1.

Few major moves in U.S. foreign policy have been undertaken with so little debate as the exchange of visits between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. Such discussion as has occured has been almost uniformly favorable. The impression has been created that the exchange of visits represents a major step towards realizing our goal of a peaceful world.

In this atmosphere it seems almost ungracious to express a word of caution. It is dangerous for democracies to create the impression that all issues can be reduced to personalities. The Cold War may be frustrating but it is *not* the result of a misunderstanding. We may be bored with a catalogue of the reasons that produced current tensions: Soviet suppression of freedom in Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany; Soviet refusal to accept schemes for control of arms; Soviet pressure on all peripheral areas; the unprovoked pressure on Berlin. They are none the less real and the cannot be removed by abstract protestations of good will. Of course, it is desirable to end the Cold War. No one can question

course, it is desirable to end the Cold War. No one can doubt
the cannot be removed by abstract protestations of good will. Of
unprovoked breesme on Berlin. They are none the less real and
for control of arms; Soviet breesme on all peripheral areas; the
Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany; Soviet refusal to accept schemes
brought current tensions: Soviet oppression of freedom in
attending. We may be pored with a catalogue of the reasons that
Cold War may be frustrating but it is not the result of a misander-
oppression that all issues can be reduced to personalities. The
a word of caution. It is dangerous for democracies to create the
In this atmosphere it seems almost migratory to express
heart of a beautiful world.

exchange of visits represents a major step towards realizing our
unmitarily favorable. The oppression has been created that the
and Mr. Khrushchev. Such discussion as has occurred has been almost
with so little debate as the exchange of visits between the President
Few major moves in U.S. foreign policy have been undertaken

2.

the necessity of striving for peace. We should not waste energy discussiong the obvious. The only meaningful debate is whether Western policy since the beginning of the threat to Berlin is likely to achieve these ends.

And here there is reason for serious concern. Little in the Western reaction to a threat advanced with dire warnings of missile and nuclear attacks is likely to inspire the Soviet leaders with caution. If Mr. Khrushchev compares his position now with that at the end of November when he first raised the Berlin question, he can only conclude that the best way to deal with the West is to frighten it. Visitors have repeatedly commented on Mr. Khrushchev's cockiness. What else should we expect of a man who remembers the bewilderment of the Soviet leadership group after Stalin's death in 1953; who weathered innumerable domestic purges and three satellite revolutions while constantly improving the Soviet positon internationally? What else is to be the reaction of a gambler whose every throw of the dice seems to succeed? As a result of his Berlin overture Khrushchev has already gained the following points:

has already signed the following points:

The decision seems to succeed? As a result of the Berlin takeover Khrushchev
What else is to be the reaction of a sampling whose every throw of the
revolutions while constantly improving the Soviet position internationally?
1983: who weathered innumerable domestic crises and three satellites
pewilidament of the Soviet leadership group after Stalin's death in
cockiness. What else should we expect of a man who remembers the
triumph of it. Visitors have repeatedly commented on Mr. Khrushchev's
he can only conclude that the past way to deal with the West is to
that at the end of November when he first raised the Berlin question,
with caution. If Mr. Khrushchev compares his position now with
missile and nuclear attacks is likely to inspire the Soviet leaders
in the Western reaction to a threat advanced with dire warnings of
And here there is reason for serious concern. Little
likely to achieve these ends.

Western policy since the beginning of the threat to Berlin is
discussing the options. The only meaningful debate is whether
the necessity of striving for peace. We should not waste energy
3.

3.

3.

(a) A de facto recognition of the division of Germany.

The division of Germany may be inevitable, but for us a great deal depends on demonstrating what makes it so. If we cannot stand for the freedom of a people to determine its own fate our values have lost all relevance. Adjustment to facts is no doubt often desirable; but the great things in history have been accomplished by those who sought to change them. If we are excessively "realistic" about accepting Soviet oppressiveness in Germany we may bring about what we should fear most: a militant, dissatisfied power in the center of the Continent, a Germany similar to that which produced two world wars. We can be moderate in the means we pursue our goal of unification but to abandon it will lay the basis for endless upheavals. We may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but we cannot be part of an arrangement that endorses it.

When an East German delegation was seated at Geneva, a major step was taken not only towards the perpetuation of the division of Germany -- which may be inevitable -- but towards our accepting the East German regime as legitimate. This was underscored

accepting the East German regime as legitimate. This was underscored
the division of Germany — which may be inevitable — put towards our
major step was taken not only towards the perestroitation of the

unheavily. We may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany put
of unification put to abandon it will lay the basis for endless
world war. We can be moderate in the means we pursue our goal
of the Continent, a Germany similar to that which produced two
we should fear most: a militant, disastralied power in the center
accepting Soviet obdreativeness in Germany we may bring about what
sought to change them. If we are excessively "realistic" spent
put the great things in history have been accomplished by those who
lost all relevance. Adjustment to facts is no doubt often desirable!

the freedom of a people to determine its own fate or its values have
depends on demonstrating what makes it so. If we cannot stand for
The division of Germany may be inevitable, put for us a great desir

3.

4.

by the lack of conviction with which the Western plan for German unification was presented and the haste with which it was pigeon-holed at the first sign of opposition. No formal declarations to the contrary will be able to convince the people of Germany or those of the satellites for that matter that the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of visits at this particular time can mean anything but a hardening of present dividing lines.

(b) A jeopardizing of well-established Western rights by the mere plea of changed conditions. The Geneva conference soon resolved itself into an issue in which the West could at best draw and at worst lose: a changed status for West Berlin. The original Western proposal that if occupation rights lapsed all of Berlin be placed under a new regime soon emerged as a means bargaining device and a not very useful one. The only topic under discussion during the second part of the Geneva conference was an alteration of our position. The interim agreement offered by the West had the advantage from the Soviet point of view that it put a time limit on our rights. It will be the starting point of any future conference.

from the Soviet point of view that it but a time limit on our rights.

the second part of the Geneva conference was an alternation of our

began under a new regime soon emerged as a more bargaining device

Western proposal that it occupation rights labed all of Berlin pe

and at most lose: a changed status for West Berlin. The original

resolved itself into an issue in which the West could at least draw

the mere dies of changed conditions. The Geneva conference soon

(p) V. Jejomina of well-established Western rights by

a bargaining of present dividing lines.

of the satellites for that matter that the Eisenhower-Kunaphenov

poled at the first sign of opposition. No formal declarations to

multiplication was presented and the paste with which it was bi gekon-

by the lack of conviction with which the Western plan for Germany

6.

debate on what to concede and public imputations of bad faith and irresolution among the allies. Three weeks before the foreign ministers conference there was still no agreed Western position and the lack of conviction with which the Western plan was presented revealed that agreement on it was largely formal. The behavior of the West since the beginning of the Berlin crisis indicates that there may exist some vague ideas as to what to prevent but that the alliance lacks any clear conception of what it might achieve or common purposes for which to strive.

The inward insecurity of the West has taken the form of an obsession with determining Soviet intentions. From the beginning of the crisis the Western response has been geared to the expectation of Soviet overtures: the Mikoyan visit, the 21st Party Congress, the Macmillan trip, the Kozlov journey, the Nixon visit. Delegations of political leaders from all over the Atlantic Community and almost all political parties have descended on the Communist capital. The impression has been created that an interview with Mr. Khrushchev is a prerequisite to domestic political

["view with Mr. Khrushchev is a brazenly brazenly brazenly brazenly brazenly brazenly

7.

and the chief guide to Western policy. In this respect the
Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings are merely the culmination of
the trend of the past year. None of this is calculated to produce
moderation in Soviet leaders: it confirms too well the Communist
expectation of a shrinking, demoralized democratic world unable
to develop its own goals or to deal with its own problems.

(d) **The demonstration of the unsuitability of the Western military establishment for the crisis it actually confronts.**

Many factors have combined to produce the tentativeness of Western policy. A key reason is the sterility of Western strategy. The exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons, the concept that deterrence is best achieved through the threat of maximum destructiveness, causes the forces we have available to be rarely suitable for dealing with the threats which we actually confront. The one-sidedness of the Allied military establishment has forced Western

8.

political leaders to decide whether Berlin was "worth" the tens of millions of casualties of an all-out nuclear war — the only war which we are in a position to fight. The dilemma posed by this prospect was expressed by the President at the recent "off the record" dinner for the press: We were not capable of fighting a conventional war in Europe, but he stayed awake at night worrying about a nuclear conflict. We would of course resist a direct Soviet attack on Berlin, but we could not be expected to underwrite its economic prosperity. Even if these statements do not encourage the Soviet leaders to believe that the economic strangulation of Berlin would not be resisted, they may well cast doubt on our willingness to defend our rights. And it does not matter how determined we "really" are: if the Soviet leaders doubt our determination they may provoke the crisis we are striving hard to avoid.

President Eisenhower is reported to have expressed puzzlement that our repeated warnings over Berlin have apparently failed to impress Mr. Khrushchev. The reason is not hard to seek: our threat to resort to our only strategy has lost its credibility,

our threat to resort to our only strategy has lost its credibility, failed to impress Mr. Kruschchev. The reason is not hard to ask: puzzlement that our repeated warnings over Berlin have apparently President Eisenhower is reported to have expressed

ministration they may provoke the crisis we are striving hard to avoid. determined we "really" are: it the Soviet leaders doubt our deter-
willfulness to defend our rights. And it does not matter how
Berlin would not be rerelated, they may well cast doubt on our
the Soviet leaders to believe that the economic attraction of
its economic prosperity. Even if these statements do not encourage
Soviet attack on Berlin, put we could not be expected to underwrite
spont a unclear conflict. We would of course resist a direct
conventional war in Europe, put he stayed awake at night worrying
record" dinner for the press: We were not capable of lighting a
broader was expressed by the President at the recent "oll the
which we are in a position to fight. The dilemma posed by this
millions of casualties of an all-out unclear war — the only war
political leaders to decide whether Berlin was "worth" the tens of

8.

9.

not because our leaders are irresolute but because the threat of
all-out war is inherently implausible. Were it not, the issue of
Berlin would probably never have been raised. Once the Soviets
applied pressure, however, few of our actions were calculated to
reinforce our words. We did nothing to remedy the weakness of NATO
in the conventional field; on the contrary in a year of a dire
Soviet threat we reduced both our Army and the Marines. It is
beside the point that thirty thousand men would not be decisive in
a ground war in Europe. The impact of this gesture was psychological;
it may have encouraged a Soviet belief that our show of determination
was bluff, that we were not to be deflected from our quest for
"normalcy."

Nor is our only choice between the level of forces at the
beginning of the crisis and the present reductions. NATO comprising
twice the manpower and three times the industrial capacity of the
Soviet Union cannot rest on the sterile repetition that it is
unable to afford what is plainly required for its survival and what
the USSR provides for itself from much smaller resources. Our

the U27A provides for itself from much smaller resources. On
maple to afford what is plainly required for its survival and what
Soviet Union cannot rest on the sterile rebellion that it is
twice the manpower and three times the industrial capacity of the
beginning of the crisis and the present reductions. NATO combating
not is our only choice between the level of force at the
"normandy."

was put, that we were not to be deflected from our great for.
it may have encouraged a Soviet peephole that our show of determination
a ground war in Europe. The impact of this feature was psychological;
people the point that thirty thousand men would not be decisive in
Soviet thrust we reduced both our Army and the Marines. It is
in the conventional field: on the contrary in a year of a dire
reinforce our forces. We did nothing to remedy the weakness of NATO
abplied breesame, however, few of our actions were calculated to
Berlin would properly never have been raised. Once the Soviets
suff-out war is inherently implausible. Were it not, the issue of
not because our leaders are irrefutable but because the threat of

II-3

There is no evidence, moreover, that conversations between heads of state necessarily improve the atmosphere. Khrushchev's meeting with Tito in 1955 did not prevent a renewal of vicious attacks three years later. The Geneva summit meeting did not stand in the way of the sale of Soviet arms to Egypt. The visit of Soviet leaders to Britain in 1956 did not bar the exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East. There is something naive about conducting foreign policy as if everything depended on proving to a commissar that we are "regular" fellows; or to rely too much on personal persuasiveness with a man who not quite six months ago said: "History teaches us that conferences reflect in their decisions an established balance of forces resulting from victory or capitulation in a war or other similar circumstances." It is, after all, conceivable that the Soviet leaders are so aggressive not because they fail to understand us, but because they understand us too well.

In ordinary times these would not be conclusive reasons against making *one* other attempt at direct negotiations. But these are not ordinary times. We are still living under a Soviet threat. It is less

II-6

our allies until sometime later. Our allies were therefore placed
into the not very dignified position of participating for several weeks
at a foreign ministers whose already slim chances for success evaporated
when the Soviet saw a prospect of direct dealings with the United States.

More importantly, the conferences between the President and Mr.
Khrushchev will bring home to our European allies that matters affecting
their most vital interests can be discussed without their participation.

The blow to the self-respect of our allies has nothing to do with whether
they can trust us or not. No one could suspect the President of betraying
our allies. But soothing affirmations of unity can not change the fact that
separate negotiations underscores the junior position of our partners. Mr.
Khrushchev has already begun to exploit this when he said at a press
conference that after his meeting with the President there might be a
conference including our European allies plus Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. It cannot be to our interest to reduce our allies to the status
of the East European satellites.

II-10

There is a nightmarish quality about the conduct of international
relatons when threats with a time limit are delivered with the bland
explanation that they are not un ultimatum and meeting of heads of state
are described as non-official.

11-10

There is a mightilyрана quality about the combat of international
relations when there are two limits set to a time limit are not
observed to exist. but mutuality must be felt to exist.
are described as non-overt.

III - 3

equivalence or abdicate our judgment in our desire to reconcile
international tensions.

We have to realize that what divides us from the Soviet
Union is something deeper than the relative ability to produce
consumer goods. If this is all that is at issue we can never ask
our people for sacrifices; nor is the difference in productive
capacity sufficient to appeal to the underdeveloped nations to which
even the Soviet standard seems beyond reach. Our challenge is to make
the concepts of freedom and human dignity living realities for
ourselves and other peoples. To do this we must end the obsession
with determining Soviet intentions and seek to become clear about
our own.

our own.

with determining Soviet intentions and seek to become clear about
ourselves and other peoples. To do this we must end the operation
the concepts of freedom and human dignity living realities for
even the Soviet standard seems beyond reach. Our challenge is to make
adequately sufficient to meet to the underdeveloped nations to which
our people for sacrifices; nor is the difference in benevolent
consumer goods. It this is all that is at stake we can never ask
Unum is something deeper than the relative ability to produce

We have to realize that what divides us from the Soviet
international tensions.

enforcement or abdicate our judgment in our desire to reconcile

III - 3