MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: Asian Society Dinner
Plaza Hotel, New York City

TIME AND DATE: May 5, 1972

PARTICIPANTS: List Attached

Following the introduction of members of the head table, Dr. Kissinger was introduced and received a standing ovation.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I don't know how to take that kind introduction. At the White House they often route protest groups through my office as an example of the depth to which human depravity can reach. I hoped he wouldn't say too many flattering things. President Nixon and I visited former President Johnson early in the Administration and asked if he had any advice. He said, "Read the columnists closely and if any of them have a kind word to say about anyone on your staff, fire him." I, therefore, hope that this introduction will be treated off-the-record [laughter]. This will be an experiment to see if I can really talk freely.

In my remarks I will address in a general way to our foreign policy, especially Asian policy. It is inevitable that with this endless war in Southeast Asia one might concentrate all the debate on Southeast Asia and therefore all our foreign policy can be summed up by the outcome in Vietnam. I will be glad to answer questions on Vietnam at the end but I hope that our policy can be looked at more objectively.

We took over essentially a post-war foreign policy. Complete attitudes had to be changed. We took office when the American pre-eminence to wage war had begun to wane. Much of our policy was based on previous successes. The principal problem was to adjust to the new realities.

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When America adopted the post-war policies, the United States was the
only country capable of having a global foreign policy. We had a history
of uninterrupted success. We could invite challenge anywhere in the
world.

Our task was how to define a role for the United States where we could
have a constructive and permanent relationship with other nations. The
Nixon Doctrine gives other countries a bigger role. Some call it a
retreat. It has led to our now evolving relationships with the People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union. It is sometimes called the
balance of power approach.

The first concern of any leader must be the basic security of the country. It cannot base decisions on circumstances elsewhere. Each country wants independent relations with the other nations. We have been lucky in the past because of geographic considerations. Vast oceans lay between ourselves and possible enemies. Technology has changed all this, requiring us now to develop careful relationships with other countries. It is important that we establish relationships with other countries even where painful to our traditional friends, who are seeing us establish relationships with previously rejected countries. We no longer have a black and white foreign policy. All nations have a stake. We could not overlook the 800 million people in the People's Republic of China.

Our relations with China started in a curious way. The President asked us to explore contacts. It is amazing how difficult it is to establish ties to a nation after 22 years of an isolationist policy. It is difficult to find an intermediary and even to do simple things like drafting messages acceptable to both sides. It is an interesting analysis for a good student in foreign relations. Once contact was established, problems arose because so many nations were looking at our China policy. They were looking at specific details and were concerned we might be shifting our weight.

The essence of our China policy is that we do not impinge on Chinese
interests very much. Our effort was basically in three levels. First
was what specific arrangement could be made in Shanghai. Second was
to make inroads bilaterally which, if acceptable, would prove significant.
And third was the impact of Americans on Chinese society, and vice versa.

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In our discussions with the Chinese our vast cultural differences became apparent. Where Americans are pragmatic, the Chinese concentrate on principal. They want to distill things into absolute terms. We talk about peace. The Chinese talk about justice and they are dedicated to the proposition that without justice, peace is meaningless. We talk about compromise. They talk about truth. It is interesting to observe what happens. The Chinese have many of the rules my former students thought they would like to have, but with the Chinese we are making no great deals. There is no counter-Soviet strategy or shifting of weight from Tokyo to Peking.

With Japan we have concrete problems. In China we are making a policy framework, results of which will not be known for four to five years. Our Japanese experience has been considerably different than the Chinese. After the war, the Japanese concentrated on economic matters and left foreign policy and security in American hands. This relationship could not continue. Japan must play a more significant role without nationalism and without all their weight with one major power.

Our objective in the Soviet summit is to try to create vested interests for both parties in many areas so that when crises occur, there will be a group within the Soviet Union with a vested interest wanting a steady course resulting in negotiation.

Now, about Southeast Asia. Our major concern is that a new international order must be built. This is complicated by a disaster which has lasted ten years. The debate is so strong that I cannot bridge the valley. The problem we face is how to act in a situation where success for the opponent would mean the capture of an additional 60,000 Americans. The only alternative given us is to impose a Communist government on the South. This we refuse to do. We will not join our enemies to defeat our friends. This is the only obstacle. This is a very painful problem and painful decisions have to be made.

I am not here to talk about Vietnam but Asian policy, but the discussion must include Vietnam. After the elections, we will find we have had great successes but also some regrets. We want to help other nations become participants in world order. [applause]

[This concluded the remarks, signaling the start to the question and answer period. The notetaker was called to the phone and was unable to listen to the question and answer period.]

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