[LC]

As noted in a previous seminar (January 3rd) on "Tactical Nuclear Alternatives," interest in conventional defense for NATO arises primarily from the problems and risks of alternative defenses. The principal argument for conventional defense is that it will preserve the "firebreak" between nuclear and other weapons at a time when other "firebreaks" between initial hostilities and theater-wide nuclear war look unpromising. If no promising "firebreaks" are preserved, will NATO be able to pose a credible deterrent and meet foreign policy challenges?

Conventional defense also should fit the comparative advantage of the West because it stresses resources, where NATO has and should continue to have a sizeable advantage over the Warsaw Bloc. Beyond economic potential, NATO already outmans the Bloc in military manpower by about 30 per cent, and out-spends it on defense by a much greater margin. And conventional defense should be stabilizing in a long-run arms race context. If NATO builds a good base for conventional defense, then it should be unattractive for the Soviets to attempt to offset it by extending the arms race in this dimension. In quantitative terms, the *incremental* rate of military exchange in any extension of this part of the arms race should then look unrewarding to the enemy. (See attached illustrative graph).

If, for the moment, a good conventional defense is assumed to be feasible, the arguments about disirability take a simplified form. First, such a defense should be inherently credible, because its use is consistent with limiting damage to NATO in war as well as with denying gain to the enemy. Second, a good