CHAPTER IX

# The Strategy of Ambiguity -- Sino-Soviet Strategic Thought

In the upheavals taking place all over the world, it is important to distinguish two different phenomena: the revolutions taking place in areas formerly under colonial rule and the revolution which had its origin in the U.S.S.R. in 1917 and which has since spread to include the major portion of Eurasia. The impetus behind the newly independent states is a desire to *enter* the world-system based on the liberal traditions of the West; their revolution has been produced because they have believed they were excluded from an international community whose principles, on the whole, they have accepted. The Soviet revolution, by contrast, is an *effort* to *overthrow* the liberal principles of the West; it therefore seeks to exploit all dissatisfactions and to prevent the establishment of any equilibrium. Without the Soviet effort to create a maximum of instability many international tensions could work themselves out at a *slower* more leisurely pace; the necessity faced by all nations to adjust to communist revolutions in ideology, technology and economic and political relationships would produce less of a sense of urgency. To the Soviet bloc the aspirations of a period in flux have become an opportunity to complete its task of destruction. All measures in policy, as in strategy have therefore to be viewed against the background of the Soviet challenge.

What is a revolutionary? Were the answer to this question self-evident, only the most moribund societies would *also* ever collapse and few, if any, international orders would be overthrown. For it would then be possible to stifle, at its inception, the party or the state

IX-1a

[y]

seeking to subvert the existing system or to remedy, in time, the
situation that brought about its emergence. Instead, history reveals
a strange phenomenon. Time and again states appear which boldly
proclaim that their purpose is to destroy the existing structure and
to recast it completely. And time and again, the powers that are
the declared victims stand by indifferent or inactive, while the
balance of power is overturned. Indeed, they tend to explain away
the efforts of the revolutionary power to upset the equilibrium as
the expression of limited aims or specific grievances until they
discover -- sometimes too late and always at excessive cost -- that
the revolutionary power was perfectly sincere all along, that its call
for a new order expressed its real aspirations. So it was when the
French Revolution burst on an unbelieving Europe and when Hitler
challenged the system of Versailles. So it has been with the relations
of the rest of the world towards the Soviet bloc.

How was it possible that from positions of extreme weakness
these powers could emerge as the most powerful states of Europe and
that the most recent of these challenges, the U.S.S.R., can bid for
the domination of the world less than a generation after a group of
die-hards were trying to hold Moscow against enemies converging from
all sides?

in a revolutionary period, most of these functions have crunched their burthen.

Do because, to because dy, stating a principal reason for settlement. But, unprorogable conditions: to because dy, providing a form for making amends, implementing agreements or dispositions in a manner that does not open negotiations in a legitimate order, due three times: to formulate dy tactical significance: to prepare positions for the next feet of, strength, domestic structure of other states or power. Adjustments here have primarily a power returns to accept either the framework of the international order or the revolutionary order, on the other hand, in such a way, become a major need to improve cooperation within a system accepted dy, iff the major powers. Framework in more important than any, if adjustments, therefore, dispositions are printed dy, an understanding that the maintenance of the existing form, their, adherence has been sufficiently. In a legitimate order, not concern adjustments within a given framework, but the framework itself. Adjustments. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, dispositions go existing states and the peace will be justified as a better expression of limits their scope. We may stress, but they will be thought in the name of the "revolutionary." A legitimate order does not make conflict impossible; it arranges the settlement or the domestic structure of the other states, which contains a power or a form of power which must be accepted either the are accepted dy, iff the major powers may be called "legitimate"; a system international order. An international order, the peace arrangements of which, adjusting to the changed nature of international relations in a revolutionary they learned in a more secure environment; in the difficulty they find in represent the status quo, to confront the revolutionary power with methods part of the answer, is to be found in the fact that the powers which

Time, while difficulties in a revolutionary order, may retain a familiar not concern adjustments within a given framework, but the framework itself. Adjustments. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, difficulties go existing states and the peace will be justified as a better expression of limits their scope. We may stress, but they will be thought in the name of the "revolutionary." A legitimate order does not make conflict impossible; it arranges the settlement or the domestic structure of the other states, which contains a power or a form of power which must be accepted either the are accepted dy, iff the major powers may be called "legitimate"; a system international order. An international order, the peace arrangements of which, adjusting to the changed nature of international relations in a revolutionary they learned in a more secure environment; in the difficulty they find in represent the status quo, to confront the revolutionary power with methods part of the answer, is to be found in the fact that the powers which

AIII - 5

VIII - 4

combination of physical safeguards and mutual trust. It is legitimate not because each ~~power~~ is perfectly satisfied, but because it will not be so dissatisfied that it will seek its remedy in overthrowing the existing system. The confidence required for the operation of a legitimate order does not pre-suppose the absence of ~~all~~ adjustments major powers that the transformations sought do not threaten their national survival. To the extent that this measure of mutual trust is not present, the quest for absolute security will reappear and relations will tend to be based on force and the threat of force, either on war or on an armaments race.

The ~~Powers~~ that represent the status quo are therefore at a profound psychological disadvantage vis-à-vis a revolutionary power. They have everything to gain from believing in its good faith, for the tranquility they seek is unattainable without it. All their instincts will cause them to seek to integrate the revolutionary power into the legitimate framework by "understanding" or by "moderation." They will tend to interpret the motives of the revolutionary ~~Power~~ in the most favorable manner, the manner to which they are used and which to them seems "natural." The revolutionary power therefore gains a subtle advantage especially if it displays any degree of psychological skill. For it can present every move as the expression of limited aims or as caused by a legitimate grievance. The status quo powers, on the other hand, cannot be sure that the balance of power is in fact threatened or that their opponent is not sincere until he has demonstrated it and by the time he has done so it is usually too late. However the physical balance may ~~inebalance~~ (this handicap) ~~against~~ ~~the~~ psychological edge. ~~advantage confused by the absence of self-restraint.~~

A revolutionary power confronts the legitimate order with a fearful challenge. The condition of spontaneity in a legitimate order is that things

IX-5

A long period of peace leads to the temptation to trust appearances and to seek to escape the element of conjecture in policy by interpreting the motives of other powers in the most favorable and familiar manner. But against a revolutionary power tactics of conciliation are self-defeating. Here safety can be found only in a precautionary policy which stakes an assessment of future chance against current protestations of innocence. When an established order is confronted by a revolutionary power, its survival depends on the ability to see through appearances and to keep the implied challenge from becoming overt. The world will never know what horrors it was spared from revolutions that were stifled in their infancy or indeed whether the repression of them was justified.

Since both its history and its aspirations generally keep a status quo power from such a course, the revolutionary power will be able to defeat its opponents by manipulating their preconceptions against them. Napoleon's conquests were made possible because the "legitimate" rulers surrendered after a lost battle according to the canons of 18th century warfare; the familiar assumptions prevented them from conceiving the enormity of Napoleon's goals. Hitler could use the doctrines of his opponents in annexing Austria because they wanted to believe that his aims were limited by the "legitimate" claim of national self-determination. And the Soviet rulers have expanded their power into the center of Europe and along the fringes of Asia by coupling each act of expansion with protestations of peace, democracy and freedom. The psychological advantage of a revolutionary state is that in order to defeat its aims the status quo powers must also give up the "legitimate"

IX-6

framework, the very pattern which to them represents the accustomed and
desirable way of life.

In the past, conflicts between a legitimate and a revolutionary
order have often had a tragic quality, for each side was unconscious of
the role it was playing. To be sure, one side was attacking the status
quo while the other defended it. But each contender spoke in the name of
an absolute truth and each was wont to ascribe its victory to the superior
validity of its maxims or its greater resolution. The particular dynamism
of the Soviet system derives from its combination of revolutionary
righteousness and psychological adeptness. Its leaders have studied not
only the elements of their own doctrine -- which is one of all revolutionary
MOVEMENT movements -- but have consciously sought to press the psychological
vulnerabilities of their opponents into their service. The liberal theory
of the West preaches tolerance. Therefore, the Communists in democratic
states seek to present their organization merely as one of the contending
parties and claim for it the equality of democratic opportunity which it
will be their first act to deny their opponents should they come to power
by parliamentary means. The empiricism of the free world teaches that
resistance by force is justified only against overt aggression. Therefore,
the Soviet leaders graduate their moves so that the balance is overturned
by almost imperceptible degrees which magnify the inward doubts of the
non-Soviet world. The West feels ambiguous about the use of power and
the uncommitted peoples exalt peace into an absolute principle. Therefore,
the MX Soviet policy alternates peace offensives with threats of the dire
consequences if their demands are disregarded: while Bulganin and Khrushchev,
during their visit to India, were MX loudly protesting their love of peace,
a hydrogen bomb was set off in the Soviet Union. The timing could hardly

IX-7

have been accidental. The free world believes that peace is a condition
of static equilibrium and that economic advance is a more rational
objective than foreign adventures. Therefore, the Communists appear
periodically in the guise of the domestic reformer eager to spread the
fruits of material advancement.

For each change of pace and tactic, the U.S.S.R. has found
defenders among its victims, defenders who justified its course not,
to be sure, on the ground of Communist doctrine but because it
fitted in with their preconceptions of a legitimate order. The great
advance of Communism over the past generation has many causes, but
chief among them is a spiritual crisis among its opponents. "We say
to the powers:" wrote Lenin long ago, "you...do not know what you want...
you are suffering from what is called a weak will, which is due to your
failure to understand economics and politics which we have appraised
more profoundly than you."

Whatever the validity of Lenin's statement, there is something
remarkable about the reluctance of the defenders of the post-World
War I "legitimate" order to believe the publicly announced aims of its
declared mortal enemies. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* was ignored for a decade
and a half while his intended victims spoke of taming him through the
responsibilities of power. And neither Lenin's published works nor
Stalin's utterances availed against the conviction of the non-Soviet
world that peace was the natural relation among states and that a

1. v.I, Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1943), v.9, pp. 311-312, cited in Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 383.

IX-8

problem deferred was a problem solved. Typical of similar views in the 1920's was the opinion of the prominent historian Florinsky: "The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate victory of the 2) proletariat."

In the 1930's, Soviet opposition to fascism and Soviet peaceful intentions were a shibboleth, despite the fact that the U.S.S.R. was the first great power to make overtures to Nazi 3) Germany.

During World War II there was a general conviction among Western policy-makers that after the war the U.S.S.R. would prefer to concentrate on the development of its own resources rather than engage in foreign adventures. And after the death of Stalin there took place a new outburst of speculation that a "basic" change had occurred in Soviet thinking: "The Soviet leaders," said Secretary Dulles in 1956, "are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance." 4)

The situation is doubly paradoxical because of the exasperation with which the Soviet leaders regularly have repudiated the notion that a change of tactics on their part implies an abandonment of their basic doctrines. "If anyone believes," Khrushchev said at the height of the 'peace offensive', "that our smiles involve abandonment of the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he deceives himself badly. This will happen 5) when the shrimps learn to whistle."

"We must learn the wisdom of the

2. Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.*, p.216 quoted in T.A. Taracouzio, (New York: MacMillan Co., 1940), p.129

3. See below

4. U.S. State Department, *Press Release No. 92*, Feb. 25, 1956

5. Denis Healey, "When Shrimps Learn to Whistle," *International Affairs*, January 1956, p. 2.

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contemptuous phrase: "We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as Hangyeng, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke."

II.

What then are the principles which constitute the "science of revolution"? In both Soviet and Chinese Communist thought they derive from Marxism as reinterpreted by Lenin. To be sure, many tenets of classical Marxism and his even of Leninism have since been discarded or modified. But is one thing to adapt doctrine to the tactical requirements of the moment; it/quite another to give up the belief which to Communists distinguishes them from all other movements and which accounts for their success: the confidence in the inexorable historical development which, contrary to their opponents', their theory is thought to enable them to understand and manage. For this reason, a study of Marxist-Leninist theory is not considered an abstract philosophical exercise in Soviet countries, but the prerequisite to effective action.

Thence, too, the constant reiteration by Marxist leaders that victory is achieved only by a superior theoretical insight than that of the opponent. In every Soviet school, whether technical or professional, a study of Marxist-Leninist theory takes up a large part of the curriculum: "All those members of the Communist party" wrote Mao, "who are fairly qualified to study must study the theory of Marx, Engels,

8. Same, v. 1, p. 253

9. Same, v.1, p. 233; v.2, p. 201

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Lenin and Stalin....It is impossible for a party to lead a great revolutionary movement to victory if it has no knowledge of revolutionary theory...."

As a result, while Communist tactics are highly flexible, every effort is made to integrate them into a doctrine presented as unchanging and inflexible. Part of the reason for the misunderstanding by the non-Soviet world of Soviet motivations is that more attention is paid to Soviet announcements meant for public consumption couched in the simple slogans of propaganda, than to Soviet doctrinal statements. Yet the latter are much more significant. Since the Soviet 'legitimacy' is based on the claim to superior theoretical insight, every tactical move is justified as the expression of "pure" theory and every effort is made to maintain long-term Communist militancy whatever the tactical requirements of the moment. From Lenin to Stalin to Mao and to Khrushchev the insistence on superior historical insight, of endless and inevitable conflict with non-Soviet states, of ultimate victory has been unvarying. It is with these underlying beliefs, compared to which the Soviet tactics are like/visible tip of the iceberg in relation to the submerged mass, that this chapter deals. It pays particular attention to Lenin and Mao for while they may become superseded on this point or that, they have established the basic orientation and the pattern of thinking of their society, including, as we will be seen, the attitudes of the current Soviet leadership.

Marxist-Leninist theory asserts that political events are only

10. Same, v. 2, p. 258

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manifestations of an underlying & reality which is defined by economic
and social factors. Leninism is said to enable its disciples to
distinguish appearance from reality and not to be deceived by what are
only symptoms, often misleading, of deep-seated economic and social
factors. The "true" reality resides not in what statesmen say, but in the productive process they represent. This process in all
societies, except a Communist one, is characterized by a class struggle
between the exploiting classes and the proletariat. To be sure, in
the industrially advanced countries the struggle may sometimes be
obscured by the ability to exploit colonies and "semi-colonial countries."
But the respite is only temporary. For imperialism transfers the class
struggle to the international scene. The very effort to escape the
contradictions of the capitalist economy at home sharpens international
tensions and leads inevitably to an unending cycle of conflicts and
wars among the imperialist powers.
Thus all of political life is
only a reflection of a struggle produced by economic and social changes.
Statesmen are powerless to alter this fact; they can only guide it or
utilize it for the ends of the dominant or exploiting class.

11) See Vladimir Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., *Principles and Problems of International Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1950), pp. 63-69.

IX-14

As a result, relations between the Communist and the non-Communist world always have some of the attributes of civil war whatever form the contest may take at any given moment. It is not that the Soviet leadership glorifies war for its own sake; it is rather that they believe that the struggle is imposed on them by the task history has set them.

Lenin wrote:

> War is a great disaster. But a Social-Democrat cannot analyze war apart from its historic importance. For him there can be no such thing as absolute *WAR* disaster, or absolute welfare and absolute truth. He must analyze... the importance of war from the point of view of the interests of his class -- the proletariat.... He must evaluate war not by the number of its casualties, but by its political consequences. Above the interests of the individuals perishing and suffering from war must stand the interests of the class. And if the war serves the interests of the proletariat...it is progress irrespective of the victims and the suffering it entails.

> "War," wrote Mao, "this monster of mutual slaughter among mankind will be finally eliminated through the progress of human society.... But there is only one way of eliminating it, namely to oppose war by means of war...to oppose counter-revolutionary war by means of revolutionary class war."

The image of a constant conflict between the Communist and the non-Communist world has given a completely different meaning to the Soviet view of war and peace. To the non-Soviet world, peace often appears as an end in

13. v.1. Lening, *Collected Works*, v. 6, p. 457 quoted in Taracouzio, cited, p. 53.

14. Mao Tse-tung, cited, v.1, p. 179.

VIII-16

waged to conquer and enslave foreign peoples. Wars of the first kind the Bolsheviks support. "Wars in history," wrote Mao following Stalin, "can be divided into two kinds: just and unjust. All progressive wars are just and all wars impeding progress are unjust. We oppose that impede progress, but we are not opposed to progressive, just wars. As for wars of the latter kind we Communists not only do not oppose them, but will participate actively in them... We aim at peace not only in one country, but throughout the world and we aim not only at a temporary peace but at permanent peace. In order to achieve this objective we must wage a life-and-death war and must be prepared to sacrifice anything."

Thus peace offensives have alternated with threats of war in Soviet strategy, depending on the Soviet assessment of the tactical requirements of the moment. Since permanent peace can only be achieved by abolishing the class struggle, and since the class struggle can be ended only by a Communist victory, any Soviet move, no matter how belligerent, advances the cause of peace while any non-Communist policy, no matter how conciliatory, serves the ends of war. Thus, while Soviet tanks were shooting down civilians in Hungary, it was the United Nations which, in Soviet eyes, threatened peace by debating Soviet intervention. And in 1939, it was the League of Nations which threatened peace by condemning the Soviet attack on Finland. Therefore, too, the constant effort to expand the Soviet sphere and to fill every vacuum, because any territory in the possession of a non-Communist state is considered by virtue of its different social structure, a danger to the peace of the

Raymond L. Stalin, *History of the CPSU (B)*, 1938, pp. 167-168, quoted in 17 10. (Garthoff. *Soviet Military Doctrine*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1953), p. 38.

18 19. Mao, *On the People's War*, II, p. 199.

VIII-17

Soviet bloc. Therefore, finally, the skillful use of peace offensives and disarmament talks always aimed precisely at the psychological weak point of the non-Soviet world: that it considers peace as an end in itself, an attitude which Lenin once described as the "pitiful pacifism of thebourgeoisie." "The replacement of the slogan 'armament of the proletarian' by that of disarmament," proclaimed a thesis at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, "can serve only as a revolutionary slogan." "The peace policy of a proletarian state in no way signifies that the Soviets have come to terms with capitalism... It is merely another -- in this situation a more advantageous -- form of the struggle against capitalism."¹⁹

What is striking, therefore, about relations between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world is not the flexibility of Soviet tactics, but that essentially the same pattern of Soviet behavior should time and again raise discussion about its "sincerity" or its "novelty." The Soviets have advanced variations of the same disarmament proposals since the mid-1920's, their recurrent peace offensives have followed the same line that the export of revolution was impossible, and their periods of belligerency have had the same justification, that a capitalist encirclement was threatening the Soviet bloc. Yet each new Soviet move has been taken at face value and has produced infinite arguments whether the Soviets were preparing for a "show-down" or ushering in a period of peace.

Nothing could be more irrelevant. For the one contingency which Soviet theory explicitly rejects is a static condition. Neither an all-out

19. Teracouzio, op. cit., p. 277.

VIII-24

a claim for allegiance. In a legitimate order, it is good negotiating tactics to formulate maximum demands because this facilitates compromise without loss of essential objectives. In a revolutionary order, it is good negotiating tactics to formulate minimum demands in order to gain the advantage of advocating moderation. In a legitimate order, proposals are addressed to the opposite number at the conference table. They must, therefore, be drafted with great attention to their substantive content and with sufficient ambiguity so that they do not appear as invitations to surrender.

But in a revolutionary order, the protagonists at the conference table address not so much one another as the world at large. Proposals here must be framed with a maximum of clarity and even simplicity, for their major utility is their symbolic content. In short, in a legitimate order, a conference represents a struggle to find formulae to achieve agreement; in a revolutionary order, it is a struggle to capture the symbols which move humanity.

The major weakness of U.S. diplomacy has been the insufficient attention given to the symbolic aspect of foreign policy. Our positions have usually been worked out with great attention to their legal content, with special emphasis on the step-by-step approach of traditional diplomacy. But while we have been addressing the Soviets, they have been speaking to the people of the world. With a few exceptions we have not succeeded in dramatizing our position, in reducing a complex negotiation to its symbolic terms. In major areas of the world the Soviets have captured the "peace offensive" by dint of the endless repetition of slogans that seemed preposterous when first advanced, but which have become common currency through usage. The power which has added 120 million people to its orbit by force has become the champion of anti-colonialism; the state which has developed

they realized that they might make gains perhaps not otherwise identified by
that the Soviet believed the university of our statements of peaceful intentions,
the "objective" factors of the American economy. Moreover, to the extent
President encountered to the premise of his advisors on the operations of
increase in pensions could be attested by the statements to the effect that the
President and the rest of the United States Government so that any independent
necessary to permit the Soviet factors to play in a distinction between the
and to the subsequent meeting of the foreign ministers. But it was not
illustrate these points. We were right to agree to the summit conference
The negotiations beginning with the summit conference of Geneva
the failure.
when it is to their advantage, without being forced to shoulder the costs for
a relaxation of tension serves their purposes and they break off negotiations
the rest of the aggression which would prejudice them. The Soviets negotiate when
attention is directed toward the horror of unclear weapons, but not toward
in the categories and at the pace established by the Soviets; the world is
As a result, the international debate is carried on almost entirely
their paradoxical aspect we have given the Soviets unnecessarily obviates
conceived as mere probands; only that by failing to cope adequately with
in a revolutionary period. This is not to say that negotiation should be
responsible for every Soviet failure; there is a positive proscription on the
aggression; but the world is not moved by legislative brushts, at least
and our overseas six passes a token of Americanاحمدالله. We have
that foreign opinion. But Bonnita has become a symbol of American interference
German unity, nor Korea nor the satellite empire have we succeeded in modifying
parties of the world as the champion of human dignity. Neither regarding
thease factors as an incorrect view of its economicclash was argued in many

XIII-52

"Soviet" problems ensnare that ambiguous conference because it means for the
existe in the negotiating position on the two series. The complete on
so negotiate except when it serves that purpose. Commitments of fidelity
Since we consider negotiation an improperly acceptable while the Soviets refuse
the Soviets to contribute to the generalization of the international order.
But the application of this principle in a revolutionary situation enables
conference known in advance so far as foreseen a accords existing tensions,
and would concentrate on the most sensitive problems left the failure of a
use. It is a cardinal principle of traditional diplomacy that negotiations
most diabolize and to shift the defences to issue of maximum emergency to
Soviet interests. They endue the Soviet to define the moral framework of

time the canons of traditional diplomacy become a subtle device of
the world balance of power.

relation of tensions was used by the Soviet as a means to attempt to meet
In short, what may in the non-Soviet world configure the position of a
mean to advance emoluments about the question of industrial bases.
Power. And in the Middle East, the Soviets used the question of alternative as a
direct negotiator with Western Germany to the exclusion of the Western
impotence to select events and fail the peace for a cause claim to begin
completely. Indeed the very sparseness of their failure generated an
oppose permit the foreign ministers' conference on German unity to fail.

Having established two de facto governments in Germany, the Soviets
Western position in the Middle East.

formed of the Soviet-Egyptian armies dealt with the extension of the
therefore to perpetuate the division of Germany. And shortly after the world
and Britain joined themselves to maintain their East German satellite and
the relation of forces. As a result, on the way back from Germany arrived

AII-SC

VIII-29

objectives sought, the issues at dispute and the *resolution* of the protagonists. On the other hand, it is precisely this dialectic quality of Clausewitz' argumentation which attracted Lenin to him. For the essence of Clausewitz is his insistence that *relation* of states is a dynamic process in which war constitutes only an aspect and *where* even a period of peace can become an instrument for imposing a nation's will. With the conclusion of peace, a number of sparks are always extinguished which would have smouldered on quietly, when the excitement of the passions abates, because all those whose minds are disposed to peace, of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is always a great number, turn themselves completely away from *the road to resistance*.33) That the skillful use *by the Soviets of* peace-offensives *by Soviet policy* has not been accidental is demonstrated by Lenin's marginalia "exactly" *to* against this passage. And this is confirmed by another aphorism of Clausewitz on which Lenin remarked and which has been paraphrased in Soviet thought on several occasions: "The conqueror," *he said*, "is always a lover of peace... He would like to enter our territory unopposed."34)

The passage which most appealed to Lenin and which Stalin in 1946 emphasized as a cardinal tenet of Marxist thought concerned the relationship of war to politics. War, argued Clausewitz, can never be an act of *utter* violence because it grows out of the existing relations of states, their *their* *alliances*, level of civilization, the nature of *Allied-relationships* and the objectives in dispute. War would reach its ultimate form only if it became an end in itself, a condition which is realized only among savages and probably not

33. Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, I, 28.

34. Friedl, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

even among them. For war to rage with absolute violence and without interruption until the enemy is completely defenseless is to reduce an idea to absurdity. War reveals the impact on each other of two hostile wills, which are inadequately informed about each other's intentions. This *xiamx* alone prevents war from being conducted as an abstract science and it is limited furthermore by the goals which policy imposes on war.

A total war, conducted on purely military considerations would have been to Clausewitz a contradiction in terms. In a passage heavily underlined by Lenin he wrote:

> War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means. We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease by the war itself....And how can we conceive it to be otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different Nations and Governments? Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself....This kind of idea would be indispensable even if war was perfect WAR, the perfectly unbridled element of hostility....But this view is doubly indispensable if we reflect that real war is no such consistent effort tending to an extreme...but a half-and-half thing, a contradiction in itself....As such it cannot follow its own laws but must be looked on as a part of another whole -- and this whole is policy.... Policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a mere instrument, it changes the tremendous battle-sword which should be lifted with both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once for all, into a light handy weapon which is even sometimes nothing more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feints and parries. /Emphasis added/ ....Only through this kind of view war recovers unity; only by it can we see all wars as things of *one* kind....(35)

35. Clausewitz, cited, v.3, p. 121ff.

It is this intimate relation between policy and war which Stalin
in 1946 described as "having confirmed a familiar Marxist thesis." It
has been paraphrased by a leading Soviet military authority: "If war
is a continuation of politics, only by other means, so also peace is a
continuation of the struggle, only by other means." And it has been
quoted with approval by Mao. This accounts for the Soviet preference
for indirect attack -- the conflict in which the physical and psychol-
ogical factors are combined in a proportion best calculated to
produce the maximum confusion and hesitation on the part of the enemy.
Buttressed by Marxist theory, this concept has been applied to the
Soviet military doctrine with its emphasis on morale, deception and a
"main thrust" at the enemy's weakest link -- all attributes which seek
to place psychology and policy at the service of a theory based on
never-ending struggle. Therefore too the most substantial Communist
contribution to the theory of war has been in the area of limited war --
the conflict in which power and policy are most intimately related, in
which everything depends on gearing the psychological to the physical
equation. Both Soviet and Chinese Communist theory emphasize the
as
integral relationship between peace and war/alternating or combined
methods for conducting a conflict; indeed, both in language and theory,
the two tactics are almost identical.

36. Boris M. Shaposhnikov, *Mozz Armii*, v.3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1929), p. 239, quoted in Garthoff, cited, p. 11.

37. Mao Tse-tung, cited, v. 2, p. 202.

38. For a good treatment of operational Soviet doctrine see Garthoff, cited, pp. 299-408, see below Chapter 8, p.

39. See for example Stalin's explanation of the nature of political strategy entirely in military terms, Garthoff, cited, p. 13ff.

Significantly, the best theoretical statement of Communist military
thought is found not in Soviet, but in Chinese writings. This is no
accident. The expansion of the U.S.S.R. has been due largely to a
skillful use of political warfare and to the vast opportunities created
by the collapse of German power in Central Europe. Chinese Communism
owes its entire success, indeed its survival, to its militancy
and its ability to derive political benefits from military operations.
The main concern for Soviet Communism for the first decade and a half
was the protection of its home base; the chief concern of Chinese
Communism was the conquest of a home base. Written in the 1930's at
the beginning of the war against Japan, Mao's essays on "Protracted
War" and on "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" are
remarkable for their sense of proportion and their skill in adapting
the Leninist orthodoxy to Chinese conditions. They are important not
only because of the light they shed on the thinking of one of the most
powerful men in the world today, but also because of the consistency
with which the strategy developed by Mao has been pursued by the
Chinese Communists both during the civil war and in the Korean war.

Starting from the familiar Leninist doctrine that war is the
highest form of struggle, Mao elaborated a theory of war which combined
a high order of analytical ability, with rare psychological insight
and complete ruthlessness. The key to Communist superiority Mao finds
in Marxist doctrine which he compares to a telescope which permits the
distinguishing

VIII-35

reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics as laws for directing the war constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war. 44)

Mao's theory of war therefore rejected the notion of a quick, decisive war conducted on the basis of purely military considerations, which underlies so much of American strategic thought. He considered it a sign of weakness to be exploited by skillful Communist strategy; the belief of the opponent in a rapid victory was one of the reasons why according to Mao a strategy of protracted war was to China's advantage.

As a result, Mao's writings about with exhortations that the psychological equation of war is as important as the physical one; indeed that it is not strength which decides wars, but the ability to use it subtly and to the enemy's maximum disadvantage. Mao therefore mentions with approval examples from Chinese history where a superior enemy was defeated by stratagem. He recounts the story of a Chinese commander who completely disconcerted his opponent by delaying his attack beyond the point when it was expected and who turned a retreat into a rout by always permitting his opponent to withdraw to a position of further disadvantage. He places great emphasis on the ability to create illusions for the enemy and then to strike him with a surprise attack; the ability to launch a surprise attack is in fact considered directly proportional to the ability to bring about illusions. For this reason, Mao never tires of counselling a strategy of maximum ambiguity, in which the enemy's impatience for victory is used to frustrate him. He expressed this principle in sixteen words: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." 45)

44. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., II, p. 201.

45. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., III, p. 212.

VIII-36

His concern with winning a war through the psychological exhaustion of the opponent led Mao to pay particular attention to the strategic counteroffensive. If part of the confusion of war is caused by the inadequacy of intelligence about the enemy's intentions, one way of reducing this uncertainty was to induce the enemy to advance in a predetermined direction. As the opponent advances into hostile territory he may make mistakes through overconfidence or he may become discouraged about his inability to fight a decisive engagement against an elusive hostile force. Moreover, it will then be easier to deny the enemy the information he requires to act purposefully. Thus during the retreat a point is usually reached where psychological superiority outbalances the physical superiority of the enemy.

This is particularly true if it is possible to attack columns on the move. For then the absolute superiority of the enemy can be transformed into a relative inferiority on the battlefield. The art of warfare is to isolate enemy units, however great their combined superiority, and to defeat them in detail: "We defeat the many with the few by defeating the few with the many."

We say this to the separate units of the enemy which we meet on the battlefield. This is no longer a secret and the enemy is now in general well acquainted with our habit. But he can neither deprive us of our victories, nor avoid his losses because he does not know when and where we shall strike. That we keep secret. The Red Army's operations are as a rule surprise attacks."46)

For this reason Mao inveighed against "desperadoism" and "adventurism" -- the tendency to cling to territory at all cost or the quest

46. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, 242, also 144.

VIII-37

for a quick victory. The strength of Communist strategy was precisely its willingness to accept withdrawals as long as they were related to an over-all strategic plan; the Communist superiority resided in the fact that in a protracted war the internal contradictions of the Capitalist enemy were certain to mature: "The objective of retreat is to induce the enemy to commit mistakes and to detect them... We can skillfully induce the enemy to commit mistakes by staging a feint as Sun Tzu called it, (i.e., make a feint in the East and strike in the West..."<sup>47</sup>) "In order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavorable to him but favorable to us, we should often engage him when he is on the move and should look for such conditions favorable to ourselves as the advantageousness of the terrain, the vulnerability of the enemy, the presence of inhabitants who can blockade information and fatigue and inadvertence on the part of the enemy. This means that we should allow the enemy to advance and should not grudge the temporary loss of part of our territory. We have always advocated the policy of luring the enemy to penetrate deep."<sup>48</sup>) If necessary, even negotiations can be utilized to magnify the psychological pressure on the opponent or to deprive him of the fruits of his victory.
Like a judo artist, Mao therefore proposes to paralyze the enemy when seeming to be most pliable and to use the opponent's strength to defeat him by attacking him when most off-balance. It requires little elaboration that this strategy advanced by Mao in the 1930's was almost precisely followed during the Korean war.

The desire of the opponent for a rapid victory is considered a sign of weakness to be exploited by a helpful Communist strategy and to be used to pressure him when success seems nearest.

47. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, 217. Same V.1, p. 217.

48. Ibid., II, 223. Same V.2, p. 223.

VIII-39

has
↑

seemingly

we have been with

made it less uncomfortable with a contest, without issue than our belief in the
achieving possibility of total victory. 49)

V

may not

leaders

But is not a change of course possible? Could the Soviets not be
sincere in their protestations of peaceful intentions? Has not the death of
Stalin and his subsequent downgrading radically altered the situation? It is
difficult to know what sincerity means where self-interest is identical with
avoidance of all-out war.
The preservation of peace, as long as the "relation of forces" is not clearly
in the Soviet favor, Marxist theory would counsel keeping the provocation
below the level which might produce an all-out war. Peaceful coexistence
would thereby become the most efficient offensive tactic, the best means to
subvert the existing order.

For what is permanent in Soviet theory is the requirement of struggle, not the form it takes at any given moment. Conflict between opposing social systems is inevitable; but its nature must be adapted to changing conditions. "Communists," said Stalin to H.G. Wells in 1934 "do not in the least idealize methods of violence... They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class."⁵⁰

49. This too was the inherent weakness of the British and French attack on Egypt that they did not possess a legitimacy which would have enabled them to continue in possession of the Canal. Even had the military operations been more successful, the framework in which the attack was launched -- to separate the Israeli and Egyptian forces -- would have made it impossible for Great Britain and France to stay once military operations between Egypt and Israel had ceased. Nasser had the opportunity to frustrate his opponents by outwaiting them.

50. Quoted in Leites, op. cit., p. 491

Joseph Stalin, "marxism is liberalism:
An interview between Joseph Stalin and H.G. Wells," 1934, quoted in

418

V

If we could succeed in establishing the principle of limited war in Europe it will follow almost inevitably as a strategy for assuring the defense of other threatened areas. At present our alliance policy is caught on the horns of a two-fold dilemma: the emphasis of our military policy on all-out war is inconsistent with a system of alliances while the concern with a world-wide system of collective security is largely inconsistent with a policy of limited war. As long as our military policy threatens to transform every war into an all-out war, we will suffer the inhibitions of a general collective security system described earlier in the chapter whatever reservations we may make about our freedom of action in case of emergency. For all-out war is of direct concern not only to every ally but also to every neutral. In every crisis their pressures will therefore be directed in favor of a policy of minimum risk. And while a military policy of massive retaliation entails all the disadvantages of a general system of collective security it affords none of the corresponding gains. It does not bring about an accretion to our military strength because it removes the incentive for an allied defense effort except to afford bases to us.

12 FJ

The international order differs from a domestic relationship in that it does not possess any agency with a monopoly of force. Because the components of the international community are "sovereign" states, no appeal to a superior authority with a monopoly of force is possible; as a last recourse a state can vindicate its interpretation of justice only by its willingness to employ its own power. The prerequisite for a renunciation of force would therefore be the absence of clashing interests, at least of those which are considered "vital" - a condition in a society of sovereign states no power can be made to surrender not even realized domestically. For no state can negotiate about its survival for the conditions it considers essential to its notion of justice is inseparable from its notion of its vital interests. Vital interests almost by definition, are those which can be challenged only at the risk of war or by posing alternatives which make surrender seem preferable to war. Recourse to force can be eschewed only if none of the Powers considers the issues at dispute to involve matter of life - and - death; only if the interpretation of "vital interests" of all the major Powers is in accord; or to put it another way, only if continued harmony is considered by all Powers a "vital" interest transcending all other differences.

[Y]

CHAPTER III

The Dilemmas of American Security

Part II

One of the problems of strategy in the nuclear age is how to establish a relationship between a policy of deterrence and the strategy for fighting a war should deterrence fail. From the point of view of its impact on the aggressor's actions, maximum deterrence can be equated with maximum destructiveness. From the point of view of its contribution to the willingness to implement it, the optimum strategy is one which achieves its goals at minimum risk. The temptation of policy is to seek to combine the advantages of every course of action: to achieve maximum deterrence but also at minimum risks. Ever since the end of our atomic monopoly, however, strategy has had to deal with a paradox: the greater the destructive capability at its disposal, the greater the reluctance to use it. It became apparent that deterrence reflects not only a physical but a psychological relationship: deterrence is greatest where a military capability is coupled with a willingness to act; it is achieved where one side's readiness to run risks in relation to the other is at a maximum; it is least effective when the willingness to run risks is low, however strong the military capability. It is the task of the strategic doctrine to strike a balance between the military and the psychological considerations. A strategy which poses alternatives policy-makers are unwilling to confront will induce either paralysis or improvisation. A strategy which interprets

V - 19

The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is a comparatively recent develop-
ment, dating in effect from 1954. To be sure, ever since 1948 the U.S.S.R.
possessed a moderate quantity of TU '4's' (for which the NATO code name was
Bull). This was a copy of our B-29, one of which had fallen into Soviet
hands during the war when it had to make an emergency landing in Siberia.
The range of these planes was 2,200 miles and their performance made them
highly vulnerable to jet interceptors. The TU-4 could therefore not reach
the U.S. from Soviet territory except on one-way missions and even then only
a very small portion of the U.S. There was a great deal of speculation at
the time that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons make one-way missions
a profitable strategy and this argument was repeated during the Symington
Hearings with respect to the present Soviet heavy bomber. But one-way
missions are uneconomical biven the cost and complexity of modern bombers.
They can be successful only if the aggressor possesses a really staggering
number of planes. Even then unless the attack is crushing, every raid
would shift the strategic balance against the aggressor: the side which used
up its striking force on one-way missions would have done all the damage it
is capable of doing; it could not pose any additional threat and if the
opponent has any offensive resources left he would have a decisive advantage.
Even should only part of the striking force be utilized on one-way missions,
the opponent will know that the enemy offensive power would decline with
every attack. One-way missions are suitable for a strategy of desperation.
They represent the most wasteful and difficult means of imposing a power's
will.

8. Symington Hearings, p.

X - 12

our airbases from Eurasia; we have striven for means to neutralize
the Soviet ground strength. Each side wishes to protect itself
against the consequences of the other's bad faith; each side, in
short, brings to the negotiations the precise attitude which caused
the armaments race in the first place.

There are, moreover, reasons inherent in the structure of
international relations and in the state of technology why a
reduction of forces cannot go beyond a certain point. None of the
major Powers -- or at least not the U.S.S.R. -- would accept a
reduction of their relative position vis-a-vis the secondary Powers.
Nothing will induce the U.S.S.R. to accept a force level which
would reduce its ability to control the satellites or to play a
major role in contiguous areas such as the Middle East. But forces
sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil
all the peripheral Powers of Eurasia. A reduction of forces
which did not affect the relative Soviet position vis-a-vis the
secondary Powers would not diminish the basic security problem of
the non-Soviet world.

On the technical plane, a reduction of forces seeks to compare incommensurables: what is the relation between the Soviet ability to <u>enforce</u> <u>strategic strike</u> over <u>Eurasia</u> and <u>American missile ships</u> with 1500 mile range which, within a decade at most, will be able to <u>bring most of the</u> U.S.S.R. <u>under attack</u>? If the United States weakened its Strategic Air Command, it would take years before it could be reconstituted; if the Soviets cut their ground-forces the strategic impact would

X-48

a retaliatory strike. The relationship of force to diplomacy
is not to be established as a variation of all-out war. The
possibility of total security has ended with our atomic mono-
poly. Limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it is a means
to escape from the sterility of the quest for absolute peace
which in the face of a dedicated revolutionary Power paralyzes
by the vagueness of its hopes, and for absolute victory, which
in the face of the enormity of modern weapons paralyzes by the
vastness of its consequences.

VII-85

derives its impetus from a desire to overthrow the liberal values of the West: the
revolution of the Soviet bloc organized to exploit all dissatisfactions for its own
ends and determined to prevent the establishment of any equilibrium. Without the
Soviet interest in creating a maximum of instability many of the international ten-
sions could work themselves out at a more leisurely pace; the necessity faced by all
nations to adjust to concurrent revolutions in ideology, technology and economic and
political relationships would produce less of a sense of urgency. To the Soviet bloc
the instability of one revolutionary period has become an opportunity to complete its
task of destruction and domination. All measures in policy as in strategy have there-
fore to be viewed against the reality of the Soviet threat. It is therefore necessary
to turn to an examination of Soviet modes of action, their strategy and their policy
to determine the impact of the nuclear age on the behavior of the Soviet bloc.

VII-85

VII-84

can therefore profit from the pressures of the uncommitted to drive us back step by step. Conversely firm United States positions might induce the uncommitted powers to develop formula which meet us at least part way. And this is reinforced by the desire of many of the uncommitted nations for peace almost at any price. Because they consider us the more malleable of the two super powers, they chose in every crisis to direct their pressures against us as a means to preserve the peace or to resolve an issue. To the degree that we can project a greater sense of purpose some of these pressures may be diverted against the Soviet bloc. A revolution like Egypt's or even India's cannot be managed by understanding alone; it also requires a readiness on our part to bear the psychological burden of difficult decisions.

VIII

The problem of American relations both with our allies and the uncommitted therefore depends on a close relationship of power and policy. Without a military policy which poses less fearful risks than all-out war, our alliances will be in jeopardy, and the uncommitted areas will vacillate between protestations of principle and a consciousness of their impotence. But even the wisest military policy will prove sterile, if our diplomacy cannot elaborate a concept of aggression which is directed to the most likely dangers. In our relation to both our allies and the uncommitted, we must realize that common action depends on common purposes and that it is the task of policy to set the frame-work of common purpose, if necessary by an act of leadership that permits no further equivocation.

Relations both with our allies and the uncommitted and the development of the proper strategy derive their particular urgency not so much from the revolution going on in the colonial areas or from the shrinking power of Europe or even from the power of modern weapons. These problems while serious might be manageable. The particular urgency of the present situation is due to the existence of another revolutionary force which in contrast to the revolution of the underdeveloped third of the world

VII-9

strength together with our allies." 2)

The second argument asserts that we have a strategic interest in denying the peripheral areas of Eurasia and particularly Western Europe to the Soviet bloc because the accretion of strength represented by its industrial resources and trained manpower might tip the balance against us: "We estimate" said General Bradley "that the manpower (of the countries of Western Europe) is over 300 million. Their industrial capacity is very substantial and if that were added to that which Russia already has, it would make them even more formidable and increase their chances..." 3) "If we should ever lose our allies completely and be confined to the Western Hemisphere, we would have an entirely different situation and different standards of living than we have at the present time." 4)

The final reason advanced for our system of alliances has been in terms of the airbases they afford us. Our system of overseas bases is said to add to our deterrent because it complicates the Soviet defensive problem and because it represents a guarantee of swift and deadly retaliation: "In raising that feeling of freedom" said General Vandenberg "from that threat which they felt was hanging over their head went the freedom of allowing themselves the luxury of giving us air bases..." 5)

The difficulty with these arguments is not that they are invalid but that they are partially inconsistent. At best they explain our interest in the system of alliances, they do not supply an inventive for allied assistance to us. In fact, our theory of deterrence tends to erode the psychological basis for collective action. For the only ally which represents a significant accretion to our strength in an all-our war is Great Britain because alone of our allies it possesses nuclear weapons and a small strategic air force for delivering them. If deterrence is achieved by maximum

2. Korean Hearings, p. 1715.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 883

4. *Ibid.*, p. 745

5. *Ibid.*, p. 1481

XI-11

missiles and support research programs for the next family of airplanes.
And every new offensive weapon carries with it a requirement for an additional
defensive outlay. Our present air-defense system designed to defeat manned
bombers will be barely completed before it will have to be supplemented by a
defensive system which will give a measure of warning against missiles. The
greater the power and speed of offensive systems, the more stress will have to
be laid on passive defense measures, on dispersal, warning and communication,
and deep shelters. Conversely, as the Soviet air defensive system gains in
effectiveness, our strategic striking force will have to be improved simply to
maintain our present offensive capabilities.

Thus a steadily rising defense budget is indicated even if we want to do
no more than maintain our present relative strategic position vis-a-vis the
U.S.S.R. There can be no doubt that the unimpaired power of our retaliatory
force must remain the first charge on our defense budget. But this will be no
simple task either technically or within present budgetary limitations. The
planned increase of the number of B-52's in heavy bomber wings of the Strategic
Air Command from thirty to forty-five will involve an expenditure of $1.5 billion
for procurement alone. And it should be supplemented by the construction of
additional bases and warning installations. The Air Defense System presently
programmed against manned planes will cost $61 billion over a fifteen year period
from 1951-1965 and the largest expenditures will commence in fiscal year 1958.
3)
The growing Soviet naval threat will force us to pay increasing attention to
anti-submarine warfare. As the Soviets develop missile-firing submarines pro-
pelled by nuclear energy--and they cannot be far behind us in this field--our
naval budget can be expected to increase.

3. Symington Hearings, op. cit., p. 298 (General Partridge).

XI-12

Moreover, present capabilities are, as we have seen, not sufficient to meet the range of challenges we are likely to confront. While a surprise all-out blow is the most serious danger, local war is the most likely threat and the form of conflict which offers the most immediate strategic opportunities to either side. And here we possess neither an adequate doctrine, nor an adequate capability. Our present army organization is too cumbersome and is in the process of change. Re-equipping one army division costs between $175 and $200 million dollars; for our current force of 19 divisions this would amount to a minimum of $3.3 billion dollars. After the expensive task of re-equipping is concluded our army will still lack mobility: given the rapidity of operation of modern war, a strategic reserve should be able to get to potential danger spots rapidly because an enemy possessing nuclear weapons who is given a chance to consolidate territory may establish a well-nigh impregnable position. A minimum requirement would seem to be the ability to airlift 2 divisions within a period of 10 days. To airlift the assault echelon of one division to the Near East over a period of 10 days would require 200 C-133's at a cost of $1.9 billion and perhaps an increase of $100 million in operating costs. To airlift two entire divisions simultaneously would require an additional capital investment of $5.2 billion and a $1.2 billion increase in operating costs.

Finally as the Soviet Union adds long-range missiles to its strategic arsenal, our present air defense system will become less and less effective. It will then be necessary to think seriously of the construction of deep shelters to conserve as much of our human resources as possible even in the face of a devastating attack. Such a program which has not yet passed the blue-print stage might cost as much as $20 billion over a ten-year period.

4. For a fuller discussion of these points, see above Chapter VI, p.

VI-53

precludes the Air Force from considering the airlift in the only terms which are
most meaningful to the Army and to the over-all situation: that of over-all
strategic mobility.

Thus our process of arriving at strategic decisions breaks down at the
precise point where the rigid division of functions causes one service to be
assigned a capability which is technically in its area of competence, but which
is subsidiary to its primary mission, although essential to the primary mission
of another service. These situations illustrate how all the pressures in our
military establishment work against considering either force levels or doctrine
in terms of an over-all strategy; how the intimate connection between primary
mission and budgetary awards impels our service chiefs with the best intentions
in the world into becoming essentially advocates of a service point of view. To
be sure, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not considered as represent-
ing a service while they sit on that body -- during the B-36 Hearings, Secretary
of the Air Force Symington went so far as to insist that the Chief of the Air
staff was not responsible to him for his discussions in the joint Chiefs.¹⁴)

But this subtle distinction is meaningless in practice. The service chiefs have
risen to their position through a lifetime of dedication to one arm. They are a
product of its problems, its training schools, its environment. While in office,
moreover, the portion of their time spent in administering their service is far
greater than that devoted to problems of over-all strategy. Maintaining the
morale of their service can never be far from their mind. And the problems of
mastering the primary mission of each service are becoming so complex that they
almost inevitably inhibit a consideration of their relationship to an over-all
mission, or better, they lead to a psychological distortion in which over-all

14. See Symington Hearings, p. (Testimony of General Vandenberg).

VI-52

The dispute about the need for airlift has been one of the cardinal disagreements between the Army and the Air Force. It is not the purpose of this book to attempt to resolve a conflict which has occupied the Joint Chiefs of Staff for several years. For the Significance of the dispute resides not so much in the contentions advanced by either side as in the fact that under the present definition of missions it is insoluble and the present organization for arriving at decisions can only exacerbate it. In terms of existing missions both the Air Force and the Army position are unassailable. The Key West agreement gives the Air Force the primary mission of defeating the enemy air arm. To invest 2.6 billion dollars in planes of no combat effectiveness which will add neither to the strategic nor to the tactical capability of the Air Force must to any responsible Chief of the Air Staff appear a diversion of resources. This will be particularly true when each service is operating under a fixed budgetary ceiling, and when the rapid rate of technological change requires large outlays for the introduction of missiles and the reequipping of most units.

But to the Army, charged with destroying its enemy counterpart, its strategic mission becomes meaningless if it cannot get into position to fight. To the Army the airlift is not a marginal requirement but the condition of all effective action. The rigid division of functions among the services, therefore, inhibits the consideration of airlift in terms of over-all strategy. The Army, to which the airlift is essential, is precluded by the Key West agreement from developing it, and Secretary Wilson's latest clarification of missions reinforces the prohibition against an Army air arm.13) The Air Force, which has primary responsibility for air transport must in turn consider it a marginal requirement in terms of its primary mission; indeed, the Key West agreement in effect

13. Department of Defense Press Release, November 26, 1956.

VII-75

there is a basic difference between areas in which colonialism ruled directly and those in which it governed indirectly.

The remarkable aspect of colonialism from its beginning was the imposition of rule by a very small group of Europeans over vast populations. This was due not so much to the military superiority of the West -- in many respects it is greater today than it was in the 19th century -- as to the fact that the European powers displaced an existing ruling group in a society where the mass of the population neither possessed nor expected direct participation in government. The structure of government in what is now the uncommitted third of the world had been feudal for centuries and in their first appearance the Europeans appeared as only a new governing group substituting itself for the existing one according to a pattern which had characterized wars in these areas for many generations. The government of vast territories by small groups of Europeans was possible precisely because they were not considered as "foreign"; the notion of their foreignness was introduced in the first instance not by the governed but by their rulers. For the Europeans were not content with displacing a feudal upper class. They brought with them the twin doctrines of rational administration and popular participation in government which in time had inevitably to prove inconsistent with their continued domination. The rationalizing of administration led to the consolidation of many areas into viable units for the first time in their history; Indonesia for example was nothing but a geographic expression until the Dutch found it more efficient to consolidate the islands of the Indies into a single administrative unit. At the same time the colonial powers trained a group of indigenous leaders in European universities where they absorbed the doctrines of the right of self-government, human dignity and economic advancement which had been the rallying points for European revolutionary and progressive movements throughout the nineteenth century.

The result was two sets of paradoxes: in its revolutionary aspect colonialism represents one of the greatest conversions of history. Almost without exception the

VII-76

leaders of the newly independent states as well as the heads of anti-colonial upris-
ings in still dependent countries are opposing their present or former masters in
terms of values they have learned from them. Their challenge to the West is not in
terms of a different set of beliefs; it is for the West to live up to its own prin-
ciples. The leaders in the uncommitted third of the world are playing a role drawn
from a Western script. As the ideals of the British, French and American revolution
became diffused partly through the very spread of colonialism, the seeds were sewn
for the destruction of colonialism itself. The more successful the teachings of the
colonial powers, the more untenable their positions became. What is taking place in
the areas once under direct colonial rule is the second stage of the revolution start-
ed by the colonial powers; it is an attempt by the leaders of the newly independent
states to spread among the masses of their people the values which they themselves
acquired from the colonial power and which furnished the original impetus of the
revolution.

This leads to the second paradox of the uncommitted third of the world: that
the position of areas which had been under direct colonial rule is more advantageous
than that of countries where the colonial powers exercised their influence only in-
directly. The territories governed directly benefitted through administrative con-
solidation and the overthrow of the old feudal order, by an outside force. The
countries controlled indirectly suffered the demoralizing influence of foreign rule
without a corresponding gain in the training of leadership groups or of administra-
tive cohesion. On the contrary, while in areas governed directly boundaries were
drawn with an eye to what constituted a viable unit, in other territories they were
drawn precisely because the countries would _not_ be viable. Thus the only reason for
the existence of what came to be known as Trans-Jordan was its need over an indefin-
ite period of time of a British subsidy. And so it was throughout the Middle East.
Boundaries reflected neither a common history nor a common language nor an economic
or administrative necessity; they were drawn to guarantee weakness and rivalry. In

VII-77

these areas several revolutions are going on concurrently: there is to begin with the revolt by a small Western educated elite against feudal rule accomplished elsewhere by the colonial powers; there is the quest for administrative, political and economic cohesiveness which in areas of direct rule is also the legacy of colonialism; there is finally the attempt to raise the economic and educational level of the masses. For this reason the revolutionary urgency is much greater and the problems more nearly insoluble in areas which had been governed indirectly because here there is a confluence of all the upheavals which in the countries under direct rule were accomplished by fiat and over a long period of time. Therefore, too, while a legalistic concept of sovereignty and aggression may be a stabilizing element in South-East Asia, it is a revolutionary force in areas like the Middle East because it works counter to the consolidation of inherently volatile and economically unviable unity.

It is the revolution occuring in these countries, however different in its nature, which makes the quest for popularity and such a treacherous course. A revolution is usually characterized by a coming together of all dissatisfactions which join in protest against the existing order but which cannot necessarily offer a clear substitute. The history of revolutions indicates moreover that after the initial phase of sweeping away the prevailing institutions, the government usually falls into the hands of a small minority which can give a sense of direction to popular resentments and aspirations. And the same may be true of the international revolution now taking place on a global scale. The United States will have to give it a sense of direction or be engulfed by it eventually. It cannot do so, however, by basing its policy on an inquiry into what people desire; the situation is revolutionary precisely because old values are disintegrating and millions are groping for a new orientation. In the uncommitted areas, popularity may therefore prove less important than respect.

The importance of United States leadership is all the greater because of the unfamiliarity of many of the leaders of the newly independent nations with the ele-

VII-78

ments of international stability. Many of the leaders of the newly independent states have found the temptation to play a major role in international affairs almost overwhelming. Domestically, their problems are intractable; even a major economic advance would still probably fall far short of the aspirations of their people and many countries will have a serious problem to keep up with rising birth-rate. In domestic policy each action has a price and sometimes a high one; even so well-established a leader as Nehru found that reshaping the boundaries of the Indian states could provoke major communal riots. But in the international field the division of the world into two contending camps exalts the role of the uncommitted and the collapse of the structure of the old international system creates a fertile field of manipulations for ambitious men. This produces an overwhelming temptation to defer the solution of difficult domestic problems by entering the international arena, to solidify a complicated domestic position by triumphs in the international field.

This attitude might be more constructive were it not combined with a lack of understanding of the nature of modern power relationships, indeed with a denial of their reality. The leaders of the newly independent states achieved their positions by distinguishing themselves in the struggle with the former colonial powers. But the independence movements almost without exception provided a poor preparation for an understanding of the element of power in international relations. Based on the dogmas of late nineteenth century liberalism, especially its pacifism, the independence movements relied more on ideological agreement than on an evaluation of power factors and to this day the claim to superior spirituality remains the battle cry of Asian nationalism. Moreover, the bad conscience of the colonial Powers and their preoccupation with European problems gave the struggle for independence more the character of a domestic debate than of a power dispute. To be sure, many of the leaders of the newly independent Powers spent years in jail and suffered heroically for their cause. It is not to deny the measure of their dedication to assert that the results achieved were out of proportion to their suffering. Empires which had

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held vast dominions for hundreds of years disappeared without a battle being fought.

And if it is difficult for the leaders to retain a sense of proportion, it is next to impossible for the mass of the people. On the whole, they were involved in the struggle for independence only with their sympathies; to them the disappearance of the colonial Powers must seem nothing short of miraculous. Moreover, most of the people of the newly independent states live in pre-industrial societies. It would be difficult enough for them to grasp the full impact of industrialism; it is too much to expect them to understand the meaning of nuclear technology. It is therefore understandable that in most former colonial areas there is an overestimation of what can be accomplished by the power of words alone. Nor is this tendency diminished by the rewards that fall to the uncommitted in the struggle for allegiance by the two big power centers.

But however understandable, it is a dangerous trend. If this were a tranquil period, nothing would be involved but minor irritations. In the present revolutionary situation, however, the dogmatism of the newly independent states makes them susceptible to Soviet "peace offensives" and their lack of appreciation of power relationships causes them to over-estimate the protection afforded by moral precepts. Indeed their very insistence on principle contributes to the demoralization of international politics for it tempts them to accept at face value protestations of peaceful intentions or legitimate grievances with which the Soviets inevitably accompany their aggressive moves. It reinforces the quest for a "pure" case of aggression which almost insures that the actual aggressions which may take place will not be dealt with and in many instances not even be recognized as aggression. Against the masters of ambiguity in the Kremlin and in Peiping, the insistence on absolute answers makes it likely that no answers will be given at all. And this in turn will react on the willingness to resist of threatened countries. They know that in any concrete case the pressure of the uncommitted part of the world will be exerted in favor of a policy of minimum risk and they will not be reassured by homilies

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about justice which may be proclaimed at their wake.

Moreover, such understanding of power as the newly independent states do possess does not favor the United States. The power chiefly visible to the newly independent states are the Chinese or Soviet armies on their borders. This is a category of power which is both concrete and in keeping with their historical experience. By contrast the power of the United States is highly abstract and nearly invisible. Two hundred Chinese divisions represent a familiar element of power; by comparison the destructive capability of a B-52 and or the strategic impact of ballistic missile is esoteric and difficult to grasp. Thus considerations of both power and principle combine to inspire the newly independent nations with caution. In every crisis they exercise a pressure for solutions of abstractness and minimum risk and in many situations they may provoke a crisis by their attempt to sublimate domestic policy in the international field.

In this situation the United States has particular responsibilities of leadership. It is imperative that the uncommitted Powers understand not only the benefits but also the responsibilities of independence. Unless they learn that in the international field just as in the domestic every action has a price, they will increasingly seek to play a global role incommensurate with either their power or the risks they are willing to assume. To the extent that foreign adventures are foreclosed, ambitious leaders will have to find an outlet for their energies in the domestic field. Condescending as it may seem the United States has for this reason an important educational task to perform in the uncommitted third of the world. By word and deed we must demonstrate that the inextricable element of international relations resides in the necessity to combine power and principle, that an exclusive reliance on moral pronouncements may be as irresponsible as the attempt to conduct policy on the basis of considerations of power alone is dissolving of all restraint. To be sure, wherever possible, we should seek to identify ourselves with the aspirations of humanity. But we must also be prepared to protect the frame-work in which these