Newsday

Harry F. Guggenheim, President and Editor in Chief
Bill Moyers, Publisher
Joseph P. Albright, Washington Bureau Chief

November 18, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Henry:

I thought you might like to see a copy of the
proofs of my series on the President. These rather
large documents are what Newsday's Syndicate Service
sends out to other papers around the country. The
series ran in Newsday October 21-24.

Thanks for your help.

MS/mb

Home Office: 550 Stewart Avenue, Garden City, Long Island, New York, 11530; Telephone: 516-741-1234
Washington Bureau: 621 National Press Building, Washington, D.C., 20004; Telephone: 202-393-6686

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEC 3 1970

Dear Dr. Henderson:

Thank you for sending me the August/Septem-
ber issue "War/Peace" with your article on
Korea. I was most interested to read what
you have to say on the subject and have passed
it on to my staff.

I was pleased to hear from you after such a
long time and hope that all is going well with
you.

Dr. Gregory Henderson
Acting Director, Edward R. Murrow Center
Tufts University
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Medford, Massachusetts 02155

jdprkkx
jlp:12/30/70 1/70

MEDFORD

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

MASSACHUSETTS 02155

November 24

Dear Dr. Kissinger

The attached article on the subject we occasionally explored together back at Harvard presents some new views on Korea. Both Koreas are dynamic; they are not likely long to keep still.

The interesting thing about this article has been the unexpected response I have received from Koreans. I had thought this would be unfavorable. It has been without exception favorable. (The ROK Embassy won't like it but has so far kept silence.) This indicates to me that a hitherto unsuspected gap exists between what younger South Koreans believe and what they are allowed to say.

It is, in fact, at the urging of a number of these Koreans, now teaching in our universities, that I forward this article for the consideration of yourself and your harried staff.

With best personal regards,

THIS MONTH

Korea: Half-Forgotten Powderkeg

In our lead article Korea: Can Cold War Ground Thaw?, Gregory Henderson portrays the situation in Korea today as being far more dangerous than it was when war broke out there in 1950 because of the massive build-ups of troops and armaments that have taken place on both sides of the truce line. "The fundamental question in Korea remains unification," he says, but "the first business must be more modest: to reduce an awesome tension." The author proposes several steps that the U.N., the superpowers, Seoul and Pyongyang should take to cool the potential powderkeg. The article was written before South Korea's President Park Chung-hee made a speech, just as we were going to press, in which he made proposals for peaceful reunification, based on North Korea's renunciation of force and acceptance of the U.N.'s authority in overseeing reunification procedures.

The cover, by Appelbaum & Curtis, was designed from a United Nations photograph (from the U.S. Army) taken in 1951, showing an approach to the 38th parallel, which divided Korea before 1950 and which approximated the armistice line settled on in 1953 after three years of war.

Headlines on arms control have lately been coming out of Vienna, where the Big Two have been carrying on their SALTalks. Meanwhile, Back in the Disarmament Committee, according to Donald F. Keys (p. 8), discussions have been proceeding on what are sure to be the two main disarmament topics at this fall's 25th U.N. General Assembly: denuclearization of the seabed and chemical and biological warfare.

The reporter-photographer team of Christine Donovan and Catherine Ursillo covered the World Youth Assembly for the feature When World Youth Took Over the U.N., (p. 10). Both are comely young women who deny any affiliation with the women's liberation movement. To our surprise, however, as readers will note, they interviewed and photographed only female participants!

Editorially (p. 12), we describe our unnerving nightmare, The Scenario for the Beginning of the Final Crisis, in which President Nixon threatens in a television address to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam. If Hanoi launches a new massive attack in South Vietnam, the U.S. commander-in-chief warns, "we intend to destroy the port of Haiphong with a nuclear weapon." And he adds, "I do not say that Haiphong will be the only target for a nuclear weapon." What about the possibility of retaliation and the beginning of a nuclear holocaust? "No logic supports this notion." Nixon assures his audience. Was this merely a bad dream, or a vivid premonition?

Peace, Too, Needs Scientific Research, argues author John Mathews (p. 14). Just as the U.S. commits its financial and human resources to massive research projects on the means of warfare, so should it work to advance the means of achieving peace, he says. And in a related article, W. C. Morgan proposes a novel plan to raise billions of dollars for peace research by selling peace bonds in A New Way to Raise Money for Scientific Peace Research (p. 17).

Glen D. Camp, Jr., reviews what he calls Harrison Salisbury's "hair-raiser of a book" in Will Russia and China Go to War? (p. 18). Camp questions Salisbury's thesis that nuclear war between China and Russia is inevitable unless the U.S. develops an effective plan to prevent it.

WAR/PEACE REPORT

FACT & OPINION ON PROGRESS

TOWARD A WORLD OF PEACE

WITH JUSTICE

PUBLISHED BY THE CENTER FOR
WAR/PEACE STUDIES

TENTH YEAR OF PUBLICATION

August/September, 1970

Vol. 10, No. 7

BOARD OF SPONSORS

Roger N. Baldwin
Founder, American Civil Liberties Union

Stuart Chase
Author

Brock Chisholm, M.D.
Former Director General, WHO

Arthur N. Holcombe
Honorary Chairman,
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

Amrom H. Katz
The RAND Corporation

Arthur Larson
Director, World Rule of Law Center, Duke University

Philip Noel-Baker, M.P.
Nobel Peace Prize Winner

Charles S. Rhyne
Chairman, World Peace Through Law Center

James N. Rosenberg
Lawyer, Painter

C. Maxwell Stanley
President, Stanley Engineering Co.

Jerome B. Wiesner
Provost, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Editor: Richard Hudson

Editorial Assistant: Ellen Spitzer

Consulting Editors: George A. Beebe, Roy Bennett, Laurence R. Birns, Arthur Blaustein, William W. Cowan, William H. Honan, Jack Voelpel

Business Manager: Charles Bloomstein

Advisory Board: Mel Dubin, chairman; Thomas Yoseloff, vice chairman; Herbert Barchoff, James Boyd, Michael Erlanger, Irving F. Laucks, Jonathan D. Levine, Leon Schneider, Norman Seiden, Isaac Wiener.

President, Center for War/Peace Studies:
Robert W. Gilmore

War/Peace Report is published monthly, except for June/July and August/September when it is bimonthly, by The Center for War/Peace Studies of The New York Friends Group, Inc.; John Hughes Hall, chairman; Dikran P. Donchian, treasurer. Copyright by The New York Friends Group, Inc., 1970. The opinions expressed in War/Peace Report are those of the contributors or editors and do not necessarily express the views of the New York Friends Group, Inc., or others associated with the publication. All correspondence should be addressed to War/Peace Report, 218 East 18th Street, New York, N.Y. 10003. Telephone: 212-228-2470. Cable address: WARPEACE, New York. War/Peace Report is printed by Indiantown Printing, Inc., Indiantown, Fla. Subscription price is $5 per year for all countries of the world. Single copies, 60 cents each. U.S. student rate, $3.50. Please allow six weeks for change of address and start of new subscriptions. Change of address should be accompanied by old address as well as new, including zip code. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional mailing offices. War/Peace Report is indexed in the Public Affairs Information Service.

2

WAR/PEACE REPORT

KOREA: CAN COLD WAR GROUND THAW?

Korea remains a neglected powderkeg, far more dangerous than it was in 1950, argues this analyst, and steps should be taken now—by the U.N., by the superpowers, by Seoul and Pyongyang—to reduce the peril of renewed conflict.

BY GREGORY HENDERSON

A mysterious ration system still operates for American interest in Asia: we have, somehow, only so much attention to give. With a military searchlight on Vietnam-Cambodia, political presentiments over China and economic worries over Japan, Korea has become a half-forgotten realm.

Dangerous before, such neglect tempts serious misjudgments again. Perhaps no other Asian nations have grown in relative power and military capacity as much in the last 30 years as the two heirs of the old Korean peninsula. From, in 1940, a sternly-controlled colony without a sem-blance of indigenous military power, with 90 per cent of its industry and much of its agricultural wealth owned by Japan, and with a popula-tion of just over 21,000,000, the two Koreas have grown to contain ap-proximately 45 million people-more than Spain and Portugal com-bined and nearly as many as France. Both Koreas send a higher propor-tion of their citizens through college than does the United Kingdom. Both have relatively large, independent, in-dustrialized, urbanized economies, the Republic of Korea having had in 1968 a G.N.P. of $5.2 billion, North Korea of $2.8 billion. The economy of South Korea has been, since 1963, the world's third most rapidly grow-ing one, after Japan and Israel. With

well-trained, well-equipped armed forces of over 600,000 in South Korea and around 400,000 in North Korea, the peninsula is, next to Vietnam, the most heavily-militarized "state" in the world. Korea's 85,000 square miles contain far more armed men than do the 11 million square miles of Africa, some 50 per cent more than all Latin America, and nearly one-third the number in China, which has some 20 times Korea's population. By almost any index of importance in strategic or international affairs, Korea should be receiving more steady attention from Americans than the Iberian peninsula and al-most as much as Italy. It should place among the top dozen nations of the world of concern to the United States. A generation ago, it is safe to say, no one would have pre-dicted such an important position for Korea. Serious, steady attention has far from caught up with the reality of Korea's significance.

Nor with its dangers. More than four times as many armed men face each other across the Korean demilitarized zone today as faced each other across the nearby 38th parallel on June 25, 1950. Then, South Korea had not one tank and, from any effective military point of view, not one plane. Only 16 ROK battalions had finished training at the battalion level; many units had not completed training at the company or platoon levels. North Korea was better off; it had 180 planes and an armored brigade with T-34 medium tanks; its troops were better trained. In sum, the forces of North and, particularly, South Korea in 1950 stood in relation to the armament and training each has today roughly as the American forces of 1820-60 compared to those of 1940, or, in some respects, of later years.

Despite military help from their pa-

tron states (South Korea has received far more aid from the United States -some $3.6 billion total aid since 1953 and $140 million military aid this year-than North Korea has had from the Soviet Union), each Korea sacrifices much of its own resources to maintain its military stance. Reports from Tokyo quoting Pyongyang radio say that North Korean defense expenditures for 1970 will amount to $905 million out of a total budget of $2,583 million, or 35 per cent of the total (some 25 per cent of the northern G.N.P.). South Korean defense costs budgeted for 1970 are $334 million, or 24 per cent of its budget of $1,428 million (6 per cent of the ROK G.N.P.). The impact of defense spending severely reduces the access of all North Koreans to consumer goods and contributes to dividing South Korean society into an expanding middle-class consuming minority and a still-impoverished majority, creating potentially dangerous wealth-poverty gaps far greater than those which the inequalities of Korea's traditional past once fostered.

Koreans on both sides as soldiers and taxpayers, we and the Soviet Union as suppliers, must one day ask ourselves why the two parts, 17 years after the end of hostilities, must constantly escalate the number of their soldiers and the power of their armaments throughout the peninsula. Why must Korea be today a greater threat to world peace than it was in the weeks before the advent of the Korean War?

In answer, each side points to the armament of the other, insisting that the mounting danger to itself demands added defense. South Korea underscores serious provocations from the north, notably the one on January 21, 1968, when a well-trained posse of 31 North Koreans staged a

Gregory Henderson served as a U.S. Foreign Service political and cultural officer in Seoul from 1948-50 and 1958-63, has been acting chief of Korean affairs in the Department of State, and is the author of Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Harvard University Press, 1968). He is now an associate professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and acting director of its Edward R. Murrow Center.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

3

guerrilla attack on Seoul's presidential mansion that was crushed only just outside its grounds. Two days later came the Pueblo incident. North Korea is said to have trained some 30,000-40,000 guerrilla infiltrators, more than the fedayeen in the Middle East. Landings of agents have been numerous; in a few cases parties of several or even several dozen trained North Koreans have landed on the South Korean coast at the same time that small-scale incursions have been made across the Demilitarized Zone. North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung has spoken of turning the Democratic People's Republic into an armed camp and has declared his intention of reunifying Korea by his 60th birthday in 1971. Armed invasion and unification by force have not been spoken of by South Korean leaders since the fall of President Syngman Rhee in early 1960 nor has any unarticulated evidence of intention to attack North Korea been evinced.

## ROK Superiority

In all respects except for air power (North Korea has 500 modern fighter planes and 100 bombers) and possibly in the case of artillery and automatic rifles, the Republic of Korea has maintained, with United States support, clearly larger forces—620,000 as opposed to some 385,000 in the North. (Estimates of troop strength in the North range from 350,000 to 466,000.) Some 60,000 U.S. troops remain south of the DMZ; no foreign communist troops have been in North Korea for many years. In a sort of trade-off, South Korea has sent 50,000 troops and some 16,000 civilians to Vietnam. There is now speculation that more of its well-armed troops might pull U.S. chestnuts out of the Cambodian fire; Seoul and Phnom Penh have just established diplomatic relations and the sending of some aid, so far non-military, is being discussed.

So far as the formal record speaks, it is Seoul, not Pyongyang, that stands in the way of all peaceful communication. North Korea has consistently advocated "economic and cultural interchange and mutual visits of individual persons between North and South Korea" and "allowing the North and South Korean people to exchange letters at least." The Republic of Korea has advocated only supervised elections throughout the peninsula under the United Nations (which was, after all, an advocate of one side in the dis-

pute), has responded only with silence to all suggestions of exchange of letters, culture or athletic teams, and has, on occasion, threatened to prosecute citizens supporting even mild, anti-communist statements favorable to such exchanges.

The basic conclusions to be drawn with respect to contemporary Korea are rather clear. South Korea appears to have no intention of forcing a military decision in view of the probability of support for North Korea by Communist China, the Soviet Union, or both, and the certainty of dissuasion from the United States and Japan. Even if it wanted to, South Korea could not launch a successful attack against the North. And there seems equally little prospect that North Korea could force a military decision against the superior forces in the South, even if one discounted the

South Korea's Park Chung-hee

U.S. treaty commitment which is unequivocal though its invocation under present conditions might well have unacceptable American domestic repercussions. Even clearer is the complete unacceptability of a war in the Korean peninsula now to either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and the high probability that China would also find a Korean conflict a highly unwelcome diversion. Japan, with its constitutional restraints on the overseas use of forces and its welcome, if belated, discovery that a purely economic Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is far more profitable than one imposed by military and political controls, is a leading voice for peaceful negotiation and reduction of tensions in the Korean

peninsula. With the possible exception of North Korea, therefore, no one wants to use armed force to unite Korea, and North Korea alone could not succeed in doing so. There remains the possibility of war arising out of military or political miscalculation, even though none of the parties really wants it. But once burned, one trusts, twice shy.

In this situation, the problem of force levels is crucial. One million men in 85,000 square miles is too many not to use. A third to a quarter of two national budgets is too much, year after year, to be squandered without benefit. Such forces create their own expectancy of use. A North Korean "people's militia" of 1,300,000 and a South Korean home guard of 2,000,000, now well started, add to these pressures. There is constant impulse for more expensive armament: jet planes, tanks, rockets, ships. New MIGs and F-4 Phantom supersonic fighters already have made their appearance. Complete absence of contact between the two Koreas increases tensions. Each side implants in its own people an image of the other side as a powerful and malign devil, and these images cannot be ameliorated through the sight and speech of real men. South Korea has an observer at Panmunjom; but he never speaks, and the meetings he observes represent probably the most lengthy and jejune stretch of negotiatory acrimony yet devised by human ingenuity.

For most of the last decade, increasingly strong economies in both North and South Korea have made them gradually more independent of their patron states and less reliant on their aid. In recent years, this trend toward independence has been accelerated by political events. South Korea has achieved substantial leverage on the United States by becoming the only nation to provide more than token armed forces for use in Vietnam. That the expense involved has been more than defrayed by the United States does not cancel the debt felt—or claimed. Should, as is rumored, South Korea take directly or indirectly some of the fanged Cambodian cat off the weary American back, Korean leverage on the United States would mount still further.

In the north, the Democratic People's Republic, meanwhile, is also cast in an increasingly key and independent role because of Sino-Soviet

4

WAR/PEACE REPORT

rivalry. No other country is in so pivotal a geopolitical position in this dispute as Korea; not only does it lie between Russia and China but it combines this characteristic, as Mongolia does not, with the ability to play each neighbor off against the other. Kim Il-sung and his circle, who appear, like most Korean politicians, to combine skill at power politics with basically nationalist sentiment, seductively safeguard this bargaining position and squeeze from it the maximum juices of independence. The Korean War forms an important backdrop for this position. By forcing China to pull what had initially been Soviet chestnuts out of the threatening fires of defeat in 1950, the Soviets created a Korean blood debt to the Chinese as strong as any pro-Russian obligation developed by years of patient Soviet tutelage and aid.

## U.N. Body No Help

On the international stage, blockage of communication between North and South Korea is of no help. The United Nations, through its Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), has probably done more to ritualize hostility and tighten resistance to change and contact than it has done "to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area," as its mandate says it is supposed to do. By joining in the Korean War to repel the North Korean attack, the United Nations lost the position of neutral intermediary which it has in Cyprus, the Middle East and elsewhere; it is the residuary legatee of an advocacy position. Indeed, since the U.N. flag still flies at the U.N. commander's staff in Seoul, it is a continuing advocate. Its commission—U.N. commissions have inhabited Korea constantly for 22 years—has never had access to North Korea, has always been resident in South Korea. Only a nation driven to the wall would be likely to accept mediation from a United Nations so closely intertwined with the opposing side. North Korea shows no signs of being driven to any wall; to the contrary, it is an increasingly powerful and independent entity—militarily, economically (despite some recent stagnation), and politically. Kim Il-sung is now the world's fifth most senior national helmsman. Yearly,

the Korean question is debated in the United Nations and UNCURK sends back still another report. Yearly, motions to abolish UNCURK are beaten down—sometimes by fragile majorities. There is endless button-holing and pressuring. To what end, one wonders—to prevent as long as possible the slightest realistic step toward unification?

Will all this futile posturing in U.N. corridors, in Panmunjom, in Seoul and Pyongyang, ever end? At this moment, there seems only one element of hope. It is, of all oddities, the South Korean public. A poll of some months ago, published by Seoul's Ministry of National Reunification (the hapless minister was soon fired in consequence) disclosed that, of a random sample of 2,014 South Koreans in 50 different districts, 35 per cent favored the exchange of ath-

North Korea's Kim Il-sung

letes with Pyongyang, and only 28 per cent clearly opposed it; 29 per cent supported journalistic exchanges (33 per cent were opposed); 25 per cent favored postal traffic, and 14 per cent thought it would not jeopardize security to permit the interchange of relatives. Meanwhile, 87 per cent judged their living conditions to be better than in the North and 92 per cent judged their lives freer. Never before—certainly not since the Korean War—has so substantial a minority view favoring direct contacts with North Korea been suspected to exist within South Korea. From the heavily-controlled, faceless masses of North Korea no opinions are vouchsafed. Yet when North Korean students were allowed to attend universities in Eastern Europe, years ago,

they acquired among their professors the reputation of opposing the Pyongyang regime. One cannot assume that opposition has died out among them; they are Koreans, after all. There is simply not much that they can do or voice about their dogmatic Stalinist overlords.

The fundamental question in Korea remains unification: the reunification of the most ancient and homogeneous entity that has ever been divided—far more ancient than Germany, far more homogeneous and longer resident within present boundaries than Vietnam. But the fundamental question no longer comes first in order of business. It is useless to prate about the reunification of a country in which one cannot even exchange a form postcard telling a Southern son whether his Northern mother is dead or his sister married. (Even in warring Vietnam, such exchange of form postals is possible, to say nothing of the thousands of letters and packages exchanged daily between the two Germanies.) In Korea, the first business must be more modest: to reduce an awesome tension.

More hangs on the reduction of this tension than the interests of Korea and the allies of the two states there. It should not be forgotten that one of the twin causes of World War II lay in a Japanese expansion whose first step was to assure that the Korean peninsula would not be dominated by any other major power. In 1950, Japan was still occupied by the United States, was forbidden armament of its own, and was in no psychological state to use arms had it had them. These conditions are now altered. Should a Korea armed at present levels erupt into war next to a conservatively-led, independent and powerful Japan with countless gains in its standard of living to lose, the effect of Japan's military and foreign policies would be profound. Certainly Japan would be more justified in taking action in the Korean peninsula, whose security has been declared essential to its own, than was the United States in intervening when the Soviets attempted to put missiles into Cuba. Only China is irretrievably involved in Southeast Asia, whereas in Korea there is a strategic involvement by Japan, the Soviet Union, China and, through formal treaty, the United States. There is a prospect, therefore, that the division of Korea might, follow-

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

5

ing the end of the Vietnam War, be a potentially even greater threat to world peace than Vietnam poses today. Though the tripping of the trigger in Korea does not currently seem likely, such action could be sudden and, as in 1950, essentially unforeseen. It behooves the international community to reduce the risks.

A sequence of steps could conduce to a Korea less threatening to world peace. The first few steps would repair the instruments of mediation.

If the U.N. is to continue, in the short term, to deal with the unification question, then certainly the attendance of North Korea at the annual discussion of the issue should be encouraged, not opposed—vituperative as such presence would almost certainly be, if the invitation were accepted at all.

## UNCURK a Liability

Next, it would be wise for the United Nations to end its partisan position in Korea. However one argues the validity of the U.N. involvement in the elections of 1948 and in the Korean War—and there are fairly strong arguments on both sides of these questions—it is clear that the United Nations is a bad election supervisor and is incapacitated to deal with future Korean problems if it seeks to employ instruments associated with its adherence to one side in a violent conflict. The present U.N. commitment to UNCURK is not only a liability to the United Nations but it can be argued that, in its incapacity to deal with a dangerous problem that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both wish to see controlled, it is a liability to the superpowers as well. Not only is UNCURK openly partisan, but its composition has long since ceased to be representative of the international community. Most of its members reside in Tokyo and show mild interest in Korea at best. It has practically no capacity to influence present events even within South Korea while its unification efforts have been sterile. In short, UNCURK has forfeited its raison d'être and should be promptly discontinued so that the United Nations could, after an interval, attempt to move to a position on the Korean question closer to its role in Cyprus or the Middle East—an advocate of neither side. The fiction of the U.N. Command in Korea—long no more than myth—should likewise be allowed quietly to lapse despite the danger that U.S. tactical controls over Korean frontline troops are

# Medal

By Ronald J. Willis

What do I do with this medal, asked the buddy. Can it go out and drink a beer with me? Can I walk down the streets with it talking of Hondas and how we'll travel when we're rich?

What do I do with this medal asked the young widow— make love to it? Kiss it? Press it to me the way I pressed him?

What do I do with this medal, Mommy. It doesn't bring home any toys like daddy did. It doesn't hug me. It doesn't smile and buy me candy.

What do I do with this medal asked the mother. Was it for this I changed a thousand diapers, taught a child to walk, cried through the night when he was sick, bandaged knees, smiled when he chased a butterfly, rejoiced when he got all A's, hugged his pretty young wife, and wished them all the love and luck in the world.

The medal was for a brave boy who fought for his country. He was killed by a man who didn't want to kill him any more than the boy wanted to kill him. But we took a hill for a day and a major made lieutenant colonel for that. And after all, isn't a silver oak leaf on a shoulder worth a million tears?

likely to lapse with it.

Following this, North Korea should be admitted to observer status in the United Nations. Bitter as this concession might seem to the Republican of Korea, it is only through such equality with the ROK that the D.P.R.K. is ever likely to have any disposition to negotiate; such disposition should, in the long run, be worth more to South Korea than its presently worthless U.N. monopoly.

Finally, the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, which for 18 years has served little to relieve tensions, more often to inflame them, should be given the task of opening

up communication between the two halves of the country. The representative of the "U.N. Command" might, when feasible, be replaced with a delegate from South Korea so that the two governments can at last communicate with each other directly.

More important than these steps to repair channels of communication would be achievement of lower levels of armament throughout the peninsula. The United States and the Soviet Union should supplement their current SALT discussions by talks in which they agree to limit the arms they inject into the Korean peninsula, and use their influence to per-

6

WAR/PEACE REPORT

suade their Korean client states to
undertake reductions of, say, initial-
ly about 100,000 men each.

Because the 50,000 Korean soldiers
in Vietnam were obtained by activat-
ing reserve divisions (or by sending
standing divisions and replacing
them by newly-activated divisions)
and because, apparently, of other
smaller increases through the years,
there are now appreciably more
ROK men under arms than there
were a decade ago. ROK forces num-
bering 620,000 today face some 385,-
000 North Korean forces. Thus, even
without a North Korean reduction,
the ROK could make some unilateral
reduction-of perhaps 100,000-with-
out lowering its essential guard or
dangerously tempting North Korea.

For its part, the United States
could certainly, as suggested by Sen-
ator Tydings and others, withdraw
one of its two divisions from Korea.
The U.S. military not only now con-
cedes this as feasible but is reportedly
(New York Times, June 12, 1970)
preparing a plan to withdraw all but
a brigade of 5,000 men within the
next three years. While a withdrawal
of at least one division could be exe-
cuted in any case, it would be better
to test in talks with the Soviets what
could be obtained from this con-
cession in the form of mutual arms
reduction. It should be the longer-
range aim of U.S.-Soviet talks to ob-
tain through the leverage of sharply
lower arms deliveries staged reduc-
tions over the next several years so
that troop levels on either side would
be in the neighborhood of 100,000-
150,000-their approximate level in
June, 1950. Unlike those days, how-
ever, the South would have strength
at least equal to that of its opponent
and would have large trained reserve
strength should an emergency arise.
A military system more like Israel's
than the present wasteful one of hav-
ing standing armies could therefore
be envisaged as a more normal Ko-
rean system of defenses on either side
of the DMZ.

Military reductions should be ac-
companied by a modest but gradually
increasing program of communica-
tion between the two Koreas. The

first step should be to permit the ex-
change, through censors, of form
postal cards, similar to those used in
Vietnam, in which space is left for
vital family statistics. The present
situation in which divided families
are unable to know whether their
members are living or dead should be
regarded as a violation of basic hu-
man rights. Such a step would be
important even though many Korean
families would fear to use such forms
since they conceivably could endan-
ger family members on the other side.
Letters should, as soon as possible,
be permitted to replace the forms
and, eventually, packages should be
permitted, as they have been almost
continually between the two Ger-
manies. While the exchange of some
security information by such means
would doubtless be attempted, it
probably would not vitally increase
what can now, on either side, be
known by other means. Exchanges of
a limited number of magazines and
newspapers should also be allowed.
An agreement similar to that between
the United States and the Soviet
Union might be initiated whereby a
magazine from each side written for
the other Korea could be sold or dis-
tributed across the DMZ in a stated
number of copies.

The Unification Issue

Such steps, if taken, might lead to
conditions enabling reconsideration
of the unification issue itself in a
decade or more. An effort in this area
could probably be undertaken more
effectively by the four powers
most intimately concerned—the U.S.,
China, U.S.S.R. and Japan—than by
the United Nations. Such reconsid-
eration would require the entry of
mainland China into the United Na-
tions system and into formal relations
with the United States, as well as
considerably more detente in U.S.-
U.S.S.R. relations. It would also re-
quire the creation, largely by means
of advanced education and broadened
contact with world opinion, of rela-
tively large numbers of North and
South Korean intelligentsia more in-
dependent of tight, centralized gov-
ernment control and less committed
than their governments to continua-
tion of the present conflict status.

While such developments may not
come about, they are not inconceiv-
able within the next two decades.
Japan might take increasingly help-
ful initiatives to create them as its
influence in Asia grows. The growing
electronic revolution may also be
helpful in bringing both Koreas, espe-
cially the North, nearer the main
current of world opinion as radio
and TV increasingly penetrate the
barriers formerly effective against
them.

One cannot claim that the with-
drawal of the U.N. presence and the
taking of the steps outlined above
will have no possible dangers. Not
least among these might be the effect
on the morale of South Korea, which
would be thereby asked to make the
greater number of concessions. Many
may be disposed to say that it is better
to do nothing, simply to safeguard
the growing prosperity of the South
and keep all fists raised. One would,
indeed, not wish to endanger the ad-
mirable progress achieved by the
South. Unification is surely no short-
run possibility; perhaps it may not
be a long-range one. Lowered ten-
sions, lowered arms budgets, more
communication should not under-
mine; they should enhance what has
been gained and reduce the chance
that it might be lost in another war.

Whether such steps would result in
eventual unification only time would
tell. Such unification seems conceiv-
able only in the framework of a dis-
armed, neutralized, independent and
united Korea allowed no bilateral aid
and alliances, divorced from the
world's power balance. Such unifica-
tion would have to be guaranteed
by mainland China, Japan, the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R., essentially on the
Austrian model. Even if this happy
state is not achieved, some sort of
coexistence can be if the above steps
are followed. Surely this is preferable
to tension, endless defense expense
and belligerency. Korea's conflict is
both too serious and too unnecessary
to permit foregoing reasonable steps
toward its solution. Divided Korea
calls in the next decades for constant
and imaginative attention of a kind
the world has yet to give it.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

7

MEANWHILE,
BACK IN THE DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE...

While the main focus of interest in arms control has shifted to the Big Two SALT negotiations, the 26-nation parley in Geneva has been continuing efforts to ban CBW and prevent an arms race on the seabed.

BY DONALD F. KEYS

Two topics undoubtedly will dominate the disarmament debate at this fall's 25th U.N. General Assembly: denuclearization of the seabed, and chemical and biological warfare. The most important topic, halting the nuclear arms race, will only be alluded to, in expressions of hope, concern and encouragement for the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Vienna and Helsinki. The two superpowers, typically, have reserved to themselves the right to deal bilaterally with nuclear disarmament, as with any topic that becomes of vital importance to them. They have ignored the appeals of the U.N. secretary general, the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. Senate and other bodies that they declare a moratorium on testing and deployment of new nuclear weapon systems while they talk. The U.S., in fact, has already deployed a large number of multi-warheaded (MIRV) missiles. Presumably the Assembly will explore this deployment and the fact that its appeal was not heeded; it will urge speedy progress in the SALTalks.

There will be great pressure at the Assembly for acceptance of the draft treaty on barring weapons of mass destruction from the seabed. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (C.C.D.—formerly the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee), in its second meeting of the year at Geneva, is hurrying to complete the draft. Last fall, it may be remembered, the draft treaty pressed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and brought to the U.N. without the full approval of the other members of the C.C.D., was not accepted. In a stinging rebuke to the Big Two, the Assembly sent the treaty back to

Geneva for more work.

The biggest failing of the seabed agreement will not be remedied. Like the Test Ban Treaty, it will be a partial agreement. As written now, the draft treaty provides not for the demilitarization of the seabed, but only for barring weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floor. The insistence of U.S. military planners prevailed in this matter, for without exception the remaining members of the C.C.D. wanted a treaty covering all weapons—not exempting conventional weapons as the present treaty does. For very narrow and shortsighted reasons, the U.S. has insisted on less scope and less inspection than the U.S.S.R. was prepared to concede.

## A Rear-Guard Battle

Some countries are still fighting a rear-guard battle. Mexico, for instance, is still maintaining that in observance of the charge given the C.C.D., the treaty should guarantee the peaceful use of the seabed by prohibiting all military activity. At the very least, the Mexican delegate has stressed, conventional weapons should be prohibited from the continental shelf, where, placed just outside the 12-mile limit of an enemy country, they would be a grave threat.

Sweden tried last year to write into the treaty a strong clause committing signatories to continue urgent negotiations toward making it comprehensive. While the Big Two in their revised draft have made a gesture in this direction, most of the Conference does not consider it adequate. Bulgaria, Burma, India, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, the U.A.R. and Yugoslavia all have indicated support for the Swedish proposal. Poland, in a move that indicates Soviet dissatisfaction with a partial treaty, has proposed that the demilitarization of the seabed be kept continuously on the agenda of the C.C.D. and that

a second convention be written to deal with conventional weapons.

The revised U.S.-Soviet draft does incorporate many suggestions of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and particularly Canada. But one important suggestion was not accepted by the Big Two—a Canadian recommendation that the treaty provide the possibility of involving "international procedures including the good offices of the secretary general of the United Nations" in inspection of suspected violations. Many countries feel that reference to the U.N. is important, particularly to establish a precedent for future arms inspection agreements. Among the supporters of this view, in addition to Canada, are Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Opposed are the U.S.S.R. and its allies—particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union emphasized that its opposition was not based on the person of U Thant, but that it "could not accept the inclusion in the seabed treaty of a provision which could serve as a cover for various kinds of attempts by some Western countries to use international institutions to the detriment of the interests of other states." The Soviet delegate mentioned "events in the Congo."

It is generally believed that the superpowers have reached a quid pro quo arrangement, whereby the U.S. will respect the wish of the U.S.S.R. to leave out reference to the U.N. if the U.S.S.R. will agree not to press for a comprehensive treaty. Chances are that the superpowers think the desire of the 25th General Assembly to accept the treaty during the anniversary year will be so strong that they can afford not to make any more modifications in it.

Chemical and biological weapons will be the main topic of discussion and negotiation in the C.C.D. over

Donald F. Keys is U.N. representative of the World Association of World Federalists.

8

WAR/PEACE REPORT

the next several years. The nuclear
arms question has been taken out of
the Conference by the superpowers;
nothing can really be done on under-
ground testing unless MIRV and
ABM development is halted, and no
one is ready to talk seriously about
general and complete disarmament.
The General Assembly this fall will
hear the report of the C.C.D. on its
work on CBW, will urge the Confer-
ence forward, and will call on all na-
tions that haven't ratified the 1925
Geneva Protocol on CBW to do so.
Among the main non-signers is the
U.S. Japan recently announced its
ratification and Brazil its intention
to ratify soon.

When President Nixon made his
momentous announcement last fall
that the U.S. was unilaterally aban-
doning research, production and
stockpiling of biological weapons, he
also indicated the American inten-
tion to ratify the 1925 Protocol. How-
ever, a Swedish resolution adopted by
the 24th Assembly stating that the
Protocol prohibits use in war of riot
control agents and defoliants has ap-
parently led to hesitation by the U.S.,
which immediately declared this in-
terpretation by the Assembly as with-
out legal force. It is not known
whether the U.S. will, after all, ratify
the Protocol in this anniversary year,
or whether it will do so with reserva-
tions, or whether the matter is just
too embarrassing in light of U.S. use
of these agents in Vietnam.

Not Gas—Smoke

The United Kingdom, apparently
in support of its American ally, sud-
denly found that the riot control
agent CS gas was not gas at all but
smoke and thus "outside the scope
of the Protocol." The U.K. has been
under heavy fire for this interpreta-
tion, both at the C.C.D. from Sweden
and other countries, and at home.
Philip Noel-Baker, M.P., and Nobel
Peace Prize winner, wrote to the Lon-
don Times: "In Vietnam CS gas is
used by U.S. forces almost daily, and
in enormous quantities. Delivered by
six-inch shells on the trenches and
bunkers of the N.L.F. soldiers, it
makes a concentration that can be
lethal and which is wholly intoler-
able if the soldiers stay in shelter; if
they come out, they are killed by
concentrated artillery or machine gun
fire. Directly or indirectly CS has
been among the biggest killers in the
Vietnam War."

In the Geneva negotiations, se-
rious work is now beginning on
CBW. Problems of inspection of

chemical weapons, which are great,
are the subject of a number of pa-
pers presented this year. The chemi-
cal constituents, processes, equipment
and storage facilities for nerve gases
and other chemical warfare agents are
not easily distinguishable from the
same elements used in peaceful pro-
duction of fertilizers, herbicides and
pesticides. The U.S. and Japan, par-
ticularly, have pointed out these dif-
ficulties. An American study of exist-
ing plants indicates that aerial in-
spection cannot determine which of
similar chemical plants is being used
for peaceful and which for military
production. The U.S. concludes on-
site inspection is needed.

The spread of views on "verification" procedures for chemical weapons is scarcely unexpected. The U.S.S.R., Hungary, Mongolia and Poland are supporting "control by national governments" (self-inspection), plus complaints to the Security Council (as per the U.N. Charter, and where the veto applies), if violations are suspected or found. Japan would like to see a reporting procedure carried out, with statistics on chemical substances and processes being provided. Japan would couple this with a system of *ad hoc* inspection on the basis of complaints made to the U.N. secretary general with approval of the Security Council. The Security Council would apply sanctions against offenders. Yugoslavia introduced a plan including "verification by challenge" (the requirement for a country to clear itself if accused of a violation), plus a multi-step process ending in investigation by a control organ. The views expressed by Sweden and Morocco are quite similar to Yugoslavia's approach.

There is a general feeling that not

enough is known by the C.C.D. about
what is needed for CBW inspection,
and at least one informal meeting
with experts has been held. Italy has
suggested setting up an ongoing
group of experts to study questions
raised on the matter in C.C.D. dis-
cussions.

The two draft treaties now before
the Conference have serious limita-
tions. The Soviet draft is a sweeping,
unimplemented ban on CBW. The
British draft provides substantial and
important safeguards, but it applies
only to biological weapons. The U.S.
agrees with the British that chemi-
cal and biological weapons should
be handled in separate treaties be-
cause control of chemical weapons
will be hard to achieve. Virtually all
other nations would much prefer to
see the two means of warfare abol-
ished by a single treaty.

The general question of disarma-
ment has received more attention at
this year's sessions of the C.C.D. This
is because of the fact that the U.N.
Assembly last fall declared 1970-1980
as "Disarmament Decade," and
among other things charged the
C.C.D. with "working out an agreed
program" for disarmament and re-
porting on it at the 25th Assembly.
There is very little agreement as this
is being written on what should be
presented to the Assembly in Sep-
tember. The various views are re-
vealing:

The Netherlands stresses the rela-
tion between disarmament and inter-
national provisions for peace and se-
curity, and suggests these main ele-
ments of a program: measures to in-
crease confidence, measures to pre-
vent armament, measures to limit
armament, measures of disarmament,
and general and complete disarma-
ment. The Netherlands proposes
drawing up a list of measures with-
in each category, noting that fixed
timetables and target dates "do not
fit the politically sensitive character
of arms control and disarmament ne-
gotiations."

Sweden also feels attention must be
paid in the disarmament program to
the "direct correlation with other
U.N. activities," including machinery
for friendly relations, settlement of
disputes, and peacekeeping activities.
Sweden suggested the following list
of priorities: all weapons of mass de-
struction, conventional weapons con-
trol on a regional basis, underground
tests, cutoff in production of nuclear

(Continued on page 16)

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

9

WHEN WORLD YOUTH

What do the youth of the world want?

Some light, along with a good deal of heat, was thrown on this widely-recurring question as more than 650 participants gathered July 9-17 at United Nations headquarters in New York for the World Youth Assembly.

To begin with, it was uncertain how accurately the assemblage reflected the total youth of the world. Five participants were invited from each nation, large or small, and in addition 126 invitations were allotted to non-governmental organizations requesting youth representation. The selection process varied greatly from country to country. In many cases, it was evident that governments had chosen the participants, who faithfully followed their government's line. In other cases, participants appeared to have ended up in the World Youth Assembly simply because they had a right acquaintance at home. The U.S. group, chosen through an elaborate process into which the government did not meddle, came out balanced in some ways (e.g., black/white) but skewed in others (e.g., all college kids/no working class). Finally, among the countries that declined to send any participants at all were mainland China, North Korea and North Vietnam.

Be that as it may, the World Youth Assembly was still undoubtedly the most diverse large political gathering of youngsters ever held. They promptly split into four commissions: Peace, Development, Education, and Man and Environment. The political pros, many of whom were older and had experience in leftist international conferences, flocked to the Peace Commission. The outcome to be expected there was telegraphed with the naming of the rapporteurs, who came from Cuba, East Germany, Guinea and Pakistan. The United States, particularly on Vietnam, came in for heavy abuse, while the Soviet Union got off relatively lightly. Participants from Nationalist China, South Korea and South Vietnam were denied even the right to speak.

In the three other commissions, work was able to proceed without the table banging, chanting and vituperation that marked the Peace Commission, and some participants felt that the Peace Commission had thereby served a useful purpose in siphoning off the most militant participants from the other groups.

There was much overlapping in the four commission reports, and much of the same kind of rhetoric in favor of development, disarmament, education and human rights that the older genera-

PHOTOGRAPHS BY CATHERINE URSILLO

On dais at opening session of the World Youth Assembly are, left to right, Richard Akwei, Ghana's representative to the U.N. and chairman of the U.N.'s 25th Anniversary Committee, Secretary General U Thant, and Francois Pouliot of Canada, provisional chairman of the Assembly.

TOOK OVER THE U. N.

tion has been churning out for years in the General Assembly. But the special interests and flavor of youth were also evident. There was considerable sympathy for proposals for a United Nations University and for an International Volunteer Youth Service Corps. Pope Paul VI was asked to review his encyclical "Humanae Vitae" to permit "the unfettered exercise of conscience of individual Catholics with regard to contraceptive methods." And a suggestion that marijuana be legalized was voted down.

In the final stormy plenary session, the World Youth Assembly called for making the United Nations universal in membership and abolishing the Security Council veto. An amendment to the final report was passed calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia. Another amendment was approved endorsing the idea of a "unitary, democratic state in Palestine," which would have the effect of doing away with the state of Israel. Thus the World Youth Assembly put itself in opposition to the unanimously-passed Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and the chairman therefore ruled that the Assembly could not vote on another amendment that would have endorsed the Security Council resolution, since the two would conflict.

Toward the end, there was such a confusion of points of order and shouting that the chairman had to threaten to adjourn the meeting unless order returned. Into the midst of this disarray walked a serene U Thant, whose presence created an abrupt tranquillity that prevailed throughout his closing remarks.

The Assembly declared in its final document that it would like to have another session in two years. Whether this will happen is problematical. The press would like it, for the Assembly made good copy. But many in the permanent missions and in the Secretariat found the exercise an annoying intrusion, both physically and diplomatically. One high Secretariat official who found the Assembly "amateurish" observed: "Well, maybe we should have another one in five years."

On balance, it would seem that the youth ought to have another round. They proved that they could bring it off without the disaster predicted by so many. And certainly there have been many General Assembly sessions, which after all last several months, that produced no more than the youth did in only nine days.

—CHRISTINE DONOVAN

Randa Musallam (left), 22, a Palestinian from Jordan, and Pnina Krindel (right), 23, of Israel were two of the participants. When they met in a corridor at the U.N., Mrs. Krindel invited Miss Musallam to visit Tel Aviv. Miss Musallam replied, "You cannot invite me to my own country!"

Brigitte Pellar, 22, a graduate student in history from Austria, is shown above talking to two members of the New York company of the rock musical, Hair. The cast gave a benefit performance to raise funds for the Assembly and also hosted the participants around New York City. Below, Kadiatou Konate (left), 20, and Assitan Traove (right), 19, of Mali pose in front of a mosaic from Morocco. Both girls are biology students.

EDITORIAL

We had a nightmare in which we dreamt that on
April 1, 1971, President Nixon delivered the following
television address:

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

Tonight I want to talk to you about the situation in
Southeast Asia, which has become increasingly grave. In
the past week, as most of you know, I have been having
intensive discussions with my advisers on what course we
should pursue there, and I now want to report to the
American people, to our adversaries, and to all interested
parties the decision that we have reached.

First, let me briefly review the events that have brought
about the present situation. While President Eisenhower
occupied this high office that I now hold, the North
Vietnamese, with logistical support from Communist
China and the Soviet Union, undertook to impose a
Communist government on South Vietnam. In response
to the request of the government of South Vietnam, first
President Eisenhower, and then Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson, took steps to assist the people of South Vietnam
in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. This
goal which was accepted by my three immediate prede-
cessors, I too have accepted—and I am confident a large
majority of the American people also accept it.

Since I assumed this office, my administration has
sought to reduce the direct American involvement in the
defense of South Vietnam by helping the South Viet-
namese to improve their capabilities to the point where
American combat troops can be fully withdrawn from
South Vietnam. That program has gone well, and we
have now withdrawn the 150,000 troops that I pledged
we would last April 21. Altogether, the United States
has withdrawn 265,000 men since this administration
took office.

While we have sought to increase the self-reliance of
the South Vietnamese for their own defense, we have at
the same time tried in every way we could to negotiate
a just peace to end this tragic war. We stopped the bomb-
ing of North Vietnam, we accepted the National Libera-
tion Front as one of the parties to the negotiations, and
we agreed in principle to removal of all our forces in
Vietnam. All to no avail. The other side still insists that
we leave, unilaterally, and that we overthrow the elected
government of President Thieu as we go.

Now a new development is taking place. As you know,
in recent months fighting in South Vietnam has been at
a relatively low level. It seemed to us that the South
Vietnamese could handle their own defense at this level,
and I had hoped that around this time we would be

able to announce further withdrawals of American troops
despite the fact that a negotiated settlement seems as
far off as ever.

In recent weeks, however, and especially in the last
few days, we have received uncontestable evidence that
the enemy is preparing to launch massive attacks over
wide areas of South Vietnam. This evidence comes both
from captured documents and from hard information on
actual movements of troops and supplies.

Let me give you a rough indication of the intensity of
the enemy buildup on this map. [using pointer] On
these roads just north of the demilitarized zone, traffic
has more than trebled in the last two weeks. The same
is true on the Ho Chi Minh trail, running along here
through southern Laos and into South Vietnam. In east-
ern Cambodia, in the sanctuaries we so effectively elimi-
nated in our action last spring, the enemy is once again
moving in large numbers of troops and supplies. Within
South Vietnam, our intelligence shows conclusively that
enemy offensive preparations are in an advanced stage.
We are certain from all this intelligence that a major
attack, at least as large as the Tet offensive of 1968, is
coming soon.

How should we meet this new peril?

There are those in this country—a distinct minority,
I am certain—who believe we should simply pull out. I
don't want to impugn their sincerity or their patriotism,
but I do say that this course would be absolutely wrong.
It would be absolutely wrong for the South Vietnamese,
who would surely suffer a massacre should the Com-
munists succeed in winning power . . . absolutely wrong
for other free Asian nations who count on the United
States to help save them from a similar fate . . . and abso-
lutely wrong for America if we are to preserve our own
freedom for ourselves and our children.

A second option would be to do nothing, that is, to
make no major moves and hope that the improved South
Vietnamese forces along with the remaining American
and allied forces could repel the impending attack.
Perhaps this would be successful, but after a most search-
ing analysis we have reached the conclusion that because
of the very high stakes we should not take this risk. We
cannot afford to gamble with the security of South Viet-
nam, of the American forces there, and, as I have said,
ultimately the security of the United States and the free
world.

A third option would be to re-introduce into South
Vietnam large elements of American forces. However,
this would only turn back the pages of history to the
years when American forces were carrying the lion's
share of fighting in Vietnam. If we were to do this, we

12

WAR/PEACE REPORT

would be defeating the very purpose that we have made
central to our policy on Vietnam: bringing the South
Vietnamese forces to the point where they themselves can
sustain their defense. We have therefore rejected this
alternative.

There is a fourth option, and that is what we have
determined to follow. But before I outline that in detail,
let me set out some background.

In helping defend South Vietnam against a Communist takeover, the United States government has exhibited a remarkable degree of self-restraint. Frankly, I do not think anyone will dispute that the United States is the greatest military power in the world. Yet our participation in this conflict has been essentially on enemy terms. Although we have used our air power effectively, we have fought mainly on the ground, in the jungle, meeting the enemy in the place and on the terms of his choosing. It may sound shocking to say this so bluntly—although everybody knows it—but the United States could reduce all of North Vietnam to ashes within hours. Let me hasten to add that this is not the fourth option I just referred to.

We have reached the conclusion, however, that it is
no longer reasonable for the United States to be expected
to keep its own hands tied when the enemy operates in all
ways, without any self-imposed limits, to his maximum
military advantage, while at the same time he refuses to
make any concession whatever at the bargaining table.
This is especially the case now as the enemy is preparing
to take advantage of our large-scale withdrawals of
troops. As commander-in-chief of United States forces,
I must carry out my duty to protect our forces there
even if there is a certain amount of risk involved. We
are forced to take this risk by the intransigence of the
other side. I would like to say again what I said on
November 3, 1969, and which I repeated subsequently
in several of my television reports to the American people
on the situation in Southeast Asia. I said: "If I conclude
that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining
forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and
effective measures to deal with that situation." The
enemy cannot say that he has not been warned that we
will react strongly if he makes new moves to threaten
our troops.

As I pointed out earlier, our troops are now threatened
and, in fact, the very existence of the South Vietnamese
government is in jeopardy. The time has therefore come
to take those "strong and effective measures" of which
I spoke almost a year and a half ago.

I now say to Hanoi, and I want the American people
to hear me say this: Do not launch the attack you are
now preparing. If you do launch it, we intend to destroy
the port of Haiphong with a nuclear weapon. You will
have time to evacuate Haiphong, and of course we will
not bomb the port at all if you refrain from your attack
in South Vietnam. But if you do attack, and persist in
your attack, I do not say that Haiphong will be the only
target for a nuclear weapon.

To the governments in Moscow and Peking, I say
this: Persuade your colleagues in Hanoi to abandon their

attack in South Vietnam. If you cannot do this, I hope
that you will not consider any reckless moves against
the United States or its forces that could threaten a direct
conflict between us and either the Soviet Union or the
People's Republic of China. We emphatically do not
want war with either of those powers. But we shall not
flinch in carrying out the action I have outlined if North
Vietnam proceeds with its attack. This action, should it
have to be executed, will be a limited, measured response
to a provocation by North Vietnam that left us no other
effective choice.

Finally, I say this to the American people: I know
that the possibility that the United States might use a
nuclear weapon in conflict for the first time since World
War II will frighten many of you. There still exists a
feeling—not at all a correct one, I believe—that should
one nuclear weapon be used in war, then an automatic
escalation to world holocaust will follow. No logic sup-
ports this notion. In this case, I am quite sure that the
leaders in Hanoi will respond to our position by calling
a halt to their projected campaign. In fact, what I hope
is that these leaders will now understand our determina-
tion better and that they will decide at last that the time
has come to negotiate an end to this war. If, however,
they do persist in this new aggression, then one evacuated
city and port will be destroyed by a nuclear weapon that
is small by today's standards.

If it comes to this, we will have accomplished two
things: first, we will have eliminated the major port of
entry for weapons destined soon enough to be firing at
American soldiers. And second, we will have demon-
strated our national will in a clear and forceful manner.
As to the possibility of further escalation, I cannot believe
that either the leaders in Moscow or Peking would
seriously consider retaliation against us. The risk would
be far too great, and I am quite sure they understand
that.

So this is where we stand, my fellow Americans. I don't
deny that there are elements of danger in our situation.
There clearly are. It might have *seemed* less dangerous to
have chosen one of the other options I mentioned. One
of the other options might also have been more popular
politically. But we have made the hard choice rather
than the easy one because we are convinced that in the
long run it will serve to protect our forces, our nation,
and not only South Vietnam but all the free nations of
the world that depend on the strength and courage of
America. I therefore ask that all Americans give me
their full support in this time of our testing. If we stand
firm, and do not hesitate to use our strength—in a careful,
restrained way—we will emerge from this situation with
more respect, both from our enemy and for ourselves.

Of course, I cannot know exactly how events will de-
velop in the coming days as a result of this address,
although I have indicated what I think the probabilities
are. In any event, you will be kept fully informed. Mean-
while, I urge that we all remain calm, and I am confident
that the situation will be resolved peacefully and con-
structively.

Thank you and goodnight.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

13

PEACE, TOO, NEEDS SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

The way to solve problems is to devote the necessary resources to the job beginning with research. However, argues this author, in the case of war prevention the U.S. government has starved the effort into virtual non-existence.

BY JOHN A. MATHEWS

In fiscal 1970—ended last June 30—National Science Foundation estimates show that the U.S. federal government obligated about $6 billion for scientific research. Nearly one third of that was spent for research on the means of warfare, and about one fourth for exploration of space. Nearly one third was devoted to combating disease, developing atomic energy, and improving agriculture. Less than 6 per cent was spent to study the behavior of human beings.

No breakdown exists on the federal funds allocated to study the prevention of war, but only about $1.9 million was allotted for behavioral research to the two agencies most likely to be held responsible for this kind of effort: the Department of State and its affiliate, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Note that this $1.9 million is less than one-thirtieth of one per cent of the amount spent by the federal government for all scientific research.)

When asked recently by a congressman to report how much it had spent since World War II on research for the prevention of war, the State Department cited only three projects costing some $70,000. The topics of the research: 1) voting procedures in the United Nations General Assembly, 2) disputed national boundaries in the Middle East, and 3) the financing of U.N. peacekeeping.

Why, one may ask, should the Department of State or, for that matter, the U.S. government, undertake research on the peaceful resolution of international conflict?

John A. Mathews, a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel and a former special assistant to Rep. Seymour Halpern (D.-N.Y.), is secretary-treasurer of the Peace Act Advisory Council.

Scientific research, after all, was the key to development of all modern weapons of war, as well as of atomic energy and the electronic computer. Scientific research made it possible for men to visit the moon and return. Should it not then be engaged to open the way to peace and prevent war?

To my knowledge, no president of the United States has yet budgeted for any *significant* amount of scientific research for the prevention of war. No secretary of state has yet requested any *significant* amount of funds for such research by his department. No Congress has yet authorized or appropriated any *significant* amount of funds for research on the peaceful resolution of international conflict.

No member of the President's Science Advisory Committee, no director of the National Science Foundation, no president of the National Academy of Science, no president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science has yet recommended to the president, to the secretary of state, or to the Congress that any *significant* amount of funds be appropriated for research on the prevention of war.

Scientific research is a well-recognized means to attain almost any end, and, furthermore, peaceful resolution of international conflict is a specific, enunciated policy goal of the U.S. government. Observe the stated objectives of U.S. foreign policy, as outlined in Department of State publication 7707, September, 1969:

1. A world free of fear and war

2. A world open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people great or small live in angry isolation

3. A world of independent na-

tions, each having the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with others to their mutual advantage

4. A world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and which moves steadily toward a rule of law

5. A world free of hatred and discrimination

6. A world of equal rights and equal opportunities for all, in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure.

Why does the State Department make so little use of scientific research to attain these lofty goals?

Perhaps if we want to find out why the government devotes so little effort to war-prevention research, we might study the attitudes of the officials of the executive branch and the members of Congress, their advisers and consultants, and even the elites and the public of our nation.

## An Attitude Study

For several years now I have been convinced of the necessity of just such research. In fact, with little encouragement or success, I have attempted during these years to promote a research proposal aimed at the study of the attitudes of government officials toward peace research. I submitted my proposal to about 60 persons who I thought would be interested. Among them were the vice president, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, the chief of the Office of External Research in the State Department, and an official of the National Science Foundation; also, 18 members of Congress with special responsibilities for research, 18 officials or key employes of private research institutions, and eight leaders of private associations believed to have a prime interest in such research.

14

WAR/PEACE REPORT

None of the 60 was sufficiently moved to act on the proposal. The vice president promised to examine it. The Bureau of the Budget referred it to the Department of State, which indicated that no funds were available for this kind of research. The National Science Foundation did not reply.

Among the officials of private research institutions, four agreed it was an interesting idea but offered various reasons for not doing it. One commented that "you are handicapped by the very deficiency that you are hoping to investigate." One sent three of its social scientists to interview me and promised to "develop a client" for the project, but this did not happen.

## Is Research Scientific?

Among the eight leaders of private associations that might be expected to have an interest in the proposal, one suggested that the problem "is more a fit topic for a staff study, or a polemical article, than for systematic research."

In promoting my proposal, I have often encountered criticism that political research has not been scientific. I subscribe to this view. Much political research is untested speculation and inference by an individual scholar based on untested speculation and inference of other scholars whose work he has reviewed. I suspect the reason for this state of affairs lies in the nature of the incentives available to motivate such scholars. The principal incentive is publication of a book. There is little profit in political research except for royalties and prestige incident to publication.

Incentives for natural scientists abound. Their pay scales are generally higher than those of behavioral scientists. They are far more numerous than behavioral scientists in policy-making positions in the government—and are eligible for more prestigious awards.

There is a fairly widespread myth that research is undertaken mainly to satisfy the curiosity of a researcher. I surmise that scientists, like the rest of us, work because they are paid, and the more they are paid the more they will work. How many scientists were working on the exploration of space prior to the appropriation of billions of dollars for this purpose beginning in 1957, when we suddenly discovered the Russians were ahead of us?

For anyone interested enough to investigate for himself, there are some

political studies that have employed scientific techniques and have obtained independently verifiable results. For instance, in a project sponsored by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency about five years ago, Professor Karl Deutsch of M.I.T. and his associates surveyed the attitudes of French and German elites toward arms control and disarmament with a view to determining the future policy of these nations. The evidence was accumulated from extensive interviews, analysis of the content of periodicals, a survey of proposals for arms control in Europe, mass opinion data and data on the actual behavior of European states and populations that pertained to international transactions. The evidence led to a prediction that the French electorate would strongly support de Gaulle's opposition to U.S. domination of NATO. Within a year, France withdrew its troops from NATO and required that all NATO forces in the nation either come under control of France or leave the country. The rest is history.

Techniques of the kind used in the Deutsch project could make calculable contributions to the solution of problems at least as complex. For example:

1. Some economists believe that currency exchange rates should not be fixed by governments but should be allowed to fluctuate as prices do in a free market. Scientific research involving simulation, gaming and attitude studies could be used to explore the efficacy of doing this.

2. Many economists believe that everyone would benefit from completely free trade, but the problem is how to attain it. Some also believe

that a nation would benefit through removal of its own barriers to trade even though other nations do not reciprocate. This problem could be given over to scientific research.

3. Most evidence suggests that, in spite of foreign aid, the gap between rich and poor nations is widening. Quite probably, scientific research would yield important data about this—first to verify that it is so, then to go to work on coping with the problem.

4. Exploitation of ocean resources is accelerating rapidly. Millions of U.S. dollars have been appropriated for this. The National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development has been established to coordinate U.S. activities through a number of agencies. Malta has proposed that control of ocean resources be vested in a regime associated with the U.N., but congressional hearings have already uncovered considerable opposition to this course. The United States has recently proposed to the U.N. Seabed Committee that future exploitation of the ocean floors beyond a certain depth be licensed by an "international seabed resource authority." Political research is definitely required.

5. The European Economic Community was created "to establish the foundations of an even closer union among the European peoples." Elite attitude surveys conducted in France and Germany during the past several years indicate that progress toward union has stopped. Any further progress will depend heavily on the relations of the E.E.C. with other nations and international organizations such as the European Free Trade Area, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Western European Union, and NATO. The U.S. is a member of two of these organizations, and since U.S. policy is to favor a union of Europe, why doesn't it support research in this area?

6. NATO was established to resist communist aggression, and was buttressed with prohibitions among its member nations against the export to the communist bloc of certain strategic materials. These arrangements are now deteriorating due to competition among NATO states in developing their trade. The U.S. has been the "loser" in this competition— to the point where its "share" is now less than 5 per cent of the imports of Eastern Europe. Research could tell us a great deal about what is happening and what the options are.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

15

7. Research on the modification of weather has been going on for some time. If weather can be changed on a substantial scale, political research will be required to avoid the perversion of this technology into still another weapon of warfare.

8. The question of national sovereignty is probably the most difficult one in international relations today. The merging of free nations, and possibly even of all nations, is now advocated by many as perhaps the only alternative to eventual nuclear holocaust. If this is so, then to say that research is needed here is to indulge in a gross understatement.

These are only samples of what must be done. There are many more challenges. We must develop new ways and means to cultivate a climate for peace. We must establish new political structures that could prevent or resolve international conflicts. Such efforts will require massive scientific political research. Surely the result sought is worthy of an effort at least as massive as our exploration of space. While there exists substantial doubt that the U.S. space program has in fact benefited the people generally, there can be no doubt that an equally massive program of peace research—research for the prevention of war—would benefit not only the people of the U.S. but the whole world.

A step in this direction was made last year when Rep. Seymour Halpern and Sen. Vance Hartke introduced the Peace Act bills. The bills call for a Department of Peace whose head, the secretary of peace, would have cabinet rank. The Peace Act also provides for the transfer to his administration of the Peace Corps, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Agency for International Development, the International Agricultural Development Service, and those functions of the Department of State that relate to the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The bills would create a Joint Congressional Committee on Peace and International Cooperation, thus enhancing the role of Congress in this field. The legislation would also set up an International Peace Institute to train young people for professional peace careers, just as we have so conscientiously for generations trained military leaders in the service academies. Research for peace would be a principal responsibility of the proposed department; it would support and foster research in its area much

as the Defense Department has on military questions for all these years. (See "The Case for Establishing a Department of Peace," by Senator Vance Hartke, WPR, May, 1969.)

## Focus on Diplomacy

The creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1961 was in itself a reflection of the wide appeal of the ideas enunciated here —as well as of the difficulties in implementing them. A.C.D.A. enjoyed the support of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, of former and current government agency heads, and a roster of illustrious statesmen, scientists, military experts and legislators. At the time of its creation everyone agreed on the inadequacy of the existing structures for waging peace, but the agency that was created, whose most far-reaching purpose was to be the study of scientific, economic, political and other factors relating to the prevention of war, has fallen far short of that mark. To date, in fact, its operations have been focused mainly on the diplomacy of international arms control.

Recognizing the slender chance of

passage of the Peace Act bills in the absence of the kind of support given the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, proponents suggested that interested organizations create a council to develop public support. Last year about 26 private associations, including churches and groups devoted to international affairs and intercultural exchange, created the Peace Act Advisory Council. It has grown since then to 38 members. Led by DeWitt C. Baldwin, founder of the Lisle Fellowship, the council works to inform the public about the potential benefits of developing individual and corporate interest in research, training and other means for the peaceable resolution of international conflict, with the purpose of stimulating widespread demand for action.

Human intelligence, highly organized and lavishly subsidized, has brought Americans and other peoples to their present condition of despair. The same intelligence must now be employed in the service of hope. We must commit to peace what we have always committed to war—our most and best.

## Meanwhile, Back in the Disarmament Committee...

*(Continued from Page 9)*

weapons material, expansion of the seabed treaty to cover all weapons, improvement of the 1925 CBW Protocol by adding a prohibition on production, testing and stockpiling of CBW weapons, and establishment of nuclear free zones in additional areas.

Italy and Yugoslavia also produced comprehensive suggestions on a framework for disarmament. The U.S. viewpoint was very negatively put, stating that the Conference should concentrate on what is presently feasible, and not even make a list of priorities. Although a number of countries, notably Argentina, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia wanted to emphasize approaches to general and complete disarmament, the U.S. particularly resisted the idea of revising the G.C.D. treaties advanced several years ago by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The necessity for the participation of China in the talks was mentioned by several participants, and Italy and Argentina appealed to France to take its seat, empty all these years.

It is to be hoped that the General

Assembly will find some additional means to utilize the Disarmament Decade for accelerated progress toward disarmament. Possibly the 25th Assembly will set up a Committee for the Disarmament Decade as it has for the Development Decade. A greatly augmented public information program on disarmament matters could be considered by such a committee, including the secretary general's suggestion of an annual Yearbook of Armaments. The committee could consider convening the U.N. Disarmament Commission, a special General Assembly session, or a world conference on disarmament early in the Decade, as well as perhaps regional seminars on conventional arms traffic control and on plans for regional disarmament. Activity during the Disarmament Decade should by no means be limited to the work of the C.C.D., vital as those negotiations are, nor to the uncertain turnings of SALT. Both could benefit from the increased weight of public attention and opinion the Disarmament Decade will make possible, if its opportunities are utilized.

16

WAR/PEACE REPORT

A NEW WAY TO RAISE MONEY
FOR SCIENTIFIC PEACE RESEARCH

By putting the profit motive to work through a novel plan for selling peace bonds, argues this author, billions could be raised to carry out the scientific research necessary to finally do away with war.

BY W. C. MORGAN

Peace research, yes. It is already late in the game to be turning the resources of scientific research toward man's foremost problem: the control and elimination of mass violence. But better late than never. The most urgent question is: where is the money coming from? Neither wealthy individuals or foundations, nor the federal government has been willing to put up even a tiny fraction of the funds for the effort that will probably be necessary.

I have a proposal to solve the money problem—and the concomitant problem of overseeing how the money is spent—that may at first seem to be financial legerdernain. But I think the idea will stand up to a tough scrutiny from the financial standpoint. I concede that it will have political difficulties, but I believe these could be overcome.

The essence of the proposal is this: Peace bonds would be sold to the American public. Redemption of the bonds, which would pay interest at least as high as defense bonds, would be guaranteed by the U.S. government. The funds from the bond sales would go into peace research. Let us say that $20 billion—about the amount the U.S. spent in sending men to the moon—is raised in this manner over 20 years. If, at the end of two decades, a stable peace has not been achieved, then the U.S. government is out $20 billion, over 20 years. If, on the other hand, stable peace has been reached, the U.S. government will be many billions of dollars ahead because of savings in the defense establishment—which now costs over $70 billion *per year*. And the wise souls who had bought the peace bonds would in this case get

back *double* the face value of their bonds. This last feature is important in order to make selling of the peace bonds easier. The underlying theory of this approach—and what is novel about it—is that anticipated savings from future peace would be used as security for private loans to finance the search for peace.

The basic assumptions underlying the proposal are these:

1. Peace is the absence of war or preparations for war (a bare minimum definition).

2. Peace is possible.

3. Peace can be achieved by the use of man's intelligence and effort.

4. The best way to apply intelligence and effort is through action disciplined by a scientific approach.

5. Men are motivated to act by their perceptions of probable physical and psychological rewards. In the absence of such rewards, men are not motivated to work for peace. But I believe men can be so motivated by supplying the missing rewards—especially through the promise of personal profit.

6. After peace is realized, it will be possible to greatly reduce military expenditures.

7. The government will be willing to pay for the cost of achieving peace out of money that had previously funded military defense.

While the above assumptions undoubtedly represent a gross oversimplification of a psychology of motivation that may produce work and workers for peace, nevertheless they serve broadly to suggest the kind of thinking behind my proposal. As in both the military-industrial sphere and the space industry, the prime motivators to work, in this case for peace, would be material rewards—wages, interest and profits.

In guaranteeing the peace bonds, the federal government would only

be following precedents of other government loan or insurance programs, similar to those provided for the Agency for International Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank. The purposes of these organizations fit in with national goals, and certainly peace is likewise an acknowledged national goal.

I suspect that peace bonds would sell. By buying peace bonds people would not only feel that they were helping a good cause but at the same time could consider that they were making a worthwhile investment. They would receive a good interest rate during the life of the bond, and if the effort succeeded they would find their original investment doubled—and their taxes lowered and public services increased. This should make a very attractive package indeed.

### $355,000 in 8 Hours

Without making any claim that my test was scientific, I can report that I carried out a poll among some church and other groups around Kirkwood, Missouri, to find out what attitudes might prevail toward buying peace bonds. I spent about eight hours polling, and I would judge that about 95 per cent of those I talked to were ordinary people, with no association with the peace movement. During those eight hours, I received expressions of interest in investing $355,000 in peace research and development, over a period of 20 years. This is approximately $45,000 per hour! I doubt if I could raise $10 per hour soliciting contributions for peace research.

Of course, just raising and spending money is not enough. It must be spent in ways that will produce the knowledge and techniques needed. So far—look at the world—we have learned very little about the ways and

W. C. Morgan is chairman of the board of the St. Louis Peace Research Laboratory.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

17

means to establish peace. The road
is still almost completely uncharted.
To oversee the expenditure of the
money raised by the peace bonds, I
propose creation of a Peace Research
and Development Corporation, which
might be a quasi-governmental or-
ganization something along the lines
of Comsat. The board of directors of
the corporation could be made up
from the ranks of its employes, bond-
holders, and representatives of the
U.S. government. Nobel Peace Prize
winners might be invited to serve on
an advisory board to enhance the

corporation's international outlook.

The first step in bringing such a
program into actuality, of course, is
to awaken interest on its behalf and
begin to develop a gathering politi-
cal momentum behind it. Perhaps I
am optimistic, but I can imagine this
happening in as little time as two
years. Next comes establishment of
the Peace Research and Development
Corporation, and the hiring of per-
sonnel.

It goes without saying that the cor-
poration would have to feel its way
to a large extent into the unknown

areas which it would be approaching.
But I don't think it would take long
to begin to get into worthwhile work.
Mr. Mathews in the previous article
has listed a few possible research proj-
ects, and there are hundreds of others
already outlined in various founda-
tions, research institutions and uni-
versities that are not under way sim-
ply because they cannot be funded.
It is really time to get moving on sci-
entific peace research, which for a
relatively modest amount of money
might enable mankind at last to solve
the problem of war.

WILL RUSSIA AND CHINA GO TO WAR?

Harrison Salisbury argues in this book that war may erupt between the U.S.S.R. and China unless the U.S. acts to head it off—but the reviewer wonders whether Salisbury has weighed all, or only part, of the evidence.

BY GLEN D. CAMP, JR.

Harrison Salisbury has written a journalistic hair-raiser with a clear and frightening thesis: nuclear war between China and Russia will break out unless the United States develops an effective policy to stop it. Only the U.S. can transform the impending disaster into a new and stable world order.

The thesis is generally well pre-
sented. Yet like a competent lawyer's
brief, the thesis is persuasive without
being totally convincing. The feeling
remains that a superlative artist has
somehow and perhaps subconsciously
selected from the myriad of facts, in-
tuitions, and generalizations avail-
able those designed to support a pre-
conceived conclusion: war is on the
way and the U.S. must act to stop it.

For one thing, despite various
caveats against "hortatory rhetoric,"
the fact is that Salisbury clearly ac-
cepts Sir Halford Mackinder's geo-
political gobbledygook. Mongolia is
"a pivot stone of history, just as Mac-
kinder described it." All this despite
the fact that Salisbury specifically
recognizes that Mackinder himself
was never sure just where the "Heart-
land" was! Surely Salisbury's thesis
would stand or fall without dragging

Glen D. Camp, Jr., is an assistant professor of political science at Long Island University-Brooklyn Center.

WAR BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
CHINA. By Harrison E. Salisbury.
W. W. Norton. 224 pp. $4.95.

in Mackinder, or Germany's version
of the same doctrine as presented by
Karl Haushoffer, or the Japanese
form of the theory as argued (al-
legedly) by Baron Giichi Tanaka in
the Tanaka Memorial of 1927.

The feeling of subconscious skew-
ing is reinforced by the imbalance in
Salisbury's presentation of Russia's
and China's attitudes. His chapter on
"The View from the Russian Side"
reflects his long years of reporting on
the Soviet Union for the *New York
Times*, while his account of Chinese
attitudes, on the other hand, seems
to lack the detailed knowledge of the
area specialist. Occasionally jour-
nalistic concinnity of style leads to
errors of fact: "As the bearer and
guardian of culture, China never
relinquished her sway over lands
once they fell within her orbit."
Salisbury's brilliant account of Czar-
ist Russia's *Drang nach Osten* into
former Chinese vassal lands refutes
this error.

The impression of a lawyer's brief
based on an adversary approach to
evidence would also have been par-
tially overcome if Salisbury had given
sources for his statements. It would
very much improve the credibility of

his account if we knew who told Salis-
bury that Mao was "three times ex-
pelled" from the Chinese Communist
Party.

Salisbury's specialized knowledge
of Russia, however, is shown in a
superb description of the Sino-Rus-
sian "unequal treaties." His analysis
of the diplomatic and military back-
ground of the Treaty of Nerchinsk
in the 17th century and the Aigun,
Peking, and Ili treaties in the 19th
century is vivid and clear.

A Strange Reversal

He is also superb in his account of
Moscow's view of Mao as the "Peck's
bad boy" of Asian communism.
Salisbury traces the complex story of
the political love affair between Sta-
lin and Chiang Kai-shek, between
the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and the Kuomintang. He cor-
rectly points out the strange reversal
by which the Chinese Communists
now revere the memory of their great
Soviet enemy, Stalin, while the So-
viet Communists must remain ambiv-
alent toward their former "semi-un-
person" leader. Salisbury's analysis of
Russian prejudice against Asians and
of Stalin's efforts to support a weak
nationalist rather than a strong com-
munist party in China is impressive.

In his chapter on the "Secret His-
tory of the Korean War," Salisbury's

18

WAR/PEACE REPORT

knowledge, analytical gifts, and clear
style join to produce a compelling
story. The reader sits on the edge of
his chair as Salisbury argues that
"China had nothing to do whatever
with the Korean" War, that Stalin
was its real instigator, and that Harry
Truman was wrong in seeing it as "a
Communist Chinese threat, not sim-
ply a North Korean blow and cer-
tainly not a Soviet blow." Salisbury is
honest and blunt in criticizing Tru-
man for being fooled and in blaming
Acheson for his National Press Club
speech of January 12, 1950. Salisbury
holds that by leaving Korea outside
the U.S. "defensive perimeter," Ache-
son may well have provided "the
trigger which touched off Korea."

Salisbury gives many effective, in-
deed frightening, arguments in sup-
port of his thesis that nuclear war be-
tween China and Russia is inevitable
unless the U.S. acts to stop it. There
is first the endemic racial hatred so
little understood in the West and so
hotly denied by Moscow. Beyond
that, there is Chinese resentment over
the land taken from China by Czar-
ist Russia, as detailed in Peking's
1952 *Short History* and 1964 *Concise
Geography*. Salisbury suggests these
territorial claims of "China irre-
denta" total about 5½ million square
kilometers, including 1½ million
square kilometers of "unequal trea-
ties" land plus such odd lots of So-
viet real estate as all of the Soviet
republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia,
Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan! With
Outer Mongolia tossed in, this adds
up to about 20 million souls of So-
viet and Mongolian extraction! And
beyond these specific causes of ten-
sion, there is a natural great-power
rivalry between the two communist
giants.

There are also domestic factors op-
erating on both sides to exacerbate
relations, Salisbury notes. He consid-
ers pressures for "Chinese Lebens-
raum" to be a present reality, point-
ing out that the population of China
is now about a billion and that it
will swell to two billion by the 21st
century, making one-third of the hu-
man race Chinese. On the Soviet side,
Salisbury shares the view of many
Western observers that Russia's cur-
rent leaders are uninspired, that they
have shown no ability to cope with
domestic problems. He concludes
that the "incentive to pursue a bel-
ligent policy toward China for
purely domestic political reasons is
strong."

Then there are strategic problems
that could lead to nuclear war be-
tween China and Russia. These in-
clude an enormous 4,500-mile com-
mon border as well as the ominous
growth of China's stockpile of nu-
clear weapons and ICBMs. The
pressure within the Soviet Union to
"strangle the dragon in its cradle," to
launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike
against China, Salisbury points out,
is remarkably similar to the argu-
ment for striking the Soviet Union
voiced in the U.S. during the 1950s.

Salisbury never tells us explicitly
whether he thinks the Soviets could
"win" a war against China, but he
seems to doubt it. He is certain that
China would rely upon protracted
guerrilla "people's war" lasting per-
haps 100 years or more. He is also
certain that Moscow is so blinded by
chauvinism that it cannot understand
Chinese internal politics any more
than it could comprehend. Czecho-
slovak politics. As part of his argu-
ment on this point, Salisbury suggests
the existence of a "military-industrial

complex” à la Russe. He sees the
U.S.S.R. as succumbing to the Rus-
sian brass, and the development of
a “creeping Bonapartism.” There
is simply no civilian “dove” faction
among Kremlin leaders prepared to
argue against a “military solution”
to Russia’s problems with China.
Salisbury is also sure that in case of
a Soviet attack, morale would remain
higher in China than in the U.S.S.R.,
particularly since the Russians are
now a “have” people with more than
their chains to lose. The younger gen-
eration in China, on the other hand,
has been trained in “battle, hardship,
sacrifice.”

Lastly, Salisbury gives a theological
cast to the Sino-Soviet dispute. "What
lends special ferocity to the battle of
Communist against Communist," he
notes, "is the quasi-religious quality
of doctrine and belief." He paints a
grim vision of internecine war be-
tween the rival Romes of world com-
munism and suggests that the rest of

the world could be dragged into the
battle.

In his final chapter, Salisbury an-
swers "No . . . But" to the question,
"Is War Inevitable?" However, there
is no ambiguity in his assertion: "If
events are permitted to continue on
the present pattern war will become
inevitable." After admitting that
Mao's death might bring about a
Sino-Soviet rapprochement, Salisbury
suggests this is a long shot.

It really comes down to the United
States, he contends. Only we "can
affect the outcome of the conflict" or
"prevent its outbreak." Salisbury
would have us end the Vietnam War,
declare Formosa to be a question to
be resolved only by the Chinese, estab-
lish diplomatic relations with Peking,
and help set up a world food pool
on which China could draw as a mat-
ter of right. It does strain one's sense
of credulity that Salisbury would
have the Soviets (together with Aus-
tralia, Canada, and the U.S.) feed
their arch enemies, the Communist
Chinese. It is also hard to believe that
the Soviet Union would change its
policy simply because the cost of such
a feeding program could be paid by
"merely a diversion of fractions of
the sums spent on armaments." Such
an argument is surely rational, but
would it be effective with the very
Kremlin hawks Salisbury has just
told us control Soviet policy?

Not Yet a Reality

China's obligations in return for
this outpouring of Soviet and West-
ern altruism would be only to in-
crease its own food production and
keep its population stable, in part by
the use of outside technical aid.

What are we to make of Salisbury's
thesis? Is war between Russia and
China inevitable unless we Americans
adopt policies we show no intention
of adopting? The smug answer, of
course, is that so far Salisbury is
wrong, for the Chinese have not cut
their population growth nor is the
world food pool in existence. Yet
Salisbury's war is not yet a reality a
year after his book was written. Per-
haps he did not see the "balance of
terror" as an effective obstacle to war,
a more effective obstacle than the
pressures for war which he so elo-
quently adduces.

Salisbury has nevertheless produced
a hair-raiser of a book that does not
encourage complacency. It is a book
worth reading for the knowledge it
offers, for the solution it proposes,
and for the vision of nuclear Arma-
geddon it suggests we act now to
avoid.

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

19

ON THE PEACE FRONT

Vietnam Study Scores Saigon Regime

The present situation in Vietnam is "both much worse and, at the same time, more hopeful than we had anticipated," reports the recent Vietnam factfinding mission to South Vietnam sponsored by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a religious pacifist organization with headquarters in Nyack, N. Y.

While the mission observed that political repression in South Vietnam is "extreme," it found hope in the strong desire of the Vietnamese people for peace and self-determination. The resolution of the conflict in Vietnam, the mission's report concludes, requires the cessation of U.S. support of the Thieu-Ky regime.

The factfinding group was comprised of delegations from the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands. During their eight days in Vietnam, they met with lawyers, labor leaders, writers, student groups, religious leaders, intellectuals, politicians, rice farmers in the fields, American soldiers, and U.S. Deputy Ambassador Samuel D. Berger.

Besides noting that "police agents are everywhere," the mission's report cites several examples of political repression under the Thieu-Ky regime:

* "We learned that when Vietnamese speak out for peace, the government jails them on the pretext that anyone who opposes the government must be pro-Communist." Frequently, the government arrests dissenters under the An Tri law, which allows individuals to be imprisoned on a renewable basis of from six months to two years without a trial.

* In the last three months many Vietnamese, especially students, have been tortured at interrogation centers.

* Newspapers that publish stories critical of the government are frequently confiscated by the police before they reach the stands.

If the U.S. would withdraw its support of the Thieu-Ky regime, the mission's report says, a "genuine and workable" coalition government could be developed. The report concludes: "There will not be peace in Vietnam until there is a government of peace in Saigon."

Participants in the delegation from the U.S. included Dr. David Hunter, deputy general secretary of the National Council of Churches; Sister Mary Luke Tobin, representing the Catholic Peace Fellowship; Sam Brown, former coordinator of the Vietnam Moratorium Committee;

Dorothy Cotton, director of the citizenship education program of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and Rabbi Balfour Brickner, director of interfaith activities of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

PUBLISHERS AND PEACE

Two groups of publishers have organized to work for peace. One, Publishers for Peace, is comprised of editors and staff members from about 150 publishing houses, most of which are located in the New York metropolitan area. The other is Peace Publishing Company, which was formed by a group of employees of American Heritage Publishing Company, also located in New York.

Publishers for Peace, which was organized soon after the invasion of Cambodia by U.S. troops, will hold a literary auction Oct. 1 in New York City to raise money for peace candidates who are running for Congress. The recipients of the campaign funds will be chosen from candidates throughout the country.

In June, Publishers for Peace sponsored a "Day of Action," when several hundred publishing employees held work stoppages and attended seminars, campaigned for candidates opposed to the war in Indochina, and collected signatures for petitions supporting the McGovern-Hatfield amendment.

Peace Publishing Company was formed "to act as an independent publishing service agency for anti-war committees and peace candidates." The group plans to prepare, at cost, pamphlets, brochures, posters, and position papers to aid congressional campaigns, peace drives and other efforts to promote an end to the war.

Dr. Bernard Weisberger, associate editor of *American Heritage* magazine, is president of Peace Publishing, and Charles L. Mee, Jr., editor of *Horizon*, is the executive editor.

The headquarters of Publishers for Peace is located at 1059 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10021; Peace Publishing Company is at 551 Fifth Avenue, also in New York City.

ARAB-ISRAELI STUDY SET

A group of Arab, Israeli and American scholars is undertaking a broad-ranging research project to promote a peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis under the sponsorship of the Fund for Peace, a New York educational foundation.

The Arab-Israeli Research and Re-

James N. Rosenberg, WPR Sponsor

James N. Rosenberg, who was a member of the board of sponsors of *War/Peace Report* from 1965 onward, died on July 21 at the age of 96.

His life was not only long; it was full. After a career as a lawyer during which he was involved in some of the major corporate reorganizations of the first half of this century, Rosenberg retired at the age of 62 to devote full time to his painting. His works now hang in more than 25 museums in the United States, including the Smithsonian Institution, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston and the Fogg Art Museum of Harvard University.

He was concerned with public affairs throughout his life. In 1921 he worked with Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in the food program of the American Relief Administration in the Soviet Union, and in 1924 he formed and headed an organization that moved 300,000 Soviet Jews from the ghetto to the rich soil of the Crimea.

In 1947 Rosenberg worked for passage of the Genocide Convention, which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly the following year. In recent years he had been pressing a proposal that would grant the World Court compulsory jurisdiction over all the nations of the world without giving the court any enforcement powers. Rosenberg argued that the judgments of the court would be respected without the threat of force behind them. He made his case in an article, "A Way to Bring Life to the World Court," in the August, 1965, issue of this magazine.

20

WAR/PEACE REPORT

lations Project (A.I.R.R.P.) was de-
veloped because "the issues in the
Middle East which threaten the se-
curity of the entire world cannot be
allowed to drift or be solved by
force," said Joseph Lyford, president
of the Fund.

The A.I.R.R.P. will conduct studies
on two levels. First, significant his-
torical events will be analyzed for
clues that they may have to offer
about previous attempts to reconcile
the Arabs and the Jews. Second, the
project will study contemporary
political questions and attempt to
add new insights to them.

One specific project that has al-
ready been planned is an examina-
tion of the entire range of Arab-Jew-
ish negotiations, dating back as far as
50 years. The study will focus on the
Palestinian question, on the implica-
tions of a confrontation between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union in the
Middle East, and on little-publicized
ideas for conciliation that have
been suggested by nongovernmental
sources in both Israel and the Arab
countries.

The steering committee that will
supervise the research project includes
Professors Don Peretz of the State
University of New York at Bing-
hamton and Ahmed Haffar of the
State University of New York at New
Paltz, and Simha Flapan, editor of
*The New Outlook* in Tel Aviv.

The A.I.R.R.P. has been endorsed
by 46 leading scholars, including
David Riesman of Harvard, Marvin
Zonis of the University of Chicago,
Elise Boulding of the University of
Colorado, and Erich Fromm.

NEW CHINA POLICY SOUGHT

A new U.S. policy toward China
that recognizes "that the People's Re-
public of China is the sole legitimate
government of China" is the aim of
the recently-created Committee for
New China Policy. Such a policy, the
Committee states, "must inevitably
lead to a new approach by the United
States toward Asia as a whole."

Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, pro-
fessor of history and political science
at the University of Chicago and City
University of New York, is national
chairman of the Committee.

In a statement of its policy, the
Committee announced that the U.S.
government should:

* Recognize that Taiwan is Chinese territory (as the U.S. did prior to the Korean War) and accept the position that it has no responsibility for determining the future status of Taiwan.

* Refrain from intervention in China's internal affairs, withdraw American forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait, and terminate all military and economic aid to Chinese Nationalist authorities.

* End the current policy of military encirclement and trade embargo of China.

* Bring the American involve-
ment in the Indochina war to a
speedy, and unconditional conclu-
sion since the continuation of that
involvement increases the possibility
of war with China.

* Acknowledge that the govern-
ment of the People's Republic of
China is the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of China in the United Na-
tions.

* Establish economic, social, cul-
tural and diplomatic relations with
the People's Republic of China on
the basis of the principles of equality,

mutual respect and non-intervention
in each other's affairs.

The Committee's plan of action is
divided into five major areas: proj-
ects involving Congress, the news
media and the U.N., developing edu-
cational materials, and promoting in-
ternational exchanges of U.S. and
Chinese scholars, students, scientists
and journalists.

The Committee for New China
Policy's national board, which is
comprised of 40 leaders from the aca-
demic, business and religious com-
munities, includes Professors Noam
Chomsky, of the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology; Rhoads Mur-
phey, director of the Center for Chi-
nese Studies at the University of
Michigan, and Dr. John C. Bennett,
president of the Union Theological
Seminary.

The Committee's office is Room
9H, 777 United Nations Plaza, New
York, N.Y. 10017. Thomas Manton
is general secretary.

Comparative Studies in
Society and History

Volume 12, Number 4. October 1970

RITUAL AND CULTURE

N. ROSS CRUMCRINE Ritual Drama and Culture Change

URBAN AND NON-URBAN TRADITION (AFRICA)

FREDERICK C. GAMST Peasantries and Elites Without Urbanism: The Civilization of Ethiopia

PAUL WHEATLEY The Significance of Traditional Yoruba Urbanism

MILLENNIALISM

KITSIRI MALALGODA Millennialism in Relation to Buddhism

WAR AND DEMOGRAPHY

JOHN LUCKACS The Transmission of Life: Certain Generalizations about the Demography of Europe's Nations in 1939-41

REVIEW ARTICLES

By RONDO CAMERON, BERENICE A. CARROLL, and SIDNEY RATNER

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

EDITORIAL COMMENT ON VOLUME 12

BOOKS RECEIVED

INDEX TO VOLUME 12

Subscription price $8.50

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

21

LISTENING POST

A Plea for the 'Third Force' in Vietnam

This book, unfortunately, is really several embryonic books, each with a
different purpose and directed to a different audience. It is a combination
of poignant vignettes, systematic political analysis, a passionate call to action
and, lastly, a collection of documents in the appendix constituting a full
third of the book.

Together, the eloquent mixture
of *genres* doesn't quite jell. The dif-
ficulty is that the vignettes are sand-
wiched in with the call for action,
which is interspersed with the dis-
passionate political analysis.

In addition, the book suffers from
having been written in a variety of
styles that are addressed to different
audiences. Is Mr. Hassler appealing
to an audience open to the Christian
message? Or to the *Realpolitiker* in
the Pentagon war room whose policy
prescription of Vietnamization has
been described as "changing the
color of the corpses"? Or is the book
aimed at the average American who
is not sure where My Lai is, but is
disturbed by what he hears about the
massacre from Walter Cronkite?

Mr. Hassler should have decided
whom he wanted to reach and then
written accordingly. For example,
the concluding chapter on "Why We
Are in Vietnam" should have been
the first if the author was trying to
reach the average American. The
chapter is clear, simply written and
persuasive. It serves as an admirable
introduction.

The vignettes might be left as they
are, for many offer striking descrip-
tions of people, movements and
events. I shall not soon forget the
"47 children under eight years of
age" at the Chi Hoa showcase prison
in Saigon. Nor the descriptions of
physical torture at the various inter-
rogation centers, nor the tiger cages
of Con Son Island that were "dis-
covered" recently by the American
news media. Nor Marshal Ky's can-
dor in telling Mr. Hassler and others
that his Saigon government would
survive about three days without U.S.
support! Finally, I shall not soon
forget the monk Thich Nhat Hanh
defining Buddhism as "a search for
truth with the knowledge that when
you find it, it will be a lie."

The political analyses in the book
should have been organized into
separate chapters. As it is presented,
it is difficult for the reader to assess

SAIGON, U.S.A. By Alfred Hassler.
Richard W. Baron (243A E. 49 St.,
New York, N.Y.). 281 pp. $6.95.

such information as the fact that the
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects have
about one million members each,
while some 1.5 million South Vietna-
mese, or 10 per cent of the popula-
tion, are Roman Catholics strongly
"ideologized" against Hanoi and the
National Liberation Front.

At times the reader, even a pro-
fessor of political science, is tossed
into a raging tide of the unfamiliar
without an explanatory life preserver
or even a glossary. For example, who
led the *phong trao tranh dau* or
struggle movement which erupted in
Hue and Danang? "Third Force"
Buddhists? N. L. F.? Or was it simply
a popular uprising against the in-
effable Marshal Ky of the Steve
Canyon scarfs and silk jumpsuited
wife?

Nonviolent Approach

The book should have ended with
the engaged plea for support which,
instead, constitutes the penultimate
chapter eight, "They Call It a 'Third
Solution.'" Mr. Hassler, as the na-
tional executive secretary of the
Fellowship of Reconciliation, clearly
supports the five-point ceasefire pro-
gram of the "Third Force" as well
as the nonviolent approach or
*satyagraha* of the Overseas Vietna-
mese Buddhist Association. He as-
sures us that this approach is in-
grained in "the ethos of the people"
of Vietnam.

Mr. Hassler's thesis is that a Third
Force exists, that it toppled former
Premier Diem as well as various
other pro-war premiers from office,
and that it is powerful enough to
protect Vietnam from a communist
takeover if the United States would
stay neutral. The main points of
the Third Force's ceasefire program
are: replacement of the present Sai-
gon government by an appointed but

truly representative interim govern-
ment, a ceasefire issued by the interim
government to all Saigon troops,
negotiations with the N.L.F. for free
elections under mutually acceptable
international supervision, and com-
plete withdrawal of American troops.

Elsewhere, Mr. Hassler calls for
neutralization of South Vietnam and
of all Southeast Asia. Presumably he
would agree that the five-point pro-
gram for a ceasefire must be based
upon international great power
agreements, for only hard political
reality can serve as the bedrock of a
durable peace structure.

G. D. C., JR.

THE DESTRUCTION OF INDO-
CHINA—A LEGACY OF OUR
PRESENCE. Stanford Biology
Study Group (Box 3742, Stanford,
Calif. 94305). 9 pp. $.25.

The Stanford Biology Study
Group, which studied the ecological
effects of the war in Indochina, con-
cludes in this report that the legacy
of the United States presence in
Indochina is the destruction of that
area. The U.S. is not waging a war
against an army, the Study Group
claims, but "against a people and
the land they live on."

Donald Kennedy, professor and
chairman of the Department of Bio-
logical Sciences at Stanford Uni-
versity and co-author of the report,
states in the introduction that the
central question is a simple one:
"How can we claim to be acting on
behalf of people when our action
itself is prohibiting a future for
them?"

The U.S. Army's use of defoliation
and crop destruction as weapons of
war, the report says, has resulted in
starvation, disease, malnutrition and
birth defects. Both the U.S. and
South Vietnamese governments have
suppressed reports of the danger and
destructiveness of these methods of
warfare, the study charges.

Another ecological hazard, the re-
port points out, is American bomb-
ing. Besides killing and maiming
people, the bombing has transformed
rice paddies and forests into a "lunar
landscape."

In conclusion, the report says that
the U.S. government is "producing
devastating, long-term ecological
damage" that will leave Indochina
"a crippled land," long after the
memories of the war fade.

22

WAR/PEACE REPORT

WHO SHALL LIVE? MAN'S CONTROL OVER BIRTH AND DEATH. A Report Prepared for the American Friends Service Committee. Hill & Wang (72 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y. 10011). 144 pp. $1.75.

The original objective of this report was "an exploration of the implications of abortion from the Quaker point of view." But during the course of their study, the authors realized that their task would be a more far-reaching one.

The implications of abortion, the authors found, were inseparable from their concern for the quality of life of the individual, family and society.

The report concludes that the birth rate must be reduced significantly in order to advance human welfare and to maintain a balance between population and resources. Although they favor contraception as the best means of birth control, the authors argue that even abortion is preferable to the misery of an unwanted birth. No woman should be forced to bear an unwanted child, they say. A woman should be able to have a safe, legal abortion if she wants one.

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

### Would Civilian Defense Work?

To the Editor:

My over-all reaction to Gene Sharp's presentation of the case for civilian defense (April issue) is one of sympathy with his objectives but pessimism about their scope of effectiveness in the real world.

There would be no doubt about the effectiveness of the technique he discusses if one grants his two key assumptions. These are, namely, that the people doing the resisting are trained, organized, disciplined and united in their objectives in opposition to their invaders, an assumption he identifies explicitly but does not particularly discuss, and that the invaders are gentlemen, an assumption he does not even mention.

The first assumption could possibly be met in a country like Switzerland. It obviously would not have been a reasonable assumption even in a country like Czechoslovakia, considered before the Soviet invasion, still less in a country like South Vietnam.

The second assumption—that the invading or occupying power is gentlemanly—may, if it is sufficiently well satisfied, actually weaken somewhat the dependence on the first assumption. Thus, Gandhi and his followers could operate successfully against the British colonial forces in India in support of

the Indian independence movement. I could easily imagine that the U.N. forces in Cyprus could be dislodged by such tactics if the Cypriotes chose to use them. But no conceivable degree of training, organization and cohesiveness of the South Vietnamese would serve to expel a North Vietnamese occupation if the occupation were once achieved. An occupying power that is willing to execute people by the tens or hundreds of thousands, possibly even by the millions, and is willing to be quite ruthless in executing, say, every tenth member of a village every week until the village either submits or is eliminated, is not going to be dislodged by such tactics. For instance, if the Poles had attempted to use such tactics against Hitler in 1939, they would simply have succeeded in eliminating that many more Poles. Or, consider East Germans trying to use such tactics against the Soviets in 1945 or 1946.

As an especially easy current case, consider the situation in Israel. If the Israelis were once occupied by the Egyptians and other Arab forces, they might not survive in any case, but their prospects for survival would surely only be degraded by the use of the tactics that Sharp suggests.

The Israeli case reminds me of Jerusalem, which reminds me of the isolated-outpost problem more generally, perhaps better exemplified by West Berlin. Defense problems of this kind cannot conceivably even be approached by the use of what Sharp calls civilian defense.

D. G. BRENNAN
Hudson Institute
Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.

## CHINA REPORT

An Indian journal (bimonthly) for the study of contemporary Chinese and related Asian affairs. Each issue contains some of the best Indian thought and scholarship. Last issue contains:

### In a Recent Issue:

China and the U.S.S.R.—Problems of Peace and Power

The Promising Triangle

Pomp and Politics in Nepal

Mao's Unfinished Revolution

China's Domestic Scene: A Review

Some Aspects of Myrdal's 'Asian Drama'

Other features include: Book Reviews, Documentation on India-China Relations and Background Articles.

### Annual Subscription

For Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia—30s; and for U.S.A., Canada, and Latin America—$4.00 by surface mail. Airmail charges extra.

Editorial & Business Offices:
5, Hailey Road, New Delhi, India

## FOR CIVILIAN 'ATTACK'

To the Editor:

Gene Sharp, in his interesting article "National Defense Without Armaments," is perhaps ignoring another more fruitful approach—civilian "attack." Professor Sharp proposes a passive civilian defense system to replace the reliance of a nation state on weapons systems. Such a defense might solve the tremendous costs of armament within the old rotting framework of nation states, but it would do little to change the world.

Could we not turn passive defense around? Could we not use nonviolent resistance for a United Nations "army"? Let us take the Middle East crisis as

AUGUST/SEPTEMBER, 1970

23

an example. What would happen if the U.N. sent in a half-million unarmed volunteers in white uniforms to sit between the Egyptians and Israelis—to march into their lines and talk and talk and talk peace and compromise?

Volunteers could be human shields or buffers between warring states or warring factions within a state. Men, women and children drawn from all the nations of the world would offer their lives and honor in the name of peace. Modern logistics could sustain them as armies numbering in the millions were in World War II. What would or could a nation do with even 100,000 outsiders beseeching in the streets and standing in the battle lines in the name of peace?

Is there anything standing in the way of the General Assembly modifying the current U.N. military organization to carry out such assignments? It would be difficult to raise, contain and lead such volunteers—but massed thousands, devoted to an ideal and on the side of the angels, would be hard to stop and hard to deny.

Professor Sharp's weakest point is the passivity and negative stance that his defense requires. It ignores the need of men to try and change and improve the system—to evolve a world that has universal laws and that needs only the local policemen and courts to provide civilian defense.

ROBERT E. NEUMANN

San Rafael, Calif.

## APPEAL TO THE SOURCE

To the Editor:

The article by Gene Sharp, "National Defense Without Armaments," gives us a new look at what can be done against the threat of tyranny.

In one respect, however, I think the concept of civilian defense could be broadened. I refer to its positive utilization by the peacekeeping and peace-making elements to be found at the source of the threat itself. For example, in Russia there must be a sizable minority who deplore the arms race and the treatment of Czechoslovakia. No doubt the militarism in our own country gives little encouragement to the peaceseeking element of the population. A systematic and nonviolent appeal on the part of the freedom-lovers of Czechoslovakia to the humanitarian elements in Russia should in time bring results.

So let us add to the weapons of the nonviolent arsenal the closest possible contact between the peace elements of nations. This should involve not only language study, but appreciation of art,

Addressee:

music and poetry across national boundaries.

REV. PAUL S. BURDICK

Waterford, Conn.

## EXCHANGE OF HOSTAGES

To the Editor:

Gene Sharp's article, "National Defense Without Armaments," is interesting and provocative. It seems to me, though, that it is an unrealistic idea, given the current state of mind of the American people as a whole, as seen in the polls on My Lai, Cambodia and Vietnam. I imagine that small groups in some areas could be convinced of the validity and effectiveness of non-violent resistance, but the bulk of the people are simply not ready for this kind of innovative thinking.

An idea which I think might possibly be more workable is the peace hostage plan: a detente with Russia could be created by large numbers of U.S. and Soviet citizens living and working in each other's country for long periods of time. Our current detente with Russia seems to be based on a scorpions-in-the-bottle balance of terror that is both irrational and perilous. I think an idea such as citizen exchange has psychological validity and is perhaps innovative enough to hold the attention of the American people, who still apparently believe that military weapons give "security."

A private organization, the Citizens Exchange Corps, is working on this plan and has helped to send 1,500 Americans to Russia on study-exchange visits of 3 weeks' duration, and more than 500 Russians have visited the U.S. since the idea originated in 1962. War/

Peace Report readers interested in participating in one of the exchanges should write to Citizen Exchange Corps, 10 W. 46th St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

RUTH HELLER

Kentfield, Calif.

## ABSTRACTORS SOUGHT

To the Editor:

Peace Research Abstracts Journal, now in its seventh volume of publication, contains abstracts (summaries) of articles, books, reports and conference papers on subjects related to war/peace issues and international affairs. Every month 750 published abstracts, classified according to subject, are received by subscribers around the world including leading universities, parliamentary libraries and peace research institutes.

The Journal, which has had support from UNESCO, is an official publication of the International Peace Research Association and is published by the Canadian Peace Research Institute.

The abstracting work is done by about 70 volunteer abstractors around the world; they include teachers, librarians, professors, journalists, chemists, university-educated women and others.

(This work can be done at home.)

If any of your readers would be interested in abstracting a journal (War/Peace Report is already being done), please tell them to name the journal and write to Drs. Alan and Hanna Newcombe, editors, Peace Research Abstracts, 25 Dundana Ave., Dundas, Ont., Canada.

HANNA NEWCOMBE

Ont., Canada

## DO YOU KNOW PEOPLE WHO SHOULD BE READING WAR/PEACE REPORT?

We'll send a free sample copy to each person you suggest!

Undoubtedly you know people-both close friends and relatives as well as acquaintances in positions dealing with public affairs-who would be interested in reading War/Peace Report. If you will send us a list of their names and addresses, we will send each one of them a recent issue of the magazine at no charge. We hope, of course, they will want to subscribe.

WAR/PEACE REPORT
218 East 18th St.
New York, N.Y. 10003

December 7, 1970

Henry -

In view of our luncheon discussion
at Blair House on Thursday, I thought you
might like to see the enclosed.

RECEIVED
DEC 7 1970
CENTRAL FILES

Franklin D. Murphy

KISSINGER, HENRY A./NEWPAPERS-CLIPPINGS

DEC 18 1970

Dear Mr. Healy:

Thank you for sending me your article on
Jeannine Cusson. I share your high estima-
tion of her and appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Mr. Paul Healy
The News
1272 National Press Building
Washington, D. C. 20004

jlp:12/17/70

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEC 18 1970

Dear Wiley:

Many thanks for your note of December 14.
It was indeed most interested in the enclosure.

It was good to see you again too -- it has been
much too long since we have had a change to
talk. Please do call after the first.

Happy holidays.

Honorable Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr.
1100 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20037

jlp:12/17/70

# Colombia

a tool of a “repressive” and
“capitalistic” society.

On the labor front, Italian
journalists struck for 24
hours and shut down most
of the nation's newspapers
and the state-run news
agency, Ansa. They planned
to strike again Tuesday in
demand of a contract re-
newal.

## For the Record

* The Paris City Council came under a mounting attack as it wavered over its previous decision to rename the Place de L'Etoile after the late Gen. Charles de Gaulle.

* Premier George Papadopoulos took control of the

WILLY BRANDT
... defends policy

Greek news media into his
own hands today with a for-
mer Colonel and one-time
Communist broadcaster as
his chief aides.

From staff reports and news dispatches

["Hansjakob Stehle: Resümé der Warschauer Verhandlungen (Seite 3)", "DIE WOCHENZEIT", "WOCHENZEITUNG FÜR POLITIK • WIRTSCHAFT • HANDEL & KULTUR", "ERSCHEIN IN\nHAMBURG\nBUENOS AIRES\nTORONTO", "Nr. 47/25. Jahrgang", "Hamburg, den 20. November 1970", "C 751.0", "Preis 1,20 DM", "## Ein Kreuz auf Preußens Grab", "Zum polnischen Vertrag über die", "Oder-Neile-Grenze / Von Marion Gräfin Dönhoff", "Über dem Berg", "Nun it der Vertrag über die Oder-Neile-Grenze fergt auchgehend. Bald wurde die Verzehrte und Wahrzeuge ihn unter- reizigen. Und dann war es nicht nur für sich, sondern die Regierung habe deutsches Land zu- dage, wurde das Kreuz für die Oder-Neile. Es war Adolf Hitler, dessen Befugnis und Gebrochen 700 Jahre lang nicht verboten. Nur brachte er bis hinauf über Herz, die Toderklärungen zu beantragen oder ihr auch zu zuzwangen. Die Verzehrte und Wahrzeuge waren nicht mehr zu ver- heiden. Er war, das hat der Leben und sein jüngstes der Maßstäbe für Leben gesetzt werden. Für den Kreuz- und Preußens Grablandes. Für den Kreuz- und Preu-", "schen Kreuz, die maintenanceen, die die Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in Groß- lande der Bundesrepublik ihrer ofteren Gesellschaft- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in Groß- lande der Bundesrepublik ihrer ofteren Gesellschaft- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert", "werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in Groß- lande der Bundesrepublik ihrer ofteren Gesellschaft- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "dem freizugeben, kann sie dem, der die Loyalität zum Lehnhörern an erster Stelle, son- den die Verworbene mit dem Lande. Wer die Verworbene, wie sie auch den Völkern und den Landen, die sich verhört und verhindert werden kann, ist nicht sein. Dort im Norden, wie alle Familien- und Handels- und Verkehrsconferenzen, die sich mit der Heimat- Heimat verbrannt, die sich durch diejenigen, die im Industriezweigen oder in", "taute tausend zunachst in den Verhandlungen der Allgemeinengelagert von (Nachrichten) Anzeigern, die sich über die Oder-Neile, die sich über die Verzehrte und Wahrzeuge und die Regierung hervorbehalten, die sich über die Verzehrte und W