7/14/04

FOREWORD FOR HEBREW EDITION OF CRISIS
TO BE PUBLISHED BY SHALEM CENTER
BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

The relationship between America and Israel is without contemporary or historical parallel. Israel, fulfilling a Biblical dream, located at the edge of the Islamic in fervent and surrounded by it, was in part made possible by the diplomatic efforts of a superpower thousands of miles away and with a totally different historical experience. Israel was wrested from an environment that, for most of its history, considered it illegitimate and major parts of which still refuse to recognize it. America never has had a neighbor capable of posing a significant threat, much less a challenge, to its survival. For the greatest part of its history, America could only be threatened by technological and military efforts of a scale incompatible with surprise. Israel's security is threatened by territorial changes that would barely be noticed on the geographical map of America.

Despite these differences in perspective, Israel and the United States have maintained a close security relationship through every administration in Washington of both parties and in Israel, whatever the coalition. But it could not be done without occasional strain. The remarkable aspect of the relationship is not the occasional friction but the ability to distil from it a constructive foreign policy.

For America, security has, above all, a strategic dimension. For Israel, security has as well a psychological aspect. For most states recognition is the sine qua non of diplomacy, inseparable from statehood. For Israel's neighbors, recognition is a prize to be bestowed or withheld as a principal concession.

Inevitably, the future of Israel has been involved in the grand strategy affecting the entire region. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, the dominant geostrategic concern was the Soviet military presence in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Twenty thousand Soviet "advisors" helped man the Egyptian air defense system along the Suez Canal; all of the military hardware of both Egypt and Syria was Soviet. This posed three problems for the American administration: to make concessions in the face of this buildup might invite Soviet military intervention in other parts of the world; it might place a premium on radicalism in the Muslim world; it

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might draw Europe into the region on the radical side. American strategy was therefore: (1) to assist Israel to achieve the military capability to discourage any military attack; (2) to resist any diplomacy based on Soviet military deployment; and (3) to promote negotiations based on American mediation when Israel's neighbors turned to diplomacy.

By October 1973, there had been several diplomatic missions including the Jarring UN mission and an American initiative seeking to promote disengagement along the Suez Canal. There had been a crisis in the summer of 1970 when the Soviets installed missiles along the Suez Canal, the PLO hijacked four airplanes to Jordan, King Hussein moved to expel the PLO from Jordan, Syrian forces invaded Jordan. An American alert and other pressures helped end these adventures.

In the spring of 1973, I had held two exploratory talks with Sadat's national security advisor, Hafez Ismail. They proved inconclusive. Attempts by the Soviet leaders to induce us to endorse the radical Arab program and impose a solution on Israel aborted because we sought a negotiated, not an imposed, outcome and because we thought it important that any negotiated solution reduce and preferably eliminate the Soviet military presence in the region. But we were determined to launch a major diplomatic effort of our own right after the Israeli election, then scheduled for early November 1973.

It was in these circumstances that the Yom Kippur war broke out. It took us, as well as the Israeli leadership, totally by surprise in what was a major failure on the part of both Israeli and American intelligence. We nevertheless attempted from the first to turn it into an opportunity to achieve the objectives we had established in the previous years: (1) to assure the survival and security of Israel; (2) to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the Soviet military presence in the Middle East; (3) to start a diplomacy under American auspices to move towards a settlement; (4) to provide American mediation as a replacement for a Soviet military presence.

These objectives were importantly achieved for the next decade. But the road to them was complicated. Ever since, an intense debate has been raging about the adequacy of America's initial reaction, the degree to which various parts of the American diplomacy were related to each other in devising policy and the role different policymakers played in this effort.

2

Israel was inevitably focused on the problem of resupply.
Washington was not aware of that need on a substantial scale until the
fourth day of the war. Washington, moreover, had to manage
relations with allies panicked as oil prices exploded. Over it all loomed
the Soviet Union, in possession of a vast nuclear arsenal, still allied
with Egypt, supplier of all military equipment to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.
It considered its interests sufficiently large to undertake an airlift of its
own to its clients. The dangers of escalation could therefore never be
far from our minds. And all this occurred while America was
undergoing its perhaps worst domestic crisis since the Civil War.
During the first week of the war, Vice President Agnew resigned;
during the third weekend of the crisis, the so-called "Saturday night
massacre" occurred, which led to President Nixon's impeachment, the
early proceedings of which began while America went on a modified
nuclear alert to counter threatening messages from Moscow.

The writing of history of the present period presents a problem
almost exactly the opposite of the traditional. Previous periods
suffered from the difficulty of finding sources; ours is overwhelmed by
them. The modern bureaucratic process produces so many documents
for so many different purposes that the researcher has the dilemma of
choosing between them.

The Yom Kippur war is an exception. Events were moving so
fast that decisions had to be made under the pressure of events. The
telephone turned from an auxiliary into a prime method of
communication. The transcripts contained in this book contain the
totality of policy discussions on the telephone. They are being
presented here to illustrate the complexity of the issues facing the
American administration and to permit the reader to make his own
judgment.

Message

Theresa Cimino

From: Theresa Cimino [tcimino@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2004 4:19 PM
To: 'hertogrz@bernstein.com'
Cc: 'restivocm@bernstein.com'
Subject: Dr. Kissinger's foreword for Shalem Press edition of CRISIS

Dear Mr. Hertog:

As you requested, attached please find Dr. Kissinger's foreword for the Shalem Press Hebrew
translation of his book, CRISIS.

Please do not hesitate to call our office if I may assist further.

Thank you,
Sincerely,
Theresa L. Cimino
Assistant to Dr. Kissinger
212/759-7919

7/14/2004

AllianceCapital

Alliance Capital
Management Corporation
1345 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10105
Tel: (212) 756-4389

Roger Hertog
Vice Chairman

June 28, 2004

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Henry:

It was good to see you again at the Regency. I know you take great pride, as do I, in seeing Walt Wriston and Norman Podhoretz receive the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

As I mentioned last Wednesday, the Shalem Center – the Jerusalem-based research institute of which I’m currently chairman – is going to publish a Hebrew translation of your book, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises*. Our plans call for the book to be out in the early fall, in ample time for the 31st anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. Publication of a Hebrew edition of your book at this time could do much to lay to rest the claim that you and President Nixon had pressured Israel to make major concessions during the war and to back off militarily. In my view, the book would be immeasurably strengthened if you could provide a short preface (3-4 pages) on your reflections on the War and the U.S.-Israeli alliance over the last three decades. We’re sure that a preface from you would make a book destined to be relevant and popular in Israel even more so.

Here’s our problem: To meet our Yom Kippur publication deadline, we’d need to have your preface in hand by July 15. I much regret the short notice, but the schedule is very demanding; I hope you can help us.

On a separate matter, we wonder if you would be interested in coming to Israel and delivering the keynote speech at the book's official launch. The event is planned for the fall, and if you honored us by speaking, we'd set the date based on your convenience. Tremendous interest in the Hebrew translation has already been sparked. *Yediot Aharonot*, the daily newspaper with by far the widest readership in Israel, has asked to publish an excerpt in its Yom Kippur edition. Further, plans are afoot for interviews on many major national news programs leading up to Yom

JUN 29 2004

1044 words

7/14/04

# FOREWORD FOR HEBREW EDITION OF CRISIS
## TO BE PUBLISHED BY SHALEM CENTER

[Y]

[x]

administrations, the dominant geostrategic concern was the Soviet
military presence in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Twenty
thousand Soviet "advisors" helped man the Egyptian air defense
system along the Suez Canal; all of the military hardware of both
Egypt and Syria was Soviet. This posed three problems for the
American administration: to make concessions in the face of this
buildup might invite Soviet military intervention in other parts of the
world; it might place a premium on radicalism in the Muslim world; it
might draw Europe into the region on the radical side. American
strategy was therefore: (1) to assist Israel to achieve the military
capability to discourage any military attack; (2) to resist any
diplomacy based on Soviet military deployment; and (3) to promote
negotiations based on American mediation when Israel's neighbors
turned to diplomacy.

3

M

4

5

6

[Y]

7

1002 words

7/12/04

Israel's security is threatened by territorial changes that would barely be noticed on the geographical map of America. America, for the

[Y]

greatest part of its history could only be threatened by technological
and military efforts of a scale incompatible with surprise.

For America, security has, above all, a strategic dimension. For
Israel, the strategic dimension is more immediate and more easily
overturned. But security has as well a psychological aspect. For most
states recognition is the sine qua non of diplomacy, inseparable from
statehood. For Israel's neighbors, recognition is a prize to be
bestowed or withheld as a principal concession.

2

buildup might invite Soviet military intervention throughout the region

American strategy was therefore two-pronged: (1) to assist Israel to

achieve the military capability to discourage any military attack, and

(2) to unit any diplomatically based on Soviet military deployment

sides to promote a peaceful outcome.

3

promote disengagement along the Suez Canal. There had been a
crisis in the summer of 1970 when the Soviets installed missiles along
the Suez Canal, the PLO hijacked four airplanes to Jordan, King
Hussein moved to expel the PLO from his territory and Syrian forces
invaded Egypt. In the spring of 1973, I had held two exploratory talks
with Sadat's national security advisor, Hafez Ismail. They proved
inconclusive. Attempts by the Soviet leaders to induce us to endorse
the Arab program and impose a solution on Israel aborted because we
sought a negotiated, not an imposed, outcome and because we
thought it important that any negotiated solution reduce and
preferably eliminate the Soviet military presence in the region. But we
were determined to launch a major diplomatic effort of our own right
after the Israeli election, then scheduled for early November 1973.

what was a major intelligence failure. We nevertheless attempted
from the first to turn it into an opportunity to achieve the objectives
we had established in the previous years: (1) to assure the survival
and security of Israel; (2) to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the
Soviet military presence in the Middle East; (3) to start a diplomacy
under American auspices to move towards a settlement; (4) to provide
American mediation as a replacement for a Soviet military presence.

degree to which various elements were related to each other in

Y

6

1002 words

7/12/04

The relationship between America and Israel is without
contemporary or historical parallel. Israel, fulfilling a Biblical dream,
located at the edge of the Islamic in fervent and surrounded by it, was
in part made possible by the diplomatic efforts of a superpower
thousands of miles away and with a totally different historical
experience. Israel was wrested from an environment that, for most of
its history, considered it illegitimate and major parts of which still
refuse to recognize it. America never has had a neighbor capable of
posing a significant threat, much less a challenge, to its survival.
Israel's security is threatened by territorial changes that would barely
be noticed on the geographical map of America. America, for the

CTI

greatest part of its history, could only be threatened by technological
and military efforts of a scale incompatible with surprise.

For America, security has, above all, a strategic dimension. For
Israel, the strategic dimension is more immediate and more easily
overturned. But security has as well a psychological aspect. For most
states recognition is the *sine qua non* of diplomacy, inseparable from
statehood. For Israel's neighbors, recognition is a prize to be
bestowed or withheld as a principal concession.

2

Inevitably, the future of Israel has been involved in the grand strategy affecting the entire region. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, the dominant geostrategic concern was the Soviet military presence in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Twenty thousand Soviet "advisors" helped man the Egyptian air defense system along the Suez Canal; all of the military hardware of both Egypt and Syria was Soviet. This posed three problems for American administration: to make concessions buildup might invite Soviet military intervention. American strategy was therefore two-pronged: achieve the military capability to discourage any military attack, and (2) when Israel's neighbors turned to diplomacy to work with both sides, to promote a peaceful outcome.

> You wrote "Two problems..." in draft but only cite one?

M

Inevitably, the future of Israel has been involved in the grand strategy affecting the entire region. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, the dominant geostrategic concern was the Soviet military presence in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Twenty thousand Soviet "advisors" helped man the Egyptian air defense system along the Suez Canal; all of the military hardware of both Egypt and Syria was Soviet. This posed a threat to American administration: to make concessions, buildup might invite Soviet military intervention. American strategy was therefore two-pronged: achieve the military capability to discourage any military attack, and (2) when Israel's neighbors turned to diplomacy to work with both sides, to promote a peaceful outcome.

3

M

Inevitably, the future of Israel has been involved in the grand strategy affecting the entire region. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, the dominant geostrategic concern was the Soviet military presence in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Twenty thousand Soviet "advisors" helped man the Egyptian air defense system along the Suez Canal; all of the military hardware of both Egypt and Syria was Soviet. This posed three problems for the American administration: to make concessions in the face of this buildup might invite Soviet military intervention throughout the region.

American strategy was therefore two-pronged: (1) to assist Israel to achieve the military capability to discourage any military attack, and (2) when Israel's neighbors turned to diplomacy to work with both sides, to promote a peaceful outcome.

3

4

These objectives were importantly achieved for the next decade.
But the road to them was complicated. Ever since, an intense debate
has been raging about the adequacy of America's initial reaction, the
degree to which various elements were related to each other in
devising policy and the role different policymakers played in this effort.

5

M

6

M

7