Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

KELCON
Sen. Goodell/Kissinger

7:40 pm

1/20/70

G: I am very concerned about Biafra. I don't know who you have talked to on it. It is much more serious then has been indicated. I was there in Feb. and it's very serious about the shipments of food.

K: We are very concerned and we are doing all we have to do.

G: I understand we are working with the Nigerian Government; and

K: If we make it too public they will not let food in. Then the President is Pushing State every day. We are to every limit of what we think is productive. The President is taking strong personal interest in it. I met with a group of people who left their only an hour ago, and I;ve talked with Norman Cousins. Terrible tradgedy.

G: They are announcing all forms of aid and they will refuse it. The people concerned about Biafra don;t believe that there is no problem. SPECIFICALLY Obviously, it is very serious. I have talked to no one who was there after the collapse.

K: We are convinced here that there is a problem and the problem we have is to convince the Gowon government to let in the food

G: Le me ask you something. I have been very quiet but I think maybe -- There is going to be a press conference with Geo. Murphy, Strom Thurmand and others. It's not against the President, only getting the facts before the public. The Nigerian Embassy must read that stuff and if they think no one thinks there is a problem they may ignore it.

K: Just don't attack the WH.

G: OK. I think we should start talking out.

K: 1 million dollars immediate, he told Wilson, two pre-packaged hospitals on the way. We did all this right away. Now we are waiting for the Nigerian Government

G: Some of us in Congress can build up and do something

K: I cannot give official advice

G: I shall not mention our conversation. I will do so immediately that the situation is entirely different.

*

By: KLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Goodell/Kissinger
7:40 pm 1/20/70

-2-

K: We could pull a grand stand play but we want to prevent mass starvation

G: I will try to shield you from a lot of requests to see you and the President.
Anything you can do to modulate what the State Department is doing, you can
prevent an attack on the President.

K: I hear you.

G: Sorry to bother you.

K: You never bother me.

By: KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCONE
Alexis Johnson/Kissinger
8:45 pm 1/20/70

J: Don't tell me you have another message

K: You thought you had a complicated problem. I should have handled this
from the beginning. Not that I know or xx care anything about it. First,
they would like Ermin to delay until Friday and he should request it.

J: You got my message

K: But apparently Sato has to get to him first. Secondly, after his meeting
with Niasano he should then request an appointment with Prime Minister on
grounds this is courtesy call to usher in the new year. In that way he should
bring the conversation around to textiles. But for heavens sake, don't let
him mention our means of communication. Then, on the 23rd he'll see the
first man and then a courtesy call on Sato and bring the conversation around
textiles and do not bring up the understanding because we have given our
word not to mention it. Then it is supposed to happen. They are pleading
on xx face saving on injury. It can be as formal as we want. I told him I
don't understand. I told him he had better put his mind to it too. And that's
where it stands. Nothing on substance and he said only for face saving.
We can make it as formal as we want just so he can show the word injury in it.

J: You have to call back with formula

K: I just have to tell him the main plan

J: OK

K: We will soon see who's fooling who. Why don't they do this with you?
I think Sato has promised something he cannot deliver. He reported that Aichi
knows.

J: Exactly. Everything points to that I am inclined to throw it back
at them. They want face saving -- what is it they want.

KX

K: You just tell me what to say and I will say it. I told him I would call him
tomorrow night.

J: I am inclined to throw it back. It is up to them to do something. You are
going to call tomorrow night?

K: Give it some thought. And request Ermin to request his appoint on the
23rd and request courtesy call on Sato for early next week and then maybe
from a formula and they will be at least obliged to go along.

some

By: KHC NARA, Dalo

J: I will talk to Mori

K: Get Mori in it. Let him come up with a formula. After all, he's the one that has to sell it.

J: He is the one that is screaming here. I will talk with him and talk with you

K: This axis one I would have gladly left to you.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

KELCON

Yoshida

8:50 pm 1/20/70

Y: I was again in touch with my friend. He was and is very sincere and really concerned on an early solution of the problem. My friend would like to know from you in advance what steps you are going to take in more concrete terms so that he can give more detailed instructions to his men directly concerned.

K: The steps we are taking are the ones we agreed on. We are not going to move very far from those steps. They are what you proposed yesterday. We will have our man in your city call on the man you suggested yesterday. I have not seen the specific instructions but I can get them for you and call you in a few hours. Would that help you?

Y: I think so. My friend was concerned with the most smooth way

K: I have a meeting shortly. I will get Mr. Lake. . . I will see if I can call in the next half hour or get word to you.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Haldeman

9:30 p.m., January 20, 1970

K: Ross Perot is bugging the daylights out of me about Stu Loory.
Did you tell me you told Loory Perot had contacted the White House?

H: Haldeman did.

K: Perot wants to get on to the guy who put out that story. Perot
had said he was not in touch with anyone in the White House and now
he thinks his credibility is being questioned.

H: I didn't say it.

K: Let me get Ehrlichman to call Perot. I'm sorry to have
bothered you.

H: That's all right. It impressed everybody here when they
said the White House was calling. Bob Semple is here at the table.
Can I give him a message for you?

K: He put out a story making me look like a nervous wreck.

H: Can I tell Bob that?

K: No. I didn't remember whether it was you or John who made
the statement about Loory/Perot this morning.

H: Don't you remember -- I gasped? I was horrified?

lds

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON:

John Ehrlichman

9:45 p.m., January 20, 1970

K: There is a nuclear weapon in transit, and I thought I should let you know so you could find shelter. Did you tell us this morning you talked to Stu Loory about Ross Perot. Perot is up in arms -- he wishes to speak to the malefactor. Would you call him tonight whenever you get away?

E: Did you know he had spread that line? We will just tell him honesty is the best policy. [Ehrlichman promised to call Perot tonight.]

By: KH NARA, Dalo 5/12/70

TELCONE
U. Alexis Johnson/Kissinger

8:55 am

1/20/70

K: This kabuki plan. How would you like to send me to negotiate it. I don't know
a thing about it but

J: I'm negotiating it at 5 different levels with no level knowing what the other
is doing.

K: I just had another call and SATO wants to know what it is we are going to
propose. They want a little detail in advance of what Meyer is going to come
in with.

J: Meyer will make a proposale we will have already made. The scenario
was that we would go to Geneva and make a tough proposition. Then we would
see about negotiating. Then Shimoda said the Prime Minister wanted us to
come back with a second proposition and so we went back with a second pro-
position to them. We have some negotiating room in it. As for the substance,
it's final. I instructed Ermine to see Niasaki today or tomorrow and express
concern and take a very tough line on the second proposal but the way things
are done we will discuss it with them.

K: No new wrinkles?

J: No.

K: Right. I will convey this to them. When you come over to the 303 meeting
I will show you the relative parts of our conversation.

J: I would like to see the original paper and review that too.

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
G. Smith/Kissinger
9:00 am 1/20/70

K: About the meeting tomorrow. I am not going to block anything from the meeting agenda. But you have to stop steamrolling me.

S: I'm not steamrolling you. I had planned and I will send over to you what we propose for the agenda. I had already suggested you come for lunch to go over things, if that's steamrolling. I am not trying to enter into your verification panel. I thought it would be a review from another group.

K: You had said let's have it at my house and I could not

S: You said our minds were going in the same channel and that you'd just talked to Hal Sonnenfeldt about meeting with them.

K: I just want a orderly agenda where everyone can prepare himself and that nothing new will be added.

S: We will send you in the course of the morning what we would like to transpire. I will cancel the meeting if it causes you problems.

K: No, I want the meeting but I thought we were going to discuss where the work is going.

Notetaker missed much of the rest due to incoming call

S: Let me send you the agenda.

By KL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Yoshida

9:15 am 1/20/70

K: I have talked with our people. They are not proposing anything new. Only as you have suggested, methods to achieve your own situation, are we willing to entertaining those. We don't insist on using comprehensive. On the principle points we feel we must stick.

Y: There is no problem on that question of substance. As I talked to you yesterday, there would only be a change of method and tactis and ours too. To avoid the word comprehensive, that should be very helpful. On our side, our people feel that some kind of damage verification concept should be put forth by your people.

K: But who would verify?

Y: I am not an expert but there should be some sort of damage verification

K: That's what bothers our people, and It was never mentioned before.

Y: On the surface of it you would accomodate somehow.

K: I will see the man who handles this in a little while and I may call you later. It will be hard to move because of our internal prestige is on the line too.

Y: My friend told me that the understanding has been pulled(?) to Aichi and he is fully aware of that. Now the first man that knows the precise circumstances of this and he is alright. The question is only the method of getting it. That is why my friend got in touch with me today and he would like to know in advance so he can give instructions to his men to avoid further confusion and complications.

K: We must stick to the substance but if methods ______ we are willing to listen but not change substance. Our people think that damage limiting is change in substance.

Y: I see. Somehow, if your people could accommodate the face-saving.

K: We will accommodate face-saving and look at those proposal sympathetically.

Y: On damage, our people

K: Our people say your proposal on damage verification is not acceptable.

Y: Our working people feel that if you could produce some formula then we would be in a line to agree.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
2:43 pm 1/20/70

P: Did I catch you while you are seeing Cabot? No, that's all right, you can talk. Two things: One, I mentioned to him my conversation with Benelli. I want him to understand we will fight the new opening to the left. I want him to fight that there. I am sure of Martin but I think the others are cutting us up.

K: I agree or why would Benelli have brought that up?

P: On the Africa thing, it seems to me Fergueson and the others are convinced that we have to take deal with Gowon. That's how he's powerful. Do you think so?

K: That's their view. The problem as I see it is first of all, in the press statement they already read one sentence

P: I thought that had already gone out

K: Not yet. Have to say determination because in a month it will be apparent that over a million people are dying of starvation.

P: The only problem is this. When I think of the whole business of having a meeting of these people and the rest, that we have Fergueson go along with it.

K: I am not sure we should have a White House conference.

P: I don't know if it will come off. We've already shown enough interest. Let Norman Cousins take it up with the State Department.

K: If there is a huge amount of starvation, I want you to be protected. You've done much

P: If they are bleeding and dying

K: Did you see the memo on Biafra I left with you this morning? I would go easy on the White House conference for at least a few days.

P: I will put that on a back burner for at least a few days. It's a savage situation. I think they are going to starve them. I think State knows it and Fergueson knows it.

K: Fergueson said over 500 thousand are going to die.

P: I think they don't give a danm. They think it's Africa and that's the way it will be. Bill made the practical point that we cannot do what they don't want us to do.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-2-

K: Every hot item gets shuttled into the White House but State gets credit for all the good

P: We haven't had any disagreements with State over this have we?

K: Oh, yes, everything that has been done in the past week has been done with WH pressure. I don't think we can do a great deal more. I would eliminate that one sentence. It looks allBUS. Other than that, I have no problems with it. The White House conference can go on the back burner. It might get you points with some people not normally for you

P: Strange isn't it? Those who usually are liberals would let Nigeria starve. They just figure that most important thing. . .

K: I thought you might like to know that at the meeting with the Chinese in Warsaw they have insisted on news media. It's unprecedented. You know, it's in their Embassy. They must be scared out of their minds of the Russians.

P: I hope something happens between us. Hope to battle on Biafra with State. We have to fight ABM. Len Garment sent me a memo. Favorable and unfavorable. I talked with Haldeman and told him that they are catering to the wrong people. They are willing to tear up the society.

K: The people to whom you are appealing will not respect you for it.

By KHU NARA, Dato'

TELCON
President/Kissinger
4:55 pm 1/20/70

K: I had Dobrynin with me.

K: I wasn't in any hurry. I want the changes you made. Would come up now?

K: You have my copy.

P: Just come as you are.

K: I can tell you what K I had. Just two nit-picks. And I will tell you what Dobrynin had to say.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Haldeman

5:55 p.m., January 20, 1970

H: That was a disgraceful performance of yours -- to allow the President to call me in while you were there and berate me for something when I had sent the memorandum to you on Friday night.

K: I don't have enough enemies as it is; I need more. XX There is no NSC meeting this Friday -- it is Tuesday of next week.

H: That may not be very good. When would you have it?

K: 10:00 a.m.

H: We'll tell Harold Wilson not to come?

K: Oh! How about Monday.

H: We'll cancel the President's Press Conference?

K: We have a problem. The Assistant to the President Lee DuBridge has screwed us XX again on PSAC. It is he and I against the world. Laird wants to present the options. I want to hold the NSC meeting with me presenting the options and Laird presenting the program. Don't you think?

H: Yes.

K: I may need help on this. If we have the meeting on Friday, it will be the damnest donnybrook ever.

H: If you don't have it on Friday -- he is going to veto HEW thing on Sunday night on national television; the Press Conference on Monday; Harold Wilson on Tuesday; the MX 'NSC Meeting' on Wednesday for Wilson. We could ;do it Thursday.

K: The budget is going on Friday and this money is in the budget. We have to do it this Friday -- there is no choice. He thinks he needs time for the HEW veto.

H: He does, but he doesn't have it.

By: KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

K: We can't have it Tuesday afternoon?

H: Yes, but you have Wilson here. We would have to cancel some things.

K: Your judgment is we have to do it on Friday?

H: I can only make a judgment as to when the President shouldn't do it.

K: Can we do it Wednesday afternoon?

H: He has a filming with Linkletter at 4:00. Maybe we can do it on Wednesday afternoon.

K: The NSC meeting in the morning for Wilson is not so important.

H: We can do it either Tuesday or Wednesday afternoon by cancelling things which we can work out.

K: Let me get back to you -- I will do so no later than tomorrow morning.

By KM NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Yoshida

6:03 pm

1/20/70

K: I have talked with our people and they feel that on the word comprehensive they can be flexible but on the demonstration of injury it is unacceptable. I don't know why. We are willing to listen to a reasonable proposal that doesn't change the substance. What I told you this morning is correct

Y: Then it is our time to put forth a proposal

K: But not that changes the substance

Y: No question of that

K: But our people think that is happening

Y: I see. On injury verification

K: Our man is instructed to ask the for counter suggestions on some of these points. We cannot accept the formula according to the which we must demonstrate the injury. Unless you can find a way of doing it without changing the outcome. You have to demonstrate that it is fully formal. The gist of your present proposal is not that.

Y: I will tell my friend.

K: We do not want to make his life difficult but our impression is that if you can come up with a formula for verification of injury that is entirely formal. But we cannot accept the present formula. But I don't know what the present one is.

P: The impression I have from my people friend, all it needs is ______ gentlemen. It is just for formality.

K: If you can express it as pure formality but this must be obvious

Y: From outside it is desireable to look like a formality.

K: I understand. Let me look at that again. Your man is not coming back until the 22nd.

Y: He is here.

K: He is not available until the 22nd on our man was told.

Y: I will get in touch with my friend. Out of the two key gentlemen, the old one whom you know was already given the understanding.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

Yoshida

6:03 pm

1/20/70

K: Our Ambassador is supposed to see the other one.

Y: He will be given the new decision from my friend. Now the only question is to devise a kind of special formula that will save the face of our people, so I got the point clearly.

K: O.K.

Y: So would you consider this question just for formality's sake on your side?

K: If it can be made pure formality I will raise it.

Y: It is very difficult to handle this kind of matter. On our side we feel we have our principle. Now it is alright. There is no question of ______ and also we would like to get it done as soon as possible. This suggestion from your side

K: You had better give it some thought too because our people are having difficulty thinking of a gesture. I will think of it overnight.

Y: Would you help my friend?

K: I will do my best

Y: I will tell my friend that as soon as your man here sees the new and perhaps the old gentleman then perhaps the question will have been solved.

K: Let us see what we can do and you do the same.

Y: I will check with my friend.

K: Very good. We will be in touch.

Y: I think he had better keep in touch. I am sorry. I am not an expert and cannot do the precise form. I think we have gotten point very clearly.

K: We are both in the same boat.

Y: Please help my friend. If you know where we have similar problems with our Capitol Hill. My friend is not worried or concerned but only to put through the bureaucracy and his man is quite all right in dealing with our Capitol Hill in the coming months.

K: I fully understand but we have our own problem. And you must understand our problem.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
Yoshida/Kissinger
7:30 pm 1/20/70

Y: Sorry to bother you again. I have just spoken with my friend and he appreciates your cooperation and he asks me to get in touch immediately/ First, the man is out of town and not available until the 22nd. Tomorrow, our time. Could it be possible to meet your man here on the 23rd? This gentleman is returning the 22nd.

K: You want to delay until the 23rd?

Y: So that my friend can talk with that gentlemen.

K: Let me understand. You want our man to delay until the 23rd.

Y: It does not have to have diplomatically handled. My friend would like enough time to talk with that gentleman.

K: I see. The 23rd then. We will do that. That's easy.

Y: He has been away.

K: We will handle it. We will tell our man to delay the appointment until the 23rd

Y: In the most natural way

K: We will request it so no one will know

Y: In the meantime our man will talk to the gentleman. X My friend will be very happy to meet your man after that. It being the new year and your man just returning from your country.

K: Use that occasion

Y: Yes, a courtesy call

K: Very intelligent

Y: Just a new year's courtesy call.

K: Next week some time.

Y: Here comes a question of ______ that could not be helped. The new gentleman doesn't need it.

K: But your gentleman does. There will be no reference to any understanding.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Yoshida

7:30 pm 1/20/70

-2-

Y: No reference to any understanding. Without refering to it your man can
have satisfactory report.

K: I understand very well

Y: Your man has no idea of understanding?

K: Just want to be sure your friend doesn't raise it.

Y: My friend would never say anything. But on that business

K: I understand completely

Y: The 3rd point. The question of the injury or damage business. I was
right in saying that half an hour ago to you that my friend does need your
cooperation on this.

K: What can I do?

Y: You see, what my friend needs for just formality, to explain to the
outside, you know

K: I understand.

Y: Just as you could somehow

K: I suggest following

Y: In a general way some kind of proof or -- it isn't verification. Just general
proof that you are meeting in getting injuries

K: Every year or just once?

Y: I am afraid I am not in a position to say.

K: I understand. My only problem is that I don't understand the subject so I must take talk with our experts and neither do you. We will have a great time with this.

Y: I am sorry about this. What my friend and the people here concerned

K: Let me suggest the following. I will talk to our experts and get a formula
that is not substantive, only tactics. Then you tell me if we should agree on
whether to give it to the first or the second.

Y: The new gentleman.

By KM NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM
Stans/Kissinger
9:35 am 1/21/70

K: Sorry to get you out of the meeting but I am under pressure. On the textile business, I have been talking to our contact. They are going to deliver but they need something with injury determination in it. Something purely formal. I told them that what they have proposed is unacceptable. They want anything at all.

S: They want us to prove that our industry is injured before any relief takes place and that was not in the plan we agreed upon

K: That's what I told him. I think he's promised something he cannot deliver

S: If it's just purely formula, we would consider it.

K: I have to call him back between 5 and 6. If you could think of something.

S: I will talk to Alex Johnson and think about it after this meeting.

K: If you cannot, you can't. Policy formal and doesn't have to be substantive.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Amb. Freeman/Kissinger
9:50 am 1/21/70

K: I have two things. I am mindful of your suggestion of sitting in and I am trying to work out a procedure. I have not been able to focus with the President. If one or the other of us could get a record, it would be satisfactory to me.

Second, I didn't know that the agenda had been worked out between you and the State Department.

F: We have put something forward for a suitable agenda. But nothing final.

K: For your own personal information, I doubt seriously that the President will want to discuss Greece.

F: If not, that's that. I know the Prime Minister wants to make one point -- no more than three minutes -- in private, of his discussions with the King.

K: Then not a full scale discussion. For instance, I don't think the President will want to get into Intelstat.

F: I have no intention of letting him discuss that. Rogers and Stewart can discuss Intelstat.

K: What we have done in the past, we got some idea on what would discuss. I don't know if that's useful in this case

F: I think that I am in the Prime Minister's mind about this. I know roughly the sort of things

K: Frankly we have spent all our time on the State of the Union.

F: I could come over

K: That might be useful. I have no question on what's on the agenda. We are friends. They are dealing with each other as friends. There is no back-biting. We only want to make the meeting more successful than it would be without planning. There isn't the slightest thought that someone is trying to run something in that will be embarrassing. Let me call you later today and fix a time. I will give you a rough idea of what the President is likely to say.

F: I don't want there to be any xpx surprise at all. Just tell me a time and I will come over.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
10:25 am 1/21/70

L: There are several things that you should be aware of so that they don't come as a surprise. We are getting near the time that the Surgeon General will come down with his report on the gas on Okinawa. It will be a favorable report. The Governor of Oregon will put pressure on the President not to move the gas off Okinawa. I don't think the President should reverse on this. We have to move it off.

K: Don't worry, he won't.

L: There is more danger with commercial gas like ________ moving through Oregon and California -- and we will take all precautions that are necessary. I keep getting calls from the WH to call the Governor. We have g kept in touch with the Governor and have explained fully how we will protect the people. If it comes up some day, we can say we settled that some time ago. The first shipment will move within two to three days after the Surgeon General's report. It is there, the ship is ready, and it is all ready to move.

K: Anything else?

L: Let me finish. I sent over that memo. I want to go to the Laotian borders with B-52's again.

K: I haven't got it yet.

L: You should have it soon. It's probably with the staff. I wanted it acted on. They are increasing their logistic supplies. They're at the same level as last year.

K: Do you think they the menu (?) series could be the reason?

L: I'm not sure. We have uncovered much. They have to have logistical support before they can send more men. That's why we cannot stop now. So to stop them we must ? ? ? . We can not scale down now.

K: I have talked to the President about it and we have agreed in principle. We were just waiting for you to tell us when to move. Early next week?

L: If we can. I wrote the memo as short as I could.

K: Does it have to go into State channels?

L: Yes, I think so.

K: You know what they will do.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Laird/Kissinger

10:25 am

1/21/70

-2-

L: Yes, but I don't think we can avoid it. On this alert for Biafra. I backed it down to 96 hours alert from the 24.

K: 96 hours and then they cannot begin to move until 96 hours?

L: Landing in the country in 96 hours.

K: It will start to get bigger and there will be tremendous heat on now because
facts of the starvation shall be hitting home.

L: We will still be on alert but we cannot maintain 24 hours.

K: We should through the week.

L: That means we have the men sitting in their planes. I can have them moving whenever you say. We will only way we are on alert and not say what kind. Otherwise

K: I would like to check it out with the President. My instinct sees trouble just starting.

L: You won't have to move that fast. The British haven't even started yet.
I can move them as fast as you want them.

K: I would think that's right.

L: On this question of selective service. The Congress has given responsibility to the NSC. That's a Congressional mandate the NSC has. I tried to change that to an advisory commission but the law now as past in 1967 does give the NSC responsibility. One of the problems we have is that the selective service system has a lot of retired National Guard colonels involved in the National Guard program and they are not up to ?????. This random selection thing is fine but it's the first time everyone knows where they stand. Because we now have to use the system's approach With the recommendations we have to make to Congress I think it is most important that they be re-organized as soon as possible. They are not really aboard. You are familiar with that?

K: No, I'm not.

L: They are really not too much attuned and it is important that things work.
I have been trying to press for a director of the selective service. This whole
policy question is with the NSC and I am concerned that there is no movement.

K: What should I do?

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

10:25 am 1/21/70

-3-

L: Encourage them to move. When they moved on Hershey they moved so fast that they did not have anyone to replace him. Now no one is running the Secret Service. They haven't planned out the call for February yet. It's a new system and we have to watch it a bit. I am pressing Bryce and Flanigan.

K: I'm on your side on this one.

L: I have your memo on DPRC and the second page -- really what it does and it bothers me.

K: What does it do? We talked about this before and I don't think we had a disagreement

L: All matters that have to do with overall force reductions

K: We agreed that Korea and Thailand, etc., would be put into the Review Group!

L: What about NATO?

K: I don't care. In the Review Group? Might as well if we are discussing the other things. Makes no difference because the same staff on my side covers it.

L: I don't like to see the DPRC at such a high level which takes time

K: What items do you object to?

L: I will put it in a memo to you. I don't think we should weigh the structure of the Security Council. There are too many lines here and they aren't staffed up properly.

K: Can you tell me what items?

L: I will give you a memo

K: We must do the 5 year review, the one year budget, bombers, aircraft carriers. Other things we are flexible about.

L: I was concerned about other things. Should be high level

K: I agree. Everything I read in a memo I later read in the newspaper that I had to back off

L: Not from me you haven't. Everything I write I keep to myself. The stuff from the JCS is voluminous and I try to condense it.

By KL V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
4:10 pm 1/21/70

K: I wanted you to know that Lucet got caught in traffic and so the memo just arrived. The figures are 30 ______, 50 fighter bombers, and 108 planes. It doesn't change anything and I wanted you to know.

R: Shows how screwed up one can get. Things couldn't be worse. Lucet says Schumann didn't know anything about this. That's why he didn't tell me. Schumann says it's the most embarrassing thing that's ever happened to him. What ever we say I will say that our government was advised a few days ago of the number of the planes. We expressed concern regarding the arms balance in the Mid. East. I will have to say it in my dispatch. Debre' says Libya had received larger approaches from the U.S.

K: Not treu

R: Conspiring from Libya (?)

K: It's third rate on their part. The timing couldn't be worse. From our point of view it gives us breathing space.

R: I hear that the Libyans will train at Wheelus. If ______ it's OK but if it's a cover to take over the airbase it will cause trouble. Anyway, they don't have any pilots.

K: They have 8. Against whom could they use 108 airplanes? That Jewish Conference -- from that point of view they will have a new target

R: Yes, get them off of me. I will use full concern in my release. I'll almost have to.

By KH W NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Cong. Morse/Kissinger

4:47 pm 1/21/70

M: Apparently you have made some time for us on Monday. Is it worth you while to talk to us?

K: Always.

M: I am going to Vietnam next month. I don't want to abuse your time.

K: I am always happy to see you.

M: My colleagues and will be there.

K: I will look forward to it.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Bob Haldeman

4:48 p.m., January 21, 1970

K: The President should look at the various papers I have been sending up on Nigerian Relief - Biafra. Buckley has written an article against us, and other domestic pressures are cropping up.

H: Why don't we do something?

K: He hasn't given the word for us to do something. I have put up various options. He hasn't been willing to take on the fight and I haven't pressed it in view of the State of the Union. However, he should be aware of the magnitude of the problem and what is building up domestically. This is not going to kill him, but he is missing an opportunity to make some points.

H: By making a grandstand move?

K: Yes. If you could just shuffle the papers so he can look at one or more of them...

H: I'll do it.

lds

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "TELCOM\nUAJohnson/Kissinger\n4:50 pm 1/21/70", "By KL NARA, Date 5/12/04", "J: Are you calling back or is he?", "K: I think I am", "J: It doesn't make any difference. I went over to you what I sent to Ermin. You know now what that is. On the question of face saving formula of any kind, I think we have to put the ball back in their court. Maurie agrees. They should do it from here. Reactivate the Shimoda line.", "K: Aichi understands the problem. I would have thought they would have used him. That's their way, I guess", "J: Shimoda channel, I think. You cannot negotiate over the phone.", "K: I cannot negotiate face to face. Meyer doesn't understand as much as I do. I will tell him that they must move it back here.", "J: That's right. It's entirely impossible to work this way. If they activate the Shimoda channel we will settle it when they want. I will not continue to go through these charades.", "K: Better through you than Ermin Meyer who must think we have lost our minds.", "J: He does. KWK&KWK&KWK&KWK&KWK&KWK&KWK&

By KHC

NARA, Dato.

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
4:55 pm 1/21/70

L: I have got one point I though you should be aware of. As far as the Paris
neogtiating team is concerned, we have Gen. Wynen who is doing a splendid
job. He is being rotated. The Army wants to send Uhle. The problem is
the psychological impact of the announcement in the absence of an ambassador.
Do you think it's ok to routinely do this?

K: You are replacing one guy with an equivalent guy? I see no problem.
We never said we wouldn't rotate. Uhle is a bright guy.

L: There are several who would like the job. Pierce, for one. Pierce is
working on something else and he would like to get out of here.

K: not Pierce

L: Before I sign this and you read in the paper

K: The military man isn't that visible. I think you can go ahead. Is it OK
with Habib?

L: I haven't checked with Habib or State

K: I see no problem. I mentioned that alert to the President and he had no
problem

Ambassador
L: The Korean War was over talking about the supplemental. I told him
about the importance of putting more money in the modernization program.
I indicated that there was a chance there would be a change in the support levels
afterwards.

K: I did not fully

L: His reaction was that if modernization gives anyone the idea of reduction in
American forces, then we won't modernize. This isn't in line with the Nixon
doctrine. We cannot assure we will always be there. I told him, it's to your
advantage to modernize. The only problem is that he wen't to the State Dept.
today. They don't want anything discussed about the possibility that there
may be changes in troop levels. We did not get into that.

K: I already have a complaint from Gerry Smith

L: What?

K That you are for ABM and you should be quiet. It's only a Presidential
policy decision and it's only natural that you be for it.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

Yoshida

7:21 pm 1/21/70

K: I talked to our people and first of all, we will do the technicalities, we will ask for the appointment for a courtesy call next week. On the problem of injury we cannot come up with a formula because we don't know what you have in mind. Why don't you come up with a formula? Secondly, after those conversations in Tokyo we should shift the discussions back here because it is easier for our people to control our people here then at a distance.

Y: Very clear. Alright then, I will get it to my friend and my friend will talk to his new gentleman so that this new gentleman -- or I don't precisely -- or the new gentleman probably will tell your man here what my friend would like to have on this injury business. Is that all right?

K: At the first appointment?

Y: As wehn this new friend meets ________ on this subject. This coming conversation will be just two of them

K: yes

KY: Special

K: That new gentleman will take the initiative for only one. We did not ask for it. We did not ask for only private

Y: That's right but you have approached us for an appointment. During the conversation this new gentleman asked you man about injury. What he and my new friend need for

K: I understand but my man will not say anything because he has nothing to say.

Y: Just convey message to you. Then perhaps next week your man will pay a courtesy call and my friend will probably also mention this matter.

K: Right

Y: And the actual talk will take place in your place

K: Fairly quickly.

YL: No questions. My friend thinks the sooner the better. He is in a hurry so it will happen quickly. One minor thing. I think yesterday I mentioned that the old gentleman whom you knew -- you know whom I'm talking about?

By KHC

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Yoshida

7:20 pm 1/21/70

-2-

K: Your friend?

Y: No, His first right-hand man. Who went with my friend. My friend told to that old gentleman of his about the contents of the understanding. However, still my first friend has not approached the whole thing.

K: Just that one part.

Y: This would be the final. He put it in a good way. Even his closest friend, the old gentleman, doesn't know the understanding. Just one part and figures only

K: Not the other part?

Y: So please don't misunderstand

K: And we will not refer to it.

Y: So when your man comes to meet my friend, my friend will not refer to that understanding. He is extremely cautious and very serious.

K: Right

Y: If you do not hear from me, everything is alright and it should move as we have talked

K: Let us do it on that basis.

Y: Now I will get in touch with my friend. If there is no need, I will not get in touch with you. Otherwise I will be in touch.

K: I hope we can be in touch on other matters.

Y: yes, please be in touch if I can ever help on other matters.

*

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCONE

A. Johnson/Kissinger

7:35 pm 1/21/70

K: I have finished another act for you. It's a refinement. I told him and they must have been prepared. Their fellow will give him something when Armin meets him. But next week with the Prime Minister they are to raise textiles. But there will be interpreters.

J: They could have just Armin's man. He speaks Japanese.

K: They want him to see the other man alone. I told them they had to initiate something

J: That's what Armin will ask for.

K: They will tell us what they need on injury on Friday. I told him that after these meetings it should be shifted back here. He agreed.

J: They just want to be able to say they did some of it there.

K: He told me that Aichi doesn't know as much as we had thought. He only knows the figures. So they must mean that he doesn't know about GATT.

J: I don't quite figure that

K: That's what he told me. I told him we had to have something quickly and they said by next week. I frankly doubt they can do it.

J: That's my worry.

K: But I think the President will be rough. Can we drag our feet on other things?

J: Yes

K: I mean on the reversion

J: We could stall on starting to talk. Let me go back. The fellow he will see on Friday will give him the formula.

K: That's what he said but I'm beginning to doubt

J: And when Armin sees the big fellow, what then?

K: They will get into problem and then it will be shifted back here.

J: Shifted here.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Johnson/Kissinger

7:35 pm 1/21/70

-2-

K: I suppose they need something in Tokyo and so don't want to just depend on stupid ambassador here in Washington.

J: But if the fellow cannot talk for them, we are in trouble

K: Aichi has x figures and there axx is not much else besides figures.

J: I have a hard time identifying that.

K: I guess they mean facts. I can go back

J: No, I have been playing charades.

K: You have your problems. Some of your people must think you have lost your mind. But you have a good record.

J: No, that's manageable. Let's play out this hand.

K: Will you send me the cables when they come in so I can see what I have wrought. Wait til I give a backgrounder on this!

J: I have him a little background on this. We'll just play this out.

K: And see where we are after Armin has seen Sato.

J: And we see what happens when it comes back here. This is about the most devious hand I have ever had. I will keep you informed.

By KM U NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON

Ehrlichman/Kissinger

8:00 pm 1/21/70

E: What's up

K: Are you still in your office for a change?

E: Indeed! I'm starting the morning mail.

K: Were you serious that I should call Ross Perout? What does he think he will get by that? -- that trip ?

E: End apartheid.

K: Come on! You just want to get me to call.

E: He told me that he and Al Haig had

K: Do you really want me to call him?

E: No

K: But is he cooking something?

E: So am I. A fine example of XX speech.

Not as ?? as it sounds.

K: XXXXXXXX We are cutting the domestic part and adding to the foreign part. He had me over there and when I said something mushy he said he had to do that for Ehrlichman. The he said, he's a tough man to know.

E: The VP said "will that get any money for lateral sewers?" We're talking national policy and he's worried about sewers!

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

TELCORN

Zeigler/Kissinger

9:40 am

1/22/70

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

K: We have broken Nigeria open and they have accepted everything on an
emergency basis. Roger Morris has a list. You had better announce it at
11:00. State wants to go to it.

Z: I will talk with Rogers and get that out.

*

By KHC

NARA, Dato

TELCONE

Richardson / Kissinger

11:14 am

1/22/70

R: Probably you have heard. It's very encouraging.

K: I did hear

R: I understand it will be announced at the White House. If fact, it may be already

K: Yes, Ron announced it at 11:00. About lunch -- I have to go to the State of the Union thing wo I won't be back until 1:30. Can you do it that late?

R: Yes, easy. I will watch it and when it is over I will come over. Meanwhile, If you would be thinking about this from the President's point of view. This is a very expensive operation and will be for AID funds for other requests. Perhaps from the President's point of view and theirs it might be a good thing to submit within the next week to 10 days a supplemental request which would give him an opportunity to say what the money has been used for and what we have done. We have developed plans to deal with

K: I have no problem with your attitude. I never expressed a view on this.

R: This is a good opportunity for the President. It might be a plus.

K: How do you think we should proceed?

R: I back am having cost figures pulled together based on previous .
For example, we now have in the works to fly trucks to Biafra. It costs
$17,000 per truck.

K: I watch these budget problems and think $20 million is too small to think about. I think this is a good idea and I'm certainly not going to worry about $17,000.

R: I want to be sure I am correct that the President's view would be that $10-or-$15,000 per truck would not make a difference.

K: You're absolutely right. We want to make a maximum effort. If the
Western report is partly right, we just don't have time to worry.

R: Western is nearer the ______ than we thought. We intend to be prepared
to deal with the problem under the time he gives. We may be able to speed
up wtkx but with more cost

K: You can do that and be sure that the President is behind you.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Richardson/Kissinger

11:14 am 1/22/70

-2-

R: It would help if the President is willing to ask for a supplemental
request. We have already spent $80 million.

K: Can you have a paper over here by the end of the day and I will have
an answer by Monday. Do you know about the helicopters for Panama?
Rockefeller brought it back as a need. He was told by the President that
he, the President, was ordering it, in Vaky's Meyer's, and my hearing.
We have not been able to get it done and Rockefeller is so mad that he is
arranging financing at the Continental Bank in Chicago to get it done. I
think it's a disgrace that the President's decision cannot be done

R: I agree

K: ????_?

R: I will follow up and get up to date

K: I have an up-to-date chronology you can read at lunch

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Packard/Kissinger

11:20 am

1/22/70

K: I have read your briefing memo and I think it is very good. At one of the DPRC meetings one of your men said something very good -- that we will want someone from Defense even if there is ______. In the area of defense even while it can be penetrated by the Soviets it means the Soviets must launch a sizeable attack. It has the advantage of forcing them into a substantial size attack. This is the best you have done.

P: I have some charts. One other issue -- that is, intermediate issue Phase 1 plus research. I will point that out and be prepared

K: PSAC will come out against it. I don't care because that is productive.

R: We should give them a chance

K: I will invite Dubridge to the meeting

R: We can get some of these fellows to help. Do you want me to send that memo around to the NSC members?

K: That's up to you

P: I think we should cover most of the. We have the question of the DIA

K: Send it as a personal memo from you saying that's what we will be speaking from

P: No objections to Gerry Smith?

K: No, but send it to him late in the day. No, I don't care

P: I will write a personal not and ask him to keep it Eyes Only.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

*

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON

David Rockefeller/Kissinger

11:45 am 1/22/70

R: Frank Lincoln has been in to see us again and is going on this trip and would like letters of introduction

K: We have told him to stay out of the Arab-Israeli area

R: I don't think he has any background in the area at all

K: He is to stay out of Lebanon, Jorday, and Egypt.

R: I though he was going to Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran

K: But no disclussions in Lebanon. Given your present problems I would go easy on Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

R: He doesn't have sensitivity and letters of to see the Shah and Faisal. Won't he get official introductions?

K: NO

R: If he isn't getting official introductions, he isn't any friend of mine and I have qualms about what he may say. He will get an introduction from someone else for the Shah.

K: Not through you

R: Heads of State he will have to get elsewhere. Faisal is strange and interesting. There is quite an effort to close our banks. The reason is that politicians running in NY State are trying to get at Nelson through me.

K: David, I had better call you this afternoon

R: I want to talk to you about that Latin American thing

K: OK, I will call you.

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato. S/12/04

KELCON

Laird/Kissinger/Reese/chose/now

2:15 pm 1/22/70

L: Re the airlift to Nigeria. I've been having inquiries -- there are inquiries from NBC

K: I thought they were the planes you had on alert?

L: Elliot Richardson says they are in not the ones to send. He says we are sending C-141's and men in civilian clothes. He says we are going to paint the markings off

K: I don't know a C-141 from

L: Say what you want done and we will do it. But leave how

K: That's fine. I didn't understand. There is no problem. We don't care what plan you use. Who did

L: We have some planes ready and on alert

K: That's a different

L: We are the only AF with C-141's. Have them stay away from what we will use. Let me

K: Unless there is a foreign policy decision I didn't know. Who did you say? Elliot? Elliot who? Elliot Richardson is right here. Let me put him on.

L: I have a request that we have C-141-6 with no military markings to airlift and no men in military clothes. You say what you want delivered and we will do it. C-141's are a good give away.

R: There was a fellow from JCS

L: We probably won't use C-141's

R: I don't know one from the other. It came out last night. The information was that two C-141's had been modified for the truck airlift.

L: They're not even on alert

R: OK. we want

L: We are told it has been announced

*

By: KHC

NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

Laird/Kissinger/Richardson

-2-

R: My understanding was that the two C-141's had already been put on. To expedite we thought we could put on more

L: If you use C-141, everyone knows its the USAF

R: I thought it was a previous announcement that we would make these available.

L: There was an early announcement that planes were on the alert but not C-141's

R: As far as I am concerned whatever you want to use

L: Tell us the quantity and its on its way

R: Quantity -- the people you have on our working group have the details

L: Re the WH announcement it would be best to say we are using planes the WH put on alert

R: I think there is good communication with your people

L: They wanted us to deny that no defense equipment is being used.

R: As far as markings go, it's a problem on the ground from the point of view of the Federal Military Government. I did not actually call. I would not use quite that tone. Someone was using my name. We are concerned about sensitivities of the FMG about not using military planes if we can avoid it. As to types, we will use your judgement.

L: We are ready to fly

R: Great

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

7:15 pm

1/22/70

K: I am sorry

L: This has been a bad day for me

K: I am terribly sorry. I didn't know what you were talking about

L: They had a press conference from State today

K: All announcements would come from the WH -- that was the arrangement

L: McCloskey said we had no C-141's. All hell broke out. We have no authority. If we are going to do it, we will, Now we are trying to quiet down something that should not have gotten out.

thought

K: I didn't think so. I didn't think that the planes you had on alert were being moved. That's all.

L: I didn't think so. I wouldn't know a 141 from a 130

K: They announced we would fly them with American service personnel, painting out the markings. Congress will

K: They were under orders that announcements came from here.

L: If you are going to do something on ______ basis, you don't announce it to the world

K: The credit should go to the President

L: We have been trying to show that the President is concerned.

L: We don't need to say we are painting our airplanes.

K: You have no problem with me on that. Now that I know I will talk talk some action on it.

L: I have told everyone to keep their mouths shut.

K: The President with safeguard. He is getting pretty sore at our position. He wants to approve your position and right there. But he wants to make sure Packard makes a tough presentation.

L: That paper you circulated today should be called back. It's a bad paper. It says it takes 10 Spartans to kill one Chinese missile. It's not true.

Republished from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger
7:15 pm 1/22/70

-2-

K: MY staff did that. I said it has no official standing.

L: It shoots the hell out of Dave and it's full of holes. I don't know who wrote it but it's bad. We would be better using the President's Scientific Advisory Board paper

K: The President just wants to go the other way.

L: Dave will. But I've been ging over this paper and for hours

K: I will call it back and say it was an unauthorized paper and it will be redone. Do you think that's better/

L: Yes. Dave Packard will start out with a tough statement. I haven't been able to cancel out on that California thing.

K: So you won't be there?

L: I tried to get someone else but they were as mad as hell. If I don't show up and I don't think I can cancel. It's the new nuclear frigate named after California because it's the President's state. We tried to get the Secretary of the Navy. Do you think I should call the President and explain?

K: Yes, because he is counting on you. I will call the paper back right now.

L: Fouls up on Chinese xinxinxinxinxinxixinxixinxixin threat

K: Can I call it back?

L: State is using it. Bill called me and said you cannot defend northwest defense on this side

K: I will say it was done by an individual staff member and has no standing. I will do it at the beginning of the meeting. I will say there are two papers and one has no standing.

L: Should I call the President about the Calif. thing?

K: No. Now is not a good time and I think he will understand. Packman is shook up

L: Yes and he thinks he has no backing.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Richardson/Kissinger

7:45 pm 1/22/70

R: On these planes for Biafra, I don't know if you have had any further conversation with Laird

K: I don't know what he is talking about. I understand McCloskey had a press briefing. No problems except that they are supposed to come out of here.

LR: Zeigler made the announcement. McCloskey just answered questions and told them that military aircarft would be used with the markings painted out which I understand caused some trouble at DOD and may not have been a wise choice. I told Mel we won't do it again. We have to be sure that Mel is pushing.

K: Don't you think he is? I suspect he didn't have the planes ready. That's why all the noise

R: I think he needs to get the President to call him up or for you to call him and say that the President said such and such.

K: Is he dragging his feet?

R: We're not sure. His people told us about the C-141 and where they were and said everything could be painted out. We thought it was on the track until now. The sense of urgency should get imparted to him other than from me. I says he will find planes but that's as far as xxx we are.

K: One other thing. We distributed xxx a paper on safe guard which is being hotly contested and was only meant for a background anyway. I would appreciate if if the State Department doesn't use it.

R: Which one?

K: It's dated Jan. 2, 1970, Safe Guard Deployment. It was not presented as having status, because it had no status. I just thought it summarized the discussion. But it's not doing that and it's inaccurate besides.

R: OK

R: Will you do it for Gerry Smith too or do I have to

LR: I will do it through S/S and then it will go to everyone, including the Secretary.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Cahpin/Kissinger
7:58 pm 1/22/70

K: The Secretary of Defense is trying to get out of the safeguard thing

C: Why can't the President send Laird to the meeting and send Packman

K: Laird is a genious and has a big story.

C: Let me get my schedule. How will he be tomorrow?

K: Newport, I guess. Could we have it in the afternoon

C: The President wants to be at Camp David after 3:00.

K: He had better have a letter there. He's the one who will have to explain it before Congress

C: Call Bob and tell him we have been discussing it.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

T. Kennedy/Kissinger

8:05 pm

1/22/70

K: We have to get the Nigerians to let the stuff in there. Most of the measures ?? We put 8 C-130's and helicopters on alert and $1 million for relief agenceis. They asked last week for jeeps, trucks and hospitals. The jeeps are there. The trucks are being flown in at $17 thousand a truck. The hospitals ?????. They have been asking for more. You were briefid on the Western report. Today they asked for planes and we are sending four Red Cross and 2 ?? . 10,000 blankets and lamps, 3 thousand 7/8?, 6,000 tons of food, 40,000 tons of food for the next 30 days and then the same again. The problem is to get it into the enclave itself. Now only on the edges. This is, just as a friend, we suffer no agony if a little hint, particularly over Nigeria. We are doing all we can. We can make a number of grandstand plays that will not get the food in.

T: You take ???? Newsom and Fergeson were very frank. I have never heard in the last 7 or 8 years a report as frank. We have had good sources and telegrams that came through the Department about the 3rd division and Red Cross efforts. I was very impressed and complimented the Administration on that. The problem from that Fergeson report is -- 30 - 60 percent are dying. The best estimate for today. That is pretty emotional. But in terms of their report and considering 10 million people dying. You have 100 tons of food in short. Your reports say

K: We made ten thousand tons of bread wheat

T: That's their figure and how much to distribution places? Eleven days have gone by and the situation is deteriorating in terms of security. Efforts by the NRC are at a standstill. One division is out of control. Your reports this morning say it is falling apart. The other report that the relief personnel previously were effective but now XXXXXXX they are closed down.

K: What should we do?

T: I think it is important to get international observers in there. I would get more than 17.

K: You saw what U Thant said this week

T: That Chief Justice Dohemi is an effective contact. I know don't know who valid that is and he could work with the Government. Your people would probably know. The relief people think and saw isolated people being fingered over there. I am sure there isn't mass genocide. But if we can get more in there. It is terribly important. In terms of this ???? keep relief personnel in there to distribute. If we could keep people and personnel in there. Where the hell is Ojukwu? You probably know. What about effort -- if he didn't said he wouldn't so in again if he could go in for a few days to get things sorted out?

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

T. Kennedy/Kissinger
8:07 pm 1/222/70

-2-

T: (cont.) We have to build hate (?) and if the Administration says nothing is getting done. These people resent our talking about their problem

K: The agony of this thing is so great we have been building all kinds of fires. The bureaucracy says this is a diplomatic problem. Let me see what I can do. This is not turn you off. It's not a political issue

T: I just think the situation will be that in 10 days when the next people go in there they will find an incredible situation. I think it is damn frustrating. One of the disappointing things is that before this the others said there was no genocide but they were at Owerri which was captured 12 months ago.

K: All I can tell you Ted is above all to make clear that as long as I have been here I have not agonized over a problem like this. And the obstacles put in the way by the bureaucracy on the one side and the African sensitivities on the other. The President is very concerned. He wanted me to let you know.

T: Newsome and Fergueson made a point but Goodell started going on it.

K: Our next point is to do some of what you mentioned and get food into the area

T: The Biafrans wouldn't accept church aid but you can free up the food. Fergueson said they are working on that. You have the plans there.

K: That has significance to Nigeria.

T: They are letting plans into Nigeria but no further. They said they could handle it but

K: Let's stay in touch

T: Yes

K: This is one in which we are both working for the same thing and the President wanted you to know what we are doing and that we are trying to do more. In this building we are trying to build fires. If you have any ideas that you feel are not being looked at, let me know.

T: I have a limited team (?) for access but may be there's something there.

K: So let's talk again early next week.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Helms/Kissinger
9:10 am 1/23/70

H: I have two ideas to ask you about. Have you focused on the distribution of the President's quarterly report on strategic forces?

K: What do you recommend?

H: I have the list appended to the memo. I think JCS, etc.

K: Same as the daily report?

H: The daily brief? That's fine. Somewhat more restricted. The DIA

K: Well, that can work

H: Can you come out tomorrow?

K: Can I let you know by early afternoon?

H: That will be fine

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCORN

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

9:15 am 1/23/70

It is

S: Matter of hearing being held by Fulbright on Vietnam. M&Y over there asking for an Executive Branch position on this. Fulbright has asked for a compromise. Saigon wants as much public hearings as possible. We have been trying to protect it.

K: I will look at the memo. I have no fixed position.

S: The memo just gives pros and cons. Saigon 1079 gives the request for more public hearings. I just wanted to alert you.

K: Thatk you.

*

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

3:25 pm

1/23/70

K: I sent you over what I called you about earlier. It was the memo Gerry Smith sent on the 21st in which he came out against Phase 2. His case there is stronger than in the letter he sent earlier.

R: It don't sound like the President was listening to him.

K: I just wanted you to know.

R: The use of the NSC for this is wrong. If the President makes up his mind then there is no need to have a meeting. The meeting is to express views to him. If he has almost made up his mind, we should start out there. It makes everyone feel unpleasant. My people said here that he had decided but I said no because that's what the NSC is for.

K: Like what?

R: He had briefings from Dave Packard.

K: No he hasn't. The DPRC had. Laird insisted on the meeting. Originally it was to be discussed only in the DPRC. But Laird insisted. Secondly, at a DPRC meeting, Gerry challenged the accuracy of my statement. Elliott Richardson can tell you. I said all right, and everyone can make his argument. One reason it went to the NSC is because a senior Cabinet member asked for it. Second, he had not discussed it with anyone before. He decided on area defense. That made it necessary to present arguments. I only had the books with the recommendations. The PSAC report, Dave's letter, etc. This was the situation. I had never seen the Packard briefing nor informal or formal recommendation.

R: As for the people over here, I think we are working on the team. What ever the President recommends we will get behind. If the President wants to hear arguments he doesn't have to.'

K: Nothing was presented to anyone that Elliott Richardson had not seen or heard. The one thing I never have permitted here was an end-run by one agency. Gerry is the only one who has had a separate hearing. The President has always felt strongly about area defense.

R: No one could say he wasn't committed.

K: He isn't frozen on thime or location of sites. The stuff from Gerry was that he wanted to stop Phase 2 and ____ R&D.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

3:25 pm 1/23/70

-2-

R: If everyone is one way and then someone presents a different point of view, then no one is responsive. When Gerry got to that he wasn't for it as you say. He was for Mitivian sites.

K: It's not the same thing but he should have been able to discuss it.

R: The rest was unnecessary.

K: Yesterday we sent out the briefing Packet and was going to give today. That was the first anyone saw of it.

R: Last night our people through two minute man sites or $250 million or ????@yahoo?. Gerry said either all right. Defense said one minute man and ????, right now.

K: This was 4 times before the DPRC and Gerry and Farley were present. Never had he presented that case. If he had, we could have considered it. Today was the first time he had heard it. It made no difference because he had not told the President.

R: You had it in your options.

K: Yes, but everyone had previously discarded it. All the scientific advice was that minute man is most in need of looking into. At meeting on Tuesday it wasn't recommended.

R: One thing we have to be conscious of. You cannot get anyone to take arms negotiating job. He has to be interested. In Arab you have ?????. I don't think he is but I don't want him to feel--

K: In my opinion, he has a tendency that as he comes up with play -- The President asked me to call him and tell him he would have total flexibility. He wasn't a cognizant of your attitude. Let him know and he will lean over backward. At the DPRC he launched against Phase 2. Ask Elliott. Elliott did not see them either. But I did not know that option would be important.

R: It's a pretty good one.

K: Since I put it forward I cannot object to it.

R: It might do some things. It might get McCloy in the game. We should get everyone on board. I think we can. I am not gettingtrouble over here. We can do the same thing in the Administration if we play our cards right. If I know what the President wants, I can get Gerry to go along with it.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Rogers/Kissinger

3:25 pm

1/23/70

-3-

K: Elliott heard it. It has been perfectly above board. It has been before the Review committee.

R: Tell Mel this. If the President has decided or almost decided it. If he wants to get someone in line, the President can tell someone and we can get him in line. The meeting on Africa was good. The President was exposed to many ideas.

K: You ask Elliott. Farley and Smith were at every meeting. Everything Everything I said the President is for -- Phase 2 -- he rejected that. I don't see what I ---. He never put in two minute man alternatives. Today it revolved around something never started. In fact, the discussion was on who we refine Phase 2.

R: I don't think there's any disagreement

K: I wish you would talk to Richardson and Smith about Smith's attitude as late as Wed. afternoon.

R: Everyone wants Phase 2. Area defense.

did

K: At two successive meetings Smith said he would not think the President is committed to area defense.

R: That's in his letter.

K: That's how this arose. If you can get Smith to say what he wants, we can get the NSC to address that issue. And he should tell you

R: And there's not reason to discuss them unless they are relevant. If the President already has decided, he should just do it.

K: If I understand the issue as it emerged last night, Gerry's give big case that Congress would never take Phase 2.

R: Bryce thought we had lost by two votes. We can pick up votes. I don't agree with the President that we can be careless.

K: If he is right, we are bound to loose

R: What we say is important now. If he puts his whole presidence on the line he would have a better -- but get it through. I hate to take our whole time and attention to the next few months. Everything is going so well. If the Washington proposal can be done

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

5:50 pm

1/23/70

R: I have two or three things. About prisoners of war. Do you want us to try to get him __________ submit a list of names? One who comes to mind would be Tom Dewey. He speaks well and would love to do it. It's quite an operation and he's a great prosecutor -- tough. It takes someone like that. __________ Why don't you take it up with the President?

K: OK

R: The foreign policy statement -- how long?

K: 50 pages of philosophical matter. Yours is pretty detailed.

R: Maybe we had better try a new draft and you too and we can then put it together. If we send ours over, your staff may just paraphrase it. The first paragraph is just assessment. Give it to a xxx committee.

K: This isn't a competitive thing

R: Of course, but get draft of what the President wants and make sure everything is consistent.

K: How do I know you don't paraphrase us?

R: That's not what I mean. If someone uses ours, it will be the same. Do you know what he wants?

K:: He had it in NSDM 1. He said what he would want. There's nothing new about this.

R: I think that there really should be different groups working on a draft. If you know what he wants, then you should make the approach. Ours -- if you look at it, it will provide framework. Is he going to want a statement or in speech form?

K: Statement, as I understand it.

R: What areas should be covered?

K: Foreign policy in various areas. He won't go into specifics.

R: Why don't I have a group of people draft something.

K: Will we get a look at yours before it is released? We will do ours and then

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

Rogers/Kissinger

5:50 pm

1/23/70

-2-

R: What I mean -- either he wants us to prepare one or you should prepare one. We should be sure they are consistent. There shouldn't be any duplication. Who does he want to write it? Your staff or mine?

K: He doesn't -- we would do it. Do you want your staff to do the first draft and we can do it from there? I will get you one and your people can take it from there.

R: When the President doesn't tell me what he wants, I can't do it. When I send something over and you bring it up and he says its not what he wants, then I get nothing else.

K: We have been in touch with Ted Eliot for weeks. We have ________ suggestions. We can take it and then we will send it over. Any changes after that, we will do it.

R: We can work it out together. What about Mel's

K: I suggested to Alex Johnson to form a committee to organize it, to pull things together.

R: You, I and Mel Laird

K: That was one way of doing it.

R: Why don't you and I and Mel get together?

K: Right

R: Any material you want?

K: When we get into it we will request it through Ted Eliot so you will know what we want.

R: Then we will sit down and go over it. If he wants to put emphasis on Vietnam

K: No he doesn't

R: What

K: General philosophical backgrounder

R: What will Mel put in his? K: We'll work on it.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
6:00 pm 1/23/70

K: The message to the Jewish leaders. I have one that Joe Sisco is happy with. It's not just the White House! Should I LDX it to you?

P: No

K: We said we would stand by our friends

P: If Sisco approves then maybe it's not tough enough

K: It's not as tough as it might be but it's all right

P: It will make the point. If you feel it is alright then it's OK

K: It's not maximum strength but it's OK.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Garment/Kissinger

6:02 pm 1/23/70

G: Max Fisher called twice. I don't know what he was talking about. He thinks there is to be an iminant statement on arms and financial aid. Only thing to diffuse this meeting would be a message

K: I have a message but not much.

G: A greeting or substantive?

K: "Provide military equipment to provide security for the people." Can I get it to you and let you do somehting with it?

G: Nothing happening between now and Sunday? Under study now. to night or tomorrow morning?

K: Within the hour.