May 4, 1966

Mr. John Muehlke, Jr.
Franconia College
Franconia, New Hampshire

Dear Mr. Muehlke:

Thank you for your letter of
April 26th inviting me to Franconia
College to discuss problems of NATO.

Unhappily, I have already over-
committed myself for the spring term
and I simply cannot take on any more
speaking engagements.

Thank you for thinking of me.

Kind regards.

Henry A. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

Thank you for thinking of me.

Speaking endearments.
and I implicitly cannot take on any more
committed myself for the arising term
uniquely, I have already over-

College to discuss problems of NATO.
April 26th inviting me to Francis
Thank you for your letter of

Dear Mr. Muehlike:

Francis, New Hampshire
Frances College
Mr. John Muehlike, Jr.

May 4, 1966

Paris, France

July 14th 1956

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

During a recent visit with Brooksie Parkman Woodard in Cambridge I mentioned to her that I would be looking for a job in the vicinity of Boston in the fall, and she suggested that I write to you about something similar to her former work for you. She also said that if I wrote to you during July I would probably not get an answer for some time - but I'd like at least to put my question on record, and hope to hear from you when I return in September.

At the moment my husband and I are on a European honeymoon, but we shall be back in Brockton, where he works, on the 11th of September. I'm not sure that this would be soon enough for you, and particularly since I would like about a month to settle down in Brockton before beginning to work if possible. I should also tell you that it is entirely possible that we will leave Brockton in June or September of 1957. I hesitate to add any more qualifications, since I'm probably talking my way out of a job faster than into one, but one more problem is the commuting distance between Brockton and Cambridge - so that if it were possible to work out an arrangement whereby I wouldn't have to come in early and stay late every day, my domestic life would be easier.

Perhaps I should give you a sort of resume - although as you probably know, a card to the Smith College Vocational Office, in Northampton, will produce our official reference file. I'm a classmate of Brooksie's, Smith '52, and a history major. I also spent my junior year in Geneva, and after graduation worked for 3 years in New York for the Far East-America Council, a kind of trade association of American firms interested in Asia. On that job I took a five month trip around Asia, from the Near East to Japan, as secretary to the Exec. Vice-President. Last year I was at Colombia doing an M.A. in economic development, which I have finished except for the thesis. I have typing and shorthand, but I think it's only fair to say that since I haven't taken any dictation for two years, the shorthand is fairly rusty.

I'd like very much to come in to talk with you when we return, and will telephone you as soon as possible. If you should want to get in touch with me for any reason before then, my address will be c/o American Express, Florence, until about August 15th - c/o American Express, Paris, until August 30th - and after that 25 Byron Avenue, Brockton, Mass.

DEC 5 1968

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N. Y. 10027

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy Hall

November 27, 1968

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Studies
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Only a sudden and unexpected meeting of a board of trustees in which I am involved prevents my coming to the meeting of the Coffee House on December 3, which you are to address. I am sorry to be missing you and hope this can be repaired soon.

CF:jn

CITÉ INTERNATIONALE DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE PARIS

FONDATION DES ÉTATS-UNIS

15, BOULEVARD JOURDAN - PARIS-14

TÉL. : POR. 35-79
Adr. Télégr. : FONDATUNIS PARIS
C. C. P. Paris 11658-24

January 17, 1969

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
International Seminar
Harvard University
471 Broadway
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
U.S.A.

Dear Henry & Cher Maître,

I should wish you not simply a Happy New Year, but
courage and strength to support the awesome task that has been placed
upon your shoulders. Your world-wide friends from the International
Seminars will rejoice at your appointment and felicitate the President-
elect for the sagacity of his judgement. Of course, we are all
prejudiced!

I hope that the project for a meeting of ex-Seminar
members planned for Rome last September has simply been postponed and
that we will all have an occasion to meet in the future. Should you
come to Paris, my husband and I shall insist that you give us the
opportunity to arrange a dinner or cocktail for you here. I could
get together the French members of the International Seminars living
in Paris, or my husband could arrange an informal meeting with our
resident students in Political Science. He has over forty nations
represented in this American house of 375 residents.

I have given up my chair in American Studies at Caen to
teach in the new Centre Universitaire Expérimental de Vincennes. Much
of our work will be interdepartmental and much of the system is inspired
by American methods.

Congratulations again, and do let us know when you
come to Paris.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1961.

Dear Henry:

I am enclosing with this letter a copy of the curriculum vitae for Frederick S. Arkhurst as promised in our telephone conversation a few weeks ago. As I indicated during that conversation, I hope very much that it will be possible for you to provide a fellowship to Mr. Arkhurst for the Center for International Affairs at Harvard.

Fred is one of the most outstanding Africans I have known. My wife and I met him in Kumasi, Ghana in 1954 and our friendship and esteem for him have continued to grow since that date. He was our guest in Michigan for several weeks in 1955 when he was in this country as the first African recipient of an Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship. From 1957 to 1960 we saw him frequently in New York when he was First Secretary of the Ghana Mission to the United Nations.

It has been my great pleasure to see Fred grow in understanding and stature during these years. He is a man of unusual ability, integrity and personality as his wide circle of friends in this country and in Africa will attest.

I think you will recall from previous conversations with Fred and myself why Fred wishes to go to Harvard. These reasons have been reinforced during his stay in Addis Ababa as a recent letter from him indicates. His present contract with the Economic Commission for Africa expires at the end of May 1962, and while he has been offered a permanent appointment, he does not wish to continue because he does not think that the policies of the Commission will enable it to be of use to the African countries and, under present circumstances, does not want to be associated with these policies.

For several years, Fred has talked of the possibility of taking a year to think about African affairs and to put his ideas on paper. Now he is ready to do just that and would greatly appreciate your letting him know how to go about applying for a fellowship.

I

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

March 10, 1961

Mr. J. Wayne Fredericks
Special Assistant for Program Planning
Bureau of African Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Wayne:

Many thanks for your note of the 7th.

I will certainly get in touch with you when I am in Washington, either next Monday or Tuesday or on my next trip.

Kind regards.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 7, 1961

Dear Henry:

I was delighted to read that you will be on the frontiers, too. When you are in Washington, give me a ring at the Bureau of African Affairs (DU 3-5374) or, for the next three weeks, at the Jefferson Hotel, DI 7-4704.

Would it be appropriate for me to read again that excellent paper prepared for you by Jim Coleman last summer? If so, would you send it to me here (Room 6234 A, Department of State)?

Best wishes to you, Anne, and the family.

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

FREE EUROPE, INC.

TWO PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016
LE 2-8900

[L]

DEC 24 1965

December 21, 1965

Prof. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I don't know whether you are familiar
with the hearings on the subject of what I call
"international political communications" which
have been conducted over the last several years
by Dante Fascell and his Subcommittee of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee. If not, I am
sure you would find the record of exceptional
interest.

I enclose a copy of the most recent
transcript, relating to "Behavioral Sciences and
the National Security." It occurs to me that you
might be especially interested in the Introduction
and Findings.

All best wishes of the season.

JRjr:mrf

Enc.

AUG 27 1968

PAUL W. FREEDMAN

60 Sutton Place South
New York 22, N.Y.

August 25

Dear Henry Kissinger:

Obviously, it was a rash assumption to have expec-
ted that the Post Office Department would deliver a
letter two blocks away in two (or was it three?) days.
The next time I extend/written invitation to so close
a neighbor, I'll save 6¢ by hand-delivering it ...

But, even if the man we both wanted in the White
House had made it there, the Postmaster Generalship
would presumably not have been yours. Hence, this note
is not designed to echo the weary complaints about mail
service.

It is more a fan letter to say how superbly you
handled yourself on CBS when it got hold of you to
evaluate the CSR crisis, and how much sense you made
in that tense, distraught atmosphere. My compliments !

With best regards,

Bullwinkle

SEP 10 1968

PAUL W. FREEDMAN

September 8, 1968

Dear Henry Kissinger:

There are more soul-satisfying endorsements of one's views than those emanating from CHRIST UND WELT, but since the "German Press Review" (at one time, and as a sideline, I used to pinch-hit for its editor when he was not available) goes to hundreds of key people across the country, it may be of passing interest that the current issue features the approving remarks which the Stuttgart weekly expressed about you.

As long as such orchids are being handed out, let me attach one to your lapel for the remarks on the Washington APSA panel about the relevance of _some_ historical lessons, even to lawyers ...

With all good wishes for a 5729 that will profit from the said lessons,

Sincerely,

German Press Review

GERMAN EMBASSY • PRESS OFFICE • 4645 RESERVOIR ROAD • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20007

This summary is prepared in the Press Office of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, D. C. It is based on commentaries published in the West German press and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the German government.

GPR 68-36

September 4, 1968

The topics discussed in this issue are:

* The Soviet-Czech "Compromise"

* The Opening of the Geneva Conference of the Non-Nuclear States

* The Democratic Convention in Chicago

THE SOVIET-CZECH "COMPROMISE"

The German press continued to devote most of its attention last week to the implications and consequences of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, implications in regard to German foreign policy, the non-proliferation treaty, NATO planning, the American elections and future Soviet-American relations. German editors are particularly concerned over the apparent irrationality of the Soviet action for they point out that this has grave implications for a rational European peace settlement and for the reliability of Soviet signatures on any future treaties such as the non-proliferation treaty. The leading Protestant weekly, CHRIST UND WELT (Aug 30) summed up this German concern:

> The idea that one can destroy ideas with tanks is obviously absurd. But the worry comes from the unnerving question of whether the leadership team of a great power which, in dealing with the problems of a related neighboring country, can miscalculate in such a grotesque fashion, would not set in motion the entire horrible annihilation apparatus at its command on some other occasion. How can one expect international obligations toward peoples in other parts of the world from a country which in its own area is capable of a miscalculation that is as dangerous as it is irrational? This is a worry which remains among the peoples of the world even after the compromise reached in Moscow between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

CHRIST UND WELT quoted with approval the comment of the American Professor Henry Kissinger to the effect that he was not so afraid of the events of the coming months as of what will happen this coming winter:

> If Moscow, with the expected big peace offensive, tries to wipe out the catastrophic impression caused through its crushing of Czechoslovakia. Will one then be ready everywhere to forget everything again?

CHRIST UND WELT agreed that there can be no turning back to the extreme forms of the cold war but added that the United States, in spite of the strong words of George Ball at the United Nations, is ready to continue its dialogue with the Soviet Union:

GPR 68-36

-2-

September 4, 1968

All in all during this critical week, the United States showed such a calm attitude that no one can doubt but that Washington is only too ready to wipe out from its memory what happened to the peace in Central Europe.

The conservative weekly, RHEINISCHER MERKUR (Aug 30), which in the previous week, had taken for granted that the Federal Republic's detente policy had failed, took a different tone last week and rallied behind the Kiesinger-Brandt regime:

> While the Kremlin tried to hang the mask of Hitler on the face of Bonn, it reaped the swastika on its tanks in Prague. It is absolutely absurd to speak of a total collapse of the policy of detente, for the unbending determination of the Prague resistance proved to everyone that Bonn's policy of peace had borne its moral and political fruit: Moscow's attempt to keep Central and Eastern Europe under its control through the propaganda scarecrow of a Bonn revanchism and militarism, failed not only in Prague.

The RHEINISCHER MERKUR saw three key results of the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia for European policy, and many German papers expressed a similar point of view:

1. The NATO warning system, which was supposed to be absolutely safe, was surprised...With this, McNamara's "Big Lift" strategy, steadily criticized by this paper since 1963, found its Cannae...To correct this wrong strategy of the Pentagon immediately should not require the NATO summit conference suggested by Chancellor Kiesinger.

2. Within the framework of the non-proliferation treaty, no self-respecting state can still be expected to accept the United Nations guarantee along with a Soviet veto in the Security Council. With or without a Kremlin guarantee, the assault on Prague has shown clearly that Moscow will not refrain from any lie when it is a question of finding a reason for intervention.

3. That Europe, which so unanimously condemned the Soviet attack...must finally insure its own security in the form of a really effective defense community if it is to be a credible factor in a European peace policy.

The liberal Hamburg weekly, DIE ZEIT (Aug 30), gave a sober analysis of the situation not too different from that presented in the conservative press. However, it gave one of the clearest summaries in defense of the Federal Republic's insistence that there is no alternative to its policy of seeking peace and detente:

> It may be that the East will force us into a new cold war - but we do not need to be the ones to declare this new cold war. The alternative to a policy of detente would be a policy of tension. There would be little to gain by this. For one thing, a Western policy deliberately based on tension would only give the corporals with bayonets in the East a belated alibi for their invasion of Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the resumption of the cold war would very soon lead to a competition in armaments of such an extent that it could be borne by no Western state without endangering the foundations of its society. And finally, a new cold war would destroy precisely that atmosphere in which everywhere in the communist power area that push toward freedom of thought and in favor of the independence of states can unfold. A return to an antagonistic co-existence would simply cement again the shaky monolith in the East; the readiness for cooperation, on the other hand, would have to foster the internal movement which will cause a further disintegration.

GPR 68-36

-3-

September 4, 1968

Like most German papers, DIE ZEIT agrees that there will have to be a pause in "bridge-building", that a phase in the policy of detente has come to an end but not detente itself:

> The real meaning of this crisis...is that it has become obvious that the forces of reform are just as strong as the forces of repression - and they will become stronger from year to year. The Prague reformers have exposed the weakness of the orthodox system; but the intervention, even if from a short range point of view to be judged a success, has increased this weakness. The forces pressing for change, in the long run, will remain stronger than the police; the requirements of modern industrial society, an increasing standard of living and the increasing training and education of people will see to this. It is this development of society which leaves room for hope.

## THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS

On August 29 the long-scheduled meeting of the non-nuclear powers began in Geneva, in an atmosphere strongly influenced by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. As the liberal FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Aug 28) expressed it:

> The cynical breach of the United Nations Charter by the Soviet Union has shaken the structure of the United Nations to its foundations. This has made clear the direction to be taken by the conference of the non-nuclear powers. In Geneva the Soviet leaders will receive their first payment; for here it is a question of the heart of the matter: how much is the word of a "peace-loving" government worth?

The paper added that, from eighty states attending the conference, only eight Foreign Ministers would be present, among them Willy Brandt and that the nuclear powers would be represented only by observers without votes:

> From the very beginning the two big nuclear powers were unhappy about the meeting because they had to fear that their agreements...would be placed in question. At this time the Soviets, with particular zeal, would consign the conference to the devil. But they only had the choice between a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly and the conference of the non-nuclear powers, and they chose the lesser evil.

The FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU says that it is too soon to know what the conference will bring and that perhaps some of the powers are saving their powder for the October debate in the UN Assembly:

> But one thing is certain already, that it will not be so easy for the super-powers to convince the weaker states of the purity of their intentions. The proposal of the big powers of having the "security guarantee" come from the Security Council, which, once more, has just proven its impotence, will receive little applause.

Most German papers saw a connection between signature of the non-proliferation treaty and the Soviet claim of the right of intervention in the Federal Republic on the basis of two obsolete clauses in the United Nations Charter. The Berlin

GPR 68-36

-4-

September 4, 1968

TAGESSPIEGEL (Aug 29) said that Bonn now felt itself relieved of pressure for an early signature:

> Since even the American Senate is hesitating to reward Moscow for its evil deed in Czechoslovakia by rushing through a ratification of the treaty, the Federal Government sees no reason for being more Catholic than the Pope, or more American that the Senate in Washington.

The FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (Aug 28) said that the feeling in Bonn was that even the Social Democrats would not be so anxious now for a quick signature of the non-proliferation treaty and that among the Christian Democrats there is a strong feeling that the treaty has to be complemented by a nuclear guarantee of the United States for the Federal Republic:

> Only then can there be a question of German signature. In this connection it is expected that the American Senate, in view of the recent events, will take a new look at its previous rejection of such a guarantee. Consequently, the thought that one must wait by all means for the conclusion of the debate in the American Senate on ratification, finds steadily more and more adherents in the Christian Democratic party.

## THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION IN CHICAGO

The Czech crisis so dominated the German press these past weeks that comparatively less attention was paid to the Democratic Convention in Chicago. Leading papers, of course, did note the nomination of Vice-President Humphrey and Senator Muskie and made some comments on the convention and the election. DIE WELT (Aug 30) spoke of:

> The depressing picture caused by the organizational debacle of the convention, its ideological confusion and its explosion in hate and violence ...The party welded together by Roosevelt out of a coalition of members of labor unions, intellectuals, city masses and conservative southerners, fell to pieces under Lyndon Johnson. It fell to pieces because of the Vietnam war which cost him the presidency and split his party. Vietnam was not the key theme, it was the obsession of this convention. It blocked the convention to the extent that there was no place for even a superficial debate on the enormous social and foreign policy problems of the United States which have to be solved by the next administration.

As for the choice of a candidate, DIE WELT said that Humphrey was the best the Democrats could have selected under the circumstances but that his task is enormous:

> He must justify the policies of an unpopular administration; he is the candidate of a party that is split...and he must make the battle in an election year in which the situation seems over-ripe for a political change...But no one should underestimate this voluble and exuberant man who has more solid qualities than indicated by his expansive and often laughed-at temperament...It will be a close race, uncertain up to the last moment.

The STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG (Aug 30) was more pessimistic:

GPR 68-36

-5-

September 4, 1968

Can the party be unified and finally led to victory by a man whose name
has been tied precisely to that policy which is primarily responsible
for the split?

Like most German papers, the STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG notes a swing to conservatism in
the United States:

The citizens are not only tired of the war in Vietnam, but also of the
constant agitation over it, they do not want any more self-accusations
because of the mistakes in Southeast Asia and because of the unsolved race
problem, but they want a policy which gives them self-confidence again -
even at the price of pushing these problems under the rug rather than by
solving them. To this extent, one finds also in Humphrey's program many
concessions to this obviously growing trend in political thinking in the
United States.

The liberal FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Aug 30) expressed the feeling of many intelligent
Germans when it commented:

For a whole mass of Americans, the choice between Nixon and Humphrey
offers absolutely no real choice but at best a lottery game between two
evils. In spite of all the fine speeches, Nixon up to now has not really
been able to prove that he has a profile; Humphrey, with many fine speeches
during the past four years, washed away himself the profile that he once
had.

710

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 62]

defense under Article 51 of the Charter, and those that would not, even though the aggression should be condemned. Among the latter types it would place ideological aggression, and subversive activities, at least when conducted in limited form.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo also relates a definition to the rights of a state to self-defense under Article 51, as well as to Security Council action under Articles 41 and 42.³⁰ This approach leads it to conclude that there is no need to define atomic aggression, as the state which is attacked will have no chance of self-defense unless the first strike fails to achieve its objectives. Its major concerns are two: certain activities of armed bands as when arms, instructors, advisers or volunteers are sent to bands operating on the territory of another state; and economic aggression, as when one state dispossesses another of its natural resources, its assets or its products sold abroad.

Burundi indicated its concern with acts which should not be considered aggression.³¹ Thus it would exclude non-compliance with an alleged international obligation, refusal to sign an armistice, rejection of jurisdictional competence, and failure to observe a war moratorium. To make certain that there would be no broad extension of the concept, it proposed that the definition be unambiguous and narrowly interpreted.

Clearly there are many views as to what should be included, what form the definition should take, and what consequences it should have. Conceived in educational terms the current return to attempts to define aggression can be meaningful in exploring these fundamental problems, if the participants restrict themselves to discussion and education of each other. The temptation is great to strike telling blows against opponents so as to win the minds of men. In itself such activity is itself a form of aggression, although not of such a type that any one would suppose that a right of self-defense under Article 51 had been created. All must realize that the peoples of the world want not only universal restraint in the use of force but also universal restraint in the use of words.

The attempt to define aggression will become truly fruitless if the Special Committee permits itself to become a forum for name-calling. It is general legal principles designed to fit dangerous situations that must be discussed and not carefully selected cases chosen to demonstrate the presence of a mote in an opponent's eye and no beam in one's own.

JOHN N. HAZARD

SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

In the years following World War II increasing interest has been evidenced in the extent to which Soviet theory and practice may have influenced the development of the law of nations. This is to be expected in view of the prominence and power which the U.S.S.R. has come to enjoy

³⁰ See U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/4/Add.1, March 23, 1965, p. 2.

³¹ See doc. cited, note 29 above, at p. 3.

1968]

EDITORIAL COMMENT

709

By 1953 these fears were noted and developed in a draft presented by the U.S.S.R.²⁵ It included a section on "indirect aggression" of three types: encouragement of subversive activity, promotion of civil war and promotion of an internal upheaval. "Economic aggression" was defined in the 1953 draft as economic pressures, prevention of exploitation of or nationalization of a state's riches, and economic blockade. A final section treated "ideological aggression" as encouragement of war propaganda, propaganda in favor of using atomic, bacterial, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, and promotion of the propaganda of Fascist-Nazi views, of racial and national exclusiveness, and of hatred and contempt for other peoples. The draftsmen wanted to avoid closing the list so they empowered the Security Council to declare "any other acts" aggressive as an attack or an act of economic, ideological or indirect aggression. The 1953 terminology seems to have become settled in Soviet minds, for it was resubmitted in 1954,²⁶ 1956,²⁷ and 1957.²⁸

While the list is long as it appears in the 1953 draft, it may yet fail the expectations of small states. It may include too much or too little. The forthcoming meetings of the Special Committee will have to ascertain present thinking, especially among the new states which have not participated in earlier deliberations. Some will surely call attention to a new technique which goes beyond the armed bands forbidden under earlier drafts. It is the single assassin trained abroad who crosses a frontier to kill local mayors one after the other until no one willing to risk his neck as a leader can be found. It is the system developed of recent years in both hemispheres to reduce a society to chaos. While some governments have denounced this form of activity, others have sought to attempt to disguise it as acts of civil war. No account is taken of the distinction between the rising in rebellion of local citizens and the infiltration of assassins drawn from their homeland for training abroad by outsiders intent upon weakening sovereignty through creating chaos.

Discussion may expose still other forms of activity on which the spotlight of world public opinion should be focused in development of a common sense of outrage. Up to the present, the new states have hardly availed themselves of the opportunity offered them since admission to the United Nations to inform the Secretary General of their views on the subject. Only a few have suggested types of activity which concern them and methods of approach which they think fruitful. Dahomey desires liberal interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to what constitutes "armed aggression," noting that today the most common form of aggression is economic, which in its view has the same effect as armed aggression.²⁹ It would draw a distinction between types of aggression: those that would permit a state to act in self-

²⁵ See U.N. Doc. A/AC.66/L.2, Aug. 25, 1953.

²⁶ See U.N. General Assembly, 9th Sess., 1954, Official Records, Annexes, Agenda item 51, p. 6.

²⁷ U.N. Doc. A/AC.77/L.4, Oct. 23, 1956.

²⁸ U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.399, Oct. 3, 1957.

²⁹ See U.N. Doc. A/AC.91/4, March 15, 1965, p. 9.