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CHAPTER II

THE PROTAGONISTS: THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

A. *The United States and the Atlantic Community: The Grand Design* (View of Necessity)

Problems which may be structural in origin ultimately emerge as policy issues. Thus within the Atlantic Alliance controversy has grown about the future organization of NATO and the relative roles of its members. The chief protagonists have been the United States and France. Now debating the wisdom of negotiating with the Soviets, now contesting the role of nuclear weapons, always disputing the future organization of Europe and the structure of the Alliance, the two countries have sometimes acted as if each had a psychological need to use the other as a foil.

Each side has developed elaborate theories of the evil designs of its opponent. French spokesmen have charged that a primary goal of United States policy is to keep its hands free for some super-Yalta--a strictly bilateral settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union. American commentators have dismissed French policy as reflecting nothing but outdated nationalism and the illusion of grandeur of a bitter man who cannot forget past slights, real or fancied. French critics have accused the United States of seeking to maintain its dominant position by disguising its aspirations behind high-sounding words about an Atlantic community whose practical consequence will be to dissolve Europe's identity. Leading Americans have replied by emphasizing the futility of seeking to base policy on past glory and they have accused De Gaulle of trying to identify European unity with French hegemony.

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The ironical aspect of the dispute is that both protagonists profess the same objectives. France and the United States avow the goal of European unity. Both insist that their policy will lead to closer Atlantic cooperation. Each side argues that its policy will cause the Communist dictatorships to become more tractable in the long run and thus return the Soviet Union to the community of nations.

It could be thought, then, that the dispute is primarily one of tactics. In fact, the controversy goes deeper. At issue are two conflicting conceptions of international order, two different views of the historical process, two variant visions of the future. What gives the controversy its tragic quality is that each approach might have succeeded but for the existence of the other. Each side has the power to prevent the other from realizing its objective. Neither can achieve its own without the cooperation of the other--France even less than the United States. Any discussion of Atlantic policy must therefore begin by tracing the conflicting views of the United States and France.

American policy toward Europe in the post-war period has been remarkably consistent. Greatly influenced by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, in fact often following their lead, four post-war American administrations have supported movements toward European integration. In the early days of the Marshall Plan, the United States urged that a European organization allocate American economic aid among the individual European countries. It strongly pressed the European Defense Community which would have brought about an integrated European army. When the French Parliament hesitated to ratify that treaty--to which, of course, the United States was not a party--Secretary Dulles threatened an "agonizing reappraisal" of American foreign policy.

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In the end the treaty was not ratified; yet, American policy did not change. The United States welcomed the formation of the Common Market as a step toward European political union. It threw its considerable prestige against British efforts to dilute the Common Market by turning it into a free trade area. As late as 1962, Undersecretary of State Ball warned against the danger of treating the Common Market simply as an economic enterprise and opposed the efforts of the Scandinavian countries and Austria to enter it without making a commitment to political unity.

The United States strongly supported the view that Britain could be induced to join Europe only if European economic integration grew so successful that Britain would have no alternative.

European political unity was considered by American policymakers as an essential prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic community. On July 4, 1962, President Kennedy proclaimed his Declaration of Interdependence between the United States and a United Europe. A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States and share with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership.¹ To its fervent enthusiasts, in Europe as well as in the United States, such a partnership seemed realizable by only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with the United States. Similarly, a single solution was offered for the achievement of European unity: supranational institutions operating on the basis of majority vote and controlled by a European Parliament.

1

John F. Kennedy, "The Goal of an Atlantic Partnership," July 4, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVII, No. 1204 (July 23, 1962), pp. 131-3.

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Four arguments were generally advanced on behalf of a federated Europe: to end Europe's internecine wars, to provide a counterweight to the U.S.S.R., to bind Germany indissolubly to the West and to provide an adequate partner for the United States.² American pronouncements always equated a united Europe with full integration on the basis of supranational institutions. Anything less was not considered to be unity.

Prominent among the factors producing the preference for supranational institutions was the conviction that the American experience was directly applicable to Europe. "The United States of America, with its balance of power and Federal-State division, is the unique political experiment in federation, about which we are proud and self-conscious," said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel. "We believe that our system works. It is a natural human reaction to believe that it might also work for other people."

² See for example, Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador to Belgium, "The New Europe--Its Challenge and Its Opportunities for the United States," address to Young Presidents' Organization, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona, April 9, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1192 (April 30, 1962), p. 711.

³ J. Robert Schaetzel, "The United States and the Common Market," speech to 1962 Summer Institute of the Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada, August 18, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVII, No. 1210 (September 3, 1962), p. 351. See also Christian Herter, *Toward an Atlantic Community*, Harper & Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y.-&-Evanston: 1963, pp. 55-6.

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A similar note was struck by President Kennedy in 1962:

The debate now raging in Europe echoes on a grand scale the
debates which took place in this country between 1783 and 1789.
Small states are sometimes fearful of big ones. Big states are
suspicious for historical reasons of one another. Some statesman
cling to traditional forms--others clamor for new ones. And
every eye is on the hostile powers who are never far away. All
this reminds us of our own organic deliberations.⁴

The incentive to urge the American model was especially great
because the nation-state, according to American spokesmen, had become
obsolete. Walt Rostow, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the
State Department, argued:

> "...the major historic lesson of the Second World War; namely, that in the world of the second half of the 20th century the individual nation-states of Europe could only execute effectively a major role on the world scene if they were to unite. The arena of world affairs had widened out to embrace the whole of the planet; and the technology of effective power had outstripped the scale of the old states of Europe.⁵"

To be sure, the American attitude was very ambivalent: It
exalted the nation-state in emerging areas and looked to nationalism in
Eastern Europe as a counterweight to Soviet Russia, but it denied its
validity in Western Europe where the concept had originated. Nor has
the United States been quite so ready to apply its lessons of the obsolescence
of the nation-state to itself. Nevertheless, the passion of the American
view was not reduced by what might, at first blush, seem like an inconsistency.

4 John F. Kennedy, "Trade and the Atlantic Partnership," remarks to Conference on Trade Policy at Washington, D.C., May 17, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1197 (June 4, 1962), p. 907.

5 W.W. Rostow, "The Atlantic Community: An American View," speech to Belgo-American Association, Brussels, May 9, 1963, DOSB Vol. XLVIII, No. 1249 (June 3, 1963), p. 856.

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There is no evidence that any serious consideration was given to
whether a partnership among equals was really likely to operate as smoothly
or mechanically as official pronouncements suggested. Occasionally the
question was posed hypothetically only to be rejected. McGeorge Bundy
explained the dominant view as follows: "...in the end our confidence
in Europe rests on deeper and more solid political grounds. These peoples
are our cousins by history and culture, by language and religion."
Considering the record of internecine wars of these "cousins" some questions
might have been raised about how well-founded such confidence really was.

The notion that there was a harmony of interests between the United
States and Europe remained unquestioned. Dean Rusk was expressing the
conviction of three post-war administrations when he said:

> In 1947 the American Government decided that it would link the
> recovery of Europe to efforts at European unification. We chose
> quite consciously not to play a balance-of-power game with the
> nations of Europe but to build toward a strong partnership in
> the affairs of the West.⁷

6

McGeorge Bundy, "Policy for the Western Alliance--Berlin and After,"
speech to Economic Club of Chicago, December 6, 1961, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No.
1185 (March 12, 1962), p. 423.

7

Dean Rusk, "Some Issues of Contemporary History," speech to the
American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 30, 1961, DOSB,
Vol. XLVI, No. 1177 (January 15, 1962), p. 86.

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As the years went by one particular form of European organization
came to be identified with the substantive policy which a united Europe
was likely to carry out. In the American view, an "integrated" Europe
would be "outward looking"; a less cohesive Europe would be parochial.
A supranational Europe would become a partner to the United States; a
Europe organized along different lines would remain a burden or perhaps
turn into a rival. In short, an integrated Europe was essential to complete
the "Grand Design." This was expressed by Undersecretary of State Ball:

> As we have felt the increasing weight of the burdens and
> responsibilities of leadership--increased geometrically by the
> existence of a real and present danger from Communist ambitions
> --we have wished, sometimes wistfully, for a closer and stronger
> Atlantic partnership. Yet a strong partnership must almost by
> definition mean a collaboration of equals. When one partner
> possesses over 50 percent of the resources of an enterprise and
> the balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relationship
> is unlikely to work very well. And so long as Europe remained
> fragmented, so long as it consisted merely of nations small by
> modern standards, the potentials for true partnership were always
> limited.⁸

This too was the theme of President Kennedy in his speech at the Paulskirche
in Frankfurt in 1963:

> It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all
> against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe
> will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean,
> in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can
> we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing
> of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice. 9

8

George Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, _DOSB_, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962) p. 366.

9

John F. Kennedy, *Address at the Paulskirche, Frankfurt, Germany*, June 25, 1963, _DOSB_, Vol. XLIX, No. 1256 (July 22, 1963), p. 122.

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Partnership presupposed equality of strength; the United States would concede to a strong and integrated Europe responsibilities withheld from a coalition of nation-states. Thus Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, as well as Secretary Rusk, have hinted that the United States was prepared to grant to a united Europe the nuclear autonomy which it had resisted giving individual allies--even though many of the arguments made against the national nuclear forces would seem to apply as strongly to a European nuclear force.

Although United States spokesmen extolled the virtues of partnership with a united Europe, they were rather vague about its nature. George McGhee, then Under-secretary of State, spoke of a "tightly integrated Europe" and a "somewhat looser Atlantic association." He described common tasks in aiding underdeveloped nations and in defending the frontiers of freedom, but he did not spell out the content of these objectives or how the partnership was going to function in practice. There was an implication that the partnership would apply to a sharing of the burdens but that the goals would remain those set by the United States during its period of dominance--not indeed because we wished to perpetuate our hegemony but because a decade and a half of unchallenged leadership had accustomed American leaders to believe that their views inevitably reflected the general interest.

The American view, for all its idealism, ignored those factors which made the American experience unique. The American federal union was formed on a new continent by states sharing a common historical experience. The American colonies had jointly fought a war to achieve their freedom.

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They were roughly of the same size. They had no tradition of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign relations. Their peoples were of similar cultural background and spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European state is the product of many centuries of a history in which a sense of national identity was often linked to what distinguished a nation from its neighbors. Independence for many European states required a long process of struggle against the domination of other European nations. In other words, the countries of Europe were formed in a manner which emphasized national peculiarities. In Europe, moreover, the conduct of foreign policy and the assumption of responsibility for national defense have been considered among the key attributes of sovereignty. An attempt to abolish the European nation-states, or to reduce their role drastically, represents a much more profound wrench with the past than the establishment of the United States of America did two centuries earlier.

The present-day attitudes of the European states toward the supranational forms of unity are as different as their histories. Smaller countries with a habit of dependence find supranational institutions easier to accept than those which were once major powers. Italy, where the nation-state was never really consolidated, and the Federal Republic of Germany, whose sense of identity was smashed in the war, are less reluctant to be amalgamated in a supranational entity than France or Britain, the countries in Europe with the longest history as great powers.

The relative weakness of the nation-state in Europe in the post-war period had been due partly to factors which proved to be temporary and invasion from the East. But economic which-emphasized Europe's dependence on the United-States.-Economic

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has recovery tended to reduce Europe's receptivity to America's political maxims. This has coincided with the belief that the Soviet threat was ending--a development also fostered by American policy.

These factors might have been counterbalanced had Europe wished to play the global role envisaged for it by the Grand Design. But the process of decolonization has sharply reduced Europe's interest in extra-European affairs. And for a European role, the nation-state is not so obsolete as is sometimes alleged. If European countries are willing to confine their foreign policy to Europe, those joint efforts that modern conditions require are mostly technical or economic in nature. These may be left to experts--perhaps even supranational commissions of experts. But they do not require the supranational political institutions favored by the United States.

Finally, the assumption that economic integration would inevitably lead to political unity and that institutions in the economic field could be transplanted into the political arena has been proved overoptimistic. In the economic field, problems are primarily technical. Within each European government, there has been a well-established tradition of entrusting these matters either to the automatic operation of a market economy or to a group of experts. On the other hand, foreign policy involves issues of prestige and power, which are much less suitable for compromise. Nor is it self-evident that supranational bodies of experts would necessarily conduct a more "outward looking" policy than established political leaders. The behavior of the Common Market Commission with

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respect both to Britain's entry into Europe and the Kennedy Round would seem to indicate the opposite.

But whatever the structure, origin or degree of European integration--whether it was the Europe of De Gaulle or the Europe of Monnet--one question could not be postponed indefinitely: What kind of policy would a united Europe pursue? The assumption that a united Europe and the United States would inevitably pursue parallel policies and have similar views about appropriate tactics runs counter to historical experience. A separate identity has usually been established by opposition to a dominant power: The European sense of identity is unlikely to be an exception to this general rule--its motive force could well be to insist on a specifically European view of the world. This is all the more true because a European sense of identity can no longer be nourished by fear of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet threat is thought to be diminishing. Even if the reality of this threat were accepted, it would provide an incentive for American assistance and thus lead to an Atlantic, not a European, conception. In short, a united Europe is not likely to share our burdens without a major voice in the political direction of the Atlantic world--which is another way of saying that it is no longer a challenge to American hegemony in Atlantic affairs. This may well be a price worth paying for European unity; but too much of American policy has suffered from an unwillingness to recognize that there was a price to be paid.

Had it not been for General de Gaulle, these problems might have remained dormant for many years. But his emergence as President of France

10

For an elaboration of these points, see below, Chapter VIII.

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precipitated a fundamental change in the United States-European dialogue. Deliberately, often cynically, exploiting the ambiguities and ambivalences of the American conception, President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of Atlantic partnership and European unity. This has produced a bitter, often personal, reaction among those who had considered the previous formula as the only possible one. But outraged pride is not a good guide to policymaking. European-American relations will never again be the same as they were before De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, which excluded Britain from the Common Market and marked a watershed in European-American relations. Waiting for his disappearance is not a policy but an evasion. It, therefore, becomes essential to try to assess without rancor the policies of the French President.

B. The Illusionist: De Gaulle's Challenge to the Grand Design

If an international system could be designed with the symmetry of a geometric axiom, the primary concern of allies would be the requirements of the common undertaking. Their efforts would be regulated by criteria of over-all efficiency and on the basis of a division of labor. But such a perfect symmetry is the illusion of utopians--or of island powers.
Historically aloof and geographically isolated, such nations consider that the main function of foreign policy is to remedy the peril which has caused them to commit themselves to a joint enterprise. Secure in their identity, they expect their allies to find fulfillment in being components of an over-all design. Such was the attitude of Great Britain toward the Continent during the Napoleonic wars.

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A society whose sense of identity is highly developed may find it psychologically easier to deal with the problem of change than a society unsure of itself. Change does not threaten the meaning of existence for a cohesive society as it does for a society wracked by self-doubt. For a cohesive society adaptation becomes a matter of prudent calculation; it is seen as an essentially technical problem. A society which has suffered severe shocks is less flexible. It must balance the benefits of a new set of international arrangements against the dangers of possible moral disintegration. Before it can decide what it wishes to become, it has to rediscover what it is. France has had this problem since the end of the First World War.

Few countries have experienced the travail which France has suffered since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe felt that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced the inter-war period as an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations. Domestically, the Third Republic witnessed mounting governmental instability. In foreign policy, France was torn between its premonitions and its sense of impotence.

Nothing could have expressed France's sense of insecurity better than the fact that at a moment when its army was the largest in Europe and Germany's was limited by treaty to 100,000 men France began to build the Maginot Line. What made the action all the more potent was that the Treaty of Versailles had specifically prohibited Germany from stationing military forces in the

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Rhineland. But an attack on France presupposed the remilitarization of that area. In other words, at the height of its victory France felt so insecure that it did not think itself able to prevent the breach of the peace treaty by its disarmed enemy and constructed a defensive line for that contingency.

As if paralyzed by seeing her fears come true, France stood by while Germany rearmed and proceeded to abrogate one after another of the restrictions put on it by the Treaty of Versailles. The French collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others. Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the Fourth Republic experienced the same governmental instability as the Third, and in addition it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars, each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the post-war landscape. But during the war in Algeria, France was on the verge of civil war three times in the span of four years. So well has De Gaulle succeeded in his tour de force that even his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness--a notion which would have been inconceivable five years ago. But less than a decade has passed since a wise (and pro-Western) French author could write:

46

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...the pretention to indifference. ... is never completely absent. It attracts like nostalgia. ... At the very moment when we are torn out of our solitude, we go on dreaming of it; ... we want to stand by the wayside and watch the traffic go by. ... Our victory in 1918 cost us too dearly. Since then we have wanted to recoup; the result is we have lost everything. Strictly speaking the French nation no longer exists. She is disintegrating at this moment. She proved unable to secure her lands against invasion because she was no longer strong enough to do so alone, and because her allies were not able to come to her aid quickly enough to prevent occupations. This is why France has had such a strong inclination to declare herself neutral. Then no one would have had the right to enter her. ... We are living like a ruined landlord unwilling to seem bankrupt. ... We have not been so unhappy in France for a hundred years; our literature has not been so sad; and only because during this time we have experienced hardly anything but deceptions: the Republic in difficulties, socialism bankrupt, our wealth gone, our wars badly conducted. 11

This spiritual malaise must be understood as the essential background for President de Gaulle's policy. A certain egocentricity on our part causes us to see many of De Gaulle's actions as being primarily motivated by a desire to annoy or to humiliate us. In fact, the central concern of De Gaulle is likely to be quite different. For the greater part of his career, he has had to be an illusionist. In the face of all evidence to the contrary, he has striven to restore France's greatness by his passionate belief in it. At first he was the leader of an insignificant faction of Frenchmen casting their lot with the Allies. His primary task, as he saw it, was to re-establish the identity and the integrity of France. Churchill and Roosevelt could concentrate on the tangible goal of winning the war. To De Gaulle, the war had an intangible purpose. Victory was

11

Brice Parain, "Against the Spirit of Neutrality," *Confluence*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (January 1956), pp. 370-9.

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empty if it did not also restore the position, indeed the soul, of France.
Churchill and Roosevelt understandably considered this quest peripheral
to their central objective and treated De Gaulle's insistence as an
irritating interruption of more important problems.

The conflict between the pragmatic and the intangible which
started during the war has continued to this day. The United States,
blessed with stable government, its sense of identity enhanced by its
war experience, could pursue single-mindedly whatever technical schemes
its bureaucracy thought up at any given moment. To De Gaulle, governing
a country wracked by a generation of conflict and decades of frustration,
the mode of reaching a goal has been as important as the objective itself.
He judges the merit of a policy not only by technical criteria but by its
contribution to enhancing France's sense of identity.

Though De Gaulle often acts as if opposition to United States
policy were a goal in itself, his deeper purpose may well be pedagogical:
to teach his people and perhaps his continent the habit of independence
and self-reliance. The "folie de grandeur" of which De Gaulle is so often
accused is a peculiar kind, for it is tried to a profound awareness of the
suffering and disappointments of his country. In 1960 this caused him to
speak as follows:

Once upon a time there was an old country all hemmed in by
habits and circumspection. At one time the richest, the
mightiest people among those in the center of the world stage,
after great misfortunes it came, as it were, to withdraw within
itself. While other peoples were growing around it, it remained
immobile. In an era when the power of States depended upon
their industrial might, the great sources of power were stingily
meted out to it. It had little coal. It had no petroleum.
Furthermore, its population was no longer growing as, in some

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years, it numbered fewer births than deaths. In the doubt and the bitterness which it came to have about itself as a result of this situation, political, social and religious struggles did not cease to divide it. Finally, after two world wars had decimated, ruined and torn it, many in the world were wondering whether it would succeed in getting back on its feet.¹²

De Gaulle has chosen to revitalize France by an act of faith powerful enough to override a seemingly contrary reality. In De Gaulle's view, an almost mystical communion has existed since the war between himself representing the general interest and the French people. Thus, during the revolt in Algiers in 1960, De Gaulle could say: "Finally, I speak to France. Well, my dear country, my old country, here we are together, once again, facing a harsh test." The effort to achieve greatness required that France regain--wherever possible--the right of independent decision. France could agree with the decisions of others: but it had to make clear that this represented a voluntary act and not the abdication of the impotent.

This is why De Gaulle never tires of insisting on his imperturbability in the face of Soviet threats or American criticisms. During the height of the Berlin crisis of 1960, De Gaulle spoke as follows:

12

Charles de Gaulle, Address on June 14, 1960, Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958-January 31, 1964 (Henceforth referred to as Major Addresses), French Embassy, Press and Information Division, New York, 1964, p. 79.

13

Address on Major Addresses, January 29, 1960, p. 74.

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personality to produce De Gaulle's aloof and uncompromising diplomatic style.

To him, being swayed by personal emotion is a form of servitude or of

irresponsibility:

> Man "limited by his nature" is "infinite in his desires."
> The world is thus full of opposing forces. Of course,
> human wisdom has often succeeded in preventing these
> rivalries from degenerating into murderous conflicts.
> But the competition of efforts is the condition of life.
> Our country finds itself confronted today with this law
> of the species, as it has been for two thousand years.¹⁵

The art of statesmanship is to understand the nature of the world
and the trend of history. A great leader is not so much clever as lucid
and clear-sighted. Grandeur is not simply physical power but strength
reinforced by moral purpose. Nor does competition inevitably involve
physical conflict. On the contrary, a wise assessment of mutual interests
should produce harmony:

> Yes, international life, like life in general, is a
> battle. The battle which our country is waging tends
> to unite and not to divide, to honor and not to debase,
> to liberate and not to dominate. Thus it is faithful
> to its mission, which always was and which remains human
> and universal.

De Gaulle's nationalism is in the tradition of Mazzini, who
thought that nations which have achieved their independence would respect
the dignity of others. His diplomacy is in the style of Bismarck, who
strove ruthlessly to achieve what he considered Prussia's rightful place

15

Major Addresses, ibid., May 31, 1960, p. 75.

16

Ibid., p. 78

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but who then tried to preserve the new equilibrium through prudence,
restraint and moderation.

However, De Gaulle's conception of the role of the nation-state
inevitably clashed with the American conviction of its obsolescence.
Washington considers insistence on autonomy divisive and as implying a
desire for separate, perhaps antagonistic, policies. Paris regards the
attacks on its independent stance as indicative of hegemonial designs.

Both sides have pressed their arguments with such vigor because
from its perspective each is right. De Gaulle is correct in insisting
that independence does not exclude cooperation. But he has stressed his
autonomy so insistently and with such abrupt methods that French
separateness at times seems to have become an end in itself. The United
States is correct in affirming an underlying community of interests. But
our emphasis on organizational devices blinds us to psychological realities.
One particular method of European integration and Atlantic partnership has
become as much an end to America as the affirmation of independence has to
France. Involved, ultimately, are differing conceptions of truth. The
United States, with its technical, pragmatic approach, often has analytical
truth on its side. De Gaulle, with his consciousness of the trials of
France for the past generation, is frequently closer to the historical truth.

Disagreement, of course, is not confined to theoretical issues. In
his effort to vindicate a more autonomous role for France, De Gaulle
challenges many basic American policies with respect to European unity,
nuclear policy and East-West relations. The problem is not that De Gaulle

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wishes to reactivate Europe's traditional national rivalries as so many of
his American critics allege. On the contrary, he affirms the goal of unity
for Europe as passionately as his detractors. But where the American and
European "integrationists" insist that European unity requires that the
role of the nation-state be diminished, De Gaulle argues that unity depends
on the vitality of the traditional Europe. To De Gaulle the states are
the only legitimate source of power, only they can act responsibly.

> . . . it is true that the nation is a human and sentimental
element, whereas Europe can be built on the basis of
active, authoritative and responsible elements. What
elements? The States, of course, for, in this respect,
it is only the States that are valid, legitimate and
capable of achievement. I have already said, and I
repeat, that at the present time there cannot be any
other Europe than a Europe of States, apart, of course,
from myths, stories and parades.¹⁷

The States are, in truth, certainly very different from
one another, each of which has its own spirit, its own
history, its own language, its own misfortunes, glories,
and ambitions; but these States are the only entities that
have the right to order and the authority to act.¹⁸

Thus De Gaulle's proposals for European unity invariably envisage
a confederation of states rather than supranational institutions. In his
press conference of September 5, 1960, President de Gaulle called for
regular consultation between the European governments, for specialized
subordinate agencies and for an assembly formed of delegates from the
national parliaments. He urged a European referendum "so as to give this

17

Major Addresses, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, p. 176

18

Major Addresses, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, pp. 92-93.

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launching of Europe the character of popular support and initiative that
is indispensable."

This affirmation of the need for European unity has been repeated
regularly:

> . . . France. . . must help to build Western Europe into an organized union of States, so then gradually there may be established on both sides of the Rhine, of the Alps and perhaps of the Channel, the most powerful, prosperous and influential political, economic, cultural and military complex in the world. 20

> . . . Western Europe must form itself politically. Moreover, if it did not succeed in doing so, the Economic Community itself could not in the long run become stronger or even continue to exist. In other words: Europe must have institutions that will lead it to form a political union, just as it is already a union in the economic sphere. 21

> . . . Western Europe appears likely to constitute a major entity full of merit and resources, capable of living its own life, indeed not in opposition to the New World, but right alongside it. 22

Most of these ideas were incorporated in the Fouchet Plan for European integration proposed by France in 1961 to its partners in the Common Market.

19

Ibid, p. 93.

20

Address on
Major Addresses, 22nd February 5, 1962, p. 159.

21

Major Addresses, 22nd May 15, 1962, p. 174.

22

Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference on July 23, 1964, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 208 (New York: French Embassy, Press and Information Division), p. 4.

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We feel that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be something organized--where the Alliance is concerned--as to their political conduct and, should the occasion arise, their strategic conduct outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, and in Africa, where these three powers are constantly involved. Furthermore, if there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe? This must be remedied.²⁴

This idea was pressed particularly urgently with respect to the Congo crisis in 1960.

When nothing came of these proposals, De Gaulle reverted to his usual, perhaps preferred, tactic of acting unilaterally and trying to force his partners' hand. After 1961, he stopped urging concerted Western action. Instead, he stressed that only a strong Europe would receive a respectful hearing from the United States or the U.S.S.R. Increasingly, De Gaulle seemed to expect that the development of Europe's economic strength and sense of identity would leave the United States no choice except to concede a coordination of policy.

This is not to say that De Gaulle's policy was primarily a reaction to being rebuffed by the United States. Rather, two changes in the international situation caused him to consider American support less crucial and made independent action appear rewarding. When De Gaulle proposed the Directorate, a global showdown seemed possible. The Lebanese crisis had just occurred; Soviet intransigence was at its height. This impelled De Gaulle to try to insure American support in case a showdown proved unavoidable. Since 1961 the threat from the Soviets has seemed to recede, and the need for

24

p. 96.

Major Addresses at a Press Conference on September 5, 1960,

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concerted action has diminished proportionately. Indeed, with the
growth of American involvements in Asia and Latin America, the shoe
is now somewhat on the other foot. It is the United States which presses
its European allies to share its global responsibilities and the Europeans
who are reluctant to assume world-wide risks.

foster
sense of
a European identity, he has never ceased affirming the need for close
association between Europe and the United States. He opposes, not the
Alliance, but the concept of integration on which it is based. In his view,
to assign tasks on the basis of a division of labor will erode France's
identity:

> It is intolerable for a great State to leave its destiny up to the decisions and action of another State, however friendly it may be. In addition, it happens that, in integration... the integrated country loses interest in its national defense, since it is not responsible for it. The whole structure of the Alliance then loses its resilience and its strength.²⁵

Integration would lead to an abdication of responsibility and a sense of impotence. Ultimately, this would demoralize France's foreign policy. It would oblige France and Europe to accept the tutelage of the United States forever.

De Gaulle has opposed both the Nussau Agreement, which tied the
British nuclear program to that of the United States, and the proposed
NATO multilateral force for the same reason. Both programs, in his view,
made Europe completely dependent on the United States. Whatever influence
Europe could exercise would depend not on its weight or its conventions but

25

Major Addresses, White Press Conference on April 11, 1961, p. 124.

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from Algiers, most of it was stationed in France and not "integrated"
into NATO. The motive for this was not only De Gaulle's objection to
the concept of integration but also a reason less flattering to the often
proclaimed image of a powerful, cohesive France:

> . . . it is absolutely necessary, morally and politically, for
> us to make our army a more integral part of the nation. Therefore,
> it is necessary for us to restation it, for the most part, on
> our soil; for us to give it once again a direct responsibility
> in the external security of the country; in short, for our
> defense to become once again a national defense.²⁷

In De Gaulle's judgment, twenty-five years of humiliating conflict and
several military revolts against legitimate authority made it more
important to integrate the French army into French society than into
NATO.

Few of De Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America
as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force.

We are in the atomic age and we are a country that can be
destroyed at any moment unless the aggressor is deterred
from the undertaking by the certainty that he too will
suffer frightful destruction. This justifies both alliance
and independence. The Americans, our allies and our friends,
have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So
long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed
their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked--for
at that time Europe alone could be attacked--the Americans
acted in such a way that for France the question of an invasion
hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability . . .
It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most
fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way,
rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal,
and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life
of America. Naturally, I am not making an evaluation--if

27 Major Addresses, ibid, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, pp. 180-1.

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indeed it is possible to find a relation between the degree of one death and the degree of another--but the new and gigantic fact is there. From then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves confronted with the possibility of direct destruction.²⁸

These views have caused American spokesmen to charge De Gaulle with fomenting distrust of the United States. He has been lectured on his ignorance of the technical requirements of nuclear strategy and ridiculed for excessive pretensions. Actually, De Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities. They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. Looking at NATO from the point of view of division of labor, the United States considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From the perspective of vindicating France's identity, De Gaulle is not so concerned with the technical aspects of strategy as with the political problem of choice. The United States considers central control over nuclear weapons crucial for the contingency of general war; De Gaulle gives priority to France's impact on the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy. Secretary McNamara strives for strategic options; President de Gaulle seeks political ones.

28

*Major Addresses, ibid.* Press Conference on January 14, 1963, pp. 216-7.

29

For a fuller discussion of the strategic problems, see Chapters IV, V and VI.

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Franco-American relations have been further irritated by conflicting views of East-West relations. As in most other controversies, each side has accused the other of the same offense: of planning a settlement, if not at the expense, at least to the exclusion of the other. In the United States, De Gaulle's comment that Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to negotiate directly with Moscow. In France, United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union are taken as an indication that the United States is seeking a separate accommodation with the U.S.S.R., perhaps as detrimental to Europe as the Yalta agreement is said to have been.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned with scoring debating points. De Gaulle's statement that one day Europe would again extend from the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a deal with the Soviet Union:

> On our old continent, the organization of a western group, at the very least equivalent to that which exists in the east, may one day, without risk to the independence and the freedom of each nation and taking into account the probable evolution of political regimes, establish a European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals. Then Europe, no longer split in two by ambitions and ideologies that would become out-of-date, would again be the heart of civilization.³⁰

The reorganization of Europe to which De Gaulle refers is to take place *after* Communist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet Union, that is when Russia is once more a national, and not an ideological, state pursuing a policy dictated by its national interests. This is the precise eventuality foreseen in American post-war policy for a final settlement. By the same

30

Major Addresses, Abid. Press Conference on May 31, 1960, p. 78.

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II-31

token, our French critics do us an injustice when they see our groping
efforts to adjust to complex situations as a complicated, perhaps
sinister, master plan. United States policy toward the Soviet Union
does not reflect a devious desire to settle all issues unilaterally.
Basically, it seeks to implement one interest which the two great nuclear
powers must have in common: to prevent a general holocaust.

Indeed, French and American analyses of Soviet trends are not
so different as the controversy sometimes suggests. Both are of the
view that at some point the Soviet system will be transformed. Both
believe that this transformation will mark the starting point for fruitful
negotiations. They disagree not over the fact of evolution but its nature,
not over the ultimate desirability of a diplomatic settlement but about
who will be the spokesman for the West when it takes place. Above all,
they differ about the nature of a stable international order and the role
of individuals in relation to it.

The United States has a tendency to believe that peace and stability
is the "natural" condition. Crises must, therefore, be caused by personal
ill-will rather than by objective conditions. If tension persists it is
because Communist leaders continue to be unreasonable; it can be alleviated
by establishing an atmosphere of trust and good personal relations. As
a result, United States policy toward the Soviet Union has oscillated
between two opposite approaches: During periods of tension, the United
States tends to see Soviet policy as conducted by highly purposeful,
ideologically inspired men operating according to careful, long-range plans.
During periods of détente, American leaders have often acted as if a settlement
could be achieved by good personal relations with their Communist counterparts.

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Great stress is placed on creating a proper atmosphere. Either approach leads to an avoidance of concreteness. During periods of tension this is because negotiations are believed to be useless, and during periods of detente it is because of a reluctance to disturb the favorable atmosphere. In either case, the final goal of our confrontation with the Soviets is often described as some definite point in time where peace can be said to have broken out. American policy statements have a tendency to envisage a permanent end of conflict and a world living under what is often described as "the rule of law."

De Gaulle's view is more historical and less legalistic. Peace to him is not a final settlement but a new, perhaps more stable balance of forces. "Now, in the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the world will find peace." An equilibrium can never be permanent but must be adjusted in constant struggles. But however temporary a balance, France and Europe must find their proper place in it, not as objects of policy but as its author.

Similarly tension in De Gaulle's view, is not so much caused by the personal attitudes of individual Communist leaders as by the dynamics of the system which they represent. To him, internal instability is the distinguishing feature of Communist leadership groups.

31

Address on
Major Addresses, ibid., May 31, 1960, p. 78.

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During my lifetime, Communist ideology has been personified by many people. ... Each of these holders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event, he firmly fights against the personality cult of the others.³²

Having erected an unnatural system, Soviet leaders are under constant pressure to divert attention by foreign adventures.

...there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects, actually its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more by the elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult to deceive and to subjugate.³⁴

Since in De Gaulle's view Soviet aggressiveness does not reflect a real grievance but domestic instability, it must be resisted and not accommodated by the West. To yield to Soviet blackmail would not alleviate internal Soviet stresses but only supply an incentive for further demands. Thus during the Berlin crisis, De Gaulle spoke as follows:

32
*Major Addresses*, ibid, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, p. 236.

33
*Major Addresses*, ibid, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, p. 84.

34
*Major Addresses*, ibid, Press Conference on September 5, 1961, p. 140.

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II-34

... we do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifications, of threats launched by certain countries against other lands and especially against ours. This is all the more true in that we realize the tactical element that enters into all this staging by those who, so to speak, make it their job to upset others.

... in their camps the struggle between political trends, the intrigues of clans, the rivalries of individuals periodically lead to implacable crises, whose sequels--or even whose premonitory symptoms--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover, we know that in those countries there are conflicting national grievances in spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We realize therefore only too well that they readily indulge in virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead people astray--within their own country and outside--without, however, overstepping certain bounds. 35

De Gaulle rejected the "exploratory" conversations on Berlin urged by the United States and Britain as a means of determining Soviet intentions.

He refused to join the talks because:

> "...so long as the Soviet Union does not put a stop to its threats and its injunctions and bring about an actual easing of the international situation, we believe that we have spared our allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic rupture or tragi-comical engulfment, in which the conference would obviously have ended. 36

And he did not participate in the Geneva disarmament conference, predicting that it would do nothing except present irreconcilable plans. 37

35. Major Addresses. (Hill) Press Conference on September 5, 1960, pp. 84-5.

36. Major Addresses. (Hill) February 5, 1962, p. 160.

37. Major Addresses. (Hill) Press Conference on May 15, 1962, p. 181.

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For this reason the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has been a constant source of friction between the United States and France. To De Gaulle it is an example of an American action which ignored, and even jeopardized, a major French interest in order to promote an American conception of the general interest. The inevitable corollary is that a similar situation could arise in other fields as well. The major thrust of De Gaulle's policy is to put France, and perhaps Europe, into a position where settlements against its wishes are impossible.

In short, De Gaulle's view is remarkably consistent in all major policy areas: Unity, whether in alliance with the United States or in association with European countries, depends on the vitality of the member states. Only those capable of taking responsible action can form meaningful associations. There is no inconsistency in affirming the Atlantic Alliance while insisting on the peculiarity of France or the identity of Europe.

To De Gaulle, the two notions are complementary--though this may seem disingenuous or even cynical to many Americans.

For centuries, one of the chief problems of Western political thought has been how to achieve unity while respecting diversity. One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that a political unit must mean something to itself before it can have meaning to others.¹ To American spokesmen the French insistence on autonomy is prima facie proof of distrust of American intentions. To France's President, the United States reluctance to concede this autonomy appears to be a device to perpetuate our hegemony,¹ and to reduce France to the status of an impotent satellite.

INSIGHT: Before a state can contribute usefully to common decisions, it requires a sense of responsibility; it must be convinced that its opinions matter.

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frequently

While De Gaulle's tactics have often been brutal, the United States has shown extremely little understanding for the special psychological situation of France. Even in the best of circumstances, a country which has been ravaged by two world wars, and which barely avoided civil war in 1958, in 1960 and again in 1962, could not be expected to find its fulfillment in the "Grand Design" of others. No matter who governed in France, he would have had to face the problem of restoring France's faith in herself. To argue about the technical feasibility of various schemes of Atlantic partnership is to miss De Gaulle's central intention. Many of his actions are designed to rediscover a sense of purpose for France--a goal that transcends any specific policy issues. How well De Gaulle has succeeded in this task is proved by the fact that two years after the end of the Algerian war France, far from being torn to pieces by internal schisms--as most observers expected--is the most active European country in international affairs.

Although De Gaulle has often exaggerated this essentially psychological mission, there is merit in his view that no theoretical conception of European or Atlantic unity can become a reality if all the diverse loyalties and convictions which have formed historical Europe must be destroyed in order to achieve it. The tendency of his opponents to refuse to take his challenge seriously and instead to treat De Gaulle as a relic to be outwaited has prevented a meaningful discussion from which a new common conception of Atlantic relations might have emerged. Difficult as it may be to deal with De Gaulle's France, we would do well to remember

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Though most American leaders tend to ascribe Allied tensions to the obstinancy of one man, the structure of present disputes is not novel. During World War II, many senior American leaders committed to assumptions about Soviet good faith and a world-wide system of collective security reacted with considerable hostility to Churchill's attempt to insure the peace by some physical safeguards. Churchill's views were then treated with the same patronizing attitude now reserved for De Gaulle. British concerns about the post-war European balance of power were considered as short-sighted and a symptom of old-fashioned nationalism. However, a subtler style, the prestige of Great Britain's heroic wartime effort and a common language prevented the conflict from being so explicit. In our impatience to realize "Grand Designs" we are sometimes reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself not only with the best but also with the worst contingency and this causes us at times to be obtuse about the psychological needs of our allies.

But if his critics have shown little compassion for his special circumstances, De Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of negotiations, the French President has moved through a series of faits accomplis to force his allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views were certain to prevail by virtue of their logical necessity and that the feelings of other statesmen were, therefore, irrelevant. A profound believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the logic of events would always override the sensibilities of others.

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No doubt, this is a heroic posture. But, man is not governed by reason alone. And history, however inevitable it may appear in retrospect, is created by men, most of whom lack the vision of the French President --though they do not lack his power. The paradox of De Gaulle's position is that he claims to speak for Europe, but he has not found it possible to create a following outside of France that sees him as a European statesman. He has alienated many potential supporters by his excessive rationalism and unilateral tactics. Many individuals who share his dedication to a European identity in world affairs have been driven into opposition by De Gaulle's wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims. De Gaulle's rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has antagonized even those who do not see the choice between a federated or confederated Europe as an issue of principle. Though the French proposals for European political unity actually offer a better guarantee against the hegemony of a single European state than the dominant American schemes, De Gaulle's methods suggest that he will cooperate only if others accept his unilateral pronouncements. Although France and the United States seem to agree on the principle of a strong and autonomous Europe, De Gaulle's tactics give rise to the impression that he desires autonomy, not to enhance the unity of the West but to be free to pursue policies contradictory, if not hostile, to those of the United States.

Ironically, De Gaulle has become a symbol on both sides of the Atlantic of principles contrary to his pronouncements and probably to his intentions. He has enabled many in Europe not heretofore noted for their devotion either to European unity or to Atlantic partnership to

71

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II-41

advocate some ideal model of either relationship in order to avoid making
whatever progress is possible now. By evoking so many memories of
authoritarian rule, De Gaulle has polarized the discussion within Europe
in a manner that makes it next to impossible to come to grips with the
substance of his thought. A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge
to American leadership. But by couching this challenge so woundingly,
De Gaulle has spurred American self-righteousness rather than the objective
re-examination of Atlantic relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that De Gaulle's conceptions
--as distinct from his style--were greater than those of most of his
critics. But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the
sweep of his conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to
absorb them, he will fail regardless of the validity of his insights.
If his style makes him unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he
is "right" or "wrong."

Though De Gaulle has performed enormous feats in lifting his
country's sights almost by an act of will, there are objective limits
which great and strong-willed statesmanship may extend but cannot change
altogether. De Gaulle's insistence that France and the United States
are equal is true in a moral sense but if pushed too far, it must bring
into the open a permanent disparity of strength. In any collision the
superiority of American resources is likely to prevail regardless of the
validity of the competing views. By generating so much personal ill-will
among American leaders, De Gaulle may rend the fabric of illusion on which
his policy depends. The irony of Franco-American rivalry is that De Gaulle

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has conceptions greater than his strength, while United States power
has been greater than its conceptions.

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about
the dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor,
following the laws of his nature, is bringing about consequences: quite
different from those intended. Either the "American" or the "French"
concept of Atlantic relationship might have succeeded. Competing
as they do--with no comprehension of the real intention of the other
--they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided,
suspicious Europe absorbed once again in working out its ancient
rivalries. Tragedy, to many Americans at least, is to find oneself
thwarted in what is ardently desired. But there is another and perhaps
more poignant tragedy, that of fulfilling one's desires and then finding
them empty.

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III-1

# CHAPTER III
## THE BERLIN CRISIS AND THE NASSAU AGREEMENT:
### THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND GREAT BRITAIN UNTIL JANUARY 1963

#### A. The Problem of Germany: Events Leading Up to the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship

Arrangements in Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe for at least three centuries. In the twentieth century the peace of Europe has been violated twice by a powerful and unified Germany. But prior to 1871, when Germany was composed of a group of competing states, it was the arena of conflict for other European powers which sought to perpetuate its divisions, thwart its national aspirations and prevent one another from gaining a preponderant influence.

Considering this history it was inevitable that Germany, when it was finally unified in 1871, should identify security with sufficient strength to defend itself against all of its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort, however understandable, proved fatal to the stability of Europe. Germany's strength, coupled with its central position, produced a vicious circle. A country powerful enough to defend itself against all its neighbors simultaneously would also be strong enough to defeat each of them singly. Moreover, the effort to develop such strength required a mobilization of resources and an exaltation of national feelings certain to disquiet all other European countries. Bismarck, the last great German statesman before Adenauer, spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." It was Germany's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions made them inevitable. Germany has been either too weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe.

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Ideally, Germany should be strong enough to defend itself but not to attack; it should be united so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not encourage the rivalries of other countries, but not so nationalistic that it disquiets its neighbors. To bring about such a Germany has been a major goal of Western policy since the end of World War II.

The effort to define a new role for Germany faces major psychological problems. Every German above fifty has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different regimes, each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two world wars and has experienced two catastrophic inflations. Every German above thirty-five has witnessed the trauma of the Nazi period, of World War II and of the post-war collapse. The Nazi experience has been so completely suppressed in public consciousness or has been sublimated into a vague feeling of generalized guilt that it is no longer a problem as such. But the rootlessness produced by blotting out twelve years of history is relevant. Germany has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks. Great national prosperity has developed at the same time that national, political and territorial integrity has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the stridency and legalism of whose disputes often hide a lack of inner assurance.

Chancellor Adenauer's great achievement--just as De Gaulle's--was that he understood the psychological needs of his country. He was aided by wise and far-sighted American statesmen, who helped reintroduce Germany into the community of nations. In order to prevent the latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the peace, Adenauer sought to give the Federal

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reconstruction, and German politics were dominated by a man whose formative experience was in the last century. But Germany's uncertain sense of identity could take surprising forms. This is all the more true because since 1961 the German situation has become more fluid under the impact of four events: (a) the Berlin Crisis and Anglo-American negotiating tactics until the end of 1962; (b) the Berlin Wall; (c) De Gaulle's European policy and the United States reaction to it; and (d) United States pressures for diplomatic flexibility.

The Berlin crisis was crucial because it emphasized a serious potential for tension within the Alliance: the difference between the German quest for national unity and the equally understandable concern of the rest of the allies for stability. Of course, no alliance can perfectly reconcile the objectives of all of its members, but the minimum condition for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance should not clash with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

The Berlin issue has proved sensitive not so much because the city is physically vulnerable, but because all of Germany is psychologically vulnerable. Not all of Germany's allies accept the division of Germany, and some might prefer a unified Germany; but none makes reunification a major goal. Thus during the Berlin crises of 1959-60 and 1961-62, many in the West argued that the logical solution was to negotiate new procedures for access to Berlin in return for accepting the "fact" of a divided Germany. To many influential Americans and Britishers, the continuation of a status quo which had persisted for a decade and a half appeared a small price to pay for a promise of stability.

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III-5

However, acceptance by the West of the division of Germany as
permanent would upset the domestic equilibrium of the Federal Republic;
this is one of the reasons that the Soviets are so eager to secure Western
recognition of the status quo in Germany. The division of Germany may be
unavoidable; but the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance requires that there
is no ambiguity about the reason for it. If the West tacitly or explicitly
abandoned the principle of German national unity--collaborating with the
Soviets in keeping Germany divided--Germans would consider it a sacrifice
of their basic interests. No German political leader can accept as permanent
the subjugation of seventeen million of his compatriots--all German political
parties are agreed on this point. His minimum goal must be to ameliorate
conditions in East Germany--a goal which he will be under increasing
pressure to pursue independently if his allies prove indifferent to it.

This is why the building of the Wall in Berlin and the hesitant
Western response to it gave such a shock to German political life. Many
in the West considered the Wall primarily as another unilateral abrogation
of a treaty obligation by the Soviets and as an act of inhumanity to the
people of Berlin. In Germany the Wall shattered the previous hopes for
unification. For better or worse, the policy of the Federal Republic had
been based on the premise that there was no inconsistency between Germany's
national aspirations and its Western orientation. In fact, the Western
Alliance had been sold to the German public with the argument that it
represented the best method to achieve these aspirations.

The partition of Berlin marked the end of the belief that German
unification would more or less automatically follow the strengthening of
the Atlantic Alliance. Since then, the Federal Republic has groped for

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III-6

a new approach to the question of German unity and to the alleviation of conditions in East Germany. Some have begun to argue that these objectives must be sought by unilateral initiatives if necessary. Others advocate a policy of relaxation. Still others favor maximum pressure. The challenge to Western policy is to prevent the Alliance from seeming an obstacle to legitimate German aspirations, while being careful to keep German national aspirations from transcending all other imperatives. - what about Khrushchev's own view of the situation? The challenge to Western policy is to strike this balance would be difficult even in a cohesive alliance. It has proved impossible in the face of a Franco-American rivalry. President Kennedy had been in office less than six months when Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum confronted his Administration with a direct challenge. The Kennedy Administration thereupon coupled a drastic build-up of American military strength with a diplomacy based on the unexceptionable proposition that a show-down could not be faced until all honorable means of compromise had been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal was to stabilize conditions in Central Europe. The United States was, therefore, inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant --the problem of the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access to Berlin. American policymakers assumed that progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing technical contacts between East and West Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior moral strength of West Germany could not fail to make itself felt.

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III-7

All of these elements were contained in the United States plan which the Germans leaked to the press in April 1962 in order to torpedo it. It provided for an International Access Authority in which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic; a number of East-West German commissions to deal with technical problems; a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.

These initiatives produced conflicting emotions on the part of the leaders of the Federal Republic. Conscious of the danger of being accused of bellicosity, they accepted the need for negotiations. But Chancellor Adenauer and his associates were extremely uneasy about the way the issue had been posed. They held that Soviet "salami tactics" had already curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety so sharply that any further concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They were torn between the desire for progress on the German question and a fear that any negotiation would conclude with further concessions on Berlin. They remembered that at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in 1959 the Western powers first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on Berlin. When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West refrained from pushing the German plan, but still allowed possible modifications of Berlin's status to remain on the agenda.

The German government, having based its entire post-war policy on close ties with the West and especially with the United States, chose not to make public the full extent of its disquiet. Similarly, the United States preferred to stress German agreement to specific formulas in order

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to maintain the appearance of allied unity. However, nominal German agreement frequently depended on Chancellor Adenauer's knowledge that President de Gaulle would exercise his veto in allied councils.

One result was that much of the polemic between Washington and Bonn was conducted by means of inspired leaks to the press. During the summer and fall of 1961, many American newspapers pointed out that Germany's bills for World War II would be coming due. The United States was said to be delaying proposals until after the German elections scheduled for that fall so that a new government would be able to bear the brunt of the unpleasant decisions which were required. There were demands for "initiatives" and "imagination" from the Germans. According to a prevalent theory, it was safe to press the Germans for concessions because, as the saying went, "where are the Germans going to go?"

On the German side, the suspicion was frequently voiced that sooner or later the United States would confront Germany with a *fait accompli*. Planted stories expressed doubt about the validity of the United States nuclear guarantee. The frequent demand that the Germans undertake "initiatives," it was said, really was a euphemism for an American desire that they should offer unpalatable concessions which we were reluctant to make ourselves.

A more important result of this atmosphere of distrust between Bonn and Washington was the emergence of France as guardian of the Federal Republic's interests...thus answering the rhetorical question of where Germany might go. This, in turn, laid the basis for the close Franco-German cooperation which existed during the remainder of Chancellor Adenauer's term in office and which gave France the psychological support it needed for the exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

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France's role has not been without its own ambivalence. French leaders are not likely to have transcended their historical reflexes so thoroughly as to have become believers in a united, powerful and self-confident Germany for its own sake. But President de Gaulle has understood that the most dangerous kind of Germany is one that feels foresaken by its allies and is thrown back on a purely national policy. This is why from the beginning of his tenure De Gaulle has sought to demonstrate that the Federal Republic would not stand alone. When rejecting--sometimes brutally --the American efforts to devise negotiating formulas, De Gaulle came to express the true convictions of the German government better than it dared to do itself.

The conflicting policies of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic created a diplomacy which combined the disadvantage of Allied disunity with the inability to gain any real benefit from negotiations with the Soviets. France refused to negotiate. The Federal Republic approved diplomatic contacts with the Soviets only with great misgivings. The "exploratory talks" were first conducted by Secretary Rusk and later by Ambassador Thompson with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Thus, the Federal Republic, on an issue affecting it most immediately, stood on the sidelines, in a position to criticize the unfavorable features of specific proposals without having to weigh them against alternative courses. By assuming the role of chief negotiator, the United States played into the hands of President de Gaulle and disquieted the Germans, and all without being able to bring about a settlement. Since we could not commit the West as a whole, the Soviets were in a position to treat our offers as fishing expeditions or to engage in fishing expeditions of their own. If they

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considered allied discord a feint, this gave them an incentive to be rigid. If they took it seriously, they could, in effect, bank every concession and use it as the starting point for the next round of talks.

The longer negotiations were conducted in this matter, the more relations between Bonn and Washington suffered. The mere fact of bilateral negotiations raised the specter of a U.S.-Soviet accommodation at the expense of our allies. Our tactics thus encouraged the Franco-German entente. The French inclination to create a Third Force would probably have been pursued in any case; but it was given impetus and opportunity by German uneasiness about Anglo-American negotiating tactics.

This was the situation when Chancellor Adenauer finally put an end to the "exploratory talks" by publicly expressing his dissatisfaction with them. Throughout 1962, American-German relations remained wary, while the Federal Republic moved ever closer to an intimate association with France.

Thus, by the end of 1962, while NATO was still going through the liturgy of unity, serious fissures had appeared. France had formulated an explicit challenge to American pre-eminence within NATO. The Federal Republic was torn between disquiet over American policy and the knowledge that its military security required American support. Great Britain's application for membership in the Common Market was stalled. Matters were brought to a head by De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. This was followed within two weeks by the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship.

The first United States reaction was stunned outrage at what was seen as an embryo European organization based on De Gaulle's conceptions. This was followed by a deliberate policy of wooing the Federal Republic

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away from its French ties. The focus of America's European policy shifted
more and more toward Germany. In the military, diplomatic and economic
fields strenuous efforts were made to forge new United States-German links.
Their practical consequence--whatever the intention--was to reduce the
German commitment to the French alliance. Where the previous policy ran
the risk of a German estrangement from the Alliance, the current policy,
by giving the impression of a special United States-German relationship,
is in danger of eventually producing an estrangement of the other allies.
Before dealing with this problem, it is important to examine the role of
Great Britain, the ally which has prided itself on its special relationship
to the United States during the entire post-war period.

B. Great Britain and Europe: The Nassau Agreement

Great Britain's relations to the Continent in the post-war period
have been extraordinarily ambivalent. In the years immediately following
the war, the countries of the Continent were on the verge of chaos. The
quest for a modicum of stability overrode all other considerations. Great
Britain alone seemed to possess a structure capable of sustaining a long-range,
orderly policy. During this period, Britain could have had the leadership
of Europe for the asking. It would have seemed inconceivable that Europe
might exclude Britain from its community--assuming that it would ever be
able to form one.

Yet it was precisely the memory of its recent isolation that prevented
Britain from seizing its opportunity. Throughout Britain's history, the
threats to its security had come from the Continent, which in Britain
significantly is called Europe. Britain's historic policy had been to prevent
the emergence of a powerful and united Continent. To promote the unity of

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Europe, to submerge Britain in such a structure and to substitute European for American and Commonwealth connections, all this has represented a wrench with tradition which few in Britain have been prepared to make.

The memory of the war reinforced this hesitation. The countries of the Continent had surrendered and forced Britain to fight alone. In the late Forties, these countries were still wracked by internal dissension. Britain might be located close to Europe geographically, but its emotional ties were to its recent ally across the sea and to the Commonwealth. The special relationship with the United States was not only an act of policy but also a psychological necessity. Long before anyone on the Continent could even imagine excluding Britain from whatever structure might be formed, Britain had made a tentative choice against the Continent.

The more the war receded, the more apparent it became that total defeat may be more conducive to making a new start than partial victory. For Great Britain, the tremendous exertions of the war did not lead to a well-deserved respite. On the contrary, Britain was obliged to undertake another major effort to adjust herself to a loss of international influence--a task which was made even more difficult by the memory of the recent heroic effort. While defeat enabled the Continent to free itself from the shackles of traditional nostalgia, Britain's policy, courageous and steadfast during two difficult decades, now began to turn stagnant. Its exertions had consumed so much energy that Britain never seemed able to decide which option to pursue: close relations with the United States, a new concept of Commonwealth or an unreserved entry into Europe. By trying to combine all three, Britain ran the risk of losing each. The roots of Britain's exclusion from the Continent go deeper than an individual's arbitrary decision.

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This ambivalence has been described by some as Britain's search for identity. But the real problem is not that Britain has lacked an identity. Rather it is that its sense of identity has been incompatible with an unreserved entry into Europe. Britain's coolness toward Europe has been a consistent feature of the post-war period. She refused to join the Schumann Plan. She was not part of the abortive European Defense Community. She opposed the Common Market and applied for membership only after it was a going concern. Britain has strongly opposed the possibility of eventually transforming the proposed NATO multilateral force into a European force--one of her motives for entering it is indeed to obtain a veto over such a development. 1

Throughout, Britain's views on the organization of Europe have been quite different from those of the European integrationists who so passionately championed her cause. They have in fact not been easy to distinguish from those of President de Gaulle except that they have been stated in a more accommodating fashion. Britain has been no more prepared than De Gaulle to join an "integrated," "supranational" Europe. Thus, in proposing that Britain enter the Common Market, Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons:

> A number of years have passed since the movement began which culminated in the Treaty of Rome and I am bound to say that I do not see any signs of the members of the Community losing their national identity because they have delegated a measure of their sovereignty. This problem of sovereignty, to which we must, of course, attach the highest importance is, in the end, perhaps a matter of degree. I fully accept that there are some forces in Europe which would like a genuine federalist system.... They would like Europe to turn itself into a sort

1 See below, Chapter V.

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of United States, but I believe this to be a completely
false analogy.

...The alternative concept, the only practical concept, would be a confederation, a commonwealth if hon. Members would like to call it that--what? I think General de Gaulle has called *Europe des patries*--which would retain the great traditions and the pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interest. This seems to me a concept more in tune with the national traditions of European countries and, in particular, of our own.²

The same thought was expressed by Reginald Maudling, then President
of the Board of Trade:

...we have seen in the last year or two the development of
the European *patrie* of General de Gaulle and it is clear,
I should have thought, that the Governments of the Six are
not supporters of the conception of a political federation.
Therefore, it is fair to say that neither by the terms of
the Treaty itself nor by the expressed views of the Governments
concerned in the Community would our membership commit ourselves
in any way to ultimate political federation.³

To be sure, Britain's attitude toward European integration was less
theoretical than De Gaulle's. It advanced no general maxims about the
relationship between national identity and cooperative efforts. It
insisted simply that supranationalism violated, not universal rules, but
the lessons of British history.

Resistance to supranationalism has had an emotional basis as well.
Britain had always considered itself primarily a world power and not a
European power. Its sense of identity was bound up with relations across

2
[Hansard], Fifth Series-Vol. 645, Commons, (July 24-August 4, 1961),
Col. 1490-91.

3
[Hansard], ibid., Col. 1598r.

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the sea, not across the channel. Its emotional ties were less with Europe
than with the "special relationship" with the United States.

This relationship is difficult to define, and there is no doubt
that President de Gaulle sees it as more formal than it really is.
Unquestionably the enormous prestige gained by Britain during the war has
played a major role. Unique ties of language and culture encourage many
informal connections. Anglo-American relations would therefore be
"special" whatever the formal agreements.

British diplomacy has skillfully exploited these assets. De Gaulle's
tactics consist of submitting a proposal pre-emptorily and with a minimum
of explanation. If the proposal is rejected, De Gaulle then proceeds to
implement it unilaterally in order to create a *fait accompli* to which his
allies must adjust. British tactics have been more subtle. Britain never
contests an abstract or theoretical point. It almost never disagrees openly
with fundamental American policies. Instead, British policy usually concedes
us the liturgy, while seeking to shape its implementation through intensive
formal and informal consultation. Where De Gaulle has often been difficult
to insure that he cannot be overlooked, Britain has been so conciliatory
that it has seemed natural to solicit Britain's views before major action
is taken. Whatever the "real" status of the "special relationship," Britain
has tried hard to give the impression to the outside world that American
policy is strongly influenced, if not guided, by London.

In the Sixties, this policy became less effective for a number of
reasons. For one thing, the "special relationship" has never had the same
psychological significance for the United States. The memory of Britain's
wartime effort, enormous as the prestige gained by it was, has diminished

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with time. As the post-war period progressed, many influential Americans have come to believe that Britain has been claiming influence out of proportion to its power. Consequently they have pressed Britain to substitute close association with Europe for the special ties across the Atlantic. This school of thought has objected to giving Britain a preferential voice or even the appearance of it. They believe that Britain should be treated as simply one other European country which should seek its fulfillment in Europe.

The two events which underlined the decline of Britain's influence in Washington most vividly were the Suez crisis and the cancellation of the Skybolt missile. The former demonstrated the end of Britain's capacity for major independent diplomatic action; the latter showed the hollowness of Britain's aspiration to military autonomy. In both instances, the wounds were to some extent self-inflicted--more in the case of Suez than in the case of Skybolt. In both instances, brutal and unfeeling American actions aggravated an already difficult situation. After Suez much of the previous assurance disappeared from British diplomacy.⁴ Britain increasingly tended to substitute maneuver for commitment and tried to add to Britain's influence while reducing its responsibilities--a combination impossible to sustain in the long run.

But the "special relationship" lasted long enough to bring about a number of illusions in Allied relationships. Where Britain tended to

4

It is interesting to compare the reaction of Britain and France to Suez. Britain, having based its entire policy on close association with the United States, suffered a severe psychological blow. France, having fewer illusions about its determining role in Washington, decided to accelerate its autonomy. The French nuclear program was much more the result of Suez than of the British example.

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exaggerate its special influence in Washington, the United States may have overestimated the extent of Britain's pliability. It came to be an axiom of United States policy that Britain's entry into a supranational Europe would be a guarantee of Atlantic partnership. This is why Washington championed Britain's entry into the Common Market so ardently and why it was so outraged when this policy was thwarted.

It is possible, however, that the American view was overoptimistic.
To be sure, Britain's political maturity would weigh heavily in Europe's
councils. With Britain playing a leading role, the policy of a united
Europe would be more subtle, more skillful and, at least in form, less
demanding. Nevertheless, the Conservative government's arguments on behalf
of Britain's entry into Europe always emphasized that only as part of a
united Europe would Britain carry weight with the United States, that basically
the United States only respected strength. One ironic result of Britain's
entry into Europe might well have been that Europe would henceforth have
conducted De Gaulle's policies with British methods.

By 1962 the chief remaining symbol of the special Anglo-American
relationship was in the nuclear field. An amendment to the United States
Atomic Energy Act in 1954 permitted United States assistance to the British
nuclear program. This corrected an inequality in the original law which,
despite close war-time collaboration in research between Britain and the
United States, prohibited the sharing of nuclear information with foreign
countries. American technology was also made available for the development
of delivery vehicles for the British retaliatory force. No such assistance
has been extended to any other ally.

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The "independent" British deterrent has been composed of about 175 V-bombers which are threatened with obsolescence. Accordingly, in 1957, Britain began to develop a missile called the Blue Streak--similar to first-generation American liquid-fuel missiles such as Jupiter or Thor. Because this development was extremely expensive--as is true of all first-generation weapons--it was scrapped in February 1960 in favor of an air-to-surface weapon then under development in the United States, the ill-fated Skybolt.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1960, the Conservative government was under constant attack by Labor on two grounds: (a) by relying on a weapon to be developed by a foreign country, Britain admitted that an "independent" British deterrent was impossible and (b) if there really was a need for an independent deterrent, it was dangerous to rely on Skybolt since the weapons did not yet exist and since, as George Brown, then Labor's spokesman on defense matters, said, "the Americans have not bought it." The Conservative government countered by referring to an "agreement" by the United States to supply Skybolt. This was never contradicted by either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy Administration.

This debate became more intense after the Kennedy Administration took office. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara publicly deprecated the utility of independent nuclear forces. They were supported in this stand by the British Opposition. In 1962, Harold Wilson, then foreign affairs spokesman for the Labor Party, insisted after a visit to Washington that the United States did not consider the British retaliatory force strategically significant and that the British defense effort would make a greater contribution if channeled in other directions. This was denied by the Conservative government. Labor then challenged the Conservative

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government to produce a single official American statement affirming that
the United States valued the British deterrent. This the Conservative
government was unable to do.

Thus, when the Skybolt program was cancelled in December 1962,
conditions were not conducive to calm deliberation. The uproar which the
cancellation produced had little to do with the technical merits of Skybolt
in any event. No one was concerned over a possible deterrent gap in the
interval between the time the V-bombers became obsolete and a new weapons
system could be developed to replace Skybolt. What was at stake was a fiction
on which Britain's post-war policy had been based and for which successive
British governments had expended ten billion dollars. British independence
in the field of strategy--whatever its "real" significance--was literally
a matter of life and death for the Conservative government. And governments
are notoriously slow to appreciate the technical merits of arguments which
threaten their existence. As a result, a conference between President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, which had been scheduled originally
to review the world situation after the Cuban missile crisis, was transformed
into a redefinition of nuclear relationships. The Nassau Agreement was
the result.

The Nassau Agreement is a document of extraordinary ambiguity
reflecting as it does an attempt to reconcile the American quest for the
integration of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance with the British
desire to maintain a measure of independence. The United States agreed to
supply Polaris missiles to Great Britain. Britain was to construct the
submarines and to provide the warheads. The British Polaris submarines,
armed with American missiles and British warheads, were then to be subscribed

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to a NATO "multilateral" force which the United States and Great Britain
pledged themselves to establish. It was to include the British Bomber
Command, some United States Polaris forces and other tactical forces in
Europe. Another paragraph stated that the purpose of the two Governments
was "the development of a NATO multilateral force in the closest consultation
with other NATO allies." Great Britain committed itself to use its nuclear
forces "for the purpose of the international defense of the Western
Alliance" except "where the supreme national interest was at stake." The
same qualification appeared in the provision that both governments agreed
that Western defense "is indivisible and ... in all ordinary circumstances
of crisis or danger / Emphasis added. It is this very unity which is the
best protection of the West." Finally Great Britain and the United States
agreed that NATO in addition to having a nuclear "shield" should have a
non-nuclear "sword," thus reversing the traditional NATO strategic concept.

5

This agreement was transmitted to President de Gaulle after it was
published. In an accompanying memorandum, the United States offered to
sell Polaris missiles to France on the same terms as to Great Britain.

The Nassau Agreement attempted a tour de force. It tried to
reconcile integration with independence, the American belief in the need
for an indivisible nuclear strategy with a British desire for autonomy.

But the price was high, and in practice the various clauses of
the Nassau Agreement tended to cancel each other out. For example, what

5

Text, Joint Communique and Attached Statement on nuclear defense
systems issued on December 21, by President Kennedy and Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1229 (January 14, 1963), pp. 44-5.

See also Chapter IV.

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was the significance of subscribing the British retaliatory force to NATO
while at the same time reserving the right of independent action when the
supreme national interest was at stake? As President Kennedy pointed out
shortly after the Nassau Agreement was signed, the supreme national interest is
automatically involved when a country considers the use of nuclear weapons.
Similarly, what was the meaning of the phrase that a unified strategy was
the best protection in "ordinary" circumstances? To what "extraordinary"
contingencies did the escape clause refer? Moreover, it was not clear whether
the multilateral force described in paragraph six was the same as that in
paragraph seven. In other words, did the commitment imply only that national
contingents be assigned to NATO or did it involve also an undertaking to
establish a mixed-manned fleet (the MLF). Britain was to urge the first
interpretation; the United States defended the latter one. Finally what was the
meaning of the reversal of the traditional notions of "shield" and "sword" in NATO
strategy. Did it imply that the United States and Great Britain were
proposing to resist a conventional attack in Europe primarily with conventional
means?

Thus even an individual less inclined to exploit Allied discord than
President de Gaulle was likely to view the Nassau Agreement with suspicion.
Indeed, reaction to the Nassau Agreement all over Europe ranged from cool
to hostile. In Germany, the grouping of NATO's nuclear forces into a
special nuclear command revived fears of a possible nuclear disengagement.

6

See below, Chapter V.

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The Labor Party interpreted the Nassau Agreement as proving the validity of their previous contention that British nuclear independence was a sham. The Agreement did not satisfy those in the United States who had been pressing for an integrated strategy. And it was, of course, rejected out of hand by President de Gaulle.

The Nassau Agreement could not have been timed more disastrously for Britain's application for membership in the Common Market. If Britain overestimated its special ties with the United States, De Gaulle took them at face value. He has never forgotten Churchill's statement that if Britain

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were forced to choose between Europe and the open sea, it would unhesitatingly opt for the latter.⁷ The tenacity with which Britain argued about the economic conditions of its entry into Europe, while settling its nuclear future in a three day conference with the United States seemed to indicate to De Gaulle the real nature of Britain's priorities. Britain's special relation with the United States in the nuclear field could have two meanings: It was either a challenge to De Gaulle's contention that a united Europe required its own defense; or else it seemed designed to assure Britain a pre-eminent place in a united Europe. Neither contingency was attractive to De Gaulle.

Moreover, if the integration envisaged by the Nassau Agreement did not go far enough for some Americans, it was much too sweeping for President de Gaulle. President de Gaulle was likely to object to the term "assignment" whatever its actual significance. He said that the proposed assignment of nuclear forces to NATO involved:

> ...a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself ... such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.⁸

And he asked how in practice integration could be reconciled with independent disposition, putting his finger on the key evasion of the Nassau Agreement. At the same time, he agreed that cooperation between

7 Charles de Gaulle, *The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, Unity, 1942-1944*, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 253.

8 *Major Addresses, 1961-62*, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, p. 219.

96

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the national nuclear forces within NATO was both possible and desirable. It is symptomatic that, while arguing the relative merits of integration and coordination, neither side has yet defined what concrete meaning these phrases would have in practical terms or what common action might be possible under one label that was not possible under the other.

The way the Nassau Agreement was negotiated created as many problems as its content and timing. Given De Gaulle's wartime experiences and his view of France's role in the world, it was against all probability that he would accept a proposal negotiated privately by the "Anglo-Saxons" and revealed to Paris only after it had been released to the press. It should have come as no surprise that De Gaulle acidly commented at the press conference where he rejected French participation: "Of course, I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because they have been published and because their content is known." 9

Moreover, the actual terms of the agreement seemed to De Gaulle to perpetuate the discriminatory treatment which he had opposed throughout his public career. France possessed neither submarines nor warheads for the Polaris missiles. Thus, the Nassau Agreement could bring benefits to France only after many years. Britain's experience with the Skybolt program reduced the already small incentive of France to make itself dependent on the promise of future delivery of United States missiles--even less so as France was not offered the information about the construction of nuclear warheads without which these missiles would be useless.

9

Ibid., p. 218.

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There have been endless debates whether the Nassau Agreement precipitated De Gaulle's decision to veto British membership in the Common Market, whether it was a pretext or--as is most likely--whether it was simply a contributory cause. It is not necessary to decide this question to realize that the Nassau Agreement exacerbated an already difficult situation and placed the issue of British membership in Europe in the most adverse light imaginable. Britain's application for membership in the Common Market was bound to raise the issue whether it was consistent with the aspirations of a united Europe for one of its members to have an exclusive relationship with the United States on so vital a subject as nuclear strategy or whether it should share its nuclear knowledge with its new partners.

The Nassau Agreement brought this issue to a premature head. Britain had received an abrupt rebuff on the Skybolt issue. Yet it never seems seriously to have considered that it might use this opportunity for closer cooperation with its European partners in the military field. Instead, it concluded an agreement with the United States without even consulting France, the other European nuclear power, and it developed a nuclear plan for NATO without the participation of its prospective partners in the Common Market. It agreed to reverse the traditional significance of "sword" and "shield" in NATO doctrine without consulting any other NATO ally. Perhaps President de Gaulle had decided in any event on a veto. But if he still hesitated, the Nassau Agreement was likely to tip the scales.

In retrospect, the failure of Britain to consult with France and its other European allies before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems a historic missed opportunity. It will never be known what the reaction would have been if Britain had made such an overture before the

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the Bahamas meeting. Even had it failed, it would have placed the subsequent
debate in a far better context.

As it was, De Gaulle, in his press conference of January 14, 1963,
abruptly and brutally vetoed British membership in the Common Market and
rejected the Nassau offer. The date marks an important watershed in Atlantic
relations. De Gaulle's action exploded the premises on which much of previous
thinking had been based. The belief in an automatic progression from economic
to political integration suddenly stood in need of re-examination. The
concept of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a united
Europe, including Great Britain, was seriously challenged. It was now clear
that conflicting approaches to Atlantic relationships were confronting
each other.

The debate was confused by the way the lines were drawn, which made
it dangerous to take either criticism or support of United States positions
at face value. France's claim that it spoke for Europe was belied by the
fact that on economic issues Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with
Great Britain and in the field of strategy the Federal Republic leaned
toward the United States. Many in Europe were disquieted by De Gaulle's
tactics even when they basically agreed with his policies--as in the case
of the recognition of Communist China and his proposal for the neutralization
of Southeast Asia.

At the same time, opposition to De Gaulle does not guarantee support
of United States policies. British policy often differs from that of
De Gaulle only in the greater subtlety of British methods. Much domestic
French criticism is due to the frustration of the divided opposition which
sees its policies carried out by the incumbent. All over Europe left-wing

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groups violently oppose De Gaulle's imperious style, seeing in him a direct descendant of the dictators of the Thirties. But this does not mean that they object to Third Force policies as such or that their long-term alternative is close association with the United States. The Federal Republic maneuvers uneasily between relying on the military protection of the United States and the diplomatic cover of France.

The press conference of January 14, 1963, ushered in a period of frantic diplomatic activity in which the United States strove hard to vindicate its previous conception, and France aloofly pursued her own course. What started out as a dispute about the internal structure of Europe and its role runs the risk of fragmenting Europe or of shifting the balance within Europe in unexpected directions. The result is a stalemate, the most obvious manifestation of which occurs in the field of strategy.