On each occasion, the period of relaxation was ended when an opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself. The period of tranquility after 1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, a third of Poland, the Baltic States and an attack on Finland. World War II lead to the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to the penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the spirit of Camp David was ended with another Berlin crisis and the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Today, we seem again to be in a period of relative calm which has three major causes.

(a) **The failure of Soviet militancy:** Encouraged by a series of U.S. half-measures in Laos and in Berlin, the Soviets in the Fall of 1962 installed missiles in Cuba. The U.S. reaction brought home to the Soviet leaders that they had pushed things too far and that they needed a period of calm to recoup.

(b) **Internal strains on the Soviet system:** There is no doubt that currently the Soviet system is suffering from the effects of over-centralization, bureaucracization and lack of incentive. There is an obvious crisis in Soviet agriculture. Soviet industry is not meeting the goals of its plans. Everywhere the over-bureaucrization of Soviet life is taking its toll. The Soviet system obviously requires a breathing spell to restore its energies.

### III. The Future of Germany

America's policy towards Germany after De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation gives rise to serious concerns for the future. After an initial period of shock, an assiduous wooing of the Federal Republic began. One reason for the MLF was to prevent the Federal Republic from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear cooperation--an offer which has not yet been made and, given De Gaulle's awareness of the inter-European equilibrium, might never have been extended. In order to tie Germany to the United States, considerable and successful efforts were made to have German arms purchases funneled to the United States, and not to Europe, and especially not France. In the political field the United States, while welcoming Franco-German rapprochment, has made clear that it does so only as long as it is not "exclusive" or lead to a new power grouping. Thus U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, McGhee, has said:

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... It is true that the signature of the Franco-German treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been achieved without formal commitments. ... Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German treaty might be used as a vehicle for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.¹

There were hints that Germany, if it did not pursue its French ties, might replace Great Britain as America's special partner in Europe.

But the Franco-German treaty, if it was to mean anything, had to produce a new power alignment. It was, after all, the Fouchet plan with implementation to gradually fill the gap calling for institutionalized meetings of heads of state, foreign ministers and sub-cabinet officials. This plan had been rejected by the other members of the Common Market as not going far enough and also with the argument that final action on it should await Britain's entry into Europe. The Franco-German treaty had it functioned properly, it might have provided an incentive to the other European countries to join.

¹George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues," Speech at Germany, July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. II, No. 1310, Aug. 3, 1964, p. 140-141.

LI

[Y]

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In any event, it would have produced a joint Franco-German position
on most issues - which certainly would have affected the bargaining

process and thus brought about the new grouping which U.S. policy
which American policy led Transamerica for itself over not only its objects,
depicts a new pattern of which this particular one and of this policy
object to a new penetration by a European one would be the result,
led to a Depression and a breakdown

The American coolness coupled with highhanded unilateral French tactics
on such issues as the recognition of Communist China, caused the treaty
of Cooperation to become mostly a dead letter. The impression grew
among responsible Germans that they were being asked to make a choice

between France and the United States. Even when they did not fully head
the appeal of its strongest ally, the experience of being wooed was heady
wine. At the least, it provided incentives to seek to benefit from the
importunes of the two rivals.

The combination of these actions has further rent the already
tenuous fabric of European unity and Atlantic cohesion. The strategic
implications of the MLF have already been discussed. In political terms

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it makes the Federal Republic, which is already the largest conventionally-armed country of Europe, also the strongest European power. It creates yet another European grouping, this one focussed around Germany. It is a tenuous grouping, moreover, because the motives of the countries comprising it are extremely varied. Outside of the Federal Republic, none of the participants is very interested in the MLF. Some, like Britain, may make a token contribution primarily as a result of U.S. pressures. Others, like Italy, may see in the MLF a symbolic gesture against De Gaulle. Most join to keep an eye on the Germans. The consensus likely to unify Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, even with the token participation of Great Britain, is not obvious and not likely to lead to a European sense of identity.

With progress towards European integration blocked, with the treaty to France ineffective, courted by all sides Germany finds itself in an extremely uncomfortable position. Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry of France and the United States, the Federal Republic is increasingly

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forced to become conscious of its own particular national aspirations.

175

Thus Germany is becoming increasingly vulnerable to Soviet siren songs and Communist blackmail. As long as Germany could avoid a direct confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other relationship--the Western Alliance or the Franco-German treaty--these dangers were minimized. The combination of De Gaulle's high-handedness and America's short-sighted reaction to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly conscious of its own

176

national aspirations and of the bargaining position conferred upon it by its central position. And these tendencies are reinforced by American pressures on Germany to be both the pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and to prove more flexible towards the East.

177

The coming together of all these policies threatens to upset the

delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to pressures and temptations which it is ill-equipped to handle and which cannot be healthy in the long

178

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run. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance.

Encouraged by U.S. policy to be the pillar of Atlantic solidarity and, ~~at the same time~~ to be flexible towards the East, the most exposed Western ally, 17 million of whose people are Communist hostages, is increasingly torn between the rivalries of its allies, the temptations of its opponents and its own ambivalent national aspirations. As German policy has become less anonymous, it has also grown more vulnerable.

After a relatively brief honeymoon, the Federal Republic is likely to find its view about the control of the MLF ~~and~~ *Umfeld* it to include land-based missiles clashing with ours. It may differ with us about arms control negotiations. It is bound to press for unification more energetically than its allies. All this time, the Communist countries will exploit the latent anti-German feeling. Indeed, the result of ~~existing policies~~ will be to fuse all anti-American, anti-German, anti-nuclear sentiments together. Confused by the constant wooing, the Federal