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been four leaders in the entire history of the Soviet
Union in over 60 years. Two died in office, the third was
replaced by coup-like procedures, and the fourth is deter-
mined to return to the earlier tradition.

A system in which the average age of the top leadership
is about 70 cannot represent the wave of the future.
Nor has any planned economy ever been able to match the
performance of a market economy. Whether one compares
Czechoslovakia and Austria, East and West Germany, North
and South Korea, market economies have invariably outstripped
socialist models. Stagnation seems inherent in the Soviet
system. The Kremlin's dilemma is that one cannot run a
modern economy with total planning but it may also be
impossible to run the Soviet system without such planning.
Two partly overlapping trends are thus involved. Our
maximum period of danger is in the next five years, while
we restore the military balance and the cycle of local
revolutions is playing itself out. After that, the cer-
tainty is that Soviet domestic problems will mount.

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Thus our opportunity is at the same time our peril.

Soviet reformers and Soviet conservatives may be able to unite on only one set of goals: to secure their international environment before turning to a reevaluation of their domestic system. But it is within our power to close off the avenue of adventurism. As is often the case, the boldest course is the safest; procrastination prolongs and thereby magnifies our danger.

We must close urgently the window of Soviet strategic advantage; and build a world free of the danger of nuclear war, but also free of the danger of nuclear blackmail; a world in which mankind's desire for peace does not become a weapon in the hand of the most ruthless but is allied to the determination of the just; a world of hope and of progress. With all our travail we remain the most fortunate people in the world, in the sense that the solution of our problems depends almost entirely on ourselves.

History will not do our work for us; but history tells us that we can yet help ourselves.

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The Geopolitical Balance

By this I mean the balance of alignments that determine how countries will react to their self-defence, whether moderates friendly to us, or radicals hostile to us, dominate the Third World, especially vital regions like the Persian Gulf. It defines the psychological conditions that determine whether peaceful solutions of problems like the Arab-Israeli dispute or Southern Africa are possible, or whether the radical tide or Communist proxy intervention dooms all prospects of moderation and progress.

The geopolitical balance is measured partly by intangibles--by whether friends of the United States believe they have a secure future, whether they have confidence in our ability to aid them against challenges and deter outside threats to their regional security.

And it depends as well on our ability to perceive trends and dangers before they become overwhelming. A statesman must act on assessments of the future that cannot be proved true when they are made. When the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is

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to be "understood;" they seek to prevail. They can make
concessions only to objective reality, not to moral
imperatives or personal good will. In the jungle that
is the Soviet system, no Soviet leader can justify con-
ciliatory or self-denying policies toward the outside
world except by stressing that such actions benefit
well eventually
prolonged
Soviet
interests.

It is surely within America's capacity to interpose
such incentives and risks, and thereby bring some
measure of stability to the relationship. But this
requires, among other things, consistency and steadiness
in our policy. Erratic shifts in American policy,
whatever their reason--whether from one Administration
to another, or within the term of one Administration,
or from the tug of war between Congress and the
Executive--run the risk of evaporating some of the restraints

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keep in mind that we alone have two times the Gross National Product of the Soviet Union and, with our allies, five times the Gross National Product of the Soviet Union. Why should we militarily禁言except through a lack of will not復合; it is within our capacity & we will do it.

We should remember that the Soviet Union is a system of government that has never managed a legitimate succession. There have only been four leaders in the entire history of the Soviet Union in over 60 years.

Two died in office, the third was replaced by coup-like procedures, and the fourth is determined to return to the earlier tradition.

A system in which the average age of the top leadership is about 70 hardly represents the wave of the future.