DR. KISSINGER: This report proceeds in two contexts. It attempts to give an explanation to the American people and other countries about what we think about the state of international affairs.

Now, not every problem that we mentioned has an immediate solution. We are calling attention to the fact that a growing Soviet military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, going beyond the immediate exigencies of the Middle East crisis, would have and does have implactions beyond the local situation and that that presence should be one of the factors to be considered in any settlement that may be made in that region.

This is not a new statement. We have made that before before and we simply reiterated it here.

Q On Page 22, it says, "The President initiated privately ultimately successful contacts with Soviet leadership. Can you elaborate on those contacts at all? How did they come about?"

DR. KISSINGER: Last January the President initiated contacts, both through messages and through other channels with the Soviet uleadership in order to bring about a comprehensive or as comprehensive an approach to outstanding issues as the Soviet Union was willing to pursue. That included SALT, European issues and other matters of bilateral concern.

The particular channels are really of less consequence than the fact that the President and the Soviet leadership took a personal high level interest in the matter and made themselves available to break any deadlocks that might develop. This is a pattern we hope, and intend, to continue to follow.

Q On Page 155, you mention, in regard to the Soviet weaponry, the FOXBAT, which is the MIG-23, and other advanced MIG aircraft. Can you tell us if you are talking about the MIG-21-J or what?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think an enumeration of weapons is the intent of this report. Other agencies, in their reports, may be prepared to list them.

Q On Page 177, you talk about a new missile system that the Russians apparently are developing. You are vague about what kind of missiles will be going into the system. You talk about SS-9s, but we are left up in the air about what is new. We know about the SS-9. Can you explain that?

DR. KISSINGER: We do not know yet exactly what they are deploying there. There is, however, sufficient evidence of new construction of a type different than we have seen before to make it unlikely that the missile that goes with it is of exactly the same character as the one for which the previous program was designed.

I am sure Secretary Laird is going to cover this in his report and his testimony before Congressional committees. What we want to point out here is that the construction is sufficiently different by now and of a sufficient effort to make us believe that it would be improbable that it would be undertaken merely to deploy additional weapons exactly the same character as we have seen.

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Q The last paragraph on Page 168, on India: "We are prepared now for a serious dialogue with India on the future of our relations." Is there anything hard in the way of a high level meeting in store or is this an invitation for such?

DR. KISSINGER: We have had, as I think has been noted by the press, some disagreements with India about past events. We believe that the problem now is to turn to the future. We are prepared, and this report points this out, to engage in a serious discussion with India, consistent with the principles which we have always had that India is one of the major countries in the world, on the basis of res proportion and mutual respect.

There have been some preliminary discussions already. These discussions are going to continue. This is not an invitation to a specific meeting at a specific level which is not the problem at this moment, but it is an expression of our readiness to start a dialogue, looking towards the future and not continue the recriminations about the past.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I can ask a question, apart from the report, can you tell us what is the lowdown on the future of Saigon, considering statements here regarding flexibility of Thieu's resignation?

DR. KISSINGER: I will answer this question, but in general this briefing is about the report and not about other issues.

All the secret negotiations, as the public knows, that we conducted with the North Vietnamese, have been carried out with full consultation with President Thieu and with his full agreement to every proposition that has been advanced. We have just now publicly made a proposal about the political evolution of South Vietnam, reflecting a similar proposal advanced by President Thieu.

Now, the question is: To this there has not been any response. We have indicated by our performance in the past jointly, that is, we and the Government of South Vietnam, that when the other side responds constructively that we will examine their proposals in a generous and fair-minded spirit. What we are trying to avoid is to engage in a long negotiation with our own people. We are sure that if the other side's re- sponds to our proposal we would intend to continue the process which has brought us to this point, which is to say we will continue to consult closely with President Thieu and I believe that whatever these statements that reflect concern, the tactics of what should be said publicly at a particular time, they do not reflect any disagreement as to where we stand today.

Q On Page 142, you refer to prisoners of war. You say, "Either as part of an overall settlement or through other means we shall secure the release of American prisoners." What other means are you talking about?

DR. KISSINGER: We have always been prepared to negotiate the release of the prisoners, either separately or, of course, our basic position is that the prisoner issue is a humanitarian problem, and we would like to see it handled on that basis. But we aren't very optimistic.

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Q If you would entertain just one ancillary question to what you said a moment ago, there have been so many different proposals made for possible solutions to the peace problem, in view of what you have in the State of the World report and what you know of world conditions, how would you evaluate the proferred peace plan of Senator McGovern?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, everyone who knows Senator McGovern knows that he has held these views consistently over a long period of time. I believe that Senator McGovern's views, with which, of course, we disagree, strongly, state the alternative in their most explicit form.

I understand Senator McGovern. We have said the only thing we aren't prepared to do, or the principle thing we are not prepared to do is to turn the Government over to the other side, that is, that the United States will not end the war by joining its opponents to destroy its friends.

Senator McGovern seems to believe that the urgency of ending the war is so great that he would be prepared to take even this step. He has said this openly. Therefore, I believe that Senator McGovern has stated the issues in the debate in the most concrete and in the sharpest form. But anyone who has followed the evolution of Senator McGovern's thinking in this knows that he has held this view with integrity and conviction and patriotism for all of his public life.

Q Can you fill us in on what you meant when you said that the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean could be taken into consideration in a settlement in the area? Do you mean an Arab-Israeli settlement or what do you mean?

DR. KISSINGER: We believe, as the President stated in 1970 in a press conference, that any permanent settlement in the area should involve also outside forces. Therefore, we believe that it would be hard to imagine that in any event, if a peace were to be achieved in the Eastern Mediterranean, that the continued presence of Soviet forces would then appear in a different light.

So, we are really restating a position we have held consistently, which is to say that a solution of the problems of the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean must also take into consideration the presence of large outside forces.

Q You mention India's balanced relationship with all the major powers. You have in mind only the Soviet Union and the United States or also China?

DR. KISSINGER: In what context is this?

Q I am talking about Page 169. "If India has an interest in maintaining balanced relationships with all major powers, we are prepared to respond constructively."

DR. KISSINGER: The problem of relationships with India depends to a large extent on India's attitude towards the United States. We would not tell India with what other countries it should maintain relationships. This refers primarily to the arguments that have been made that India may be moving into a position of excessive dependence on one of the major countries. We are saying that if India feels

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that it wants to maintain its traditional policy of non-
alignment we will respond in the same spirit. What other
countries India has relations with is for the Government in
New Delhi to decide.

Q The other day I asked you if you could elaborate for us, in the nature of the evidence this government had, of India's intention to destroy the West Pakistan armed forces and to occupy the west of Kashmir.

It seems to me that that is asking the public to
take on faith alone a major justification for policy that
we followed that caused a great deal of concern to a great
many people.

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q I wonder if I can raise the question again,
sir, and ask you for an answer.

DR. KISSINGER: I will say that we have made the
statement here in a Presidential document and we have said it
before. We had evidence which we considered conclusive. We
will not produce that evidence, since it would compromise
other things. We have no interest in winning a debating point.
We tried to put before the American public as squarely as we
could what our thinking was with respect to the India-Pakistan
crisis and the American public will have to decide whether an
Administration which has not acted notably capriciously on other
matters would have acted, without, in its judgment, having
conclusive evidence.

We cannot spread out our intelligence reports. We
will not engage in these activities. But I recognize the
validity of your question. This is one of the difficulties
of conducting foreign policy in this period. But we repeat
the assertion and we will maintain it.

Q You were asked earlier about the Middle East
and the answer would indicate in a larger settlement that the
size of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the Sixth
Fleet should be regarded as a negotiating point.

DR. KISSINGER: They are not entirely commensurable
factors, but we are looking at the Middle East in two
perspectives: In the perspective of the immediate local
rivalries and from the perspective of whatever great power
confrontations may be involved there and from the perspective
of neither side seeking to achieve a unilateral advantage. It
is in that spirit that we would look at a comprehensive settle-
ment.

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Q On page 168, you said that the Soviet Union was willing to veto U.N. action and to make military moves against China during the India-Pakistan War. What, specifically, did they do?

DR. KISSINGER: This question was already asked in the last session. Let me explain the spirit in which this chapter was written.

We felt that it was imperative that we explain our reasoning to the American public. We did not do this in order to start another debate with foreign countries that had already been sufficiently intense during the period when these decisions were actually being made; but we did feel it was important for the American public to understand why we acted as we did, not necessarily to agree with this, but at least to understand the reasoning that went into the making of the decision.

The part that is addressed to the foreign governments is the last part of the chapter that looks to the future, and, of course, also to the American public. Now, what this refers to is the public threats and associated activities that the Soviet Union engaged in early in December when it stated that any outside -- I forget the exact phrase -- but any outside moves with respect to the subcontinent would be considered by it as a threat to its own security.

The basic point we are making here is that, given the choices that were available to us in the end of November and early December, we could not, consistent with our principles, compete with this particular approach, while having failed to oppose the use of military force might have led to a spreading of the war from the East to the West.

This is the basic argument which we wanted to put before the American public as an explanation of the actions that were taken then.

Q On page 39, discussing the implications of our new China policy toward our relations with the Republic of China, you say in the first paragraph that the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland is not a matter for the United States to decide. You go on to say that a peaceful resolution by the parties would do much to reduce tension, and then say, "We are not urging either party to follow any particular course."

Do you envision any other course than direct negotiations between the parties as being likely to produce a lasting reduction in those tensions?

DR. KISSINGER: I have stated our view on that in previous press conferences. I do not really think that speculation by me of what other courses might work would be very helpful. This is obviously the course which we think has the greatest promise.

Q Without reference to any particular page, but the tone of your comments about Russia and China, you are very explicit, the report is, about Soviet military developments, about Soviet military missile developments, Soviet personnel located in different parts of the world, and you are extremely general and almost deliberately so in your comments about China.

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Q Is it a fair assumption on your chapter on South Asia that the Soviet Union's arming of India, which you trace back to 1966, in terms of the friendship treaty which you say had been under preparation for more than two years, is aimed primarily or directly at China?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on Soviet motives. It is not unknown that a government produces results that it didn't precisely aim for. We were describing here the consequences of the actions by the Soviet Union that we could observe, and the consequences, in our judgment, were that some Soviet actions contributed to a sharpening of the tensions there.

But we have also stated that we believe that the Soviet Union, once the war had started, played a constructive role in bringing about the cease-fire.

Q Doctor, does the section on SALT indicate that the agreement to be announced by May, the first-phase agreement, will be limited only to land-based missiles and ABM's, with submersibles to be put over until the next round?

DR. KISSINGER: This is a subject now under negotiation, and I do not think you should draw any conclusions from the report as to the scope of the offensive limitations.

Our view is that the offensive limitations should be of the broadest possible coverage. Our position has been to include the widest range of weapons consistent with the ability to achieve a reasonably rapid agreement. So nothing in this report is intended to tip the scales in the direction of a more restrictive interpretation.

Q On page 67, discussing Japan, you say the President welcomes the Japanese move to have more independent policy decisions. How far do you think a nation under the U.N. nuclear umbrella could be independent without going nuclear, and do you have any concern about the possibility of the Japanese going nuclear?

DR. KISSINGER: We have very vocal examples of European allies who have been under an American nuclear umbrella without any excessive restraint on their willingness to oppose the United States position on specific issues.

The American nuclear umbrella means that the Japanese survival is considered a vital interest by the United States, and that does not indicate that Japan has to pursue policies that are in every respect identical with ours. In fact, the whole thrust of this report indicates that we expect our relations with Japan to develop the same pattern of partnership that has evolved with Europe, and which we clearly consider compatible with the nuclear umbrella.

Q On page 39 there is a rather self-effacing comment discussing the Sino-Soviet tensions. You said that the Soviet Union and China disagree over the proper interpretation of Communist philosophy, a subject in which we have no competence and interest. We still live in an age of ideology. Are you trying to suggest a new set of differences --

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# 1971: A Year of Breakthroughs Toward Peace in the World

## Address by President Nixon¹

Good morning. Today I have submitted to the Congress my third annual report on United States foreign policy. I want to share my thoughts with you now on some of the highlights of that report.

For the first time in a generation, the most powerful nation in the world and the most populous nation in the world, the United States and the People's Republic of China, have begun a process of communication.

For the first time in a generation, we have taken a series of steps that could mean a new relationship with the Soviet Union.

For the first time in a generation, our alliances with the nations of Europe, Japan, and other nations have been reshaped to reflect their new capacity to assume a greater responsibility for their own defense.

For the first time in a generation, we have laid a new basis for fair competition in world trade that will mean more jobs for American workers.

These are great changes. They have brought the world closer to a stable peace. They did not happen by accident. These breakthroughs toward peace took place in the past year for good reason.

Three years ago we stopped reacting on the basis of yesterday's habits and started acting to deal with the realities of today and the opportunities of tomorrow.

Where has this new attitude taken us?

In our relations with the Soviet Union, these were the elements of the breakthrough that took place over the past 12 months.

> The complete text of President Nixon's third annual foreign policy report to the Congress, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace," will appear in the March 13 issue of the Bulletin.

We broke the deadlock in the arms limitation negotiation and agreed on a framework for progress in the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] talks.

We agreed on a treaty barring weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floor and on another treaty to remove the threat of germ warfare.

We agreed on a more reliable "Hot Line" between Washington and Moscow and found new ways to consult each other in emergencies which will reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

And in a step of the greatest importance, we reached an agreement on Berlin. If there was one city where world war III could have broken out in the past 20 years, it was Berlin. This new agreement reduces the danger of the superpowers in direct confrontation.

There are other areas where we have had, and continue to have, serious differences with the Soviet Union. On balance, however, I have concluded that Soviet willingness to take positive steps toward peace in the past year makes a meeting at the highest level timely, particularly in arms limitation and economic cooperation.

And that is why, for the first time, a President of the United States will visit Moscow.

¹ Made to the Nation on radio on Feb. 9 (White House press release).

March 6, 1972

289

I will go to that meeting in May with no
naive illusions but with some reasonable ex-
pectations.

Our relations with the Soviet Union were
helped by the fact that our two nations have
had long-established communications. Be-
cause we deeply understood what our real
differences were, we could move to negotiate
them.

When it came to dealing with the People's
Republic of China, 25 years of hostility stood
in the way. Accordingly, I began what is
now 3 years of the most painstaking and
necessarily discreet preparation for an open-
ing to the world's most populous nation.

In 2 weeks, I shall begin my journey for
peace to Peking. The agreement to meet,
and the mutual trust needed to make the
arrangements for the first American state
visit to the People's Republic of China, is a
breakthrough of great importance.

We do not expect instant solutions to deep-
seated differences. But the visit is a begin-
ning. Now, in the relations between our
countries, the old exchange of denunciations
can be replaced with a constructive exchange
of views.

Just as we have established a creative re-
lationship with our adversaries, we have
developed a more balanced alliance with our
friends.

Not so long ago, our alliances were ad-
dressed exclusively to the containment of
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China. But now there has to be more
to our alliance. It is fairly simple to unite
about what you are against. It is a lot more
complicated to hold together an alliance on
the basis of what you are for.

We do not shy away from this complexity
because now, in this time of breakthroughs,
there has never been a greater need for a
sense of common purpose among the non-
Communist nations. There is no require-
ment that we all march in lockstep, but there
is a need to move forward in the same di-
rection.

And that is why we encourage initiative
and self-reliance on the part of our allies.
That is why our alliance is becoming what
we need in the real world of the seventies—

a dynamic coalition of self-assured and in-
dependent nations.

Our former dependents have become our
competitors. That is good for them, and
it is also good for us.

But as the roles change, the rules change.
The old international monetary and trading
system had become unfair to the American
workers and to American business. Facing
vigorous, healthy competitors, the United
States could no longer be expected to com-
pete with one hand tied behind its back.

Nothing would have happened unless we
made it happen. Last August, we took ac-
tion to stimulate a worldwide settlement of
the problem. Within a few months, a gen-
eral realignment of currencies took place, the
first step toward complete reform.

We succeeded in moving the non-Com-
munist world away from the constant state
of monetary crisis of the past decade, and
we removed a danger to the unity of the free
world.

Let me turn now to Viet-Nam. This has
been America's longest and most difficult
war. It began long before I became Presi-
dent. And I have been doing everything I
can honorably do to end it.

I have brought almost one-half million
men home from Viet-Nam. As high as 300
a week were being killed in action when
I took office. This week there were two.
We have reduced air sorties, budget costs,
and draft calls. And we have made the most
generous peace offer in the history of war-
fare.

I have no complaint over the fact that
during this period, when I have been end-
ing a war I did not begin, I have been sub-
jected to vigorous criticism. I do not ques-
tion the patriotism or the sincerity of those
who disagree with my policies to bring peace;
but as I said in 1968 when I was a candidate
for President, we have only one President
at a time and only the President can nego-
tiate an end to the war.

There should always be free debate and
criticism so that our policy will represent
the best thinking of our Nation, but a candi-
date for President has a higher responsibil-
ity than the ordinary critic. A candidate

290

Department of State Bulletin

should make any criticism he believes would
contribute to bringing an honorable peace.
But I would hope that anyone seeking the
Presidency would examine his statements
carefully to be sure that nothing he says
might give the enemy an incentive to prolong
the war until after the election.

Trust in the United States among the 45
nations with which we have treaty commit-
ments is essential if peace and freedom are
to be preserved in the world. Let us end our
involvement in the war in Viet-Nam in a
way which will not destroy that trust.

Looking ahead on the world scene, how
can we move ahead to make the most of the
breakthroughs of the past year? We must
advance the delicate process of creating a
more constructive relationship between our-
selves and the People's Republic of China.

We must bring the arms race under con-
trol and, by so doing, lay the basis for
other major steps toward peace that can be
taken together by the United States and the
Soviet Union. And equally important, we
must continue to strengthen the partnership
with our friends. We must work with friends
and adversaries to build an international
structure of peace which everyone will work
to preserve because each nation will realize
its stake in its preservation.

We must continue the process of reform-
ing the world's financial and trading systems
so that workers and consumers can benefit
in America and in every country that has a
competitive spirit.

Those are by no means the only items on
our international agenda. We want to see
the cease-fire in the Middle East, which we
initiated, moved toward a more secure and
permanent peace. We want to work out with
our friends in Latin America, Africa, and
non-Communist Asia new ways of helping
them help themselves. We want to shore up
the eroding confidence in the United Nations.

There is much unfinished business. But
there is a new awareness of reality growing
in the world. Movement and progress can
be felt today where there was stagnation and
frustration before.

By facing the realities of the world to-
day—as this breakthrough year has shown

we are capable of doing—we can make peace
a reality in the generation ahead.

Thank you and good morning.

Restrictions Eased on Exports
to People's Republic of China

Following is the text of a statement made
to news correspondents on February 14 by
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to Presi-
dent Nixon, on a decision by the President
regarding trade with the People's Republic
of China.

White House press release dated February 14

Following a full review of a report by the
Under Secretaries Committee on U.S. trade
with the People's Republic of China, the
President today [February 14] announced
his decision to place the People's Republic
of China in Country Group Y of the Com-
modity Control List. The effect of this de-
cision is to make available under general
license to the People's Republic of China all
commodities now available under general
license to the countries of eastern Europe,
including the Soviet Union. Poland, Ro-
mania, and Yugoslavia are in a separate
category. This also moves controls on the
export to the PRC of foreign products made
with U.S. technical data to the same level as
those governing such exports to eastern
Europe, except those countries noted above.

In addition, the President has decided to
modify remaining Foreign Assets Control
Regulations pertaining to the People's Re-
public of China. He has directed removal of
the requirement that U.S.-controlled firms in
countries (including western Europe, Can-
ada, and Japan) which are members of
COCOM—the international coordinating
committee on strategic trade with Communist
countries—obtain a Treasury license in addi-
tion to a host-country license for the export
of strategic goods to the People's Republic
of China. He has also directed elimination
of the requirement that U.S.-controlled firms
abroad obtain prior Treasury licensing for
the export of foreign technology to the Peo-
ple's Republic of China.

March 6, 1972

291

PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 22

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

4:00 P.M. EST

February 10, 1972

Thursday

In The Oval Office
At The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, before going to your other questions, I would like to make an announcement with regard to the details of the trip to Mainland China. This will not cover all the details, but it will at least cover those that have been announced at this time.

The official party will be announced from Florida, Key Biscayne, on Saturday the 12th. Of course, as you know, we have already announced that Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, Mrs. Nixon and I will be going, and the other members of the official party at that time will be announced from Washington.

On Monday, I have an event that I think has already been announced, a meeting with Andre Malraux, and I am giving a dinner that night for him to which several Congressional leaders will be invited, as well as members of the official party, the Secretary of State and Dr. Kissinger.

In mentioning Andre Malraux, I do not want to reflect on many of the other experts -- and there are many experts in this field of China -- whose books have been brought to my attention. I do not want to indicate I have read them all, but I have been exposed to a great number. I asked him to come because there was an interesting coincidence.

In 1969, when I met with President de Gaulle in Paris, Mr. Malraux at that time was the Minister of Culture in the de Gaulle Cabinet. We had a discussion prior to dinner on the subject of China generally, and I was particularly impressed with his analysis of the leaders. His book, at least one he has written, but his book -- the one I particularly refer to was his Anti-Memoirs. I commend it to you not only for what it tells about China and its leaders, but also about France, its problems, and the whole World War II and post-World War II era.

I give you this only to indicate the breadth of the kind of briefings that all of us who are going to participate in the talks are trying to undertake. It is very different from the other meetings that we have had at the highest level with other governments. I have visited virtually all of the other countries, just as I have visited the Soviet Union.

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Page 10

THE PRESIDENT: We already have. We are in constant consultation. I have discussed the matter with Ambassador Bunker. President Thieu knows first, as he said in his own statement, because if you will read it carefully, he pointed out he felt we had consulted him. He knows first that we have never made a proposal except when it was a joint proposal. He knows now that there will be no new proposals made unless it is a joint proposal and I trust that this press conference, I am having now with you ladies and gentlemen, will reassure not only him, but the people of South Vietnam as well on that point.

As far as flexibility is concerned, what Secretary Rogers was referring to was what we have always said that we have put a proposal on the table. We are ready to negotiate on it.

Now, that does not mean, however, that after having made such a proposal that two weeks later we are going to go a step further and say that we will go further than we have in that proposal. At this point, I emphasize here today we have made a proposal, we think it is reasonable.

The enemy has not responded to it. Until the enemy does respond to it, there will be no further proposals and no further concessions on our part.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you spoke in your foreign policy report about sympathy for the aspirations of the East Bengali people. Could you give us some idea of the factors and the timing of the decision on the recognition of Bangladesh.

THE PRESIDENT: With regard to the problem of the Bengali people, first let me say that on the humanitarian side issue, as you know, both before the war, during the war, and after the war, the United States has been the most generous of all of the nations. We will continue to be. That is separate from the political side.

With regard to the political side, we have under study our whole relationship with the subcontinent and as part of that relationship, of course, the 70 million people in Bangladesh are involved. We have not yet made a decision with regard to recognition you should not expect a decision prior to the time that I return from China.

QUESTION: Mr. President, what are your views on the constitutional amendments on busing now before the House and Senate?

THE PRESIDENT: Which one?

QUESTION: Well, the amendments have to do ---

THE PRESIDENT: There are several. Let me get at it this way. My views on busing are well known. I favor local control of local schools. I oppose busing for the purpose of racial balance. Those are my views which have been stated on many occasions.

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QUESTION: I would like to ask you, Mr. President, about statements made by the Administration officials during the India-Pakistani war. Mr. Kissinger told us, during that war, this Administration had no bias toward India. Subsequently, papers came to light quoting Mr. Kissinger saying he was getting hell from you every half hour because the government wasn't ---

THE PRESIDENT: Every hour. (Laughter)

QUESTION: --- because the government wasn't tilting enough toward Pakistan.

THE PRESIDENT: Keep your good humor, otherwise you lose your colleagues.

QUESTION: I am wondering from a credibility standpoint how do you reconcile these two things?

THE PRESIDENT: I remember being in this office on what I think was one of the saddest days of President Eisenhower's Presidency. At the time we had come out against the British, the French and the Israelis in the Suez crisis. We did so because we were against the war, not because we were anti-British, anti-French or anti-Israeli. As a matter of fact we are pro-British, pro-French and pro-Israeli, but we were against war more.

As far as India is concerned, for 25 years -- and those of you who have followed me in the House will know this, as a Member of the House, as a Member of the Senate, as Vice President, when I was out of office, and now as President -- I have supported every Indian aid program. I believe it is very important for the world's largest non-Communist country to have a chance to make a success of its experiment in democracy, in comparison with its great neighbor to the north, which is the world's largest Communist country. That and, of course, other reasons are involved.

But as far as being anti-Indian is concerned, I can only say I was anti-war. We did everything that we could to avoid the war, as I pointed out. At this point, we are going to do everything we can to develop a new relationship with the countries on the subcontinent that will be pro-Indian, pro-Bengalese, pro-Pakistan, but mostly pro-peace.

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That is what that part of the world needs. A million
were killed in the war of partition. That is probably a
modest figure. And then they went through the terrible agony
again in 1965, and now they have gone through it again.

It was Prime Minister Nehru who told me more than
anything else what the subcontinent needed was a generation
of peace. That is where I got the phrase.

As far as we were concerned, I believed that our
policies -- certainly, we may have made mistakes -- but our
policies had the purpose of avoiding the war, of stopping it
once it began, and now of doing everything we can to heal up
the wounds.

QUESTION: Mr. President, has the Administration discover
sir, who was the source of the papers which were leaked to
Mr. Anderson, and are you planning any action against that
person if you know who it is?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first, we have a lot of circum-
stantial evidence. Second, as a lawyer, I can say that we do
not have evidence that I consider adequate or that the Attorney
General considers adequate to take to court. You can be sure
that the investigation is continuing. If the investigation
gets a break which provides the kind of evidence which will
stand up in court, we will present it; but we cannot go to
court on circumstantial evidence.

QUESTION: Mr. President, a few moments ago you dis-
cussed your stand in 1968 with regard to the peace negotiations.
We know now that there was really very little possibility --

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, you know it now,
but I said it then, over and over again, to those who had to
listen to my speech. I only had one in 1968, as you recall.
(Laughter) That is what you wrote anyway.

But I pointed out that I thought there was very
little chance, but I said as long, -- and this was my
phrase; I just read it this morning -- as long as there was
any chance whatever -- and I could not be sure, because I
wasn't being consulted -- for a breakthrough at the peace
table, I was going to say nothing that might destroy that chance.
That was my view. It may have been wrong.

QUESTION: Could I take sort of a different tact?

THE PRESIDENT: Sure, any way you want.

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NEWS CONFERENCE

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

11:30 A.M. EST

FEBRUARY 10, 1972

THURSDAY

MR. WARREN: You have one release this morning. The President has announced the appointment of a chairman and 12 members of the President's Commission on Personnel Interchange. I think that is self-explanatory. The members serve for terms of two years and they receive no compensation. There is no limit on the number of members the President may appoint.

Also this morning, the President is submitting to the Speaker and to the President of the Senate draft legislation authorizing appropriations for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for another two years after the current authorization expires on June 30.

As you know, the ACDA is funded on a biennial basis, and this request would be for funds for fiscal 1973 and fiscal 1974. The amount requested for those two fiscal years is $22 million, which represents an increase of $4.5 million over the previous two-year total. I am told $1-1/2 million of that is increased salaries.

Also, we are transmitting to the Congress the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 11th Annual Report, and those will be available in the Press Office following this briefing. The President's transmittal letter is printed in the report.

The President today is formally transmitting to the Congress the annual report on coal mine health and safety. This is for the calendar year 1970. The report itself was sent to the Congress by the Secretary of the Interior in November. This is just the formal transmittal.

The Air Force today is announcing a number of promotions, signed by the President, to Major General. There are 12 permanent Major Generals and 38 temporary Major Generals. Included on the list is Brigadier General Walter R. Tkach, who is Physician to the President. He is being promoted to Major General.

Q Temporary or permanent?

MR. WARREN: Temporary.

I have some pools to give you for this evening.

Q Jerry, did Don Hughes get a promotion?

MR. WARREN: He has been promoted. He received his second star before he left the White House.

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Q The only point at issue with President Thieu is Secretary Roger's remark that we are flexible on his political life. Now, do you say that there is no misunderstanding with the Saigon government?

MR. WARREN: That is exactly right.

Q It appears that President Thieu thinks that is a new element.

MR. WARREN: No, I think I have answer that. I have to warn you that I have really told you what I can, and that is it.

Q Jerry, from time to time in the last few days, Government spokesmen have made reference to what they seem to believe is a history in Saigon of President Thieu and other officials speaking for domestic consumption. Is that the way we regard this latest news conference of President Thieu?

MR. WARREN: I have not studied what President Thieu said, and I cannot comment specifically on it.

Q Has that been our experience then, with public statements and domestic statements made in Saigon, that frequently they are designed for domestic consumption?

MR. WARREN: I have nothing more to say on this subject at all, Bill.

Q Jerry, you said the North Vietnamese haven't responded. Haven't they rejected the 8-point plan and isn't that a response?

MR. WARREN: I have said they have not yet responded, and that is our position.

Are there any other subjects you wish to cover?

Q Yes, I have another subject. Since the last time we were able to question the President, which in a couple of days will be a period of three months, we have had a war between India and Pakistan, we have had the Anderson papers, we have a whole new set of circumstances and debate in the nation about Vietnam, we have Mr. Haldeman accusing people, including some Democratic Members of the Senate, of treason -- a lot of issues that I would think it would be legitimate for the President to be questioned about.

Can you tell us why the President has failed for so long to hold a press conference, and is there any prospect of a press conference in the near future?

MR. WARREN: First, as to your question, Skip Isaacs, of the Baltimore Sun, I will not accept everything you said.

Secondly, when there is a press conference to be announced, Ron will announce it to you.

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