Apartado 1944
San Jose, Costa Rica

Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto

Abogado y Notario

Telefono 22-58-18
Cable: Romani

September 9th., 1983

SEP 14 1983

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

You are certainly acquainted with Costa Rica's struggle to overcome a very deep economic crisis and, at the same time, to preserve our peace and our democratic institutions. It is not by coincidence that Costa Rica is the only country in the area that has not been dragged along by violence and terrorism.

Even though we don't pretend to set a pattern for any other nation, regardless of how close it might be, we will not permit the loss of one hundred and sixty two years of national effort to maintain a modest but authentic democracy, either for economic reasons or due to external - efforts to weaken our institutions.

In his letter to you of July 26, President Monge expressed his desire to cooperate fully with your work. With that in mind, he has appointed a national commission composed of several Ministers and myself as Chair man, to cooperate to the fullest extent with the United States commission, headed by you, which has been asked to recommend policy on long range aspects of Central American development.

For the above mentioned reasons and encouraged by mutual friends, I am addressing myself to you on behalf of our national commission to see if it is possible to obtain an appointment with you, your commission or some of its members, as you deem appropriate, to exchange points of view regarding this rather complicated region.

During Mr. Alan Storga's visit to Costa Rica I had a very pleasant and interesting conversation with him, which increased my optimism - about what could be derived from a longer and more elaborate exchange of opinions.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Esq.
Chairman
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
September 9th., 1983

Pag. #2

If you will give me a favorable answer, the Minister of Exports and Investments Mr. Mario Carvajal, and I will travel to Washington when you think it advisable, preferably during this month of September. Minister Carvajal will be in Canada the week of September 19 and he and I could easily stop off in Washington on September 24, and for as long thereafter as necessary, on his way back to Costa Rica.

Thanking you in advance for your kind attention to this letter, I remain.

cms/

Enclosed: Decree of Official Appointment

LA GACETA — Viernes 19 de agosto de 1983 — 7

Nº 14753-H

PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA
MINISTRO DE HACIENDA,

que dispone la ley Nº 3657 de 5 de enero de 1966 en la ley Nº 6874 de 21 de junio de 1983,

DECRÉTAN:

## Emisión de los "Bonos Deuda Interna 83, (Tercera Emisión)"

Nº 3 de Hacienda emitirá títulos de la deuda pública interna 8% 1983 (Tercera Emisión)", por un total de estos bonos estará compuesta por los siguientes

Nº 1/20 15.000.000,00
Nº 1/40 20.000.000,00
Nº 1/40 10.000.000,00
Nº 1/50 5.000.000,00

TOTAL 50.000.000,00

Nº 19 de agosto de 1983, tendrán una cuota fija de 100.000.000,00, por el 8% anual o del 5½% si son comprados por el 50% por trimestres vencidos el día 19 de cada uno, agosto y noviembre y para atender la amortización del Presupuesto Ordinario de la República la suma

estarán a cargo del Tesoro Público y llevarán en el Banco de Hacienda y del Contralor General de la República, el sello de la Contraloría General de la Central de Costa Rica, y todas las seguridades y registro que se crea convenientes para valores

control interno mecanizado del Banco Central de Hacienda, tanto los Bonos como los Cupones, el 225.

Ileyará adjuntos 40 cupones que tendrán el número por el anverso y el reverso el número de orden representará los intereses de un trimestre y será el de Hacienda.

rán amortizados mediante sorteo trimestrales que de pago de intereses y se iniciarán con el corres-
1983.

Nº 1. El Banco Central de Costa Rica, dentro de los límites de cada trimestre, en presencia de dele- da, la Auditoría General de Bancos, la Contraloría General de los gobiernos de bonos que deseen asistir. A ese efecto, la hora y fecha del sorteo. El resultado del Diario Oficial antes de la fecha indicada para

lo que dispone el artículo 120 de su Ley Orgánica, a atender el servicio de los valores a que se re-
se le hayan traspasado oportunamente los fondos

y cupones de intereses pagados serán inutilizados
medio de perforaciones u otro sistema adecuado a
cual los incinerará dentro del año siguiente a la
a de los delegados que cita el artículo 59 de este
rse el acta correspondiente que se publicará en

avocados dejarán de devengar intereses a partir
el sorteo respectivo puedan ser cobrados debiendo
s sus cupones no vencidos.

mientras no estén en circulación, se considerarán
de depositarán en custodia en el Banco Central de

e completa la impreión de los bonos definitivos,
rá de emitan bonos provisionales hasta por un total
tas mismas firmas y demás garantías y requisitos.
los deberán ser canjeados por los definitivos tan

to rige a partir de su publicación.

de la República.—San José, a los cinco días del
ntos ochenta y tres.

LUIS ALBERTO MONGE

El Ministero de Hacienda

Nº 14755-RE

## EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA
Y EL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES Y CULTO,

Con fundamento en el artículo 140, incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política, y considerando el propósito del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América de elaborar un amplio plan de ayuda para los países de Centroamé- rica, a cuyo efecto ha creado una Comisión Especial presidida por el señor Henry A. Kissinger, y atendiendo al interés de Costa Rica en los trabajos y recomendaciones de esa Comisión.

DECRÉTAN:

Artículo 1º—Créase una comisión para atender, por parte del Gobierno de Costa Rica y en lo que fuere pertinente, todo lo relativo a los trabajos de la Comisión Especial nombrada por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América y presidida por el señor Henry A. Kissinger, destinada a la formu- lación de un amplio plan de ayuda a Centroamérica.

Artículo 2º—La Comisión será presidida por el señor Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto y estará integrada además por los siguientes personas:

Fernando Berrocal Soto, Ministro de la Presidencia.

Claudio Antonio Volio Guardia, Ministro de Planificación y Política Eco-
nómica.

Mario Carvajal Herrera, Ministro de Exportación e Inversiones.

Fernando Soto Harrison, Embajador de Costa Rica en Washington.

Jorge Manuel Dengo.

Artículo 3º—Los señores Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto y Jorge Manuel Dengo, desempeñarán sus cargos ad honorem.

Artículo 4º—Rige a partir de su publicación.

Dado en la Presidencia de la República.—San José, a los nueve días del mes de agosto de mil novecientos ochenta y tres.

LUIS ALBERTO MONGE

El Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores
y Culto,

FERNANDO VOLIO JIMENEZ.

Nº 14756-C

## EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA
Y EL MINISTRO DE CULTURA, JUVENTUD Y DEPORTES,

Con fundamento en el artículo 140, incisos 3) y 18) de la Constitución Política y artículo 28.2.b de la Ley General de la Administración Pública y ley Nº 5397 del 8 de noviembre de 1973, y

Considerando:

1º—Que el edificio que actualmente ocupa la Escuela Bernardo Soto en el centro de la ciudad de Alajuela fue a partir del año 1886 sede de la Escuela Superior de Niñas Nº 1, dando efectividad a la Ley de Educación Común pro- mulgada en el mismo año y establece que la enseñanza primaria es gratuita, obligatoria y costeada por la nación.

2º—Que el edificio construido en bahareque, madera y mosaicos, con cu- bierta de hierro galvanizado está en muy buen estado de conservación y posee gran valor en el aspecto del conjunto urbano del casco central de la ciudad de Alajuela.

3º—Que su diseño en terrenos de cuarto de cuadrante, con corredores internos hacia los jardines centrales corresponde a la casa clásica urbana de arquitectura nacional que se encuentra en vías de desaparición.

Por tanto,

De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 3º de la ley Nº 5397 del 8
de noviembre de 1973,

DECRÉTAN:

Artículo 19—Declarar reliquia de interés histórico y arquitectónico la Escuela Bernardo Soto en el cantón central, distrito primero de la provincia de Alajuela.

Artículo 29—Esta declaratoria prohíbe cualquier remodelación o demo-
lición total o parcial del inmueble.

Artículo 30—Las respectivas restauraciones se harán bajo la supervisión y dirección del Departamento de Patrimonio Histórico del Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes.

Artículo 40—Rige a partir de su publicación.

Dado en la Presidencia de la República.—San José, a los nueve días del mes de junio de mil novecientos ochenta y tres.

LUIS ALBERTO MONGE

El Ministero de Cultura, Juventud
y Deportes,

HERNAN GONZALEZ GUTIERREZ.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 SAN JO 06154 01 OF 02 121353Z 7686 ARA0871

SAN JO 06154 01 OF 02 121353Z

7686 ARA0871

ACTION ARA-00

DEEM APPROPRIATE, TO EXCHANGE POINTS OF
VIEW REGARDING THIS RATHER COMPLICATED REGION.

ACTION OFFICE CR-02

INFO RF-01 ARA-04 OAS-01 PPA-01 RPP1-01 ECP-01 PPC-01 NECA-01
DCEN-01 RPP2-01 STON-01 REIC-01 REG-01 DIR2-01
/019 A2 YC

- DURING MR. ALAN STOGA'S VISIT TO COSTA RICA, I HAD A VERY PLEASANT AND INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH HIM, WHICH INCREASED MY OPTIMISM ABOUT WHAT COULD BE DERIVED FROM A LONGER AND MORE ELABORATE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS.

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-08
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 PM-08 INRE-00 SP-02
/056 W

- IF YOU WILL GIVE ME A FAVORABLE ANSWER, THE MINISTER OF EXPORTS AND INVESTMENTS, MR. MARIO CARVAJAL, AND I WILL TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON WHEN YOU THINK IT ADVISABLE, PREFERABLY DURING THIS MONTH OF SEPTEMBER. MINISTER CARVAJAL WILL BE IN CANADA THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 19 AND HE AND I COULD EASILY STOP OFF IN WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 24, AND FOR AS LONG THEREAFTER AS NECESSARY, ON HIS WAY BACK TO COSTA RICA.

O 102051Z SEP 83
FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0671

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN JOSE 06154

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, CS

SUBJECT: COSTA RICAN COMMISSION REQUESTS APPOINTMENT
WITH DR. KISSINGER

- THANKING YOU IN ADVANCE FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION TO THIS LETTER, I REMAIN,

1. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT MONGE AS THE COSTA RICAN COUNTERPART TO THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA HAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE EMBASSY FOR DELIVERY TO DR. KISSINGER. ORIGINAL BEING HAND-CARRIED TO WASHINGTON BY USAID DIRECTOR.

- SINCERELY YOURS,

2. BEGIN TEXT:

- RODRIGO MADRIGAL NIETO
END TEXT.

DEAR DR. KISSINGER:

3. FOLLOWING ARE BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF MADRIGAL AND CARVAJAL. BOTH SPEAK FLUENT ENGLISH. RODRIGO MADRIGAL NIETO IS A 59-YEAR OLD LAWYER, BUSINESSMAN, FORHIER NEWSPAPER EDITOR, AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL LEADER,

- YOU ARE CERTAINLY ACQUAINTED WITH COSTA RICA'S STRUGGLE TO OVERCOME A VERY DEEP ECONOMIC CRISIS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO PRESERVE OUR PEACE AND OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. IT IS NOT BY COINCIDENCE THAT COSTA RICA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE AREA THAT HAS NOT BEEN DRAGGED ALONG BY VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM.

- EVEN THOUGH WE DO NOT PRETEND TO SET A PATTERN FOR ANY OTHER NATION, REGARDLESS OF HOW CLOSE IT MIGHT BE, WE WILL NOT PERMIT THE LOSS OF ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-TWO YEARS OF NATIONAL EFFORT TO MAINTAIN A MODEST BUT AUTHENTIC DEMOCRACY, EITHER FOR ECONOMIC REASONS OR DUE TO EXTERNAL EFFORTS TO WEAKEN OUR INSTITUTIONS.

- IN HIS LETTER TO YOU OF JULY 26, PRESIDENT MONGE EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH YOUR WORK. WITH THAT IN MIND, HE HAS APPOINTED A NATIONAL COMMISSION COMPOSED OF SEVERAL MINISTERS, AND MYSELF AS CHAIRMAN, TO COOPERATE TO THE FULLEST EXTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION, HEADED BY YOU, WHICH HAS BEEN ASKED TO RECOMMEND POLICY ON LONG RANGE ASPECTS OF CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT.

- FOR THE ABOVE-MENTIONED REASONS AND ENCOURAGED BY MUTUAL FRIENDS, I AM ADDRESSING MYSELF TO YOU ON BEHALF OF OUR NATIONAL COMMISSION TO SEE IF IT IS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT WITH YOU, YOUR COMMISSION OR SOME OF ITS MEMBERS, AS YOU

UNCLASSIFIED

3339 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008-3687

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SEP 16 1983

No. 791/83/6

September 14, 1983

This No. Should Be Prefixed to the Answer

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Following our meeting at the Apostolic Delegation yesterday, I am pleased to send related documentation.

1. Notes taken about our conversation containing the names of Catholic ecclesiastical authorities whom the Presidential Commission may wish to contact during the visit to Central America.

2. The text of the Address of Pope John Paul II to Members of the Trilateral Commission published in *L'Osservatore Romano* April 25, 1983, pages seven and twelve.

3. The texts of the Apostolic Letter, *Concerning the Office of Representaives of the Pope*, of June 24, 1969 and the *Norms for the Selection of Candidates for the Episcopacy in the Latin Church* of 1974. Both these instructions remain in effect and may be of use as general information about the work of Representations of the Holy See be they Apostolic Nunciatures (in countries where diplomatic relations are established) or Apostolic Delegations (in countries without formal relations with the Holy See.)

Please be assured that I remain at the service of the Commission with the hope and prayer that God will bless your efforts for the welfare of all concerned.

Enclosures

CONFIDENTIAL NOTES TAKEN DURING A WORKING
BREAKFAST AT THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., SEPTEMBER 13, 1983

Archbishop Pio Laghi, Apostolic Delegate in the U.S.A.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Chairman of the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America

Dr. William Walsh, Director of Project Hope and member of
the same Commission

The Commission is scheduled to depart for Panama October
9, 1983 and will visit Nicaragua, Guatemala, Costa Rica,
Honduras and El Salvador (not necessarily in that order.)

A. <u>Resources of Information</u>

Dr. Kissinger was particularly interested in the opinion of
the Apostolic Delegate about members of the hierarchy whom
the Commission should contact during the trip. Archbishop
Laghi suggested the following.

<u>The Chairman of the Commission himself</u> should seek to
meet with:

1. Most Reverend Mark MC GRATH, C.S.C.

The Archbishop of Panama will be most helpful to the
Commission. He is from the religious Order entitled the Con-
gregation of the Holy Cross (C.S.C.) as is Father Theodore
Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame. Archbishop McGrath is
American born but a native of Panama.

- 2 -

2. Most Reverend Miguel OBANDO BRAVO, S.D.B

The Archbishop of Managua will be able to contribute his experience as a member of the religious Order of the Salesians of St. John Bosco (S.D.B.), who have a long and well established school system aimed at educating the poor. He has wide popular support. By temperament and ethnic background (Spanish, Miskito and Black) he may seem to be somewhat combative.

3. Most Reverend Arturo RIVERA DAMAS, S.D.B.

The Archbishop of San Salvador is also a Salesian of St. John Bosco. He would probably welcome the opportunity to discuss the local situation with Dr. Kissinger and may wish to have another bishop of his choice present, e.g., the Secretary of the Episcopal Conference. To avoid seeking contact with the successor of the slain Archbishop Romero would give a signal that would not be helpful to the work of the Commission.

4. Most Reverend Cordero LANZA di MONTEZEMOLO

Archbishop Montezemolo is the Apostolic Nuncio in the two countries of Honduras and Nicaragua. It may be best for the Chairman to confer with him in Tegucigalpa. The government of Nicaragua might react negatively to such a meeting in Managua. Dr. Kissinger may wish to indicate that the Nuncio will be welcome to invite a local Bishop of his choice to share in the discussion.

-3-

## 5. Most Reverend Lajos KADA

Archbishop Kada is the Apostolic Nuncio in the two countries of Costa Rica and El Salvador. He is highly respected by all the bishops and is received well by the respective governments.

A Member of the Commission should meet with:

### 1. Most Reverend Roman ARRIETA VILLALOBOS

The Archbishop of San Jose of Costa Rica is also President of the Episcopal Conference of Costa Rica (CECOR) and Vice President of the Episcopal Conference of Latin America (CELAM). He is a native Latino with broad experience and respectable stature in Latin America. Archbishop Arrieta may relate well with a Roman Catholic member of the Commission.

### 2. Most Reverend Julian Luis BARNI, O.F.M.

Bishop Barni is a Franciscan from the Order of Friars Minor (O.F.M.) and Bishop of Leon in Nicaragua.

### 3. Most Reverend Prospero PENADOS del BARRIO

The Bishop of San Marcos is President of the Episcopal Conference of Guatemala (CEG).

## B. General Comments of the Apostolic Delegate

1. The Central American Bishops will understand that the Chairman and, for that matter, the members of the Commission, cannot meet with the entire hierarchy.

-4-

2. It is to be expected that the Chairman will not be personally involved in all the discussions, etc., thereby not exposing himself to be distracted by immediate problems.

### C. Responses of the Apostolic Delegate to Specific Questions

1. The Catholic Bishops in Central America will not take advantage of the presence of the Presidential Commission by using the study for their own purposes.

2. It would be advisable to have Commission members conduct their interviews with the bishops in private, especially in the absence of the local American Ambassador.

3. Some bishops, such as Archbishop McGrath of Panama, are in a more advantageous position than others to offer objective and valuable counsel to the Commission about the need for cultural, social and economic development in the Central American countries.

4. Almost all agree that the goal of establishing a strong democracy in Latin American countries can be achieved only after there is developed a middle class of persons with at least some training in technical skills such as carpentry or plumbing. At present, the vast majority may be swayed to vote on the basis of the criterion of immediate satisfaction of their primary and even physical needs.

Archbishop Laghi suggests that pilot programs such as the construction of housing would be a first step. The best country to begin this effort would be El Salvador. Mention

-5-

was made at this point of the value of some sort of indepen-
dent revolving fund to be managed by an established
organization such as the Catholic Relief Services.

5. The Commission need not anticipate any hostility from the established Church. The diocesan clergy (priests belonging to geographical ecclesiastical jurisdictions under the local Bishop) may be expected to welcome the interest of the Commission in the problems of the people with whom they live and work. Religious (priests and nuns who are members of Religious Orders whose structure and mission extend beyond local dioceses) may be less cooperative if they have come from or have studied outside Central America. Finally, there may be some negative reaction from members of the "popular church" in Nicaragua.

6. To the knowledge of the Apostolic Delegate, there has not been within the Catholic Church in the United States of America any significant opposition to the naming of the Commission. The Administration (and, therefore, the Commission) should avoid creating unnecessary ill will by ignoring the leadership of the Episcopal Conference (National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, D. C.) in favor of conferring with a prominent ecclesiastic who may be seen to be more sympathetic to the Administration. For the good of all concerned, the official spokespersons for the Bishops of the USA should be faced and their opinions heard.

-6-

7. It would indeed be helpful for the Commission to meet with some representative bishops in this country to confer about the Central American visit. It is understood that such a conference will not be able to be scheduled until after the fact of the trip but an initiative should be taken at present to arrange for the meeting.

8. Regarding how the Catholic Church may be of use to the Commission, the educational system, e.g. of the Salesians, immediately comes to mind. Secondly, the Church brings together peoples of many ethnic backgrounds including those in Central America who have roots in western European countries. It may be helpful to have German, Spanish or Italian supervisors come to direct the work of local artisans in housing projects, for example. Catholic agencies in the USA already known to the government and well established that may be approached for assistance are the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Latin American Bureau (LAB).

The meeting concluded after approximately one hour and a half. Dr. Kissinger expressed the hope that his Commission and the Apostolic Delegation will remain in contact. The Chairman also invited Archbishop Laghi, who is more familiar than he with Church persons involved, to alert the Commission to any problems which may be foreseen.

END

JACOB K. JAVITS

375 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10152

September 13, 1983

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Henry:

This is a note pursuant to our telephone conversation as to my preliminary thoughts on the Central American situation which the Commission you chair is looking into with a view toward a U. S. strategy. My thoughts fall into five points as follows:

1. I believe that United States policy must be a policy of regional reconciliation with the support of both of the Americas. I believe also that the basic institution for regional cooperation and peacekeeping represented by the Organization of American States (OAS) is crucial in terms of the framework for the future of Central America and the Caribbean as well as South America. This means that we must support the effort of the Contadora group and be sure that it is tied in effectively with the OAS and the series of treaties which give some power for peacekeeping to the other American states. It is greatly in our interest to see that the inter-American system, which has a history and an institutional base, becomes, in the public's mind, responsible for the situation in Central America. Our security interests must be heavily dependent upon this OAS institutional base and it is our job to strengthen it at this particular moment.

2. One of the great deficiencies in the OAS system is that it does not include Canada, which is getting all of the benefits -- whatever they may be -- and carrying none of the responsibilities. Hence, it must be a central element of U. S. foreign policy to bring Canada into the inter-American peacekeeping system. If there is one important point I could make with you that is it. I believe that Canada is the way in which to assure the other nations of the hemisphere that they will not be overridden or overweened by the United States.

SEP 15 1983

JACOB K. JAVITS

-2-

3. It is very important to bring into play the influence beginning now of the international financial institutions and the regional development banks. These include, of course, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund and, in the case of the Americas, the Inter-American Development Bank. The objective should be -- in my judgment -- the recreation of a Central American common market which looked so promising until its future was shattered by war. It is a goal which is highly essential for the Central American States. Another supporting mechanism may well be the Latin-American Free Trade Association, which failed to establish any significant position but the movement and the concept of the movement are very well known and popular in Latin America. Such a movement could be a good backup and frame of reference for an effort to recreate a Central American common market.

4. Western Europe and Japan also have a very considerable interest in the Latin American and Central American markets and this has been traditional going back over decades. This should be recognized and the OECD should be invited to have a hand in the economic development after a period of such instability in Central America and to be joined in that by the Bank for International Settlements and other agencies of the kind. This should be included in U. S. policy and neither feared nor resented. This is the time to invite that kind of approach.

5. Other countries in the world also have an interest in Latin America, which should be recognized on a fraternal basis. For example, the ASEAN nations should be invited to give the benefit of their experience to a new integration of the Central American countries economically and socially from this point of view. And other nations, like Australia and New Zealand may very well find this an interesting idea that the United States is reaching out for that kind of support.

Also, I would make it plain in U. S. strategy that the private sector, both on a regional and on an international

JACOB K. JAVITS

375 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10152

-3-

basis, are very welcome participants according to the new
U. S. strategy and policy in Central American development,
just as we would expect the private enterprise of the
United States to be welcomed into other areas of development,
like Africa, where it can play a part in giving full recog-
nition to local aspirations and local opportunities for
private enterprise.

The idea of U. S. openness to these influences is a
very important element in what we should be trying to
accomplish in our own policy towards this area.

I feel my own views may be summed up under the headings
of recognition of interdependence between nations on the
immediate regional level, the utilization of the machinery
of the inter-American system on the hemispheric level, the
introduction of new international interests in the social
and economic field on the free-world international level
and a welcome to international participants -- public and
private -- whose mission is peace and freedom.

You have a monumental job and a monumental opportunity
and I hope very much that at least in concept these thoughts
may be of some use to you at this stage of the proceedings.

Warmest and best wishes always for Nancy and you from
Marian and me.

P. S. Having reread the above, I appreciate also the problems
of your commission with the immediate security situation.
My personal view is that we are off base in backing the rebel
efforts to oust the Nicaraguan government, that we are right
about insulating it from seeking to undermine the government
in El Salvador, and that we must work to gain for the people
of Nicaragua human rights, including a democratic choice of
their own form of government.

JUNCAN L. HUNTER

45TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

COMMANDER
MILITARY RESEARCH
AND CIVILIAN PARTNERS

DEAPOWER AND STRATEGIC AND
DISTRIBUTIONAL MATERIALS

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS
ABUSE AND CONTROL

U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE

ASSISTANT NATIONAL WHIP
WESTERN AND PLAINS STATES

RECEIVED

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

83 AUG 5 1983

Washington, D.C. 20515

August 3, 1983

The Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Judge Clark:

I recently returned from a trip to El Salvador and another to Israel. While in Israel, I met with a number of top officials, including Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Moshe Arens, Minister of Communications Mordechai Zippori, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Cabinet Secretary Dan Meridor, President of the International Association of Secretary Generals of Parliament Nataniel Lorch and others.

Mr. Lorch was formerly Director of Latin American Affairs for Israel and he had a number of excellent ideas regarding the current situation in Central America. I took the liberty of asking Mr. Lorch if he would be available to help a small group of key leaders from the Western democracies in formulating long-range strategy for dealing with communist expansion in Central America.

When I returned to the United States, I spoke of this with Ed Derwinski, former ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House. Ed was enthusiastic about this proposal.

I sensed in Nataniel Lorch an awareness of our problems in Central America and an ability to suggest a fruitful course of action for us. I feel that he could prove invaluable to the United States policy and would ask that you give his ideas consideration.

Thank you for your attention.

Member of Congress

cc: President Ronald Reagan
Ed Derwinski
Nataniel Lorch

REPLY TO:

☐ 117 CANNON BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-6672

DISTRICT OFFICE:

☐ 2830 MOUNTAIN AV.
NATIONAL CITY, CA 90061
(619) 474-8120

☐ 1101 AIRPORT ROAD, SUITE 3
IMPERIAL, CA 91351
(619) 353-6420

☐ 250 E. Main Street
61 CANNON, CALIFORNIA 91351
619-679-3440

SEP 14 1983

CHAIRMAN
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR. NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR. CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR. WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR. LANE KIRKLAND
MR. RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR. JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR. WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB. HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN. LLOYD BENTSEN
REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN. PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON
REP. JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR. WINSTON LORD
SEN. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR. WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP. JAMES C. WRIGHT

MEMORANDUM

September 6, 1983

TO: HAK

FROM: HWS

You asked me to make certain the *Venezuelan President's proposal* for a multilateral steering group was brought to the attention of the Commission. Following are talking points you might use for the purpose:

-- Bill Walsh and I met with Perez Chiriboga Friday at his request.

-- We discussed the efforts of the Contadora Group at some length. In essence the *message from Herrera Campins* seemed to be that the *USG should support Contadora quietly but avoid getting out in front or identifying itself too strongly with the initiative in a public fashion*.

-- Perez Chiriboga agreed to arrange *for the Commission to talk to Foreign Minister Zambrano and perhaps other leading Venezuelans* at a social occasion. Zambrano will be here for the UNGA.

-- He made a specific proposal on behalf of Herrera Campins: *to revive the five-nation steering group which operated within the context of the Caribbean Basin Initiative before the Falklands war. At the outset of the CBI, Venezuela, Mexico, Canada and the U.S. met as a donor group and to plan the program. Colombia joined later. The group had scheduled a meeting with the Europeans in May of last year but the Falklands war intervened. Herrera Campins proposes that we encourage the Canadians to call the five countries back together as a steering committee for a longterm program.*

-- The staff can make available to any who want it a memcon covering all this.

0088A

2201 C STREET NW., ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 TEL: (202) 632-7804

FACIO & CAÑAS
ABOGADOS Y NOTARIOS

GONZALO J. FACIO
ALBERTO F. CAÑAS (INACTIVO)
OCTAVIO TORREALBA
EDGAR PACHECO GURDIÁN
RODRIGO OREAMUNO B.
RODRIGO ARIAS SANCHEZ
CARLOS SOLIS
RODOLFO A. GURDIÁN

TELEFONO 21-12-55
APARTADO 5173
CABLE: FAYCA
TELEX: 2508
CALLE 1A, NO. 719
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

July 21, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was in Washington D.C. when I heard the good news of your appointment as head of President Reagan's National Commission on Central America. In fact, when the news arrived, I was in room 106 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, taking part in a debate on "Promises and Realities of the Sandinista Revolution", in which participated, among others, Senator Henry Jackson and Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick.

I then had the opportunity to tell the audience how much I support President Reagan's decision to select you for presiding over this bipartisan commission to study our troubled region.

Next day, in a meeting at the White House which President Reagan attended for half an hour, I took the opportunity to express my opinion that there is no statesman in the United States more qualified than you to perform the difficult job of advising the Administration, the Congress and the U.S. public opinion as well, about how to seek peace in our embattled countries, not only by military ways, but simultaneously through fostering economic and social progress.

The fact that the radical liberals and the radical conservatives, both from Congress and from the mass media, are criticizing your appointment, evidences that you are in the vital, intelligent and enlightened center of the political expectrum you have always been.

As a Central American that all his life has struggled for democracy in our region, I am fully satisfied with you taking part in this new Panel on Central America. I feel confident that your leading participation in the Bipartisan Commission guaranties a sound report in the proper direction.

JUL 25 1983

LQ

GONZALO J. FACIO
ALBERTO F. CAÑAS (INACTIVO)
OCTAVIO TORREALBA
EDGAR PACHECO GURDIÁN
RODRIGO OREAMUNO B.
RODRIGO ARIAS SÁNCHEZ
CARLOS SOLIS
RODOLFO A. GURDIÁN

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

2.

Please find attached the statement I made in the above mentioned Forum about the violence in Central America, as well as two articles I wrote for the outstanding newspaper in Spanish in Miami, Diario Las Américas. One of these articles deals with the wrong approach of the Contadora Group to a peacefull solution of Central American problems. The other trys to explain why the Mexican Government is so inclined to promote the cause of the Sandinistas and of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Hoping to see you soon and to have the opportunity to discuss with you the facts and theories of the Central American upheaval, I remain,

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Address by DR. GONZALO J. FACIO
at the Dirksen Senate Building,
Washington, D.C., on July 19, 1983.

With the exception of Costa Rica, the people of the other
Central American countries have lived subjected to political
oppression and economic misery.

Such conditions justified, and made it imperative, to put
into motion in every one of these countries, a vigorous process
of reform.

Unfortunately, when this process of reform was germinating
in 1959, Fidel Castro handed over the Cuban Revolution to the
Soviet imperialism. This incident came to change the perspec-
tives and the very nature of the Central American reform move-
ments.

Making use of minority Leninist groups infiltrated in the
Central American Reform Process, they were able to alter and
capture the Democratic Movements, and lead them toward totalita-
rianism.

The transformation of Nicaragua into a Soviet satellite, has
created, with Cuba and Grenada, the strategic triangle with which
the Soviet Union is trying to strangle one of the most important
lines of communication for the North American commerce and for
the defense of the Western World.

This serious strategic threat was pointed out by President
Reagan himself in his historic speech of April 28, 1983, addressed
to the Joint Session of the House of Representatives and the Se-
nate of the United States Congress, as he asserted:

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"The problem of Central America affects directly the security and the well-being of our nation. Central America is closer to the United States than many other places in the world that worry us. Being in the Caribbean (Central America), is in our vital route to the outside world. Two-thirds of our foreign trade and the oil we import go through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. In a European crisis, at least half of our shipments to NATO would have to go to Europe by sea. It is good to remember that at the beginning of 1942, a handful of Hitler's U-Boats sank more tonnage of ships in the area of the Caribbean than in the whole Atlantic Ocean. And they did it without bases in the area. Today the situation is different. Cuba serves as a base for a brigade of Soviet fighting men, and its military air bases are regularly visited by Soviet war planes."

## THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS AND THE CONFRONTATION OF THE SUPER-POWERS

Many of the critics of President Reagan's Central American policy, as well as the Contadora Group (formed by the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama), have been arguing that the Central American crisis is due to a mere confrontation of the Super-Powers. And thus, simplistically they conclude that peace would be gained if only the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would withdraw from the Isthmus. And further, they contend that by allowing the two sides supported by each Super-Power to carry on a dialogue between themselves, peace will be achieved through the organization of National Unity Governments in each of the embattled countries of Central America.

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The truth is that, in practice, this line of thinking would
only lead to the U.S. leaving unprotected those nations under
Soviet aggression, and allowing the Central American Leninists
to be the only ones holding power and placing their respective
governments at the service of the international interests of
the Soviet Union, as it has happened in Sandinista Nicaragua.

Those who oppose President Reagan's Central American policies,
seem to fail to understand the very nature of the Léninist doctrine
of Global Revolution. To make my point, let me undertake a very
brief review of this doctrine:

## MARX AND LENIN'S OPPOSING DOCTRINES OF GLOBAL REVOLUTION

Karl Marx never gave any importance to the marginal countries (which he called the pre-Capitalistic ones, and are known now as the Third World). He maintained that the objective conditions for the Communist revolution were only to be given in the industrialized countries. Marx asserted in 1948 that the contradictions of the developed capitalist nations would dig their own graves in the countries that had already reached the top of the Industrial Revolution, such as England, Germany, France and, eventually, the United States.

But already during the second decade of the 20th Century, the
failure of Marx's prediction concerning the self-destruction of the
capitalist system was evident. Contrary to Marx's dictum, Capitalism had created, since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution
and up to the second decade of this century, the most accelerated
period of economic and social progress in the entire history of
mankind.

In order to save Marxism, Vladimir Lenin decided to issue a
different and opposing doctrine of the Global Revolution. Capital-

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ism, Lenin argued, would not destroy itself, as Marx had be-
lieved. The moving force of the Revolution was then not to be
the working classes of the large capitalistic cities, because
thanks to the exploitation of the colonial and the dependent
countries, the capitalists bribe the workers of the industrial-
ized nations and transform them into agents of the Bourgeoisie.
In the face of this, Lenin demanded that the Revolution be ini-
tiated in his semi-feudal country, as was then the Russia of
the Tzars. And should continue afterwards, with the support
and under the direction of what later would be called the Soviet
Union, in the marginal countries now called the Third World. On-
ly by the conquest of the Third World, the Soviet Union would
be able to surround the capitalist countries and force them in-
to the Communist System. By the way, such thesis of Lenin would
favor, more than the triumph of universal Marxism, the national
interest of his Russian homeland, which thus were to become the
center of the World Revolutionaty Power.

The triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution allowed Lenin to put
into practice his doctrine about the Global Revolution. And dur-
ing the first forty years that followed, to apply it in Asia and
Africa. The Communist Revolution in the Afro-Asian countries did
not bring their people any improvement in their living conditions.
But they were tied to the war charriot of the Soviet Union. And
they were provided with patience in order to continue the siege
of the Capitalist world.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

The Soviet leaders were always anxious to carry the Communist
Revolution to Latin America, but they did not dare to defy the
United States on their own Hemisphere. The submission of Fidel

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Castro's Cuban Revolution to the Kremlin represented an unexpected bonanza for the leaders in Moscow. Once they realized, astonished, how the United States tolerated Fidel Castro's treason, the Soviet leaders were convinced that, what they had desired the most, but had not dared to begin by themselves, was now within their grasp.

Based in Cuba they started to try to expand Soviet power into Latin America. The promoter of the first South American unsuccessful guerrilla attempts to seize power in the Southern part of this Hemisphere was the notorious Che Guevara, who had rated himself as the foremost theoretician of the Guerrilla War-fare in the New World.

Before dying in Bolivia, Che Guevara asserted that every good Latin American revolutionary should try to create, in his own country, another Viet Nam (where, at that time, the Communist guerrillas were facing the U.S. might).

## THE VIET NAM SYNDROME

Che Guevara issued the motto that there should be one, two, many Viet Nams in Latin America, in order to destroy what he termed as the U.S. domination.

I wonder if many of these Revolutionaries that even today repeat his motto for "one, two, many Viet Nams", have stopped to think what has really happened in this unfortunate Indochinese country.

I wonder if these revolutionaries and, in fact, all of the critics of the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, have ever asked themselves these fundamental questions: Did the sacrifice of the Vietnamese guerrillas really serve the best interest of their nation? Was the war against the French colonialists, first, and the war against the

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[LC]

American troops, afterwards, actually directed to obtain the liberation and the well-being of the Vietnamese people?

The objective and truly answer to these questions cannot be but an absolute Nö. Today anyone may realize that this war was a terrible tragedy that befell the Vietnamese nation, whose nationalistic aims were alienated, since the very beginning, to the hegemonic interests of the Soviet Union.

Any Latin American should realize that Viet Nam is not today freer, more independent, more humane, than when Ho Chi-min took his country into the Soviet orbit. The "Nomenklatura" made up of the Vietnamese Communist Party's high echelon, is today crueler, more brutal, and much more alienated to a foreign government, than those who governed Indochina under the tutelage of the French colonialists, or under the protection of the U.S. troops.

And notwithstanding this known fact, and that of the horrible suffering and degradation of the whole Indochinese population under the Communist rule, the international propaganda machinery of the Soviets still manages to present these Hanoi tyrants as an example of the kind of democratic government to be followed for those who oppose U.S. imperialism in Latin America.

I cannot understand how there are still so many Americans who dare to argue what they called the wrong caused by the U.S. to Viet Nam, to oppose President Reagan's wise policies toward Central America.

By now it should be clear to anyone in our Hemisphere that Viet Nam was not a country wronged by the United States, but a nation harmed by the brutal nature of its own Communist leaders.

[c]

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In a recent article published in the Reader's Digest, the courageous and brilliant woman that serves with great distinction as U.S. Representative before the United Nations, Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, asked these very pertinent questions. What is it that Central America has in common with Vietnam that so repels liberals? Is it because lobbies of the left have managed to make the anti-communist side seem unfashionable?

Mrs. Kirpatrick answered these questions asserting that God knows there are parallels enough. In both cases, well orchestrated international campaigns have focused mercilessly on the political and moral failings of the governments.

But - Ambassador Kirkpatrick goes on forcefully--there are crucial differences too. Differences that involve what we know *now* and what we knew *then*. We know *now* about human rights under the communists in Vietnam, about the labor camps and mass deportations. We know that the Vietcong did not establish a broad-based government or a socialist democracy. We know about these matters--continues Mrs. Kirkpatrick--as surely as we know the character and the stakes of the contest in Central America. And she finished her article with this vital admonition:

> "The crucial difference between Vietnam and Central America is not the Pacific Ocean, although that is important.
> 
> The crucial difference is that the Congress that cut off aid to Vietnam could say that it did not know what would follow.

> "Today's Congress cannot."

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THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA.

In an effort to stop political bickering with such a serious matter as the Soviet infiltration in Central America, President Reagan decided to appoint a Bipartisan Commission to look for solutions, not only of a military nature, but also related to the economic and social progress of the Central American isthmus, which are essential to gain and maintain peace and democracy in our region.

President Reagan's decision to select former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger to preside over this Commission, has my wholehearted support. I think there is no statesman more qualified than Dr. Kissinger to perform the difficult job of advising the Administration, the Congress and the U.S. public opinion, about how to seek peace in our embattled countries, not only by military ways, but simultaneously through fostering economic and social progress.

The fact that some radical liberals as well as some radical conservatives, both from Congress and from the mass media, are criticizing Dr. Kissinger's appointment, gives evidence that he is in the vital, intelligent and enlightened center of the political expectrum he has always been.

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THE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE AGAINST CENTRAL AMERICA.-

The failure of the Leninist guerrillas in South America, made the Kremlin look to more suitable grounds, such as the countries of our Central America, where, as I said before, there exist regimes which were highly unpopular.

The majority of the Central Americans wanted a change in their political, economic and social situation, through freedom and toward democracy. But a minority, unfortunately better organized, and sold to the Leninist doctrine of Global Revolution, was ready to take advantage of the prevailing discontent.

In 1978, the Soviets had the first opportunity to use these minorities that they have carefully prepared, to get control of a State on the American continental landmass. The Nicaraguan people raised against the Somoza dynasty, and started to fight. And just as it was planned, the Sandinista minority, indoctrinated and trained in Cuba, took over the direction of the guerrilla movement. And although they never obtained a military victory, they managed to turn to their own advantage the heroic efforts of the entire Nicaraguan people, as well as the foreign aid supplied by democratic countries and by the O.A.S.

Once in control of the Government, the Sandinistas gradually eliminated all their naive democratic collaborators and began the building of a totalitarian state, subjecting themselves, through Cuba, to the absolute direction of the Soviet Power.

WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN NICARAGUA WOULD HAPPEN EVERYWHERE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

What happened in Nicaragua should not have been a surprise for any fairly informed person about the Leninist doctrine of the Global

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[L.C.]

Revolution and about the methods of the Marxist-Leninist struggle.
Everywhere the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas have infiltrated a govern-
ment, the outcome has been the same as in Cuba and in Nicaragua.

There would not be the least doubt that what took place in
Nicaragua during these past four years, would also take place in
El Salvador, and later in Guatemala, Honduras, and even in Costa
Rica and Panama, if the thesis of certain adversaries of President
Reagan's Central American policies, or those of the Contadora Group,
were to prevail.

To sum up, I would assert that the situation of violence under
which Central America lives, has two chief manifestations:

(a) There is a popular anti-Sandinista insurrection in Nicaragua, which the Sandinista high command insists in portraying as an international war promoted by the United States and Honduras; and
(b) There is an international aggression in El Salvador, promoted by the Soviet Union through its satellites, Cuba and Nicaragua, which the guerrillas insist in characterizing as a popular insurrection against the Salvadoran government, but which only embraced a Communist minority.

The U.S. intervention in Nicaragua's internal affairs, denounced
by the Sandinistas, is the direct result of the previous interven-
tion by the Soviet Union through its Cuban satellite.

And the so-called intervention of the United States in El Salva-
dor, which the guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti Front denounced,
is not such intervention at all. Is a legitimate collaboration of
the U.S. Government with a moderate Salvadoran Government, which came
to power through the first free elections that were ever held in
this suffering Central American country.

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LC

To recommend to the Super-Powers the complete withdrawal of their respective support to the sides they defend, would only favor those who pretend to transform Central America into a group of totalitarian states, committed to promote the international interests of the Soviet Union.

The only formula which could insure peace in Central America, is the elimination, by force if necessary, of every dictatorial regime, either of the Left or of the Right, and its replacement by a democratic, representative, and pluralistic government which is a product of a truly free electoral process.

This was the position taken by the XVII Meeting of Consultation of the O.A.S. Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In their famous Resolution taken on June 23rd, 1979, they affirmed that there could be no peace in Nicaragua, and in fact, in all Central America, if the existing dictatorial regime was not substituted by a democratic one.

Four years afterwards, the then dynastic dictatorship has been replaced, but not by the democratic Government recommended by the O.A.S., but by a crueler and more absolute totalitarian dictatorship, which has alienated Nicaragua's interests to those of the Soviet Power.

This is why the Nicaraguan people is again fighting against its Government. And this is why their cause should be the cause of all of us who treasure freedom and believe in the democratic way of life.

THE MEXICAN INFLUENCE ON THE CONTADORA GROUP

By

Gonzalo J. Facio

(Published by DIARIO LAS AMERICAS, June 1, 1983)

In the violent conditions under which Central America lives, two opposing points of view have preeminence: (a) There is taking place in Nicaragua an anti-Sandinista popular insurrection, which the Sandinistas try hard to expose as an international war promoted by the United States and Honduras; and (b) There exists in El Salvador an international aggression from the Soviet Union through its agents from Cuba and in Nicaragua, which the guerrillas insist in presenting as a popular insurrection against the government which is the product of the first free elections held in that country.

The intervention of the United States of America in its internal affairs, that Nicaragua now denounces, is the result of a prior intervention by the Soviet Union in that country, through Cuba. And the intervention of the United States in El Salvador, denounced by the guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front is nothing but a simple collaboration of the power of the West with a government freely elected, that defends itself against the international aggression promoted by the intervention

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of the Soviet Union through Cuba and Nicaragua.

In the Nicaraguan case, it is an internal
popular uprising which is being presented as an interna-
tional aggression. But in the case of El Salvador, it
is an international aggression which is being presented
as an internal popular uprising.

As long as the true nature of the situation
in each of these countries is not clearly understood,
the Ministers of the Contadora Group can not find a for-
mula that in truthfulness may serve the interests of
Peace in Central America.

But among the members of the Contadora Group
there is one, the most powerful and the most influential,
who is not impartial. Mexico defends and supports the
existence and stability of the Marxist-Leninist regime
of Nicaragua. On the other hand, it considers illegiti-
mate the democratic government of El Salvador, which is
the result of free elections, and affirms that the real
representatives of the Salvadoran people are the guerri-
lla minority armed, indoctrinated, and directed by the
Soviet Union through its Cuban and Nicaraguan satellites.
That is why Mexico opposes the covert aid the United Sta-
tes gives to the Nicaraguans fighting against the regime
which is the result of the Marxist-Leninist intervention.

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