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The formation of the ExCom was consistent with Kennedy's tendency to form special committees and task forces to study and deal with specific problems (e.g., Laos, Berlin) rather than relying on more formal groups, the composition of which might be designated by the organization chart or rank. The more flexible approach made it easier to include specialists and outside advisors. This practice was continued by President Johnson, notably during the Middle East crisis of June 1967.

The real reason for the Council's less frequent use is probably that explained by Bill Moyers, who wrote of President Johnson:

"He is generally more satisfied with small groups of people he knows well. As Kennedy before him, he learned that the NSC is not a live institution, not suited to precise debate for the sake of decision. President Johnson chooses to call in a handful of top advisers, confidants, close friends."

Thus today, Council sessions are generally used for "educational," "ratification" or "public relations" purposes.

### e. The Tuesday Lunch.

The Tuesday Lunch is the most important regular meeting in the national security process. The President views it so, since this time on his calendar is jealously guarded.

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The Tuesday Lunch was devised by Bundy, Rusk and McNamara as a scheduled occasion when they could sit down with the President and deal with the most pressing issues of the week. The format is highly compatible with President Johnson's desire to maintain continuing contact with a very few of his closest advisors.

The basic Tuesday Lunch group now consists of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, JCS, the Special Assistant, and the Presidential Press Secretary and his Assistant. The Chairman, JCS, did not attend regularly until mid-1967. Since that date he has become a regular participant, thus helping to counter the allegation that professional military opinion was being disregarded in this forum. Others are frequently invited, depending on the subject matter and what important official be visiting in town, e.g., Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland.

The participants regard the Tuesday Lunch as a particularly useful institution. Still there are serious shortcomings: there is no adequate preparation of the agenda or any formal record of action.

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f. <u>The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG).</u>

In order to achieve a more systematic coordination and to
bring about State Department control of foreign policy operations, the
Senior Interdepartment Group (SIG) was created in 1967. It is chaired by
the Under Secretary of State and has as members the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Deputies
of other interested agencies. It is supposed to engage in many of the func-
tions of the NSC Planning Board as well as the OCB under Eisenhower:
planning long-range policy as well as supervise execution. Under it are
regional Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG) chaired by the appropriate
Assistant Secretary.

In practice this has not worked too well. Neither SIG nor the
IRG's have a staff of their own. The Under Secretary level is too low
for effective national security coordination. (There should be at least
formal Cabinet level membership.) SIG papers do not go anywhere; they
are not normally considered either by the NSC or the Tuesday Lunch.

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g. <u>The Situation Room.</u>

The Situation Room symbolizes one of the greatest changes in
the President's relation to the national security process: the change in
his proximity and access to operations. The proximity and access afforded
him by the Situation Room are literal as well as figurative, for it is
located in the West Basement. The conference room adjoining it has
frequently been used by the President as a command center in times of
high crises.

The "Sit Room" staff prefer to refer to it as a "communication
facility." When President Kennedy took office, the departments and
intelligence agencies still selected the communications to be sent to the
White House and delivered them by hand. Today a very high proportion of
significant State and Defense telegraphic traffic goes automatically to the
Situation Room -- most of it by telegraphic relay. This means that today
the President can and often does know of a new development as soon as or
before his principal cabinet advisors.

Information of all types now received in the Situation Room is

Ordinates Independently

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closely monitored by its staff, who bring significant items to the
immediate attention of the Special Assistant. The latter determines what
goes to the President. The tendency, reflecting the President's dislike
for surprises, is to give him more rather than less.

The President's basic daily intake of intelligence consists of
a specially prepared daily CIA summary, which synthesizes the product
of the intelligence community and State Department's cable traffic, and
morning and afternoon State Department summaries. In addition, early
each morning the President receives a memorandum called the "Ops-
Intelligency Summary" prepared at the Pentagon and summarizing last
minute military intelligence and operational information. In recent months
this has been primarily oriented toward Vietnam but it includes other
critical events as well. During crisis periods (e.g., the Middle East war
of June 1967 and the Pueblo Crisis) the Situation Room also forwards
directly to the President periodic situation reports prepared by operational
task forces usually located in the State Department Operations Center.

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Summary and Conclusions.

1. The above description makes clear that since 1961 the focus of the conduct of National Security policy has shifted to the White House. The White House staff monitors not only the consistency of over-all policy with the President's wishes but "clears" all important operational cables.

2. The degree of White House dominance is much greater vis-a-vis the State Department than towards the Defense Department.

3. The position of the Secretary of State is anomalous. Usually the White House deals directly with his subordinates so that he loses a great deal of operational control. At the same time, he does not speak for his department with respect to over-all policy partly because of poor staffing, partly because the White House solicits the views of his subordinates independently.

4. There is in the whole process no focus for the consideration of long-term policy. SIG, which could do it, has no staff or status. The

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Special Assistant is overworked; the Policy Planning staff is too low-level and not very competent.

5. The remedies depend on the wishes of the President. If he prefers to operate from the White House, a planning as well as a program evaluation function should be added to the assignments of the Special Assistant. The disadvantage of this procedure is that it will increase the White House staff to unmanageable proportions and further demoralize the State Department. Foreign policy cannot be planned with the present State Department, but it also cannot be made without an effective State Department.

6. The best solution would be to make SIG a true coordinating body to be chaired by the Secretary of State. In practice, the Under secretaries could sit for most of the purposes of SIG. But cabinet-level membership would guarantee the proper level of attention. SIG, to be effective, should have a small staff of its own under the direction of the Under Secretary of State. The State Department will not be able to perform its coordinating function, however, without a major reorganization that

advice to the President. He has both the first and last shot at bringing matters to the President's attention, and is usually the first to know the President's reactions. He is often the person first charged with meeting the President's requirements and carrying out his instructions; in the last resort the Administration in his hands, if the choice lies between doing it and observing the constraints of orderly procedure, the former takes precedence and the latter is accommodated as feasible. While he does not have the executive responsibilities of cabinet officers, he is deeply involved in most matters which are of paramount importance to them. In present practice he is at the nerve center of the entire process.

The Special Assistant attends the Tuesday Lunch, as is present at all important meetings (formal and informal) with the President, travels abroad with him, and often speaks for him to the rest of the country. As the White House representative, he sits on the principal formal interdepartmental committees, such as the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and the 303 Committee, as well as ad hoc groups such as the various Vietnam coordinating committees and the Middle East Task Force of June 1967.

The activities of the Special Assistant and his staff may be arbitrarily divided into functional components. In practice they seldom can be clearly separated. The following are offered here primarily as indicators of the scope of the Special Assistant's operations:

- Oversees, coordinates and contributes to the President's flow of basic information and intelligence;

- Performs a secretariat type function in processing the flow of paper to and from the President;

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-- Identifies matters involving the President's interests and assures that they are receiving appropriate attention and that his right of decision is protected;

-- Monitors national security operations to assure responsiveness and conformity to the President's wishes;

-- Acts in a close, personal sense as advisor to the President and, together with his staff, provides private, independent analysis of advice received by the President from official and informal sources;

-- Performs a variety of work generated by the President and of a nature which, for reasons of sensitivity or personal choice, the President does not wish to be handled by his immediate official family, e.g., highly secret correspondence with other national leaders;

-- Performs continuing liaison with cabinet officers and their departments, including the coordination of difficult interdepartmental issues which the President chooses not to leave in formal channels, e.g., the Food to India problem of early 1967; and

-- Provides guidance to the White House Press Office for dealing with questions on national security matters.

Some of the above functions will be described in more detail later in this section following an identification of the other elements of the NSC staff.

b. The Executive Secretary of the NSC

While the Special Assistant has no operating deputy, the Executive Secretary comes closer to performing that function and fills in for him in his rare absences. The Executive Secretary is limited in this role, however, because he cannot possibly duplicate the personal advisory relationship which the Special Assistant enjoys with the President.

While the importance of the formal NSC has diminished in recent years, the Executive Secretary is still its executive officer. He

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oversees the agenda and the preparations for Council meetings and
maintains the NSC records. However, the NSC staff, which on paper
works for him, is now under the direct supervision of the Special
Assistant. The title "NSC staff" is now a misnomer--they are
"Presidential staff".

The diminution of this aspect of the Executive Secretary's role
has been more than offset by his involvement in the staffing and
operational activities of the Special Assistant and his over-
sight of the Situation Room. There is a vast paper management job
which flows around and through the Special Assistant's complex and
the Executive Secretary has, in the absence of more formal arrange-
ments, assumed a primary if somewhat ambiguous responsibility for
its management.

### c. The NSC Staff Members

(1) **Personnel and Relations with Other Agencies.** Every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, crisis permitting, the Special Assistant meets with his staff. The total varies from 15 to 20. About one-third of these are foreign service officers detailed from the State Department. The others are on the NSC payroll or belong to other organizations. Some of these officers have fairly specific jurisdictions, although responsibilities overlap. The clearest distinctions are among those with geographic assignments, one each for: East Asia, Latin America, the Near East, Africa-South Asia, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe-Soviet Union. These beats roughly correspond to the geographic bureaus of the State Department. All but one of these officers have an assistant or two under at least nominal supervision. Some of the principal six carry additional functional portfolios: the Africa-South Asia officer also has