TELCOM

Secretary Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

9:14 a.m., November 29, 1972

K: Are you in the car?

P: No, I'm at home, Henry.

K: Oh, you're at home.

P: Right.

K: I see. Pete, I was thinking that on your problem somebody who knows really how that NATO works is Bob Ellsworth, who is at Lazar (sp?) Brothers.

P: Yeah, I have talked to Bob, Henry. But I didn't tell him about the job. I just asked him what he thought --

K: But, for example, the things that concern Sally.

P: Yeah.

K: I mean, he knows what the house is like.

P: Yeah. Okay. That's a good thought.

K: And what the town is like.

P: Yeah.

K: And also he was in an analogous position in the sense that he moved from Washington to Brussels.

P: Yeah. Right.

K: And I've found him to be a fairly reliable guy.

P: Well, I think his point of view was that it depends entirely on the relationship with you, you know.

K: Yeah

P: Because the State row can get very, very frustrating he said.

K: Oh, no question. Well, you know your relationship with me.

TELCON
Secretary Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

9:14 a.m., November 29, 1972

- 2 -

P: Yeah. We're still talking, Henry. I'd say it's -- we humorously refer to this as a Vietnam (laughter) type decision. You know, in which --

K: Yeah, I hope you don't have Thieu to work with.

P: Well, it's worse. [laugh]

K: [laughter]

P: At least you and I share a number of things but perhaps one of them above all is a common hostility.

K: That is true.

P: What I think I'll do, Henry --

K: There's a common concern for the country which makes that --

P: / we lack Yes, substantive. And then the thing . . . with everyone else is a concern for substance and that's an interesting combination.

K: Yeah.

P: What I think now, Henry, is I'll be down in half hour or an hour. Sally's obviously very, you know, upset and concerned about the personal aspect.

K: Oh, you should be.

P: And you're very thoughtful to think of this. I would think that if I decide to say yes, we ought to try to structure such questions --

K: Don't yield easily.

P: Yeah, yeah. As, you know, what do we do about this planning group; what do we do about direct access -- you know, the White House; an office back here, where is it. You know. Because really, Henry, I think the ultimate degradation for me would be to find myself enmeshed in that State Department apparatus. I wouldn't find that very hard to swallow.

K: Well, the major thing is -- I don't think Haldeman will be able to answer that for you. If you can get a Charter from him to work out a Charter with me, which I think he will do.

P: Um-humm. Right.

TELCONE

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger

9:43 a.m. - 11/29/72

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, anything we should know about Duc?

S: No, he was rather groggy when he came in. I told him that the meeting was at the White House at 3:00 and that I would reconfirm that this morning. He said absolutely nothing to the press. There were hordes of them out there that damn near trampled him to death and we had no substantive discussion at all.

K: Right.

S: But I didn't detect any lightness of touch; that may have been just because he was damn tired but he also had a sort of gloomy visage all the way in.

K: Yeh, well what we've seen of their letter isn't very encouraging. Have you seen it?

S: I haven't. No, No.

K: Well, they're just singing their old song.

S: This stuff out of Saigon is indicating that they want to have a summit meeting. I'm not sure whether that was

K: What's your view on that?

S: I think, as we discussed earlier, only if the man agrees that it will be for ratification of his understanding and not for arguing it. He can't put the President in a position of

K: Well, we would be willing to do it if that's the only way to get it done. On the other hand, I think from their point of view I think it would be a helluva lot better if they did it after the signing when we could put ourselves behind a peacetime President.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 27 1972 11:01

2

S: Yeh. What he may want is this one plus that idea that was in that
little note they handed me about some sort of a ____ session.

K: He won't get the President twice; out of the question.

S: Yeh. Well, we'll just have to see.

K: Of the two, which do you think we should do?

S: I think whichever way pins down the agreement is the most important
thing. Take one step at a time on this.

K: Bill, one other thing which is out of your control. If this leaking out
of State doesn't stop we're just going to go back to our old procedure.

S: That was a - Stewart Hensley?

K: Steward Hensley and also these attacks on me of how everything was
goofed up and how the Secretary was forced to come to the rescue.

S: That I haven't seen. Where is that?

K: Well there's a lot of it around.

S: I haven't seen that.

K: A lot of the - you know if you fellows want to pursue your suicidal
bend it's fine with me. I'll just cut everybody out again.

S: (Laugs) The Hensley one was a backgrounder the Secretary gave
and apparently told the President about it.

K: Oh, that's bullshit.

S: Well, he said he told the President.

K: I don't believe it.

S: Ah, come on.

K: He hasn't talked to the President.

S: Yes, he said he did.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 22 1966
B47433 9/1/66 10:01

["3", "K: Listen I see the goddam list.", "S: Well, he did give it and he's the one that gave that one - yes. And he says that he talked to the President about it.", "K: When did he give it?", "S: I assume yesterday or the day before.", "K: OK. Good.", "S: But the other stuff I haven't seen. I'd be interested in seeing it anyway.", "K: Good. OK.", "S: All right", "K: Thank you.", "01-123456789012345678901234567

Tel Con
B. Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 am, November 29, 1972

K: Hello.

G: Hello. Sorry to bother you, I know you are busy, but a story from Flora Lewis in Paris which the New York definitely wanted me to check out which is making quite mischievous. Let me tell you a little bit of it. It says all the major points of the draft ceasefire agreement were re-opened during the 22 hours of Vietnam negotiations in Paris last week, it was learned today from informed French sources, it is in the nature of the agreement, the sources point out, that the key points are linked to the package retracting any point automatically breaks down the package. Therefore, U.S. insist on renegotiating some basic elements such as the presence of the North Vietnamese troops in the South has underlined the whole accord. It goes on in that vein without any real specifics--

K: I think it's just totally unfounded.

G: In other words, what I had in the paper yesterday basically correct.

K: What you had in the paper is basically correct. You know, everyone is playing psychological warfare and if you publish it, and we'll just see.

G: Well, I have a feeling about trying to keep my readers as close to--

K: What you had yesterday is essentially correct.

G: The point on the truth--

K: I'm not going to go into specifics. You know, there are some outstanding issues but to say that the whole agreement is jeopardized is total nonsense.

G: In my story I say from talking to General Haig I discussed the troop question in the context of what's in the agreement and - so Tass would understand it.

K: Look, General Haig knows as much as I do, so I would say basically we're better--we are further advanced than we were when we started on November 20th. Now how much further and so forth I don't want to speculate on.

G: All right. Was today's meeting a significant one?

2

K: Yes, I think it will have some importance.

G: Do you think we'll have anything afterwards to report about it?

K: I doubt it seriously. I'm practically certain not.

G: Any advantages--we're going to tell him what happened in Paris.

K: He knows what happened in Paris.

G: And he's getting in his beef or whatever it is. Is there any inclination of how the summit went.

K: That we'll have to see. It depends on what we can be certain will come out of it.

G: I suppose if he gets a joint agreement it would be useful but--

K: Well, I don't want to go into any of that. But, I would really warn you--we haven't misled you. I think anything we've said will stand up.

G: Uh huh. Well you're still on course and we are weeks away.

K: That's our judgment.

G: Right. Much thanks.

K: Right, bye, bye.

CLASSIFIED

TelCon

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:33 am, November 29, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: I read your talking points, and I deferred on them. I am not going to go into great detail about quite as much detail as these points would indicate because I think that it will get across more coldly and roughly if they think, you know what I mean, if you make two points you might get through one, and I'm going to pick the points that I think are important and we'll get it across. I'm going to make a very tough statement to them.

K: Good. Mr. President if I may make a suggestion, it's two things, well there are three things that are very important. One, is that you explicitly say that Haig and I totally--

P: Yes, I intend--

K: Because they are trying to play that game.

P: That's right. I'll say that--now I intend to cover that with brutality, don't worry.

K: The second that you make clear to them that there is absolutely no give in the schedule any more.

P: That's right. Good. I'll do that.

K: And the third is on the opposite side, that you give them those three assurances at the end of the talking points. That we will make a statement that we recognize only the GVN as the government that we react violently to violations, and that you'll be prepared to meet with Thieu.

P: I just covered that---

K: I know, but they would have--they would like to hear that from you. We don't want them to leave your offices broken men. We need them to yield but we need them to want Thieu to maintain themselves when the agreement is signed.

P: Well, all right, I'll make it again. I don't know how many times it has to be done, but I had intended to say that. Okay.

2

K: May I make one other suggestion, Mr. President. If they could be asking for a meeting with you and Thieu, my recommendation is the follow9ng: One--

P: I can't do it between that.

K: Well, actually it would be better for him if he met you after the agreement so that you could put yourself behind him as a peacetime President.

P: That's right.

K: W It just absolutely got to be as a condition of the agreement if you were willing to do that, then it would have to be only in the context of a prior assurance that he'll agree. You cannot go to a meeting--

P: I wonder if we just couldn't give on that point.

K: You will meet him.

P: No, no. I said I wonder if we just shouldn't not give them that point. If you open that door, Christ their slip the schedule and a hell of a lot of other things.

K: The only time, I don't know whether your schedule would permit, it would have to be towards the end of next week.

P: Well, I can do it anytime. This comes before anything else. But I just--

K: You can do it over next weekend, say. We could still meet the schedule. But I don't think, Mr. President, that you can afford to meet him and fail.

P: Well, that's the part--I don't think I can afford to meet him at all because I think he's too unpredictable.

K: But, if he gets such an assurance, and he needs this for his own public opinion, that he will agree to that final formula I think you could agree to it.

P: Yes, well, don't worry I'm not going to--they are going to have to press a hell of a lot harder on that than I think they will.

K: It wouldn't be in their interest.

3

P: That's right. Okay. Well I got the points, they are well done and I'll work them out.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: As far as his letter is concerned and so forth---

K: Well this is an intercept date, they of course don't know that we have it. They will hand you a letter and you will have to read it. But above all it's important that you are brutal about this schedule. If they detect any crack, we've had it.

P: They won't detect any crack, and the problem is whether they do leave broken men, because they may. There isn't going to be a -- we may have to do that.

K: Well, if they get the assurances we've indicated, they won't leave as broken men.

much

P: Yes. Well let me say I'm going to kill/st stronger to the test line than even your memorandum indicates. It has to be. I know these people, and at this point we've just got to say that there's no nonsense and that I'm really shocked that it's gone this way, they haven't paid any attention to my letters, and that so forth, now let's come right down to it, it's all finished, let's get going.

K: Well, I think it's better to lean on the tough side because we can always be soft afterwards. Where we can't recoup anything that is definitely soft.

P: Yes, yes. All right. Well, that's what we'll do. We'll meet at 3:00 o'clock. Now when do come to Florida.

K: You wanted me Saturday morning.

P: Right, you'd better come down Friday night, don't you think.

K: I'll come Friday night or the very first thing Saturday morning.

P: Right. I think we should make that, the announcements, say we had a quick ~~two-hour~~ meeting or something like that, a long meeting.

four

K: Right. I understand.

P: We met for four hours so that when you get back they'll know it's all over.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 12 1966 10:07

BOSTON DAILY GAZETTE

4

K: Exactly.

P: So, let's plan that you are here for a period of at least four--

K: No, I'll plan to be there all day Saturday.

P: Yes. Good. And we'll -- I told Haldeman to put you into the House so that you are not caught on the beach.

K: Okay.

P: You know, the big house. Isn't that all right.

K: That's fine. Any place you say.

P: You see, if you are there, then you're in a position that the press doesn't know where you are. They'll figure you're over in the compound. You'll like that house, it's got a swimming pool--

K: Oh, it's great.

P: Fine, so we can do that and there's plenty of room there.

K: Excellent.

P: But we will meet at whatever length is required.

K: It won't take a hell of a lot of time.

P: Frankly, I expect maybe an hour. At most. But then we'll say, a Ziegler will put out the President met with Dr. Kissinger for four hours this morning--but we have met for four hours on the phone. (laughter)

K: Oh, God, yes.

P: Okay, anything else new?

K: No, that all.

P: Nothing new from the North or anything?

K: No, no.

P: That's all right. But move relentlessly on, that's what we have to do now.

K: Right, Mr. President. Bye.

BROKEN FIELD

August 22, 1967

BROKEN FIELD - 856 22 10/07

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:35 pm, November 29, 1972

K: They are in my office. They want modifications. I don't know whether they can give their's. That letter was the most outrageous I ever saw.

P: Are you outside your room?

K: Oh, yes. The only thing we have to do, Mr. President, is at the very end. You said you were willing to discuss some change in wording. Now they are back in my office--

P: All changes meant that you could--

K: If you would tomorrow see them for five minutes and tell them yourself, they are on to making changes.

P: Other changes are not possible. My God, we've been round and round, and now they are saying if we could only do this and that, but they got the word.

K: If they don't get the word it cannot be done. You have done everything that was possible. It was a supurb performance, you were absolutely great, you were very proper. Nothing was left out.

P: Well, if you want to bring them in it's okay, but not another hour.

K: No, no, just say you want them to hear it from you what the changes will be, and that's that.

P: You've talked to me about the changes, some can be done, some cannot.

K: Which changes. I'll write the changes.

P: I'll say I just want them to have no illusions. When they leave we may be friends but may not be allies.

K: I think what we may have to do is conclude the meeting without them.

P: Are you going to conclude it without them next week, are you going to do that.

K: No, we can't.

DREASSIFIED

Authorized: FEB 26 1972

BY: May 6 1972

P: Maybe you can leave a couple of phrases open to work out later. The agreement has got to be made. The one thing in the letter I'll open on is the meeting with him. It may help him for me to meet with him at the conclusion, but don't give that unless you think it's the right thing to do. What is your thinking about that.

K: I think there's a possibility, Mr. President, if you want to---

P: I'll even go to Saigon if that is the point.

K: If we could get it in that he agree to the text, you can meet him before we sign.

P: So that we can properly put the interpretation before we sign. Okay. Second, about Dobrynin, Tricia will be very happy to.

K: Mrs. Dobrynin will call Tricia. They want to come over for lunch or something--whatever she wants.

P: Well, don't worry about that, Haig is working on the schedule. He can take care of that.

K: Okay, Mr. President.

0711557.19

TelCon
Secy. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

8:30 pm, November 29, 1972

K: Hello.

P: Yessir.

K: I'm in the middle of meetings but I want to talk to you a minute to return your call. What have you decided.

P: Well, I'm trying to work a somewhat different approach because I checked now with two or three of these bastards, and they just say it's ludicrous to think that you can do an overall job while you are pinned down to all the crap, you know that they go through, Schulz called a couple of times and I suggested the possibility of a role in which I would supervise the three or four European type things. But not actually be the Ambassador to--

K: I see, and you'd be located where?

P: Well if they insist, over there. Though I don't want to talk to you over the phone about what I really have in mind. But then you have a special representative title.

K: Then what you really have in mind you don't want to make me an accessory do you.

P: I think I should talk to you privately.

K: Well, let's talk about it tomorrow.

P: Well, I've been feeling for you, how are you going over there.

K: Oh, it's tough, it's tough.

P: Well, okay, I think we ought to talk privately.

K: Exactly, right, bye.

P: Bye.

Dated: 11/2/72
Author: F. D. B.
Title: B. M. G.
Page-footer: 10-11-72

TELCONE
Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger
8:58 p.m., November 29, 1972

F: ... You know, that Bill Casey is -- that I was kind of his Rabbi down here in getting him here and --

K: Yeah, I'm talking to him.

F: He's in the room with you?

K: Yeah.

F: Okay, let me make it quick then. He wants to take the -- start off with the job on Economics Affairs and then move later into Administration. I would suggest that that presents two problems. One, we can't get the new guy on Economic Affairs now when you need him and you put that off for quite a while and Bill then spends his time on Economic Affairs instead of the other. There is a tough guy -- Chuck Robinson -- who's a good man, who I think would take that Economics job and you could get them both now if you could do it.

K: I want to talk to you about it. I also want to talk to you about the Ambassadors.

F: Delighted to do that. Finally, do you know that they have got this problem with this fellow Hemmingway over there that is -- who was selected out of the service.

K: No.

F: Well, he did and it's been a two-year battle. He was reviewed by a reviewing board that voted that he should be reinstated. A fellow by the name of Hall took the thing over and reversed that ruling and then bounced it upstairs to Irwin. Irwin doesn't know whether he's going to act on it or not. I don't know anything about Hemmingway; I don't know the validity of the case, but it is going to be another Otto Ateptra (sp?) case.

K: He must have supported us if he gets selected.

F: Well, he makes that claim. And he says that --

K: [Laughs] I was kidding. Is it true?

F: There's a long file on it which he says yes, I have always been an outspoken Republican and this fellow Hall ran with the other pack. I mean, during the Kennedy Administration and has run with the other pack --

TELCORN

Amb. Phuong (Vietnam)/Mr. Kissinger

Mr. Nguyen Phu Duc, Special Assistant to Pres. Thieu

7:58 p.m., November 29, 1972

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

P: Thank you.

K: Mr. Ambassador, I hadn't focussed on the fact that the time differential really makes it important for you to communicate with Saigon tonight.

P: Yes.

K: Because if we meet tomorrow morning, they will all be sleeping by the time you get our views.

P: Yes, that's correct.

K: You probably have a pretty long dispatch to write as it is.

P: Yeah, we are preparing it now.

K: Right.

P: Yes.

K: Is Duc on the phone too?

P: Yes, Duc is here.

K: Okay.

P: Would you like to talk to him?

K: No, no, no; I'm delighted to talk to you. What I think is this -- at least present it to Saigon. One, as I understand it, what you need - want above all is the principle of the withdrawal.

P: Of the withdrawal, yes.

K: You want that more than the actual withdrawal?

P: When -- I think that according to Duc it is correct. That is, Duc said that when the basic point of the withdrawal [is respected/stated?] -- You would like to get clarification from him. He's --

01:00:00

10/10/72

B40300000000000000000000000000000

TELCONE

Amb. Phuong/Special Advisor Duc/Mr. Kissinger

7:58 p.m., November 29, 1972

- 2 -

K: No, no; I believe you, I believe you, I believe you. Well, look, put
Duc on, I don't care. Whoever should I talk to.

P: Duc is going to express his feeling because he get directly from the
President.

K: Okay.

P: He's coming now.

K: Right.

D: Hello.

K: Hello, how are you?

D: Fine, thank you. How are you?

K: Okay. I thought that because of the time differential, I better get
straight what you want and also to get clear to you -- You know, I've
talked to the President three or four times since we left -- of where
we stand. As I understand it, what you want above all is the principle
of withdrawal, right?

D: That's correct.

K: More than the actual withdrawal?

D: Well, I would --

K: Well, I know you want both.

D: ... part of the phrase.

K: What?

D: I would rather dwell on the first part of a phrase. Namely, the
principle of the withdrawal. Of course, if we then have more of a
principle --

K: Well, let me tell you, my own view was that option two -- what we gave
as option two in Paris -- is the best. You follow? But, if you can't do
that, I think we could probably trade the three -seg -- I think we have
a chance. You see right now they've withdrawn 8(c) and offered in return

UNIVERSITY

TELCONE

Amb. Phuong/Mr. Duc/Mr. Kissinger

7:58 p.m., November 29, 1972

- 3 -

K: (cont'd) to withdraw some troops de facto for it. But what I recommend what I would say we have a chance at -- at least point is, if we leave paragraph 12 unchanged, which is with the three segments, just weakening the word "administrative" to the correct translation, whatever that is. And put in that one sentence that you want "and their territory". You know what I mean? In the demarcation zone.

D: Uh-huh.

K: You see? Where it says "South and North Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone and each other's territory", which is what you said you wanted.

D: Yes. In accordance --

K: In accordance with Article 24 of the Geneva Accord.

D: That's correct.

Now

K: That I think we have a chance at. That would only leave the problem of the PRG in the Preamble and what we do about that I have no way of knowing.

D: Now, if I understand you correctly, you feel that the way to do by it is on the one hand to have the condition in the Article relating to DMZ concerning what you have just cited Article 24?

K: Right.

D: But concerning the GNR and the PRG you feel that far is here now if you can change the wording, is it correct?

K: I would think impossible if we are going to get the change that you want for the territory.

D: So you mean impossible for all -- for any change, because you have mentioned three parts of it.

K: No, we can get the change of weakening the word "administrative".

D: Pardon me?

K: We can get the word "administrative" weakened.

D: I see. You mean, instead of "governmental".

DATE: 10/01/72
TIME: 12:22
AUTHOR: B. J. B. M. B. B.

B. J. B. M. B. B.

TELCONE

7:58 p.m., November 29, 1972

- 4 -

K: Yes, right.

D: Get it into "administrative". [Someone here speaks to Duc at other end.] Structure?

K: Right.

D: You mean the word "structure"?

K: Right.

D: So the only word is the word "administrative"?

K: Right.

D: And how about the three components and --

K: Three components we cannot get changed under this theory.

D: Uh-huh. [Change in tapes] . . and lower level.

K: Cannot get changed under this theory. That you are only required to consult about.

D: How many . . .

K: You are not required to be consulted.

D: . . . [Begin Tape2] . . the word "lower level".

K: Yes.

D: Or either the words "for all the GNR". The only word for which there can be a change is the word "administrative" that we wish to maintain.

K: Right.

D: And above the GRB. The words "GRB" throughout the text.

K: Well, throughout the text we can drop it. That only leaves the question in the Preamble.

D: Which you'll have -- significantly remains the same. If it is a -- mentions the ones, the principle is there.

TELCONE

ASSISTED BY A C.A.E. DEPT. 2210101

B Giorgio Bardi

TELCONE

7:58 p.m., November 29, 1972

- 5 -

K: Well, I can tell you we'd make a maximum effort of keeping it out.

D: Because we feel that, as I explained to you, this is a serious situation --

K: No, I understand your point on that.

D: This is a very important question [on the national one].

K: Yeah. We would make a maximum effort.

D: You'd try to leave altogether?

K: To leave it out altogether.

D: Not even in the Preamble?

K: That's what I mean.

D: Well, I take note of that and I send cable to Saigon.

K: Okay. Well, let's meet at 9:15 anyway. But I implore you, Mr. Duc, disabuse Saigon of the idea that they can get another big palaver started.

D: Another what?

K: Another big dialogue started. Really, do not pay too much attention to what the President said at the end about the wording. He meant Option Two and that's all he meant. I have never misled you about his views. I couldn't survive here if I did.

D: I know, I know. But you see, it's also my duty to convey to the President

K: You have the absolute duty and you've discharged it with great dignity.

D: I thank you very much. But we have to convey in all honesty and --

K: No, I --

D: ... possible what we consider of vital to us.

K: Of course, and you've done it very well.

D: Thank you.

DRE ASSIGNED
Author: F012658
Date: 11/05/05

TelCon

9:25 am, November 30, 1972

George Sherman/Dr. Kissinger

K: Hello

S: I'm sorry I missed you last night. I was trying to clear up--one of them was this constant reports from Saigon which you saw in the paper Yesterday about your pushing for a summit meeting and Duc's visit connected with bearing sort of a personal message, and the second thing was I wasn't quite clear from Ron's briefing about the mood of the meeting. He left me with the impression that knowing myself, and a lot of people, that it was a fairly tough bargaining session and --

K: Well, not so much bargaining, it's a tough situation, but the mood was certainly light and friendly.

S: But no sort of raising of voices and arguments.

K: Oh, God, no, not anywhere close to that.

S: Okay. Were across the board agreements reached or not.

K: Well, we're still talking.

S: But generally would say there was progress in the talks.

K: Yeah, I think there was some progress. This is all off the record.

S: Right. Now, did he in fact bring any message from Thieu asking for a meeting with the President.

K: I can't go into the substance, he did bring a letter.

S: Frankly, I talked to the South Vietnamese Ambassador afterwards and he said we didn't ask for anything which sounded to me slightly-- well you know, I don't know how gullible I should be. Obviously they are asking for something.

K: The meeting is just being vastly overplayed.

S: Well can you just tell me they have indicated that they'd like--Duc has indicated Thieu at some point would like to talk to President Nixon, with regard to one of the other stages of the negotiations.

K: Well--

DREASCHFIEC

AUFnahme 27.12.72
Bef. 1. MAJD. 1972

R. B. J.

2

S: What I'm trying to get at is I don't want to try and mislead my readers, because at the moment I have a story saying that as you say, it was the main thing of the meeting but leading to the distinct possibility that they would like this meeting at some stage. Is that very far off the mark.

K: YEAH, but don't play it too heavily. I mean it's not a big item right now.

S: It could become an item, say, after your next talks with Le Duc Tho and your trip to Saigon.

K: Conceivably.

S: Another thing is, have you seen Nguyen's story this morning in the Times.

K: Oh, Jesus Ghrist. I won't go into that.

S: Well, is it basically accurate, though.

K: I just won't go into it. All I can say is I conducted negotiations for many years without anything ever being in the papers, but I can't achieve that in this one.

S: Uh huh. So they ask to consider it accurate and you ask to consider it inaccurate, is that what you are trying to say.

K: I just don't want to go into it. We have an agreement with the North Vietnamese and we won't reveal it, which we are breeching every day, that we won't talk about it.

S: You mean, someone in your establishment is breaching it.

K: I would doubt that.

S: Tell me, are you planning to take him back to Paris with you still, or not.

K: Well, they'll be coming back to Paris, either with me or separately.

S: q Mr. Duck is coming back.

K: Well, I don't know about Duc, I guess Phuong, the Ambassador.

CLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11/30/72 11:49 a.m.

AD: Hello Henry!

HK: How do you know its me?

AD: There is a certain kind of feel going through the wires when you take the phone.

HK: You have my office not only bugged, but you have a television camera here--

AD: So be careful (laughing)

HK: Anatol, before you tell me what you have to tell me, I want you to know the President is very grateful for what you said about Tricia and she's looking for ward to--if Mrs. Dobrynin or you would want to call Tricia she'd be delighted to have--

AD: Anytime--you will give us--

HK: Call her through the White House.

AD: Okay, we'll call tomorrow because my wife is in New York for a day but tomorrow she will be back from New York.

HK: Good.

AD: And we will have a discussion with her.

HK: And they are thinking about the first few days in January--

AD: In January?

HK: Yes.

AD: I see. That's all right too.

HK: And they will stay at the Embassy--I mean at ______ House

AD: ) Right. As for the details, we will discuss with them. Thank you very much--I will mention this to Brezhnev.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012057 0904
By: N.W. La. 50-

Page 2

HK: Now you called me.

AD: I called you about tomorrow's meeting and I just really called you for tomorrow, not for today, because as you remember we were talking about lunch or just a 10-minute talk--I know you are very busy.

HK: No I think we should talk.

AD: I have from Moscow--they are asking me for a talk to you for the President--its along the line really I mentioned to you--its a short one but the substance is the same--no details but expressing some anxiety (?) and at the same time hoping that everything will go right.

HK: Can we perhaps meet very briefly on that today?

AD: That's all right.

HK: Because I wanted to tell you exactly what the President's thinking is.

AD: Okay--when should I see you?

HK: Let's say about 5:30--is that all right.

AD: Quite all right. 5:30 I will be there.

HK: Right. And then we will set a time for tomorrow to discuss our bilateral problems.

AD: Okay 5:30 your place.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: M.W. King, 5-20-90

TELECOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11/30/72 11:49 a.m.

AD: Hello Henry!

HK: How do you know me?

AD: So be careful (laughing)

HK: Anatol, before you tell me what you have to tell me, I want you to know the President is very grateful for what you said about Tricia and she's looking for ward to--if Mrs. Dobryin or you would want to call Tricia she'd be delighted to have--

HK: Good.

HK: And they are thinking about the first few days in January.

AD: In January?

HK: Yes.

HK: And they will stay at the Embassy--I mean at ____ House

AD: Right. As for the details, we will discuss with them. Thank you very much--I will mention this to Breshnev.

CLASSIFIED

10/01/72
JAN 10 1972
B-3562102F

Page 2

HK: Now you called me.

AD: That's all right.

AD: Okay 5:30 your place.

TELCONE

Bob Toth/Kissinger
12:11 p.m. - 11/30/72

K: Hello.

T: Hi.

K: Bob, how are you?

T: Fine, did you have a good trip?

K: Yeh.

T: I'm sorry you didn't take me along.

K: (Laugh's)

T: Henry, two quick things. One is December first is coming up and I was just wondering whether there would be another troop withdrawal announcement.

K: I don't think so.

T: We'll stay where we are?

K: Yes.

T: And is there any truth to the request by Thieu for meeting with the President?

K: He has not received one.

T: Would it come now or . . . ?

K: Well, we have no indication of it. But it could come. I'm just trying to give myself a way out.

T: I have talked to Al so I have a fairly good feel on the present situation. One of the things I didn't ask him was whether or not there was confirmation of the intelligence reports of some withdrawal by the North Vietnamese?

K: There is some but it's really inconclusive.

T: Inconclusive?

2

K: Yeh.

T: All righty and one final thing. The <u>Star News</u> piece, Lisagor's piece, that quoted the Italian reviewer.

K: Oh, God.

T: (Laughs). Were you distressed with those initial quotes about not quarreling - whether it was useful or useless? Was that one of the things you were disturbed with?

K: What?

T: Well, in that piece, you were quoted as saying that you 'might agree" that the war was useless but it was not up to you to judge whether it was useful or useless.

K: I was disturbed with the whole thing. You see first of all it was given in bits and pieces with the understanding that she'd show it to me again. I made a mistake to give it. I have admitted that. And everything has a slightly wierd quality to it, but I don't want to get into a debate with her about what I did say and what I didn't say and in what context. For somebody who's never been on a horse to think that I would visualize myself as a cowboy goes a little far.

T: (Laughs) I wasn't worried about that, but in the context of the piece I've got to write on you and the end of that war - for the <u>Times</u> whenever it's signed I was looking through it and

K: What I must have said to her is that I don't want - this is not the time for me to discuss and debate with you whether it was useful or not.

T: I see.

K: That was the context of it.

T: Will you have any time to see me, I know this week may be bad but maybe it's not as bad as I think in the context of this article?

K: Certainly.

T: OK. Shall I leave it up to you to set a time?

K: If you want to.

T: Do you think it's possible?

K: I'll do my damndest. T: OK, Thank you. K: Bye.

UNCLASSIFIED
Date: 12 Oct 1995
Author: B. St. John

TELCOM

B. Gwertzman/Kissinger

2:47 p.m. - 11/30/72

K: Hello.

G: Hello. Thank you for your advice yesterday. On that basis I was
able to persuade the editors not to print that story from Paris.

K: I think you'll turn out to be correct.

G: Could I just ask you for some feeling on these talks with Mr. Duc?
Have we moved any closer now?

K: Well, I think we - you know, we are engaged in a serious effort with them and I think - but I just don't want to go into any details about it.

G: On the one detail which is in the news, of course, this summit - was
that actually raised?

K: With what business?

G: This report that President Thieu is asking for a summit? Was that really raised?

K: I don't really want to go into discussions of the talks but that's really more of a tactical than a substantive question.

G: Uh-huh. And the Joint Chiefs today, was that just a routing thing or are they now sort of getting their blessing on this thing?

K: Well, no, we discussed the whole situation with them.

G: I take it then from what we said in the past that they have no military objections to this - to the projected plan.

K: That is correct.

G: My feel from talking to you and General Haig this week is that we're really pretty close next week to reconciling our problems with the North Vietnamese.

K: You know, it takes an effort on both sides.

G: Yeh. Yeh.

2

K: But we're certainly doing our damndest to create preconditions for major progress.

G: Yeh.

K: Who's writing Beecher's articles now? You?

G: No, he's writing it. I don't know who his sources are.

K: Listen, Beecher hasn't been in the White House or in the State Department in years.

G: I know, but

K: He couldn't have gotten it in the Pentagon because they don't know enough.

G: I take it he's on the money, I take it.

K: I'm not saying no. I'm just saying I admire the way the _New York Times_ operates.

G: Well, there's no deception there. I mean he just came in with a story.

K: (Laugs)

G: No, seriously.

K: That's fair enough.

G: Seriously between us, is there something way off on that thing that I should know about?

K: No, I don't want to go into that. What I want to say is it's awfully hard to maintain your honor with the North Vietnamese if you have a mutual agreement not to reveal substance.

G: I understand that.

K: And you know that just makes it awfully tough because they have more or less kept their promise.

G: Yeh. Well, it's a terrible business, you know. I remember sitting in one of your classes back at Harvard back in 1960 and thinking it's a long way in the real world. The sentiment is really something. I suppose if you could have a moratorium on daily newspapers. . .

07/19/60
8562107 AM
07:05:58

3

K: We were in a beautiful position as long as we were protected by the general cynicism that nothing was going on and that it was all eyewash.

G: Yeh.

K: Now you have every - I have no complaints basically about the substance of the *New York Times*. You've been very conscientious, but this constant taking of temperatures and everyone looking for did he scowl, did he

G: How do you support - I notice your comment in that interview of Miss Fallacci

K: Well, I wouldn't take anything in that interview seriously. What was said?

G: No, this is about a journalist taking your temperature and you were either too pessimistic or too optimistic.

K: You've made an operatic aria out of that statement.

G: That wasn't a stenographic - I mean allowing for the translations from Italian back to English is it

K: Look, it was done in such bits and pieces and snatches and it is inconceivable to me that I said these things in that context, in that way. I mean after all I've given enough press conferences where you can compare what I've said. I mean it just doesn't sound like me.

G: No, no and the English of course was not your English and I suggested to her - one reason that *Times* hasn't jumped into that interview is that I suggested at the start before they do anything is they seek the English transcript - she said she had a tape recorder so I don't know what the hell she had.

K: Oh yeh.

G: But seriously on Mr. Duc - it's a colorful name - we've been calling him Duc soup around the press room.

K: Here they say - this is the Saigon and not the Peking Duck.

G: Oh gees.

K: It's worse.

ENGLISH

AUTHOR'S F. F. 12. 6. 1966

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

4

G: Is the mood of his boss to reach an agreement with you, is it - I don't know what kind of points he's trying to make here.

K: Well, let's wait a little while.

G: You think something will spill in the wash?

K: Look, our problem is to keep all these various characters in tandem. And that's what we're working on now.

G: Yeh. That's what you said from the start you wanted to do.

K: That's right.

G: Listen I really feel irritated at the way people are picking on the way you said three or four days.

K: Even if I wanted to play a legalistic game I could say if it's done in the same spirit . . . . . several weeks.

G: Well, that's true. Tom Wissing (?) called me up on Monday before he wrote his column and . . . . . I think he agrees nationally but to no avail. And I was saying to him, "You just don't know the answers, Tom.

K: Well, I'll talk to Tom after this is over. I don't see any sense in arguing with him now.

G: No, I agree.

K: But I think it will be seen that I had reasonable grounds for saying what I did. And we aren't all that far off.

G: Yeh. Yeh. Well, you said that you were 90% down the road. Is it like 95% today?

K: Yeh, I would say so.

G: This summit thing, do you think it's going to come about?

K: It is not a top priority thing in itself. It just depends on the whole context of events.

G: You mean more for the long-range future of Vietnam rather than to actually reach an agreement?

TELCOM

U. Alexis Johnson/Kissinger

2:55 p.m. - 11/30/72

K: Hello.

J: Yes, Henry.

K: I wanted to tell you how sorry I was that at that particular moment I called you with my parochial problems and also to emphasize again that I consider you one of the outstanding public servants with whom I've had the privilege of working.

J: Well, thanks Henry.

K: Please don't do anything hasty because I want to keep you in the governmental service. I know the President thinks the world of you. Some day when we can be alone I'll tell you how this whole game of musical chairs wound up with you in that particular position.

J: Yeh. Yeh.

K: And what was caused in part by the reluctance of others to make the vacancies and so that's strictly for you and me.

J: Yeh. Yeh. Yeh. You know I'm relaxed about this.

K: No, but what I want you to know is that considering what's ahead of us in the next four years somebody with your experience and your dedication and loyalty will perform great services. I assure you I've talked to the President about it and I really don't think you should think of retiring.

J: Well, thanks a lot. You know I don't want to be one of these fellows that hangs around.

K: No, that isn't the point. Alex, I've always told you - any government that is making a job for you must.

J: As I've often said, as long as I have my health and a reasonable capacity this is the thing I've grown up with, this is the thing I enjoy doing. As long as people want me around

K: Alex, don't even think of leaving because even if you go out into the field temporarily I know that what's ahead of us, you're going to be needed back here before we are too far into the second term.

DECLASSIFIED

AUTOMATED
B: 10/1/72
D: 10/2/72

2

J: Well -

K: And I certainly don't like to even think of going through crises without being able to pick up the phone and getting you in.

J: You're very kind, Henry.

K: No, I've had an enormous regard for you and this is besides - we'll yell and scream at each other on substance but this is what serious people are bound to do. I want you to know this and I'm going to be down on Saturday with the President and - just really stay loose about it and above all don't think of retiring.

J: All right. Well, thanks very, very much. I can stay loose. When Bill Porter comes in, I want to get out of town right away for about 30 days in fairness to him and it's been four years - it's been longer than that since I've had 30 days off and you know, I'd like to have

K: But look - just think of all the major things that have to be done. Saigon doesn't interest you?

J: Oh, not particularly, no. You know - let me confess I'm a little bit of a coward. You know they tried to kill me three times when I was there previously and that kind of environment

K: No, you've had better - earned better.

J: I did it with the Japanese. I went through that war and I went through this one. I'll do it, you know, if I'm asked to do it.

K: Of course you'll do it.

J: It's that kind of environment, though, where obviously in my present state I'd like to avoid. Now if it's wanted, why sure I'll do it. Of course, I'll do it.

K: Right. Well, I'm just looking for where we really need our best people.

J: I really think - you know we didn't talk previously about it.

K: No, NATO could be very - but the President has frankly talked to one other person.

J: Well, if he's done so, that's that.

3

K: But it may not come off.

J: I just thought that from his standpoint - an administration standpoint - it could have some virtue.

K: Well, let me tell you this, Alex. If that other thing doesn't work out, and I don't really think it will, you will be the next one up.

J: All right. Well, and virtually from his standpoint, I have a certain amount of relationship with

K: And if you think of anything else will you let me know?

J: I sure will. I really haven't thought of anything else. Saigon - I know it's a hard post to fill. If he'd like to have me do it, let me say that's all he has to say. But as to asking me what I would like to do, I just don't know.

K: Can you before Saturday morning think of two or three things you'd like to do?

J: All right.

K: I've got one of them but if you can give me two other choices.

J: All right. All right.

K: I will break my back to bring about one of them, but it won't take much persuasion. It won't take any persuasion. There's nothing against you, believe me.

J: No, no. All right. Well, let me think and I'll talk to you. Are we really having an SRG here now at 3 o'clock?

K: Yeh, but it will be very brief.

J: OK. We just broke up the lunch.

K: It will be very brief.

J: OK, I disposed of both of them in about 10 minutes this morning.

K: Yeh, I hope the whole meeting will be over in 45 minutes.

J: All right. I'm going to get right in the car and come right over.

K: See you then, Alex.

4

J: We had a good lunch and I think Al'll report to you on it. We hit very, very hard at this Congressional problem and that there was no other options open.

K: So did the President.

J: Al said that you did and we felt that was one area that we could get at and we had hit all of us just as hard as we possible could. I think from that standpoint

K: And you know when you listen to these guys you begin to doubt your sanity but it's a goddam good agreement.

J: Of course it is. Of course it is.

K: And all this crap

J: As you know the three of us over here involved think that it is.

K: People say to us there is no legal basis for defending it. That's just crap. There's the DMZ provision; there's the Laos/Cambodia provision; there's the ceasefire and there's the no infiltration.

J: Henry, I think as you know as far as we're concerned over here, we feel exactly the same way.

K: I know but there are certain people

J: Putting personalities completely aside

K: But there are some pretty vicious eager beavers around, really. I mean I just don't know what it serves anyone, but let's not talk about that.

J: No, let's not.

K: Get out of all the crap.

J: It gets my blood pressure back up again.

K: Because it is really - it really doesn't - you know we've got enough experience that the people who put it out are achieving the opposite of what they want.

J: No precisely so. That's why I

5

K: They haven't won one of these yet. And they're not going to

J: Well, we don't want to go into it and you know we just have nothing to gain.

K: No.

J: We just have nothing to gain from it.

K: Look, and I know none of you are involved.

J: And we're the only three that know what the hell's going on.

K: Right. Well, let's keep eager beavers from doing the rest. OK, Alex.
See you soon.

J: I'll get in my car; I'll be over there in a few minutes.

K: Right.

01H15CTVE

TELCONE

David Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

4:55, November 30, 1972

K: Hello.

R: Oh, Henry, Hello.

K: David how are you.

R: I'm fine, I'm out in San Francisco just making a speech.

K: I just wanted to call you as you probably surmised, I have to go to Paris for my next round, so I can't come to the Dartmouth meeting.

R: Well, I obviously understand completely and assumed you probably wouldn't be able to do it when I read it in the paper. Certainly hope it goes well. Do you think you will finish it this time?

K: I hope so.

R: Yes, it must be agonizing for you, I just pity you.

K: Well, we are within reach and now they are engaged in purely semantic exercises.

R: Why do they want to drag it out.

K: Well, it's not they so much, it's our allies in Saigon who are dragging.

R: Oh, really. They are more troublesome than the others. Isn't that awful. Well, I'm sorry, and I certainly wish you luck. I hope that you will still get back in time for our other affair, which is in Washington.

K: On the 11th, I remember it very well.

R: Good, Well if you can it will be great. Our friend seems to be doing quite well.

K: He's doing a great job.

R: I would say. On the other hand Franz Joseph, in Germany I was told last week, he really caused the election to go the way it did.

K: Oh, really, by overplaying it.

R: Yes, and he's so anti-Soviet that people thought they just didn't want to go that way.

TelCon

Amb. Jha/Mr. Kissinger

5:02, November 30, 1972

K: Hello.

J: Hello, Henry!

K: Okay, how are you.

J: Maury Williams asked me for lunch tomorrow, and I wanted to get
what ideas you wish me to talk on the loan.

K: Only in the sense that there should some improvement in our dialog

J: So, I can talk to him very freely, then.

K: Absolutely.

J: Okay. And you will be operating through the proper channels.

K: Oh, yes.

J: Can you see me before you go or are you to busy.

K: I'm very pressed, but let me see what I can do, if not I'll see you as soon as I get back.

J: It was not urgent, I didn't want to press for an appointment. Well, if you can make it, good, if not, I'll understand and wait until you come back.

K: Good, thank you.

J: Okay.

K: Bye

*

TelCon

Mr. Duc/Mr. Kissinger

6:42/November 30, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello.

K: How are you, Mr. Duc.
fine

D: Fine, I'm doing how are you.

K: Have you had a good day? Rough day.

D: A good one.

K: Look, you asked yesterday for a list of the changes we submitted.

D: That's right.

K: I'm sending it over plus the latest version of the document as it now stands.

D: You mean the 69 ones?

K: The one that we gave you in Paris on the 23rd.

D: Uh huh.

K: You want that? You have the latest one don't you?

D: Well, but I'm not absolutely sure.

K: All right, I'll send it over.

D: Very good. Please have it sent over to the Embassy.

K: Yes.

D: I am now at the Embassy.

K: Okay, and I'll see you at 10:30 tomorrow morning.

D: Fine. Would you also send over to me at the same time the list of the 69---

K: Yes, that's what I'm doing.

D: I see, I see.

2

K: Now don't you start counting them and tell me it's only 68.

(Laughter)

D: Perhaps 70!

K: General Haig is responsible for the counting.

D: I see.

K: Haig may have counted syllables rather than changes.

D: It is why he now is going to be in charge of logistics, because he counts so well.

K: (laughter) That's an example of Bonapartism.

D: I look forward to seeing you tomorrow at 10:30.

K: Right, and then we'll get these things into some sort of priority, that's really essential.

D: Very good. When you plan to leave for Florida.

K: Tomorrow night.

D: Uh huh.

K: Are you going to be going back to Paris.

D: At this time, I'm planning to return to Saigon. Saturday.

K: Well that may be better. Because I think it's important. To convey the thinking. How about your Ambassador, is he coming.

D: That I don't know yet. He's not so definite.

K: Okay.

D: When do you plan to leave for Paris yourself.

K: I will leave Sunday morning at 8:30. And you of course understand whichever arrangement you want to make.

D: Uh huh. So around 8:30 from now until 10:30 tomorrow I may receive something from Saigon.

K: It really would be very important that you do.

BRAEFIELD

August 12 1967 - B567 01/05

3

D: Yes, I hope so.

K: I really--it really almost would be essential.

D: Yes. So, if I have to call you for some--

K: I'm at your disposal. The White House will always know how to reach me.

D: That may be the only reason, if I need an adjustment of the time.

K: Oh, look, that's the most important thing we have to do tomorrow.

D: I just mentioned it to you just in case--

K: Of course, I understand. Okay. I'll send this over within the next hour.

D: I appreciate it.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye.

0711557.19

7:02 pm, November 30, 1972

K: Hello.

H: Dr. Kissinger, my name is Charles G. Rebozo, Key Biscayne, 490 Bay Lane.

K: Listen, you, you won't get any of these phone numbers no matter what you say.

H: I hope you're here, because I've got two blondes that are dying, crazy to meet you I should say. Are you in town.

K: No, I'm coming down tomorrow.

H: Oh, that's too bad, they are leaving town tomorrow.

K: I know it. You didn't want to meet Raquel Welch anyway.

H: You wouldn't like those girls, they are both nymps. Harvard professors don't understand what that's all about.

K: No, I appreciate--

H: Wait just a minute, a friend of ours wants to say hello.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, how'd your meeting go after we left. More of the same.

K: About the same. They've sent back for instructions, and I'm meeting them at 10:30. We had a very conciliatory message from the North Vietnamese.

P: Oh, that's what I was concerned about. That's why I called you. Is this a bad time to call, are you with somebody.

K: No, no, I'm fine.

P: Okay. What did they say.

K: Well, they said they would come with great good will and they'd make a great effort, and if we made a great effort--

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

F-01205X 10-30-72 11:00

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
Date: 10 Dec 1969
By: N.W.

2

P: You and I know what we are going to do. Now, with regard to the South Vietnamese, are they going to consult you.

K: That's right.

P: Do you think we went too far in offering the meeting with him?

K: No.

P: The meeting would be great after the deal has been made.

K: No, actually, Mr. President, there's a lot to be said if you meet him before. You give him those assurances. First it will warn Hanoi, that they have to behave themselves, and then--

P: And it also looks like not a U.S. /Hanoi deal, but a U.S. /Saigon deal which I think is very good.

K: No, I think it's a courageous thing when you applied to put yourself on the line, but that's what you've done all along. And I think it will give it the right sort of a setting.

P: You're coming down Friday night, Henry.

K: I'm coming down tomorrow night, yes Mr. President.

P: We are having you in the 340 house, you know, the one with the pool and everything, so you'll like that. And the other thing I was going to say is that--is Dobrynin in town.

K: Yes.

P: I want you to accomplish something. I just had a long talk with Connally. Connally is deeply involved, that is really no mercenary interest, really, but he is handling the gas deal for all these people. A fellow by the name of Pochinaugh, or what's his name, the guy in charge of economics or commercial for the Russians.

K: Alkimov.

P: Not Alkimov. But anyway, I would like for you to call Amb. Dobrynin and tell him that because the U.S. government is involved. Let me tell you what's involved in this gas deal. What is involved is the Federal Power Commission, the Commerce Department, and the White House.

K: Yes, I'm very familiar with it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01 2058
By: MWB, Oct 30 1974

P: And I'd like for you to tell him that the President--well that Secretary Connally is the shmost best man in the private sector will represent our views. That he has my total support and that I would appreciate it if he, Amb. Dobrynin, would see Secretary Connally and discuss it. Would you do that?

K: I'll do it tomorrow--I'll do it the first thing in the morning.

P: And then if you would call Connally and what I want to do basically, Henry, this is a big deal you know, it's $8 Billion, and for us it's life and death, so we are all for it. So if you would set it up with Dobrynin, and I told Connally that I would get you to do it, set it up with Dobrynin that Dobrynin will--Dobrynin would really, well he would separate it, but the most wouldn't. Some would go with enterprise.

K: Right.

P: That the President feels that Connally is the man to represent the private and the governmental sectors and that he has appointed him to do this. Could you do that.

K: Certainly.

P: When that fellow comes, I want you to know and you can tell Dobrynin, when he comes to the U.S., that I personally will see him.

K: Right.

P: This is the--

K: I will look over the project before I call him so that I know exactly what we are talking about. Before I call Dobrynin.

P: Don't worry too much. The project is a good one. It's the one that has to do with development of natural gas from the East and the West and--

K: I know it very well. Because that's what we negotiated last September Mr. President.

P: I know, that's what I told Connally, I said I want this deal set up so that we can announce it at the summit, see.

K: That's right.

P: That's why I want Connally in the deal so we can do a second summit. Don't you agree.

K: Absolutely.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055404
By: MW. Gare

4

P: But if you could tell Dobrynin because--

that

K: No, I just want to find out which of the two groups/are Connally in representing.

P: He's representing both groups.

K: I know, but there are two fields. I'll call Connally and find out.

P: There are two groups, that's right.

K: There's one field in --

P: One field there and one in the other, and there's Tennessee gap and the other, and El Paso and the other--and Hammar, but Connally has contacts withboth. The main thing is that the government has to be in both deals because it involves shipping, it involves the Maritime unions and the rest, and Connally, Henry, is our big guy in this thing, and I want him to be my man in this.

K: All right.

P: I don't want some ass like Clark Clifford. Clifford's in the deal, too.

K: Oh, really.

P: I want to cut him out. So if you would do, first, if you would call Connally, perhaps in the morning.

K: Right.

P: And find out what he wants you to do, and second, call Dobrynin and set up a meeting between Dobrynin and Connally, will you do that.

K: Absolutely. I'll do it tomorrow.

P: It's in our interest to do this; to have it handled, because Connally will handle it in a governmental way, and he wants to put the two groups together. That's what we to do rather than having the Russians play one against the other. Don't you agree?

K: Absolutely. We have to gear the staging of it to our political requirements.

P: I understand that.

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

8:00 p.m. - 11/30/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol

D: Yes

K: How are you?

D: Thank you very much, I'm just drinking coffee.

K: You're drinking coffee!

D: Yes, why not?

K: What's a Russian doing drinking coffee?

D: Well, this is the point, I'm wondering myself, usually I but this, my wife is in New York, you see, so I am at liberty to do what I want.

K: You want some of the phone numbers I have? I would like to do to you what Antonov tried to do to me.
(Laughter)

D: Well I think he was trying to be really polite.

K: Look, I have nothing but the warmest memories.

D: To my knowledge, it was the first time, really, to go that far is rather dangerous position, for the Chief of Security in this case. He goes that far and just wanted the cake and looked and showed it to me and then he brings to you with a girl and one of his assistants. So he really takes skch an interest.

K: Well I really look forward to seeing him again.

D: He's a nice guy, he' really nice.

K: Yes. I talked to the President about our discussion. Now he is reluctant, before I had my conversation tomorrow, to give you exact formulations.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
BY: N.M. 5/20/72

2

D: I understand.

K: And, however, what I told you about our general efforts, it is to
conceive something to give to them. I think for the preamble we
have found a solution which goes -- really the greatest part of the
I don't want, and we have checked with the
lawyers now and we think it's possible.

D: I see. Just to put it down in way--

K: In a way in which the greater part of their concern can be mentioned.
In other words, we mention three, not our three.

D: You mention three more ideas.

K: Position of a revolutionary government, but we don't say of what
country. And then we interpret it to mean something else.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: No, no. I really thing we have found a constructive thought.

D: As for this council you mentioned to me.

K: Well that's not yet fully--because I want to wait for an answer, but
the thinking is along those lines.

D: Maybe you are going to wait until tomorrow.

K: Well, I think it may be safer.

D: Yes, I think maybe better not to confuse them.

K: No, don't confuse them until tomorrow.

D: Until things are more clear it would be much better I think.

K: I think we should wait until tomorrow.

D: Yes, then it would be better.

K: Then I'll let you know tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By: M.W. Patsy Date: 04/30/94

TELECOM

Debryin/Kissinger

8:00 p.m. - 11/30/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol

D: Yes

K: How are you?

K: You're drinking coffee!

D: Yes, why not?

D: To my knowledge, it was the first time, really, to go that far is rather dangerous position, for the Chief of Security in this case. He gets that far and just wanted the cake and looked and showed it to me and then he brings to you with a girl and one of his assistants. So he really takes each an interest.

D: He's a nice guy, he's really nice.

K: Yes. I talked to the President about our discussion. Now he is reluctant, before I had my conversation tomorrow, to give you exact for formulations.

UNCLASSIFIED

Autobiography E012 9/8
BJS 8/10/91

D: I understand.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: No, no. I really think we have found a constructive thought.

K: Well, that's not yet fully--because I want to wait for an answer, but the thinking is along those lines.

CLASSIFIED