HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38
MASSACHUSETTS

November 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Kissinger

From: Alex Inkesle

Dear Henry:

Thank you for giving me the chance to see your notes on the
<u>Stowe</u> Conference. I have often encountered the anxiety about upsetting
the Russians which you here attribute to the American scientists--and
have regarded it as mistaken and also ineffective. The Russians
really more appreciate plain talking--so long as it is not unmistakably
aggressive or vituperative. You are also correct in making the
contrast between the high cohesion of the Soviet group and the relatively
uncoordinated quality of the American delegation. But here I think
you underestimate the effect which such obvious individual freedom of
action has in upsetting the Soviet image of how controlled Americans
and American society are--this latter being largely a projection of
Soviet experience onto our society. In addition, I think one must
acknowledge that the Soviet monolithic unity is much more evident in public
than in more intimate private conversation; oddly enough, the American
pattern may be precisely the reverse.

Despite agreeing with your astute observation on these and other
points, I think your memorandum misses one of the main points of these
and related Soviet activities. I feel it tragic that the Administration
also misses this point. We confuse the Soviet style of doing something
with their objective. Because their method is devious, full of outright
duplicity, follows the pattern of making a threat in order to later
seem reasonable and withdraw, etc., and because we feel from our cultural
perspective that these qualities are dastardly, we fall into the error
of assuming the object in whose service these qualities are employed
must also and automatically be reprehensible too. I do not think this
is the case. At least not so far as one objective is concerned. The
Russians, in my estimation, are looking for some basis for a detente. The
conversations they encourage have this underlying purpose--along with many
others, of course, such as splitting the Western Alliance, disarming the
U.S., etc., etc. The difficulty is that we are either unable or unwilling
to recognize this because the basis of the arrangement they seek is so
unacceptable to us. We insist the Soviets accept the non-Communist status
quo of all territories in the world for the now foreseeable future.
This they will never accept. And it would be historically, as well as

-2-

politically, ridiculous that they should. We arbitrarily assume that
all territory which is not now Communist is lost to us if it becomes
so. They see all such territory as uncommitted, "in the pot" and
see no reason why at least half should not end up as their "winnings"
and the other half ours. I believe they would go very far in working
out programs of arms reduction and other forms of security against
major wars if they could be assured we would play the game on those
terms. The game would consist in seeing who got what share of the pot
by what strategy. We might win all, but so might they! They are ready
to gamble on such a game. Are we?

In other words, I think the Russians mean it when they talk about
economic and political competition. Of course, they include in the word
"political" a certain amount of revolutionary activity and also,
perhaps, guerrilla war. Again, it is not at all clear that we are
prepared to accept that definition, particularly since it is a game
we seem to play so poorly. In other words, I believe that if we were ready
to accept ground rules which limited our conflict to economic, political,
and guerrilla activity--limited by agreement to certain areas of the
world and even to certain countries--they would be ready to give
guarantees against escalation which were supported by rather firm arms
control agreements.

The Russian idea expressed at the Conference, that conflict,
tension, and competition are inherent in nature, is not in my opinion
a bizarre, stupid, or merely doctrinaire point. I frankly think it a
sensible, indeed accurate, description of social and especially
political life. We are an immature (and in that sense dangerous) power
so long as we fail to recognize this point. Because to reject the
point is to believe in final solutions. Today the only final solution
is total destruction. Recognizing this point will not bring peace,
comfort, and quiet to all men. On the contrary, it commits us to an
unending struggle, but in many ways of a different nature than that we
have mounted in the past. Failure to recognize it means more and
more Cuban crises--and some day the damn things will go off.

If you care to, I would like to discuss these issues with you
some time.

September 16, 1961

Eighth Conference on Science
and World Affairs

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

The Eighth Conference on Science and World Affairs was held at Stowe, Vermont, from September 11 to September 16, 1961; its general subject was Disarmament and World Security.

It is gratifying that in such troubled times it proved possible for forty-eight scientists from eleven countries to meet in a friendly atmosphere and to examine together carefully the dangers which face the people of the world.

During the previous week the Seventh Conference, devoted to International Cooperation in Science, had outlined many important areas where cooperative action would be scientifically productive as well as effective in improving international understanding. In this Eighth Conference, a wide range of topics was discussed in plenary session, in separate working groups, and in private conversation.

The subjects of study which related in one way or another to the problems of attaining stable peace, world security, and general and complete disarmament included:

- Cessation of production of fissile materials for military use and destruction of military nuclear stockpiles.

- Elimination and control of means for weapons delivery

- Demilitarization of outer space

- Interdependence of international political settlements and disarmament

-2-

- Nuclear weapons tests

- Military disengagement, and creation of demilitarized and
  atom-free zones

- International security forces

- Methods of settlement of international disputes

- Rules of peaceful coexistence

- Organization of control and inspection over disarmament

- Conditions for creating trust and confidence among nations

A variety of individual views was expressed. These were often
quite divergent, but were explored in a frank manner. The participants
found the discussions helpful in clarifying points of view, and
common understanding was reached on a number of important issues.
We hope this will open important avenues for constructive action.

The participants of the Conference are united in the realization
of the danger of unleashing a nuclear war, which would cause untold
destruction and bring death to innumerable people. We hope that the
desire for peace and the revulsion against war, which are shared by
all peoples, will make possible a peaceful resolution of the conflicts
which have led to the present deterioration of the international
situation, and make possible the attainment of complete and universal
disarmament, and the establishment of stable peace on earth.

In the present crisis we reaffirm our belief in the general
principles enunciated in the Vienna Declaration of September, 1958.

This meeting kept open a much needed informal channel of communi-
cation among scientists concerned with the future of civilization.

-3-

For this reason it is hoped that similar conferences will be convened by the Continuing Committee at suitable intervals in the future. In addition, plans have been made to form continuing unofficial East-West study groups in order to devote more detailed attention to problems of the nature of those considered at the present Conference.

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Mark Oliphant - Australia

Professor G. Nadjakov - Bulgaria

Professor J. Polanyi - Canada

Professor G. Burkhardt - Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. Francis Perrin - France

Mr. Pierre Rosenstiehl - France

Professor P. M. S. Blackett - Great Britain

Sir Edward Bullard - Great Britain

Sir John Cockcroft - Great Britain

Mr. Michael Howard - Great Britain

Lt. Honorable Philip Noel-Baker - Great Britain

Sir William Penney - Great Britain

Professor J. Rotblat - Great Britain

Professor F. B. Straub - Hungary

Professor Toshiyuki Toyoda - Japan

Professor B. V. A. Röling - Netherlands

Mr. N. I. Bazanov - Soviet Union

Academician A. A. Blagonravov - Soviet Union

Academician N. N. Bogolubov - Soviet Union

Academician M. M. Dubinin - Soviet Union

Professor V. M. Khvostov - Soviet Union

Mr. S. G. T. Korneev - Soviet Union

Mr. V. P. Pavlichenko - Soviet Union

Academician N. M. Sissakian - Soviet Union

Professor N. A. Talensky - Soviet Union

Academician I. E. Tamm - Soviet Union

Academician A. V. Topchiev - Soviet Union

Professor Hans Bethe - United States

Professor R. R. Bowie - United States

Dr. Donald Brennan - United States

Professor Harrison Brown - United States

Professor Paul Doty - United States

Professor B. T. Feld - United States

Mr. Trevor Gardner - United States

Professor Bentley Glass - United States

Mr. Amrom Katz - United States

Professor Henry Kissinger - United States

Professor George Kistiakowsky - United States

Professor Charles Lauritsen - United States

Professor Leon Lipson - United States

Professor W. Panofsky - United States

Professor E. M. Purcell - United States

Professor I. Rabi - United States

Professor Eugene Rabinowitch - United States

Professor Matthew Sands - United States

Professor Louis B. Sohn - United States

Professor Leo Szilard - United States

Professor Charles Townes - United States

The National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences were hosts to this as well as the preceding Conference. Both Conferences were organized by the United States Organizational Committee under the aegis of the International Continuing Committee of these Conferences.

The following did not join in the resolution:

Professor R.R. Bowie
Dr. Donald Brennan
Mr. Amrom Katz
Professor Henry Kissinger
Professor Leon Lipson

The following were absent during the discussion of the statement:

Sir John Cockcroft
Mr. Trevor Gardner
Professor Charles Lauritsen
Professor I. Rabi

SUGGESTED CONFERENCE COMMUNICUE

(Second Draft)

The Eighth Conference on Science and World Affairs was held at Stowe, Vermont, from September 11 to September 16, 1961, on the general subject of disarmament and world security. Participants included forty-nine scientists and scholars from the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and seven other countries. [It is the custom of the Conferences not to publish any statement on which there is not substantially unanimous agreement.] A wide range of specific topics was discussed, including nuclear production and stockpiles, nuclear testing, delivery systems, selected next steps in arms reduction, problems of general and complete disarmament, and preconditions to possible success at negotiations. Many individual views, which were often quite divergent, were explored in a frank manner. Most of the participants found the discussions helpful in clarifying points of view, and in suggesting possible avenues for further action. It was hoped that the group would continue to meet at suitable intervals in the future.

(This statement has been evolved in discussions with most of the American participants, but has no official status. D. G. Brennan)

2nd Draft of Preamble for Conference Statement, September 14, 1961

The Conference on Disarmament and World Security which has taken place in Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A. from September 11 to Sept. 16, 1961, was attended by 43 scientists from 11 countries. Their names are given in the attached list. Problems related to disarmament and world security were discussed at the Conference in a spirit of friendship and frankness, and guided by a desire for mutual understanding.

We discussed many problems related to the path by which general and comprehensive disarmament could be achieved. Such disarmament, which we believe to be necessary to achieve stable peace among nations, is a common aim of all peoples and has been unanimously endorsed by all states members of the United Nations.

We have reached agreements on a number of important questions relating to the quest for peace and security of nations; these proposals are listed below. Disagreements have arisen on some matters related to the present deterioration of the world situation and the estimation of the causes of this deterioration. Despite these disagreements, and in the face of growing danger of nuclear war, we reaffirm our belief in the principles expressed in the charter of our movement - the Vienna Declaration of September 1958.

All participants of our Conference are united in the realization of the danger of unleashing a nuclear war, which would cause untold destruction and bring death to innumerable people. We consider it, therefore, imperative that our governments should initiate at once measures which would make possible a rapid opening of negotiations on the now controversial issues.

2nd draft Preamble/2

These negotiations should aim at the conclusion of an agreement that could lead to complete and general disarmament and the creation of stable peace. We hope that the desire for peace and the revulsion against war, which are shared by all peoples, will make possible a peaceful resolution of the conflicts which have led to the present deterioration of the international situation.

In our Conference we have touched upon many important problems and have reached agreement on a number of proposals aimed at positive and constructive measures for the stabilization of peace.

Before enumerating them, we would like to refer to the recommendations made a week ago in our Conference on International Cooperation in Science, which we consider of prime importance for the achievement of our aims. The following proposals have emerged from our present Conference on Disarmament and World Security.

DRAFT STATEMENT

September 15, 1961

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U. S. A.

It is gratifying that in such troubled times it proved possible for
fortyeight scientists from eleven countries to meet in a (friendly) atomsphere
and to examine together carefully the dangers which face the people of the
world.

The subjects of study related in different ways to the problem of
attaining complete and general disarmament included:

- Cessation of production of fissile materials and destruction of such materials (stockpiled for military use).

- Nuclear weapons tests

- International security forces.

- Methods of settlements of international disputes

- Rules of peaceful coexistence.

DRAFT STATEMENT/2

The participants of the Conference are united in the realization of the danger of unleashing a nuclear war, which would cause untold destruction and bring death to innumerable people. We consider it, therefore, imperative that our governments should initiate sincere and purposeful negotiations aiming at the conclusion of agreements that could lead to complete and general disarmament, and to the creation of stable peace. We hope that the desire for peace and the revulsion against war, which are shared by all peoples, will make possible a peaceful resolution of the conflicts which have led to the present deterioration of the international situation.

In the face of this crisis we reaffirm our belief in the principles enunciated in the Vienna Declaration on September, 1958, which is the Charter of our movement.

This meeting kept open a much needed informal channel of communication among scientists concerned with the future of civilization. For this reason it is hoped that similar conferences will be convened by the Continuing Committee at suitable intervals in the future. In addition, plans have been made to form continuing unofficial East-West study groups in order to devote more detailed attention to problems of the nature of those considered at the present Conference.

DRAFT STATEMENT/3

PARTICIPANTS

Sir Marcus Oliphant - Australia

Professor J. Polanyi - Canada

Dr. Francis Perrin - France

Dr. Pierre Rosenstiehl - France

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker - Great Britain

Professor Donald Brennan - United States

Dr. Amrom Katz - United States

DRAFT STATEMENT/4

The National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences were hosts to this as well as the preceding Conference.
Both Conferences were organized by the United States organizational
Committee under the aegis of the International Continuing Committee of
these Conferences.

these Conferences.

Committee under the aegis of the International Committee of
Both Conferences were organised by the United States Organizational
and Sciences were hosts to this as well as the preceding Conferences.

DRAFT STATEMENT 4

Report - September 15, 1961

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP 1 ON NUCLEAR PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILES

Working Group 1 had a successful meeting in a very cooperative spirit. Nearly complete agreement was reached.

The group agreed to discuss the reduction or elimination of nuclear production and stockpiles within the framework of a general and complete disarmament agreement. It should form part of such an agreement and should fit into definite stages of the approach to complete disarmament. In particular the reduction of existing stockpiles must go hand-in-hand with the reduction of the means of delivery of weapons.

The problem of the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons is very specific in the respect that fissionable materials used in these weapons are also to a large extent used for peaceful purposes and moreover are produced in the process of normal operation of atomic power plants. Therefore, much attention was paid to the problem how to achieve reliable disarmament in this particular field and at the same time to retain peaceful atomic industry. The problems relating to cut-off of production and to the elimination of stockpiles were considered separately.

A. Cut-off of Production

The elimination of further production of fissile material for weapons is a far easier problem, and should take effect earlier than the reduction of stockpiles. There was agreement that it would be best to discontinue completely the production of highly enriched U-235. This would not seriously affect the ability of the United States or the Soviet Union to make nuclear weapons, because of the large existing stockpiles of this material. (The U.S. stockpile has been estimated unofficially¹ as 300-350 metric tons.) In fact, the nuclear powers could take fissile material out of obsolete weapons and fabricate it into more modern ones. However, a production cut-off would clearly by itself slow down the arms race and be followed by the elimination of stockpiles in the framework of general and complete disarmament.

The demand for fissile material for nuclear power and other peaceful purposes in the next decade or two will be only a small fraction of existing stockpiles. Moreover, there was consensus that material of low enrichment is quite adequate for most nuclear reactors, 3-5 percent being sufficient in very many cases and 20 percent in nearly all. 20 percent material is of little direct military value. It was realized that enrichment from 20 percent to over 90 percent, i.e., to military grade, is possible with much smaller isotope separation plants than enrichment from natural uranium (0.7 percent) to 90 percent. However, the group agreed that 20 percent material is considerably safer against diversion to military uses than 90 percent. It might therefore be considerably safer to produce only 20 percent enriched material. However, the group recommends that the cut-off production of U-235 should be effective immediately, should be complete, and should stay in effect for the next decade or so.

¹Kalkstein, M. and Smith, W., "An Estimate of the Nuclear Stockpiles from Unclassified Sources," ARMS REDUCTION PROGRAM & ISSUES, edited by David H. Frisch, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, pp. 91-97.

Report Working Group 1

September 15, 1961

2

Plutonium presents a more difficult problem since it is produced in the normal operation of most reactors. A cut-off of plutonium production would mean an end of the nuclear power industry, and the group therefore recommends against such a measure. Instead, the group recommends strict control over plutonium production. The critical link in this production is the chemical extraction of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel elements, and the group agreed that in view of the special danger of diversion of this material to military purposes, this extraction of plutonium should be done under international management. The (rather few and large) existing plants for plutonium extraction should be used and operated with about 90 per cent of the staff, especially the managerial and analytical staff, being international. Nuclear power stations would continue to be nationally managed and operated but at least in the larger stations, a few per cent of the personnel would be international inspectors guarding against diversions of material both before and after irradiation. Transportation of irradiated fuel elements would best be done by the international management.

The question of denaturing of plutonium by admixture of Pu-240 was discussed. It was pointed out that this is not an effective measure against military use by a sophisticated nuclear power but might be of some effect in the case of new nuclear powers. Such admixture is therefore recommended for plutonium delivered under control for civilian use.

As already pointed out, a production cut-off without reduction and ultimate elimination of stockpiles will not decrease the nuclear weapons potential of the present nuclear powers. It would make it impossible for a new nation to build up its weapons stockpile, and if strictly adhered to, would make it impossible for additional powers to build nuclear weapons by their own efforts. A very important benefit would be that experience would be gained with a control system which would be largely applicable in the later stage of stockpile reduction.

Cheating on the agreement would be of very little benefit to the nuclear powers. Diversion of material from power reactors would be very difficult especially with the international inspection described above. It is unlikely that diffusion plants or major reactors could be concealed. Light aerial inspection will be necessary at some stage to discover possible clandestine plants but their large size and power requirements (or production) should make this rather easy. Centrifuge plants for separating uranium are reported to be smaller and therefore might be harder to detect. However, their production would be correspondingly small, and would be of no appreciable value to the nuclear powers in comparison with their present stockpiles. This might change when the stockpiles are appreciably reduced but at this time also the controls will be tightened.

A possibly more effective way to "cheat" for the nuclear powers might be to transfer some of their stockpiles to some ally before stockpile reduction takes effect but there are obvious elements of danger in such a procedure.

P.3

Small production units--centrifuge separators, or productive reactors plus chemical extraction of plutonium--might be of greater usefulness to some of the powers which at present do not have nuclear materials or weapons. Such action might cause considerable local distrubance but would not constitute a danger to world peace during the transitional period when the present nuclear powers retain an appreciable fraction of their present stockpile and are agreed to act against a smaller power breaking the cut-off convention. In the ultimate stage of complete disarmament it is assumed that inspection will be efficient enough to insure against even small clandestine production units.

The group believes that it would not be practicable to control the production of fusionable materials. Heavy water is produced in large amounts for reactors and other civilian uses, amounts much larger than those in fusion weapons. Lithium-6 is not of much use outside of weapons although Lithium-7 might be (as a coolant for high-temperature reactors). Lithium separation requires special plants but these are much smaller and simpler than those for uranium separation, and hence much harder to control. The only exception among fusionable materials is tritium for whose production reactors are required; its production can be cut off as easily as that of uranium 235, and this would have the consequence of an automatic reduction of the stockpile because of the small half-life (12 years) of tritium.

The group agreed that the cut-off of production for military purposes, when agreed on, should be considered to be permanent, with a view towards ultimate complete disarmament, rather than limited to five or ten years.

## B. Stockpile Reduction

1. Much attention was paid to the question how accurately can past production of U-235 and Pu-239 be estimated in order to determine the possible size of existing stockpiles of these fissionable materials. In the opinion of the group a conservative and even perhaps a pessimistic estimate of the precision of such a determination of the size of past production would be of the order of 20 percent, under the assumption, that there would be (1) free inspection of relevant plans, (2) free access to the records of production and delivery, and (3) interrogation of the personnel of the plants. Such a degree of precision can be achieved even if there were attempts to forge the records.

It was suggested, that in order to minimize the possibility of such a forgery all records of production and delivery of fissionable materials for the past should at the earliest possible date be deposited in each of the countries concerned in a depository guarded by an international guard, with the understanding that (1) the records remain secret up to the time when the reduction of stockpiles would be affected and (2) that up to this time no records deposited could be withdrawn.

2. The reduction in the stockpiles will be a very important step in the process of general disarmament. In the opinion of the group the stockpiles could, in a first stage, be reduced to about 20 percent of their present size, either in a single step or in two. In the latter case, the first step might reduce their size to about 50 percent, and they might be held at this level for about a year or two, while the control system is being put into effect and its efficacy is being tested. The particular figure of 20 percent for the remaining stockpiles was chosen

4

to be equal to the above estimate of the maximum amount which might possibly be concealed by some country from the international inspection system. Even if such concealment were to be attempted, this would at most give a two-fold advantage in stockpile to the violator, and the group felt that such an advantage would not be sufficient for a country to initiate a nuclear war. In the opinion of the group a reduction of stockpiles by a percentage less than about 50 per cent would be rather meaningless whereas a reduction of the order of 50 per cent will be of very great importance, and a reduction of about 80 per cent would constitute a tremendous change especially if coupled with the reduction of delivery systems.

The group discussed whether in this stage of disarmament the stockpiles of each country should be reduced to the same percentage of their present size (which gives an advantage to the country possessing the larger initial stockpile) or whether the stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union should be reduced to the same absolute size. It was agreed that when the level of about 20 per cent is reached the absolute amount of fissile material should be equal on both sides, on the basis of the argument that a corresponding absolute equality is also attempted in existing plans on the reduction of conventional forces. In a first step of reduction to 50 per cent (if such a step is taken) both possibilities (reduction to the same percentage or to the same absolute amount) should be further considered.

At later stages of disarmament when controls have been found to work satisfactorily, further substantial reductions in military stockpiles should be made, and ultimately complete elimination should be achieved.

3. It was the opinion of the group that there is no valid justification for the destruction of the eliminated fissionable materials and that these materials should be transferred to peaceful uses (e.g., breeding reactors, fast atomic reactors, etc.) under a strict international control. Besides the existing stockpiles of U-235 should be mingled with U-238 so as to be converted into uranium containing up to 25 per cent of U-235. Uranium with such a content of U-235 will be appropriate for utilization in reactors, but could be used for military purposes only after being subjected to a complicated process of enrichment.

Only a small part of the existing amount of U-235 (of the order of one or several per cent) should be conserved intact for some special peaceful purposes. Any stockpile of such a kind in any country derived from the breakdown of weapon stockpiles should be available to other countries for peaceful uses and should be under strict international control.

4. As to the fissionable materials (lithium, deuterium) it would be of use to ascertain the past production only of the Li-6 and not for deuterium by the methods outlined above for fissionable materials (inspection of plants, records, etc.). But for the reasons discussed above the estimates of production of Li-6 are likely to be less reliable than those for fissile materials. However, although different projects for the realization of fission-free atomic weapons are under consideration and research in this direction is being conducted, it was felt that at present fissionable materials, the production of which can be ascertained more accurately, are indispensible for nuclear weapons.

Preliminary Report of Group 2

September 13, 1961

Chairman: Prof. George Kistiakowsky

Rapporteur: Amrom H. Katz

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

DELIVERY SYSTEMS

It was clear at the outset that Group 1 had an easier assignment than
did Group 2, because the subject of Group 1 was more purely a scientific/technical
problem. Group 2 reached far less agreement than did Group 1.

Our report will attempt to convey the tone and content of the subjects
discussed, as fairly as is possible. The outline with which we started was a
point of departure.

We clarified the notion of a "list of delivery systems" which would be
furnished at the start of a disarmament agreement to include rockets, bombers,
submarines, surface ships capable of delivering mass destruction weapons,
and, further, agreed that such a listing, to be significant, must include
quality, type, and location.

Keeping within the context of General and Complete Disarmament, as the
purpose of disarmament, so as to get to certain important operational details,
we also considered the following points:

(1) Nuclear weapons are most dangerous to mankind.

(2) But they are dangerous only when combined with delivery systems.

(3) And we consider the latter to include bases as well as devices.

We explored in fullest detail the problem of verifying the completeness
of the list of weapons and delivery vehicles, bases, and related support systems.
Precisely at this point we attained and maintained an impasse.

The Soviet position is that inspection must be confined to disarmament, e.g., to observing the destruction of armaments. The Western questions about knowing about the weapons not destroyed was answered by references to trust and confidence. This fundamental dilemma, this non-agreement, persisted, and except for a brief but important discussion, late in the day, concerning an adaptation of a zonal inspection system to the verification problem, the impasse was unresolved. It would be a d sservice to the participants in this group, and to the members of the larger meeting, to report otherwise, or to minimize this point.

Elementary and schematic examples of the working of such a system were made. For example, it was suggested at the end of destruction of x missiles in the Soviet Union and y missiles in the West, neither government would be able to determine whether its security was increased or decreased, or whether stability is increased or decreased unless it know how many weapons and delivery systems remained. This point was repeated and elaborated, and if there was no agreement on a plan at least all agreed that each other's arguments were well understood and appreciated.

The Brown-Katz paper was discussed briefly. An objection to this approach
was that it apparently called for an increase in arms. This was answered as

Working Group 2
Delivery Systems

not really being necessary, because the deterrent forces of phase I of this
plan could be composed of existing stocks of various weapons. In any event,
the total to be used in the example of submarines was between 100 and 1000 MT,
which is quite small by comparison with new announced bombs, and especially so
when compared to existing stocks.

It was later suggested, and agreed, that the first step must be prepared
in more detail than subsequent steps, and that it is important to get started.

FINAL REPORT

WORKING GROUP 3

September 15, 1961

EIGHTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE
and WORLD AFFAIRS

September 11 - 16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, USA

## SELECTED NEXT STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTION

The Morning discussion on September 14 was devoted to the study of the first step of a disarmament plan as part of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament. The group had before them the detailed proposals of the USA and the USSR to the Committee of Ten in June 1960 and noted their marked differences in approach. A long discussion took place on possible ways in which a substantial degree of disarmament and increased security could be achieved while maintaining a strategic balance between the two blocs. The essential problem has long been recognized as that of finding a suitable phasing of the various steps in disarmament, inspection, and control. Following the argument at the Moscow Conference it was held that the degree and completeness of the inspection system should increase as the disarmament proceeds.

Clearly there are many possible solutions, and several were discussed. However, out of the discussion emerged one which seemed worthy of further detailed consideration. So a small committee of the group prepared a draft statement for submission to the afternoon meeting which was held in conjunction with Group 4. At the plenary session on September 15, various alterations were suggested and the following final draft incorporating many of their suggestions has been agreed by the group.

## GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. We have considered the first steps in a disarmament agreement in the framework of general and complete disarmament.

2. The first stage in such an agreement must involve arms reduction measures large enough to lead to a radical diminution of the chances of a nuclear war.

3. At all times during the stages of such an agreement, all parties must be convinced that the strategic balance is not upset.

4. The reduction of armaments must at all times be accompanied by sufficient effective controls to assure both sides against violation of the agreement.

5. The achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the attainment of a substantial first-stage of disarmament would contribute very substantially to the solution of outstanding political problems.

page 2 Working Group 3

6. We urge that further detailed studies of a first stage, the outline of which is given below, are urgently needed and we strongly endorse the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international study group.

## SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

In accordance with these principles the agreement on general and complete disarmament should include in the first step:

1. Limitations on conventional forces according to a formula similar to those suggested by both sides, in previous proposals. No transfer of nuclear weapons or technical information from the present nuclear powers to any other power.

2. A complete published inventory of military manpower, weapons, delivery systems, means of production of weapons and weapons materials, to be submitted by both sides to an international control commission at the beginning of the agreement.

3. Rapid reduction of stockpiles of delivery systems and weapons materials by a substantial percentage of the declared inventory and the diversion to peaceful uses of a substantial percentage of fissile materials to be verified by the international control commission.

4. The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and of further production of weapons material and delivery systems with the institution of the required staged controls as outlined in the reports of other working groups, such as inspection at declared production plants.

5. Upon the completion of the above measures, the institution of a system of inspection using suitable forms of sampling designed to verify the temporarily remaining declared armaments, including delivery systems and stockpiles, and to monitor the test ban. From this point on, the completeness of inspection would bear a direct relation to the degree of reduction achieved. Simultaneous with the institution of this inspection, a continued reduction of delivery systems and stockpiles to agreed levels consistent with strategic requirements of both sides for a minimum deterrent force.

This phase of the disarmament process should imply a further commitment to proceed to complete inspection simultaneous with final reduction of delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles to the lowest verifiable levels.

VIII-WG-4-1

Eighth International Conference
on Science and World Affairs

September 11-13, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

FINAL REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 4 ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

September 14, 1961

We here reached an agreement on the following points:

In discussing the problems of a disarmed world, we agreed that none of them will be as dangerous as the problems with which we are faced today. In some areas, new problems might arise with the disappearance of military power and of the fear of major war. These problems should be studied further.

In particular, in a disarmed world, importance of strategic problems connected with national frontiers will substantially diminish. Although some of the existing frontiers are in dispute, any changes should be made only by negotiation or other peaceful means. For instance, the existing German frontiers could not be changed without a great upheaval.

The stability of a disarmed world will depend to a large extent on general acceptance of methods of solving of international disputes by means other than the use of military force. The Charter of the United Nations provides various means for the peaceful solution of international disputes. In a disarmed world the United Nations will have a much better chance than it has today to make effective the basic principles of the Charter. The influence of world public opinion will also increase, and no nation will be able to ignore recommendations having behind them overwhelming support of the United Nations and of the public opinion of the world.

In a disarmed world, even more than at present, it will be necessary to protect each group of states against the arbitrary actions by majorities in international organs.

Both during the period of actual reduction of armaments and after complete disarmament has been achieved, the process of inspection should not be subject to veto in any form. In case of a gross and properly ascertained violation of the disarmament treaty, if agreement cannot be reached on means of enforcement, each nation would have the option of taking such steps as it would deem necessary in order to protect itself against such a violation.

In addition, we considered the following questions:

(a) Ideological conflicts caused by social and colonial revolutions, especially those in which assistance from abroad is influencing the outcome.

(b) Usefulness of regional arrangements in solving local disputes and in policing a region.

(c) Settlement of economic conflicts.

VIII-WG-4-1

2.

(d) Economic consequences of disarmament, which can probably be solved by proper advanced planning.

(e) Control of new technological developments which may introduce new dangers in a disarmed world.

(f) Development of international criminal law applicable directly to individuals violating the disarmament agreement or committing other crimes against peace.

(g) Protection of rights of various states against arbitrary majority action and adaptation of the United Nations Charter to contemporary conditions.

(h) Limitation of propaganda directed against other nations or races.

(i) Controls over the manufacture and trade in conventional and police armaments.

We suggest that these problems be studied by the joint research group to be established.

Working Group 5

Eighth Conference on Science
and World Affairs
Stowe, Vermont
September 11-16, 1961

REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 5

It will be clear that there is considerable overlap with Group 4.
Probably it would have been better for us to have eliminated Group 5
and distributed the members among more useful groups.

The brief for discussion by this group was:

"Preconditions to Possible Success of Negotiations
and Initiation of Disarmament-Measures"

with the subheadings:

International Behavior;

Conditions for Creating Trust and Confidence;

The Role of the Scientist.

It is unfortunate that so constructive a brief turned out to be
incredibly difficult. At the last plenary session our rapporteur
presented an admirable account of our proceedings, but had to indicate
that we had reached no agreed conclusions. On this occasion he is not
prepared once again to take over the duties of the chairman, so that
I must do the best I can to emulate his performance, with the exception
that I am able to include, in what I say, three decisions, or
resolutions, reached after 2.5 days of work!

Our discussions were by no means confined to our brief, and
because some members of the group who submitted proposals had to
spend much time away from the meeting, it was necessary not only to
abandon the order of subjects in the agenda, but to consider some
questions in a series of disjointed moments.

For the sake of this report, I shall follow the order of matters
in our agenda and will gather together our spread-out discussions.

1. <u>International Behavior</u>

The Conference will recollect that a large part of the first day
of our work was devoted to this subject. This is equally true of
our second day of discussions, though the fruit of our efforts appears
insignificant.

There was one very important difference between East and West over
this question of international behavior. In the one case it was

WG 5

2

emphasized that conflict was part of nature and inevitable so long
as the West remained organized politically as it was: conflict was the
natural result of historical forces and influences and did not arise,
in general, from particular acts or decisions alone. On the other hand
most members of the Western nations believed that it was the acts of
governments which created conflicts and that it should be possible to
ensure that governments acted rationally and avoided conflicts which
are unnecessary. This difference proved insoluble. Proposals made by
Western members, aimed at such measures as agreement that political
conflicts be put in cold storage for a cooling off period, during which no
hasty actions were taken by either side, were rejected by our Eastern
colleagues. A suggestion that some rearrangement within the United
Nations be made which would enable it to act as an arbitrator mediator,
or conciliator in disputes, was opposed on the ground that negotiation
and settlement of all disputes was a major duty of the United Nations,
as it exists, and that it would be an impertinence and an interference
with the internal affairs of the U.N. were we to recommend any alterations
whatever in its structure. There was even greater opposition by the
East to any idea that a process of arbitration or mediation was feasible
outside the U.N.

On the other hand, our Eastern colleagues repeatedly urged that
all differences between nations be resolved by negotiation, and not by
resort to war.

The major premise of the West was that the new weapons make
obsolete the old responses i.e., expression of national purpose
through threat and build-up of arms, is both ineffective and
dangerous. Hence, we need completely new attitudes, procedures
and mechanisms.

2. Conditions for Creating Trust and Confidence

There was much discussion of the part played by existing
restrictions upon exchanges of persons and of information between
the East and the West, and other difficulties arising from the general
problems of secrecy. I use the term "exchange" because our
socialist colleagues were unable to accept such expressions as "free
flow of persons and information." However, these discussions (as
all our discussions) were illuminating and helpful to both sides.
The following statement was agreed unanimously:

Statement - No. 1.

International confidence, necessary for progress in the field
of disarmament which in turn will facilitate the development of
international confidence, would be strengthened by the reduction
of unnecessary secrecy. We recommend to governments that they
encourage the expansion of scientific, cultural, touristic, and
other contacts, as well as of the exchange of information, and that
they take steps to remove obstacles in the way of such an expansion.

WG-5

3

It was felt by the Western members of the group that disarma-
ment negotiations were carried out at present without the essential
careful preparation and clarification of all aspects of the problem
before negotiations began. As a result of discussion, the following
statement has been agreed unanimously:

Statement - No. 2

The problems of disarmament are sufficiently complex as to demand
in most cases careful examination of them on a national basis and
informal discussions on an international basis, as an adequate
preparation for the negotiation of agreements. Failure to take these
steps may result in the premature taking of firm positions, and in
frustrations. We urge that nations provide for extensive and continuing
study of the problem of disarmament. The joint study group proposed
elsewhere in this conference under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences should also
be very useful. We urge further that preparations for negotiations
should also include the use of informal discussions, these discussions
and any conclusions reached in them being protected from use for any
purposes harmful to the attainment of agreement.

The group discussed in detail the major obstacle to successful
negotiation of complete and general disarmament arising from the
absence from the negotiations of at least one very important
sovereign nation. It is unnecessary to elaborate this extremely
important difficulty. After prolonged discussion the following
statement was agreed unanimously:

Statement - No. 3

The Conference considers that the United Nations must play an
important role in the solution of the problem of general and complete
disarmament with effective control, including all those steps leading
toward the achievement of this goal which require the participation
of all nations.

Therefore the Conference urges the United Nations to make the
necessary efforts to insure representation in the U.N. of all the
peoples of the world, and to insure that the U.N. serve as a forum
for discussion between nations, as well as an organization for the
peaceful settlement of international problems.

On the question of trust between nations, it was the opinion
of the Western members of the group that certain steps could be taken
to build that degree of trust which would enable firm steps in
disarmament to be taken. Alternatively, one of our members put the
proposition that it was essential that a degree of trust be taken for
granted, even though it were unjustified.

WG-5

4

On the other hand, the attitude of the East was that trust can be
developed only through disarmament, so that the two--disarmament and
trust--must go hand in hand.

We were unable to discuss some of the most important subjects
falling within our brief, e.g., it has been suggested that there
were many unilateral acts by nations which would reduce tension--
e.g., delivery of weapons of all kinds to the smaller nations; deliber-
ately refraining from provocative statements; use of preliminary
steps of disarmament for propaganda purposes.

Finally, we failed completely to discuss what could have become
our major contribution to this Conference. This was consideration of
those long-term problems which will lead to differences between
nations when disarmament is finally achieved, and particularly those
problems which can be foreseen by men of science who can also suggest
solutions. Much progress has been made in this Conference in reaching
agreement on the immediate problems of disarmament, but this is not
sufficient to ensure that the legitimate long-term goals of mankind
are achieved.

Such problems as the estimation of the total resources of the
earth, in relation to the needs of nations, require very careful and
thorough consideration. Means by which trade is facilitated or
world-wide meteorological and communications systems set up and
managed, require investigation, and so on.

We suggest, therefore, that those more technical long-term
problems of especial human importance, rather than of more purely
scientific interest, be coupled with consideration of the sources of
tensions in a disarmed world, and be made the subject of a future
COSWA Conference.

STATEMENT FROM THE

SEVENTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS

STOWE, VERMONT, SEPTEMBER 5-9, 1961

The Seventh Conference on Science and World Affairs was held at Stowe, Vermont, September 5-9, 1961. The forty-one scientists from twelve countries attending the Conference were:

Sir John Crawford - Australia

Professor Hans Thirring - Austria

Professor C. Pavan - Brazil

Professor A. Haddow - Great Britain

Sir Ben Lockspeiser - Great Britain

Professor F.B. Straub - Hungary

Dr. G. Bernardini - Italy

Professor T. Toyoda - Japan

Professor B.V.A. Röling - Netherlands

Academician A.A. Blagonravov - Soviet Union

Academician N.N. Bogolubov - Soviet Union

Academician M.M. Dubinin - Soviet Union

Professor V.M. Khvostov - Soviet Union

Academician N.M. Sissakian - Soviet Union

Professor N.A. Talensky - Soviet Union

Academician I.E. Tamm - Soviet Union

Academician A.V. Topchiev - Soviet Union

Dr. William Consolazio - United States

Professor C. O'D. Iselin - United States

Dr. Martin Kaplan - United States

Professor Chauncey Leake - United States

Professor Linus Pauling - United States

Professor Jay Orear - United States

Professor W. Pickering - United States

Mr. Gerard Piel - United States

Dr. Roger Revelle - United States

Professor Alexander Rich - United States

Professor Walter Rosenblith - United States

Dr. Eugene Staley - United States

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Dr. Alvin Weinberg - United States

Professor Eugene Wigner - United States

Professor J.R. Zacharias - United States

This Conference had as its theme "International Cooperation in Pure and Applied Science." Our previous conferences have been chiefly concerned with ways of preventing the misuse of science in the wholesale destruction of mankind. In this Conference at Stowe, we have turned to the discussion of constructive international cooperation in science, because it is a way to create trust between nations, a trust which develops from common interests and from experience in working together.

Science misused by nations to foster their competitive interests as world powers makes possible the destruction of mankind. Science used cooperatively by all nations for the increase of human knowledge and the improvement of man's productive capacity can give all men on earth a satisfactory and worth-while life. Scientists bear a responsibility both to foster the constructive use of science and to help in preventing its destructive use.

The deliberations of the Conference were carried out in plenary sessions and in meetings of working groups. These groups were six in number as follows: I. Cooperation in the Earth Sciences; II. Cooperation in Space Research; III. Cooperation in the Life Sciences; IV. Cooperation in the Physical Sciences; V. Cooperation in Assistance to Developing Nations; VI. Exchange of Scientists and Scientific Information.

Similar suggestions for cooperative research activities arose independently from different working groups. This is reflected in several places in this statement. This is a welcome indication of the essential unity

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# I. COOPERATION IN THE EARTH SCIENCES

The planet earth is the common abode of all humans. They have a common interest, both intellectual and practical, in increasing the knowledge of the structure and dynamics of the earth.

As the work of the I.G.Y. has demonstrated, the earth sciences present an especially appropriate and fruitful field in international collaboration. The work in these fields must be carried forward on an international scale, as no one country is likely to provide sufficient funds to conduct on its own the world-wide investigations which are required.

In recognition of the developing sociological and engineering problems posed by the present trends in earth sciences, we recommend the enlisting of the social and engineering sciences in this work.

The following concrete proposals are made.

## A. A Survey of the Entire Ocean in Three Dimensions

### 1. The Ocean Floor

We propose an international program to develop a detailed map of the floor of the world ocean, including sub-bottom reflecting layers. This program would require, in the first instance, international agreements on exchange of data and methods, including intercalibration of instruments.

### 2. Waters of the Ocean

An international program to survey and map the three dimensional distribution of temperatures, salinity, density, dissolved oxygen, and nutrient salts, under average conditions, of the ocean and synoptic surveys to develop the broad picture of seasonal and shorter-period changes in more limited areas, as well as the study of the interactions among the major bodies of water in the ocean.

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3. Ocean Life

An international survey and mapping showing the major
biological provinces of the ocean and determination of the fertility
of the waters at all levels in the food chain and the standing crop of
food materials available for human use.

Prosecution of the foregoing program would necessarily involve the
establishment of world-wide navigation and communication systems and
allocation of radio frequencies for earth-science measurements which
would serve many other significant objectives. These matters, as well
as the new ocean-wide surveys recommended above, fall within the province
of the International Oceanographic Commission (IOC).

B. Earth's Crust and Mantle

1. Deep Drilling Program

The objective of drilling through the earth's crust to the mantle at selected points around the globe presents many unsolved technical problems which call for international collaboration. We agree, therefore, that the calling of an international conference on these problems is an urgent first step. The conference would provide for the exchange and pooling of drilling techniques developed by present national programs and would consider methods for the solution of such unsolved problems as the re-entry and management of high temperatures to be encountered in depth even at oceanic sites. The survey and selection of drilling sites would be a primary responsibility of this conference. The conference could also undertake the establishment of scientific objectives for the drilling program. We further agree that the execution of the program would benefit from the continuous exchange of technique and personnel,

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and that the full exchange of information and of samples is imperative
for the success of the program. It is recommended that when the prime
contractor for the United States Mohole Project is selected, arrange-
ments should be made for such meetings and the exchange of accumulated
experiences.

C. Total Environmental Forecasting

The water-air interface appears to be the primary site of heat,
water-vapor and momentum exchange between the oceans and the atmosphere,
and so the key to short-term and long-term forecasting of weather,
climate, and changes in the ocean. Together, the oceans and atmosphere
constitute a huge and complex heat engine. To some degree the ocean-
half of this system acts as the fly wheel over both short and long time
periods. Studies of these phenomena must necessarily be conducted on a
long-term and world-wide basis.

An international conference should be called to consider and to
organize the establishment of a world-wide network of radio-telemetering
observational buoys. This system of buoys would render continuous
reports on atmospheric conditions and so contribute to the completion
of the world weather map. It would also continuously monitor the energy
and water vapor energy exchange between the ocean and the atmosphere,
and would observe the changes in the flow of ocean currents in three
dimensions. Over a sufficiently long time period, such a network of
buoys would help to assign reliable values to the rate of overturn of
the ocean as a whole, a key problem in both climatological forecasts
and in the safe disposal of radioactive wastes at sea. The hydrographic
offices of the major maritime nations, as well as the World Meteorological
Organization (W.M.O.) should be encouraged to stimulate such a program.

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D. <u>Resources</u>

1. <u>Fresh Water</u>

The rising world population and the increasing concentration of
that population in metropolitan centers is already pressing upon the
water resources easily available for direct human consumption, for
industrial purposes, and for agriculture. We agree that an international
conference should be called to consider the organization of an Inter-
national Hydrologic Decade for the study of the many unknowns that
surround this ominous development.

The proposed conference would institute a world-wide survey of
water resources and of the future course of water use. Such a program
would have the significant incidental benefit of attracting the interests
of scientists to a field in which basic studies have been neglected.
Subjects for immediate consideration are the qualities of water considered
from the point of view of various uses, the economical desalting
treatment of water, the recycling and the reuse of water. The conference
necessary to set such studies in motion should be called by UNESCO.

2. <ins>Living Resources of the Ocean</ins>

Acre per acre the oceans today sustain at least as large a plant
crop on the average as does the land, yet man now gets only about one
percent of his food requirements from the sea. The oceans, therefore,
offer a means for the rapid solution of the protein deficiency afflicting
two-thirds of the world population. It is apparent that these resources
can best be exploited to this end through international cooperation.
The ultimate aim should be to elevate the fishing industry from a
hunting industry to an agricultural technology. It has been estimated

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that existing fishery techniques could easily produce 5 times the present annual crop of fish, which is at present about 30 million metric tons. This yield could be even more greatly increased by development of means for helping the winds to overturn the oceans more rapidly. This is not an insurmountable undertaking, but experiments to this end must be conducted under international auspices (Food and Agricultural Organization-FAO, and Scientific Commission for Oceanographic Research-SCOR).

### 3. Mineral Resources of the Ocean Floor

Recent studies of the ocean floor show a vast reserve of minerals, especially nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. By means of bottom-photography organized on a world-wide basis, the potentiality of this reserve may be more fully assessed. The necessary observational program could be organized by SCOR.

### 4. Natural Catastrophes

The forecasting, minimizing or eventual control of violent natural catastrophes is one objective of the earth sciences which will also require continuing international cooperation. Earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, and tornadoes constitute the principal hazards of this kind.

With respect to the first three a better international seismological network, including better instrumentation and distribution of stations, is required. More detailed studies of hurricanes and tornadoes would reveal whether or not man can exert some control over these phenomena.

To implement these programs, we further recommend:

a) That insofar as possible existing international organizations such as IOC, UNESCO, FAO, WMO, SCOR, SCAR, etc., be

*Special Committee on Antarctic Research.

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the means of furthering these programs.

b) Since what is suggested here represents a long-term enlargement of their present activities, increased funds may have to be requested to finance continuing international conferences and studies in these various fields. At the outset, at any rate, the funds necessary to finance the travel of specialists to conferences so as to plan productive international programs are relatively small, and within the means of the agencies suggested. If forward-looking programs are agreed to, as was the case during IGY, it is likely that each nation will find means of financing its share of the total long-range program.

c) There is at present no effective means of promoting atmospheric research on a world-wide basis. WMO remains a data handling organization. At present, to suggest an international atmospheric research center on a scale considerably larger than the international meteorological research institute at Stockholm would tend to rob national centers. Thus it is recommended that this matter, however, desirable, be deferred to one of our subsequent conferences. For the present a considerable acceleration of international atmospheric research seems impractical.

d) Of the many desirable studies suggested the highest priority should be given to three:

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i. The world-wide survey of the oceans, including their contents in three dimensions.

ii. The deep drilling program, including systematic samplings of the unconsolidated sediments.

iii. The establishment of a total environmental, that is to say, atmosphere and ocean, forecasting service.

## II. COOPERATION IN SPACE RESEARCH

Though believing that there should be close cooperation in space research, we realize that complete cooperation in this field, as in some others, will become possible only when the arms race is ended, international tensions are reduced, complete and general disarmament becomes a reality, and the need for secrecy disappears.

We believe, however, that certain advances in the presently established cooperation in space are possible now, and that certain others could be studied now with the hope of realization in the not too distant future.

A. First, we recommend an increase in the exchange of scientific information in areas such as the physics of space and the effects of the space environment on life. We further recommend periodic international symposia devoted to such subjects.

B. We also recommend the exchange of methods, and of information on instruments, for scientific space studies which have no military importance.

C. We recommend the orderly assignment and use of radio frequencies in space. We support the initiative in this direction

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taken by the International Telecommunications Union, and hope that a
final solution can be reached within two years.

D. We recommend the expansion of existing systems of satellite tracking stations. Bilateral agreements between different nations, including (within the limits of military security) an agreement between the United States and the USSR, on the common use of tracking stations; such a bilateral agreement could serve as the first step in this direction.

E. International agreement should be reached on a coordinated program for the use of rocket and satellite during the Quiet Sun Year (planned for the second half of 1962).

F. Similar agreement should be reached on cooperation in the use of rockets and satellites in the projected world magnetic survey. This agreement should include arrangements for simultaneous observation from satellites launched into different orbits by different nations. This cooperation could be organized in the framework of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).

G. We endorse in principle the desirability of international worldwide systems of communications satellites and of meteorological satellites, since these would clearly be in the interests of all mankind. We realize that certain difficulties now stand in the way, but we hope that the governments of the United States and the USSR, as well as of other nations embarking on rocket and satellite programs, will undertake a common study of the ways to overcome them.

H. We recommend that cooperation should be established in the instrumental study of the moon, and also that the basic principles

of the International Antarctic Treaty be applied to the moon and other cosmic bodies.

I. We recommend the calling of an international conference or symposium to consider how to avoid the biological and radioactive contamination of extraterrestrial bodies.

### III. COOPERATION IN THE LIFE SCIENCES

Among the many fields of biology in which international cooperation is possible, some are particularly well suited by their nature and importance for combined efforts. These, which relate especially to the promotion of human welfare, have been given primary concern by us. It is very evident that world-wide betterment of human welfare could be produced if the already existing biological knowledge were to be properly disseminated and fully utilized. Among the most important considerations are the means of bringing this about, so that local facilities and resources can be optimally exploited. The following recommendations incorporate proposals designed to achieve this end, as well as to promote research for the discovery of new knowledge in the field of biology.

#### A. Biological Aspects of Food Resources

One of the most important problems facing humanity is that of assuring an adequate supply of food. While some areas have an abundant food supply, in others there is a low yield of food production and a correspondingly low level of nutrition. Adequate biological information now exists to enhance food production in these areas considerably, provided the knowledge is adequately diffused and applied. This can be

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done most effectively by the development of regional agricultural experiment stations, which can deal with the problem of developing agricultural methods suitable to the local terrain, as well as the long-term problem of breeding plants and animals which are able to thrive in the specific locality. These local agricultural experiment stations should be coordinated with an international center. In this way it will be possible to teach agricultural practices which avoid errors experienced in the development of other areas, such as erosion of the soil, deforestation, overgrazing, etc. The implementation of this recommendation might be carried out through the establishment under the United Nations of an international center and a large-scale international training program, supplemented by interinstitutional exchanges of personnel between countries. Although some work has been carried out under the United Nations in this area, their program should be strengthened and extended considerably, especially in the newly developing countries.

Even though the majority of all life on this planet is synthesized in the oceans, man has utilized this source of food only to a limited degree. It is quite likely that the oceans can supply ten times more food for man than the total being produced at the present time. This can be done by developing methods for the cultivation of food in the oceans, rather than the use of the inefficient and self-limiting hunting procedures employed today. To do this we must greatly expand our knowledge of marine biology. Fortunately, the international oceanographic research expeditions, such as now planned for the exploration of the Indian Ocean, can afford a significant opportunity for increasing

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our knowledge of marine life. Another important means for expanding
knowledge in this area is through the work of marine biological laboratories,
situated in many countries. Many of these laboratories are now critically
short of funds and need a wider basis of support. We recommend that
these laboratories be united into an international system, perhaps under
the International Union of Biological Sciences, to ensure permanent
support and increase in number.

B. Preservation and Promotion of Health

The health sciences offer one of the most rewarding meeting grounds
for international cooperation in science. Increased international
cooperation and financial support is essential for the realization of
important advances in such fields as cancer, cardiovascular disease,
immunology, infectious diseases, mental health, environmental sanitation,
problems of aging, nutrition, human genetics, and others.

International institutes of health devoted to these problems should
be established in one carefully chosen place to serve as a world center
of medical research. Sufficient financial support of a long-term nature
should be provided to permit their efficient operation. Smaller sub-
sidiary institutes oriented towards more specialized problems or regional
needs (space medicine, medical entomology, tropical medicine) should be
established in different countries.

Other urgent needs in the health sciences characteristically
requiring greater international cooperation and support include: (1) more
effective and rapid dissemination of information on research and advances
in medical knowledge; (2) increased education and training of physicians
and allied scientific and auxiliary personnel at both undergraduate and

postgraduate levels; (3) an extension of epidemiological studies and control of important communicable diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and influenza, as well as of chronic degenerative diseases; (4) genetic and immunologic studies of human population groups; and (5) problems of reproduction.

The central coordination and administration of these institutes and programs should be entrusted to the World Health Organization of the United Nations, which is the major operating international agency in the medical field. It is realized, however, that these additional tasks in the health sciences cannot be undertaken adequately unless the funds now being spent for these purposes are at least trebled.

### C. The Environment and Its Modification by Man

The exponential growth of human populations and the accompanying industrial, agricultural, and scientific activities have given rise to a number of serious problems including pollution of air and water resources which are of considerable biological importance. We now recognize that continual chemical pollution of the air (known as smog) is a characteristic feature associated with most metropolitan areas, and as such constitutes a problem of world-wide importance. The great increase of industrial growth has brought about extensive water pollution, which is lethal to aquatic organisms and renders the water unfit for human use. Especially grave are the problems involving contamination of air, soil, and water with radioactive substances. Included here, as well as the more obvious problem of fall-out from nuclear explosions, there is the matter of the safe disposal of radioactive wastes.

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Even though several agencies of the United Nations have carried out
extensive studies in the field of radioactive contamination, more
international attention should be directed toward the problems of
chemical pollution of air and water. We recommend that international
conferences be scheduled on these topics.

Another of the more serious consequences of man's rapid growth
is the extent to which it may bring about the extinction of many
plant and animal species. There are large forest and game reserves
in the newly formed African countries which are seriously threatened
today because of a shortage of funds and trained personnel who can
maintain these preserves. This problem has been considered by a
committee on ecology in the International Council of Scientific
Unions. We believe that action on this problem should be taken by
the United Nations in order to bring about prompt and effective
results. If this is not done rapidly we will unfortunately suffer
irreplaceable losses. Another aspect of this problem should be
the establishment of a system of world-wide institutes for preserving
indigenous strains of plants, animals, and microorganisms. These
may have enormous practical as well as theoretical benefits in
future years.

D. "Endless Frontiers"

It has been said that the developments in biology during the
next century will be as explosive as the growth of the physical
sciences in the preceding century. This will undoubtedly offer
new opportunities for international cooperation. At least two

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directions of this advance are already evident.

There has been a phenomenal development recently in our understanding of the structure and function of biological macromolecules and the central role of the nucleic acids and the mechanism which relates the nucleic acids to the protein molecules. This work has led to a significant insight into the molecular events which underlie cell division, as well as viral infection. These developments have a significant bearing on the problem of cancer as well as the broader fields of molecular evolution and the origin of life. Intense interest in this field has developed among scientists in all countries, and it may be possible to capitalize on this enthusiasm by developing an intercontinental institute of molecular biology. This institute could serve as a research and training center for expediting the development of the subject and as an important continuing channel of communication in the biological field between "East" and "West" countries.

This proposal originated in both the biological and physical science working groups.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have announced that they are planning to carry out manned exploration of space. It is not unreasonable to suggest that some of the biological developmental work be carried out in common. To implement this exploration it will be necessary for these proposed trips to develop a wide variety of equipment needed to maintain the human occupant for a prolonged period in a confined space. A considerable saving of

[Lc]

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time and money would ensue from joint research projects in this
area. In addition, some of the instruments which man uses in
space for his scientific investigations could be included in this
cooperative program. Joint precautions must be exerted to prevent
the contamination of extraterrestrial bodies by terrestrial
organisms. Joint investigations of possible extraterrestrial
forms of life and macromolecules should be planned. We propose
that these suggestions be forwarded to COSPAR for its consideration.
It should be noted that the adoption of even a limited type of
cooperation in space research would be of great symbolic value and
have substantial popular appeal.

At the present time an International Biological Program is
under discussion by ICSU. Many of the projects described above
may be included in this Program, which if carried out broadly
and effectively, would have considerable scientific value as well
as a favorable impact on public opinion.

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IV. COOPERATION IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Modern physical science has in many of its aspects become very
big and expensive. It therefore lends itself particularly well to
intercontinental cooperation in which the costs are shared, and the
results are made available to all mankind.

Four specific areas of physical science were identified as being
ripe for vigorous action on an intercontinental basis. These areas were
the following:

A. High Energy Physics

The field of high energy physics is an excellent one for
cooperation between all countries of the world. This cooperation
could center around the establishment of a laboratory whose main research
tool would be an accelerator of not less than 300 x 10⁹ electron volts
and of a design which would achieve success in the shortest possible time.

B. Controlled Thermonuclear and Plasma Research

In the field of controlled thermonuclear research there has
been much effective exchange of information and scientists. This
development is particularly significant since thermonuclear research,
prior to 1955, was secret. We urge that such collaboration be broadened,
in particular, that the world's thermonuclear laboratories remain open
to scientists of all nations who can contribute to this interesting
and potentially important field of research.

Although a new very large thermonuclear device is probably not
needed immediately, still there is a large field of general research
in plasma physics which could well be advanced by the establishment of
an intercontinental laboratory.

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### C. Ultra-Heavy Element Chemistry

The production and study of the very heavy elements (atomic number 95 and above) and the: resulting extension and elucidation of Mendeleev's periodic chart is a scientific investigation of great interest to mankind. Handling large quantities of the heavy elements is difficult and very expensive, and gives strong reason to pool the world's efforts in this field.

Two different devices are needed for such studies: high-flux reactors, and heavy-ion, high-current cyclotrons.

We recommend that an intercontinental center devoted to investigation of the properties of the ultra-heavy elements be established. The center probably should be equipped with the most powerful available heavy-ion cyclotron and with equipment for handling the materials. The ultra high-flux reactor ($10^{16}$ neutrons/cm$^2$/sec), because of its hazard, probably should be located at a different, more isolated site.

### D. Large-Scale Computers

The development of the large modern electronic computers with its enormous memory and high speeds represents one of the most significant scientific events of the last two decades. The future development of these computing machines, with larger memories and higher speeds by orders of magnitude, would be of immense value to science. Such computing machines will cost sums of the order of magnitude of a large accelerator--perhaps as much as $100 x 10^6$.

The development of such computers would be a suitable project for international cooperation. The utilization of such a machine will advance not only mathematics but all the physical sciences,

and the biological sciences, particularly the unravelling of the
structure of macromolecules. It would also find great utility in
economics and other social sciences.

We recommend further study for such an intercontinental center.

E. <u>A Globular Cluster of Big Science Centers</u>

It is our belief that the separate big science laboratories
in high-energy physics, heavy-element chemistry, macromolecular
biology, health research, and possibly thermonuclear research,
will prosper better if they are reasonably close together than
if they are completely isolated from each other. We particularly
believe that the intercontinental computing center will be more
viable and will be a better center if it were the nucleus of such
a cluster.

We therefore urge that the Intercontinental Scientific
Laboratories be located in relative geographic proximity and that
they be served by the Intercontinental Computing Center. Such
an Intercontinental Science Center, comprising much of what is called
"Big Science", would represent a capital investment of the order of
$5 x 10<sup>9</sup>. It is our belief that the astute location of such a
striking epitome of Science--the most characteristic theme of our
modern civilization--could have extraordinarily great significance in
improving the tone of the present political situation.

improving the tone of the present political situation.
modern civilization--could have extraordinarily great significance in
attracting attention of science--the most characteristic theme of our
$2 x 10^9$. It is one fact that the same location of such a

"Big Science", would represent a capital investment of the order of
an Intercontinental Science Center, comprising much of what is called
they be served by the Intercontinental Computing Center. Such
Institutions be located in relative geographic proximity and that
We therefore urge that the Intercontinental Scientific
a center.

Apple and will be a better center if it were the nucleus of such
believe that the intercontinental computing center will be more
it they are completely isolated from each other. We particularly
will broader further if they are reasonably close together than
pilots, health researchers, and possibly thermometers research.
in high-energy physics, heavy-element chemistry, macromolecules
It is our belief that the separate big science laboratories

E. A. Gropman Cluster of Big Science Centers

We recommend further study for such an intercontinental center.
economics and other social sciences.

structure of macromolecules. It would also find great utility in
and the biological sciences, particularly the Revealing of the

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V. COOPERATION IN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS

We express the strong belief that assistance to developing countries is a duty and necessity for all countries.

This aid should be rendered so that it would not impair the independence of any country.

We express our support for greater international cooperation in assistance to developing nations. Such cooperation could help to reduce world tensions, to strengthen peace, and to further disarmament. Disarmament would in turn improve the climate for international cooperation in this and other fields and make available additional funds which could and, we hope, would be used to increase the assistance to developing nations. Clearly, the greatest cooperation and the release of maximum funds for the assistance program could be achieved by complete disarmament.

Assistance, we believe, should be provided both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, including a substantial expansion of assistance through the United Nations.

The problems of assistance to developing nations are different in different parts of the world, and should be studied as such. Scientists could assist in this study through a cooperative program which should involve not only scientists of different countries but also specialists in different fields--biologists and physicists as well as anthropologists, economists and engineers.

Several programs have to be undertaken simultaneously if technical assistance is to be successful. This includes both measures

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of immediate help as well as programs which require long-range approach. Coordinated study of such programs by scientists from different countries, including both scientists from the developed countries and those from the recipient countries, is required.

Useful in this connection may be further spread of sister relations such as already exist between some universities in the developed and in the developing nations. Similar relations could be established between research institutes, agricultural stations, and other centers of applied research. Particular attention should be given to problems of adaptation of advanced technology to the needs and resources of an underdeveloped area. Establishment of regional applied science research institutes appears desirable.

We believe that scientists have a definite role to play in the development of assistance programs and therefore suggest that we place special emphasis on this subject in one of our subsequent conferences. We believe that this conference should include a large participation of representatives from the developing nations.

We welcome the recommendation from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that a conference on science and technology in application to the problems of new nations should be held next summer in Geneva under United Nations sponsorship.

Among subjects related to the assistance to developing nations in which scientists have a particular interest, are problems of education in all its aspects--science education and general education, elementary education and higher education. Another subject of interest to scientists is that of natural resources of different

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areas and of their population trends. Unprejudiced quantitative
study of the latter topic should be carried out on an international,
cooperative basis. Another topic for similar cooperative research
is world nutrition, including the study of reasons for widespread
occurrence of avoidable malnutrition in many parts of the world.
The problems of energy supply, particularly in areas in which the
demand for energy is diffused rather than concentrated in large
industrial centers, calls for a similar study. We suggest that
preliminary study groups on these problems be organized prior to
the above-mentioned conference.

We suggest that an international study be made of the
advisability and practicability of establishing an international
fund to which individual scientists from countries in which local
funds are insufficient for this purpose could apply for assistance
in their scientific research.

VI. EXCHANGE OF SCIENTISTS AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

By its very nature and tradition science is a univeral enterprise.
Not only does the accumulating knowledge and understanding belong to
all mankind, but the work of science moves forward most surely when
it engages the collaborative effort of scientists of all nations.
The intimate character of this collaboration on questions of profound
import to the life of mankind serves to enhance the mutual trust
and understanding of the scientific community and of the nations
from which its members are drawn.

The rapid exchange of information, mutual visits of scientists and

The right exchange of information, mutual aid of scientists and
understanding of the scientific community and of the nations
import to the life of manning serves to enhance the mutual trust
The intimate character of the collaboration on questions of profound
to engage the collaborative efforts of scientists of all nations.
off making, put the work of science move forward most surely when
not only goes the acquiring knowledge and understanding belong to
By its very nature and tradition science is a universal enterprise.

AT. EXCHANGE OF SCIENTISTS AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

in their scientific research.

They are instrumental for this purpose could apply for assistance
fund to which individual scientists from countries in which local
valability and practicability of scattering an international

preliminary study should be on these problems be organized prior to
industrial centers, e.g. for a similar study. We suggest that
gemment for energy is utilized rather then concentrated in large
The problems of energy supply, particularly in areas in which the
occurrence of available radiation in many parts of the world,
its world nutrition, including the study of reasons for widespread
cooperative plans. Another topic for similar cooperative research
activity of the latter topics should be carried out on an international,
area and of their population trends. Unprejudiced quantitative

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