MAY 30 1978

Dear Admiral Massera:

I would like to thank you for your most gracious invitation to visit Argentina at the time of the World Soccer Championship matches. President Videla contacted me several months ago to extend a similar invitation, and my staff has already been discussing arrangements with the Embassy of Argentina.

I am hoping very much that I will be able to be in Buenos Aires at that time and shall know in a week or two whether my commitments here will allow me to make the trip. Perhaps we will have the opportunity to meet in Buenos Aires.

With thanks, again, for your thoughtfulness.

Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera
Commander in Chief
Argentine Navy
c/o Naval Attache
Argentine Embassy
1816 Corcoran Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ
ARGENTINE EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(FREE TRANSLATION)

BUENOS AIRES, May 4th, 1978.

Dr. HENRY KISSINGER
on hand

Dear Dr. KISSINGER:

Through mutual friends we have learned
of your desire to visit ARGENTINA.

I think that the World Soccer Champion-
ship, in JUNE, would offer an added attraction to you - a
renowned fan of that sport - to prompt you to set the date
for the visit.

Your trascendental intervention in tough
world problems, our fond feelings for the high qualities of
your personality and the deep currents of affection nurtured
by mutual friends, move us to extend an invitation for you
to travel at any time you may decide upon.

In the event of your accepting this invit
ation, we have the honor of extending it to Mrs. KISSINGER,
to your son and two companions to be named by you.

We take the liberty of pointing out that
- under any circumstances - the invitations cover round-trip
tickets and stay in our country. If you decide to come, all
the details of the trip will be coordinated through the
Naval Attaché to the Embassy of Argentina in WASHINGTON.

Hoping the present invitation will meet
with an acceptance reply, I am sending my warm regards.

(Signed)

from Admiral
EMILIO EDUARDO MASSERA

Armada Argentina
Comandante en Jefe

BUENOS AIRES, 4 de Mayo de 1978.-

Señor
D. HENRY KISSINGER
Presente

Estimado Señor KISSINGER :

Por amigos comunes hemos tomado conocimiento
de su deseo de visitar a la ARGENTINA.

Creo que la realización del Campeonato Mundial
de Fútbol, durante el próximo mes de Junio, suma un atractivo adicional, para
que usted -notorio aficionado a ese deporte- se decida a concretar la vi-
sita.

La trascendencia de su intervención en arduos
problemas mundiales, la simpatía que le profesamos por las calidades de su
personalidad y la íntima corriente afectuosa nutrida por comunes amigos, nos
mueven a invitarlo a viajar dentro de las fechas que decida.

En el caso de que acepte esta invitación, tene-
mos el honor de hacerla extensiva a la señora de KISSINGER, a su hijo y a dos
acompañantes que usted designe. Nos permitimos precisar que -en todos los
casos- la invitación cubre los pasajes de ida y retorno así como el aloja-
miento, durante su estadía en nuestro país. Si decide viajar, todos los de-
talles de coordinación se harán a través del señor Agregado Naval de la Emba-
jada Argentina en WASHINGTON.

Deseando que su respuesta incluya su aceptación
a la presente invitación, lo saludo cordialmente.

Del Almirante
EMILIO EDUARDO MASSERA

[c]

As recently as 100 years ago a British envoy in East Asia boasted
that he could "declare war and make peace" before the news ever reached
Whitehall.

Now, the most remote outpost of the world is only hours away. Two
days ago, I was in the Peoples Republic of China. Tomorrow, I will be in
Washington. This telescoping of time and space has profound and inescap-
able implications for our foreign policy.

The planet we live on is very small, and gets smaller every day. The
problems we face are not local. They are universal. Everyone on earth
shares them, which makes for a very complex, interdependent world.

home, I think President Carter has badly underestimated both the sophisti-
cation of the American people and the validity of the idea.

The American people will support a forceful foreign policy, even when
it involves risk and sacrifice. But they will not support a foreign policy
that lacks coherence and direction. People do not need spectaculars to help
them understand the new imperatives of a changing world. They do need lead-
ership that can articulate a comprehensible vision of where our foreign pol-
icy is heading and why.

For example, the Panama Canal is difficult to explain and to sell to
the American people as an isolated issue. But, Panama Canal Treaties, pre-
sented as one facet of a larger perceived vision of our role in an interdepen-
dent world, would be a different thing. The American people must understand

- 7 -

It took about three million years to reach a world population of one billion. Then, in only 100 years, it doubled. After that we really picked up speed. In another 30 years, the population reached three billion and 15 years later it hit four billion. By the year 2000, the world population is expected to top 6.5 billion. Estimates place close to five billion of those people as inhabitants of one of the 114 "developing" countries, not including the People's Republic of China.

How to absorb and feed these additional billions remains an open question. The earth's finite resources are already severely strained.

Lester Brown, President of Worldwatch Institute which trains a concerned eye on the condition of Planet Earth, reports that, "The health of the earth's principal biological systems -- fisheries, forests, grasslands and croplands -- is threatened by excessive human claims."

[LC]

For example, between 1930 and 1970, the global fish catch rose from 21 to 70 million metric tons a year. But, since 1970 the catch has not grown at all. In fact, some years it has actually fallen below the 1970 level.

In the area of energy, we are all aware of the finite resources that sustain our highly industrial society. But how many know of the firewood crisis that devils the "developing" world? A generation ago villagers in the Himalayan foothills of Nepal gathered all the firewood they needed in an hour or two. Now the process takes an entire day.

As our world and its problems change, so does our role in the world.

The increasing diffusion of military, economic and political power, which I mentioned earlier, does not affect our absolute strength, which continues to grow militarily and economically. But, it does affect our relative strength. To put it bluntly, we are more dependent on the rest of the world

- 10 -

Not only is our economy heavily dependent on foreign imports, it is also heavily export-oriented. Today, one in eight manufacturing jobs in the United States produces for export. Forty percent of our construction machinery is produced for export and exports account for 25 percent of the cash receipts of our agricultural sector.

I dwell on these facts and figures because they argue effectively the need for a new vision in U.S. foreign policy -- a vision that is in tune with the complexities of a changing world. We will, of course, continue to be concerned with traditional security questions, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We must deal with these issues both by negotiation and by maintaining a credible military posture.

But, more and more, we must center our concern on the global problems that threaten our existence. And, increasingly, we must focus on the Third

[L.C]

- 11 -

World, where the bulk of the world's population will live by the year 2000,
and which is rich in the natural resources so vital to our survival.

From what President Carter said before his election and from what mem-
bers of his Administration have said since then, I believe the Executive
Branch is aware of and concerned about these issues. But I am troubled
that no Administration spokesman so far has come forth with a strategic
approach to the problems of the Third World or, for that matter, to our
allies' problems. And I am concerned because no one is telling the American
people plain truths about what new directions we should be taking in foreign
policy and about why they are a matter of national survival.

A hundred speeches about world interdependence by me would be meaning-
less beside one straight-from-the-shoulder, no-punches-pulled talk by the
President of the United States. I hate to describe limits to the power of a

[LC]

allies and for our adversaries. Uncertainty can be very tempting to international adventurers.

The Carter Administration, of course, has not been inactive in foreign affairs this first year. Major departures in our arms transfer policy, nuclear proliferation and human rights have been discussed. But, in practice, most of President Carter's first year has gone to developing initiatives on SALT, the Middle East, Panama and Africa which were legacies from past administrations.

After a shaky start, which should be laid more to inexperience than to ineptitude, the Carter Administration now has U.S.-Soviet relations back on the track. A great deal of attention is being devoted to a range of negotiations with the USSR on SALT, the Indian Ocean, MBFR and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

[LC]

- 17 -

We urgently need to define what our vital interests in the world arena
are. Then, we must condition ourselves not to get involved in every issue,
large and small, that arises on the face of the globe.

I know a fellow who advocates what he calls a foreign policy of "eclectic
neglect." By his definition, you could ignore most of the world's problems.

I don't go quite that far, but I do think we have to learn to say "No." We

must define the limits of the possible and then we must not stretch ourselves
beyond them.

Obviously, the Soviet Union will occupy a good deal of our attention in
the coming years and the Peoples Republic of China undoubtedly will be in-
creasingly important in the geo-political picture. At the same time, we must
reassure our Western European allies and Japan that we consider our relations
with them to be the fixed star of our foreign policy.

- 18 -

We must also focus more attention on our important relationships with Third World nations, for the truly crucial problems of the future -- energy, population, hunger, the destruction of the environment -- all intimately involve the Third World. And they can only be solved by cooperation not by fiat.

I know it's not necessary to remind this audience that we can only be as strong abroad as we are at home. If our cities are decaying; if unemployment and inflation are sapping our strength and breaking our spirit; if our lakes and rivers are polluted; if the confidence of our business community is uncertain, then we cannot expect to provide leadership to a troubled world.

In great periods of American history, foreign policy has been bipartisan. Both parties have shared the takeoffs as well as the landings. The whole Senate has been broadly knowledgeable of the course and the goal of our for-

- 19 -

foreign policy. It has interpreted them to the American people in the multiple,
mysterious ways in which we communicate such things.

Out of such a bipartisan effort may grow a conviction that positions are
taken in the national interest and not merely in the President's interest, or
the Administration's interest, or in the interest of a particular political
party.

From time to time, there are signs on both sides that this tradition is
being neglected or forgotten today. I call for its revival, not out of sen-
timent, but out of a sense of urgency dictated by the decisions required of
us and the need for consensus to support solutions yet to be found.

I pledge my best effort to rekindle the sparks of bipartisan foreign
policy that enabled America to overcome great challenges in the past. I hope
others will join me in the effort which is long overdue. But, no matter how

[LC]

## USA LOOKS AT THE WORLD

chosen this time to initiate a series of actions which can only be seen as iminimal to détente and undermining the prospects for arms control.

In this atmosphere, I think it useful to stop and reflect a bit on how SALT can promote the national interests of the U.S. in ways that are really unrelated to other issues, such as Soviet activity in Africa.

In 1970, the nations of the world spent $200,000,000,000 on their military budgets. Eight years later, this figure has doubled. These nations now spend more than $1,000,000,000 a day on arms.

Despite increasing levels of destructive power available world wide, no one's national security has increased. Arabs and Israelis, Greeks and Turks, Indians and Pakistanis all live in fear despite their expanding military arsenals. So do the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Never has our capacity to do damage to each other been greater, yet neither of us feels secure.

This insecurity is reflected in the view, widely expressed in this country, that the U.S., despite its sizeable annual defense budget, is weak and growing weaker. Many maintain that, during the last 10 years, the U.S. has stood still while Soviet power has surged. If that were the case, of course, we should have fired our entire military establishment for grossly misusing the billions of dollars appropriated each year for defense.

### U.S. deterrent strength

This is not the case. A quick look at our strategic nuclear forces confirms the strength of our deterrent. We have over 300 B-52 bombers armed with approximately 2,000 nuclear bombs. We have 41 nuclear submarines with over 600 nuclear Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's), which carry over 5,000 nuclear weapons. Finally, we have 1,054 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM's) capable of delivering over 2,000 nuclear warheads on target.

Our triad of bombers, submarines, and ICBM's can deliver a total of over 9,000 nuclear weapons. One measure of our relative strength is that, at present, the Soviets have only about half this number of warheads. Moreover, approximately half of our nuclear weapons are located in invulnerable submarines, whereas Soviet strategic forces are concentrated in land-based installations, whose vulnerability is increasing.

Nor have we stood still in the last 10 years as some suggest. In 1970, we had roughly 4,000 nuclear warheads. Today, that figure has more than doubled. Published figures show that, between 1970 and 1977, we added over 500 new ICBM's to our arsenal. During the same period, the Soviet Union only deployed something over 400 new ICBM's. Today, we are pressing forward on several strategic

nuclear programs which can significantly improve our capabilities. I am thinking specifically of the Trident submarine and cruise missile programs.

One way to put these figures into perspective is to consider the capabilities of a single U.S. nuclear submarine. One Poseidon submarine carries 16 separate missiles with up to 10 re-entry vehicles on each missile, for a total of 160 independently targetable nuclear warheads. Each warhead is more than three times the size of the nuclear bomb which devastated Hiroshima. Each submarine carries a greater total explosive force than was used in all of Europe and Japan in World War II. We have 31 Poseidon submarines.

The Soviet Union has not been idle either. Whereas we once could speak of our clear superiority in nuclear weapons, now we refer to our "essential equivalence" with the U.S.S.R. The Russians have had an ambitious weapons development program which has produced a nuclear arsenal of impressive proportions. The throw-weight (thousands of pounds of carrying capacity) of their large SS18 ICBM's is staggering. If we use ICBM throw-weight as the yardstick of comparison between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the latter is clearly superior, but this is only one measure of comparison and gives a skewed impression of the realities, just as does citing only our numerical superiority in warheads.

Despite the efforts of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. to expand their nuclear arsenals, both countries share a mounting sense of insecurity. We are both arming without really increasing our chances of surviving nuclear war as functioning societies. What we should both be seeking instead is a condition of strategic stability in which neither side can gain a unilateral advantage by initiating nuclear war. We should also be seeking to reduce the potential damage of any nuclear exchange within the context of maintaining strategic stability. Limiting the number of nuclear weapons targeted on each other can contribute to this goal. That is what SALT seeks to do.

### SALT II and U.S. national interests

As a Congressional Advisor to the SALT negotiations, I have had the opportunity to monitor very carefully the progress of these negotiations. SALT II will not provide all the answers. It can only be viewed as a stage in a process, but it is a very necessary stage. The Senate will, of course, have to examine a completed agreement very carefully. It is my assessment, however, that the emerging SALT II treaty will further our national interests. Let me suggest why.

* In SALT I, the Soviet Union was permitted more ICBM and SLBM launchers

than we were. Under SALT II, the principle of equal aggregates has been accepted. SALT II sets limits on the aggregate number of strategic nuclear launchers. This means that equal ceilings will be placed on the combined total of bombers, SLBM's and ICBM's each side can have. There will be sublimits as well for certain categories of delivery systems. For example, neither side will be permitted more than 820 MIRVed ICBM's. This limitation is of great importance to the U.S. because it is precisely this category of Soviet delivery vehicles which we consider threatening.

* To achieve the over-all aggregate of 2,250, the U.S.S.R. will have to destroy from 250 to 300 launchers at present targeted on the U.S. Since our active force is under the agreed aggregate of 2,250, we will not be required to destroy any of our existing weapons. This agreement will inhibit Soviet weapon deployment while leaving us considerable leeway to pursue our strategic programs as planned at present.

* Under SALT I, both the Soviet Union and the U.S. bound themselves not to interfere with the so-called National Technical Means of surveillance of the other side. No deliberate concealment of nuclear launchers is permitted. This injunction will be an important part of SALT II.

* Our negotiators believe that the limits being established are limits we can verify through independent means. We have absolutely no intention of "trusting" the Russians. Senate ratification of this agreement and certainly my vote will depend on the verifiability of this agreement.

* SALT II will take initial steps toward grappling with the issue of controlling the proliferation of new types of weapons and the modernization of existing systems. Ultimately, we can control quantity, but we do so to little purpose if we do not also control quality.

* Finally, SALT II will point to SALT III. It will set out a tentative agenda for continuing efforts to get control over our nuclear arsenals. A major topic on that agenda will be further restrictions on those Soviet systems we consider most worrisome.

### Objections to the treaty

Critics of SALT object to range restrictions placed on cruise missiles and the exemption of the Soviet Backfire bomber from aggregate restrictions as evidence that SALT does not serve U.S. interests.

The restrictions on cruise missiles will be in a protocol to the treaty which will expire before we even can deploy our first cruise missile. The Soviets will be under severe pressure to make major concessions.

36

USA TODAY / NOVEMBER 1978

USA LOOKS AT THE WORLD

sions if they want to see these restrictions continued for the full term of the treaty, which is scheduled to expire in 1985. Here, we will have a bargaining chip of enormous potency.

It is true that the Backfire bomber can probably hit the U.S., but most agree its mission is not intercontinental. It appears to be intended for possible use in Europe and the Far East. The Backfire bomber system is analogous to our so-called Forward Based Systems (FBS)—planes and missiles capable of hitting the U.S.S.R., but based in Europe—which are not covered by SALT. We have, for example, FB-111 bombers located in England which can hit Soviet targets. Moreover, the nuclear arsenals of our allies, Great Britain and France, are not affected by SALT. We have successfully avoided having these systems made part of the SALT process. Insisting on the inclusion of Backfire in the SALT aggregates could jeopardize this achievement.

By restricting both the Soviet Union and the U.S., a finely drawn SALT agreement can serve our mutual interests. The final agreement will, of course, be examined carefully in the Senate. However, a great many of SALT's difficulties have little to do with the intrinsic value of this particular treaty. Other factors are involved.

For example, critics complain that SALT does not solve the problem of ICBM vulnerability—that, in the 1980's, the U.S.'s land-based force will become increasingly vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet strike. Unfortunately, a SALT treaty which would solve that problem simply isn't in the cards. It would involve massive reductions in the Soviet land-based force, which comprises 70% of the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear arsenal. SALT will, however, leave us a range of options with which to respond to the potential threat of ICBM vulnerability. I say “potential” because those who point to ICBM vulnerability consistently ignore the fact that the two other legs of our nuclear triad provide a powerful disincentive, in the form of approximately 7,000 nuclear weapons, for any Soviet consideration of a preemptive attack on our ICBM's.

SALT suffers from other problems as well. The Carter Administration has not made the case for SALT in a consistent and coherent way. It has been hampered somewhat by not having a completed agreement to defend. However, it is not necessary for the President to go into all the details of this particular agreement in order to let the American people know that the issue itself is absolutely vital. We simply have not heard a strong case for arms control emanating from Washington. Instead, we have been subjected to a hot-water, cold-water treatment. One day, a SALT agreement is a few weeks away. The next day, SALT is

being linked to Soviet activity in Africa. The following day, it is being unlinked. Rarely, however, does anyone in the White House explain SALT's advantages to the American people. The field is left wide open to the opponents.

Either SALT is in the national interest of the U.S. or we should not be engaging in this negotiating exercise. I believe that it is and that the President should not be at all defensive about explaining why to the American people.

Unfortunately, Pres. Carter has made a series of decisions, each of which, if taken in isolation, is perhaps defensible, but which cumulatively have given him the aura of someone willing to give up something for nothing. I am thinking specifically of the B-1 decision, the Korean withdrawal plan, the joint U.S./U.S.S.R. statement on the Middle East, the cuts in the projected navy shipbuilding program, and the neutron bomb decision. He has proved unable to defend these decisions as part of a forceful national security policy.

## Soviet actions holding up SALT

Many of SALT's problems in this country can be tied directly and unmistakably to provocative and hostile Soviet activities, which have intensified in the last year. The increased harassment of Soviet dissidents in direct violation of the spirit of the Helsinki accords has outraged concerned Americans.

The provocative actions of the Soviets in Europe and Africa cause equal concern. The introduction of the Soviet SS20, a medium-range nuclear ballistic missile, into the European theater can only be seen as tilting the balance of forces in that area further in favor of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets clearly have chosen to go well beyond prudent defensive actions in Eastern Europe. Joint Soviet-Cuban actions in Africa have also received great attention in this country.

Many maintain that SALT is incompatible with this type of provocative Soviet activity and that we should show our disapproval of Soviet adventurism by cutting off or slowing down the SALT process. I disagree. If SALT is in the mutual interest of both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., it should be judged on its merits. The whole point of negotiating a nuclear arms reduction treaty, even of sitting down at the negotiating table at all, is that both sides gain by it. The only way we could use the SALT negotiations to put pressure on the Soviets to modify their behavior elsewhere would be if the Soviets were gainers and we losers under SALT—but if this were true, we shouldn't be in SALT at all.

We are left, in any case, with an incompleted SALT treaty which, despite its

considerable strengths, is in grave trouble. There are those who counsel delay. It is suggested that we should “freeze” the negotiations.

In my opinion, delay is not a real option over any extended period. We must consider the delicate health of Leonid Brezhnev. It is not at all certain that a successor to Pres. Brezhnev would have the authority or the interest to conclude an agreement. We must remember that SALT I, which expired officially last year, can not be extended forever. The Soviets, for example, have submarines ready to begin sea trials which would put them in violation of SALT I, although not of SALT II. They also have a mobile ICBM, the SS16, which is ready for deployment. SALT II would constrain them from deploying it and from testing certain other new ICBM systems they are considering. In the absence of agreement, Soviet interest in holding back on these moves may well wane. Perhaps more importantly, six years have passed since SALT I. The momentum for arms control once lost may not return for a long time.

In the absence of SALT, both sides will move ahead on development of a series of dangerous new systems. Each side will feel the need to match the other across the range of indicators—numbers of warheads, throw-weight, hard-target kill capability, and so on. This would mean greater expense, but not, I think, greater security. How could either of us feel more secure with ever more missiles targeted on our heartlands? From our far-larger economic base, we could and would match the Soviets bomb for bomb, but would either side be better off? I think not.

We must also consider the consequences if all our agreed verification procedures were to be put aside, because without SALT these verification agreements will be dropped. The Soviets can rely on our free press to provide them with an accurate assessment of our capabilities, but we must rely on our national technical means of verification, with which the Soviets are committed not to interfere. Without accurate knowledge of Soviet developments, our force planning becomes very difficult.

SALT must stand or fall on its own merits. It must serve the security interests of the U.S. Its terms must be verifiable. If these criteria are met, however, they must not be tied to other issues. We must deal with the problems created by Soviets in Africa, but tying these problems to SALT only serves to doom the treaty's prospects in the U.S.

Teddy Roosevelt used to refer to the White House as a “bully pulpit,” and it is. I hope the President will begin to use his bully pulpit to get these truths about SALT across to the American people. Ultimately, only he can turn the tide.

USA TODAY . NOVEMBER 1978

39

Prague, May 1, 1978

UNIV. PROF. DR. OTAKAR MATOUŠEK
Božecká 335
108 00 PRAHA-MALEŠICE, Czechoslovakia

Dear Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,

it is unusual to answer a letter from Dec. 12th so late.
But only now I can it answer definitively. Better to say, I cannot wait
more - in less than three weeks there will be the Meeting of the Council
of World Members of our IH. And it has been shown that there is no hope
to take part in it. I cannot come.

I am sorry, very sorry for it. The only meeting I was able
to participate in was in Japan, ten years ago. I tried my best to help.
I would like to help even now, very much - but believe me, it is not
easy without living contact, I do not feel enough what can and what
cannot be realized.

In general I wish to recapitulate my old idea. IH needs
money, more money at this very minute to renovate so many old equipment.
We cannot ask all from Rockefellers; and I believe that even the dona-
tions of alumni, asked again and again, will be not as high as expected.
This is why I make the proposal - ten years ago - to propagate the purchase
of rooms of honour which will bear the plate of the donor: a little
plate with his name and perhaps a line "in memory of...". Let us say
something which was done in great size to found Stanford University,
or a library, institute etc. at the University.

I have the impression that it was not understood enough.
There is something in the human personality to feel happy to see that
his name will stay here for the future. Some 20.000 dollars or so are
attainable. We need to select carefully and then to interest the man.
I don't think this was done well enough. Psychologically it is a diff-
rent thing than to ask money for a national room of this or that country
( which remains goog, of course, too), it is impersonal.

Well, I still repeat this proposal- the success needs an
able personality. At least the experience can be confronted. -

Now other problems of IH. You know better than anybody else
the difficult international situation. And we still need that Internati-
onal House cooperates with other International Houses, and we need this
initiative: to make a resolution in the Council Meeting, addressed to
all International Houses of the World to help, to cooperate.

The main trouble is between the socialistic and non-sociali-
stic countries. We must face this situation. At the IH Gold Jubilee
I sent about twenty circulars-letters to former IH alumni in Czechoslo-
vakia -(with two exceptions I know personally) all old alumni. No one
dared to answer. I also sent letters to 16 institutions which ought
to be interested in IH - Authorities, official students associations,
official press agency, broadcasting Corp. ( once I was director of the
programme, suspended after Munich, and the Head of broadcasting in the
days of liberation battles in May 1945) -- no official answer at all.

I will be 80 in the middle of January 1978 (never mind -
my ancestors were fit till 90 and in one or two cases till 100), I have
let us say some authority in spite of the fact that I never was inter-
rested in politics (my field is History of sc. and Med. and University
problems). I wish to help as much as possible, I still work with my

./.

[LC]

2/

students. I tried to find the possibility to take part in this meeting. Of course it is a problem of money, but not only this (I expected that I should give some lectures at Teachers College Columbia and at Harvard to be able to stay 21 days and minimize the expenses for the airplane). But it is necessary to get the permit. This goes through the University, Academy, Ministry of Education, Ministry of foreign affairs - and in spite of the fact I was accepted friendly, it has been shown that all this needs much more time to get the permit; and even some embarrassment has been shown which need more time to be removed. I must surrender this time, and I believe you understand this.

I am sure the Meeting could discuss such difficulties. The IH is international, this means: we must find the way how to cope with everything which makes international relations in education so unfriendly. Even when I were present at the meeting I could not do much more than to present this problem. We must continue to this idea of brotherhood. I am ready to abdicate in the case there would be any young, able alumnus from Czechoslovakia, but there is not. I would be happy to discuss this personally with you any time and anywhere, if you reach this possibility, let us say in any socialistic country. But now, I am only happy that a man with your experience, worldwide, presides this alumni meeting. I wish you all success and all the best to the Council meeting and to our IH. If there is a possibility for IH to help in the friendly relations of educated people, there lie in your hands the best. And I do not mean it as a compliment, you know it is the fact, and not an easy one.

Very friendly yours

KODANSHA INTERNATIONAL / USA

10 East 53 Street, New York, New York 10022

(212) 593-7050

October 18, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I understand you will visit Japan for the April meeting of the Trilateral Commissions. We at Shukan Gendai, which as you know is one of the largest weekly magazines in Japan with a circulation of one million, would like to publish an interview with you to coincide with your visit.

Since we know that you have left public life and are currently in private
business, we suggest a payment of $2500 for an hour's interview. This
figure of course is open to negotiation.

I hope your busy schedule will allow you to grant Shukan Gendai this inter-
view, and I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

MM:pw

NORBERT J. MAY

1270 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020
---
TEL. (212) 757-1705

March 29, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It is because each and every possible avenue attempted has failed, that I am appealing for your cooperation on behalf of the following Russian family:

Reinstein, Israel Moisevick Born: 12-29-33
Reinstein, Polina Bentsionovna Born: 7-19-36
Reinstein, Berta Israelevna Born: 11-19-60

11 Orbeli Street Apt. #53
Leningrad 194018 U.S.S.R.

Mr. Reinstein, a highly-qualified engineer, Mrs. Reinstein, thoroughly educated, and their daughter, have repeatedly been denied exit visas.

Mr. and Mrs. Benzion Korik are permanent residents of the United States and the parents of Mrs. Reinstein. Mr. and Mrs. Korik reside in the Washington Heights section of New York City and have contributed an enormous amount of energy to the social and economic development of this community.

Your consideration in this matter is deeply appreciated.
Should any additional information be needed, kindly contact
me at your earliest convenience.

In sincere appreciation, and with kindest personal regards,

Ilse May

[LC]

REMO J. ACITO
Chairman

STEPHEN MAY
Vice Chairman

DONALD A. RETTALIATA
Commissioner

WILLIAM H. McKEON
Commissioner

STATE OF NEW YORK
STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Two World Trade Center
New York, New York 10047

PERSONAL AND UNOFFICIAL

THOMAS W. WALLACE
Executive Director

GEORGE V. PALMER
Asst. Executive Director

DONALD J. McCARTHY JR.
Counsel-Enforcement

THOMAS P. ZOLEZZI
Special Counsel

May 5, 1978

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Although you may not recall it, you agreed through
Larry Eagleburger to serve on the committee which was being
formed in 1976 to establish the Kenneth B. Keating Institute
of American Studies at Tel Aviv University. As Ken Keating's
long-time associate during his service in Congress, I have
volunteered to coordinate this fund-raising effort, and I
would like very much to discuss it with you if you can squeeze
me into your hectic schedule.

The enclosed material will give you further insights
into this worthy cause, which will honor an outstanding
public servant and contribute significantly to American-
Israeli friendship and understanding. A key part in the
program at the Keating Institute will be courses in how
American foreign policy is developed and how it has evolved
in the Middle East. The Israeli Defense and Foreign Ministries
have indicated that they want to send some of their brightest
mid-career people to take such courses in order to deal more
perceptively with their American counterparts in the future.

I will be in Washington later this month for a meeting
of the board of the Police Foundation and wonder if we might
get together on the afternoon of Monday, May 15 or anytime on
Tuesday or Wednesday to discuss this project. I'll give
your secretary a ring a few days in advance to see what we
can work out.

SL/mch
enclosure

THE KENNETH B. KEATING INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN STUDIES
AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY

In spite of the deep interrelationship and the historic bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel, there is relatively little knowledge in Israel about American history, political processes and social development. Since the Israeli educational system is European in orientation, there are surprisingly few opportunities for Israelis to learn more about the American experience in democratic government, the ways in which America has dealt with problems which now confront Israel, the operation of the American free enterprise system, and generally, to gain a sophisticated understanding of the nation to which they are closest in spirit and purpose.

To help fill this void, a number of friends and admirers of the late Senator and Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating have joined together to raise funds to establish the Kenneth B. Keating Institute of American Studies at Tel Aviv University. The Institute will expand on the American History program at the University to provide a broad, interdisciplinary agenda of study and research in the fields of American government, politics, foreign policy development, literature, economics and the arts.

It will provide courses for undergraduates and graduate students, as well as members of the general public who wish to gain greater insights into America for career or other purposes. Thus, the future governmental, intellectual, business and labor leaders of Israel, a young democracy similar to America, will be able to acquire a thorough knowledge of two centuries of the American experiment in free government, while the United States will benefit from their increased friendship and understanding.

A distinguished group of sponsors has endorsed this effort to raise $500,000 for an endowment fund which will yield, at 8%, $40,000 annually. The Israeli government, in recognition of the importance of this program, is expected to match this sum. The $80,000 thus available will permit the formation of a first-rate faculty, the development of an outstanding library and pertinent research, publications and public lecture programs.

Tel Aviv University has enthusiastically agreed to associate the memory of the late Kenneth Keating with the proposed Institute of American Studies, because his activities and personality symbolize the close ties between America and Israel. With the interest and support offered by the many friends and admirers of Kenneth Keating, who wish to see his name and memory appropriately perpetuated, a drive is now under way to establish the necessary endowment fund which will convert the dream of the Kenneth B. Keating Institute of American Studies at Tel Aviv University into a living reality.

Contributions to "American Friends of Tel Aviv University" are tax deductible and should be sent to Stephen May at that organization's office, 342 Madison Avenue, Suite 1426, New York, New York 10017. (Telephone: (212) 687-5651). Israel Bonds are welcome as contributions.

REMO J. ACITO
Chairman

STEPHEN MAY
Vice Chairman

PERSONAL AND UNOFFICIAL

August 30, 1978

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Further to my letter of May 5 and my subsequent
conversation with Ms. Vick, I will be in Washington
September 14-18 and wonder if we could get together
during one of those days to discuss the memorial for
Ken Keating. I am free all day of Thursday and Friday
(14th and 15th) and any time after 2:00 P.M. on Monday
the 18th. (Or any time over that weekend, if you wish.)

I'll call your secretary early in September to see
when we can set up a meeting.

SM/kc

[LC]

Simon&Schuster

Alice E. Mayhew
Vice-President and Senior Editor

Mr. Henry Kissinger
suite 520
1800 K St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

26 July 1978

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thomas Hoving, who, as head of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, arranged the fabulous Tutankhamun exhibition that has been drawing unparalleled crowds all over the country, has written the real story of the boy-king's excavation. It is a riveting account of adventure and intrigue, a story filled with fascinating men who struggled for the treasure and were overwhelmed by it.

We are proud to be publishing TUTANKHAMUN: THE UNTOLD STORY.
I hope you enjoy it.

Best wishes,

Alice Mayhew

Simon & Schuster Building
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020
212 245 6400
A Division of Gulf & Western Corporation