FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 9, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:20 A.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will have brief remarks and then will take your questions. What he says to you today is on the record for direct quotation.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: In order to put these decisions into context, I wanted to put before you the efforts the Administration has made in recent months to begin serious and constructive negotiations with the other side. I also wanted to put before you the considerations that led to the President's decision and to his speech and the reasoning and then I will answer your questions.

I need hardly emphasize that this was a very painful and difficult decision to make, which was taken only because it was believed that no other honorable alternative was available. This Administration has invested an enormous amount of effort and conviction in our relations with the major Communist countries.

We have attempted, since coming into office, to open a new era in international relations and we are determined insofar as it depends on us to continue these efforts. But we have also had the problem that one small country has resisted all efforts to find an honorable way out of the situation of Southeast Asia.

It has been supported with equipment and offensive weapons by some major powers and this is what has produced the situation we face today.

Now, in order to put into perspective where we are in the peace negotiations, I would like to go through with you the exchanges that have taken place between us and Hanoi since the end of last year, that is to say, since the North Vietnamese cancelled the private meeting that was scheduled for November 20th, when they cancelled it three days before.

As you remember, the President in his speech on January 25th pointed out that after Le Duc Tho had been suddenly taken ill, we offered to resume negotiations any time that he recovered, either with him or any other representative of Hanoi's political leadership, in order to bring about a rapid end of the war.

MORE

We insisted on a representative of Hanoi's political leadership because our experience had been that the delegation in Paris simply did not have sufficient authority to make these private talks useful. We never received a reply to this message of November 19th.

On January 26th, or the day after the President's speech revealing the secret talks, we sent a message to Hanoi indicating our readiness to resume private negotiations. On February 14th, there was a reply in which Hanoi indicated its willingness to meet any time from March 15th on.

On February 17th, that is to say, three days after we received the message, we accepted this proposal and suggested the date of March 20th. The reason we suggested March 20th is because it is easier to travel on a weekend and we picked the first weekend after March 15th.

In this message we said the following, which has characterized our attitude. We said, "The United States believes that (at this meeting) the proposals of both sides should be considered." In other words, we indicated our readiness to discuss their points, "It expects to negotiate on this basis with an attitude of justice and generosity and with a view to bringing about a rapid end of the war."

On February 29th, Hanoi accepted the date of March 20th. On March 6th, Hanoi postponed the March 20th meeting until April 15th. We accepted this on March 13th, only pointing out that there were other commitments on April 15th and proposing instead April 24th. The other commitment was the trip to Japan that had been planned and which we did not wish to cancel.

We did not hear from Hanoi to our acceptance of their own proposal. So after 10 days, Porter interrupted the plenaries on March 27th. Four days after Porter had interrupted the plenaries, Hanoi accepted the date of April 24th, provided the United States returned to the plenary.

We called Ambassador Porter back and we sent a message which was delivered on April 2nd, but which was in fact drafted on March 31st, in which we agreed to resume the plenary sessions on April 13th and confirmed the meeting of April 24th.

When that message was drafted we were not aware of the fact that a major offensive had in fact started at the Demilitarized Zone, and therefore, some of the press reports that we were tying the resumption of the plenaries to the end of the offensive are totally wrong. In fact, I will read you from our message to the North Vietnamese which will confirm this. It said as follows:

"In order to demonstrate its positive attitude and explore every possible opportunity for progress in negotiation, Ambassador Porter will propose a plenary session of the Paris Conference on Thursday, April 13th, 1972.

MORE

"On this basis the United States reaffirms its agreement to a meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on April 24th at the usual location.

"The U.S. side points out that the military operations launched by the North Vietnamese in recent days near the Demilitarized Zone and elsewhere and the firing of missiles from North Vietnamese territory into South Vietnamese air space are inconsistent with the purpose of this meeting. The U.S. side has been showing great restraint in its response in order to give the negotiations every chance to succeed."

At that time, some of you who called me will know we were not sure that this was a full scale offensive until Easter Sunday. Maybe we should have. But we were not certain that this was an offensive across the Demilitarized Zone.

The purpose of this message was to prevent military pressure from being put by either side.

I would also like to point out that during March, while we knew that a military build up was going on, we nevertheless, showed very great restraint. In fact, we did not authorize attacks into North Vietnam except the normal protective reaction, but nothing against supply installations or missile sites, because of our concern for our relationships that had been established in Peking and that we were trying to develop in Moscow.

I have mentioned all of this to stress that what has happened was not done lightly, whatever judgments people may make.

Then during April there was an exchange of many messages which revolved around the question of whether there should be a private meeting before a plenary session or a plenary session before a private meeting which did not however add a great deal to the substance that I have already pointed out to you.

There were a total of six messages that were going back and forth in April. This was the situation when I went to Moscow.

As has been reported, the problem of Vietnam was discussed at considerable length. We pointed out to the Soviet leaders the extraordinary complexity that was posed for us by a massive invasion of the entire North Vietnamese field army against South Vietnam, an invasion that if it achieved its objective was bound to jeopardize the security of 60,000 Americans, and the impact that such developments had to have on our attempts to move forward on a broad front.

While I do not want to go into the details of the discussion, the Soviet leaders felt that every effort should be made to resume negotiations, and on this basis, and in order not to be hung up on a procedural point, we proposed that we would return to the plenaries, if we received a firm assurance that a private meeting would follow rapidly.

MORE

We left no doubt that we were not concerned only or primarily with the fact of a private meeting, but with the results of a private meeting. We made it very clear that we were prepared to consider any reasonable approach that would lead either to a reduction in the violence, to an end of military operations, to a discussion of the military issues alone or to a discussion of the entire complex of issues with only one proviso. We would not impose a Communist Government on Saigon, we wanted a genuine political solution. With that one proviso we indicated a readiness to discuss any possible approach.

The meetings took place, as you know. There were two plenary sessions and a private session. We again went through every conceivable approach for ending the military situation and we indicated a readiness to examine any political proposal other than the imposition of a Communist Government.

We were confronted by the reading to us of the published Communist statement. It had taken us six months to set up the meeting and innumerable exchanges and when we got there, what we heard could have been clipped from a newspaper and sent to us in the mail. This was the situation we confronted last week.

MORE

- 5 -

What is it that the other side is asking of us that we have rejected? The other side has asked of us, prior to a cease-fire, that the following steps must be taken:

The President of South Vietnam must resign. What is called by the other side "the machinery of oppression of the government" must be disbanded. Pacification must be stopped. Vietnamization must be stopped, which means the end of American military and economic aid. All persons who have been arrested on political grounds should be set free. Then a government should be formed which is composed of all those who favor peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, presumably, by definition, including the Communists.

In that government, in other words, the Communists would be the only organized force, since all the organized non-Communist forces would have been disbanded by definition.

All of this is prior to a cease-fire. Then this government is supposed to negotiate with the Communists a final solution. In other words, this is only the thinnest veneer; this government, which already contains the Communists, is then supposed to negotiate with the Provincial Revolutionary Government, which at that moment will be the only force in the country which has an army, which is backed by the North Vietnamese army. It will be the only force in the country that has any physical strength, and it is supposed to negotiate with them a final settlement. And all of this, ladies and gentlemen, is before a cease-fire.

That is what we have rejected. That is what we call the imposition, under the thinnest veneer, of a Communist government. That is the ending of American economic and military aid, the disbanding of the government that exists in South Vietnam, as a prelude to negotiation. That is the only issue on which negotiations have broken down.

On the whole complex of military issues, we have indicated total readiness for discussion and our proposals have not been rejected; there has been a total refusal even to discuss them. We have not been told what is wrong with our proposals. There has been an absolute unwillingness to discuss any one of them, or to give us any reason why it was unacceptable so that we could continue the discussions.

This was the background against which the Presidential decision had to be seen. No one can believe that two weeks before a summit meeting that it has taken us two years to set up that the President would lightly engage in the sort of decisions he had taken.

We were confronted with the fact that an opponent was insisting on continuing an all-out military offensive which he would stop only on terms that no American President can be asked to accept, and this is why, with enormous pain and great reluctance, this Administration was forced into those decisions.

For two years we have been engaged in negotiations on a broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on the verge not just of success in this or that negotiation, but of what could be a new relationship of benefit to all of mankind, a new relationship in which, on both sides, whenever there is a danger

MORE

of crisis, there will be enough people who have a commitment
to constructive programs so that they could exercise a restrain-
ing influence. But in order for such a policy to succeed, it
cannot be accepted that one country can be oblivious to the impact
on another of the actions of its friends, particularly when those
friends are armed with the weapons of this country.

I ask you to consider what you would think, in the
months before a summit meeting, if an American ally, armed with
American weapons, attacked a Soviet ally and put into jeopardy
the tens of thousands of Soviet troops, whether you would not
ask yourself whether we should have exercised some restraint.

I am not saying that at the point when I was in
Moscow the Soviet ability to exercise restraint was very great.
I am saying that the decision was very difficult, but it had to
be taken for these reasons:

First, you must not conclude from this decision that we
are assuming that the battle in the South cannot be stabilized.
What we are trying to prevent by this decision is an endless
continuation of this process by which one attack after another
takes place over a period of months without serious negotiation,
and without any prospect for a settlement. But we also want to
be in a position that if our assessment is incorrect, and things
should turn out not as well as we hope, that we have some bargain-
ing position left on behalf of the Americans who will then be
threatened, and of the Americans who are now prisoners.

What we have done must be seen not in the context of a
country which is trying to impose its will. It has to be seen
in the context of the proposals which the President made in his
speech.

What is it that we are asking of the North Vietnamese?
What is it in those proposals that a country cannot honorably
accept? We are saying that if our prisoners are returned, and if
there is an end to the fighting, that we will withdraw all our
forces from South Vietnam in four months, and that we will stop
all acts of force throughout Indochina. Why is it that these
proposals should not be accepted?

They would leave the determination of the political
future to the Vietnamese. They would enable us to withdraw with
honor and they would at least put an end to the fighting. So it
is incorrect to say that we have embarked on a course designed
to impose our solution. We have embarked on a course to try to
bring an end to this agony, and, in a way, to this deception, where
there is the constant delusion that there is just one formula
that has somehow eluded us, where for months we have attempted
in good faith to set up a serious negotiation, where our pro-
posals are not even discussed, and where everything is staked
by the other side on a pure military move. So both we and
other major powers are at this moment at a critical decision.

It is this decision that is compared by some to the
Cuban missile crisis, but there are very important differences.

MORE

(LC)

- 7 -

We do not view this as a confrontation between us and the Soviet Union. We are not attempting by these actions to impose a one-sided solution. We are trying to work out some principles of international conduct and an end to a conflict which threatens, alike, our interests as well as the interest of other countries that have a stake in the preservation of peace.

Those were the reasons, in summary, that led to the President's speech last night, and now I will be delighted to answer questions.

Q Would a cease-fire have to be established along the present line of military forces or would the North Vietnamese have to withdraw to North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: We will be delighted to spell out the details of our proposal as soon as a serious negotiation starts, but I can only repeat that we would approach negotiations in a generous spirit and with the attitude of bringing about a rapid end to the war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the summit meeting with the Soviet Union to go forward, and have you had any indication either way?

DR. KISSINGER: To take the second question first, we have had no indication from the Soviet Union, and it will probably be a day or so before we receive one.

With respect to the first question, we are proceeding with the summit preparations, and we see at this moment no reason from our side to postpone the summit meeting. We recognize that the decisions we have taken present some short-term difficulties to the Soviet leaders, but we also believe that the situation that they permitted to evolve presented massive difficulties for us, and both sides have faced the problem throughout of making some real choices; that is to say, if one wants a genuine improvement in relations, as we do, one cannot also at the same time maximize the pressures all around the periphery, so I am not, of course, able to predict what the Soviet reaction will be. Whatever it will be, I can only affirm that as far as we are concerned, we still believe that a new era in East-West relations is possible, and as far as we are concerned, we will place no obstacles in its way, but, rather, we will pursue it with the same intensity as before.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when you were in Moscow, did you inform the Soviet leaders of the possibility of the military action which you have now taken?

DR. KISSINGER: I cannot go into the details of the discussion. I do not believe that there could be any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders of the gravity with which we would view an unchecked continuation of a major North Vietnamese offensive and of an attempt by the North Vietnamese to put everything on the military scales.

The precise actions we would take had obviously not been decided upon at the time, and, therefore, could not be discussed. But I do not believe that the Soviet leaders could be under any misapprehension of how seriously it would be viewed if this offensive continued.

MORE

- 8 -

[L]

Now, let me point out, in addition, that after my
visit to Moscow, and after we had agreed to resume talks, the
North Vietnamese launched three major onslaughts. They launched
an attack on Kontum the day we informed them privately that we
would return to the plenaries. They launched an attack on
Dongha four days later on the eve of the plenary session, and
they launched their attack on Quang Tri on the eve of the private
session. Now, these are facts.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did anyone in the inner councils
dissent from this decision, and did anyone point out that Senator
Goldwater offered this solution in 1964 when it was rejected
by the country?

DR. KISSINGER: I never discuss the internal deliberations of the Government.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you spell out for us, with
some more degree of clarity--the President, I believe, did not
use the word "blockade." What have we said that we would do
should Soviet vessels bearing war materiels, bear down and enter
into one of the ports? Will we stop that ship, and how?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I will not go into the precise rules of engagement. At this point, the instructions are to warn all foreign ships of the existence of these minefields, but not to interfere with them if they decide to proceed into the minefields at their own risk.

Q Doctor, is it now fairly safe to conclude that
Vietnamization has been pretty much of a failure?

DR. KISSINGER: No. What it is safe to conclude is that when there is a massive attack by the entire North Vietnamese field army, every last division equipped with the most modern weapons, that a very precarious situation will develop, the outcome of which is uncertain. That is the only thing that it is safe to conclude at this moment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you give us an estimate of
the amount of supplies, in terms of days, that are actually in
the pipeline now, that have already been unloaded off of Soviet
ships, and based on that, how long do you think it will take
before the blockade, or whatever you want to call it, takes effect?

DR. KISSINGER: These assessments, of course, would differ in relation to critical items, and it has happened before that our estimates had a certain margin of latitudine, so I do not want to tie myself to any specific figures. But it has to be analyzed, whatever the figure is, in two ways: There is a tendency to say that there are X months of supplies, and, therefore, they can go for this many months before there is any effect. That is probably a wrong way of looking at it, because if there are only so many months of supplies, it must effect decisions before they run out.

It is unlikely that anybody would run down his supplies to the zero level before he made another decision. Now, at what point that decision has to be made, it is difficult to predict. We do not believe that anything that was done will affect the battle that may now be taking place in the next three weeks. It could affect and should affect the next round, and I

MORE

[LQ]

- 9 -

repeat: What decision Hanoi makes depends on two factors, one, on the constraints that are placed on it, but secondly, what it is that we are asking of it, and after all, it is not the most onerous condition to ask that we withdraw within four months in return for a cease-fire and a return of prisoners.

This modification of our peace proposal, a modification which corresponds with what was the accepted wisdom everywhere only a little while ago, has to be seen in the context of the cut-off of supplies. So we think that in this next round, the effect would only be indirect. In the round after that, the effect should make itself felt.

Q Dr. Kissinger, will the U.S. Navy attempt to prevent the offloading of supplies outside the minefields?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, it wouldn't serve any useful purpose if I went into every detail of what will or will not be done in given circumstances. What I was trying to convey is that every country now has an important decision to make of what interest it may have to keep this war going at all cost when we are trying to bring it to a conclusion on a basis which seems to us is just to all the parties.

Now, in reply to your specific question, there is only so much you can offload across the beaches, and if you remember that a large percentage of the imports concern petroleum, I think there are certain physical limitations, but we would interfere with it to the maximum degree possible.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to follow that other question, in your first National Security Council memorandum, which has been given some publicity lately, the CIA estimated bombing Haiphong harbor would have only a temporary effect, for two or three months and the North Vietnamese will quickly find alternative routes of supply. Why do you think it would work, in view of that?

DR. KISSINGER: These assessments of what can be shaped by alternative routes were, of course, carefully considered and much more detailed studies were made before this decision was reached. One always has to distinguish, in these systems analyses, between theoretical capacity and practical capacity, and between general availability and specific availability of specific items.

All I can say is that these memoranda were made available to all the principals who reached the decisions, and they were fully discussed.

Q This concerns the President's speech and something you said before about the Vietnamese can negotiate a settlement between themselves after a cease-fire and withdrawal. Does this mean we would totally withdraw from the negotiating table?

MORE

DR. KISSINGER: We have always indicated that we are prepared to pursue two courses: We are either prepared to negotiate a comprehensive settlement, or we are prepared to negotiate the military issues alone.

Now, the difficulty has been that the only comprehensive settlement that the other side has ever proposed to us is the one I described to you earlier, the one that begins with a de facto imposition of a Communist government after which they settle all other issues. After that, there are no other issues left to settle, because after that, we won't have any negotiating power.

If the other side is prepared to discuss with us a political process which gives the real political forces an opportunity to express themselves, we are prepared to discuss it.

We recognize it is a difficult problem. We know that some of our Western forms have another connotation in Vietnam. Maybe we don't have enough imagination. We are prepared to listen to another proposal. We have never had one except this particular formulation, despite repeated attempts on our part to suggest our best judgment or to invite them to make an alternative proposal.

If the political route is closed, we are prepared to discuss the military issues alone and on that hypothesis, we would negotiate our disengagement from the war on the terms I have indicated, and leave the political negotiations to the Vietnamese.

MORE

- 11 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, may we infer from the President's third numbered point that rail and all other communications would be cut off to the maximum extent possible, that the restrictions on Air Force strikes of rail lines close to the Chinese border have now been lifted?

DR. KISSINGER: I obviously cannot go into the details of operations, but we will take great care that the People's Republic will not misunderstand our actions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the long history of misassessments about the Vietnam war, on what does the President base his confidence that this present move will work or might work?

DR. KISSINGER: Peter, these decisions have to be seen in the context of the choices that are available. No action is also a decision and no action is subject to exactly the same question which you have just raised and therefore, this was the decision reached prayerfully and on the best belief that it will work, but only events will prove whether it will.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the proposal of the concept of mining the harbors and seeking the cut-off of supplies into North Vietnam has been kicking around ever since we became involved in that conflict nearly 10 years ago and it has always been rejected by this Administration and the previous Administration up until now on the grounds, as far as we were able to learn, that it imposed an unacceptable risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Can you tell us what has changed to make that risk now acceptable? Is the risk less than it has been in the past or are the circumstances such as to warrant greater risks than we have been willing to undertake in the past?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course you ladies and gentlemen have access to sources that are sometimes closed to me. So you may know the reason why things were rejected that didn't totally percolate to us.

But the question is do we believe it involves unacceptable risks with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

As I pointed out, it, of course, involves some risks. The judgment was that it did not involve an unacceptable risk, especially compared to the risks of the situation where for the second time since the summit meeting was arranged Soviet arms fueled a military upheaval, and no one has pretended that this decision was lightly arrived at. The judgment has been obviously, that the risks were not unacceptable.

MORE

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you still rule out the
possible reintroduction of U.S. ground forces and the use
of nuclear weapons?

DR. KISSINGER: That has been ruled out by the
President, yes.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell me how the
proposal that the President made last night, the conditions
he stated for the four-month withdrawal, differ from the
proposals you made on May 31st in the secret military
proposals and can you also say why you think that they might
be more acceptable now to the other side than they were then?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not saying they might be more
acceptable now. Of course, the deadline has been shortened,
certain events have happened since then which might make
the other side believe that it has now proved its military
capacity to a point where it could afford a purely military
solution, but we have to face this fact: If we can make only
proposals that the other side has said it will accept, we will
be pushed into the position of sooner or later accepting their
political formulation.

We are not saying that the other side will accept it.
We are saying this is a fair proposal and it should accept it.
We are not saying that we know the other side will do this,
we are saying that looking at the situation and the need to
end this war, there is no reason for the other side not to accept it.
We think it is a just proposal. We are not saying it is at this
moment an acceptable proposal, but we hope it will be an acceptable
proposal.

Q Last night he said nothing whatever about the
previous condition of free elections country-wide. What is
our attitude now toward that particular proposal?

DR. KISSINGER: Our attitude is that if the other
side is prepared to discuss political issues, we will discuss
our proposal of January 25th, or some variation of it, or
listen to their counter-proposal to it. If the other side
insists that the only political solution is the one that they
have proposed, which is a defacto imposition of their government
by us, then we suggest we have a deadlock in the political
field and we solve the military problem.

As far as the United States is concerned, we are
prepared to pursue an alternative approach; either a compre-
hensive solution or a purely military solution. Since the other
side totally rejected a political approach last time, or
insisted that there had to be a literal acceptance of its
published program, the President did not refer to it yesterday --
but we are prepared to continue.

MORE

- 13 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President told us many times that his preference was for negotiation but that he is willing to go the Vietnamization route if that didn't succeed. Did that Vietnamization program assume that the North Vietnamese would not at some time fight with all of their might and means?

DR. KISSINGER: We had hoped that in the light of the proposals we had made that there would be a possibility for a negotiated outcome. We had also perhaps underestimated the massive influx of offensive weapons particularly from the Soviet Union, weapons that came in in quantities and of a type that changed the military balance and that in many respects, especially artillery and heavy tanks, tipped the balance in the North Vietnamese direction.

Now, while I have a chance to talk about Soviet supplies, and with Ron looming over me, let me give you our assessment of the Soviet role so that we don't misunderstand each other.

There are two schools of thought. One school of thought maintains that this operation was supplied, conceived, and planned by the Soviet Union in order to impose a maximum humiliation on us prior to the Summit.

Another school of thought maintains that, to be sure, the Soviet Union supplied the weapons, and therefore has to be held responsible for some of the consequences. But that it did not plan this operation, that it could not have considered it in its interest for it to take this extreme form, and that what we face here is one of the problems great powers have in dealing with their clients, that the client looks at problems from its own regional or national perspective, while the great powers may take actions in a much wider one.

We tend to lean towards the latter interpretation. We do not argue that this was a deliberate plan to inflict a humiliation on the United States. We are saying that any thoughtful national leader looking at the masses of offensive equipment might have considered the consequences and, prior to a meeting that had, and still has such high prospects, one should ask oneself whether it can be in the interest of either party to impose a major setback on the other.

This has been our concern, vis a vis the Soviet Union and this has been the reason for our occasional criticism. Not the charge that this is a massive all-out conspiracy.

Q Do you foresee the possibility of a victory by the Hanoi forces of such magnitude that we would have to have a Dunkirk type of operation to withdraw our troops?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we do not foresee a victory of such magnitude, but one has to say that their behavior suggests that such a victory may be their intention and therefore it has to be considered by us. We don't foresee it though.

MORE

Q Dr. Kissinger, for months you have expressed a
personal view and conviction that this war will be resolved
by negotiation, perhaps at the Summit. Two parts in this
question: Do you still feel that is a probability and secondly,
given the breaking off of this private session, have you
hopes that it can be revived in the future, the idea of private
negotiations, with yourself playing a part?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, to take the last part first,
these private negotiations haven't remained very private
lately. For example, after the last meeting at the insistent
request of the North Vietnamese, we did not announce the fact
of a meeting, even though we had proposed that to them. Then
we were forced to confirm it by their own announcement of it.

Now, leaving aside how possible it is to have really
complete private meetings under present circumstances, we
believe that the most effective way of ending the war, the
most certain way, is by negotiations. We respect Le Duc Tho
as a serious, dedicated spokesman for his side, and we are
prepared on our side to resume negotiations with him at any
time that he is prepared to discuss propositions that are
consistent with our principles. And we would make every
effort to understand his point of view.

Therefore, on our side, we will never break off the
channel of communications and we will always be ready to talk
to them.

Now, do I still believe that there is hope for
negotiations? I have always based my hope of negotiations on
the fact that even in Vietnam there must be some realities
that transcend the parochial concern of the contestants and
that a point must be reached where a balance is so clearly
established that if we can make generous and farseeing proposals
that a solution may be possible.

I still have hope that we can do this. And that we
may be able to do it soon. I expect that when the present
turmoil has subsided that both sides will make efforts to
resume the negotiation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,

10:15 A.M. Salzburg Time

MAY 21, 1972

(Salzburg, Austria)

MR. ZIEGLER: You may refer to Dr. Kissinger, but
no direct quotations.

DR. KISSINGER: I do not have any formal statement.
The reason for this briefing is to have an informal conver-
sation about what we are trying to do;
general policy. Just let me begin by giving you a very
brief account of how we got to where we are, and then I will
answer any questions which you may have.

You may remember at the President's first Press
Conference he pointed out a number of things about our rela-
tions with the Soviet Union: First, that he was not opposed
to a summit, but that he wanted to make sure that they did not
concentrate simply on the atmospherics, but on the substance;
second, that the cold war, or the tensions, or whatever you
want to call it, had not been caused by misunderstandings, but
by a series of concrete conditions, and that it was going to
be the purpose of this Administration to work on the specific
conditions in terms of precise settlements of the issues that
had produced the tensions; third, that we believed progress
in one field would facilitate progress in other fields, and
that, therefore, we would propose to proceed on a broad front
of a series of related issues.

I think if you look at what the Administration has done, you will find that this is essentially the approach which we have followed. We have always attempted to conduct several negotiations with the Soviet Union simultaneously, in keeping with the convictions that I have pointed out previously.

We have always been, in principle, prepared to have
a summit, but we wanted to make sure that when the summit
occurred, not that success was guaranteed, but that a base
existed from which success could be envisaged.

Third, we define success not simply as an improve-
ment in the general atmosphere, but as a series of concrete
steps.

Now, the actual discussions with respect to the
summit began first about the time of Cambodia, over two years
ago now. Then there was a period, which you will remember,
of tensions in the Middle East and tensions around Cuba and
Berlin, in which discussions with the Soviet Union went
forward on a variety of issues, but in which a summit meeting
did not seem to be the most effective way of proceeding.

Since then the SALT negotiations have been proceeding and have been making good progress. So it is an enormously complex issue and I am sure that the negotiators are convinced that if only the people in the capitals understood the technical issues as well as they do everything else would be well. But I think we have made as much progress as possible, given the fact that we are dealing with the central armaments of both countries, that these armaments have been designed with different objectives in mind and on the basis of different theories and we are hopeful that in this week we will make further major progress towards an agreement.

The second area in which we have made central to the summit negotiations -- and I mean both sides, both we and the Soviet leaders -- was the Berlin Agreement. That too is an issue that had brought the world to the brink of war on a number of occasions since World War II and in which it was felt necessary to get a clearer legal statement of conditions for the future.

That too turned out to be an extremely complex negotiation which was successfully concluded last August.

After the Berlin negotiation was concluded and when it became apparent that it would be successfully concluded, the President and the Soviet leaders decided that the time had now come to turn the general decision to have a summit into a concrete plan and they agreed on a date and on a general approach to the summit.

It was decided last August at the time that there was an agreement between Mr. Brezhnev and the President, it was decided then that we would attempt to move forward on a broad front, that we would spend the interval between the announcement and the summit on trying to move forward negotiations which were in progress and to start negotiations which were thought by both sides to be desirable.

Because the ultimate objective of our relationship is this, obviously: the Soviet Union and the United States are divided by profound differences of ideology. The Soviet Union and the United States are both great powers, the only nuclear countries whose policy has a world-wide impact on each other almost everywhere. Therefore, the potentiality for tension is enormous.

But, equally, whatever may be said about the traditional precepts of foreign policy that this Administration allegedly is attempting to return to, and particularly in this country I must pay some tribute to them, whatever may be said about them, there have been enormous changes and one fundamental change.

There can be no peace in the world unless the United States and the Soviet Union exercise restraint in their policies toward each other. We cannot avoid nuclear catastrophe unless the two great nuclear powers, the only powers that can totally understand the total panoply of weapons and the full consequences of what is involved in the decisions to go to nuclear war, until these countries act with a degree of foresight commensurate with their power.

- 4 -

Therefore, we are in a position which is totally unprecedented in history. Never before have countries that have been divided so much by ideology and that have impinged on each other so considerably all over the world, never before have they also assumed the responsibility or at least had imposed on them the necessity of being equally partners in the preservation of peace.

This is a responsibility that has been imposed on us by current conditions, by the fact that there can be no nuclear peace without us; that as conflicts, even since the announcement of the Moscow Summit, have abundantly demonstrated that in many areas of the world, in Asia, and elsewhere, there can be no peace unless these two countries exercise restraint and beyond that restraint, creativity in putting relationships on a more permanent and more stable basis. This is the attitude with which we are going to Moscow.

What will be said at the various banquets and the atmosphere that will be created will be evanescent, but what must be built sometime between the Soviet Union and the United States is permanent. And we have proceeded on the major issues, some of which I have outlined, and on an accumulation of what in themselves are secondary issues with this in mind: we are both great powers, we are both advanced economies, and we are also states which, let's face it, are run by large bureaucracies. Nothing is easier in such countries than to perpetuate the momentum of the status quo and the status quo always has the advantage of familiarity, and indeed the status quo, as long as it has not yet produced a catastrophe, has many arguments on its behalf.

What we are attempting to do is to redirect the momentum of the accumulated past and to arrest the momentum of the accumulated past and to chart some new directions, and in the process, perhaps on both sides, to create a vested interest in restraint and in the preservation of peace.

MORE

- 5 -

Some of the secondary issues that will be discussed, some of which the President has mentioned, such as space and science, and some of the primary but not so easily political issues, like the improvement of economic ties, do not, in themselves, affect the current crises. But they can, if they are developed properly, create a situation in which, on both sides, as new crises develop, people will remember that they have a stake in other things than the marginal advantages that used to form the essentials of traditional diplomacy, because the fact of the matter is that in the nuclear age it is no longer possible to assume that by patient accumulation of marginal advantages, one can ultimately destroy one's opponent.

All foreign policy has to start with that insight, and while that is only the beginning of wisdom, it enables one to go on, then, to the other steps which I have described. Now, you must not expect that all of these things will be brought to a conclusion in Moscow. We are going there, however, with the attitude that I have described to you of making major progress in the key areas, of making progress also in the secondary areas, but above all, to see whether a basis exists to put the postwar relationships between the countries which, for the first time in history, have the potentiality of destroying humanity, on a basis so that henceforth international relations can be conducted in an atmosphere not free of conflict, because that is impossible, but in an atmosphere in which mankind can look forward to a prolonged period of tranquillity.

Now let me answer the questions.

Q Henry, the President spoke of the great difficulties still involved in the arms limitation agreement.

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

Q You also mentioned hope for measured progress. Does that mean you have scaled down your expectation for an agreement to be actually signed in Moscow?

DR. KISSINGER: There exists the possibility of signing an agreement in Moscow. On the other hand, we believe -- and I am sure the Soviet leaders have the same view -- that when the central armaments of both sides are, for the first time, put under international restrictions, when these central armaments involve such a wide range of really different weapons designed by different criteria, that we must be very meticulous in coming up with an agreement that does not, in itself, become a source of endless controversy.

We are now at the stage of the negotiations where I think it is fair to say that it is highly probable that an agreement will be reached some time soon. What divides us from the Soviet Union now are a number of technical issues on which serious people can properly differ, and which have to be looked into with some care.

The major issue of principle has been, essentially, settled, with maybe one exception. So we are still hopeful of having an agreement this week, but both sides determined to make an agreement that they can be sure would be reached.

- 6 -

down all the ambiguities, so I have to leave open the possi-
bility that it will not be, but in any event, major progress
will be made, such that the eventual agreement will be very
close.

Q Could you identify the exception?

DR. KISSINGER: The points of difference?

Q You said "major issues of principle have been settled, with one exception."

DR. KISSINGER: No. I do not want to go into them, but it is a soluble one and I am really quite confident that it will be settled. What happens is that you make a preliminary agreement. The way these negotiations have proceeded is that we have gone through long, technical preparations always, which would then be distilled into negotiations. This negotiation would inevitably then produce some sort of a deadlock, or at least two positions which were hard to reconcile. Then what inevitably happened at various stages was that the President and the Soviet leaders would try to break these deadlocks through some political exchanges in which one attempted to reconcile not so much the technical differences, but see whether one could find a bigger framework than the technical issues.

This is really what broke the deadlock on May 20. The technicians and even the negotiators just could not go any further than they had. Then the May 20 momentum went on until this Spring, when we reached the issue of the scope of the offensive limitations, that is, which weapons should be included.

Take the offensive limitations problem. The weapons on both sides are different. Ours are technically somewhat more advanced, but smaller. Theirs are cruder and larger. Their submarine program is just now in full swing. The present phase of ours is that we do not have any submarines now under construction until the UMS come along. We have some forward bases for our submarines; they do not.

I am just trying to indicate what differences can be reconciled. What arms should be included in the agreement, and in what way, led to another series of exchanges at the highest level, which was essentially resolved a few weeks ago, at the end of April, and about which there was some discussion on the occasion of my trip there, and subsequently was announced by the White House at the end of April.

This, in turn, now has led to the implementation of the discussions, or the implementation of the general agreement. Once you implement it, you find more layers of the onion and some new problems. We are quite confident that those problems are going to be solved, and I would say on the whole, the odds are that we will solve them this week, but if we don't, we will make major progress.

Q In what sense is one issue, to use the word, "linked" to another as we gather momentum in talking of these things. Things are proceeding in separate ways, but how are you linked to each other?

- 8 -

If you look at the summer of 1970, when simultaneously we confronted crises in the Middle East, around Cuba and on the access routes to Berlin, I would not say these were the most heroic moments of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. Similarly, after the breakthrough in SALT on May 20 which the President announced in '71, after the conclusion of the Berlin agreement in August, a momentum was created to enable us to move forward on a broad front.

So the answer is we have not made it conditional
in a blackmailing sense. We have tried to look at the
reality of the situation and we have believed, and I
think the Soviet leaders share our view, that if you
move forward on a broad front and if you gear the actions
of the bureaucracy on a wide scale to the expectation
of improvement of relations, that the fact that this
is going on will create a momentum and a set of
expectations within both governments that first
makes the agreements easier and, secondly, makes the
general orientation of the overall policy easier.

I must say on behalf of the President, having
overlooked some of these negotiations, it has really been
interesting to see how a lot of tentative discussions that
were started with the attitude, "Let's see what is possible
here," and with no final idea of what an agreement looked
like, as the months developed became more and more concrete.

The concessions on both sides occurred much more
rapidly and, therefore, have been brought together more
or less simultaneously not to a completion, but to
a point where one can now visualize what, over a period
of months, it would look like.

Q Is it possible that SALT agreement might be
signed next week, leaving out that one exception?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

Ladies and gentlemen, I don't want you to start
getting all excited here. There are a number of issues
that are really so technical that they are getting to
be very hard to understand. I must tell you honestly
it is really a problem now for top leaders to make
decisions when, for example, one of the issues is what
is the cut-off of the power of radar, of radars that are
designed for space tracking, for example, so that
they cannot be used for ABM and other purposes.

That is really such a complex, technical issue
that one wonders over a period of time how this is going
to be handled within government. That is what I call
a pure technical issue.

Then there are others that shade into more
policy oriented issues. But don't get the idea that there
is some momentous issue of principle, and if Ron keeps you
two doors away from the conference room it is not so you
wouldn't hear the raised voices of the principals as they
go at each other, it is just one that, you know, you can
settle by saying yes and no, and there are others that
just require technical considerations. But we are
reasonably confident that we can settle the whole gamut.

MORE

Q Is there any prospect for better understanding between the United States and the Soviets on their recent crisis over Vietnam than there was, say, a week ago? Have we made some progress on that?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the Soviet leaders quite well understand our position with respect to the crisis in Vietnam. That was discussed at some length with General Secretary Brezhnev at the end of April.

Q Do you mean by yourself, sir, or by the President?

DR. KISSINGER: I speak for the President when I speak with him. My megalomania hasn't reached that point yet. It is working up to it, but not yet. (Laughter.)

They have somebody on the staff who takes every joke out of the transcript. (Laughter.)

And also in other exchanges that are constantly going on between the President and the General Secretary. Now both sides here have difficulties which are very real. We recognize that the Soviet Union is a major Communist country. We recognize it conducts its foreign policy on the basis of its principles and we are, therefore, not asking it to do things that go beyond the framework of what its ideology or its interests as a great power dictate.

On the other hand, both of us have an obligation to make sure that conflicts in other areas of the world do not interfere with the broader perspectives which I have sketched. So I would say there already exists a body of exchanges between the two leaders. There is no doubt that they will continue these exchanges in the next week and where they will lead to I don't want to speculate.

MORE

- 10 -

Q. DR. Kissinger, in that connection, can you give us a little elucidation on the trade situation, particularly as to whether or not we may anticipate a more concrete thing, maybe something like a grain agreement, with other things coming along later or agreed on in principle? What is the situation on the trade negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: If you remember from early in the Administration we have maintained the position that we are prepared to move ahead in trade. However, we have also insisted that trade had to move in tandem with the general political climate, and therefore, this, if you review the various positions that have been made about export licenses and so forth, has generally been the case.

Now we have made a judgment that there is a sufficient basis in our political relationship to put our trade relations and our general commercial relations with the Soviet Union on a more regular basis than has been the case in the post-war period.

The Soviet leaders seem to have made the decision that it would be in the mutual interest of both countries that the two largest economies in the world today have a relationship that is more in keeping with their size rather than both being encapsulated in relation to each other by various restrictions.

This is why over a period of months, going back to the visit of Secretary Stans and continuing through constant exchange of delegations, we have attempted to explore the possibilities of working out a more long-term economic relationship in a whole variety of fields.

Now you are familiar with the fact that there have been negotiations going on in the settlement of lend lease which is, of course, a central issue to our ability to be more forthcoming in other fields, such as most favored nations and credit, and so forth. So what we have attempted to do is to mutually explore the basis for a wider commercial relationship and above all a more long term relationship in which these two economies can interact.

There have been discussions, again, as you know, on a medium term agriculture deal. These are in the process now of being advanced further. I don't want to speculate about which agreements are going to be concluded in Moscow and which are going to be concluded after Moscow.

We have, in all these areas--and particularly in an area which is as new as a long-term economic relationship --a parliament of issues, so we have two objectives: One, to conclude whatever agreements can be concluded; but where we can't conclude them, or where we are not even ready to conclude them, to create a framework by which they are not just left to haphazard exchanges, but by which we can systematically move towards a fairly rapid conclusion of the on-going negotiations.

I would have to say to you, Chuck, that we will either have an agreement on a number of those issues, or we will advance them further. In the commercial field, I think we will probably advance them.

- 11 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, when the President announced this trip last year, he said he expected Vietnam to be only a peripheral issue. Has that now changed? And secondly, what do you expect will be going on in Vietnam at the time of the talks?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously Vietnam is a somewhat more central issue than one was hoping for last fall, because of the decision by the North Vietnamese to put their whole field army into South Vietnam. Obviously some of the decisions that have been taken in Southeast Asia have impinged on our relationship more than, I believe, perhaps either side might have wished.

Nevertheless, I think it is an interesting fact, and perhaps a testimony to the structure that has been built, that while there has been strain, it has not interrupted the general design of what we are attempting to do.

The answer would be this: Vietnam will probably figure more largely, but not overwhelmingly. It is not a Vietnam summit. The summit is about what I said at the beginning -- how these two countries can contribute to creating a more peaceful world by the manner in which they regulate their relationships, and we are trying to fit Vietnam with that rather than have Vietnam the central focus of that.

Q How about the second part of the question, what do you expect to be going on in Vietnam during the summit?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not going to be caught in revealing to you the shortcomings of my anticipations. I think we will see a continuation of the military operations that have been characteristic of the last few weeks, with some offensive moves by the North Vietnamese. I think that the general framework of the military operations that you have seen in the last few weeks will continue and will ebb and flow. Some towns may be attacked or may be taken, and others will hold, and I don't want to speculate which ones will do which.

Q How about the question of our bombing and so forth, and also in the context of big power restraints, did we take a calculated risk when we decided the mining and bombing at a time the summit was coming up?

DR. KISSINGER: Helen, every decision in foreign policy is a calculated risk, and inaction is also a calculated risk. If you had a computer that told you certainly what would happen, it would be easy.

So all I would say is action as well as inaction was a calculated risk, and the President weighed the danger of action against the danger of inaction, and all the consequences, and he decided that he had no choice and he proceeded.

- 12 -

Q Did you have reason to anticipate the temperate reaction of the Soviets in the mining of Haiphong?

DR. KISSINGER: I suppose that this is a subtle way of asking whether there was an agreement between us and the Soviets ahead of time about the mining of Haiphong.

Let me answer this in two parts. The Soviet Union did not know in advance what we were going to do. The Soviet Union could be under no illusions that we were taking the situation extremely serious. This, after all, was the reason for the whole complex of the diplomacy of the previous four weeks. We had no assurances of what the Soviet reaction would be.

We expressed our attitude in the President's speech and in the press conference I gave the next day in which we pointed out that as far as we were concerned, we considered that the reasons that lead to the summit were still operative; that this was not an anti-Soviet move; and that in the long-term it was in the interest of both of our countries to have a just peace in Southeast Asia so that the world could return to the central issues of war and peace, especially since we believed that our peace proposals are not proposals that are humiliating to either side or that preclude either side from achieving legitimate objectives.

Q Is it possible to indicate whether the President will propose a limitation on the supply of weapons to both sides in Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on any specific proposal that the President may make.

Q I have a very easy question for the Doctor. The President has received about a million and a quarter petitions from Jewish people all over the United States, pleas for Soviet Jewry. Can you indicate what course, if any, you will be taking while the summit is going on?

DR. KISSINGER: The President is very much aware of these petitions, and he will look for an opportunity to bring that to the attention of those with whom he is speaking.

Q Would this summit have taken place if the President had not gone to Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: The discussions about the summit, as I pointed out, long antedated the trip to Peking and the agreement in principle that there would be a summit had been taken several months before the first trip to Peking, and therefore it is safe to say that the summit would have taken place in any event. Our China policy is not a policy that is designed against the Soviet Union. It was conducted on its own merit.

TOTAL EMBARGO UNTIL
11:00 P.M. MOSCOW TIME

May 26, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Moscow, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND
AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH, DIRECTOR
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
SPASO HOUSE

10:05 P.M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, we have only a very short period here. Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Smith are here to provide you with some general details about the agreement which will be signed tonight at about 11:00 o'clock at the Kremlin. It will be signed at the same location in which the other agreements have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The material that we are giving you now, the Fact Sheet and also the comments that Dr. Kissinger will make, will be embargoed totally until 11:00 o'clock, or at the time of the signing ceremony. I believe the signing ceremony will be carried on television into the Press Center so that you will be able to observe it at that time.

As we mentioned to you in the briefing earlier today, immediately following the signing ceremony, within 20 or 30 minutes after the signing ceremony, we will have available to you at the Press Center copies of the agreement, and representatives from both delegations will be there to take your questions and to discuss the agreement with you at that time.

The purpose for this briefing is simply to give you a general outline as to how the agreement developed. As you see, Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Smith are here now, so I will give you Dr. Kissinger. This is on the record.

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, I thought that the most useful thing I could do was to give you a general background of these negotiations and of the President's view of the treaty, and Ambassador Smith, of course who has conducted the negotiations and brought them to this conclusion is in the best position to go through the details of the agreement.

First of all, let me say on behalf of the President that he certainly will take occasion to express personally that the reason we are here is the dedication and work of the delegation in Helsinki which has been led by Ambassador Smith. He has come here straight from the airport. He has been working on the final work of this agreement since 5:00 o'clock this morning. This concludes a rather hectic week for everybody who has been connected directly or indirectly with these negotiations.

more

[L]

Let me make a few general observations before I turn this over
to Ambassador Smith.

Nothing that this Administration has done has seemed to it
more important for the future of the world than to make an important
first step in the limitation of strategic arms.

All of us have been profoundly convinced that to arrest
the arms race is one of the over-riding concerns of this
period. Now it is a subject of enormous technical complexity,
and for the two great nuclear powers to make a beginning in
putting their armaments under some restraint required political
decisions and an enormous amount of technical work.

It is a process that has continued for many years. It
started with extensive technical studies in Washington. It went
through two and one half years of negotiations alternating
between Helsinki and Vienna. It has been brought to a
conclusion because both governments decided that in an
agreement of this kind the stakes were larger than the
simple technical issues; that what was at stake was a major
step toward international stability, confidence among
nations, and a turn in the pattern of post-war relationships.

This is why at various crucial moments in these
negotiations there had been direct contacts between the
President and Soviet leaders, which led by mutual agreement
to breakthroughs -- the first on May 20 of 1971, in which there
was an agreement that broke the deadlock that had developed
between the Soviet insistence that an agreement cover antiballistic
missile systems only, and our view that an agreement involved as
well the offensive weapons.

The compromise was that the initial treaty would deal with
ABM's, and that this would be accompanied by a freeze on
certain categories of offensive weapons. The next deadlock
developed over the issue of what offensive weapons should be
included, whether it should be confined to intercontinental
ballistic missiles or whether submarine-launched ballistic
missile systems should also be involved. The answer -- this deadlock
was broken at the end of April and in large part by direct contact
between the Soviet leaders and the President and it has finally
resulted in the present agreement which Ambassador Smith has just
brought back from Helsinki and which will be signed at 11:00.

Ambassador Smith is in the best position to explain
the provisions of this agreement, but I wanted to make a few
general observations about its significance and how it should
be looked at.

The first point to make is that in an agreement that
involves the central armaments on both sides, it is foolish
or shortsighted to approach the negotiations from the point of
view of gaining a unilateral advantage. Neither nation will
possibly put its security and its survival at the hazard of its
opponent and no agreement that brings disadvantage to either
side can possibly last and can possibly bring about anything
other than a new circle of insecurity. Therefore, the temptation
that is ever present when agreements of this kind are analyzed as
to who won is exceptionally inappropriate.

more

We have approached these negotiations from the very beginning with the attitude that a wise proposal is one that is conceived by each side to be in the mutual interest and we believe that if this agreement does what we hope it will, that the future will record that both sides won.

Secondly, let me make a few observations with respect to the freeze of offensive weapons which has perhaps some of the more complicated provisions and the anticipation of which has aroused some anticipatory comments in the United States.

First, the freeze concerns only two categories of offensive weapons; that is to say, intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. It does not include the number of warheads, nor does it include bombers, nor does it include, obviously, other systems based elsewhere than at sea or in the territory of each country.

Secondly, in assessing the significance of the freeze, it is not useful to analyze whether the freeze reflects a gap between the forces that are being frozen.

In the two categories that are being frozen, that is to say ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the facts are these: The Soviet Union has more intercontinental ballistic missiles than the United States. The Soviet Union has been building intercontinental ballistic missiles; the United States has not and has no such program at the moment.

The Soviet Union has been building submarine launched ballistic missiles at the rate of eight submarines a year. The United States has at this moment no submarines under construction.

Therefore, the question to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates, but what situation it prevents. The question is where we would be without the freeze. And if you project the existing building programs of the Soviet Union into the future, as against the absence of building programs over the period of the freeze in either of the categories that are being frozen, you will get a more correct clue to why we believe that there is a good agreement and why we believe that it has made a significant contribution to arresting the arms race.

The weapons are frozen, as we pointed out, in categories in which we have no ongoing programs. Now, having said this, however, I am not implying that we gained a unilateral advantage because it is perhaps true that in the ABM field we had the more dynamic program which is being arrested as a result of these developments.

more

What I am saying is that this agreement has been made through
a long process of negotiations; that this week, while our delegation
was working around the clock in Helsinki, the President met with
the Soviet leaders extensively and some members of the American
delegation had extensive talks with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnoff
and Foreign Minister Gromyko to resolve those issues that required
a primarily political decision.

The reason it was possible to achieve such an agreement is
because we are confident it will be seen to be in the common interest
of both countries and in the common interest of humanity. That is
what I wanted to say on behalf of the President.

I would like again to express our appreciation to Ambassador
Smith, who has borne up under great strain and who has details of
the agreement before him.

I will let him comment on those and then both of us will be
available to answer questions.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I understand I am going to have an
opportunity later to go into greater detail with you all about the
specific provisions of the treaty and the interim agreement, so
perhaps at this time I should limit myself to trying to make some
general observations and then later on try to answer your questions
and even later on than that go into any specific provisions that are
of special interest.

First, let me say perhaps the obvious, that these documents
are the product of long, careful, complex and exhaustive negotiations.
As a matter of fact, we were not finished with the last detail after
we got on the airplane this evening in Helsinki. We flew back. I
invited some of the Soviet delegation, including the Chief Delegation
Minister, Semenov, to join us and we continued to work on our way
here to Moscow. So this is about the freshest treaty that I have
ever talked about.

I think that in sum, these documents, when you look at them
carefully, will demonstrate a solid, concrete, yet first step in
the problem of controlling strategic arms. They are not the end of
the road by any means, but I think that they are a very solid step
forward.

You know we have an obligation that sometimes people forget
under the Nonproliferation Treaty of some years ago to get on
with trying to limit strategic arms and get on with disarmament.
I think as a general proposition these documents will show that
we are not lax in that respect. We are conscious of our responsibilities.

more

Now, as Henry said, there are two basic documents here, the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement which, in effect, is a negotiating freeze arrangement to hold the situation, to permit us to hopefully negotiate a treaty to match in the offensive field the treaty that we have succeeded in negotiating in the defensive field.

In the defensive field, I would urge you to look very carefully at the language of Article I which looks very general but to my mind is a most significant step forward in relations between two great powers.

In effect, it says that neither side is going to try to defend its nationwide territory. This is an admission of tremendous psychological significance, I believe, recognition that the deterrent forces of both sides are not going to be challenged.

When you think of the concerns that we have had for the last 25 years about first-strike and counter-force, it seems to me a general recognition by both countries that they are not going to field a nationwide system is of first importance, political, psychological and militarily.

In addition to that, the countries are going to agree not to lay the base for such a nationwide system. That got us into all sorts of radar problems which some of you people perhaps felt we took too long in solving, but much of the time we have spent was in trying to wrestle with this radar problem to prevent the possibility of a nationwide system arising.

In addition to that, the two nations have made commitments not to even try for a thick or regional defense in one part of the country except as specifically permitted under the agreement; that is, to defend one's capital or to defend a relatively small number of ICBM silos.

So, although Article I looks like sort of a general statement, to my mind it is one of the most significant articles in the whole agreement.

Now, Article II defines what we are talking about and has a very important bearing on the whole question of what we call future ABM systems. This treaty has as a most significant aspect that it not only limits the present situation, but has a choking off effect on future systems which, under the terms of the treaty as we have reached understandings, futures will not be deployable unless this treaty is amended.

more

[L]

Article III is the heart of the treaty and deserves a great deal of study. I think we spent more time trying to wrestle with Article III than any other part of the treaty.

I will go into details later if you like, but it says both sides can have two sites with no more than 100 launchers at each site, with radar sharply limited; one site for the defensive capital and one for the ICBM's. The Soviets will agree to deploy the ICBM site well away from the capital site, so the possibility for a base of a nationwide system is very poor.

In addition to the numbers, we have had to work out problems involving test ranges, numbers of test launchers, the question of modernization, the question of how you verify this treaty, and one of the significant conclusions that we have reached is that this treaty can safely be verified by national means of verification, that is, without on-site inspection. This is largely a limitation on numbers of relatively large objects which we are confident can be monitored, if you will, without on-site inspection.

As a matter of fact, if I had my "druthers" and could have on-site inspection instead of our present national means, there would be no question in my mind that we would be much better off with national means of verification.

In addition to that, we will have commitments from the Soviets not to interfere with those national means of verification and not to take measures to conceal their operation so as to prevent the workings of national means of verification. I think you ladies and gentlemen can realize the psychological significance of a nation making such a commitment as that.

We are going to set up a joint consultative commission which will, in effect, act as a surveying agent that will watch over the operation of the agreement, to which ambiguous situations can be referred, which will be a forum for further discussion of the possible amendments to see how this treaty is working, and to make sure that it stays viable over the years.

This treaty will have indefinite duration, but if it doesn't work, if our supreme interests are jeopardized, there is a provision that on short notice either side can escape from the binding obligations under the treaty.

Turn, now, for a minute to the offensive side. As Henry said, what we are trying to do is to set up a useful device that will hold

more

[c]

the situation while we negotiate, hopefully, a matching treaty; that is, to match the treaty in the ABM defense field. I think that the measures that we have succeeded in spelling out in this interim agreement with the Russians will do just that. There will be a commitment on their part not to build any more of these ICBMs that have concerned us over the years. That commitment will extend to not building such things as SS-9s, and there will be provisions that if the sides want to increase their submarine missiles, which, if you can say so, are a more benign form of weapons system than ICBMs, they may do so, but only at the price of a substantial reduction program in other weapons systems.

Keep this in mind when you think about the possibility of increasing SLBMs. It is not for free. It is at a very substantial price in terms of reductions of other weapons systems. Reductions have never before been successfully negotiated, so I think this ought to be considered a great accomplishment.

I think I had better stop at that, since I am going to have a chance to go into specifics. I understand that there are to be some questions at this point.

Q Mr. Smith, could you answer just a couple of basic things? On the question of the radar, could you give us an estimate of what percentage of the national territory will be protected by the ABM radar on each side?

Secondly, on the offensive side, the submarines, there are no figures in the Fact Sheet, and the phrasing there seems to be a little ambiguous. Could you give us what you consider to be, in terms of numbers, the current levels of submarines on each side?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: On the question of radar, I cannot give you a precise percentage. The radar coverage, of course, is not the essential consideration. No re-entry vehicle was ever killed by a radar. It takes a lot of interceptors, in addition to radar, to do a defensive job. The radar coverage, however, will be minute, and especially in the case of radar around ICBM fields, where there will be quantitative limitations as well as qualitative limitations, so only a relatively few radars will be permitted in these ICBM fields.

We are quite confident that a radar base for a nationwide or thick regional defense is not possible under the terms of this treaty.

more

[c]

-8-

Now, in terms of numbers of submarines, I would like to reserve
that until I can go into it more specifically.

Q On the limitation of two ABM sites, we are building two
now in the Far West. Does that mean we abandon one of those
around those ICBM silos and build another one around Washington?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: If we exercise our rights under the treaty, we will build a system around Washington. Our obligation under the treaty will be to have not more than one which we had designated as Grand Forks. So under the treaty the Malmstrom construction would be stopped.

Q Do the Russians complete their construction of submarines presently under construction? They have 17 operation and 25 presumably at some stage of construction. Will they be allowed to complete those before the freeze becomes effective?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: Under the interim arrangement, they will be permitted to finish construction of submarines, yes. I would like to go into the whole submarine question in greater detail later.

Q Would you clear up the withdrawal rights from the treaty "..." if supreme interests are jeopardized and on six-month's notice"? Is that "and/or" or must both conditions be prevalent, a supreme interest endangered, does this then require six month's notice of withdrawal?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: That is correct. That is the same
condition as in previous arms control treaties, such as the
Nonproliferation Treaty.

Q Does this Commission decide whether or not supreme
interests are involved?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No. That is a unilateral decision for both countries.

Q Doesn't this allow them to protect all of their ICBMs while we protect only some of ours?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: No. This will permit them to protect a smaller percentage of their ICBMs than ours, since they have substantially more than we have.

more

Q If after five years there is no comprehensive offensive agreement, does the interim agreement lapse?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: If the five years is past and the negotiations look fruitless, I would think we would not want to continue it. If the negotiations look as if they might still bear fruit, if both sides agree to extend the five-year arrangement, that is certainly in our field of vision.

Q The basic story is going to go out of this session. I think we have to get figures on submarines and other estimates, otherwise the story will go out in a gobbled way.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: This treaty will have no effect on warhead numbers. The United States and the Soviet Union will be free to mount as many warheads as they want. As you know, the United States has a very substantial advantage, and I do not see in the time period of this freeze that there is any prospect of its losing it.

Q What about the submarines, the question of figures? Is this figure of 42 Y Class submarines an accurate one that they will be allowed to complete, and we with 41?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I don't know about this figure of 42 submarines. I have seen all sorts of speculations about Soviet submarines, but it is perfectly clear that under this agreement if the Soviets want to pay the price of scrapping a substantial number of other important strategic weapons systems they can build additional submarines.

Q What submarines do they have under construction now? I think you are evading the point on the number of submarines they will be frozen at under this Treaty.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I am purposely evading the point because that it an intelligence estimate that I am not in a position to give out.

Q How many old submarines, the old submarines with three obsolete launchers on them, would they be able to convert?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I would have to answer that the same way. I am not in a position to describe the breakdown of the Soviet fleet between old and new submarines.

more

[L]

Q You are leaving open the possibility of a very large Soviet superiority in the SLBM field.

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I am leaving open the possibility that you are facing an indefinite period of time. We don't know how long it will last. If we negotiate a treaty within a year, then the Soviet submarine level, if they elect to follow this route, will be one thing. If it is two years, it will be another. There is no doubt that under this arrangement they could, at a high price, increase their submarine fleet.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the question is whether the Soviets will be able to complete their construction of Y Class submarines and modernize their older submarines to become new Y Class submarines and if they do all of this and pay the price, as you said, of retiring the SS-7 and SS-8 missiles, what is the advantage to them, to retire the missiles, for example, and keep these submarines, do they have a significant advantage if they do that?

AMBASSADOR SMITH: I cannot tell you what the factors making facilities at force planning are. All I can do is explain the provisions of these treaties. Now, what the Soviets will do with the rights under this arrangement is something that we can not know.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for just one more question. We are running short of time. Dr. Kissinger has one comment to make.

Q We have had only ten minutes of questions.

MR. ZIEGLER: The entire delegation and Dr. Kissinger will be available at the press center later tonight.

DR. KISSINGER: Since I am not quite as constrained or don't feel as constrained as Ambassador Smith, lest we build up a profound atmosphere of mystery about the submarine issue, I will straighten it out as best I can.

The base number of Soviet submarines is in dispute. It has been in dispute in our intelligence estimate exactly how much it is, though our intelligence estimates are in the range that was suggested.

Q 41 to 43?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not going to go beyond what I have said. It is in that general range.

The Soviet estimate of their program is slightly more exhaustive. They, of course, have the advantage that they know what it is precisely. (Laughter.)

more

-11-

Now the provisions of the agreement, as I understand it, are
that the Soviet Union can convert land-based missiles of a category
of which we estimate that they have 210, plus 30-odd missiles on
older nuclear submarines, into submarines or submarine-based
launchers.

This, then, would give them a figure of submarines and Launchers
substantially about the level that is now estimated as being under
construction. This level has a upper ceiling.

Now, there are two things to be said: One, they can reach this
level only at the sacrifice of existing weapon systems and, therefore,
it would represent the first reduction of one category of weapons.
Second, in the absence of this agreement, the Soviet Union was
building submarines at the rate of eight or nine a year in any
event, and their decision to build these submarines at that rate
seems to have been fixed for some time.

Therefore, the ceiling on submarines has to be seen in terms
of two factors: Factor one, where would the Soviet Union be without
that ceiling? And without that ceiling the Soviet Union would be
some 50 percent higher over the period of time if it exercised its
full capacity of production. Second, in order to reach that ceiling,
the Soviet Union will have to trade in heavy land-based missiles
and/or submarine-based missiles of older types. So that in
addition to arresting the momentum of the submarine construction
program, there is also a reduction of weapons that would under
other circumstances not have been reduced.

The next question that can be asked then: Well, perhaps the
best way to deal with this Soviet submarine program would have
been to build more submarines of our own.

I think those of you who followed defense matters know that the
United States has no plan at this moment -- and for that matter had
no plan before this agreement -- to build submarines over the
five-year period of the freeze that this agreement was lasting.
So we have to remember that we were prepared to live with a
condition without an agreement that was significantly worse than
it is with the agreement and; secondly, that the freeze is purchased
by the reduction of several hundred -- if the Soviets exercise all
their rights -- land-based missiles and another category of sea-
based missiles.

more

This is the context in which the submarine decision has to be
seen.

Q On a point of fact, Henry, didn't the Defense Secretary
announce a program for 10 ULMS or Trident Missiles?

DR. KISSINGER: None of those will become operational until
after the period of the freeze.

Q Could I make a plea to you and Ron as well? It has taken
30 months to get this treaty. The Senate of the United States wants
to know what is in it. There is an argument about it. We have been
out of our hotel an hour and a half. We get ten minutes of questions
and tomorrow it is going to be our fault for screwing it up and creat-
ing political trouble. Can somebody else pass up the champagne
and let's keep this going?

MR. ZIEGLER: I suppose you are asking by passing up the champagne that Henry not go to the signing. That has to be his decision. Ambassador Smith must go to the signing. I will offer you this alternative, recognizing the fact that you have been here an hour and a half, and recognizing the fact that we have to have the material to put together to provide you which, as Ambassador Smith said, was put together as quickly as we can. The option is to have the briefing, as we have scheduled, at the press center immediately after the signing.

Q You know what kind of a brawl that will be.

MR. ZIEGLER: We would be willing to return here to take
your questions if that is what you would like.

Q Will we have to go through the Russian commentary on
this one.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is exactly the dilemma.

Q I have one question that I know would clear up my confusion
and maybe some others' confusion. Does the treaty permit the
Soviets to complete their present submarine construction without
penalty?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Will these Tridents replace old Polaris Submarines in that case?

more