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## Political & Social

### Shevardnadze Speaks on Foreign Policy

PM 2607101988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian

26 Jul 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "19th All-Union CPSU Conference: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy"]

[Text] A Foreign Ministry scientific and practical conference which opened 25 July is devoted to this topic. Its aim is to analyze the accumulated experience; to conceptualize the period following the April Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the 27th CPSU Congress; and to determine ways, forms, and methods of work which will ensure the deepening and irreversibility of restructuring Soviet diplomacy.

A report was made by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister. He focused on the results of the party conference and shared his personal impressions on Mikhail Gorbachev's report and the delegates' speeches. He then concentrated on the key philosophical and conceptual questions posed to Soviet diplomacy by the practice of the past 3 years and the working conclusions drawn from them.

From the very beginning of perestroika, he said, we aspired to stimulate our best creative forces. It was a fine time of a fresh, spring renewal of foreign policy. A time of the April plenum and party congress, of Paris and Geneva, of Vladiyostok and Reykjavik, of Washington and Moscow, of the 15th January statement, and the Delhi Declaration. A time of working out bold decisions concerning the scrapping of medium and shorter-range missiles, and the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan.

For the first time in the history of Soviet diplomacy, the party leader held a meeting with its big workforce. While visiting us, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke at a general Foreign Ministry conference and defined the basic parameters and directions of our activity. We have restructured ourselves structurally and in essence. We have gained new experience and have emerged to new frontiers of departure.

Great positive changes have taken place in the USSR's foreign policy over the past 3 years. Mankind has received a multitude of confirmations of our resolve to steadfastly implement the program for stage-by-stage liquidation of nuclear weapons by the year 2000; to realize ideas for the creation of a system of all-embracing security, a "common European home," defense sufficiency and nonoffensive defense, the resolving of regional conflicts, the calling back of troops from bases on foreign territories, and so on.

In his report, Eduard Shevardnadze repeatedly returned to the ideas and proposals expressed by ministry personnel during preparations for the party conference. It was noted that the braking mechanism, developed in the

years when excessive centralization and administrative-command methods also held sway in the foreign policy sphere, has not yet been smashed once and for all. It was also noted that even to this day some comrades are unreceptive to collegial and democratic discussion of problems. It was stressed that in discussing the fate of the country, the appearance of varied and sometimes diametrically opposed points of view is a natural phenomenon. While not underestimating the danger of conservatism, it is also important to be aware of the danger of ultraleft deviations and to ward off, with the same amount of patience, attempts to resolve all problems of life at one fell swoop.

It was stated that the innovative concept of socialism set forth at the party conference in the general secretary's report puts an end to the monopoly that entrenches the principle of the single alternative, dogmatism, and the dangerous sense of one's own infallibility. Democratization, glanost, and the renunciation of excessive secrecy are the most efficient means for combatting it. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1605 OMT on 25 July carries a similar report, which renders the two preceding sentences as follows: "It was stated that the innovative concept of socialism set forth at the party conference in the general secretary's report puts an end to the monopoly that entrenches the principle of the single alternative, dogmatism, and the renunciation of excessive secrecy are the most efficient means for combatting it."] The democratization of the country is an essential condition and prerequisite for the democratization of international relations.

The 19th all-union party conference conclusion on enhancing the role of political means of ensuring security, Eduard Shevardnadze said, generates very serious consequences of a dual nature for the Foreign Ministry. First, our responsibility for prompt and correct evaluations of international situations increases dramatically. Second, one has to interpret in a new way the place and the role of the USSR Foreign Ministry within the structure of executive power, thereby assuring its increased activity, responsibility, and efficiency in developing our foreign policy in all of its aspects.

Eduard Shevardnadze focused on the constitutional and legal mechanism of the adoption of foreign policy decisions, which is defined in the report as a guarantee of their infallibility. The minister then stressed that the present conference is aimed not only at the staff in Soviet diplomacy and scientists, but also at the main target—the Soviet public, all Soviet people. Nationwide participation in forming foreign policy is a vital necessity. Soviet diplomacy, the main point of whose activity is the people's good, is obliged to explain itself to the people; obliged to plan its work in accordance with the people's expectations, hopes, and aspirations; obliged to answer to them for its actions and demarches. In the state accepting the rule of law which we are building, it is an

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obligatory norm for us. The 19th party conference decision on forming a constitutional-plenipotentiary mechanism for discussing and adopting major foreign policy decisions has been achieved through the suffering of our people. The decision on monitoring by popularly elected bodies on the basis of the democratic process was also achieved through the suffering by our diplomacy. The implementation of this decision in full is restoring its prestige and returning the primordial functions which are inherent only to it.

From the party conference decisions to create the constitutional-plenipotentiary mechanism follows the need to introduce a legislative procedure in accordance with which all departments concerned with military and military-industrial activity will be under the control of the supreme nationwide elected bodies. This affects both questions of utilizing military force outside the country's national frontiers and plans for defense construction, and the openness of military budgets in their main conjugation with the problem of national security.

Perestroika has thrown new light on the potential for people's diplomacy. At the UN General Assembly Third Special Session on Disarmament, we were convinced of how great its potential was in forming innovative approaches to problems of peace and how strong is its influence on politicians.

A detailed historical review of the Soviet state's foreign policy activity is given in the report. When speaking about the lessons of the past and in assessing them, said Eduard Shevardnadze, we are duty bound to take into account the nature and system of power, the methods prevalent at that moment in time of making decisions, and specific historical circumstances. The rapporteur adduced such achievements of Soviet diplomacy as the formation and strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition; the solution of the large-scale task of arranging the post-war world; the creation of the United Nations; the achievement of a number of very important agreements in the sphere of limiting the arms race; and the Helsinki Final Act, which laid the beginning for the pan-European process. At the same time, he noted, not all opportunities were used fully to prevent the appearance of the "Iron Curtain" and to limit the scale and acuteness of confrontation and the arms race. A direct and open analysis of the history of Soviet foreign policy reveals the natural influence that the deformations in the country's internal life had on our line in international affairs. Each departure from Leninist principles in internal policy had a serious negative effect on Soviet diplomacy.

The report notes that the new political thinking views peaceful coexistence in the context of the realities of the nuclear century. We are fully justified in refusing to see in it a special form of class struggle. One must not identify coexistence, which is based on such principles as nonaggression, respect for sovereignty and national independence, noninterference in internal affairs and so on, with class struggle. The struggle between two opposing

systems is no longer a determining tendency of the present-day era. At the modern stage, the ability to build up material wealth at an accelerated rate on the basis of front-ranking science and high-level techniques and technology, and to distribute it fairly, and through joint efforts to restore and protect the resources necessary for mankind's survival acquires decisive importance.

One of the motives of the arms race foisted on us by the West has been counting on the economic exhaustion of socialism. Now the truth, which Mikhail Gorbachev indicated in a speech at a general Foreign Ministry conference in May 1986, is completely obvious: The idea, which gained a firm hold in the minds and deeds of certain strategists, that the Soviet Union could be as strong as any possible coalition of states opposing it is absolutely groundless. To follow it means to act clearly against the national interests. We cannot, said Mikhail Gorbachev, permit ourselves the luxury of "imitating" the United States, NATO, and Japan in all their military-technical ventures. At the same time, in the modern world, a country's security undoubtedly means the availability of duly trained and equipped armed forces.

An important place in the report is given to the issues of developing and strengthening the Soviet Union's relations with the socialist countries. At the stage of restructuring and renewal, the world socialist system, the socialist community, is our enormous, priceless property. And at the same time, as a factor of peace and progress, it is the property of the whole of civilization, mankind. To augment it, improve it, and develop contacts between alien means to make peace more reliable and more secure. It means to become stronger and guarantee the realization of our peacemaking ideas.

The Soviet Union's approach to its relations with the developing countries—cooperation with them and the provision of assistance for them—and to the settling of regional conflicts is expounded in detail. Undoubtedly the movement toward the lowering of tension and the settling of regional conflicts, notes the minister, is going to be uneven and, of course, not smooth, but this movement has started and is proceeding on a wide front. Afghanistan has created a "chain reaction".

The theme of the shape of the Soviet state as an important aspect of its existence in the international community, in the modern civilized world, occupied a special place in the report. Today we are overcoming the "relic" of the years of stagnation and are building a foreign policy that will forever exclude the very possibility of our behavior not conforming with our ideals.

Speaking about the restructuring of the approach to human rights, Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that we are carrying it out not because someone is putting pressure on us or is trying to profit from this subject, but because such an approach corresponds to the ideals and principles of socialism.

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The rapporteur noted that up until recently science was in essence divorced from diplomatic "production." In the past 3 years the situation had been changing for the better. Soviet foreign policy is open to Soviet and world science. From the political point of view, this means to fulfilling the 19th party conference provision on the direct inclusion of science in policy. In this connection the report examines in detail the tasks of expanding the cooperation between diplomacy and science in the spheres of history, international law, and disarmament, and in the foreign economic sphere.

Having depicted culture as an active and skillful emis-
sary of peace. Eduard Shevardnadze stressed that a well-
thought-out cultural policy in the sphere of external
relations is obliged to utilize to a maximum everything
that is to be found in the very nature of the intelligentsia.
One can extend the access representatives of the intelli-
gentsia have to the foreign public by creating a more
ramified network of channels for informal, international
contacts for cultural and scientific figures.

He expressed a series of wishes for international journalism. The minister proposed that in planning this or that action, the views of not only scientists should be taken into account, but also of our best journalists specializing in international affairs. We must think how we can introduce into the country's international affairs journalism a pluralism of views and evaluations, and how we can use them to check on the course and line of foreign policy.

Talking of the restructuring of the central apparatus of the
USSR Foreign Ministry and its institutions abroad, Eduard
Shevardnadze noted that the present structure of the min-
istry, its new functional and territorial-sectional subpart-
ments, are being increasingly directed toward the highest
priorities of foreign policy strategy. On the whole, the
reorganization of the ministry has proved justified.

Completing the report, the minister said: "We are con-
vinced that the restructuring of international relations—
with a simultaneous restructuring of foreign policy and
diplomacy—is irreversible. It is irreversible because it
follows the single flow of transformations and renewal of
our socialist country. Because, following the course of
the party, it expresses the people's aspirations."

The debates then took place. On Tuesday, 26 July, the
conference will continue its work at sessions of eight
hours, where they will discuss various directions of
foreign policy activity.

Taking part in the conference's work are A.F. Dobrynin
and V.A. Medvedev, secretaries of the CPSU Central
Committee; V.M. Kamentsev and B.L. Tolstoykh, deputy
chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR
Ministers K.F. Katushev and V.I. Gostev; O.I. Marchuk,
president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; O.S. Bel-
yakov and S.V. Chervonenko, chiefs of CPSU Central
Committee departments; S.F. Akhromeyev, USSR first
deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed

Forces General Staff, A.I. Vlasov, first deputy chief of
the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department;
senior officials from the CPSU Central Committee and a
number of ministries and departments; scientists; cult-
tural figures; and mass media representatives.

Further on Unrest in Armenia, Azerbaijan Areas

'Practical Measures' Resolution
PM2607095188 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Jul 88 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium have adopted a resolution "on practical measures for implementing the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh." In accordance with the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 18 July 1988 "on the decisions of the Supreme Soviets of the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh," the document reads:

Comrade Volakly, member of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee, deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and head of a
CPSU Central Committee department, is to be sent as the
representative of the CPSU Central Committee and the
USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] of Azerbaijan SSR. He is to
organize and coordinate the work of the party, soviet, and
economic bodies of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the NKAO in
order to implement the decisions of the CPSU Central
Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the
USSR Council of Ministers on Nagorno-Karabakh, having
been invested with appropriate powers.

The Central Committees of the Azerbaijan and Arme-
nian Communist Parties, the Supreme Soviet Presidia,
the Councils of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR and the
Armenian SSR, and the appropriate union ministries
and departments have been instructed to provide every
facility and assistance to the representative of the CPSU
Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet Pre-
vidium in implementing the tasks for the unconditional
fulfillment of the adopted party and state decisions. For
this purpose he is empowered, when necessary, to enlist
the aid of senior officials of the CPSU Central Commit-
tee apparatus, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium,
ministries and departments, and other central bodies in
order to solve any questions which may arise.

In accordance with the provisions of the 18 July, 1988
resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, a
special commission has been organized from deputies of
the USSR Supreme Soviet of Nationalities.

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## Political & Social

### Further on Ligachev's Gorky Visit, Speech

PM0508160988 Moscow PR41'DA in Russian

6 Aug 88 First Edition p.3

### [TASS report: "Down to Business Without Delay"]

[Text] Gorky, 5 Aug.—The results produced by every collective and every worker are the real gauge of activity to fulfill restructuring's tasks. This was stressed today at a meeting between Ye.K. Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the aktiv of Gorky Oblast party organization.

The meeting was opened by G.M. Khodyrev, first secretary of Gorky CPSU Obkom. He gave a briefing on the work of the oblast party organization at the present stage of restructuring.

The meeting was addressed by Ye.K. Ligachev.

The whole of the country's life is increasingly influenced by the ideas and decisions of the 19th party conference, he said. In Lenin's words, the conference has given the party "an enormous increase in its strength and weight." It fulfilled the main mandate of Communists and non-party people—to develop the political and organizational preconditions for making restructuring irreversible and deepening it.

A lively, keen discussion was held at the conference. Delegates strongly condemned the errors and crimes of the past and criticized the shortcomings and blunders of the last 3 years. At the same time, they categorically rejected attempts to nullify the achievements of the Soviet people and the party in the course of socialist building, to belittle the real results of restructuring, and to thrust upon us ideas of a multiparty system and of creating a political opposition in society. In short, it was a forum of like-minded people, of people sincerely interested in revealing socialism's creative potential. [Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian carries a similar TASS report on pages 1 and 2 of its 6 August First Edition. At this point the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA version adds the following sentence: "The conference strengthened in all of us the feeling of Soviet patriotism and pride in our party and country."]

The party Central Committee—and this was clearly reflected in M.S. Gorbachev's report at the conference—is certainly not inclined to create exaggerated notions of the transforming work or of the fulfillment of the 27th congress directives. In a number of cases new approaches are only just beginning to burgeon and the preconditions for acceleration are being accumulated.

The conference and its decisions open up new horizons for restructuring. The powerful forces of democracy and socialist self-management are being brought into play.

To realize the power of the people in full and in reality is in fact the main point of the reform of the political system proposed by the Central Committee. Success will depend to a decisive extent on whether the party itself acts—in full accordance with the Leninist concept—as the real political vanguard of society. It is primarily a question of getting rid of functions that do not properly belong to it and seriously restructuring the style, methods, and forms of work of all party links, from the primary organization to the Central Committee.

Our party is a ruling party. And while increasing the sovereignty of the soviets, it is not renouncing its leading role. The fear is sometimes voiced that this concentration on political functions might lead to the party's self-removal from the economy and other practical matters. I think that fears of this nature are unfounded. And notions that in our socialist society the economy can develop exclusively on the basis of market laws, without accounting for the politically expressed interests of the working people, are equally unfounded.

Allow me to make a small digression here. Commodity-money relations and the market are realities of the socialist economy. We are now overcoming their underestimation. We intend to impart a developed nature to these forms of ties. We must and will utilize all the best that has been accumulated by the historical experience of organizing exchange and the market. But first, we must do this without forgetting that market forms of ties are not a panacea against all ills, and that they themselves need regulating one way or another. Second, we must do this while realizing that copying the Western model of a market based on private ownership is fundamentally unacceptable for the socialist system of economic management founded on social ownership.

It is inadmissible to forget, for example, that the capitalist market is not just a market for things and capital. An inalienable part of this model is the manpower market with its ruthless laws and chronic unemployment. It is impossible not to see that market relations are inevitably accompanied in capitalist society by deep social stratification, a deepening of inequality, and a concentration of wealth in the hands of a small section of society. Should we really reproduce all that here?

It is not a question of whether a developed socialist market is needed or whether it is necessary to assimilate such powerful regulators of economic growth as, say, prices or supply and demand. It is undoubtedly necessary. But it is necessary, at the same time, to ensure that labor productivity growth goes hand in hand with the working people's full employment, that the flexible operation of the price formation mechanism is accompanied by real growth in the living standards of all members of society, and that economic interests are realized together with the strengthening of social justice and protection and the country's political stability.

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But let us return to our discussion, the speaker continued. Delimiting the functions of the party and the state does not mean separating politics from economics. On the contrary, it is a question precisely of the necessary and only real way to strengthen party and political influence on the system of priorities in economics and social practice. And there is another side to the matter. The party's leading role belongs not only to its highest echelons, not only to local committees. The party is, above all, primary organizations in labor collectives with their everyday production and worldly concerns. Is it conceivable for Communists to stand aside from these concerns? It is precisely through more vigorous activities by primary organizations that party policy will be interpreted.

The Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo attach paramount significance to implementing the party conference decisions. As you know, a CPSU Central Committee plenum was held recently to discuss a wide range of questions raised in the conference delegates' speeches and in numerous appeals addressed to the conference. A detailed, specific plan of action was adopted. The Central Committee thereby set an example of a truly businesslike, constructive approach to the results of the party conference. Just such an approach is required of everyone today. Everyone must get down to work at once, without loud words, and develop purposeful, painstaking organizational and ideological political work on fulfilling the adopted decisions.

The speaker dwelt on objective and subjective difficulties of restructuring. He called the surmounting of conservatism and red tape the most vital task. Democratization will strike a telling blow against their positions.

There is no longer any need today to persuade people that socialist pluralism of views is an indispensable condition for elaborating comprehensively substantiated approaches, the CPSU Central Committee secretary continued. However, when decisions have been adopted, they must be fulfilled. "Following a decision by competent organs," V.I. Lenin emphasized, "all we party members act as one person." This does not mean that debate is not necessary at this stage. But we must not endlessly return to what has become the party's guidelines. Efforts must now be channeled into seeking the most efficient ways to realize them.

We must place in the service of restructuring, above all, what has started to grow since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum. It is also served by past experience of the party's activity that has stood the test of time.

Critical interpretation of the lessons of history and continuity of policy are indissoluble conditions for the party's successful work. Ignoring both approaches is fraught with serious complications. Evidence of this is provided by the crisis events in the Transcaucasus. Disregard for historical experience of resolving the

nationalities question in our country within the framework of the established national territorial structures led the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh into a political impasse. There is no easy way out of it. [The SOVETS-KAYA ROSSIYA version omits the preceding sentence]

Socialism's ability to develop and improve on its own basis is manifested in the dialectical unity of the policy of renewal and continuity.

The Central Committee believes that in the course of restructuring there has been an appreciable increase in the working people's involvement in managing the state's affairs and in their activity in using the freedoms of speech, the press, rally, and assembly. It is important to ensure that the businesslike suggestions advanced by them are realized and that the shortcomings exposed are eliminated.

At the same time people in some places, misunderstand- ing democratization, are trying to resolve the problems by means of strikes. Socialism is the working people's system, and it is absurd for them to go on strike against themselves. In our society there are other democratic, constructive ways to resolve conflicts. An atmosphere of contempt must be created around inciters of strikes, illegal rallies, and demonstrations which are of an extremist, antisocialist nature. Leaders who connive at unlawful actions must bear the entire responsibility for this. As for Communists, their involvement in strikes and illegal assemblies is simply incompatible with party membership. There can be no other decisions.

The priority of the cause is making us take a new look at our ideological work, too, the speaker said. Two fume tions are inseparably combined in it—explanatory-educational and constructive-organizational. V.I. Lenin was the first to note this.

I believe that we should now considerably strengthen the constructive-organizational function of ideology. The involvement of the mass news and propaganda media in practical matters is what is assuming special significance. In the ideological sphere, obviously, the chief emphasis must be shifted to where millions of workers, kolkhoz members, and members of the intelligentsia work every day. Their voice and their views and opinions need higher public recognition. With the formulation of the main areas of the reform of the political system the party has essentially finished shaping the program for the renewal of society and the strategic plan of an offensive across the whole front.

The reform of the political system on which we are now embarking in line with the decisions of the party conference and the Central Committee July (1988) Plenum does not mean that the cardinal economic reform or, say, the reform of the education system, are being downgraded in the slightest, much less forgotten. Quite the opposite. Only taken as an indissoluble whole can the reforms produce results—to guarantee revolutionary

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transformations through the entire gamut of social relations. The success of each reform—or, conversely, its failure—could have a considerable effect on our progress toward our planned goals.

Moving onto the results of work by working people in Gorkiy Oblast, Ye.K. Ligachev noted that the oblast's industrial and agricultural output is growing on the whole at a rate corresponding to the 5-year plan targets. [The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA version renders the previous sentence as follows: "Moving onto the results of work by working people in Gorkiy Oblast. Ye.K. Ligachev noted that they are having an appreciable impact on the dynamics of scientific and technical progress and on the development of a number of sectors of the national economy. A powerful center of machine-building and the chemical industry is concentrated here. It can be noted with satisfaction, he said, that the oblast's industrial and agricultural output is growing on the whole at a rate corresponding to the 5-year plan targets."] But results are now not only determined by comparison with plans but also by comparison with the potential, requirements, and cost at which the targets are fulfilled.

From this standpoint it must be pointed out that both the industrial and the agricultural potential of the oblast are growing more rapidly than their output. The new economic mechanism is not working as it should. This is apparent, for example, in the fact that one-fifth of Gorky's enterprises working under the new conditions fail to meet their contract obligations in terms of output deliveries. Or take construction workers. All the main subdivisions of the Glavvolgovyatskostroy have been transferred to the collective contract, but this has had absolutely no effect on labor productivity growth rates. High-productivity lines, machine tools, and robots are poorly utilized in industry. The low technical level of a number of machine-building goods and also many consumer goods is a source of concern.

Why are we taking these problems to the party aktiv? Because the use of reserves is now a big political issue. We must do a better job of bringing everything at our disposal into play and choose the right directions in which to channel labor collectives' efforts. The targeting of political and organizational work by primary party organizations and party committees is important in this respect.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee shared his impressions of his visit to the Gorkiy Automobile Plant. The most important problem there is to modernize and retool production. This applies to all machine-building enterprises in the oblast. The modernization problem also faces Gorkiy chemical industry workers.

Talking about his meetings and conversations with specialists, workers, and kolkhoz workers, he stressed that whatever subject was touched on, one thing was always rearfirmed: Progress can only be made by primarily showing concern for the working people's everyday needs.

Priority, as noted at the 19th all-union party conference, Ye.K. Ligachev said, must be given to satisfying people's requirements for valuable food products in as short a time as possible. In recent years the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government have implemented a series of major measures to stimulate agricultural production and the output of the food-industry. These are producing positive results. Nevertheless, the problem is still the most serious and the most painful one in the life of our society.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary analyzed the state of affairs in Gorkiy Oblast's agro-industrial complex, a major one in the RSFSR non-Chernozem zone. Considerable funds are being invested in its development. But the growth of production is not tangible enough compared with requirements, and falls far short of the countryside's potential. In order to reach the planned level, the rate of production growth has to increase 2-3 times. At the moment large amounts of crop farming and livestock products have to be brought into the oblast from other regions. But the potential of the country's agrarian sector is still limited. In order to make richer and more varied the diet of the people of Gorkiy Oblast, which is at the moment very modest, it is necessary to provide for people's needs for basic foodstuffs by producing them locally. The speaker recommended wider and more resolute introduction of the lease contract and incentives for the development of personal holdings (podvoria) and incentives for the development of enterprises' subsidiary farms. Reduction of losses of products during harvesting, transportation, storage, and processing is a substantial reserve. It was pointed out that it is important to gear cities' industrial potential to the acute problems of the agro-industrial complex. It was said that it is necessary to create zones of guaranteed milk, potato, vegetable, fruit, and berry production around the oblast center by 1990.

Problems of the social reorganization of the Gorkiy countryside are of decisive significance, Ye.K. Ligachev continued. As is known, the Central Committee has set the oblast party organization substantial tasks in this connection. Much has already been done. Yet people continue to leave the countryside. It is a worrysome fact. As you can see, plans are plans, even if they are fulfilled, whereas people have their own views of our work, their own yardsticks for assessing labor and living conditions and life prospects. Party, Soviet, and economic organs in the oblast must establish their social policy in line with these very yardsticks.

He went on to talk about the need for a very serious effort to improve the way the housing problem is being tackled and the provision of health and cultural facilities for the population. The central task for the Gorkiy people in this sphere is that of increasing production of construction materials and improving the use of housing construction capacities.

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The speech dealt with ecological problems in Gorkiy. The cardinal improvement of the situation should be at the top of the party agenda's political work and local soviet bodies must focus their practical efforts on it.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary dealt in particular on questions of restructuring public education and culture. While noting definite progress in the development of this sphere in Gorkiy Oblast, he said that from the position of the demands of the 19th all-union party conference and Central Committee February plenum this progress can only be described as the first steps in a vast job. Attention was drawn to the need for a more caring attitude toward historical and cultural monuments. It was noted that the "leftover" approach to the development of the material base of culture has evidently not yet been overcome. The tradition of holding mass popular festivals in the city has been lost.

The speech touched on questions of CPSU foreign policy, in particular on the correlation between general human and proletarian-class interests.

They are intrinsically and profoundly interconnected. The true purpose of socialism is the liberation of man and mankind from all types of exploitation and oppression. But can we Communists remain aloof from global problems, from the struggle against the nuclear threat and for the salvation of civilization? No, we cannot. Unless people win this struggle, the efforts to improve working people's lives and guarantee the fundamental interests of the working class and the right of the peoples to decide their own destiny will lose their meaning.

We proceed from the class nature of international relations. Any other formulation of the issue only introduces confusion into the thinking of Soviet people and our friends abroad. [The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA version omits the preceding sentence] Active involvement in the solution of general human problems by no means signifies any artificial "braking" of the social and national liberation struggle. And M.S. Gorbachev's report at the 19th party conference reaffirmed the CPSU's solidarity with the working people of the entire world.

In conclusion Ye.K. Ligachev said:

Much work lies ahead. The decisions of the 19th all-union party conference and Central Committee July plenum enable the party and Soviet people to move forward even more boldly and more confidently along the path of renewing socialism. Get down to business without delay. The Central Committee wishes Communists and all working people of Gorkiy Oblast success in implementing our revolutionary designs.

In their speeches the following people voiced their considerations on how to build work in the future in order to pursue with greater efficiency the policy of renewal of the life of our society: B.V. Perevezentsev, leader of a team

of fitters at the "Krasnoyarsk" Steel Plant and chairman of the labor collective council: M.V. Tararin, chairman of Koverinsky Rayon's "Mir" Kolkhоз; G.A. Suvorov, first secretary of Gorky Komsomol Oblkom; and Academician O.G. Devyatkyh, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Chemistry Institute. [The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA version omits the preceding paragraph]

While he was in Gorkiy and Gorkiy Oblast 2-5 August Ye.K. Ligachev visited, as already mentioned, the Gorkiy Automobile Plant. He visited shops and assembly lines. During meetings with workers and specialists and with the enterprise party aktiv, there was a discussion of ways of retooling the plant—the number one task. In particular, it was pointed out that one of the keys to its successful implementation is the development of its own machine building. Attention was drawn to the importance of the social sphere and the creation of its own strong construction base to ensure the speediest solution of the housing question and develop the plant agricultural shop. The participants in the conversations talked about the developing process of restructuring in primary party organizations and the concern that must be shown for their leaders.

The theme of satisfying the population's paramount needs largely determined the character of the conversation at the Arzamas CPSU Gorkom. The discussion centered on ways to increase the agrarian sector's yield in the rayon so as to improve the supply of produce and on the pace of stockraising construction.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary familiarized himself thoroughly with the elimination of the consequences of the explosion at Arzamas, which was reported in the press. He toured a district of individual construction which suffered from the disaster, talked with residents, and at their invitation visited their rebuilt homes. People expressed profound gratitude to the party, the Soviet state, local party and Soviet workers, militia organs, and physicians for their great concern and help. There was also a trip to a residential district of high-rise housing which is being built by envoys of various regions of the country.

In the oblast's Shatkovskiy Rayon Ye.K. Ligachev asked about the work of the "Shatki" cooperative state-kolkhоз association. There was a lively conversation in the field with combine operators working on the harvest. They noted that the collective contract has given them an incentive for highly productive labor.

The CPSU Central Committee secretary visited the Gorkiy footwear association.

There was a meeting with mass media workers from Gorkiy city and oblast. It was stressed that the party and its Central Committee regard journalists as active supporters of the processes of renewal and the press as an

38

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effective fever for implementing the tasks of restructuring. In this connection special attention was drawn to the need to now intensify the creative role of the press, radio, and television, at the stage of implementing the decisions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. At the same time it was pointed out that the press' creative mission is impossible without its organizational role.

During a meeting with activists of the local branch of the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments and representatives of the creative intelligentsia, the talk centered on the fact that the preservation of and propaganda about monuments must be regarded as an important area of ideological work and patriotic education. While showing a solicitous attitude toward antiquity, it is necessary to make wider and more effective use in educational work of everything connected with our people's revolutionary past, their feats during the Great Patriotic War, and achievements in the socialist building sphere.

Ye.K. Ligachev visited the Gorkiy vegetable depot, stores, and canteries, and talked with customers. A conference was held with leaders of the local agro-industrial committee on questions raised during those conversations.

A conversation was held with members of the Gorkiy CPSU Obkom Bureau. [The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA version omits the preceding paragraph]

In Gorkiy the CPSU Central Committee secretary laid flowers at the monument to V.I. Lenin and at the Eternal Flame of the memorial dedicated to the citizens of Gorky who fell in the struggle for our motherland's freedom and independence.

Flowers were laid in Shatki at the memorial in honor of fallen heroes and at the tomb of the Leningrad girl Tanya Savicheva, whose diary of the blockade is well known to the whole world.

Ye.K. Ligachev was accompanied on his tours of Gorkiy and the oblast by G.M. Khodyrev and A.A. Sokolov, chairman of the Gorkiy Oblispolkom.

## Television Carries Comments

LID0508222188 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 5. Aug 88

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev is in Gorky Oblast. Today he met with the aktiv of the oblast party organization. Addressing a meeting, he said, among other things:

[Begin Ligachev recording] Esteemed comrades, I believe that you will agree with me when I say that the whole of life in our country is now moving forward under the influence---under the increasing influence,

# NATIONAL AFFAIRS

moreover---of the ideas and decisions of the 19th all-union party conference. In Lenin's words the party conference has given our party an enormous increase in strength and weight and has undoubtedly strengthened the confidence of the whole people in the success of the revolutionary changes. It has fulfilled the main mandate of Communists and nonparty people: It has worked out the political and organizational prerequisites for making restructuring irreversible, and for deepening it.

You are well aware of the fact that discussion took place at the conference. Let's put it bluntly: lively, sharp, and impartial discussion. Delegates subjected the errors and crimes of the past to serious condemnation and criticized thoroughly the shortcomings and blunders of the last 3 years following the April plenum of the party's Central Committee. And at the same time---and I would particularly like to stress this---they categorically rejected attempts to strike out the historic achievements of the Soviet people and of the Communist Party in the course of socialist construction; to belittle the real results of restructuring; and to pass over to an idea of a multiparty system and of creating a political opposition in our society. [end recording]

[Announcer] Yegor Kuzmich Ligachev went on to note that there are still acute problems in the economic and social spheres: There are also omissions and errors. But none of this is cause for disappointment, for losing heart. On the contrary, the difficulties we are encountering must serve only to make us mobilize ourselves, to follow along the course that has been chosen in almore insistent and energetic manner.

[Begin Ligachev recording] The party Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee attach paramount significance to implementing in a real way the party decisions. As you know, a plenum of the party's Central Committee took place recently for that purpose. Let's be blunt, a detailed, specific plan of action was adopted. The party Central Committee thereby set an example to all of us, an example of a truly businesslike and constructive approach to the results of the party conference. Today a new approach is required of all of us, comrades, an approach of the very kind that was required by the party's Central Committee plenum. Without loud words we have to begin practical matters in a serious way and for a long period of time, and we have to develop purposeful, painstaking organizational and ideological-educational work in implementing the decisions that have been adopted.

I would say that we have to act mercifully in eradicating the age-old style of failing to exert oneself and once again remaining idle. What's more, this is often done under cover of politically fine-sounding words. That style, moreover, is one of the most dangerous manifestations of relativism. Indeed, is it not there that one finds the essence of behavior of those people who oppose the high demands of working in the new way, because they either

[LC]

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

see or fear the way in which they might shake the foundations of socialism? And is it not in the image of the conservative turned inside out that those people show themselves supposedly worried about the slow progress of the reforms, while they put forward nothing at all—except, often, for rejections of all and everything—that is constructive, and in figurative terms are scared stiff of the so-called calluses that come from the hard work of restructuring. Let's be quite blunt: It's a dreadful habit, talking in terms of a ruble but of delivering in terms of just one kopeck.

When decisions have been made, comrades, they have been earned out, by our joint efforts and thoroughly. This is what the great Lenin had to say in this connection. Following a decision by the competent bodies, Vladimir Lich Lenin stressed, all we party members act as one person. This does not mean, comrades, that at this particular stage we are not going to hold discussions. No, we need them. But I do not think that we can go on endlessly returning to things on which we have already reached agreement and which have become the directives of our party. It seems to me that efforts must be directed toward the search for the most effective ways, forms, and methods of implementing the decisions that have been adopted.

We must place in the service of restructuring, above all, what has started to grow since the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. That part of the past experience of the party's activity that has stood the test of time will also be of service to restructuring.

I would like to stress the following. Critical interpretation of the lessons of history and continuity of policy, it would appear, are indissoluble conditions for successful activity by the party. Ignoring either the one or the other of these approaches is—let us be blunt—fraught with complications that are often serious. Evidence of this is provided by the crisis events in the Transcaucasus. Disregard of historical experience in resolving the nationalities question in our country within the framework of those very structures moved Nagorno-Karabakh into a political impasse. Nihilism with regard to the past, it seems to me, gives rise to the same kind of attitude toward the present. The link between the times, the link between the generations, is lost. It is precisely in the dialectical unity of the policy of renewal and continuity that the ability of socialism to develop and to improve itself further on its own foundation is displayed.

Both other comrades, and I myself on more than one occasion—and I am sure that this applies to you, too—have been insisting that democracy is indivisible from the strictest observance of discipline and legality. In this connection, I want to draw attention to the following. Contradictions and conflicts are inherent in socialism as they are in any social system. Such are the dialectics of development, as they say. But they are not irreconcilable in character, and the ways and forms of resolving them are different.

The Central Committee believes that in the course of restructuring there has been an appreciable increase in the working people's involvement in managing the state's affairs and in the activity of our people in using the freedoms of speech, of the press, of meetings, and of assembly. At the same time, it is very important, unusually important, to ensure that the businesslike suggestions advanced by the working people are realized and that the shortcomings exposed are eliminated.

At the same time—and this I would like to stress especially—in understanding democratization in a wrong way people in some places are trying to resolve the conflicts that arise between administration and collective by means of strikes, no more and no less. Socialism is the system of the working people; going on strike against themselves is quite simply an absurdity. In our society there are other democratic, constructive ways of resolving conflicts. I think that we have to create an atmosphere of contempt in society around inciters of strikes and illegal rallies and demonstrations which are of an extremist and antisocialist nature. Leaders who connive at illegal actions must bear complete liability for this. As far as Communists are concerned, their participation in strikes and illegal assemblies, I would say, is quite simply incompatible with party membership. I do not think that there can be any other decisions here. [end recording]

[Announcer] Comrade Ligachev devoted a considerable part of his speech to specific problems in the work of the oblast party organization. The need to carry out a strong social policy was stressed. In particular, he said:

[Begin Ligachev recording] Over the past few days, comrades, I have had what I would say were most interesting meetings and conversations with many inhabitants of Gorkiy Oblast: specialists, workers, and kolkhoz farmers. I would like to draw your attention to one particular feature: No matter what subjects we discussed, even deeply technical ones, one thing was confirmed: We can only move forward and accomplish tasks when we display first and foremost genuine concern for the everyday needs of the working people. In fact, the whole meaning of the policy of socialist renewal is to enable people to lead better and more interesting lives, richer both in material and spiritual terms. This is the whole meaning of the restructuring policy.

Priority, as was noted at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, must be given first and foremost to satisfying the requirements of the Soviet people for food products of full value, and to doing so within the shortest possible period of time. In recent years, as you know, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have implemented what I would call unusual measures, measures which seem to us to be fundamentally effective and extraordinarily large-scale for stimulating agricultural production and the food industry. They are already giving known results. Nevertheless, as was said at the All-Union CPSU Conference, the problem of ensuring

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the country's food supply is the most acute, painful area in the life of our society. As has already been said here, it is currently necessary to bring arable and livestock farming produce into the oblast from other parts of the country, and to do so in considerable quantities. As a result, consumption of, say, meat per capita of your oblast's population is greater than the figure for the average throughout the country. But as I see it, the table of the people who live in Gorky is still extremely modest.

Making it richer and more varied within a short time by bringing in food from outside is not a very realistic path. I tell you frankly. The capabilities of the country's agrarian sector for doing this are still extremely limited. This is something you yourselves feel. It is necessary, therefore, to provide for people's needs in terms of the basic foodstuffs by producing them locally. What is more, dear comrades, more than anyone else you have both a large industrial potential and also a large land stock. There is something of the order of 0.8 hectares per capita, which is considerably more than the average per capita throughout the country. Of course, it is a difficult thing to ensure one's own supply of food products from local production. Frankly speaking, however, there is quite simply no other fast road toward sufficiency. I would therefore like to call on you to be more vigorous in putting agriculture onto the intensive track and to be bolder in grasping the levers of the new mechanism of economic management. That is the most important thing.

The CPSU Central Committee recently examined the issue of improving supplies of foodstuffs in 830 major industrial cities of the country, including the city of Gorky. But it did not do so with the object of taking this from somewhere and giving it to these cities, thus rapidly improving their foodstuff supplies. We simply do not have the possibility of doing that. No small importance for these purposes is being attached to the development of the cities' industrial potential toward meeting the acute problems of the agro-industrial complex. This is the purpose with which we looked at these cities. Measures in this connection have been defined in your case, too. We have had a thorough conversation. We can feel that you are beginning to deal with this matter seriously. To implement them, the most resolute political and organizational support by local soviet and economic bodies must be given, so that a zone of guaranteed production of milk, potatoes, vegetables, fruit, and berries can be created around the oblast center by the year 1990.

Among the many problems in the development of agriculture, comrades, problems of the social reorganization of the countryside are of decisive significance. As is known, the Central Committee has set the Gorky Oblast party organization serious tasks in this connection. A CPSU Central Committee decision was adopted in this connection. I want to report with satisfaction that a great deal has been done over the time that has elapsed,

During the past 5-year plan it was possible to double the number of flats put into operation per farm. I do have to draw your attention to the fact that lately you have once again substantially reduced the speed. Rates of road construction, of building preschools, schools, and clubs have risen.

Nevertheless, comrades, I note that the drift away of the rural population has not been halted. Here are the figures: Over the past 7 years about 100,000 workers of working age have left the villages of your oblast. 100,000 workers of working age. An alarming fact. As you can see, plans are plans, even if they are fulfilled, whereas people, as they say, have their own way of assessing our work, their own yardsticks for assessing working and living conditions, their own way of measuring living prospects. Party, local soviet, and economic bodies in the oblast must, therefore, structure their social policy in line with precisely these yardsticks rather than measuring themselves only against plans and targets. Only serious and, I would say, stable changes, particularly in the remote areas, can inspire people with optimism and confidence that changes for the better are taking place in the countryside. [end recording]

[Announcer] The speech also covered certain issues in the party's foreign policy.

[Begin Ligachev recording] Here, comrades, I would like to touch on an issue of vital importance, the question of the correlation between general human and proletarian-class interests. We must stress straightforwardly that what we are talking about are not things in opposition, but a primordial and deep interlinking between the general human approach and the class approach in foreign policy. The true meaning of socialism, as you understand, consists in the liberation of man and mankind from all types of exploitation and oppression. The question arises: Can we Communists disregard reality and global problems? For example, can we remain apart from the struggle to save human civilization? Of course not. Unless people win this struggle, you must understand that all attempts to improve the life of the working people and to make it, as they say, freer and more worthy and more rich, lose all their point. The struggle for peace and for the survival of mankind is indeed also the struggle for the root interests of the working class, for the right of the people to choose their own road and to decide on their own fate for themselves. It makes it impossible to fitter the forces of imperialist militarism. No doubt, opposition to its expansionist aspirations with regard to other countries is stimulated by efforts directed toward the political settlement of regional conflicts of all kinds.

We proceed, comrades, from the fact that international relations are particularly close in character, and that is of fundamental importance. Any other way of putting this question introduces confusion into the consciousness of our people and our friends abroad. Active involvement

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in the solution of general human problems, and prima-
rily the struggle against the nuclear threat, by no means
signifies any—I would say—artificial braking of the
social and national, national liberation, struggle. It does
not mean that class contradictions and antagonisms are
being ignored. I would like to draw your attention to the
fact that the report given by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gor-
bachev at the 19th CPSU Conference (ain confirmed
our party's unchanging solidarity with the working peo-
ple of the whole world and with those fighting against
colonialism, racism, and reaction. [end recording]

[Announcer] In conclusion, Comrade Ligachev stated:

[Begin Ligachev recording] There is a mass of work
ahead, comrades. There is a lot of it. The decisions of the
19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee July Plenum enable the party and the
Soviet people to move forward, I would say, even more
boldly and confidently along the path of renewing social-
ism. Get down to business without delay, as they say,
comrades. The CPSU Central Committee wishes the
Communists and the working people of Gorky Oblast
success in implementing our revolutionary designs.
[applause] [end recording]

Journal Calls for Solzhenitsyn Rehabilitation

ACU0508140588 Paris AFP in English 1350 GMT
5 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow, Aug 5 (AFP)—A Soviet literary maga-
zine on Friday called for the rehabilitation of exiled
dissident writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and the restora-
tion of his Soviet citizenship.

The PANORAMA OF BOOKS, in an article quoting
writer Iliana Chukovoka, said that before publishing
"Cancer Ward", a Solzhenitsyn novel, "we need to
quash the injustice that accuses him of treason and give
him back his nationality."

"Afterward, we will publish his books," the article said.

"It is time to put an end to our differences with this remarkable son of Russia, an officer of the Soviet Army, a victim of Stalin's labor camps, a universally-acclaimed writer."

The article was the second this week in the Soviet press
praising the author.

The weekly MOSCOW NEWS said in its latest issue that
Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisso-
vich" was "One of the strongest works in Soviet litera-
ture."

With that hook, Solzhenitsyn was the first to express
openly the suffering that millions endured at the hands
of Soviet leader Stalin and his police chief Beria, the
weekly said.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

He was exiled in 1974 and now lives in the United
States.

Disident Ukrainian Poet Reportedly Freed

AU0508070888 Paris AFP in English 0312 GMT
5 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow, Aug 5 (AFP)—Ukrainian poet and jour-
nalist Ivan Sakulski has been freed from a labour camp
after some eight years, the disident bulletin EKSPRESS-
KHRONIKA reported here Thursday.

Mr Sakulski, 48, was released on Tuesday, the bulletin
said, after being held in a section of the Perm labour
camp set aside for prisoners condemned under Article 70
of the Soviet penal code, which deals with anti-Soviet
agitation and propaganda.

He was sentenced in 1980 to ten years' imprisonment
and five years' exile for "anti-Soviet agitation."

Five political prisoners were still being held in the special
wing of the camp, the bulletin said, but added that
several others had been freed recently.

Thursday, the Soviet Foreign Ministry confirmed the
release last month of Lithuanian priest Alfonsas Sva-
rinkas.

EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA reported that several meetings
on behalf of political prisoners had recently been held in
the Ukraine, including a gathering at Klev, the capital,
on July 14 calling for the release of Mr Sakulski.

Political Rehabilitation in USSR Viewed

LD0608205688 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1858 GMT 6 Aug 88

[Text] Moscow, August 6 (TANJUG)—Lenin's close
collaborators Lev Kamenev, Grigordy Zinovyev, Niko-
lay Bukharin and many other Soviet revolutionaries
were forced by beating and blackmail to confess sins they
never committed, says Vice-Chairman of the USSR
Supreme Court Sergey Gusev.

Gusev cites NKVD [USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs 1934-43] files and the statement by an NKVD official from the period, B. Kamkov, who said that Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin and others had been beaten and threatened with destruction of their families unless they confessed to committing their "crimes." Their "confessions" did not contain a word of truth, they had not been involved in any acts of espionage and subversion, said Kamkov.

At the time of Stalin's purges and represssion in the
1930's, Zinovyev and Kamenev, regardless of their past
services for the revolution, were first expelled from
Moscow without any investigation or court decision (in
1932). Then, after the 1934 assassination of Sergey
Kirov, they were returned from exile and convicted in

Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Deputy Chancellor

Born March 21, 1927 in Reideburg (District of Saale),
married, one child

1946 Finished secondary school (Abitur)

1943-1945 Air force auxiliary, labour service, military service,
brief period as prisoner-of-war

1946-1949 Studied Law and Economics at the Universities of
Halle and Leipzig

1949 First state law examination in Leipzig

1954 Second state law examination in Hamburg

Since 1954 Lawyer in Bremen

1946 Joined the Saxony-Anhalt regional organization of the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

1952 Joined the Free Democratic Party (FDP)

Since 1965 Member of the German Bundestag
Parliamentary secretary of the FDP parliamentary party

1968-1974 Deputy national chairman of the FDP

1969-1974 Federal Minister of the Interior

1974-1984 National chairman of the FDP

Since 1974 Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy
Chancellor

COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS

# MEETINGS GUIDELINES

For Presiders, Speakers, Members, and Guests

1. The purpose of meetings sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations is to promote understanding of international affairs through the free interchange of ideas among participants.

2. Since the Council invites guests representing many different viewpoints, since it selects topics regardless of, or because of, their controversiality, and since there is a wide divergence of viewpoints among members, it is to be expected that Council meetings will sometimes be marked by sharp dispute. The presider is expected to stimulate the open expression of opinion by all participants and should not attempt to mute controversy or stifle differences of view, where they exist. All viewpoints are to be treated with respect.

3. All Council proceedings are subject to the Council's Rule Against Attribution, unless waived in advance of any given meeting by an officer of the Council. The rule should be stated by the presider at the opening of each meeting. It assures participants that they may speak openly, as it is the Council's tradition that others will not later attribute their statements to them in public media or forums or knowingly transmit them to persons who will, and that all participants are expected to honor that commitment.

July 1986

# THE "TWO-TRACK" DILEMMA IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS

JAMES L. GEORGE

THE AUTHOR: Dr. George was an Assistant Director — and for a time Acting Director — of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1982 to 1984. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he is also a former Public Affairs Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and served in various staff capacities in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.

## IN BRIEF

The "two-track" dilemma in the current START negotiations concerns the relationship between the existing inventory — and ongoing programs — in U.S. strategic weapons and the deep cuts that have been accepted as base-lines in the negotiations. Under the warhead-counting rules that have been adopted, and in light of the limits and sublimits that have been set, the United States faces excrutiating choices in adapting viable strategic forces to a START regime. The Soviet Union, by dint of its much more diversified force inventory, does not confront this problem in nearly the same measure. The prospects point not only to dangerous instabilities but, ironically, to a return to the very strategic environment of "massive retaliation" that the United States has sought to escape.

Most of us are familiar by now with the "two-track" approach adopted by NATO in 1979 to INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) — to negotiate the elimination of weapons systems while at the same time developing, building and deploying those very same systems. Less explicit, but potentially more fateful, is a similar "two-track" approach in the arena of strategic arms.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) have now lumbered on for over five years, with most of the basic principles guiding the negoti-

ations known from their inception. In his initial address on START, in Eureka, Illinois, in 1982, President Reagan called for major reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. After some hesitation, the idea of "deep cuts" was accepted by the Soviets in principle. At the 1985 Geneva "fireside summit," the 1986 Reykjavik "mini-summit" and the December 1987 Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Washington, both sides agreed on 50 per cent reductions in strategic forces and even on some specific numbers: a launcher limit of 1,600, an overall

Winter 1988

35

Table 1
SALT I LIMITATIONS

<table><thead><tr><th>Delivery System</th><th>U.S.</th><th>USSR</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBMs</td><td>1,054<br>[1,000]</td><td>1,618<br>[1,408]</td></tr><tr><td>SLBMs</td><td>656<br>[710]</td><td>740<br>[950]</td></tr><tr><td>Submarines</td><td>41<br>[44]</td><td>62</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: Bracketed numbers represent allowable limits.

warhead limit of 6,000, a ballistic missile warhead limit of 4,900, as well as an implicit ceiling on bombers and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) of 1,100.

Despite the longevity of the talks and these now well-publicized numbers, there has been virtually no critical analysis of the implications of these limits. There has been no discourse on exactly what a "50 per cent" reduction really means — for example, in terms of what 4,900 warheads will be left on which ballistic missiles. Both the U.S. Air Force and Navy are continuing to build strategic weapons as if no limits were looming: the MX ICBM, B-1B Bomber, Trident SSBN and Trident I (C-4) SLBM, as well as two modes of cruise missiles — air and sea. Moreover, additional weapons systems are on the way: a mobile MX, the single-warhead Midgetman (MgM or SICBM) ICBM, the Trident II (D-5) SLBM and a new "stealth" Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB).

In short, a series of questions beg answering: First, just what will a START "50 per cent" inventory look like? Second, is the United States building the right kinds of weapons systems? Third, what does the U.S.-USSR strategic balance portend to be in the wake of a START agreement? Finally, and most important, what impact is START exerting on nuclear strategy and deterrence?

Table 2
SALT II LIMITATIONS

* 2,400 equal aggregate limit on all delivery systems (includes ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers).

* 2,250 final aggregate limit on all delivery systems (within three years).

* 1,320 equal aggregate limit on MIRV missiles and heavy bombers with cruise missiles.

* 1,200 sublimit on MIRV ballistic missiles (120 implied limit on heavy bombers with cruise missiles).

* 820 sublimit on MIRVed ICBMs.

Obviously, definitive answers to these questions await both the final agreement and the decisions each country will make on its respective weapons systems — since there will be a certain degree of “freedom to mix.” Still, enough information exists to explore some inevitable trends. In order fully to appreciate the START “two-track” dilemma, however, it is helpful to begin with a brief review of the changes in the rules of the game from SALT to START.

## From SALT to START

Neither the SALT I Agreements nor the (unratified) SALT II Treaty have had a truly profound effect on U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, for one basic reason: both were, in essence, "freezes," especially for the United States. SALT I signed in 1972 (see Table 1) simply placed a "freeze" on the numbers of existing ballistic systems on both sides. One leg of the nuclear Triad, bombers, was not even mentioned. The only limit imposed by SALT I was on launchers or Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs), as they are called in arms control jargon. This rule indirectly encouraged placing as many Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads per launcher as possible, since there were no restrictions or penalties.

36

Strategic Review

START Negotiations

Table 3
START LIMITATIONS

<table><tr><td>• SNDVs</td><td>1,600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.</td></tr><tr><td>• Warheads</td><td>6,000 ceiling to include ICBM and SLBM warheads, long-range ALCMs (heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs and SRAM counting as one warhead).</td></tr><tr><td>• Sublimits</td><td>4,900 ballistic missile warheads (ICBMs and SLBMs)<br>1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles<br>(1,100 implied sublimit on bombers and ALCMs).</td></tr></table>

SALT II signed in 1979 (see Table 2) was, at least for the United States, also a “freeze.” The Soviet Union would have had to retire some 200 of its older systems, a condition that was undoubtedly the best feature of this accord. Launchers were still the basic counting device, but now some important sublimits were set. MIRV systems were placed in a new sublimit, and bombers were added. Those bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were placed in the MIRV sublimit. The basic counting device under SALT II was still SNDVs, with MIRVed warheads only indirectly counted in the sublimits. And again, the agreement did little more than “freeze” the status quo.

A START accord, however, promises to be quite different — a difference that is already reflected in the name-change from SALT “limitations” to START “reductions”; and these would not just be reductions but very “deep cuts.” The second major change is that now both launchers (SNDVs) and warheads would be counted. Thus, the MIRVed warheads that were indirectly encouraged in both SALT I and II (since they did not count) will now incur penalties and, as will be shown below, severe problems.

As has been mentioned, important limits have already been agreed upon in the START negotiations. These include a limit of 1,600 SNDVs, an overall 6,000 limit on warheads, including ballistic missile (ICBM and SLBM) warheads and ALCMs, and a separate ballistic missile warhead sublimit of 4,900. As is shown in Table 3, another sublimit has been set for heavy missiles, but the three important ceilings are the 6,000, 4,900 and 1,600 limits on overall warhead inventories, ballistic missile warheads and SNDVs, respectively.

Warhead-counting numbers for ballistic missiles were also set at the Washington Summit. Although these could change, as will be discussed below, any modification of the current verification rules would have to be extremely “intrusive,” might encourage cheating and for the long run would have to be very complex.

## Difficult Choices Among Missile Systems

What then, are the short- and long-term implications of START for the strategic forces of the United States? Table 4 shows the current, approximate inventory of the U.S. Strategic Triad. As of this writing, there is still some question about whether more B-52 bombers will be equipped with ALCMs and/or whether a new Trident will join the fleet, either of which would place the United States over the SALT II limits. For purposes of this analysis, however, those numbers are inconsequential. The main point is that scaling down from the approximate 11,000 warheads to only 6,000, and from 2,000-odd SNDVs to 1,600, will cause problems.

Offhand, the limit on SNDVs might not be too restrictive from the U.S. vantagepoint because of some normal retirements and attrition. By the early 1990s, when any START agreement would take effect, the 450 Minuteman-II missiles, older Poseidon SSBNs and B-52G bombers will all be nearing the end of their normal thirty-year life-cycles. Just retiring the 450 Minuteman-II missiles alone will put the United States below the 1,600 SNDV limit. On the other hand, now that the old Titan missiles have been shelved, the Minuteman-II missiles represent the only “megaton” warheads in the inventory. Although aging and not as accurate as their follow-on systems, they still would be effective in “city-busting” missions associated with “countervalue” deterrence. Nevertheless, the Minuteman-Is might be considered expend-

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[LC]

Table 4
CURRENT INVENTORY
(Approximate 1988)

<table><thead><tr><th>System</th><th>Launchers (SNDVs)</th><th>Number of Warheads</th><th>Total Warheads</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MX</td><td>50</td><td>10</td><td>500</td></tr><tr><td>Minuteman-II</td><td>450</td><td>1</td><td>450</td></tr><tr><td>Minuteman-III</td><td>500</td><td>3</td><td>1,500</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ICBMs</td><td>(1,000)</td><td></td><td>(2,450)</td></tr><tr><td>SLBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Trident Submarines (8 x 24)*</td><td>192</td><td>8</td><td>1,536</td></tr><tr><td>Poseidons with Trident (12 x 16)*</td><td>192</td><td>8</td><td>1,536</td></tr><tr><td>Poseidons (18 x 16)*</td><td>288</td><td>10</td><td>2,880</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal SLBMs</td><td>(672)</td><td></td><td>(5,952)</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ballistic missiles</td><td>1,672</td><td></td><td>8,402</td></tr><tr><td>Bombers</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>B-1B</td><td>100</td><td>1</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>B-52G (ALCM)</td><td>98</td><td>12</td><td>1,176</td></tr><tr><td>B-52H (ALCM)</td><td>46</td><td>20</td><td>920</td></tr><tr><td>B-52G</td><td>69</td><td>1</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>B-52H</td><td>50</td><td>1</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal bombers</td><td>(363)</td><td></td><td>(2,315)</td></tr><tr><td>Totals</td><td>2,035</td><td></td><td>10,717</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>SNDVs</td><td></td><td>Warheads</td></tr></tbody></table>

*First number represents number of submarines; second number is the number of missile tubes per submarine.

Source: *Soviet Military Power* (adjusted to 1988).

able, and some of the older Poseidons also will be approaching obsolescence. Of course, by the 1990s more Tridents will be joining the fleet. Still, in light of fairly routine attrition, reaching the 1,600 launcher limit might not be too excruciating a task.

The real problem comes in the associated warhead limits, especially the limit of 4,900 warheads on ballistic missiles. Retiring the 450 Minuteman-IIs illustrates the dilemma of changing the counting device from SNDVs to both SNDVs and warheads. Removal of all the Minuteman-IIs barely affects the warhead

count, inasmuch as the systems are only single-warhead missiles. Although the Minuteman-II missiles account for 45 per cent of the U.S. ICBM force — and for 27 per cent of the overall ballistic (ICBM and SLBM) SNDV force — they represent only 5.4 per cent of the total inventory of U.S. ballistic warheads.

The numerical problem remains one of cutting down from approximately 8,400 ballistic warheads to only 4,900. Some systems, including the new MXs and Tridents, inevitably would be retained by the United States. Recently modernized systems would also be desired:

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## START Negotiations

these include the three-warhead Minuteman-IIIIs with the new Mk-12A warhead; starting in 1979. 300 of the systems received the new warhead. Then there are the 12 late-model Poseidon SSBNs of the Benjamin Franklin class that were retrofitted with the Trident-I missile. Besides carrying the C-4 SLBM, these ships are quieter and possess other improvements. As is shown below, these four systems alone have 4,472 warheads:

<table><tr><td>50 MX</td><td>(50 x 10 warheads)</td><td>500</td></tr><tr><td>8 Trident submarines</td><td>(8 x 24 tubes x 8 warheads)</td><td>1,536</td></tr><tr><td>300 MM-III w/Mk-12A</td><td>(300 x 3 warheads)</td><td>900</td></tr><tr><td>12 Poseidons w/Trident</td><td>(12 x 16 tubes x 8 warheads)</td><td>1,536</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">Total Warheads</td><td>4,472</td></tr></table>

Thus, there are only 428 warhead "slots" left to be divided among 18 Poseidon SSBNs and 200 Minuteman-IIIIs. The choice could be between 2 SSBNs or 142 Minuteman-IIIIs — not an easy decision. Further complicating the decision would be that by the early 1990s at least two more Trident SSBNs should join the fleet, thereby easily filling those "slots." In order to keep more ICBMs, some Benjamin Franklin SSBNs with the Trident-I SLBM will have to be retired. In short, any decision would require retiring still useful, and in some cases recently modernized, systems.

## Likely Impact on U.S. Bomber Forces

The prospective situation with respect to U.S. bombers may not be as dire, although their full capabilities will not be exploitable under the START limits. Given an overall warhead limit of 6,000 and a sublimit of 4,900 ballistic warheads, there is an implied 1,100 sublimit on bombers and ALCMs. In theory, that number could be increased, but it would have to come at the expense of the ballistic missile force. Since the latter must be reduced from 8,400 to 4,900, the bomber force would probably be limited to the implied 1,100.

Under current rules, a non-ALCM-carrying bomber counts as only one warhead, with each ALCM also counting as "one." As was noted above, assuming some normal attrition, such as the retirement of the 450 older Minuteman-IIIIs, there should be no need to scrap any of the long-range bombers except for reasons of age. The problem comes, again, in the warhead count — reducing from 2,315 to only 1,100.

The dilemma has been further exacerbated by the placement of an additional 8-cylinder capacity ALCM-dispenser in the later model B-52Hs. The older B-52Gs carried only 12 ALCMs, but the B-52Hs now being converted can carry 20 ALCMs, thus running the numbers up very quickly. Therefore, a final disposition of the long-range bomber force would depend on the mix of the older and modernized versions of the B-52. Yet, one prospect is certain: the ALCM, which was once hailed as the savior of our long-range bomber force, especially for the older planes, cannot be fully exploited in the face of START limitations.

There is still another illustration of the ALCM-limitation dilemma. The B-1B bomber currently entering the force is under severe criticism for being overweight and, worse, lacking adequate electronic countermeasure (ECM) capabilities to penetrate Soviet layered defenses.¹ This problem would be of less concern if the B-1B carried ALCMs and thereby the capability to launch the weapons outside Soviet defense envelopes. However, once the ALCMs are placed on the B-1B, which is capable of carrying 22, the numbers rise dramatically.

There is the additional question of redundancy: why have both the B-52 and B-1B as ALCM-launchers? Many critics of the B-1B suggested that it be delayed in favor of the "stealth" Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB). Yet, the B-1B was sold as an "interim" penetrator until the ATB will join the inventory in the 1990s. A new bomber seems certain to be needed as a replacement for the 1950-vintage B-52s, but the ALCM limitations under START will prove very restrictive in this context.

## The Longer-Range Dilemma

Thus, in the short term, it appears that under START the SSBN force will decrease by at least 50 per cent, the ICBM force could be diminished by 60 per cent, and although the bomber force per se should not be affected except through

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Table 5
INVENTORY LATE 1990s

<table><thead><tr><th>System</th><th>Launchers (SNVs)</th><th>Number of Warheads</th><th>Total Warheads</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MX</td><td>100</td><td>10</td><td>1,000</td></tr><tr><td>Midgetman</td><td>500</td><td>1</td><td>500</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ICBMs</td><td>(600)</td><td></td><td>(1,500)</td></tr><tr><td>SLBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Trident (20 x 24)</td><td>480</td><td>8</td><td>3,840</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ballistic missiles</td><td>1,080</td><td></td><td>(5,340)</td></tr><tr><td>Bombers</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>B-1B (ALCM)*</td><td>41</td><td>22</td><td>902</td></tr><tr><td>B-1B</td><td>59</td><td>1</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>ATB</td><td>132</td><td>1</td><td>132</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal bombers</td><td>(232)</td><td></td><td>(1,093)</td></tr><tr><td>Totals</td><td>1,312</td><td></td><td>6,433</td></tr></tbody></table>

* Maximum allowable (full load) under proposed START restraints.

some normal attrition, restrictions on ALCM warheads could render the aircraft increasingly vulnerable.

The long-range implications of START limitations present another set of dilemmas. Table 5 shows the planned inventory for the late 1990s period. Under current plans, there will be 100 MX ICBMs (50 stationary and 50 rail-mobile), 500 single-warhead, mobile Midget-man missiles, some 20 Trident SSBNs (although unofficial, this is the number most often quoted), 100 B-1B bombers and 132 new "stealth" ATBs.

By the late 1990s timeframe, most of the current weapons systems that today serve the United States and the West so well will have reached the end of their normal life-spans: the Minuteman missile series, the Poseidon SSBNs and the B-52s. Modernizations are possible, and there are in fact plans to extend the life of some of these programs. The Air Force has a Minuteman modernization proposal, along with plans to extend the life of the B-52s for conventional missions. Still, with the possible exception of

the modernized Minuteman-IIIIs equipped with Mk-12A warheads, by the late 1990s most of these systems probably would be retired or at least earmarked as expendable. Keeping any of them, as will be shown below, will simply complicate matters.

As can be seen in Table 5, reaching the SN DV limit of 1,600 would again pose little difficulty: in fact, the planned inventory is some 300 SN DVs below that number. The real challenge, once again, would emerge from the overall warhead, ballistic warhead and ALCM limits of 6,000, 4,900 and 1,100, respectively. As shown in Table 5, the inventory is over 400 ballistic missile warheads above the limit. Or, to put it another way, the choice would seem to be between 2 Trident SSBNs, 44 MX, 440 Midgetman (SICBMs) or some combination.

All choices have tremendous tradeoffs. Eighteen Tridents would mean that only 11 to 12 SSBNs would be on patrol at one time, as contrasted with the over 20 boats the United States has operated on patrol for years. Forgoing the additional MX missiles, which the Air Force

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prefers over the SICBMs, would mean sacrificing a more accurate system. The mobile SICBMs, alternatively, would be less vulnerable.

The problem might well resolve itself. Congress seems very reluctant to purchase an additional 50 MX mproofissiles, even in a mobile mode. On the other hand, the price tag on the SICBM is now $45 billion and rising. For the same number of warheads, the MX is approximately one third the cost. At the same time, the Navy's Trident programs — which include the submarine, the C-4 and the new D-5 missile programs — are sailing through Congress relatively unscathed. While some concern exists that the D-5 is a "first-strike" weapon due to its increased accuracy, attempts to halt that program have failed.

Therefore, it appears that the choice may well be between 50 more MX missiles versus 500 SICBMs. As has already been noted, the Air Force prefers the MX and has been very blunt about that preference. The crux of the problem is that if the Air Force had its way and built 50 additional MX, the United States' ICBM inventory could possibly total only 100 missiles, half of them stationary. This would amount to a decrease in SNDVs not merely of 50 per cent, but rather of 90 per cent in terms of what the United States has maintained for years. It would entail, in short, a most radical change in force structure.

The bomber situation for the long term is once again complicated by ALCM questions. The 232 SNDV bombers are well within any proposed ceilings. As was mentioned above, there would even be SNDV "slots" left over for some conventional-mission B-52s (since they are "heavy," they presumably would still count under START, but only as "one"). Although, again, theoretically the bomber/ALCM limits could be greater than the implied 1,100, due to ballistic warhead restrictions, the limit undoubtedly will be that implied ceiling. According to that calculation, this would allow 41 B-1Bs carrying a full load of ALCMs, but the other 59 B-1Bs and all the 132 ATBs would have to carry only gravity bombs or SRAMs. There could possibly be some weapon-load combinations of both ALCMs and gravity bombs, but then all 100 B-1Bs would be put at risk instead of only the 59 penetrators.

Thus, once again the full capabilities of the bomber force will be artificially restrained. Presuming an even better Soviet defense sys-

tem in the late 1990s, this ALCM limitation will prove to be even more debilitating as the years progress. It will also mean that at least some of the B-1Bs must overcome existing ECM deficiencies for penetrating capabilities.

On the other hand, it does seem appropriate that the bomber leg be the least affected SNDV leg. It takes five years to build a SSBN, two to three years for an ICBM, depending upon the condition of the assembly line, while the time to convert a bomber into an ALCM-carrier can probably be measured in weeks, perhaps even days. In a true emergency, presumably the B-1B and ATB can be converted fairly quickly.

Thus, in the long run, the problems and dilemmas continue. All of the currently planned ballistic missile systems cannot be built, since START ceilings will prevent the construction of over 400 planned warheads. The bomber force — i.e., the SNDVs themselves — will not be greatly affected, but planned ALCM deployments will have to be curtailed by well over 50 per cent. Fewer than half the B-1Bs will be able to carry ALCMs, while none of the ATBs could be thus equipped.

## Verification Problems Compounded

There have been hints in the American press that the current SALT warhead-counting verification procedures might be changed to allow more SNDVs. For example, some MXs might only have 5 warheads, and some bombers only 10 ALCMs. This would probably require some type of on-site inspection. While on-site inspections might be appropriate to monitor the elimination of systems such as those covered by the INF Treaty, or for periodic checks, the verification of compliance with START would face three enduring problems.

First, on-site inspection of ICBM and SLBM warheads, as well as of ALCMs, would have to be extremely "intrusive." The problem might not be too severe with respect to a fixed-site missile in a stationary silo, but verifying any mobile system would be a nightmare. The missile could be inspected at one place and then be moved to another, in the process being armed with a new warhead.

Second, there would thus be a tremendous incentive to cheat, especially with respect to mobile systems. A mobile missile, whether an ICBM or SLBM, is by definition difficult to locate; it easily could be slipped into some

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## START Negotiations

covered shed, where warheads are switched. A constant and comprehensive verification of SLBMs, and especially aircraft carrying ALCMs, would be virtually impossible.

Finally, changing the verification procedures seems to violate that basic principle often known as KISS — “Keep It Simple, Stupid!” As we know from repeated Soviet violations of SALT in masking missile tests by encryption, even the current, relatively simple monitoring system can present problems. Moving to a system requiring constant monitoring would be virtually impossible. Predictions are always risky to make in this turbulent world, but a count-down could almost be started from the day any such agreement was signed before cries of “cheating” would come from many quarters.

## The Wrong U.S. Weapons Menu?

All of this leads to the question whether the United States has built the right weapons systems in light of the looming START restrictions. The answer seems to be: obviously not. But this should not be too surprising, since every system now being deployed by the United States was conceived under the old SALT I rules, where only the launcher and not the warheads counted. Those systems are the 10-warhead MX ICBM, the 22 ALCM-capable B-1B bomber, the 24-tube Trident SSBN and, to a certain extent, the 8-warhead C-4 and D-5 SLBMs.

By far the worst offender of the emerging new rules is the MX, especially the stationary system. Ten warheads are simply too many per SNDV. As was illustrated above, it could well be that in the late 1990s the land-based ICBM force could consist of only 100 missiles, albeit 1,000 warheads. Those who point out that it is warheads that kill, not launchers, are of course correct. But for vulnerability calculations, it is the launcher that is more important. Considering that the United States would never launch a first strike, a force of only 100 ICBMs, even if half are mobile, is simply too vulnerable to a surprise attack. That could well become a "bay-window" of vulnerability.

The single-warhead Midgetman is under development but, as has been noted, faces opposition within the Air Force because of its expense. The Air Force, rightfully, fears that these costs will cut into other programs; thus, they prefer the MX.

Another option could be to extend the life of

the Minuteman-IIIIs, 300 of which are modernized with the Mk-12A warhead. Assuming an availability of approximately 500 warhead "slots," that could mean only 50 MX, 500 Midgetman missiles, or 166 Minuteman-IIIIs. Only 50 additional MX would mean too few ICBMs; 500 Midgetman missiles are too expensive; but maintaining 166 Minuteman-IIIIs would cost literally nothing.

As has already been indicated, the B-1B bomber situation continues to be clouded by controversy. Congress is furious about cost-overruns which, according to one Government report, are reaching 6 billion dollars.² But Congress is even more upset at defects in the B-1B program that may cost in the billions to correct. The B-1B was sold as an "interim" penetrator between the older B-52 and the new stealth ATB due to deploy in the early 1990s; once the latter came on line in the mid-1990s, the B-1B would assume the ALCM-carrying role from the B-52. Despite all these problems, considering the flexibility of a large bomber in both conventional and nuclear wars, as well as the added flexibility provided by advanced weaponry, the B-1B or at least some follow-on is needed to replace the 1950-era B-52s.

While the planned "stealth" ATB is still considered a supersecret program, some details have emerged. A book has even been published with a diagram showing the aircraft capable of carrying 9 ALCMs or ACMs.³ Unfortunately, as was explained earlier, any ATB ALCMs would have to come at the expense of the ALCMs on B-1Bs. Assuming that the B-1B will be limited in penetrating capabilities, the ALCM-carrying role would probably be left to it, with the ATB only carrying gravity bombs and counting as "one" under START rules. The ATB seems needed, therefore, but it will be very expensive — according to some reports, about $300 million per plane.⁴

The strategic submarine situation is a little more complicated. Moreover, unlike the MX and B-1B, which do have follow-ons that comply with START rules, no proposed successor to the Trident system has surfaced. For years, the Trident with 24 launch-tubes (compared with the 16 tubes of the earlier Polaris and Poseidon SSBNs) has been criticized for carrying "too many eggs in one basket." Currently the Navy has approval for 15 Tridents, with plans for at least 20. Given the goal of maintaining 66 per cent of the force-on-station, it

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START Negotiations

would mean that only 13-odd SSBNs would be
on station, as compared with the more than
20 SSBNs thus engaged for years.

While no one anticipates a breakthrough in
anti-submarine warfare (ASW), there is always
that threat. Also, it has recently been disclosed
that new Soviet attack submarines are quieter,
making detection more problematical. There
undoubtedly exists some mathematical model
predicting the exact number needed for mis-
sion requirements versus detection probabili-
ty, etc., but perhaps more important will be
the unquantifiable psychology of deterrence.
For years, the SSBN force was considered to
be the ultimate deterrent that, when all else
failed, would be able to respond to any threats.
It is difficult to pinpoint where any "numer-
ical-satisfaction curves" would cross, but cer-
tainly only 13 deployed would represent a
modest, and potentially vulnerable force-on-
station. This suggests work should be started
on a smaller SSBN with fewer tubes.

Greater Adaptability of the Soviet Inventory

What effect will START have on the Soviet
inventory and the balance? Fortunately, the
Soviets will also be faced with many difficult
decisions and dilemmas. Unfortunately, they
might be better prepared to face them for one
simple reason: they have considerably more,
and different types, of systems.

Soviet ICBM development is often described
in terms of "generations," with anywhere from
one to three different types per generation. The
Soviets deployed their first generation, the
SS-6, in the late 1950s, followed by the second
generation of SS-7s and SS-8s in the early
1960s. By 1966, deployment of the third gener-
ation of SS-9s, SS-11s and SS-13s was under-
way. Many of these third-generation ICBMs
are still in the force. In the mid-1970s, the
Soviets began their fourth generation of
MIRVed SS-17s, the huge SS-18 and the SS-19,
with 4, up to 10, and 3 warheads, respective-
ly. And the Soviets are starting to deploy a
fifth generation: the single-warhead, road-
mobile SS-25, and the 10-warhead, rail-mobile
SS-24.

Thus, the Soviets have in their inventory
everything from single-warhead missiles, both
stationary and mobile, to medium-sized mis-
siles with 3 to 6 warheads, to heavy missiles,
both mobile and stationary, with up to 10 war-

heads. This is the strategic equivalent to shop-
ping in a department store offering a vast
array of merchandise. For example, the new
Soviet 10-warhead SS-24 might be a mistake
under START counting rules, but the Soviets
also have the single-warhead SS-25. In other
words, they already have their "Midgetman,"
which certainly does conform to a START
regime.

The Soviets have similar flexibility in their
SSBN and SLBM forces. Much has been made
of their huge Typhoon SSBN, which is twice
the size of the U.S. Tridents — but the Typhoon
has only 20 tubes, not 24. Moreover, the
Soviets are also producing a new Delta-IV
SSBN with the older 16-tube arrangement.
Their newer SLBM, the SS-N-23, has 10 war-
heads — but they also have the SS-N-18, with
from 1 to 7 RVs, as well as the SS-N-20, with
from 6 to 9 MIRVs. In bombers, the current
Soviet aircraft carry only a few ALCMs,
although their new "Blackjack" might carry
more.

Too much attention has been paid to restrict-
ing Soviet ICBMs, especially their heavy mis-
siles. Not enough attention, however, has been
paid to their total nuclear force.

Thus, when one looks at the full array of
Soviet nuclear weaponry, one sees immeasur-
ably more flexibility of systems than on the
U.S. side. While it is, within limits, fairly easy
to predict the future U.S. force, it is virtually
impossible to calculate what the Soviet force
might look like after a START agreement. One
thing seems certain: the Soviets will probably
end up with more SNDV platforms than the
United States, albeit with the same number
of warheads. Thus, there could well be a situ-
ation similar to SALT I (Figure 1), but with
one major difference: After SALT I, even
though the ratio of SNDVs was 1,712 to 2,450
in favor of the Soviet Union, the warhead ad-
vantage was about 7,500 to 2,500 in favor of
the United States. Under START, both sides
will be "equal" in warheads.

A Return to Massive Retaliation?

The numerical balances and considerations
are important, but equally important are the
potential effects of START on nuclear strategy
and deterrence. Indeed, the real focus of con-
cern should not be just on the "bean-count,"
but on how START will affect strategy. This

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43

could prove to be the deepest dilemma of all. Instead of ridding the world of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), as the present Administration had aspired. START could well mean a return to a similar — indeed even more onerous — strategy of Massive Retaliation.

The popular perception of nuclear strategy is often expressed in the simplistic proposition that the United States will, or always can, respond to a Soviet first strike by hitting Soviet cities. President Carter's famous statement about the need for only one SSBN to destroy Soviet cities encouraged that perception. While it may be technically correct, few strategists would endorse that solution.

In fact, U.S. strategy has always been decidedly more intricate. The impression during the Eisenhower Administration was that of a U.S. strategy of Massive Retaliation against Soviet cities. Yet, as we now know from declassified documents, there were tremendous debates behind closed doors in the 1950s, and targeting was seldom clear-cut. Part of the misconception of this early period was that, except for John Foster Dulles' famous Massive Retaliation speech of 1954 — where, in fact, he never used that phrase — there were few declaratory statements.⁵

During the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, which coincided with the development and deployment of most ICBMs, SLBs and SSBNs, there were numerous statements on strategic policy, mostly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The policy went from Massive Retaliation to "Assured Destruction" and thence to MAD.

In 1970, President Nixon asked: "Should a President ... be left with the single option of ordering mass destruction of enemy civilians?"⁶ In 1974 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced the notion of limited nuclear options (LNOs). As he stated: "Rather than massive options, we now want to provide the President a wider set of much more selective targeting options."⁷

Secretary Schlesinger's departure and the end of the Ford Administration left this strategic policy in doubt. But "limited options" resurfaced in the Carter Administration's "Countervailing Strategy" formalized in a Presidential Decision, PD-59. Further developed were the notions of SNOs (selective nuclear options) and even RNOs (regional nuclear options). Secretary of Defense Harold

Brown presented this as an "evolutionary strategy." The Reagan Administration essentially has affirmed PD-59 with its own National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-13.⁸

One needs to review, however briefly, this history of nuclear strategy in order fully to appreciate the effect of START. Again, the concept must be given that final numbers and disposition await the treaty and the decision each country will make. Yet, certain trends seem inevitable. For several reasons, it appears that the United States will have to abandon the "Countervailing Strategy" and revert to at least a quasi-Massive Retaliation strategy.

First and foremost are the sheer numbers available. Limited options require more, not fewer weapons. There might or might not be such a thing as "overkill," but there certainly is such a thing as "underkill" — a classic military problem. Whatever one might do with limited resources, one cannot expect to exercise many options.

Second, there is the type of weapons. Again, final dispositions are unknown, but it appears that the land-based ICBM force could take the deepest cuts, perhaps up to 90 per cent. These are the weapons that have the best accuracy and the most timely command, control and communications features. Complicating the problem of sea-based forces is that each time an SSBN launches a missile, it invites detection and retaliation. If all 24 SLBs are launched, that is not a major concern; but any effort at selective launches of only several missiles risks the detection and thereby the survival of the submarine and its unfired missiles.

A related problem is that, if current trends continue, the U.S. inventory would consist of only MIRVed systems, with the exception of the Navy's nuclear Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). MIRV missiles are not necessarily the type suited for any limited-options strategy. To make matters worse, at the Washington Summit the United States finally agreed to some restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Since SLCMs are the only system not now being restricted, such limits should be carefully analyzed for their implications; otherwise the U.S. Navy could well find itself in a restrictions dilemma similar to that discussed in connection with the Air Force's ALCMs.

Third, and last, is the problem of susceptibility to a first strike. Assuming that the

44

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Soviet Union will have more ICBMs than the United States under START, they could launch a devastating first strike and still have at least their SLBM force available for a third strike. After SALT II, the United States still commanded a substantial advantage over the Soviet Union in warheads; nevertheless, many in the United States were apprehensive of a "window of vulnerability." If Americans were concerned about vulnerability when the United States had warhead superiority, it seems difficult to believe that they will be comfortable in a situation where even that edge will be gone.

Thus, with fewer weapons, possibly less con-
trol over those weapons and an abiding con-
cern over vulnerability, U.S. strategy will have
to change. The United States would be left
with those forces suitable for retaliation, even
massive retaliation, but not any more complex
strategy requiring the numbers and sufficient
control for exercising options. Finally, we
should remember that the conventional wis-
dom after World War II held that the West, not
the East, needed nuclear capacity for overall
deterrence.

This new START dilemma could raise sub-
stantially the importance of the President's
Strategic Defense Initiative. If, in fact, the
Soviets do end up with more weapons plat-
forms and options, clearly viable U.S. strategic
defenses could help to offset that imbalance.
Yet, a START Treaty is likely to be concluded
in the near future, determining offensive
weapons deployments into the late 1990s and
beyond. By that time, will SDI have survived
the U.S.-Soviet bargaining table and/or domes-
tic politics in the United States? Or, having
survived those exigencies, will credible stra-
tegic defenses become available in time to
relieve the imbalance?

Incompatible "Tracks"

Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the
START two-track dilemma is the "right-hand,
left-hand" approach between the weapons-
builders and the arms-controllers. From an
historical viewpoint, one would have to side
with the weapons-builders. After all, the roots
of the Trident SSBNs, MX missiles and B-1
bombers go back to the early 1970s, when only
launchers, not warheads, counted. In this day,
when it takes over a decade to bring a weapons

system from the drawing board to deployment,
changing weapons systems in midstream is not
easy. Thus, the START negotiators should
have taken more careful account of the exist-
ing and planned U.S. weapons inventory.

On the other hand, now that the arms con-
trol details are public, the weapons-builders
should adapt, and the U.S. Congress should
pay attention. Yet, the Air Force is still push-
ing hard for the heavy-penalty (under START)
10-warhead MX system and does not want the
single-warhead missile. At the Office of the
Secretary of Defense level, strong considera-
tion was given, at least for a time, to placing
three warheads on the Midgetman for better
"cost-effectiveness." A former Pentagon offi-
cial once in charge of research and develop-
ment told an audience how the new ATB with
advanced ALCMs and ACMs would solve the
bomber problem in the 1990s, ignoring the im-
plications of START.⁹ The Navy wants more
24-tube SSBNs. In most cases, the weapons-
builders are arguing on the strictly military
merits of the systems and/or cost-effectiveness,
while completely ignoring the implications of
START. The MX might be more accurate and
more cost-effective than a Midgetman, but does
the Air Force really want merely 100 missiles
in its inventory?

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is developing
"generations" of different types of systems,
giving Moscow the flexibility for any conceiv-
able type of arms control agreement. And dis-
cussions of strategy and deterrence have been
virtually ignored in the ongoing rush to sign
a START accord.

Enough details exist to indicate the START "deep-cut" proposal will prove to be a major mistake. The United States simply is not building the proper weapons compatible with such an agreement, and future systems now proposed that might be more compatible may never be built. Fortunately, the United States still fields some adequate systems such as the Minuteman-III ICBMs with the Mk-12A warhead and later-model 16-tube Poseidon boats that can last well into the 1990s, by which time the weapons track of the START two-track dilemma can be sorted out. And these older but modernized systems can keep up the numbers needed for nuclear strategy.

The Administration should keep in mind
that, probably for the first time, there will be
another type of "two-track" dilemma when it

Winter 1988

45

JAMES L. GEORGE

## IN BRIEF

Winter 1988

35

Table 1
SALT I LIMITATIONS

Table 2
SALT II LIMITATIONS

Obviously, definitive answers to these questions await both the final agreement and the decisions each country will make on its respective weapons systems — since there will be a certain degree of "freedom to mix." Still, enough information exists to explore some inevitable trends. In order fully to appreciate the START "two-track" dilemma, however, it is helpful to begin with a brief review of the changes in the rules of the game from SALT to START.

## From SALT to START

36

Strategic Review

Table 3
START LIMITATIONS

<table><tr><td>• SNDVs</td><td>1,600 ceiling on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers.</td></tr><tr><td>• Warheads</td><td>6,000 ceiling to include ICBM and SLBM warheads, long-range ALCMs (heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs and SRAM counting as one warhead).</td></tr><tr><td>• Sublimits</td><td>4,900 ballistic missile warheads (ICBMs and SLBMs)<br/>1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles<br/>(1,100 implied sublimit on bombers and ALCMs).</td></tr></table>

SALT II signed in 1979 (see Table 2) was, at least for the United States, also a "freeze." The Soviet Union would have had to retire some 200 of its older systems, a condition that was undoubtedly the best feature of this accord. Launchers were still the basic counting device, but now some important sublimits were set. MIRV systems were placed in a new sublimit, and bombers were added. Those bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) were placed in the MIRV sublimit. The basic counting device under SALT II was still SNDVs, with MIRVed warheads only indirectly counted in the sublimits. And again, the agreement did little more than "freeze" the status quo.

A START accord, however, promises to be quite different — a difference that is already reflected in the name-change from SALT "limitations" to START "reductions"; and these would not just be reductions but very "deep cuts." The second major change is that now both launchers (SNDVs) and warheads would be counted. Thus, the MIRVed warheads that were indirectly encouraged in both SALT I and II (since they did not count) will now incur penalties and, as will be shown below, severe problems.

## START Negotiations

Warhead-counting numbers for ballistic missiles were also set at the Washington Summit. Although these could change, as will be discussed below, any modification of the current verification rules would have to be extremely "intrusive," might encourage cheating and for the long run would have to be very complex.

Offhand, the limit on SNDVs might not be too restrictive from the U.S. vantagepoint because of some normal retirements and attrition. By the early 1990s, when any START agreement would take effect, the 450 Minuteman-II missiles, older Poseidon SSBNs and B-52G bombers will all be nearing the end of their normal thirty-year life-cycles. Just retiring the 450 Minuteman-II missiles alone will put the United States below the 1,600 SN DV limit. On the other hand, now that the old Titan missiles have been shelved, the Minuteman-II missiles represent the only "megaton" warheads in the inventory. Although aging and not as accurate as their follow-on systems, they still would be effective in "city-busting" missions associated with "countervalue" deterrence. Nevertheless, the Minuteman-Is might be considered expend-

Winter 1988

37

<table><thead><tr><th>System</th><th>Launchers (SN DVs)</th><th>Number of Warheads</th><th>Total Warheads</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MX</td><td>50</td><td>10</td><td>500</td></tr><tr><td>Minuteman-II</td><td>450</td><td>1</td><td>450</td></tr><tr><td>Minuteman-III</td><td>500</td><td>3</td><td>1,500</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ICBMs</td><td>(1,000)</td><td></td><td>(2,450)</td></tr><tr><td>SLBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Trident Submarines (8 x 24)*</td><td>192</td><td>8</td><td>1,536</td></tr><tr><td>Poseidons with Trident (12 x 16)*</td><td>192</td><td>8</td><td>1,536</td></tr><tr><td>Poseidons (18 x 16)*</td><td>288</td><td>10</td><td>2,880</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal SLBMs</td><td>(672)</td><td></td><td>(5,952)</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ballistic missiles</td><td>1,672</td><td></td><td>8,402</td></tr><tr><td>Bombers</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>B-1B</td><td>100</td><td>1</td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>B-52G (ALCM)</td><td>98</td><td>12</td><td>1,176</td></tr><tr><td>B-52H (ALCM)</td><td>46</td><td>20</td><td>920</td></tr><tr><td>B-52G</td><td>69</td><td>1</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>B-52H</td><td>50</td><td>1</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal bombers</td><td>(363)</td><td></td><td>(2,315)</td></tr><tr><td>Totals</td><td>2,035</td><td></td><td>10,717</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>SNDVs</td><td></td><td>Warheads</td></tr></tbody></table>

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Strategic Review

START Negotiations

these include the three-warhead Minuteman-
IIIs with the the new Mk-12A warhead; start-
ing in 1979. 300 of the systems received the
new warhead. Then there are the 12 late-model
Poseidon SSBNs of the Benjamin Franklin
class that were retrofitted with the Trident-I
missile. Besides carrying the C-4 SLBM, these
ships are quieter and possess other improve-
ments. As is shown below, these four systems
alone have 4,472 warheads:

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>50 MX</td>
      <td>(50 x 10 warheads)</td>
      <td>500</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>8 Trident<br>submarines</td>
      <td>(8 x 24 tubes x 8<br>warheads)</td>
      <td>1,536</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>300 MM-III<br>w/Mk-12A</td>
      <td>(300 x 3 warheads)</td>
      <td>900</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>12 Poseidons<br>w/Trident</td>
      <td>(12 x 16 tubes x 8<br>warheads)</td>
      <td>1,536</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td colspan="2">Total Warheads</td>
      <td>4,472</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

The prospective situation with respect to U.S.
bombers may not be as dire, although their full
capabilities will not be exploitable under the
START limits. Given an overall warhead limit
of 6,000 and a sublimit of 4,900 ballistic war-
heads, there is an implied 1,100 sublimit on
bombers and ALCMs. In theory, that number
could be increased, but it would have to come
at the expense of the ballistic missile force.
Since the latter must be reduced from 8,400 to
4,900, the bomber force would probably be
limited to the implied 1,100.

Under current rules, a non-ALCM-carrying
bomber counts as only one warhead, with each
ALCM also counting as "one." As was noted
above, assuming some normal attrition, such
as the retirement of the 450 older Minuteman-
IIIs, there should be no need to scrap any of the
long-range bombers except for reasons of age.
The problem comes, again, in the warhead
count — reducing from 2,315 to only 1,100.

The dilemma has been further exacerbated
by the placement of an additional 8-cylinder ca-
capacity ALCM-dispenser in the later model
B-52Hs. The older B-52Gs carried only 12
ALCMs, but the B-52Hs now being converted
can carry 20 ALCMs, thus running the num-
bers up very quickly. Therefore, a final dispo-
sition of the long-range bomber force would
depend on the mix of the older and modernized
versions of the B-52. Yet, one prospect is cer-
tain: the ALCM, which was once hailed as the
savior of our long-range bomber force, especial-
ly for the older planes, cannot be fully exploit-
ed in the face of START limitations.

There is still another illustration of the
ALCM-limitation dilemma. The B-1B bomber
currently entering the force is under severe criti-
cism for being overweight and, worse, lacking
adequate electronic countermeasure (ECM)
capabilities to penetrate Soviet layered
defenses.¹ This problem would be of less concern
if the B-1B carried ALCMs and thereby the
capability to launch the weapons outside Soviet
defense envelopes. However, once the ALCMs
are placed on the B-1B, which is capable of car-
rying 22, the numbers rise dramatically.

There is the additional question of redundan-
cy: why have both the B-52 and B-1B as ALCM-
launchers? Many critics of the B-1B suggested
that it be delayed in favor of the "stealth" Ad-
vanced Technology Bomber (ATB). Yet, the
B-1B was sold as an "interim" penetrator un-
til the ATB will join the inventory in the 1990s.
A new bomber seems certain to be needed as
a replacement for the 1950-vintage B-52s, but
the ALCM limitations under START will prove
very restrictive in this context.

The Longer-Range Dilemma

Winter 1988

39

Table 5
INVENTORY LATE 1990s

<table><thead><tr><th>System</th><th>Launchers (SN DVs)</th><th>Number of Warheads</th><th>Total Warheads</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MX</td><td>100</td><td>10</td><td>1,000</td></tr><tr><td>Midgetman</td><td>500</td><td>1</td><td>500</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ICBMs</td><td>(600)</td><td></td><td>(1,500)</td></tr><tr><td>SLBMs</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Trident (20 x 24)</td><td>480</td><td>8</td><td>3,840</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal ballistic missiles</td><td>1,080</td><td></td><td>(5,340)</td></tr><tr><td>Bombers</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>B-1B (ALCM)*</td><td>41</td><td>22</td><td>902</td></tr><tr><td>B-1B</td><td>59</td><td>1</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>ATB</td><td>132</td><td>1</td><td>132</td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal bombers</td><td>(232)</td><td></td><td>(1,093)</td></tr><tr><td>Totals</td><td>1,312</td><td></td><td>6,433</td></tr></tbody></table>

The long-range implications of START limitations present another set of dilemmas. Table 5 shows the planned inventory for the late 1990s period. Under current plans, there will be 100 MX ICBMs (50 stationary and 50 rail-mobile), 500 single-warhead, mobile Midgetman missiles, some 20 Trident SSBNs (although unofficial, this is the number most often quoted), 100 B-1B bombers and 132 new "stealth" ATBs.

As can be seen in Table 5, reaching the SNDV limit of 1,600 would again pose little difficulty: in fact, the planned inventory is some 300 SNDVs below that number. The real challenge, once again, would emerge from the overall warhead, ballistic warhead and ALCM limits of 6,000, 4,900 and 1,100, respectively. As shown in Table 5, the inventory is over 400 ballistic missile warheads above the limit. Or, to put it another way, the choice would seem to be between 2 Trident SSBNs, 44 MX, 440 Midgetman (SICBMs) or some combination.

40

Strategic Review

[LC]

START Negotiations

Winter 1988

41

[LQ]

Finally, changing the verification procedures seems to violate that basic principle often known as KISS — "Keep It Simple, Stupid!" As we know from repeated Soviet violations of SALT in masking missile tests by encryption, even the current, relatively simple monitoring system can present problems. Moving to a system requiring constant monitoring would be virtually impossible. Predictions are always risky to make in this turbulent world, but a count-down could almost be started from the day any such agreement was signed before cries of "cheating" would come from many quarters.

As has already been indicated, the B-1B bomber situation continues to be clouded by controversy. Congress is furious about costoverruns which, according to one Government report, are reaching 6 billion dollars.² But Congress is even more upset at defects in the B-1B program that may cost in the billions to correct. The B-1B was sold as an "interim" penetrator between the older B-52 and the new stealth ATB due to deploy in the early 1990s; once the latter came on line in the mid-1990s, the B-1B would assume the ALCM-carrying role from the B-52. Despite all these problems, considering the flexibility of a large bomber in both conventional and nuclear wars, as well as the added flexibility provided by advanced weaponry, the B-1B or at least some follow-on is needed to replace the 1950-era B-52s.

42

Strategic Review

START Negotiations

Winter 1988

43

[LC]

could prove to be the deepest dilemma of all. Instead of ridding the world of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), as the present Administration had aspired, START could well mean a return to a similar — indeed even more onerous — strategy of Massive Retaliation.

During the Kennedy-Johnson Administration, which coincided with the development and deployment of most ICBMs, SLBs and SSNs, there were numerous statements on strategic policy, mostly by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The policy went from Massive Retaliation to "Assured Destruction" and thence to MAD.

One needs to review, however briefly, this history of nuclear strategy in order fully to appreciate the effect of START. Again, the caVEat must be given that final numbers and disposition await the treaty and the decision each country will make. Yet, certain trends seem inevitable. For several reasons, it appears that the United States will have to abandon the "Countervailing Strategy" and revert to at least a quasi-Massive Retaliation strategy.

A related problem is that, if current trends continue, the U.S. inventory would consist of only MIRVed systems, with the exception of the Navy's nuclear Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). MIRV missiles are not necessarily the type suited for any limited options strategy. To make matters worse, at the Washington Summit the United States finally agreed to some restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Since SLCMs are the only system not now being restricted, such limits should be carefully analyzed for their implications; otherwise the U.S. Navy could well find itself in a restrictions dilemma similar to that discussed in connection with the Air Force's ALCMs.

44

Strategic Review

START Negotiations

Incompatible "Tracks"

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is developing "generations" of different types of systems, giving Moscow the flexibility for any conceivable type of arms control agreement. And discussions of strategy and deterrence have been virtually ignored in the ongoing rush to sign a START accord.

Winter 1988

45

James L. George
10 Vallingby Circle
Rockville, Maryland 20850

29 April 1988

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

MAY 2 - 1988

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I would like to thank you for your letter of
March 24 in regards to my article on the START
"two-track dilemma." And, I appreciate your
kind words.

I read with great interest your own assessment
of START in Sunday's _Washington Post_. Needless
to say, I am in full agreement with you both in
the main points of your analysis and the need to
begin a very serious and widespread debate on
these critical issues. I, like you, find it
amazing that no one in Congress has asked "which
6,000/4,900/1,600?" or worried about the affect
on nuclear strategy.

START will probably be the most important arms
control issue we as a nation yet face in this
nuclear age. I am anxious to join the debate.
If I can be of any assistance, please let me
know.

GERALD R. FORD

FOUNDATION

President Ford
and Betty Ford
Honorary Co-Chairmen

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Martin J. Allen, Jr.
Chairman

Steven M. Ford
Vice Chairman

Robert M. Warner
Secretary

Harold L. Davidson
Treasurer

Robert E. Barrett

Philip W. Buchen

Dean Burch

Richard Cheney

Marvin Davis

Richard M. DeVos

Leonard K. Firestone

Max Fisher

John G. Ford

Michael G. Ford

Richard A. Ford

Richard M. Gillett

George Grassmuck

Alan Greenspan

Robert P. Griffin

Robert T. Hartmann

Carla Hills

Roderick M. Hills

Robert L. Hooker

G. Richard Katzenbach

Thomas E. Kauper

Henry Kissinger

Lawrence B. Lindemer

John O. Marsh, Jr.

Frederik G.H. Meijer

Terrence O'Donnell

Paul O'Neill

Leon W. Parma

James M. Paxson

Donald Rumsfeld

Brent Scowcroft

Peter F. Secchia

Jordan Sheperd

William E. Simon

Harry A. Towsley

Jay Van Andel

Susan Ford Vance

Werner Veit

Frank Zarb

Trustee Ex-officio

Don W. Wilson, Director

Gerald R. Ford Library
and Museum

DATE: May 31, 1988

TO: Board of Trustees
Gerald R. Ford Foundation

FROM: Marty Allen

SUBJECT: Annual Meeting & Dinner - June 6, 1988

JUN 02 1988

This is an information memo to trustees attending the subject
events.

This is a special year for President and Mrs. Ford. On
April 8 Betty celebrated her 70th birthday, on July 14th
the President will celebrate his 75th, and on October 15th
they will celebrate their 40th wedding anniversary.

We have purchased a piece of Waterford crystal in the shape
of the U.S. Capitol Building as a gift from the trustees
to be presented at the annual meeting. At the dinner the
program will focus on President and Mrs. Ford.

We hope the gift and program are a surprise to them, but
wanted you to be informed in advance.

[LC]

303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (616) 456-2675

[Y]

HAK:

I assume you have no interest in any
financial involvement in a Soviet Cultural
Center at Epcot at Disney World.

Unless you indicate to the contrary, we
will not respond.

No interest ✓ Find out more

ssm

GERARDO INTERNATIONAL

112 GRAY DOVE COURT • DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA 32019 • (904) 756-1916

March 21, 1988

Mikhail S. Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
Of the Communist Party of the USSR
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR

Dear Mr. Gorbachev:

It is with sincere, genuine and respectful intentions that I write this letter of hope, peace and cooperation between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States.

Your policy of glasnost has inspired the people of the world with a new spirit of genuine interest in working together.

The New Spirit you have created has instilled in me, a desire to propose the possibility of your considering an eternal tribute to the policy of Glasnost in the form of a Soviet Pavilion at Walt Disney's EPCOT Center in Orlando, Florida.

I wish to make it very clear that I have no political or financial consideration in this matter. My only desire is to offer in whatever way I can, as a simple and very average person, a positive step for peace and mutual cooperation in the exchange of culture and economic benefits for the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States. I have informed Steve Baker at Walt Disney that I will not accept any financial benefit from his corporation nor from the Soviet Union.

It is my hope that the pavilion would be a tribute to the "New Spirit," and that it would include a cultural exchange for art, music, acting, theater, film, ballet and the many interesting facets of the Soviet people, including the Circus for the children. That formal affairs for evenings be made possible so that visitors from all over the world could understand and appreciate the Soviet people, their warmth and their true desire for peace.

The Soviet pavilion could be economic window to the vast American markets for Soviet goods. As a central office to promote, advertise, market and set up distribution of Soviet products in the United States.

I believe this Soviet Pavilion could promote The New Spirit and provide for the acceleration of the floating of the Ruble on the world market. Working together, with financial integration and mutual cooperation of an interwoven worldwide economic system, we can only bring the world community together with respect and understanding.

A formal proposal will be presented to you on April 11, 1988. If I may very humbly request, your possible consideration of this sincere attempt for peace, that you may allow the world community to celebrate May 1, 1988, with the Soviet people, with the possibility of your announcement to enter negotiations for the possibility of establishing this cultural exchange as the most significant action ever taken by a Soviet leader.

Very Respectfully, Yours,

GERARDO INTERNATIONAL

April 26, 1988

Dear Mr. Carlucci:

Upon your direction, I would like to prepare a report quantifying the economic impact of the commercialization of by-product technologies derived from the SDI program.

This report will provide Congress and the American people with a lucid perspective of the importance of this and other military projects with a simple "dollars & cents approach."

Justification of military expenditures and increased defense budgets can be defended through such reports as they directly effect every American's financial future.

This problem exemplifies and parallels the R&D justification among current American Corporations, without a clear view of the financial benefits, the research is the first division to be cutback at the expense of technological superiority.

In Defense, this technological superiority is far more paramount.

Defense by-product commercialization can virtually assist in underwriting a substantial portion of defense spending, thus, transferring funding from the government, to the private sector.

If the next Presidential Administration were to seek cuts in defense spending, I firmly believe this possibility can be deterred through this effort of by-product commercialization.

Television ads reflecting the economic benefits of the military budget as it relats to current products could be another source of enlightenment to Congress and the American people, Thus, insuring continued technological superiority.

My company has been playing avital role in continued american technological superiority through commercialization of research. By bridging the gap between research and the marketplace, we are able to return a percentage of the profits to the participating facility, thus providing the incentive for continued U.S. technological advancement.

The military by-product commercialization effort can provide the financial means to assist in underwriting defense spending and provide positive proof to Congress and the American people exactly how the military is positioned to aid the U.S. in an expanding economy and improve the everyday quality of life in new and innovative products for consumers.

If I may be of assistance in spearheading this approach for the justification of an increased military budget, please advise as to any specific criteria you would prefer to be included.

cc:General Abrahamson

APR - 5 1988

EPSTEIN BECKER BORSODY & GREEN, P.C.

March 31, 1988

PERSONAL

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for meeting last week with our Japanese friends, Mrs. Tabei and the representatives of The Mainichi Shimbun. From what I heard of the events, the questioning was lively and your responses were most tactful and sensitive.

Besides their appreciation of the policy matters that you discussed, I am told that your visitors were particularly interested in two personal matters: your description of the importance of loyalty, which was quite congruent with the Japanese sense of obligation, and your narration of the circumstances of your coming to the United States and rising to prominence by force of intellect and perserverence.

With characteristic duality, that experience was seen on one hand as impossible in Japan, with its ethnic monolithy, but on the other hand as susceptible of repetition by a Japanese coming here, a thought both satisfying and challenging.

With best wishes and appreciation, I am

AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY
AMERICAN EXPRESS TOWER, WORLD FINANCIAL CENTER, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10285

LOUIS V. GERSTNER, JR.
PRESIDENT

APR - 7 1988

April 5, 1988

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry:

Thank you for the comprehensive update on our
effort to bring the World Cup to the U.S. in 1994.
I remain excited about the possibility of truly
"globalizing" the sport of soccer by raising its
visability and following in the U.S.

My staff has been working with the U.S Soccer
Federation to determine additional ways that
American Express can support this worthwhile
effort. We are now in the process of contacting
some of our major business partners (such as
airlines and hotel chains) that would most likely
benefit from an association with the USSF and the
1994 event.

Once again, we are delighted that you and Drew
Lewis made us aware of this effort in its early
stages. Although the exact nature of our future
involvement is difficult to define at this point,
we are continuing to pursue ideas that would best
serve the mutual interests of the USSF and American
Express.

JUL 28 1988.

July 26, 1988

Mr. Rong Yi-ren
Chairman
CITIC Industrial Bank
19 Jianguomenwai Dajie
Beijing, China

Dear Mr. Rong:

I wanted to express my sincere appreciation for the very successful conference you hosted in China last week. Despite the inherent difficulties of achieving progress in a group as disparate and large as this one, I think we made substantial progress.

American Express is committed to expanding its business in China in ways that are consistent with China's own development objectives. We look forward to expanding our role in the years ahead. Moreover, we are delighted with our relationship with CITIC and look forward as well to a significant expansion of that relationship.

I hope to see you soon either in New York or during my next trip to Beijing.

cc: Dr. H. A. Kissinger