DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2/24/71 8:00 a.m.

L: You were going to call after you went over that speech. I didn't hear
from you.

K: I got called to the President. Have you got any problems with it?

L: I have no problems with it, but I think it takes away a little from the
report.

K: That's what I thought.

L: I think the report reads well, well-structured. I said I'll send you some comments and he said ' you are just supposed to read it.' I think the text has to be put out and will probably in some cases . . . they'll use a shorter thing than the whole report -- they won't print it all. I just wanted to talk to you about it.

K: I wasn't going to mention it to you but I have the same problem with it.
I don't think it's bad, it's just second rate.

L: It could be improved but if you take the structure from the report and
followed that it would be a lot better. But they didn't want me to work on it
over night. He said no so I thought 'what the hell.'

K: Speech writers are temperamental.

L: They sure as hell are. I said let me work on it for three hours and
he said no I'm supposed to sit with it. I said I promise I won't show it to
anyone but they didn't want me to do any restructuring on it.

K: Okay Mel, thank you for calling.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

2/24/71 9:10 a.m.

Z: Have you gotten any body count thing at all for Thursday?

K: No, you mean for the speech?

Z: No, the killed in action.

K: No, I don't know whether the President did -- at any rate it's 59.

Z: Are you busy right now?

K: I've got somebody with me.

Z: Can you give me a call later?

K: Sure, I also want to talk with you about these afternoon affairs.

Z: Okay.

K: And the President wants the TV people separated from the press.

Z: Okay.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELCON
Adm. Zumwalt/Kissinger
9:47 a.m. 2/24/71

Z: Sullivan? ? ? in regard to the ENTERPRISE visit.

K: I am not eager for it to go in there. Not because the Chilean Navy wouldn't like it but Allente would use it to say they have great relations with us.

Z: Could I sit with you today to go over the exact context of the visit? There's more to be won than by most visits.

K: Everyone has been saying that about Chili on every argument and we will have closer ties with a quasi-communist country than with others.

Z: You know my feelings on Chili but I feel that military can keep him boxed in but independent.

K: I haven't even raised it with the President. So far an entirely personal view.

Z: Could we get together for 30 mins.? You will see it's not an unsophisticated proposal.

K: You don't have to convince me of that.

Z: The pragmatic problem is the ENTERPRISE is making 75 knots. Ideally we should have it done on the 26th.

K: I will have Halperin get in touch with you on a time for tomorrow.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Safire/Kissinger

10:04 a. m.

2/1 24/71

K: We are getting another draft. The problem Bill is this. Laird called this morning and he thinks this speech is worse than the report and that it will violently detract from the report. This is separate from me. When you look at a painting and it hasn't got an arm but you have 9/10 of the body, what are we objecting to. Some is professional and we can face it.

S: I have a bunch of suggestions here and a new draft. What do you want to do?

K: I want to get this retyped and get it to you and let's see.

S: Fine. I am completely available.

K: It will take about 15 mons.

S: Shall I come over there?

K: Let me call you after I go talk with Win.

S: You have talked with the President/

K: I have not mentioned it to him. I will not. I think it's best if you have an agreed draft. I have not said Laird is complaining and I have reservations about it.

S: It would be best to combine the drafts.

K: I agree. I will be back to you in about 15 mins.

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2/24/71 11:40 a.m.

K: The Commander-in-Chief is getting awfully sore about the slow-flying platforms he wants over there. Can you get a paper over here on that?

L: I did -- I sent you a paper.

K: Oh, then it's probably going through my bureaucracy. It's my fault. Does it give specific dates when it will be there. He wants to have some additional stuff.

L: We're putting gunships and A-1s out there as fast as we can -- I don't know what else we can do.

K: When did you send the paper over?

L: I signed it Monday night -- it may not have gotten to you till yesterday. Those B-26s -- it's better to buy aircraft than to send them. All the wiring in them would have to be redone.

K: I'm on your side -- I'm not finding fault.

L: I know, I'm not arguing -- I'll send you a paper.

K: I don't even know what a B-26 looks like.

L: If you fly over Arizona you'll see them.

K: That's the wrong thing to say. Don't put that in the paper.

L: But it's true.

K: I know it is. It's exactly what Arnold Palmer said to him

L: If you fly into Tuscon you fly over thousands of them.

K: Tell him in the paper that the wings were falling off them in '63 already.

L: Tom Moorer came in and said 'you're not serious about those B-26s! I said yes I am. He said 'I wouldn't fly that one of those in '63.'

K: Say you have carefully examined them, that we are, of course, prepared to do it but this is the case and I will endorse it.

L: Okay.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
Sen. Allot/Kissinger
11:43 p. a. m. 2/24/71

A: How are things looking over there?

K: About like they did yesterday.

A: So they didn't deteriorate.

K: They have broken off attacks in the northern section.

A: I told you about my attempts to get in touch with you about the Finnish and SALT talks.

K: I was mortified.

A: That was long ago. What I want to tell you is I am going to Germany next week on Interior work. This has great application in the West.

K: I will get you red carpet treatment.

A: I have talked with State. No need. I have made arrangements to talk with Rush on Sat. morning. I have a ride with Mitchell 3 days early but I want you to know I am going to talk with Rush.

K: Will you be meet?

A: I am all arranged for.

K: I will call Rush and be sure that nothing is lacking.

A: I know he is a close friend of the President's.

K: I will tell him what we think of you.

A: Just a word to say I can be trusted.

K: I will do that immediately.

A: And you might tell the President I am going to talk with him.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
C. McGregor/Kissinger

12:00 noon 2/24/71

K: There's been some talk here about this foreign policy report whether the President should get together with the bipartisan leadership and if it should be done.

M: Memo from Bill Timmons that went through me and I okayed it.

K: Bill Timmons thinks he might not want the President to do it. I am in
favor of it. It has to be done tomorrow. Will you take action?

M: I will.

K: We have to get the fax report translated into English.

M: From Swahili?

K: Germany

M: I never would have guessed. OK, I will let you know.

NARA, Dalo

5/26

TELCOM
Bernard Kalb/Kissinger

12:22 p. m.

2/24/71

HAK: I wanted to mention two things -- one, I just want to check out this appearance with Haldeman-and the President. No reason for objection.

K: I was delighted it was possible and you can imagine here because it comes right on top of the State of the World.

HAK: I want to get ground rules straight. I haven't talked about substance of foreign policy on TV. I am stretching that here but I want to talk on what this report tries to say. Questions so I am explaining what's in the report instead of profound new thoughts. But presumably it covers all problems.

K: It covers everything on people's minds.

HAK: But phrase the questions so they focus on the report. Otherwise it will be hard to say why I don't talk before Congressional committees but talk on TV.

K: You will get your high sign today?

HAK: Yes.

K: And if you will give me a call --

HAK: I will.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 p.m., February 24, 1971

K: What is that baffling comment that Haig is working on a speech?

H: No, you are. He would like General Vogt to come over and give him a briefing. Check to see if he is available.

K: Was I supposed to sit in?

H: He wants you to stay on the speech. He wants to do the briefing while you are working on the speech.

K: I have given all my comments.

H: But you have to look at it again.

K: I understand.

Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

1:25 p.m., February 24, 1971

H: Bring him in over at EOB low-key.

K: My backgrounder will be over about 5:15.

H: Bring him in at 5:30.

K: Okay.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 p.m., February 24, 1971

K: Was I supposed to sit in?

K: I understand.

Bob Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

1:25 p.m., February 24, 1971

H: Bring him in at 5:30.

K: Okay.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/General Vogt
1:30 p.m., February 24, 1971

K: How are you?

V: I have been better.

K: Are you building a four-lane highway on Route 914?

V: We better not be.

K: Just two days in a row I would like to see the same battalion
in the same place. The President would like a briefing from you
around 5:30.

V: On Lansam?

K: Yes. Come to my office at 5:30 and we will take you over.
The same sort of thing I get each morning but a little broader.
Give him a sense of the flow of the thing over the period of a week
and where you plan to go in the next few weeks.

V: All right. I'll be there.

lds

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

1:50 p. m. (?)

2/24/71

P: Before you have your briefing this afternoon you better look over Mel's. I talked with him and I think he handled it well. One point I want you to nail. Zeigler should not brief after you.

K: I have TV and press.

P: Zeigler shouldn't brief. I asked Mel about the Tchepone thing. He said that what they did was to say the WH briefing said Tchepone was the objective. I told him that wasn't true. They may try to nail you on that.

K: Klein might have said it. But he doesn't know enough.

P: Well, he knows -- you used disruption thing. We were careful not to use Tehepone. Mel said he knew they didn't but that they always quote unnamed sources at the WH. Zeigler didn't say it because it would be on record.

K: We agreed not to give a particular objective.

P: We thought we might only get in for a few miles. Zeigler should read Mel's briefing and have him follow up and if a reporter said someone at WH he should nail it publicly and say it's absolutely a false question based on false assumption. It should be nailed. You will find your questions are devoted more to that then the report. Get them off it and onto the report.

K: I will say first the report and then 15 mins. on Laos at the end. Otherwise it will be an hour on Laos.

P: Good.

K: I will look at the briefing before.

P: Get one of your staff to find out what the question was asked on Tchepone and then have Zeigler read it and nail the Tchepone thing. Mel is very tough.

K: He is good.

P: Not giving an inch. I don't know what we can do. Vogt --

K: I have him set up --

P: I want to see the stuff before the NSC meeting so I can be current.

K: I have him set at 5:30.

P: That's fine.

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

2/24/71 2:05 p.m.

Z: Laird did a very good job.

K: Good.

Z: Spent an hour and 25 minutes. My judgment is that because he went so extensively into this there's no need for you to cover it.

K: I won't unless they ask. Have you got a text?

Z: No, and unfortunately we're not going to get one in time for the 2:30 meeting.

K: But before the 4:30?

Z: We'll try.

K: When they start asking questions about Laos I'll just say let's talk about the report first and then that if there's time.

Z: Laird said there weren't two pipelines cut.

K: That son of a bitch!

Z: He said there was one main and a spur that went out from there.

K: I was told by those stinking briefers there were two. Why would I make that up?

Z: Well there was a spur coming off of that -- you can say there were two: one major one and one a spur. You might want to check with Laird's office. One other thing: they said we were told by the White House that Tchepone was . . .

K: I never said Tchepone was an objective.

Z: No, but you said it was a switching station.

K: The Tchepone area.

Z: That's okay.

K: Okay, you're doing a good job.

Z: I thought you were until I saw your luncheon guest.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

2/24/71 2:05 p.m. page 2

K: I'm trying to keep the Democrats confused.

Z: I opened the door and thought you were having lunch with David Young. I walked around that bookshelf and nearly swallowed my pipe. Did you see me?

K: Harriman has been wanting to tell me for two months about his trip. I couldn't put him off any longer.

The Vice President/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

February 24, 1971 2:15 p.m.

jlj

NARA, Date 5/26

VP: Henry. How are you today?

K: I am fine.

VP: How's the operation going today?

K: OK. They are still cutting . . . aerial strike for most of the major roads. When you read the press - if I was a logistic officer in Hanoi . . . They cannot know which are going to be open on which day. The *Times* . . .

VP: Just a moment. OK.

K: I have one or two reservations but they are not the same ones. If we had 15 minutes I would be glad to talk to you about them.

VP: When will you have some time?

K: How about tomorrow?

VP: I have to go over to the State Department to introduce Secretary Rogers and Laird to the Governors. Then I have a luncheon for them. Afternoon I will be free.

K: OK, let's get together. I am free in the afternoon. Have they asked if you would call attention to the Annual Report when you talk to the Governors?

VP: I just got a copy of it. It just says that we may want to send advance copies to all the Governors and that NSCX we are getting NSC reaction on this now and waiting to see what they say. You do not want to do that do you?

K: Yes, sure. That would be fine with us. And you could draw attention to it in your remarks.

VP: Fine. You can get them to - get one of your staff to give them to Kent Crane. Another thing Henry that is bothering the hell out of me is Taiwan.

K: I don't know how we are as an enemy but as a friend we are (formidable).

VP: I am leaving for Hilo on Tuesday for a revenue sharing meeting out there.

K: Where?

VP: Hilo, Hawaii. I was wondering whether you thought, as long as I was half way there, you would want me to go to Taiwan and meet with them.

K: The President took a very strong negative view of it.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

VP: How about this for a counter. What about inviting Chiang Ching-kuo (?) to meet with me?

K: Let me raise it with the President. Tomorrow I will give you his reaction.

VP: I am not pushing it. I am just worried.

K: No, I know there is nothing in it for you personally. I know that. I will raise it with you the President and let you know tomorrow when I see you.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Bill Safire/Mr. Kissinger

5:30 p.m., February 24, 1971

S: Let me try a paragraph on you.

K: Why kill a good speech?

S: The President, you, Rogers and I checked the thing. The girl is typing it now and she caught a discrepancy. [Read it to Mr. Kissinger who agreed] I propose the following: 'If the North Vietnamese wish to negotiate, they will have to recognize that time is running out ... except with respect to the POW issue. ...'

K: But that doesn't say we will keep forces there.

S: Then we go on to say, '...our eventual goal is total withdrawal of all American troops, etc.'

K: Okay. That's all right.

lds

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger
6:10 p.m., February 24, 1971

P: How did your second round go?

K: Very well. They asked nothing about Laos. They had read it very carefully.

P: You spent about an hour?

K: About 45 minutes. They asked some tough questions.

P: They had read it?

K: Yes.

P: Good. That's lots better than last year. They hadn't read it last year. This was a good idea to give them advance copies.

K: The questions showed a lot of thought. I will have to read it more carefully next year. They asked questions like on page 126... There were no inconsistencies. They were primarily interested in the Soviet chapters, SALTT to some extent, Vietnam. There was only question on the Middle East.

P: Of course, Vietnam.

K: They were not unfriendly questions.

P: That's all right. Good. Some of the thoughtful ones asked questions? That's good. This is something on which you will have stories several days. There will be news stories tomorrow afternoon and evening and Friday. The main thing is there will be a column thing in the news magazines.

K: An MIG-29K interpretive stories on Sunday.

P: Riland said he just saw you.

K: He really relaxes me.

P: Good. Get some rest.

lds

By NAIA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Bernard Kalb/Kissinger

10:17 a.m. 2/25/71

HAK: The ruling of the people here is this and I can see their point. If you want to talk to me about procedure and how the report was written and what it attempts to do without going into substantive I will do it. But we have turned down "Face the Nation" and others on grounds that we don't discuss foreign policy publicly.

K: On the grounds of our conversation yesterday would that be okay?

HAK: No, because you would ask about policy.

K: About tone.

HAK: They would rather you didn't. What does the President do, how other departments fit in. No reason for you to do that.

K: If we were asking questions about what the report said.

HAK: That's what I thought at first would be acceptable. Explain the report rather than my views but they feel it's too close to explaining my views.

K: If you work within the basis of the report and say that ? ? ? ? along lines of yesterday, and that would be all right?

HAK: I think not. On a matter like this I can't say I XXXXX was an anonymous advisor but I should keep the fiction of it.

K: You think it is should be said within the framework of--

HAK: That's the judgment of the people here who state the public relations policies and this is out of my area. What does a report like this attempt to do and how is it made?

K: How about our raising technical questions like that come out of the report. Say "careful reading of China thing seems to hold out moderate ______ with the two countries."

HAK: I could say it's a fair reading but not go into it. I don't want to break the spirit of it.

K: You would have to hold back on certain things. I will talk with the producer.

HAK: I will see you and Marvin for lunch or dinner in the next two weeks.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

B. Kalb/Kissinger

KL Hold on just a minute -- I have a quick reaction -- could we work it out on what you would be willing to answer? That's what you told me.

HAK: It's not an attempt to steer you into areas helpful to us but rather why am I on TV when I won't appear before committees.

K: I will get back to you soon.

By

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joan Braden

10:35 a.m., February 25, 1971

K: Joan, how are you?

B: Henry, it's you. My houseman doesn't speak very good English. I'm fine. I didn't have a chance to thank you. You were sweet to send flowers.

K: Will you shut up. I'm very fond of you. It was a very nice evening.

B: Wasn't it fun? I did think it was fun.

K: I have some acquaintances from Beverley Hills coming into town tomorrow -- Doug Cramer. He's head of Paramount TV productions. His wife is Joyce Haber.

B: I know her.

K: Can you and Tom join us for dinner at the Jockey Club? I am having Valenti and others.

B: We would love to, but we have to go to Fred Harris's for dinner. It's one of those things. What time? Are you having drinks at home first? If you do we might come -- you can call me late. I think dinner is at 8:00 there. Really I'm sorry -- I would love to. I'm so pleased you came last night. We must further our conversations about certain people who were there last night.

K: Yes.

B: Thank you and I'm sorry.

K: See you soon.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

10:42 a.m. 2/25/71

L: I am going to spend time on Laos and Cambodia with the Governors. I wanted to visit with you. I had a visit on the telephone with the President yesterday for 45 mins. I am concerned about some of the information on the Westmoreland proposition. They got into the WH machinery. Tom Moorer is closer in touch with this operation and Abrams then anyone else. The President suggested Vogt but I said Moorer was chairman and ask in closer touch.

K: I wanted Moorer yesterday but he did it that way because Moorer wasn't available.

L: You know how I feel about that. I rather use Tom. On Westy, there's a feeling with him and Abe which you know as of. We have never had a better team then Abrams and Weyand. If I come to the point where I don't think we can rely on them, I will tell you.

K: That's not a problem. Westy has been trying to come over for a long time so I had him over on a personal basis for his judgment on what's going on. That didn't go anywhere.

L: We get a report on that. I was disturbed on what he said.

K: I told him whatever he said to me he should tell Moorer.

L: You have to put greater trust in Tom then on Westy's comments.

K: I didn't tell the President about it. It was for my own understanding. One, if you look at the military history it isn't field commanders who are always right.

L: That's true.

K: Secondly, the thing that's created a problem for me is that the briefings in the morning don't hang together. I got a briefing this morning and they didn't mention Hill 31 and I pick it up in the newspapers and if someone asks me I don't know what's going on. The next thing I would try to do is get an order to ______. I just want to be sure every aspect is getting looked at. I recognize my responsibility to the President is that he stays on steady course and I didn't tell him of my concerns. If I have concerns then I tell them to you, not Westy. Did he think I had a concern.

L: He indicated you had the same questions he did.

K: He told me of his strategic ideas. I said a course of concern and tell it to Moorer.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

10:42 a.m. 2/25/71

-2-

L: I went over the whole plane in the tank. I didn't ask to every Chief and asked a series of questions. I wanted to be sure that all approved the plan. There hasn't been a Secy. who spent time with the Chiefs that I have. I expect them to speak up before the program goes forward and not afterward. I am tough on them and I will be. You follow me/

K: Absolutely.

L: That's why I am a bit of a SOB once in a while but I have to be in this kind of operation.

K: Nothing will go to the President on those operations that I don't talk with you about first. No second-guessing in the oval office.

L: They want to get into position when the decision is made. Questions raised before decisions and not after.

K: I understand and Westmoreland has a tough personal problem as a former commander there. But he was very meticulous saying the field commander always knows best.

L: We have gotten certain suggestions through to Abe in a nice way and he usually comes back and on 914 changes are being made and he is making them himself. Abe hates it like hell to do what I ask him to do on press and he did a good job.

K: I was talking with Haig a few minutes ago and the news flow there is better after what you did this weekend.

L: He will keep on this. Going up there for a press briefing on ____ I.

K: If he could send in a conceptual report once a week.

L: We will do it twice a week.

K: The big picture twice a week and you would have the WH off your back.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safire

10:59 a.m., February 25, 1971

S: He goes on in 30 seconds so any changes you want to make will have to be on the last pages.

K: It's probably too late. Will he have the arms control stuff on TV -- that he hopes for an agreement?

S: Yes.

K: Oh, God damn it! Some things cannot be left to him to choose because he may not know the whole picture.

S: He wants to go on TV. Oh, he's starting to talk now. Let's listen to it.

K: Can I still do something about the TV thing?

S: I don't know. You would have to check with Ron.

K: I will talk to Ron.

lds

By

NARA, Date

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

11:05 a.m., February 25, 1971

K: Mel, Just to put it in perspective, Westy wasn't here for
more than 10 minutes.

L: I understand that.

K: He dropped in to give a quick impression of how it looked to him. Haig was there. We told him to go back and say the same to Moorer. I wanted you to understand. So this wasn't a big conference. The President doesn't know anything about it.

L: Very good. Thanks, Henry.

lds

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

2:14 p.m., February 25, 1971

K: I was talking to the President about that visit of the aircraft carrier to Chile. Has that come to your attention?

R: No.

K: When Zumwalt was down there, he was being feted by the Chilean navy. They took him into Allende. He got carried away and promised a visit of an aircraft carrier on its way to the Pacific. We have to make a decision by tomorrow.

R: Why send it to Chile?

K: That is the President's view. If you shared his view about being leery, we could unite on it.

R: We are trying to be proper but cool with Chile.

K: They have municipal elections in Cuba soon. Allende will use this.

R: He will say they don't have to be nice to the United States to get what they want.

K: Zumwalt says this is a way of strengthening the military whom we are counting on.

R: But Allende will take the credit.

K: I agree with you. I think basically in the public mind Allende will get credit from it. No matter what you do to the U.S. you don't have to be a friend.

R: You can go further and say, 'you get more attention if you kick the U.S. in the teeth.' We haven't sent nuclear aircraft carriers to other Latin American countries.

K: Except to Rio.

R: Relations with Peru are better than Chile. Tell the President my view is not to do it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

2:14 p.m., February 25, 1971

- 2 -

K: I may have an SRG meeting to let Zumwalt state his case. Would you instruct Irwin that is the position I will tend to take.

R: How will the military get credit for it?

K: Zumwalt said the Chilean navy will claim a four-star Admiral was there and a four-star general was there. We agreed to send the tanks they have bought. We have gone out of our way to be nice to the Chilean military.

R: It will be construed that we are trying to curry favor with them.

K: I think your people are uneasy about it. I have not talked with them, but I have heard that.

R: Tell the President this is how I feel about it.

lds

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

2:20 p.m., February 25, 1971

M: Good afternoon, Henry.

K: Brian, how are you?

M: Not so good. I listened to the President today.

K: What did you think?

M: I thought he was sort of being very sincere. But there is still the old question. I liked what he said about Europe very much, and Africa. But I don't know on Vietnam. I feel two-thirds of the speech is really good sound thinking. The other third is the antithesis of being unable to ever do the other two-thirds. He is asking Americans to give more than ever before. We are getting more greedy. I don't know... I really did agree with his outline, and I can realize his fear of Cuba -- it's so close it cannot be accepted. At the same time, there is the whole Vietnam thing. Philadelphia is almost waging war. Two cops just killed a retarded boy who was only out of Vietnam two months. People feel they have given so much already -- without a payoff. I have no answer for that third.

K: That is the nightmare.

M: The nightmare is it can go beyond the point of being able to recover. Victory...

K: Victory isn't the point.

M: If Hanoi did a turn-around tomorrow and gave all the boys a ticket home, would that be a working solution? With regard to Vietnamization, people are now more pro-war because they are afraid he is leaving the prisoners there. It is really a difficult time.

K: I hope this is the last crisis.

M: I don't think we have the energy for another one. Does that help at all? I don't know...

K: Yes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

2:20 p.m., February 26, 1971

- 2 -

M: I wanted to send you a note. But I wanted it to be confidential and be sure that no one would read it.

K: You could put your name on the cover and double envelope it and say 'exclusively for.'

M: It's not secret -- it's personal.

K: No one will read it. You can send it to my house [gave address].

M: Great. Do you see any chance in the future for the other meeting?

K: I will get Dave Halperin to call you.

M: What happened to Dave Young?

K: I wore him out.

M: He is good and loyal.

K: That's a rare quality here

M: Can we have dinner when you feel like it?

K: When you are down here. I will look forward to that.

Ids

2:25 p.m., February 25, 1971

M: Henry, I forgot to ask you one question. Tomorrow night, Alice and I are supposed to go to an art reception -- the Ambassador of Japan. Is he worthwhile meeting?

K: Ushiba -- not bad.

M: But not too exciting?

K: Not outstanding. He's not a warm human being, but few Japanese are.

M: I wanted to know whether he was outstanding. Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Taft Schreiber/Kissinger

3:55 p.m.

2/25/71

S: I have a little problem. I am embarrassed to call you. I have a depreciation problem on motion pictures. I have a meeting with Shultz, Ehrlichman and ______ for Sat. at 1:00. Could we have lunch on Sunday? Or could you come to the Cezanne opening and dinner that night?

K: Why don't we aim for lunch on Sunday.

S: I feel like a dog calling you. We have lunch on Sunday. Wherever you want to meet let me know. Leave word at the hotel.

K: Let's aim for lunch. A hotel will be the only place open. Maybe the Madison.

S: Or the Georgetown Inn. If it has to be humble, fine. ??

K: I was going to have the Cramers for lunch on Sat. So lets' join forces. Can we consider also going to -- when is the Cezanne opening?

S: Sat. night at Philips.

K: I cannot do that.

S: Have you got an early or late dinner?

K: 8:00

S: You could see it earlier.

K: I will catch it another time. I will leave word for you at the Madison.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Secy. Laird/Kissinger

5:17 p.m. 2/25/71

L: There were two things I didn't have a chance to finish up with you. Yesterday on this Rolling Thunder plan I told the President about what we had developed and I would like to show it to you and the President. Right now maybe we should wait a week or so because I don't think the targetting is that good.

K: Domestically? You think it's worse than a week from now?

L: It will seem a desperation and we don't want to give that impression.

K: I get the point.

L: Can I see you after the meeting tomorrow?

K: Sure. With the President or with me alone?

L: Either way. We can decide tomorrow. You can let me know. If he is serious about it--

K: It won't be done without talking with you.

L: Maybe we can discuss it first.

K: What do you think about the ENTERPRISE visit to Chili?

L: I told Zumwalt to talk with State because the Ambassador is against it.

K: The President isn't happy with it nor is Bill.

L: We shouldn't do it. I have no problems personally but if it interferes with my long term political problem then we shouldn't do it. It will help militarily within the countries.

K: Let's wait until the morning.

L: They are telling me the reaction in State tomorrow. Murphy tells me there's opposition because the Ambassador is against it.

K: We are doing a lot for the military right now.

L: I will tell you one thing you had better talk to Irwin w about this.

K: Tom Moorer did well this morning. Why not stall on the Haig visit for two weeks.

L: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Secy. Laird/Kissinger

5:17 p.m.

2/25/71

-2-

K: Then it doesn't look like second-guessing.

L: No problem on that. Talk about that other operation.

K: Let's do it after the meeting.

L: I will put a hold on it and talk with you tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safire

5:50 p.m., February 25, 1971

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Don't say "yes, Henry" anytime I call as if I am asking for something. I will have you cut down eventually. I wanted to ask whether you wanted to have lunch with me and friends of mine from Beverley Hills -- Doug Cramer, Head of Paramount TV Productions -- and his wife, Joyce Haber who writes a gossip column.

S: Oh, yes, I've heard of her. That's nice.

K: And bring your wife. At the Sans Souci on Saturday at 1:00.

S: That sounds wonderful. Thanks.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Mankiewicz/Kissinger

6:42 p.m.

2/25/71

M: I have the worst case of chicken pox.

K: I was going to invite you to dinner tomorrow night.

M: You will get it.

K: I have a friend on the West Coast who is a wild ______ fan.

M: I don't think I will be in condition to do it. I'm not contagion free.

K: Doug Cramer -- head of production of Paramount TV.

M: My doctor will not let me out of bed let alone out of the house. First day without a temperature of 102.

K: It's good for the Administration.

M: I thought you would have noticed things were going better for you. What was the mess age well received today?

K: I can't tell yet. But I think it's a good message.

M: Is the text in the evening papers?

K: The text is 62,000 words which I expect you to read from cover to cover.

M: Nothing broken down?

K: NO.

M: Then iwill have to read the whole thing.

K: That's what I think.

M: I can't get out until the middle of next week. You were very kind to ask me.

K: Next time you come in if the Atty. Gen. is waiting in the lobby, I will know you are being tailed by the highest authority.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
B. Kalb/Kissinger
late morning 2/25/71

BK: We have taken to some of our people on this because we have problems. We have asked Crawford from NY to talk with you.

Crawford: I don't think we have problems.

K: You don't have them, we do.

C: The thing that bothers News is circumscribing the questions in advance but if we say News going to be on the report and say so openly and say we want News amplification of it --

K: That's what I can do. I have no problems of talking on the substance. But if he says "what you say on Communist China is mild" I can say that's fair but if he wants amplification then I am in trouble. But if he wants background stuff this I can do. It's not an effort to manage the news but me out of the news.

C: If we get beyond these points --

BK: Saying it's a sensitive job --

C: You could say you couldn't go beyond what you have said then we can go beyond to the next question.

K: If I can say that it's not for a WH aide to go into substance then I will answer your questions.

C: It's a practical thing. We can agree on the general areas on what questions will be but what happens if a question goes beyond --

K: Then I will say that. But the normal thing for an interviewer to do is ask about withdrawal policy or say what do you say when we are down to men?

BK: If we pick up the substance on Cambodia and try to get into timing, saying they put that sentence in --

K: If you understand I want to stay away from substance. For internal reasons.

BK: If you want to say I can only go so far --

K: If I can do that in the beginning and say I don't generally speak on substance --

BK: If question goes beyond what is comfortable and you might be uncomfortable about it.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

B. Kálb/Kissinger
late morning 2/25/71

-2-

K: So long as Mr. Kálb understands.

BK: We want to be sure it's not anemic. My own feeling --

K: If you think we shouldn't do it, I can understand it.

BK: We can do it if we are open about what we are doing and viewer would understand it's sensitivity of area.

K: We are agreeing that I will make clear what I cannot answer.

BK: Then if someone asks questions you cannot answer then you will say so.

K: It's just you, isn't it?

BK: No, Marving and John Hunt in NY. They will carefully lead in on what we are saying now. John will go into saying your joy is sensitive and suggest that what the report hopes to accomplish, etc., and then perhaps we can go into some of the sentences.

K: How long?

BK: 20 mins.

K: At what hour?

BK: 7:15. We would probably go on about 7:30. We haven't done anything like this since last fall.

K: I am usually belligerent at that hour.

BK: So am I.

K: It could be more fascinating.

K: If you could straighten this on procedural things.

BK: And build on report.

K: What it hopes to accomplish, what differences from last year.

BK: What bothered me is if we strayed off into awkward areas then you can say --

K: Give me a chance early in the program -- why I cannot offer certain things.

BK: Make it clear and then we can handle some of it in our introduction and then you can establish what you can and cannot do.

K: Let's do it on this basis. We are gentlemen on this. You don't want to embarrass me.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sen. Jackson/Kissinger
3:05 p.m. 2/26/71

J: I really tried to help you out in caucus. Not many of us left. It's outrageous. They don't do themselves any good. Not enough willing to speak out.

K: If everyone would shut up for 6 months. The idea that we are looking for reasons to stay in there is absurd.

J: They give me the devil. I will just call them as I see them. I got a rumor that I am trying to get an answer to that the heat is being put on Israel to pull all the way back. The over all Soviet --- unless we look at the whole picture -- I am really concerned if this is what they are going to do. I will raise hell. It would be against our national interest.

K: Why don't you write the President a letter?

J: Are they going to do something right away? I can call the President. I think it's probably State.

K: I will tell the President.

J: I feel very deeply on it's impact on the whole middle East problem. We have to get those Russians to roll back. If you can get that message to him and tell him I am deadly serious about it. I will get a letter to him in addition on this point down to you so you can pass it on. My concern is the Rogers crowd. I am just giving you my views.

K: I didn't think you thought I was pushing it.

R J: NO, you are my intermediary. I will talk with the President direct if he will call me.

K: I will transmit your message.

J: I am deeply concerned in this area. I will not say yet anything publicly but don't isolate the few of us that are left. I will get a letter to the President through you.

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON

Hedrick Smith/Mr. Kissinger

3:43 p.m., February 26, 1971

S: Good afternoon. How are you? How do you feel seeing your prose excerpted? That will teach you to give us a summary. If we are going to write small novels... We got most of our ties caught in the machinery.

K: I am not complaining.

S: I am passing on to you a thought if you think about it next year a summary might help us and you. But that's not the reason I called. Some of the comments you made this morning with the Kalbs -- particularly the question about going north... At one point you are quoted as saying [and Rick Smith read this -- having to do with 'we are not threatening North Vietnam)]. I took it that you mean we are not thinking about using ground troops in Vietnam.

K: That is a fair statement.

S: We have asked both the White House and the State Department about that. There seems to be reluctance on that point.

K: I have trouble enough explaining reluctance of mine.

S: Is it to leave the other side guessing? On South Vietnam, does this appear to be a considered set of thoughts that Thieu is asking for planning on a North Vietnamese incursion.

K: For a newspaper to be so worried... I would eliminate a number of my worries if I were you. If you are worried about holding on in Laos, you can't be worried about going north. I don't want to speculate any further. I think I have been very clear.

S: In other words, we are not to worry about it. We want to understand whether anyone else is trying to arrange a national campaign.

K: I will leave it at what I said. I wish I could be more helpful.

S: I do, too. I will try again another time.

Ids

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Scotty Reston/Kissinger
5:12 p. m. 2/26/71

R: I have been sitting here today trying to puzzle in my mind when you claim executive privilege -- when you go public and when you don't.

K: Personally? The Kalb thing?

R: When you are on the record and when not.

K: On the Kalb thing -- Let's take that first. I have never spoken on TV on substance or foreign policy and I had agreed to give a 10 minute account of what the report tries to cover. The one program that tried to cover substance and I was in the spot of time seeming evasive on answering but I will never repeat it.

R: You thought you were tricked?

K: No, I think they felt they had the privilege to ask me what was in the report. I probably shouldn't have put myself in the position where ambiguity could arise. I shouldn't have.

R: When I heard you this morning I couldn't believe my ears.

K: I shouldn't have been done by a Presidential assistant and it will never happen again while I am here.

R: I think there's confusion about this. I am interested in principle about this. Ehrlichman is another case --He will go to the Hill and answer questions and brief Republican members of Congress but not submit to questions by me particularly. I can see ? ? ? ? ? in a staff that gets more and more powerful but so long as it sticks with executive privilege I can't quarrel with it.

K: The general rule I have applied and will continue to apply -- I will talk about what my job entails and background of how something happens and what the report attempts to achieve but I cannot report ? ? ? ? .

R: But for back ground you will.

K: But I will try to stay within what I feel is a surrogate for the President on that and not an independent force. Since the President can see as many as he wants.

R: That's what I am trying to get straight. I think the WH is in trouble on this. I don't know what -- the last 2-3 weeks are ghastly.

K: We haven't done much briefing here in the last 2-3 weeks.

NARA, Date 5/26

Scotty Reston/Kissinger

5:12 p. m. 2/26/71

R: I am jumping on you on Laos. I think it's been handled exceedingly poorly. Not only for facilities for reporters. Black out and lifting the black out just before the operation. Perhaps the Pentagon. I don't know what's going on. At least the briefing at the Pentagon is open.

K: Exactly. We haven't had any formal and very few informal -- No briefings on Laos. I answered a few questions in Zeigler's office for 10 mins. I see your point.

R: What do you say about the invasion of a sovereign country without a word from the President on it.

K: Laos? We are not doing a hell of a lot then we have done before. It is afterall a country in which the NVN have been for 4-5 years. It wasn't occupied by ? ? ? ? ?

R: There's a good case for doing so but take the men who will be drafted in the armed services and then not have a word from the President on the action seems to be outrageous.

K: You have had the Secy. of State before the Senator Foreign Relations Committee. We are not doing anything-- pilots have been flying there for years.

R: And most of that canceled.

K: Not on the Ho Chi Minh trail.

R: Before this Administration.

K: We published what is going on in Laos last year.

R: I am clear on your position but I don't like it. But it's not for me to like or dislike.

K: I would be more comfortable if you liked it on personal grounds.

R: I just don't.

K: I don't want you to think it's indifference.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

5:25 p.m. 2/26/71

L: I want to check 2-3 things. One, Geo. Shultz called on the luncheon and he feels he wants to bring Weinberger and Schlessinger.

K: No objection.

L: You can bring Haig and Smith.

K: If it's agreeable.

L: Sure. We were going through tentative guidance and see why we did it this way and if not proceeding properly, we would like to know. A working luncheon. I have no objections to these people coming over. Irwin will come from State.

K: That's courteous of you.

L: Schlessinger leaving in a week few days. He is joining Rogers Morton as Under Secy. of Interior.

K: They will be a wild pair.

L: A lot easier in some other respects.

K: Jesus!

L: Don't make too much of it.

K: We have a common interest.

L: Back several months ago the President said to take care of those two generals. The army has a recommendation. I am going to put my feet to the fire on it. No criminal charge but they want to demote them a rank.

K: Let's talk to the President about that.

L: That g could go to the President.

K: No, keep it away from him. They have to resign in practice.

L: No but it's a promotional procedure in reverse. But I am waiting on it because it wasn't my understanding with the President. He said take care of them. On the ENTERPRISE --

K: I talked to the President and he would just as soon cancel the trip.

L: How about the President?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

5:25 p.m.

2/26/71

-2-

K: I am waiting to see him.

L: I should follow up and if shouldn't go ? ? ? ?

K: Zumwalt went way off base on his conversation.

L: Zumwalt said he sent a wire back here through State and Defense.

K: No but the tone says we share their objectives.

L: I realize that.

K: He is a first class guy.

L: I should take the heat. The ship is going to Hawaii and it will be near that port by 8:00 Sunday.

K: I will get to the President immediately.

L: Last item is that I hope we can get any comments on the Defense report as soon as possible. We have most and have your memo today. Only a couple of ______ where the language can be taken care of.

K: We will give the basic comments by Mon. afternoon.

L: The classified will not be released until May 15 but it has to be given to them Thurs. We have to deliver to the pringer 24 hours in advance. We have to have it to the printers by 12 noon Monday. No problems with State but you might have things to crank in, I have nothing else. I am ready on this -- I am sending to you the plan. No problems militarily on it. I am ready to go up above the 3rd pass so we limit it to 8:00 from the top bass to the DMZ. I haven't authorized to go ahead because I don't know if we want it going this weekend x from a political standpoint.

K: Let's wait.

L: We will talk about it Monday.

K: I have no problem -- I have a colonel on my staff who is up for promotion for brigadier general. He has done an outstanding job. he has been in finance and ISA but not much combat.

L: You think he qualifies in all other ways.

K: And Haig feels the same way.

By. Φ NARA, Dale 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

5:25 p.m. 2/26/71

L: And I have taken care of Haig. He has never been passed over. I wouldn't
let that happen.

K: It's Col. Richard Kennedy.

L: I will check on it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Birrenbach/Kissinger
5:33 p.m. 2/26/71

B: I have called you on behalf of Bartzel. You have heard of the new Western proposal on Berlin. They accepted it without talking with the opposition. This is against the agreement (last fall). The CDU has supported the government inspite of their objections. We prefer not to have difficulties in Berlin. But Bartzel is not able to remain silent because of what he knows about the German proposal unless he can say he will have the possibility of seeing you and the President before these proposals go into a definitive state.

K: Sonnenfeldt has told me the problem.

B: Do you think it's a possibility in April to see you and the President?

K: I am always glad to see him. I recommend that you request an appointment with the President through the Ambassador. I cannot be accused of interfering with German domestic politics. Whether the President consults with Bartzel is a problem for the government and not me. I understand your position. If you request it through the Ambassador it will come to me and I will take it up with the President but I cannot give any assurance.

B: In principle this is possible?

K: I don't know. I will have to wait for the recommendation of the Ambassador.

B: I will see the Ambassador on tomorrow morning. He is meeting with the Executive Committee of the party on Monday. He cannot remain silent on what he knows. It could make difficulties on negotiations which is in no one's interest.

K: I understand. I am always happy to see him but I don't want a public statement made that will effect his position vis-a-vis the government.

B: I hope you will have understanding for our position too and recommend that the President sees him before April.

K: The first thing is a recommendation from the Ambassador.

B: Understood.

K: It's always a pleasure to hear from you.

B: Please ask Sonnenfeldt to tell you what I wrote him about our position. Also a speech on the state of the nation which reflects our position on Ostpolitik. The first pages talk about the proposal of the West and what it means for Germany.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman (I. O.)

6:45 p.m., February 26, 1971

(missed beginning of conversation)

H: ..... the President just before he left.

K: I knew he did.

H: The President said he was going to send it right over so he could look at it tonight. What should we do with it?

K: Give it to us and we will write an analysis of it.

H: I don't know how it will come over. I will tell Alex because the President will probably send it direct to him.

K: He has been talking to him about it.

H: He (the President) doesn't want to take the thing. He wants to give it to you unless you already have it.

K: I don't have it.

H: He wants you to go over it and he wants to have a meeting off-the-record in the morning with you, Laird, Rogers, and Helms.

K: Without Moorer?

H: Yeah and at 10:00 a.m.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
The President

2/27/71 9:18 a.m.

P: Henry, come in about 10 minutes before so we can go over this.

K: Yes, Mr. President.

P: In the meantime, I wanted to be sure you talked to Brandon. I want to be sure this is in a book rather than a current news story.

K: I have talked to Brandon already Mr. President.

P: If it's current news I won't talk as freely as if it's going to be in a book.

K: I have talked with him and I think he's basically very sympathetic.

P: Yes, I think he is too, but if it's going to be current news then I have to talk to others too.

K: Mr. President, how about having Sisco at this meeting?

P: He is supposed to be here. You check to make sure that he is coming.

By. 0

NARA, Date 5/26

Murry Marder/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)
February 27, 1971 5:00 p.m.

jlj

M: Hello Henry. I am just looking for a bit of guidance. Are there plans for a big increase in American air support for this Laos operation and are they going to need have the use of rifle teams?

K: There is nothing to this business of rifle teams. No change in any of the previous planning and they are not going to ... new losses and no substantial forces in for rescue missions. I do not know what DOD will tell you but to the best of my knowledge that is not going to happen.

M: Has pressure on the scene mounted appreciably? This meeting at the White House this morning helped stimulate that appreciation speculation.

K: That had very little to do with it. Only on an informational basis. You recognize that I am dependent on reports I get from out there. The situation is not changed. We are speaking for background here aren't we?

M: Of course. What about helo losses?

K: That is the same. If you look at last week's figures they are about the same. It is in a more concentrated area and that has to be taken into account.

M: The enemy forces on surrounding hilltops . . . is not getting out of the previous range of rescue?

K: It does not look that way.

M: We have the same kind of time frame here presumably? Enemy can reinforce . .

K: Potentially but you must remember that these forces were going to be used in the 1st and 11th Corps later this year. It has to be put in this perspective. Casualties from other [areas of battle]. However, we think they have ______ in there given the fire power they confirm.

M: The Chup plantation operation - how is that going down in Cambodia?

K: It is going extremely well.

M: Would you have any problems with the K-100A? ? ? ?

K: This is a much different operation. They are closer to sources of strength.

M: What we could not gauge from here, at all, - strains on US air capacity - if it was putting some on it. Necessity to make large new deployments of

By. NARA, Date 5/26

blocking forces.

K: NAXX Units that have been earmarked but nothing new.

M: I just wanted to get the term temperature of handling the situation.

(The Pres. is at Camp David)

K: The Secretary of State and Defense are our playing golf and I am relaxing in my office so there can't be a crisis. We would have to call everyone together.

M: The Chup...

K: It is going extrer

M: W. J. E. K. W. J. E. K.

This is a much different
strength.

What we could not gauge from
it was putting some on it. Ne

NARA, Dato

5/26

Joseph Sisco/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

February 27, 1971 5:05 p.m.

jlj

S: Henry. I just wanted to tell you I sent over with Hal a cable and I sent it to the Secretary with a chit that I thought it should be cleared with the White House.

K: If I understand the meeting this morning I thought everything should be cleared over here. To whom does it go and what does it say?

S: You have not seen the cable?

K: No.

S: It is just a cable - what I am trying to avoid is what could happen on Monday. The Israelis go back to Jarring on Monday -

K: They will not change their position.

S: Just hear me out a minute Henry. . . . Jarring in order to control the damage and keep everything cool. In this cable I have laid down a little scenario and I think we should go to both Tel Aviv and Cairo and get their views over the weekend.

K: I can give you what Cairo will say. I could write the response. Look, I have no overwhelming desire to get stuck on this with it. What do you think was decided?

S: I do not think that anything was decided at the meeting today. Just that there was a general consensus that we have to do something either in the Council or on the floor that buys time.

K: If they say "A" are we going to drive them from issue to issue? The President ought to get an answer on this.

S: Don't you think we covered that in this meeting? We are just going to buy more time.

K: How?

S: I want you to look at this cable. I think it will answer some of your questions.

K: What I am trying to get for the President is what comes afterwards - where will we go. You know that the next tactical move may lead to next six moves.

S: I have a paper on the overall program and where we go from here and the results but I have been working 18 hours a day Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

K: If you do well we will give Laos to you.

S: Laos does not look good and if you are worried I do not blame you. I didn't particularly want to spend 10 hours in the department today writing this cable. I just got home and I will try to look the paper over tonight.

K: The President will not be back from Camp David until late tomorrow afternoon.

S: You told us to project ahead. I am going ahead on this cable that really need in order to meet what we may very well be confronted with on Monday. It tells no one to do anything.

K: Did you talk to Rabin today?

S: Yes.

K: What did he say?

S: Told him I was calling on behalf of the Secretary and that we hoped they would reconsider their reply and I hoped he would transmit this to Tel Aviv. He said thank you Joe. I will do it but do not expect any change. The atmosphere was very good.

K: ... what we are crunching for...

S: Henry. Let me tell you something. You really ought to look at the papers we are coughing up to you. The question you raised today about what on the Jordanian side could we do.

K: I know what the papers say. I know it but the President did not know it.

S: I thought your contribution was very good and I thought that the meeting went very well. Everyone was able to get what they thought in. The Secretary did not want to bulldoze the President. He just wanted to go over everything step by step so that he would have a complete understanding. The poor guy, I know he has a lot of things on his mind.

K: I am not sure he understood the Jordanian stand or the situation and by pretending that it is going to be easier next time. . secure frontiers and '67 frontiers. I don't know if he knew the difference between them.

S: Not a hell of a lot. Another thing. Nobody advised that the President get involved himself at this stage. We have a series of problems coming up with Israel. It is the beginning of the rocky road.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Admiral Moorer
2/27/71 5:45 p.m.

K: I wondered when . . . I wondered if I might suggest to you whether you could get some report from Abrams with an analysis of what's going on on Hill 31 to show to the President. I know you think I am losing my cool and bugging the daylights out of you. But I am trying to save the military position. If this goes bad the bugging out will be unbelievable. How does it look now?

M: I was just talking to McCain. Of course it's night there now. Daylight will be breaking soon and then they'll start fighting. As I understand it there is one company on the hill and the other three around the hill. Have joined with the armor and are fighting now to reacquire the hill and they are fighting in that general area.

K: I talked with the President a few minutes ago. If I could talk with him tomorrow morning and say this has just come in it would be a great help. If it involved movements of reinforcements it would be helpful too but that of course is up to the commander.

M: They've got three battalions into Khesahn and I don't know what the next move will be but they know that I want that. I will give you a report which will have the movements first thing in the morning -- that will give us the hours of daylight between now and then.

K: Okay Tom, thank you. And I'll hold the fort here.

NARA, Date 5/26

The President/Mr. Kissinger

February 28, 1971 11:30 a.m.

AMH:jlj

K: State wants to send out a cable which I believe will be the first step in a confrontation with Israel.

P: Did you discuss it with Sisco?

K: Yes it has been discussed. We gave him some word changes designed to soften it to the degree possible and they have accepted them, but the basic problem remains one of strategy. I am afraid that time will force us to let them go but if we had known it was developing this way earlier we could have perhaps worked bilaterally with the Soviets and gotten a great deal more for what we are going to have to do to Israel - perhaps even the Summit. Now it appears we will have to go with the cable but we should try to slow State down.

P: How can we do that?

K: First, to soften the cable. Secondly, to avoid launching into the four-power forum. Explore the issue with the Egyptians, thus buying some time. And perhaps agree to go to the four-power in return for an extension of the ceasefire by the Egyptians.

P: Stay on top of this Henry. Determine where we are going and check with the Soviets. See what we can get from them.

K: At this point I think we are bound to get a brutal public confrontation with Israel. If they cave we will pay a price for nothing. I only wish we had moved with the Soviets and gotten something for it.

P: Is this still possible?

K: In my private discussions they have certainly offered.

P: Should we let the cable go?

K: I am afraid our only alternative is to do that. But someone else should be put in charge. Its moving too fast this weekend. Laird and Rogers are locked together. Therefore, I think for now it is best to let the cable go with the changes I have suggested to State plus a bid to get something from the Egyptians. The important thing is to slow the process down for now.

P: All right Henry. Clear the cable but tell Sisco I don't wish this to move to a blow-up with Israel. Tell him to delay and filibuster to the extent possible. We must be in a position to see what we can get. We should not be polemic or abrasive. It cannot be helpful at this time to put pressure on Israel. Can you

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

talk to Sisco in this way?

K: We have no personal problem, just one of temperament.

P: What about the Soviets?

K: I think we should watch the four-power process.

my

P: Then go to the Israelis, let them know *my* position on the Golan Heights and assure them I will support them.

candid.

K: That is where esterday's meeting was not exactly *good*. State has told the Jordanians the territorial changes will be very minor. We will have to reverse this.

P: Obviously we will have to handle the Jordanians in order to get a settlement.

K: The four-power process must be slowed down.

P: How?

K: I will talk to Sisco.

P: Good. Where do we stand in Laos?

K: I have just talked to Moorer who talked to Weyand. We now have retaken Hill 31. The airborne linked up with a calvary squadron and retook the position. The ARVN have fought very well. Now they are considering leaving them in. The regiment in the south has linked up with its battalions but that has been a very difficult action. We have 25 to 30 tanks knocked out in Hill 31 action. More importantly the ARVN did not break. If the situation *wants* to stabilize we are in good shape. In Cambodia they are still doing very well.

P: Did you tell Joe Alsop I wanted him to go Vietnam to get some honest reporting. I told you this last week. I do not want a white wash, just honest stories.

K: I think he should do so. Moorer told me he was also uneasy about Abrams' failure to enforce but he now feels better. Reinforcements are going in this week. We will still have a month of heat but if we hadn't done this the enemy would have been in Huay by June. The whole effort has blocked their ability to do this.

P: DXX Are they moving up that road?

K: They are moving to do so and they may be on the road now. The enemy

By. NARA, Date 5/26

pressure has been slackened for the last time being. General Weyand says the B-52's have been murderous. Yesterday ARVN found 200 bodies in a B-52 target area.

K P: Henry, that fire is devastating. It must be exacting a heavy toll. Did Joe comment on the world report?

K: Yes. He thought it was great and Bob McNamara has also been very complimentary. An editorial in the *Star* today backed you to the hilt in your foreign policy.

P: Going back to the Middle East, be sure and sit on this problem. Tell Sisco to go slow and talk to Dobrynin at the right moment. Tell Sisco to buy time. He should reassure the Israelis on the Heights and we will have to push the King right to the brink. With the Egyptians we will have to put in our weight against the Soviets. Get everyone talking this way. I am convinced that State knows they are at a deadend. You tell Rabin I am watching. That I will not hurt Israel. I am their friend. I will be the buffer for them. Tell them about the Heights. Do not allow State to do anything precipitous.

K: Mutual confidence is the issue.

P: I will get them the arms but only if they are reasonable.

NARA, Dato 5/26

Joseph Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

(not verbatim)

February 28, 1971 noon

jlj

K: Hello Joe. I have just had a long conversation with the President who has read the cable and he is willing to go ahead provided he knows exactly what... He does not want an all out confrontation with the Israelis. Therefore, wants us to cool the tone a little bit. He did not suggest any specific language but said to tell Sisco to figure out some way to cool the tone down and give us some time.

S: That is just what we are trying to do. Cool the rhetoric and...

K: Cool the rhetoric but wants to have some time to figure out the long [range track]. Wants to know the incentives and pressures. On the Golan Heights you know what his feeling is. On Jordan I think he is willing to go further than we have given him.

S: I think all of this makes sense. I do not purport to have the answer. I just want to do what is minimally necessary both publically and privately to keep negotiations open. Believe me we all agree we are not going to do more than is necessary. The one bad thing is that we have to do more privately than what any of us wants to do. This is too bad. I think you should talk to the Secretary about this too. Don't get me wrong - he does not disagree.

K: The President wants us to gain 2 or 3 weeks.

S: Let me get this so that I understand. There is going to be some four power action this week. There has to be because the ceasefire will expire - what - Saturday. If we are to gain time - 2 or 3 weeks - must figure how we can get to the Israelis in order to keep negotiations open.

K: But we have to have the whole package out - what we will not ask and what we will.

S: Yes I know. Really Henry, I understand you so well - believe me.

K: Looking at the cable I have a few suggestions which would reduce the rhetoric. I understand you have all ready accepted the changes we made last night.

S: Yes but I was at home so if you want to give them to me again I have the cable here and can write them down. I didn't write them down last night.

K: Para B1 on page 3. [both Sisco and Mr. Kissinger reading - most of the changes below are Mr. Kissinger's words which he wanted inserted into the cable] We have examined Israel's reply... reading and find that Israel has not responded to it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

Next page. Frankly we have not . . . intend to discuss this matter further with Israel . . . next line. has not advanced negotiations.

S: Has not advanced matters.

K: Yes. . . . if we are to proceed --- take out more.

S: Are to be effective.

K: . . . that no precuitous action . . . which to discuss with them what can be done. Next page - I believe it is the resolution or something. Express the hope that negotiations will start or something to this effect.

S: Just a minute. This is a key. This is the minimum that we can get by with. I am not trying to say that I am wedded to this formulation but we can not change the thoughts. Do not want to make the judgment . . . this is the minimum that we can say. I have also been working on a positive statement we will have to make here at the Department on Monday at some sort of press briefing. "Examined Israeli reply which we consider inadequate particularly on the question of borders. It is not responsive to Jarring talks with regard to the position of Egypt. (not exact)"

K: This is a head on confrontation. Joe could you explain one thing to me. You know this will lead to imposed settlement. Let's not kid ourselves.

S: Can be but is . . .

K: No that is not my question. Answer me - My question is why shouldn't we have done this with the Soviets and gotten something from the Soviets?

S: I do not understand.

K: You are telling Israel to get back to the '67 borders. Why couldn't we say to the Soviets get their bases the hell out of there.

S: Our position is based on the October 1969 document. This has been our position for years. Why didn't we tell this to the Soviets to get them out of there?

K: Yes

S: This is wholly unrealistic. Totally unrealistic, Henry. Assuming we get a peace settlement, there will be a general disinvolvement by the Russians in the Middle East because the Arabs naively think they can get rid of them. But it will be the same as where we have military bases and there is no [action] - they generally want them to move out and the Russian influence will go down with the Arabs as they become disenchanted - this is assuming we get a settlement.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-3-

K: You do not think this should be worked out used in any way?

S: No. God Bless you Henry, I wish it was ...

K: Ok Joe.

S: I wanted to tell you something personally Henry. Have a chat with the Secretary, I want the two of you guys to work together. Just have a talk with him and tell him I have given Joe the go ahead. KWKXXMKX KOXXX Henry, I will promise you this. I will call you ex once every morning and once every evening to tell you where we are. You do not even have to tell me what broad you are taking out.

K: With a deal like that who can miss. Thank you Joe.

But we will.

Is Yes I know. Really.

K: Looking at the cable I see rhetoric. I understand you have last night.

S: Yes but I was at home so if you have a cable here and can write them down

K: Para B1 on page 3. [both Sisco the changes below are Mr. Kissingen into the cable]. We have examined it that Israel has not responded to it.

Please tell me the latest changes we made

Is again I have the latest.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "NARA, Date 5/26", "Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger\nFebruary 28, 1971 3:05 p.m.\njlj", "(not verbatim)", "K: Hello Bob. How are you? I had a talk with the President this morning on this topic we discussed yesterday. I think he is beginning to see what we are up against. I was wondering if you talked to him about this matter.", "H: I went through the points that you had made with me. That we should decide where we want to end up. We should sit down with the parties and do it. At some point we should get the Israelis in and find out exactly what they want and that . . . MKKKXX It looks like he is being lied to by your friends. He said that this approach makes sense and he can understand that.", "KXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXXXXXXIXXX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By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: When is he coming back tonight.

H: I don't know. There is no indication that he is getting ready to leave.
I don't know where he is.

K: They want to make a public statement tomorrow attacking Israel. I
see no need for that at all. . . . I will try him tonight - I just
wanted to ask you if you has mentioned our conversation to him.

H: . . . constructive basis than they were. . . . ??

K: It is impossible to salvage much under the present management. Could
Connally take it?

H: I don't see how.

K: We will try to slow it down. We retook Hill 31 today.

H: I read that we should took it yesterday. How are we doing with Hill
32 or whatever that other one is right there. We were about to lose it
yesterday.

K: It generally looks a little better today.

H: When will we take Tchepone?

K: It is of no interest. We can grind them down but the big thing is to keep
the roads cut. We don't need to take Tchepone.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Len Garment (not verbatim)

February 28, 1971 3:15 p.m.

jlj

K: I had lunch with Taft Schreiber today and I told him there were three people who understood exactly the Middle East and what was going on there and that was you, Haig and me. He should not pay any attention to anyone else.

K: You have not done anything else?

G: I have not done anything with anyone.

K: We are moving into a very ticklish phase and it has to be handled with the utmost delicacy. The existing channels are going to be saying some harsh things about Israel but we have to keep everything cool. They should not go to the President. I will spend 15 minutes tomorrow and I will brief you on the situation and how we will proceed.

G: What does Taft know, I am having dinner with him?

K: He doesn't know anything. I just told him that from time to time I would want to contact him and would do so through you.

G: Good, I understand. I will come over tomorrow for 15 minutes. Do you think you will be able to do anything for Schreiber on the Hermitage Collection ? If we could it would be a 10 strike for the President.

K: I will see. Do not let anyone approach the Russians or they will say no. We have several things that we are trying to get through them and we will know by the end of April. . . . I will be in touch with you. . . . With Taft - do not be too reassuring when you see him tonight.

NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Rabin (not verbatim)

February 28, 1971 3:20 p.m.

jlj

K: I had a long talk with the President this morning. He asked me to say to you and he asked me to tell you he is doing what he can to ameliorate the excesses of some of the things that are being proposed to you. It is very difficult for him but you any reaction you should keep in mind this fact. I am not saying you will particularly like the reaction.

R: I know. Jarring is going to talk this afternoon to Sadat. I do not know in what way Jarring will present our position to Sadat. I see no need for you to take a position before you know what the Egyptians are going to do. I may be completely off base but Egypt is looking for a way out of the October statements and we have given them a way to get out of it - I am not convinced that they will turn this down. But the United States should not make a statement before they do know what Egypt's reaction will be.

K: That is theoretically reasonable.

R: This way we have given him (Jarring) some sort of way. This is our position. We do not want to say this is our position. We do not want to be hard about this. If you can find a way to solve the issues...

K: We would like to gain a little time.

R: Why should US take a position before they know what is the reaction of Jarring, Egyptians, everybody.

K: Let me say Mr. Ambassador, if your advice should not be taken I hope your reaction will focus on the fact[that the President is thinking about this situation sympathetically]. I do not expect anything to appear today.

R: Not today and I hope not tomorrow. The Egyptians do not know how to get off the hook of the 7th of March. This way we have given them a way to get off the hook. . . . We do not negotiate through Jarring with the U.S. . . . The President said in his letter to the Prime Minister - he gave us maximum latitude with these negotiation.

K: We will have this in mind.

R: Do you want me to say this to somebody else?

K: It would not hurt if you said it later this afternoon - have you talked to Sisco today? X

R: Yes I have.

K: It would I think be useful to say it to Sisco in another hour or so.

NARA, Dato 5/26

February 28, 1971 3:26 p.m.

jlj

S: Two things Henry. You were returning my call weren't you?

K: No. I didn't know that you had called me. What I have on my mind is
that I think about this public statement tomorrow you should definitely check
it with the President.

S: I got the word on that Henry. I am not saying we have to make it. I just
want to be prepared in case it is necessary.

K: We cannot respond until we know what the Egyptians say.

S: We know. Jarring met with them this morning.

K: What did they say.

S: They just communicated it to Cairo. But I am not going to do anything
without checking with you.

K: Why do we have to put out this cable?

S: We want to preempt the Soviets, control reactions and reassure Egyptians. I have sent the cable. I can tell you that. I think it is the right move. Henry, I have two things for you. About this cooling rhetoric that you talked to me about. I sent a personal telegram to about 7 Ambassadors telling them to keep everything low-key, keep cool, keep our objectives in mind and not let our wishes and disappointment at the response - resist any temptation to say things. Secondly, if you can take a minute. I think we know now what we have to produce. I am working on a paper which will study all of the things we want. Israel will not move to international border as long as this is the only thing we are focusing on.

K: I completely agree.

S: This will be a total package in two ways. Relate to the inducements. I am going to come up with a paper which I am writing right now. It will take me a day or so and we will recommend to the President that we make a total effort - private discussions between ourselves and the Israelis with a common understanding as to what package we will be willing to stand on together. In other words, what will it be. I will try to sketch it out for you. The President asked the right question the other day. On border agree what to do and what not to do. Israel agree to Rogers plan with following modifications and additions - 4 power UN force in Sharmel Shiek support in demilitarization of Sinai or substantial rather than total.

K: Territory or numbers?

S: Territory.

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

S: There could be a small power force on the border. Fourth, give the Gaza to Jordan. On the Jordanian side - demilitarization of ________. In Jerusalem - support Israel. Border adjustment in Golan Heights of a minor nature -- This is what I am thinking now and without commenting on it this is the way I am proceeding.

K: You are now saying something that we can talk about.

S: Perhaps a letter from the President and in it he could say this is what we are thinking. I will send Joe Sisco over to talk to you about it. This is a complete package with everything. For inducements - arms to "X" amount. $500 million this year and $500 million next year. That's $1billion [dollar] - this is not chicken feed Henry. I am talking about big peanuts. Refugee question - Israel not be expected to take . . but . . prior to going to Israel would have to sign a statement they would live in peace as Israeli citizens. Political commitment to formalize our consultations. . . UN force on the ground. 5th - big money in terms of compensation. . . economic development. We are going for broke. Cannot go to the President and tell him to go to Golda Meier if we have nothing concrete.

K: Joe, you are now addressing the problem which is bothering him.

S: I called Rabin. I told him we are going to do and say things that we are not going to want to do in next 10 days. Approach going to be doing publically and privately in order to get ceasefire open. He expressed appreciation. Said he - said we have done something that you people do not like. But Henry, give me a day or a day and one-half on this. It is hard to work something like that up in a short time. Do not set a meeting with your group until I call you.

K: I will get off you back Joe.

By

NARA, Date

5/26

February 28, 1971 3:40 p.m.

jlj

K: Mr. Ambassador, I think the point you have made has been well taken and you do not need to tell it to anyone else. I don't think you have to call Mr. Sisco.

R: Since we last talked Jarring met with Sadat (?) and reaction was not favorable. However, I have learned to judge reaction by concrete actions and not what they say at first.

K: I just wanted to let you know there is no need for you to repeat what you told me.

R: If you do not think it is a good idea then I will not.