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of the articles of the draft could be amended in negotiation. For
instance, the draft had suggested that the two parts of Germany
should leave NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps another way
out could be found; and the Soviet Union for its part would have no
objection to Western Germany remaining in NATO and Eastern
Germany in the Warsaw Pact, for a period. After this introduction
Selwyn Lloyd suggested that we might take note of what had been
said and now proceed to discuss disarmament. There then followed
a long, inconclusive, but by no means discouraging, discussion.
After a detailed account of the history of disarmament over the
years in the course of which Khrushchev claimed that the Soviet
Union had been the first to produce the hydrogen bomb and inter-
continental ballistic missile, he added that the only sensible thing to
do was to accept our differences on other issues and at least achieve
common agreement in a disarmament policy. For this he thought
that the best thing would be to have a meeting of Heads of Govern-
ment to work out principles, to give directions to the Foreign
Ministers and then 'lock them up with a limited supply of bread
and water and tell them to reach agreement'. In replying I said that
I found Khrushchev's remarks of great interest, especially the last
suggestion. Gromyko observed that it left open one practical
question—how much bread and water? Khrushchev at once declared
that he and I would settle that matter without difficulty. In the more
serious part of my answer I observed that both of us had seen two
wars. If the first had happened almost by mistake, the second had
been planned and plotted by wicked men. We all agreed that some-
thing must be done to avoid a third tragedy. There had been two
possible methods of approach up to the present. The long and
laborious verbal contests in the United Nations had not led to very
much progress. A Summit meeting of Heads of Governments was
now suggested. But great as was my natural respect for Prime
Ministers, and both Khrushchev and I belonged to that trade union,
I did not see how we could deal with this kind of problem in the
five or six days of a meeting. Could we not tackle the matter by
another method? There were already the scientists working at
Geneva. Could we not get a quick agreement on the stopping of
tests with some reasonable compromise on inspection? It was quite

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true that this would not bring about disarmament; but it would be a
start. Could we not then put the scientists on to study further
questions from the control of nuclear tests to a system of the limita-
tion and inspection and control of armaments, whether conventional
or unconventional, in some area of Europe big or small? Khrushchev
did not quite agree, for he felt that the scientists were often as
prejudiced as the politicians. Indeed at the Surprise Attack Confer-
ence at Geneva a representative of the West had started to ask tech-
nical details about Soviet rockets. There then followed a somewhat
desultory discussion, in which I suspected Khrushchev of trying to
drive a wedge between us and the Americans. Nevertheless the
session ended on a very friendly note, and indeed before we parted
we were able to move on to some quite practical talks about trade
and so-called 'cultural relations'.

We lunched alone at the Embassy, and I was able to get off some
telegrams to my colleagues in London, as well as to our principal
allies, Eisenhower, de Gaulle and Adenauer. I thought it wise to
give them my first impressions. I had meanwhile received from the
President a not altogether discouraging reply to my proposal for a
compromise on the question of control, if an agreement on nuclear
tests could be reached. On the immediate question of Germany, I
had to report to all my friends that Khrushchev had not liked the
proposal for a Foreign Ministers' Conference which we had put
forward in our notes of 16 February. They seemed to him an attempt
to involve the Soviet Government in interminable negotiations since
we had confused issues which were open for early settlement with
others which were more remote. My general impressions which I
sent at some length to the President were as follows:

From the way in which Khrushchev talked to me throughout
yesterday when we were out in the country it was borne in on me
that, in spite of their great new power and wealth, the Russians
are still obsessed by a sense of insecurity. The old bogey of
encirclement has not yet been laid. Like a poor man who has
suddenly made a fortune, they feel uneasy in their new situation
and they are resentful and nervous of their neighbours. When-
ever Khrushchev mentioned the Germans it was possible to sense
his hatred and distrust of them.

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I believe that these feelings of apprehension are just as real as are their misconceptions about Western policy. Khrushchev treated me to a diatribe about mistakes which the West had made in the past and about the evil intentions which it had nurtured towards Russia. He said that we had made a wrong assessment of the situation after Stalin's death. We had counted on internal difficulties to enable us to extract concessions. We had even thought 'liberalism' might appear in Russia. We had tried to impose conditions and had followed slogans of containment, roll-back and liberation. Such concessions could not be wrung out of the Soviet Union. He did not accuse us of actually wanting war, but said that we had created an atmosphere of war.

In the afternoon Selwyn Lloyd and I paid a visit to Moscow University. The University building was a vast skyscraper, lavishly adorned with towers, pinnacles, turrets and arches, together with gigantic statues. If not classically beautiful, it was certainly impressive. We were received by the Rector, Ivan G. Petrovsky, and, in replying to an address of welcome, I said that I trusted that we would be able to arrange exchange visits from students, since we had much to learn from each other. I also expressed the hope that there would be a far greater number of English books circulated in Russia: 'There are other authors besides Dickens, just as there are other authors besides Tolstoy'. I was presented with a two-volume history of Moscow University and a small plaque. In return I gave the library a four-volume edition of Shakespeare's works and an illustrated book about the city of Oxford. When the students were gathered to meet me in the hall there was a dense crowd including lecturers, Press correspondents and officials. The students gave me a warm and even enthusiastic welcome, especially when I referred to some of the great sons of the University such as Lermontov, Chekhov, Turgenev and others whose writings were well known to us in England. At the same time I spoke of the newer Russian authors who were now becoming known among us. Both of us came away from this visit much encouraged. Moreover we were beginning to become known in Moscow and the crowds were friendly.

So far the visit was certainly an outstanding success. The Press

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of the world, in spite of the absence of any official communiqué, had rightly formed the impression that the talks, although still in general terms, had been conducted in a most favourable atmosphere. Moreover those journalists who knew the practice of the Russian Government were astounded by the special compliments which Khrushchev had decided to show his British visitors. His flamboyant nature had led him to almost extravagant demonstrations of friendship on every public occasion. He repeated his declaration that East and West could and should work together. This demonstration of goodwill was especially marked at a dinner for Khrushchev and his colleagues at the British Embassy on the night of 23 February. In proposing the toast of Khrushchev and his colleagues, after referring to the great war-leaders Stalin and Churchill, I recalled

> the brilliant role which you played in the organisation to support the efforts of the armies, particularly at Stalingrad. The battle to which that city has given its name was indeed one of the most decisive turning-points of the war. You must be proud indeed to have played so large a part in that victory.

This compliment to Khrushchev, who was particularly proud of his war efforts, was received with beaming, almost pickwickian smiles. I continued on the same note:

> When we think of those days of close comradeship between us, I, for one, am sad. It is no use pretending that since the war ended our relations have been anything like what they were in the face of the common danger. In those days, of course, we had a common interest; we were indeed both mortally threatened. No wonder we combined against a common enemy.

> But when I reflect upon the present situation in the world, I wonder whether we have not at least as great a common interest today. That common interest is Peace. Let us combine for Peace.

In his reply, after he had paid me a number of compliments, Khrushchev added:

> What we like in our discussions with you is your frankness and understanding of the interests not only of your country and your side, but also of our country and our side. This is pleasing to us because such an approach makes it easier to find reasonable solutions that could satisfy both countries, both sides.

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There followed a passage which was considered very significant.

We greatly regret, just as you do, that it was not possible to maintain after the war that spirit of co-operation and friendship which arose in the battles against the common enemy.

We understand that the original cause of this lies in the difference between our social systems. But by now, it seems, enough time has passed and the situation has sufficiently changed for us to recognise that the difference between our systems must not create obstacles to the establishment of friendly relations between our peoples, between our countries.

The social conditions in one country or another depend on the will of the people of the given country. We must recognise this fact, just as we recognise that the sun rises every morning, and must proceed from the fact that we live under different systems, but on one planet; that we breathe the same air, enjoy the blessings of nature and the warmth of the same sun.

It was at this dinner that Khrushchev proposed the health of the Queen and the Royal Family. In the course of the evening I presented Khrushchev, on behalf of the British Government, with a beautiful George I walnut bookcase and some silver candlesticks. In addition, there was a silver tea-service and china dinner-service for Mrs. Khrushchev. At the end of the tour he gave me in return some noble gifts including a Russian-made shotgun and a fine gold and malachite box. In addition, experienced journalists observed some other equally significant signs of goodwill. Khrushchev and his colleagues had come to an unprecedented number of entertainments, and come in force. They had stayed late and seemed to enjoy themselves. They had given a great deal of time to the visit and it was already known that Khrushchev himself, together with Gromyko and Mikoyan and other leading ministers, would go with me to Kiev and Leningrad. This was an almost unprecedented favour. In addition, my public speeches were issued immediately by the Russian agencies and were highlighted in the Russian Press. The first three days, therefore, had more than satisfied our expectations.

The next day, 24 February, the Foreign Secretary and I left early in the morning for the Nuclear Research Station at Dubna. Gromyko and Frol Kozlov came with us. The Director explained to us the

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work on which the three hundred scientists employed in this institute were chiefly engaged. Naturally I understood little of what was shown to me, but this would have been equally true in visiting a similar institute at home. The Press again were admitted, and full reports appeared both in the Russian Press and all over the world. One of the points which the Director impressed upon me was that nearly half of these scientists had come from other Socialist countries, stretching from Albania to China.

On our return we found that while we were thus engaged a hundred and twenty miles from Moscow, Khrushchev had delivered an important and at first sight wholly unexpected speech in public. In the course of the afternoon our officials were able to obtain a copy, the text of which was being circulated by the Tass agency all over the world. It was apparently a public speech made as part of his election campaign—for it seemed that a General Election was at the time proceeding. But in a country where these contests are purely formal, the character of the speech could hardly be regarded as a sudden outburst intended only for local consumption. Although the references to our visit were cordial, and there were several passages underlining the desire for friendly relations between Russia and Britain, the whole effect of this sudden and unexpected oration—or declaration—of which we had been given no warning was in the circumstances deplorable. Khrushchev began by blaming Western powers for having proposed a Foreign Ministers' Conference on Germany, while excluding the foreign ministers of Czechoslovakia and Poland, Germany's neighbours and the victims of German aggression. He added

> the West wants to inveigle us in diplomatic talk, in the labyrinth of which the Soviet Union has had many years of experience—a bog without an exit. . . . It would be better if the Great Powers had a meeting of Heads of Government with full powers. . . .

He criticised in harsh terms Eisenhower and Dulles. About Adenauer he was brutally offensive. One of the greatest opponents of Soviet plans was Dr. Adenauer. To him he would say, 'Your policy contradicts the Christian interpretation, and you should reflect about it.' After some friendly words about Egypt and Iraq—'Russia will

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always stand by those who are fighting for liberation and against oppression'—he turned to a violent attack upon the Shah of Iran. The Shah had promised to work for good relations with Russia 'but then we found out about his backstage activities. We know about these secrets ... literally everything.' The Shah had signed, or was about to sign, a pact with the United States. 'The text is already drawn up. We have this text.' The speech ended with an attack upon the 'so-called people's capitalism' in Britain, United States, France and elsewhere. This was a sham; capitalism remained a system dominated by poverty and mass unemployment. The only surprise was the offer of an immediate non-aggression pact with Britain.

The full report of this unexpected and offensive attack, particularly directed against our allies, was brought to us at the Embassy, where Selwyn Lloyd and I were resting. The Press representatives, British and foreign, were buzzing with excitement. Nevertheless, whatever our feelings, the programme had to be fulfilled without interruption.

At 7.30 p.m. there was a reception at the British Embassy, at which the Ambassador was the host and to which a vast number of people had been invited. Khrushchev and all the leading members of his Government again attended—a great compliment. They stayed a long time and were in apparently rollicking form, indulging in a good deal of schoolboy bandying of the usual quips and somewhat heavy jokes. There was a long and bantering exchange with Selwyn Lloyd about the relative merits of Scotch whisky and Californian wine. More serious argument came between Mikoyan and Selwyn Lloyd on the question of 'parity'. This was conducted in public and with good humour, but Khrushchev himself intervened and seemed to enjoy the public raillery, talking freely to the crowd of journalists of all countries. Some of these, including Emrys Hughes, were Labour Members of Parliament, acting as correspondents. The evening was long, the rooms intolerably hot, and at one moment I was overcome with faintness. However, after twenty minutes' rest I came back into the turmoil. At one stage I had a few minutes' talk with Khrushchev in a private room, but neither he nor I referred to the speech, which I knew would by tomorrow fill the Press and command the interest of the Western world.

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After the reception Selwyn Lloyd and I drove out to a *dacha* some miles from Moscow which had been put at our disposal by the Soviet Government. It was a charming house of the usual Russian style, built of birchwood—much polished wood, polished floors, and simple but very comfortable chairs. I was tired and had not yet altogether thrown off the cold which I had when I left England. The night was for sleeping, the morning for reflection.

But reflection involves deliberation—if possible discussion, even debate. In the circumstances in which we found ourselves on the morning of Wednesday 25 February, the Foreign Secretary and I were faced with many difficulties. We had yet no reaction from the British or foreign Press as to the effect of Khrushchev's speech. Harold Evans, assisted by Peter Hope, the Head of the News Department of the Foreign Office, was able to provide us with a clear picture of the messages which the correspondents had filed; and although we had not seen, we could imagine, the headlines. Nor had we any official message from any of the capitals. We must therefore act upon our own initiative and follow our own instincts. Discussion was of course impossible in the guest house, or *dacha*, otherwise so attractive. It is said that walls have ears; certainly these wooden walls and the charming furniture with which we were surrounded would not be lacking in those essential aids to modern diplomacy. We must therefore deliberate outside in the snow, keeping as far as possible, so we had been warned, from the trees in the park; for in these too there were believed to lurk hidden dangers. Khrushchev was coming with his colleagues to lunch with us at 12.30, after which there would be a discussion—this time a vital discussion. So after a lavish breakfast, where caviare usurped the role of marmalade, Selwyn Lloyd and I sallied forth into the grounds of our little estate. You must imagine two middle-aged, not to say elderly, politicians, clothed in fur coats, fur hats and above all the inevitable but essential galoshes, tramping up and down with their advisers and engaged in long and earnest discussion—sotto voce—about a situation which if not immediately dangerous, threatened to become ludicrous. Since there was little material on which to base a judgement, it was clear that we must 'play it by ear'. Having come to this prudent, if somewhat vague, decision, we returned as quickly as

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possible to the well-warmed rooms with their agreeable surroundings.

One of Khrushchev's charms was his inability to hide his feelings. Many of the Russians in high places appeared to be almost wooden in their correctness. These orthodox bureaucrats permitted themselves scarcely any relaxation and, in the presence of the chief, little emotion. But Khrushchev, expansive, irrepressible, eloquent, seemed almost cast from a different mould. All the rest, with a few exceptions, were office-men, and as far as one could see, yes-men. Mikoyan, the sole survivor through many troubled days, in turn Menshevik, Bolshevik, follower of Lenin, of Stalin, of the short Cabinet Government that followed Stalin's death, and now apparently in high favour with Khrushchev, was a subtle oriental of a type who would make his way equally well in London, New York or Moscow. But Khrushchev with all his faults and crudities still gave one an impression of an excitable, petulant, occasionally impossible, but not unlovable extrovert. I wondered what would be his mood when he and his friends came to lunch with us today. I had not long to wait. While he was enjoying all the delicacies which we as nominal hosts provided for our guests, I could see in his face a sly, but rather engaging, expression of a schoolboy who has been caught doing something wrong, is conscious of his culpability, but certainly intends to brazen it out. As we sat down after luncheon, not at the conference table, but in armchairs drawn round the fire, it seemed to me that through the haze of cigar smoke and the fumes of alcohol, he gave me a wink. Oh yes, the speech to his constituents had been very naughty, but it had been great fun.

With Khrushchev came as before Gromyko, Mikoyan and Malik, the Ambassador in London. The Foreign Secretary and I had with us Sir Norman Brook and Sir Patrick Dean. The interpretation was as usual provided by the marvellous Russian interpreter, Mr. Troyanovski. In addition we had Murray, an admirable Russian scholar. We trusted to the Russian interpreter, but we had our own man to check any mistranslation or mistake. This had not been so important at the earlier meetings, but I was determined that now or at any other subsequent talks there should be no excuse for misunderstanding.

I began by thanking him for having devoted so much time to our

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talks. This had been of great assistance to me and my colleagues. I had long been unhappy at the failure of each side to understand the other's point of view and to find the reality that lay below the surface of official documents. In the last few days we at least had been able to see things through each other's eyes. As an example we had been able to discuss freely the problem of detecting atomic tests. I quite understood the Russian fear that any control mechanism which involved visits to each other's territory might be made use of for the purpose of intelligence. I had some new plans on this which I could put forward at the formal meeting on the following day. But the most urgent questions which faced us were those of Berlin, Germany, and European security. These were the matters which Mr. Khrushchev in his speech yesterday had declared that a meeting of Heads of Governments could profitably discuss. Indeed he had dealt with them at some length. Naturally this speech was an important event, both as regards its timing and its content. I did not yet know what effect it would have in the United Kingdom or among our allies or in the Press of the world. I would now like to discuss the situation in the same spirit of frankness as had animated both of us up to now. About the possibility of a conference, I could only speak for myself. The details of time and place and level must be arranged with all the Governments concerned. I was not now going to discuss whether such a conference should be of Heads of Governments or Foreign Ministers, or a combination of both; but I felt strongly that in the period of the next few weeks or months the two sides must get down to a practical discussion of the kind which we had been having in the last few days. Matters must not be allowed to drift into what he had himself called 'a dangerous situation'. At such a conference a settlement must be reached, at least on the main principles, and a determined effort be made to negotiate on all these problems, which, as Khrushchev had rightly said, were linked together. Naturally I did not agree with a good deal that was in his speech, but I did agree that it was necessary to negotiate and to take the poison out of the international situation. So much for the method of our work. As for the substance we could not disguise from ourselves that as a result of the initiative that the Soviet Government had taken about Berlin recently, a very dangerous situation was in prospect.