THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPE AND AMERICAN POLICY

Address at Haverford College, February 14, 1956

by Milton Katz

At Geneva in July, 1955, at the conference of the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, the primary topics were Germany, European security, disarmament and East-West relations. These elements interlock so extensively and intricately that the participating governments found themselves unable to consider any one deeply apart from the others. The problems of Germany, European security, and the community of Europe interlock in comparable fashion.

Although topics one and two on the agenda at Geneva were Germany and European security, Germany was not represented, nor was any continental West European nation other than France. This reflected the situation of Europe since World War II, and the historic processes which shaped the issues at the conference. It is these same processes which help to illuminate both the current notions of European community and the varied arrangements which have been proposed to give them effect.

When World War II came to an end, organized society on the continent of Europe, apart from neutral Switzerland, Sweden, the Iberian Peninsula and Turkey, consisted largely of the structure and operations of two far-flung military commands - the Allied Forces in the West and the Soviet forces in the East - and the various local communities. The initial task of Europe following the war was to gather up and bind together the broken threads of

2

economic life and to restore national government. With the
elements of a working society reestablished, Europe had to con-
front the tasks of reconstruction and full scale recovery. It
had to cope not only with the consequences of World War II, but
with longer term, deep-lying dislocations of which the effects had
been emerging over a period of years or even decades, and with the
unrelenting efforts of the Soviet Union to fish in Europe's
troubled waters. In this undertaking, the free nations of Europe
had the economic assistance and the political and military support
of the American government and people, mindful of our stake in
their stability and vigor. The degree of accomplishment to date
can be measured by the statistics of increased production and
trade, of expanded investment and rising consumption. It may also
be measured by the reinvigoration of Europe's free institutions
and culture, and the restoration of hope that a future worthy of
free men may yet be possible.

Throughout this endeavor, a sense of the common needs and
interests of Europe and of its common possibilities and outlook,
was deep and widespread. Both popular instinct and the judgment
of leaders affirmed the importance of this sense of community to
the future of Europe. In many quarters, the conviction ran strong
that this feeling of community must be nurtured into a positive
trend toward the unity of Europe. The terms in which unity was
understood varied from time to time and place to place. The
emphasis was sometimes economic, sometimes political, and some-
times both. Even when the terms appeared to be identical, the
same terms not infrequently meant different things to different
people. There was a corresponding variety in the practical

3

arrangements suggested to translate concepts into action.

The insistent pressure toward unity or community or cooperation found outlets in official measures and proposals, and in popular activity. Official measures included the familiar Organization for European Economic Cooperation (the OEEC), established by the sixteen nations of Europe participating in the Marshall Plan as the symbol and instrument of their participation; the Council of Europe; the European Coal and Steel Community (the Schuman Plan); the European Defense Community, which was never ratified; the Brussels Pact; and the Western European Union, which grew out of the Brussels Pact and supplanted the European Defense Community. Official efforts also comprised less familiar proposals, such as the plan for a European Political Community, which it was hoped would deepen and extend the bonds forged by the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community, and abortive and transient suggestions like FINEBEL (France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium) and UNISCAN (United Kingdom and Scandinavia). The popular movements have been tenacious and energetic, and appear to have commanded substantial support in a number of countries.

The quest for European unity has been by no means confined to Europe. It has taken hold in important aspects of American policy, at times to such a degree as to cause European opponents of particular measures for European unity to attack them as essentially American proposals. In its earlier manifestations, in 1947 and 1948, American concern for European unity appears to have derived primarily from economic considerations. Through the Marshall Plan, American policy sought to assist the countries of Europe to achieve "a healthy economy independent of extraordinary outside assistance". American opinion leaned heavily to the view that this could not

4

be accomplished through the separate action of the several European countries, but only through collective measures designed to realize the potential of the European economy as a whole. This attitude was made explicit in the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, which launched the Marshall Plan. "Mindful of the advantages which the United States has enjoyed through the existence of a large domestic market with no internal barriers to trade or to the free movement of persons, and believing that similar advantages can accrue to the countries of Europe, it is declared to be the policy of the United States to encourage these countries through their joint organization to exert sustained common efforts to achieve speedily that economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity. It is further declared to be the policy of the people of the United States to encourage the further unification of Europe, ..." This concept of a Europe-wide market, within which production and distribution could be adjusted to the possibilities of unrestricted sale throughout Europe and stimulated by competition from sources throughout Europe, was pressed steadily and vigorously in the actual administration of the Marshall Plan. Its most vivid expression was the European Payments Union, established through the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), which served as a framework for the ready mutual interchange of European currencies. It was also given effect through the efforts of the OEEC to eliminate or substantially reduce import quotas and licenses within intra-European trade. It was further reflected in attempts to arrive at some kind of harmonization of monetary and investment policy among the participating European countries.

5

Against this background, it was to be expected that American policy would welcome the French initiative of the Schuman Plan, aimed at the creation of a single market for coal and steel among France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium and Luxembourg. While the Schuman Plan in some of its aspects could be understood as a contribution toward the eventual realization of a single Europe-wide market, in essence it represented a different current in the broad stream of European life. To the previous efforts in the direction of what was sometimes called the economic integration of Europe, two new elements had been added: the institutional fusion of national power in a central High Authority for the participating countries; and the limitation to six participants in the heart of continental Western Europe. In relation to the objective of economic integration for Europe, in the sense of a single Europe-wide market, the limitation to the six countries could perhaps be explained as a step in the desired direction. The fusion of national responsibility and power in the High Authority and the other contemplated central institutions, however, could hardly be explained in comparable terms. A political dimension had to be taken into account. To M. Schuman and M. Monnet and others among the original proponents of the Coal and Steel Community, the project from the outset was far more than economic in its aims and possibilities. They saw it as a large initial step toward unification in the political and social, as well as economic, sense. In their view, the conjunction of circumstances and events in Europe was such that bold and imaginative leadership would be supported by popular instinct, and they believed the objectives to be obtainable in measurable

6

time. The European Defense Community and the proposal for a
European Political Community were subsequent formulations, shaped
by later events, but their seeds were in the concept which found
its original expression in the European Coal and Steel Community.

When the French announced the plan for a European Coal and
Steel Community (the Schuman Plan) in May, 1950, the prompt and
cordial expression of American welcome to the proposal was motivat-
ed only in part by the policy in favor of the economic unification
of Europe, in the sense of a common European market. Other factors
were also involved in the American attitude. These related to the
portent of Franco-German partnership in a major endeavor; and to the
security of Europe and the maintenance of the peace in the face of
Communist aggression. These elements grew in relative importance
with the rapid progress of events and the reciprocal adjustment of
the several phases of American policy toward Europe. The North
Atlantic Treaty had been adopted in April, 1949, hardly more than
a year before the French proposal of the Schuman Plan. Barely a
month after the initial announcement of the Schuman Plan, the
Communist aggression in Korea threw its glare across the world. In
October, 1950, some four months after the outbreak in Korea, the
French proposed the creation of the European Defense Community, as
an additional long step toward the unification of Europe and a
framework within which German manpower could constructively con-
tribute its share to the defense of Europe.

The crisis in Korea threw a new and revealing light upon the
two years of strenuous and many-sided economic effort which the
United States and the free nations of Europe had sustained together
under the Marshall Plan. Even in their absorption in this task,

7

they had remained uneasily aware of the divisions and air fleets
maintained by the Soviet Union along the rim of free Europe, in
Eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria. The
sense of this looming military force, and of the defenselessness of
Europe before it, had been sharpened from time to time by such
events as the blockade of Berlin and the depredations of guerrilla
warfare against Greece. The Berlin air lift and our military aid
to Greece had been specific reactions against particular manifesta-
tions of the danger. The adoption of the North Atlantic Treaty
was a longer term and more comprehensive undertaking to ward it off.
By the light of Korea, the implications of this armed menace to
Europe were illuminated in a world-wide perspective. The economic
underpinnings for Europe's life and future required a military
counterpart. As it had been and remained necessary to restore the
economic strength of Europe, so was it necessary to reestablish
the military strength and political effectiveness of free Europe.

At the threshold of all plans to organize the defense of
Europe in 1950, a fact had to be confronted. In essence this was
the same fact which, five years later, in July, 1955, shaped the
first two items on the agenda of the meeting of the heads of
governments at Geneva, and was a central concern at the conference
of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, France and the
Soviet Union in the same city in October, 1955. The problem of
European security was enmeshed with the problem of Germany. More
particularly, in the context of 1950, it was clear that a primary
step in the organization of the defense of Europe had to be the
establishment of definitive peace between Germany and her West
European neighbors. At its core, this involved the establishment

8

of definitive peace between Germany and France: a peace which
would be definitive in much the same sense that peace between
France and England is definitive, a peace which could be fully
accepted in the innermost recesses of the French and the German
consciousness. As a parallel measure, Germany had to become a
dependable and trusted and respected member of the community of
free Europe. In the conditions of 1950, the partition of Germany
had to be accepted for the time being as a then present fact.
Attention centered upon the Federal Republic of Germany and its
relations to France, the other nations of Western Europe and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In these relations, considerations
of history and broad policy were reinforced by technical
military factors.

In technical military terms, the protection of Western Europe
against the possibility of armed attack by the Soviet and other
Communist forces involved, as a necessary element, the defense of
the Federal Republic of Germany. This was a direct consequence
of geography and the nature of modern weapons. Any inquiry into
the means for defending Germany automatically raised the question
of participation by German manpower. The presumption could
scarcely be avoided that West German manpower should play its
part in the defense of West Germany. In larger terms, a sense of
the constructive relationship which it was imperative to establish
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the community of free
Europe indicated that the Federal Republic should bear its just
share of the burden of defending free Europe.

The early and continuing American interest in the formation
of a large common market for the European economy thus merged into

9

a policy with a triple objective: the establishment of unquestioned peace between France and Germany, the effective incorporation of Germany into the free community of Europe, and the addition of German military strength to the defense of free Europe. It was entirely natural that many Frenchmen, mindful of the bitter past, and many Germans, intent upon the creation of a free and democratic Germany, should be wary and distrustful of any suggestion for the organization of a German army. The caution and anxiety were warranted by the facts of history. In any event, the anxiety and caution were themselves political and psychological facts which had to be taken into account. Narrowly regarded, they might be seen by American eyes as merely irritating obstacles. Broadly and deeply understood, they were a reminder that the several facets of our policy were mutually indispensable. French and German fear and distrust at the prospect of a German army could only be met - or at least could most effectively and constructively be met - if France and Germany could be bound together in conditions of enduring peace, and the future of Germany could be bound into and become a part of the future of free Europe.

In October, 1950, French imagination, which had conceived the European Coal and Steel Community, put forward the plan for a European Defense Community. As a concept, it seemed admirably suited to the realization of the triple objective. Its origin in a French initiative, and its early and enthusiastic support by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, made it doubly welcome to the United States for the indication that French, German and American policy saw the problem and the possible lines of action in harmonious terms. Like the European Coal and Steel Community,

10

the European Defense Community was proposed to embrace France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium and Luxembourg. In May, 1952, just three days before General Eisenhower left his command at SHAPE, a treaty for the establishment of the European Defense Community was signed by representatives of the six participating nations. In the two years following, the treaty was ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium and Luxembourg, but it was rejected by the French Parliament in August, 1954, and was set to one side.

The miscarriage of the European Defense Community meant the abandonment of a particular means to help fill a need. Conceivably, its rejection might have signified a belief that the need itself in its three aspects had somehow disappeared. On the record, it seems clear that the objections were principally to the particular instrument. If any serious doubts had been entertained in any responsible French quarter concerning the urgency of the needs, it was speedily belied by the subsequent development of French policy. To American eyes, it seemed plain throughout that the need continued vital, whether appraised in terms of American policy, or French or West German policy, or the policy of any of the NATO partners. On this side of the Atlantic, it appeared on occasion that the distrust of some French circles for the means had blinded them to the continuing importance of the aims. On the other side of the Atlantic, it sometimes appeared that the concern of some American circles over the aims had caused an unduly rigid attachment to a specific means. It was necessary to sort out ends from means, to reappraise the relationship of means to ends, and to adjust conflicting appraisals

11

on both sides of the Atlantic.

The immediate consequence of the reappraisals and readjustments was the transformation of the Brussels Pact into the Western European Union, on October 3, 1954. In the Western European Union, the nations that had participated in the abortive European Defense Community joined with the United Kingdom. It was buttressed by the full support of the United States, and mashed into the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Certain of its features might be described as supra-national, notably the post of Director of the Agency for the Control of Armaments to supervise and enforce controls upon the kind and volume of armaments in the participating nations, the agreement by Britain to maintain designated military forces upon the continent and not to withdraw them without the concurrence of a majority of the members of the organization, and the powers of inspection and training of troops vested in the NATO Supreme Commander. In essence, however, it is a cooperative arrangement among separate national forces. It does not involve the elements of actual fusion of national power and responsibility which had been contemplated in the European Defense Community, nor does it look toward eventual additional steps in the direction of political integration.

To those European statesmen and members of popular movements who envisaged a process of authentic unification for continental Western Europe, the Western European Union did not redeem the loss of the European Defense Community. There is reason to believe that they will not readily abandon their vision of a single society for continental Western Europe, integrated through comprehensive

12

political, economic and social institutions. It was scarcely to
be expected that so deep and far-reaching a psychological process
could have unfolded steadily and without interruption; and it
would be premature to write off their hopes as beyond realization.
American policy, however, must appraise the Western European Union
by other criteria. This does not imply coldness to the aspira-
tions toward the fusion of national responsibility and power in
continental Western Europe. It does imply that unification in
the sense of such a fusion should not be regarded in itself as an
aim of American policy. It should be understood as one of a
number of possible means. To the degree that Europeans may them-
selves prefer such an arrangement, it is sound American policy to
support it. Insofar as American attitudes and conduct may be able
to influence European opinion toward such a preference, it may be
sound American policy to foster it, provided that our conduct and
expressed attitudes do not disproportionately impair other aspects
of our relations with Europe. To the extent that the tides of
European life may wash such a preference away, it becomes the task
of American diplomacy to find other means, consonant with the
reality of European judgment and feeling, by which the aims of
policy may be attained.

To the United States, the adequacy of the Western European
Union as a substitute for the European Defense Community will
depend upon the degree to which it may help to bring the Federal
Republic of Germany firmly into the free concert of Western Europe,
establish definitive peace between France and Germany, and con-
tribute German military strength to the defense of Europe. These
objectives of American policy in Europe remain substantially

13

consistent with the interests and purposes of the free nations of Europe. They stand confirmed by events. Not least among the confirming events have been the conferences at Geneva in July and October of 1955. The changes in the form and tone of Soviet behavior there revealed are in large part a consequence of the economic effort, the armed vigilance and the steady progress toward European community and Atlantic harmony which have marked the evolution of American and West European policy since 1948. We would do well to keep this in mind.

The criteria by which American opinion will judge the Western European Union are, of course, part of a larger pattern of purposes. The Federal Republic of Germany can be brought into the free concert of Western Europe only if such a concert exists and is sustained. Its maintenance implies an adequate measure of stability and vigor in the society of France and in the other societies of free Europe. In its economic aspect, such stability and vigor must be sought through processes which harmonize, or at least do not fundamentally conflict, with the world-wide perspectives of trade and economic development. The free partnership of Western Europe can only be sustained within the larger North Atlantic partnership; and the effectiveness of the North Atlantic partnership will depend upon the capacity of the member nations to adjust to the technical and emotional implications of nuclear weapons, the shifts and turns in the tactics of the Soviet Union, and the interlocking complex of relationships among the several NATO partners and the societies of Asia and Africa. The concern for peace between France and Germany implies a larger concern for the general peace. It is only in terms of such interrelationships that the current notions of

14

European unity or community or cooperation and the aims of American policy can be understood. It is also in terms of such interrelationships that we must appraise the various forms of organization and methods of operation that now exist or may be created or proposed as means to pursue our aims.

If the Western European Union should prove ineffectual, it will be necessary to devise other arrangements toward the same goal. If a European initiative should lead to a new or modified proposal equally adapted to the attainment of our objectives and deemed preferable by our European associates, it would be wise for the United States to receive any such proposal sympathetically. Even if the Western European Union should prove effective in accordance with its terms, the ramifications of the problem and the flux of events will require constant alertness to the possible need for new or revised arrangements.

In the continuing development of means to realize our objectives, a variety of practical choices may be possible. There may be occasions when questions of form and procedure will be so intimately related to the essence of things as to require a tenacious insistence upon particular arrangements. Other occasions may call for marked flexibility in regard to matters of organization and procedure. The problem of German national unification, in certain of its many aspects, may serve perhaps to illustrate the point.

In the period immediately before us, it is likely that no factor will bear more powerfully upon the prospect for European community than the struggle over the unification of Germany. The Soviet Union resists the unification of Germany on any basis that would permit the Germans a free choice of association with Western

15

Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. If the current deadlock should persist, segments of German opinion might come to regard German adherence to the West as antithetical to German unification. A notion might emerge that Germany should be separated from NATO and the partnership of free Europe in order to make German unification possible. In terms of American purposes and the purposes of the NATO partners, this would invert ends and means. The interest of the United States in German unification stems primarily from our concern lest the desire of Germans for national unification should take a turn which would impede their participation in the free concert of the West, or even render them susceptible to enticement or intimidation by the Kremlin. Germany could presumably be united in different ways, and we might contemplate some variations in the form or method of German unification with equanimity. The United States and its NATO partners, however, cannot but insist on the right of a Germany united by free elections to adopt as its own the Federal Republic's membership in the Western European Union and the North Atlantic treaty.

In these matters, our choices of what to do and how to do it must be shaped by an appreciation of the relation of means to ends, the concrete circumstances of time and place, the variations in aim among the participating nations which will inevitably occur even when their aims are fundamentally consistent, and the inter-relationships among the European community, the North Atlantic community, and the United Nations. It is hardly necessary to add the ultimate factor to which all the others must be adjusted. This is the central purpose of American foreign policy: a just and honorable peace, under which individual men and women may realize to the full their potentialities for free growth.