[Y]

MR. KISHIDA: Now he would like to go to the Japanese-American relations.

As a presidential assistant and later as Secretary of State, you had experience of dealing with the Japanese leaders and officials of the Sato, Tanaka, and Miki Administrations. You are also known to have acquainted with Prime Minister Fukuda, former Foreign Ministers Ohira and Miyazawa, or Mr. Nakasone and others.

Would you tell us your impressions of Japan's political characteristics, either in terms of their procedure in decision making or of the manner in which the Japanese negotiate with foreign partners?

DR. KISSINGER: I am frank to say that I did not distinguish myself at the beginning of my period in understanding the Japanese manner of acting. I did not understand the decision-making by consensus by which Japan operates. I did not understand the exquisite politeness with which you express yourselves, so that sometimes I missed the point of what you were trying to say to us.

And I quite frankly had to learn a great deal, and my Japanese friends were very patient with me.

As I learned, it turned out that I visited Tokyo more than any other capital. I made actually more visits to Tokyo than anyplace else. And I understood that in dealing

- 20 -

with Japan, there is a formal level and there's a human level, and what is not said is sometimes as important and maybe more important than what is said.

So one needs a lot of time to understand the communications. I grew to admire Prime Minister Sato enormously, and even after he left office, I never visited Japan without meeting with him. And I had excellent relations with each of his successors, and many leading figures, I had a very close relation with Foreign Minister Miyazawa, and Foreign Minister Kimura when he was in office.

And I don't want to exclude anybody. I feel that in the last three years of my being in office, I had a very good relationship with Japan. It's very important for Americans to understand that Japan as a culture that has existed for thousands of years, has different forms from ours, very unique social structure, very great ability to make important decisions. But we make decisions through an individual personality. Japan avoids giving the impression that one man makes a decision.

So for Americans, it isn't always easy to find who it is that we are supposed to deal with. But if one looks at the record of Japanese decisions since 1945, it's spectacular, it's extraordinary. Even though one can never point out one personality, like Chou En-lai who you can say has done it, or it's the -- it's the society that does it, that makes it very remarkable.

- 21 -

MR. KISHIDA: I feel we should be very flattered by your comments on the high evaluation of the Japanese decision-making process. But wouldn't there be some advice that we should change in terms of our way of communication and decision making political arena in the years to come?

DR. KISSINGER: I must say, you've been very effective in 30 years. You have to judge a country not by any one year. Japanese communicate with each other in a different way from us, so for a Westerner, it is not always easy to understand what the Japanese are trying to get at.

And certainly, it would be easier if your conduct were like that of Westerners. But then, on the other hand, you would lose your special characteristics. And if I look at the record of 30 years, I must say it's outstanding. In any one year it may be difficult, but I really have no specific advice. We always have economic problems produced in part by your abilities. We can't ask you to be less able.

So we have economic problems inherent in the nature of the society, so we will have negotiations every year or so. We usually lose them, anyway. But I think, as I have already said, that Japan will play a greater security role, not because I advise it, but because I think the Japanese consensus will come to that conclusion without my advice.

- 22 -

MR. KISHIDA: Well, since you touched upon the economic problems, I would like to go to the next question. What are some of your dissatisfactions on the Japanese behavior, having such an enormous trade surplus as well as economic power?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, of course, some of the problems are due, as I said, to your extraordinary abilities. Who would have thought in 1973 and 74 that Japan could turn the enormous oil deficit into a huge surplus? That's a great achievement.

Our people who are more competent in economics than I am say that Japan pursues a rather nationalistic course in economics. On the other hand, we have to be careful not to produce so much disorganization in Japan that the political stability of the country is affected. So obviously Japan has to understand that every economic relationship should be reciprocal. We have to understand that Japan is a very peculiarly situated country economically with few resources. So a great deal depends on its skill and its technology.

And this requires understanding on both sides.

MR. KISHIDA: Despite the fact that today Japan belongs to the Western Democracies, it could hardly take a similar posture as the NATO countries because 1) it is located in Asia, 2) adjoining, even though with a belt of water in between, with such countries as China, Russia and North Korea,

- 23 -

to all of which Japanese people have special, traditional
feelings, and 3) it had in the past a history of militarism
and super-nationalism. Furthermore Japan's constitution
which forbids the use of force and her three principles
against nuclear weapons enjoy support of the majority of
people. Against such background, what do you conceive Japan
can play in Asia, considering particularly the self-imposed
limit of Japan's military capabilities?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, Japan's position is
different from NATO's. On the other hand, Japan's security
will be affected by what happens in Europe. If Europe were
to be overrun by the Soviet Union or become Finlandized, so
that it were no longer a major power factor, this would
affect the security of Japan, as it would, for that matter,
affect the security of China.

So it is not a matter of indifference
what happens in Europe, even to Japan, especially with the
nature of modern technology. Secondly, Japan has a large
population and an advanced technology, yet it is an island.
So I really do not see why Japan should not be able to defend
itself substantially by itself, or at least make a much
greater contribution to its own defense. And Japan has not
been exactly incompetent in military matters in its history.

- 24 -

So I think that Japanese military capabilities potentially are not negligible. Now, the relationship of Japan's constitution to its security role is a matter the Japanese have to decide by their own constitutional processes. This is not for an American to determine.

But I think it is historically inevitable that Japan becomes a more significantly military power. I'm not saying next year, but as a historical phenomenon it is inconceivable to me that a country with the historical traditions of Japan, with the sense of national identity in Japan, and with the economy of Japan, will forever be content with playing such a small role in its own defense. It is not compatible with my reading of Japanese history. But I could be wrong.

I want to make clear, I'm not recommending it. I'm predicting it. If I'm wrong, this will be no reason to criticize Japan.

MR. KISHIDA: With this prediction of yours in mind, and I understand clearly that it is not your recommendation, I'm interested in the recent argument that is going on in Japan that we should not confine ourselves within the one percent limit of GNP our defense budget. The other forces, of course, say that we should remain within that framework. How does your prediction go in this question?

- 25 -

DR. KISSINGER: I think that [I think] the group that says you should not confine yourself within one percent limit probably has history on their side, and reality. Whom have I offended in Japan now?

MR. KISHIDA: I would think that if your view of prediction is introduced in the Asahi Shimbun, it will become a great conversation piece in Japan.

DR. KISSINGER: But you will make clear that I'm not recommending it.

MR. KISHIDA: Oh, yes. We will make clear that it is a prediction. Let me proceed on to the Security Treaty.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty has been a target of attack by China and the opposition parties in Japan for years. Lately however a remarkable shift of attitude is being seen on the part of China and some quarters of domestic opposition in this matter. In the United States, on the other hand, we hear from time-to-time a criticism against Japan's so called "free-ride". From the viewpoints of the equal partnership between Japan and the U.S., would you say you are satisfied with the functioning of the present Security Treaty? Do you consider this Treaty as a pivot of Asian stability in the future as well?

- 26 -

[x]

DR. KISSINGER: I'm satisfied with the security treaty. [I think] it is the keystone of our Pacific policy. I think that it is historically probable that Japan will assume a greater burden within the security treaty, but even if Japan played a greater role, the security treaty should be maintained.

MR. KISHIDA: I would like now to move to the U.S. and Soviet relations, and particularly this bipolar structure.

It is well known that you have once described the world situation as "militarily bi-polar, but politically multi-polar" in your book "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy", published in 1968. Former President Nixon later described as a "five polar structure of the world", adding Western Europe, China, and Japan to the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

What is your current geometrical picture of the present global structure?

Would you disclose your current birds-eye view of the bi-polar power structure as it stands now, and locate in that map such nations as China, West Germany, and Japan. What localities and gravity would the countries occupy in such a chart?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think it is true that in the field of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union are the two power centers. We [have] we're

the only two countries that have the whole range of nuclear weapons. France and Britain have some capability, especially if used in conjunction with us. China has a more limited capability than France and Britain.

But China has the capability to develop more and so I would say, among the countries now in the military field, I would have to put the Soviet Union and the United States on the top level, West Germany has no nuclear weapons, but it has a good Army. Japan has a small Army, but is a potentially powerful country. China has a large Army, but yet as strong as the United States and the U.S.S.R., it is militarily not so strong but potentially also strong. Economically, however, the Soviet Union is not so strong as it looks. It is not possible to run a modern economy by total planning efficiently.

I would consider Japan and West Germany almost super powers, economically. Certainly, in relation to their population. I think a united Western Europe and Japan are beginning to approach the United States in terms of economic importance. We are still the most powerful country economically, but our relative position has declined somewhat, as is shown by the difficulties that the dollar has had.

So I would have to maintain my original argument, that there is a difference between military power and other forms of power today. Saudi Arabia is militarily not very strong, but economically enormously strong. And secondly, that military power does not necessarily confer the advantage.

It did once before, so that it is possible for a country to
be militarily much stronger than another, and yet not be able
to gain the political advantages that, say, 50 years ago
would have gone with military predominance, which makes
this a very complicated international situation.

MR. KISHIDA: My interpretation of your explanation
is that the Soviet Union and the U.S., is not placed in
juxtaposition in the same level of equality, particularly
if you take into consideration the economic factor. Could
I then in totality, both military and economic, could I then
interpret the two super powers' bipolar structure not in
the way of juxtaposition, but rather in a vertical positions,
of U.S. above and the Soviet Union right underneath?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that's a very good way of
putting it. I think if you add all the indications of
strength, we are still far more powerful than the Soviet
Union. If you look only at the military, there's a certain
parity. But our overall strength is still far superior to
that of the Soviet Union.

MR. KISHIDA: When one speaks about the military
parity, "certain parity" between the two super powers, my
impression is that the concept of parity is for the United
States to maintain military superiority over the Soviet Union.

- 29 -

DR. KISSINGER: It depends on the category. The
Soviet Union has more conventional forces, and more tanks.
On the other hand, we have a much greater mobilization
potential than the Soviet Union, and in any prolonged war,
we would certainly get the upper hand by our potential.

In nuclear weapons, the destructiveness is so great
on both sides that a certain equivalence is reached. I
would say, if you looked at all the indices of power, I
would still put the United States ahead, even in the military
field.

MR. KISHIDA: "Detente" has been one of the most
prominent elements in world politics during the past
decade. There is no question that the Nixon-Kissinger
diplomacy has contributed significantly to the evolution
of "detente" through improved U.S.-Russian relations, U.S.-
China reconciliation, and initiating the SALT negotiations.
In view of the current widely-recognized stagnation of the
process of "detente":

What in your view are some of the obstacles
forestalling the progress of "detente"? What
are the preconditions essential to the further
evolution of "detente"?

Do you consider the Soviet involvements in
Africa in recent years continue to jeopardize
U.S.-Russian relations and hence, East-West
relations?

- 30 -

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think the overwhelming reason for stagnation is that the Soviet Union must make up its mind whether it wants detente or expansion. It cannot possibly have both. What the Soviet Union in Africa, [what the Communist takeover it has encouraged in countries like Afghanistan] cannot permanently be accepted by the United States. At what point we draw the line depends on [whichever Administration is in office].

But that we must draw a line, it cannot be questioned. We cannot permit 40,000 to 50,000 Cuban troops running around Africa; [they cannot permit us to run around Africa;]

a nation of nine million in the Caribbean. That is an absurdity. It cannot be permitted, it will not be permanently permitted, no mater what the decision of the Administration is, the opposition here will become unmanageable.

Similarly, whether the Soviet Union ordered the coup in Afghanistan or tolerated it, the fact is, in a country that was already very heavily under Soviet influence, a Communist party has been put into office. I cannot believe that this was unknown in Moscow.

Now we see another invasion by the Katanga gendarmes in Zaire. [It is not possible to accept it. So detente cannot survive this.]

- 31 -

MR. KISHIDA: Yours seems to be the linkage theory.
Would you comment on the two diametrically opposed views
regarding the "linkage" theory; a theory that any dealings
with the Russians ought to be linked, while some argue that
the SALT could be negotiated independently from the issues
such as the Russian involvement in Africa?

DR. KISSINGER: Linkage is reality, it's not an
invention. Things are linked, you cannot unlink them by an
act of policy. Sooner or later, we cannot tolerate geo-
political transformations indefinitely. It cannot be.
Reality will force it.

MR. KISHIDA: There's a widely-held observation that the so-called "human rights diplomacy" by President Carter has actually been responsible for the deterioration of the U.S.-Soviet relations. What is your comment on this?

DR. KISSINGER: I agree with the principle of the human rights policy of President Carter. I stated publicly a number of concerns with the practical implication. policy must have some possibility of being implemented, and if there is too big a gap between rhetoric and implementation, then it demonstrates the impotence of the country, rather than its moral force. This is one consideration.

- 32 -

The second is whom does it apply to? I would make
a distinction between totalitarian governments like the
Communist governments, especially of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, and
authoritarian governments
like the Philippines, Korea, some Latin American countries.
I think authoritarian governments have a much bigger
possibility of evolving in a positive direction than
totalitarian governments.

Third, I would hate to see our human rights policy
applied only against allies, and among allies, only against
weak allies. This would be a distortion.

And, fourth, I would hate to have human
rights become an excuse for American isolationism.

MR. KISHIDA: What about the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it worsened our relations
with the Soviet Union for a brief period, but we
haven't done much against the Soviet Union lately in the
human rights field.

the Carter Administration makes less references
to human rights with the Soviet Union than we did.

MR. KISHIDA: You have referred earlier the major
obstacles of the current U.S.-Soviet negotiations. But the
SALT negotiations seem to be constantly out-paced by the rapid
developments in the field of military technology, as exemplified

by ever-developing MIRV systems or advancement in the cruise
missile systems. Would you not fear that nuclear arms
competition might have eroded any significant achievements
in the present SALT II negotiations by the time a new treaty
is concluded?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, I don't think that is true. I
think it is possible to get an adequate SALT agreement.

MR. KISHIDA: Do you mean to say then that the
SALT I treaty, despite its expiration, is working, and would
you foresee that SALT II sooner or later will be completed?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, SALT I is working within the
framework which it was supposed to establish, which was to
limit numbers. I think SALT II will be concluded this
summer

MR. KISHIDA: This summer?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, that's my estimate. And there
will be a big debate in this country.

MR. KISHIDA: Could we then expect that after SALT II,
you will go on to SALT III?

DR. KISSINGER: I would think so.

MR. KISHIDA: I believe when it gets to the third
stage, the strategic offensive weapons ought to be substantially
reduced, or it would have no meaning.

- 34 -

DR. KISSINGER: Well, they're already being reduced in SALT II. They will probably be further reduced in SALT III, because these weapons are so destructive that reduction [does] leave a vast destructive power.

MR. KISHIDA: Do you believe such further reduction in SALT III would be possible?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. Keeping in mind that with the destructiveness of weapons and with the multiple warheads on each weapon, reductions are not a magic cure.

There will still be, with all reductions that are conceivable, there will be more warheads in ten years than there were in 1968.

MR. KISHIDA: Since, as you pointed out, that the warheads may be more than '68, can we then say that it is not a substantial reduction in any true sense of the word?

DR. KISSINGER: Compared to what? It is a reduction over what it would be without SALT. It is not a reduction compared to what it would be without the improvements in technology over the past decades.

MR. KISHIDA: I, too, think substantial reduction is the only hope that we will have. Let me now move to the question of the Euro-communism. Despite the recent setbacks, the Western European communist parties continue to have a potential to either actively participate or take over the government.

- 35 -

[Y]

Do you believe that these communist parties are in fact proceeding towards total independence, both in their doctrine and practice, from the Russian communist party, as stressed by the French communists who relinquished the doctrine of "dictatorship of the proletariat", or by the Spaniards who deleted the word "Leninism" from their party platform?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviet new constitution also gives up the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And so they're now again all in agreement.

[And] none of the Communist parties that I know has given up the dictatorship internally. They are all run in a very autocratic manner. The response that the United States has pursued, there are two problems. One, are these parties independent of Moscow as far as their internal organization is concerned? Maybe yes, maybe no. Communist leaders like to be independent. So they may even be somewhat independent of Moscow.

Second, what policies will they pursue? I think on the whole, their policies are contrary to the interests of the United States, and heavily influenced by Communist ideology, even when they're independent of Moscow. And so, in Western Europe, I think the Communist parties will pursue policies contrary to our interests, that is to say, neutralist, anti-U.S. policies.

MR. KISHIDA: Communist parties in France, Italy, and Spain have declared that they will support the political pluralism. Do you trust their contentions prima facie as their true and genuine intentions? What in your observations are some of the factors that communist parties could maintain their strength in Western Europe?

DR. KISSINGER: No. They will support it until they get into office. Once they're in office, they will destroy it. It is contrary to Communist beliefs. They will reduce the government to irrelevance and make the party the principal organ in the state. This is no Communist state has ever been different. How can they permit the reversal of the progress of history? What Communist party has ever permitted itself to be voted out of office once it was in office? That's why they didn't want to go into office in France right now, because they're not yet strong enough.

MR. KISHIDA: Do you then foresee that the Communist parties are gaining power in Western Europe?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't foresee it, I say there's a danger.

MR. KISHIDA: Why do you believe the European Communist parties are gaining power right now?

- 37 -

DR. KISSINGER:

it depends on the country. Because the economic crises caused by the oil price rises, and by the fact that the growth rate in all industrialized countries is declining compared to what it was in the '50s and '60s.

Because in such countries as Italy, the tradition of national unity never was firmly elaborated, because those who should resist the Communists have become indolent and consoled themselves by saying, maybe the Communists are democrats. So that way, they don't have to make any effort.

Partly because of the boredom of the middle class youth, that prefers excitement to economic progress. I think these are all factors.

MR. KISHIDA: Would you consider it as the beginning of an end of the NATO Alliance, if and when a Communists regime is established in one of the NATO countries?

DR. KISSINGER: It will be a very serious problem for NATO. I don't think the American public will support indefinitely the protection, the stationing of American troops to protect one Communist government against another Communist government.

I think statesmen have to understand reality, and not pretend that they have every choice.

MR. KISHIDA: Although the United States no longer exercises the kind of leadership in world politics like the one she once used to enjoy, there is no question that she still bears a great responsibility in maintaining world peace.

What do you foresee is a likely American role in
international politics in the next century, and what do you
believe should be the right role?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the United States, as the
economically strongest nation and militarily the strongest
nation in the world, has an obligation to help define an
agenda, this includes security, which we've already discussed, as well
as the relationship between industrial democracies, and the
relationship between the industrial democracies and
the developing World.

I think that in this sense of developing a new
world structure, the United States has a very major role
to play.

MR. KISHIDA: In the development of these areas
that you have mentioned, what in a concrete form does the
major role of the United States take place?

DR. KISSINGER: we've already discussed security in the industrial democracy so we'll let me talk about the developing countries. I think the United States should make, and when I was in office we tried to make, and I'm sure my successors will also agree on the specific issues, commodity prices, technological exchange, and the problem of the poorest countries. All of these require some concrete solutions.

- 39 -

Now, the developing countries, it must be within
the framework of special policies. It cannot be an inter-
national charity program, and it cannot be with the United
States assuming all the burdens and the developing countries
assuming no responsibilities. But I think in all of these
areas, specific proposals have been made, can be improved,
and should be discussed; energy, nothing can be done
without the United States in energy.

MR. KISHIDA: Do you mean to say that the military
role will gradually be decreased while the roles that the
United States play in other areas such as economy and
energy be increased?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't think the military role
can be decreased, but I think the role we play in other areas
must be increased.

MR. KISHIDA: I asked this question because I have
a feeling that relative decline of American power would occur
in the years to come, in the overall relations.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it depends on what policies
we pursue. Our relative strength is in many ways greater
than it was before. It depends on our policies. In the
field of energy, the cooperation among industrial democracies,
the need for it, is greater than it was before. [The] there
is no inherent reason why the relative position of the United
States should decline, but it could happen. It should not
happen; it need not happen; but
it could happen. It depends on us.

- 40 -

[v]

MR. KISHIDA: It appears historically that the U.S. diplomacy has been oscillating between the two diverse policies of internationalism (sometimes viewed as overseas intervention) and isolationism (or, retrenchment). Since Vietnam, pendulum seems swinging to a mood of retrenchment. To what extent do you believe this trend would continue? Do you expect that the American public continues to show little interest in the communist expansion, for instance, in Africa?

DR. KISSINGER: It is true that the United States has a tendency to oscillate between isolationism and euphoria, or [what do] you call it, isolation and overseas intervention. It is true that the pendulum is now swinging toward isolationism. This is the obligation of our national leadership to prevent. We cannot afford isolationism anymore. It is against our interests, it's against everybody else's interest, too.

But it will weaken us militarily and economically and politically.

MR. KISHIDA: Inasmuch as I understand that the leadership ought to prevent such a trend, but what about the public in America? Would the American public continue to show interest in things that are happening in Africa or they would rather stay away?

DR. KISSINGER: Most of our leadership problems are public problems. I don't mean the leadership of this government. I mean the people who used to support an active foreign policy were demoralized by Vietnam. But [think if t] I think the

- 41 -

a strong policy
public will support if they get strong leaders.

MR. KISHIDA: Isn't there also a -- the position
that the Congress takes, say, for example as opposed to the
government leadership?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. The relationship between the
Executive and the Congress requires very careful re-consideration.
The actions of our Congress have been inconsistent with our
national interest in many fields.

MR. KISHIDA: We are watching the U.S. Congress
with interest, with some anxiety as to the increasing strength
of the Congress in foreign policy matters. How would you
best solve this issue?

DR. KISSINGER: I think part of the reason the
Congress has become so strong is because the executive
authority declined after Watergate. I think that with normal
Presidencies there will be a certain restoration of executive
authority. And when some of the debacles caused by the
Congress become apparent, there will be greater public
support for the correct policies.

MR. KISHIDA: On the Middle East, the area continues
to pose a potential threat to world peace. Your efforts
which successfully resulted in the first Sinai Agreement,
Re-opening the Suez Canal, and the second Sinai Agreement
are well known. In view of the recent dramatic Sadat,
Begin mutual visits and the subsequent developments......,

- 42 -

What is the greatest barrier that appears to have almost alleviated the momentum in the peace process? Is it a deep-rooted, yet potentially undeniable influence of Arab radicals including the PLO, or Israeli intransigence regarding West Bank and her settlements? What is the rock-bottom core of the Middle East question?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the big problem is how you measure security and how much are you willing to pay for legitimacy. Israel has identified security with territory. The Arabs have considered that conferring legitimacy on Israel is a big concession.

Israel feels that this legitimacy can be withdrawn again later after they have given up their territory.

the heart of the problem, how you balance territorial adjustment, which means Israeli withdrawal against the need of acceptance by the neighbors, how you define peace, this is what international politics has been about for hundreds of years.

On the other hand, I think President Sadat's initiative has created a totally new situation. And even though the negotiations will be difficult, I am hopeful they will lead to a successful conclusion.

MR. KISHIDA: Your method of the Middle East peace has been exemplified in that dynamic "shuttle diplomacy". As opposed to this, the Carter Administration favors the comprehensive method. But the recent trend indicates that the shuttle diplomacy has been also applied. What is your evaluation as to the methodology of enhancing the peace process?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think there is any one methodology, and each Administration must do what it is comfortable with. So I have no criticism of the particular method that is used. Also, if I had stayed in office, I would have had to adjust my diplomacy to this new circumstances, which in fact my previous diplomacy helped create.

So I think there is no one correct method, and I'm not inclined to be critical.

MR. KISHIDA: I would like to hear your comment on the dramatic action that President Sadat took by flying into Jerusalem.

DR. KISSINGER: I think it was one of the great historical acts of our period. It showed enormous courage, great wisdom, and it created entirely new conditions. And as you know, I'm a great admirer of President Sadat. He is a good friend of mine.

MR. KISHIDA: I asked this question because your method and his, in a way, has some similarities.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we learned from each other.

MR. KISHIDA: When you say, we learned from each other, what did you learn from President Sadat?

DR. KISSINGER: He has a great ability to go to the heart of a problem.

[Y]

MR. KISHIDA: How do you conceive of the Soviet participation, in terms of guaranteeing future peace in the Middle East? Should the Soviets stay away during the process of peace negotiations, but participate as one of the guarantors of Middle East peace?

DR. KISSINGER: You know, guarantees are a double-edged sword, because on the one hand they can help preserve the agreement, on the other, they can help provide an endless excuse for intervention. And I don't see why the Soviet interests would be harmed by a peace settlement in which they don't participate.

So I would say, yes, if the Soviet Union wants to participate in a conference that gives international recognition to an agreement, I would have no objection. But basically, the issue is not who participates in what, the issue is what will lead to a conclusion? What will lead to a settlement? And there, I don't see why the Soviet Union should be so eager to participate.

MR. KISHIDA: One of the major characteristics of the recent situations is the rise of the Third World's influence. Many of those countries possess various important natural resources including oil, and are demanding a new order not only in the economic sphere but in other areas; hence, the Third World in many respects has become a major subject in the international political arena.

- 45 -

Like the so-called "coercion by the majority" which we once experienced in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Third World countries are now apt to rely on their numerical strength thus creating a danger of confrontation with the advanced nations. What in your view are some of the important factors if the North and South are to conduct a dialogue rather than confrontations?

DR. KISSINGER: I have already indicated that I think we have an obligation to develop complete programs, together with the other industrial democracies for the Third World.

On the other hand, the Third World has an obligation to understand that they cannot continue to adopt slogans that are insulting to the industrial democracies. And at the same time demand our cooperation. They cannot continue to conduct domestic policies at home that guarantee that there can be no progress. And at the same time, insist that we rescue them from the consequences of these policies.

And above all, they cannot try to coerce us with numerical majorities in the United Nations. So both sides have an obligation for a responsible dialogue on specific issues.

MR. KISHIDA: Regarding these obligations on both sides, we still see, for example, in the conference of Law of the Seas that the Third World seemed to be depending on the numerical strength.

- 46 -

N

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but here is a classic example.
I believe that the United States has made very reasonable
proposals. We have a monopoly on the technology. Certainly
we and Japan and a few other industrial democracies are the
only countries that have any technical possibility of
exploration. If we followed traditional patterns, we
would simply do it. Nobody could stop us. We could make
an agreement with each other, allocating specific areas
to each other. And it couldn't be stopped.

Now, we have made proposals where half of the
bottom of the ocean is assigned to the developing nations,
and where on top of it a certain royalty is paid to
fund for development. I don't think we can do anymore, and
if they don't accept it, I think we have to go ahead on
our own.

MR. KISHIDA: Many a country in the Third World
appears inclined to adopt socialist system in order to
attain their political as well as economic independence.
In this connection, are there attractive ideologies and/or
concepts that the free world could offer to these countries?

DR. KISSINGER: Economic progress, fulfilling the
aspirations of their people, peace. I think all the
aspirations of mankind are much better represented by our
side. It's an absurdity. Over 90 percent of the transfer
of resources to the developing countries comes from the

- 47 -

industrial democracy. The Communist countries do less
than ten percent. They have nothing to offer in the
economic field. And yet, the ideology of the developing
countries is closer to the Communist ideology than to ours.
That is an incongruity there.

All the Soviets are offering is arms, with which
you cannot build economic progress.

MR. KISHIDA: Don't you think what the capitalist
world is offering is more time consuming?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, no, it's not more time
consuming. What the Communist
world offers is authority, but it doesn't offer a solution,
because, after all, none of the Communist countries have
solved their own economic problems. So how can they solve
the economic problems of others?

But what the capitalist world offers requires
discipline and some sacrifice over a period of time, but
nothing like the Communist system. But it also offers success.

MR. KISHIDA: You have just mentioned that all the
Soviets or the Russians could offer, mainly, are the arms.
But we see the capitalist nations offering arms, too.
Wouldn't that offer by the free world be contrary to
the --

- 48 -

DR. KISSINGER: No. Because for many of these countries, their security threat comes from Communist arms. Take North Africa. Algeria is being supplied with Communist arms, so a certain necessity exists vis a vis Morocco and Mauritania. The same is true in Africa where the West has not supplied any arms or any significant amounts of arms. And that has created an imbalance.

The best would be, for the developing countries, if both sides reduced the shipment of arms. That would certainly be useful and something we should attempt to negotiate. I'm not saying we should force arms on countries or even encourage them.

MR. KISHIDA: As part of the Third World movement, southern Africa is clearly one of the most fluid areas at this time. With racial issues and various forces, including the Soviet influence, involved, would tell us what are your prospects for the future of that region?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, two separate issues. One is, I favor majority rule in Southern Africa, and I favor that societies be established, or governments be established, which reflect the will of the majority with protection for the rights of the minority.

Secondly, I'm opposed to having this accomplished by Communists, by Cuban troops. As I've said before, we cannot tolerate it indefinitely, if Cuban troops march all

- 49 -

Y

around Africa. So prospects of a peaceful evolution exist.
The United States should stand for its traditional
principles, but if the Cubans appear, we will
[may] have to oppose it, no matter what
other issues.

MR. KISHIDA: Since the military capability still
remains as one of the major factors in international
negotiations, many of the developing countries are keenly
interested in obtaining both nuclear and modern weapon
systems. Nuclear explosion, if a country so wishes, is no
longer difficult a task due mainly to a remarkable develop-
ment of technology. Given such a reality, do you expect that
nuclear proliferation would continue in the years to come?
For the purpose of deterring such proliferation, what methods
of policies do you suggest to have Geneva disarmament conference
and other international systems function more effectively?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think there is a definite
danger of nuclear proliferation. And I think with respect
to peaceful nuclear technology, it is almost impossible to
prevent

So then the question is,
Whether diversion to military uses can be avoided. And a subsidiary
question

is whether it should be done in cooperation with other advanced
industrialized countries, or should we do it alone against
everybody or without the cooperation of others.

- 50 -

[Y]

I feel strongly, we should as far as countries even without i like Japan are concerned, they have all the technology, and it really depends on the decision of the government. There is no technical means available to prevent Japan from getting nuclear weapons. There is only a political decision that prevents it.

So therefore, we should work with the Japanese government, by encouraging its political against nuclear weapons decision, and secondly, on agreeing with each other not to spread this technology to other areas in a way that lends itself to diversion for military uses. And if we confuse those two problems, we will achieve nothing.

I would say the same about Western Europe. I don't want to single out Japan. Japan and Western Europe are in exactly the same position.

MR. KISHIDA: In agreeing with what you have explained, however, isn't there an immediate concrete method that we could put in force the principle of nonproliferation, like for instance the United States would not deal with any country that has not signed the non-nuke treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: What does that mean, would not deal with them? Like who? Like India?

MR. KISHIDA: Right, India, Pakistan, Brazil. Or Israel, Egypt.

DR. KISSINGER: Would not cooperate with these countries in the nuclear field?

- 51 -

[Y]

MR. KISHIDA: Right. Because they refused to sign
the non-proliferation treaty.

DR. KISSINGER: I would have to look at this country
by country. So far, I think we are better off insisting on
specific safeguards, than in asking other countries to sign
specific treaties. I think we can make our cooperation de-
pendant on the agreement to sign safeguards with us. But it
depends on the country. I'd be reluctant
to make this a general doctrine.

MR. KISHIDA: A new nuclear energy policy of the
United States, as announced by the Ford Administration, has
been further delineated by President Carter. Clearly we are
faced with an agonizing task of securing both non-proliferation
and peaceful use of atomic energy at the same time.

Do you consider the current U.S. policy in this field
ideal? Do you expect that other advanced nations would accept
and follow the U.S. proposals, including development of alter-
nate energy sources?

DR. KISSINGER:

I think the objective of non-
proliferation is correct. I think it is in the common interest
of us and our industrial democratic friends like Japan and the
countries of Western Europe.

- 52 -

[Y]

We however have to avoid the impression that we
are blackmailing our closest friends. This is
an area where consensus is important because we cannot
really force people. So maybe we ought to apply the
Japanese method of consensus, and you ought to teach us how
to do that.

MR. KISHIDA: But my feeling is that the consensus
will be very difficult in this case. In fact, we see
Western Europe or Japan not really in support of the
U.S. policy.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but I believe that our policy
is possible, that Western Europe and Japan will support it,
because it is not in the interests of Western Europe and Japan,
either commercially or militarily to have a spread of nuclear
technology of a kind that lends itself to the production of
nuclear weapons.

What Western Europe and Japan not want to accept
is that they should stop their own nuclear development in
order to prevent proliferation. If we could separate those
two issues, I think we would get their support.

MR. KISHIDA: The third U.N. Conference of the Law
of the Seas is in the progress, having just completed its
7th session. Obviously it is inevitable for the family of
nations to discuss how the mankind could make best use of the
limited space of our planet.

- 53 -

[y]

The United States in virtual disregard of the request of the Conference Chairman legislated in 1977 a 200-mile fishery zone. It is further contemplating a similar procedure for the development of the deep-seabed resources. Would you not consider such U.S. attitudes incompatible with a heavy responsibility that a super-power bears in terms of establishing a world order?

DR. KISSINGER: I was opposed to the legislation, as you know.

And I think it was a mistake to have it. On the other hand, it shows the problem of the law of the seas conference. We would have been able to avoid it, if we had been able to give a deadline for a comprehensive agreement to our Congress, say for the next session. But we could not tell our Congress never to have this law when there was no prospect of success.

So I think it was wrong of us to do it, but I have now seen that I have developed the conference, I can understand why they did it.

MR. KISHIDA: In our era when the role an individual could play in the world history is generally on the decline, there is no question that your grand design and major decisions, along with those of Chou EnLai, Willy Brandt, and Anwar Sadat, radiated a major change upon the course of history.

As a historian as well as a policy maker, how do
you assess the influence of an unusually gifted individual
upon politics and diplomacy?

DR. KISSINGER: [Well, I think that there is some]
there is an element in all our policies of objective reality,
and no man, no matter how gifted, can invent a new reality.
At the same time, reality gets strained through the minds of
individuals who have to interpret it and who have to understand
it.

And obviously, if you look at the history of China,
it would have been different without Mao and Chou En Lai.
American history would have been different without Lincoln
or French history without DeGaulle,
or Franklin Roosevelt. [So I think the problem of policy is
to find the relation between necessity and choice.]

unusually gifted individuals have an
important role, but their role is also to understand reality.

MR. KISHIDA: Judging from your resourceful experience,
will it make any difference if a head of government is more
gifted, more capable, or of higher calibre than otherwise?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I've already indicated it makes
a great difference, it makes a considerable difference whether
a head of a government is more or less gifted. As I've illustrated
by the examples I've given you.

- 55 -

MR. KISHIDA: Would you give us a balance-sheet of both merits and demerits of summit conference in our age of skidding world? How do you evaluate the significance, if any, of the London summit of last year (and Bonn summit of this year) in which leaders of advanced nations attempt to forestall impending economic crisis, or of the recent Carter-Fukuda summit in which "frank exchange of views" was just about the only action that took place?

Also, given the current precarious climate between the United States and the Soviet Union, do you not consider it too risky (for President Carter) to aim for a summit for the purpose of alleviating mutual distrust? Would you not rather wait for the right moment when a prospect of compromise is assured by paintaking cumulative efforts of lower-level diplomatic contacts and negotiations:

DR. KISSINGER: First, I would make a distinction between summit conference among friends and summit conference with opponents.

A summit conference among friends, even if it does not have a spectacular result, is useful because it enables leaders to get to know each other, to exchange ideas, to force decisions.

I think the summit conferences of Rambouillet, of Puerto Rico, of London and now of Bonn, are good. Even if their progress is limited, they help the understanding, and occasionally they make important progress. Now, summit conferences among opponents, that's more complicated. Because if they fail, they make the situation worse rather than

- 58 -

[Y]

MR. KISHIDA: What about during the negotiations?
All of a sudden the public is presented with the result without knowing what was going on till then?

DR. KISSINGER: Oh, no. I think the public should know the general aims that one is seeking to achieve. Then, of course, it should be given *general* information. But the *tactical* day-to-day leakage of *information* is very dangerous.

MR. KISHIDA: How do you compromise the difficulty of an open society in that the public has to know, but there is the necessity of keeping the secret of diplomacy?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that if you try to *but out* *reveal* *tactical information*, too much, you will end up achieving nothing, and then you create another kind of crisis. And I think this is a question that each political leader has to determine in the light of his special circumstances. There is no general rule.

MR. KISHIDA: I understand there is no general rule, but I still believe that the degree of 'secret diplomacy' in the 'democratic society' is a very, very difficult question.

DR. KISSINGER: It's a very difficult question, and I agree that the government should give the greatest possible amount of information to the public. Your newspapers always find out everything, anyway.

[4]

MR. KISHIDA: May I ask the personal future of your career? What do you intend to do after a couple of years?

DR. KISSINGER: I haven't made any decisions yet.

Right now I'm writing my book, and after that I'll make a decision.

MR. KISHIDA: More specifically, I think there have been a lot of rumors going on about your Senatorial candidacy from New York.

DR. KISSINGER: I know,

I have made no plans along that line, because first of all, Senator Javits has not yet decided whether he will run. I will certainly not oppose Senator Javits, so if he decides to run, then I will not even consider it.

If he doesn't run, I'll make the decision then in 1980. [I'm right now] not very interested in it.

MR. KISHIDA: You are very well known in Japan, and sometimes compared with Metternich or Bismarck. Do you think they could have done as well as you have done provided if they had been in your position?

DR. KISSINGER: I would think in all likelihood --

MR. KISHIDA: How would you compare yourself?

DR. KISSINGER: You can't compare the two. Metternich was an aristocratic statesman in an aristocratic age. I had to conduct foreign policy in a great democracy. His problems

[Y]

were totally different. He was a great statesman for his period, and so was Bismarck, who actually influenced my thinking more than Metternich,

I certainly could not have done what he did in his period. That is for sure. Whether he could have done what I did in my period would depend on his capacity to adapt.

Certainly, I could not have acted in an aristocratic age, with my kind of diplomacy.

MR. KISHIDA: But then, do you think that he was adaptable enough to the current world conditions?

DR. KISSINGER: Probably. But he was a product of a totally different age.

MR. KISHIDA: I recall you making a remark seven, eight years ago during the Nixon Administration. A remark in the West Coast, saying something to the effect that Japanese people are apt to make a drastic change in history, while the Chinese are ....

DR. KISSINGER: No, I have said if they think the balance of power has shifted, Japanese people will adapt themselves. I do not think that without a reason. But if they think the balance of power has changed, would be shifted against the United States, I think it's possible.

MR. KISHIDA: You made that remark in connection with the Chinese emerging in the international scene.

- 61 -

DR. KISSINGER: I don't remember my exact phrase.
But my basic point is that Japan, like any other country, will
adjust itself to what it perceives to be its overwhelming
security interests. Japan is in a better position to do it
than many other countries because it is, with all its internal
debates, a very cohesive society.

Mr. KISHIDA: You said nothing about some kind of unaccountability of the Japanese ....

DR. KISSINGER: on the contrary. I think
Japan is very dependable, provided the basic framework doesn't
change.

MR. KISHIDA: When you say the record of Japanese negotiating history have been excellent so far, are you endorsing that Japan should continue to do what she has been doing?

DR. KISSINGER: obviously I would
like the economic problems to be worked out. But I think it
is difficult to fault the achievements of Japan. You can
argue, the fact that a negotiator is difficult to deal with
for the other side, doesn't mean he's a bad negotiator. And
your people are very consistent.

MR. KISHIDA: Is Japan one of the most difficult countries for you to understand, mentality-wise?

- 62 -

[Y]

DR. KISSINGER: Without any question, that's true.
But then, it's very difficult for you to understand us. Don't
you think it's very hard for Japanese -- I mean, you have a
lot of experience, but it takes a lot of adjustment. Then, I
don't know whether Japanese can be translated into English,
and vice versa. I think there's a real linguistic problem.
You express yourself in fine shades. I don't think you can
really ask a Japanese to say yes or no to a question, because
he doesn't think exactly this way. It took me a long time to
understand this. You may have a much subtler mind than we do.

So I think this is a real cultural problem.

MR. KASHIDA: We understand that President Ceausescu
of Romania has been to a certain extent instrumental for your
visit to Peking. We also hear that he is now working behind
the scenes on the Korean question at this time. Is this true?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, Ceausescu [had] a certain influence, but not [a] decisive one. At any rate, there must [be] a secret trip to Pyong Yang. That must not be. That would be too demoralizing for everybody. Pyong Yang is not of the same importance as Peking.

I'm afraid that I must go [to] you are very patient inter-
viewer.

- 63 -

M7

MR. KISHIDA: To follow up on the Taiwan question, inasmuch as we fully realize you can't go into details on the concrete matters, speaking academically, what are some of the alternatives, theoretical alternatives, that we could think of in solving the Taiwan question?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think really with Brzezinsky,
just having returned from
China

I don't want to go into it.

- END -