44

I really feel passionately that if we don't maintain our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis, we will be in the deepest trouble. We will have a presidential election in 1976. Of course fundamental issues ought to be discussed, including fundamental foreign policy issues. But there are various areas in which there is or ought to be substantial agreement. And as far as I am concerned, I am going to go to the absolute limit of maintaining it on a bipartisan basis, and I will stay out of any electoral or partisan debate.

MR. VAN VOORST: You think the pendulum has swept too far from one direction, from the Super K, to an over-willingness now to criticize you?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think there was a period in which there was a considerable amount of criticism. I have the sense that the pendulum is swinging back now, not to the Super K, which really -- it is a terrible burden. You see, there is no magic in foreign policy, and there are no supermen in foreign policy. The difference between a successful -- sometimes not even -- between a good foreign policy and a mediocre foreign policy is the accumulation of nuances. It is meticulousness, it is careful preparation.

(lc)

45

If a Secretary of State or anybody concerned
with foreign policy goes out to hit a home run every
time he goes up there, he negotiates, I think he is putting
a burden on himself and a strain on the system.

So I am delighted not to be through of as Super K.

I think my historical position, and above all
the welfare of the country is more assured if people
realize that, first of all, failures are not only possible,
but inevitable. And secondly, that there is no substitute
for very careful preparation.

This period of super-stardom started in 1971,
and people forget that it took three years of painstaking,
agonizing work to get it ready.

MR. KLEIN: You have been quoted as saying, yourself --
a painful reminder, perhaps -- saying that Americans like
the lone cowboy, walking into town with his six-guns
blazing, and so forth.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To tell you the truth --
I said this, but I would like to know the question to which
I gave that answer, and the context in which I said it.
I don't want to -- this I won't permit you to quote, either.
But Bruce has heard me at press conferences for five-and-a-half
years, and it is very rare that I make an egregious error.

46

Why I should give an interview into which I pack every idiocy I might ever have said is almost inconceivable to me.

MR. KLEIN: Did she tape record it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: She tape recorded it. She never produced a tape. First of all, this happened on a day when President Nixon was going off on a campaign trip, and I was shuttling back and forth to his office. Now, what she did to produce this interview, I honestly cannot say. You see, whether she did it from English into Italian and then retranslated the Italian into English -- it just doesn't sound like me. Did it sound like me to you?

MR. VAN VOORST: I'm with you on that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you think of all the interviews I have given, why to her? Why would I be so insane to her?

MR. KLEIN: All of which --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me say this. Americans want a hero.

MR. KLEIN: This is back on the record now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not me necessarily. But I think any society wants somebody that can symbolize what it stands for. I am an unlikely subject for that, so

47

I am not advancing myself. But I think to run countries
without great figures is difficult.

MR. KLEIN: Do we have any such great figures today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think one of the problems
of the modern age is that great figures are becoming --
are not so easy to come by.

MR. KLEIN: Why? Or is this too philosophical
a question?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I think it may be that
the process of reaching high office is so consuming that it
takes more energy than reflection about what one does.
Because modern man doesn't like to stand alone. Because
of the impact of the media, in which everybody wants
to check tomorrow morning's editorials. And then the
question is -- if the editorial writers are so good, why
aren't they running the country.

MR. KLEIN: I would like on the record to give you,
if you like, the opportunity to comment on what role you
think the media, even at its best, plays in your
conduct or any Foreign Minister's conduct of foreign policy.
How negative, how positive, is this role?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Negative aspects. Let me put
the negative aspect first. The negative aspect is that

48

there is almost a daily pulling up of the trees to see
whether the roots are still there. And that there is a
daily necessity to explain each day's action. And in the
process there is a danger of losing the essence of a
substantial foreign policy, which is the relationship of moves
to each other and the overall design.

You know, it is like taking a painting, and
composing it of experts in hands and arms and so forth.
It is the sense of proportion and its relationship to an
overall purpose on which a policy has to be judged.

It is also inevitable -- even shades of Filacci --
in order to conduct a foreign policy you must be prepared
to walk alone for some period. You cannot get univeral
approbation at every step of the way. And so the media
have a tendency to produce a congenital insecurity on the
part of the top people, who in turn have been taught to be
very sensitive to the media.

On the positive side -- the need of justifying
yourself to the media forces an awareness that might
not otherwise exist, that would not otherwise exist,
because there is a tendency -- and the more sophisticated
of the journalists often have a reservoir of knowledge and
continuity that is better than that of many of the top

49

officials. I could name people here in town who, on
arms control, on Viet-Nam negotiations, could spot subtleties
that many of the officials could not see.

So I think that the interplay is on the whole useful.

But as one looks ahead in the future, there are
several dangers. There is a danger of a Ceasaristic
democracy in which the media are manipulated by the
government.

There is a danger of the media trying to substitute
themselves for the government. And how you get this balance.

And you know yourself that there are fads; that
sometimes there is excessive praise, and then it swings back
to excessive criticism.

But all of this is inherent in -- I mean no one
expects perfection.

MR. VAN VOORST: Leaving aside the image of the lone
rider -- the fact that you have conducted such personal
diplomacy has put you in a very central role in a lot of
things going on right now. Do you really worry -- can
anybody take this over? I won't use the institutionalization
question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, if you look

50

at the institutionalization question, or at the allegedly
extremely personal nature -- first of all, I have changed
practically all the key personnel in the Department.
I think if you look at the people, I have tried to put
the youngest and ablest people I could find into the key
positions. And if you look at the Assistant Secretaries,
for example, or the head of the Policy Planning Staff,
of INR, you will find that their quality is of a very high
order.

Secondly, before I move out visibly, I spend an
enormous amount of time -- you take the Cyprus issue.
When that issue happened, I would have three meetings a
day, talking to the five or six key people who were dealing
with it, to get the theories straight. I believe very
much in having some conceptual understanding. Then when I
move, I may move with great rapidity, and I try to keep
tactical control of the individual actions. But that
part that is seen is -- I never, I would say, to all
practical purposes, move without having my top advisors'
opinion. I may not take it. But I don't just sit here
and -- so in terms of staff meetings, I bet you if you added
the amount of time I spend with the Assistant Secretaries,
it is a hell of a lot more than my predecessor, or Dulles.

51

Then, I would make a distinction between strategy and tactics.

On tactics, I may keep some personal control, and I have strong opinions, so I may carry out what I have in mind, even if the advice is different.

But you take the Cyprus issue. We started with many divergent points of view. And I didn't have an absolutely clear grasp of it. But now I can turn over ninety percent of it to Hartman and Stabler, who have been running it, and I only come in now on the very big decisions.

MR. AUCHINCLOSS: Let me ask the obligatory final question.

You are about to begin your seventh year now as a top foreign policy advisor to the President. Is there a seven-year itch? Are you thinking of turning to something else?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to think that, as I said to Reston, the best time to leave is when you are not under pressure, and when it is clear that whatever ego you had was related to doing a job.

I have been here long enough now so I don't have to continue being here to prove something to myself.

On the other hand, I am also engaged in a number

52

of things from which it would be either difficult to dissociate or painful to dissociate.

I would like to think that if I thought that I was hanging on, that I would know when to get out. But very few people have mastered this. And most people are carried out instead of walking out.

I have no itch to leave. But I also have no compulsion to stay.

MR. AUCHINCLOSS: Before we are carried out, instead of walking out, or being thrown out, let me thank you very much. You have been very generous with your time.

(Whereupon at 6:55 p.m. the interview was concluded.)

December 20, 1974

No. 540

BIOGRAPHY OF SECRETARY OF STATE

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Henry Alfred Kissinger, of the District of Columbia, was sworn in September 22, 1973, at the White House as the 56th Secretary of State. He concurrently holds the position of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which he first assumed in 1969.

Secretary Kissinger was born in Fuerth, Germany, on May 27, 1923, came to the United States in 1938, and was naturalized a United States citizen on June 19, 1943. He received the BA degree Summa cum laude at Harvard College in 1950 and the MA and PhD degrees at Harvard University in 1952 and 1954 respectively.

From 1954 until 1971 he was a member of the faculty of Harvard University, both in the Department of Government and at the Center for International Affairs. He was Associate Director of the Center from 1957 to 1960. He served as Study Director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, for the Council of Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956; Director of the Special Studies Project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from 1956 to 1958; Director of the Harvard International Seminar from 1951 to 1971, and Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program from 1958 to 1971. (He was on leave of absence from Harvard from January 1969 to January 1971).

Secretary Kissinger has written six books and more than forty articles on United States foreign policy, international affairs, and diplomatic history. Among the awards he has received are the Guggenheim Fellowship (1965-66), the Woodrow Wilson prize for the best book in the fields of government, politics and international affairs (1958), the American Institute for Public Service Award (1973). Other awards include: the Veterans of Foreign Wars Dwight D. Eisenhower Distinguished Service Medal (1973), the HOPE Award for International Understanding (1973), the George Catlett Marshall Award (1973), the Society of the Family of Man Award (1973), the Charles Evans Hughes Award of the National Conference of Christians and Jews (1973), the Nobel Peace Prize (1973), the American Legion Distinguished Service Medal (1974), and the Wateler Peace Prize (1974).

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He has served as a consultant to the Department of State (1965-1968), United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961-68), RAND Corporation (1961-68), National Security Council (1961-62), Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1959-60), Operations Coordinating Board (1955), Director of the Psychological Strategy Broad (1952), and Operations Research Office (1951).

From 1943 to 1946 Dr. Kissinger served in the US Army Counter-Intelligence Corps and from 1946 to 1949 was a Captain in the Military Intelligence Reserve. He speaks French and German.

Secretary Kissinger married the former Nancy Maginnes on March 30, 1974. He is the father of two children, Elizabeth and David, by a previous marriage.

* * * * * * * *

[L.C.]

Secretary Kissinger's replies to questions from the news media in the foyer of the United Nations Secretariat Building after he met with Secretary General Waldheim and President of the General Assembly Bouteflika on the morning of December 21, 1974:

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us the important subjects of your discussions with the Secretary General and the present President of the Assembly?

A. Well, it seems to us important that as the General Assembly reached its end to meet both with the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly to review the votes of the General Assembly. With the Secretary General, we discussed particularly developments in the Middle East. I briefed him about the status of our step-by-step approach and he, of course, informed me of his recent trip to the Middle East.

We paid particular attention to the negotiations on Cyprus which started a few days ago and in which you know the United Nations is playing an important role and we agreed that we would do our utmost to bring about a rapid movement in these negotiations and on the basis of reports available to both of us we were encouraged that progress may be possible. We also reviewed the problem of economic development on a local basis and exchanged some ideas about the future of the United Nations in the light of some of the concerns that the United States has expressed.

With the President of the Assembly, we reviewed some of the work of the Assembly but also the status of Algerian-United States relations which since the resumption of diplomatic relations can be described as excellent. We paid considerable attention to the problem of Cambodia to see how the United Nations resolution calling for negotiations to settle this problem could be put in effect, and, of course, we also reviewed the situation in the Middle East. Those were the major topics in those discussions.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are there any new developments in the Middle East which were discussed today?

A. Well, there was a discussion of the situation as it exists, and, as has been generally reported. There is no dramatic new development that was discussed today.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, do you envisage a trip to the Mideast in the near future?

A. I don't envisage an immediate trip to the Mideast but it has been my destiny sooner or later to...

Q. When do you expect the next step of the negotiations?

A. Well, whenever the parties are sufficiently close to bring it about. We are actively engaged in exploring those possibilities.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, could we have your assessment of the work of the U.N.?

A. Well, I, of course, I subscribe to the observations made by Ambassador Scali. I think there were some very positive decisions at the U.N., but we are also concerned about some of the trends that have developed. I expressed my views with respect to that both to the Secretary General and the President of the Assembly. It is our view that the interdependence of the world requires that problems be solved cooperatively and not through confrontation between automatic blocs that may be created. It is in this spirit that the United States will approach all the political issues as well as the special session of the General Assembly next September which can make, if it is approached in the right spirit, a significant contribution to the economic development of the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Scali was rather forthright the other day on colonialism and our attitude toward Rhodesia and South Africa, in regard to sanctions and so forth. Does this mean, are we going to take a stronger line against colonialism?

A. Well, Ambassador Scali obviously reflected the view of the Administration. I don't want to go into all the tactics as it may be pursued but we indicated our basic policies.

Q. Did you talk with Mr. Bouteflika about getting the Arabs back in the negotiations?

A. The Arabs are involved in step-by-step talks in the Middle East. I don't have to get them back. I mentioned to you the topics that were covered with Mr. Bouteflika, of which the Middle East was one. Cambodia was another. And the general relationships of the Arab world to the United States independent of the Arab-Israeli relationship.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, is Geneva still on the agenda, as far as the Middle East is concerned?

A. It has always been on the agenda. The problem is to pick the right moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any specific discussion of the Palestine Liberation Organization with Mr. Bouteflika?

A. Mr. Bouteflika, as you would expect, expressed his view of the subject, and our views on the subject are well known.

Q. Do you have any remarks on Moshe Dayan's declarations yesterday on the Golan Heights.

A. I frankly have seen only a three-line summary. I haven't seen the entire text. I'd rather study the text before I make a comment.

I want to call attention, in addition to the problems you keep
asking me about, of the importance the United States attaches
to the progress, and rapid progress, on negotiations on Cyprus,
which are carried out under the auspices of the U.N. and which
were the subject of considerable discussion between the Secretary
General and myself.

Q. (Inaudible)

A. Algeria is one of the leading countries of the Arab world with a considerable moral influence with many other countries and we have always pursued the policy in our diplomacy in the Middle East of keeping the President of Algeria and the Foreign Minister closely informed of our measures and at various stages in the past Algeria has played a very constructive role.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, this week President Sadat spoke of recognizing Israeli borders and of enforcing the boundaries and prospects for peace. Rabin, as you know, has followed by saying if you really want peace you have a partner in us. Does this represent any sort of a developing break over there? Would you comment on that?

A. Well, as you all know, we are trying to bring about further progress in negotiations and we welcome any conciliatory statement that is made by either side that will move these negotiations along. But I don't want to comment on every statement that may be made in the Middle East. We are still hopeful that progress can be made and we believe that it will be made.

Q. Thank you Dr. Kissinger.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 2, 1975

NO. 3

For Release after 3 p.m.
Sunday, December 22, 1974

INTERVIEW OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
WITH NEWSWEEK

**QUESTION:** Looking back over the conduct of American foreign policy in 1974, what have been your greatest satisfactions and greatest disappointments?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Strangely enough, the greatest satisfaction was that we managed the Presidential transition without a disaster. This was a rather heartbreaking period. I was extremely worried that while the central authority was in severe jeopardy, the transition might create basic weaknesses in the structure of our foreign policy. I considered our ability to continue an effective foreign policy the most satisfying thing. Of course, individual events were important, too: I got great satisfaction from the Syrian disengagement.

**QUESTION:** In that transition period, was there a hiatus in which you could not function very well?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would say from July to October was a period in which we could not act with decisiveness. Every negotiation was getting more and more difficult because it involved the question of whether we could, in fact, carry out what we were negotiating. Secondly, we were not in a position to press matters that might involve serious domestic disputes. And I think this affected to some extent the summit in Moscow in July. But it affected many other things in more intangible ways

**QUESTION:** How do you rank the SALT agreement in Vladivostok in the list of achievements for this past year?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Very high, and of more permanent significance than perhaps anything else that was achieved. The various disengagement agreements in the Middle East were dramatic and important because they reversed a trend toward another outbreak of a war and may have set the stage for making some important progress. But I think in terms of permanent achievements, I would rank the outline for a second SALT agreement at or near the top. And I think it will be so viewed by history.

**QUESTION:** How do you account for all the criticism of SALT II?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think we have a difficult domestic situation right now. Many people remember, or think they remember, that foreign policy had certain domestic effects in '71 or '72. I don't agree with this. But I think it is in the back of some people's minds.

Secondly, there is a general atmosphere of disillusionment with government.

Thirdly, the liberal intellectual community, which used to lead American foreign policy, was alienated for a variety of reasons from the Johnson

For further information contact:

PR #3

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Administration and then from the Nixon Administration, and therefore
from this Administration as well, at least at first.

Now, what in fact is the significance of this agreement? The nightmare
of the nuclear age is the fear of strategic arms based on the expectation
of what the other side is doing. One has to get one's priorities right.
The first objective must be to get that cycle of self-fulfilling prophecies
interrupted. That has now been substantially achieved. Once that is
built into the planning of both sides, I think the negotiations on reduc-
tions will be easier.

**QUESTION:** Do you see those negotiations for reductions taking place
before the ten-year period covered by the agreement is over?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, in fact, we have covered that in the aide-memoire. A number of people gained the impression that the reductions were to start only after 1985. The Vladivostok announcement, in fact, said that negotiations should start no later than 1980 for reductions to take place after 1985. That has now been eliminated from the aide-memoire because it was never intended to preclude an agreement on reductions to take place well before 1985. So it is clear that negotiations can start as soon as possible and take effect as soon as there is an agreement.

**QUESTION:** Some people argue that the agreement sanctions MIRV levels that will lead to a first strike capability by both sides and actually encourage a new arms race.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The agreement has to be compared with what would have happened in the absence of an agreement--not with a theoretical model. All our intelligence estimates indicate that in the absence of an agreement, Soviet MIRV levels would have been substantially higher than they will be under the agreement, as well as Soviet total levels, which in turn would have triggered another series of moves by us. The so-called new construction programs are the minimum planned construction programs; they would certainly have been accelerated and expanded if the Soviet Union had in fact produced at the level that our intelligence estimates thought they could. And not only could, but would. I am talking now about the middle intelligence estimate. Generally three estimates are made--low, middle and high. Both of the ceilings agreed in Vladivostok are below the low intelligence estimate, and substantially below the medium intelligence estimate.

A myth is beginning to develop that in July we made a proposal of more
severe limitations on MIRV's, and that this, for some curious reason, was
abandoned between July and December. This simply is not true. The July
proposal first of all called for a five-year agreement. If you double
the number that we proposed for the five-year agreement, you would
have a higher number than the one we settled on for ten years.

**QUESTION:** The Soviets have issued a statement that they are not going to make any guarantees about Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Does this statement and its possible impact on the trade bill concern you?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, it concerns me. Certainly there is no one
in Washington who has not heard me warn about this for years. Without
saying anything, without making any claims for it, we managed to increase
Jewish emigration from 400 a year in 1968 to 35,000 before any of this
debate started. We had managed to intercede quietly in behalf of a list
of hardship cases, of which more than half were dealt with successfully.
We never claimed a success; we never took credit for it. We never
said this was a result of detente. We just encouraged it to happen.
We have warned constantly not to make this an issue of state-to-state
relations, because we were afraid it would lead to a formal confrontation
and defeat the objective of promoting emigration. Despite our deep

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misgivings, we acquiesced when statements were made by some which implied
that the Soviet Union had yielded to pressure, because we thought it was
the result that was important, and we wanted to avoid a domestic debate
that might have jeopardized the trade bill.

The issue of Jewish emigration is above all a human problem. There is
no legal agreement we can make with the Soviet Union that we can enforce.
Whether the Soviet Union permits emigration depends on the importance
they attach to their relationship with the United States and, therefore,
on the whole context of the East-West relationship.

If we can maintain a Soviet commitment to detente and if we can make clear
that this is related to the emigration question, existing understandings
will have a chance. But what we have had is, first, excessive claims.
And now the Export-Import Bank bill has been encumbered with amendments
that, to all practical purposes, virtually prevent loans of any sub-
stantial size to the Soviet Union.

Loans are more important to the Soviet Union than most-favored-nation
status, and in this respect the Soviets are worse off now, after three
years of detente and even after increased Jewish emigration, than they
were to begin with. We cannot simply keep saying that the Soviets must
pay something for detente, and then not provide anything from our side
to give them an interest in its continuance.

**QUESTION:** Do you see any signs that detente has led Moscow to play a more positive role in the Mideast?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Middle East is a very complicated issue for them and for us. I do not believe evidence supports the proposition that the Soviet Union produced the 1973 war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not been prepared to risk its relationship to some of the Arab states for the sake of Middle East tranquility. What this proves is that detente does not mean that the Soviet Union and we have become collaborators, but that we are partly rivals, partly ideologically incompatible, and partly edging toward cooperation. The Middle East has been an area where cooperation has been far from satisfactory.

**QUESTION:** Will detente help in the next round in the Mideast?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Generally, yes, if all parties proceed with circumspection. Some of the participants in the Middle East conflict did not want an extremely active Soviet role. This was one inhibiting feature. The second is that a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union depends on the actual positions the Soviet Union takes. If the Soviet Union takes positions which are identical with one of the parties, then we are better off dealing with those parties directly.

**QUESTION:** What would be the necessary condition before the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel could sit down together and talk?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is impossible for the United States to recommend negotiation with the PLO until the PLO accepts the existence of Israel as a legitimate state. As long as the PLO proposals envisage, in one form or another, the destruction of Israel, we don't see much hope for negotiation with the PLO.

**QUESTION:** Do you share the concern of many people now who feel that both sides are hardening their positions?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have been through several Mideast negotiations, and they run a fever cycle. There is a great deal of excessive talk on both sides to prove that they have been tough, unyielding and didn't make any concessions. We are now in the relatively early phases of

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PR #3

these exchanges. I am not pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe another step is quite possible. Obviously, because of the Rabat meeting, and the increasing complexity of the domestic situation of almost all of the participants, negotiations are more difficult now than they were a year ago. The stakes are also higher. But I believe that progress is possible. We have to do it now by somewhat different methods than we did last year. If I compare where we are now with where we were at various stages during the Syrian negotiations, I think it looks far more encouraging than it did then. I am in fact quite hopeful.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to de-emphasize "shuttle diplomacy"?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There was a time for shuttle diplomacy, and there is a time for quiet diplomacy. I cannot accept the principle that whenever there is something to be settled, the Secretary of State must go to the area and stake his personal prestige on the conduct of the negotiations. I don't think that is a healthy situation. And, therefore, while I don't exclude that in a concluding phase, or in a critical phase, I might go to the Middle East for three or four days, I will not do so unless conditions are right and the stakes are important enough.

**QUESTION:** Do you think there can be any further progress before Leonid Brezhnev goes to Egypt in January?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It would be a grave mistake for the United States to gear its own policies to the travels of the General Secretary of the Soviet Party. We will negotiate as rapidly as we can, but we don't want to get into the business of imposing settlements or of getting ahead of the parties. The art of negotiations is to make sure that all of the parties feel that their essential interests are safeguarded, and that their dignity is respected. Our pace will be set, not by Brezhnev, but by how rapidly the parties move toward each other.

**QUESTION:** The military resupply of Israel, both during and after the 1973 war, seems to have stripped the American military establishment of some of its materiel. Does this suggest that the U. S. will have a difficult time resupplying Israel in any war of extended duration?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I understand from Secretary Schlesinger that these stories about stripping the American military establishment are incorrect. And I understand that production in many of the essential categories is being stepped up. I don't think there is any physical incapacity to do what is necessary.

**QUESTION:** Some people say that it would be to Israel's advantage to find an excuse to launch a pre-emptive strike.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Based on my talks with Israeli leaders, I do not believe that any responsible Israeli leader operates on this assumption. They know that if a war starts it may start events of incalculable consequences.

I think the responsible people in Israel realize that improved American relations with Arab countries are also in the interests of Israel, because they enable us to be a moderating influence. The Israeli leaders with whom I am dealing are genuinely interested in moving toward peace. It is a very complicated problem because their margin of survival is so much narrower than ours that it is hard for Americans to understand some Israeli concerns. But I do not believe that any Israeli leader would deliberately engage in such a reckless course.

**QUESTION:** Given the Arab oil weapon and how it affects Western support of Israel, can Israel expect to survive?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the survival of Israel is essential. The United States--and finally in the last analysis Europe--will not negotiate over the survival of Israel. This would be an act of such extraordinary cynicism that the world would be morally mortaged if it ever happened. But it won't happen.

**QUESTION:** In your list of pluses and minuses for the year, we have not touched on energy yet.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think next to SALT, I would consider the most lasting achievement to be the energy policy that we developed. I think the Washington energy conference, the International Energy Agency, the Emergency Sharing Program and the measures which we are currently pursuing may be the beginning of a restructuring of relationships among the advanced industrial countries and eventually serve as a bridge to the producing countries.

**QUESTION:** What sorts of structure are you referring to?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The structure that emerged in the immediate postwar period was essentially geared to military defense. Some of the difficulties that emerged in the '60s and early '70s, as a result of the growth of European unity and the emergence of Japan, were that the military organization and the political and economic organization had grown out of phase with each other. It has proved difficult to bring them back into phase by purely military arrangements. This is what I attempted to say in my "Year of Europe" speech, which was a little premature, but many of whose basic principles are now being accepted. Now the problem of how the advanced industrialized nations can give effect to the realities of interdependence is one of the most serious problems of our time--in the fields of energy, of food and of the whole nature of economic policies.

**QUESTION:** Is it American policy to organize the oil-consuming nations so that they can negotiate a reduction of oil prices with the producers?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We would like to create the maximum incentives for a reduction of prices, and, failing that, the maximum capacity to withstand the high prices. The two things are related. If we have effective conservation measures, if we develop alternative sources of energy and if new sources of oil continue to be discovered, the balance between supply and demand must inevitably change. I have heard statements that the producers can always keep up with us by cutting production, but they will, I think, find this increasingly difficult to implement. If the industrialized nations implement measures of financial solidarity, we can reduce the effect of the balance-of-payment deficits. And when the emergency sharing program is in effect in a few months, the capacity of these countries to use embargoes for political effect will be reduced.

**QUESTION:** But while many of President Ford's advisers have been urging him to take stringent conservation measures, he has resisted so far.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am convinced that the President will soon announce a program that will give effect to the principle I have outlined. I am confident that it will be a good program and that it will be adequate to our international responsibilities.

**QUESTION:** Are French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt going to be more cooperative in these international structures? Are they really frightened of what is going on in Europe and the world?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Both countries are convinced that without a greater interaction of economic policies, an economic disaster for everybody is probable. And everybody realizes that they cannot deal with the economic policies on a purely national basis.

PR #3

-6-

Secondly, there is a growing realization that the political demoralization of the industrialized countries must be arrested. This presupposed that governments can be seen to be coping with the problems that confront them. And that again will drive some more in the direction of interdependence. Right now it is really irrelevant to discuss what formula of consultation would be adequate because the necessities that are imposed on us by the energy crisis would produce their own formula.

**QUESTION:** Do you think the American public is prepared for the consequences of such a program?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** All I can say is that it is the absolute duty of leaders to tell the people what they believe is necessary. You can make your life easier by not putting tough choices to the public. But then when the inevitable catastrophe occurs, you have lost not only credibility, but legitimacy. So I don't think we really have any choice. I think the Administration will have to tell the public what is needed and I know that the President intends to do this. I think this is basically a healthy society, and I think there will be support.

**QUESTION:** If all else should fail, would the United States consider military intervention in the Middle East to secure oil at prices that we can afford?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think that would be a cause for military action.

**QUESTION:** You don't think that the financial bankruptcy of the West would be a casus belli?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The financial bankruptcy of the West is avoidable by other means. We will find other solutions.

**QUESTION:** That doesn't answer the question, with all due respect.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What we would do if there were no other way of avoiding financial bankruptcy and the whole collapse of the Western structure, I cannot now speculate. But I am convinced that we won't reach that point.

**QUESTION:** What concrete steps might the U. S. take to try to induce the Third World countries to pursue a more realistic course in the UN?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the Third World countries have to accept the fact that they too live in an interdependent world. They cannot both insist on cooperation from the advanced industrial countries and conduct constant warfare--economic or political--against the advanced industrial countries. The spirit of cooperation must be mutual. There will be disagreement, of course. That is unavoidable. But if you have a group of 77 nations that automatically vote as a group, regardless of the merits of the issue, then the United Nations becomes a test of strength, and the web of cooperation on which the development of all countries ultimately depends will be severely strained. In future sessions of the United Nations we will look more carefully into the degree of mutuality in the positions of the countries with which we are dealing.

**QUESTION:** Can you conceive of a situation in which the United States might decide to temporarily suspend itself from the United Nations to protest the tyranny of the majority?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can conceive that if an issue is too outrageously decided, that we would suspend our activities in relation to that issue. But it is hard to answer this question in the abstract.

PR #3

-7-

**QUESTION:** Our detente with China seems to have been stalled.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, this is the constant position of Newsweek magazine. But it is not our position. I believe that on the level of bilateral relations between the countries, we are essentially on course. I found that essentially confirmed by my last visit to the People's Republic of China. It is a relationship of practical necessity, in which two countries have made a decision to cooperate for limited objectives with each other. I don't accept the proposition that our policy is stalled.

**QUESTION:** Do you think within the next year we might move toward a normalization of relations with Cuba?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We were prepared to accept a two-thirds vote of the Organization of American States at its recent meeting in Quito, and we were led to believe that this two-thirds vote had been assured. Suddenly we found ourselves in the position of being asked to produce votes for a resolution which we could not possibly sponsor, given the history of our involvement in the sanctions. There will be another occasion next year in a less structured meeting in Buenos Aires to discuss the Cuban issue, where the necessity of producing votes is less intense, and where one can then chart a course on a hemisphere basis more effectively. I think there will be some evolution during the next year.

**QUESTION:** How do you evaluate your own situation now at the end of the year?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** During the period of President Nixon's crisis, I may have been over-protected from Congressional criticism because many of the senators and congressmen instinctively were fearful of doing damage to our foreign policy and believed that they had to preserve one area of our national policy from partisan controversy. So it was inevitable that after that restraint was removed I would rejoin the human race and be exposed to the normal criticisms of Secretaries of State.

I have spent a great deal of time with Congress in the last few weeks, and I have the impression that there is a solid relationship. We worked out the Greek-Turkish aid problem, I think, in a cooperative spirit. I really feel passionately that if we don't maintain our foreign policy on a bipartisan basis, we will be in the deepest trouble. Of course, fundamental issues ought to be discussed, including fundamental foreign policy issues. But there are various areas in which there is or ought to be substantial agreement. And as far as I am concerned, I am going to go the absolute limit of maintaining it on a bipartisan basis.

**QUESTION:** Do you think the pendulum has swung too far from one direction, from talk of "Super K", to an overwillingness now to criticize you?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There is no magic and there are no supermen in foreign policy. The difference between a good and a mediocre foreign policy is the accumulation of nuances. It is meticulousness; it is careful preparation. If a Secretary of State or anybody concerned with foreign policy goes out to hit a home run every time he goes up there, he is putting a burden on himself and a strain on the system.

**QUESTION:** You have been quoted as saying that Americans like the lone cowboy, walking into town with his six-guns blazing.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think any society needs individuals that symbolize what it stands for. It is difficult to run countries without great figures.

PR #3

-8-

**QUESTION:** Have we great figures today?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** One of the problems of the modern age is that great figures are not so easy to come by.

**QUESTION:** Why?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It may be that the process of reaching high office is so consuming that it leaves little occasion for reflection about what one does. Moreover, modern man doesn't like to stand alone. This is due largely to the impact of the media, in which everybody wants to check tomorrow morning's editorials.

**QUESTION:** What role do you think the media plays in your conduct of foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The negative aspect is that there is almost a daily pulling up of the trees to see whether the roots are still there. There is almost a daily necessity to explain each day's actions. And in the process there is a danger of losing the essence of a substantial foreign policy, which is the relationship of moves to each other and the over-all design. In order to conduct a foreign policy you must be prepared to act alone for some period. You cannot get universal approbation at every step of the way. And so the media have a tendency to produce a congenital insecurity on the part of the top people.

On the positive side, the need of public explanation forces an awareness that would not otherwise exist. The more sophisticated of the journalists often have a reservoir of knowledge and continuity that is better than that of many of the top officials. I could name individuals, who on arms control, on Vietnam negotiations, could spot subtleties that many of the officials could not see.

So I think that the interplay is on the whole useful. But as one looks ahead, there are several dangers. There is a danger of a Caesaristic democracy in which the media are manipulated by the government. There is a danger of the media trying to substitute themselves for the government. And you know yourself that there are fads; that sometimes there is excessive praise, and then it swings back to excessive criticism.

**QUESTION:** You are about to begin your seventh year in Washington. Is there a seven-year itch? Are you thinking of turning to something else?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would like to think that the best time to leave is when you are not under pressure. I have been here long enough now so I don't have to continue being here to prove something to myself.

On the other hand, I am also engaged in a number of things from which it would be either difficult to dissociate or painful to dissociate. I would like to think that I will know when to get out. But very few people have mastered this. And most people are carried out instead of walking out. I have no itch to leave. But I also have no compulsion to stay.

+++ ++

KISSINGER SUMS UP '74

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met in his State Department office last week for a year-end interview with Newsweek Executive Editor Kenneth Auchincloss, Foreign Editor Edward Klein and diplomatic correspondent Bruce van Voorst. A transcript of their one-and-a-half-hour talk:

**Q.** Looking back over the conduct of American foreign policy in 1974, what have been your greatest satisfactions and greatest disappointments?

**A.** Strangely enough, the greatest satisfaction was that we managed the Presidential transition without a disaster. This was a rather heartbreaking period. I was extremely worried that while the central authority was in severe jeopardy, the transition might create basic weaknesses in the structure of our foreign policy. I considered our ability to continue an effective foreign policy the most satisfying thing. Of course, individual events were important, too. I got great satisfaction from the Syrian disengagement.

**Q.** In that transition period, was there a hiatus in which you could not function very well?

**A.** I would say from July to October was a period in which we could not act with decisiveness. Every negotiation was getting more and more difficult because it involved the question of whether we could, in fact, carry out what we were negotiating. Secondly, we were not in a position to press matters that might involve serious domestic disputes. And I think this affected to some extent the summit in Moscow in July. But it affected many other things in more intangible ways.

**Q.** How do you rank the SALT agreement in Vladivostok in the list of achievements for this past year?

**A.** Very high, and of more permanent significance than perhaps anything else that was achieved. The various disengagement agreements in the Middle East were dramatic and important because they reversed a trend toward another outbreak of a war and may have set the stage for making some important progress. But I think in terms of permanent achievements, I would rank the outline for a second SALT agreement at or near the top. And I think it will be so viewed by history.

**Q.** How do you account for all the criticism of SALT II?

**A.** I think we have a difficult domestic situation right now. Many people remember, or think they remember, that foreign policy had certain domestic effects in '71 or '72. I don't agree with this. But I think it is in the back of some people's minds.

Thirdly, the liberal intellectual community, which used to lead American foreign policy, was alienated for a variety of reasons from the Johnson Administration and then from the Nixon Administration, and therefore from this Administration as well, at least at first.

pared with what would have happened in the absence of an agreement—not with a theoretical model. All our intelligence estimates indicate that in the absence of an agreement, Soviet MIRV levels would have been substantially higher than they will be under the agreement, as well as Soviet total levels, which in turn would have triggered another series of moves by us. The so-called new construction programs are the minimum planned construction programs; they would certainly have been accelerated and expanded if the Soviet Union had in fact produced at the level that our intelligence estimates thought they could. And not only

> "In terms of permanent achievements, I would rank the outline for SALT II near the top."

into the planning of both sides, I think the negotiations on reductions will be easier.

**Q.** Do you see those negotiations for reductions taking place before the ten-year period covered by the agreement is over?

**A.** Yes. In fact, we have covered that in the aide-memoire. A number of people gained the impression that the reductions were to start only after 1985. The Vladivostok announcement, in fact, said that negotiations should start no later than 1980 for reductions to take place after 1985. That has now been eliminated from the aide-memoire because it was never intended to preclude an agreement on reductions to take place well before 1985. So it is clear that negotiations can start as soon as possible and take effect as soon as there is an agreement.

**Q.** Some people argue that the agreement sanctions MIRV levels that will lead to a first-strike capability by both sides and actually encourage a new arms race.

**A.** The agreement has to be com-

could, but would. I am talking now about the middle intelligence estimate. Generally three estimates are made—low, middle and high. Both of the ceilings agreed in Vladivostok are below the low intelligence estimate, and substantially below the medium intelligence estimate.

**Q.** The Soviets have issued a statement that they are not going to make any guarantees about Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Does this statement and its possible impact on the trade bill concern you?

**A.** Yes, it concerns me. Certainly there is no one in Washington who

December 30, 1974

has not heard me warn about this for
years. Without saying anything, with-
out making any claims for it, we man-
aged to increase Jewish emigration
from 400 a year in 1968 to 35,000
before any of this debate started. We
had managed to intercede quietly in
behalf of a list of hardship cases, of
which more than half were dealt
with successfully. We never claimed
a success; we never took credit for it.
We never said this was a result of dé-
tente. We just encouraged it to hap-
pen. We have warned constantly not
to make this an issue of state-to-state
relations, because we were afraid it
would lead to a formal confrontation
and defeat the objective of promot-

Q. Do you see any signs that détente has led Moscow to play a more positive role in the Mideast?

A. The Middle East is a very complicated issue for them and for us. I do not believe evidence supports the proposition that the Soviet Union produced the 1973 war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has not been prepared to risk its relationship to some of the Arab states for the sake of Middle East tranquillity. What this proves is that détente does not mean that the Soviet Union and we have become collaborators, but that we are partly rivals, partly ideologically incompatible, and partly edging to-

We are now in the relatively early
phases of these exchanges. I am not
pessimistic. On the contrary, I believe
another step is quite possible. Obvi-
ously, because of the Rabat meeting,
and the increasing complexity of the
domestic situation of almost all of the
participants, negotiations are more
difficult now than they were a year
ago. The stakes are also higher. But
I believe that progress is possible.
We have to do it now by somewhat
different methods than we did last
year. If I compare where we are now
with where we were at various stages
during the Syrian negotiations, I think
it looks far more encouraging than it
did then. I am in fact quite hopeful.

Q. Are you going to de-emphasize "shuttle diplomacy"?

A. There was a time for shuttle diplomacy, and there is a time for quiet diplomacy. I cannot accept the principle that whenever there is something to be settled, the Secretary of State must go to the area and stake his personal prestige on the conduct of the negotiations. I don't think that is a healthy situation. And, therefore, while I don't exclude that in a concluding phase, or in a critical phase, I might go to the Middle East for three or four days, I will not do so unless conditions are right and the stakes are important enough.

Q. Do you think there can be any further progress before Leonid Brezhnev goes to Egypt in January?

A. It would be a grave mistake for the United States to gear its own policies to the travels of the General Secretary of the Soviet Party. We will negotiate as rapidly as we can, but we don't want to get into the business of imposing settlements or of getting ahead of the parties. The art of negotiations is to make sure that all of the parties feel that their essential interests are safeguarded, and that their dignity is respected. Our pace will be set, not by Brezhnev, but by how rapidly the parties move toward each other.

Q. The military resupply of Israel, both during and after the 1973 war, seems to have stripped the American military establishment of some of its matériel. Does this suggest that the U.S. will have a difficult time resuplying Israel in any war of extended duration?

A. I understand from Secretary Schlesinger that these stories about stripping the American military establishment are incorrect. And I understand that production in many of the essential categories is being stepped up. I don't think there is any physical incapacity to do what is necessary.

Q. Some people say that it would be to Israel's advantage to find an excuse to launch a pre-emptive strike.

A. Based on my talks with Israeli leaders, I do not believe that any responsible Israeli leader operates on

"We can't recommend negotiation with the PLO until it accepts the existence of Israel."

ing emigration. Despite our deep misgivings, we acquiesced when statements were made by some which implied that the Soviet Union had yielded to pressure, because we thought it was the result that was important, and we wanted to avoid a domestic debate that might have jeopardized the trade bill.

If we can maintain a Soviet commitment to détente and if we can make clear that this is related to the emigration question, existing understandings will have a chance. But what we have had is, first, excessive claims. And now the Export-Import Bank bill has been encumbered with amendments that, to all practical purposes, virtually prevent loans of any substantial size to the Soviet Union.

Loans are more important to the Soviet Union than most-favored-nation status, and in this respect the Soviets are worse off now, after three years of détente and even after increased Jewish emigration, than they were to begin with. We cannot simply keep saying that the Soviets must pay something for détente, and then not provide anything from our side to give

Q. Will détente help in the next round in the Mideast?

A. Generally, yes, if all parties proceed with circumspection. Some of the participants in the Middle East conflict did not want an extremely active Soviet role. This was one inhibiting feature. The second is that a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union depends on the actual positions the Soviet Union takes. If the Soviet Union takes positions which are identical with one of the parties, then we are better off dealing with those parties directly.

Q. What would be the necessary condition before the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel could sit down together and talk?

A. It is impossible for the United States to recommend negotiation with the PLO until the PLO accepts the existence of Israel as a legitimate state. As long as the PLO proposals envisage, in one form or another, the destruction of Israel, we don't see much hope for negotiation with the PLO.

Q. Do you share the concern of many people now who feel that both sides are hardening their positions?

A. I have been through several Mideast negotiations, and they run a fever cycle. There is a great deal of excessive talk on both sides to prove that they have been tough, unyielding and didn't make any concessions.

30

Newsweek

INTERNATIONAL

I think the responsible people in Israel realize that improved American relations with Arab countries are also in the interests of Israel because they enable us to be a moderating influence. The Israeli leaders with whom I am dealing are genuinely interested in moving toward peace. It is a very complicated problem because their margin of survival is so much narrower than ours that it is hard for Americans to understand some Israeli concerns. But I do not believe that any Israeli leader would deliberately engage in such a reckless course.

**Q. Given the Arab oil weapon and how it affects Western support of Israel, can Israel expect to survive?**

**A.** I think the survival of Israel is essential. The United States—and finally in the last analysis Europe—will not negotiate over the survival of Israel. This would be an act of such extraordinary cynicism that the world would be morally mortgaged if it ever happened. But it won't happen.

**Q.** *In your list of pluses and negatives for the year, we have not touched on energy yet.*

**A.** I think next to SALT, I would consider the most lasting achievement to be the energy policy that we developed. I think the Washington energy conference, the International Energy Agency, the Emergency Sharing Program and the measures which we are currently pursuing may be the beginning of a restructuring of relationships among the advanced industrial countries and eventually serve as a bridge to the producing countries.

**Q.** *What sorts of structure are you referring to?*

**A.** The structure that emerged in the immediate postwar period was essentially geared to military defense. Some of the difficulties that emerged in the '60s and early '70s, as a result of the growth of European unity and the emergence of Japan, were that the military organization and the political and economic organization had grown out of phase with each other. It has proved difficult to bring them back into phase by purely military arrangements. This is what I attempted to say in my "Year of Europe" speech, which was a little premature, but many of whose basic principles are now being accepted. Now the problem of how the advanced industrialized nations can give effect to the realities of interdependence is one of the most serious problems of our time—in the fields of energy, of food and of the whole nature of economic policies.

**Q.** *Is it American policy to organize the oil-consuming nations so that they can negotiate a reduction of oil prices with the producers?*

**A.** We would like to create the maximum incentives for a reduction of prices, and, failing that, the maximum capacity to withstand the high prices. The two things are related. If we have effective conservation measures, if we develop alternative sources of energy and if new sources of oil continue to be discovered, the balance between supply and demand must inevitably change. I have heard statements that the producers can always keep up with us by cutting production, but they will, I think, find this increasingly difficult to implement. If the industrialized nations implement measures of financial solidarity, we can reduce the effect of the balance-of-payment deficits. And when the emergency sharing program is in effect in a few months, the capacity of these countries to use barges for political effect will be reduced.

**Q.** *But while many of President Ford's advisers have been urging him to take stringent conservation measures, he has resisted so far.*

**A.** I am convinced that the President will soon announce a program that will give effect to the principle I have outlined. I am confident that it will be a good program and that it will be adequate to our international responsibilities.

**Q.** *Are French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt going to be more cooperative in these international structures? Are they really*

**Q.** *Do you think the American public is prepared for the consequences of such a program?*

**A.** All I can say is that it is the absolute duty of leaders to tell the people what they believe is necessary. You can make your life easier by not putting tough choices to the public. But then when the inevitable catastrophe occurs, you have lost not only credibility but legitimacy. So I don't think we really have any choice. I think the Administration will have to tell the public what is needed and I know that the President intends to do this. I think this is basically a healthy society, and I think there will be support.

**Q.** *If all else should fail, would the United States consider military intervention in the Middle East to secure oil at prices that we can afford?*

**A.** I don't think that would be a cause for military action.

**Q.** *You don't think that the financial bankruptcy of the West would be a casus belli?*

**A.** The financial bankruptcy of the West is avoidable by other means. We will find other solutions.

**Q.** *That doesn't answer the question, with all due respect.*

**A.** What we would do if there were no other way of avoiding financial bankruptcy and the whole collapse

> "I think there will be some evolution of the Cuban issue during the next year."

*frightened of what is going on in Europe and the world?*

**A.** Both countries are convinced that without a greater interaction of economic policies, an economic disaster for everybody is probable. And everybody realizes that they cannot deal with the economic policies on a purely national basis.

Secondly, there is a growing realization that the political demoralization of the industrialized countries must be arrested. This presupposes that governments can be seen to be coping with the problems that confront them. And that again will drive some more in the direction of interdependence. Right now it is really irrelevant to dis-

**Q.** *What concrete steps might the U.S. take to try to induce the Third World countries to pursue a more realistic course in the U.N.?*

**A.** I think the Third World countries have to accept the fact that they too live in an interdependent world. They cannot both insist on cooperation from the advanced industrial countries and conduct constant warfare—economic or political—against the advanced industrial countries. The spirit of cooperation must be mutual. There will be disagreement, of course. That is unavoidable. But if

December 30, 1974

31

INTERNATIONAL

you have a group of 77 nations that automatically vote as a group, regardless of the merits of the issue, then the United Nations becomes a test of strength, and the web of cooperation on which the development of all countries ultimately depends will be severely strained. In future sessions of the United Nations we will look more carefully at the degree of mutuality in the positions of the countries with which we are dealing.

**Q.** Can you conceive of a situation in which the United States might decide to temporarily suspend itself from the United Nations to protest the tyranny of the majority?

**A.** I can conceive that if an issue is too outrageously decided that we would suspend our activities in relation to that issue. But it is hard to answer this question in the abstract.

**Q.** *Our déténte with China seems to have been stalled.*

**A.** Well, this is the constant position of *NEWSWEEK* magazine. But it is not our position. I believe that on the level

during the next year.

**Q.** *How do you evaluate your own situation now at the end of the year?*

**A.** During the period of President Nixon's crisis, I may have been over-protected from Congressional criticism because many of the senators and congressmen instinctively were fearful of doing damage to our foreign policy and believed that they had to preserve one area of our national policy from partisan controversy. So it was inevitable that after that restraint was removed I would rejoin the human race and be exposed to the normal criticisms of Secretaries of State.

**Q.** *Why?*

**A.** It may be that the process of reaching high office is so consuming that it leaves little occasion for reflection about what one does. Moreover, modern man doesn't like to stand alone. This is due largely to the impact of the media, in which everybody wants to check tomorrow morning's editorials.

**Q.** What role do you think the media plays in your conduct of foreign policy?

**A.** The negative aspect is that there is almost a daily pulling up of the trees to see whether the roots are still there. There is almost a daily necessity to explain each day's actions. And in the process there is a danger of losing the essence of a substantial foreign policy, which is the relationship of moves to each other and the over-all design. In order to conduct a foreign policy you must be prepared to act alone for some period. You cannot get universal approbation at every step of the way. And so the media have a tendency to produce a congenital insecurity on the part of the top people.

On the positive side, the need of public explanation forces an awareness that would not otherwise exist. The more sophisticated of the journalists often have a reservoir of knowledge and continuity that is better than that of many of the top officials. I could name individuals who, on arms control, on Vietnam negotiations, could spot subtleties that many of the officials could not see.

**Q.** You are about to begin your seventh year in Washington. Is there a seven-year itch? Are you thinking of turning to something else?

**A.** I would like to think that the best time to leave is when you are not under pressure. I have been here long enough now so I don't have to continue being here to prove something to myself.

"I like to think I'll know when to leave. I have no itch to go but no compulsion to stay."

of bilateral relations between the two countries, we are essentially on course. I found that essentially confirmed by my last visit to the People's Republic of China. It is a relationship of practical necessity, in which two countries have made a decision to cooperate for limited objectives with each other. I don't accept the proposition that our policy is stalled.

**Q.** Do you think within the next year we might move toward a normalization of relations with Cuba?

**A.** We were prepared to accept a two-thirds vote of the Organization of American States at its recent meeting in Quito, and we were led to believe that this two-thirds vote had been assured. Suddenly we found ourselves in the position of being asked to produce votes for a resolution which we could not possibly sponsor, given the history of our involvement in the sanctions. There will be another occasion next year in a less structured meeting in Buenos Aires to discuss the Cuban issue, where the necessity of producing votes is less intense, and where one can then chart a course on a hemisphere basis more effectively. I think there will be some evolution

fundamental foreign-policy issues. But there are various areas in which there is or ought to be substantial agreement. And as far as I am concerned, I am going to go the absolute limit of maintaining it on a bipartisan basis.

**Q.** Do you think the pendulum has swung too far from one direction, from talk of "Super K," to an overwillingness now to criticize you?

**A.** There is no magic and there are no supermen in foreign policy. The difference between a good and a mediocre foreign policy is the accumulation of nuances. It is meticulousness; it is careful preparation. If a Secretary of State or anybody concerned with foreign policy goes out to hit a home run every time he goes up there, he is putting a burden on himself and a strain on the system.

**Q.** You have been quoted as saying that Americans like the lone cowboy, walking into town with his six-guns blazing.

**A.** I think any society needs individuals that symbolize what it stands for. It is difficult to run countries without great figures.

**Q.** Have we great figures today?

**A.** One of the problems of the mod-

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Newsweek