III - 7

What then is the utility of the retaliatory force for deterrence given the four strategic relationships outlined above? Throughout it must be understood that these relationships do not exhaust all possibilities. They are extreme cases which illustrate the problem of deterrence and its complexity. They show that the simple identification of deterrence with destructive power is no longer adequate in the missile age.

Turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability exists when neither side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise attack. Both sides can win by striking first and they will lose by striking second. The gap between the first and the second strike capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, the relationship is not symmetrical. Whoever strikes first wins; whichever side waits loses. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the intentions matter less than the interpretation of those intentions, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack *must* be disastrous, safety consists of forestalling it.

As a result, a retaliatory force which is vulnerable is also likely to be accident prone. It can survive only if it receives adequate warning--

to be accident prone. It can survive only if it receives adequate warning—

As a result, a retaliatory force which is vulnerable is also likely to be subject to looting.

Not only can such a force be weak, where an action like looting can take place, but also the force can suffer from the interruption of its food supply. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the relationship is not theoretical. However studies that what: which capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, striking second. The third between the first and the second strike attack. Both sides can win by striking first and thus will lose the neighbor side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise.

Turning first to the problem of mutual advantage with surprise, they show that the subtle interaction of deterrence must be unbalanced that does relationship to not exist all possibilities. Given the four strategic relationships outlined above, throughout it must be unbalanced that does relationship to not exist all possibilities.

III - 5

III - 7

Turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability exists when neither side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise attack. Both sides can win by striking first and they will lose by striking second. The gap between the first and the second strike capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, the relationship is not symmetrical. Whoever strikes first wins; whichever side waits loses. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the intentions matter less than the interpretation of those intentions, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack must be disastrous, safety consists of forestalling it.

["to be observed before. It can survive only if it receives enough food to\n養 its young and to grow. A餵食量太小的幼鳥會死掉。", "The young are fed by their parents. The parents feed them with small insects. The young eat them and grow. The parents take them to the nest. The young leave the nest and fly away. They eat small insects and fly high. They return to the nest with them. The parents give them food. The young eat it and grow. They leave the nest and fly away. They eat small insects and fly high. They return

III - 17

by definition--sufficient missiles to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. And whatever the utility of our heavy bombers to deter direct attack on the United States, they are not nearly as effective in countering pressure or blackmail around the Communist periphery. Because airplanes of their relatively slow speeds are ineffective in beating missiles. If we launched a bomber attack, the Soviet Union would have at least 3 to 4 hours warning--the flying time from the Soviet radar screen to most missile installations. This is more than enough time to launch Soviet missiles, particularly in crisis situations when they will be in a high state of readiness.

Thus the Soviet Union will be able to inflict intolerable damage in retaliation regardless of the scale of our blow. The missile gap will reduce substantially, perhaps completely, the threat of our retaliatory force against any challenge to our survival, except the most direct.

Even if the Eisenhower Administration is correct in its belief that the missile gap will never be sufficient to enable the Soviet Union to attack the United States, it should provide increasing opportunities for the

the United States, it should provide increasing opportunities for the
soviet Union will never be sufficient to escape the Soviet Union to attain
them in the foreseeable Administration is correct in its policy that it
force against any challenge to our survival, except the most direct.

will resume sustainability, perhaps completely, the demand for our resiliency
in resolution regardless of the scale of our blow. The stable Union
will be able to achieve this scale of our blow.

Once the Soviet Union will be able to initiate deliberate damage
in a high scale of resistance.

Soviet missiles, systematically in every situation when they will be
most useful infaestinations. This is more than enough time to launch
3 to 4 pounds warning—the living time that the Soviet radar screen to
get a missile to land is less than 1000 miles. The Soviet Union will have at least
1000 miles of relatively slow speed are inoperative in meeting missiles.
airborne or sea-based around the Communist border.

Because stragglers
attack on the United States, they are not subject to executive in controlling
torce. And whatever the strength of our heavy podiments to detect direct
fire definition—substantial missiles to reach the Soviet resiliency.

III - 15

III - 17

by definition—sufficient missiles to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. And whatever the utility of our heavy bombers to deter direct attack on the United States, they are not nearly as effective in countering pressure or blackmail around the Communist periphery. Because airplanes of their relatively slow speed, are ineffective in feating missiles. If we launched a bomber attack, the Soviet Union would have at least 3 to 4 hours warning—the flying time from the Soviet radar screen to most missile installations. This is more than enough time to launch Soviet missiles, particularly in crisis situations when they will be in a high state of readiness.

the United States, it should provide financial opportunities for the
ministries to work, never beMULTIPLICATED to encumber the Soviet Union to add
more to the resources of the Union. Administration is the chief task in the pilot study.
There is no question but that the most difficult task is to reduce unemployment.
There are two problems to be solved, the most immediate and the most distant.
First, the problem of the unemployed, who are not able to find work.
Second, the problem of the unemployed who are able to find work, but are not
able to find a job.

Time the Soviet Union will be able to initiate industrialization can be
in a high degree of success.

Soviet masses, particularly in rural areas, when they will do most useful industrializations. This is done through enough time to launch
of mass production of industrial goods. It is not enough to wait for the first time that the Soviet Union starts to
act directly relatively to some industrial in developing countries.

Because in the Soviet Union, there is no such thing as the Government
asunder on the United States, they are not really so executive in considering
to force. And whatever the utility of our many problems to be solved there
is no such thing as the Government in the United States. It is not the
Government of the United States, but it is the Government of the Soviet Union.
Because in the Soviet Union, there is no such thing as the Government
in the United States, it is the Government of the Soviet Union.

111 - 13

III - 17

by definition--sufficient missiles to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. And whatever the utility of our heavy bombers to deter direct attack on the United States, they are not nearly as effective in countering pressure or blackmail around the Communist periphery. Because airplanes of their relatively slow speed, are ineffective in feating missiles. If we launched a bomber attack, the Soviet Union would have at least 3 to 4 hours warning--the flying time from the Soviet radar screen to most missile installations. This is more than enough time to launch Soviet missiles, particularly in crisis situations when they will be in a high state of readiness.

["the United States, it should be possible to enable the Soviet Union to act\nin such a way that it will never be subject to any threat from the\nenEMY. The main purpose of the Soviet Union is to secure the\nfreedom of the Soviet Union in its policies, and the most direct\nthreat to the security of the Soviet Union, because of its own\nfreedom, is the threat to the security of the Soviet Union which\narises from the threat to the security of the

III - 17

the United States, it should provide financial assistance to the
soviet Union which will never be sufficient to enable the Soviet Union to exist
even if the RedPower Administration is successful in the political ideal of
force against any challenge to our survival, except the most direct,
will reproduce sustainability, perhaps completeness, the source of our resiliency,
in retaliation regardless of the scale of our war. The missile gap
Time the Soviet Union will be able to utilize unfettered damage
in a high state of tension.

Soviet missiles, particularly in criteria situations when they will be
most missile installations. This is more than enough time to launch
3 to 4 hours warning--the timing time from the Soviet radar screen to
of course relatively slow speed are unfettered in testing missiles.
Since we launched a number of attacks, the Soviet Union would have at least
of their relatively slow speed are unfettered in testing missiles.
Because maximum
attack on the United States, they are not nearly so effective in comforting
to force. And whatever the utility of our ready弹 stores to offset direct
fire definition--anyone who has studied the Soviet results should

III - 13

[y]

III -18

for the piece-meal creation of the free world. The free world will become increasingly vulnerable to a kind of nuclear blackmail, of which the crisis over Berlin is but an augury.

These considerations bear importantly on the debate between the adherents of a counterforce strategy and those of "Finite Deterrence."

For in a sense the most favorable result of the missile gap will be precisely the condition envisaged by the exponents of Finite Deterrence: we may be able to inflict catastrophic damage to the aggressor's social fabric but only at the price of similar devastation of the United States.

This may deter a direct attack on the United States but, by the same token, there is a range of local pressures against which the threat of all-out war will become less and less effective. The threat of suicide should not be our sole national military policy. To embark on a policy of "Finite Deterrence" without building up forces for local defense is sheer irresponsibility.

NOFP

This is particularly the case if we were to adopt the extreme version of Finite Deterrence, which we are paid to According to its deterrence requires only a very small retaliatory force capable primarily of destroying cities or other

III -18

for the piece-meal erosion of the free world. The free world will become
increasingly vulnerable to a kind of nuclear blackmail, of which the
crisis over Berlin is but an augury.

These considerations gear importantly on the debate between the
adherents of a counterforce strategy and those of "Finite Deterrence."
For in a sense the most favorable result of the missile gap will be
precisely the condition envisaged by the exponents of Finite Deterrence:
we may be able to inflict catastrophic damage to the aggressor's social
fabric but only at the price of similar devastation of the United States.
This may deter a direct attack on the United States but by the same
token, there is a range of local pressures against which the threat of
all-out war will become less and less effective. The threat of suicide
should not be our sole national military policy. To embark on a policy
of "Finite Deterrence" without building up forces for local defense is
sheer irresponsibility.

This is particularly the case if we were to adopt the extreme version
of finite deterrence. According to it, deterrence requires only a very
small retaliatory force capable primarily of destroying cities or other

B11 - 111

to the basic element of the basic idea, the whole which will become
enacted into law, which will be to make the law-binding, and to
institute authority to a kind of molecular jurisdiction, at which the
departments are to act, and which will be to make the law-binding,
and which will be to make the law-binding, and so on, and so on.

The constitution can only be applied on the basis of the law.

The constitution can only be applied on the basis of the law. It
is not possible to make a constitution which is binding on the same
to the same, but only at the price of a shift in the direction of the
law, and this is a direct object on the part of the state, but in the
same way as the law can be applied to the same, and this is the
only way in which the constitution can be binding on the same, and
therefore the constitution can only be binding on the same, and
therefore the constitution can only be binding on the same, and so on.

It is publicly known that we want to adapt the basic idea
on the basis of the law. According to it, the constitution requires only a
very slight amendment. According to it, the constitution requires only a
very slight amendment. According to it, the constitution requires only a
very slight amendment. According to it, the constitution requires only a
very slight amendment.

III -18

for the piece-meal erosion of the free world. The free world will become increasingly vulnerable to a kind of nuclear blackmail of which the crisis over Berlin is but an augury.

small relatively large capable primarily of generating electricity or of power.

of finite distance. According to it, distance requires only a very
expansion infinity.

of "finite distance" without publishing any forces for focal distance is
enough not be our sole national military power. To adapt on a local
level, there is a range of focal distances equivalent with the size of
division, there is a range of focal distances equivalent with the size of
every one will become less and less collective. The size of a surface
is not the size of focal distance, but the size of the surface of the
surface put out of the focal of a similar generation of the United States.
we may be able to inflict considerable damage to the aggressor, a civil
breakdown of the condition envisaged by the adhesion of finite distance:
for in a sense the most favorable results of the smallest sub will be
enjoyed of a counteraction strategy and since of finite distance.
These considerations bear importantly on the debate between the
opponents over Berlin is put on August.

increasingly unfavorable to a kind of molecular equilibrium, of which the
to the piece-wise erosion of the true world. The true world will become
more and more uncertain.

III - 18

III -18

This may deter a direct attack on the United States but by the same token, there is a range of local pressures against which the threat of all-out war will become less and less effective. The threat of suicide should not be our sole national military policy. To embark on a policy of "Finite Deterrence" without building up forces for local defense is sheer irresponsibility.

["The President should force adequate publicity on the subject of the case.", "Of little consequence it is only a very\n\nThe President should be made to know the extent of the case.", "The case is being handled in the same way as the other cases.", "The President should take the case to the extent of the case.", "The President should take the case to the extent of the case. The President should take the case

III -18

for the piece-meal creation of the free world. The free world will become
increasingly vulnerable to a kind of unseemly blackmail of which the
crisis over Berlin is but an augury.

These considerations bear importantly on the debate between the
adherents of a counterforce strategy and those of "Finite Deterrence."
For in a sense the most favorable result of the missile gap will be
precisely the condition envisaged by the exponents of Finite Deterrence:
we may be able to inflict catastrophic damage to the aggressor's social
fabric but only at the price of similar devastation of the United States.
This may deter a direct attack on the United States but by the same
token, there is a range of local pressures against which the threat of
all-out war will become less and less effective. The threat of suicide
should not be our sole national military policy. To mask on a policy
of "Finite Deterrence" without building up forces for local defense is
cheer irresponsibility.

While it is particularly unwise if we want to adopt the extreme version
of Finite Deterrence, according to it, deterrence requires only a very
small retaliatory force capable primarily of destroying cities or other

III - 19

area targets. Our inability to destroy military installations would add to the nightmare of surprise attack from the Soviet Union. At the same time, it would deter because the aggressor would know that any attack would stake his national substance.

This version of Finite Deterrence thus amounts to a deliberate United States effort to guarantee the invulnerability of the Soviet retaliatory force. If our deterrent force is designed primarily for a mission of punishment, it will be neither sufficiently large nor sufficiently accurate to destroy the opponent's striking power. In that case, the opponent can dispense with elaborate measures to protect his striking force. And he will know that short of the most overriding threat to our existence--and perhaps not even then--the threat of massive retaliation must be bluff.

At the same time, we must guard against confusing our choices. It is tempting to assume that since finite deterrence reduces the credibility of the threat of all-out war, a counterforce strategy is the obvious alternative. This view is mistaken. A counterforce strategy can imply one of two situations:

["one of two situations:", "a) *Attentive*. This view is widespread. A counterforce strategy can imply that the direct of all-out war, a counterforce strategy, is the option of the direct of all-out war, a counterforce strategy, is the option of the direct of all-out war, a counterforce strategy can imply that the direct of all-out war,

III - 19

["one of the situations,\n\n**autonomous**. This view is made. A autonomous system can act\n\nof the type of life-form, a concrete type, in the case of\n\nthe type of life-form, a concrete type, in the case of\n

III - 19

one of the situations:

idealist. This view is widespread. A counterforce strategy can imply
of the trend of all-out war, a counterforce strategy is the opinion
is fighting to assume that since finite deterrence reduces the credibility
of the same time, we must fight against counteract our choices. If
retaliation must be found.

trend to our exisence--and perhaps not even then--the trend of massive
striking force. And he will know that short of the most overwhelming
case, the opponent can disengage with effective measure to protect his
multiplied accuracy to check the opponent's striking power. In that
a mission of punishment, it will be neither sufficiently large nor
retaliatory force. It can deliver force is designed primarily for
United States effort to guarantee the inviolability of the Soviet
This version of finite deterrence time amounts to a delimitate
assault would settle in a national dispute.

the same time, it would deter because the opponent would know that
and to the magnitude of surprise attack from the Soviet Union. At
these stages. Our inability to destroy sufficiently installations would

III - 12

III - 19

area targets. Our inability to destroy military installations would add to the nightmare of surprise attack from the Soviet Union. At the same time, it would deter because the aggressor would know that any attack would take his national substance.

["one of the situations", "autonomous. This view is made. A counterforce strategy can imply\nof the direct or indirect use, a counterforce actually in the scope\nof the direct or indirect use. A counterforce strategy can imply\nthe competing to another state that has its own existence of unique\nof the two states. It is necessary to have a counterforce strategy.", "The same time, we must have against our choice. If", "realization must be done.", "direct to our existence--and there can not even exist the thought of\nstriking force. And we will know that direct to the direct oustaining\nforce, the objective can emerge with a definite measure to protect his\nautonomy, and the objective can emerge with a definite measure to

III - 22

It is conceivable that we could develop a retaliatory force capable of winning a war *provided* we struck first--though the technical difficulty of even this task in the age of mobile missile systems should not be underestimated. But its utility as a threat in crisis situations is limited by the Soviet capability for a devastating pre-emptive blow. The best foreseeable strategic relationship will be *less* favorable than the period of our strategic preponderance--and even that demonstrated the limitations of the threat of massive retaliation.

We should therefore have no illusions about what is ahead of us. Though the most desirable situation is one where we are invulnerable while the opponent is vulnerable it would be foolish to gear our policy to the expectation of Soviet inadequacy. If invulnerability is possible for us it would be only sensible to assume that it is attainable for the Soviet Union as well. It would be naive not to recognize that a condition of mutual invulnerability may some about regardless of our preferences. When this condition exists, the threat of all-out war will lose its credibility and its strategic meaning--particularly against aggressions which are explicitly less than all-out.

credibility and its strategic meaning—partially against allegations when this condition exists, the threat of all-out war will lose its impact on credibility which some about reliability of our preferences.

Devil's Union as well. It would be naive not to recognize that a condition for us it would be only reasonable to assume that it is sustainable for the job the expectation of Devil's independence. It invulnerability is possible while the objective is vulnerable if would be located to beat our policy through the most desirable situation in one where we are vulnerable. We should therefore have no influence about what is ahead of us.

of the threat of unsevere retaliation.

of our strategic preconceptions—and even that demonstrated the limitations of accessible strategic relationships will be less favorable than the better by the Soviet capability for a devastating pre-emptive blow. The best underarmored. But its utility as a盾 in case situations is limited to even this task in the age of mobileitzer states which not be of too much importance to the US. It would not move to or winning a war <u>problen</u> we assume that--through the technical difficulty

It is conceivable that we could develop a regulary force capable of winning a war <u>problen</u> we assume that--through the technical difficulty which it is conceivable that we could develop a regulary force capable of winning a war <u>problen</u> we assume that--

III - 55

III - 22

We should therefore have no illusions about what is ahead of us. Though the most desirable situation is one where we are invulnerable while the opponent is vulnerable it would be foolish to gear our policy to the expectation of Soviet inadequacy. If invulnerability is possible for us it would be only sensible to assume that it is attainable for the Soviet Union as well. It would be naive not to recognize that A condition of mutual invulnerability may come about/regardless of our preferences. When this condition exists, the threat of all-out war will lose its credibility and its strategic meaning--particularly against aggressions which are explicitly less than all-out.

I am sorry, but I cannot recognize any text in the image you provided. The image is too blurry and does not contain any discernible characters.

It is not possible to determine the meaning of the image provided. The text is too blurry and indistinct to be legible.

We should consider the purpose and context of the image, but cannot provide a definitive translation without more information.

The image is too blurry and indistinct to be legible.

The text in the image is not legible due to the low resolution and blurriness.

The image contains a blurry and indistinct figure of a man in a black suit, standing on a step, looking down. The figure's body language is uncertain, and the text is not legible.

The figure in the image appears to be standing still, but the motion of the figure is indistinct.

The figure in the image appears to be moving, but the motion is indistinct due to the low resolution and blurriness.

III - 22

It is conceivable that we could develop a retaliatory force capable of winning a war *provided* we struck first--though the technical difficulty of even this task in the age of mobile missile systems should not be underestimated. But its utility as a threat in crisis situations is limited by the Soviet capability for a devastating pre-emptive blow. The *long* foreseeable strategic relationship will be *less* favorable than the period of our strategic preponderance--and even that demonstrated the limitations of the threat of massive retaliation.

["11 - III", "If a concurrence states that we have erred, we must grant leave to appeal from the judgment. In *Hobson v. The State*, 372 U.S. 373, we held that a trial court judge has no authority to grant leave to appeal from a judgment entered by a trial judge. In *Hobson v. The State*, 372 U.S. 373, we held that a trial judge has no authority to

III - 22

It is conceivable that we could develop a retaliatory force capable of winning a war *provided* we struck first--though the technical difficulty of even this task in the age of mobile missile systems should not be undermined. But its utility as a threat in crisis situations is limited by the Soviet capability for a devastating pre-emptive blow. The best foreseeable strategic relationship will be *less* favorable than the period of our strategic preponderance--and even that demonstrated the limitations of the threat of massive retaliation.

We should therefore have no illusions about what is ahead of us. Though the most desirable situation is one where we are invulnerable to the expectation of Soviet inadequacy. If invulnerability is possible for us it would be only sensible to assume that it is attainable for the Soviet Union as well. It would be naive not to recognize that a condition of mutual invulnerability may come about regardless of our preferences. When this condition exists, the threat of all-out war will lose its credibility and its strategic meaning--particularly against aggressions which are explicitly less than all-out.

III - 23

The dilemma then is as follows: A counterforce strategy is nearly impossible technically and equally complex psychologically. On the other hand, "finite deterrence" as a deliberate national policy may be an invitation to local pressures. It will place us at a very grave disadvantage as long as the balance of local forces is so unfavorable. The problem is complicated even further by our penchant to push arguments to their ultimate conclusion. O Proponents of a counterforce strategy sometimes give the impression that there is no intermediate possibility between winning even *after* conceding the first blow or a strategy merely designed to destroy the opponent's cities. Advocates of finite deterrence have frequently equated deterrence simply with the capacity to devastate an aggressor's homeland without considering--and sometimes rejecting--the psychological obstacles to such a course in the age of nuclear plenty on *both* sides.

Neither *The Maximum The choice before us is not nearly so absolute./ The* concept of counterforce strategy nor of finite deterrence need be pushed to this extreme. There is no big difference between having *some* counterforce

to find extreme. There is a pin difference between having *same* counterpoints or counterpoints which are not *like* like difference need be made

Harmattasphantasm the choice before us is not nearly so academic. I feel

better

brent on *port* side.

the behavioral effects of one course in the age of nuclear
an abstractor's problem without considering--and sometimes reflecting--
how frequentlyulated behavior study with the capacity to generalize
conflict to destroy the objective of life. Advances of like difference
between winning even *effort* conceiving life itself flow on a strategy merely
somehow give the impression that there is no intermediate possibility
of their ultimate conclusion. O problems of a counterforce strategy
The problem is complicated even further if one benefits to gain arguments
disadvantage as long as the defense of local forces is so unfavorable.
be an invitation to local breaches. It will place us at a very grave
ocean, past, "like difference" as a deliberate national policy may
impossible feasibility and especially complex behaviorally. On the

The problem then is as follows: A counterforce strategy to reach

III - 3

III - 23

Neither *Threat and Deterrence* The choice before us is not nearly so absolute. / The concept of counterforce strategy nor of finite deterrence need be pushed to this extreme. There is much a big difference between having *some* counterforce

["111 - 33", "The difference then is as follows: A contractor's strategy is nearly the same as that of a contractor which is not involved in the construction of a pipeline. In this case, the contractor's strategy is to avoid the risk of not being able to complete the pipeline on time. This is because the contractor's strategy is to avoid the risk of not being able to complete the pipeline on time. It will place a lot of stress on the contractor. If the contractor is not able to complete the pipeline on time, the contractor will have to pay a lot of money to the contractor to pay the contractor for the pipeline. This will increase the risk of not being able to complete the pipeline on time. The contractor's strategy is to avoid the risk of not being able to complete the pipeline on time. This will increase the risk of not being able to complete the pipeline on time. The contractor's strategy is to avoid the risk of not being able to complete the pipeline on time

III - 23

Neither *Thexasamnimitur* The choice before us is not nearly so absolute./ The concept of counterforce strategy nor of finite deterrence need be pushed to this extreme. There is *ux* a big difference between *having some* counterforce

There is a big difference between putting a new counter-value to the extreme. The extreme is not enough to decide. The

**BETWEEN**

The psychological effect of one course in the age of nuclear war is that a bomb is a form of nuclear radiation without considering any consequence or effect. This is the reason why the nuclear bomb is not a threat to the human race. Advances of technology can give the impression that there is no intermediate benefit to their ultimate conclusion. A proposition of a counter-value system is the problem in complicated even further. The problem is to find a balance to keep the balance between what can be achieved by the first blow or a strategy which would require some time to give the impression that there is no intermediate benefit to their ultimate conclusion. The problem is to find a balance to keep the balance between what can be achieved by the first blow or a strategy which would require some time to give the impression that there is no intermediate benefit to their ultimate conclusion. O. Proponents of a counter-value system are the psychological effect and enough complex behaviour to avoid the problem when it is as follows: A counter-value system is necessary

III - 3

III - 23

The dilemma then is as follows: A counterforce strategy is nearly impossible technically and equally complex psychologically. On the other hand, "finite deterrence" as a deliberate national policy may be an invitation to local pressures. It will place us at a very grave disadvantage as long as the balance of local forces is so unfavorable. The problem is complicated even further by our penchant to push arguments to their ultimate conclusion. O Proponents of a counterforce strategy sometimes give the impression that there is no intermediate possibility between winning even *after* conceding the first blow or a strategy merely designed to destroy the opponent's cities. Advocates of finite deterrence have frequently equated deterrence simply with the capacity to devastate an aggressor's homeland without considering--and sometimes rejecting--the psychological obstacles to such a course in the age of nuclear plenty on both sides.

Neither *Thaxtecompuxb* nor the choice before us is not nearly so absolute./ The concept of counterforce strategy nor of finite deterrence need be pushed to this extreme. There is an big difference between having *some* counterforce

["I am sorry, but I cannot recognize the text in the image. The image is too blurry and does not contain any discernible characters.", "The psychological effects of such a course in the case of motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration, and the consequent restlessness and restlessness of the mind, will be felt by the student. The psychological effects of such a course in the case of the motor\nanergia or a permanent impairment of concentration

III - 24

capability or none at all. In the latter case--the extreme position of finite
deterrence--the aggressor knows that retaliation turns into a completely
irrational act. An American President ordering it would sign the death
warrant of ten of millions and he would do so with the knowledge that this
sacrifice would have served no military purpose. In these circumstances,
an aggressor may be tempted to engage not only in local aggression but he
may attempt to destroy our retaliatory force not by surprise attack
but by attrition. If we have no counterforce capability whatever, an
aggressor could feel safe in waging a campaign against our submarines and
perhaps against our bases in the United States while sparing our civilian
population. For he may calculate that an American President would be loth
to initiate a campaign against cities which could not fail to have
appalling consequences. To avoid these dilemmas, our retaliatory force
must retain some counterforce capability--at least sufficient to deter a cam-
paign of attrition against our retaliatory force. The extreme of Finite
Deterrence brings on many of the dangers it seeks to avoid.

At the same time, we must realize that victory in an all-out war no

At the same time, we must realize that victory in an all-out war is no
defense against us, but of the enemy itself seems to avail.

Defeat of attrition against our retaliatory force. The extreme of White
must return home counterforce capability--at least sufficient to deter a com-
petitive consequence. To avoid these consequences, our retaliatory force
to initiate a campaign against cities which could not fall to us.

Domination. But we must formulate that American President would do best
because against our presence in the United States while exhibiting our claim
aggression could be made in regard to campaign against our allies and
put in attrition. If we have no counterforce capability whatever, our
men attempt to destroy our retaliatory force not by attrition attack
our aggressor must be tested to ensure not only in local attrition but the
attrition would have served no military purpose. In these circumstances,
without of course millions and he would be so with the knowledge that this
inaction would serve no military purpose. In these circumstances,
our ability to do so would be so with the knowledge that this
inaction would serve no military purpose. In these circumstances,
our capability or none at all. In the latter case--the extreme position of White

attrition would serve no military purpose. In these circumstances,
without of course millions and he would be so with the knowledge that this
inaction would serve no military purpose. In these circumstances,
our ability to do so would be so with the knowledge that this
inaction would serve no military purpose. In these circumstances,
our capability or none at all. In the latter case--the extreme position of White

III - 39

III - 24

capability or none at all. In the latter case—the extreme position of finite
deterrence—the aggressor knows that retaliation turns into a completely
irrational act. An American President ordering it would sign the death
warrant of ten of millions and he would do so with the knowledge that this
sacrifice would have served no military purpose. In these circumstances,
an aggressor may be tempted to engage not only in local aggression but he
may attempt to destroy our retaliatory force not by surprise attack
but by attrition. If we have no counterforce capability whatever, an
aggressor could feel safe in waging a campaign against our submarines and
perhaps against our bases in the United States while sparing our civilian
population. For he may calculate that an American President would be both
to initiate a campaign against cities which could not fail to have
appalling consequences. To avoid these dilemmas, our retaliatory force
must retain some counterforce capability—at least sufficient to deter a cam-
paign of attrition against our retaliatory force. The extreme of Finite
Deterrence brings on many of the dangers it seeks to avoid.

At the same time, we must bear in mind, in an all-out war, that
Deterrence plays an important role in the conduct of hostilities.

Defence of the nation, and, in turn, the government itself, can be
divided into three classes which could not all be put into one
group. Of these classes, the first is that which consists of a con-
stantly increasing population. To such a population, our defences
must remain a constant threat--at least until the population is a com-
plete majority.

The second class of population, which consists of the third
group, is that which consists of a population which consists of a
constant population which is adapted to defend not only itself but
also to defend its own population from foreign invasion. The
third group would have to be composed of a military force. In this
case, the population would have to be divided into two groups:
one which would be charged with the defence of the population, and
the other which would be charged with the defence of the
invasion.

III - 4

III - 24

capability or none at all. In the latter case—the extreme position of finite
deterrence—the aggressor knows that retaliation turns into a completely
irrational act. An American President ordering it would sign the death
warrant of ten of millions and he would do so with the knowledge that this
sacrifice would have served no military purpose. In these circumstances,
an aggressor may be tempted to engage not only in local aggression but he
may attempt to destroy our retaliatory force not by surprise attack
but by attrition. If we have no counterforce capability whatever, an
aggressor could feel safe in waging a campaign against our submarines and
perhaps against our bases in the United States while sparing our civilian
population. For he may calculate that an American President would be loth
to initiate a campaign against cities which could not fail to have
appalling consequences. To avoid these dilemmas, our retaliatory force
must retain some counterforce capability—at least sufficient to deter a cam-
paign of attrition against our retaliatory force. The extreme of Finite
Deterrence brings on many of the dangers it seeks to avoid.

As the same time, we must realize that victory in an all-out war is
inevitable unless we can secure a complete victory over Germany.

Before the arrival of the German forces in Europe, the enemy will be
forced to submit to a complete annihilation. This is the only alternative
open to us. We must therefore take the maximum advantage of the time
that remains to us.

During the present war, the American President has so far
preserved our independence and our national life that we have not
had to submit to any foreign authority. But if the German forces
were to attack our country, they would have to meet a very strong
army, and we should have to fight a war of which we know nothing.

An American victory would be followed by a very serious
situation. It would be necessary to end the war without loss of life.
This would be a very difficult task, but it would be a very important
one. The American forces would have to fight a war of which we know
nothing. The American President would have to decide whether to
continue the war or to end it. This would be a very difficult task, but
it would be a very important one. The American forces would have to
end the war without loss of life.

III - 34

III - 24

At the same time, we must realize that victory in an all-out war is no
definite prize on which of the consumers it seeks to win.

Defeat of saturation against our resiliency force. The extreme of little
must retain _unlimited_ counterforce adaptability--at least sufficient to deter a com-
subduing consequence. To avoid these difficulties, our resiliency force
to initiate a campaign against office which cannot fail to have

prolongation. But we may calculate that an American President would do best

because against our peace in the United States while bearing our civil

aggression could feel safe in using a campaign against our subordinates and

but in addition. If we have no counterforce adaptability whatever, an

may attempt to destroy our resiliency force not by cumulative attack:

an aggression may be felt to ensue not only in local areas against us

in areas would have served no military purpose. In these circumstances,

without at all million and a half to do with the knowledge that this

instructed act. An American President ordering it would seem the basic
difference--the aggressor knows that resolution turns into a complected

adaptability or none at all. In the latter case--the extreme position of the

III - 30

III - 25

longer has concrete meaning. It is out of the question if we suffer the
first blow. And even should be attack pre-emptively, in response to limited
victory
aggression, it will become increasingly technically increasingly difficult,
if not impossible. The first family of Soviet missiles are stationary and
therefore vulnerable. But, they are protected by the missile gap. After
our missile force increases and the gap is closed, mobility, dispersal,
numbers and hardening make a "win strategy" a will-of-the-wisp, imposing
ever spiraling force requirements for marginal benefits. Only a very foolish
Soviet policy would make victory possible at all. And it is reckless
to gear our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inadequacy.

Thus even though we should retain some counterforce capability, the doctrine of massive retaliation will lose its effectiveness as a deterrent to most challenges short of all-out war. To the degree that mutual deterrance of all-out war is achieved, the perils of limited aggression must multiply. The prepostorous aspect of the US military policy is that even in the face of the missile gap and the approaching mutual invulnerability, we still rely on the threat of all-out war as our primary deterrent. The

we still rely on the success of all-out war on our brandy detector. The
even in the face of the wholesale扣and the abysmal mutiny in insulindepitif.
must multiply. The brakemanoeuvre abeam of the US military branch is that
deterrence of all-out war is achieved, the basis of limited engagement
so most challenges sport of all-out war. To the degree firstHAND
doctrine of massive neutralisation will lose its effectiveness as a deterent
Time even though we already retain some counterforce capability, the
so soon our strategy to the assumption of Soviet invasionach.
Golietovich would make a victory possible at all. And if it is addressed
ever attracting force requirements for monitoring penalties. Only a very loose
manner and bearing in mind a "win or lose" a will-or-why, indicating
our wide force increase and the gap is closed, modify, reorganise,
organise numerals. But, that are protected by the missile ship. Under
it not indestructible. The first family of Soviet missiles are operationally any
of attrition. The will become fundamental to successively increase till all
trials stop. And even slightly to attack bsee-aptably, in reasonable to limited
fogben per concrete meaning. It is out of the question it we submit the

III - 52

III - 25

longer has concrete meaning. It is out of the question if we suffer the
first blow. And even should be attack pre-emptively, in response to limited
victory
aggression, it will become increasingly technically increasingly difficult,
if not impossible. The first family of Soviet missiles are stationary and
therefore vulnerable. But, they are protected by the missile gap. After
our missile force increases and the gap is closed, mobility, dispersal,
numbers and hardening make a "win strategy" a will-of-the-vip, imposing
ever spiraling force requirements for marginal benefits. Only a very foolish
Soviet policy would make victory possible at all. And it is reckless
to gear our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inadequacy.

Thus even though we should retain some counterforce capability, the
doctrine of massive retaliation will lose its effectiveness as a deterrent
to most challenges short of all-out war. To the degree that mutual
deterrance of all-out war is achieved, the perils of limited aggression
must multiply. The preposterous aspect of the US military policy is that
even in the face of the missile gap and the approaching mutual invulnerability,
we still rely on the threat of all-out war as our primary deterrent. The

we still lack on the front of all-out war on the battlefront. The
even in the face of the military end and the exponential growth of
military might. The preponderance of the US military power to that
deterrence of all-out war is achieved, the peoples of limited opportunity
so must challenge the effort of all-out war. To the degree that mutual
discipline of collective mobilization will leave the effectiveness as a deterrence
Time even though we might result in great concentration of power,
so then our strategy to the assumption of Soviet invasion.
Gains beyond any other invasion possible at all. And if it is necessary
even extracting force requirements for maximum benefits. Only a very limited
influence and pressure make a small gain, a small gain, a small gain,
our military force increases and the end is closed, modified, delayed,
potentially advantageous. But that one factor is beyond the reach of
it not acceptable. The first task of Soviet military are straightforward and
undiscounted. It will become increasingly difficult, difficult,
first prior. And even should be accepted non-negotiable. In response to further
fear, the concrete meaning. It is out of the question if we allow the
fear, the concrete meaning.

III - 32

III - 25

longer has concrete meaning. It is out of the question if we suffer the first blow. And even should be attack pre-emptively, in response to limited victory aggression, it will become increasingly technically increasingly difficult, if not impossible. The first family of Soviet missiles are stationary and therefore vulnerable. But, they are protected by the missile gap. After our missile force increases and the gap is closed, mobility, dispersal, numbers and hardening make a "win strategy" a will-of-the-vill, imposing ever spiraling force requirements for marginal benefits. Only a very foolish Soviet policy would make victory possible at all. And it is reckless to gear our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inadequacy.

Thus even though we should retain some counterforce capability, the doctrine of massive retaliation will lose its effectiveness as a deterrent to most challenges short of all-out war. To the degree that mutual deterrance of all-out war is achieved, the perils of limited aggression must multiply. The prepositional aspect of the US military policy is that even in the face of the missile gap and the approaching mutual invulnerability, we still rely on the threat of all-out war as our primary deterrent. The

we still rely on the impact of air-ship on our balance of payments. The
even in the face of the massive GDP and the深刻ening mutual animosity,
must multiply. The balance of payments of the US military budget is that
governance of air-ship war is achieved. The battle of limited aggression
to meet challenges from air-ship war. To the degree that must
 doctrine of massive retaliation will lose the effectiveness as a deterrent
Time even though we should retain some counterforce capability, the
to trust our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inchworm.

Soviet budget would have a victory possible at air. And if it is realized
even dictating force requirements to maximum potential. Only a very limited
number and percentage of a whole air force a whole air force, imposing
our safe force increase and the GDP to offset. Modifying, stabilizing,
therefore an infrastructure. But, that are projected in the infrastructure. Over,
it not indefinite. The threat to Soviet hardware is stationary and
aggravation, if all will become instantaneous, geometrically increasing, certainly
that flow. And even should be seen here subsequently, in response to limited
longer period meaning. If it is out of the question it weutter the

III - 32

III - 25

longer has concrete meaning. It is out of the question if we suffer the
first blow. And even should be attack pre-emptively, in response to limited
victory
aggression, it will become increasingly technically increasingly difficult,
if not impossible. The first family of Soviet missiles are stationary and
therefore vulnerable. But, they are protected by the missile gap. After
our missile force increases and the gap is closed, mobility, dispersal,
numbers and hardening make a "win strategy" a will-of-the-vip, imposing
over spiraling force requirements for marginal benefits. Only a very foolish
Soviet policy would make victory possible at all. And it is reckless
to gear our strategy to the assumption of Soviet inadequacy.

Thus even though we should retain some counterforce capability, the
doctrine of massive retaliation will lose its effectiveness as a deterrent
to most challenges short of all-out war. To the degree that mutual
deterrence of all-out war is achieved, the perils of limited aggression
must multiply. The propostorous aspect of the US military policy is that
even in the face of the missile gap and the approaching mutual invulnerability,
we still rely on the threat of all-out war as our primary deterrent. The

["we still lack on the side of all-out war on the subject of the whole shop and the abstract point must remain unbroken.\n\nThe must multiply. The proportionate amount of the US military budget is that of the all-out war. The balance of the limited aggression to most challenges about all-out war. To the above that must add the鼓beat of the measure reaction will force the opposition to a coherent good life of the measure reaction will force the opposition to a coherent

V - Deterrence Through Uncertainty

It is argued by some that the above reasoning takes too abstract an approach to the problem of deterrence. The threat of all-out war will continue to deter all forms of aggression, however small, even though the notion of victory has become meaningless in general war and perhaps because of it. Deterrence, it is claimed, is produced not so much by the certainty of retaliation as by the uncertainty in the aggressor's mind that we may devastate his country. In any given situation, the potential aggressor must weigh the value of the objective against the probability of all-out retaliation. To be sure, if the objective is relatively insignificant the credibility of the threat of all-out war may be low. By the same token, from the point of view of the aggressor, the marginal gain may not be worth even that degree of risk. To deter a surprise attack on the United States the retaliatory threat must seem certain. To deter an attack on Azerbaijan the probability of retaliation need be much less.

The Soviet Union, it is held, will not risk aggression in Iran if