FRANK ALTSCHUL

730 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 19, N.Y.

ROOM 1701
TEL. JUDSON 6-5526

June 12, 1957

Dear Henry,

Thank you so much for sending me
an advance copy of your book, accompanied by
an inscription and a note both of which I ap-
preciate exceedingly.

We are off on a North Cape cruise
on July 2nd. Maybe sometime before then, you
and I will have lunch together by way of saying
hail and farewell.

STRATEGIC CHANGES [LC]

E. J. KINGSTON - McCLOUGHRY:
*Global Strategy*. Cape. 18s.

Out of Russian ambition to dominate has come a condition of defensive preparedness among the free nations of the West such as has rarely occurred in peace-time. Out of the development of new weapons has arisen a whole series of modifications of the principles of war. The theme of this study is that although changes in war and in strategy are parallel they are not necessarily simultaneous; its appeal is that strategy shall be brought into line now with the changes in war because there will be no time, after total war has broken out, to muddle through.

Many of the changes are recognized as dependent on political action and some insistence is placed on the need for statesmen to take the final decision on strategic changes. The inability of any single European Power to defend herself in isolation is acknowledged and the differences in emphasis which may have to be submerged in allied strategy are confessed, yet the writer holds that good allied strategy must be based on good national strategy; and if this is to be afforded in times of costly modern weapons and services, the contributions the armed forces shall make must be judged from a functional and not a traditional standpoint.

By these steps the author arrives at a somewhat fuller statement of the case he made for the reconsideration of Service functions in his book *The Direction of War*. That statement is peculiarly free from air bias. He asserts, for instance, that new weapons have restored to the Navy its offensive function and argues the need to integrate "the high direction of maritime and air strategies into something more positive than the present coordination of the two partisan attitudes at chiefs of staff level." Of the new shape the Army should take he has an equally clear view, but again he avoids dogmatic advice. Air power, too, he believes, may need a new deployment.

Confusion is apt to occur from the variety of the wars—local, limited and total—against which provision must be made. The author counters this with a set of five priorities, in which the first two are deterrence and

obligations to N.A.T.O. and the last is a limited war. The need to define the responsibilities of the Services in order of urgency underlines his statement that one of the special requirements of the times is a defence manual. For the rest, he has already shown how tradition and self-interest prevent a chiefs of staff committee from arriving at any more radical application of Service strength to a strategic plan than that represented by the highest common denominator of Service attitudes. Hence the demand for independent examination and rationalization.

In some ways this book reflects the frustrating uncertainties of the era. It remarks the shifting strategical sands of the Middle East and prescribes an element of flexibility in allied strategy. It notes the distrust of western motives by the nascent nationalists of the Far East and the tenuous nature of the strategy that can consequently be related to that area. It considers the different interests of allied Powers in these zones and the different strategical approaches they inspire. The book, in fact, is a survey. As such it should serve staff and defence colleges admirably, but those parts of it which reject ships, men, aircraft and weapons as criteria of defensive strength and ask that this shall be re-expressed in terms of function deserve to be read by statesmen and by those who provide statesmen with their resources.

The course of the Suez Canal dispute as it developed between last July and November can be followed, with the help of the documents relating to it, in a handbook issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (*Documents on the Suez Crisis*). 26 July to 6 November, 1956. 5s.). In an introduction Mr. D. C. Watt tells a clear, well-balanced story of the events and discussions that took place, and the text of the principal Suez documents follows. The series opens with the Canal Convention of 1888; the remaining eighteen documents, all belonging to July-November last year, begin with the Egyptian Law nationalizing the canal, and end with the General Assembly resolution of November establishing the United Nations' force.

which embraces the wider period
from 1530-1790. Mr. Millar is a
specialist on Stuart portraiture and a
good deal of fresh information is
imparted (by him, one supposes) on
both oil and miniature painting in
this volume.

The period under review from
Charles I's to Queen Anne's reign is
well chosen. It starts with the first
manifestation in England of the
classical proper and concludes with
the introduction of the Baroque,
leaving out the first Stuart's reign
which was still a hangover from the
Elizabethan period. The early part
is dominated by the names of Inigo
Jones and Van Dyck, the middle by
Wren, Lely and Kneller, and the last
by Vanbrugh, Hawksmoor and
Thornhill. Whereas all the important
architects of the period were British
born, the leading painters (and sculp-
tors) were mostly foreigners, until, in
fact, the advent of Thornhill. Con-
sequently, of the two arts architecture
might, at first, seem to afford the
more rewarding study but for the
unaccountable fact that the foreign
painters once established on these
shores very rapidly assimilated the

century Italy, France or Holland.

This volume should long remain
a most useful source book for the dili-
gent student of the rise of English
classical art. It may therefore not
seem captious to refer, to only one
ambiguity and three minor mis-
statements in so painstaking and
scholarly a work. Surely the Rubens
equestrian portrait of the first Duke
of Buckingham did not belong to the
Child bankers in the seventeenth
century, but eventually came to
Osterley through the marriage of
George Villiers, fifth Earl of Jersey
with the prospective Child heiress in
1804. The "ceiling piece" which
Sir Francis Child bought in Amster-
dam in 1697 was probably the
apotheosis which until lately was
inset over the staircase at Osterley.
Two pavilions, not one, survive
at Stoke Bruerne Park. The Coleshill
staircase was of wood, not stone, and
the Cibber relief on the Monument
approximates not to the Bernini
school so much as to Algardi's distinc-
tive counter-Baroque school, of which
his famous relief of Attila may well
provide the actual prototype, seen by
Cibber in Rome.

MEDIEVAL TIMEPIECE

H. ALAN LLOYD: Giovanni de
Dondi's Horological Masterpiece,
1364. The Author (Hookwood,
Limpsfield, Oxted, Surrey). 7s.

In this privately printed pamphlet
Mr. Alan Lloyd gives a detailed
account of a fourteenth-century
manuscript which contains the earliest
known description of a mechanical
clock. Unlike most *horologia* of
the period, this was not a church
clock with mechanical figures and
chimes, but a smaller instrument with
a definite scientific purpose. Its
maker, Giovanni de Dondi, was a
lecturer at Padua some two and a half
centuries before Galileo, and he lived
therefore in an age which had not
yet forsaken astrology, and which
still adhered to the Ptolemaic system.

His clock showed not only the time
of day but also the festivals of the
Church, and from its dials the posi-
tions of the heavenly bodies and
other astrological data could be read.
Mr. Lloyd describes the extremely
complicated trains by which Dondi's
clock reproduced the deferents and
epicycles of the Ptolemaic system.
These details have not previously been

published, and the author's account is
based on a translation from an
original manuscript by the late G. H.
Baillie, the illustrations being taken
from another copy in the Bodleian.
The pamphlet, although containing
a number of printer's errors, is full
of interest, and shows clearly that
horology in fourteenth-century Italy
was even more advanced than has
been generally supposed.

PAINTER'S WIFE

LUCIE VALORE: Maurice Utrillo, mon
Mari. Paris: Joseph Foret.
1,000fr.

Lucie Valore (Madame Utrillo)
appointed herself—or was appointed
by Suzanne Valadon—guardian-
angel of a man of genius who was
also, to say the least, a difficult
character. She succeeded in her task
and so has a right to be pleased with
herself. She is pleased with herself;
and so she has written a book. In it
she appears as an excellent woman
who adores her husband, her dogs,
decorations and dignitaries (down to
and including municipal councillors):
but she is not a good writer.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 June 1957

Dear Henry:

Thanks ever so much for your letter of 10 June
inclosing the advanced copy of your book. It will be some
time before I will be able to wade into it, I am afraid, but
I sure want to do so and will argue with you if I find such
argument necessary at that time.

Also, thanks ever so much for your good wishes
on my new assignment. I hope it will not be too long before
our paths cross again.

Mr Henry A Kissinger
Rockefeller Bros. Fund
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

CANCER RESEARCH INSTITUTE
NEW ENGLAND DEACONESS HOSPITAL

194 PILGRIM ROAD
BOSTON 15, MASSACHUSETTS

June 17, 1957

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Henry:

I appreciate very much indeed the autographed copy of your book. I shall read it with a great deal of interest. I learned a great deal during the discussions when it was under preparation. I shall look forward to a careful reading of it and shall write you later on.

With many thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy,

SW:NF

June 19th, 1957

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Dear Henry:

Congratulations on a splendid book. I know that my necessarily
brief review does not do it justice.

I read your book with some rapidity due to the closeness of
the deadline for the review and I am looking forward to
reading again what I had to read rather quickly. Your
chapter on the Soviet Union and the Atom is superb.

I was rather disappointed that you did not try to assess
Soviet nuclear capability. I suppose you had your reasons.

You will find some interesting data in the Holifield fall-out hearings.

By the way, the problem of persistence of radioactivity in
fall-out areas upon which I have harped so much has now
been exposed by the Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Data on
the contamination of Naen Island show that the projections
made in the Feb. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists were
in fact realistic.

I wish that you would write a shorter (Blackett style)
book banging home the things you said in this book.

With all good wishes,

R. E. LAPP

R. E. LAPP
ARLINGTON TOWERS M-707
ARLINGTON 9. VA.

June 19, 1957.

Review of Henry A. Kissinger:
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
455 p. New York: Harper & Brothers (1957); $5.00

Atoms, Generals and Statesmen

"Our generation has succeeded in stealing the fire of the gods and it is doomed to live with the horror of its achievement." With these words Dr. Henry Kissinger sums up the dilemma of mankind today.

By all odds, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* is the best book yet written to analyze the impact of nuclear explosives upon military strategy and the conduct of world affairs. It is the outgrowth of three years of intensive discussion with a task force of experts convened by the Council on Foreign Relations. Thus it is the work of many men--generals such as Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin; scientists of note--Dr. Henry D. Smyth for example; former Defense Department officials--Frank Pace, Jr. and Thomas K. Finletter and former A.E.C. chairman Gordon Dean.

No group of men, however, could have produced such a cogent and profound analysis of nuclear affairs. Full credit must be given to Dr. Kissinger who picked the minds of many, scrutinized each argument with meticulous care and integrated each tidbit of information into a fully documented and well-ordered exposition. The task to which he sets himself is the formulation of a national policy on nuclear weapons consistent with the spectrum or array of threats which the Soviets are likely to pose.

There is, of course, the threat of strategic or all-out warfare with megaton-class weapons. The hope is, as the author puts it: "If we behave effectively, we should be able to make it clear to even the most fanatic opponent that all-out war would be tantamount to national suicide." Do the men in the Kremlin understand this? Malenkov apparently did on March 12, 1954, when he admitted that nuclear war "means the ruin of world civilization". But within two months Malenkov recanted and substituted "capitalistic system" for "world civilization". However, it would seem that hard-headed realists in the Kremlin must have some paternalistic

-2-

feeling for the physical end products of their many Five Year plans. The mutuality of destruction must inevitably be a deterrent force mitigating against the nuclear slugfest. Assuming, of course, that these strategic deterrent forces are always on-the-ready and are wedded to a resolute national policy.

The real worry is not that megaton warfare will erupt without notice but that the constant expansion of Soviet threats will precipitate a local contest involving military actions. To deter such aggression it is hoped that tactical nuclear weapons--atomic artillery, nuclear missiles and air-dropped fission bombs--will restrain Communist expansion. Thus the formula today is for a spectrum of deterrents to meet a spectrum of threats. It is this thesis which Kissinger develops and for which he holds hope.

To be sure, there is always the danger that a small war may blow up into a global disaster. But it is argued that the deterrent power of strategic weapons will limit war--even nuclear war--to the battlefield. And here we come to the great puzzle. Can the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. engage in a limited nuclear battle and keep it limited? The answer to this question may well decide the fate of our civilization.

As the author sees it, limited nuclear warfare will involve careful rules of conduct so that neither party will go out of bounds. It seems to me that the rules of good conduct on the nuclear battleground are too complex and the weapons, themselves, are too explosive. Furthermore, the prior art of Hiroshima and Nagasaki--the only two military applications of the new force--is too limited for generals to use in conducting themselves in an area of local combat. I think that it is akin to asking for the return of chivalry in warfare to expect subtle nuclear restraint on the battlefield. Certain phases of air and naval combat could well involve tactical nuclear weapons without cataclysmic consequences but land combat seems a most perilous venture.

-3-

The answer may well be broader spectrum of deterrents, both atomic and non-atomic. On this score the single most ominous sentence in the book comments upon budget-mindedness of Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson: "Despite all the information at their disposal, they simply cannot believe that in the nuclear age the penalty for miscalculation may be national catastrophe."

Our present Defense Establishment, with its lack of unification, may even predispose the eventual blow-up of a small war into a big one. Kissinger suggests that the Army, Navy and Air Force might be reorganized into a Strategic Force and a Tactical Force, so that the line of distinction might be clearer between the force we would bring to bear upon a limited contest. There is much merit in this suggestion and perhaps the Congress will be stimulated to reexamine our Defense Department structure in the light of modern weapons.

Kissinger's chapter "The Soviet Union and the Atom" makes fascinating reading for it takes the reader behind the scenes in Russia. For example, we learn that it was not until 1954 that Soviet newspaper readers were permitted to see a photo of the mushroom cloud so symbolic of the atomic age. This chapter throws considerable light on Soviet nuclear policy and should prove valuable to all students of Russia.

An excellent annotated bibliography is appended to the book, but one looks in vain for an index. It is a thoroughly documented and scholarly book which should be on the desk of every officer in the Pentagon and State Department. In fact, a book of such importance deserves to appear in a less lengthy form so that it would reach a very wide audience. The Council on Foreign Relations has performed a notable service in selecting Dr. Kissinger as the author of its profound study of the monumental nuclear dilemma which now faces the world.

Metals & Controls Corporation

General Plate Division

Spencer Thermostat Division

Attleboro, Massachusetts

TELEPHONE 1-2800

June 21, 1957

Dear Henry:

I was thrilled to receive the book and grateful indeed for your kind inscription in it. I am off to the Adirondacks in a week, and hope to have some time there to do some reflective reading. The first thing on my list is to read your book. It is a superb piece of work as I know from the opportunity of reading the manuscript. The closely reasoned argument supporting your points step by step, certainly imposes on the critic a need to think as clearly as you have, the reasons for a contrary view.

It is particularly gratifying to me that the outcome of this study should be such a distinguished contribution to clear thinking on this darned important subject. It was in April 1954 that I wrote to George Franklin some of my ideas on the formation of a Study Group at the Council. As a matter of curiosity, I got out this letter the other day and, if you haven't seen it, you might find the enclosed copy interesting.

You will probably have a very busy summer getting products of the panel studies sorted out and steered in useful directions. I hope your schedule permits you a little holiday to spend with your charming wife and delightful dog.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, N.Y.

CARROLL L. WILSON

CANNONDALE, CONNECTICUT

May 3, 1954

Mr. George Franklin, Executive Director
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear George:

At luncheon recently we discussed the general subject of a review of the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy by means of a study group in the Council. We didn't identify this as a title but considered the general content of such a study and its feasibility from the standpoint of public availability of the relevant information. I agreed to try to summarize the discussion we had in the form of this letter.

I should say first of all that in my opinion there is ample data in the public domain to permit an intelligent consideration of this subject without need for access to any classified information. A vast amount has been published and it will be useful to consider here what kinds of information regarding nuclear weapons will be needed for intelligent study of the present and prospective role which they may play in the foreign policy of United States. Through the many publications of the AEC and the Department of Defense beginning with the announcement of the bombing of Hiroshima and the Smyth report down through and including the announcements by the Chairman of the AEC in March, 1954 concerning the hydrogen bomb, there is in the public domain a great deal of data.

The most significant and relevant data seem to me to include the destructive effects of the bomb upon cities whether by an under-water shot or an air burst, the relationship of kiloton TNT equivalent to the scale of destruction, the effects upon human beings, the probable availability of fission weapons in substantial numbers and in a variety of forms and portability including atomic warheads for the atomic 288 mm cannon. Thus we are told that there are weapons suitable for atomic warheads for guided missiles and artillery shells and this infers a portability such that they can be carried by carrier aircraft. It is also a reasonable assumption that the power of such weapons ranges from the 20,000 ton "bang" of the Nagasaki weapon to several times this power. There is also reason to believe that inasmuch as we have been manufacturing these weapons for seven or eight years and have greatly expanded the production plant of the AEC and the acquisition of raw material and doubtless have made improvements in the efficiency of the weapons and processes of producing fissionable material, that the arsenal of these weapons must run into large numbers, probably in the thousands.

in the phenomena,
that the source of these weapons met run into large numbers, properly
efficiency of the weapons and processes of launching these weapons,
adaptation of raw material and complete use of these improvements in the
means and means thereof exchanged the migration trend of the VEC and the
influencing as we gave them manufacturing these weapons for seven on eight
weapons to several times this power. There is also reason to believe that
batteries of such weapons range from the 50,000 ton "Doom" of the Russian
carried by carrier aircraft. It is also a reasonable assumption that the
and untilled spares and parts interest a hostility and that such can be
that there are weapons suitable for atomic arsenage for guided missiles
including atomic ordnance for the atomic 588 mu cannon. There we are told
weapons in substantial number and in a variety of forms and hostilities
are the effects upon humanKinetics the possible availability of the scale ofarma-
tive effects of the bomb then cities whether by aninger-writer shot on an air
The most significant and relevant data seen to me to include the demutual-
ization in the public domain a great deal of data.

Origin of the VEC in March, 1924 concerning the hydrogen bomb, there is
the study report down stream and including the announcements by the
of Defense beginning with the announcement of the pombust of Hiroshima and
United States. Through the many implications of the VEC and the Department
present and hypothetical role which they may play in the future beyond that
implanted and it will be useful to consider here what rings to information
out need for access to such classified information. A vast amount of the pen
public domain to permit an intelligent consideration of this subject with-
out any doubt that all that in any opinion there is ample data in the
the discussion we had in the form of this letter.

availability of the relevant information. I agreed to try to summarize the
content of such a study and its applicability from the standpoint of public
the Council. We didn't identify this as a title put considered the general
role of modern weapons in today's bomb by some of a study group in
the Institute recently we discussed the general subject of a review of the

Dear George:

New York 51, New York
28 East 48th Street
Council on Foreign Relations
Mr. George Franklin, Executive Director

May 3, 1924

COMMONWEALTH, CONNECTICUT

CERROFT T. WILSON

We have now been told enough about the hydrogen devices that have been tested in the Pacific to understand that these weapons are rated in megatons (millions of tons of TNT equivalent) and that they probably range from 5 to 30 or 40 megatons in power. We may infer from the length of time taken to develop these hydrogen weapons that the task proved easier than was anticipated in 1949 and that important inventions must have been made which have simplified the manufacture of these devices, reduced their cost, and improved their deliverability as compared with what might have been expected a few years ago. The increase in "bang" by a factor of 100 to 1000 between fission bombs and fusion bombs means that whereas a city such as New York might survive and in fact could survive and cope with several fission bombs, a single fusion bomb would wipe out the city of New York and presumably produce millions of deaths and casualties. Thus a single weapon of this type would destroy any target in the world. This is what the Chairman of the AEC has said in regard to power of hydrogen weapons. We may infer also that the arsenal will comprise a growing number of these devices with a deliverability which is presumably no more difficult than the early fission bombs.

We may assume that since 1949 the Russians have had a growing capability in fission bombs. There is no doubt of the validity of the evidence considered at that time concerning the Russian success in their first test of a fission bomb. We may infer that over this period of nearly five years their arsenal of fission bombs has grown steadily and probably quite rapidly and while doubtless far less than ours numerically, is nevertheless of such proportions as to give them a capability of vast destruction against targets which they might choose. We also know that since last summer the Russians have had hydrogen devices. On their first test of a hydrogen device we are told occurred in November 1952. Less than a year later the Russians tested their first one. We undoubtedly have a substantial head start on the Russians in the whole nuclear field but this margin of superiority is probably diminishing and we may expect that they too before very long will have an arsenal of hydrogen weapons as well as fission weapons. Although numerically inferior to ours, their arsenal will in a relatively short time give them a capability of destruction upon targets in the West of staggering proportions.

The British are undoubtedly making fission weapons and their potential in this field presumably is additive to ours but as pointed out in many places numerical superiority in this field ceases to be a great significance when both sides have a sufficient number of weapons to work devastating destruction upon the targets of their choosing.

Obviously weapons capability alone is not a measure of the power of visiting destruction upon enemy targets. One must have a versatile and ever-improving strategic air force, bases, well protected storage sites for weapons in a number of places, etc. Capability to deliver weapons against targets is a necessary companion-piece to an arsenal of nuclear weapons.

A third factor, of course, is the character of the defenses of any nation against an attacking force. Presumably each side will be at work to erect as effective defenses as are feasible in order to make an attack

["are as effective defenses as are less effective in order to make an attack against an attacking force. Therefore each stage will be at work to avoid an attacking force.", "A target is a necessarily combination-piece to an enemy of major importance. We have in a number of places, etc., a capability to deliver weapons against improving strategic air force. These will be protected against sites for future destruction when such targets. One must have a versatile and extensive knowledge of these weapons as well as know the generalities of the field. This field capability is additive to one's own as being part of the whole. The pilot are undoubtedly making these weapons and their potential in modernations.", "The pilot is a multi-tactile and multi-target. He has a multi-tactile head and a multi-targeting eye. He has a multi-tactile eye and a multi

costly in terms of losses of aircraft, confusion, diversion from targets, etc. We are told that our own defenses and warning systems in this field are not nearly adequate. Adequacy of course does not mean in the present state of the art 100% effectiveness or anything like it. The most that may be feasible today is a capability of exacting a substantial toll--50% let's say or somewhat better--from an attacking force. When we talk about this we are talking about continental North America. The feasibility of providing that degree of defense against attacks on the cities of western Europe and the British Isles seems vastly more difficult.

We may expect that the art of delivery, speeds of aircraft, the art of defense in terms of anti-aircraft guided missiles, etc., will be constantly improved and be a see-saw affair in which from time to time offense and defense become out of balance but over a period of time it is probably fair to assume that the capabilities of both the Soviet Union and the United States will be fairly evenly matched.

Studies of Civil Defense of our cities against attack by fission weapons have been discouraging but held at least some hope that a city might absorb a few of these weapons—at least a large city might— and be able to pull itself together and restore the city as a functioning unit if not subject to repeated attack. Even this presented enormous difficulties in terms of the fragility of our cities to disruption, the enormous casualties and damage which would be sustained, and the doubt that any attack would be launched until or unless it could be an overwhelming attack for a "knockout blow". The advent of the hydrogen bomb makes the business of endeavoring to cope with attacks by such bombs on our cities vastly more difficult. Mass evacuation is now discussed. The principle of staying and "taking it" which still seemed feasible with fission weapons, seems hopeless with hydrogen weapons. With sufficient warning, mass evacuation of cities might be handled but the complete destruction of a number of the major cities in the U.S. and western Europe would certainly change profoundly the character, industrial potential, productivity, etc. of such countries. Obviously the same would apply to Russian cities and major targets. A modern economy is characterized by and only sustained by an urban-industrialized physical plant. If a large part of this plant were destroyed by nuclear weapons, the rebuilding of a viable and productive structure and economy might be a process of years or decades even if a substantial part of the population survived.

The examination of the position up to this point strongly suggests that with each side capable of annihilating the other, and each side faced with retaliatory annihilation upon launching an attack, a condition is created which—barring madmen at the trigger on either end—neither side can use these weapons, nor are threats to use capable of fulfillment.

For this condition of stalemate to persist the weapons capability, the weapon deliverability, and the defenses which will exact a toll from attackers, must remain generally in balance. These weapons remain neutralized by being in the hands of both sides only so long as the capability of producing mutual annihilation continues. Thus no relaxation of effort in these areas can be permitted to occur. Nevertheless, as an instrument of national policy and power to bring pressure upon the Soviet Union—pressure which is flexible and usable—these weapons cease to have a positive role.

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- 4 -

It is worth going back to consider the changing role of the atomic bomb in
terms of how it has served as an instrument of national policy. During the
period of our monopoly from the end of World War II to September 1949 the
atomic bomb served, we believe, as a great deterrent and perhaps an over-
whelming deterrent to aggression by the Soviet Union in Europe. As long as
we had a capability in atomic weapons and a monopoly of them and neither
the U.S. nor our Allies in western Europe needed to fear retaliation, the
atomic bomb was of enormous value as an instrument of national power. The
restraint which it may have imposed upon the Soviet Union permitted us and
our friends in Western Europe to carry out the many constructive programs
of rehabilitation of plant and economy and the rebuilding under NATO of conventional
military forces on a scale sufficient to provide a shield of considerable
value against Soviet aggression in Europe.

When our atomic monopoly disappeared in September 1949 the significance of the change was not widely appreciated at the time. Our conventional military forces were then at a low point in effectiveness and strength. This was nearly a year before Korea. Yet some of those who lived most closely with these atomic weapons and understood both their capabilities and limitations realized that a profound change in their usefulness as instruments of national policy had occurred. They could foresee the progressive stalemate in the useability of these weapons and could foresee that competition in hydrogen bombs would doubtless run the same course. Success by one side would be followed by success on the other. Each would then soon have an arsenal of hydrogen weapons as well as fission weapons. Each would have a capability of annihilating the other.

Russian success in fission weapons did emphasize to some the need for a re-
appraisal of the role of atomic weapons or future hydrogen weapons as
instruments of national policy and power as compared with conventional arms.
Such a review was not made at that time--late 1949. It was the aggression
in Korea which led to the rebuilding of armed strength of a conventional type
in this country and by our friends in western Europe. Atomic weapons were
not used in Korea. Perhaps they might have been had Korea occurred prior to
September 1949. Perhaps the Russians would not have been emboldened to
embark upon aggression in Korea had they not achieved success in fission bombs.
In Korea the UN military forces used conventional armaments in meeting aggression
there and stopping it. Atomic weapons do not appear to be worthwhile using
in Indochina. Indeed, a study of their use in Indochina might indicate that
they would serve the cause of the Viet Minh better than they would serve France.

It is worth considering the meaning of a threat to use atomic bombs against
the Soviet Union in terms of our real capability to enforce such a threat.
Premier Malenkov in his recent statement to the Supreme Soviet said what
could have been expected a long time ago that "If aggressive circles, banking
on the atomic weapon should attack Russia, the aggressor would without doubt
be crushed by the same weapon and such adventure would inevitably lead to the
ruin of the capitalist social system." He did not add that the Soviet social
system would doubtless be crushed by the same weapon. Mr. Malenkov dismisses
the idea of atomic warfare as a possible or practicable instrument in deal-
ing with present issues. It is time that we recognize the same realities.
We should proceed to appraise the significance of the neutralization of our
nuclear strength and consider the meaning it has in terms of our military,
economic and diplomatic courses of action.

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At this point it may be worth reviewing whether the tactical employment of
atomic weapons can occur without having a high probability of provoking
the use of nuclear weapons of all kinds against all kinds of targets. The
concept of tactical employment of atomic weapons presupposes that they would
be used against "military targets only". We then come to the question of
what are "military targets". We assume this means troop concentrations,
bridges, supply trains, air bases, supply dumps, railroad marshaling yards,
military headquarters, naval bases, and perhaps other things. The concept
of such targets as "military targets" presupposes that they are well separated
physically from urban centers and centers of population and industrial pro-
duction. Immediately one is faced with many narrow questions. Should a
shipyard be considered a military target? Should an atomic energy production
installation be considered a military target? Should an aircraft factory or
a tank factory be considered a military target? Such facilities require
large numbers of workers and hence are in or adjacent to urban areas where
housing for workers is located. Employment of atomic weapons against
strictly military targets presupposes an understanding of some sort that the
enemy will confine his use of such weapons to similar targets. By intent or
inadvertence or juxtaposition of military targets with urban--industrial
centers there is strong reason to believe that any tacit dividing line
between military and civilian targets would rapidly disappear. Certainly the
target selection in World War II suggests that the line, if any exists, is a
very tenuous one. For example, in view of the enormous importance of the U.S.
as an arsenal for the West in any military action in Europe, the ports of
embarkation from the U.S. and receiving in Europe become critical "military
targets" and obviously there are no ports of embarkation of greater importance
than New York City.

It is conceivable that if atomic warheads on anti-aircraft missiles became
component of defense over oceans or unpopulated areas and the use of atomic
weapons were restricted to such actions to repel attacking forces, such a
restriction on their use might be observed by each side. But it seems
to me that if atomic weapons in any form are used for attack on enemy forces
or installations "Pandora's box is opened" and the likelihood of being able
to hold any line short of complete strategic bombing of cities becomes a
forlorn hope.

The items I have discussed up to this point are predominantly in the field
of military tactics and strategy and I have not dealt with the moral or
political aspects of the useability of atomic weapons on the initiative of
the U.S. A consideration of this aspect of the matter merely serves to
reinforce the military appraisal of the problem. With the capability of
retaliation and the threat of retaliation known to exist and now voiced
by the Soviet Union and such retaliation to be visited upon not only the
U.S. but the major cities of our allies, the freedom of the U.S. to take
unilateral action in using such weapons seems to me to be thoroughly
abridged. The question was asked a long time ago as to what value our
atomic weapons and strategic air force would have in terms of attacking
Russian targets, if the Russians had both the capability and the determina-
tion to drop atomic bombs on the major cities of western Europe when the
first atomic weapon landed on a Russian target. There was no answer then
and I fail to see any answer today. With a thoroughly informed and awakened
public, it is inconceivable to me also that public support could be enlisted
for taking the initiative in a military adventure which held the certainty
of bringing upon the U.S. a scale of destruction of the sort we can now
envisage. A requirement for consultation and agreement of our Allies in any
such measure is far more needed today than it was during World War II.

["atomic smoke can be used to mask it as being a great help to the enemy. A recruitment for compensation and agreement of men to villages in an area should be made. The U. S. has some of the best of the villages. The U. S. has some of the best

- 6 -

One of the features of atomic weapons which may have misled us is that we find it difficult to believe that a weapon of such enormous destructive power should not have comparable power as an instrument of national policy. Many people have been mesmerized by the three-mile diameter fire ball and the enormous capabilities of physical and human destruction which these weapons have. This thinking leads to the premise that the power potential of the U.S. in world affairs is a function of the destructive capability of our nuclear arsenal. This is an appealing idea to some because it is relatively cheap. One can buy so much more "bang for a buck" in nuclear weapons than in any other way. It seems a cheap and easy way to create impressive armed might. Perhaps its greatest value lies in restraining an enemy from using nuclear weapons. This is, of course, of enormous importance. It may even mean that the hazards of a general war become so great that the Soviet Union will be very cautious about aggression in places or ways which may provoke a World War III. On the other hand they might conclude that nuclear weapons had become so completely neutralized that neither side would dare use them in a general conflict. But could they be sure?

Suggestions have been made from time to time that this general position could be profoundly modified by the clandestine Soviet delivery of nuclear weapons into this country followed by an announcement by the Soviet Union that we must capitulate to their demands or be blown up by weapons already secreted in strategic locations in our cities. We have to look at this in the light of equal capabilities in terms of an arsenal, in terms of delivery and in terms of defense. Any nation embarking upon the use of these weapons must rely heavily on the element of surprise and an overwhelming blow in the first attack. Otherwise, the nation discovering an intent by an enemy power to attack is provoked to retaliation before the initial blow can be delivered. Smuggling these devices into the U.S., their subsequent delivery to strategic areas, assembly of the complicated parts, their secret placement in critical places is a large and difficult job. Could the Russians be sure that none of these movements would be discovered, that no agents would defect? Obviously not, and discovery would be likely to bring upon them the initial attack. It is far too risky. Such an enterprise is so likely to cause the attacker to lose the element of surprise that it seems to me that no nation would take such risks of provoking a massive initial attack upon his own country.

The foregoing suggests that nuclear weapons have had and will have a profound influence on our military and foreign policy. Moreover, it suggests that the time is at hand for a thorough-going reappraisal of the meaning and significance of these weapons as instruments of power in dealing with the issues now before us and those we may encounter in the next few years. It also suggests the importance of strength in conventional arms. The experience in Korea and Indochina suggests the enormous importance of a capability in weapons and techniques of dealing with wars of this sort--limited but bitter and destructive wars where the conditions of combat are very different from what they are in Europe.

If a full appraisal of the role of nuclear weapons supports the stalemate situation which I have outlined and the corollary that this may create a situation in which the Soviet Union avoids aggression in places and on a scale which is likely to provoke a third world war, it raises questions as

["society which is likely to break a third among us, if twice a decade we sit down in which the Soviet Union average Ambassador in Brussels and on a situation which I have outlined and the corollary that this will create a life a full yearlong of the role of unoffensive weapons subordinates the agencies", "which differ from them what they are in nature.", "limited put bitter and destructive force where the conditions of combat are such that the bitter will come to bear on the attacker to force the element of annihilation to so indirectly come to bear on the initial attack. If it is too risky, then we must wait until they come the initial attack. Otherwise, the nation discover the use of these weapons must rely heavily on the element of annihilation in some way. Otherwise, the element discover the use of these weapons must rely heavily on the element of

to what the probable strategy of the Kremlin may be over the next few years. It raises the question, for example, as to whether the major efforts of the Soviet Union may not be directed towards the battle for the minds of men in Asia, in Africa, and elsewhere through the agents of communism, through technical and trade arrangements, through the export of their doctrine and the fanning of discontent and aspirations of political independence where these have not yet been achieved by backward peoples. It raises the question of whether the Kremlin is not likely to increase their "courses of education" for students selected from many parts of the world to send out as "missionaries for the Soviet Union". It raises the corollary question as to what our foreign policy and program looks like in such areas as economic and technical aid, trade arrangements, exchange of students and teachers, the encouragement of private capital investment in foreign countries for developing the resources and improving the standard of living of backward areas. It raises further the question of the role of the UN in all of these things and the power of the UN in terms of collective action as compared with the action of the U.S. alone.

It raises a question as to the military policy of this country in arming battalions of atomic artillery in Europe. While such action may be a part of the total position of retaliatory capacity, it certainly raises a question as to the wisdom of building tactical concepts and plans around the use of atomic artillery.

I have written this as a statement of a position and the line of reasoning supporting it. The purpose of a Council study would be to examine this whole question and to determine the validity of these conclusions or any others which might emerge. It seems to me that an intimate understanding of the scientific and technical factors of nuclear weapons, carriers, and defense is not necessary in coming to grips with the questions which I have reviewed in this memorandum. It is the political implications both here and abroad and in the UN which it seems to me deserve a major part of the attention of the study group after appraising and reaching whatever conclusions may be warranted on the basis of study of the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of national power. I am not suggesting that this is a process by which group agreement is reached at each stage but rather that the general study falls into two main parts. The first is an appraisal of the practicability of nuclear weapons as instruments in dealing with present issues and as an instrument useable in the exercise of national power in such issues as we now have and those we can foresee arising. The second part is to appraise the adequacy and balance of our current military and diplomatic policy in the light of the general results of the appraisal of the first question.

Please feel free to use or discard whatever parts of this letter may seem to you suitable in preparing a memorandum or statement for your Committee on Studies, if you decide to put such a project forward for their consideration.

CLW:rb

["GIM:J", "Carlroff R. Wilson", "Sincerely yours,", "of the United States. It has been my privilege to attend the General Assembly of the American Academy of Political Science in Washington, D.C. and to serve on the Executive Committee of the American Law Institute. I have attended many of the meetings of the American Law Institute and have given my support to the efforts of the American Law Institute to promote the understanding of law and to further the cause of justice and equality for all men. The work of the American Law Institute is made possible by the kind support of the many friends who have given their time and energy to the cause. I wish to express my sincere thanks to all those who have assisted me in carrying out the work of the American Law Institute. I wish to thank all those who have assisted me in the preparation of this report. I wish to thank all those who have assisted me in the preparation of this report. I wish to express my sincere thanks to all those who have assisted me in the preparation of this report.

June 30, 1957.

Dear Henry,

I am pleased to have your letter of the 24th, and I'm happy
to see my review of your book get the front page of the Herald Tribune.
What happened to the New York Times? I realize the importance of
having a review on time and although I was completely snowed under
with other work I made the deadline the Herald Tribune specified.

I'm delighted to see that Chalmers Roberts gave you such a good
play in the Washington Post. You surely deserve the thanks of the
Nation for your great effort. If only we could get the President
to read -- your book.

We seem to be subjected to a new course in political physics
given by professors Lawrence and Teller in Admiral Strauss' school
for nuclear knowledge. My own feeling is that these extremists are
undermining themselves with their gyrations.

I do hope to see you when you come to Washington next.

undermining themselves with their aspirations.

tor most knowledge. My own feeling is that these extreme rates are

given by professors Lawrence and Teller in Admira! Stranaa, school

We seem to be disappointed to a new course in political physics
to read -- your book.

Mation for your great effort. It only we could get the President
play in the Washington post. You surely deserve the thanks of the
I'm delighted to see that Charles Roberts gave you such a good
with other work I made the deadline the Herald Tribune specified.

Having a review on time and sufficiently I was completely anoyed under
What happened to the New York Times? I realize the importance of
to see my review of your book got the front page of the Herald Tribune.

I am pleased to have your letter of the 34th, and I'm happy

Dear Henry,

WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 30, 1921.