Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Joseph Kraft

11/24/69 10:23 a.m.

Kraft had a couple of questions: one, the Xuan Thuy statement, is it a
diddle? K said, is terms of historical record, it is total nonsense, there's
nothing to it. Whether it is a backhanded way of telling us something for
the future . . . . . . Kraft said, telling us they are willing to represent
the Front? K said whether this is their way of saying they are more recep-
tive to talks then previously, we'll have to see. K said we are looking at it
from that point of view; as historical record, it is not worth talking about.
Kraft said, is it that bad? K said yes, it says we've been unwilling to dis-
cuss the political future of Vietnam, and that's not true. We've been pre-
pared to discuss Vietnam's political future. K said he said we were not
willing to discuss general political subjects; that's not true. We have been
willing to discuss the future of Saigon. K said we never said we wouldn't
discuss their 10 points. They have discussed outs, and said everything
they think is wrong with them. K said we are willing to; it just didn't turn
out that way.

Kraft asked when the 11 meetings took place. K said he couldn't go into
that. Kraft said at one point it looked like we were going along a formula
line. Kraft asked if there had been any progress. K said not yet. Kraft
said what emerges is a perfect symmetry; we could have this war going on
forever. K said we are not beginning to understand where the real issues
are. K said in September, nothing could happen--nobody in Paris. Then
the moratoriums--nothing could happen until they had seen that. K said
look at it in terms of time frames. They are dedicated communists--they
couldn't let down their allies by making moves in October and November
that might be inconsistent . . . Kraft said, they you see this as positive?
K said he didn't see anything negative. Kraft said he sees the thing as a
perfect symmetry. K said he didn't know, we may botch the whole thing.

Kraft said he never did see the purpose of releasing letters that didn't
say what they were purported to say. K said it was important to show
that we had made efforts and the road of peremptory demanding was not
the way to do it. K said there is also a line in the President's speech
saying that we are not mentioning things that still seem promising. K said
Kraft knew what that meant. Kraft said no he didn't. K said well, it wasn't
directed toward him.

Kraft said we need somebody gibber than Phil to handle the GVN. K agreed.
Kraft said he takes it that there's no thought of replacing Phill for quite awhile.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon

Joseph Kraft

11/24/69 10:23 a.m.

page 2

K said he wouldn't say "quite awhile."

Kraft said, you said this identified better where we stand? K said there are two problems. There are hand-ups on both sides. But during September and October there was no question of the hang-ups. It was a question of getting into a posture to discuss hang-ups. K said this may just be language-- an appeal to the moderate American opinion. K said but if it's genuine, I wouldn't say you couldn't talk in that language.

Kraft asked if K accepted the Rhodes formula; or is that hard? K said everything is hard, but that's not impossible. K said we are looking at it from the point of view of seeing what can be done with it. Kraft said that makes sense.

Kraft said he still doesn't understand what the moratoriums were about, but they weren't clearly weren't about Vietnam. K said yes, that's a problem. K said they may have been triggered by Vietnam, but they have gone far beyond that now. K said that's what we ought to think about. K said 98% of the last was non-violent.

Kraft asked if K had talked with Barnett. K said no, but he would this week. Kraft said that should be interesting. K said he would talk to him this week.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon IO
Ehrlichman
11/24/69 10:58 a.m.

K asked if he was expected to come to the dinner for the governors. E
said yes, but it's not necessary; the day is over at dinner time. K said,
but I am invited? E said yes.

K said how important is it that I go to the lunch? E said not very, as long
as you're there for the briefing. K said the reason he asked is that Habib
is getting a Public Service Award, and he thought he might go to that. K
asked which E preferred. E said he thinks K should be at the dinner.
K said okay, he would do that, and go to the lunch for Habib.

[Both signed off, so I hung up, and then they went on talking. When I picked
the phone back up they were setting up a date and time for a meeting, 4:00
this Wednesday--they didn't say what the subject of the meeting was.]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon

David Rockefeller

11/24/69 12:30 p.m.

K was sorry he couldn't get back to R last week--these negotiations were
very time-consuming. R said they seem quite effective--R saw Sato Friday
night, and he seemed pleased. K said he thought they turned out well; each
got what he wanted, and we decided to be generous about it.

K said about seeing the President. The P is aware of the seriousness of
the situation. He is having a full review of the Middle East thing next week.
He will do his damnedest to fit it in next week, but K couldn't get a firm date
out of him because he is going to Key Biscayne. R said all we can do is try.
R said he should think from his point of view, to have 3 individuals who
occupy certain responsibilities in the world and are deeply involved, for him
not to see them creates further conviction of his inaccessability, which isn't
good. But he's the boss. K said let me go to him again, but the case was
made. R said he knew that, and there's nothing more we can do. R said he
would report to them. R said if not this coming next week, then not at all?
K said no, if there isn't a short time fuse, same time in the next two weeks.
K said the P has seen R, and K and has read the report, and agrees with
R's analyses. He's wondering about what additional information there is.
K said let me go back to him. K said the trouble is we have the budget pro-
cess at this moment. R said let me speak with them before K goes back to
the P. K said he wanted R to know he had put in R's urgent request as fully
as he could. R said no need to go back to him until R has talked with
them. R said thank you very much.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Telecon
Professor Doty

2:55 p.m. 11/24/69

Doty wanted to inform K that Cyrus Eaton was going to be seeing Kosygin and then would be going to Hanoi. Doty wanted to know if there was anything special K wanted passed on to Eaton. K thought that was very interesting and thought that maybe he should see him and asked Doty's advice. Doty said he had been against him for a long time but Eaton doesn't seem to be as radical as he used to be. He has calmed down considerably. K told Doty to have Eaton call him before he leaves. Doty said he would.

K wanted to inform Doty that we would be making public statement about biological warfare tomorrow. If it goes through, K thought Doty would be pleased. If that was so, K thought some expression of good will from people would be very helpful in restoring relationships. K indicated that this was not an issue in which we need help since it is not a controversial subject within the intellectual community. The people who are fighting it are not going to be affected by Doty's expression of support. If some friends could say this is a significant step, if indeed it is what they think, it would be helpful K added.

Doty said he would be ready.

Telecon
Senator Fulbright

6:35 p.m. 11/24/69

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

K wanted Fulbright to know that the President had approved the idea of K meeting with members of the committee. Fulbright and K decided that 4:30 on December 4 would be convenient for both of them and it would take place at the Senators Office in the New Senate Office Building. One point that the President wanted K to make was that we have been prepared to discuss political matters with the North Vietnamese since May and every private meeting we have had has been at our initiative -- there hasn't been a single one called by them. Secondly, we have been prepared to discuss political matters (repeated this). We have told them we would discuss their 10 points if they would discuss ours and said they don't have to accept them, just discuss it. They have refused. Fulbright said they were very difficult people. K felt that if serious negotiations start, it will be fairly rapid. If we can only get over the hurdle and then put our big offers on the table. Fulbright said it was difficult for him to bring himself to believe that the Government has decided to get completely out. K said our problem is that we have to make Vietnamization look worse than negotiating or they won't negotiate seriously. We have to try to handle this to avoid any additional rifts in society. K added that we wouldn't have been doing things we have been doing if we didn't want to get out. K said he worked with LBJ on getting the negotiations started. LBJ handled all of the negotiations just to have alibi for continuing. K said we have to handle it in way that enables us to get greatest degree of consensus of getting things done. K was not saying that the other side doesn't have its problems. It is an enormously concerned situation. In terms of objectives, K said he didn't feel Fulbright and the WH were that far apart. K said if we have learned anything from 1956 it is that we can't afford a settlement that they won't maintain. The only sort of settlement is one which they feel is fair. Otherwise we are just buying a year or two, if that much. Fulbright said he certainly felt the urgency of it. He had never seen such concern about all sorts of things which Fulbright thinks are related to Vietnam. K thought there was no question that this society is facing a profound psychological crisis.

K told Fulbright that he could determine who would be present at their meeting and that he looked forward to it.

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Telecon
General Wheeler

11/24/69 6:52 p.m.

W said he has a small problem: he's invited to the breakfast tomorrow morning, but he's also supposed to speak at the Naval War College. K said he thinks W should go up there. K asked if W wanted to send the acting chief. W doesn't think he knows about the subject. K asked who is was. W said Admiral Moorer. W asked if it would help to have a military man. K said just if anyone asked what do the Joint Chiefs think. W said he would call Mel and ask if he thinks Moorer ought to go. K said yes, why don't you leave it up to him.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Sir Edward Tomkins
11/24/69 7:55 p.m.

K wanted to tell T now, on a personal basis that we are going to make
an announcement tomorrow about our policy with regard to biological
and chemical warfare. K said we are going to endorse the principles
of the United Kingdom draft convention. And we will offer to work out
specific provisions with you. T asked if we would announce the last
part. K said yes. K asked that T make sure the Prime Minister knows;
K asked that he handle it on a personal basis between the President and
the Prime Minister. T said he would and that he was most grateful to
K.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Haldeman

11/24/69 8:37 p.m.

H said the President just called; there's a problem on the list for
the breakfast and friefing. The list shows McCormack and Albert,
and they're not supposed to be there. H asked where K got the list.
K said from Harlow. H asked when. K said he didn't know, when
Harlow gave it to him. H said not late today? K said no, last week
some time. H said McCormack and Albert are not supposed to be
on it, nor Ziegler for that matter.

K asked if H had gotten a briefing paper from Harlow this afternoon.
H said yes.

By KLC NARA, Dato. S/12/94

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/24/69 9:15 p.m.

L asked if everything was all set for tomorrow. K said all set, we put the suggestion L made to NSDM. L said he thinks it's important to have it in there. K said it's in there.

L asked if the President was going to have a regular press conference tomorrow at 10:00. K said no, he is just going to read the statement to the TV cameras. It's not regular; he's not even going to answer questions. He's going to read a summary of the NSDM. Then he's going to release a longer press statement which lays it out precisely. L asked if he was going to release questions and answers. K said no, we thought if he answered . . . you do it the next day in the Pentagon. L said I do it the next day at the Pentagon? K said yes, not that afternoon, wait until the next day.

L said he had gotten Wheeler aboard on this thing. K said the P intends to make it clear that without the cooperation from Defense, he couldn't have done it. L said Ryan and Westmoreland don't understand. L said Moorer is better about it than R and W. K asked if Moorer was coming. L said yes; Wheeler can't be there. K said Wheeler had asked if he could be excused. L said if Wheeler can't be there, Moorer should be. L said Westmoreland and Ryan don't understand, and he doesn't want them answering questions on it. K said Moorer understands? L said yes, Moorer understands, but you've got to draw pictures for Westmoreland and Ryan. K asked how long they are in for. L said they're all in for 4 years, at the pleasure of the President. K said they don't have enough first-class generals at that level. L said we've got a real gap in the Navy. K said what about that guy in Norfolk. L said Henderson? K said yes; somebody said he's pretty good. K said the President would be very sympathetic if we could yank someone. L said that guy in Vietnam--Dumwalt?--isn't bad. K asked if L was still thinking of keeping Moorer up. L said he doesn't know yet; it doesn't have to be done before April, does it? K said no; L said we're doing okay. They've never been through anything like what they've been through during the past six weeks. K said it's miraculous that they haven't blown their stacks. L said the JC disapproved of what we're doing tomorrow, but they are coming around. K said it is a historical occasion. L said it's amazing it was never done in the Kennedy or Johnson administrations. K said and never done in the Eisenhower administration.

K said it's really due to L that this has gotten off the ground. L said it's amazing that there's been no policy. K said his academic friends

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Joesph Alsop

11/24/69 9:45 p.m.

K said he was sorry he didn't get back to A earlier today. A said why don't you come over here for a drink on your way home. K said he's got another hour's work, he better not. K said he's been going since 8:00 and he has to prepare a briefing paper for the Congressional group. A said a quick drink would held him sleep and besides A has something important to talk about but oughtn't to talk on the telephone. A said it would be on K's way. K said he would try; where does A live. A said 2720 Dumbarton. K asked how late he could come. A said he would be working until 11:00 or so. K said he would do his best.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/64

Telecon
John Ehrlichman

10:05 a.m.

11/25/69

Ehrlichman said he was getting a call from Syminton and asked if there
were any recent developments in that(?) meeting. K said he knew of
none. E said he would take the call then.

K asked if Ehrlichman would be having the meeting tomorrow. E said
yes.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KM NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

John McCloy

10:05 a.m. 11/25/69

K mentioned that he would be speaking to McCloy's group this afternoon and asked what he should cover.

McCloy said generally get the background of K's and the President's thinking on the overall strategic situation and then move from that into the SALT negotiations and in very broad outlines, what K and the President would like to see in connection with their objectives. McCloy indicated some questions they were concerned about were sent to Hal Sonnenfeldt. To repeat, McCloy said a general background, where we stand in the world, what's the display of forces and where does SALT fit in connection with that.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon IO
Ron Ziegler

11/25/69 10:08 a.m.

Ziegler had just talked to the President. The P wants to go in there and make the announcement. K should be with him when he makes it. K will take the Qs and As. K said should there be any Qs and As? Z said yes. K said he didn't have much to add, and Z said he could say that-- 'Gentlemen, I don't have much to add, but I'll be glad to answer any questions I can. K asked when he should be there. Z said at 10:25 to go in with the President.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

12:30 p. m.

11/25/69

The President wanted to know how the press briefing went. K thought it went well. They were extremely interested and asked a lot of technical questions. The press people had really studied it. Saville Davis told K that what the President had down was really historic. K indicated that Mary McGrory asked why this sudden interest in peace things. K told her this was started in March in line with the President's general approach. K also told her that we would have made this decision no matter what happened in the world. It has been scheduled for 4 months. The President stated that that was believable. He asked K if he was able to get across the point on deterrent and K said he had. K said they heckled him a bit on the difference between tear gas and incapacitating agents. The President said they don't want tear gas, they just want the mobs to runloose. K added that with tear gas, at least you can leave the area.

K indicated that he had just read the memcon with the Japanese and thought the President really put it to him. K thought he was tough on the textiles. K told the President that he had shown it to Alex Johnson. The President thought that was important that State do see just as much of this as possible so they can see how much the President really gets into. K said that the President had talked to Stans and will have a meeting with him and Johnson tomorrow so they can get a program going so State will ask for more than they have already settled for so Sato can offer compromise. The President noticed that the New York Times played the NPT on the front page and they will have to do the same on this one. K said there was no question it was historical. The President thought that was something about Mary McGrory saying how did we think this up. The President said K should have asked her why Kennedy and Johnson hadn't done this. Everyone has told the President, he said, that the Okinawa thing wouldn't have been possible with any other President. K reminded the President that State said there would be trouble with Congress, and K told them the President could handle it. The President thought something should be put into a column very soon. K said a lot of things have come together and he thought he might have a press backgrounder. K indicated that Chuck Bailey has asked to see him. The President suggested K see them before the end of the week and add Semple. The President said he wanted to ride on the whole business of historical issues. He said the Asian policies couldn't have been sold without him and said these were Presidential leadership issues of the highest order. The President added that the draft wouldn't have been sold without him. Both Aber and Rivers told the President they have never worked so hard for something they didn't believe in and only because the President asked them to.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

K said he would make sure Bailey and Semple got in before the end of the week. The President thought it would be very helpful. He asked if K thought it was best for K to handle the press conference rather than himself. K said yes and added that the President should let himself get into the heckling.

The President mentioned again the statement by Mary McGrory. K said she didn't look very good after his reply. The President said, the thing is they are dying because of the polls. They said we were down.... K said they had the President on the skids in October. The President added, also before the Asian trip and there will other times. The President said we wouldn't give a damn what happens.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon

Hugh Sidey

4:00 p.m. 11/25/69

K said he had not had a chance to thank Sidey for the warm note-- it meant
alot to him and he appreciated it very much. Sidey said he redid the column
last week so he got part of what K wanted in. K mentioned that it was a
little less enthusiastic in the second version, but he thought it was good.
Sidey said events change. Sidey said he even had a note from Grenwald in
New York who seems to be softening a bit. Grenwald said they should try
to do a piece -- it looks like more is really being done than they thought.
K said if we get a break here and there, we might make it.

K called because he heard that Time was doing a piece on Nancy and K and wanted to know what it was about. Sidey explained that it was really about K and his social life taken from newspaper articles. They called people who have been linked with K and asked what they thought and the reports were universally good. Sidey said the story was not going to run just yet though. K said jokingly -- "so you killed it!" K said as long as it wasn't focused on her -- she was having a heart attack.

As a matter of fact, Sidey said, they just had built a new dining room in their new quarters. He wanted to know if K would consider coming over for lunch with some of the Washington Bureau and some from New York sometime in the future. K suggested some time before Christmas or in the next three weeks. Sidey said he would call the office to make arrangements.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Professor Doty

4:55 p. m. 11/25/69

K asked if Doty received the statement on biological warfare. Doty said he had just read it and it looks very good. K said we are destroying all biological warfare stuff and thought that went further than anyone thought the President would go. Doty said he was please with it. K said we didn't need any support on it but the reason why it would be helpful, as Doty could appreciate this from his own experience, a lot of blood had to be spilled on this one. It would be helpful if one could demonstrate to the President there is some resonance since the President did something where there is no obvious political interest. K added that he had no personal interest in this either. Doty said he thought that was good. His own view is that the use of harrassing gases on the battlefield, we can't expect much to happen until the war is over. But to abolish it all to gether is more than Johnson or Kennedy even considered doing K added. Also that we joined the Geneva protocol -- Stennis and Rivers werent' jumping off the tables on that one. K said -- so if some of Doty's friends could call attention it would help. He was not asking for anything spectacular.

Doty wanted to know that the same group would be down on December 18 if K wanted to see them. K said he fully expected to and asked if they could have a paper telling him where they can help out.

Doty asked if there was anything out of Helsinki. K said no -- it has gone ahead in a very careful way which he considers important that it is non-exciting.

Doty mentioned that Bob Kleiman had asked called him. Evidently Kleiman talked to John Foster and Foster let the upgrading out. He said that we had communicated to the Russians but we didn't consider MIRV moratorium unless large numbers were either destroyed or put under inspection. K said that was totally untrue. Kleiman got very excited and didn't know what was going on. Doty said he thought Foster was working the other side of the tracks. K said there was no question about that.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Ambassador Sullivan

11/25/69 5:12 p.m.

S said Xuan Thuy has given a rebuttal interview. K said he hadn't seen the text. S said he just got it off the ticker. S said he called Cabot a liar. They said they were ready to meet with the US in private talks; that's not true. S said Cabot asked for the talks; he also initiated some. K said no, that's not true. S said in one instance, Thien (?) initiated one. S said Cabot didn't say that he initiated all of them, just with Xuan Thuy, which was true. K said right. S said that can be more or less ducked for the time being. K said we don't have anything against private meetings. S said they want to say three things: 1) the US is ready at any time to have private meetings, 2) in these meetings, anything can be discussed (Xuan Thuy said the meetings would be to discuss the 10 point program; ours would say anything), 3) they would back up Lodge's statement. K said that's okay. S said he would get his people to coordinate it with Ziegler. K said, say we are willing to discuss their 10 points, but say then must be willing to discuss ours. S said Phil said it can raise any subject it wishes. K said okay, but I don't want the story to say only we agreed to discuss their 10 points.

K said, while I've got you on the phone, I think the Christmas cease-fire has gotten way beyond anything the President wanted. K said why don't you get a piece of paper over here. S said with the options. K continued which he can respond to. K said he hates to creats another confrontation on it. S said he is putting together a paper with 7 options, without suggestions except who supports what, what Lodge supports, what Bunker supports, what the JCS supports. S said he doesn't know what his secretary or Laird supports, but hopes to have that by the time it gets to the White House. K said we can get Laird. S said their Secretariat said K wanted reactions from all. S said there are only about 3 that are real; the rest are throw-aways. K asked if S could get that to us this week. S said certainly; he hopes tomorrow.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/13/69

Telecon
Secretary Laird
6:10 p.m. 11/25/69

Laird thought the press conference went very well today. There seem to be only a couple of problems. At HEW some of the stories they are carrying are that we are going to (missed ......) Kleindenst wanted the college deferment done away with. Laird said he testified two weeks ago in the Senate that we would make those recommendations after the Security Council had passed. We thought he said he would be ready in February. Laird thought there were too many people with different make stories and going in different directions. Laird said he would call Kleindenst on it. K agreed.

Laird thought that Packard should report to the President on his trip. K agreed and said he would work on setting it up for early start part of next week. Laird reminded K that he would be leaving for Burssels on Tuesday, for a week so K said he would try to do it on Monday.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Prof. Messelson
6:30 p.m. 11/25/69

Messelson was very pleased with the statement today. He didn't see how the President could have achieved a better set of decisions. M told the New York Times and Washington Post that these are sound decisions following objective military and political considerations but there is only one problem -- it is the question of chemical warfare and we should continue to be open minded about it. There is also the political question as to what other countries would expect.

K said the thing we have to avoid now is that his colleagues here in the WH get the idea that every time they make what is not an easy move bureaucratically, the liberals judge them for not going the extra mile. M said the press exaggerates too -- but he made very strong statement to the press. On the technical basis, K said we are more than willing to talk about it, but didn't think we could reach major decision until the war is over.

M asked when the protocol would be submitted. K indicated he hoped within the next few weeks. M was surprised and said he hoped the Foreign Relations would go slowly on it until the war has de-escalated a bit. K said he had no control over that. K indicated that he talked to Fulbright today. He was very pleased with the statement also. In fact, K remembered that Meselson had testified before Fulbright. Fulbright remembered the testimony and mentioned it to K.

M asked if his paper was of any use. K said that it was. K said it was good because it showed the outside and inside communities working together. We did it quietly which made it hard to mobilize objection. M mentioned that the Sweeds are going ahead on question of gases.

M mentioned that this was so horribly handled previously. K agreed.

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/64

Telecon
The President

6:30 p.m. 11/25/69

The President said he understood that the Soviets had some reaction that we would destroy all chemical warfare. One of the Senators said something to him today. The President said it was purely propaganda. K had not seen anything on it but would look it up. We are saying we are willing to do that if they come up with system of verification. The President agreed that they should and said let them say no then. The President thought this took them by surprise -- they are now on the defensive. K mentioned that Xuan Thuy made another statement today saying that private talks were essential. Whatever his reasons were..... We have no problem with that. The President said they are at least talking about talking which they haven't before. He suggested that maybe K move up his channel -- strike before Lodge screws it up. K mentioned that Lodge will be out on Dec. 6 and Habib will be here Monday. K indicated that he wanted to talk to Thompson and then he could get in touch with Walters. Walters could say we want appointment after the weekend of Dec. 13. K said he would warn them against an offensive and add that a lot of things are possible if we set necessary deadlines for working it out. The President said it just could be that they are hurting. K indicated that on several occasions they were beginning to blink. One of the things that is happening in State is that they are going on big operation on ceasefire. The President asked, why, they have already turned it down. K thought it would be taken as a sign of weakness. We should have a low-key Christmas ceasefire. We won't get any points for making it four days rather than 2. We can say we are willing to negotiate generally whenever they are ready. The President said, let us use this period for a general ceasefire. K thought and suggested that we should announce soon that we are ready for Christmas for two days and in that announcement say we are always ready to negotiate general ceasefire. The President told K to try to get State around to this. K said that was a biggest obstacle, to keep them from getting away with more than the Japanese have already conceded (K switched the conversation to mention point about getting State to go along). K mentioned that he let Johnson see the memcon. K said what is more important is that Sato made personal commitment to the President. The President said Sato was pleased -- they expected worse treatment and we gave them a good deal. Back to the ceasefire - K said we should play ceasefire low key. We have them going on without offering any. If they said they would settle in three months, that's when we should make our offer. The President said, at the present time on the other ceasefire thing, the main thing now is to get us some time. He didn't even want to consider this until after troop thing and we don't expect that until Dec. 20. K said he would recommend that the President announce a

*

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/94

Christmas ceasefire within the next two weeks so he can get ahead of the others. Then the President is not following their lead. The President said what difference does it make on 2 or 3 days. Lets make it 2 days then.

K mentioned that he just had to calls about the President's statement today. One was from an arch-liberal on chemical destruction and he has given interview to New Yor, Times and Washington Post saying this is most statesmanlike thing that has been done in a long time. He also called the editorial page of the Times and said don't demonstrate on loose ends.

When K sees Bailey and Semple, the President asked him to make points on Asian policy and Okinawa that it wouldn't have been possible without the Trust in the President. K suggested that maybe he should see Frankel since he has been asking to see him. K mentioned that he hadn't seen Frankel since July. The President agreed but that K should be very cold with him and talk candidly and see what he comes up with. The President thought Frankel would put it on the front page. The President said that K should mention to Frankel that he(K) was impressed by it. The point being that here we are, we have taken all these subjects and the idea of taboo subjects to suggest an Asian policy because these people trusted the President. K indicated that the Japanese negotiations have gone well. The President asked what the reaction in Japan was. K said it was very good. He(?) only got back today. The press reaction was very well. -- afterall the communication was extremely generous. The President thought K was right -- lets play for Frankel. The President asked who had requested an appointment from Time -- K said no one - The President said to get Sidey in then and Bailey because of his influence with the others. They should realize that on Okaniwa, germ warfare and the orders come back to Nixon doctrine that these would not have been possible without Nixon trust. And the fact that Eisenhower didn't even suggest these things. K said that the President had done more fundamental things. If you compare Kennedy at this time, he had achieved nothing, although he did have the press with him. But we have a lot of people with us the President added. This is what has shaken Hanoi K added. We are not going to make offer to them. On the contrary, it should be an trip, the President thought it should be sooner -- strike while the iron is hot. He asked K to check when the polls would be out. K said he would like Lodge to be out of there so it would make it after Dec. 7. K would suggest the 12th or 13th. They will need to get instructions from Hanoi. K would like to call them tomorrow -- but on second thought said that might be too eager and thought he would wait until Monday. General Walters would call them. The President said they may think K has an offer. The President suggested that K tell them to read the notes of the previous meetings and say that this one will be conducted in the same manner. K agreed/

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Dr. Wiesner

11/25/69 7:45 p.m.

K said what did I do wrong now? W said nothing, you did something great. W thought he ought to call and say so. K said aren't you nice. W said absolutely great. K said it certainly was tough going.

W said he thought he's send the President a telegram saying 'One giant step for mankind here on earth' but W thought the P would take it the wrong way. K said what would be helpful, not for political reasons, would be if some of the scientific community would say if we do something in a human direction, it is noticed. W said he is trying to get Winship, and to talk to Oakes about something in the NYT tomorrow. K said that would be appreciated.

W said he heard from Paul that the session he had with K was very good. K said they were going to meet on a regular basis. K said we are trying to do the sort of thing down in other quarters before.

*

Telecon
Cyrus Eaton

10:00 a. m.

11/26/69

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Eaton opened the conversation by asking whether the U. S. Government would agree to a coalition government in Saigon that would be a provisional one. He wanted to take something back to Kho Vy Khoxy Kosygin. K said if Eaton wanted to be helpful -- we need to get Hanoi to negotiate rather than make declaration. The most important thing is that we are not rigid but it is essential for them to make a move also. Eaton said the Kosygin is just as anxious as they are to end this war -- it is very expensive for him. Kosygin is an old and trusted friend of Eaton's and has asked him to have The President tell him what is required of Kosygin. Kosygin wants Eaton to become better acquainted with North Vietnamese people. Eaton was sure that the Soviet Union and China will not permit North Vietnam to be defeated. K indicated that we have stated publicly that we... (Missed).

Eaton noticed where there were speeches that North Vietnam will collapse by next Spring. That is getting around but there is no foundation. Eaton asked again what he should say. K said Eaton has two essential positions (1) he could say that there will be more and more pressure on us and then come back repeating the position. (2) the best way is to convince them that we are willing to talk very seriously and we recognize there has to be give and take on both sides. Eaton said without Kosygin's support, they will not collapse. Kosygin wants to know what he can do that will be helpful here. He wants to know from someone and he thinks Eaton has the backing of the American economy. Eaton didn't think that the President or Kissinger were influenced by the businessman. K said he wasn't. Eaton said our Government is only interested in what gives them the votes. Eaton asked again what he could say specifically to Kosygin. K said they know what we are willing to talk about. K said Eaton was not the first person who is going there. Eaton thought that he was closer to Kosygin than any other American and thinks Kosygin is the key man. If Eaton could just give him... If Eaton just gives him (Kosygin) the runaway, it won't do any of us any good. K said he could not give Eaton any precise details. They would have to discuss this much further than they have at this point. Eaton asked who they could talk to. When K says let them talk to us -- who does he mean by "us". If we could get Thieu and Nixon to meet with Kosygin in 24 hours the war would be settled. Eaton didn't think you could get anywhere with long drawn out talks. If anything is accomplished it will have to be swiftly. The essential questions if would the U. S. agree to provisional Government in Saigon. K said they would have to talk to us about political outcome and there are many ways the Soviet Union can talk to us. Eaton said, but they now are talking to you through himself. Eaton asked again who would talk to whom. K said again, there are many ways in which we can talk to them. They can send Dobrynin to me for example or anyone else they want to designate. E aton said Dobrynin didn't feel that he was being taken too seriously by the Americans or that he is trying to make progress. Eaton said he sees him often and feels Dobrynin is justified.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

K doubted that that was true -- he thought Dobrynin was taken seriously. Eaton said he wants this thing settled and would go further than anyone else in the Soviet Union to bring understanding and peace. Eaton asked if there were any other routes other than Dobrynin which they might take. K said the can talk to anyone in the State Department. K said that Eaton could assure them that if they want to talk, we will set something up. Eaton asked if K would agree that Kosygin is the most important man from their point of view. K said not necessarily, but he is one of them. Eaton said he knew all of them but of course they also have their rivalries and differences of opinion. Eaton mentioned Podgormy would be a good man to have visit the U.S. In the Soviet Union, they think Kosygin would not put something up the others would be opposed to. Eaton asked who K would placenext. K said Breshnev. Eaton said he could work miracles with Brezhnev since he is very good natured. Podgormy is a capitalist. Eaton asked who would be next. K said he thought that would be the order. Eaton stated that he would like to be helpful. He said the businessmen are at the point of revolt. K said he appreciated that. Eaton said that cities and corporations couldn't borrow money at any price. K said he appreciated this but that we are most agreeable to end the war. The people who have studied this situation

Eaton said he had to have specific times, places and individuals. K said if they indicate a willingness to get it done, we will make arrangements. Eaton said for K to take his word for it, they are more than eager. K said, then let them say it to us. Eaton said he was saying it to K on behalf of Kosygin.

K said he had to go off to a meeting. He had given Eaton his general attitude which is one of complete willingness but again, he would not give Eaton any specific propositions to take to them. Eaton said he was wondering what K and the President feel they are gaining by delaying this. K said we are not delaying it and it is simply not the right way to state it. Eaton asked if he could come and see K when he returned and have Dobrynin present at the meeting. K said he would see him and if Dobrynin wanted to be present it would be up to him.

By KHC NARA, Dalo.

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/26/69 11:30 a.m.

L just wanted to check out onething with K. For Dave, L wonders
would it be possible to do it any earlier than 5:00. K said he should
not change travel plans he already has. K said he told the President
Dave might want to go to the west coast. L said he wanted to go home
for Thanksgiving, and was to leave about 5:00. K said when could he
do it, 4:00? Or Monday? L said yes, either 4:00 or Monday. K said
he would check with the P. L said probably it would just be Dave, K
and probably Rogers. L doesn't think he ought to be in it. K said
does the P want Rogers to come? L said yes. L said he didn't think
he ought to come; he's such an advocate. L thinks it would be better
if he's not there. L thinks it would be better for the P to have a
direct exchange with Dave.

K said while he's got L on the phone--K was going to call him. About
the Mace Bs, the P prefers to hold the announcement until the second
week in December. L said he's got them all set to come, all deactiv-
ated. K said don't do it yet. K said we want them to deliver on some-
thing else first. K said they'll come out, but we just want to hold
them for two weeks.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/64

Telecon
Bob Haldeman

11:35 a. m. 11/26/69

(Missed first part of conversation since Mr. Kissinger placed the call on his I. O.)

K was saying that Packard has to leave at 5:00 so the meeting can't run over. He(the President?) thought he might have Rogers there and if he does, K suggested that K call Rogers to invite him. Haldeman asked if Laird would be there. K indicated that Laird had been asked but does not want to come in order to give Packard a day in the sun. K said there is always more to it than meets the eye with Laird though.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/13/69

Telecon
Professor Doty

11:45 a.m.

11/26/69

Doty asked if K was satisfied with the responses yet. K said now they are beginning to nit-pik on tear gas. K said if this leads now, at the rafification hearing, to pressure on that, it is going to be counterproductive. There is just no chance of doing the other until we get the war in Vietnam over.

Doty said he had a call from Cyrus Eaton but wanted to call K before taking the call from Eaton. K said Eaton was obnoxious and said he was negotiating for Kosygin and asked what specific propositions could he make on Vietnam to Kosygin. Eaton asked if we were prepared to accept a coalition government. K told Eaton; that he would not give him any specific propositions and they know how to get in touch with us and if Eaton wanted to use his influence, he could say we are ready when they are. K indicated that Eaton wasn't interested in that very much. Eaton asked K why we are delaying. K said at this point the conversation wasn't very happy and Eaton accused K of delaying a settlement. K said if Doty could sooth him a bit -- he should just not be the negotiator. K said Eaton's first words were, can I now tell Kosygin that you would be willing to accept a coalition government.

Doty wanted explanation on the private meetings in Paris between U.S. and Hanoi and wanted to know if there was something today that is any different. K said we couldn't have this thing on TV -- Every private meeting has been on our initiative. They have never asked -- so they have never been refused. We have not refused to talk on political issues. They have shown no interest. They never mentioned private meetings until last week. K added that on this, the evidence is overwhelming. K said this was not the obstacle.

Doty said o.k. Going back to the statement on biological warfare, Doty thought there would be more telegrams coming in. George Wall(?) is sending one today. K said he appreciated Doty's role in this.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Joseph Alsop

11/26/69 11:55 a.m.

K said about Sunday night, is that still open? A said it certainly is. K asked if he could come by with Miss Maginnes. A said yes, come by here for a drink and then we'll go to Braden's together. K said what time. A said 6:45. K said that was pretty early; what time was dinner? A said 7:30; you can go directly to Braden's if you want. K said I will try to come by at 6:45; failing that I will go to Braden's directly. [A had his secretary give K the address: 101 East Melrose Street, Chevy Chase, telephone 652-4717] K asked if they knew he was coming. A said yes. K said he is looking forward to it.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
11/26/69 1:10 p.m.

R said he is going to send over a memo on our renewal of the 4-power talks. K said we have one already. R said this is another one; R said he can hold off on the speech. R said they had a long meeting when __________ was here. R said should go ahead with the four power talks on Tuesday. We will say we talked with Rabin ahead of time. We won't do anything substantive until . . . K said until after the NSC meeting. R said well that, yes and until Eban gets here. K said if you send this over here, we will use it as a lever to get a decision.

R said on the speech. K said what speech. R said there was a proposal that he make a public statement about our position. R said he doesn't think he is going to decide that now. But R does think he should decide on the 4-power thing before he leaves. K said yes. R said he was sending the memo over.

R said the bacteriological thing came out okay. K agreed. R said it came out at a good time to take attention away from the massacre thing; that was a terrible thing. K said yes, why they sat on it, I don't know.

*

By: K.L.V. NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
11/26/69 4:20 p.m.

K just talked to the President about the Middle East, about that paper. He hasn't had a chance to read it, but K gave him the essence. He agrees that we should go ahead next week, but not get into the substantive things until after the NSC meeting next Thursday. K asked if R minded if we had the NSC meeting while he wasn't here. R said no, Elliot would be there, and Sisco. K said if Charlie could hold back on substantive propositions until Thursday, I'd appreciate it.

R said he is going to be on NET program tomorrow night. They released a transcript. R doesn't think anything was said that would cause trouble, except possible a discussion on MIRV. R said Niven asked whether [tests would be completed in May or June?] R said he answered no, that a moratorium would make negotiations more difficult. R said a moratorium would possibly make it more difficult; no agreement would be possible on a moratorium because neither side would know where the other stood on testing--each side would be suspicious of the other. R told McClosky to explain: 1) all R did was express some doubt, 2) there's no inability to reach an agreement, just an inability to have a moratorium. R said if it comes up with the P, just tell them R just expressed a doubt, and it's a real doubt. R said if the Russians pushed up, we would be suspicious. K said we should be reception, but non-committal. R said he just wanted to express a doubt; he didn't want to get expectations up and then not be able to fulfill them. R said he's afraid Murray Marder is going to write another one about Finney (?).

R said he was surprised at what Cabot said about a coalition government. K said Jesus! He was not in touch with us on it; it was totally against our view. K said he's been getting jumpy. K said everybody in that job winds up drawing for the Noble Prize. R said it will make the South Vietnamese a little jumpy. K said didn't he agree to put out a statement? R said yes, but he probably never will. K said it was totally against our views and K knows it is against R's.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

Rogers - 4:25

A couple of items that Rogers forgot to mention

(1) He asked if there was a backgrounder or breakfast meeting this morning since there was a story that the President planned to replace Lodge soon. K said he saw the Spurling group and they were discussing the Lindley Rule. The questions was will Lodge be replaced in the near future or by the end of the year. K told them he would not comment on the end of the year but he certainly could see a future where Lodge would be replaced. Rogers said there was another report that Ed Gillum was a possibility. K indicated that he mentioned no names, in fact K said his only comment was that he could see a future. K said he spoke to the President on this and the President is inclined to wait until next year. Rogers thought we should ride it for awhile. K said that Thuy is terrified that he will have to face Habib.

On the NET program, they asked the question about the relationship between
NSC and State. They asked about Acheson and his reasons for leaving.
Rogers said (something like) that Acheson would have had to invent a
system like the NSC. Rogers pointed out the bacteriological warfare.
Secondly, Rogers told them that just the staff work on papers that are
submitted to the WH is tremendous and it isn't something that the Sec.
State or the President can handle all of this. Rogers told them there
was no problem. K said he says the same thing and believes it.
Rogers thought it had all died out.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/69

Telecon
Frank Shakespeare

5:40 p.m. 11/26/69

S heard about this decision on Western Europe in terms of reduction. What concerned him was when the decision was made on Thailand, he had spent four months investigating the situation and it was coincidental when he received the memo that he had made the same decision. S thought it was a very wise move. He was concerned at the time, but did not voice his concern, that the decision had been made without consultation with the Agency. To have a decision made on Western Europe without consultation with the Agency and to be notified by one of his junior members upset him very much. He said he thought he should request an appointment with the President. K indicated that he had no part in that decision and thought S should request an appointment with the President.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
11-26-69, 6:25 p.m.

K - Mr. President, I wondered if you had had an opportunity to consider Ambassador Bunker's latest cable on the ceasefire in which he has shifted his position to come closer to the Lodge proposal.

P - Henry, I want this ceasefire business knocked off. I have never visualized linking the brief holiday pause with a formal proposal on ceasefire and I want all discussions on the formal ceasefire knocked off as of now. The only thing I want our people dealing with is a Christmas truce. Have you gotten the State paper on ceasefire yet?

K - no, Mr. President.

P - Well, I reiterate again. I want instructions put out immediately to the effect that there will be no linkage between the holiday truce and a permanently negotiated ceasefire. All discussions of a permanently negotiated ceasefire are to stop until the National Security Council has an opportunity to consider this issue. Would you be sure that these instructions are carried out and that all further exchanges on this subject are stopped immediately.

K - Yes Mr. President.

By KLC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger
Mary McGrory
11/26/69, 7:05 p.m.

K asked how M was and she said I must say I am better now that something has been said on the atrocity -- I couldn't have waited a great deal longer.

M said she would love to see K and talk with him. K said I don't have my calendar but there is a slight possibility on Friday or we'll do it next week. M asked if K would be in town on Sunday. K said yes, but I will have a friend. M said I was going to offer you lunch, or drinks or dinner. M said, look I don't want to bother you. K said you don't bother me. There are some people from journalism that I have to see and some I like to see and you are the latter. K said if you compare me to Rostow..... M said Oh, I have not ever. K said that's right, it was Hoffman. K said look lets do it next week -- maybe late on Monday or Tuesday. K said I will get my secretary to call you. M said I am leaving for Boston tonight and will be back in town Saturday. K said I have no special message for you, however. M said I have SEVERAL messages for you!! M said I will phone your secretary Monday morning.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

10:40 a. m.

11/27/69

what

K told Laird that he had just heard from Haig about/these reporters have been saying. The reporters said that Laird had given backgrounder and said that he(Laird) didn't care what the President announced, he was going to continue withdrawing troops and that Laird hadn't paid any attention to the previous decision to withdraw. Laird said that wasn't true. K said he told them there was no such thing as a Defense policy withdrawal policy only a national withdrawal policy and there has never been a disagreement. There is the President's policy which has been worked out together with everybody. The idea that you were feuding with the President on with withdrawal policy....... Laird said this whole thing came up because of the transcript being released by the Foreign Relations Committee. They have been leaking out bits of that at a time. They were using Laird's remarks he said in Vietnam. Rogers said it was an irrevocable plan. The problem that Laird had when he came to testify was that he said the plan had been approved by the President. Then they wanted to know the time table. They wanted to know that we had already reached 484 and Laird told them yes and that was the goal reached by the President. K said he was wrong when we established 484, it was understood that it could go 2% below because we have never been right up to that level so that what Laird must have been talking about was that. Laird said he has always hedged that and because of Christmas period, we took out reserves to get them home by December. K said he wanted to explain to Laird what he had done. K asked if Laird had the impression that K had knocked him. Laird said the impression he got was that there was no plan by the President -- withdrawal of combat forces only over period of 3 or 4 months but there is no overall plan. K said that is totally wrong and Laird knew what K's view was on that. Laird said he only talked to three of them. They were pressing and they called him at home. Laird said to them that he was sure they were wrong and sure that they had misinterpreted the facts and that they should call K and they will see there is a plan. K said that wasn't the issue at all. On the plane, K said they all should say there is a plan so the issue was what? regardless of whether there is a specific announcement, we could ....... but K saw now what they were getting at. K was looking at some different point of view. He wanted to ask avoid the impression that Laird and the President were at cross purposes but that Laird and the President were in complete agreement. K said of course Laird will go to 484 by limit of 2% but everything else should be in context of agreed position. Laird said that we have 400,000 people moving in and out every month. Laird hoped to be between 475 and 478. and he would like credit for that. Laird indicated there was talk about not releasing the figures but it has been done on weekly basis and he didn't see how we could stop. K said Laird should

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/64

understand that he was not knocking Laird. Laird thought the impression was given that the President hadn't approved a plan. K said that impression wasn't given and they know it. K asked if Laird talked to Rogers or should K call him. Laird indicated that State press people called his press people and that he had not talked to Rogers. K said then he wouldn't bother him. Laird said he told Hinken to talk to McCloskey and that he was sure they were misinterpreting Kissinger and that they should talk to K before writing the story. K agreed. K said they were trying to make completely different point. They said that Laird was the President and that the President asked Laird in effect didn't care what the President was doing. Laird said he would like to hear somebody tell him that. K told them there is no Laird plan different from the President's plan. The President's plan everybody agrees with. They weren't questioning whether there was a plan only if you asked one Laird had one separate from the President. Laird said they were just trying to bait this one. K said they were hitting us with two different issues. Laird said he takes his orders and follows them.

K said he would just let it die. Laird told them they had better get in touch with K. K asked who the reporters were. Laird said they were people who were in backgrounder yesterday morning. Laird recommended that K not call them. They swore Laird to secrecy and Laird told them to call K. K said it was a complete misinterpretation. Laird said he wanted K to know that somebody might call. K said he only wanted to show that Laird and the President were completely together. Laird said we can't have that going in different directions. K said the issue was whether there was a plan never came up. K told them there was only one plan.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson

11/28/69 3:35 p.m.

K said he just talked to Shimoda and he can't tell whether S knows or not. K said he outlined the procedures in that memo. S understood well enough. K said we had it arranged for J to handle the negotiations, and S could treat J with the same confidence as the President said K could be treated with. Shimoda said, in effect, does that mean I don't have to talk to Stans again? J said he'd bet he did. K said that's right; you deal with Johnson. K said the man was greatly relieved. K said does that seem plausible to you? J said yes.

K told J that Shimoda said 'comprehensive' is a hard word for us; Shimoda said he knew that 'selective' is a hard word for you. K told him something could be worked out; this gets into details Mr. Johnson can pursue. K said Shimoda made a big deal out of the need for secrecy. K said he asked for a time frame; K said the end of December. K said he didn't fall off his chair. K said everything he brought up from the memo, Shimoda seemed to understand, but but he didn't say yes, yes. J said he was playing it cool.

K said he is expecting a call from you; K wanted J to know. J said yes, he would call him tomorrow.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/28/69 5:40 p.m.

K said he had a memo from Bill about cease-fire, permanent cease-fire in Vietnam. L said he had just the opposite. K said very good, because this is totally against the President's wishes. L said he's got one 24-hours one, but there's nothing in that except by the word of the P's May 14 speech. K said that the P's wish. L said he said it's better if State has one and I have one; I didn't want to go along with that one. K said the President wanted me to send out a memo saying pipe-down. L said he would get it over to K tonight; he was going to deliver it tomorrow morning. K said if it was convenient, tonight would be helpful; then K could get it to Key Biscayne tomorrow morning.

L said he didn't always want to complain, but he had a complaint about the NSC meeting. L said there was a leak on Seabed, now on biological research and chemical warfare, as if the JCs had been uncooperative. K said who leaked it; frankly I thought it came out of Defense. L said it did not come out of Defense! L said his people think is was ACDA or State. L said only Wheeler and himself could have leaked it, and he knew it wasn't Wheeler, and it wasn't himself. K said he want to the P and told him that the JCs were cooperative. The P said maybe one of L's people did it; thought it would make him look good. L said it makes it more difficult. L said there were too many people in that room. There were many from ACDA and State; only two from Defense in that room. K said we didn't holler before because we didn't want to embarrass your people. L said you can't; the JC went along on the expenditure cuts and other cuts; L doesn't think it's fair. K agreed. K said some people thought of this as a counter-weight; K said we don't need a counterweight to the JCs; they are cooperative. K said it's totally against what the President wants, and what you want--it's not right. L said if they can't express themselves in the meeting like that and not have it go out, L is going to bring it up at the next meeting. K said he wishes L would; as long as you don't want to complain about me. K said he doesn't always want to be the bastard. L said they did it on Seabed; they did it on SALT. K said he wishes L would raise it. L said this will work if we trust each other; but we don't. L said he doesn't even debrief from NSC meetings. K said we're on your side. K said he was sure it wasn't his staff; it had to be State or ACDA. K said he's not going to let anybody but Jerry Smith in any more. L said the think he doesn't like

By KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

page 2

is blaming the chiefs. K said they couldn't have been better. L
said Wheeler said coming back from the meeting, 'I go along with
you.' Wheeler said he would have trouble, but he was with L and
so were the other chiefs. K said on the NSDM we had 2 or 3 in
uniform; they were the best. K said he wasn't aware that it came
out of ACDA. L said he had one of K's men over here discussing
the Law of the Sea problem. L said at the staff meeting, he brought
it up too. L said we can't have this happen to guys who want to
help us. K said I completely agree with you and if you can get that
paper over tonight, I'd appreciate it.