WHAT NIXON WILL
FIND IN CHINA

Hostile coolness—or a chance for real progress? No one can be quite sure what awaits the American President on his visit to mainland China, but some important clues are starting to emerge as the time draws nearer.

Reported from
WASHINGTON and HONG KONG

Richard M. Nixon's historic trip to mainland China is suddenly being viewed in a new light: The American President is likely to find a more receptive attitude than anyone anticipated six months ago when the two nations agreed to meet at the summit.

What had been shaping up as a sparring match between mutually antagonistic leaders, each testing the other's will, has acquired a fresh and unexpected dimension:

> The talks now seem certain to include close examination of the dramatic changes in Asia's power balance resulting from Soviet Russia's explosive drive to gain a dominant position everywhere on China's borders.

**China's hemmed-in feeling.** It was India's swift and impressive military victory over Pakistan last December that changed the negotiating climate in Peking. The Chinese had publicly backed the Pakistanis. So had the Nixon Administration. But India, with powerful support from Russia, won the war.

Almost overnight the Communist Chinese military view of the world began collapsing. They already felt menaced

by the nuclear missiles and 41 divisions of troops Russia has in place near China's northern borders. Now they were being outflanked in the South.

The Chinese could see evidence building up of a Soviet effort to create a "collective security" arrangement that would stretch from India across North Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin—a military and political "ring" that would isolate China inside the Asian mainland.

It was against this background of Chinese concern that the Nixon Administration is finding new hope for at least modest success in the first-ever visit to mainland China by an American President.

The Nixon-Chou talks will, to a considerable extent, focus on a search for means—based on understandings and common objectives rather than formal agreements—to slow down, if not completely derail, Moscow's drive into South Asia.

All this is to China's apparent interest, and it accounts for Peking's warmer approach to President Nixon's visit. But there are other issues—very serious problems—that must be threshed out.

What, then, is the over-all outlook on such matters as diplomatic recognition, trade, Vietnam?

**The big issues.** The current appraisal in Washington and Hong Kong:

**Diplomatic recognition.** This is ruled out as long as the U. S. continues to recognize Nationalist China, abides by its mutual-defense treaty with the Chiang Kai-shek Government, and keeps U. S. servicemen on Taiwan.

Not ruled out is a negotiated formula providing for periodic visits to Peking by a designated American diplomat. The Chinese already have a senior Ambassador readily available to visit Washington-Huang Hua, who divides his time between his post in Ottawa and the United Nations Security Council in New York.

Another possibility at a future time: a small, permanent U. S. trade mission based in Peking. Japan, for example, does not recognize mainland China but maintains a trade office of 12 people in Peking. The staff was recruited from the Japanese Foreign Office, and it uses both codes and couriers to keep in contact with the Government in Tokyo. Italy, prior to its recognition of Peking, also had a trade office there.

**Trade agreements.** U. S. officials consider this unlikely at present.

Trade between the two countries will be of symbolic rather than real importance for some time. The article on page 30 sums up that situation.

**Travel and cultural exchanges.** Experts rate agreements as highly probable. Both capitals are showing fresh interest in officially sponsored people-to-people contacts—scholars, scientists, doctors, industrial technicians and agricultural experts.

The Nixon Administration is particularly interested in having Chinese citizens visit the United States. One official explains:

> "The Chinese now have a distorted view of America. Some of the leaders may have knowledge of this country, gained from intensive briefings, but they seem to have little

—PEB in "Philadelphia Inquirer"
"SLOW THAW"

24

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 14, 1972

tion at a multimillion-dollar cost. Before we put them into effect, let's see how they work."

**Action this year?** Administration spokesmen announced that the President is willing to go along with the Ribicoff idea. The compromise, most observers agreed, greatly improved the chances that some sort of welfare-reform program will emerge from Congress this year—although perhaps not on the scale that Mr. Nixon had wanted.

The Finance Committee, headed by Senator Russell B. Long (Dem.), of Louisiana, has given the House-passed measure a cool reception.

Senator Long has been especially critical of the bill's failure to deal with the problems of absent fathers and illegitimate children. He noted a Government study showing that 44 per cent of all families receiving aid for dependent children have illegitimate youngsters.

"In my opinion, a solution to the problem of family desertion and illegitimacy will do more to correct the welfare mess than any other action we can take," said Mr. Long, adding:

"We have got to stop this ridiculous situation we find ourselves in today where almost any man who wants to can avoid supporting his children by, in effect, depositing them on Uncle Sam's doorstep, expecting the taxpayers of America to pay his bills for him."

At a Finance Committee hearing on February 2, a spokesman for welfare recipients told Senator Long: "We feel that every child born is a legitimate child—even you."

Governor Ronald Reagan of California

told the Committee on February 1 that passage of H.R. 1 would bring about "a fiscal and administrative disaster."

The Governor added: "It is commonly understood that a Government-guaranteed income not based upon individual productivity is a giant step toward a welfare state with its inherent loss of individual identity and pride."

Some witnesses protested that the reform measure does not go far enough.

Jack T. Conway, president of Common Cause, a nonpartisan citizens' lobbying group, testified that the bill is too strict in its work requirements and sets the income level too low.

Lucy W. Benson, president of the League of Women Voters, called the bill "false packaging" because it misleads people into thinking that work requirements will solve welfare problems. She cited studies showing that only 7 per cent of those receiving public aid could even be considered for jobs—if work was indeed available.

A spokesman for the National Welfare Rights Organization called the bill "a sad step backwards" and a "fraud."

A fight on the Senate floor over whether to expand or sharply restrict public aid is predicted when the measure finally clears the Finance Committee.

"Long road ahead." Some experts look for Congress to wind up approving some of the reform bill's features but eliminating or scaling down more controversial parts.

"Despite a long road still ahead," asserted one Senate leader, "we're going to have a welfare bill of some kind this year."

The legislature, at my urging, enacted in 1969 the first income tax in our State's history. With that action, we raised more than 1 billion dollars in the first full year of the levy and increased by nearly 50 per cent our State's general revenues.

Substantial increases in most other State levies—except for the regressive sales tax—also were enacted that same year. Yet, just three years later, we find ourselves in a financial strait jocket once again. Why? The reason is quite simple and is best illustrated by citing this one fact:

Eighty-four per cent of the increase in State revenues during fiscal 1972 is being absorbed by the welfare budget alone—and even that is now proving to be insufficient.

That leaves 16 per cent of our new revenues to meet the growing demands

of our colleges, common schools, hard-pressed local governments, park system, corrections system and other traditional activities of State government.

During calendar 1971, some 203,000 new people joined the rolls of those claiming welfare benefits in Illinois. Our monthly disbursements rose from 68 million dollars to 91 million....

It's as if the entire population of our second-largest city—and all of its surrounding suburbs—were added to the case load in one year....

Because of the relatively narrow tax base of most State and local governments and the pre-emptive nature of the federal income tax, the States simply are not able to sustain sudden cost increases of the dimensions we have been experiencing in the past few years.

## WELFARE: TAKING A BIGGER CHUNK OUT OF YOUR TAXES

### FEDERAL WELFARE SPENDING AS A SHARE OF TAX REVENUES

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1961</th><th>1971 (est.)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Welfare spending</td><td>$2.2 BIL.</td><td>$9.1 BIL.</td></tr><tr><td>Revenues</td><td>$77.5 BIL.</td><td>$136.9 BIL.</td></tr></tbody></table>

### STATE-LOCAL WELFARE SPENDING AS A SHARE OF TAX REVENUES

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1961</th><th>1971 (est.)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Welfare spending</td><td>$2.1 BIL.</td><td>$7.7 BIL.</td></tr><tr><td>Revenues</td><td>$38.9 BIL.</td><td>$93.2 BIL.</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: 1961, U.S. Census Bureau; U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare; Office of Management and Budget; 1971, estimates by USN&WR Economic Unit

Copyright © 1972, U. S. News & World Report, Inc.

23

understanding of what makes the U. S. tick. Continuing visits by many Chinese would help correct this."

**Prisoners.** The Chinese admit they hold three Americans. Officials believe Mr. Nixon may be able to persuade Chou En-lai to release them as a friendly gesture.

**Assets and claims.** U. S. has frozen about 78 million dollars' worth of Chinese assets—bank accounts, insurance policies, real estate and trusts. American citizens have claims of roughly 196 million dollars—mostly church and corporate property taken over after 1949 by the Communists. U. S. officials rate fairly high the chances of agreement on a settlement of mutual claims.

**Vietnam.** In the back of Mr. Nixon's mind appears to be the hope that Peking, as signs of an accommodation with the U. S. grow larger, will do what Moscow so far has refused to do—use its influence with Hanoi to arrange an "acceptable" settlement of the conflict in Indo-China.

The Administration seemed to breathe more easily when the renewed U. S. bombing of North Vietnam in December, 1971, continuing in 1972, evoked relatively restrained reaction from Peking. American officials interpreted this as meaning that China is far more concerned over Soviet expansion into South Asia than it is fearful about the U. S. cranking up the war in Vietnam.

**Peking's stance on Vietnam.** Although Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser on national-security affairs, has twice visited Peking and has presumably discussed all aspects of Chinese-American relations, there have been no hints that Peking is switching its stand on what the U. S. should do in order to end the fighting in Indo-China. Peking continues to back North Vietnam's demands that the U. S. pull all of its forces out of the peninsula and abandon its military and political support of the Government in Saigon, with no strings attached.

Peking's influence in Hanoi now is considered weaker than Moscow's. Russia has just agreed to supply Hanoi-free of charge-arms and other aid "designed to strengthen

Presidential visit will include only Peking, Shanghai, Hangchow. But talks will be broad, encompassing Soviet drive to dominate Red China's borders.

the defense potential" of North Vietnam.

Even so, the Chinese have powerful levers they could use if they were so inclined:

1. They are next door to North Vietnam. Russia is far away. Hanoi in the long run cannot ignore Peking.

2. North Vietnam, still suffering from heavy flood damage in 1971, is to a large extent dependent on China for food.

No one expects the Nixon-Chou talks to produce any public agreement on ending the Vietnam war. But American authorities hope that "understandings in principle"

reached in Peking may, in time, result in a softening of Hanoi's rigid stance, on the battlefields and at the Paris talks. Most officials agree that even if Peking thinks it worthwhile to bring pressure on Hanoi it could be months before signs of success would appear.

**Chances for understanding.** Many U.S. officials admit all this may be wishful thinking and the Chinese will show themselves unwilling to do anything to help President Nixon in Vietnam. But as one American explained:

"We have two things going for us. Most Chinese leaders still consider the United States an enemy—but they don't think of us as a military threat to their security. Most American leaders still consider China an enemy, but not dangerous in terms of our survival, either at home or in Asia.

"When both sides are thinking in those terms, the odds are greater they won't continue to work at cross-purposes, in Vietnam or anywhere else. At least not as long as each side thinks it has something to gain from co-operation."

Diplomats on both sides of the Pacific are inclined to agree that Mr. Nixon has more going for him now than six months ago. Their reasoning:

It was President Nixon, not the Chinese, who at first appeared to be most committed to success. With Mr. Nixon under pressure to "deliver the goods" and thus make his trip seem worthwhile to American voters in a presidential-election year, the Chinese could sit back and see what he had to offer.

The Chinese had little to lose by listening. They were already well ahead in the game of diplomacy. Peking became a member of the United Nations in October, 1971, and now occupies the Security Council seat, with its veto power, that Taiwan formerly held.

It has ever since been collecting other dividends:

The prestige and world position of its rival Chinese Government on Taiwan has been going downhill steadily ever since Chiang Kai-shek's Government was ousted by the U. N.

*(continued on next page)*

25

NIXON'S CHINA VISIT

[continued from preceding page]

Japan's relatively modest efforts to re-
adjust relations with Peking have gone
into higher gear. Experts now think it
likely that Tokyo will pay the price
Peking demands for diplomatic recogni-
tion: abandonment of Japan's close ties
with Taiwan, and renunciation of Jap-
anese strategic interest in the security of
South Korea.

**Nixon's improved position.** The diplomats began sensing basic changes in Chinese attitudes toward the Nixon visit in the first days after India's victory over Pakistan. How solid the changes are is still unclear. But the diplomats believe Mr. Nixon now has greater room in which to maneuver.

Cited are these changes:

* Peking still wants U. S. ground forces withdrawn from the mainland of Asia—specifically Indo-China and South Korea. The American troops are too close to China for Peking's comfort. But the Chinese are taking another look at what U. S. naval and air power can contribute to Chinese security against Russia in Asia. Experts say there are hints that Pe-

king welcomed the Nixon decision to send the U. S. Seventh Fleet on regular patrols into the Indian Ocean. Chinese criticism of U. S. strategic air bases in Thailand is becoming less vigorous.

* China appears to be less apprehensive than before over the U. S.-Japan Security Treaty. Instead of viewing it as an

alliance directed against them, the Chinese are now said to be cautiously appraising it as a device that will tend to keep Japan from building a nuclear striking force of its own. There are indications that the Chinese consider a nuclear-armed Japan a far greater threat to their security than a nuclear-armed United States.

Diplomatic failure. Gen. George C. Marshall, shown talking with Mao Tse-tung in 1946, was unable to stave off civil war between Chinese Nationalists and rival Reds.

—UPI Photo

NIXON AND
CHOU EN-LAI
TWO VIEWS OF THE
PEKING SUMMIT—

—Riboud-Magnum Photo

Why Have a Meeting?

**President Nixon:** "No one can sit in this office and allow, hanging over the world and hanging over the United States for the future, this great danger of the most populous nation in the world becoming a major nuclear power and outside the world community, with no contact with the United States of America. . . . We have some evidence that the Chinese are now ready to talk about their role in Asia and our role in Asia."

**Premier Chou En-lai:** "Why should we talk with President Nixon? Because Nixon is President of the United States of America.

"The present issues between China and the United
States can only be solved with President Nixon. Since he

wants to come, we will talk with him. Because if you do
not talk with the head, who else should you talk with? If
you talk with people of second or third rank, instead of the
head, the issues cannot be solved.

"Finally, President Nixon himself knocked on the door, saying that he wished to come to Peking for talks. So, well and good, we invited him to come for talks. Now the talks have not yet started but we are already in the United Nations. This is a victory, and we have not bartered away any principles."

Will Anything Come of It?

**President Nixon:** "There were no conditions on our side and no conditions on their side....

"When summits are not well planned, when they have for

26

**Diplomatic success.** White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger and Red China's Premier Chou En-lai broke through decades of distrust by arranging the President's visit.

As the experts see it, the Chinese are just now beginning to weigh the advantages of having the U. S. as a potential counter to Soviet aspirations in South Asia and as a deterrent against a Japanese decision to go nuclear.

It will not be easy for Mr. Nixon to "sell" these ideas publicly. He knows that an obviously close working relation-

ship between Peking and Washington would jeopardize his hopes of reaching agreements with Russia on nuclear-arms control and other problems. The official U. S. position is that moves toward reconciliation with China will not be used as negotiating levers to strike bargains with other powers.

**The Chinese way.** Experts make this additional point:

The current generation of Chinese leaders does not believe in permanent alliances and unbreakable friendships. What they do believe is that as circumstances change—or new "targets" of diplomacy develop—so new relationships with earlier enemies can be developed to China's advantage.

In the 1930s, for example, the Communists called off the civil war and allied themselves with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. The target: Japan.

Fear of eventual war with Russia, following the series of border conflicts of 1969, and growing concern over Japan's impressive burst into economic—and potentially military—might have spurred Peking's interest in opening a dialogue with the Nixon Administration. And, as Mr. Nixon prepares for the summit in Peking, it is clear that Pakistan's

unexpectedly swift decline as an Asian power has added to the pressure in Communist China to explore openings aimed at developing a new relationship with a recent enemy—the U. S.

*How Nixon will be guarded, page 28; facts about trade prospects, 30; Chinese-Russian feud, 57.*

their purpose just cosmetics, they raise great hopes and then there is a great thud when they fall down.

"The wrong kind of an agreement with the Chinese, one that would discourage our friends in non-Communist Asia, that kind of an agreement would be one that simply would not be worth making."

**Premier Chou:** "We should not expect too much to come out of it. How could all problems be solved at once? There can be no such thing. But if he solves nothing, will the American people agree to it?"

## Any Chance for Diplomatic Recognition?

**President Nixon:** "Recognition in the conventional sense will not be one of the results. They do not expect that. We do not expect that. The reason it can not be one of the results is that as long as we continue to recognize Taiwan, which we do, as long as we continue to have our defense treaty with Taiwan, which we will, the People's Republic will not have diplomatic relations in the conventional sense in that country. . . . We will have normalization in terms of setting up some method of communication better than we currently have."

**Premier Chou:** "It is indeed absurd to refuse to recognize the People's Republic of China with a population of more than 700 million but still regard Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan as the representative of China. . . ."

"I think it is up to President Nixon to answer this question—otherwise, if he comes to China and yet the Taiwan

issue remains unsettled, how will he account for himself when he gets back?"

## Finally—the War in Vietnam

**President Nixon:** "Can the President of the United States ... with the responsibility for 400 POW's and 1,500 missing in action throughout Southeast Asia, because they are also potential POW's—can he withdraw all of our forces [from Vietnam] as long as the enemy holds one American as a prisoner of war? The answer is no."

"Dr. Kissinger raised the subject with Chou En-lai on both of his visits to the People's Republic of China."

"In the event that, at the time of the meetings that I will have in China and later on in the Soviet Union, we have not made progress in this area, the subject will again be raised. . . . If POW's are still retained by North Vietnam, in order to have any bargaining position at all with the North Vietnamese, we will have to retain a residual force in Vietnam and we will have to continue the possibility of air strikes on the North Vietnamese."

**Premier Chou:** "Talking of face and honor, only America's immediate, complete and total withdrawal from Indo-China and stopping support for his 'old friends' there would be honorable. Halfhearted measures and dragging out the affair will please neither side and meet with the opposition of both."

Sources: CBS interview with President Nixon, Jan. 2, 1972. Premier Chou's interview with British historian Neville Maxwell in London's "The Sunday Times," Dec. 5, 1971.

27

SAFEGUARDING A
TRAVELING PRESIDENT

For safety's sake, nothing is
left to chance about the Nixon
trip to China. U. S. Secret Serv-
ice, in tandem with co-oper-
tive Chinese, has seen to that.

When President Nixon and his party travel through Communist China, they will be under the protection of scores of highly trained Secret Service agents.

Those charged with guarding the U. S.
President are convinced that he will be
safe at all times. No President has ever
been harmed while abroad, though four
—Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley and Ken-
ney—have been assassinated in the U. S.

Secret Service agents have been on
four, advance trips to China. At every
scheduled stop in and around Peking,
Shanghai and Hangchow, they have pre-
pared "secure" escape routes which will
permit swift exits by the President and
Mrs. Nixon from crowded areas. Says a
spokesman for the Secret Service:

"We are delighted with the co-oper-
tion of the Chinese security people.

They asked us what we wanted, and we
got it."

The Secret Service has 1,169 agents,
including six women. Although no figure
has been announced, about 80 agents
are expected to make the trip to China,
working in shifts.

The big worry of the Secret Service
is crowd control. Crowds, whether
friendly or not, are considered major
hazards. There is always the possibility
that even a friendly crowd can get out
of hand and crush or smother a Presi-
dent accidentally.

**Call for a million?** So far, there has been no clue from the Chinese as to what kind of reception Mr. Nixon will get. Red China can, as it pleases, order out a million or more people to jam airports, highways and city squares—or it can clear areas of all spectators.

The Secret Service is proceeding on the assumption, as it does for all presidential visits abroad, that the crowds will be immense.

Security includes these provisions:

* A careful check of all places the Nixons will stay or visit, with an eye for such things as fire hazards, loosely hung

chandeliers or areas where an assassin
could hide.

* Assurance that mentally ill persons will be kept away from the President.

* Guarded motorcade lanes for quick movement to hospitals, if necessary.

* All food and drinks served the presi-
dential party will be prepared under
security supervision.

* Guaranteed use of American airplanes in China. All aircraft and fuel supplies will be guarded day and night by U. S. Air Force personnel and Chinese security agents.

One customary item of presidential protection may be missing—Mr. Nixon's specially built automobile, with its bullet-resistant windows and bomb-resistant chassis and body. Sight of the car in Europe and Asia has angered some foreigners who feel that Americans do not trust their security systems. It may be left in Washington.

**Ambidextrous agents.** Secret Service agents are drilled in shooting with either hand. They are taught fire-fighting, judo and technical skills used in crime prevention and detection. Part of the training includes lectures at Government institutions, where they study the habits of mentally disturbed patients.

The Air Force's rescue and recovery
service will be working closely with
the Navy and Coast Guard. In the event
of a forced landing at sea anywhere
between Washington and Peking, help
will be only minutes away.

-USN&WR Photo

Dr. Walter Tkach heads the
medical team on China trip.

TO KEEP NIXON HEALTHY ON CHINA TRIP-

EVERY PRECAUTION has been taken to
insure expert care for President Nix-
on's health during his trip to China.

The presidential plane, "The Spirit
of '76," is almost an airborne clinic,
equipped to handle anything except an
emergency operation. Aboard will be the
President's personal physician, Dr. Wal-
ter Tkach, an Air Force brigadier gen-
eral who is a general practitioner. His
assistant, Dr. William M. Lukash, a Navy
captain who specializes in internal medi-
cine, also will be on the trip.

Medical equipment on the plane in-
cludes a defibrillating machine, which
can control the flow of blood from the
heart in case of a coronary attack, and
other devices to replace blood or body
fluids and administer oxygen.

A blood supply of the President's type
is carried.

Scores of hospitals along the 11,000-
mile route between Washington and Pe-
king have been alerted. Distances have

been plotted so a swift descent can be
made if necessary. Should illness strike
Mr. Nixon while in China, he would be
taken to Peking Hospital in Peking, Hue-
tung Hospital in Shanghai or Chekiang
Hospital in Hangchow, the three cities
he will visit. All have been inspected by
an assistant to Dr. Tkach and approved.

**Specialists ready.** If a medical
emergency develops which the President's
physicians feel is outside their compe-
tency, Chinese medical specialists would
be called in. Says Dr. Tkach:

"Should a need arise, surgeons, physi-
cians and dentists are prepared to prac-
tice the kind of treatment available in
the United States, but, of course, they
could recommend acupuncture."

Acupuncture is a method of inducing
anesthesia and treatment through the
use of needles penetrating body tissues.
An ancient Oriental form of healing,
acupuncture has recently come back
into vogue among Chinese doctors.

28

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# The CHINA
## President Nixon Will See

The whole thing began with the bounce of a Ping Pong ball. In that instant, a modern myth dissolved and a longtime devil figure began to assume a new shape in the mind's eye of America. It was almost as if a benign new country had been born on the Chinese mainland—and, for most Americans, that idea took some getting used to. Over the past two decades, the people of the United States had come to believe that they knew what China was—and that was nothing but trouble. But then, Peking nudged the door ajar and admitted American scholars, doctors and journalists by the score. And like latter-day Marco Polos, they came back telling wondrous tales of 800 million Chinese working together serenely under the slogan "Serve the people."

Next week, Richard Nixon will step through the Chinese looking glass. But he will find a country that fits neither the old clichés nor the new stereotypes, a China that is neither a frenzied red anthill nor an egalitarian utopia.

Americans can be excused if they are bewildered by these incompatible images. And not even the Presidential pilgrimage will put to rest their lurking suspicions about China. For what happened to the China that suffered a national nervous breakdown during the cultural revolution? Where are the masses who were indoctrinated to believe that coexistence with the U.S. imperialists was impossible? Was the nightmare vision of China only a misunderstanding? Surely not altogether. But then how is all this to be reconciled with the enthusiastic accounts of recent visitors? They describe an impossible dream —a land without drug addiction or pollution, without crime or venereal disease; a land where there are no slums, no alcoholics and not even any bosses; a land where the miracle of acupuncture permits patients undergoing major surgery to chat cheerily with their doctors.

It was perhaps inevitable that America's perceptions of China would spin full circle. Twenty-two years of intense hatred had to abate. And the changes in China cried out to be viewed objectively. Yet it is not so much China that has changed, but the mind and the mood of the U.S. Once, the fear that Maoist Communism would engulf Asia propelled America into a self-destructive war in Vietnam; now, the hope is that a benevolent China will provide the key to release.

The new hope, of course, could prove as illusory as the old fear. And the new admiration is surely as oversimplified as the old contempt. At a time when many Americans are wondering what has happened to the ethic that built the U.S., it is easy to see in China a kind of new frontier, a country embodying the spirit of self-sacrifice that Americans associate with their past. It is also easy to overlook China's suppression of the personal liberty that Americans have traditionally held dear.

In truth, no one picture, no one vision can adequately encompass China. To present the Special Report in the following 21 pages, NEWSWEEK interviewed scholars, refugees and nearly 100 recent visitors to China. The portrait that emerges is of a land of endless contrast and contradiction. For each improvement in China's human condition, there still exists a staggering problem to be solved. For all the virtues of the new Maoist man, there remain those vices of human nature that all history has been unable to eradicate. Both Mr. Nixon and his country will face a monumental task—and one of monumental importance—in arriving at a realistic appraisal of this complex land and alien people.

‘We must keep to our style of plain living and hard work,’ Mao Tse-tung tells his people. Thousands of Chinese, young and old, obey the Chairman by doing ballet-like exercises before work each day.

Paulo Koch—Rapho GuILLUMette

Newsweek, February 21, 1972

34

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What It Means to Be Chinese

"I began to become aware of being Chinese at the age of 3 when my mother told me stories or sang folk songs about great emperors and ancient heroes and famous men of letters—about China's superior culture. I had no knowledge of foreigners, but I grew up believing that foreigners were barbarians."

"I was growing up in Shanghai when I got my first look at a real foreigner. At that time, the city had special areas marked off as 'foreign concessions,' patrolled by helmeted and (to me) fierce-looking foreign soldiers. I also noticed many lovely parks and buildings. Some of them had signs announcing: 'Dogs and Chinese not allowed.'"

Perhaps no voices are more foreign to an American than those of the Chinese. The two peoples are poles apart—separated by such a vast cultural, historic and psychological chasm that it is hardly surprising that Americans have so much trouble grasping that elusive sense of "Chinese-ness." Where an American thinks in terms of "I," a Chinese is apt to think of "we." Where Western logic tends toward the absolutes of either/or, Chinese reasoning is based on the more harmonious blend of both/and. And if a primary gauge of American civilization lies in its level of technical achievements and material affluence, the measure of Chinese society as Chinese see it lies in collective ethics and social organization.

Chinese and Americans, in short, are separated by far more than geography—with the result that, more often than not, they have regarded each other with misunderstanding, distrust and hostility. But now, after a prolonged and bitter era in the relations between these two nations, an American President is embarking on a precedent-shattering journey to Peking. And thus an effort toward bridging the gap of mutual misunderstanding between 200 million Americans and 800 million Chinese has suddenly become more essential than ever before.

For foreigners, a persistent stumbling block to understanding the Chinese is the sheer magnitude of the subject. In all, the Chinese form the largest tribe on the face of the earth, a single massive and, in some ways, an astonishingly cohesive grouping that constitutes nearly a quarter of all mankind. Their rich traditions span virtually the whole of man's recorded history—and reach even beyond that to the misty realm of legend and myth. Through more than three millennia, records of China's existence unroll like an endless scroll through 24 dynastic cycles. Little wonder that one American missionary was moved to complain: "The trouble with Chinese history is that there is altogether too much of it."

"I was taught that it was virtuous to be useful to society, to curb one's individual desires, to get along

Leaders of the Great Leap Forward Commune near Sian carry a Mao bust into the daylight. After a reverent polishing, they assemble, beaming proudly, to record the moment for posterity.

Newsweek, February 21, 1972

well with others. To be selfish was considered bad; to be disloyal was considered bad; to be unkind was considered very bad."

To ignore the impact of China's complex and frequently glorious history would be to miss a theme that is central to the Chinese make-up. For it is from history that each Chinese derives his strongest sense of identity. And while a deep attachment to cultural roots can hardly be said to be a uniquely Chinese characteristic, certainly no other people has expressed a devotion to its peculiar traditions for so long or on such a pervasive scale. Whatever their individual qualities or quirks, their circumstances or political allegiance, whether they live in China itself or are scattered to distant lands, pride in the Chinese cultural heritage links all Chinese. As Li Choming, vice-chancellor of The Chinese University of Hong Kong explains it: "I look back on Chinese history, and I think there really has never been anything like China ... Basically, ours is a history of continuous civilized life that has gone on longer than any others. And this is something every Chinese realizes and is proud of."

In fact, for all the bewildering variations within Chinese society, China long ago achieved a startling degree of cultural homogeneity. A system of philosophical values and social attitudes became so thoroughly entrenched as to be the unquestioned norms. And despite the numerous inequities of the old system, the essence of traditional China's philosophical outlook remained pragmatic and humanistic. The doctrine that "people come first before all else" is not a concept one would necessarily expect to be cherished in a society that traditionally has had a superabundance of people. Yet, as Prof. Ping-ti Ho of the University of Chicago points out: "No other major culture in the world so consistently relied on man rather than God ... a reliance on the human spirit and will, faith in his ability to solve his own difficulties—that is the Chinese attitude toward mankind."

"I was a good son and never dared to do or say anything to provoke my father's wrath. Once, after I got a zero on a math exam, he bent me over a chair and spanked me with a hand of iron. I felt greatly disgraced and concentrated on redeeming the blight I felt I had brought on my family's name."

As with other countries, China's social organization reflected its particular environment. As Harvard Sinologist John K. Fairbank wrote: "Chinese man has been so crowded upon the soil among his fellows that he is also a most socially minded human being, ever conscious of the interplay of personalities and social conventions around him ... He is seldom in all his life beyond earshot of other people." Quite understandably then, the Confucian ethic that dominated and shaped Chinese society for some 2,000 years was preoccupied with human relationships, defining the rank, title, role and duties of each member within the social structure in precise detail.

At the core of Chinese social thinking was the fam-

星之火可以燎原

'A single spark can start a prairie fire'

Mao Tse-tung

37

ily structure, which in China meant the extended family or clan. The huge family with multiple generations living together in a single compound was something to which all Chinese aspired. In reality, however, relatively few families possessed the wealth to support such a large, expensive establishment. Still, it was achieved often enough to remain the ideal, and many Chinese today still remember it well. "Our entire 600-member clan, like many others in China at that time, formed a distinct social unit," recalls NEWSWEEK'S Hong Kong correspondent, Sydney Liu. "We had some 1,200 acres of farm land altogether, which constituted the resources for a mutual-welfare fund. A portion of the income from these lands was used for the repair and upkeep of three family temples and numerous tombs, for the care of sick and poor within the clan or to subsidize the education of young clan members. A committee of elders elected by the entire clan ran the fund—and their decisions were indisputably final."

In such a system, the highest virtues were ancestral veneration, respect for elders and duty to the group. "We were taught as children that filial piety was the most important virtue," remembers P.C. Woo, a Hong Kong lawyer in his mid-50s. "This was followed by instruction that we should never do anything that would bring dishonor to the family name. That would include acting dishonestly, behaving rudely in public, drinking too much and smoking opium (a lot of people smoked opium when I was a young boy). The family ties were very strong but my family would not have expected a member to behave in a dishonest way in order to look after

a kinsman—like offering a bribe to get one of them out of trouble. We were taught to be honest first—and discreet."

The subordination of the individual to the welfare of the family, however, did not mean that an individual counted for nothing in old China. Rather, the Chinese tended to regard each person as a valuable element of the group and judged individual conduct and achievement as they reflected on the group as a whole. Nor was the status of women, though it was bleak enough in traditional Chinese society, wholly without redeeming features. For while the eldest male in the family was absolute boss, the ranking female usually had plenty to say about what went on within her household. Women of lesser status in the family were expected to wait on *fu-ren* (the mistress) hand and foot, and for them the only real hope was to bear sons and survive long enough so that they, too, would become that most powerful of female figures—the mother-in-law.

"We always thought the Russians stupid, the Americans vulgar, the British hypocritical, the Japanese cunning, the Southeast Asians dumb. Only the French were a possible exception because they had a culture and at least knew how to eat well."

Like a mirror of the family, the Chinese political structure has always been basically authoritarian. But it was not necessarily a system of blind obedience or passive acceptance. For Chinese tradition also sanctioned the right to rebel against unjust authority and, indeed, some

Pictorial Parade
An attachment to the good earth

Sally and Richard Greenhill—Transworld
Family lunch break in a courtyard

## A SENSE OF 'CHINESE-NESS'

Plagued by overpopulation, China has nonetheless traditionally held that "people come first." A system of collective ethics codified by Confucius (551-479 B.C.) dominated Chinese society for centuries and, though officially discredited now, still finds some echoes in the revolutionary China of Chairman Mao.

Harry Redi—Black Star

New York Public Library
Old print of Confucius

## Group portrait in Peking's Tien An Men Square

38

Newsweek

越
是
困
难
的
地
方
越
是
要
去
这
才
是
好
同
志

'A good comrade
is one who is
more eager to
go where the
difficulties
are greater'

Mao Tse-tung

tury. Just as the West came to China ignorant of
the great civilization it was plundering, the Chinese
failed to perceive the challenge posed by these
"barbarians." China's emperors had seen European
visitors not as ambassadors from equal nations but
simply as new envoys in a long procession of vassals
bearing tribute. What the Chinese could not com-
prehend was that the intruding Western civilization
might rival and in some ways—particularly in weap-
onry and technology—surpass their own. Thus, when
the Europeans—and the Japanese—began to success-
fully carve up the mainland, the comfortable illusions
of superiority that had reassured the Chinese
throughout their history were shattered.

"When I was a schoolboy in China I was oh so proud of my cultural heritage. Yet I was also sad. For even then, I had this great sadness because modern China was so weak."

D isbelief gave way to bewilderment, then bit-
ter shame. Often, the Chinese responded to
the new Western presence with a character-
istic ambivalence. "Western material civilization was
held in awe by almost all Chinese," Sydney Liu re-
calls. "Anything foreign-made had to be good. The
goal of almost every Chinese student was to go
abroad to learn how to build factories, to make
weapons and communications systems to enable Chi-
na once again to become a power in the world. Yet
a Chinese was not to trust any foreigners. The idea
was to use foreign techniques, but to retain the tra-
ditional Chinese ideals."

Underscoring this effort was a sense of suppressed
anger, the visceral rage of the proud who had been
humbled. Xenophobia flourished. To the Chinese, it
seemed as if outsiders used the very term "Chinese"
to imply "backwardness" and "inferiority." The goal
of rebuilding and unifying China became the com-
mon aim of every Chinese political movement,
though there was great dispute over who was going
to lead the nation to salvation. Still, in the autumn of
1949, when a triumphant Mao Tse-tung proclaimed
that "The Chinese people have stood up," the mes-
sage was instantly grasped by every Chinese. And of
late, the emergence of China on the international
diplomatic scene has been cheered by most Chi-
nese as proof of their nation's restored pride.

In the final analysis, the feeling of Chinese-ness
clearly transcends nationalism and politics. There
are, for example, some 19 million Chinese outside
China's territories, living in nearly half the world's
nations. Some may be descendants of families who
have been abroad for generations and whose direct
ties to China may be tenuous at best. Some may now
give their primary allegiance to their adopted land
and would not consider a return to China for any-
thing longer than a brief visit. Some may find the
ideology of the regime, or the regimentation of the
society, uncongenial to their own values and tastes.
Some may be appalled by the periodic turmoil that
has buffeted Maoist China—particularly the assault
on historic treasures during the cultural revolution.
But they retain the hope for a unified, strong China
as a symbol of their own heritage and pride. “Now
China has pride,” said Prof. Ping-ti Ho as he thought
back on his youth, when the calendar was pocked
by official “days of humiliation” to mark yet another
national catastrophe. “At least now—today—no Chi-
nese need observe a day of national humiliation.”

scholars have sought to view Chinese history as a
long series of peasant revolts. But if rulers were
toppled for failure to measure up to accepted
standards of virtuous conduct, the Confucian system
itself went unchallenged. Conserved by a ruling
class of scholar-officials steeped in the classics, sus-
tained by collective pressures toward social conform-
ity, the old system endured until the modern era.

Before the nineteenth century, in fact, there was
nothing in their racial experience that might have
jogged Chinese into considering an alternative to
Confucianism. They were all but totally isolated
from the civilization of the West. And in their
neighbors around the periphery of the Chinese Em-
pire, they perceived only lesser cultures that were
no match for the richness of China's own philosophic,
literary and artistic patterns. Over time, the notions
that China was the Middle Kingdom, the center of
the world, "all under heaven" (or, at least, all that a
civilized Chinese need concern himself with) took
firm hold. The Middle Kingdom was not a nation-
state in the modern sense since, at that time, the
Chinese could hardly conceive of their land as just
another country among many. As British journalist
and author Dennis Bloodworth has observed: "The
Chinese ... did not think of China as the British
thought of Britain, but as Christians thought of
Christendom." With their sense of moral and cultural
superiority, it was self-evident to the Chinese that
those who embraced China's culture were the en-
lightened, those who did not were barbarians.

As a result, the Chinese were totally unprepared
for the Western onslaught in the nineteenth cen-

Kaió Garrúbha—Rapho Guillemette

Red Guards mass during the cultural revolution

February 21, 1972

39

Bettmann Archive
Chinese haircut c. 1900

New York Public Library
Western missionary with her flock

Bettmann Archive
Turn-of-the-century view of Chinese xenophobia

New York Public Library
Cantonese peer through barrier to foreign sector in the 1920s

## CHINA'S CHANGING IMAGE

Coming at one of the weakest moments in China's history, the Western onslaught in the 1800s left the Middle Kingdom shaken. Christian missionaries swarmed through the countryside, and foreigners established commercial enclaves that were immune to Chinese law. The result was an intensification of China's historic xenophobia. But thanks to a profound lack of knowledge about China, it was not until the Communist take-over that most Americans began to see the Chinese as anything but grateful wards.

## An Open Door, a People Dimly Seen

For more than two decades, China has been out of sight but rarely out of mind. Contained, isolated and quarantined by successive U.S. Presidents, China has still managed to seize a spot near center stage in recent American history. In the 1950s, the furor over "who lost China" helped unleash the witch hunts of Sen. Joe McCarthy. And in the '60s, it was a war designed to stop the spread of Chinese-style Communism that nearly tore America apart. Yet, in a sense, both of these devastating national traumas could have been avoided, for they stemmed at least in part from a chronic American failure to perceive China as it really is. Indeed, although few nations have aroused so much curiosity among Americans, none has been more consistently misunderstood than the Middle Kingdom. As one U.S. China scholar explains: "Americans have never been able to think rationally about China. China has always been our emotional self-indulgence, our national hangup in foreign affairs."

Over the generations since the first U.S. trading ship set out for Canton in 1784, American perceptions of China have shifted back and forth, almost cyclically, between the poles of love and hate. At times, China was seen as a land of wisdom, industry and strength—the land of Marco Polo, Sun Yat-sen

and Pearl Buck. But in darker moments, it conjured up images of cruelty, violence and teeming subhuman masses—the China of the Boxer Rebellion, Fu Manchu, the Red Guards and all that is implied by the phrase “Yellow Peril.” Always near the surface, never really displacing one another, these contradictory images seemed forever to be waiting for the fresh call of circumstance to tilt the balance. Today, after nearly a quarter century of unbridled antagonism toward the Chinese, that balance is shifting rapidly again. And as Richard Nixon prepares to make his historic visit to Peking, some people have begun to wonder if the pendulum is swinging too far.

At the heart of America's view of China is a streak of old-fashioned racism (which the Chinese have traditionally reciprocated in their own xenophobic way). Whether they went to save souls or to make money, Americans traveling to China in the nineteenth century carried with them the unshakable conviction that Western religion, technology, indeed, Western civilization as a whole was superior to all others. At the same time, many saw China as an international extension of America's own vanishing frontier. Fired by the vision of the other successful colonial powers of the day, these Americans considered the Orient an ideal outlet for their impulses

40

Newsweek

革命不是请客吃饭

‘A revolution
is not a
dinner party’

Mao Tse-tung

A Shanghai victim of Japanese bombing in 1937
UPI

American peace mission in Yenan in 1946

toward economic, religious and nationalistic expansion. "This was the period of Manifest Destiny," observes one U.S. China watcher. "We were reaching out, but because of our colonial past and because we were a democratic nation, we couldn't conquer anybody. We had to be an indirect colonial power, and China was one of the few places left."

Unfortunately for both the U.S. and China, when the two societies met in the cataclysmic embrace that was to shape their relations for decades to come, the crusading American expansionists encountered China at its weakest. The time had passed when the West lauded Chinese morality, law and administration and enthusiastically adopted a vogue of *chinoiserie* in art, architecture and furnishings; the Opium War of 1840 and the resulting "unequal treaties" with foreign imperialists had revealed China's true vulnerability. It was a China where foreign merchant ships plied the Yangtze River and coastal waters peddling the "foreign mud" of opium; where foreigners controlled the Chinese customs service and were immune to local laws; where Christian missionaries ranged across the countryside. In short, it was a China that had been so thoroughly invaded and violated that the nation had been brought to the brink of collapse and dismemberment.

For its new target of opportunity in Asia, the U.S. constructed a policy that was a curious blend of self-justification and self-interest. Standing aloof from the armed attacks on China in the mid-1800s, Americans spoke righteously about the evils of foreign en-

croachment. Yet, all the while, the U.S., under the umbrella of the British Navy, was winning its share of lucrative commercial concessions. And how much Americans valued those concessions became clear in the 1890s when Japan and Russia entered the China sweepstakes, and the U.S. feared it would be squeezed out. The result was the Open Door policy —a two-edged instrument that sought to maintain China's territorial integrity and keep the mainland open to foreign concessionaires. Says one U.S. diplomat: "We saw ourselves as the high-minded protector of China, the one big power that was disinterested." But the Chinese saw a far different picture. As a young general named Chiang Kai-shek put it in 1926: "Thinking men in China hate America more than they hate Japan. Japan says frankly she wants special privileges. We understand that and know how to meet it. The Americans come to us with smiling faces and friendly talk, but in the end your government acts just like the Japanese."

Nonetheless, the U.S. capacity for self-delusion seemed boundless. For all the talk about self-determination, few Americans batted an eye when Woodrow Wilson bargained away former German holdings in Shantung to the Japanese at Versailles. And as World War II approached, most Americans continued to see in China what they wanted to see—an allied democracy struggling against the Japanese—and not the reality of Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt, decaying regime. Through it all, of course, Chiang's government cultivated those American illusions. Helped along by visits to the U.S. by the Generalissimo's beautiful, Wellesley-educated wife, the regime's public-relations campaign easily drowned out the predictions of Gen. Joseph Stilwell and others in Asia that Chiang was doomed.

As a result, the fall of China to Mao Tse-tung's Communists came as a sudden, severe shock to American self-confidence. The beloved wards had turned on the patrons; in an instant, one-fourth of the world's population had spurned not only Christianity but all of the revered Western values. That, coupled with Stalin's consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, raised the specter of aggressive Communism sweeping the globe, and the conflict in Korea only served to freeze the image. Inevitably, a stunned America searched for scapegoats. The cry of "Who lost China?" rang throughout the U.S., and before Joe McCarthy was through, he had hounded John Paton Davies Jr., John S. Service and other Sinologists out of the State Department. Once again, frightened Americans perceived China as an evil, threatening force.

In retrospect, that image proved exaggerated, for Communist China's rhetoric turned out to be far more aggressive than its policy. Peking has yet to threaten Asia with its nuclear weapons, and its defense-oriented army has shown little desire to project Chinese power beyond the nation's boundaries. Eventually, too, many Americans have come to suspect that because of the historic enmity between the Vietnamese and the Chinese, the danger that Peking will acquire hegemony over Southeast Asia may well be a chimera. Today, even the brief Sino-Indian border war of 1962 is seen as an aberration, with many scholars convinced that the conflict quite probably was provoked by New Delhi. "Our judgments about China were badly wrong in the beginning," admits one U.S. official, "but the striking thing

February 21, 1972

41

is that even when our judgments finally changed, the policy lagged badly behind our perceptions.”

Why was the change so slow in coming? For one thing, there was a simple lack of knowledge about China. At the time of the Korean War, there were only some 200 China scholars in the U.S., and most of them were classicists. What's more, despite a crash training program following the Korean War, the new Sinologists never seemed to develop the influence on China policy that such Kremlinologists as Ambassadors Charles Bohlen and the late Llewellyn Thompson had on U.S. policy toward Russia. Even America's leading China scholar, John K. Fairbank of Harvard, has had only limited contact with the White House. And, lacking patrons in high places, those members of the bureaucracy concerned with China remained ultra-cautious. "You must remember," says one diplomat, "that Jack Service is called brilliant today, but he was called a traitor in the '50s."

Not till the U.S. involvement in Vietnam did thinking begin to change. The U.S. failure to score a quick victory touched off intense introspection about America's role in Asia. And after years of public antipathy toward China, U.S. scholars began to stage an increasingly active campaign to erase public misconceptions about the mainland. When it came time to leave Indochina, the Nixon Administration saw the chance to move on two tracks at once by enlisting Chinese help. Perhaps China could not cajole concessions out of Hanoi, but the initiative toward Peking could be used to cloak the U.S. retreat with an aura of positivism—the establishment of a new relationship with all of Asia.

Astonishingly, the U.S.-China thaw immediately captured the imagination of millions of Americans. Once again, America has been bitten by the China bug. In dozens of cities, department stores display merchandise from the mainland, and this year's fashion scene sports the Chinese look. More than 30,000 Americans have already cabled Peking for visas to the People's Republic, and countless businessmen drool over China's 800 million-customer market. Young scholars and revolutionary blacks seek solutions to America's complex urban problems in China's communal socialism, and, as fanciful as it sounds, harassed U.S. officials admit that some missionaries have been inquiring about the chances of reopening their outposts on the mainland.

But amid all the euphoria, there is the risk of an American overreaction. In simple terms, of course, the higher the hopes the greater the chance for better disappointment if the rapprochement with Peking does not go smoothly. In a more important sense, however, the latest American fascination with China could possibly make a rapprochement more difficult to achieve. As Columbia University's Michel Oksenberg comments: "I'm disconcerted by this enthusiasm because it doesn't deal with the essential challenge of dealing with China. Since 1840, the problem has been one of a search for equalities. How do we talk to each other? What is the basis for conversations between equals? I'm afraid we'll have to have a great deal of patience and a certain amount of aloofness to solve these problems." Or as Loren Fessler, the respected American Universities Field Staff scholar in Hong Kong, puts it: "Our relations with China will have an unreal quality until sooner or later we realize that the Chinese have hang-ups and ambitions just like everyone else."

Goksir Sipahioglu—Jocelyne Benzakin
The Chairman's image, larger than life

## Maoism: A Method to the 'Madness'

To many Westerners, Mao Tse-tung's China appears to suffer from periodic bouts of national insanity. During the so-called "great leap forward" campaign of 1958, millions of Chinese busied themselves stoking backyard blast furnaces—only to learn in the end that steelmaking was never meant to be a cottage industry. And in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that began eight years later, youthful Red Guards threw the economy into chaos and viciously humiliated revered leaders by forcing them to parade in public wearing dunce caps. Yet, for all its destructiveness, there has been a method in China's apparent madness. For these massive shock treatments have been dispensed by Chairman Mao in pursuit of his overriding goal: to reshape human nature and create a "New Chinese Man."

In the idealized, egalitarian utopia of Mao's vision, each Chinese will be guided not by motives of personal gain but by the principle of selfless service to the people for the common good. And to instill that concept in the masses, Peking has created a pantheon of heroic models deemed worthy of emulation by all. During the Korean War, there was the soldier Huang Chi-kuang who was said to have given up his life for his comrades by using his body to block an American machine gun. Then there was Chiao Yu-lu, a country magistrate who refused medication and died because he did not wish to spend state funds on himself. And at the height of the cultural revolution, the example of the Chairman himself was served up to the people as a model of infallible wisdom and virtuous conduct.

Outwardly at least, Maoism has been one of the twentieth century's great ideological success stories. In place of China's traditional Confucian value system, Mao has established a new common standard of behavior—and, in the process, wrought fundament

42

Newsweek

我们共產党人好比种子人民好比土地

‘We Communists are like seeds and the people are like the soil’

Mao Tse-tung

Camera Press—Pix

Train travelers study Mao-thought

Audrey Topping—Rapho Guillumette

China's young in pursuit of a vision

MAO'S HAUNTING VISION

"Serve the people" is the byword in the new China of Mao Tse-tung, who envisions a selfless society based on mass commitment and participation. Yet the question of whether China's sense of mission will fade after he dies still haunts the aging Chairman.

tal changes in Chinese society. In a little more than two decades, he has taken an exhausted, demoralized nation and forged a remarkable degree of unity among the 800 million Chinese. He has been surprisingly successful in his efforts to break down the old taboos against manual labor and the old barriers between the ruling elite and the common man, between intellectuals and workers and peasants. And he has seemingly given his people a sense of participation in the larger community, pulling them out of their old family-based loyalties and involving them in the life of the nation as a whole.

Virtually every foreign traveler to China has reported that it is now possible to ask a Chinese peasant a political question and expect an answer. The answer may simply be parroted from Radio Peking, but at least the Chinese peasant will not stand there dumbstruck, as do peasants almost anywhere else in Asia. Indeed, recent visitors to China have been impressed by the open, straightforward demeanor of today's Chinese. Prof. Philip Huang of UCLA, for instance, tells of attending a meeting at Peking's Tsinghua University and hearing a 33-year-old laborer assigned to campus maintenance discuss school problems with the university president without the slightest trace of servility. And a Chinese-American couple, Veronica and Ernesto Yhap, report that at a Chinese hospital they visited everyone-doctors, nurses, orderlies-pitched in to prepare a patient's room: "No one was too important to do the scrubbing because the Chinese now accept the premise that serving the people is not degrading."

Historians point out that similar glowing tales were once brought back from the Soviet Union where, during the early stages of that country's revolution, Lenin too tried to create a "new man." And many Sinologists have noted that, despite Maoist attacks against old attitudes, the Chairman's own style, in many ways, remains traditionally Chinese. Such concepts as the reliance on human will, individual sacrifice for group betterment and self-criticism were esteemed in China-though with somewhat different emphasis-long before the advent of Maoism. Then, too, China's people have always tended to accept whatever ethic emanated from the center. What

Mao has achieved, in fact, is a synthesis of Communist ideology with traditional Chinese virtues. "He has changed the face of Chinese society," said a Western diplomat in Peking, "but he has not yet changed the individual to any great extent. What Mao has changed is the pride of the individual Chinese in his country and in his factory or farm."

Thus, there remains the question of just how deeply Maoism has really taken hold. While the People's Liberation Army has doffed all badges of rank, its officers clearly remain more equal than the men. "You can be standing somewhere and everyone looks all alike in their baggy uniforms," reports a visitor. "But one person who doesn't act any different from the others has only to say a sentence and everyone else reacts instantly. He's the man in charge." And one foreign visitor to Sian recalls a backstage scene at a revolutionary ballet when, shortly before the curtain call, the political commissar gathered all the performers for an earnest ideological pep talk. While he quoted Mao, the actors yawned, ate fruit, chatted with each other and put on their make-up. As one Chinese student who has left his country put it: "Today we may have to go through the motions of studying Mao and chanting slogans, but mentally we still have the freedom to remain silent, to not commit ourselves to what we're saying."

No one seems more keenly-even painfully-aware of his people's tendency to backslide than Mao Tse-tung himself. To a large degree, China's present revolutionary élan reflects a massive reaction against the venality and debasement of a previous era. But revolutionary ardor flags with time. The historic development that Mao most fears-the re-emergence of a privileged ruling bureaucracy-may be an almost inevitable by-product of the strong, modernized China that he seeks to create. But if Mao's dream of perpetual revolutionary renewal is probably unrealistic, it is hardly conceivable that China will revert to its old ways after the Chairman departs the scene. Though time will surely dilute them, the basic changes Mao has wrought in China will surely live after him.

February 21, 1972

Coming of Age in Communist China

From time immemorial, the family has come first in China. It was Confucius who taught that every Chinese owed his primary loyalty to kith and kin. And Mencius, the fourth-century B.C. sage, wrote: "The substance of humanity is to serve one's parents." In the space of two short decades, however, Mao Tse-tung has sought to change all that. As part of his vast experiment in re-molding the Chinese masses in his revolutionary image, he has initiated a whole new approach to child-rearing, education and relations between the sexes—all with the goal of making the family serve the state. And by assuming the role of China's Dr. Spock, its John Dewey and, indeed, its Gloria Steinem, the Chairman has radically altered the Chinese way of life.

Like the Puritan youngsters in Colonial America, the 18 million children born each year in China are virtually weaned on the state's all-pervasive religion. Even though a shortage of jobs keeps many women from working, millions of Chinese mothers do labor in factories or businesses and till the soil alongside their husbands. As a result, their children's early years are for the most part spent in day-care centers, or, on the communes, under the traditional tutelage of grandmothers.

For the children in a city day-care center, it is not entirely a life without mother. Even though the babies are toilet-trained, bathed and taught to make their beds by the day-care staff, the mothers are allowed time off from work to nurse their children. Moreover, the youngsters spend evenings and weekends in the warm embrace of their families. Nonetheless, their early group experience conditions Chinese children to seek the approval of their peers—a prerequisite for successful existence in the Maoist state. And political indoctrination begins in earnest in nursery school, where such plays as "The Little Truck Driver Goes to Peking to See Chairman Mao" and songs such as "Happy Tidings of Victory From Indochina" are a staple of a child's daily diet.

Once it has begun, such indoctrination never stops. "In kindergarten," says Ruth Sidel, a New York psychiatric social worker who visited China last year, "children are taught to be the 'inheritors of the socialist cause'." Their games are couched in political terms: as they climb over chairs, crawl through hoops and cross a play bridge, they are told this represents the hardships of Mao's Long March. "In a tug of war that I saw in a Canton kindergarten," recalls civil-rights leader Hosea Williams, "the teacher chided the losing team, 'You're going to be the imperialists.'" By the time a child is in elemen-

tary school, he has become "a Little Red Soldier"—the still-functioning younger version of the Red Guards—and spends part of his day in the schoolyard pretending to shoot at cutouts of Uncle Sam. Even the academic curriculum is politically tinted. A typical elementary school math problem runs: "473 students out of 500 volunteered to go to the countryside and do productive labor. What percentage volunteered to do so?"

But while the basic Chinese curriculum includes a hefty chunk of Chairman Mao's thoughts, a number of U.S. educators who have recently traveled to the mainland point out that it also encompasses mathematics, geography, art and literature, politics, the Chinese language and even foreign languages—with English the most prevalent. (In spurring students to study the language of the most powerful of "imperialists" the schools are copying the safest of all examples; in preparation for the Nixon visit, Mao himself is polishing up his limited English.) Even here, however, Chinese teachers find ways to inject politics into the curriculum. A recent visitor recalls watching 10-year-olds learning two English sentences: "We have boundless love of Chairman Mao" and "My brother is in the People's Liberation Army." Aside from the emphasis on propaganda, however, teaching methods are still old-fashioned. "Despite talk about teaching reforms," says Massachusetts Institute of Technology political scientist Susan Shirk, "it will be some time before rote learning and reciting are replaced by the informal give-and-take the leadership wants."

Still, the Chinese have instituted some revolutionary changes in education. "They are trying to eliminate grades and competition," notes Yale Prof. Arthur Galston. "Exams are used to let the student know what he doesn't know and tell the professor where he failed as a teacher." Moreover, the schools apply the group-critique method that is so much a part of all Chinese Communist life. It is accepted practice for students to break down into groups at the end of the term and review everything-teachers, curriculum, fellow students; they debate what was right and wrong, and try to correct problems before starting a new year.

As might be expected, the goal of education in an underdeveloped country like China is primarily practical, and all students are made to feel like apprentices. "In a kindergarten I visited," recalled Helen Rosen, a New York audiologist, "children made cardboard boxes which were sent to a factory, filled with crayons and then sent back to the school." And University of Wisconsin graduate student Ken Levin added, "In one primary school in Nanking, the kids

were building air filters for trucks, and in some rural areas the students are constructing the school buildings themselves." Every high-school graduate must put in a stretch of "serving the people"—by working in a factory or a commune or by joining the army for as much as three years. Even then, his peers must approve his performance and recommend him for further schooling before university gates will open. "If you want to go to college," says Rhoads Murphey, director of the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies, "the best thing to say is, 'I want to be the best peasant, work hardest and learn from the other peasants.' And then you must do just that. The person who succeeds is the one who volunteers first for the most barren and difficult place."

Despite all this, the life of youth in "New China" has not changed in at least one important way—most boys and girls in their early 20s are still virgins. Chinese sexual mores have always been fiercely conservative, but even so, modern Chinese seem more sorely inhibited than their parents were. While couples may stroll hand in hand or seek the rare privacy of a park bench, that is as far as they go until marriage. Any would-be Lothario who tried to play the field, would be mercilessly scorned by his fellows. "If you play around with girls, nobody will trust you," says one recent refugee from the mainland.

Since few Chinese dare risk public disapproval by marrying before the officially approved ages of 25 for women and 28 for men, they must endure years of sexual privation. "When you ask Chinese adolescents about their love life," says Jean Leclerc du Sablon, the Agence France Presse correspondent in Peking, "they blush and stammer: 'We play a lot of sports and work hard to build the country.'" Some visitors are not totally convinced by all this and suspect with Michigan's Professor Murphey that "There is a good deal of funny business going on behind the haymow." Perhaps. But the fact is that the Chinese go to great lengths to avoid any public sexual provocation. Young women wear baggy trousers, hide their brightly colored blouses beneath drab "unisex" jackets and do not use make-up. (One exception to the rule is Madame Mao, a former Shanghai actress, who tints her hair and fancies a bit of powder on her cheeks.)

The social taboos on romantic involvement lend some credibility to the official version of how boy meets girl—on the job. "Like marries like," says French journalist François Debré. "An interpreter will very likely have an interpreter wife, and a doctor will have a doctor husband."

Even after marriage, moreover, a Chinese couple finds that the government

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Newsweek, February 21, 1972

Goksin Sipahioglu—Jocelyne Benzakin

and party are actively involved in their life. Acutely aware of its population problem, China encourages parents to have only two children—a policy it promotes mainly by indirect means. To begin with, since the average Chinese family is usually limited to a two-room apartment (and must often share kitchen and bath facilities with other families), more children mean less space. As a further incentive to parents to restrict their families, the government sanctions abortions and sells condoms throughout the country (as cheaply as two for a penny). And even though the most commonly used female contraceptives are the standard Western birth-control pill and intra-uterine devices, the Chinese have a special version of the pill—a sheet of saturated rice paper that is eaten in stamp-size bites.

Like the government, the neighbors are authorized intruders in China. "Street and Lane Committees" in the cities and "Team Authorities" in the communes hold regular meetings to examine not only political attitudes but intimate marriage details as well. "They may begin by asking details about your earnings and your possessions," recalls a refugee now living in Hong Kong, "and end by asking about your attitude toward your wife." (If a couple wants to get divorced, they must first discuss their difficulties with the neighborhood committee and get its approval.) Yet the Chinese seem to accept such inquisitions as a normal part of life. And judging by reports from recent visitors, they maintain a tightly knit and peaceful family life. "There is no generation gap," notes Keiko Saino, a Japanese woman who recently visited China. "One of their values is the 'combination of three'-the aged, the young and those in the middle."

There is, as well, a noticeable new harmony between men and women, who have developed a relationship that Western advocates of women's liberation

Harry Redl—Black Star

In Maoist China, many working mothers leave their children at daycare centers and well-equipped kindergartens. Commune kids (above) are often cared for by grandparents.

45

School-age children mix occasional outings (right) with Maoist indoctrination (below) on how to 'serve the people'

Marc Riboud—Magnum

could well envy. Casting aside “chauvinist” terms, married couples refer to each other as *ai-ren*, a word meaning “sweetheart” or “lover,” rather than as husband or wife. Chinese men and women share some household chores, the shopping, the budgeting. And the autocratic husband seems to be a thing of the past. Yet, the Chinese have clearly not obliterated all sexual roles. Says Nobel Prize-winning physicist Chen Ning Yang: “Roles are still differentiated.” And Harvard graduate student Kay Johnson adds: “There are discrepancies in jobs—engineering is considered a man’s job, for example, while women staff daycare centers and teach elementary school.”

However much China may have closed the traditional gap between the sexes and improved the lot of its people, many aspects of life in Mao's China are patently abhorrent to Americans. Some, like Hosea Williams, are appalled by all the ideological saturation. “It’s the children growing up who worry me,” he says. “Nobody can be taught to hate like that and not be affected.” Yet many American educators have noted that Chinese children seem to have few neurotic hangups—and they attribute this mental health to the sense of acceptance the children derived from belonging to the group. Other visitors have been disturbed by the blatant snooping of the street committees into private lives. But unlike Americans, the Chinese have never made a sharp distinction between “private” and “public.” “The thing for Westerners to remember,” says a China expert, “is that although Mao has wrought many drastic changes in the Chinese way of life, he has not tampered with the Chinese sense of groupness. The Chinese have always felt part of something larger than themselves, and today that something is the state.”

Newsweek

Hard Work-
Little Play

One morning not so long ago, the "revolutionary committee" that runs the South China Engineering Factory in Canton decided to build an electron microscope. It was, to say the least, an ambitious undertaking since the factory had no blueprints and no working model to copy. For the next eight months, guided by a handful of foreign textbooks, the 120-man staff labored on the project day and night—and in the process spent more than $400,000. But still, they were unable to construct the complex instrument. "Finally, we were called into a self-criticism session," recalls a former technician at the factory. "Everyone knew that we didn't have enough data. But no one said that. Instead, we all got up and each one of us blamed himself. We said we hadn't worked hard enough and that we hadn't given enough study to the works of Chairman Mao."

The musings of Mao Tse-tung did not help this time. But sometimes, mysteriously enough, they appear to. Over the past 22 years China's leaders have successfully exhorted their people to perform some astonishing feats—most notably, perhaps, the construction of their own atomic bomb. As part of its gargantuan effort to catch up with the advanced nations of the West, the Communist regime has implanted in its citizens an unwavering belief in the value of self-reliance and hard work. When a recent visitor to China asked why employees of a table-tennis-ball factory went to the trouble of making all their own machinery when it could have been purchased abroad, the manager replied, "It never occurred to us to do it any other way." To the Chinese, indeed, work is more than a way to make a living—it is virtually a religious experience, an end unto itself. Says the University of Michigan's Rhoads Murphey, "Work is a virtue in the same way it was in nineteenth-century America. It's China's version of the old Protestant ethic; it drives people and establishes values."

That dogmatic belief in the inherent value of work helps propel the average Chinese factory worker through a daily life that most Americans would find intolerable. He spends six days a week working with antiquated machinery in ill-lit, badly ventilated buildings that are

In a land of Spartan virtues, there are such popular amenities as efficient train service, the weekend swim and local troupes of actors who perform Chinese operas

Harry Redl—Black Star

Mare Riboud—Magnum

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Many fine restaurants closed during the cultural revolution, but China's great chefs are once again preparing Peking duck. Even the masses eat well, whether at a watermelon stand or a factory canteen.

Harry Redl—Black Star

Marc Riboud—Magnum

Brian Brake—Rapho GuILLumette

Harry Redl—Black Star

inadequately heated in winter and literally sweatshops in summer. Both his daily work shift and his one day off each week may be different from his wife's, and he moves up the pay scale at a torturously slow pace. (Each of the nine "ranks" of employees in China—such as technicians, factory workers, teachers or state executives—is subdivided into "grades," and promotion from one grade to another comes only after years of diligence and unsullied demonstration of the "right" political attitude.) Moreover, every worker still must attend political critique sessions several times each week. At these meetings, which are a combination of group encounters and post-game chalk talks, the workers freely criticize themselves and each other. "Comrade Lee is always late," "Comrade Liang takes the elitist attitude that he is too busy to sweep the shop floor"—and so on ad infinitum. Says one eminent Chinese scientist: "To break the rules at the risk of being criticized openly by one's own colleagues is just not worth it."

Harsh as the life of the urban laborer may be, it is less arduous than that of most commune workers—who make up 70 per cent of China's work force. To be sure, some communards—such as those living on the rich farms in the Pearl River delta—live comfortably and even earn extra money by raising poultry. And practically all commune families are now permitted to keep small private plots.

Acupuncture charts guide doctors in anesthetizing patients for surgery

Newsweek

But like their ancestors down through the centuries, the peasants are still outside the money economy (commune workers are paid in work points, the equivalent of 60 cents a day, which they trade for clothing and other essentials). The average commune, moreover, is about as Spartan as a nineteenth-century frontier homestead in the U.S. "At a commune like Chung Shan near Canton," a recent refugee from the mainland recalls, "no one has electrical appliances or running water, there is no sewage system, and everyone's day begins at 5:30 a.m." To break the monotony, the peasants can switch on a speaker hooked up to the commune radio and listen to patriotic songs, news and the thoughts of Chairman Mao.

The grueling labors of the average Chinese are performed for what Americans would regard as aАНСТСТ. The beginning wage for a factory apprentice is only $8 a month, and the majority of workers earn $25 a month or less. Yet, money goes a long way in today's classless China, and as in most socialist countries, many essentials are astonishingly cheap. One typical Peking couple earns $63 a month, but pays a minuscule 80 cents rent for a two-room apartment with a kitchen and toilet. Family medical insurance in China costs an average worker $3 a year-plus an extra charge of a few cents for dependents' visits to the doctor. And although food is relatively expensive-consuming about half of the average family's monthly earnings-millions of Chinese own their own furniture and purchase such luxuries as radios and wrist watches. Not only that, most have small savings accounts- which earn them 3.5 per cent interest.

Yet with womb-to-tomb socialism and the stress on Maoist egalitarianism, there is no incentive to build a private nest egg. "Nobody talks about money, nobody ever says, 'I'll work harder for money'," said one emigrant Chinese now living in the U.S. "They work harder to serve the people." The rewards for that service may strike some Americans as absurd; "model workers," for instance, often receive a bonus of a T shirt emblazoned with the phrase "advanced producer." But the Chinese are just as scornful of the frantic American-style scramble for success; the average worker thinks of executive responsibility as a yiwan a-szu-pi-lin or a "10,000 aspirin" job. And while some do aspire to greater heights and are clearly more equal than others, they try to camouflage it. "A university professor wears the same tunic as a working man," said University of Chicago historian Ping-ti Ho, "though occasionally it will be of a better fabric, and tidier." The desire to demonstrate sacrifice reaches even to the top in China; reportedly, Mao Tse-tung himself recently took a pay cut from $200 a month to $160.

Even if a Chinese could somehow accumulate capital, he would have a hard

time finding a place to spend it. There is no Chinese version of Paris night life, and even mah-jongg is now banned. The performing arts died a thousand deaths during the cultural revolution, when many artists and actors were publicly humiliated, beaten and, in some cases, driven to suicide. To this day, as one recent visitor put it, "cultural life in China is as barren as the Gobi Desert." Admittedly, there have been signs of a slight thaw in Peking's antipathy to traditional culture: China's most distinguished intellectual, Kuo Mo-jo, was recently allowed to publish his study of two classical poets. But, as Associated Press correspondent John Roderick, the first American journalist invited to China last year, puts it, "Mao has stated that one must write to reach the consciousness of the peasant or worker. And this means that art's aim is very low."

Evidence of that low aim abounds in

Still, China can boast of one pleasure unsurpassed elsewhere in the world-its food. Forced to close during the cultural revolution, most of China's great restaurants have opened their doors again. Admittedly, only the elite can afford to pay $2.60 for the Peking duck dinners at the capital's legendary Chuan Chu Fu restaurant. But the average worker is nonetheless able to eat well. And often he does. Visitors tell of workers enjoying five- and six-course meals at a cost of 60 cents per person, with their choice of two dozen varieties of rice wine-and no tipping permitted. (Diners must go home early, however, for restaurants close as early as 8:30 p.m.) Perhaps even more than eating, however, the Chinese love sports-not only their national game, table tennis, but even some Western pastimes as well. They pack Peking's stadium to see hockey and crowd the city's only bowling alley, a one-lane af-

Mare Riboud-Magnum

As they have for centuries, peasants use water buffalo to plow a paddy

contemporary China. Mao's authoritarian wife, Chiang Ching, has approved eight "exemplary theatrical works" that are presented in operatic and ballet form. And these oft-repeated political plays-such as "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy" and "The White Haired Girl"-are virtually all that the people see.

There is no respite in films either. Movie fare is limited largely to films of Madame Mao's morality plays, Vietnam documentaries showing Communist victories and-by far the most popular-some Albanian and Rumanian imports. In many of the arts, classics are still banned-"Swan Lake" has been declared a "poisonous weed." What's more, no novel has been published since before the cultural revolution, and reading fare is limited to the propaganda of official newspapers and magazines, technical books and, as always, quotations from Chairman Mao.

fair built 80 years ago by an American.

Yet the films, the books, the sports are curiously incidental in today's China. For leisure is only an adjunct to labor in the eyes of a Chinese living in the People's Republic. It is not-as in the West-a question of working hard in order to play hard. In both pursuits, there is but one goal- *wei ren-min fu-wu*, "Serve the people." And so widely has this concept been accepted that China has made remarkable strides toward eliminating one of the major social ills faced by Western societies since the Industrial Revolution: the alienation of the worker. Yet, the homogenization of Chinese society has resulted in perhaps the permanent dilution of one of the world's great cultures. "A farmer who works for ten hours in the field will go to see a visiting opera company," mused one student of China recently. "And what will he see? An opera about a farmer who works for ten hours in the field."

February 21, 1972

51

# The Summit: Great Expectations

From that moment last summer when Richard Nixon informed a startled world that he planned to visit Peking, many Americans have wondered whether the trip would amount to much more than an election-year stunt. That it will surely be. With a flock of 87 American newsmen on hand to transform next week's summit into a media spectacular (page 100), the first visit of an American President to China will give Mr. Nixon a big political head start at the very moment that the 1972 campaign is slipping into gear. Yet in undertaking this journey the President had more in mind than domestic politics. Simply by meeting with the leaders of a nation long regarded as an implacable foe, Mr. Nixon will close the door on more than two decades of hallowed U.S. policy in Asia. At the same time, he will signal the opening of a new era, marked by a radically different balance of power in Asia and by the possibility of a historic détente with the People's Republic of China. "Those who think this is all fluff," remarked a Western diplomat in Hong Kong, "are likely to be very surprised."

Certainly the President has given every indication that he regards his mission as one of the most crucial of his entire Presidency. To prepare for his meetings with Premier Chou En-lai and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Mr. Nixon immersed himself in Chinese history, economics, geography and current affairs. He devoured a huge stack of books, including "The United States and China," by John K. Fairbank, and "Anti-Memoirs," by old China hand André Malraux (with whom Mr. Nixon scheduled a private chat at the White House on the eve of his departure). With even greater attention, the President pored over a series of highly classified loose-leaf volumes-provided mainly by the National Security Council-dealing with the issues likely to come up in his dialogues with Chou and Mao, the personalities he will meet during his week-long stay in China and tentative drafts of communiqués that could result from the summit. At the head of this must reading was a four-inch-thick, "eyes only" record of the previous visits to China made by Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's top foreign-policy adviser. (Like her husband, Pat Nixon prepped for the trip by reading up on Chinese language and culture. She considered making her debut in China in a "respectable Republican cloth coat" but decided to take a fur coat, too, upon learning that the average February temperature in Peking is 23 degrees Fahrenheit.)

For their part, the Chinese were making a major effort for the historic summit. A major cosmetic job has been done on the places the Nixons will visit. In Peking, where the President and his fourteen-man entourage* were expected to spend four days, the Gate of Heavenly Peace was repainted, and streets and buildings were given noncontroversial new names to replace the anti-imperialist ones they received during the cultural revolution. In Shanghai, China's largest metropolis, which the Nixons will visit in addition to Peking and the lakeside city of Hangchou, dozens of palm trees were planted along

the Hwang Pu River in place of giant portraits of Mao and billboards depicting revolutionary themes.

All of this, of course, did not mean that next week's meeting between the leaders of two long-horrorful nations will turn into a lovefest. But the elaborate preparations did suggest that both sides saw compelling reasons for a meaningful round of negotiations at this particular juncture.

To begin with, Washington and Peking share convergent security concerns. Despite important strategic accommodations recently reached with the Soviet Union—like those on the status of Berlin and the handling of nuclear accidents—Mr. Nixon and Henry Kissinger are known to believe that the growth of Soviet power in Asia represents far more of a threat to U.S. security than Mao's gospel of a people's war. As he withdraws U.S. forces to the rim of Asia, the President seems convinced that the key to peace in the region lies in an understanding with China.

In parallel fashion, the Chinese see the limitation of Soviet power in Asia as their top security priority. Indeed, ever since the 1969 Soviet border fighting, the Soviet Union has replaced the U.S. as China's arch enemy. This Chinese fear of the Soviet Union was exacerbated by the Russian role in the Indo-Pakistani war and by Russia's recent gesture of friendship toward Japan. Coupled with a deep-seated fear of a remilitarized Japan, these latest developments have produced a virtual phobia of encirclement among China's leaders. (Significantly, the Japan issue also strikes some muted echoes in America; the Nixon Administration is becoming somewhat concerned that Japan might decide to "go nuclear" within the next decade and to establish firmer ties with Moscow.) Finally, both President Nixon and Premier Chou have a large

CDMO—Editorial Photocolor Archives

Peking railway station is a blend of old and new

*All members of the President's party were issued practice chopticks. "I'm getting so good at using them," quipped one White House aide, "I can now use them to pick up my antacid pills."

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Newsweek

personal stake in their meetings. There is evidence that Chou has opted for accommodation with the U.S. in the face of strong internal resistance. And, with an election staring him in the face, Mr. Nixon cannot afford to return from Peking empty-handed.

In view of the high stakes, it was hardly surprising that the exact arrangements for the Presidential visit were kept strictly secret. Nothing, for instance, was revealed about where President and Mrs. Nixon will stay during the seven-day tour. Nor was it known where the actual negotiations would take place. All the press was told was that the Presidential entourage would leave for Peking on Feb. 17, with stops in Hawaii (for two nights) and Guam (to overcome jet lag), and a pause in Shanghai to pick up a Chinese welcoming party. Upon reaching Peking on Feb. 21, Mr. Nixon is expected to receive the usual welcome accorded a visiting head of state—complete with an honor guard and a cacophony of cymbals, gongs and drums—even though the U.S. and China have no diplomatic relations.

Despite the sticking points of protocol, however, there seems ample reason to believe that the Sino-U.S. summit will prove fruitful. Indeed, in recent weeks, both Chou and Mr. Nixon have all but announced some of the probable results of their talks. In a television interview last month, the President asserted: "We will have normalization [of relations with China] in terms of setting up some method of communication better than we currently have." Thus, the final communiqué may well contain agreements on an expansion of cultural and sports exchanges; the establishment of Chinese and American news bureaus in Washington and Peking, and the creation of some diplomatic machinery—short of formal recognition—to deal with the new complex of relations that will surely emerge. Equally important, most experts expect to see an agreement to open trade links. "The easiest way to open the door to China is through trade and industrial cooperation," says Samuel Pisar, the author of "Co-

existence and Commerce." "Part of pre-revolutionary China's industrial infrastructure was U.S.-built. They can use our spare parts and know-how. And we can buy from them rare metals, furs, silks, objets d'art and, almost as important in volume, specialty foods for the large Chinese community in the U.S."

At the same time, it also seems possible to predict those issues that will not be settled at the summit. Mr. Nixon will undoubtedly appeal for Chinese help in seeking an Indochina peace agreement. It remains questionable, however, whether Peking will choose to intercede with Hanoi and whether, if it does, North Vietnam will accede to such pressure. Equally doubtful is a settlement of the issue of Taiwan. While there is a general feeling that the President may tacitly acknowledge that Taiwan is a part of China in return for a pledge by Peking not to try and regain the island by force, this is unlikely to be mentioned in the communiqué.

Although China has made it clear that it will not establish full diplomatic relations with the U.S. until after a Taiwan accommodation, the Peking summit is nonetheless expected to be a success for both sides. Indeed, with the groundwork laid by a meticulous Henry Kissinger and a pragmatic Chou En-lai, the prospects for the President's epic voyage to the Middle Kingdom look far brighter than the White House has let on. "The summit talks and the entire U.S. involvement with China will move much more rapidly than similar moves with the Soviet Union," predicted a Western diplomat in Hong Kong. "You and the Soviets can't trust each other because both of you are too powerful. But you and China can afford to trust each other because you have finally learned you mean each other no harm."

Of course, next week's summit will mark only the beginning of the process of establishing mutual trust. But it seemed no exaggeration when a Chinese diplomat remarked on the eve of the meeting: "The future of all of Asia may hang on the outcome of the Peking summit."

Eastfoto

Western Lake graces the city of Hangchou

## A PACKAGED PRESIDENTIAL TOUR

Richard Nixon's visit to China—the first by any U.S. President—will be more than a televised election-year extravaganza. Like the President's meticulously orchestrated tri-city tour of Peking, Shanghai and Hangchou, the summit talks have been carefully planned on both sides. And they are expected to produce significant results.

February 21, 1972

With its clock tower and waterways, Shanghai has a European flavor

53

After Mao: Can the
Revolution Go On?

By the year 2001, Mao Tse-tung predicted a few years ago, China will become a great power. And although the Chairman has not always proved to be an infallible guide to the future, this time he may be right. Emerging from the convulsions of World War II and from decades of division and decay, China under Mao has already come a long way. It can feed its people, defend its borders and has won acceptance as an equal in the world community. "China," a Western diplomat in Hong Kong confidently asserts, "is well on its way to becoming a prosperous, powerful and far more peaceful country. There may be future ideological erupitions, but they will only affect the speed and scope of China's growth; they won't reverse the trend."

If the past two decades are any guide, the prospects for the Middle Kingdom look brighter than at any time during the past two centuries. Despite the tumultuous upheavals of the "great leap forward" and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Mao's small band of revolutionaries has forged a unified, functioning nation out of the ruins of traditional Confucian China. Only fifteen years ago, China's gross national product stood at $60 billion. Last year, the Chinese GNP hit $120 billion, just slightly behind France's. Starting from scratch, the Chinese have developed and tested thirteen nuclear devices, and soon they are expected to test their first intercontinental-ballistic-missile system. Perhaps most symbolic of all, a regime that was once shunned as a pariah by most of the world is now about to play host to the President of the United States.

No one—least of all the Chinese—can ignore the fact that China is still a poor country and that it faces immense problems. Perhaps the most immediate and in many ways the most critical of the problems is the question of who will inherit Mao's mandate. Like other Communist countries, China has no established procedure for replacing a fallen leader, and even to discuss the succession dilemma is considered slightly conspiratorial. What's more, Mao himself has complicated the process even further. Twice the Chairman has chosen successors (Liu Shao-chi in 1945 and Lin Piao in 1966) and twice he has purged his heirs. Today there is simply no single figure with the reputation, status and power to take Mao's place. No doubt, Premier Chou En-lai has the political skill to arrange a transition of power, but at 73, even the seemingly ageless Chou cannot go on forever.

With no strongman waiting in the wings, post-Mao China seems destined to be ruled by a collective leadership drawn from the ranks of the party, the army and the leading regional chieftains. But no matter how much the central authority may be diluted, most experts are convinced that a return to the divisiveness and warlordism that long characterized Chinese political life is out of the question. In their 22 years in power, the Communists have fashioned a durable nationwide administration, a broad-based military establishment and wide-ranging party apparatus—all of which have bound the country together as never before. "Everyone is lis-

Novosti—Sovfoto

Chinese troops in 1969 border clash with Soviets

JOINING THE POWER ELITE

Although still a relatively poor country, China has elbowed its way into the world's big-power club. Armed with nuclear weapons and growing technological capabilities, the Chinese have developed into a military force to be reckoned with. Under the pragmatic leadership of Chou En-lai—and prodded by fears of the Soviet Union—Peking has now launched an ambitious diplomatic offensive as well.

tening to the same radio, reading the same material—the thought-molding process is going on constantly,” says one diplomat in Peking. “These are forces for building unity, not disunity.” Adds another: “Their strength lies in unification and they know it.”

Still the pieces in the Peking leadership puzzle remain a mystery. Once they get below Mao and Chou, outsiders have been totally frustrated in their efforts to sort out the Peking hierarchy. In the past year, eight members of the Politburo have been purged and six of what China scholar A. Doak Barnett calls "the most powerful military men in the world" have vanished. Laments one State Department specialist: "Look, I can run out five or six names speculatively—or I can run out a hundred. But damned if I can tell which, if any, are favored."

Despite the lack of specific information, however, China watchers have pieced together a composite picture of the next generation of leaders. Now in their 50s, these men joined the party or the army during the second world war. Unlike Mao's comrades on the Long March, most have some high-school education and many attended universities. And although they remain committed to the Chairman's revolutionary goals, they seem more comfortable with the current emphasis on flexibility than with romantic ideological notions. Behind this take-over generation are 15 million younger, middle-level cadre. Well-educated and with a bent toward technocratic solutions, these men in grayflannel Mao tunicos saw their budding careers stifled by the dislocation of the great leap and the cultural revolution. They, too, seem likely to follow Chou En-lai's present pragmatic path, perhaps swerving even further toward revisionism.

Once in power, the executors of Mao's legacy will

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Newsweek

Bernard Gotfryd—Newsweek

Peking's delegation to the U.N.

Premier Chou En-lai

Eastfoto

Mare Riboud—Magnum

Magnum

Modern computer factory in Sian

face no more pressing problem than the economy. Like their predecessors, they will undoubtedly follow the Soviet example by constructing a strong military-industrial base. Thanks to the relative level of prosperity achieved by Mao and Chou, however, the new leadership will almost surely confront a demand for more consumer goods. While attempting to stave off a revolution of rising expectations, moreover, the regime must insure continued agricultural growth. By the end of this decade, China should be able to increase its grain production by 20 to 25 per cent. But even that impressive performance would barely keep pace with a population expected to hit one billion by the turn of the century. The Chinese, in fact, will do well to keep their economy as a whole expanding at the current rate of 4 to 5 per cent per year. But while the present Chinese growth rate is higher than that in most developing countries, it is hardly enough to keep up with, let alone surpass, their rivals in the developed world.

In a sense, the problem is as much philosophic as economic. To close the gap, China's leaders would have to make some painful ideological choices. The Maoist emphasis on production-related classroom work at the expense of advanced, theoretical education may in the long run hamper economic development. So, too, will the practice of promoting managers and administrators on the basis of ideological zeal rather than proven performance alone. On a different level, the regime faces the fundamental questions of whether to open up China to foreign industrial development and what kind of steps should be taken to gain technological know-how from the industrialized world. So far, there are no signs that Peking is ready to scrap its vision of an independent Maoist society for the prospect of increased production. But as one scholar notes: "Once

a country really starts worrying about development, ideology gets pushed into the background."

In foreign policy, that process already appears to have begun. Under Chou En-lai's guiding hand, the Chinese have recently been acting far more like masters of Realpolitik than of world revolution. Quite clearly, next week's Nixon visit is in response to what Peking perceives to be a growing Soviet threat. (Although many experts discount the likelihood of a Sino-Soviet war, one who does not is Henry Kissinger. Only half joking, he told a group of scholars that he had two nightmares: one that Moscow and Peking would make up; the other that they would fight a war.) Beyond their effort to use the U.S. to help keep the Russians at bay, the Chinese would like to move other foreign-policy issues to the back burner. For all their talk about exporting revolution, unless they perceive a threat to their vital interests, the Chinese are unlikely to pay much more than lip service to Maoist-style revolutionaries abroad. "China wants to be left alone and not threatened," says one U.S. diplomat. "China will be looking inward."

Given the opportunity to focus its energies on domestic priorities, China stands a good chance to attain the status of superpower. And of that the Chinese themselves seem abundantly confident. Looking back on their rich history, they like to recall China's two most powerful dynasties, the Han (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) and the Tang (618 to 907 A.D.). Both were preceded by short-lived, ruthless dynasties that unified China, built a nationwide communications network, developed trade and industry and laid the foundation for the glorious dynasties that followed. Today in China, millions believe—and with some reason—that the decades to come will more than justify the tumultuous era of Mao.

February 21, 1972

55

NIXON IN CHINA

Who Stands to Gain Most

WITH THE PRESIDENT

As Richard Nixon headed into his crucial week of bargaining with the leaders of Communist China, the significant question was this:

Who stands to make the greatest gains from the historic confrontation in Peking?

In other words: Will the American President be able to get anything from China that will outweigh the substantial concessions the U. S. has already made as a price for the meeting?

The U. S. starts from far behind, when it comes to tangible immediate benefits achieved by either side in the months leading up to the China trip. U. S. concessions in trade and in helping to bring China into the United Nations are spelled out on page 15, as are the main U. S. objectives in the Peking talks.

Publicly, the President's specific aims were both modest and cautious. As he left Washington on February 17, Mr. Nixon said that "what we must do is to find a way to see that we can have differences without being enemies in war." Privately, the President was prepared to negotiate on the broadest, most complex issues—from Vietnam to massive American aid to mainland China, if Chairman Mao Tse-tung were receptive.

While a rich and colorful panoply was

laid out for Mr. Nixon in the streets of the three Chinese cities on his itinerary, it was behind closed doors, in hours of face-to-face discussions with Mao and Premier Chou En-lai, that the real business was to be done. And it might be weeks—or far longer—before all the results were known to the outside world.

**A strong hand?** People around the President insist that he undertook his historic journey with a strong hand to play. Confusion persists over Indo-China. But elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia, U. S. military and economic aid has given China's neighbors—shaky and vulnerable 20 years ago—new confidence in their own stability.

—"Washington Star" Photo

China, on the other hand, is worried about the presence of a million Soviet troops just across its frontier with Russia. And China still has not fully recovered from its two vast upheavals—the ill-fated "Great Leap Forward" in 1959 and the chaotic "Cultural Revolution" of 1966-69.

It was against this background of flux in Asia that Mr. Nixon and the Chinese started looking for ways to end 22 years of bitter hostility, marked by a mutual bloodletting in Korea in the 1950s and indirect warfare in Indo-China for most of the past decade.

The President is mindful, his critics say, that the outcome of his trip to China—and his later journey to Moscow—will have an important bearing on his chances of re-election.

But the Chief Executive is concerned, as well, with a more fundamental American interest: establishment of genuine peace between the world's richest nation and the world's most populous—and potentially dangerous—nation.

For its part, China wants an opening in the "encirclement"—as Peking sees it—by the Soviets on the land and the Americans on the sea.

Already, the very fact of the President's journey to confer with Mao and Chou has enhanced China's world prestige and placed its deep-rooted rivalry

(continued on next page)

FROM
WASHINGTON
TO PEKING

Note: All dates based on local times.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 28, 1972

13

NIXON IN CHINA

with the Soviet Union in a more favorable perspective for Peking.

On specific issues in the talks:

War in Indo-China rates high. Mr. Nixon hopes for Chinese help in ending that war. He hopes, too, that China will use its influence to speed release of American prisoners in North Vietnam. Concrete help on either problem would be a signal U. S. achievement.

Another thorny problem—possibly most difficult of all—is Taiwan, held by the Chinese Nationalists. The U. S. has made clear that it does not intend to abrogate its security treaty with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime. But at the same time it urges a peaceful solution of the conflict between the "two Chinas" and has said Washington would not interfere in their negotiations.

Some analysts see this approach as an opening toward a compromise, possibly involving withdrawal of the relatively small number of U. S. troops on Taiwan.

Korea is another matter where the U. S. would like Peking's co-operation. The U. S., Red China, Russia and Japan all are involved here. Mr. Nixon, in his quest for peace safeguards, would welcome a start toward an agreement designed to prevent a new outbreak of hostilities between North and South.

Still another problem: Japan, which Peking regards as a bulwark of U. S. power in Asia and as China's main rival in that area. The Chinese Communists have been trying to weaken Japan's close ties with the U. S. Mr. Nixon will resist further erosion of those ties.

**What China wants.** China's worries about the massive military build-up by Russia along their common border take top priority with Mao and Chou, Western experts believe.

The President is determined to avoid taking a stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute. He wants, instead, to improve U. S. relations with both of the giant Communist powers. If Mr. Nixon can make a start in that direction, he will count it an important plus.

U. S. bars to trade with China were lowered by the President in step-by-step moves toward his trip to Peking. Sudden expansion of trade is not in the cards—but any kind of increase will be viewed as contributing to the "constructive relationship" sought by Mr. Nixon.

**Is U. S. aid a key?** Some experts argue that an offer of massive, long-term U. S. economic support, through loans to spur China's industrial development, is essential if the Peking talks are to get anywhere. These experts contend that China's need for outside

financing is a prime reason for Mao's invitation to the President.

Other experts, considered just as knowledgeable, insist that Mao is much too proud to ask for American help—and that he would regard any offer of U. S. assistance as an insult.

Along with the major issues are some smaller ones, where progress is considered more likely.

One point on which agreement seems possible is the problem of frozen assets. Chinese claim ownership of about 78 million dollars' worth of bank accounts, insurance policies, real estate and trust funds frozen in the United States. American citizens lay claim to about 196 million dollars' worth of assets in Red China—mostly church and corporate property. A settlement would be considered a gain for the U. S.

**"The first step."** In assessing what the Peking summit means in terms of immediate benefits to the U. S., one American official says:

"Forget about single issues and whether there will be solutions tomorrow. The big accomplishment lies in the fact that the President has been able to take the first step in a process that can be expected to continue for years. It represents fulfillment of the President's long-held determination to open the door to a nation of 775 million people."

On the first visit to China ever made by a U. S. President, Mr. Nixon headed an entourage of more than 300 Americans, including 87 newsmen. Satellite relays were set up to send TV highlights of the mission to the U. S.

Top officials accompanying the President and the First Lady include Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's adviser on national-security affairs. Also: State Department experts on Asia, and White House staff members.

Among these officials there seemed no question that—even if immediate concrete achievements were limited—the U. S. stood to gain most from the talks, if they resulted in brightened prospects for a durable peace in Asia.

Outside the President's official party, there was a feeling of extreme caution. Experts with a background of first-hand knowledge of China suggest that it will be months—or even years—before anyone knows with certainty what Peking's leaders are really up to.

Red China today, page 16. Mao and Chou, 18. A French author's views of China, 20. The "other China," 22. What the world expects from Nixon summit, 39. How to do business with China, 77.

14

WHAT
NIXON
HAS GIVEN
PEKING
SO FAR...

THE MOST
THE
PRESIDENT
CAN
HOPE FOR...

A T LITTLE COST to themselves, the rulers of Red China have already won a long string of concessions from the U. S. as the price of a Nixon visit to Peking.

Latest U. S. concession, for example, came on February 14, when the White House dropped the last trade restriction aimed specifically at the mainland Chinese, putting Peking on the same trading basis as the Soviet Union. That means that American businessmen can now sell to Communist China items such as industrial chemicals, locomotives, construction equipment and rolling mills.

Over all, the three-year record of Mr. Nixon's overtures shows substantial gains for Red China on the political as well as the economic front. Details:

* A series of conciliatory gestures began in July, 1969, when the U. S. gave permission for noncommercial purchases of Chinese goods by American tourists, museums and others. At the same time, the U. S. eased some restrictions on travel to China by American citizens.

* In December, 1969, foreign subsidiaries of American firms were authorized to engage in commerce between mainland China and third countries.

* In March, 1970, the U. S. announced it would validate passports for travel to China "for any legitimate purpose."

* In August, 1970, restrictions were lifted so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering facilities for trips to and from Chinese ports.

* In March, 1971, the U. S. ceased to require special validation of passports for travel to China.

* In April, 1971, Washington decided to: 1. Expendite visas for visitors from China. 2. Relax currency controls so China could acquire dollars from the U. S. 3. Permit U. S. oil companies to provide fuel for ships or aircraft en route to or from China, except those whose itineraries included North Korea, North Vietnam or Cuba. 4. Allow U. S. ships and planes to carry mainland Chinese cargo between non-Chinese ports, and U. S.-owned carriers under foreign registry to call at Chinese ports. 5. Compile a list of nonstrategic items for direct export to China.

* In May, 1971, other controls on dollar transactions with China were lifted.

* In June, 1971, the U. S. ended a 21-year embargo on trade, issuing a general export license for a comprehensive list of nonstrategic items.

By far the most important political concession was reversal of U. S. opposition to United Nations membership for Red China. Allied diplomats say this not only brought the People's Republic into the U. N. but triggered the expulsion of Nationalist China—Taiwan.

### IN RETURN FOR ALL THIS:

China has freed two imprisoned Americans and commuted the life sentence of a third American to five more years. Peking has also opened its doors to cultural, scientific and journalistic visitors from the U. S.

Robert P. Martin, Directing Editor of the International Staff of "U. S. News & World Report," is with the President's China entourage. He cabled this analysis:

### WITH THE PRESIDENT

What is the most Mr. Nixon can hope to gain from the Communist Chinese in his week of negotiations?

Not much of immediate substance—but a great deal in terms of tacit and useful understandings on key problems that worry both nations.

Indo-China is very much on Mr. Nixon's mind. He wants a political settlement, a return of American war prisoners, and final withdrawal of U. S. forces.

Peking also wants an end to the war, to speed up departure of most American troops from one of China's touchiest border areas. It would also slow down Russia's drive to gain pre-eminence along China's borders with Southeast and South Asia.

Will Peking agree to help Mr. Nixon? The Administration clearly is hopeful. And Republican Senator Edward W. Brooke of Massachusetts—who has a solid track record on the President's own thinking—is one who goes even further. He believes: "There is a great chance that a formula will be found at the Peking talks to resolve that conflict."

Such a formula would have to be sold to Hanoi—and there is no certainty that the Chinese could deliver. Even if Peking agrees to try, it will be a while before the world knows about it. Red China's leaders cannot

afford to align themselves publicly on the side of a so-called "imperialist" nation against a fellow-Communist Government which it had supported in the past.

Mr. Nixon is eager to cut back on U. S. military outlays in Asia while at the same time reducing the nation's commitments to allies. The President hopes that the two nations can agree—and possibly say so publicly—that the "ultimate relationship" between Taiwan and mainland China is a matter for "peaceful resolution" by the Chinese.

Mr. Nixon's gain from such a declaration: It would permit him to say that U. S. troops and bases are no longer needed on Taiwan because Peking has agreed not to use force to "liberate" the island.

Will Mr. Nixon be able to make any headway on possible neutralization of areas in the Pacific basin and Asia's mainland?

The Chinese in the past have envisaged a brand-new order in Asia that would include a nonaggression pact signed by the United States, Russia, Japan and China. This idea is a suitable one for discussion, but Mr. Nixon's prospective gains—if any—are likely to be intangible even though each side will know exactly what the other is thinking.

Mr. Nixon wants the U. S. and China to keep talking long after his departure. It is likely that U. S. representation in some form will be established in Peking at a later date. That's another plus.

Most of all, the President expects to return with what he calls "a solid beginning" in which China and the U. S. can search for "common ground on which to build a more constructive relationship."

15

PICTOGRAM

Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

A SECOND-RATE POWER—
WITH A LONG WAY TO GO

**A** TIME OF a dramatic turn in the history of Chinese-American relations, attention is being focused on an ancient land which has about one fourth of the earth's population.

Of prime interest: Just how great a power in the world is China?

The answer: Right now, it is not much. The Pictogram on these pages gives important clues to China's economic and military status.

Since Communist rule began in 1949, economic progress has been impeded at intervals by such upheavals as the "cultural revolution" of the 1960s, which spawned the disruptive Red Guards and led to a temporary reign of terror in Peking and other cities.

**Great potential.** But it is the China of the future with which President Nixon is concerned—the nation he has described as potentially one of the world's "five great economic superpowers."

These five power centers, Mr. Nixon has predicted, will "determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of this century."

Experts on China say that statistical comparisons with the U. S. should not obscure what Communist China has achieved or blur advances that can be expected. As one authority put it:

"Some of China's accomplishments are amazing, especially when you take into account the spasms of domestic turmoil. Of course they lag far behind the West, but the point to keep in mind is this:

"What they had to do to make the country stronger, they did. They didn't get their nuclear capability as a gift. They are building their own fighter-bombers, their own submarines, their own destroyers-which are almost as big as cruisers.

"They have built up industry from virtually nothing. The Chinese people are eating better. Food output is at least keeping up with population growth. The standard of living is going up. Output of consumer goods is climbing. Rail and water-transportation systems have undergone tremendous improvement."

**Settling for less.** Analysts stress that Red China should not be judged by its gross national product, which is only one tenth that of the United States. Unlike people in the West, who demand more and spend more on personal consumption as the economy expands and broadens, the Chinese settle for far fewer goods and services.

Although emphasis is on heavy industry—with new factories being built and old ones being modernized to incorporate latest technological developments—the Chinese are beginning to get more items for personal or household use. Now readily available are such things as wrist watches, transistor radios, sewing machines and bicycles.

Most Western analysts expect China to be subjected to continuing social and political strains-but President Nixon is demonstrating by his historic journey his conviction that the mainland is achieving status as a fast-growing economic power. Mr. Nixon is showing, too, that the U. S. may even be willing to help in that achievement.

Compared With U. S.

RED CHINA IS
VAST IN SIZE
AND IN PEOPLE

...BUT LAGS FAR
BEHIND IN INDUSTRIAL
AND MILITARY
STRENGTH

Red China's Industry-

$ TOTAL OUTPUT OF GOODS AND SERVICES: $80 to $120 billion a

year, one tenth that of U.S.

STEEL PRODUCTION: 20 million
tons, about one sixth as much as the

United States produces a year.

OIL OUTPUT: 130 to 150 million
barrels a year, only 4 per cent as

much as in U.S.

ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY: 16 million kilowatts,

compared with over 350 million kilowatts in U.S.

16

## Communist China occupies a huge area—3.7 million square miles—slightly larger than the U.S.

## Red China is the largest of all nations, with a population of 775 million, nearly four times that of U.S.

**CEMENT PRODUCTION:** 12 to 15 million tons a year, about one fifth that of the United States.

**COAL OUTPUT:** 350 to 400 million tons annually, roughly two thirds the production of the U.S.

**HIGHWAYS:** 330,000 miles of roads, less than a tenth that of U.S. Only 1,000 miles are hard-surfaced highways.

**VEHICLES:** 60,000 cars in use, 30,000 buses, 400,000 trucks—each a fraction of the U.S. with its 93 million cars, 400,000 buses, 18 million trucks.

**RAILROADS:** About 25,000 miles of tracks, one ninth as much as in U.S.

**AIRLINES:** Fewer than 400 transport aircraft, compared with 2,700 passenger and freight craft in the U.S.

**SHIPPING:** About 250 ships in its merchant marine, with gross weight of 800,000 tons. U.S. has 2,000 large seagoing vessels, totaling 25 million tons.

## Red China's Armed Forces—

**ARMY:** 2.6 million men, nearly triple the size of the U.S. Army. But Chinese troops lack trucks, self-propelled artillery, other equipment used in modern war.

**AIR POWER:** 180,000 men—less than one fourth the size of U.S. Air Force. Red China's 3,000 combat aircraft, about half as many as U.S., include few bombers; fighter-interceptors are mostly of older vintage.

**NAVY:** 40 old-type submarines, 4 destroyers; hundreds of smaller craft. Only now starting to modernize. U.S. has 140 submarines, including 95 nuclear subs, plus 338 major surface ships.

**ATOMIC WEAPONS:** Red China has deployed about 20 nuclear missiles, none of intercontinental range. The Chinese have accumulated enough fissionable material for 120 atomic and hydrogen bombs of relatively small explosive power. U.S. has 1,710 sub-based or land-based missiles, more than 50,000 nuclear bombs and warheads already stockpiled.

**NOTE:** Figures on Chinese industrial and military strengths are latest estimates available from U.S. and Chinese Government sources as well as from private sources, such as the Institute for Strategic Studies.

17

—Riboud-Magnum Photo
Chairman Mao Tse-tung

# THE HARD BARGAINERS FACING NIXON

Mao Tse-tung is no ordinary adversary. His long record as a revolutionary leader makes that clear. And at his side: Chou En-lai, onetime guerrilla fighter, today a formidable negotiator. They have a history of getting more than they give.

**W**AITING IN PEKING for Richard Nixon were two of the toughest—and most ruthless—Communist revolutionaries of this century.

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of China's Communist Party, is the largely self-educated son of a Chinese peasant. At 78, he is still No. 1 man.

Premier Chou En-lai is No. 2, a well-educated and self-styled member of a "bourgeois" family. He is 73.

One is the brain; the other is the mouth.

Together, they—and no one else—run the world's most populous country.

It took Mao 14 years to turn a be-draggled band of guerrillas into an Army that swept across all of China and subsequently—in 1950—fought the U. S. to a standstill in Korea.

It was Chou, at one time senior to Mao in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, who discarded his guerrilla uniform, became Mao's principal diplomat and trouble shooter and is now the undisputed chief executive officer in mainland China.

**At the top, only two.** A measure of the power and prestige held by the two men: Peking is one of the few capitals where diplomats find themselves unable to name a single individual in his 40s or 50s—and only several in their 60s— who are being groomed to succeed Mao and Chou, despite their ages.

This concentration of authority means there is no one else with whom Mr. Nixon can usefully talk at length, or even see.

What, then, are China's leaders really like?

Chou is urbane, sophisticated, well-informed, and able to talk or negotiate for hours without reference to notes. He

is widely traveled, first as a student and later on as China's top contact with South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and with the other Communist countries.

Mao, on the other hand, is much more of a recluse, far more introspective. Only twice in his life has he left China. The first time was in 1949-50 when he visited Moscow as the guest of Stalin. The second, and last, was in 1957, when Mao attended the 40th anniversary of the Soviet revolution.

It is Mao who speaks to China, but it is Chou who speaks for China to the rest of the world. What this means to Mr. Nixon is that almost all substantive talks are scheduled with the Premier—but always within the framework of what Mao wants.

**Softer words, same line.** Eric Chou, formerly editor of a Chinese Communist newspaper and close associate of the two leaders but now living in London, says that one of Chou En-lai's advantages as a negotiator "is that he can always render Communist ideology and ideas into a plain language less repulsive to the Western ear. But this does not mean he will depart from the line firmly laid down by Chairman Mao."

It was Eric Chou who said: "Mao is the brain and Chou is the mouth."

Australian-born Prof. Ross Terrill, who now teaches at Harvard University and was invited to visit mainland China in 1971, makes this point about the President's trip to Peking:

"If Mr. Nixon has talks with Mao—rather than just seeing him—the meeting of the two leaders will be worthwhile—and historic."

**First: "Will U. S. help?"** André Malraux, French author, friend of Mao's, and a Minister of State in the Cabinet of the late President Charles de Gaulle, made this observation in Paris early in February—

"Mao will have the first question, and I can tell you it will be this: Are you, the richest country in the world, prepared to help one of the poorest coun-

tries in the world on the road to progress?

"Unless Nixon answers affirmatively, that the United States will assist China, then the rest of the meeting will degenerate into an exchange of trivialities."

At a news conference on February 10, President Nixon declined to speculate on prospects the U. S. would offer to help Peking. He added: "I cannot really predict with much confidence, as Mr. Malraux perhaps can, as to what Mr. Mao Tse-tung's questions will be."

**Not competitors?** Mao was asking the same question in 1945, at a time when the war with Japan was still going on and the Communists were a minority party and an outnumbered Army on the mainland of China. As John S. Service, U. S. diplomat, summarized Mao's remarks at a meeting in Yenan, the Communists' wartime headquarters:

"China's greatest postwar need is economic development. She lacks the capitalistic foundation necessary to carry this out alone. Her own living standards are so low that they cannot be further depressed to provide the needed capital.

"America and China complement each other economically; they will not compete.

"China does not have the requirements of a heavy industry of major size. She cannot hope to meet the United States in its highly specialized manufactures. America needs an export market for her heavy industry and these specialized manufactures. She also needs an outlet for capital investment....

"America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China: She is also the only country fully able to participate. For all these reasons, there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America."

By 1949, when the Communists controlled most of the mainland, Mao's tune had changed. In a series of articles in the Chinese press, he said U. S. policy in the postwar years had been "to turn

18

—Riboud-Magnum Photo

Premier Chou En-lai

China into a U. S. colony. All the 'friendship' shown to China by U. S. imperialism over the last 109 years . . . had one purpose, to maintain the Open Door."

**Mao: temper, too.** President Nixon will find Chairman Mao to be rather soft-spoken but argumentative, and addicted to philosophic analysis. He can also be short-tempered, as shown in this World War II report by Col. David D. Barrett, chief of the U. S. military liaison group, at Chinese Communist headquarters in Yenan:

"Chairman Mao's attitude throughout [our] interview was recalcitrant in the extreme. He was not discourteous to me, but several times he flew into a violent rage. He kept shouting, over and over again, 'We will not yield any further! . . . If Chiang [Kai-shek] were here I would curse him to his face.'

". . . Chou never lost his temper, but backed up in cold, calm language everything that Chairman Mao said. I left the interview feeling that I had talked in vain to two clever, ruthless and determined leaders who felt absolutely sure of the strength of their position."

Chou En-lai is more diplomatic but he, on occasion, can be just as blunt as Mao. After his latest visit to the mainland, Mr. Service said he had asked Chou, late in 1971, 'if he planned to visit the U. S., now that Peking is in the United Nations. Chou's reply, according to Mr. Service: "Never! Never! As long as a Taiwan Embassy is in the United States, you'll never see me."

Even so, there seems to be two Chou En-lai—the conversationalist and the negotiator.

**"Rivet every eye."** Professor Terrill and E. Gough Whitlam, leader of the Australian Labor Party, talked at length

with Chou in the summer of 1971. Mr. Terrill's impressions, reported in "The Atlantic Monthly":

"It is [Chou's] face and hands which rivet every eye in the room for the next two hours. The expression is tough, even forbidding. . . . The eyes are steely, but they laugh when he wants them to. . . . One moment he is nearly whispering, weary and modest. The next he is soaring to contradict his visitor. . . .

"The small, fine hands, moving sinuously as if direct from the shoulder, serve his rapidly varying tone and mood. Now they lie meekly on the bluegray trousers as he graciously compliments Mr. Whitlam on the Labor Party's 'struggle' to get back to power in Australia. Now they fly like an actor's in the air as he denounces Prime Minister Sato of Japan. Now the right hand is extended, its fingers spread-eagled in professional authority, as he instructs me to study well a recent editorial in the 'People's Daily.' . . .

"The conversation is a freewheeling give-and-take. The Australian style, blunt and informal, fits in well with Mr. Chou's. The evening has a lively, argumentative note rare in talks between politicians of different countries, rarer still when the countries represent different civilizations.

"When he disagreed—as on how widespread militarism is in Japan—the Prime Minister would interrupt in English: 'No, no, no!'"

**"Bitterly anti-American."** A vastly different experience was that of Anthony Eden, Britain's Foreign Secretary at the Geneva Conference in 1954. In his autobiography, "Full Circle," Mr. Eden wrote this about Chou:

"He was cold and bitterly anti-American, and my first interview with him at our villa was rigid and disagreeable. We sat grimly exchanging sharp acerbities. It was on this occasion that he brusquely rejected my proposal of a truce for the evacuation of wounded at Dien Bien Phu....

"He states his case with little acceptance of any other, and is very hard to shake. . . .

"Chou En-lai's intentions were [not] easy to fathom, and it took me some time to achieve any kind of personal contact."

**Chou's victories.** The Premier has had startling successes—and some failures—in his diplomatic moves over the years. The successes:

* Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in 1954, agreed to pull Russian military forces out of Port Arthur, Manchuria. He also agreed to transfer four jointly owned Sino-Soviet development corporations to Chinese ownership, and to give China scientific and technological help

to develop nuclear energy. Chou personally negotiated that victory.

* In 1955, at the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, Chou made his first big move toward talks with America when he announced that Peking would be willing to negotiate with the U. S. on the "question of relaxing tension in the Far East." It was this approach that led to 15 years of intermittent Chinese-American talks at the ambassadorial level that had few accomplishments other than the release of some Americans held in China.

* In 1958, Chou cooled the Formosa Strait crisis then brewing between the U. S. and China as the Communists threatened to seize the offshore islands. He announced that Peking would be willing to resume ambassadorial-level talks with the U. S.

**And setbacks.** China's most astute diplomat has also experienced failures. Examples:

* Chou and India's Jawaharlal Nehru agreed in 1954 that their countries would observe the "Five Principles" of peaceful coexistence. India and China were at war eight years later.

* In 1964, Chou tried to organize a Second Bandung Conference that would take not only an anti-American but an anti-Soviet slant. While laying the groundwork, he told an audience in Tanzania that Africa was "ripe for revolution." It was a phrase, carelessly used, that drew few welcoming cheers from politically insecure African leaders. The speech, by coincidence, was followed by a coup against Chou's admirer, President Ben Bella of Algeria. Chou's plans for a "Second Bandung" never got off the ground.

* Later that year, shortly after Nikita Khrushchev was thrown out of power, Chou went to Moscow, hoping to negotiate a settlement of Sino-Soviet differences with the Kremlin's new leaders, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin. The effort was a failure—and within weeks China began describing Soviet leaders as "new Khrushchevs."

**The Nixon approach.** It was against a background of knowing exactly how tough—and how expert in pushing demands—Mao and Chou can be that President Nixon said on February 10:

"This trip should not be one which would create very great optimism or very great pessimism. It is one in which we must recognize that 20 years of hostility and virtually no communication will not be swept away by one week of discussion."

Mr. Nixon indicated the talks would be long and probably arduous, adding this: "There will necessarily have to be a substantial amount of dialogue before

(continued on next page)

19

CHINA'S BARGAINERS

we can come to the point of negotiating on substantive matters."

An American who knew Chou En-lai well—Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn, U. S. Army (Ret.), World War II aide to Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell in China—gave this warning:

"China's Communist leaders operate like old-style shopkeepers who considered anyone a fool who agreed to the first price without bargaining. They operate strictly on the principle of *caveat emptor*—let the buyer, or negotiator, beware."

-Wide World Photo

Mao Tse-tung needs help from outside to build up China's industrial economy.

What Malraux Told the President:
MASSIVE U.S. AID
IS "THE REAL ISSUE"

André Malraux, a foremost French writer, played a special role in President Nixon's mission to Red China.

Mr. Malraux, 70, is a friend not only of the President's but of China's Mao Tse-tung, whom Mr. Malraux has known for more than three decades and whom he interviewed at length for his widely noted book, "Anti-Memoirs."

Mr. Nixon was so impressed by the Malraux analysis of the situation in China that he asked the writer to fly to Washington to brief him on February 14, three days before the President's departure for the mainland.

The following day, in a meeting with news-
men in the capital, Mr. Malraux put many of his
views about Chairman Mao on the record. On
this and the facing page are highlights of a
"U. S. News & World Report" transcript of that
question-and-answer session.

Q: Mr. Malraux, do you think the trip of President Nixon to Peking will help ease the tensions in the world?

Mr. Malraux: Do you believe that without his visit it would have been better? He is attempting something that is vitally important for world peace.

Now, as to whether he will come out winning or whether
he will not win—who am I to attempt to predict this? But the
fact is that his attempt is a noble one. It is a good attempt

in this particular historical phase of American history. I find
it courageous that a President of the United States, who
cannot be unaware of the fact that the Chinese will be using
his visit, is nonetheless able to see beyond this and to over-
look this, because this is one of the very finest things that
the United States has done among many of the things that
it has done.

Q: In which ways do you believe the Chinese "will be using" the President's visit to Peking?

Mr. Malraux: You have an extensive press in China. You have also the radio in China. Don't forget that they have the radio in every single village of China. And they will be presenting the arrival of the President as a victory for China. But that doesn't matter.

Q: You wrote your book ["Anti-Memoirs," published in 1968] after seeing Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung. Would you change your opinions today as far as their attitudes toward the rest of the world and the United States are concerned?

Mr. Malraux: Time passes. . . . Five years ago the hatred of the United States in China was total. At that time, the Chinese position was still what I would term a highly or very revolutionary position versus a capitalist position. That, of course, was before the "Cultural Revolution."

At this time, the Chinese
are no longer in the least
bit interested in revolution-
ary problems, and I will
explain what I mean. In

-USN&WR Photo

André Malraux

20

BURTON BERINSKY

MUSKIE VIEWING NIXON

SANDERSON—NORTHWEST JOURNAL

"Now what were you saying, Senator Muskie?"

## THE WAR

# Preparing a Political Fallback Position

Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them aid and comfort.

—U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 3

THE revived debate about the Viet Nam War grew intense and rather nasty last week. Administration acrimony was aimed at all the Democratic presidential contenders who have challenged President Nixon's eight-point peace plan, but especially at the Democratic front runner, Edmund Muskie. To Nixon's chagrin, Muskie had suggested a peace plan that went beyond his own; it would call for a fixed U.S. withdrawal date and urge the Saigon leaders to "move toward a political accommodation with all the elements of their society"—with the implicit threat of a U.S. aid cutoff if Saigon refused.

The most egregious bit of Administration rhetoric was in fact taped before Muskie spelled out his plan, though it appeared only last week. In a Today show interview, Presidential Aide H.R. ("Bob") Haldeman charged that Nixon's Democratic opponents favored installing a Communist regime in Saigon; critics of the President's Viet Nam proposals, said Haldeman, were "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States." That language came close to the constitutional definition of treason, and angry Democrats and editorial writers denounced Haldeman. Press Secretary Ron Ziegler told clamoring reporters that Haldeman had been speaking only for himself, which was probably technically true. Haldeman, who is in effect Nixon's chief of staff, is a hard-lining con-

servative and political naïf who is fiercely loyal to the President. "That was just Bob," said one White House aide. "He wasn't programmed."

Perhaps not, but he may as well have been. The Administration felt that it had found a plump target in Muskie's peace plan at a time when the President was still trying to get the North Vietnamese to accept his own proposal. The President's men lined up the guns and pulled the lanyards one by one. Republican National Chairman Bob Dole warned that Muskie's speech announcing his plan "may have greatly damaged the prospects for peace in Viet Nam." Herb Klein, the White House communications director, charged that some of the Democrats "seem to parrot Hanoi's line." Repeating a joke he had heard at a Washington Republican fund-raising dinner, Attorney General John Mitchell declared that Muskie was following a Northern strategy —North Viet Nam's, that is. Vice President Agnew said in a TV interview taped for this week: "There has been a definite undermining, even if unintentional, of our position."

Finally, the President himself entered the fray. In a radio speech to the nation presenting his annual State of the World report on foreign policy (see following story), Nixon struck the statesmanlike note, saying that he did not "question the patriotism or the sincerity" of his critics. But he urged them to be careful not to "give the enemy an incentive to prolong the war until after the election." Next day, at a press conference, he was tougher. Said Nixon: "The responsibility for the enemy's failing to negotiate may have to be borne by those who encourage the enemy to

wait until after the election." While the White House insists that the President genuinely worried about the chances for a negotiated peace, Nixon is plainly preparing a political fallback position. Since he pledged in 1968 to end the war, he now wants to be able to blame the Democrats—at least in part—if he does not.

**Weighed Words.** To be sure, a presidential candidate—especially a pre-convention front runner like Muskie—has an unusual responsibility not to say anything that could imperil the national interest. His words are weighed far more carefully abroad than those of just another Senator, especially if he proposes an alternative to existing policy. On the face of it, there is some merit in Nixon's contention that Hanoi may await the outcome of the 1972 election in hopes that Americans will pick a Democrat who will offer a better deal than Nixon. Says a White House aide: "If I were the enemy, I wouldn't accept the President's offer at least until after November."

But former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, a Muskie adviser, insists that Muskie did not advance his plan until the National Liberation Front "clobbered" Nixon's. Besides, however late Muskie came to his views on the war, they are now well known. Hanoi and the National Liberation Front have had three years to negotiate with Nixon; if they had had any real interest in a settlement, they could have acted long ago. Moreover, contrary to some of the attacks on Muskie, his carefully worded proposal stops far short of selling Saigon down the river.

Muskie responded to the Republican attacks by reciting a litany of

TIME, FEBRUARY 21, 1972

9

THE NATION

Nixon criticisms of U.S. conduct of the war in 1965 and 1966. "If I am guilty of consciously aiding and abetting the enemy," he said in New Hampshire, "then President Nixon must have been too." Nixon, however, was careful to cite his own record on the war before he took office. He forbore to attack Lyndon Johnson on Viet Nam in 1968, he said, because he feared that he might jeopardize the fledgling negotiations in Paris. In that campaign, Nixon regularly said only that he had a plan to end the war; he never explained what that plan was.

**Front Burner.** Who gains politically from the battle? The White House is certain that Muskie has hurt himself. Democrats and independents see it differently. The Republican attacks, said Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, "put this issue back on the front burner. What they do also is to build up Muskie." By focusing on Muskie, the Republicans give the Democratic front runner greater prominence; the Administration seems to be treating him as if he were already the nominee. Further, by making Muskie out to be the leading dove, the Republicans have strengthened his position with antiwar voters who might otherwise prefer George McGovern or John Lindsay.

Whatever the domestic political consequences of the confrontation between Nixon and Muskie, there was no cheer last week for anyone who holds out hope for the Paris negotiations. Xuan Thuy, North Viet Nam's delegate to the talks, appeared on a split *Face the Nation* show with Secretary of State William Rogers to denounce Nixon for revealing the secret meetings with Kissinger. Nixon's act, said Thuy, is a "serious obstacle" to an agreement. Thuy's U.S. counterpart, William Porter, canceled this week's Paris session in protest against a three-day anti-American international convocation, called principally by a group of French leftist organizations, at nearby Ver sailles. Some observers at recent meetings had got the impression that some slight accommodation might be possible, but last week's negotiating session was unusually bitter.

The U.S. had problems with the South as well as the North. The Nixon plan included President Thieu's resignation one month before new elections would be held. Last week Rogers suggested that the U.S. was "quite flexible" on the question of just how far in advance that resignation should take place. This upset Thieu, who had earlier given his full support to Nixon's eight points. An angry Thieu called Rogers' statement "a violation of Vietnamese sovereignty" and asked Washington for clarification. Washington insisted that U.S.-South Viet Nam relations were "excellent." The explanation for Thieu's pique doubtless is that he is just as concerned about his domestic political situation as Nixon is about his.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Nixinger Report

One of man's nobler qualities is his irrepressible drive to apply reason and a sense of order to a world that is stubbornly irrational and untidy. Few official documents illustrate that passion more forcefully than President Nixon's annual State of the World reports. His third, prepared under the rigorous supervision of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and released last week, optimistically organizes U.S. foreign policy into manageable problems and fits each specific American move into a grand strategy for achieving "a generation of peace." In 236 pages of clear prose, remarkably free of diplomatic delicacy, the Nixon-Kissinger paper offers a unique guide to how the White House approaches problems as lofty as halting the strategic arms race or as lowly as stopping quarrels over fishing rights.

Much of the report retraces the familiar terrain of the spectacular Nixon initiatives in "the watershed year" of 1971: his historic overture to China, his abrupt shake-up of world monetary and trade policies, his personal summitry with U.S. allies, and the invitation for him to visit Moscow. The personal

settlement in Viet Nam was the Administration's most serious failure, but blames this on Hanoi.

Unfortunately, the report immodestly begins each major section with a Nixon quotation, and arrogantly dismisses the foreign policy of previous Administrations. Before Nixon came along, the U.S. was either "drawn into situations, responding tactically, without a clear perception of where we would end up," or failed to take bold steps of its own because "we had no positive conception of where we wanted to go." But under Nixon, "the United States is once again acting with assurance and purpose on the world stage."

The report also suffers from a lecturer's tone, revealing some obvious truths as intellectual insights. For example, after "meticulous preparations" in seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic weapons, the Administration concluded that "the strategic balance would be endangered if we limited defensive forces alone and left the offensive threat unconstrained."

The global report deals most notably and forcefully with these specific topics:

**SOVIET UNION.** For a President who will soon visit Moscow, Nixon is sur-

CONKLIN

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HENRY KISSINGER IN WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

*A President and a professor ordering an untidy world.*

pride with which Nixon views these moves shows through, as does the bellicerence with which he defends his also familiar—and still embattled—policy on Viet Nam.

While bristling with self-confidence, the report is not offensively self-righteous. It forthrightly ticks off some U.S. failures: to prevent the India-Pakistan war, stimulate fruitful negotiations between Egypt and Israel, keep Taiwan in the United Nations, find a better way to help nations of Latin America develop economically. It concedes that not achieving a negotiated

prisingly blunt in criticizing Russia. The report accuses the U.S.S.R. of using the Arab-Israeli conflict "to perpetuate and expand its own military position in Egypt," of allowing hostilities between India and Pakistan "to boil up toward crisis in the hope of political gain," and of rapidly building up its military forces "beyond a level which by any reasonable standard already seems sufficient." Yet the report cites enough contradictory instances of Soviet accommodation (including progress at SALT, agreement on access to Berlin, treaties banning biological

10

TIME, FEBRUARY 21, 1972

Weapons) to convince Nixon that "a summit would not be an empty and self-deluding exercise in atmospherics." It is up to Moscow to determine whether a period of *détente* is to be used as "another offensive tactic" or a chance to stabilize relations between the two powers.

**SALT.** The report worries about the Soviet arms buildup, claims that an apparent pause in Soviet ICBM silo construction only served to permit "a totally new missile system" to be deployed. Now nearly 100 new ICBM silos are under construction in the U.S.S.R., multiple warheads have been tested, submarine-launched missiles are being improved, and there are more ballistic missile submarines being built than the U.S. now has. Erection of anti-missile defenses around Moscow has been resumed. Moreover, says the report, the Soviet Union has "the technical capability" to develop a missile system that on a first strike could knock out the U.S. ability to retaliation effectively. While wondering whether Moscow might not be stalling in the SALT talks until it develops a superior strategic force, the report nevertheless holds out substantial hope for agreement. Nixon sees this developing in steps: first a long-term treaty limiting defensive systems, next "an interim agreement" that would freeze levels on "certain offensive weapons" and, finally, a second phase of negotiations to work out a more permanent limitation of most offensive weapons.

**INDIA.** The Administration offers no apology at all for its controversial "tilt" toward Pakistan, contending that it has undisclosed but "convincing evidence" that India wanted to do more than carve out Bangladesh in the East: New Delhi intended to destroy Pakistan military forces in the West as well. Since India was the aggressor, the report claims, the U.S. could either "take a stand against the war and try to stop it, or we could maintain a 'neutral' position and acquiesce in it." Typically, Nixon posed extreme alternatives (akin to the choice between "settlement and surrender" in Viet Nam) when more complex options were open. A firm denunciation of Pakistan's slaughter of Bengalis, for example, might have put the U.S. in a stronger position to denounce India's resort to force—and could hardly have been less effective. The report nonetheless offers to open "a serious dialogue" with India, and hints that the future of U.S.-Indian relations depends heavily on how much independence from the Soviet Union India retains.

**JAPAN.** Neither does Nixon's report apologize for the shocks the Administration gave Japan by approaching Peking and moving unilaterally on trade. These shocks, says the paper, "only accelerated an evolution in U.S.-Japanese relations that was overdue, unavoidable, and in the long run, desirable." Nixon tells Japan that both

Tokyo and Washington can deal with Peking without hurting each other. There is soothing flattery for the Japanese: the report praises their "remarkable display of disciplined energy" and their emergence "firmly in the front rank of international powers."

More broadly, the Nixon-Kissinger view of an orderly world calls for the major powers to deal realistically with one another's national interests and to downgrade ideological differences so long as they do not endanger world peace. Nixon says, for example, that the U.S. will deal with Communist countries "on the basis of their foreign and not their domestic policy." Similarly, on the disputes between China and Russia, the report dismisses their arguments over Communist philosophy as "a subject in which we have no competence and little interest."

If that all sounds refreshingly realistic, there is also a certain amount of wishfulness in the notion that nations can neatly separate their foreign interests from their internal political concerns. The difficulty is demonstrated by Nixon's pledge to help friendly Asian nations combat "subversion and guerrilla warfare" with U.S. funds, even though such movements may be highly ideological and may not always threaten U.S. security. The Nixon report also criticizes racial injustice in South Africa somewhat more vigorously than the Administration has attacked racial inequality in the U.S., raising subtle questions of which problems transcend boundaries and which are really internal.

Certainly, Nixon and Kissinger make sense in trying to deal with the emerging multipolar world in a way that more closely equates the nation's commitments with its limited ability to influence events everywhere. They are constructive, too, when they argue that "the heart of our new conception is a more balanced alliance with our friends —and a more creative connection with our adversaries." If the President and the professor seem uncommonly impressed by their own fallible formulations, perhaps even that is understandable in a presidential election year.

## POLITICAL BRIEFS

### Mills Comes Out

Of the proliferating group of Democrats who would like to win their party's presidential nomination, conservative Congressman Wilbur Mills of Arkansas has probably been the most coy. While keen for a crack at the nomination, he has consistently feigned indifference. Last week for the first time Mills came right out and admitted that he is indeed a candidate. In letters to Wisconsin and Nebraska election officials, Mills said that he could not "in good conscience" ask that his name be

left off primary ballots in those states. He added, however, that he does not plan to campaign.

Mills, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, has also refused to go on the stump in the New Hampshire campaign, although he does not deny that his supporters there are trying to get him at least 5% of the total vote in the state's March 7 pri-

CONKLIN

CANDIDATE WILBUR MILLS

Feigned indifference.

mary, and will spend $200,000 doing it. Mills calmly calls the whole thing "a draft movement." His obvious strategy is to stay in the nomination race without getting into open electioneering. Then, if all goes well enough, he could make more trouble in later primaries while reminding Democrats that he is indeed available, even for the vice presidency.

### Taft v. Rhodes in Ohio

None of the principals involved will talk about it and the White House has taken a quietly apprehensive hands-off stand, but a deepening intra-party Republican squabble in Ohio could jeopardize Nixon's re-election chances in November. The trouble is the result of the bitter 1970 primary fight between Ohio Senator Robert Taft Jr. and Former Governor James Rhodes, and a series of G.O.P. financial scandals, all of which has left the party in a shambles. Now Taft is maneuvering to wrest power from the Rhodes-influenced Republican state central committee. He plans to run for the 46-member committee in hopes that growing dissatisfaction with Rhodes' leadership and Taft's own improved power position will enable him to break Rhodes' grip on the party. Since Ohio and its 25 electoral votes are a major election prize, Nixon's men are hoping that the fratricidal fight will be over and the wounds healed by November.

TIME, FEBRUARY 21, 1972

11

WRITER JAMES PHELAN

IRVING & RESEARCHER RICHARD SUSKIND SHOPPING IN MANHATTAN DELI

CRIME /COVER STORY

# The Fabulous Hoax of Clifford Irving

THE tale came wrapped extraordinarily—boxes within boxes, each festooned with its own diminished fantasies, each gaudily papered in ever thinner tissues of lies. The serial revellations in the Howard Hughes-Clifford Irving affair became an extraordinary popular entertainment, a top of the TV news, a front-page divertissement that evoked the distractions of an earlier, less desperate age. Like the Americans who once crowded the docks waiting for the latest chapter of Dickens to arrive by boat, devotees anticipated the next surprises.

As Irving's outrageous story collapsed in on itself, one principal element in the puzzle loomed ever larger and more baffling: Where had the material he spun into his *summa* of non-books come from. All the supposed Hughes letters, now clearly revealed as forgeries, and all the affidavits of supposed meetings with Hughes had helped Irving create an atmosphere of verisimilitude. But the essence of its apparent validity—and the key to the big con job—had been the words in the manuscript itself. Several experienced editors and publishers at McGraw-Hill and *LIFE* magazine had read Irving's work and found it convincing in its tone and above all its remarkable wealth of detail about Hughes' complex life. It seemed beyond mere inventive compilation, even given all that has been printed over the years about Hughes. It had an undeniable smack of authenticity.

That authenticity now seems explained. Irving's hoax worked because the base on which he built was largely genuine. In subject matter, Irving's book is identical at many points with

the manuscript of a Long Beach, Calif., writer named James Phelan, who had been hired to ghost-write the story of the man who knows more than anyone else in the world about the life and times of Howard Hughes. He is Noah Dietrich, 83, who for 32 years was Hughes' chief of staff, hatchet man, fixer and right arm. The conclusion emerging from a study of both manuscripts is that much of Irving's book was lifted from Phelan's writings. Irving could have come into possession of the Phelan version, along with 150 pages of the transcript of tape-recorded interviews with Dietrich, some time in the last year. Then, with the help of a researcher, his own imagination, and information supplied by current or former Hughes associates, Irving concocted *The Autobiography of Howard Hughes*.

**No Prune.** Through his lawyer, Irving late last week admitted in the U.S. Attorney's office in New York City that his baroquely detailed scenario was a fraud. Irving's lawyer, Maurice R. Nessen, had hurried to the Federal Courthouse for the conference after Richard Suskind, a writer and researcher who had worked with Irving on the manuscript, refused to back Irving's story. In exchange for immunity from prosecution, Suskind said he was willing to testify that contrary to his earlier affidavit, he had never seen Hughes; Hughes had never offered him that organic prune he had once mentioned to lend a touch of credence to the tale.

Irving and Nessen tried to hammer out their own deal with the U.S. Attorney. They promised to cooperate provided the prosecutors could per-

suade the Swiss government to soften passport-forgery and bank-fraud charges against Irving's wife Edith. No one was quite certain whether Irving was acting out of chivalry or more self-serving motives. It was possible, some investigators said, that Irving hoped to ease Edith's legal burdens before she broke down and told her own side of the story, partly in anger over her husband's now famous affair with Danish Singer Nina van Pallandt.

Two members of the U.S. Attorney's office, Robert Morvillo and John Tigue Jr., consented to talk to Swiss authorities about leniency. But first Morvillo wanted to know one thing: did Irving intend to persist in his story that he had met with Hughes? Nessen stepped out into the hall to talk to Irving. When he returned, he said: "You won't have to call Hughes. There were no meetings with Hughes." "All right," said Morvillo, "but Irving should know that we'll break his balls before the grand jury if he says he met with Hughes."

**Swiss Sanctum.** Irving was willing to accept a prison term for fraud and perjury, and give his account of the entire scheme. The prosecutors were amenable to that, since if Irving took the Fifth Amendment, it might be difficult to track down the other conspirators. Morvillo and Tigue immediately flew to Zurich, where they tried to induce the Swiss to reduce their charges against Edith. They received a cool reception. For weeks Zurich Prosecutor Peter Veleff had been horrified by the publicity surrounding the case and by the lack of cooperation from U.S. legal authorities. The spectacle of Clifford and Edith blithely ap-

12

DAVID LOGGIE; JOHN RODATON—CAMERA S

How to make use of your TV console
after you buy a Sony.

© Sony Corp. of America, Visit our Showroom, 714 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. TV picture simulated.

You bought a
color console.

And you loved
having a color TV.

In fact, you loved it
so much, you bought
a second set.

A Sony Trinitron.

And you loved it
even more.

Its picture is so
bright and sharp and
true-to-life, you may
not be watching the
console the way you
used to.

So what should
you do?

You should use
the console.

No matter how
sharp and bright your
Sony picture is.

No matter if you
bought a 9, 12 or
17 inch diagonal
Sony Trinitron.

Use the console.

After all, when
you're not watching
it, it's a beautiful piece
of furniture.

Keep your Sony
on it.

**Trinitron**
SONY COLOR TV

A BURST OF ACTION
BEFORE CHINA TRIP

RICHARD NIXON WAS clearing his desk—piled high with unfinished business—in advance of his unprecedented mission to Red China on February 17.

The result was a flurry of midwinter action in Washington, unmatched since August of last year, when the President switched the U. S. economy to wage-price controls.

An 86,000-word document—the Administration's third annual report on foreign affairs—set forth the hopes, expectations and possible pitfalls in Mr. Nixon's new approach to China, Russia and the rest of the world. In it, he set a firm line toward countries that have been needling the United States. And he told friendly nations the day had passed when they could look for the U. S. to bail them out of trouble.

That message was coupled with a warning to Americans that they must buckle down or lose out in an advancing and highly competitive world.

Then, as a step toward balancing the economic scales, the Government asked Congress to boost the official price of gold from $35 an ounce to $38—the first change since the early days of the “New Deal.”

Signed into law was a complex and, in some ways, bewildering attempt to bring order and reason to the soaring costs of political campaigns—the first such attempt since 1925.

A new and tougher drive to combat pollution and clean up the environment came into being through a White House directive and a request to Congress for legislation.

Foreign aid, almost killed without a whimper last year, had fresh life breathed into it with legislation calling for a 2.75-billion-dollar program. The White House said it was too little to be an effective tool of foreign policy, but conceded privately it was better than nothing. Even the new legislation bore the marks of an era that is ending.

Congress went home to celebrate Abraham Lincoln's birthday only after passing legislation to deal, if necessary, with a nagging strike of West Coast dock workers—a strike the Administration contended was bleeding the slowly improving economy of billions of dollars in trade.

Other unfinished business remained.

Welfare reform was moving at a snail's pace.

More people were working than ever before, but, because of the growth in the labor force, no way had been found to make a noticeable dent in the numbers out of work.

Vietnam remained a trouble spot, as suspense over a new

Communist attack built up. Even though the draft was all but ended, 178,000 Americans remained in uniform in Southeast Asia. Another 300,000 were on duty in Europe—with no cut likely any time soon, the President said.

Looking ahead, a new form of national sales tax, called a value-added tax, was being studied, although Mr. Nixon made it clear at a February 10 press conference there would be no federal tax changes this year.

Over everything spread the heat of a presidential campaign in an election year not yet two months old.

Even before the first presidential primary, the White House and irate Democrats were at each other's throats over criticism of Mr. Nixon's new peace proposal for Vietnam.

-USN&WR Photo

President in his office.
Topping a busy calendar: the trip to Peking.

Men in positions that have been exempted from the hurly-burly of campaigning in recent years—such as Secretary of State William Rogers—were drawn into the fray.

It was clear from what was going on that politics would tinge almost everything short of a world disaster between now and November's election day.

The President, though, took an above-the-battle stance. His view was that the best politics for him at the moment was to be publicly nonpolitical. His energies seemed focused increasingly on preparations for a trip halfway around the world in which he would try, after a quarter of a century of freeze, to break the ice with Communist China.

Related stories: Nixon in China, page 16; Vietnam outlook, 21; antipollution drive, 36; labor and politics, 22 and 89; controlling campaign costs, 42; new U. S. role in world, 76; President's news conference, 82.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1972 o

15

Chill or Cheers in Peking—

# CLUES TO WATCH FOR IN NIXON MISSION

President's departure for mainland China is start of a sincere good-will mission so far as White House is concerned. Do Chinese see it the same way? In a country where welcome signs can be turned off and on by signal, it won't take long for Americans to find out.

—Wide World Photo

ALMOST FROM THE MINUTE President Nixon touches down in China, millions of Americans—watching by satellite-relayed television—will be able to see for themselves whether the American Chief Executive has been successful in persuading Peking's Communist rulers to warm up to the U. S.

In Communist-run China, official welcomes are carefully orchestrated, with warmth turned off or on from above. For example, the President of Pakistan, an ally of China's recently humiliated by India, was accorded a cool, rather formal reception when he arrived in Peking on January 31 for a two-day visit. This was in contrast to the enthusiastic crowd of 300,000 that welcomed Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie last October after he extended diplomatic recognition to Peking.

**Welcome mat spread.** A lively greeting for Mr. Nixon would bring thousands of youths in folk costumes to dance against a background of drums and cymbals. The tree-lined highway leading to the official guest residences at Jade Abyss Pool Park, on the western outskirts of the capital, would be jammed

with spectators carefully supervised by block wardens, union heads and school officials.

Mr. Nixon announced at a news conference in Washington on February 10 he will fly to Hawaii on February 17, spend two nights there and then go on to Guam. After an overnight stay on the island, he will fly to China, arriving in Peking on Monday, February 21. The President plans to stay a week in Peking, Shanghai and Hangchow.

All the signs so far point to a genuine effort by the Chinese to make Mr. Nixon feel welcome. The annual orgy of spring "housecleaning" prior to the lunar calendar New Year celebration on February 15 rose to new heights this year. The political slogans that formerly dominated Peking's streets were being painted out, and store fronts repainted. Street signs are now in Roman letters as well as Chinese ideographs. The capital's red and white buses are being refurbished.

**Maoism played down.** In both Peking and Shanghai, giant portraits and statues of Mao and billboards depicting revolutionary themes are disappearing. In Shanghai, dozens of palm trees have

replaced Mao's portrait in the park near the city's world-famed Bund on the Whampoo River. Chinese officials say these changes are in fulfillment of Mao's order to diminish scope of the "personality cult" that has sprung up, and are not connected with the Nixon visit.

So far there have been no signs that "anti-imperialist" skits and movies will be closed during the Nixon visit. In Shanghai's acrobatic theater center, Chinese "liberation fighters" still bayonet or fire their rifles at an effigy of Uncle Sam to the cry of "Kill, kill, kill."

Americans looking forward to unrehearsed glimpses of an exotic China may be disappointed. Peking no longer has the medieval beauty that once entranced Westerners. It is now a metropolis of wide boulevards and imposing new buildings—many of them barrack-like structures modeled after the tasteless Stalin-type buildings in Moscow. And unless snow has freshly fallen, Peking in wintertime is drab and gray.

Coming as a surprise to most Americans will be their first look at vehicular traffic in a city of 7 million people. Automobiles are few, and the maximum speed

One way Peking shows warmth: dancing in the streets. White House aides will be watching for key signal.

—Rapho Guillumette Photo

16

permitted is 30 miles an hour on the wider streets. Buses are many and bicycles at times seem to number in the millions. Traffic is controlled by countless police-men perched on platforms in the middle of the road.

**Glimpses of the past.** The President at his news conference said he would do some sightseeing in China but "first priority must be given to our talks." What his hosts probably will show him:

**The Forbidden City.** The walled, Imperial sector built by Emperor Yung Lo in the fifteenth century, is a magnificent collection of yellow-roofed audience halls and pavilions with glittering, upswept roofs and intricately painted ceilings, gardens, marble courtyards and palatial residential quarters. The entire area was closed from 1966 to 1971 to forestall looting or destruction by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

The President may also visit the simple but magnificent three-tiered marble Altar of Heaven where once a year China's Emperors sought blessings.

**The Great Wall.** One of the true wonders of the world, the wall's beginnings trace back 2,500 years when the Chinese first began to feel military pressure by the barbarian invaders from the North. Two hundred years before the birth of Christ, the wall extended 1,500 miles from the Gulf of Chihli in the East to Kansu Province in the far Northwest. Reconstruction and extensions during the sixteenth century saw the wall reach its final grandeur of 2,484 miles.

Favorite viewing spot is at Nan Kou pass, 35 miles north of Peking. There the Wall, 21 feet thick at the base and rising to 26 feet in height, is kept in good repair and provides a spectacular view of the valleys and mountains stretching toward the borders of Outer Mongolia and Russia.

**The Ming Tombs.** Thirteen of the 16 Ming Emperors who ruled from 1368 to 1644 are buried here with their Empresses and second wives. The "sacred way," stretching 4 miles from the marble portico to the tomb of Emperor Yung Lo, is lined part of the distance by 24 stone animals-lions, camels, elephants and mythical beasts-and stone statues of military and civilian mandarins, all dating to the fifteenth century.

China's Communists, uninhibited by traditional reverence for their ancestors, opened the sixteenth-century tomb of a Ming Emperor 15 years ago and found it filled with a fabulous collection of gold, jade and porcelain objects.

President Nixon will see "the other side" of China when he stops off in Shanghai, and there he will sense for the first time the vast gulf that long existed, and is present to some extent even

*(continued on next page)*

**Forbidden City.** Paved courtyard provides approach to Gate of Supreme Harmony, on far left. Last Emperor to live here was Hsuan T'ung, evicted by a warlord in 1924.

**Ming Tombs.** In Imperial China, everyone, including Emperors, walked along the "sacred way" lined with stone animals and mandarins. Vehicles now use the road.

**Great Wall.** Communists keep section near Peking repaired but rest is disintegrating. President Nixon, if he visits Wall, will be able to walk along stone battlements.

—Burri-Magnum Photos

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1972

NIXON MISSION

today, between China and the West. He will see a city that most Westerners loved and most Chinese detested as a symbol of colonialism.

It is no longer the city of bright lights, smart shops, high-rise department stores and rushing traffic that it was when foreigners were in control. The Communists wiped that out. But relics of the past remain—the 15 skyscrapers built of stone and cement that once were the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, the Jardine Matheson offices, the world-famed Palace Hotel, for example. These the Chinese use for their own purposes, but they have done relatively little new building, and the former foreign-concession areas are seedy and rundown.

The Communists have concentrated their efforts on the suburbs and rural areas where foreigners never ruled. It is there Mr. Nixon will find Chinese life brighter and livelier. Streets have been broadened, trees planted, apartment houses and shopping centers erected.

### Urban sprawl, too.
Result of all this is that the Shanghai municipality has grown into an urban sprawl over 3,500 square miles and containing an estimated 10 million people. Factories belching smoke are seen in every direction, and the smog will remind the U. S. President of many American cities. For Shanghai is not only one of China's chief ports, it is also the country's most highly industrialized city. It turns out nearly 2 million tons of steel a year, and has shipbuilding, machine-building, electronic and textile plants.

The President's visit to China will end in Hangchow—a city of 720,000 people nestled among terraced hills. Its tree-lined streets are quiet, and only a few cars, trucks and buses are seen. Factories have sprouted in the wooded suburbs, but Hangchow is still considered China's most beautiful holiday center. Two great Buddhist shrines—one of them the 1,700-year old Ling Yin Temple with its gilded Buddha—have been reopened as historical relics operated by the state. Mao Tse-tung often spends some of the winter here to escape the

Hangchow is no longer the place, described by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century, "where so many pleasures may be found that one fancies himself to be in paradise." But still there is the solitary hill in the center of West Lake where Emperors formerly meditated on state affairs. It may be just the spot for the U. S. President to examine the diplomatic and political fruits of his venture into China.

The First Lady. Doing her homework for a very special journey.

FOR MRS. NIXON:
A STRANGE
NEW WORLD

Mrs. Richard M. Nixon is likely to see a great deal more of China—old and new—than the President.

No agenda has been made public. But experiences of other American women who have visited China indicate that what her hosts hope to show Mrs. Nixon while the President is engaged in formal discussions with Peking's leaders is this—

**A hospital** and a view of surgery, with acupuncture as the only anesthetic used on the patient.

**A commune** and talks with men and women who work side by side in the fields or in collectively owned industry. She may also watch a "bare-foot doctor"—a medical worker with limited training who takes care of simple ailments.

**A "May 7th cadre school"** where Government officials, teachers and heads of commercial and financial organizations are given "ideological remolding" over periods lasting from six months to three years. Or Mrs. Nixon may visit a school in which children of workers and peasants are given preference in enrollment and study concentrates on Maoist-style politics and military training.

**A museum**, a spectacular exhibit of clay, porcelain, jade, bronze and gold objects—many of them up to 2,000 years old—uncovered through archeological excavations since the Communist take-over of the mainland in 1949.

**A department store**, jammed with Chinese shoppers but selling mostly

utilitarian items, no luxuries. Mrs. Nixon may also visit a Government-owned curio shop where only foreigners are permitted to buy old ivory or paintings—nothing enormously valuable or very old, but unobtainable elsewhere in China.

It is not yet known who will be Mrs. Nixon's unofficial hostess but widely mentioned are these three:

1. Soong Ching-ling, 82. The widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, known worldwide as "father of the Chinese Revolution," and sister of Soong Mei-ling, wife of Chinese Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek. Mme. Sun has never been a member of the Communist Party, but she has tremendous prestige in China and is a Vice Chairman of the National People's Congress.

2. Teng Ying-chao, 69. A member of the Chinese Communist Party since 1925, the year she married Premier Chou En-lai, Mme. Chou was elected to the Central Committee in 1969 but has made few public appearances recently, possibly because of illness.

3. Chiang Ching, 57. A Shanghai-born former actress and the third wife of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. She joined the party in 1940 and was elected to the Central Committee nine years later. She played a powerful role in organizing the youthful Red Guards during Mao's Cultural Revolution, but has since that time been seen only occasionally in public.

U. S. experts say odds favor Mme. Sun's selection to be Mrs. Nixon's hostess. Mme. Sun was educated at Wesleyan College for Women, Macon, Ga., and is fluent in English.

18

O U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 21, 1972

HEADLINES OVER COVERAGE
OF STATE OF THE WORLD

February 15, 1972

Following are the headlines over stories on the State of the World.
They were often accompanied by photos of RN before the mikes. Banners
were frequent and many papers had 2 or more stories on the report. A
good number of papers also carried excerpts from the document.

RN's warning to his critics and/or defense of their patriotism turns
up more than any other headline. Breakthrus, nearer to peace, progress
etc. was seen almost as often. Appearing about half as much was the
expectation of an arms pact. PRC talks and Soviet arms buildup were
next in line in terms of headline coverage.

"Nixon Warns Candidates Not to Cause War Heat-Up" Banner, *Atlanta Journal*

"Nixon Suggests Critics Guard Viet Language" -- pg. 9, *Manchester Union*
*Leader*

"World is Nearer to Peace, President Tells Congress/'71 Breakthroughs
Lauded by Nixon" -- Banner, *Miami Herald*

"Arms Pact is Near, Nixon Hints" -- p. 1, *Herald*

"Missile Pact is Near -- Nixon" -- pg. 1, *Atlanta Constitution*

"Don't Doubt Critics' Patriotism -- Nixon" -- p. 2, *Constitution*

"Nixon Challenges Soviets to Join Search for Peace" -- Banner, *Det. Free Pres*

"China Talks Might Avert a Catastrophe, Says Nixon" p. 12, *Det. Free Press*

"Nixon's State of World: A Year of Breakthrus" -- Banner, *Chic. Tribune*

"Soviets May Have 2 New ICBM Systems: Nixon" -- p. 1 *Chic. Tribune*

2

"Pres. Cautions Critics of VN on Giving Aid to Enemy" -- p. 2 Chic. Trib.

***

"Nixon Challenges Soviet to Cooperate With US in Easing World
Tension" -- Banner, Phila. Inquirer

***

"Nixon Warns of Soviet Arms Buildup" -- Banner, NY Daily News

"Nixon to Critics: Don't Peril Peace" -- p. 2, NY News

***

"Nixon Says Big Two Near Accord on Arms" -- Banner, Richmond Times
Dispatch

"Nixon Advises Democrats Not to Encourage Hanoi" -- pg. 1, Times-Dispatch

***

"Nixon, Foes Continue Hot Debate on Dissent" -- pg. 1, Richmond News
Leader

"Nixon: Reds in Arms Build-up" -- pg. 1, News-Leader

***

"Nixon Urges Dem Rivals to Weigh War Criticism/ 'Don't Give Foe
Reason to Contine'" -- banner, Denver Post

***

"Pres. Cites Progress in Foreign Affairs, Also Admits Disappointments" --
banner, Birmingham News

***

"1971 'Breakthrough' Year: Nixon" -- p. 5, Newsday

"President Softening a Blow at War Critics" - p. 5, Newsday

***

"China Trip 'giant Step Toward Peace' says Nixon" -- Houston Post - p. 1

***

"Nixon Reports Strides on Road to Peace" -- p. 1, Memphis Commerical
Appeal

3

"President Predicts Breakthrough Year" -- p. 10, <u>Commercial Appeal</u>

"Nixon's Report Fits Campaign" -- p. 11, <u>Commercial Appeal</u>

***

"Nixon Defends Peace-Plan Critics" -- p. 1 <u>Minneapolis Tribune</u>

***

"Nixon Sees Summit Trips Ways to Peace" -- banner, <u>Portland (Me)</u>
<u>Herald Press</u>

"N-Arms Accord Near, President Reports" -- p. 1, <u>Portland (Me)</u>
<u>Herald Press</u>

***

"China Soviet Ties Called Improved/Nixon, in report to Congress, cites Foreign Policy 'breakthrough' in '71" -- banner, <u>Louisville Courier Journal</u>

"Initial U.S. -Soviet Arms Curb Pact Near, Nixon Indicates" -- p. 2
<u>Courier Journal</u>

"Nixon Hints US May Use Force to Free POWs" -- p. 2 <u>Courier Journal</u>

"Better US -- India Relations Possible" -- p. 2, <u>Courier Journal</u>

"Nixon Advises War Critics not to give Enemy an Incentive to Prolong the War" -- p. 2, <u>Courier Journal</u>

"Nixon Calls China Policy his Major 'Breakthrough'" -- p. 2, <u>Courier Journal</u>

***

"Nixon Sees Promise of World Peace" -- banner, <u>Boston Globe</u>

***

"Nixon Sees Nuclear Arms Curb" -- banner, <u>Indianapolis Star</u>

"Peace Nearer, Nixon Says in State of World Speech" -- p. 21, <u>Indianapolis Star</u>

***

4

"Nixon Claims Peace Breakthroughs, Half-Dozen 'Sharp Disappointments'" -- p. 1 *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*

***

"President Steps Into Fray", p. 1, *Dallas Morning News*

"Nixon's 'State of World' Notes 4 Diplomatic Gains" -- banner, *Orlando Sentinel*

"Nixon Tries to Dampen Loyalty Rift" -- p. 11, *Orlando Sentinel*

***

"Nixon Says Soviet and US, Defined Pact on Missiles" -- lead, *NY Times*

"President Urges Taipei and Peking to Negotiate" -- p. 1, *NY Times*

"Nixon Bids Rivals Not Block Peace" -- p. 1, *NY Times*

"President Appears to Hint at Raids" to Free POWs -- p. 21, *NY Times*

"Nixon Edging Nearer to Tie with Bangladesh" -- p. 20, *NY Times*

***

"Nixon Report on Foreign Policy Stresses Restraint by Foes, Self-Reliance by Allies" -- p. 4, *W. S. Journal*

***

"Nixon Hopeful on World" -- lead, *Balt. Sun*

"Nixon Feels US, Soviet near Consensus on Arms" -- p. 1, *Balt. Sun*

"Nixon Kissinger tell War Critics They do Not Question Their Patriotism" -- p. 1, *Balt. Sun*

"Nixon's World: Why he Focuses on Moscow" -- banner, *C. S. Monitor*

"Nixon Tries to Remove Haldeman's Arrows" -- p. 6, *CS Monitor*

***

5

"Nixon Sees Gains In Foreign Affairs" -- lead, <u>Wash. Post</u>

"Democrats Reject Nixon Bid to Soften War Criticism" -- p. 1, <u>Wash. Post</u>

"Nixon Says Weapons Pact Near" -- p. 12, <u>Wash. Post</u>

"Nixon Tells Goals for His 2 Summits" -- lead, <u>LA Times</u>

"Nixon Says He Doesn't Question Patriotism of Viet Policy Critics" -- p. 1
<u>LA Times</u>

"Nixon Warns Russians Against Arms Buildup" banner, <u>Phila Eve. Bulletin</u>

"Nixon Reports on State of World" -- banner, <u>Wash. Star</u>

"Pakistan Tilt Is Explained" -- p. 1, <u>Star</u>

"Nixon Hopes for Arms Pact, Won't Yield Lead to Russia" -- p. 5, <u>Star</u>

"President to Rivals" Limit War Criticism" -- lead, <u>Jacksonville Journal</u>

"Nixon Claims Progress Toward Goal of Peace" -- banner, <u>Columbus Dispatch</u>

"Nixon Warns Rivals on 'Incentive' in War" -- banner, <u>Kansas City Star</u>

"Focus on China" -- p. 1, <u>K. C. Star</u>

"Nixon Calls on Rivals Not to Encourage Reds" -- banner, <u>Youngstown Vindicator</u>

###

Foreign Press Comment on President's
State of the World Report
February 13, 1972

Louis Heren of the *London Times* wrote that judging from the direction and tone of RN's report, "1972 might well be remembered as the year when the U.S. regained its self-confidence as a great power in the world arena."

***

The London *Daily Telegraph* asserted that RN "fully recognizes America's international obligations. He is also obviously alert to various dangers which he might perhaps have overlooked in the search for a detente with Russia and China. ... Reassuring as RN's words may be, W. Europe should not become complacent. Presidents less resolute and cautious, less loyal and trustworthy than he are, alas, quite possible. ... We should never rest easy till we can look after ourselves."

***

Frankfurter Allgemeine declared: "The message is addressed to RN's own family, to which the allies also belong. They will find in it another formulation of the concept of changed relations among allies, a concept, prepared by Kissinger during his Harvard days, which has been hammered out during RN's Admin. with mounting consistency and clarity. ... Together with new rights, the allies are supposed to accept new duties. ... This is frequently interpreted as indicating U.S. withdrawal. The message again makes clear that this is not so." (Frankfurter Allgemeine)

***

"There is no doubt that RN expects considerable dividends in prestige from the publicity operation which his historic visit to China constitutes. It is even clearer that it is from Moscow that he intends to bring back 'successes' that will make him undefeatable for reelection. ... All other problems in the message may therefore mistakenly appear to be secondary. To be remembered from the section devoted to Europe is, however, the stirring appeal for 'cohesion of the West,' presented as the indispensable condition for 'detente with the East'..." (Figaro)

***

2

"This is the most important document prepared by the USG in the past years. It seals the principle of the U.S. 'low profile' and the revision of the U.S. role in the world. ... It also indicates the new guidelines 'for a generation of peace,' namely, balance of power with the Soviet Union, detente with China and a reform of the trade and monetary structures of the West and Japan. ... RN was so firm with Moscow that he denounced its policy of expansion and cast doubt on its intentions. ... On the other hand, RN was conciliatory with China. ... Another important element is the change in tone on VN. RN evidently is not prepared for further concessions. ... Without saying it openly, he implied he is waiting now for an initiative from Hanoi, perhaps through Chinese or Soviet mediation. ..." (La Stampa of Turin)

###