November 23, 1965

FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S EYES ONLY

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have just returned from three days in Washington where I saw Bill Bundy (several times), McNaughton and Yarmolinsky, Len Unger, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, the Joint Chiefs and Admiral Raborn. I also met twice with the Vietnam Coordinating Committee. Dean Rusk was out of town.

Here are a few impressions:

(1) Bill Bundy seems to me pretty well persuaded of your point of view on negotiations. He submitted a paper for the Johnson City meeting which is in all major respects consistent with your point of view. There are a few lacunae which more staff work in Washington and Saigon could fill in. I will discuss these below.

(2) Your own position in Washington seems to me extremely strong. Bill Bundy volunteered the information that the reporting from Saigon is at the highest level ever. McGeorge Bundy said that the President has overcome any lingering suspicion from the time when you were a Presidential contender and has absolute confidence in you as a man in addition to being very pleased with your performance.

(3) McNamara struck me as unexpectedly understanding. He may be the senior official closest in tune with Saigon needs. The difficulty in Defense is on the second level, specifically in ISA where the negotiating options are wildly overestimated.

FOR THE VMVB22VADOR, 2 EYES ONLY

....

negotiating options are wildly overestimated.
in Defense is on the second level, specifically in IBA where the
the senior official closest in tune with Saigon needs. The difficulty
(3) McNamara struck me as unexpectedly understanding. He may be

in you as a man in addition to being very blessed with your berr Performance. When you were a Presidential contender and had absolute confidence the President has overcome any lingering suspicion from the time from Saigon is at the highest level ever. McGeorge Bundy said that strong. Bill Bundy volunteered the information that the reporting (2) Your own position in Washington seems to me extremely

below.
work in Washington and Saigon could still in. I will discuss these
with your point of view. There are a few lincense which more staff
Johnson City meeting which is in all major respects consistent
point of view on negotiations. He submitted a paper for the
(1) Bill Bundy seems to me pretty well buttressed of your

Here are a few impressions:

Dean Rusk was out of town.
Raporn. I also met twice with the Vietnam Coordinating Committee. Leu Unger, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, the Joint Chiefs and Admiral I saw Bill Bundy (several times), McNaughton and Yarmoline. I have just returned from three days in Washington where

Dear Mr. Ampasador:

San Francisco, California
APO 90543
Saigon
American Embassy
Ampasador
The Honoraple Henry Capot Lodge

November 23, 1962

(4) Goldberg's influence is not entirely wholesome. He simply does not understand the problems of Vietnam. Would a visit by him to Vietnam help or hinder?

(5) CIA is almost entirely absorbed in pushing an expansion of the PAT program. I have my doubts about this for reasons which I will write you in a brief memo I am preparing on the pacification problem. Basically my view is that the top priority should go to strengthening the existing cadres. Rapid expansion may wreck the whole program. My visits to the provinces lead me to believe that the existing programs are only about 15% effective.

A few recommendations:

(1) I would suggest tempering extremely optimistic predictions somewhat. Failure to realize them will undermine your influence when it counts. It is better to exceed expectations than the opposite.

(2) The pacification problem is of great concern in Washington. I will send you a few reflections about that within the week.

(3) Washington is intellectually unprepared for negotiations but committed to them—as soon as the DRV asks for them. When this happens you will be confronted with a series of very concrete issues. These include:

(a) Forum for negotiations

(b) Participants at a conference

(c) Conditions for ending the bombing of the DRV

(d) Conditions for a cease-fire in the SVN

(e) Internal status of the SVN

(f) International status of SVN

(g) Presence of US troops

When negotiations start, it will not be fruitful to argue about their desirability. Disaster can be avoided only by a concrete Saigon position. Bits and pieces of it exist now. Should Phil Habib be asked to pull them together? My suggestion would be to keep the paper which results on ice until you return to Washington or the issue becomes more acute.

....

FOR THE AMBASSADOR, 2 EYES ONLY

more acute.
results on ice until you return to Washington or the issue becomes
to build them together? My suggestion would be to keep the bader which
boition. Bites and pieces of it exist now. Should Budi Hapid be asked
their desirability. Disaster can be avoided only by a concrete plan
When negotiations start, it will not be fruitful to argue about

(g) Presence of U2 troops

(f) International status of the 2AM

(e) Internal status of the 2AM

(d) Conditions for a cease-fire in the 2AM

(c) Conditions for ending the bombing of the DRA

(p) Participants at a conference

(a) Forum for negotiations

These include:

The problem you will be confronted with is a series of quarterly concrete issues. It is committed to them as soon as the DRA asks for them. When this

(3) The pacification problem is of great concern in Washington.

when it comes. It is better to exceed expectations than the obsolescence somewhat. Failure to realize them will undermine your influence

(1) I would suggest tending extremely optimistic predictions

A few recommendations:

the existing programs are only about 15% effective.
whose program. My visit to the province led me to believe that
strengthening the existing capes. Rapid expansion may wreck the
problem. Basically my view is that the top priority should go to
I will write you in a brief memo I am preparing on the pacification
of the PAVN program. I have my doubts about this for reasons which

to Vietnam help or hinder?

(4) Coldplay's influence is not entirely wholesome. He simply
does not understand the problems of Vietnam. Would a visit by him

The Honorable Henry Capot Lodge

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December 1, 1965

ROUGH DRAFT

The Hunnrable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Since my return I have been giving a great deal of thought to the
problem of pacification. For whatever they may be worth, I will pass on
these reflections. Needless to say, in a letter of this type there is a
tendency to dwell on tasks yet to be accomplished than on successes. I
write these comments anyway because I am sure you know how much I believe
in what you are doing. What I write is not a startling new discovery; the
conclusions would be shared by most senior observers in Vietnam--especially
in the provinces.

I. THE PROBLEM

It is probably that the military situation will continue to improve
over the next year. While the military have probably been overoptimistic and
while *x* a great deal remains to be learned about the kind of warfare involved,
the basic trend is bound to be favorable. If we are patient and persistent
we should be able to decimate Vietcong Mainforce units and gradually push them

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[N]

away from the main centers of population.

This, however, will only be the beginning of our challenge. Whatever
our military success, the final pay-off will be in the field of pacification.
Success will depend on the ability to create a political structure to fill
the void x created by twenty years of civil war, ten years of systematic Vietcong
assassination of key officials and two years of political upheavals in Saigon.
The problem seems to me to have the following aspects:

(1) The current Saigon government--while the best available--is
still in a precarious position. It must be nurtured carefully. It is not
always recognized in Washington that the Saigon government has little in
common with governments in the Western sense. It lacks cohesion--ministers
say extraordinary, sometimes disloyal, things about each other (with Ky a
notable exception). It can be basically weakened by the mere act of making
a proposal to it (this is particularly relevant in the area of negotiations.)
Its authority in the countryside is still weak.

(2) Extreme centralization in Saigon has made for a cumbersome
bureaucracy which in turn has produced an enormous gap between conception and

[N]

- 3 -

execution. I have never seen such subtlety in the high officials of a new
nation and at the same time so little relationship between plans and
achievement. This state of affairs is understandably in terms of Vietnamese
history; it does represent a challenge to policy.

(3) In the provinces, civil war and political turmoil in Saigon have produced a combination of attenti ______, demoralization and lethargy. Assassinations, incompetence, governmental change all place a premium on hedging bets. As one follows programs from Saigon into the provinces one is struck by how many peter out and how many of those of which remnants can be detected are beside the point. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the following causes seem paramount.

(a) The mere fact that many high sounding programs have been initiated and then collapsed has induced a general atmosphere of cynicism and demoralization.

(b) The official Mac V security map is different from the security situation as it affects the local population. This is because military units can be secure while the civilian population remains subject to blackmail and

- 4 -

reprisal; because in most of the country outside of Saigon the VC are
likely to have a preponderant influence at night (most knowledgeable
people to whom I spoke placed the figure as high as 85% outside Saigon,
Hue and Danang) and because some of the Mac V criteria are very formalistic.
For example, some of the roads shown as "open" are so only in the technical
sense that they are passable by convoys; some of local governments shown
in place physically disappear at nighttime.

(c) Some of the local government which remains in place may be even more worrisome than that which is insecure at night. The latter at least can be assumed to thwart Vietcong wishes or they would not attack it. But I would guess that in many areas government survives only by means of a tacit agreement with the Vietcong whereby both sides coexist without getting into each other's way. This I would judge to be the situation in much of the Delta. In these areas official statistics are highly misleading: sweep operations are conducted but find nothing; the two sides share the tax revenue, etc. One advisor summed up this problem when I asked him how things were going in his province with the phrase: "I am not watching a professional wrestling match."

[N]

- 5 -

(4) Because the security map is geared to military and not to pacification criteria, we as well as Saigon are in a real sense flying blind. Some of our aid may be going into areas where it helps build up a Vietcong tax base and where in any case it is difficult to establish its relationship to the extension of governmental authority.

(5) Our exploding bureaucracy leads to a proliferation of programs which may overtax the slender resources of Vietnamese manpower and which makes it difficult to establish criteria for success or failure. It also has the following consequences: (a) Unless carefully handled it may magnify a Vietnamese sense of importance. In the provinces it is not rare to see American advisors outnumbering the Vietnamese staff of the province chief. This involves the danger that the war may come to seem more of a VC-American conflict than is desirable; (b) Competition among the advisors enables the Vietnamese to play them off against each other; (c) Some of the "progress" being reported is based on internal agency criteria which may not be related to a central plan; (d) There is a tendency to jump on the bandwagon of partially successful programs which soon overtaxes them while neglecting others of equal importance. For example, at the moment in the PAT program is highly fashionable.

- 6 -

[N]

I am not sure, however, whether instead of expanding PAT we should not concentrate on creating follow-up cadres in agriculture, education, public safety, etc.

(6) Overshadowing everything is a social or maybe even philosophical problem: The Vietnamese have a strong sense of peoplehood but little sense of being a nation. Our deepest challenge then is how one can build a nation in a divided society in the middle of a civil war. All new countries have had the problem of achieving political cohesion; none have had to do so in the face of such overwhelming pressures as Vietnam.

## II. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

### A1. Vietnamese Governmental Structure,

The Vietnamese political structure exists on three levels: in the Saigon government, in the military hierarchy especially the Corps Commanders add in the provincial administration.

The Saigon government is trying hard but as I pointed out above faces major problems in achieving legitimacy, internal cohesion and administrative thrust. We must be careful not to swamp it with requirements drawn from

- 7 -

American standards the practical consequence of which may be to overtax the capacity of the Vietnamese administration. Alexis Johnson has wisely said that the result of some of our pressures is to connect a garden hose with a fire hydrant. Nevertheless by patience and a continuation of your current close relationship with the Ky government, the GVN can become an increasingly useful instrument.

B. The military hierarchy. The military hierarchy suffers from two disabilities:

(1) It is overloaded by attempting to combine the control of military operations with supervising pacification missions (2) In the Corps Commanders there is a tendency towards autonomy verging on war-lordism. Thus General Thi told me that he was less concerned with continuity in Saigon than with stability in I Corps. This tendency is sometimes magnified by American administrative procedures. For example, the decision to create regional aid offices coinciding with corps boundaries would strengthen the autonomy of corps commanders by giving them direct access to American aid. On the one hand, the Corps Commanders are elements of stability. On the other, they are obstacles to a coherent national policy on pacification. The challenge is to focus them on the military arena while creating alternative structures for civil government.

C. Provincial government. This is now the weakest link in the chain.

Provincial and village government has been the principal victim of Vietcong depredations and Saigon instability. It is caught further between the civilian and military chains of command and torn by the competition of American agencies. Any pacification program will have to rebuild the structure of local government from the bottom up.

D. American Administrative Resources. Perhaps the most helpful procedure would be to give you a brief inventory of available agencies with their strengths and weaknesses in the pacification field as I see them:

**AID:** USOM has the most elaborate bureaucracy in the field and the largest resources. Its top personnel is excellent. Charles Mann struck me as tough-minded and I liked the way he went about getting on top of his job.

Colonel Sam Wilson, for all his public relations flair, is also first-rate and thoughtful. He understands the pacification problem as well as anyone.

Roy Wule is exceptionally able. I was much impressed with his analysis of the situation.

In the provinces, the absence of a maxximum career service makes for
spotty quality. In the provinces I visited the USOM personnel struck me
as the least able American group.

The most serious shortcoming of AID seems to me its ever-growing
bureaucracy. This almost forces it to empha size big projects which can be
implemented on a national basis, preferably in all 43 provinces simultaneously.
I do not think, however, that Vietnam has either the human resources or the
administrative apparatus to operate on such a scale. The result is an inevitable
short-fall or the application of criteria that may not be relevant.

For example, much of the USOM program is based on the premise that any
project that strengthens the economic infrastructure also enhances the position
of the Saigon government. But this is not inevitably true. In areas where the
VC predománate at night or where government is based on a tacit agreement between
the local government and the VC, building up the economic infrastructure may
simply extend the Communist tax base. USOM may be too large to cooperate sèlectively.

[Y]

- 10 -

**CIA:** We have discussed CIA operations often enough at breakfast not to need to repeat the problems here. I liked the top personnel of CIA which struck me as calm and business-like. My impression was that penetration of the VC apparatus was on the whole extremely poor. In the pacification field, the PAT program seems to me useful. Of all the efforts in the pacification field it was easiest to follow from Saigon into the provinces. My chief concern would be that expressed in my recent letter to you: The principal virtue of the present PAT program is that it exists. In practice many teams do not live up to their goals. I would guess that only about 30% of the teams are really operating as designed. This suggests that it would be wise to improve the quality of the existing operations than to expand it too dramatically--all the more so as I just do not know where the high-level manpower is going to come from. If pacification cadres are expanded I would prefer seeing resources put into follow-on cadres to existing PAT teams than into expansion. (Perhaps USOM could create a school for these analogous to the Cape St. Jacques operation.) Also, in the long run, CIA is not the best locus for a major pacification program. In the short run, however, any attempt to move responsibility for PAT is likely to bring more trouble than it is worth.

- 11 -

**JUSPAO:** I did not see enough of it to form a judgment.

**MAC V:** I will confine my comments to Mac V's role in the pacification field. Mac V's strength is its large pool of extremely able, extremely dedicated personnel--probably the most capable group of any agency engaged in field operations. Mac V's weakness is the tendency to try to do too many things simultaneously. Mac V is fully occupied with fighting the war and advising the Vietnamese military establishment. Pacification is always going to be a subsidiary problem to it. Moreover, it is not a task which comes naturally to the military. The efforts of the Marines in Danang or of some Special Forces officers in the Highlands are touching. Nevertheless, the special qualities developed in a decade or more of combat training do not include discriminating political judgment in volatile and complex circumstances.

This problem is compounded by the <u>xxx</u> system of military reporting which emphasizes tangible and concrete achievements. This produces a preference for programs which can be expressed numerically--such as the distribution of food and medical supplies--and to a neglect of efforts which depend on intangible qualities such as the discovery of local leadership groups. There is also a

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natural and understandable concern with police and security functions
over other governmental tasks. Finally, Mac V struck me as the most
bureaucratic agency operating in the pacification area. On balance I
would think it best to resist Mac V's efforts to expand its role in the
pacification field; indeed it would be wise to reduce it.

**Lansdale Group:** In many respects this is the most complex, the most
difficult to assess. Lansdale is without doubt
a man of extraordinary gifts. He is an artist at dealing with Asians. He
is patient, inspirational, imaginative. He has assembled an extraordinary
group of individualists--each of marked personality in his own right. Anybody
who could first collect such a group and then retain its loyalty over two
decades cannot be an ordinary person.

Many of the ideas of the Lansdale group struck me as highly original.
In addition to Lansdale, I was particularly impressed by Mike Deutsch, Dan
Ellsberg and Valinano

At the same time, the artistic and highly individualistic temperament of
Lansdale and his group have caused them to cut themselves off--sometimes

- 13 -

needlessly--from the other members of the mission. Most other elements of the country team cordially dislike the Lansdale operation. Some of this is an inevitable by-product of an unusual administrative arrangement. But some tensions could be avoided by greater tact on the part of Lansdale and his colleagues. They too often take the attitude that they will settle the pacification problem singlehandedly, that Lansdale alone has the major recipe and that the major contribution of other members of the mission should be to get out of the way. One evening while discussing the pacification problem with members of the mission, one of Lansdale's people said in answer to the question of what to do: "Turn the whole effort, US and American, over to Lansdale with full powers." Aside from the fact that this cannot happen, it does not make for good relationships.

Similarly, tensions could be reduced if Lansdale confided somewhat more in others. From what I saw, I would judge that many of his reports could be shown to Phil Habib without compromising Lansdale's relationships. Failure to do so exacerbates what would in any case be a difficult relationship.

In addition to these administrative problems, Lansdale and his associates
may be drawing too much on a precedent which is no longer fully relevant. The
Philippine insurrection has as many points of difference from the Vietnamese
civil war was similarities.

In the Philippines the insurrection had never reached the present scale of
the war in Vietnam. There was no foreign base for the guerillas. The indigenous
government was much stronger. There was a tradition of working with Americans.
The situation in Vietnam is much more complex, much less susceptible to
individual efforts.

Lansdale's group is essentially a collection of expediters and operators;
they are extremely able at axg getting individual efforts launched. But in a
large country whose social structure is torn by twenty years of civil war, this
is not enough. The challenge presented by the Lansdale group is to prevent
their efforts from flying off in all directions; to encourage them to become
more explicitly members of a team; to recognize that pacification requires the
sustained effort over a long period of time of all elements of the mission and
not the sole, performance of one small group which itself is not too well organized.

not the sole, performance of one small group which itself is not too well organized. An sustained effort over a long period of time of all elements of the mission and more explicitly members of a team; to recognize that facilitation requires the their efforts from flying off in all directions; to encourage them to become is not enough. The challenge presented by the Lamedale Group is to prevent large country whose social structure is torn by twenty years of civil war, this they are extremely able at mgx betting individual efforts launched. But in a Lamedale's Group is essentially a collection of expebtors and operators; individual efforts.

The situation in Vietnam is much more complex, much less acceptable to the American Government was much stronger. There was a tradition of working with Americans. the war in Vietnam. There was no foreign base for the Guerillas. The indigenous in the Philippines the inactivation had never reached the present scale of civil war was similarities.

Philippine inactivation has as many points of difference from the Vietnamese may be drawing too much on a precedent which is no longer fully relevant. The In addition to these administrative problems, Lamedale and his associates

[4]

If this is achieved the Lansdale group will make the most profound contribution which its talents warrant.

**The Embassy:** I can add little to your own knowledge here. I was much impressed by the Embassy personnel. Phil Habib is thoughtful and energetic-- one of the very best political officers which I have met anywhere. His staff is equally capable. I was particularly struck by Smyser, Bucke and Levine. The % institution of provincial reporter is an extraordinarily original innovation. Their judgments about conditions in the provinces were perhaps the best of any group in Saigon.

Bill Porter grew on me the more I saw of him. He is discreet, thoughtful, absolutely loyal to you, very perceptive--the best type of foreign service officer. He can be a major source of strength to you.

I did not see anything of Chadbourne. I did not have the impression that he played a major role in coordinating the diverse elements of the mission. At least I never heard his name mentioned for good or ill.

**Over-All Assessment:** In terms of ability the Saigon country-team is one of the strongest--if not the strongest--American mission that I have encountered anywhere. It also faces stupendous tasks which exceed in

**Over-All Assessment:** In terms of ability the Saigon country-team is one of the strongest--it not the strongest--American mission that I have encountered anywhere. It also faces unknown risks which exceed in

mission. At least I never heard the name mentioned for good or ill. that he played a major role in coordinating the diverse elements of the I did not see anything of Charles. I did not have the impression officer. He can be a major source of strength to you.

apexively loyal to you, very mercenary--the best type of foreign service Bill Porter grew on me the more I saw of him. He is discreet, thoughtful, Saigon in Saigon.

Their judgments about conditions in the provinces were perhaps the best of any The institution of provincial reporter is an extraordinarily original innovation.

is equally cabable. I was particularly struck by Smoker, Bucke and Revine. one of the very best political officers which I have met anywhere. His staff impressed by the Empaeyy beraunet. Bill Hapip is thoughtful and energetic--

**The Empaeyy:** I can add little to your own knowledge here. I was much which its talent warrant.

It this is achieved the Lunsdale Gronb will make the most broiland contribution

[D]

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[Y]

complexity those before any other comparable group. A great deal of
dedicated, selfless effort is taking place. The following shortcomings
should be seen as reflecting the magnitude of the task and not any personal
inadequacies.

(1) The various elements of the mission are pursuing programs devised in isolation from each other and not fully related to *over-all* criteria generally accepted by all members of the country-team.

(2) The result is a great degree of overlapping in some areas and a neglect of others. Everyone tries to copy a relative success story--like PAT. At the same time some other needed projects like follow-on administrative and agricultural cadres may be neglected.

(3) I am not aware of a full analysis of every project now being pursued by every agency. A lot of programs are still on the books which have either petered out or which may no longer be relevant. But failure to terminate them uses up the very scarce pool of available man power.

(4) Too many projects reflect the personal predelictions of some individual in Saigon or some provincial officer. This is understandable.

- 17 -

When we first started operating on a massive scale in Vietnam almost any
effort was likely to be useful. Today the contribution of any program should
be weighed against the additional demoralization of the Vietnamese administrative
structure which failure would entail.

(5) The somewhat *ad hoc* approach to the launching of pacification projects has a tendency to gear our programs to the capabilities of the US bureaucracy not to those of the Vietnamese. The result is that we may unintentionally overload Vietnamese resources of administrative skill and of scarce manpower.

(6) The Mission Council is useful in preventing an outright clash among the elements of your country team. It is less suitable for developing a truly coordinated approach geared to a central concept. It does not meet frequently enough. The head of the various agencies are too M harassed to do the detailed planning which the new situation requires. Because each agency is above all eager to push its own programs there is a tendency to operate through what is in effect a series of non-aggression treaties. Unless one agency's program directly impinges on another element of the mission, there is a premium on

not challenging it for fear of submitting one's own cherished projects to
general *scritiny*. This process avoids direct competition; it also encourages
proliferating bureaucracies and a tendency to try to avoid choices by attempting
to carry out every available option, a course which given the scarcity of
available *rw*sources--especially in trained manpower--*kx* is bound to produce *dkmax*
disappointments.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is obviously easier to point out difficulties than to suggest remedies.

Also many of the problems outlined in this letter are beyond immediate solution because they reflect the dilemmas of a war-wracked country whose social cohesion --as opposed to its sense of identity--was never highly developed. With all these qualifications here are a few random suggestions:

(1) The pacification program needs above all some clear and unambiguous success. Over the past decade this *hàmàx* history of civil government in Vietnam is replete with many plans which were very insufficiently realized, with many high hopes which eventually proved empty, with the formation of many cadres which finally evaporated. This has produced a certain cynicism among some of the operating Americans and a sense of hopelessness in many of the Vietnamese

poxxx

19
- ± ±
- -

provincial administrators. Any project which is seen through from conception
to execution would--in addition to its intrinsic merit--demonstrate the
possibility of doing something about Vietnam's present plight. This could
then have an important multiplier effect throughout Vietnamese society.

(2) The major obstacle to pg0gr66 now is the gap between conception and execution produced by the virtual collapse of Vietnamese civilian administration in the provinces and the American tendency to do too much too quickly on too vast a scale.

(3) The remedy is to begin with pilot projects which are known to be
within our capabilities and those of the Vietnamese, however modest these may
be. After success they can then be extended further and further. WXXX Where
a year ago it was wise to try to move on a broad front, the need today is to
demonstrate consistent progress somewhere. This suggests the need for a
careful review of projects, criteria and means. Projects no matter how good in
conception should be carefully and critically vetted for feasibility. For
example, I think that the Lansdale group's idea of "revolutionary villages" has
much to xuxx commend it. But before launching it, a survey of existing cadres

- 20 -

should be made, the security situation should be studies (lest these villages
become prime VC targets), the feasibility of achieving some concrete results
should be examined; in short, we must make sure that the idea does not turn
into another strategic hamlet program.

(4) To being with relatively small areas is, of course, the approach of HOPTAC and similar enterprises. These have not lived up to expectations not as a result of fmax faulty conception but because there was insufficient fxx follow-up and inadequate coordination.

(5) Thus an effective program requires an instrument to plan, coordinate and followup our max programs. In theory Lansdale's coordinating group is upposed to do this. However, he does not seem to me well suited by temperament or bureaucratic positioning to perform the planning and coordination function. Since he is at the same bureaucratic level as those he is supposed to be coordinating his maxporadic efforts to achieve cohesion add to the already powerful resentments against him and reduce his effectiveness in the area where he has exceptional talents: of dealing directly with the Vietnamese. Lansdale can and should be an important role; he cannot, in my view, be the focal point.

- 21 -

Planning and coordination to be acceptable to all the elements of the mission should be done at the level of the Ambassador or the Deputy Ambassador.

I think it would be unwise for you to engage your own prestige in every administrative squabble. Thus the chairmanship of the committee might go to Bill Porter or to Cladbourne. I did not see enough of Cladbourne to form an impression as to his abilities; I know that he is not now very effective. At the same time I was extremely well-impressed by Bill Porter's grasp of the subject, his loyalty to you, his discretion and by the respect in which he is held by the other elements in the Embassy. However, you will have a much better feel than I for who would be best suited for this role. Whoever is chairman, it seems to me that such a Program Review Committee should be composed of the Deputies of the various agencies. The heads are too busy for the required detailed review and the Mission Council level gives meetings too much formality.

(6) As The Program Review Committee should meet frequently--initially probably daily and in any event several times a week. Its initial task should

be to take an inventory of where we actually stand--specifically:

(a) The committee should prepare a map which reflects the security situation not as it applies to military units but as it affects the civilian population. Such a map would show where village government functions day and night. It should indicate where we have reason to suspect collusion between local officials and the VC. Where roads are declared open, we should make clear what force is required to keep them so, what traffic in fact moves on them and under what conditions. I believe that the Mac V pacification criteria will not be of much help in preparing such a map. Yet without such a map it is impossible to develop a well-designed program.

(b) Each agency should be required to submit a list of projects related to pacification, their *actual* status and their projected needs. This is necessary to prevent duplications and to correct efforts.

(c) There should be a survey--province by province--of *actual* manpower availability.

(7) With this survey as a background, the Program Review Committee should then:

then:

(1) With this survey as a background, the Program Review Committee should availability.

(c) There should be a survey--province by province--of actual manpower necessary to prevent publications and to correct efforts.

to fabrication, their actual status and their projected needs. This is

(p) Each agency should be required to submit a list of projects related
a map it is impossible to develop a well-designed program.

criteria will not be of much help in preparing such a map. Yet without such
fact moves on them and under what conditions. I believe that the Mac V fabrication
should make clear what force is required to keep them so, what traffic in
between local officials and the AC. Where roads are declared open, we
and night. It should indicate where we have reason to suspect collaboration
population. Such a map would show where village government functions day
situation not as it applies to military unite put as it affects the civilian

be to take an inventory of where we actually are--specifically:

- 33 -

[A]

- 23 -

(a) Design pilot projects in a few areas which we know to be within the capabilities of the Vietnamese and within the ability of the military to protect. These should be given top priority and energetically, indeed ruthlessly, pushed. Expansion should be avoided until there is a demonstrable success. The Program Review Committee should run periodic checks to insure that projects are, in fact, being carried out. For this purpose, the provincial reporters should be charged in addition to their existing duties with an inspection function on your behalf and that of the Program Review Committee.

(b) The Program Review Committee should also review the plans of each agency not only to slow down the bureaucratic proliferation but also to make sure that plans are related to a central concept.

(c) Lansdale should be a member of the Program Review Committee. He should be its principal contact with the GVN.

(3) One useful role for your son George on his visit might be to take some one pacification program either of Lansdale's or one of his, to me very interesting, ideas and see what it actually implies from gaining approval of the GVN to operation in the provinces.

(8) One useful role for your son George on pie is that might be to take
should be its principal contact with the GVN.

(c) Lunadale should be a member of the Program Review Committee. He
sure that plans are related to a central concept.

agency not only to slow down the bureaucratic proliferation put also to make
(p) The Program Review Committee should also review the plans of each
invasion function on your behalf and that of the Program Review Committee.
reporters should be charged in addition to their existing duties with an
projects are, in fact, being carried out. For this purpose, the provincial
success. The Program Review Committee should run periodic checks to insure that
ruthlessly, hushed. Expansion should be avoided until there is a demonstrable
protect. These should be given top priority and energetically, indeed
the capabilities of the Vietnamese and within the ability of the military to

- 33 -

[x]

- 24 -

(9) One minor recommendation: Though I have used the word pacification throughout this letter as a term of act, I think it should be changed: It has an excessively passive, perhaps even condescending, sound to it-- too reminiscent of colonial wars when one pacified the "natives."

This letter has grown much too long. I have written so frankly because I thought it was more helpful to stress the challenges ahead rather than the very real accomplishments of the past year. I am deeply persuaded that Vietnam is the hinge of our national effort where success and failure will determine our world role for decades to come.

My warmest wishes are with you.

With high regard.

As ever,

Henry A. Kissinger

December 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Since my return I have been giving a great deal of thought to the problem of pacification. As our military strength increases, VC mainforce units are likely to be decimated and pushed away from the main centers of population. Attention can then shift from the need to avoid military defeat which has rightly absorbed our energies until now to the problem of political construction.

I know from many conversations with you how much importance you attach to this challenge. Your selection of Lansdale testifies to this. But you have inherited a grim situation because for the past year the military effort has had overriding priority. If I dwell on what remains to be accomplished, it is not to derogate the dedicated efforts of people I like and respect but to try to make a contribution to a new phase of our effort. I am sure you know how much I believe in what you are doing.

I. THE PROBLEM

Military success can be sustained only if we are able to create a political structure to fill the void created by twenty years of civil war, ten years of systematic Vietcong assassination of key officials and two years of political upheavals in Saigon. The problem of pacification seems to me to have the following aspects:

(1) The current Saigon government--while the best available--is still in a precarious position. It has little in common with governments in the Western sense. It lacks cohesion--ministers say extraordinary, sometimes

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December 3, 1965

disloyal, things about each other (with Ky a notable exception). It can
be basically weakened by the mere act of making a proposal to it (with
respect to negotiations or by overloading its administrative machine.)
Its authority in the countryside is still weak. It must be nurtured
carefully.

(2) Extreme centralization in Saigon has led to a cumbersome bureaucracy which is plagued by an enormous gap between conception and execution. I have never seen so wide a gulf between conception and execution or such a chasm between theoretical subtlety and administrative ability. This state of affairs is understandable in terms of Vietnamese history but it does represent a challenge to policy.

(3) In the provinces, the civil war and political turmoil in Saigon have produced a combination of attentisme, demoralization and lethargy. Assassinations, incompetence and governmental change all place a premium on hedging bets. As one follows programs from Saigon into the provinces one is struck by how many simply evaporate without a trace and how many of those which survive in truncated form do so in a form which makes them irrelevant. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the following causes seem paramount:

(a) The mere fact that many high sounding programs have been initiated and have then collapsed has induced a general atmosphere of cynicism and demoralization in the provinces.

(b) The official Mac V security map is different from the security situation as it affects the local population. This is because military units can be secure while the civilian population remains subject to blackmail and reprisal; because in most of the country outside of Saigon the VC are likely to have a preponderant influence at night (most knowledgeable people to whom I spoke placed the figure as high as 85% outside of Saigon, Hue and Danang) and because some of the Mac V criteria are very formalistic. For example, some of the roads shown as "open" are so only in the technical sense that they are passable by convoys; some of the local governments which Mac V considers established physically disappear at nighttime.

(c) In some areas the uncontested presence of local government may give a misleading impression of progress in pacification. When local government is harassed one can assume that it is thwarting Vietcong wishes. In other areas where it is not challenged, it may be due to improvement in security. It may also reflect a tacit agreement by the local authorities with the Vietcong whereby both sides coexist without getting into each other's way. This I would judge to be the situation in much of the Delta. In these areas official statistics are highly misleading: sweep operations are conducted but find nothing;

- 3 -

December 3, 1965

the two sides share the tax revenue, etc. One advisor summed up this problem when I asked him how things were going in his province with the phrase: "I am watching a professional wrestling match."

(4) Because the security map is geared to military and not to pacification criteria, we, as well as the GVN, are in a real sense flying blind. Some of our aid may be going into areas where it helps build up a Vietcong tax base or where at the very least, its role is uncertain because of the difficulty of determining the dominant authority.

(a) It may magnify the Vietnamese sense of impotence. In the provinces it is not rare to see American advisors outnumbering the Vietnamese staff of the province chief. This involves the danger that the war may come to seem more of a VC-American conflict than is desirable.

(b) Competition among the advisors enables the Vietnamese to play them off against each other.

(c) Some of the "progress" being reported is based on internal agency criteria which may not be related to a central plan or to what is relevant to the fundamental problems outlined above.

(d) There is a tendency to expand partially successful programs too rapidly. This overtaxes them while at the same time other areas of equal importance are slighted. For example, at the moment the PAT program is highly fashionable. I am not sure, however, whether, instead of expanding PAT, we should not use the limited pool of manpower to create follow-up cadres in agriculture, education, public safety, etc.

(6) Overshadowing everything is a social or maybe even philosophical problem: The Vietnamese have a strong sense of being a distinct people but little sense of nationhood. Our deepest challenge then is to discover how a nation can be built when the society is torn by internal schisms and in the middle of a civil war. All new countries have had the problem of achieving political cohesion; none have had to do so in the face of such overwhelming pressures as Vietnam.

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December 3, 1965

II. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

A. <u>Vietnamese Governmental Structure</u>

The Vietnamese political structure exists on three levels: the
Saigon government, the military hierarchy (especially the Corps Commanders)
and the provincial administration.

(1) **GVN:** The Saigon government is trying hard but as I pointed out above it faces major problems in achieving legitimacy, internal cohesion and administrative thrust. We must be careful not to swamp it with requirements drawn from American standards. The practical consequence may be to overtax the capacity of the Vietnamese administration. Alexis Johnson has wisely said that some of our pressures try to connect a garden hose to a fire hydrant. Nevertheless by patience and a continuation of your current close relationship with the Ky government, the GVN can become an increasingly useful instrument.

(2) **The military hierarchy:** The military hierarchy suffers from two disabilities: (a) It is overloaded by its efforts to combine the control of military operations with the supervision of pacification missions. (b) In the Corps Commanders there is a tendency towards autonomy verging on war-lordism. Thus General Thi told me that he was less concerned with continuity in Saigon than with stability in I Corps. This tendency is sometimes magnified by American administrative procedures. For example, the decision to create regional USOM offices coinciding with corps boundaries should strengthen the autonomy of Corps Commanders by giving them direct access to American aid. On the one hand, the Corps Commanders are elements of security. On the other, they are obstacles to a coherent national policy on pacification. The challenge is to focus them on the military arena while creating alternative structures for civil government.

(3) **Provincial government:** This is now the weakest link in the chain. The provincial and village governments have been the principal victims of Vietcong depredations and Saigon instability. They are caught further between the civilian and military chains of command and torn by the competition of American agencies. Any pacification program will have to rebuild the structure of local government from the bottom up.

B.

B. <u>American Administrative Resources</u>

Perhaps it would be most helpful if I gave you a brief inventory of
agencies in the pacification field together with my assessment of their
strengths and weaknesses:

attractiveness and weakness:

agencies in the certification field together with my assessment of their
perceive it would be most helpful if I save you a brief inventory of

B. American Administrative Resources

B.

of local Government from the bottom up.

American agencies. And certification program will have to rebuild the structure
the civilian and military chains of command and turn by the competition of
Vietcong degradations and Saigon instability. They are caught further between

The provincial and village governments have been the principal victime of
(3) Provincial Government: This is now the weakest link in the chain.

for civil Government.

is to focus them on the military arena while creating alternative structures
they are operative to a coherent national policy on certification. The challenge
On the one hand, the Corba Commanders are elements of security. On the other,
autonomy of Corba Commanders by giving them direct access to American aid.

regional NCOM offices coinciding with corba headquarters should strengthen the
by American administrative procedures. For example, the decision to create
in Saigon than with stability in I Corba. This tendency is sometimes neglected
forsaken. The General TPI told me that he was fees concerned with continuity
the Corba Commanders there is a tendency towards autonomy seeking on mar-

military operations with the observatory of certification missions. (p) In
expatriates: (a) It is overloaded by its efforts to combine the control of
(3) The military hierarchy: The military hierarchy suffices from two

with the K government, the GAN can become an increasingly useful instrument.
Nevertheless by patience and a continuation of your current close relationship
said that some of our breaches try to connect a Saigon nose to a fire hydrant.
the capacity of the Vietnamese administration. Алексія Johnson has mostly

drawn from American standards. The practical consequence may be to overtax
administrative strain. We must be careful not to swap it with requirements
above it faces major problems in achieving legibility, internal cooperation and

(1) GAN: The Saigon Government is trying hard but as I pointed out

and the provincial administration.
Saigon Government, the military hierarchy (especially the Corba Commanders)
The Vietnamese political structure exists on three levels: the

V. Vietnamese Governmental Structure

II. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

Henry Capot Lodge

- 4 -

December 3, 1962

The Honorsle
The Honorsle

- 5 -

December 3, 1965

**AID:** USOM has the most elaborate bureaucracy in the field and the largest resources. Its top personnel is excellent. Charles Mann struck me as tough-minded, and I liked the way he went about getting on top of his job. Colonel Sam Wilson, for all his public relations flair, is also first-rate and thoughtful. He understands the pacification problem as well as anyone. Roy Werle is exceptionally able. I was much impressed with his analysis of the situation.

In the provinces, the absence of a career service makes for spotty quality. In the provinces I visited the USOM personnel struck me as the least able American group.

The most serious shortcoming of USOM seems to me to be its ever-growing bureaucracy. This almost forces it to emphasize big projects which can be implemented on a national basis, preferably in all 43 provinces simultaneously. I do not think, however, that Vietnam has either the human resources or the administrative apparatus to operate on such a scale. The result is that programs are almost bound to disintegrate or that they are carried out on the basis of essentially irrelevant criteria.

For example, much of the USOM program is based on the premise that any project that strengthens the economic infrastructure also enhances the position of the Saigon government. But this is not inevitably true. In areas where the VC predominate at night or where government is based on a tacit agreement between the local government and the VC, building up the economic infrastructure may simply extend the Communist tax base. USOM must acquire the ability to operate selectively.

**CIA:** We have discussed CIA operations often enough at breakfast not to need to repeat the problems here. I liked the top personnel of the CIA; they struck me as calm and business-like. My impression was that penetration of the VC apparatus was on the whole extremely poor. In the pacification field, the PAT program seems to me useful. Of all pacification efforts it was the easiest to follow from Saigon into the provinces. My concern would be that expressed in my recent letter. The principal virtue of the present PAT program is that it exists. In practice many teams do not live up to their goals. I would guess that at most 30% of the teams are really operating as designed. This suggests that it would be wiser to improve the quality of the existing operation than to expand too dramatically--all the more so as I just do not know where the high-level manpower is going to come from. If pacification cadres are expanded I would prefer seeing resources put into follow-on cadres to existing PAT teams in the fields of agriculture, public safety, etc.

- 6 -

December 3, 1965

**MAC V:** I will confine my comments to Mac V's role in the pacification field. Mac V's strength is its large pool of extremely able, dedicated personnel--probably the most capable group of any agency engaged in field operations. Mac V's weakness is its tendency to try to do too many things simultaneously. Mac V is fully occupied with fighting the war and advising the Vietnamese military establishment. Pacification will never be its primary concern. Moreover, it is not a task which comes naturally to the military. The efforts of the Marines in Danang or of some Special Forces officers in the Highlands are touching. Nevertheless, the special qualities developed in a decade or more of combat training do not include the ability to make astute political judgments in volatile and complex circumstances.

This problem is compounded by the system of military reporting which emphasizes tangible and concrete achievements. This produces a preference for programs which can be expressed numerically--such as the distribution of food and medical supplies--and to a neglect of efforts which depend on intangible qualities such as the discovery of local leadership groups. There is also a natural and understandable concern with police and security functions over other governmental tasks. Finally, Mac V struck me as the most bureaucratic agency operating in the pacification area. The military should understand the importance of pacification; but on balance I would think it best to resist Mac V's efforts to expand its operating role; indeed it would be wise to reduce it.

**Lansdale Group:** In many respects this is the most complex, the most promising and also the most difficult to assess. Lansdale is without doubt a man of extraordinary gifts. He is an artist in dealing with Asians. He is patient, inspirational, imaginative. He has assembled an extraordinary group of individualists--each a remarkable personality in his own right. Anybody who could first collect such a group and then retain its loyalty over two decades is not an ordinary person.

Many of the ideas of the Lansdale group struck me as highly original. In addition to Lansdale, I was particularly impressed by Mike Deutsch, Dan Ellsberg and Valeriano.

- 7 -

December 3, 1965

At the same time, the artistic and highly individualistic temperament of Lansdale and his group have caused them to cut themselves off--sometimes needlessly--from the other elements of the mission. Most other elements of the country-team cordially dislike the Lansdale operation. Some of this is an inevitable by-product of an unusual administrative arrangement. But some tensions could be avoided by greater tact on the part of Lansdale and his colleagues. They too often take the attitude that they will settle the pacification problem singlehandedly, that Lansdale alone has the magic recipe and that the major contribution of other members of the mission should be to get out of the way. One evening while discussing the pacification problem with members of the mission, one of Lansdale's people said in answer to the question of what to do: "Turn the whole effort, U.S. and American, over to Lansdale with full powers." Such an attitude is unrealistic and, above all, compounds tensions.

Similarly, tensions could be reduced if Lansdale confided somewhat more in others. From what I saw, I would judge that many of his reports could be shown to Phil Habib without compromising Lansdale's relationships. Failure to do so exacerbates what would in any case by a difficult relationship.

In addition to these administrative problems, Lansdale and his associates may be drawing too much on a precedent which is no longer fully relevant. The Philippine insurrection has as many points of difference from the Vietnamese civil war as similarities to it. In the Philippines the insurrection had never reached the scale of the war in Vietnam. There was no foreign base for the guerillas. The indigenous government was much stronger. There was a tradition of working with Americans. The situation in Vietnam is much more complex, much less susceptible to bravura, individual efforts.

Lansdale's group is essentially a collection of expediters and operators; they are extremely adept at getting individual efforts launched. But this is not enough in a large country whose social structure has been torn by twenty years of civil war. In fact, their tendency to push uncoordinated ideas adds an additional strain to an already overtaxed structure.

The challenge presented by the Lansdale group is to prevent their efforts from flying off in all directions; to encourage them to become more explicitly members of a team; to recognize that pacification requires the sustained effort over a long period of time of all elements of the mission and not the solo performance of one small group which itself is not too well organized. If this is achieved the Lansdale group will make the profound contribution which its talents warrant.

[N]

- 8 -

December 3, 1965

**The Embassy:** I can add little to your own knowledge here. I was much impressed by the Embassy personnel. Phil Habib is thoughtful and energetic-- one of the very best political officers whom I have met anywhere. His staff is equally capable. I was particularly struck by Smyser, Burke and Levine. The institution of provincial reporter is an extraordinarily original innovation. Their judgments about conditions in the provinces were perhaps the best of any group in Saigon.

**Over-All Assessment:** In terms of ability the Saigon country-team is one of the strongest missions--if not the strongest--that I have encountered anywhere. It also faces stupendous tasks which exceed in complexity those before any other comparable group. A great deal of dedicated, selfless effort is taking place. The following shortcomings should be seen as reflections of the magnitude of the task and not as indications of personal inadequacies:

(1) The various elements of the mission are pursuing programs which have been devised in isolation from each other and are not fully related to over-all criteria generally accepted by all members of the country-team. The result is a considerable overlap in some areas and a neglect of others.

(2) There is no consistent review of programs. Many programs are still on the books even though they may have petered out or may no longer be relevant. The failure to terminate them unfortunately uses up the very scarce pool of available manpower.

(3) Too many projects reflect the personal predelictions of some individual in Saigon or some provincial officer. This is understandable. When we first started operating on a massive scale in Vietnam almost any effort was likely to be useful. Today the contribution of any program should be weighed against the additional demoralization of the Vietnamese administrative structure which failure would entail.

(4) The somewhat ad hoc approach to the launching of pacification projects has a tendency to gear our programs to the capabilities of the U.S. bureaucracy not to those of the Vietnamese. The result is that we may unintentionally overload Vietnamese resources of administrative skill and of manpower.

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December 3, 1965

(5) The Mission Council is useful in preventing an outright clash among the elements of your country-team. It is less suitable for developing a truly coordinated approach geared to a central concept. It does not meet frequently enough. The head of the various agencies are too harassed to do the detailed planning which the new situation requires. Because each agency is above all eager to push its own programs there is a tendency to operate through what is in effect a series of non-aggression treaties. Unless one agency's program directly impinges on another element of the mission, there is a premium on not challenging it for fear of submitting one's own cherished projects to general scrutiny. This process avoids direct competition; it also encourages proliferating bureaucracies and a tendency to try to avoid choices by attempting to carry out every available option, a course which given the searcity of available resources is bound to produce disappointments.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The pacification program needs above all some clear and unambiguous success. Over the past decade the history of civil government in Vietnam is replete with plans which were insufficiently realized, with high hopes which eventually proved empty, with the formation of many cadres which finally evaporated. This has produced cynicism and hopelessness. Any project which is seen through from conception to completion would--in addition to its intrinsic merit--demonstrate the possibility of doing something about Vietnam's present plight. This could then have an important multiplier affect throughout Vietnamese society.

(2) The major obstacle to progress now is the gap between conception and execution produced by the inadequacy of Vietnamese provincial administration and the American tendency to do too much too quickly on too vast a scale.

(3) The remedy is to begin with pilot projects which are known to be within our capabilities and those of the Vietnamese, however modest these may be. After success they can then be extended further and further. This suggests the need for a careful review of projects, criteria and means. Projects no matter how good in conception should be carefully and critically examined for

matter how good in conception should be carefully and critically examined for
the need for a careful review of projects' criteria and means. Projects no
pe. After success they can then be extended further and further. This suggests
within our capabilities and those of the Vietnamese, however modest these may
be. The remedy is to begin with pilot projects which are known to be

(2) The major obstacle to progress now is the gap between conception and execution produced by the inadequacy of Vietnamese governmental administration and execution. The American tendency to do too much too quickly on too vast a scale.

Vietnamese society.

Present right. This could then have an important multiplier effect. Inextricably merit--demonstrate the *possibility* of doing something about Vietnam, a

it seen strongly from conception to completion world--in addition to its
evacuated. This has produced criticism and hopelessness. And project which
eventually brought forth, with the formation of many capiara which itself
rejoice withANA which were insufficiently realized, with high probe which
succeeds. Over the past decade the history of civil government in Vietnam is

(1) The facilitation program needs to prove all some clear and unambiguous

these qualifications are a few random suggestions:

--as opposed to its sense of identity--was neverfighly developed. With all
because they reflect the dalema of a war-cracked country whose social cohesion

It is optionally easier to put out difficulties than to suggest remedies.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

resources is pound to produce qtaabonments.
available obtaon, a course which gives the searach of available
tendency to try to avoid choices by attempting to carry out every
competition; it also encourages brokering purescrates and a
confused brokets to general acriminy. This process avoids direct
briarum on not challenging it for fear of admitting one's own
directly tmbangee on another element of the mission, there is a
series of non-aggression treaties. Unless one agency's program
brokets, there is a tendency to operate through what is in effect a
redundant. Because each agency it upove all eager to help its own
are too paraded to do the detailed blunting which the new situation
It does not meet frequently enough. The head of the various agencies
tor developing a truly coordinated approach feared to a central concebt.
clash among the elements of your country-team. It is lessBJutaple

Henry Capot-Pedoe
The Honorspie

- 9 -

December 3, 1962

- 10 -

December 3, 1965

feasibility. For example, I think that the Lansdale group's idea of "revolutionary villages" has much to commend it. But before it is launched, a survey of existing cadres should be made; the security situation should be studied (lest these villages become prime VC targets); the feasibility of achieving some concrete results should be examined; in short, we must make sure that the idea does not turn into another strategic hamlet program.

(4) To begin with relatively small areas is, of course, the approach of HOPTAC and similar enterprises. To be sure, these have not lived up to expectations. But the cause was not faulty conception so much as insufficient follow-up and inadequate coordination.

(5) Pacification to be effective must have an administrative mechanism to plan, coordinate and follow-up our programs. In theory Lansdale's co-ordinating group is supposed to do this. However, he does not seem to me well suited by temperament or bureaucratic positioning to perform the planning and coordination function. Since he is at the same bureaucratic level as those he is supposed to be coordinating, his sporadic efforts to achieve cohesion add to the already powerful resentments against him and reduce his effectiveness in the area where he has exceptional talents: of dealing directly with the Vietnamese. Lansdale can and should play an important role in planning; he cannot, in my view, be the chief executive officer.

In order to be acceptable to all the elements of the mission, planning and coordination should be conducted at the level of the Ambassador of the Deputy Ambassador. I think it would be unwise for you to engage your own prestige in every administrative squabble. This leaves Bill Porter or Chadbourne. I did not see enough of Chadbourne to form an impression as to his abilities; I know that he is not now very effective. At the same time, I was extremely well-impressed by Bill Porter's grasp of the subject, his loyalty to you, his discretion and by the respect in which he is held by the other elements in the Embassy. However, you will have a much better feel than I for who would be best suited for this role.

(6) The Program Review Committee should meet frequently--at least several times a week--and initially probably daily. Its first task should be to take an inventory of where we actually stand--specifically:

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December 3, 1965

(b) Each agency should be required to submit a list of projects related to pacification, their *actual* status and their anticipated needs. This is necessary to prevent duplications and to coordinate efforts.

(a) Design pilot projects in a few areas which we know to be within the capabilities of the Vietnamese and within the ability of the military to protect. These should be given top priority and energetically, indeed ruthlessly, pushed. Expansion should be avoided until there is a demonstrable success. The Program Review Committee should run periodic spot checks to insure that projects are, in fact, being carried out. For this purpose, the provincial reporters should be charged with an inspection function on your behalf and that of the Program Review Committee in addition to their existing duties.

(8) One useful role for your son on his visit might be to consider one specific pacification program (either one of his, which he has mentioned to me and which I found most interesting) or one of Lansdale's and find out what it would actually involve--from gaining approval of the GVN to pperation in the provinces.

FOR THE VICE-CHANCELLOR & CHAIRMAN ONLY

in the provinces.
what it would actually involve--from gaining approval of the CAM to cessation to me and which I found most interesting) or one of Isadale's and find out one specificification program (either one of the two, which he has mentioned (3). One useful role for your son on this matter might be to consider

He should be its principal contact with the CAM.

(c) Isadale should be a member of the Program Review Committee.

but also to make sure that plans are related to a central concept. of each agency not only to allow down the bureaucratic proliferation (p). The Program Review Committee should also review the plans

their existing duties.
benefit and that of the Program Review Committee in addition to reporters should be charged with an inspection function on how are, in fact, being carried out. For this purpose, the provincial Committee should run periodic spot checks to insure that projects avoided until there is a demonstrable success. The Program Review energetically, indeed mindlessly, bashed. Expansion should be the military to protect. These should be given top priority and within the capabilities of the Aleutians and within the ability of (a) Design pilot projects in a few areas which we know to be

approved then:

manpower availability.

efforts.

needs. This is necessary to prevent publications and to coordinate related to classification, their actual status and their anticipated

(p) Each agency should be reduced to submit a list of projects

program.
without each a map of it. It is impossible to develop a well-designed criteria will not be of much help in preparing such a map. Yet and under what conditions. I believe that the Mac A classification required to keep them so, what traffic in fact moves on them roads are declared open, we should make clear what force is expected collaboration between local officials and the AC. Where

Henry Capot Lodge
The Honorable

- ff -

December 3, 1962

[A]

- 12 -

December 3, 1965

(9) One minor recommendation: Though I have used the word pacification throughout this letter as a term of art, I think it should be changed: It has an excessively passive, perhaps even condescending, sound to it--too reminiscent of colonial wars when one pacified the "natives."

This letter has grown much too long. I doubt that I have said much that is unknown to you. Rather I have tried to put together some thoughts which may be relevant to the direction in which I know from our conversations you intend to move. I have tried to confine my observations to views which I know are shared by many senior officers of your mission or in the provinces. I am deeply persuaded that Vietnam is the hinge of our national effort where success and failure will determine our world role for decades to come. And I have very great confidence in your ability to see it through.

With warm good wishes and high regard.

As ever,

Henry A. Kissinger

P.S. After finishing the letter two other thoughts occurred to me.

(1) One of the longer-term problems is the lack of commitment of students and intellectuals in general to the war effort. In the short-term this makes no difference. In the long run, it provides a focus for any opposition group and it deprives us of what may be an untapped reservoir of intelligence and idealism. It seems to me that if we proceed by the approach outlined above--by selecting some high-priority areas for pacification--we could then challenge students and professors with something like a Vietnamese version of the Peace Corps to go into these provinces and work for their people. These individuals could then serve as nuclei for other areas as they are pacified.

(2) The difficulty in pacification now is that there are many programs but little authority. The Program Review Committee could supply this lack.

but little authority. The Program Review Committee couldably this lack.
(2) The difficulty in rectification now is that there are many programs

areas as they are rectified.
for their people. These individuals could then serve as uncles for other
a Vietnamese version of the Peace Corps to go into these provinces and work
tion--we could then challenge students and professors with something like
abroad outlined above--by selecting some high-priority areas for pacifica-
of intelligence and idealism. It seems to me that if we proceed by the
obstruction group and it deprives us of what may be an untabbed reservoir
this makes no difference. In the long run, it provides a focus for any
students and intellectuals in General to the war effort. In the short-term
(1) One of the longer-term problems is the lack of commitment of

Henry V. Klaageger

Ye ever,

I have very great confidence in your ability to see it through.
success and failure will determine our world role for decades to come. And
I am deeply berated that Vietnam is the stage of our national effort where
you intend to move. I have tried to continue my operations to views which
which may be relevant to the direction in which I know from our conversations
that is unknown to you. Rather I have tried to put together some thoughts
This letter has grown much too long. I doubt that I have said much

reminiscent of colonial wars when one pacified the "natives".
has an excessively naive, perhaps even condescending, sound to it--too
throughout this letter as a team of art. I think it should be changed: It
(3) One minor recommendation: Though I have need the word pacification

- 13 -

December 3, 1962

December 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In reading the attached letter over it occurred to me
that I might sum up its central recommendation as well as add
a few thoughts which have occurred to me since:

(1) The basic recommendation is that we try to have a success story somewhere in the pacification field. The criteria for success should be a program that (a) can be consistently pursued over an extended period and (b) can be expanded to other parts of Vietnam as it develops.

(2) The fundamental problem is to develop an ideology which can enlist popular and especially intellectual support. We cannot defeat the VC only by administrative or economic measures. There must be something to affirm, not only to reject. This is the reasoning behind my recommendation to enlist Vietnamese students for work in the countryside.

(3) I wonder whether it might not be a good idea to establish close ties between various faculties of the Vietnamese universities and sister institutions in the United States. If some American faculties established some kind of permanent link with their colleagues in Vietnam it might help break down the sense of isolation of Vietnamese intellectuals.

I will write you soon about the negotiations problem.

Excerpts from a letter to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

... A few recommendations:

(3) Washington is committed to negotiations as soon as the DRV asks for them. When this happens you will be confronted with a series of very concrete issues. These include:

(a) Forum for negotiations

(g) Presence of US troops

December 13, 1965

MEMORANDUM

January 3, 1966

To: Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

From: George C. Lodge

Subject: Problems of motivation and organization in South Viet Nam

**Introduction:** This report is based on observations made during a trip to Viet Nam (December 7-21, 1965) when I visited the following places: Saigon; Vung Tau Training Center; Thu Dau Mot and Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province; Phan Thiet; the Cam Ranh Bay area; the Qui-Nhon area; and Huế and other communities of Thua Thien Province. I had extensive conversations with Tran Quoc Buu and other leaders of the Viet Nam Confederation of Labor (CVT); province and district chiefs; leaders of five Political Action Teams (PAT) in the field; U.S. Marines at Phu Bai and Army personnel elsewhere; top personnel of the U.S. Mission and U.S. field representatives; a number of GVN officials, including Prime Minister Ky, Minister of Labor Nguyen-Xuan-Phong, and Vo Long Trieu of the Ministry of Rural Affairs; a group of "out" politicians, including Tran Van Van, Phan Quang Dan, Phan Huy Quat, Tran Van Tuyen and Nguyen Van Tuoi; leaders of the Buddhist hierarchy in Huế; and students and faculty at Huế.

I

The problems confronting the United States and the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) are parts of a circle, inter-dependent and interrelated, inseperable from one another. Efforts to deal with them separately are bound to fail.

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The point of highest priority in this circle is the matter of security, which can be divided into two parts: (1) the confrontation of main force units of the Army of North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong on one side against the U.S. and GVN regular forces on the other, and (2) the activities of small groups of guerrillas and terrorists who have been regularly and systematically destroying the social, political and economic life of each community and of the nation. This report deals with this second category of security.

The identity, control, and defeat of the terrorist in any community depends largely on the motivation, organization and commitment of that community. Without this commitment, guns and force are of limited and short-term value. The terrorist in Viet Nam has the powerful weapon of fear which he has refined and implanted over a long period of time. The villager has received little protection against him and, therefore, has frequently cooperated with him, not because he approves of him, but because he has no clear alternative. The Government - Saigon, Province or District - remains a distant and confusing entity. For many in fact the Viet Cong is the government, it being organized and dispersed in such a way as to tax and impose its will in a very direct if oppressive manner.

The problem comes in the shape of a circular dilemma: increased commitment on the part of the villager to his hamlet, his village, his district or province or nation, is necessary to motivate and organize him to deal with his security problem; but it is also necessary to provide him with the means of security in order to raise his commitment level above that of his fears. Commitment and security, therefore, must be dealt with together and concurrently. There is good reason to believe that previous security efforts failed partly at least because they attempted to provide security _first_ and _then_ to raise the commitment level.

There is ample evidence to show that the commitment level is not necessarily raised by the bestowal of goods and services from authorities outside the community. School houses, health workers, fertilizer and pigs do not necessarily have an effect on the commitment level. Their distribution does not necessarily, therefore, achieve our objectives in Viet Nam. They can, in fact, hamper that achievement by smothering initiative and dulling local agitation for the fulfillment of needs.

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It seems apparent that some of our material aid is indeed a waste and, what is worse, is undoubtedly enriching the Viet Cong. I saw a handsome new school building which is used in the morning by the children of the region and in the afternoon by the Viet Cong. Another schoolhouse at Ben Cat is an adornment and probably an efficient educational institution but there is no evidence whatsoever that it has advanced our objectives in that benevolent community.

We must be clear in our minds what the priorities are and what we hold as criteria for success. We are not presumably interested in education per se or indeed even in health per se. I heard a story of a health worker in a village in Thua Thien who had done an admirable job. After he left, the local Viet Cong newspaper, *The Liberator*, congratulated him on his good work and told the people that efforts would be made to get him back, leaving the clear impression that the Viet Cong had been responsible for the man's work. Incidentally, our information program seems to lack anything equivalent to *The Liberator*, which is local, flexible, and quick to take advantage of small opportunities.

A proper ordering of priorities and success criteria would suggest that a rude thatched hut built by villagers as a place in which to educate their children is more valuable than a million-dollar concrete building.

This is reasonably obvious. Where, then, does the problem lie? USOM's program policy was admirably and articulately explained to me - the list of needs of the people, the manner in which goods and services were being distributed to meet those needs and the basic premises upon which all this is being conducted. The flaw lies in one simple element of the reasoning: the program is being conducted by, with, and through local government for the purpose of making that government more effective and responsive. While with part of our mind we know quite well that in most of Viet Nam there is not a shred of social-political-economic structure that can legitimately be called "government", with the other part of our mind we assume that by injecting large quantities of material aid into what is called "government", we will automatically inflate and strengthen it.

[LC]

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This is a fallacy which marks our AID policy not only in Viet Nam but in Latin America and other regions where large and critical masses of the population are completely beyond the reach of central, national government.

The effect of this policy is often to harrass and overburden the delicate tentacles of what someday may be government and to consume scarce local manpower in a fruitless exercise.

We must recognize that the priority objectives of the US-GVN effort in South Viet Nam is not necessarily related to the distribution of matter. Our objectives are met only to the extent that the villagers are agitated, motivated and organized to commit themselves to achieving fulfillment of their needs. Then and then only will their commitment level surpass their fear level and will we be in a position to solve the security problem.

**AGITATION** - I was told that the people in Viet Nam really do not care much about reforms or anything else except tranquility. They want to be left alone; they want peace. While this is quite understandable, it is also dangerously misleading. What it really means is that the fear level is so high that all other needs of the villager are sublimated. As long as this is the case, of course, seeking to meet his needs is in a sense a waste of time. He must be agitated to feel his needs as being just as, if not more, important than his fears. He must be stimulated to realize that education for his children, reasonable credit arrangements, land reform, health or whatever, are of great importance to him. He must be made, in short, into a revolutionary. This doesn't happen naturally, especially in rural, static, traditional areas.

It is interesting in this connection to note what Prime Minister Ky said to me when I asked him about his plans for land and other reforms. I asked whether his land reform scheme was more than parcelling out government land to the squatters who occupied it and who in effect felt already a sense of ownership, only without its responsibilities. We also talked about the inability of NACO to reach the people who need agricultural credit the most. I gathered that it was hard for him to push through reform against the forces of the status quo who naturally resist them without real and visible pressures from the countryside. The point is that while all seem to agree that revolution is necessary in Viet Nam, you can't have revolution without revolutionaries among the masses.

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[LC]

**ORGANIZATION AND MOTIVATION** - Once the needs of the villagers are as or more important to him than his fears, he can be motivated to act to fill those needs through organization of many kinds: political structures, labor organizations, cooperatives, community efforts, etcetera. It is only after the villager has been agitated, motivated and organized that his needs can be fulfilled with the political or ideological effect which is our priority concern. It is only then that response to his call for assistance is useful. It is only then that he can receive assistance with dignity.

**COMMITMENT** - The natural sequel is commitment of the villager to whatever individual, group or force has successfully agitated, motivated and organized him and assisted him in meeting his needs. In Viet Nam it would seem unlikely that commitment will come quickly to the Central Government which is by tradition and in practice so distant and overburdened. Commitment would logically come first at the hamlet level, then the village, the district and maybe in time the province and the nation. This, of course, does not mean that the villager need be opposed to any of these levels of government during the stages of commitment growth, but it is important to recognize as precisely as possible the place or point to which he can be expected to be committed at any one time.

Given this sequence, I would recommend that USOM review its provincial operations program and policy and consider substantial rearrangements and refocusing of effort to the end that:

No aid is distributed or services rendered unless they follow upon real local agitation, motivation and organization and unless they are requested by and directed through an organizational structure which offers a reasonable guarantee that they will not fall into the hands of the Viet Cong and that they will directly contribute to raising the commitment level above that of the fear level and thus contribute to the solution of the security problem which is paramount.

We should remember that the Communists achieve substantial motivation and organization but distribute very little aid. They heal very few sick and build few schoolhouses. The problem in Viet Nam is fundamentally not materialistic. Matter will not solve it; it can, however, be used as a tool in its solution.

[L]

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II

I would suggest four existing or potential
receptacles for focus and priority under the above criteria
(not listed necessarily in the order of their importance):

1. The Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT) impressed me as an organization of the utmost importance with proven capacity to agitate, motivate and organize. It is hard to estimate its real capacity for action at the moment. It has been restrained by successive governmental regimes which understandably fear its political power. It is wary of committing itself to any single regime, having the equally understandable apprehension that the regime may be overthrown. On the other hand, it is reasonable to estimate that it has 100 competent leaders and perhaps 100,000 committed followers in three areas of work which are critical to Viet Nam: fishing, the rubber plantations, and farming. It also has varying degrees of strength in other activities, especially the oil industry, various sorts of transport, the docks, the construction industry, and, in some parts of the country, meat slaughtering.

Relationships and understanding between the CVT and the GVN, especially Prime Minister Ky, seem to be at an unprecedented high level. In my conversations with Ky and the Minister of Labor there seemed to be an awareness of the importance of the CVT in securing political support for the GVN, gaining worker cooperation in industries such as the Saigon bus company, and in performing various social services in both urban and rural areas. Tran Quoc Buu, President of the CVT, appeared disposed to cooperate with the GVN in any way he could, although he was obviously aware of the distance between the GVN and the people and its consequent instability. It is too early to predict what will happen to these relationships in the future, just as it is hard to assess with confidence the real power of the CVT. It is time, however, to conduct some careful tests with the following objectives:

a. To show the GVN that the CVT can be a useful and constructive force in the achievement of national objectives;

b. To show the CVT that it can engage in substantial activities without the interference of government;

c. To lay the basis for continuing activity by the CVT in motivating and organizing the people of South Viet Nam;

d. To develop useful experience in this regard which can be converted into training material for wider application.

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[LC]

**Test #1:** At Phan Thiet the CVT has about 10,000 dues-paying members under the leadership of Tran Van Khuyen, most of whom are or were engaged in fishing, fish processing and boat building. The quantities of fish caught today are substantially below normal because it cannot be transported over the roads to Saigon and other markets, where the price of fish is rising, contributing to the general inflationary problem.

A $15,000 (one million piasters) loan should be extended to the Fishermen's Federation at Phan Thiet with which it would build a 50-ton boat, members of the boat builders union contributing some free time for the construction. This boat would be owned and operated cooperatively by the Union. It could be built in two months and could pay for itself within a year or less with efficient operation. It would shuttle between Phan Thiet and Saigon, carrying fish to market.

Its real purpose, however, would be to demonstrate and test techniques of cooperative formation in Viet Nam today, to form a model for further similar organizations along the coast and to produce practical and proven training material for cooperative and community development to be used at Vung Tau or elsewhere for the training of PAT groups and other associated teams. This is a low risk project which consumes a minimum of Vietnamese manpower and could provide maximum assurance to the GVN and the CVT of each other's sincerity. It is outside of Saigon and would be under the direction of a relatively non-political labor leader, who appears to enjoy close relations with his District Chief.

There are undoubtedly numerous obstacles to be overcome. For example, the unloading and marketing of the fish in Saigon in an efficient and just manner would have to be assured. Some technical assistance might be required. I would strongly urge that this assistance not come from the United States. U.S. cooperative experience appears to be of only marginal value in countries like Viet Nam. The unfortunate history of the Cooperative Research and Training Center in Saigon, which was assisted by the Cooperative League of the U.S., is a case in point. Our advice and experience concerning cooperatives is far too sophisticated and is usually based on assumptions of motivation and organization which are just not valid in developing countries. Assistance might be sought from the community development institute (Coady Institute) at Antigonish, Nova Scotia; Histadrut in Israel or possibly Taiwan.

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It would be advisable to interest Vo Long Trieu of the Ministry of Rural Affairs in this project. He is a brilliant young man who played a leading role in the Peace Corps-like pacification efforts in the 8th District of Saigon, is a close personal friend of the Prime Minister, understands cooperatives, knows about relevant experience in Israel and Tunisia and does not appear to be engaged in priority work now. He would serve several purposes: to keep the Prime Minister informed and aware of the project, to relate it to overall GVN rural reconstruction activity, and perhaps would serve as director of the training program and expanded activities which could result.

If the Phan Thiet boat worked well, the Union could be encouraged to organize cooperative operations in other fields, such as cold storage and freezing, marketing and credit. It has already had some elementary experience with cooperation with a landing and cleaning facility at the port.

If USOM plans to continue to supply motors to the fishermen at Phan Thiet, I recommend that it be done through the Union so as to strengthen it as an organizer.

**Test #2:** It appears that the Tenant Farmers Union is strongest in Dinh Tuong, Vinh Binh and Kien Giang Provinces. (This should be checked.) Consideration should be given to assisting this union in these areas to form credit and fertilizer cooperatives with assistance from one of the three places mentioned above. It is apparent that NACO is not reaching far enough down to be really effective. Furthermore, it does not carry with it the motivation-organization powers that the TFU may. In general, it would seem wise to channel as much fertilizer and agricultural assistance through the TFU as possible. Undoubtedly the union would need accounting and administrative help if this were to be done on a large scale.

**Test #3:** The Plantation Workers Federation has its best organization at Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province on the French-owned C.E.X.O. plantation. Prime Minister Ky seemed enthusiastic about the idea of the GVN nationalizing this plantation and turning it over to the Union to run as a cooperative. The Union was also enthusiastic about the idea, although its president said he would need assistance in bookkeeping and marketing.

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[LC]

He suggested that such assistance could come from the Malaysia Rubber Workers Union which is one of the strongest organizations of its kind in South Asia and has long enjoyed close relationships with the Plantation Workers of Viet Nam. There are 5,000 workers on the Loc Ninh plantation, 3,000 of them permanent, under the leadership of a man named Tuy, who was described to me as one of the strongest leaders in the country. I understand there is a Special Forces Camp in the District and appreciate that this idea is filled with risks and difficulties. Its ideological appeal, however, is sufficiently strong that I believe it should be given careful consideration.

In general, I would suggest that opportunities be sought to involve the CVT in the management of enterprises. It has done an apparently successful job of managing the slaughter house in Hué, reducing prices and increasing wages. Most important is the ideological and commitment impact of such projects. In countries where the opportunities for more traditional trade union functions, such as collective bargaining, are severely limited, this type of cooperative-entrepreneurial venture can have substantial and beneficial social, political, and economic effect (e.g., Tunisia, Israel, Uruguay, etc.).

Incidentally, in Hué I saw a school which the CVT had built in the workers' section of town. I was told that it has been inoperative for a year because the small amount of cement and other materials necessary to complete it had not been received from USOM as promised. If this is true, it is an example of failure to observe proper priorities and criteria for success. I cannot imagine that there are many other instances where a local organization on its own initiative has built a school. Speedy assistance to allow its completion would seem to be of the highest priority.

I would guess that if the CVT is going to become a major factor in Vietnamese development, as I believe it should, it will and should eventually become increasingly identified with government. This is the pattern throughout the developing world. The stronger the CVT becomes, the more of a political force it will be and thus the more necessary it will seem to government to have its cooperation and support. The CVT obviously will continue to need government protection and approval. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to keep the lines between the two strong and clear of misunderstanding and unjustified apprehension.

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[LC]

2. The second receptacle which should receive priority attention under the criteria stated above is the Political Action Teams and other development groups which it is planned to associate with and behind them. I had occasion to visit and talk at length with the leaders of five PAT groups in the Quinhon and Mué areas. I was profoundly impressed by their indoctrination and commitment and the work they were doing. The danger is that they will be over-extended, moved from community to community too quickly and asked to do things for which they have not been trained. There were many signs of extreme fatigue among the teams I saw. Their work of community organization is so important and yet so difficult that it would seem wise to keep them in one place for a year if necessary, it being far better to have one area properly established than to have ten inadequately organized. The process of integration of the PAT operation into the rural reconstruction framework obviously must be watched with the closest attention. This transition from a special, elite, high quality operation to a routine bureaucratic one could be disastrous.

As training in cooperative and other types of community organization are necessary to expand and solidify PAT achievements, great care must be taken to insure that training for these activities is as good as that now given the PAT teams at Vung Tau. My guess would be that it will be difficult to find the knowledge necessary to make this new type of training valid in the Vietnamese environment. This is why the Phan Thiet experiment and others like it is of special importance: to produce valid techniques based on experience and experiment.

3. The civic action work of the Marines at Phu Bai exemplifies a kind of motivation-organization achievement on the part of our military which can have permanent effect on village commitment level. The significant factors at Phu Bai seemed to be: a squad of volunteer Marines stays in one hamlet or village for a long period of time, four to six months; they work with Popular Force contingents in the community not as supervisors or trainers but as fellow fighters, leaving the command structures to be set by experience; the example of their humanity and dedication has a profound effect. In the Phu Bai hamlets the hamlet chiefs are once again able to sleep in their houses and there is reason to hope that enough fabric has been put back into these communities so that when the Marines leave they will not slip backwards. It would seem possible to repeat this operation elsewhere, using volunteers from other military units.

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4. In some ways the most important revolutionary receptacle is the political structure of the hamlet or village itself. At the moment it would seem that there is no structure except that which has been superimposed from the district or provincial level, which by definition is not representative. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to hold some form of village elections at the earliest possible moment. In talking to hamlet-village chiefs I was struck by how frequently there was someone alongside him who was described as being "the man who knows the people here", or "the man who has been around here a long time". Until the communities can establish their own representative political framework it is hard to conceive of their having any political validity. It is equally hard to imagine their commitment level rising.

I recommend that consideration be given to concentrating U.S. provincial operations on making these four receptacles as useful as possible. If a request comes from any of these four, it should get high priority and speedy attention. At the same time, consideration should be given to reducing our efforts in other places so as to conserve scarce GVN manpower and allow all concerned to concentrate on gaining a real success in a few selected areas.

## III

### Some miscellaneous observations:

1. Housing at Cam Ranh Bay - I found an urgent and serious problem at Cam Ranh involving the 700-odd construction workers who have come from all over South Viet Nam to work on our Air Force installations there. Another 10,000 workers will be needed during 1966. The workers are now living in a disorganized community with inadequate housing and would appear to be likely targets for easy subversion by the Viet Cong who inhabit the surrounding hills. While housing is indeed an urgent necessity, even more urgent is the organization of these men into a viable community. For this purpose I recommend that consultation be held with the civilian contractor on the job (R.M.K.) with a view to securing two U.S. construction trades organizers to proceed immediately to Cam Ranh. Working with two counterparts from the CVT they should organize the work force into a bargaining unit and a community. Housing should then be built in cooperation with this organization on as much of a self-help basis as possible.

a community. Housing should then be built in cooperation with CAT they should organise the work force into a pertaining unit and immediately to Cam Rany. Working with two counteracts from the to seeming two U.S. construction trades oršaurers to brookeed held with the civilian contractor on the top (U.W.K.) with a view community. For this purpose I recommend that consultation be even more agent is the organization of these men into a stable surrounding circle. While housing is indeed an agent necessary, targets for easy supervision by the Aret Council who inspect the community with inadequate housing and would abber to be likely needed during 1966. The workers are now living in a co-organised Air Force installations there. Another 10,000 workers will be workers who have come from all over South Africa to work on our serious problem at Cam Rany involving the 700-odd construction I. Housing at Cam Rany Bay - I found an agent and

## Some miscellaneous operations:

### III

selected areas.

concerned to concentrate on gaining a real success in a few other places so as to conserve scarce GAN manpower and allow all time, consideration should be given to reducing our efforts in it should get high priority and speedily attention. At the same rate as possible. It a redneat comes from and of these form, U.S. provincial operations on making these form recepciee as I recommend that consideration be given to concentrating

imagine their commitment level raising.

their having an political validity. It is equally hard to representative political framework it is hard to conceive of a long time". Until the communities can accept their own who knows the people here,¹ or "the man who has been around here was someone silongside him who was described as being "the man to hamlet-affiliate chiefs I was struck by how frequently there affiliate elections at the earliest possible moment. In talking to, therefore, of the most importance to hold some form of provincial level, which by definition is not representative. It except that which he has sublimated from the district or itself. At the moment it would seem that there is no structure recepciee is the political structure of the hamlet or affiliate

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[n]

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It would appear that there are two situations in Viet Nam in which U.S. labor methods and personnel could be useful: on the docks in Saigon and at Cam Ranh.

2. I was struck by the imprecision with which we use words and the ease with which we accept Communist terminology. The Viet Cong are known as the "revolutionary liberation army"; the GVN is known as "the nationalist army". We apparently accept these designations as we do "National Liberation Front", "People's Army of North Viet Nam", and "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam". We tend to ridicule the preposterous jargon used by the Communists over and over again. We tend to assume that actions speak louder than words and that, therefore, words are not all that important. I think this is wrong. We should give more careful attention to our language, our explanations, our terminology, never accepting that of the Communists, including the word "communism" itself, which among the villagers to whom I spoke means: "No rich people and no poor people."

spoke means: "No rich people and no poor people."
the word "communist", itself, which among the affiliates to whom I
terminology, never accepting that of the Communists, including
more carefully attention to our language, our expressions, our
not all that important. I think this is wrong. We should give
actions, especially, longer than words and that, therefore, words are
by the Communists over and over again. We tend to assume that
Viet Nam. We tend to ridicule the breveterous jargon used
"People's Army" of North Viet Nam, and "Democratic Republic of
accept these designations as we do "National Liberation Front",
the GVN is known as "the nationaliet army". We apparently
The Viet Cong are known as the "revolutionary liberation army";
words and the ease with which we accept Communist terminology.

S. I was struck by the imprecision with which we use
on the docks in Saigon and at Cam Ranh.

on the docks in Saigon and at Cam Ranh.
Nam in which U.S. Iapor methods and hermeneut could be useful:
It would appear that there are two situations in Viet

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[x]

KISSINGER, Henry A.

Saigon, Vietnam,

April 13, 1966.

Dear Henry:

This acknowledges yours of the 8th.

In reply let me say: You are always welcome. You talk about your schedule being hectic. I can assure you that that word can be applied to our lives here now. Whenever you come, you would have to more or less fend for yourself and, with all your friends here (including me, needless to say!) that should not be too much trouble. But the whole pace here is much more breathless compared with what it was when you were here before Christmas.

I cannot possibly prescribe a time because there is so much that is quite unpredictable. Anytime!

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University,
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

AMB: HCLodge:bl

[y]

June 7, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

SUBJECT: Taylor Memorandum

The memorandum of General Taylor lists the bargaining counters available to both sides. It then proposes that the United States could stop the bombing of the North and (together with the GVN) cease offensive military operations in the South in return for an end to VC/PAVN offensive operations.

The advantages of this proposal are:

(1) It is relatively inspectable. It should be possible to monitor whether large-scale military operations are taking place (with the qualifications listed below).

(2) It might avoid a bombing "pause" brought on by the mere willingness of MacArthur Hanoi to negotiate.

Nevertheless I have severe misgivings about the schemes. In effect, General Taylor is proposing a general cease-fire as a substitute for a unilateral

General Taylor is proposed a general cease-fire as a substitute for a ministerial
nevertheless I have severe misgivings about the schemes. In effect,
of Maxx Hanot to negotiate.

(3) It might avoid a pumping "bame" brought by the mere willingness
below).

larde-acute military operations are taking place (with the qualifications slated
(1) It is relatively inadvisable. It should be possible to monitor whether
The advantages of this proposal are:

operations.

military operations in the South in return for an end to AC/PAN offensive
the pumping of the North and (together with the GAN) cease offensive
available to both sides. It then proposes that the United States could atop
The memorandum of General Taylor flat the pertaining documents

SUBJECT: Taylor Memorandum
MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

June 7, 1966

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ending of United States bombing. This has several drawbacks:

(1) Whether we like it or not, the bombing of the North is in a special category in world opinion. In the atmosphere of hope that the beginning of negotiations will engender, we will be under severe pressure to end air attacks and leave the general cease-fire to the outcome of the conference. Thus, General Taylor's scheme may commit us to the desirability of a general cease-fire without providing an adequate safety valve for an end to the bombing.

(2) We should, of course, be prepared to withstand pressure from world public opinion if we are convinced of the validity of our program. However, it is not clear to me that a cease-fire defined as in the Taylor memorandum is in our interest.

--The Communist methods of control are more subtle and indirect than those of the ARVN and the United States. It is difficult to conceive an inspection

those of the ARVN and the United States. It is difficult to conceive an inspection
of the Communist methods of control are more naive and indirect than
our interest.

it is not clear to me that a cease-fire defined so in the Taylor memorandum is in
world public opinion if we are convinced of the validity of our program. However,
(S) We should, of course, be prepared to withdraw pressure from
anybody to the bombing.

of a general cease-fire without providing an adequate safety valve for an
conference. Thus, General Taylor's scheme may commit us to the geceapability
to end air attacks and leave the general cease-fire to the outcome of the
pursuit of negotiations will endanger, we will be under severe pressure
special circumstance in world opinion. In the atmosphere of hope that the
(I) Whether we like it or not, the bombing of the North is in a
ending of United States bombing. Thus has several drawbacks:

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[A]

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[Y]

system which could account for individual assassinations or acts of sabotage.

The Communist challenge can be kept below an easily identifiable threshhold.

The retaliation would be a clear violation of the cease-fire.

--An end to offensive military operations must lead to the legitimization of recognized VC areas. This, in turn, will involve either the partition or an irresistible demand for a coalition government.

--These dangers could be minimized only if the GVN were permitted unimpeded access throughout the country during a cease-fire in which case it is difficult to see what incentive the VC could have to accept it.

## What Can Be Done?

(1) We must recognize that the beginning of negotiations will face us with enormous pressures to stop bombing the North both from our public opinion and from countries--such as Great Britain--which have heretofore supported us.

supported na.

opinion and from countries--and as Great Britain--which have therefore
with enormous pressures to stop pumping the North both from our public

(1) We must recognize that the beginning of negotiations will face us
<u>What Can Be Done?</u>

unimbedded access throughout the country during a cess-e-tire in which case
---These demands could be minimized only if the GCM were permitted
irresistible demand for a coalition government.

of recognized AC areas. This, in turn, will involve either the partition or an
---Aend to offensive military operations must lead to the liquidation

The relation would be a clear violation of the cesse-tire.
The Communist challenge can be kept below an easily identifiable threshold.

The Communist challenge can be kept below an easily identifiable threshold.
system which could account for individual assassinations or acts of aspotade.

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[x]

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(2) These pressures can be countered in one of two ways: (a) stopping the bombing for a specified time as a sign of our good faith to provide an opportunity for the attainment of clearly specified objectives. The drawback of the pause approach is that we will be subjected to severe pressures to extend it, that we may have difficulty defining our conditions sufficiently precisely or to determine whether they are being met. (b) to make cessation of bombing conditional on actions by Hanoi clearly related to the originally stated purpose of the bombing.

(3) A possible scheme would make the end of air bombing depend on an end to infiltration from the North. We could declare our readiness to cease air attacking the North if the North (a) forswears infiltration in the South (b) agress to the establishment of control posts along the Ho Chi Minh trail and on both sides of the Vietnamese-Laotian border.

trial and on both sides of the Vietnamese-Laosin border.

South (p) address to the establishment at control points along the Ho Chi Minh to cease air stalling if the North if the North (e) forces areestation in the on an end to infiltration from the North. We could declare our readiness

(c) A possible scheme we could make the end of air pumping depend to the originally stated purpose of the pumping.

to make cessation of pumping conditional on actions by Hanoi clearly related sufficiently precisely or to determine whether they are being met. (p)

batteries to extend it, that we may have difficulty defining our conditions
The drawback of the same approach is that we will be subjected to severe
to provide an opportunity for the attainment of clearly specified objectives.
stopping the pumping for a specified time as a sign of our good faith

(s) These batteries can be complemented in one of two ways: (s)

- 4 -

[A]

- 5 -

(4) It will not be necessary for Hanoi to admit that it **has** infiltrated
If it maintains a public posture of non-intervention, the control posts could be
established with less loss of face.

(5) This scheme has the advantage of relating the end of bombing to
the interdiction of supplies which is its stated purpose. It would be a heavy
blow to the morale of the VC if Hanoi publically forswore infiltration.
It would enable us to continue the bombing until a stated satisfactory inspection
mechanism is worked out. In turn, the issue of a general cease-fire its
could then be related to the general political settlement where it belongs.

mechanism is worked out. In turn, the issue of a general cease-fire is

It would enable us to continue the pumping until a status quo satisfactory inaction

piled on the morale of the VC if Hanoi publicly tomorrow inflitration.

the interdiction of supplies which is assisted by force. It would be a heavy

(6) This scheme has the advantage of relating the end of pumping to

each satisfied with less loss of force.

If it maintains a public posture of non-intervention, the control boats could be

(4) It will not be necessary for Hanoi to submit to it being infiltrated

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[N]

August 8, 1966

FOR WHITE HOUSE USE ONLY

Mr. Robert Komer
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bob:

As you requested, I have put down a few observations about the pacification problem in Vietnam. They are based on two trips in October-November 1965 and again in July 1966. On my second trip I visited again some of the provinces that I had seen earlier to observe what changes--if any--had occurred. I spoke separately to each element of the American effort and did the same on the Vietnamese side. I visited eleven provinces in 1965 and eight in 1966 with four of them overlapping.

With this as a background, here are my observations.

(1) **Organization of the Embassy:** The organization of the Embassy has been vastly improved since my last visit. The plethora of competing agencies each operating their own program on the basis of partly conflicting and largely uncoordinated criteria has been replaced by an increasingly effective structure under the extremely able leadership of Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job. It would be idle to pretend that the previous confusion is wholly overcome. He has replaced competition by coordination; he is well on the way to imposing effective direction on

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....

by coordination; he is well on the way to imposing effective direction on
the brevions consultation is wholly overcome. He has replaced competition
Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job. It would be idle to pretend that
creatively effective structure under the extremely able leadership of
flicting and largely uncoordinated criteria has been replaced by an in-
decisive each operating their own program on the basis of fairly con-
has been vastly improved since my last visit. The brevions of competing

(1) <u>Organisation of the Embassy</u>; The organisation of the Embassy

isbound.

visited eleven provinces in 1966 and eight in 1968 with four of them over-
of the American effort and did the same on the Vietnamese side. I
what chandras--it small--had occurred. I also separately to each element
I visited also some of the provinces that I had seen earlier to observe
October-November 1966 and again in July 1966. On my second trip
specification problem in Vietnam. They are based on two tribes in

Dear Pop:

Washington, D.C.
The White House
Mr. Robert Komer

FOR WHITE HOUSE USE ONLY

August 8, 1966

FOR WHITE HOUSE USE ONLY

[Y]

Mr. Robert Komer

- 2 -

August 8, 1966

the basis of carefully considered criteria. At least the basic structure for progress exists. Where eight months ago I hardly knew where to begin, the problem now is how to translate structure into performance--a difficult but not insuperable task.

(2) **The American Effort in the Provinces:** Here two major changes for the better have occurred. The four principal American elements (Mac V, CAS, AID and JUSPAO) are coordinating their efforts. Joint reports force them to take cognizance of each other's activities. Three weaknesses remain:

(a) The joint reports are useful in producing coordination. They have the drawback of encouraging a series of non-aggression treaties among the various agencies. People forced to live together in small Vietnamese provincial towns in some isolation and danger are not likely to compound their difficulties by challenging each other systematically. This suggests the need for an independent group of inspectors--similar to the old provincial reporters--at the Embassy.

(b) Pressures for short-term achievements predominate over the long-term. Too much attention is given to technical and not enough to political problems. This suggests the need for agreed priorities.

(c) There does not yet exist a clear concept of what pacification requires--especially with respect to the interplay of political, economic and military factors.

(3) **The Situation in the Provinces:** Candor compels me to say that I did not find any substantial change in the provinces with the possible exception of Bin Dinh. It may be that the "secure" areas are more so--though security is a relative concept. (For example, whenever I asked our advisers in how many hamlets listed as "secure" they would be prepared to sleep, they would list at most 25% of the so-called pacified areas.) The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me as follows:

(a) The criteria for pacification require further elaboration. The official Mac V criteria include too many subjective elements and lead to over-optimistic conclusions.

(b) Some areas listed as pacified may be so because the VC find it convenient to leave a source of supply undisturbed. It seems to me essential to make a survey of how much of each province is subject to VC taxation--especially in the Delta provinces with respect to rice.

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Mr. Robert Komer

- 3 -

August 8, 1966

d (c) The cadre program suffers from growing pains and too rapid expansion. We simply do not know what the cadres are doing.

e (d) Even if the cadres were more effective, they are being employed in a wasteful manner because of the reluctance of ARVN to undertake pacification missions and the low priority given to RF and PF. In classic anti-guerrilla doctrine, the regular army provides a perimeter within which the RF and PF provide local security and the cadres supply local government. In Vietnam exactly the opposite is true. The cadres are frequently at the most exposed point while ARVN sits in provincial towns protected by RF and PF. This must be changed.

f (e) Even when the cadres become more effective, their impact will be limited because the structure of local government and security to fill in behind them does not exist.

g (f) The U.S. military effort while useful in thwarting Main Force activity is inadequately related to pacification missions--except in the Marine area.

(4) A Few Recommendations:

(a) We urgently require a security map less formalistic than the existing one. Its criteria should determine who can make the villagers do what at what time of day.

(b) High priority should be given to improving local government through systematic training programs and adequate supervision.

(c) RF and PF should be organically part of the pacification effort. This suggests that they should be removed from the Ministry of Defense and probably put under the Ministry of Reconstruction.

(d) At least half of ARVN (i. e. one division in each corps) should be assigned to pacification on the basis of an over-all concept.

(e) A study of all available security forces should be made. Overlap should be eliminated and central direction established.

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...

among be eliminated and central direction established.

be allowed to facilitate on the basis of an overall all concept.

(d) At least half of ARVN (i.e., one division in each corba) among

properly but under the Ministry of Reconstruction.

(c) RE and PE should be ordinarily part of the facilitation effort.

This andates that they should be removed from the Ministry of Defense and

through systematic training programs and schedule intervention.

what at what time of day.

(a) We should require a security msd less formalistic than the

(4) A few Recommendations:

cases.

activity is inadequately related to facilitation missions--except in the Marine

(d) The U.S. military effort while useful in thwarting Main Force

behind them does not exist.

(e) Even when the casernes become more effective, their impact will

and PE. This must be considered.

most exposed to fire while ARVN attacks in provincial towns protected by RE

In Vietnam exactly the opposite is true. The casernes are frequently at the RE and PE provide local security and the casernes supply local government.

derritory doctrine, the regular army provides a barometer within which the
fascination missions and the low priority given to RE and PE. In classic anti-
in a material manner because of the reluctance of ARVN to undertake bac-

(d) Even if the casernes were more effective they are not employed

exhaustion. We simply do not know what the casernes are (point).

(c) The casernes program angler from drawdud bains and po rabid

Mr. Robert Komer

- 3 -

August 8, 1966

FOR WHITE HOUSE USE ONLY