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TelCon

Hank Trewhitt/Kissinger

8:44 a.m. - 7/17/73

K: Hello.

T: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

T: OK.

K: If you want to go ahead with writing this thing with the proviso that I have the right to approve direct and indirect quotes.

T: That's perfect.

K: Then go ahead. Now what I have done with Sidey is I've given him none of the concrete analysis but some of the philosophical stuff, but we can handle it by what I approve so as to avoid overlap.

T: OK. This is fine because I was concerned that - I must say that the way the thing did shape up it really does look like a Kissinger piece and I was having a little trouble with Klein there after we left because he, never having been a reporter himself, he doesn't really appreciate ground rules and as far as I'm concerned, the sanctity of them. So he was overenthusiastic, but if you'll hold for approval of all direct and indirect quotes or attributions or anything, that's fine. There's no problem with it and I'm in good shape with him so I think we're going to be all right then.

K: With Klein?

T: Yeh.

K: Right. Now what exactly are you going to do?

T: What he has in mind I think, is sort of a Kissinger and Foreign Policy profile kind of thing and I think it's going to work out OK. Now I say I was worried when we left because from the way he was talking I thought he was going to be too insistent on personalizing the thing but I think he's all right now and I think I've got him sort of stabilized to make him understand the ground rules of the operation and that kind of thing.

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K: But I have to rely on you that I'm not being made the straightman in the Newsweek editorials here.

T: No, you're not. That I'm sure of now. I was a little bit worried about that when we left because you were quite frank and he's not accustomed to dealing frankly with news sources so I had a bad half hour or so there, but I think we're on a pretty solid basis now and you don't need to worry about that.

K: Right and it won't be that Watergate is ruining American foreign policy?

T: Definitely not and I'll be back at you I would think the timing on the thing - I'm having a girl transcribe the tape now and I want to take a look at quotes to bounce off you - that kind of thing. I could have those back to you sometime Thursday.

K: Also indirect quotes.

T: Absolutely. Nothing attributed.

K: And you will make absolutely clear that you sought me out.

T: Absolutely, yes.

K: So it doesn't look as if I'm peddling an Administration line.

T: No, that we will make absolutely clear. That I pledge.

K: OK, well I'm counting

T: But I'll be back at you sometime Thursday.

K: Because I went this far out of my confidence in you as you know.

T: Yeh, I know and I appreciate that and as I said I was a little bit worried right after we left because he was all flying into the stratosphere with suddenly having first-hand information and he doesn't know how to deal with it. He's a pretty bright fellow but he doesn't

K: What was the first-hand information?

T: Well, just that he talked to you or something like that.

K: OK, well you'll handle that for me.

T: I think I'm in good shape and if I have any trouble of course I'll come back and bounce it off you but I don't think I'll have any problem with it at all.

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TELCORN

Sec. Butz/Kissinger

8:45 a.m. - 7/17/73

K: Earl.

B: Yes, Henry.

K: Earl, we have had an urgent request from the Indians to buy with
hard currency 4 1/2 million tons of wheat. Now we know we can't -
it's not that formal you know, we know they can't do that. Is there
anything at all we can tell them?

B: Yes, let me get back to you, Henry. The Ambassador was in our
office here last week discussing this with our people. He's relatively
new here and by the same token Dan Moynihan was in here before
he went to San Clemente and he may have talked with you in San
Clemente.

K: Yeh, but if I could tell them something as coming from the President
it would be worth a lot to us.

B: All right, I don't think 4 1/2 million

K: No, but if you could give me some figure at all even if you say we
could guarantee a hundred thousand - you know I'm kidding, but you
can give me a low figure and say we will increase it then at least
we can answer something.

B: All right. Can I get back to you later today, Henry?

K: Please, can you let me know today?

B: Yes, I can. Henry, thanks a million for your help on this matter.

K: Well, it was in the national interest.

B: This would have been disastrous

K: I couldn't agree more. But see what you can do for me.

B: Certainly.

K: Thank you.

TelCon
Gov. Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

10:11 am, July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Henry. I want to tell you my admiration for you *is* reached an all time high last night. You are fantastic.

K: Well, you are a marxvelous friend.

R: Why are you lieing, I'm just your friend.

K: Well, we are having one hell of a problem now.

R: Well, I still feel the same way. You don't need to say anything.

K: Right.

R: Listen, Henry, one other thing I wanted to mention to you, and that is I talked yesterday to Ann Armstrong on the money, and also on getting the four leaders of the Congress through a special resolution, a joint resolution, as ex-officio members which I think would be very valuable.

K: Which ones would be ex-officio members?

R: Well, Mansfield and

K: Oh, the leaders.

R: Yeah. This is Jerry Ford's idea.

K: Right.

R: And I think we ought to get them involved. I think they need to be involved. They are going to need this kind of forward planning just like everybody else.

K: Oh, I think it's a good idea.

R: You do. He will be talking to you and to others about this idea, see. Jerry proposed it.

K: Nelson, would you, in my judgment speaking to you as a dear friend, is I not sure this Administration will now survive.

R: Yeah. I understand. And that makes it all the more--

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K: But that makes it all the more important.

R: I think so, don't you.

K: Absolutely.

R: Well, believe me Henry, whatever happens I just want you to know that you've done for this country as few people in its history, and your work for this country is a major continuing force for us.

K: Well, I think now if this thing--whichever way it goes, this country has to be pulled together on a bipartisan basis.

R: That's right.

K: It has to believe again that it can achieve great things. And for all these reasons what you are doing is essential.

R: Well, if I can get these Congressional people to see it that way, really it's a question as to whether Ann, you know, this was sort of horrendous concept for her.

K: Are you going to talk to her again?

R: Well, I talked to her yesterday.

K: Well let me talk to Ann.

R: Yeah, tell her that I--she consults you see, about names and so forth.

K: I will talk to Ann.

R: She said she was going to talk to you and the General. We've drawn up a joint resolution for both Houses in which they say they would --and Jerry Ford said he thought the resolution ought to come at the initiative of the Congress rather than the White House. She said why, and Jim, who talked to him the last time, said very frankly on account of Watergate. Which is a simple reality.

K: Well, I will talk to Ann and I will support it strongly.

R: You're great.

K: And it was marvelous to see you.

R: Well, it was kind of a historic evening and I apologize for that other stuff.

TELCON

Seymour Hersh/Kissinger

12:22 p.m. - 7/17/73

K: Hello.

H: Hi.

K: How are you?

H: This is in the nature of here we go again, ok?

K: On what basis are we talking?

H: We're talking on the - there's a wonderful story making the rounds about retroactively off-the-record. We're talking off-the-record.

K: OK.

H: Strictly on background. And here's the situation. Late last night in connection with this Cambodian bombing stuff - story, I got a call from someone who was in the government then, a military man, very upset because he said he wanted me to know that the orders for the - I don't think anybody in the - there's no question that there was enough justification to bomb Cambodia given Sihanouk's cooperation and the buildup and also the fact that all the bombing was kept into a very rigorously centered area. The only issue that seems to me in the whole issue of the Cambodian bombing in '69 and '70 is the falsification of records as described by Mr. Knight and General Brown's admission yesterday that the orders to falsify came from higher up. Well, listen this person I talked with last night was in the government over in the JCS then and he said very flatly, this was done not by a general nor by an admiral and the way he described the situation is this - that it was - that the operation was conceived or the falsification of the operations were conceived in the National Security Council. He mentioned specifically Mr. Haig and he says the reasons for it were quite good, he said, and we all accepted them. In fact he said I accepted them. I assumed he had some authority and he said simply because, apparently it had to do again with the spin off from the William Beecher May 1969 story. I'm not sure about that. His recollection was faulty. But the point is there was some means to set up a special reporting procedure just simply to prevent any and all leaks that could be embarrassing internationally. His argument was that there wasn't an attempt to tell the Congress, well Congress publicly wasn't told, I mean the fact is that's a fact. And he also said that he knows for a fact that Goldwater and Stuart Symington and Stennis were briefed on this bombing.

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K: The senior Senators were briefed.

H: Yes, so when Senators are talking about not being told, that's not so. It seems to me the ______ is simply this: If the Air Force was ordered to falsify documents as he alleges and he insists it was not done, it was done across the river over in the White House over in the National Security Council, at least the impetus for the program came there and it was worked out

K: Impetus for what program? Of the bombing or of the falsification?

H: The falsification he says.

K: Look, I made the mistake when these FBI wiretaps surfaced of talking on the basis of my recollection, and you know all these things happened four years ago.

H: Absolutely.

K: And therefore I don't want to get into the position of now making a flat statement which if I'd checked I may have to lament so let me talk on an off the record basis as to my assessment of the situation is. One, if we're speaking about myself I don't know anything about the god damned reporting system. So I wouldn't even know how to give an order to falsify it if I wanted to.

H: Yeh.

K: I never heard a discussion about how the reporting should be handled. I know we put great pressure on them to keep the thing secret for diplomatic reasons, but it seems to me almost out of the question that we told them how to report this thing. Our concern was not to have false reports; our concern was to keep the secrecy and therefore it seems to me that this information you have is almost certainly wrong. Now I will check with Haig when he gets back from Bethesda and I will be able to confirm it.

H: Now let me tell you exactly what the information is. It's a very emphatic that it was done at the instructions for setting up the procedure were not conceived by any military officer. They were conceived by a civilian officer.

K: Now Haig wasn't a civilian officer.

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H: That's right, he was a military officer.

K: Yeh, but look that's inconceiveable to me.

H: Well

K: You know the reason it's inconceiveable is that I do not - if my life depended on it, I couldn't tell you how the reporting is done.

H: Right. Right.

K: And therefore that couldn't just be true.

H: Well

K: I mean again now I'll have to search my records and see whether I can find any phone conversation or anything else which could be construed this way. But he didn't say I did it.

H: No, no, he didn't say. He just said - you have to understand it - I know from my conversations with people did work on the handwork that this is something you wouldn't have the technical knowhow to even begin to - but I understand there was a tremendous reaction to the Beecher story over at the ACS. Basically, also in your shop.

K: That's true, but yeh - well mostly because of the great concern of the diplomatic consequences.

H: Sure. That means there's no question that you had a problem with Sihanouk. So there was a decision made to cut out a vast number of Pentagon people with information.

K: Now that - no, no, wait a minute. As I recall it our pressures were to keep the thing secret but not to specify how that was to be achieved.

H: Well, yeh.

K: That makes a big difference.

H: You're right.

K: I to this day don't know who in the JCS knows what. When we want something like that we tell the Chairman it should be kept on the most restricted basis possible. We don't tell the Chairman who should get what report.

H: Yeh. OK.

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K: I'm just telling you what my present

H: This is totally off the record and I'm going to tell you what I'm going to plan to do. I'm going to put in a call to Mr. Haig.

K: Why don't you call General Haig. He's at Bethesda.

H: I'm going to give a call to his office and tell him I talked to you. Obviously

K: Incidentally, let me say one other thing. There's going to be one office in this building where if Haig did it, I'm responsible. There is no such thing as Haig doing it on his own.

H: Of course not, but that doesn't mean you had to know about it. Look, you know this is all needless to say, at this point

K: I must say that I nor any of my civilian associates know enough about the reporting

H: To conceive of how to set it up.

K: I mean what I read in your story was total news to me.

H: The problem of course is the obvious one that, you know, in talking to military men there are ethical questions raised. You know there is a time for false reporting, obviously it has a role.

K: The first time I heard of false reporting was in a Monday newspaper.

H: OK.

K: Now that I can say flatly.

H: OK, I accept that.

K: How they kept the information secured, that I just didn't look into, but that didn't in my mind presuppose false reporting. In my mind, it presupposes that only a tiny number of people knew about it.

H: Right. Right.

K: That is my conception of how you keep things secret.

H: Do you agree that perhaps whoever thought up the idea of false reporting should at least be talked with or discussed with? You know nobody's suggesting anything wrong but there should be some action taken

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to find out just who did.

K: Yeh, but the first - that's right, I am looking into this. I have not been aware previously of any false reporting.

H: Are you initiating any steps to look into this?

K: No, but I will. I think that's a good point but you have to consider the first time I heard about it was yesterday.

H: I understand that. I'm going to leave a call for Mr. Haig and talk to him about it and tell him I talked to you. Is that all right?

K: I think he'll still be General Haig until August 1st.

H: Oh yes, that's right. $2,000 a month is that right? I'll tell you something, he's learning about politics and the hardway isn't he? It's a rough game.

K: Well, you know, let me tell you something in an individual capacity. You know there are a lot of people who have tried to do the right thing, even the moral thing and the honorable thing, and it's getting awfully tough when everything - when constantly every action has to be interpreted four years after an event.

H: That's right. And Inouye too.

K: And Inouye. Now just don't think - I just don't believe there was any order to falsification out of the White House. I cannot believe that. The thing we were conscious of is how to keep it secret and to restrict the knowledge of - how to do that wasn't our problem.

H: No, but if not ordered to, at least approval of. I mean nothing was mentioned about you but Haig did come up, but I'm not going to play a game.

K: Well, you have to talk to him.

H: I certainly will and I'll put in a call now to get this straight. And it could be that they're talking about the Secretary of Defense who conceived this except that wasn't the impression they gave me.

K: I suggest you talk to Laird too.

H: I absolutely will. OK, thank you very much.

K: Right.

TelCon

Max Fisher/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 pm, July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

F: Henry, how are you.

K: Fine.

F: Henry, before we meet on Thursday, the meeting I've set up for Thursday at 5:00.

K: Yeah, I've got it on my schedule.

F: I think it could be very helpful if you and I had some discussion beforehand to talk a little bit about strategy on that thing. We've got this problem coming up, you know, on this whole business and I think it is important that we exchange views so that you could have an idea of some of the background, and I think it might be very helpful.

K: Okay, let me get in touch with you. Let's aim for 4:30.

F: All right. I'd like to do it so that it doesn't look like we are having a meeting as far as the other fellows - I'll be coming in on Thursday morning.

K: Okay, I'll be in touch with you.

F: You will?

K: Right.

F: Will you agree with me it might be--

K: With who?

F: I say, do you agree with me it might be helpful.

K: Well I have no way of knowing. I tell you, I've been trying to get across that I'm not that eager to meet, having that many meetings with Jewish leaders. For reasons which I've explained to you.

F: I know that We understand each other. I don't talk to you about these things, unless it's something of importance. That's the reason I think you will find I haven't bothered you.

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TelCon
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Mr. Kissinger

12:40 pm, July 17, 1973

K: Hello. Hal, on the message to Scheel and Heath, what is missing is a concluding paragraph about the crucial importance of the July 23rd meeting. And about the consequences in this country.

S: Well, I was just reflecting your yesterday's mood, yeah I've been thinking about the same thing now.

K: That's much more important than-- in fact I would condemn the press stuff, and I would say that we understand the concern with respect to other countries, and the last thing we want is to isolate any country. On the other hand, the consequence is for everybody will be serious and I give you here with my best judgment of what it will be, and use some of today's and yesterday's stuff.

S: Yeah, I was a little concerned about whether we want to put that in writing or not.

K: Well you can put it in writing on a personal letter, don't you think.

S: Yeah, you also have one to Brandt there.

K: Right, and what we need is something now to Jobert.

S: Well do you want to do that now or do you want to wait for the clarifications of those two questions.

K: What's today, Tuesday?

S: Yeah.

K: I would do it no later than tomorrow.

S: Okay. Well I finally got Phil ______ today and told him about our distribution of the documents, and he said he had reported that late last night.

K: Okay, well you get that. And get those two things changed now and then Jobert we'll write to tomorrow.

S: Okay.

K: Good, thank you.

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TELCORN

Hugh Sidey/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p.m., July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Henry!

K: Hugh, how are you?

S: Pretty good. How about you? I spent a weekend hearing all kinds of rumors about you, some of which I believe. Can you tell me where you stand? Where are you --

K: What do you mean? What about? About Liv Ullman?

S: No, I know those are true. I don't question you on that. When it comes to sex, I believe everything.

(laughter)

K: Listen, I have concluded that the newsmen feel that any man who is lecherous and perhaps an adulterate can't be all bad.

S: Absolutely. Well, W. C. Fields put it another way: Anybody who beats dogs and old ladies -- or kicks dogs and old ladies can't be all bad, yeah. Well, that's pretty good. Listen, no, I just wondered where we stand because I picked up a couple of little wiggles around town last week that kind of tended to confirm the fact that it looked like you might be moving over to State Department.

K: Hugh, really, I don't know where one could pick up such wiggles.

S: Well, I'm kind of obligated not to --

K: Of course. No, no, I'm not asking you to tell me but how many people could -- I mean, how many people could possibly know a thing like this reliably?

S: Yeah. I don't know, I don't know the answer to that but it makes some good -- I guess maybe it's the duck beef or the deduction here more than anything probably, that it would make some sense to do it. at this time. I don't know. But you find that one of these things that took a life of its own.

K: I find it -- You see, the reason -- Let's talk totally off-the record.

Hugh Sidey/Mr. Kissinger

2

S: Sure, yeah.

K: The reason I am not squelching it a thousand percent -- to phrase a
______ political figure.

(laughter)

K: Is that deductively you have to say that you could see where the President
might come to that conclusion, that he wants to -- But you ask me for
the evidence, I would have to reject it.

S: Um-humm, um-humm. In other words, there is nothing that --

K: The President has not asked me to do that.

S: Um-humm.

K: The only thing I don't want to say is that it could never happen.

S: Yeah.

K: And, frankly, I would also have to say if -- Six months ago, I would have
said it is unlikely to happen and be if it were to happen, I would reject
it.

S: Um-humm, um-humm. Well, I just see that it makes good sense, In
many ways, it makes good sense from the President's standpoint and
your standpoint. And again I don't mean as a gesture against Rogers.
Well, I don't buy that argument.

K: No, absolutely not.

S: But I do buy the argument of a concerned President about his foreign
policy achievements and that somehow to move them beyond the White
House at this time would make some sense.

K: That is the deductive aspect of it.

S: Yeah. Because I just see that things out in the Department like that
are largely -- Watergate does not poison them as much, you know, as
when it's in that close and my suspicion is that we're going to have a lot
of Watergate to go yet, you know, and I could see a concerned President
responding that way. But I must say that there were just a couple of small
things from people around who are asking questions -- over at the State
Department and elsewhere -- and I agree that the sort . . .

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Hugh Sidey/Mr. Kissinger

3

K: Which then assumes that the State Department knows something that I don't know and that seems to me very unlikely.

S: Well, I know that, I know that. You know, these are remote sources and it was such casual conversation that I passed it by until suddenly that thing emerged and I suppose what happened was Dan Rather caught the same thing I did and maybe they don't have as much restraint or their deadlines come quicker, you see.

K: Yeah.

S: So it went. But in any event, you see nothing right this moment on it.

K: I see nothing --

S: If there were to be --

K: Say within the next three weeks, which is about as far as I can see.

S: Yeah. Um-humm, I see. Very good. Listen, Henry, are you going -- What's your China schedule like?

K: Well, I'm really now -- We are now assessing that.

S: Um-humm.

K: You know, in the light of the cut-off. I don't know whether I want to be there --

S: Oh, I see.

K: With the cut-off as imminent.

S: Yeah, I see.

K: You know, the trip to China was never intended as primarily Cambodia oriented.

S: Um-humm.

K: It was part of -- I went there after last year's Soviet summit and I was going to go again to assess our basic situation.

S: Yeah, I see. I see and It's become too involved in that other.

K: Well, it may or may not. We're going to decide within the next week but I will certainly go -- I mean, that will just affect it by two or three weeks.

Hugh Sidey/Mr. Kissinger

4

S: Yeah. Listen, where do we stand on these European things? Is there any guidance you can give me really on a personal basis -- when we are apt to end up over there?

K: (laughter) Well, I was just raising hell with Murray Guard (sp?) because I thought the TIME article this week was really very one-sided and --

S: I haven't seen that. What's that on -- Europe?

K: And wrong.

S: I haven't gotten that far yet. You -

K: All saying that --

S: . . speed readers, huh?

K: Everything is wrong and Europeans are very suspicious of ..... [change in tapes] ......

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TelCon

Dr. Kraemer/Mr. Kissinger

12:55 pm, July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

Kr: Henry, nothing earthshaking but of a delicate nature. Your visitor tomorrow from--

K: Yeah, I know which one you mean.

Kr: Would be unbelievably grateful. I've had not talked to him but the old whom you helped nicely, phoned me and said it wouldn't be possible that without witnesses, he could see you entirely alone.

K: For the whole period. We have an appointment for an hour and a half.

Kr: No, no, no, not for the whole period. He wants (1) (german language) after that nobody else is present.

K: That can be done, but for how long do you think.

Kr: As I understand it, a half an hour alone.

K: Well why don't we do this; when he comes I'll take him in alone, I often do that.

Kr: Do that please.

K: Okay.

Kr: That's all I wanted to say, I just wanted to get through to you quickly.

K: My dear friend, if you can't get through to me--

Kr: Thank you very much indeed.

K: Good. Bye.

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A6

TelCon
Lloyd Shearer/Mr. Kissinger

2:20 pm, July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry let me get these teletypes off the hook will you.
Hello Henry, I'd like to become a recording artist, may I sing two
songs.

K: Of course.

S: There was more to it than fiction, what I told you, all of us were being
recorded, particularly you. Well, what the hell, it's for history.

K: Of course. You know, I have a very unique accent.

S: So have I, I use it all the time. My accent I always say" Halloo,
Henree Kissinger speaking, vot can I do for you. You got some
girl's telephone number, I exchange numbers with you." So when
they go to transcribe the tape, they say what is that crazy Kissinger
doing in California, he's supposed to be in Washington.

K: I know it, so what can we do for you.

S: Well, you have an idea when you'll be in Peking?

K: No, I still don't have it set.

S: You think it will be sometime in August?

K: That's right.

S: Do you know a fellow called Poe Penh Pang (?)

K: No.

S: Could we find out from the China desk who this guy might be.

K: Can you give me a clue.

S: Well I don't know, I have a telegram from him. PUNG PENEG
PHENG. He must be some--

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K: What does he want, what does he ask.

S: Director of something--

K: Is he asking you to come?

S: Yeah.

K: Okay, I'll find out for you.

S: Let me ask you this, are you going to take any press with you at all?

K: No.

S: Not even kind of a pool.

K: It's not my present plan, but I've had a lot of requests. I have never on any previous trip taken any press, but as soon as I can get Ziegler out of the hospital.

S: Yeah.

K: Maybe I can get a judgment from him what I should do. I don't make these decisions.

S: I know you don't. Okay, another question. Did Dan Rather talk to you?

K: About what?

S: About S. S.

K: No. Well wait a minute, now let's get this straight. He called me after he had that story, and asked me whether there was any truth to it. I said to him what I'd been quoted as saying, that the President has not discussed this with me, and therefore I don't believe there could be a reliable source.

S: Right.

K: And that is all I have said to him. He got his story from somebody else and he told me he got it from somebody who didn't wish me well but I didn't know who it was.

S: He got it from somebody who didn't wish you well?

K: Right.

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S: Well I don't know, because we have this lovely layout, you know what I mean.

K: Well, I don't know who gave it to him.

S: Yeah. You have some kind of address where we could send you something? You know, Rock Creek, third rock from the left.

K: My home address is 2527 Waterside Drive, N. W. What are you going to send me.

S: We are going to send you something.

K: Okay.

S: All right. As soon as we can get together a small press pool, because what we really want to do is to put you on the cover and we need some reason to be there.

K: Okay.

S: I have an understanding that there's--I have an on-going thing with Sihanouk and I guess you do to, but there might be a very good cover if somehow we could work it and be there simultaneously.

K: Well if there is a pool, I'll really make an effort to take you.

S: All right.

K: Good.

S: All right, you'll get this in the mail.

K: Thank you.

S: You bet, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

2:42 p.m. - 7/17/73

HK: Hello.

MK: Henry, Marvin.

HK: Marvin.

MK: Hi, sir. How are you?

HK: OK. Marvin, I just have one minor - one point about your broadcast this morning.

MK: Yes, sir.

HK: In addition to you know my pain that you'd repeat such a low statement as the one that I had originated it in order to get out from Watergate when you can check with Dan Rather. He ought to know that it didn't come from anywhere around me.

MK: I know that.

HK: So you know by repeating it even as a quote it's - what's the average person going to know, but that's your decision.

MK: Henry, I can tell you that when I came in this morning to the office I had about 8 telephone calls from people at the State Department who wanted to know when in the hell am I going to stop putting out that anti-Rogers Pro-Kissinger stuff

HK: No, no, that isn't what I'm worried about. I want to give you a piece of factual information.

MK: OK.

HK: I did not check with the State Department to determine who was on the manifest of the Rogers plane nor did I check with anyone else nor did I make any inquiries as to who was on that plane.

MK: I was misinformed then. I apologize for that.

HK: You were totally misinformed. I made no effort to find out who could have made that statement.

2

MK: No, I was then - I will go back to the person who told me but I would start with a clear case of a bad source.

HK: That was either malicious or totally ignorant.

MK: I have a feeling it might have been even both now that you tell me this because it was told in a volunteered kind of way.

HK: Well, I had heard yesterday that Joe Kraft had been given that information too.

MK: By a source close to the one near me.

HK: That I don't know.

MK: No, I mean it's a common part of the bureaucracy anyway.

HK: Well, I can assure you that it is absolutely incorrect. I have made no efforts to find out who had made that statement.

MK: I tell you my intention in putting it was to point out how dumb the thing has gotten and how nervous the State Department has become and how really foolish people here are wrapped up in really non-substantive

HK: You know Marvin if you analyze it there are only two possibilities -- either the statement is -- either the Rather story is essentially true in which case I'd be insane to put it out; or it isn't true in which case it would be ridiculous for me to put it out.

MK: Yeh. Henry, when this story first came out, I didn't even call you on it as you know because I thought it was, for the two reasons you've just given me, sort of dumb. I mean I could not figure you as the source and knowing a little bit about Rather's operation I didn't figure that it came from anywhere near you.

HK: It doesn't. No one that I know talks to Rather. I rather like Rather, but it so happens we never volunteer anything to him.

MK: Yes, yes.

HK: But you by now must know what the source is. I don't know what it is. I just checked with Rather whether I could plausibly tell people that it didn't come from a friend of mine. And he said in his judgment I could do that.

DECLASSIFIED
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MK: That it did not come from a friend.

HK: That the man who made it could not be considered anyone who wishes me well. But I don't know.

MK: This is something that I'm a little

HK: I don't want you to tell me.

MK: No, I'm a little ignorant of this and I'd rather not

HK: I don't want you to comment on it, I'm just telling you what I heard from Rather and the only thing that I have said, and the only thing I can say is that it never was brought to me.

MK: Well, if it makes you feel any better, out of this whole mess you've excited a mostly dormant State Department into believing there may be better things ahead.

HK: Well, I'm not engaged in a fight with the State Department on this. Or for that matter with Rogers. I have no interest in that.

MK: I don't think that it would be - no, I agree. All I can tell you is it made a lot of people get back to work here and that's what they want to do.

HK: One thing about people who work for me is that they don't complain about lack of work.

MK: (Laugs)

HK: A lot of other things but not that.

MK: Oh dear. Well listen you know, don't - I think that if this thing would have happened, I can see only good coming out of it and I hope it does.

HK: Well, I really have no knowledge of it. I genuinely do not know whether it is in the President's mind or not, but if it is he has not shared it with me.

MK: I understand. Well, good luck.

HK: Ok, thank you.

MK: Bye, bye.

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger - General Haig

Tuesday, July 17, 1973

4:12 p.m.

K: Hello, Al.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: This is not your biggest problem but Seymour Hersh called and said he has received a call from the JCS who said the call came from civilian authorities, and they thought it was from you. I said, first, we were responsible for everything in this office, then that we didn't know ourselves, thirdly, that we didn't tell them what to report. Did we ever tell them how they should do their report?

H: Hell, no.

K: That is what I said.

H: That is utter bull-shit. Why should we even talk to them about that? Why should we even tell Seymour Hersh anything?

K: Well, you can take that attitude but I can't. I knew about the operation. Well, anyway, if he calls you, at least you know what he wants.

I: Well, from the Department of Defense down we didn't know anything.

C: I didn't say that, only that we knew the reporting procedure

I: OK.

K: How are you doing out there?

H: We went through a very bloody, tortuous session.

K: You conducted the meeting beautifully this morning.

H: Well, I still think we are on the wrong wicket. I am not sure that the man is so confused....

K: Well, supposed he called a man a dirty son of a bitch. Does it mean anything? Maybe he feels it is so improper for a President to talk in such a way.

H: Well, I've told him that. And the lawyers have told him that, though not in such strong tones. Neither ......... nor Bryce didn't even give a wimper. I think they want other people caught in this. I've talked to him in the vaguest of terms. At this report I don't trust his guilt or innocence.

K: That isn't executive privilege at all. If Haldeman can listen why not some

DECLASSIFIED
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trusted person? You would die before telling anybody.

H: That's right but he just won't do it.

K: I will be here if you want to talk to me. I know what a night mare this
has been for you. I am giving interviews this week to put foreign policy out and
trying to get a consensus of foreign views.

H: Yes, this is going to be a tough road.

K: Will you be back by 6:00 or 7:00?

H: I must see Mansfield.

K: I may wait for you because I have some thoughts I want to discuss with you.

H: OK.

K: OK, bye Al.

H: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Sec. Butz/Kissinger

4:19 p.m. - 7/17/73

K: Hello.

B: Earl Butz, Henry.

K: Yes Earl, How are you?

B: Three things. You called this morning about wheat for India.

K: Yeh.

B: Right now the Indians can buy anything they want to on wheat or corn, old crop or new crop, no restrictions. The basic part of the face, however, is if they contact the American grain exporters they have been reluctant to make any commitments for export unconditional saying that if exports control are imposed I'll need to cut back pro rata along whatever line the government imposes. I think this applies not only to the Indian buyers now but to any other purchaser and I would think that after the President's announcement tomorrow night in which he indicates that given the crop prospects we have, there'll be no export controls, this condition would be greatly ameliorated.

K: So can we advise them then to place their orders as quickly as possible?

B: I think that's right. That's what we did when the Ambassador was in my office here a week or ten days ago. He was in here with Mr. Agerwoll who is head of the Indian Mission and does their purchasing here. Our people think that Agerwoll understood this. They doubt if the Ambassador understood what was involved here. And I'd say go ahead and place their orders and it should be between them and the exporting companies.

K: Right. But what's your guess?

B: What did you say?

K: What is your guess as to how much they are able to buy?

B: Well, they said they wanted to buy 5.4 million tons.

K: Yeh.

B: When Pat Moynihan was in the office here he had that figure 4 1/2 million but our people at that time thought that they'd plan to get 1.5 million tons elsewhere than the US.

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※

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K: Right.

B: I understand they have approached the Canadians and

K: And they're getting 500 thousand from the Canadians.

B: They are getting 500 thousand from the Canadians. Well, we had thought they were going to get more than that from the Canadians. We had talked in terms of their getting 3 million tons from us of which the bulk would be wheat and some would be grain sorghum.

K: Can I tell them that that's your judgment?

B: I think that's right but of course at the moment they can buy whatever they want to buy on the market.

K: Yeh, but if they can't get anything that's just a theoretical thing.

B: Well, then our saying that they could buy 3 million still won't make

K: No, but if I could tell them your estimate is that that's what may be around.

B: OK, I think that's all right if you do that and indicate to them that after we get on Phase IV there ought to be less uncertainty in the market and they should be more nearly able to place their orders without these restrictive provisions in them.

K: OK, I'll get a message off to that effect.

B: That's No. 1

K: I'll get Scowcroft to check it with you just to make sure that I understood it correctly.

B: OK, do that. No. 2, the Minister of Agriculture in India, Polansky, not in India, in Russia, Polansky, has indicated a desire to visit us in the US when Brezhnev was here his conversation with me

K: We have no objection to that.

B: Now then we talked about having an invitation to him before Brezhnev arrived and you didn't want that. You wouldn't object to an invitation going to him now.

K: No.

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B: OK. No. 3. I understand it will be impossible for you to meet with the Ag attaches next Tuesday.

K: Because the Shah is there.

B: Would it be possible for you to meet on a different day?

K: How long will they be in?

B: They'll be in all week.

K: Yes. I'll definitely - but I'd rather not talk about economic matters. If you let me talk foreign policy in general.

B: I'd rather have you talk foreign policy in general.

K: I think I'll do a better job for you.

B: That's what we would like Henry.

K: Why don't you work it out with my office.

B: I'll be glad to do that.

K: Good Earl. And thank you. I'll get that cable checked with you.

B: Have Brent check with us.

K: Right.

B: Thank you.

CLASSIFIED

E.O.12958

By:Ab NARA Date: 6/9/69

TelCon

John Mullikin, (TIME MAG.)/Mr. Kissinger

4:35 pm, July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Dr. Kissinger, John Mullikin of Time Magazine.

K: What do you want to know, do I hate the Japanese?

M: Well I thought we ought to ask you after last Monday.

K: What did I do Monday?

M: Didn't you call about a story we did about the European---

K: Oh, yeah.

M: And I thought one of your grievances was that no one bothered to check with you on the interview of the thing. And so I thought that before we got into the Japanese part of it, we'd better check with you and make sure, whether they hate you or not.

K: Whether they hate me; whether I hate them.

M: No, talking about what Mr. Reichauer was saying out there.

K: Look, I would say that certainly some mistakes were made in our handling of the Japanese. I would think, however, that the majority of the difficulties are caused by fundamental factors which would have brought about a need for a readjustment of the relationship in any event. And that we are going through that process now. That we take the Japanese extremely seriously and it's a difficult process for both sides.

M: Yes. You did go out there too.

K: Well, I've been out there I think four times in the last year. Three times in the last year. And if, or when I go to China, I plan to stop there again.

M: Um hum. Well why do you think an old colleague of yours like Professor Reischaurer would make such remarks. It's just in the nature of his view I suppose. It can't be helpful.

K: No, it certainly didn't help us. I consider him a friend; I don't want to speculate on this. You know, we face a major problem in the whole attitude towards foreign policy. It is the entire atmosphere here.

M: Well I guess the circumstances kind of coalesced down here, didn't they, with the phase IV coming up and these Cabinet officers having to drop out of the trip which leaves the Japanese press held as being as sort offlacking--

K: I think you have the problem. Also that for somebody who remembers a great and easy rapport with the Japanese, it's easier to assume that that was natural and that somebody is to blame than to assume that this was bound to change anyway.

M: Um hum.

K: None of this is for quotation.

M: No, I understand. Certainly. But as they got stronger, you mean, and more aggressive.

they were

K: Well if they get stronger and more independent, they will be bound to get more independent.

M: Yeah. But personally are you very worried about the relationship. Certainly it's a sensitive one, and you just said, and certainly it's an important one, but can you confer to the Middle East or Cambodia.

basically

K: No. I think we're talking about the relationship that is we are talking about quarrels among friends. We are not talking about--it can't compare with an adversary relationship.

M: Um hum.

K: You see, the Japanese are a people that have not normally engaged in local foreign policy, and they have to make a big adjustment in their whole perception of international affairs, that they have historically held.

M: Um hum.

K: And then for 20 years they had essentially no major foreign policy. And they are now coming of age.

M: Yeah. And this means that they--it means a lot to them, at least to their press.

K: Well, I'm not saying everything we're doing is right, if one could have avoided cancelling out two Cabinet members --

M: Um hum. Well, that's sort of what I thought, and on the other hand as long as one of the editors in --well the editors in NY are printing that stuff from Reishaur, and your name was associated with it.

TELCON
Jack Sutherland (U.S. News & World Report)

Mr. Kissinger

10:22 p.m, July 17, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Dr. Kissinger.

K: Yes, how are you?

S: How are you this morning?

K: Okay.

S: Doctor, we are still trying to get you over for an interview.

K: Yeah.

S: And you remember the letter our Editor sent sometime ago. And I was
wondering if any time soon would be convenient for you?

K: Let me get back to you towards the end of this week.

S: Okay, fine. Thank you very much, sir.

K: Okay.

S: Bye.

wgh

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TELCOM

Robert Bernstein/Mr. Kissinger

10:50 a.m., July 18, 1973

K: Hello.

B: Hello. I'm calling about Monday, as I said I would, next Monday.

K: Right.

B: Now I would be coming down only to see you, which I will be glad to do.
Could you have dinner Monday evening?

K: Can I call you back on that? Probably yes.

B: All right. Now I'm going out of town but my off -- I'm going to
Nantucket tomorrow morning at 8 o'clock.

K: No, I'll call you this afternoon.

B: I won't be here but my office can take a message and I can call back --
or call in. I'll be out at a meeting.

K: Okay. We'll leave word for you this afternoon and if I can't make dinner, can we have a drink late in the day?

B: I will be coming down only for that. Is the following weekend possible for you or are you going to be away -- the week of the 30th?
With that I have no trouble, I can come any time.

K: That may also be possible but --

B: In other words, the week of the 30th I have completely open.

K: Well, let me see whether I can make dinner on Monday.

B: All right.

K: And I'll get word to you this afternoon.

B: All right, great.

K: Thank you.

B: Bye.

wgh

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DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon
Mr. Kissinger
The President (Bethesda Hospital)
7/18/73; 11:25 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: How are you doing today?

K: I am getting along fine. I was in another office with the German Defense Minister. We are making very good progress with the Germans. We had a good session with the Italians this week.

P: Good, good. Fine, fine.

K: How are you feeling?

P: I am fine. I am going to leave Friday. I'll probably come down to the office for one or two hours and then go to Camp David for Saturday and Sunday and be back at the office as usual on Monday.

K: I would take it easy, Mr. President.

P: We are only going to concern ourselves on the things that matter.

K: The Shah will be coming in Tuesday and really that actually will be a very important meeting.

P: Of course it will.

K: I can see him on some details in order to spare you some time if you wanted me to.

P: No, no. I want him to have the full treatment. Nothing further from the Chinese?

K: No, no, nothing. Very weird. But Bruce thinks that Magnuson has so sensitized them on Cambodia. Bruce thinks unless we get assurances from Chinese on Cambodia we would be better to delay the visit a month. I think that is right.

P: I agree.

K: I think it is better also for the Chinese and then go early in September.

P: And then do the other business. You know we have to -- they know. The fact that we have not heard anything from them is very curious.

7/18/73; 11:25 a.m.

-2-

K: It may be that they don't know what to say. Bruce feels that they would do whatever they can but the situation in Cambodia with the bombing deadline may be so out of control that the Cambodians feel they have to pay.

P: The bombing deadline being August 15 -- only a month away.

K: We have to hear from them because we proposed making the announcement on Monday. I propose, if you agree, that if we have not heard from them by that time that we cancel the visit until . . .

P: In other words you could simply say with the delay we would now wish to do it in the following month. They could be having internal problems.

K: It seems to me that they have to be panting after this visit. Until two weeks ago all their propaganda was geared to this visit. I don't think our domestic problems have anything to do with it -- they existed then.

P: No, no, that's gotten better anyhow.

K: I think the new factors -- Congressional --

P: Also combined with Magnuson, it could raise questions in their minds. But they are too sophisticated to pay attention to him. What does Bruce think?

K: They think that they annoyed them. One advantage, Mr. President, if I can't go in August is that Mansfield won't see Sihanouk either.

P: Oh, yes, we don't have approval of his visit yet.

K: Yes, he is going on the 19th.

P: When I talked to him yesterday he said he did not know.

K: Oh, he had given them the 19th. They had told him that he could . . .

P: Are we now only allowing these visits?

K: We are checking those visits.

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★

-3-

P: When he was out here with Hugh Scott I asked him. Is there anything to do -- it can be handled. On a minor point -- have we had any message from them on the illness business?

K: No. They have not sent us a message on anything. We have had one from Brezhnev, Pompidou. . . They may be having some internal problems, too, Mr. President. We are getting reports that they are calling a Party Conference for October.

P: I would not underestimate that that could be the problem. The Brezhnev visit -- as much as we have said -- they have not been reassured enough.

K: But if they want reassurances, they would want me there.

P: Well, they have always delayed a bit on some of the things and so have the Russians -- nothing to get in a sweat over.

K: They are not going to risk their relations with us.

P: I would not think so after you told the Ambassador about my visit with Brezhnev unless they have decided to make a deal with them.

K: That has crossed my mind, too. It is an option that we must think about. But what deals can they make (something about nuclear developments -- which I missed). The Russians may interpret that as a stalling(?) device. Mr. President, I hope you continue to improve.

P: I hear that even the Kennedy Library has admitted they have tapes of conversations and telephone calls, etc. What the hell, everyone knew they had them, too -- and the Johnson thing.

K: They won't acknowledge it but (I was distracted at this point but HAK mentioned something about not being bothered too much about wiretaps now).

P: The Library says they have 230 tapes of national security things -- I know damn well they had the thing wired.

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TELCONE

Mel Laird/Mr. Kissinger

12:16 p.m., July 18, 1973

K: Mel.

L: Henry, I got a problem. You know I was supposed to see George, who's with you now.

K: Yeah.

L: At the time of the -- I'm briefing the Hill Leadership and could I just come down and shake his hand when you get ready to kind of break up your meeting because I feel badly about having to change my date with him?

K: Yes, you want me to call you when he's ready to leave.

L: Yeah, give me a call. Yeah, because I want him to understand why I had to change that time.

K: Oh, sure. Will you see him at all?

L: Yeah, I'll see him but let me come on down when you get about through.

K: Good, I'll give you a call when we are ready to leave.

L: Thank you.

K: Right, thank you.

wgh

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TELCONE

Senator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

4:35 p.m., July 18, 1973

M: Henry!

K: How are you, Senator?

M: Fine. And you?

K: Okay.

M: Listen, I hate to bother you.

K: You couldn't bother me.

M: But I thought I ought to call this to your attention. For the last couple of days, Spencer Rich of the Washington Post has been coming around asking if I'm going to China, when I'm going, am I going next month, will I see Sihanouk and I just sort of brushed him off.

K: Yeah, they've asked me the same and I've brushed them off.

M: So I got a letter -- a note from Carl Morrisey (sp?) who said just this afternoon I quote: I have heard from two Washington Post press sources today there will be a story in the next day or so about a projected visit to China by you during the recess. There will also be speculation that you will be an intermediary of sorts between the White House and Prince Sihanouk. Since this story is sure to break almost within hours, I suggest you most privately and for the sake of good relations in the Committee that you comment to Senator Fulbright if these stories be true unless you have done so. Well, I say Bill and said there is nothing to them, I'm hoping to go but it hasn't firmed up yet and as far as Sihanouk is concerned that is purely an executive function. That's about it.

K: Well, that's right. Now we will brief you before you go on where exactly we stand.

M: Yeah.

K: And what line -- You know, we would take were we doing the talking.

M: Surely. Yeah.

K: But then you, and of course any information you bring back would be greatly appreciated. So in that sense you would have an intermediary role but I think you can be freer on that basis, don't you think?

*

2

M: Oh, no that basis, yes. And in accord with the Executive Branch but certainly not on my own. And I think what they did -- I mean, at this time --

K: That's right.

M: I mean, I think what they did -- I had a lunch with Han Hsu the other day and I think they're putting two and two together and that's all I can tie it to.

K: Now, may I ask you, Senator.

M: Um-humm

K: Have the Chinese confirmed your date? Because I talked to the President this morning and I said I thought you were going -- arriving there on the 19th.

M: That's right.

K: And he told me he had the impression from you yesterday that the date wasn't absolutely fixed yet.

M: Well, that's true. But you see he brought it up while Scott was there and I was just sort of humming and hawing around.

K: I get it.

M: But I think it is fixed. But I'm not saying anything publicly. If they ask: Sure, I'm trying to go but it hasn't been firmed up -- until it has been firmed up and then I'll get in touch with you.

K: Right. I haven't finally fixed my date yet and we're still talking interdependence. I might go either just before or just after or during your visit.

M: Fine.

K: You'll be there for two or three weeks?

M: Yes, yes.

K: Well, if I don't go before, I'll be overlapping with you and then, of course, it would be a great joy to see you there.

M: It would be, indeed. Okay, Henry. I just wanted to keep you in touch with developments.

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TELCON

Frank Mankiewicz/Mr. Kissinger

5:05 p.m., July 18, 1973

K: Hello, Frank.

M: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

M: I'm fine.

K: Frank, it turns out they are filming our staff meeting tomorrow morning for a thing that CBS is doing on General Haig.

M: Just for historical purposes I take it.

K: No, that filming is for a program. The taping is for historical.is

M: I see, I see. The audio portion they don't need.

K: You know your Alumni are stupid enough probably to have done it only for historical purposes.

M: That's right, that's right. So we can't have breakfast?

K: But how about having a drink at the end of the day?

M: All right. What is that?

K: Around 6 o'clock.

M: Sure.

K: Do you want to come over here or do you want to meet some place.

M: I can come over, I'll be right across the street. I'm working at 1700 Pennsylvania.

K: Oh, we have easy access to you.

M: So I'll drop around.

K: Come around six.

M: Yeah, that's fine. I told you that was going to happen about Haig.

K: Yeah. Oh, you mean about -- But actually I've looked into this.

2

M: Yeah.

K: He's not gaining once cent from delaying his retirement. There were
two reasons for it.

M: Yeah.

K: One is that he had to find new housing.

M: Yeah.

K: And, you know, he had sold his other house. He's now got to rent one.

M: Well, what difference does that make? Oh, because the Army gives
him a house.

K: He's now got an Army house. And the second one, he had certain
procedures that he had to go through but he assures me that he's gaining
nothing in retirement out of it.

M: Well, he ought to put out a statement saying if he is, he renounces
it because everybody believes that he is.

K: He's not. I know -- You know, unless he's lying to me; he's not.

M: He'd be six months in-grade. That's the story. He qualifies on
August 1st for the retirement at the Four-Star whereas otherwise
he'd have to retire at Two-Star. What he should do is just put out
a statement saying that was never my intention; to the extent that there
is any increase, I will kick it right back to Treasury and I'll sign that
paper now or whatever.

K: Okay. That's a good idea.

M: Huh?

K: As I understand it, he isn't even getting all of his retirement because
he can only get up to a certain amount, which is -- that

M: Yeah. Well, I don't know if you saw that story/Aspen had and --
Yeah.

K: But he says that's totally wrong.

M: Well, maybe he could clear the air. It would be better if he did.

K: Okay.

M: Very well. I'll see you tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCOM

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

7:30 p.m., July 18, 1973

K: Hello

F: Henry.

K: The Soviets agreed to our saying that they will stop purchases -- they will not purchase any more this year.

F: Oh, that's sensational! That's fantastic.

K: The only thing they want is something you may not be aware of. We discussed it with Shultz and Butz and they agreed to it and that happened when Brezhnev was here.

F: And that is.

K: They want us to sign a letter with them to which we agreed -- we didn't agree to the letter -- we agreed that if we signed a letter, we would sign that letter.

F: I did [read it] and I think we can sign it.

K: If we sign it, then it's fine.

F: Good. That is very good news and I would think that we ought to structure this for sometime on Friday perhaps after we talk to the EC and see what we can say about them too.

K: Good. You let me know.

F: Of course I will. Thank you very much, Henry.

K: Good, Pete.

F: Bye, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/09

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By NARA Dje 5/9/09

TELCORN

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 7/19/73

K: Heile.

D: Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

D: First about this list of two points you raised yesterday. I am now leaving in 10 minutes for Europe (?) but I will be back tomorrow. But this is answer about the question you raise yesterday. First about this list of some Jewish families.

K: Yes.

D: They were meeting more than 80 ______ to our ______ by our authorities to let them go but the final decision is not yet taken because they vote one way or another over security restrictions.

K: How many?

D: More than 80. Around 80 or 90, something like that. They are now - their applications are being considered in the light of developments.

K: Can I say that? Oh, that explains the discrepancy in numbers?

D: You may say, but it is not decided whether they will give them permission or not. So this is the only thing I could tell, but you may say

K: That explains the

D: I think this is what - there are more than 80

K: Yeah, that explains the discrepancy in numbers.

D: this
Well, you may say, but I don't know about - they don't know yet in Moscow how many will get out of this more than 80 to go or maybe they will be kept because of this security reasons.

K: Right.

D: So you may say, really there is no objection, that there is more than 80 now with possibility to give them permission but there are some security reasons but maybe it's not really such a strong security reasons it could be decided. They are looking where there is a real security risk or it is just an assurance that sometimes one has this assurance when there is no need to be to have such an assurance.

2

K: I understand.

D: So this is really the reply I give you.

K: OK, what's the second problem.

D: You know, problem, it's not my problem. I'm joking. I just receive it but it has not yet been translated. This is on - I receive information for you and the President on the [illegible] Breshnev [illegible] because they specifically send [illegible]. But I need it translated so I will ask Vorontsov to do it so late in the afternoon around 5 or 6 or 7 pages. He will do it - I will give him instructions so he will be in touch with you or with General Seowcroft - he will be in touch by the evening or late in the afternoon you will receive it, all right?

K: Thank you, Anatol. When will you be back?

D: I will be back tomorrow.

K: Because I'm always uneasy when you're out of town.

D: I will be back in the evening. Have you had any chance to think about the gas deal?

K: No, but I will have it by tomorrow.

D: OK. And then you remember we discuss about Rogers statement about a conference specific countries coming. I find that Tanaka, it was in March again, he make such proposal.

K: Oh yes, but in the context of the Indochina reconstruction.

D: No, no, no, no. It was two proposals made, but one was really in the context of Indochina and the second, it was about this one - it was in March.

K: Well, Anatol, I'm telling you we will not pursue it.

D: No, but I think we have to clarify what

K: Anatol, you can tell Gromyko it was not done in response to Tanaka. It was done in response to Rowland Evans. Do you understand what I mean?

D: Yeah, I do. OK, so then we will be in touch tomorrow.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye. Bye.

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 7/19/73

K: Hello.

D: Henry, how are you?

K: OK.

K: Yes.

K: How many?

K: That explains the

K: Yeh, that explains the discrepancy in numbers.

this

D: Well, /you may say, but I don't know about - they don't know yet in Moscow how many will get out of this more than 80 to go or maybe they will be kept because of this security reasons.

K: Right.

2

K: I understand.

D: Your problem, it's not my problem. I'm joking. I just receive it but it has not yet been translated. This is on - I receive information for you and the President on the ________ Brezhnev ________ because they specifically send ________. But I need it translated so I will ask Vorontsov to do it so late in the afternoon around 5 or 6 or 7 pages. He will do it - I will give him instructions so he will be in touch with you or with General Scowcroft - he will be in touch by the evening or late in the afternoon you will receive it, all right?

D: I will be back tomorrow.

D: Yeh, I do. OK, so then we will be in touch tomorrow.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By M.W. Tanaka, 5-21-93

TELCONE

Joe Alsop/Kissinger

10:35 a.m. - 7/19/73

K: Joe.

A: Hello Henry, how are you?

K: OK, welcome home.

A: I'm not really home, I'm on the wagon and I've given up cigarettes and I'm avoiding all forms of humanity unless you have a quiet moment.

K: All your friends are convinced that you will be totally impossible.

A: I'll be down to 160 pounds; 15 pounds, 17 pounds lighter than I was before.

K: That's hard to face given the fact that I've just taken off two pounds and am inordinately proud of it.

A: Once again to be not smoking.

K: Are you in town this weekend?

A: Yes, indeed.

K: Because Nancy is coming down.

A: Well come and have a meal with me.

K: Good. Let me call you tomorrow and fix it.

A: Yeh. Now there's two other things very much on my mind. First I think really, given everything he's been through, you ought to make a little time to call Charlie and sort of give him a __________, if you know what I mean.

K: Yes.

A: And he didn't say so to me.

K: I will see him Joe, but I'm unbelievably busy.

A: Well, just send him a message then that you want to see him before -- sometime and that you are very busy.

K: I will.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By: NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By AB NARA Dae 6/9/69

A: Have your young man do that and then really do call him.

K: No, no, I will see him.

A: He's going to be here until Labor Day.

K: No, I will certainly see him soon.

A: And the second thing is, which I think is very important, Ellsworth Bunker has reacted very strangely to my mind, about something called a Medal of freedom. It's supposed to be like a medal of honor for civilians.

K: I will make sure that he's put in for that.

A: And you ought to be able to make sure he gets it. He's got two already and he wants to be the first one to ever have three. He deserves it too.

K: No question.

A: And it would really mean a hell of a lot to him, it's the biggest possible reward that you could give him.

K: I'll put in for it.

A: And I'm sure the President would see it the same way. The third thing, which is ridiculous, is may I get your secretary to use your glorious resources to find out where the God damn devil Dick Helms is staying. Since he has written us saying he wants to see us while here, he gave me an address and I can't find out anything. The State Dept is as usual totally useless.

K: I will let you know this afternoon.

A: Well let me talk to your secretary, you won't remember.

K: Good, hold on. (To Bonnie, - Can you pick up that call from Joe Alsop?)

2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By: AB NARA Dje: 6/9/09

TELCOM
Secretary Butz/Mr. Kissinger

11:07 a.m., July 19, 1973

B: Yes, Henry.

K: On this letter which we discussed when I --

B: Yes.

K: You remember? The Soviets have now agreed that we could announce that they have completed their agricultural purchases.

B: This is very good.

K: Right.

B: This will be helpful.

K: But they want us to sign that -- you know, it's not a *quid pro quo* but can we then proceed --

B: They want us to -- Now that letter that Brezhnev was going to deliver was unilateral. Did they want something back from us in return for that?

K: Well, we would write them a letter saying: Yes, that's right.

B: Release them both at the same time?

K: Yeah.

B: That's 5 million tons a year so far below what they've purchased.

K: Look, it could be in the next two or three weeks. We don't have to do it now.

B: All right.

K: All I have to be able to tell them is yes, we'll proceed.

B: All right, we'll do that. But let's put it off if we can for two or three weeks because we just announced this business.

K: No, no; if they'll say four weeks.

B: Okay, all right.

K: But can I definitely tell them we'll proceed.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By: NARA Dic: 6/9/09

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/George Shultz

11:52 a.m. 7/19/73

HK: George, I just wanted to check--the Soviets have agreed that we would not--that they would not make any further grain purchases this year, but they would like us to proceed with those letters within the next three weeks.
Butz thinks that is all right.

GS: Well, let us take stock--I think we want to see how these commodity markets behave. And their statement will be helpful in that regard, and I said at a foreign press briefing this morning that we intended to talk with our trading partners--

HK: No, no, you know those letter we did when--

GS: I know what you are referring to--but just on the timing, can't we leave that a little bit loose--

HK: As long as we tell them we will definitely do it.

GS: If things should go badly in the commodity market and the corn price shoots up and the wheat price and soybeans and so forth, we might be forced to impose export controls--then wouldn't we look odd having just announced what looks like a commitment to the Soviets for their exports when it really is a commitment on their part that they are going to cut their purchases by about a third compared with the year before. But I think we could work ourselves into an odd position if we got too firmly pinned down.

HK: You know what we said to them in June wasthat after July 10 we'd proceed

GS: Right.

HK: Well, we'll after July 10

GS: I know it. And here we are in this sort of ambiguous situation and we've got this new thing and we have an effort to stay away from export.

HK: When will we know?

GS: I think we'll have a pretty good idea by the end of next week; particularly if they make their statement, that'll help.

HK: I mean even under export controls, they couldn't get 5 million tons under export controls?

GS: Yes, I think they could.

DECLASSIFIED
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By: NARA Dje 5/9/09

Page 2

GS: There isn't any real problem. I don't think.

HK: Okay, well we can wait until the end of next week.

GS: Okay. I know it is a gamble not to have imposed export controls the way Chuck Cooper wanted and I assumed he was speaking for you, but if we can stay away from them, we're a lot better off.

HK: I'm in favor of it--I don't know what the hell--
He wanted export controls on agriculture?

GS: Yeh--I thought he was speaking for you--he sent me a memorandum
explaining what he thinks ought to be done--

HK: Okay, I've got to get him under control. I think you did the right thing.

GS: Okay, now have you made any headway on that Saudi Arabian visit that you and I talked about? The way the Statement Department has it organized?

HK: No, I have to knock off Clements and Rush and I'll eventually let
Simon go--but I will not approve the big (?) package.

GS: All right, good, I agree with that

HK: I have already talked to Rush and he is agreeable.

GS: Good.

HK: So now I've got to wear down Clements

GS: And I will get Simon set up ---knows what the economic things are
and that he is not going to get into all this other stuff--

HK: If Simon can figure out a way for them to invest their money, that I
would think is greatly to be desired.

GS: Okay sir.

HK: Thank you.

GS: Thank you.

TELCORN

Jeff Cook (Time Magazine)/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 p.m., July 19, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Henry, Jeff Cook at Time.

K: Yes.

C: Thanks for coming on. I'm given to understand by some sources that the orders or instructions for the changing the reports on the Cambodian bombing and falsifying and secrecy and so forth came from you.

K: Total nonsense.

C: Well, the way this story goes Laird and Wheeler -- their denials are accurate and that it was the White House dealing directly with the Air Force.

K: That is total nonsense. What do you mean?

C: Well, I mean that the instructions went directly to the Air Force.

K: That is simply not true. All our instructions were to -- First of all, we don't know anything about the reporting system here.

C: Um-humm.

K: We wouldn't know how the Air Force does any reporting. Our instructions to Laird were to keep the information as restricted channels as necessary -- as possible. How they reported I to this day don't know.

C: Um-humm.

K: I don't give a damn what you print. It's just not true. And I don't believe Laird would say this.

C: You don't think that the New York Times' report is accurate of his denials of any knowledge? But I haven't seen --

K: Was it in today's Times?

C: Yes. Both Laird and Wheeler are staunchly denying any knowledge -- they don't deny they knew about the bombing of course, but they are denying any knowledge of falsification of reports or orders to handle the reporting ......

Jeff Cook

2

K: Well, from that there are two possible conclusions -- that the Air Force did it on its own, just as well as that we ordered it from the White House. How the hell would we know enough about the reporting system in the Air Force to order anything like this? None of this is incidentally on-the-record.

C: Not your denial?

K: I said we did not issue orders on how to report. That you can say.

C: Well, didn't you on some occasions deal directly with the Services?

K: I can not think of a single occasion when I did it. I've dealt with General Wheeler but I've never gone below General Wheeler.

C: Well, how about Haig for you?

K: You'd have to check with him but to my almost certain knowledge, he neither.

C: Um-humm.

K: But you'd have to check that to be absolutely sure. But I've already checked this with him -- We have never dealt directly with a Service Chief.

C: Oh, you have checked it with him?

K: You have?

C: I say you have checked it with him?

K: I haven't asked that precise question. I've asked him the question whether we gave any instructions to anybody on the how to report and to that the answer is no.

C: Um-humm. So you think it was a purely Air Force operation?

K: I will not speculate on how it was done. I am saying that we did not issue orders from here, that we dealt with Laird and Wheeler on that operation and that our participation consisted of approving the operation and asking that the operation for diplomatic reasons, that the knowledge be confined to the minimum number of people. The nature of the reporting was not described from us or did we even know how the reporting was handled.

I*

Jeff Cook

3

C: Um-humm. Okay.

K: We have never talked to the Air Force about this and in any case, the chain of command didn't go through the Air Force unless I am totally mistaken. I think the chain of command went from Wheeler to Abrams.

C: Um-humm.

K: The B-52s were under Abrams.

C: Um-humm. Well, that's of course the formal chain of command. Fine. Thanks very much, Henry.

K: You know, we're dealing here with a situation where anybody can say anything and then see officials explain why they didn't do what they can't -- won't even know how it operated.

C: Um-humm. Well, fine. I'm glad I called you.

K: Right.

C: Thanks a lot.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By: NARA Due 6/9/09

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Kraemer

7/19/73 2:50 p.m.

HK: Let me ask you a question about your paper. Now one of them is based on a total misapprehension--there is no question of yielding to this note or--but it isn't in that country.

DK: Henry, I understand that, I thought first that you would like to gain time to answer this in some way.

HK: And the answer will be brutal, but that isn't the question--the question I have--you raised in your longer paper and to that you didn't really give me an answer, namely, what would induce them to send such a contemptuous note, unless they--there has been a reversal of basic policy.

DK: No______ is illogical because since they assume this is in the paragraph 3 of my footnote, which says in my fully considered opinion, this is indeed an attempt to cash in ?) on our present weakness.

HK: Yeh, but do you think--what I would like to get is your judgment--you say I should have a full discussion with top leaders--like who? Alone?

DK: No, not you. This letter I wrote--didn't Gen Scow--was meant as a paper from your executive head of our office there--that was not a letter to you.

HK: Oh, oh.

DK: Henry, I __k__ sat down and wrote--

HK: A message--I understand.

DK: letter--a table of instructions to the head of that office--

HK: I understand completely.

give

DK: You see and first I wanted to / you a number of ______, then I wanted this man to do what ______; that is why I used such words which the French speaking Mr. Shi and will understand very well. When he uses this and goes over there and says you know that you have given us something which has raised suddenly grave doubts--this in my mind is you speaking--you. Not I, Kraemer.

DECLASSIFIED
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I*

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Page 2

HK: Now I understand--what is your personal judgment--is it your judgment that they are cashing in or is your judgment that they have in fact changed their--

DK: You see you haven't read the last--

HK: No, I have read it--they are trying to cash in on our weakness. I don't know if they permanently--?

DK: The article before--Paragraph before said let us assume the very worst that the other side--

HK: I understand you said that we are not--that even no matter how weak we will be a ______ without which they cannot operate.

DK: That is why these people cannot possibly, after they have very carefully create a new thought--I won't even use the word equilibrium or balance but at least a new relationship on a side issue change this whole thing that is impossible--and you think about it and you will come to the same conclusion. However as you very rightly surmised to say ah -- in this brutal statement there is for example the sentence "continue to bomb". Now since they know very well that on a given date we must stop that and since they didn't certainly hope that we would stop it right now, what does it mean--it means that they are still not sure even after that date. Somehow in this strange democracy, the President might not go and ______; otherwise they might not have mentioned it, all they would have said, huh--they have to stop anyhow on such and such a date--

HK: But their problem is that they are --next to us they are nearly as badly off down there as we are because the congress as destroyed their bargaining power with the Khmer Rouge because they now no longer need their protege--

DK: That is correct.

HK: The only hope their protege now has is to follow totally the Khmer Rouge line rather than--

DK: Yeh, but they would know--I mean this man as I described in another paper to you although he still has the loyalty of the peasantry, he is better organized and these are all mixed units--with North Vietnamese in it--he would be a shadow person--

HK: I know that but now there is not even the slightest pretense left.

DK: No, Henry, what I think this is, since they are in this position which

Page 3

you rightly described, they said to themselves, the US is in a bind,
we are in a bind, but we by just remaining ironhard can get something.
But that does not mean that they are suddenly saying that *we can't now
one cans't now forever do with them what one wants and we have changed
and we will no longer take into account the weight of the---

HK: Okay, I now understand.

DK: Now this other paper, Henry, I beseech you to read it again, I thought
it was in many respects diabolical because first ______ time;
secondly ______ pull it and say see this is what I got from home
so I really think that you have called anything not in fear but they think
you have possibly made this decision. Now your man is discussing this
and making it clear that you suddenly felt that you have been--I didn't
used your word--deceived--but you know my appeal to the pride that
no great power can let itself be dictated to in this way. That is ______
mean for the psychology of those other people, not for you.

HK: No, no I understand, Kraemer I have to go to a meeting.

DK: Henry, will you do me a favor and read this thing again--

HK: Yes, now I understand it of course. I read it now again.
my conscience and

DK: Will you and do me the favor for/the rest of my mind--when you have
read give me a ring and say I have read and I have now looked at it--

HK: No, no, Kraemer, I just thought it was addressed to me-I understand
it now. I'll have to call you back.

DK: All right.

By A6 NARA Dae 6/7/07

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Seymour Hersh

7/19/73 4:42 p.m

SH: Listen this is getting a little worrisome, let me tell you why, besides the stuff that you obviously know about today--the Senator Symington and Hughes and also some of the others--Saxbe--it's beginning to spread in the committee--are now talking about the immediate resignations of ________. They are doing things like they are pointing out to the President, April 30, 1973 your address on Cambodia in which he said "for five years neither the US or the South Vietnamese has moved against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation--they made available to me classified testimony of Secretary Rogers in May, 70 in which he talked as if he had never made a military action against it--they are hot, they are quite angry and what I wanted to do was to able to if I could put your off-the-record disavowel of any falsification which the Pentago now says came out of the strategic air command on the record.

HK: What would you say? Just give me the text.

SH: I have no text--

HK: You can say that the White House use neither ordered nor was it aware of any falsification of records nor did it order any particular reporting procedures.

SH: Now you told me two days ago that, of course, you made it clear that you wanted this kept very tightly and the time can say that there was pressure which nobody would--

HK: We wanted to make sure it was kept as tight as possible. But I don't want to put that on the record--but you can say you heard that from high administration sources. That is true. But that doesn't mean they should falsify reports.

SH: They described it today as a double entry book system.

HK: That, you know, I don't want to debate with Senators--you asked me a very simple question.

SH: Right, now how should I attribute this--to Dr. Kissinger.

HK: You can say that I said the White House neither ordered nor was it aware of the falsification of reports, nor did the WH order any particular reporting system.

SH: Now still on the record--is there any attempt made to find out what happened?

DECLASSIFIED
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By NARA Dje 6/9/09

HK: Yes, I Have asked for reports.

SH: You asked who for reports?

HK: The Defense Department.

SH: And do you have any XXX opinion on the record of falsification -- in general falsification of documents.

HK: I think it is intolerable.

SH: Why is it intolerable? There are arguments that it is justifiable.

HK: Well I don't want to --why should it be justifiable?

SH: Because they say you have to do something they say to protect the security--all those--nobody was hurt --all those who needed to know did know--all that--

HK: Look I don't want to get into that

SH: You don't want to get into a pissing contest--

HK: I don't want to get into--and I don't want to have that intolerable-- just say--well I can say it is intolerable--I'll stick with that

SH: All right, fine. You have asked for an investigation or report-- how shall I put it?

HK: I have asked for report of just exactly what happened. Don't quote that you can just say that XXX it is understood that the WH has asked for a report.

SH: All right on-the-record: The WH has neither ordered nor was it aware of any falsification of records nor did it order any particular reporting procedure. I have asked for a report--I think it is intolerable information came from the Pentagon.

HK: No, no--you have to say it is intolerable in answer to a question-- when asked what do you think of the falsification of the reports, I said it is intolerable.

SH: Fair enough. Also--it is also known in the WH --it is also known of course, that the Administration wanted --(this is no direct quotes) wanted to make sure the bombing was keep as tightly held as possible but of course officials are saying that it didn't mean that anybody should

DECLASSIFIED
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falsify reports--

HK: Just for your understanding--how that was handled--we would tell Laird and Wheeler that we want it kept as tightly as possible--what happened from then on, we just didn't know--I haven't the foggiest idea of how they report these things--I don't even know who orders--how the chain of command goes.

SH: Al Haig said it the best--he said are you trying to tell me, he said, that I know what some Major in Ben hua is doing or Henry knows what some Major in Ben hua is doing?

HK: No, that is right. What we did was to tell Wheeler and Laird the President wants this kept as secret as possible and as tightly as possible and let's be confined to the minimum necessary number of people. What Laird and Wheeler did to effect this, we don't know. I'm not saying they ordered it--on the contrary they've denied it. I'm just telling you--

SH: I'm--no something went wrong somewhere

HK: I'm just telling you from where I sit I wouldn't know. Even if I wanted to do it, I wouldn't know how to do it.

SH: The reason I called you back is I wanted to get on the record and I'm delighted you are doing it--the concept that nowhere nobody was batting an eye--there was no wink--there was ______ to call rule from below involved--you understand what I'm getting at.

HK: Oh that's right.

SH: And that's the sense I get from talking to Mel Laird yesterday too. Okay--

HK: I've talked to Mel and I believe genuinely he has no idea what we're all talking about here--

SH: I don't think anybody realizes we are talking about people that spend two months a year over South Vietnam and 10 mos a year flying nooks(?) --you know most of them go TDY and it's an awfully bad precedent. Okay--we have exactly--you understand it'll make a story--you're aware of that.

H: What do you mean--

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SH: You know, Henry Kissinger said today--

HK: That the WH neither ordered-- nor was aware of the falsification
--

SH: Right--can I say on the record--when you say it you are speaking for President Nixon's knowledge too

HK: Yes. Well--now wait a minute--I can't do this--haven't talked to him about it, but why don't you just keep it to me, I'm sure this applies to him even more

SH: So am I, okay, but on the record you don't want to do it because you haven't talked to him about it, right

HK: Also I don't think it is proper for me to invoke the President's name

SH: I agree, I agree, particularly--there is no way anybody could have communicated with him without going through you people--

HK: Impossible.

SH: That's the point to make--

HK: If he had communicated with anyone, he would have done it with Wheeler I mean the President wouldn't even know how to get to anyone else.

SH: The thought of him calling up SAC ADVON--

HK: He wouldn't even know what that was--

SH: Okay, that's fine. I think that makes a lot of sense.

HK: Right.