NEWSWEEK 1 NOVEMBER 71

328

# WILL SUCCESS SOBER MOSCOW?

Every year as the Pentagon prepares to launch its fight for another multi-billion-dollar budget, the nation's military leaders begin raising alarums that, strategically speaking, the Russians are coming. This year, to hear some of the top U.S. brass tell it, the Soviets are not only coming—they have already arrived. The Kremlin is known to be building monstrous holes in the ground to accommodate new nuclear behemoths (page 100) and is building missile-spewing submarines with a fervor that causes Adm. Hyman Rickover to bite his lip. By now, it has become an article of faith among U.S. military men that Moscow is on the verge of tipping the strategic balance sharply into its favor. But to other analysts, both in and out of government, the figures simply do not add up that way. At present, a pivotal dispute is raging over those numbers—and, more important, over what they really signify.

The debate itself is hardly new, but it has taken on an added dimension as the tools of nuclear war have become increasingly complex. At issue once again is nothing less than a new definition of American national security. Throughout most of the 1960s, the U.S. was confident that as the world's top nuclear dog it could win any showdown. But in recent years, two historic developments have challenged that assumption: thanks to its rapid military buildup, the Soviet Union has emerged as an increasingly self-confident superpower while the U.S., thanks to its tragic involvement in Indochina, has lost its old relish for an activist foreign policy. As a result, as he enters the 1972 campaign, Richard Nixon is painfully aware that he is susceptible to the charge that he has allowed the Russians to open a strategic gap. And as a victim of a similar—and groundless—charge in 1960, the President seems likely to do everything in his power to protect himself against that accusation.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has carried the main burden in persuading the Congress and the public of the seriousness of the Soviet threat. According to Pentagon estimates, Russia has already deployed nearly 600 more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the U.S. (1,600 to 1,054). And even though the U.S. currently is clinging to a 41-to-25 edge in Polaris-type submarines, the Soviet sub factory in Sevastopol is said to be turning out enough Y-class boats to catch up to the U.S. by 1973—one year earlier than previously expected. Worse yet, say Pentagon planners, the Kremlin is spending $3 billion more a year on military research and development than the U.S. "The way things are going," warns one analyst, "the Soviets are soon likely to eliminate all those areas in which they are now at a disadvantage."

Margin: Few experts seriously contest the Pentagon's figures on Soviet hardware, but many doubt the military's analysis of Kremlin spending and future capabilities. The U.S. General Accounting Office, for instance, believes that available data on Soviet research spending are too meager for "a realistic measurement." And even those who accept the $3 billion figure question its long-range significance. For one thing, the U.S. still maintains a sizable margin over the Russians in the number of deliverable warheads and in the over-all quality of strategic forces. For another, the cost to the Soviets of actually taking the lead in the arms race would be far greater than merely catching up. And the Kremlin, these experts argue, cannot even afford to continue present military spending without falling dangerously behind the West in civilian technology (page 45). "The Kremlin understands," says Harvard Prof. Paul Doty, "that the era of expensive big weaponry may be drawing to a close. Before it signs any arms-limitation agreements, it appears to be stocking up bargaining chips as fast as it can."

Beyond that, Western experts do not think that Soviet strategists are gearing up for a first-strike capability against the U.S. Indeed, everyone agrees that even a Soviet strategic edge would by no means guarantee that the Kremlin could emerge from a nuclear exchange with the U.S. in the position of a clear-cut victor. "Almost any conceivable nu-

clear exchange is going to be almost unlivable," Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard said last week. "In terms of nuclear war, the question of whether you have a few more [weapons] or a few less is not really the issue. In a sense, there probably isn't any such thing as nuclear superiority in terms of any ability to use the weapons."

What worries Packard and other proponents of an expanded U.S. defense budget, however, is the possible international political fallout from a shift in the nuclear balance. In the past, nuclear stockpiles have often proved a crude but handy yardstick of a nation's power. And Pentagon officials contend that if the U.S. falls behind, Washington's allies will have less confidence in the U.S. defense umbrella. More important, they are concerned that an emboldened Soviet Union might decide to turn on the heat in world trouble spots in order to wring concessions from the West. Time and again, military planners invoke the danger of a "Cuban missile crisis in reverse" in which Moscow would invoke its nuclear muscle to force the U.S. to back down.

Not surprisingly, budget-minded civilian critics do not see it that way. To them, the U.S. came out on top in the 1962 Cuban test largely because of its overwhelming naval strength in the area and not because of its nuclear superiority. Neither do the civilians fully accept the military's theory that political power grows out of the silo of an ICBM. In their view, international influence is as much the product of the domestic image a nation conveys to the world as of pure military might. Economic vigor, a country's perception of its role in the world and the strength and flexibility of its society in general all play a part in the game of nations.

**Confidence:** Still, there is no denying the benefits that have already accrued to Moscow from its position of nuclear parity. With its tightened grip in the Middle East, its naval forays into the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean and its show-the-flag visits around the world, the Soviet Union has clearly established itself as a superpower of the first order. But with the Kremlin's increased boldness has come at least one benefit for the West—increased Soviet self-confidence. As long as Moscow believed itself to be weak militarily, its political maneuvers were part stonewalling, part dust-stirring, part timidity covered in bluff. With its newfound confidence has come the willingness to enter strategic arms limitation talks, to dicker and to deal more easily with the U.S. on a myriad of peripheral issues and to break some of the old stalemates of European politics. How much longer that willingness will last, no one really knows. But as one British observer put it: "Predominant power or too little power is no a priori spur to responsibility. Equal power can be. The West can only hope that for the Soviets it is."

NEWSWEEK 1 NOVEMBER 1971

BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

# SOVIET VULNERABILITY

President Nixon's acceptance of the invitation to visit Moscow in May of next year was tactically wise. It will increase the Chinese stake in making Mr. Nixon's earlier visit to Peking at least a moderate success; at the same time, it will have a similar impact on the Soviet leaders who, in fact, issued the invitation only after mulling over the implications for themselves of Mr. Nixon's journey to China. Mr. Nixon has thereby gained additional leverage both in Peking and in Moscow.

The trip to Moscow, moreover, will come at a complicated stage in American-Soviet relations. On the one hand, they have been becoming less hostile during the last several years; yet at the same time, Soviet military development is posing a growing threat to the United States' interests; finally, despite Russia's growing international strength, the internal position of the Soviet system is not getting stronger; indeed, there are portents of grave crises to come. All of that makes the next several years quite critical.

## SOVIET CONTRADICTIONS

That Soviet military power has grown needs no demonstration. What is less appreciated, however, is that that growth has been achieved at enormous cost, not only financial but scientific as well. Given the sharp compartmentalization in the Soviet Union between military and non-military industrial production, there has been relatively little economic spin-off from the massive Soviet efforts. The result might well be that by 1975 the Soviet Union will be confronted by a severe scientific-technological gap in comparison to the U.S., Japan and Western Europe. (The intense Soviet efforts at industrial espionage are clearly designed to offset this threat.)

There are other internal problems as well. The ruling elite is aged and non-innovative. The scientific community is frustrated and restless. The remarkable analysis of Soviet foreign policy published in the 67th issue of "Political Diary," an underground journal clearly produced by very well-informed Soviet scientists, reveals acute concern that, with about 30 per cent of its GNP consumed by defense and space, the Soviet Union is wasting its assets in the pursuit of a traditional big-power foreign policy.

At the same time, the Chinese are beginning to exploit Soviet nationality problems. It is sometimes forgotten that 50 per cent of the Soviet population is non-Russian and there is a growing awareness of national identity among the non-Russians. For example, the Chinese have begun to cultivate Ukrainian national sentiments with remarkable boldness.

## LOST ELAN

Equally troubling in the longer run is the general decline of Soviet revolutionary élan. The Soviet political system rests on the claim that it represents the historically inevitable wave of the future. Yet increasingly it is viewed even at home as a conservative bureaucratic mechanism that employs Marxist rhetoric to justify its own vested interests. This condition carries with it the threat of "delegitimating" the Soviet system among its own adherents.

In a way, I have personally experienced Soviet sensitivity on this point. A year ago, I published a book entitled "Between Two Ages" that dealt with the impact of the new scientific revolution on the modern world, and particularly on the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In it, I argued that much of America's current turbulence is rooted in America's leap into a historically new age, whereas the Soviet Union has frozen itself into an increasingly anachronistic system, derived largely from the Stalinist mode of industrializing Russia.

It usually takes the Soviets at least a year or two to review foreign books. Yet "Between Two Ages," which certainly was not written for a mass audience, was reviewed almost instantly, in both the academic as well as popular Soviet press. In passionate reviews Soviet writers attempted to rebut its principal themes, showing particular sensitivity to the argument that the Soviet system is now in a dialectically hostile relationship to the growth needs of the Soviet society.

This condition of growing domestic rigidity has important international implications. If the U.S. navigates skillfully the next several years—during which some Soviet leaders may be tempted to seek more assertively short-term foreign-policy successes—the longer-term prospects in peaceful American-Soviet competition become more promising.

329

# OUR TURN TO BLINK?

BY STEWART ALSOP

NEWSWEEK 1 NOV 1971

(27OCT)

WASHINGTON-It is highly likely that one of these days soon, probably before Christmas, quite possibly before Thanksgiving, CIA director Richard Helms will call the White House and ask for an urgent appointment with the President. A great deal will then depend on what Helms tells President Nixon, and what President Nixon decides to do about it.

Helms, of course, is the No. 1 man in the U.S. intelligence community. The intelligence community is braced for "the other shoe to drop." The other shoe is a series of Soviet missile tests that the intelligence specialists are sure-rather mysteriously sure-will take place before the end of this year, most probably in November or early December.

These tests will tell a great deal about the real purpose of the very great Soviet investment in offensive strategic weapons. This investment is the first shoe, and it is symbolized by the missile silos-"holes," they are called in the intelligence trade-that the Russians have been constructing with extraordinary urgency throughout this year. The tests will show what kind of missiles the Russians intend to put in their holes.

This is not, admittedly, a subject that much interests most people in the present, curious mood of this country. But it is a subject that has to interest the intelligence specialists-and the President, too. For what goes into the Russian holes may well determine whether or not it is rational to hope for what the President likes to call "a generation of peace."

The facts about the holes are as follows (and these facts are indeed facts, for the Pentagon's reconnaissance satellites bring back pictures of the holes almost as detailed as a picture of a building across the street). A total of 91 new holes has been dug so far this year. Twenty-five of these new holes are very large-larger than the holes that used to be dug for the huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missile. Sixty-six of the holes are somewhat smaller than the regular SS-9 holes but larger than the holes for the 1-megaton SS-11 missile.

These smaller holes are dug in a big circle, with ten missiles to a circle. In the middle of a half dozen or so of these circles, a very big hole, bigger than any missile site ever built, has been dug. None of the holes has as yet been fitted with a missile, and the experts do not expect them to be operational until about July 1972.

There are no doubt innumerable papers marked Top Secret filled with details about the Russian holes, but the essential facts are as stated above. These facts make it possible for any reasonably intelligent reader of this magazine to be his own intelligence analyst. What are the holes: for?

It is very unlikely that they are simply for more first-generation SS-9s and SS-11s. Otherwise, the missiles would already be in their holes. They could be for improved versions of the SS-9 and the SS-11. Or they could be for entirely new weapons.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the Russians want to do one thing to improve the SS-9, and another thing to improve the SS-11. The SS-9, or an entirely new version of the big missile, could be provided with multiple warheads, or "MIRVed." Because its warhead is so immense, the missile could be MIRVed six, or even ten times over. Given sufficient accuracy, even a relatively small number of MIRVed megaton missiles could be used to destroy, in a first strike, this country's main strategic deterrent-our 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles.

Greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11, or some new version of such a missile, would have a similar effect. The SS-11 is an "anti-city" weapon; it is only roughly accurate, since only rough accuracy is required to destroy a city with a 1-megaton warhead. But if it could be rendered accurate enough to dig a Minuteman missile out of its concrete silo, then it too would become a direct threat to our strategic deterrent.

How about the enormous new holes? The reader's guess may be as good as the specialists', for the specialists do not pretend to have the answer. These huge holes could be for hardened control centers. Or they could be for some new kind of offensive strategic missile, perhaps filled with penetration aids to blind the U.S. defense, perhaps with an enormous warhead designed to black out the defense's radar and control systems. Nobody knows.

After the expected tests, a lot more will be known, for the tests tell us almost as much as they tell the Russians about such factors as accuracy, range and megatonnage. Suppose the tests show (a) a MIRVed SS-9-type missile, (b) greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11-type missile, and (c) an entirely new offensive strategic missile of immense size. Even if the tests showed only one or two of these things, Richard Helms would have to ask for that urgent appointment with the President. What would the President do then?

Already, it is too late to talk about missile "parity." The Russians have 1,600 intercontinental missiles against 1,054 American missiles, and in terms of missile megatonnage, they have between five and ten times the thermonuclear capacity we have. Their anti-bal listic-missile complex is fully operational in the Moscow area and being urgently extended, whereas our ABM system will not be operational for several years.

They are ready to produce an entirely new swept-wing attack bomber, with an undoubted "anti-U.S. attack capability," whereas our B-52s are Model T bombers, terribly vulnerable to the new SA-5 Soviet anti-aircraft. The Soviet Y-class nuclear submarine fleet of 41 boats now equals ours, and instead of halting production, the Russians have doubled their production capacity. The Soviet conventional fleet is already in several categories superior to ours.

The new Soviet missile tests could indicate at least the serious possibility that the Soviets are building up for a new eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation, like the 1962 Cuban crisis, in which it would be our turn to blink. The likely locale of the confrontation is obvious-the Middle East. It is easy to dismiss this possibility as mere Pentagon propaganda. But it is also silly.

The intelligence analysts, including the Pentagon's, have consistently underestimated the Soviet missile program. As for the President, his political future may be at stake. If he were to abandon hope for successful SALT talks and ask for very large new appropriations to regain nuclear parity with the Russians, he might well be throwing away his chance of re-election, in this country's present mood.

So what would the President do? If some of the gloomier analysts are right, what will the President do?

330

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 6:30 PM

NOV 2

Will Arms Be Limited?

CRONKITE: Despite the current arms limitation talks between the US and the Soviet Union, there are still doubts as to whether the arms race can ever be ended.

Tonight, in the third report on the arms build up, CBS News Pentagon Correspondent Bob SCHIEFFER examines the exorbitant cost of keeping an uneasy peace.

BOB SCHIEFFER: On a remote Pacific island, the US missile defense ABM is still being tested but the nuclear super powers are already developing newer weapons - modern bombers, more accurate missiles, newer submarines.

Since WWII, the US has spent a trillion dollars on defense. The Soviets are now spending so much on defense research that even Pentagon minds boggle.

Though both can destroy the other, the question remains, how much security is enough.

MAN: I think to a very considerable extent, we leave our military planners very mucy at large as to just what it is they are suppose to prepare for.

As a consequence, they end up preparing for things that aren't at all likely to happen.

ANOTHER MAN: We have to not get in a position where we're going to waste a lot of money on useless systems simply because the Russian political leadership doesn't have control over their military and are permitting them to waste a lot of money.

That doesn't seem to be very sensible.

THIRD MAN: National security is expensive and it does take the efforts of a large fraction of our American people.

It's unfortunate but it is better to be secure and to have our freedom then to be insecure and run the risk of losing it.

SCHIEFFER: In Rome, John Cardinal CROLL (?) told Winston BURDETT the stakes are so enormous that the arms race has become a moral dilemma.

CROLL: It's frightening to think that about a million people go to bed every night suffering from hunger and malnutrition and that about ten thousand people die every day.

While this is happening last year there was an expenditure of two hundred and four billion dollars in the world for armament.

And while there is such a tremendous flow going into armament, we find that people are starving and suffering from malnutrition and dying.

SCHIEFFER: For the first time in the arms race US planners say there is rough parity but do the Soviets feel the same way.

The official answer is yes, but the question has sparked debate within the Administration.

The Soviets now have more land base missiles than the US and will apparently deploy additional ones.

Some see this as a reaction to the US decision to build ABM and to put multiple warheads on its missiles, but others see it as a Soviet thrust for superiority.

The concern is that the Soviets would use that beefed up nuclear arsenal for psychological purposes - the way to tempt America's allies to turn elsewhere in the big power showdown.

Well the arms limitation talks are underway. No one is sure that the arms race can be halted even if both sides want to halt it.

MAN: We just must put a limit to the total raw power on each side. And yet, despite the best efforts on each side, it just may be that - that we cannot in the near future put a limit - put an end to this ever increasing capability.

I think there is hope. I really believe that we will be successful in SALT.

(CONTINUED)

331

332

We won't be as successful as some wish, but we'll be more successful than the pessimists believe we'll get.

ANOTHER MAN: I think that if there is no SALT agreement and there is sort of a general consensus between the two countries that the possibilities of arms control have disappeared and we can look forward to nothing except the continued effort to maintain the balance of terror but at ever increasing costs.

I regard that as a dreadful prospect.

SCHIEFFER: There is no question that the buildup on both sides has gone far past the point of overkill.

The new warnings about Soviet missile activity being leaked by some within the Administration can only increase pressure for counter-reaction by the US.

And that in turn, could touch off further reaction by the Soviet Union.

The arms limitation talks are underway but progress is slow. In the meantime, the balance of terror can only increase on both sides.

333

WALL STREET JOURNAL 4 NOVEMBER 1971

## Safety at the Summit

Is an amelioration of relations with the Communists possible without appeasement?

Evidently most Americans agree with their government that it is indeed possible. It marks quite a change of attitude all around.

The change was underscored by the relative calm—punctured by some angry words—with which the public accepted the expulsion of Nationalist China from the United Nations and the seating of Communist China in the General Assembly and the Security Council. Even though, as it turned out, the U.S. was unable to prevent it, such a reversal would have evoked outraged cries of appeasement just about everywhere in this country only a few years ago. All the more so since the UN vote came in the context of President Nixon's new policy of summitry vis-a-vis both Peking and Moscow.

This doesn't mean, of course, that Americans approve of the expulsion of Taiwan or that they have come to believe the Chinese Communists are suddenly men of peace and good will. Certainly we don't think any such thing, and we consider that the UN at the least made a sham of its pretensions to universality by voting Taiwan out.

Yet it would be understandable if a lot of people have grown bored or frustrated with a Nationalist-Chinese situation that increasingly has seemed to have nowhere to go but down. To regard Chiang Kai-shek's government as the government of Taiwan is one thing; it is quite another for that government to insist, as it has for 22 years, that it is the legitimate government of all China and that it will retake the mainland. The Chinese Communists may not have much claim to legitimacy, but they have in fact ruled the mainland all this time.

In any event, the Nationalist government's stance could only put mounting strain on its credibility. With the passage of time, too, that stance became more and more of an albatross for the U.S.

Particularly it complicated the pursuit of what the Nixon administration has long felt is the necessity of achieving tolerable relations with Peking—not because the Communists are nice people but rather precisely because they aren't. In a state of continued isolation, that is, they might well be more dangerous than otherwise.

That strikes us as a judgment of maturity on the part of Washington and on the part of the citizenry. For years the Communists of both varieties have been all but impossible to deal with, and they won't be easy in the future. Now that there are slight signs of an interest in improving relations with the U.S., however, the President is right to follow through, including his resort to summitry.

Granted, the danger of appeasement lurks in this policy, not least in connection with summit meetings. Through history, such sessions have hardly made a uniformly happy record, and they got a fresh and deservedly bad name in and immediately after World War II. Then, out of a mistaken hope for Soviet cooperation in the postwar world, the allies did make unfortunate concessions to Stalin.

But that history, it seems to us, has less to do with summit meetings as an institution than with the attitudes the participants bring to bear. Of all people, Richard Nixon and his advisers are extremely unlikely to be duped by the Communists or to give in to them for the sake of illusory improvement. As far as we know, the American officials don't even regard the summit as a place to bargain, a process that is usually more safely conducted at lower levels. Summitry probably should be used mainly to symbolize decisions already made to try to get along without war.

Manifestly, then, Washington's approach is very different from—and much healthier than—it was in the war years. Something else is fundamentally different as well; at that time the U.S. alone had the bomb, whereas for years now America's professed enemies also have had it. The result has been the so-called balance of terror, and the peoples of the world are entitled to think the opposing governments should be able to work out a less hair-raising relationship, despite the deep and abiding ideological chasm between communism and freedom.

Whatever successes or whatever disappointments may be in store for the new U.S. diplomacy, there does seem to be a rare chance of rational discussion with Peking and thereafter Moscow. Not to grab the chance would, in the circumstances, be derelict, perhaps fatally derelict.

WASHINGTON POST
12 NOVEMBER 1971

Renewed Interest
In a Full Test Ban

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

THE SIGNS point to a new flurry of pub
lic interest in a comprehens ve nuclear test
ban treaty (CTB) that would extend the par
tial ban of the 1953 treaty to cover under-
ground tests as well.

The public's attention, or at least its envi-
ronmental anxiety, has been freshened by
the huge underground bias last week at
Amchitka. A Senate Foreign Relations sub-
committee headed by an issue-minded presi-
dential candidate, Edward Muskie, has just
published a report on the CTB hearings it
held while everybody was vacationing last
July. A subcommittee of the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy has'd new hearings
on U.S. seismic monitoring capabilities. And
the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute has weighed in w th a major re-
port, "The Test Ban."

An aroused public, an ambitious politi-
cian, and new ammunition for debate:
doesn't it seem as though the comprehensive
test ban is an idea whose time has come?

It is with regret that one must report this
is probably not the case. The CTB may well
be an idea whose time came years ago—in
the brief interlude early in 1963 when Mos-
cow was willing to accept a few on-site
inspections of suspicious blasts—but has not
reappeared since. That CTB talk is again in
the air may say more about the changing
arms control scene than it says about the
prospects of the project itself.

THE PARTIAL test ban engaged the
world public, and the governments of
non-nuclear states, as perhaps no other
arms control initiative has. Some may
have thought that the great danger of over-
arming the world and fitting a nuclear fuse
to it would have alarmed people enough to
lead them to curb the arms race; as we
know, this hasn't happened. Some may have
thought that the colossal expense and waste
of resources, documented again last week by
a United Nations experts' report, would
have produced effective counter-pressures;
this has not happened either.

But the spectacle of actual nuclear explo-
sions, of bombs bursting in air, as it were,
has had an appreciable impact in dramatiz-
ing the arms race and in reducing its hor-
rors from the esoteric and the abstract to the
reachable and the real. Thus mobilized, it
was the likes of mothers for peace, worried
sick over strontium 90 in milk, it seems to
me, who gave President Kennedy the extra
moral impetus and political support he
needed on order to push the partial test ban
through the bureaucracy, the Russians and
the Congress in 1963.

However, to swing the approval of the
Joint Chiefs and the crucial votes of securi-
ty-conscious senators like Henry Jackson,
President Kennedy had to promise an exten-
sive research and underground-testing pro-
gram. These "safeguards" were implemented
to an extent which at once satisfied Senator
Jackson and eviscerated the treaty from an
arms-control viewpoint. Testing and arming
have continued with unprecedented vigor.

Ever since then, public discussion of a
CTB has centered on the certainly nar-
row and conceivably irrelevant issue of "ver-
ification." The old argument over inspec-
tions was an aspect of this; so is the new ar-
gument, conducted in the Muskie hearings,
over improvements in seismic monitoring.
The emphasis on verification has served well
those, including the American government,
without much interest in a CTB. It has let
them largely avoid—in public—the impor-
tant question of whether if the Russians did
find reason or opportunity to cheat they
could derive an advantage worth anything.
Senator Muskie has yet to zero in on this
question.

The emphasis on verification, necessarily
a highly technical issue, has had the further
effect of turning the whole test ban idea back
into the narrow experts—only issue it was
in the old days before radioactive fallout
gave it a politically important public. The
widespread concern over Amchitka focused
on efforts to block that single event and
never broadened into a campaign to attack
the problem at its roots by banning all tests
through a CTB.

TO BE sure, a CTB does have an unavoid-
able yesterday ring to it. The delegations
and governments at Geneva keep plugging
it; they may have a certain institutional and
historical interest in it, the new Stockholm
report suggests, and "many may feel that they
and the public were swindled when they
were led to believe that the partial test ban
treaty would limit or stop tests." But mean-
while the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
has come into being. It serves several of the
purposes, nonpollution as well as nonproli-
feration, that a CTB signed by non-nuclear
states would serve. Most important, Wash-
ington and Moscow have set up their own
private arms control shop at SALT.

Is a CTB out of the question in a SALT
agreement aimed at limiting the numbers of
strategic missiles, since tests may be neces-
sary, or may be urged, to improve the qual-
ity of missiles? Given the concentration of
Executive and political energies essential to
any one arms control effort, is it not just as
well for the administration to focus itself on
SALT? For that matter, would a CTB ac-
tually limit the arms race—that is, could we
be entering a period in which technology,
and the great force it lends to weapons
building, might proceed without tests?

To ask these questions is not only to indi-
cate how relatively little we of the public
may understand about a CTB, which in its
face sounds like such an attractive idea. It is
to emphasize how generally poorly situated
is the public, including the Congress, to
oversee the specific practice of arms control.
The Executive has secrecy to enhance its
power. It has the expertise and continuity of
its large bureaucracy as well. Maybe that's
why the current flurry of public interest in
a CTB is no more than that.

335

336

CQ Fact Sheet

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY

13 NOV 71

ANNUAL ABM DEBATE DISARMED BY SALT ACCORD PROSPECTS

Although the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system continues as an ongoing weapon system, it was sidetracked as a controversial issue in the Senate this year with only one-third of the network paid for.

One overriding factor caused the anti-ABM forces in the Senate to wither in strength and fade in interest—word from one of their leaders that, in his studied opinion, U.S. and Soviet negotiators at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) were near agreement on the ABM.

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R Ky.), who for years had opposition to the ABM program, told the Senate Sept. 29 that a successful SALT settlement depended on the politicians, not the negotiators. Cooper felt an ac- cord was so close that he reversed his position in one last effort to give the President an unhindered chance to reach agreement with the Soviets, using the ongoing ABM program as a bargaining chip.

SALT negotiators were scheduled to convene the sixth round of talks Nov. 15 in Vienna with both the President and Cooper hinting that some kind of agreement was possible by the end of the calendar year.

Despite the low level of activity by the ABM opposition in 1971, a Congressional Quarterly survey showed that a strong sentiment against the program remained an important consideration in the 1971 debate, although it was not held to be the most important factor.

A strong opposition movement to ABM funding would not be likely during consideration of the upcoming defense appropriations bill, the survey showed, but if some type of agreement was not reached at the SALT negotiations by the spring of 1972, the President would probably face a revitalized opposition movement as well as a full-scale resurrection of the arms race.

The day the Senate voted on an amendment to stop deployment of the Safeguard system, some of the program's former foes—such as George McGovern (D S.D.), Alan Cranston (D Calif.), Birch Bayh (D Ind.), Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.), Fred R. Harris (D Okla.), Joseph M. Montoya (D N.M.), and Daniel K. Inouye (D Hawaii) stayed away. Some who had for years opposed or were expected to vote against the program were voting for it—names like Cooper, Frank Church (D Idaho), Edward W. Brooke (R Mass.), Clifford P. Case (R N.J.) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.).

A survey of lobbyists, key Senate staff members and the records of the 1971 ABM debate showed that while the primary factor in defusing the anti-ABM movement may have been the expectation of a SALT agreement, many other influences played a role in thwarting the movement. They were:

* Action by the Senate Armed Services Committee restricting deployment to two of the four proposed ABM sites which cut $161-million from the Administration's $1.268-billion Safeguard ABM request.

* The reversal by Cooper to temporarily support the ABM and thus indirectly pressure the Administration to reach a SALT settlement.

* Poor organization by Senators normally opposed to the ABM authorization. One anti-ABM lobbyist, said: "Liberals have this natural tendency not to agree to focus on a limited number of issues. They come running into the Senate with 50 different amendments and, my God, who's going to listen to them?"

* Lobbyists were not active, partially, they said, because their function had been to educate and because there were few new technological or scientific aspects that had not already been explored previously. They also said the disorganized anti-ABM forces in the Senate had not kept lobbyists informed of upcoming crucial votes.

* The bill containing the ABM authorization (HR 8687) came to the Senate floor after nearly four months of Senate debate on the military draft extension bill (HR 6531—PL 92-129). The Senate by then was tired of long debates, especially on military matters.

* There was the feeling that any Senate-passed provisions would be watered down or knocked out in the Senate House conference committee. (The bill subsequently went to the conference and House conferences agreed to the ABM cuts made by the Senate Armed Services Committee.)

References. 1971 ABM debate, Weekly Report p. 2096, 2051, 1365; SALT background, p. 1155 and 1970 Almanac, p. 383; ABM debates in previous years, 1970 Almanac, p. 394-98; 1969 Almanac, p. 257, 269-73; 1968 Almanac, p. 412; Editorial Research Reports, Nuclear Balance of Terror, July 1, 1970, Vol. II, p. 485.

Cooper's Key Role

Sen. Cooper first offered an amendment to halt deployment of the ABM system April 18, 1968. His proposal was rejected by a 28-31 roll-call vote after an afternoon of floor debate.

Cooper joined with Philip A. Hart (D Mich.) the following year to offer an amendment to the defense procurement authorization bill to cut all funds for Safeguard procurement. After more than one month of debate, the Senate Aug. 6, 1969, by a 50-50 vote rejected a substitute amendment similar to the Cooper-Hart proposal and then by a 49-51 margin rejected the original amendment.

The ABM battle in 1970 again centered around a version of the Hart Cooper amendment to the procurement bill restricting ABM authorization to just two sites instead of the four requested by the Administration. After eight days of debate, the amendment was rejected Aug. 12, 1970, by a 47-52 roll call vote.

Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa), who had offered an amendment in 1970 aimed at halting all deployment of ABMs, sponsored the only anti-ABM proposal during consideration of the 1971 defense procurement authorization

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bill (HR 8687). The Hughes amendment was debated for 90 minutes Sept. 29 and was rejected by a 21-64 roll call vote, the worst defeat for such an amendment in four years.

**Position Switch.** It was during debate on the Hughes amendment that Cooper told the Senate he had changed his mind on how best to restrain future enlargement of the Safeguard ABM network.

"I have not changed my views about the inadequacies of the Safeguard ABM system," Cooper told the Senate Sept. 29. "But for the present and this is the core of my statement the adequacy or the inadequacy of the ABM system is not the issue before us.... It is my firm belief that an agreement on ABM is attainable before the end of this calendar year. I strongly believe that the SALT talks are the most important diplomatic negotiations that have been undertaken since the nuclear age began.... I believe it best that we do not alter the basis upon which negotiations are taking place."

Cooper placed great hope in the outcome of SALT but warned that if an agreement had not been reached when the Senate considered the 1972 defense authorization bill, he would oppose further funds for the Safeguard system.

Stuart Symington (D Mo.) commented on Cooper's switch: "I do regret that he (Cooper) believes it essential to authorize this additional billion dollars for a worthless system, apparently as a necessity for reaching such an agreement (at SALT). To me this is a tragic and additional unnecessary waste of the taxpayer's money."

One lobbyist told Congressional Quarterly that Cooper had been given a "horse and pony show over in Helsinki... he was sold a bill of goods."

William G. Miller, aide to Cooper who has for four years been involved in the fight to reduce the ABM program, said that Cooper's decision was reached "not simply in Helsinki." Miller explained: "We had discussions before we left with people in the White House, the State Department and with the Soviets. We've been studying this for years."

"There is a distinction between what the negotiators can accomplish and what the political leaders will decide to do," Miller told Congressional Quarterly. He said that when he visited Helsinki with Cooper in August 1971 to talk with U.S. negotiators, "they had reached a position where an agreement was possible. After this point it becomes a political question," Miller said. "The timing on a thing like this is up to the politicians."

"The SALT talks are at a position now that if an agreement on defensive weapons can be attained," Cooper said, "an agreement on offensive missiles can take place. The negotiating team at Helsinki...has brought the negotiations with the Soviet Union to this point. What remains is for the two governments to take action on the possibility which lies before them."

**Bargaining Chip.** According to Miller, the only viable argument left for continuing the Safeguard program, was its possible value to U.S. SALT negotiators. This had for several years been referred to as the "bargaining chip" argument, and, during the 1970 and 1971 ABM discussion, it was a primary defense of the program.

Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), a long-time supporter of the Safeguard program, illustrated the bargaining chip argument in the Sept. 29 debate: "I believe it is clear

## Background On Safeguard

ABM stands for a family of anti-ballistic missiles designed to destroy incoming enemy missiles in flight.

By linking anti-ballistic missiles to an early-warning radar and guidance system, the Pentagon created an ABM system known as Safeguard. Within the Safeguard system are two types of ABMs—short- and long-range intercepters.

The Spartan missile was designed to destroy incoming enemy warheads at about 100 miles above the earth with bursts of X rays from a five megaton atomic blast in the vacuum of space. The Atomic Energy Commission conducted an experimental five-megaton test blast Nov. 6, 1971, at the Alaskan island of Amchitka. The test was believed to be for the Spartan warhead and sparked a heated controversy.

The Sprint missile was designed to intercept enemy missiles that the Spartan failed to destroy. The Sprint is a short-range missile with an estimated attack range of about 35 miles. The Sprint bursts from its launch pad at speeds unmatched by any other U.S. missile.

One related research program costing $25-million in fiscal 1971 and $65-million in fiscal 1972 was named Hardsite. According to a Pentagon spokesman, Hardsite would provide greater "close-in protection by deployment of more Sprint missiles and more accurate close-range radar systems."

**Site System.** Defense planners in the Johnson Administration called their ABM program the Sentinel system and Congress was told that major cities would be protected by the 17-site system.

President Nixon changed the name to Safeguard in 1969 and said it would stress regional protection with a 12-site system. Although this plan has not been abandoned altogether, Congress has authorized funds for just four sites to protect offensive missile launch locations, not cities and not regions.

Of the four approved sites, two have been given the go-ahead by Congress for full deployment of the radar systems and missiles—Grand Forks Air Force Base, N.D., and Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont. The other two sites—Whiteman Air Force Base, Mo., and Warren Air Force Base, Wyo.—have been cleared by Congress for advanced preparation. Development of a possible fifth site, protecting Washington, D.C., was postponed by Congress. The Pentagon estimated that the first Safeguard site, Grand Forks, would be operational by early 1973.

**Funding.** Cost estimates for the four-site Safeguard program jumped from a fiscal 1971 estimate of $6.5-billion to a fiscal 1972 estimate of $7.1-billion. Congress authorized $1.1-billion in continuing appropriations for fiscal 1972.

Although Congress had authorized appropriations for Safeguard totaling $3.7-billion through fiscal 1971, the Pentagon had actually spent just $2.5-billion by Sept. 30, 1971.

PAGE 2338—Nov. 13, 1971

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since the beginning of the talks (SALT), the Soviets' goal to limit the U.S. ABM system has been at the center of the Soviet interest in the over-all negotiations. This desire is the only effective leverage available to us in attempting to obtain limitations on ongoing Soviet programs.... Every vote in the Senate, at this point in time, to stop the American ABM program unilaterally makes it more difficult for the United States to persuade the Soviets to limit offensive systems as well as defensive."

Hughes tried, with little success, to discredit the bargaining chip defense of the ABM system. "A year ago it was argued that ABM deployment would constitute an effective bargaining chip for these talks. There is no more reason to accept this as a valid approach today than there was a year ago.... I deeply believe that our rejection of the ABM would strengthen, rather than weaken, our negotiating position in the SALT talks."

"The technological questions have been answered," Miller said. "Safeguard will never be built. Technology ceased to be the issue even last year, and it is now entirely to support the negotiators."

## Defusing the Movement

In the four years that budget-cutting amendments to weapons bills have attacked the ABM on the Senate floor, the White House forces have always defeated the anti-ABM contingent. The score on these floor fights would seem to indicate that the plans of the Pentagon have been overwhelmingly endorsed by Congress.

In the long run, the ABM has been defeated," said J. Stone, director of the American Federation of Scientists. "Each year the rationale has changed for keeping this program alive and each year the size of the program itself has been reduced."

Stone said that the ABM was not a major issue in the Senate in 1971 because the Senate Armed Services Committee pre-empted the anti-ABM forces by restricting deployment to just two of the four sites. "We never win a floor fight—the White House and Pentagon have tremendous power and resources—but we nudge them year after year."

Tom Halstead, a former lobbyist against the ABM and currently legislative assistant to Sen. Cranston, said that Cooper's switch may have affected some votes on the Hughes amendment, "but the Armed Services Committee was much more important in defusing interest."

"The committee acted more carefully this year," Halstead said, "so there was less justification to go after it."

"The Cooper-Hart forces got 50 votes in 1969," Halstead said, "and only 47 in 1970. It would have been a psychological mistake to march up the hill again because they would have gotten even less support."

**The Lobbyists.** The Council for a Livable World and the American Federation of Scientists were two of the most active anti ABM lobby groups in recent years. Both claimed their goal was to educate the public and members of Congress about the ABM system. Others from both groups said they had not been active in 1971 as in past years on the ABM issue for several reasons: little interest in Congress, few new scientific arguments and the feeling that the ABM had already been defeated in the long run.

Halstead, who for several years served as director of the Council for a Livable World, said that the Council was "not an arm-twisting, nose-tweaking organization. We were concerned with the educational aspects of the ABM...bringing in experts from outside the government to testify on the program. This year there was little need for that."

Peter Ognibene, the new director of the Council for a Livable World, told Congressional Quarterly that Senate leadership was dispirited. "There was the feeling among some members that irrespective of what the Senate did in the way of amendments, they would all be watered down or knocked out when the bill went to conference."

The American Federation of Scientists, a lobby group responsible for bringing many non-government experts before the Armed Services Committees, was not active this year either.

Stone said that the $1.1-billion Safeguard authorization for fiscal 1972 (bringing to $4.8-billion the total authorization) was not a major concern of the group. "We aren't so worried about a $4-billion boondoggle. Those are all over the Hill. We were worried that this program was going to turn into a boondoggle of immense proportions." Stone referred to the $20-billion to $60-billion cost estimates for the Sentinel ABM program promoted during the Johnson Administration. (Box, p. 2338)

## Outlook

Two strains of thought prevail concerning what would happen if an agreement has not been reached by SALT negotiators when the fiscal 1973 weapons bills reach the Senate in 1972. First, some participants say that a massive campaign against the ABM system would be mounted in the Senate and carried to the public. Still others have said that with no agreement the United States will require the ABM more than ever.

Sen. Cooper said he would again oppose Safeguard if no agreement was reached at SALT by the time Congress considered the 1973 defense bills. "Safeguard as now planned remains a system inadequate to the task of defending the Minuteman missile force against any significant threat," Cooper said. "There are many signs that the Pentagon is moving in the direction of developing a more effective missile site anti-ballistic missile system called Hardsite which, in the event that it becomes necessary in the future to deploy an ABM, could provide a more adequate defense. (Hardsite, box p. 2338)

The Council for a Livable World, said its director, Ognibene, will actively support candidates siding with the council's policy of trying to "defuse the potential for nuclear conflict and to introduce some sanity into the arms race."

Halstead said that although funds for the ABM program would be included in the upcoming defense appropriations bill, the weapon system would not be a major issue until the next defense procurement authorization bill was considered in 1972. He also said, "You can bet we'll have something from SALT before the '72 elections."

"What will happen if nothing comes out of SALT?" Miller said. "If SALT fails then the attempt at parity has failed, and we are doomed to the mad arms race all over again."

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LOS ANGELES TIMES - 15 NOVEMBER 1971 (24)

Nuclear Arms: After Two Years of
SALT Talks, U.S. Still Has Edge

BY DON COOK
Times Staff Writer

VIENNA — Two years ago this week, delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union met in Helsinki to launch their historic talks on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms.

The third year, and sixth round, of the SALT negotiation begins here today.

The early excitement has long since worn off with the plodding pace of discussions which are not only highly technical but also highly secret.

Meanwhile, while hope is fairly strong that some positive outcome can be expected before too long, the fact remains that the nuclear arms race has continued unchecked on both sides.

When the talks opened Nov. 17, 1969, the Soviet Union had deployed an estimated 1,050 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 160 submarine-launched missiles. It also had a fleet of 150 Bison strategic bombers which probably carry three nuclear bombs each. The total of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads when the talks opened was therefore approximately 1,660.

U.S. Count

The United States had 1,054 Minuteman intercontinental missiles in hard-site silos 656 undersea missiles aboard its Polaris submarines, and a fleet of 540 strategic bombers which carry three or four warheads each. The number of nuclear warheads was therefore approximately 3,330, a considerable edge which is scarcely offset by the fact that Soviet weapons are generally of a much higher megatonnage.

If you're dead, you're dead, and whether a city is taken out by a 1-megaton warhead or a 5-megaton warhead is of little strategic consequence.

How does the nuclear arms race stand two years later?

In 1970, the Russians added another 150 ICBMs to their land arsenal and their undersea missile strength jumped from 160 to 280. In 1971, they have deployed an additional 210 land missiles and another 160 submarine missiles, so

that their total number of launch vehicles stands now at 1,510 land missiles, 440 sea missiles and the same fleet of 150 aging Bison bombers. This means that Russians can now fire a total of approximately 2,300 city-killing warheads compared to 1,660 when the SALT talks opened in 1969.

The building rate of Soviet nuclear submarines is increasing, and Pentagon "satellite spies" brought back pictures of 40 new missile launch silos under construction in late 1970 and then turned up another 50 this past summer—a total of 90 new missile holes which scaringly indicate that the Soviets are levelling off in their strategic nuclear deployment.

Yet alongside these facts which Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird and the Pentagon never cease emphasizing are some facts about the increased deployment of American nuclear warheads which get less official attention and publicity.

The number of American missiles had remained stationary — 1,054 land missiles and 656 submarine missiles, the same deployment as when the SALT talks opened. But the number of nuclear warheads which those missiles are now carrying has risen enormously—so that the gap in numbers between American warheads and Soviet warheads is still strongly in America's favor.

In June, 1970, the United

States began installing the new super-warheads, the "multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles" on the Minuteman missiles. Like one of those skyrocket fireworks which bursts into a series of graceful smaller rockets, the MIRV is three warheads on one missile, each of which can be targeted on cities or sites several hundred miles apart.

The best information is that the United States is putting MIRV warheads on at least half of its 1,054 Minuteman missiles. At the same time, the American nuclear submarine fleet began getting new Poseidon undersea missiles early this year—with not three but 10 independent warheads in one cluster—to replace the single-warhead Polaris missile. As a result, although the number of missiles has remained stationary, the total number of American strategic warheads which can be launched at the Soviet Union has soared from 3,330 when the SALT negotiations began to something like 4,600 today.

Whatever the increase in the number of Russian missiles, the strategic edge which the United States maintains is still enormous, 4,600 warheads against 2,300, a superiority of two-to-one.

What, then, are the implications of this continuing upward spiral for the SALT talks?

Broadly speaking, it looks as if the United States can live with the situation for a good many months to come—certainly until the definitive results of this present negotiation are known. Analysis of the strategic problem is endless—the implications of a mix between

offensive and defensive weapons; of Soviet fears and intentions; of second-strike capacities and the relative merits of seaborne versus land-based missiles.

But the basic premise on which the United States is conducting this SALT negotiation is that while the Russians are probably going to go on building up their missile forces until they come a lot closer to closing that gap in numbers of strategic warheads, they are not looking for nuclear war. Therefore, the American attitude so far is to accept the slow closing of the warhead gap with a certain equanimity.

330

BALT SUN 16 NOV 71

Return to SALT

The United States and the Soviet Union have again resumed their talks, begun just two years ago in Helsinki, on the limitation or control of "strategic"—i.e., nuclear-armaments. This particular session begins in an atmosphere of cautious and refreshed hope which may or may not be realized. One reason for the seeming cheerfulness is the statement made simultaneously last May in Washington and Moscow which was interpreted, indeed by President Nixon himself, as announcing a breakthrough of sorts toward a first step in agreeing on a restriction of anti-missile defenses. Even if reached, such an agreement would not provide a general accord on freezing all nuclear weapons, offensive as well as defensive, but it could open the way to broader negotiations.

Another reason for the development of a more optimistic attitude is the recent scattered evidence of Moscow's desire to come to better understandings with the West on a number of subjects. Anyway the chief of the American delegation at Vienna, as reported by Joseph R. L. Sterne from Vienna, speaks now of a hope of bringing the consultations to some kind of "successful conclusion" by the time Mr. Nixon visits Russia next May—or perhaps even "sooner." Russia's chief spokesman at the talk thinks there's now "a real possibility for the achievement of more positive results."

All this is vague enough and subject to quick disappointment. The two nations remain extremely sensitive about any action which might put, or seem to put, one or the other at a disadvantage in nuclear weaponry in being or in planning. Each is suspicious of what the other regards as a fair balance of strength. Still, it is welcome news that the latest round of talks is beginning with signs that both sides now believe some of the hard problems may be ready to yield to a little more mutual effort. May they hold to that faith, and may they be proved right in doing so.

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BALTIMORE SUN 17 NOVEMBER 1971 P-2

Soviet ready to include
offensive arms in talks

BY JOSEPH R. L. STERNE
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vienna — The Soviet Union indicated a readiness to discuss a curb on offensive missiles during the first working session yesterday of new strategic arms limitation talks.

Conference sources suggested
that the United States was quite
satisfied by the Soviet attitude
on this sensitive point.

"Where we left off"

After the longest working ses-
sion opening a round of negotia-
tions since the talks began two
years ago, adjectives such as
"constructive" and "business-
like" were used to describe the
atmosphere.

"We picked up where we left

off in Helsinki — in other words,
on a positive note," one source
remarked.

Last week, William P. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, pointed out that the summer round of negotiations had concentrated on defensive missile systems and said the time was coming in Vienna to discuss strategic offensive weaponry "in greater detail."

Joint guidelines

When conference sources were
asked yesterday whether any-
thing had occurred to indicate
that Mr. Rogers's wishes were
being fulfilled they replied they
would not dispute the positive

implications of the question.

It was emphasized that both
superpowers were displaying a
willingness to adhere to their
joint guidelines of May 20, when
they agreed to concentrate this
year on a defensive missile
treaty and certain measures to
curb offensive weapons.

The Russians showed a decid-
ed preference earlier this year
for a first-stage agreement lim-
ited to the defensive field, while
the Americans held to the view
that there also should be a ceil-
ing on the number of strategic
offensive missile launchers per-
mitted. This reflected U.S. wor-
ries about the continuing Soviet
installation of offensive missiles
during a period when the U.S. is
not expanding its offensive mis-
sile capacity.

Under an American proposal
tabled some time ago, there
would be a 1,900 limit on the
number of offensive missiles,

plus a ceiling of 250 missiles on
launchers over a certain size.

Statistics compared

According to recent estimates,
the Soviet Union had about 1,500
land-based intercontinental-bal-
listic missiles as against 1,054
for the United States, 400 sub-
marine-carried missiles as
against 656 for the United States,
and 175 to 195 heavy bombers as
against 569 for the United States.

The proposed 1,900 limit thus
would permit some new develop-
ment both in land-and sea-based
offensive missiles, provided
bombers were phased out.

Neither nation has shown any
eagerness to halt present pro-
grams to equip existing launch-
ers with multiple warheads. This
is a field where the United
States holds a lead that the
Soviet Union may want shorten
or eliminate before it is ready to
negotiate.

WASHINGTON STAR 18 NOVEMBER 1971

Back to SALT

A crucial sixth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), starting in Vienna this week, will have much to say about whether rational bounds can be placed on the nuclear weapons race. The alternative, if the two-year-old American-Soviet negotiations fail, is an indefinite extension of appalling arms costs and a continued buildup of nuclear terror.

At the moment, the words from persons who should know are optimistic. President Nixon, while calling the chance for a SALT agreement by the end of this year "highly improbable," insisted last week that "great progress will be made." Some of the betting is on the likelihood of a partial agreement — covering defensive weapons and an understanding about offensive weapons — being reached early next year, in time for Mr. Nixon's planned exercise in Moscow summitry.

The Russians' professed desire for an agreement at this time fits in with other Soviet objectives — for improved relations with the West, in turn providing greater access to Western technology (needed for broader advancement of the Soviet economy) and better prospects

for a European security agreement sanctifying post-World War II borders.

The current SALT session is supposed to turn discussion to offensive nuclear weapons — land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-based nuclear warheads. This is a necessary corollary of any agreement limiting the defensive anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), on which Mr. Nixon noted there has been "significant progress." In putting a lid on either kind of weaponry, much hard bargaining lies ahead, centering on concepts of "equality" and current variances in the two countries' stockpiles.

The approach of 1972 represents a danger on our side of the table. It may loom as an election-year imperative for Mr. Nixon to bring home from Moscow a trophy in the form of a SALT agreement. It would be tragic and dangerous if the price of this were to be a set of unwise concessions in the current negotiations. Mr. Nixon shows no sign of letting this happen, but it is no harm for all to be aware of the mounting political pressures and to let the Kremlin know our interests in effective arms control stretch far beyond 1972.

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BALTIMORE SUN 19 November 1971 P2

# A-power Pacific peace talk urged

By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE

Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, last night proposed a four-power Pacific peace conference composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan.

Such a meeting, he said, would be a "natural follow-through" of President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow.

"The clarity of direct contact can contribute, I believe, to the stability of a situation in which the nuclear power of three nations already converges and where the technical capacity exists to add a fourth input at any time," he said.

"A quadra-partite conference might well be designed in the first instance to seek to bring nuclear dangers—whether in testing or in potential conflict—under rational control in the western Pacific," he said.

"If this situation finds a counterpart in the Soviet Union, then we may well be on the threshold of the liquidation of the dubious

heritage of the cold war," he told a capacity crowd at the final session of this year's Milton S. Eisenhower Symposium at the Johns Hopkins University.

The Montana Democrat listed current Senate moves to make withdrawal from Vietnam within six months national policy and the "tugs, starts and stops" of recent foreign aid votes, as Senate attempts to solve dilemmas of power.

"Contrary to the appearances, these actions are more than marches up the hill and down. They are not empty gestures. They say what the people of the nation are saying.

A "surge of change" was sweeping the globe, he said, adding "just as currencies, fixed in value for decades, are now floating, so too are old alliances and alignments."

"China, for example, now looms large in the concerns of the Soviet Union. At the same time the United States is immersed in the practical and

gent threats to the economy, more or less to the exclusion of the theoretical and distant mentalities of alien ideologies," he said.

Senator Mansfield called for further U.S. military cutbacks—including complete termination of military involvement in Southeast Asia, and a unilateral cut in U.S. force levels in Europe.

"In some quarters, there is a tendency to see in this process of military contraction some sort of shameful furling of the flag. Rather, the change is sensible and long overdue.

"It acts to reduce the too heavy burdens which have been carried for too long by the people of the nation often in the vague name of 'international commitment'. Moreover, if the flag has been placed by a mistaken policy in places where it does not belong—as in Indochina—its withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine is not only an essential act in our vital national

interests, it is also the only honorable course," he said.

Calling for a judicious use of resources abroad, he said foreign aid had become in recent years "a lavish grab-bag, an international pork barrel, and a world-wide arms distribution."

To applause he commented: "More seriously, it has led the United States via the path of well-meaning humanitarian generosity into unwarranted political and military involvements in the inner affairs of other peoples."

Other shifts in the balances of world power meant that major questions of war and peace might no longer rest overwhelmingly with the Soviet Union and United States, he said. China the European Community and Japan were all emerging as major powers.

He said the "highest priority" should be given to progress in disarmament, and two other "most complex" issues — relationships within Europe and China.

SALT's Challenge

The Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), now entering their third year, have resumed in Vienna amid continued hopes of ultimate success but renewed predictions of further delay. President Nixon has acknowledged that a first-stage agreement by year-end, the goal set in his May 20 summit accord with the Kremlin, is now "highly improbable." It may still be "unfinished business," he has said, when he gets to Moscow in May of next year.

So far, instead of curbing the nuclear missile race, the talks seem to have stimulated it. Both sides have pressed ahead with strategic missile deployment over the past two years. Washington has rationalized its deployment of defensive antiballistic missiles (ABM's) and offensive MIRV multiple warheads as "bargaining chips" in the SALT negotiations. The Soviet Union has put the emphasis on achieving "parity" with superior American strategic forces through deployment of giant SS-9 ICBM's and a stepped-up program of missile submarine construction.

From the start, the proposals of both sides have envisaged larger forces than they had when the talks began. And the military of both countries have pushed their missile deployment ahead as if to beat some expected cutoff date. The expectation that there will be a cutoff date may be encouraging. But the escalation of the missile race that is under way is costly. It adds nothing to the security of either side. On the contrary, it could heighten the nuclear danger for both—and for civilization as a whole.

Both nations already have strategic forces large enough to destroy each other many times over in retaliation against a surprise first-strike. Further force expansion so far has simply added to overkill. But the passage of time increases the danger of a technological breakthrough on one side or the other that might destabilize the nuclear balance or threaten to do so. Another upward spiral in the missile race would then ensue, postponing indefinitely any possibility of a SALT agreement.

The two known weapons that, if further improved, already threaten such a breakthrough are the ABM and MIRV. Neither side is ready to negotiate about MIRV yet, the United States because it is far ahead but not yet fully deployed, the Soviet Union because it is behind. Other limitations on offensive delivery systems will add little to security as long as MIRV runs free.

What could be achieved in a SALT agreement at this time that would be of capital importance is a low ceiling on defensive antimissile systems. With a low limit on ABM's—or, even better, a zero ABM accord—the incentive on both sides to expand MIRV and other strategic offensive forces would be sharply reduced. The traditional defense-offense race in weaponry would be cut short.

An ABM agreement at Vienna in the coming months should be feasible. The best way to achieve it would be to go back to earlier ideas for a zero ABM agreement advanced by both sides though pursued by neither. Short of that, political decisions on both sides and intensive negotiations will be needed to draft a low-ceiling ABM treaty.

Political factors have more to do with the American-made obstacles to a first-stage SALT agreement than the nation's strategic needs. There will be a better chance of concessions by the Soviet leadership, which evidently faces similar problems, if Mr. Nixon moves again as in May to sidetrack these parochial forces and pursue the true national interest in curbing the missile race.

344

NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE

22 NOVEMBER 1971 (16)

DIPLOMACY:

Bridging the Gap

When Richard Nixon visits the Soviet Union next May, one prize that he clearly hopes to bring back home is a treaty limiting the possession of nuclear weapons. With this in mind, the President will surely be keeping a close eye on the sixth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), which gets under way this week in Vienna. For after two years of protracted negotiations, some major gaps still divide Washington and Moscow. And round six in Vienna will, to a large measure, determine whether these gaps can be bridged before next spring.

Ironically, there are some who feel that Mr. Nixon himself has undermined the chances for an early accord. Several members of the U.S. SALT delegation have privately lamented Mr. Nixon's remark that "if it [a SALT agreement] is not achieved, certainly that would be one of the subjects that would come up [in talks with Soviet leaders]." This, say the experts, offered the Russians the prospect of dealing with a politically vulnerable Richard Nixon on the eve of the 1972 Presidential campaign. As one of them expressed it: "Why should the Soviets negotiate now when they can talk to the President when he's under pressure in May?" And, in the same vein, Washington's Sen. Henry M. Jackson, the right-of-center Democrat who is expected to announce his Presidential candidacy this week, observed recently that the timing of the Moscow summit conference gives the Russians "a pretty powerful weapon" for extracting some major concessions at SALT.

**Optimistic:** Even without these considerations, the obstacles to a preliminary nuclear-weapons agreement remain formidable. The first step toward an overall treaty is to reach an accord on defensive missiles, but the Americans and Russians are still arguing over the size and location of their current anti-missile defense systems. And once this point is settled, there is still the far more complex problem of finding ways to limit offensive weapon systems. Despite all this, most U.S. officials are optimistic that a workable nuclear accord will eventually be achieved. Largely on the strength of the Soviet performance at past SALT talks, one Pentagon official said last week: "I am convinced that the Soviet Union has a genuine desire to limit nuclear arms. At the very least, a nuclear treaty would enhance the Russians' status by writing their nuclear parity with the U.S. into a formal agreement. And such an accord would fit in with recent positive developments in relations between our two countries."

345

"AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

WORLD AFFAIRS, WINTER 1971
HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

III.

Despite their increasing parity in certain areas of nuclear weaponry and defense, it is important not to ignore that the fundamental question before the Soviet Union and the United States now is not who should be the superior or enforcer, but rather, according to Robert E. Osgood, "how much of what kinds of strategic weapons is enough for assured destruction, with perhaps an extra margin for damage limitation." We must be continuously alert to redefining the boundaries and scope of this question.

Congressional limitation of the ABM and declarations on limiting the involvement of U.S. troops in conflict abroad have also given the nod from the United States for agreements of substance and scope. The details of current Soviet and U.S. proposals cannot be discussed with any accuracy, and I cannot talk about hypotheticals. However, now that MIRV has begun to be deployed on both Poseidon and Minuteman III, United States and Soviet negotiators must make every effort to reach agreements that are reciprocal.

I do not think that we have the luxury of time or opportunity to reject a limited ban or curtailment of any system, and insist on a comprehensive agreement. This would be the ideal. However, we must not reject making some progress if agreement cannot be reached on all systems.

We have valuable precedents to support Presidential overtures of a conciliatory nature. In 1958 President Eisenhower offered to halt American testing of nuclear weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of negotiations on a formal treaty if the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union would follow suit. This mutual moratorium was preserved for nearly three years.

In 1963 President Kennedy again ordered a halt to testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere and proposed to maintain the ban so long as the Russians did likewise. They responded, and the result was the historic Test-Ban Treaty—a proposal I had long urged.

We now have pledges from many countries to adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Of course, we must not ignore that serious obstacles remain before this treaty can go into effect. Many countries, including large ones, have neither signed nor ratified this treaty, largely because they feel its impact is to disarm the unarmed. This feeling can be worked on, no doubt, and fears alleviated. The difficult problem comes, however, from those nations which, consciously or unconsciously, wish to keep open their nuclear option.

It is important that President Nixon halt deployment of ABM and delay further deployment of MIRV. Like President Kennedy, he holds in his hands the keys to arms control—or to an uncertain world of mutual terror. We would run no serious risks; and we could always continue our programs if the Russians failed to respond. I believe that such a moratorium can succeed; and all mankind—all future generations—would forever be in our debt. But even if we do succeed—even if we do stop the dangerous and

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

201

destabilizing weapons now being prepared by both sides, there will be other terrifying weapons in the future.

This prospect increases the importance of the SALT talks. Whether or not we succeed in stopping the MIRV, the ABM and the SS-9 before it is too late, we must work patiently with the Soviet Union to achieve one common goal: continued survival in a world where nuclear weapons technology itself is our greatest enemy.

No nation dare ignore that technology has eroded the ground out from under traditional concepts of security. Today we are faced with a balance of terror. From now on, nations must bare much of their security on greater political understanding, or we will have no security at all!

I do not argue that we can trust the Russians in all of our relations with them. We cannot: they are still not prepared to consider agreements with us or with our allies in many areas of the world in which competition and conflicts of interest could still have deadly consequences. All we have to do is to look at the sudden rapid growth of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea to be sufficiently alerted to expanding Russian threats throughout the world. Despite these realities, unless we transform Soviet-American relations in the critical area of nuclear weapons, we may not live to debate other questions of serious but lesser importance.

This will require a new diplomacy, managed with skill and patience, and extending far beyond the SALT talks. We must recognize that there is no easy exit from the many dilemmas facing us; we must take full account of the interests of our allies, in Europe and elsewhere; and we must seek ways to turn all aspects of our relationship with the Soviet Union from the sterile byways of military confrontation into the more hopeful paths of political accommodation. On their part, moreover, the Soviets must not mistake current U.S. disillusion and uncertainty about Vietnam as an opening for them to take a leapfrogging lead in nuclear weaponry. Perhaps the most distinguishing hallmark in the American culture is the ideal of "fair play" for all. The American people react instinctively when this ideal is grossly or seriously violated and they would not tolerate in any manner any inkling that the Soviet Union or any other nation was ever again trying to "pull a fast one" on us.

* * *

BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

DECEMBER 1971

MARTIN L. PERL

348

# SALT and Its Illusions

The major objectives of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are to stop the nuclear arms race, to begin nuclear disarmament and to reduce the probability of the outbreak of nuclear war. As the talks continue, there is rising optimism in the American scientific community that the talks will achieve these objectives. Because scientists are especially aware of the terrible costs and dangers of the nuclear arms race, any development which may lead to a reduction of these costs and dangers will be viewed optimistically by them. But the crucial question is whether this optimism is justified. My position is that this optimism is very probably not justified, and that we may become the victims of false and perhaps dangerous wishful thinking.

There is little doubt but that SALT will lead to headline-producing agreements on some specific aspects of nuclear weapons. These agreements are expected to limit the size of ABM (antiballistic missile) systems, to limit the number of land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and perhaps to limit the number of submarines carrying missiles with nuclear warheads. However, achieving these agreements is by no means the same as achieving the major objectives of SALT. In fact, equating these narrow agreements with the major objectives of the talks can only be done if one adopts a number of misconceptions or illusions about the nature of the nuclear arms race. I believe it is the adoption of one or more of these illusions which permits the scientific community to be optimistic.

The first illusion is that SALT can be truly successful even though both the United States and the Soviet Union continue the installation of MIRV (multiple independently-

> "I expect no more from SALT than from the Test-Ban Treaty because the SALT talks are being conducted by the same diplomatic methods. . . . There is the same emphasis on petty maneuvering and on minor technical questions. There is the same intrusion of other international problems. There are the same controlled leaks to the press. There is the same almost paranoid cautiousness on both sides. . . . The entire atmosphere is more suitable to a 1920 negotiation on naval limitations or Balkan boundaries." Professor Perl is professor of physics at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.

targeted reentry vehicles) warheads on their intercontinental missiles. This illusion, "nuclear stability through, or in spite of, MIRV" has been discussed by others and I shall only summarize the arguments. The second illusion is broader and deeper. MIRV is only the latest example of a major innovation in nuclear weapons technology, an innovation which will increase the instability of the arms race. The ultimate effect of most research, development and testing in offensive and defensive nuclear weapons technology is to produce such destabilizing innovations. Thus the second illusion is that the major objectives of SALT can be attained even though the superpowers continue to carry out research, development and testing on nuclear weapons technology. The third illusion is somewhat different. It is the illusion that, even though SALT's concrete accomplishments turn out to be small, the talks are a useful first step. This is the mildest of the illusions because it is based on the smallest amount of optimism, but it may be the most dangerous.

I shall use the conventional phrase, "nuclear arms race," to describe the situation in which both superpowers continually increase the number and types of their nuclear weaponry, sometimes to get ahead of their adversary, sometimes to catch up with

their adversary. I include defensive weapons because they can be just as threatening as offensive weapons. The word "race" is not a good one because there is no final goal in this race, but I have not found a better word. For example the phrase "mutual growth of nuclear weaponry" misses the fits and starts, the erratic changes of pace, which characterize the increase.

Most thinking about the nuclear arms race and most negotiations about nuclear weapons are based on the concept of mutual deterrence. Similarly the illusions about the nuclear arms race are intimately connected with the deterrence concept.

For 20 years the United States and the Soviet Union have been increasing the quantity and the effectiveness of their nuclear weapons. Yet there has been no nuclear war. It is generally believed that the reason there has been no war is that a situation of mutual deterrence has existed. The absence of nuclear war in the late 1950s and in the 1960s is attributed to the circumstance that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could completely destroy the other side's nuclear weapons by a first strike. No matter who struck first, the other side could always retaliate with nuclear weapons in sufficient quantity to cause enormous death and destruction. Thus

December 1971 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 7

349

both countries were able to deter the other country from starting a nuclear war. This then is the mutual deterrence concept.

The concept of mutual deterrence certainly has value both as an explanation of the historic fact that there has been no nuclear war and as a basis for strategic thinking. But it has taken on an importance far beyond that value. Both the United States and the Soviet Union now believe fervently and almost religiously in the importance of the deterrence concept and in the importance of their deterrent forces. The major concerns of both sides are how to strengthen their own deterrent, how to protect their own deterrent, how to weaken the other side's deterrent. The major question associated with any change in the number or kinds of strategic weapons is "What will it do to our deterrent and what will it do to their deterrent?"

For the United States the preservation and safety of its deterrent forces has now assumed overwhelming symbolic importance. The same appears to be true for the Soviet Union. Any threat to those deterrent forces is taken very seriously. It does not matter if the threat is small compared to the size of the deterrent force, if the threat is directed toward only one part of the deterrent forces or if the threat will occur 5 or 10 years in the future. In many ways the deterrent forces have become the symbol of the nation's virility. Even the language of deterrence is the language of virility. "Is our deterrent aging?" "Is our deterrent obsolescent?" "To lose one's deterrent is to lose everything." (I shall return several times to this concept — necessary for the understanding of much of the dynamics of the nuclear arms race and SALT.)

There are three pillars which, both for the United States and the Soviet Union, support the belief in the effectiveness of the deterrence concept. One pillar, which is now being threatened by the advent of MIRV, is the fact that a missile carrying a single warhead can only attack one target on the ground. In the past, to destroy an opponent's ground-based missile force, one had to extend at least as many missiles as

one wished to destroy. In fact, to be sure that complete destruction was achieved one would have had to expend many missiles for each opponent's missile; there was a disadvantage in making a first strike. Thus, in the 1960s, one of the pillars of the deterrence concept was the relative ineffectiveness of a first strike against land-based missiles.

A second pillar of the deterrence concept is the invulnerability of missile-carrying, nuclear-powered submarines. No nation has built a system which can find and destroy these submarines, so that a nation with such a submarine force can always retaliate after it is initially attacked.

The third pillar of the deterrence concept is the present technical inability of any nation to build an effective ABM system. A country contemplating making a first strike in a nuclear war must face the facts that (1) the attacked nation will retaliate with missiles armed with nuclear weapons and (2) the attacking nation will not be able to shoot down a substantial number of these retaliating missiles.

## First Illusion

I have noted that in the 1960s one of the pillars of the deterrence concept was the low effectiveness of a

FIGURE 1

first strike against land-based missiles. MIRV is rapidly increasing that effectiveness and is thus destroying that pillar. This increased effectiveness comes from two technical improvements — the placing of several independently-targeted warheads on a single missile and the increased accuracy of the targeting of the warheads. The effectiveness is easily calculated by the formula presented below.

$$P = \begin{cases} \text{probability of destroying one missile site} \\ 1 - \left[ \frac{1}{2} \right] \left[ \frac{39 \ y^{2/3} \ N}{H \ (\text{CEP})^2} \right] \end{cases} =$$

In the formula y is the warhead yield in megatons, N is the number of warheads attacking the site, H is the hardness of the site in pounds per square inch and CEP is the radius of a circle, in nautical miles, within which the warhead has a 50 per cent change of landing. With the advent of MIRV, N increases and the CEP decreases. Thus the probability approaches 1. This is shown in Figure 1 for H = 300 psi, the hardness of existing sites and for a hypothetical future hardness of 1,000 psi. At the beginning of the 1960s the CEP was about one mile, now it is about one-

8

350

quarter mile for the Minuteman III,
in five years it will probably be one-
eighth mile, and even one-twentieth
mile — a city block — is thought to
be technically feasible. When P goes
above 95 per cent one of the pillars
of the deterrence concept begins to
crumble. Figure 1 will help to in-
dicate when this will happen.

Yet from a rational standpoint this
crumbling of one of the pillars of
the deterrence concept does not seem
desperately serious. After all, there
are still two pillars left. The ad-
vent of MIRV does not threaten the
safety of missile-carrying submarines.
The advent of MIRV does not change
the inability of any nation to build
an effective ABM system. Add to
all this the fact that the United
States possesses a large, nuclear-
bomb-carrying, Strategic Air Force
and the fact that both superpowers
possess large numbers of tactical nu-
clear weapons. Thus the reality is
that the strength of the deterrent
forces on both sides is still enormous
in spite of the coming of MIRV. But
unfortunately it is mostly not reality
that now controls strategic thinking;
it is the symbolism of the deterrence
concept which is of paramount im-
portance. Only one part of our de-
terrent forces, the land-based ICBMs,
is being threatened. But that threat
is by itself of great symbolic impor-
tance. Therefore it must be answered
with an amount of activity and with

FIGURE 2

a desperation far in excess of the real
extent of the threat.

The governments of the United
States and the Soviet Union are both
answering the MIRV threat to their
land-based ICBM deterrence forces
in the same way. They are each try-
ing to make better MIRV-type mis-
siles. They are each thinking about
hardening missile sites and about
building ABM systems to protect
missile sites. They are both pushing
R&D to find technical counter-threats
to MIRV. All these activities to
counter MIRV lead to instabilities
in and escalations of the nuclear arms
race. The escalations do not appear
as increases in the number of weap-
ons but as escalations in the effec-
tiveness of defensive and offensive
weapons. The major objectives of
SALT are completely incompatible
with such activities. Yet there is no
expectation that SALT will lead to
any agreements limiting these de-
stabilizing activities.

Second Illusion

Although the appearance of MIRV
is frightening enough in itself, we
must realize that MIRV is only the
latest example of how technological
innovations produce instabilities of
and escalations in the nuclear arms
race. Consider what would happen
if a method was found to find and
destroy, in a short time period, 90
per cent of a nation's nuclear sub-
marine fleet. Such a discovery would
destroy the second pillar of the de-
terrence concept — the invulnerabili-
ty of the missile-carrying, nuclear
submarine.

It does not really matter if the
United States should find the method
first; the Soviets would certainly de-
velop it in a few years. What would
we do? We could increase our mis-
sile-carrying submarine fleet from 40
to 400 vessels, thus still having 40
vessels left for a retaliatory attack,
but breaking perhaps an agreement
produced at SALT. Or we could
start a large research program on
counter-counter measures. Or we
could think about a preemptive first
strike before our submarines were
actually threatened. We can take
our choice as to which of these we
would do, but whichever we choose
it will be an escalation of the arms
race. Finally one must realize that

for this escalation to occur it is not
necessary that a 90 per cent effec-
tive method of destroying nuclear
submarines be found. This escala-
tion can occur even if there is only
the threat or the fear that such a
method is about to be discovered!

How probable is it that a way can
be developed effectively to find and
destroy nuclear submarines? It is
more probable than we would like
it to be, for we would like that pro-
bability to be precisely zero. V. An-
derson, an authority on ocean tech-
nology, has written, in the "Impact
of New Technologies on the Arms
Race," that new acoustic detection
technology "virtually removes the
technical barriers to oceanwide ASW
[antisubmarine warfare] surveillance
and enfolds it in the economic con-
straints that are dictated by the stra-
tegic importance assigned to such a
capability." According to this au-
thority, the threat or the fear is al-
ready here; indeed the only restraint
would be the cost. Other authorities
do not agree that the solution to the
technical problems are yet apparent,
but both the United States and the
Soviet Union are carrying out ex-
tensive research on the technology
of antisubmarine warfare. Scientists
who believe that this technology can-
not be substantially improved are, for
scientists, in a strange position. They
must believe that we now know sub-
stantially all that can ever be known
about this technology or they must
believe that somehow the researchers
in this field will all be incompetent.

There is no need to discuss with
the same detail the third pillar of
the deterrence concept — the present
technical inability of any nation to
build an effective ABM. It is not
for the lack of trying that such an
inability still exists. And even an
ABM system that hardly works can
be built using as one of the arguments
the reasoning that the experience
gained will be helpful in building
an ABM that works. There is no
doubt that it is the intention of our
Executive branch to find out how to
build an effective ABM. This, like
the ASW research, illustrates the con-
tinuous and intense effort made by
governments to find new techniques
and to develop new devices for use
in the nuclear arms race.

But this is not a new problem.

December 1971 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 9

351

on the average, every four years since 1950 there has been a major destabilizing innovation in nuclear weapons technology. As long as research, development and testing go on in nuclear weapons technology, there is no reason to expect any change in this rate of destabilizing innovation. Thus the heart of the problem is research, development, testing. This brings us back to the SALT talks with the question, "Will the talks effectively limit research, development and testing in nuclear weapons technology?"

The answer is that it is highly unlikely that any limit will be put on R&D. That subject is apparently not even being seriously considered at SALT. There is a very small possibility that some limit might be put on the testing of MIRV. But, as I argue later, even this is unlikely. One reason for my pessimism is the recent tremendous emphasis of the U.S. Department of Defense on the importance of weapons research and on the existence of a research gap with respect to the Soviet Union. This is best illustrated by the following excerpt from a paper by J. S. Foster, Jr., in the "Defense Industry Bulletin."

> Today, while our research and development level of effort is now smaller, we believe that the United States is still technologically ahead of the Soviet Union — ahead on quality of weapons — by perhaps two or three years on the average.

If present trends continue, however, the larger and increasing Soviet effort could result in the following:

The Soviet Union could assume technological superiority in military research and development in the latter half of this decade. This superiority might be observable by the mid-1970s through the appearance of unexpected prototype military systems which, if produced, could make major U.S. weapon systems obsolete in the late 1970s. Their new missile silos may be an early first example of results of the incremental Soviet effort.

Loss of U.S. technological superiority would markedly reduce our understanding of the intelligence we do collect and, as a result, seriously impair our confidence in our ability to make decisions about future weapon systems.

Present relative trends in quality, coupled with the comparable trends in quantity — indicated by relative numbers of improved weapons deployed — would seriously jeopardize the U.S. margin of security in the 1975-85 time period.

Recovery from such a loss of U.S. technological leadership would require enormous expenditures over many years — years of grave risk to our national margin of safety.

> Thus it appears that threats to our deterrent forces from the building of Soviet nuclear weapons are being replaced by threats to our deterrent forces from Soviet research on nuclear weapons. These new types of threats are most insidious because they are difficult to answer and because they easily lead to instabilities in the arms race. It is very difficult

to verify the claims of our Department of Defense about what nuclear weapons research is being done in the Soviet Union. It is hard enough to verify the claims of DOD about what the Soviet Union has actually built.

Because I have used the DOD example does not mean that I take them to be the only villains. If the Soviet Union's equivalent of the "Defense Industry Bulletin" were available to me, I am fairly sure that I could find a set of quite similar quotations. There is little doubt that R&D in nuclear weaponry is pursued as actively in the Soviet Union as it is in the United States and that their fears about new weapons are similar to ours. We seem, however, to be ahead by two to three years in much of this R&D, so we usually are the first to introduce the new weapon or weapon system.

The proposal has been made that it is only necessary to ban the testing of all missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons. It is argued that such a ban, particularly if it took effect soon, would stop the further development of MIRV and of ABM systems. This in turn would stop the extensive installation of new systems using MIRVs or ABMs. This proposal is accompanied by the contention that the continuation of R&D on nuclear weapons is not only to be allowed — it is to be encouraged. The claim is made that by continuing to do extensive R&D on nuclear weapons, both sides will always know what is technically feasible. Therefore both sides will know what to expect in the future and there will be no destabilizing surprises.

The proposal that nuclear weapons R&D be continued and strengthened is closely related to the second illusion. First, as I argued above, weapons R&D is basically a destabilizing activity. It is an activity which constantly raises threats to the safety of our deterrent forces and constantly raises fears about the safety of those forces. These threats and these fears need not be closely connected with reality; they need only be connected with symbolism and mystique which surround the deterrent forces. And, as I have already noted, we can easily threaten

10

352

From Figure 2 it can be seen that, ourselves through the all-pervasive fear that if we make a destabilizing discovery, the Soviet Union will also make that discovery.

Second, there always exists the possibility that continued research and development will lead to a new non-missile weapon which on an objective basis is destabilizing. Such a weapon might be offensive or defensive. An example would be the invention of an ABM system using lasers or other electromagnetic radiation. Such a defensive weapon would immediately destroy all three pillars of the deterrence concept. Such a weapon could be thoroughly tested even under the proposed ban on missile testing.

### Third Illusion

The third illusion takes two slightly different forms. In the first form it is acknowledged that SALT will not achieve its major objectives: stopping the nuclear arms race, starting nuclear disarmament, reducing the probability of nuclear war. But

it is claimed that the narrow agreements which will be achieved still represent substantial progress toward those objectives because of three beneficial long-range effects of these narrow agreements. These effects are (1) the slowing down of other aspects of the nuclear weapons race, (2) the providing of a "breathing space" in which further negotiations can be started and (3) the production of a better international atmosphere for broader negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In brief, SALT is regarded as a substantial step in the right direction. The second form of the illusion has a tougher appearance. It is regarded as naive to believe that the major objectives of the talks are those stated above. Those major objectives are just part of the necessary publicity surrounding the talks. The real objectives are simply to produce a few narrow agreements, which will then have the three, beneficial, long-range effects listed above.

Thus both forms of the third illusion contain the beliefs that narrow

agreements on nuclear weapons can slow down aspects of the nuclear weapons race and can provide a "breathing space." Unfortunately the historical evidence contradicts these beliefs. Past agreements related to nuclear weapons technology have had little effect on the pace of research and development in nuclear weapons technology, very little effect on the rate of introduction of innovations in weapons technology and no effect on weapons technology not covered by the agreements. These points are best illustrated by considering the Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 which dealt with atmospheric testing. As shown in Figure 2, the rate of introduction of new and destabilizing nuclear weapons systems was not affected by that treaty. The effect of the Treaty on the pace of nuclear weapons research may be assessed from Figure 3. The United States has conducted more nuclear weapons tests per year since 1963 than were conducted per year from 1951 to 1963. The Soviet Union as usual is behind, but not far behind.

DECEMBER 1971
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

353

# SALT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

This report is excerpted from the Statement by the Pugwash Continuing Committee, following the 21st Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs Aug. 26-31, 1971 at Sinaia, Rumania. The conference was attended by 97 scientists from 31 countries and nine observers from five international organizations.

The past year has seen some positive developments — an encouraging statement by the USSR and the United States on the further program of SALT and the successful elaboration of a draft treaty banning biological weapons (BW). But the arms race continues to outpace by far the progress in arms limitation and disarmament.

There is an urgent need for measures, partial or general, which will be more effective than those taken hitherto in slowing down the arms race and achieving disarmament.

The Group's considerations reflected its agenda, with emphasis on the limitation and elimination of mass destruction weapons. The discussants were fully aware, however, of the dangers inherent in the conventional arms race, the existence of military blocs not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world, arms traffic, etc., and considered it important that due attention be paid to all these problems.

## Matters Related to SALT

It is hoped that the SALT conference will bring some significant results before the end of this year. Prompt and substantial results in this area are a prerequisite for progress in other areas of disarmament, especially the further expansion in the number of adherents to the NPT and its effectiveness. Such progress will also have beneficial effects on other disarmament measures, such as on European Security, limitations of

conventional forces and weapons, and other measures leading towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament.

Specifically, the negotiating parties at SALT are urged to achieve an agreement which would severely limit the deployment of ABM, preferably at the zero level. The zero level was considered to be far preferable to any other because it avoids any questions about qualitative differences and hidden growth potentials and thus removes the last vestige of any stimulus for the further arms race not only in anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), but to a substantial degree in the field of offensive weapons also. Any possible advantages of a severely limited ABM over a zero ABM do not seem to outweigh the dangers of a continuing arms race.

The negotiating parties at SALT were also urged to achieve a meaningful limitation on offensive weapons in order to stop the arms race immediately and to make it possible to begin the process of substantial arms reduction soon after. Such substantial arms reductions may be more difficult to negotiate, but they are absolutely essential if real world security is to be accomplished. It was emphasized that, in addition to limiting and reducing numbers, it will also be important to make provision for controlling and limiting qualitative features of weapons so that the arms race cannot be simply shifted in this direction. Qualitative fea-

tures include size, multiple warheads, accuracy, etc. It was suggested that one good means for accomplishing this last objective would be a severe limitation on the rate of missile test launches, including confidence launchings.

This process can and must proceed on the premise that equal consideration is given to the security interests of each party and that neither seeks to obtain unilateral advantages.

Disarmament negotiations also must give attention to limiting or, better, avoiding an arms race in new areas. In this connection the problem of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) was discussed, and it was pointed out that ASW research and development aimed against missile-bearing submarines is research and development on counterforce techniques. Such efforts could be taken by either party as indicating preparation for a preemptive attack by the other, and thus can be very destabilizing and can stimulate further arms races in unpredictable directions. An ASW limitation would therefore greatly facilitate the achievement of agreements to reduce substantially the numbers of long-range delivery vehicles.

## Comprehensive Test Ban

Preventing further vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons remains extremely important, and the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty will make a major contribution to that end.

December 1971 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 17

354

Fortunately, progress in the devel-
opment of the means for detecting
possible violations has effectively re-
moved the obstacles which once
blocked the achievement of such a
treaty. These means include not only
seismic methods for detection and
identification of nuclear explosions
but also satellites and other unilateral
means for collecting information.
The combination of all these tech-
niques now makes it practically im-
possible to conduct meaningful nu-
clear testing without detection.

In the process of preparation and
putting into effect of such a treaty,
it is most important to include at an
early stage all the nuclear nations;
it is also important to involve other
nations, especially those that have
the capability of becoming nuclear
powers in the near future.

In this connection the problem of
so-called peaceful nuclear explosions
was also discussed. The conclusions
reached at the last Pugwash confer-
ence were reaffirmed: "Excessive
claims have been made regarding the
importance of nuclear explosions for
peaceful purposes. Whatever short
term economic advantage there may
be in the use of such explosions is
likely to be more than offset by the
risks of nuclear proliferation implicit
in such explosions."

Non-Proliferation Treaty

It was noted with satisfaction
there has been no nuclear weapon
proliferation for the two and one-
half years since the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty was first signed. Even
so, the great importance of formal
accession to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty was affirmed and all nations
that have not yet done so were urged
to sign and ratify it at the earliest

possible date.

At the same time, there was an
awareness that the continuing effec-
tiveness and durability of the treaty
demand substantial progress in in-
hibiting vertical proliferation by real
progress at SALT, adoption of other
measures of self-restraint by all the
nuclear powers, and agreement on
the comprehensive test ban treaty.

Chemical and Biological Warfare

Geneva Protocol. It was noted
with satisfaction that there are now
96 parties to the 1925 "Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases and of Bacteriological Meth-
ods of Warfare." The United States
is the last militarily important coun-
try which is not a party to it.

In the United States the Protocol
was recently resubmitted to the U.S.
Senate for its consent to ratification.
It was resubmitted with a letter stat-
ing the United States' interpretation
that the Protocol did not apply to
the use of tear gas and herbicides in
war. The chairman of the Senate
committee responsible for the treaty
replied with a letter asking for re-
consideration of this interpretation,
and it appears that such a reconsid-
eration is now going on. It was
urged that the United States with-
draw its interpretation excepting
tear gases and herbicides and become
a party to the Protocol. The United
Kingdom was urged to withdraw its
interpretation excepting CS tear gas
from the prohibitions of the Protocol.

CB Disarmament. A major issue
in the field of CB disarmament has
for a long time been whether chemi-
cal and biological weapons should
be got rid of together or whether a
treaty outlawing possession of bio-
logical weapons only, would be a
productive first step to the eventual
elimination of both. During the past
year the issue was settled in favour
of action on biological weapons only.

President Nixon unilaterally re-
nounced development and production
of biological weapons and toxins and
undertook to destroy the U.S. stocks
of these weapons. The socialist coun-
tries, which previously had tabled a
draft treaty on chemical and biologi-
cal weapons, tabled a draft on bio-
logical weapons only. After a rela-

tively short period of negotiation, a
revised draft has now been agreed
and submitted to the CCD by the
socialist countries and the United
State.

The draft treaty would not pro-
hibit research to improve defenses
against biological weapons, such as
the preparation of vaccines for in-
noculation against germs which
might be carried by such weapons.
It was recommended that secrecy be
eliminated from research of this kind
as a protection against its being car-
ried further than the production of
vaccines, and to minimize the suspi-
cion that may be provoked by this
kind of work.

Chemical Weapons Disarmament.

There is a grave risk that the achieve-
ment of a biological weapons treaty
will lead to a relaxation of efforts
to achieve a chemical weapons dis-
armament treaty, and thus leave un-
touched what is undoubtedly from
a military point of view the most
important part of the CB-weapons
field. The draft biological weapons
treaty explicitly provides that nego-
tiation of a chemical weapons treaty
should be pursued, and the non-
aligned nations have been trying to
strengthen this obligation. Progress
to a chemical weapons treaty is im-
perative if chemical weapons are not
to become a tacitly endorsed item in
national armories.

The obstacle to chemical weapons
disarmament has, been disagreement
whether international verification of
nonpossession of chemical weapons
is needed and is possible.

The suggestions made at the Gene-
va Disarmament Conference, for a
verification procedure not unlike that
provided by IAEA safeguards, were
noted. Such a procedure would com-
bine a national chemical safeguards
system with international audit and
spot checks. The objective should
be to achieve an overall system which
would deter significant violations
with as little intrusion as possible.

There were different views in the
Group on the need for international
verification rather than reliance on
national means. There were also dif-
fering views as to whether verifica-
tion was the real point of disagree-
ment.

## Tactical Arms Limitation

The reduction of nuclear arms in Europe is of very great importance, both from the point of view of European security and as a substantial step in the general efforts for disarmament. To that end, the following was offered:

*A Specific Proposal for Tactical Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe, designed to serve as a first approximation for further discussion.*

a. No Foreign Nuclear Weapons in any European country. Delivery systems which are useful only when outfitted with nuclear warheads should be similarly prohibited. This in effect means denuclearization of Europe from the Rhine to the Soviet Border.

b. United Kingdom and French nuclear weapons should be limited to those now deployed, or currently in the process of being deployed. No distinction between "Tactical" and "Strategic" deployments or uses should be made in this case.

c. Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs which are located so as to be capable of striking Europe should be limited to a number equal to the total number of British and French weapons deployed on long range missiles. Similar arrangements for medium range aircraft should also be made.

d. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Partial Nuclear Test Ban should be continued in force and expanded to the extent possible. All possible political means should be used to reinforce the treaties so as to prevent any further spread of nuclear arms in Europe.

e. If these radical reductions are to be achieved, there must also be a substantial and simultaneous reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments.

The simultaneous elimination of both military blocs — NATO and the Warsaw Treaty — or, as a preliminary step, the dissolution of their military organizations, thus putting an end to the stationing of troops on foreign territory and their maneuvers, the existence of foreign military bases, etc. — would be of great importance for European security and disarmament in Europe.

It should be understood that these

proposals are not a final blueprint but show only the main direction which could lead to significant results in disarmament in Europe and improvement of the political situation in that continent.

It should also be understood that many particular items which have been ignored or overlooked here will become of importance during possible actual negotiations. These include the disposition of nuclear-capable naval forces and other similar questions. But it is hoped such further details could be readily solved if the negotiations are in the spirit and scope of the above proposals.

It was felt that this radical approach may have a better chance of working than the traditional piece-meal attempts to ensure precise balance in every field each time a small disarmament proposal is made. Bold actions seemed to be the only practical way out of the present impasse.

However, it was felt by some that the proposal is not a realistic one. The question was also raised as to whether entirely new standards and approaches, substituting for the concepts of military balance and deterrence, should be considered. It was emphasized by some that these traditional concepts have led only to an arms race.

## Disarmament Negotiations

There are important flaws in the present method of negotiating disarmament agreements. Some of these, and possible corrections for them, are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Two nuclear powers, China and France, are not now participating in any negotiating forum. Without them any real major disarmament is very difficult and general and complete disarmament is obviously impossible.

France should take her seat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and contribute to disarmament again as she did so positively in the past.

China should participate in disarmament negotiations. States having formal diplomatic or informal political relations with China should urge her to do so.

Those countries which could achieve nuclear weapons capability

in less than five years have insufficient opportunity to discuss the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles with the United States and the USSR who are talking about these matters alone in SALT. Also there is no link between the discussions of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in SALT and the discussion of other kinds of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, in other forms.

In any case, since progress in other disarmament negotiations depends on progress at SALT, a close link is required between SALT and the other disarmament negotiations. Some of the discussants believed that SALT should become a subcommittee of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Some others suggested that the United States and the USSR should make periodic reports to the Geneva Conference on progress made at SALT. Still others believed that the present system should not be disturbed at such a crucial time.

Some people believe that too much power has been exercised by the United States and the USSR as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. They argue that a condition for the entry of France, and possibly China, into this Conference is the abolition of this co-chairmanship. Others feel that this Conference has been productive of a number of agreements and that the work of the Co-Chairmen has really facilitated this progress. They urge that an institution that has worked well in the past should not be abolished hastily or prematurely.

Finally, there was general agreement that a general disarmament conference should be convened in which all interested states could participate and express their points of view.

Successful progress towards disarmament, considering not only interim measures but also general and complete disarmament, requires a radical improvement of the international situation, the elimination of all hotbeds of war and sources of tension, the renunciation by all states of the use of force or threats to use it to resolve international disputes, and the strengthening of international machinery for the resolution of conflicts and keeping the peace.

December 1971 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 19

355

WALL STREET JOURNAL 1 December 1971 P1 (3)

356

# The Olive Branch
## Soviet-West Detente
### Now Is Held Likely; Factors: Trade, China

By ROBERT KEATLEY

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

When Peter the Great visited Paris nearly three centuries ago, a local commentator named Voltaire noted with pleasure that the traveling czar was received "in a manner befitting."

Last month another officially proclaimed Russian great, Leonid Brezhnev, toured the same city. All this prompted a Soviet propagandist named Nikolay Polyanov to boast that the "manner befitting" of Peter's-day was estimated "a stage further" in honor of the grand occasion.

So far, few Western authorities rank Soviet Communist Party Secretary Brezhnev with czar Peter as a shaper of world history (and Mr. Polyanov is certainly no Voltaire), but there is something significant about this parallel. Mr. Brezhnev and some Politburo colleagues are busily barnstorming the West in search of political detente and modern technology much as their Royal predecessor did so long ago; like Peter, they aren't entirely satisfied with the Russia they rule and have decided some changes are in order.

This helps explain why Soviet foreign policy these days has taken new form and, many analysts believe, some new substance as well. During a recent six-week period, Moscow's three top comrades visited 13 countries. They ranged from Vancouver to Versailles, with stops at Persepolis and Casablanca, among other unlikely spots for aging Bolsheviks. They brought back a clutch of peaceful treaties, joint communes and trade pacts, and they clearly thirst for more.

Along the way, the men dropped hints about desiring agreements on strategic arms control, central European disarmament, Berlin and a European security conference (which would include the U.S. and Canada). They also talked much about expanding trade and technological exchanges, especially with the United States. Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans has just finished an 11-day Russian trip to find out what the Soviets had in mind, and trade talks will continue this month in Washington.

The Soviet explanation for all this travel and sweet talk is straightforward. Politburo member Viktor Grishin calls it a "peace program" that seeks "a realistic and constructive approach to international problems ripe for solution by methods of negotiation and cooperation."

Such words in themselves aren't particularly new; the Russians officially favored negotiations even in Stalin's day. But American analysts have slowly concluded that Mr. Brezhnev and friends have injected new meaning into such phrases since outlining their objectives at last spring's 24th Soviet Communist Party Conference (where the Brezhnev group clearly emerged in control). "A lot of old drives and new pushes now incline them toward detente," says one U.S. Kremlinologist.

Just how far inclined remains uncertain; some crucial talks are only in the earliest stages. But if any U.S. detente with Moscow should result, it would have far greater import than an easing of tensions with mainland China, the experts say. Most agree with President Nixon that the basic issue of war and peace can't be resolved until Americans and Russians work out better living arrangements

and methods for settling international disputes. And though remaining cautious, these U.S. officials now see a real chance to negotiate practical improvements in that relationship.

### Major Motives

The major Soviet motives, it's believed in Washington, include:

- Desire for trade and technology. Russian leaders apparently realize their economy is in many ways second-rate and needs major innovations. Output doesn't rise fast enough to meet unleashed consumer demands, and product quality is low. The strains of a large military budget restrict economic growth. The civilian sector remains inefficient despite political exhortations. Reorganizing the economic system would pose too many political risks for Soviet officials (including party man Brezhnev), so many of them see a magic solution in acquiring Western plants and technology. Thus the Soviet diplomatic offensive may be designed to set the framework for greatly expanded commercial dealings, sped by Western credits and tariff concessions.

- Fear of China. To many experts, this is the major explanation; they believe the U.S.S.R. has an emotional, even irrational concern about its relationship with neighboring China. The Red Army has 42 well-equipped army divisions near the border, and the buildup continues. Making peace in the West would either release Soviet assets for transfer east or permit a net cut in military spending without weakening the Sino-Soviet frontier.

- Confidence in military strength. The Soviet Union has reached a rough parity with the U.S. in nuclear weapons. Some experts say this gives Russian leaders more confidence in their dealings with the West, as they no longer fear somehow being done in by a stronger American force. This confidence, some analysts conclude, makes compromise rather than confrontation more acceptable to the Russians.

In addition, experts cite Mr. Brezhnev's becoming "more equal" than his Politburo comrades as contributing to the possibility of detente. The military and the bureaucracy still restrain the party chief's freedom of action, but his role is dominant enough to permit policy initiatives—something more difficult when a committee of peers runs things. And he has stated his position clearly: "We proceed from the assumption that it is possible to improve relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A."; this line is frequently quoted by Soviet spokesmen when explaining current foreign policy.

None of this means East-West rivalries will disappear overnight. "The psychology of confrontation is as strong as ever—they will keep an adversary relationship with us," warns an American analyst. The Russians apparently agree. "It is impossible to believe that relations, between the U.S.S.R. and the United States will suddenly enter an era of undisputed harmony," writes Georgy A. Arbatov, Moscow's senior America-watcher. "Such things do not happen in real life."

The move toward detente remains a fragile thing, certainly. Senior Washington officials are concerned about the Soviets' continued construction of intercontinental missiles; they wonder if Moscow will settle for a vague "parity" or if it seeks military "superiority"—and the political muscle this could bring. These officials insist superiority is an obsolete concept, and a Soviet effort to gain it would only mean a dangerous new round of arms-building that would scatter progress toward peace, they say.

It's unlikely, in fact, that some fundamental Soviet objectives have changed. One goal is to reduce American influence in Europe. Another is to establish the Russians in European minds as friendly fellow-Europeans, rather than as

dreaded Easterners who threaten Western societies. And above all, Moscow wants to nail down the European status quo in law as well as in fact—meaning the permanent division of Germany and international acceptance of post-World War II frontiers.

But what has changed, many experts contend, is the means the Russians use to seek these goals. They now appear willing to make concessions in return for concessions from the West, rather than merely be obstinate. The recent Berlin agreement is cited as evidence. Though Moscow gained some political rights in West Berlin, it gave the Western powers essentially what they wanted on access—despite protests from East Germany.

Russia's Mr. Arbatov, among others, believes there are more concessions to come. In a recent speech in Baltimore, he said chances for detente "are more realistic than at any time since World War II." His comments indicated that Soviet political thought may be growing more sophisticated, for he warned of the danger that the two powers might be dragged into unwanted conflict by smaller nations. Specifically, he cited the Middle East, where many experts believe the Russians have little more control over their client (Egypt) than the U.S. has over its client (Israel). Mr. Arbatov, director of the U.S.A. Institute in Moscow, a government center for American studies, said the superpowers must reach understandings about how to prevent such catastrophes—something Washington has argued for since getting involved in Vietnam.

Translating professed goodwill into hard agreements is another matter, of course. Involved are talks on Berlin, peace treaties and trade pacts, plus other subjects identified by confusing labels, such as SALT, MBFR, CES and MFN.

Furthest along is negotiation on Berlin, the key to many other political deals. The Big Four powers have reached broad agreement covering access to West Berlin and West Germany's rights there. Some specific details now are being discussed by the two Germanies; after initial stalling, East Germany has begun serious talks, and an agreement is expected soon. It's possible that discreet pressure from Moscow helped; Mr. Brezhnev stopped in East Berlin en route home from France and may have emphasized that the U.S.S.R. wants the access rules put down on paper. Once a Berlin pact is signed, peace treaties between Bonn and Moscow and between Bonn and Warsaw will be ratified. These pacts are important to the Soviets, for they will establish existing European borders as the legal ones.

Next to bear fruit may be the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, or SALT, which just resumed in Vienna. Washington still expects a useful agreement before or during President Nixon's late-May visit to Moscow, despite some growing doubts about Russian military intentions. Such a pact would limit offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, leading, it is hoped, to more restrictive agreements later. Despite harder Soviet bargaining than once expected, most U.S. officials still believe the Russians are truly seeking an arms limitation.

Less clear are prospects for mutual and balanced force reductions, or MBFR. The object is to cut military forces in both East and West Europe, particularly in the two Germanies; this would ease political tensions and permit slashes in defense budgets by both sides. So far there isn't even tentative agreement about what "mutual" and "balanced" reductions mean. However, many Washington officials believe the Soviets would like to pare their 22-dimension force in East Germany if the U.S. would make comparable cuts in West Germany. A North Atlantic Treaty Organization representative will visit Moscow soon to see what the Russians have in mind.

(CONTINUED)

"We're sure they would like to do something about force reduction, though we doubt if they have decided just what," says one U.S. official.

Then comes Moscow's proposal for a conference on European security, or CES, which the Russians hope will be held next year in Helsinki. It would be basically a diplomatic peace-and-love jamboree, with all governments (including the U.S.) proclaiming their nonaggressive intentions in vague terms. American officials aren't enthusiastic about the exercise, but they have no serious objections; the Soviets consider it more significant.

Such a conference would help establish the U.S.S.R. as a friendly European nation, which it desires to be called, and perhaps erode Western Europe's reliance on the United States. It would also give new status to East Germany, expected as a participant.

Finally, there is trade. The Soviets seek most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment in the U.S., meaning that Russian goods would get tariff treatment as favorable as the best the U.S. offers any other nation. The gain might be more symbolic than real, for the Soviets have few manufactured items suitable for the American market. But they hope anyway to get Export-Import Bank credits, plus permission to buy high-technology computers and other goods now withheld for strategic reasons. Congress has granted President Nixon authority to give Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviets, but he has yet to do so.

The Russians also talk about possible joint ventures with big American companies, especially in developing natural resources. Last summer, for example, Premier Alexei Kosygin told an American delegation that U.S. firms might make large investments in Siberia and take payment in kind—such as copper, natural gas, titanium, tin, diamonds or other materials. He said the question of profits for the visiting capitalists could be worked out satisfactorily.

But many U.S. businessmen remain skeptical because of the huge sums required. One copper project could entail a $4 billion investment, for instance. Years of joint-venture talks between Moscow and Tokyo haven't gotten far. It's noted, because the Russians want great amounts of cash flowing in and very little flowing out—a dubious proposition to profit-minded executives. However, Commerce Secretary Stans presumably heard more details about such projects during his Soviet visit.

Whether any of the detente talk will bring results remains unclear; the slow-moving SALT and Berlin negotiations prove how laboriously the discussions can be. "The Russians aren't about to give anything away," warns one U.S. official. And he adds: "Of course, neither are we."

357

358

Charles Bartlett

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 4 DECEMBER 1971

Arms Race Looms
As SALT Talks Drag

VIENNA. — The secrecy which cloaks the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is so complete that the rooms in which the negotiators meet are regularly swept for bugging devices perhaps planted by Chinese spies or entering reporters.

The aim, as the talks go down the home-stretch, is to keep the negotiating climate as ideal as possible. The spokesman for the American delegation, Nedville Nordness, has the painful task of telling the press less and less. Congressional observers continue to be barred from the sessions because the Soviets react so indignantly to leaks.

The mood here is more dogged than optimistic and the outlook for a substantial lid on the nuclear arms race is still clouded. The negotiators are grappling now with how many ABM sites will be allowed to each side. The Soviets' attitude toward a limit on offensive weapons remains ambiguous and they are reportedly still in-disposed to deal with nuclear submarines and multiple warheads.

As hopes recede for a deal by the end of the year, a big uncertainty here is whether the ideal negotiating climate can be prolonged. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has warned for 18 months that failure to reach an agreement by this December would face him with a necessity to go forward with new strategic weapons.

This means that Laird has to make budget decisions before January on whether to expand the Polaris fleet and begin research on new ways to kill Russians. These decisions, plus the military pay increase, can force a rise in the defense budget despite the cutbacks in Vietnam. They are capable of putting a new spin on the arms race.

The negotiators labor here under an awareness that their slow progress is stirring pressures at home for Laird's response to the unfaltering pace of the Soviet build-up. Warnings that the balance of power is shifting against the United States are echoing within the Nixon inner-core.

It is possible to argue that these assessments exaggerate the implementation of what the Soviets are adding to their arsenal in terms of the retaliatory power the United States will gain from the MIRV-multipli-

cation of the warheads on its missiles. But it is also plain that the long SALT parleys have not solidly affirmed the Soviets' readiness to accept nuclear parity.

The Russians have stalled on these negotiations since 1966, but their old reasons for stalling no longer seem pertinent. They have closed the missile gap which troubled them before and the signs of division in their leadership have largely disappeared with the emergence of Chairman Brezhnev.

They know now that they misread American politics when they anticipate that the frustrations of Vietnam would give the unilateral disarmers the leverage they needed to dismantle the military. They have been clearly apprised, by a series of votes in Congress, that the majority will be apt to react to disappointment in the SALT talks with more funds for defense.

Premier Kosygin has frequently described the SALT talks as a useful way of increasing confidence between the East and West. Other features of their present diplomacy indicate that they want this confidence in order to devote more resources and attention to the problems at home and with China.

It may well be that the Russians are merely negotiating as Russians always do, hard and defiantly until the moment when the deal is made. The long sessions may still yield the package which Nixon wants to bring home from Moscow.

359

BOSTON GLOBE 4 DEC 1971 (10)

Arming for disarmament

Hopes for disarmament proceed, like a three-ring circus. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the Soviet Union and the United States recently reopened in Vienna in a mood of good will and with an absence of polemics. Meanwhile, at home, President Nixon signed a $21.3 billion military procurement bill that authorizes funds for the 'continued construction of anti-ballistic missile systems. And, at the same time, the House of Representatives passed a $71 billion defense bill after turning down several antiwar amendments.

Early reports of the talks in Vienna made a special point of the fact that the recent test of an American ABM warhead at Amchitka Island

was not raised as an issue by the Russians, nor was the admission of China to the United Nations. Instead, the stage appeared to be set for constructive discussion of the limitation of offensive intercontinental ballistic missile systems.

When the last SALT sessions broke up in Helsinki on September 24 there were clear indications that the two nations had reached agreement on defensive weapons, allowing each side to maintain the number of ABMs necessary to defend its own key areas. The Russians have run two underground tests and we have run one since that session broke up. Our own test was considered necessary as a bargaining

1-E

chip at the new SALT talks despite the apparent agreement on defensive systems.

But an agreement on ABMs is not considered sufficient. Since May 20, President Nixon and the State Department have insisted that any arms limitation treaty include offensive ICBMs as well. On October 12 the President called for an initial agreement by the end of the year. A month later he said that meeting such a deadline would be improbable. Now a Hungarian party newspaper quotes Russian authorities as predicting a settlement "in the first quarter of 1972 or at the end of the year."

This is good news and the SALT negotiators deserve all of our blessings. But one would think that their job would be less difficult if we were not busy financing an arsenal here while they discuss arms limitations in Vienna. It is not very easy to talk if you are holding a knife in your teeth.

360

NEW YORK TIMES 6 DECEMBER 1971 (?)

# Soviet Policy of Detente Has Diverse Roots

The following article is one of a series by the Washington correspondent of The New York Times assessing reaction abroad to United States foreign policy.

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Dec. 3—Eagerly, but also anxiously, the Russians are talking of Soviet-American accommodation, again, in much the same tones of ambiguity that can be heard in Washington. It all depends on the other fellow, they say.

Looking ahead to President Nixon's visit in May, the talk of reconciliation here touches on the most vital as Analysis well as trivial interests. It touches on laced boots and bell-bottomed trousers and the automobile revolution that now haunts this society more than Marx's legendary specter. It turns on horror tales of Chinese atrocities and the popular but still unsettling official conclusion that Americans are more natural partners than the Oriental masses in the East.

It harps on the hope for an end to conflict in Europe at last and for Western acceptance of the postwar "borders of the socialist community" out in the middle of the Continent. And it toys uncertainty with the theory that American strength may have been sapped just enough in Vietnam and at home to make this a moment for profitable negotiation.

The Russians resent the doctrine that Soviet and American societies are converging on common approaches to common problems. Indeed, they vigorously insist on continuing the ideological combat.

But they do perceive a convergence of national interests and they are daring to hope that Mr. Nixon—whom they have never trusted—has been propelled (they would like to say compelled) to a similar conclusion.

## Mutual Suspicion Evens

There are mirror images here and in Washington of Soviet and American strengths and weaknesses at this moment. The Russians suspect hostile mischief in President Nixon's forthcoming journey to Peking, just as Americans suspect the Soviet leaders of wanting to divide the Western alliance and diminish United States influence in Europe through détente. The Russians think Americans now want Soviet trade as much as Moscow wants American technology and capital.

Each Government thinks the other needs to trim its global ambitions to cope with fractured alliances and strains at home.

These are not always the terms in which the surge toward accommodation is explained around Moscow these days, but the quest itself is unmistakable. At the ministries and research institutes among party leaders and editors and foreign observers, there is virtually total agreement that the Soviet leaders wish to stabilize their relations with the West, and above all the United States, and somehow make the arrangements durable.

They approach the problem feeling good about some things and deeply worried by others. They are proud to have achieved virtual equality with the United States in military strength, to have kept West Germany a nonnuclear power and forced her to accept a separate and Communist East Germany.

## Satisfied with Position

They are satisfied with the suppression of challenges to the Communist system in Czechoslovakia and Poland, whose repercussions they feared within Soviet society. They are pleased with extensions of their influence in the Middle East and South Asia.

And all the while they believe they have made gradual but persistent progress in raising their standard of living—a sentiment that is shared by ordinary Muscovites even though their appetites keep running far ahead of the available goods and services.

In the street, as in the Kremlin, what the Russians fear most is China—and the diplomatic and military diversions that result from Peking's challenge. They are troubled by what they call the "zigzag" of President Nixon's policies and they think his trip to China is a mighty big and advancing zag.

They think the Chinese are undermining Soviet approaches to the less-developed nations as well as efforts to cool conflict with the United States—so much so that they implore Americans to quit talking about the "two superpowers" that figure as villains in Peking's propaganda.

Fear of the United States has diminished to mere worry and, in some sense, even to some cautious hope. The American exhaustion in Vietnam and economic weakness, the Russians

expect, will lead to a period of American introversion, but not really isolation and withdrawal. They sense a desire in Washington for a resolution of conflicts but they also suspect President Nixon of wishing to use accommodation in both the East and West to constrict their influence and further undermine the loyalty of their allies.

And the traditional Soviet interest in access to Western technology and capital has come close to a necessity. The Russians are proud and defensive on this point, recalling that they have always denied themselves and their consumers if the political price of trade is pegged too high. But they have firmly proclaimed the satisfaction of consumer demands as the main economic objective and the proclamation itself has now legitimized and encouraged those demands.

For the great economic fact of Soviet life is not that Russians enjoy better housing and food and clothes than before or that their style of life lags behind that of West Europe and America. It is that the waves of demand, like the weather, roll in massively from the West.

After hairpins came hairpieces and now wigs. Although the West now wears Russian boots, the Russians want laces in theirs. Now that women are getting pants, and permission to wear them, they want bell-bottoms.

## Now, the Automobile Age

And now that the Government is committed to increase automobile production, from more than one million to four million a year in five years, you need go no farther than the offices of Pravda to be told that no one is ready for such an upheaval in life styles and resource commitments.

Where party slogans were once strung across the streets there are now exhortations to obey the traffic rules. And this is only one sign of society coming to terms with the end of one revolution and the start of another.

But it remains a society constrained by bureaucratic rigidities and political conformities and by a party machine that fears for the ideology that alone legitimizes its power. Indulgence of the consumer to make him a better producer is an important impulse toward détente, but it also adds to the fear of the unknown.

(CONTINUED)

Party leaders feel compelled to assure themselves as well as visitors and the ever-listening Chinese that their pursuit of more national and consumer interests will tolerate no slackening in the ideological warfare against Western capitalism and liberalism. And they have vowed that they will not again permit themselves and their people the "overoptimism" of former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev about making friends with the United States and overtaking its living standard.

Mr. Khrushchev's successors are approaching their vision of détente along two paths: containing China and Chinese influence in Asia and other undeveloped regions, and stimulating a competition for their diplomatic and commercial favor in the industrial world.

They are punishing Britain for her expulsion of 105 Russians on charges of espionage at the moment, but there have been warm and urgent approaches to France, to West Germany and recently also to Japan. Besides trade, the Soviet leaders are seeking political stability, notably in Central Europe, with new agreements with Bonn and with the United States, Britain and France about Berlin.

They also hope in this way to break through the protective walls of the European Common Market, whose further political cohesion they would deplore. Above all they hope to enlist the United States in the stabilization effort, to cut back on Soviet and American troop deployments in Europe, to freeze the present boundaries and to

win explicit sanction for their dominance in the Eastern half of the Continent.

## Exports a Major Problem

Thus they seek from President Nixon not only agreement to limit the competition in intercontinental missiles but also progress toward the dismantling of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe and perhaps of rival military blocs themselves.

They want his help in managing a European security conference to ratify the trend. And they eagerly want to trade.

They want the trade for its own sake and for the breakthroughs in technology that it promises. They want the trade to multiply their choices in Western markets. And they want it to provide an underpinning for stable political arrangements with the West. Secretary of Commerce Maurice H. Stans and a separate delegation of a hundred touring American businessmen were given the most regal possible Kremlin receptions here this week in testimony to those ambitions.

But the problem, as always, lies not only in American restrictions on commerce with the Soviet Union, which Mr. Nixon has promised to relax. The problem is finding things to sell in the West so as to balance the enormous purchases the Russians wish to make.

Their knowledge of Western markets remains superficial. Their standards of service and quality control and accommodation of foreign businessmen here lag far behind the West's. They want the Western Governments, as an earnest of their goodwill, to persuade traders into doing business here, an approach that has brought only limited returns from France

and does not promise much from West Germany, Japan or the United States. So there is talk now of inviting Western capital and technology to develop the bountiful but distant Soviet resources and paying in kind, be it chrome or timber or natural gas. But these would be massive commitments of long duration requiring the kind of trust on both sides that no one yet dares proclaim.

The last time the United States and the Soviet Union reached this point of exploration and preparation for a Presidential visit was in 1960, when the shooting down of a United States U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union shattered the Russians' fragile confidence, canceled the summit meeting with President Eisenhower and led to a new period of tension and arms competition.

Neither Vietnam nor Czechoslovakia nor any of the great intervening events ever long deterred the two great powers from reaching out toward each other, with a wary eye on China. But it has taken nearly 12 years to overcome the accumulated tensions and to reach a new plateau of military and diplomatic equilibrium.

Though scarred by past failure and still wary of American intentions, the Russians want to climb the mountain again.

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364

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 21 DECEMBER 1971

# Soviet and Western arms-curb views

By Lansing R. Shepard

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Providence, R.I.

Like the music that goes 'round and 'round and comes out somewhere, speculation surrounding the current secret strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union goes on and on.

The latest spate of such debate occurred Monday night at Brown University where NBC news commentator Irving R. Levine moderated a symposium titled "Arms Control: Hope or Hoax?

Voicing various degrees of apprehension, skepticism, and "guarded optimism" before an audience of 500 was a panel of scientific and journalistic talent, including two men who helped shape United States science policy in the early 1960's.

What made the gathering especially significant was the presence of panelist Alexander S. Yereskovski, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., and an authority on disarmament.

His appearance marked the first time the Soviets have allowed themselves to become involved in such a public give-and-take session, evidence, perhaps, of the Soviet desire to halt the costly arms race and to reach some sort of general political and military accommodation with the West.

## Former adviser

Other panel members were Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former science

adviser to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson; Dr. James E. Dougherty, executive vice-president of St. Joseph's College in Philadelphia and an arms-control authority; and Dr. Donald F. Hornig, president of Brown University. Dr. Hornig succeeded Dr. Wiesner as chief presidential science adviser in 1964.

Also taking part were John Finney of the New York Times and Chalmers M. Roberts, retired chief diplomatic writer of the Washington Post.

Mr. Yereskovski, addressing himself to Russia's own increased armament production, said, "I still have the impression that the word 'parity' is not in the vocabulary of some American military people. I think some military people still want to retain superiority."

He said that the United States maintains 7,000 nuclear weapons at its bases in Europe. "We consider them strategic weapons," he said. "For us, bases in Europe or Turkey are a threat we cannot ignore."

## Agreement urged

"Any reasonable agreement is a welcome step forward," Dr. Wiesner said.

"The first stage of SALT [strategic arms limitation talks] could be a meaningful agreement," said Dr. Dougherty.

"I'm generally optimistic about the ... parity [in arms] between the United States and the Soviet Union," he continued. "It's a fluctuating parity—we're a little bit ahead in one dimension and the Soviets may have superiority in another.

"But all this adds up to sufficient uncertainty to make it extremely unlikely that there's going to be any choice either in Washington or Moscow for any deliberate

option toward a first strike,"

## Political foundations

Dr. Wiesner said that both sides had thousands of missiles and multitudes of antimissiles. But the mutual deterrent against their use, he said, is the knowledge that some missiles can penetrate defenses.

"Negotiations on a question like SALT," said Mr. Roberts, "rest on political foundations. Nothing can be accomplished unless there's some political atmosphere that makes it possible—and that means a whole lot of other things, like what's happening between us over Berlin, or the possibility of new talks between East and West in Europe.

"The whole thing could be blown up over a Middle East war, or if the [Indo-Pakistani] war turns into some sort of Soviet-U.S. confrontation."

Mr. Roberts also commented that what was presumably being agreed to at SALT was limits to quantitative weapons and not such things as missile accuracy and multiple warheads.

"Each side," he said, "will be free to improve what it has."

Mr. Finney said that the SALT negotiations may have the unintended effect of encouraging both sides to bargain from a position of strength.

He added that even while SALT was going on the Russians had increased the number of ICBMs and missile submarines while the United States was going ahead with its multiple-warhead missiles.

Dr. Wiesner said he felt the decisions that prompted both sides to increase armaments were made for other reasons and long before SALT.

365

WASH STAR 12/22/71 (23)

Test Ban Pact

By JAMES DOYLE

Star Staff Writer

The Federation of American Scientists today called on the Nixon administration to negotiate a treaty banning all underground nuclear testing, without demanding on-site inspection.

The FAS, a nonpartisan organization which has sought to bring scientific research to bear in halting the arms race, reported that recent improvements in seismology and other monitoring systems make on-site inspection unnecessary to detect even small underground nuclear tests.

At a news conference here today, leading members of the federation, including former Defense and State De-

partment scientists, said that with improved systems of detection, "We believe that the United States would detect Soviet violation of a test ban treaty long before the Soviets could carry out enough tests to score a breakthrough that would threaten the stability of the nuclear balance."

According to the scientists, nuclear explosions of as little as two or three kilotons, buried in rock, now can be detected at great distances.

FAS spokesmen said Soviet scientists would have to inform their leaders they could not be confident that even one small test would go undetected.

On-site inspection under present monitoring capabilities would be of only marginal value. the scientists said, and less cheating is possible now than would have been possible, even with inspections, in 1963,

3-F

when the above-ground nuclear test ban was signed by President Kennedy.

The scientists urged declasification of the methods that the United States uses, other than seismology, to detect underground blasts, saying this would "permit the public a better appraisal of our ability to monitor a ban."

"Much of the opposition to the test ban treaty in the United States does not arise from fear of Soviet cheating," the FAS said. "It springs from the desire to continue American nuclear testing in order to develop new weapons, to retest existing weapons and to keep our laboratories vigorous."

The statement was signed by FAS Chairman Morton H. Halperin, former deputy assistant secretary of Defense for arms control and policy

planning under President Johnson and former senior staff member of the National Security Council under President Nixon; Marvin L. Goldberger, chairman of the physics department at Princeton University and former chairman of the White House Science Advisory Committee's strategic weapons panel; Herbert Scoville Jr., former deputy director for science and technology of the Central Intelligence Agency; Herbert F. Yori, chancellor of the University of California at San Diego and deputy director of Defense research and engineering under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy; George W. Bushjens, formerly of the disarmament agency and the Institute for Deefnse Analysis; and Adrian Fisher, dean of Georgetown Law School and former deputy director of the disarmament agency.

NEW YORK TIMES 30 DECEMBER 1971

Halting Nuclear Tests

Adjournment of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Vienna, without the year-end agreement to which the White House and Kremlin committed themselves last May, demonstrates again the slow pace of progress in curbing the atomic arms race. It brings into question the wisdom of delaying other nuclear negotiations that could contribute to this goal and, particularly, exploration of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear tests, including those underground.

The American case against a comprehensive test ban has been based on the difficulty in verifying compliance without on-site inspection, something that is anathema to Moscow. To overcome this obstacle, the United States in the past decade has spent $274 million in research on means of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions, mostly by seismic methods. It is increasingly evident that a genuine breakthrough has been achieved.

The extent of this breakthrough has just been underlined in a report by a prestigious committee of the Federation of American Scientists, including former Presidential science advisers George Kistiakowsky and Franklin Long, former Pentagon research chief Herbert York and the former science chief of the C.I.A., Herbert Scoville. They state that recent improvements in long-range seismology and other unilateral means of detection—presumably satellite photography and communications monitoring—provide high confidence that violations of a comprehensive test-ban would be detected.

Specifically, the report states, the United States could be sure of detecting violations long before illicit underground tests could develop new weapons threatening the stability of the nuclear balance. Even unrestricted Soviet testing below the level easily spotted by seismic and other national means would achieve nothing more than wasteful further refinements in very small tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, the difficulties in carrying out on-site inspections appear so considerable and the benefits so small that the United States would have no need to go through with them even if Moscow agreed to permit them.

Much of the American opposition to a comprehensive test-ban does not stem from fear of Soviet cheating any more, the report argues, but from a Pentagon desire to continue American testing. New weapons, however, are not needed to maintain the American deterrent, which already is much greater than required. After a SALT agreement, particularly, there will be no need to test new warheads for anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) and MIRV, multiple warhead missiles.

A comprehensive test-ban, on the other hand, would bulwark American and world security by slowing the arms race, reinforcing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and reducing the likelihood of other countries joining the nuclear club. Soviet officials informally have indicated a willingness to open new test-ban talks. The United Nations General Assembly, by vote of 112 to 0 with only one abstention, has urged the Geneva Conference to pursue a test-ban. An early move by the Nixon Administration to initiate test-ban negotiations is clearly warranted.

367

The New York Times -- February 8, 1971

U.S. STRATEGY ON THE KREMLIN DEBATE

368

by -- Robert Kleiman

The critical period of decision-making underway in the Kremlin in preparation for the postponed Communist party Congress March 30, the first since 1966, has set off a parallel debate in Washington. A reluctant White House is being urged by State Department, C. I. A. and outside Soviet analysts--including some in the Soviet Embassy--to send a new signal to the Moscow summit to influence decisions there on Russia's national priorities in the 1970's.

Crucial choices between guns and butter in the long-delayed 1971-75 Five-Year Plan, on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and on other issues undoubtedly will be affected by Moscow's estimate of the Nixon Administration's intentions.

"We are not sure that Washington is not serious about the SALT talks, but we are not sure that it is," Premier Kosygin told Senator Muskie last month.

If the Soviet Union misreads American policy toward SALT, Soviet-German detente, stability in the Mideast and peace in Southeast Asia, hard line elements in the Politburo could be strengthened.

There are signs that a power struggle within the Soviet leadership over the ultimate succession to party secretary Leonid Brezhnev may be in progress. Mr. Brezhnev, now 64, reportedly has suffered two heart attacks and some political ups and downs. President Podgorny will be 68 this month; Premier Kosygin will by 67 and has been in poor health. The average age of the 11-member Politburo is now 62 and ambitious younger men presumably are eyeing some of these posts.

Although the seriousness of this challenge is difficult to assess, as are the precise issues and players in the Politburo debate, analysts agree that there is a sharp conflict of tendencies, if not of individuals, within the Soviet leadership.

The official press reflects a trend toward a tightening up in ideology and discipline, a trend evidently favored by the party machine and military leaders. But among scientists, younger plant directors and the managerial elite who travel abroad there is a desire to modernize and rationalize the

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369

lumbering Soviet system and even to open it more to the world. Pressure for higher living standards, at the expense of heavy industry and arms spending, has increased since the Polish food price riots.

In these circumstances, President Nixon is being urged to employ a channel his predecessors used but he has neglected--direct correspondence with Premier Kosygin--in an effort to break the impasse in the SALT talks and clear away other misunderstandings.

Another suggestion is to set up a high-level strategy group to screen out Administration moves--such as the ill-timed announcement of a defense budget increase--that could have an adverse impact on the Poliburo's internal argument.

Mr. Nixon reportedly tried to signal a real desire for accommodation in his speech to the U. N. General Assembly last fall. But there evidently was too much static in the line. Other White House comments have interpreted difficulties with Moscow on some matters, such as the Middle East and Cuba, as a general hardening of Soviet policy, requiring a stiffening of Washington's responses in unrelated fields. Many Soviet analysts challenge this "linkage" concept and urge an issue-by-issue approach to the Russians to make progress where possible.

The Russians have never been sure whether they were dealing with the "old Nixon" or a "new Nixon" and the White House has felt it advantageous in the past to keep them guessing. That strategy could boomerang now. What Ambassador Charles Yost once termed "the law of disproportionate responses to miscalculated challenges" could again govern the Kremlin's decisions.

Of all the positive steps Washington might take, Soviet analysts consider two of over-riding importance. One is to normalize trade with the Soviet Union beyond recent case-by-case relaxations in strategic trade controls. Secondly, a need is seen for a new, more reasonable proposal in the SALT talks to meet Soviet concern that the United States is trying to freeze Russia into a position of nuclear inferiority.

President Nixon has always believed that he could pressure Moscow toward agreement by withholding trade until later and by stepping up American missile deployments. But now he is being told that these tactics play into the hands of the Kremlin's hardliners. His decision in the coming weeks may determine whether deterioration continues in the Soviet-American

371

New York Times Editorial -- February 22, 1971:

"Improving U.S. -Soviet Relations"

Rapid action by Washington on two fronts might usefully influence Russia's foreign and defense policies and its priorities for the 1970's.

One move would be to normalize Soviet-American trade. Elimination of tariff discrimination and steps to bring American export controls in line with NATO's shorter strategic embargo list would have a major psychological effect. The tactic of withholding American trade as leverage for some later bargain over unrelated issues is far less likely to influence Soviet policy favorably than is the trade itself, once it begins to play a role in Soviet economic planning and in increasing Soviet contact and interdependence with the West.

The most urgent need in the coming weeks is a dramatic new American move--preferably in a direct Nixon message to Premier Kosygin--to break the impasse in the SALT talks...

372

New York Times Editorial --June 26, 1971:

...The economic case for increased commercial trade with the Soviet Union is particularly strong in view of continuing high unemployment and balance-of-payments difficulties in the United States. Politically, the atmosphere has been improved by the recent agreement on the next stage of SALT and progress toward beginning negotiations on mutual and balanced withdrawal of forces from the center of Europe. Moreover, the Administration, having recently eased trade bars with China, would doubtless wish to appear even-handed by similarly increasing the possibilities of Soviet-American trade.

The Washington Post

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375

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

...R

MONDAY, JUNE 7, 1971

PAGE A1

East-West Trade: Old Habits Die Hard

Balance of payments worries are coming to outweigh considerations of "theology" in the shaping of American trade policy, and it's about time. For a generation after World War II, the United States commonly treated trade as an instrument of global policy. Countries with which we had political and ideological disputes—the Communist countries—were regarded as unworthy of the privilege of trading with us. We rationalized an elaborate strategic scaffolding for embargoes, blockades, strategic lists, tariff discrimination, export controls, and so on; inevitably, a big bureaucracy grew up with a vested interest in maintaining and expanding these various restrictions. In the interim, our competitors—many of them our allies—took the business. West Europe's trade with East Europe and Russia is 10 times ours, and we do no business at all with China and Cuba.

Only now, when we have become seized by an entirely appropriate concern for our recurring balance of payments deficits and our declining trade balance, are we starting to realize that the practice of indiscriminate economic warfare is a costly anachronism. Hard times have brought home the lesson of how harmful and gratuitous it is both economically and politically to inject artificial "strategic" objections into the free play of world commerce. This is the significance of the report that the United States has approved licenses for the export of $85 million in vehicle-making equipment to the Soviet Union. Just a year ago Defense Secretary Laird destroyed a prospective Ford truck deal with Russia, demanding that first "there should be some indication on the part of the Soviet Union that they're not going to continue sending the trucks to North Vietnam by shiploads for use on the Ho Chi Minh trail."

Well, no such indication has been given. It was idle anyway to imagine Moscow would cut off Hanoi for the sake of American trucks—when it can buy European trucks, some made under American license. In the years since, economic pressure has shaved the Pentagon's Neanderthal influence on trade policy, and now American firms will be allowed to compete for an important range of orders previously off limits to them.

But the contest between bad habit and good sense is far from over. Currently Chile wants to buy two more Boeing 707s and a 727. Some officials reportedly are balking at the deal on grounds that Chile may land the planes at Havana and that the new elected Marxist government in Santiago hasn't established how it will pay its future bills or what

it will pay for nationalized American properties. These considerations are demeaning; that they are raised at all testifies to the ossification of cold-war thinking on trade. For other American-made planes already land at Havana. Chile has paid past bills without fault. To wield 707s and 727s as a political club is 1) to insult Chile. 2) to ignore its ability to buy commercial jets elsewhere, 3) to stiffen any incipient Chilean tendencies to go hard on the nationalized American firms.

We trust the decision on the planes will reflect Mr. Nixon's words of March 25 to Boeing employees, after the SST defeat: "Each time I fly in Air Force One—a Boeing plane—I am reminded of the role Boeing has played in making America the world's leader in commercial aviation. Throughout the world, the 707, the 727, the 737, and now the giant 747 have become symbols of America's leadership."

The most intriguing East-West trade case now pending concerns the list of items permissible in trade with China which Mr. Nixon has said he will release next week. The key question is whether he will apply a more stringent measure to China than Russia, as the Pentagon is urging him to do on grounds that China, being less advanced, will be hurt by denial of some items whose denial to Russia would be meaningless.

This is, of course, precisely the reason to put trade with both countries on the same basis. Politically, discrimination against Peking would undo much of the benefit gained from the President's new China initiatives. Economically, it would simply ensure that China will buy elsewhere or create its own capacity. This goes for food products as well as manufactured goods. And in the case of food, it would be wise to remove the restriction, adopted by President Kennedy in a weak political moment, which requires half of the food grains shipped to Communist countries to be carried in American ships. So high are their rates that they have effectively discouraged food shipments.

In a country ostensibly dedicated to free enterprise, why should the government intervene in private trading decisions? Doubtless there is a class of items, however hard it may be to define them, which have a direct military potential rendering them "strategic." and these should not be sold. But the idea that the United States alone has the economic resources or the political clout to control industrial and military progress elsewhere has been proven wrong by events. It is an illusion which the country's politics can no longer abide and which the country's economy can no longer afford.

New York Times Editorial -- July 26, 1971 :

'Undermining the Budget'

Senate and House conferees, completing a bill to expand the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank, have agreed to permit the bank to supply credits for shipping American goods to Communist countries including China. President Nixon would, however, retain the power to decide whether to let the bank make particular loans to Communist countries.

This will give the President the flexibility he needs in using trade as an adjunct to his policy for normalizing political relations with mainland China and other Communist states. In this context it would now make sense for the Administration to re-examine the numerous categories of commodities which it is willing to sell in East-West trade.

By imposing far more rigid standards on itself than its allies have done, the United States has simply shut itself out of markets without any impact on Communist countries or gain to national security. The Administration should call upon the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to propose a new list of strategic goods that they wish to exclude from East-West trade, and decide whether this country will accept that list or continue to impose stricter limits upon itself. . .

375

# A Negative Approach to East-West Trade

Mr. Nixon is often to be found repelling what he regards as congressional boarders trying to clamber into his foreign-policy ship but, rather inconsistently, he has done little to help along congressional efforts to arm him with more authority in East-West trade. Trade-minded legislators wanted him to support repeal of the Fino Amendment, which prevents the Export-Import Bank from financing trade with countries whose governments aid Hanoi, and to replace it with a provision giving him authority to approve Ex-Im financing country by country. But Mr. Nixon said he did not favor repeal of Fino: the issue lost on the House floor. When a House-Senate conference wrote in repeal, he shifted position but only to the point of saying he wouldn't object to it. This is pretty tepid, particularly when you consider that the President intended to exercise Ex-Im discretion, if he got it, for Romania. He has made it clear for a long time that he wants to give Romania—a burr in Moscow's side—all the help he discreetly can.

Essentially, the Fino Amendment, enacted in 1968, codified the illusion that Communist countries would sell out Hanoi for the sake of trade with the United States. In practice, it did not limit the North Vietnamese war effort; it merely ensured that American firms would lose some business. During the long postwar period when Americans enjoyed a fat trade surplus and without much complaining carried on an anti-Communist crusade, this would have been all right. But the trade surplus has all but disappeared and so has much of our anti-Communist fervor. This is the spirit in which the Fino Amendment came under attack. With a vote due soon on the conference report containing that amendment, it's not too late for Mr. Nixon finally to put in his oar.

In a related development showing a similar passivity on trade, Mr. Nixon has ended months of delay with another backhanded gesture. Asked

to support a bill giving Romania "most favored nation" or MFN status (that is, ending tariff discrimination against its exports), he said he would "not object" to the bill. At the same time, he has indicated that in the event Congress offers him authority to extend MFN to other countries, he will not use it. Since MFN is not only a real obstacle to trade but one with high political visibility, his attitude is negative, to say the least.

Something more seems to be involved in Mr. Nixon's thinking than a calculation that the economic potential of East-West trade is too limited to merit the expected domestic political difficulty of enacting legislation to help broaden it. [The judgment that legislative change in this area would be difficult and costly, by the way, is widely disputed on Capitol Hill.] Nor is this just a case of Mr. Nixon's being unwilling to ask congressional help in "building bridges" to the East—though it is a fact that in trade matters, and not only trade matters, he has shown a disposition to deal with powers already in presidential hands. Removing restrictions on trade with China is the most recent example.

The President's approach to trade seems to be primarily political: he seems to be trying to fit each trade gesture into a larger global mosaic which he, perhaps only he, has in his head. Want to soften up China? Remove old restrictions. Reward Romania? Let it get MFN. Mollify Moscow? Approve the Mack truck deal. Get a Berlin agreement? Offer, as Under Secretary of State Irwin did in a recent speech excerpted "For the Record" today, to discuss trade and other matters at a European security conference. It's odd to find a Republican President so unwilling to let businessmen make trading decisions by themselves. But that seems to be Mr. Nixon's way. Whether the country's balance of payments and the business community and his political opposition will continue allowing him to treat the matter as his own personal preserve, is something else again.

APPENDIX B

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE WITH DARTMOUTH CONFERENCE

The sixth regular meeting of the representatives to the Dartmouth Conference from the United States and the Soviet Union met in Kiev on the 12-16 of July. (These meetings are known as the Dartmouth Conferences because the first meeting of this type took place at Dartmouth College in 1960. The four subsequent meetings have convened alternately in the USA and the USSR.) Problems of Soviet-American trade relations were a principal subject of the exchanges at the meeting as well as other problems important to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The participants exchanged views and advanced proposals aimed at achieving a general lessening of international tensions and the improvement of the relations between the USSR and the USA. Both sides presented their ideas for working more effectively toward world peace. The Soviet participants informed their American colleagues on the contents of the peace programme advanced by the XXIV Congress of the CPSU, that, in the Soviet view, presents a sound basis for the improvement of international relations in this decade. The American participants presented proposals on ways of promoting international cooperation, particularly in the fields of international trade, the strengthening of the United Nations, and the protection of the human environment.

The participants were unanimous in considering that the improvement in Soviet-American relations would serve the vital interests of the Soviet and American peoples and recognized the utility of promoting mutually beneficial relations of a permanent and stable nature.

The participants expressed their conviction that real possibilities exist for the promotion of a greater volume of Soviet-American trade, for cooperation in the field of industry and for more meaningful exchanges in the areas of science, technology and management. The preliminary meeting of minds which was reached on certain trade matters was, in their view, a welcome development. They expressed the hope that this understanding would open the way to further and more effective promotion of Soviet-American commerce.

The conference favored the normalization of trade relations, through the elimination of laws and practices which restrict the free flow of trade in non-strategic items, and felt confident that improvements in the conditions of trade can be achieved despite existing differences in institutions, laws and customs.

The conference expressed the conviction that the growth of Soviet-American commerce and other forms of economic cooperation would help to improve the political climate and contribute to the settlement of outstanding political issues.

The exchanges in Kiev were conducted in the spirit of good will and candor. The Conferences participants are aware of the existence of contradictions and divergent interests between the USSR and the USA, countries with different social and economic systems, and these differences were reflected in the discussions. This notwithstanding, the participants in the Conference recognize that, given good will and a desire to arrive at mutual understanding, real opportunities exist for the improvement of relations between our countries. They expressed the belief that the continuation on a regular basis of the Dartmouth Conferences will maintain contacts with each other for the good of the constructive goals these meetings have been called for.

US participants included Senators Frank Church and Mark Hatfield.

McGOVERN PLAYBOY INTERVIEW

August, 1971

377

McGOVERN. I hope so. Speaking for myself, I think communism is another economic system that doesn't happen to fit my view of how society ought to be organized, but I'm willing to live in a world of diversity and I think we can get along with the Communists. If people want to be organized under a Communist system, we've got to accept the fact that this is their judgment to make. The Soviets may be in competition with us, but that doesn't mean we can't coexist peacefully with them. And I think the same thing is true of the Chinese. We have had the view too long that because they are Communists, they are our mortal enemies.

I think even Nixon is beginning to see that. I mean, he seemed to enjoy being wined and dined in Romania by the Communist government. And he doesn't seem to be particularly disturbed about communism in Yugoslavia. He even talks of being concerned about Czechoslovakia because of the difficulties with the Soviet Union. So I think even he is beginning to see that you can survive in the same world with Communists. That we don't have to get involved in any more holy crusades to "stem the Red tide."

* * * *

PLAYBOY. While we're at loggerheads with the Soviets in the Middle East, do you think we should cooperate with them on SALT talks for disarmament or on détente for central Europe?

McGOVERN. Yes, I do.

* * * *

PLAYBOY. Is there any way other than further arms expansion to ensure our national security?

McGOVERN. Indeed there is. The best way to ensure our national security is to improve relations with the Soviet Union in every area we can. That means expanding international trade and trying to reach an agreement on such outstanding questions as the Middle East, Berlin, Southeast Asia and arms control. But if we're going to get anywhere in any of these areas, we're going to have to abandon our paranoia about Russia's ambition to dominate the world. I think if the Russians had messianic views at one time, they've largely subsided. The Soviets are interested in a security zone to protect them from another invasion from the West, from revived German militarism, and they see American policy in western Europe as reviving German power and building a nuclear cordon around them. I've always felt that's the real reason they wanted a cushion of Communist states on their western border, from Poland to the Mediterranean.

378

The New York Times -- November 10, 1971 :

'Ribicoff Advocates Trade With Communist Nations'

Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff urged here yesterday that the United States, despite its current preoccupation with the realignment of international exchange rates and trade barriers, move quickly to liberalize commercial dealings with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

Particularly, the Connecticut Democrat urged that the law be changed so that the Administration would be permitted to grant most-favored-nation treatment to Communist countries other than Poland and Yugoslavia, which already have it.

Noting that the United States accounted for only $600 million of a total of $18 billion of trade between the non-Communist nations and the Communist bloc last year, Mr. Ribicoff demanded that the United States cahnge its basic approach to the issue.

Addressing the annual meeting of the International Fiscal Association at the Hotel Plaza, Mr. Ribicoff said: "If the United States continues its present course of tying removal of a trade restriction to specific political payoffs, we will not benefit much--politically or economically. The current policy is actually one pf putting the political cart before the economic horse.

Instead we should first concentrate on forging stronger economic ties with Eastern European countries. By doing so we will be creating an environment in which bilateral political problems will be more easily solved."

Recalling the United States' preoccupation with military security after World War II, the Senator argued that while the United States was busy with the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) order of battle, the West Germans were concerned with gathering orders for Volkswagens.

"While the United States sought to restrict its exports to the East, Western European trade with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and mainland China flourished," he added.

The Senator, who has sponsored several bills in the Congress aimed at liberalizing trade with the East, asserted that during 1971 the countries of Eastern Europe had, in varying degrees, reached a point of departure from economic

379

dependence on the Soviet Union.

He continued that there was a great need in Europe, the Soviet Union and China for high-technology equipment and industrial products that the United States could produce competitively.

The United States, he said, showed a $10 billion surplus in its trade in capital goods, excluding automotive products.

"Increasingly, the East will want more of what the West and the United States can offer," he asserted.

The Senator said that, if peaceful coexistence between countries with different political philosophies is the only rational course to pursue, a most logical policy objective of the United States should be to see "that all nations are included in a world system in which the mutual benefits from trade and commerce can be shared by all."

Joseph Kraft

Baltimore Sun
No. 17,711

U.S. may find Russia
willing to do business

Washington.

The new set of relations
shaping up between this coun-
try and China are getting the
headlines. But the most excit-
ing possibilities arise from the
new set of relations shaping up
between this country and the
Soviet Union.

Apart from an agreement to
limit strategic weapons
through the Big Two talks
which are again under way in
Vienna, there is a serious
prospect that a number of ma-
jor business deals could be
wrapped up when President
Nixon visits Moscow this
spring.

Maurice Stans, the Secre-
tary of Commerce, is off on a
Soviet trip this week in order
to explore a series of well de-
fined prospects.

Probably the biggest project
centers around the huge cop-
per deposits in Vdokan, Siber-
ia. An estimated $4 billion is
required to bring these fields
into full commercial use.

An idea currently being ex-
plored is that the investment
be made by American firms
using United States govern-
ment credits and their own fi-
nancial resources. These firms
would operate the plants joint-
ly with Soviet authorities.

An estimated 400,000 tons of
copper would be mined, an-
nually. About half of that
would go to the Soviet Union;
the other half to the United
States.

A second giant project in-
volves exploitation of the ex-
tensive gas deposits all over
the Soviet Union.

The project under considera-
tion calls for an investment of
$3 billion to $4 billion to aug-
ment Soviet production by $800
million annually by the end of
this decade. About half of the
increment would go to meet
Russian needs, which are ex-
panding dramatically. The

rest, liquefied and carried in
specially built ships, would
come to the United States.

A third big project involves
feed grains, which are in short
supply in Russia, but produced
in abundance in the U.S.
The recent agreement to sell
$140 million worth of grain is
considered only a foretaste of
what is possible. The favorite
idea in the Commerce Depart-
ment now is for a long-term
agreement that would send,
say, $150 million worth of
American feed grains to Rus-
sia every year for the next 10
years.

A fourth candidate for a ma-
jor deal has to do with the vast
truck manufacturing complex
the Russians are building on
the Kama River, about 500
miles east of Moscow.

A number of small deals for
sales of American-made
foundry equipment are al-
ready far advanced. In addi-
tion, there is a plan for Ameri-
can firms to set up units on
the Kama River for making
component parts, say, truck
transmissions, which they
could then use for truck pro-
duction in their West Europe-
an factories.

To be sure, talk about big
deals with the Soviet Union
has been going on for years,
with about the same results as
the talk about El Dorado in
the Sixteenth Century. Bilater-
al commerce is a mere trickle
—about one-hundredth of one
per cent of the American gross
national product. And there
are solid reasons on both sides
for the lack of economic activ-
ity.

The Russians subordinate
trade to politics in a thorough-
going way. Big orders were
promised back in 1933 when
this country was considering
recognition of the Soviet re-
gime, and then vanished as

soon as recognition came
through.

The credits extended in
World War II under Lend-
Lease were not paid off to
American satisfaction.

There has been no willing-
ness to let American compa-
nies own their plants as they
do in most foreign countries,
or even to participate in joint
ventures with state authorities
as they do in such Communist
countries as Rumania and Yu-
goslavia.

On the American side there
has been an unwillingness to
treat Russia as even a dimly
normal trading partner. Credit
for transactions, which is the
life blood of foreign com-
merce, has been extremely
scarce, and the Export-Import
Bank, which was set up in 1934
to promote trade with Russia,
never served that purpose.

Russia has not even been
given the most-favored-nation
treatment that would put her
on an equal tariff footing with
other countries.

But in Washington at least,

traditional harshness on trade
has softened as the climate of
international detente has
spread. Harold Scott, the as-
sistant secretary of commerce
who has been handling inter-
national trade, emphasizes
that there cannot be even a
beginning of normal relations
until the Russians are given
credit guarantees and most-fa-
vored-nation treatment.

The big question involves
the Russian attitude. Around
the White House and the State
Department, there is continu-
ing suspicion the Russians are
talking trade just to promote
political concessions from this
country.

The Commerce Department,
though favorably impressed
by recent conversations with
the foreign trade minister,
Vladimir Alkhimov, is still not
clear that the Russians are:
prepared to receive American
companies. And it is for the
purpose of exploring this latter
point that Secretary Stans now
undertakes his mission to Mos-
cow.

"NO NEW GUIDELINES THIS MORNING?
DOES THIS MEAN MY HANDLING OF PHASE
TWO MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL?"

-18-

380

Prelude to Nixon Trip

19 Nov 74

# Soviet Jews Draw New U.S. Attention

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

DELICATELY mixing diplomacy and a dab of politics, the Nixon administration is deepening its intervention into a particularly sensitive area of Soviet domestic life—the condition of Soviet Jews—even while the President is preparing for the major diplomatic project of his trip to Moscow next May.

The effort has its ironic aspect: The last two Democratic Presidents, presumably much more responsive to Jewish voters and advisers than a Republican chief executive, did very little of substance or political visibility to help the cause of Soviet Jews. Some memos on the issue which he did not use were prepared for John Kennedy in his lone public reference, he condemned synagogue closings in passing during a speech to the U.N. General Assembly—without naming the Soviet Union. Lyndon Johnson's attention seems to have been only private.

Richard Nixon presumably counts less on Jewish voters and expects less from them. His Mideast policy, for instance, has distressed many American Jews; his pro-suburbs policy appears to be directed only incidentally at them. But he has done a great deal—enough to privately astonish some of his Jewish critics on other issues—in respect to Soviet Jews.

In fact, he is no stranger to the issue. He has a little known but long term record of concern. As Vice President in 1959, he responded to a request from American Jews and successfully undertook to have President Eisenhower take up the Soviet Jewish question privately with a visiting Kremlin official, Anastas Mikoyan. In his own trip to Moscow that year, Mr. Nixon-inaugurated the practice of having high American officials request the Russians to review the cases of those residents, including many Jews, who had tried and failed to join close relatives in the United States.

His administration's record is curiously little known. First, he has identified himself with American Jews and others who want to help Russian Jews, by publicly receiving delegations and lending White House status to their appeals.

REVERSING a tough American immigration policy dating back to World War II, the administration announced on Sept. 20 that it would admit without limit Soviet Jews who might want to immigrate. Attorney General Mitchell said he had decided so to use his "parole authority" (used in the past for Czech and Cuban refugees) because of "mounting evidence that Soviet Jews have unsuccessfully sought permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union." Congressional sponsors of legislation to grant 10,000 non-quota emergency visas to Russian Jews halted their efforts, acknowledging that the Nixon initiative was more generous and effective.

to end discrimination against its Jewish citizens and to allow those so minded to leave. The Annunzio resolution, one of several currently being studied by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is the first to receive presidential endorsement. In offering support, the State Department set aside its customary aloofness from such an "internal" matter and explicitly accepted the resolution's purpose of "helping focus world attention on the plight of Soviet Jewry."

Finally, in a series of State and White House pronouncements, the administration has protested specified Soviet acts, such as the death sentences handed down last year to some Jews who had hijacked a plane to go to Israel—the sentences were later commuted. It has had American representatives at the United Nations turn from generalized appeals for "human rights" to specific appeals for Soviet Jews' right to emigrate—emigration to Israel is reaching new highs this year. In a 21-page statement to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Nov. 8, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Davies made a comprehensive indictment of Kremlin policy toward Russian Jews.

EVENTS then took an odd turn. The New York Times ran the Davies story on the front page under the headline "U.S. Assists Soviet Jews Are Not Living in Terror." Actually, Davies didn't so "assert"; he said carefully that "with respect to the majority, claims that Soviet Jews as a community are living in a state of terror seem to be overdrawn."

Reacting just to The Times, not to the text, however, the American Jewish Congress at once said it was "shocked and outraged by the attempt of the U.S. State Department to diminish the severity of the situation facing Soviet Jews." Also reacting just to The Times, Pravda ran a dispatch from its New York correspondent quoting Davies as saying, "The statement that Soviet Jews live in conditions of terror is not valid." Davies had refuted "the fantasies of the Zionists," Pravda concluded.

The result is that an official statement on Soviet Jews of unprecedented fairness, sympathy and toughness was presented to two important audiences—the readers of The Times and the readers of Pravda—as an official deprecation of the plight of Soviet Jews. At one end, the administration was attacked by weighty groups in the United States for heartlessly and bureaucraticly selling out Soviet Jews. At the other end, its purposes were gleefully distorted by the Russians in their continuing attempt to minimize the international political costs of the way they treat their Jews.

That leaves President Nixon headed for Moscow next spring. If past performance is any guide, he will surely raise the subject of Soviet Jewry. This prospect does trouble some diplomats, who fear that Moscow's extreme sensitivity on the Jewish issue makes it risky for the United States to press it. But the facts argue otherwise. Mr. Nixon has vigorously involved the American government in the plight of Soviet Jews and simultaneously he has moved to explore better relations with the Kremlin. His record so far shows the two do fit.

381

382

New York Times Editorial -- November 29, 1971

'Kosygin Echoes Krušchev'

...Mr. Stans' visit to Moscow symbolized the change in Washington's attitude toward Soviet-American trade. While Kruschev was repeatedly rebuffed in his efforts to gain access to the latest American technology through the purchase of equipment and techniques, the Nixon Administration seems prepared to let the Kosygin Government raise Soviet-American trade to record levels.

We applaud the Administration's new and positive approach; but there remain the question how Moscow will pay for a sharp increase in American imports. A partial answer might be large-scale American purchases of Soviet natural gas, oil and other raw materials this country needs.