43

1 ex machina, there is nobody going to hand it all to them, the

2 Americans will not be able to deliver everything, and the

3 Europeans recognize that it does not do any good to keep

4 stirring up unfulfillable hopes, and if we then keep heading

5 towards the implications of what is almost inherent in some of

6 the processes that have started, I could imagine a

7 breakthrough, provided we can find one moderate Arab leader

8 who is willing to take some responsibility for it. It cannot

9 be done simply by outside countries.

10 Senator Nelson: I agree.

11 What if President Assad of Syria were to suddenly seize
12 the moment and come forth and say we are going to stop all of
13 the international terrorist activity that is harbored in
14 Syria? Would that not be a cataclysmic change that could
15 suddenly cause a shifting of the tables toward peace?

16 Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have written in an article
17 about 6 weeks ago commenting on President Assad's interview
18 with the New York Times, that this is an initiative that
19 should be explored. If he means that the negotiations can
20 start where they left off -- if he really means that -- all
21 that was left in these negotiations was a strip of land along
22 the Sea of Galilee of a few hundred yards wide. That, of
23 course, raises questions of riparian rights and it is not a
24 simple question, but it is a definable question.

25 And also, if President Assad were prepared to make a

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005

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1 genuine peace agreement with Israel, while the Palestinian

2 question still is unsettled, that would create a major

3 incentive for the Palestinians.

4 On the other hand, for Sharon to engage in a final status

5 negotiation with Syria involving settlements on the Golan

6 Heights at a moment that he is dealing with settlements in

7 Gaza and the potential settlements beyond the security fence,

8 that is a really tough domestic question in Israel. And for

9 the United States to promote a negotiation with Syria and let

10 Syria, with respect to terrorism, take the step, similar to

11 Libya's with respect to nuclear weapons, is an important challenge, is impossible.

[no new paragraph]

12 But If Assad were prepared to get rid of the Hizbollah in

13 the Bekka Valley and the headquarters of terrorist groups in

14 Damascus, I think it would be an important step towards peace

15 if they explored the Syrian option.

16 Senator Nelson: He told me that he would not cause any
17 preconditions, and I have asked that question nine ways to
18 Sunday to make sure that I was hearing what he was saying.

19 Secretary Kissinger: He would not cause any?

20 Senator Nelson: He was saying he would not impose any
21 preconditions. Now, you hear a different opinion, whoever is
22 speaking, but that is what he said to me eyeball to eyeball
23 with our U.S. Ambassador sitting there and with his foreign
24 minister sitting there. But, oh, it is a tortuous path.

25 Thank you.

45

1 Secretary Kissinger: I think it is something that should
2 be explored, always keeping in mind that we must insist on the
3 end of the terrorist activities from Syrian soil.

4 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

5 Senator Chafee.

6 Senator Chafee: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome,
7 Ambassador.

8 This arguably is the darkest period of Israel's
9 existence, this 4-year intifada, and certainly the chaos and
10 the violence we read about every morning in the papers we
11 condemn. As Robert Malley said, who will testify in the
12 second panel, the Road Map, embraced but all but believed by
13 none, as the only route we have out of this except, as you
14 said, a deus ex machina, is the Geneva Accords. This in
15 detail addresses all the issues, the Palestinian right of
16 return, the recognition of Israel as a state for the Jewish
17 people, Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, the settlements, and of
18 course, very importantly the disarmament of militias and their
19 renunciation of terror. This is signed by Israelis and
20 Palestinians.

21 And my question is why would members of our
22 administration, such as Secretary Powell testify 2 weeks ago
23 that he took heat for meeting with the signatories of the
24 Geneva Accords? And Secretary Wolfowitz publicly announced
25 some support for the Geneva Accords, and he took some heat for

46

1 it from the administration. Why is that and out of this

2 darkness is some light that this administration would condemn

3 or renounce?

4 Secretary Kissinger: The Geneva Accords are a
5 negotiation between an Israeli who has made important
6 contributions in the past but who is totally marginalized in
7 Israeli politics, and a PLO representative.

8 governments came to such a conclusion, I do not think it would

9 be vetoed by the United States.

10 There are aspects of it that, looking at, seem improbable
11 to me. I find it hard to imagine that Israel can live with an
12 outcome in which access to the Wailing Wall has to go through
13 some Arab territory no matter what the international guarantee
14 is. But this gets into fine points that would take us too
15 far.

16 I am not saying it is not possible for private groups to
17 get together and draw up paper plans. Governments have not
18 been able to do that.

19 But the refugee part of the Geneva Accords I think is
20 extremely dangerous. The refugee part of the Geneva Accord
21 establishes a right of return in some proportion to those
22 returning to other countries, and secondly, they reopen the
23 question that the decision will be left to Israel, subjecting
24 Israel to constant pressure to adjust its attitudes. It is
25 not definitive from that point of view. But I do not know

47

1 whether it is useful to discuss details of an accord made

2 between private people.

3 Senator Chafee: I guess that would be my point. As I

4 said, Mr. Malley will say the Road Map, embraced by all but

5 believed in by none --

6 Secretary Kissinger: I do not quarrel with the Road Map.

7 Senator Chafee: We might quibble about the language on
8 the right of return. My reading of it is that the

9 Palestinians do concede the right of return, and it is very
10 specific about --

11 Secretary Kissinger: The trouble with the Road Map -- it
12 is not a trouble. It is --

13 Senator Chafee: If I could just finish.

14 Secretary Kissinger: Oh, excuse me.

15 Senator Chafee: So my question is, why is this not more
16 closely looked at as a vehicle of peace if that is our goal?

17 Secretary Kissinger: There is no reason not to use the
18 Road Map in a serious negotiation. The Road Map is a good,
19 general statement of what should be settled in a negotiation.

20 Once one had a serious negotiation, the Road Map would be one
21 of the documents one would take very seriously.

22 Senator Chafee: More so than the outline of Geneva.

23 Secretary Kissinger: More than?

24 Senator Chafee: You are saying the Road Map has more

25 potential than the outlines from Geneva. Do I hear you right?

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48

1 Secretary Kissinger: The acoustics or my hearing is
2 failing me. More serious than what?

3 Senator Chafee: More potential for a resolution of the
4 various issues, that sticking to the Road Map has more
5 potential -- am I hearing you correctly -- than the very, very
6 specific agreements reached in Geneva?

7 Secretary Kissinger: I think the Road Map has more
8 potential than the Geneva Accords.

9 Senator Chafee: I do not have any other questions.

10 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

11 Senator Sununu.

12 Senator Sununu: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Dr. Kissinger, I think in answering a previous question,
14 you talked about the potential for withdrawal from certain
15 Israeli settlements, and you said that even as they withdraw,
16 Israel should engage Egypt. In what way should they engage
17 Egypt?

18 Secretary Kissinger: Dennis Ross has submitted a paper
19 to you on that subject. He thinks that as Israel withdraws,
20 it is going to create potentials for all kinds of adjustments
21 that need to be made and that it would be a wise Israeli
course to discuss with Egypt a way by which territory that is
23 begin abandoned or settlements that are being abandoned, on
24 the one hand, do not begin a new terrorist wave and, secondly,
25 can be used in a constructive way for the development of the

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1 Gaza. But I think you should ask Dennis Ross this question

2 when he testifies here.

3 Senator Sununu: I will do my best to do so, but I wanted
4 to get your assessment of what kind of steps or approaches on
5 the part of Israel could make a substantive difference.

6 Secretary Kissinger: What he says and what I believe too
7 -- let me speak for myself and let him speak for himself.

8 What I believe is that as Israeli settlements are given up,
9 this is such a significant change in Israeli policy of such
10 major consequence for the Arab world, that Israel should do it
11 unilaterally where it can, but it should simultaneously
12 indicate to the Arab world that the change in Arab conditions
13 is something they would be prepared to discuss with them and
14 in which the moderate Arab countries could make an important
15 ~~unilateral~~ contribution.

16 Senator Sununu: In your testimony you suggested that the
17 security wall facilitates the abandonment of obstacles that
18 deprive so much of Palestinian life of its dignity. I think
19 those are pretty accurately your words. But much of the
20 complaint about the practical implementation, the construction
21 of the wall is that it has created a new set of barriers, a
22 new set of obstacles, division in villages, division of
23 farmland, and division of families. So does that not in part
24 defeat the purpose or the value that you were describing?

25 Secretary Kissinger: We are talking really about two

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50

walls, one that may be built unilaterally on the basis of

whatever security needs Israel thinks it has. I do not

necessarily endorse the *exact* line for that. The second one

is one which is either parallel or close to what will be the

final border. That, if it is intelligently drawn and

thoughtfully drawn, should minimize the obstacles.

What is now happening, as I understand, in the occupied

territories is that there is plethora of checkpoints and great

impediments to movement. One could imagine that once that

wall exists, the movement on the Palestinian side of the wall

would be essentially unimpeded or much less impeded.

Senator Sununu: But it would seem to me that the

situation you described, the one is a hypothetical and one

that might have the benefits you describe, and the other is

the practical or the real, at least in parts, that is again

creating these divisions.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is very important to

have a comprehensive effort of development and progress in the

Middle East along the lines that I have described. If it is

proved impossible to do this, then I think Israel is entitled

to take unilateral actions, and we should use our influence --

and I believe we are using our influence in this team that is

now in Israel -- to get the wall placed in a way that it

reduces the impediments to Arab dignity.

Senator Sununu: Well, along those very lines, you talk

51

1 about American opposition to the wall. I do not know if it
2 was in your testimony. It might be in the op-ed that you
3 wrote at the end of last year. But you suggest that America
4 should reconsider its opposition to the wall, but to the
5 extent that the U.S. has expressed concerns or opposition, it
6 is along the lines that you just described having to do with
7 the placement for just these reasons.

8 Secretary Kissinger: I think the administration is very
9 close to the position that I have indicated now.

10 Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate that clarification.

11 Secretary Kissinger: I have not discussed this with the
12 administration. When I wrote this article, there was
13 opposition to any concept of a wall. I think now the
14 administration's view, as I have understood it, is very close
15 to what I have described here.

16 Senator Sununu: So you do not believe that the work that
17 is being done now to address the concerns of the routing, the
18 division, the obstacles --

19 Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the mission of
20 Assistant Secretary Abrams and of Deputy Security Advisor
21 Hadley is meeting the concerns that I have expressed here.

22 Senator Sununu: I appreciate that clarification. It
23 seems to me that that is the difference between the potential
24 of this being constructive in the ways that you describe or
25 you hope or the wall being as divisive and as

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52

1. counterproductive as anything that has been done. It seems to
2. me that the issue of land ownership, land confiscation is as
3. visceral and inflammatory as anything that is happening in the
4. Middle East right now.

5. Secretary Kissinger: I look at the wall as a
6. contribution to coexistence, not as a means of supporting new
7. settlement policy.

8. Senator Sununu: Thank you very much.

9. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10. The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Sununu, and
11. thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for coming to us, being so
12. forthcoming and comprehensive in your answers. We appreciate,
13. as always, your attendance at our meetings and the leadership
14. that you bring.

15. The chair would like to now recognize the next panel, and
16. that will include the Honorable Dennis Ross, Director and
17. Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, the Washington Institute for
18. Near East Policy; Mr. Robert Malley, Middle East Program
19. Director of the International Crisis Group; the Honorable
20. Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center for Middle East
21. Policy, The Brookings Institution.

22. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for coming today. Your
23. full statements will be placed in the record. Let me ask you
24. to testify in the order that I introduced you which would be,
25. first of all, Mr. Ross, then Mr. Malley, and then Mr. Indyk.

53

1 Please take a reasonable amount of time. I would suggest
2 perhaps 10 minutes at least at the first go so we can have
3 questions. It appears we will have a roll call vote at about
4 5 o'clock. That need not end the hearing, but it will
5 punctuate it at that point as Senators go to vote. Mr. Ross.
6
7
8
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10
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18
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54

1 STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER

2 DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST

3 POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

4 Ambassador Ross: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take
5 10 minutes and I want to basically offer a perspective on why
6 I think we are not at a point where we can achieve what is a
7 comprehensive solution to the problem, but that does not mean
8 you do not make the effort to transform the situation. I
9 think what I will do is I will focus on why we are at that
10 point, why we need a way station and what the options are for
11 producing a way station.

12 But before I get into that, let me offer one observation
13 on the exchange between Senator Biden and Secretary Kissinger,
14 and that was really on the role of the Arab states and what
15 they can do. I am a believer that we do have to see Arab
16 responsibility, which is something we have not seen. I am a
17 believer that that is critical for making it easier for
18 Palestinians both to compromise on issues where, in fact,
19 there is not a context that has been created for compromise,
20 as well as to be able to confront groups like Hamas and
21 Islamic Jihad. Having an Arab umbrella would make it much
22 easier to do that.

23 The problem is we have not seen that up until now, and I
24 would say the reason we have not seen it is because even
25 though I think there is a desire on the part of many of the

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55

1 Arab leaders to see peace, the price they are willing to pay

2 for it is not that high. The price they see in effectively

3 having to condition for compromise and confront the

4 Islamicists is greater in their eyes than the price of

5 continuing to face the risk of ongoing conflict between

6 Israelis and Palestinians.

7 We will have to affect that calculus is we want Arab

8 leaders to begin to play a very different kind of role. I

9 think we should. I think it has to be part of what should be

10 the broader efforts we make in the region, but I think to

11 understand the context we are in and the exchange that you

12 had, that is the way I think one has to look at it.

13 Let me explain why I think we are not at a point where we

14 can produce a solution. For the last 3 years, we have had a

15 war process. We have not had a peace process. There is a

16 legacy from those 3 years on both sides, on the side of the

17 Israelis and on the side of the Palestinians. The vast

18 majority of the Israeli public today do not believe that

19 Palestinians are prepared to live in peace with Israelis.

20 They do not believe they accept the idea of a Jewish state

21 next to them. The vast majority of Palestinians believe the

22 Israelis are not prepared to surrender control over them.

23 You cannot go from the current situation we are in, the

24 current context we are in, where both sides need a kind of

25 freedom. The Israelis need a freedom from fear and

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56

insecurity, and the Palestinians need a freedom from the

Israelis. You cannot go from a situation like that to the end

result because you don't have a context.

So the question is how do you create that context, and I

think you need what I call a way station to get there. Now,

there are really two options for how to do it.

One option is a limited deal, a limited deal that would

be between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian

Authority today. It is a deal that basically would be what I

would call the first serious implementation of the Road Map.

Up until now, the Road Map has never really been implemented,

but then again, the approach of the Road Map was fine as being

an umbrella, it was fine as being a point of departure, it was

fine as providing a set of guidelines. But the Road Map was

not negotiated with the Israelis or the Palestinians, the two

parties who had to carry it out. So if you were going to

implement it, you had to have an agreement where they, in

effect, bought on to the specific obligations, defined them

the same way, understood them the same way, and you could have

some accountability.

A limited deal right now would look something like a

variation of the Road Map, not in fact its precise

implementation, even in terms of the guidelines. It would be

a comprehensive cease-fire. No Israelis would be attacked by

Palestinians on either side of the Green Line for a simple

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57

reason. If Palestinians want to draw a distinction between

the Green Line, what is in and what is out, and they will

attack Israelis outside the Green Line, then the IDF will

continue to carry out targeted killings and it will continue

to carry out arrest sweeps. So if you want to see a

comprehensive cease-fire, the Palestinians in fact have to be

prepared, on the one hand, to stop all attacks against

Israelis wherever they are and the Israelis, in return, would

stop the targeted killings and the arrest sweeps.

Now, to ensure that that could endure for a while, you

have to have some enforcement of the cease-fire. On the

Palestinian side, what that means is they would have to arrest

those who violate it, and it would mean they would have to

begin to go after what I would call parts of infrastructure.

The Road Map called for a dismantling of terrorist

infrastructure. The Palestinians today are probably not

capable, certainly not willing to do that. But there are

things they could do if in fact you were talking about a

limited deal, and that would involve closing down the

smuggling tunnels, especially those that run from Egypt into

Gaza. It would mean closing down the Qassam rocket workshops.

It would mean closing down the bomb-making labs.

Senator Biden: I am sorry. You said smuggling and then

what? I did not hear the next word.

Ambassador Ross: The next one was closing down -- they

58

1 are Qassam rockets. They are crude rockets that are made in
2 the Gaza and then fired into Israel. Closing down those
3 workshops. Closing down the bomb-making laboratories and
4 arresting those who carry their weapons in the open as a way
5 of enforcing law and order.

6 Now, the Palestinians would require something in return
7 for that. They would require a lifting of the Israeli siege.
8 That means a lifting of the checkpoints. They would probably
9 also press for the freeze on at least of what they call the
10 wall, what the Israelis call the fence, what I prefer to call
11 the barrier. They would require a freeze on working on that,
12 and they would probably require a freeze on settlement
13 activity.

14 Now, that is a deal that I can tell you in December,
15 having been out in the area and having talked to both sides, I
16 thought was at least something they could talk about, not that
17 they had agreed to, but it was a basis for discussion. What
18 has been very clear since December is that Yasser Arafat will
19 simply not allow that to take place.

20 A limited deal is a deal that may be done between Prime
21 Minister Sharon and Prime Minister Abu Ala, Ahmed Qureia, but
22 it is with Arafat standing the curtain. Well, Arafat does not
23 want to stand behind the curtain. Arafat wants to be a part
24 of it, and even then, it is not clear for how long such a
25 limited deal would last.

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59

1. If you are trying to use this as a basis on which the
2. implement the Road Map, you will not get to phase two of the
3. Road Map which calls for a stable provision of borders because
4. the Israelis are not going to accept the creation of such a
5. state if the infrastructure for groups like Hamas and Islamic
6. Jihad still exist. How can you have a state when you still
7. have independent militias able to operate? And that is the
8. point where Arafat will draw the line because Arafat is
9. someone who always preserves an option. He never closes the
10. door, and he has made it clear, in my judgment anyway, he will
11. not close them down.

12. Still, you might be able, through a limited deal, to get
13. real calm for a year or 2, and given the current situation,
14. that could be dramatically better than what we face. I do not
15. rule it out at this point, but I do not have a high
16. expectation that it will take place.

17. And that I think leads you to option two, which is the
18. path that we begin to see emerging right now, which is a
19. unilateral pathway, at least in terms of the Israeli
20. declarations. What Dr. Kissinger said about Prime Minister
21. Sharon should be reemphasized. He has said things that no
22. other Israeli Prime Minister has said. They represent
23. revolutionary statements. It is not just statehood for
24. Palestinians. It is the whole idea of partition and
25. disengagement. The unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, the

60

1 evacuation of settlements. With those statements, there is
2 not much meaning left to the traditional Likud ideology. So
3 these are revolutionary statements.

4 I think, again, we have to put this in a context. Why do
5 we see a move in this direction? The Palestinians, if they
6 cannot do a limited deal, if they cannot fulfill obligations
7 under the Road Map as it relates to dealing with terrorist
8 groups, if they cannot fulfill their security
9 responsibilities, they leave the Israelis two choices to
10 handle security. One is a siege. That is what we have today.
11 In the West Bank alone, you have anywhere from 140 to 160
12 Israeli checkpoints. Normal life is an impossibility in such
13 circumstances. So if you want commerce, very difficult to
14 carry out. If you want to get your kids to school, plan on a
15 couple extra hours in the morning and in the evening. If you
16 want to get medical care, you better hope it is not an
17 emergency.

18 Now, do the Israelis impose the siege because they simply
19 want to inflict punishment on the Palestinians? Many
20 Palestinians might perceive that or believe it, but the
21 reality is the siege is there because the siege is designed to
22 prevent the killing of Israelis. Today the Israelis probably
23 stop 90 to 95 percent of the attempts against Israelis because
24 of the siege.

25 The problem with the siege from the Israeli standpoint

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61

1 now, not a Palestinian standpoint, is a year from now or 2

2 years from now, they will still have to stop the same number

3 because what the siege does is preserve anger on the

4 Palestinian side. What the siege does is ensure there is

5 continuing resentment on the Palestinian side. Israelis can

6 go after the Hamas operatives and they can stop them or kill

7 them, but they are going to have a pool of ready new recruits

8 unless they end the siege.

9 From an Israeli standpoint, the siege is a bad idea. You

10 have a current situation where the IDF is put in the position

11 where they have large numbers of soldiers to protect small

12 numbers of settlers, not the optimum way to structure your

13 forces. You have a guaranteed pool of anger and resentment on

14 the Palestinian side. And from the demographic issue that has

15 been raised -- Dr. Kissinger referred to it as well -- there

16 is no way, given the demographic trends that Israel can stay

17 in the territories and be a Jewish democratic state, which is

18 what Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was talking about and

19 that is why he talked about his unilateral withdrawal.

20 So the siege from a Palestinian standpoint is a

21 devastation and from the Israeli standpoint, it obviously does

22 not serve their interests. And that is what leads you to what

23 you are seeing now, what is the idea of a pull-back out of

24 Gaza and at least a new security line in the West Bank.

25 Now, the real challenge is how to make this a way station

62

1 that creates a new environment for peace-making, how to ensure
2 that as the Israelis get out, you do not leave something worse
3 behind, how to ensure that as the Israelis pull out, you can
4 reach some kind of coordination so you do it in a way that
5 actually benefits those Palestinians who would be most
6 committed to a transformation of the situation.

7 That is why, in effect, what I have called for is a
8 coordinated unilateralism. If the Israelis and the
9 Palestinians cannot do it directly, then it is our role. And
10 there are several different focal points for us.

11 One is what we do with the Israelis. When we approach
12 the Israelis, it should be guided by a series of criteria.
13 For example, when you are dealing with the issue of the
14 barrier, focus on the issue of a security line that makes it
15 difficult to infiltrate, focus on the importance of not
16 absorbing Palestinians, focus on the importance of the
17 humanitarian considerations, and focus on the Israelis getting
18 out of Palestinian life.

19 We do have a reason to be asking the Israelis questions
20 about what the Prime Minister has said because it is more a
21 concept than a plan at this point. But it is a revolutionary
22 statement and it would be a mistake to subject it to every
23 microscopic question we can think of because you will, in a
24 sense, drown that revolutionary idea in what may be a lot of
25 very small questions.

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63

1 With the Palestinians, what we should be doing is talking
2 to Abu Ala, talking to the Legislative Council people. We
3 should be focused on the very issue of what happens when the
4 Israelis go. How can the Israelis do it in a way that
5 benefits you, but what responsibilities will you absorb as
6 they get out? We, the United States, might be prepared to
7 recognize sovereignty provided you fulfill your security
8 responsibilities. We might lead the world in terms of
9 emphasizing investment and assistance, again, if you assume
10 your responsibilities.

11 I would go to the other members of the Quartet and have
12 them go to the Palestinians with the same very clear position.
13 We can work with you. Here is what we can provide you. I
14 would have the United States, as well as the other members of
15 the Quartet, even in the area of security, say we are prepared
16 to provide you the kind of support that you would need. You
17 tell us what you would need, but you have to be in the lead.
18 One thing about the history of the Palestinian movement is
19 there has never been a tendency to assume responsibility, to
20 make decisions, to be accountable, to have consequences. If
21 others are going to assume the responsibilities, we are going
22 to perpetuate that psychology. We should be there in a
23 supportive position and it could even involve an international
24 presence, as long as we are backing them up and reinforcing
25 them.

64

Finally, I will make the point -- and then I will close
-- that Dr. Kissinger was emphasizing about what I had
written. If we are talking about a Gaza first withdrawal, not
a Gaza only withdrawal, Egypt, being a neighbor of Gaza, has
more capability to affect that than anybody else. They can
certainly help those Palestinians who are prepared to assume
responsibilities materially and otherwise. They can do
something even today. The smuggling that goes from the Sinai
into Gaza is smuggling that goes in one direction. It does
come from Gaza into the Sinai. They can do a lot more on
their side of the border to stop the smuggling. They can make
it clear that the Palestinians have an opportunity before the
world to show that they are ready for statehood by succeeding
in this area.

I would like the administration now to be focused not
only on talking to the Israelis about what it is they have in
mind, which we should be doing, but also talking to the
Egyptians now about the opportunity and what can be lost,
talking to the Palestinians now, not later, about the kinds of
responsibilities they would have to absorb and what can be
gained, which, by the way, in my judgment would also make many
of the Palestinian reformers see it as an opportunity where
they can do more than they are doing today and talking with
the other members of the Quartet as well about how you take
advantage of what can be a moment. This is a moment. If

65

1 there is one thing that characterizes Middle Eastern moments,

2 they do not last long, and when you lose them, you are worse

3 off.

4 Thank you.

5 [The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:]

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67

1 STATEMENT OF ROBERT MALLEY, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM

2 DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.

3 Mr. Malley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
4 holding this hearing at what I think is a critical time where
5 not only the Road Map, but many of the traditional tools of
6 peace-making in the Middle East have to be rethought in a
7 fresh, creative, and bold way if we do not want the Israeli
8 and Palestinian people to be further harmed, if we do not want
9 the two-state solution to be further jeopardized, and if we do
10 not want our own national interest to be further at risk.

11 In these brief remarks, I just want to emphasize three
12 points. The first is why trying to resolve the Israeli-
13 Palestinian conflict is central and vital to our national
14 interest. The second is why the methods we have tried up till
15 now to do so have failed, and the third is what options exist
16 in the future.

17 It used to be conventional wisdom that resolution of the
18 Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in
19 particular was a central vital national interest. Not so
20 anymore. After the failure of Camp David and the peace
21 process in 2000-2001, the outbreak of the intifada, and
22 particularly the events of September 11th, it took a back seat
23 to other issues, fighting terrorism and radicalism in the
24 Middle East, promoting reform and democracy in the Middle
25 East.

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1 Paradoxically, however, I am convinced -- and I think
2 Senator Biden made that point earlier -- that resolving that
3 seemingly narrow conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
4 has never been more important now that we have broadened our
5 stake and broadened the issues that we are preoccupied by in
6 the Middle East, and that an integral part of our efforts to
7 fight terrorism and to fight extremism is precisely to resolve
8 or seek to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

9 It is our lack of engagement, our lack of resolve that is
10 hurting us, not the contrary. And I think one hears it
11 anytime you travel to the Middle East and most of all that
12 those very reformers and democrats who are so burdened by the
13 fact of the perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
14 and the perpetuation of the perception, right or wrong, of
15 excessive U.S. disengagement and excessive U.S. bias. And I
16 think that if we want to help those people, it is vital that
17 we come to the core and we try to, once again, resolve the
18 issue because nothing hurts us more than the current
19 situation, and nothing would help us more, particularly in the
20 fight against terrorism, than a successful effort to resolve
21 it.

22 Now, if we all agree on the fact that it is a vital
23 interest to try to resolve it, the question is how to do so.
24 The first answer I think is not the way it has been done
25 before. And I was part of the way it was done before, and I

69

1 do not have any regrets about what we did, but I think that
2 one has to learn from the past and learn that what has been
3 tried now for over 10 years has failed and failed and failed
4 again and it is the situation we are in today.

5 The recipe of the past was an incremental step-by-step
6 approach in which Israelis and Palestinians were each asked to
7 take very sensible, rational steps to lead somewhere as a
8 mutual confidence-building process, but without really ever
telling either side with any precision what the final outcome
9 would be. So each side was basically asked to take steps,
10 asked to take difficult and painful political steps vis-a-vis
11 their own constituencies without a clear end in sight and
12 without knowing whether the outcome would justify the steps
13 they are being asked to take in the interim.
14

15 Now, the usual response, each time one of these efforts
16 fails, whether it is the Mitchell Report or the Tenet Plan or
17 now the Road Map, is to say we have to try harder and try
18 better, and in particular, the U.S. needs to try harder and
19 try better, but basically try more of the same. And in the
20 case of the Road Map, one can say, indeed, that the
21 Palestinians did not do enough on the security side, that the
22 Israelis did too much on the military side, that the U.S.
23 stood on the side lines and Arafat stood in the way. And all
24 that is very likely to be true, but at some point it is
25 probably wise to stop blaming the actors and to take a step

70

back and look again at the script. And the script they were

handed is a script again in which there is no precision as to

the outcome they are being asked to take painful steps to

achieve.

And if it was hard in the past through this step-by-step
approach, I would suggest that it is far harder today, in
fact, practically impossible if we look at the 3 years of what
Dennis began to describe, atrocious violence, suicide bombs,
devastating military reprisals on the Israeli part, the
collapse of those very security institutions on the
Palestinian side that are expected to take on the radical
extremist groups, the dwindling of the authority of Fatah, the
backbone of the Palestinian national movement, and the
strengthening of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and other radical
groups, a Palestinian national authority that is no longer
national and barely exercises any authority anymore, the
leader of the Palestinian national movement who is virtually
isolated and therefore, for better or for worse, incapable of
making decisions.

And so this notion that today Israel is going to hand
over to the Palestinians responsibility for its security in
this kind of step-by-step approach appears to be completely
fanciful, again more so today than it was in the past. And
the notion that today the Palestinian national authority and
Fatah, weakened as they are today, disorganized, fragmented

4

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1 geographically and organizationally, are going to be capable
2 or willing to take on Hamas or Islamic Jihad, particularly at
3 a time when they have no faith that the Israeli Prime Minister
4 currently in position, Ariel Sharon, could even come close to
5 meeting their needs, their basic expectation in terms of a
6 national movement, seems to me equally fanciful. So I think
7 that the notion of trying to revive the Road Map as it exists
8 today is an illusion that was costly in the past and will be
9 even more costly in the future.

10 Now, the most obvious manifestations of the collapse of
11 the Road Map are the actions of Prime Minister Sharon. And I
12 may not agree with much of what he does, but I do believe he
13 has foresight and I think that his announcement about taking
14 steps unilaterally, disengaging Israel from the Palestinians
15 is a manifestation of an understanding of having reached the
16 conclusion that the ways of the past will not work, that
17 bilateral step-by-step negotiations are a thing of the past,
18 and not a thing of the future, at least in the current
19 context.

20 We are now at a crossroads in terms of what we do. We
21 can follow what the Prime Minister has done -- and I agree
22 with Dennis that it is revolutionary and it does have
23 potential, good potential and bad potential -- and follow the
24 path of Israeli unilateral disengagement. And that is the
25 most likely outcome, and I will spend some time discussing it.

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1 The other is what I would suggest would be far preferable

2 which would be a U.S.-led international engagement, and I will

3 get to that in a minute.

4 Sharon's ideas at this point are much more of a puzzle

5 than a plan. He has not said much about how many settlements

6 he would withdraw from, when, under what circumstances,

7 whether the IDF would be left behind or not, whether it would

8 be done in one fell swoop or whether it would be prolonged and

9 over a period of time, who he would hand authority over of the
settlements that he has evacuated, question after question

10

11 after question. But he has broken out of the box, the box of

12 the Road Map, and I think it needs to be taken seriously. He

13 has triggered movement and potential movement more than

14 anything else in the last 3 years.

15 One cannot predict, again because of the uncertainties,

16 what will happen when he takes an action. The action itself

17 is ill-defined and even if we knew what he wanted to do, it is

18 very unclear how the Palestinians are going to react, in part

19 because of the picture I painted earlier. There is no

20 Palestinian Authority to speak of and there is no Palestinian

21 national movement to speak of. So it is unclear to know how

22 they and who the they are will react. It is also unclear to

23 know what the Israeli political system will do and what kind

24 of obstacles it might put on the path of this plan.

25 But assuming the general outlines, in terms of what

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1 Dennis described, I think one could see potential benefits and drawbacks, and in many ways, they touch exactly the same areas. Potential security benefit. Israel's security could be strengthened if it shortens its lines of defense, if it evacuates settlements that today are populated by small numbers of settlers that require a large Israeli military force to defend.

8 On the other hand, it could be a security drawback if the lesson, the message that comes out of this is that violence is what gets Israel out of the territories and if Hamas and Islamic Jihad manage to turn it into their victory and to say violence is what got Israel out of Gaza today, it is what will get Israel out of the West Bank tomorrow. So, look to what happens in the West Bank not only in Gaza after an Israeli withdrawal.

16 One other potential benefit: strengthening the PA, strengthening Palestinian security services, again along the lines of what Dennis suggested. One could imagine a scenario whereby the settlements are handed over to the Palestinian Authority, that they use this to give them momentum to rebuild the Palestinian Authority, to rebuild Palestinian security services. Flip side: it is handed over to no one. There is chaos. Hamas is strengthened. Hamas takes over Gaza. Hamas takes over the settlements.

25 The third potential benefit. This could be a precursor

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1 to much broader withdrawals in the West Bank itself, and it is
2 true that the Prime Minister has broken a taboo and he has
delinked these two intertwined concepts of security and
3
4 settlements. He, a Likud Prime Minister, has said implicitly
5 settlements do not bring Israel security, they bring Israel
insecurity. And therefore, one could imagine after Gaza and a
6
7 few isolated settlements in the West Bank a broader
withdrawal. Flip side. If in fact this is just a plan to get
8
9 out of Gaza and to consolidate Israel's hold on the West Bank
10 by thickening some of the settlements, by taking more action
11 in east Jerusalem, by building a fence in certain ways, and by
12 retaining control over the Jordan Valley.

13 Both of these scenarios on all three fronts are possible,
14 and I think the U.S. objective, if it takes the reactive
approach of reacting to the Prime Minister's decision, needs
16 to simply try to focus on two issues: number one, making sure
17 that this is Gaza first but not Gaza last, which means putting
18 pressure on Israel not to take action in the West Bank or at
19 least telling Israel that it will acquiesce in actions in the
20 West Bank that will foreclose a two-state solution, and
promoting the kind of coordinated actions that Dennis spoke
22 about to make sure that whatever is withdrawn from is handed
over to the Palestinian Authority and not the Hamas.

24 Now, I think it is very clear that even though this is a
25 revolutionary option and it could have ground-breaking

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consequences, it is a limited one because ultimately in its
wake it will leave untouched the fundamental ingredients of
the conflict. Occupation will remain. The Palestinians will
still want to fight Israel, and even if there is a fence, one
could count on the Palestinians to find more lethal ways to
circumvent the fence and to try to attack the Israelis, and we
are reading it in the press even today.

There is another option which is to replace the
incremental, step-by-step approach by an end game strategy.
Three points to describe it very briefly.

Number one, the United States, together with moderate
Arab leaders, together with the European Union, together with
the U.N., would put forward a suggested comprehensive
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a blueprint,
not to impose it, to suggest it, to put it out there publicly
with Arabs there, the moderate Arabs that we have all said
need to be involved in this, and only do it once the Arabs
have committed beforehand that they will back the President in
this effort, publicly back him and publicly put pressure on
the Palestinians to accept it. Number one.

Number two, as part of this plan, suggest the
establishment of a U.S.-led trusteeship over the territories
that ultimately would become Palestine, to give security
guarantees to Israel, to give guarantees to Israel that those
who will govern these Palestinian territories will not be what

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1 I have called the dwindling forces of the Palestinian

2 Authority, but the international forces. It also responds to

3 Dr. Kissinger's valid point that Israel will not withdraw from
4 one day to the next and give all territories to the

5 Palestinians. No. It would hand over the territory to this

6 trusteeship, to the United States-led trusteeship, which in

7 time, as the Palestinians took the actions they need to take,
8 would be turned over to the Palestinians.

9 And third, to maximize the prospects of public acceptance

10 on both sides, suggest that this proposal be submitted to

11 referendum. We have seen this idea not only in Prime Minister

12 Sharon's suggesting of a referendum on the withdrawal from

13 Gaza, but also in another intractable conflict such as Cyprus

14 as a way to make it easier for leaders to accept a solution

15 that they know their publics will accept but that is hard,

16 given their harder line constituencies, to sign onto.

17 Senator Biden: Excuse me. Is that referendum you are
18 suggesting only in Israel or in both --

19 Mr. Malley: Oh, absolutely in both. And I would say it
20 is probably more important on the Palestinian side.

21 Absolutely.

22 I am going to concede up front that I was not born
23 yesterday, but I do not hold any particular hope that this
24 plan will be taken up tomorrow by the administration. And I
25 do not think this is a partisan issue. I think for any

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1 Democratic or Republican administration, this would be

2 considered a risky endeavor. I know Dennis has said he does

3 not think the conditions are right. I think Dr. Kissinger

4 said the same thing, and many people would say that we are in

5 this position now where we have to be realistic.

6 I wonder sometimes, though, where is the realism in
7 pursuing a path that has failed us so often in the past.

8 Where is the realism in counting suddenly on a change of heart

9 of leaders who have not changed hearts over all these years
10 for good political reasons, not because they are stubborn?

11 Where is the realism in thinking that we have uncounted time
12 in front of us to salvage a two-state solution? And where is
13 the realism in thinking that suddenly the conditions for peace
14 are going to emerge?

15 I think that is all a surreal realism and the former
16 realistic approach is the one that I put forward here, and
17 particularly if you can get the Arab countries -- and I think
18 it is a precondition -- to say up front they would accept it
19 so that you corner those extremists, you isolate the
20 extremists, and you give voice to the moderate forces that
21 exist today, submerged but exist today, in the Arab world.

22 So I would want to leave this committee with three
23 questions to ponder.

24 The first is, has the current policy been working? I
25 think the answer is pretty clear.

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1 The second is, would this alternative approach have a
2 better chance of succeeding? Again, I think the answer is
3 more likely yes than no.

4 And third, if we do not try something different, how long
5 before the two-state solution becomes a thing of the past and
6 we will come back here and the next session that you will hold
7 will not be rethinking the Middle East Road Map, but
8 rethinking the two-state solution?

9 Thank you.

10 [The prepared statement of Mr. Malley follows:]

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. MARTIN INDYK, DIRECTOR, THE SABAN

2 CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE,

3 WASHINGTON, D.C.

4 Ambassador Indyk: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,

5 Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, Senator Chafee. I am very

6 grateful for the opportunity to address you on this occasion

7 and for your patience while we make all these presentations.

8 I will, given the lateness of the hour and the inevitability

9 of a roll call vote, be very brief and hope that my longer

10 statement will be submitted for the record.

11 I wanted to pick up quickly on something that I heard

12 Secretary Kissinger say, and I wonder whether you heard it

13 too, that basically he feels that both sides are moving much

14 more closely and much more rapidly towards a final status kind

15 of deal. It is precisely that conclusion which I too have

16 reached, that as a result of three important factors that have

17 developed over the last 3 or 4 years of the intifada, the

18 exhaustion factor, the demographic factor, and the shift in

19 the balance of power that has occurred, we see both sides now,

20 I believe, moving at least in terms of their publics,

21 substantial majorities on both sides now supporting what

22 would, in effect, be a two-state solution, based more or less

23 on the Clinton parameters that the three of us all worked on

24 at the close of the Clinton administration.

25 I will not go into great details about these three

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factors. I do in my testimony, but I think it is important
just to recognize that exhaustion on the Israeli side has led
the Israeli people to want action from their government, but
they do not believe in a negotiated solution at the moment
because they do not see a Palestinian partner that is reliable
enough to negotiate with. They are impatient. They want a
better future for their children, and they therefore are the
motivation behind Prime Minister Sharon's revolutionary
statement about a unilateral withdrawal and evacuation of
almost all the settlements in Gaza and some of them outlying
ones in the West Bank. It is that impatience and that
exhaustion which I think we need to take careful note of.

On the Palestinian side, there is also an exhaustion
factor at work. The Palestinian Authority is collapsing, as
Rob Malley has pointed out. The Palestinians themselves are I
think disillusioned with the corrupt and failed leadership of
Yasser Arafat. But unlike the Israelis who are insisting that
their government change the approach, the Palestinians seem to
be incapable of insisting on serious change from their
government and seem rather to be prepared to play a waiting
game.

Part of the reason for their willingness to play a
waiting game is the second factor, the demographic factor,
which is playing a very substantial role in Israeli
calculations. The fear that within this decade Jews will no

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1 longer be a majority in the state, in the land of Israel that

2 Israel controls between the Jordan River and the

3 Mediterranean, is leading Israelis to want to separate from

4 the Palestinians. Since they have concluded there is no hope

5 of negotiating the separation, that too is what fuels their

6 demand for a unilateral step from their government.

7 The Palestinians see this demographic factor at work, see

8 the Israelis pushing their government to withdraw, and that I

9 think is another reason why they are prepared to play a

10 waiting game, consoled by the belief that time is on their

11 side, that either Israel will leave the West Bank and Gaza to

12 rid itself of the demographic threat or they will become a

13 majority in the land of Israel and then be able to demand

14 their equal rights.

15 Finally, the balance of power factor, which I think is

16 really important but little recognized. This is the fact that

17 as a result of a combination of the toppling of Saddam Hussein

18 and the evaporation of the Iraqi army, Israel no longer faces

19 a potential eastern front coalition. And the balance of power

20 in conventional, even nonconventional terms has shifted so

21 dramatically in Israel's favor, also as a result of our own

22 military presence on Syria's border, which is the only country

23 with a much weakened army that remains on Israel's borders in

24 a position to have any kind of conventional conflict with

25 Israel, that this shift in the balance of power makes Israelis

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1 more prepared to take on this idea of a unilateral step that

2 would even advantage its worst enemies, Hamas, Hizbollah, who

3 will claim that they were the ones who forced Israel to

4 withdraw through violence and terrorism. But because the

5 Israelis feel that their deterrent power has overall increased

6 significantly, I suspect that they are prepared to allow a

7 weakening of their deterrent power in order to meet their

8 needs for separating from the Palestinians.

9 On the Palestinian side and on the Arab side more

10 generally, I think this shift in the balance of power have

11 reinforced a trend that has developed for some time of Arab

12 states now being willing to end the conflict with Israel, as

13 they have expressed in the Arab League initiative, to

14 normalize relations with Israel in return for a full

15 withdrawal. And the Arab states are, I believe, moving more

16 and more rapidly to, in effect, abandon the Palestinian cause

17 as they focus more on their own pressing needs and are

18 engaging more and more with Israel on the side and being

19 prepared to settle with it, even at the expense of the

20 Palestinians. The Syrian overtures to Israel for peace make

21 no mention of the need to settle the Palestinian problem, and

22 that is just one example of that.

23 So as a result of all of these changes, I think what we

24 have now is a situation in which Israelis are demanding a

25 change from their government and are even willing to give up

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1 territories they have held for 36 years and evacuate
2 settlements without receiving any commitments from the
3 Palestinian side. But they are, Mr. Chairman, acting out of
4 despair of the alternatives rather than out of hope for peace.
5 Arab states are more willing than ever to end the conflict
6 with Israel but unfortunately unwilling to take any serious
7 initiative to do so. The Palestinians have exhausted
8 themselves but seem incapable of producing a new leadership
9 that could enter negotiations with Israel, preferring instead
10 to sit, wait, and wallow in their misery.

11 What is to be done? Unfortunately, the challenge here
12 lies not in defining the end game, as Rob Malley has
13 suggested, but rather in overcoming the structural impediments
14 that prevent the parties from getting there. And that is, I
15 think the issue that we need to deal with and come up with
16 solutions for.

17 The single most important structural impediment is the
18 lack of a capable, responsible, and accountable Palestinian
19 leadership, and therefore any attempts to get a modified Road
20 Map off the ground are simply not going to work. Therefore,
21 any attempts to resolve the problem with an end game solution
22 are not going to work because of the absence of this
23 responsible, capable, accountable Palestinian partner.

24 So the question is, how can we take the current
25 confluence of events, the way in which these factors are

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1 driving the parties to consider things that they would not

2 otherwise consider, take advantage of that to deal with this

3 fundamental structural impediment?

4 In essence, what I am suggesting here is that given the

5 Government of Israel's Prime Minister's decision to take a

6 unilateral initiative, we need to get behind that, as the

7 other speakers have suggested, and shape that initiative. And

8 we can do this in two ways.

9 One is to try to turn it into a negotiation process, that

10 is, take the willingness to evacuate settlements, withdraw

11 from Gaza and significant parts of the West Bank, and use that

12 to shape a more effective Palestinian leadership that could

13 respond to it. And I go through, Mr. Chairman, in my prepared

14 testimony a number of steps that we would need to take.

15 It would need to be a U.S.-led intervention with the

16 Quartet in the first instance to demand that Yasser Arafat

17 give up control of the security services.

18 If the Palestinians are to take control of the areas that

19 Israel evacuates, to retrain and reunify those services, to

20 make it clear to him and there will be no more support for the

21 Palestinian Authority, no financial support for the

22 Palestinian Authority unless he does so.

23 To then have the Quartet supervise the implementation of

24 a political and economic reform process that essentially we

25 have given up on, even though we started it in the first phase

86

1 of the Road Map. And in that way, Senator Biden, to oversee a
2 process in which the young guard and the reformers could as a
3 new leadership.

4 And in that context, what I would suggest is we do it a
5 different form of a modification of the Road Map. With a new
6 Palestinian leadership in which Arafat has stood aside and we
7 have overseen a reformed leadership come about, have them
8 negotiate with Israel phase two of the Road Map, a state with
9 provisional borders, but that would not be implemented until
10 their phase one obligations of confronting the terrorists
11 would be fulfilled. In other words, they would have the
12 ability to go to their people and tell them we have a viable
13 state with provisional borders agreed on, but we will not be
14 able to implement it until we deal with the terrorists, give
15 them credibility with their own people.

16 And, of course, I agree with Dennis Ross on this, that we
17 do need Arab state endorsement for such a process. The
18 essence of this option is to restructure the Palestinian
19 Authority in ways that would give it credibility with Israelis
20 and Palestinians.

21 The second one is what I would call a modified
22 trusteeship option. I would call it a receivership option.
23 In effect, we would get in behind Israel's unilateral
24 withdrawal and lead an international intervention to take
25 control of the territories that Israel withdraws from,

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1 essentially put the Palestinian Authority in receivership --
2 it is almost bankrupt at this very moment -- and take on
3 responsibility, using the shell of the Palestinian Authority
4 to start to restructure the Palestinian leadership, implement
5 the reform ideas, restructure the security services, and
6 thereby create a credible Palestinian leadership that could
7 then take control in the territories Israel evacuates and also
8 then begin the final status negotiation that Rob Malley has
9 suggested is the way to solve the problem.

10 Either way, Mr. Chairman, we do not have the option
11 anymore, if Israel is in fact going to take unilateral steps,
12 of sitting back and doing nothing because that option will, I
13 believe, surely lead to a failed Hamas-controlled, terrorist
14 state on Israel's borders in the heartland of the Middle East.
15 If we want to prevent that, we either have to shape Israel's
16 urge to unilateralism to create a more Palestinian leadership
17 that can negotiate with Israel or get in behind that
18 withdrawal and do the same thing under our own auspices.

19 Thank you.

20 [The prepared statement of Ambassador Indyk follows:]

21

22

23

24

25

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1 The Chairman: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Indyk.

2 Let me just say that we will have a roll call vote, as I

3 have predicted, and it may come almost anytime. But Senators

4 have stayed with this hearing, as you can tell, and we

5 appreciate your staying with us. So we would like to proceed

6 with questions. I will try again for the 8-minute limit,

7 knowing that there is some liberal ruling as required. One of

8 us may disappear to vote and return. Whoever is here will

9 serve as chairman while he is here so we can have continuity

10 of the hearing.

11 Senator Biden: I may stay just to get that feeling

12 again.

13 [Laughter.]

14 Senator Nelson: Mr. Chairman, you can be assured I will

15 stay.

16 [Laughter.]

17 The Chairman: Well, there is an incentive for you.

18 [Laughter.]

19 The Chairman: Now, let me just say, listening to the
20 last testimony of Dr. Indyk, one thought that comes to mind is

21 that, as I think all three of you suggested perhaps, Prime

22 Minister Sharon or other Israeli leaders have come to this

23 demographic conclusion that Israel wants to continue to be a

24 Jewish state and to have people coming and going in great

25 numbers might jeopardize that at some point, quite apart from

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1. how the negotiations come out. And given the fact that things
2. have not worked out very well, one way of bringing about some
3. guarantee of that state is to put the fence up, hopefully in
4. the right places so that does not exacerbate the situation,
5. and let the Palestinians do the best they can.

6. Now, given the end of all of the checkpoints that Dennis
7. Ross suggested, the commerce obviously slows. As a matter of
8. fact, if the economy is weak now, to use your term, Mr. Indyk,
9. they really do head into receivership or whatever you
10. described that situation. And furthermore, there is some
11. territory being given up, some assets there that are floating.

12. So depending upon how the Palestinians look at it, an
13. international receivership might be created, in which we are
14. involved, the United States, our European allies, maybe NATO
15. is taking more of an interest in this as we heard at Vercunda,
16. for example, maybe even some Arab states under the right
17. circumstances. And under those circumstances, perhaps the
18. Palestinian state becomes a reality with new leadership in due
19. course.

20. The thing I want to query, though, in the meanwhile is
21. that one thing that has always seemed to have stopped each of
22. the situations is that some persons involved in all of this
23. are not cooperative. They create terror. It could be five
24. young men who suddenly got the idea one night, leaving aside
25. all of the high state craft that we are discussing. Now,

90

1 maybe these acts are going to continue anyway. Perhaps

2 Israelis and Palestinians say it is just the price of living

3 in the area. We are going to have a number of unstable people

4 for whatever psychological reasons, and so we just have to

5 understand that and weather through the storm.

6 But then, on the other hand, conceivably out of this

7 receivership does come some type of constructive organization

8 which has gotten the interests of the United States, the

9 Western Europeans, the Arabs. In other words, some economic

10 vitality might conceivably come to people that are very poor

11 and have very little prospect.

12 Earlier on, the suggestion of Dr. Kissinger was even if

13 we effect all of that, there will be a psychological yearning

14 of some Palestinians or others to resettle where they used to

15 be. The thought is that they are not coming back. Once the

16 fence goes up and that is it and you circumscribe Israel,

17 Israel is going to remain a Jewish state unless strange things

18 happen. Therefore, maybe it takes a generation for this to

19 pass away. Maybe it passes away. Maybe it does not. Still

20 it is a factor there.

21 Likewise, even the Palestinians, if they are restored to

22 some prosperity, still may deeply resent for a long time the

23 fact, at least some of them, that there is an Israeli state

24 there. They just do not like the idea and that maybe true of

25 a lot of people. Once again, a generational problem.

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1 And maybe some people still cannot give up terrorism.

2 After all, in many states all over the world, they have not

3 done so.

4 But still, at least I see a formation here of something
5 to work with that we, that is, the United States, and others
6 could get our teeth into. The problem will be are countries,
7 U.S. included, Europe, Arabs, willing to take casualties. If
8 the terrorists strike now, the Israeli fence may be up. Now,
9 maybe as you say, they would devise ways of getting around it
10 anyway, but this is going to be more difficult. The garden-
11 run terrorists will probably be doing the terrorism with
12 whoever is trying to effect this new state in the Palestinian
13 area in receivership or a guardianship or whatever it may be
14 in. So you have almost like the insurgency movement in Iraq.
15 They are not analogous, but still people killing people,
16 sometimes us, and the American people say, well, now hang on
17 here. That is not exactly what we signed up for. So you have
18 to go in with eyes wide open.

19 Now, for the moment, why, we are not near that stage, but
20 still, given the circumstances you are describing today, if
21 the Road Map is not really going to work and if the old plan
22 did not work and if there are risks in just letting it go
23 forever, then we have to begin to take a look at the risks,
24 and likewise, a potential pragmatic solution in this case
25 impelled by Israeli action. They make a choice. The

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1 theological statement that you have to have the settlements

2 out there for a biblical reason or so forth may be so, but

3 abandoned. You come back and you have something else out

4 there, a trusteeship these days, in return for a Jewish state

5 in essence. That is sort of a unilateral decision, but it is

6 a very big one.

7 On the other hand, the Palestinians perhaps have already

8 come to recognize that they cannot govern themselves. I do

9 not see any possibility of their being able to enforce a dicta

10 against Hamas or anybody else. So they are going to need

11 help. They may or may not want the help. But eventually they

12 will because they do not want to starve. The economic

13 conditions will be rigorous there.

14 So I have traced at least some thinking as I listened to

15 you and just ask any of you to comment on this in the short

16 period of time that I have in my 8 minutes.

17 Ambassador Indyk: Mr. Chairman, I think you have
18 outlined very well a lot of the difficulties and dilemmas,
19 conundrums that would confront us with these kinds of ideas.

20 I will try to respond to some of them.

21 I think, first of all, the context in which a U.S.-led
22 intervention takes place is very important. It needs to be
23 clear that the purpose of this intervention is to create a
24 viable Palestinian state with provisional borders. I am not
25 suggesting we should give up on the Road Map in that regard.

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1. Phase two of the Road Map provides for such a thing. Then
2. once the state, with its democratic political institutions and
3. its transparent economic institutions and its capable security
4. service and its independent judiciary, once those institutions
5. of better governance are established and the economic
6. component, which you point to which is very important, there
7. will be a final status negotiation, that the provisional
8. borders will not be the final borders. But that is the
9. context in which the Palestinians can buy into it and see that
10. their future is not going to be taken away from them by a
11. different kind of occupation. So that is, I think, point
12. number one.

13. Point number two I will just say is that, yes, you are
14. right about the problem of how do you deal with the
15. terrorists. Why I came up with this concept of receivership
16. or trusteeship or whatever is precisely because we do not have
17. on the Palestinian side an authority, a leadership that is
18. capable of dealing with this terrorist threat. But the point
19. is not to take on that responsibility for ourselves leading
20. the international community, but rather to get behind a
21. Palestinian security force that would have that responsibility
22. because it would be, in the process, helping to build the
23. Palestinian state.

24. It is in that context not doing Israel's bidding --
25. Israel will have already withdrawn -- not doing the

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1 international community's bidding, but doing the bidding of

2 the Palestinian people who have an interest in a Palestinian

3 state. And our role would be to retrain, restructure, and

4 give them the backing, and if necessary, that might require

5 some special forces on the ground, but it is the Palestinians

6 who are the lead component in this.

7 It is easier to do if you are dealing with Gaza first in

8 this context. There you have greater Palestinian security

9 capabilities now still in existence that could be reorganized

10 and supported for that purpose. That also would give the

11 Israelis some confidence, if it worked, that there was a way

12 to deal with the terrorism problem.

13 The Chairman: I thank you for that.

14 I want to yield to my distinguished friend. Now, let me

15 say that having begun the day and heard people talking about

16 the need for a political context before we do anything in

17 Haiti, this happens elsewhere in the world. The creativity of

18 the three of you in trying to formulate some sense of how that

19 context might ever come about -- we could wait for quite a

20 while in Haiti right now waiting for the context to happen.

21 And that is a good point. What do you deal with if there is

22 no context of this sort. On the other hand, that is a part of

23 our dilemma today. We feel we cannot just wait indefinitely

24 for something to happen fortuitously, and the structuring or

25 the suggestion of how the context might be in which we do come

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1 in or with others come in preferably is very important.

2 Senator Biden.

3 Senator Biden: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 This has been a privilege today. No fooling, fellows.

5 To hear from the three of you sitting here today is -- you

6 talk about assets. You guys are national assets. For real.

7 I have always been impressed with at least two of you. I have

8 bugged you for the last 15 years for ideas, and I have read a

9 great deal about what the third one of you has said. I truly

10 want to thank you. I consider it an honor that you are here.

11 As Wag behind me suggested, I feel like I have listened

12 to a concert of the three tenors with the basso perfundo

13 having gone first.

14 [Laughter.]

15 Senator Biden: But I tell you what.

16 The Chairman: You are the chairman for the moment.

17 Senator Biden: Yes, thank you. I am chairman for a
18 moment.

19 [Laughter.]

20 Senator Biden: Let me say two things and then I have a
21 specific question for each of you.

22 Ironically I find two or three extremely consistent

23 threads that run through all your testimony, including

24 Kissinger's, and that is that, Martin, notwithstanding the

25 fact I put such emphasis on the need to have a circumstance

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1 that requires the Arab states to take some leadership to give
2 leverage to the blossoming of this Palestinian leadership I
3 think we all think is there, the truth of the matter is each
4 of you have basically said the same thing in slightly
5 different ways.

6 Each of you, with your different approach as to how to
7 proceed next, acknowledge what we did not use to emphasize as
8 much before, and that is the active participation of the Arab
9 states in some way and the active coordination of the EU, not
10 necessarily the EU per se, but the European community, and
11 that probably will be the vehicle. So having done this for as
12 long as you guys have with not the same degree of expertise
13 and focus as you have had, that is a change. That is a change
14 in what we have considered to be the essential elements to
15 anything moving forward.

16 Am I correct that in generic terms, there is a
17 recognition on all of our parts that there is a need for the
18 Arab states, main Arab states, at a minimum signing off on
19 this and at a maximum being engaging more and that the
20 Europeans have to be on the same page for any one of your
21 approaches to have a chance of working? Am I correct?

22 Ambassador Ross: Yes.

23 Ambassador Indyk: Yes.

24 The Chairman: The second point I would like to make is
25 that there is a recognition on everyone's part of the four

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1 witnesses today, as I understood the testimony, that to steal
2 a line from one of Yates' poems, Easter Sunday 1916 about
3 another dilemma that still has not been resolved, Northern
4 Ireland and Ireland, that the world has changed. It has
5 changed utterly. A terrible beauty has been born. The world
6 has changed in the last 4 years not because of the intifada
7 alone but because the world has changed. The world has
8 changed in the meantime while this internecine war has been
9 going on. The surrounding circumstances have changed, Martin,
10 as you have laid out in terms of the region.

11 The first question I have -- and I would like you to take
12 a quick crack at it, Martin, and each of you to speak to it,
13 if you would like. I would like to hear your views. You
14 point out the conditions why the Israelis are willing to take
15 a new approach, good, bad, or indifferent, a new approach,
16 that they want action and they do not have anybody to deal
17 with, so you take it unilaterally. They feel both more and
18 less secure. They are willing to take, at least in broad
19 strokes, more of a risk because the existential threat from
20 Arab states is much diminished, notwithstanding the fact that
21 threat from individual terrorists has increased considerably,
22 but nonetheless, that sets a condition. And you went through
23 others.

24 Martin, my question is when is, to use a Christian term,
25 that epiphany going to take place in Europe. When is a

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1 similar epiphany going to take place among the Arab states? I
2 am not trying to be humorous, but that is that the world has
3 changed. Therefore, their approach to what they are willing
4 to risk and not risk -- that calculus is able to change too.
5 I do not see it changing in those other two pieces. So for
6 me, this really crass syllogism I am putting together is the
7 basic premise is here that we need to get any of these options
8 underway, Europe and the Arab states to some greater degree
9 than we have now. Circumstances have changed to allow the
10 Palestinians and the Arabs to maybe be prepared to take
11 chances or a different approach. But the condition, it seems
12 to me, is there has to be something that happened to get the
13 Arab states and the Europeans invested in one of these
14 approaches.

15 Am I making any sense by my question? Could you speak to
16 that for a minute?

17 Ambassador Indyk: Sure. If I might make just one
18 comment. I thought that you were going to identify three
19 trends that we were all agreed on.

20 Senator Biden: Well, there were. I did not go through
21 them all.

22 Ambassador Indyk: But the other thing that we are all
23 agreed on is that there needs to be active U.S. participation.
24 I think you would agree with that.

25 Senator Biden: Yes.

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1 Ambassador Indyk: As far as the Europeans, I think they
2 have actually already got it, or at least the key ones. What
3 I mean by that is that the critical epiphany that they needed
4 to reach was that the only way in which they could become
5 helpful and relevant on the political level was if they had a
6 strong and close relationship with Israel. That is what gave
7 us such leverage in this situation because we could take,
8 whether it was Sadat or King Hussain or Arafat in an earlier
9 life, their willingness to make peace with Israel and use our
10 influence with Israel to work out a deal. The Europeans saw
11 as in their interest to side with the Arabs and therefore
12 ruined their relationships with Israel, had no relationship of
13 trust, and therefore could not play an influential role.

14 I think that what we see with the British, the Germans,
15 and believe it or not, the French in recent days is an
16 understanding. That is their epiphany that they have got.
17 Even though they do not like Sharon, they have got to find a
18 way to deal with him.

19 Senator Biden: Quite frankly, I am more optimistic, as
20 bizarre as this sounds, about the French epiphany than I am
21 the British and the German, but that is a different question.

22 [Laughter.]

23 Senator Biden: Since time is running out, maybe I will
24 not ask each of you to comment. Rob, let me ask you a
25 question.

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1 This notion of a total plan -- if we had a European

2 consensus and an Arab state willingness, I think there are

3 conditions upon which that circumstance becomes much more --

4 how can I say it -- likely.

5 For example, I go back to a very crude analogy of a very

6 important political event in American domestic politics. Back

7 some 15-20 years ago, I was in a room with Bob Dole and the

8 Democratic leadership and Republican leaders when I used a

9 phrase to Bob Dole, we all got to jump in the same boat and

10 know that if any one person starts to cut a hole in the boat,

11 we all sink. And that was a compromise we reached, which was

12 very painful, on Social Security to keep it solvent at the

13 time. We all agreed literally we would not criticize the

14 other for engaging in this agreement. As a party we would not

15 as parties use it in our elections.

16 In a sense, do we not have to get to the same place with

17 our Europeans friends and our Arab state friends that we are

18 all in the same boat where we say, okay, we are all signing on

19 to the same deal in order to create the condition for that

20 Palestinian leadership to be able to become viable? Because,

21 Martin, as you talk about it, setting up that circumstance

22 requires, in your analogy, you got to still have the Arab

23 states signing off and you got to have us getting in.

24 So, Rob, my question is, is that sort of a condition

25 precedent to being able to go the route you are suggesting?

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1 Mr. Malley: Absolutely. I think what needs to be done
2 -- and I think you are putting your finger on one of the main
3 pieces of the puzzle which is the U.S. cannot do it alone.

4 One of the lessons we learned from the past -- and I think it
5 is one of the lessons of Camp David -- was we did try to do it
6 alone. I am not saying that had we involved the EU or the
7 Arabs, who probably were not ready at the time in any event,
8 we would have succeeded, but certainly alone makes it much
9 harder.

10 I think we have reached this point. I think this
11 administration is working much more closely with Arabs and
12 Europeans, and I think the Europeans and the Arabs too for
13 their own self-interest, in particular the moderate Arab
14 states, are much more willing today to sign on to anything the
15 U.S. does, even things they may not believe in, let alone
16 things that they would believe in.

17 I think the kind of plan I put on the table -- and I
18 would not go public with it until you get Arab leaders and
19 European leaders publicly committed.

20 Senator Biden: You have just answered my next question.
21 It increases my respect for your judgment beyond what it
22 already was.

23 [Laughter.]

24 Senator Biden: I am serious.

25 Look, if I was sitting down in Bush's position, I would

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1 ask the three of you to spend the next -- and we just took
2 over an administration -- I would literally ask all three of
3 you. I would split you up and say, I want you heading to
4 Europe, I want you heading to the Arab states, and I want you
5 heading to the region. And I need you to get me a deal with
6 the Arab states first, and you got to get me a deal with the
7 Europeans. We have not in earnest, I believe -- we have not
8 been in much negotiation at all of late. And this is not a
9 criticism of the effort the three of you made in the last
10 administration. I mean it. I was right there following you
11 guys.

12 A guy who ran my staff for years and years has more
13 wisdom than any man that I have ever met. His name is Ted
14 Kaufman. For real. He does. Every time I would say
15 something about negotiating our way through something, trying
16 to get to a solution, I would say, my God, we are wasting a
17 lot of time. And he said, you know, I had a professor at the
18 Wharton School who used to talk about a quote that John
19 Wanamaker, the famous retailer back at the turn of the
20 century, said. John Wanamaker allegedly said, I know that 50
21 percent of my advertising is a waste of time. My problem is I
22 just do not know which 50 percent.

23 [Laughter.]

24 Senator Biden: The truth of the matter is that we had to
25 go through everything we have gone through so far in my view

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1 in order to get to the place where we may be able to set the
2 conditions for doing what we do now. So none of what I am
3 asking or saying is in any way even an implied criticism of
4 anything that you guys in your former roles and present roles
5 as public citizens have attempted to do. This is an evolving
6 process.

7 But having said that, can I ask you -- and I am going to
8 have to go vote -- whether or not you sense that there is any
9 inclination on the part of this administration, to use a trite
10 Washington expression, to think outside of the box right now,
11 or is it basically live and let live for the time being and
12 eventually something else is going to have to change on the
13 ground before we, the United States, are able to react? It
14 seems counterintuitive to say that because something is
15 changing on the ground. Something significant is changing on
16 the ground. Something potentially massive is changing on the
17 ground with this unilateral movement on the part of the Sharon
18 government.

19 So can you give me a sense? I'm looking for how we get
20 -- if the chairman and I agreed fully precisely and signed on
21 to one of the three approaches you said and we are going to do
22 everything we can, do we have anybody to talk to in your view?

23 Ambassador Ross: I think that the administration
24 realizes there is something that is profound that is
25 happening, but I would say at this point, at least for my

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1 tastes, they are still too cautious in terms of how they are approaching it from several standpoints.

3 One, as I said a little earlier, when you have a
4 revolutionary move, as is the case on Sharon's part, it is
5 entirely appropriate to try to get your questions answered and
6 to be sure that what is there is, in fact, for real and it is
7 something. But do not bury it with 1,000 questions. There
8 are maybe 10 questions that are critical and strategic, and
9 you focus on those, number one.

10 Number two, do not wait to be satisfied on every answer
11 before you start working with the others. I am very much
12 concerned that if the only discussion is with the Israelis,
13 then the implication is the only responsibility is on the
14 Israeli side and it is not only on the Israeli side.
15
16 being prepared to take a step.

17 Senator Biden: Right.

18 Ambassador Ross: So do not fortify the sense somehow
19 that it is only up to the Israelis.

20 Third, you are going to have to engage in what amounts to
21 very active diplomacy with the others. With the Europeans,
22 focus on the fact, look, there is an opportunity here and here
23 is the kind of role that we can play together to make
24 something of it. With the Egyptians, as I said, particularly
25 because of -- look, the last thing that Egypt wants is for

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1 Gaza to become a Hamas stronghold led by Hamas.

2 Senator Biden: The last time I had a conversation with

3 the President of Egypt, who is an old buddy of a lot of us

4 personally here, there was no inclination to talk to anybody.

5 There is nobody to talk to here.

6 Ambassador Ross: The critical question right now is if

7 you have a revolutionary move and if you cannot on our own

8 make sure that it comes out a certain way, what are the assets

9 we have available? What are every one of the potential

10 resources that give us a chance to take advantage of this? We

11 have to talk to the Palestinians.

12 By the way, everything that Rob and Martin have said

13 about the fragmentation I see all the time when I am over

14 there, but I also see something else. I see reformers. I see

15 a move with the new guard within Fatah who in the siege

16 environment are on the defensive, but in an environment where

17 it is clear an opportunity is coming, they will become much

18 more assertive and aggressive. And we should be working with

19 them.

20 We can also make it more difficult for Arafat to block

21 it. If it is clear there is something profound to be gained,

22 is he going to stand in the way of that, when it is much

23 clearer that that can be the case?

24 But then, again, it is not just us with them. It should

25 be the Quartet members with them. It should be Egypt. We

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1 should try to engage the other Arabs as well. Maybe as a

2 collective they can do more than they have in the past.

3 The issue you were raising before about the Europeans and

4 the Arabs, I think the Europeans are coming to the point of

5 view of realizing maybe there is something here.

6 I think with the Arabs, I do not think they see it yet.

7 I think they still reflect the mythologies. Even the

8 terminology of what is used, the wall was used today. There

9 are 87 miles that have been built. 3 miles are wall. 84 are

10 not. There is a mythology that has built up around that.

11 They have not broken through the mythology to realize what if

12 the Israelis are getting out of a large percentage even of the

13 West Bank, what if they are getting out of all of Gaza? Well,

14 that is an opportunity. Now, what is your role in that going

15 to be? How can you make sure that those who gain from it on

16 the Palestinian side are those who believe in peace, not those

17 who do not?

18 So there is a lot that can be done here, but then you

19 have to be prepared to step up to the plate and do it.

20 Senator Biden: Guys, I only have a minute left to go

21 vote. I just want to tell you again with all sincerity how

22 much I appreciate your contributions not here in this

23 committee today. We are so used to calling on your time, that

24 we almost take it for granted.

25 I hope people are listening not only here but on both

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1 ends of the street. I think there is a great opportunity. I
2 think we have a chance, to vastly overstate it, to make the
3 21st century the century of hope, not one of doom like we are
4 starting it off. I think what you guys have suggested with
5 the threads that are the same here, there is real possibility.

6 Anyway, I thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
7 allowing me to be chairman for 10 minutes. It was a nice
8 feeling, but I am very comfortable with you as chairman as
9 well.

10 [Laughter.]

11 Senator Biden: I am going to go vote. Thank you,
12 fellows. I appreciate it.

13 The Chairman: You did very well.

14 Senator Biden: Thank you.

15 [Laughter.]

16 The Chairman: But back to normal now.

17 [Laughter.]

18 The Chairman: I call upon Senator Nelson.

19 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Since it certainly seems the case now that Arafat will
21 not cooperate and that there will not be any viable
22 Palestinian security, it seems like until something changes
23 there that it is almost hopeless. So what should the U.S. do?
24 And let me preface that by just telling you a story.

25 I had met with the leaders in Egypt before going to

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1. Israel, and General Soliman had told me that he had just had a
2. meeting with Arafat and Arafat had said -- now, this is back
3. in early January -- that within 2 weeks he was going to name a
4. new Palestinian security chief. So in the next day or so when
5. I was meeting with the Palestinian Authority, the Prime
6. Minister Qureia, I said this to him. I said is that going to
7. happen in 2 weeks as General Soliman said. And he smiled and
8. he said, maybe in 10 weeks, maybe in 52 weeks.

9. So is it hopeless unless we can get Arafat to cooperate?

10. Ambassador Indyk: Well, what I have tried to suggest,
11. Senator Nelson, is the short answer to your question is yes,
12. that you will not get Arafat to cooperate. Therefore, I think
13. it is about time that not just the United States, but the
14. Europeans as well who have been funding the Palestinian
15. Authority simply go to him with an offer he cannot refuse, to
16. say that there will be no more money for the Palestinian
17. Authority unless he gives up his control over the security
18. services. Period. Take that control away from him and vest
19. it in the Prime Minister and a security minister and come in
20. and do what we committed to do in phase one of the Road Map.
21. The United States took on the responsibility of restructuring
22. and retraining those security services. If it is done in the
23. context of an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, then that security
24. service and that Prime Minister will have an incentive to take
25. control because the alternative is that Hamas will take

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1 control. So they will, in a sense, have to confront Hamas,

2 but you have got to give them the ability to do so.

3 Left to his own devices, Yasser Arafat will do a deal

4 with Hamas. He is so weak that he will -- that is his classic

5 style -- align himself with Hamas and allow them to take over

6 in Gaza. So in the context of an Israeli unilateral move, I

7 believe it is an urgent priority to end this game that he is

8 able to play by simply taking the authority over the security

9 services in the first instance away from him. And it is not

10 just the United States. The Europeans have a critical role to

11 play in that regard and the U.N. and the Russians.

12 Ambassador Ross: One thing about Arafat, Arafat always

13 wants to demonstrate that nothing can be done without him, and

14 he has not much demonstrated that a whole lot can be done with

15 him.

16 Now, to follow up on what Martin was saying, I think also

17 here if it is only us, it will not work because then he will

18 make it a case of us trying to humiliate the Palestinians. It

19 is the equivalent of the siege which if you humiliate Arafat,

20 in those circumstances you create the sense of humiliation for

21 all Palestinians. So there is a coalescence around him. We

22 would need everybody to accept it.

23 And here again, I would say we have to have some Arab

24 support to do it too. There has to be a kind of consensus

25 that can be presented that says, look, if you do not give this

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1 up, you are destroying the Palestinian cause. This is
2 something that the Arabs have never been willing to do. They
3 have always been willing to go to him in private and put
4 pressure on him. They have never been willing to say it in
5 public. The only thing he is going to respect is if it is
6 done in public. So you are going to have to cross that
7 threshold if you are going to succeed in that fashion.

8 Mr. Malley: I think we have all had our time dealing
9 with Chairman Arafat over the years. I think one thing that
10 is true, as Dennis just said, what is critical for him is to
11 remain relevant, and I think he is now in a position --
12 whether he would act differently in other situations or not is
13 a matter that we could discuss, but he is clearly now put in a
14 position where the only way he can show his relevance is by
15 being an obstruction, an obstacle. He has no incentive to be
16 anything else and the only way he shows that he still is
17 playing a role is by blocking whatever else is happening.

18 I personally am not convinced that if he had put before
19 him the kind of threat that Martin discussed, that it would
20 change that much for several reasons, one, because his
21 incentive structure would not be any different, and second of
22 all, because I think it is more complicated than simply him
23 wanting to hold onto the security services. I think the
24 Palestinian political system as a whole, I think Palestinian
25 society as a whole has invested in him a role that he is only

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1 too happy to play, but that will not simply be removed by

2 transferring authority, nominal authority, to the Prime

3 Minister.

4 I also think that if one wants to reach an agreement,

5 whether it is the kind of agreement I have in mind or others,

6 one will need his blessing. And if I were an Israeli in

7 particular, I would want his blessing for that agreement.

8 Otherwise, the notion of it being a viable, stable agreement

9 would be merely an illusion.

10 Now, part of my answer to your question, Senator, is to

11 say we have to bypass the Palestinian leadership as a whole

12 and that is why the notion of a trusteeship is one that I put

13 on the table. But I think again the only way it is a credible

14 alternative is if it is not a partial trusteeship over Gaza,

15 for example, but a trusteeship over all the lands that

16 ultimately will become the Palestinian state and will then be

17 handed over to leadership that is credible.

18 Senator Nelson: What do you all think about the Olmert

19 plan? This is where he had proposed an elimination of 85

20 percent of the settlements in the West Bank.

21 Ambassador Indyk: I think two things about Olmert's

22 statement is important. First of all, that he is giving voice

23 to what he understands to be a broad Israeli sentiment that

24 Israel does not have reason to be in the West Bank and has

25 very good reason to get out of the West Bank because of the

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1 demographic factors, which he himself cites in this interview.

2 So I think that that is a very important acknowledgement by

3 the Deputy Prime Minister of something that now runs quite

4 deeply through Israeli society.

5 But beyond that, the fact that he came out when he did

6 with that statement, the fact that all other contenders for

7 the Likud leadership find it necessary to stake out a position

8 that goes against the fundamental ideology of Likud and the

9 other right wing parties in the government is an indication of

10 how much the political ground is shifting underneath the feet

11 of the government and of the politicians. And that is why the

12 Prime Minister himself is now giving voice to something that

13 he would never have.

14 I mean, I feel like I have policy whiplash here, as

15 Ambassador to Israel, having heard Prime Minister Sharon --

16 you may have heard it too, Mr. Chairman, also -- give you his

17 lecture about the critical importance to the survival and

18 security of the state of Israel of the settlements in Gaza, of

19 Netzarim and Kfar Darom, and one day he stands up and says I

20 have come to the conclusion that those settlements should be

21 evacuated and then in a final agreement no Jew -- I am quoting

22 him -- will live in Gaza. This is an amazing epiphany, if I

23 can use that word. But it is because the political reality on

24 the ground in Israel is shifting dramatically, and that is

25 driving the leadership to take unilateral steps. The

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1. challenge, as I think we all agree, is to take advantage of
2. that, to shape it in a way that can be productive for a final
3. agreement.

4. Ambassador Ross: Just to follow up on that, I agree
5. completely with what Martin said. I would just add the
6. following, and it gets back to a point you were raising, Mr.
7. Chairman.

8. The Israelis are going to ensure that they maintain at
9. least the Jewish state of Israel, not a one-state solution,
10. but maybe somewhere down the road, if you cannot get a
11. Palestinian state soon, maybe there will be one later. But
12. the whole idea of the fence and the barrier is to guarantee
13. that there will at least be the Jewish state of Israel, and
14. that is what is driving it. That is what guarantees it. What
15. Olmert says is a reflection of that.

16. And not only does it embody the profound political change
17. within Israel, but it also reflects something else. When you
18. build the barrier, as he is putting it, basically on 15
19. percent of the territory or less than that in the West Bank,
20. it means whatever is on the other side of the fence, whatever
21. is to the east of the fence, sooner or later is not going to
22. be there any longer in terms of Israeli settlements. And he
23. also said that. So it has implications very clearly for how
24. Israel will preserve itself and it has implications as well
25. for the kinds of settlements that will remain.

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1. Understand one thing. When we were at Camp David and
2. again afterwards, we knew, when we looked at the configuration
3. of where the settlements are, that even if you build a fence
4. in, say, 12 percent of the territory, you can capture more
5. than three-quarters of all the settlers where they are in that
6. area. In the Clinton ideas, we talked about 4 to 6 percent
7. annexation for 3 blocks. That would have accommodated 80
8. percent of the settlers, not of the settlements. So you can
9. absorb that, but the rest of the territory goes. And what
10. Olmert is saying, in effect, is whatever is to the east is not
11. going to be part of Israel.

12. Senator Nelson: Thank you.

13. The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

14. Let me just raise one more question. It has been several
15. months -- it seems very appropriate to mention now that Prime
16. Minister Sharon visited the United States. He made a visit
17. here subsequently, but he was here for 2 or 3 days. So as a
18. result, in a part of that visit, he invited Senator Biden and
19. me, among a few others, to come to the 10th floor of the
20. Mayflower Hotel, which was quite an excursion just getting
21. there through the security, as the hotel was reconfigured,
22. into a very small room where we finally found the Prime
23. Minister.

24. I had the impression, as he described the fence that
25. evening, because he had been admonished by our administration

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1 to not do it, and there had been a public reference I think by
2 President Bush, in their joint press conference. But he
3 wanted to affirm at least to Biden and to me that he was going
4 to do it.

5 Furthermore, I had the feeling that he was expressing at
6 least subtly and maybe even more overtly that the security or
7 the strategic situation had changed after the war in Iraq and
8 that in fact Israel is fully capable of defending itself. In
9 other words, he was going to make certain that there was a
10 Jewish state and the demographic problem would not overtake
11 Jews in Israel, but furthermore, if there were a lot of
12 contra-attempts around, Israel militarily was prepared really
13 to deal with it.

14 Therefore, his visit to us was really to sort of explain
15 the facts. It was not as a supplicant for aid, asking we get
16 heavily involved in negotiations or work out two states or
17 what have you. It was really much more direct. I do not
18 think that has changed, whatever may be the rhetoric.

19 So this leads me to a question. I will play the devil's
20 advocate for the moment because you have heard today from
21 Senators, all of whom want to get involved, who are engaging
22 you, and what do we do next, what do we advise the
23 administration or anyone else to do. But what if there had
24 Senators here at the hearing today who said, given this
25 context, it is a miserable predicament for the Palestinians

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1 and very sad for Arabs who complain about this and are
2 aggrieved and do not like us, probably will not so long as
3 this persists? But on the other hand, Israel may very well be
4 able to take care of the problem and at some point, in the
5 event that there are Palestinians who want some support from
6 somewhere else, they may ask for it. They may ask Arabs,
7 first of all, but that might not be forthcoming. So they
8 might ask Europeans. They might ask the United States. In
9 other words, you sort of turn the tables as opposed to our
10 worrying day by day how we impose ourselves there or our
11 allies or how we get a context for coming into the picture.
12 We do not get into the picture for a while.

13 There are a good number of Americans who, for quite a
14 while, wanted to take that position, sort of a time-out
15 period. This is one of these intractable affairs. And they
16 could not have anticipated that Prime Minister Sharon would
17 build a fence, that he would take these strategic
18 considerations. But he has and so, as a result, why, things
19 have changed whether everyone has realized that or not.

20 Now, constructive Americans would still say, well, our
21 hopes are broader for the total Near East or Middle East. In
22 other words, we believe in the war against terrorism. There
23 must be some fundamental changes so that the lives of people,
24 hundreds of millions of them, are improved and that there is
25 some hope for young people out there who now may feel hopeless

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1 and go into terrorism because of their despair. And beyond

2 that, we simply believe in freedom, democracy, human rights,

3 rights for women, a number of other things.

4 So we want to get engaged anyway. We are out there with

5 the war against terrorism. Sort of a wake-up call. Suddenly

6 we discovered countries that we had not been dealing with for

7 quite a long while became very active.

8 Yet, there are still other Americans who say, get over

9 it. That was 9/11 and we responded appropriately. We have

10 got our homeland defense now. We are mopping up with the

11 Taliban or al Qaeda between the borders of Afghanistan and

12 Pakistan and doing the best we can with the U.N. and others in

13 Iraq, to bring about some stability there, which will be a

14 distinct improvement, and doing much better with diplomacy

15 with the Europeans, perhaps in Iran, maybe with the six powers

16 in North Korea, some good fortune in Libya.

17 In essence, what is the reason, aside from the fact you

18 have devoted all of your lives to this issue -- this committee

19 has not been quite so devoted but some of us for quite a long

20 while have, as Mr. Biden pointed out, been listening to you.

21 Why are we seized with this issue as being this critically

22 important?

23 I ask this not to argue you out of telling me why it

24 should be, but I think that somebody probably needs to express

25 the priority and why we are here today.

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1 Ambassador Ross: Let me put it in the following way. In
2 the war on terror, there is a military component that is
3 absolutely indispensable. You have no alternative to it. You
4 have to defeat those who understand only one way to deal. But
5 to win the war on terror you have to do things other than in
6 the military realm, and I am not talking now about the obvious
7 points about sharing intelligence, law enforcement, financial
8 flows, and so forth. I am talking about how you create an
9 environment that shows that hate does not work and that hope
10 is still there and that there is a reason not to be so angry.

11 If you take that global statement and you relate it
12 specifically to the issue of, well, gee, if Sharon is doing
13 this anyway, and the Israelis can handle it after they get
14 out, why do we still care, we care because we do not want this
15 to be a replay of Lebanon in the year 2000 where Hizbollah
16 looked like the real victor where violence works, negotiations
17 do not. We do not want Hamas to inherit what happens in Gaza
18 or, for that matter, in the West Bank. We do not want their
19 model to look to be successful because if it is successful,
20 the war on terror will be much harder for us to have to
21 contend with more generally.

22 What we want is for Palestinians who believe in peace to
23 be able to show there is a pathway there. They can take
24 advantage of it. I think Rob said it earlier. If the
25 Israelis are getting out of settlements in the West Bank, let

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119

1 us coordinate with the Palestinians about what the handover is
2 going to be so we do not have Hamas standing at the top of
3 buildings in Kfar Darom or Netzarim waving a Hamas flag. We
4 have a big stake in this when it comes to the broader war on
5 terror. So this dimension of it is, at least from the
6 standpoint of your question, one we have to consider.

7 Mr. Malley: Mr. Chairman, if I could add. I think it is
8 a very fair question and I would just make three points in
9 response.

10 The first one is I am not in favor of engagement for
11 engagement's sake. I think it is not a matter of sending a
12 special envoy simply to be there to make phone calls. I think
13 there is always a risk in U.S. engagement. There is always a
14 cost and it should be worth the cost. Therefore we should
15 have objectives that are commensurate to the risk that we
16 take.

17 All that being said -- and here I agree 100 percent with
18 what Dennis just said -- if we want to have an effective
19 policy in the Middle East and in the war against terrorism, we
20 are going to need to try to come to terms with this issue and
21 to try to resolve it. There is no single issue that dominates
22 the minds of Arabs and of Muslims more than this one, and it
23 is a constant burden on our efforts. As I said in my opening,
24 nothing hurts us more than the perpetuation of the conflict,
25 and nothing would help us more than its resolution. It is the

120

1 constant elephant in the room, and anyone who you will talk to

2 from Indonesia to Morocco to anywhere in the Middle East will

3 say that. I think that is why it remains at the top of our

4 national agenda, even though we have so much else to worry

5 about.

6 The Chairman: Mr. Indyk, do you have a thought?

7 Ambassador Indyk: Just one other comment because I agree

8 very much with what both Dennis and Rob have said, and they

9 have been very articulate about it.

10 But I would just like to make a different point, which is

11 that people who care about the survival, security, and well-

12 being of the state of Israel should also have an interest in

13 seeing us engaged because there has been this kind of

14 simplistic conclusion reached over the last 3 years that

15 somehow by disengaging we are doing Israel a favor. And over

16 900 Israeli lives later and with the deep recession cutting

17 into the hopes and dreams of the Israeli people, Israel is in

18 trouble. Israel is not better off as a result of our

19 disengagement. And Israel cannot survive as a Jewish state,

20 the thing that you have been focusing on today, unless it has

21 peace, eventually has peace with its neighbors. And it can

22 achieve that peace -- even Dr. Kissinger reached that

23 conclusion -- in the foreseeable future, but it cannot do it

24 without American engagement.

25 Ariel Sharon is going to undertake a unilateral

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121

1. disengagement? No. He is coming here to get us involved in
2. his unilateral disengagement because he knows he cannot do it
3. effectively without U.S. engagement. And so that is an
4. additional reason because of our interest in the survival and
5. well-being of the state of Israel that we should want to be
6. engaged.

7. The Chairman: Well, that is a very good point. I remember when we have visited, this committee, with former
8. Prime Minister Shimon Peres and he frequently got into the
9. economic issues of the area and what this might mean for
10. Israel, in addition to surrounding states. Israel is a small
11. state with relatively few people given the territory. So it
12. could have its borders at this point but the commerce and the
13. opportunities that might come from a greater Middle East
14. participation, obviously, might not work out under those
15. circumstances without there being diplomacy and, if not
16. friendship, at least tolerance and a movement pragmatically to
17. deal.
18.

19. Well, I thank each one of you for those answers and we
20. are reassured that we are on the right track in holding the
21. hearing. We thank you for the investment of your time, which
22. has been very, very generous, and your wisdom. Thank you very
23. much.

24. The hearing is adjourned.

25. [Whereupon, at 5:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

✓ All HAK edits incorporated.

YOUR PORTION ONLY

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, it is
always a great pleasure for me to appear here and especially
under circumstances where I substantially agree with the two
opening statements that have been made, with the one proviso
that I believe the White House has done as much as can be
done. But on the general philosophy of the two statements, I
am in general agreement.

I have submitted a rather lengthy statement and I will
summarize my views so that we can get to the question period
as efficiently as possible.

The major problem in bringing the conflict to a
conclusion is that the two sides are talking about
incommensurable issues, producing a psychological crisis
between them.

The Israelis, living in a state that has never been
recognized by its neighbors in its history and dealing with
countries that consider recognition a concession, are, above
all, concerned with questions of survival. They are
militarily overwhelmingly strong, but their margin of safety
is very narrow. In 1973, they came close to defeat in a
surprise attack, and with the nature of their territory and
the nature of their attack, they consider their existence
inherently precarious.

For some period, the Israeli peace movement believed in

16

1 the possibility of trading land for peace. This belief has
2 been destroyed by the intifada, and so much of the Israeli
3 population want victory and the defeat of their Arab
4 adversaries.

5 At the same time, they are a middle class society, and
6 the open-endedness of a terrorist conflict produces a sense of
7 resignation and a sort of undifferentiated desire for peace,
8 which is difficult to express for them in concrete conditions.

9 On the Arab side, I believe there is one overwhelming
10 obstacle which is the psychological reluctance of the
11 Palestinians to accept the permanence of the state of Israel.

12 I had a personal experience of this on the day the Oslo
13 Agreement was signed, and I spoke to one of Arafat's deputies
14 who said to me that he was returning to Palestine for the
15 first time in 40 years, and that was a tremendous experience.
16 And I asked him how would he feel once he got there if he saw
17 the lights of some Israeli citizens. And he said, the lights
18 I can see are not what bothers me. What bothers me is that if
19 you ask me where my home is, I have to tell you it is in Jaffa.
20 And if you ask my children where their home is -- and they
21 have never been there -- they will tell you it is in East Jerusalem.
22 is this psychological undercurrent that, for many
23 Palestinians, if not most Palestinians, these negotiations are
24 stages in a process towards the gradual elimination of Israel.
25 The Palestinians have not yet found it possible to generate a

17

1 gesture like President Sadat when he visited Israel in 1977

2 and produce a psychological breakthrough that led to a

3 settlement.

4 On the other hand, despite the stalemate, one has to note

5 some significant progress. The Israeli Government under Prime

6 Minister Sharon has agreed to the creation of a Palestinian

7 state with contiguous territory. The Likud Party had never

8 done that before. And contiguous territory is the code word

9 for the elimination of some settlements that stand in the way

10 of contiguity. Sharon has now announced the unilateral

11 withdrawal of all the settlements in Gaza, and as I also point

12 out, I think the fence implies the dispensability of some of

13 the settlements on the other side of that.

14 On the Arab side too there have been movements towards

15 negotiations. Crown Prince Abdullah made a formal proposal

16 for normalization of relations with Israel after return to the

17 1967 border.

18 So some of the preconditions for a solution in my view

19 exist. The question is, how does one define a solution? And

20 can one achieve the solution in one step?

21 The solution that is generally put forward by our allies

22 is a return by Israel to the '67 border, the abandonment of

23 its settlements, and partition of Jerusalem in return for

24 normalization and some sort of international guarantees. I

25 have two difficulties with this particular formula.

[4]

18

1 The first is I have never met an Israeli Prime Minister
2 or chief of staff who considers the '67 border defensible.

3 This is going back over a period longer than I care to admit,
4 but shall we say over 40 years. I probably could do longer if
5 I were less vain.

6 Secondly, I do not believe that international guarantees
7 are very meaningful. I had, of course, a personal experience
8 with the international guarantees that accompanied the Vietnam
9 Treaty in which the guaranteeing powers never even answered
10 our requests calling attention to the invasion of South
11 Vietnam. Obviously, this is a separate case, but I find it
12 difficult to imagine that the European nations would go to war
13 over the issues that are likely to threaten Israel's security.
14 And above all, the most serious of those are terrorism, and to
15 terrorism, the deployment of troops is not an adequate answer.
16 If the Israeli army which has a maximum incentive to prevent
17 the terrorist acts cannot stop them, I do not see how the
18 deployment of an international force can be relevant to the
19 terrorist problem.

20 Thirdly, there are some aspects to the negotiations that
21 seem to me to guarantee a protracted negotiation such as the
22 return of refugees. I do not believe that any Arab leader can
23 today sign an agreement that does not provide for the return
24 of refugees, and I cannot imagine an Israeli leader who will
25 sign an agreement that provides for anything less. Therefore,

19

1 this guarantees in itself a protracted stalemate.

2 The Road Map is useful as a consensus statement of
general principles. It has some similarities to Resolution

3 242, and these general principles usually have the quality

5 that they have a lot of adjectives that each side defines in a
different manner. For example, with respect to refugees, the

7 Road Map calls for an agreed just, fair, and realistic
settlement. To the Palestinians, fair and just means the

9 return of most refugees. To the Israelis, realistic means, at
most, a token return of refugees. So the Road Map is useful
in calling attention to terrorism, in setting up a schedule by
which agreement could be reached, but I do not think that in
itself it can provide us the guide for a breakthrough.

14 I am agnostic on the issue of whether one should
negotiate an overall settlement immediately or a series of
partial settlements, and I would be open-minded to either
approach.

18 My instinct is that a negotiation for an overall
settlement will have two problems. One, it will be extremely
protracted, and secondly, at its end, it would still have to
have some interim stages. I cannot believe that Israel would
withdraw in one move to whatever final borders are negotiated
before there is a demonstrated end to the terrorist apparatus
on the Palestinian side and to a demonstrated interval without
terrorist activities. And this cannot happen in a very brief

20

1 period of time.

2 I believe that the security fence that Israel is building

3 may be a means to accelerate negotiations, and therefore I

4 have advocated that the United States take a positive

5 attitude, provided that it is placed in a relationship that

6 defines a strategic necessity and not simply another form of

7 territorial expansion.

8 So what we need is a negotiation on final borders. These

9 final borders should recognize strategic necessities and

10 demographic realities. It cannot be in Israel's interest to

11 acquire additional Arab populations. Indeed, if one were

12 dealing with a really serious effort at a permanent solution,

13 one would look for territory that is today an undisputed part

14 of Israel that is heavily populated by Arab populations that

15 could be traded for territory of strategic importance to

16 Israel and perhaps including some of the settlements that are

17 close to the Israeli border. That would take care of the

18 strategic and political necessities.

19 In principle, I agree with the statements that have been

20 made that the United States must play a major role at the

21 right moment. Our European allies could make a significant

22 contribution if they would suspend the flood of paper plans,

23 by which they seek to improve their position in the Arab

24 world, and help us in the major problem in which we use our

25 influence with Israel and they help bring the Arab countries

21

1 to a recognition of the importance of putting an end to
2 terrorism and a genuine normalization of relations with
3 Israel.

4 I also favor the Mideast Initiative that has been put
5 forward recently by the German Foreign Minister that is trying
6 to develop an Atlantic concept of Middle East development
7 within which the evolution of a Palestinian state could be
8 placed and within which a specific commitment could be made to
9 the development of a Palestinian state.

10 In my view, the overwhelming problem we face now is not
11 so much to define the word peace as to define a pattern of
12 coexistence. If one could create a Palestinian state side by
13 side with an Israeli state, if those borders reflected
14 demographic and strategic realities, and if a normal life
15 could develop in such a framework, then one could think that a
16 fundamental breakthrough has been made. And I think with all
17 the difficulties that we see, the opportunities for such a
18 breakthrough objectively exist.

19 Thank you very much.

20 [The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]

21

22

23

24

25

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22

1 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

2 I will suggest that the committee have 8 minutes per

3 Senator in the first round of questioning, and then we shall

4 see if there are additional questions of Senators.

5 I will begin by asking this question, Dr. Kissinger. You

6 have mentioned that the refugee issue is deep-seated, perhaps

7 insoluble in the short run, and really a feeling of place and

8 possession by many people, this perhaps coupled with a fairly

9 general feeling, although it is hard to tell, I suppose, how

10 pervasive on the part of many Palestinians, many Arab states

11 that Israel might not be permanent after all, that at some

12 point it might go away.

13 And third, sort of over in the short run, but we do not

14 know for how long, some persons in the situation express

15 themselves through terrorist acts, and the call of at least

16 the United States and others who are friends of Israel has

17 been for the terrorism to cease and someone must be

18 responsible for bringing that to conclusion. But it is not at

19 all clear how and when.

20 So as I listened to your testimony, you are suggesting

21 that perhaps the best we can hope for in the present issue,

22 perhaps utilizing the fence -- and you have guided the

23 direction of where the fence ought to go -- offers at least

24 some basis for, as you say, coexistence of the parties. Maybe

25 for a period of time, maybe a generation has to pass before

23

1 the feeling of the end of the permanence of Israel or the
2 refugee yearnings or even the terrorism passes all
3 understanding.

4 But in any event, are you testifying essentially that in
5 the meanwhile pragmatically there could be a degree of
6 coexistence and the United States might be able to support at
7 least meaningful talks and negotiations among parties who
8 might find it possible to coexist? And then as you have
9 expressed, perhaps in a greater Middle East strategy in which
10 more commerce comes, hopefully more wealth, more prospects
11 politically and economically for people who have not had very
12 much, that some of the discontent is ameliorated. Will you
13 sort of guide me through that?

14 Secretary Kissinger: Well, start with the refugees, Mr.
15 Chairman. I cannot conceive of a negotiation in the immediate
16 future under which Israel will permit the return of any
17 refugees or of any number except a number so token as not
18 possibly meeting the problem. I can understand the Arab
19 position that they cannot sign an agreement in which they
20 renounce the return of refugees. If they were willing to do
21 that, of course, the problem would go away. But that is
22 probably the hardest of all the steps for the *Israelis* to
23 take, and this may have to wait an evolution as was the case
24 in the German Polish refugee problem where this was not put at
25 the very beginning of the process.

24

1 So on the other hand, what fuels the terrorism, it seems
2 to me, is not so much the refugee problem as a general
3 condition in which there is no normal life whatever on the
4 Palestinian side. Therefore, the beginning of an effective
5 way towards peace is to create conditions in which honorable
6 people can coexist. So if one could come to some agreement
7 about borders, the future of settlements, the demographic
8 adjustments that I have suggested, and create a Palestinian
9 state, this would be major progress.

10 Now, if in the course of such a negotiation, it suddenly
11 appeared that the desire for peace had grown so great that the
12 other issues can be settled too, I would surely not oppose
13 this. But I would think the immediate objective of the
14 negotiations should be to see how the Middle East can be moved
15 from the present condition of inherent terrorism as part of
16 the political expression on one side and reprisals on the
17 other to a concept by which the two societies could begin
18 coexisting with each other, and then let coexistence produce a
19 process.

20 The Chairman: If a border agreement could be made, a
21 Palestinian state defined, what are the prospects that the
22 Palestinian state or the people living at least in that area
23 might be able to improve economically? In other words, their
24 prospects improve materially enough that they begin to like
25 the idea. What is feared on occasion, even with the fence

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25

1 idea, is that the commerce back and forth that now involves

2 Palestinians and Israelis might be thwarted, might be stopped,

3 and the difficulties therefore for income for the Palestinians

4 is rather dim under those prospects.

5 Secretary Kissinger: I am not suggesting, Mr. Chairman,

6 sort of buying off the Palestinians and making them happy with

7 whatever exists today. I believe that a serious effort at

8 defining a final border between Israel and a Palestinian state

9 should accompany the creation of a Palestinian state, but that

10 should take into account the special nature of the '67 border

11 between Israel and the Palestinians as compared to that

12 between Israel and Egypt and Syria and Lebanon.

13 The other three were international borders that had been

14 recognized internationally and established through some

15 process of negotiation that had been given international

16 sanction by practice. The '67 border is a more or less

17 accidental cease-fire line that reflected military conditions

18 as they existed in 1948, and they were not drawn with any idea

19 of being a permanent border.

20 So if these two states are to coexist effectively, I

21 think it is important that the border is drawn in such a way

22 that it takes care of reasonable Israeli security concerns

23 and, at the same time, makes adjustments in favor of the

24 Palestinians that such an approach would generate.

25 Now, I have advocated the movement, even out of existing

26

1 Israel, of Arab populations that are contiguous to the
2 territory. And when I say movement of the populations, ~~not~~ not mean moving the populations. I mean moving the border so
3
4 that the populations would be part of a Palestinian state.
5 This concept is resisted today because ~~people do not want to~~ Palestinian
6 accept yet the notion of the separation on that basis. But
7 the realities that have produced terrorism, under which people
8 live, makes it in my view desirable to make the demographic
9 adjustments of that nature and to trade them for Israeli
10 settlements that enhance the security of Israel strategically.

11 Now, I have also stressed repeatedly in my public
12 statements that once such a border is drawn, either by
13 recognizing the security fence or through negotiation, the
14 Israeli settlements on the other side of that border become
15 subject to Arab jurisdiction or to Palestinian jurisdiction so
16 that that border has to be drawn with the consciousness that
17 the Israeli populations in those settlements may prefer to
18 return to Israel.

19 The Chairman: Thank you.

20 Senator Biden.

21 Senator Biden: Thank you very much.

22 Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask a couple of specific
23 questions. Then I would like you to -- in my lifetime I have
24 known of no one who could do it better -- talk to us about
25 some strategic notions here about the whole region, if you

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27

1 will.

2 But, first, let me ask you. With regard to the notion of

3 settling on borders now that would -- nothing guarantees --

4 have reasonable Israeli security built in, one of the tenets

5 upon which -- since the days I watched you actively as

6 National Security Advisor and then as Secretary of State as a

7 young Senator to today have observed is that it has always

8 been talked about in terms of land for peace. And peace,

9 defined by most Israeli leaders, both Likud and Labor, over

10 the years, has meant security as it relates to the right of

11 return. In other words, they attach this notion of right of

12 return, which you pointed out is the most difficult for

13 Palestinians to deal with. And I agree with you

14 intellectually that the only way that may get solved is if

15 there are conditions of coexistence and a maturation of both

16 societies over a period of time that allow that to be

17 addressed and both peoples get their arms around it.

18 But in establishing borders, is that not a hard call for

19 the Israelis? Because part of this rationale is their

20 bargaining chip to get these other serious divisive issues

21 addressed and settled has been the land. Once they give the

22 land, once the border is set, even though it may not be cast

23 in stone and be an internationally recognized border -- or

24 maybe that is what you have in mind -- they are not likely to

25 get the kinds of concessions they believe they need from the

28

1 Palestinians specifically, Arabs generally. Could you speak

2 to that for a moment? Maybe I am misunderstanding your

3 initial proposal.

4 Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Historically the Israelis

5 have thought of this as bargaining chips, and the late Prime

6 Minister Rabin used to say, a little bit of land for a little

7 of peace. One trouble with that is that peace is not so

8 easily divisible and another problem is also that almost

9 everything that the Arab side gives is revocable and almost

10 everything the Israelis give is irrevocable. They give land

11 and they get --

12 Senator Biden: A promise.

13 Secretary Kissinger: But your fundamental question is if

14 one pursues the course that I have suggested of settling the

15 border and creating a Palestinian state and leave refugees,

16 does that not create a situation in which that refugee issue

17 will forever disturb the relationship.

18 Well, I think there is another issue that is also not

19 fully settleable now. That is Jerusalem. There too one can

20 make an interim arrangement, but the ultimate arrangement --

21 and I think one would have to decide to what extent these two

22 issues will be kept open -- will balance each other.

23 Finally, I would not object if, in the course of a

24 negotiation, they would prove to be resolvable.

25 Senator Biden: And I understand that.

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29

1. Secretary Kissinger: It is a very good point you make, that the dilemma of what I put forward is that if you leave something open, do you give a pretext for reopening hostilities. And one has to analyze that in terms of the people who want to reopen hostilities are really opposed to the existence of Israel and not to any specific condition.

7. Senator Biden: Precisely.

8. Secretary Kissinger: And can one create a pattern of life in which those who want to destroy Israel itself are marginalized and therefore a general atmosphere develops? That's the open question.

12. Senator Biden: I understand now better what you are saying. I happen to agree with you. It is easy. You know that old joke they used to tell about the chicken and the pig in the barnyard saying they are going to give Farmer Brown a birthday gift, and the chicken says, let's give him a ham and egg breakfasts. The pig says, for you it is a contribution. For me it is a total commitment. Well, it is a little bit like what we ask of the Israelis.

20. I guess the point I want to establish -- to make sure I understood, not establish -- is that it would require a mindset change on the part of the Israelis to go the route you are going, which, easy for me to say, were I an Israeli leader, I would find worth taking the chance. It is not my job to tell them their business, but I just wanted to make sure I

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1 understood it.

2 Secretary Kissinger: I think it requires a mind-set

3 change on both sides.

4 Senator Biden: Yes. And by the way, I think that is the
5 context in which it would happen.

6 Secretary Kissinger: I think we are beginning to head in
7 that direction.

8 Senator Biden: What I am worried about is we are going
9 to head in a direction that Israel is going to be increasingly
10 at a disadvantage. This is a case where I think time does not
11 work on the side of the Israelis. What I am worried about is
12 we move from a point of a two-stage solution to the acceptance
13 of a notion on both sides that there is only a one-stage
14 solution, that there is no possibility of a two-stage
15 solution. But that is a different issue. Not a different
16 issue. That is a path I would rather not go down at the
17 moment.

18 I would like in the few minutes I have remaining --
19 because I know of no one else who is able to speak to these
20 kinds of issues better than you. I have been at a loss to
21 convince myself that I do understand the European -- EU
22 European -- and there is no single European view, but the
23 official position of the EU or individual nation states within
24 Europe -- at a loss to understand their attitude toward Israel
25 and what solutions are most appropriate. I realized they

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1 signed onto the Road Map, but I still am not convinced they

2 share our view. And I would like you to try to explain to me

3 what I thought in your statement you indicated is that some of

4 our European allies are using -- maybe I misheard you --

5 Israel to better their position in the Arab world. If you did

6 not say that, maybe it is that old, you know, I am thinking

7 that. That is what I think. I do not know if that is what

8 you said.

9 Secretary Kissinger: I did not understand the sentence.

10 Senator Biden: That the Europeans use their attitude
toward Israel, their position toward Israel to better their

11
12 European position in the Arab world.

13 Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

14 Senator Biden: That is my view. Is that what you said?

15 Secretary Kissinger: No, I did not say that, but I agree
16 with it.

17 [Laughter.]

18 Senator Biden: Well, I am smarter than I thought I was.

19 Secretary Kissinger: I said it in a longer sentence.

20 [Laughter.]

21 Senator Biden: What I would like to do for a moment is
22 kind of explore that because it seems to me that there are
23 really four parties -- five parties to any ultimate settlement
24 in the Middle East. The two critical parties are the
25 Palestinians and the Israelis. The indispensable party is the

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1 United States. But the other parties are, quote, the

2 Europeans and the Arabs, the Arab leadership.

3 I have been at a loss to understand why there is not
4 anyone in the Arab world since Sadat who has a more strategic
5 vision of Arab interests, of the interests of the Arabs and
6 the interests of that particular Arab country, whether it be
7 Saudi Arabia or Egypt today or anyone other than Jordan a
8 little bit, but they do not have much muscle.

9 The idea that if the Arab leadership in the identifiable
10 countries were literally willing to recognize in a tangible
11 way -- that is, invite Israeli diplomats to their capitals, to
12 visit Israel -- that seems to me, coupled with a change in
13 attitude of leveraging Israel for their benefit with Arabs, a
14 change in attitude on the part of the Europeans, creates an
15 environment that is fundamentally different than the one that
16 exists now.

17 And I just wondered if you would talk with us for a few
18 minutes. My time has been up about 2 minutes and 5 seconds.
19 Maybe on the second round tell me what you think they are
20 thinking. Tell me what the European perspective is, why they
21 are not being more progressive, for lack of a better word, and
22 why, beyond the obvious issue of fearing their own populations
23 in a backlash, Arab leadership has shown so little imagination
24 out of their own naked self-interest, unless I am
25 miscalculating what I think they have not done. That is an

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1 awful broad question, but if you could speak to any of that.

2 Secretary Kissinger: On Europe, what the Europeans mean
3 when they put forward their proposal is that the United States
4 should impose it. And if the United States would only impose it,
5 this, that then the problem would go away, the parties would
6 live happily together, Europe would furnish some sort of
7 guarantees, which on the basis of history cannot be credible.

8 So I think this is an abdication of statesmanship, and it
9 appeals to anti-Americanism for one thing so that if there is
10 no progress in the Middle East, it is by definition America's
11 fault despite the fact that every progress that has been made
12 in the Middle East historically has come through American
13 participation in the process. Even the Oslo agreement grew
14 out of the Madrid Conference.

15 So part of it is domestic politics. Part of it is the
16 view that Europe can establish a special relationship in the
17 Arab world by taking this position.

18 I do not believe that either of these approaches are in
19 the long-term interests even of Europe. Europe would make a
20 much greater contribution if it convinced the moderate Arabs
21 that this is a problem not only for a small group of
22 Palestinians, but for all those who want to prevent a
23 fundamentalist or radical outcome in the Islamic world and,
24 more than that, who want to give the Islamic world a modern
25 direction in which the aspirations of the people can be met.

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1. So if this were some seminar at a university, I would say
2. an ideal outcome would be if the Europeans and we could
3. develop a common approach that took into account the
4. psychological and strategic necessities of both sides and
5. presented it with some degree of understanding, even
6. compassion to both sides.

7. As for the moderate Arabs, I had the honor of working
closely with President Sadat. When I first met him, I had a
8. very ambivalent attitude, but one of the very first things he
9. said to me is this is, above all, a psychological problem and
10. my contribution to it has to be to show that we genuinely want
11. peace. He also added, the Israelis have to see to it that
12. they do not humiliate our people that are dealing with them.
13.
14. That is a fair request.

15. So I believe that it may be impossible for Palestinian
16. leaders by themselves to jump the psychological hurdle that
17. has to be jumped. And it would be highly desirable, probably
18. necessary, for the moderate Arab leaders to say this frontier
19. is one we consider reasonable and you are not traitors if you
20. accept it. This, of course, means there have to be reasonable
21. compensations.

22. Therefore, I agree with the presentation you will hear by
23. Dennis Ross that even in the process of unilateral withdrawal
24. of the Israelis, they would be wise to engage the Egyptians
25. and other moderate Arabs to create a sense of Arab

35

1 participation in this as a process. And one of the roles of

2 American diplomacy should be, and I believe attempts to be, is

3 to bring the moderate Arabs and the Europeans to a less

4 tactical approach and to take a more far-sighted look at it.

5 I did not answer the chairman's question. Is it

6 possible, you asked me, to bring the Palestinians to a point

7 where they can coexist? I think within such a framework and

8 if we could come up with a Middle East initiative in which the

9 Atlantic nations were to put before the peoples in the Middle

10 East what peace can bring through collaboration of the Middle

11 East nations with the Atlantic nations and under conditions of

12 peace with Israel, I think one can at least imagine what a

13 structure would look like.

14 Senator Biden: My time is up. I will just close with

15 this comment.

16 I cannot imagine, Mr. Secretary, notwithstanding the

17 existence of these young Palestinians we have talked to and

18 know and we know exist -- I cannot fathom how an ultimate --

19 wrong phrase -- how a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict,

20 as it relates to the Palestinian question, could be

21 accomplished at the hands of these new leaders alone, for them

22 alone to do it. I do not see how it can happen absent the

23 leadership in the Arab world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, saying

24 first it is okay because I do not know how -- I think we

25 approached this the wrong way.

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36

1 We have to get the Arab world to say under conditions

2 that are in this shape and form, you go ahead. We will bless

3 you if you do it. You are not only not a traitor, you are

4 helping us all. Right now, that psychological leap that was

5 referenced by Sadat is so high on the part of any Palestinian

6 leadership, I do not know how it gets accomplished.

7 Secretary Kissinger: The most important aspect of Middle

8 East policy is to understand that one has to deal with all

9 these four or five issues simultaneously, with the moderate

10 Arabs, the Europeans, the two parties, and other interested

11 groups. But those are the key elements that one has to move

12 towards this process.

13 Senator Biden: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

14 I thank my colleagues for letting me go over.

15 The Chairman: Senator Hagel.

16 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, thank you. And welcome,

17 Dr. Kissinger.

18 Picking up on the theme of your conversation with Senator

19 Biden, you mentioned in your opening statement the proposal

20 put forward by Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Abdullah. I take

21 it from your comments that you thought there was some

22 substance, some opening, some hope, and it seems to me it

23 reflects a bit on what you and Senator Biden were talking

24 about, the moderate Arab leadership of the Middle East

25 becoming involved. And I happen to agree with the assessment

37

1 that to place this on the Palestinian limited, fractured

2 leadership, as it is, will not get us where we need to go.

3 And in light of your statement here, as you note on page 5 of

4 your testimony, no progress is possible without a major

5 diplomatic effort by America.

6 So my first question is what do you believe happened to

7 Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal? Why did it not ever get the

8 attention that some thought it would?

9 Secretary Kissinger: The importance of the proposal of

10 the Crown Prince was that it was the first proposal by an Arab

11 country that did not have a direct national conflict with

12 Israel. So it was not one of the neighboring states, and

13 therefore it was an approach in the name of moderation and

14 peace by a country that did not have a direct issue with

15 Israel. That was important.

16 Secondly, the fact that he spoke of normalization was an

17 important contribution.

18 On the negative side of the proposal or on the incomplete

19 side of the proposal, I do not believe that the '67 border,

20 for the reason I gave, can be the dividing line and I think

21 there has to be a negotiation on that subject.

22 Secondly, the concept of normalization needs to be

23 fleshed out because the way it is defined now, it is something

24 like diplomatic recognition. Now, diplomatic recognition is

25 the way most negotiations begin, not how they end. It is a