PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL

PRESSURES

US-SOVIET RELATIONS 1971

In 1971 the overriding issue in US-Soviet relations was SALT.
US-Soviet trade and the general issue of improved US-Soviet
relations received secondary attention.

This book is divided into four sections: (I) a summary of the
debate over Administration handling of the SALT negotiations
and US-Soviet relations in general, followed by a more detailed
chronology of events and criticisms. (II) A summary and chrono-
logy of US-Soviet trade relations debate; (III) clippings on
SALT, detente; (IV) clippings on US-Soviet trade.

2

SALT NEGOTIATIONS: DETENTE

## Summary

While criticism of 1969 and 1970 dealt with whether ABM and MIRV were reliable, verifiable, necessary or desirable, criticism of the 1971 period centered around the US negotiating position at SALT; specifically whether or not we should insist on linking agreement on limiting defense weapons with an agreement on offensive weapons. The debate was kicked off in December 1970, by the Federation of American Scientists' call for an ABM-only agreement. This theme, soon picked up by the liberal press and later by Congressional critics, argued that an agreement on limiting or banning ABM was preferable to no arms control agreement at all. Critics reasoned that since the Administration was reluctant to ban MIRVs, we should speedily agree to squash the single greatest source of instability - the ABM. Throughout 1971 the liberals and doves were unhappy because the Administration was both deploying MIRVs and refusing the 'half a loaf' ABM agreement.

This argument gathered support after the 9 January leak that the Soviets had proposed an ABM-only agreement limited to Washington and Moscow, and that the US had rejected the offer. There was growing pressure from academics and the liberal press that the US accept the Soviet offer. Academics such as Scoville, Rathjens, Kistiakowsky, William Foster, Paul Warnke, York and Panofsky led the call for an ABM-only agreement - a theme immediately picked up by the New York Times and Washington Post. The New York Times claimed the Soviet proposal "deserves an immediate, favorable American response." Congressional critics were slower to catch on to this line of criticism, instead urging reduced defense spending. (e.g. Muskie, McGovern, Church)

Leaks of the Soviet proposal, coupled with reports that the Soviets had slowed down on construction of SS-9 silos were taken as a further indication of Soviet reasonableness and good faith. In February Sen. Humphrey called for a freeze on ABM and MIRV deployment as an "appropriate response" to the Russians; and Frank Church urged the US to accept an ABM-only agreement. The academics, New York Times and Washington Post increased pressure to accept the Soviet offer.

Yet, there remained some supporters of the Administration's negotiating position, such as the Washington Star, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, Wall Street Journal, and Sen. Jackson. Henry Owen of Brookings called for an ABM ban, but urged it be linked to an agreement on offensive weapons. Critics on the Right were concerned that the US might agree to a zero ABM or a Washington-Moscow ABM-only agreement which would leave Minute-man vulnerable to surprise attack.

3

In March Sen. Jackson claimed the recent SS-9 slowdown was not a good faith gesture on the part of the Soviets, but rather a construction necessity to enable them to deploy a new generation of offensive weapons. This brought a flurry of negative response. The Christian Science Monitor, Washington Post, New Republic and other liberal papers were skeptical and implied these reports were put out to help the Administration in seeking higher budget requests. Most Congressional critics kept quiet, but Symington accused Jackson and the Administration of disingenuous efforts to gin up the defense budget.

By the end of March Senators Humphrey, Hughes and McGovern jumped on the bandwagon and called for an ABM-only agreement as a first step. Symington called for a mutual ABM freeze and claimed this would render MIRV unnecessary. Sen. Jackson called for a one year freeze on US and Soviet land-based missiles. Sen. Muskie said he would withhold judgement until he could conduct closed door hearings in April.

On March 30 Marvin Kalb reported that the Soviets had presented the US with a draft treaty for a ban on the development and deployment of ABM. This served to intensify pressure for an ABM-only agreement. By early April Joe Kraft was calling the Soviet ABM proposal an "attractive offer" and the New York Times endorsed Muskie's earlier suggestion that the US abandon Poseidon, Minuteman III and agree to a mutual halt of ABM deployment. The Times called on Congress to go a step further than Sen. Humphrey's Sense-of-theSenate Resolution to halt ABM and MIRV and to force the Administration to stop deployment through Congress' "control of the purse strings."

In a speech on 6 April, Senator Muskie joined his colleagues in advocating an agreement limiting or banning ABM as a first step.

By early May, criticism from these quarters increased and intensified, with accusations that the Administration was dragging its feet on SALT while the arms race continued. Sen. Symington went so far as to accuse the Administration of "planning deliberately not to have any arms control agreement at all."

Reports that the Administration was using ABM and MIRV as 'bargaining chips' brought stepped up criticism. Fulbright claimed 'bargaining chip reasoning' was fallacious, and served only to escalate the arms race. The Christian Science Monitor accused the Administration of tripling US nuclear striking power while the Russians were deploying nothing.

The 20 May announcement caught critics off guard, and all were forced to offer varying degrees of praise. The announcement was interpreted as everything from a "major breakthrough" to an Administration concession to the Soviet/Liberal/Doves' negotiating stance. Senators Muskie, Humphrey, Mansfield, Church and Fulbright praised the announcement, as did the liberal press. The networks and most news stories were factual and

straight, but Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post played the agreement as a US concession. Columnists James Reston and Robert Kleiman hailed the agreement. Editorials in the Wall Street Journal, Baltimore Sun, Washington Star, Washington Post and New York Times were laudatory. The Wall Street Journal had three SALT editorials in a week, all praising the Administration's foresight in refusing to abandon its position. Even the MIT-Harvard academics praised the agreement, although some saw it as Administration acceptance of the Soviet ABM-only proposal.

After the 20 May announcement, the critics had no real stand left to take, and commentary more or less petered out. In June and July there were occasional calls for speeded up progress at SALT. The initial lines of argument in early 1971, that the US should accept the Soviet ABM-only proposal, and that the US should reciprocate or respond to the Soviet SS-9 construction slowdown, were rendered obsolete.

Motivations for an arms agreement, such as horror of war, needless overkill capacity, and an escalating arms race remained, but were stiffled so long as the talks seemed to be moving ahead. One remaining motive for an arms agreement, that the US would save money on defense - money which would be better utilized on domestic programs - was abetted so long as it seemed the US would be saving money with a SALT agreement. However, a Brookings report released in June, asserted that even with a SALT agreement, the US would not save much money on defense cutbacks. This was echoed by articles in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. These reports provided the theme for a short-lived revival of criticism of the costliness of the bargaining chip rationale. Packard testified on the Hill that funds were still needed for ABM and MIRV so they could be used as 'bargaining chips' at SALT. Warnke, Marshall Shulman and Scoville testified that the bargaining chip reasoning only led to an expensive new arms race. The liberal press agreed. Muskie and Humphrey asked for a freeze on ABM and MIRV, and Javits supported it. Yet when the MIRV amendment came up for a vote on 24 September, almost all the potential democratic candidates stayed home, and the amendment was defeated 39-12. In addition, John Sherman Cooper and Phillip Hart, long time critics of ABM, decided not to renew their fight against ABM in light of improving prospects at SALT. Not only was Humphrey embarrassed, but the anti-bargaining chip argument was defeated.

Liberal congressional leaders tried a second line of attack by proposing that reductions of tactical nuclear weapons be included in the SALT talks, but this was a non-starter.

The 15 July announcement of Nixon's upcoming trip to China provided another possible vehicle for criticism of the Administration's Russia policy. Averell Harriman, Frank Church, Humphrey, Muskie, Birch Bayh and Symington thought the proposed China trip was a good idea, but warned that it might upset the Soviet and have an adverse affect on SALT and US-Soviet relations. Nation

5

Magazine and other liberal press picked up on this theme. Brzezinski echoed this argument in a column in the 11 October issue of News-week. But the 12 October announcement that Nixon would visit Moscow put an abrupt halt to this line of criticism.

The Soviet-Indian friendship treaty, in early August, prompted the New York Times and Washington Post to claim the Soviets were "handed a major foreign policy coup" by US support of Pakistan. This line of criticism failed to pick up interest, and also proved a non-starter.

By November, when there appeared no new progress at SALT, some congressional critics and the liberal press accused the Administration of footdragging. Muskie, Humphrey, and the New York Times made a half hearted attempt to revive criticism and claimed if we could not get agreement on offensive limitations we should still press for an ABM-only agreement.

After announcements of the Moscow and Peking summits took root, the liberal press and some congressional critics began to argue that we were improving relations with China and Russia at the expense of our allies, or that we were ignoring our allies in Europe and Japan. (This theme is covered in a research book on US Relations with Allies, 1971-72.)

6

CHRONOLOGY

2 Nov 1970 Round III SALT Talks open in Helsinki.

16 Dec 1970 Laird reveals SS-9 program slowing down.

18 Dec 1970 Round III SALT Talks concludes in Helsinki.

Dec 1970 Federation of American Scientists calls for SALT agreement on ABMs-only, "precluding missile defenses or limiting them drastically." ('SALT Pause Sparks Alternatives', Washington Post, 3 January 1971) p.36

Jan 1971 Herbert Scoville urges freeze on existing offensive weapons and calls for ABM-only agreement. Scoville claims Nixon's proposals might "provide strong incentives for accelerating the arms race." ('The limitation of Offensive Weapons', Scientific American, January 1971.) p.25

4 Jan 1971 Sen. Symington's subcommittee on U.S. Overseas Bases and Commitments cautions that continued maintenance of a "nuclear ring" around the Soviet Union and China encourages them to "break out" and establish their own nuclear weapons overseas. ('Tempting Russia', Milwaukee Journal editorial, 4 January 1971.) p.37

8 Jan 1971 Writing on the Washington Post, Stephen Rosenfeld calls the "SS-9 slowdown a signal" from the Russians and urges the US to take advantage of the opportunity and make a "reciprocating gesture." ('Kremlin's Tensions Offer US Opening', Washington Post column, 8 January 1971.) p.38

9 Jan 1971 The New York Times and Washington Post report that the Soviets have proposed an ABM-only agreement, limiting sites to Washington and Moscow, which the Americans rejected. ('Soviet Said to Ask Antimissile Curb', New York Times, 9 January 1971; 'Soviets Propose ABM Limit', Washington Post, 9 January 1971.) p.42, 43

11 Jan 1971 Milton Viorst, in a Washington Star column, accuses the Administration of "overlooking how important" an ABM-only agreement could be. ('Nixon Was Noncomprehensive', Washington Star, 11 January 1971.) p.44

14 Jan 1971 Averell Harriman, in Moscow at the suggestion of Edmund Muskie, claims the Nixon Administration made a mistake in not offering to halt MIRV early on in the SALT Talks. ('Harriman Sees Area for Accord', Washington Post, 14 January 1971.) p.46

15 Jan 1971
A Washington Post editorial claims the Administration's delay of the SALT negotiations "has...the effect of giving arms technology and production time to make more 'progress' and raising doubts about Nixon's intentions." ('An Agreement on ABM', Washington Post editorial, 15 January 1971.) p.47

17 Jan 1971
A New York Times editorial claims the Soviet proposal for an ABM-only agreement "deserves an immediate, favorable American response without waiting for resumption of formal talks....It would be self-defeating to endanger a possible ABM agreement by insisting that offensive weapons must be linked to it." ('RUSSIA'S SALT OFFER', NEW YORK TIMES editorial, 17 January) p.48

26 Jan 1971
Senator Muskie, recently returned from the Soviet Union, said that he had told Kosygin that "there was a body of opinion in the United States that wanted to reduce US weapons spending. Muskie said "we were concerned about the cost of armaments and in the Congress we were trying to do something about it - that we've reduced the President's own budget in this field." When asked if his comments might lead to the charge that he is meddling in foreign affairs, Muskie said, "Since I can say it here on the Senate floor, I don't see any damn reason why I can't say it to Kosygin." ('US Split on Defense Costs, Muskie Told Soviet Premier', Washington Post, 26 Jan 1971.) p.51

1 Feb 1971
Senator Humphrey urges Senate to freeze ABM and MIRV programs "as an appropriate response to the recent halt in construction and deployment of Russian land-based missiles. ('Halt MIRV, ABM, Asks Humphrey', Chicago Tribune, 2 Feb 1972.p.55) "At no cost to ourselves - and with absolute guarantee of our own security - we can stop our part of the nuclear arms race in response to actions already taken by the Soviet Union." ('Senate Panel to be Informed on Progress in Arms Talks', Washington Post, 2 Feb 1972 p.56) (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE, 1 FEB, p.52-53)

3 Feb 1971
In a closed door Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Senator Church called on the President to accept "an ABM-only agreement as a first step." ('US Negotiator Testifies on Limiting ABMs', Washington Post, 4 Feb 1971.) p.57

6 Feb 1971
A Washington Star editorial says the US should not accept a Washington-Moscow ABM-only agreement, which would leave the missiles unprotected and defend only the city of Washington which is neither a rational nor a credible alternative." ('Capital Defense', Washington Star editorial, 6 February 1971.) p.58

* 9 Feb 1971 Writing in a column in the New York Times, Herbert Scoville advocates a ban on testing, production and deployment of MIRVs. ('The Problem of MIRV: II', New York Times, 9 Feb 1971.) p61

* 22 Feb 1971 A New York Times editorial says "There is nothing to lose and everything to gain by offering to explore in depth Moscow's detailed proposal for a first step treaty limiting antiballistic missiles alone." ('Improving US-Soviet Relations', New York Times editorial, 22 Feb 1971.) p63

* 25 Feb 1971 Nixon's State of the World message to Congress clearly rejects an ABM-only agreement.

* 25 Feb 1971 Writing in a Washington Post column, Henry Owen claims "a ban or limitation on ABMs is more likely to endure if it is joined with limitations on offensive weapons from the start." ('Some Decisions Due for SALT Talks', Washington Post, 25 Feb 1971.) p.64

* 26 Feb 1971 A NYT editorial claims Nixon's "determination to persist with American ABM and offensive missile development lessens the likelihood of a fresh American initiative to break the disarmament deadlock." ('New Message, Old Doctrines', New York Times editorial, 26 Feb 1971.) p65

* 26 Feb 1971 William Foster calls for "a complete ban on ABM deployment, production and testing." (Foster Asks Total Ban on A-Tests', Washington Post, 28 Feb 1971.) p67

* 27 Feb 1971 Roscow Drummond, in a Christian Science Minitor column, endorses William Foster's proposal for a total ban on all nuclear weapons tests. ('How to Rescue the SALT Talks, Christian Science Monitor, 27 Feb 1971.) p66

* 27 Feb 1971 Paul Warnke calls for an ABM-only agreement as a first step, and a "complete freeze on the further deployment of offensive missile systems while negotiations continue." ('Democrats Urge US-Soviet Agreement on ABMs', Washington Post, 27 Feb 1971.) p68

* 28 Feb 1971 Wolfgang Panofsky, in a speech presented to the National Academy of Sciences, says "the era of MIRV and ABM initiates a new round in the arms race. Unless these weapons are stopped soon, it may be even more difficult to turn back from the brink." ('How Ignorance Fuels the Arms Race', San Francisco Chronicle, 28 Feb 1971.) p69-70

* 2 March 1971 In a letter to the editor, Herbert Scoville repeats his call for the US to "negotiate immediately on agreement banning ABMs or limiting them to levels no greater than the present Moscow system." ('ABM Limitations at SALT', Washington Post, 2 March 1971.) p71

* 7 March 1971 Senator Jackson claims the Soviet's recent slowdown on SS-9 deployment is due to their deployment of a new generation of offensive systems. (Sen. Jackson on Face the Nation, 7 March 1971.) p72

9

* 9 March 1971 A Christian Science Monitor news article reports that talk of "new Soviet missile developments will undoubtedly help the Nixon Administration in its quest for strategic funds", particularly with ABM. ('Soviet ICBM Construction Detected', Christian Science Monitor, 9 March '71) In an editorial on the same day, they say, "A healthy skepticism is the wisest response...to Sen. Jackson's televised warning." ('A Need for Facts', Christian Science Monitor editorial, 9 March 1971.) p77

* 10 March 1971 Sen. Symington, commenting on the "warnings of grave new dangers" posed by Russia, said that "in reasonably good humor, I say to my colleagues and the taxpayers - here we go again." ('Admiral Cites Soviet Danger, Asks Deterrent At All Costs', Baltimore Sun, 11 March 1971.) p79
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 10 MARCH p82

* 15 March 1971 Round IV, SALT Talks resume in Vienna.

* 16 March 1971 A New York Times editorial states "there is little logic" in American rejection of the Soviet ABM proposal. The Times claims we could stop the Soviet MIRV only "by offering to give up the American MIRV." ('Back to the SALT Mines', New York Times editorial, 16 March 1971.) p97

* 18 March 1971 A Washington Star editorial calls any proposal to stop the development and deployment of MIRV and ABM in response to Russian moves is "suicidal folly." In addition, "the Administration has very wisely rejected an agreement limited to defense weapons systems." ('More SALT', Washington Star editorial, 18 March 1971.) p99

* 20 March 1971 Ronald Tammen, in an editorial column in The New Republic, claims recent reports of Soviet offensive buildup are the annual cries of "wolf" to get a larger defense budget. ('Wolf at the Pentagon Door', The New Republic, 20 March 1971.) p101

* 23 March 1971 Henry Owen, writing in the Washington Post, calls for a total ban on ABMs, linked to a follow-on agreement to limit offensive weapons. ('Total Ban on ABM Is Real Solution', Washington Post, 23 March 1971.) p103

* 25 March 1971 Sen. Humphrey calls for an agreement limiting ABM systems as a first step and criticizes the Administration for assuming an "all-or-nothing position." Humphrey introduced a Sense of the Senate Resolution (S Res 87) urging the President to agree to ban or limit deployment of ABMs and then to negotiate limitations on offensive weapons. The resolution also proposed a US-Soviet freeze on the testing of MIRV and ABM. Senators Harold Hughes and George McGovern co-sponsored. (N.B. A similar resolution was defeated by a 50-50, then 51-49 vote by the Senate two years before in a 1969 resolution originally sponsored by Sen. Brooke.) ('Humphrey Urges Limits on ABM's', New York Times, 26 March 1971 p112)
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 25 MARCH p104-111

10

28 March 1971 In an interview on Issues and Answers, Sen. Jackson proposes a one year agreement with the Soviets to freeze deployment of most land-based missiles. ('Missile Freeze Urged by Jackson', New York Times, 29 March 1971; 'Freeze on Missiles Urged by Jackson', Washington Star, 29 March; 'Jackson Urges Missile Freeze', Washington Post, 29 March 1971.) p 113, p 115, p 114

29 March 1971 In a Washington Post news article, Chalmers Roberts claims the Administration is resisting an ABM only agreement in order to get congressional approval for ABM construction. ('Jackson Urges Missile Freeze', Washington Post, 29 March 1971.) p 114

30 March 1971 Sen. Symington urges acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a mutual freeze on ABMs as a first step. (CBS Evening News, Marvin Kalb, 30 March 1971; 'Symington Backs Soviet on ABM Freeze', New York Times, 30 March 1971; 'Symington, Jackson Differ on Arms Limit', Baltimore Sun, 31 March 1971.) p.117-120

30 March 1971 Marvin Kalb reports that the Russians two weeks ago formally proposed an end to the development and deployment of ABM defensive missiles alone. (Marvin Kalb, CBS Evening News, 30 March 1971.) p 118

1 Apr 1971 Joseph Kraft, in columns in the Washington Post and Baltimore Sun, claims that despite "two undoubted difficulties", the Soviet ABM proposal is "an attractive offer." ('Russians' Offer on ABM's Puts the Ball in US Court', Washington Post, Baltimore Sun, 1 April.) p 125

5 Apr 1971 A New York Times editorial claims that "The Soviet Union clearly is not going to stop MIRV development unless the United States abandons Poseidon as well as Minuteman III and agrees to halt the ABM deployment on both sides that MIRV is designed to counter."

"An even-handed offer of this kind has long been suggested by...Senator Muskie." The Times urges Congress to hold up deployment of ABM and MIRV missiles through its control of the purse strings - for "only then will Nixon be likely to implement the Senate's recommendations on SALT." ('SALT Can Be Saved', New York Times editorial, 5 April 1971.) p 126

6 April 1971 Sen. Muskie, in a speech in Philadelphia, gave his endorsement to the Soviet ABM proposal. Muskie repeated this call in a statement on the floor of the Senate on 6 May. p 127, p. 154-159

20 Apr 1971 Sen. Symington says the Safeguard program is reminiscent of "the parachute company that said if it doesn't work, send it back and we will give you another." In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Symington was able to get Dr. John Foster to admit that if there was an ABM only agreement prohibiting ABM systems, then there would be no need for MIRVs. ('Senate Reopens Debate Over ABM,' New York Times, 20 April 1971.) p 139

11

21 April 1971 In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Herbert York and Wolfgang Panofsky say the US could safely switch to a cheaper, more effective ABM if such a defense proved necessary. However, the best solution would be a SALT agreement banning or limiting rival ABMs. ('ABM Critics Rap Policy at SALT', Washington Post, 21 April 1971.) p141

26 April 1971 A Christian Science Monitor editorial says we should wait and see what the Russians are up to before we commit ourselves to expensive new weapons systems. ('The New Russian Missiles', Christian Science Monitor editorial, 26 April 1971.) p146

29 April 1971 William Beecher reports that "the Soviet Union has proposed a detailed five-year treaty limiting their missile defenses to ond hundred interceptor missiles protecting each nation's capital." ('Soviet Proposes a Five-Year Treaty for Curbs on ABM's', New York Times, 29 April 1971.) p147

2 May 1971 A Washington Post news article states that time is running out on SALT. "A number of top-level US defense planners...believe the critical weapons systems both sides are using as bargaining chips in SALT...are developing a momentum of their own that threatens to outpace the talks." ('Arms Race Surge is Feared', Washington Post, 2 May 1971.) p149

4 May 1971 Sen. Symington accuses the Nixon administration of planning deliberately not to have any arms control agreement at all by their insistence on linking offensive and defensive weapons agreements. (UPI, 4 May 1971; p152 'Symington Assails Arms Control Stand', Washington Post, 4 May 1971.) p151

4 May 1971 Sen. Fulbright says the continuation of the arms race while the two sides negotiated was "insanity", and that if both sides are deliberately escalating the arms race in an effort to gain advantage at the talks, they should be broken off. (UPI, 4 May 1971.) p152

4 May 1971 In a column in the Washington Star, Crosby Noyes warns that "it is high time that Americans woke up to the very unpleasant implications of these Soviet words and deeds." ('The Danger of Ignoring Russia's A-Power', Washington Star, 4 May 1971.) p153

6 May 1971 Richard Wilson write in the Baltimore Sun that the Administration is doing nothing in the face of "extensive, not to say massive", Soviet arms buildup. ('US Must Act Now To Counter Soviet Arms Expansion', Baltimore Sun, 6 May 1971) This theme is echoed in a Sun editorial on 7 May. ('Soviet Missiles', Baltimore Sun editorial, 7 May 1971.) p160, p161

6 May 1971 Sen. Muskie repeats his support of an ABM-pnly agreement. ('Congressional Record, 6 May') p154-159

12

* 11 May 1971 Columnist Joseph Kraft writes that the United States, in dealing with Russia's forward thrust, can afford to be broadminded, "since we are way ahead." "To demand concession for concession in an explicit one-for-one way, as the linkage theory of the Nixon Administration provides, is a recipe for getting nowhere." ('Russian Expert's US Visit Reflects Continuing Tension', Baltimore Sun, 11 May 1971.) p163

* 12 May 1971 A Christian Science Monitor editorial asserts that "while (the Russians) were not deploying any new SS-9 missiles the United States was fitting new warheads to its Minuteman missiles." ('Weaponry, 1971', Christian Science Monitor editorial, 12 May 1971.) p164

* 16 May 1971 In a column in the Baltimore Sun, Herbert Scoville claims "Nixon's refusal to negotiate an 'ABM only' limitation as a first stage of an arms limitation agreement may now have reaped its harvest with the resumption of Russian ABM deployment, making agreement in this area and perhaps others more difficult than before." ('As A Matter of Fact, the US is Widening the Missile Gap', Baltimore Sun, 16 May 1971.) p165

* 17 May 1971 A Time Magazine article says that recent "developments have tended to weaken the Administration's already questionable case for refusing to consider the Soviet ABM-only proposal." ('Disarmament: SALT Up to Date', Time Magazine, 17 May 1971.) p166

* June 1971 George Rathjens, in an editorial in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, says that the Soviet draft treaty to limit ABMs "ought to be warmly welcomed as a basis for negotiation, but the reported negative US response is a cause for concern." ('A Breakthrough in Arms Control' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1971 - but written prior to 20 May announcement.) p217-218

* 20 May 1971 Announcement that US and Soviets have agreed to negotiate limitations on both offensive and defensive weapons, but will concentrate on defensive weapons first.

Reaction to 20 May Announcement:

* Congressional leaders:

Senators Muskie, Mansfield, Church, Hughes and Humphrey all praised the announcement. Sen. Fulbright initially said he did not completely understand its significance and would reserve judgement, but later that day said he was "encouraged" by the news. Cong. Herbert commented "It's all well and good, but let's keep our powder dry." (UPI, 21 May; Congressional Quarterly, 28 May; ABC, CBS, NBC Evening News, 20 May; 'US, Soviet Union Agree on Format for Arms Talks,' Baltimore Sun, 21 May; 'US and Russia Agree to Press for ABM Accord', Washington Post, 21 May.) p 170-176

13

Sen. Jackson said he found no comfort in the announcement, saw no reason for euphoria, and did not believe it was a major breakthrough; but at least the negotiations themselves are saved. ('Russia Seeks Arms Straight-jacket on US, Jackson Says', *Los Angeles Times*, 22 May.) p195

### Network Coverage:

ABC, NBC, and CBS played the announcement as a straight news story. Eric Severid offered cautious praise. (ABC, NBC, CBS Evening News, 20 May.) p170-174

### News Stories:

* Michael Getler, writing in the Washington Post, provided a straight news story ('US Goals Stress ABM, SS-9 Limits', Washington Post, 21 May). However, Chalmers Roberts emphasized the ABM-first aspect, saying that "White House officials strove to avoid any characterization of yesterday's announcement as a concession by one side or the other. But there seemed to be no doubt that it was Mr. Nixon who accepted the bigger change." ('US and Russians Agree to Press for ABM Curb', Washington Post, 21 May.) p177, p178-179

* Max Frankel of the New York Times reports that the US "gave up the search for an initial limitation on all major offensive strategic weapons, while the Soviet Union softened its demand for an initial limitation on defenses only." ('US and Russians to Stress ABMs at Arms Parley', New York Times, 21 May) p180-181

* Articles in the Baltimore Sun played the story straight saying, "the two governments outlined what appeared to be a compromise." ('US, Soviet Union Agree on Format for Arms Talks', John Carroll, Baltimore Sun, 21 May.) p184

### Editorials and Columns:

* James Reston declared "Mr. Nixon was widely praised even by most of the Democratic presidential candidates for reaching an agreement with the Russians on the agenda for the strategic arms talks." ('Cautious Nixon Strategy', New York Times, 21 May.) p187

* A New York Times editorial calls the announcement "a major step forward", but cautions that "the offensive missile restrictions would not halt the arms race in submarine-based missiles, MIRV warheads nor long-range bombers. But the ABM limitation would have major importance in discouraging both sides from wasting money on more offensive weapons to add to the present overkill." ('Summit Accord on SALT, 'New York Times, 21 May.) p188

* Editorials in the Wall Street Journal, Baltimore Sun ('SALT In Motion'), Washington Star ('The Breakthrough') and other papers warmly praised the announcement. p189-190

14

* A Washington Post editorial calls the announcement "commendable", "a positive development and an admirable achievement." ('The Joint Statement on SALT, ' Washington Post, 23 May.) p199

* Robert Kleiman writes that "Nixon's effort...to break the impasse in the SALT talks...has led to a more hopeful phase in Soviet-American relations." Kleiman notes that Muskie's recent statements in Moscow "may have had something to do with Brezhnev's skeptical comment later that Nixon had followed a zigzag course abroad influenced by domestic politics." ('SALT At the Summit', New York Times, 24 May.) p201

* In its third SALT editorial in a week, the Wall Street Journal asserts that "...by refusing to totally abandon its position, as its critics urged, the Administration has won an agenda pointing toward a more comprehensive SALT agreement, and not so incidentally, one less risky for American interests." "More broadly, the Russians would have had little incentive to compromise at all if they had concluded that the Americans lacked the will to match the strategic advances beyond rough parity." ('The Budding of Hope; Wall Street Journal, 27 May.) p208

* In an editorial entitled 'SALT Seasoning', the New Republic advocates a halt to American ABM construction and elimination of the program. ('SALT Seasoning', the New Republic, 29 May) p211

* Chalmers Roberts claims that the proposed SALT agreement would result in "no halt to the emplacement of MIRVs by either nation." ('The ABC8s of FBS, SALT, MBFR and CES (or ESC)', Washington Post, 29 May) p212-213

* A Washington Post editorial calls for a speedup in the arms control negotiations. ('Negotiations: Now', Washington Post editorial, 30 May) p215

## Academics:

* In a news story in the New York Times, entitled 'Harvard-MIT Arms Experts Pleased by Nixon's Move on Talks', John Finney reports on the extraordinary reactions of the "Charles River gang", most of whom had favored an ABM-only agreement. Some experts are quoted praising the President for having accepted in effect the Soviet proposal of an ABM-only agreement. Abe Chayes amazingly (1) assumed the President had accepted an ABM-only agreement, (2) thought it was right to do so, but (3) gave the President no credit since all he had done was to "clear away some of the obstacles that were of his own making" in attempting to link offensive and defensive weapons' limits. ('Harvard-MIT Experts Pleased', New York Times, 27 May.) p209

15

7 June 1971 In a column in the New York Times, Herbert Mitgang claims that even with success at SALT, the Administration's commitment to "huge military outlays" makes "the promise of a full generation of peace" sound like "George Orwell's Newspeak slogan for 1984: War is Peace." ('New Wings for 1984', New York Times, 7 June.) p220

21 June 1971 Richard Levine writes in the Wall Street Journal that "an initial agreement slowing the arms race would shrink the Pentagon budget very little, if at all." ('How Much Money Will SALT Save?', Wall Street Journal, 21 June.) p224-225

July 1971 Marshall Shulman writes in Foreign Affairs that the arms race has continued throughout the SALT talks, because of "the absence of an effective political leadership in either Russia or America capable of presiding with common sense over the pressures of military services and new war technologies." The bargaining chips rationale has resulted in an increased "dynamism for military competition." ('What Does Security Mean Today?', Foreign Affairs, July 1971.) p226-227

4 July 1971 In a column in the Washington Post, Peter Ognibene urges that the SALT talks accept unconditional agreement on limiting ABMs; that "to do otherwise makes no sense." ('ABM Pact is Better Than None', Washington Post, 4 July 1971.) p228-229

8 July 1971 Round V SALT talks resume in Helsinki.

13 July 1971 In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control, David Packard called for deployment of offensive and defensive weapons as "bargaining chips" for SALT. Paul Warnke argued it was a "self-defeating notion" to argue for the deployment of ABM and MIRV as bargaining chips since they only lead to acceleration of the arms race. Warnke claimed MIRVs are destabilizing.

Sen. Muskie (chairman of the subcommittee) said the US has had "a unilateral escalation of the arms race since the talks began." ('Pentagon Aide Urges Deployment of More Missiles as Bargaining Chips for Talks with the Soviets', New York Times, 14 July; 'Packard Sees SS-9 No Dire Threat Now', Washington Post, 14 July; Congressional Quarterly 'Arms Control' 30 July; Hearings before Muskie subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Cme.) p243-247

14 July 1971 In testimony before the Muskie Subcommittee, Senator Humphrey proposed that Congress place in escrow approved funds for MIRV while we seek an arms control agreement. Humphrey, with Muskie's endorsement, said he would introduce a Sense of the Senate Resolution calling for a US and Russian freeze in offensive and defensive weapons deployment through the course of the SALT negotiations. Senator Javits expressed support of the freeze idea.

16

Marshall Shulman testified that the "bargaining chip
rationale provides dynamism for the arms race," while
Herbert Scoville said the US can halt MIRV deployment with-
out incurring any security risks.

During the hearings Senator Case expressed disbelief in
the validity of the 'bargaining chip argument', while
Senator John Sherman Cooper questioned to what extent
Senate action might complicate the negotiations by doing
or not doing what the Administration asks. (ABC Evening
News, 14 July; 'Humphrey, Muskie Ask Missile Curb', New
York Times, 15 July; 'HHH Warns on Buildup in A-Arms',
Washington Post, 15 July; 'Arms Control', Congressional
Quarterly, 30 July; Hearings before the Muskie sub-
committee of Sen. Foreign Relations Cmte, 14 July) p248-256

15 July 1971 In an editorial entitled 'SALT's Auspicious Openings' the New York Times echoes Warnke's argument that the bargaining chip "reasoning turns SALT into a means of accelerating the arms race." ('SALT's Auspicious Openings', New York Times editorial, 15 July.) p263

15 July 1971 Announcement of HAK's secret trip to Peking and Nixon's acceptance of Chinese invitation to visit.

16 July 1971 A report prepared for the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law (a group of liberal Senators and Congressmen, including Humphrey, McGovern and Muskie) proposed that tactical nuclear weapons be included in either the SALT or proposed mutual balanced force reduction talks. ('Talks on Tactical Nuclear Arms Limitation Urged', Baltimore Sun, 16 July) p264, p249-252

21 July 1971 A Christian Science Monitor news article by Charlotte Saikowski reports that "some observers believe the Russians, wary of a Chinese-American detente,...will be cautious in SALT." ('Peking: Invisible Delegate at SALT Talks in Helsinki', Christian Science Monitor, 21 July) p264

Congressional Reaction to Nixon's Trip to Peking:

In commenting on Nixon's proposed China trip, Averell Harriman said it "will cause a lot of difficulty for us.... For instance in Russia they will resent this highly.... And how does it affect our SALT talks?"

Frank Church, recently returned from a trip to Moscow,
said the Russians showed "mixed feelings" about the trip.

Sen. Humphrey urged the President to visit Moscow on his way to or from Peking to reassure Soviet leaders. "The point of this suggestion is that we must be careful that the Russians do not misinterpret the purpose of the Pres-

17

ident's visit. We cannot risk taking any action which would escalate (the Russians') fundamental feeling of insecurity."

Sen. Muskie said the "visit must not be allowed to increase suspicion between the United States and the Soviet Union and must not decrease the chances of a comprehensive arms agreement between us."

Sen. Bayh said the US "must pursue improved relations with China in away that is not calculated to stimulate Soviet suspicion and fear of a US-China alignment against them. (While better relations with China are important) we have even more vital business to do with the Soviets."

Sen. Symington said, "I would hope nothing develops which would affect in a negative fashion any possible progress in the SALT talks." (Quotations from 'US-Soviet Relations, Congressional Quarterly, 23 July) p 270

* 10 Aug 1971 In testimony before a Joint Economic Subcommittee, Averell Harriman said Nixon Administration is too slow in responding to Soviet proposals for MBFR in Europe, and that if we had abstained from deployment of ABM and MIRV we would have had a comprehensive SALT agreement by now. "The delays have wasted a major opportunity for cutting US military spending." ('Harriman Urges Soviet Accord', Washington Post, 10 August; 'Deplores Arms Testing', Baltimore Sun, 10 August) p276, 277

* 10 Aug 1971 Editorials in the New York Times and Washington Post claim "Moscow has been handed a major foreign policy coup" with the Soviet-Indian friendship treaty. The pact was India's response to US support for Pakistan. ('Soviet-India Pact', New York Times; 'A Bold Move in the Subcontinent', Washington Post, 10 August.) p278, 279

* 14 Aug 1971 In a speech in California, Sen. Goldwater said the Soviets now have superior defenses, and the US is on its "way to becoming a second rate power." ('Russia's Power Called Superior', Baltimore Sun, 15 August) p285

* 14 Aug 1971 Charles Yost writes in the Washington Post that there should be a US-Soviet summit. Yost cautions that Japanese reaction to the Peking summit may be to turn toward either China or the Soviet Union. ('More and Regular Summit Meetings May Be Answer', Washington Post, 14 August) p284

* 23 Aug 1971 In a US News and World Report editorial, David Lawrence calls for a US-Soviet summit. ('Why Not Invite Brezhnev to Visit the United States', US News & World Reports' 23 August) p286

13

* 6 Sept 1971 In an editorial column in Nation Magazine, Fred Warner Neal is pessimistic of the Administration's ability to bring about rapprochement with both China and the Soviet Union. If the Peking summit is being used to pressure the Russians on SALT, it will fail, and "damage our relations with Moscow." ('A Leaf from Metternich', Nation Magazine, 6 Sept) p288

* 23 Sept 1971 Sen. Humphrey added an amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Bill calling for suspension of US MIRV deployment. This proposal was "embarrassingly" defeated, 39-12, on Sept 24. "All the potential democratic presidential contenders (except Humphrey) were absent for the vote." ('Humphrey Curb on MIRVs Beaten', New York Times, 25 Sept; UPI 24 Sept) p298, 294

* 24 Sept 1971 Round V SALT talks concluded in Helsinki.

* 28 Sept 1971 John Sherman Cooper and Phillip Hart have decided not to renew their annual fight against ABM because of improving prospects for a SALT agreement to limit ABMs. ('Two Senators Ease Fight on ABM', Washington Star, 28 Sept) p299

* 1 Oct 1971 News articles report that the Ad Hoc Committee on Professional Standards of the Operations Research Society of America accused Professors Wiesner, Rathjens, Weinberg and Lapp of "inappropriate, unprofessional, misleading" and factually incorrect analysis in the ABM debate. ('Report on Safeguard ABM Testimony Finds Unprofessional and Misleading Comments on Both Sides', New York Times, 1 Oct; 'Colleagues Criticize Anti-ABM Scientists', Washington Post, 1 Oct) p300-302

* 11 Oct 1971 In an editorial column in Newsweek, Brzezinski says that US-China rapprochement is squeezing the Russians, and warns that this could lead to Soviet moves in the Middle East, Vietnam, Japan and Europe. Thus, Nixon's initiative toward China should be accompanied by political initiatives toward Western Europe and Japan. ('The Great Squeeze', Newsweek, 11 Oct) p310

* 12 Oct 1971 Announcement of Moscow summit.

Reaction to Announcement:

* 13 Oct. Editorials in the New York Times ('Nixon's Second Summit'); Chicago Tribune ('Moscow on Nixon's Itinerary'); and Baltimore Sun ('Later, Moscow'), all praise Nixon's proposed trip to Moscow. (13 Oct) p311, 312

* 14 Oct. A Wall Street Journal editorial entitled 'Mission to Moscow' praises the Moscow Summit and is optimistic on chances for a SALT agreement this year. p313

* Murrey Marder writes that summits are a good idea and quotes Mansfield as saying: "The President has

19

made some tremendous strides and very worthwhile
moves" in foreign policy. ('Nixon's Dual Summits
Cut Risks', Washington Post, 14 Oct) p 314

* A Washington Post article by Michael Getler notes some officials are concerned that the Moscow trip may induce Russia to drag her feet at SALT. ('Timing of Moscow Trip Worries Defense Experts', Washington Post, 17 Oct) p 319

* 26 Oct 1971 A New York Times editorial urges a curb on US ABM and MIRV. ('Laird v. Nixon', New York Times editorial, 26 Oct) p 325

* 15 Nov 1971 Round VI SALT talks opens in Vienna.

* 21 Nov 1971 A New York Times editorial claims "so far, instead of curbing the nuclear missile race, the talks seemed to have stimulated it." Since "neither side is ready to negotiate about MIRV yet" the US should push for a zero ABM accord. ('SALT's Challenge', New York Times editorial, 21 Nov) p 344

* Winter 1971 Sen. Humphrey, in an article in World Affairs, writes that we do not have "the luxury of time or opportunity to reject a limited ban or curtailment of any system, and insist on a comprehensive agreement." Humphrey urges Nixon to halt ABM and delay MIRV. ('American Foreign Policy', World Affairs, Winter 1971) p 346-347

* Dec 1971 Martin Perl, writing in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, claims SALT cannot be "truly successful" so long as the US and Soviet Union continue with MIRV. ('SALT and Its Illusions', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dec 1971) p 348-352

* Dec 1971 The Pugwash Conference Committee issued a statement calling for severe limitation or ban on ABM, and a "meaningful limitation on offensive weapons, and argues for a comprehensive test ban treaty." (SALT and International Security, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dec 1971) p 353-355

* 22 Dec 1971 The Federation of American Scientists calls for a treaty banning all underground nuclear tests, without demanding on-site inspection. A statement signed by Mort Halperin and other scientists claims: "Much of the opposition to a test ban treaty" does not arise from a fear of Soviet cheating, but "springs from the desire to continue American nuclear testing in order to develop new weapons." ('Test Ban Pact', Washington Star, 22 Dec) p 365

* 27 Dec 1971 Sen. Muskie called the SALT talks "a story of unfulfilled promise"; "our security and economy can no longer afford the luxury of a hesitant, proprocrastinating arms control policy." ('Muskie cites Protraction in SALT Talks', Washington Post, 27 Dec) p 366

21

# US-SOVIET TRADE, 1971

## Summary

US-Soviet trade was a separate issue, but related to the general call for improvement in US-Russian relations. Congressmen and the liberal press argued that US-Soviet trade was of economic benefit to us, or at least of mutual benefit, and of political benefit in promoting both detente and internal liberalization. Withholding trade was seen as self-denying economically, futile as leverage, a stimulus to tensions, and as playing into the hands of the Stalinist hardliners. "Linkage" was dangerous and a hindrance; the Administration was too slow.

Response to Sec. Stans' trip to Moscow was favorable.

## Chronology

* 8 Feb 1971 Robert Kleiman of the New York Times saw normalized US-Soviet trade as one of the "positive steps...of overriding importance" which would influence "critical choices" in the Kremlin at the forthcoming Party Congress. Experts were telling the President that "withholding trade until later" would "play into the hands of the Kremlin's hardliners." ('US Strategy on the Kremlin Debate', New York Times, 8 Feb) p. 368-370

* 22 Feb 1971 A New York Times editorial cited the beneficial impact of liberalized trade: "The tactic of withholding American trade as leverage for some later bargain over unrelated issues is far less likely to influence Soviet policy favorably than is the trade itself, once it begins to play a role in Soviet economic planning and in increasing Soviet contact and interdependence with the West." ('Improving US-Soviet Relations', New York Times, 22 Feb) p. 371

* 7 June 1971 A Washington Post editorial called trade discrimination against Communist countries a "costly anachronism", a "bad habit", and evidence of the "ossification of cold-war thinking." ('East-West Trade: Old Habits Die Hard', Washington Post, 7 June) p. 373

* 26 June 1971 A New York Times editorial thought "the economic case for increased commercial trade with the Soviet Union is particularly strong." The political atmosphere was ripe for it, and it would help the US appear even-handed in view of the recent liberalization of US trade with China. (New York Times editorial, 26 June) p. 372

* 26 July 1971 The New York Times urged giving the President "the flexibility he needs in using trade as an adjunct to his policy for normalizing political relations with mainland China and other communist states." Excessive rigidity simply shuts the US out of these markets "without any impact on Communist countries or gain to national security." ('Undermining the Budget', New York Times editorial, 26 July) p. 374

* 27 July 1971 A Washington Post editorial attacked the Administration's "negative approach on East-West trade." The problem was that the President's approach "seems to be primarily political: he seems to be trying to fit each trade gesture into a larger global mosaic which he, perhaps only he, has in his head....It's odd to find a Republican President so unwilling to let businessmen make trading decisions by themselves." ('A Negative Approach to East-West Trade', Washington Post editorial, 27 July) p. 375

* July 1971 Senators Church and Hatfield represented the US Congress at the US-Soviet Dartmouth Conference in Kiev in July 1971. The communique at the close of the Conference hailed the beneficial impact of trade on US-Soviet political relations, mutual understanding, and the lessening of tensions worldwide, "despite existing differences in institutions, laws, and customs." ('Joint Communique of the VIth Dartmouth Conference' July 1971) p. 376

* August 1971 In an interview with Playboy, Sen. McGovern said "the best way to ensure our national security is to improve relations with the Soviet Union in every area we can. That means expanding international trade" as well as trying to resolve political problems. McGovern was for "coesixting peacefully" with the Soviets. (Interview with George McGovern, Playboy Magazine, August 1971) p. 377

* 9 Nov 1971 Sen. Ribicoff made a strong pitch for more rapid liberalization of East-West trade in a speech before the International Fiscal Association in New York. Ribicoff claimed that if peaceful coexistence between countries with different political philosophies is the only rational course to pursue, a most logical policy objective should be to see "that all nations are included in a world system in which the mutual benefits from trade and commerce can be shared with all." ('Ribicoff Advocates Trade with Communist Nations', New York Times, 10 Nov) p. 378-379

* 17 Nov 1971 Joseph Kraft, writing in the Baltimore Sun, hailed "the exciting possibilities" in US-Soviet political relations which the Stans trip reflected. He cited with approval Harold Scott's statement that "there cannot be even a beginning of normal relations until the Russians are given credit guarantees and most-favored-nation treatment." ('US May Find Russia "willing to do Business", Baltimore Sun, 17 Nov) p. 380

* 19 Nov 1971 In a column in the Washington Post, Stephen Rosenfeld praised the President for his little-known but impressive record on helping Soviet Jews. The President's approach

LOS ANGELES TIMES

28 DEC 1970 (5J)

# U.S. Must Pursue Arms Talks

24

Bringing the arms race under some semblance of control is so important that the Nixon Administration has no rational choice but to keep trying, and trying again, to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union.

It is both disappointing and frustrating, however, that the third round of the strategic arms limitation talks has ended with almost no discernible results.

Furthermore, barring a change in the Soviet attitude, there is precious little reason to believe round four of the SALT negotiations, scheduled for Vienna in mid-March, will be any more productive.

Over six months have passed since the U.S. negotiators made a proposal calling for a numerical limitation on offensive strategic weapons, and for either a ceiling or outright prohibition of antimissile defensive systems.

When the last round of talks got under way in Helsinki in November, the Administration was hopeful that the Soviet negotiators would respond in detail, or make a specific counterproposal of their own.

These hopes were disappointed.

The Russians refused to talk in specific numbers. And, they sharply disagreed with Washington on what constitutes an "offensive strategic system." They insisted that, in addition to Polaris-type submarines, ICBMs and long-range bombers, an agreement must cover any delivery system that can drop nuclear weapons on the other's territory.

Such an interpretation sounds sensible on the surface.

The result, however, would be to include U.S. planes based in Europe and aboard aircraft carriers in the limitations, but to exclude the Soviet Union's medium-range missiles which are targeted on Western Europe.

Such a one-sided formula is unacceptable to the United States. It is even more unacceptable to our NATO allies, whose security is directly involved but who are not parties to the SALT negotiations.

Obviously it is best to deal with intercontinental weapons first, and with the more complex matter of the tactical weapons later. If the Soviet Union refuses to accept this fact of life, hopes for an agreement are dim indeed.

Inevitably, Moscow's dilatory tactics makes one wonder how serious the Kremlin is about the negotiations.

On the hopeful side, the Pentagon reports that the Russians have slowed construction of sites for deployment of the big SS-9—the monster ICBM which, in sufficient numbers, could gravely threaten the land-based portion of our nuclear deterrent.

The Kremlin also has disclosed that the publicly announced portion of its military budget for the coming year will level off at $19.7 billion, the same as 1970.

Western experts caution, however, that the announced portions of the Soviet military budget are no more than a third of what is actually spent. As for the slowdown in SS-9 emplacement, this could

Established 1845

SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN

January 1971

Volume 224

Number 1

25

# The Limitation of Offensive Weapons

*It is argued that the best possible outcome that can be expected to emerge from the current strategic-arms-limitation talks (SALT) would be a freeze on the existing offensive forces of both sides*

by Herbert Scoville, Jr.

Recent public debate in the U.S. on the control of strategic weapons has been mainly focused on anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) systems. Apart from the limited and so far unsuccessful effort to halt further testing by this country of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's), there has been little open discussion of how offensive strategic weapons might also be controlled. It appears to have been generally assumed that reaching an international agreement to limit the deployment of offensive weapons systems would be a comparatively straightforward matter not requiring such extensive analysis.

In reality, however, a number of different approaches to the limitation of offensive weapons are possible, and these could have very different effects on the future course of the strategic-arms race. Certain approaches could raise serious issues of national security for one side or the other, whereas others could actually accelerate the arms race instead of cur tailing it. The economic gains from the banning of certain activities could be completely nullified by rechanneling arms expenditures into new develop ments. Some types of agreement would be extremely difficult to verify and could even lead to increased tensions by arousing fears that the agreements were not being honored. Other possible agree ments, although superficially attractive to one side or the other, would be ex tremely difficult to negotiate.—

In any attempt to evaluate the various

approaches to the problem of limiting offensive weapons it is important to bear in mind the stated objective of the U.S. strategic forces: to deter the initiation of nuclear war by maintaining a credible capacity to cause unacceptable destruc tion to the other side even after any conceivable surprise attack. In theory this "assured-destruction capacity" can be achieved by having enough offensive forces so that those that survive a "counterforce" strike are enough to penetrate the enemy's defenses. At present both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. possess such forces in the form of a combination of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's), fixed, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and long-range strategic bombers. Neither side has an ABM system that can threaten the other's deterrent. The primary goal of any arms-control agreement is to provide greater confidence that this state of mutual deterrence is maintained and at the same time conserve scarce re sources that both nations need for many other programs.

In general the methods of offensive-arms limitation that have been proposed so far can be grouped under three broad headings. First, an agreement could be reached setting a ceiling on the total number of delivery vehicles that would be allowed for each side. Such an agreement would not place any limitation on the mix of weapons that could be included in the total number. Thus replacement of an existing weapon with

another type of weapon would be allowed. A variation of this approach would further restrict the number of weapons in specific categories, such as bombers or land-based ICBM's; alternatively, such an agreement might limit the replacement of an existing weapon by one of a radically different size.

The second general approach would be to limit the total useful payload deliverable by each side; payload in this case would include both warheads and penetration aids.

The third approach would be to freeze the strategic forces of both sides at their present levels, without formally stating any specific allowed numbers. Substitution of existing delivery vehicles or launchers by new types would not be permitted. A possible variation would be to allow only those replacements that did not alter the external configuration of the delivery vehicle or launcher.

It is important to analyze each of these approaches in detail in order to develop an understanding of the significance of any agreement that might be reached as a result of the current strategic-arms-limitation talks (SALT) between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Before proceeding with such an evaluation, it is necessary to review the present levels of the deployed strategic forces on both sides and consider how these levels might change in the event that no arms-limitation agreement is reached [see illustration on next page].

15

26

For the purpose of this review a land-based delivery vehicle is considered strategic if it has the range to deliver a warhead to a substantial part of the territory of one nation from its deployed launching point on the territory of the other nation; in addition delivery vehicles launched from nuclear-powered submarines are regarded as strategic. Systems that are only capable of being fired between Siberia and Alaska are normally not considered to be part of this total. Similarly, manned aircraft that are only capable of one-way missions, short-range, medium-range and intermediate-range missiles that are capable of being used only against allied nations, and tactical aircraft that are based either overseas or on carriers are not included in the total. (The U.S. FB-111's, which have been classed as strategic bombers by Secretary of Defense Laird, are now being deployed in Britain, so that these are a somewhat marginal case.) Although any such definitions are of necessity somewhat arbitrary and would of course be the subject of negotiation, they help to simplify the analysis and do not alter the basic conclusions.

Since the U.S. and Russian missiles do not have identical characteristics, numbers alone are not sufficient to analyze the security implications of any potential agreement. The U.S. Minuteman I and Minuteman II missiles, which comprise most of our deployed ICBM force, can each carry a warhead with an explosive yield in the megaton range.

Roughly half of these missiles, however, are in the process of being replaced with the Minuteman III, which will have approximately the same payload but will carry three MIRV's, each with a yield in the range of hundreds of kilotons. The 54 Titan missiles have a larger payload capacity: each can deliver more than five megatons on the U.S.S.R. No plans exist for modernizing these Titans. The Russian SS-11's and SS-13's have nearly the same payload capability as the Minuteman. Just recently Secretary Laird announced that the Russians were testing an SS-11 system with three multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's), which lack the capability for being independently targeted. The Russian SS-9, a much larger missile capable of delivering a 25-megaton warhead on the U.S., has been tested for a period of about two years with three MRV's, each of which might have a warhead yield of about five megatons.

The U.S. has no plans to deploy additional land-based missile launchers, although many design studies have been carried out for advanced systems that might be either mobile or in "superhardened" rock silos (or both). The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, is continuing to deploy SS-11's and SS-13's at the rate of about 100 per year and SS-9's at the rate of about 50 or fewer per year. Although there is some evidence that the rate of this deployment has decreased somewhat in the past year, it is not known at what point the Russians would unilaterally halt these programs in the

absence of an arms-control agreement. There is some possibility that they are continuing the deployment of the SS-9 in order to emulate the U.S.'s example of being able to negotiate at SALT "from a position of strength."

The U.S. SLBM force consists of 41 submarines equipped with Polaris missiles, a large fraction of which are the A-3 model with three MRV's. Of the existing Polaris submarines 31 will be modified to carry the new Poseidon missile, which will be capable of delivering 10 MIRV's with yields of somewhat less than 100 kilotons each. At present eight submarines are undergoing such modification; the first will go to sea in January, 1971. The early Russian ballistic-missile submarines could handle only three missiles each, but the later versions, some 14 of which are now reported to be operational and 16 more to be under construction, are equipped to carry 16 missiles of the early Polaris type. No Russian testing of MRV's or MIRV's for this system has been reported. The Russians have the capability of increasing this fleet by approximately six or eight submarines per year and so could have a force with a numerical, but not qualitative, equivalence of the U.S. fleet before 1975. The U.S. has no firm plans for building new ballistic-missile submarines but has in the design stage a replacement for Polaris-Poseidon called the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS). Secretary Laird has stated that without an agreement at SALT a decision will have

U.S.

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">DELIVERY VEHICLES</th><th>NUMBER</th><th>APPROXIMATE EXPLOSIVE YIELD (MEGATONS)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="2">ICBM'S</td><td>TITAN</td><td>54</td><td>5-</td></tr><tr><td>MINUTEMAN</td><td>1.000</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>SLBM'S</td><td>POLARIS</td><td>656</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>BOMBERS</td><td>B-52, FB-111</td><td>550</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td></td><td>2.260</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as of January 1, 1971, are listed in this table. The three major categories on both sides are fixed, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) and long-range bombers. The approximate explosive yield of each type of missile is given in equivalent megatons of TNT; megatonnage is not indicated for the bombers, since this value varies from mission to mission, but the U.S. is known to have a substantial advantage in this category. In addition to the figures shown the U.S.S.R. is believed to have under construction about 40 SS-9's, 100 SS-11's and SS-13's, and 16 submarines carrying 256 SLBM's. The SS-9 has been tested with three multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's), each with a yield of about five megatons. The SS-11 has

U.S.S.R.

<table><thead><tr><th>DELIVERY VEHICLES</th><th>APPROXIMATE NUMBER</th><th>APPROXIMATE EXPLOSIVE YIELD (MEGATONS)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td rowspan="3">ICBM'S</td><td>SS-9</td><td>270</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>SS-11, SS-13</td><td>825</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>OLD MODELS</td><td>220</td><td>1+</td></tr><tr><td>SLBM'S</td><td></td><td>254</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>BOMBERS</td><td>BISON, BEAR</td><td>150</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td></td><td>1,719</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

also been tested with three MRV's, with a total yield of less than one megaton. About 50 percent of the Minutemen are currently being converted to carry three multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MRV's), again with a total yield somewhat less than one megaton. Some Polaris SLBM's currently carry three MRV's with a total yield less than one megaton, and the U.S. is in the process of replacing the Polaris missiles on 31 of its submarines with Poseidon missiles capable of carrying 10 roughly 100-kiloton MIRV's. No additional bomber deployment is taking place on either side. The U.S. now has a total of more than 4,300 strategic nuclear weapons in the form of missile warheads and bombs, whereas the U.S.S.R. has about 2,000. With the completion of the MIRV program in the mid-1970's the U.S. total will rise to about 9,000.

27

be made in 1971 on whether to proceed with the deployment of ULMS.

The U.S. currently has a force of 550 B-52 and FB-111 intercontinental bomb-ers. Since there has been no new produc-tion of B-52 aircraft for many years, the size of this force is gradually decreasing, but it is estimated that it will still total several hundred aircraft into the 1980's.

The B-52's are being modernized to car-ry air-to-surface missiles and improved penetration aids. Originally the nuclear weapons for these bombers had yields greater than 20 megatons, but it has been found more efficient to load them with several bombs having considerably smaller yields. The smaller Russian long-range bomber force is composed of a mix of turboprop Bears and jet Bisons. The U.S.S.R. has tested a nuclear device with potential yield of 100 megatons deliv-erable by a Bear aircraft, but no infor-mation is available concerning whether or not such a weapon has been deployed.

All likelihood the majority of the bombs for the Russian aircraft are of such lower yield. The U.S. is in the early development stage of a new long-range intercontinental bomber, the B-1, but there is no known Russian program for the development of a replacement for the U.S.S.R.'s existing aircraft.

Perhaps the simplest type of arms agreement to limit offensive strategic missiles would be one in which both na-tions agreed to a common ceiling on the total number of deployed launchers or delivery vehicles without regard to what they would be included within the total. Replacement of existing weapons by new models of the same type or by sub-jection with a different type would be allowed provided that the total number of operational weapons at any given time did not exceed the agreed number. Restrictions would be placed on qual-i-tative improvements or on the number of warheads or bombs that could be car-ried by any given delivery vehicle. In case of missiles it would be assumed each completed launcher contained delivery vehicle, and no restrictions would be placed on missiles that were associated with a launching plat-form. In the case of bombers each air-head would be regarded as a single de-ivery vehicle.

There are several alternative ways to a ceiling on numbers might be se-ized. If the ceiling were very high, say 100, it would provide no limitation at all if it were initially chosen to be very high, say 1,000, it would involve wide-distribution and scrapping of existing weapons that might raise questions in some minds

as to the viability of the deterrent. Intermediate levels would satisfy the security requirements of both nations but, depending on the exact terms, might present negotiating problems.

If such an agreement were reached with forces as of January 1, 1971, the U.S. would have a total operational force of 2,260 delivery vehicles and the U.S.S.R. about 1,720. This inequality results from the much larger U.S. bomber and SLBM forces, which outweigh the numerical advantage that the U.S.S.R. has in land-based ICBMs. The U.S.S.R. would also have approximately 400 additional missile launchers under construction. It is conceivable that the Russians might be willing to agree that the allowed numbers should be at the existing operational levels since a rough parity in force strength does exist. The larger payload capacity of the Russian land-based missiles (specifically the SS-9's) might be said to compensate for the U.S. advantage in number of SLBM's. The Russians might worry, however, that the number of their currently deployed sea-based missiles, the least vulnerable of all strategic systems, would be dangerously low in view of the fact that, with no restrictions on MIRV's, fixed land-based systems might at some time in the future be vulnerable to complete elimination by a U.S. counterforce strike. Furthermore, under such an agreement there would be nothing to prevent the U.S., if it chose, from replacing its present small missiles with those of larger payload.

On the other hand, the agreement could require that both nations have an equal number of delivery vehicles. Since the relative Russian inferiority in numbers would be largely alleviated if the U.S.S.R. were allowed to complete those launchers now under construction, a freeze on new starts might be the simplest way to achieve equality. The alternative to the U.S.'s reducing its force levels to those of the U.S.S.R. might be politically more difficult for the U.S. to accept and might leave the Russians feeling insecure because of their comparatively small number of SLBM's.

None of these approaches presents any real risk to U.S. security, particularly if ABM systems are simultaneously limited to low levels, since the U.S. would still have an adequate deterrent force. Even if the Russians developed MIRV's with sufficient accuracy to provide a high probability of eliminating U.S. land-based missiles, the U.S. would still be left with 656 submarine launchers, almost 500 of which would be ca-

pable of firing Poseidon missiles, each of which in turn could carry 10 warheads. Such a weapons system could be confident of wreaking completely unacceptable devastation on the U.S.S.R. in retaliation even if the Russians had deployed a very large ABM force. In addition the U.S. would have as a backup a large bomber force, which could not be destroyed simultaneously with the ICBM force. The deterrent should therefore remain secure, but if in time concern for security developed, the U.S. would always be in a position to replace its fixed land-based systems with less vulnerable mobile or sea-based ones.

An agreement along these lines, however, would have only minor effects in curbing the offensive-arms race and would only turn it in the direction of qualitative rather than quantitative developments. Since at present the U.S. has no plans for increasing the total number of its delivery vehicles, it would unilaterally affect the U.S.S.R. Although the U.S. is doing design studies on new systems in all categories, no decisions have been made for the deployment of any of these systems, and any deployments that might occur would probably serve to replace existing systems. On the other hand, such an agreement would have considerable effect on present Russian programs since the U.S.S.R. is continuing to deploy both land-based ICBMs and new submarines with SLBM's. In spite of this asymmetry the Russians might be willing to negotiate such a ceiling, since they may now be almost at the point of halting additional deployments. If the total number of Russian delivery vehicles were to be kept at the January 1971 level, it is likely that the Russians would decide to replace some of their 220 older ICBMs with SLBM's in order to remedy their present deficiency in this area. They could also substitute SS-9's for some of these old missiles, thus eliminating one of the chief U.S. aims at SALT.

The failure to place restrictions on qualitative improvements in the delivery systems or on the replacement of old missiles with new ones is likely to accelerate rather than restrict the arms race. We have had the experience of an arms-control agreement being used to justify technical programs that otherwise might not have been carried out. In 1963 one of the key elements in gaining acceptance of the Limited Test Ban Treaty by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress was President Kennedy's undertaking that the U.S. would maintain a standby capability to resume atmospheric testing on short notice and would vigorously

28

prosecute those weapons-development and test programs that were still permitted under the treaty in order to be in the strongest position possible should the Russians abrogate or violate the treaty. Such programs have cost the U.S. hundreds of millions of dollars, have involved an increase in the total annual number of nuclear tests over the average for the preceding 10 years, and have in many cases been continued at a somewhat reduced level up to the present time even though many have little or no effect on national security. It is almost certain that similar requirements would be placed on the Administration in the event that an agreement were reached in SALT. The U.S.S.R. would probably be pressured to emulate such actions. Thus such a SALT agreement could become a stimulus to the arms program in the same way that SALT itself has already been used to justify continuing present programs in order to be able to negotiate from strength.

In the first place the U.S. would undoubtedly proceed with its present program to put MIRV's on a large fraction of the Minuteman and the Polaris systems. In fact, under the constrictions of a SALT agreement it is not at all unlikely that these forces would be completely MIRVed instead of only partially as now planned. The Russians, who do not yet have any MIRV systems tested, would undoubtedly feel impelled to proceed with similar programs. They probably would not be content with placing only three MIRV's on their SS-9's, the number that has been given in most threat calculations publicized by the Department of Defense, and they would undoubtedly attempt to take advantage of the larger payload of the SS-9 by plac-

POSSIBLE NEGOTIATED CEILINGS on the strategic offensive forces of the U.S. (black bars) and the U.S.S.R. (colored bars) are indicated by the broken lines at the top of this chart. An agreement that placed a ceiling on the total number of delivery vehicles at the present U.S. level (a) would have to allow the U.S.S.R. to add about 150 vehicles (presumably missiles) to its forces in addition to those now under construction. An agreed ceiling at the present Russian level (b) would require a corresponding cutback in U.S. forces. A compromise ceiling of, say, 2,000 delivery vehicles (c) would allow the Russians to finish some of the missiles they now have under construction (light-colored bars) and would require a small U.S. reduction in total delivery vehicles. A freeze at existing force levels would leave the strategic balance substantially as it appears here.

25

ing 10 or more warheads on each missile. In time these could have the accuracies required to virtually ensure destruction of all U.S. fixed land-based ICBM's. The race for increasingly effective MIRV systems would be given the sanction of an arms-control agreement.

The race, however, would not be restricted to the development of MIRV's. As the threat to the U.S. land-based forces increased, an ABM defense of the missile sites, if not already banned, would begin to appear inadequate. Since it would be allowed to do so under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. would feel forced to attempt to reduce this vulnerability by replacing fixed land-based systems up to the agreed ceiling even though the existing weapons would continue to provide an adequate deterrent. The most likely replacement would be less vulnerable but more expensive submarine systems. If land-based systems were eliminated entirely, however, it would create the difficult political problem of removing the Air Force from the strategic-missile picture. Substituting sea-based missiles for land-based ones would be argued as having the security disadvantage of placing reliance on a single type of missile deterrent system. This point has already been used to justify the Safeguard ABM system. It is most likely that at least some of the conversion would include replacement with new land-based systems involving superhardening and/or mobility. The expense of deploying such new systems would be staggering compared with that of present programs. The U.S. also might be tempted toward missiles with a larger payload in order to compensate for the Russian advantage in this area and to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the limit on the total number.

Within such an agreement the U.S.S.R. would also probably be led to deploy new systems. Certainly the Russians would be forced to take certain measures to decrease the vulnerability of their present land-based missile systems. This could be carried out by using up a larger fraction of their total number of allowed missiles in the form of submarine systems. Such a program could be quite expensive for the U.S.S.R. because submarines are costly vehicles and because the distance from ports to operating areas is considerably greater for the Russian submarines than it is for those of the U.S. From a geographical point of view alone, the U.S.S.R.'s submarines also are probably more vulnerable to anti-submarine-warfare measures than those of the U.S. since they must operate in deep-ocean areas that are

surrounded by Western-controlled land masses and are more amenable to acoustic-detection techniques.

Finally, the Russians too would have the political problem of moving their deterrent from land to sea. The rocket forces are a powerful group within the Russian military hierarchy, and they are unlikely to forgo this mission. The U.S.S.R. is traditionally much more land-minded than the U.S. Therefore it is likely that the Russians would turn to a firing doctrine of "launch on warning" or to mobile land-based missile systems or to both. They have already tested some mobile missiles at short ranges and have boasted of the existence of mobile ICBM's. It would seem very likely that they would move into this area with extensive programs as they became concerned that their present forces might be threatened. Such deployment would increase the uncertainties in U.S. planning, since mobile missiles are hard to count accurately. It is also possible that the Russians would choose to increase the proportion of the large SS-9's in their missile force in order to ensure the maximum potential payload and penetration capability. This would still further increase U.S. fears of the Russian threat.

Although under this agreement both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would have the option of replacing their old bombers, it is not clear that either nation would choose to do so. As the present forces become obsolete or gradually become smaller because of accidents and deterioration, both nations might choose to deploy additional missiles in their place. Such a choice would be less costly than developing and deploying an entirely new bomber force, but it would in time eliminate one alternative form of deterrent. When bomber forces are no longer operational, the need for costly air-defense systems will be largely eliminated. The U.S. is already decreasing its air-defense efforts, whereas the Russian efforts in this area continue at a high level. The Russians would be faced with the decision on bomber replacement sooner than the U.S. in view of the fact that they have fewer long-range bombers. Their medium-bomber force has the range capable of attacking both Chinese and European targets, so that the U.S.S.R. does not need the very-long-range bombers for this purpose. On the other hand, the U.S. has only a small number of medium-range aircraft operational and, when the B-52's are gone, it would be forced to rely entirely on the FB-111's and carrier-based planes in

the event that such aircraft were needed for lesser conflicts. The U.S., however, is known to be developing the B-1 as a replacement for its B-52's. As a result the U.S. might be less inclined to forgo bomber replacements than the U.S.S.R. would be.

Verification of an agreement limiting strategic delivery systems to a given fixed total would present a number of difficulties. Any new construction of missile launchers or of submarines carrying ballistic missiles could be observed by unilateral means (that is, without on-site inspection) well in advance of completion so that one could be confident of detecting any significant additions to the force. Nonetheless, an accurate count of the total number of operational missiles at a specific time would be harder to obtain if substitutions were allowed. This would be particularly difficult if mobile land-based missiles were deployed. Moreover, there would be some difficulty in ascertaining when a new missile system that was being constructed to replace an old one had reached operational status. If the replacement rate were very high, then concern might arise that the new facilities were being constructed without the intention of phasing out existing ones and that by so doing one side hoped to gain a temporary advantage. It is unlikely, however, that the new construction would be so extensive that such a violation could provide a real threat to anyone's security in view of the already large number of missiles available to both sides. Procedures for replacements could perhaps be negotiated to reduce the risks from a violation, but such a situation is likely to create a climate for accusations of bad faith and to increase tensions, which of course is the exact opposite of what a well-designed agreement should provide.

A final difficulty might arise in proving a violation. It would not be enough to point to a new site; it would also be necessary to present evidence that the total number of sites at a given time exceeded the agreed number. This might be very difficult to do and would open the way to charges and countercharges. The problem would be even more difficult if missiles were allowed to be substituted for bombers, since the operational status of the entire bomber force at any one time is difficult to determine. During the complete nuclear-test moratorium from 1958 to 1961, continued claims were made by certain groups that the Russians were violating the moratorium, and major efforts were necessary in order to provide the President with sufficient confidence that this was in-

30

deed not the case. An agreement such as the one proposed above would provide countless opportunities for misunderstandings.

In summary, an agreement that placed a ceiling on the total number of strategic delivery systems, although simple in concept and probably presenting little risk to the security of either nation, would have little if any value in controlling the strategic-arms race. In fact, the race might even be accelerated as it turned to qualitative as opposed to quantitative increases. There would clearly be little saving in funds, and in actuality new and expensive programs might be more easily justified under such an agreement than they would be without any agreement at all. At a minimum some additional restrictions on the replacement of existing systems should be added to this approach. It would be far better for both sides to agree to phase out their fixed, land-based missiles as they became vulnerable than to allow their replacement with new weapons. Although it is difficult to imagine any violation that could escape detection seriously affecting the security of either nation, it is likely that many misunderstandings and disputes would arise through misinterpretation of the programs allowed under the agreement.

In view of the numerous difficulties and risks that an agreement allowing complete freedom to shift strategic forces from one type to another presents, consideration could be given to agreeing not only on the total number of systems but also on the numbers within the various categories. The simplest such scheme would involve an agreement on specific numbers of aircraft and specific numbers of missiles; it would allow the option to vary the types of missiles or aircraft within the agreed numbers. This approach would represent a considerable improvement, since it would separate out the disparity in the numbers of aircraft, which is less significant, from the more critical missile problems. At present both nations have approximately the same number of missiles, the Russian ad-

vantage in land-based systems almost compensating for the U.S. advantage in sea-based systems. If closer equality were essential, the Russians could be allowed to complete the missile submarines now under construction until they had the same total number of missiles as the U.S. This separating of missiles and aircraft would avoid many of the difficulties in negotiating an agreed total number of delivery vehicles.

Such a variation would, however, still have many of the disadvantages of a simple agreement on total number. Strong pressures would still hold for replacing existing systems with more modern ones. With complete freedom to continue development and deployment of MIRV's, both sides would have strong incentives for revising their force structures to reduce the vulnerability of their land-based systems. The pressure would be particularly strong for the U.S.S.R. with its relatively weak SLBM forces. In addition there would be nothing to prevent the U.S.S.R. from continuing to build up its SS-9 force to the point where Secretary Laird's predictions about the vulnerability of the U.S. deterrent would become more credible. For this purpose the U.S.S.R. has more than 200 older missiles that could be phased out and replaced. There would then be strong pressures within the U.S. for the replacement of existing systems to neutralize this Russian threat. As in the previous approach, the arms race might only proceed faster on a new track.

Since such an agreement would freeze the U.S. with an overwhelming advantage in strategic bombers, it would certainly present the Russians with serious political difficulties even though they have no known plans to expand their present force. They would probably seek in some way to try to negotiate a reduction in the number of U.S. bombers to reduce this inequality. The U.S. in turn might be quite reluctant to do so and could use the argument that this U.S. advantage was compensated by the large Russian medium-range bomber force. Once this class of aircraft becomes a subject of negotiation, however, the Rus-

ALTERNATIVE CEILINGS on strategic offensive forces are shown in this pair of bar charts; systems currently under construction are indicated by the lighter gray and lighter colored bars. In terms of deliverable missile payload the Russians have a significant lead (left), but this is outweighed by the large U.S. advantage in bomber capacity (not shown). In terms of deliverable warheads the U.S. currently has about a 50 percent lead (right). An agreed ceiling on payload could require that the U.S.S.R. greatly reduce the size of its missile force (a), or that the U.S. greatly expand its force (b), or that some combination of these two approaches be put into effect (c). A freeze on warheads that put no restrictions on MIRV's would allow the U.S.S.R. to make more effective use of its payload advantage and would eventually enable it to surpass the U.S. in deliverable warheads as well.

31

sians are likely to press many complicat-
ing questions pertaining to U.S. carrier-
based and European-based systems. Al-
though the bomber discrepancy is likely
to complicate the negotiation, it would
probably not be an insuperable obstacle,
since for both countries the bomber
forces are less critical to the deterrent
balance. It should not be forgotten, how-
ever, that the largest part of the total nu-
clear yield that can be delivered by the
U.S. on the U.S.S.R. comes from the U.S.
bomber force, and the Russians are ex-
tremely conscious of that fact. This un-
doubtedly accounts for their large con-
centration of effort on antiaircraft de-
fenses even now when the major threat
is from missiles.

An additional variation of this approach would be to limit the further deployment of very large missiles such as the SS-9. If the SS-9's could be kept at their present number, the threat to the U.S. Minuteman would be greatly reduced, since extensive MIRVing would be required before the present force could approach a first-strike capability. Certainly as long as the Russians could not deploy more than three MIRV's per missile an important fraction of the Minuteman force could not be threatened. On the other hand, a limitation on Russian SS-9 deployment is not easily balanced by any similar U.S. limitation. This country has no plans for deploying larger ICBM's, and the Russians are not likely to agree to any restrictions on their SS-9's without some parallel restriction on the part of the U.S. The most obvious limitation would be on the further replacement of the Polaris missile with the larger Poseidon missile or the possible eventual deployment of an underwater long-range missile system. Such a proposal, however, is likely to be strongly opposed by the U.S. since the Poseidon system is considered the most critical element in the U.S. deterrent. The ability of this missile to carry more than 10 MIRV's ensures penetration of any ABM system the U.S.S.R. would be able to construct for many years to come. If ABM's were also limited to low levels by the agreement, however, then the U.S. requirement for the Poseidon MIRV's to penetrate a Russian ABM system would be removed. Furthermore, if the SS-9's were limited, the Minuteman missiles could be relied on to supplement the sea-based deterrent. Thus from a strict security point of view the U.S. could afford an agreement that limited SS-9's and Poseidons simultaneously, even taking into account the risks from a possible clandestine ABM program. Nevertheless, there would be strong opposition in the U.S.

from those groups that have insisted on
the necessity for continued U.S. MIRV
testing and deployment. This opposition
would have to be overcome, because un-
less some limitations were imposed to
prevent present missiles from being re-
placed by larger ones the arms race
would continue almost unabated and
U.S. security would not be improved.

One proposal that has been suggested in order to place some limitations on qualitative improvements on existing strategic systems would be to agree that each nation would be restricted to a total payload that could be delivered on the other nation. Payload, sometimes referred to as throw weight, is here defined as the total useful weight that can be delivered to a target area from a launcher. This can be in the form of nuclear warheads or penetration aids to overcome defenses. For a given missile there will be a tradeoff between range and payload (since the longer the range is, the lower will be the deliverable payload) so that the payload would have to be tied to some nominal range.

Such an agreement would have the
advantage of preventing the replace-
ment of existing small missiles with
much larger ones. It would not, how-
ever, prevent the replacement of single-
warhead missiles by MIRV's since this
could be done without increasing the
payload of existing missiles. In actuality
the threat to the U.S. from the SS-9,
which has created such concern on the
part of Secretary Laird, results from the
assumption that MIRV's will replace the
existing reentry vehicles without requiring any increase in the total payload.

If the agreement were such that the
U.S. and the Russian missile forces were
frozen with the existing payloads, the
U.S.S.R. would be left with an advan-
tage of about two to one in the missile
payload that could be delivered on the
U.S. This disparity would be somewhat
alleviated if the U.S. were allowed to
complete the conversion program for 31
of its Polaris submarines from the pres-
ent missiles to the larger Poseidon. It is
highly unlikely that the U.S.S.R. would
agree to the continued buildup on the
part of the U.S. without being allowed
some concession in return. This could
take the form of allowing the U.S.S.R. to
complete its present submarine construc-
tion program to the point where it ap-
proached the Polaris fleet in size, if not in
payload capacity. This would involve a
very significant addition to the total
number of missiles available to the Rus-
sian forces, however, and would then
provide a disparity in favor of the

U.S.S.R. in total number of strategic de-
livery vehicles. Although none of these
inequalities would present serious secu-
rity problems—in fact, greater emphasis
on submarine-based systems improves
the reliability of the deterrent—they
would certainly present serious political
problems in the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. and
might therefore be difficult if not im-
possible to negotiate.

Another alternative might be to allow
both nations to have the same total pay-
loads without any restrictions on how
this was divided among various missile
systems. That, however, would either en-
able the U.S. to build up unilaterally to
the present Russian level by doubling its
present payload capacity or require the
U.S.S.R. to reduce the size of its forces.
Neither of these alternatives appears to
be negotiable. If bomber load were in-
cluded in the total payload for strategic
systems, the tables would be turned and
the U.S. would have an advantage. Per-
haps the simplest solution would be to
leave the Russians with their present ad-
vantage in missile payload and consider
that this was compensated for by the
present U.S. advantage in long-range
bombers. Such an agreement would
not threaten U.S. security even if the
U.S.S.R. exploited its missile advantage
by MIRVing its larger payload capacity.
Provided that ABM defenses were simul-
taneously controlled at zero or very low
levels, the Polaris fleet would by itself be
able to provide an adequate deterrent
even if the Poseidon conversion was not
completed. The large U.S. bomber force
would offer an additional safety factor,
although this would not be vital.

If the limitation were restricted to payload only without any simultaneous restrictions on the number of delivery vehicles, then each nation would have the option of increasing the total number of its delivery vehicles, provided that it reduced the average payload of each individual vehicle. Such a conversion would not increase the threat and in fact might in some cases add a greater reliability to the deterrent. The more potential launch points and the greater the number of potential retaliatory warheads there are, the greater will be the certainty that the deterrent will not be eroded by a combination first strike and ABM defense. It does, however, mean that there would be few restrictions on the development of new missile systems to replace existing ones. Uncertainty would always be created during these transition periods concerning whether or not the limitation was being abided by.

Therefore a more satisfactory arrange-

32

ment might be to combine the payload limitation with one on total number. This would tend to freeze present forces at their existing strength and would provide fewer opportunities for misunderstanding. There would certainly be less expense for a broad expansion of the arms race. In qualitative areas the most serious development that this type of agreement would not control is MIRV's. In fact, the result would probably be a race to develop the most efficient MIRV system within the agreed limitations on payload and number. Whether or not in the face of such a situation it will be possible to

maintain a prolonged halt to other parts of the arms race is open to serious question. As mentioned above, it is likely that there would still be strong incentives for replacing existing systems with less vulnerable ones, for example the replacement of fixed land-based Minute-man or SS-11 missiles with sea-based systems or with mobile or superhardened land-based ones.

Finally, one should consider whether or not a limitation on payload can be adequately verified without requiring unacceptably intrusive inspection. Within a given missile silo, either on land or

in a submarine, it would be possible to replace an existing missile with one having a somewhat greater payload capacity. This might be accomplished by increasing the energy available from the fuel, by better utilization of the launch-tube volume or by using different techniques for ejecting the missile from the launcher. None of these changes is particularly susceptible to observation by unilateral means, although evidence of wide-scale conversions that might significantly affect security might be difficult to conceal. If replacement of existing systems were allowed for other purposes,

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ARE DEFINED for the purpose of this article to include only those long-range nuclear

map. Various other medium-range, intermediate-range and tactical weapons systems, indicated by the broken arrows, are nevertheless available to both sides and could be discussed at SALT.

33

however, it might be almost impossible to detect those that involved an increase in payload capacity. Thus it would appear that for a deployment ban alone it would at a minimum be necessary to

try out rather extensive on-site inspections if one was to be certain that the agreement was being abided by. This verification problem has also been the major stumbling block in developing controls on MIRV deployment.

As in the case of MIRV's, however, there are opportunities for dealing with the problem by limiting the testing of missiles with larger payloads. At present the U.S. has a reasonably reliable estimate of the payload capacity of the Russian missiles. This has been obtained by observation of test programs over the years and is partially the basis for Secretary Laird's being able to announce that the Russian SS-9 is capable of delivering a payload of 13,500 pounds and a single warhead of 25 megatons on the U.S. Therefore, providing that the Russians did not change their test procedures, it is likely that the U.S. would be able to determine if they tested a new missile with a significantly increased payload.

On the other hand, it is possible that by changing its test procedures the U.S.S.R. could test a missile with a larger payload capacity without U.S. knowledge. Development testing could proceed under conditions where observations from outside the U.S.S.R. might not be able to determine that the payload of the operational system had been increased. Any new missile system on which the Russians intended to rely for a major part of their strategic power, however, would require testing under closely simulated operational conditions, and such tests might be more easily monitored and provide opportunities for detection of an increased payload capability. Such detection would be significantly more difficult than the detection of MRV and MIRV testing; yet the verification problem has been used by some as a justification for on-site inspection in order to control MIRV's. Therefore, if verification considerations are sufficient to prevent the achievement of a MIRV ban, such considerations should also militate against the negotiation of a ban that limited payload capacity.

Another approach to limiting the deployment of strategic arms would be an agreement that froze existing delivery systems at their current status. The levels of the agreed freeze need not be specified since the ban would be directed at changes in the existing balance rather than at limitations to agreed numbers.

Ideally the prohibition should be all-inclusive, not only banning the substitution of one launcher by another of a different type but also preventing the replacement of the present missiles and aircraft. This would be most satisfactory from the point of view of security, of halting the arms race and of economic savings. It would, however, present serious problems of verification, since extraordinarily intrusive and almost certainly impractical inspection would be required to ensure that new weapons having some enhanced capabilities were not being substituted for those currently deployed. For example, to detect the deployment of an improved guidance system in a missile would require dismantling the missile and inspecting its interior. Even then one could not be sure that violations were not occurring. An agreement, however, could partially cope with the problem of qualitative improvements by restricting the launchers to those now in existence, by not allowing their replacement by new systems and by restricting any modifications to these launchers and their missiles to those that did not change their external configuration or that of the missiles they contained.

Under such a freeze it would be possible to replace single warheads by MIRV's in existing missiles, since this could be accomplished without any alteration in the external configuration of the launcher or missile; enlarging the missiles to still further improve MIRV capability would be constrained. Some other improvements in the missile systems might be possible, but these would also be restricted by the necessity of keeping the configuration of the launcher and the envelope of the missile unchanged. Since the replacement of old launchers by new ones would not be allowed, wholesale changes in the force structure would be prohibited. Fixed land-based missiles could not be replaced by submarine systems or by mobile ones. This might be considered a disadvantage, since in time such land-based systems would become vulnerable to highly accurate MIRV's, although this would be less likely with a freeze than without one. In any case, as long as ABM systems were simultaneously limited to low levels the deterrent would not be threatened. The U.S. would still have 656 SLBM's, supplemented by a large bomber force, which would be more than enough to produce unacceptable damage to the U.S.S.R. in a retaliatory strike. Since it is not possible to destroy either the bomber or the Minuteman forces without providing advance warning to the other, the combi-

nation of these two forces would still provide deterrence even if they were individually vulnerable. Pressures for new strategic systems could probably be contained. The conversion of the Polaris to the Poseidon would, however, be halted at the point it had reached at the time the agreement went into effect. The halt in submarine construction might be a more serious problem for the Russians, since their SLBM program lags considerably behind that of the U.S.

Such a freeze would leave both nations with a secure deterrent force (provided that ABM systems were simultaneously controlled). Furthermore, at the present time both nations have an approximate parity in overall force strengths in spite of inequalities within individual systems. Thus such an agreement should be politically acceptable to both sides. Any changes that would be allowed under the agreement or carried out clandestinely could not upset the present strategic balance.

From the point of view of controlling the arms race this proposal would be the most far-reaching. There would be greatly reduced opportunities or incentives for replacing existing missile systems with new ones. Although MIRV's would be allowed, the replacement of the fixed land-based system by a mobile or a sea-based one would be precluded, and there would be few incentives for increasing the payload capacity of the existing missiles within the agreed limitations. Such an agreement would therefore also be by far the most effective in terms of economic savings.

Verification of a freeze of this nature would also be relatively easy. New deployments of missile launchers or long-range aircraft are comparatively easy to observe by unilateral means, and since any change in visible characteristics would be banned, it would be relatively easy to determine if a violation had occurred. To determine a violation it would not be necessary to present evidence on the total number of deployed systems but only that a change had occurred from the situation that existed at the time the agreement went into effect. This would avoid the extensive disclosure of unilateral information available on the programs of the other side and would greatly simplify making a case for a violation before the world. Furthermore, sources of misunderstanding and confusion would be much reduced. Since no new missile-site construction would be allowed, there would be no question of whether a given activity was an allowed replacement or not. The

34

only possible source of confusion would be in connection with the external configuration of the missiles themselves. Once the missile was emplaced within the hole, it would be very difficult to determine whether or not it had the same external configuration as an older missile. There would, however, always be some risk of detection of such replacement during the emplacement phase; evidence that a new missile was available for this purpose could be obtained during testing. Furthermore, since the dimensions of the launcher would be kept constant, the opportunities and incentives for significant cheating would be kept to a minimum. Thus old Russian missiles could not be replaced by SS-9's. In sum, it would appear that such a freeze could be adequately verified without fears that security was being eroded.

None of the foregoing proposals for limiting the deployment of offensive strategic weapons provides any limitations on the deployment of MIRV's. The proposals for limiting payload or banning changes in the external configuration of missiles or launchers would still allow replacement of single warheads with MIRV's, although they would pro-

vide some limitations on the number of MIRV's that could be associated with any one missile, since the number is dependent on the payload available and the external configuration of the missile. The proposed Poseidon missile, however, is planned to carry 10 or more MIRV's, each one admittedly of low yield (although still several times greater than the Hiroshima bomb). The SS-9, which is much larger than the Poseidon, could be adapted to hold at least 10 MIRV's.

Analyses of the foregoing proposals also show that the most destabilizing element would in all cases be the ability to obtain a MIRV capability. MIRV's threaten the viability of the fixed land-based missile component of the strategic force and provide pressures for the development and deployment of new systems. A Russian MIRV capability presents a much greater potential threat to the U.S. than vice versa because of the greater payload of the Russian missiles. Therefore it should be an extremely important U.S. objective to see that MIRV's are controlled. The problems of MIRV's have been discussed in detail elsewhere [see "The Limitation of Strategic Arms," by G. W. Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, January, 1970]. Heretofore the ma-

for problem facing the U.S. in this connection has been fears that a MIRV ban could not be adequately verified. Clearly this is true for deployment of previously tested systems, since this would require at a minimum extremely extensive and probably impractical inspection. Nonetheless, it would take the Russians at least a year and probably several years before they could have a tested, deployable MIRV system that could threaten the Minutemen. Hence this provides an opportunity to extend the ban to include testing. Although there are differences of opinion on the adequacy of unilateral verification techniques, such techniques would certainly be much more satisfactory for verifying a ban on the testing of MRV's and MIRV's than they would be for verifying a limitation on total missile payload. A strong case can be made that it is technologically possible to verify a MIRV test ban adequately by unilateral means in order to protect U.S. security without on-site inspections. These means should clearly provide greater confidence against significant violations than would the on-site inspections that have been proposed for the detection of clandestine deployment of MIRV's, since it is not clear how any procedure could provide confidence that

<table><thead><tr><th>POSSIBLE SALT AGREEMENT</th><th>EFFECT ON U.S. SECURITY</th><th>ECONOMIC SAVINGS FOR U.S.</th><th>EFFECT ON ARMS RACE</th><th>NEGOTIABILITY</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1 CEILING ON NUMBERS OF DELIVERY VEHICLES</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>a NO LIMITATION ON REPLACEMENT</td><td>LITTLE, IF ANY, IMPROVEMENT</td><td>NONE (MIGHT INCREASE MILITARY EXPENDITURES)</td><td>LITTLE, IF ANY (MIGHT ACCELERATE)</td><td>VERY EASY (VERIFICATION COMPLICATED)</td></tr><tr><td>b SEPARATE CEILINGS ON MISSILES AND BOMBERS</td><td>SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN 1a</td><td>LITTLE, IF ANY</td><td>SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN 1a</td><td>EASY (VERIFICATION COMPLICATED)</td></tr><tr><td>c LIMITATION ON LARGE ICBM'S</td><td>SOME IMPROVEMENT</td><td>LITTLE, IF ANY</td><td>BETTER THAN 1b BUT LIMITS ONLY ONE SYSTEM</td><td>HARD (UNLESS U.S. IS ALSO WILLING TO HALT POSEIDON)</td></tr><tr><td>2 FREEZE ON DEPLOYED PAYLOAD</td><td>NO IMPROVEMENT (FREEZES U.S. INFERIORITY)</td><td>SOME</td><td>GOOD BUT DOES NOT HALT MIRV'S</td><td>HARD (VERIFICATION HARD)</td></tr><tr><td>3 FREEZE ON DELIVERY VEHICLES</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>a NO REPLACEMENT</td><td>SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT</td><td>VERY LARGE</td><td>EXCELLENT</td><td>POSSIBLE (VERIFICATION MARGINAL)</td></tr><tr><td>b NO CHANGE IN EXTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS</td><td>SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT (LESS THAN 3a)</td><td>LARGE (LESS THAN 3a)</td><td>VERY GOOD</td><td>EASIER THAN 3a (VERIFICATION EASY)</td></tr><tr><td>4 LIMITATION ON MIRV'S</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>a BAN ON DEPLOYMENT</td><td>IMPROVEMENT</td><td>SIGNIFICANT</td><td>VERY GOOD</td><td>HARD (VERIFICATION ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE)</td></tr><tr><td>b BAN ON PRODUCTION TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT</td><td>GREAT IMPROVEMENT</td><td>SIGNIFICANT</td><td>VERY GOOD</td><td>EASIER THAN 4a (VERIFICATION POSSIBLE)</td></tr></tbody></table>

VARIOUS APPROACHES to a strategic-arms-limitation agreement are evaluated in this table in very general terms. The best agreement possible under the present circumstances would appear

to be one in which the strategic forces of both sides would be frozen at their existing levels, ABM systems would be banned and further production, testing and deployment of MIRV's would be halted.

35

a single warhead was not substituted for
a deployed MIRV warhead before the
inspectors visited the launching site.

As time has passed, another obstacle
has arisen to the success of achieving a

MIRV limitation. The U.S. has now com-
pleted more than two years of testing on
its first-generation MIRV system for the
Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles.
Beginning in June, 1970, the deploy-
ment of Minuteman III with MIRV's
was begun at an operational site in
North Dakota. Eight Polaris submarines
are now in the yards being modified to
fire the Poseidon missile, and the first of
these will be going to sea in January,
1971. Even if the U.S. were willing to
stop this program and actually withdraw
these MIRV missiles from the inventory,
it would seem highly unlikely that the
Russians would be willing to accept an
agreement that would leave them so far
behind the U.S. in this particularly criti-
cal strategic area. Past experience has
clearly shown that the Russians are un-
willing to negotiate from a position of
significant inferiority. They steadfastly
refused to seriously discuss strategic-
arms limitations until they had ap-
proached general parity with the U.S.
Therefore there should be no optimism
that it will be possible to reach an agree-
ment on MIRV's until the Russian pro-
gram is considerably more advanced.
The clock on the U.S. development can-
not be turned back. Unfortunately when
the Russians have a capability equivalent
to the present U.S. one, an agreement
will still be extremely hard to achieve,
since then they would be able to deploy
an already tested system and the verifi-
cation problems would be greatly com-
pounded. Hence the U.S. should make
an urgent, all-out effort to attempt to
persuade the U.S.S.R. to accept a MIRV
limitation at this time. Otherwise U.S.
security could in the long run be reduced
and the arms race would continue, while
scarse funds would be expended on more
advanced weapons systems. An agree-
ment to ban the production, testing and
deployment of MIRV's would be in the
mutual interest of both sides; the U.S.
could still verify such a ban in the testing
phase and the Russians in the production
and deployment phases.

Although it is not the purpose of this article to discuss limitations on ABM systems, it is clear in analyzing the various alternative methods of limiting offensive systems that their adequacy is strongly dependent on whether or not ABM systems are limited at the same time. In fact, ABM limitations would be desirable even if no controls could be

placed on offensive weapons. Without
controls on such defenses, fears could
develop that an ABM system might be
deployed that could successfully handle
those residual offensive weapons that
might survive a first strike. If this came
to pass, the deterrent would be threat-
ened. Thus without controls on ABM
systems, and particularly without also
having controls on MIRV's, strong pres-
sures will exist for the deployment of
new offensive systems that will be less
vulnerable to a first strike: mobile land-
based missiles and more SLBM's. There
will also be increased pressures to de-
ploy more MIRV's on the existing sys-
tems, particularly on the SLBM's. These
would not be needed if ABM defenses
were also limited to low levels.

From the point of view of arms con-
trol, a complete ban on ABM systems
would be most satisfactory, but if these
were limited to defense of capitals, then
they should not require an escalation
of the offensive-arms race. Whereas the
present Moscow ABM system might be
politically justifiable by the U.S.S.R., in
view of its existence and in view of that
city's role as the center of the Russian
nation, it is harder to justify the large
U.S. expenditure of funds for a future
defense of Washington, which does not
occupy the same position in American
minds. Security considerations allow the
U.S. to leave the Moscow ABM system
as it is and to forgo the Washington
ABM system and perhaps extract some
parallel concession from the Russians in
another area. If ABM defenses were
limited to defense of Minuteman sites,
they should, like capital defenses, not be
destabilizing, since these would not pro-
vide significant protection of U.S. urban
centers. Unfortunately the same would
not be the case for a parallel Russian
ICBM defense, because their ICBM de-
ployment is relatively close to urban
centers; hence such a system could pro-
vide nationwide coverage and could be
viewed as a potential threat to the U.S.
deterrent. If either nation built a thin
area defense to handle even a small Chi-
nese threat, this too would be destabiliz-
ing and militate against U.S.-U.S.S.R.
controls on offensive weapons, since it
could be viewed as being expandable
into a system that could cope with a
limited second-strike capability.

In summary, it appears that the ideal
method of limiting offensive strategic
weapons would be to freeze currently
deployed forces at present levels and
types of weapons. This would maintain
the present security that exists in a stable
strategic balance; it would have the

greatest damping effect on the arms
race, and it would provide the largest
economic savings. On the other hand,
such an agreement would present nu-
merous problems of verification, since
many qualitative improvements cannot
be detected without very intrusive in-
spection.

The most immediately practical meth-
od of controlling offensive weapons
would involve a freeze on existing sys-
tems, a ban on the construction of new
launchers and a restriction on any
changes in deployed systems to those
that do not change their external charac-
teristics. Such an agreement would pro-
vide some valuable limitations on quali-
tative improvements and would be ade-
quately verifiable by unilateral means.

A limitation that restricted both the
number of weapons and the payload
they could deliver would also provide
some useful restriction on qualitative
improvements but would present certain
verification problems. It might also prove
difficult to find a mutually satisfactory
negotiating formula for such a concept
in view of the present large Russian lead,
in missile payload and the U.S. lead in
bomber payload.

An agreement that limited strategic
weapons to specific numbers without any
restrictions on replacement or substitu-
tion would do little if anything to halt
the arms race and in fact might provide
strong incentives for accelerating it along
new directions. Placing additional limi-
tations on specific types of weapons
might overcome some of these defects,
but it would be difficult to achieve an ar-
rangement that would satisfy both the
security and the political requirements
of both nations. Furthermore, this type
of agreement would provide opportuni-
ties for misunderstandings concerning
whether or not it was being abided by.

Although limitations on MIRV's may
now be increasingly difficult to achieve
both because of problems of verification
and because of the present U.S. techno-
logical lead, the risks they present to the
strategic balance and to almost any long-
term arms-limitation agreement make it
important that no opportunities be over-
looked to attempt to reach some limita-
tion on these weapons. The risks from no
limitation would seem to far outweigh
the risks from possible undetected viola-
tions of a ban on MIRV production, test-
ing and deployment.

Finally, a prerequisite to any useful
long-term limitation on offensive forces
requires a simultaneous ban on ABM
systems or at least a limitation that pre-
cludes rapid expansion to provide na-
tionwide coverage.

36

WASHINGTON POST - 3 JANUARY 1972

# SALT Pause Sparks Alternative

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

When on-going negotiations fall into a period of doldrums a sort of centrifugal force comes into play. This is the current case with the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

The current U.S. line is that SALT is now hung up pending a political decision in Moscow to try for a treaty, meaning to put forward a full proposal on which bargaining can begin along with the U.S. plan already on the table. This is not expected until the decision-making for the forthcoming 24th Communist Party Congress is concluded, probably in late March.

But science waits not for politics. Both nations are continuing work on schemes that will further destabilize the nuclear arms race, especially the anti-missile (ABM) systems and multiple warheads (MIRVs).

Both are destabilizing in that they alter the balance of terror. The United States, ahead in MIRVs, is displacing them on Minuteman missiles and on submarine missiles. Moscow is perfecting its own MIRV system. The Soviets already have a partial ABM system and President Nixon in his new budget will ask for a further go-ahead on the four sites already under way in the Safeguard ABM system.

The three SALT rounds so far have disclosed some difficult problems. Moscow wants to include the American forward-based aircraft and, at Vienna last summer, suggested that provision be made to permit mobile land missiles, among other problems.

A few days ago the Federation of American Scientists called for a SALT agreement on ABMs only, one "precluding missile defenses or limiting them drastically." Either a limited or zero ABM agreement would break the action-reaction weapons cycle, the FAS argues, and eliminate rival fears of a first-strike potential.

But on the other hand there are rumbles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly opposed to any ABM agreement on the grounds of what Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird constantly calls the "momentum" of Soviet rocket construction and deployment. Some think that the JCS ploy, if that is what it turns out to be, has been undercut, deliberately or not, by Laird's recent statement that Moscow has begun to slow "the level of activity associated with SS-9 con-

struction."

Ironically, the U.S. initially proposed the SALT talks to limit ABMs alone but the U.S.S.R. insisted that the talks also should cover offensive weapons. But the U.S. is now in the position of opposing an ABM agreement alone, having insisted to the Senate last fall that Safeguard was the best bargaining chip in the effort to win Soviet agreement to limit SS-9s, the giant Russian missile doubtless soon to be MIRVed.

## Internal Discussion

Thus it is probable that the idea of a separate ABM agreement, leaving a curb on offensive weapons until later, will not become a major issue in Washington, if it ever does, until we know the outcome of the current internal Soviet discussion of what to do at SALT.

The complexity of constructing a meaningful curb on offensive as well as defensive weaponry is well illustrated in a lengthy article in the January issue of Scientific American. There Herbert Scoville Jr., long an insider (first at the Central Intelligence Agency and then at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) who had a hand in the FAS statement, examines four types and seven sub-types of possible agreements.

Scoville rates the Nixon proposals as far from satisfactory, even if accepted in Moscow, on the grounds that they would do little to halt the arms race and might very well "provide strong incentives for accelerating it along new directions."

## Quantitative Control

This is not denied by the administration since the plan is for quantitative rather than qualitative control. Any real qualitative control would include MIRVs but they are now so far advanced on both sides that only through rigid onsite inspection would either side likely have trust in an agreement. And neither Washington nor Moscow is prepared to have agents of the other poking into the details of such critical weapons as missiles to see how many warheads they have.

The fact is that the bureaucratic investment in the current American plan has been so great that a major change in policy would be a major wrench. This may be a good time to talk about such ideas but probably only a Moscow offer containing some attractive and negotiable ideas will change the U.S. proposals.

37

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL 4 JANUARY 1971 (8)

Tempting Russia

Sen. Symington's subcommittee on US overseas bases and commitments worries that continued maintenance of a "nuclear ring" around the Soviet Union and China encourages them to "break out" and establish their own nuclear weapons overseas. The temptation for the Soviets becomes greater because they no longer are nuclear inferiors.

Few today still would argue that the US needs to maintain the many bases that it did in the 1950s. Since 1961, almost 400 major and minor overseas installations have been closed. However, more than 2,000 remain, and increase the chances of confrontation.

The Symington committee expresses concern about the promises, secret commitments and quid pro quo executive agreements that have become standard operating procedure in negotiating overseas base rights.

Tactical nuclear weapons on these bases remain a primary problem. The US has some 7,000

nuclear weapons in Europe and probably thousands more on its bases ringing mainland Asia. They cause security problems because of local political turmoil. Reliance on them promotes rigidity in policy. The Russians consider many of the weapons strategic, since they are stockpiled within range of the Soviet Union, and this has become a barrier in the SALT discussions. Finally, it is doubtful that the weapons could be used without turning host nations into nuclear wastelands and forcing a strategic nuclear interchange between superpowers. A thorough review of placement of our nuclear weapons, as the report recommends, is called for.

The greatest value of the Symington report is its showing of resurgence of congressional interest in aspects of military and foreign policy too long ignored. The leadership of men like Symington — a onetime Air Force secretary and supersupporter of the military — should insure that Congress won't become distracted again soon.

38

WASHINGTON POST - 2 JANUARY 1971

# Kremlin's Tensions
## Offer U.S. Opening

By Stephen S. Rosenfeld

WASHINGTON'S view that Kremlin leaders are preoccupied by the infighting that traditionally precedes a Communist Party congress is not just a piece of abstract political analysis, which may be right, may be wrong, events will prove it out. It is also the formal basis of the administration's operational judgment that the men in the Kremlin are too preoccupied to make the hard decisions required to advance the strategic arms limitation talks. Not until next spring, after the congress has closed and presumably a more authoritative Soviet leadership has taken command, can the SALT discussions be profitably resumed, it is said. And even then, it will be up to Moscow to make the next move.

Certainly this is a plausible reading, perhaps even an accurate one. Yet it is essentially arbitrary. It proceeds from a set of assumptions about Soviet politics which are not universally shared. It harbors the possibility that to an extent the administration analysis is self-serving, intended to put an onus of indecision and delay on the Soviet Union rather than to acknowledge for the United States a responsibility for sound policy of its own. Since, while the talks lag, the technology advances and political pressure to build arms hardens, it would seem an urgent matter to explore an alternative path.

THE administration view of Kremlin immobilism starts from the manifest difficulty of identifying which Russian leaders support which policy tendencies. It proceeds to the demonstrable contention that politicians shift policy positions for tactical advantage. It concludes that any effort to hold out "rewards" to "good guys" risks missing them altogether in the darkness of the Kremlin night or tarring them as American stooges or seeing the "rewards" misappropriated by the "bad guys" for their own anti-liberal and anti-American purposes.

To offer expanded trade on the theory that you are encouraging liberalizing elements in Soviet society, for instance, is to risk having the fruits plucked off by conservatives who would use them to avoid the reforms that the original resource or technology gap might otherwise have dictated. To suspend MIRV development on the theory that you are relieving the pressure on the Kremlin to take a matching step, for another example, is to risk having Soviet hardliners say to their more moderate Politburo colleagues: "Ha!"

This is the analytical rationale for "negotiating from strength." It takes little imagination to suspect how it might strike a President known, at least in the past, for regarding Soviet-American differences as fundamental, irreconcilable, inevitable historically and sometimes perhaps even a wee bit convenient politically.

THE alternative view is that it is in the

nature of politics. Soviet no less than American, for opposing factions or tendencies to develop on all sensitive issues, and that such splits flourish in the Kremlin regardless of whether we on the outside know about them or identify accurately the teams or players. It follows that any faction, if it is all within range of victory in a close fight, craves help, and that the United States is uniquely situated to provide it. That this is a line currently being peddled by the Soviet Embassy makes it no less plausible.

A Soviet moderate hoping to block the expenditure of 20 billion rubles on a questionable missile, for instance, could not fail to be fortified if he could show his Kremlin rivals that the United States was not exploiting his move. But if the United States was moving seemingly irreversibly toward spending $20 billion on a questionable missile of its own, then the Soviet moderate would be correspondingly undermined.

Just as Khrushchev claimed—true, with his customary exaggeration—that his release of U-2 pilot Powers after the 1960 election "cast the deciding ballot" for Kennedy, so an American gesture could have an influence in a Kremlin policy contest. That possibility would seem to grow in a situation like the one now, where the Kremlin appears closely divided on major issues touching SALT. Soviet "immobilism." that is, might offer American policy not its narrowest ambit but its widest.

In this regard, one must note with dismay how the administration has handled its own discovery that Moscow has slowed down construction of SS-9 missiles. These are the monsters whose size and potential yield, accuracy and number had raised alarms in some Washington quarters that the Russians were building a first-strike capability that we would have to match. Might not the SS-9 slowdown be a "signal" of Russian hopes to agree to limit that missile at SALT, Defense Secretary Laird was asked on Dec. 28, and might not a SS-9 halt change Laird's views on the need to build new weapons (ULMS, B-1) intended in large part to offset SS-9s?

HERE was—and is—a potential opening for the administration to try to encourage would-be arms controllers in the Politburo. Yet Laird seemingly ignored the opening. He put a mean twist on the SS-9 slowdown, suggesting it was just a pause before deployment of a more deadly missile, and he said he wouldn't delay his ULMS and B-1 "decision timetable" for any kind of Soviet "signal," only for a consumated agreement at SALT.

This is classic "negotiating from strength." No one can swear it will fail. It is matter of ample and undeniable record, however, that 25 years of "negotiating from strength" has produced the two largest, fastest-growing arsenals in human history. There is a view of Soviet politics—certainly no less reasonable and responsible than the one the administration has selected—which suggests that Moscow may be quite competent at this time to take significant strategic decisions, that the SS-9 slowdown can fairly be read as a feeler put out by Kremlin moderates, and if the United States loses the opportunity to make a reciprocating gesture, it may not get another.

NEW YORK TIMES

31 JANUARY 1971

Soviet Activities in Cuba

To the Editor:

During his Jan. 4 television interview President Nixon expressed his belief that the Soviet Union would abide by the "understanding" of Oct. 11 and not establish "a military naval base" in Cuba or service nuclear submarines in or from Cuba.

There is reliable evidence available which indicates that the Soviet Union is not abiding by the "understanding" alluded to by President Nixon, or by the earlier Kennedy-Khrushchev "understandings" to keep strategic weapons out of Cuba.

Just over eight years ago the Soviet Union deceived President Kennedy and placed strategic weapons in Cuba after giving assurances that Cuba was only being supplied with "defensive weapons." There is good reason to believe that the Soviet Union has similarly misled President Nixon and placed strategic weapons in Cuba, this time aboard nuclear missile submarines.

In spite of Soviet "denials" and "assurances," the circumstantial evidence, including U.S. reconnaissance photos and eyewitness accounts from reliable Cuban underground sources, overwhelmingly points to two conclusions:

The Soviet Union completed the basic installations of the Cienfuegos submarine service and support facilities by the end of December.

Cienfuegos is operational, since at least one Soviet Yankee-class nuclear missile submarine has been observed there between Dec. 12 and 20.

There are disturbing signs that under the umbrella of nuclear parity the Soviet leaders are in an expansionist mood, have no intention of denying themselves the use of Cuba to service nuclear submarines and seriously underestimate United States will power and determination. President Nixon is, therefore, likely to face a crisis in United States-Soviet relations of major proportions over the coming months if the Soviets do not draw back in time and abandon their efforts to turn Cuba into a key naval base.

President Nixon's failure clearly to define and jealously to enforce the limits of tolerable Soviet activities in Cuba at the end of the summer of 1970 when it was already clear the Soviets were building submarine support facilities in Cienfuegos has considerably raised the political cost of a future United States response.

Looking beyond the strategic weapons issue in Cuba, the Soviet Union clearly intends to increase its naval presence in the Caribbean, whether operating from Cuban bases or not. The Nixon Administration would be well-advised to examine the political threat to United States interests in the Caribbean posed by the deployment of Soviet naval vessels in the area.

JAMES D. THEBERGE

Washington, Jan. 26, 1971

The writer is director of Latin-American Studies at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

40

LOS ANGELES TIMES 13 January 1971 (21)

Quiet Diplomacy Wins a Round

The Nixon Administration deserves considerable credit for the quiet but firm diplomacy which seems to have induced the Soviet Union to abandon its plans for establishing a base in Cuba to service missile-carrying submarines.

According to news released by the Pentagon over the weekend, a Soviet submarine tender — whose presence in and around Cuban waters for the past several months had been at the heart of U.S. concern—is in mid-Atlantic.

The vessel presumably is returning to Russia. Assuming it stays there, this means that a new and potentially explosive U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Cuba has been avoided.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has been sending elements of its naval fleet on more or less regular visits to the Caribbean area, including "courtesy" calls in Cuban ports.

While the presence of Soviet warships in our own backyard is not exactly welcome, the United States had no real kick coming. The Caribbean, after all, is a part of international waters.

Early last fall, however, the situation changed. U.S. reconnaissance planes found that four Soviet vessels—an ocean-going tug, a submarine tender and two barges for servicing of nuclear submarines—had arrived in Cienfuegos harbor on the South Coast of Cuba. Construction of barracks and a soccer field suggested that a permanent base was planned.

In Washington's eyes, the implications

were clear. The Soviet Union planned to establish a Cuban base for servicing of the missile-firing, Polaris-type submarines which they now have on station off the East Coast of the United States.

The effect of such a base would be to increase the on-station time of these strategic subs by an estimated 40%. There was concern in Washington, furthermore, that if the Soviet move were allowed to go unchallenged, the Kremlin might be emboldened to establish an even stronger military presence in the Western hemisphere.

In any event, the United States looked upon the development as a violation of the agreement growing out of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, in which Moscow promised not to put strategic missiles into Cuba.

Quietly but firmly, the Nixon Administration let the Soviets know that the servicing of nuclear subs "in or from Cuba," as the President put it in an interview last week, was unacceptable to this country. The pressure was kept on, apparently, with the result that the Soviets seem to have abandoned plans for the base—at least for now.

The Administration is to be congratulated for its adroit handling of the matter. Care was taken to avoid the kind of public bluster that might have made it impossible for the Russians to pull out without losing face. Now that they have pulled out, the Administration is forsaking the temptation to boast of its "victory."

Particularly valuable is Moscow's apparent acquiescence to our view that the 1962 agreement does, indeed, preclude any kind of Soviet strategic presence in Cuba.

The situation will, of course, continue to bear watching. As Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) observed not long ago, "The Soviet Union is like a burglar who walks down a hotel corridor trying the handles of all the doors. When he finds one unlocked, in he goes."

In this case, the Russians have been put on notice that the door is indeed locked.

43

WASHINGTON POST - 9 JANUARY 1971

# Soviets Propose ABM Limit

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has proposed a limited, first-step strategic arms agreement that would bar rival antimissile (ABM) systems other than for the protection of Washington and Moscow.

This would leave until later an agreement on limiting rival land and sea-based missiles.

The Soviet proposal came toward the end of round three of the SALT talks that wound up in Helsinki last Dec. 18, it has now been learned.

But the Nixon administration opposes an ABM-only agreement despite the fact that the United States, under President Johnson, originally sought the SALT talks in order to curb ABMs. It was the Soviet Union that insisted on including offensive nuclear weapons as well as defensive systems before Moscow would agree to SALT.

The reversal of position on Moscow's part came about this way:

During the Helsinki round, from Nov. 2 to Dec. 18, the Soviet delegation placed major emphasis on a demand that in any overall agreement covering both offensive and defensive weapons, the United States must include its aircraft in Western Europe and aboard carriers in both the Atlantic-Mediterranean area and in the Pacific, since such planes can deliver nuclear weapons to Soviet soil.

But the American delegation was under presidential instruction to reject the inclusion of what are known as

FBS, forward based systems. In essence, the United States stood pat on its proposal put forward at the Vienna round last July 24.

In turn, the Soviets refused to put forward a counterproposal covering both offensive and defensive weapons until the United States agreed in principle to include FBS. But finally, in December, in the face of this deadlock the Soviets suggested breaking out the ABM issue from the larger package.

Gerard C. Smith, the chief American negotiator, was forbidden by Washington to consider this proposal. Hence the Helsinki session ended in disappointment with the next round due to open in Vienna on March 15.

It is now conceded within the administration that pressure can be expected from the new Congress, especially in the Senate, to accept the idea of an ABM-only agreement as a first SALT step. The Federation of American Scientists recently called for just such a step.

The argument here is that the two destabilizing steps in the arms race are the creation of rival ABM systems and the development and deployment of multiple warheads, MIRVs. It is generally agreed that control of MIRVs is now impossible, given their deployment by the United States and testing with a view to deployment by the Soviet Union.

The Pentagon said yesterday that the Air Force has completed installation of the

first 50 Minuteman III intercontinental missiles with MIRV warheads. The installation began last June at Minot Air Force Base, S.D.

The unit is designated as the 741st Strategic Missile Squadron, part of the 91st Strategic Missile Wing. Each of the 50 missiles carries three warheads, and each of these a nuclear punch of around 170 kilotons compared to the 20-kiloton warhead of the Hiroshima bomb. About half the 1,000 Minutemen are due to be converted to MIRV warheads.

In addition, the first American Poseidon submarine with up to 14 missiles, each with an 18-kiloton punch, is due to become operational in a few days. The Soviet MIRV program is thought to be about a year and a half behind the American development.

Thus with MIRVs so far developed and deployed that control is rated next to impossible, there is bound to be increased pressure in Washington to control the other destabilizing development, the ABMs.

But thus far the Nixon administration flatly opposes an ABM-only agreement. The desire, and still the hope, is that a way can be found around the FBS issue so that an ABM limitation can be linked in a SALT treaty to a numerical

limitation on rival missile systems, including a sub-ceiling on the giant Soviet SS-9s.

In proposing an ABM-only agreement, the Soviets offered to give details on how it might be done if the United States would accept the principle. But since Smith was foreclosed on that, the details were not forthcoming at Helsinki.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on Dec. 16 announced that Moscow had begun to slow its SS-9 program, an announcement that followed Soviet hints that this somewhat was related to SALT. The Soviets also have complained that the United States missed their "signal" in late 1969, at the start of SALT, when they first halted SS-9 construction.

However, in order to win Senate approval for phase two of the Safeguard ABM system last August, the administration argued that continuation of the program would be a "bargaining chip" in winning Soviet agreement to an SS-9 limitation by treaty.

Between now and March 15 the administration will have to decide whether to go back to the Johnson administration position, which was an ABM-only agreement, or to find some solution to the FBS issue in order to get a formal SS-9 limitation agreement.

WASHINGTON POST 14 January 1971

# Harriman Sees Area For Accord

By Anthony Astrachan

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 13—There is no chance of complete detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, but a real chance of progress in certain areas, W. Averell Harriman said here today.

"There are certain things on which we can come to agreement with the Soviets if we go about it in an intelligent manner," Harriman told a press conference at the U.S. embassy. "It's a question of finding the right way to achieve objectives" that both countries want.

Harriman mentioned strategic arms limitation and Middle East peace as examples of objectives where Soviet-American agreement is possible.

Harriman reaffirmed his view that the Nixon administration made a mistake by not offering to stop deployment of MIRV missiles early in the strategic arms talks.

Harriman, a former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, is here at the suggestion of Sen. Edmund Muskie (D-Maine), who is scheduled to arrive Thursday for a short visit that is apparently intended to strengthen his foreign-affairs credentials as a presidential

candidate. Harriman will probably accompany Muskie to an expected meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin.

Although he is clearly here as a Democrat, Harriman offered noncommittal answers to questions on the nature of Soviet criticism of Mr. Nixon and on the possibility that the Soviets were looking for a new U.S. president after 1972.

Muske and Harriman will be here during a period of Soviet-American confrontation over harrassment of Soviet representativies in the United States by Jewish militants and retaliatory harrassment of Americans here.

The Moscow harrassment dropped close to zero today with no Americans accosted and lectured on the streets, no cars damaged and no new petitions against anti-Soviet violence brought to the embassy by workers' delegations. Letters of protest continued to arrive in the mail, however, and now total over 500 since the campaign began a week ago. Similar letters distributed by Tass and signed with Jewish names were published in three major newspapers today.

Harriman said the harassment campaigns came up during his meeting with Soviet Foreign Miniter Andrei Gromyko today and were dealt with "in a sophisticated manner." Harriman called the incidents unfortunate and 'said that both sides' harrassment was counterproductive. He called it a "temporary" problem.

43

47

WASHINGTON POST - 15 JANUARY 1971 P-24

# An Agreement on ABM?

The SALT talks suggest two blindfolded men at opposite ends of a canoe trying to keep it from capsizing in furious white water. The Soviet Union and the United States presumably share a desire not to "fall in," that is, not to let the arms race run totally wild. But neither can be sure whether a particular shift of its own weight, deliberate or flailing, will contribute to that end.

So it is with the reported Soviet proposal of a first-step strategic arms agreement applying just to anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, a proposal that would limit them to defense of the capitals of the two countries. The proposal is bound to have a potent appeal to those who believe: (1) any agreement is worthwhile at this point of flagging hopes in arms control; (2) any agreement with Russia is desirable in contributing to mutual good will, confidence and negotiating momentum; (3) an ABM agreement is particularly desirable since ABM, threatening as it does to cave in the other side's confidence that it can destroy you, destabilizes the balance of terror; (4) the administration is wrong in thinking it can hold back the ABM card until Moscow agrees to a deal limiting offensive missiles as well; and (5) the administration can fairly anticipate that "even" a limited ABM agreement would be good politics for 1972.

Most of these contentions (and we do not claim the list is complete) have at least a degree of merit to them—some more than others. Yet we are not prepared to assert that the administration should snap up the Soviet proposal and accept an ABM accord limiting these costly and still-questionable systems to areas around Moscow and Washington.

To spell out a single point, a characteristic one, Moscow surely knows that Washington perceives the hooker in the Soviet proposal. While the Russians, who already have ringed Moscow with ABMs, would merely have to stand still, the United States would have to embark on the difficult political exercise of junking the ABM system already begun in the West and of concentrating on Washington area defense. But even if you can imagine that happening, consider that the ABM system the United States would build presumably would be better than what the Russians have in place around Moscow. How would they respond to that?

If there is one factor we feel impelled to stress above all others, it is that of time. Time is wasting: it is wasting the prospects of arms control. This leads us to conclude that, although the questions posed to American policy by the Soviet ABM proposal are very difficult, they must be addressed and answered with all deliberate speed. To lag is to surrender the initiative to the justly notorious "mad momentum" of the arms race. In this regard, we acknowledge some anxiety about the pace of this administration's arms control activities.

Unquestionably, it had an obligation, and an entitlement, to make its own canvass of control possibilities when it took office in 1969. But what it defended as a necessary pause for study has had the secondary effect of giving arms technology and production time to make more "progress," and of raising doubts about Mr. Nixon's intentions in the minds of many Americans and perhaps in the minds of some Russians as well. Surely in the third year of his administration Mr. Nixon cannot fail to come to grips, and to appear to be doing so, with awesome issues like the ABM.

4

NEW YORK TIMES

17 Jan 1974

48

## Russia's SALT Offer

The Soviet Union's suggestion of a preliminary strategic arms agreement restricting antiballistic missile (ABM) defenses in both countries deserves an immediate, favorable American response without waiting for resumption of formal talks March 16 in Vienna.

Moscow evidently has offered to outline in detail its concept of such a treaty if the United States would accept the principle of an ABM-only accord as the first step in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Washington reportedly reacted negatively when this proposal was made in Helsinki last month, insisting that a curb on offensive missiles must be agreed to at the same time. This is a serious error and no time should be wasted in correcting it.

A meaningful agreement on offensive delivery systems is proving difficult to negotiate. The Soviet Union wants all American tactical bombers in Europe counted in the numerical limitations, something the United States justifiably refuses. The United States, meanwhile, has failed to make a realistic proposal for curbing MIRV multiple warhead missiles—its chosen way of expanding fourfold the nuclear delivery vehicles in its strategic offensive forces. But it is asking for a numerical limitation of about 1,900 on Soviet and American offensive missile launchers and a sub-limit of 250 on the huge Soviet SS-9 launchers. Moscow's chosen vehicle for expanding its strategic offensive forces.

It would be self-defeating to endanger a possible ABM agreement by insisting that offensive weapons limitations must be linked to it. Moscow, in fact, has merely reverted to the original American SALT proposal of 1967, which called for ABM limitations alone. It was the Soviet Union that insisted then that offensive missiles also had to be controlled and Washington agreed.

Both types of weapons should be controlled. But an ABM-only agreement, if properly drafted, could be of great benefit even if limitation of offensive missiles proves impossible. Unilateral verification is feasible, and such a pact could brake the arms race, add stability to the present nuclear balance and permit major savings in future defense expenditures.

Moreover, discussion of offensive missiles limitations in SALT need not be delayed by a first-stage ABM negotiation; on the contrary, it could even be expedited. An idea of what ABM limitations are projected is essential to permit serious discussion of offensive missile restrictions. Limitation of ABM's to a low level, in fact, would eliminate any real need for a further build-up of offensive missiles on either side, including MIRV. If the Soviet Union's ABM proposals prove to be negotiable, and are delegated to experts to draft a treaty, the main SALT conference could press forward discussion of offensive weapons with a better chance of success.

In any event, the numerical limitations on offensive missile launchers that the United States currently demands would leave MIRV and qualitative improvements uncontrolled. They would not halt the offensive missiles race but merely shift it into other fields. Such an agreement would virtually be a sham, if it could be achieved; to hold up an ABM treaty in an effort to achieve such meaningless curbs on offensive missiles would be unjustifiable.

What is critically needed is a new attempt to achieve a MIRV ban before deployment on both sides makes it too late. But, meanwhile, wisdom counsels immediate exploration of the ABM limitations the Soviet Union has in mind. Senate hearings clearly are needed to probe into the Administration's reluctance to take up the Soviet offer.

The President's advisory committee in order to speed up the SALT agreements or reverse the arms race has already recommended that we drop our demand for on-site inspections. It is not essential due to the technical efficiency of our reconnaissance satellites which identifies missile launchers. He has rejected their advice. I urge him to reconsider. I urge him to accept the true promise that is before us today—a mutual moratorium on the building of land-based systems that can bring a vital part of the arms race to a halt—today and not in the gray distance of tomorrow.

I look forward to the day that we will have a formal agreement at SALT, which I strongly support, to be fully assured that the arms spiral is being unwound. Perhaps we can accomplish the same thing by a continuing process of discussions and simultaneous coordinated, unilateral acts. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the only real way to stop the arms race is to do just that—stop it. With a month-by-month moratorium, with continued vigilance and preparation, we can respond with safety and security.

We now have the chance and it is my duty and the duty of this body as a public forum to convince the President that we must take it.

## WHERE ARE THE SALT TALK ALTERNATIVES?

Mr. President, in today's Post, Marquis Childs discusses the SALT talks and the U.S. lack of negotiation alternatives. The column entitled, "Annihilation Gametmanship" underlines the fact that the U.S. negotiators have been discussing arms limitations and arms reductions, while the Defense Department is moving ahead full-blast with both MIRV and ABM.

In my prepared remarks today, I have called for a moratorium on both ABM and MIRV deployment. We have the technology and the know-how to deploy these weapons effectively. What is to be gained by their installation during a time of most delicate negotiation? We do not need any new version of "brinkmanship" in the 1970's. We need diligent, sincere and reciprocal negotiations that will enable the United States and the Soviets to begin the diversion of resources to development of the best in man rather than threaten to the destruction of the species.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the column by Marquis Childs, appearing in the Washington Post of February 1, 1971, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

WASHINGTON POST - 4 FEBRUARY 1971

57

# U.S. Negotiator
Testifies on
Limiting ABMs

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

The chief American negotiator at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) yesterday gave the Senate Foreign Relations Committee what was described as a "very negative" response to the idea of an agreement confined to limiting rival anti-missile (ABM) systems.

Gerard C. Smith appeared behind closed doors for about two and a half hours. While Smith was firm on the ABM proposal, made last winter by the Soviet Union, he said that on other SALT issues he has as yet had no guidance from President Nixon.

Smith's appearance coincided, by chance, with the first public Soviet statement on a specific issue on the SALT table since the Soviet-American talks began nearly 15 months ago.

This was the disclosure in a Pravda article that the Kremlin will not agree to a treaty unless it covers fighter-bombers, based in Western Europe and on carriers, that can deliver nuclear weapons to Soviet soil.

American officials had been warned in advance that the Soviets were irritated by accounts in the U.S. press about SALT details and that the United States therefore could expect a Moscow response. More of the same is anticipated before the next SALT round begins in Vienna on March 15.

Smith's negative attitude on the Soviet ABM proposal, a proposal not mentioned in the Pravda article, was paralleled in comments some days ago by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's foreign policy aide, during a closed door meeting in Cambridge, Mass.

However, Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho) and others pressed Smith yesterday on the idea of accepting an ABM agreement as a first step toward a larger pact to include offensive weapons systems as well.

Church suggested that an ABM agreement might even be made contingent, within a set time, on the larger agreement. But Smith's response was that the United States prefers an agreement limiting both ABMs and rival missile systems in order to put a ceiling on the huge Soviet SS-9 missiles.

## Standing Pat

The net result of Smith's testimony and of other information is a strong indication that the United States will go to Vienna standing pat on its past proposal, waiting to see whether the Soviets will have anything new to offer or whether the Communist Party's 20th Congress will produce changes that could affect SALT. That Congress begins on March 30.

Soviet sources are adamant that there can be no larger agreement unless the forward-based aircraft are included. So, they say, why not start with ABMs only, and they have been pressing hard on this idea in Washington.

The Soviets have some definite ideas about the details of an ABM agreement, for instance the physical area that would be permitted under a pact limiting each side to protection of its national capital.

The paper they gave the Americans at Helsinki in December left blank places for such figures. The Soviets said they would be glad to provide them if the Americans would agree in principle but President Nixon forbade Smith to do so.

The Soviets are insistent that only the Washington and Moscow areas could be covered. They specifically exclude a substitute U.S. system in the Rocky Mountain area, headquarters of the North American Defense Command, as has been suggested by some Pentagon planners.

The Soviets profess to see no problem about large radars, necessary for ABM systems, that are already located in other areas for other purposes. But these are a source of concern in Washington on the grounds that such radars in the Soviet Union could be quickly hitched to ABM missiles, thus leaving the United States at a disadvantage that would take years to overcome.

The Soviets also are now saying for the first time that there is no longer a chance of agreement to limit multiple warheads (MIRVs) as U.S. officials some time ago concluded.

58

WASHINGTON STAR 6 FEBRUARY 1971 (8)

## Capital Defense

The best thing that President Nixon can do with the Pentagon's latest scheme for building nuclear missile defenses around Washington is to file and forget it. On the face of it, the idea makes no sense.

The fact that it was originally a Russian idea doesn't particularly commend it for serious consideration. At Helsinki last fall, the Soviet SALT negotiators came up with a suggestion for a way to limit the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses. Why not, they asked, restrict these defenses to Moscow and Washington?

The Pentagon has taken it from there. They are asking the administration to get congressional authority to start forthwith on preparing missile sites around the nation's capital—this, in addition to the work already under way to protect four Minuteman missile complexes in Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming and Missouri. Then, says the military, if the Russian proposal should be accepted, we could quickly convert the whole program to the defense of Washington.

We don't pretend to know why the Russians are so concerned about Moscow. We do know that protecting Washington, and Washington alone, against a nuclear attack—assuming it could be done—is no answer to our problem of maintaining the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. What on earth would be accomplished by saving the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department and Congress if the rest of the country were blown sky high or rendered helpless by a surprise Russian attack?

Deterrence depends on the ability of

either side to absorb such an attack and still be able to inflict terrible destruction on the attacker. Unless this ability is assured by protecting our Minuteman missile sites, the protection of the Capital as a national command post is meaningless.

Our need for any missile defenses, furthermore, relates to what the Soviet Union has in the way of offensive capability—not to what its own defensive dispositions may be.

If the Russians want to defend Moscow, well and good. But if at the same time they develop an offensive capability to knock out our strategic missile system, it will make precious little difference whether Washington survives or not.

The hard fact is that, much as we may want to reach an agreement with the Russians on something, the United States cannot enter into a pact limiting defensive systems without a parallel limitation on offensive weaponry. The news that the Soviet Union has apparently halted deployment of its huge SS-9 missiles is perhaps encouraging. But it provides no reliable guide to Soviet intentions in the future and certainly cannot form the basis for American defensive planning.

Pending a possible agreement on both offensive and defensive missile systems, we favor—reluctantly—a limited deployment of the Safeguard system as a means of protecting our retaliatory missile strength, and hence our deterrent force. To leave the missiles unprotected and defend only the city of Washington is neither a rational nor a credible alternative.

WASHINGTON POST - 7 FEBRUARY 1971 P-2 (8)

# Work on Six SS-9 Silos Is Halted by Russians

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Soviet Union has halted construction on six more underground silos for its huge SS-9 ICBM, well informed U.S. officials report.

The stop in construction work was spotted recently by Air Force photo reconnaissance satellites orbiting over the Russian landmass and is now being reflected in the latest U.S. intelligence estimates, these sources say.

Work was still underway at these sites as recently as three months ago.

The new information comes at a time when the Nixon administration is debating the stance it will take when the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with the Russians resumes in Vienna on March 15.

This most recent intelligence estimate is the second one within the past two months which reflects apparent continuing cutbacks by the Russians in the SS-9 buildup which got under way in 1964 and continued, with occasional pauses, through mid-1970.

As recently as last Oct. 9, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird publicly credited the Kremlin with "more than 300 SS-9s" including those already deployed plus others for which underground silos were still being prepared.

## Slowdown Confirmed

In December, however, the Pentagon confirmed press reports that a slowdown had been spotted in Russian SS-9 activity.

Informed government sources at that time said privately that work had stopped at 12 of 18 new silos started last spring, bringing the total under 300 to 294. No new sites have been started since then.

Now, officials say that work has also stopped at another six sites, bringing the total down to 288 missiles, 278 of them

now judged as ready to fire.

The SS-9, which can carry three five-megaton nuclear warheads, has been painted by the Pentagon in recent years as the biggest threat to survival of the U.S. Minuteman ICBMs.

Defense officials have said frequently that with a force of 420 of these mammoth missiles, each equipped with three warheads, the Russians could wipe out 95 per cent of the 1,000-missile Minuteman force in a surprise attack.

## Main Argument

The SS-9 has also provided the principal argument for building the Safeguard ABM network to protect Minuteman. And, it is the single most important Russian weapon that American negotiators at the now recessed arms talks have been trying to put a specific numbers limitation on.

The latest intelligence information is likely to increase a debate already going on within the Nixon administration on how and if to respond to the Soviet SS-9 moves.

Officials remain cautious of Soviet motives. Some suggest that the SS-9 developments may merely be a pause while the Russians install triple warheads on the missiles.

Others believe the Russians, who have never mentioned the SS-9 cutbacks in discussions at SALT, may be signaling to this country that it is indeed interested in moving toward some agreement.

There is a widespread feeling, however, that by not mentioning the reductions at SALT and letting the U.S. discover it on its own, the Soviets may be attempting to bring pressure on the White House to accept a tacit limitation on nuclear arms, without an official agreement, something the administration opposes and feels would be dangerous.

## Pressure Increased

Pentagon confirmation of the earlier SS-9 slowdown has already brought increased congressional pressure on the President to make a similar gesture by slowing down or halting work on Safeguard.

The administration is considering such a slowdown, though the President's final position on Safeguard for the coming year is still said to be undecided. Fewer SS-9s, Defense officials admit, reduces somewhat the urgency of the ABM system.

Nevertheless, informed officialssreport that the administration remains convinced that Safeguard is the best bargaining chip the U. S. has at SALT and wants to keep the program moving, but perhaps at a slower pace.

Officials from several government agencies say there is little doubt that the Russians are more interested in getting the U.S. to halt Safeguard than any other weapon.

60

62

NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE 15 FEBRUARY 1971 (10 FEB)

# WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

BY STEWART ALSOP

WASHINGTON-President Nixon, like all modern Presidents, is the target of a continuous bombardment of intelligence reports. Recently, three reports he has received must have caused the President to stop and think—and then think again. These reports, which to most readers will seem of passing interest—if any at all—may be summarized about as follows:

1. There is evidence, as yet inconclusive, that the Soviets intend to six-MIRV their 300-plus SS-9s. In other words, the huge intercontinental missiles are to be equipped with six independently targeted warheads, rather than three, as previously expected.

2. Last October, the Soviets carried out an eleven-day series of tests whose purpose was to make it possible to destroy intelligence satellites over Soviet territory, without using nuclear warheads. Similar, less sophisticated tests had been carried out in 1968.

3. Several prototypes of the Foxbat (U.S. code name) aircraft have been tested in Russia, and the plane is now believed to be in line production. The Foxbat is unquestionably the best aircraft of its kind in the world.

To most readers all this no doubt sounds like cold-war gobbledygook. But it is sometimes useful to try to put yourself in the President's shoes. For a nuclear-age President's first concern has to be the actual physical survival of the United States as a functioning society. Thus a President, unlike the rest of us, cannot afford to duck into the nearest intellectual foxhole, muttering comforting clichés about Pentagon propaganda or the horrid old military-industrial complex.

A President has to take serious intelligence, like the three items listed above, seriously. These three items go right to the heart of the great decision now confronting President Nixon—how to respond to the latest Russian proposal in the SALT talks.

In the last meetings in Helsinki, which ended in December, the Russians put on the table a reasonable-sounding proposal for eliminating all ABM's except those in the Moscow and Washington areas. Distinguished scientists and influential editorialists have passionately urged the President to give this proposal a positive response,

when the talks resume in Vienna in March. To do so would certainly be politically popular. Moreover, any agreement which might tend to slow or halt the arms race would obviously be in our interest, and the world's.

And yet—and yet. Put yourself in the President's shoes, and consider those three items of intelligence. The Soviet SS-9 is a "counterforce" weapon. Its only logical use is against our Minuteman missile complex—the SS-11 and other Soviet weapons are quite adequate to destroy our great cities. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has announced that the Soviets, having deployed about 300 SS-9s, seem to have slowed or halted deployment.

This could be good news. It could be a signal from the Soviets that they are serious about a SALT agreement. But if the intelligence about the six-MIRVed SS-9 is correct, it could be the very opposite of good news.

The Pentagon's chief scientist, John Foster, has assured Congress that our Minuteman retaliatory force will not be seriously threatened until or unless the Soviet SS-9 force reaches about 420 missiles. This assurance was based on complex mathematical computations, plus an assumption—the assumption that the SS-9s would be triple-MIRVed, as our much less powerful Minuteman III missiles are.

But the SS-9 has an immense warhead—roughly 25 megatons as against the Minuteman's 1 megaton. This very high yield reduces the accuracy requirement. For example, if the SS-9 were triple-MIRVed, each vehicle would have a warhead of about 5 megatons, and a CEP (circular error probable) of about 440 yards would be required. With six MIRV's each warhead would have a yield of about 1 megaton, and a CEP of about 300 yards would be required to destroy a Minuteman in its concrete silo.

If the Soviets are going for a six-MIRVed SS-9, this would mean that they are confident they can build a 300-yard CEP into their SS-9s. This in turn would mean that they would need no more than 300 SS-9s, to knock out the U.S. Minuteman complex of just over 1,000 missiles, in a first strike.

This arithmetic may seem insane, something for Dr. Strangelove. But a President in the nuclear age has to

consider the insane arithmetic. He also has to consider the meaning of those satellite intercept tests.

Suppose there were a crisis as dangerous as the Cuban missile crisis—or more so. Suppose this President, or his successor, knew, or suspected, that the six-MIRVed Soviet SS-9s were capable of knocking out our whole land-based retaliatory force in a first strike. Suppose that, in this time of crisis, one of our Samos intelligence satellites simply disappeared. If it were knocked out by a nuclear warhead, this would be in flat contravention of the test-ban treaty, and very close to an act of war. But suppose it has just disappeared.

Suppose a second Samos has disappeared also. What then? The obvious answer would be to send over the Soviet land mass an SR-71 reconnaissance plane—the supersonic, very high altitude SR-71 is the modern descendant of Francis Gary Powers's U-2. But here the third item of intelligence has to be considered. The Foxbat is specifically designed to knock out, not only the comparatively slow and low-flying B-52s, but the SR-71s too.

So the SR-71 disappears too. The U.S. is like Sanison, a blind giant. What then? Does the blind giant pull down the temple of civilization?

After the Cuban missile crisis, Russian diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov, meeting with John J. McCloy, who was acting as President Kennedy's personal representative, confirmed Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the Cuban missiles, and then added a comment: "This is the last time you Americans will be able to do this to us."

During the Cuban missile crisis the strategic advantage favored the United States, by a ratio of about six to one. Kuznetsov's comment was a clear warning that the Soviets meant to reverse the odds, and they have been working away doggedly to do so ever since. If the President accepted the Soviet SALT proposal—and if the intelligence cited above is accurate—the odds might indeed be reversed.

It is easy for a bystander to dismiss this sort of thing as a Strangelovian nightmare, and to take comfort in the uncomfortable fact that the United States will always presumably have what it takes to destroy the Soviet Union if the United States is willing to be destroyed. But the President of the United States is not a bystander. What would you do, if you were in his shoes?

NEW YORK TIMES 22 FEBRUARY 1971

Improving U.S.-Soviet Relations

Rapid action by Washington on two fronts might usefully influence Russia's foreign and defense policies and its priorities for the 1970's.

One move would be to normalize Soviet-American trade. Elimination of tariff discrimination and steps to bring American export controls in line with NATO's shorter strategic embargo list would have a major psychological effect. The tactic of withholding American trade as leverage for some later bargain over unrelated issues is far less likely to influence Soviet policy favorably than is the trade itself, once it begins to play a role in Soviet economic planning and in increasing Soviet contact and interdependence with the West.

The most urgent need in the coming weeks is a dramatic new American move—preferably in a direct Nixon message to Premier Kosygin—to break the impasse in the SALT talks. There is nothing to lose and everything to gain by offering to explore in depth Moscow's detailed proposal for a first-step treaty limiting antiballistic missiles (ABM's) alone. A counterproposal could spell out the radar and ABM launcher restrictions the United States favors and, even better, could offer to forgo construction of an American ABM system over the next six to eight years if the Soviet Union agrees to dismantle its existing Moscow system in the same period.

Parallel negotiation could proceed on offensive weapons. The immediate roadblock here is Washington's refusal to discuss at SALT its 500 tactical nuclear bombers in Europe. Those on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean retain a nuclear strike role against Soviet targets and some of the land-based aircraft have the range for such missions.

Soviet negotiators have recognized that these aircraft are not going to be withdrawn or even counted one for one in the numerical totals of strategic vehicles. But the Soviet military evidently insist that "some account" be taken of them. One formula worth exploring is a tacit agreement limiting longer-range tactical bombers to present numbers in return for a freeze on Soviet medium-range missiles targeted on NATO Europe.

Of far greater importance to American as well as Soviet security would be a serious American proposal, for the first time, to ban MIRV multiple warhead missiles on both sides. A proposal of this kind, dropping unnecessary demands for on-site inspection, has been urged unanimously on President Nixon by his presidtigious General Advisory Committee.

The United States in the SALT talks has proposed a ban on MIRV flight-testing and deployment with on-site inspection. The Soviet Union has suggested a ban on MIRV production and deployment without on-site inspection. A Nixon proposal to Premier Kosygin now to drop on-site inspection and combine the two views—banning flight-testing, production and deployment of MIRV warheads and missiles—would have a good chance of Soviet acceptance, many informed officials believe.

Clear proof that Mr. Nixon is serious about halting the missile race could not only open the way to a SALT agreement, but might lead to a broader Soviet-American accommodation.

NEW YORK TIMES 26 FEBRUARY 1971
New Message, Old Doctrines

President Nixon's second State of the World Message is essentially a restatement and updating of last year's document. It does not appear at first reading to contain any new thoughts or proposals. Indeed, what is most striking is the manner in which the emerging Nixon Doctrine increasingly resembles old United States policies of the past two decades.

This is particularly noticeable in the lengthy passages in which the President attempts to defend his policies in Southeast Asia. While the mode of American intervention has been changed in order to assuage domestic criticism, the President seems to be pursuing the policy of containment in Asia first laid down by John Foster Dulles. He reiterates his determination to honor American commitments throughout the area—commitments which predate the changed conditions to which he says elsewhere American policy must respond—and he appears ominously to be extending those commitments to Cambodia and Laos.

Although the President continues to call for increasing self-sufficiency on the part of America's Asian allies, individually and in concert, he indicates that the transfer of defense responsibilities to local forces will be a long and slow process. It is obvious that the Nixon Doctrine is running into serious trouble in the face of Asian realities.

In Europe, too, Mr. Nixon reiterates old policy in such expressions as "today's new strategic equation," which turns out to be simply a restatement of the McNamara policy of graduated deterrence and response. He does wisely allow for Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik and for initiatives by others when he says: "Today, our Western European allies are properly anxious to make their own contribution to East-West negotiations. They will increasingly assert their own judgment and interest in doing so."

While holding out hope for new understandings with the Soviet Union, the President generally adopts a tough line vis-a-vis the Kremlin. His expressed determination to persist with American ABM and offensive missile development lessens the likelihood of a fresh American initiative to break the disarmament deadlock when the SALT talks resume in Vienna next month.

There were echoes in the President's message of recent hints of a changing policy toward Peking. He said the United States would continue to oppose Communist China's efforts to unseat Nationalist China at the United Nations—which, of course, is not the same as opposing admission for Peking. But United States actions in Indonesia are likely to speak louder than any Presidential words of conciliation.

On the positive side, the President's firm statement on liberalizing trade offers hope that the Administration will provide stronger leadership this year in the trade battle in Congress. There are also welcome signs of a more hospitable attitude toward trade with the Communist world.

Mr. Nixon takes justifiable pride in his Administration's vigorous efforts to promote a cease-fire and negotiations in the Middle East, which he correctly labeled as the most dangerous current international crisis area. His careful restatement of the American position should give further impetus to progress in the delicate negotiations now taking place at the United Nations.

In the closing remarks of his radio address, summarizing the message, Mr. Nixon said: "But history has taught us that the old diplomacy of imposing peace by the fiat of great powers simply does not work." Unfortunately the Presidential Message—especially that portion dealing with Southeast Asia—strongly suggests that President Nixon has not abandoned the old diplomacy.

65

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 2/27/71

# How to rescue the SALT talks

By Roscoe Drummond

Washington

The purpose of this column is to try to get the answers to three crucial questions:

Why are the United States-Soviet nuclear arms talks absolutely vital to both sides and to the whole world?

Are they at the point of breaking down?

What can be done to rescue them?

To get a significant agreement on the SALT talks is a bigger accomplishment than going to the moon — and more important.

It would mean that vast resources could be used for building a better peace instead of being used to avert a worse war.

It would reduce the horrendous risks of the arms race getting totally out of control and bringing on a nuclear conflict no one wanted.

## Deterioration

An agreement between the U.S. and Russia on nuclear arms reduction would make other agreements more attainable.

This is why success in the SALT talks is transiently urgent.

And this is why it is a grave concern that there is now a visible deterioration in the climate surrounding the negotiations.

Much of that "business-like atmosphere" which was so evident during the early months seems to be vanishing. Each side is starting to pick at the other and to break out of the needed privacy of the discussions to argue publicly that the

other is trying to seek one-sided advantages.

These are delicate and difficult negotiations. The security of either nation can be in jeopardy if it makes a wrong decision. The Soviet Union isn't going to be looking out for the safety of the U.S. and we aren't negotiating to protect the Soviets. Neither side can afford to rush into an agreement hastily or lightly.

But it looks to me as though the talks have reached the point of very tough bargaining and they may be nearer a dangerous stalemate than we realize.

## Unlimited test ban

In either event a new approach on how to end this ever-mounting nuclear competition, in which each side pays more and more to get less and less security, may well be needed.

A new approach is being offered by an American expert in the field of arms control with high credentials. He proposes that we simply expand the limited test ban into an unlimited test ban. So simple it might be very sensible!

William C. Foster has concluded that now is the time to do it and believes it would be a far more effective way of steadily cutting back the arms race than to try to decide how many of which nuclear offensive and defensive nuclear weapons each side should have. He believes that its very simplicity is part of its strength.

What does Mr. Foster know about it? He knows a lot about it. He has been undersecretary of defense,

and he knows the military side of the problem. He headed the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for years, and he did most of the negotiating which brought about the atmospheric test ban which nearly the whole world has accepted.

## Monitoring total ban

Mr. Foster believes it is now possible and safe for both Washington and Moscow "to ban all testing, not just atmospheric testing, but all testing including underground."

How would this action control the nuclear arms race if it were accepted? Mr. Foster's answer is:

"Do this and you automatically slow down and ultimately end nuclear innovations for you remove the means of development. To end all nuclear testing is like taking the test tube away from the chemist. This one logical, sensible step would answer all the bothersome points now taking us endless hours of fussy negotiations in SALT."

But could violations of such a total test ban be monitored? It is Mr. Foster's judgment, based on much firsthand knowledge that surveillance techniques are vastly improved and that it is now entirely within our scientific competence to discover if the other is committing a serious violation

I venture to say that if Mr. Foster's proposal isn't the way to rescue the arms talks, we'd better find a better one soon.

66

SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE - 28 FEBRUARY 1971

HOW IGNORANCE FUELS THE ARMS RACE

69

*(The following is an abridge-ment of a speech given last week by Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky to a seminar at the National Academy of Sciences in Washington, D.C. Dr. Panofsky, one of the Nation's most eminent scientists and a former Presidential advisor, is director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center.)*

By W. K. H. Panofsky

THE NUMBERS which describe the effort the people of the world are making in arming themselves are staggering beyond description. Since World War II over a trillion dollars has been spent by the world on armament, and the world's annual military bill is about $180 billion. This figure is approximately 8 per cent of the total productivity of the world; the actual impact on the economic health of our globe is probably much higher than this because of the indirect costs which are not included in this total.

Any comparison of arms spending one wishes to make with other human activities points to the absurdity of our course. For every dollar the U.S. and the Soviet Union each spend on arming themselves against each other they spend only 4 cents to assist in solving the problems of the underdeveloped part of the world. Global military spending exceeds the total sum that all countries are spending on education. Military spending is a large factor in the depletion of the world's resources and the corresponding ecological effects.

Nuclear weapons surpass all others in destructive power. Nagasaki and Hiroshima were each devastated by a single explosion equivalent to about twenty thousand tons of TNT; the world's stockpile in equivalent explosive power is now more than one million times larger; this is more than ten tons equivalent for every man, woman and child on this globe.

* * *

IN SPITE OF these frightening numbers one cannot truthfully state that the arms race is uncontrolled. All nations are facing, at least annually, a struggle with the budget, in which the priority between military expenditure relative to urgent domestic needs must be weighed. In such debates the argument put forth by military leaders that vast expenditures are needed to preserve "security" and the invocation of real or manufactured threats of external aggression has carried military spending to where it is today. Yet few can doubt that the real security of all nations has in fact decreased as military stockpiles have grown on all sides.

Strategic arms constitute only about 10 per cent of the present U.S. military budget. But nuclear weapons are by far the cheapest way to kill, so budget pressures may actually push us back into increased reliance on nuclear armaments to counter threats that might best be answered by other means. It is specifically this increasing threat of nuclear devastation to which I would like to address myself.

IT IS ABUNDANTLY clear that decisions involving military armaments must be made by balancing the risk of the continued arms race against the danger of military inadequacy. Yet most national decision makers tend to "play it safe" in purely military terms while ignoring the risk which the continual growth of the military stockpiles of all nations implies.

Military conservatism is reinforced in several ways: by misinformation concerning the opponent's technical status, by misjudgment of his strategy and plans, and by mistrust of his intent.

In regard to misinformation, the history of the arms race is filled with instances where the U.S. was misinformed about the status of Soviet weaponry. For example, the emergence of a Soviet ICBM in 1957, followed by the surprising launching of a Sputnik in October of the same year, caused what President Eisenhower later called a "wave of near hysteria."

Another example of misinformation fuelling the arms race deals with the offense-defense race in connection with ABM. During the period 1960-62 it became evident that the Soviet Union was deploying an ABM system around Leningrad. The decision to equip the American Polaris fleet with multiple warhead A-3 missiles was partially a consequence of this discovery. As it turned out, the Leningrad deployment was dismantled, and a new ABM system was started around Moscow in 1964. This system was finished only last year and is of limited defense value, since it contains only a small number of anti-missile launchers (64), not all of which are fully equipped even today. Yet the initial deployment of this highly marginal Moscow system has been the excuse for proceeding with the American MIRV (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle) force, a weapon designed to penetrate the Soviet ABM system.

In the public statements of U.S. civilian and military leaders the primary emphasis has been given to a policy of deterrence. The ability of U.S. arms to "deter" nuclear aggression implies that the U.S. could absorb a first strike from the USSR or other opponents and still be willing to retaliate with sufficient power to destroy the opponent's society. It is amply clear from the gruesome statistics of the arms race that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have an

ARMS RACE - CONTINUED

70

excess of nuclear weaponry for this purpose. Deterrence is, however, not the only stated objective of U.S. strategic forces. For instance, Secretary McNamara, in his annual reports to the Congress, emphasized that "damage limitation" was also a strategic objective. What this means is that, should nuclear war somehow commence or be considered unavoidable, then U.S. armaments should be such that damage to this country could be minimized.

This brings us directly to the fundamental problem of the arms race. The problem is the fact that these two strategic objectives—deterrence and damage limitation—effectively countermand one another. If the U.S. increases its ability to limit damage under Soviet nuclear attack, then Soviet military leaders will conclude that we could be harder to deter from striking them first. Conversely, should the Soviet Union put up an extensive damage-limiting defense which the U.S. believes might blunt their nuclear retaliation, then we will conclude that the USSR could be harder to deter from striking first and thus we would be pushed to increase our offensive forces accordingly. This is the way the arms race continues.

THESE TWO mutually contravening strategies are, of course, a reflection of the internal conflicts which take place in the councils of government of both nations. Most independent members of the technical community have long since concluded that deterrence is the only feasible strategy for avoiding nuclear war, and that "damage limitation" and "military victory" have very little meaning in the nuclear age. Many military men, however — even in the face of the overwhelming destruction which nuclear weapons can bring to the world — adhere to their traditional mission that, should deterrence fail, they should be able to "fight a war and prevail." In the absence of a clear resolution between these two contradictory strategies the arms race will be very difficult to curb.

Without meaningful estimates of damage in a nuclear war, there is a wide margin of opinion as to how large a "deterrent force" should be, and "damage limiting" measures can hardly be evaluated at all if we know so little about the amount of damage to be limited. The effects of single nuclear weapons are well understood. We know about blast, heat, radiation and fall-out, and thus we can estimate what structures or human beings might be expected to survive the first impact of a single weapon. What one knows very little about are the interactions among the elements of society and ecology which a large-scale attack might bring.

Yet the calculations which are used as the basis for the military requirements for "deterrent" weapons ignore this vast set of post-attack effects. Even the calculations on which the U.S. positions for SALT — the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—are based are the same primitive models which forget all the disastrous consequences of nuclear war on the ecology, on physical and genetic health, and on functioning of the society. The time has come for ecologists and weapons-effects experts to join forces and generate a scenario of nuclear war which goes far beyond the simplistic models now in use. I would predict that calculations which attempt to include the after-effects of nuclear war would drastically revise upward the estimates of deaths, casualties and destruction. If this is true, then need for nuclear weapons which could reach an enemy's homeland to "deter" him from striking first would be greatly diminished. Many of the problems which currently stall agreement at SALT would disappear. At the same time, it would become clearer to our military planners how unrealistic their "damage limiting" plans really are.

WE THUS find that the ambiguity in strategic thinking of both the U.S. and the USSR, in combination with the primitive models of nuclear war which translate

these strategies into military hardware, have brought the arms race to the absurd state of overkill we are facing today.

How has this situation actually affected the technical character of the strategic weapons systems deployed by the two nations? In order to function in a deterrent role, such weapons should be able to survive initial attack and be able to "go" on command to attack the opponent's people and industry. This means such deterrent weapons must either be "hardened" (i.e., in heavy shelters) or be hidden from the enemy in order to survive attack. On the other hand, they need not be very accurate in aim, nor do they need to carry high nuclear explosive power, since their targets are generally widespread and not resistant; a single, one-megaton nuclear blast will almost completely destroy a fair-sized city, wherever in the city it occurs.

MIRV describes a load of multiple nuclear weapons which can be carried by a long-range ballistic missile launched either from land or sea, with each weapon independently aimed at targets in the opponent's country. Several arguments are given by Defense Department advocates for MIRV. One purpose is to defeat a conjectured Soviet ABM defense as a "penetration aid"; yet I mentioned above that, construction of Soviet ABM defenses started a decade ago and has made only halting and unsatisfactory progress (which bespeaks the same degree of vacillation and indecision concerning ABM on the Soviet side as reflected in our own ABM debates).

Why, then, do we need MIRV? Although the Soviets do not have a significant ABM now, maybe they will build one so rapidly that we cannot build a countermeasure fast enough — so the argument goes. In order to give weight to this line of reasoning, DOD spokesmen have emphasized the possibility that the very widely deployed Soviet defenses against airplanes (which we have seen in action in Vietnam and Egypt) could be clandestinely upgraded in short order into an effective ABM. For many technical reasons I give little credence to this argument. In giving the Soviets credit for "instant ABM" we are assuming them to be capable of a feat which we ourselves have been unable to accomplish over a protracted period of time with a research and de-

velopment effort costing billions of dollars.

IF THE only objective of MIRV were a deterrent role to defeat a real or imagined Soviet ABM system, then it would clearly not be necessary for such missiles to be highly accurate. Nevertheless, the U.S. has pursued intensive programs to upgrade the accuracy of MIRV's.

The Congress has justly criticized the program, concluding correctly that such high-accuracy MIRV's would add nothing to our deterrent ability but could well be interpreted by the Soviets as being a step on the part of the U.S. to develop weapons for attack against the Soviet missile silos on which the Soviets are relying to deter U.S. aggression.

In principle an observer could, by watching the technical details of MIRV deployment, identify its purpose. A low explosive power, inaccurate MIRV fits a deterrent strategy, while an accurate and powerful MIRV might threaten attack against the opponent's missile force. However, the actual technical situation on both sides remains ambiguous, and therefore each party, preparing for the worst, will tend to assume a first-strike threat and will increase his forces accordingly. Thus MIRV fuels the arms race.

This ambiguous situation is similar, and even more potentially threatening, in the case of AMB. As has been explained repeatedly in public statements and testimony, ABM can serve several roles. It can attempt to protect population and industry from nuclear missile attack, although it is generally conceded that it cannot do much of a job against a massive attack from the Soviet Union. In this role its function would fit into a "damage limiting" mission and again, if the U.S. began to build such a countrywide system, would give rise to Soviet suspicions that the U.S. might consider launching a first-strike attack against the Soviet Union because its ABM could blunt a retaliatory strike.

U.S. technology in both of these areas is ahead of that of their Soviet counterparts, so we bear the brunt of pacing the technological arms race in this area. It has been aptly said that the era of MIRV and ABM initiates a new round in the arms race. Unless these weapons are stopped soon, it may be even more difficult to turn back from the brink.

72

Senator Henry Jackson
'Face the Nation'

7 March 1971

(excerpts)

"It will come...as a shock to a lot of Americans, after much discussion here that they had leveled off on the deployment of the SS-9's, to know that the Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advance generation, of offensive systems....We do not know quite what it means, but I can say to you that these are huge new missiles...big or bigger than the SS-9's....The indications that we have are that the new system is something superior to the SS-9, not necessarily in yield, but in quality. It may be related to MIRV'ing.

I am sure, or reasonably sure, that the Russian use of this huge buildup will come not in the form of a first strike on the United States, but to use this growing power to take greater and greater international political risks in the 1970's.... What I'm saying here now is that...the need to limit offensive systems is critical. This is why I think the President is right. We must do both; to limit just the defensive systems makes no sense at all.

WASHINGTON POST 8 March 1971 P1

# Jackson Says Reds Deploy New ICBM

By Morton Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) said yesterday that the Soviet Union, in an "ominous" development, is in the process of deploying "an advanced generation" of huge, new intercontinental ballistic missiles.

He said the new weapons are as "big or bigger" than the mammoth SS-9s and probably superior to them, "not necessarily in yield, but in quality."

The Defense Department, questioned about Jackson's statement, said it was "correct that we have detected some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union."

A Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, added, "We are not exactly sure what it is or what Soviet intentions are."

Jackson speculated on those intentions on "Face the Nation" (CBS, WTOP).

He was, he said, reasonably sure that the Russians will use "this huge buildup" not for a first strike against the United States but as a power base for taking "greater and greater international risks in the 1970s."

"This is the meaning of their buildup of strategic arms and of conventional surface forces, the buildup of their navy," Jackson continued.

The senator did not identify the source of his information about the new missiles. Neither did he give any direct response to a question about the numbers that may be deployed.

He said that a related "ominous" development involved the SS-9s, which "have leveled off at 305—around that figure."

Jackson said he was convinced that the reason for the leveling-off is the need to adapt the SS-9 for MIRVs, or Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles.

He said that it will come "as a shock to most Americans" that the Russians are deploying a new generation of offensive systems while indicating a contrary position by holding back on SS-9 deployment.

Last month, The Washing-

ton Post quoted well-informed U.S. officials as saying that, since last spring, the Russians had stopped work on a total of 18 new SS-9 silos. In a downward revision of earlier estimates, they said that the Soviet Union has 288 SS-9s, 276 of them now judged ready to fire.

A single SS-9 can carry three five-megaton nuclear warheads. The Pentagon has depicted it as the biggest threat to the survival of the U.S. Minuteman, the "second-strike" ICBMs. Pentagon officials have said that 420 SS-9s, each equipped with three warheads, could wipe out the entire force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles in a surprise attack.

President Nixon, in his press conference last week, said he was against any agreement with the Russians in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) that would be confined to defensive weapons alone.

Jackson said yesterday that he wholeheartedly supports the President on this..."I think our position is sound, which calls for a limitation on offensive and defensive systems." The "further buildup in new offensive systems" by the Russians makes the need to limit such systems critical, he said.

Turning to other subjects, Jackson said the administration was guilty of "a terrible mishandling" of the news blackout on the invasion of Laos.

If there had to be such a blackout for security reasons, he said, it "made no sense at all" to impose it on the pre-invasion phase, only to lift it on the eve of the invasion itself.

74

77

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

9 MARCH 1971

A need for facts

A healthy skepticism is the wisest response from the public to Sen. Henry M. Jackson's televised warning this past weekend that the U.S.S.R. is producing and putting into place "an advanced generation" of huge, new intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We would advise a dual skepticism: toward Senator Jackson's assessment, until some hard official confirmation is available; and toward the Soviet Union, whose approach to the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is at least ambiguous.

Skepticism toward the Senator from Washington: partly because as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he has close liaisons with the Pentagon, including some superhawks on the nuclear arms issue; partly because the Pentagon itself, while confirming "some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union," added that "we are not sure exactly what it is, or what the Soviet intentions are"; and partly because the Senator from the State of Washington — home of missile-oriented Boeing Company — is conditioned politically to take an automatic hard-line position regarding the missile defense systems of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

But skepticism also toward the U.S.S.R. — to this degree, at least, we concur with Senator Jackson — because what is known is that the Soviets have leveled off their number of huge SS-9 missiles at 288 (latest revised Pentagon figure) and stopped work on 18 new SS-9 silos.

The Pentagon admits that it does not know what the present Soviet activity concerning the SS-9's is all about. The furthest it has gone is to speculate that one of several possibilities might be that it is equipping the SS-9 with MIRV (multiple independent reentry vehicle) warheads.

If this were actually the case, it would be a grave sign indeed that the U.S.S.R. is flagrantly using SALT as a red herring. But the case is far from proved. And a number of United States experts insist that the U.S.S.R. has nowhere near the capability in MIRV development yet to so equip the SS-9's.

Thus when Senator Jackson says publicly he is "convinced" that the U.S.S.R. is deploying "an advanced generation" of missiles, but offers no hard facts — and is not supported factually by the Pentagon — we reserve the right to remain skeptical.

While we acknowledge need for continued official skepticism regarding Soviet motives and acts, we also must beware of stirring up another wave of public hysteria, lest the hoped-for progress in the SALT talks be rendered politically unreliable by the Senate.

BALTIMORE SUN 11 MARCH 1971 PAGE 1

79

# *Admiral Cites Soviet Danger, Asks Deterrent 'At All Costs'*

By CHARLES W. CORDDRY
Westminster Bureau of The Sun

Washington, March 10—The strategic nuclear balance has “drastically shifted” in Russia’s favor in recent years with potentially damaging effects on American foreign policy, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said today.

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, the nation's top military officer, told the House Armed Services Committee in a detailed assessment of U.S. military posture that "Soviet achievement of a clear-cut strategic superiority must be avoided at all costs."

He outlined a series of measures now proposed to hedge against a possible breakdown in the American-Soviet arms limitation talks and continued expansion of Soviet strategic power. These measures are to improve the quality but not the size of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and to develop new weapons, but to defer decisions on producing them.

## Cites Implications

In his warning about Soviet nuclear progress, backed up by comparisons in all offensive and defensive weapon categories. Admiral Moorer cited the implications for both military and foreign policy.

If the Soviet Union achieved clear-cut strategic superiority as could happen in 5 or 6 years the admiral said, "it could destroy the confidence of our friends and allies in the deterrent power of strategic forces."

"We will pay a very high price in the effectiveness of our diplomacy if we permit the Soviet Union to achieve a clearly evident overall strategic superiority," he said, "even were that superiority to have no practical effect on the outcome of an all-out nuclear" war.

## "Variable Range" Rocket

In the 31-page, heavily censored, public version of the closed-door testimony, Admiral Moorer reported that the Russians have developed a "variable range" version of their SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missile.

This, other sources explained, is a missile that can be adjusted for launch against targets in either the United States or Western Europe, and it appears to be replacing some older rockets of lesser range. More than 100 of the Russians' 900 SS-11's are of the variable range variety, thorities said.

Admiral Moorer also touched briefly on the construction of new missile sites in Russia, disclosed Sunday by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) on a television program.

"The new missile silos are unlike any others which the Soviets have previously constructed," he said, "and we do not know what these silos are intended for or how many will be built."

## New Missile Silos

Senator Jackson believes the construction is for a huge new successor to the world's biggest intercontinental missile, the Soviet SS-9. Melvin R. Laird, the Defense Secretary, said this morning on the NBC "Today" show that "we have firm evidence" of the new Soviet construction program, but it is uncertain whether the silos are for improved SS-9's or new missiles.

Senator Stuart S. Symington (D., Mo.) said in the Senate today, regarding "warnings of grave new dangers" posed by Russia, that "in reasonably good humor, I say to my colleagues and the taxpayers—here we go again." He recalled "comparable spring announcements of previous years" during defense budget consideration.

Asked afterward whether he meant to imply there was no new missile-site construction, Senator Symington said, "No, no." He said he was "not skeptical" of the reports, but recalled he had "been fooled before," referring to the Soviet bomber and missile alarms of the 1950's

## "Purported Details"

Mr. Symington said in his Senate speech that the Senate Armed Services Committee was briefed about "purported details of new Soviet missilery" last week in a session so secret no record was kept. He contended the same details were not known when the "same people," otherwise unidentified, briefed the Joint Atomic Energy Committee the previous week.

Because of the "secrecy emphasis," the senator said he avoided answering reporters' questions in his home state last Sunday, only to read about the new Soviet missile undertaking next morning. He told a reporter Senator Jackson had not attended the secret briefings.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

9 MARCH 1971 (16)

# New Soviet Missile Threat

Sen. Henry M. Jackson's disclosure that the Soviet Union appears to be deploying a new generation of offensive missiles—"as big or bigger" than the huge SS-9s—is one of the most ominous pieces of news in a long time.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird presumably will have something to say about the new development in his annual defense posture statement, to be released this morning.

But if Jackson knows what he is talking about—and in view of his access to U.S. intelligence information, there is no reason to doubt that he does—some of the more hopeful interpretations of recent Soviet behavior will have to be abandoned. The prospect for a meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement will also have to be downgraded.

Optimism about arms control talks—the so-called SALT negotiations, which resume next week—has been on the rise lately because of the Soviet Union's action in seemingly halting deployment of the SS-9 missile.

The SS-9 is a monstrously large ICBM, capable of carrying three to six nuclear warheads—each of which would be more powerful than the warheads on our own ICBMs. If deployed in sufficient numbers, the big missile could tip the balance of power dangerously in the Russians' favor.

When construction of SS-9 silos stopped in mid-December, there was widespread hope that the Kremlin was signaling a willingness to join the United States in limiting

the number of offensive missiles available to each side.

That possibility still exists, but Jackson's disclosure raises serious doubts, to say the least.

For several weeks, he said, the Soviet Union has been deploying a "new generation, an advanced generation of offensive missiles." The latter appear to represent a "follow-on generation" to the SS-9, according to Jackson.

Pentagon spokesmen, when queried by newsmen, were more cautious in their interpretation than Jackson. But they confirmed that the United States has detected construction of new Soviet ICBM silos, and they would not rule out the possibility that they portend a new generation of Soviet offensive missiles.

It remains to be seen just what the Russians are up to. The whole episode does tend, though, to underscore the wisdom of President Nixon's position that any agreement growing out of the SALT negotiations must include a ceiling on offensive missiles as well as ABMs.

If we agreed to a pact imposing limits on ABMs but not on offensive missiles, it seems clear that we might very soon find ourselves having to launch a major new ICBM-building effort of our own in order to maintain a semblance of nuclear parity.

The whole purpose of the SALT negotiations is to head off any such new missile race.

83

WASHINGTON STAR

10 MARCH 1971 (11)

## Realistic Deterrence...

As was to be expected, Defense Secretary Laird, in his annual report to Congress yesterday, accentuated the positive. The Nixon administration's "strategy of realistic deterrence," he maintained, is new, emphasizing "measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiations from a position of strength."

Although the words employed may have been different, we would assume that the object of all previous administrations, from Eisenhower's through Johnson's, was that of Mr. Nixon and Secretary Laird: To provide for the essential security of the United States in an increasingly dangerous world.

The one really new and significant development which has taken place since Mr. Nixon took office is the initiation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which have shuttled between Vienna and Helsinki for many months without making discernible progress.

This lack of progress is recognized by Laird, and it is the principal reason why, as he suggests, the President may have to go ahead with a third Safeguard anti-ballistic missile site either here or in Wyoming. And it is the slowness of SALT which makes Laird's recommendation for a 2.5-million-man defense establishment absorbing about 7 percent of the gross national product look reasonable.

In the absence of a comprehensive international agreement on arms limitations, and one to which Communist China adheres, any defense secretary would have to take note of what Laird describes as "a growing Soviet military

capability and technological momentum, and expanding Soviet influence around the world ... (and) an emerging Chinese Communist nuclear threat."

It is useless to speculate about Russian or Chinese intentions. But we know their capabilities and we know their political philosophy, as evidenced most recently by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Given these conditions, it would be madness to cut military appropriations to the point where our national security would be endangered.

This is not to say that the Defense Department should be given a blank check. There has been too much of that in the past and, despite the secretary's economies, there may remain fat that could be trimmed. The point is, however, that Congress should take a positive rather than a partisan approach to questions of national security.

Insofar as it goes—and the 119-page report is marred both by a vagueness of phraseology and a lack of details—Laird's analysis seems both reasoned and realistic. Its success, however, particularly in regard to dealing with non-nuclear wars of both the conventional and guerrilla type, is predicated on two factors that are by no means certain: The ability and willingness of our allies to do a great deal more for their own defense (particularly in terms of manpower) and the conversion of our own reserve forces into truly combat-ready units.

Unless both can be accomplished, Mr. Nixon's goal of a zero-draft may remain more of a dream than a reality.

## ... And Moscow's Missiles ✓

If Senator Henry M. Jackson is correct in saying that the Russians have started to deploy a "new generation" of offensive nuclear missiles, the news does indeed have ominous implications for the effort to put a stop to the spiraling nuclear arms race.

In a recent television appearance, the senator said the new missiles are as big or bigger than the monstrous Soviet SS-9 and include some unspecified technical improvements. He implied that the Soviets are also in the process of deploying multiple warheads on their existing missile force.

Defense Department spokesmen have partially confirmed this new information that the Russians have embarked on a new program of missile construction after a pause of several months. The Pentagon has declined to speculate on what kind of missiles may be involved or what Soviet intentions may be.

Based on the senator's revelations, however, some of the implications are only too obvious.

It means first that the "pause" in Russian missile deployment, seized on by some as an argument for a similar pause in American defensive efforts, has proved illusory. It also means that the

Russians do not accept the concept of nuclear parity with the United States. And since the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are based squarely on this concept, it opens up a dark perspective for the success of those talks.

The strong implication is that the Soviet leaders are out to achieve a position of nuclear superiority over the United States—perhaps even the capability for a first-strike attack against our 1,000-Minuteman missile force which is the backbone of our nuclear deterrent. An actual attack, as Senator Jackson suggests, is improbable. However, no one knows better than the Russians the military, political and diplomatic consequences of being in a position of nuclear inferiority. And they appear determined to put us in that position.

The United States cannot accept under any circumstances a status of nuclear inferiority to the Soviet Union. It must continue to work toward an effective limitation of both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons in SALT. But it must also in the meantime proceed with the deployment of the limited Safeguard system of anti-ballistic missile defenses. To do less would be to play Russian roulette with the security of the nation.

WASHINGTON POST 11 March 1971 P1

# Moorer Cautions On Soviet A-Lead

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Congress yesterday that the Soviet Union could gain nuclear superiority over the United States "within the next five or six years"—a situation to be "avoided at all costs."

"Aside from the military implications," Adm. Thomas H. Moorer told the House Armed Services Committee, Soviet superiority would destroy the confidence of this country's allies and weaken U.S. diplomacy "even were that superiority to have no practical effect on the outcome of an all-out nuclear exchange."

Despite the apparent slowdown in silo construction for the Soviet Union's three front-line ICBMs, Moorer estimated that force would continue to expand from its present 1,440 missiles to about 1,500 by mid-1971.

He also pointed to fresh evidence—now widely publicized—that the Kremlin has started building new silos for what may be still another ICBM. Furthermore, he raised the possibility that even one more variety of globe-spanning missile may be in the offing.

"There remains the possibility," Moorer said, "that the Soviets may develop and deploy a mobile ICBM" in the next several years.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) criticized the Pentagon's assessment and the airing of secret intelligence on the new Soviet missile silos on national television just before the defense budget went to Congress.

"Here we go again," said Symington in a Senate statement.

Among the inevitable signs of a Washington spring, he listed "proposed higher defense budgets and warnings of grave new dangers . . . because of new developments in Soviet weaponry."

Symington is a member of

the Senate Armed Services Committee along with Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). It was Jackson who revealed the new silo information on TV last Sunday.

"Last week," Symington said, "in a session secret to the point where no record was kept, the Senate Armed Services Committee was briefed about Soviet missile plans. This briefing included for the first time purported details of new Soviet missilery which was not known about when the Joint Atomic Energy Committee was briefed the previous week on the same subject by the same people."

In a possible swipe at Jackson, Symington said he was asked by reporters about this new Soviet threat last Sunday, but "based on the secrecy of the briefing, I avoided answering." He then asked that news stories following the TV show be printed in the Congressional Record.

On the estimates themselves, Symington said "one cannot fail to remember several comparable spring announcements of previous years—in the early 1950s those thousands of new long-range bombers the Soviets were going to build, but never built; in the late 1950s, those hundreds upon hundreds of long-range missiles the Soviets were going to build, but never built.

"As a result of these and other inaccurate intelligence reports," Symington claimed, "the American taxpayer is currently hearing the burden of tens of billions of dollars of additional weaponry we now know is not needed for his and our security."

84

85

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

11 MARCH 1971

MORE SOVIET MISSILES ✓

American negotiators are preparing to return to the strategic arms limitation talks [SALT] Monday in Vienna amidst indications that the Soviet Union has begun deployment of a new generation of giant offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Whether the addition of what appear to be new offensive missiles to the Soviet arsenal constitutes an intensification of the strategic arms race even while SALT is in progress is the subject of an equally intense reevaluation of the American negotiating position.

Even without a new missile system, the nuclear balance of power favors the Soviet Union. Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reminded the House Armed Services Committee yesterday that Russia holds a great lead in the number of land-based ICBM's and in total nuclear megatonnage. America leads only in the number of multiple warheads and submarine missiles.

The disclosure of the new Soviet missile system was made over the weekend by Sen. Henry M. Jackson [D., Wash.], a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee with close ties to the Pentagon. Robert J. McCloskey, a State Department spokesman, later verified that this new missile deployment had started the Americans on their reevaluation program.

In his State of the World Message Feb. 25, President Nixon reported an apparent slowdown in silo construction of the Soviet SS-9 missile, the world's largest offensive weapon, together with other missile developments. The President said then that if this activity turns out to be preparatory to intensification of the strategic arms race "it will be necessary for us to react appropriately."

At the moment, at least in regard to America's announced position, this consists of Mr. Nixon keeping all his options open while showing some restraint in connection with the arms race, as Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird pointed out Tuesday to the House Armed Services Committee.

What Laird called a "sign of restraint" was the administration's decision to go ahead with only a "limited" expansion of the Safeguard ABM system to protect our own Minuteman ICBM silos. For this the President will seek $1.28 billion in the 1972 financial year, beginning July 1.

Laird indicated that final Presidential decisions on the ABM expansion, as well as possible development of other strategic weapons systems, will depend upon the outcome of the fourth round of SALT talks. Some observers believe that at the moment SALT seems to be hung up on serious differences between the Soviets and the Americans.

The Russians are pictured as proposing only an agreement on limiting defensive weapons systems. President Nixon said recently that any agreement, whether comprehensive or not, would have to include a limitation on offensive weapons as well. He had in mind particularly the mammoth SS-9 missile, which carries a warhead 25 times as powerful as any in the American nuclear arsenal.

The disclosure of the apparently brand-new systems of offensive strategic missiles in the Soviet Union can only serve to make any kind of arms limitation agreement more difficult, if not impossible. Certainly the department of such city-wrecking missiles while arms limitation talks are in progress hardly fits into a picture of the Soviet Union showing any "restraint."

WASHINGTON POST

12 MAR. 1971 P-23

# Bitter SALT for Optimists

## Joseph Alsop

THE END OF the cold war, limitations on nuclear weapons, an agreement to terminate the arms race— these have been the understandable dreams of a great many virtuous Americans. They have been, indeed they are, being nourished by the SALT talks.

Anyone with the sometimes bitter salt of realism in his makeup must now abandon the dream, however, at least for the time being. That is the real meaning of the fairly dire fact that the Soviets are beginning to deploy a whole new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, far more powerful than any in the American arsenal. This was first disclosed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson of Washington.

"Scoop" Jackson's necessary disclosure all too sadly and ironically explains the earlier announcement of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird that the Soviets had suspended deployment of their SS-9 missiles. It is now clear, in fact, that SS-9 deployment was suspended, not as a "signal," but simply because the Soviets had a far better weapon already in production.

Thus far, the American reconnaissance satellites have only seen the new silos that are being dug for the new missiles. These resemble the silos of the SS-9 missiles, with their 25-megation warhead-capacity. Hence it is all but certain that the new missiles belong to the same family of weapons.

There are significant differences in the configurations of the new silos, however. Hence it is again all but certain that the new missiles, which will eventually fill the silos, will be the second generation of the SS-9 family. In sum, they will be improved in several ways, and most importantly improved, no doubt, by having more numerous warheads.

That means that the new missiles, so clearly implied by the new silos, will be what the Pentagon calls "counterforce weapons." The SS-9 is another counterforce weapon. With its gigantic warhead-capacity, in other words, the SS-9 has no rational purpose except to destroy America's Minuteman missiles, and thereby to break the back of the American nuclear deterrent.

Before SS-9 deployment was suspended, 300 of these gigantic weapons had been put in place. All have pretty certainly been retrofitted with the triple warhead the Soviets have already tested. That means that the existing SS-9 force is probably sufficient, at this moment, to destroy about three in every four of the U.S. Minuteman missiles.

THE NEW MISSILES for which the new silos are destined are all but certainly much-improved versions of the SS-9, as stated. That means, quite simply, that each one of them must be expected to have the capability of destroying several more of our Minutemen missiles than any one of the SS-9 missiles can now destroy.

In sum, the back of the American nuclear deterrent is in fairly urgent danger of being broken in the near future. It will not happen all at once. From the first spadeful of earth being turned, to an operational Soviet missile in a silo, about 18 months are required. And as yet, so far as we know, none of the new missiles is actually operational.

By the same token, however, there is a far longer time lag between any possible American decision to take counter-measures, and the counter-measures becoming effective. It is a matter to thank God for, in view of this ugly news from the Soviet Union, that the ignorant and willful opposition to the American ABM was narrowly overcome.

"Safeguard" deployment should obviously be speeded as much as possible, instead of being slowed down. But that is the least of the lessons to be drawn from the rude interruption of the happy political opium dream in which virtuous persons have been wallowing.

If you think about it, the whole story is disgraceful. Long ago, when SS-9 deployment began, the alleged experts at first denied that this missile really was what it quite obviously is. Then they repeatedly set arbitrary limits, saying deployment would not go beyond this or that non-fatal number. Yet deployment proceeded remorselessly.

Then the halt in SS-9 deployment was tearfully welcomed as a "signal"—a message of sweetness and light, in fact. Instead, this halt has now proved to be a message of menace and darkness. In short, all these virtuous persons have been proven a set of wishful fools.

What must now be considered, furthermore, is the decision whether to proceed with a second-generation American deterrent. Against what the Soviets have and are building, what we have is becoming obsolete and useless. And no sane American can want a deterrent that does not deter.

86

87

WALL STREET JOURNAL - 12 MARCH 1971 P-6

REVIEW and OUTLOOK

First Step Toward What?

The Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks will resume in Vienna on Mon-
day, and it seems the strategic arms
debate is also about to heat up here in
the United States. The division at home
is essentially between those who are
willing to accept almost any agree-
ment as a symbolic first step, and
those who insist on a pact calculated to
promote maximum stability in the nu-
clear balance.

A bona fide agreement limiting both American and Soviet nuclear forces would of course be one of the most hopeful developments of our era. At the very least it would lift an enormous and senseless financial burden from both peoples. And it would lay a base upon which the superpowers, with luck and perseverance, could build larger understandings sharply reducing the chances of an eventual nuclear war.

In the real world, unfortunately, these great accomplishments cannot be won by just any agreement. Given the staggering complexities of nuclear strategy, indeed, it's not especially difficult to conceive of a pact that would increase rather than reduce the long-run chances of a nuclear exchange.

If an arms pact is to promote stability, it must insure both sides of an effective deterrent, the ability to retali ate overwhelmingly even after an opponent strikes first. Or to reverse the proposition, neither side must be allowed first-strike capability, the ability to wipe out the opponent's missile forces so that retaliation becomes impossible.

No one is saying that leaders on either side are madmen who would push the button for a first strike the moment their computers told them the odds were favorable, but if the Soviets do achieve such a preponderance in the nuclear balance, as Senator Jackson remarked the other day, they will have the confidence to run bolder risks in their fundamentally expansionist foreign policy.

Such risks are likely to lead to cri-
sis, a first-strike capability is likely to
make a nuclear blow look more profit-
able to some strategist or other, and
this is a terribly volatile combination.
Since we are after all talking about the
chances of a nuclear holocaust, we can
scarcely afford to be complacent about
evolution toward a first-strike environ-
ment.

American strategic planners have been fairly good about choosing weapons that do not raise a sharp first-strike threat. Our missiles are large enough to carry warheads useful for attacking cities, the logical target of a retaliatory strike, but not large enough to count on in attacking heavily dug-in enemy missiles, the logical target of a first strike. By the same logic, our anti-ballistic missile system is intended to protect our own missiles from an enemy first strike, not cities from a retaliatory strike.

Whether by plan or from simple fas-
cination with size, the Soviets have
created a missile force neatly suited to
a first strike. Their huge SS-9 missiles
carry warheads of a size many times
over that needed to level a city, but ex-
cellent for attacking hardened missile
sites. When they fit these missiles with
multiple warheads, they will be very
close to achieving the ability to wipe
out the entire American force of land-
based missiles.

Despite this threat, the nuclear bal-
ance must be rated reasonably stable
at present. The United States has de-
ployed large numbers of multiple war-
heads while the Soviet Union has not.
We tend to think this particular
weapon was ill-chosen, but for the
present it does give the Americans a
lead in total numbers of warheads.

Even if American land-based mis-
siles can be destroyed, moreover, the
d doctrine of a multiple deterrent also
provides retaliatory forces through
manned bombers and Polaris submar-
ines. A Soviet first-strike capability

would not be possible without some
further breakthrough to neutralize the
submarines. Finally, by the time the
Soviets could deploy their multiple
warheads, the Safeguard anti-missile
system would protect a large share of
our land-based missiles from any
first-strike threat.

All this is highly pertinent to the
items on the table as the SALT talks re-
sume. Proposals for a general limita-
tion on strategic arms have been
blocked by arguments over their defi-
nition. The Soviets argue that a strate-
gic weapon is any that can strike the
other country. While this has a certain
plausibility, it is in effect a demand for
withdrawal of American forces from
Western Europe without a correspond-
ing Soviet withdrawal from Eastern
Europe.

The Soviets argue, further, that if a
general limitation is not attainable, we
should start by agreeing to limit defen-
sive weapons. Here at home critics of
the American negotiating position are
saying, Here is a chance for an agree-
ment, how can we turn it down?

The administration has continued to
insist, however, that any agreement
must cover both offensive and defen-
sive weapons. The reasons for this link-
age are quite pressing, for the real
meaning of the Soviet defensive-only
proposal is this: Russia will be able to
continue deployment of its SS-9 mis-
siles or possibly newer missiles of the
same huge size, even though such de-
ployment would increase the likelihood
of eventual first-strike capability. But
America must curtail its Safeguard
anti-missile, even though its deploy-
ment would reduce the likelihood of
eventual first-strike capability. In the
current context, a defensive-only pact
would be a step toward a first-strike
environment, not away from it.

While such a pact would not auto-
matically or immediately plunge us
into such a dangerous nuclear environ-
ment, it is, for all the talk about sym-
bolic first steps, scarcely the kind of
precedent we ought to create. The last
thing we need from the SALT talks is a
first step toward instability.

TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL. 13 MARCH 1971 (18)

88

# Time's running out for SALT talks

In the past 16 months the Soviet Union and the United States have strengthened their offensive capabilities. New warheads on missiles. Tests of a bombardment system. All this during SALT talks and time is running out.

By JOHN GELLNER

ON MONDAY the fourth round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union opens in Vienna—more than 16 months after the negotiations started in Helsinki.

One usually hears two kinds of assessment of SALT, both, to my mind, wrong. The optimists point to the businesslike—and at times almost friendly—atmosphere in which the talks are being conducted. They see in it a hopeful sign, and they stress the interest both sides must have in coming to an arrangement, if for no other reason than to save themselves the astronomical costs of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race. The not-so-optimistic do not think that an agreement is in sight; they contend that the very fact that the Americas and the Russians are meeting on this touchy subject is important enough.

In fact, time is running short. The talks may collapse unless agreement is reached on at least some substantial points fairly soon, say, this year. SALT simply cannot be compared with such marathon negotiations as Panmunjon or Paris—or the nine-year-old Geneva disarmament conference.

So far, in the first three rounds of SALT, the bargaining has not been going well. There has not even been agreement on what the negotiations should be about.

The trouble lies with the term, "strategic arms". To the Americans, these are the weapon systems, offensive and defensive, designed to deter, and in the extreme case to wage, all-out nuclear war: heavy bombers; surface, submarine-launched, and (conceivably) satellite-borne ballistic missiles; and defensive systems against such bombers and missiles. The Russians say that every nuclear warhead that can reach the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, is a strategic weapon. Consequently, they want to include in any control agreement all the, so-called, tactical U.S. nuclear arms in Europe which could be carried to a point in the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, they say that their own tactical weapon systems would not belong in such an accord, because they could not reach the United States. Under this reasoning, a U.S. Phantom fighter bomber, with an atomic bomb aboard, is a strategic weapon system, because for it the Ukraine is in range, but not the otherwise comparable Soviet Tu-22 strike aircraft which cannot cross the Atlantic.

The United States will have none of this distinction—and its European NATO allies in any case would not allow a distinction to be made between the several thousand Soviet medium-range missiles and tactical aircraft in Europe, and the fewer U.S. tactical weapon systems in the same area.

According to reliable reports—the negotiations are secret, but there are the usual leaks in the U.S. side—a U.S. package proposal of July 24, 1970 contains these main provisions: There would be numerical parity, at an agreed level, in strategic weapon systems (as defined by the United States). The mix as between bombers and different kinds of ballistic missiles would be left to each of the parties to determine, but there would be an absolute limit on the number of the most powerful among the Soviet rockets, the SS-9. There could be either no anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) defense systems at all, or, if the Russians wanted to keep the one they have already deployed around Moscow, the Americans would deploy ABMs around Washington.

It seems that the Russians did react to this plan during the opening stages of the third round in November. Reportedly, they offered to make an agreement on ABM, while leaving the problems connected with offensive weapons to future negotiations. This, the United States is not likely to accept, because it would allow the Russians to deploy SS-9s without limitation, but would prohibit the establishment of ABMs around the Minute-man missile sites, which the Americans think are particularly threatened by the huge Soviet rockets.

In the 16 months the SALT negotiations have been going on, both sides have significantly strengthened their already formidable offensive capabilities. The Americans are putting multiple warheads (MIRV, multiple individually targeted re-entry vehicle) into their Minuteman III, Polaris A.3, and new Poseidon missiles. The Russians are known to be developing MIRV, and to have at least MRV (multiple re-entry vehicles, though not individually targeted) warheads in their SS-9 and SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missiles. They have also recently concluded a long series of tests of a satellite-borne fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS).

Although these things are going on, SALT or no SALT, the Americans certainly, and perhaps the Russians as well, are held back to a degree by the fact that negotiations are in progress. The United States is marking time with the development of a new strategic bomber, the B-1 and an Undersea Long Range Missile System (ULMS), both of which, according to their proponents, are needed to make the U.S. retaliatory forces—the deterrent—invulnerable. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird has already intimated that the United States will not be held back much longer from doing what it considers necessary for its security.

Such statements may be only designed to prod the Russians to get down to serious negotiations, but they show that there is a time limit.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 13 MARCH 1971

(25)

89

# U. S. Losing Arms Race?

By JAMES McCARTNEY

Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON.—Is the U. S. really
standing behind in the strategic arms race
with the Soviet Union?

The idea has been implied strongly in
recent days by Pentagon reports that
the Russians may be building a new and
powerful missile system to present the
U. S. with a serious new challenge.

But hard facts in testimony presented
formally to Congress this week paint a
somewhat different picture.

The testimony shows that the U. S. is
still far ahead of the Soviets in key
strategic categories — and in fact is
currently deploying nuclear warheads
at a rate three times as fast as the
Soviets.

The Pentagon budget shows that the U. S. is plunging ahead with deployment of major new strategic systems on both land and sea — as well as continuing its anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program, which is a nuclear weapons defense system.

Headlines have been dominated by
reports of what the Pentagon fears the
Soviets might or could do — not by what
they actually are known to have done.

Sen. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) — a
gime-time secretary of the Air Force who
pro nounced in the field — says that the
pentagon is engaged in its annual spring
 campaign for a higher defense budget.

"Many new occurrences inevitably
come with spring," he told the Senate
with a wry smile the other day, including
"warnings of grave new dangers to this
country because of new developments
in Soviet weaponry."

Here's the way the strategic picture
now shapes up in key categories accord-
ing to testimony by Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird and Adm. Thomas Moorer,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This, in essence, is what the fine print
says:

(1) —Deliverable nuclear warheads.

This is perhaps the most important
category of all — and the U. S. has a
huge lead which nobody thinks could be
overcome in the next decade.

The U. S. had 4009 deliverable nuclear
warheads at the end of 1970, compared
to 1800 for the Soviets.

The Soviets are building — but the
U. S. is building faster. The Soviets are
expected to have 2000 by mid-1971 — the
U. S. 4600.

U. S. growth is a result of the highly
complex, little understood MIRV pro-
gram in which multiple warheads are
being installed on U. S. missiles, both
and sea based.

S. technology makes it possible to
each of the warheads separately.
The Russians still don't know how to do
this and nobody is sure when they might
learn.

(MIRV stands for multiple independ-
ently targetable re-entry vehicle.)

The U. S. has never said how many
bombs it plans to build — but informed
estimates have run from 10,000 to 15,000.

The Soviets continue to have an over-
all lead in "megatonnage" — meaning
in explosive nuclear power. This is be-
cause of the immense power of their
huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missile, by far the
most powerful in the world.

President Nixon told the New York
Times in an interview this week that
"the Soviets now have three times the
missile strength of ourselves." The
White House explained later that the
President was referring to megatonnage.
Precise figures are classified.

The U. S. chose voluntarily not to try
to build such a big missile years ago
because scientists felt the power would
be wasted. The U. S. could still do it
if it wished.

(2) — Land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

The Soviets have a numerical lead,
but have halted or leveled off deploy-
ment recently in all major categories
— including the SS-9 missile.

The Soviets now have 1440 land-based
ICBMs while the U. S. has 1054 — a fig-
ure the U. S. has maintained, and con-
sidered adequate, for several years.

But figures on the numbers of missiles
can be misleading. An important ques-
tion is how many nuclear bombs each
of the missiles can carry and how ac-
curate they are.

In this field the U. S. is ahead. It is
proceeding to deploy nuclear warheads
on land-based missiles far more rapidly
than the Soviets.

The new U. S. defense budget calls
for a 42 percent increase in funds for the
U. S. Minuteman III Missile program —
the backbone of the U. S. land-based
missile force.

The budget requests more than a half
a billion dollars to build new Minuteman
missiles with multiple nuclear warheads.

Defense Secretary Laird has said pub-
licly that he has information that the
Soviet Union is "going forward with the
construction of a large missile system."

But he didn't pretend to know exactly
what the Soviets are doing, beyond con-
struction work on new missile silos, and
he interpreted the Soviet program as in-
dicating that they intend to maintain
"parity" in strategic weapons, meaning
equality.

(3) — Submarine - launched missiles
(SLBeMs).

The U. S. is far ahead in submarine-
launched missiles with its virtually in-
vulnerable fleet of 41 Polaris sub-
marines and an on-going program to
convert 31 of them to the much more
powerful Poseidon.

The U. S. has 656 launchable missiles,
compared to 350 for the Soviets.

The Soviets, however, are struggling
to catch up. They are building sub-
marines faster than anything else, and

will deploy 50 new under-water missiles
by the middle of this year.

Nevertheless, U. S. submarine tech-
nology is way ahead of that of the So-
viets. Their submarines aren't nearly
as effective. They still do not have a
solid fuel missile and are operating with
highly dangerous liquid fuel.

Laird said if the Soviets continue
building at the current rate they would
have a fleet comparable to the U. S.
Polaris-Poseidon fleet by 1974.

But he and Adm. Moorer declined to
point out that the U. S. Poseidon-build-
ing program will multiply the strength
of the U. S. submarine fleet vastly in
this same period it involves added hundreds
— in fact thousands — of nuclear
warheads that can be separately aimed.

The Soviets haven't learned how to do
this yet, and thus the U. S. has a huge
margin in one of the most important
parts of the strategic equation.

(4) —Strategic bombers.

The U. S. has a huge lead in bombers
as well. It has 517 bombers and is add-
ing to the force, while the Soviets have
195 and are cutting down.

The U. S. is also putting $371 million
into developing a new bomber.

(5) —Anti-ballistic missiles (ABM).

The Soviets have deployed four ABM
complexes around Moscow, but the De-
fense Department's official statements
fail to note that they are considered out-
moded and ineffective.

The U. S. is continuing to expand its
Safeguard ABM system. It is building
two sites and plans to build two more.
The first elements would become opera-
tional in 1974. The effectiveness of the
U. S. ABM is a matter of scientific dis-
pute.

Over-all, Laird and Moorer put great
emphasis on their fears of eventual
Soviet capabilities.

Adm. Moorer said, for example, that
he believed it is "fair to say that the
over-all strategic balance, during the
last five or six years, has drastically
shifted in favor of the Soviet Union."

"Our comfortable lead has now all but
vanished," he said, "and within the next
five or six years we could actually find
ourselves in a position of over-all
strategic inferiority, certainly as far as
numbers of offensive delivery vehicles
and megatons, and air defense systems,
are concerned."

Sen. Symington, however, expressed
skepticism.

"One cannot fall to remember several
comparable spring announcements of
previous years," he said, "... in the
early 1950s those thousands of new long
range bombers the Soviets were going
to build, but never built. In the late 1950s
those hundreds upon hundreds of long
range missiles the Soviets were going to
build, but never built ...

"As a result ... the American tax-
payer is currently bearing the burden
of tens of billions of dollars of additional
weaponry we now know is not needed
for his and our security."