46

Washington, Huang Chen, for having repeated some traditional slogans about the solidarity of the nonaligned with respect to Egypt.

Subsequently, the aftermath demonstrated the difference in perspective between Beijing and Washington. Nixon's progressively weakened position and was obliged to resign. Détente with the Soviet Union, but in the face of improving relations developed in the United States. The new president, Gerald Ford, met with Brezhnev in December 1974 in Vladivostok, not far from the Chinese border. This was not

one of our more brilliant moves in the Ford Administration; the less in terms of one relation with almost any other venue would have been preferable, as Deng did with the Chinese. Not fail to point out. "In the past, the inhabitants of this territory were mainly Chinese. And our name for that place was Haishanwey [meaning sea slug]...We hear the present name

48

The Chinese analysis was strategically sound but incompatible
in the conditions of the early 1970s with the leadership of a
democratic coalition.

Between Vladivostok and the
Thus, in their dialogue with American visitors after

death of Mao
attached
1974, the Chinese leaders tended to criticize our East-West
policy in terms of which our emerging conservative movement
approved.
would have been proud. And, like our conservative critics,
they ignored the McGovernite Congress elected in 1974, busily
passing War Powers resolutions and dismantling our
intelligence system.

Whatever the merit of the policies, Chinese leaders began
to criticize American foreign policy as insufficiently
worn
determined. Deng, following Mao, called the détente policy

"shadow boxing;" he doubted the efficacy of regular
consultations with Moscow, he called the European Security
Conference an "insecurity conference," he questioned the

greater 49 cooperation
wisdom of increasing economic arrangements with the Soviet
Union: "We do not understand why the United States and the
West use their strong points to make up for Soviet weakness.
If the United States and Europe took advantage of the
weaknesses of the Soviet Union, your negotiating position
might be stronger."

Throughout 1975, as Indochina collapsed and Angola fell to Cuban troops, Chinese criticisms grew more insistent. The Chinese foreign minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who later joined the so-called Gang of Four which purged Deng a second time, accused America of trying to push the "evil waters east" and of "seeking to stand on the shoulders of China" in order to make a better deal with Moscow.

than more
always more
never more

Deng's attitude was quite different. He never challenged
America's good faith. He did not question our commitment to
the containment of the Soviet Union. His disagreements

54

foreign policy. Deng deplored the collapse of the Shah of
Iran and Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. He urged a
stronger US policy; in any event, China would resist Soviet
expansionism. Because Vietnam had become a Soviet tool, China
would "teach it a lesson."

Many senior officials of the
Carter Administration thought he was bluffing. I recalled
Chou's statement, "One word counts," and also Deng's remark
when I had reminded him of Mao's reference to the "empty
cannons" of ideological rhetoric. "My cannons," said Deng,
"are at least always half-full." Shortly after Deng's return
to China, the Red Army invaded Vietnam to teach its lesson.

The next time I saw Deng was in April 1979 in Beijing.
Hua Kuo-feng was still Secretary General of the party. He and
Deng received me separately for long meetings in the Great
Hall of the People. The contrast was striking. Both put
forward detailed programs of economic reform. But for the

56

thousands of Chinese students abroad ("we have nothing to fear from Western education"), to end once and for all the abuses of the Cultural Revolution, and on the need to strike a balance between centralization and decentralization in a significant country of such huge population and regional differences. I noticed that, while Deng had not raised his voice and was addressing his remarks to me, the tables around us had fallen silent. The other Chinese were sitting at the edge of their seats, not even pretending to be listening in on the old man outlining his vision of a new China. "We have to get it right this time," concluded Deng. "We have made too many mistakes already."

Deng prevailed over Hua who disappeared into a minor position soon after. And over the next decade, Deng implemented what he had described, bringing about more

57

permanent and fundamental changes than even those who had
destroyed ancient China.

Now I would meet with
From then on, I saw Deng once a year for extended

conversations until he retired from his formal positions in

The meetings would generally
begin with a discussion of the international situation from the point of

1990. They followed the by now firmly established pattern: a
and reform were

begin with a
and reform were
discussion of the international situation from the point of

view of parallel American and Chinese interests to stem Soviet
expansionism or other hegemonical aspirations, especially in

Asia. Deng would comment now on the Iraq-Iran war, now on

Afghanistan, often on the need to hold NATO together--

sometimes in sorrow, occasionally with approval, always as a
friend of the American relationship. At each meeting, he

would brief me at length on the progress his program was

making. Typical was a meeting in September 1987, He told me

that the changes he was planning in the Standing Committee of
as part of the effort to bring
the Politburo to the end of bringing younger people into the

61

This article does not attempt a final assessment of
Lao Long mui cai emplacy
Deng's historic role, being concentrated on my encounters with
him and his predecessors. But these do permit a number of
conclusions.

dido
Deng achieved his ultimate goal, unlike Maoist revolution is irreversible. Whatever happens, China cannot return to the state-controlled economy of Maoist economy for his rigid political conformity. The economic reforms and the market have spawned an economy require constitutionalism--that is, predictability--even if pluralistic democracy is not yet established. The relative position between provinces and central government may well fluctuate as it has throughout Chinese history. In short, alterations in leadership and institutions can affect emphasis not direction.

As for the United States, it is, of course, entitled to
articulate its preferences as to Chinese developments and