TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>Preface</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>I</td><td>The Developing Power Framework</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>II</td><td>The Role of Research and Development</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>III</td><td>Approach to a Rational Military Program</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>IV</td><td>The Strategic Stand-off and Limited War</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>V</td><td>The Problem of Tactical Atomic Weapons</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>VI</td><td>Strategic and Tactical Forces - Their Interrelationship</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>VII</td><td>Organization of The Defense Department</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>VIII</td><td>Alliances and the Role of Force</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>IX</td><td>The Special Problem of NATO</td><td>63</td></tr><tr><td>X</td><td>Disarmament</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>XI</td><td>Civil Defense</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>XII</td><td>Budget For National Security</td><td>82</td></tr></tbody></table>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>XII</td><td>Budget for National Security</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>XI</td><td>Civil Defense</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>X</td><td>Disarmament</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>IX</td><td>The Special Problem of NATO</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>VIII</td><td>Alliances and the Role of Force</td><td>83</td></tr><tr><td>VII</td><td>Organization of the Defense Department</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>VI</td><td>Strategic and Tactical Forces - Their Interrelationship</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>V</td><td>The Problem of Tactical Atomic Weapons</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>IV</td><td>The Strategic Stand-off and Limited War</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>III</td><td>Approach to a Rational Military Program</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>II</td><td>The Role of Research and Development</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>I</td><td>The Developing Power Framework</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Preface</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Page</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

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PREFACE
---

Subpanel II of the Special Studies Project sponsored by the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund was charged with exploring the problems and opportunities
facing the United States during the next 10 - 15 years in the field of "inter-
national security objectives and strategy". The Report which follows represent
our group efforts to discharge this formidable assignment. While we have
achieved general agreement and a remarkable consensus on the major points,
it must be said that not every member of the Subpanel subscribes in detail
to every statement in the Report.

We are living through a period of broad, swift, far-reaching change,
with indications that the impersonal forces at work are rendering man's con-
trol over events ever more precarious. The past 45 years have witnessed two
global wars of tremendous violence, one Russian and two Chinese revolutions,
the collapse of great empires and the drastic decline of the French and British
systems. These events have basically altered the distribution of power that
existed in 1914, which power has gravitated increasingly to two centers, the
United States and the Soviet Union. These two super-states, animated by
purposes in fundamental conflict, now confront each other across the world,
each holding in readiness sufficient power to destroy the other and, perhaps
civilization. The present world struggle has become a highly complex and
explosive mixture of three distinct, but related, power drives: 1) the 'relent-
less ambitions of a scavenger Communism to undermine a Europe gravely
weakened by two World Wars and the dissolution of the colonial system, to

weakened by two World Wars and the dissolution of the colonial system, to
less ambitions of a scavenger Communism to undermine a Europe gravely
explosive mixture of three distinct, but related, power drives: 1) the relevant
civilization, The present world order has become a highly complex and
each holding in readiness sufficient power to destroy the other and, perhaps
purposes in fundamental conflict, now confront each other across the world,
United States and the Soviet Union. These two super-states, animated by
extinct in 1914, which power has gravitated increasingly to two centers, the
systems. These events have basically altered the distribution of power that
the collapse of great empires and the drastic decline of the French and British
global wars of tremendous violence, one Russian and two Chinese revolutions,
total over events ever more悲壮. The past 42 years have witnessed two
with indications that the imperial forces at work are tendering war's a con-
We are living through a period of broad, swift, tax-reaching change,
to every statement in the Report.

it must be said that not every member of the Subterranean subordinates in detail
achieved general agreement and a remarkable consensus on the major points,
out group efforts to discharge this formidable statement. While we have
national security objectives and� strategy. The Report which follows represents
facing the United States during the next 10 - 12 years in the field of "inter-
Brothers Fund was charged with exploring the problems and obstacles
Subterranean II of the Special Studies Project sponsored by the Rockefeller

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prevent the coming to vigorous freedom of the newly emergent nations in Asia, and to achieve the politico-military isolation of the United States; and 2) the deep, insistent purpose of the backward peoples to achieve political freedom and rapid economic development, 3) the determination of a powerful United States to preserve the integrity and vitality of its own free society whose nourishment and growth, it realizes, is dependent upon the preservation and expansion of free society elsewhere.

After several month's reflection on the military implications of this situation, as to those major world problems which face us now and those which will in all probability continue to face us during the 10 - 15 year time span under consideration, our deepest impression is this: that the United States stands in urgent need of a clear strategic concept--a considered theoretical doctrine--to guide our conduct of global policy and our application of military power. This is the paramount need. The United States can, without question, create and maintain all of the elements of power necessary to survive - and not just precariously, but in confident strength and leadership. The really pressing task is, rather, to achieve an understanding of the meaning of power in the air-atomic era and to apply this understanding in the course of freedom and world stability.

The overriding politico-military fact of our world is that the US and the USSR are now, or will soon be, capable of destroying each other by large scale nuclear attack. To us this means that a general war fought without

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restraint might produce varying degrees of defeat, but no meaningful victory.
This ominous threat of mutual thermonuclear devastation thus provides a
somber backdrop against which national aspirations, on both sides of the
Iron Curtain, must be set, and makes it clear that rational men can no longer
contend for total solutions in war. On the other hand the power struggle does
not abate; therefore the renunciation of force would not in present circum-
stances be consistent with our survival.

It seems fundamental to us that the United States is faced in this era
with two distinctive military problems, and that it must develop means to
cope with both if the free world is to maintain itself. The first is to deter our
major enemies from resort to general war; the second is to prevent the Soviets
and Chinese of their satellites from conducting effective limited aggression
against any additional areas of the free world. While the two problems are
intimately related, in fact interdependent, they are not one and the same; nor
is it possible to solve both with the same military means. Success in the first
will depend upon our maintenance and continued development of strategic
striking power and continental defenses, and upon our unflinching determina-
tion to use that power against a major aggressor, if the provocation is so
extreme that no other course of action would be consistent with our continued
national integrity. Only under the protection of a powerful strategic deterrent
can the United States seriously contemplate lesser military operations.
Success in the second will depend on our possession of the will and the means

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to use power with sublety and discrimination for limited political and military
purposes.

The central fact for us is that these two distinct military concepts
represent interdependent halves of the only viable strategy open to the United
States, and that our default with respect to either could mean disaster for the
free world. Failure to develop such a coherent strategy will, in our judgment,
present the gravest danger that the relentless and bewildering advance of
science, spawning weapons of ever greater range and destructive power, will
come to dominate policy, to the detriment of mankind. Already there is dis-
turbing evidence that, as a result of our inadequate response to the concept-
ual challenge, we are in danger of becoming the victims, rather than the
masters, of our military technology. On the other hand, achievement of a
coherent doctrine and the capabilities needed to give it effective expression
will enable us to face with reasonable confidence even the worst possibilities
of a catastrophic age.

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# I. THE DEVELOPING POWER FRAMEWORK

The next 10 - 15 years are certain to see changes that will significantly influence the military position of the United States and its Allies. A number of the closely related economic, technological, psychological and political developments are foreseeable. Major trends in these general fields will all be influenced by the onward rush of technology, and by the power of decision and the system of priorities which authoritarian Communist government is able to apply.

The trends will include:
1) continued rapid economic growth of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, and less rapid economic growth of the United States and Western Europe;
2) achievement and maintenance of sufficiency in military technology by the U.S.S.R., particularly in those areas assigned high priority by the Kremlin;
3) continued increase by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain in the number and variety of nuclear weapons possessed;
4) disappearance of the concept of "scarcity" in calculations concerning use of nuclear weapons by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and, to a lesser extent, by Britain;
5) development of an atomic weapons capability by several other countries;
6) increased complexity in weapons technology, with a corresponding increase in the difficulty of deciding among prospective weapon systems and in the cost and effort of developing, manufacturing and maintaining them;
7) continued willingness on the part of the Communist Bloc to maintain very large military forces deployed against the non-Communist world;
8) increased

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and more knowledgeable awareness of the destructiveness of atomic weapons and 9) continued manifestations of the eternal fact that the aspiration to freedom remains a powerful force in the affairs of men.

As a general proposition, technological developments over the next 10 - 15 years in warheads and delivery systems are likely to continue to add to the power of offense, relative to the defense. Our Subpanel is not disposed to predict that means cannot be developed to counter with reasonable effectiveness the foreseeable developments in offense, but it appears to us that the defensive task grows ever more difficult. The advent of large numbers of high performance, long range offensive guided missiles will greatly aggravate the problems of warning and air defense. On the other hand, they will make effective retaliation more certain. It is our judgment that an effective active defense is likely to grow more expensive in the years ahead, both for the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

The U.S. has in the past been afflicted by a general tendency to underestimate the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. in military technology. The following appear to be facts:

1) Soviet science is at least equal to our own in most military applications;

2) Employing a system of effective priorities, Soviet engineering developments in weapons are adequate to achieve the objectives they decide upon;

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3) The total capability of Soviet technology grows larger, enabling the assignment of high priority to an ever increasing number of projects, and

4) The U.S.S.R. has achieved shorted lead-times for major weapons developments than we have.

The principal points of present U.S. military advantage would seem to be the following:

1) We have a superior long-range bomber force and a more advantageous-positioned forward base system.

2) We have superior and more flexible naval power, and

3) We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety thereof.

These advantages must be qualified, however, by a number of caveats:

1) The long-range bomber capability is not a static asset. It is always in competition with improving defenses, for example, in the never ending "chess game" of electronic counter measures. Its speed and performance must be ever improved, but by the laws of nature a sacrifice of range is the usual price of higher performance. Some forward bases are politically vulnerable, and the system as a whole is deficient in intermediate bases. The readiness of our strategic force is somewhat handicapped by lack of alternate crews, a shortage of family housing, and pay scales inadequate to hold experienced flight and maintenance personnel. For dearth of dispersed and "hardened" bases and fully reliable early warning, SAC is not invulnerable to surprise attack. In short, the job of maintaining superiority, even in a

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field where we have it, is neither easy nor inexpensive.

2) Our naval power also has vulnerabilities which seem bound to grow more worrisome with time. The aircraft carrier is relatively, although not entirely, free of the political uncertainties affecting forward air bases in foreign territories. It also enjoys a degree of mobility for escaping attack. More generally, it is clear that the surface ship, combatant and transport alike, has an important offensive role in limited war for a long time to come. Also in defending the United States against hostile missile-launching submarines we think it plausible that carriers and other surface vessels, supported by a competent detection system, can greatly assist our shore-based defensive air forces. Surface ships are likewise invaluable, at present, in extending the continental air warning system in the sea approaches, and carrier-based aircraft could be of considerable assistance in repelling an actual attack.

Nevertheless, surface ships, including carriers, will be increasingly vulnerable to nuclear attack, and we must recognize that during the next 10 - 15 years other instruments, like the submarine and the guided missile, must be brought along to supplement and eventually to supplant large surface ships.

3) The third point of assumed U.S. military advantage is in the number and variety of atomic weapons. Here it must be said that U.S. weapons research and development will not always be more skilled than the Russian; and as to our more abundant supply of fissionable material, we believe the Soviets

as to our more sproutant subly of flashable material, we believe the Soviet
search and development will not always be more skilled than the German; and
and variety of atomic weapons. Here it must be said that U. S. weapons re-

3) The third point of assumed U.S. military advantage is in the number
 Missiles.

must be brought along to supplement and eventually to subplant large surface
to 10 - 15 years other instruments, like the submarine and the anti-aircraft,
vulnerable to nuclear attack, and we must recognize that during the next

aircraft could be of considerable assistance in repelling an actual attack,
continental air warning system in the sea approaches, and carrier-based
forces. Surface ships are likewise unavailable, at present, in extending the
beyond detection of a ship, can greatly assist our shore-based defensive air

think it plausible that carriers and other surface vessels, supported by a com-
defending the United States against hostile missile-launching submarines we
an important offensive role in limited war for a long time to come. Also in
generally, it is clear that the surface ship, combatant and transport ship, pas-
sionaries. It also enjoys a degree of mobility for reaching attack. More

therefore, due to the political uncertainties affecting toward air passes in foreign
more worrisome with time. The aircraft carrier is relatively, although not en-

8) Our naval power also has vulnerabilities which seem bound to show

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can make good any critical shortage in this respect during the next 10 - 15
years.

As to Soviet capabilities; the Kremlin appears to place high priority on
the creation and maintenance of long-range atomic striking power. The Soviets
now possess a considerable nuclear and thermonuclear capability against the
U.S., and in a few years attacks of extreme severity should be possible
against all our major centers of population and industry. For the immediate
future, the delivery system will be the manned aircraft with guided missiles
coming along sometime after 1960.

They are laying heavy stress on missiles and missile power plants and
will probably have a submarine - launched missile in the near future. Their
intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) should be ready within three years,
and their inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) within five years.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking
system, supported by a small number of supersonic interceptor aircraft and
large numbers of all-weather subsonic, interceptors. Ground-to-air missiles
of short range and apparently the major element of local air defense.

Their preponderance in ground forces permits them to handle any plausible threat on the ground-- from China or Western Europe, in the satellites, or in maintaining political control inside the Soviet Union.

The Soviets are concentrating on submarines and have already built a
fleet of over 400, a number greatly in excess of the German submarine force

The Soviets are concentrating on submarines and have already built a fleet of over 4000, a number greatly in excess of the German submarine force.

The preponderance in ground forces permits them to handle any blast of short range and apparently the major element of local air defense.

large numbers of all-weather subsonic, intercontinental, ground-to-surface missiles, authorized by a small number of subsonic interceptor aircraft and Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system.

and their inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) within five years.

Intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) should be ready within three years, will probably have a submarine - launched missile in the next future. Their

They are laying heavy attacks on missiles and missile power plants and

coming along somewhat after 1960.

U.S.A., and in a few years attacks of extreme severity should be possible

now possible a considerable nuclear and thermonuclear capability against the

As to Soviet capabilities: the Kremlin appears to place high priority on

years.

can make good any critical shortage in this respect during the next 10 - 12

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which constituted a mortal threat to surface shipping during the early stages
of World War II. Although there is no evidence that the Soviets have as yet
built a nuclear powered submarine, we must assume their technical capacity
for doing so.

## II. THE ROLE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

In the technical race with the Communist Bloc, some very knowledge-
able people are deeply concerned that our present application of science and
technology to military problems lags behind the Soviet effort and that there
exists a serious danger of our being overtaken and outclassed with a decade,
unless drastic changes are introduced. This concern stems from the convic-
tion that Soviet technology is not qualitatively inferior to our own, at least
in those fields where a concentrated effort is made; and from the apparent fact
that the Soviets are exerting both a greater total scientific effort and a
greater specific effort on weapons systems and other aspects of military de-
velopment. The danger therefore exists that our qualitative superiority, which
we must retain to offset the ability of the Communist Bloc to support substan-
tially larger numbers of men under arms, will be lost. Were this to happen,
the psychological effect upon neutrals, allies and our own people would
probably be severely damaging to the cause of the Free World, to our own
national prestige and even to our military position.

Retention of our qualitative superiority in weapons systems and tech-
niques is directly dependent on the effectiveness of our research, which is

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in turn dependent upon a coherent and purposeful organization of our technical and scientific resources. While we cannot pretend in this Report to deal comprehensively with this broad and difficult subject, we do perceive of three ways in which our position could be immediately improved, namely, (1) by more inducements and better training for high-quality scientific manpower, (2) by a larger and earlier participation by scientists and other technical experts in the process of formulating weapons requirements, and (3) by a better integration of the research effort on certain large and urgent problems (like anti-submarine warfare) which comprise a variety of related smaller problems.

Our country has reason to be proud of the techniques it has developed for integrating the engineering and production resources of industry into the fulfillment of military requirements for weapons and equipment. The mistakes and inefficiencies which become evident on occasion usually result not from basic flaws in the system, but from bad managerial judgment, or inadequate and erratic funding. The successful marriage of science and management is a different matter. Never entirely easy, it seems to be especially difficult in the U.S. defense establishment, in spite of complete agreement on its critical importance to the security of the country. The reasons for this anomaly are several, but the more important ones are subtle and arguable and we can deal with only a few of the problems in this report.

The U.S. is short of scientists and engineers. It needs to make better use of the ones it has, and both the quality and the quantity must be

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increased. The present deficiency will not cure itself, but will become more severe during the next decade unless vigorous national action is taken to alleviate it. The management of military research and development, representing the major source of demand, has great reason and great power to assist in the alleviation.

More effective use should be made of the knowledge and methods of science in the military decision-making process: for the guidance of military research and development, in the setting of military requirements for new weapons, and in the formulation of strategy and tactics for their employment.

It is also our view that while government-operated and government-supported laboratories make useful contributions to military research, these are not on the whole very impressive. Frequently the thinness of the work seems a direct consequence of the fragmentation of the effort; that is to say, a laboratory is too often charged with responsibility for developing a single weapon without sufficient reference to the other components that go to make up a modern weapons system. The laboratory may accordingly lack an important, intelligible and integrated task to carry out and its performance will accordingly suffer. The outstanding work of those few laboratories which have been charged with responsibility for broad, self-contained subject areas leads us to believe that a great deal is to be gained through this approach.

The Atomic Energy Commission, through wisdom and circumstances, gave to the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory the comprehensible and tech-

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nically comprehensive responsibility for research and exploratory development
on <u>all</u> atomic weapons. This responsibility extended to the weapons to be
used by <u>all</u> three military services and the Los Alamos effort was closely
coupled to a strong developmental organation at Saudia. Faced with this high
challenge, the management and staff at Los Alamos turned in a superb techni-
cal performance in the face of severe handicaps, while developing strong
leaders and staff competence. Based on the same principle of concentration
on a major task, the Lincoln Laboratory is developing into a strong center of
expertness on the manifold problems of air defense, warning and interception.
In our view, a similar concentration of research effort on anti-submarine war-
fare is immediately desirable, and the Government should also examine other
major problems to which this technique could be usefully applied.

It is important for responsible government officials to understand the
importance and nature of technical "breakthrough". With thermonuclear war-
heads of manageable size and weight yielding almost unmanageable amounts
of explosive power, it makes little sense to look for startling increases in
the magnitude of energy release. Similarly, if a ballistic missile can span
a quarter of the world in half an hour, even a doubling of its speed will not
be of great strategic interest. But a technique that can locate a submarine
more accurately at usefully greater distances, than can make possible com-
munications with our arctic warning line under all atmosphere conditions,
that can improve the accuracy of a long range missile, that can add 20 per

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cent to the altitude and range of a strategic bomber - these are the important areas of potential "breakthrough". They are examples, too, of the need for intimate understanding between science and strategy.

A major sin committed in the name of orderly management of military research and development is the imposition of a fixed rate of total spending from year to year in an effort to avoid wasteful "peaks and valleys." *First*, monetary inflation makes a level budget result in a declining rate of effort. Second, as technology becomes more complex, the tools of research become more expensive and the cost of supporting each scientist goes up. Third, the rate of replacement of weapons can be determined only in part by our own decisions. The rate of the enemy's improvement cannot be disregarded when his achievements appear as military weapons in being. Fourth, while scientific research may proceed effectively at an orderly rate of expenditure, requirements for major systems engineering developments come into being at irregular intervals, when an achievement in research promises sufficient increase in combat potential to justify the expense and effort of devising a new weapons system.

In our view, one tragic aspect of the developing situation is the failure of the United States to draw upon the rich store of scientific talent in Western Europe for assistance in military research. According to our information, this asset is being largely wasted because of the legal and procedural obstacles to providing qualified Europeans with the necessary classified

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information. We think this situation is plainly alien to our own security in-
terests, and particularly intolerable because it stems in great part from the
illusion that we still have scientific secrets to withhold. We appear to be
in the absurd position of withholding from our allies information and develop-
ments which Soviet science already possesses.

Revision of our security policies and procedures to permit a reasonably
free exchange of the latest technical information between US research agencies
and those of our NATO allies is an urgently needed first step toward a solution
to this problem. It should be followed by official encouragement and support
of a unified military research and development effort in Western Europe de-
signed to concentrate the available European talent on problems of NATO de-
fense. Such a unified research effort would, in our judgment, strengthen
the Europeans' sense of responsibility for their own defense and could there-
fore lead to a more significant defense effort in Europe. The present situation
excludes Europe from technical knowledge possessed by the US and limits
European industry to the production of old-model and obsolescent weapons;
it thus precludes a full European contribution to NATO and imposes a dis-
proportionate burden on the United States, as to both research and manufacture.
By thus depriving Europe of a fully meaningful participation in the developing
defense effort, it threatens European self-confidence and morale. If our
judgment concerning the present and future capabilities of Soviet science are
even generally correct, then we cannot afford any longer to deny ourselves
this very significant asset.

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### III. APPROACH TO A RATIONAL MILITARY PROGRAM

As the cost of weapons systems grows, as the lead-time from drawing board to field operations lengthens, as the technological choices open to scientists and military men multiply into the thousands, the question as to how the United States is to maintain the necessary military strength will be asked with increasing urgency. We are reasonably clear in our minds (1) that our total resources are adequate and (2) that given leadership and an understanding of the facts, the American people will sustain whatever level of military effort is necessary. The question for us therefore centers not so much upon the extent of our resources, as upon the spirit and skill with which we organize, develop and apply them - physical, human, and financial.

Underlying the technical complexities is the practical question as to what general level of military strength the United States should strive to achieve and maintain, both absolutely and in relation to the military strength of other nations -- avowed enemies, neutrals and allies. This question is given particular point by the possibility that within 10-15 years certain additional nations will have achieved ample stocks of atomic, and possibly hydrogen, weapons, thus bringing the present bipolarity of nuclear power to an end. A clear answer is rendered especially difficult by the revolutionary swiftness with which military technology is advancing; and yet a practical, reasonable finding must be made if the United States is to avoid irrational levels of military expenditure. In a later section of this report, we attempt

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to answer this question in terms of general dollar expenditures and composition of forces. Here we are concerned with developing a conceptual approach to the problem and with establishing more definite criteria for determining (1) the general level of necessary military expenditure and (2) the allocation of funds as between the several types of forces to be developed and maintained.

Essentially we believe that, in order to hold off general war and otherwise maintain the reasonable safety of the Free World, the United States must have a combined force capable of destroying a selected target system in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and of discharging a variety of military tasks related to limited war; but that we do not necessarily need for these purposes strategic and tactical forces quantitatively and in all other respects "superior" to those of the Soviet Union. We may need marked superiority in certain types of capability, but in other areas a Soviet effort greater than ours should not concern us unduly. We believe therefore that the level of our military effort should be determined, not by reference to such abstract bench marks as "superiority", "relatively greater strength", "parity" or "sufficiency", but by the forces required to carry out a number of particular tasks. Ideally, the tasks should be defined, the type and size of forces required to carry them out should then be determined, and the resulting cost of such forces should form the basis of the appropriations request to Congress. If this approach were adopted, we would have a firmer basis for judging the adequacy of our military establishment at any given time. The test would be

agreement of our military establishment at any given time. The test would be
if this approach were adopted, we would have a further basis for making the
amount forces should form the basis of the appropriations required to Congress.
deduced to carry them out should then be determined, and the resulting cost of
tasks. Ideally, the tasks should be defined, the type and size of forces re-
"efficiency," but by the forces required to carry out a number of particular
punch marks as "authority," "relatively greater amount," "partly" or
our military effort should be determined, not by reference to such spadact
ours should not concern us mainly. We believe therefore that the level of
in certain types of capability, but in other areas a Soviet effort greater than
"enforcer," to those of the Soviet Union. We may need marked authority
complete strategic and tactical forces quantitatively and in all other respects
tasks related to limited war, but that we do not necessarily need for these
in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and of discharging a variety of military
must have a combined force capable of destroying a selected target system
otherwise maintaining the reasonable safety of the free World, the United States
basically we believe that, in order to hold off general war and
of funds as between the several types of forces to be developed and maintained.
(i) the general level of necessarily military expenditure and (2) the allocation
the problem and with establishing more definite criteria for determining
of forces. Here we are concerned with developing a central approach to
answer this question in terms of general dollar expenditures and combination

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not "sufficiency" in the abstract, but sufficiency for performing the particular
tasks which in their sum define the nature and shape of our national military
problem.

In advocating this approach, we fully understand that the arms race
is dynamic and that maintenance of the present Communist reluctance to wage
general war will depend to a large extent upon the continued improvement of
our air-atomic striking force, warning systems, and air and civil defenses.
In particular, we cannot glimpse the end of the race for greater accuracy,
reliability and reaction time of delivery systems. But we also understand
that, given the developing advantage of the offense vis-a-vis the defense,
the number of nuclear weapons and vehicles necessary to inflict intolerable
destruction upon our enemies is definitely finite; and that we are likely to
reach a point of development -- with the advent of large numbers of long-
range missiles operated from well-hidden, subterranean launching sites --
beyond which the enlargement of this aspect of our offensive capability
would have no strategic significance.

We also believe there is much weight to the argument that a "techno-
logical breakthrough" in any sense comparable to the development of the
first atomic bomb in 1945 is unlikely within the foreseeable future. This
means to us that it is doubtful whether either the USSR or the US will
achieve a new weapon or instrument with which it could hope to force its
enemy to general surrender or even to a series of particular and limited

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concessions. For whatever the new development, the other side would
probably continue to possess a capacity for devastating counterattack; unless
its nerve failed, it could not be blackmailed into giving up this capability.
Moreover, nations are not prone to risk their very lives on such slender and
unreliable factors as temporary technological advantage, both the extent and
duration of which would be difficult to measure with even reasonable precis-
ion. We think this cautious attitude is particularly characteristic of the
Soviet Government, which still feels itself less than fully secure at home
and which, despite aggressive probing actions against the outer world,
has shown a deep-seated reluctance to pursue courses which carry with
them a serious risk of provoking nuclear attack upon the "home base" of the
Communist revolution.

We conclude that a rational approach to the necessary level of our
military effort will involve, first, an analysis of the distinctive military
problems facing the United States. These problems arise in part from our
geographical position, in part from our formal treaty agreements, and in
part from the special responsibility we have accepted for leading, sustain-
ing and protecting the civilized order against an aggressive, powerful
revolutionary movement which occupies the Eurasian "Heartland". Our
military problems are comparable to, but by no means identical with,
those facing the USSR. Therefore we must seek satisfactory solutions to
our distinctive problems, without attempting to match our enemy item for item.

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IV. THE STRATEGIC STAND-OFF AND LIMITED WAR

In the basic struggle between the Communist Bloc and the Free World there now exists a strategic military balance or stand-off, based on the capability of each major protagonist to deliver devastating nuclear attacks on the territory of the other. Although this condition is essentially dynamic, rather than static, there appears to be a growing awareness on both sides that "total destruction now faces total destruction across the abyss" and that deliberate resort to general war would not constitute a rational policy for either side, because of the virtual impossibility of insuring against effective counterattack. In our judgment, the advent of long and medium-range missiles in operational numbers (to be expected within the next decade) will tend to reinforce this stand-off because it will be far more difficult for an attacking force to find and destroy the small, numerous, well-dispersed and well-hidden missile launching sites, than it is at present to mount an effective strike against the large airfields from which long-range bombers must operate. It is therefore our belief that deliberate resort to general war has become less likely, certainly for the period in which significant atomic striking power is essentially bi-polar, and probably also in the later period when a number of other nations will have achieved a meaningful atomic capability.

Nothing in the conception of strategic stand-off should be construed
as in any way derogating the fundamental importance of SAC and our

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supplementary air-atomic striking forces. On the contrary, the capacity of these forces to visit swift and terrible destruction on the territory of our principal enemies <u>and the known willingness of the U.S. Government to employ them without hesitation if the provocation is so extreme that no other course of action would be consistent with our continued national integrity</u> are the principal props upholding the stalemate. Our transcendent obligation is to make sure that our enemies can never doubt our will to use these forces and can never logically calculate that a nuclear exchange would be to their advantage. Our conclusion above that deliberate resort to general war has become less likely must accordingly be qualified by these assumptions about the readiness of our strategic striking forces and the existence of a stern national resolve to take whatever measures are required.

This new military situation has not, however, altered the Soviet Communist purpose to eliminate all centers of power and influence beyond its control; it has tended merely to shift the effort to other planes where the struggle goes forward with perhaps increased intensity. Indeed the strategic military stand-off has opened up new opportunities for Communism because, within broad limits, it has neutralized the principal instrument chosen by the United States for deterring Communist military advance and for inhibiting Communist resort to subversion, infiltration and coup d'état.

So long as the United States was not itself vulnerable to heavy nuclear attack, our strategic air-atomic force served as an indirect restraint upon

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at least the manner and scale of Soviet probing actions against the Western World, but it is significant that even an atomic monopoly in American hands did not prevent the Communist guerrilla actions against Greece in 1947, the severe pressures against Turkey in the same year, the ruthless coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948 or the Berlin Blockade. Nor did concern for its great inferiority in atomic weapons prevent the Soviets from sending the North Korean Army across the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950.

Crucial events in the cold war have thus demonstrated (1) our own reluctance to employ strategic air-atomic power in response to limited challenges, even when this involved no risk of physical damage to the United States, and (2) the Soviet willingness to press local situations to the point of crisis even in the face of our immense atomic superiority. Now that the Soviets can themselves inflict severe nuclear devastation on the United States, the limited value of our own strategic atomic striking force as a deterrent to local probing actions or small-scale military aggression has become obvious. Though it holds off general war, strategic air power alone is not an adequate underpinning for our foreign policy, because it confines our diplomacy to the awesome choices of unlimited war of default. Inherently, it is not a flexible instrument we can readily use as a means of controlling the recurrent crises of the cold war, because the power it wields is too destructive and too final. Now that a kind of strategic umbrella has been spread, under the cover of which certain types of small-scale military

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and quasi-military operations can be conducted by either side without unacceptable risk of general war, the world has probably entered upon an era of limited warfare. This is, we believe, the meaning of the strategic stand-off.

The Communist challenges are being pressed with an apparently keen understanding of this new power situation; and this fact is revealing the weakness of our heavy, almost exclusive reliance on strategic air-atomic power as a means of deterring or countering Communist advance. Although there is some evidence to suggest that the United States Government has begun to perceive this imbalance, it has not yet shown a willingness either to embrace the concept of limited war -- with its clear implication of less than total victory -- or to devise and build the ready, mobile, highly trained tactical forces needed for the effective conduct of limited military operations. Meanwhile the great disparity between the nature of the particular challenges confronting us and the nature of our current attitudes toward meeting them is producing an evident paralysis of our military policy.

Taking into account both the strategic military stand-off and the fact that the cold war moves relentlessly on, we are brought to a basic conclusion: that a strong air-atomic striking force, though vital, does not by itself constitute the kind of military strength we need; for its use -- at least against our principal enemy -- now implies our own destruction. In a true sense the strategic force can fulfil its mission only if it is never used. Therefore, in addition to a strategic force, we need

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a tactical force to protect our world-wide interests, support our diplomacy, and permit our cooperation with all free nations in preventing further Communist expansion by military means or the threat of military means. We must, in other words, be willing and able to conduct limited military operations with weapons and forces commensurate with limited objectives, so that the free countries can deal firmly with local threats without raising the question of survival for every nation in every crisis.

The popular discontent in this country generated by what has been called "the undigested experience" of the Korean War would indicate that the concept of limited warfare is foreign to current American thought and, perhaps, alien to the American temperament, and it is undeniable that at least since World War I, we have tended to nurture the illusion that clear distinctions exist between "peace" and "war." This latter penchant has led us frequently to renounce force when its modest application could have forestalled the danger of major war, but then to embrace total and unrestrained force when, largely as a result of our lack of prudence, our national survival was placed in immediate peril. These attitudes of immaturity, developed in more tranquil times, have cost us much. In the era of atomic abundance when a policy of total solutions in war is synonymous with suicide of the civilized order, we are certain they will not prove consistent with our leadership of a world-wide coalition facing the incessant and pervasive challenge of a revolutionary enemy. We think it imperative

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to bring the American people back to an understanding that existed in the early days of the Republic: namely, that struggle is endemic in every era; that "peace" is not the normal condition of relations between nations; and that the hope of avoiding both great war and decisive loss of national position depends on achieving the will to identify national interests with precision, to accept risks for their defense, and to use power with reasoned forethought and discrimination. These elementary truths of statecraft apply with compelling force to the present somber time when our task is to avoid both general atomic holocaust and the loss of our world position through progressive Communist encroachment. In this time, more than ever before, we need a policy of firmness and precision with respect to the use of military force. Failure to achieve it will, in our judgement, deepen our military predicament by leaving us without effective doctrine, or appropriate military means for countering small-scale aggression, or for otherwise absorbing and moderating the dangerous, unruly forces at work in the world. Unless we face up, and soon, to the realities of our own position and accept the need to (1) fight local wars, where necessary, and (2) develop suitable military instruments for the purpose, we may lose our capacity to hold a power balance favorable to the free world.

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V. THE PROBLEM OF TACTICAL ATOMIC WEAPONS

One of the principal considerations leading to the Dulles dictum of "massive retaliation" appears to have been the need to find an offset to the political fact that the Communist Bloc is willing to support larger standing forces than are the nations on our side. Through enunciation of this doctrine, the Administration sought to substitute centrally based air-atomic power for the large conventional forces which would otherwise be needed to confront and balance the Soviet and Chinese troop concentrations in Eastern Europe, Korea and Northern Indochina. To this fact of the free world's effective manpower inferiority must now be added the growing Soviet capability for employing atomic weapons in tactical situations. Both factors must be taken into account in seeking a counter to limited military challenges at points of likely danger.

It may be said that there exist serilus political and economic obstacles to the raising of large conventional ground, sea and air forces in the Free World. Our strongest ally, Britain, is in economic straits and has recently announced far-reaching cutbacks in her conventional military capabilities. France has been able to raise only fourteen divisions and has now taken most of these out of the NATO area for use in Algeria. The West Germans, although they have at last accepted short-term conscription, remain divided on the question of rearmament. In Asia and the Near East, only India and Japan among the friendly or neutral powers have significant military potential,

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but Indian support is not reliable and Japanese rearmament is frustrated by
both a constitutional prohibition and a popular reluctance tinged with fear of
incurring Sino-Soviet displeasure. The United States clearly prefers to
substitute fire-power for numbers of men by building a military establishment
based largely on atomic weapons.

In the circumstances it is highly doubtful whether the free world would
be able to respond effectively to serious local aggression with conventional
forces alone. Accordingly, it must either be prepared to risk total war on an
issue that is not vital; or it must take such measures as it can to assure that
nuclear response is made possible on a limited scale.

Therefore, in searching for a tactical counter, we are brought squarely
up to the question of tactical atomic weapons. There is no doubt but that the
United States and Britain (and other nations with our help) could establish
and implement a policy of using tactical atomic weapons to meet limited
aggression. Indeed both United States and British military forces are now
being developed and equipped in such a way as to reduce their non-atomic,
capability, and perhaps soon to eliminate it except with respect to the most
minor operations. The United States has also announced publicly that it will
use atomic weapons under certain unspecified conditions. But a policy of
response with tactical atomic weapons raises two serious and closely related
problems of a political nature: first, that even the smallest atomic weapons
are extremely destructive, and that therefore a threatened country would
hesitate to accept reinforcement by tactical atomic forces; and second, that

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the present state of public opinion, in the West and throughout the world generally, would be hesitant about supporting the threatened country with tactical atomic weapons because of the fear that the local conflict would quickly spread to total war. In a given instance, this hesitancy might be decisive for the United Nations and the governments concerned and might therefore result in default by the free world and bloodless victory for the aggressor.

Nothing can be done immediately to alter the destructiveness of small nuclear weapons, but in our judgment much can and must be done to change the prevailing climate of opinion. The doctrine of "massive retaliation" has unfortunately served to reinforce the Communist propaganda theme that the use of atomic weapons anywhere will quickly lead to general holocaust.

What is urgently needed is an effort to draw clear distinctions between (1) the strategic and tactical use of weapons and (2) strategic and tactical targets, and (3) strategic and tactical theatres, and to impress these distinctions upon the public consciousness well in advance of a crisis, so that the use of tactical weapons by the West in the legitimate defense of a vital interest would not be a cause either for widespread panic or for wholesale condemnation of the West. In several areas of the world only the clear understanding that we are fully prepared to use such weapons can provide the local balance of power needed to give stability and poise to our diplomacy.

Yet only if the proposed distinctions are developed, explained, and tacitly accepted by all concerned, including the Russians and the Communist

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Chinese, will be able to use such weapons in these areas without grave
political disadvantage and serious risk of general war.

These proposed steps are of course valid only on the assumption that
we would be in fact prepared to use tactical atomic weapons and could not be
bluffed. But the proposed distinctions would make it easier for us to be
unwavering, if they succeeded in creating a climate of legitimacy for our use
of the weapons and if they reduced the general feeling that use of atomic
weapons in any situation would inevitably bring on global war.

At present we are in the dangerous position of emphasizing the develop-
ment of atomic forces and doctrines to the point where we may soon have lost
any conventional capability, while at the same time doing almost nothing to
change a state of public opinion which, both at home and abroad, imposes
heavy inhibitions on our use of atomic weapons under any circumstances
except direct attack on the United States.

Assuming the desirability of achieving the proposed distinctions, the
feasibility of doing so raises real questions; and the detailed development
of such distinctions will require in any event a professional experience
beyond the competence of this Subpanel. We are nevertheless encouraged by
a thoughtful pamphlet ("On Limiting Atomic War", written by four informed and
experienced Britishers) to believe that the drawing of reasonably clear and
simple definitions is feasible.

The following seem to us the kind of distinctions that might be
developed and refined to a reasonable degree of clarity, although we realize

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they are at present arbitrary and entirely a matter of opinion:

(1) as between the strategic and tactical *use of weapons* - there is some doubt that strategic and tactical distinctions can be drawn between weapons, but weight would seem to lie also on the other side of the question. Tactical weapons would surely contain the smaller explosives; they would be accurately aimed and used in such a way as to avoid serious radioactive fall-out. Tactical use would probably have to mean a limitation on numbers of weapons employed against any target area. Larger fission bombs, burst higher in the air, and H-weapons producing serious fall-out would be considered strategic.

(2) as between strategic and tactical *targets* - tactical targets should be confined to troop concentrations, tactical airfields and other areas of acknowledged and immediate military significance. They should exclude all heavily populated cities, industrial centers and strategic air-striking forces. The key point here is that war can be limited only if those instruments and facilities which constitute each side's capacity to fight a general war are treated as mutual sanctuaries. Tactical attack cannot therefore be directed against the "inner keep", the basic sources of either side's nuclear striking power.

(3) as between strategic and tactical *theatres* - perhaps the only useful point to be made here is that the mutual fear of global hydrogen war makes limitation of a war area something which both sides would probably want. It is therefore no longer true that even a major conflict in one area must

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necessarily spread. It is possible to foresee a war fought without restraint
as to weapons which would nevertheless remain limited geographically.

It has been argued that it would be undesirable to establish the proposed
distinctions because the result would be to reduce the Communists' fear of
retaliation against their home base, and would thus encourage them to a
bolder exploitation of their local advantages. This argument appears to
ignore several realities: (1) our present counter to local aggression, the
threat of "massive retaliation", is in fact defective because we cannot strike
at Russia without being devastated in return, and because the use of air-
delivered, high-yield nuclear weapons against, let us say, northern Viet
Nam following a crossing of the frontier by Viet Minh troops would be a
response so disproportionate as to be militarily absurd, and would produce
severly adverse political consequences throughout Asia; (2) the proposed
distinctions would strengthen our deterrent to local Communist adventure
because the Communists would have to consider that our response would then
be more certain than it is at present. Today in calculating their risks, they
must wrestle with the abstruse and hypothetical question whether the United
States would be willing to plunge the world into a war of total destruction
in order to keep them out of a small third country. They called our bluff in
Indochina and might accept the risk again. Such a situation invites miscal-
culation and increases the danger of general war.

If it be thus true that in certain places the free world can achieve a
local tactical balance of power only by its determination to use tactical

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atomic weapons, it does not necessarily follow that the use of such weapons
is desirable in all circumstances. The use of atomic weapons, in general, is
atomic bombs in warfare--at Hiroshima and Nagasaki--and both of these were
used in the strategic sense and by one side only. It is therefore extremely
difficult to visualize the consequences of a local exchange of tactical atomic
weapons, in terms of (a) military results, (b) control over the scope of
hostilities, and (c) public reaction in the United States and elsewhere.

As mentioned previously, much would appear to depend on the extent to which
public opinion in the free countries understood the distinctions between the
strategic and tactical use of weapons, and on the evaluation of enemy
intentions made by the leading governments on both sides. Maintenance of
diplomatic relations during the period of hostilities would be essential to the
safety of both sides; for a true appreciation of what the other side intended,
of what risks it was prepared to take, of what it would settle for might
mean the difference between negotiated settlement and total war.

Even if the distinctions were fairly well understood, however, and
close contact were maintained, there would remain a serious danger that one
side (intentionally or otherwise) would exceed the understood limits and thus
bring into play larger weapons or broader definitions of the combat area,
both of which would increase the danger of spreading the war. It must be
said that this hazard of widening the conflict would exist equally with
respect to an engagement involving only non-atomic weapons at the outset;
for unless reasonable distinctions between strategic and tactical uses

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existed in the public mind, the first side that felt obliged to bring atomic weapons into play, in order to maintain its local position, would run the grave risk that its intentions would be misunderstood. The widespread public fear that even one nuclear attack directed against Chinese troops would swiftly lead to dire consequences in Western Europe was, for example, perhaps the controlling factor in U.S. reluctance to use atomic weapons at certain stages of the Korean War. It may therefore be logically asserted that the danger of losing control over the scope and intensity of a local conflict is inherent in the problem of limited war and is not peculiar to the nature of the weapons employed in the opening phases. From this the conclusion would seem to follow that we should embrace the organizational simplicity and apparent economy (in dollars and manpower) to be realized by moving toward all-atomic forces.

But this conclusion does not seem wholly satisfactory. For one thing, the deep-seated human fear of atomic weapons employed in large numbers can be mitigated, but not removed, by the proposed strategic-tactical distinctions; and secondly, the destructiveness of even the small atomic weapons may frequently be disproportionate to military problems presented. Bearing these factors in mind, we cannot escape the difficult conclusion that U.S. forces must retain a respectable non-atomic capability, while being prepared to employ atomic weapons without hesitation where necessary. This suggests a system of what has been called "graduated responses" based on the view that, taking into account our political objectives, it will usually be in our interest

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to employ no more than the amount of force required to repell an aggression and
restore the situation.

In seeking to develop a system of "graduated responses", ground warfare appears to pose the most perplexing problems because of the basically different troop organizations, deployments and supply systems required for atomic and non-atomic combat. For example: to conduct conventional (non-atomic) operations appears to require roughly the kind of ground force organization and tactics employed in World War II and in Korea, although lighter and more powerful non-atomic weapons and improved troop airlift may modify this condition. To resist atomic attack, ground units must be much smaller, more independent and separated by great distances. Among other things, a nuclear strategy for ground warfare demands a swift, long-range system of transport and supply beyond anything that has as yet been budgeted or planned. What seems certain is that all U.S. ground forces should be *trained and equipped* to engage in nuclear warfare, while at the same time retaining a non-atomic capability for police actions and other situations that require the use of minimal force. Providing this dual capability poses serious technical problems, but, in our judgment, the demands of sound policy must be met.

The problems facing us might be summed up as follows: the strategic military stand off has nullified "massive retaliation" as a meaningful policy and has forced upon us the choice of accepting and developing the idea of limited response or yielding before each successive Soviet challenge. The effective numerical superiority of the Communist Bloc, together with the

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fundamental political and economic obstacles to the raising of large military forces in the free world, requires us to accept the discriminating use of tactical atomic weapons as a means of achieving a local power balance in certain areas, or similarly to yield to Communist pressures. The present state of public opinion, both in the United States and overseas, makes clear that the Soviets have thus far succeeded in their efforts to attach a moral opprobrium to any free nation that might initiate the use of such weapons.

If the foregoing is an accurate summary statement of our problems, our course would seem to be clear. We must accept the idea of limited war and must persuade the American people of its necessity. We must achieve reasonable public distinctions between the strategic and tactical use of atomic weapons, targets and operational theatres; and must persuade world opinion that the tactical employment of tactical weapons is a legitimate means of defending our vital interests. We must achieve a firm national resolve to fight, whenever necessary, to safeguard our own position and the security of the free world, bearing in mind our special position of responsibility to civilization and freedom, and recognizing the cumulative consequences of submission or default in the face of the Communist challenge.

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VI. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL FORCES - THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP

The complementary and interdependent relationship between strategic and tactical forces is to be emphasized. It is not sufficient that we avoid a surprise attack on the United States, if at the same time our world position is progressively eaten away by encroachment or limited aggression to which we can muster no effective response; nor is it enough that we have a capacity for local resistance, if the American population and industrial base necessary to support this capability can be wiped out by surprise attack. Both elements are needed for our security.

A sharp distinction between strategic and tactical forces involves an oversimplification because certain forces will have essential roles to perform in both limited and general war. Nevertheless the distinction is valid; and the two components are not only complementary, but also competitive. They compete for funds, resources and popular support. We believe our national attention has focused on the strategic forces during the past decade, with beneficial results, but with a resulting imbalance which has now become apparent. The task now before the Government and the country is sharply to improve our military capabilities for limited war, but without detriment to SAC.

We need a strategic force capable of inflicting a degree of devastation upon the enemy's territory which he cannot tolerate; but a destructive capability above that level serves no useful purpose, adds nothing to our military strength, and diverts funds and energies away from the tactical forces where they are urgently needed. It may not be possible to determine

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the precise level of destructive capability required by the strategic force, but
it will be necessary to achieve a practical estimate of the upper limit.

There are several major obstacles to the achievement of a more
rational balance between strategic and tactical forces (that is, between
forces for general war and forces for more limited operations). As they are
interrelated and tend to be mutually reenforcing, a much wider public dis-
cussion and debate concerning their merits and weaknesses is needed if the
American people are to see with a truer sense of proportion the military
problems confronting them.

One obstacle is the view held by those Air Force officers who might be
called the extreme advocates of strategic air power. To this group it is
"crystal clear" that the next war will begin with a deliberate Soviet attack
upon the United States and that such an event is "inevitable" unless all of
the outstanding issues between the Communist Bloc and the free world are
resolved. Although they will, if pressed, pay lip-service to the concept
of limited war, they are disinclined to believe that limited war is possible
in an era of nuclear abundance. They are opposed to the development of
separate or specifically designated forces for use in limited warfare, holding
that SAC is perfectly capable of performing limited missions; at the same time,
they argue that the integrity of SAC must be safeguarded for execution of
the primary mission. The strength and poised readiness of SAC comes close
to being their exclusive concern. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity
of their convictions.

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A second obstacle appears to have originated with, or at least to have
been aggravated by, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" enunciated in 1954.

Although this doctrine has been qualified several times since then, it has
tended to distort the competition among the three military services and to
accentuate the rigidity of our military posture. It has tended to exacerbate
inter-service rivalry by emphasizing a point on which there need be no basic
conflict. For "massive retaliation" suggested rather bluntly that we would
henceforward apply our national military power only in large doses, only
at great distances, and only against the territory of our principal enemies.

It was foreseeable that each service would conclude from this that its own
survival was thereafter intimately bound up with achievement of a capacity
to participate in the long-range atomic bombardment of the Soviet Union.

Today the Navy is rapidly developing a strategic bombing capability, based on
carriers much larger and aircraft of much longer range than would be required
for the execution of tactical tasks, and the Army is fighting for control of
long-range missiles. It can hardly be denied that both of these efforts are
duplicative of SAC and are being made at the expense of Army and Navy
capabilities for carrying out vital and distinctive tactical tasks. If the
general strategic concept adopted by the political leaders of the nation
were broader and more balanced, if it included an important place for flexible
task forces of combined arms, it is reasonable to assume that the Army and
Navy would be less desperately concerned with establishing their right to
employ the most powerful weapons of the longest ranges, and the prospect

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would be brighter for a military establishment comprising service elements devoted to complementary, rather than directly competing, missions.

A third obstacle, directly related to the second, but antedating it, might be called the "general war fixation" of military planning in the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, planning against a hypothetical D-Day (which in theory may come at any moment) and concerned with maintaining in "peacetime" at least the nucleus of wartime force, are reluctant to commit any units to "brush fire" operations because of the danger of unbalancing our posture and thus weakening our general war capability. They are confronted with the real problem of protecting the integrity of forces needed to maintain the strategic deterrent and wage a general war, but the matter is aggravated by an absence of agreement as to what constitute the forces necessary for general war and what forces should be regarded as deployable in lesser conflict. The prevailing assumption is that all standing forces are for general war and that these constitute no more than a nucleus of the total forces required for such a contingency. Given this frame of reference, it is understandably painful and difficult for the JCS to commit any part of them in a piecemeal fashion or for purposes which they believe to be secondary.

In our view the situation calls for a definitive reassessment at the highest levels of Government of (1) the relative immediacy and seriousness of the general war threat and the limited war threat and (2) the size and composition of forces likely to be needed in the early phases of a general war. Nothing less than an authoritative governmental position on these

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matters, hammered out by the highest political and military officials, will
produce a more balanced approach to the two distinctive military problems which
face the nation.

The Air Force conception of how long a general war might last and
what functions the Army and Navy could most usefully perform in the initial
stages seems to us rather plausible. This view holds that the strategic air
battle will be compressed into the first 36-48 hours, during which time the
principal function of the Army and Navy will be to stay alive, in order that
they may be poised and ready to exploit the subsequent phases. Without
extending the logic of this conceptual approach into the subsequent phases of
a conflict (which is difficult enough for professional military experts), we
believe it provides a key to the way in which we should think about the re-
lated problems of general and limited war. For if the Air Force conception is
reasonably correct, we can conclude with some assurance that the forces re-
quired to fight the initial stages of a general war will be both finite and of a
highly specialized character. They will consist of our ready, long-range air-
atomic striking units (SAC, some elements of the naval air arm, and our air
warning and air defense organization). No other type of military force located
in the United States, or in other regional reserve areas away from the initial
fighting, will have a significant role to play. And because the military
situation that will face the United States after a large-scale nuclear exchange
is so exceedingly difficult to visualize, even in broad outline, we share the
doubt of a number of distinguished military planners whether it is useful to

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write definitive plans for any period beyond D+5.

If a rational approach to the general war problem is to be found in something like the above line of reasoning, it follows that, even within the framework of presently available forces, we should be able to commit substantial tactical groups (comprising air, sea and land elements) to limited or "brush fire" operations without seriously hampering our strategic capacity to maintain the over-all stalemate or to fight general war. To admit and act upon this conclusion would require a marked shift in our politico-military thinking and a quite different approach to war planning in the Pentagon, but it would also constitute the beginnings of a coherent strategic concept - at present non-existent. This would in turn form the basis for a more rational development of roles and missions, force levels and service budgets.

If, as we believe, limited war is the more immediate danger and we can suffer a decisive erosion of our power position through a failure to respond effectively to probes and local military challenges at various geographical points, then surely we cannot afford to husband our tactical military forces for an all-out war (1) which may never come, (2) which it is a cardinal purpose of our policy to avoid, and (3) which, if it does come, may not permit tactical forces to be used effectively. We believe it is urgently necessary for our Government and our people to share this perception and to adopt the attitudes, policies and measures which it calls for.

In our judgment, the President should now instruct the Defense Department to establish two functional combatant commands, each

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representing a clearly distinguishable basic mission. They would have roughly the same status as present so-called "unified commands", except that they (1) would be functional rather than geographical and (2) would have a clear priority on those forces from each service which were required to carry out their respective missions. There would be a Combined Strategic Force for all-out war and a Combined Tactical Force for limited war. The Combined Strategic Force would include SAC, Air Defense Command, Navy units designated for participation in delivering the atomic counter-offensive, and Army units required to protect overseas bases. The Combined Tactical Force would include those Army, Navy and Air Force units required for the development of a highly mobile, hard-biting "fire brigade" capable of rapid and effective deployment in local situations for the purpose of conducting limited military operations.

The Combined Tactical Force might be organized into several "regional reserves", which would be capable of mutual support and imbued with a common doctrine. Sufficient air transport is the vital prerequisite for effective tactical task forces, for our enemies operate on interior lines of communication while we must move around the perimeter of the Eurasian land mass. The remaining military units (including training commands, garrison troops, anti-submarine warfare units) would remain under the control of the appropriate military service.

The division of our major combat units into a strategic and a tactical force would reflect the real nature of the strategic situation we confront; it would delineate the two related, yet different, military problems with

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which we must deal; it would clarify for all concerned, professional expert
and layman alike, the two distinctive military concepts which reflect inter-
dependent halves of the only viable military strategy open to us. Finally,
it would meet what we regard as the fundamental need to establish certain
clear distinctions in the public mind between general and limited war, between
strategic and tactical forces, between the strategic and tactical use of atomic
weapons, in order to calm public fears of total war, strengthen our alliances
and make legitimate our effective use of limited means.

and make legitimate use of limited means, weapons, in order to claim public fear of total war, strangle our alliances, strangle and tactical forces, between the strategic and tactical use of atoms clear distinctions in the public mind between general and limited war, between it would meet what we regard as the fundamental need to establish certain defendant halves of the only visible military strategy open to us, finally, and layman alike, the two distinctive military concepts which reflect interest which we must deal with, it would clarify for all concerned, strategical expert

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## VII. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

The sharp increases foreseeable during the next 10-15 years in technological complexity, in the cost of maintaining first-line weapons systems, and in the interdependence of foreign policy and military capability lead us to believe that in future our security will require a far more efficient system for military planning and military decisions than now exists. We doubt that these requirements which should be met now, and must be met within a decade, can be achieved without certain fundamental changes in organization and philosophy at the Pentagon. The obstacles to their achievement - political, technical and human - are admittedly formidable indeed, and no panacea is at hand. Nor can a group such as ours, lacking both time and detailed information, expect to formulate definitive remedies. If we have a contribution to make, it is through analysis and through an indication of the general direction in which, it seems to us, the organization of this vast and complex institution should evolve.

It is significant that in the ten years since it was given statutory basis in the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization has signally failed to develop an agreed military strategy for the United States, with the result that Army, Navy and Air Force troop levels and budgets are not designed to fit into agreed war plans, but are individually shaped by the particular strategic concept believed in by each service, by the popularity of that particular concept in the Congress, and by compromise within the JCS. Although it is quite true that the political guidance

within the 108th. Without it is quite clear that the political guidance
the Republic of that particular concept in the Congress, and by compromise
shaped by the nationalistic concept believed in by each service, by
and budgets are not considered to lift into being wet pins, but are individually
the United States, with the result that Army, Navy and Air Force reach levels
organisation has automatically failed to develop with increased military strategy of
passage in the National Security Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
it is significant that in the ten years since it was given statutory
invention should evolve,

direction in which it seems to us, the organization of this vast and complex
tion to make it through analysis and through an indication of the general
information, expect to furnish definitive remains. If we have a committee
is at hand, how can a group such as ours, lacking both time and details
technical and human, be sufficiently formidable indeed, and no hedges
philosophy at the Pentagon. Theophilos to their development. Political,
can be achieved without certain fundamental changes in organization and
these requirements which should be met now, and that be met within a decade,
for military planning and military decisions than now exists. We doubt that
to achieve that in future our security will require a far more sufficient staff
and in the intersetidence of totally different and widely acceptable tech-
нического complexity in the cost of maintaining that-line operations taxes
The sharp increase of taxes possible during the next 10-12 years in itself

VI. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT PERMANENT

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received by the military planners (in the form of "National Security Objectives" from the NSC) leaves much to be desired, it is equally true that whatever the stated objectives of grand strategy or foreign policy may be, the Army, Navy and Air planning staffs propose and proceed to build the kind of forces they each believe in. Our military establishment is not therefore being developed and maintained as a chosen instrument of national policy; rather policy is to a great extent being determined by the capabilities and limitations of our military forces which are, it is to be emphasized, the result not of broad agreement at the highest levels of government, but of barter and compromise between three conflicting strategic concepts. This is a basic inversion of the strategic planning process.

There can be no doubt that the serious defects of the JCS are inherent and organic, and it is perfectly clear that time alone will not cure them. Over a number of years, various distinguished and experienced men with intimate knowledge of the situation have pointed out the basic flaw with precision. Major General Otto L. Nelson, Jr. has said:

"A basic fault of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that no organizational integrity exists. No one is completely imbued with what should be the JCS objectives and overall attitude. Every individual and every committee member associated in any way with the Joint Chiefs of Staff is primarily a representative from one of the component parts of the armed forces. If he is not an uncompromising fighter for the special interests which he represents, his work will be regarded as unsatisfactory by those who determine his promotion, assignment and future success....."

["assignment and future success....\" designed as unilaterally to stage who determines the promotion, special interests which he represents, and work will be done. If he is not an uncompromising fighter for the representative from one of the component parts of the armed force with the Joint Objectives of Self-primarily a representative and every committee member associated with what should be the JCS objectives and overall aim, organizational integrity etc., No one is completely implied.\n\nA basic fact of the Joint Objectives of Self is that no one should be the Joint Objectives and overall aim, and organization and it is periodically clear that time alone will not one day. There can be no doubt that the various duties of the JCS are inherent in the planning process.", "conflicting strategic concepts. This is a basic inversion of the strategic concepts of the highest levels of government, but of better and better cooperation between them, forces which are, if not to be embraced, the result of poor planning. Great extent being determined by the capabilities and limitations of our military maintenance as a chosen instrument of national policy, rather than by a belief in. Our military establishment is not therefore being developed and Air Planning staff propose and process to build the kind of force necessary to achieve these objectives of grand strategy or foreign policy may be, the final, as said from the MCO. Leave much to be desired, it is equally true that whatever the results by the military planning in the form of \"National Security Objectives\" is not ed all programs in the form of \"National Security Objectives\" is not ed

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Mr. Robert Lovett has added:

"By their very makeup it is extremely difficult for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain a broad non-service point of view.... The maintenance of an impartial non-partisan position becomes increasingly difficult in times of shortage of either men, money or material."

The present organization of the JCS, while unsatisfactory, might nevertheless be an acceptable risk if there existed some other group in the Pentagon with sufficient objectivity, capacity and authority to review and evaluate the work of the JCS for the Secretary of Defense. But such a group does not now exist and the military services have been at pains to see that it shall not come into being. The National Security Act prohibits the Secretary of Defense from establishing a military staff other than the JCS. In addition, the military services have carefully nurtured the view that military planning is an esoteric activity to be practiced only by those experienced in battle and clothes in uniform. For reasons not entirely clear, but which are related to the prestige of the wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff and to a very broad interpretation of their role as "principal military advisors", the JCS have generally made good their claim to exclusive jurisdiction over all of the really crucial elements of military policy, namely, strategic planning, force levels, roles and missions, and development of weapons systems. At the present time no other official or group in the Government is considered competent to initiate or hold authoritative views on these matters, nor to review the conclusions reached by the JCS.

We have thus arrived at the rather remarkable situation where decisions

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of transcendent importance, touching the quick of our national life, determining
the strength and scope of foreign policy, and involving by far the largest portion
of the Federal budget are left in greatest part to a military committee of
partisan adversaries which, by definition and performance, has shown itself
incapable of achieving a broad, objective view of the national interest. As
Robert Lovett has said, "it is, I think, a tribute to the quality of the individuals
involved" that the system has worked as well as it has. Nevertheless we do
not see how a situation so irrational and imprudent can much longer be tolerated,
particularly in light of foreseeable developments over the next 10-15 years
that seem certain to demand a far more effective system of planning for our
national security.

The root of the trouble, in our view, lies in the fact that the roles and
missions assigned to the Army, Navy and Air Force by the Key West Agreement
of 1948 have, in the era of swift movement and powerful long-range weapons,
lost their respective uniqueness. The existence of three separate services
has always stood on the assumption that each had a distinctive mission to
perform, and this was generally the case until the end of World War II; for
until that time there were significant physical barriers to an overlapping of
function: the Navy could not project its power far inland; the range and
character of Air Force planes did not permit effective combat over large bodies
of water; the Army could not strike through the air against a distant enemy.
In such circumstances it was sensible to agree that the primary mission of each
service was to defeat its enemy counterpart.

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Today, however, the tremendous advance in the power and range of weapons plus a naturally extended, but highly rationalized and self-serving, interpretation of its mission by each service has led to a situation in which each service holds that, in the performance of its own primary mission, it must carry out tasks identical with the primary mission of a sister service. Thus the Air Force argues that control of the air demands destruction of the opposing retaliatory force and supporting facilities; the Navy likewise claims the right to participate in long-range strategic bombardment on the ground that control of the sea implies the destruction of enemy industries and supply depots; and the Army defends its aspiration to control the 1500-mile missile by asserting that the Army's mission is to destroy enemy ground forces wherever it can find them. The compulsion of each service to control those weapons systems which will allow it to strike at the vitals of our principal enemies derives in great part from the fear that Congressional appropriations will be forthcoming only for those who possess and "all-out" war capability. This is a measure of the current conceptual sterility in many places, deriving from our national predilections for total solutions in war and fortified by the obsolete definition of roles and missions.

If we are to work toward a more coherent organization of our national military establishment, we must first recognize (1) that the roles and missions of the three services are no longer complementary, but directly and progressively competitive and overlapping; and (2) that the principal thrust of our military preparations is for "all-out" war, which is netierh the most likely

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danger, nor in any way commensurate with our national purposes. We must see
that inter-service rivalry is inherent in the present definition of missions, and
that both this fact and the prevailing attitudes about strategy and appropriations
make it difficult to assure proper consideration for the two distinctive military
problems which confront the nation - namely, general war and limited war.

So much for analysis of the problem. As to recommended changes, we
suggest that several steps could be taken immediately which would serve
to clarify lines of authority within the Defense Department and to strengthen
what we perceive to be a tendency toward a greater centralization and
integration of both planning and operations. We are aware that these modest
proposals will not of themselves resolve the major organizational difficulties
within the Defense Department.

First, we believe the authority of the Secretary of Defense has tended
to be diffused by the large number of Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Although
we fully agree that his powers should extend to all the areas now covered by
these eight functional aides, we think the problem of coordination among
them would be simplified, and the Secretary's control correspondingly
improved, if their number were reduced to perhaps four.

Second, an effort should be made to enhance the status and prestige
of the joint civilian-military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The Secretary should assume full responsibility for the promotion and re-
assignment of all military officers assigned to this staff, and should judge
their performance by the extent of their contribution to broad, non-partisan

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solutions.

Third, through this staff, or Defense Secretariat, the Secretary of Defense should initiate periodic reviews of roles and missions, force levels, tables of organization, and evaluation of weapons systems, and other policy matters.

Fourth, the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be further strengthened. Specifically, the committee structure within the JCS should be abolished and responsibility for all strategic planning should be transferred to the Joint Staff. This Joint Staff would be accountable to the Chairman of the JCS, who would select and supervise its personnel through the Director of the Joint Staff. It would include civilians as well as military officers. The Secretary of Defense would be responsible for the promotion and reassignment of the Joint Staff.

Although we do not see precisely how it will come about, we think the pressures of logic, technology and public opinion will force rather more drastic changes in the organizations of the military establishment over the next ten years, and perhaps sooner. The inadequacy of present roles and missions, leading as they do to direct and progressive interservice competition and considerable waste of both money and manpower, will become increasingly obvious; the growing cost of new weapons systems will produce justified demands for economy through the elimination of obvious duplication; the widening awareness of the need to face the limited war problem with suitable land-sea-air combinations will contribute to a further blurring of service

land-air-sky combinations will contribute to a further thinning of service widening awareness of the need to face the limited war problem with outside demands for economy through the elimination of obstacles publication; the obsolescence; the growing coat of new weapons systems will produce justified considerable waste of both money and manpower, will become increasingly leading as they do to direct and progressive inter-service competition and ten years, and perhaps sooner. The inadequacy of present roles and missions, drastic changes in the organizations of the military establishment over the next the premises of logic, technology and public opinion will force rather more

Without we do not see precisely how it will come about, we think reassessment of the Joint Staff.

The Secretary of Defense would be reasonable for the promotion and officers. The Director of the Joint Staff. It would include civilians as well as military Chairman of the ICs, who would select and appoint its personnel through transferred to the Joint Staff. This Joint Staff would be accountable to the should be shorn of responsibility for all strategic planning should be further strengthened. Specifically, the committee structure within the ICs

the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be transferred to the Joint Staff. This joint staff would be accountable to the Chairman of the ICs, who would select and appoint its personnel through transferred to the Joint Staff. This joint staff would be accountable to the should be shorn of responsibility for all strategic planning should be further strengthened. Specifically, the committee structure within the ICs

tables of organization, and evaluation of weapons systems, and other policy Defense should initiate periodic reviews of roles and missions, force levels, Third, through this staff, or Defense Secretary, the Secretary of

solutions.

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distinctions.

We can look forward, with reasonable hope and equanimity, to the advent of an integrated organization headed by a Secretary of Defense who would be assisted principally by a Deputy Secretary and three functional Undersecretaries - for general management, for budget, and for planning. There would be a single Chief of Staff assisted by a Joint Planning Staff. The Chief of Staff would preside over a military committee of three or four functional force commanders (heading, perhaps, strategic, tactical and naval forces). The present military services would probably remain as administrative entities, but their importance would be greatly diminished.

Although, to repeat, we do not foresee the precise steps in this development, we believe this is the direction in which the organization of our military establishment is inexorably trending; and, by and large, we think this trend is in accord with the requirements of our national security. The principal question in our minds is whether it will come fast enough.

principal direction in our minds is whether it will come from enough
this trend is in accord with the requirements of our national security. The
military establishment is inexorably trendsetting and, by and large, we think
development, we believe this is the direction in which the organization of our
Although, to repeat, we do not lose sight in this administrative entities, but their importance would be greatly diminished.
naval forces). The present military services would properly remain as
functional force commanders (leading, perhaps, strategic, tactical and
Chief of Staff would preside over a military committee of three or four
There would be a single Chief of Staff assisted by a Joint Planning Staff. The
Undersecretaries - for general management, for budget, and for planning,
would be assisted principally by a Deputy Secretary and three functional
advent of an integrated organization headed by a Secretary of Defense who
We can look forward, with reasonable hope and equanimity, to the
distinctions..

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VIII. ALLIANCES AND THE ROLE OF FORCE

There is no question of our need for alliances in an increasingly inter-
dependent world: they are vital to our maintenance of a favorable balance of
power vis-a-vis the Communist Bloc, which is centrally organized and commands
the Eurasian "Heartland"; they make clear our political solidarity with friends
and neighbors; they warn potential aggressors of our willingness to defend
specifically defined areas or interests; they nourish our values by providing
a frame of reference for the outward projection of our democratic beliefs
and ideals. Also, given the danger of general war that would exist in a direct
clash between U.S. and Soviet forces, it is well to have buffers between the
major powers wherever possible - not neutral areas which would draw the
Great Powers like a vacuum, but areas linked to the free world by treaty
arrangements that strengthen the local will to resist and thereby create a
respectable deterrent to Communist degradations.

We must accordingly strive to maintain and strengthen our system of
alliances. At the same time we cannot avoid a careful reassessment of their
military value at this time because of (1) the inherent limitations of
military coalitions, (2) the growing ambiguity and indirectness of Communist
challenges, which render inadequate the classical concept of aggression
on which existing military treaties are based; and (3) the cost and complexity
of the new weapons systems, which increase the disparity in military strength
between the Great Powers and the lesser states.

between the Great Powers and the lesser states,
of the new weapons systems, which increase the disparity in military strength
on which existing military theories are based; and (2) the coat and complexity
challenges, which render inadequate the classical concept of abstractive
military conditions, (3) the growing ambiguity and indirectness of Communist
military value at this time because of (1) the inherent limitations of
alliances. At the same time we cannot avoid a careful reassessment of their

We must accordingly strive to maintain and strengthen our system of
respectable deterrent to Communist deviations.

arrangements that strengthen the local will to resist and thereby create a
Great Powers like a vacuum, put areas linked to the free world by nearly
malot bowers wherever possible - not neutral areas which would draw the
clash between U.2. and Soviet forces, it is well to have buffers between the
and ideals. Also, given the danger of general war that would exist in a direct
a frame of reference for the outward protection of our democratic beliefs
specifically defined areas of interest; they nourish our values by providing
and neighbors; they mean potential aggressors of our willingness to defend
the European "Heartland"; they make clear our political solidarity with friends
bowers via a via the Communist bloc, which is centrally organized and commands
dependent world; they are vital to our maintenance of a favorable balance of

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As to the first point, an alliance embracing a large number of nations and a considerable territory tends to dilute the effective capacity of its stronger members, especially in the face of a challenge that does not present a clear and compelling danger to the entire alliance. Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are very similar will find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response; yet if the strongest member is committed exclusively to the alliance and regards the dissent of lesser members as an effective veto against any unilateral action on his part, paralysis may follow to the detriment of the whole alliance.

The weaknesses inherent in this system are magnified several times in the case of United Nations, which strives to be an expression of worldwide consensus in a period when much of mankind is involved in bitter, irreconcilable conflict. We hold to the view that the UN can and should remain a world forum, an indispensable neutral ground for the expression of opinion and for the exchange of views between parties in dispute, but we seriously doubt whether the UN can perform effectively, or indeed at all, as an agency for collective security. The absence of the Soviet delegate from the Security Council in June, 1950, which permitted the Korean War to be waged in the name of the UN, must be seen in retrospect as a fortuitous accident; and the emergence in the General Assembly of the Afro-Asian Bloc which, when combined with the U.S.S.R. and its eastern satellites, can prevent any UN action displeasing to that group, would seem to have effectively nullified the once-hopeful "Uniting For Peace Resolution". It is true that the recent

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Middle Eastern crisis has given rise to a UN Emergency Force, but the pre-
ponderant interests in the General Assembly have effectively deprived it of
independence, strength, or clarity of mission. Under the present ground-rules
it can remain on a given piece of territory only at the pleasure of the recognized
national sovereign - who, in every foreseeable case, will be a party to the
dispute. In short, the United Nations cannot and should not be relied upon
as a major instrument for collective security; and it is basic to any considera-
tion of our military problems that we avoid pretending that the United Nations
is possessed of power and influence which it does not in fact have. Referral
of issues to the United Nations is not a substitute for formulation of United
States policy in Washington.

Aggravating the inherent limitations of alliances and collective security
arrangements is the unhappily rigid and formal concept of aggression under-
lying them. For this concept, which is essentially restricted to the crossing
of frontiers by armed regular troops, makes it exceedingly difficult to
organize a legitimate response to a whole range of aggressive techniques
which, if not countered, can have the same effect as open military attack.
We do not think it possible to provide an adequate "definition" of aggression
to meet the current situation; but given the strategic military stand-off
which has, in a sense, reenforced the Communist preference for advance
by indirect means, we feel there is a pressing need to broaden the way in
which governments and the general public think about "aggression", in
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reality. For unless we can achieve a more-embracing concept and can make this generally acceptable to the community of nations, we shall find ourselves unable legitimately to defend important or vital interests against ambiguous aggressions. We will thus be in danger of suffering serious reverses by default, largely because we will have succeeded in paralyzing our policy by an insistent clinging to outmoded or otherwise inadequate conceptions. This danger has in fact already presented itself in several instances.

The UN, for example, showed itself powerless to intervene in the Middle East crisis until the advent of actual war. Egypt could deny transit to Israel through the Suez Canal, violate the Treaty of Constantinople, and otherwise perpetrate any sort of trick short of war without being branded an aggressor. Moreover, appeals to the UN by the aggrieved parties could produce no remedy for these injustices. But when at length Israel felt compelled to send troops into the Sinai Desert to destroy the supply of Communist arms that were being stocked there; and when Britain and France sought to restore their rights in the Suez Canal, they were automatically condemned by the formal definition of "aggression" (set forth in the Charter).

The President's message enunciating the "Eisenhower Doctrine" appears to persist in the classic definition of aggression by indicating that United States forces would not be employed in the Middle East except in response to "overt aggression". From what we can gather, the U.S. Government contemplates no direct response, military or other, to the steady Communist infiltration of Syria, the resumed flow of Communist arms into both Syria and