Is it wrong to be in love with a car?

There's no reason to hide your true
feelings. The deep, consuming passion
you may now be experiencing for the
1999 Accord Coupe is perfectly normal.

the elegantly sculptured body styling.
With such voluptuous curves, lustrous
surfaces and chiseled details, the Accord
Coupe turns heads everywhere it goes.

inside the refined interior, and you're
welcomed by a comforting atmosphere
that literally sweeps you off your feet.
Settle into the contoured, ergonomic

After all, who could blame you for
giving in to the seductive powers of this
sleek, sexy automobile from Honda?

Well, just look at it. From its flowing,
sophisticated lines to its well-appointed,
spacious interior, this is one car that's
easy to fall head-over-heels in love with.

At first sight, you'll be smitten by

Stylish. Sporty. Good-looking. On a
purely visceral level, this car possesses
all the qualities you lust for. But deep
down, it's really a reliable, practical car
at heart. In other words, it's a car you
could settle down and get serious with.

Of course, the Accord Coupe's
beauty is not merely skin-deep. Step

driver's seat. Stretch out a bit. Make
yourself comfortable. There's plenty of
legroom, hiproom and shoulder room.
Because, after all, allowing for personal
space is vital to any good relationship.

Acquaint yourself with the interior
and you'll discover thoughtful features
everywhere you look. The controls

© 1998 American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

TOP OF THE WEEK

PHOTO ILLUSTRATION BY STEPHEN WEBSTER, STYLING BY MICHELLE BROWNING

THE COVER: The next wave in high tech isn't for hackers or geeks. Soon computers will be in everything from your dishwasher to your car—all wirelessly connected to the Net. Here's how it's going to change your life. Page 56

SCOTT MCKIERNAN-ZUMA

NATIONAL AFFAIRS: The GOP runs for cover on guns. Page 24

ALEXIS DUCLOS-GARUM-LAISON

INTERNATIONAL: As it deploys ground troops, the U.S. plans cyberwar against Milosevic. Page 36

COVER: Photo illustration by Geoff Spear. Clockwise from top right: 3Com Palm VII organizer, Diamond Rio MP3 music player, Philips Internet breakfast-tray prototype, Nokia 8800 mobile phone, Sega Dreamcast controller.

LISA ROSE-GLOBE PHOTOS

SOCIETY: Kobe Bryant's struggle to fit in with the Lakers—and the superstar's life off the court. Page 66

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

**Guns:** The Republicans Under Fire
by Howard Fineman 24
Civil War in the Gun World
by Matt Bai 28

**Campaign:** Hillary's Pre-Senate Race 31

**Justice:** Death-Penalty Student Sleuths
by Martha Brant 32

INTERNATIONAL

**Kosovo:** Sending In the Troops 36
A Secret Plan Against Milosevic
by Gregory L. Vistica 38
Macedonia, the Next Domino?
by Jonathan Alter and Carla Power 39
New World Disorder
by Henry A. Kissinger 41

**Israel:** The General Takes Charge
by Joseph Contreras and Michael Hirsh 44

BUSINESS

**Ad Wars:** Adding Zip to Heinz 50

**Deals:** Paying Big for U S West
by Allan Sloan 52

**TV:** The Teen-Crazy Fall Schedule 54

**'Judgment Calls':** The U.S., Phantom Superpower? by Robert J. Samuelson 55

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

**The Cover:** The New Digital Galaxy
by Steven Levy 56
Profile of a Net Genius 63
Why the PC Will Not Die
by Bill Gates 64

SOCIETY

**Sports:** Kobe Bryant Goes It Alone
by Allison Samuels and Mark Starr 66
**Education:** A Dean's Fall from Grace 70

ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT

**Latin Pop:** Lovin' La Vida Loca 72

**Design:** The Eameses' Cool Modernism 76

FOCUS ON MONEY

**Retirement:** Are You a 401(k) Fat Cat? 77
**'Leading Questions':** Savings Surprises
by Jane Bryant Quinn 82

DEPARTMENTS

**Periscope** 4 **Letters** 20

**My Turn** 12 **Perspectives** 23

**Cyberscope** 16 **Newsmakers** 84

Newsweek

Letters to the Editor should be sent to NEWSWEEK, 251 West 57th Street, New York, NY 10019-1894. In the U.S. send subscription inquiries to NEWSWEEK, P.O. Box 59967, Boulder, CO 80322-9967. NEWSWEEK (ISSN 0028-9604), May 31, 1999, Volume CXXXIII, No. 22. In Canada send subscription inquiries to NEWSWEEK, Inc., P.O.Box 4012, Postal Station A, Toronto, Ontario M5W2K1. Canada Post International Publications Mail (Canadian Distribution) Sales Agreement No. 546593. Canadian GST No. 123-321-309. For all changes of address call 1-800-634-6850. For all other inquiries call 1-800-631-1040. Unless otherwise indicated by source or currency designation, all terms and prices are applicable in the U.S. only and may not apply in Canada. NEWSWEEK is published weekly, except for 2 issues combined into one at year-end, for US $41.08 a year and Canadian $61.88 a year, by NEWSWEEK, Inc., 251 West 57th Street, New York, NY 10019-1894. Richard M. Smith, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief; Stephen Fuzesi Jr., Chief Counsel and Secretary. Periodicals postage paid at New York, NY, and at additional mailing offices. To order reprints (minimum order required: 500 copies) or request permission to publish a NEWSWEEK article, please call 212-445-4870 or fax 212-445-4929. POSTMASTERS: send address changes to NEWSWEEK, P.O. Box 59968, Boulder, CO 80328-9968. Printed in U.S.A.

© 1999 NEWSWEEK, INC. 251 WEST 57th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019-1894. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK 3

PERISCOPE®

GORE

Another Campaign Headache?

HOW CAREFULLY DID Al Gore's campaign review the tangled business dealings of Tony Coelho before naming the ex-congressman as its new campaign chair? Some Gore aides grumble that it wasn't carefully enough. NEWSWEEK has learned that Coelho was recently questioned by Securities and Exchange Commission lawyers as part of an ongoing investigation of International Thoroughbred Breeders Inc., a floundering New Jersey gaming firm of which Coelho was board chairman until earlier this year. Sources say the SEC is looking into the possible misuse of ITB assets and insider dealing that allegedly began in January 1997, after Coelho and his then business partner, Nunzio DeSantis (who's also left ITB), took over.

Sources close to Coelho say the SEC inquiry involves “warfare” among rival ITB board members. They say there are no

allegations of personal wrongdoing by Coelho. But the probe could be embarrassing. Corporate minutes show that Coelho, who had a $120,000-a-year consulting contract from ITB, presided over board meetings where transactions under review were approved. Among them: large compensation pack-

ages for DeSantis and other firm officials and corporate jet expenses to a firm owned by DeSantis's son. DeSantis's lawyer declined comment. An attorney for Coelho said he had limited knowledge of the transactions. "We're comfortable that Tony is fine on these issues," said a Gore spokesman.

A probe of the new chairman's business ties could be embarrassing

THE DOLES

Deep Freeze

BOB DOLE HASN'T WON himself any friends on his wife's campaign staff. While he has ruminated about contributing to rival candidates, the fat-cat fund-raisers who bankrolled his three presidential runs haven't come through for Elizabeth. "This is the boys' club, her damn husband included," says an adviser to Mrs. Dole. "They're standing at the door saying, 'We don't want her'." The Dole camp is turning to non-traditional ways to raise money, particularly among women.

They're buying subscriber lists from women's mags, booking Mrs. Dole on the "Rosie O'Donnell Show" and searching for "common sense" positions on issues like guns and abortion.

Meanwhile, "there'll be a lot of casseroles in the deep freezer for Bob," says the adviser.

Fund-raising woes: Dole

LAWSUITS

A Bad Day at the Beach

THE DISCRIMINATION SUIT filed last week against the Adam's Mark Hotel in Daytona Beach, Fla., is not the first charge of racism the hotel chain has faced. At last month's Black College Reunion, a spring-break event, hotel guests were required to wear orange ID bracelets, pay in advance and provide a damage deposit. Daytona Beach has tried to

Protesters at the Adam's Mark

clamp down on large, rowdy groups that descend on the barrier island, and Black College Reunion has had an especially testy relationship with the town since a shootout that occurred during the rite last year. The hotel says its rules apply to any large group and denies that blacks were singled out, as the Daytona Beach guests allege. But lawyers in the class-action suit cited an earlier discrimination case involving the Adam's Mark Hotel's parent company. After a trial, the court ordered management to attend race education programs and to submit to monitoring by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. A spokesman for the chain denied knowledge of the case.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

Massing at the Border Edition

CW apologizes for shoddy work this week—we were in line for “Episode 1.” But we hear the ground war is coming. May we be the Gungans, Slobo the Battle Droid.

C.W.

Guns

Cheers to Senate for gutsy vote. Not even Tom Selleck can defend you now.

Barak

Does new P.M. mean new hope for Israel? CW says: give peace a chance.

Dole

May donate to McCain campaign. Can Viora help make it up to Liddy?

Sun Vista

Malaysian cruise ship sinks, but "Titanic" song comforts survivors.

Lucci

Daytime diva wins Emmy after 19 noms. But acceptance speech soap opera of its own.

Smallpox

Last-minute reprieve saves the disease. A pox on none of your houses.

4 NEWSWEEK MAY 31, 1999

J

TOP TO BOTTOM: DAVID HUME KENNERLY FOR NEWSWEEK, FRED JEWELL—AP, PAM LOCKEBY—DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-JOURNAL—AP

INTERNATIONAL

[L]

# New World Disorder

The ill-considered war in Kosovo has undermined relations with China and Russia and put NATO at risk. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

A WAR AT THE FAR EDGE OF THE BALKANS HAS HAD POLITICAL consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In Russia, an outraged sense of humiliation over NATO's actions has spread from the elites to the population at large and threatens to blight U.S.-Russian relations for years to come. In Beijing, the virulent reaction to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented frus- trations with the roller-coaster nature of Sino-American relations that have accumulated for many months. And in Europe, the seeming unity of the Atlantic Alliance has grown brittle: key allies are ey- ing the exits; domestic opposition is mounting; the newly admitted members in Central Europe are uncomfortable that their first allied activity is as part of a NATO- initiated war.

The causes in Russia and China are plain enough. Their leaders are products of societies that interpret decisions about war and peace ac- cording to whether they enhance a nation's security or other vital in- terests. If they can discern no such traditional rationale to U.S. behav- ior, they ascribe our motives not to altruism but to a hidden agenda for domination.

In Europe, the situation is more complex. The allies share our mo- tives but are beginning to question our judgment. And they find them- selves under increasing domestic pressure as the damage from the bombing of Serbia compounds the devastation of Kosovo.

A generation gap has exacerbat- ed the crisis. The formative expe- riences of the Clinton administra- tion's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam pro- test movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both. Suspi- cious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffective- ly and without conviction. They emphasize the so-called “soft” issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests, which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public- opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect to strategy; adept at “spinning” public opinion but oblivious to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility of notions of “graduated escalation.”

The rejection of long-range strategy explains how it was possi- ble to slide into the Kosovo conflict without adequate considera- tion of all its implications—especially the visceral reaction of al- most all nations of the world against the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Before the start of the bombing, it was conventional wisdom in Washington that Serbia's historic attachment to Kosovo was exaggerated and that Slobodan Milo- sevic was looking for a pretext to get rid of the incubus it rep-

resented—which a few days of bombing was supposed to supply. But what if Serbia, the country that fought the Turkish and Aus- trian empires and defied Hitler and Stalin at the height of their powers, did not yield? How far were we willing to go? Not to ground war, it was announced at the very beginning, tempting Milosevic to test his endurance to sustained bombing. No provision was made for a war of attrition or the flood of refugees it was bound to create—not to speak of the eth- nic cleansing that the war has ac- celerated and intensified.

From the start, there has been a vast gap between the rhetoric and the means with which to back it up. Allied pronouncements have ritu- ally compared Milosevic to Hitler. But the transparent reluctance to accept casualties signaled that the Alliance would not make the com- mitment necessary to overthrow the accused tyrant. Now, if the out- come is to be some kind of com- promise, Milosevic will inevi- tably be legitimized and emerge as a valid interlocutor. By justifying the war in terms requiring total victory while conducting a strategy impelling compromise,

NATO has maneuvered itself into a trap.

Several fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly far- off days in February, when other options were still open. The first was the demand that 30,000 NATO troops enter Yugoslavia, a country with which NATO was not at war, and administer a prov- ence that had emotional significance as the origin of Serbia's inde- pendence. The second was to use the foreseeable Serb refusal as justification for starting the bombing.

Rambouillet was not a negotiation—as is often claimed—but an ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an adminis- tration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the U.N. Charter and multilateral procedures. The transformation of the

ROBERT GIBBONS—GAMMA-LIAISON

SLAP AT BEIJING: Clinton backed away from a favorable trade deal with China's Zhu Rongji in April

> We must not repeat in Asia the emotional and unthought-out policies that brought us such grief in the Balkans

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK

41

INTERNATIONAL

L'ECHEANCE

Alliance from a defensive military grouping into an institution prepared to impose its values by force occurred in the same months that three former Soviet satellites joined NATO. It undercut repeated American and allied assurances that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO expansion, since the Alliance's own treaty proclaimed it to be a purely defensive institution.

Kosovo has thereby become a symbol of Russia's post-cold-war frustrations. The tribulations of Yugoslavia, Moscow's traditional friend (leaving aside the interruption of the Tito years), emphasized Russia's decline and have generated a hostility toward America and the West that may produce a nationalist and socialist Russia—akin to the European Fascism of the 1930s. This would be a sorry end for the administration's policy of supporting Russian reform and coaxing Russia closer to the West.

This is why the expectations attached to the Russian mediation in Kosovo seem excessive. Russian leaders would hardly be bro-

kenhearted if the outcome in Kosovo weakens NATO. A Russian intermediary faces a double dilemma: if he is seen as supporting the NATO program, he will lose standing at home; if he induces us to reduce our demands, he will become a scapegoat in the American domestic debate over compromising our war aims. Russia's most constructive role in my view would be as full participant at a conference for political arrangements in the Balkans *following* a ceasefire.

To its credit, the administration from the beginning has recognized the importance of bringing Russia into the international community. But it has identified this effort primarily with democratic reform and market economics inside Russia and nonproliferation abroad. All this accentuates the Russian sense of having come under a kind of colonial tutelage. Russia, in turn, has clung to many aspects of its traditional diplomacy: seeking to reduce our influence, especially in the Middle East. Russia's image of itself as an historic player on the world stage must be taken seriously. This requires less lecturing and more dialogue; less sentimentality

and more recognition that Russia's national interests are not always congruent with ours; less sociology and more foreign policy.

Before the attack on its Belgrade embassy, China's reaction to the air war was more muted than Russia's—but equally negative. Every nation views international events through the prism of its history. And to China, the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian intervention evokes Europe's unilaterally proclaimed civilizing mission in the 19th century, which led to the fragmentation of China and a series of Western interventions. These humilations were followed in the 20th century by the so-called Brezhnev doctrine that proclaimed the Kremlin's right to punish by force of arms communist regimes that strayed from its ideological line. Indeed, it was to resist the Brezhnev doctrine that China moved to restore its relations with the United States in 1971.

That policy of close ties between the United States and China is now questioned in both capitals. President Clinton's policy has built on the conviction of all his predecessors since Richard

Nixon that both China and the United States have much to gain from cooperation and risk exhausting themselves by confrontation. For China, a breakdown in relations would deal a severe blow to its economic program and modernization. For America, it would ensure turmoil throughout Asia, leaving China's neighbors torn by the need to choose between the world's most populous country, whose 5,000 years of history give it a special place in Asia, and America, the world's only superpower.

That cooperative policy is losing momentum on our side largely because of a stalemate between the administration and opponents who see China as our principal strategic threat. The stalemate arises from the administration's tendency to present its policy of engagement with China less in terms of common objectives than as a better method of achieving its critics' objectives. A "strategic partnership" has been proclaimed, but real strategic discussions on the highest level have been rare amid dis-

putes over issues ranging from Taiwan to human rights to nonproliferation. And the administration has felt obliged to balance its China policy with periodic bows to its critics.

A GOOD EXAMPLE WAS the visit to Washington in early April of Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji—generally considered among the most reformist and market-oriented of the Chinese leaders. That visit was bracketed by the announcement—just before Zhu's arrival—that the United States would support a U.N. resolution condemning China's human-rights practices, and immediately afterward by the sale of long-range radars to Taiwan. And during the visit, the administration declined to sign an agreement on China's entry into the World Trade Organization, for which the Chinese had made major concessions and which they had reason to believe would be the centerpiece of Zhu's visit. (To compound Zhu's embarrassment, the administration published all the concessions he had made.)

Whatever one's view of the substance of these decisions, their timing conveyed an impression of a government driven by its critics into subordinating to domestic politics a policy that should be based on mutual national interests.

The bombing of the Belgrade embassy was the match that set off the explosion. Mutual suspicions fed on each other. The Chinese viewed the president's original apology—made as a response to a question at a press conference during a visit to Oklahoma and linked to a justification of NATO bombing—as inadequate. Americans considered the Chinese violence against the American Embassy in Beijing unacceptable. But if the Soviet-American relationship is not to spiral toward a confrontation, it is essential to call a halt to mutual recrimination and seek to restore a dialogue.

The leaders of both countries seem aware that a confrontation would be catastrophic for both sides as well as for the peace of the world. But both are under pressure from ideological opponents at home. However, there is no way to dodge this debate.

WADE GODDARD—STUART

WE MUST PERSIST: Ground troops may be required to clear Kosovo and allow refugees to return home

Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, administration officials use it ineffectively and without conviction

NEWSWEEK MAY 31, 1999

In the United States, the critics are serious and so must be the administration.

The critics of a cooperative China policy fall into two camps. The first group holds that the emergence of China as a major power automatically threatens American vital interests, especially under communist leadership. A second group is concerned about specific Chinese policies from human rights to proliferation. To be sure, China's actions on many fronts reflect the unsentimental policy of an emerging power. Nevertheless, Sin-American disagreements can be kept short of confrontation by patient and firm diplomacy. And there are many areas of congruent interests. If, in the absence of a direct challenge, the emergence of China as a major power and its political system are turned into the occasion for American hostility, we will be embarked on a lonely course without support from any major nation in either Europe or Asia. I would warn against such an ad-

venture that will distort our Asian policy for decades. There is no more important task for American foreign policy than to design a strategy recognizing and managing adversarial elements in our relations with China, yet drawing Beijing further into the international system. We must not repeat in Asia the emotional and unthought-out policies that brought us such grief in the Balkans. The law of unintended consequences still operates.

D ESPITE THE SEEMING unity of the NATO summit, Kosovo has made a debate about the Alliance's future inevitable. It is being delayed by horror at Milosevic's barbarities and by the paradox that Europe's new left-wing governments—especially in Germany and Italy—are afraid of being accused of undermining their conservative predecessors' legacy of pro-American and pro-NATO foreign policy. But these new governments are likely to consider that they have now paid enough homage to the traditions of allied solidarity. They can be expected to be influenced by

the mounting indignation of their rank and file, who would be protesting in the streets of Germany in the tens of thousands had former chancellor Helmut Kohl won the election and carried out a similar policy. Once the Kosovo crisis is over—or if the war drags on—these constituencies will become more dominant. And their influence has already been shown in the unprecedentedly abrupt refusal of the German chancellor to consider ground troops for Kosovo.

The issues ducked at the NATO summit brook no further delay. Specifically, what is the proper mission of NATO in so-called "out of area" conflicts? What are the relative roles of Europe and America? Does the Alliance have a serious political or military strategy for stabilizing parts of Europe or adjacent strategic regions?

Europe (the U.K. included) has already begun to draw the conclusion from Kosovo that it needs to accelerate the elaboration of its own institutions in order to enhance its autonomy from the United States—hardly a vote of confidence in the middle of a

war. But if Europe will not supply the resources for this task—as is likely—the Alliance will be left with the worst of all scenarios: a Europe asserting greater freedom of action from the United States but with little actual ability to act alone; and an America estranged from Europe.

No issue is more in need of rethinking than the concept of humanitarian intervention put forward as the administration's contribution to a new approach to foreign policy. The air war in Kosovo is justified as establishing the principle that the international community—or at least NATO—will henceforth punish the transgressions of governments against their own people. But we did not do so in Algeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Rwanda, the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions. And what will be our attitude to emerging ethnic conflicts in Asia, for example in Indonesia and the Philippines? The answer often given is that we act where we are able to without undue risk, not

elsewhere. But what are the criteria for this distinction? And what kind of humanism expresses its reluctance to suffer military casualties by devastating the civilian economy of its adversary for decades to come?

Moral principles are expressed in absolutes. But foreign policy must forever be concerned with reconciling ends and means. The fact that ethnic cleansing is repugnant does not obviate the need to devise the most appropriate response. At every stage of the Kosovo tragedy, other mixes of diplomacy and force were available, though it is not clear they were ever seriously considered. A strategy that vindicates its moral convictions only from altitudes above 15,000 feet—and in the process devastates Serbia and makes Kosovo unlivable—has already produced more refugees and casualties than any conceivable alternative mix of force and diplomacy would have. It deserves to be questioned on both political and moral grounds.

The United States can take pride in elevating human rights to an integral part of foreign policy.

But when one observes the pro-

gression from the call for moral pressure of the 1970s, to economic sanctions in the 1980s, to military intervention in the 1990s, the time has come to call for a definition of purposes and a dialogue on the relationship between objectives and methods. But this is for the future. Now that the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance has been staked, we must persist—with ground troops if necessary—until Serb military forces leave Kosovo and the refugees are allowed to return.

The paradox is that a country that thinks of itself as acting in the name of universal values is seen by too many others as acting arbitrarily, or inexplicably, or arrogantly. A re-examination of the prevailing premises of our foreign policy is overdue. This is a tall order for the last 18 months of an administration heretofore more given to tactics than strategy, more to Band-Aids than to healing. The agenda will not be completed in the time left. But if the president encourages a debate on a new agenda before the end of his term, he will have left an important legacy.

ALEXANDER ZEMAN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

RIFT WITH MOSCOW: Both public and elite, like new P.M. Sergei Stepashin (above), are shocked by NATO's war

> Russia's self-image as a player on the world stage must be taken seriously. This requires less lecturing and more dialogue.

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK 43

INTERNATIONAL

ISRAEL

# The General Takes Charge

Barak rides into office on a wave of good feeling. But Israeli politics may be as fractured as ever.

BY JOSEPH CONTRERAS AND MICHAEL HIRSH

‘M PRETTY GOOD WHEN THE BATTLE begins,” Ehud Barak told Bob Shrum, his newly hired American ad man, a few days into his campaign. The ex-general running for prime minister of Israel quickly proved it. Some pundits called Barak’s stunning landslide victory over incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu last week a tribute to his aggressive U.S.-style election tactics. Others pointed to a back-lash against Netanyahu’s dark, Nixonian personality. But for many Israelis the triumph was mainly about Barak himself, the tough little Sabra with the chest full of medals and the 180 IQ whose campaign

changed the face of Israeli politics. “This victory belongs to all of Israel,” Barak told a roaring crowd of 300,000 in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square—many of whom saw him as heir to the martyred Yitzhak Rabin. Blunt and defiant as always, he added: “I will be the prime minister of those who voted against me as well.”

Israelis are a skeptical lot—hardly easy touches for bring-us-together rhetoric on election night. Especially in an election that, while it handed a 56 percent margin to Barak, has fragmented Israel’s Parliament, the Knesset, as never before. But last

week many were almost ready to believe Barak. An almost giddy optimism is sweeping the nation, a sentiment that has more to do with relief than anything else. Why? Barak’s winning slogan, engineered by Shrum and Clinton’s famed “war room” adviser James Carville, tells it all. It was a barb aimed at Netanyahu, and aired almost hourly by Barak’s U.S. spinmeisters:

“Stuck, Stuck, Stuck.” For three years Netanyahu had blocked peace with the Palestinians, sown discord between religious and ethnic factions and overseen an economy in a rut. “Ta-Cou-Ah, Ta-Cou-Ah, Ta-Cou-Ah,” as Carville recited it in his Bayou Hebrew. “Stuck. That’s what resonated with the Israelis.”

The question is whether Barak, who must form a coalition government within six weeks, is really the man to get things unstuck. On paper, of course, he’s a phenomenon: a Stanford-educated systems analyst who is also an accomplished classical pianist. During a 35-year military career,

Barak became Israel’s most decorated and celebrated soldier. Squat and apple-cheeked, at 57 Barak bears more resemblance to a Borscht Belt comic than a commando who once killed Arabs in hand-to-hand combat; in one of his best-known feats, he dressed up as a woman in 1973 to mount a raid on a PLO safe house in west Beirut. Now Barak says he wants to make peace—and like his mentor Rabin, another fabled soldier, he has the battlefield credibility to keep the hawks at bay.

He also has a natural ally in Bill Clinton, whose relations with Netanyahu

were, at best, frosty. Still, longtime Mideast hands caution that it took Rabin years before he was ready to shake Yasir Arafat’s hand on the White House lawn. “I don’t know that we know about Barak’s real intentions,” says a senior Clinton-administration official. “He drapes himself in the mantle of Rabin. But it also depends which Rabin—the Rabin of ’92 is not the same as

the Rabin of ’95.” And Israelis who know Barak well say he has more than a little of the smug, autocratic Netanyahu in him. He’s a man who discards those no longer useful to him (after taking over Labor, for instance, Barak consigned longtime leader Shimon Peres to a backbench role). “He lacks genuine human warmth,” says an old Army colleague who has known him for

BETH FREEMAN - AP

Backlash: Netanyahu, with his wife, Sara, concedes defeat

NADAY NEUHAUS—SYNA

But can he govern?
War hero Barak
must deal with a
fragmented Knesset

44 NEWSWEEK MAY 31, 1999

["INTERNATIONAL", "New World Disorder", "The ill-considered war in Kosovo has underpinned relations between China and Russia and put NATO at risk", "Fax copy", "A WAR AT THE FAR EDGE OF THE BALKANS HAS HAD POLITICAL consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In Russia, an outraged sense of humiliation over NATO's actions has spread from the elites to the population at large and threatens to blight U.S.-Russian relations for years to come. In Beijing, the virulent reaction to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented frus- trations with the roller-coaster nature of Sino-American relations", "that have accumulated for many months. And in Europe, the seeming unity of the Atlantic Alliance has grown brittle: key allies are eyeing the exits; domestic opposition is mounting; the newly admitted members in Central Europe are uncomfortable that their first allied activity is as part of a NATO-initiated war.", "The causes in Russia and China are plain enough. Their leaders are products of societies that interpret decisions about war and peace according to whether they enhance a nation's security or other vital interests. If they can discern no such traditional rationale to U.S. behavior, they ascribe our motives not to altruism but to a hidden agenda for domination.", "In Europe, the situation is more complex. The allies share our motives but are beginning to question our judgment. And they find themselves under increasing domestic pressure as the damage from the bombing of Serbia compounds the devastation of Kosovo.", "A generation gap has exacerbated the crisis. The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam pro-test movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both. Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffectively and without conviction. They emphasize the so-called “soft” issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests, which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public-opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect to strategy; adept at “spinning” public opinion but oblivious to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility of notions of “graduated escalation.”", "ROBERT GIROUX-GAMMA-LIAISON", "SLAP AT BEIJING: Clinton backed away from a favorable trade deal with China's Zhu Rongji in April", "> We must not repeat in Asia the emotional and unthought-out policies that brought us such grief in the Balkans", "Thepossibility of alternative courses of action, however, is more complex. NATO has no military force that can be used toشنala the most號able toendure the most號able to

INTERNATIONAL

New World Disorder

The ill-considered war in Kosovo has un-
determined relations with China and Russia and put NATO at risk.

WAR AT THE FAR EDGE OF THE BALKANS HAS HAD PO-
litical consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In
Russia, an outraged sense of humiliation over NATO's
actions has spread from the elites to the population at
large and threatens to blight U.S.-Russian relations for
years to come. In Beijing, the virulent reaction to the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented frus-
trations with the roller-coaster nature of Sino-American relations

that have accumulated for many
months. And in Europe, the seem-
ing unity of the Atlantic Alliance
has grown brittle: key allies are ey-
ing the exits; domestic opposition
is mounting; the newly admitted
members in Central Europe are
uncomfortable that their first
allied activity is as part of a NATO-
initiated war.

A generation gap has exacerbated the crisis. The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam pro-
test movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both. Suspi-
cious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffective-
ly and without conviction. They emphasize the so-called “soft”
issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions
of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests,
which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public-
opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an
extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful
in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect
to strategy; adept at “spinning” public opinion but oblivious to a
generation’s worth of lessons about the limitations of air power
and the futility of notions of “graduated escalation.”

The
able to re-
lation of
most a
humoral
was co
attach
sevic was looking for a pretext to get rid of the incubus it rep-
resented—which a few days of
bombing was supposed to supply.
But what if Serbia, the country
that fought the Turkish and Aus-
trian empires and defied Hitler
and Stalin at the height of their
powers, did not yield? How far
were we willing to go? Not to
ground war, it was announced at
the very beginning, tempting
Milosevic to test his endurance to
sustained bombing. No provision
was made for a war of attrition or
the flood of refugees it was bound
to create—not to speak of the eth-
nic cleansing that the war has ac-
celerated and intensified.

From the start, there has been a
vast gap between the rhetoric and
the means with which to back it up.
Allied pronouncements have ritu-
ally compared Milosevic to Hitler.
But the transparent reluctance to
accept casualties signaled that the
Alliance would not make the com-
mitment necessary to overthrow
the accused tyrant. Now, if the out-
come is to be some kind of com-
promise, Milosevic will inevi-
tably be legitimized and emerge
as a valid interlocutor. By justify-
ing the war in terms requiring
total victory while conducting a
strategy impelling compromise,

Several fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly far-
off days in February, when other options were still open. The first
was the demand that 30,000 NATO troops enter Yugoslavia, a
country with which NATO was not at war, and administer a prov-
ince that had emotional significance as the origin of Serbia's inde-
pendence. The second was to use the foreseeable Serb refusal as
justification for starting the bombing.

ROBERT GIBBON - GAMMA-LIAISON

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK

INTERNATIONAL

New World Disorder

A
WAR AT THE FAR EDGE OF THE BALKANS HAS HAD PO-
litical consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In
Russia, an outraged sense of humiliation over NATO's
actions has spread from the elites to the population at
large and threatens to blight U.S.-Russian relations for
years to come. In Beijing, the virulent reaction to the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented frus-
trations with the roller-coaster nature of Sino-American relations

A generation gap has exacerbated the crisis. The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam pro- test movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both. Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffective- ly and without conviction. They emphasize the so-called “soft” issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests, which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public- opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect to strategy; adept at “spinning” public opinion but oblivious to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility of notions of “graduated escalation.”

The rejection of long-range strategy explains how it was possible to slide into the Kosovo conflict without adequate consideration of all its implications—especially the visceral reaction of almost all nations of the world against the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Before the start of the bombing, it was conventional wisdom in Washington that Serbia’s historic attachment to Kosovo was exaggerated and that Slobodan Milosevic was looking for a pretext to get rid of the incubus it represented—which a few days of bombing was supposed to supply. But what if Serbia, the country that fought the Turkish and Austrian empires and defied Hitler and Stalin at the height of their powers, did not yield? How far were we willing to go? Not to ground war, it was announced at the very beginning, tempting Milosevic to test his endurance to sustained bombing. No provision was made for a war of attrition or the flood of refugees it was bound to create—not to speak of the ethnic cleansing that the war has accelerated and intensified.

ROBERT GIBBONS - CAMBRIDGE HANSON

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK

41

INTERNATIONAL

Alliance from a defensive military grouping into an institution prepared to impose its values by force occurred in the same months that three former Soviet satellites joined NATO. It undercut repeated American and allied assurances that Russia had nothing to fear from NATO expansion, since the Alliance's own treaty claimed it to be a purely defensive institution.

Kosovo has thereby become a symbol of Russia's post-coldwar frustrations. The tribulations of Yugoslavia, Moscow's traditional friend (leaving aside the interruption of the Tito years), emphasized Russia's decline and have generated a hostility toward America and the West that may produce a nationalist and socialist Russia—akin to the European Fascism of the 1930s. This would be a sorry end for the administration's policy of supporting Russian reform and coaxing Russia closer to the West.

This is why the expectations attached to the Russian mediation in Kosovo seem excessive. Russian leaders would hardly be bro-
kenhearted if the outcome in Kosovo weakens NATO. A Russian intermediary faces a double dilemma: if he is seen as supporting the NATO program, he will lose standing at home; if he induces us to reduce our demands, he will become a scapegoat in the American domestic debate over compromising our war aims. Russia's most constructive role in my view would be as full participant at a conference for political arrangements in the Balkans following a ceasefire.

To its credit, the administration
from the beginning has recognized
the importance of bringing Russia
into the international community.
But it has identified this effort
primarily with democratic reform
and market economics inside Rus-
sia and nonproliferation abroad.
All this accentuates the Russian
sense of having come under a kind
of colonial tutelage. Russia, in
turn, has clung to many aspects of
its traditional diplomacy: seeking
to reduce our influence, especially
in the Middle East. Russia's image
of itself as an historic player on the
world stage must be taken serious-
ly. This requires less lecturing and
more dialogue; less sentimentality

Nixon that both China and the United States have much to gain
from cooperation and risk exhausting themselves by confronta-
tion. For China, a breakdown in relations would deal a severe
blow to its economic program and modernization. For America,
it would ensure turmoil throughout Asia, leaving China's neigh-
bors torn by the need to choose between the world's most popu-
lous country, whose 5,000 years of history give it a special place in
Asia, and America, the world's only superpower.

That cooperative policy is losing momentum on our side large-
ly because of a stalemate between the administration and oppo-
nents who see China as our principal strategic threat. The stale-
mate arises from the administration's tendency to present
its policy of engagement with China less in terms of common
objectives than as a better method of achieving its critics' objec-
tives. A "strategic partnership" has been proclaimed, but real
strategic discussions on the highest level have been rare amid dis-

putes over issues ranging from
Taiwan to human rights to non-
proliferation. And the administra-
tion has felt obliged to balance
its China policy with periodic
bows to its critics.

WADE GODDARD—STOMA

A
GOOD EXAMPLE WAS
the visit to Washington
in early April of Chinese
Prime Minister Zhu
Rongji—generally con-
sidered among the most
reformist and market-oriented of
the Chinese leaders. That visit was
bracketed by the announcement—
just before Zhu's arrival—that the
United States would support a
U.N. resolution condemning Chi-
na's human-rights practices, and
immediately afterward by the sale
of long-range radars to Taiwan.
And during the visit, the adminis-
tration declined to sign an agree-
ment on China's entry into the
World Trade Organization, for
which the Chinese had made major
concessions and which they had
reason to believe would be the cen-
terpiece of Zhu's visit. (To com-
pound Zhu's embarrassment, the
administration published all the
concessions he had made.)

Whatever one's view of the sub-
stance of these decisions, their timing conveyed an impression of
a government driven by its critics into subordinating to domestic
politics a policy that should be based on mutual national interests.

The bombing of the Belgrade embassy was the match that set off the explosion. Mutual suspicions fed on each other. The Chinese viewed the president's original apology—made as a response to a question at a press conference during a visit to Oklahoma and linked to a justification of NATO bombing—as inadequate. Americans considered the Chinese violence against the American Embassy in Beijing unacceptable. But if the Sin-American relationship is not to spiral toward a confrontation, it is essential to call a halt to mutual recrimination and seek to restore a dialogue.

The leaders of both countries seem aware that a confrontation
would be catastrophic for both sides as well as for the peace of
the world. But both are under pressure from ideological oppo-
nents at home. However, there is no way to dodge this debate.

NEWSWEEK MAY 31, 1999

The critics of a cooperative China policy fall into two camps. The first group holds that the emergence of China as a major power automatically threatens American vital interests, especially under communist leadership. A second group is concerned about specific Chinese policies from human rights to proliferation. To be sure, China's actions on many fronts reflect the sentimental policy of an emerging power. Nevertheless, Sin-American disagreements can be kept short of confrontation by patient and firm diplomacy. And there are many areas of congruent interests. If, in the absence of a direct challenge, the emergence of China as a major power and its political system are turned into the occasion for American hostility, we will be embarked on a lonely course without support from any major nation in either Europe or Asia. I would warn against such an adventure that will distort our Asian policy for decades. There is no more important task for American foreign policy than to design a strategy recognizing and managing adversarial elements in our relations with China, yet drawing Beijing further into the international system. We must not repeat in Asia the emotional and unthought-out policies that brought us such grief in the Balkans. The law of unintended consequences still operates.

expected to be influenced by the mounting indignation of their rank and file, who would be protesting in the streets of Germany in the tens of thousands had former cellor Helmut Kohl won the election and carried out a similar policy. Once the Kosovo crisis is over—or if the war drags on—these constituencies will become more dominant. And their influence has already been shown in the unprecedentedly abrupt refusal of the German chancellor to consider ground troops for Kosovo.

pro-gression from the call for moral pressure of the 1970s, to econom-ic sanctions in the 1980s, to military intervention in the 1990s, the time has come to call for a definition of purposes and a dialogue on the relationship between objectives and methods. But this is on the relationship between the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance for the future. Now that the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance has been staked, we must persist—with ground troops if necessary—until Serb military forces leave Kosovo and the refugees are allowed to return.

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK

43

INTERNATIONAL

New World Disorder

A WAR AT THE FAR EDGE OF THE BALKANS HAS HAD POLITICAL consequences extending far beyond Kosovo. In Russia, an outraged sense of humiliation over NATO's actions has spread from the elites to the population at large and threatens to blight U.S.-Russian relations for years to come. In Beijing, the virulent reaction to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has vented frus-trations with the roller-coaster nature of Sino-American relations that have accumulated for many months. And in Europe, the seem-ing unity of the Atlantic Alliance has grown brittle: key allies are ey-ing the exits; domestic opposition is mounting; the newly admitted members in Central Europe are uncomfortable that their first allied activity is as part of a NATO-initiated war.

In Europe, the situation is more complex. The allies share our motives but are beginning to question our judgment. And they find themselves under increasing domestic pressure as the damage from the bombing of Serbia compounds the devastation of Kosovo.

A generation gap has exacerbated the crisis. The formative experiences of the Clinton administration's key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam pro-test movement, or in presidential campaigns—or both. Suspicious of the role of power in foreign policy, they use it ineffective-ly and without conviction. They emphasize the so-called “soft” issues, like the environment, and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium or of traditional U.S. interests, which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public-opinion polls, they are ever tempted to treat foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect to strategy; adept at “spinning” public opinion but oblivious to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility of notions of “graduated escalation.”

The rejection of long-range strategy explains how it was possible to slide into the Kosovo conflict without adequate consideration of all its implications—especially the visceral reaction of almost all nations of the world against the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Before the start of the bombing, it was conventional wisdom in Washington that Serbia's historic attachment to Kosovo was exaggerated and that Slobodan Milosevic was looking for a pretext to get rid of the incubus it represented—which a few days of bombing was supposed to supply. But what if Serbia, the country that fought the Turkish and Austrian empires and defied Hitler and Stalin at the height of their powers, did not yield? How far were we willing to go? Not to ground war, it was announced at the very beginning, tempting Milosevic to test his endurance to sustained bombing. No provision was made for a war of attrition or the flood of refugees it was bound to create—not to speak of the ethnic cleansing that the war has accelerated and intensified.

From the start, there has been a vast gap between the rhetoric and the means with which to back it up. Allied pronouncements have ritually compared Milosevic to Hitler. But the transparent reluctance to accept casualties signaled that the Alliance would not make the commitment necessary to overthrow the accused tyrant. Now, if the outcome is to be some kind of compromise, Milosevic will inevitably be legitimized and emerge as a valid interlocutor. By justifying the war in terms requiring total victory while conducting a strategy impelling compromise,

Several fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly far-off days in February, when other options were still open. The first was the demand that 30,000 NATO troops enter Yugoslavia, a country with which NATO was not at war, and administer a province that had emotional significance as the origin of Serbia's independence. The second was to use the foreseeable Serb refusal as justification for starting the bombing.

Rambouillet was not a negotiation—as is often claimed—but an ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an administration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the U.N. Charter and multilateral procedures. The transformation of the

ROBERT GROUZ—GAMMA-LIAISON

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK 41

INTERNATIONAL

diseases over issues ranging from Taiwan to human rights to nonproliferation. And the administration has felt obliged to balance its China policy with periodic bows to its critics.

Whatever one's view of the sub-

NEWSWEEK MAY 31, 1999

【LC】

MAY 31, 1999 NEWSWEEK 43

INTERNATIONAL

ISRAEL

# The General Takes Charge

‘M PRETTY GOOD WHEN THE BATTLE begins,” Ehud Barak told Bob Shrum, his newly hired American ad man, a few days into his campaign. The ex-general running for prime minister of Israel quickly proved it. Some pundits called Barak’s stunning landslide victory over incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu last week a tribute to his aggressive U.S.-style election tactics. Others pointed to a backlash against Netanyahu’s dark, Nixonian personality. But for many Israelis the triumph was mainly about Barak himself, the tough little Sabra with the chest full of medals and the 180 IQ whose campaign

the Rabin of ’95.” And Israelis who know Barak well say he has more than a little of the smug, autocratic Netanyahu in him. He’s man who discards those no longer useful to him (after taking over Labor, for instance, Barak consigned longtime leader Shimon Peres to a backbench role). “He lacks genuine human warmth,” says an old Army colleague who has known him for

RUTH FREUNSON - AP

NADY NEVIALA - STORA

NEWSWEEK MAY 31, 1999

IN0722 in07 Kissinger
initiated war. If the bombing con-
tinues into the summer, the crisis of
confidence is likely to become pub-
lic.

The causes in Russia and China
are plain enough. Their leaders are
products of societies that interpret
«cut hk» decisions about war and peace ac-
cording to whether they enhance a
nation's security or other vital in-
terests. If they can discern no such
traditional rationale to U.S. behav-
ior, they ascribe our motives not to
altruism—the American percep-
tion of itself—but to a hidden agen-
da for domination.

In Europe, the situation is more
complex. The allies share our mo-
tives but are beginning to question
our judgment. And they find them-
selves under increasing domestic
pressure as the civilian damage
from the bombing of Serbia com-
pounds the devastation of Kosovo.

«hk» A generation gap has exacerbat-
ed the crisis«hk». The formative experi-
ences of «hk» the Clinton Administra-

DEPT:

PG:

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[10]

IN0722 in07 Kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

tion's «hk» key personnel were either in
the trenches of the Vietnam protest movement, or in presidential
campaigns—or both. Suspicious of the role of power in foreign
policy, they use it ineffectively and without conviction. They em-
phasize the so-called "soft" issues, like the environment, and have
little concern with notions of the international equilibrium «hk» or tra-
ditional U.S. interests«hk», which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively
driven by public opinion polls, they are ever tempted to perceive
foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diploma-
cy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but ob-
tuse with respect to strategy; adept at "spinning" public opinion
but oblivious to a generation's worth of lessons about the limita-
tions of air power and the futility of notions of "graduated escala-
tion."

---
End of column
---

tion."

The rejection of long-range strategy explains how it was possi-
ble to slide into the Kosovo conflict without adequate considera-
tion of all its implications—or possible alternatives. Before the
start of the bombing, it was conventional wisdom in Washington
that Serbia's historic attachment to Kosovo was exaggerated and
that Slobodan Milosevic was looking for a pretext to get rid of the
incubus it represented—which a few days of bombing was sup-
posed to supply. «hk» But «hk» what if Ser-
bia, the country that fought the
Turkish and Austrian empires and
defied Hitler and Stalin at the
height of their powers, did not

IN0722

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IN0722 in07 Kissinger

reemerge. By justifying the war in
terms requiring total victory while
conducting a strategy impelling compromise, the Alliance has ma-
neuvered itself into a trap.

Several fateful decisions were taken in those now seemingly
far-off days in February, when other options were still open. The
first was the demand that 30,000 NATO troops enter Yugoslavia,
«mg» a country «mg» cut hk with which NATO was not at war, and «hk» administer a
province «hk» that had emotional significance as the origin of Serbia's
independence. The second was to use the foreseeable Serb refusal
as justification for immediate military action.

Rambouillet was not a negotiation—as is often claimed—but an
ultimatum. This marked an astounding departure for an adminis-
tration that had entered office proclaiming its devotion to the UN

----- End of column -----

«hk» charter and multilateral procedures. The transformation of the Al-
liance from a defensive military grouping into an institution pre-
pared to impose its values by force occurred in the same months
that three former Soviet satellites joined NATO. It undercut re-
peated American and allied assurances that Russia had nothing to
fear from NATO expansion, since the Alliance's own charter pro-
claimed it to be a purely defensive institution.

Kosovo has thereby become a symbol of Russia's post-Cold
War frustrations. The tribulations of Yugoslavia, Moscow's tra-
ditional friend (leaving aside the interruption of the Tito years)
emphasized Russia's decline and has generated a hostility to-
ward America and the West that threatens the emergence of a

DEPT: PG:

IN0722

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MAY-21-1999 16:32

[Lc]

[c]

ING has recognized the impor-
tance of bringing Russia into the
international community. But it
has identified this effort primarily
with democratic reform and mar-
ket economics inside Russia and
non-proliferation abroad. All this
accentuates the Russian sense of
having come under a kind of colo-
nial tutelage of the West. Russia, in
turn, has clung to many aspects of

its traditional diplomacy «mg»:«mg» seeking

to reduce our influence, especially in the Middle East. Russia's
image of itself as an historic player on the world stage must be tak-
en seriously. This requires less lecturing and more dialogue; less
sentimentality and more realism that Russia's national interests
are not always congruent with ours; less sociology and more for-
eign policy.

«makeup: insert drop initial here if possible» Before the attack on its Belgrade embassy, China's reaction to the air war was more muted than Russia's—but equally negative.

Every nation views international events through the prism of its
history. And to China, the new NATO doctrine of humanitarian
intervention evokes Europe's unilaterally proclaimed civilizing
mission in the 19th Century, which led to the fragmentation of
China and a series of Western interventions. These humiliations

were followed in the 20th Century, first by the Japanese invasions and then by the so-called Brezhnev doctrine that proclaimed the Kremlin's right to punish by force of

DEPT:

PG:

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DEPT:

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arms Communist regimes that strayed from its ideological line.

----- End of column -----

That policy of *cut hk close ties* between the United States and China is
now questioned in both capitals. President Clinton's policy has
built on the conviction of all his predecessors since Richard Nixon
that both China and the United States have much to gain from co-
operation and risk exhausting themselves by confrontation. For
China, a breakdown in relations would deal a severe blow to its
economic program and modernization. For America, it would en-
sure turmoil throughout Asia, leaving China's neighbors *cut hk* torn by
the need to choose between the world's most populous country,
whose 5,000 years of uninterrupted history give it a special place
in Asia, and America, the world's only superpower.

That cooperative policy is losing momentum on our side largely
because of «hk» concern over Chinese espionage and human-rights pol-
icy, resulting in a stalemate between the president and «hk» critics who
see China as our principal strategic threat. The President has turned his encounters with Chinese leaders into
television spectaculars and/or discussions of immediate, tactical issues, mostly on trade. A "strategic partner-
ship" has been proclaimed, but real
strategic discussions on the highest
level have been rare amidst dis-
putes over issues ranging from Tai-
wan to human rights to non-prolif-
eration. During a nine day sojourn
in China, the President managed

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DEPT:

PG:

only two hours of dialogue with the
top Chinese leaders. And «hk»the ad-
ministration«hk» has felt obliged to bal-
ance «hk»its constructive«hk» China policy
with periodic bows to its critics.

A good example was the visit to
Washington in early April of Chi-
nese Premier Zhu Rongji—gener-
ally considered among the most re-
formist and market-oriented of the
Chinese leaders. That visit was
bracketed just before Zhu's arrival
by the announcement that the Unit-
ed States would support a UN reso-
lution condemning China's human-
rights practices, and immediately
afterward by the sale of long-range
radars to Taiwan. And during the
visit, the Administration declined
to sign an agreement on China's en-
try into the World Trade Organiza-
tion, for which the Chinese had
made major concessions and which
they had reason to believe would
be the centerpiece of Zhu's visit.
(To compound Zhu's embarrass-

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DEPT: PG:

ment, the Administration pub-

lished all the concessions he had made, causing him to appear both accommodating and ineffective.)

Whatever one's view of the substance of these decisions, their timing conveyed an impression of a government incapable of consistent policy and driven by its critics into subordinating to domestic politics a policy that should be based on «hk»mutual«hk» national interests.

The bombing of the Belgrade embassy was the match that set off the explosion. Mutual suspicions fed on each other. The Chinese viewed the President's original apology—made as a response to a question at a press conference during a visit to Oklahoma and linked to a justification of NATO bombing—as inadequate. «hk»Americans«hk» considered the Chinese violence against the American embassy «mg»in Beijing«mg» unacceptable. But if the Sino-American relationship is not to spiral toward a confrontation, it is essential to call a halt to mutual recrimination and seek to restore a dialogue.

----- End of column -----

world. But both are under pressure from ideological opponents at home. However, there is no way to dodge this debate. In the United States, the critics are serious and so must be the Administration.

«hk»The critics of a cooperative China policy fall into two camps. The first group holds that the emergence of China as a major power automatically threatens American vital interests, especially under Communist leadership. A second group is concerned about specific Chinese policies from human rights to proliferation. To be sure,

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DEPT:

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the Alliance have a serious political or military strategy for <lb>
stabilizing parts of Europe or adjacent strategic regions?

Europe (the UK included) has already begun to draw the con-
clusion from Kosovo that it needs to accelerate the elaboration of
its own institutions in order to enhance its autonomy from the
United States—hardly a vote of confidence in the middle of a
war. But if Europe will not supply the resources for this task—as
is likely—the Alliance will be left with the worst of all scenarios:

----- End of column -----

No issue is more in need of rethinking than the concept of hu-
manitarian intervention put forward as the Administration's con-
tribution to a new approach to foreign policy. The air war in Koso-
vo is justified as establishing the principle that the international
community—or at least NATO—will henceforth punish the trans-
gressions of governments against their own people. But we did
not do so in Algeria, the Sudan, Sierra Leone, Croatia, Rwanda,
the Caucasus, the Kurdish areas and many other regions. The an-
swer often given is that we act where we are ablc to without un-
due risk, not elsewhere. But what are the criteria for this distinc-
tion? And what kind of «hk»humanism vindicates its«hk» reluctance to
suffer military casualties by devastating the civilian economy of its
adversary «hk»for decades to come«hk»?

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DEPT:

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Kosovo is on the verge of turning into the sort of watershed the Vietnam war was for an earlier

generation. The paradox is that a country that thinks of itself as
acting in the name of universal values is seen by too many others
as acting arbitrarily, or inexplicably, or arrogantly. (Boris Yeltsin
has been using the word "impudently.") A reexamination of the
prevailing premises of our foreign policy is overdue. This is a tall
order for the last eighteen months of an Administration heretofore
more given to tactics than strategy, more to «hk»band aids than to heal-
ing«hk». The agenda will not be completed in the time left. But if the
President encourages a debate on a new agenda before the end of
his term, he will have left an important legacy. ■

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05-21-99 06:54

ID=212 4215882

P01/17

HAKKOSOVO2

DEPT: VER # 1
BU: HJ: Galley 424

PG: ISSUE:

CREATOR: MWHITA; 05/20/99, 11:05

PRINTED BY: mwhita; 05/20/99, 3:11 PM

WRITER: MWHITA

FROM: 05/20/99

FILE: HAKKOSOVO2-MWHITA-PVT

REVISOR: MWHITA; 05/20/99, 14:29

By Henry. A Kissinger

A war at the far edge of the
Balkans has had political consequences
extending far beyond Kosovo.

In Moscow, an outraged sense of
humiliation over NATO's actions has
spread from the elites Moscow elite to the population at
large and may blight US-Russian relations
for decades. In Beijing, the virulent Chinese reaction
to the bombing of the Chinese their embassy in
Belgrade vented frustrations with the
roller-coaster nature of Sino-American
relations that have accumulated accumulating for many
months. And in Europe, the seeming unity
of the Atlantic Alliance is brittle. Key allies
are eying the exits; domestic opposition is
mounting in Germany and Italy and was
always powerful in Greece: the newly
just admitted members allies in Eastern Europe are
uncomfortable that their first allied activity
is as part of a NATO-initiated war. In the
bombing continues into the summer, theEric-
sis of confidence is likely to become public.

HAKKOSOVO2

05-21-99 06:54

ID=212 4215882

P02/17

HAKKOSOVO2

DEPT:

PG:

The causes in Russia and China are plain enough. Their leaders are products of societies that interpret foreign policy in the historic terms of national interest.

They assume that decisions about war and peace are made according to whether they enhance a nation's security or other vital interests. If they can discern no such traditional rationale to U.S. behavior, they ascribe our motives not to altruism—the American perception of itself—but to a hidden agenda for domination.

In Europe, the situation is more complex. The allies share our motives but are beginning to question our judgment. And they find themselves under increasing domestic pressure as the civilian damage from the bombing of Serbia compounds the devastation of Kosovo.

The Clinton Administration's Les exacerbated the crisis style and philosophy have so far exacerbated

the crisis. The formative experiences of the key personnel were either in the trenches of the Vietnam protest movement, or in of presidential campaigns—or both.

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conviction. They emphasize the so-called "soft" issues, like the environment and have little concern with notions of the international equilibrium, which they scorn as outdated. Obsessively driven by public opinion polls, they are ever tempted to perceive foreign policy as an extension of domestic politics. Their diplomacy is quite skillful in dealing with short-term tactical issues but obtuse with respect to strategy; adept at "spinning" public opinion but tone-dee to a generation's worth of lessons about the limitations of air power and the futility of notions of "graduated escalation"

The rejection of long-range strategy explains how it was possible to slide into the Kosovo conflict without adequate consideration of all its implications—or of possible alternatives. In the days before the start of the bombing, it was conventional wisdom in Washington that Serbia's historic attachment to Kosovo was exaggerated and

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