TO SUPPORT US IF WE NOW REFUSE TO MODERNIZE
THE CANAL RELATIONSHIP. WE WOULD WITNESS A GRADUAL
DETERIORATION OF OUR RELATIONSHIPS EVEN WHEN SOME
LEADERS MIGHT PREFER TO RETAIN CONSTRUCTIVE TIES.

IF THE TREATIES ARE ACCEPTED, ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR
MANY FRIENDS IN THE HEMISPHERE WILL BE ENABLED TO
COOPERATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTRUCTIVE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE POLICY.

ANOTHER QUESTION WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED IS WHETHER
THE NEUTRAL STATUS OF THE CANAL WOULD MEAN THAT
HOSTILE WARSHIPS COULD TRANSIT THE CANAL AND, IN
EFFECT, BENEFIT FROM US PROTECTION. I CAN ONLY COMMENT
THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS AND MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE
AT ITS DISPOSAL OTHER MEANS TO DEFEND ITS VITAL
SECURITY INTERESTS IN ANY SUCH SITUATION. THE
UNITED STATES MUST HAVE THE CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE

SEA LANES; HENCE WE MUST BE ABLE TO PREVENT HOSTILE
SHIPS FROM REACHING THE CANAL. IT WE DO NOT MAINTAIN
THAT CAPABILITY, WE ARE IN A PARLOUS CONDITION INDEED
AND THE PROVISIONS OF A LEGAL DOCUMENT WILL BE PRECIOUS
LITTLE HELP.

I RECOGNIZE THE DEEP FEELINGS OF MANY AMERICANS
WHO WISH, AFTER THE VIETNAM TRAGEDY, TO SEE AN END TO
YIELDING AND RETREAT BY THE UNITED STATES. NO
ONE CAN APPRECIATE SUCH CONCERNS BETTER THAN ONE WHO
STROVE FOR AN HONORABLE OUTCOME DURING THE VIETNAM
PERIOD. BUT THE CANAL IS NOT THE ISSUE TO SELECT TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT WE REMAIN STRONG AND RESOLUTE. PANAMA
IS THE SMALLEST AND WEAKEST OF NATIONS. WE ARE NOT
"GIVING" THE CANAL TO PANAMA; WE ARE, RATHER, ENSURING
OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT IT. BY TAKING CONSTRUCTIVE
ACTION NOW TO REVISE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PANAMA IN

AN ATMOSPHERE FREE OF PHYSICAL PRESSURE, WHILE WE ARE
STILL ABLE OBJECTIVELY TO ASSESS THE LONG TERM RISKS
AND BENEFITS, WE WILL BE DEMONSTRATING FUNDAMENTAL
STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS. IT IS JUST THIS ABILITY TO
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SYMBOL AND REALITY, TO PLAN FOR
FUTURE NEEDS AND TO TAKE TIMELY ACTION TO ADVANCE
OUR BASIC INTERESTS THAT IS THE ESSENCE OF A STRONG
AND EFFECTIVE WORLD POLICY.

FIRMNESS IN THE DEFENSE OF ESSENTIAL NATIONAL
INTERESTS IS VITAL. BUT A NATION ASSURES ITS INTER-
NATIONAL POSITION BY UNDERSTANDING AND DEFINING CLEARLY
WHAT ITS INTERESTS ARE AND TAKING THE PRECISE APPROPRIATE
AND NECESSARY ACTION TO SAFEGUARD THOSE INTERESTS.

UNREASONING ADHERENCE TO THE STATUS QUO HAS NEVER BEEN
THE MARK OF AN EFFECTIVE AND VIGOROUS FOREIGN POLICY.

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WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED OURSELVES CAPABLE OF MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF THE UNPRECEDENTED ON MANY OCCASIONS IN THE PAST. AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II, WE EMBARKED ON A NUMBER OF NEW INITIATIVES -- THE MARSHALL PLAN, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, POINT FOUR, TO CITE A FEW -- THAT CONSTITUTED A DRAMATIC CHANGE FROM THE COURSE WE HAD FOLLOWED IN THE PAST. WE DID SO BECAUSE WE REALIZED THAT THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE POST-WAR ERA REQUIRED NEW RESPONSES -- THAT WE COULD NOT ASSURE THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY OF OUR NATION BY ADHERING TO THE ISOLATIONIST POLICIES OF THE PAST. TO CLING TO OUTMODED APPROACHES WAS TO ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE OVERWHELMED BY FUTURE EVENTS.

AND THERE ARE MANY MORE RECENT EXAMPLES OF CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO CHANGING WORLD CONDITIONS. THE EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE ARMS RACE, THE OPENING OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA, OUR EFFORTS TO MODERNIZE THE INSTI-

TUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION ARE CASES
IN POINT. IN EACH CASE, WE DID NOT HESITATE TO MODIFY
OLD POLICIES AND ARRANGEMENTS WHEN WE FELT THAT OUR
NATIONAL INTEREST WOULD ONLY BE PRESERVED BY DOING SO.

THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATIES SHOULD BE VIEWED
IN THE SAME LIGHT. THEY MARK A STEP FORWARD, AN
IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. THEY PRESENT
YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY WITH AN OPPORTUNITY
TO MODERNIZE AN OUTDATED ARRANGEMENT THAT HAS ITSELF
COME TO THREATEN THE VERY INTERESTS IT WAS DESIGNED
TO PROTECT.

BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE WITH WHICH THEY DEAL,
THESE TREATIES REPRESENT THE MOST IMPORTANT AND SERIOUS
INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING FORMALLY SUBMITTED TO THE
CONGRESS BY THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT CARTER.
WE
THUS YOU HAVE A DOUBLY GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY: A REJECTION

OF THE TREATIES WOULD NOT ONLY CAUSE A CRISIS IN OUR
RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE;
IT WOULD IN ADDITION WEAKEN THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL
AUTHORITY AT THE BEGINNING OF HIS TERM. IT WOULD THUS
BE A DEMONSTRATION OF NATIONAL WEAKNESS, WHICH WOULD
BE TAKEN BY FRIEND AND ENEMY ALIKE AS EVIDENCE THAT
WE ARE SYSTEMICALLY INCAPABLE OF RECOGNIZING AND PUR-
SUING OUR INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC
DIVISION, DOUBT AND CONFLICT. THIS WOULD BE ALL THE
MORE SO BECAUSE WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO CONSIDER
THAT THE NEW TREATIES IN FACT ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS
AND ARE SEEN AS SUCH THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

IN SUPPORTING BOTH THE CONCEPT OF A NEW TREATY
ARRANGEMENT AND THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF WHAT HAS
BEEN NEGOTIATED I DO NOT MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THE SENATE'S
ROLE IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS SHOULD BE THAT OF A
MORE RUBBER STAMP. ON THE CONTRARY I BELIEVE THAT

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THE SENATE CAN AND SHOULD MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE
CONTRIBUTION CLEARING UP AMBIGUITIES IN THE CURRENT
TEXTS AND ASSURING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT OUR VITAL
INTERESTS ARE INDEED BEING SAFEGUARDED.

MY SUPPORT OF THE TREATIES IS BASED ON MY READING
OF TWO KEY PROVISIONS -- A READING WHICH COINCIDES
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION:

--FIRST IS OUR RIGHT TO "MAINTAIN THE REGIME OF
NEUTRALITY" UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE NEUTRALITY
TREATY, AND

--SECOND IS THE MEANING OF OUR RIGHT TO "EXPEDITIOUS
TRANSIT" UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE NEUTRALITY
TREATY.

WITH RESPECT TO OUR RIGHT TO DEFEND THE CANAL,
I CONCUR IN THE [ADMINISTRATION'S] INTERPRETATION THAT
WE HAVE THE RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO ACT, IF NECESSARY
UNILATERALLY, TO DEFEND THE CANAL'S NEUTRALITY. [IT
IS UNFORTUNATE THAT THE WORD "INTERVENTION" HAS BEEN

- 19 -

INJECTED INTO THE DEBATE TO CHARACTERIZE THAT RIGHT;
THIS WORD CONVEYS IMPLICATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTER-
FERENCE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF PANAMA THAT WE
NEITHER NEED NOR CLAIM, AND WHICH ARE PROVOCATIVE THROUGH-
OUT LATIN AMERICA. WITH RESPECT TO EXPEDITIOUS
PASSAGE, I CONSIDER THAT IT MUST MEAN "PRIORITY
PASSAGE" IN WARTIME AND SPEEDIEST POSSIBLE PASSAGE
AT ALL TIMES.

THE FACT REMAINS THAT THESE INTERPRETATIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN INTO QUESTION -- PARTLY BY AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS OF PANAMANIAN OFFICIALS UNDERSTANDABLY CONCERNED WITH THEIR OWN RATIFICATION PROCESS AND SUBJECT TO ATTACKS, WHICH ARE THE MIRROR IMAGE OF THE OPPOSITION IN THIS COUNTRY, THAT THEY HAVE YIELDED TOO MUCH TO THE US. AMBIGUITY IS, OF COURSE, THE ESSENCE OF DIPLOMACY; IT OFTEN PERMITS EACH SIDE TO MAINTAIN ITS

- 20 -

DOMESTIC POSITION WHILE SAFEGUARDING ESSENTIAL INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS. I HAVE RESORTED TO IT IN NEGOTIATIONS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

I HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED AMBIGUITY OF LANGUAGE ACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER, IF IT MASKED A TRUE DIFFERENCE OF INTERPRETATION. WHATEVER THE WORDS OF AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT MAY SAY, IT IS VITAL IN MY EXPERIENCE THAT BOTH SIDES SHARE THE SAME UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTENT OF THAT INSTRUMENT. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, AMBIGUITY OR LACK OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING COULD SOW THE SEEDS OF FUTURE CRISIS IF IN FACT THE PARTIES ARE NOT OF A SINGLE VIEW AS TO THE CENTRAL PROVISIONS OF THE TREATIES.

I BELIEVE, THEREFORE, THAT THE SENATE CAN PLAY ITS CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE BY EXPLICITLY AND FORMALLY ENDORSING ITS RATIFICATION.

THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE IV THAT HAS BEEN PUT FOR-WORD BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE: THAT

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UNITED STATES WHICH WOULD THEN BE ENDORSED BY THE SENATE AS PART OF THE RATIFICATION PROCESS. EITHER COURSE WOULD ENSURE THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OR AMBIGUITY IN THE FUTURE.

THE SAME PROCEDURES COULD BE FOLLOWED WITH RESPECT TO THE MEANING OF "EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT." EITHER THE SENATE [OR AN AGREED MINUTE WITH PANAMA] SHOULD STATE THAT IN TIME OF WAR UNITED STATES NAVAL SHIPS AND AUXILIARIES SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY PASSAGE AND AT ALL TIMES THE SPEEDIEST PASSAGE POSSIBLE. [IN EITHER CASE THE FULL SENATE SHOULD APPROVE THE INTERPRETATIONS BY A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY.]

[I] WISH TO EXPRESS MY STRONG HOPE THAT THESE STEPS BE TAKEN IN HARMONY AND COOPERATION WITH AND NOT IN REPUDIATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION. THEY ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION. THEY REFLECT OUR NECESSITIES; THEY TAKE NOTHING

AWAY FROM PANAMA'S DIGNITY. THE ABILITY OF THE TWO BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT TO WORK OUT A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS A GREAT SERVICE THEY COULD RENDER TO AMERICA'S POSITION OF CONTINUED LEADERSHIP IN THE WORLD. I CAN THINK OF NO EVENT MORE REASSURING TO OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AROUND THE WORLD THAN THE POSITIVE RESOLUTION OF THIS DIFFICULT DEBATE IN COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT AFTER ALL THE DIVISIONS OF THE LAST TEN YEARS.

THIS IS NOW THE REAL ISSUE OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AND THEIR ULTIMATE SIGNIFICANCE. I AM CONFIDENT THAT STATESMANSHIP ON THE PART OF ALL CONCERNED WILL BRING THIS DEBATE TO ITS PROPER, POSITIVE CONCLUSION. FOR THIRTY YEARS THIS COUNTRY HAS BORNE A VITAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, FOR THE HEALTH OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, AND FOR THE CAUSE OF HUMAN FREEDOM. TO FULFILL THIS HISTORIC

ROLE WE MUST BE A UNITED PEOPLE; CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT, REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS, MUST ALL HAVE
THE SENSE THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN A SHARED ENTERPRISE.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES
MUST BE CONSIDERED, AND IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT
I RESPECTFULLY URGE THEIR RATIFICATION.

- 1 -

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to express my views on the proposed treaties with Panama which are before you. Over a period of years I participated in the negotiations and have given much thought to the question of how we can best assure in the decades ahead our interest in the free, neutral, and efficient operation of the Panama Canal.

You have already heard from the Secretaries of State and Defense from Ambassadors Bunker and Linowitz, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials of the Administration. You have had an opportunity to assess the detailed provisions and background of the two new treaties and the Administration's reasons for urging that the Senate advise and consent to ratification. In supporting ratification I want to address not the detailed clauses of the agreement but some fundamental issues raised by the treaties.

Our nation's foreign policy must be based on a conception of enduring national goals and permanent responsibilities, not on the accidents of personality or change for the sake of novelty with the advent of each new Presidential Administration. The future wellbeing and security of this country can never be a partisan issue. They affect every American, and, given our central role, every human being concerned with the preservation and strengthening of the cause of freedom.

Our substantial stake in the Panama Canal is a case in point. The United States has a vital interest in the free, neutral, and efficient operation of the Canal. This interest cannot be compromised; we cannot foresee the day when it will be inconsequential.

Up to now this interest has been identified with the precise treaty relationship we established in 1903 under vastly different circumstances. But four successive Presidents and their Secretaries of State, representing both political parties, have been persuaded over a period of thirteen years that a new treaty relationship with Panama is more likely to serve the long-term security and foreign policy of the United States; above all that it would best assure what is the essence of our interest: the efficiency, neutrality, accessibility, and security of the Canal. All four Presidents come to the view that the Treaty of 1903 no longer adequately assures that interest. The present arrangements include provisions which are no longer essential and which could over time actually make protection of our vital interests more difficult by forcing us into actions increasingly in conflict with our traditional allies in the Western Hemisphere.

It is my conviction that the two treaties recently negotiated with Panama do indeed protect our long-term interest in the Canal more effectively and under conditions more in keeping with present-day realities than is possible under the 1903 Treaty.

We must recognize that however we in the United States may view that Treaty, the rest of the world and especially the nations of the Western Hemisphere do not regard it as an equitable and freely negotiated agreement. It was reached in ambiguous circumstances and no Panamanian ever signed it. Some even question its legality. To insist on these arrangements would mean that over time we would be compelled to fall back on the use of force as the ultimate basis for our presence. This we should be prepared to do when our vital interests can be defended in no other way. But this is not the case here because the treaties give us a clear, and on balance a better, alternative.

Under the terms of the new Panama Canal Treaty, nothing of real significance to us in the existing arrangement for management and defense of the Canal will change during the remainder of this century. The United States will continue to control operation of the Canal; United States military forces will continue to provide for defense of the Canal from within Panamanian territory. At the same time, the new treaty arrangement establishes a cooperative working relationship with Panama which will enhance our ability to ensure the Canal's security and efficient operation, provide for an orderly transition, and increase Panama's stake in the long-term secure and neutral operation of the Canal.

After the year 2000, when management of the Canal passes to Panama, Article IV of the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal will become controlling. The Neutrality Treaty not only establishes the legal obligation of both Panama and the United States to maintain a permanently neutral Canal, it also defines neutrality clearly in terms of concrete standards for the operation of the Canal which both parties are pledged to maintain. Article IV makes the United States a guarantor of that permanent neutrality. It thus gives the United States the continuing right, unilaterally if necessary, to defend the Canal and its operation against threats to the neutrality of the Canal -- and thus, the ability to defend the Canal for the indefinite future. And this same regime of neutrality, and our right and responsibility to underwrite it, will apply as well to any other international waterway that might be built in Panama in the future.

- 3 -

Furthermore, under Article V of the Neutrality Treaty, Panama would relinquish the right to invite or accept foreign military forces or foreign military installations anywhere in the Republic. This would bar Panama from engaging in an alliance with any other power in a way which involved the presence of military personnel on its soil. By the same token, Panama's breach of that commitment would entitle and oblige the United States to take appropriate action to ensure the Canal's neutrality.

We would not, in short, have a general right of "inter-
vention" in Panama's internal and domestic affairs. Nor would
we want such a right. But we have under the new treaties
the right and obligation to take such action as is required
to ensure that the Canal remain permanently neutral -- free
of the threat of foreign military presence and forever open
to the ocean-borne commerce of the world on a non-discriminatory
basis.

The new treaties will establish a far stronger legal
underpinning and political environment for the protection
of our interests in the Canal while retaining all the essentials
of assuring the Canal's security. Their ratification is
thus an opportunity to advance fundamental American foreign
policy interests. Their rejection, on the other hand,
would be read by the nations of the Hemisphere as a demonstration
that this nation stands on force as the final arbiter even
when a constructive alternative is available. Such a course
would be unnecessarily costly to many other of our interests,
particularly to the solidarity and alliance of the Western
Hemisphere nations that has been central to our foreign
policy for generations. And I am convinced that we shall
not again be given the opportunity to safeguard and advance
our interests on terms as favorable as those which have just
been negotiated. The moment when we are clearly strong
enough to defend our rights in the Canal and while the
Canal is free of immediate threat and menace provides the
best opportunity to preempt a potential crisis and to secure
the future of the Canal on mutually beneficial terms.

Let me turn now to some of the concerns and questions
that have been raised with respect to the new treaties.

First, some have asked what would happen if Panama
were to abrogate the treaties. There is no question that this
is a possibility. But it must be viewed against the
near-certainty that the 1903 Treaty will not be accepted
any longer either by Panama or by the other nations of the
Hemisphere. The question therefore is which arrangement
puts us in the best legal, political, and military position
to protect our rights and interests if we are forced to do
so by the unilateral action of Panama. I believe that
the new treaties will significantly reduce the risks of
abrogation, and will also create far better conditions in
which we could defend our rights if abrogation should
occur.

- 4 -

By establishing a relationship of shared responsibility and benefit, the new treaties make Panama a partner in a successful Canal enterprise. They increase Panama's stake in safeguarding the vital interests we wish to assure -- a free, open, safe, and well-run Canal. The new arrangement accords with the reality that consent and cooperative endeavor are the only bases for secure operation of a canal which is located within Panamanian territory and even now is run by a predominantly Panamanian labor force. But if, despite everything, we have to act to defend the Canal, we would be in a far stronger position to do so in the name of a 1977 treaty freely negotiated and signed in the presence of the heads of government of most of the Western Hemisphere nations than in the name of an agreement concluded seventy five years ago and which every Latin American nation in every recent meeting of the Organization of American States has repeatedly urged us to replace.

One of the strongest arguments in favor of ratification is in fact its impact on cooperative Western Hemisphere relationships. Our decisions on these treaties will testify to them whether or not we are willing to resolve disputes with them on the basis of negotiation. This does not mean that ratification of the treaties will resolve all differences between us and our neighbors to the south. Our capacity for cooperation, understanding, and imagination will be tested in this Hemisphere long after the Panama issue is resolved and for as far into the future as one can see. There will be many who do not wish us well in the area even if we ratify the treaties. But failure to ratify will provide hostile forces with a permanent issue of incalculable value around which to rally and encourage a vast new tide of anti-American sentiment and make it politically impossible for our friends to rally to our side.

I find it significant that no Hemisphere leader, regardless of what his private feelings on this issue might be, feels able publicly to take any position other than that of strongest support for the modernization of the 1903 Treaty. This reflects the depth of public sentiment on the issue. No government and no public opinion in any of the countries of this Hemisphere would be willing to support us if we now refuse to modernize the Canal relationship. We would witness a gradual deterioration of our relationships even when some leaders might prefer to retain constructive ties. If the treaties are accepted, on the other hand, our many friends in the Hemisphere will be enabled to cooperate in the development of a constructive Western Hemisphere policy.

- 5 -

Lg

Another question which has been raised is whether the neutral status of the Canal would mean that hostile warships could transit the Canal and, in effect, benefit from US protection. I can only comment that the United States has and must continue to have at its disposal other means to defend its vital security interests in any such situation. The United States must have the capacity to control the sea lanes; hence we must be able to prevent hostile ships from reaching the Canal. If we do not maintain that capability, we are in a parlous condition indeed and the provisions of a legal document will be precious little help.

I recognize the deep feeling of many Americans who wish, after the Vietnam tragedy, to see an end to yielding and retreat by the United States. No one can appreciate such concerns better than one who strove for an honorable outcome during the Vietnam period. But the Canal is not the issue to select to demonstrate that we remain strong and resolute. Panama is the smallest and weakest of nations. We are not "giving" the Canal to Panama; we are, rather, ensuring our ability to protect it. By taking constructive action now to revise our relationship with Panama in an atmosphere free of physical pressure, while we are still able objectively to assess the long-term risks and benefits, we will be demonstrating fundamental strength, not weakness. It is just this ability to distinguish between symbol and reality, to plan for future needs and to take timely action to advance our basic interests that is the essence of a strong and effective world policy.

Firmness in the defense of essential national interests is vital. But a nation assures its international position by understanding and defining clearly what its interests are and taking the precise appropriate and necessary action to safeguard those interests. Unreasoning adherence to the status quo has never been the mark of an effective and vigorous foreign policy.

We have demonstrated ourselves capable of meeting the challenge of the unprecedented on many occasions in the past. At the end of World War II, we embarked on a number of new initiatives -- the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, Point Four, to cite a few -- that constituted a dramatic change from the course we had followed in the past. We did so because we realized that the new circumstances of the post-war era required new responses -- that we could not assure the security and prosperity of our nation by adhering to the isolationist policies of the past. To cling to outmoded approaches was to allow ourselves to be overwhelmed by future events.

-6-

And there are many more recent examples of constructive response to changing world conditions. The efforts to control the arms race, the opening of relations with China, our efforts to modernize the institutions of international economic cooperation are cases in point. In each case, we did not hesitate to modify old policies and arrangements when we felt that our national interest would only be preserved by doing so.

The new Panama Canal treaties should be viewed in the same light. They mark a step forward, an improvement over the present situation. They present you and the people of this country with an opportunity to modernize an outdated arrangement that has itself come to threaten the very interests it was designed to protect.

Beyond the immediate issue with which they deal, these treaties represent the most important and serious international undertaking formally submitted to the Congress by the Administration of President Carter. Thus you have a doubly grave responsibility: a rejection of the treaties would not only cause a crisis in our relations with the nations of the Western Hemisphere; it would in addition weaken the President's national authority at the beginning of his term. It would thus be a demonstration of national weakness, which would be taken by friend and enemy alike as evidence that we are systemically incapable of recognizing and pursuing our international objectives because of domestic division, doubt and conflict. This would be all the more so because we have every reason to consider that the new treaties in fact advance our interests and are seen as such throughout the world.

In supporting both the concept of a new treaty arrangement and the essential structure of what has been negotiated I do not mean to imply that the Senate's role in the ratification process should be that of a mere rubber stamp. On the contrary I believe that the Senate can and should make a constructive contribution clearing up ambiguities in the current texts and assuring the American people that our vital interests are indeed being safeguarded.

My support of the treaties is based on my reading of two key provisions -- a reading which coincides with the Administrations's interpretation:

- First is our right to "maintain the regime of neutrality" under Article IV of the Neutrality Treaty, and

-8-

The Senate interpretation should be reduced to formal and explicit language with the Senate's advice that it be submitted by the Administration as an integral part of the instrument of ratification either by protocol or some other method which would ensure that it becomes the authoritative and mutually acceptable explanation. Another way of dealing with the interpretation would be an agreed minute between Panama and the United States which would then be endorsed by the Senate as part of the ratification process. Either course would ensure that there could be no question or ambiguity in the future.

The same procedures could be followed with respect to the meaning of "expeditious transit." Either the Senate or an agreed minute with Panama should state that in time of war United States naval ships and auxiliaries should be given priority passage and at all times the speediest passage possible. In either case the full Senate should approve the interpretations by a two-thirds majority.

I wish to express my strong hope that these steps be taken in harmony and cooperation with and not in repudiation of the Administration. They are fully consistent with the Administration's interpretation. They reflect our necessities; they take nothing away from Panama's dignity. The ability of the two branches of government to work out a constructive solution to this problem is a great service they could render to America's position of continued leadership in the world. I can think of no event more reassuring to our friends and allies around the world than the positive resolution of this difficult debate in cooperation between the Congress and the President after all the divisions of the last ten years.

This is now the real issue of the Panama Canal treaties and their ultimate significance. I am confident that statesmanship on the part of all concerned will bring this debate to its proper, positive conclusion. For thirty years this country has borne a vital responsibility for international security, for the health of the world economy, and for the cause of human freedom. To fulfill this historic role we must be a united people; Congress and the President, Republicans and Democrats, must all have the sense that we are engaged in a shared enterprise. It is in this spirit that the Panama Canal treaties must be considered, and it is in this spirit that I respectfully urge their ratification.