12

Kissinger: "Nothing in foreign policy for the next four years. Oh, maybe a few things that we have all anticipated. You know, normalization with China, the Middle East, southern Africa, SALT. But these are things we have anticipated. If they happen, Cronkite five-second tell item. What American people are interested in today is background. Now, there are a lot of interviews that I have done in the archives, that I have done with Marvin, that were never used. You know, you can roll those out hour after hour, and that will take care of the American audience."

"Anything you would like to tell me?" says Paley.

"A couple of things. I will tell you about the Middle East.

"One of the things that group in the back of the plane never got wise to was my effort to get Anwar and Yitsak to change jobs for a year. I thought it would be marvelous if there were a shift in perceptions so that they could appreciate each other's problems.

"Anwar -- interested. CIA has pictures of him standing in front of a mirror marveling at the way he looks

13

in a yarmulka.

"Yitsak -- a little more difficult. Ultimately he agreed, but on one condition: that he would be able to take Shimon Peres with him -- and leave him.

"Talks with Mao. He wanted me to become the Chairman. He knew he was dying. There wasn't a word I said to him in those six meetings that made any sense, but he wanted me to become the Chairman. [Laughter.]

"And Kissinger looked a little concerned, and Mao said, 'Don't worry, I don't speak Chinese, either.' Bavarian accent, Yunanese accent, nobody will know. Mao's suit will do wonders for your wardrobe."

They chatted for a while. Kissinger began asking, naturally, about the perks. "What about my limousine?"

"Oh, you know, we don't have limousines in this country. Bicycles. We'll get you a tandem with a chauffeur up front."

They tried for a while, but the deal fell through. For one thing, Kissinger could not remember the name of the Chinese foreign minister. [Laughter.]

Then there was something else. Brezhnev got

14

wind of the whole thing, and Brezhnev did not want to see
Kissinger go into the Forbidden City. He made an offer
that Kissinger could not resist, and, as a matter of fact,
resulted in the collapse of the entire deal.

Brezhnev offered Kissinger a squadron of Backfire
bombers pretargeted against the Pentagon.

The conversations went on. Kissinger said to
Paley, "On the technical level, let us say that about
6:28, just before the Cronkite show goes on, I decide
that I want to pre-empt the show. I would like to do a
tough, searching, investigative interview with myself.
Can I take the time?"

Paley: "What about Walter?"

Kissinger: "Walter has always been interested
in outer space."

"No problem, we'll get him a place out there."

Bernie Gwertzman wrote a story in *The Times*
that has done wonders for both Marvin and me, quoting
Kissinger to the effect that when he takes over CBS, he
is going to replace both Kalbs.

Paley, I must say, was delighted with that.
But in their conversations about our future, Kissinger

15

said, "We must not be unnecessarily harsh. There is no
reason to be cruel. They are rather nice people. Marvin
has always talked about the Middle East. He is interested
in the Middle East. He is very sensitive to the nuances
of the problems of the Middle East. Ambassador to Iraq.
[Laughter.] And Bernie never stops talking about Asia.
Bhutan. Bhutan is going to be developing into a big
story in the years ahead."

And so they finally concluded the talks. Kissinger
said, "Well,-- ."

And Paley said, "Are you interested?"

And Kissinger said, "Only if you buy the other
two networks."

And he added that he thought that the initials
"CBS" were a bit passé. They had been around now fifty
years. And he was rather familiar with three initials
of his own, but he thought it would work out very nicely
for the network.

"I'm the Chairman," said Paley. "I am also the
Chief Executive Officer. What would you like to be called?"

"Well," he said, "I am joining an empire. Why
don't you call me 'Emperor.'?"

16

This is a night for lyrical exchanges of shared
experiences, of suppressed deceptions, of -- I have always
found that if you were to say to the Doctor, "Why did you
deceive me?" it stopped the conversation, and then you
could ask the question that was really at the top of your
mind.

But nevertheless we are here. This, after all,
is a special night. And so may I, on behalf of myself,
and my future, [laughter], let me say that when I walked
through the reception line, I stopped to shake the Doctor's
hand, and I said, "Doctor, what about our future?" And
he said, "Don't worry, I am going to take care of you.
You will like Chad." [Laughter.]

Maybe I can't top that, nor do I even want to
try to. What I want to do, really, tonight is to join
in Dr. Kissinger's and Dick Valeriani's tribute to nothing
really politically or diplomatically specific, but rather
the sense of excitement and exhilaration that came with
being awfully close to turning points in the history of
the world.

I was to join these trips later when my dear
brother's back started to be a problem for him. So I

17

don't have as many as some of the more husky and stalwart veterans who travelled do here. But I have a variety of trips under my belt. And I must say that I have always thought that what Kissinger tried to do, very often, on his shuttles was to see if he could exhaust the principles with whom he was dealing into giving way to his vision of reality and his vision of the future.

We were very close to history. We saw a great deal of it. We obviously missed a lot. No one in his right mind ever went up front on that airplane thinking that Kissinger was going to share the total secrecy with us. That would have been idiotic on our part and certainly on his part.

But I must say that many, many years ago, 1956, long before Kissinger was born, I was in Burma, and Ed Murrow came out to do an interview with Chou en-Lai. And he did the interview. He was doing a program then called "Person-to-Person." Did you direct that, Don?

It was done on a Friday night, I think between 10:30 and 11, and he flew and arrived in Burma Sunday night, and he had an interview with Chou en-Lai on a Monday morning. And I had known Murrow slightly, not well at all, and after

18

the interview, he came back to the Grand Hotel in Rangoon,
and we chatted for a while. And he told me a story then
that has been ineradicably scratched in my own mind, and
which in a way relates to the sense of excitement and
exhilaration about some of the trips and the opportunity
to be that close to history.

Murrow said that after Chou en-Lai had accepted
the idea of doing an interview with CBS, Murrow said, "I
will leave right after "Person-to-Person" ends at 11 o'clock.
I will try to get a late plane, or the first one that is
possible."

And somebody in the office said, "Why do you
want to go, Ed? It is ridiculous for you to go. It is
all right to be Ed Murrow and arrange for the negotiation.
But then send Don Hewitt or Marvin or Bernie or anybody
else who is around the office to do it." He said, "Those
poor bastards, they really miss the point of the story,
the sense of excitement about going out there, being there,
listening, hearing the syllables yourself."

And, in a way, that is what the plane has been
about. And that is why it is a special pleasure for me
to be here tonight to share in a personal and perhaps even

19

in an emotional way, my own excitement and my own
indebtedness, both to CBS and to the Doctor, to be there,
to watch it, to listen, to be skeptical, to take certain
things that were literal, but nevertheless to always
remember that this was a particular piece of history
that none of us in this room will ever forget.

Thank you.

[Applause.]

A 1

Secretary Kissinger
National Press Club
Luncheon, Jan 10, 1977

CHAIRMAN ALDEN: This is truly a memorable occasion at the National Press Club and we want to make it a happy and relaxing time for Secretary Kissinger. We have a little surprise for you, Mr. Kissinger.

[Bellydancing performance.]

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Kissinger says that he is not prepared to answer back. [Laughter.]

Like Dr. Kissinger, our oriental dancer, Shadia, is from the world of education. She has a masters degree and is on leave of absence from her job as a school teacher, to dance for the Secretary of State.

We thank you, Shadia. [Applause.]

I am Robert Alden, of the Washington Post, President of the National Press Club. And once again it is my privilege to welcome you to this historic news forum where so many world statesmen have appeared for so many decades beginning with Lord Brice, in 1909.

A 2

That welcome also is extended to the many
thousands of persons who are listening to the broadcast
of this speakers luncheon on the 200-station network of
National Public Radio, in such diverse places as Swift
River, Massachusetts; Thunderland, Vermont; and
Wellington, Colorado.

Those of you here in Washington, D. C. in the
Ballroom of the National Press Club, have the good fortune
of being able to address questions to our speaker.
Please write those questions on the cards found at the
table, and pass them along to the head table -- although
we already have enough questions to keep the Secretary
here until 5:00 p.m. -- so we don't really need too many
more.

Before introducing our speaker, I would like
to make known to you the distinguished guests seated at
the head table, among Officers of our Club and Members
of the Speakers Committee.

On my left, the wife of the Secretary of State,
Nancy Kissinger. [Applause]

On my right, a man almost as famous for his
travels as Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of the Treasury,

A 3

The Honorable William E. Simon. [Applause]

On my left, the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, Lieutenant General Brent
Scowcroft. [Applause]

On my right, a man who made a memorable
valedictory here, after a long and distinguished career
in the United States Senate, the former Chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee and Senator from Arkansas,
The Honorable J. William Fulbright. [Applause]

On my left the former Chairman of the Inter-
national Relations Committee and former Representative
from Pennsylvania, The Honorable Dr. Thomas E. Morgan.
[Applause]

On my right, the Vice President and Columnist
of The New York Times, Mr. James Reston. [Applause]

The President-elect of the National Press Club,
Bureau Chief of McGraw Hill World News, and part of the
Business Week team that conducted a controversial
interview with Dr. Kissinger, about two years ago, Mr.
Robert E. Farrell. [Applause]

On my left, my illustrious predecessor as

A 4

President of the National Press Club, who flew across the nation last January to preside at Dr. Kissinger's last speaking engagement here, Mr. William Broom. [Applause]

In the audience, there are many State Department associates of Dr. Kissinger, diplomatic correspondents, Congressmen and members of the diplomatic community. And we welcome all of you here today.

I would like to introduce from the audience, a long-time newspaper and magazine columnist, author, and a former assistant to the Secretary of State, who helped to make the National Press Club Speakers Luncheon an institution in the 1930s, the Speakers Chairman, Mr. Ernest K. Lindley [Applause.]

[Sound of music extracted from the Overture to William Tell]

THE CHAIRMAN: A firey horse with the speed of light. A cloud of dust, and a hearty: "Hi ho Silver!"
The Lone Ranger! [Laughter]

And his faithful Indian companion, Tonto, the daring and resourceful Masked Rider of the Plains -- led the fight for law and order in the early Western United States.

A 5

Nowhere in the pages of history can one find a
greater champion of justice.

Return with us now, to those thrilling days
of yesteryear when, out of the past come the thundering
hoofbeats of the great horse, Silver.

The Lone Ranger Rides Again. [Laughter]

Some politicians have attacked Henry Kissinger
for his conduct and foreign policy, describing him as a
secretive "Lone Ranger of International Adventure."

But the mythical Lone Ranger was a hero to a
whole generation of Americans; and when the verdict of
history is reached on the 1970s, the new Lone Ranger
may be regarded as even more of a hero to America and,
to the world.

Henry Kissinger, today, is following one of
the great traditions of the National Press Club -- a
number of Presidents and Secretaries of State have chosen
to make valedictions here, as their careers have come to
a close:

Beginning with William Howard Taft, in 1913 --
three days before Woodrow Wilson took office.

And most recently, when President Johnson spoke

A 7

The historian in that classic study of Metternich and Castlereagh, evoked a number of truths on statesmanship and diplomacy: "The test of a statesman," the author wrote, "is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends. It is not sufficient to judge the statesman by his conception alone for, unlike the philosopher, he must implement his vision.

"The acid test of a policy," he wrote, "is its ability to obtain domestic support."

That historian who is seated on my right, concluded that "the statesman is like one of the heroes in classical drama, who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellowmen and who cannot validate its truth."

"Nations learn only by experience. They know only when it is too late to act."

"But statesmen must act as if their intuition were already experienced, as if their aspirations were true. It is for this reason that statesmen often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honor in their own country -- that they always have a difficult task in

A 8

legitimizing their programs, domestically, and that
their greatness is usually apparent only in retrospect
when their intuition has become experience."

Whether or not Henry Kissinger joins CBS,
or the Harlem Globetrotters -- [Laughter]

or takes over direction of the National
Archives-- [Laughter]

he has made his imprint on diplomacy --
shuttle and otherwise.

He has inspired dash and romance in a staid
profession, paving the way for the likes of Ambassador
Zahedi and Secretary General Orfilio [Laughter]

Regardless of the Republican platform, and
all that has been said and written, Henry Kissinger is
with honor in his own country. It is indeed a privilege
for me to present to you, The Secretary of State, Henry
A. Kissinger. (Standing ovation)

-1-

I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you today. It is almost like coming home, for we have so much in common: a reluctance to see our names in print (laughter), a uniform appreciation of the goodness of mankind, total subordination of ego (laughter), a basic reliance on working within the system (laughter), and, above all, humility (laughter).

I agree, of course, with the brilliant introduction of your President.

I have been called indispensable and a miracle worker. I know because I remember every word I say (laughter).

And you will also be relieved to learn that my departure from office does not mean the end of my relationship with the press. But henceforth I see it as a two-way street. You can be of great help to me with my memoirs since some of you are such superb creative writers (laughter). For my part, I will reciprocate by giving a lecture course at an appropriate school of journalism, on the art of the press conference -- from "peace is at hand" to Salzburg (laughter). Or, interviewers

- 2 -

I have known -- from Oriana Fallaci to Otis Pike (laughter).

I expect to lead a happy and full life once I leave the
government. But it will be hard to replace my daily sessions
with the Department's press spokesman prior to his daily
briefing. I will be sorry to be deprived of the opportunity
to instruct him each day on the virtues of frankness, honesty,
and openness (laughter).

Before I turn to my remarks I would like to say a few words
about some of the people at the head table.

I've waited for eight years to tell Bill Fulbright and
Doc Morgan what I thought of them. And now that the opportunity
has come I find myself going soft. Bill Fulbright, as you all
know, has been the ogre of Secretaries of State. I was
prohibited when I came here from meeting with him in any
formal way, a prescription around which we got by meeting
privately at his house. But after I became Secretary of State
I learned that the conduct of foreign policy became immeasurably

easier through the partnership with Bill Fulbright. Of course,
he was retired from public life within two years after
establishing this partnership. But I want to pay tribute
to a man who has always had the courage to stand alone, who was
all the more irritating for generally being right when he
disagreed with the Executive, and who was a great friend and a
close associate.

Doc Morgan retired from public life when his margin in the
primary fell to 75 per cent. But he, too, fought many valiant
battles for our foreign policy and the history of our international
relations owes a great deal to his leadership of the committee.

Bill Simon is here for many reasons. One: why should I make
his political career easy? And I think this picture of him with me
will not help him too much in certain circles in California.
Secondly, I have always wanted that he be asked, on the record,
to answer this question. He added immeasurably to, shall we say,
the complexity of our foreign policy (laughter) by calling the
Shah of Iran a nut. He then protested that he had been quoted

- 4 -

out of context. My question to my friend Bill Simon is:

in what context can you call a foreign head of state a nut?

But contrary to what you have written in the newspapers,
inspired by anonymous sources in the Treasury Department,
Bill and I were close collaborators. He let me have the
theory, and he kept control over the execution. That way,
I could say anything softheaded that I had on my mind, and
he made sure that economic policy remained realistic. But
he has made a tremendous contribution to our foreign economic
policy and he has been a close friend.

Now, let me turn to what has been called my valedictory
address. The only thing wrong with it is: What makes you
think I'm retiring from public life?

In these last few weeks many of you have asked me how I would
sum up the successes and failures of our foreign policy. As you
know, my hearing consistently fails during the second part of that
question. But since I shall soon settle that issue conclusively
in my memoirs, let me confine myself today to some general princi
ples.

I have participated in the conduct of American foreign policy during a period of fundamental change. As always in such times, that policy emerged from an amalgam of factors: objective circumstances, domestic pressures, the values of our society and the decisions of individual leaders.

The relative weight to be given to each can be left to historians.

But their mix shaped a profound transition in our nation's foreign policy. The trauma of Vietnam transformed our international perceptions; the nightmare of Watergate brought into question the validity of our domestic institutions. These upheavals coincided with radical alterations in the international environment. We have had to cope, over the past decade, with an increasingly complex and turbulent world in which America must seek to achieve its principles and its

purposes under circumstances greatly at variance with
traditional attitudes.

Through the greater part of the past two centuries
America defined and justified its role in the world in terms
of abstract principle. Our isolation, vast margins of safety,
and a preoccupation with developing our own continent produced
a sense of American uniqueness, and a conviction that our
power and the uses we made of it were but the physical expression
of our moral purpose. We tended to believe that in foreign
affairs our involvement or non-involvement was a matter of
our own choice, and that we needed to act only when our democratic
principles bade us to do so.

In the early years of this century we found ourselves
alone among the democracies, sufficiently powerful to maintain

the precarious world balance. But then, shunning the claims
of security and alliance, we fell back on our traditional
isolationism; we sought, repeatedly and unsuccessfully, to
substitute law for politics and to legislate solutions to
international conflicts.

After World War II, we finally accepted the responsibilities
of world leadership. But the great exertions we undertook
were based on the premise that they would be temporary -- that at
some point our allies would need us no longer; that poor nations
would embrace democracy and move toward self-sufficiency; that our
adversaries would change or that their systems would collapse.
We applied abroad policies and programs modelled after our

domestic experience of the New Deal and war-time mobilization; we acted as if any political problem anywhere could be solved by overwhelming it with our resources; as if the revolutions of our time had primarily economic, rather than political and even spiritual causes.

The Sixties were the last full flowering of these impulses -- the belief in our omnipotence, in our self-sufficiency, in our ability to remake other societies in our image. To be sure, temptations remain with us and occasionally surface in our domestic debate or in our legislation.

But as the decade drew to a close, we began to learn that we cannot legislate our own moral preferences upon the world at a time when we no longer enjoy physical

- 9 -

[10]

predominance. We can see that abstract principles are
not self-fulfilling; they can lead to an overinvolvement as
pernicious as our earlier isolation. We live today in a
world of many centers of power and contending ideologies; a
collection of some 150-odd nations sharing few agreed legal
or moral assumptions; an international economic system in
which the wellbeing of all peoples is inextricably intertwined;
in short, a set of new historical realities in which the challenges
of peace, prosperity and justice have no terminal date and are unending.

Seldom before has foreign policy had to be conducted
against the background of such vast ideological divisions; never
before has it been conducted in the knowledge that miscalculation
could mean the end of civilized life. The need for a global
structure has long been evident, but the gap between developed

- 10 -

and developing countries -- a constant challenge to
tranquility -- has continued to widen. The growing reality
of our interdependence is in constant tension with the compelling
trends of separatism and intense nationalism.

At the turn of the decade, our cardinal task was to
disengage from a war that had placed 550 thousand Americans
on the mainland of Asia in a way that preserved our ability to
design and to influence the development of a new international
order. Newly conscious of our limits, we sought to put into
place a foreign policy of the kind less favored nations had to
conduct throughout history -- a foreign policy that depended
on the perception of priorities, a feeling for the
importance of nuance, and a realization that there could be no
terminal date to our efforts. Our traditional predisposition

-11-

for moral, legal and clear-cut solutions was not abandoned,
but we attempted to reconcile them with a new understanding
of the geopolitical realities of our time. Above all, we
needed to rally and maintain the support of the American
people for the long haul.

It is in the nature of foreign policy that problems
of world structure cannot be concluded in one Administration.
I believe that we have emerged from one of the most trying
decades in our history with new maturity with the foundations
of a long-term policy in place, with the world and America
more tranquil than we found them and with considerable
opportunities for constructive achievement before us. We are

no longer innocent, but neither have we grown cynical.

We have reconfirmed our historic responsibility to contribute to the eternal quest of all peoples to live in security and peace, free from fear, oppression or foreign domination. We must never forget that no other free nation is strong enough or cohesive enough to replace us. If we falter, no one can step into the breach, and hostile purposes and incompatible values will then shape the future of mankind.

Without our commitment there can be no security; without our contribution there can be no progress. This is America's inescapable burden; its incontestable glory.

So, as the Administrations change, let us dedicate ourselves to the task of ensuring that our common purposes transcend our differences. No matter how strong the foundations we have laid, the challenges confronting

the next Administration will be complex, difficult, and
painful. There will continue to be, as there have
been in the past, many complicated choices to make;
and there will continue to be intense dispute over the
wisdom of the choices made and the courses that have
been set. Achievement will inevitably fall short of
hope and expectation, as it has in every Administration.

The new Administration may avoid some of the mistakes
we made; it will surely make some new ones of its own.

But all of us owe those who carry the burden of responsibility

the benefit of the doubt, a healthy understanding for
the magnitude of their problems and compassion for
the narrow range of choices available.

Long before I had any expectation that I would be
leaving office, I emphasized, perhaps self-servingly, the vital
importance of a non-partisan foreign policy. I repeat that
plea now with equal fervor. The divisions that have characterized
the last decade in this country must finally end. The deeds
demanded of America in the decade ahead can only be accomplished
by a united

people and government acting with boldness, perserverance
and vision.

This is the time to build a new foreign policy consensus
similar in scope though different in content than that which
sustained the post-World War II generation. Americans must
once again conduct their foreign policy debates with a recognition
that we are, after all, partners in a vital national endeavor
on which depends our future and that of the rest of the world. Let
us behave during these years so that we shall remember them as the
time when the American people rediscovered their unity. For my own
part, I wish my successors well. I will do my best to contribute
to an informed, constructive and supportive public dialogue.

You ladies and gentlemen of the Fourth Estate have a
stake in this enterprise. If I may make a parting request it
is to look upon my successor's challenges with some sympathy;
to remember that what appears to an outsider as lack of
candor may in reality be the best judgment of serious people
grappling with events emerging from a fog of confusing reports
and putting forward policies which they believe to be right, but
which they cannot know to be right until the time for decision is
past.

The profound alterations over the past decade in our per-
ceptions of morality and political propriety have affected every
aspect of our public life; and they have had a dramatic impact
upon the relationship between the government and the press. The days
when statesmen and journalists coexisted in an atmosphere of

trust and shared confidences have given way to a state of
almost perpetual inquest which, at its worst, can degenerate
into a relationship of hunter and hunted, deceiver and dupe.

But in its best sense these new attitudes have been -- and
will be -- centrally important to the health and vitality of our
democracy. What public servant who bears that title with pride
and integrity ultimately will not be grateful for a press that
relentlessly holds its officials to high standards of truth and
integrity? Can one ever forget the sinking feeling of being asked
a question at a press conference by a reporter who already knows
the answer from an earlier background session? What official
has not been aged by the panicky knowledge that some journalist
is seducing another source to confirm what he has been told on
an off-the-record basis? And who can avoid the special anguish

- 18 -

of knowing that if the reporter succeeds, one has gotten exactly
what one deserves.

You and I have been reasonably good protagonists. The jokes
and the conflicts, the cooperation and the pain that we have had over
the past eight years reflect the fact that, under our system, the
press and the government are natural sparring partners that
nevertheless need each other. Both are powerful institutions
attempting to serve the public interest by their own lights, and
according to their own legitimate purposes. The aim of the
executive branch is to govern and lead and to implement public
policy; yours is to illuminate, question, and analyze. The fact
that we are generally right and you are generally wrong does not
change the basic elements made up on both sides of respect,
fear, deference, and the attempt by each side to get the better of the
other.

Nor can it avoid the difference in perspective inherent

in the two points of view, I know how exciting it is for reporters to

be given access to arcane classified documents, even though

they are usually appallingly written and generally incomprehensible.

I, of course, hold the view that the real essence of our foreign
policy was to be found in the series of speeches I
have given around the country.

These, of course, have often been slighted (I consider anything
except running the full text as being slighted.) -- I suspect because
they were unclassified. But I have one consolation. If you had
had all the classified documents that were available to me, you
would be as confused as I was.

We shall not settle this debate here -- all the less so since
after January 20th I hope to profit from the leaks which you print.

- 20 -

This may be the occasion to say that for all my needling, I have
admired the objectivity the honesty and the fundamental fairness
of the press corps which covers the Department of State and the
White House. They are the most amusing and perceptive
collection of outrageous individualists that I have know.

They have, at times, left me breathless with exasperation.

But they have sharpened my wits as well. They have even
made me concede, in sentimental moments, there may be
something in Thomas Jefferson's claim that were it left to
him to decide between a government without newspapers or
newspapers without a government, he would prefer the latter.

Luckily for us all, Jefferson never had to pronounce himself
regarding television.

We have had -- to put it mildly -- an intense
experience, and we are now at the end of our time together
until late January 1981. As a result of the extraordinary

- 21 -

record of discourse between us, we understand each other better. And if I may be so bold, I believe that our discourse has also served the American people, for they know more, as a result, about the role and responsibilities of this nation in the world -- perhaps more at times than I wanted them to know.

This nation has never lost its spirit, or its faith in its destiny. Even in the difficult times through which we so recently passed, we kept our balance and showed the world the resiliency of our free institutions. And we should forever thank the fates that watch over us for the steady hand of the President it has been my honor to serve for more than two years. His strength, and his honesty, calmed our troubled land and restored our pride, our integrity, and our sense of decency. President Ford leaves to Governor Carter a nation recovered; a nation confident

- 22 -

in the progressive fulfillment of the American dream.

Our new President and Secretary of State deserve
the understanding and the support of all Americans -- for
today our relations with other nations affect every citizen.

The search for peace is -- in this age of nuclear weapons --
a moral and practical imperative. The pursuit of well-being
a traditional concern of nations, becomes now -- in an
age of interdependence -- one that can only be realized in
cooperation with others. The problems of justice take on
fresh, urgency and complexity when the future of democracy
rests in the hands of a dwindling number of countries.

Today America's leaders must address the familiar goals of
peace, prosperity and justice in a global landscape that
has been transformed and for which our historical experience
offers little guidance. Let us, for the first time in over

- 23 -

a decade, chart our future as a united people.

Three and a half years ago I -- a naturalized citizen -- was sworn in as Secretary of State of my adopted country. The responsibilities once borne by such men as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Marshall, and Acheson were temporarily bequeathed to me. In no other country in the world would this have been possible. Because of my origin, I have perhaps had a unique perspective of what America means to the cause of freedom and human dignity. And I have had no higher aim than to repay in some small measure my debt to this country which saved me from totalitarianism and the world from slavery.

I leave to you, for a time, the great domain of public policy. I would be hypocritical if I pretended that to part is easy.

I envy you the excitement, the responsibility,

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the opportunities that will be yours. I shall never
forget how hard you tested me. I shall always cherish
the experiences we enjoyed together. And I will think
of you with affection tinged with exasperation.

Thank you.

Q&A

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Q What do you believe will be regarded as your most enduring achievement in the conduct of U. S. foreign policy?

A Occasionally making a decision that was not recommended by the Foreign Service. (Laughter.)

In general, before I appear totally evasive in my last appearance with the press (laughter), let me confess that I will be evasive. (Laughter) I don't think this is the time for me to assess my contribution -- particularly since I have referred in the beginning to my well-known humility (laughter) -- I don't want to raise any questions about that subject. But as I pointed out in my remarks, the merit of individual policies will have to be assessed over an extended period of time.

The fundamental problem that America faced in the late sixties and early seventies was how to move from a foreign policy that was conducted by analogy to domestic policy to a foreign policy that other nations have had to conduct throughout most of their history in which interests had to be assessed in relation to values -- in which priorities had to be established among objectives

B-2

that could not all be achieved simultaneously, -- and in
which we realized that our international role would be
unending.

This was the fundamental task that had to be
begun in this Administration and that will now have to
be carried forward in the next.

Q What was your greatest disappointment in
office, apart from losing your job? (Laughter.)

A I believe that the disintegration
of Executive authority that resulted from Watergate
prevented us from exploiting fully the situation that existed
in the early seventies -- and, indeed, it created a rather
dangerous international environment for a limited period
of time. It led to needless disputes about the relative
role of the Executive and the Legislative Branch, and it
consumed too much of our energies on procedural and
peripheral issues.

Q Did you have a more free hand in conducting
foreign policy under President Ford or under President Nixon?

A No matter how I answer that question I
will ruin myself. (Laughter.)

In the relationship of the Security Adviser or
of the Secretary of State to the President, one cannot measure

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3

the relative role of either by the degree to which they may
have differed with their President or the degree to which
the President may have overruled them. Any strong Secretary
of State has had the necessity of a close relationship with
the President. No Secretary of State can conduct
foreign policy without the full support of the President,
and any Secretary of State who understands the nature
of our system will not make a major move without the fullest
discussion and guidance by the President.

The personalities of Presidents Nixon and Ford
were substantially different and, therefore, the nature
of the relationship and the nature in which they made decisions
was substantially different. But as for my own relationship
with them, I had a relationship of confidence with both
and I had the backing of both and I had the guidance of both
in the conduct of foreign policy. (Applause.)

Q Former President Nixon has indicated that
he was the primary idea man behind the Kissinger policies.
What is your comment? (Laughter.)

A My comment is that I'll write my book
after he completes his. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

Q You have been photographed often in
embrace with Sadat and have been widely hailed for your

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shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Is the Middle
East really any closer to solution of the Israeli, Palestinian
and other issues that have so long plagued it? Has the
Middle East been eliminated as a likely area of Soviet-
American confrontation and conflict?

A The Middle East has obviously not been
eliminated as a source of conflict. It's important to look
at the situation in 1973 and the situation today. In 1973,
the Arab World and Israel were engaged in a war, at the
end of which the danger of a new flareup was extremely
great. We had no diplomatic relations with the key
Arab countries, except Saudi Arabia and Jordan. We often
sent messages to Cairo or to Damascus via Moscow. What
was needed was to reestablish some relationship with the
Arab World, to maintain our traditional friendship with
Israel, but to move the area towards peace initially by
a step-by-step approach which we have always believed
would merge in an overall solution.

We are now approaching the point where the
conditions in the Middle East for significant progress seem
to us propitious. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan
are all committed to a progress towards a peace which
recognizes the existence and legitimacy of the State of Israel.

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B-5

The radical elements in the area no longer have the influence that they possessed some years ago. I believe the negotiations will be extremely complicated, and they may take some time. But I do believe that the conditions for progress are better than they have been in many years.

Q According to Murrey Marder, in his comprehensive survey of your career that appeared in the *Washington Post* two months ago, you have acknowledged duping the press on only one occasion. You were reported seeking from Syria a list of Israeli prisoners, and the list was in your pocket all the time.

How many other times have you duped the press, and are you prepared to acknowledge any of those occasions today?

A Well, I think we only have two minutes [laughter] and if I give a partial answer to that question, you will accuse me of duping you again.

On that particular occasion, that Mr. Marder mentioned, we had a profound humanitarian problem, which is that we had been given the list on a confidential basis. We had told of the fact that we had this list to only the highest leaders on the Israeli side, and we

B-6

were afraid that the prisoners would not be released if
we did not follow the sequence that had been suggested
to us.

Maybe it could have been handled in a different
manner, but as soon as we had been given the go ahead
to release the list, we explained to the press exactly
the circumstances in which it had been obtained. But we
could not do it before we had complied with the sequence
of events that had been suggested to us.

Q As a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks under your stewardship, have you put the Soviet Union into a position to achieve world nuclear supremacy?

A I think it is time that we conduct a
rational debate on the issue of nuclear strategy. It is
too important and vital a subject to be made the subject
of partisan and doctrinaire political debate.

First, with respect to the first SALT Agreement.
The limitations that were established at the first SALT
Agreement resulted from the force levels that had been
decided upon in the 1960's. There was no American program
that was stopped as a result of the first SALT Agreement.
And 210 Soviet missiles had to be dismantled, and several

B-7

Soviet programs were stopped.

I have never understood the argument why an agreement that ratified a balance that we had unilaterally accepted and that we had unilaterally established, should threaten our security when it was simply a reflection of the existing reality that no one had proposed to change without the Agreement.

With respect to the negotiations that are now going on, the American people must understand that strategic nuclear weapons confront all of mankind with a new circumstance; namely, that for the first time in history, mankind can literally destroy itself.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union is achieving military supremacy over the United States. I do not believe that any American administration would permit a situation to arise in which the Soviet Union could achieve strategic superiority over the United States.

But the essence of the contemporary problem in the military field is that the term "supremacy"--when the casualties on both sides will be in the tens of millions--has practically no operational significance,

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B-8

as long as we do what is necessary to maintain a
balance.

The military danger we face is with respect
to regional conflicts. Those forces must be modernized
and strengthened. But no Administration, neither ours
nor our successors, will ever permit the Soviet Union
to achieve supremacy. And those who are talking as if
in the strategic field we could still talk about a
meaningful conduct of military operations are not doing
this country a service and they are not doing mankind a
service. [Applause.]

Q Mr. Secretary, in retrospect, could you,
or would you, have developed other diplomatic initiatives
that might have ended the war in Viet-Nam in 1969?
Was the price of four more years of war worth what we
achieved otherwise?

A In 1969 we found 550,000 Americans in
Viet-Nam suffering hundreds of casualties a week.
Those of you who remember the difficulty of extricating
10,000 Americans in 1975 will understand the complexity
of the problem that we confronted in 1969.

It was our belief that as a country on which many
others relied for their security and for their commit-

[c]

B-9

ments, we had to extricate the American forces from
Viet-Nam in a manner that maintained a belief in our
capacity to keep our word, and that did not throw into
question our own international role.

And if you look over the debates that existed
in 1969, '70 and '71, there were no significant proposals
to withdraw all our forces. The differences concerned
tactical issues of the terms under which they might be
withdrawn.

I think the issue of whether it could have
been done more rapidly will undoubtedly always be open.
We would not have done what we did if we had not believed
it to be the right course.

We had one condition that we would not over-
throw--as a price of leaving Viet-Nam--a government
which our predecessors had established. We did this
because of our perception of what the honor and the word
of the United States required.

As soon as that condition was met, we terminated
the war. But it will require a long and detailed
analysis of all of the negotiations in order to be able
to determine what other opportunities existed. Obviously,
if I had believed other opportunities existed, we would

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B-10

have ceased.

Q It is almost five years since the signing of the Shanghai Communique. Why has China not been recognized? Why has there been no resolution of the Taiwan question, and what are the prospects for U.S.-China trade?

A The Shanghai Communique set no deadline for the normalization of relations.

Our relations with China have two aspects. There is the aspect of our assessment of the international situation, and the common objectives that the People's Republic of China and the United States have in preventing what we have jointly called hegemony.

Secondly, there is the commitment in the Shanghai Communique to the achievement progressively of the normalization of relations. This commitment remains, and will no doubt be also pursued by the new administration.

The timing, the conditions, under which it can be achieved will have to be negotiated between the United States and the People's Republic of China. And we have not previously achieved a meeting of the mind on this, but we also believe that in the other areas, in the

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B-11

area of our perception of the world situation, we have
had fruitful talks with the Chinese throughout the whole
period since the Shanghai Communique was signed, and
those talks can continue even before normalization is
concluded.

Q Before the final question, Dr. Kissinger,
I would like to present to you another National Press
Club Certificate of Appreciation.

Also, a warm-up jacket for when you
become a rebounder for the Harlem Globetrotters or the
assistant to Coach George Allen, the celebrated National
Press Club windbreaker.

[Applause.]

Q And now for the final question. Actually,
I have two of them here. We don't always know from
where they originate, but I think this first one may
have come from a Cabinet member here, and it is something
that he has thought a long time about asking you -- Why?

[Laughter.]

And the other one comes from a very well-known
journalist at the head table. How are you going to keep
them down on the farm, after they have seen the farm?

/Laughter and applause/