MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: Metropolitan Club, Washington
TIME AND DATE: Wednesday, May 3, 1972
PARTICIPANTS: List Attached

Mr. Bonsal, Gordon and Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to be here this evening. Shortly after my appointment, President Nixon and I called on former President Johnson to find out what the experience had taught him. He said, "Read the columnists closely and if any one of them say a member of your staff is great, fire him." [laughter] I live in constant fear of such praise and I wonder about the motives of Scotty Reston. In this period of Vietnam debate I am often visited by protesting students. I think they route them down to my office as an example of the depths to which depravity can reach.

I would like to start by giving a general appraisal of the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration. I will leave enough time at the end for questions. Since I will be talking in generalities, I will not address Vietnam directly but I am sure this issue will occur to someone during the question and answer period. The most basic thing to understand is that while we have had our riots, Vietnam is not the principal part of our foreign policy. We inherited Vietnam and are trying our best to solve it.

The post-war policies pursued by previous Administrations was based on the assumption that the United States was the only country with an independent foreign policy. Under this policy many countries counted on us for economic support which lent itself to the social reform throughout the period of the 1950s and 60s. This period was marked with substantial U.S. involvement all over the world resulting in many joint security agreements such as NATO, SEATO, and others. By the end of the 60s, however, there were certain realities which had to be recognized. First, Europe and Japan, which up to this time had been impotent

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became dynamic world powers. Second, scores of new nations had come into being. Third, the Communist countries have proven to be a diverse group with each country having its own individual interests rather than being a monolithic centrally controlled organization.

All this meant that the military balance of power had changed. The U.S. as late as the Cuban situation in 1962 had a definite superiority. Our inventory of 600 strategic missiles and numerous long-range bombers compared to the Soviet's 80 missiles. This is not the situation now. The Soviet Union has as many missiles as we do and is building at a much higher rate. This situation is obviously different than it was to Mr. Nixon's predecessors.

Our critics say we are conducting a cold-blooded articulate balance of power politics and that this is bad. The facts are, however, for any country, security is the basis of foreign policy. If it is based on anything else, it is not an autonomous policy. We lost our hegemonous position. Our previous policy had been based on the assumption that other countries were more vulnerable because we had vast oceans between ourselves and possible enemies. Technology has changed all this. This assumption is now a falacy. We have no choice but to try to encourage countries to provide their own minimum security. Does this mean that everyone will be equal and work independently? No, you will obviously be better off with allies than without. It does mean that we have a requirement of flexibility and foresightedness not necessary before. We do not have the latitude to make the mistakes previous Administrations have made because of the change in our relative power position. We can no longer protect all other parts of the world. We are not powerful enough to do this.

I have been asked what I have learned since I have taken this job [laughter]. As you might know, as a Harvard professor I am not prone to admit that I have been able to learn anything [laughter]. And my current job is not one which makes me prone to reflect on these matters. However, when you are on the outside world, outside the government, you have the capacity to pick an individual problem and work on what is most important. But policy making is much more complex than that. First, the urgent problems tend to drive out the important. And second, there are far more problems than can be handled. The nightmare is that you know the problem and the solution but you just can't get to it. You must set priorities. You must get out of the way of the train before it runs over you.

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The object of our foreign policy is to make other countries share in the international responsibilities. In addition, our goal has been to limit the number of areas of commitment which we have in the world to increase our capacity to exercise good judgment. Some say this is an isolationist policy. It is not. We are trying to develop a policy to be maintained indefinitely into the future. We felt that a country like China with 800 million people and the oldest continuous government in the world could not be left out of international discourse. We cannot accept the assumption that all communication comes through one communist sender. We are trying to develop a relationship which is more humanistically oriented.

Concerning the Soviet Union, both major powers may have common problems. We have interests in a wide range of topics. What do we hope to come out of the Moscow trip? We are going to attempt to set up a relationship such than when crises arise, both sides have a vested interest in peace. The Soviet Union must make a choice. It cannot continue to feed crises by providing arms to the conflicting parties and then claim to be trying to maintain peace.

I think I have said enough and will now throw the floor open for questions.
Mr. Gray, would you please be so kind as to point out the troublemakers.
[Applause]

**Question:** I find myself in agreement with your policies, but fail to notice any reference to our economic interests around the world. What attention of potential value is placed on economic interests around the world? Given the fact that the earnings of the private economy are the basis of power of the United States, protection must be vital.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I am not myself concerned with day to day economic policy of the United States. For that you are lucky [laughter]. I get into the act only when it is a foreign policy question. When international economic problems reach the Presidential level, I am involved. But economics is not my primary area of responsibility. There is no question that we are facing a new economic situation with major competition in Western Europe, resulting from past U.S. policies. We are facing a threat to our investments in other parts of the world. Government policy in these other countries supports the economy of their own country. Other people might want to talk to John Connally [laughter]. We have built a National Security Council for economic problems. To date, their problem definition seems to be better than their solutions.

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**Question:** The present Administration seems to be a captive of the previous Administration policy of gradualism, both in their military and domestic policy?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I am not sure of the definition of gradualism (questioner clarifies). My definition of escalation would be that we are doing things too slowly. Our critics seem to say the opposite [laughter], for which I am not prepared. Concerning the problem of Vietnam, our objective is to end the war in a way that will not lead to the disintegration of national honor. We are not going to impose a communist government on the Vietnamese people. We have made offers and have gotten no response. On the one hand, we are trying to preserve our country's honor. The undermining of respect for country would be a calamity. On the other hand, we are sensitive to the legitimate concern of the people who want to see an end to the war. We must try to end the war without going too far so as to endanger national honor. Gradualization is not our problem. Domestic debate is what is hurting us. The result is how firm a strategy to take without going for an all-out military victory.

**Question:** What do the NVA demand? What sort of control of South Vietnam will they accept?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We have found nothing. If we had found it, we would have settled. They are asking us to (1) overthrow Thieu, (2) cut off economic aid to the resulting government, (3) the resulting government should settle with the communists. The obvious result is the collapse of the non-communist political force. Left would be the communists. They ask us to destroy the non-communist organization. We are willing to settle anything reasonable. Their formula is just an overthrow of non-communist government. We will not ally ourselves with our enemies for the defeat of our friends.

**Question:** What are the dangers of insistence (questioner makes a reference to one of Dr. Kissinger's books. The question is not clear; Dr. Kissinger asks for clarification. Question is still not clear.)

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I must have been using a little ambiguity. [Laughter] Putting the verb at the end of the sentence [more laughter]. I said post-war policy had to be changed because the world situation had changed. I believe this Administration is a watershed of new, enlightened

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foreign policy. Our policy will prove to be significant because we will
not make a brilliant move once every six months. We are on a steady
course. If we find we are wrong, we will change.

**Question:** Can you explain our relative non-position in terms of Bangladesh?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) If I read the Anderson papers correctly [laughter] that was not the problem. With respect to Bangladesh, I would like to divide the answer into three parts: before the war, during the war, and after the war. When the war broke out, a delicate situation arose. Pakistan was our only contact with the People's Republic of China. We did suspend economic and military aid except for the 3.5 million which was in the pipeline. I will admit that that sounds like about 4 divisions, but that 3.5 million represents spare parts to existing equipment only. No new equipment was introduced. We moved the Pakistani government too slowly to a more enlightened policy. Not that we were oblivious; we just did not move fast enough. When the war broke out it was not necessary in our view and we tried to stop it. During the conflict against India, we stayed out because we did not back violence fueled by Soviet arms. Once the war was settled, we reinstated humanitarian aid, we provided 70% of all relief in Pakistan while also helping India. We can only be criticized on the speed with which we moved. We objected to the military violence, but once it broke out, we attempted to save West Pakistan.

**Question:** Could you give us an analysis of the construction of the men that must deal with the policies that come out of your office, that is, the foreign service. (Clarification is asked for) -- What kind of people do we need?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me try to answer what I understand to be the question. The U.S. has had to make major changes to project world responsibilities. In the past, we were dominant; other countries were lobbyists in American foreign policy. We must take into account the autonomy of the other countries. The problem we have is that it is very difficult to think in strategic terms. Current policy calls for broad thinking, not in terms of negotiating terms. This person should be concerned with where a country is going, and not how to construct a negotiating position. The current policy of promoting up through the ranks does not encourage creative thinking. Seniors tend to focus on

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negotiating and not on leading and planning. At a risk of being too direct,
today interests in the trend of foreign affairs has been declining. We
all know of the endless debate of who should advise the President. It
cannot be solved by prerogatives. If you have to go in and say you have
the right to be heard, you are already licked. The President needs
advice, you must give him what he needs, not what he wants. You must
earn the right to be heard. The organization must encourage young
people to think in presidential terms while maintaining continuity and
stability. He must concentrate on much more than tactics.[Standing ovation]

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