INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, April 1977

KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE
DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT?*

Coral Bell

AMERICAN Secretaries of State are almost under obligation to be controversial characters: so many of the hopes and fears of the world circle round their heads. Those who escape debate are usually those who have not made much impact on events, like William Rogers, President Nixon's first Secretary of State, who actually had longer in the appointment than Henry Kissinger—five years as against three—but who seems in grave danger of going down in history as a footnote in the accounts of Kissinger's eight years of command. The three strong Secretaries of State of the postwar period—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger—have all been amply controversial in their respective times, and no doubt it is too early to assign any of them his final place in American diplomatic history. Nevertheless I think one can see Acheson and Kissinger in sequence as defining and developing—or even as creating—a tradition in American foreign policy which is quite unlike the predominant earlier tradition, and also distinct from the rather disastrous intervening years of Dulles and Dean Rusk.

In effect, I would argue that Acheson moved American policy away from the assumption which had underlain the policies of the interwar years and earlier, that the balance of power in peacetime was none of America's business, and that balance-of-power policies were an immoral un-American idea anyway, fit only for devious European minds. He took America into a balance-of-power coalition, Nato, which has stayed together with remarkable success for almost thirty years, and must be accounted his prime memorial. The Dulles years did not much damage it, but they conducted the United States into the equal and opposite error to isolationism, what Kissinger calls 'undifferentiated globalism', and tainted the traditional diplomatic sangfroid appropriate to balance policies with an ideological cold-war moralism or zealotry that prevented them from effectively producing their only hopeful and constructive outcome, a workable long-term modus vivendi or accommodation. Exactly how incautious a policy-maker Dulles could almost be during the high cold war was made apparent very recently by Mr. James Angleton's

* Some of the arguments put forward in this article are developed with more substantiating detail in the author's forthcoming book: *The Diplomacy of Detente: Studies in an American Foreign Policy and its Impacts, 1969-77.* (Martin Robertson.)

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[L.C.]

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account of the CIA plans for 'spontaneous' uprisings in Eastern Europe in 1956.¹ However, the peak point of 'undifferentiated globalism' and the moral rhetoric of cold war was the Kennedy inaugural address of 1961, with its promise to 'pay any cost, bear any burden', a promise whose implementation in Vietnam proved that the American electorate's appetite for paying costs and bearing burdens was in fact no greater than that of any other sensible people. The anguish of the American involvement in Indochina (in my view the most painful and damaging error in the entire two hundred years of American foreign policy) so overshadowed everything else in Rusk's eight years of office as rather unfairly to blot out any successes that might otherwise be set to his account.

It is by comparing the world at the end of 1968 and at the end of 1976 that one can most readily measure Kissinger's tasks as the intellectually dominant policy-maker for the West for those eight years. In 1968 the United States seemed to be politically shaking itself to pieces as a consequence of its unwinnable war in Asia, alienating both its Western allies and third-world onlookers in the process. Its relations with China had hardly moved from the rut of pointless hostility in which they had been stuck for twenty years. Its relations with the Soviet Union were confused and uncertain in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Western Europe was tense, jittery, disillusioned and resentful of American inaction during that crisis. France was still offering a serious challenge to American leadership of the West. Eastern Europe was in a state of trauma and despair. No significant effort had been made towards the control of either nuclear or conventional armaments. The Middle East appeared as far from any kind of settlement as it had been for twenty years: the Arab world seemed positively eager for the status of a Soviet protectorate, and American influence was at an almost total discount. Latin America was on a rising tide of apparently revolutionary prospects. The two Iberian dictatorships, in Portugal and Spain, were visibly wearing out with their incumbents' lives, and the prospective succession crises appeared full of impending strategic dangers for the Western coalition, and even for the general peace. The political temperature in Southern Africa was simmering up to a level at which it would sustain a race war in which the Western powers might become involved in the fates of their delinquent kith and kin in Rhodesia and South Africa. Japan was caught in a crunch between its need for some measure of rapprochement with China and its inability to move until the United States did. America's other Pacific allies, Australia and New Zealand, were becoming as badly disrupted as America itself by the guilts and resentments of Vietnam.

1 *New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1976.

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Eight years on, the world that President Carter's policy-makers have inherited in their turn seems almost tamerly rational. At the time of writing there is less scope for the profession of war correspondent than at any time since 1945: Ulster and Rhodesia and a few other guerrilla campaigns in the third world. The fact that the Western powers are morosely preoccupied with economic problems is in itself a reflection of the level of success in controlling security problems. The changes produced by these eight years seem to me, despite the West's economic downturn, to be almost wholly to the net advantage of the Western camp, as well as to the long-term prospects of peace. The change in the American relationship with China has been effected at astonishingly little cost, not even the full sacrifice of the connection with Taiwan. The relationship with the Soviet Union has been 'mutated' to a degree that has made some co-operation in crisis management possible, and which has brought some measure of control of both nuclear and conventional armaments into at least distant prospect. Neither the American alliance with Japan nor the alliance with Western Europe has been seriously sacrificed to this new articulation of the central triangle. It is true that both alliances were (deliberately?) put through somewhat abrasive periods of transition, the Japanese in 1971-72 and the West European in 1973-74, but in both cases the end result seems a more viable and realistic relationship. Nor has America's true strategic edge been sacrificed in the arms-control negotiations; it still retains substantial advantages in numbers of warheads, accuracy of guidance systems, general technological sophistication, and the level of invulnerability of the major strike force. (The election campaign did of course produce allegations to the contrary, mostly from Mr. Reagan, Senator Jackson and Admiral Zumwalt rather than Mr. Carter, but such alarms must be expected in the Presidential battle. In fact that particular campaign standby was less seriously pursued in 1976 than the analogous 'missile gap' allegations of the 1960 campaign, and seems likely to be disavowed with even greater speed by the new Administration. The new Secretary of Defence is already dismantling some of the more extravagant bits of the fantasy-structure of alleged Soviet advantage.)

The Middle East is not only apparently closer to an overall settlement than at any time since 1948, but has been astonishingly converted from an area of Soviet diplomatic ascendancy to one of American diplomatic ascendancy, with the Saudi Arabians, of all people, even moved to defend the interests of the Western capitalist world against those of their fellow members of OPEC in such matters as increases in oil prices. Southern Africa has been (belatedly) manoeuvred on to a course which at least conceivably might with luck prevent the great race war which previously had seemed inevitable. Japan's problem of how to reconcile its diplomatic identity as an American fellow traveller and its economic

KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT? 205

status as a member of the advanced capitalist world with its cultural and political need to be on better terms with China has been greatly eased, perhaps resolved. The succession processes in the Iberian peninsula, either of which might have produced re-runs of the 1930s, have in fact evolved new governments in Portugal and Spain acceptable as members of EEC and Nato, and likely to be close strategic fellow travellers of the United States. That may have been pure good fortune for the West, but I think that in due course Kissinger's policies towards both regimes, as they emerged, will be shown to have been quite adroit, although they were much criticised at the time.

The East Europeans have had their diplomatic leverage against the Soviet Union unobtrusively sustained and enhanced, without being deceived into suicidal imprudence by promises of 'liberation', as was the tendency of the Dulles years. Quite contrary to Mr. Reagan's campaign charge that the Kissinger policies 'required slaves to accept their slavery', they have helped to maximise the breathing space the East Europeans are able to exact within the Soviet embrace and this is now quite considerable, as events in Poland and elsewhere in the post-Helsinki period have shown. Even in the fields of economic diplomacy, where Kissinger is usually given low marks, and in which he was undoubtedly very reluctant to engage himself, some advance has been made. The 'North-South dialogue' may mostly sound like an acrimonious argument, but it is at least under way. The meetings of the advanced capitalist powers (as at Rambouillet and in Puerto Rico, and prospectively in London) do not yet seem to have acquired a name but are nevertheless acquiring the status of an institution, and could be a powerful one. Some beginnings have been made on the problems of food and energy. The once rather frightening edge of OPEC as a potential weapon against the West appears to have been subtly turned. Altogether, as the necessary crisis-manager and power-conservator for the West, Henry Kissinger seems to have amply earned the Secretary of State's salary.

## From balance of power to concert of powers

Some American and British opinion has suggested, in criticism of these activities, that the Secretary of State should have defined his role otherwise, as a sort of international welfare worker, largely preoccupied with human rights and economic advancement. But worthy though those causes no doubt are, many pressure groups and officials can and do tend them. No one, however, except the Secretary of State or the National Security Adviser can effectively look after the power-interests of the West and its overall relation with the adversary world. And the prevention of central war is, after all, a strikingly useful piece of welfare work for the human community as a whole. Besides, the frequently

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advanced reproach that Kissinger deviated more than earlier policy-
makers from American political values does not accord much with the
historical evidence. Washington established its alliances with autocracies
like South Vietnam, South Korea, Franco's Spain or the colonels'
Greece well before Kissinger came on the scene. It practised 'destabilis-
ation' and still rougher techniques in places like Iran and Guatemala
and even Chile from the mid-1950s or early 1960s. As a recent Brookings
study has shown, America used military action or military threat three
times as often in the Kennedy years as in the Kissinger years. In a
specific human rights issue on which he was often attacked, Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union, Kissinger did vastly better than his
noisiest critic. Between 1969 and 1973 he managed to raise the rate
permitted by the Russians from 600 to 34,800 a year. When Senator
Jackson loudly took up the cause, for his own political reasons, the
Russians cut the rate back to 13,000 a year in 1975,⁵ apparently to
demonstrate their resentment of public pressure.

This problem was one which greatly affected the most criticised of his
policies, the detente with the Soviet Union. Detente came under such
frequent fire in the two-year run-up to the 1976 elections that it sometimes
seemed doubtful that it could survive, at least under its proper name.
However, I would argue that it will rank historically as the most important
of Dr. Kissinger's strategies, because it sought to grapple creatively with
the most dangerous power reality in the international system, the attain-
ment of 'essential equivalence' (or something like it) by the Soviet
Union in the overall balance of forces. This is the matter on which I
interpret Kissinger as completing Acheson's work, and rescuing it from
the ill-considered deviations of the Dulles period. Acheson created the
balance-of-power coalition, and oversaw the beginnings of American
acceptance of a permanent role in it, but he was not able to move from
the balance itself, which is *necessary* but not *sufficient*, to the stable
modus vivendi of diplomatic accommodation which it should make
possible. Besides, in Acheson's period of office the time was not ripe,
and unfortunately the process that created the twenty-two years of point-
less hostility to China had already begun, thus putting the United States
at a disadvantage in the triangular balance. Kissinger has been as deter-
mined a friend and defender of the Western power-base as could well
be imagined (somewhat ruthless and tactically machiavellian in its
preservation, in fact) but he brought a larger historical imagination and
more subtlety of mind to elaborating and using that base in the construc-
tion of what he tactfully calls a structure of peace, but which, if it
actually works, will look uncommonly like an old-fashioned concert of
powers.

9 1st World-Talks, Jan 4 1977

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The two terms are not incompatible: the nineteenth-century concert of powers, using the phrase in its broadest meaning, did in fact maintain a structure of peace, by and large, in the central balance for the century from 1815 to 1914. Kissinger's book about that concert, *A World Restored*,⁴ which represents his first substantial research preoccupation, (it was his PhD thesis) is still a major source of illumination of his general policies. That is not to say, as has so often been alleged, that he is an uncritical enthusiast of Metternich, or that he has expected a late twentieth-century world system to work in precisely the same way as a nineteenth-century European system. But the business of transforming an achieved *balance* of power into a *concert* of powers involves the growth of the same sort of network of common conventions, common assumptions and some common interests in the two cases. This is what detente, in its more ambitious definition, has been about. Many analysts of foreign policy have not believed that it can be done, and Professor Brzezinski, who has now taken over as the chief intellectual strategist in the field, may still be among the sceptics. But the very nature of the contemporary balance seems likely to force some similar effort upon him. There is still enough distrust of the past traditions of European diplomacy in the United States, and in the third world, to make it injudicious to use officially the term concert of powers (the term detente came into disfavour during the election and Acheson would hardly have used publicly even the term balance of power) but nevertheless a surprising amount of this potential structure, or at least the scaffolding for it, seems to me to be already in place.

A new concert of powers would of course be on a world basis, not
a European one, and one can already see its prospective 'candidate
members' emerging in various parts of the third world: Iran, Brazil,
Nigeria, for instance. Luckily it will not need any new formal structures,
since the Security Council provides a ready-made one. It does, as I said,
require a set of common conventions, expectations and assumptions,
but these have been more rapidly advanced during the past eight years
than is normally conceded. Even the vocabulary of this form of political
understanding has spread surprisingly wide and fast. A few years ago
the word 'detente' would hardly have been found outside the writings
of the European diplomatic historian: now it is invoked even in race
relations in the Southern African bush.

In sum, I would say that Kissinger's central task, as one of the makers
of American diplomatic history, has been to build the bilateral balance
of power achieved in Acheson's time into the more viable and flexible
triangular balance of the present, and to maintain that balance as the
infrastructure of a (hopefully) creative and peace-oriented diplomatic

4 A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22

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order, which may in time be strong enough to permit change and adjustment without the catastrophe of central war. His central strategy has been detente, deployed as a mode of management of adversary power vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and China, with an even-handedness intended perhaps to give the United States some of the advantages of the balancer in the classic system, with leeway for tilting towards the one or the other, as the occasion indicates. His chief intellectual model has clearly been the historic European concert system, whose nineteenth-century successes look a good deal more impressive, since there have been so many twentieth-century failures to compare them with, than they did in 1918.

Let us look now at the reasons why this undoubtedly constructive, imaginative and subtle-minded effort has created so many powerful groups of enemies. I do not mean to imply that Kissinger's policies have in general been unpopular: on the contrary, a poll taken after eight years of office showed him still enjoying a 65 per cent approval rating, and in periods of particular success, as after the first Middle East disengagements, he enjoyed (in both senses) a considerable degree of press adulation. But there has grown up a substantial assortment of particular groups with powerfully-felt cases against him, both on the left and the right, though predominantly on the left. That is logical enough, for he has been a conservative policy-maker in a double and literal sense, intent on conserving both the peace and the Western (particularly American) power-base. The liberal left, in America and elsewhere, has liked the peace-oriented side of the policy—arms-control efforts, the detentes with China and the Soviet Union, the playing-down of cold-war rhetoric, the attempts at a settlement in the Middle East, Panama, Southern Africa—but has resented the stubborn, frequently successful, and often devious or machiavellian defence of Western interests, as much in the contests with the third world as in those with the communist powers. The right has been resentful or suspicious chiefly of the detente with the Soviet Union, but also (in America), of the efforts to negotiate a Panama treaty and some of the Southern African diplomacy.

However, the largest and easily the most bitter camp of Kissinger's critics holds the remaining faithful of the anti-Vietnam movement, who cannot forgive him either for the four years that the disengagement of American forces took, or for the involvement of Cambodia. There is a neat irony in the situation of this group vis-à-vis the change of administration. Many of its members were supporters of the Carter candidacy, on the grounds, among others, that it would entail a break with the remaining unholy relics of the American involvement with Indochina, like the Secretary of State. But in fact the whole group of Carter appointments on the foreign/defence/intelligence side were far more parties to the initial Kennedy-Johnson decisions than Kissinger was. The origins

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of the American escalation lay in the period in which the Kennedy administration took over the 'undifferentiated globalism' of the Dulles years, without finding a substitute for the caution or inertia with which Eisenhower mitigated or restrained the policies of his Secretary of State.

Kissinger was never an adherent of that 'undifferentiated globalism': in fact he was one of its most trenchant critics, especially in the Dulles period. And he began work very early in Richard Nixon's Presidency on removing the ruins with which this policy had scattered the international landscape. That, it seems to me, was the true meaning of the Guam Doctrine, announced on Nixon's first Pacific trip. But neither Kissinger nor, more conclusively, the President were prepared to pursue this course at the cost of an undisguised defeat for American arms, such as an immediate quitting of Indochina would have represented. For the President, this may have been merely because he was no more prepared than his predecessors to preside over the first American admission of defeat. For Kissinger the reasons seem to have been more complex, and bound up with his personal experiences. He was born in Bavaria in the year of Hitler's first *putsch*, and fled the country as a fifteen-year-old with his family as Hitler's 'final solution' started on its terrible way. He had therefore strong personal reasons for historical pessimism about the effect which military defeat may have on the psyche of a civilised people—for the Germans in 1914 were undoubtedly among the most civilised and educated of Europeans. In the deeply troubled America of 1969, a domestic polarisation of unforeseeable scope and consequences could not be ruled out. Moreover, in the international field, America's credibility as an ally would hardly have been enhanced if it openly cut the throat of the regime in Saigon which its own policy-makers had fathered, however ill-advisedly, in 1954. And most important of all, the stream of signals to Moscow and Peking, which American policy decisions inescapably constitute, might have proved dangerously misleading. They might have seemed to embody a sort of promise, an indication that American commitments in more strategically important parts of the world like north-east Asia or even Western Europe might not be met. And that in turn would increase the chances of the sort of miscalculations which tend to produce major war. The whole basis of a successful balance policy requires providing the *adversary* powers with clear and emphatic signals which will deter them from dangerous adventurism.

These reasons for the delay in American disengagement have been much scoffed at by Kissinger's critics, but they seem to me sober and realistic enough. The dichotomy between the need to disengage, and the need to minimise the consequences of doing so, was met by the process of diplomacy, delay and 'Vietnamisation', the latter being intended to make the South Vietnamese army equal to the task of defending its

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base without outside help except the supply of weapons. The Cambodian invasion, in effect, was an ill-considered aspect of 'Vietnamisation': an effort to restrict the flow of supplies and reinforcements through Cambodia to the battlefields in South Vietnam. It was certainly a deplorable decision in all its consequences for Cambodia: a sacrifice of what slim chances there were of long-term political stability there for the sake of relatively short-term military advantages in Vietnam. It is always cited, along with Chile, as a major part of the moral case against Kissinger's policies. But one has to remember that these decisions were taken very early in Nixon's first administration, in 1969-70, when the President himself was very much in charge of policy-making, and Kissinger was a relatively obscure and easily-dismissed back-room boy. The soldiers (General Westmoreland as well as General Abrams) thought that their forces and allies ought to have the advantage of disrupting the supply trails and base camps in Cambodia; Nixon agreed, and Kissinger somewhat ambiguously went along with the decisions, whereas several of his National Security Council staff resigned in protest. The episode as a whole was the origin of some very painful troubles in the Watergate period.

'Vietnamisation' did not of course work on the military side, and when the new push from the North came in 1975, the southern forces and regime collapsed in a few weeks. But I would not therefore say that Kissinger's Vietnam policies failed in all their objectives. The domestic and international consequences that he felt must be avoided were in fact avoided. This has been particularly striking on the domestic side. Even in the 1976 election campaign, begun barely a year after the final debacle in Saigon, Vietnam was hardly mentioned. There has been no intellectual witch-hunt, as after the 'loss' of China in Acheson's time. Delay, and the abdication of responsibility by 'Vietnamisation', did their work almost eerily well. The end was not felt by the man in the street as an American defeat: the Saigon regime had by then become a remote unsatisfactory bunch of people whom the United States had once tried to help, but who had proved incapable of 'making it' and who deserved nothing more, not even the final allocation of funds Kissinger wanted for them. And internationally also, the process of delay and the time it gave for the development of detente with both China and the Soviet Union prevented either country from being inclined to sacrifice the advantages of its rapprochement with the United States for any forward policies in the period of readjustment. Thus the general alliance-structures and the central balance were hardly shaken.

The United States should never have intervened in Vietnam; the consequences of that intervention were catastrophically destructive for the peoples of Indochina, and very dangerous for America itself. But by the time it fell to Kissinger's lot to undo the errors of his predecessors,

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the American commitment in South-east Asia was like some monstrous deadly vine, so intertwined into the useful structures of American power in the world that the task of cutting away without producing further disasters to that valuable piece of architecture was tedious, painful and bloody. The only plea in mitigation one can make is that the consequences of doing it in any other way might over the long term have been even more bloody.

## The critics of detente

Among Kissinger's critics, I would put the enemies and sceptics of detente as next in intensity of moral conviction to the Vietnam protesters: those who remain basically nostalgic for the cosy simplistic days of the cold war, when an ally was an ally and the adversary was readily recognisable by his wicked ideological scowl. Many temperaments find considerable satisfaction in seeing international politics in terms of black and white, with themselves always on the side of the angels and the other side always fiendish oppressors. Moreover, this set of images is practically useful to a great many people: to the military, for instance, in their necessary task of securing adequate funds for the forces required to maintain the balance of power. But to understand both the nature and the limitations of detente requires a more sophisticated vision. A natural deviousness is considerable help in exploiting the usefulness of detente as a strategy.

The most articulate critics of detente in Kissinger's final year of office were of course the right-wing Republicans who adhered to Ronald Reagan, and the nearest they came to success was the contrivance of a severe snub to Kissinger in the Republican foreign policy platform adopted at the party's convention last August. But the real damage to his hopes was in the postponement for two years of the prospect of new arms-control measures. The SALT II agreement will now fall to the Carter Presidency, which Kissinger must find rather galling, especially as he reportedly believed that the agreement he reached in Moscow in January 1976 would have served as the basis for a SALT II treaty. President Ford, under heavy pressure from Ronald Reagan, dared not sign. But the troops who rallied to the anti-detente banner are not merely country-club anti-communists. The predominantly emotional tone of the movement stems from the many Americans of East European origin who have good reason to resent what Russian power is doing to their relatives' lives back home, and who were induced to believe, quite mistakenly, that the Helsinki meeting operated to their disadvantage. In fact the precise opposite was true, and this is now being conceded by Congressional and other observers, but it will take time for popular assumptions to catch up with realities.

A group of critics related to the anti-detente camp, and like them

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commanding some academic big guns are what I will call ‘the Friends of Israel’. The term ‘Jewish lobby’, which is often used, is misleading in suggesting that all its adherents are Jewish, whereas in fact many Gentile politicians, such as Senators Henry Jackson and Edward Kennedy, are prominent members. Carter was not one originally, but a cynical observer might say that he adopted associate membership for electoral purposes in 1976. It is ironic that the first Jewish Secretary of State should have run into so much opposition from this group, but it is logical enough. The American Jewish community is powerful, articulate and impressively prominent in the country’s scholarship and in the media, as well as in the Democratic party machine. It has two major and well-founded reasons for suspicion and dislike of the Soviet Union: the oppression of the Soviet Jewish community on the one hand, and the Soviet machinations in support of the Arabs against Israel on the other. American Jewry is of course overwhelmingly Zionist, whereas Kissinger seems never to have been much of a Zionist, nor to be any longer observant, though he came from a family who were. An extra edge of resentment against ‘one of our own who is not with us’ can therefore readily be detected in much of the writing of this sector of opinion on his Middle East policies. At one stage, especially about March 1975 (which represented in several ways the low-point in his general success-rate), there were indications that a real hatchet job was being attempted against him, and that he would need extra reserves of toughness and guile to survive it. But he had won the undercover battle by the end of the year, and both the Israeli government and the ‘Friends of Israel’ now appear more reconciled to the view that the security of Israel has in fact been advanced, not diminished, as a result of Kissinger’s Middle East subtleties. They certainly ought to be: if one compares the security situation of Israel in September 1973, when it proved vulnerable to surprise, despite its possession of the occupied territories, with its situation in January 1977, when both the incentives and the capacity of the Arabs to attack had been substantially undermined, one would certainly say the Israelis and their American supporters had no long-term reason to regret that Kissinger had turned his attention to the Middle East. Of course he was playing, very successfully, for the American hand, as the Secretary of State should, as well as for the chances of peace and stability, as should all policy-makers, but the accusations that he disregarded Israeli interests are unlikely to be endorsed by history, even Israeli histories. The opposite case, that he disregarded Arab interests, might be more easily sustained but does not have much of a lobby in the United States.

A group of critics strongly allied with the 'Friends of Israel' in Congress at the nadir of Kissinger's fortunes there, were the 'Friends of Greece', whose resentments stemmed mostly from his failure to

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prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but also from his earlier failure to move against the Greek junta itself. However, the Greek colonels' friends in Washington were elsewhere than in the State Department: close to the President himself, in the form of a Greek-American millionaire contributor to campaign funds; very close to the Vice-President when Spiro Agnew so deplorably held that office; influential at the Pentagon, which found Greek facilities useful for the Sixth Fleet, and at the CIA, where former chiefs of the 'Athens station' had far too long and close connections with Greek politics. The Cyprus crisis unfortunately erupted during the final throes of Watergate, when Nixon was being remorselessly edged by events towards accepting the necessity of resignation, and that staggering melodrama was inevitably absorbing a good deal of Kissinger's attention. However, some of his manoeuvres in the Cyprus crisis do seem to have expedited the fall of the Greek junta, which ought to be accounted a blow on the side of the angels. He did fail to prevent the Turkish invasion, and the Greeks will clearly never forgive him for that, but the American diplomatic leverage by which the threatened earlier Turkish invasions of 1964 and 1967 were averted had become largely ineffective by 1974. One of the more ambivalent side-effects of detente is to make strong middle powers like Turkey less anxious for the protection of their great power allies, and thus to lessen the degree to which they will heed those powers' warnings when local interests are at stake. The Turks well knew that what they contributed to Nato in the form of strategic bases was far too valuable for the Americans to push events to a rupture in defence of Greek interests, and they were exasperated by the memory that they had heeded the American injunctions in 1964 and 1967, and that the fortunes of the Turkish minority in Cyprus had continued to deteriorate. Relations between Greek and Greek Cypriot decision-makers—Ioannides, Grivas, Makarios and the faceless irresponsible leaders of Eoka B—precipitated the Cyprus crisis; the Turks saw and took a long-wanted opportunity, and the Secretary of State felt unable to avert the consequences, save at unacceptable cost to the strategic relationships which he interpreted as his primary care.

The alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean now seems to be returning to an even keel. Both Greece and Turkey have negotiated new base agreements with the United States, and Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean are easier, though the 'Friends of Greece' in Congress remained strong and resentful enough to prevent ratification of the bases agreements during the Ford administration. The population transfers within the island, enforced at such a cost of death and anguish by the Turkish army, seem unlikely to be reversed, except through some adjustment of the borders (though the Greeks still say they will never accept them), and a new constitution, federal rather than unitary in character, seems

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likely to emerge in due course. In the long term that may have its benefits for both Cypriot communities, permitting each to live under the guardianship of administrators, police and militia of its own culture. The examples of other instances of two cultures sharing a small area—like Ulster and the Lebanon—do not encourage one to believe that the problems of living together are more easily soluble than the problems of local separation.

Earlier in Kissinger's term of office one would have had to give considerable space to other groups of critics: the 'Friends of India', the 'Friends of Japan' and the 'Friends of Europe'. But these voices are somewhat muted now, and for good reasons. The 'Friends of India' group was initially outraged by Kissinger's handling of the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, in which he took the view that the dismemberment of Pakistan (as it then was) ought if possible to be prevented, since it was likely to lead to instability and 'Balkanisation' in the subcontinent, thus providing new diplomatic opportunities for the Soviet Union. It was also unlikely to do much for economic welfare or human rights, an autonomous Bangladesh being likely to prove 'an international basket-case'.⁵ Kissinger's efforts to prevent the Indian army's invasion were of course unsuccessful; Mrs. Gandhi seems to have proved an even tougher crisis-manager than himself. But the views on which his policy was based do not, at this remove, seem imperceptive. Further 'Balkanisation' remains a danger, Soviet machinations have recently been rebuked even by the Indian Prime Minister, the economy of Bangladesh varies with the harvest, but has mostly teetered on the edge of disaster. Above all, those who presented the Indian strategic success as a triumph for human rights and democratic freedoms have found the victory singularly hollow, for the prestige it conferred on Mrs. Gandhi, and her popularity with the military as a consequence of her disposal of the danger which the original Pakistani state had always represented to them, were to prove the basis on which she was later able to erect her personal or dynastic autocracy. Bangladesh is ruled now by a home-grown army given its orders in Dacca instead of Islamabad, and the residue of Pakistan fights off its assorted domestic instabilities as best it can. It is difficult to see that these outcomes are more advantageous to the citizens of the subcontinent than the compromise proposals (with autonomy for Bangladesh) which Kissinger was trying to promote at the time the Indian army moved. But at that date it was mandatory to take a more charitable view of Mrs. Gandhi's political techniques than it is now.

The case made by the 'Friends of Japan' was based on the roughness of the transition period when America's China policy was being remade.

⁵ The phrase does not just mean an object of charity: it is US army slang for one mutilated by war.

KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT? 215

Certainly it was possible to detect some degree of conscious diplomatic brusquerie in the 'Nixon shokku', though later evidence suggests that this may have originated mostly in the ex-President's personal attitude to the Japanese. The restoration of friendly relations with China was always bound to produce some mutation in the United States-Japanese alliance. Over the longer term the change has been very substantially to Japan's advantage, and if the roughness of the transition disturbed Japan's illusions about the nature of its situation vis-à-vis American power, that is not necessarily to be regretted. Diplomatic arrangements, however useful, ought not to be sentimentalised into eternal friendships: this merely encourages false expectations.

In the same way the case made by the 'Friends of Europe' was mostly based on the abrasiveness of a particular episode, the six months from October 1973 to March 1974, during the very difficult period when European assumptions were being adjusted after the Middle East war. This was a fascinatingly complex piece of in-fighting by some very accomplished hands, and cannot be satisfactorily explored except at considerable length. But I would in general argue that Kissinger came out a victor on practically all points in what was essentially a struggle over the nature of the future West European identity. This identity seems now to have acquired a settled Atlanticist definition, with very little challenge remaining from the sponsors of the alternative view. Kissinger was certainly less of an optimist concerning the European movement than earlier Secretaries of State, precisely because he knew much more European diplomatic history than they. And he assumed, like any European foreign minister, that the powers need to protect themselves against their allies as well as their adversaries. Of all the postwar Secretaries of State, he was the one most adept at the traditional diplomatic game within the old European conventions, and though this sometimes meant rather brisk battles, it was on the whole more congenial to Europeans than the moral lectures which some earlier American policy-makers had given them.

## Maintaining continuity through the Watergate crisis

Reverting to the comparison with Acheson, one may note a very important respect in which Kissinger had a much harder row to hoe. In Acheson's time, European policy-makers like Bevin and Adenauer were not only forces in themselves, they represented strong European diplomatic establishments full of the consciousness that their own societies had even more at stake than the Americans in the rebuilding of a viable balance. By Kissinger's time Britain had (alas) become mostly a diplomatic and economic lame duck, to be helped rather forcefully to face stiles like Rhodesia. Brandt and Schmidt were admittedly helpful when they were in office, but Jobert and the Quai d'Orsay were still

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absorbed in the lost battles of the Gaullist cause. And, to put it deli-
cately, Kissinger was even less lucky in most of his political colleagues
in Washington than in some of those abroad. Truman had been a moral
tower of strength for Acheson, brave and politically astute even when
at odds with Congress. As to the general quality of Mr. Nixon's moral
leadership, silence is the only possible charity, though one can say he
had the courage to make decisions in foreign policy which better men
and better Presidents had failed to make. And as to Mr. Ford, it is
difficult to see that he had much to contribute to foreign policy save his
amiable and direct personality. He was never strong enough vis-à-vis
Congress (having no mandate) to provide effective political endorsement,
nor vis-à-vis his party was he strong enough to ward off the attacks of
the right. The whole extraordinary constitutional imbroglio of Watergate
was of course something for which the Secretary of State had no prece-
dents, nor anyone else either. His capacity to maintain a sense of the
continuity and the steadiness of American foreign policy, both towards
adversaries and allies, in that trying time, is difficult even now to
estimate at its full value and importance.

There remains, however, a final point of uncertainty in assessment
of his work. One can already say of Acheson that his diplomatic con-
struction has proved viable in that, thirty years on, his Western alliance
is still the central factor in international politics. Only time can establish
whether Kissinger's will stick as durably. All Secretaries of State are
to some degree at the mercy of their successors, so Mr. Carter and his
policy-makers must be a factor in Kissinger's chances of long-term
accomplishment. One thing which is certain is a change in intellectual
style from that of the 'lone ranger', the intellectual maverick, to a team
effort whose dominant members are as yet uncertain. At the moment, in
reaction against a strong personal style, this is being assumed to be
necessarily advantageous. But the team player is always in some danger
of 'group think'—the sacrifice of criticism to consensus—and no better
example exists of that process than the early days of the Vietnam in-
volvement, in which so many of President Carter's new team were
prominent.

Policy-makers cannot command success, only deserve it. And intel-
lectual constructs as ambitious as Kissinger's probably always proceed,
if at all, in a 'two steps forward, one step back' fashion. His Secretary-
ship of State will certainly remain among the most interesting in
American diplomatic history for its complexities and ambivalences. With
a little luck it may prove also the most notable for its creativity.

KISSINGER'S DOUBLE-CROSS FOR 'PEACE'

# THE BROKEN PROMISE TO HANOI

## GARETH PORTER

This article is based on a number of talks which Gareth Porter has had recently with persons close to the U.S.-North Vietnam negotiations of 1972 and 1973. All its assertions on Kissinger's negotiations, whether as direct quotes or in the author's words, come from these conversations. In particular, Mr. Porter draws upon several interviews with an official who participated in the Paris talks and who, because he is still employed by the U.S. Government, has asked that his name not be used.

—The Editors

Washington

With formal diplomatic talks between the United States and Vietnam about to start in Paris, Richard Nixon's secret pledge of $3.25 billion in postwar aid to North Vietnam, made in February 1973, is being re-examined by a Congressional subcommittee. Rep. Lester Wolff (D., N.Y.), chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the International Relations Committee, is planning to subpoena Henry Kissinger, if that proves necessary, in order to question him on what was promised to Hanoi, under what circumstances, and why the promise was never carried out.

Kissinger has managed until now to dismiss the issue of a secret commitment to provide postwar aid. He denied the existence of such a pledge until the Foreign Ministry in Hanoi revealed the existence of the Nixon letter to a delegation of the House Select Committee on MIAs in February 1976. Then he claimed in a private meeting with the committee that there had been no actual agreement on aid, but only an offer, made conditional on a cease-fire in Cambodia that was never achieved. Kissinger was careful, however, not to permit anyone to see the letter.

Now information from various sources, including that from an official who was directly involved in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese as an aide to Kissinger, has revealed for the first time how Kissinger negotiated an agreement to provide a major reconstruction aid program with no political strings attached as part of the Paris Agreement, and then violated that agreement by insisting on a political condition which Hanoi could not have fulfilled even if it had wanted to. This new material shows how far Kissinger and Nixon went in deceiving the American public on one of the crucial diplomatic issues in U.S.-Vietnam relations.

The secret agreement on postwar aid was the last problem to be resolved in the final round of peace negotiations in January 1973. Article 21 of the draft agreement had already pledged postwar reconstruction aid, but did not go into details or provide a mechanism for supplying

Gareth Porter is the author of A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam and the Paris Agreement (Indiana University Press) and was staff consultant to the House MIA Committee on their trips to Paris and Hanoi in December 1975.

the aid. Accordingly, Le Duc Tho demanded a Presidential letter spelling out more concretely the U.S. commitment. The letter was to be negotiated down to the last detail by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

Kissinger agreed to negotiate the text of such a letter, apparently because the North Vietnamese threatened not to sign the agreement without it. He tried to leave room for later use of postwar aid for political leverage on Hanoi by keeping the U.S. commitment as vague and conditional as possible, but Tho insisted that the letter promise postwar aid "without any political conditions."

Kissinger also wanted the letter to make it clear that the U.S. executive branch could not commit the government to any foreign aid program without Congressional approval. But Hanoi's negotiators suspected that this statement would later be cited as a basis for evading the commitment altogether and opposed any such stipulation. Finally, a compromise was struck: the letter would refer only to "constitutional processes," while a separate letter would explain Congressional prerogatives in regard to foreign assistance.

By January 23, the language of the Nixon letter was complete, except for the level of aid to be provided. Hanoi had raised its demands in January, asking compensation for the damage done by the December U.S. bombing of Hanoi. In the final session, Kissinger dismissed the importance of the specific figure to be used in the Nixon letter. "Henry told them," said the aide, "that it didn't matter what figure was put in the agreement, because it would depend on what Congress would appropriate anyway." He joked that when they had to deal with Otto Passman, they would long for Henry Kissinger. There was nevertheless hard bargaining in the final session, until the two sides agreed on a compromise figure of $3.25 billion.

Kissinger then tried once more to push Hanoi on a cease-fire in Cambodia—a demand that had been persistently rebuffed by Hanoi throughout the negotiations. He suggested to the North Vietnamese that Congressional approval of reconstruction aid would be impossible in the absence of a Cambodian cease-fire. "We told them, if you are thinking about getting any aid from Congress, you will have to produce a cease-fire in Cambodia," the aide recalls.

But this implicit threat to use the Congressional prerogatives as a way to turn the aid pledge into a political lever produced no change in Hanoi's position of noninvolvement in the Cambodian cease-fire issue. And it left intact the U.S. pledge to provide postwar aid "without any political conditions." Kissinger had to content himself with a unilateral declaration on Cambodia which threatened to resume U.S. bombing there unless the fighting stopped.

The full text of the Nixon letter to Pham Van Dong,

THE NATION/April 30, 1977

519

dated February 1, 1973, has never been made public, despite a law which requires that the Senate be given the texts of all executive agreements signed by the United States. But excerpts read to members of the House Select Committee delegation and later published by the Hanoi newspaper *Nhan Dan* have been confirmed as accurate by one of the participants in the negotiations who has retained a copy of the letter. It refers to "principles guiding the participation of the United States in the post-war reconstruction of North Vietnam" and as its first two principles states as follows:

(1) The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.

(2) Preliminary United States studies indicate that the programs appropriate for the U.S. contribution to the aforementioned postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of $3.25 billion grant aid over five years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties. This proposal will be reviewed by the governments of the U.S. and Vietnam concerning details.

In addition, the letter agreed to the establishment of a Joint Economic Commission to negotiate the "details" of the U.S. aid program and indicated that each party would act upon the recommendations of the commission "in accordance with its own constitutional processes." Then, as agreed in the Kissinger-Tho negotiations, Pham Van Dong replied to the Nixon letter with one of his own, confirming his agreement with each of the points in Nixon's letter. The exchange of letters constituted a legal commitment which was considered a codicil to the Paris Agreement. Asked about the legal status of the Nixon

refusal of China and the Soviet Union to support any major offensive by the Communist forces in the South. So he saw the economic aid pledge not as a concession which he had to make to avoid a military resolution of the conflict but as a diplomatic card he could play to wrest a major concession from Hanoi.

Both Kissinger and Nixon were convinced that the Thieu regime in Saigon could not survive if the Lon Nol regime were overthrown by the Communists in Cambodia. By early March 1973, their worst fears were being realized, as an offensive by the Cambodian revolutionaries threatened to sweep the Phnom Penh government away. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy for turning back the offensive and saving Lon Nol was to combine the threat of renewed bombing against North Vietnam with the inducement of postwar aid.

As the Nixon Watergate cover-up unraveled in April and May 1973, however, the bombing option began to fade in importance. What was left to manipulate was the possibility of postwar economic aid. "Kissinger was trying," recalls his aide, "to add by means of his leverage on economic aid the missing link that he couldn't get in January—a Cambodian cease-fire."

Kissinger requested a new round of negotiations on the implementation of the agreement to begin in Paris at the end of April, first between Ambassador William Sullivan and Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, and later between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. Kissinger authorized Sullivan to negotiate on North Vietnam's demands, including an aid program to be presented to Congress and compliance with the cease-fire by the Thieu regime. But Sullivan was to agree to these demands only on the condition that Hanoi agree to take responsibility for a cease-fire in Cambodia. The U.S. delegation, while pressing North Vietnam to name points of entry for war materiel entering South Vietnam after a cease-fire (as called for in the Paris Agreement) realized that Hanoi's refusal to be bound by the agreement's controls on resupply and reinforcement was related to Thieu's continuing military offensive. The problems of infiltration and points of entry were basically a sidelight, while Cambodia was the primary concern.

In these talks, economic aid to North Vietnam was for the first time explicitly made hostage to a Cambodian cease-fire. One of the negotiators at the meetings says: "We demanded a cease-fire in Cambodia as the price of economic aid. We told them we wouldn't be prepared to go to Congress with an agreement unless they came through with it." The condition, he adds, was reiterated "at least twenty times" during the six weeks of conversations in Paris.

Kissinger was thus posing a political condition on post-war aid, in violation of the letter from Nixon pledging that the aid would be given "without any political conditions." For there was no provision in the Paris Agreement for a Cambodian cease-fire; it was to be left to the Cambodian parties themselves to work out.

The North Vietnamese refused the demand, insisting that they did not control the Cambodian revolutionaries. "The Vietnamese told us they couldn't produce it," the

letter, my principal informant says, "It is clear that this was part of the agreement."

Back in Washington, however, Kissinger argued that he had not made any formal commitment on postwar aid, but merely a "statement of intent" that was not legally binding. Kissinger apparently viewed Hanoi as hamstrung by both the threat of U.S. bombing and the

Blaine, The Spectator (Hamilton, Canada)

"And the Stories that Go with It Are Priceless!"

THE NATION/April 30, 1977

aide recalls. "They would say quite earnestly that they would do everything possible. But they couldn't commit themselves to a settlement."

Finally, Le Duc Tho agreed to a private understanding with Kissinger that each side would do its best to promote a settlement in Cambodia, but without promising any concrete result. In short, "We got as much as we could get on Cambodia." After the June 13, 1973 communiqué was signed, Kissinger privately conceded what the Vietnamese had been saying all along: Hanoi did not, in fact, control the situation in Cambodia.

Kissinger agreed in the same communiqué to the resumption of the Joint Economic Commission talks, which were given two weeks to complete the first phase of an agreement. By the end of June, the Commission had completed its "principles and modalities" document and was ready to move to the second phase of its work: the completion of a specific aid package for submission to Congress. North Vietnamese delegation chief Dang Viet Chau submitted a series of detailed studies of North Vietnamese reconstruction needs, which the U.S. delegation estimated would cost at least $10 billion. But chiefs of the two delegations knew that the general level of grant aid had already been agreed on at the highest levels, and regarded the $3.25 billion figure as a "general guideline" for the negotiations. By mid-July, the Joint Economic Commission was nearing agreement on a proposal to be sent to Congress for a first year construction aid program. The Vietnamese delegation pressed the United States to finish the talks by July 23. But Kissinger's orders to U.S. delegation chief Maurice Williams were to get the best agreement he could—but not to sign it until he got the word.

The word never came, and it was clear by mid-July that there would be no Cambodia settlement. By that

time the JEC talks were just about completed, and the American delegation had to decide "either to go ahead or cut them off," as the former Kissinger aide puts it. Kissinger ordered the delegation to return home without completing the agreement. On July 23, the two delegations issued a joint statement that the talks were being "temporarily suspended," while the negotiators reported to their respective governments. Kissinger was letting the commission die quietly.

The U.S. decision to refuse to carry out the terms of the secret agreement was not justified on the basis of alleged violations of the cease-fire by Hanoi (it was not even announced at the time). On the contrary, there was still every reason to believe that Hanoi was interested in seeing the military provisions of the agreement fully implemented. Secretary of State William Rogers testified before a Congressional committee on June 5, 1973: "We find that the North Vietnamese are conducting themselves as if they want the Paris Agreement to be carried out, and . . . in a way that suggests that they have come to the conclusion that continuation of military activities does not make sense." Rogers added that he thought Hanoi was "looking forward to programs of rehabilitation, reconstruction."

The Ford administration would later point to the Communist counteroffensive of 1974-75 as the reason why the United States refused to give postwar reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. But in fact the sequence of events was the opposite. Kissinger's refusal to keep his end of the bargain took away the last incentive which Hanoi had to maintain a defensive military posture in the South, and led ultimately to the drive that brought Saigon's collapse. It also left a diplomatic obstacle to normalization of relations which the Carter administration has not yet found a way to remove. ☐

# THE AFRICAN TAR BABY

## Bankers' Stakes in Zaire

REED KRAMER

Washington

The world financial community took note in mid-March when Dr. Irving Friedman, senior international adviser at Citibank, N.A., landed in Kinshasa, Zaire. Friedman was the architect of an unprecedented agreement signed in London last November by Zaire and its private bank creditors. His visit to Kinshasa came only two weeks after fighting had erupted in Zaire's Shaba Province (formerly Katanga), a turn of events that convinced many bankers that their $500 million in loans to that beleaguered nation were as good as lost.

Zaire's foreign debts now total about $3 billion. That's a small portion of the estimated $160 billion indebted-

ness of all the less-developed countries (LDCs) that do not export oil. But the bankers' concern focuses less on the size of Zaire's deficit than on the precedent which a complete default there might create.

Months before the present crisis, representatives of several large U.S. banks went to Capitol Hill to quietly appeal for additional foreign aid to Zaire which they feared even then would need significant outside help to avoid bankruptcy. "They want us to bail them out

Reed Kramer is on the staff of Africa News Service in Durham, N.C., which publishes a weekly digest of African affairs and produces twice-weekly news feeds for radio stations. He is working on a study of U.S. nuclear relations with South Africa on a grant from the Fund for Investigative Journalism.

THE NATION/April 30, 1977

521

KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE
DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT?\*

Coral Bell

A MERICAN Secretaries of State are almost under obligation to be controversial characters: so many of the hopes and fears of the world circle round their heads. Those who escape debate are usually those who have not made much impact on events, like William Rogers, President Nixon's first Secretary of State, who actually had longer in the appointment than Henry Kissinger—five years as against three—but who seems in grave danger of going down in history as a footnote in the accounts of Kissinger's eight years of command. The three strong Secretaries of State of the postwar period—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles and Henry Kissinger—have all been amply controversial in their respective times, and no doubt it is too early to assign any of them his final place in American diplomatic history. Nevertheless I think one can see Acheson and Kissinger in sequence as defining and developing—or even as creating—a tradition in American foreign policy which is quite unlike the predominant earlier tradition, and also distinct from the rather disastrous intervening years of Dulles and Dean Rusk.

\* Some of the arguments put forward in this article are developed with more substantiating detail in the author's forthcoming book: *The Diplomacy of Detente: Studies in an American Foreign Policy and its Impacts, 1969-77.* (Martin Robertson.)

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[L.C]

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205

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

advanced reproach that Kissinger deviated more than earlier policy-
makers from American political values does not accord much with the
historical evidence. Washington established its alliances with autocracies
like South Vietnam, South Korea, Franco's Spain or the colonels'
Greece well before Kissinger came on the scene. It practised 'destabilis-
ation' and still rougher techniques in places like Iran and Guatemala
and even Chile from the mid-1950s or early 1960s. As a recent Brookings
study has shown, America used military action or military threat three
times as often in the Kennedy years as in the Kissinger years.² In a
specific human rights issue on which he was often attacked, Jewish
emigration from the Soviet Union, Kissinger did vastly better than his
noisiest critic. Between 1969 and 1973 he managed to raise the rate
permitted by the Russians from 600 to 34,800 a year. When Senator
Jackson loudly took up the cause, for his own political reasons, the
Russians cut the rate back to 13,000 a year in 1975,³ apparently to
demonstrate their resentment of public pressure.

© 1975 The Times, London A 1977

KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT? 207

The two terms are not incompatible: the nineteenth-century concert of powers, using the phrase in its broadest meaning, did in fact maintain a structure of peace, by and large, in the central balance for the century from 1815 to 1914. Kissinger's book about that concert, *A World Restored*,⁴ which represents his first substantial research preoccupation, (it was his PhD thesis) is still a major source of illumination of his general policies. That is not to say, as has so often been alleged, that he is an uncritical enthusiast of Metternich, or that he has expected a late twentieth-century world system to work in precisely the same way as a nineteenth-century European system. But the business of transforming an achieved *balance* of power into a concert of powers involves the growth of the same sort of network of common conventions, common assumptions and some common interests in the two cases. This is what detente, in its more ambitious definition, has been about. Many analysts of foreign policy have not believed that it can be done, and Professor Brzezinski, who has now taken over as the chief intellectual strategist in the field, may still be among the sceptics. But the very nature of the contemporary balance seems likely to force some similar effort upon him. There is still enough distrust of the past traditions of European diplomacy in the United States, and in the third world, to make it injudicious to use officially the term concert of powers (the term detente came into disfavour during the election and Acheson would hardly have used publicly even the term balance of power) but nevertheless a surprising amount of this potential structure, or at least the scaffolding for it, seems to me to be already in place.

⁴ *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22*

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KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT? 209

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211

### The critics of detente

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KISSINGER IN RETROSPECT: THE DIPLOMACY OF POWER-CONCERT? 213

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215

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GEORGETOWN VOICE 4/21

# Columbia After Henry

by Jeff E. Schapiro

He started at Harvard, resumed his teaching career at Georgetown after an eight-year stint as National Security advisor, and later as Secretary of State. Now, if Columbia University has its way, Dr. Henry Kissinger will join its faculty as a full-time professor.

According to the *New York Times* Dr. Kissinger, presently Georgetown's Visiting Professor of Diplomacy, has been offered a full-time teaching post at Columbia. However, a group of faculty and students there say the former Secretary of State should not teach because of his "alleged 'immoral' actions while directing American policies in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Chile."

They have demanded that Columbia's president, Dr. William J. McGill halt negotiations with Dr. Kissinger, who is expected to tell University officials by the end of the month whether he will accept the teaching post. The position would include teaching graduate students, planning seminars, as will as personal writing and research.

But because the former Secretary of State has numerous other commitments—including writing his memoirs, a contract with NBC, an advisory position with the

Chase Manhattan Bank, and an appointment at Georgetown—the Columbia president has “been wary of offering him a fulltime position yet,” the *Times* reported.

While Dr. Kissinger's appointment here has received relatively little criticism, there are those who continue to oppose it.

Student Government Vice President Dan Burke said he was disturbed by the campus' "blind acceptance" of Dr. Kissinger's appointment. "While I have serious questions concerning his diplomatic practices," Burke added, "I won't call the man immoral."

Burke said that he did not express his opposition to the appointment to University President Timothy S. Healy, SJ.

Negotiations with the former Secretary of State have included several meetings and telephone conversations with Dr. McGill. The Columbia president told the *Times*, "What we don't want is a sham appointment."

Columbia critics say the possible appointment "is motivated as much by economics as academics;" charging that Dr. Kissinger's presence at Columbia could raise money for the University.

Published by the Office of Public Relations

the
Mid/Week
report

Georgetown University • Washington, D.C. 20057

Vol. 6 No. 60

KISSINGER GIVES NASH LECTURE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger said that Presi-
dent Carter deserves the support of every
American in the SALT negotiations.
Kissinger delivered the annual Frank C.
Nash memorial lecture on April 5 in Gas-
ton hall.

Dr. Kissinger's address, jointly spon-
sored by Georgetown, the National Defense
University and the Naval War College, was
attended by foreign ambassadors, veteran
U.S. diplomats, and Georgetown faculty,
students and staff members. Joining Dr.
Kissinger on the speaker's platform were
Father Healy; Dean Peter F. Krogh, SFS;
Rev. Aloysius Kelley, S.J.; Rev. Frank
Winters, S.J.; General Robert G. Gard and
Admiral Huntington Hardisty.

April 13, 1977

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

TSD

Dr. Jason Rosenblatt, as-
sociate professor of
English, was recently awar-
ded a Guggenheim Fellow-
ship to study conflict-
ing traditions in John Mil-
ton's _Paradise Lost_.

ROSENBLATT AWARDED GUGGENHEIM FELLOWSHIP

Rosenblatt, who came to Georgetown in 1974 from the University of Pennsylvania, will spend the summer studying at the Folger Shakespeare Library, and the late fall at the British Museum

in London.

A graduate of Yeshiva Uni-
versity in N.Y., Rosenblatt
says, "My interest in con-
flicting traditions ante-
dates my appointment at
Georgetown, a Jesuit in-
stitution where an Ortho-
dox Jew can teach courses
in Milton and the King
James Bible."

The John Simon Guggenheim
Memorial Foundation was
established by former Sen-
ator and Mrs. Simon Guggen-
heim as a memorial to their
son, who died in 1922. To
date, the foundation has
granted $70 million in fel-
lowships to assist research
in artistic creation.

Dr. Rosenblatt is the only
member of a D.C. college
or university to have re-
ceived a fellowship this
year.

Dole Confers on Rebuilding Republican Party

Vice Presidential Candi-
date Senator Robert H. Dole
(R-Kansas), discussed the
rebuilding of the Republi-
can Party at a lecture spon-
sored by Georgetown's Col-
lege Republicans in Gaston
hall on April 5. The Re-
publican Party is trying to
broaden its base by attract-
ing and electing new and
younger members to key gov-
ernment positions, he ex-
plained. Dole encouraged
the audience to vote for
the Republicans running for
election in New Jersey and
Virginia.

Senator Robert Dole

STEPPING
OUT
Wednesday, April 13

* Dr. David
L. Lewis, D.C.

University, will lecture
about Martin Luther King,
Jr., at 1:15 p.m. in room
101D of McGuire hall.

* "Georgetown Today: Has John Carroll's Dream Been Betrayed?" will be discussed at 4:30 p.m. in Copley lounge. Thursday, April 14

* Mr. Jose Epstein, Inter-American Development Bank, will discuss "Latin American Development: A New Look at Old Myths," at 8 p.m. in Palms lounge. * Dr. Margaret Mead, anthropologist, will speak at 8:30 p.m. in the Hall of Nations.

Friday, April 15 * Dr. Jack Blanchard, Environmental Protection Agency, will

speak about "The Science
and Politics of Kepone Con-
tamination," at 4:30 p.m.
in room 112 of the Reiss
Science building. Sunday,
April 17 * GU Symphony will
present the works of Brahms,
and Mozart at 5 p.m. at the
Christ Episcopal Church,
31st & O Sts., N.W.

Tuesday, April 19

* Berndt von Staden, Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany, will discuss "America and the Federal Republic of Germany in a Shrinking World" at 7:30 p.m. in the Hall of Nations.

Wednesday, April 20

* Barry Goldwater will speak at 8 p.m. in Gaston hall.

* Dr. Linus Pauling, Stanford University, will discuss "Nutrition and Immunology," at 8 p.m. in room LA-6 of the Basic Science building. Friday, April 22

* Dr. Bruce Shenker, biology, will discuss "Cyclic Nucleotides in Lymphocyte Transformation," at 4:30 p.m. in Room 112, Reiss Science.

MWR PROFILE

The Economics Department,
composed of 34 faculty and
four staff members, boasts
a distinct achievement. It
recently won the award for
the most appropriate booth
at the Healybaloo on March
26. "Our booth displayed
the applied probability
theory (dealing black-
jack)," Faye Reaves, eco-
nomics explains. Prizes
and profits from the booth,
Reaves notes, will be used
for scholarship funds.

Reaves at work

FACULTY/STAFF NOTES

Aelise Green, R.N., Home Care Program, and Father Daniel Gatti, S.J., Pastorial Care, recently participated in a panel discussion on "Multidisciplinary Approaches to the Cancer Patient," sponsored by the Oral Cancer Society, held at Howard University Hospital. Dr. William F. McDonald, sociology and Institute of Criminal Law, participated in a symposium on "Crime and Punishment: Retribution and Restitution," at the Harvard Law School. Charles V. Christian, chief investigator, protective services, published "Moon Over United States," in the Campus Law Enforcement Journal. The Rev. Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Andre E. Hellegers, Kennedy Institute, published "Legislation and the Living Will," in the March 12 issue of America. Naomi C. Broering, associate Medical Center librarian, authored "Guideline for Preparing a Health Science Library Grant or Contract Proposal," which she will teach in Seattle this June.

JOBS
The University Personnel Office lists
the following vacancies within the
University as of April 7.

Editor Writer II (39) $12,937; Administrative Officer (34) $10,608; Medical Secretary II (31) $9,443; Secretary III (28) $8,362; Chief X-Ray Technician (40) $14,239; Staff Nurses Intensive Care Units (04) $11,378; Computer Operator-Nights (29) $8,736; Communications Officer (83) $9,776.

Those interested in any of these po-
sitions should call Personnel at x3251.

The *MID/WEEK REPORT*, official newsletter for the faculty and staff of Georgetown University, is published each Wednesday except on major holidays during the academic year, and every other Wednesday in the summer, by the GU Office of Public Relations, Healy Building, Washington, D.C. 20057. The deadline for copy is noon of the Thursday preceding publication.

News Bureau Staff

Anne Marie Ellis, Editor/Staff Writer

Jeannine F. Addams, News Director

William Collins Auth, Photographer

Sandy Harrell, Secretary

Michael A. Byrnes, Director of Public Relations

the
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Mid/Week
report

III. 7 Apr 77

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

DISARMAMENT & SALT

AA 1

KISSINGER REMARKS ON SALT AGREEMENT, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow TASS in English 1310 GMT 6 Apr 77 LD

"Statement by H. Kissinger"--TASS headline]

[Text] Washington, April 6, TASS--Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, speaking at Georgetown University, said it is in the interests of America and the whole world to achieve a balanced long-term strategic arms limitation agreement. Implicit in Henry Kissinger's remarks were criticisms of the present administration's tactics in the talks on such an agreement. He said "negotiations must proceed in a calm, non-confrontational way, without self-imposed deadlines or rhetorical battles that publicly stake the prestige of both sides." The limitation of arms is not a favour one side does for the other, he said. "It is a fundamental necessity". "A reasonable, balanced agreement taking into account the security concerns of both sides is achievable."

H. Kissinger stressed the need for the continuity of U.S. foreign policy irrespective of the change of administration. He said foreign policy must not vary dramatically with each change of luck for the American political parties since this makes the United States a major source of unpredictability and instability in a world which badly needs continuity and reliability. He said there can be no sound international system without stable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

W. EUROPEAN PRESS COMMENTS ON MOSCOW TALKS NOTED

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Apr 77 Morning Edition p 3 LD

[G. Deynichenko article: "Holding Back the Arms Race"]

[Text] The results of the talks between L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State C. Vance have given rise to enormous interest in Western Europe. Now that the information reports in the newspapers on the course of the Soviet-U.S. talks and on A. A. Gromyko's press conference have been replaced by editorial comments, it may be noted that Washington's position on questions of strategic offensive arms limitation is giving rise to profound anxiety among the broadest circles of the West European public.

The roots of these sentiments are obvious. After all, the questions discussed in Moscow have tremendous significance for the fate of the cause of peace. "Above all," Italy's PAESE SERA stresses, "it should be borne in mind that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, even if it is true that the sides most interested in such a limitation are the USSR and the United States, as the possessors of global nuclear power, are talks on an international scale which concern all states. The side which provokes a breakdown in the strategic dialog automatically assumes a tremendous responsibility on the international plane since there is no one in the world who is not convinced that there is no sensible alternative to negotiations."

Commenting on the lack of serious progress in Moscow in discussing the prospects for the conclusion of a new strategic offensive arms limitation, the democratic press of various countries directly links this outcome with the general course of U.S. foreign policy. "There is a contradiction between Carter's words and deeds in the strategic arms limitation field," the newspaper L'HUMANITE notes. In the words of the Italian newspaper AVANTI, Carter is threatening a new intensification of the arms race. But this can in no way assist the development of the process of the relaxation of international tension and attests to the United States' forgetfulness with regard to the accords reached in Vladivostok.

Prof Kissinger Urges
Nonpartisan Policy

HOYA 4/11

by Rod Kuckro

Visiting Professor of Diplomacy Henry Kissinger called for "wide nonpartisan backing" for the Carter Administration's foreign policy, as he delivered the Frank C. Nash Memorial Lecture on International Security Affairs in Gaston Hall Tuesday evening.

The former secretary of state's address also touched broadly on topics of international security, the challenges of global peace, East-West and North-South relations, and the effects of American ideals on world peace.

The hour-long address was Kissinger's first major statement since leaving public office January 20. The lecture was characterized by a blend of academic theorizing on the future motives and goals of US foreign policy and deliberate, restrained approach to current issues confronting American diplomacy.

The tone of Kissinger's speech was optimistic as he noted that President Carter has the "best chance in two decades to lead the nation toward its goals in conditions of hope."

He confessed to the audience that "as time passed from when I served in office, my perception of my infallibility increases." Kissinger extended his empathy to the new administration, amending Harry Truman's metaphor, saying, "when you have been in the kitchen you know

how hot it can become. And you sympathize with the cooks."

Kissinger continued, "The new administration needs the support of all of us, for it is essential that they succeed. Their achievements will be the nation's achievements; their setbacks are the nation's setbacks."

Throughout his lecture Kissinger freely offered advice on problems facing the Carter Administration.

In a defense of the often controversial position of foreign policy formulator, Kissinger said, "Nothing is easier than to pass judgement after the fact. Nothing is more difficult than to bear responsibility for the fate of a nation in a world of turbulence, uncertainty and challenge."

Kissinger cited the critical nature of total cooperation in formulating a world order. "The overriding challenge to our foreign policy then, is to create new relationships — among allies, with adversaries, with the developing world."

The former secretary's most forceful words concerned the achievement of "a reasonable, balanced (arms limitation) agreement taking into account the security concerns of both sides." Kissinger contended that the nuclear age raises the problems of U.S.-Soviet relations to the "level of life and death."

(Continued on page 2)

Kissinger
Speaks

(Continued from page 1)

To obtain an arms accord and understanding with the Kremlin, Kissinger urged that the US "make clear by our strength and determination" that Soviet expansionism "will be resisted," and that the US "moderate Soviet conduct" by including the soviets in the international system. These goals can only be obtained, Kissinger maintained, if the Soviet Union understands the need for "strict reciprocity." Kissinger cited the recent invasion of Zaire by Katangan rebels as one example of Soviet acquiescence to "irresponsible acts."

Kissinger suggested that a balance be achieved between the isolation and over-involvement that has characterized US foreign policy in this century. He urged a combination of idealism and pragmatism.

Kissinger also spoke on the controversial human rights question, praising the legitimacy of the issue in the international forum, but calling for an integration of the issue in "the full mosaic of our policy goals"

Kissinger, as Conservationist,
Sees Danger in Oil Imports

By J. P. Smith

Washington Post Staff Writer

Henry A. Kissinger, in his first appearance before Congress since resigning as Secretary of State, yesterday urged the adoption of energy conservation measures to reduce U.S. dependence on oil imports, which he said "impairs our national security."

Appearing before a packed Senate hearing room, Kissinger, who looked tan and less portly than he was while Secretary of State, acknowledged in a low voice that the Nixon and Ford administrations failed to implement energy conservation plans.

Citing U.S. performance in the oil-
consuming nations' organization—the
International Energy Agency—which
he helped create, Kissinger said, “Our
role has not been adequate to date.”

An IEA study released earlier this
year ranked the United States 17th
out of 18 in overall energy conserva-
tion among the leading industrial na-
tions. U.S. imports of foreign oil dur-
ing the years Kissinger served as Sec-
retary of State surged to record levels
by the end of last year, amounting to
42 per cent of total oil consumption.

Kissinger, testifying as chairman of the Board of Advisors to the Alliance to Save Energy, a volunteer organization established by Sen. Charles Percy (R-Ill), was warmly received by members of the Senate Energy Subcommittee on Conservation and Regulation chaired by J. Bennett Johnston (D-La).

In an appearance marked with little
of the panoply of the past and without
the battery of aides who accompanied
him while he was a Cabinet member,
Kissinger warned in measured tones
that the United States would remain
dependent on foreign oil imports over
the next five years.

He expressed support for efforts by
President Carter and energy advisor
James R. Schlesinger to forge a na-
tional energy policy. "No administra-
tion would allow the oil producers to
dictate our foreign policy," he de-
clared.

Later, asked about policies he initi-
ated. Kissinger quipped, "As time pas-
ses from when I served in office, my
perception of my infallibility de-
creases."

In response to a question from Sen.
Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), Kissinger
declined to offer "any new dramatic
proposals with regard to our policy
toward Saudi Arabia."

Saudi Arabia is now exporting al-
most 10 million barrels of oil a day
and has the largest proved oil re-
serves of any non-Communist country.

He said Carter's policy toward Saudi
Arabia is "correct." That policy, which
follows one that Kissinger authored,
consists of maintaining a close rela-
tionship with Saudi Arabia and en-
couraging it to moderate oil price in-
creases to maintain a stable world
economy.

Questioned by Sen. Lowell P.
Weicker Jr. (R-Conn.) on whether he
advocated mandatory measures, Kis-

singer called for increased voluntary
efforts, "mobilizing private initiative,"
before mandatory measures are im-
posed. Kissinger said he also favors
eventual decontrol of energy prices.

As the cordial questioning ended,
Sen. Johnston inadvertently thanked
"Dr. Schlesinger" for his appearance
—confusing Kissinger with his former
rival, who now serves as Carter's top
energy policy maker

Kissinger told Johnston, "I'm sure
he'll be glad to tell you the differ-
ence."

He then picked up his raincoat and,
clutching a manila folder, nodded to
the -committee, walked quickly
through the hearing room door, and
left a trail of reporters, cameramen,
and tourists behind.

strategic missiles and bombers allowed each side at Vladivostok because it would permit the Soviet Union only half of its heavy missiles, Gromyko said. The United States has none.

"I would say that that's rather strong language ... I would say it's inaccurate," said Brzezinski of Gromyko's accusations that the United States was guilty of devious tactics in negotiations.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell said Thursday that Carter did not plan on changing his two arms proposals and Brzezinski said today the plans gave the Soviets "the opportunity of indicating their preference within the range of between 1,800 and 2,000" strategic weapons compared to the 2,400 negotiated at Vladivostok.

The "innovative" U.S. proposal, Brzezinski said, went much farther than the Vladivostok accord because "unlike previous proposals, (it) doesn't nearly establish a framework for continued competition.

"It really reduces the weaponry on both sides. And it will take some time for the Soviet leaders to appreciate the mutual advantages of this proposal."

## Generally Shared

As for the Russian counterattack on human rights, former Columbia University Professor Brzezinski said he did not think there was pressure on Carter to change his outspoken stand because it is generally shared by the world at large.

"I think if SALT is dependent on the United States having to deny itself the right to affirm these beliefs, then it is not worth it. Because, in the final analysis, we are what we believe."

"We have not made Soviet acceptance of our views the basis for negotiating in good faith on strategic issues. But by the same token, we deny the Soviet Union the right to tell us that we do not have the right to express our beliefs if we want to negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement."

As for further arms negotiations, Brzezinski said he is confi-

sive proposal."

## European Question

On Gromyko's statement that if the Soviet Union must cut back her strategic missiles, then the Russians will have to raise the question of American deployment in Western Europe, he said:

"If they raise that issue, then it will, of course and necessarily, open up also the question of medium - range weapons systems.

"Western Europe, after all, is exposed to Soviet medium range weaponry. And if the Soviet Union insists on opening the issue that pertains to our defensive systems in Europe — which are only designed to protect Europe, because Western Europe doesn't have strategic systems — then necessarily the Soviet systems targeted on Europe become subjects for negotiations."

But, he added, if the Soviet Union "wishes to widen the scope... then at some future point, in full consultation with our allies, it is not to be entirely excluded."

## Keeping Schedule Light

Carter appeared to be taking the temporary breakdown in stride, keeping his schedule fairly light.

Press Secretary Jody Powell has told reporters that Carter believes it is "important to be patient, to be methodical. We have no pressure to reach a particular agreement in a particular meeting."

Carter has received written reports from Vance who is briefing European leaders on the unsuccessful preliminary arms negotiations, and is looking forward to a blow-by-blow account when the secretary returns to Washington Saturday night.

The President has confined most of his on-the-record appointments this week to meetings on domestic affairs. He has begun a series of individual luncheon meetings with key senators for advice, and governors who have regional problems.

MOTHER

2 THE BETHLEHEM GLOBE-TIMES — FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1977

DR. ROBERT M. SOLOW

C. D. PERKINS

HOWARD K. SMITH

7 Named for LU Honors

Continued From Page 1

1954.

He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. On Jan. 13, President Ford presented him with the President's Medal of Freedom, this country's highest civilian award.

Born in Fuerth, Germany, he came to the U.S. in 1938, and became a U.S. citizen in 1943. He was a member of the Harvard faculty from 1954 to 1971. Earlier this year, he became associated with Georgetown University, and has started work on his memoirs.

Mrs. Kissinger, the former Nancy Maginnes, will receive the honorary doctor of humane letters degree. A native of White Plains, N.Y., she is the daughter of Agnes McKinley Maginnes and the late Albert Bristol Maginnes, a New York lawyer and Lehigh alumnus and trustee.

Mrs. Kissinger was in Bethlehem in 1971 when Lehigh dedicated Maginnes Hall of Liberal Arts named for her father.

She was graduated from Mount Holyoke College in 1955, and later earned her master's

degree in history from the University of California at Berkeley, where she is a PhD candidate.

Smith, with CBS - TV and United Press International in Europe and the U.S. before joining ABC, will receive the honorary doctor of laws degree. He has been a journalist since 1939.

A native of Ferriday, La., he received his BA degree from Tulane University, where he was named a Rhodes Scholar. He also studied at Heidelberg University in Germany. He won an Emmy Award in 1961.

Martin, affiliated with his family - owned business since 1918, will receive the honorary doctor of engineering degree. A Nazareth native, he received the AB degree from Princeton University.

Perkins, who has served with the Department of Defense and has been chief scientist for the U.S. Air Force, will receive the honorary doctor of engineering degree. A native of Philadelphia, he received the BS degree from Swarthmore College and the MS degree from Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

He is currently on leave of absence from Princeton University, where he is associate dean of the School of Engineering and Applied Science.

Roberta Peters, who made her singing debut with the Metropolitan Opera in 1950, will receive the honorary doctor of humane letters degree. A native of The Bronx, she is currently a resident of Scarsdale, N.Y.

Since her debut, she has appeared around the world with outstanding orchestras, on television and radio, in solo recitals, and on major stages in Europe, Russia and the U.S.

Solow, a Brooklyn native, will receive the honorary doctor of laws degree. He received the BA degree in 1947, the MA in 1949, and the PhD in 1951, all from Harvard University.

He is a major lecturer in Sweden, England, the Netherlands and the U.S.

PLYMOUTH, Mass. — Over half the Pilgrims were minors. And although at least one of every four babies born in the colonies died in infancy, about 2 million of the 4 million Americans in 1776 were under 16.

Nobu Times

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Bolstered
Jobless Rate

shortages, the economic re-
has resumed following a so-
1976. Other economic statis-
ade of healthy expansion.

Americans were unemployed
per cent unemployment rate of
as the lowest since the nation
in the worst days of the reces-

nt rose for the fifth straight
an increase of about 500,000

over February. Thus some 56.7 per cent of the
nation's population was employed — the highest
percentage in 29 months.

The average duration of unemployment also fell to 14 weeks, the lowest level in nearly two years. And the number of persons forced to accept part-time employment was down by 160,000 to 3.3 million.

Discouraged workers — those who have given
up looking for work — declined to an average level

Continued on Page 2, Col. 1

## Chairman K.

Last week's announcement that Henry A. Kissinger will become chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank's international advisory committee—even though it's little more than an honorary position—is viewed by sources close to Chase as a clear sign that Chase chairman and chief executive David Rockefeller is now actively shaping the future top management of the nation's third-largest bank. It also seems clear that David has earmarked people with especially close ties to the Rockefellers to figure prominently in this future management.

Here's the speculation: Kissinger, a former foreign adviser to Nelson Rockefeller and admired by David (who is 61), is headed for a top executive job at Chase. It could be as chairman (though not as chief executive)—a position in which he would take on the role of a statesman and focus on Chase's far-flung foreign operations. He could be joined right at the top, possibly as a vice-chairman, by Robert R. Douglass, currently Chase's general counsel and an executive vice-president. David Rockefeller brought Douglass (a former aide to Nelson Rockefeller) to the bank last year from Milbank,

Kissinger: A statesman's role at Chase.

Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, a top law firm that has long represented the Rockefeller interests.

Since neither Kissinger nor Douglass is a banking type, it's possible, so the speculation goes, that a new chief executive is likely to be someone with strong financial background. Willard C. Butcher, currently Chase's president, would seem to fit the bill. But he may be out of the running. Sources say he's hardly been a world-beater as chief operating officer in restoring Chase's declining market share of the banking

business under Rockefeller's inept leadership. (His ineptness—which has turned Chase into what one analyst terms “an accident-prone organization”—is reflected in, among other things, declining earnings, slipping from second to third place among New York banks, very high-loan losses, and disastrous results in its real-estate investment trust.) Big MAC chairman Felix Rohatyn's name continues to crop up inside Chase as a possible replacement of David as the chief executive officer.

David has some time to go before mandatory retirement at 65. However, some sources think he might step down sooner—perhaps with gentle nudging from the Chase board. “Chase’s directors are no longer a bunch of rubber-stamp pawns,” one unhappy Chase insider told me, “. . . and even they can’t go on forever closing their eyes to an incompetent Rockefeller.”

However, it seems unlikely a concerted move will be made to oust him. It's believed David is powerful enough to block such a move. “He may just be stubborn enough to want to stay till the very end to avoid going out as a loser,” one source said. “But he's not going to get rid of the ‘loser’ tag very easily.”

SYGMA

12 NEW YORK/APRIL 4, 1977

New York Times
Apr. 6, 1977

[LC]

Kissinger Urges
U.S. and Soviet
Avoid 'Rhetoric'

Says Strong Statement
on Zaire Is Needed

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 5—Henry A. Kissinger, in his first public speech since leaving office, called on the Carter Administration today to avoid “rhetorical battles” with the Russians over strategic arms negotiations and to speak out forcefully about the invasion of Zaire, which he said could not continue without Soviet backing.

The former Secretary of State, giving Georgetown University's Frank C. Nash Memorial Lecture on International Security Affairs, took the position that “the new administration needs the support of all of us, for it is essential that they succeed.” But implicit in his remarks were criticisms of some aspects of the new Administration's policies dealing with the Russians and human rights.

Frank Nash was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Eisenhower Administration, and his friend endowed an annual series of lectures. Mr. Kissinger, who has been affiliated with Georgetown University on a six-month arrangement ending in the fall, spoke to an audience mainly of students and faculty.

In the prepared text of his speech, Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. Carter, in his quest for a new strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union “deserves the support of every American.”

But there seemed to be a suggestion of unhappiness with Mr. Carter's "comprehensive" plan to make significant reductions in the 2,400 total of bombers

Avoid 'Rhetoic,' Kissinger Cautions

Continued From Page Al

and missiles negotiated for each side at Vladivostok by Mr. Kissinger and former President Gerald R. Ford with Leonid I. Brezhnev.

The Soviet leader rejected the idea last week, setting off recriminations on both sides.

"Whether reductions should be sought in one major step or several: whether the result of negotiations conducted over a period of years by the top leaders of both countries should be set aside or built upon, are matters of tactical judgment," Mr. Kissinger said.

He said that what is important is the "ultimate necessity" of significant reduction.

"We must not be unsettled by temporary disappointments," he said. "We have had these before. The problem is as difficult as the technology which spawned it, and its solution is bound to be complicated and therefore time-consuming."

"Negotiations must proceed in a calm, nonconfrontational way without self-imposed deadlines or rhetorical battles that publicly stake the prestige of both sides," he said, alluding to Mr. Carter's news conferences and similar public statements by the Soviet side.

"The limitation of arms is not a favor one side does for the other," Mr. Kissinger said. "It is a fundamental necessity.

A reasonable, balanced agreement taking into account the security concerns of both sides is achievable. The Administration should have wide nonpartisan backing in bringing it to a successful conclusion."

On overall relations with the Russians, Mr. Kissinger returned to one of his favorite themes—that the Soviet Union must not be permitted under the blanket of detente to seek “geopolitical gains” in far-off corners of the world. It was this view of his that led to American covert involvement in Angola in 1975 to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention.

And Mr. Kissinger seemed to repeat this concern in discussing the current situation in Zaire where Katangans have crossed the border from Angola into former Katanga province.

The Carter Administration today joined with President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt in expressing "deep concern" over outside involvement in Africa, but up to now has refused to blame publicly either Cuba or the Soviet Union for the incursion into Zaire.

"Whatever the details of the current invasion of Zaire," Mr. Kissinger said, "it is clear that the attack took place across a sovereign border from a country in which the government was installed by Soviet arms and the military personnel of a Soviet client state."

"It could not have taken place—and it could not continue—without the material support or acquiescence of the Soviet Union—whether or not Cuban troops are present," he said. In the advance text, the words, "whether or not" were underlined.

"Such irresponsible acts set a dangerous precedent," Mr. Kissinger said. "If all African problems are to be settled hereafter by radical means with weapons brought in from outside, a catastrophic race war in Southern Africa will become more and more likely with profound implications for us both at home and around the world."

He said if attacks across borders "are supinely accepted by the international community, sooner or later events will get out of control."

On human rights, he repeated his view that the challenge is "to steer a course between rhetorical prescription and a calious acceptance of inhumanity."

"Human rights is clearly a legitimate subject of international discourse, and an object of international legal standards," he said. "But our effort must be related to the full mosaic of our policy goals—to give it a place and meaning in terms of everything else we do in foreign affairs."

Quotation of the Day

"The limitation of arms is not a favor one side does for the other. It is a fundamental necessity."—Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in a speech at Georgetown University, urging the Carter Administration to avoid rhetorical battles over strategic arms talks with the Russians [A3:2.]

[LC]

Washington Post

April 6, 1977

# Kissinger Backs Carter Arms Stand

By Lawrence Feinberg

Washington Post Staff Writer

Former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger yesterday strongly supported President Carter's efforts to achieve a strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. He urged the public not to be "unsettled by temporary disappointments," such as the recent impasse in arms negotiations in Moscow.

Speaking at Georgetown University, where he is a visiting professor this spring, Kissinger declared that the issue of nuclear weapons conflicts between the United States and Russia can be on "the level of life and death."

"No single agreement can ever totally remove the danger," Kissinger said. "No setback can be permitted to stand in the way of trying again."

Kissinger added that "negotiations must proceed in a calm, nonconfrontational way without self-imposed deadlines or rhetorical battles that publicly stake the prestige of both sides."

While he called for continued efforts to achieve disarmament, Kissinger urged that the United States must "match" Soviet military power in order to maintain peace and preserve free societies. He also accused the Soviets of irresponsible action in permitting the invasion of Zaire by troops based in Angola, a country whose government, Kissinger said, "was installed by Soviet arms and the military personnel of a Soviet client state (Cuba)."

Kissinger said that the current invasion of the copper-belt region of southern Zaire "could not have taken place—and it could not continue—without the material support or acquiescence of the Soviet Union."

"Such irresponsible acts set a dangerous precedent," Kissinger continued. "If all African problems are to be settled hereafter by radical means with weapons brought in from the outside, a catastrophic race war in southern Africa will become more and more likely with profound implications for us both at home and around the world."

"If attacks across sovereign borders are supinely accepted by the international community, sooner or later events will get out of control."

An audience of about 850, including foreign ambassadors and veteran U.S. diplomats, as well as students, filled Georgetown's Gaston Hall to hear Kissinger's speech, which was his first public address since leaving office in January. They listened to him intently for more than an hour and then applauded for several minutes after he had finished.

The address was sponsored not only by Georgetown but also by the National Defense University and the Naval War College, as the Frank C. Nash Memorial Lecture. Nash was a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs, who died in 1957. Kissinger said that Nash understood well that "military strength is indispensable . . . and the prerequisite for a world that fulfills our ideals of freedom and human dignity."

At one point, Kissinger said: "Though we cannot surpass the Soviet Union in all categories of military power, the free nations cannot fall behind in every significant category without suffering profound political consequences. Diplomacy, no matter how imaginative, cannot operate from impotence. Matching Soviet power in realistic ways that remove the incentive for oppression is the precondition of all effective policy."

Although Kissinger said that "human rights is clearly a legitimate subject of international discourse," he warned that American efforts to achieve them "must be related to the full mosaic of our policy goals."

In all his direct references to Carter, Kissinger praised the President and said that American foreign policy should have bipartisan support. However, without naming the President, he declared that an emphasis on moralism in foreign policy, which Carter often expresses, has led to the "most serious errors of American foreign policy in this century."

[1C]

III. 7 Apr 77 U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A P P A I R S

DISARMAMENT & SALT

AA 1

Commenting on the lack of serious progress in Moscow in discussing the prospects for the conclusion of a new strategic offensive arms limitation, the democratic press of various countries directly links this outcome with the general course of U.S. foreign policy. "There is a contradiction between Carter's words and deeds in the strategic arms limitation field," the newspaper L'HUMANITE notes. In the words of the Italian newspaper AVANT! Carter is threatening a new intensification of the arms race. But this can in no way assist the development of the process of the relaxation of international tension and attests to the United States' forgetfulness with regard to the accords reached in Vladivostok.