February 21, 1978

# COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT ONE AGREEMENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief account of the background, discussion, and status of those questions related to compliance with the SALT agreements of 1972 -- the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms -- which have been raised by the US and the USSR. It also provides a brief discussion of matters which have been mentioned in the press but which have not been raised with the USSR.

## II. GENERAL

Even before talks with the USSR on the subject of strategic arms limitation began, the US established, in the framework of the National Security Council system, an interagency group known as the Verification Panel to study questions concerning SALT, with special attention to matters of verification of compliance with the provisions of possible agreements. During the preliminary talks in November and December of 1969, the US proposed, and the USSR agreed, to create a special standing body to deal with questions of implementation of agreements which might be concluded, including questions which might arise concerning compliance. This reflected early recognition and agreement that such matters would require special attention in connection with any agreement as complex as one limiting the strategic weapons of the US and the USSR.

Article XIII of the ABM Treaty of May 26, 1972 provides for a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to, among other things, "consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be

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considered ambiguous." Article VI of the Interim Agreement provides that the Parties use the SCC in a similar manner in connection with that Agreement. In December 1972, during the first session of SALT TWO, the SCC was formally established.

Since the conclusion of the 1972 SALT agreements, procedures have been established within the US government for monitoring Soviet performance and for dealing with matters related to compliance. All intelligence information is carefully analyzed in the context of the provisions of those agreements, and recommendations on questions which arise are developed by interagency intelligence and policy-advisory groups within the NSC system. Currently, these are an Intelligence Community Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations and the Standing Consultative Commission Working Group of the NSC Special Coordination Committee. Should analysis of intelligence information indicate that there could be a question concerning compliance, this latter group reviews and analyzes the available information and provides recommendations. The President decides whether a particular question or issue is to be raised with the USSR based on the study and recommendations of the Working Group and, if necessary, the department and agency principals who comprise the Special Coordination Committee or the NSC itself. After discussion of any question is opened with the USSR in the Standing Consultative Commission, the positions and actions taken by the US representatives are also guided in the same manner.

### III. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE US

#### A. Launch Control Facilities (Special-Purpose Silos)

Article I of the Interim Agreement states: "The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed

3

land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers
after July 1, 1972."

In 1973, the US determined that additional silos of a
different design were under construction at a number of launch
sites. If these had been intended to contain ICBM launchers,
they would have constituted a violation of Article I of the
Interim Agreement. When the US raised its concern over this
construction with the Soviet side, the USSR responded that the
silos were, in fact, hardened facilities built for launch con-
trol purposes. As discussions proceeded and additional intelli-
gence became available, the US concluded that the silos were
built to serve a launch control function.

In early 1977, following further discussions during 1975
and 1976 and a review of our intelligence on this subject, the
US decided to close discussion of this matter on the basis that
the silos in question are currently used as launch control
facilities. We will, of course, continue to watch for any
activity which might warrant reopening of this matter.

B. <u>Concealment Measures</u>

Article V of the Interim Agreement and Article XII of
the ABM Treaty provide that each Party shall not "... inter-
fere with the national technical means of verification of the
other Party." nor "... use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification by national technical
means of compliance with the provisions. ..." of the Agree-
ment or the Treaty. Both articles provided that the latter
obligation "... shall not require changes in current con-
struction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."

The US has closely monitored Soviet concealment practices
both before and after conclusion of the 1972 SALT agreements.
During 1974, the extent of those concealment activities
associated with strategic weapons programs increased substan-
tially. None of them prevented US verification of compliance

4

with the provisions of the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement, but there was concern that they could impede verification in the future if the pattern of concealment measures were permitted to continue to expand.

The US stated this concern and discussed it with the Soviet side. In early 1975, careful analysis of intelligence information on activities in the USSR led the US to conclude that there no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs. We continue to monitor Soviet activity in this area closely.

### C. Modern Large Ballistic Missiles (SS-19 Issue)

Article II of the Interim Agreement states: "The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time." This provision was sought by the US as part of an effort to place limits on Soviet heavy ICBMs (SS-9 and follow-ons). We did not, however, obtain agreement on a quantitative definition of a heavy ICBM which would constrain increases in the size of Soviet light ICBMs (SS-11 and follow-ons). Thus, the US side stated on the final day of SALT ONE negotiations:

> "The US Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the US Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM.
> 
> The US proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

5

The USSR Delegation maintained the position throughout SALT ONE that an agreed definition of heavy ICBMs was not essential to the understanding reached by the sides in the Interim Agreement on the subject of heavy ICBMs and made clear that they did not agree with the US statement quoted above. When deployment of the SS-19 missile began, its size, though not a violation of the Interim Agreement provisions noted above, caused the US to raise the issue with the Soviets in early 1975. Our purpose was to emphasize the importance the US attached to the distinction made in the Interim Agreement between "light" and "heavy" ICBMs, as well as the continuing importance of that distinction in the context of the SALT TWO agreement under negotiation at the time. Following some discussion in the SCC, further discussions of this question in that forum were deferred because it was under active consideration in the SALT TWO negotiations.

Since that time, the US and USSR Delegations have agreed in the draft text of the SALT TWO agreement on a clear demarcation, in terms of missile launch-weight and throw-weight, between light and heavy ICBMs.

### D. Possible Testing of an Air Defense System (SA-5)
Radar in an ABM Mode

Article VI of the ABM Treaty states: "To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode."

On April 7, 1972, the US made a statement to clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode." We noted, with respect to radars, that we would consider a radar to be so tested if, for example, it makes measurements on a cooperative

6

target vehicle during the reentry portion of its trajectory
or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM
interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range.
We added that radars used for purposes such as range safety
or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these
criteria.

During 1973 and 1974, US observation of Soviet tests of
ballistic missiles led us to believe that a radar associated
with the SA-5 surface-to-air missile system had been used to
track strategic ballistic missiles during flight.

A question of importance in relation to this activity was
whether it represented an effort to upgrade the SA-5 system
for an ABM role. The Soviets could have been using the radar
in a range instrumentation role to obtain precision tracking;
on the other hand, the activity could have been part of an
effort to upgrade the SA-5 system for an ABM role, or to col-
lect data for use in developing ABM systems or a new dual
SAM/ABM system. The observed activity was, therefore, ambig-
uous with respect to the constraints of Article VI of the ABM
Treaty and the related US-stated interpretation of "testing in
an ABM mode." If the activity was designed to upgrade the SA-5
system, it would have been only the first step in such an
effort. Extensive and observable modifications to other com-
ponents of the system would have been necessary, but these
have not occurred.

The US raised this issue based on the indications that an
SA-5 radar may have been tracking ballistic missiles during
the reentry portion of their flight trajectory into an ABM
test range.

The Soviets maintained that no Soviet air defense radar
had been tested in an ABM mode. They also noted that the
use of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was
not limited by the ABM Treaty.

A short time later, we observed that the radar activity
of concern during Soviet ballistic missile tests had ceased.

The US has continued to monitor Soviet activites carefully

7

E. <u>Soviet Reporting of Dismantling of Excess ABM Test Launchers</u>

Each side is limited under the ABM Treaty to no more
than 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. During 1972, soon
after the ABM Treaty was signed, the Soviets dismantled
several excess launchers at the Soviet ABM test range.

On July 3, 1974, the agreed procedures, worked out in
the SCC, for dismantling excess ABM test launchers entered
into force. After the detailed procedures entered into effect,
the USSR provided notification in the SCC that the excess ABM
launchers at the Soviet test range had been dismantled in
accordance with the provisions of the agreed procedures.
Our own information was that several of the launchers had
not, in fact, been dismantled in complete accordance with
those detailed procedures.

Even though the launchers were deactivated prior to entry
into force of the procedures, and their reactivation would
be of no strategic significance, the US raised the matter
as a case of inaccurate notification or reporting
to make known our expectation that in the future care would
be taken to ensure that notification, as well as dismantling
or destruction, was in strict accordance with the agreed
procedures.

F. <ins>Soviet ABM Radar on Kamchatka Peninsula</ins>

Article IV of the ABM Treaty states: "The limitations
provided for in Article III <ins>on deployment</ins> shall not apply
to ABM systems or their components used for development or
testing, and located within current or additionally agreed
test ranges . . . ." In October, 1975, a new radar was
installed at the Kamchatka impact area of the Soviet ICBM
test range. Since Article IV exempts from the limitations of
Article III only those ABM components used for development or
testing at current or additionally agreed ranges, location of
this radar, which the US identified as an ABM radar, on the

8

Kamchatka peninsula could have constituted establishment of
a new Soviet ABM test range.

This situation, however, was made ambiguous by two facts:
(1) just prior to the conclusion of the SALT negotiations in
1972, the US provided to the Soviet Delegation a list of US
and Soviet ABM test ranges which did not include the Kamchatka
impact area. The Soviet side neither confirmed nor denied
the accuracy of completeness of the US listing, and indicated
that use of national technical means assured against misunderstanding
of Article IV; and (2) the presence of an older type
ABM radar could be viewed as having established the Kamchatka
impact area as an ABM test range at the time the ABM Treaty
was signed.

Though the location of a new ABM radar on Kamchatka
was not strategically significant, it was decided that this
matter should be raised with the Soviet side in order to set
the record straight.

We brought the situation to the attention of the Soviet
side. The USSR indicated that a range with a radar instrumentation
complex existed on the Kamchatka Peninsula on the
date of signature of the ABM Treaty and that they would be
prepared to consider the Kamchatka range a current test
range within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty. The
US continued the exchange to establish that Kamchatka is
an ABM test range, that Sary Shagan and Kamchatka were the
only ABM test ranges in the USSR, and that Article IV of the
ABM Treaty required agreement concerning the establishment
of additional test ranges.

The Soviet side has acknowledged that Kamchatka is an
ABM test range and that it and Sary Shagan are the only ABM
test ranges in the USSR. On the third point, discussions are
continuing on how properly to satisfy the need for discussing
and agreeing upon the establishment of an ABM test range.
Agreement appears near on this matter.

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G. Soviet Dismantling or Destruction of Replaced ICBM Launchers

Under the Interim Agreement and the Protocol thereto of May 26, 1972, the USSR was permitted to have no more than 950 SLBM launchers and 62 modern, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. In addition, it was provided that Soviet SLBM launchers in excess of 740 might become operational only as replacements for older ICBM and SLBM launchers, which would be dismantled or destroyed under agreed procedures. Such procedures were developed in the SCC, and became effective on July 3, 1974. The procedures include detailed requirements for the dismantling or destruction actions to be accomplished, their timing, and notification about them to the other Party.

By early 1976, the Soviets had developed a requirement to dismantle 51 replaced launchers. It soon became apparent to the US that the Soviets would probably not complete all the required dismantling actions on all of the launchers on time. Therefore, the US decided to raise this question with the Soviets, but before we could do so, the notification concerning dismantling or destruction provided by the Soviet side in the SCC acknowledged that the dismantling of 41 older ICBM launchers had not been completed in the required time period. The Soviet side explained the situation and predicted that all the dismantling actions would be completed by June 1, 1976 and agreed to the US demand that no more submarines with replacement SLBM launchers begin sea trials before such completion. Both conditions were met. Since that time, although we have observed some minor procedural discrepancies at a number of those deactivated launch sites and at others as the replacement process continued, all the launchers have been in a condition that satisfied the essential substantive requirements, which are that they cannot

10

be used to launch missiles, and cannot be reactivated in a
short time. As necessary, we have pursued the question of
complete and precise accomplishment of the detailed require-
ments of the agreed procedures.

H. <u>Concealment at Test Range</u>

Provisions of the Interim Agreement pertinent to this
discussion are:

Article V.3: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. . . ."

Agreed Statement concerning launcher dimensions: "... in the process of modernization and replacement, the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased."

Agreed Statement concerning test and training launchers: "... there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM and SLBM test and training launchers or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. . . construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training."

In early 1977, we observed the use of a large net cover-
ing over an ICBM test launcher undergoing conversion at a test
range in the USSR.

There was agreement in the US that this subject could
be appropriate for discussion in SALT in the context of the
ongoing discussions on the subject of deliberate concealment
measures in connection with a SALT TWO agreement. The subject
was initially raised in this context.

In addition, we also expressed our view that the use of a
covering over an ICBM silo launcher concealed activities
from national technical means of verification and

11

could impede verification of compliance with provisions of the Interim Agreement, specifically, the provision which dealt with increases in dimensions of ICBM silo launchers as recorded in the Agreed Statement quoted above. The US took the position that a covering which conceals activities at an ICBM silo from national technical means of verification could reduce the confidence and trust which are important to mutual efforts to establish and maintain strategic arms limitations.

It has been the Soviet position that the provisions of the Interim Agreement were not applicable to the activity in question. Nevertheless, they subsequently removed the net covering.

## IV. QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE USSR

### A. Shelters over Minuteman Silos

Paragraph 3 of Article V of the Interim Agreement states: "Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."

The US used shelters which were either 300 or 700 square feet in size over Minuteman ICBM silos to provide environmental protection during initial construction as well as modernization, from 1962 through 1972. Beginning in 1973, in connection with modernization and silo-hardening work, prefabricated shelters of about 2700 square feet were used. From four to twelve of these shelters were in place over silos at any given time, for 10 days to four weeks depending upon the severity of the weather.

The Soviets raised this subject, taking the position that the activity was inconsistent with Article V of the Interim Agreement since it could be classified as deliberate concealment, and that, therefore, it should cease. The US, based on the nature of the shelters and their use strictly for environmental purposes, not for concealment, believed that their use was consistent with Article V.

12

In early 1977, the US decided to modify the use of
environmental shelters over Minuteman ICBM silos based on
explicit confirmation of the common view shared by us and
the Soviets that neither side should use shelters over ICBM
silos that impede verification by national technical means
of compliance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement.
Our use of shelters has recently been modified by reducing
their size almost 50 percent in recognition of that under-
standing.

B. <u>Atlas and Titan-I Launchers</u>

The Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantlingling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for Strategic Offensive Arms, as noted above, provides detailed procedures for dismantling ICBM launchers and associated facilities, one principle of which is that reactivation of dismantled launchers should take substantially more time than construction of a new one.

There are 177 former launchers for the obsolete Atlas and
Titan-I ICBM systems at various locations across the continental
United States. All these launchers were deactivated by the
end of 1966.

The Soviet side apparently perceived an ambiguity with
respect to the status and condition of these launchers, based
on the amount of dismantling which had been done and its
effect on their possible reactivation time. They raised this
issue in early 1975.

The US view was that these launchers were obsolete and
deactivated prior to the Interim Agreement and were not sub-
ject to that agreement or to the accompanying procedures
for dismantling or destruction. However, we did

13

provide some information on their condition illustrating that
they could not be reactivated easily or quickly. The discussion on this question ceased in mid-1975.

### C. Radar on Shemya Island

Article III of the ABM Treaty states: "Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except . . . within one ABM deployment area . . . centered on the Party's national capital . . . and within one deployment area . . . containing ICBM silo launchers. . . ."

In 1973, the United States began construction of a new phased-array radar on Shemya Island, Alaska, at the western end of the Aleutian Island chain. This radar is to be used for national technical means of verification, space track, and early warning.

The Soviets raised a question in 1975, suggesting that the radar was an ABM radar, which would not be permitted at this location.

The US side discussed this matter with the Soviets and as a result, we believe, eliminated any concern about possible inconsistency with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The radar became operational in early 1977.

### D. Privacy of SCC Proceedings

Paragraph 8 of the Regulations of the SCC states: "The proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission shall be conducted in private. The Standing Consultative Commission may not make its proceedings public except with the express consent of both Commissioners."

Prior to the special SCC session held in early 1975 to discuss certain questions related to compliance, several articles appeared in various US publications with wide circulation. These articles speculated about the possibility of certain Soviet "violations" of the SALT agreements which would be discussed, and tended to draw the conclusion that

14

there were violations, based on what was purported to be
accurate intelligence information.

The Soviets have expressed to us their concern about the
importance of confidentiality in the work of the SCC, and
about the publication of such items. They were apparently
particularly concerned about press items that may appear to
have official US government sanction.

We have discussed with the Soviets the usefulness of main-
taining the privacy of our negotiations and discussions and
limiting speculation in the public media on SCC proceedings,
as well as the need to keep the public adequately informed.

E. Dismantling or Destruction of the ABM Radar under
Construction at Malmstrom AFB

When the ABM Treaty was signed on May 26, 1972, the US
had ABM defenses under construction in two deployment areas
for the defense of ICBMs. Since the ABM Treaty permitted
each Party only one such ABM system deployment area, the US
immediately halted the construction, which was in the early
stages, at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Specific procedures for
the dismantling or destruction of the ABM facilities under
construction at Malmstrom were negotiated as part of the
Protocol on Procedures for ABM Systems and Their Components,
signed on July 3, 1974.

Dismantling of the ABM facilities under construction at
Malmstrom was completed by May 1, 1974.

In late 1974, we notified the USSR in the SCC that dis-
mantling activities at the Malmstrom site had been completed.
Somewhat later, the Soviet side raised a question about one
detailed aspect of the dismantling which they apparently felt
had not been carried out in full accord with the agreed pro-
cedures.

15

We reviewed with the Soviet side the actions taken by the US to dismantle the Malmstrom stie, and also showed them some photographs of the before and after conditions there. The question was apparently resolved on the basis of that discussion.

## V. OTHER QUESTIONS AND CHARGES

The process of monitoring Soviet activity and analyzing the information obtained in order to decide whether any particular matter needed to be raised with the Soviet side has been described above. Activities not raised with the USSR as ambiguous or of possible concern have also been examined by the US. In those cases, analysis of the available intelligence information showed that they did not warrant discussion or categorization as inconsistent with the agreements. Generally, it has been the practice to avoid public discussions of these matters.

From time to time, articles have appeared in US periodicals and news papers, alleging Soviet violations of the provisions of the SALT ONE agreements. As indicated earlier, these reports or commentaries have been generally speculative, and have concluded or implied that violations or "cheating" by the Soviets had taken place.

Among the subject most recently or frequently mentioned are those listed below.

### A. "Blinding" of US Satellites

Soviet use of something like laser energy to "blind" certain US satellites could be an activity inconsistent with the obligations in Article XII of the ABM Treaty and Article V of the Interim Agreement "not to interfere with" or "use deliberate concealment measures" which impede verification, by national technical means, of compliance with the provisions of those agreements. In 1975, information relevant to possible incidents of that nature was thoroughly analyzed, and it was determined that no questionable Soviet activity was involved and

16

that our monitoring capabilities had not been affected by
these events. The analysis indicated that the events had
resulted from several large fires caused by breaks along
natural gas pipelines in the USSR. Later, following several
reports in the US press alleging Soviet violations, and in
response to questions about those reports, the US press was
informed of those facts by several US officials.

B. <u>Mobile ABM</u>

From time to time, it has been stated that the USSR, in
contravention of Article V of the ABM Treaty, ahs developed,
tested, or deployed a mobile ABM system, or a mobile ABM radar,
one of the three components of a mobile ABM system.

The USSR does not have a mobile ABM system or components
for such a system. Since 1971, the Soviets have installed
at ABM test ranges several radars associated with an ABM
system currently in development. One of the types of radars
associated with this system can be erected in a matter of
months, rather than requiring years to build as has been
the case for ABM radars both sides have deployed in the past.
Another type could be emplaced on prepared concrete foundations.
This new system and its components can be installed more rapidly
than previous ABM systems, but they are clearly not mobile in
the sense of being able to be moved about readily or hidden.
A single complete operational site would take about half a
year to construct. A nationwide ABM system based on this new
system under development would take a matter of years to
build.

C. <u>ABM Testing of Air Defense Missiles</u>

Article VI of the Treaty specifically prohibits the test-
ing in an ABM mode of missiles which are not ABM interceptor
missiles, or giving them ABM capabilities (see Section III.D
above). Our close monitoring of activities in this field have
not indicated that ABM tests or any tests against strategic

17

ballistic missiles have been conducted with an air defense missile; specifically, we have not observed any such tests of the SA-5 air defense system missile, the one occasionally mentioned in this connection in the open press.

### D. Mobile ICBMs

The development and testing of a mobile ICBM is not prohibited by the Interim Agreement, but the US stated SALT ONE that we would consider deployment of such systems to be inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement. We do not believe the Soviets have deployed an ICBM in a mobile mode.

The possibility that the Soviet SS-20, which is a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile system, has been given or could be given ICBM range capabilities has been discussed in the press. The SS-20 is being deployed to replace older medium and intermediate-range missiles. It is judged to be capable of reaching the Aleutian Islands and western Alaska from its present and likely deployment areas in the eastern USSR; however, it cannot reach the contiguous 48 states from any of its likely deployment areas in the Soviet Union. While the range capability of any missile system, including the SS-20, can be extended by reducing the total weight of its payload or adding another propulsion stage, there is no evidence that the Soviets have made any such modifications to the SS-20. We have confidence that we would detect the necessary intercontinental range testing of such a modified system.

### E. Denial of Test Information

It has been reproted in some articles on SALT that the Soviets have violated the Interim Agreement by encoding missile-test telemetry, and that such activity is contrary to the provisions of Article V of the Interim Agreement which were noted in Section V.A above. Such activity would be inconsistent with those provisions of the Interim Agreement if it impeded verification of compliance with agreement provisions; it has not been considered to have done so. In SALT TWO negotiations, we have treated this subject in considerable detail, since such activity could affect verifica-

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F. ASAT

It has been alleged that Soviet development of an anti-satellite system is a violation of the obligation not to interfere with national technical means of verification of compliance with SALT provisions. Since development of such systems is not prohibited, this program does not call into question Soviet compliance with existing agreements. The actual use of an ASAT system against US national technical means is prohibited but this has not occurred.

CAL CHEMICAL & MANUFACTURING CO.

1003 BALDWIN AVENUE

DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48214

PLANT NO. 2

PHONE: 331-0990

July 11, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street N W
Office Strategic & International Studies
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As a Soccer Football promoter, I have come to admire your enthusiasm and participation toward this great sport and, for that reason, I am taking the liberty to write to you in the hope that you and I might discuss a "Soccer First" in America, with you as an advisor and/or Director.

The plan is very simple...and goes as follows: Teams participating will be league team Champions of each country that have participated in the World Cup games. The Classic will be on the same basis as the World Cup with one exception, the process of elimination will be omitted. The Champion will be decided in their respective league competition. The prizes will be from $600,000.00, possibly more, for 1st prize; 2nd. prize $500,000.00; 3rd. prize, $400,000.00; 4th. prize, $250,000.00, assuring every team a guarantee of at least $150,000.00 each.

The prizes could be higher, depending on TV rights, closed circuit TV concessions, etc. etc.

Dr. Kissinger, a personal discussion with you is necessary so that I may present the plan in detail for your consideration. To wait for the "World Cup" to come to America is not, as we both know, on the FIFA calendar for many, many years.

The United States of America needs an individual of your calibre to promote something close to the World Cup...Just think what this would do for putting Soccer instantly 'on the map' of North America with 'World-wide enthusiasm to decide who will be the Champion of Champions in the 'International Soccer Gold Cup Classic'. With confidence I write to you because you are the man to lead such a spectacular, the OLYMPICS, the WORLD CUP and now, the WORLD SERIES, with 5 continents participating.

SURFACE PRESERVATIVE

TINTS

NEUTRAL CLEANER and SHAMPOO

AUTO WASH DETERGENT

TIRE WHITE

MOTOR CLEEN

CAR WAX, ETC.

[LC]

SSM

KL

Page 2...

In a recent conversation with Ms. Helen Thomas, U.P.I. White House Bureau Chief, and long time friend, a feeling of enthusiasm was generated by Ms. Thomas for a project of this kind, expressing a mutual feeling that your participation in this worthy sports endeavor would indeed enhance North America's public relations image internationally. We agreed that you are indeed the very person to emulate Soccer in the United States.

The five continents will view this Classic in the same fashion as the Olympic games and the World Cup games.

Trusting that my brief explanation will be sufficient to inspire a positive reaction so that we and the American public can see Soccer Football as it should be played. I would appreciate your thinking on the subject. and eagerly await, on behalf of Soccerplay, Inc., a response from you for a possible meeting to further discuss this 'First'.

The Detroit Major Soccer League as well as the Michigan Soccer Football Association has replied very favorably to my request as shown in the enclosed letters; meanwhile, I am awaiting a response from the United States Soccer Federation and the 'FIFA Federal International Football Association.

Again my thanks for your consideration and response,

Charles F. Abud
Soccerplay, Inc.

CFA/gj
Enc.

I. EVENT

'SOCCER WORLD SERIES' (SOCCERPLAY INC.)

"INTERNATIONAL SOCCER GOLD CUP CLASSIC" (Date and year to be decided)

II. PARTICIPANTS:

5 Continents

Europe, Asia, Africa, North America, South America.

III. Invitational Soccer Tournament

IV. PARTICIPANTS:

League Champions from each of the countries that have participated in the World Cup games. 16 countries minimum.

V. RULES:

F.I.F.A. World Cup Rules (Federal International Football Association)

VI. POSSIBLE LOCATIONS:

Michigan, New Jersey, Minnesota, California, Illinois, Washington (Seattle). etc.

VII. TO DETERMINE CHAMPION OF CHAMPIONS:

VIII. CASH PRIZES:

<table><tr><td>1st. Prize</td><td>$600,000.00</td><td>( Possibly more )</td></tr><tr><td>2nd. Prize</td><td>$500,000.00</td><td>( " " )</td></tr><tr><td>3rd. Prize</td><td>$400,000.00</td><td>( " " )</td></tr><tr><td>4th. Prize</td><td>$300,000.00</td><td>( " " )</td></tr></table>

All other teams participating will receive the minimum $ 150,000.00

IX. Mailing Address:

Renaissance Center, Detroit, Michigan

May 22, 1978 - Page 2.

Offenbach, Champion Team of the German Professional League, among others.

7. An Argentinian by birth, a Lebanese by heritage, and an American by choice, Mr. Abud speaks the three languages fluently.

8. A devoted Soccer individual presently associated with the St. Clair Shores Red Barons, as well as the Derby Junior High of Birmingham, Michigan, Mr. Abud assists in many local soccer projects in the Metro-Detroit area because of his love for the game.

Presently, Mr. Abud is requesting permission from the proper authorized organizations in Michigan, in the United States, as well as the FIFA, the World Body Organization, so that he may implement a "SOCCER WORLD SERIES", under the International Soccer "Gold Cup Classic".

Participants in this proposed endeavor will be the Champion teams from each country (16 in all), so that the Champion of Champions may be determined.

The "Purse" in this "SOCCER WORLD SERIES" will be based on the World Cup figures--65% for the teams participating, to be divided in four parts: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th prize, with an additional guaranteed amount for each participant. FIFA will receive their 10%, with 25% appropriated for the promotion of the games.

It is our belief that such a Soccer "First" has merit, and we fully support Mr. Abud's venture which would prove to be a "Sports Spectacular" and a great boost, foreign-relationswise, for the United States of America.

Michigan Soccer Association

SECRETARY KENNETH R. WESTERMAN • 715 GRANGER AVE. • ANN ARBOR, MI. 48104 • PHONE (313) 668-6584

Affiliated with the United States Soccer Federation

25 June 1978

Charles F. Abud, President
CAL Chemical & MFG. CO.
1003 Baldwin
Detroit, Mi. 48214

Dear Mr. Abud,

The Council of the Michigan Soccer Association, having read your resume and statement of support from the Detroit Soccer League, and having heard your proposal for a 'Soccer World Series'-'International Soccer Gold Cup Classic, is happy to be able to give you official approval and our enthusiastic support in furthering your dream.

The Executive Committee of our Association feels that the next step in your approach to FIFA should be to the National Commission rather than the National Council of the United States Soccer Federation. We also feel that a more detailed presentation should be prepared for the National Commission, perhaps after an initial appeal to their Executive Secretary Mr. Kurt Lamm.

The Michigan Soccer Association will be pleased to help you as much as possible short of any financial involvement in the promotion of the series. Please feel free to contact our office or you feel necessary.

The United States Soccer Federation's address is 350 5th Ave, #4010
New York, N.Y. 10001. Write care of Mr. Kurt Lamm, Executive Secretary.

Kenneth R. Westerman, Sec'y

cc: J. Christof, file

PRESIDENT

Josef F. Christof
12104 Barlow
Detroit, Mi 48205
(313) 521-8872

VICE PRESIDENT
(REFEREE ADMINISTRATOR)

Thomas M. Syme
8652 Edgewater Lane
Warren, Mi 48093
(313) 264-1279

TREASURER

Ted Kuczara
11733 Klinger
Hamtramck, Mi 48212
(313) 892-5418

REGISTRAR

Donald A. Edwards
18850 E. 9 Mile Rd.
East Detroit, Mi 48021
(313) 775-6010

STATE COACH

Wayne Pitmann
593 Pierce
Birmingham, Mi 48009
(313) 642-7539

MEMBERS

Gerhard Mengel
G-8068 Fenton Rd.
Grand Blanc, Mi 48439
(313) 739-2576

Patrick A. McDonald
1732 Buhl Building
Detroit, Mi 48226
(313) 961-0473