European powers over Suez.

To be sure, the difference between our approach and that of the European states was a matter of degree; the increment of power required to upset the European balance was relatively small; the margin of safety of the individual nations was, therefore, correspondingly narrow; they tended to resist transformations which would only be marginal to our security. By contrast, under conditions of pre-World War II technology, the increment of power required to upset the world balance of power was considerable; it could be achieved only by overthrowing so many intermediary states that no doubt was left about the threat to our security. And because many other states had to be attacked long before the threat to our security became apparent, we could always be certain that some other nations would bear the brunt of the first battles. Thus we came to develop a doctrine of aggression from making difficult so purist and abstract that it absolved our statesmen to make ambiguous decisions. Because we could conceive of no goal which for which to contend except the preservation of the status quo, we came to regard power entirely negatively, as something to be invoked when all else failed, but then absolutely and to the greatest extent. But because the consequences of our weapons technology has become so fearful, we have had

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22a

But the power and speed of modern weapons have ended our traditional invulnerability and the polarization of power in the world has reduced our margin of safety. The intermediary states having lost either the power or the will to resist, we can no longer count on other Powers to hold a line while we assess events and wait for the threat to become unambiguous. Resistance to aggression henceforth is no longer a problem of tilting the scales in a battle long joined, as was the case with our entry into World War I and World War II. It depends not only on our strength, but also on our ability to recognize aggression. By the time a threat has become unambiguous in the nuclear age, it may be too late to resist it. Moreover, as the power of weapons has increased, the forms of attack have multiplied not only militarily, but also politically and psychologically. The age of the hydrogen bomb is also the age of internal subversion, of intervention by "volunteers," of domination through political and psychological warfare.

In such circumstances, our notion of aggression as overt attack across sovereign boundaries and our concept of war as inevitably all-out have inhibited our coming to grips with our perils.

EP

24

we have been tempted to treat Soviet intransigence as caused by a misunderstanding of our intentions, or else by the malevolence of an individual, to be removed by patience, firmness and determination.

There is a measure of pathos in our efforts to find "reasonable" motives for the Soviets to cease being Bolshevik: the opportunities to develop the resources of their own country, the unlimited possibilities of nuclear energy or of international trade. The Soviets have been able to exploit this attitude by periodic policies of "peaceful coexistence" which inevitably raised the debate whether a "fundamental" shift had occurred in Soviet thinking, a shift, that is, to what has come to seem normal to us and which lulled us before the next onsalight. On the other hand, because our strategic doctrine has left little room between total war and total peace, we have found/difficult during periods of Soviet belligerency, to bring the risks of resistance into some relationship with the issues actually under dispute.

Much has been made of the "nuclear stalemate" which is supposed to have come about with the development by the Soviets of thermo-

to have come out with the development by the Soviets of thermo-

Much has been made of the "nuclear atrocity" which is being
actually under dispute.

bring the risks of resistance into some relationship with the issues
we have found/difficult during period of Soviet pellagra, to
if,
dothing has left little room between total war and total peace,
before the next one/sight. On the other hand, because our strategic
is, to what has come to seem "normal" some and which I listed us
"fundamentals" shift had occurred in Soviet thinking, a shift, that
"beguasive coexistence" which inevitably raised the debate whether a
have been able to exploit this attitude by periodic policies of
policies of nuclear energy or of international trade. The Soviet
to develop the resources of their own country, the unlimited bosh-
motives for the Soviets to cease being Bolanovik: the opportunities
there is a measure of bathos in our efforts to find "reasonable"
individual to be removed by patience, firmness and determination.
misunderstanding of our intentions, or else by the miscalculation of an
we have been tempted to treat Soviet intransigence as caused by a

nuclear weapons and a long-range air force. But for the purpose of our national policy, the stalemate is not anything new. Actually, it has existed ever since the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To be sure, it was not a physical stalemate; for nearly a decade the United States was [relatively] immune from Soviet retaliation. But it was a stalemate nonetheless in the sense that we never succeeded in translating our military superiority into a political advantage. This was due to many factors: a theory of war based on the necessity of total victory, the memory of the wartime alliance with the Soviets, humanitarian impulses, lack of clarity about the process in which we found ourselves involved. But whatever the reason, our atomic monopoly had at best a deterrent effect. While it may have prevented a further expansion of the Soviet sphere, it did not enable us to achieve a strategic transformation in our favor. Indeed, even its importance as a deterrent is questionable. Assuming that there had never been an atomic bomb, would we really have acquiesced in the Soviet Union's taking over Europe? Would the U.S.S.R. have risked a general war so soon after having its territory devastated by the Germans and having lost, by