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# CHAPTER VII
## EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

There is a curious disproportion between the energy that has been devoted to the issue of nuclear control and that which has been spent on the issue of the future of Germany. This is no accident. Nuclear control for all its complexity has the advantage of concreteness. Solutions permit technical analysis. Absorption in this problem can therefore serve as an escape from issues which are intangible and much less amenable to mechanical remedies. Yet it is probable that over the next decade the cohesiveness of the Alliance will be tested more severely by the problem of German unity than by the issue of who presses the button for nuclear war.

Basic to any policy regarding the future of Germany is a common conception of East-West relations.

### A. East-West Relations

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the early years of NATO, our European allies feared above all that we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, therefore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about the American understanding of the Communist threat. If anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did the rest. America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew absolute. In American thinking the danger of Communist aggression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic aloofness from international affairs was great.

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After the death of Stalin, the previous allied unanimity about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated. Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic transformation of the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in Soviet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Republic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks regarding Berlin. They have been uneasy about most of the schemes advanced at the Geneva disarmament conference. France rejected --as the Federal Republic would have liked to do but did not dare--the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

1

Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that NATO was provocative.

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United States policy has oscillated between these conflicting views.

American pronouncements include many of the phrases of the early days of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting views of its allies but not reconciling them, the United States has retained the liturgy of the Cold War and adopted a good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of relaxation of tensions.

As a result, much of the allied debate about East-West relations has concerned not the content of a program for negotiation but the nature of the Soviet system. Those who see a change of policy in every Soviet change of tone tend to transform foreign policy into a form of psychotherapy. To them a great deal depends on establishing good personal relations with Soviet leaders and on bringing about a general atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangeable nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society immune to the erosion of time--an achievement unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in dispute.

The only sensible debate can concern the question of how peace can be achieved and then made secure. The issue is not whether tensions should be artificially maintained, but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Is the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have deeper reasons? Is the road to a lasting detente to improve the atmosphere first and move from there to specific settlements? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding issues? Above

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all, what exactly is to be understood by a settlement? These are
the questions which the Alliance must answer for itself if it is to determine
whether a given peace offensive represents a change of tactics or a change of
policy.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history. Peaceful
co-existence has been avowed since the advent of Communism in Russia. It was
stressed particularly between 1924-39; between 1941-46; at the time of the
Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit
to the United States in 1959; since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each
occasion the reason for the detente was some internal or external strain on
the Soviet system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky
followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges; in
1941-46 it was the German invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle
after the death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to push
the Western allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused by the shock
of the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an opportunity
for expanding Communism presented itself. The period of tranquility after
1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, of the Baltic States, a
third of Poland, and an attack on Finland. World War II led to the creation of
the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to an
attempted penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the
spirit of Camp David was succeeded by another Berlin crisis which did not end
until the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

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During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the West
--including some who thought of themselves as staunchly, sometimes almost
religiously anti-Communist--hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude.

This demonstrates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is
usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes.

The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of
heart on the part of Communist leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost
> have exchanged their swords for machine tools and
> now rely more on the results of their labor than on
> direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the
> proletariat.²

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the then Senator Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."³ In 1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance."⁴ This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists]

2 Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1933), p. 216.

3 *New York Times*, May 23, 1943

4 U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, February 25, 1956.

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appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction
between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of
the Soviet state and people.⁵

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken--except
Secretary Rusk's about which returns are not yet in. The reason is not
obscure. Any system has its own dynamism which shapes its leaders and
affects what is considered reasonable in internal discussions. There is
need for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system which produce
belligerence and those which make for accommodation. These are delicately
balanced. It should be the goal of Western policy to give a maximum spur
to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist world:
the kind of man who rises to leadership positions and the ideology on which
the Communist system is built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any decade with its membership at
the end of that decade illustrates the precariousness of high office in the

⁵ Secretary Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries: Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D.C. on Feb. 25, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1290 (March 16, 1964), p. 393.

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6. Soviet system. Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves public disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any public activity.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at least have the consolation that the enormous risks they run are on behalf of their own ambitions; those on the lower levels may find themselves engulfed as a result of events totally out of their control. Loyalty may turn into a source of personal danger; subordinate officials will often share the fate of the leader even though they may have had no real alternative.

6. The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows:

Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still members of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikhailov, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospełov, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-rate post. Only two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev and are now in the front ranks of the post-Krushchev leadership.

Severyn Bialer, "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," *New York Times Magazine*, November 1, 1964, p. 27.

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All of this creates an atmosphere of suspicion--even of conspiracy--in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruthless enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich whose protégé he had been and he turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they, nevertheless, overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career --indeed their survival--has been advanced by the ability to dissemble.

Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for his rivals to organize against him. Suspiciousness is, therefore, inherent in the situation of Soviet leaders. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world

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is more benign. There is no reason for them to treat foreign statesmen more gently than their own colleagues or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically this means that the power of potential competitors must be broken. Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that they feel secure only if all conceivable rivals are reduced to impotence. Wary of even his closest colleagues, the type of person who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of forces and will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure make them possible competitors of the U.S.S.R. This does not make crises inevitable or settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever their experience, are cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend on their pronouncements alone, it would not be very secure.

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because these writings are so contradictory and so dependent on tactical considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory which will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing

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criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the
growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of
any Communist system, in the immediate future ideology continues as one of
the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation,

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an invaluable tool
in understanding historical trends and the relation of forces existing at any
particular moment. According to it, "subjective" factors, such as the
personal convictions of statesmen, matter less than the "objective" factors
which they reflect. These objective factors include the social and economic
conditions of society, the nature of the economic process and, above all, the
class struggle. Communists consider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to
distinguish between appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism"
inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "adventurism" which
risks a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains why
Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a choice between Western
goodwill and a territorial or political gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the
latter. The friendship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of
World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establishing
Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva
did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of penetrating
the Middle East. The spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum
on Berlin. The many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed
until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not
in fact favorable.

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The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions" because they believe that concessions are made to reality, not to individuals. They may change their position, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients: no matter what is said, they think that they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. This is one of the reasons why exercises in personal diplomacy--even at the highest level--have been so futile. No Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposition that he has been impressed by the personal goodwill of a capitalist statesman. Settlements are possible; but to be meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect "objective" conditions and not a personal relationship.

The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class struggle causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable philosophical hostility toward the non-Communist world. Even while advocating political co-existence, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. declared:

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The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truths, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.⁷

Thus, peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the policy of "peaceful co-existence":

> Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the development of the revolutionary class struggle in the capitalist countries, the upsurge of national liberation movements?⁸

In yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet Communist Party affirmed:

> We fully support the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.⁹

7

"The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [hereafter cited as *CDSP*], Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

8

"Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3, *CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

9

"The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," *op cit.*, *CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20

[Y]

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Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet leaders not as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition. This proposition has elicited the following exasperated comment from George F. Kennan:

> ... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in ... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life ... by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence ...<sup>10</sup>

These factors, which almost overnight could produce again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be balanced against restraints which, over a period of time, may come to predominate. First, there is the power of modern weapons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever strategic theory predominates in the West--even if it is not an ideal one--Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge.

To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself with reasonable

10

George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 174.

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prudence, the traditional methods of military pressure can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible to implement one interest the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is in the West's interest to see to it that it remains so.

Another factor making for restraint in Soviet foreign policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering. It is a symptom of weakness that over forty years after seizing power, the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession. Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor.

In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office. In the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian people may support such a style of government. At some point, however, cynicism and demoralization are likely to set in. Sooner or later, the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a system which constantly invokes the universality of its maxims can produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of "objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration--again by its own account--the "cult of personality."

The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability of Communist countries to deal with each other. Communist ideology makes no provision for conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear

[Y]

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wherever Socialism has triumphed. Since conflict among Communist states is believed to be impossible, no provision for the settlement of disputes exists. Consequently, Communist leaders try to conduct disputes among Communist states as they do their own internal struggles by seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents. But since Communist states remain sovereign, such tactics cause disputes to harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, demonstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be interpreted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a shattering impact on the world Communist movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scientific truth supplied the inward assurance; the pre-eminence of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

The unity produced by these factors has been undermined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet split, and the manner in which Khrushchev has been overthrown. De-Stalinization raised the question of relationship between the scientific truth of the dominant ideology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How could a system which was supposed to end forever man's oppression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be reconciled with slave

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labor camps and a police state? Even if the Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres must have been assailed by doubts which must have been reinforced when Khruschev was overthrown in his turn and denounced for "hare-brained schemes".

The Sino-Soviet split produced the overt fragmentation of the Communist world. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up, its underlying cause seems to be beyond repair. A movement, which claims to represent a universal truth, cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist--whatever temporary adjustments may be made.

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to compete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previously monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be demoralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khruschev's fall has also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their views about Khruschev's merit, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their

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own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power
in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics
of their Soviet colleagues--including a highly developed sense for personal
power--the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves
by a measure of autonomy. They must try to prevent their position
from being shaken by every upheaval in Moscow. The initial hesitation of
the Communist parties around the world in endorsing Khruschev's ouster can
be partly explained in this manner.

A more independent attitude corresponds in any event to the dominant
trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have,
if anything, intensified traditional nationalism. Communism has been able to
gain a measure of popular acceptance only where its leaders emphasize national
and not Communist concerns. The autarkic organization of each Communist
economy compounds these tendencies. It encapsulates each state in a system
of total planning, which complicates relations even with Communist neighbors.
A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension
has been initiated by the Soviets, not because a few individuals have overcome
the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it.
To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows:
When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the
relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press
for the settlement of issues that produced the tension in the first place?

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It can also happen that the two Communist giants may try to outbid each other in giving so-called liberation movements an anti-Western cast--Soviet actions in the Congo are a good example.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable" form of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situation of several of our allies. One of the major achievements of the post-war period in Europe has been the isolation of the Communist parties. Under the impact of many factors, to which United States policy has occasionally contributed, this isolation is beginning to break down. In Italy, for example, the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new-found strength for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of the traditional parties by De Gaulle and the change in tactics by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popular Front for the first time in thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in the new countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders were restrained from joining the Communist camp because this action reduced them to the status of satellites. With the growing disarray in the Communist world it will seem increasingly possible to combine nationalism and Communism. Many in the West draw comfort from this. But it is important to distinguish between a national Communist government in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example, Latin America. A national Communist regime in Eastern Europe is an improvement over the previous condition of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin America or Africa would inevitably become a center of anti-American agitation.

[Y]

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If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it requires a common policy and a specific program. The temptation for bilateral approaches is great. Each national leader, depending on his temperament, has visions of appearing as the apostle of a final settlement or of adding Communist pressures to his own as a bargaining device within the Alliance. This sets up a vicious circle. Each approach to Moscow is followed by a tour to uneasy allies to reassure them. Since leaders generally do not reach eminence without a touch of vanity and since some stake their prestige on their ability to woo the Soviet leaders, they tend to present their contacts with the Soviets as a considerable accomplishment. But the real issues have gone unresolved because they are genuinely difficult; hence they are usually avoided in favor of showy but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer the East-West discourse, the greater will be the confusion in the West. An attitude of sentimental optimism will make it impossible to distinguish real progress from surface gesture. The tendency to use East-West relations for domestic politics will in time foment a narrow nationalism.

Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate distrust within the Alliance. The traditional Western balance of power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Kremlin. Whatever incentives the Soviets will have to be responsible will vanish. They will be able to escape their difficulties with the assistance of the West and without settling any of the outstanding issues. Since in the Kremlin--as in the West --there must be many who consider maintaining the status quo preferable

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to change, the result is likely to be diplomatic paralysis obscured by
abstract declarations about peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies. (a) The willingness by the members of the Alliance to subordinate short-term advantages to a long-term conception of the future. (b) The willingness to develop a concrete and common program embodying the West's vision of the future. A united West would have unusual opportunities for negotiation. The disarray in Eastern Europe should permit it to adjust its policies to the degree of autonomy shown by the various East European countries. Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered in a new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy urgently requires a comprehensive solution. All these approaches presuppose some consensus in the West about the shape of international affairs over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the future of
Germany. No other issue illustrates as dramatically the need for unity and for
purpose, for an agreed Allied policy as well as for concrete proposals.

B. <u>The Future of Germany</u>

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-German Treaty of Collaboration has become increasingly complicated. After the initial period of shock, the United States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Republic. One motive behind the MLF was to prevent West Germany from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear cooperation--an offer which has not yet been made and, given De Gaulle's awareness of the inter-European equilibrium, might never have been extended.