PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

January 2, 1974

# 1

The Secretary of State has
today sent the following letter of
sympathy to Mrs. Charles E. Bohlen:

January 2, 1974

Dear Mrs. Bohlen:

The death of your husband has filled all of his
friends and associates in the Department of State and
the Foreign Service with a deep sense of loss. I
share this sorrow, knowing as I do how much the Foreign
Service meant to him, and how much he contributed to
his country. I feel, as well, a deep sense of personal
loss, for he was a close personal friend.

Chip Bohlen will be remembered not only as an
outstanding expert on the Soviet Union, as a respected
counselor to Presidents and Secretaries of State, and
as a distinguished Ambassador, but above all as a
warm human being whose integrity and charm won him
the affection and loyalty of all those who knew him.
He both represented and helped to create the best
traditions of the Foreign Service.

Your husband's memory will be with us always, and
serve as an inspiration and example to those who follow
him in the American diplomatic service.

You and your children have my deepest sympathy and
warmest good wishes.

For further information contact:

EUR/P - Mr. Jeraneck
x 20851

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

January 4, 1974

No. 5

#8

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

JANUARY 3, 1974

MR. WARREN: The Secretary, as you know, has been in San Clemente for a few days in discussion with the President on foreign policy, on the Geneva talks, and the Middle East situation. He discussed various matters with the President this morning by telephone and will begin by taking your questions.

Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Actually, we have been reviewing the Middle East situation as well as the whole gamut of foreign policy. It hasn't been confined to the Middle East. But I will be glad to answer your questions.

**QUESTION:** What are the prospects for an early peace and disengagement along the Suez?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as you know, we have encouraged negotiations on the separation of forces first on the Egyptian front, but in principle also on the other fronts to reduce the danger of war, to begin some movement towards a peace settlement.

These talks took place first at Kilometer 101 and while they didn't lead to a settlement, they led to a clarification of the position of the two sides in a direction that offered some promise of further progress.

As you all know, I expect to see Defense Minister Dayan, as was agreed when I last was in Israel, tomorrow and unless there has been a basic change of view, which I do not believe, I expect that good progress can be made in the separation of forces along the Suez Canal.

**QUESTION:** What effect will the elections in Israel have on their standing in the talks?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't believe that the elections will have any effect on the talks that are now going on with respect to disengagement, because there has been, as I understand it, a broad consensus in Israel that those talks can proceed even before a new government is formed.

What the effect will be of the election on the ultimate settlement talks will depend in part on the composition of the Cabinet and on the negotiations that are now going on between the parties and I think it would be premature for me to offer an opinion.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you have a timetable for when you think that disengagement might actually get started?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I don't have a timetable because a great deal, of course, depends on the parties, but it has always been understood that after the Israeli elections that the talks might accelerate and we would expect that after my talks with Dayan tomorrow, that then when the talks resume next week that we will then see, during the month of January, how much progress is possible.

I am not predicting that there will be a solution during the month of January. I am just saying we will then see what can be done.

**QUESTION:** On a related subject, what are the chances of the oil embargo being lifted in the next few weeks or the near future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I know I keep repeating myself about the oil embargo. The principles that the President has adopted with respect to the oil embargo and that we are attempting to implement are as follows: We have understanding for the initial Arab position. Nevertheless, we believe that it becomes increasingly less appropriate for Arab governments to pursue discriminatory measures against the United States when the United States has publicly declared its support for Resolution 242 and has been the principal country promoting a settlement in the area.

We cannot engage in negotiations with the Arab governments about the specific terms that we will support in negotiations in order to get the embargo lifted, because it would make our foreign policy then entirely subject to the producing nation's decisions and would set up an endless cycle.

However, we will continue to make a serious effort. We have told the Arab governments the direction in which we are moving and we have talked to the Israeli Government.

We therefore cannot tie it to any particular time frame, but we hope that there will be progress on the oil embargo issue, together with a general easing of the situation in the Middle East.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, is there any thought of a counter-embargo of some American raw materials which are used in the Arab countries?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are not planning any specific measures of this kind at this moment. First, let me make a few general observations about the energy problem.

First, it is important to separate the Middle East war aspect of it from the endemic long-range problem. There would have been an energy problem even without the Middle East war and there will be an energy problem after the embargo is lifted.

The energy problem is produced in part by the fact that the demand has outrun the incentive for supply and therefore, there is a common problem on the part of all energy-consuming countries to develop

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new sources of energy, to adopt conservation measures for existing sources of energy and to deal with this whole new complex of issues produced by this rapid rise in energy prices.

This is why the President asked me to propose the Energy Action Group between consumers and between consumers and producers and we will take additional initiatives with respect to that within the next week, and we believe that that is the long term solution to the energy problem.

Yes.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on another subject, did you in your talks with Le Duc Tho leave him with any kind of a warning that a North Vietnamese offensive would be met with an American response?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, we have an agreement that we do not discuss the substance of these talks. Secondly, we had a general review of the situation in Indochina with particular emphasis on the situation in Viet-Nam and measures that might be taken to ease the situation.

We are now both studying these positions. We will be in touch with each other in the next few weeks and therefore, the thrust of our talks concern the ways to alleviate the situation and not particular responses we might make to this or that move.

**QUESTION:** If I could follow up, do you anticipate a North Vietnamese offensive now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My old associate Le Duc Tho is not one of the most confiding of men and he has not in the past been in the habit of sharing all his plans with me. I would think that on the whole, on narrow balance, I would expect that the North Vietnamese would recognize that nobody's interest would be served by an offensive in Viet-Nam.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, will the energy problem affect the President's plans for foreign travel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, the energy problem will not affect the President's plans for foreign travel. It, of course, is likely to be a subject in conversations, especially with European and Japanese leaders, if he should meet them later this year.

The President's plans with respect to European travel have been geared to progress that is being made on the various declarations that we are discussing now with our European allies, a declaration within the NATO framework and a declaration between the Common Market countries and the United States.

In both of these cases, substantial progress has been made and there is another meeting of the political directors of the Common Market with our equivalent of political directors, which is Assistant Secretary Stoessel and the new Counsellor of the State Department, Mr. Sonnenfeldt. And we believe that after the period in which there was a conjunction of the formation of European unity with our attempt to redefine Atlantic relationships, and these two efforts tended to compete with each other for the attention of the leaders, that now there is a relation on both sides of the Atlantic, that these efforts are not competitive, but complimentary

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and that relatively rapid progress will be made.

**QUESTION:** What can you tell us, Mr. Secretary, about the possibility of a European trip by the President this spring?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, if we make the progress in Atlantic relations that I have indicated as possible, then it has always been foreseen that the President at that point might take a trip and, while no final decision has been made, this could very well happen this spring.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can I take you back to the Middle East for a moment. You discussed the proposal for an energy group, Energy Action Group, and you said that the Administration intended to take additional initiatives within the next weeks. Can you discuss at all what those might be or what the general character of those initiatives might be?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, of course, this will become more apparent when these initiatives are developed, but basically they will spell out in somewhat greater detail than I did in London, our concept of cooperation between consumers and between consumers and producers. Incidentally, it is interesting to point out that some of the most positive reactions to this idea have come from the producing countries that also seem to feel the need for stabilizing what could otherwise turn into an extremely competitive and disruptive situation and since they are part of the same world economy everyone else is, the producing countries cannot have an interest in a massive depression.

So, what you will see is a spelling out of the ideas that the President asked me to put forward in London and the initiative will probably be undertaken at the Presidential level.

**QUESTION:** In a speech or a statement of some kind?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Probably in an approach to the various leaders concerned.

**QUESTION:** Going back to Indochina for a moment, if I may, if there should be a North Vietnamese offensive, is it at all possible the United States might respond militarily?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to speculate on what the United States would do in every circumstance. I have pointed out in Washington that we are conscious of the legal obligations under which this Government operates and that we, of course, intend to observe them.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there have been reports that General Dayan is coming here so that the US can coordinate a policy with Israel. In view of the fact that the situation with the Arabs is so tenuous and you are trying to make progress in lifting the oil embargo, do you think it is proper for the US policy to be so tied to the Israeli policy that there seems to be no separation?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have conducted our policy in the Middle East by talking at great length with all of the parties concerned. We have discussed our ideas on a settlement in exactly the same terms with every one of the parties involved. Every Arab country that is concerned

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is aware of Mr. Dayan's visit to Washington and I have every reason to believe that they welcome the fact that the United States is actively pursuing the objective of the separation of forces and that they don't view it at all in the light you have indicated.

**QUESTION:** Going back to this Presidential approach to the producer nations, how high --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** And consumer nations.

**QUESTION:** And consumer nations. How high is the United States willing to let the price of oil go, how serious is this situation as you see it now? Are you prepared to just let the price go on up or are you going to try for some rollbacks or what?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You have to understand that the very way you formulate the question demonstrates the nature of the problem. It is not in the power of the United States to control the rise of these prices. These prices are being set by the producing countries and under conditions of totally unrestrained competition among all the consumer countries. There is no way any one consumer can affect the prices.

The United States has made it clear that it is not in the long term interest of even the producer countries to pursue a policy of unrestrained price increases because, as I pointed out earlier, the producers, too, are living in the same world economy that the consumers are. And a world-wide depression produced by an imbalance in balance of payments and a complete over-emphasis on the energy side would have the inevitable consequence of depressing also the situation of the producer countries. And many of them have come to realize this.

The situation has developed in this way because the long-term demand for energy has grown so rapidly and the uses to which money can be put are relatively so limited, that there has been little incentive to increase production and an almost unlimited seller's market.

One reason why the United States has supported cooperative approaches among the consumers and between the consumers and producers is because, even with good will on both sides, unless there is a systematic effort to address the problem, there is no way any one nation can solve it by itself, not even a nation as powerful as the United States.

It is the example par excellence of how interdependent the world has become, how impossible purely selfish policies are, and how suicidal for everybody it is to pursue totally independent courses.

We will make a major effort to bring the prices into some relationship to the needs of the growth of the world economy in which everybody has a share. And we are also profoundly convinced that as far as the consuming countries are concerned, unrestrained competition between them would be a disaster for everybody, and I say that even though in the short term we are better placed than anyone else to withstand such competition.

**QUESTION:** Are these going to be personal appeals by the President to King Faisal and --

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to go into it. They will be announced at the appropriate moment. But they will be an attempt to embody the principles that I have outlined here, and they are of a very major concern of the President right now, to which he is giving a great deal of his personal attention.

**QUESTION:** Will we get it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't know how much of it will be made public all at once, but you will see the development of this approach over the next weeks.

**QUESTION:** Will one of the principles be an attempt to get the producer countries to forswear future oil boycotts of this kind? I mean, you spoke about our relative independence compared to Europe and Japan. But it seems to me those other countries would have a stake in wanting a promise along this line.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are two problems, as I pointed out. One is the problem of the boycott -- there are three problems: the boycott, the production and the prices.

Leaving aside the question of the boycott, in the long term, if the Arab countries or if the producing countries -- it isn't just a question of the Arab countries -- if the producing countries do not increase their production, it will have the same objective consequences as a boycott did, because it will mean that there will be a constant shortfall of supplies.

Secondly, if the prices keep rising, then it is already estimated that anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of the foreign reserves of some countries will have to be devote simply to the acquisition of energy, and this will affect their import policy towards other countries and it will therefore have a very profound effect on the whole world economic situation.

Now, in the short term, it is possible to conceive any number of bilateral deals that can be made between major consuming countries and major producing areas.

In the short term, it is possible to see how particular producing countries can enrich themselves by an unrestrained use of their temporarily strong bargaining position.

But in the long term, it is bound to lead to disaster for everybody. And therefore, we are not trying to approach this on a piece-meal basis, but on a comprehensive approach to the energy problem now and in the foreseeable future, to see whether some thoughtful long-range policy can be developed. And it is peculiarly a case where the common interest is also everybody's selfish interest.

**QUESTION:** In view of all this, what do you see as the most hopeful sign in the Mideast right now, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think in the Mideast there is a good possibility of progress in the separation of forces talks. This, in turn, will create very positive conditions for similar progress on other

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fronts, and it will be a good bridge into the general peace talks that will, of course, continue.

The President has said, and it has been our policy and our conviction, that the chances for peace in the Middle East are better than they have been in 25 years. That doesn't mean that the negotiations won't be extremely painful and extremely difficult.

With respect to the energy situation, on the one hand, of course, we are going through a rather painful period; on the other, there is a certain advantage in having the nature of a problem that was endemic precipitated in a way that one could deal with it comprehensively and at an early enough stage so that we could get a look at all of its implications on a worldwide basis. So even the dislocations of this year can spur us to develop alternative sources of energy, to conserve energy in a systematic way and to enable the consuming countries to work together and to work together with the producing countries to get a long range policy. So this could be seen, this year -- if we all act wisely and decisively -- could be seen as a good transitional period.

**QUESTION:** What about a country like Japan? It is more than a pinch there. They are threatened with economic destruction. How long can you keep a country like that in check?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is not a question of keeping a country like that in check, because that is not our attempt. Our attempt -- if what we are attempting to do works, then obviously it must take into account the basic needs of Japan. And again, at the risk of repeating myself, I can only say that an attempt by Japan to deal with its problem on a purely national basis will bring it up against almost insoluble problems, either of price rises or of competition with other countries, and I have every reason to believe that this is recognized by the Japanese, too.

We have been talking about a structure of peace. We have been talking about the interconnection of events in the world. And when we were talking about political matters, it sounded abstract and theoretical, but here we have a very concrete case in which isolated solutions will turn out to be impossible. We are not trying to contain Japan. We are trying to enable Japan to meet its requirements within the only framework in which it is possible to meet them, and I am confident that the Japanese see it in the same way.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, will you give us a personal note regarding the energy crisis? Coming out here you traveled commercially. I just wondered what your reaction was to that flight and the attention you got on it. Did you feel like an average traveller?

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, they don't have stewardesses on Air Force One. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in that same personal note, there are a lot of people who are interested -- particularly women -- interested in your future. Could you tell us your marriage plans?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't plan them. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** What can you tell us about your plans to get married?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I said three weeks ago when a particular plan was mentioned, that that particular plan -- I commented on that particular plan and I said that I would not make any future comments on my personal situation. I would be spending too much of my time. I don't want to upset too many people. (Laughter)

Humility has always been my outstanding trait. (Laughter)

Jerry is going to issue a statement putting that part off the record. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, on the President's trip to Europe which you say could take place as early as the spring, would there be two separate declarations made? Do you foresee that, one with the Common Market and one with NATO?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, the present plan is to have two declarations, one with the Common Market and one with NATO. The reason is that not every member of the Common Market is also a member of NATO, and therefore it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to construct a document that took care of both of these groupings.

Secondly, in the Common Market, the nine members speak as a unit, while in NATO they are still represented in their capacities as individual nations. And therefore there will be two declarations, one dealing with the issues of mutual security and the political issues related to that, and the second one related to the emerging European identity, the American position vis-a-vis that and the united Europe's position vis-a-vis the United States, the economic issues and that part of the political relationship that is relevant to the relations of a united Europe with the United States.

As I said, we have made very good progress on the NATO declaration and we are also making progress on the declaration with the European Community. We have to stress again that to us this is not just a paper exercise, nor is it an attempt on our part

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to define legal obligations, which can then be enforced by one
party against the other, which is obviously not the case. It is
an attempt on our part to give the democracies an opportunity
to prove that not all achievements in foreign policy are to be sought
in relations with adversaries, but that those countries whose unity
and strength and dynamism brought them to the point where relations
with adversaries can be improved, can also define a future for
themselves in a world which is different from that of the early
1950's.

It is an opportunity for creativity, not a legal haggle in which
we are trying to get this or that clause, and in this process I
think the effort has already generated a great deal of reexamination
on both sides of the Atlantic and will in retrospect, I think, be
seen as having made a useful contribution.

**QUESTION:** If you get these two declarations for the sake of clarity, then when will the President be making the trip to Europe?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Whenever those declarations are ready for signature, and for the final stages of the negotiations, the President would like --

**QUESTION:** No time frame?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I indicated that I thought then somebody mentioned this spring that that was a possibility. But the final decision has not been made and we do not want to set a date and then give ourselves a deadline that puts us under pressure.

We will follow the same procedure that we followed in other negotiations, that is, we set the date when there is a reasonable progress in sight.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, how is impeachment going to affect the President's foreign policy initiatives in the coming year? I mean, the whole fight over it and the threat in Congress?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have no reason to assume that there will be an impeachment and therefore, I don't want to speculate on that. We can only conduct foreign policy on the assumption that the principles that we have attempted to implement of a new relationship with our friends, of accelerating the progress in easing tensions with our adversaries, are basic principles of American policy which the President will continue to pursue because they are right and independent of the situation to which you have referred.

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**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, there have been some reports that since the President has been beleaguered by the challenge and the complexities of Watergate that you as a Secretary of State, have been carrying out policy perhaps in a more independent way than in the first four years when you served as an adviser. I wonder, sir, if you could address yourself to that question.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have read those reports and they are totally incorrect. I think the idea developed because now that I am Secretary of State the press is traveling with me and sees me more regularly than they did on previous trips, and also, there is a more detailed reporting of my day-to-day activities because of the necessity of daily press briefings emerging out of one of the great departments.

I see the President when we are in town together, every morning, for a minimum of half an hour, but usually for a much more extended period than that. When we are not in the same town, I cannot recall a day when we do not talk on the telephone. When I travel, I send the President a report at the end of every day. I am in close touch with General Haig and General Scrowcroft, who are manning the White House, with whom I usually talk on the telephone even when I am on trips and from whom I always get a report. Before I go on a trip, the President and I sit down, as we always have, and he tells me what his general strategy is and what he wants me to accomplish.

Having worked as closely together as we have for five years, there is no necessity for him, and it isn't his style anyway, to go into every last tactical detail, but this is not new. This is the way it has always been.

I do not believe that the great departments of the Government can be personal fiefdoms of individual men. The constitutional responsibility for conducting foreign policy resides in the President. The Secretary of State has to be the agent of the President or he represents nothing. And in this present situation in America, I believe that Government has to be regular, and it has to be conducted on the basis of existing constitutional practice. And I, therefore, totally reject the idea that I am attempting to conduct an independent policy.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, going back to the two European declarations, did you really give us all the reasons why there are going to be two declarations? You had said in your New York speech that you wanted a new Atlantic charter and you had spoken of defense, political, and economic matters as realistically being connected.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

QUESTION: The Europeans came back and said no, no, we don't want them connected. We want two declarations. Isn't this really what happened or has been evolving?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. What happened was when we made the proposal, I think it is fair to say that we did not expect that we were raising a controversial issue. We had reason to believe, on the basis of conversations which the President had had with the British Prime Minister and exchanges which the President had had with other European leaders, that this would be an issue that would be relatively non-controversial, would be greeted with some enthusiasm and would lead fairly rapidly to a general declaration.

In this respect, as I pointed out last week, the European reaction surprised us and I am frank to say, disappointed us. Now, what was the reason for this?

There were many causes, one of them being that this was also the year in which the Europeans attempted to form their political union and that some of the European countries thought that there was an inconsistency between at one and the same time fostering European union and greater Atlantic cooperation.

Given the way the constitution of the European community is written, one or two countries can block the views of the majority, because it requires the approval of all of them.

Secondly, many European countries had domestic problems of their own and therefore, the process by which they responded to the initiative was somewhat slow and somewhat uncertain. It was reflected, for example, in the fact that the Europeans could not decide among themselves how to respond. That is to say, there was one proposal which still existed at the time of the meeting between the President and President Pompidou at Reykjavik, that the declaration should be developed at the level of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the individual countries. We agreed to that.

Then there was a proposal that there be a series of bilateral meetings between the United States and key European countries. We had 15 bilateral meetings between the United States and key European countries, including five by the President himself, with Foreign Ministers of other countries, in one case the British Cabinet Secretary. And at that time, we were still talking about a comprehensive declaration because we were dealing with the European countries as individual countries.

At the end of July, without, incidentally, discussing the

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matter with us, the Europeans decided that for the part that concerned economics they were going to attempt to use our initiative as a device to form European unity and to go for the first time in their experience through the exercise of developing a common political position.

So at that point, when the Europeans decided that some issues were going to be handled by the Nine and others were going to be handled by NATO, we agreed that the two could be split but would be signed essentially simultaneously so that their total effect would be in any event one common approach.

Then, having decided that we were going to do it on a common basis, it took the Europeans three months to develop a common declaration. And while it was a major achievement for them to get anything agreed to among nine countries, its content, in our view, did not reflect the difficulty of achieving a consensus and therefore it led to another set of negotiations.

This is the history as I see it. Now I know there were many criticisms made that we were trying to link together political, economic and military things and that that was not appropriate. The fact of the matter is that in practice they are linked, whether they are in two declarations or in one declaration. And the fact of the matter however, even more importantly, is we do not conceive these declarations as a means of blackmail on the Europeans. We do not conceive them as something that we can use in defining a legal obligation from which we can develop certain demands.

What we are trying to do is to see whether the free countries in totally changed conditions from those of the 1950's can define a future for themselves and can work cooperatively along these ranges of issues.

If we want a confrontation with the Europeans on economic matters, those of you who know Washington will be aware of the fact that we don't need a declaration. Our economic agencies are delighted to have a confrontation.

With a declaration, what we are trying to do is to have a long-term political objective which would put at rest all of these arguments: Is the United States planning a condominium with the Soviet Union, an argument that cannot be answered in the abstract.

We have told the Europeans, "For God's sake, let's sit down together. What is the world we are trying to bring about? We are willing to discuss with you what policies should be done unilaterally, what policies should be done jointly and we are willing to put our detente thinking before you and you put yours before us, and let's talk about it on that basis."

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All we want from these declarations is that they create the framework for it, not a legal dicker in which one side then produces a document as if we were going to court.

**QUESTION:** If the short answer then is that there aren't going to be any trade concessions --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are no short answers in my press conferences. (Laughter)

These guys have gotten totally out of control since I stopped briefing them. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** If the short answer is that there aren't going to be any trade concessions, how rapidly and at what pace will the Administration begin re-evaluating our military contribution to Europe?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am not saying the short answer is that there won't be any trade concessions, because there are negotiations going on within the GATT framework in which, of course, our trade bill will be an essential component, and we expect that there will be an agreement also on trade matters.

However, the new reality that has been created by the energy crisis, in terms of reserves and so forth, will force all countries to take a new look at their economic relationships. And I think it will make some of what you previously considered to be irritating competitive aspects seem somewhat less important and will make their solution somewhat easier.

**QUESTION:** Just a piece of detail. How many countries would you like to see involved as consumers and producers in any kind of group? To put it another way, how many will appeals be made to?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We will announce that next week. We are in the process of discussing it and it is one of the issues which the President has yet to decide. But we have a pretty clear idea already.

**QUESTION:** On the order of 20?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** In that general area.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the publication of Mr. Solzhenitsyn's book will have any effect on our detente with Russia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Our view about detente has never been geared to our approval of the Soviet domestic system. We have always maintained that we recognize that there is an important

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difference and, in many significant respects, incompatibility
between the Soviet domestic system and our system.

It did not indicate moral approval in any respect of the
Soviet system -- even less, of course, of the conditions
described in that book.

Our view about detente is produced by the horrors that a
nuclear war would inflict on mankind and therefore, the
obligation that is imposed on the leaders of all countries to do
their utmost to prevent such a catastrophe from arising.

This is why we are seeking to moderate Soviet foreign policy
conduct. This is why we believe it is essential for high-level
contact to be maintained, and easy communication between the
President and the rulers of the Soviet Union. And therefore,
while we have our own views of the conditions which are described
in this book, they do not obviate the necessities that I have
described.

**QUESTION:** Incidental to an earlier question about travel, is there a possibility, and if so how strong, of another visit by the President to the Soviet Union this coming year, and also one to Japan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There has been already an agreement in principle that the President would visit Japan this year and we believe that this is an agreement that can be carried out.

There has also been an agreement which was reached at the last
summit that the President would visit the Soviet Union this year,
and this, too, in fact we are planning for.

Now, the exact date of the visit to the Soviet Union will
depend on progress in negotiations which would justify Presidential
participation in meetings with the General Secretary, principally
SALT.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, can I follow up on the impeachment
question, which I don't think you answered the first time I asked
it. Do you think the President can be the leader of the free
world in pretty ambitious schemes to maintain economic stability
and world peace while he is under unprecedented attack at home and
fighting for the very Presidency here in the coming months?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that the President can do it
and I believe that his foreign policy will be recognized as valid
in the years ahead.

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**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, if I could follow on Pat's question, do you think it is possible that new foreign policy initiatives would be part of the President's defense on impeachment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The foreign policy of the United States, I think, will be seen to have been carried out in a consistent, responsible manner over the years, according to principles that have been laid down in annual foreign policy reports, and I believe that it will be recognized that the measures are conducted on their own merit and not for domestic reasons.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * * * * *

REMARKS BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
AT THE SWEARING-IN OF MR. HELMUT SONNENFELDT
AS COUNSELOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JANUARY 9, 1974

Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Marjorie, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am sorry that we could not accommodate everybody of the vast circle of acquaintances of your new Counselor. We had letters of regret from Gromyko, the Pope, Pompidou, Albert Spier and John Hemenway.

Our new Counselor has been called "Kissinger's Kissinger" and I only hope that he has read Lawrence Durrell when he wrote that they can conceive and then act. But I did not want to take any chances and so I have removed the man who has the world's record for being Under Secretary of Treasury presumptive from proximity to the President by either having him in the EOB or in the Treasury Department. Now I have warned Arthur Burns that his office overlooks the Federal Reserve Bank and another window I understand opens on Lincoln's Memorial. I won't worry about that until Hal starts growing a beard.

Hal has been perhaps my closest associate. It started on Inauguration Day in 1969 when I read in the newspapers what a brilliant staff I had assembled and I could hardly wait to make their acquaintance. Of course Hal and I had known before. I assembled the staff and wanted to hear what profundities they would utter. The first speaker was Hal Sonnenfeldt who wanted to know about his mess privileges and parking space. So for the record I want to say that Hal has access to the first floor cafeteria. I do not know the answer to the parking space problem yet.

But speaking seriously, there is no swearing-in ceremony that has given me more pleasure and very few that have given me as much as the one today. Hal and I have been friends for a long time, sometimes obscured by the severity of his criticism. But that is due to the fact that Hal is a perfectionist; and, as he said to me after the Moscow Summit meeting, "I got pretty good work out of you on this occasion." He was a close counselor in the White House and his advice was all the more valuable because of the friendship that we have had for each other for a very long time.

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I think that the old Greeks must have had Hal in mind when they said, "Happiness is the exercise of power in the direction of excellence in the lives affording it scope." His standards have been always high. He has made invaluable contributions to East-West relations, to SALT, to discussions on Mutual Force Reductions and to the whole philosophy of foreign policy. I know he will make a very great contribution here and I look forward to his role in the State Department with affection, anticipation, and a slight touch of fear.

REMARKS BY MR. HELMUT SONNENFELDT
AT HIS SWEARING-IN AS COUNSELOR
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JANUARY 9, 1974

Mr. Secretary, Secretary Shultz, Ladies and Gentlemen:

My much reputed intelligence system did not get a very
good line on your remarks here and since I didn't write
them myself on this occasion I am not exactly sure how to
respond. I hope you all noticed that another rumor that
I always move my lips when the Secretary speaks was not
true on this occasion either, but I do very much, of course,
appreciate your very generous remarks.

Mr. Secretary, I think perhaps your eloquence somewhat exceeded the bounds of credibility -- somewhat. I do want to take this occasion to raise a question in the spirit of our first formal meeting at the White House to which you so kindly referred and make note of the fact that I do not yet have an office. I had invited Secretary Lynn -- Is he here? -- to get some advice on high-density, low-income housing on the seventh floor. Obviously the demand quota -- a much used phrase -- the demand for space on the seventh floor in the last few months has exceeded the incentive of supply. But I hope this will be straightened out shortly.

Mr. Secretary, you referred to our association over
these past five years. They have been years in which old
assumptions became ripe for questioning and for very serious
and powerful review. They have been years in which many
lingering and painful problems were hopefully put behind us
and others under the President's and your guidance perhaps
brought closer to a solution. They have been years of
innovation and creativity, and I am honored and challenged
to be joining you again here in the Department now to
continue those endeavors in the areas in which you would
want me to assist you.

In thinking about the five years with you at the White
House and in being here on this occasion today, my mind
inevitably goes back some twenty-seven years when I first
came to work in the Department. That was in the era of
James Byrnes and then George Marshall as Secretary of State.
It was also a period in which old assumptions were challenged
and new assumptions created; which in many respects have
guided us over the years and which should be a model in their

clarity and distinction of thoughts for our present endeavors. It was the period also when the occupant of the office that I am about to enter on was a man to whom many of us paid our last tribute just a few days ago, Charles Bohlen. His example and that of the many other distinguished men inside and outside the career service that have occupied this office will be a constant guide to me in meeting the very exacting standards that you, Mr. Secretary, have set for service in this Department.

I look forward to working with all of you in this Department -- you notice I am not saying "the" Department; I will get back to that shortly -- and this Department and in all the other Departments and Agencies of the government over the period ahead we indeed have a very full agenda.

Thank you very much.

January 10, 1974

No. 14

#9

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM SIMON
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATOR

JANUARY 10, 1974

SECRETARY KISSINGER:

Well, I wanted to welcome His Majesty, the Energy Czar, to the State Department. We will do this press conference in two parts. I will talk about the foreign policy aspects of the President's letter to the consumer nations and also to the OPEC members, and Mr. Simon will discuss the relationship of this initiative to the domestic energy concerns, and we will both take questions on that subject. Then, at an appropriate point, we will switch to other foreign policy subjects which I alone will answer, Mr. Simon. [Laughter.]

MR. SIMON: I can understand that, because at the appropriate time, Mr. Secretary, you will press a

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2

button and I will disappear into the ground. [Laughter.]

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So, let me discuss the philosophy and intention behind the letters which the President has sent yesterday to the consuming nations, as well as to the members of OPEC.

It is the President's conviction that the energy crisis reflects a basic problem for the entire international community for the foreseeable future, that today concerns energy, but that in the future may concern other raw materials or foodstuffs where incentives for supply are out of proportion to the demand.

We face two major problems in connection with energy.

One is that demand has far outstripped incentives for supply. The second is that the rise in prices that has been decided upon by the OPEC countries recently, and the pattern that may be established as a result of this, may have a revolutionary impact on the world economy, affecting balance of payments of all of the advanced as well as the less developed consuming nations, and creating a situation in which the producing nations as well can become victims of their own actions, and in which there exists as of this moment no framework in which comprehensive long-range

3

decisions can be taken.

If anything was needed to illustrate the inter-
dependence of nations in this world, it is what has happened
in the field of energy.

No single country is capable of solving the problem
by itself. Indeed, no group of countries as between con-
sumers and producers can solve the problem by themselves.
And therefore we feel very strongly that what the President
has proposed should not be seen as a confrontation between
consumers and producers; rather it should be seen as creating
a framework within which decisions can be taken by both
consumers and producers that take into account the long-term
necessities of both sides, and that can assure a constructive
evolution of the world economy and of international relations,
and can prevent certain very dangerous and potentially
catastrophic consequences.

We are proposing to proceed in two or three
stages.

The invitation to the Foreign Ministers Conference
on February 11th was addressed to the nations comprising
the high level oil committee of the OECD. They are the
nations that import 75 to 80 percent of the world's energy
imports. They are the nations that have worked together

4

on that committee to take certain emergency measures.

The President has proposed that the meeting be moved to the Foreign Ministers level, because the issues that have been raised, both on the supply side as well as by the increase in prices, now far transcend the technical issues that are normally involved in simply allocating available energy sources.

However, we view this meeting as a prelude to a discussion with other consuming nations, especially consuming nations from the less developed parts of the world, who have been even more profoundly affected in terms of their capacities by the recent price rises than the developed nations. Our estimate is that their bill may approach $30 billion, which, of course, far exceeds any of the aid flows that anyone has ever projected, and indeed makes the whole international aid program a problematical and different exercise compared to the additional exactions that have been imposed on these countries.

And we will move from there, with the agreement, of course, of the countries concerned, to a meeting between consumer nations, both developed and less developed nations, and the producing nations, in order to assess and to develop a pattern of supply that is just to the concerns of all of

PR #14

countries concerned, that will produce prices that are
sustainable over an indefinite future, and that will discuss
the impact on the world economy in which all of these
nations will live, of the energy needs on a global scale.

At the meeting of the consumers, the first task
will have to be to see whether we can come to an agreement
about the nature of the problem that is facing us -- whether
the consuming nations can agree between themselves about
the impact of the supply situation on their economies, and
the necessities that are produced for all of their economies
by the prices that now exist.

We believe it is important that we will discuss
together alternative sources of energy, efforts to pool the
research and development efforts of the major consuming
countries, and attempts to share between the major consuming
countries the energy sources that become available as a
result of these efforts.

Therefore we believe that it may be appropriate
that working groups be formed to study these problems,
as well as the international economic problems that are
raised by the present patterns. And Secretary Shultz
will raise some of these issues at the C-20 meetings that

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he is attending in Rome next week.

Now, we are aware of the fact that there are
temptations towards bilateral arrangements. And we, of
course, are in the best position of any consuming country
to engage in bilateral efforts on our own. We have sub-
stantial sources of energy in our own country. We have
large capabilities for research and development. And we
are in possession of much of the advanced technology that
is necessary in exploring the sea beds, for example.

Nevertheless, we believe that unrestricted bilateral
competition will be ruinous for all of the countries con-
cerned, and that the seeming victories that can be achieved
will be at the cost of world stability and of the world
economy. And therefore, even though we are well placed in
this competition, and even though we have the capability
to withstand it better than any potential competitor, we
believe that it is essential for all of the developed countries
to understand that we are now truly interdependent, and
that it is a problem that must be solved on a common basis
if we are not going to suffer very severe consequences
for international stability and for the international
economy.

PR 114

We also, in the developed nations, have a special
obligation towards the consuming developing nations, so
that as a result of the situation that has developed so
suddenly, the hard-won gains of 20 years of effort are not
dissipated, and the international efforts to bring about
a greater equality between the developed and less developed
nations are not destroyed as a result of decisions that
certainly did not take all the consequences into account.

So, as far as the consuming nations are concerned,
the energy situation, and what it portends for the future,
will be a test of the whole approach towards the international
system that we and other developing nations have pursued,
and other developed nations have pursued towards each other,
and towards developing nations for the last 25 years.

It is a test of the proposition that the world
has become truly interdependent, and that isolation and
selfish approaches must be destructive for all concerned.

As for the relations between the consuming and
the producing nations -- the same is essentially true.
In the framework that now exists, the producing nations
have no alternative except to maximize their short-term
benefits. There does not exist a framework in which they
can assess the impact on them of the changes in the economies

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8

of the developed nations that are produced by the producing nations. And therefore, the evolution that the President is proposing, which seeks a greater understanding by the consuming nations of the whole range of their energy concerns, as well as of the impact on energy needs on their economies, provides also a framework within which the producing nations can guarantee to themselves the international stability within which alone the seeming benefits that they are gaining can be maintained.

The basic conviction of the President and of his associates is that it is a problem of truly global significance, in which selfish advantages cannot be attained, or if attained, cannot be sustained, either among consuming nations or between consuming and producing nations. It is in this spirit that the United States will make its proposals, first at the meeting on February 11th, and at the subsequent meetings that will, we hope, flow from that, and it will be in a spirit that we are constructing a solution for all of mankind, and not of particular benefit to any one segment of it, that the President has addressed both the consuming and the producing nations to start a process which we hope will provide long-term answers to the problem of supply, as well as to the problems of the economy.

9

Now, Bill, would you like to talk about the
domestic side?

MR. SIMON: Basically, the energy policy of the United States, domestic as well as international, can be broken down into five parts.

From the domestic side, number one, we must establish a new energy ethic. We must reduce demand in this country, as you have all often heard me say. With a nation that has six percent of the world's population and consumes 35 percent of the world's energy, we have been a nation of great energy wastrels. There is great waste in our consumption. This must be reduced. We must have this change in life-styles that I have spoken about so often.

A new government relationship must be forged with the domestic as well as international energy problem and energy industries. We must create this agency in government that brings together for the first time all components of energy under one roof, so that we can more effectively deal with this problem.

Fourth, and most important, is what we like to call Project Independence. The energy problem, as far as the United States is concerned, is the most infinitely soluble problem in our country today. We have been blessed

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10

with a super-abundance of natural resources and technology.
We have the ability to become self-sufficient. We are today
domestically 85 percent self-sufficient in energy -- that
other 15 percent is going to be achieved over the next
decade to decade-and-a-half.

And finally, this dovetails with what Secretary
Kissinger has been explaining, international cooperation.

Our domestic goals are completely compatible
with our international role of reducing demand, of the
apportionment of critically short supplies, not only during
short-term emergencies, such as this, but to deal with the
long-term energy problem. And this problem is not going
to go away, domestically or internationally, even after
the embargo is lifted. This has been a problem that you
have been warned about for years in the United States. The
embargo is what brought it home. Demand continues to rise
at 4 to 5 percent domestically. Our production peaked in
1970. Our exploration peaked in 1956. We have to get about
the regeneration of our coal industry domestically, the
utilization of oil shale -- a Manhattan-type project, or
comparable to the synthetic rubber experience during
World War II, to utilize the imagination, technology, and
just great thrust of this free enterprise system.

11

Our technology -- we must work with other nations
of the world in sharing our technology, the development
with them of alternate sources of energy.

And, finally, world oil prices. Obviously, we
must deal with these world oil prices, because the long-
term interests of the world are best served by a world econ-
omy that is healthy.

I look forward to working with my colleagues in
the State Department, in moving forward with the rest of
the world, in solving this very difficult problem.

Thank you.

12

(lc)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I can just add one point to what Mr. Simon said. As the United States achieves self-sufficiency in energy, and in time surplus, we are prepared, as part of these discussions with the other consuming nations, as well as with any other interested nation, to discuss sharing our energy sources, as they develop over the long-term future, and above all to share the research and development efforts.

Q Mr. Simon and Mr. Secretary, to deal with the present hard situation, the oil price squeeze, to what extent do you think the oil companies themselves have created a fanciful situation? Should they be implicated in our minds with the problems we are under-going? I have heard no mention from either of you about the role of the oil companies in the future. How about the present, though? Is this oil squeeze some of their doing?

MR. SIMON: Actually, you did hear me allude in one of my five parts, as far as our energy policy is concerned, and that was the second part, the new government relationship that is going to be forged -- that we are going to have to take a brand new look at

13

what the government role is to be, internationally as
well as domestically, in our energy industry.

Q Are you including pricing, sir?

MR. SIMON: I would include pricing. I would
include government negotiation versus the way it is done
now, in a company to government manner. I would not
preclude looking at absolutely everything, but would not
give you any final solution today until we forge this new
role that government is going to hold. Industry and
government cooperation to bring on the alternate sources
of energy. There are many things that must be done.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Peter.

Q How do both of you reconcile the
statements of the President with what you have just said?
The President said that we must become self-sufficient.
And I think you, Mr. Simon, have said it often -- you have
just said it -- so that we would not be subject to blackmail
from foreign sources or dependent upon foreign sources.
Secretary Kissinger says we are a world that is truly
interdependent and we can't solve this problem alone.

14

(wc)

Now, how do you reconcile those two views?

MR. SIMON: Well, that basically -- Mr. Secretary, would you like to start? (Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We can solve probably the immediate problem of energy by a unilateral effort, although it would still leave a gap of about five to ten years in which this fifteen percent shortage of which Mr. Simon spoke would exist. So when the President speaks of achieving independence, he is talking about the late seventies, early eighties. He is not talking of any short-term future.

Secondly, as I indicated in my presentation, we could probably achieve, even in the period between 1970 and 1980, a preferential position for ourselves by an exercise of bilateral diplomacy, using the strength of our economy and our political strength to achieve a preferred position with respect to energy. And it could be that we will be driven to this. But the intent to do so would heighten the difficulties of all other consuming nations in this interim period. And therefore we believe that as we achieve greater independence with respect to energy, we must let the other nations participate in this

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effort.

The problem of bringing in new sources of energy, expanding our research and development, is not an effort which we should conduct, if we have a choice, entirely by ourselves.

And therefore, while we can in time become independent, our preferred course would be to use our technological capability, to help solve the problems on a common basis, because if the economies of other nations -- if one looks at the statistics, for example, of the impact on the balance of payments of other developed countries of the price rises, they have a really revolutionary impact for the other countries; they have a relatively less decisive impact on us.

Nevertheless, if the economies of other countries are weakened, in time the world economy will suffer. And therefore, we may bring about a situation in which it will be demonstrated that no nation can prosper in isolation.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you have any hope that by the time the conference begins on February 11 there will be any resumption of Arab oil deliveries, and

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what effect, if that were to take place, would that have
on the conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You, ladies and gentlemen
know that we have a firm policy in this building, at least,
not to put any deadlines on our expectation with respect
to the embargo. Nevertheless, the problem that I have
described here is essentially independent of the embargo.
Even if there had been no embargo, the problem would have
existed on both levels that I have indicated. It would
have existed on the level of supply, because unless the
producing nations increase their production, there would
have been a shortfall in any event, and it would, of course,
have existed on the level of price, independent of the
embargo.

So what we are proposing here is not a device
to get the embargo ended -- but of course it remains
our strong conviction that the embargo is becoming
increasingly inappropriate, and it is a matter that should
be considered seriously by those countries imposing it.
But this is not the purpose of these conferences.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there has been a
situation described here today in which we are in
the United States 85 percent self-sufficient, and we

17

have other countries, our allies, that are 80 percent
dependent on foreign sources of oil. Is the United
States prepared to start sharing now, before this conference
begins, in order to discourage efforts at bilateral deals?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The conference is proposed
for February 11 or any other convenient day in that week.
We will put before those nations, the nations that have been
invited, and before all other interested nations, our ideas
as to the long-term evolution of the energy situation.
The purpose of this conference is not to prevent nations
between now and February 11 to make bilateral deals.
The argument with respect to bilateral deals is a more
fundamental one than the immediate situation. It has
to do with the impact on everybody of unrestricted
competition once it is unleashed.

Do you want to say something?

Q Mr. Secretary, could you elaborate, sir,
on your statement at the outset of your presentation,
that there may be shortages in other commodities? Was
this a reference to food?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One looks ahead over
the next ten to fifteen years. It is conceivable, though

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not in such an acute form, that other raw materials may
become scarce in relation to demand, and we saw temporarily
some pressure on the food situation last year. I think
it behooves all nations to take a look at their long-term
problems so that we can deal thoughtfully with them before
they become acute.

Now, as you know, we have proposed a world food
conference which will address itself to these issues.
And we have started, within our government, a study
of what may happen with respect to other commodities over
the next ten years. And if our conclusions should lead
us to the view that a repetition of some of these
difficulties could arise, we hope to make proposals
at an early time.

Q Mr. Secretary, since the Eastern Europeans
have not been invited --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have to understand
the system by which this works, where one points to one
person and --

Q Oh, were you looking at somebody else?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it's my glasses.

(Laughter)

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Q Since the Eastern European countries have not been invited, how will this conference have an impact -- what will be the impact of this conference on detente with the Soviet Union? Two, aren't we getting into the position of 1947-1948 when the Marshall Plan was launched that precipitated in some form the Cold War? And three, perhaps you can say what will be the impact of the conference on countries which are not invited at present but have hopes for entry? I mean how will they get in?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the East European countries, it is our understanding that the socialist countries of Eastern Europe are substantially self-sufficient as of this moment through their cooperative arrangements. We see no reason why this should produce in any sense the Cold War, or a resumption of the Cold War, because there is no stretch of the imagination by which this could be construed as directed against the Soviet Union or against any other group of nations. It is an attempt to produce a common solution.

Secondly, with respect to the participation of other countries -- we are prepared, for example, if the European Community should feel that all its members