Rand Corp. - Berlin - August 24, 1961

Came out to learn not to lecture

Have been so busy that I have not been able to make thoughtful preparation

Will therefore speak extemporaneously and ramble on

Discuss Berlin in three stages:

I. Organizational Devices

II. Chronology of Decisions and Issues

a. Strategic

b. Political

III. Some Conclusions about the Policy Process

Berlin crisis can be used to advantage

I. Organization for Berlin

NSU

Steering Group

Working Group

Ad hoc Devices - Acheson

Small Group on Negotiations

Problems: Bureaucracy - fourth branch of the government

People who made decisions in the past Administration are being asked to make
proposals now.

Therefore great persistence of familiar themes.

Outside Influences.

Pervasiveness of planning process - Sealing off of East Berlin considered
an irritating interruption of planning process

Economic Countermeasures

Strategy lacking

Strategem Tracking

Economic Consumerism

an interesting interruption of planning process

Benevolence of planning process - Planning off of East Berlin considered

Outside Influences.

Therefore great benevolence of similar themes.

probes now.

People who made decisions in the East Administration are being asked to make
Problems: Bureaucracy - fourth branch of the Government

Swiss Group on Negotiations

Vd po Devices - Johnson

Working Group

Steering Group

NAB

I. Organization for Berlin

Berlin creates can be used to advantage

p. Political

a. Strategic

I. Organizational Devices

Discourse Berlin in three stages:

Will therefore be asked extemporaneously and sample on

Have been so play that I have not been able to make thoughtful preparation

Rud Corb. - Berlin - August 37, 1961

## II. Sequence

Acheson report

Military build-up. Defense view.

Some concerns about the philosophy underlying build-up and attitudes
towards it.

1st. Fact: Government not fully clear what it intends.

JCS seems to me to have different view from DOD

Take what they consider foolishness because they believe when
balloon goes up they can have free hand.

Am very concerned that we will be confronted at some point with problem
of military insisting that they can no longer guarantee security of
their forces.

Also hear increasingly that primary purpose of build-up is psychological
NATO Allies

This raises issue: What are we threatening?

Can there be a psychological impact if the move cannot be
interpreted as a meaningful gesture.

Is our conventional build-up a means of staking our prestige?

Is it to give us an additional capability?

Is it a symptom of our reluctance to face nuclear war?

Whatever it is, how will the Soviets interpret it?

Just what kind of military operation does it presage? Move
Towards Berlin? Salient

How do we communicate it?

If there is escalation what do we propose for the employment of
nuclears?

How do we handle blockade?

Are there discriminating uses of nuclear weapons?

Are there disinfluencing uses of nuclear weapons?

How do we handle program?

nuclears

It then is escalation what do we propose for the employment of

How do we communicate it?

Towarda Berlin? Satisfied

Just what kind of military operation does it bessage? Move

Whatever it is, how will the Soviet's interpret it?

Is it a abutment of our reliance to face nuclear war?

Is our conventional build-up a means of -aerospace our brevity?

Interpreted as a meaningful feature.

This reates frame: What are we threatening?

NATO Villes

Who bear increasingly that primarily burden of build-up is psychological
their forces.

of militarily insatiating that they can no longer guarantee security of
As very concerned that we will be confronted at some point with problem
paleon goes up they can have free hand.

Take what they consider toofar夫 because they behave when

lat. ad: Government not fully clear what it intends.

towards it.

Some concerns about the philosophy underlying build-up and attitudes
Military build-up. Defense view.

Yaleon report

II. Sequence

- 5 -

- 3 -

If so what do we want to convey?

Relation of unin-
tended war to
control

What does

Battening

down convey?

Imminence of general war?

Control of local situation?

Shot across the bow?

Depends on assessment of state of retaliatory forces

Bound up in Pentagon with whole list of other considerations

Against Nat'l Security policy

Disarmament

a. During build-up

b. At point of crisis- Quick demobilization

c. After war has occured - how do you make peace

d. Comprehensive scheme

What does battening down convey -- Enormous importance of looking
at problem from Communist prospective

Bits of answers exist. But whether coherent pattern emerges in
time can't be sure.

## Political Problem

Debate about whether we should negotiate

Acheson report.

State Department attitude

What are we trying to accomplish?

Attitude towards Berlin

Germany

Atlantic Union

Negotiability

Negotiability

Atlantic Union

Germany

Attitude towards Berlin

State Department attitude

Venezue report.

Depose spont whether we should negotiate

## Political Problem

time can't be made.

Bite of answers exist. But whether coherent pattern emerges in
at problem from Communists prospective

What does patting down convey -- Euromons importance of looking

c. Comprehensive scheme

o. After war has occurred - how do you makeiese

p. At point of crisis- Quick demobilization

a. During build-up

Disarmament

Against US I Security policy

Bond mb in Pentagon with whole list of other considerations
Debates on assessment of state of retaliatory forces

down convey?

Out across the pow?

Control of local attraction?

Immediacy of general war?

Control
tended war to
relation of min-

It so what do we want to convey?

- 3 -

- 4 -

Rules of thumb: Novelty - Variations of Old Proposals

Conciliatoriness by meeting Soviets half-way

Problem if terminal phase of one negotiation becomes staring point
of another

Access rights.

"Improve status of Berlin.

Status in W. Berlin

Concessions on German unity

East German regime

What is problem?

Oder-Neisse line as normal dividing line

What can Germany not refuse

Soviets to offer it?

What do Soviets want to achieve

1. Status of E. German regime p. 3-7

2.

Arguments for : Negotiable - Soviet Disengagement

Status Quo Frozen

Offensive Move

Rapallo type policy

No agreement about increase

Issue is in of what outcome

is reached?

Requirement of Western plan.

1. Slow, reasonable Russians other way

2. World Opinion

Oder-
Neisse
line

3. Germans can't do better for themselves

Atlantic Union as outlet for inevitable frustration

Psychological problem of U.S.-Soviet relations

Issues are hopes of Ferman people and our allies

Issues are probes of German people and our allies

Biographical problem of U.S.-Soviet relations

Atlantic Union as outlet for inevitable frustration
line
Metase
Open-3. Germany can't do better for themselves

S. World Opinion

M. Slow, reasonable
Rational offer way

Requirement of Western plan.

is resolved?

Issue is in
of what outcome
Rebelло the policy
No agreement about increase

Offensive Move

Status quo broken

S.

I. Status of E. German regime b. 3 -

Open-Meise line as normal dividing line

What is the problem?

Est German regime

Status in W. Berlin
Concessions on German territory

Vocasas rights.
Improve status of Berlin.

of another

Problem at terminal phase of one negotiation becomes a starting point

Conciliatoriness by meeting Soviets pull-way

Rules of thumb: Novelty - Variations of Old proposals

- 7 -

Internal problems of Machin's outweigh purpose of it.

New departures

Problems of change

Nested interests of best

Unresolved problems of strategy and political interrelationship

Impact of Crude

## Couplings: