DECLASSIFIED

E012958

Authority

By MR NARA Date 9/16

Ecevit/Kissinger

2

E: Could you repeat again -- your voice was cut off.

K: I said, you know my high regard for you.

E: Thank you, Mr. Kissinger.

K: And I would like you to think of the long-term consequences of what you're doing.

E: No, please don't think that I'm making a tactic. We have serious problems, Dr. Kissinger. I was just having to explain that to Mr. Callaghan when I saw him personally. If he wants a workable ceasefire, he must assure that it's going to be so. We can discuss the minimum ______ conditions within an hour or so. [If they are] giving you their word, they are not keeping it. They are ... [beeping noise on line] ... So we must make sure that if they are going to make ceasefire, [that they respect it].

K: Because on Cyprus itself we are very sympathetic to your position.

E: Yes, thank you.

K: And as soon as we have a ceasefire I would like Sisco to talk to you about our thinking because we I think would see things very similarly.

E: Well, even to know this, I think we have to hold short preliminary talks. We may hold this just with the British.

K: Yeah.

E: Or we can make a different arrangement. You see, we have to be satisfied with ...

K: Well, but why couldn't you make a 24-hour ceasefire during which a permanent one will be discussed?

E: Well, we can do this. In that case -- well, I don't know. You see, this ______ we do not know how they can violate -- how they are going to violate the ceasefire with their Turkish speaking pilots. Actually, this is night now.

K: Yeah.

E: And our troops cannot make any moves. So nobody needs worry about what the Turkish troops are going to do -- or in Cyprus. We cannot fly at night so there is no danger from our angle. But we can expect

- MORE -

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

NARA Date 9-19

By

Ecevit/Kissinger

them to play certain things. For instance, at Kyrenia (?), again throu
using those Turkish words, etcetera they ......[our people at night].
They can do the same to the ............ So we are afraid of what they
can do with the intrigues that they have fought during the night.
............

K: Well, let me see what the Greek answer is and I will call you back.

E: All right.

K: But I must tell you we are deeply concerned and we hope that you are
not doing something that will in the long term be a disaster for Turkey.

E: Well, you see, we have immediate worries as well and reason to be worried.

K: Yes, but it cannot be in your interests that when all of this is over
Cyprus will lend towards the Communists.

E: Well, you see, Mr. Kissinger, I wish I had the chance to talk these
things over with you as well as Mr. Sisco. We have followed the
policy recommended by America in Cyprus for 10 years and where
have we ended? We have different ideas about it. We believe that
Turkish peasants in Cyprus is the best guarantee against
Communism.

K: Well, we're not opposed to that.

E: Excuse me?

K: We're not opposed to that.

E. But until now we haven't been given a chance. Our ..........
all the time we tried to do something about this. Now we took the
initiative here and Britain as well and we have reached somewhere.
We want to make good use of it. [Beating noise on line.] I mean, if
Turkey were effective in Cyprus, there wouldn't be much more of the
danger of Communism in Cyprus than in Turkey. After all, ......
we won't become part of Turkey.

K: Yes, but that outcome -- Cyprus cannot become part of Turkey.

E: No, I'm not saying that at all. But if Turkey were effective there,
if Turkey was to be influential enough to help in Cyprus to prevent
it's drifting away towards Communism, that would be the best
guarantee.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By NARA Date 6/16

Ecevit/Kissinger

4

K: Yeah, but that can only arise from the negotiations.

E: We were not given this opportunity until now and we are not trying to seek it through our rights in the Treaty.

K: Yes, but I'm afraid you may be bringing about a situation in which exactly the opposite happens.

E: No, I don't think so. Anyway we have reached the night. We have doubts about what they would do in the night. Tomorrow we can make a decision. We can announce the time. I have no doubt about that. I mean, the Cabinet accepts the principle. Tomorrow we will announce it.

K: All right. Well, --

E: We --

K: After I have had an answer from Greece, I will be in touch with you.

E: All right, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

<table><thead><tr><th>DOCUMENT NUMBER</th><th>DOCUMENT TYPE</th><th>SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS</th><th>DATE</th><th>RESTRICTION</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and Robert Ingersoll (2 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/20/74</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and the President (2 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/20/74</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and James Callaghan (4 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/20/74</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and Bulent Ecevit (2 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/21/74</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and Alexander Haig (1 p)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/21/74</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and James Callaghan (2 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/21/74</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and Bulent Ecevit (2 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/21/74</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Telcon</td><td>HAK and Alexander Haig (2 pp)<br>SANITIZED</td><td>7/21/74</td><td>B</td></tr></tbody></table>

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 9/26/74

FOLDER TITLE

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.

B. National security classified information.

C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.

D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.

F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.

G. Withdrawn and returned private and personal material.

H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

*U.S.GPO;1989-235-084/00024

NA 14021 (4-85)