# III Evolution and The
# New Countries

## A. The Problem

The problem of political development of the new nations is subtle and our relation to it is highly delicate. On the one hand, the greatest possibility for creativity exists at the very beginning of the evolutionary process, during the first decades of independence. At the same time, this is the period when the pressures of immediate problems are likely to be greatest. The technical task of setting up a going concern may absorb so much energy that little is left for reflection about its purpose. The new nations may hesitate to accept foreign advice and may interpret any attempt by the West to assist political development as simply another form of colonialism.

The inhibitions against offering political advice are almost equally strong on the part of the Western nations. Exporting democracy has become unfashionable. It is believed to constitute interference

has become unmanageable. It is believed to constitute interference
excessively strong on the part of the Western nations. Exporting democracy
The inhibitions against offering political advice are almost
political development as simply another form of colonialism.
foreign advice and may interpret and attempt by the West to assist
reflection about its purpose. The new nations may hesitate to accept
up a going concern may afford so much energy that little is felt for
problems are likely to be greatest. The technical task of setting
At the same time, this is the period when the pressures of immediate
of the evolutionary process, during the first decades of independence.
the greatest possibility for creativity exists at the very beginning
enthusiast and our relation to it is highly delicate. On the one hand,
The problem of political development of the new nations is
not the problem

A. The Problem

New Countries
III Evolution and The

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in the domestic affairs of other states. And many
in the West believe that we must revitalize our own
institutions before we can concern ourselves with their
relevance to the emerging nations.

In these circumstances it has been natural for the West
to concentrate on the problem with which it is most familiar
and the solution of which has been so insistently demanded
by the new nations: that of economic development. The
incentive has been all the greater because of the con-
viction that raising the standards of living would eliminate
the basic source of Communist appeal. As capital accumulates
and a consumer economy develops, so the argument goes,
some enlightened form of government is likely to emerge.
The experience of the Marshall Plan in Europe seemed to
confirm the existence of a causal relationship between
economic progress and political stability.

Unfortunately the problem of the new nations is infinitely
more complicated than those of Europe after World War II.

Unfortunately the problem of the new nations is fully economic progress and political stability.

fulfill the existence of a causal relationship between
The experience of the Marshall Plan in Europe seemed to
some enlightened form of Government is likely to emerge,
and a consumer economy develops, so the argument goes,

the basic source of Communist appeal. As capital accumulates
viction that raising the standards of living would eliminate
incentive has been all the greater because of the con-
pany the new nations: that of economic development. The
and the solution of which has been so insistently demanded
to concentrate on the problem with which it is most familiar
In these circumstances it has been natural for the West
relevance to the emerging nations.

institutions before we can concern ourselves with their
in the West believe that we must revitalize our own
in the domestic allies of other states. And many

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In Europe the political framework had been elaborated over centuries. The administrative structure was well developed. The societies were cohesive. The threat to existing institutions arose because the war had shattered the industrial plant and because despair was threatening to produce a climate of extremism. By removing the causes of economic discontent, the Marshall Plan revitalized an existing political framework.

These conditions do not apply to any emergent nation with the possible exception of India. The end of colonial rule has also brought with it the disintegration of the existing political system. Economic development, to the extent that it succeeds, also tends to destroy the indigenous political structure, which usually is feudal. At the same time, sustained growth requires

At the same time, an accelerated growth requires
unbearable political structure which necessarily in itself,
extent that it succeeds, also tends to destroy the
existing political system. Economic development, to the
life, has also brought with it the transformation of the
with the possible exception of India. The and of colonial
These conditions do not apply to any emergent nation
an existing political framework.
came of economic discontent, the Marandil plan revitalized
threatening to produce extremism. By removing the
affected the industrial plant and because disorder was
to existing institutions arose because the war had
developed. The societies were cooperative. The first
over centuries. The administrative structure was well
in Europe the political framework had been evaporated

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capital accumulation and this, in turn, presupposes a system
capable of impelling savings. Even in the West, it was
necessary to overthrow the feudal system before industrial-
ization would take place. A new political framework
preceded or at least accompanied economic development in the
democratic countries. The need for new political structures
is even greater in the emerging countries because/their
views of the role of the state in the process of development.
Growth could, of course, be achieved by largely private
measures -- though this would not obviate the need for
a different political system. In practice, however, all
new countries are looking to the state to play the major
role in industrialization. Laissez-faire economics
is largely irrelevant not because it is unworkable --
it works in fact best in relatively primitive economics--
but because it is politically unacceptable. Indeed, one of
the handicaps faced by Western style democracy is its

the bandicapped faced by Western style democracy in its
put people it is politically unacceptable. Indeed, one of
it works in last year in relatively primitive economics--
It is largely irrelevant not because it is unworkable --

role in industrialization. Lausanne-laine economics
new countries are looking to the state to play the major
a different political system. In practice, however, all
measures-- through this would not operate the need for
Growth cult, of course, be achieved by largely private
views of the role of the state in the process of development.
is even greater in the emerging countries because of
the economic countries. The need for new political structures
brought on at least accompanied economic development in the
nation would take place. A new political framework
necessary to overcome the tough slates before industrial-
capable of insulating savings. Even in the West, it was
capital accumulation and trade, in terms, broadened a slates
inability to invest in the long slates before industrial-

necessity to overcome the tough slates before industrial-
capable of insulating savings. Even in the West, it was
capital accumulation and trade, in terms, broadened a slates
inability to invest in the long slates before industrial-

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identification in the minds of many of the new countries
with both colonialism and a form of individualism which
seem to them largely self-serving. For better or worse,
most of the people of the emergent nations judge a political
system by the purpose with which it can infuse the social
effort. The problem of political organization thus confronts
the new nations at the very beginning of the process of
development in an even more acute form than it ever did
the West. To rely on economic development to bring about
enlightened political institutions is to reverse the
real priorities. Whatever political system brings about
industrialization may well be confirmed by it.

Here our dilemma is great. Communism proclaims the unity
of politics and economics. It insists on establishing a system
of political order as a precondition to economic development.
Its successes are due not to the excellence of its *economic*
theory but to its political ability to mobilize national

Theory put to its political ability to modify national
life processes are due not to the excellence of its economic
or political order, but a precondition to economic development.
Of politics and economics. It initiates on establishing a system
Here one dilemma is here. Communism proclaims the unity
we are a great
industrialization may well be continued by it.

Real priorities. Whatever political system springs upon
enlightened political institutions is to reverse the
development in an even more sense from than it ever did
the new nations at the very beginning of the process of
effort. The problem of political organization thus confronts
us by the purpose with which it can influence the social
most of the people of the emergent nations judge a political
seem to them largely self-serving. For better or worse,
with both colonialism and a form of individualism which
seem to them largely self-serving. For better or worse,
identification in the minds of many of the new countries

in the minds of many of the new countries
identification in the minds of many of the new countries

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A4

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for human dignity meaningful to the new nations, the much-vaunted
economic competition between us and Communism in the uncommitted areas
will be without meaning. If the issue is simply the relative capacity
to promote economic development, the outcome is foreordained. In
terms of physical capacity to improve output Communist has certainly
proved its mettle. If we cannot demonstrate effectively the sacrifice
this
of human dignity at which/increased output has been achieved, the clearer
patterns of authority of the Soviet system may become increasingly
attractive. If we rely on history to bring about automatically what we
lack the conviction to affirm, much less to strive for, we may find
that economic progress has been achieved at the cost of the quality
of life which gives it meaning.

Continued on 6a

Continued on page

that economic progress has been achieved at the cost of the duality

 lack the conviction to attain, much less to strive for, we may find

 of human dignity at which increased output has been achieved, the clearer

 this

brought its mettle. If we cannot demonstrate effectively the securities
terms of physical capacity to improve output. Communist has certainly
to promote economic development, the outcome is foreordained. In

economic competition between us and Communists in the uncommitted areas
for human dignity meaningful to the new nations, the much-vaunted

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Of course, under the best of circumstances, a democracy would confront a difficult and delicate task in conveying its values to a new society. Its most cherished qualities are also the least tangible. By its very nature, democracy offers an attitude rather than a doctrine, a process and not a dogma. For societies confused by their problems and searching for definite answers, the democratic method may seem too elusive. The temptation is overwhelming to settle for some form of enlightened authoritarianism and to rely on evolution to ameliorate it.

But this is a delusion. The authoritarianism is likely to become more, rather than less, well-established as time goes on. As it develops its own structure and its own values, the scope for affecting it will constantly diminish.

minutiae.

own structure and its own values, the scope for selecting it will constantly di-
more¹, rather than less¹, well-accepting as time goes on. We can develop its
But this is a delusion. The authority is likely to become
on evolution to ameliorate it.

whom to act for some form of enlivened authority and to rely
on answers, the democratic method may seem too efficient. The combustion is ever-
goes. For societies continued by their prophecies and developing for definite
nature, democracy offers an attitude rather than a doctrine, a process and not a
check. Its most Cherished duties are those the least significant. It has even
trom a difficult and definite task in conceiving its avowed to a new co-

Of course, under the press of circumstances, a democracy may con-

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To be sure, the new nations must find forms of democracy appropriate to their own special conditions. Our capacity to influence their political structure is limited. But we can hardly expect them to see the relevance of democratic principles and institutions to their circumstances if we do not believe in it ourselves. Whether we have anything to offer them depends on the confidence we earn and on the dynamism of our over-all performance.

It would be idle to deny that there is reason for serious concern about the future of freedom in the new countries. Democracy in the West grew out of a long tradition according to which the standards of justice were rooted either in the essential nature of man or in a divine dispensation or both. The actions of governments were to be judged by criteria, which not being made by man, could not be abolished ...

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by government. When democracy developed, this conviction
was embodied in specific institutions designed to safe-
guard individual rights. The postulate of the uniqueness
of the individual and the belief that he was the repository
of ultimate values had two consequences: ~~it protected the~~
~~individual against the exercise of arbitrary power.~~

~~And it produced the conviction that every citizen by~~
the more fact of being a citizen was entitled to ~~make~~ have a
political judgment and to participate in the political
process. A certain constitutionalism -- whether formal as
in the United States or tacit as in Great Britain has been
inseparable from democratic government. ~-~

A key test of democracy, the ~~is not the claim~~
~~so that justice -- this, can be made by any system -- but the limits~~
to which ~~it is pressed.~~ A free system, whatever its
formal institutions, cannot function unless it is based
on self-restraint. There must be some mechanism for
dealing with dissent other than ~~destroying it.~~ To be

deseling with both ends other than heating it. To be
on self-restrainer. There must be some mechanism for
formal institutions, cannot function unless it is passed

to which it is bposed. A true system, whatever its
of justice -- this made p and system -- put the limits

A key test of democracy, is not the claim

unseparable from democratic government.

in the United States or fact as in Great Britain has been
--
process. A certain constitutionalism -- whether formal or
political jurisdiction and to participate in the political
type were left to being a citizen was entitled to have a

And it produced the conviction that every citizen p

of ultimate values had two consequences: 1. protected the
of the individual and the pellet that he was the repository
of individual rights. The basis of the multiplicity
was embodied in specific institutions designed to sale-

p Government. When democracy degenerates, this conviction

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meaningful, self-restraint must set limits even to exercise
of righteous power. This presupposes two seemingly contra-
dictory conditions. On the part of the individual it
presumes a measure of identification of his welfare
with the welfare of society. On the part of society
the fulfillment of the individual must be considered
intrinsically valuable and indeed the chief reason for
the social effort.

If the individual behaves purely selfishly, organized
social effort becomes impossible. A truly free cooperative
requires that effort cannot be achieved unless a significant majority
of the population is convinced that in exercising self-
restraint in matters of conduct and property and passion,
it will not simply place itself at a disadvantage with
respect to other groups, less inhibited Democratic
government faces an almost insuperable dilemma as soon
as a substantial minority does not accept its restraints.

Government faces an almost impossible dilemma as soon
respect to either Groome's less innocited Democratic
it will not simply place itself at a disadvantage with
restraint in matters of conduct and property and passion,
of the population it convinced first in exercising self-
effort cannot be achieved unless a significant majority
remains.

Social effort becomes impossible. A truly free cooperative
If the individual behaves duly self-consciously, organized
the social effort.

influentially valuable and fужed the chief reason for
the fulfillment of the individual must be considered
with the welfare of society. On the part of society
breaches a measure of identification of his welfare
dictator conditions. On the part of the individual if
of lightyears below. This breachboces two seemingly contra-
measured, self-restraint what not limits even to exercise

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When this happens, the almost inevitable result is chaos or a dic-
tatorship.

As for limitations on government, self-restraint must be
expressed in some formal institutions. Democratic government is
inseparable from a constitutionalism which symbolizes the principle
that certain values are more important than the momentary possession
of power or of the immediate definition of righteousness. When the
mere possession of the tools of power confers legitimacy, opposition
will necessarily be treated as subversion or heresy. A key element
of any democratic system is the acceptance of limitation as on the
exercise of their power by those who are in control. And this limi-
tation must be understood not simply as an act of grace--as an enligh-
tened form of despotism--but as deriving from the nature of man
and from the proper function of government. Constitutionalism or
the limitation of governmental power is not in itself enough to
bring about democracy. But democracy cannot be achieved without it.

Historically, limitations on governmental power have been produced

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could have levied direct taxes or conscripted his subjects into the army.

Their very claim to divine-right limited the exercise of their authority. It remained for the French Revolution and its notion of the general will--implying the irrelevance of traditional restraints--to expand governmental power into areas heretofore not even imagined.

For this reason, the democracies which have been most successful have been those based on essentially aristocratic forms. Aristocracies by their very structure must oppose the preeminence of a single person and therefore absolutist rule. And, they are based on a concept of quality inconsistent with the excesses of egalitarian democracy. Without the self-restraint produced by such beliefs, democratic institutions can become the means for the most violent form of repression. The majority, by definition representing the people--may recognize no limits to the exercise of its rule and treat all dissent as sedition. At the same time, if democracy is to remain vital or even meaningful, the aristocratic concept can not remain the province of a minority. A democracy is true to itself only if the tradition of self-restraint becomes the conviction not simply of the ruling group but of a significant majority of society as well. The challenge to democracy--and not only in the

magnanimity of society, and not only in the
democracies, but also in the rest of the
universities, where the constitution of self-restrains
minority. A democracy is true to itself only if the tradition of self-restraint
even meaningful, the aristocratic concept can not remain the province of a
dissent as addition. At the same time, if democracy is to remain vital or
people--may recognize no limits to the exercise of its rule and treat all
most violent form of repression. The matterly definition representing the
same does not affect, democratic institutions can become the means for the
with the excesses of egalitarian democracy. Without the self-restraint pro-
ecesstutatute rule. And they are based on a concept of quality unconfinement
very structure must impose the preeminence of a single person and therefore
been those based on essentially aristocratic forms. Aristocratic forms, their
power into areasaretorefore not even imagined.

infringing the irrelevance of traditional restraints--to expand governmental
remained for the French Revolution and its notion of the 'maxim general will--
their very aim to divino-right limited the exercise of their authority. If
could have favored direct taxes or conscripted his subjects into the army.

III

new nations -- is whether an entire society can live by
were thought to be the virtue of
values which in previous centuries, only small minorities,
were thought to be capable of
A democracy that does not set
its sights this high is likely to fall prey to either con-
formity or dictatorship.

3. Legal Institutions: In a few countries a written constitution serves as the final arbiter of the permissible sphere of governmental action. Though the limitation on authority is more formal than in the traditional societies, it is produced by similar factors. Formal constitutional restraints have been effective only in societies with a well-established tradition of respect for legal forms. Where this respect has been lacking, constitutions have turned into a tool in the struggle for power. Far from being a means to restrain political power, they have become an expression of it.

Their standing is like that of any other law which can be altered by government. This has been the case in many countries of Latin America. It has also been the function of the many French constitutions since the Revolution.

countries of Latin America. It has also been the function
aftermath of French government. This has been the case in many
of its own constitutions.

Their standing is like that of such other laws which can be
to retain political power, they have an expression of it.
A tool of thePRIESTS to control the power of the state.
This has been the case in many
of its own constitutions.

It is produced by similar factors. Formal constitutional
authority is more formal than in the traditional societies,
such as Government action. Though the limitation on
autumn action serves as the final epitaph of the baneful
institution always has been effective only in societies with a well-
formed political structure.

3. **Formal institutions:** In a few countries a written con-
tent or constitution.

its aims this rig is likely to fall short of either con-
trary to the idea of a capable. A democracy that does not set
limits which in previous centuries only small minorities,
were thought to be the旨 of
new nations -- is whether an entire society can live by

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4. A Conviction that Politics Does Not Matter: Throughout the 19th century, the conviction was general that the primary function of government was to create a framework for the free play of the ultimately decisive economic forces. When government is viewed negatively, freedom comes to be seen as

Treehow comes to be seen as
economic forces. When Government is viewed negatively,
framework for the free play of the ultimately decisive
primary function of Government was to create a
the 13th century, the conviction was General that the
**¶. A Conviction that Politics Does Not Matter: Tyronepont**

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Formal constitutional prohibitions have proved empty in almost every new
nation with the possible exception of India. There x has been hardly
any greater hesitation to alter the constitutions of the new countries
there has been
than to amend their laws. Many provisions of the constitution of Ghana
can, for example, be changed by a simple majority. Finally the belief ...

can, for example, be caused by a simple majority. Limiting the period...
does not amend their laws. Many violations of the constitution of India
are greaterheit to after the constitutions of the new countries
with the possible exception of India. There was peace parly
between constitutional provisions have proved enough in most cases new
law

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experience of colonial rule. Frontiers--particularly in Africa--reflect the administrative convenience of the former colonial powers or the outcome of the struggle among themselves. Most of the new states therefore are in quest not only of independence but of identity. They lack a social consciousness or they are split up into competing groups, each with a highly developed sense of identity, often weak. The state is the primary unifying factor.

When social echesiveness is low the struggle for the control of authority becomes increasingly bitter. When government is the chief, sometimes the sole expression of national identity, opposition tends to be considered as treason. Many leaders of the new nations insist on the political parties are unnecessary in their countries because the national purpose is generally shared. Quite the reverse is likely to be the case. So far as these statements are not merely a desire to hold on to power--and it is well to remember that the notion that power might be relinquished voluntarily is both subtle and ancient--they indicate an awareness of the centripetal forces of the new nation. It may be difficult to imagine intermediary points between total rule and chaos.

When social schisms are deep, the question as to which group rules can be a matter of life and death. The rule of the majority is bearable only

[y]

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if the minority can hope to transform itself at some
point into a majority. Then minority does not have to
fear that the majority will use its power to destroy it.

The knowledge that any majority is temporary sets limits
to the exercise of authority or to the violence of
opposition. But where there exists a permanent majority,
democracy has a hollow ring to all other groups -- especially
when these groups have a strongly developed sense
of identity. Under those conditions the struggle for
power takes on the characteristics of a civil war.

These difficulties are magnified by the economic
conditions in the new countries and by the low level of
education. When the most elementary wants are not met,
liberty can easily appear as a useless abstraction. Though
democracy survived the deprivations of the 19th century
industrialism, expectations were not as high and totalitarian
alternatives unavailable. The future of democracy requires
that political freedom and economic progress do not appear as
antithetical.

antidotal

that political freedom and economic progress do not appear as alternatives, unavailable. The future of democracy requires industrialism, expectations were not so high and totalitarian democracy annulled the deprivations of him 10th century. Liberty can easily appear as a needless spasmation. Though education. When the most elementary wants are not met, conditions in the new countries and by the low level of these difficulties are magnified by the economic power takes on the characteristics of a civil war. Under those conditions the struggle for identity. When these groups have a strongly developed sense democracy has a hollow ring to all other groups -- especially opposition. But where there exists a permanent majority, to the exercise of authority on to the violence of the knowledge that any majority is temporarily sets limits learn that the majority will use the power to destroy it. Point into a majority. Then minority does not have to if the minority can hope to transform itself at some

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Equally worrisome is the general educational level of most of the emerging nations. Democracy originally was based on the assumption of a citizenry capable of judging political issues and of being persuaded by rational appeals. These notions are altered radically when the electorate has an illiteracy rate of 90 per cent. At a moment when the government plays a very large role and the issues are much more complicated than in the early stages of Western democracy, the ability to define these issues is extremely circumscribed because of its lack of sophistication on the part of both the leadership and the population. A premium is placed on propagandistic technique over substance. Demagogery is encouraged. The rewards are for mobilizing mass emotions. Many pressures make for the emergence of the totalitarian form of democracy: a Caesarism which mocks the maxim of consent of the governed because it manufactures consent by pressure or blackmail.

or preclude it.

Governed because it manufactures consent by pressure
a Caesarism which makes the maxim of consent of the
mobs for the emergence of the totalitarian form of democracy
are for modifying mass emotions. Many breaches make
over apastance. Demagogery is encomiaged. The remnant
the population. A minimum on probablistic techniques
of sobriation on the basis of both the leadership and
issues is extremely circumscribed because of flux and
fluctuations of Western democracy, the ability to define those
are more complicated than in the early
the Government plays a~~argue~~ role and the issues
has an inefficiency rate of 20 per cent. At this moment when
these notions are offered radically when the electorate
political issues and of point bemanned by national abbeys.
pased on the assumption of a citizenry capable of judging
most of the emerging nations. Democracy originally was
Equally worksome is the General constitutional level of

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former imperial powers in particular -- or those identified with them
in the eyes of the new nations -- have to behave with restraint, lest
preferred assistance be construed as an attempt to reestablish a new and
subtler form of control. Nevertheless, we delude ourselves if we believe
that, as the leading nation in the free world, we do not affect
other countries either by acts of omission or of commission. Economic
assistance is a form of intervention and, by the claims of those who
effect on the impact of economic evolution, a kind of political manipulation.

Moreover, while direct pressure would undeniably be
if resented, ... ... ... ... ...

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If released, ... ... ... ... ... Moreover, while direct broadeauism might conceivably be
on the impact of economic evolution, a kind of political manipulation,
such as a form of intervention end, by the claims of those who
other countries either put acts of omission or of commission. Economic
that, as the leading nation xxx in the free world, we do not affect
any other form of control. Nevertheless, we decline ourself if we believe
brothered assistance be construed as an attempt to reenact a new and
in the case of the new nations -- have to pertain with restraint, just
former imperial powers in particular -- or those identified with them

III-24

of imperial rule. The imperial powers imported into the colonial areas the twin doctrines of rational administration and popular participation in government which ultimately raised the very issue of their "foreignness." At the same time, they provided education in European universities for a small but able group of the indigenous populations which became committed to the values of human dignity, popular participation in government and economic and social progress-- and these very values were then invoked to overthrow colonialism.

d
The fact that almost all the leaders of the independence movements were educated in the countries against whose rule they later rebelled and that almost invariably they fought the imperial powers in the name of the principles learned from them accounts in part for the weakness of the resistance, especially in British territories.

It also explains why the anti-colonial upheaval has been most active where European rule was most enlightened and not where it was most oppressive. Where Europeans ruled by the mere fact of having seized power and where the tradition of the .... .... ....

["power and where the tradition of the\nobedience. Where Europeans ruled by the mere fact of having seized\nwhere European rule was most enlightened and not where it was most\nIt also explains why the anti-colonial upheaval has been most active\nthe weakness of the resistance, especially in British territories.\nin the name of the principles learned from them accounts in part for\nrepealed and that almost invariably they fought the imperial powers\nments were educated in the countries against whose rule they later\nThe fact that almost all the leaders of the independence move-\nand these very values were then invoked to overrule colonialism.\nbooster participation in Government and economic and social progress--\nboominations which became committed to the values of human dignity.\nEuropean universities for a small but able group of the indigenous\nof their "foreignness.\" At the same time, they provided education in\nparticipation in Government which ultimately raised the very issue\nareas the twin doctrines of rational administration and belliger-\nof imperial rule. The imperial powers imported into the colonial", "III-34"]

Enlightenment was weakest in the imperial center -- as for example in the Portuguese territories -- the independence movements have been most effective. Where an effort was made to educate the local population in the doctrines of the West, opposition to imperial rule was most persistent. It was the moral success of the imperial powers which undermined their political rule.

Most of the new nations emerged into independence with con- stitutions in the Western world and a political system drawn from the European example. The right of man, the transcendant importance of human dignity, even the necessity of a party system, were unquestioningly accepted. The crises in many nations have arisen because it has not proved possible to transplant institutions and ideas quite so literally. It has become apparent that the seeming spontaneity of Western institutions -- in any case probably exaggerated in the eyes of the colonial peoples -- was the product of a long historical development. As a result, values which had seemed self-evident only a decade ago have become tarnished or have

become more incantations to justify the exercise of arbitrary power.

The maxims of the origins of independence have been submerged in the expedients of day-to-day affairs, or in the frustration of finding the gap between expectation and reality widening instead of narrowing.

While the principles of the Enlightenment are still being affirmed, doubt has arisen about their relevance to the conditions of the new nations. The problem has been made more difficult in Asia, at least, as the generation which struggled for independence has been replaced by a leadership group less familiar with Western values and less committed to them. The easy conclusion is that the early enthusiasm for the values of liberty was a misunderstandings that they have no relevance to the problems of the new nations.

But such a view is a counsel of despair. To be sure, in societies rent by social and cultural schisms, Western institutions are sometimes unworkable. For transitional periods, some form of

are sometimes unworkable. For transitional periods, some form of
accretive rent, political and cultural elements, Western institutions
But such a view is a counsel of despair. To be sure, in
nations.

Attending that they have no relevance to the problems of the new
the early entanglements for the values of liberty was a standard-
values and less committed to them. The easy conclusion is that
less been replaced by a leaderless group less familiar with Western
Yates, at least, as the generation which arranged for independence
at the new nations. The problem has been made more difficult in
tried, doubt has arisen about their relevance to the conditions
While the principles of the Enlightenment are still being at-
risk.

The gap between expectation and reality widening increased
the exponents of dah-footy all around at the transition of finding
The maxims of the origins of independence have been underscored in
become more incantations to justify the exercise of arbitrary power.

III - 27

authoritarian rule may be inevitable as a last resort. But where it is --
and it is well to remember that this so-called inevitability is often
a reflection of the x lack of vitality of democratic ideas -- a great
deal depends on the attitude with which it is accepted, whether as a
regrettable necessity or as desirable because efficient. At the least,
every effort should be made to maintain the vitality of the principle
of freedom which animated the struggle for independence. Just as colonialism
was ultimately defeated by the values to which it paid lip service, so
the affirmation of the values of human dignity and liberty may in time
prove inconsistent with despotic urle. A cult of efficiency as the ul-
timate value, an obsession with economic progress as the primary stan-
dard, will mean the perpetuation and strengthening of all absolutism
through the very process of industrialization.

First, will mean theuperabation and strengthening of all specific
climate air, an operation with economic progress as the primarily at-
tribute inconsistent with geologic time. A sort of efficiency as the un-
less ultimately released by the air to which it had lived service, so
was ultimately released by the air to which it had lived service, so
of freedom which animated the attitude for independence, that as colonial
early effort should be made to maintain the vitality of the branch of
retrospective necessity on a degree because efficient. At the least,
degradation on the attitude with which it is accepted, whether as a
a reflection of the lack of activity of democratic ideas — a great
and it is well so remember that the so-called inaptitude is often
authoritative rule may be inevitable as a last resort. But where it is —

III - 31

III - 32

believe that the conversion of the colonial areas to the values of
the Enlightenment was due entirely to the intrinsic merit of the ideas
involved. Western technology and political theory triumphed not only
because of their own inherent attractiveness. Their success was also
due to the over-all performance of the countries advocating them. The
imperial power might be disliked, perhaps even hated, but it was also
respected. It seemed to represent power, purpose and progress. The
economic and scientific preeminence of the West made it easy to see a
causal connection between its political institutions and its achievements
in other spheres. This is not to say that the values of political ax
liberty and human dignity were not attractive in themselves; it states
that their wide and rapid acceptance in the colonial areas owed a considerable
debt to the success of their proponents.

Many of these conditions have fundamentally altered. The rate
of material progress of the Soviet system has been faster than ours in
too many fields. Starting from a position of substantial inferiority in
almost all areas, the Soviet Union has caught up with and surpassed us

III - 34

purpose.

At the same time, important as is the impact of our performance on the future course of the uncommitted areas, we cannot derive our mo-tive force for our actions from such consideration,⁵ alone or even pri-marily. We are not putting on a play for the benefit of a foreign au-dience. The argument that we must solve the race problem in America because of the impact of segregation on the mind of Africa misstates our proper priority. We must overcome discrimination above all because of its impact on the mind and values of America.

Once we have injected more dynamism into our over-all per-formance, we can address ourselves with greater confidence to the prob-lem of "political aid". This is not to say, of course, that our eco-nomic assistance programs will decline in significance. There is no doubt that our goal must be to help the new nations reach the point of self-sustaining economic growth. This requires economic assistance on a substantially larger scale than in the past decade. Indeed, assistance below the amount required to generate growth may do no more than prevent

III-36

serious about promoting economic development in the new nations--as we must be--we have to be serious also about the political structure without which that development is impossible and which will shape the future of the country concerned.

For example, exchange of persons programs could improve not only the technical competence of the participants but also their commitment to democratic values; young Americans might be motivated to spend some years of service in the underdeveloped regions. Ideas have never spread automatically and rarely because of their inherent per-suasiveness. There has generally been required a group "willing to bear witness." One of the dilemmas of democracy all over the world is that it has not succeeded nearly well enough in enlisting the idealism of the young generation. There are all too few willing to suffer or perhaps even sacrifice themselves on behalf of political liberty--except, ironically enough, in the countries of Eastern Europe where the deprivation of freedom has poignantly demonstrated its significance.

The details of such programs would have to be carefully studied.

At this time, the need is above all for a commitment to them and a recognition that we have before us a major challenge of political construction.

construction.

recognition that he gave before an major challenge of political
At this time, the need is above all for a commitment to them and a

its significance.

Europe where the deprivation of freedom has profoundly demonstrated
liberty--except, ironically enough, in the countries of Eastern
Europe or perhaps even sacrifice themselves on penalty of political
idealism of the Young Generation. There are all too few willing to
be that it has not succeeded nearly well enough in emulating the
past witness." One of the differences of democracy all over the world
suspicion. There has generally been required a strong "willing to
never spread automatically and rarely because of their inherent her-
some years of service in the underdeveloped regions. Ideas have
to democratic airlines: Young Americans might be motivated to absorb
the technical competence of the participants put also their commitment
for example, exchange of benevolent programs could improve not only
future of the country concerned.

without which that development is impossible and which will sap the
we must be--we have to be serious also apart the political structure
serious apart promoting economic development in the new nations--as

III-98

37

This will not be a simple task. For all the goodwill, there
are in the American cultural mode major obstacles to understanding
the revolution of our time and in contributing a sense of direction
to it.

There are at least three reasons for this state of affairs. First, the
psychological problem of understanding the nature of revolutionary leader-
ship already mentioned is reinforced by a tendency to think of man as largely
motivated by economic considerations. Nothing seems more natural than to
"get ahead in the world" by which we generally mean material advancement.

The "natural" course of action for a Castro or a Nasser to follow, it
seems to us, is to concentrate on the economic development of their country.

We fail to give enough attention to the fact that those who seek material
advancement never enter revolutionary movements during their period of
struggle. What makes the deprivation and hazard of the early days of
a revolutionary movement supportable is the prospect not of wealth but
of power. The same qualities which cause a Castro or a Nasser to appear
"wild men" by our standards also make them effective revolutionary leaders.

It is therefore generally useless to appeal to this type of revolutionary
to dedicate himself to running the domestic affairs of his country. Were
Castro to place pre-eminent stress on Cuba's economic development, he
would have to engage in detailed, to him no doubt boring, administrative
measures. The best he could hope for would be to head a small, progressive
country--perhaps a Switzerland of the Caribbean. Compared with leading
a revolution throughout Latin America, this goal would appear to him
trivial, indeed unreal.

The second factor is a corollary of the first. We consider an appeal
to empirical reality a conclusive argument. We therefore find it difficult
to follow the reasoning of many of the leaders of new countries who erect
elaborate verbal structures on the basis of unproven assumptions or the
Communist method of repeating slogans as if the mere act of repetition
could
would make them come true. When Castro harangues crowds for four hours,
we are prone to smile with an attitude of superiority. We tend to refute
Communist charges by "proving" the lack of correspondence of their statements
with empirical reality.

with empirical reality.

Communist charges by "proving" the lack of correspondence of their statements
we are prone to smile with an attitude of superiority. We tend to repute
we should make them come true. When Castro parades crowds for four hours,
could

Communist method of repeating slogans as if the mere set of repetition
elaborate verbal structures on the basis of unproven assumptions or the
to follow the reasoning of many of the leaders of new countries who erect
to empirical reality a conclusive argument. We therefore find it difficult
The second factor is a corollary of the first. We consider an appeal
trivial, indeed unreal.

a revolution throughout Latin America, this goal would appear to him
country--perhaps a Switzerland of the Carribean. Compared with leading
measures. The best he could hope for would be to head a small, progressive
would have to engage in detailed, to him no doubt boring, administrative
Castro to place pre-eminent stress on Cuba's economic development, he
to dedicate himself to running the domestic affairs of his country. Were
It is therefore generally useless to appeal to this type of revolutionary

modes causes us to appear selfish, cold, even supercilious, because the
part of existence which is most meaningful to many outside the West is
sometimes not even recognized as significant by us.

All of this suggests that the revolutionary leaders of our time fill above all a spiritual void. Even Communism has made many more converts through the theological quality of Marxism than through the materialistic aspect on which it prides itself. This explains the appeal of Communism among university students all over the world, despite the fact that this group has most opportunity to note its logical inconsistencies or the discrepancy between profession and reality. This makes comprehensible the acceptance in so many quarters of the sterile Communist justifications, namely that a Communist state being owned by the people is by definition just, however repressive, or that a socialist state, having however bellicose, is really serving the cause of peace. The intellectual content of the Communist appeal may be shallow. But in the absence of a real alternative it has a clear field.

Of course, the United States cannot match the demagogery of a
Castro or the ruthless propagandistic manipulations of Communist leaders

Castro or the nungee propagandistic manipulations of Communist leaders
Of course, the United States cannot match the demagogery of a
in the absence of a real alternative it has a clear field.

The intellectual content of the Communist appeal may be shallow. But
state, making however pellicsa, is really serving the cause of peace.
people is a definition that, however repressive, or that a socialist
municipal legislation, namely that a Communist state being owned by the
comprehensive acceptance in so many quarters of the sterile Com-
terences or the discrepancy between propaganda and reality. This makes
fact that this group has met opportunity to note its logical incompat-
of Communism among university students all over the world, despite the
materialistic aspect on which it bridges itself. This explains the appeal
to convert through the theological duality of Marxism than through the
time till spoke all a spiritual void. Even Communism has made many more
VII of this suggests that the revolutionary leaders of on-
sometimes not even recognized as significant by us.

part of existence which is most meaningful to many outside the West is
mores causes us to abhor aelfish, cold, evenmerciless, because the

nor should it seek to do so. We can compete only in terms of *our* values and *our* beliefs. But it is not inherent in our values (or consider the contest for the minds of men as primarily a problem of salesmanship or to deal with the contemporary revolution, if at all, primarily as an economic phenomenon. Nothing we do can appeal ideologically to a Castro or to a dedicated Communist. But we can appeal to the millions on whose hopes and aspirations totalitarianism feeds. The crude interpretation of the NewTONIAN view of reality is already discarded in the West by its most sensitive thinkers. Domestically, many thoughtful observers are questioning the cult of productivity for its own sake.

We therefore have come a long way toward the recognition of the importance of the intangible factors on which the future political relationships of the world may well depend. As we gain in compassion and understanding, there is every prospect that we can infuse the values of human dignity and freedom with enough vitality so that the younger generation all over the world will feel obliged to come to grips with them emotionally and intellectually. The argument that this kind of spiritual elan is
beyond the capability of democracy is equivalent to saying that democracy is doomed.

4. The New Countries and International Relations

The problems of political and economic development would be difficult enough in their own right. They are complicated by the fact that the new nations find themselves drawn into international affairs to an unprecedented degree. While building a state and seeking to realize the most elementary aspirations of their people, they are being wooed, asked to form judgments or to assume international responsibilities. Whether they have joined political or military groupings or remained neutral, the contest for their favor has continued to rage. The result has been a diversion of the energies of the new states and a demoralization of international relations.

The United States approach to the new nations has not helped matters. As in most other fields of policy we have been going from one extreme to the other. For a time we acted as if the only political significance of the new nations was as potential military allies in the Cold War. The quest for neutrality was officially condemned. Great efforts were made to induce new nations to join security pacts. Within the space of a few years this policy has been replaced by its precise opposite.