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# The George P. Shultz Foreign Service Institute Dedication Ceremony

Arlington, Virginia

May 29, 2002

George P. Shultz

Mr. Secretary, friends of the Department of State and Foreign Service: Today's ceremony that links my name to this Institute and to the Foreign Service is an honor beyond anything I ever imagined. I take it as a profound compliment not only from the wonderful colleagues with whom I served in the State Department, but also from that long line of strong and creative men and women who have served our country's diplomacy across the generations. I am humbly grateful for the tribute you offer me today.

I came into office as Secretary of State with a war going on in the Middle East and a bigger war - the Cold War - keeping the world in turmoil and keeping me busy to an extent I could hardly have imagined.

When I answered President Ronald Reagan's call to service, I also brought to the job a way of thinking developed from years of experience in government, business, and universities. I knew I would be dealing with many crises on a day-to-day basis and that, for American foreign policy to succeed over time, I would have to pay attention to long-term issues. But my experience also taught me that, to succeed in these efforts, I would need the help and support of the people who were devoting their careers to the

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understanding and conduct of diplomacy. So I would try to strengthen the institution, to
make the best use of its people, to pay attention to their careers and their aspirations to
serve their country. I wanted to leave the Department of State and Foreign Service in
better shape than I found it.

In the process, I learned a few things. The Foreign Service is the custodian of our
country's diplomatic experience in the world. Not theories or abstractions but actual
experience. Recognizing the importance of experience, I decided, as Secretary of State,
to pull together a collection of books by and about the American diplomatic experience.
That collection is still up there in Colin Powell's office. (And I know from my tenure in
that office that he doesn't have time to read those books). FSI should be the center for
such works that record our nation's diplomatic experience: things written down that get
into people's heads and can make a practical difference.

The practice of diplomacy requires a clear understanding of what is happening
and the ability to make a clear record of it and report it honestly and in depth. This may
seem obvious and easy. It is not; it requires exceptional intellectual skills and qualities of
character and discipline. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said about it, "The true
diplomatist [is] aware of how much subsequently depends on what clearly can be
established to have taken place. If it seems simple in the archives, try it in the
maelstrom."

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Fast-moving media coverage, impressive though it may often be, is almost inevitably focused on the newsworthy. The United States must conduct diplomacy on a global scale, clearly dependent on careful reporting from posts around the world and interpretations by people on the ground, who speak the language and understand cultural nuances. And, of course, results of discussions need to be written down immediately. Memories are all too often faulty or self-serving.

So we need to encourage careful record-keeping and indoctrinate that skill in the foreign service. The times threaten. Even in my time, if a cable came in from an ambassador with a highly critical or sensitive set of observations about the country where the ambassador was stationed, the existence of this cable would often become the subject of rumor. Relentless demands for that cable would almost inevitably follow. I fought these pressures because the release of such a cable would mean, of course, that the ambassador's role would be diminished, sometimes even ended. Nonetheless, the pull-and-haul has its impact. Candor in the cables inevitably suffers. Reliance on telephone diplomacy increases, with all its imprecision and vulnerability to misunderstanding.

More broadly, there is now a widespread and conscious reluctance to create records – and a disposition to destroy them if taken – in our society, whether in business or government. What I worry about is our ability to conduct our affairs with precision and to portray history accurately if such records are not at hand and the statesman tries to rely heavily on his or her own memory, which is often flawed in significant ways. A living history requires tools of remembrance. Moreover, so much of what we do today

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depends upon our understanding of the past. If we lose that past, we are also going to lose one of the important handles on the future.

So, members of the Foreign Service, keep records.

The ability to comprehend other cultures must be a key factor in our diplomacy. This is an area of comparative advantage for the foreign service. Even in this age of globalizing influences, we are finding that not only do traditional cultures continue to exist but that in many places they are gaining greater influence, being used, sometimes badly misused, in the interests of some cause or grievance. I do not need to tell you in this audience that those who speak the local language have a greater sensitivity to cultural variations, a greater ability to comprehend mood and nuance, and a heightened capacity to convey those realities back to Washington. So FSI's world-class capacity to teach language skills must be nourished and used.

And we also know that language study is not enough. The field of area studies, once regarded as essential but later disparaged, needs to be given new life. When I was a Dean at the University of Chicago, I developed a strong point of view about one key objective of professional education. Yes, experience is a great teacher. So, formal education should develop the ability to learn from that experience.

We all have seen instances where four or five people share an experience and only one or two of them learn much from it. For the others, that experience might as well have

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never happened. So a key objective for the Foreign Service Institute is to provide our people with the language, analytical, and area skills they need in order to be the ones best able to learn from their experiences out there in the world.

America's need for a seasoned Foreign Service and the intelligent management of foreign service careers are inextricably bound together. Half of the career service will retire in the next six years. State and other departments -- with the exception of the Department of Defense -- have never handled the problem of intake well. Secretary Powell tells me that applications for the Foreign Service -- including lots of strong minority candidates -- are two to three times what they were in recent years, so here's a chance to get it right. Good training is essential -- at the beginning and throughout a productive career. FSI provides a real advantage, as a place where careers can be developed, enhanced through training, and provided with substantive depth. And then there is career structure, particularly the length of the Foreign Service career. We need to preserve access to senior positions, so that our finest people do not resign or retire to start their next careers just when they are coming into the peak years of performance at the top of the service.

Careers in the foreign service have their risks. You can get shot at. On opposite walls of the entry hall to the main state building are two lists of names of officers killed in the line of duty, covering the years 1780 to 2002. We lost 209 officers, 83 in the first 187 years of our history and 126 in the most recent 35 years. So the losses per year are now almost nine times as great as in earlier times.

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All too many of those casualties were the result of acts of terror, a subject now
before us in urgent terms. So I want to say a few words about this acute problem, one on
which I worked hard and endured the frustrations and agonies that come with death and
destruction. I remember so well flying back from Pakistan on August 21, 1988 with the
remains of a talented and beloved Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Arnie Raifel - a
sad and moving day.

* * * * *

The tragedy of September 11 was a riveting wake-up call for the people of
America. We saw in a flash our vulnerability. As we reacted, we saw our strengths and
we experienced a renewal of patriotism and national pride. And we also deepened our
realization of how closely intertwined our fortunes are with developments elsewhere,
sometimes far away culturally as well as geographically.

That attack was also a transforming event here and in many places throughout the
world in attitudes toward terrorism. For decades, terror has been all too frequent, mostly
in the Middle East, but also in Europe and Asia, all too often aimed at Americans. We
saw our share of it in the 1980s, when I was in office. The pace picked up in the 1990s
by which time the capabilities and intentions of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaida
network were well known. I said in 1984 that, "We cannot allow ourselves to become the

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Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond." But, for whatever reasons, we did not respond at all effectively during these past two decades. Face it. The lack of effective response encourages terrorism, not the other way around.

But now, opinion has changed. When, in 1984, following terrorist attacks on our embassy and on the Marine barracks in Beirut and the IRA terrorist effort to blow up Margaret Thatcher, I called for "active prevention, preemption, and retaliation," and said we "must be willing to use military force," I was disowned and dismissed by official Washington and on leading editorial pages. (After I had a chance to go over my thinking carefully with him, President Reagan said he agreed with me.)

By contrast, we all cheered — I at the top of my voice — when Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld said on the *Jim Lehrer NewsHour*,

> If you think about it, we have no choice. A terrorist can attack at any time at any place using a range of techniques. It is physically impossible to defend at every time in every location against every conceivable technique of terrorism. Therefore, if your goal is to stop it, you cannot stop it by defense. You can only stop it by taking the battle to the terrorists, where they are and going after them....

> ...When it's something like smallpox or anthrax or a chemical weapon or the radiation weapon or killing thousands of people at the World Trade [Center], then you say to yourself, Well, if we can't stop terrorists at every location of every technique at every moment of the day or night, what must we do — just sit here and take the blows like the World Trade [Center], take the blows that

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biological weapons would pose to us? The answer is no. You have a
responsibility to defend your country. Everyone in the world knows – even the
UN Charter provides – for the right of self-defense. And the only self-defense,
the only effective way to defend is to take the battle to where the terrorists are.
They are planning, they are plotting, they have trained thousands of terrorists very
well, and we have no choice but to find those people and root them out, as the
president said, and stop them from doing what they’re doing and stop countries
from harboring them.

So preemption with military force is now an operative idea, with wide support.
I’m glad of it.

But continuing threats are all too real so we must not flag or be distracted in our
efforts to end the use of this terrible and unacceptable weapon. President Bush has given
us the concepts we need.

This is a war, not a matter of law enforcement. States that support terror are as
guilty as the terrorists. So they are in the crosshairs and the principle of state
accountability is established. And our goal is not primarily to punish and retaliate but
rather to eliminate the source, to prevent acts of terror through superior intelligence and a
readiness to preempt. These are big and far-reaching ideas that must be kept front and
center: war, state accountability, preemption. This is a war of worldwide dimensions and
must be fought on many fronts.

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There is the front of the hinterlands, those places around the world where states have failed or where no state authority reaches. In these places, terrorists can train and plan and find sanctuary from where they can emerge to strike again. Afghanistan was the main such area, but it's not the only such place. You can name them as well as I, and you need more than the fingers on your two hands. We have conducted a brilliant campaign on the Afghanistan front. Afghanistan cannot now serve as a terrorist refuge and staging area. But there is still an enormous task yet to be completed there. The fires still burn. And a state has got to be built from the ground up and given the legitimacy and authority to prevent the country from sliding back into terrorist hands.

There is the European front and, to a degree, our own country. In the liberal, open, welcoming democracies of the West, terrorists have been able to establish themselves, move easily about, communicate and develop their plans with hardly any interference from the authorities, particularly of many European countries. The terrorists know that they can enjoy and employ the freedoms offered by the democratic west to plan the destruction of those same liberal institutions and societies. So the governments and peoples of the democratic west have got to get themselves in order. Our investigative capabilities must be enhanced and be better coordinated. The mind set must change. The idea is to prevent criminal acts, not just catch and punish after the damage is done.

Through intensive intelligence-sharing and cooperative police work, the war on this front can be won – and won within the framework of protective civil rights and proper judicial procedures.

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There is the front that involves the regimes of Arab and Islamic countries. Over the years, in the knowledge that many of the terrorists seek their overthrow above all, these regimes have, each in its own way, made their deals with the terrorists. They have paid them off, propagandized them to focus on external enemies, or sought to use them to build up the religious legitimacy of those regimes themselves. They have created a monster. They may have bought some time for themselves, but they are sealing their own doom if they keep on this way. Since September 11, some of them have come to their senses. Those regimes have got to take state responsibility and accountability. They have to stop playing the double game. They should be encouraged and supported if they work seriously to put their states and societies on the right track. But I have to say, when money is collected to reward the families of suicide bombers, that is support for terrorism. There is no other way to describe it.

There is the front where Israelis and Palestinians face each other. Perhaps some thought that this was a special case that could be insulated from the war on terrorism. Now we can see that terrorist extermists have gotten their hands around the throat of the Palestinian movement. Those hands need to be cut off so people with determined but constructive attitudes can emerge to take over leadership in a restructured Palestinian Authority. Strength and diplomacy must go hand in hand: fight terrorism relentlessly even as negotiations for peace get started again. There are now some developments to work with, but nothing comes easily. I offer three thoughts.

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(1) In Negotiation 101, we teach a negotiator to study his opposition. You want counterparts capable of taking yes for an answer and of delivering on tough commitments. Saudi Arabia has led Arab states into an initiative on behalf of the Palestinians. For the first time since King Hussein bowed out in 1988, nation states are involved. So I welcome the President's and the Secretary's effort to move this forward and bring this measure of competence to the negotiating table.

(2) Yes, declare a commitment to a Palestinian state up front so all can see where the future may be. But make clear that a proclamation does not create a functioning state. Patterns of government must be created, the legitimacy of leaders established so that properly made sovereign decisions are effective, and means of accountability for policy decisions and for handling funds brought into being. And a state can hardly even begin to function effectively where citizens cannot move about from one urban center to another. So there is lots of work to do. But the work has a potential for major pay-off. State-to-state negotiations, in the context of a potential regional and world network of support, can transform this situation.

(3) And transformation is a necessity. Palestinians and others in the region now lead miserable lives without the light of hope for a better future. And Israelis continue to live with the lethal environment of a hostile neighborhood. A major change is imperative to improve the quality of life in the region: security, water, education, health, the

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opportunity to create the jobs on which standards of living depend.

Help in the form of private as well a public initiatives is needed. So

again, there is lots of work to do.

There is the front on the periphery of the Arab-Islamic world where terrorists are pushing out to radicalize countries that previously had escaped the terrorist scourge.

Most prominent and crucial here is Indonesia, where Jihadists have suddenly become more visible, active, and intimidating to the population. In the southern islands of the Philippines, terrorists have become more daring and outrageous in their hostage-taking and murders year by year. In Singapore, the discovery of a sophisticated Al-Qaida network shocked everyone because we all consider Singapore to be one of the most tightly-run states of the world. And Jihadist terrorism no doubt has plans for the new countries of central Asia, and for China as well. So this is a front that we must attend to actively.

Finally there is the most important front of all - the minds of the world's people.

There are still those who profess not to know the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The difference is clear. The definition of terrorism is simple and unmistakable. Terrorists use random violence on as large a scale as possible against civilian populations to make their points or get their way. Anyone who at this point in history claims to be confused will have to face up to being known as an apologist for terrorism.

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We have a war to win. Every tool available needs to be used aggressively. The message of the Great Seal of our Republic is front and center once more. The eagle faces the olive branches to show that the United States will always seek peace, but holds onto the arrows (plural) to show that the United States understands that, if you are to be effective in seeking peace, you must be strong. The message: strength and diplomacy go together.

Looking back at that remarkably creative post-Second World War period, we see Foreign Service officers - George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler, and others, and the soldier-statesman of that time, George C. Marshall - developing the ideas that led to the institutions and concepts that shaped the way one American generation after another engaged the world during the dangerous Cold War years. Particularly in the light of the war on terrorism and in recognition of the huge change in world affairs since those days, the times demand a new burst of creativity. Now the ball is in the hands of a new generation of Foreign Service officers, led by Colin Powell, today's distinguished soldier-statesman, able to work with President Bush, who is decisive, bold, and resolute.

So I salute the members of the Foreign Service and this center for learning the practice of diplomacy. We're lucky that you and your leaders are good. May you get better and better. You have lots of work to do.

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Let me conclude with a story from my time in office. When ambassadors had made it through the hurdles of nomination and confirmation, I invited them to my office and said, "Before you can leave, you have one more test. Go over to that globe and show me that you can identify your country." Without exception, they spun the globe and located the country to which they would be posted.

One day, the late Mike Mansfield, already many years our ambassador to Japan and an old friend from my previous times in the cabinet, came in for a visit just before he was to return to Tokyo. I said, "Mike, I always give this little test, so how about you?" He laughed and went to the globe. He put his hand on the United States. "Here's my country," he said.

So, in this setting dedicated to representation, always remember Mike's words.
Be proud to be a citizen, let alone a representative, of the greatest country ever, the United States of America.

14

Don Kelly accompanies

05/28/2002(2)

May Washington Trip
National Foreign Affairs Training Center Dedication/ Hudson Institute Dinner

May 29-30, 2002

Wednesday, May 29:

9:00am Depart LGA via US 6855 (320 Airbus) PNR# DEKXYP
10:08am Arrive DCA/National. Met by Ray Urrutia cell: 703/926-5616; pager: 703/826-0207

They have asked guests to park in the RED Parking Area. (Lot P7)
Directions: The NFATC is located at the junction of Arlington
Boulevard (Route 50) and South George Mason Drive in Arlington.
Traveling west on Route 50 from DC, exit on the right at George
Mason Drive, turning left at the traffic light. Turn left at the next
traffic light at the end of the overpass onto the Arlington Boulevard
service road. Enter the National Foreign Affairs Training Center at
the second entrance on the right. Alternatively, after exiting at
George Mason Drive, turn left at the traffic light and continue to
the entrance on the left at South Sixth Street.

ca. 10:45 ca. 15-20min. drive from DCA/National to Foreign Affairs Center
Arrive National Foreign Affairs Training Center, (4000 Arlington
Boulevard) where you will be greeted and taken to a holding room;
they are aware you are arriving early.

Note: VIP luncheon guests (120 attending) will be escorted ca. 100 yards from holding room to outside courtyard. Guests must be in place by 11:15am (because of security requirements)

11:30 **George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center**
**Dedication** program begins @ Nat'l. Foreign Affairs Training
Center **outside courtyard** (4000 Arlington Boulevard)
(800 attending) April @ State Department: 202/647-1734; Wayne @
Foreign Service Institute: 703/302-6730; staff (day of event) 703/302-
6729

Guests will be directed from courtyard to the lobby for:
12:15-2:00 Lunch by M/M Powell & M/M Shultz (120 attending; ca. 20 State Department principals)

Note: Secretary Powell will give brief remarks

Wednesday, May 29 cont'd.

afternoon To 1800 K Street office

business attire

**6:00pm 12th James H. Doolittle Award Dinner Honoring George P. Shultz** @ Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. (HAK is honorary co-chair)

Ray to drop HAK off at 14th Street Entrance. Met by Denise Braye, Exec. Asst. to Kenneth Weinstein, VP and Director, Washington office, and escorted to The Pavilion. cell: 240/535-7569 DL: 202/974-2422

Kenneth Weinstein, VP and Director of Hudson Institute Washington Office DL: 202/974-2404 / 202/223-7770 (main number) Fax: 202/223-8537 / Cell: 202/271-2404; Kelly Drew @ Ronald Reagan Building DL: 202/312-1324 Fax: 202/312-1310

**6:00-7:00 Reception in The Pavilion**

[5:30 Set up for Variety Music by Brian Litz Trio
6:50 First chime for guests to enter dining room
6:55 Second chime for guests to enter dining room, bar closes
6:55 Head table guests escorted to holding room
(Holding room across from dining room, Reverend Wright, Wolfowitz, Shultz, Kissinger, & head table guests to remain in holding room until introduction at 7:02pm)]

Note: There will be 2 head tables: one hosted by Shultz and one hosted by Wolfowitz - to hear which one you will be seated

**Note: Dinner will be covered by press and C-SPAN**

7:00 Welcome by Herb London (President of Hudson Institute)

7:02 Introduction

7:04 Presentation of colors and National Anthem

7:08 Invocation by Reverend Frederick Wright

HUDSON INSTITUTE'S

Twelfth Annual

JAMES H. DOOLITTLE AWARD DINNER

Honoring

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Ronald Reagan Building & International Trade Center

The Pavilion

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

May 29, 2002

6:00 p.m. Reception

7:00 p.m. Dinner

Table Number 21

Biography of the Deputy Secretary of Defense

Page 1 of 2

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Paul Wolfowitz

Deputy Secretary of Defense

On February 5, 2001, President Bush announced his intention to nominate Dr. Paul Wolfowitz to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. He was unanimously confirmed by the Senate on Feb. 28th and sworn in March 2, 2001 as the 28th Deputy Secretary of Defense. This is Dr. Wolfowitz's third tour of duty in the Pentagon.

For the last seven years, Dr. Wolfowitz has served as Dean and Professor of International Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of The Johns Hopkins University. SAIS is widely regarded as one of the world's leading graduate schools of international relations with 750 students, studying on campuses in Washington, D.C.; Nanjing, China; and Bologna, Italy. As Dean, he led a successful capital campaign that raised more than $75 million and doubled the school's endowment. Also under his leadership, the curriculum and facilities were modernized and new faculty and programs were added to shift the school's focus from the Cold War to the era of globalization.

From 1989 to 1993, Dr. Wolfowitz served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in charge of the 700-person defense policy team that was responsible to Secretary Dick Cheney for matters concerning strategy, plans, and policy. During this period Secretary Wolfowitz and his staff had major responsibilities for the reshaping of strategy and force posture at the end of the Cold War.

Under his leadership, the Policy Staff played a major role in reviewing war plans for the Gulf War, and developing and executing plans that successfully raised more than $50 billion in Allied financial support for the war and prevented Iraq from opening a second front with Israel. Other key initiatives included the development of the Regional Defense Strategy, the Base Force, and two presidential nuclear initiatives that led to the elimination of tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons.

During the Reagan administration, Dr. Wolfowitz served for three years as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia - the fourth largest country in the world and the largest in the Moslem world. There he earned a reputation as a highly popular and effective Ambassador, a tough negotiator on behalf of American intellectual property owners, and a public advocate of political openness and democratic values. During his tenure, Embassy Jakarta was cited as one of the four best-managed embassies inspected in 1988.

Prior to that posting, he served three and a half years as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, where he was in charge of U.S. relations with more than twenty countries. In addition to

http://www.defenselink.mil/bios/depsecdef_bio.html

5/22/02

Page 2 of 2

contributing to substantial improvements in U.S. relations with Japan and China, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz played a central role in coordinating the U.S. policy toward the Philippines that supported a peaceful transition from the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos to democracy.

Dr. Wolfowitz's previous government service included:

* Two years as head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1981-82);

* An earlier Pentagon tour as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs (1977-80), where he helped create the force that later became the United States Central Command and initiated the Maritime Pre-positioning Ships, the backbone of the initial U.S. deployment twelve years later in Operation Desert Shield;

* Four years (1973-77) in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and a number of nuclear nonproliferation issues; and

* A year as a Management Intern at the Bureau of the Budget (1966-67).

Dr. Wolfowitz taught previously at Yale (1970-73) and Johns Hopkins (1981). In 1993, he was the George F. Kennan Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. He has written widely on the subject of national strategy and foreign policy and was a member of the advisory boards of the journals Foreign Affairs and National Interest.

Among his many awards for public service are:

* The Presidential Citizen's Medal,

* The Department of Defense's Distinguished Public Service Medal,

* The Department of State's Distinguished Honor Award,

* The Department of Defense's Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, and

* The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's Distinguished Honor Award.

Dr. Wolfowitz received a bachelor's degree from Cornell University (1965) in mathematics, and a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago (1972).

(Current as of March 2001)

Updated: 06 Mar 2001

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5/22/02

Rebecca Jordan

From: Hansen, Ann, CIV, OSD-POLICY [Ann.Hansen@osd.pentagon.mil]
Sent: Monday, May 20, 2002 3:19 PM
To: (Ret) Bill Owens (E-mail 2); (Ret) Bill Owens (E-mail); (Ret) David Jeremiah (E-mail); Allison Eggleston (E-mail); Anne Marks (E-mail); Barry Blechman (E-mail); Chris Williams (E-mail); Devon Cross (E-mail); Eliot Cohen (E-mail); Former VP Dan Quayle (E-mail); Fred Ikle (E-mail); Gary Becker (E-mail); Gen (Ret) Ronald Fogelman (E-mail); Gen. (Ret) Chuck Horner (E-mail); Gerald Hillman (E-mail); Hal Sonnenfeldt (E-mail); Harold Brown (E-mail); Henry Kissinger (E-mail 2); Henry Kissinger (E-mail); Henry Rowen (E-mail); Jack Sheehan (E-mail); James Schlesinger (E-mail); James Woolsey (E-mail); Kenneth Adelman (E-mail); Kim Holmes (E-mail); Kiron Skinner (E-mail); LTG (Ret) Marc Cisneros (E-mail); Martin Anderson (E-mail 2); Martin Anderson (E-mail); Nancy Bonomo (E-mail); Nancy Bryant (E-mail); Newt Gingrich (E-mail); Pete Wilson (E-mail); Phillip Merrill (E-mail); Richard Allen (E-mail 2); Richard Allen (E-mail); Richard Perle (E-mail); Thomas Foley (E-mail); Tillie Fowler (E-mail)
Subject: DPB - Item of interest

Recently Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz spoke at an event at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Sonnenfeldt feels that his comments are relevant and wanted to share them with the other members of the DPB. The text of the event can be found at <http://brook.edu/dybdocroot/comm/transcripts/20020515.htm>.

Press Coverage and the War on Terrorism

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A Brookings/Harvard Forum
Press Coverage and the War on Terrorism

Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz to Answer
Questions at Brookings Forum

Wednesday, May 15, 2002

9:30am-10:30am
Holeman Lounge
National Press Club
529 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC

➤ event info

MR. HESS: Good morning, and welcome to the 17th session of the Brookings/Harvard Forum. I'm Stephen Hess of the Brookings—my co-inventor of the forum, Marvin Kalb, is the executive director of the

Washington office of the Shorenstein Center from Harvard University.

The Role of the
Press in the Anti-
Terrorism Campaign

➤ project home page

event video
(requires RealPlayer)

In introducing our guests today, let me say a word about a very creative personnel system that's uniquely American. President Kennedy's headhunters called them the "action intellectuals," and our friend Richard Neustadt at Harvard called them the "ins-and-outers." They're a special brand of public-spirited Americans

who are appointed to positions at a high reach in the U.S. government when they are in agreement with the party in power, and when they are out of power, they relax and they reflect on the lessons they've learned in government in perches at universities, think tanks, foundations, advocacy groups, certain types of law firms, while of course awaiting the next opportunity to put their knowledge to work for government. And a very key member of this "in-and-outer" club is Dr. Paul Wolfowitz. During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, he was assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, he was ambassador to Indonesia. During the presidency of George H.W. Bush, he was the undersecretary of Defense for Policy. And then, during the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton, he became the dean and professor of international relations at the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University, which is on Massachusetts Avenue, right across from the Brookings Institution, where we also have a welcome mat out for action intellectuals. And now, during the presidency of George W. Bush, he is the United States deputy secretary of Defense.

Paul Wolfowitz is going to have a conversation with us, and a little later we'll open it up to questions from the audience.

So, Marvin, what would be your first question?

➤ full event

➤ intro

➤ discussion

➤ Q & A

5/28/2002

**MR. KALB:** Okay. Well, I would like to start with the fact that the secretary of Defense is going up to the Hill tomorrow, obviously to defend his decision to kill a very important weapons system that is called the Crusader. And it appears over the last couple of weeks that there is a very large battle that is brewing between supporters of the Crusader up on the Hill, within the Pentagon itself, in the Army, and then you and the secretary and others who feel that we've got to move on to a new generation of weapons and put down things like the Crusader.

I would like to ask you to begin to explain it to us. Why is this so important—this kind of a decision? Why is it so important?

**MR. HESS:** It's only $11 billion, for heaven's sake.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Even in the Pentagon, we consider that real money.

I do have to respond to Steve's introduction—

**MR. KALB:** (Inaudible)—please.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:**—because, you know, that phrase "in-and-outer" suggests that when you're out, you're really waiting to be in. And when I was out, I had a terrific job as dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and I loved it. And in my previous job, I wasn't allowed to say anything nice about Harvard or Brookings. But now I can say I want to compliment Harvard and Brookings—(laughter)—because I think what you're doing with this series is important.

And I hope we get off the subject of media quickly, but I do think it's important to say we in the Defense Department feel as though our goal is the same as that of the American press, which is defending liberty and democracy. I know sometimes we're sparring with each other, but I think that's, in fact, part of the process. And I compliment you for what you're doing. And you know our expert on questions from and about the media is the secretary of Defense himself, and you've had him, so I'd like to get into your question, which is about transformation.

I was at a ceremony a week ago where we named the Old Executive Office Building after late President Eisenhower. And on that occasion, Colin Powell, a former general, a great secretary of State, said, "Speaking of Eisenhower, I think a point that is not always known about his career"—he reflected on Eisenhower, certainly, but our country, in Powell's words, "had to rebuild and transform our armed forces in the period between the wars." And he said that "Ike's determination to see that transformation happen and the effect that transformational systems and thought had on the outcome of World War II" influenced him as a young officer after Vietnam. And as Rumsfeld has said, we're facing the same kind of challenge today.

In the case of the period of the '20s and '30s, we didn't have the great armed forces that we have today, it's true, but what we had was an armed force that was designed for the last war, and what Eisenhower represented was those people who were thinking ahead to the next war.

Today in the Pentagon we have great soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and civilians who are all thinking both about this war and about the next war. What brought us to the decision on Crusader was a judgment—and it's always a

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judgment call, these are not absolutes—that while Crusader is a good system, it's definitely an advance over our current artillery, it's not the kind of transformational leap that really brings us the forces we need to fight the wars of the 21st century. That where the Army has set its sights, on what they call the transformation force or the objective force, which emphasizes accuracy, emphasizes deployability, emphasizes mobility, that those are the qualities that we really need to complement the already substantial capabilities Army has today.

It was a judgment about risks. It's a judgment to terminate Crusader, but not just to move that money to the Air Force, for example. It's not air power over Army. It's a decision that what the Army most needs and what Army artillery most needs is precision and mobility.

**MR. KALB:** But Mr. Secretary, help us understand, do you already have in mind a specific new weapon system that, instead of the Crusader, you can put into its place immediately; or are you killing one weapon system without a clear vision of what the next system is going to be?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** It's somewhere in between. And it is definitely not a decision to put something in place immediately. By the way, Crusader isn't immediate either. Crusader wouldn't start to—start to deploy until 2008. So we're talking, in the case of Crusader, about a medium-term capability, not a near-term one.

The alternatives we're talking—we're talking about a set of alternatives, not a single alternative. And I think it's important also in discussing these complicated issues—and it makes it more complicated—that you don't match gun for gun or system for system; you match a complex of weapon systems against a complex of weapon systems.

And, indeed, we had a—I mean, I think Afghanistan, although in many ways it's a unique war, it's been a very clear demonstration of what this system of combat systems accomplishes.

In the case of Crusader, to answer your question more directly, I would say what we're looking at is to accelerate precision in artillery. And that means, if I can start using complicated Pentagon jargon, a round called the Excalibur round, which could deliver 10-meter accuracy in an artillery round. It would revolutionize artillery. And something like it called the Guided MLRS—Guided Mobile—Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System—it's hard for us to talk without acronyms—which would deliver the same kind of accuracy in a rocket system. That would come in with an accelerated schedule, actually before Crusader would be available.

The other thing we're talking about, which is in the longer term, is how to get Crusader-like capabilities in a system that is deployable on aircraft and even on theater lift aircraft like the C-130. But basically—and I think this is really important—it is a judgment to give up something, something that's valuable in the medium term, in order to get something that we—sooner that we believe is more valuable in the long term. And that's why it's a hard decision.

**MR. KALB:** I'm sure it's a hard decision; it's also a hard battle for you, because there is strong opposition up on the Hill, there has apparently been strong opposition within the Pentagon at the Army level. Do you feel that as you look at the odds right now that you and the secretary are going to win?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** He said we will, and I believe him. (Laughter.)

**MR. KALB:** That's a safe call. (Laugs.)

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**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** But we will, Marvin.

**MR. HESS:** The secretary is confident. But is history on your side? When you look at what's happened with major weapons systems, you look at poor Dick Cheney or Harold Brown when they tried to get rid of the Osprey, the plane that went up like a helicopter and then flew like an airplane, and both of them found that Congress felt otherwise. Even the B-1 bomber that President Carter could cancel and President Reagan could bring back. It's hard to find—you almost have to go back more than a decade to find a major weapons system that has been cancelled.

Now, I want to ask about the strategy. You folks seem to be off to a very rocky start. And if anything, you seem to be the fall guy. Congressman—the congressman from Oklahoma, J.C. Watts, almost called you a liar, if you'll recall. The leading Democrat on the committee said he had no advance notice. So it's a somewhat strategic question since we know that both you and Don Rumsfeld are pretty smart folks. Is this part of a strategy, not to give advance notice to the Congress? And the Army feels the same way. It says that if we spring this on them, there's going to be less chance for their regrouping and going ahead—or have I got it wrong? What is the strategy that—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Okay. There's a lot in that question.

But let me start with the fact, this isn't about winning. And in fact, it's important to stress, we make a recommendation to the Congress; it's the Congress that decides. I do believe this is a win-win decision for the Defense Department, for the Army, for the Congress.

Process is always messy and I—I mean, when the press does its job, things happen. It's almost as soon as you have a meeting—I had a meeting with Secretary White on this subject. Even before the meeting was over, somehow, through the permanent bureaucracy to the contractors to the Congress to the press, we were already getting phone calls about the content of that meeting before it had even been finished. So it's a little hard to have orderly process in those circumstances.

But the real point here is that we are constantly in the Defense Department putting together at least two and frequently three or four budgets at the same time. Right now—by "right now" I mean over the last three or four months, we have been presenting the FY '03 budget to the Congress, which has Crusader in it. We have been putting together and presenting to the Congress an '02 supplemental to fight the war. And we have been working on the guidance for the FY '04 budget. And it's that convergence of the '03 budget, which is on the Hill, with our analysis of the '04 budget, and as that analysis increasingly said to us—we were looking at Crusader, we were looking at a number of programs, but Crusader was, you know, at the front of that pile—the analysis increasingly said to us it's a good system, we still believe it's a good system, but it's the wrong place to put the money; there are better places to put the money.

And it would have been irresponsible, in my view, to let the Congress continue along, appropriate the '03 money, and then tell them, after it was all done, "oh, by the way, three months ago we came to a different conclusion." There's no way to have a perfectly orderly process.

**MR. KALB:** Excuse me. Isn't the Congress proceeding anyway? They're going ahead, the House and the Senate both have voted 400- some-odd million dollars to continue the Crusader program. Is that correct?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Well, first of all, as you know—

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when I was ambassador to Indonesia, it was often very difficult to explain, "Congress Votes Textile Ban on Indonesian Imports," and it turned out it was a subcommittee of the House committee and it was a bill the president was going to veto. So that process doesn't end with the first action.

The House Armed Services Committee voted already in its authorization bill to keep money for Crusader. The Senate Armed Services has not yet voted on that subject. There's going to be a major hearing tomorrow where the secretary of Defense is going to, for the first time, have a chance to present his case in public, and then we'll see.

**MR. KALB:** You were mentioning before General and President Eisenhower and you quoted from him. He also has a great quote—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I quoted—I quoted from General and Secretary of State Powell, another great general.

**MR. KALB:** General Powell—referring to Eisenhower. Eisenhower also is known for many, many things, including the warning about a military-industrial complex, which he did at the very beginning of the 1960s. And that takes you back 40 years, so to give you some historical perspective on the battle that you're involved in with right now. And I asked you before, do you think you're going to win, and you said yes, and that's an understandable answer.

But against the background of that kind of history, the power of the military-industrial complex in the United States not to determine an outcome, but strongly to influence the direction of a decision is there, and you face it every day. You are conscious of that historical parallel?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Look, there are a lot of people with important stakes in every decision, on both sides of every decision.

And it is true that when you're talking about a weapon system that is underway—it's not, by the way, in production yet, but it's underway—there are people who can see jobs and interest at stake. We're talking about shifting that money to a whole bunch of other systems. There are jobs at stake in that also, but the people who are going to get those jobs don't know about it yet.

But I think something that is different from that warning that Eisenhower voiced. And I can't say I know precisely what he was thinking of or talking about at the time, but remember: That was the height of the Cold War. I think we've seen something about—that is great about that military-industrial complex. We have seen an ability of our military, backed up by our industry, to deliver capabilities that no one else in the world can deliver and that since September 11th the American people understand we need to have.

And I do think it's changed the way in which people think about this decision. This is not about cutting budgets in order to save money because we don't need defense. It's about how we spend those defense dollars most wisely. And I think it helps us a lot that there isn't a debate about whether we need a defense budget or a Defense Department anymore. That debate has been resolved.

**MR. HESS:** But go back to the strategy on this. We certainly know where the members of Congress are coming from—those that are in districts in which they potentially lose tax revenue, they lose jobs and so forth. We know that Walter Pincus had an interesting article in the Washington Post the other day. We know that United Defense spends a million dollars a year on lobbying on this. We know that they gave $180,000 to members of Congress, many of whom happen to be on the Appropriations Committee or the Armed Services

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Committee for this.

So we see, on that hand, the forces arrayed against you. But what confuses
me is—tell me the internal politics inside the Pentagon, itself. Why, suddenly,
did we have to brouhaha over the Army and over talking points and so forth? In
this complex of those arrayed against you, you have parts of the Pentagon.
Now it strikes me that's peculiar in a system where service personnel are
trained in loyalty. They salute their commander in chief. What's going on over
there?

MR. WOLFOWITZ: Okay, well first of all, there's nothing sudden about this. I mean, it may seem sudden to some of you, but we have been discussing what transformation is about since—well, since before I came in, in March 2nd of last year. We've been discussing specific weapon systems. We've had multiple, multiple meetings and sessions on Crusader, itself. So this is not a sudden process. In fact, it's been a very careful, deliberate process.

Secondly: Yes, there are all those kinds of interest that you describe. But I think it trivializes the people who disagree with us to say that all they're thinking about is parochial interests. I mean, it is true that people from Oklahoma have a particular concern about Crusader. I don't think it's just about jobs. It's because Fort Sill, the home of Army artillery, is in Oklahoma. They have come to believe the Crusader is a great system. It is a good system, by the way. There's no argument about that. Within the building, particularly within the U.S. Army, there are people who have become very attached to Crusader. And frankly, I was prepared to defend it until I began to see what some of those alternatives were.

I think if you ask me why we've come to some of these different judgments, I'd say it's two things. One is a judgment about future—sorry if this is jargon—future risk versus near-term risk, the risk that we won't have something we want to have if a war starts in Korea tomorrow. Of course, you don't have to say "tomorrow", either. But if a war starts in Korea in 2008. First it's a risk of you don't have what you really want to have in 2015. Those are judgment calls. No single person, frankly, has all the qualifications for it. But the closest you come to the individual who is confirmed by the Congress to make those judgments and to make the recommendations to our commander in chief is the secretary of Defense. And he has to weigh those things, and he has to weigh future risk versus current risk.

The other thing, I believe, that is operative here is that Crusader is closer to
what we have already. It's easier, I think, for most people to understand the
value of an improvement in what you have already than to understand
something that is revolutionary that you don't quite believe in. Accurate
munitions are a perfect example.

I remember 25 years ago, the first time Rumsfeld was secretary of Defense
and I was working in another agency of the U.S. government, there were a lot
of people, including people in the Navy, who said "We don't need these
Tomahawk cruise missiles. They're useless, they take up valuable torpedo
space, they're just another way to deliver nuclear weapons and we don't need
it." Those people, in my view, did not appreciate what precision could mean in
delivering a conventional weapon from a submarine. Now the Navy swears by
Tomahawks. It's a major weapons system for the Navy. But at that time it was
sort of a leap into the dark. And I don't think we're leaping into the dark any
longer. I think precision has demonstrated itself over and over again, most
recently in Afghanistan, as one of the most revolutionary transformational
capabilities that we have.

MR. KALB: But it's a transformational capability into something that is not yet

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there. I mean, number one, you—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Crusader wasn't there yet, either.

**MR. KALB:** Right. But it isn't—but to kill one system and go toward another system without knowing really exactly what that other system is, if I understand you right—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Well—

**MR. KALB:**—you're struggling to find what will be the appropriate system for 10 or 15 years out.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Again, a complicated decision because there are at least four different things we want to put this money into, okay? Two of them are quite real, they're under development, we believe they are a few years away from being realized. One is the Excalibur artillery round, which would give you highly accurate artillery rounds that would go in every single artillery tube in the Army, the Navy and the Marine Corps. That's not just a gleam in someone's eye; that is a development program. The other one that is a real system is the guided rocket system, which takes our existing inventory of multiple launch rocket systems and puts accurate guidance on them. Those aren't pie in the sky; those are systems we can have, we think we can have them faster and in larger quantity if we put more money into them. There are other systems, particularly the—what the Army is calling the Future Combat System in their transformation force, which is a family of lighter vehicles. And we believe you can have a Crusader-like gun in the Future Combat System. That still is conceptual, that still needs work. And there's a little bit of a gamble there, yes.

**MR. KALB:** And the experience in Afghanistan, was that crucial in making the decision on the Crusader?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I don't think it was crucial, but I think it reinforced the conclusions that we had already had come to last summer in putting together the Quadrennial Defense Review.

**MR. KALB:** You kind of put it over the top.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I think—more just reinforce the importance of accuracy and the importance of being able to deploy forces deep and maneuver deep. I mean, if we had the Army objective force today, the Army would've been able to do things in Afghanistan that would've been wonderful. We're not there yet, but we want to get there faster.

**MR. HESS:** Bring us beyond—we've now used the word "transformation" a lot of times, but is this the first piece? What's the second and the third?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Oh, no. There are many pieces already.

**MR. HESS:** Tell us what—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** We do use the word a lot; maybe we use it too much, but I think it's an important word. We've spent a lot of time trying to put a more precision definition on what it means.

And one of the things that it does mean is accelerating introduction of accuracy into the force. That's a process that's been underway for a while. But as a result of that review last summer, we have added real money—over a billion dollars—to increase our production of the JDAM, the accurate bomb that we've been using so much in Afghanistan. We put money in this year's budget

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request to convert four Trident submarines from a nuclear mission, which is a Cold War mission that we don't need anymore. And we have a treaty actually that takes us in that direction. We're taking those incredibly valuable submarines and converting them to be cruise- missile carriers, so that we will give those submarines the kind of conventional punch that is transformational. We have—and it was a difficult decision last year—we decided to cut our B-1 force by a third so that the 2/3 that were left could be transformed into systems that could deliver munitions accurately.

There is a long list, and I actually—

**MR. HESS:** What will be the next weapons system, assuming you win on—or lose on Crusader? Do you go on to tactical fighter aircraft? Is that the next major system to be cut?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** That's a great question.

**MR. HESS:** (Laugs.) Well, I—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Look. In fact, in the Defense Planning Guidance—and all the military departments know it—in the Defense Planning Guidance, to put together the fiscal year '04 budget, we have a series of studies that look at the V-22 aircraft, the F-22, various helicopter programs. We're trying to take a look comprehensively at a whole series of things.

And I say the basic reason for it is that there are so many good things—and they are good things; these are not bad systems, or they wouldn't be around—these are good things that the military would like to have, I think that the country would benefit from having. But when we make projections out—FY '08, '09—and we have to do that in our business—you start to see that we aren't going to be able to afford them all, even with what we think are some pretty generous increases in defense spending.

So we're staring to look at those choices. They're going to again be hard choices. But it's hard because all of this stuff is capable. It's big improvements over what we have.

**MR. KALB:** Mr. Secretary, a lot of cameras around here, so I want to widen our lens of discussion, so to speak, and get us into a few other subjects.

If one were to watch television on a regular basis, television news, read the papers, one thing or another, you would logically come to the conclusion that the American planned effort against Iraq has been essentially shelved by virtue of the pressures generated by the crisis between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

I was wondering if you accept that generalization? Is that the way you see it?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** You know, people come to a lot of logical conclusions. They concluded, right after the State of the Union message, in which the president identified North Korea as one of those "axis of evil" countries, that we were about to go to war with North Korea.

I think one of the things that's happened—I believe—can't say cause and effect, but it happened after the president's speech, is the North Koreans are suddenly coming forward wanting to talk with us.

What the president said about all three of those countries—and Iraq was

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clearly one of them—is that they represent dangers to the United States because they're hostile, because they have or are developing weapons of mass destruction, and because they have a record of supporting terrorism, and that that is not a danger we can afford to live with indefinitely; that we can't wait until there's a 9/11 with a nuclear weapon or a biological or chemical weapon to then go and find the perpetrator. But he hasn't set forth specifically how to go about dealing with it. In each case it's different, in each case it's difficult and complicated. And I just would discourage people from concluding too much from what seems, quote, "logical," as you put it.

**MR. KALB:** But the focus that everybody has in the past month or so on the Palestinian and Israeli crisis, has that not distracted you from a more principled effort against Iraq?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I think we try very hard to walk and chew gum at the same time! (Laugs; laughter.) We are trying—I'll come back to your question in a minute. But I think it's important to emphasize that these decisions about Crusader and about the future of the armed forces are being made at the same time that we're making very difficult decisions about how to fight today, and the armed forces are performing magnificently.

I would say that it's an analogous thing to think about here. We have a huge stake in moving forward on achieving some kind of a peace between Arabs and Israelis, or specifically now between Israelis and Palestinians. And I must say, by the way, too, to throw another laurel in Secretary Powell's direction, I think he's done magnificent work, and I think we're better off today for his having gone to the Middle East than if he hadn't.

But it is a formidable problem, it is difficult. Does it affect how we go about thinking about dealing with Iraq or Iran? You bet it does. Does it stop us from thinking or working on it? No, it doesn't. From the other direction, I think this sometimes isn't appreciated enough, Iraq and Iran are major disrupters of the peace process. They have—one of their goals in life is to make sure that process doesn't work. If there were a change of regime in Iraq, would it help us in the peace process? You bet it would. And in fact, if you go back historically and look when the great breakthroughs have been made in Arab-Israeli peace—the Egyptian-Israeli treaty happened, I would say not long after, and as a direct result of the demonstration in the early 1970s that the United States was a strategic power in the Eastern Mediterranean, not the Soviet Union. The breakthroughs that were represented in the 1990s by Madrid and Oslo came after the defeat of Saddam Hussein and the elimination, for a time at least, of Iraq as a major factor in the Middle East. So you have to work both of these things at the same time and just keep at it, and we're doing that.

**MR. KALB:** The king of Jordan said, just the other day, that if the United States were to go against Iraq, it would be—I think his word was "devastating," and I think on another occasion he said "catastrophic." Now, that is a clear difference in a strategic vision of how Iraq plays into a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli problem.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Not necessarily—

**MR. KALB:** In other words, he's saying, "Don't do it, because it would make things worse."

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Look, people say a lot of things. People have a lot of different views, a lot of different interests. Believe me, if you live in the neighborhood of a Mafia lord or if you live in the neighborhood of Saddam Hussein, then that's going to affect what you say, even in private, but particularly in public. And there's truth in what he says.

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But the point is, we can't continue living forever with the dangers that are presented. That's what the president's made clear. And he is thinking through, with the help of, I must say, I think, a world-class team of advisers, how to manage each of these issues, how to synchronize things, how to get time lines together. But I'd say both issues are very much on the front burner.

**MR. HESS:** And would you like to comment, if all, Mr. Secretary—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Probably not, if you start it that way! (Laugs.) I think—
(laughs)—

**MR. HESS:** You're quite right. Okay. I'll ask you a question. Among others, the press likes to divide people into camps within an administration. There now seems to be what's called a Richard Perle camp and a Brent Scowcroft camp. At any rate, we know the players in each camp. Tell us something about the internal dynamic in this administration. How much civility and how pleasantly do you fight out these battles, or are these just a figment of the press's imagination?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Well, I must say I think those press stories must be great for Richard Perle's and Brent Scowcroft's consulting businesses. (Light laughter.) But they honestly do not pull the strings in the administration.

I think a quality of this president, which I observed really from the very first time I met him early on in his campaign, is that he thrives on people debating issues in front of him. He is a great listener, and he's a great decider. And at a certain point, he says, "Okay, I've heard you. I've heard you. Here's what I think and here's what we're doing." And I would say, number one, that that, I think, is the key to an effective decision-making process. You can't come to good decisions if you don't have different points of view represented. And you can't have a good policy if that debate goes on forever and no one ever decides anything. And you can't have good policy if after that decision the players continue to argue their positions or particularly act as those there's been no decision made. None of that happens. I think there's a very good, clear debate, very good, clean decisions and a very teamwork-like implementation of those decisions.

We've just seen it, I think, accomplished in what is truly a revolutionary change—well, maybe "revolutionary" is a word one should be cautious about—I think, a very significant change in the U.S.-Russian relationship. We're out of the ABM Treaty, or about to be. We have a new strategic relationship, an arms control treaty that is unlike any we've had before. That was a product of different points of view from both Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, Condi Rice, a lot of people. I would say it's pretty civil, and it's helped by the fact that we have been friends and worked together over a long period of time.

I must say—you referred to my prior life. You know, in the academic world, it's unfortunately true that you can disagree with a colleague over some trivial thing and stop speaking to him or her for the next 30 years, and nothing really is affected by that. In government, if you have that kind of argument, you may need that person the next day because they're going to be your ally in a different argument. And it seems to me that it constantly moderates and introduces a level of civility that is essential to make government work.

**MR. KALB:** You were talking a moment ago about the new relationship with the Russians. And I was just wondering whether there is any thought that is being given to discussing with the Russians an arrangement on energy, the net result of which would be a diminution, then, in the reliance of the United States upon Middle East oil, particularly Saudi oil, and that, then, would have the effect of perhaps liberating American policy from certain constraints that

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operated on it up to this point.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I can't say. I think that's probably in several other cabinet departments' main line of thinking. So I—

**MR. KALB:** You have been involved in deep thinking on policy for a long time.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I mean, it's an interesting idea, and I certainly think that the energy potential of Russia and some of the Central Asian countries who probably would be shipping energy through Russia is enormous, and it will be a benefit to the world in many ways, including the one you mentioned, if that can be developed more. But at the same time, there's a notion out there that if we could just somehow fix the energy problem, we could ignore the Persian Gulf. The energy resources of the Persian Gulf are so enormous, bring with it such wealth and such potential for power, and power that can be abused, that I believe we've got to pay attention to it. Look, it's a sensitive subject, but we've seen where some of that Gulf money goes into—let me say, miseducating people in the Muslim world, it's harmful even if we have an alternative source of energy. And—you want me to think about—talk about a big subject. I mean, I think it a very big subject—and I spoke about this a couple of weeks ago in Monterrey—part of this war on terrorism is finding terrorists and capturing them and killing them and putting them out of business. But another part of it has to be, as the president said in his State of the Union message, building a better world after this war on terrorism has been won. And that means, I think, particularly reaching out to the moderate Muslims. And there are hundreds of millions of moderate Muslims.

I was ambassador to Indonesia for two years. It's the fourth-largest country in the world; a lot of Americans don't know that. It's the largest Muslim population of any country in the world; even fewer Americans know that. It is one of two countries with a Muslim majority in which Islam is not the state religion, and there are almost no Americans who know that. It is a model of moderation. Yes, there are a few extremists around. But those people aspire to the same values of democracy and freedom that we do. They want the same benefits of a free enterprise system, the prosperity that goes with it—

**MR. KALB:** To get that there.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:**—we need to make that vision clear to those people.

**MR. KALB:** Exactly. And it seems that up to this point, at least since 9/11, the effort to get the American message through to the modern Arab world has not been a roaring success. When one reads reports of journalists who go to Indonesia, for example, your sort of adopted country—Tom Friedman, recently with the New York Times, you come back with rather frightening judgments as to what it is that young Muslim graduate students and college students think of the United States and think of their world. Is there any way that you can—aside from saying this is a good idea, do you feel that there is any evidence that we have been able to meet that frontally and had any positive effect?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Yes, there is any evidence. Is it a difficult job? Yes, it's difficult. Are we winning? I'm not sure we're winning. But let—you want evidence? I'll give you one piece of evidence.

When the Taliban fell in Afghanistan, I know as women took off their burqas, the attitude in Indonesia toward what we were doing in Afghanistan was transformed. They suddenly realized this is not a war against the Afghan people, this is a war that was liberating Afghan people.

Did it completely transform their view of the United States? No. But it was a

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piece of progress.

I'll tell you a little anecdote that I remember from 15 years ago when I was
ambassador—

**MR. KALB:** And then, by the way, we will go to questions from the audience.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:**—that I think illustrates some of what we're up against. We sent three Indonesian — they call them keyaeyees (ph). In the Middle East they'd be called imams. They run Muslim schools in Indonesia. We sent them on a USIA-sponsored tour of the United States to visit American public schools. And they came back, and we asked them, "Well, was there anything particularly surprising?" They said, "Yes, we were surprised at how religious American teachers are." And I was a little surprised at that observation myself, particularly since, to my knowledge, the teachers in public schools don't wear their religion on their sleeves at all.

It was very clear that what they meant, their definition of being religious was being devoted to your students, caring about your students. And what became very clear was, for these men before they came here, they thought of the United States from those Saturday night reruns of "Dallas," that were the most popular TV show in Indonesia. We don't always project the best image of the United States to people, and that is part of our problem. And there are people. like bin Laden and his ilk, who are out funding schools to project the worst image of the United States. So we have a very big challenge against us, with people working hard against us to do it, but we've got to rise to that challenge.

**MR. HESS:** You know, it's interesting, just in passing we mentioned Afghanistan. Half a year later—before we go to the audience—give us a quick report, Mr. Secretary, on where we are, particularly in terms of American troops, our contingent there, how long it's going to be there, how large it's going to be, where it's going to be stationed.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I think we've made terrific progress. And I mean, I must say if you'd asked me back in early October where we would be in April or May of this year, I would not have predicted we'd be in as good shape as we are. It's quite impressive to me. And I want again—I think it really has to be said. General Franks and his people put together a plan out of nothing in about—in less than three weeks, and they were liberating Mazar-e Sharif, I believe, less than five or six weeks after that. It's testimony to what our men and women in uniform can do, and it's incredible.

We have removed the Taliban from power. We have essentially made Afghanistan—eliminated it as a operating base for terrorists. There are still terrorists there and we're looking for them, but they are not able to plan or organize or do very much. And I think we've created the conditions for a better government for Afghanistan for the future.

We still have work to do. We still have pockets of terrorists around that we're looking for. There are still Afghans associated with the Taliban who do not wish us well and do not wish this new government well. And we are working to make sure that we don't end up leaving Afghanistan and just recreating all the conditions that brought us in there in the first place, which I guess is a way of saying we recognize that maybe we should have given that a little more thought 10 years ago, but 10 years ago was a different story.

It's a big challenge because Afghanistan is a huge country. It's a pretty wild country. It's not a country that's ever had a strong central government. So the

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kinds of solutions that work in, say, Bosnia or Kosovo, and work quite well, are not going to work at all in Afghanistan. So we will be there for a while and we'll be working hard at it. But I think we've accomplished a lot already.

**MR. HESS:** Shall we open it to questions?

**MR. KALB:** Yes, please.

**MR. HESS:** Let me just note that in our audience today, Mr. Secretary, we have the Jefferson Fellows. This is a program of the East-West Center in Honolulu, and these are distinguished journalists who have come here for a short period from India, Pakistan, China, Malaysia, Vietnam. I may have missed a few countries; forgive me, if I have. But it's a wonderful program. They're here, and maybe they'll ask some questions too. So—

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Looks like there's one in the middle—

**MR. HESS:** Okay.

Marvin, do you want to direct questions? There's a hand up in the middle.

**MR. KALB:** Yes, please. Right here.

**MR. HESS:** Oh, and please, when you ask your question—because all of this will be taped and will be, within 48 hours, on the Brookings website—www.brookings.edu—so please identify yourself and your affiliation.

**Q:** Hello. I'm Mari Pota (ph) from China. And I'm honored to be here as a Jefferson Fellow. And I'm also honored—I go to Harvard Kennedy School also.

**MR. KALB:** That's an excellent selection. (Laughter.)

What is your question?

**Q:** Yes. My question is for Mr. Wolfowitz.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Perhaps someone should ask you, Marvin! (Laughter.)

**Q:** President W. (sic) Bush made a statement, "America has the obligation to protect Taiwan." And he quotes, "Every Chinese must understand it." As a Chinese myself, I can't understand it. Could you please explain that?

**MR. KALB:** Okay, good question.

**Q:** Thank you.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I think the president has been very clear about our policy on Taiwan. We support a one-China policy. We do not support independence for Taiwan, but we also do not support an attempt to impose a solution on Taiwan by force. We think that a peaceful process is the only way to bring Taiwan and the Mainland together again. And, frankly, we believe that the sooner a peaceful approach is adopted, the sooner that solution can happen.

There is no intention, no desire to separate Taiwan from the Mainland or have an independent Taiwan. But I think an attempt to solve this problem by force would be a disaster for everybody.

**MR. KALB:** Yes, please? No, no. Just a moment.

**Q:** Good morning, Secretary—

5/28/2002

genuinely different system, that is as democratic as can be achieved; that
provides decency and freedom for Iraqi people. And by definition, I think that
means that we're not around picking new leaders.

MR. KALB: Yes, ma'am. I skipped you a moment ago. Yes, please.

Q: Thank you so much.

Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Lisa Sunaiki Chan (ph) with Broadcasting
Corporation of China. I was also a SAIS graduate in ('97 ?), when you were the
dean. So very nice meeting you today.

If I may, I would like to address my question with relating with U.S. relations
with China and Taiwan. In this March, you attended a defense seminar in
Florida and met with the Taiwanese defense secretary—defense minister
Tang. In your view, what is your position on the high-level military-to-military
exchange between Taiwan and the United States? Do you support Minister
Tang to visit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.? Thank you very much.

MR. KALB: Thank you. Thank you.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: I really can only repeat what I said before, which is, we
believe in One China policy. We believe in a peaceful solution to the
differences between China and Taiwan, and we believe that the security of
Taiwan contributes to that peaceful outcome.

But there is a lot more to the U.S.-China relationship than just this issue of
Taiwan. And I think we had a very good series of visits just a few weeks ago
from Vice President Hu Jintao. He came to the Pentagon, met with Secretary
Rumsfeld. We're looking forward to moving forward between China's military
and our military to develop closer relationships, better context. Obviously, there
was a setback last year after the EP-3 incident. But we'd like to rebuild those
ties and even deepen them, if possible.

MR. KALB: Thank you.

Yes, please.

Q: Yes. My name is Said Arikat from Al Quds newspaper.

Secretary Wolfowitz, in his op-ed column in today's New York Times, Thomas
Friedman says that, quote, "Over at the Pentagon, the view is that Yasser
Arafat is no different than Osama bin Laden and that other Arab leaders are
worthy only of contempt." He goes on to say the Pentagon sees the Israeli war
to crush Arafat as an extension of the war on terrorism and that the most we
can do today is conflict management.

Is that how you see things, sir? And how does that fit into your advocacy for an
Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a
viable Palestinian state last week? Thank you.

MR. WOLFOWITZ: No, it's not how I see things, and Tom Friedman didn't talk
to me, and I don't know who on Earth he was talking to, to come to those
conclusions. I mean, I've said it—said in my Monterrey speech, I've said on
other occasions—the president has said it, which is much more important—that
this conflict does not have a military solution; there has to be a political
solution. That political solution clearly is one that includes the end of the Israeli
occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state, and the recognition by the
Palestinians and the Arabs of Israel's right to exist within secure borders. I think
the single greatest obstacle to getting to that solution today is terrorism and

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Page 16 of 17

particularly the suicide bombings. I think if we could get statesmen with the kind of creative vision that Anwar Sadat had 25 years ago, we could really move forward.

**MR. KALB:** Do you see Arafat in that category?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** That, I'm willing to say, he clearly isn't. I mean—but Sadat was in a—unfortunately, in almost a class by himself. But we could use another one.

**MR. KALB:** Yes, please.

**Q:** Quinn Laurence (sp) with the BBC, the World. I'm wondering if the return of weapons inspectors of Iraq would necessarily preclude a U.S. military intervention there? And what is the U.S. casus belli against Iraq at the moment?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** You know, it's been, I guess, four years since the inspectors were kicked out of Iraq and, I think, closer to five years since there were effective inspections there. And even when they were at their most effective, it was a very difficult slog, and in fact under the leadership of Rolf Ekeus, who did as good a job as one could imagine, and then Richard Butler—I can't remember; I think it was under Ekeus—they were on the verge actually of saying they didn't think Iraq had biological weapons. And then Saddam Hussein's son-in-law defected with piles of documents. It turned out there was a lot of stuff around that they hadn't been able to find.

So it's a huge challenge now. You've had four or five years without inspections. There's no son-in-law in sight to defect. And in fact, after what happened to the last one, I doubt if there will be too many more. So this is a huge challenge. It's a big problem. I don't have an answer to it, but it is a big problem.

**Q:** Thank you, sir. I am visiting from India. And right now there's a potential for conflict in that part of the world, and we have your representative negotiating between India and Pakistan right now. How do you see as a permanent, long-lasting solution to the dispute that's going in that part of the world, as an optimum option of all the options? Thank you.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I guess rather than take your invitation to go into the long-term ultimate solution, it seems to me—though it's got to be addressed at some point; there are big problems there—I really believe strongly that what President Musharraf is trying to do in Pakistan is hugely important for all of us, including, I believe, in India; that Pakistan was a country heading into very deep trouble before September 11th. There were a lot of people there who I think said, "September 11th is a great thing, and let's figure out how we can help bin Laden." It was a very bold move on Musharraf's part to say, "This is not where I want Pakistan going. I'm prepared to cooperate with the United States in this effort to go after terrorists." And he has cooperated impressively. I think within his own country he's taken some very bold measures to try to get terrorism under control.

There's still more work to be done. But I think we all have a huge stake in that success. And if we can build on that success, that's the route to a longer-term solution.

**MR. KALB:** Do you see an imminent outbreak of conflict between Pakistan and

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Page 17 of 17

India?

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I sure—I hope not. I mean, there—we have been very concerned by the build-up of forces on both sides. But I think a war between those two countries would be a terrible mistake, and we are working very hard to prevent that.

**MR. KALB:** Last question, right there. Lynne.

**Q:** Lynne Joiner. (Laugs.) This morning's newspaper had a big article about increased money for the CIA, a new increase of money for the FBI. Today you have said that to really get at the roots of the terrorism and the bad image that the United States had we have a lot of work to do with the moderate Muslims. I would submit to you we have a lot of work to do with people all over the world, no matter what their cultural or religious background is—

**MR. KALB:** Please, the question.

**Q:** I don't see the United States putting its money where its mouth is in terms of those root causes of education and health, for example. And I wonder what the thinking is within this administration—you can't just keep talking about new weapons.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** I—(audio drops)—State Department money. But I think there is—there is, I know, well over a billion dollars, I think closer to $2 billion, in the supplemental request for the State Department for foreign assistance precisely to deal with some of the things that you're talking about. And no one says you can just do this with weapons.

You also, by the way, can't do it just by pouring money at things. When it comes to how do you build education systems, for example, it's—it is a challenge. I keep asking, in fact, about Afghanistan, can't we do more faster with hospitals and schools and roads. And I think we're doing a lot. It turns out the military moves a lot faster than the U.N. bureaucracy does. That's about all I can say. But those are very important things. We've got to put money into them, there is no question about it.

**MR. HESS:** Well, we promised that we would let the secretary get on to his next meeting at about this time. We have had, as one would always expect to have in a conversation with Paul Wolfowitz, a fascinating, interesting and civilized morning. We thank him very much.

**MR. WOLFOWITZ:** Thank you. (Applause.)

The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036

Telephone: (202) 797-6000 | Facsimile: (202) 797-6004 | E-mail: Brookings Info Comments on this Site

5/28/2002

Jessee Incao

From: Foreign Policy Research Institute [fpri@fpri.org]
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 8:16 PM
To: Henry Kissinger
Subject: George Shultz on Diplomacy Before & After 911

Foreign Policy Research Institute
A Catalyst for Ideas
www.fpri.org

JUN 13 2002

E-Notes
Distributed Exclusively via Fax & Email

THE WORK OF DIPLOMACY
by George P. Shultz

June 11, 2002

This is the text of a speech given by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz on the occasion of the dedication ceremony for the The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, on May 29, 2002, in Arlington, Virginia.

THE WORK OF DIPLOMACY

by George P. Shultz

Mr. Secretary, friends of the Department of State and Foreign Service: Today's ceremony, which links my name to this Institute and to the Foreign Service, is an honor beyond anything I ever imagined. I take it as a profound compliment not only from the wonderful colleagues with whom I served in the State Department, but also from that long line of strong and creative men and women who have served our country's diplomacy across the generations. I am humbly grateful for the tribute you offer me today.

I came into office as Secretary of State with a war going on in the Middle East and a bigger war -- the Cold War -- keeping the world in turmoil and keeping me busy to an extent I could hardly have imagined.

When I answered President Ronald Reagan's call to service, I also brought to the job a way of thinking developed from years of experience in government, business, and universities. I knew I would be dealing with many crises on a day-to-day basis and that for American foreign policy to succeed over time, I would have to pay attention to long-term issues. But my experience also taught me that to succeed in these efforts, I would need the help and support of the people who were devoting their careers to the understanding and conduct of diplomacy. So I would try to strengthen the institution, to make the best use of its people, to pay attention to their careers and their aspirations to serve their country. I wanted to leave the Department of State and the Foreign Service in better shape than I found them.

In the process, I learned a few things. The Foreign Service is the custodian of our country's diplomatic experience in the world: not theories or abstractions but actual experience. Recognizing the importance of experience, I decided, as Secretary of State, to pull together a collection of books about American diplomacy. That collection is still up there in Colin Powell's office. (And I know from my tenure in that office that he doesn't have time to read those books.) The Foreign Service Institute

should be the center for such works that record our nation's diplomatic experience: ideas written down that get into people's heads and can make a practical difference.

The conduct of diplomacy requires a clear understanding of what is happening and the ability to make a clear record of it and report it honestly and in depth. This may seem obvious and easy. It is not: it requires exceptional intellectual skills and qualities of character and discipline. As former Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan describes, "The true diplomatist [is] aware of how much subsequently depends on what clearly can be established to have taken place. If it seems simple in the archives, try it in the maelstrom."

Fast-moving media coverage, impressive though it may often be, is almost inevitably focused on the newsworthy. The United States must conduct diplomacy on a global scale, clearly dependent on careful reporting from posts around the world and interpretations by people on the ground who speak the language and understand cultural nuances. And, of course, results of discussions need to be written down immediately. Memories are all too often faulty or self-serving.

So we need to encourage careful record-keeping and teach and nurture that skill in the foreign service. This is no mere technical matter; in these times it takes courage, and issues of national interest may be at stake. Even in my time, if a cable came in from an ambassador with a highly critical or sensitive set of observations about the country where the ambassador was stationed, the existence of this cable would often become the subject of rumor. Relentless demands for that cable would almost inevitably follow. I fought those pressures because the release of such a cable would mean, of course, that the ambassador's role would be diminished, sometimes even ended. Nonetheless, the pulling- and-hauling has an impact. Candor in the cables inevitably suffers. Reliance on telephone diplomacy increases, with all its imprecision, vulnerability to misunderstanding, and loss to the vital diplomatic record.

More broadly in our society, whether in business or government, there is now a widespread and conscious reluctance to create records -- and a disposition to destroy them if made. What I worry about is our ability to conduct our affairs with precision and to portray history accurately if such records are not at hand and the statesman tries to rely on his or her own memory, which invariably is flawed in significant ways. A living history requires tools of remembrance. Moreover, so much of what we do today depends upon our understanding of the past. Each generation creates the record of the past for succeeding generations. If we lose that past, we are also going to lose an important key to the future. So, members of the Foreign Service, keep records.

The ability to comprehend other cultures must be central to our diplomacy. This is an area of comparative advantage for the Foreign Service. Even in this age of globalizing influences, we are finding that traditional cultures not only continue to exist but in many places are gaining greater influence. Sometimes they serve a useful role as ballast in the rough weather of globalization. At other times, they are used -- sometimes badly misused -- in the interests of some cause or grievance. I do not need to tell you that those who speak the local language have a greater sensitivity to cultural variations, a greater ability to comprehend mood and nuance, and a heightened capacity to convey those realities back to Washington. So the Foreign Service Institute's world-class capacity to teach language skills must be nourished and used.

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We also know that language study is not enough. The field of area studies, once regarded as essential but later disparaged, needs to be given new life. When I was a dean at the University of Chicago, I developed a strong point of view about the value of experience. Yes, experience is a great teacher. Formal education should develop the ability to learn from that experience. We all have seen instances where four or five people share an experience but only one or two of them learn much from it. For the others, that experience might as well never have happened. A key objective for the Foreign Service Institute is to provide our people with the language, analytical, and area skills they need in order to be the ones best able to learn from their experiences out there in the world.

America's need for a seasoned Foreign Service and the intelligent management of Foreign Service careers are inextricably bound together. Half of the career service will retire in the next six years. State and other departments -- with the exception of the Department of Defense -- have never handled the problem of intake well. Secretary Powell tells me that applications for the Foreign Service -- including lots of strong minority candidates -- are two to three times what they were in recent years, so here's a chance to get it right. Good training is essential
-- at the beginning and throughout a productive career. The Foreign Service Institute provides a real advantage, as a place where careers can be developed, enhanced through training, and provided with substantive depth. Then there is career structure, particularly the length of the Foreign Service career. We need to preserve access to senior positions, so that our finest people do not resign or retire to start their next careers just when they are coming into the peak years of performance at the top of the Service.

Careers in the Foreign Service have their risks. You can get shot at. On opposite walls of the entry hall to the Main State Building are two lists of names of officers killed in the line of duty, covering the years 1780 to 2002.
We lost 209 officers. In the first 187 years of our history, we lost 83 officers. In the most recent 35 years, we have lost 126. The losses per year now are almost nine times as great as in earlier times.

All too many of those casualties were the result of acts of terror, a reality that today confronts us in more urgent terms and in greater magnitude than ever before. I want to say a few words about this acute problem, one on which I worked hard and endured the frustrations and agonies that come with death and destruction. I remember so well flying back from Pakistan on August 21, 1988, with the remains of a talented and beloved Foreign Service Officer, Ambassador Arnie Raphel. That was a sad and moving day.

September 11 was a riveting wake-up call for the people of America. Stunned and horrified, we saw in a flash our vulnerability. As we reacted, we also saw our strengths and we experienced a renewal of patriotism and national pride.
We deepened our realization of how closely intertwined our fortunes are with developments elsewhere, sometimes far away culturally as well as geographically.

That attack was also a transforming event here and in many places throughout the world in attitudes toward terrorism. For decades, terrorism has been all too frequent, mostly in the Middle East, but also in Europe and Asia, often aimed at Americans. We saw our share of it in the 1980s, when I was in office. The pace picked up in the 1990s, by which time the capabilities and intentions of Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network were well known. I said in 1984, "We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond." But for whatever reasons, we did not respond effectively during

3

these past two decades. Face it: the lack of effective
response encourages terrorism, not the other way around.

But now, opinion has changed. When, in that same 1984
speech, following terrorist attacks on our embassy and on the Marine barracks in
Beirut and the IRA effort to blow up

Margaret Thatcher in Brighton, I called for "active
prevention, preemption, and retaliation," and said we "must
be willing to use military force," I was disowned and dismissed by official
Washington and on leading editorial

pages. (After I had a chance to go over my thinking
carefully with President Reagan, he said he agreed with me.)

By contrast, we all cheered -- I at the top of my voice -- when Secretary of Defense
Don Rumsfeld said on the Jim Lehrer NewsHour on February 4 of this year:

"If you think about it, we have no choice. A terrorist can attack at any time at any
place using a range of techniques. It is physically impossible to defend at every time in
every location against every conceivable technique of terrorism. Therefore, if your goal
is to stop it, you cannot stop it by
defense. You can only stop it by taking the battle to the
terrorists, where they are and going after them."

"When it's something like smallpox or anthrax or a chemical weapon or the radiation
weapon or killing thousands of people at the World Trade [Center], then you
say to yourself, 'Well, if we can't stop terrorists at every location of every
technique at every moment of the day or night, what must we do -- just sit here and
take the blows

like the World Trade [Center], take the blows that
biological weapons would pose to us?' The answer is 'No.' You have a responsibility to
defend your country. Everyone in the world knows -- even the UN Charter provides for
--

the right of self-defense. And the only self-defense, the
only effective way to defend, is to take the battle to where
the terrorists are. They are planning, they are plotting,
they have trained thousands of terrorists very well, and we have no choice but to find
those people and root them out, as the president said, and stop them from doing what
they're doing and stop countries from harboring them."

So preemption with military force is now an operative idea,
with wide support. That is essential. But continuing
threats are all too real, so we must not flag or be distracted in our efforts
to end the use of this terrible and unacceptable weapon: terrorism.

President Bush has given us the concepts we need. This is a war, not a matter of law
enforcement. States that support terror are as guilty as the terrorists. They are in
the crosshairs, and the principle of state accountability is
being established. Our goal is not primarily to punish and
retaliate but to prevent acts of terror through intelligence that enables us to preempt
and ultimately to eliminate the

source. These are big and far-reaching ideas that must be
kept front and center: this is a war; states must be held accountable. We are calling
on states to step up to their internal responsibilities to end any terrorist
presence, while saying also that we reserve, within the framework of our right to self-
defense, the right to preempt terrorist

threats within a state's borders. Not just hot pursuit:
hot preemption. The juxtaposition of these ideas calls for
sophisticated diplomacy, clear intelligence, and the will to act with the courage of our
convictions.

This war is of worldwide dimensions and must be fought on many fronts. I will identify
six of them.

First, we have the front of the hinterlands, those places around the world where
states have failed or where no state

authority reaches. In these places, terrorists find
sanctuary where they can train and plan and can emerge to

4

strike again. Afghanistan was the main such area, but it's not the only place. You can name them as well as I, and you need more than the fingers on your two hands. We have conducted a brilliant campaign on the Afghanistan front. Afghanistan cannot now serve as a terrorist refuge and staging area. But an enormous task remains to be completed there. The fires still burn. A state must be built from the ground up and attain the legitimacy and authority to prevent the country from sliding back into terrorist hands.

Another front is in Europe and, to a degree, in our own country. In the liberal, open, welcoming democracies of the West, terrorists have been able to establish themselves, move about easily, communicate and develop their plans with little interference from the authorities, particularly in many European countries. The terrorists know that they can enjoy and employ the freedoms offered by the democratic West to plan the destruction of our liberal institutions and societies. This, too, is a matter of making the state -- the democratic state -- effective and accountable. We in the democratic West have to get ourselves in order. We must enhance and better coordinate our investigative capabilities. We must change our mind-set. Our task is to prevent criminal acts, not just catch and punish after the damage is done. Through intensive intelligence-sharing and cooperative police work, the war on this front can and must be fought effectively -- and within the framework of protective civil rights and proper judicial procedures.

Another front that needs our attention is that of the regimes of Arab and Islamic countries. Over the years, in the knowledge that many of the terrorists seek their overthrow above all else, these regimes have, each in its own way, made their deals with the terrorists. They have paid them off, propagandized them to focus on external enemies, or sought to use them to build up the religious legitimacy of those regimes. They have created a monster. They may have bought some time for themselves, but they are sealing their own doom if they keep on this path. Since September 11, some of them have come to their senses. These regimes have to take responsibility as states and they must be held accountable. They have to stop playing the double game. They should be encouraged and supported if they work seriously to put their states and societies on the right track. But I have to say, when money is collected to reward the families of suicide bombers, that is support for terrorism. There is no other way to describe it.

We must also look at the front where terrorists are pushing out to radicalize countries that previously had escaped the terrorist scourge. Most prominent and crucial here is Indonesia, where Jihadists have in the last several years become more visible, active, and intimidating to the population. In the southern islands of the Philippines, terrorists have become more daring and outrageous in their hostage-taking and murders year by year. In Singapore, the discovery of a sophisticated Al-Qaeda network shocked everyone, because we consider Singapore to be one of the most tightly run states in the world. Jihadist terrorism no doubt has plans for the new countries of central Asia, and for China as well.

Kashmir presents compelling issues, especially since nuclear weapons lurk in the background. The outline of a potential settlement is much easier to identify than is the process by which to get there. As elsewhere, the starting point is to hit hard against terrorism as the method of influencing policy on any side of the problem.

And now we come to the front of the Israelis and Palestinians, who confront each other violently and whose conflict captures attention virtually throughout the world. We can see that terrorist extremists have gotten their hands around the throat of the Palestinian movement. Those hands need to be wrenched away so that people with determined but constructive attitudes can emerge to take over leadership in a restructured Palestinian Authority. Strength and

5

diplomacy must go hand in hand: fight terrorism relentlessly even as negotiations for peace get started again. We now have some developments to work with, but nothing comes easily.

I offer three thoughts.

First, in Negotiation 101, we teach a negotiator to study his opposition. You want counterparts capable of taking "yes" for an answer and of delivering on tough commitments. Saudi Arabia has led Arab states into an initiative on behalf of the Palestinians. For the first time since King Hussein bowed out in 1988, states on the Arab side are involved. So I welcome the President's and the Secretary's effort to move this initiative forward and bring this potentially important measure of state-based competence to the negotiating table. Realists recognize that progress will only come with emerging experience of commitments that are not only made but kept. Whatever the vision of a final settlement, that vision will come into being through a step-by-step process.

Second, declare a commitment to an eventual Palestinian state up front. But make clear that a proclamation does not create a functioning state. Patterns of government must be created and the legitimacy of leaders established so that properly made sovereign decisions are effective, and means of accountability for policy decisions and for handling funds are instituted. If a Palestinian state were to be established without a far-reaching reform of the present Palestinian Authority, it would be a failed state at birth. And just as a Palestinian state can hardly even begin to function effectively where citizens cannot move about from one urban center to another, so the state of Israel cannot agree to anything other than its own secure, defensible, and internationally recognized borders.

Third, realize that transformation in this tiny area is a necessity. Palestinians and others in the region now lead miserable lives without the light of hope for a better future. Israelis continue to live within the lethal environment of a hostile neighborhood. A major effort is imperative to improve the quality of life in the region: security, water, education, health, the opportunity to create the jobs on which standards of living depend. Help in the form of private as well a public initiatives is critically needed. So there is lots of work to do.

Finally there is the most important problem of all -- what is in the minds of the world's people. There are still those who profess not to know the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The difference is clear. The definition of terrorism is simple and unmistakable. Terrorists use random violence on as large a scale as possible against civilian populations to make their points or get their way. Anyone who claims to be confused at this point in history will have to face up to being known as an apologist for terrorism.

We have a war to win. Every tool available must be used aggressively. The message of the Great Seal of our Republic is front and center once more. The eagle faces the olive branches to show that the United States always seeks peace, but holds onto the arrows to show that the United States understands that, if we are to be effective in seeking peace, we must be strong. The message comes from the earliest days of our Republic: strength and diplomacy go together.

The end of World War II brought a compelling opportunity to put in place a new vision of how the world would work. Looking back at the remarkably creative response to that opportunity, we see Foreign Service officers -- George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, Foy Kohler, and others, notably Paul Nitze -- as well as the soldier-statesman of that time, George C. Marshall, developing the ideas and the institutions that shaped the way one American generation after another engaged the world during the dangerous Cold

6

War years. Once again, with the huge changes in world affairs since those days, punctuated by the trauma of September 11 and the shifts in attitude toward state accountability and rights to preemption, the times demand a new burst of creativity and sustained efforts to achieve needed transformation. Now the ball is in the hands of a new generation of Foreign Service Officers, under Colin Powell, today's distinguished soldier-statesman, able to work with a president, George W. Bush, who is decisive, bold, and resolute.

So I salute the members of the Foreign Service and this center for learning the practice of diplomacy. We are lucky that you and your leaders are strong, experienced, and wise. You have lots of work to do.

Let me conclude with a story from my time in office. When an ambassador had made it through the hurdles of nomination and confirmation, I invited him or her to my office and said, "Before you can leave, you have one more test. Go over to that globe and show me that you can identify your country." Without exception, the ambassador-to-be spun the globe and located the country to which he would be posted.

One day, the late Mike Mansfield, already many years our ambassador to Japan and an old friend from my previous times in the cabinet, came in for a visit just before he was to return to Tokyo. I told him about my little test and said, "Mike, how about you?" He and I laughed, and he went to the globe. Mike put his hand on the United States and said, "Here's my country."

In this setting dedicated to representation, always remember Mike's words. Be proud to be a citizen, let alone a representative, of the greatest country ever, the United States of America.

You may forward this email as you like provided that you send it in its entirety and attribute it to the Foreign Policy Research Institute. If you post it on a mailing list, please contact FPRI with the name, location, purpose, and number of recipients of the mailing list.

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For information, contact Alan Luxenberg at 215-732-3774, ext. 105 or email fpri@fpri.org or visit us at www.fpri.org

7

DATE

JUN 13 2002

CORR. FILE Shultz, George

ACTION: JSR ARB DG SSM
FG TC JI (RAJ) LE

SUBJ. FILE

CROSS REF.

COMMENTS:

DC OFFICE:
Jody/Christie/Jennifer

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED

Jessee Incao

JUN 13 2002

June 11, 2002

THE WORK OF DIPLOMACY

by George P. Shultz

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But now, opinion has changed. When, in that same 1984
speech, following terrorist attacks on our embassy and on the Marine barracks in
Beirut and the IRA effort to blow up
Margaret Thatcher in Brighton, I called for "active
prevention, preemption, and retaliation," and said we "must
be willing to use military force," I was disowned and dismissed by official
Washington and on leading editorial
pages. (After I had a chance to go over my thinking
carefully with President Reagan, he said he agreed with me.)

President Bush has given us the concepts we need. This is a war, not a matter of law enforcement. States that support terror are as guilty as the terrorists. They are in the crosshairs, and the principle of state accountability is being established. Our goal is not primarily to punish and retaliate but to prevent acts of terror through intelligence that enables us to preempt and ultimately to eliminate the source. These are big and far-reaching ideas that must be kept front and center: this is a war; states must be held accountable. We are calling on states to step up to their internal responsibilities to end any terrorist presence, while saying also that we reserve, within the framework of our right to self-defense, the right to preempt terrorist threats within a state's borders. Not just hot pursuit: hot preemption. The juxtaposition of these ideas calls for sophisticated diplomacy, clear intelligence, and the will to act with the courage of our convictions.

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I offer three thoughts.

Third, realize that transformation in this tiny area is a necessity. Palestinians and others in the region now lead miserable lives without the light of hope for a better future. Israelis continue to live within the lethal environment of a hostile neighborhood. A major effort is imperative to improve the quality of life in the region: security, water, education, health, the opportunity to create the jobs on which standards of living depend. Help in the form of private as well as public initiatives is critically needed. So there is lots of work to do.

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7

DATE

AUG 2 6 2002

CORR. FILE Shultz, George

ACTION:

JSR ARB DG SSM

DK TC JI RAJ

SUBJ. FILE

CROSS REF.

COMMENTS:

DC OFFICE:

Jody / Christie / Lisa

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED

Princeton University

James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions

Robert P. George
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence
Director

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Ave, 26th floor
New York, NY 10022

AUG 2 6 2002

August 16, 2002

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am enclosing a copy of the address delivered by the Honorable George P. Shultz '42 on May 30th when he accepted the John Witherspoon Medal for Distinguished Statesmanship of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University.

All of us at the James Madison Program are grateful to you for joining us on that very special evening at the Union League Club in New York City to honor George P. Shultz.

Robert P. George
McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence
Director, James Madison Program

Encl.

Department of Politics Princeton, NJ 08544-1012

Telephone: 609-258-0590 Facsimile: 609-258-6837 Email: rgeorge@princeton.edu

PRINCETON IN THE NATION'S SERVICE

The Honorable George P. Shultz

I am deeply honored by this award, named for John Witherspoon and sponsored by Princeton's program named for his student, James Madison. What an impressive pair of Princetonians, appropriately associated with a program dedicated to "the pursuit of excellence in constitutional law and political thought" and training rising generations for the "responsibilities of leadership."

First, a few words on Witherspoon, Princeton's president for twenty-five truly formative years. He was the Presbyterian minister who shifted the mission of our college from training ministers to preparing men for leadership and with an orientation to public service. His mailing list included James Madison, John Adams, Benjamin Rush, and George Washington. He was deeply involved in the work of the Continental Congress and the efforts to create and ratify our Constitution.

1

He argued that political freedom would aid reli-
gious freedom but that “religion would not be secure
until it was officially separated from the state.”

He argued that governmental scope and structure
must reflect the reality of sin and vice as the natural
drift of every human being. What followed was an ar-
gument for limited government – to limit the possi-
bilities for abuse of power – and for balanced and com-
peting branches of government.

His ideas are as fresh today as they were over 200
years ago. Another Princetonian, Professor Bernard
Lewis, argues in his provocative *What Went Wrong?* that
domination of the state by religion is one reason why
the world of Islam has fallen so far behind, a sort of
reverse validation of Witherspoon's position and our
own country's preoccupation with the separation of
church and state.

President Witherspoon's advocacy of public service resonates today as we struggle with the challenges of terrorism. Let me reflect with you on one conceptual aspect of what President Bush forcefully and properly has called it, a war on terrorism.

The President has declared war on terrorists and
the states that harbor them. No place to hide. This

2

idea underlines the importance of the sovereign na-
tion-state, an entity with the capacity to govern and
therefore to be responsible for what takes place within
its borders. And this emphasis on the sovereign state
dramatizes a shift of concept in international relations
perceptively under way today.

The monstrous acts of Al Qaeda have now made
the principle of state accountability the law of nations.
After the bombings of our embassies in 1998, the
United Nations Security Council stressed "that every
Member State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts
in another State or acquiescing in organized activities
within its territory directed towards the commission
of such acts...." [Res. 1189] On December 29, 2000,
the Council strongly condemned "the continuing use
of the areas of Afghanistan under the control of the
Afghan faction known as Taliban... for the sheltering
and training of terrorists and planning of terrorist
acts..." [Res. 1333]. Then, after September 11, 2001,
the Council accepted the position pressed by the United
States and Great Britain recognizing the inherent right
of self-defense, stressing "that those responsible for aid-
ing, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, orga-
nizers and sponsors of these acts will be held account-

3

able,” reaffirming that every state is duty-bound to refrain from assisting terrorists or acquiescing in their activities. [Res. 1368 & 1373]

So the legal basis for the principle of state accountability is clear, and the right of self-defense is acknowledged as an appropriate basis for its enforcement. Now actions must make that principle a reality.

So the war to hold terrorists accountable for their evil acts and to hold states accountable for acts of terror that originate within their borders compels us to look closely at the foundation of order and progress in the world.

We live in an international system of states, a system that originated over three hundred years ago. The idea of the state won out over other ideas about how to organize political life because the state gave people a sense of identity, because it provided a framework for individual freedom and economic progress, and because states over time proved able to cooperate with each other for peace and mutual benefit.

The state has made its way in the world by beating back one challenge after another. In our time, the state has been challenged by global currents that have eroded its authority. Information, money, and migrants move

4

across borders in ways far beyond the traditional means of state control. Non-state entities encroach upon state responsibilities from below while international organizations draw sovereign state powers from above. Too often, nation-states have themselves taken the easy way out of a problem: blame globalization, punt to the U.N., blame the U.N. for any misfortune, and blame "hot money" for problems originating in poor national governance. All this amounts to defining multilateralism as participation in – sometimes virtual abdication to – international organizations and loose understandings.

As states have appeared weaker, terrorists have moved in on them. Many states in response, and in the false hope of buying time or protection, have taken damaging actions that only further diminish their own authority and legitimacy. States in every part of the world have avoided accountability when it comes to terrorism, and now we are paying a heavy price.

Every deal between states and terrorists is an abdication of state accountability to its citizens. If these deals are not reversed, the states that make them and ultimately the international system of states will not survive. That is why the war on terrorism is of unsurpassed importance.

5

For all the realities of globalization that have drained authority from the state, no other basic entity of international life can replace it. The state is all we have as a means of ordering our international existence. Other forms may challenge, but none can replace it in its most important function: the state is the indispensable institution for achieving representative government and for protecting individual rights.

So, if the pendulum has swung away from the sovereign state in past decades, it is long past time to swing it back toward the sovereign state, to hold states responsible and to help strengthen states against our common enemy, terrorism. For make no mistake: terrorism is the enemy of the state, out to destroy the state or to commandeer it for its evil purposes.

As we swing the pendulum back toward support for state responsibility, we must also think out the implications of the concepts we are advocating. Certainly, these big and far-reaching ideas must be kept front and center: this is a war; states must be held accountable. We are calling on states to step up to their internal responsibilities to end any terrorist presence, while saying also that we reserve, within the framework of our right to self-defense, the right to preempt terrorist threats within a state's borders.

6

The juxtaposition of these ideas calls for sophisticated diplomacy, clear intelligence, and the will to act with the courage of our convictions. I also issue a call to you students of government to lead us through this conceptual thicket.

If you use the ideas of John Witherspoon and James Madison, you will be better for it.

Again, thank you for this honor and for keeping aloft the banner of Princeton in the Nation's Service.

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John Witherspoon was a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a leading member of the Continental Congress, and sixth president of Princeton University. He was described by John Adams as "as high a Son of Liberty, as any Man in America." As a clergyman, Benjamin Rush described his sermons as "loaded with good sense" and delivered in a manner that was "solemn and graceful." A teacher of many great patriots, John Witherspoon's students at Princeton University included James Madison.

The John Witherspoon Medal for Distinguished Statesmanship honors persons with distinguished service in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of government. Recipients of the medal possess qualities of character that, in the opinion of the Advisory Council, would be recognized by the American founders as marks of greatness. Fundamental to the greatness of a statesman is a demonstrated commitment to work in the service of others. In Witherspoon's words, which are inscribed on the Witherspoon medal, "Love to others, sincere and active, is the sum of our duty." Recipients of the John Witherspoon medal fulfill this duty to an exemplary degree, while exercising good judgment, demonstrating strong leadership and upholding American ideals and institutions.

The John Witherspoon Medal for Distinguished Statesmanship is awarded on a nonpartisan basis. The award of the medal is an occasion for Princeton alumni and friends to celebrate the achievements of a distinguished statesman whose example is to be emulated by others, particularly by those who are leaders, or who strive to be leaders, in their fields.

James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions
Princeton University

The James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions is dedicated to the pursuit of scholarly excellence in constitutional law and political thought. Its mission is to promote a rigorous engagement of ideas for the purpose of advancing civic education in the academy. The Program also promotes a greater appreciation of the canon of the Western tradition and explores the application of fundamental principles to modern problems.

James Madison, a graduate of Princeton University, was the principal architect of the Constitution and fourth President of the United States. In his honor, the James Madison Program builds upon Princeton's traditional strengths in public law and jurisprudence. This tradition goes back to Woodrow Wilson, the first McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence in the Department of Politics, and has been carried on with great distinction by his successors, Edward S. Corwin, Alpheus T. Madison, and Walter F. Murphy. These distinguished scholars dedicated themselves to the rigorous philosophical and social scientific study of constitutional law and related subjects.

The James Madison Program supports the research of visiting fellows, hosts conferences and seminars, bestows prizes and awards, develops courses and programs for undergraduates and alumni, supports faculty and graduate research, and offers lectures by notable intellectuals and public figures. Through the award of the John Witherspoon medal, the Program seeks to teach, by the example of an outstanding statesman, the excellences needed in citizens and public officials alike to sustain America's experiment in ordered liberty.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear George:

Although we have spoken on the telephone, I wanted to tell you
again how sorry I am for not having responded to you sooner
about Villa Cypress. I was absolutely convinced I had written
you before Christmas to explain that Nancy and I wouldn't be
able to keep our date for the February 15-17 weekend. But
when a check of the files revealed no copy of a letter, and a call
by my office to yours while I was in India confirmed that you
had never received a response, I can only conclude that I must
be losing my mind!

Needless to say, I am mortified. You and Charlotte have every
right to think me beyond the pale, and when I start sending
imaginary letters I begin to agree. But in spite of my lapse, I
wanted you to know how much we appreciated the invitation
and how disappointed both Nancy and I are that we will miss
being with you all. I know we will be missing a wonderful
weekend. However, with my already impossible mid-February
schedule, a flight to California right at that time would be more
than any sane person should even have contemplated.

The Honorable
George P. Shultz
50 Beale Street
San Francisco, CA 94105

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

JAN-23-2002 12:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248

December 17, 2001

TO: HAK
FROM: Christie
RE: Various Questions & Invitations

1) **Copenhagen** - Amb. Bernstein's office said they are still awaiting the official notification of the date change to March 14, but ask if you would still be interested in doing something in Copenhagen Feb. 25-26, even if you won't be participating in the Congress of Vienna Exhibition. Bernstein would still love to host a dinner for you and they offered to arrange a public speaking opportunity with the Danish Foreign Policy Society. They ask what your fee would be.

Forget it; not going to Copenhagen ✓ Prefer __________

2) **EEF Berlin** - They would like to confirm your speaking on June 5 @ lunch, which you had suggested as an option. You would then leave after lunch via Bosch to fly to Strasbourg in time for their opening dinner.

**Your schedule:**

Bilderberg - over Sunday@ lunch, June 2

Monday, June 3 - to Berlin? (not attending G. Ford Found. annual mtg)?

Tuesday, June 4 - HAK skipping MT&R's board meeting in NY

Wednesday, June 5-Friday afternoon, June 7 - Bosch in Strasbourg

Fine; confirm I'll speak in Berlin on June 5 @ lunch ✓ early

Prefer __________

3) **Berlin book publicity** - will you want some time while in Berlin to offer Propyläen Verlag for publicity of DANFP?

Yes, offer Christian Seeger June 4 (can skip out of EEF) __________

Prefer __________

4) **Shultz' Villa Cypress Weekend** - they invite you & NK to join the Milton Friedmans, Walt Wristons, Gerhard Caspers, Gary Beckers and Dick Kovacevichs on the Monterey peninsula starting with dinner Friday, Feb. 15 through lunch on Sunday, Feb. 17.

**NOTE:** Orthopaedists in Dallas, Thursday, Feb. 14, 11:00-12:30 (too early to fly to California)

Can't go; HAK will talk to Shultz __________ draft warm regret for HAK signature ✓

Prefer __________

JAN-23-2002 12:57

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.03

January 9, 2002

TO: HAK
FROM: Christie
RE: Trip Updates Before You Leave

1) Andrew Roberts - I have emailed him about changing to 11:30 (since he is religious about checking it) and will call him if I don't hear tomorrow morning.

2) India:

Ashley Tellis for Blackwill said he will talk to Amit Mitra of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), as he knows him well and trusts him. Tellis thinks your best bet for an extra meeting would be a small/manageable group set up by Mitra for informal conversation but without the press. If Tellis is convinced Mitra will pull together a group you will NOT have already met, he will advise you to do this. All can be discussed and decided upon once you get there on Sunday. He understands you are not seeking and would rather avoid allot of press exposure.

He or Blackwill also plan to discuss with you one or 2 one-on-one tv interview requests they have received. Taping could be done at the Residence. They do not think you should probably do the CNBC India interview as they have 2 in mind they think are better and with broader exposure. Again, deciding Sunday before Udaipur is plenty of time to set them up for Thursday.

You can also decide Sunday which Thursday dinner you want to attend. The CII dinner by Bharat Ram will be at his farm and, while it will include the delegation, he is inviting 20 or so other major Indian businessmen.

For the Thursday Delhi lunch with younger Cabinet members, Blackwill thinks you should attend. While it will also include the delegation, 3 Ministers will attend and everyone will be seated a 1 large table of ca. 30, so the Amb. thinks it would be interesting and useful. The rest of the day Thursday is without the delegation, with the possible exception of the dinner by Ram.

India sounds very well in hand.

3) March 5 ACF DC Program - you asked today if the reporters panel could be moved from 5:00-6:30 to the morning so you could attend AND get back to NY that afternoon for the ContriGroup dinner. They cannot move as it is set, open to the public and to be followed by a VIP cocktail reception (plus they set it in the evening for better coverage). You do not yet have a role in this discussion, but if you were able to attend, they were planning to have you

01-09-02 20:44 TO:

FROM:212 753 7248 P.02

JAN-23-2002 12:58

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.06

DEC 10 2001

George P. Shultz

Fifty Beale Street
San Francisco, CA 94105

November 16, 2001

Dear Henry:

When you were here ! mentioned our annual weekend at Villa
Cypress, the Bechtel house on the Monterey Peninsula. Our weekend
is planned for February 15 – 17, 2002. We gather for dinner on Friday
and go through to lunch on Sunday.

Other guests include:

Milton and Rose Friedman

Walt and Kathy Wriston

Gerhard and Regina Casper

Gary and Guity Becker

Dick and Mary Jo Kovacevich

Please let me know as soon as you can whether you and Nancy can
join us.

Charlotte joins me in sending you our warm personal regards.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
River House Apartment #6-E
435 East 52nd Street
New York, NY 10022.

TOTAL P.06