Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCON

Mayo/Kissinger

10:40 am

3/3170

K: I have talked with the VP and he doesn't know what the Secy. of State is talking about. A Presidential order cannot be countermanded so you had better go ahead.

M: Why don't you talk to Rogers.

K: I have no reason to talk to Rogers. I have a Presidential order and I have passed it on and it should be carried out. What do you understand the Presidential order to be?

M: He wanted to reduce the PC in Afghanistan because of the demonstrations.

K: Exactly. I have to go. the VP is calling back.

TELCORN
Vice President/Kissinger
10:45 p am 3/3/70

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

VP: On other thing I would like to get the story on the Laotian thing. I missed
the NSC meeting.

K: I will get it to you this afternoon

VP: Will you give me a call?

K: Yes.

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Mayo/Kissinger
10:50 am 3/3170

K: All I can say is the VP agreed to nothing. As far as I am concerned, there is a Presidential order extant and you should carry it out. If you don't, it's between you and the President.

M: I will find out the facts.

K: You can't do that. It's a Presidential order.

M: He would be embarrassed if it were a misstatement of facts.

K: What facts?

M: Rogers says it was a misstatement of facts.

K: The facts were that a group had a meeting with the DCM. The facts were that they had not demonstrated but had threatened to. They gave a list of grievances in the presence of reporters.

M: That's not what he (or I) was told.

K: If it's facts, that's my office.

M: I will do what I am told but I wouldn't want him acting on percipitous information.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

10:52 am

3/3/70

K: About two months ago I was asked by the President to communicate to Mayo about the Peace Corps in Afghanistan and he wanted it reduced. Mayo tells me that it was incorrect information and he will not carry out the order.

R: That's right -- the information was not correct.

K: I wonder if we could have the information so the President could reverse himself if he feels it warrants it. The VP says it's correct.

R: Blatchford says the VP was satisfied when he left. They didn't have demonstrations and met with the VP.

K: The President was against that they threatened to demonstrate and the VP (objected) that they were promised meetings (with high level officials to placate them so that they wouldn't demonstrate.)

R: There was a court case, in which we didn't want the President mixed up, where some PC members were fired.

K: I'm familiar with that case. I talked to Elliott Richardson at the time. He wanted them fired immediately.

R: You can't run this place if people are picking up the paper and firing people.

K: He wanted it done by budgetary reductions.

R: However it's done, it will be known. We have done very well in Afghanistan with very little and it's right along the Russians border.

K: Why don't you get a memo over.

R: The facts should be heard. Like Israel -- the judgment is right but to do it tomorrow would be wrong.

K: That was my attitude on that.

R: On this thing

K: What matter of Israel ?

R: As I understand it, he was thinking of issuing a statement to the press tomorrow on arms. ? ? ? ? ?

K: That was my advise.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/13/04

*

Rogers/Kissinger

10:52 am

3/3/70

--2--

R: I'm not talking about your advice but he must have the facts. I want to know what the decisions are and not hear them second hand.

K: Everybody was informed to my knowledge.

R: If he wants to fire 25% of them, we can. But does he want to get involved. It's just a lot of petty trouble we don't need. We could get rid of the PC -- that would be better if that's what he wants. I could have ? ? ? ? down in Africa but 95 % are pretty good.

K: Get a memo over and we will hold this in abeyance until he sees your memo.

R: Are the decisions in writing?

K: Certainly. But this was not in a case when he was in a fury. You were on vacation. He called me about 10 times that night. We talked to Blatchford and Richardson. Richardson said it couldn't be done legally on a court order and so he wanted it done on budgetary cuts. He picked up a newspaper. We spent most of one night in San Clemente in Sept. working on that. They are not technically government employees.

R: You cannot fire people through budgetary gimmickry without getting caught. He is running into a buzz saw.

K: He had the facts straight.

R: Blatchford says he doesn't.

K: Maybe the decision was wrong and done in emotional state.

R: Was anything presented to the President in writing?

K: I will have to check on that.

R: I don't think so.

K: The VP presented a written statement. I am absolutely positive of that.

R: I will talk to Blatchford and get a memo to him with the facts.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCOM
Zeigler/Kissinger

11:00 am

3/3/70

?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??

Z: ?? ?? on this Swartz (?) thing. I undertand that Hillenbrand said that it would be announced tomorrow. Hillenbrand shouldn't be making agreements like that. McCloskey will be here on the NPT thing, another item where they made a promise. So I'm going to announce it today. Why should they be heroes all the time?

K: OK

Z: Did Haig talk to you about those talks. I am going to low key it. But if I'm asked I will say the talks will continue.

K: Right

Z: ?? ?? ??

K: Just say there are channels of communication.

Z: OK

*

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

12:40 pm 3/31/70

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

R: Blatchford is going to see you tomorrow and I will have him have the facts all prepared.

K: I'm not trying to make an issue. I'm carrying out insistent orders. I have no interest. I can see your point.

R: We might punish innocent people. He is doing a good job. He has fired 3 or 4 who are out of line

K: If Blatchford brings in a memo I will present it to the President. Perhaps he has quieted down.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCOM

Zeigler/Kissinger

12:50 pm 3/3/70

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Z: If we send it at 11:00

K: We have an NSC at 11:00

Z: No, it's at 9:30.

K: Will it be over at 11:00?

Z: If not, we can do it at 12:00.

K: I understand this problem but I have a problem too. I have no statement as yet.

Z: Can I meet with Haig to loosen you up and move it through?

K: I have to give it to the State Dept. They would like to see noting better than
for it to fall flat and for us to land on our faces with it.

Z: I think we are better off to do it earlier than on Friday in Key Biscayne. So
if I'm talking to Al Haig it will be on your schedule.

K: I have complete confidence in Al.

Z: On the Israeli jets, I said it had moved through the various departments
and is before the NSC.

K: I have to meet with the Overseas Writers at 1:00 tomorrow. It has been set
for 3 weeks.

Z: Let me work this with Al. That OK?

K: OK

When they asked me:

Z: Are they asking us are they going to discuss it in the NSC tomorrow? I said
no. Are they going to discuss Laos? I said no.

K: I don't think you should say what we are going to discuss.

Z: I didn't

K: But you do when you say no.

Z: But they would have put on more pressure if I had said nothing.

K: You are right.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

*

TELCON
Ehrlichman/Kissinger

1:00 (?) pm

3/3/70

E: The national education assoc. doesn't give me dinners, why are the Geramns giving you one?

K: Are you coming? They're not very discriminatory on who they invite.

E: I'll look for you wearing your lederhosen. I had a call from your friend Mr. Rogers and he said, you know things aren't well with the Fulbright committee. He kept going on and on and I kept bringing him back to the agreement with Symington and the President. He said he wanted a meeting with our out committee. So, next Tues. we are having an meeting with him telling us about his troubles with the Symington committee.

K: I'd better be there and you'd better have the Atty. Gen.

E: Then he talked about McClintock. He admitted guilt ? ? ? ? ? between one boss and the other. I said maybe he should meet with McClintock and chastize him and that would make it better that will chastize him. I said it reflects on his ability as an Ambassador. I said he should meet with McClintock. So he is.

K: He'll not chastize him.

E: It's a catharsis. He knows that we know that he knows, etc, and he'll do something (?).

K: I will see you tonight.

E: Are you going to speak?

K: I probably will have to.

E: Good. I'll save a french roll to throw at you.

*

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
2:35 pm 3/3/70

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

VP: Appropos of nothing else but something that struck me over the weekend -- Gen. Powers wants me to have a briefing at Omaha in which he would involve himself because he is concerned about something he wants me to see. I would like to do it. Is it OK?

K: Absolutely. I'm strongly in favor of it.

VP: Should I do it through Defense or your office? I'd prefer your office.

K: Through my office.

VP: I would like to arrange to begin that -- there's a Cabinet meeting on Wed. which I could be excused from. I would like to begin at 8:00 Wed. morning at SAC. This would be helpful for me. Will you call me back?

K: You can count on me to arrange it.

VP: Some of your people are working with me on a drug and trade speech for me to give in NY. It's in response to adverse comment. Will you get your people to help?

K: Are they not helping?

VP: My people are over there now and I want to be sure it's on the track.

K: My people are to give your's top priority assistance and if they are not, I want to know.

VP: It's Thurs. and I just want to be sure.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telcon
Joseph Kraft
3/3/70; 4:20 p.m.

Kraft: What is the logic of the Watson appointment?

HAK: For once you have me on something with which I have got nothing to do.

Kraft: Really?

HAK: I stay out of appointments as a rule.

Kraft: Are you the man who devises complicated policies and lets the idiots carry them out?

HAK: Is he an idiot?

Kraft: Oh, I don't know. He just doesn't say anything to me at all.

HAK: When I want to interject myself I can do it, but as a general practice I don't.

Kraft: Where are we on the Chau case? It looks to me as though Thieu is making a show of his capacity to step all over him in public.

HAK: We are trying to keep in touch with it.

Kraft: That is not the point. He knows you are trying to and he is trying to show how much he will put up with. Why did he do it in such a public way?

HAK: Chau is doing something in public.

Kraft: Has Bunker been active on this again and gotten a satisfactory response?

K: Well, you know how these responses go. They are time-consuming.

Kraft: I take it the first time he didn't take the case.

HAK: But he has been taking it personally the last few times.

Kraft: Do you get into things like the President going up to see Pompidou?

HAK: In a general way.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Kraft: Was there anything special that preceded that?

HAK: He felt in the light of the demonstrations and Pompidou's extremely offended feelings he wanted to make sure there was an indication officially that we laid stress on good Franco-American relations.

Kraft: Had the talks gone well?

HAK: Yes, but nothing spectacular.

Kraft: Nothing on Vietnam?

HAK: Nothing.

Kraft: What about arms control? I had the impression he did not understand they had a strategic role to play.

HAK: I think they are a few years behind the rest of the world in strategic thinking.

Kraft: Is there anything doing in Paris? Is that Zorin story a reality?

HAK: I don't believe it. You mean the one that they are backing off. I have no indication except for the Zorin story.

Kraft: How serious is Laos?

HAK: We will know in a few weeks how far they are going to go. But a lot of the press stories -- they are taking things that have been going on for years.

Kraft: That is quite true, but the fact that they have been able to retake the Plain of Jars with all the air we have been putting in.

HAK: Yes, but they have never put in that many ground forces.

Kraft: That's a point. What do you think they are trying to do?

HAK: They may be taking all of Laos or getting ready to negotiate a little further down the road.

other

Kraft: Are there any good indications of negotiating?

HAK: No but at the time of the Tet offensive we didn't think so.

Kraft: I have been looking now again at your State of the World message. Specifically at a statement to the effect that there had been identified

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

four criteria of sufficiency and then you blandly go along and you
don't name them. Are we going to get to know what those are?

HAK: Well, it was nothing world-shaking. And we thought it wasn't
too good to be too specific.

Kraft: Yes.

HAK: It was close enough that at one stage we were considering
giving them.

Kraft: It doesn't add up to hang that much out and then not to name them.

HAK: Well, that was probably an editorial mistake.

Kraft: The Army data on ABM -- does it look like a possible
statement on negotiating.

HAK: No matter what the ups and downs of the public statements, I
think we will have a little further down the road.

Kraft: You know the people you have to talk to -- Helms' testimony
with Gore went a lot into this question.

HAK: We will do it a little bit further down the road.

ms

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN

Sen. Church/Kissinger

5:12 pm

3/3/70

C: I just wanted to have a brief word on a matter in your shop which you are going to have to implement one of these days. That's the Inter-American Social Development Institute. I helped it in the Senate bill and in the discussion we had in the conference committee and the emphasis was on the fact that this Institute would give us a chance to give a new approach to aid in Latin America. It would be quasi-independent and would deal with groups outside the government, i. e., foundations. It would leave some of the initiative to the Latins and it would be experimental and diverse from the old program.

K: I think well of it.

C: I'm concerned that when it's implemented and set up that it will not be dominated with AID and it's attitudes and we loose the one thing we had hoped to get -- a new experimental approach with a new way. It's only possible if we have people in it not indoctrinated in the old way. I'm just concerned that this will become a depository for

K: If we goof it up it will not be because we didn't understand. But when you staff these agencies the most opportuning are those you are trying to avoid. The XK AID approach is sterile. We are trying to do this in this and in the new staffing of AID. It's difficult.

C: I just wanted you to know how the committee feels.

K: This gives me moral support and the President and I are in agreement with you.

C: Well, it's good of you to talk to me and I am glad to hear that.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Richardson/Kissinger

5:37 pm

3/3/70

R: That was interesting, wasn't it.

K: He is doing a paper on it. I will send it over to you.

R: I was just talking to Hanna on the Peterson Task Force paper.

K: I haven't seen it.

R: It will be delivered tomorrow. They are putting in the revisions tonight. They will deliver it tomorrow. From Hanna's point of view an interval between it's submission and its release would be helpful for AID. He would like to go over it with his staff people and to the field.

K: I don't understand.

R: He wants to be able to talk to his people and get them calmed down and send a cable to the field before they read it in the paper. So he wants a day to get a cable to the field when they present it to the President. It would be consistent with a scenario to the press with a 24 hour embargo.

K: Will you get a scenario here by COB today?

R: He would like it longer but to avoid leaks ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? The President can say he was considering it carefully and will have his remarks by the end of the month. For Hanna, 24 hours will be reasonable.

K: It sounds reasonable.

R: I will get a draft statement over to you.

*

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCORN
Packard/Kissinger

6:12 pm

3/3/70

P: We are doing our home work on the verification panel meeting tomorrow. How do you plan to approach this tomorrow?

K: I plan to go through the paper myself but I was going to see if we can get the s substantive papers done and two or three positions worked out so we can put it before the NSC.

P: We have most of the papers but it seems to me there are two or three other things -- we need to get a schedule set. We have one set out for us and we could enter that. Do you have a schedule?

K: No, I would be glad to get that.

P: You could adopt that or another but we need a schedule.

K: The President is calling

(Actually it was Haldeman saying HAK could see the President at 9:15 in the morning, prior to the NSC)

6:20 pm Continue Conversation

K: I may not have been fully clear. What I would like to aim for is a panel on Mar. 13 and then (NSC?) on Mar. 18.

P: We have an overall schedule that might be useful. Maybethe best way to handle this is to get Gardner Tucker to go over this in the morning with Larry.

K: That is best. You have not been asked to the Ashe report meeting tomorrow afternoon?

P: Yes, and Garder Tucker and ______ would be at the verification meeting.

K: Should we delay the meeting?

P: That would be all right with me. Gardner is up on this but if you want to delay the meeting we could do that.

K: To 4:00 or something like that? Or 4:30?

P: I can fit that in anytime.

K: Let me check on who has been invited.

*

By: KHLN NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Telcon
Haldeman
3/3/70; 6:30 p.m.

HAK asked who should go to the meeting tomorrow in the East Room. He had a conflict - a meeting which also involved the Under Secretaries.

Haldeman told HAK that he should be at the meeting in the East Room, and also the Under Secretaries should attend.

HAK said he would slip his meeting. He said he also needs to see the President for 10 minutes before the NSC meeting so that the President understands there is a new ploy that may be tried.
Haldeman said he will check on the time of the NSC meeting, whether 9:00 or 9:30 and will call back.

ms

*

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
6:40 pm 3/3/70

K: Are you not going to be at the NSC tomorrow?

L: No, I will be before the House Foreign Services Committee.

K: We have a draft NSSM on ? ? ? ? ? and Korea that State wants to table tomorrow but the President won't have seen it. Is it your view too?

L: Is that the one on military assistance?

K: Yes.

L: I don't think it should be done tomorrow.

K: Would you instruct Dave so the President gets a crack at it? I don't think we should draft instructions at a meeting -- they become indestructable. We all want a chance at this.

L: Wheeler will raise some questions about it too. Tom Moorer will be there tomorrow and I will talk to Dave and Tome

K: Let the President consider that. We would like to discuss it primarily with you.

L: I will talk with them. I can't walk away from these hearings. I have hearings on (supplemental funds ?) next week. We have nothing on that.

K: They are not as bad as last year.

L: We are holding our own. We are on force reductions and you really get a lot of heat. We will have everybody here briefed tomorrow afternoon. I am testifying Tues., Wed., and Thurs., next week and I want to talk to you. I want to say I favor more for Korea.

K: I think you should. The President would go along on that.

L: I will talk to you before I go up there. If I stay at this level we cannot go up there at this level we have now.

K: And you will talk to Packard and Moorer?

B: I will.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Max Fisher/Kissinger

6:52 pm 3/3/70

F: How did everything go?

K: It went pretty well.

F: We did everything we could. The thing I would like to do with you is form a procedure for ? ? ? ? (couldn't hear).

K: OK

F: You know that I have never dreamt there would be anything. I hope the President has gotten over some of it.

K: He is quieting down a bit.

F: I think Pompidou used it to his advantage very well at the end

K: He did but that was to be expected.

F: I will be in town Wed. and Thurs.

K: I can't make it this week.

F: I will give you a week's notice and we will go over some of it.

K: Good. We appreciate all of what you did.

F: I am only doing what I consider is my responsibility.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCORN

Amb. Freeman/Ksisinger

10:55 am

3/4/70

K: Have you got my office bugged as well as my home? I was going to call you.

F: I have a couple of points. I could come see you or do in on the telephone.

K: Why don't you come by about 12:30. I have one thing. We appreciated the letter you sent over yesterday. The President was very pleased.

F: Good. At 12:30.

By KAL NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCORN

Green/Kissinger

11:45 am

3/4/70

K: On this Laos business -- two things. One is that I will have the statement to you that the President worked on in an hour or so and we would like your comments as early as we can. Hopefully, they will be editorial. I am transmitting a message. The President doesn't want to make it defensive and wants it to be a positive move. He wants to write to Wilson and Kosygin as co-chairmen to help restore the Accords. That way he isn't explaining our actions but ('questioning') theirs.

G: How about the letters?

K: I'm sending a draft of those too. You know the legalities and they must be looked over carefully. He isn't as locked in on those as he is on the statement. You will deliver them on Friday to Freeman and Dobrynin. Then the President will make a statement on Friday morning.

G: We did want -- anything they will require ? ? ? ?

K: You are free to do that. You will find that the President's statement is actually an expansion of the draft you sent over.

G: Which is actually the Souvanna formula. That should please them.

K: All it does is explain -- only difference is it's more detailed.

G: Which

K: His. It uses yours and CIA's recommendations and it hooks it on those letters. Otherwise it isn't diffirent from what the Secretary said to him. It should ease the Symington problem.

G: Now what we are doing on the Ho Chi Minh trail we are doing in the North.

K: We will have that over by 1:00.

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/13/04

*

TELCORN
Sisco/Kissinger

12:27 pm

3/4/70

S: When you have a look at this scenario on the announcement for Monday

K: Who said it was Monday?

S: That's what I was told by the Secretary.

K: I'm not sure that's true. You are going to make it.

S: Whatever is low key. This will not be a pleasant discussion here and the President shouldn't be involved. Ron Zeigler could do it or the State Dept.

K: We didn't want to challenge the State Dept's pre-eminence. You know how meticulous we are that you get publicity.

S: When you look at this, look from one point of view if you are looking for additional sweeteners re what's said privately and publicly. Think about 2 things: one, in the talking points on what we tell Israel you could inject a sentence which establishes a principle for replacement of losses. In the present series of points, that's not included. In If the President is looking for ways to make it palatable, that is possible. In the public announcement you will find that the instructions ? ? ? ? ? ? ? privately in the short run we are willing to do ? ? ? economic and publicly we would not say anything. In the announcement we can say presumably what we will say economically.

K: What you say is now, which makes it pretty permanent.

S: How about "for the time being."

K: Or "for an interim period."

S: Yes. I'll reflect on that. That gets away from the 90 day deadline. For the time being is better. I will reflect on it.

K: That sounds like it says we will bring it up soon again.

K: If you think they are worthwhile, I think they should come from you and not us.

K: What were they again? Economic aid reference in the public announcement and add a sentence on the replacement of losses.

S: If this agreeable, I will help you write it.

K: I don't think it will be ready on Monday.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

5:47 pm

3/4/70

R: Mel just called on this speech.

K: Mel?

R: We both have the same reaction that it's beligerent.

K: Could you give an example.

R: The last paragraph on page 12 and 13 is open ended.

K: He is changing that. Mel called and I told the President and that's being changed.

R: Under no circumstances we would

K: That sentence has been eliminated as all together and we are saying we do not plan to send any

R: We would get there approval and not just ~~consult~~ them. That happened last time, we only consulted Congress.

K: That he is taking out.

R: I wonder if he can -- the historical part seems long. If he is making changes, maybe we should wait.

K: If you would get your comments over tonight so he will have them tomorrow morning. I will tell him about shortening the historical account.

R: Let me look it over. That was what concerned me the most. We don't want to leave the impression we are going to use troops.

K: He says we have no plans and he is taking out Congressional action. On the NPT ceremony tomorrow, he thinks you should make the substantive comments and he will make a bi-partisan tribute. He wants to say that now that the treaty has been signed and ratified it is the law of the land.

R: I'm not going to say anything -- just what the ceremony is about. ? ? ? introduction.

K: Someone sent over 8 pages of a speech

R: (this portion missed -- something about how the President should pay tribute to all the ambassadors present and also make a bipartisan statement.) It may be on International TV.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Yoshida

6:30 pm 3/4/70

Y: My friend has asked me to let you know how things are going on this problem. Our envoy, now at home, will leave directly for Washington in 3 hours time from now. My friend has given specific instructions to the 2 ministers concerned to prepare a counter proposal so that our envoy can take it back.

K: Does he have it?

Y: They are working very hard right now and before his departure my friend himself will meet with this man in about an hour's time.

K: He will meet with him.

Y: In about an hour's time for a final conversation.

K: Right.

Y: So this envoy will have something different. My friend has asked me to keep you informed. I will call you back around 11:00 pm tonight if it's all right or about 9:00 tomorrow morning your time and I will give you the outline of our PREPARED proposal.

K: Make it 9:00 in the morning.

Y: In advance, my friend would like to let you know the outline which this man will propose.

K: 9:00 is better

Y: All right. We will do that tomorrow morning at 9:00 your time.

K: I appreciate this and I look forward to hearing from you.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCOM
G Smith/Kissinger

6:45 pm

3/4/70

K: I'm returning your call.

S: I'm calling about a communication on Alden Frye on his conversation with Voronsov.

K: What's the gist of it?

S: What the Soviet position is supposed to be. I suggested that when Elliott sees Dobrynin in the future he tell him to put it in the proper channel and if they're just trying to cause confusion, tell him (to stop).

S: I haven't seen it yet but I'll read it tonight.

*

Telecon

U. Alexis Johnson

3/4/70 6:55 p.m.

By: KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: It's a kabuki play. They are sending their fellow back, and there is going to be a new proposal.

J: Good. When is he coming?

K: He is leaving in three hours. He is seenig his boss in the next hour. I will get the outline on it and I'll let you know.

J: That's very good news. This will give us something to work on.

*

By: K.L. NARA, Dale S/12/94

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
7:07 pm 3/4/70

R: We want over some suggestions but I wanted to talk to you about two things.

K: Marshall mentioned them but the Congressional point will bother the President.

I
R: I will be involved in litigation for a month. ?? ?? ?? ?? the sentence is tricky saying Congress must know what is going on but ?? ?? ??. I cannot tell you how difficult that will be.

K: I will tell him. Laird put that in his thing.

I
R: We can put it in his background but for him to say it -- MEXICO will be called up and asked how they know it.

K: The Symington committee didn't know it?

R: Yes, but we will be forced to say how they knew it. It looks like notification for approval. We are trying to say they approved and they didn't. They acquiesced. The Paris negotiations are red flag.

K: Why?

R: We don't trust them which means we don't trust them in Paris.

K: It doesn't say we don't trust them but if they break an agreement drawn on their recommendations, it will effect our confidence. One purpose of the statement is to keep them from going further.

R: It's quite a digression. It will ____ away from the President's speech.

K: Let me see if we can find a formulation that makes it positive. He wants to say we want to be able to trust them. That's what he is trying to say.

R: That would be all right. Otherwise, it will look like the President is pouring cold water on the Paris negotiations which might even give them a reason for calling off the talks.

K: I see your problem with the Congressional question. We don't want you to have to say what was told.

R: They are dying for a confrontation and now they can say the President has told it, now you tell us. They will say they weren't told.

*

Rogers/Kissinger

7:07 pm

3/4/70

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

K: That's a strong point and I will tell him.

R: I want to talk to him.

K: It won't go without your having a chance to talk to him.

*

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Ziegler
3/4/70; 7:06 p.m.

(Missed first few sentences. Ziegler was telling Mr. Kissinger that State had leaked to Marvin Kalb that the White House was releasing a Presidential statement on Laos this weekend.) You at the Overseas Writers Club take the ____ and I take this guff all day.

K: If I could have said, gentlemen you will have a statement this weekend I would have been a hero.

Z: And I have been doing it for a week. And what do I say tomorrow. I think I am going to call McCloskey and raise hell with him.

K: I think it's an outrage. For an hour I took the guff of these characters, and I have a credibility gap myself.

Z: What is the President going to do tomorrow?

K: He is just going to read about four lines. A few graceful remarks to the Ambassadors. At most half a page. The whole thing will take two minutes. The Secretary wanted him to say more.

Z: What do I do tonight when people call on the CBS report?

K: Say we are considering it.

Z: Tell Haig. He will get a big kick out of it.

ms

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon

The President

3/4/70; 7:45 p.m.

N: On those three Cabinet officers, I approve the idea of all three going.

K: To the Soviet Union.

N: You said you can go one-two-three, or one. My view is that three will diffuse it more. The main point is this, that what I want to do is to get the credit for it in terms of basically there isn't much that they have to do once there. It's Volpe, Hardin and Hickel.

K: Hardin is the one I like best.

N: I wrote a memo that I want nothing done with regard to requests for appointments. I don't want to have a reverse request for appointments when the Russians are here. From now on we are not going to give any letters to any Cabinet officers to see anybody because we will have the reverse situation. I don't think it is too important to make a big issue about it. So negotiate it out.

K: My concern is that three Cabinet members to the Soviets -- those are important officials and they may think we are a little over-eager.

N: Why don't you use that as one of your bargaining things with Dobrynin? We are trying to get some exchanges and it is right that they send somebody of equal rank here. I have no objection to their going if it will serve our interests, but under no circumstances do I want any requests that they see the top man. Let's not get anybody from the Soviet Union over here seeing me. You talk to the Cabinet officers, get Hardin's approval immediately and talk to the others, say we can't say right now - keep them on the string. Say it's got to be reciprocity. Provided we can get reciprocal treatment from the Soviet Union. You understand, the other two, not Hardin, but the other two are very insecure. So you have got to build their egos up and say it is very important they go, but I don't want to use it until we are ready. We want you to go but the question is not whether but when, and we have got to do this in terms of strict reciprocity. Give them the idea that I have approved but you are to work out the details.

K: We have the departmental comments on the Laos paper. The only big one from State is that they don't want to mention the Congressional

*

By KMLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

committee. They don't want to mention that Congressional committees were informed because Bill is afraid he will get into a confrontation with Symington and Fulbright who claim they weren't informed.

N: It isn't a big enough thing to argue about. You cover that in the background, but my view is it isn't big enough to fight about. I think Bill is wrong in not standing up to Fulbright but he doesn't want to do it. This demonstrates Congressional committees knowing these facts, look like damn near traitors.

K: But it was why we had to do it here -- the statement. We can use it to get him to go along with some other statements as you may want to make.

N: Give on that one.

K: We can give on that one. There was one thing that Ziegler called me up about. They have apparently leaked from State to Marvin Kalb that there will be a statement this weekend.

N: They would give it to Kalb -- our enemy.

K: He had it on TV tonight. It takes away from the surprise.

N: I don't want Ziegler to confirm -- just say it is under consideration but whenever there is something to announce he will announce it. But don't confirm Kalb. Don't let them get the credit. You may say the President has decided to postpone it a week. And then we will do it on Friday. Call McCloskey and say that, and then we will release it on Friday. Get a fresh copy to look at tomorrow. If we had left the statement for them to make it would have been an utter disaster -- whining, defensive. You can't win on an issue like this without hitting it head-on, if you are going to have to hit it.

K: This was the lesson of the November 3 speech and we have a good case on this.

N: Yes, we have. After this they will be after Cambodia.

K: They will be after Thailand.

K:

N: Thailand is an ally. I think they are moving in Laos in order to stampede us in Paris. I like the line you are taking because it will help us in the war in Vietnam. No one will care next year what the ____ of public opinion were.

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

N: You do consider this a strong statement enough, don't you.
That is what I want.

K: Yes.

N: If the statement is strong enough it will help us in Vietnam.
What we are really saying is, all right boys, yes we are, what of it.
State didn't want it in that tone?

K: I know they wanted us to say, we are not going to do any more.

ms

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Marshall Green/Kissinger

7:50 pm 3/4/70

G: We are getting it in the typewriter now. The Secretary has gone over it carefully. Our changes are minimal. We will introduce our changes on the draft. Two important changes: One -- our mentioning that policy we pursued in Laos should be ? ? ? ? ? to Congress. The Secretary feels that left him in a difficult sdtate of mind. He has to live with Congress and it has been a problem.

K: On that he will have trouble with the President.

G: That was his feeling.

K: You can be sure it will go to the President.

G: The other is VN peace talks. He would like to see that deleted.

K: The President has rewritten that but why?

G: ? ? ? ? ? has focus on the wrong thing and looks like we are challenging the wrong thing. The total figure should include contracts.

K: That's being done.

G: The first paragraph on 13 -- that bothered Mel Laird too

K: Do you have new language?

G: We just want to talk take it out and in the next one the word "now" and the next paragraph.

K: That's been done.

G: On the letter, it looks fine except that we have made technical changes. Also the democratic system in VN is signatory.

K: Will you see to getting the letters sent?

G: Yes, but I will send back the letters now with the changes.

K: And then we will phone your own approval and you will do the mechanical part.

G: ? ? ? ? two telegrams to Ottawa, ------, and Vientiane telling them what we are doing and paying the courtesy of telling Souvanna.

K: As late as you can.

By KHL NARA, Dale S/12/04

Green/Kissinger
7:50 pm 3/4/70

-2-

G: Tomorrow. There are a few other little changes. The package will be leaving in about 10 minutes.

K: The President is working tonight and it will go to him.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

8:00 pm 3/4/70

K: I just talked to the President and told him about it. Did you talk to Haldeman?

Z: He was very quiet about it. He asked how it happened.

K: He wants you to talk to McCloskey. He is boiling. He doesn't want you to confirm it. He wants you to say he was considering it. He may not make a statement.

Z: Was he mad?

K: He used some pictureque language.

Z: OK

8:15 -- further conversation

Z: I talked to McCloskey. He said Kalb called him today and said he got it from the Hill.

K: Rogers told it to Fulbright in confidence. Exactly right and McCloskey confirmed it.

Z: Kalb got it from the Hill.

K: Why didn't he deny it?

Z: He didn't deny it because I don't know if he confirmed it.

K: Did he say maybe the President wouldn't make a statement?

Z: He said that the Secretary said that maybe the President wouldn't make a statement.

K: OK

NIXON PRES

By KCL NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

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NIXON PRES

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

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