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March 18, 1985

Ms. Chris Vick
KISSINGER ASSOCIATES
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New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Chris:

Enclosed please find the edited copy of Dr. Kissinger's interview with Yomiuri, which is for release next Sunday, March 24.

Would you please get back to Jack Burby, L.A. Times Editorial Editor, 213-972-7946, with Dr. Kissinger's approval as soon as possible. We need to send out the final copy to the Kissinger international clients tomorrow.

Thanks for your help.

JEL/bb
encl.

P.S. If you have approval early tomorrow morning, you can always call us and we'll relay the message.

SJESSE AND BETH: THIS VERSION TO BE SENT TO KISSINGER'S OFFICE FOR HIS APPROVAL.<

CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased, or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.<

< HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW<

For release Sunday, March 24, 1985<

* * *

As part of a contract with the Los Angeles Times Syndicate to produce ten articles a year for newspapers and other periodicals around the world, Kissinger agreed to be available for interviews. He receives no extra compensation for the interviews.<

* * *

In a wide-ranging interview conducted by U.S. correspondents for the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, Dr. Henry Kissinger gave his views on the changes in Soviet leadership, arms control talks, U.S.-Japanese trade relations, Central America, China and the Korean peninsula. The correspondents were Akitaka Hirata from Yomiuri's New York bureau and Yasuo Suzuki from the newspaper's Washington's bureau.<

Q. We would like first to discuss the new Soviet leadership. Do you expect significant changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies to emerge from the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev? He is reported to be an impatient seeker of economic change. How do you evaluate the fact that, compared with recent Soviet leaders, he is younger, better educated and perhaps more open-minded about the outside world?"

A. First of all, I would say he is certainly better educated. He's certainly younger than the last two leaders, although only three years younger than Brezhnev, who was 57 when he became general secretary, and a little older than Khrushchev when he became general secretary. So we have to keep a sense of perspective.<

Whether he is more open-minded about the outside world, we really don't know. We have now had three Soviet leaders in the last three years. Each time the new leader came in, it was alleged that he was more accessible than his predecessor. None of the others was in office long enough to prove it one way or the other, but I think it is very dangerous to base policy with the Soviet Union on purely psychological assessments of the leaders. It is dangerous, first, because the assessment may be wrong, but it is also dangerous because it may remove any serious Soviet incentives for discussion. If the Soviet Union gets the idea that simply because a man is more urbane or friendlier in tone, everybody else will take a great sigh

of relief. Then they can avoid coming to grips with the fundamental problem.<

What is the fundamental problem? The Soviets have to make up their mind whether they want to have a genuine coexistence or whether they will continue to conduct a policy whose objective consequence is to try to undermine the equilibrium of the non-Communist world. If they make the positive decision, we should meet them at least halfway. But we have to convey to them that a serious decision has to be made and that we cannot simply be bought off by a friendlier tone and an elegant wife. That is the key issue.<

Q. Why did they choose a younger leader this time?<

A. If you look at the history of Soviet successions, it has always been the case that in order to become general secretary you must be one of the party secretaries and you must be on the Politburo. There were only two candidates who met those qualifications: Romanov and Gorbachev. Gorbachev obviously has the wider experience of the two and probably the easier personality from everybody's point of view. That's one reason. Secondly, they have now experienced two successions that did not last very long. They must have concluded that to have yet another change very quickly might produce enormous stagnation in the Soviet system. So they had the choice between taking either a man from the generation now in its 70s or a man below 65. In the generation now in its 70s, they ran the inherent risk of repeating the Andropov and Chernenko experience. And from that group, really only Gromyko could have been a plausible leader. A leader under age 65 really could be only Romanov or Gorbachev, and Gorbachev clearly was the front runner for a long time.<

Q. Will Gromyko play a greater role in the coming years?<

A. It's hard for me to imagine Gromyko playing a greater role than he has played. I think Gromyko will be the dominant figure in foreign policy. He's the only member of the Politburo who has any experience in foreign policy and he is always marvelously well prepared. On the other hand he is 77 years old. So I would think that for two or three years he will play a very important role. But, as he is, strong as he seems, when a political figure approaches 80 one has to think of the fact that he's reaching the physical limits at which political leaders usually have functioned.<

Q. Similar, then, to the role that Alexi N. Kosygin played when Brezhnev appeared on the Soviet scene and before Brezhnev grasped foreign policy issues?<

A. Most certainly. When Brezhnev took over in 1964, the representative figure for foreign policy was Kosygin. All A level communications to our government were signed by Kosygin during the Johnson Administration. They were still signed by Kosygin in the first two years of the Nixon period. This is six years. For a man of 77 to serve six years -- that would really be a long time. So I would think that we are seeing the end of the Gromyko period. I'm not saying this as a criticism of Gromyko, for whose competence I have very high regard. I'm simply saying it as a fact of nature. Gorbachev obviously will -- if he survives other challenges -- outlast Gromyko.<

Q. As foreign correspondents in your country, we sense

expectations of better relations rising in the United States, and not just in the United States.<

A. I'm very worried by this. I believe that, objectively considered, there should be a considerable opportunity to make progress in East-West negotiations. The Soviet Union has a succession problem that goes beyond Gorbachev, in that five members of the Politburo are 70 years old or older. Secondly, the Politburo is undermanned, so that three or four people, maybe more, will have to be added to it. It would be in character to change some of the regional secretaries. All of this will take time.<

Secondly, the Soviet Union clearly has a major economic problem, as Gorbachev said both in his eulogy and in his inaugural statement. Sooner or later, they have to face the same question that China did, namely, can you run a modern economy by central planning? I think they will find the answer is "no." They will find that there are only two answers available to them, either greater discipline and repression or greater incentives. I think the rational solution is greater incentives. That means they need some period of adjustment domestically.<

And then there are the familiar problems of Poland, of Afghanistan, of the changing composition of the Soviet population. For us in the industrial democracies, the challenge is to make sure that the change that this period of transition, results in some fundamental adaptations in international affairs, and that the time is not simply used up by psychological exercises of friendlier tone. It is even in the Soviet interest that this occur, because sooner or later one of these many crises in the world could explode and then we will all be in great difficulties.<

So we can be hopeful, of course, but many of the statements one reads create the impression that the change has already occurred. The change has not yet occurred. An energetic younger Soviet leader pursuing Stalinist policies is worse for us than an invalid Soviet leader. We must hope that a younger energetic Soviet leader will pursue more conciliatory policies.<

Q. We understand that, from time to time, you see President Reagan, as you did at lunch recently. What did you suggest that he do with regard to Soviet policy?<

A. I never discuss my conversations with the President. But it is reasonable to assume that my views expressed privately are not different from my views expressed publicly, except that they may be more detailed in private.<

Q. Was the President right to invite Gorbachev to the United States, and how do you think Gorbachev will respond?<

A. Well, he made that offer before our lunch. And I was not asked my opinion. I would not have made that offer. I am not opposed to a summit meeting but I think a summit meeting should occur when there is some demonstrated progress in the relationship, or at a minimum when we know the nature of the deadlock and we know the nature of the decisions that have to be made to break the deadlock.<

It is very dangerous for heads of government to meet with a real deadhand, more dangerous for heads of state, when they have no idea what

either of them is going to say, because if they meet and fail to agree, you have no other recourse and it is hard to imagine how they would then ever find a way to agree.

Q. May I change, move to another subject about --<

K. Could you stop for one minute? I have to make one phone call before 5 o'clock.<

* * *<

Q. Can we turn to arms control. Negotiations have just started and there is not much substance, but how are we to look at it? Is it important just for the fact that that talks started after all, or is it too early to tell?<

A. It's very important that it started. Let us remember, the Soviet Union said about 18 months ago that if we deployed intermediate range missiles in Europe there would be no further discussion and they walked out of the existing talks. In fact, now they have returned to these talks and they have agreed to discuss intermediate range missiles. In the past they took the position that the only thing to talk about was our not deploying any missiles. So that is very important.<

Now we are repeating the same thing with strategic defense. It is very important to understand what the issues are, because there seems to be total confusion. President Reagan has a research program of about $30 billion. President Carter had a research program of $19 billion. So we're talking about a difference of $11 billion. The Soviet Union has had a research program of missile defense for 10 years. I don't want to estimate how much it cost, but certainly more than $30 billion. They are technologically behind us, but that is a result of their economy -- not of their intentions. So what exactly is the problem? They cannot ask us to stop our research since there's no way of verifying that, especially since I'm sure they will not stop their research. They are asking us to observe the ABM treaty, and we have. They have built a radar the size of three football fields, which is a clear violation of the agreement. They built it over a period of six years, and they must have known it would be discovered. So it is a direct challenge to the agreement.<

So, it's not clear to me what the argument is about. We should take the position, the United States should say that we are prepared to reduce our offensive weapons to much lower levels, that we are prepared to agree now to deploy no more defensive weapons than are consistent with a very low level of offensive weapons. In other words, very few. And then we can relate the size of the defensive deployment to the size of the offensive deployment.<

I do not understand why it helps arms control or protects human life to say that you can have defenses against airplanes but you cannot have defenses against missiles, especially when their side has been experimenting with defensive weapons and building radars against missiles.<

Q. How about the general feeling of support for the United States position among the allies?<

A. I think those of our allies who support us are absolutely on the right course. To the extent that the United States is capable of protecting part of its population or part of its missile force, it can contribute more effectively to

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the defense of its allies. And to the extent that we can convince the Soviets that stability depends on a balance between offensive and defensive forces, we will contribute to arms control.weg

Q. To move the subject closer to home for us, the U.S. economy has recovered remarkably, but the United States still has a huge trade deficit. What should be the U.S. strategy to reduce the deficit, especially the one with Japan? How long do you see the U.S. dollar remaining so strong?<

A. Of course, part of the reason for the deficit is the strong dollar, which makes it more difficult for our exporters to compete. I'm speaking about the trade deficit. I believe that it is unrealistic to expect that the dollar will remain strong forever. No currency has ever done that. And sooner or later it will decline. How soon that happens, nobody knows. Every year there are predictions that it will decline by 20 percent and it has not happened. And maybe part of the reason it hasn't happened is that of all of the countries that are open to foreign investment, the United States looks the safest. Japan would be safe, but it doesn't take much foreign investment. That is a reality.<

Now, what will be the American strategy? I have to tell you I have a long and very friendly association with Japan and I have very many close Japanese friends and I visit Japan I think more often than almost any other country. But there is now in our industrial community a growing resentment; justified or not, it is a fact. And I fear there is a rise of protectionism. And something should be done before it gets out of control. I believe our friendship and alliance and trade relations with Japan are among the very most important relationships in the world for the United States. But we should preserve them before there is a crisis.<

Q. What is the real cause of that resentment? Even the Japanese Americans we talk to, even those who know Japan very well, resent, as you say, the trade situation with Japan.<

A. I would not say everybody feels that way. I don't resent Japan, but then I'm not an exporter, I'm not a businessman. I think some causes are cultural. When there's a dialogue between the United States and the Japanese minister, it is very difficult for the Japanese minister by the nature of his culture to say no. Therefore he will say something polite. Anybody who knows Japan will know that when a Japanese says something polite, that does not necessarily mean that it is concrete or that he will necessarily do anything. And between Japanese, the other party would understand that this means probably very little will happen.<

But an American going home thinks that the Japanese agreed with him. Then nothing happens. And he thinks the Japanese may have deceived him or may have been overruled. I would not think the Japanese had deceived him -- I would think the Japanese had followed his cultural pattern of avoiding a decision. But our businessmen are not experts on Japanese culture. I think this is one problem.<

Secondly, your political system is such that there are many people with great influence who have no formal position,

like the faction leaders in the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party). Our people always talk to specific ministers, who in a way represent factions in addition to the cabinet. That is not fully understood. Third, you operate by consensus. So even with good intentions on the part of individual Japanese, if they cannot bring their colleagues with them there will be no action. Fourth, it seems to me to be very difficult in Japan to take a very long range decision, that you prefer to wait for a complete issue to arise. And on the other hand our people need to plan. So I'm not saying the fault is entirely on the Japanese side. I am saying that gradually there builds up a feeling that as long as we have a good economy, a strong economy, there's no fundamental problem. But if the economy weakened, and you have to expect sooner or later that will happen, then we could see strong protectionism in this country, and then it will be too late.<

Q. How do you evaluate the efforts of Prime Minister Nakasone and his government in the field of international diplomacy?<

A. Of course, Prime Minister Nakasone was a student of mine at one point, and even more important he's a good friend. I have the highest regard for Prime Minister Nakasone. I evaluate his efforts very positively. He has played a very constructive role. He has a very good relationship with the United States and he has played a very positive role in relation to other parts of the world. I want to make it clear that he is doing that on his own merit, not because 30 years ago he was a student of mine.<

Q. On one hand there is resentment. On the other hand Japanese are told that our relations with the United States are good. How do we reconcile those positions?<

A. I think that what we should do between Japan and the United States is to have a fundamental review of our economic relations. The political relations are excellent, and you know we keep each other informed, so we have excellent political relations. We should have a review of our economic relations and try to plan five or ten years ahead so that we avoid the present situation which is as follows: An American industry gets into trouble because of Japanese competition. It then goes to the Congress or to the President. Our government then pressures you to have restraints, and to let in more goods. That leads immediately to a controversy. We should try to anticipate problems. We cannot expect you to be less efficient than you are and where you are very competitive we have to pay the price for it. But our business people also must have an assurance that where they are competitive, they will be given some chance.<

Q. If Japan does nothing, what will happen, and when?<

A. I think if Japan doesn't do anything, then the next time the business cycle turns down I would think it possible that there would be some protectionist legislation in the Congress, maybe supported by if not this administration, another administration.<

Q. Moving to China. To what extent do you think China will pursue its pragmatic policy in both the economy and international affairs? Do you think China will continue its

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cooperative stance with the United States and Japan?<

A. I think that China will, under its present leadership, certainly pursue its pragmatic course. It would require a change not just of leadership but of cadre to bring about a change in the pragmatic course. Is it possible for this to happen? It doesn't look so from the outside, but on the other hand there have been other changes in China that were unexpected. I'm not expecting it; I don't totally exclude it; but I don't anticipate it. In foreign policy? Yes, I think China will pursue a realistic policy. It did so even under Mao. Nothing can shorten the frontier between China and the Soviet Union. And we don't really have very active security cooperation. We have some parallel policies in the foreign affairs, without any formal understanding, I have always believed, as an individual, that the independence and territorial integrity of China is a fundamental American interest -- not as a favor to China and not as a favor China does for us, but for the balance of power in Asia and in the world. This is a fact. We don't need an agreement for that. And because it is a fact I think the Chinese will also keep this in mind in their foreign policy. So I expect the foreign policy of China will be very steady because they are very careful students.<

Q. What does your experience tell you about a seeming improvement of relations between China and the Soviet Union? Is it worrisome?<

A. No. I think we should be relaxed. China broke with the Soviet Union not as a favor to us; in fact, we didn't even understand it was going on. They did it for their own reasons. As long as they are concerned about their independence and their territorial integrity, they will not get so close to the Soviet Union as to lose American or, for that matter, Japanese interests in their future. Short of this, it is entirely up to them what they do. They after all have a tradition of 3,000 years of conducting their own affairs, and I'm perfectly relaxed. I think we should express no opinion, we should show no concern, and we should let them do what they think is appropriate because there are limits that geography, history, and the national interest impose. They don't need our advice on that.<

Q. About Central America -- do you see, in the next few months or years, any drastic improvement in that area in terms of the U.S.-Nicaraguan and U.S.-Cuban relations?<

A. I don't think we can tell for a year. If we can come to a fundamental agreement with Nicaragua this year or next year, then of course there will be an improvement and that may even affect Cuba, because it couldn't happen without Cuba. But I think at this moment one cannot tell.<

Q. Is it outrageous to think of a tradeoff -- Afghanistan and Nicaragua?<

A. No. That's not possible.<

Q. It's incredible?<

K. We cannot do that.<

Q. Why?<

A. We cannot say that we can just march into Nicaragua because the Soviet Union gave us their permission. We have

certain interests in Nicaragua. Nor can we say that the future of Afghanistan is of no interest to us. We cannot establish the principle that the Soviet Union can just occupy any country they want. We can say that they can have ~~its~~ neutral, they can have it demilitarized, or they can have any restriction that affects their security, -- that is of no concern to the United States. But we cannot say, ''Go ahead and occupy it.'' And we should not ask for ourselves the right to occupy other countries. [<

Afghanistan.

Q. We will have a Bonn summit coming in May. Do you see anything different coming from this one than came from earlier summits?<

A. I really don't. There is a pattern that has been set now and I think the procedures make it very difficult. You know, what I think would be interesting is if the summit discussed the future of energy in the world and the future of trade relations in the world, if they picked one or two topics and concentrated on those and had some good staff work done ahead of time. But they would have to change all the existing procedures. [<

Q. About the Korean peninsula -- what is the state of Korean independence? Is the situation stable?<

A. The North Korean government is, at least for Americans, very difficult to understand. For example, I thought that they would be very active in trying to prevent the IMF meeting this year in Seoul and the Asian games next year and of course the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988. And they haven't really done anything very aggressive as yet. So if things continue as they are now, then relations between North and South Korea are relatively stable. Internally in South Korea, a certain evolution is going on, but that can have beneficial consequences and it has not led to any loss of political stability. So at this moment the Korean peninsula appears quite stable. [<

Q. Won't having the Olympic Games in Seoul make North Korea feel psychologically more isolated? Is it necessary to take that into consideration?<

A. I think that we have done so. The United States has repeatedly said it is willing to talk to North Korea as long as South Korea is present. We have also asked for China to be present. In my view, it is not absolutely essential that China be present but it is essential that South Korea be the major partner. We cannot give the impression that we are negotiating about the future of Korea over the head of South Korea. [<

Q. But isn't it the time to do something about the Korean peninsula? Or do you think the status quo is to be preferred?<

A. The status quo cannot be changed very quickly. And I believe what much of North Korea is doing is psychological maneuvering. And after all they also can make a move. So I think the present situation is tolerable; it's not the ideal one. [<

Q. Do you plan to visit Japan soon?<

A. I'm going to be in Japan early in July for three or four days, and I probably will go to Korea also at that time.

I plan to go to Japan because the Aspen Institute is having a meeting there of its board of trustees and I am on that board. I plan to use that opportunity to renew acquaintances with my Japanese friends.<

Q. This may be presumptuous, but we hear it said often in the United States that President Reagan would like to have what you might call a second Henry Kissinger to help open communications with the East, and especially with the Soviet Union. Would you take that job if you were asked?<

A. My basic position is that I can play my most useful role as an advisor position, as I do now. Whenever the President wants to see me or the Secretary of State wants to see me, I'm always ready to go to Washington. If they want me to do a very limited assignment of a few days or a week, I'm ready to do it. But to undertake a continuing responsibility, I would not think it's desirable and I would not expect to accept that.<

Q. Thank you very much Dr. Kissinger.<

(c) 1985, Los Angeles Times Syndicate