MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

February 18, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Statement Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee

At _Tab A_ is the transcript of my 1967 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on United States policy toward Europe which in its main outlines continues to reflect my views.

At _Tab B_ is a background paper I submitted before my testimony.

I thought you might like to read through these two papers before your European trip.

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PROFESSOR OF
GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: FACULTY
MEMBER, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman and gentleman, the current NATO
crisis was triggered by a unilateral, pre-emptory French demand.
But it would be wrong to conclude that the pattern of relationships
which developed after the war could have continued. The with-
d withdrawal of Franch from integrated commands forced a reconsideration
of the structure and the purpose of the Alliance which would have
been inevitable in any case -- though the atmosphere was surely
worsened by France's tactics.

It is well to keep three things in mind at the outset. First, the
present crisis is a family affair. It concerns internal arrangements
between closely related peoples. France is not our basic opponent in
the world; unless statesmen everywhere submerge their judgment in
their passions, there are objective limits which reality imposes on
interallied discord.

Second, the present crisis marks the end of the phase of
United States-European relationships which was ushered in by the
Greek-Turkish aid program and led through the Marshall plan to the
construction of the Atlantic alliance. Nothing can restore the former
state of affairs. In many ways, this should be an occasion for self-
confrontation rather than bitterness. Goals which seemed visionary in
the late forties have been essentially achieved. Europe has recovered
its economic strength and much political vitality. The threat of
imminent invasion no longer dominates people's minds.

Third -- and somewhat contradictorily -- Europe's recovery
is still tenuous. It is often assumed that European vitality will be
permanent and that the primary problem is to moderate Europe's
assertiveness. However, the vigor so noticeable in Europe today
is very close in time to nihilism; European confidence is still shaky.
To avoid both the danger of excessive nationalism and a new version
of neutralism is the challenge before the alliance.

Foreign policy knows no plateaus. What does not become a
point for new departures soon marks the beginning of an inexorable
decline. It would be unprecedented if a policy developed in the late

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forties remained valid for the seventies. The original conception
of NATO was correct for the situation which then existed. I have
always supported it strongly. But it no longer exhausts current
challenges. What we need today is another leap of the imagination
similar to that which took place two decades ago.

In order to reduce my views to relatively manageable proportions, I am submitting two documents to this committee.

(a) This formal statement dealing with policy issues.

(b) A background paper dealing with the structural causes of the current crisis.

SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

A. American Policy -- the Grand Design

Any attempt to sum up American policy in a few sentences is
bound to be highly misleading. What follows must be taken as a
summary of a dominant trend which has been followed with various
degrees of consistency.

1. Commitment to an Atlantic Community based on equal partnership:

The United States has supported the notion of an equal partnership between the United States and Europe. This grand design -- variously symbolized by such concepts as "dumbbell" or "twin pillars" -- was based on the proposition that an Atlantic partnership would enable our European allies to share our global responsibilities more equitably.

2. Support for a united Europe on a federal basis:

European unity has been considered by American policy-
makers as a prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic Community.
A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an
equal partner with the United States and share with us the burdens and
obligations of world leadership. To its supporters, in Europe as well
as in the United States, such a partnership has seemed realizable by
only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with
the United States. Similarly, a single solution has been offered for

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the achievement of European unity: supranational federal institutions controlled by a European parliament. American pronouncements have often played down anything less as no unity at all.

### 3. Integrated defense:

While the United States has advocated a twin-pillar concept in the political and economic realm, it has urged an integrated military defense. Partly this has reflected the conviction that with modern weapons, defense is indivisible; partly it was due to our special responsibility in the nuclear field: Ninety-five percent of the nuclear arsenal of the alliance belongs to the United States. Only those allies on whose territory nuclear weapons are located share in their control, and then only negatively: they can prevent these weapons from being fired but they cannot make us fire them nor can they prevent us from resorting to nuclear weapons located elsewhere.

Finally, the United States has insisted on central command and control of nuclear weapons in the alliance. It has sought to meet the concerns of its allies -- real or imagined -- by a number of devices ranging from the creation of a new nuclear force (either in the form of an MLF or ANF) to the NATOR Special Committee (the so-called McNamara committee). (The nuclear problem will be discussed in greater detail below.)

## U.S. POLICY TOO THEORETICAL, SCHEMATIC, INCONSISTENT

### 4. Summary and critique:

U.S. policy has had the great advantage of offering a clear-cut concept. In the early stage of the Atlantic alliance it provided the basic impetus for European recovery. Its major drawback has been not that it was wrong but that one conceivable pattern of relationships has sometimes been presented as the only possible one. A too theoretical and schematic approach runs the risk of losing touch with contemporary European realities.

For all its idealism, the American view has always contained some inconsistencies. In the emerging areas the nation-state has been treated as natural, and in Eastern Europe great hope has been placed in nationalism as a counterweight to communism. But in Western Europe, where the concept of nationalism had originated, American policy has decried the nation-state as outdated and backward.

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Moreover, American claims regarding the general applicability
of our Federal institutions have ignored those factors which have
made the American experience unique. The American Federal
Union was formed on a new continent by States sharing a common
historical experience. The American Colonies had fought together
to achieve their freedom. They were roughly of the same size.
They had no tradition of sovereignty in the conduct of foreign
relations. Their peoples were of similar cultural background and
spoke the same language.

The situation in Europe differs fundamentally. Every European
state is the product of many centuries of a history in which a sense of
national identity was often linked to what distinguished a nation from
its neighbors. Independence for many countries required a long
process of struggle against the domination of other European states.
In other words, the nations of Europe were formed in a manner which
emphasized their uniqueness. It is no accident that support for
federal institutions has come on the whole from smaller countries
accustomed to the protection of some major power or from countries
like the Federal Republic or Italy, eager to escape their past. France
and Great Britain with the longest history as national states have
consistently aimed for a confederal rather than a federal solution.
Another inconsistency in the American position has been ardent
advocacy of Britain's entry into Europe and a federal structure which
is as unacceptable in London as in Paris.

## DE GAULLE'S CHALLENGE

These problems might have remained dormant for many years
but for the emergency of President de Gaulle -- though it is my view
that they would have had to be faced sooner or later. Deliberately,
brutally, often cynically exploiting American inconsistencies,
President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of
Atlantic relationships and European unity. Since this conception has
more support in Europe than is generally recognized, I will sketch
it briefly now.

### B. The Gaullist Conception

#### 1. Historical perspective:

First, let me say something about the historical perspective
in which I believe de Gaulle's challenge should be seen. We have fallen
into the habit of believing that the major difficulty in Europe and,
particularly, the major difficulty in France, is excessive assertiveness.

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However irritating de Gaulle's methods and however brutal his tactics, there are few figures whom it is more crucial to see in historical perspective. For his policy reflects at its core a deep awareness of the suffering of his people over the span of a generation. Few countries have known the travail which France has suffered since it lost much of its young generation in World War I. Victorious in 1918, France knew better than any of its allies how close to defeat it had been. Inchoately, the survivors of that catastrophe realized that France could not stand another trial like the one just surmounted. Deprived of its youth, fearful of its defeated antagonist, feeling misunderstood by its allies, France experienced in the interwar period an almost uninterrupted succession of frustrations. The French collapse of 1940 was as much moral as military. Even though France emerged among the victors of World War II, its leaders were aware, despite all the rhetoric and perhaps because of it, that France had been saved largely through the efforts of others.

Once more, peace brought no respite. Instead, the fourth republic experienced the same governmental instability as the third, and in addition it had to go through the searing process of decolonization. Humiliated in 1940, the French Army had barely been reconstituted when it was obliged to engage in nearly two decades of frustrating colonial wars each of which ended in defeat.

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. Eventually it is all but forgotten that between 1958 and 1962 France was on the verge of civil war three times. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his *tour de force* that his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness -- a notion which, as I have said, would have been inconceivable 5 years ago. Thus, in a certain sense de Gaulle's objective may well be pedagogical: to teach his country and his continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. This, in my view, is an act of historical importance wholly consistent with American long-range interests -- however abrupt and annoying the methods by which it comes about.

## DE GAULLE AFFIRMS ROLE OF NATION-STATE

### 2. Substantive views:

> Let me say he believes before a nation can or an area can mean something to others it has to mean something to itself.

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The attempt to achieve more self-reliance makes de Gaulle wary of integration in any sphere but particularly in the military field. De Gaulle believes that countries without direct responsibility for their defense will not make the necessary effort over a period of time. This will lead, in his view, to a growing sense of impotence and dependence on the United States. Where the United States believes in obsolescence of the nation-state, de Gaulle passionately affirms its continued role. Where the United States and many Europeans want to construct a united Europe by way of federal institutions, de Gaulle bases his notion of Europe on agreement among governments. Where the United States tends to equate unity with formal, legal commitments, de Gaulle emphasizes the nation of interest and equilibrium. He insists on autonomy in nuclear matters; recently he has come close to affirming freedom of action across the whole spectrum of defense. Once an advocate of autonomous, if confederated, Europe he seems to have bcome disillusioned by the possibilities of Franco-Germany cooperation which would be essential to such a scheme and for the failure of which many French officials blame American pressures. He has, therefore, resurrected the first hints of the classic Russo-French understanding. Whatever his motive, de Gaulle has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe to holding out a vision of the unity of all of Europe. He has made himself the spokesman for a relaxation of East-West tensions.

### 3. Summary and critique:

De Gaulle's abrupt and unilateral tactics often tempt his opponents to absorb their energies in dealing with the symptoms to the neglect of the deeper challenge. Whatever we may think of his answers, he has posed questions which the West will not be able to avoid answering. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others, it must first mean something to itself. It would be wrong, moreover, to picture de Gaulle as totally isolated.

Where we place great stress on legal commitments, he emphasizes the notion of interest and equilibrium. He believes in autonomy in nuclear matters and, perhaps, on the whole spectrum of defense. He has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe for a vision of unity of all Europe.

Many Europeans support his views -- especially on NATO questions and East-West relations -- though they are too used to the old pattern to say so openly.

It seems to me that he is not nearly as isolated in Europe as one
is sometimes led to believe. Some of his critics oppose him for
reasons of domestic not of foreign policy; the recent actions of his
challenger in the presidential election -- Mitterand -- illustrate
this point. Others affirm a version of Atlanticism that comes close
to shifting all responsibility to us. It is possible to argue that but
for de Gaulle the previous pattern might have continued; now it
cannot be restored even after de Gaulle's departure.

## DE GAULLE'S POLICY: STYLE AND STRUCTURE

Nevertheless, I would say that there are two major weaknesses
in his policy. One, the question of style which produces tensions
that go beyond the substantive disputes and, second, a question of
continuity since it seems to me dubious that the present type of
French policy can be pursued by his successors and he may, therefore,
be trying to create a structure which is inherently unstable.

At the same time, De Gaulle's imperious style explains why he
has often thwarted his own aims. Man is not governed by reason
alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect; but it is made
by men who cannot always distinguish their emotion from their
analysis. De Gaulle's wounding insistence on intellectual submission
to his maxims and his rigid defense of an extreme conception of
sovereignty has antagnonized even those who share his aspiration
for greater European autonomy. His tactics create the impression that
the desires autonomy not to enhance the unity of the West but to enable
him to pursue policies contradictory, if not hostile, to those of the
United States. Great men build truly only if they remember that their
achievement must be maintained by the less gifted individuals who are
likely to follow them. A structure which can be preserved only if there
is a great man in each generation is inherently fragile. This may be the
nemesis of de Gaulle's success.

## GERMANY: PRECARIOUS STABILITY, INCONGRUOUS SITUATION,
HISTORICAL ISOLATION

### C. The Problem of Germany

The real victims of the current split in the Atlantic Alliance has
been the Federal Republic of Germany. Urged by France to pursue
a "European" course and by the United States toward "Atlantic"
conceptions, advised to seek unity now by firmness, now by

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conciliation, pressed to meet balance-of-payments costs, the pillar of everybody's construction and the worry of many, the Federal Republic stands in danger of losing the precarious stability which it has so painfully and so responsibly developed since the war.

For the seeming balance and solidity of postwar Germany -- which causes it to be the object of constant wooing -- is highly deceptive. Every German over 55 -- and this includes almost all leaders -- has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different regimes each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two World Wars and experience two catastrophic inflations. Every German over 40 has lived through the Nazi period, World War II, and the postwar collapse. Germany has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks to sustain prolonged pressure. Great national prosperity has developed at the same time that national, political, and territorial integrity has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the legalism of whose policy prescriptions often hides a lack of inner assurance.

This sense of insecurity is absolutely central. The dominant German desire is to escape the burden of difficult choices. The German nightmare is a reappearance of the historical isolation which for almost its entire national history has forced Germany to confront hostility on all its borders, East and West. If this situation reappears, German worries could take dramatic form. If the Federal Republic becomes the focal point of all European and Atlantic tensions, German frustrations are likely to turn on the seeming cause of its isolation. It is essential that we do not find ourselves in that position. This -- not the nuclear issue -- is in my view the real German "problem."

The German "problem" is complicated not only by history but by difficulties of policy. Alone among the Western Powers, the Federal Republic cannot be satisfied with the territorial status quo. Any foreseeable German Government -- regardless of party -- will have as one of its paramount objectives the reunification of the German people. Until 1961, it was assumed that this goal could be achieved by even closer integration within the Atlantic alliance. The Berlin wall shattered these hopes. It is clear that however German unity comes about -- if ever -- it will be under conditions other than a movement of the frontiers of NATO toward the East. It has become apparent that the slogans of the fifties no longer fully apply causing all German political parties to grope for "new approaches" to a problem which in the present world constellation may be insoluable

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and whose intractability may further mortgage German political
life. I will say more about this later.

The unsettling effect of these developments causes efforts to
relax East-West tensions to take on a special significance in
Germany. German leaders welcome relief from pressures on them;
but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation
become frozen, too. They make a distinction between "peripheral"
settlements which they welcome and "central" agreements which
they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German
question. This explains the extremely unsettling effect the
negotiations on nonproliferation have had on many German political
leaders.

## GERMANY HAS BECOME FOCAL POINT OF ALL DISPUTES

In short, the Federal Republic finds itself in an extremely
difficult situation. France threatens to withdraw its troops over
the principle of integration; Britain and the United States indicate
that they might reduce theirs unless the Federal Republic eases their
balance-of-payments problem. The Soviet Union has cast the Federal
Republic in the position of the international villain. Even within the
Western alliance a potential "threat" from the Federal Republic is
often invoked to justify schemes -- from MLF to enhanced integration.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance of German
political life. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures
and temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel within
the Western alliance. The most exposed Western ally, 17 million of
whose people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point
of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this
strain. There are signs already that the conflict may tear apart the
governing party, the Christian Democratic Union, which largely forged
the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will
liberate tendencies in the other parties that are now restrained by their
desire to present themselves as responsible trustees of well-established
consensus. Thus the current situation contains a series of time bombs.
Schizophrenia is built into the Federal Republic's political life.

Many are outside American control. But the volatility of the
situation does impose on American policy requirements for very great
circumspection. The insecurity of German leaders and their desire to
be good allies cause them to go along with American proposals not
necessarily because they want them but because they believe it is

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expected of them. But this does not mean that the Federal Republic
can sustain the consequences of all such actions. A break with
France which can be ascribed to American pressure could easily
backfire on us. And I am bound to say that American actions in
recent years have already placed us into a precarious position in
this respect. Overtures toward East Germany encouraged in the
belief that they offer a possibility of reunification could easily
generate a frustrated nationalism if it turns out that they cement
the partition of Germany rather than alleviate it. What the Federal
Republic needs above all is solid, reliable, steady allies. What it
cannot stand is to be the focal point of all pressures. It would be
tragic if Germany whose national disasters in this century were
caused in part by the attempt to conduct an isolated policy in the
center of the European Continent, now came to grief because it
tried to be too responsive to allies whose conflicts strain its
internal political structure. To be sure, President de Gaulle bears
a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs. But if we compound his
abruptness with our outrage history will not excuse the inadequacy of
the response by the magnitude of the challenge.

# "HARDWARE" SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR PROBLEM

## D. The nuclear problem

Let me now turn to the nuclear problem. In recent years, the
socalled nuclear "problem" has been at the center of the NATO debate.
Until President Johnson called off intense pressures on its behalf --
in my view wisely -- the MLF was pushed as America's principal
answer to the Gaullist challenge. The MLF is no longer actively
pursued; but the belief that NATO's problems could be eased by a
new nuclear force under alliance ownership and control dies hard.
It therefore may require a few words here.

I have always been extremely skeptical of the so-called hardwar
solution for the following reasons:

1. If the analysis in my background paper, which I am submitting to this committee, is even partly correct, the basic problem before the alliance is political not military. It derives from the need to adjust European-American and East-West relations to new conditions. Even the nuclear issue is not technical but political; its "solution" -- insofar as it has one -- depends on the ability of an alliance composed of sovereign states to develop the confidence which will enable it to act in common in the face of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness.

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2. It was a mistake to attempt to gear NATO policy to the projection of unstated German wishes. No significant demand for possession of nuclear weapons existed in Germany when the NLF was first proposed. Outside very restricted official circles, no significant backing exists for other "hardware" solutions. Even after 3 years of discussion and pressure only a small number of German officials -- and no other public figures -- are committed to the "hardware solution."

3. The nuclear control issue is not "solved" by any of the "hardware" solutions now being discussed nor can it be by any adaptation of them. If any of the common ownership schemes so far proposed were accepted the situation would be as follows:

(a) No country presently unable to go to nuclear war will be enabled to do so as a result of the "hardware solution" -- the existing vetos would remain.

(b) No country presently able to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so by participating in a "hardware" solution.

(c) No country presently unable to go to nuclear war can force its nuclear ally to go to nuclear war as the result of a "hardware" solution.

I do not believe that this can remain a permanent state of affairs if heavy financial expeditures are involved.

All that participation in a commonly owned force buys is the ability to veto the use of the very small percentage of the total nuclear arsenal which it represents (about 3 percent) but not the remainder. If a "hardware" solution were accepted, this could not remain a permanent state of affairs especially if heavy financial sacrifices are involved. The probability is, therefore, that a commonly owned force will repeat within its framework all the arguments it was supposed to allay. Pressures for altering the control mechanism are inevitable. A jointly owned force will buy not a solution but a permanent crisis.

## PROBLEMS ARE POLITICAL, NOT MILITARY

4. The nuclear issue diverts attention from the cardinal problem of political cooperation to an inherently divisive issue with respect to which formal pronouncements are likely to be highly misleading. Nuclear war -- if it should occur -- will come only at

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M

the end of a long diplomatic process and will involve the national
survival of all participants. It seems contradictory to try to
integrate nuclear strategy while leaving the process of diplomacy
which precedes it bilateral. If a coordinated diplomacy can be
achieved the problem of who presses the button will seem less
crucial. If political confidence and cooperation cannot be
developed, theoretical voting formulas for entering nuclear war
will prove empty. No country will let itself be voted into nuclear
war against its better judgment. No one can seriously believe that
a U.S. President would risk hundreds of millions of lives after
being outvoted in a committee -- after, in short, having decided
that nuclear war was not in the American interest. And, the same
is true of other countries. The primary guarantee for our allies
is a harmonization of political objectives so that the conception of
vital interests of various allies is virtually indistinguishable. If we
and our allies see our vital interests the same way, the nuclear
control issue will be well on its way to a "solution." If we cannot
achieve such a consensus, physical possession of a small jointly
owned force will be irrelevant. As will be discussed below, the
major thrust of American policy should be to strengthen political
consultation and for this the special committee (The McNamara com
 committtee) seems at present the best forum available.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The French challenge has raised a whole host of logistic,
legal, and technical problems which inevitably absorb much of the
immediate attention. I will here try to sketch some of the long-
term goals which I believe should guide U.S. policy. Not all of
them are inconsistent with existing U.S. policy; many of them in fact
reflect American objectives. I will state my views partly in the form
of answers to questions, partly under various policy headings.

A. What kind of a Europe Is in Our Interest?

Though I deplore the methods of President de Gaulle, I have
always been prepared to grant his historic importance. A greater
degree of political and military autonomy for Europe is essential
for the cohesion of the West and in our long-term interest. Though
this proposition will be granted in the abstract, there is a tendency

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to resist independence when it takes the form of challenging our judgments. Nevertheless, it is essential that we adjust the pattern of relationships which grew up after the war. Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution, we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a grownup son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to control all the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war, Europe has been first nurtured and then protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality -- a process to which no nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of Europeans self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is important for us as well.

Some critics of American policy argue that the attempt to play a role simultaneously in every part of the globe is beyond our physical resources. Without going into that argument it seems to me clearly beyond our psychological resources. If we insist on assuming the principal responsibility for every square mile of territory at every moment of time, we will tear *ourselves* to pieces inwardly. The continent closest to us culturally, with similar political traditions and substantial economic resources should -- for our sake as well as its own -- assume a greater *responsibility* for its policy and *effense*. It is neither in our interest not that of Europe that Europe become the Greece to our Rome -- a political backwater, interesting culturally but unable to play an active role. This would not be healthy for us because hegemony is demoralizing in the long run.

Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not gorwn less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny. Some

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## B. Do We Need To Fear a Third Force?

Many would grant the need for a greater European role in the abstract. However, they tend to argue that this will have to wait the unification of Europe on a Federal basis. There exists also a certain ambivalence: the desirability of a united Europe is affirmed, but there is also a fear lest it pursue "third force" tendencies. The seeming dilemma is often solved by a call for American leadership. Some invoke the "heroic" days of the creation of the Marshall plan as a model for current American attitudes.

### Encourage European Sense of Responsibility

I believe our present challenge to be more complex and subtle. In the late forties, conception, execution and salesmanship alike depended on American initiatives. Today, the central task is to encourage a European sense of responsibility. To the extent that the United States uses the methods of the forties it encourages two unfortunate tendencies. On the one hand, some Europeans will be only too happy to abdicate "leadership" to us. The question is whether those most ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders will prove very steady partners in times of crisis. On the other hand, we will see a mounting tendency to base European policy on anti-Americanism. There will be a growing belief that a European identity can only come about if seized from the United States and not with our cooperation.

I am not advocating a reduction of our commitment to the defense of Europe. I am urging a change in the means by which the commitment is carried out. I am not saying that our influence in Europe should disappear. I am arguing that the only way we can maintain our influence is by reducing our formal predominance.

As for third force tendencies, it is important to distinguish the fact of a third force from its objectives. Europe as a third force -- in the sense of being powerful and active in world affairs -- is in our interest even if its internal structure does not follow our preferred prescription. Whether there is a danger that Europe pursues policies detrimental to the United States depends on Europe's ability to perceive its proper interests. The memory of its impotence and of our tutelage contribute to the illusion that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself. In the long run, this is not a reliable basis for Atlantic policy. If Europe cannot be trusted to perceive the realities of its position, American tutelage can be at best a stopgap remedy. I would even argue that the greatest incentives for irresponsibility exist when we seem anxious to assume all risks while our allies are on the sidelines free to criticize but unwilling to shoulder burdens.

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A long-range Atlantic policy will try to base itself on the following
facts:

1. A Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own foreign policy and defense will be bound to recognize (a) that there exists only one potential threat to its security and (b) that in every conceivable case this threat can be met more effectively with U. S. assistance than without it.

2. It follows that Europe must be at least as interested in an American commitment to its defense as we.

3. We do not have to "fight" for our position in Europe: there is always likely to be a substantial majority on behalf of a continued major U. S. role -- even in France.

4. There are objective limits to an anti-American European policy.

There are many people who seem to be worried about a "deal" between the Soviet Union and Europe. It is hard for me to visualize a deal between the Soviet Union and Europe which might jeopardize our interests or security and which would not jeopardize European interests and security first. What is true of Europe as a whole is even more applicable to individual European countries.

5. An erratic U. S. policy can perhaps make thoughtful Europeans doubt that integral connection between their future and ours. By itself, French policy cannot.

This suggests a policy of great restraint by the United States. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries -- which de Gaulle has already done so much to foster -- in the name of Atlanticism. To the extent that Europeans are made to face their problems in a European context they are more likely to be driven to Atlantic cooperation than the opposite. To the extent that we take the principal role in attempting to shape internal European developments we may create the impression that there is an inconsistency between Atlantic cooperation and a European evolution.

## French Isolation Would Hurt Alliance and Germany

### C. Is It in Our Interest To Isolate De Gaulle?

According to one school of thought President de Gaulle is the chief

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obstacle to European unity and Atlantic integration. Its advocates urge "isolating" de Gaulle both within NATO and in Europe. I consider this approach to be mistaken and doomed to failure. In fact, I believe that de Gaulle's policies are sometimes given impetus by our aggrieved, personal reactions to them. Like a judo artist he uses our moves to gain a leverage that his own strength does not afford. To test Allied cohesion by a formal counting of votes is misleading. Within NATO the 14 to 1 lineup against France may prevail on technical issues; it will not hold together in a prolonged political contest -- even over strategic doctrine. Within the Europe of Six, de Gaulle has never been as alone as some like to believe. And he would have even more support were he to pay lipservice to some wider conception of European unity. On the issue of East-West relations, his views without question represent the dominant trend in Europe.

The real victim of a deliberate policy to isolate de Gaulle will, in any event, not be France but the Federal Republic of Germany. France cannot be isolated without the assistance of the Federal Republic. This is why some have urged that NATO essentially rest on a "special" United States-German relationship. Such a course would mortgage the alliance as well as the Federal Republic.

A confrontation with France -- unless provoked unambiguously by France and perhaps even then -- must undermine German political life. It will split the CDU. This will in turn radicalize the other parties.

At the same time, the practical consequence of such a policy will be to exalt the relative weight of the Federal Republic both in Europe and in the alliance. This will not be healthy for the Federal Republic, for European cohesion, or for the Atlantic Alliance. If the Federal Republic becomes the senior European NATO partner, the existing -- already largely superficial -- unity in opposition to de Gaulle will disintegrate. Most European countries will be extremely uneasy about a structure in which German influence will seem to predominate. This will have profound effects when the issue of renewal of NATO comes up, especially in the Scandinavian countries and Italy.

Finally, such a course has a high probability of alienating us in the end from the Federal Republic. If the cementing of a Franco-German rift should be followed by measures of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union which causes anxiety in the Federal Republic a serious crisis in the United States -- German relations is likely. In short, I believe that the United States has a positive interest to prevent a Franco-German rupture and to encourage the Federal Republic to retain its ties to France.

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The future of the two French divisions in Germany should be considered largely from this aspect. Their removal -- unless it results from clearly demonstrable French intransigence -- will symbolize a Franco-German rupture. A reappearance of a situation in which Germany once again has only hostile neighbors will lead to serious psychological effects later on. We could easily become the target of these frustrations.

## Franco-British-German Understanding Essential

Five policy conclusions follow:

1. If France must be fought on its side for such a conflict should be clearly on its side. We should lean over backward to avoid it.

2. If France is to be fought it should be in the name of the structure of Europe and not of specific military arrangements that were developed in the early 1950's.

3. The United States has a positive interest in encouraging the closest relationship between London, Paris, and Bonn. No other road to European unity is as promising. A grouping of Britain and the Federal Republic -- which many urge -- is fragile even should we join it. There are too many differences in perspective on global problems, East-West relations and deployment for such a grouping to be anything but a temporary expedient. A Bonn-Paris axis arouses too much hostility in Washington and too much distrust in the rest of Europe. A London-Paris axis understandably would isolate Germany and might lead to separate German overtures toward the East. A Washington-Bonn grouping is likely to focus all anti-German, anti-American, and anti-nuclear sentiments against the Atlantic alliance.

4. If Franco-British-German understanding is essential, we must take care not to submerge the longterm in the immediate and to encourage the building of bridges to France instead of the opposite. The United States should do nothing to weaken further the Franco-German rapprochement. If a rift should come, it should be evident beyond doubt that it was not due to American pressures -- direct or indirect, official or unofficial. Though many American statements are formally consistent with these maxims, it would be difficult to convince most Europeans that they represent American "action" policy. In this connection I want to express my strong support, for the record, for the reported decision of President Johnson not to permit a public debate with France.

5. Whatever happens, a serious dialog at the highest level between France and the United States is essential. I recognize that some may construe such an effort as a reward for bad French behavior. But too much time has already been lost and too much is at stake. In a period of hoped-for detente with the Communist world, it should not be impossible to conduct unconditional conversations with a traditional ally. If the attempt succeeds, most Europeans would be relieved. If it fails we could face the ensuing contest with the knowledge that no effort was spared to prevent a rift which must hurt the West.

Relationship Between Power and Willingness to Play
International Role

D. How Much Integration Do We Really Want?

1. Political:

Many hold the view that the reason Europe is reluctant to play a global role is due to the inadequacy of the resources of national states. They hold that unified Europe would assume greater global responsibilities. One answer to the current crisis, therefore, is to urge more integration and to press for European unity. In the meantime, consultation and formal legal structures should promote Allied cohesion.

I think

I think this view is vastly oversimplified. The American national experience would seem to contradict the assumption of an automatic relationship between power and the willingness to play an international role. Until 1941, the United States possessed the resources but not the inclination to assume global responsibilities. Conversely many European states maintained vast overseas commitments when their resources were much smaller than they are today.

With respect to overseas involvements, the combination of decolonization and two world wars have been traumatic for the Europeans -- Great Britain partially excepted. Having been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they no longer consider that their security is directly affected by what happens in, for example, southeast Asia. Rather than run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United States looked at Europe's quarrels until 1941. And they are no more likely to be swayed by exhortations than we would have been in our period of isolation.

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[4]

Cooperation Must Balance Incentives for Responsible Policy

Even within Europe, burden-sharing provides an incentive for
responsible policy only when two conditions are met:

(1) Our allies must have the same view of the political environment as we, at least as it affects Europe.

(2) They must believe that unless they play a greater role the United States will reduce its contribution (not its commitment). Neither condition is met today. Indeed our overeager, importuning attitude with respect to the second point defeats our objectives with respect to the first.

Thus it seems high time to consider how much integration we really want. The logic of our position will create pressures for integrating ever more of our forces, including our strategic forces. And it will generate increasing demands for European participation in global decisions. This leads to the curious position where our allies at one and the same time reduce their defense contributions while pressing for increased political influence.

The consequences for overall policy are highly undesirable. In such a system policy may grow stagnant. The alliance will be able to agree only on doing nothing. Domestic pressures in most allied countries will mount. Any crisis occurring anywhere will turn immediately, automatically and organically worldwide. It is often said that World War I was caused by the absence of a functioning system of collective security. This may be true. But World War I surely illustrates the perils of alliance structures so rigid that any conflict -- however trivial -- becomes immediately and organically worldwide.

Of course, we should cooperate with Europeans wherever possible. But cooperation cannot be an end in itself. It functions best through balancing incentives for responsible policy. A multiplication of legal devices -- unsupported by a real conception of common interest -- defeats its own purpose. In the long term, excessive concentration of decision-making may deprive our allies of the incentive to act responsibly and it may open up profound fissures when a conflict of interests becomes apparent -- especially in crises outside of Europe.

2. Military integration:

As I have pointed out in my background paper, the military arrangements of NATO have had both a symbolic and a substantive aspect. Our European critics are right when they accuse us of dominating NATO planning, but they are wrong when they ascribe it to dark American designs.

[Y]

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SACEUR's role was deliberately brought about by Europeans afraid of a return to American isolation and eager to create as many tangible American ties to the Continent as possible. During the period of the American nuclear predominance our allies had an interest to commit us organically -- preferably automatically -- to their defense.

In the fifties, a dominant position for the United States seemed to our allies the best guarantee of our commitment to the defense of Europe. But many allies have used this state of affairs as an excuse to avoid difficult domestic choices. They have encouraged us to assume the burden of defense expenditures and the stress of difficult strategic decisions. Their incentive has been to provide forces large enough to induce us to maintain a maximum deployment in Europe but not so large as to create real alternatives to nuclear deterrence. Their interest has been in the symbolic, not the substantive, aspect of NATO. Some allies have been more concerned with status within the alliance than with elaborating a strategic posture on its merits.

Such a state of affairs cannot be healthy in the long run. It is unprecedented that the defense of an area so rich and potentially so powerful as Europe should in all essentials be left to a country 3,000 miles away. As a result, our allies have either abdicated from the strategic field or adopted a military posture which duplicates the categories in which we are strongest.

## Malaise of NATO is Organic

The malaise of NATO is, therefore, organic. The present system encourages too many of our allies to shift the costs and the responsibilities of the common defense to us. Exhortation will not alter this. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair; only because it is necessary. Europe will not assume a larger burden for its defense until it also shares a larger responsibility.

This suggests that it would be a great mistake to identify the future of NATO with the indefinite continuation of every detail of the existing structure. Whether a country comes to the assistance of an ally depends less on formal chains of command than on its conception of vital interests. It is primarily a political, not a military, problem.

Three principles should govern our attitudes toward the present military command structure:

(1) Integrated commands are made necessary by modern technology. This realization will govern the decisions of all those taking defense seriously.

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(2) As NATO has evolved, the symbolic functions of SACEUR are no longer so crucial as in the fifties. SACEUR should therefore concentrate on the military problem while the political and doctrinal issues should be shifted partly to the special committee, partly to the military committee. Present policy seems to be moving in this direction.

(3) The relative weight of Europe in the command structure and in the NATO organization should be increased. This is all the more important because in no other area has the dependence of Europe on the United States been so great or so prolonged. In every other field American policy has deliberately sought to reduce Europe's dependence on the United States; in the military sphere the thrust of U. S. policy has been to make our tetelage more bearable.

When the United States gave economic assistance to Europe after World War II, it tried to induce its European allies to assume responsibility for developing a joint program and a system for dividing up the total available aid. Though U. S. representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. The Atlantic alliance owes a great deal to the habits of cooperation and mutual respect developed during the Marshall Plan. In the military field, by contrast, the United States never encouraged the emergence of a specifically European point of view. It made no effort to stimulate European institutions comparable to those it fostered in the economic sphere. The Western European Union (WEU), which originally had been expected to play that role, has remained dormant. It would seem wise for the WEU to be given new vitality by charging it with carrying out the European portion of common plans as well as to define common strategic guidelines.

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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EUROPE

<u>German Ties With the West</u>

E. Policy Toward Germany

The necessity of retaining the Federal Republic as a willing member of the alliance, of keeping Germany organically tied to NATO, of meeting real or assumed German wishes is being invoked to support almost every policy in almost every country. Apart from the fact that the objective is used to justify widely contradictory policies, the formulation is highly dangerous. It creates the impression that whether the Federal Republic behaves responsibly depends entirely on the self-restraint of its government. It overlooks that integration has corresponded to basic interests of the Federal Republic and did not simply reflect individual preferences. What has kept Germany tied to the West is not a legal obligation but a wise assessment of its long-term interests.

Integration was the route to equality. It was made necessary by the trauma of defeat and the consequent horror of standing alone. It is extremely dangerous to create the impression that we must pay a yearly price to the Federal Republic lest it do something very reckless. If the United States becomes the advocate of unstated German desires and gears its policies to anticipate them, it may create illusions of choice for the Federal Republic. It is essential to take legitimate German concerns seriously. It is dangerous to act with such extraordinary nervousness for this may encourage tendencies not founded on reality. Similarly, it cannot be good for the cohesion of the alliance to keep insisting that one of its primary functions is to restrain the potential menace of one of its key members. Fifteen years of responsible policy should have earned the Federal Republic the right to have its positions accepted on their merit.

What is most urgently needed in our German policy is steadiness and reliability. Constant pressures -- however valid the requests -- must shake German self-assurance. Unending exhortations to accept the latest version of new doctrines may strain the fabric of German political life. Frequent changes of policy will use up our credit -- whatever the merit of individual measures. Trying to make Germany take the lead in an anti-French crusade will -- as already pointed out -- mortgage the future. Germany's psychological margin is far narrower than its economic one and in the long run more decisive.

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But if the United States requires compassion and respect for the political and moral dilemmas of a divided country, and if it should strain to avoid complicating its choices, this will presuppose sufficient confidence to deal with individual issues rather than their symbols.

## Observations on the Question of German Reunification

Among these, German reunification looms ever larger. I cannot do justice to this complicated problem in a statement which is already too long. Let me confine myself to a few observations.

(1) An alliance which does not treat this paramount German interest with respect and understanding will soon lose its meaning in German eyes. It is incumbent on Germany's allies to take the concern for unification seriously and to help develop responsible programs.

(2) Any such responsible program must include provisions about Germany's eastern frontiers, its military status and its renunciation of nuclear weapons. These may not be enough, but without them no serious program is possible.

(3) Whatever the program, unification will result not from one spectacular negotiation but from an extended historical process. Under present world conditions no program, however reasonable, can induce the Soviet leaders to sacrifice the East German regime. The collapse of a Communist regime would shake the Soviet hold in Eastern Europe and jeopardize its prospects in the ideological conflict with Communist China.

(4) German unity will become possible only if there is (a) a collapse of Soviet power or (b) a change in the ideological climate of the world which might make the East German regime less important for a more national Russia.

(5) A program for unification will be relevant primarily in these contingencies. It will be promising to the extent that there exists a European structure in which the significance of national frontiers is sharply reduced.

(6) It is dangerous to encourage the Federal Republic into solitary efforts on the subject of unification -- especially toward East Germany. The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position toward East Germany -- which is postulated by some -- is likely to be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German Government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at which point

- 25 -

an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced
an irreversible trend. The result is more likely to be the
indefinite continuation of two hostile, competing German states
than progress toward unification. Such an outcome would build
pressures toward a popular front into the German scene - a
popular front of a particularly virulent kind because the partner
would be not a party but a sovereign state.

(7) While progress toward German unity presupposes a
change in current East-West patterns, this change must be sought
in a framework larger than the German national one. This is
another reason why a European structure is so important and why
the United States must do nothing to undermine the building blocks
of European unity, including Franco-German friendship.

In addition to the subject of unification, it seems to me the
issue of strategic doctrine and troop deployment require confident
discussions between us and the Federal Republic.

THE NUCLEAR ISSUE: ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL SELF-INTEREST

F. The Nuclear Issue

Let me say a few words about the nuclear issue. As I have
already pointed out, the so-called hardware solution does not seem
to me fruitful. Since the problem is essentially political, the special
(McNamara) committee should be given every opportunity to work and
should be expanded to include political functions. Its task should be
to formulate common strategic doctrine and common disarmament
policy. Within its framework, the European countries could, if
they wished, for a closer association. For example, the Western
European Union might well be given responsibility for the European
contribution to joint NATO plans. As Europe gains structure, the
special committee could draw nearer to the twin pillars concept.
But, Atlantic partnership, in this approach, could become operative
even if European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and
increased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultaneously,
with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course.

If this solution fails to satisfy our allies in the long run, a
European nuclear force is preferable to the "hardware" solutions
now being proposed. Indeed, it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the
least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field,

- 26 -

competition between Europe and the United States involves, at
best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for
independent action are great and the penalties small. In military
matters -- and particularly in the nuclear field -- the closest
association between Europe and the United States is in the self-
interest of both sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is
highly improbable that our allies would prefer to go to war with
the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for
them and without the support of our necessarily preponderant
arsenal. Close coordination between Europe and the United
States in the nuclear field is dictated by self-interest; and Europe
has more to gain from it than the United States.

This is not to say that the United States should actively promote
a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States
should show more restraint in seeking to influence internal
European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic
relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek
to destroy those elements from which a European force could
emerge by pressing for alternatives -- through the so-called
hardware solution -- which will in time cause much greater
difficulties. A European nuclear force presupposes, however,
European political unity.

## CONCLUSION: LET US FIND OUR COMMON DREAMS

Gentlement of the committee, I have tried to present some
possible directions, not a detailed policy. Those who have final
responsibility are, of course, aware of nuances unavailable to
me; all of policy moreover depends on assessments which cannot
be proved correct when they are made. Needless to say, this
applies to my judgments as well.

In these days, we are aware of disagreements above all.
It is well to remember that the problems in the alliance are
essentially a luxury made possible by an increasing margin of
safety; they reflect strength and returned vigor; we can therefore
hope that they can serve as the basis of a new relationship.

Some months ago at a private conference of Europeans and
Americans, we were discussing the nuclear question when a
Frenchman said something with which I strongly agree. He
pointed out that it is futile to have the future of the alliance turn on
plans for such an apocalyptic contingency. The only way the

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Atlantic nations could come together is to find a way of dreaming
together about the kind of world they want to bring about, rather
than about the circumstances in which they might wish to blow it
up. We live in a world which, because it is revolutionary,
constantly confronts us with problems. Yet is it impossible to
create another structure, or another form of community, without
a clear conception, which we sometimes deny ourselves by our
intense preoccupation with daily crises. It is important to
remember that there are two kinds of realists; those who adapt
to reality and those who seek to shape it. The world we in the
West will build may depend less on technical discussions than on
common dreams.

BACKGROUND PAPER FOR A STATEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

Structural Changes in the Atlantic Alliance

I. <u>European Recovery</u>

The most obvious and striking factor is, of course, the recovery of
Europe. Present policies were devised when the end of America's
isolation coincided with the temporary loss of Europe's ability to play an
effective international role or to protect itself against foreign danger.
Every European country -- with the exception of Great Britain -- had
been defeated at one time or another during World War II. Every country --
again with the exception of Great Britain -- had been the victim of foreign
occupation. Societies were shattered. Europe was dependent on the United
States for its material well-being, domestic cohesion and safety from
invasion.

In such a situation it was natural that the United States should have a
dominant position. European policy consisted of trying to influence choices
essentially made in Washington. NATO discussions usually involved the
technical implementation of unilateral American strategic decisions. It was
no accident that our European allies -- with the exception of Great Britain
which possessed many unofficial contacts -- oscillated between formal
pliancy and excessive suspiciousness.

This pattern of benevolent paternalism on one side and more or less
adaptable lobbying on the other could not survive European economic recovery.
Its newfound strength has enabled Europe to express again its own view
of the world. The trend has been given impetus by the existence of an
intact young generation -- the first since the carnage of World War I.
Difficult as this adjustment is, a Europe assuming ever greater responsibility
is profoundly in our long-term interest. It represents, in fact, the
realization of the most consistent United States policy since World War II.

II. <u>The Changed Nature of the Soviet Threat</u>

Relations with the Soviet Union have changed dramatically since the
Cuban missile crisis. Most of our European Allies have reached the con-
clusion that the two main nuclear powers will avoid a direct military
confrontation for an indefinite period. This conviction has been strengthened
by the hope of some, and the suspicion of others, that bilateral United States-
Soviet dealings are prevented only by the war in Vietnam. An atmosphere

-2-

of imminent detente removes the previous urgency for Allied cohesion. As the Soviet threat appears to recede, the scope for largely national action widens proportionately. As the impression grows that bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations are sooner or later inevitable, Third Force tendencies in Europe are stimulated. In all alliance of sovereign states each country will think that it is a better judge of its own requirements than any partner, however close. While it would be a mistake to treat President de Gaulle's policies as reactions to American moves, his interpretation of the long-term trends in East-West relations and of United States policy necessarily play a role in shaping his actions.

As the detente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. The effectiveness of defense against a military threat will diminish. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them.

### III. The Process of Decolonization

The process of decolonization has also contributed to current difficulties. Freed from overseas commitments, many European countries for the first time in a generation are able to develop a specifically European role for themselves. Ironically, the end of Europe's colonial empires has led to a reversal of the traditional postwar attitudes of the United States and Europe toward many underdeveloped countries. Some European leaders are now repeating the American argument of the fifties: that the larger interests of the free world are sometimes served by allowing for differing, occasionally even competing, Western approaches to the emerging nations.

This attitude, too, was inevitable. As a result of decolonization, our European Allies have ceased to think of themselves as world powers. They possess neither the resources nor the domestic framework for distant enterprises. No European government, with the possible exception of the United Kingdom, is likely to be convinced that its security is jeopardized by events in another part of the globe.

### IV. The Strategic Problem

Underlying the malaise in the Alliance is the change in the nature of strategic relationships. When NATO was formed the United States

-3-

possessed an atomic monopoly. Soviet land forces seemed poised for an attack on Europe -- American territory was invulnerable. In these circumstances our European Allies had a high incentive to devise a structure which committed the United States organically -- and preferably automatically -- to the defense of Europe. The preferred strategy was one that guaranteed the maximum American nuclear involvement from the outset.

The result was a difference in perspective between the United States and Europe about the military purpose of NATO. From the beginning the symbolic commitment of the United States had been crucial to the Europeans; or to put it more accurately, our Allies saw the significance of the American deployment in Europe and the command structure which went with it primarily in terms of the *commitment* it created. The United States, on the other hand, judged these measures largely in terms of actual military operations. The Europeans were primarily interested in the *fact* of an American response to aggression, which to them meant primarily a nuclear response. The United States was as much concerned with the *mode* as with the *fact* of its reactions, with its options as well as with the initial decision to go to war. The United States since 1961 -- when mutual vulnerability became apparent -- has sought a "pause" if war broke out to give both sides an opportunity to "appreciate the wider risks involved." The Europeans have preferred to make our response as automatic as possible.

As long as American nuclear power was dominant this difference in perspective could be evaded. In recent years, however, the nuclear equation has basically altered. The absolute superiority of the United States in nuclear weapons may be unimpaired, but the *useful* margin has changed fundamentally. In the past, the major problem for strategists was to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary period the problem more frequently is how to make the available power relevant to objectives likely to be in dispute. Though the major nuclear powers have an unprecedented capacity to devastate their opponent, their threats to do so have only a limited credibility. This is because the ability to destroy is not related to the ability to disarm -- so that using one's nuclear arsenal indiscriminately against a major opponent guarantees only self-destruction.

This is illustrated by figures given by Secretary McNamara in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee of February 18, 1965. He gave the following estimates of possible United States fatalities given various levels of expenditure for active and passive defense:

-4-

Estimated effect of fallout protection on U.S. fatality levels for several damage limiting programs - Based on 1970 total population of 210 million

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="3">Additional investment</th><th colspan="4">Millions of U.S. fatalities</th></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Early urban attack</th><th colspan="2">Delayed urban attack</th></tr><tr><th>Partial protection</th><th>Full protection</th><th>Partial protection</th><th>Full protection</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0</td><td>149</td><td>149</td><td>122</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>$5,000,000,000</td><td>145</td><td>120</td><td>107</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>$15,000,000,000</td><td>121</td><td>96</td><td>79</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>$25,000,000,000</td><td>107</td><td>78</td><td>59</td><td>41</td></tr></tbody></table>

According to these estimates, at *any* level of expenditure -- and so far no additional expenditures for these purposes have been budgeted -- the President must count with *fatalities* amounting to a minimum of twenty per cent and perhaps ranging as high as seventy per cent of the population. No leader in history has had to conduct policy against the background of a potential catastrophe of such magnitude. In the face of such expectations, it is unrealistic to insist that the credibility of a nuclear guarantee has remained unimpaired. It *must* make a difference to the President of the United States whether no civilian casualties need be expected which was the situation in 1949 or whether the decision to go to war hazards a major part of the population. Even if his determination should remain unaffected, it may grow increasingly difficult to convince an opponent of this fact.

At the same time, while the new strategic balance affects the credibility of a nuclear response to some challenges, these issues with respect to which a nuclear guarantee does remain credible are so fundamental that Allies may feel that their actions cannot affect our decision to support them. In the fifties, our Allies believed that American support had to be purchased by acquiescence to our preferences. In the sixties and seventies this condition no longer holds. De Gaulle probably believes -- almost certainly correctly -- that in case of full scale Soviet attack on Europe we have little choice but to support him. Conviction of American reliability in the face of an ultimate challenge is thus coupled with uncertainty about lesser issues to produce the present debate in the Alliance.

-5-

Two contradictory tendencies result: Those Allies with nuclear weapons have an incentive to provide themselves with an opportunity to assess the full implications of the decision to go to nuclear war. This is the psychological origin of the "pause" theory, which was developed first by the United States in 1961 and which is also at the heart of the French disengagement from the integrated NATO commands. Yet the attempt to make the reaction dependent on the circumstances of the moment creates disquiet among those Allies who do not have the technical means to implement their judgements. They cannot know what the circumstances will be at the time of attack or how discretion will be exercised. NATO's nuclear "problem" is due to the fact that in the new strategic situation Allies have an incentive either to develop forces of their own or to try to participate effectively in the decisions of its senior partner -- to an extent inconsistent with traditional notions of sovereignty.

## V. The Internal Change in Europe

The political structure in every European country -- with the exception of Great Britain -- is in a state of transition. Personalities which dominated the formative periods of NATO are being replaced. In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union, which shaped the Federal Republic's pro-Western orientation in the fifties, is rent between an "Atlantic" and a "European" wing. The Socialists are explaining new initiatives towards East Germany while all parties are reassessing their stand on unification.

In Italy the Center-Left experiment is not yet consolidated; its ultimate direction is far from clear.

Even in France the seeming stability of the De Gaulle era is likely to be deceptive. While it is premature to predict the precise policy of De Gaulle's successor, it is safe to say that a post De Gaulle France will face internal pressures now obscured by the towering personality of one man.

On the Iberian peninsula such stability as exists may not survive two aged dictators.

American policy toward Europe must therefore take account of two contradictory trends: Europe's economic and psychological recovery and the tenuousness of this assertiveness. Many United States policies are

-6-

geared only to the first of these tendencies. The assumption seems to be
that European vitality will be permanent and that the only obstacle to
Atlantic cohesion is an excessive estimate by the Europeans of their power.

However, De Gaulle's policy may have produced an illusion of European
strength and self-confidence which is more a reflection of his personality
than of underlying factors. If one moves from Europe in the abstract to an
examination of the individual European countries, it becomes apparent
how precarious Europe's stability really is. The vigor so noticeable in
Europe today is very close in time to nihilism; European self-confidence
is still shaky. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of
insufficient strength by a neutralism which exalts impotence. To avoid
both dangers and to create a new and more vital structure is the
challenge before the Atlantic Alliance.

STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PROFESSOR OF GOVERN-
MENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTER-
NATIONAL SEMINAR, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; FACULTY
MEMBER, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman and gentleman, the current NATO
crisis was triggered by a unilateral, preemptory French demand.
But it would be wrong to conclude that the pattern of
relationships which developed after the war could have continued.
The withdrawal of France from integrated commands forced a recon-
sideration of the structure and the purpose of the Alliance which would
have been inevitable in any case—though the atmosphere was surely
worsened by France's tactics.

It is well to keep three things in mind at the outset. First, the pre-
sent crisis is a family affair. It concerns internal arrangements be-
tween closely related peoples. France is not our basic opponent in the
world; unless statesmen everywhere submerge their judgment in their
passions, there are objective limits which reality imposes on interallied
discord.

Second, the present crisis marks the end of the phase of United
States-European relationships which was ushered in by the Greek-
Turkish aid program and led through the Marshall plan to the construc-
tion of the Atlantic alliance. Nothing can restore the former state of
affairs. In many ways this should be an occasion for self-confronta-
tion rather than bitterness. Goals which seemed visionary in the late
forties have been essentially achieved. Europe has recovered its eco-
nomic strength and much political vitality. The threat of imminent
invasion no longer dominates people's minds.

Third—and somewhat contradictorily—Europe's recovery is still
tenuous. It is often assumed that European vitality will be permanent
and that the primary problem is to moderate Europe's assertiveness.
However, the vigor so noticeable in Europe today is very close in time
to nihilism; European confidence is still shaky. To avoid both the
danger of excessive nationalism and a new version of neutralism is the
challenge before the alliance.

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It would be unprecedented if a policy developed in the late forties remained valid for the seventies. The original conception of NATO was correct for the situation which then existed. I have always supported it strongly. But it no longer exhausts current challenges. What we need today is another leap of the imagination similar to that which took place two decades ago.

(The background paper appears in the appendix as item 25, p. 459.)

## SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

### A. *American Policy—The Grand Design*

The United States has supported the notion of an equal partnership between the United States and Europe. This grand design—variously symbolized by such concepts as “dumbbell” or “twin pillars”—was based on the proposition that an Atlantic partnership would enable our European allies to share our global responsibilities more equitably.

European unity has been considered by American policymakers as a prerequisite to the formation of an Atlantic Community. A politically and economically integrated Europe would become an equal partner with the United States and share with us the burdens and obligations of world leadership. To its supporters, in Europe as well as in the United States, such a partnership has seemed realizable by only one method: a politically unified Europe in close association with the United States. Similarly, a single solution has been offered for the achievement of European unity: supranational federal institutions controlled by a European parliament. American pronouncements have often played down anything less as no unity at all.

3. Integrated defense:

While the United States has advocated a twin-pillar concept in the political and economic realm, it has urged an integrated military defense. Partly this has reflected the conviction that with modern weapons, defense is invisible; partly it was due to our special responsibility in the nuclear field: Ninety-five percent of the nuclear arsenal of the alliance belongs to the United States. Only those allies on whose territory nuclear weapons are located share in their control, and then only negatively: they can prevent these weapons from being fired but they cannot make us fire them nor can they prevent us from resorting to nuclear weapons located elsewhere.

Finally, the United States has insisted on central command and control of nuclear weapons in the alliance. It has sought to meet the concerns of its allies—real or imagined—by a number of devices

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ranging from the creation of a new nuclear force (either in the form of an MLF or ANF) to the NATO Special Committee (the so-called McNamara committee). (The nuclear problem will be discussed in greater detail below.)

4. Summary and critique:

DE GAULLE'S CHALLENGE

These problems might have remained dormant for many years but for the emergence of President de Gaulle—though it is my view that they would have had to be faced sooner or later. Deliberately,brutally, often cynically exploiting American inconsistencies, President de Gaulle has proclaimed a completely different view of Atlantic re-

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B. *The Gaullist Conception*

1. Historical perspective:

President de Gaulle's brutal tactics sometimes give the impression that a powerful, self-confident France has been a permanent feature of the postwar landscape. Eventually it is all but forgotten that between 1958 and 1962 France was on the verge of civil war three times. So well has de Gaulle succeeded in his *tour de force* that his critics act as if the only problem for Europe were to moderate excesses of French assertiveness—a notion which, as I have said, would have been inconceivable 5 years ago. Thus, in a certain sense de Gaulle's objective may well be pedagogical: to teach his country and his continent attitudes of independence and self-reliance. This, in my view, is an act of historical importance wholly consistent with American long-range interests—however abrupt and annoying the methods by which it comes about.

2. Substantive views:

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Gaulle believes that countries without direct responsibility for their defense will not make the necessary effort over a period of time. This will lead, in his view, to a growing sense of impotence and dependence on the United States. Where the United States believes in obsolescence of the nation-state, de Gaulle passionately affirms its continued role. Where the United States and many Europeans want to construct a united Europe by way of federal institutions, de Gaulle bases his notion of Europe on agreement among governments. Where the United States tends to equate unity with formal, legal commitments, de Gaulle emphasizes the nation of interest and equilibrium. He insists on autonomy in nuclear matters; recently he has come close to affirming freedom of action across the whole spectrum of defense. Once an advocate of autonomous, if confederated, Europe he seems to have become disillusioned by the possibilities of Franco-German cooperation which would be essential to such a scheme and for the failure of which many French officials blame American pressures. He has, therefore, resurrected the first hints of the classic Russo-French understanding. Whatever his motive, de Gaulle has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe to holding out a vision of the unity of all of Europe. He has made himself the spokesman for a relaxation of East-West tensions.

### 3. Summary and critique:

De Gaulle's abrupt and unilateral tactics often tempt his opponents to absorb their energies in dealing with the symptoms to the neglect of the deeper challenge. Whatever we may think of his answers, he has posed questions which the West will not be able to avoid answering. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others it must first mean something to itself. It would be wrong, moreover, to picture de Gaulle as totally isolated.

Where we place great stress on legal commitments he emphasizes the notion of interest and equilibrium. He believes in autonomy in nuclear matters and, perhaps, on the whole spectrum of defense. He has moved from advocating the unity of Western Europe for a vision of unity of all Europe.

Many Europeans support his views—especially on NATO questions and East-West relations—though they are too used to the old pattern to say so openly.

It seems to me that he is not nearly as isolated in Europe as one is sometimes led to believe. Some of his critics oppose him for reasons of domestic not of foreign policy; the recent actions of his challenger in the presidential election—Mitterand—illustrate this point. Others affirm a version of Atlanticism that comes close to shifting all responsibility to us. It is possible to argue that but for de Gaulle the previous pattern might have continued; now it cannot be restored even after de Gaulle's departure.

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At the same time de Gaulle's imperious style explains why he has often thwarted his own aims. Man is not governed by reason alone. History may appear inevitable in retrospect; but it is made by men who cannot always distinguish their emotion from their analysis. De Gaulle's wounding insistence on intellectual submission to his maxims and his rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has antagonized even those who share his aspiration for greater European autonomy. His tactics create the impression that he desires autonomy not to enhance the unity of the West but to enable him to pursue policies contradictory, if not hostile, to those of the United States. Great men build truly only if they remember that their achievement must be maintained by the less gifted individuals who are likely to follow them. A structure which can be preserved only if there is a great man in each generation is inherently fragile. This may be the nemesis of de Gaulle's success.

### C. *The Problem of Germany*

The real victims of the current split in the Atlantic Alliance has been the Federal Republic of Germany. Urged by France to pursue a "European" course and by the United States toward "Atlantic" conceptions, advised to seek unity now by firmness, now by conciliation, pressed to meet balance-of-payments costs, the pillar of everybody's construction and the worry of many, the Federal Republic stands in danger of losing the precarious stability which it has so painfully and so responsibly developed since the war.

For the seeming balance and solidity of postwar Germany—which causes it to be the object of constant wooing—is highly deceptive. Every German over 55—and this includes almost all leaders—has lived through three revolutions. He has known four different regimes each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has seen Germany lose two World Wars and experience two catastrophic inflations. Every German over 40 has lived through the Nazi period, World War II, and the postwar collapse. Germany has suffered too many breaks in historical continuity and too many shocks to sustain prolonged pressure. Great national prosperity has developed at the same time that national, political, and territorial integrity has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity of German leadership groups, the legalism of whose policy prescriptions often hides a lack of inner assurance.

This sense of insecurity is absolutely central. The dominant German desire is to escape the burden of difficult choices. The German nightmare is a reappearance of the historical isolation which for almost its entire national history has forced Germany to confront hostility on all its borders, East and West. If this situation reappears German worries could take dramatic form. If the Federal Republic becomes the focal point of all European and Atlantic tensions, German frustrations are likely to turn on the seeming cause of its isolation. It is essential that we do not find ourselves in that position. This—not the nuclear issue—is in my view the real German "problem."

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Republic cannot be satisfied with the territorial status quo. Any foreseeable German Government—regardless of party—will have as one of its paramount objectives the reunification of the German people. Until 1961, it was assumed that this goal could be achieved by even closer integration within the Atlantic alliance. The Berlin wall shattered these hopes. It is clear that however German unity comes about—if ever—it will be under conditions other than a movement of the frontiers of NATO toward the East. It has become apparent that the slogans of the fifties no longer fully apply causing all German political parties to grope for “new approaches” to a problem which in the present world constellation may be insoluable and whose intractability may further mortgage German political life. I will say more about this later.

The unsettling effect of these developments causes efforts to relax East-West tensions to take on a special significance in Germany. German leaders welcome relief from pressures on them; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation become frozen, too. They make a distinction between “peripheral” settlements which they welcome and “central” agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. This explains the extremely unsettling effect the negotiations on nonproliferation have had on many German political leaders.

In short, the Federal Republic finds itself in an extremely difficult situation. France threatens to withdraw its troops over the principle of integration; Britain and the United States indicate that they might reduce theirs unless the Federal Republic eases their balance-of-payments problem. The Soviet Union has cast the Federal Republic in the position of the international villain. Even within the Western alliance a potential “threat” from the Federal Republic is often invoked to justify schemes—from MLF to enhanced integration.

Many of these difficulties are insoluble at least in the short run. Many are outside American control. But the volatility of the situation does impose on American policy requirements for very great circumspection. The insecurity of German leaders and their desire to be good allies cause them to go along with American proposals not necessarily because they want them but because they believe it is expected

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of them. But this does not mean that the Federal Republic can sus-
tain the consequences of all such actions. A break with France which
can be ascribed to American pressure could easily backfire on us. And
I am bound to say that American actions in recent years have already
placed us into a precarious position in this respect. Overtures toward
East Germany encouraged in the belief that they offer a possibility
of reunification could easily generate a frustrated nationalism if it
turns out that they cement the partition of Germany rather than
alleviate it. What the Federal Republic needs above all is solid,
reliable, steady allies. What it cannot stand is to be the focal point
of all pressures. It would be tragic if Germany whose national
disasters in this century were caused in part by the attempt to conduct
an isolated policy in the center of the European Continent, now came
to grief because it tried to be too responsive to allies whose conflicts
strain its internal political structure. To be sure, President de Gaulle
bears a heavy responsibility for this state of affairs. But if we com-
pound his abruptness with our outrage history will not excuse the in-
adequacy of the response by the magnitude of the challenge.

“HARDWARE” SOLUTION TO NUCLEAR PROBLEM

D. *The nuclear problem*

Let me now turn to the nuclear problem. In recent years, the so-
called nuclear "problem" has been at the center of the NATO debate.
Until President Johnson called off intense pressures on its behalf—
in my view wisely—the MLF was pushed as America's principal
answer to the Gaullist challenge. The MLF is no longer actively
pursued; but the belief that NATO's problems could be eased by a
new nuclear force under alliance ownership and control dies hard.
It therefore may require a few words here.

I have always been extremely skeptical of the so-called hardware
solution for the following reasons:

1. If the analysis in my background paper, which I am submitting to this committee, is even partly correct, the basic problem before the alliance is political not military. It derives from the need to adjust European-American and East-West relations to new conditions. Even the nuclear issue is not technical but political; its "solution"— insofar as it has one—depends on the ability of an alliance composed of sovereign states to develop the confidence which will enable it to act in common in the face of a technology of unprecedented destruction.

2. It was a mistake to attempt to gear NATO policy to the projection of unstated German wishes. No significant demand for possession of nuclear weapons existed in Germany when the MLF was first proposed. Outside very restricted official circles, no significant backing exists for other "hardware" solutions. Even after 3 years of discussion and pressure only a small number of German officials—and no other public figures—are committed to the "hardware solution."

3. The nuclear control issue is not “solved” by any of the “hardware” solutions now being discussed nor can it be by any adaptation of them. If any of the common ownership schemes so far proposed were accepted the situation would be as follows:

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(a) No country presently unable to go to nuclear war will be enabled to do so as a result of the "hardware solution"—the existing vetoes would remain.

(c) No country presently unable to go to nuclear war can force its nuclear ally to go to nuclear war as the result of a "hardware" solution.
I do not believe that this can remain a permanent state of affairs if heavy financial expenditures are involved.

4. The nuclear issue diverts attention from the cardinal problem of political cooperation to an inherently divisive issue with respect to which formal pronouncements are likely to be highly misleading. Nuclear war—if it should occur—will come only at the end of a long diplomatic process and will involve the national survival of all participants. It seems contradictory to try to integrate nuclear strategy while leaving the process of diplomacy which precedes it bilateral. If a coordinated diplomacy can be achieved the problem of who presses the button will seem less crucial. If political confidence and cooperation cannot be developed, theoretical voting formulas for entering nuclear war will prove empty. No country will let itself be voted into nuclear war against its better judgment. No one can seriously believe that a U.S. President would risk hundreds of millions of lives after being outvoted in a committee—after, in short, having decided that nuclear war was not in the American interest. And the same is true of other countries. The primary guarantee for our allies is a harmonization of political objectives so that the conception of vital interests of various allies is virtually indistinguishable. If we and our allies see our vital interests the same way, the nuclear control issue will be well on its way to a "solution." If we cannot achieve such a consensus, physical possession of a small jointly owned force will be irrelevant. As will be discussed below, the major thrust of American policy should be to strengthen political consultation and for this the special committee (the McNamara committee) seems at present the best forum available.

## WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

The French challenge has raised a whole host of logistic, legal, and technical problems which inevitably absorb much of the immediate attention. I will here try to sketch some of the long-term goals which I believe should guide U.S. policy. Not all of them are inconsistent with existing U.S. policy; many of them in fact reflect American ob-

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jectives. I will state my views partly in the form of answers to ques-
tions, partly under various policy headings.

Though I deplore the methods of President de Gaulle, I have always
been prepared to grant his historic importance. A greater degree of
political and military autonomy for Europe is essential for the cohesion
of the West and in our long-term interest. Though this proposition
will be granted in the abstract, there is a tendency to resist independ-
ence when it takes the form of challenging our judgments. Neverthe-
less, it is essential that we adjust the pattern of relationships which
grew up after the war. Though historically we are the children of
Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution we are somewhat in the
position of a father toward a grownup son. He can always take the
attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to con-
trol all the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances
in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate
request will ever go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the
son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality—a process to which no nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of Europeans self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is important for us as well.

Some critics of American policy argue that the attempt to play a
role simultaneously in every part of the globe is beyond our physical
resources. Without going into that argument it seems to me clearly be-
yond our psychological resources. If we insist on assuming the princi-
pal responsibility for every square mile of territory at every moment of
time, we will tear ourselves to pieces inwardly. The continent closest
to us culturally, with similar political traditions and substantial eco-
nomic resources should—for our sake as well as its own—assume a
greater responsibility for its policy and defense. It is neither in our
interest nor that of Europe that Europe become the Greece to our
Rome—a political backwater, interesting culturally but unable to play
an active role. This would not be healthy for us because hegemony
is demoralizing in the long run.

Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight
to discipline our occasional impetuosity and to supply historical per-
spective to our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions. The day
will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a
blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have
foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look
like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more pre-
dictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be
discouraged. It is not always the least responsible allies that wish
to reserve some measure of control over their destiny. Some of those
most eager to have us assume all responsibility may do so for reasons
which are not too comforting in the long run; they may be only too
eager to shift all risks and burden to our shoulders. Little would be
gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength by a neutral-
ism masquerading as Atlanticism.

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B. *Do We Need To Fear a Third Force?*

Many would grant the need for a greater European role in the abstract. However, they tend to argue that this will have to await the unification of Europe on a Federal basis. There exists also a certain ambivalence: the desirability of a united Europe is affirmed, but there is also a fear lest it pursue "third force" tendencies. The seeming dilemma is often solved by a call for American leadership. Some invoke the "heroic" days of the creation of the Marshall plan as a model for current American attitudes.

ENCOURAGE EUROPEAN SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

As for third force tendencies, it is important to distinguish the fact of a third force from its objectives. Europe as a third force—in the sense of being powerful and active in world affairs—is in our interest even if its internal structure does not follow our preferred prescription. Whether there is a danger that Europe pursues policies detrimental to the United States depends on Europe's ability to perceive its proper interests. The memory of its impotence and of our tutelage contribute to the illusion that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself. In the long run, this is not a reliable basis for Atlantic policy. If Europe cannot be trusted to perceive the realities of its position, American tutelage can be at best a stopgap remedy. I would even argue that the greatest incentives for irresponsibility exists when we seem anxious to assume all risks while our allies are on the sidelines free to criticize but unwilling to shoulder burdens.

1. A Europe assuming greater responsibility for its own foreign policy and defense will be bound to recognize (a) that there exists only one potential threat to its security and (b) that in every conceivable case this threat can be met more effectively with U.S. assistance than without it.

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3. We do not have to "fight" for our position in Europe: there is always likely to be a substantial majority on behalf of a continued major U.S. role—even in France.

5. An erratic U.S. policy can perhaps make thoughtful Europeans doubt that integral connection between their future and ours. By itself, French policy cannot.

This suggests a policy of great restraint by the United States. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries—which de Gaulle has already done so much to foster—in the name of Atlanticism. To the extent that Europeans are made to face their problems in a European context they are more likely to be driven to Atlantic cooperation than the opposite. To the extent that we take the principal role in attempting to shape internal European developments we may create the impression that there is an inconsistency between Atlantic cooperation and a European evolution.

## FRENCH ISOLATION WOULD HURT ALLIANCE AND GERMANY

According to one school of thought President de Gaulle is the chief obstacle to European unity and Atlantic integration. Its advocates urge "isolating" de Gaulle both within NATO and in Europe. I consider this approach to be mistaken and doomed to failure. In fact, I believe that de Gaulle's policies are sometimes given impetus by our aggrieved, personal reactions to them. Like a judo artist he uses our moves to gain a leverage that his own strength does not afford. To test Allied cohesion by a formal counting of votes is misleading. Within NATO the 14 to 1 lineup against France may prevail on technical issues; it will not hold together in a prolonged political contest—even over strategic doctrine. Within the Europe of Six, de Gaulle has never been as alone as some like to believe. And he would have even more support were he to pay lipservice to some wider conception of European unity. On the issue of East-West relations, his views without question represent the dominant trend in Europe.

A confrontation with France—unless provoked unambiguously by France and perhaps even then—must undermine German political life. It will split the CDU. This will in turn radicalize the other parties.

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and in the alliance. This will not be healthy for the Federal Republic, for European cohesion, or for the Atlantic Alliance. If the Federal Republic becomes the senior European NATO partner, the existing—already largely superficial—unity in opposition to de Gaulle will disintegrate. Most European countries will be extremely uneasy about a structure in which German influence will seem to predominate. This will have profound effects when the issue of renewal of NATO comes up, especially in the Scandinavian countries and Italy.

Finally, such a course has a high probability of alienating us in the end from the Federal Republic. If the cementing of a Franco-German rift should be followed by measures of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union which causes anxiety in the Federal Republic a serious crisis in United States-German relations is likely. In short, I believe that the United States has a positive interest to prevent a Franco-German rupture and to encourage the Federal Republic to retain its ties to France.

The future of the two French divisions in Germany should be considered largely from this aspect. Their removal—unless it results from clearly demonstrable French intransigence—will symbolize a Franco-German rupture. A reappearance of a situation in which Germany once again has only hostile neighbors will lead to serious psychological effects later on. We could easily become the target of these frustrations.

FRANCO-BRITISH-GERMAN UNDERSTANDING ESSENTIAL

3. The United States has a positive interest in encouraging the closest relationship between London, Paris, and Bonn. No other road to European unity is as promising. A grouping of Britain and the Federal Republic—which many urge—is fragile even should we join it. There are too many differences in perspective on global problems, East-West relations and deployment for such a grouping to be anything but a temporary expedient. A Bonn-Paris axis arouses too much hostility in Washington and too much distrust in the rest of Europe. A London-Paris axis understandably would isolate Germany and might lead to separate German overtures toward the East. A Washington-Bonn grouping is likely to focus all anti-German, anti-American, and antinuclear sentiments against the Atlantic alliance.

4. If Franco-British-German understanding is essential, we must take care not to submerge the longterm in the immediate and to encourage the building of bridges to France instead of the opposite. The United States should do nothing to weaken further the Franco-German rapprochement. If a rift should come, it should be evident beyond doubt that it was not due to American pressures—direct or indirect, official or unofficial. Though many American statements are formally consistent with these maxims, it would be difficult to convince most Europeans that they represent American "action" policy.

[k]

5. Whatever happens, a serious dialog at the highest level between France and the United States is essential. I recognize that some may construe such an effort as a reward for bad French behavior. But too much time has already been lost and too much is at stake. In a period of hoped-for detente with the Communist world, it should not be impossible to conduct unconditional conversations with a traditional ally. If the attempts succeeds, most Europeans would be relieved. If it fails we could face the ensuing contest with the knowledge that no effort was spared to prevent a rift which must hurt the West.

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POWER AND WILLINGNESS TO PLAY INTERNATIONAL ROLE

### *D. How Much Integration Do We Really Want?*

#### 1. Political:

With respect to overseas involvements, the combination of decolonization and two world wars have been traumatic for the Europeans—Great Britain partially excepted. Having been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they no longer consider that their security is directly affected by what happens in, for example, south-east Asia. Rather than run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United States looked at Europe's quarrels until 1941. And they are no more likely to be swayed by exhortations than we would have been in our period of isolation.

#### COOPERATION MUST BALANCE INCENTIVES FOR RESPONSIBLE POLICY

65-625-66-10

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The consequences for overall policy are highly undesirable. In such a system policy may grow stagnant. The alliance will be able to agree only on doing nothing. Domestic pressures in most allied countries will mount. Any crisis occurring anywhere will turn immediately, automatically and organically worldwide. It is often said that World War I was caused by the absence of a functioning system of collective security. This may be true. But World War I surely illustrates the perils of alliance structures so rigid that any conflict—however trivial—becomes immediately and organically worldwide.

Of course, we should cooperate with Europeans wherever possible. But cooperation cannot be an end in itself. It functions best through balancing incentives for responsible policy. A multiplication of legal devices— unsupported by a real conception of common interest—defeats its own purpose. In the long term excessive concentration of decisionmaking may deprive our allies of the incentive to act responsibly and it may open up profound fissures when a conflict of interests becomes apparent—especially in crises outside of Europe.

## 2. Military integration:

As I have pointed out in my background paper the military arrangements of NATO have had both a symbolic and a substantive aspect. Our European critics are right when they accuse us of dominating NATO planning, but they are wrong when they ascribe it to dark American designs. SACEUR's role was deliberately brought about by Europeans afraid of a return to American isolationism and eager to create as many tangible American ties to the Continent as possible. During the period of the American nuclear predominance our allies had an interest to commit us organically—preferably automatically—to their defense.

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Such a state of affairs cannot be healthy in the long run. It is un-
precedented that the defense of an area so rich and potentially so
powerful as Europe should in all essentials be left to a country 3,000
miles away. As a result, our allies have either abdicated from the
strategic field or adopted a military posture which duplicates the
categories in which we are strongest.

MALAISE OF NATO IS ORGANIC

The malaise of NATO is, therefore, organic. The present system
encourages too many of our allies to shift the costs and the respon-
sibilities of the common defense to us. Exhortation will not alter this.
Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair; only because it is
necessary. Europe will not assume a larger burden for its defense
until it also shares a larger responsibility.

(3) The relative weight of Europe in the command structure and in the NATO organization should be increased. This is all the more important because in no other area has the dependence of Europe on the United States been so great or so prolonged. In every other field American policy has deliberately sought to reduce Europe's dependence on the United States; in the military sphere the thrust of U.S. policy has been to make our tutelage more bearable.

When the United States gave economic assistance to Europe after World War II, it tried to induce its European allies to assume responsibility for developing a joint program and a system for dividing up the total available aid. Though U.S. representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. The Atlantic alliance owes a great deal to the habits of cooperation and mutual respect developed during the Marshall plan. In the military field, by contrast, the United States never encouraged the emergence of a specifically European point of view. It made no effort to stimulate European institutions comparable to those it fostered in the economic sphere. The Western European Union (WEU), which originally had been expected to play that role, has remained dormant. It would seem wise for the WEU to be given new vitality by charging it with carrying out the European portion of common plans as well as to define common strategic guidelines.

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## GERMAN TIES WITH THE WEST

### *E. Policy Toward Germany*

What is most urgently needed in our German policy is steadiness and reliability. Constant pressures—however valid the requests—must shake German self-assurance. Unending exhortations to accept the latest version of new doctrines may strain the fabric of German political life. Frequent changes of policy will use up our credit—whatever the merit of individual measures. Trying to make Germany take the lead in an anti-French crusade will—as already pointed out—mortgage the future. Germany's psychological margin is far narrower than its economic one and in the long run more decisive.

### OBSERVATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION

1. An alliance which does not treat this paramount German interest with respect and understanding will soon lose its meaning in German eyes. It is incumbent on Germany's allies to take the concern for unification seriously and to help develop responsible programs.

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(6) It is dangerous to encourage the Federal Republic into solitary efforts on the subject of unification—especially toward East Germany. The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position toward East Germany—which is postulated by some—is likely to be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German Government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at which point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. The result is more likely to be the indefinite continuation of two hostile, competing German states than progress toward unification. Such an outcome would build pressures toward a popular front into the German scene—a popular front of a particularly virulent kind because the partner would be not a party but a sovereign state.

F. *The Nuclear Issue*

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to formulate common strategic doctrine and common disarmament policy. Within its framework, the European countries could, if they wished, for a closer association. For example, the Western European Union might well be given responsibility for the European contribution to joint NATO plans. As Europe gains structure, the special committee could draw nearer to the twin pillars concept. But Atlantic partnership, in this approach, could become operative even if European unity were delayed. Atlantic partnership and increased European cohesion thus could be pursued simultaneously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to either course.

If this solution fails to satisfy our allies in the long run, a European nuclear force is preferable to the "hardware" solutions now being proposed. Indeed, it is likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States involves, at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military matters—and particularly in the nuclear field—the closest association between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of both sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is highly improbable that our allies would prefer to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and without the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal. Close coordination between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by self-interest; and Europe has more to gain from it than the United States.

This is not to say that the United States should actively promote a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should show more restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for alternatives—through the so-called hardware solution—which will in time cause much greater difficulties. A European nuclear force supposes, however, European political unity.

Gentlemen of the committee, I have tried to present some possible directions, not a detailed policy. Those who have final responsibility are, of course, aware of nuances unavailable to me; all of policy moreover depends on assessments which cannot be proved correct when they are made. Needless to say, this applies to my judgments as well.

In these days we are aware of disagreements above all. It is well to remember that the problems in the alliance are essentially a luxury made possible by an increasing margin of safety; they reflect strength and returned vigor; we can therefore hope that they can serve as the basis of a new relationship.

Some months ago at a private conference of Europeans and Americans we were discussing the nuclear question when a Frenchman said something with which I strongly agree. He pointed out that it is futile to have the future of the alliance turn on plans for such an apocalyptic contingency. The only way the Atlantic nations could come together is to find a way of dreaming together about the kind of

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world they want to bring about, rather than about the circumstances in which they might wish to blow it up. We live in a world which, because it is revolutionary, constantly confronts us with problems. Yet it is impossible to create another structure, or another form of community, without a clear conception, which we sometimes deny ourselves by our intense preoccupation with daily crises. It is important to remember that there are two kinds of realists: those who adapt to reality and those who seek to shape it. The world we in the West will build may depend less on technical discussions than on common dreams.

## PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESOURCES LIMIT U.S. OVERSEAS INVOLVEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. That was a very interesting statement. I wonder if I might begin my questions by asking you to elaborate on that part of your written statement in which you say, "Some critics of American policy argue that the attempt to play a role simultaneously in every part of the globe is beyond our physical resources. It seems to me clearly beyond our psychological resources," and so on.

I wonder if you would expand that idea a bit because this problem recurs not only in NATO, but in the Far East, Latin America, and elsewhere. It does seem that we have a major interest in nearly every part of the world, and if I understand the administration's position, they believe this interest is essential.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that we do have interests in every part of the world, but I do not believe that we can be the principal protectors of all these interests everywhere simultaneously.

It is beyond the ability of any government, to handle with wisdom and perspective crises in many parts of the world simultaneously. If all decisions everywhere on the globe finally come back to Washington the psychological strain on our decisionmaking apparatus and on our leadership will be too great over a period of time.

The most difficult problem in foreign policy in any event is to prevent the immediate symptoms of a crisis from submerging the long-term perspective. If we are the country that must make all the decisions everywhere at every moment of time, this will be more than we can bear. We can certainly do it over a few years, we cannot do it indefinitely.

There are many parts of the globe where we have no choice. If the alternative, where vital interests are concerned, is to do nothing or doing it ourselves we will have to assume the responsibility. But in Europe, there are the economic, political, and psychological resources for a more autonomous policy.

Secondly, we have found within our own society that pluralism adds to the vitality of institutions. I think we would benefit from the existence of closely related countries, whom we *must* take seriously not because of an act of friendship on our part but because of their special weight.

Thirdly, when I look ahead, it would seem to me that it cannot be in our interests to bring about a situation in which institutionally any crisis everywhere is organically extended to Europe, and Europe can be used as a hostage for all the crises that may arise in the world. But

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my deepest concern is what will happen to our own society if we try to
maintain a hegemonial role in the world.

## DE GAULLE Fears AMERICAN HEGEMONY

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand General de Gaulle, he agrees with this view. The theme running through his statements is America's attempt to establish hegemony over Europe. Is this correct, in your view?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that the question that de Gaulle has put is essentially correct. I do not agree with the answer he has given because it seems to emphasize the national components, too much. I do not think Europe can be built on the basis of the nationalist state.

Some of our people believe that whether a country exercises hegemony or not depends on its intentions. I do not know anybody in Washington who wishes to exercise hegemony. But it has happened often enough in history that a country, despite its intentions, was driven into a position which had that practical consequence. I believe that our bias for technical solutions, our physical predominance, our optimism, our impetuosity, many good qualities in the American character, sometimes have the practical result of bringing about the situation that worries me.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree. In many cases this situation arises not from governmental action, but from the actions of private businesses which add to political and public activities. This has been especially true in Western Europe, has it not?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am really not very well prepared to speak about economic questions.

The CHAIRMAN. The objection of the French to our big private corporations purchasing their corporations, particularly in the electronics and motors fields has been widely publicized. We hear some of the same complaints from the Canadians.

Dr. KISSINGER. It is a criticism which I have often heard in Europe which I am, however, not personally capable of judging.

If I may add one point to my previous statements, sometimes our predominance is encouraged by the Europeans, and is not only due to our actions.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. It was thought at one time that we were doing the Europeans a favor by investing in Europe—I mean during the period of the dollar gap we believed that we were doing them a favor. We now believe this to be true in the underdeveloped countries.

Our Government policy has changed, and yet because of private profit motives many private U.S. corporations persist in purchasing European ones. There is nothing illegal about this—they are not doing anything intentionally bad. This practice is in accord with what you said—that very often there is no intention to dominate, but our acts have that effect.

## DE GAULLE AND THE FUTURE OF NATO

Coming now more specifically to de Gaulle, you have outlined a very appealing attitude. Specifically what can we do, if anything, particularly in the Senate, by way of advising our Government? It

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looks as if we are trying to pursue the goal of reestablishing the NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and then more or less to proceed without France. I gather you have great reservations about the policy we are presently pursuing; is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have reservations about the enthusiasm with which some people pursue policies that may be imposed on us. Of course, we cannot let France paralyze the essential business of NATO, and it will be necessary on some issues, to proceed without France. I doubt, however, that this 14 to 1 lineup can be sustained over a long period of time and on many issues. If one examines the attitude of the individual countries, one will find that this is not going to stick.

My policy would be to make every effort to build bridges to France rather than to make efforts to emphasize its isolation.

Let us take the concrete issue of French troops in Germany. I would not be worried whether the label by which they stay is called integration, coordination, or some third term. I do not think that the details of the command structure are as important as the political realities that follow from a withdrawal of French troops. I am glad that President Johnson has stopped some of the utterances that were made against France.

Also there is an impression in Europe, that despite official statements to the contrary, we are encouraging anti-French behavior, particularly in Germany.

To the extent that these impressions are justified, it is a wrong policy, and to the extent that these impressions are unjustified we should do everything in our power to remove them.

ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF SACEUR

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up, but I want to ask a final question about SACEUR. Some of the previous witnesses have seemed to think that the retention of SACEUR, more or less as at present is essential to any kind of alliance. Would you expand about SACEUR's origin and the importance to Europeans of SACEUR in keeping us involved in Europe?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, in the early 1950's, when we first committed ourselves to the defense of Europe, the Europeans, remembering their own historical experience with alliances, wanted something more tangible than a formal American guarantee. They, therefore, wanted, and were very reassured to have, an American general in charge of the military defense of Europe.

As things developed the Europeans began to look more and more toward SACEUR as their spokesman in Washington. This produced a tendency for SACEUR to become the 16th NATO government. It encouraged the curious situation where an American general in Europe was trusted by many Europeans more than the President in Washington.

Now, I believe that in the 1960's this situation should be altered. An integrated defense is still necessary, and SACEUR should carry out the military functions of his office. But the political functions should be transferred to other institutions. The military commander should concentrate on the military functions of the defense, largely on

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the central front, and should gradually be phased out of the symbolic
and political aspects.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

GIVE EUROPEANS GREATER RESPONSIBILITY

Senator SPARKMAN. Dr. Kissinger, I first want to compliment you on a very fine and very interesting statement dealing with a series of very complex problems.

I am impressed by what you said about reforming NATO, if I understand it correctly, so as to give additional responsibilities to the European countries, and by your statement that they will accept a greater carrying load if they are given additional responsibilities. This is correct, is it not?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. But we may have to throw them in the water to make them swim.

Senator SPARKMAN. How do you suggest that they might be induced to accept additional responsibilities and additional burdens?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, we are in the curious position now of sometimes seeming to plead for the privilege of assuming the burdens and responsibilities. I differ from some of the views you have heard in that I am less worried about excessive European assertiveness than about an excessive European willingness to let us carry the whole load. Therefore, irritating as I, too, find President de Gaulle, I doubt that we will benefit if he is defeated by a coalition of all those who would like to abdicate from the international scene and leave all the tough choices to us.

Our policy should be to encourage those in Europe who do want to assume a larger responsibility on the assumption that if Europeans think seriously about their defense, and about their political interests, they ought to be driven to similar conclusions as we are. There is no reason to think we understand their interests better than they do.

Therefore, I would like to see institutions created which will enable the Europeans to assume a greater responsibility.

Let me illustrate it by the experience of the Marshall plan, and the difference between the Marshall plan and the present military command.

In the Marshall plan we made aid available, but we left the development of the programs and the allocation of the resources essentially up to European institutions with American advice, but with European predominance.

In the military field this role was always reversed. Every strategic doctrine that has existed in the Alliance has come down from the Pentagon, and the Europeans have been confined essentially to discussing technical implementation of our conceptions.

Therefore, there has never developed a specifically European point of view.

My attitude on the military issue would be that our margin of safety is greater than that of Europe. We have a greater choice of doctrine than they. We need not fear their autonomy. Therefore, I would put greater responsibility on the Europeans, perhaps through the Western European Union or some other institutions yet to be created, and have us move into the second line.

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## AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE

Senator SPARKMAN. Would a reduction of our Armed Forces in Europe have the effect that you desire?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, Senator, with respect to our forces in Europe we are, in the difficult position that we have over the last 10 years changed our strategic doctrine four times. For people whose survival depends on our assessments of the situation, it does not matter which version is right. The mere fact of frequent change produces insecurity.

It is less than 3 years that we were advising the Europeans that an increase in conventional forces, including American conventional forces, was essential, and that their security would be jeopardized unless these conventional forces were increased. I did not agree with this view at that time, but now we must keep in mind the political consequences of changing our minds again.

Secondly, the American forces in Europe perform also a symbolic function, and we must take care that a withdrawal is not interpreted as a reduction of the American interest in Europe.

Thirdly, these forces should not be reduced as a result of unilateral American budgetary decisions.

With all these qualifications, I would nevertheless, regret it if confidence in America came to depend on one particular force level. If I had to make a prediction, it seems to me extremely unlikely that 10 years from now the present deployment will still be in Europe. It is important, however, that any changes that do occur result from serious conversations with our allies about the substance of the common defense effort rather than from budgetary decisions made unilaterally in the United States.

## EXTENT AND METHODS OF NATO REFORM—REMOVAL OF FORCES AND HEADQUARTERS

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you think that NATO could have been reformed without France breaking away?

Dr. KISSINGER. Senator, I would like to believe that a reform could have been carried out without the brutal tactics that were employed.

I also believe that some of the things, such as expelling headquarters and American forces from France, go far beyond the requirements of the situation.

On the other hand, I sometimes have the unhappy feeling that short of confronting us with a crisis, it may be very difficult to get a serious dialog started. I fear there may be a tendency sometimes to be willing to talk about our conception but not about alternative conceptions.

But I do believe that the French tactics went too far. Certain shock tactics probably were necessary, but I think de Gaulle went much too far.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you have left the headquarters in Paris?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, there are two headquarters. There are the military headquarters which were kicked out. My criticism of the abrupt tactics applied to French tactics, not to American tactics.

Senator SPARKMAN. What about the removal of forces? I am asking because de Gaulle gave notice that they had to be out by a certain date.

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Dr. KISSINGER. I agree with our moving our forces. I disagree with the methods that de Gaulle used to make us to move our forces. As to the military headquarters, we were asked to move it. The location of the political headquarters—the so-called NATO Council—is now being discussed. My view would be that it is difficult to leave the political headquarters in Paris when the military headquarters have been ejected. But tactically it would be better if the political headquarters were moved not under American leadership but under the leadership of the Europeans. I do not think we need to be in the forefront of that kind of countermove.

## REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY: THE GOAL MUST BE MAINTAINED

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask you a question with reference to Germany. Do you believe that reunification of Germany is essential for Germany to be strong, or are we going to have to learn to live with two Germanys?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it would be easier for us to live with two Germanys than for the Germans to live with two Germanys.

Senator SPARKMAN. I meant to live with generally—not just for our country to live with.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I have to give you a somewhat unsatisfactory answer. If I have to predict whether Germany will be unified, I will have to say that under present world conditions I cannot conceive of any program or any set of circumstances to bring it about. I see nothing that we can offer the Soviet Union that will induce it to permit Germany to be unified.

I can conceive a historic evolution in which national frontiers in Europe become less significant, in which the East European States become less ideological and, therefore, this particular salient of the Communist world in the West becomes less crucial. This I can conceive, but not as the result of one specific negotiation and not in the present constellation of the world.

On the other hand, the difficulty is that within Germany no political leader can accept the continued division of his country, and every political leader of every political party has felt obliged to hold out some hope of unification.

It seems to me the big problem in Germany now is to move public opinion and leadership from the view that reunification would be achieved by one great negotiating confrontation, and from the idea that there is some plan not yet discovered which, if you only offer to the Soviets they will accept, to the notion of what they should contribute toward a historical evolution. Otherwise, I fear that German political life will become more demoralized by chasing after an illusion, and by promising things that cannot be fulfilled. But the goal of unification has to be maintained.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger has presented a very thoughtful approach to the problems and the situation in Western Europe.

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MAINTAIN INFLUENCE BY REDUCING FORMAL PREDOMINANCE

I found two short statements both appearing under the heading "Do We Need to Fear a Third Force?" which appeal to me very strongly. The first is that "the only way we can maintain our influence is by reducing our formal predominance." As a nation, we have very successfully overcome any modesty which we might have had before, and it seems to me that the magnitude of our formal predominance has had something to do with General de Gaulle's disenchantment with our association over there.

Then further down in your statement we get clearly another view of the situation, where you say, "Europe must be at least as interested in an American commitment to its defense as we." There have been times recently when I felt that Western Europe was becoming rather complacent in regard to its own security.

I now have two questions for Dr. Kissinger. The first is, Do you believe that the United States could presently withdraw some of its forces from Europe without affecting Western European security?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I have expressed my general view on American forces. If you are asking me about the immediate situation it would be extremely unfortunate for us to withdraw forces because it would now be considered a reduction of American interest in Europe. It would also be seen in the context of our previous assertion, that an increase of forces was required to assure the defense of Europe.

Yet, it is important to create mechanisms in which the issue of troop deployment in Europe can be discussed on its substantive merits rather than for its symbolic qualities and which will make it possible to relate the troop deployment to an agreed strategic doctrine. Creating these mechanisms and that climate would have to precede any withdrawal of American forces.

Senator AIKEN. I find it a little difficult to understand how we can reduce our formal predominance in Western Germany, which you say is necessary, and still maintain such a high degree of military support.

HOW DO U.S.S.R. AND EASTERN EUROPE REGARD U.S. TROOPS IN WESTERN EUROPE?

However, let us turn now to eastern Europe. I would like to ask you whether the east Europeans and Soviets want to see all U.S. troops leave central Europe, and West Germany in particular, or do they regard these troops as a stabilizing force there. What is your opinion?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say, incidentally, that my previous comment about our deployment 10 years from now, includes the conviction that substantial American forces will have to be in Europe for the future that I can foresee barring a complete change in the world constellation.

As for the east Europeans I think they are probably ambivalent. Ideologically they probably want our troops out. Rationally they must feel that our troops are an element of restraint on too nationalist policies. I consider it probable, for example, that the Soviet Union, which feels somewhat more secure, could be more eager to have our troops out of Europe than the east European states whose experi-

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ence with their neighbors in central Europe has been even more drastic
than that of the Soviet Union.

I would expect, therefore, that there is a significant element in
eastern Europe that would like some American troops in Europe,
although they find it difficult to give that formal expression.

Let me add here that I do not agree with those who argue that
France wants all American troops out of Europe. I believe that the
French President understands that some American troops in Europe
are also useful for the security of France. Some of the moves he is
making now are really only meaningful if he expects some American
troops to remain in Europe indefinitely, maybe not in their present
strength, but in some strength.

Senator AIKEN. I would not find it difficult to agree with that
part of your statement.

Do you believe also, when it comes right down to it, that the think-
ing of Poland and Czechoslovakia might be different from the think-
ing of Russia in regard to our troops in West Germany?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would think that Poland and Czechoslovakia
would probably not be too eager to be confronted alone by a national
Germany without any restraint.

Senator AIKEN. Or a nationalist Russia.

Dr. KISSINGER. They are already confronted by a nationalist Rus-
sia but to add to that a national Germany could not be in their interest.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

MAIN ISSUES: PEACE SETTLEMENT OF WORLD WAR II AND DIVISION OF GERMANY

Senator MORSE. Dr. Kissinger, I want to thank you for a very
penetrating and powerful statement. It challenges, I am sure, the pre-
conceived notions of probably every one of us here on this committee—
certainly that is true in my case—and it will make us do more book-
work than we have done before.

My questions are organized around the theme that the big, out-
standing issue in Europe is still the peace settlement of World War II,
involving particularly the division of Germany.

The question is whether the huge military force of NATO, includ-
ing some 300,000 Americans, will ever contribute to a settlement of the
issue, or whether it will only serve to make the present situation
permanent—at least probably for as long as the treaty force remains. I
can hardly see the Russians giving an inch on the German issue as
long as the present NATO military force is around.

Therefore, I think we should keep in mind that the North Atlantic
Treaty is not the same as the military force that has been organized
under it. In connection with your defense of maintaining an
American military force over there, I am very much opposed to main-
taining these forces in Europe in any substantial numbers very much
longer for a good many reasons, which I will not bother to bore you
with other than to say this, because it relates to the questions I am
about to ask you: You keep referring to the fact that 10 years from
now you do not think Europe will be the place of major American

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troop deployments. I assume, maybe wrongly, that you think our
deployments will be elsewhere in the world—probably Asia. The
deployment of American forces I think goes to the heart of our policy
internally—we have been talking about, or you have been talking
much about, the internal views of Europe—and too few people are
talking about what will be the internal views in the United States in the
next 10 years.

I do not think the American people are going to support a military
state, and we are well on our way to a military state—a combined in-
dustrial military complex which is bound to destroy individual freedom
for Americans. When you destroy the individual freedom of a free
people you invite revolution. It can happen here if we do not take the
steps necessary to protect individual rights.

Now, with those biases, if one wants to call them that—I always
call my views biases, never convictions, and I am nearer right than
those who talk about convictions—with these views in mind, I would
have you take a look with me on the matter of our military presence
in Europe.

IS WESTERN EUROPE FEARFUL OF GERMANY?

It is often said that all or most of Western Europe is anxious, if
not downright fearful, of Germany, and desires a large American
presence on the Continent in order to dilute German military power.

I have questioned that, for if this is true, then I ask you why have
not our NATO partners fulfilled their own obligations militarily to
NATO? Is it only because we are willing to do it for them, or do
they really have less fear of Germany than this assumption would
seem to indicate?

Dr. KISSINGER. May I, before I answer this question, make a brief
comment on your initial statement?

Senator Morse. Certainly.

Dr. KISSINGER. I did not mean to say that there would not be a
major American troop deployment in Europe 10 years from now.

What I meant to say was that I did not believe that a troop deploy-
ment in its present strength was likely 10 years from now. But I do
believe that a substantial American force in Europe will still be re-
quired 10 years from now.

Also I would not expect that troops leaving Europe should neces-
sarily move to Asia. Where they will be at that time would depend
on the circumstances.

I would hope they would not be in Asia at that time, but at any rate,
in my mind, the idea is not to move them out of Europe and into Asia.
The idea is rather we should get to a situation where troop deploy-
ment in Europe can be discussed on its merits rather than for the
symbolic quality of demonstrating American commitment.

Now, on the specific question you raised about fear of Germany.
On the one hand, Germany is essential to the Atlantic alliance.
Everybody remembers the consequence of a German national policy
carried out in isolation in the center of the Continent treating all
neighbors as potential opponents. Therefore, we have a high incen-
tive to try to relate Germany to a structure larger than itself, and to
give it incentives for a policy other than a purely nationalistic one.

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On the other hand, painful as this may be for Germans, there is a fear of Germany, and there is the notion that the presence of American troops acts as some kind of restraint.

### WHY HAVEN'T NATO PARTNERS FULFILLED THEIR OBLIGATIONS?

Now, your question was, why are the NATO partners not doing more? Well, one reason the NATO partners are not doing more is because their incentives are different from ours. Once we had only large numbers of troops there, we tried to give them a military function. That was inevitable. Our European friends wanted the troops there for symbolic reasons. They, therefore, had a high incentive to keep the proportion of their troops to ours as low as possible in order to make sure that any war would be as much of a Soviet-American war as possible.

They looked at their troops as the admission price for American troops, and this, I think, is the principal reason why they have not increased their forces, and why they will not, in my view, increase their forces until they are forced to face the issue of defense in a more immediate and direct form.

Finally, for those Europeans who are concerned with defense, the worry is still primarily Soviet and not German attack. Their fear of Germany leads more in the direction of integration of forces and political integration than toward defense policies.

Senator MORSE. Why shouldn't the American voters say to their Government, "You bring home that percentage of American troops in excess of the percentage failure on the part of our NATO partners to maintain their allotment of troops." What is wrong with that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, because the way the history has developed. What we do now is going to be taken as a sign of our commitment, and I believe that a drastic, sudden change in American deployment in Europe, taken as a unilateral American decision, will have very serious and bad consequences.

When you speak of allotment, it is well to remember that the allotment has often been made in terms of a doctrine with which many of our allies have not agreed. What we first have to do is to get an agreed position on what a reasonable allotment is before we can make that decision.

Senator MORSE. Well, we would not have much trouble supporting the premise, would we, that our troops are all out of proportion to the troops that some of our allies are supplying, and that the American voter ought to make clear to his Government that the European people ought to look at the consequences in Europe. Then if the Europeans do not want to fulfill their burdens under the NATO military alliance and if we are going to continue it—and I seriously doubt if we should give emphasis to the military aspect, which is another question—but if they are going to continue the military alliance, then unless they are willing to carry their burden we should bring our men home; at least a proportion home.

I think there is too much thought about what the Europeans are thinking and not enough thought about what the Americans are already thinking and should be thinking about this so-called NATO Alliance which has been emphasized as a military alliance. The

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French approach may now really give us an opportunity to emphasize not a military approach to the problems of Europe but an economic approach.

Dr. KISSINGER. If the military problem were the only issue we faced in Europe I would go along with much of what you say.

I believe, however, confidence in the American position now involved. We have to consider what we can do in the immediate future in terms of the petitions that we have been stressing over a period of time. If there is a collapse of confidence in American purposes and in American policy in Europe, this would have very unfortunate consequences which far transcend the merely strategic question. This is why I feel we have to approach the problem which concerns you from the point of view of a discussion of purposes rather than from a point of view of who has been meeting past allotments which have not always had full agreement.

## SOME PROPOSALS FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION

Senator MORSE. I want to allude to one question that Senator Sparkman asked. Do you think the present division of Germany, including the island of West Berlin within the Communist sea of East Europe, can remain permanently? Aren't the alternatives, to a negotiated settlement on some basis, either the settlement of the German issue with Russia—and I do not see how you can possibly negotiate with 300,000 American troops, as well as other troops, in Europe, or the elimination of the military emphasis by building up an economic alliance rather than a military one? Because you have had 20 years of this division of Germany, Russia is certainly going to consider it permanent as far as she is concerned as long as she is confronted with a military threat, such as the threat NATO constitutes, at her doorstep at all times.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I had not understood the drift of your previous questions as related to a change in the political status of Germany.

If there is a change, if German unification is to be achieved, it seems clear that it cannot come about by moving the front of NATO 100 miles east. The unification of Germany is bound to involve a change in the military status of Central Europe. Under those conditions if there is unification of Germany, it seems to me highly improbable that 300,000 American troops will remain in Germany.

Under those conditions it seems to me that some form of denuclearization of Germany will also be involved, and the recognition of the present eastern frontiers.

How one would assure the security of Germany in case of unification is a very difficult problem. While it is possible to conceive of neutralizing 7 million people, as was done in Austria, neutralizing 80 million people is quite a different matter because you have the question of enforcing any guarantees and that is very hard against 80 million people.

Senator MORSE. Do you think that de Gaulle's conversations with Russia might open the door, at least a bit, for possible agreement between the allies and the Russians for a mutual reduction of forces, on the part of Russia and East Germany and the United States and

65-625-66-11

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West Germany, which would in turn be a step in the direction of a disarmament agreement—say 10, 15, or 20 years from now?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not believe de Gaulle is going to try to make any concrete agreements on this trip. I think he is going to try to establish a mood that might lead later on to some discussions.

I am fairly relaxed about de Gaulle's trip. If he wants to lead Europe he has to take the interests of all of his potential partners in Europe into consideration. Therefore, I do not see the danger of a sellout that worries some people.

If he should attempt a sellout, then France, as a national state, will find itself unable to deliver, so he would be attempting something that is beyond his capacity.

If we are assuming that he is trying to pursue a European policy then I think he is doing something which we need not worry about and which, as a policy, leaving aside his style, we should even encourage.

Senator MORSE. I want to thank you very much. You have been very helpful to me.

## PURPOSE AND EVALUATION OF OUR TROOPS IN EUROPE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Williams.

Senator WILLIAMS. Dr. Kissinger, as I understand the original purpose of our troops in Western Europe, they were put there not on the premise that they were sufficient to withstand an attack, on a particular country, but rather as an indication of our support to the respective countries if they should be attacked. Do you agree with that?

Dr. KISSINGER. There has always been a certain confusion about the purpose. I think the original purpose was to symbolize our commitment. In 1914 when Marshal Foch was asked how many British soldiers he wanted in France in case of German attack, he is reputed to have said, "Give me one, and I will make sure he gets killed on the first day of the war."

In the nuclear age this kind of assurance may have risen to something like five or six divisions.

On the other hand, once you had American troops on the Continent, it became inevitable that we tried to give them some kind of military mission, and so while you are quite right, the original intention was to symbolize America's commitment, the way the situation has developed they were given important strategic and tactical functions as well.

## DE GAULLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. TROOPS IN FRANCE

Senator WILLIAMS. What percentage of our troops were stationed in France prior to Mr. de Gaulle's becoming President?

Dr. KISSINGER. Frankly, I do not know the percentage. I would guess about 20 percent. But I think—the troops stationed in France, unless I am very much mistaken were not combat troops. They were mostly supply troops, almost entirely supply troops, and some Air Force units.

Senator WILLIAMS. In view of President de Gaulle's request that our troops in France be removed by a certain date, what would be your opinion of the advisability of withdrawing just that portion of the

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troops back to this country—since they are not wanted where they are?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, they are wanted by the other Europeans, and I think it would have an unfortunate impact if, under this kind of pressure, we started withdrawing these troops, particularly as we have declared them to be necessary for the defense of Europe. The mere fact that the French have kicked them out does not make or should not affect our judgment of what is necessary for the defense of Europe.

Moreover, as long as we keep the combat troops at their present strength, it would seem to me that the supply troops have to be kept. This will determine the number of supply troops that are needed.

I would not, under present circumstances, favor a substantial withdrawal of American troops, and I would not withdraw any American troops as a result of what might be interpreted as peevishness, but rather as something that in the common interest of everybody and by common agreement has become necessary.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do you think President de Gaulle himself would prefer that these troops come back, or do you think he is just asking them out of France with the hope that they will be stationed in another country?

Dr. KISSINGER. My guess is that President de Gaulle would prefer some American troops in Europe, but probably not in their present strength. But guessing de Gaulle's motivations is never a very rewarding task. My guess would be that he prefers some American troops in Europe.

Senator WILLIAMS. If you are operating a fire department and the fellow whom you are helping does not want your assistance, wouldn't it be wise to bring some of your men back home and see what reaction such a move would bring?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think the French attitude is probably more complicated than that. I am not so sure that they do not want our assistance. I think they have come to the conclusion, first, that the Franco-German treaty on which they wanted to build Europe is not going to work, partly because of the difficulties they have had with Germans, and partly because of American pressures. If this is true, I think what they are trying to bring about is a situation in which if there is a minor war or a war that starts in other continents, they have some choices. On the other hand, if there is a general European war they want us to remain tied to the defense of Europe. In short, I do not think they want to do without our assistance.

In a way, they are playing a rather cynical game. They want our assistance and to reduce some of their risks.

## NATO ALLIES TRADE WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND CHINA

Senator WILLIAMS. Is not a fact that at least a majority our partners in NATO, including France, insist on continuing to trade with North Vietnam and with Red China? In the face of our problems in that area, do you think that we, who are pledging our assistance to our European allies, have some reasonable basis for expecting their cooperation in return? Aren't the problems somewhat related?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we have a reasonable basis for expecting them not to complicate our difficulties in other parts of the world.

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do not believe that under present circumstances we are going to obtain their active support, for the war in Vietnam.

Senator WILLIAMS. Perhaps not. But I just wondered if we should not indicate to them that if they expect our support when they get in trouble, our support would be contingent upon what they had done in the way of trading with, and furnishing supplies to, North Vietnam, at least at this particular time. I wonder if it is not about time we put a more forceful interpretation upon their intentions in that area.

Dr. KISSINGER. You see, I think the difficulty we face is that most of our allies have become convinced, and probably correctly, that we are not defending them as an act of choice, but as an act of necessity, and that the defense of Europe is not something we are doing for them but for ourselves.

I believe, for example, that de Gaulle, rather than fearing American failure to support him is so convinced of our support that he feels that he can in a way borrow the Strategic Air Command to conduct policies contrary to our wishes.

If we threaten to withdraw our support from them, we are either not going to be believed or we are going to create such a panic about our general judgment that the marginal benefits we might demand from them would not be worth it. I think the defense of Europe is essential to our security, and we have no real choice about it. We have choices about the plans but not about the fact.

Senator WILLIAMS. I think it is, too. But our commitment could be maintained without maintaining such large numbers of troops in Western Europe. We could perhaps withdraw some of our troops, and spell out the commitment on paper as they indicated they wished it. At least we would save the expense of maintaining our forces in an area where they are apparently not wanted.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, as I said, I would be opposed to withdrawal now under present circumstances. But I would favor creating a mechanism which would enable us to discuss this issue in a different framework than it has been.

Senator WILLIAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield to Senator Church of Idaho who made such an interesting study and wrote such a fine report on NATO. I will have some questions later.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Church.

Senator CHURCH. I appreciate that very much, Senator Gore. I would certainly defer to you though because you have waited all morning for your questions, or to Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead.

Senator CHURCH. Professor Kissinger, have you had occasion to read the report I wrote upon my return from Europe?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, I have.

Senator CHURCH. Would you say that you were in general agreement or disagreement with it?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am in general agreement with the analysis of it, and with all of its recommendations, except that the impact of the disarmament conference on the German situation could not be dealt with fully in such a brief report. But I agree with the general analysis and with the general drift of it.

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## "MLF: WRONG PROBLEM, WRONG ANSWER"

Senator CHURCH. You mentioned the Geneva Conference and the question of nuclear sharing in the very excellent initial statement you made this morning. I know that one chapter of your book "The Troubled Partnership," is captioned "The MLF—Wrong Problem, Wrong Answer." What is the right problem and what is the right answer?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not believe that the issue of who presses the nuclear button is the key problem before the alliance. I also do not believe, as I have said in my statement, that the German desires, which were supposed to produce the need for the MLF were as dominant as some of the MLF advocates urged.

Finally, I did not believe that any of these military hardware solutions really do more than paper over the issue for a very brief time.

Now, you ask what is the right problem. The right problem is how an alliance of sovereign states can get a conception of common interests and some common notion of the future so that they can work together with confidence. If they do have this then the question of who presses the button will not arise.

If they have clashing interests no theoretical voting formula would be able to answer the need. It is inconceivable to me that the President of the United States, having been outvoted on a committee, in other words, having said that it is against his judgment to go to nuclear war, will enter nuclear war because some majority of his allies has said that he should.

The only protection for our allies is that we take their interests as seriously as our own or that our conceptions of vital interests are very similar.

Therefore, the solution to the nuclear problem is in the political field and not in the creation of new forms of nuclear ownership.

Senator CHURCH. When I was in West Germany, there seemed to be very little evidence of any interest in the MLF proposal. Was there ever much interest in that proposal in Germany, in your opinion?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, you will be able to get widely different opinions on this subject. My own judgment is that there was never a real demand for German nuclear weapons. Indeed, many of advocates of the MLF were saying, not that there was a demand now, but they were forestalling a demand later. Even today, except for certain officials who have now committed themselves, there is still not a substantial demand. In fact, I would even strike the word "substantial." I would say there is no demand for ownership.

Senator CHURCH. This was certainly the impression that I received from my conversations in Germany.

## U.S. INFLUENCE ON FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY

You have written, Professor Kissinger, with respect to the Franco-German Treaty that the United States has followed, and I quote your language, "* * * a deliberate policy of wooing the Federal Republic away from its French ties."

How have we done that?

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Dr. KISSINGER. Let me separate here my view as to formal policy and as to action policy.

In our formal statements, one would find little support for what I wrote in my book. It is my view, however, that most senior Europeans would be of the opinion that the United States has feared a Franco-German relationship and has attempted to create organic ties between the United States and Germany which would make it difficult for the Franco-German Treaty to become the nucleus of a grouping within Europe.

Now, I would add, in fairness, that French tactics have been as brutal to the Germans as to anybody else and have compounded this problem. In short it is not fair to put the whole blame on us.

But with this one qualification if one looks at the Arms Purchases Agreement, the MFL, and the many official, semiofficial, and unofficial contacts most leading Germans have received the impression that it is wiser to go slow in elaborating the German-Franco Treaty. In the many intangible ways a country with great influence can operate our influence has, in my opinion, been operating against the Franco-German Treaty. Whether this is true or not, this is what is believed by almost all senior persons in both France and Germany.

Senator CHURCH. Would you agree that the formation of a German-American axis within NATO would fail to benefit either country; rather than resolidifying the Alliance, would not such an axis tend toward further fragmentation?

## GERMANY HAS TO BE PART OF A LARGER STRUCTURE

Dr. KISSINGER. I think a German-American axis in NATO would be a disaster for the United States, Germany, and NATO. I have always strongly advocated an important and honorable role for Germany. I believe putting Germany into a special position in Europe would lead to a coalescence of all anti-German, anti-American, and if it is tied to something like the MLF, antinuclear feelings.

It would lead to a situation where by 1969, when the NATO Treaty comes up for revision, many of the countries of Europe, especially in Scandinavia and Italy, would tend to shy away from a treaty which has become a German-American axis. Chancellor Adenauer deserves great credit for understanding that the German role if it is to be durable has to be reasonably anonymous. Germany has to be part of a larger structure. I think a special German-American relationship would be extremely unfortunate in the interests of both countries.

Senator CHURCH. Tell me, Professor Kissinger, in connection with our policy toward Germany, do you think it would be advisable for us to attempt to nudge West Germany into taking certain initiatives toward the East, such as recognizing the Oder-Neisse Line?

Dr. KISSINGER. When one reflects about what one can ask the Germans to do, one has to keep in mind the rather narrow psychological margin on which they are now operating. There are really very many demands made on them simultaneously.

Secondly, I think that, I believe, if unification is ever to come about it will be the result of a historical evolution in which the present dividing lines in Europe will become less important.

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I would be uneasy if Germany were to attempt to take the lead in these efforts. If Germany pursues such a policy alone it will be driven toward a national policy.

A national policy for Germany has been historically a disaster for Europe, partly because of its geographical position, and partly because of the special traditions of German foreign policy.

Therefore, the most constructive German role in relation to the East, is to be part of a structure larger than themselves, which then, in turn, would make it possible to some of the moves that you have talked about.

Senator CHURCH. Do you think that structure could be the alliance itself, and that through the alliance we could reach eastward?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not believe that a military alliance is the best instrument for reaching eastward. I, therefore, believe that a European structure which would continue to be protected by the United States militarily should be the chief agent of that diplomacy.

That does not mean that it should be done without us, even less against us. But the diplomacy for the reunification of Europe has to be different from the strategy for the defense of Europe.

Senator CHURCH. Do you think such a structure has yet been born?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. I think the structure is now being torn to pieces by the debate between the federalists and confederalists, between the United States and France. But I believe if we look at this as a historical problem, a structure capable of doing that is in everybody's interest, and I would not worry too much whether it has the label "confederal" or "federal" if it came about.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Lausche.

## FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING NATO

Senator LAUSCHE. Dr. Kissinger, I want to get into matters that may seem extraordinarily simple, but I think they are important to the objective of obtaining an understanding of the general course that we ought to follow.

Is it your position that NATO generally should be continued even though de Gaulle has announced the withdrawal of his fleet and his troops and his air forces from it?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, absolutely. I believe NATO should be continued.

Senator LAUSCHE. Right.

Now, what is this third force de Gaulle is talking about? I want you to be brief, as my time is very limited in this matter. You have mentioned the third force of de Gaulle.

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not believe that de Gaulle has ever talked about a third force. I believe that some people who are worried about the tendencies of his policies characterize them as third force policies.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. You can answer this: Do you believe it would be justified to establish a third force separate and apart from NATO?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. I believe it would be useful within NATO to have another force as a balance to ours.

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Senator LAUSCHE. When NATO was established in 1949, the Communists were operating upon Greece and upon Turkey. The Communists took hold of Yugoslavia; the nations of Europe feared the advancement of communism and, therefore, created NATO. Is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct; yes.

## CHANGES SINCE NATO'S ESTABLISHMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, since 1949 there have been some changes that have occurred. The prosperity of Western Europe is one. The death of Stalin is a second. The weakening of the Soviet hold on Eastern European satellites is a third. The alleged detente between the United States and the Soviet Union is a fourth. And the seeming relaxation of the cold war is the fifth change.

Do you believe that those items I have enumerated, taken together, warrant an attitude on the part of the United States and the European nations of sinking into a state of security and saying "we have no fear of the further expansion of communism?"

Dr. KISSINGER. No; I do not. I agree with you that these five factors are at the heart of the problems in the NATO alliance.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, but there are some who say that all is quiet, that the dangers are past, that we can rest contented, and that no challenge will come to the nations of Europe or to the United States.

You do not agree with that, do you?

Dr. KISSINGER. No; not in this form.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do, however, understand that you feel that we could solidify the seeming advancements toward peace by trying to create more intimate exchanges with the Communists.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that we should not look at the problem of security and peace as alternatives to each other but as complements, and that we should be open to changes in the requirements.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes—that is, there are changes that have occurred, and there may be modifications needed in the tactics adopted toward procuring peace and containing the Communists—is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes; that is right, and in moderating their policies.

## HOW SHOULD UNITED STATES RESPOND WHEN ALLIES DON'T DO THEIR SHARE?

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, there is a problem that bothers me very deeply, and I have given thought to it just as Senator Morse has. It is argued that our allies have not performed their share of the responsibility. I know that to be a fact, and I regret it very much.

I believe that our Government has done everything within its power to persuade them to perform. Nevertheless, we are faced with this dilemma: because our allies are not performing their part, it is suggested that we withdraw.

Now, my question is: If the Allies do nothing, does that warrant the United States doing nothing and thereby allowing the Communists to take full hold?

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Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I have indicated that we are defending Europe for ourselves and not just for the Europeans, and the security of Europe would remain a major American interest, unhappily regardless of what the Europeans do, although the methods by which we defend it may have to be adapted to the circumstances.

One of the problems in the European effort is that the way the force levels have been developed in the past they have been essentially American requirements; that they have not had the same responsibility toward the force levels in NATO that they have had toward the Marshall plan.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you agree that we have our own Nation to defend and to secure?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, I do.

Senator LAUSCHE. We hope that we will procure help from our allies, but if we do not, it does not mean that we have to abandon the protection of our country, does it?

Dr. KISSINGER. We cannot abandon Europe.

Senator LAUSCHE. Earlier in your testimony you said something like this, "If the choice is between doing nothing and letting the wrong be perpetrated, then the United States must act." I do not know if I have written down exactly what you said. You made the statement in connection with spreading our forces too thin, and you thought there were places where we could pull out.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe the context, if I remember it correctly, was this: I had indicated that greater responsibility should be assumed by areas which were to be defended, and that it was in our interest that we did not always be the principal country. However, I added, if I remember it correctly, that there may be areas incapable of assuming this responsibility for a variety of reasons, and there if the choice was between doing nothing or permitting unfortunate developments occurring, I was in favor of acting. But I do not include Europe in that category because I think they are capable of assuming that responsibility.

### QUESTION OF VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you advocate pulling out of South Vietnam?

Dr. KISSINGER. No, I do not.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we did pull out, do you believe that would be the end of our troubles, or would they rise at some other place in south-east Asia?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would really prefer not to get into Vietnam, but I will answer this question. I do not believe that under present circumstances pulling out of Vietnam would end our difficulties.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

I thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK. Professor Kissinger, I find much in your statement with which I am in profound agreement, including particularly your very stimulating discussion on the multilateral force, the McNamara proposal, and the "hardware" as a proposed solution to the nuclear sharing problem.

I think that your views are pretty close to those of Senator Church when he came back and gave us his very valuable report called "Europe Today."

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However, there is one aspect of your testimony—which all of the witnesses we have heard so far have brought up—on which you can perhaps enlighten us.

## NATO WITHIN CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

I do not see how you can intelligently discuss the future of NATO, either as a military alliance or as a political association of nations, in what seems to me to be a vacuum. In other words, the future of NATO and of Western Europe is irrevocably tied up, is it not, with our relations with the Soviet Union? We must also discuss their capabilities and intentions, the possibilities for an East-West détente. It occurs to me that they are part of the problem to which this committee is addressing itself, and the question concerning this part have been left unanswered. Would you comment on that, sir?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think East-West relations are a crucial element of any analysis of the NATO problem, and I think it works both ways. I think the possibilities of a détente affect the security posture and the security posture affects the possibility of a détente. It is important to gear both of these policies together.

Senator CLARK. But I do not think your statement makes any very extensive effort to discuss East-West relations, does it?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think I have to accept that criticism, yes.

Senator CLARK. It is not intended as a criticism.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think it is a correct statement.

Senator CLARK. I am one of those who believes that we should be exploring far more vigorously than we have to date the possibility of a détente with the Soviet Union. I do not think we are very difficult antagonists or frequently unpredictable ones. But from my point of view, the future peace of the world is dependent on an effort to bring together the two great nuclear giants, and I think we should be out in front leading in this matter instead of, as I see it, back on our heels waiting. I would like to ask you your views on a number of measures to ease East-West tensions which have been suggested and talked about, but with respect to which we have done not very much.

In the first place, I refer to the comprehensive nuclear test ban. In this connection I call your attention to a story in this morning's *New York Times*—about the meeting in Canada with which I am sure you are familiar—which suggested a new approach to that matter. Could you comment on that?

## EFFORTS TOWARD EAST-WEST DÉTENTE

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. Could I say a general thing about the détente efforts first?

It obviously has to be in the interests of everybody concerned with the future of mankind to reduce the dangers of war, and to reduce the tensions that exist.

In the past, one of the problems with efforts at détente has been that there has been little effort to achieve a common assessment of the nature of the problem and of the means to deal with it. There has also been an inconsistency between the security efforts and the détente efforts.

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In the security field we have insisted on integrated commands and joint action. In the area of détente, the efforts have been essentially bilateral, and every time one of the allies has made an effort toward détente it has disquieted all the others because it has occurred outside of a common framework.

We made some moves in the 1950's and early 1960's more or less bilaterally; the British have tried it, and now de Gaulle is trying it.

I believe that it is inherently impossible to have East-West contacts bilaterally, and to insist that if the whole thing collapses we are going to have an integrated decision to go to nuclear war. I would consider it much more important to integrate the détente efforts than to integrate nuclear forces.

With respect to the nuclear forces, reality is going to impose certain requirements on us. With respect to détente it will not help the relaxation of tensions if the Soviets come to believe that the détente can be used simply as a psychological ploy.

We must discourage the Soviets from using détente as a means of splitting the West rather than for bringing about a basic change in the situation. Therefore, I have been strongly in favor of integrated diplomacy or at least a common assessment of the situation.

## TEST BAN AND OTHER DÉTENTE MEASURES

You have asked me about the comprehensive test ban, and I must duck that question for the reason that I have not studied the detection problem except to say it is one of the measures which has generally been identified with bringing an end to the arms race and being constructive, and if one can be reassured on the technical side, I would feel it could be a constructive step.

Senator CLARK. I agree with you that it is still a technical problem.

The Swedes have just had a very interesting meeting in Stockholm where they gathered together a number of neutral nations to discuss the identification of seismic events with substantially less verification than has hitherto been possible. But my time is short, and I would like to throw one $64,000 question at you, if I may, rather than taking it piecemeal.

It seems to me that there are a number of things the United States could be doing and is not doing which would at least ease East-West tensions and that our reasons for not doing them are not very good. The first would be to move further on the test ban treaty; the second is to meet the Russians with the McNamara suggestion instead of the MLF with respect to nonproliferation; the third is ratification of a consular treaty with the Soviet Union; the fourth is putting into effect the aviation agreement between Russia and the United States—this agreement does not even require senatorial approval; and the last is to move forward with East-West trade along the lines recommended by the President.

Can you state generally whether each, any, or all of these measures seem to you to be useful in terms of easing tensions?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I repeat that our general problem is to convince the Soviets that an intransigent policy is very risky, and that a constructive evolution of relationships is open to them. We have to pursue both of these policies simultaneously.

Senator CLARK. Yes, I agree with you so far.

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## MERITS OF THE MLF

Dr. KISSINGER. On the specifics you have mentioned, I have always been opposed to the MLF on its merits, apart from the Soviet objectives to it. Having staked so much on it, I am a little reluctant to offer the MLF as a concession to the Soviets. I think we should drop it on its merits.

Senator CLARK. I would agree with you on that. But I suggest that our motivation for dropping it is not very important as long as we drop it. I am convinced, having been in Geneva myself, that we will get a nonproliferation treaty so far as the Russians and we ourselves are concerned. The matter of getting the other nations concerned is also important. The nonnuclear powers still pose a serious problem.

Dr. KISSINGER. On the aviation rights, I do not know enough to form a judgment. On the other two measures, I would think, I would agree with that.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. I will pass at this time.

## CLARIFICATION OF STATEMENT ON VIETNAM AND THE QUESTION OF CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to that last question of Senator Lausche's, I was not sure you intended to talk about Vietnam. I know very few people who advocate a simple pullout. But I wonder whether, to put the question in another frame of reference, you advocate attacking China?

Dr. KISSINGER. I really feel that if we are going to get into Vietnam it would be better to have a more extended statement which deals adequately with the complexity of the situation. But I do not advocate an attack on China.

The CHAIRMAN. We already have gotten into it. I did not intend to get into it, either.

Dr. KISSINGER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The record stands, the implication—

Dr. KISSINGER. No, I do not favor an attack on China.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree in following a policy that would be likely to result in a war with China? I do not particularly wish to ask these questions, but I want to try to clarify what you believe, since your previous answer would seem to imply that you are standing behind a policy which appears to be for a total military victory.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I really think that the issue of Vietnam is such a complicated one that to answer it as a series of answers to questions is bound to be misleading. The answer to your particular question would really very much depend on our objectives in Vietnam. If we have reasonable objectives which then lead to war with China, I would say yes, I would be willing to run that risk. But I would be opposed to provoking a war with China deliberately or adopting objectives which threaten legitimate Chinese concerns.

The CHAIRMAN. That statement goes some distance toward answering the question. I knew you did not intend to—and I did not intend to—bring up China. But I did not like to leave the record appearing

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as it did appear. I think we might say that you did not intend to
get into this question, and that it is very difficult to make your position
clear to this committee under the circumstances. Is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is not easy to make clear one's view on Viet-
nam in answer to—

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be a legitimate question to ask whether
or not you think Vietnam has any effect on our NATO alliance?

Dr. KISSINGER. It has a profound effect on our NATO alliance.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON NATO

The CHAIRMAN. What effect does it have on NATO?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it has a contradictory effect. First of all, it
would be difficult to answer it in an absolute way, because one would
have to make a judgment country by country.

In many countries of Western Europe there is dubiety either about
the fact of the American commitment or its extent. I would except
Germany from that generalization. There is also concern lest the
war in Vietnam spread to Europe.

At the same time, whatever the judgment about the wisdom of the
American commitment to the defense of Vietnam, there would now be,
in my view, a very great uneasiness if after the United States has staked
so much of its resources and prestige on the defense of Vietnam, the
war ended in a manner that could be plausibly represented as an
American defeat. Even people who are critical about the American
commitment to Vietnam and about the wisdom of our action, might
share that uneasiness.

STRENGTHENING OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The CHAIRMAN. You were asked if you were proposing to abandon
Europe. I do not know of anyone who wishes to abandon Europe.
But your answer did raise the point that the problem is to make Europe
perform more effectively, according to its capacities, and to enable it to
make a real contribution to the security of this area. If I understand
you correctly, you think that the Western European Union is one
vehicle which should be strengthened in order to serve this purpose. Is
that right?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct, particularly with respect to the
military, but also with respect to the political role.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything we can do to strengthen the
Western European Union, or should we just allow it to follow its
own course?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, one way for us to strengthen the Western Euro-
pean Union or to strengthen any sense of European identity is to be
a little less assertive in urging our own preferences.

For example, many Americans have taken the view that a Federal
Europe was the best solution to the problem of unity, and insofar as
we had influence in Europe our weight has been thrown in that
direction.

I am not opposed to a Federal Europe, but I do not see that it is a
primary American interest how Europe arranges its internal affairs.
Our influence will be greater if we leave this kind of issue more to the
Europeans.

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In the military field instead of bargaining with each European country about their contribution to a common defense plan, we should let the West European Union develop a doctrine by which Europe is to be defended because it is, after all, their continent that is being defended, and we have more options than they do. We can think of many strategies and then leave the allocation of the common European effort to the Europeans rather than have us plead for it. Thirdly, in the political discussions, including the issues that Senators Clark and Church raised; that is, what kind of political evolution do we foresee, if we would throw some more of that into the Western European Union or some similar institution that would be constructive. But, in general, our correct stand, it seems to me, toward Europe is to maintain influence by reducing pressure.

UNITED STATES ENCOURAGES GERMANY TO BUY ARMS

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the question of the sale of arms. It makes me a little squeamish to read in the paper so often that we are doing everything possible to urge the Germans to purchase more arms. I understand our motives, but don't you think it is a little inap-propriate at this stage to be urging them to buy vast quantities of arms?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I do not know all the details. I can only speak about the consequences in the public discussion, and I could easily be persuaded that I am wrong.

On my recent trip to Germany I had the impression that the American insistence that they buy arms that they feel they do not need did produce some uneasiness and some tension. Secondly, in European relations in general, there is a feeling that our insistence on their purchase of arms has prevented the development of a European approach to common arms policy whether by design or simply as a consequence of a policy developed for other reasons.

Now, I recognize our balance-of-payments problem, and it may be this is overriding. Since I am not as conversant with economic issues, I can only note the political drawbacks of what we have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It seems to me that there are many overtones to our appearing to force arms upon people around the world. The one mentioned is not the only incident because, of course, we give arms to a great many nations, don't we?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The other day the Secretary made a statement—I believe I am accurate, and I think it was on television—that since World War II we had spent $850 billion in defense. Do you know whether or not that is about right? It seems rather large to me. It is too large for me to comprehend.

Dr. KISSINGER. It sounds right, because we have had a military budget of about $50 billion since 1951, and it may be even a little low.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be so. It seems to me that the world is so insane that there is not much hope for it, is there?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, we have confronted a serious challenge. The problem in any large government, it seems to me, is whether one can adjust a pattern that has developed to new circumstances.

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The CHAIRMAN. You have already indicated, have you not, that the MLF was our own idea, and that it did not arise out of a desire of the Germans? Is that correct?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is my view, but I am sure you can get contrary opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. I know. But assuming that to be so—

Dr. KISSINGER. It is my view, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Assuming that is so—and I see no reason to disagree with you—the MLF is an example of the kind of policy which causes the vast arms race to amount to a sum which is so large that it is incomprehensible.

Dr. KISSINGER. I will have to say in defense of the MLF advocates that they thought they were forestalling an arms race rather than creating one.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe that one, do you?

Dr. KISSINGER. I disagree with their judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you. A succession of such mistakes can lead to very serious consequences, it seems to me. This is one of them.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON OUR ECONOMY: QUESTION OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

This morning I was disturbed by two pieces in the paper in which economists were saying that the boom in our economy is assured by the war in Vietnam. It seems to me that we are developing a rather odd attitude in this country—that we cannot afford to stop the war now because our economy would collapse. This was the attitude expressed in the two articles in the *Post*.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, as I have indicated, I believe that an American defeat in Vietnam would be a disaster.

The CHAIRMAN. It need not be a defeat. Are you against any compromise?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. One would have to discuss the nature of the compromise.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. KISSINGER. But I would think that there is no justification whatever to continue the war for economic reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Lastly, you said in the beginning of your statement that what we need is another leap forward—a leap in our imagination. Do you recall that passage?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has your imagination leaped? Can you give us any new ideas that we might consider? When you review the last 20 years since the war and defense expenditures during that period—$850 billion for ourselves and about $150 billion for others, nearly a thousand billion dollars, a trillion dollars has been spent on defense, and yet we are no more secure now than we were at any time. Many people argue that we are even less secure. This seems to be some kind of madness that requires a leaping imagination. Have you toyed with any ideas in this direction?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I am very reluctant to give the impression here that the only reason the problems of the world have not been solved is because I have not been sufficiently listened to. [Laughter.]

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The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what is wrong with that. We all share this feeling to a certain extent, I would say.

WE NEED INTANGIBLES: PERSPECTIVE AND PHILOSOPHY

Dr. KISSINGER. And also I would think that, and again I have to say in fairness to the harassed people whom I have been criticizing, that it is much easier to point out weaknesses than to offer a detailed blueprint.

I have already outlined the measures which seem to me indicated in the NATO area. As for the rest of the world, rather than go into details area by area, let me give this general answer. We have a tendency to think that there are, perhaps, some technical programs that can be implemented or some specific remedies to end all problems once and for all. In fact, what is most urgently needed for the construction of an international system is a combination of intangibles.

Whatever one thinks of a man like De Gaulle, the impact he has had could not have been expressed in a blueprint when he started. It reflected the fact that he represented consistency, a vision of the world, a notion of evolution. International systems that have been reasonably peaceful have combined a notion of justice with a sense of security, a certain balance with a concept of what was reasonable. It is very difficult to know how one should deal with the symptoms of a crisis which one confronts in the nature of a revolution without having some idea of where we want to go, what we consider reasonable or just, and what constitutes a balance.

I am sorry to be so abstruse, but I think it may be in the nature of the modern bureaucratic state, that it is always dealing with immediate problems, and finds it very difficult to ask the questions that involve perspective or philosophy. There is no reason to suppose that I would do it any differently if I were in any of these positions. It may be in the nature of the machine.

What we need most urgently is some notion of how we want to shape history. Some idea, for example, around the world, in the big turmoils that are arising of how one creates political structures.

For example, we tend to believe that economic aid automatically produces political stability. I think we are finding around the world that this was true in Europe, but it is not true in countries where there does not exist a notion of political legitimacy. This does not mean that I know how to produce political stability, but I would urge that after this moment it may be more important that we get clear about the questions to be asked than debate about specific answers that ought to be given. But I know I have not given you anything approaching a fair answer to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, no; but you suggest, I think, something very important: that these concrete, or "hardware," as you call them, solutions are inadequate; that what is involved here are intangibles, attitudes of mind, a comprehension of ideas; and that the way people react to these problems is not very prominent in our policies or in our actions generally.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. But I think there are deep reasons for these which are simply not policy decisions which have to do with the mentality, with the way we go at problems as a Nation, and with the diffi-

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culties of the large Government having to deal with very many im-
mediate crises.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. I am not going to take all of my 10 minutes. I per-
sonally am sorry that the Vietnam issue was raised at all this morn-
ing because your expertise for this hearing, and your preparation for
this hearing, was on NATO.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

THE QUESTION OF OBLIGATION AND DEFEAT IN VIETNAM

Senator MORSE. But I would not want the record to stand that I think any consideration ought to be given to any NATO country with respect to what its reaction would be to what you call an American defeat in Vietnam.

We are not going to be defeated in Vietnam, nobody is talking about a defeat in Vietnam. It is certainly not a defeat for the United States to carry out an obligation to world peace which it owes to world peace. But no Nation in the world is presently as much a threat to peace as is the United States.

We started this intervention in Vietnam. We are sending young American draftees—18, 19, 20, 21 years of age—to die over there, and who is thinking about our obligations to them as we continue this war unilaterally? The NATO countries are not helping us out. They are standing on the sidelines, and letting us do the dying. All I want to say is that I think we ought not to be giving the emphasis—which I think is implied in your statement—to American face, but that we ought to be giving the emphasis to our obligation to stop the bombing, to declare that we are going to hold—as some recognized military experts such as Ridgway, Gavin, and others say is possible—those positions that we can defend. Then we ought to say to our NATO allies and to the rest of the nations of the world, “You have an obligation now to help enforce the peace.”

That is not a defeat for the United States. In my judgment it is carrying out a responsibility that we owe to mankind and to our own youth that we are killing over there in an area that is not worth the life of any of them. I just want the record to show that I do not accept at all what I think are the implications of your statement, that we ought to fight this matter through to a surrender on the part of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese.

I think that policy will keep us there for decades and will eventually, in my judgment, cause the American people by increasing millions to become aware of the fact that we are fast being dragged into a military state rather than a democratic state.

Those are my views. I respect your differences with them, but I do not want this record to close with even an implication that I sat here in silence while your views on this subject was expressed.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, do you have any questions?

Senator CASE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have just a few more questions.

65-625-66—12

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Professor Kissinger, you have referred several times to the pos-
sibility of a historical evolution improving the prospects for a Euro-
pean settlement that might one day replace the present arrangement.

PREREQUISITES FOR SOLUTION OF GERMAN PROBLEM

First of all, I would like to ask you, do you believe that the solution
to the German problem, which lies at the heart of the present division
of Europe, will follow a relaxation of tensions between East and West
or vice versa?

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that the solution of the German problem will come when two conditions are met in Europe. One is that national boundaries as a whole are less crucial so that the size of Germany and the specific location of its frontiers becomes less important; and, secondly, when ideology loses its present importance. I think one of the difficulties the Communists, the Russians, have on giving up their hold on Eastern Germany is the impact of sacrificing a Communist government no matter what they are offered in the areas of security or economic benefits.

So on the whole, I would imagine that German unification would
follow these transformations rather than precede them.

Senator CHURCH. This, I understand, to be President de Gaulle's
view also.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. I would take it to be the dominant view in Europe today.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Would you agree with a statement that appeared in last week's
Economist which reads as follows:

In practice the détente with Eastern Europe that almost everybody wants
may come more through trade and economics than through the much more diffi-
cult route of political agreement.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, I would believe that the way one can promote evolution in Eastern Europe today is to create links between the countries of Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and preferably to avoid difficult political issues which force them to confront the choice between their national interests and Soviet physical predominance, and to hope that later on as these ties strengthen that then the political issues can be faced.

PRESIDENT COMMENDED ON EUROPEAN POLICY

Senator CHURCH. In the European context, let me say as one who,
as I think you know, has for a long time been troubled over American
policy in southeast Asia and has, as a result, often been labeled as a
critic of the Johnson administration in the field of foreign policy, that
it seems to me that the President deserves credit for the way he has been
recently conducting our foreign policy in Europe.

Now, I refer to three specifics: First of all, the immediate American
reaction to de Gaulle's decision was one of outspoken indignation,
and some very high-placed people began using epithets that France
was untrustworthy, that she was an unreliable ally, and that kind of
thing. I take it that the President felt that bad manners did not

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make for good diplomacy. He has exercised great restraint, not only
on himself but on the administration, so that this tendency has
disappeared.

Secondly, it was President Johnson, as I understand it, who called
off the insistent American pressure for the MLF when it became ap-
parent to him that this was causing more strain within the alliance
than it was helping, that the resistance to it in Europe had to be recog-
nized, and American policy had to be adjusted accordingly.

And, thirdly, I think the President is to be commended for his
own recognition of the need to move toward a wider détente or nor-
malization in our dealings with Eastern Europe. His proposal to
build bridges to Eastern Europe, and to adopt the most favored nation
principle for the countries of Eastern Europe, which now has been
submitted to the Congress, is a third indication of what seems to me
to be good management of American policy with respect to Europe.
Would you agree with that?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am very glad you have given me this opportunity.
I have no firsthand knowledge of the internal workings of the admin-
istration but from what I can gather yours is a fair statement. My
impression is that the constructive steps toward our European policy
have been largely due to the influence of the White House.

REDUCTION OF FORCES ON RECIPROCAL BASIS

Senator CHURCH. You have been asked to comment several times
on the question of reductions in American forces in Europe, and I
think you have made your position clear. But there is one aspect
that has not been touched upon, and that relates to what I understood
to be Secretary McNamara's statement last week that we were pre-
pared to reduce American forces in exchange for or in connection with
reductions of Russian forces in East Germany; that apparently we
would follow a thinning out policy provided it was reciprocated by
the Soviet Union.

What is your view with respect to the McNamara position?

Dr. KISSINGER. I was in Europe last week and, therefore, I did not
see the text of what Secretary McNamara said, and I will, therefore,
have to comment on your version of it.

I do not believe, as I indicated earlier, that there is any one magic
figure of forces which should be identified with security, and which
should be sacrosanct for eternity.

Certainly, the level of forces in Europe should be related to the
threat and to the potential threat.

The worst way to withdraw forces would be as a unilateral Ameri-
can budgetary decision. The best way to reduce forces is to relate
it to a reduction of the Soviet threat. So it would seem to me that
if there is a significant reduction of Soviet forces that this could
easily put a different light on the need for Western forces in Ger-
many, keeping in mind the differences in time required for reinforce-
ments, but that is a technical problem.

Senator CHURCH. On the whole, you think it is a constructive
approach?

Dr. KISSINGER. With the qualifications mentioned it is a construc-
tive approach, yes.

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CONTRADICTION OF POLICY: NATIONALISM VERSUS FEDERAL PARTNERSHIP

Senator CHURCH. Professor Kissinger, in your book "The Troubled Partnership," you pointed to a contradiction that intrigued me considerably in U.S. policy which exalts nationalism as the most reliable bulwark against Communist domination everywhere except in Western Europe where the concept originated.

It is true, of course, that we have praised and supported nationalism in Latin America, in Africa, and in Asia. But our policy has been strongly inclined in the opposite direction in the years since the war in Western Europe.

What, in your judgment, accounts for this contradiction, and what is your feeling about it?

Dr. KISSINGER. What accounts for the contradiction is the conviction that our Federal institutions is the best model for other States to follow; and, secondly, that the scale of the European nation-state is not adequate for the contemporary world. This is coupled with the view that Europe cannot be an adequate partner to the United States unless it consolidates, and one can find many official statements which express both a preference for Federal institutions and the need for Europe to unite, so that it can be a partner to us.

Senator CHURCH. But, Professor Kissinger, we neither advocate nor propose, nor make as a major foreign policy objective, federal union arrangements in other parts of the world.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes. We also do not ask them to be our partners to that extent, and I responded to your first question, which was what accounts for our policy.

Now, I have, as I indicated in my book, I have some doubts about this on a number of grounds. First, I am uneasy about the notion that we can be partners only with areas of equal size and equal strength, considering the fact that we have to conduct foreign policy with some 80 or so nations of much smaller size. I would hate to have it as a basic doctrine of American foreign policy that we can be good partners only to units of equal strength.

Secondly, even if that doctrine is accepted, I do not believe we need to identify the unity of an area with the pattern of relations that worked well in our experience partly because there were special factors which made the American experience not easily repeatable, including the fact that in Europe the nation-state, for better or worse, originated through a process which elaborated its distinction from its neighbors.

Now, we can deplore that, but there are several hundred years of history behind it, and it seems to me no accident that the opposition to the Federal solution of Europe has come from the two nation-states with the longest history, namely, France and Great Britain, and that the support of it has come either from small countries which have always been parts of larger structures or from countries that were smashed in the war and were eager to absorb their past in a larger unit, such as Italy, and especially Germany. For this reason I have felt not that the Federal solution was wrong if it could have been implemented, but that we have been, perhaps, too one-sided in our support of it.

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Thirdly, there has been another inconsistency that the same people who have been very strongly in favor of federal institutions have also been strongly in favor of admission of Great Britain into Europe. But federal institutions are as unacceptable in London as in Paris. The only difference is that the British methods of fighting a problem are less nationalistic and more attuned to our psychology than the French methods.

EUROPE: FEDERAL OR CONFEDERAL SYSTEM?

Senator CHURCH. Suppose we had been successful in the earlier days when the fear of Soviet Union was greater, and reasoning after our own political experience—and in this I agree with you, I think this has done more to influence our policy than anything else—but, reasoning after our own political experience, let us assume we had been successful, that a federal union had indeed been established in Europe, and that there was a United States of Western Europe in existence today, and suppose de Gaulle were the President of the United States of Europe. Would we be better off?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, that is a very important question. I happen to believe, as you imply, Senator Church, that a federal Europe is likely to have the greatest incentives for a policy which we tend to identify as a Gaullist policy, while a confederal Europe would permit us to maintain an influence at many centers and it would probably be, in the long run, less likely to pursue such a policy. When you destroy all existing political loyalties and try to form new ones, it is not conceivable to me that anti-Americanism might be the one cohesive bond between Scotland and Sicily and Schleswig-Holstein and southern France.

So I agree with the drift of your question. There is no necessary relationship between the internal structure of Europe and the policy which it will pursue.

Senator CHURCH. It has always been assumed without question in this country that such a development would necessarily serve the interests of the United States, and I think, at the very least, such a question should be asked.

As a matter of fact, is political unification really indispensable to the peace of Europe? There was no such unification during the period that followed the Napoleonic wars until 1914, a period of a century of peace.

In the light of that experience, does it necessarily follow that political unification of the kind we have sought for Western Europe is indispensable to the peace of Europe?

Dr. KISSINGER. Classical European history was, of course, different from the present because Europe tended to be either dominant in the world or isolated from other parts of the world. But those periods in which there was peace were based on some conception of a European commonwealth or a European system. This did not necessarily avoid conflict but the maintenance of the system came to seem more important than any of the conflicts within it. At least that degree of European consensus is necessary or important. People always talk about the 19th century system as being bad. In the 19th century,

176

between 1815 and about 1890, there was a notion of a system of Europe, and they did solve their problems without major war.

It is when social Darwinism developed among nations and the survival of the fittest became an accepted doctrine both within nations and among nations that you had the problem. Now, that kind of nationalism, it seems to me, would be a disaster.

Senator CHURCH. Do you think, Professor Kissinger, in view of the extraordinary success of the Common Market and the high degree of economic integration that now exists in Western Europe that kind of nationalism is likely to return to Europe?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not. No.

Senator CHURCH. Do you think that this process toward unification and cohesiveness which I personally have favored and do continue to favor as preferable in its benefits and certainly much less risky than continued divisions in Europe, do you think that this process is more likely to take a headless form?

Dr. KISSINGER. A what form?

HORIZONTALLY STRUCTURED UNION SAFER

Senator CHURCH. A kind of headless form—in other words, that it is likely to be horizontal in character rather than vertical, that rather than moving in the direction of superimposing a single executive authority along the lines of the United States, that instead, there will be arrangements like the Common Market, which are horizontal in character, and are addressed to the pragmatic solution of practical problems held in common. In other words, this is a sloughing away of sovereignty from the nation-state to these new regional commissions. But this is a kind of movement toward cohesion that is very different in character than what we have known in the United States, being organized, as I say, horizontally rather than vertically.

Do you think this is likely to be the future pattern of Europe?

Dr. KISSINGER. If I had to predict, I would consider it to be the more likely pattern and also the safer pattern.

Senator CHURCH. That is an interesting comment, Professor, because it might well be the safer pattern. For many, many generations there was an assortment of principalities in Germany, for example, along with Bavaria and Prussia; then Bismarck secured the unification of these principalities under the German Emperor, forming the vertical organization of the German state when the German Reich took the place of the German Bund. Yet I think it was once said of the Bund that it was impregnable in defense and incapable of aggression. Yet the world knows what happened once it got organized vertically under one executive authority.

So possibly this movement taking place in Europe is the safer one, in terms of the general peace of the world.

Dr. KISSINGER. I would think it is the most likely one; secondly, it seems to me it is the one that would put the least strain on the political system, create the least problems in bringing about political unity. I think your analogy to the German situation, as somebody used to be very interested in 19th century diplomatic history, is a very apt one.

Senator CHURCH. You think it is an apt one?

177

Dr. KISSINGER. It is, in my judgment; yes, sir.

Senator CHURCH. One final question, Professor. What, in your judgment, is the likelihood for our achieving an Atlantic union as distinguished from the separate European union, then forming a kind of partnership between the two large entities which, I take it, has been the grand design of American policy in recent years? I mean by an Atlantic union, one in which the United States and Canada and the countries of Western Europe join under a common federal government with powers to conduct foreign policy, to establish a common currency, and to provide for the common defense.

Dr. KISSINGER. When I first started thinking about these problems I was very attracted to this idea.

I have to say now, as I look at the world, and this is also partly an answer to something that Senator Fulbright asked me earlier, I am becoming very worried about excessive concentrations of decision-making in too large units, and I would prefer now a certain pluralism in the world. Now I tend to resist the penchant for excessive rationalization.

For this reason I would now feel, that an Atlantic union which would stretch from Hawaii to the borders of Russia or beyond would probably be a factor of rigidity in the world rather than a factor of flexibility. The more helpful evolution would be close association between whatever autonomous Europe develops and America. My instinct would be in the direction that we sketched before, of Europe and the United States working together for common interests, but not being so organically tied that they must do everything together, since that is as apt to lead to paralysis as to creativity.

I would like to preserve at least some centers of decision in the world and some other centers of judgment and, therefore, rather reluctantly I must say that this notion of the global Atlantic commonwealth under one sovereignty seems to me probably not in tune with the needs of our time.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case has a question.

## ALLIES MUST SHARE VIEW OF POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Senator CASE. Dr. Kissinger, in your statement, you say that—

Even within Europe, burden sharing provides an incentive for responsible policy only when two conditions are met: (1) our allies must have the same view of the political environment as we, at least as it affects Europe and (2) they must believe that unless they play a greater role the United States will reduce its contribution (not its commitment).

Then you say:

Neither condition is met today. Indeed our over-eager, importuning attitude with respect to the second point defeats our objectives with respect to the first.

Now, the second of these conditions, at least, is somewhat within our control.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator CASE. What the dickens can we do about the first condition that they must have the same view of the political environment as we? Do you mean we should change to theirs? Just what do you mean by that?

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Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I believe that the institutions and the process of political consultation within the alliance and among the nations bordering the North Atlantic is much less well developed than the institutions for developing military requirements.

It seems to me that we urgently need a way in which we can address the first of these questions because the answer even to military requirements, and certainly to the whole issue of relaxation of tensions depends on some kind of political assessment.

The typical pattern today is for some negotiation to impose the need for a position. Then that position is discussed in the NATO Council or among ministers or however the process of consultation operates for that issue.

But to argue about a negotiating position is in itself misleading because you cannot then get to the philosophy which underlies it or to the longer range purposes which you are trying to achieve. What I was trying to get at with this statement is really the building of political consensus or at least knowing of what the real divergences are. This will be at the heart of the alliance problem in the next decade or decade and a half, while the need to achieve military security against physical invasion was the problem of the past decade and a half.

Senator CASE. You do not think that this should be done through an effort to build institutions but rather by keeping the thing flexible, I take it?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. I think some institutions can be built or existing ones can be developed. For example, in order to meet some of the needs in the nuclear field, there was created the special committee of NATO, the so-called McNamara committee. That has up to now been confined to dealing with nuclear issues. I believe that the nuclear issue is really important but it deals with a contingency which comes at the end of a very long process. It seems to me that either that committee or something like it, ought to regularly ask itself in a serious and systematic way where we think we are going and where we would like to be 5 or 10 years from now.

What are we trying to achieve, for example, in our arms control policy? My experience in very frequent trips to Europe brings home to me that the whole issue of the nonproliferation treaty has, rightly or wrongly, created enormous, in my view, unnecessary uneasiness in Germany. If there were a full understanding of what one is trying to do, the purposes should be clear long before one starts quibbling about whether the second paragraph of a treaty text is crucial or not, and this is—I think we need some institutions, but above all we need, perhaps, a different spirit.

There is a great reluctance to discuss things unless, until they are ripe for decision; and, on the other hand, when they are ripe for decision it is very often too late to do something about it.

Senator CASE. In this field, as in others, there may be a feeling that you should make progress little by little as you can, and that when you cannot see the end of the road in many of these things you should at least take the first steps. This is contrary to your general view, which is that we have not thought about the ultimate objectives and common understandings as to where we are going.

179

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would say even as a government we some-
times have difficulty looking more than a few steps ahead and, as an
alliance even more so.

I do not object to taking one step at a time as long as one knows the
road on which one is traveling.

GERMAN UNIFICATION SEEN WITHIN BROADER EAST-WEST FRAME

Senator CASE. Toward the end of your statement you suggest that the main reason you disagreed with Dr. Barzel's suggestion about discussions between East and West Germany was the possibility that these would lead to a good deal of unity between the two areas, not excluding the possibility of eventually including Russia in both areas. This is, I take it, the kind of thing you express as being dangerous.

Dr. KISSINGER. My concern is that the Germans not try to tackle the unification issue as a purely national problem but in a framework larger than Germany itself.

Many proposals can be constructive if they are presented in, say, a European framework, but become highly unsettling when they are presented by the Germans as purely national initiatives.

I do not consider that Barzel was saying these should be done as a
solitary German effort, and what I said was not intended as either
endorsement or criticism of Barzel.

We should keep in mind that because in the 1950's there was a some-
what rigid posture on the part of Germany toward East-West rela-
tions, there may be now a tendency to assume that if the Germans by
themselves change things that this will improve matters. Two con-
current measures are necessary: building the Germans into a structure
larger than themselves, and then simultaneously convincing them of
the kind of historical evolution toward the unity of Europe that we
were discussing before.

So both of these measures seem to me to have to be carried out.
My worry is that Germany may by itself try to be a bridge between
East and West and this, in effect, would be going back to its old policy
and will produce a consciousness of its national interests in an excessive
way, if not immediately then over a period of time.

Senator CASE. And in the process West Germany will be tempted
and driven politically to make concessions to East Germany. I think
that is part of your paper.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think its bargaining position will be very difficult
and its domestic structure will be under great pressure.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Well, Professor Kissinger, there are many other things we could
discuss, but the hour is getting late. It is difficult to tell you how much
we appreciate your coming here. Your discussion has been most
informative, and it is a great comfort for us to know that there
is somebody in the country studying these matters as thoroughly as
you obviously have studied them.

I wish to announce that tomorrow two separate hearings will take
place in which the emphasis will be on the relationship of disarmament
and arms control measures to our policy toward NATO. The first