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(CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased, or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.)

HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, March 13, 1988
(c) 1988, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview of Henry Kissinger was conducted by Fernando Schwartz, a special writer for El País in Spain.

Q: You said recently that the proposed Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty was the result of Western European nations pressing for a disarmament deal they really did not want; that you did not view the treaty with any favor at all; and that the West had focused on whether it could prevent the Soviets' violating an accord rather than on whether a violating act could be verified.

A: I said the West has to think about what countermeasures it takes in case of violations, not just on what verification procedures it has to discover violations.

Q: We still have the same problem facing us with the Moscow summit? A: Infinitely worse, because the INF agreement reduces weapons to zero. So in the case of INF if you find one or two such weapons, that's already a violation. The START agreement reduces weapons by 50 percent, which still leaves thousands of weapons around, so you have to be sure you're counting the permitted 1,600 missiles correctly, and that's a much harder thing to do.

Q: Is NATO's flexible response still sound doctrine? A: I agree with the flexible response doctrine, but I think that the INF agreement has made flexible response more difficult, because it means that you cannot retaliate (ital) from (unital) Europe against an attack (ital) on (unital) Europe to the same degree that you could before. It leaves only tactical weapons in Germany and strategic weapons in the United States. It leaves a small number of airplanes that can perform a strategic mission but that could shorten the conventional period because, in order to avoid using up NATO's airplanes in the conventional phase, they would have to go earlier to the nuclear phase.

Q: Conventional war is only a phase ... ? A: The concept of flexible response is that you begin with a conventional phase, but it stands to reason that if you are using up part of your nuclear forces in the conventional phase, then the threat of a nuclear phase is also reduced. There is an additional operational consequence of INF. The terms of the treaty shift the nuclear defense of Europe from Europe to the United States and to the sea. Now the practical consequence of START is to reduce the nuclear weapons at sea and in the United States by 50 percent so the total impact of this must be to reduce the credibility of strategic nuclear wars.

The idea that the Soviets will launch an all-out attack on Central Europe is, of course, one danger against which we have to protect

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ourselves, but it is highly possible that if the Soviets launch an
attack it will be in a more discriminating and limited way. This then
raises a political and a military problem for the West: To what degree
and with what weapons does it want to resist? Does it have the capacity
to resist those attacks where they occur? I think the initial
resistance should be by conventional means. But realistically one has
to accept the proposition that NATO will be forced to use nuclear
weapons much earlier than the Soviets and that NATO cannot defend
itself at present or at any stage in the next five years without
recourse to nuclear weapons.

Q: What do you see as the disparity between conventional forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

A: I think it is very difficult to calculate conventional balances. The Germans nearly won World War I and won many battles in World War II with numerically inferior forces in men, tanks and airplanes because they concentrated their forces. The history of conventional warfare shows that a great deal depends on concentration of forces and on many intangibles that are very hard to calculate. NATO has to spread its forces over a very long front. The best NATO forces on the Central Front are in the south, the American and then come the Germans. The most logical area to attack is in the north and is covered by the British, the Belgians and the Dutch and a few Germans. But then those are also the forces that have the fewest stockpiled supplies, so the idea of a prolonged conventional defense is highly unrealistic and I have never known a NATO commander who thought we could do more than hold for at most a few weeks. If it turned out that the capacity of NATO is stronger than that, it would be a tremendous bonus.

I think such an attack improbable, although I would not rule out
some form of blackmail like another Berlin crisis. I do believe,
however, that if the only answer we have is the mass extermination of
civilian populations, that is not credible. The Soviets know they can
kill as many Americans as we can kill Soviets, and they will ask
themselves whether any rational decision makers would resort to such
actions. That is the problem. As to the first step, if the Soviets face
the high probability of some significant nuclear response and if they
feel that once it starts it will be very hard to calculate how it could
be limited, then that would contribute to deterrence.

Q: How do you think we Europeans are supporting the Americans in this approach? And what are your feelings on the NATO Summit?

A: At the summit they found a formula to support modernization of nuclear weapons but attached no timing to it. They found a formula for the reduction of conventional forces but they made no specific proposal about it. I believe the Europeans have avoided confronting the President in the last nine months rather than risk any real decisions, and the President decided that he didn't want to face the Europeans with any real decisions, so I construe the summit as a way of getting through this year without solving anything.

Q: What are your feelings about the Moscow summit coming up?

A: The series of arms agreements that are being made have the practical consequence of stigmatizing the weapons on which the defense of the Atlantic Alliance depends, namely nuclear weapons. They also are reducing the capacity to use them. But the Western governments have told their publics for so long that they want to eliminate the very nuclear weapons on which their security depends that nobody feels

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strong enough, except perhaps Mrs. Thatcher, to speak the truth. This
in effect weakens, at a minimum, the Western capacity to make
decisions. Moreover, nobody wants to say that a conservative American
President is going too far, having criticized him all during his first
five or six years for being too tough. So I think the European reaction
avoids all problems and it is not particularly heroic.

Q: The reaction to Reykjavik was revealing in that respect.

A: Most Europeans were appalled by Reykjavik, but you will find
nobody who said so publicly.

The European nuclear countries, at least subconsciously, feel, on
the basis of Reykjavik, that the President is clearly determined to
give away some nuclear weapons, and they'd rather have him give away
American nuclear weapons than British and French nuclear weapons.

The Germans feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have been singled
out for special nuclear devastation because most of the tactical
nuclear weapons are on their territory and their range is limited to
targets inside Germany territory. So the end result of that will be
that the Soviets can operate at both ends of the spectrum. They can
make the Germans uneasy by suggesting the tactical nuclear zero option
and they make the British and French uneasy by hinting that the next
round of strategic arms negotiations must include the British and
French forces.

Q: What about Franco-German cooperation?

A: I'm in favor of Franco-German cooperation even though I disagree with President Mitterrand who wants to return to massive retaliation. He wants to play the game of pretending that no nuclear weapons will fall on German territory and therefore make Germany totally dependent on the French nuclear forces. That won't work because the French nuclear forces are less credible than the American nuclear forces. But I also think that for Germany to be left alone as defender of the Continent magnifies all the psychological problems of a divided country with a complex history. So I favor Franco-German cooperation.

Q: And the Western European Union?

A: I would like to see the West European Union create the continent's
own military capacity. In the long run that would strengthen Atlantic
cooperation.

Q: Do you see Spain and Portugal in the WU?

A: If they want to join, yes. If they don't want to join, it should
be done without them. It's a decision for Spain to make, but I'm in favor
of Spain's joining if it wishes and the same would apply to Portugal.

Q: Can we review briefly relations between Spain and the United
States? What do you think of the agreement in principle to remove 72
American planes from the air base at Torrejon and the reduction of the
American presence in Spain?

A: Fundamentally relations between countries depend on the
importance each country attaches to the relationship. It's not like a
quarrel between two lovers who have a choice of going their way. Spain
is an important country and we cannot afford to be petulant about its
actions. We are important to Spain. It is a pity that even as we are
destroying nuclear weapons in Europe, a major European country is also
asking us to withdraw from its territory conventional weapons important
for the defense of Southern Europe. Now that it has happened we have to
see what can be done to ease the damage. It has certainly created some
disillusionment, but fundamentally I think relations between Spain and

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the United States should remain and will remain on a friendly basis.

Q: You wrote recently that it would be very difficult for Israel to negotiate with the PLO?

A: At least at this point.

Q: But in Spain we say that you may be able to decide that you wouldn't play a football match against Real Madrid, but you certainly cannot determine who is going to play on their team.

A: The PLO after all is a group whose program foresees the destruction of Israel. It is not too much to ask that the PLO accept the State of Israel before it can sit down in negotiations.

Q: If eventually Israel decides to negotiate with a Jordanian delegation that includes elected Palestinians, those Palestinians would be PLO people.

A: Yes, but they would not be there as representatives of the organization that is dedicated to the extinguishing of Israel as part of its basic program. Realistically any Palestinian in the Jordanian delegation will have to be accepted as from the PLO. But I don't really think the compositions of the delegations are the key issue of the conference. The key issue of the conference is what are we trying to accomplish? What is the term of reference of the negotiations? I have the impression that an extraordinary amount of discussion concerns purely procedural issues.

We must not exhaust ourselves on procedures, but instead make certain that we define substance. What precisely is it that is supposed to be negotiated? It seems to me that Israel cannot stay where it is. But it is also clear to me that the Arabs cannot get all they asking for. They are asking for the 1967 borders and the old city of Jerusalem in return for which they will recognize Israel. That is an unusual approach; you will recognize your negotiating partner at the end of negotiations in which the partner makes all the sacrifices.

The real problem is the Arabs have a justified claim for self-determination. The Israelis have a justified claim for security. How can one reconcile the Israeli concern for security with the Arab claim to self-determination? Neither can have everything because even if Israel went back to the 1967 borders there would still be several hundred thousand Arabs under Israeli rule in the Galilee and elsewhere. Even if they divide the West Bank, Israel will not be perfectly secure because they're not perfectly secure on the Jordan. So -- as in much of diplomacy -- the question is relative: what is it that you're (ital) willing (unital) to live with and what is it that you (ital) can (unital) live with. Nobody is going to get an absolute solution.

Q: What do you think of Mr. Shultz's latest plan?

A: Courageous. I think it is conceivable that some sort of a compromise will appear on the procedures of a conference. But I don't think we have made progress on substance, which means we're mortgaging the future.

A: Is Mr. Gorbachev in trouble with his opposition at home?

A: Let me say two things. I think the West may wind up killing Gorbachev. The West is inscribing to him qualities to which no single Soviet leader can possibly possess. He is, after all, a product of Communist evolution. He's also a product of 400 years of Russian history. The idea that suddenly somebody has appeared who is solving all our problems by an act of will is a sign that the West is abdicating its own responsibilities for its own future. Because of this

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fascination, it is easier for his enemies in the Soviet Union to point out that the West sees in him qualities that are incompatible with leadership in the Soviet Union.

Now is he in trouble? Gorbachev faces an objective dilemma. If the Soviet Union had continued on its pre-Gorbachev course, it would have become the most developed of the under-developed countries. It would have lagged in economic evolution. They can avoid this only by changing structures that have been intimately associated with the whole history of the Communist country and some structures intimately associated with the whole history of the Russian state. You cannot have a modern economy without decentralization. But in the Soviet Union, decentralization has already run into the nationality question and it is likely to run into managerial obstacles.

I asked a Soviet planner recently how his factory should operate, and he said enterprises should be autonomous. I asked how an enterprise in Kiev could sell its products in Vladivostok without going through a central ministry of distribution and he said, well, that's a very interesting question that they haven't solved yet. They need advertising. They need markets. They need a banking system. And they need wholesalers. All of this is theoretically conceivable but only with a reduction in the role of the planning mechanisms of the local governments and of the Communist Party. The Chinese have made some progress in that respect, but for the Soviet Union it is a much vaster undertaking. So I expect that Gorbachev will face constant opposition and the question is to what extent his colleagues are convinced that even though the process is painful it must be carried out.

Q: And he is benefiting from the West in ways that another leader might not?

A: His benefits from the West take, among others, the forms of technology and of foreign policy concessions that he is very skillful in attaining; and they are without cost to him because any other Soviet leader would have to do more or less what he is doing domestically anyway.

Q: How do you suppose the Soviet Army views its withdrawal from Afghanistan -- with relief or with a degree of bitterness?

A: Probably both. During the Vietnam War President Nixon and I used to be attacked for not ending the war fast enough, and now we are attacked by the very people who led the peace demonstrations on the grounds that we made an inadequate peace. So it is possible that the Soviet Army was unhappy when it was in Afghanistan, will be unhappy when it sees the results of withdrawing, and that some demagogic leaders might accuse Gorbachev of bringing about a result that they themselves could not have avoided.

Q: Are the Soviets liable to give up territory elsewhere in the Far East, off the coast of Japan, for example?

A: If you look at the history of the Russian state giving up territories is not their specialty. I suppose that anything is conceivable, but it is very dangerous for the Soviet Union to give up territory, especially its own national territory. Afghanistan was never part of Soviet territory; still, withdrawal is an unusual step. If the government in Kabul can maintain itself, even if much of the rest of the country falls to the Moujahedeen, then the Soviets may feel that they made a graceful exit. But if the government in Kabul falls within three to six months, then I think even some of those who welcomed the

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withdrawal will be unhappy.

Q: Congress has, for now, cut off aid to the guerrilla forces in Nicaragua.

A: The issue has now become totally confused. Nobody knows anymore what we are trying to accomplish in Central America. The Administration made a mistake to begin with by putting forward a request for aid that was so small that it could not convince the American public that the security of the United States could possibly be involved. Secondly, they defined the peace process in terms of criteria that permit no objective assessments.

If we had said that the Cubans must leave Nicaragua and that the Nicaraguan army should be reduced to historic Central American dimensions, that would involve concrete criteria that the public could understand. But when you say that you want democracy in a country which has never known democracy in its whole history, then you create a criterion which has no clear-cut objective definitions. So the combination of an originally small sum and criteria that were hard to understand led to the first defeat. There was also the American illusion that negotiations can take place independent of the pressures that are generated on their behalf. That is one set of problems. The next round failed, in part, because the Republicans did not want the Democrats to get credit for sending any aid at all. As for non-lethal aid, it is an insult to the intelligence. It says we Americans will support a guerrilla war but we are so noble that we do it only with humanitarian aid which means somebody else has to give the weapons because otherwise there's no point in giving even the non-lethal aid. So there's now such a confusion of objectives and the issue has become so politicized that I fear that we are beginning to look ridiculous.

Q: However, we in Spain have always said let the Central Americans sort out their own problems without interference.

A: You can't tell America that it must defend Japan, Europe and everybody else but it has no right to security on its border. Certainly the Central American countries should have a significant voice and certainly we should listen to them. But the fact that Costa Rica has no army, but does have 90,000 armed Nicaraguans on its borders, is bound to affect its perception of the risks it can run and the positions it should promulgate. I'm not attacking the Arias plan, I'm attacking the notion that you can negotiate independently from the whole context of things, both positive and negative, without regard to either pressures or incentives.

Q: But just as Congress said no to humanitarian aid, Daniel Ortega said he would see the contra leaders in Managua anyway, provided it is without Cardinal Obando y Bravo.

A: If you recall, he did not say Managua, he said at the border.

Q: At the border, right.

A: At the border of Costa Rica. And what is the significant element in that? Is it the absence of Obando or the willingness to see the contra leaders? Consider that now he can see the contra leaders, break up that negotiation, say they were obstinate and do it all with no third party there to express a judgment. We will have to see. But I find it very difficult to believe that the Sandinistas will agree to a significant reduction of their powers in circumstances in which with every passing month American's capacity to bring pressure is being reduced.

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Q: Would you venture a guess as to who will be your next President?

A: I find that situation rather confusing and uncertain. You have to understand that I am of the moderate wing of the Republican Party, which barely exists any more. Logically one would have to say that unless there's a recession the Republican candidate will have a better chance than the Democratic candidate. On the other hand, there are some similarities with the situation in 1960 when another popular President, getting on in years, was leaving office and the public was looking for a new face and that produced John Kennedy. I really think it's a very close election.

Q: It is constantly suggested is that there are no major confrontations on ideology, only on personality.

A: That's not exactly true. The Democratic Party is much less willing to address the issue of national defense in the context of a bipartisan foreign policy. So that is one significant difference. The personalities of the leading candidates are not so remarkable when you consider the basic differences. Right now they're spending all their time fighting each other within each party.

Q: I don't know whether I should ask you this, but do you think that Mr. Cuomo will eventually be a candidate?

A: A lot of people say that, but I find it hard to visualize that the people who went through the long march through these primaries will agree to let an outsider get the nomination if one of them can withdraw in favor of the other.

Q: One final question. You are an enthusiast of soccer.

A: Oh yes!

Q: Whom do you take for the European Cup?

A: I think Real Madrid; it is the finest I have seen. I don't think Bayern is as good as it has been and I like Real Madrid. It is beautiful to watch.

Q: It is.

A: I want to see it when I was in Spain last year and it was elegant.

Q: The machine, the Gold Machine.

A: Elegant, elegant performance. I would like to say one thing because you asked me about Central America.

Q: Please.

A: We focus so much on Central America but in the long term the future of Argentina, of Brazil and of Mexico are more decisive. The United States must come up with a program on that governmental level to give these countries more hope for growth. I don't think it is desirable that most of the negotiations between these countries and the United States concern how much interest can be paid in a year.

Q: For us in Spain, Latin America is tremendously important. That goes for the King and (Prime Minister) Felipe Gonzalez, tremendously important figures there. They have been in Uruguay, they have been in Argentina for a return to democracy. What do you see ahead for those tortured countries like Chile and Peru?

A: Chile is doing well economically but requires still a political evolution. Peru has had a pretty good political evolution but has produced a debacle economically. The way in which (President Alan) Garcia came to power was very democratic, but since he's come to power he has not been able to fulfill expectations. So there are many unresolved issues in Latin America, and the task of the friends of

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HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

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A: I agree with the flexible response doctrine, but I think
that the INF agreement has made flexible response more
difficult, because it means that you cannot retaliat (ital)
from (unital) Europe against an attack (ital) on (unital)
Europe to the same degree that you could before. It leaves
only tactical weapons in Germany and strategic weapons in the

B

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The idea that the Soviets will launch an all-out attack on Central Europe is, of course, one danger against which we have to protect ourselves, but it is highly possible that if the Soviets launch an attack it will be in a more discriminating

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B

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north and is covered by the British, the Belgians and the
Dutch and a few Germans. But then those are also the forces
that have the fewest stockpiled supplies, so the idea of a
prolonged professional defense is highly unrealistic and I
have never known a NATO commander who thought we could do more
than hold for at most a few weeks. If it turned out that the
capacity of NATO is stronger than that, it would be a
tremendous bonus.

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A: The series of arms agreements that are being made have the practical consequence of stigmatizing the weapons on which the defense of the Atlantic Alliance depends, namely nuclear weapons. They also are reducing the capacity to use them. But the Western governments have told their publics for so long that they want to eliminate the very nuclear weapons on which their security depends that nobody feels strong enough, except perhaps Mrs. Thatcher, to speak the truth. This in effect

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British and French uneasy by hinting that the next round of strategic arms negotiations must include the British and French forces. I think that is the real situation.

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A: Fundamentally relations between countries depend on the importance each country attaches to the relationship. It's not like a quarrel between two lovers who have a choice of going their way. Spain is an important country and we cannot afford to be petulant about its actions. We are important to Spain. It is a pity that even as we are destroying nuclear weapons in Europe, a major European country is also asking us to withdraw from its territory conventional weapons important for the defense of Southern Europe. Now that it has happened we have to see what can be done to ease the damage. It has certainly created some disillusionment, but fundamentally I think relations between Spain and the United States should remain and will remain on a friendly basis.

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PAGE 10

A: At least at this point.

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A: Let me say two things. I think the West may wind up
killing Gorbachev. The West is ascribing to him qualities to
which no single Soviet leader can possibly possess. He is,
after all, a product of Communist evolution. He's also a
product of 400 years of Russian history. The idea that
suddenly somebody has appeared who is solving all our problems
by an act of will is a sign that the West is abdicating its
own responsibilities for its own future. Because of this
fascination, it is easier for his enemies in the Soviet Union
to point out that the West sees in him qualities that are
incompatible with leadership in the Soviet Union.

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A: If you look at the history of the Russian state giving up territories, it's not their specialty. I suppose that anything is conceivable, but it is very dangerous for the Soviet Union to give up territory, especially its own national territory. Afghanistan was never part of Soviet territory; still, withdrawal is an unusual step. If the government in Kabul can maintain itself, even if much of the rest of the country falls to the Moujahedeen, then the Soviets may feel that they made a graceful exit. But if the government in Kabul falls within three to six months, then I think even some of those who welcomed the withdrawal will be unhappy.

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non-lethal aid. So there's now such a confusion of objectives and the issue has become so politicized that I fear that we are beginning to look confused.

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Q: At the border, right.

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A: Oh yes!

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Q: It is.

A: I went to see it when I was in Spain last year and it
was elegant.

Q: Please.

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like Chile and Peru?

A: Chile is doing well economically but requires still a political evolution. Peru has had a pretty good political evolution but has produced a debacle economically. The way in which (President Alan) Garcia came to power was very democratic, but since he's come to power he has not been able to fulfill expectations. So there are many unresolved issues in Latin America, and the task of the friends of Latin America is to help them promote growth and democracy.

MAR 7 '88 11:58

FROM LA TIMES SYN

This is an edited version of the tape of Henry Kissinger's interview of Friday, March 4, 1968, with, as I understand it, El Fais.

It was then faxed to his house in Connecticut on Sunday but apparently did not go through.

Please see that Jesse Levine gets this as early as possible.

BEGIN·TRANSCRIPT

A: I said the West has to think about what COUNTENANCE MEASURES IT takes in case of violations not just on what verification procedures it has DISCOVER VIOLATIONS.

Q: We still have the same problem facing us with the Moscow Summit?

A: Infinitely worse, as comparison, because the INF agreement reduces weapons to zero. So if you find one or two such weapons, that's already a violation. The START agreement reduces weapons by 50% which still leaves thousands of weapons

MAR 7 '88 11:58

FROM LA TIMES SYN

agreement so you have to be sure you're counting the 1,600 munis correctly, and that's a much harder thing to do.<

Q: Is NATO's flexible response still sound doctrine?<

A: What I have said is that the threat of immediate all-out warfare is not credible. I have no problem with flexible response but I think that the INF agreement has made flexible response more difficult, because it means that you cannot retaliate against Europe against an attack on Europe to the same degree that you could before. It leaves only tactical weapons in Germany and strategic weapons in the United States. It leaves a small number of airplanes that can perform a strategic mission but that could shorten the conventional period because, by using up your airplanes in the conventional phase, you would have to go earlier to the nuclear phase, which you still had a strategic air capacity.

Q: Conventional war is only a phase ... ?<

A: The concept of flexible response is that you begin with a conventional phase, but it stands to reason that if you are using up part of your nuclear forces in the conventional phase then the threat of a nuclear phase is also reduced. There is an additional operational consequence of INF. The terms of the treaty shift the nuclear defense of Europe from Europe to the United States and to the sea. Now the practical consequence of START is to reduce the nuclear weapons at sea and in the United States by 50% so the total impact of this must be to reduce the credibility of strategic nuclear wars.<

MAR 7 '88 11:59

FROM LA TIMES SYN

Central Europe is, of course, one danger against which we have to protect ourselves but it is highly possible that if the Soviets launch an attack it will be in a more discriminating and limited way. This then raise a political and a military problem for the West: To what degree and with what weapons does it want to resist? Does it have the capacity to resist those attacks where they occur. I think the initial resistance should probably be by conventional means. But realistically one has to accept the proposition that NATO will be forced to use nuclear weapons much earlier than the Soviets and that NATO cannot defend itself at present or at any stage in the next five years without recourse to nuclear weapons.<

Q: What do you see as the disparity between conventional forces in NATO and the Warsaw Fact?

A: I think it is very difficult to calculate conventional balances. The Germans nearly won World War I and won many battles in World War II with numerically inferior forces in men, tanks and airplanes because they concentrated their forces. The history of conventional warfare shows that a great deal depends on concentration of forces and on many intangibles that are very hard to calculate. NATO has to spread its forces over a very long front. The best NATO forces on the Central Front are in the South, the American and then next come the Germans. The most logical area to attack in the north is covered by the British, the Belgians and the Dutch and a few Germans. But then those are also the forces that have the fewest stockpiled supplies so the idea of a

MAR 7 '88 11:59

FROM LA TIMES SYN

have never known a NATO commander who thought we could do more
than hold for at most a few weeks. If it turned out that the
capacity of NATO is stronger than that, it would be a
tremendous bonus.<

I think such an attack improbable, although I would not
rule out some form of blackmail like another Berlin crisis. I
do believe however that if the only answer we have is the mass
extermination of civilian populations, that is not credible.
The Soviets know they can kill as many Americans as we can
kill Soviets and they will ask themselves whether any rational
decision makers would resort to such actions. That is the
problem. As to first step, if the Soviets face the high
probability of some significant nuclear response and if they
feel that once it starts it will be very hard to calculate how
it could be limited, then that would contribute to deterrence.<

Q: How do you think we Europeans are supporting the
Americans in this approach? And what are your feelings on the
NATO
Summit?<

At the summit they found a formula to support
modernization of nuclear weapons but attached no timing to it.
They found a formula for the reduction of conventional forces
but they made no specific proposal about it. I believe the
Europeans have avoided making the President in the last six-
months rather than risk any real decisions and the President
decided that he didn't want to face the Europeans with any
real decisions so I construe the summit as a way of getting
through this year without solving anything.<

MAR 7 '88 12:00

FROM LA TIMES SYN

A: The series of arms agreements that are being made have the practical consequence of stigmatizing the weapons on which the defense of the Atlantic Alliance depends, namely nuclear weapons. They also are reducing the capacity to use them. But the Western governments have told their publics for so long that they want to eliminate the very nuclear weapons on which their security depends that nobody feels strong enough, except perhaps Mrs. Thatcher, to speak the truth. This in effect weakens, at a minimum, the Western capacity to make decisions. Moreover nobody wants to say that a conservative American President is going too far, having criticized him all during his first five or six years for being too tough, but it is not particularly heroic.

A: Most Europeans were appalled by Reykjavik but you will find nobody who said so publicly.

The European nuclear countries, at least subconsciously, feel, on the basis of Reykjavik, that the President is clearly determined to give away some nuclear weapons and they'd rather have him give away American nuclear weapons than British and French nuclear weapons.

MAR 7 '88 12:00 FROM LA TIMES SYN

end result of that will be that so the Soviets can operate at
both ends of the spectrum. They can make the Germans uneasy by
suggesting the deaths(?) of they see(?) the intentions in
Germany by suggesting that the tactical nuclear search(?) zero
option and they make the British and French uneasy by hinting
that the next round of strategic arms negotiations must
include the British and French forces. I think that is the
real situation.<

Q: What about Franco-German cooperation?<

A: I'm in favor of Franco-German cooperation and I disagree with President Mitterand who has attacked tactical response. He wants massive retaliation. He wants to play the game of pretending that no nuclear weapons will fall on German territory and therefore make Germany totally dependent on the French nuclear forces. That won't work because the French nuclear forces are less credible than the American nuclear forces. But I also think that for Germany to be left alone as defender of the Continent magnifies all the psychological problems of a divided country with a complex history. So I still favor Franco-German cooperation.<

Q: And the Western European Union?<

A: I would like to see the West European Union create the continent's only military capacity. In the long run that would strengthen Atlantic cooperation.<

Q: Do you see Spain and Portugal in the WU?<

A: If they want to join yes. If they don't want to join, it should be done without them. It's a decision for Spain to

MAR 7 '88 12:01

FROM LA TIMES SYN

not too much to ask that the PLO accept the State of Israel
before it can sit down in negotiations.<

Q: If eventually Israel decides to negotiate with a
Jordanian delegation that includes elected Palistinians, those
Palestinians would be PLO people.<

A: Yes, but they would not be there as representatives of the organization that ~~is~~ is dedicated to the extinguishing of Israel as part of its basic program. Realistically any Palestinian in the Jordanian delegation will have to be accepted as ~~inseparable~~ from the PLO. But I don't really think the compositions of the delegations are the key issue of the conference. The key issue of the conference is what are we trying to accomplish? What is the term of reference of the negotiations? I have the impression that an extraordinary amount of discussion concerns purely procedural issues.<

We must not exhaust ourselves on procedures, but instead
make certain that we define substance. What precisely is it
that is supposed to be negotiated? It seems to me that Israel
cannot stay where it is. But it is also clear to me that the
Arabs cannot get ~~ALL~~ AND they asking for. They are asking for the
1967 borders in the old city of Jerusalem in return for which
they will recognize Israel. That is unusual approach; you will
recognize your negotiating partner at the end of negotiations
in which the parter makes all the sacrifices.<

MAR 7 '88 12:04 FROM LA TIMES SYN

Q: At the border, right.<?

A: At the border of Costa Rica. And what is the significant element in that? Is it the absence of Obando or the willingness to see the contra leaders. Consider that now he can see the contra leaders, break up that negotiations, say they were obstinate and do it all with no third party there to express a judgment. We will have to see. But I find it very difficult to believe that the Sandinistas will agree to a significant reduction of their powers in circumstances in which with every passing month American's capacity to bring pressure is being reduced.<?

Q: Would you venture a guess as to who will be your next President??

A: I find that situation rather confusing and uncertain. You have to understand that I am of the moderate wing of the Republican party, which barely exists any more. Logically one would have to say that unless there's a recession the Republican candidate will have a better chance than the Democratic candidate. On the other hand there are some similarities with the situation in 1960 when another popular president, getting on in years, was leaving office and the public was looking for a new face and that produced John Kennedy. I really think it's a very close election.<?

Q: It is constantly suggested is that there are no major confrontations on ideology, only on personality.<?

A: That's not exactly true. The Democratic party is really much less willing to address the issue of national defense in

MAR 7 '88 12:05

FROM LA TIMES SYN

Latin America and the task of the friends of Latin America is
to help them to expose growth and democracy.<

Q: Very good that's a very nice way of ending. Thank you
very much indeed.<

A: Very nice to see you.<

Q: Extremely interesting.<

end of transcript<

** TOTAL PAGE.017 **

MAR 7 '88 11:58

FROM LA TIMES SYN

This is an edited version of the tape of Henry Kissinger's interview of Friday, March 4, 1988, with, as I understand it, El Fais.<

It was then faxed to his house in Connecticut on Sunday but apparently did not go through.<

Please see that Jesse Levine gets this as early as possible.<

BEGIN·TRANSCRIPT

Q: You said recently that the proposed Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty was the result of Western European nations pressing for a disarmament deal they really did not want; that you did not view the treaty with any favor at all; and that the West had focused on whether it could prevent the Soviets' violating an accord rather than on whether a violating act could be verified.<

A: I said the West has to think about what measures it takes in case of violations not just on what verification procedures it has.<

Q: We still have the same problem facing us with the Moscow Summit?<

A: Infinitely worse, no comparison, because the INF agreement reduces weapons to zero. So if you find one or two such weapons, that's already a violation. The START agreement reduces weapons by 50% which still leaves thousands of weapons

MAR 7 '88 11:58

FROM LA TIMES SYN

agreement so you have to be sure you're counting the 1,600
correctly, and that's a much harder thing to do.<

Q: Is NATO's flexible response still sound doctrine? <

A: What I have said is that the threat of immediate all-out
warfare is not credible. I have no problem with flexible
response, but I think that the INF agreement has made flexible
response more difficult, because it means that you cannot
retaliate against from Europe against an attack on Europe to
the same degree that you could before. It leaves only tactical
weapons in Germany and strategic weapons in the United States.
It leaves a small number of airplanes that can perform a
strategic mission but that could shorten the conventional
period because, by using up your airplanes in the conventional
phase, you would have to go earlier to the nuclear phase while
you still had a strategic air capacity.<

MAR 7 '88 11:59

FROM LA TIMES SYN

Q: What do you see as the disparity between conventional forces in NATO and the Warsaw Pact?<

A: I think it is very difficult to calculate conventional balances. The Germans nearly won World War I and won many battles in World War II with numerically inferior forces in men, tanks and airplanes because they concentrated their forces. The history of conventional warfare shows that a great deal depends on concentration of forces and on many intangibles that are very hard to calculate. NATO has to spread its forces over a long, long front. The best NATO forces on the Central Front are in the South, the American and then next come the Germans. The most logical area to attack in the north is covered by the British, the Belgians and the Dutch and a few Germans. But then those are also the forces that have the fewest stockpiled supplies so the idea of a

Q: How do you think we Europeans are supporting the
Americans in this approach? And what are your feelings on the
Summit?<

A: Oh, at the summit they found a formula to support
modernization of nuclear weapons but attached no timing to it.
They found a formula for the reduction of conventional forces
but they made no specific proposal about it. I believe the
Europeans have avoided facing the President in the last six
months rather than risk any real decisions and the President
decided that he didn't want to face the Europeans with any
real decisions so I construe the summit as a way of getting
through this year without solving anything.<

MAR 7 '88 12:00

FROM LA TIMES SYN

A: The series of arms agreements that are being made have the practical consequence of stigmatizing the weapons on which the defense of the Atlantic Alliance depends, namely nuclear weapons. They also are reducing the capacity to use them. But the Western governments have told their publics for so long that they want to eliminate the very nuclear weapons on which their security depends that nobody feels strong enough, except perhaps Mrs. Thatcher, to speak the truth. This in effect weakens, at a minimum, the Western capacity to make decisions. Moreover nobody wants to say that a conservative American President is going too far, having criticized him all during his first five or six 6 years for being too tough, but it is true. So I think the European reaction avoids all problems and it is not particularly heroic.

MAR 7 '88 12:00

FROM LA TIMES SYN

end result of that will be that so the Soviets can operate at
both ends of the spectrum. They can make the Germans uneasy by
suggesting the deaths(?) or they see(?) the intentions in
Germany by suggesting that the tactical nuclear search(?) zero
option and they make the British and French uneasy by hinting
that the next round of strategic arms negotiations must
include the British and French forces. I think that is the
real situation.<

MAR 7 '88 12:01

FROM LA TIMES SYN

make, but I'm in favor of Spain's joining if it wishes and the
same would apply to Portugal.<

A: Fundamentally relations between countries depend on the importance each country attaches to the relationship. It's not like a quarrel between two lovers who have a choice of going their way. Spain is an important country and we cannot afford to be petulant about Spain. We are important to Spain. I do think it is a pity that even as we are destroying nuclear weapons in Europe, a major European country is also asking us to withdraw from its territory conventional weapons important for the defense of Southern Europe. Now that it has happened we have to see what can be done. It has certainly created some some disillusionment but fundamentally I think relations between Spain and the United States should remain will remain on a friendly basis.<

Q: You wrote recently that it would be very difficult for Israel to negotiate with the PLO.?

A: At least at this point.<

Q: But in Spain we say that you may be able to decide that you wouldn't play a match, a football match against Ramon(?) Maduke(?) but you certainly cannot determine who is going to play in their Madrid(?) against him?

MAR 7 '88 12:01 FROM LA TIMES SYN

is not too much to ask that the PLO accept the State of Israel
before it can sit down in negotiations.<

A: Yes, but they would not be there as representatives of
the organization that it's dedicated to the extinguishing of
Israel as part of its basic program. Realistically any
Palestinian in the Jordanian delegation will have to be
accepted as inseparable from the PLO. But I don't really think
the compositions of the delegations are the key issue of the
conference. The key issue of the conference is what are we
trying to accomplish? What is the term of reference of the
negotiations? I have the impression that an extraordinary
amount of discussion concerns purely procedural issues.<

We must not exhaust ourselves on procedures, but instead
make certain that we define substance. What precisely is it
that is supposed to be negotiated? It seems to me that Israel
cannot stay where it is. But it is also clear to me that the
Arabs cannot get what they asking for. They are asking for the
1967 borders in the old city of Jerusalem in return for which
they will recognize Israel. That is unusual approach; you will
recognize your negotiating partner at the end of negotiations
in which the parter makes all the sacrifices.<

MAR 7 '88 12:02

FROM LA TIMES SYN

security with the Arab claim to self-determination? Neither
can have everything because even if they went back to the 1967
borders there would still be several hundred thousand Arabs
under Israeli rule in the Galilee and elsewhere. Even if they
divide the West Bank, Israel will not be perfectly secure
because they're not perfectly secure on the Jordan. So, as in
much of diplomacy, the question is relative: what is it that
you're willing to live with and what is it that you can live
with. Nobody is going to get an absolute solution.

A: Courageous. I think it is conceivable that some sort of
a half-baked compromise will appear on the procedures of a
conference. But I don't think he's even trying yet to make
progress on substance, which means we're mortgaging the
future.

A: Let me say two things. I think the West may wind up
killing Gorbachev. The West is ascribing to him qualities to
which no single Soviet leader can possibly fall heir. He is,
after all, a product of Communist evolution. He's also a
product of 400 years of Russian history. The idea that
suddenly somebody has appeared who is solving all our problems
by an act of (worth?) is a sign that the West is really
abdicating its responsibilities for its own future. Also
because there is this fascination, it is easier for his
enemies in the Soviet Union to point out that the West sees in
him qualities that are incompatible with leadership in the

MAR 7 '88 12:02

FROM LA TIMES SYN

Now is he in trouble? Gorbachev faces an objective dilemma. The dilemma is that if the Soviet Union had continued on its pre-Gorbachev course, it would become the most developed of the under-developed countries. It would lag in economic evolution. They could avoid this only by changing structures that have been intimately associated with the whole history of the communist country and some structures intimately associated with the whole history of the Russian State. You cannot have a modern economy without decentralization. But in the Soviet Union, decentralization has already run into the nationality question and it is likely to get worse.<

I asked a Soviet worker recently how his factory should operate, and he said enterprises should be autonomous. I asked how an enterprise in Kiev could sell its products in Vladivostok without going through a central ministry of distribution and he said, well, that's a very interesting question that they haven't solved yet. You have to say that they need advertising. They need markets. They need a banking system. And they need wholesalers. All of this is theoretically conceivable but it is achievable only with a reduction in the role of the planning mechanisms of the local governments and of the Communist Party. The Chinese have made some progress in that respect, but for the Soviet Union it is a huge undertaking. So I expect that Gorbachev will face constant opposition and the question is to what extent his colleagues are convinced that even though the process is painful it must be carried out.<

MAR 7 '88 12:03

FROM LA TIMES SYN

Q: And he is benefiting from the West in ways that another leader might not?<

A: His benefits from the West take, among others, the forms of technology and of foreign policy concessions that nobody else could get; and they are without cost to him because any other Soviet leader would have to do more or less what he is doing domestically anyway.<

Q: How do you suppose the Soviet Army views its withdrawal from Afghanistan_with relief or with a degree of bitterness.<

A: Probably both. During the Vietnam War President Nixon and I used to be attacked for not ending the war fast enough and now we are attacked by the very people who led the peace demonstrations on the grounds that we made an inadequate peace. So it is possible that the Soviet Army was unhappy when it was in Afghanistan, will be unhappy when it sees the results of withdrawing, and that some demagogic leaders might accuse Gorbachev of bringing about a result that they themselves could not avoided.<

Q: Are the Soviets liable to give up territory elsewhere in the Far East, off the coast of Japan, for example?<

A: If you look at the history of the Russian state giving up territories, it's not their specialty. I suppose that anything is conceivable, but you know it's very dangerous for the Soviet Union to give up territory. Even though Afghanistan was never part of Soviet territory, withdrawal is an unusual step. If the government in Kabul can maintain itself, even if much of the rest of the country falls to the Moujahedeen, then

the government in Kabul falls within three to six months, then I think even some of those who welcomed the withdrawal will be unhappy.<

Q: Congress has, for now, cut off aid to the guerilla forces in Nicaragua.<

At: Unbelievable. The issue has now become totally confused. Nobody knows anymore what we are trying to accomplish in Central America. The Administration made a mistake to begin with by putting forward a request for aid that was so small that it could not convince the American public that the security of the United States could possibly be involved. Secondly they defined the peace process in terms of criteria that permit no objective assessments.<

If we had said that the Cubans must leave Nicaragua and that the Nicaraguan Army should be reduced to historic Central American dimensions, that i would be something the public could understand. But when you say that you want democracy in Nicaragua, which has never known democracy in its whole history, then you create a criterion which has no clear-cut objective definitions. So the combination of an originally small sum and criteria that were hard to understand led to the first defeat. There was also the ideological (applications?) (affectation?) of the Democrats, based upon the American illusion that negotiations can take place independent of the pressures that can be generated on their behalf. That is one set of problems. The next round failed; in part, because the Republicans did not want the Democrats to get credit for

MAR 7 '88 12:04

FROM LA TIMES SYN

sending any aid at all. As for non-lethal aid, it is an insult
to the intelligence. (If you want to get an army to continue
it's obviously to fight a guerrilla war and to skip non-lethal
aid it's sort of a form of arrogance?) It says we Americans
will support a guerrilla war but we are so noble that we do it
only with humanitarian aid which means somebody else has to
give the weapons because otherwise there's no point in giving
even the non-lethal aid. So there's now such a confusion of
objectives and the issue has become so politicized that I fear
that we are beginning to look ridiculous.<

Q: However we in Spain have always said let the Central
Americans sort out their own problems without interference.<

A: You can't tell America that it must defend Japan, Europe
and everybody else but it has no right to security next door
to its border. Certainly the Central American countries should
have a significant voice and certainly we should listen to
them. But the fact that Costa Rica has no army, but does have
90,000 armed Nicaraguans on its borders, certainly affects its
perception of the risks it can run and the positions it should
promulgate. I'm not attacking the Arias plan, I'm attacking
the notion that you can negotiate independently from the whole
context of things both positive and negative, without regard
to either pressures or incentives(?).<

Q: But just as Congress said no to humanitarian aid, Daniel
Ortega said he would see the contra leaders in Managua anyway
provided it is without Cardinal Obando y Bravo.<

MAR 7 '88 12:04

FROM LA TIMES SYN

Q: At the border, right.<

Q: Would you venture a guess as to who will be your next President?<

A: I find that situation rather confusing and uncertain. You have to understand that I am of the moderate wing of the Republican party, which barely exists any more. Logically one would have to say that unless there's a recession the Republican candidate will have a better chance than the Democratic candidate. On the other hand there are some similarities with the situation in 1960 when another popular president, getting on in years, was leaving office and the public was looking for a new face and that produced John Kennedy. I really think it's a very close election.<

MAR 7 '88 12:04

FROM LA TIMES SYN

the context of a bipartisan foreign policy. So that is one
significant difference. The personalities of the leading
candidates are not so remarkable when you consider the basic
differences. Right now they're spending all their time
fighting each other within each party.<

Q: I don't know whether I should ask you this but do you think that Mr. Cuomo will eventually be a candidate?<

A: A lot of people say that, but I find it hard to
visualize that the people who went through the long march
through these primaries will agree to let an outsider get the
nomination if one of them can withdraw in favor of the other.<

(Henry: I am leaving this part in because you are the only one at the Los Angeles Times who might know what you both were talking about.<

Q: One final question. You are an enthusiast of soccer.<

A: Oh yes!?

Q: Whom do you take for the European --?--either by or
--?--?

A: I think Real (?) Madre(?) not because he is finest(?).<

Q: Ha, ha.<

A: I don't think --?-- is as good as he has been and I like
Real (?) Madrid(?) is really beautiful thing to watch.<

Q: Uhhuh he is.<

A: I went to see it when I was in Spain last year and it
was beautiful, elegant.<

Q: The machine, the Gold Machine.<

MAR 7 '88 12:05 FROM LA TIMES SYN PAGE.016

Q: Please.<

A: See we focus so much on Central America but in the long term the future of Argentina is if Mexico are more decisive(?) and I believe that the United States must come up with a program on that governmental level to give these countries more of a possibilities to grow. I don't think it is a desirable objective when most of the negotiations between these countries and the United States concerns how much interest it can have in the ...<

(Henry: Apparently the tape snapped off at this point, and everybody went on talking. It probably does not represent a substantial gap, but they did miss some of it. It picks up with the next question:)<

Q: If we can turn because you know that Latin America for us in Spain is tremendously important.<

A: That's right, that's it.<

Q: Thank you and that goes for the King and Phillipe Gonzales, tremendously important figures there. They have been in Uruguay, they have been in Argentina for a return to democracy. What do you see of those tortured countries like Chile and Peru? I'm not only focusing on the dramatic Chile?<

A: Chile is doing well economically but requires still a political evolution. Peru has had it pretty good political evolution but has produced a debacle economically. I mean the way in which Garcia came to power was very democratic but since he's come to power it has produced, he has not been able to fulfill this. So I there are many unresolved issues in

MAR 7 '88 12:05

FROM LA TIMES SYN

A: Very nice to see you.<

Q: Extremely interesting.<

end of transcript<

** TOTAL PAGE.017 **

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BURBY TAPE/INTERVIEW KISSINGER

BOTH SIDES

SIDE A

Q: .. so what we would like to do is to...

A: You know we can go a few minutes longer.

Q: That's very kind of you. I have here a skim-out(?)
impressions I would like to go through with you if I could do
that?

A: Sure.

Q: What I would like to do if you agree would be to take up
the various problems we're facing nowadays in the world and see
your reactions and comments to various sort of. In fact the
day before yesterday we at Biasee(?) agreed to run an article
by you and by Dr. Zinski(?)

A: Oh about this appointed deterrent?

Q: About this --?-- deterrence. In which basically the
object of the operation was the student(?) deterrents as
opposed to blanket flexible answer by NATO.

A: No as opposed to all our general nuclear war as opposed

8

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PAGE 2

to every provocation. In the case of every provocation. We
don't oppose flexible response.

Q: But you have said, now I think I heard you say I was
then still in the Hague during the Atlantic Commission meeting
in October in the Hague.

A: Yes.

Q: I think I heard you say during dinner at one stage and
in the following day when you were addressing the people there
that one the proposed INF treaty at that time was the result
of Western European nations pressing for a disarmament deal
they really did not want?

A: Correct.

Q: First of all and that you did not view the accord with
any favor at all?

A: Correct.

Q: And also that the Western focused on whether it could
prevent the Soviets violating an accord rather than with an
act(?) could be verified?

A: Yes, that's a general no, I said the West has to think
about what measures it takes in case of violations not just on
what verification procedures it has.

8

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PAGE 3

Q: In fact we have, we still have the same problem facing us with the Moscow Assembly, isn't it true that?

A: Even worse, no comparison.

Q: No comparison?

A: Infinitely worse.

Q: Why?

A: Because the INF agreement reduces weapons to zero. So if you find 1 or 2 that's already a violation. The START agreement reduces weapons by 50% which still leaves thousands of weapons around. In fact 1600 ICBMs are permitted under the, not IBM but 1600 missiles are permitted under the agreement so you have to be sure you're counting the 1600 in first and that's a much harder thing to do.

Q: But you have also always you have suggested or said I think that NATOs flexible response would be ultimate outcome of which is all-out atomic warfare is not credible?

A: No, no, I didn't say that! What I had said is that the threat of immediate all-out warfare is not credible. Flexible response I have no problem with.

Q: And in yes, and in the out...

A: But indeed I think that the INF agreement had made

8

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flexible response more difficult, that's my objection to that.

Q: Why?

A: Because it means you cannot retali ate against an attack on Europe from Europe to the same degree that you could before.

Q: That leaves only tactical and strategic...

A: It leaves only tactical weapons in Germany and strategic weapons in the United States, at least a small number of airplanes that can perform perhaps a strategic mission but then it makes the conventional period shorter because you have to save, either you will use up your airplanes in the conventional phase or you have to go earlier to nuclear phase because there will be a certain attrition of those airplanes during the conventional phase.

Q: This question, do you think the conventional phase is only a phase and in that eventually...

A: Well not, the concept of flexible response is that you begin with a conventional phase but it stands to reason that if you are using up your, part of your nuclear forces in the conventional phase that the nuclear threat is also less.

Q: Yes.

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A: And an additional problem is that the operational consequence of INF is to shift the nuclear defense of Europe from Europe to the United States and to the sea. Now the practical consequence of Start is to reduce the nuclear weapons at sea and in the United States by 50% so the total impact of this must be to reduce the credibility of strategic nuclear wars.

Q: It depends on the size of remaining ....

A: No, not really because there is also the size of the, the relationships between the various forces has not improved.

Q: And yet in this time after light I was referring to in the beginning of this conversation you said that the most probable effect would be an attack on one, not only the entire....

A: I think that the idea that the Soviets will launch an all-out attack on Central Europe that's of course one danger against which we have to protect ourselves but it is highly possible that if the Soviets launch an attack it will be in the more discriminating and the more limited way and that this then presents major(?), would cause a political and a military problem to what degree and with what weapons it wants to

8

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resist and whether it has the capacity to resist those attacks
where they occur.

Q: And whether it has the capacity as well to resist those
attacks by merely conventional means or not?

A: I think the initial resistance should probably be by
conventional means.

Q: Yes, and then the imbalance of conventional means with
force would force NATO to ....

A: I think realistically one has to accept the proposition
that NATO will be forced to use nuclear weapons much earlier
than the Soviets and that NATO cannot defend itself at the
present or any foreseeable stage in the next five years
without recourse to nuclear weapons.

Q: I see, even if one takes even if one takes the disparity
between conventional forces NATO Warsaw pact and the sudden
--?-- soldier in the sense that maybe in the center the
relation between relative forces of tanks for instance is not
as imbalanced as it would appear on the total figures?

A: I think it is very difficult to calculate conventional
balances. The Germans nearly won World War I and di the peak
grants(?) at World War II with numerically inferior forces in

8

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both men and tanks and airplanes because they concentrated
their forces, the history of conventional warfare is the,
shows a great deal depends on concentration of general --?--
on many intangibles that you, that are very hard to calculate.
NATO has to spread its forces long long front. The best NATO
forces on the Central Front are in the South, the American and
then next comes the Germans. The most logical area to attack
in the north is covered by the British, the Belgians and the
Dutch and a few Germans. But then those are also the forces
that have the fewest sustained supplies so I think the idea of
a prolonged professional defense is highly unrealistic and I
have not know any NATO commander who thought we could do more
than hold for at most a few weeks. If that turns out to be
wrong I mean if it turns out that the capacity of NATO is
stronger than that it would be a tremendous bonus. I myself do
not think it is highly probable that the Soviets will attack
in a more odd(?) way in, on the Central Zone.

Q: I was...

A: But I do not think it is improbable that they will
blackmail in some way the with a Berlin crisis or some other
means.

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Q: Which takes me back to another, to why do you say that a flexible response instant to NATO flexible response is not favorable?

A: You keep asking me, with all due respects the wrong questions, I'm not against flexible response. The incident in need of massive retaliation of all out general war is credible. I am not objecting to the instantiniety(?) of flexible response. I do believe however that if the only answer we have is the mass extermination of civilian populations that is not credible because the Soviets know they can kill as many Americans as we can kill Soviets and they will ask themselves whether any rational decision makers would resort to such actions. That is the problem. As to first step now if the Soviets face the high probability of some significant nuclear response and if they feel that once it starts it will be very hard to calculate how it could be limited then they would contribute to the limitations, to deterrents.

Q: I see and how do you think the Europeans, we Europeans, support the Americans in this approach? And what are your feelings on the Summit?

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A: Oh I think the Summit was everybody they found general poor(?) relations to avoid making explicit aerial(?) concerns. They found a formula to support modernizations of nuclear weapons but attached no timing to it. They found a formula for the reduction of conventional forces but they made no specific proposal about it. I believe the Europeans avoided facing the President in the last six months of this period in August, risked any real decisions and the President decided that he didn't want to face the Europeans with any real decisions so I construe this some ways as a way of getting through this year without solving anything.

Q: How will the, this Summit the Moscow Summit looming
ahead?

A: Yes.

Q: And what are your feelings on that?

A: My feelings are that the series of agreements that are
being made have the practical consequence of stigmatizing the
weapons on which the defense of the Atlantic Alliance depends,
namely nuclear weapons. And secondly reducing the capacity to
use them. At the same time I believe that the Western
governments have told their publics(?) for so long that they

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want to eliminate nuclear weapons on which their security
depends that nobody feels strong enough except perhaps Mrs.
Thatcher to say the truth. That this is in effect a weakening
at a minimum of the Western psychological decisions. Moreover
nobody wants to say that a conservative American President is
going too far having stigmatized, having criticized him all
during his first 5, 6 years as being too tough but that is so
I think the European reaction avoids all problems and is it's
not particularly heroic.

Q: No I think that the European reaction to Rikovik(?) was
an interesting piece of...

A: But that was the same thing.

Q: Yes.

A: Most Europeans were appalled by Rikovik(?) but you will
find nobody who said so publicly.

Q: Correct. How do we...

A: And they're so, and they're all afraid, I think they have
so many mixed feelings the European nuclear countries at least
subconsciously feel that on the basis of Rikovik the President
is clearly determined to give away some nuclear weapons and
they'd rather have him give away American nuclear weapons than

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Q: Right.

A: The Germans feel, rightly or wrongly, that they have been singled out for special nuclear devastations because they're the only ones on whose territory or most of the tactical nuclear weapons are on their territories and have a reach of only in their territory so the end result of that will be that so the Soviets can operate at both ends of the spectrum. They can make the Germans uneasy by suggesting the deaths(?) or they see(?) the intentions in Germany by suggesting that the tactical nuclear search(?) zero option and they make the British and French uneasy by hinting that the next round of strategic arms negotiations must include the British and French forces. I think that is the real situation.

Q: What about French German?

A: Well I'm in favor of Franco Germany cooperation and I disagree with President Mitterand who once, who has attacked, he has attacked tactical response. I'm not. He wants massive retaliation. He wants to play the game of pretending that no nuclear weapons will fall on German territory and therefore make Germany totally dependent on the French nuclear forces.

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That won't work because the French nuclear forces are less credible than the American nuclear forces but I favor Franco German cooperation. I think it's, I think for Germany to be left alone in defender of the Continent magnifies all the psychological problems of a divided country with a complex history and so I favor Franco German cooperation.

A: I favor also that the West European Union create its only military capacity and I think in the long run that will strengthen Atlantic cooperation.

Q: Do you see Spain and Portugal in it in WU?

A: If they want to join yes. If they don't want to join we should do it, it should be done without them, it's a decision for Spain to make.

Q: Is the acceptance or non-acceptance of the platform I presume?

A: But I'm in favor of Spain joining if they wish to appeal(?) Portugal as well.

Q: We'll come in a moment to relations between Spain. I'm not very sure I like, oh, ahh we were I just said, can we review briefly relations between Spain and the United States? Do you