TELCORN

S. Alsop/Kissinger

3:02 p.m.

1/26/72

AX

K: Where have you been?

A: Killing innoeent little birds with Jock Whitney in Ga. and interviewing Geo. Wallace. I wonder if you remember the lunch I had with a reconstruction and it was pretty accurate. You said when the story broke you would fill me in.

K: I don't know how much more I want to say. Were you at the briefing this morning?

A: No. By whom?

K: By whom? me. You can read the transcript. I explained evaluation of the position. 8 points and why so complicated. One reason is we are following their sequence and proposal leaving out one on reparations which we will do separately.

A: And not cut SVN off at the knees.

K: Not join our enemy in overthrowing friends and doing for the enemy what he cannot do himself.

A: And will I not do. It will be most embarrassing for a front running Democratic candidate to run on this.

K: If he wants to, let him. It's the position he is in. I like having lunch with you and I might get a favorable column.

A: You have had plenty.

: Let's have lunch. Let's see what more that can be said. Early next week?

: Whatever you say.

: We will suggest a time. Next week.

: I will be writing about Geo. Wallace this week and if I want to write about this will need a handle.

: What you do can be next week. You feel fine?

: I feel fine. In full feather. Have lunch with you early next week.

TELCONE
Sisco/Kissinger

3:08 p. m. 1/26/72

S: I wanted to catch you before going to Paris again. I need your help. I would like to see you for 10-15 mins. off the record tomorrow.

K: I will call you.

S: I will come to your house in the morning and ride in with you. I need your help on the Middle East and you will see the situation and only you can do it.

K: We have proved we can keep a secret.

S: Looking forward to tonight.

K: It's only 10 mins.

S: Make it good.

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

1/26/72 3:15 p.m.

HK: I'm sorry I had to do it to you. What I told you was true . . .

DK: But I wind up with my ass naked.

HK: Only because you are smarter than anybody else and suspected something. It would be like asking you what your sources are. I just couldn't talk about it.

DK: Then you should say you can't discuss it with me. I look like a damn fool.

HK: I was wrong, but I would be glad to call you . . .

DK: You don't need to call anybody. They can see how sensitive this was. But I wish you could have given me some guidance.

HK: But that was what I didn't feel like doing. This was before the Brooke thing.

DK: I felt it in my gut; I just felt it.

HK: You were literally the only senior journalist who did.

DK: But Brooke and Scott turned out to be wrong.

HK: What I steered you away from was accurate.

DK: But I also mentioned the Porter thing as

HK: But that really had little to do with it. That wasn't directly related. I told you the technical truth but a substantive inaccuracy.

DK: I wonder what happens to our project.

HK: I owe you something. Let's talk about it on Friday.

DK: I'm more interested in China now. Doesn't Hanoi appear to be behaving as if it was the upper hand and can therefore hang tough.

HK: My own judgment -- and this is absolutely unattributable -- there is a high probability that they will negotiate and on something like this proposal. It would be uncharacteristic for them to leave a proposal like this on the table. They never have when they wanted to close the book on something. I think they will shoot their wad.

EMX DK: Militarily?

HK: Yes, and if it fails, but in a position of demonstrated -- maybe exaggerated strength . . . They may figure they may negotiate later this year.

F.O. 1400 8-73
06/07/84 FD

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

1/26/72 3:15 p.m. p. 2

DK: But first they want to shoot their wad.

HK: In '68 when Tet hit, you ask ~~people~~ people who talked with me, I said this means a negotiation. In '67 they didn't wipe the table off with that either.

DK: They may want to get their ______ out of the way as a prelude to negotiation.

HK: That's right. What they may be doing... it would be very odd for them not to turn a proposal down. It has never happened. Now they may.

DK: They have.

HK: It would not have been turned down ~~that~~ had we not surfaced it. In every secret contact I have had with them they always made a formal turndown, except in October of 1967 and then they settled on what I proposed a year later in effects.

DK: You think they felt they would win militarily?

HK: Or make clear... In this case this is even more important for them. If it comes to a political contest, they have to ~~play~~ prove that they are a major political force in the country. If they do it in a position where they haven't done anything in three years... If they don't want to negotiate, it's much better for them to have a series of high points this year and then next year either have a Democrat in office who will get out, or have us back but with such a reduced chance to be able to do what they are doing now.

DK: ... to topple Thieu and second, failing that, to demonstrate force.

HK: To make clear they seem the stronger of the two parties if not decisively.

DK: When do you anticipate this whallop?

HK: February or March.

DK: As big as Tet?

HK: Not as big...

DK: What will we do?

HK: Bomb the sons of bitches back into the stone age.

DK: Seriously.

01-05-1972 10:30

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

1/26/72 3:15 p.m. p. 3

HK: There will be setbacks. The question is how calm and wise our people are going to be. I think there's a better than even chance to get the thing settled this year.

DK: But first we have got to go through the agony.

HK: But we have put it in the open to see if we can avoid the agony or at least have people understand it isn't caused by the determination of a military victory.

DK: ... if the whallop comes, it would entail a serious stepup in bombing on our part?

HK: It depends on where it is.

DK: But it's possible?

HK: I don't want to speculate on that. You followed these negotiations and when all the smoke has cleared any fair minded person has to say we have gone practically to the limit of what is possible.

TELECON

The President

1/26/72 3:25 p.m.

P: I know you are going out. I just wanted to say briefly, I had a good idea about your briefing. You answered every question, and so rather than sending it around in a gob I would like to have Safire or Buchanan put it all in question and answer from answering the questions and send it to the Cabinet leaders.

K: I think that's a good idea.

P: You see what I mean?

K: Yes, and I think it's excellent.

P: Okay, I have ordered it done, but I wanted to be sure you knew I had done it.

K: Excellent.

P: Okay. How is everything on your speech?

K: I think okay.

P: You'll knock them dead.

K: I think the reactions are good.

P: On yesterday, have you had any calls?

K: Oh yes. And I was at Sans Souci and two newsmen came up to me and said it was good, and they don't ever do that.

P: Good newsmen?

K: Yes and they don't do that.

P: At the restaurant too?

K: Yes, there too.

P: I think think it came out better than we had a right to hope. One other thing, when you are talking to people, they will want to know how we worked on it. From a color standpoint don't you think that the fact that I personally worked on it during the preparation for the State of the Union would be a good idea?

K: I think so.

P: Haven't you felt the reaction was outstanding.

TELECON
The President
1/26/72 3:25 p.m. p. 2

K: Far beyond what I thought. I thought our opponents would concentrate on us immediately.

P: One question. On the question of the POW pullout, they will never offer it. They want to keep them for more than a pullout, isn't that right?

K: Yes, but I think if we offer it, Laos and Cambodia will collapse.

P: Psychologically?

K: Yes.

P: On the other hand, we would be prepared in case they did offer it.

K: But they won't.

P: We have to pray to God they don't. But we are in a position if they do. Well good luck on your speech Henry. I have now given you your 30 minutes of hell for today.

TELECON

Ben Bradlee

1/26/72 4:00 p.m.

B: We are making each other famous.

K: You are making me famous; what have I done for you?

B: Didn't you say at the briefing something about Bradlee and Maxine?

K: That's right.

B: You're on a hot streak.

K: I'm just trying to come up for air.

B: I'll bet you are.

K: I heard you say to Kay that you were finding out what your medical situation is on Saturday.

B: Oh, I'm fine. I'm tense. Blood pressure 120 over 78. The only thing is my heart beats quite loud. But that's better than not beating. I have the normal amount plus since June, starting with the Pentagon papers, press backgrounders, people being away here and Kay looking for new . . .

K: You fight your share of the battles.

B: Yes, a lower profile would be better.

K: You want to have lunch next week?

B: Yes. I turned down Zorza. I figures he was using you to get to me and vice versa.

K: That's why I thought it was rather silly. I told my people to turn it down. We don't have to go to Zorza to get together.

B: What about Tuesday for lunch? Are you free?

K: Tuesday or Wednesday.

B: Both.

K: Let's say Wednesday.

B: Where?

K: Madison, Sans Souci.

01-10-72 10:00:00

TELCON
Safire/Kissinger
4:14 p.m. 1/26/72

K: Another question. If I want to read what I have as the communique and do only under duress -- if Church has stolen a lot of lines -- instead of saying it's a communique because that is absurd.- Say this is a ______ and both exchange gifts which were ticking.

S: The whole thing bothers me. What's humorous to us may not be taken with a grain of salt overseas. May object to it. Don't want to harm possibility of negotiation in joking around.

K: What about *Six Crises* book?

S: It's respectable and will get a laugh. I didn't want to articulate this the other day.

K: I should have told you before. I think that speech apart from content was a superb job of draftsmanship. Frankly, I didn't realize it was that good until I heard it. You get so used to the danm thing.

S: What carried the speech was not rhetoric but it was the substance.

K: American public are crackers for secret meetings.

S: I haven't gotten back because I am in this Q&A thing.

K: It doesn't have to be done today.

S: The word I have is the President wants us to work today and night. I will get back to you. Don't use the communique. It could be criticized. I will be there with a bag on secret trips.

: OK. Before 6:00. Good.

DEC 22 1972 9:00AM

TELCON

J. Alsop/Kissinger

5:20 p.m

1/26/72

A: Unless you have a lot of glorious gossip on this I will wait until later. I have written a column.

K: Be merciful.

A: I have given you all the support I can.

K: You are too bright. Everyone thinks I gave you information.

A: I sent a memo to the Director of the CIA adx which almost caused him to fall off his chair. I asked which statements of the speech made the Secy. look like a quince. I was watching him.

K: No cracks at State.

A: No. Nothing. I have omitted the State Dept. It takes a lot of guts for the President to take criticism when all along he was doing what the Democrats said he should and doing it privately.

K: We are in a position that all that's left is surrender and that's all that's left.

A: What about Friday morning?

K: I am snowed. I will call you tomorrow.

A: Let's plan on breakfast on Frid.

K: I cannot do that. How about Sat. ?

A: I have to write for Monday on Friday. Perhaps on Friday afternoon. is here on the 3rd and 4th.

K: I like her.

A: She wants a dinner party with you on the 3rd.

K: I think I can make it. About 8:30?

A: Let's aim for 8:15. Hopelessly. I wrote Nancy Magginnes that I bitterly object that she is used as a cover all the time. It's most unchivalrous.

K: It's ruined my reputation. Everyone thinks when I disappare it is for an assignation and it is not at all.

A: It's an assignation with a NVN man. I hope to see you Friday.

01 12/24/72
GEO-1241-1D

TELCON
Rabin/Kissinger

5:40 p.m.

1/26/72

R: Just to Congratulate. It was really a masterpeice and well kept secret in U.S.

K: The only thing it is done is destroyed my reputation. Everytime I was away for a weekend everyone thought I was doing something more exciting.

R: Exciting and business together.

K: The directive has been transmitted.

R: There's a change. I was told yesterday no problem with continuation with technical talk even though I ______ until today. That's fine.

K: On the other basis string along a few days and if no satisfaction, go along line we discussed.

R: We are trying to change from prior agreement to prior understanding.

K: I am seeing Dobrynin on Friday. Can you hold for final decision until then?

R: No problem. It's only on ______ of Joe Sisco. We had a very unpleasant talk on the phone. No problem. After the talk in the morning to drag it until Friday (is no problem.).

K: Tell your friends in Jerusalem to have a little more faith.

R: No problem there especially after what you said was the right one.

K: We don't make promises we cannot keep.

R: The PM asked me to say she thanks you more than she can express.

K: I admire her and it's in mutual interest. I have to go study my speech.

R: I will hear you. I will drag it. If he tries to put an end to talks, I will call you.

K: He won't dare. It's a plan we have planned carefully and everyone in this building is aborad.

TELECON

Dan Rather
1/26/72 5:45 p.m.

R: One question, which comes from Walter Cronkite. Did Wilford Burchette
have anything to do with . . .

K: No, nothing whatsoever. There was only one and it had nothing to do
with it directly, indirectly, in any way whatsoever.

R: Okay. Thank you.

TELECON

Phyllis Cerf

1/26/72 late p.m.

K: Will I see you at the dinner?

C: I hope so.

K: What table are you at?

C: 19, with Mr. and Mrs. Dickerson.

K: When will I see you? You want to sort of hang around near the door and I'll definitely find you?

C: I'll find you.

K: Or you can come up to wherever I am standing.

C: If the Secret Service doesn't keep me away.

K: No, the secret dream of the Secret Service is in a situation in which they are not responsible. I would sort of disappear. They don't like the hours I keep.

C: What about tomorrow?

K: 6:30 or so you, Freddy and Charlotte should come here. We can go to the TODAY reception around 6:45. Then go to the theater and . . .

C: And then dinner, there I am told.

K: Right. I must warn you, there's no way for me to go to a cocktail party without everyone with me getting into the papers.

C: Naturally. You and Charlotte will be the item of the year. Maybe you should come back here tonight and have a drink afterward. You think that is a good idea?

K: Yes, that's a good idea. Unless there's something going on here.

C: I'll set up the drinks and we'll play it loose.

K: Okay, you come up to the head table.

C: Or we'll get a note to you if they won't let us come up to the head table.

K: They'll let you. If you don't get up there, then near the door and if all that fails, I will call you at the Shoreham.

FEB 26 1972
DEC 22 1972

TELECON

Rowland Evans

1/26/72 late p.m.

E: That was a great speech. One question -- on the reason for the timing, can you tell me strictly not for attribution, did they know in Peking what's going on?

K: That I can't talk about.

E: It occurred to me this was one factor and an important one.

K: Certainly a contributing one.

E: That's all I wanted. You getting a good reaction?

K: I think so. People are not looking for things that are wrong with it. I think we have gone the limit.

E: Without surrender. You gave every Republican candidate something to talk about. You think the Russians have been filled in by Hanoi on this?

K: I just don't know.

E: What's your guess?

K: Partially.

K: I've got an hour to write something.

K: When will you be back?

E: Friday night.

K: I gave a long briefing on the record today.

E: I can't get that here.

K: But you are not off base.

E: Have you seen much speculation on that Peking angle?

K: No.

E: Well, congratulations Henry. I watched that on television with 6 legislators in Sacramento last night -- it made a hell of an impact.

K: Aren't you nice.

KX

TELECON

Towland Evans
1/26/72 late p.m. p. 2

E: You must have had a time! Christ! I read a very delightful piece you would like to read by Malvina Lindsay about you. Two women who interviewed you in your office.

K: What were their names?

E: Malvina Lindsay is one and another girl with whom she has a column; I'll send it to you.

TELCONE
Bill Moyers/Kissinger

early afternoon 1/26/72

M: I heard you were so tremendous that I thought you might be sex wanting to go on public TV

K: Can't repeat them.

M: Maybe on tape and you move your lips.

K: I feel very strongly about this subject.

M: Glad to see you are doing this not on deep background. You were digging a hole.

K: When I did deep background it was to sexx spare State Dept. sensitivities. And itxex there is no WH spokesman by me.

M: Why can't you film?

K: That's the next issue.

M: I would like to put you on sexx tonight.

K: Tonight they won't. There's no one with whom I would rather. It's been much too long since I have seen you. Don't you come down?

M: Rarely.

K: Come for a lunch sometime.

M: How did it go this morning?

K: It went well. I will send you a transcript.

M: Our fellow will pick one up.

K: I tried to put before them a most honest account of why we did what we did. I would like your private judgment on how we could do more then surrender.

M: Ask the President if we can't use the same ground rules on film. He doesn't realize how you are missing people.

K: He said he was sorry about not having the TV there today.

M: Why don't you ask him about it.

K: I will call you in half an hour.

TELCON
Ray Price/Kissinger

late afternoon

1/26/72

K: Just wanted to check if you can do something on it.

P: I think so. I am working on it now.

K: Not that you are finished. Either something you threw up your hands on in such perfect condition that it needs no other.

P: What's the thesis?

K: Say, look, this isn't something that concerns a party or measured in terms of communication. What we need is, indeed, peace among ourselves as individuals. Conciliatory. The same theme you had in that beautiful paragraph. Same sort of mood. Discover ourselves. Today this war transcends either our divisions or tactical achievements next year. I know I am not saying it yet.

P: What will proceed this?

K: All light. A series of heavy Teutonic jokes. A group on Anderson papers and a group on China.

TELCON

Hugh Sidey/Kissinger

afternoon

1/26/72

S: We will have to dedicate this magazine to you. I think your briefing answers all substantive questions I have. We are closing the magazine this afternoon for next Monday.

K: You don't control the captions of the story.

S: They weren't bad. A charming story.

K: Brought out Maxine Cheshire stuff about Judy Brown.

S: All they had was business on dinner. That going along with revelations last night that makes you the complete James Bond. What I am <u>REHEARSING</u> confronted with is trying to get a story ______. You answered all the substantive. Any more of the mood? Details of meeting <u>MAX</u> room or excuses you gave for absences from here? That I need not attribute to anyone.

K: A small suburban home in the working class district of Paris. We <u>REHEARSE</u> met in the living room in the early meetings. Each delegation on either side of the room. After May 31 others were around a green table. In an adjoining room. The dining room. Meetings lasted about 4-5 hours. Break after 2 hours. <u>SMALL</u> talk and then they would withdraw after awhile to prepare reply. Personal relationships pleasant.

S: Did you eat there?

K: No meals, but served snacks. VN food. Fish wrapped in that awful stuff.

S: Interpretation all the way.

K: Yes.

S: Right there and returned.

K: Arrived night before, meeting in the morning and leave after the meeting. Gone from here two days. Grueling.

S: Leave mostly from Washington?

K: Often.

S: Your presence was in Washington as far as people knew.

K: I may get married some day and I will not be able to cheat on my wife if I tell you my maneuvers.

S: People thought you were in the office?

OCTOBER 31, 1972

JANUARY 1, 1973

H. Sidey/Kissinger
afternoon 1/26/72

-2-

K: Sometimes or out of town. Usually on Sat. morning.

S: What kind of cars?

K: French rented cars.

S: Plain? Did French handle that?

K: No, we did.

S: Any other side lights?

K: The thing on the world trip -- I was more proud of getting to see Le Duc Tho
undetected then getting into Peking.

S: They saw you at dinner?

K: After I had met with them for 4 hours.

S: What kind of cars?

K: Peugots.

S: Any special dress?

K: Bavarian pants.

S: Liederhosen! Did you part in front of the house?

K: I don't want to go into detail.

S: Not too difficult.

K: To go to Paris and stay overnight was not easy.

S: Where you stayed and meeting place were different?

K: Right.

S: Two places.

K: Airport to where I was staying and then from there to meeting place. Quite a
distance to go.

S: Any pictures on the walls -- Pompidou?

K: Simple, middle class.

DEC 26 1972

TELECON

Kitty Carlisle

1/27/72 9:25 a.m.

K: I want to be a leading man.

C: I can fix it for you.

K: Can you tell me how you are?

C: Yes. It was just great that line about trying to commit suicide after you have been assassinated -- it was great. You had a bad time though.

K: I got cicked around.

C: It was just awful.

K: Yes, but it's been a miracle that it didn't happen earlier.

C: You said it would be three months...

K: My father fixes the critics.

C: What does he do?

K: He takes them out of the clipping book. They are non-persons. He takes them out of the book -- that's it.

C: That's the way it is with reviews. When are you off?

K: Middle of February.

C: Maybe I'll see you before then.

K: When you come anywhere near Washington and if you can afford to be seen with a Republican, let me know.

C: I will/

TELECON

Sec. Rogers

1/27/72 10:10 a.m.

K: Two things: we are talking to Ted Eliot about it. We will do no more briefing here on this proposal. If by chance passle of other things being done here it comes up, we'll call and let you know. In other words, it's the State Department's responsibility now to handle it.

R: Good.

K: Second, apparently some Democrats are saying the cease-fire is a trick we put in there meaning we are not serious because they won't accept it. The answer is the cease-fire in the President's plan is point 7 in the Vietnamese plan and has put in by them. I think that is a crushing reply, don't you?

R: I do. Point 7?

K: 7 in theirs but 6 in ours. Our plan follows theirs point by point. We just took out reparations.

R: I am trying to stick to the fundamentals with this group particularly.

K: But just say this is point 7 of the North Vietnamese plan. We didn't put it in. They never said what Clifford is saying -- that the cease-fire makes it a fraud.

R: If I can, it seems to me that what we want to do now is hit the upbeat note. Compliment Mansfield.

K: That's right.

R: Developing into a national concensus and that's why the President did it, so the American people would understand. Emphasis should be on the upbeat.

K: That's right. The President wonders whether Marshall Green or Bill Sullivan couldn't write some letter to the Washington Post about their editorial saying here are the new elements in our proposal.

R: Wasn't that a nasty editorial?

K: Yes. Do you think they could?

R: Sure.

K: I'll get over a little sheet to them about what the new elements are.

DEC 24 1972 10:10

TELCOM
Safire/Kissinger

10:18 p a.m. 1/27/72

K: You made the God damn speech.

S: Word around town is that your serious piece was the highlight of the evening. Such good text and sensitivities and depth. They were really moved.

K: Church set it up with partisan attacks.

S: A little dirty which is wrong for that audience. So in particular it was because it was in good taste. Rose Woods said what good taste. The serious part was high light of the evening. That's what will be quoted in Newsweek.

K: Will it?

S: If I have anything to say with Hubbard, Elfin and ______!

K: The jokes were much better than his.

S: You could handle the humor.

K: They had 5 mins. on CBS and also on TODAY show.

S: This week is Kissinger week. You have come back like a ton of bricks.

K: Thanks to your help and support.

S: It was the anguish of the soul. The only help I had was finding that quote.

K: It gave it an end.

EC 1/27/72 7:30 a.m.

TELCOM

Atty. Gen. /Kissinger
10:22 a.m. 1/27/72

K: I was ok sorry I couldn't talk with you last night. I was going up to the head table in the National Press Club. Was it urgent?

AG: Not at all. What -- I had no idea where you were. Graham Martin is here as you probably know. In view of work he is doing there and his charisma aspects --

K: He should see the President. I will do my damndest. He is our guy.

AG: Will not take a lot of time. Just ok needs the touch so they know over there what his stock is.

EC 1/20/72 7:36
01:00:01 1/27/72

TELCON

Joe Kraft/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 1/27/72

HK: I have found a way of finding a category here where there is a chance and want you to know that prospects here are now brighter than last week.

JK: Delighted to hear that.

HK: May I please say one thing? Today your article is for the first time one that does not show understanding. Before when critical you had a finger on the nerve, but your criticism of proposal doesn't understand. Our outline follows point by point the VN one. Did you see the briefing?

JK: No, I had to write.

HK: You must read the one yesterday. It's on the record and give detailed account of it. The ceasefire is point 7 of their 9 points. Slightly different language.

JK: I was careful to couple ceasefire with withdrawal.

HK: It's not mutual withdrawal. Our withdrawal is a formulation which is different from their point 5 -- Very close to theirs. It's as your ______ discussed in a different form.

JK: I did not feel it was.

HK: It's their point 9. Do you have their 9 points?

JK: No, I have 7 points. I assumed what the other two were.

HK: I can just tell you this was in -- they say they don't object to this as long as we are not a party to this negotiation.

JK: I have no defense to make because I tried to get there. It's a fair point.

HK: You are one of the few people here who knows nearly about as much as the govt. on negotiations. I want this clear in your mind. No ______.

We tried to do to go as far as I can imagine to stopping short of unconditional surrender but giving them what we can support and deliberately got away from mutual withdrawal. The U.S. withdrawal is in point 1. The U.S. withdrawal would start as soon as principle agreed to. NVN withdrawal is to be decided among Indochinese people at a separate conference.

JK: I tried to be conscientious.

HK: How was NY?

J. Kraft/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 1/27/72

-2-

JK: They gave me several hours. I think I will get in at some point.

HK: I made a strong appeal.

JK: He didn't use your name but it was clear something happened. He wanted me to spend 3-4 weeks. He knew some of my work. Wanted me to talk with people in Peking high up. Thought he would be interested in regional people as well.

HK: I am glad it worked.

JK: I thought it was a question of time. If not on the President's trip perhaps a few weeks after or later for 2-3 weeks.

HK: There's a chance at very high level. Out of my hand but I will keep you posted.

JK: I have to give a lecture in Montego Bay next week.

HK: Just sit tight. Everything being done. I will not tell anyone that I intervened with the Chinese. I don't want to do it except in most unusual circumstances. I think you can do the most thoughtful pieces.

JK: OK. Seeing what my colleagues wrote, I think I came closer.

HK: Look at plan more carefully. And look at my briefing of yesterday. Let me know what you think.

JK: Do you want to comment on elections?

HK: After all Thieu is resigning. That's not negligible factor and announcing it publicly. What they want from us -- two things. Electoral commission to supervise election once official __________ to national concord. Second, is Thieu's resignation. What they are asking is that we put in govt. that they have an overwhelming possibility of dominating.

JK: I never doubted that.

HK: That we replace Thieu. I said what about X, Y, or Z? Are they obstacles? They always said he doesn't stand for peace and neutrality either. They never got to a negotiating point.

JK: I didn't give an impression that they were easy and prepared to make deals.

HK: Not a hostile column. Just want you to know.

J. Kraft/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 1/27/72

-3-

JK: It was that I missed your briefing because I went up there. They said how do we know that you will not be the first of a long chain of people.

HK: I will make that clear to them. It is not in my interest. This is being done without any ______.

JK: When I saw VN in Moscow and saw what China thing meant with them then I knew you were not bowling me.

HK: I try to be honorable.

JK: I hear that you were very funny last night?

HK: Really?

JK: weren't you? They applauded several comments. They thought it was a good exchange.

HK: I thought Frank was good too. We will be in touch.

TELCOM

Wm. Attwood/Kissinger

11:10 a.m.

1/27/72

New Year's

A: I got a note from Sihanouk last night. It occured to me in passing that it
might be of use to members of party in working with him that he said he talked
with you and some chat might be arranged. I don't see any harm. Is it useful?

K: Say it's your idea. Not that you talked with me. You think that *useful* from
your social acquaintaince with me you are --

A: I know what you mean. Marty Schram if he goes will be seeing him
separately. In case Marty goes. I don't know who is going.

K: I haven't seen the list.

A: I saw the Chinese people in the UN the other day. They were going to come
for lunch.

K: Did they come?

A: They are coming to visit office the second half of Feb. They asked about
Schramm. Have a good trip.

K: Will you call me when you get back?

A: We are stopping in Paris.

K: Always wanted to go to Morocco. Call me when you are back.

A: I will be back on the 15th.

K: That's when I will leave. Let's get together after the trip.

TELCORN

David Frost/Kissinger

11:26 a.m. 1/27/72

F: Congratulations! Brilliant press conference. Most coherent explanation.

K: It was extemporaneous so my sentences run together.

F: Last night too?

K: The text of the press conference was extemporaneous.

F: Is this the time to do TV?

K: I am not sure that my colleagues think so but I will raise it.

F: It occurs to me that you are on the offensive in getting the most across.

K: Don't want them to think it is a promoting cause. They know my affection for
you. Ultimate choice is in Haldeman's shop on timing. It might not be a bad
time. Your format would permit a long discussion. You have a mind that could
ask the right questions.

F: Really elucidate a few things.

K: I don't think they want me on TV before China.

F: After China would be good too.

K: I had lunch with Brisson yesterday who spoke with great affection of the trip to Bermuda. Milestone for everyone.

F: That's heaven! Everyone had such a happy smile on their face all day.

K: Will it be an annual event?

F: I think it's a marvelous idea. Do you think it should?

K: It should be repeated once more.

F: Are you pretty incarcerated in Washington?

K: Might be in NY this weekend.

F: Diahann here but every Sun. night doing a program in Lonson. You have been travelling too. Did you ever call people back from Paris?

K: Sxxxxx We set up a complicated system. I was never gone more than 2 days and always on a weekend.

F.O. 1200 21-76
OCTOBER 22ND 1976

D. Frost/Kissinger

11:26 a.m. 1/27/72

-2-

F: So only 24 hours late calling back.

K: Had calls switched to another switchboard and they took message.

F: If you could call from Paris and make it sound like it was from Washington.

K: I could do that easily from London. But people in Paris didn't know I was there either. So couldn't use switchboard their either.

F: You are working hard and having all the fun in this administration.

K: That is saying absolutely nothing.

F: Not only the work but the cloak and dagger. Diahann is at the Plaza.

K: I may call her if I am in town.

F: If you are in NY next week --

K: Do you want to come down here?

F: Tues. dinner?

K: There's a dinner at the Japanese embassy for me. They would be delighted to have you. They are screaming bores but we will have a chance to see each other after.

F: How about lunch?

K: Not possible. How about Thurs.? I can't inflict the Japanese embassy on any body.

F: And if we talked only to each other it would be worse.

K: A boring official dinner.

F: Lunch on Thurs. is lovely.

K: Will Diahann come with you?

F: Yes.

K: Lunch Thurs. Terrific. Come here and we will go to the Sans Souci. See you at 12:45 here.

F 01-0027-13G
DEC 27 1972

TELCON

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

4:11 p.m.

1/28/72

MK: I am checking back with you on recurring request on interview.

HK: Brief one or long one.

MK: The lone one we have taken care of.

HK: The brief one I haven't gotten a final answer yet.

MK: The long one --

HK: In 3-4 weeks after return.

MK: Brief one?

HK: I will know about that by Mon. or Tues.

MK: Have you heard about --

HK: Giving information to the Chinese? Totally untrue.

MK: NVN said yesterday that on Nov. 17 they came back to us and said Le Duc Tho sick and we could meet with Xuan Thuy.

HK: I read our response. Said we would meet with whomever in power to make decisions.

(State says)

MK: On Oct. 20 when you were in Peking you informed Chinese we responded to Hanoi.

HK: I doubt anyone there would know that. It isn't true. I won't go into that.

MK: The concept of your discussing -- am I wrong to report that Chinese were informed of our response to NVN?

HK: I don't want to go into discussions with third countries. Soviets, Chinese, or others. Be careful about accepting fools (?) like this.

MK: State Dept.

HK: I don't see how he can know.

MK: There are a couple of guys here who feel they are in the know and au courant on China. He mentioned it flat out. Oct. 20 we responded to the 7 point plan.

OCT 28 1972 11:00

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Hugh Sidey

6:10 p.m., January 27, 1972

K: Hugh, I am seeing you for breakfast, but I have a problem of a semi-personal nature. TIME is going to put me on the cover next week.

S: It is kind of symbolic concerning the Nixon speech.

K: Is Nixon on the cover, too?

S: The cover story is on the Nixon speech, but you are the face on the cover.

K: I don't want to leave the impression I am the mastermind of this whole thing. I am not editing TIME, but...

S: I realize that, but I don't think the story will leave that impression. However, I will check on the illustration.

K: Why don't you have a picture of Nixon striding over my prostrate body.

S: They want a picture of you and Nixon on LIFE's cover next week. I have not been able to get to Ziegler about it. The deadline for color is Monday and Tuesday for black and white. But we need Ollie to do it immediately.

K: Of me kissing the ring? Or with my shoeshine box?

S: Any way you want to do it. That follows next week -- between the two of them we may be all right.

K: Well, check on the illustration. I don't want to leave the impression it is my effort.

S: On the LIFE one, I know they want you and Nixon together. If we can get it tomorrow or Saturday...

K: You have told Ziegler?

S: But he is too busy. We need it by Monday because we want to try color. I'll see you in the morning.

K: I will have to brush my teeth tomorrow.

01-10-72 10:13:10

Telecon
Henry A. Kissinger
Robert Kleiman
1/27/72; 6:50 p. m.

HK: I thought your editorial today was very fair.

K: I am glad you agreed. We have many different views around here.

HK: Some of their reactions astonish me.

K: The editorial is my view for the time being. What I am trying to do is another piece for Sunday. Excuse me, I'll be back in one second.

HK: But I have not got much time.

K: ________ thanks you for your osteopath (?).

HK: I thought he was going to Israel.

K: I wonder if it is possible to cut through some of the confusion. Is there any way one can get the sense of the ting? Or, is it too early in the stage. We are proposing something with an uncertain conclusion?

HK: Yes. They are proposing a guaranteed takeover. (Missed a sentence)

K: They say anybody but Thieu.

HK: We checked that and that is not true.

K: They have in mind a Government that they think they can live with.

HK: They have in mind a government that they think they can dominate. We proposed electoral commission.

K: Have we said that to them.

HK: Of course.

K: How have they responded?

HK: They have not really turned this down flatly yet. And I don't think we should . . .

K: You have the impression that they may want to talk on this.

E O T A O T A O T A
DECEMBER 1972

Telecon

Henry A. Kissinger

Robert Kleiman

1/27/72; 6:50 p.m.

-2-

HK: It is characteristic of them not to turn anything down when they want to keep it open.

K: What about the ceasefire approach?

HK: The ceasefire approach is not a hangup. I can't seem to convince anyone of that. They object to the ceasefire if it precedes the settlement.

K: Are we proposing it before the settlement?

HK: No.

K: The problem is what are the conditions of ceasefire.

HK: Right.

K: The question is what do you negotiate first -- what do they want?

HK: They want central government first. What we don't want to give is an impression that this proposal has already been turned down.

K: You were able to get into this kind of clarity?

HK: Yes.

K: Were you alone?

HK: No, others were with me.

K: Was Bruce with you?

HK: No, but he had verbatim texts, etc. He did not want to participate. I think the hold up is that they want to make one more try to see if they can get the whole ball of wax. Obviously something happened between Oct. 25 when they agreed to talk and November 17 when they cancelled it.

K: Any idea what?

F.O. 1884 24. 36
OCTOBER 24, 1972

1/27/72; 6:50 p. m.

-3-

HK: No. Mayge they thought the foreign aid cutoff would lead eventually to cutting aid to Vietnam. I-am trying to be helpful to you. The cease-fire issue may break down when we get into details but the concept is not problem.

K: But you are not going to do that until . . .

HK: We felt that we were essentially agreed on all but two points. Structure of Government and Withdrawal. Bob, I would prefer to talk to you at greater lengths tomorrow.

K: I am writing for Sunday but I am only going to be here in the morning.

HK: What time. Can I call you around 8:30?

K: No that early.

HK: Around 10:00?

K: That might be better.

HK: Good, I will call you. Can I reach you at this same number?

K: Yes or at SC 4-0371

TELCON

Robt Kleiman/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 1/28/72

HK: You are not taping this are you?

RK: No. Mostly I wish I could see more clearly and I wonder if you do on basis
what the possibilities really are. If the doors are closed.

HK: No. I don't feel it. You followed it long enough. It's very uncharacterisit
to turn something down if they want to close it down.

RK: What do you sense is possible?

HK: It's possible they will want to give us a bash before they talk. I believe there's
a chance that they x will head for negotiation. I thought our talks last summer
were making more progress then ever before.

RK: In what sense?

HK: For the first time they agreed to talk about an American plan. Our plan
and their plan and we were talking where it can be melded together and agree in
principle on 6 or 7. In principle. To go from agreement in principle to detailed
negotiation. There's nothing to say there couldn't be a thousand practical
snafus.

RK: They said not all that difference in your point and ours on this. I was looking
at the ceasefire point again after you spoke and there seems to be a second
sentence in our point 6 or 7 that they might have trouble with.

HK: No. What they would have trouble with is withdrawal of our troops with us.
No problem with Indochinese people. That's where we gave on that point.

RK: As part of ceasefire --

HK: Indochinese people will negotiate among themselves. Point 5.

RK: I see. "Problems existing among the Indochinese people will be settled
among the Indochinese people." My implication between them.

HK: When I say accepted, I don't want to mislead you. It's tough but do-able.

RK: Point x 5 and 6 --

HK: Read me Point 6. I don't have it in front of me now.

RK: (Reads point 6.)

DEC1227 7:00AM

R. Kleiman/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 1/28/72

-2

HK: That will present them problems. It's not a big hold-up. Especially as 5 and 6 are linked.

RK: I don't see how they can accept that.

HK: It depends on how it occurs. I am looking for the annotated copy. If ceasefire part of over all solution it is not a problem for them.

RK: How do they ______ themselves.

HK: That's negotiable. Replace ~~x~~ forces and supply existing ones.

RK: That's what I was getting at.

HK: Of course.

RK: I don't have the exact phrasing but the President said it is the essence of the proposal.

HK: The proposal has an element that includes the staging which is tactical and being put to them in other form. There are some minor word changes.

RK: What do you mean?

HK: As I said in my briefing, if they sign, we are prepared to go with withdrawals and ______ while details of other points being negotiated so long as they are in period of withdrawals.

RK: That was not included in the previous proposal.

HK: In the Oct. 11 proposal.

RK: Not in this text.

HK: But put to them by Porter yesterday.

RK: Pulling it out and putting it back in.

HK: We took it out because a tactical devise we didn't insist on. When we showed this text to people they got so confused that we felt ? ? ? ? ?.

RK: Minor word changes make it a new proposal?

HK: No.

RK: To one other central point --

OCT 11 1972 10:16

-3-

HK: In the note we forwarded to them we said we would talk on their proposal. Not a take it or leave it basis.

RK: Did you go down and compare point by point?

HK: We went through the points point by point and gave them our reactions and re-drafted them.

RK: Oct. 11?

HK: Aug. 16 and then Oct. 11. It's a mistake for journalists to take these as new proposals. It's stupid to raise ceasefire which they haven't raised. It's been before them until Aug. It's one we agreed to put aside if we can get others agreed to.

RK: Ceasefire in overall proposal rather than original May idea.

HK: They wouldn't accept that because of political.

RK: And ceasefire no problem.

HK: I didn't say that. Normal would be troop ceasefire and exchange principle. They said no, there must be political. It's linked. That's our whole theme.

RK: What's the point of all Indochina ceasefire?

HK: Laos and Cambodia would go immediately. The idea -- we are being accused of ending the war for Americans only and not VN. The same should apply to withdrawals. That was an opening proposal that never got off the ground.

RK: I don't see how you can end the war without agreement on terms.

HK: Then why just have withdrawal and prisoners.

RK: They are bugging out. That's want everyone's doing.

HK: I unfortunately have to leave but if we could get out domestic debate to raise problems that other side raised. What's frustrating is for domestic to raise what other people didn't. There has to be a political settlement.

RK: A political settlement includes a ceasefire but a ceasefire doesn't include a political settlement.

HK: You can have a ceasefire that breaks down again. There's a ceasefire in Laos.

R. Kleiman/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 1/28/72

-4-

RK: Let me come back to yesterday. What's our concept of outcome? We know
? ? ? ? ? coalition.

HK: They want to dominate if not in physical control.

RK: How much they want to control you only get into after negotiation.

HK: They won't discuss electoral committee. We have proposed xx names and
none are acceptable.

RK: For which position?

HK: In the govt.

RK: In the Cabinet or electoral commission?

HK: In the Cabinet.

RK: We have tried it out on them?

HK: To see what they are trying.

RK: ? ? ? ? ? ? . They say no, or no response.

HK: Those don't respect peace, neutrality and ______.

RK: How about ______?

HK: He is not acceptable.

RK: How about Buddhist?

HK: I can't go over the whole list.

RK: Have we tried the Souvanna Phouma on them? You know what the break there
was.

HK: The whole debate is to get it going. No gimmick the govt. has overlooked.
You made points yesterday. These will come out in negotiations. We don't want
to negotiate with you.

RK: What will rebound in the debate in the U.S. and can't be put down --

HK: We started the debate.

01-21-1972
JAN 21 1972 1:00 PM

R. Kleiman/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 1/28/72

-5-

R: The whole feeling is that it cannot subside until it finds there's some answer to question of what the outcome is they are proposing. And we have is U.S. proposal with unknown outcome.

HK: They correspond to our traditions.

RK: It's ours then.

HK: Not at all. The only other thing we can do is put them in power which we will not do. Or listen to their idea.

RK: Have you defined the electoral commission?

HK: Gave some ideas.

RK: Have they responded?

HK: Not until now.

RK: ? ? ? ? level on equal basis.

HK: 30-30-30

RK: Jointly choosing other 1/3?

HK: Haven't gotten into that yet.

RK: Some feeling --

HK: They have not accepted proposition that we will war can end with existing structure in Saigon remaining in any form.

RK: They may never accept that in principle.

HK: Not an exclusive power but as it exists in Laos. I must go. I have given a good feel.

RK: On withdrawal. Do you think -- withdrawal of SVN army is silly.

HK: I feel it is not negotiable. It is tougher.

RK: On what basis?

HK: We cannot negotiate this with you. We go with you, you print it and then go around with them. They are really after us to get off economic and military aid. Withdrawal not so tough.

DEC 22 1972 1:00

R. Kleiman/Kissinger

10:16 a.m. 1/28/72

-6-

RK: More extensive timetable to solve that problem.

HK: We haven't gotten into that.

RK: Idea that's gotten around. Withdraw troops in 6 months and on assumption of peace the military aid can come to end in 2 years.

HK: And they have unlimited military aid. We are prepared to stop military aid if they will stop accepting military aid. They don't like that.

RK: That was in the '54 agreement.

HK: I really must go now.

DEC 28 1972 10:16

TELCONE
P. Doty/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

1/28/72

D: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? your Vietnam speech is not what we expected.

K: You are kind. We have given what the people can expect us.

D: We may still lose,

K: Then you lose but not negotiating. I have had a hysteric month. Let me know when you are down here. I will see you on one of your very next visits.

D: Let me put on a P.S. on the conversation. Harrison Brown has given me this -- it's up to you to accept Cuban scientists for annual international meeting in Washington. They are about to cancel it (because they aren't going to let the Cubans in. That would be terrible).

K: I would support that (having them in the country). Ask him to write me a note.

D: It's not worth cost of letting it slide.

K: I agree.

E 01 12:00 27.06
DEC 27 1972

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

1/28/72 12:50 p.m.

K: They want to do a cover on the President and me, but it's got to be tomorrow afternoon.

Z: Okay, Ollie's working on that right now.

K: And then they want me alone.

Z: Let them.

K: But for my relations here, it would be better with the President, don't you agree?

Z: Yes. . . . It doesn't make any difference really.

K: It does because there will be other stories on me.

Z: You're right.

K: I don't get anything out of it but I think it would please the President.

Z: That's right.

TELECON

Bob Pierpoint

1/28/72 3:30 p.m.

P: What about the story?

K: It's nuts.

P: But it was the same guy that wrote two authoritative stories on President Johnson, that he was going to become a Catholic and that he would not run for the Presidency again in favor of his Vice President.

K: It's totally nuts, believe me. I usually don't say anything, but this is just plain nuts.

P: Nothing to the damn thing?

K: No.

P: What about the other inquiry I put in to you?

K: On what?

P: Wanting to interview you about what you say to the POW wives.

K: I would rather not get into that.

P: I understand. Can I quote you on this other thing?

K: I would just say a high Administration official says there is absolutely nothing to it.

E.O. I'age 27, je
GEOV2241FD

TELCONE

Jerry Schechter/Kissinger

4:05 p.m.

1/28/72

S: I am sorry to bother you. I found out what the cover is. It's a line drawing of you. Haven't seen it but they say it's nice. Slash line is Nixon's secret agent. It's not a pastiche or abstract thing. Here's a problem. Our guy in Paris has talked with some people there. He filed some stories that most <u>trips</u> routed to Rhein Main AFB.

K: I won't go into it. Tell me but I won't go into it.

S: From there you changed plans to French military airfield at Villa <u>Box</u> Coublay. They want to run a map on how you did it saying this might be a typical trip. I am in a position here that I have reported what you told me and now they have <u>gamed</u> this information. Tell me how you feel about it.

K: It's an <u>over</u> statement for one thing. There's no such thing as most.

S: If we said typical trip or something like that.

K: You would be less out on a limb on one example. This was not more typical
then several others.

S: All right. Let me work on it that way. I will make it clear there were various routes and this may be one of them.

K: That's much <u>sounder</u>. Just stay away over there from Hunebelle.

DEC 28 1972 9:00AM

TELCON

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

4:11 p.m.

1/28/72

HK: Brief one or long one.

MK: The long one --

MK: Brief one?

MK: Have you heard about --

(State says)

MK: State Dept.

TELCON
Jos. Sisco/Kissinger
4:32 p.m. 1/28/72

K: I didn't have a chance to tell you I talked with your client and he said he would call you today or tomorrow.

S: Called before lunch. What I conveyed as you conveyed to me was precisely right.

K: For that I want to be kept informed of the consequences of what I have wrought.

TELCOM

President/Dr. Kissinger

6:25 p.m. 1/28/72

RN: How are we getting along with the ladies?

HAK: If they represent the American people you have never been in better shape.

RN: Did they raise the question of a straight deal?

HAK: Yes, I explained about May 30 proposal--they said of course there has to be a ceasefire in there. They said of you, that he has kept every promise he has made. This is the best meeting I have ever had with them--they are positive and strong.

RN: They know we are doing everything we can.

HAK: In the end, eight or nine made little speeches--they said they won't second guess you. One man said it is in the President's hands.

HAK: About this dinner you asked me to attend--I have a black tie dinner tonight--they have Dobrynin coming.

RN: No, don't bother. This is mainly for the friends of Wallace --about six are sick with the flu. We are just trying to fill in.

HAK: It think it is best if I am with Dobrynin.

FEB 28 1972
DEC 22 1972

TELECON

Barbara Walters

1/29/72 8:33 a.m.

K: How was the Haldeman interview?

W: Fine; it went even longer than yours. It was about an hour and a
half so I think we will probably divide it into sections. He was very comfortable.
He was terribly easy and answered everything. He's of course obviously very
aware of everything he said. He said at one point, anyone who disagrees with
the President on this is consciously aiding and abetting the enemy. I said but
there are several people in the Democratic party who are running for office who
are still disagreeing; are you saying they are aiding and abetting the enemy?
He said yes. I said do you mean George McGovern is doing this consciously.
He said I won't name names, but yes.

K: Are you going to use that?

W: Yes. It was very hot in his office, he wanted his fire going. I don't
see how he works in there like that. He was shining and when we stopped for
a few minutes I said let me powder your face, we can go into another room.
He said no, no, do it here. And he had his secretary bring in his home movie
camera. Then after it was all over someone was in his outer office and he
said "here she is" and it was the Attorney General and we talked. It was that
kind of atmosphere. I said it wasn't an interview that would make any head-
lines. He said "I've given you some headlines." I was going to ask him about
the President's speech, but before he even got to that he volunteered it.

K: When are you going back?

W: I was going to go back at 9:30. But then I woke up and didn't want to
kill myself so now I'm going at 11:30.

K: But you got my message that we wouldn't be able to show the film?

W: Yes, I was sorry.

K: If the President leaves for Camp David I might be able to show them.
But I don't want to do it if he's in the building.

W: I understand. You were so nice at the party to let us schlep over
all those people to you. You finally got back in the Style section of the Post.

K: Can I reach you at this number if the President does leave?

W: Surely. I won't leave until 11:00.

EC 1-100 2/27/72
DEC 22 1972

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Dobrynin

1/29/72 10:00

HAK: Good to see you last night

AD: Yes, and that couple was nice.

HAK: I think that will straighten out some of the atmospheric problems.

AD: You mentioned the 8th or 10th.

HAK: I may drag a bit and the reason is to have the man who will conclude the meeting to initiate it. I would like Peterson to handle it--to do it on a personal basis. Regarding the matter which you handed me a paper on last night. I haven't had an official position yet, but there are two things I need--one a statement from your embassy explaining they are Soviet citizens and why they do not have papers.

AD: They were brought by your agencies.

HAK: That is your problem. As far as the papers, they are Argentinians. Just give us a statement, some formal statement, certifying they are Soviet citizens declared by you. And secondly, it is the same problem as before--they have to make a statement which State Department or airport can have saying that they want to go back.

AD: This is no problem. Wouldn't yourofficials......

HAK: We will handle that. If we do it, we will do it to be helpful and not to make trouble. We want to make it routine.

AD: What kind of letter:

HAK: Just declare them Soviet citizens. If you agree, I am saying this informally, if they are willing to give us statement saying these are Soviet citizens--you have no papers. This will not lead to a cross examination

AD: I will check with Moscow.

HAK: If we do it, we won't set a trap for you--we just want to get it done. Then I will figure out a form of doing it and we will do it without additional questions.

AD: Should it be my statement?

DEC 29 1972 11:00