it can find reflection in official policy with
very unfortunate results.

In order to better understand the nature of this near polarization,
it may help to quickly look at Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Baldwin and for some time under
Chamberlain. Vansittart had visited France very early in his life and
subsequently returned many times throughout his life for vacations there.
He also held an early diplomatic post in Paris for a time, and was the first
Englishman in a number of years to be elected to the exclusive Jockey Club.
Needless to say, while denloring French instability, he still was very
strongly pro-French. His experiences with Germany and the Germans had not
been so pleasant. He had first visited in 1899, when anti-British sentiment
was very high. As he stated frankly later, "My francophilia started
simply because the French were kinder than the Germans."³¹

As an official at the Versailles peace talks, it was obvious where
his antipathy lay: "I would not like to seem vindictive because I was."³²
He had lost a brother in the war and sharply defended, even from the retro-
spect of the 1950's, the Versailles provisions. He was against removing
the war guilt clause: "Save for its presence no Germans would ever have
felt guilty of anything."³³ After his rise to Permanent Under-Secretary
he became known as the chief anti-German within the government. As such
he attracted certain elements of diplomatic society, such as the Italian
and Russian ambassadors.³⁴ Officially he seemed to participate in the
internal polarization of the government and led the Foreign Office in its
seeming anti-German line. Whenever Cliveden criticized the Secretary he
heartily returned the favor,³⁵ speaking of such things as a "renewed will
to power."

Page 12

Within the opposition there was nothing approaching consensus on what was to be done. Even when those opposed to appeasement could make policy, they often had no idea as to what that policy should really be. The Abyssinia disaster of 1935-6 was a good case in point. Vansittart was sure that Italy should be a British ally, and being a natural enemy of Germany she would help Britain prevent *Anschluss* and further expansion. 36

He thus favored throughout this period some sort of Franco-Italian accord, but was unable to realize his wish. In addition at the time he felt, as we have indicated, that British strength simply couldn't be spent in the face of a possible German confrontation. This stand brought him into direct conflict with Anthony Eden, who was at this time Minister for League of Nations Affairs and a passionate League supporter. Eden felt that collective security was the way to stop Hitler and that the Germans would follow the Italian example if Mussolini was allowed to succeed. What emerged from all this was a weak policy of sanctions which were expressly not going to be backed by military force. Thus the oil sanction, which Mussolini claimed was an act of war, was never used- and anything Mussolini would not threaten to go to war for would naturally be ineffective. Thus, as Vansittart admits, Great Britain and France got the worst of all worlds. In the coming struggle Italy had been alienated from the West and shoved into Hitler's open arms. At the same time collective security was dead and the League discredited.

There was a similar battle between the Opposition and the Government over rearmament and conscription. As in the Abyssinia case, each group failed to carry out the implications which its own policy demanded. The government wanted to rearm- but it followed a policy based on the irrelevance of war. The Opposition demanded a stronger government policy, but refused until it was almost too late to support the rearmament which might make

Page 13

possible such a policy. Although Chamberlain and his colleagues only
introduced conscription itself under the greatest of pressure we find
Attlee opposed to the end. On April 28, 1939 he stated in Parliament
that "... we believe that so far from strengthening this country it will
weaken and divide it...."³⁷

With Italy allied to Germany, there seemed(in these final months)an
obvious need for advances to gain Russian support. Inspite of this, Russian
aid was not only not sought but they were often excluded from international
conferences, as at Munich. This was a late as 1938; earlier, in 1935,
the French had signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviets, and earlier
still, in 1934, the U.S.S.R. had joined the League of Nations. This switch
from militant communism to the "united front" had been dictated by Stalin's
growing fear of the man his communists had helped to power, Adolph Hitler.
During this period of receptivity there was no response from Great Britain.
It was another failure of British policy which, though in some ways
separate from appeasement, never the less is an extension of its basic
premises.

To begin with, Chamberlain himself was not enthusiastic about ties with
Russia. His objection was two-fold. As he did not love Germans, neither
did he like Russians- and this dislike came to be expressed in ways which
sounded more like policy than morality: "I can't believe that she has the
same aims and objectives as we have, or any sympathy with democracy as
such."³⁸ This dislike was certainly echoed throughout Great Britain- the
Bolshevik revolution was never terribly popular, especially with the
upper class who were Britain's political leaders. When alliance with
Russia came up for debate in the House of Lords one heard phrases like
"that most godless one" and the eventual triumph of "the force of Christi-
anity."³⁹

Page 14

Chamberlain for his part avoided these excesses. The possibility of Russian military aid came to interest him more and more, but he always seemed to view it as a question of geography more than strength. This was a view widely shared, for the recent officer purge had cut up all commands seriously and the Russian military was said to be extremely weak. Again, information received proved to be somewhat less than reliable. Again *The Times* was in full step with the government- for a long period of time the only correspondent in Russia was in Riga. His dispatches were considered biased by all leftists who bothered to read them.⁴⁰ *The Times'* own policy echoed the government's- i.e., they weren't interested. In a long editorial entitled "The Common Front," printed on April 14, 1938, there are only two referrences (and these vague) to the U.S.S.R.

*The Times* did mention the U.S.S.R. favorably in promoting a "Peace Front" on April 4, 1939. This was to consist of France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and Poland- the latter two replacing Italy and Germany. From March 15, when the German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia was proclaimed, it was evident that the logic of appeasement was faulty. From this point new guarantees were necessary. Some, it was seen, would come from Great Britain; others, it was hoped, would come from the U.S.S.R.

There are conflicting claims made as to who was responsible for the failure of the Anglo-Soviet talks. The British subsequently charged the Soviets with duplicity. Recent researches would seem to support the fact but not the implications of such charges.⁴¹ The Soviets certainly had their own game to play, but the British, who usually saw the other point of view so well, seemed not to recognize that they could be charged with duplicity with the Nazis as well. Whether the charge was true or not is unimportant here. The point is that the other side had its suspicions and the British did nothing to allay them. The fact that the Soviets were also bargaining

Page 15

with the Nazis does not mean that they would have signed the pact had negotiations with the allies been more satisfactory.

The problem, as in other situations which Britain dealt with between 1937 and 1939, was that others could see British needs perhaps better than she could herself. When the British did not act accordingly, others drew their own- usually right- conclusions. As Beaufre, a member of the Anglo-French military mission to Moscow, noted, there were only 40 Polish and 20 Rumanian divisions. Nor could France help offensively from behind her Maginot Line. It was evident to all, then, that if the British were serious in their guarantees to either Poland or Rumania they must have Russian helo in creating an Eastern front. Therefore, when the British stalled, the Soviets could rightfully conclude that the British were not anxious for an alliance and thus must be dealing with Germany. This would have probably ended by giving a free hand to Germany in the east- where the British had often disclaimed interest- leaving Russia to face Germany alone.

As at Berchtesgaden, the British were unsure what policy to follow. They responded to the Soviet call for a six-power conference by calling it "premature."⁴² The Times spelled out the "new" policy toward the U.S.S.R. on April 15, 1939, as "... leaving open every opportunity for Soviet cooperation against aggression and of being ready to welcome any sign that such cooperation is forthcoming." This lack of initiative disturbed not only Russia, but others as well. A Times dispatch from Angora related how the Balkans saw the U.S.S.R.'s support as vital if Turkey were to help in the Balkans. Chamberlain's "non-committal" remarks were regretted in these areas.⁴³

The one nation which was glad- and which was also partly responsible- was Poland. Beck had had extensive conversations with Chamberlain concerning the nature of the guarantees. The Polish Minister for Foreign

Page 16

Affairs had evaded a Polish guarantee for Rumania, the real reason behind the British guarantee to Poland in the first place.⁴⁴ Chamberlain apparently agreed with Beck on the latter's rejection of a Russian alliance. Beck asserted that: 1.) the Poles hated the Russians; and 2.) this act would be provocative- and Germany might not attack Poland at all. Chamberlain added that he felt the U.S.S.R. was "a very unreliable friend."⁴⁵ We might call this the pot and the kettle if the whole affair had not been so tragic. It was no wonder that French pressure on the Poles to sign the treaty was ineffective.

As summer came, the political talks in Moscow sputtered on the definition of "indirect aggression." The Soviets were afraid that disturbance from within the states on her borders might replace native rulers with Nazi ones. The border states were afraid that giving the Russians rights of intervention for subjective causes was tantamount to giving up their independence- and they weren't sure that Germans weren't preferrable to Russians if it came to that. Finally, the British and French acceded to the Russian demand that military consultation accompany the political discussions. They thought it would be possible to reach a political settlement through this back door approach. The situation on the Polish-German frontier grew more serious by the day; obviously time was important if agreement was to precede, and possibly prevent, the outbreak of war. The British instructions to Admiral Dfax and his staff, as reported to their French allies, related to: 1.) the possibility of German-Soviet collusion; and 2.) the importance of dragging out the negotiations as much as possible.⁴⁶ Either the public was being grossly misled as to the chances for settlement or these instructions represented an even larger governmental miscalculation.

The Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23 and the subsequent

Page 17

signing of the Anglo-Polish alliance on August 25 meant that, once more,
Great Britain had gotten the worst of all worlds. Germany invaded Poland
September 1- the British and French declared war September 3. The policy
of appeasement, some of whose facets we have tried to examine here, had
utterly failed. But still Chamberlain felt he had been right, and he was
never voted out of office, even when he stepped aside in favor of Churchill
on May 10, 1940.

The *Times* wrote on September 21, 1938 that "...all hope of revision
without war must be abandoned, and recurrent war must be accepted as a
law of humanity, if an attempt at revision is to be represented as an act
of cowardly surrender just because, and at the moment when, it has become
the only alternative to war...." On March 20, 1939- after the Munich pact
had been broken- Halifax reiterated the purposes of Munich in support of
that settlement: 1.) to effect a settlement of a difficult problem; and
2.) "to build a Europe more secure, upon the basis of freely accepted con-
sultation as the means by which all future differences might be adjusted....
only with time can hope be converted into sure beliefs."⁴⁷ The most inter-
esting critique of these statements- and others like them- is not a
reiterations of what happened on September 1, 1939; it is, rather, a
critique of appeasement in its own terms- as much as possible without
benefit of hindsight- but with the benefit of concepts partially suggested
by these very mistakes. With the "Munich analogy" in everyday use, this is
the least we can do to make this discussion more relevant.

To take the most general proposition first, let us examine the British
attempt to revise the *status quo*. Obviously the status quo in regard to the
British Empire was something which Great Britain would fight for. From that
it is obvious that revision has its limits. One of the problems inherent
in the Versailles treaty was that no provision had been made for revision.
Therefore once revision started theoretically the whole structure of

Page 18

Versailles, and the status of all Europe, was called into question. The
strength of the French in refusing any revision reflected this very fact.
Once the legal structure (which is an inherently static concept) is questioned
one is forced to rely on "promises," "aims," and "attitudes."

This is why Hitler's aims should have been a more important topic for
discussion. The _Anschluss_ or the Sudeten additions might or might not be
legitimate in themselves- the real question concerned the legitimacy of
the program of which these were only a part. The fact is that there were
never signs- other than words from the Germans themselves- that any given
step was the end. In fact there was every reason to believe, after looking
at Nazi irrationality and persistent opportunism, that there was no point
at which the dictator could legitimately stop. Chamberlain said of
appeasement in a Birmingham speech: "If that policy were to succeed, it
was essential that no power should seek to obtain a general domination of
Europe."<sup>48</sup> If this was true then assurances more valid than words should
have been demanded.

Furthermore, another fundamental error was made by the appeasers and
it concerns the words "seek to obtain" in this quotation. The danger in
using such a standard is, at what level do I act? The answer has to be,
at that level where one's own national security is threatened. But this
doesn't tell us too much. The French saw, and rightly, that the mere
existence of Germany was a threat to their security, and they worked constantly
to keep Germany weak. The French could not wait until Germany rearmed
because by then it would be too late. This is the essence of what one
might call a precautionary foreign policy.<sup>49</sup> The English, on the other
hand- and this is perhaps the essence of Chamberlain's self defense after
March 1939- felt that they could wait until the threat to themselves was
unmistakable. This was also Henderson's attitude: "Provided one is

Page 19

prepared for the worst, one can and must always hope for the best, until
the worst happens."⁵⁰ The problem was that "the worst" kept getting worse-
and there was no sign that Great Britain was prepared for it. Perhaps
the worst charge against the appeasers which could have been made at that
time is that they refused at each stage to prepare for the worst.
Instead, lack of preparation became itself the *raison d'être* for more con-
cessions. Chamberlain's fault was not perhaps that he hooed- but that
he created a situation where hope was his country's only hope.

One of the other misapprehensions which attended appeasement was that
every move was to be taken at face value, with each incident being somehow
isolated in time from all others. Because of previous policy the "firm
commitment" to Poland could not be believed up to, and even after,
Great Britain's formal declaration of war in 1939. One of Chamberlain's
interests was to make sure that 1914 was not repeated, and that Germany
knew that the British would stand by Poland. Earlier actions made this
absolutely impossible- and assured Russia's suspicions of her would-be
allies.

Perhaps some of the considerations and faults of appeasement have now
been made clear. One hopes that it is also clear that "Munich analogies"
are always incomplete and are thus usually almost useless. Appeasement
was not wrong because it allowed revision. The problem of revision was
the problem of Versailles, and it might have been insoluble in any case.
Appeasement was wrong because it tried to hide instead of dealing with
British weakness. And to hope was not wrong. Without hope no change could
have been undertaken and a static system might have been shattered at any
moment by one hard blow. But a hope which is its own support, and which
has no alternatives to itself- this was the British position in September,
1939: hopeless.

Page. 20

FOOTNOTES

¹ Lord Rober Vansittart, *The Mist Procession* (London, 1958)

² Reported in *The Times*, September 17, 1938

³ In scanning *The Times* it must be admitted that reports of speeches against "standing solidly" were minimal. In the September 17 paper, for instance, the above quoted report was the only unfavorable one- and was placed somewhat below a statement by the P.M. of Australia, Mr. Lyons, oledging Australian unity with Great Britain. The fact- or excuse- of Commonwealth disunity is mentioned by several diplomats of the period, however, and in the spring of 1939 an attitude somewhat more hostile to the British becomes evident.

⁴ Keith Feiling, *The Life of Neville Chamberlain* (London, 1947), p. 57. But as Vansittart said of Barrington-Ward, perhaps he was "wrong-headed on the highest and therefore most hopeless grounds."

⁵ Feiling, pp. 120-21

⁶ Feiling, p. 252

⁷ Feiling, p. 402

⁸ Vansittart, p. 523: "There is little doubt that we should have lost the second world war, and ceased to be a nation, if we had spent our small margins prematurely."

⁹ Feiling, p. 425. Also, in the hope of using German public opinion against Hitler he forbade the bombing of munitions centers and towns unless the Germans started it.

¹⁰ Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission* (New York, 1940), p. 176

¹¹ Henderson, p. 9

¹² German Documents D, Vol II, no. 149, May 7, 1938, as quoted in Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, *The Appeasers* (London, 1963), p. 123

¹³ Henderson, p. 99. On the basis of self-determination; What did he think, one wonders of a letter to *The Times*, Sept. 16, 1938, mentioning "the Ukrains in Poland" and other displaced peoples.

¹⁴ Henderson, p. 287. The proposals were cession of Danzig and a plebiscite on the corridor. There were other points which Ribbentrop read so fast as to be, in Henderson's words, "unintelligible." Yet they were all "reasonable!"

¹⁵ He came from an ambassadorship in Argentina, the most pro-Nazi country in Latin America.

¹⁶ Henderson, p. 146

¹⁷ Especially since Halifax admitted in a speech on Oct. 3, 1938 that in matters of treaty revision "the way of consent... has not hitherto in vital matters been made effective."

Page 21

18 History of the Times: The 150th Anniversary and Beyond, Part II (Vol IV) (London, 1952), pp. 929-30

19 Times History, p. 962. In a differentiation between "integrity" and "independence" possible changes in Polish borders seemed hinted.

20 The"Cliveden Set" was so named because they often met at Cliveden, the Astor's country house. Astor, by no coincidence, in his turn owned *The Times*!

21 Harold Williams was a good friend of Vansittart's and as foreign editor had aided him in "exposing German and Russian intentions."

22 Until his recall in 1937 for reporting the religious persecutions.

23 Times History, pp. 907-908

24 Gilbert and Gott, p. 60

25 Dirksen Papers, Vol I, no. 12, July 10, 1938, as quoted in Gilbert and Gott, p. 65

26 Times History, p. 904

27 Lothian, Appendix 3 (b), pp. 337-45, Interview with Hitler, May 4, 1937, quoted in Gilbert and Gott, p. 53. Lothian also sent a letter to *The Times* which stated that "the real purpose of the Rome-Berlin Axis is to break the old monopoly in favor of the status quo as created at Versailles."

28 Germ. Docs. D, Vol.IV, no. 260, Oct. 31, 1938, as quoted in Gilbert and Gott, p. 194

29 As when Chamberlain related to journalists his optimism concerning disarmament on February 1939. Even Halifax thought Germany and Italy might draw the wrong conclusions.

30 *The Times*, September 15, 1938

31 Vansittart, p. 29. His misfortunes in Germany had not reached their climax, however, in 1899. After graduating from Eton he went to Germany again, only to challenged to a duel over a game of tennis!

32 Vansittart, p. 250

33 Vansittart, p. 507

34 As Maisky recalls him: "A clever and cultivated man, a skillful diplomat and politician, a talented o'clock and writer, he was, of course, flesh of the flesh of the ruling class of Great Britain. His divinity was the British Empire." No wonder Vansittart admired Churchill so much!

35 See Gilbert and Goss, p. 45

36 Vansittart was quite favorably disposed toward Italy: "...democracies dislike most those whom they fear least. They vented disproportionate wrath on a 'mountebank,' while excusing bloody Lenin."

37 Reported in *The Times*, April 28, 1939. He proposed "conscription of wealth" instead.

Page 22

38 Feiling

39 *The Times*, March 29, 1939. This last, spoken by Lord Hastings, followed his statement that "It was not for those who carried the grave responsibilities of controlling the affairs of this country to be animated by aspirations of moral obligation." Consistency must not be asked of a Lord. Of course this was better perhaps than not mentioning erstwhile allies at all. In Halifax's speech in Parliament of April 13 about events since the occupation of Albania (i.e., guarantee to Greece, etc.) there was not one reference to the U.S.S.R. This deficiency was noted and corrected by the speakers following- Attlee and Churchill.

40 *Times History*, p. 911

41 Adam Ulam, in his new book *Expansion and Coexistence* claims that the British guarantee to Poland was the real turning point. With the West drawn into war if Poland was invaded, the Russians were assured that at the very least they would have allies, *de facto* if not *de jure*. On the other hand, by making an agreement with Germany there was a good possibility that Russia could do as she had always wished- namely, watch the leading capitalist powers bleed themselves to death, at which point she would step in to pick up the pieces. The one problem with this argument is that it assumes that Stalin, who was known to be abnormally suspicious anyhow, would trust Chamberlain's promise of assistance. It is thus likely that with the Polish guarantee a powerful argument- but not conclusive by any means- was available for an understanding with Germany.

42 *The Times*, March 22, 1939

43 *The Times*, April 15, 1939

44 See *Gilbert and Goss*, pp. 229-41

45 Feiling, p. 408

46 General Andre Beaufre, 1940: *The Fall of France* (London, 1967), p. 96

47 Viscount Halifax, *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (London, 1940), pp. 242-43

48 *The Times*, March 18, 1939. Chamberlain's annual Birmingham speech, which in this case was devoted to the P.M.'s first strong statement on Hitler's Czech annexation.

49 The "one" in this case being ex-Professor Henry Kissinger.

50 Henderson, p. 97

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beaufre, Andre. 1940: The Fall of France. London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1967.

Feiling, Keith. The Life of Neville Chamberlain. London: Macmillan & Company Ltd., 1947.

Gilbert, Martin and Gott, Richard. The Aopeasers. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1963.

Halifax (Viscount). Speeches on Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University Press, 1940.

Henderson, Nevile (Sir). Failure of a Mission. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940.

History of the Times: The 150th Anniversary and Beyond, Part II. (Vol.IV). London: The Times, 1952.

Maisy, Ivan. Who Helped Hitler. London: Hutchinson, 1964.

Rowse, A. L. All Souls and Aopeasement. New York: Macmillan & Company Ltd., 1961.

The Times

Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.

Vansittart, Robert (Lord). The Mist Procession. London: Hutchinson & Company, Ltd., 1958.

FREDERICK DRUM HUNT
FOREIGN TRADE CONSULTANT
5309 CARVEL ROAD
WASHINGTON 16, D. C.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

OLIVER S. 8067

229-8867

June 28th, 1972

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I note with pleasure that you are going to speak before the American Foreign Service Association tomorrow when they hold their annual luncheon to make awards to certain members.

It is great that you can be there. I had the pleasure of hearing you speak before the same group some time ago and then more recently at the Metropolitan Club. As a native of Washington and a former Foreign Service Officer, I happen to be active in both organizations.

[You will no doubt speak on Vietnam and on your recent trip to the USSR and other matters of current interest. However, if given the opportunity, I would like to ask you a question on the attitude of the President as regards our relations with southern Africa. I am very much aware of the policy of the African Bureau of the State Department since it has changed little from that laid down by Assistant Secretary "Soapy" Williams in former Administrations. On the other hand, President Nixon promised during the campaign of 1968 that he would improve our relations with South Africa, Rhodesia, and the territories of Mocambique and Angola. Since then the President has said on at least three important occasions that we should recognize all countries and that recognition does not mean that we agree wholeheartedly with their Governments. If so, then why is that we do not even have a Consulate in Rhodesia? Why can we not take part in a trade fair in Johannesburg? Why are we passing up opportunities to make profitable trade?]

It will be appreciated if you will speak to this and advise us as to what the President might do. Furthermore, it is nice to be able to change the subject to southern Africa instead of Vietnam.

(To be read prior to going to the luncheon at the State Department on Thursday, June 28th)

RECEIVED
JUL 1 1972

CENTRAL FILES

HOWARD HUNT

11120 River Road
Potomac, Md. 20854

June 3, 1969

Editor
The Alumni Monthly
Brown University
Providence, R. I. 02912

Sir:

I was as delighted over this year's selection of honorary degree recipients as I was appalled at the shocking discourtesy shown to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger by a large number of the Class of 1969. This latest outrage against a guest of Brown follows logically and inevitably the earlier harrassment of General Earle Wheeler and recruiters from CIA and industry.

It is inconceivable to this alumnus that the University
can continue tolerating yahooiism on campus regardless of its
guise. And the fact that so many members of the Class of
1969 were involved in this latest incident demonstrates to
me that something is very, very wrong at Brown. The Univer-
sity was established to produce "men of usefulness and
reputation" not hirsute know-nothings, as seems increasingly
the case.

Perhaps the failure begins with screening applicants for admission. I have been active in interviewing candidates for Brown, following the guidelines laid down for academic and personal qualities in applicants. In view of this most recent blot on the University's name I think alumni might well consider an additional and urgent criterion when making their candidate appraisals: Does the young man demonstrate the capacity to become a good citizen?

Dr. Kissinger is one of the President's principal
advisers. Even his opponents concede him to be intelligent
and well-motivated. He will survive this effort to humiliate
and discredit him. But Brown? Are the University's honored

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

AUG 10 1971

Dear Willard:

Many thanks for your note of August 4 and
for enclosing a copy of the prayer you de-
livered before the New Hampshire Senate.
Your good wishes are very welcome and
you were very thoughtful to write.

Please stay in touch.

Rev. T. Willard Hunter
K. F. D. 1
Durham, New Hampshire
03824

RECEIVED
AUG 2 1971
GENERAL FILES

jlp:8/9/71

SENATE JOURNAL

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Wednesday

16Jun71

The Senate met at 1 o'clock.

A quorum was present.

Prayer was offered by Guest Chaplain, Rev. T. Willard Hunter of the Union Congregational Church, Madbury, New Hampshire.

O God of ages, maker and breaker of mighty nations, we come before you this afternoon in the humble knowledge that all our human wisdom has thus far failed to stem the tide of the destruction and decay we see all around us. Pour into our souls the concrete of character that will help make us more nearly adequate to the assignment has been handed to us.

We pray that towering conflicts within our state may be healed. We pray for Walter Peterson. We pray for William Loeb. We pray for teamwork. We would that New Hampshire might be not only first in the nation with a presidential primary election but also first as a pattern of reconciliation that might launch a wave of national unity throughout our country.

Give us wisdom and insight above and beyond our poor powers in the decisions we must make in this room this day, and give us not only our daily bread but also the peace that passes all understanding, both at home and abroad, starting with ourselves.

We pray today not only for our state leadership but for our national leadership as well. We pray especially for your servants Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and all those who have the awe-ful decisions to make affecting peace and war. Uphold them in their fearful moments. Reprove them when tempted with

1119

1120

SENATE JOURNAL, 16JUN71

lesser motives. Encourage them to follow your ways. And give us all a just peace at last, in Jesus' name. Amen.

Pledge of Allegiance was led by Sen. Poulsen.

## HOUSE CONCURRENCE

SB 91, naming a certain mountain in the town of Odell, Muise Mountain.

SB 178, authorizing the liquor commission to extend certain provisions relative to liquor licenses.

SB 191, relative to abandoned boats.

SB 210, enlarging the conditions under which federal or state aid projects may be pre-financed and extending the term of borrowing for the same to five years.

SJR 20, in favor of Mrs. Ann Morrell.

## HOUSE RECONSIDERATION OF REQUEST FOR COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

HB 6, relative to the power of Hesser College to grant degrees.

HB 43, relative to the power of White Pines College to grant degrees.

HB 99, relative to the power of McIntosh College, Inc. to grant degrees.

## HOUSE NON-CONCURRENCE TO SENATE AMENDMENTS

## HOUSE CONCURRENCE TO SENATE AMENDMENTS

HB 613, relative to the terms of members of the air pollution control agency; expanding the powers of the agency establishing a permit system for the control of air pollution.

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

FEB 17 1971

Dear Sam:

Many thanks for your letter of February 11 and the enclosures. I was most interested to look at them. I only hope that my active involvement with Harvard had a positive impact commensurate with the negative impact of my departure.

Please do get in touch either before you leave for Washington or after you arrive. With the Annual Review of Foreign Policy nearing completion my schedule is incredibly full, but I would make every effort to see you.

D. Samuel P. Huntington, Chairman
Department of Government
Harvard University
Littauer Center M-22
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

jlp:2/17/71

Muzammel Huq
Asian Studies Center
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan
48823

June 8, 1971

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Presidential Advisor
National Security Council
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissenger:

I come from East Pakistan, currently a graduate student at the University of Michigan and my area is military in the political and economic development of new nations. This summer I am participating in a seminar on Rural Development in Pakistan at Michigan State University. At present I am twenty six years old.

As a politically active student of Dacca University (East Pakistan) and later a faculty member of Gordon College, Rawalpindi, West Pakistan, I had been actively and closely associated with the political movements of my country, which gave me an opportunity to come in close contact with most of the political leaders of Pakistan, including the military.

I believe that the situation in East Pakistan is distressing to you and the East Pakistan issue is an immense difficult issue. It is a complex matter for diplomats and humanitarians alike. Still, I believe that the situation in East Pakistan should be particularly distressing to Americans; for it is the U.S. military hardware, guns, tanks and aircraft which are contributing much to the suffering. And this is being done, apparently in violation of negotiated agreements on the use of American military aid to the central Pakistan government.

In this connection I will be most grateful if you kindly allow me an interview with you at your earliest. Any day and time will suit me to come over to Washington, D. C.

7th Annual Bengal Conference

University of Minnesota

Holte Center

May 28-30, 1971

May 28 8:00 p.m.-9:00 p.m. Dinner for panelists and discussants at 1538 Granthum Avenue, St. Paul.
9:00 p.m. Preliminary discussion of the Bangladesh situation.

May 29 9:00 a.m.-12:30 noon

**Politics in Bengal: East and West**

Chairman: R. Owens, Univ. of Minn.

M. Franda, Colgate University, "Communism and Regionalism in Bengal"

J. Bhattacharya, University of Southern Illinois, title to be announced.

Z. R. Khan, Dacca University, title to be announced.

Informal papers by:

Dr. M. Alangir, Harvard University
Professor M. Yunus, Univ. of Kentucky
Professor S. Bari, Univ. of Chicago
Mr. M. Huq, University of Michigan

1:30 p.m.-4:30 p.m.

**Myth, Ritual and Symbolism**

Chairman: Ron Inden, University of Chicago

R. Nicholas, "Rice, Ritual, Rebellion and Relief"

E. Dimock and R. Inden, "The Symbol of the Motherland in Tagore's Patriotic Songs"

A. K. M. Aminul Islam, Wright State University, "Religion and Myth in an East Pakistani Village"

-2-

Manisha DasGupta, Univ. of California, Santa Barbara, "Development of Romantic Phantasie Among Upper and Middle Class Bengali Women and Bengali Social Structure."

Lina Ostor, Univ. of Minn., "Cults of the Saints (Pir) in Bengal"

Akos Ostor, Univ. of Minn., "Myth, Ritual and Theatre: Symbolic and Cultural Forms in Bengal."

5:00 p.m.-6:00 p.m.

Discussion of future research resources.

8:00 p.m.

Plenary session: Bangladesh and the future.

May 30

9:00 a.m.-11:30 a.m.

Research Panel on Bengali Art and Literature

Chairman: Ram Dayal Munda, Univ. of Minn.

F. Miller, Univ. of Chicago, "Contemporary Bengali Theatre."

Anjani Sinha, Univ. of Chicago, "A Reader's Response to Vidyapāthi and So Called Bhakti Poetry."

H. Banerjee, Toronto Univ., "Effects of Urbanization in Jibananda Das and R. Achanja's Poetry."

P. Sarkar, Univ. of Chicago, "The 'You' in Tagore's Poems."

A. Dil, Stanford Univ., "Hindu-Muslim Dialects of Bengali."

C. Sealey, "Buddhadeva Bose's New Novel and the Obscenity Laws of India."

I. Aal, California State College, "Research in Indian Art."

R. D. Munda, "Phonological and Metrical Problems in the Vaisnava Songs of Manbhum Bangla."

-3-

12:30-2:30 p.m.

Bengal Views of the Past

Chairman: Len Gordon, Columbia University

Session to be held in the Ames Library of
the University of Minnesota.

John Moriarty, Univ. of the Pacific, "The
Mythology of Indian Spirituality and the
Golden Age" read in absentia.

Joseph O'Connell, Univ. of Toronto, "Function of Symbolism in Facilitating Social Integration in Bengal During the 19th Century."

Ranu Basu, Stanford Univ., "Elites in Urban
Bengal 1850-1872."

B. Morrison, Univ. of British Columbia,
"Where is Bengal? A Contribution to the
Definition of a Cultural Region."

Om Prakash, Harvard Univ., "The Organization
of Industrial Production in Mughal Bengal."

L. Gordon, Columbia Univ., "Exploring
Indian Identities in the Early Nationalist
Period: A Comparison of R. Dutt and Sayid
Ameer Ali."

Akos Ostor, Univ. of Minn., "The Pasts of a
Bengal Town."

CENTER FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

BAG LUNCH SCHEDULE

October 16
Joel Rocamora, Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science, Cornell University.

"Political Prisoners and the New Indonesian Military Regime."

October 23
Sir James Plimsoll, Australian Ambassador to the United States.

"Some Aspects of Australian Relations with Asia"

October 30
Peter Hook, Lecturer, Department of Linguistics.

"Language-Switching in the Speech of a Bombay Gang."

November 6
W. Dean Howells, Head, South Asia and Near East Section, Internal Research, U. S. Department of State.

"South Asia--In Search of New Alternatives."

November 13
K. Muzammel Huq, Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.

"Why the Presidential form of Government failed in Pakistan."

November 20
Professor Russell Fifield, Department of Political Science.

"The Concept of Southeast Asia: Origins Development Validity."

November 27
Thanksgiving Vacation - no Bag Lunch

December 4
Don Laird, Doctoral Student, Department of Political Science.

"How Asian are the Philippines"?

The Bag Lunches are held in the Commons Room in the Basement of Lare Hall every Friday at Noon. Everyone is welcome, just bring your lunch, coffee is free.

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN

2315 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

November 25, 1970.

Dear Mr. Huq,

Thank you very much for your letter of
November 20, 1970 enclosing a cheque for $1500.00
collected by you and by the Pakistan Students
Association at the University of Michigan. I and
my staff are greatly touched by this gesture. The
sum is generous and I am sure it will go a great way
to help our unfortunate brothers and sisters in East
Pakistan who are the victims of this colloidal disaster.

Kindly continue your hard work and send us
further sums as and when you collect them. Please also
thank the people of Ann Arbor and the International
Student's Association on my behalf for their sympathy
and for their help to Pakistan Student's Association for
collecting these funds.

I have credited the cheque to the President's
East Pakistan Relief Fund opened by me and remittances will
go regularly from this fund to the authorities at home for
being spent on relief and rehabilitation.

A formal receipt for this amount will be sent to you by
the Accounts Officer of this Embassy.

With kind regards,

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rawalpindi, Pakistan

August 21, 1969

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

I have known Mr. Muzammil Huq for a period of fourteen months, and
have had frequent and close contact with him on many occasions.
I have had ample opportunity to observe him in a number of situations

and feel qualified to provide you with a personal assessment of his
abilities as a scholar, and to make a judgment regarding his
potential for future academic achievement.

Last year Mr. Huq delivered a series of lectures at the American
Center on the subject of American History and Government. For an
individual who had never studied in the U.S. he conducted an
outstanding class, handling both the subject matter and the
questions with ease and finesse. The USIS was pleased and proud
to have had Mr. Huq participate in this program.

I have been assisting Mr. Huq in his efforts to pursue his post-
graduate work in the U.S., and have been doing so because I am
convinced of his serious approach to his subject field, his earnest
desire to attain a degree of academic excellence, and his keen
interest in and concern for political affairs. He is a bright,
enthusiastic young man, an individual who well exemplifies the
best traits of the Pakistani intellectual of today. He has a good
future as a member of a staff of a college or university here in
Pakistan, and is precisely the kind of individual that Pakistan
needs so badly.

I commend Mr. Huq to you, and hope that it will be possible for you
to provide him with the assistance which he is seeking.