Goodpaster

Page: General comment:

The trouble on the publicity with these public statements, like
the Gaither report, the tendency is to give the impression that we are at
a great disadvantage and continue to exist only by the sufferance of the
Russians. I don't think this report gives that feeling. Should make
the point that it is the opposite. For a period of years Soviets were behind us,
and that what we are trying to do now is find solutions for the problem
that will face us two years from now. Disavow idea we are at a
disadvantage. We've got advantage but we are drawing behind and we
must now get into the business of what we are going to do a few years
from now.

KLINE:

Should be some reference to Russian competence in industrail
science in addition to frequent references to their progress in
military technology.

GENERAL

BERLE: Has given one important paragraph to HAK. Feels NAR ought not to be in a position where what is said can be construed as sabre rattling, or containing threats. People might pick out of it as it now reads. By adding a sentence can get all the punch you need.

II - Report
December 24, 1957

FOREWORD

The Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund is an
attempt to assess the problems and opportunities which are likely to
confront America over the next decade.

As the 20th century nears the end of its sixth decade, America
confronts a world in swift and often turbulent change. Both within our
borders and beyond, enormous transformations -- in human aspirations, in
the structure of society, in economic development, in scientific knowledge --
are reshaping the pattern of existence at a speed without parallel in
history. The recurrent shock of our age is the realization that concepts
and patterns of action of a more secure past no longer have this accustomed
relevance.

We live in a period which demands constant choice. But choice
without purpose leads to paralysis or to fitful and erratic behavior. And
power without a sense of direction may drain life of its meaning if it does
not destroy humanity altogether. Our problems, therefore, require for
their solution not only great effort and skill, but even more importantly
great conviction. And our opportunities will reflect above all in the
boldness and vision with which we face the future.

II - Report

December 24, 1957

- ii -

This report on national security deals primarily with the tangible aspects of power. It is the effort of only one of seven subpanels. The others deal with United States international objectives, foreign economic policy, domestic economic and social objectives, education and manpower, the democratic process and the moral framework of national purpose.

This alone indicates that security was only one of our concerns. While it is the most urgent, we do not consider it the most important. We are concerned with national security because we **must** be. We are concerned with more positive tasks because we **want** to be. Security defines our necessities. Our other panels will deal with our hopes.

Nevertheless we consider it appropriate to launch this project with a report on the national security. For while power cannot by itself supply an answer to the challenge of the future, it offers the prospect that there **will** be a future. A people preoccupied as ours is with the tasks of peace is always in danger of confusing its aspirations with reality, of refusing to believe that there may be states which prefer victory to peace.

Because we would prefer to dedicate ourselves to tasks of construction, we need constantly to be reminded that we are in great peril and that we cannot substitute our preferences for our duty.

II - Report

December 24, 1957

- iii -

We must strike a fine balance between vigilance and conciliation, prepared to use force to defend freedom but wary not to let force become an end in itself. Power can only give us security against immediate dangers. In the long run, our security resides in the principles for which we stand and in the confidence which we inspire.

Each of the members of this overall Panel has also served on one of the subpanels. We have been meeting since November 1956. Obviously we are most familiar with the subpanels on which we have served. But we have heard periodic reports from all other groups. In particular, we have considered the draft of this report at various stages of preparation and we have gone over the final draft in full committee. Not every member of our group necessarily endorses every detail in this report. But we have approved its philosophy and we strongly urge implementation of its recommendations.

This report concludes that we can afford what has to be done to assure our security; indeed that we cannot afford less. We feel that we can achieve military power while preserving and expanding other elements of our strength, such as health, education and economic growth. We recognize that this will require great exertion. To say that our institutional structure does not lend itself to such efforts merely reminds us that the

II - Report

December 24, 1957

-iv-

leadership of a democracy is a more exacting task than the direction of
a police state, but also that the power which is generated by the voluntary
effort of a free people cannot be equalled by the reluctant compliance of
a subject nation.

NAMES

II - Report
December 22, 1957

A WORD BY THE PANEL

This Report is the result of a group effort by Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although not every member subscribes to every detail, it reflects our substantial agreement.

Starting in the fall of 1956, we were charged with exploring the military aspect of the United States' security problem, the strategies most likely to achieve our security and the challenges in this field which may face the country during the next ten to fifteen years. We have had the benefit of specially prepared papers. We have heard testimony of numerous experts in relevant security areas. We have sought to make our report as specific as possible, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they become critical. On the other hand, too much of the raw material of our consideration will be shaped by events in science and human affairs which have yet to happen for us to have attempted to blueprint every detail of our military posture.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U. S. security policies and operations. The overall U. S. strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense organization in major ways is unrelated to critically important military missions. Governmental systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management are painfully out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military developments. The United States system of alliances must be adapted to rapidly changing strategic requirements. United States strength is inadequate with respect to important challenges with which we may be confronted.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 2 -

We are convinced that sizeable corrective steps can be taken now.

We believe that the security of the United States supersedes any
budgetary considerations.

Our Panel therefore hopes that the most important result of recent
Soviet advances in the field of earth satellites may be that they will serve
as a catalyst for a genuinely deep review of the basic attitudes and policies
affecting the security of our country.

For the U. S. lag in missiles and space machines, however worrisome,
is a symptom and not a cause. It reflects a general complacency over the
past dozen years. It is now vitally important to the U. S. to calculate its
strategy and security requirements on an integrated and long-range basis,
and to set about correcting all significant deficiencies.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

# I - FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The world is living through a period of swift and far-reaching upheavals. Standards and institutions which have remained unchanged for centuries are breaking down. Millions who have hitherto accepted their place in life are clamoring for a new and meaningful existence. Western Europe, the fountain-head of our civilization, has lost its position of pre-eminence in world affairs. Across the great land-mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa new nations are rising in the place of colonial empires.

The world is yearning to realize its aspirations in peace. But it is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to exploit all dissatisfactions and to exacerbate all tensions, and the new weapons technology capable of obliterating civilization.

The United States has thus been placed into a fateful position. Our whole tradition impels us to desire peace. Relatively invulnerable behind two great oceans, we have until the end of World War II asked little of the world save to be free to work out our destiny undisturbed. But we have been forced to realize that our security is inextricably bound up with the safety of the rest of the non-Communist world and that freedom everywhere depends on our strength and resolution. Force alone will not supply the answer to the hopes of humanity. Yet our power can help bring about a framework of security in which these aspirations may be realized in freedom and without fear.

Looking at the world from the perspective of our past isolation, perhaps the most difficult thing for us is to accept the reality of our peril. Other and

II - Report

December 22, 1957

-4-

more exposed nations have had to learn to live over a period of centuries with the consciousness that their existence might be imperiled by foreign attack. It is a new experience for us.

A new technology of unprecedented power and destructiveness has placed <u>all</u> nations of the world into dire peril. The largest "conventional" bomb of World War II -- the famous blockbuster -- had an explosive power of 20 tons of TNT. The first atomic bomb had an explosive equivalent of 20 thousand tons of TNT, a thousand fold increase. Today weapons with an explosive equivalent of 20 million tons (20 megatons) have been tested and there is no theoretical upper limit: it is possible to construct weapons of almost any desired explosive power.

As the weapons have become more powerful, their speed of delivery has grown ever faster. Soon missiles will be able to travel intercontinental distances and wipe out whole cities in one blow. An attack on 50 of our most important metropolitan areas would bring under five 55 per cent of our population and 75 per cent of our industry. Moreover if the fireball of a megaton weapon touches the ground, it sucks up particles of earth and buildings and deposits them downwind as radioactive material. The area of this "fall-out" will depend on meteorological conditions, but it may cover an area of 10 thousand square miles or the size of the State of New Jersey. An attack on 50 of our most important urban centers would, in the absence of effective defensive measures, produce at least 10-15 million dead and 15-20

[y]

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 5 -

million injured from blast and heat and perhaps another 30 million casualties
from "fall-out".

What gives this weapons technology its ominous quality is that it is
in the hands of a Communist movement which has proclaimed for over a
generation now -- the last time in the Moscow declaration of all Communist
states on November 16, 1957 -- the irreconcilability of its system with that
of the free world. Of course "peaceful co-existence" has reappeared periodic-
ally as a Soviet slogan. But, as used in Soviet propaganda, it has never had
more than tactical significance. After World War II, it did not stand in the
way of Soviet domination of the satellite orbit and the breaking of the most
solemn wartime pledges. It did not stop the Berlin airlift, the Greek civil war
and the Korean aggression. After the Geneva "summit" conference "peaceful
coexistence" did not restrain the Soviet Union from selling arms to Egypt,
thereby inviting a crisis in the Middle East that has not ended to this day.
In 1957 it did not keep the Soviet Union from threatening nuclear attacks on
Norway, Denmark and Turkey. Both their doctrine and their internal dynamism
will impel the Soviet Union and Communist China to try to fill every vacuum
and to encourage every dissatisfaction. Should the U.S.S.R. and Communist
China ever attain strategic superiority we can be certain that subsequent
events will be brutal and unforgiving. And the power of these states,
particularly of the U.S.S.R., has been growing threateningly both absolutely
and relative to the United States.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 6 -

The prospects of peace, therefore, depend on the strength and firmness
of the United States and other free nations, on their joint ability to relate
power to purpose, on the willingness to act resolutely in the face of continuing
peril and ambiguous challenges.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 7 -

# II - THE NATURE OF OUR STRATEGIC PROBLEM

Ever since our unilateral disarmament at the end of World War II pro-
duced not the peace we desired so earnestly but Soviet intransigence, the
United States has been forced to engage in a military effort unprecedented in
our history in peace-time. But the effort to harmonize our power and our
policy has been handicapped by many factors including the nature of our
historical experience. Tradition impels us to believe that peace is the
"normal" relation among states. As a result we have conceived it to be the
task of our military policy to assemble overwhelming power to "punish" the
disturber of the peace -- the aggressor. Aggression has appeared to us as
an unambiguous and clear act. Because we have been geographically remote
from the major centers of world affairs we have been able to rely on relatively
small forces-in-being and to mobilize our resources only *after* a war had
started. Because many other powers would be threatened before the danger
to our security became explicit, we have in the past been able to count on
allies to hold a forward line while we rallied both our physical and psycho-
logical resources.

Many of these ideas have been overthrown by technological develop-
ments since World War II and by the emergence of the United States in the
forefront of world affairs. Soviet policy has coupled an attempt to develop
overwhelming power with a strategy of deliberate ambiguity, so calculated
that the risks of resisting any given advance always seem out of proportion

II - Report

December 22, 1957

to the objective or else designed to appeal to what the Free World has come to
consider "legitimate." As a consequence, the recognition of aggression has
often proved as difficult as finding the means to resist it. A symptom of the
difficulty is that a United Nations committee charged with the task of defining
aggression was forced to give up.

At the same time that the forms of aggression have multiplied and
become more ambiguous, we have lost the safety indicators of a more secure
past. We can no longer think of our military effort as designed for a conflict
which we enter only after great deliberation and after other nations had run
the initial risks as was the case in World War I and II. Since many powers
no longer have the ability to resist alone, the international equilibrium will
depend on our ability, psychological and military, to engage our forces promptly
and decisively.

The importance of forces-in-being is magnified by the altered
significance of industrial potential. As long as there prevailed a certain
balance between the destructiveness of weapons and the complexity of their
means of manufacture, victory in war could be achieved only through a
quantity of equipment too large to stockpile before the outbreak of hostilities.
Then, an attack on production facilities was a highly effective strategy. But
with modern technology industrial potential must be used _before_ a war breaks
out. Unless a massive and reliable defense is developed each major power
will be able to destroy in a matter of hours the production facilities of its

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 9 -

opponents with a few weapons relatively simple to manufacture. And long
before attrition can set in, the social structure is likely to have collapsed.

Thus our military problem, with which this particular Subpanel is
exclusively concerned, has three aspects:

(a) We require industrial, technological and scientific potential in
order to be prepared for the long haul. Without an adequate industrial plant
it is impossible to produce the spectrum of weapons to assure security.

Without a pool of scientific talent and a high level of scientific activity, we
shall not be able to maintain the strategic balance in a situation when the
real armaments race is in the laboratories. But scientific development by
itself is ineffective strategically if it cannot be translated into operational
weapons. Great importance therefore attaches to two kinds of lead-time:
the interval between the drawing board and operational weapon; and the
rapidity with which weapons can be manufactured. A lag in either category
is certain to create a strategic weakness. For this reason, great importance
attaches to our industrial base, to our policy with respect to science and
education and to policies to promote long-term growth and stability.

(b) At the same time long-range programs and balance cannot become
ends in themselves. However powerful we may be over the long pull, our
strategic effectiveness in any given crisis depends importantly on our active
forces supplemented by any quickly mobilizable reserve capabilities. Given
the power and destructiveness of modern weapons, we can not count on an
extended period of mobilization prior to the outbreak of any hostilities.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 10 -

(c) But however vast our over-all strength, it may still be ineffective
in meeting certain challenges if it can not be applied with discrimination.

Until the development of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver
it, we could concentrate on our capability to deliver a crushing blow on the
Soviet homeland as the deterrent to <u>all</u> types of aggression. But with the
growth of the Soviet capability to retaliate on the United States we may be
reluctant to risk resisting Soviet moves at their periphery. There exists the
great danger that the Soviet Union will be able to use its nuclear striking force
as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. Thus the test of
our military establishment is two-fold: one, the existence of retaliatory force
sufficiently powerful to discourage an all-out attack; and, two, the ability
to make our response fit all other challenges.

These three factors -- the importance of industrial potential, the
crucial role of forces-in-being, and the necessity of a versatile military
establishment -- impose on policy makers an unparalleled problem of choice.
It is further complicated by the explosive rapidity with which technology is
developing. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons system
would be good for nearly a generation; the equipment of U. S. ground forces
really changed very little between 1919 and 1940. Today a weapons system
begins to be obsolescent when it has barely gone into production. The B-17
"Flying Fortress" remained in operational use for a decade; the B-36 inter-
continental bomber was obsolescent in less than seven years; and the B-52

ELLIS JOHNSON: Add the following to the end of the first full paragraph: "In all categories of weapons each new weapon systems generation costs more than double its predecessor of 5-7 years before." (See McNeils speech on this. It is good)

Second full paragraph, fifth line: "...fight <u>and at the time</u>
<u>he proposes to fight it.</u> But the side..."

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 11 -

jet bomber is beginning to be outdated even before all wings of our Strategic
Air Command are fully equipped with it.

Moreover, all weapons are becoming increasingly costly. A new
submarine costs ten times as much as its World War II counterpart. A B-52
wing is four times as expensive as the B-36 wings it replaces.

This technological race places an extraordinary premium on the ability
to assess developing trends correctly and to back decisions firmly over a
period of time. It also places the side which is on the defensive at special
disadvantage. The aggressor needs prepare only for the war he proposes to
fight. But the side which is on the defensive must gear its planning and
procurement for as long as the danger of aggression continues and in such
a manner that no important strategic weakness is created at any given point.

The basic problem of American strategy then is the ability to make
effective choices. This will depend on our national resolution, the courage
of our leadership and the effectiveness of the organization of our government.
The test of our military policy will be its relevance to the tasks to which we
may be challenged.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

-12-

III - DEVELOPING POWER TRENDS

The outstanding characteristic of the strategic equation is a military
technology in a state of spectacular change. Starting with World War II
scientific research has produced military equipment and new patterns of
military operations at an ever accelerating pace. Four trends appear to be
of particular significance.

1. Weapon technology will become increasingly complex with a corresponding increase in the difficulty of choosing the most effective combination of weapons. The crude U.S. bomb of 1945 has been outmoded by a broad range of highly developed weapons. Energy releases have risen from the original 20,000 tons of TNT equivalent to many million tons. The Hiroshima bomb required a large aircraft and crew. Equally powerful warheads have been reduced in size and simplified to the point where they can be employed effectively in anti-aircraft rockets. And with the increasing capacity for the production of fissionable materials, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have become available in very large quantities.

The outlook is even more portentous than the achievements of the
recent past. Aircraft will be capable of cruising at several times the speed
of sound, of bombing from altitudes of a dozen miles and more, and of
carrying air-launched missiles so that they need not pass directly over
heavily defended target areas. New high energy fuels can give them greatly
increased range and performance.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 13 -

Within a very short time, a major role in both offense and defense will be played by missiles. It will be possible to produce missiles of almost any desired range, from very short distances analogous to traditional artillery to intercontinental ranges of five thousand miles or more. Because these weapons require less extensive installations than airplanes, it will be possible to disperse them more easily and they will therefore be more invulnerable to surprise attack.

Earth satellites are a special adaptation of missiles which explore a new frontier. To develop them new technologies are required which will have important military applications.

Submarines, already an extremely powerful weapon will be even more important as nuclear propulsion comes of age. They pose a threat to our harbors and to our allies by interrupting sea communications. As a platform for missiles they can pose a constant threat of a sudden, devastating blow from unpredictable directions.

These are not dreams of the far distant future. Many of these weapons are in existence now; even the most remote among them is attainable within the next 10-15 years. By that time, many of them will be in the hands of several nations.

2. The rate of technological change will continue to accentuate the advantage of lead-time the offense enjoys relative to the defense. Both

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 14 -

offense and defense will improve -- and improve enormously. However, foreseeable new offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles -- sudden in action, massively destructive, difficult to destroy either before launching or in flight -- will greatly aggravate the problems of strategic defense and enormously increase its costs.

3. The U.S.S.R. and Communist China will continue to gain in overall military strength. Although the rate of economic growth of these countries may slow down, the economic superiority of the West will become increasingly less significant militarily at present levels of effort. By sacrificing the civilian sector of its economy, the U.S.S.R. has already caught up with the United States in many major fields of military technology. In certain areas assigned high priority by the Kremlin the Soviets have surpassed us, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Unless we greatly increase our pace and level of effort, they will achieve superiority in many other fields as well.

4. The concept of "scarcity" in nuclear weapons will disappear from the calculations of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and to a lesser extent Britain.

The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain will continue to increase the number and variety of their atomic weapons. Other countries will in due course have their own atomic arms if on a more limited scale.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 15 -

## Soviet Capabilities

Ever since World War II, the United States has suffered from a tendency to underestimate the military technology of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet Union produced its first long-range bomber we comforted ourselves with the belief that it was just a copy of our B-29. When it developed jet fighters we dismissed it as the imitation of a British design. When our atomic monopoly was ended we took it as a reflection on our security methods against espionage rather than as an indication that our technological lead was inherently ephemeral.

In the meantime the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its achievements in the immediate post-war period were far from accidental. Today Soviet science is at least equal to our own in many strategically significant categories. In the military field, the technological capability of the U.S.S.R. is increasing at a pace obviously faster than that of the United States. If not reversed this trend alone will place the free world in dire jeopardy.

The result of the Soviet concentration on military technology is an impressive military establishment which already poses a mortal threat to the free world and which is growing larger. Its main features can be summarized as follows:

The Soviet ground forces, far superior numerically to our own, have been reorganized and re-equipped for atomic war. New rockets and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads add to their atomic capability; new

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 16 -

tanks, artillery pieces, and light weapons give them a powerful conventional strength. Vehicles and communications equipment have been markedly improved. The Soviet Army not only is far superior numerically to available ground forces in Western or Southern Europe, but is progressively increasing its margin of superiority. In addition to these substantial forces-in-being, the U.S.S.R. possesses a vast and readily mobilizable reserve.

The Soviet Union now has the second largest navy in the world. While producing large numbers of light vessels, the Soviet Union has long concentrated on submarines. A fleet of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the German force which severely menaced Allied surface shipping during the early years of World War II. There is no doubt about the capacity of the U.S.S.R. to develop naval atomic power plants, or to adapt ships and submarines to launch short and medium-range missiles; in fact Soviet leaders have pointedly discussed the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor aircraft, an increasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are a major element of the air defense of important areas, and this system is being progressively extended.

Over the last ten years the U.S.S.R. has not only maintained the largest air force in the world, but has progressively re-equipped it with new

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 17 -

and modern aircraft. The Soviet Union now produces many aircraft at least as advanced as our own -- and produces them in large numbers. Moreover, the Soviets have impressively demonstrated their ability to manufacture modern electronic equipment and to master the techniques required to guide and direct defensive and offensive aerial operations.

The Soviet weapons program has given high priority to the development of rockets and missiles. A medium range ballistic missile within range of Japan, Taiwan, and most of Western Europe from Communist bloc bases is already operational and missiles of intercontinental range will soon follow.

In all of its programs the Kremlin has apparently given high priority to the development of a long-range air-atomic capability. From what is known of the present Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons it is inferior to that of the United States, but it is already enormous and it is growing rapidly.

Moreover, the U.S.S.R. possesses a long-range delivery system which, although second to ours, is considerable. Soviet nuclear attacks of great severity are possible now; within a few years the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering massive air and missile attacks against all major targets in the non-communist world. In short Soviet military strength is already enormous and is growing rapidly.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 18 -

U.S. Capabilities

As compared with the U.S.S.R., the United States now has these
military advantages:

We have a superior industrial base and production know-how, which,
providing we use it properly, should enable us to assign high priority to a
greater variety of projects than the U.S.S.R.

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range
manned airplanes and geography favors our system of advanced bases.

We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially surface
naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some of these advantages must be qualified, and others
are only temporary. For example, our long-range bomber force is always in
competition with the improving defenses of our potential enemy. And our
advantage in training is transitory because missiles will increasingly take
over missions heretofore performed by manned planes. Moreover some U.S.
forward bases will continue to be exposed to the instability of the areas in
which they are located and all of our air bases are vulnerable to surprise
attack, particularly from Soviet missiles.

Nor can we afford to take for granted an indefinite continuation of
our present superiority at sea. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval
power is built, faces a problem of limited refueling facilities, particularly

Goodpaster

Page 19

In the discussion of U.S. capabilities --- this notion that the Soviets like us are approaching "enough" in the sense of being capable of causing our complete destruction ... It is true. It is also true that there is nothing practical that can be done to modify that. So the statement about U.S. lead is probably meaningful and can be spelled out. If you accept the notion of the enough philosophy. You might want to develop the point of delivery means. At the present time we have a certain kind of delivery means which gives us a larger capability. However they are developing and probably would be ahead of us in other means. But the totality of their power in that area is still rather limited. But unless present trends are altered the whole balance of power will shift in favor of the Soviets. This is susceptible of two meanings. (1) will shift so that they will be stronger than they are now or (2) stronger than us. The meaning needs to be brought out better.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 19 -

for its aircraft complement. The value of its freedom from the political
uncertainties of foreign bases is therefore a matter of degree. The unresolved
naval weakness is that our anti-submarine capability is not adequate to deal
with the growing Soviet underwater threat.

The third point of present U.S. military advantage is in the number
and variety of atomic weapons. But the U.S.S.R. is closing the gap and
because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons numerical superiority
beyond a certain point may be meaningless.

Thus it appears that the U.S. is losing its lead over the U.S.S.R.
in the military race. For a little while yet we possess the shield of a clear
superiority in strategic striking power. But unless present trends are
altered, the world balance of power will shift in favor of the Soviet bloc.
If that should happen we would not be given another chance to remedy our
failings. However, it is emphatically not too late if the American people
and its leadership are prepared to make the big effort required now and in
the years ahead.

ELLIS JOHNSON: Last paragraph, first line: "With modern weapons such a war _could_ involve catastrophic casualties.

Comment on last paragraph: "This assumes the shaky assumption that _no_-active defense is feasible or will be attempted by either side. We may speak for the U.S. but the U.S.S.R. is designing a defense which may make an attack ?. We can not be _sure_ that their defense may not work.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 20 -

IV - MISSIONS

The types of conflict by which we may be challenged pose particular
problems because they tend to overleap the traditional boundaries between
the military services. With modern weapons the distinction of land, sea and
air warfare has lost a great deal of its validity. The criteria by which any future
wars can be distinguished turn on the nature of the conflict, the issues in
dispute, the geographical area of hostilities rather than on means of
locomotion.

Among the possible challenges we may confront, three stand out
most starkly: all-out war, limited war and a kind of war new to the twentieth
century and highly developed by the communists -- the disguised or obscure,
war concealed as internal take-over or as civil war.

All-Out War

Of the threats to our security, all-out war is the most overwhelming.
It can be defined as an attack of such magnitude that our survival would be
directly and immediately at stake. It is therefore the ultimate war, in which
no inhibitions can be counted upon as regards the case of weapons.

With modern weapons such a war would involve catastrophic casualties.
It is doubtful that civilized life as we know it could withstand the carnage.
Even the nominal victor would have suffered losses which would shake its
social fabric. This is particularly true for the side which concedes the first

Goodpaster

Page 21 - first pgh, next to last sentence re "limited war, for instance can be kept limited ....". I would offer -- it might not be kept limited even then. This is a serious point. The capability for limited warfare seems to be quite important and from everything I have seen that has great importance. The notion of limited warfare you have to recognize it is almost a question of probabilities and the force people have different views as to whether it is being kept limited. People would differ whether it can in fact be kept limited. You might stress that a little more.

The boss raised an interesting problem -- to what degree the reserve and support forces that might be outside of the area would also be subject to attack. How do you discriminate between retaliatory forces ... the recipients k of the attack wouldn't know.

Also the question of geographically separate but he doesn't deny the possibilities.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 21 -

blow, if it be directed in large part against his population.

For this reason the purpose of our capability for all-out war is above
all to prevent war from breaking out; it is effective to the extent that it
deters a sudden onslaught. At the same time, our capability for all-out war
is the essential precondition for any more discriminating application of our
power. The capability to conduct all-out war does not protect all our
security interests. But it does preserve our ability to protect these interests
by means less drastic than all-out war. Limited war, for instance, can be
kept limited only if an opponent must consider expansion of the war highly
unattractive. An overwhelming readiness for all-out war must therefore be
the first charge on our military establishment.

The basic requirement for all-out war is a strategic striking force so
well protected and numerous that it can overcome any defense. Moreover,
the hard core of the striking force, whether based at home or overseas,
must be continuously alert, fully armed, and as secure as possible against
destruction or neutralization by surprise attack.

Thus the second requirement for all-out war is an active and passive
defense system capable of protecting the bulk of our striking force and of
blunting the effects of enemy attack against our centers of population and
industry. Dispersal, the hardening of bases and critical installations
against nuclear weapons through underground shelters and the increasing use
of ground, sea, and undersea missiles will all help to reduce vulnerability

ELLIS JOHNSON: Add to the end of the second line: "...might be successful, and if good enough make the certainty of the success of an attack highly doubtful."

Second full paragraph, statement (b) "An active defense which can provide effective survival of the retaliatory force and which is able to reduce the enemy blow on our cities to the smallest possible proportions;"

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 22 -

to successful enemy attack. Early warning and air defense measures will reduce the likelihood that such attacks might be successful.

As attacking vehicles have become speedier and weapons ever more destructive, increasing attention will have to be paid to passive defense, often called civil defense, which seeks to blunt the enemy offense by reducing the damage as much as possible. This can be accomplished through shelters, dispersal of industries, and the stockpiling of critical supplies. A power which has succeeded in protecting its population at least to some degree is in a stronger psychological position than an opponent totally vulnerable to attack. In the age of the long-range missile, the known ability of a society to withstand attack through passive defense will become an increasingly important deterrent.

Readiness for all-out war therefore reflects a combination of three factors: (a) A retaliatory force sufficiently powerful and well-protected so that no matter what the scale of the enemy attack, the aggressor must have to contend with a return blow which will inflict an unacceptable amount of damage; (b) An active defense which can provide effective survival of the retaliatory force and which is able to reduce the enemy blow to the smallest possible proportions; (c) A passive defense which reduces the value of the enemy offense and the incentive for it.

The importance of defensive measures is that they force the enemy to increase his investment of resources in his offensive effort without

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 23 -

adding to its strategic effectiveness. The necessity of a crushing retaliatory force is that it can deprive the aggressor of the fruits of a surprise attack. The task of strategy is to decide on the relative emphasis to be given to offensive and defensive capabilities and the "mix" which will provide the greatest degree of deterrence.

In looking at the strategic equation for all-out war there is reason for serious concern. Our strategic striking power, on which we have heretofore relied as the major element of our security, is imperiled by Soviet missile developments and the inadequate dispersal of our Strategic Air Command. Our active defense designed against manned planes will have to be redesigned for the missile age. Our civil defense program is completely inadequate. The effort to keep up our capability for all-out war will therefore require a substantially greater effort.

## Limited War

Unfortunately, readiness for all-out war does not exhaust our strategic problem. For no matter how vast our over-all strength, we face the dilemma that the magnitude of the total does not assure its sufficiency in any particular situation. Even if we are able to deter all-out war by the threat of total annihilation, our peril remains. Until the development of a Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, our retaliatory force could serve as the major deterrent to Soviet aggression. But as the Soviet capability to attack American cities increases, it will raise the threshold

II - Report
December 22, 1957

- 24 -

of provocation which would unleash our retaliatory force. And with the increasing horror of weapons technology this threshold is constantly rising. It is not that we will not fight if our national survival is threatened. It is simply that we shall interpret the requirements of our survival increasingly stringently if we must weigh all objectives against the destruction of New York or Washington or Chicago. If all-out war becomes our only riposte to aggression, the Soviet Union will be enabled to use its strategic striking force as a shield behind which to expand by more limited methods and to confront us with the alternative of acceding to what will seem a marginal Soviet gain or a world-wide holocaust.

As a result, though all-out war is a great danger, it does not represent the most likely threat. Thus we face the strategic problem of limited war, the form of conflict which overturns the balance of power by installments, any one of which does not seem to warrant a final showdown.

The distinctive feature of limited war is that its outcome does not involve or seem to involve national survival. It is for this precise reason that we have had such difficulty in coming to grips with it. For any peripheral Soviet move raises doubts whether this particular encroachment warrants a final showdown. Another difficulty has been caused by our lack of mobile forces capable of intervening rapidly and decisively and of restoring a local situation before matters get out of hand. Thus we may be forced into the position of choosing between Armageddon and defeat without

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 25 -

war. In each crisis our inhibitions have tended to exceed those of the
Soviet Union.

To a certain extent, the forces designed to deter all-out war will
also be useful in preventing or stifling limited war. It would be dangerous,
however, to rely too heavily on our strategic striking force to fight limited
war. Since the chief sanction against the expansion of a limited war resides
in a crushing capability for retaliation, the deterrent force must be kept at
a state of the highest readiness particularly during periods of limited
conflict. An aggressor who could tempt us to use up our strategic striking
force in a limited war would gain an advantage however those particular
military operations ended. To consider our strategic striking force as a
dual-purpose force would weaken the deterrent precisely when it should be
strongest. The practical effect of a dual-purpose weapons system is to
withdraw it from the availability for limited war.

It is therefore imperative that we develop forces which can intervene
rapidly and which are able to make their power felt with discrimination. We
require much more airlift capacity. Our mobile forces must be tailored to
the gamut of possible limited wars which may range from a war involving
several allies to relatively minor police actions. At one end of the spectrum
limited war may require a highly complicated weapons system including
nuclear weapons. On the other end of the spectrum it may involve con-
ventional forces capable of assisting friendly governments resisting
border incursions.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 26 -

The effectiveness of our power thus depends on our unmistakable
ability and willingness to oppose force with force at whatever level of
intensity may be required. We do not now possess that capability. The
greatest point of concern about the U.S. strategic position is that our
distaste for limited risks may ultimately lead us into the ultimate risk at a
rate determined not by us but by Communist policy.

The Political Problem

We must not make the mistake of assuming that even a diversified
military establishment can protect us against the total range of our dangers.
To begin with, force by itself is useless without the resolution to use it
if need be. A great deal, therefore depends not only on our physical but
also on our psychological and political readiness. An effective policy must
not only find the means to resist transformations of the strategic balance,
it must also be able to determine what transformations to resist. As events
have proved, the latter may be our most difficult challenge and it depends
on the wisdom and courage of our political leadership.

For our security can be imperiled not only by overt aggression but
also by transformations which are made to appear, insofar as is possible,
to be no war at all. Those "concealed wars" may break out in the form of
internal revolution or civil war; they may be instigated by outside forces
or merely be exploited by them. Greece has furnished one example;

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 27 -

Vietnam another; the Middle East still another. Whatever the degree of initial Soviet responsibility, one of the greatest threats to the security of the Free World is gradual Soviet infiltration and domination of vital areas through steps each of which is so small and seemingly so "legitimate" that it does not seem to justify overt intervention.

These conflicts raise issues with which in terms of our preconceptions and the structure of our forces we are least prepared to deal. A civil war has not traditionally been thought to justify foreign intervention however much its outcome may affect the international balance. The gradual subversion of a government is difficult to deal with from the outside, even though the fate of millions may depend on it.

As a result, unless we have a clear understanding of our national purpose we shall find ourselves paralyzed in the face of upheavals which may completely overturn the international equilibrium. We must also realize that it is the essence of these concealed conflicts that the issue they present is deliberately and intrinsically unclear. To ask for certainty in such situations is a prescription for inaction. Nor is it possible in advance to determine the nature of the conflict or every United States response. The problem in its deepest sense is not military but political and will therefore be treated more fully by Subpanel I. It should be our aim to prevent such situations from breaking into the open. When they do become acute we may have a choice only between evils. Our security and

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 28 -

that of the rest of the non-Communist world will then hinge importantly on our willingness to protect the international equilibrium in situations which fit neither the soldier's classic concept of war nor the diplomat's traditional concept of aggression.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 29 -

V - THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One of the most troublesome strategic problems is the role to be
played by nuclear weapons in a future conflict. It is complicated by the
fact that except for two now obsolete weapons at the end of World War II
no nuclear weapons have ever been set off in wartime. The effect of the
introduction of nuclear weapons into military operations is therefore to some
extent a matter of conjecture. It is argued by some that the use of nuclear
weapons marks the dividing line between all-out and limited war. It is
feared by others that nuclear weapons would cause such widespread de-
struction that they would devastate at least the area which is being fought
over. Still others maintain that even if there should be an intention to keep
the war limited, neither side would accept defeat without resorting to every
weapon in its arsenal.

These arguments have great weight. It is important, however,
to distinguish between those which apply to limited war as such and
those which apply to limited nuclear war only. For example, if it is
argued that neither side will accept defeat short of having exhausted
every means at its disposal, it would not seem to make any difference
whether the war started as a conventional or as a nuclear war. A power
unwilling to accept defeat in a nuclear war is not likely to be more prepared
to accept defeat in a conventional war. This particular argument
therefore amounts to a rejection of any concept of limited war,

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 30 -

nuclear or otherwise. It tends to run counter to every experience since
World War II. If we keep our retaliatory force in a high state of readiness,
it can be expected that both sides will look for excuses to limit, not to
expand the war. The possibility of limited war depends on making all-out
war or an expansion of hostilities an even more unattractive course.

In dealing with the issue of nuclear weapons, we come up against
the hard fact that the choice is no longer entirely up to us. Whatever we
may decide, the Soviet Union and in time other powers as well may choose
to conduct its aggressions with nuclear weapons. The introduction of
nuclear weapons by an opponent would immediately raise the question of
our reaction. Would we be prepared to respond with all-out war? And if
not, we would be forced into a limited nuclear war under the worst possible
circumstances: in the confusion of battle and unready.

It does not seem likely or wise that we would respond to <u>any</u> use of
nuclear weapons with all-out war. The decision to engage in a war that
stakes our survival and may lead to a basic transformation of our society
will depend to a much greater extent on the issues under dispute than on the
weapons used. To attempt to keep a limited war conventional by the threat
of all-out war would in fact involve all the dilemmas of massive retaliation.
It would enable an opponent by increasing the level of risk slightly to give
us the choice between all-out war and surrender. It would enable him to
achieve a decisive victory through the introduction of nuclear weapons against
conventional forces and to leave the next move up to us.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

- 31 -

Thus against a nuclear power we must always be prepared to fight a
limited nuclear war. Even should we decide to use conventional weapons
in certain circumstances, we would not dare to do so without a nuclear
establishment ready at hand. And in a war in which the U.S.S.R. is a
war in which the U.S.S.R. is a direct participant, nuclear weapons will
have to be used almost by necessity. In their face the huge Soviet con-
ventional armament becomes obsolescent. In their absence the Soviet Union
will have the choice of seeking to prevail with its large ground army and
failing that could still introduce nuclear weapons at a moment of maximum
difficulty for us.

That the Soviet Union is well aware of this is shown by its persistent
"ban the bomb" propaganda. Even an equality in nuclear weapons will not
change the fact that nuclear weapons complicate the tasks of an aggressor
and reduce the blackmail value of Soviet World War II type forces.

No one can look at the prospects of nuclear war with equanimity.
It raises many issues from "fall-out" to bomb testing to its moral aspect.
We shall deal with the issue of bomb testing in a later chapter. The
argument for not renouncing the use of nuclear weapons is that it represents
our best chance to maintain the peace and of reducing the Soviet advantage
in conventional forces. It is the price of our liberty and of our values.

Goodpaster

Page 32 - Defense Organization

The boss is right with you on this whole discussion. Did not raise the point with him about putting responsibilities in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Chiefs rather than in the Joint Chiefs. Essentially his point is tactical. You would create alarm if you proposed *or* if he would propose. Better that you propose.

Goodpaster not only talked over the general but the specific. The proposal if effective should come from defense and not be dictated from W.H.

(Discussion re showing charts)

The boss is still quite interested in that and may push further along.

- 32 -

NAR

Add to end of first paragraph:

...inadequate to its task in the face of rapidly changing weapons technology and world conditions.

Delete "quickly" first line 2nd para.

Fifth line 2nd para.: ...are inherent in the present organization and will be further.....

Point 1. - The roles and missions assigned to the individual military services have become competitive, rather than complementary, because they are out of accord with .....

Rusk

3rd line:

...some extent with () organization and procedures in the Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been ..... since the creation of the () National Military Establishment....

II - Report

December 23, 1957

- 32 -

# VI - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Because of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the Pentagon. This concern is not new. It has been a preoccupation of successive administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

While detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments outside the scope of this panel's undertaking, we have nevertheless sought to identify the critical areas of weakness and to advance several broad principles which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. It seems to us that the major defects in the present organization are inherent and organic, and will be further aggravated by the passage of time. These defects are three in number:

1. As now defined, the roles and missions assigned to the individual military services are competitive, rather than complementary; moreover, they are out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety;

2. The present organization and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff precludes the development of a comprehensive and coherent strategic doctrine for the United States;

Clade of Staff precludes the development of a comprehensive

3 - The present organization and responsibilities of the joint

om national safety

weapone technology, and the principal military threats to

complementarily; moreover, they are out of accord with both

1 - We now defined the roles and missions attached to the

are three in number:

organic, and will be further specified by the passage of time. These defects
seems to us that the major defects in the present organization are inherent and
which should guide the development of specific organizational changes. If,
identity the critical areas of weakness and to advance several broad principles
outside the scope of this benefit is undertaken, we have nevertheless agreed to

While detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to agreements
the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

ten years ago. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found
administrations since the creation of the original National Military Establishment
Bureaus. This concern is not new. It has been a preoccupation of successive
concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the
in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably
because of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center

VI - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

- 15 -

December 28, 1928
II - Report

II - Report

December 23, 1957

- 33 -

3. The Secretary of Defense is so burdened with the <u>trying to</u> negative tasks of <u>arbitrating</u> and controlling inter- service disputes that he cannot play his full part in the initiation and development of high military policy.

These points will be discussed in order.

## The Problem of Roles and Missions

The range and destructiveness of modern weapons have tended to overleap the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our <u>national</u> effort to develop an adequate <u>strategic</u> plan has been beset by interservice rivalry. This rivalry is not due fundamentally to "parochialism" on the part of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and missions.

Ten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense organization, one result was expected by the public: that through joint planning by the Chiefs of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the authority of the Secretary of Defense, we would develop in concert our potential in all three <u>media</u> of operations: land, sea, and air. Such has not occurred. With the <u>circumstances</u> advantage of hindsight, it is now clear that the organization itself doomed this important goal.

However, one judges the wisdom of this initial assignment of roles and missions, one fact is self-evident: the stage was set for rivalry. The only

["between our friends the winners of this crucial statement of roles and\nadvantage of jurisdiction, it is now clear that the organization itself does not\nrequire of operations: land, air, and sea. Such has not occurred. With the\nadvantage of the Air Force, we would develop in concert our potential in all three\nby the Chief of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the authority of the\norganization, one result was expected by the public: that through local planning\nten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense\nmistrions.", "The Air Force, in its turn, has been the first to recognize the need for\nadvantage of jurisdiction, it is now clear that the organization itself does not\nrequire of operations: land, air, and sea. Such has not occurred. With the\nadvantage of the Air Force, we would develop in concert our potential in all three\nby the Chief of Staff, supplemented when necessary by the authority of the\norganization, one result was expected by the public: that through local planning\nten years ago, whatever else was hoped for in the new defense\nmistrions.", "## The Problem of Roles and Mistrions", "The Air Force and the Navy have tended to\noverlook the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our\nrange and destructive power of modern weapons have tended to\nbe reduced in order to develop an adequate statistic basis has been kept by inter-service\nagreement to develop an adequate

II - Report

December 23, 1957

question in this regard was whether the competition could be kept at a healthy level and prevented from becoming destructive of efficiency (cf. The "B-36 Hearings").

Then came the new capabilities inherent in guided missiles. The army, never content with the quantity on the organization of its tactical air support saw the possibility of again having its own tactical air power. It also saw its short range air defense missiles developing into replacements for manned inter-ceptor aircraft, and capable further of destroying enemy ballistic missiles in flight. The navy saw the possibilities of missiles launched from ships and submarines enlarging its role in strategic air warfare. Needless to say, the air force saw in all of this an undermining of the integrity of its mission and the unity of air power which had supplied the very reason for its creation.

More importantly, the assignment of roles and missions among the Army, Air Force and the Navy has become increasingly inconsistent with the new technology. Each of these services has had the mission of defeating its enemy counterpart: the Army has had primary responsibility for the land battle, the Navy for control of the seas and the Air Force for the control of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of locomotion with everything moving by water assigned to the Navy, everything moving by land assigned to the Army and everything moving through the air assigned to the Air Force.

Ten years ago this assignment of roles still represented distinguishable strategic tasks. Each service was, therefore, able to control exclusively the

["strategic force. Each service was, therefore, able to control exclusively the\nTen years ago this assignment of roles still represented distinguishable\nArmy and everything moving through the air assigned to the Air Force,\nmoving by water assigned to the Navy, everything moving by land assigned to the\nThese misactions were based, in effect, on means of locomotion with everything\nthe Navy for control of the sea and the Air Force for the control of the air,\nenemy counterpart; the Army has had primary responsibility for the land battle,\nnew technology. Each of these services has had the mission of defeating its\nArmy, Air Force and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the Navy, the assignment of roles and missions among the\nArmy and the Air Force, and the Navy has become increasingly dependent with the\nof the services.\nWhat follows is an analysis of the misactions and misuses among the\nAir Force and the

II - Report

December 23, 1957

weapons considered essential for achieving its mission. In general it could
develop its own strategy without too much risk of duplicating the tasks of a
sister service, and without too much risk of conflict over the issue of what
constituted essential targets.

But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the overwhelming
destructiveness of the new weapons have almost obliterated the traditional
boundaries among the services. Today, no service can achieve its primary
mission without either trespassing on the role of the other services, or calling
~~or duplicating their functions.~~
on them for assistance. Some services, like the Navy, operate in all the media -
sea, land and air. Other missions are shared by two or more services, such as
tactical air support. Thus we have three services with airpower and two with
armies; the Air Force responsible for coordinating air defense but the Army
responsible for the air defense of specific targets.

As a result the division of functions which worked without fundamental
frictions until the end of World War II has become a source of bitter rivalry
in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a wrangle as to which service
should control it. It is inherent in the philosophy and training of each service
that it should see in the developing enemy threat predominantly those elements
which its own particular organization seems best adapted to counter. And each
service by a natural rationalization, judges the proper balance of forces to be
that one which maximizes its own role.

Such a procedure is costly and inefficient. It leads to a duplication of

II - Report

December 23, 1957

 weapons systems. It prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and in every crisis confronts our policy makers with needlessly conflicting advice. New weapons are pressed into the strait jacket of obsolescent missions instead of refashioning missions to conform to revolutionary departures in technology and to new military problems.

Conversely, where there is no competition or duplication of mission, and little glamor in the tasks, the present organization may neglect certain vital tasks. An example is the problem of airlift for the ground forces. Providing such facilities our airforce responsibility is very expensive. When budgets are tight, the airforce is not likely to favor this mission at the expense of its primary task of defeating the enemy in the air, especially against the background of growing Soviet strength in planes and missiles. On the other hand the *army* is prevented by our mechanistic assignment of functions from developing and operating the transport aircraft it must have to move its forces swiftly to the combat zone.

## The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Except for the Chairman, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are each the senior officers of the military services. Therefore, even with the best will in the world, they must be in considerable part advocates of a service point of view. Each has risen to his position through a lifetime of dedication to his service. He is primarily the product of its training schools, its problems, its environment and primarily responsible for its future. Maintaining the status and morale of his service can never be far

["environment. Maintaining the status and morale of his service can never be lost. Services. He is primarily the product of its training schools, its problems, its view. Each has a mission to fulfill through a lifetime of dedication to his in the world, they must be no considerable part advocates of a service point of view. Each has a mission to fulfill through a lifetime of dedication to his in the world, they must be no considerable part advocates of a service point of view. Each has a mission to fulfill through a lifetime of dedication to his in the world, they must be no considerable part advocates of a service point of view. Each has a mission to fulfill through a lifetime of dedication to his", "The Joint Chiefs of Staff", "adequately to the combat scene. The enemy is prevented by the mechanical assignment of functions from background of drawing Soviet aircraft in advance and by the other its primary task of detecting the enemy in the air, especially against the are right, the aircraft is not likely to favor this mission at the expense of 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机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机机

II - Report

December 23, 1957

from his mind. Thus under the present organization most of the decisive pressures on the JCS organization are imposed by the individual services, and it functions too often as a committee of partisan adversaries engaged in advancing service positions and compromising service differences. Too little in present arrangements permits the Chiefs of Staff time and opportunity to think spontaneously or comprehensively about overall strategic problems. The result is that our military plans for meeting foreseeable threats are a patchwork of compromise between conflicting strategic concepts or simply completely uncoordinated service war plans. The readiness of our forces for the time of dire emergency cannot be allowed to rest solely on committee action.

## The Role of the Secretary of Defense

The organization of the military establishment into three competing services, and the aggravation of this difficulty by obsolete roles & missions, have shaped the role of the Secretary of Defense in ways not foreseen when the office was created in 1947. To a great extent these conditions have confined him to the essentially negative functions of adjudication and discipline. He has become the referee in disputes over policy issues originating in the services or in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the essence of a referee's position that disputes reach him only after positions have hardened. The Secretary of Defense has, in consequence, found it difficult to play the positive, creative role which befits the cabinet officer who is a full member of the President and the Secretary of State, to formulate a high policy triumvirate for foreign and military affairs.

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In order to exercise the functions of adjudication and discipline, the Secretary of Defense and his staff are overwhelmed with many housekeeping and management functions which, were it not for deep-seated interservice rivalry, could be better handled by the individual services.

This condition is reflected in a proliferation of Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the elaborate organization of the Secretary's office, as a vast business concern with heavy emphasis on financial controls. We certainly do not dispute the need for financial controls, nor for the nation's largest enterprise to be run in a business-like manner.

Nevertheless a principal objective of any reorganization plan should be to create conditions in which the Secretary of Defense can play a larger, more positive role in the initiation and formulation of broad military policy, and can relegate to the substructures of the defense organization a substantial portion of his present administrative burden.

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December 23, 1957

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## Proposed Remedies

The foregoing analysis indicates that the difficulties described are inherent in the present organization of the Defense Department, that they cannot be removed merely by adjustments of the present structure. The obstacles to correcting these deficiencies are formidable indeed, and no panacea is at hand. Yet the growing increase in technological complexity, the foreseeable rise in the cost of maintaining first-line weapons systems, and the interdependence of foreign policy and military capability make it clear to us that our future security -- which is to say, our survival as a nation -- will require a far more efficient system for military planning and military decisions than now exists.

To remedy the central weaknesses, we feel competent to put forward certain general proposals for consideration. In our judgment a plan for reorganization of the Defense Department should include the following elements:

a. The military services, especially should be removed from the channel of operational command. They should cease to be individually responsible for carrying out particular combat missions. Their function should henceforth be to provide administrative support for the combined functional commands (to be described below) in matters of recruitment, training, research, procurement and supply. Freed from the responsibilities for operational commands, the service chiefs and their civilian superiors could concentrate on tasks of management and logistics.

before

NAR: It may be worth recalling that the establishment of the Defense Department both the Army and the Navy were organized to separate the commande function from training and logistics function.

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December 23, 1957

b) All of the operational military forces of the United States should be organized into functional commands to perform the missions which seem called for by our strategic requirements. No foreseeable conflict will fit the category of land, sea or air battle. As a result, unified commands are essential for the conduct of military operations as in fact they have been both in World War II and in the Korean War. Each such command would be composed of the appropriate elements from each military service brought together under a single commander. The units assigned to each functional commander should be organic to his command and not simply placed temporarily under his operational control. As units completed their training within the existing services they would be assigned to a functional command. Each command would be, in effect, a combined force with its own doctrine and trained to carry out its distinctive tasks.

The composition and mission of these commands should not be frozen by legislation. They should be determined from time to time in the President's discretion, so that they remain congruent with technology and with the tasks an evolving strategy will require to be performed.

In such an organization officers would be brought more naturally to address themselves to strategic doctrine. To be sure, there will be rivalry between the functional commands; competition is a healthy concomitant of high morale. But with each functional area representing a distinguishable strategic option, the requirements of self-interest and of strategic doctrine would be much more in harmony than now.

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December 23, 1957

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c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be given a stronger role, specifically by giving him control over the staff. He should also be designated Principal Military Advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the only member who can give his full-time attention to problems of overall strategic doctrine. It is therefore logical that he be the Principal Military Advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense instead of the Joint Chiefs collectively. At the same time he should be in a position to shape strategic planning. One major obstacle is the situation in which officers on inter-service committees are negotiators rather than planners and tend to represent the point of view of a service rather than the overall approach. A unified staff under the direct control of the Chairman would remove at least some of the service pressures on the members of the staff.

d) The chain of operational command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Any modern war requires a rapid reaction time and this can be achieved only if there are a minimum number of organizational layers. Since the present division of functions among the military services often represents no distinguishable strategic option, the separate military departments should be relieved from responsibility for military operations. At the same time this proposal recognizes that the Secretary of Defense is the deputy commander-in-chief. His position in the line of command should thus preserve civilian control over the armed forces.

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December 23, 1957

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e) The line of logistic command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the existing military departments. This recommendation is an application to logistics and manpower of the previous recommendation.

f) All officers above the rank of Brigadier General or equivalent should receive their permanent promotion from the Octanus be absorbed into a new and separate service (which might be called the Department and would become officers of Armed Service of the United States). For effective overall planning, it is essential that we develop a group of officers who throughout their careers have been encouraged to concern themselves with questions of strategic doctrine.

The procedure recommended here would retain the specialization necessary to command specific units and the morale which goes with membership in a service. At the higher levels, however, where the requirement is for an overall view there would exist a group of officers whose primary loyalties transcend service boundaries. Since entry into this group would be the goal of all officers throughout their careers, junior officers would have an incentive to take an overall view. Their future would depend on their ability to consider the whole, not as is so frequently the case today on the ability to defend the point of view of their service on interdepartmental committees. This proposal takes cognizance of the great impetus derived from service experience and motivation; but service experience will be most effective if it can be freed from the necessity of adhering to current instructions of individual services.

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December 23, 1957

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g) The Secretary of Defense should be given authority to cancel direct overall research and development programs and the right of transfer development and procurement programs among the services.

In addition, He should also be given a direct appropriation for the conduct of long-range research and development programs at the Defense Services. receive

One of the outstanding characteristics of the present period is the integral connection between strategy and technology. When technology was relatively stable, the technical aspect of military planning usually involved problems either of procurement or of engineering. But today with technology developing at an explosive rate, the direction of its change is itself a primary strategic concern. As a result, the next war may well be won or lost in the laboratories and on the drawing boards. As long as the Secretary of Defense cannot shape the direction of research and development, his role will be the essentially passive one of arbitrating disputes formulated elsewhere. Where so much depends on keeping up and staying ahead in the technological race, it is essential that our weapons development reflects a clear sense of direction and not a compromise.

Research and development poses another challenge to our military establishment. In the fields of engineering and procurement where most of its experience lies, goals are fixed and progress can be gauged by well understood criteria. By contrast, it is the nature of basic research that its results are uncertain and that together with its very discoveries it produces the criteria for judging them. A bureaucratic approach to it can only stifle creativity. The mode of organization and the pattern of creativity therefore tend to

Goodpaster

Page 44 - first full sentence

'With respect to our fundamental problem of _regaining_ our technological supremacy,... should be _retaining_.

The breadth and diversity of what we've been doing deserves some credit.

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December 23, 1957

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clash and when they do bureaucratic norms should be subordinate. With
respect to our fundamental problem of regaining our technological supremacy,
it is the task of our military establishment -- as of the national government --
to bring about an environment conducive to real creativity. As our government
has grown, it has followed the familiar course into a system of rewards that
favor caution and mediocrity. Seldom is anyone punished for inaction, but
often for measures that were risky and failed. It is especially important that
this pattern be reversed in research where there is an inherent uncertainty
and where great achievement is particularly inseparable from great risk.

The Problem of Lead Times

Lead time -- the interval between conception and execution -- has
never been more crucial. The best plans will be fruitless if they cannot be
implemented sufficiently quickly. The best production apparatus will be
ineffective if it requires too long to produce the necessary implements of war.
A nation can score a basic advantage if it can either develop or produce
weapons more rapidly than its opponent.

One of the major weaknesses in our strategic posture has been our
inordinately long lead times. They have been produced in part by the cumber-
some machinery in the Department of Defense and the National Government.
In part they have been caused by a quest for perfection in development and its
corollary an overconcern with the avoidance of mistake. It is essential that

Goodpaster

Page 45 - middle of page - re sentence reading "Whatever the *work* wisdom of the decision not to engage in a race with the Soviets in the satellite field....." (but don't reflect in comments)

This is somewhat less good story than it actually was. There *was* awareness of the psychological impact but failure to carry the awareness through into policy, *which* of *xxxx* will be reflected in the program.

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December 23, 1957

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we compress our lead times, and the recommendations in this report should help in this direction. At the same time there has to be a greater willingness to run risks both in procurement and in development. Speed is of greater importance than security.

## Strategy and Psychology

One of the great weaknesses in the organization of our national government is the absence of a clear focus to assess the psychological impact of our actions. Whatever the wisdom of the decision not to engage in a race with the Soviets in the satellite field, it does not appear that the psychological impact of a Soviet breakthrough in this field had been sufficiently analyzed.

Yet it is clear that the more revolutionary developments of technology, the more their significance depends on the interpretation placed on them. Since very few of the modern weapons have ever been used in wartime, the impact of their use on policy reflects dependence on what people think with respect to them. It is therefore essential that within our national government there exist a mechanism to assess the impact both at home and abroad of our actions in the military field as in others. This is a problem far transcending the organization of the Department of Defense. Is it mentioned here only because a section on organizational remedies would be incomplete without it.

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December 23, 1957

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## Summary

If adopted together, the proposals in this chapter give promise of achieving the following objectives: (1) they would eliminate the root causes of interservice rivalry while fully utilizing the reservoir of leadership and special skills which each service represents; (2) through the device of functional combatant commands, the U.S. armed forces would be organized to carry out the distinguishable strategic and tactical tasks which correspond to the actual military threats which confront us; (3) through creation of a separate service for senior officers and provision for its administration by the Secretary of Defense, the motivation of the entire officer corps would be basically changed, for the goal of high rank and broad command could be reached only by transcending the boundaries of a particular service; (4) responsibility for strategic planning and for strategic direction of the armed forces would be clearly fixed in a high professional officer responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and supported by a strong staff drawn from all of the services. Achievement of these objectives would provide a unity and a coherence that are now absent from our Defense organization.

Alliances and the Role of Force -

Thinks inconsistencies where it says for some ten years we
have relied on our shield and only recently we have begun to stress
the deterrent reducing our reliance on the *ik* shield.

II - Report

December 22, 1957

# VII - ALLIANCES AND THE ROLE OF FORCE

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has entered into a wide variety of military agreements with other states, ranging from the sweeping multilateral defense arrangements of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Association to a large number of bilateral agreements with individual nations. Our Army, Navy and Air Forces overseas are a token of our determination to carry out these commitments.

## The Basis of the U.S. System of Alliances

Strategically, the U.S. system of alliances is invaluable in the overall world-balance of power. Overseas bases provide advanced observation and warning posts against Soviet aggression. They bring striking forces closer to enemy targets, thus complicating the opponent's defensive problem. The advantage of missiles will not reduce the importance of alliances for the security of all their members. To be sure, missiles will increase the vulnerability of nations, our allies, as well as of our overseas airbases. On the other hand, intermediate and short-range missiles can reach almost all of the U.S.S.R. from present free-world territory. The geographic relationship is such that intermediate range missiles in the hands or on the territory of our allies have the same strategic significance as intercontinental missiles in the hands of the U.S.S.R. And the shorter range the missile, the more mobile its launching site and, therefore, the more invulnerable to Soviet surprise attack.

NAR

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December 22, 1957

- 47 -

The significance of alliances has been further increased by the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. As long as the United States possessed an atomic monopoly, the chief significance of alliances was in providing advance notice of American intentions. As long as the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression was thought to reside in U.S. superiority in strategic striking power, there was an understandable reluctance on the part of our allies to make a major military effort of their own. As long as it was believed that the issue of a war would be decided elsewhere, few of our allies saw much significance in a large military contribution of their own. The reliance on an all-out strategy tended to run counter to our desires for building *united* strength.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver its rapid approach to equality in all out striking power, all members of the alliance have an equal interest in removing any Soviet illusion that it might use its capability for all-out war as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. They also share an interest to keep any war that does break out to the smallest proportions. This is possible only to the extent that local resistance is feasible. Alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check limited aggression. They can strengthen local will to resist because they guarantee that a threatened country would not stand alone. The efficacy of our alliance policy may not only determine *victory* or defeat in limited war; it is a good insurance against such wars breaking out in the first place.

- 2 -

of abstention by numerous nations plays quite a part in determining
how many votes are necessary to get a 2/3rds vote.

However, the membership of the United Nations now runs to
82 nations. The Soviet bloc always has nine votes. The Afro-Asian
bloc can command at its full strength 28 votes but it is not con-
sistently cohesive, having regard to Japan, the Philippines and
other such nations which sometimes vote with the West. If all 82
nations voted and none abstained, then it only would take 28 votes
to block effectively a measure requiring two-thirds support.

Even with abstentions in the U.N. Assembly just ended, the
Dutch were not able to prevail as to sovereignty of half of New Guinea
and this was in U.N. parlance, "hung up."

December 26, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

From Charles Kline

Page numbers below refer to the draft of December 22.

On page 48, on December 24, I attempted to go into the "realpolitik" of the United Nations. The deductions in that memo are real and valid but now appear somewhat oversimplified.

Maybe we would be better off just to point out that it was only the Russian boycott of the Security Council in 1950 which permitted unanimity and assignment to the U.S. of the responsibility of defending South Korea. Fifteen other nations in one way or another did contribute, save with the exception of the United Kingdom, token forces and medical units to carry out the military task.

As to the General Assembly, to be strictly accurate, it was the U.S. proposal adopted before Korea, under the popular title, "Uniting for Peace," which was designed whenever applied by 2/3rds majority to circumvent paralysis of the Security Council and to make the General Assembly an effective instrument for keeping the peace.

This basic resolution in the U.N. General Assembly is the organic and permissive resolution which, when considered in conjunction with Articles 51 and 52 of the U.N. Charter, is intended to allow some liberty of action for the free nations of the west.

It was the resolution upon which Lester Pearson of Canada relied as to the U.N. Emergency Force being sent to Suez in 1956. It also was invoked to justify the creation of a committee to look into the Hungarian revolt.

Perhaps it was going a trifle too far to say that the last session of the General Assembly "demonstrated conclusively" the near impossibility of now getting desirable action under this resolution. When the Assembly votes on various propositions, it acts by 2/3rds of those members voting. Hence, the favorite dodge

II - Report

December 22, 1957

Alliances and the United Nations

Nothing said about our alliance system should be taken as a derogation of the United Nations. The United Nations remains the greatest symbol of man's hope for peace. It has proved its ability to act in a number of situations from Korea to Suez. It remains an indispensable forum for expressing the hopes of humanity and an effective instrument for pursuing all ends of war.

Still it would be idle to pretend that under present circumstances the United Nations can replace our alliance policy. The Soviet veto in the Security Council prevents effective action in all situations where Communist powers are parties to the dispute. The General Assembly is still in the first tentative stages of its gravest threat to the security of the world. Moreover, many other dangers may see the United Nations paralyzed either by Communist intransigence or by disputes among U.N. members extraneous to the issues actually at stake. Thus while we should strive to transform resistance to aggression into the widest possible expression of the police powers of humanity, we cannot permit the world to be dominated by hostile states because these have been able to hamstring the machinery of the United Nations. Failing United Nations action we should try to act in concert with the widest grouping of states attainable -- a possibility foreseen in Articles 51 and 52 which has provided the juridical basis of our system of alliances within the world organization. Our system of alliances thus is not an alternative to the United Nations but its complement: it can provide security where the processes of the United Nations may be too slow or its action ineffective.

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December 22, 1957

- 49 -

Pressure on Our Alliance System

To assert that alliances are important does not imply that all is well
with our alliance policy. Any evaluation must recognize three sets of forces
tending to weaken our system of alliances: the fear of Communist military
power, the ambiguity of communist tactics of aggression, and the lack of a
defense concept offering to our allies reasonable prospects of security. Any
alliance embracing a large number of nations over a considerable territory
tends to diminish in effectiveness, especially in the face of a challenge that
does not present a clear and present danger to the entire alliance. Our allies
are faced with a situation in which, at one and the same time, the danger of
war seems less imminent and the fear of the consequences of war grows greater.

In Europe and in Asia, the communist bloc is steadily improving its military
capabilities, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Against the
threat of nuclear attack, many of our allies have little defense of their own.
The fear that the use of even the smallest atomic weapon would involve
enormous destruction -- a fear assiduously fostered by the U.S.S.R. -- has
evade some weakened the will to resist of many of our allies, in and out of NATO.

A correlative force contributing to the reluctance of many countries to
make a substantial military effort is the growing cost and complexity of modern
weapons. This imposes a fearful burden on frail economies as well as requiring
skills and facilities which some of our allies do not have. The attainment of a
capability to deter or to check local aggression is made much more difficult and
in many cases such capabilities are actually decreasing, while the need for

Risk
Dean
NAR
[y]

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December 22, 1957

- 50 -

such local deterrents has become greater than ever. Aggravating the other pressures on our alliance arrangements is the concept of aggression which underlies them. Existing treaties essentially are concerned with open attack by armed regular troops, and do not cover a whole range of communist aggressive techniques, from a civil war or economic strangulation to slow takeovers by communist-guided and communist-armed fifth columns.

As a result the communist bloc has learned that if it keeps its challenges sufficiently ambiguous, and below the level which the non-communist world considers to warrant major military action, we and our allies may prove unable or unwilling to take effective action. Neither Korea, nor Indochina, for example, seemed to some of our allies worth running major risks, and Suez found the shoe on the other foot. Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are very similar find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response (whether or not the response involves force or lesser measures).

## Alliance Strategy

One of the major problems faced by our alliance policy is to devise a military strategy equally meaningful to us and to our allies. In view of its manifold interests and commitments the United States has been understandably reluctant to commit itself specifically to defend allied territories, and has relied largely on its strategic striking power, supplemented by mobile sea and tactical air power, to deter aggression at all levels. While our allies have of necessity acquiesced in this concept, they have never abandoned their wish to see their own homelands protected from local invasion or devastation.

II - Report
December 22, 1957

This difference of concepts has meant that, with the partial exception
of NATO our security arrangements are not based on a military strategy equally
<u>confidential</u>
<u>meaningful</u> to all partners. This lack of an agreed strategy has resulted in
weaknesses, indecisions and contradictions at all levels of our security
arrangements. It has led to endless difficulties in formulating and implementing
U.S. base agreements and military aid programs. There have been disagreements
among the U.S. services concerning military requirements and programs. And
there has been a reluctance on the part of our allies to make or to meet specific
force commitments, partly because the function those forces would perform has
been so vague. Moreover our strategy is largely atomic, those of our allies
generally non-atomic, and their forces are designed accordingly. Thus as
nuclear weapons and delivery systems increase, present allied forces will
become less capable of making <u>major</u> military contributions to other than
internal security missions <u>unless they have a degree of atomic capability</u>.

The United States must therefore make a concerted effort, together with
its allies, to develop and obtain plans meeting the joint security requirements
of <u>all</u> partners. The act of consultation will be of itself of great significance
for one of the reasons for the sense of impotence of many of our allies is
ignorance about the nature of modern military technology and a sense of being
left out from decisions which affect their fate. If allied forces are to be capable
of acting in concert with U.S. forces, we will have to assist in their transformation and development. This does not mean we should equip all allied elements

MAR

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December 22, 1957

along the lines of comparable U.S. units. To the maximum degree possible
both the types and levels of equipment provided allied forces should be
tailored to the missions which suit their particular security requirements.
make demands upon
And we should not set standards for our allies based on our own levels of
technology. But We must establish a measure of harmony between the tactical
doctrine of our allies and our own and equip the respective forces accordingly.

In effect, the free world is faced with a task of strengthening and
re-equipping its forces at least comparable in magnitude to that which it faced
in 1950, and at a time when both rapidly changing technology and, in many parts
of the world, decreasing popular support for military programs combine to make
the job even more costly and difficult. It is probable that the United States
will have to provide -- either directly or indirectly -- much of the equipment
needed by our allies, or else see their political stability decline along with
their military strength. As a result, U.S. military aid programs will necessarily
be costly.
Substantial increment of

Nor are the proposed military measures sufficient by themselves. They
must be supplemented by positive programs for political cohesiveness, for
economic and technical cooperation, and by other measures discussed more
fully by various groups of the overall study project of which this panel is but
one part.

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December 22, 1957

The actions required to strengthen our system of alliances will be
neither easy nor cheap. And, despite our efforts, we can still expect to
be confronted with situations in which the choice may seem to lie between
acquiescence in communist aggression or acceptance of splits among our
allies. This much we can say concerning such decisions: we must act with
resolution or accept grave losses.