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the point to try to defend a ship whether it is on the surface or a
submarine -- this idea that once it is detected it can be defended.

MR. FLOBERG: I agree with that. The only reason you will use conventional weapons against the submarine that I could imagine at this time, assuming that the unconventional ones become commonplace, as they seem to be, would be because it was so close to you that you couldn't attack it without destroying yourself.

DR. TELLER: But by the time it is so close to you, you must have been a dope not to notice it, and in fact you won't be there because he will have noticed it.

VOICE: Let me remind, Edward, that so far as seaworthiness is concerned I once went through a hurricane on a carrier and found it not at all unpleasant, so far as seaworthiness is concerned. You don't have to worry about the surface ships. They are perfectly able to cope with any weather which you get on the surface of the sea.

VOICE: I survived a hurricane in the Atlantic in a 110-foot submarine chaser you could easily put in this room, all across the Atlantic ocean.

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DR. JOHNSON: I don't think that argument is of any importance at all. So far as seaworthiness is concerned, surface ships are perfectly capable of coping with the perils of the sea. You say you can substitute submarines, but what is it that a submarine can shoot at with a weapon that is presumably what it is going to do and it could only shoot against a fixed target that it knows, unless it has some target acquisitional systems -- if you are talking about land targets.

I know of no way a submarine can acquire anything except fixed by land unless it has got something to go and acquire the target with, which is an airplane, or communications from the land to the submarine. And if you try to do the latter you will have one very difficult problem in connection with navigation errors, and other errors, if you are thinking of shooting missiles from the submarine, with a very limited capacity in the number of weapons that you can carry on the submarine.

MR. DEAN: Not if the submarine is big enough. The trouble is we have been thinking always in terms of something a little bit bigger than the fleet type submarine; snorkel adjusted.

I think we must agree on one thing and that is, so far as the role of this nuclear-propelled submersible missile ship is concerned, it's much more really of a deterrent to strategic attack than it is a precise

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weapon for local warfare, although it may have some uses in the latter.
But if that be its role as a real deterrent, with these things stuck all
around the periphery of Russia loaded with missiles. And you can load
as many missiles as you want to if you make the submarine big enough,
and you can go just about as deep as you want today . . .

DR. TELLER: I feel a lot could be done by a much more thorough
management of underwater control, so as to be in a better position of
finding where we are, by looking for landmarks under the sea.

The other point is how do you stay in touch with the surface,
both for reasons of communication, and for reasons of the possibility
of attacking. Now it seems to me that you will have to have either in
the form of voice-amphibious transmitters which partly work with some
sort of radar, partly with sonar. The advantage of such a system might
easily be that the submarine itself plays a passive role in it. If the
enemy shoots at something, it will have to shoot at the ...., whereas
the submarine receives the pings from the ...., and only has to listen,
and therefore is not in danger of being detected itself. In this Indian
war of hide-and-seek where I think really the hiding is the most important
thing, this listening system is of great importance, and in this sense
a submarine is a more stealthy and therefore more dangerous attacker

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than even a plane. The last point is that after having listened you
have to do something about an attack -- attack the land from where
you may have obtained information, or from where you may have just
through your ears and eyes received information, or even shoot at
planes which are attacking you, or which are seeking you, or which
are going themselves against a land mission. It seems to me that
there is every possibility of developing an amphibious missile which
rises to the surface, and there becomes a rocket. The problem of this
kind of a missile delivery is clearly not a simple one. The discussions
so far have tended to convince me that this problem is not of a
different order of magnitude and difficulty from that of shooting a missile
from a plane which is already supersonic, and therefore has to cope
with quite a bit of wing. While the technical problem is there, I have
the feeling that our main deficiency is that the Navy has not envisaged
this whole complex of submarine problems, has treated it as we have
heard as a purely defensive missile, as a missile not worthy of man,
and consequently neglected not only the submarine's development but
the development of all the weapons systems that go with it.

MR. JOHNSON: The uncertainty in the estimates of a technology
are very great. All you have to do is ask General Land to give an estimate

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of what the defense against ICBM would be 10 years from now. That's something beyond the capability of the people in the U. S., who know every facet of the problem that is known now.

When we're trying to make a forecast of the trouble to come, based upon a comparison of Soviet with U. S. technology, we're in a far worse case. We have to face the fact that there is a terrific dynamic effect in technology which is modern in the sense that it's a kind of factorial function. When you're trying to design an airplane or any other thing, you have one or two choices you have to go through.

From 1940-1955 you had about 2 or 4, and from 1950-1960 you have about 100, and into the 60's to 70's, you're going to have 10,000 choices to choose between. It is the problem of choosing a technological course of action that is unsuperably difficult.

Technology, roughly speaking doubles about every decade -- that is, the amount of knowledge, etc., available to both sides. The weapons system cost increases about tenfold every decade. The lead times, from concept to use, are increasing. It's hard to put in numbers, but the lead times from concept to use roughly doubles, and the probable number of choices are so many that the research man has difficulty in choosing among the possible alternatives that he could give the customer.

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This has serious implications because, if the problem has become complex, in time it means that you can no longer rely on the random inventions of the inventor. You have to have guidance down as well as guidance up, and you have to worry specifically about the problem of lead times from concept to use. At the present time the U. S. lags behind the Soviet Union by about 50% in the time from concept to full operational use of a military weapons system.

I need to take a little issue with some of the other technical people here on the comparison of Soviet with U. S. military technology. When you look at the problem of forecasting the Soviet capabilities, you have to categorize the reliability of information from excellent on the Soviet atomic program to poor on many of the others, to essentially no information, but just a mere image assumption on a large set of the important things that determine whether we will or will not be successful in any specific ground-to-ground, or air-to-air action or sea-to-sea action.

I'd summarize the general situation by saying that, in my opinion, the Soviet Union was three to five years behind us in 1945 in military technology, and is about equal to us now. Specifically, they are ahead in some things and behind in others. But if you look at the ratio of time, they've done 15 years of work in 10 years and we've

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done 10 years in 10 years. Three to two. In atomics I disagree with
Edward Teller. In tactical atomic weapons, as well as thermonuclear
weapons, I believe that Soviet atomic technology is in every sense our
equal. Most of their tests have been concerned with tactical atomic
weapons. They have a complete doctrine for their ground forces. We
don't. 85% of their forces facing us in Europe have an atomic capability.
15% of the NATO forces facing them have an atomic capability.

If you look at delivery systems, it is well known that the Soviet
Union is roughly two years ahead of us in missile systems. In air
defense there is good reason to believe that they are roughly two years
ahead of us. I don't believe that this is a situation that we cannot alter.
If you look at the complete capabilities in research and invention in
NATO, at least half our capabilities reside in the countries of our allies.
We don't need to bring coal to Newcastle; we do have to give them the
advantage of a lot of the information we have to help them on their way.
But if you remember the resources of Germany, England, of France, and
if you put all of this complex together, we could at least easily double
our overall inventiveness and research.

I also want to consider the ground problem, but you can't
consider that without considering the problem of air defense and attack.
I think we do have to thrash out the question of what are the most
vulnerable targets in the U. S. My own estimate is that we ought to

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protect our population first; that is our most important resource. Next we ought to protect our military forces-in-being, SAC in particular, because this is the main deterrent of the republic. And thirdly, we ought to protect our physical plant. It turns out that this is about in the order of the ease of doing it, too.

We have to consider the fact that the ultimate attack system is a mixed attack system composed of bombers, submarines, large missiles, ICBM, and that, because of the Russian emphasis and perhaps lead time, these are following one after another in a very sharp time sequence. Let's say that the manned bombers will be the main attack system till '60 or '61, that the ICBMs will be from '61 on, that the submarines can launch now in one form of delivery system or another. If we attempt to design too simple a defense system, we can save ourselves from destruction by manned bombers but be destroyed by sub-launched missiles, or we can save ourselves from both and be destroyed by ICBM.

The problem of timing is very difficult to figure out. We don't have the facts of life with respect to the Soviet ICBM system. The ultimate defense system has to consider then how much it costs to produce what kind of defense. If you look at these in the order I propose -- population, military force and physical plant -- you can probably

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protect the population at the least cost. That is, at a cost of roughly
20 billion dollars. If you look at the active defense, depending upon
whether you want to protect only SAC or the whole physical plant, this
could run at a cost of about 15 billion dollars a year, for a total cost
of about 20 billion dollars a year. This would give some probability
of blunting the Soviet attack, though not as good as we'd like, because
we have neglected some of the most serious defects in our system, like
atomic counter-measures for one, low altitude attack, and very high
altitude attack. We know the technical solutions are feasible, in
timing we cannot possibly achieve these in consonance with the Soviet
attack capability. And so it is one of those difficult questions if we
assume they will attack simply without regarding our counter measures
capability, these are going to be long periods which will come and go
when they will have a full capability of destroying this continent -- the
population, physical resources and retaliatory capability, and though
we may regain it, we may lose it again because we haven't systematic-
ally planned for the whole system of attacks that may occur in time.
Now, in all fairness, we have to say that this situation has been very
seriously affected by ICBM. When it came to defense against pre-ICBM
attack systems, the advantage in defense was about 3 to 1 in favor of
defense ... that is, you had to spend about $3 in offense in order to

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maintain the same offensive capability. But my own estimate is that
in the ICBM case this situation will be reversed, that it will take about
$3 in defense to counter a $1 increase in offense.

We have the reverse situation too. The Soviet Union is busting
a gut on air defense. They're roughly two years ahead of us. The
Air Forces estimate is that they're going to have to spend 40 to 50
billion dollars a year to retain their offensive capabilities.

VOICE: If you don't have a defensive system, then the manned
bomber system is a very powerful weapon. As long as they have the
manned bombers, we have to take that very seriously from a defense
point of view.

DR. JOHNSON: I agree that we cannot afford to neglect manned
bomber defense. It's worth the insurance for the period between now
and '65 when manned bombers and submarine-launched missiles will
be the primary threat. It will be high cost, but I'd rather face that than
take a chance.

On the ground war, there's been a lot of discussion, both public
and classified, on what happens to the country that is fought upon. I
agree that the countries fought over will be completely destroyed. I
don't think it makes any difference whether the people fighting are

don't think it makes any difference whether the people fighting are
agree that the country fought over will be completely destroyed. I
and classified, on what happens to the country that is thought upon. I
On the ground was, there's been a lot of discussion, both public
take a chance.

be the primary threat. It will be high coat, but I'd rather face that than
and '62 when manned bombers and submarine-launched missiles will
pomper defense. It's worth the insurance for the period between now
DR. JOHNSON: I agree that we cannot afford to neglect manned
point of view.

manned bombers, we have to take that very seriously from a defense
pomper system is a very powerful weapon. As long as they have the
VOICE: If you don't have a defensive system, then the manned
pilots will be a year to retain their offensive capabilities.

Air Force estimate is that they're going to have to spend 40 to 50
a dot on air defense. They're roughly two years ahead of us. The
We have the reverse situation too. The Soviet Union is peaking
$3 in defense to counter a $1 increase in offense.

in the ICBM case this situation will be reversed, that it will take out
maintain the same offensive capability. But my own estimate is that
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Americans, Germans, Russians, or any other ground forces. It isn't feasible, once you've engaged in the tactical aspects of the battle, to limit the places where you explode atomic weapons in such a way that in a heavily populated country you will not destroy most of the population. You could estimate that, depending upon the policy adopted in this respect, you will destroy between 30 to 100 percent of the actual physical and human resources of the country fought in. It's all very well to say you'll use little tiny bombs, but the trouble is that all the places where you'll want to use them are places where there is a population.

VOICE: You're assuming the use of tactical atomic weapons?

DR. JOHNSON: Yes, weapons from the range of 1/2 to 1 kt.

The other difficulty in the ground end of it, is that we and the Russians have assumed that, although you may start with conventional weapons, you'll always have a threat over the use of tactical weapons, and that this will force the ground tactics into a war of dispersal and movement.

You say, Well, that's fine, we'll disperse and move. The tactical decision is so difficult that nobody will ever really get clobbered on the military end of it, although the population may.

decision is so difficult that nobody will ever really get clapped on the
You say, 'Well, that's fine,' we'll diatherize and move. The tactical
this will force the ground tactics into a war of diatheral and movement.

You'll always have a threat over the use of tactical weapons, and that
have assumed that, although you may start with conventional weapons,
the other difficulty in the ground end of it, is that we and the Russians

DR. JOHNSON: Yes, weapons from the range of 1\1 to 1 kt.

there is a population.

It is that all the places where you'll want to use them are places where
It's all very well to say you'll use little tiny pompas, but the trouble
of the actual physical and human resources of the country taught in,
adopted in this respect, you will destroy between 30 to 100 percent
population. You could estimate that, depending upon the policy
that in a heavily populated country you will not destroy most of the
to limit the places where you explode atomic weapons in such a way
feasible, once you've engaged in the tactical aspects of the battle,
Americane, Germans, Russians, or any other ground forces. If not,

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The difficulty with that is that our ground forces -- Russian, British, American -- have been based on a flankless line concept. There's a line and you're on this side, and they are on that side. This is because all of our equipment has been bought on a minimum capital investment basis. And you've got a garage on every corner and fuel trucks to bring up the fuel, and this is the most efficient system for a flankless line situation.

The problem of going from a flankless line tactic to one of dispersal and movement requires the most drastic revision in all of the equipment of an army. It means you have to go from vehicle ranges of 100 miles to perhaps 1,000 or 5,000 miles. It means that not only do you have to cut down the weight of ammunition, but the weight of fuel. How do you get the fuel there? If you look at the logistics burden, its 1/3 fuel, 1/3 ammunition and 1/3 repair parts and food, etc. No use in getting rid of the ammunition unless you get rid of the other two. And we don't have a prayer at the present time of getting rid of the fuel and the repair parts. It can be done -- technically it's a possibility, but at the rate at which the Department of Defense operates, it will be 20 or 30 years before you come to that kind of an army. When you speak of the possibility of a tactical war of dispersal and mobility, you're talking about a revolution in weapons systems which is the same

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order of magnitude as that of the air defense or atomic weapons themselves.

The other favorite proposal is that we'll get Burke's strategic mobility by two means; by our wonderful air life -- and if you look into that, you'll find out there isn't enough airplane capacity in the U. S. and even if there were, how would you get the fuel to the places you want to go? There's no answer; you can't get the fuel there without the sea lift. And if you look at the sea lift, Admiral Burke says the Russians are going to have 1200 submarines by 1960. . .

DR. TELLER: I would first like to ask a question, and then I would like to make a statement. The question is this: You said that first, and I agree, we'd been ahead of the Russians by some years -- I don't care precisely how many -- in '45. You said that we are now about at the same level, and then you proceeded to enumerate that the Russians are ahead in A-bombs, in defense, in submarines and in missiles. Will you please mention those many instances which you so far have not mentioned where we are ahead?

DR. JOHNSON: I didn't mean to say that they were ahead in A-bombs. In general I'd say that it's touch and go now except that in tactical weapons they have, I think, an advantage and in thermonuclear weapons I think we have an advantage. But it's six of one and a dozen of another.

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DR. TELLER: What of our defense? Where they are two years
ahead, and in submarines where they are ahead by 10 or more and in
missiles where they are likewise a few years ahead.

MR. HOOPES: When you say we are ahead in A-bombs, do you
mean quantity?

DR. JOHNSON: Quantitatively, no. I was speaking of technical
quality, and in production. We're well ahead in stockpiling. One of these
weaknesses is, however, that their stockpile is doubling every two years.

MR. HOOPES: In submarines, are you implying that our strategy
require us to have the same number of submarines as the Soviets?

DR. JOHNSON: No. I'm saying that they have an attack capability
in denying us freedom of transportation across the sea. I don't see why
they built so many submarines without considering not only the denial
of our overseas transport but also an attack on the U. S. by missiles or
aircraft, submarine launched. Because our ratio to the German situation
is pretty bad for us; it's just out of this world.

DR. TELLER: I would like now to list a few little things in which
I feel a difference of opinion -- points where I would like to put things a
little differently. First, the point that the Russians are ahead in nuclear

little differently. First, the point that the Russians are ahead in nuclear
I feel a difference of opinion -- points where I would like to but things a
DR. TEITER: I would like now to list a few little things in which

it pretty bad for us: it's just out of this world.
aircraft, submarine launched. Because our ratio to the German airforce
of our overseas transport but also an attack on the U. S. by missiles or
they built so many submarines without considering not only the denial
in denying us freedom of transportation across the seas. I don't see why

DR. JOHNSON: No. I'm saying that they have an attack capability
require us to have the same number of submarines as the Soviets?

MR. HOOPE: In submarines, are you implying that our strategy
mistresses it, however, that their stockpile is doubling every two years.
durability, and in production. We're well ahead in stockpiling. One of these
DR. JOHNSON: Quantitatively, no. I was speaking of technical
mean quantity?

MR. HOOPE: When you say we are ahead in V-pompa, do you
mistakes where they are likewise a few years ahead.

speed, and in submarines where they are ahead by 10 or more and in
DR. TEITER: What of our defense? Where they are two years

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weapons. This is one area into which I had an opportunity to look in
some detail. I feel perhaps a little firm about it and thoroughly con-
vinced that we are, at the present time, ahead qualitatively in the kinds
of weapons that we can make, at least in the thermonuclear range and,
I have some less firm reason to believe, also in tactical weapons.

I feel that we are ahead, and way ahead, in stockpiling. This,
in tactical weapons, is a very important thing. When you make big
-weapons, then the size of your stockpile is not so particularly import-
ant, but when you are trying to make little weapons, then the size of
your stockpile is extremely important. We are probably behind in the
planning for the application of these weapons, particularly the tactical
-weapons, so that, in actual effect, they may be indeed ahead.

I would like to disagree that in bombers the offense is three
times as expensive as the defense, whereas for ICBM it is the other
way around. From what I have heard, for bombers the defense is 10
times as expensive as offense, for ICBM the defense is 100 times as
expensive as offense. The trend is the same but the base line is differ-
ent, and the conclusion of deep shelter is precisely coincident.

The gravest difference, and essentially the last one which seems
to exist between the points of view, is the concept of tactical war in
brush fire wars. Here I feel that Ellis Johnson has all the advantage on

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me. He is the expert and probably I should duck. For the sake of argument and sticking my neck out, I would like to suggest two points of view which might change his disagreeable conclusion that brush fire wars cannot be effectively fought. When one discusses what one does to the enemy's armed forces, as compared to what one does to the bystander, the population, the important thing may be to consider the precise ratio of the unintended damage to the intended damage.

To my mind, it has not been proved that this unintended to intended damage is greater in the case of atomic weapons than it is in the case of other kinds of weapons. I'm not convinced that one indeed can fight such a war practically, but I would at least think it worth a good and detailed try of discussion as to how one can do that.

Then, as to the other point, Ellis has made a very telling point in saying we can not save on ammunition, we cannot save on fuel, and therefore the long-range operation, the high mobility, might indeed become impossible. I would like to try to make a flank attack against this impregnable position by saying that if you carry very powerful weapons, then not only is ammunition less, but the number of people, the number of vehicles, and, therefore in the end the amount of fuel may well be less. You can use more expensive fuel. You might rely to a greater extent on fuel which you requisition on the spot -- however unfriendly the country,

fuel which you regulation on the spot -- however unfriendly the country,
You can use more expensive fuel. You might rely to a greater extent on
vehicles, and, therefore in the end the amount of fuel may well be less.
not only the ammunition less, but the number of people, the number of
noble position by saying that if you carry very powerful weapons, then
impossible. I would like to try to make a flank attack against this imme-
terore the long-range operation, the high mobility, might indeed become
in saying we can not save on ammunition, we cannot save on fuel, and
then, as to the other point, Ellis has made a very telling point
try of discussion as to how one can do that.

a war practically, but I would at least think it worth a good and detailed
other kinds of weapons. I'm not convinced that one indeed can fight such
damage is greater in the case of atomic weapons than it is in the case of
To my mind, it has not been proved that this unintended to intended
of the unintended damage to the intended damage.

the bobulation, the important thing may be to consider the precise ratio
enemy's armed forces, as compared to what one does to the platoonner,
not be effectively fought. When one discusses what one does to the
which might change his disagreeable conclusion that push the war can-
ment and sticking my neck out, I would like to again beat two points of view
me. He is the expert and properly I should duck. For the sake of argu-

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and the more so if the country which you are trying to help is friendly.

Finally, I cannot restrain myself from extrapolating the sequence
from the 30's, 40's, 50's, 60's into the 70's. In the 30's we had, as
you said, one chance; in the 60's -- to jump a bit -- you said we had
10,000 chances. I agree with you. Unless we change our way of beha-
vior, in the 70's we will have no chance.

DR. JOHNSON: Because I conclude that if you really fight over
a ground war in a pretty hard and determined sense with combatants
which are pretty determined to take a hold, doesn't mean that that elimi-
nates a ground war. There are places where you can fight for the Soviet
Union it is the U. S., for the U. S. it is the Soviet Union. It may also
be in these areas which are very lightly populated, and I was aiming my
comments primarily at Western Europe which is a very heavily populated
area, where the population is already extremely alarmed and where, as
another point, you have to have a certain minimum amount of ground troops
to counter any attack, even with atomic weapons. The end result of that
would be, in a densely population area, pretty much devastation of the
country.

MR. DEAN: I would like to ask Edward one question. If I under-
stand you, you have said or implied that you believe that thermonuclear
weapons could be very usefully employed in a local tactical situation.
Is this true?

In this true?

messons could be very usefully employed in a local tactical situation.

stand you, you have said or implied that you believe that thermionic

community.

would be, in a densely population area, pretty much devastation of the
to counter any attack, even with atomic weapons. The end result of that
another point, you have to have a certain minimum amount of ground troops
area, where the population is already extremely alarmed and where, as
comments primarily at Western Europe which is a very heavily populated
be in these areas which are very lightly populated, and I was aiming my
Union it is the U. S., for the U. S. it is the Soviet Union. It may also
nates a ground war. There are places where you can fight for the Soviet
which are pretty determined to take a hold, doesn't mean that that elim-
s a ground war in a pretty hard and determined sense with combatants

after, in the 70's we will have no chance.

10,000 chances. I agree with you. Unless we change our way of life,
you said, one chance; in the 60's --- to jump a pit --- you said we had
down the 30's, 40's, 20's, 60's into the 70's. In the 30's we had, so

Finally, I cannot retain myself from extrapolating the sequence
and the more so if the country which you are trying to help is friendly.

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DR. TELLER: Right. In my opinion the distinction is not between big weapons and small ones, but between weapons employed with care against military objectives and indiscriminately against civilian populations. I furthermore try to maintain -- I am not sure that I am right -- that careful application of the weapons against military objectives will turn out to be, from a purely military point of view, more effective than their indiscriminate use.

In this sense, atomic weapons in the end will not turn out to be different from the other weapons. It has been the consensus of military science that it is the enemy's armed power which one should try to hit, not for reasons of morality but for reasons of practicality.

MR. HOOPES: Is there such a thing as a discriminating use of an H-bomb?

DR. TELLER: Yes, there is. May I please give you an example? You could do the following: Assume that you would like, for very good reasons, to take over temporarily, and I don't think it would be easily possible to do it more than temporarily, an airfield which is under enemy control. Let us say we are talking about an airfield in a country which is engaged in aggression. The following type of attack, while difficult -- and perhaps impossible -- might be considered.

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You might make a big thermonuclear burst at somewhat high altitude in such a way, and it can be done, that no negligible ground contamination will result. However, the installations within a radius of 10 miles will be flattened, and enemy planes and superstructures will just cease to be there. At the same time runways will not be damaged. You can drop such a bomb and at a considerable period afterwards, for instance, 20 minutes, giving time for the hot cloud to rise, your expeditionary force which has been underway will land.

Within a further few minutes, it will begin to set up defensive missiles against a counter stroke. On that field you will then try to execute either local demolition of the runways or else -- for a certain period of time like a day at most -- use this airfield as an operational base of your own. In this attack, it is quite possible that you will have hurt no civilians if the base has been a distance from a heavily populated area. Even if it is a little bit closer, you still will have made a big dent in the enemy striking power without, perhaps, a disproportionate effect against the civilian population.

MR. HOOPES: But what is the distinct advantage in that situation of using an H-bomb as opposed to a tactical fission bomb?

DR. TELLER: The following: In order to make the same attack, you would have to use several fission bombs. In fact, you might have

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to use 50. To bring in that many, in a surprise attack, without the possi-
bility of an effective defense on the other side, might be really difficult.

To bring in a surprise way, just one bomb, to flatten momentarily all
defense -- leaving you to execute what you want, at least for a short
period of time -- might turn out to be a much more feasible procedure.

COL. LINCOLN: One of the advantages is that it apparently dis-
pels the fog of war, turning it from an art into a science.

DR. JOHNSON: That might be true in China, but in Europe it would
kill 200,000 civilians. In Europe, all the airfields are close to cities.

MR. DEAN: You are assuming a pretty clean bomb.

DR. TELLER: I definitely assume that one uses in these exercises
clean bombs -- that is, a minimal fall-out -- and furthermore I would like
to say that any specific application of this or any other will have to be
carefully adapted to the local conditions. I don't claim that this can be
universally applied. I merely am trying to state that I am very much
afraid of generalities such as tactical bombs are small, strategic bombs
are big. Things are not necessarily that simple.

DR. JOHNSON: Let me paraphrase what I said previously. I'm
perfectly willing to use any size bomb in China or the Soviet Union, but

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I raise the question of whether or not we want to do that in Europe, or in the country of any of our allies if we're defending that country.

DR. TELLER: If you defend a country and if you have reason to believe that a reasonable proportion or a majority of the population is on your side, then I suppose that this particular mode of procedure might turn out to be wrong. At the same time other procedures might open up; for instance, it is possible to believe, though not necessarily right, that Budapest has demonstrated that tanks are not perfect weapons inside a city. And this is particularly true if you have somehow managed to sneak into that city considerable numbers of small weapons. How to do that is the next question. There might easily occur a number of ways to do that. What the Russians managed to do in Hungary was to start out by massive tank concentrations outside Budapest at the time when inside Budapest they could not operate.

Once you have, however, massive type tank concentrations, then you begin to have quite interesting targets for small tactical weapons which can be used against such concentrations. Individual tanks, on the other hand, you can take out first, with nice little bottles and other objects.

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DR. JOHNSON: There's a general law with respect to the opera-
tion of guerrilla forces versus strictly out-for-blood forces. That is,
if you have guerrilla forces who can hide either in the terrain or in the
population, and if the policy is not to decimate the population, then it
takes about 20 times as much military force to break even on the chance
of controlling the dissident population.

But just as soon as you change these conditions and go on from
a policy of being quite willing to decimate the population, all that disap-
pears, and then you no longer have the problem because you just knock
out the characters, and under those conditions, you do not have the situ-
ation you had in Budapest. The city becomes, if necessary, just rubble
heap which is just as much an advantage to the aggressor as there would
be if there were a full population there. You have to distinguish between
the guerrilla situation with really serious prohibition toward decimating
the population and the one of a really serious tactical war.

DR. TELLER: It is obvious that we are getting into very difficult
questions, but if I understand what you say, it is this: cities cannot be
defended, populations cannot be defended, particularly your own popu-
lations cannot be defended. I mean, for the Russians, a city under their
control cannot be defended against the Russians themselves. If they
want to place atomic bombs on top of those cities, they can do so.

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DR. JOHNSON: And it's easier, if some other population.

DR. TELLER: That is, of course, quite obvious. However, it is entirely possible that we going into a country which can make it difficult or impossible for the Russians to concentrate their forces and after that, they cannot hold down rebellion in those countries except by killing off the population.

DR. JOHNSON: In the 30's they killed 30 million of their own population; during the last war they accepted 50 million casualties from the Germans; in antiquity the Russian population was reduced to something like 20 or 50 percent of the total population -- they'd have gone out to the forests in those days. They are a courageous, brave, brutal, insensitive people. Look at their culture. They're different. They have their own cultural attitudes and they're not the same as ours. They're perfectly willing to kill either Russians or foreigners in order to achieve their objectives. Don't judge them by our culture.

DR. TELLER: I am not trying to, but I am trying to say that we can put them before quite hard choices. I do believe, though I might be wrong, that they have values also. They may not value their population so highly. I am not quite sure whether or not they might value their newly erected industry a little bit higher than we value our own. We

ΣLCJ

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are now talking about really intangible things. You say now that they are
more determined people than we are. Maybe.

DR. JOHNSON: I said they are different.

DR. TELLER: I mean different in that sense. I mean that is the
side you have emphasized. If this is ultimately true, then they will win. . .

MR. DEAN: Let's go back to exactly what kind of military tool we
ought to have. When the Russians carry out their program of subversion,
is there a military tool? On the one hand, you'll find yourself saying,
"Maybe there is no military tool, maybe it's all economic. On the one
hand you'll find yourself saying that we have persuasion backed up with
force. We should be more specific about the kind of force we are talk-
ing about for the back-up.

The thing I'm talking about is whether the nature of the forceful
outlets indicate what military tool should exist as a back-up -- which we
probably would not use, but which we know we could use, as we counter
their subversive activities with analogous activities of our own. It's
just that kind of force that I want to make sure we think about it at the
same time we're talking about the mess of problems Dr. Teller is talking
about . . .

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DR. SMITHIES: I find it hard to conceive the conditions under which we would be prepared to use tactical atomic weapons in limited wars. In what areas of the world? Would we drop these destructive weapons on any European satellite? Would we drop them on any Middle Eastern country? Would we drop them on any Asian country? In fact, is there any area in the world, other than the mainlands of China and Russia, where we would use these weapons and would not the Russians and the Chinese be sensible enough to contrive limited wars in the nature of civil wars around the world where dropping the atomic weapon on the mainland would not be appropriate? My feeling is that if the Russians are really smart, in their own strategy, they'll contrive limited wars where we will need to use conventional weapons . . .

MR. NASH: An atomic rifle is something maybe we don't have. I don't know much about it. Certainly, it's possible. Is it conceivable that a ground unit, with the lad in the bunkhouse, will have in his rack or locker, two guns, a conventional rifle, as we understand it today, and an atomic rifle, and he'll say, which one do I take out today, Sarg?

COL. LINCOLN: If you want to use the other thing, you can just send some guys out with atomic bazookas. They have the fire power of a battalion.

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MR. NASH: But if we can technologically get the application of the atomics to the relatively small weapon, the rifle, why do we have to keep talking about a guy keeping a conventional old-time rifle, too?

MR. HOOPES: Because there may be a situation, frankly, where you don't want to use the fire power involved; even in an atomic rifle; suppose you didn't need it in order to restore a very minor incursion.

MR. NASH: Yes, but I'm thinking in terms of, I've got so many dollars now . . .

COL. LINCOLN: You're going to have to have both . . .

DR. SMITHIES: It seems to me that there is a very real danger to emphasize tactical atomic weapons because their chief benefit is one of destructive power. This may be very embarrassing for us. It seems to me that we do face a range of possibility in the limited war field between preserving internal security, on the one hand, and countering an invasion of a country on the other hand. It seems to me that it is also a fair assumption that the Russians are likely to adopt tactics which will make the use of atomic weapons as embarrassing for us as possible. It seems to me that the tactic that will succeed in that state of circumstances is one that makes their attack resemble a civil war in the country itself. . .

one that makes their attack resemble a civil war in the country itself...
to me that the tactic that will succeed in that state of circumstances is
the use of atomic weapons so compensating for us as possible. It seems
assumption that the Russians are likely to adopt tactics which will make
of a country on the other hand. It seems to me that it is also a fair
preserving internal security, on the one hand, and countering an invasion
me that we do face a range of possibility in the limited war field between
destructive power. This may be very compensating for us. It seems to
embarrass tactical atomic weapons because their chief benefit is one of
D.G. SMITHIES: It seems to me that there is a very real danger to

COR. LINCOLN: You're going to have to spare money...

dollars now...

MR. MASH: Yes, but I'm thinking in terms of it. I've got so many
substitute you didn't need it in order to restore a very minor inflation.
You don't want to use the fire power involved! even in an atomic rifle!
MR. HOOKE: Because there may be a situation, family, where
I to keep talking a moment a key keeping a conventional old-time rifle, too?
the atomics to the relatively small weapon, the rifle, why do we have
MR. MASH: But it we can technologically get the application of

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EPO

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MR. NASH: (reporting on a subcommittee session) Our subcommittee had a rather extended discussion on whether or not it is possible to have a limited nuclear war in Europe. We concluded that the Soviet Union would be foolish to undertake an attack on Western Europe which they would hope to keep limited, that it would be such a warning to us to get us ready, and indeed, might even induce us to set off global war if by the dimensions of what we thought would be their buildup, we thought this was the only way that we could really meet the threat.

Take the more realistic possibility of a miscalculation in Western Europe such as an effort by Eastern Germany to throw off the Soviet yoke and to accomplish what Hungary tried unsuccessfully to accomplish, aided and abetted as they might very well be by Western Germany -- this action would have to be responded to by the Soviets and the situation might then move on from one step to another. Of course if there were a nuclear capability in Western Europe, the Soviet Union would think very carefully before they would want to take further measures which they could take, but which could only be responded to by us in the way of global, or all-out strife. We think, therefore, that the concept of a limited war in Western Europe is something that might be a feasible thing, not likely to be kicked off deliberately by the U.S.S.R., but something that could happen by mischance. . .

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(from the minutes of one of the subpanel meetings)

Mr. Hoopes referred to the situation a year ago respecting Quemoy and Matsu, at which time the United States threatened to respond to a Chinese attack by using tactical atomic weapons. He suggested that we have not yet thought through the implications of trying to use even small atomic weapons where our purpose is to limit the fighting when the Soviets or Chinese also possess such weapons. He proposed a hypothetical illustration: If we had used atomic weapons on the airfields in southern China in response to an attempted Chinese invasion of Quemoy and Matsu, what would we have done if the following day two American aircraft carriers had suddenly been vaporized in the Formosa Strait? In these circumstances, what would have been the probable reaction of American public opinion? Would this have been such as to facilitate our control over the situation? ...

MR. GAYLORD: I am very much concerned about the direction in which we are going. I was deeply impressed with Colonel Kintner's paper in which he outlined so clearly the static defensive nature of our whole military posture at the moment, giving the enemy the opportunity to pick the weakest link in the chain and by ambiguous attack to create nothing but troubles.

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If we are successful in total warfare it is by the posing of two
vast and enormous forces where our objectives are accomplished at the
stalemate as it were. On the other hand, the question of the definition
of limited warfare, and the proper tactics to apply in limited warfare,
seems to me a very fitting subject for our deliberations, particularly
with reference to whether it can be made more dynamic and more useful
so that we take the offensive position rather than the defensive.

We see today, coming out of the government, what seems to me
to be a very clear course. They're about to try, little by little, to edu-
cate the American public on the possible use of atomic and nuclear weap-
ons in limited warfare . . .

DR. COFFEY: If it is attempted to justify limited war, not so much
in terms of a nuclear stalemate, as in terms of its essential goodness in
itself, this approach, whatever its validity, is likely to run smack against
some of the strongest forces in U. S. political, economic and govern-
mental life. Because there is a convergence of currents on this question
of nuclear war which results in the opinion that this is the cheapest way
to fight, the only way to do it and that we will come out ahead.

Now, unless you can make an argument that at least we do not
come out ahead, I submit that this other approach is likely to run into a
psychological back-bar which would cause great damage. . .

2C3

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DR. KISSINGER: I think you have to distinguish between the kinds of limited wars. If we fight a war against Nicaragua, that would be a limited war in relation to us. I suspect the Korean war was an all-out war with respect to China, a limited war with respect to us, and we always had the physical capability to put in the one extra increment that might have broken their back for a number of reasons valuable now.

Now, the really tough case is a limited war between two major powers and that remains limited by definition not through a physical but partly through a psychological equation. Either side has the physical capability of expanding the war; this is why it is limited. And the only way you can keep it limited is to make the risks of expanding it seem costlier than whatever price is claimed by the limited war. And for this reason, I think that in a war between two major nuclear powers between us and the U.S.S.R., or even between us and China, which is something else -- a limitation of war depends importantly on our general war capability or at least being able to pose some threat to them that makes it unattractive to put in the additional resources they could . . .

MR. WILSON: There is great need to develop an understanding of the significance of what limited war means in terms of facilities, units, training, military doctrine, and so on to go with it. The need for planning,

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organization, distribution of munitions, etc., in terms of the limited war
idea, which is distasteful to Americans psychologically and which has
not been conspicuous in our planning today, means doing a good many
things, including developing an awareness and acceptance of the fact
that limited wars are the rule or had been in history, rather than unlimited
wars. We must be prepared for this kind of activity and must be properly
organized for it. . .

MR. NASH: What we are most in danger of is not so much aggress-
ion that involves overt force, as it is this creeping sort of paralysis which,
though not overt force in its nature, is just as much aggression, really,
because it is insidious, or more dangerous to us than overt. It is our
history, or rather our experience as a nation, to deal with something that
you can come to grips with; you have to be hit over the head or right in
the teeth with a sinking of the Lusitania or an attack on Pearl Harbor and
when we are we respond, but good. But we haven't much experience in
dealing with this creeping paralysis and we need to concentrate a good
deal of our time and effort and wealth on improving our techniques in the
direction of covering that form of aggression.

Somewhere in here is a point to cheer: that there isn't any nice
war and any bad war, nor are big wars bad and little wars good, good,

war and any psd war, not even pit were psd and little war was enough good, somewhere in here is a point to cheer: that there isn't any nice direction of converting that form of aggression.

desire of our time and effort and wealth on improving our techniques in the dealing with this creeping barbary and we need to concentrate a good when we are we reboard, put good. But we haven't much experience in the teeth with a sinking of the Lisitsia or an attack on Pearl Harbor and you can come to alpha with you have to be fit over the head or right in history, or rather our experience as a nation, to deal with something that because it is inadmissible, or more dangerous to us than overt. It is our though not overt force in its nature, is just as much aggression, really, ion that involves overt force, as it is this creeping sort of barbary which, MR. WASH: What we are most in danger of is not so much address-

organized for it. . .

wars. We must be prepared for this kind of activity and must be properly that limited wars are the rule or had been in history, rather than unlimited things, including developing an awareness and acceptance of the fact not been conspicuous in our planning today, means doing a good many ideas, which is distasteful to Americans psychologically and which has organization, distribution of munitions, etc., in terms of the limited war

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that all wars are bad and aggression is bad; you throw at it, to eradicate
it, whatever is the most suitable weapon at the time and place.

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III. OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS AND PROBLEMS

FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND THE CHANGING REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY, PANEL TWO TURNED ITS INVESTIGATIONS AWAY FROM RESEARCH AND THEORIES OF STRATEGY ON TO EXISTING SITUATIONS AROUND THE WORLD. WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE USEFULNESS OF U.S. OVERSEAS BASES AND FOREIGN AID AND MILITARY SECURITY PROGRAMS? HOW WELL ARE OUR SYSTEMS OF ALLIANCES FUNCTIONING? WHAT ARE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMITMENTS IN VARYING PARTS OF THE WORLD? IS THE U.S. NECESSARILY BETTER OFF WITH ALLIES? AND WHY HAVE ALLIANCES AT ALL? ---

FROM THE MINUTES OF THE PANEL MEETINGS. . .

The Friday morning meeting, November 30, opened with a presentation by Dr. Kissinger on the strategy of alliances.

The central problem is power and the will to use it; and with respect to power, the United States remains hampered by a number of old myths. Once we had such a margin of safety, deriving from the geographical distance separating us from Europe, that we could wait until a threat became unambiguous before considering

could wait until a threat became unambiguous before considering
from the geographical distance separating us from Europe, that we
number of old mines. Once we had such a margin of safety, deriving
with respect to power, the United States remains numbered by a
the central problem is power and the will to use it; and
presentation by Dr. Kiesinger on the strategy of alliances.

FROM THE MINUTES OF THE BANET MEETINGS...

BETTER OFF WITH VILLES? AND WHY HAVE VILLES AT VILL?---
IN AVOIDING PARTS OF THE WORLD? IS THE U.S. NECESSARILY
FUNCTIONING? WHAT ARE OUR RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMITMENTS
PROGRAMS? HOW WOULD ARE OUR SYSTEMS OF VILLINES
OF U.S. OVERSEAS BASES AND FOREIGN ARE AND MILITARY SECURITY
WORLD? WHAT ARE THE CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE USEFULNESS
THEORIES OF STRATEGY ON TO EXISTING SITUATIONS AROUND THE
TWO TURNED ITS INVESTIGATIONS AWAY FROM RESEARCH AND
CHANGING REQUIREMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGY, BANET
FROM CONSIDERATIONS OF AMERICAN OBJECTIVES AND THE

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### III - 2

our response. The rest of the world has always had far narrower margins of safety and has constantly been disturbed by far smaller transformations of the power balance. Although our position has now become comparable to that of the rest of the world, our old attitude persists in part.

In times past we have thought that maximum power meant maximum security, but this is no longer true. Now it may be that the stronger one grows, the stronger grows one's inhibition to use one's power. Also, in the nuclear age, it may not be consistent with survival to withhold a response until a threat has become overt.

It is necessary to achieve a compatible relationship between deterrence and a plan for war if deterrence fails. But if we rely solely on maximum deterrence (massive retaliation), we may have a war capability terrifying to ourselves and especially to our allies, as well as to our enemy. In this circumstance, if the deterrence fails, we might shrink from using our maximum force and hence might suffer a self-imposed paralysis of our military policy.

We should not regard alliances as ends in themselves. Nevertheless, there is a psychological need for allies, for each nation in a sense a self-expression of justice and it needs to feel that its energies and values go outward in association with

feel that its energies and assets go outward in association with
action in a sense a self-expression of justice and it needs to
Nevertheless, there is a bayesian need for slights, for each
We should not regard alliances as ends in themselves.
enter a self-imposed barbels of our military policy.

slights, we might shrink from using our maximum force and hence might
as well as to our enemy. In this circumstance, if the deterrence
war credibility terrifying to ourselves and especially to our allies,
solely on maximum deterrence (masive retaliation), we may have a
deterrence and a plan for war if deterrence fails. But if we rely

It is necessary to achieve a compatible relationship between
with arrival to withhold a retribution until a finest has become overt.
one's power. 'Wao,' in the unclean age, it may not be constant
the stronger one drowns, the stronger flows one's inspiration to use
maximum security, put this is no longer true. Now it may be that
In times beat we have thought that maximum power meant
attitude berates in part.

now become comparable to that of the rest of the world, om oig
transmutations of the power balance. Although our position has
margins of selecty and has constantly been distended by far smaller
om retribution. The rest of the world has always had far narrower

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E.C.

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others. In the United States, it is especially important to our
democratic values that we retain a sense of our missionary role in
the world.

Basically, there are two kinds of alliance: that which
seeks to achieve a new balance of power, and that which seeks to
prevent a new balance of power. Generally speaking, the U.S. and
the Western Europeans are the status quo powers, and our problem
is accordingly to define what specific shifts of power we are seeking
to prevent and then to determine how to achieve this aim.

There are several purposes of an alliance: one, to make clear to potential aggressors our willingness to defend specifically defined interests; two, to make clear our political solidarity with our allies; and three, to create a climate of public opinion in which the stationing of our troops in foreign allied countries is regarded as legitimate. In our present situation, everything depends on two key questions: How do we define aggression? And what do we do in response to it?

As others have said, freedom and justice begin with, and
depend in large part upon, the willingness to fight for one's
existence. This is not a logical exercise. One cannot question
one's own existence or one's right to it without seriously weakening

one's own existence or one's right to it without seriously weakening
existence. This is not a logical exercise. One cannot question
debate in advance part upon, the willingness to fight for one's

As others have said, freedom and justice begin with, and
in reason to it?

key questions: How do we define aggression? And what do we do
as legitimate? In our present situation, everything depends on two
the stationing of our troops in foreign allied countries is required
our allies; and three, to create a climate of public opinion in which
defined interests; two, to make clear our political solidarity with
clear to potential aggressors our willingness to defend specifically
there are several purposes of an alliance: one, to make
to prevent and then to determine how to achieve this aim.

is accordingly to define what specific shifts of power we are seeking
the Western Emotions are the status quo powers, and our problem
prevent a new balance of power. Generously beseeching, the U.S., and
seeks to achieve a new balance of power, and that which seeks to
basically, there are two kinds of alliance: that which
the world.

democratic values that we retain a sense of our missionary role in
others. In the United States, it is especially important to us

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one's capacity for survival.

As to the definition of aggression, take the example of Korea,
Most of our allies followed our lead there for symbolic reasons. They
wanted us to commit ourselves to "collective security", but thereafter,
their interest was to limit the risk because Korea itself was not of
major concern to them, as it was to us. This illustrates the danger
of over-generalizing our alliance systems, because in the process,
the purpose and effectiveness are diluted.

Hitler presented a clean-cut threat to the West to which a
clean-cut response was relatively easy. By contrast, the Soviets
almost always present us with an ambiguous challenge -- the threat
is always sheathed in conditions that create on our part a psychological
reluctance to act. In the face of such ambiguous threat, it is exceed-
ingly difficult to achieve a collective response by a group of nations
whose interests, though similar, vary substantially. In the
circumstances, if a major power like the United States is committed
exclusively to collective security (the U.N.), and the collective
security agency is incapable of effective action, paralysis may
follow. In any event, the United States will tend to lose the
capacity for acting effectively alone. For in every crisis, the ally
with the least interest has a veto over the ally with the greatest interest.

with the least interest has a veto over the ally with the greatest interest, capacity for acting effectively alone. For in every crisis, the ally follow. In any event, the United States will tend to lose the security agency is incapable of effective action, paralysis may exclusively to collective security (the U.N.), and the collective circumstance, if a major power like the United States is committed whose interests, through similar, veryapatentially. In the ingly difficult to achieve a collective ressource by a throat of nations resistance to act. In the face of such ambitious thrust, it is exceed- is always anesthetized in conditions that create on our part a psychological almost always present us with an ambitious challenge -- the threat clean-out ressource was relatively easy. By contrast, the Sovets Hitler presented a clean-out thrust to the West to which a the purpose and effectiveness are diluted.

of over-generalising our alliance systems, because in the process, major concern to them, as it was to us. This illustrates the danger their interest was to limit the risk because Korea itself was not of wanted us to commit ourselves to "collective security", put thereafter, Most of our allies followed our lead there for aympolic reasons. They As to the definition of aggression, take the example of Korea, one's capacity for survival.

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Etc

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When a wide discrepancy between the interests of allies is thus revealed, the alliance never appears quite suitable for any single concrete situation; moreover, it tends to become a domestic whipping boy; that is, nations are tempted to blame the inefficiencies of the alliance for their failure to take actions which they had never serkously intended to take in any event. For example, we tended to blame British reluctance for our failure to intervene in Indo-China. This is a dubious proposition. Simikarly, the British tend to explain their current troubles in the Middle East in terms of American failure to support the British position. This is likewise a dubious proposition.

Where discrepancies of interest are thus revealed, the common purpose of the alliance tends to be expressed in inaction. The alliance becomes valid and solid only against a clear and direct threat with which, ironically, the strongest power can probably best deal alone.

Conclusions:

1. Alliances should be limited and specific.

2. Collective security should not be regarded as an end in itself, and should not be allowed to prevent uni-lateral action by the U. S. in defense of what it regards as vital interests.

3. If the United States is to maintain the integrity of the free world, it probably cannot escape responding to certain challenges, irrespective of what other members of a particular alliance are willing to do. It must be prepared to act in its own interests for the good of the whole free world.

good of the whole free world.

It must be presumed to be so in its own interests for the
members of a particular alliance are willing to do,
to certain challenges, irrespective of what other
the free world, it properly cannot escape reresponding

regards as vital interests.

interal action by the U. S. in defense of what it

in itself, and should not be allowed to prevent and-

3. Collective security should not be regarded as an end

## Conclusions:

which,ironically, the strongest power can properly best deal alone,
becomes valid and solid only against a clear and direct threat with
purposes of the alliance tends to be expressed in action. The alliance
where discrepancies of interest are thus revealed, the common
to support the British position. This is likewise a dubious proposition.
their current troubles in the Middle East in terms of American failure
This is a dubious proposition. Similarly, the British tend to explain
plame British reluctance for our failure to intervene in Indo-China.
seriously intended to take in any event. For example, we tended to
of the alliance for their failure to take actions which they had never
withdrawing policy; that is, nations are tempted to plame the ineffectiveness
single concrete situation; moreover, it tends to become a domestic
thus revealed, the alliance never appears quite suitable for any

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There are certain dangers in exclusive reliance on an "all-out strategy":

(a) It causes allies to believe they have no contribution to make except to provide bases for our aircraft.

(b) It causes allies to duplicate the kinds of forces in which we are strongest. For example, the British are creating a strategic atomic striking force because they are not sure SAC would hit targets of greatest importance to them, and because they feel that British weight in diplomatic councils would be lacking without this force.

An all-out war is not in our interest. We erroneously assume however that an attack on Europe would lead to all-out war. This is by no means a foregone conclusion and, if we are to regain the enthusiastic support of Europeans for the NATO alliance, we must consider local resistance in Europe. We do need a massive retaliatory force (SAC) to deter a blow against the United States. Any other kind of threat anywhere else in the world would be best dealt with by a local response.

As a general proposition it is doubtful whether we can hold the vast perimeter of Asia by solely defensive means. We must somehow develop positive goals; we must be prepared in certain instances to act alone. History is replete with nations which have been paralyzed by their own preconceptions.

been beset by their own misconceptions.

instances to act alone. History is replete with nations which have
somewhat develop positive dosis; we must be prepared in certain
the vast perimeter of Vols dy solely defensive means. We must

be a general proposition it is difficult whether we can hold
dest with dy a local resistance.

Why other kind of thrust anywhere else in the world would be best
retaliatory force (SAC) to deter a blow against the United States.

consider local resistance in Europe. We do need a massive
entomological support of Europeans for the NATO alliance, we must
py no means a foreseen conclusion and, if we are to regain the
thereover that an attack on Europe would lead to all-out war. This is

in all-out war is not in our interest. We erroneously assume

conclaves would be lacking without this force.

cause they feel that British weight in diplomatic
targets of greatest importance to them, and pe-
force because they are not sure SAC would hit
Britain are creating a strategic atomic striking
in which we are strongest. For example, the

(p) It causes allies to dubernate the kinds of forces

to make except to provide passes for our aircraft.

(s) It causes allies to believe they have no contribution

out strategy.;

There are certain quadrants in exclusive reliance on an "all-

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[c]

II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

III - 7

VARIOUS PANEL SESSIONS ALSO DEVOTED MUCH OF THEIR
DISCUSSION TIME TO ASPECTS OF OUR ALLIANCES AND THEIR
DESIRABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS---

GEN. WHEELER: When you acquire partners in anything you acquire certain checks to what you would like to do if you had complete freedom of action. In other words, you take on responsibility. It's just like a man getting married. He acquires responsibility along with other things. I think it was Clausewitz who pointed out that in a war the common interests between partners in a coalition should be a proper objective for the enemy. In other words, you break down the common interest so that the coalition would fall apart.

To sum very briefly, I would say that if the United States could go it alone, realistically, that from the national point of view of the national interest this might be the best possible posture in which to be. I don't believe that we have entered into alliances entirely from altruistic motives, by any manner. But I think that we have entered in because we expect to receive something in return, whether it is moral support, active military support, varies as you go through the list of countries with whom we are associated. Now beyond that the question of how far you will go in backing your

beyond that the question of how far you will do in packing your
do through the rest of countries with whom we are associated. Now
whether it is moral support, active military support, varies so you
we have entered in because we expect to receive something in return,
enoughly from altruistic motives, by any manner. But I think that
which to do. I don't believe that we have entered into alliances
of the national interest this might be the best possible posture in
could do it alone, realistically, that from the national point of view
To sum very briefly, I would say that if the United States
common interest so that the coalition would fall apart.

broader objective for the enemy. In other words, you break down the
a war the common interests between partners in a coalition should be a
with other things. I think it was Clausewitz who pointed out that in
It's just like a man getting married. He suggests reasonableness slight
complete freedom of action. In other words, you take on reasonableness,
suggest certain checks to must you would like to do if you had

GEN. WHEELE: When you suggest partners in studying you

DETERMINES VAND LIMITATIONS---

DISCUSSION TIME TO VIEWS OF OUR ALLIANCES AND THEIR

VARIOUS BULLET SESSIONS VERO DEMOLED MUCH OF THEIR

III - 1

II - Mook-nb (2/4/82)

C/c

II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

III - 8

coalition is something that must be decided in each instance, because
you could get to the absurd point where the least member of the
alliance dictated the policy for the whole.

MR. HARR: We could have absolutely no allies and we could reject the concept of alliances. We would then suffer a tremendous loss of strength, potential strength, if we would assume also that the countries would be able to stand by themselves for a long period, or effectively stand. Or we could extend our alliances much farther than they now are extended to include every non-communist nation that was willing. But that would, of course, spread our risk of getting ourselves involved in something we don't want to get involved in much further. You have to strike a balance between the two extremes and decide those countries and areas which are essential to your own security and for which you are willing and to which it is worthwhile to give financial assistance and security. You have to expect the risk of being involved. For instance, one of the hot spots is, of course, West Germany where everyone can see that we might get ourselves drawn into a major conflict with the Soviet Union in one form or another because of our assistance to Western Germany, without any leadership being directly involved. And that can happen. Yet we certainly cannot afford to let West Germany go. As a matter of

we certainly cannot afford to let West Germany do. We a matter of
any leadership being directly involved. And that can happen. Yet
form or another because of our assistance to Western Germany, without
ourselves drawn into a major conflict with the Soviet Union in one
of course, West Germany where everyone can see that we might get
the risk of being involved. For instance, one of the hot spots is,
while to give financial assistance and security. You have to expect
own security and for which you are willing and to which it is worth-
and decide those countries and areas which are essential to your
much further. You have to strike a balance between the two extremes
ourselves involved in something we don't want to get involved in
that was willing. But that would, of course, share our risk of getting
than they now are extended to include every non-communist nation
or effectively stand. Or we could extend our alliances much further
the countries would be able to stand by themselves for a long period,
loss of strength, potential strength, if we would assume also that
select the concept of alliances. We would then suffer a tremendous
MS. HARR: We could have absolutely no allies and we could
alliance dictated the policy for the whole.
You could get to the spand point where the least member of the
coalition is something that must be decided in each instance, because

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III - 9

fact there are those who think that even in defensive areas which
are of no strategic importance to the United States, we might have
to get engaged merely to avoid a situation in which it appeared that
we had retreated from a defensive interest which we were hitherto
willing to defend out of fear of nuclear war. In other words, this
has been stated as a proposition for a basis of diplomatic decisions
that say let's not let ourselves ever get in that position. In other
words, let's not let there be such ambiguity that we find ourselves
trapped in a situation where we either have to take strong measures
or suffer that kind of a political defeat. Of course in all this I think
there is one thing that we have not all realized, that there is a
terrible implication involved in present weapons technology. It
almost defies comprehension of anybody, because no matter what
you say now, no matter what you plan in terms of stability, early
some morning, or late some night, in the middle of a golf game,
or somewhere, somebody has got to come in and sit down and make
a decision of which awful implications of action are innumerable.

MR. LINDSAY: Well it is the case in the history of our
allies that many of the decisions have arisen from a series of steps
which people did not see the implications through. Like them, it is
far simpler today and seems to me from your earlier statement that the

ter simpler today and seems to me from your earlier statement that the
which people did not see the implications through. Like them, it is
simpler that many of the decisions have arisen from a series of steps
MR. LINDBAY: Well it is the case in the history of our
a decision of which awful implications of action are innumerable.
or somewhere, somebody has got to come in and sit down and make
some morning, or late some night, in the middle of a doll game,
You say now, no matter what you say in terms of stability, early
almost defies comprehension of anybody, because no matter what
temperate implication involved in present weapons technology. It
there is one thing that we have not all realized, that there is a
or suffer that kind of a political defeat. Of course in all this I think
trapped in a situation where we either have to take strong measures
more so, let's not let there be such ambiguity that we find ourselves
that say let's not let ourselves ever get in that position. In other
have been stated as a proposition for a part of diplomatic decisions
willing to defend out of test of nuclear war. In other words, this
we had retraced from a defensive interest which we were hit into
to get engaged merely to avoid a situation in which it appeared that
are of no strategic importance to the United States, we might have
that there are those who think that even in defensive areas which

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III - 10

fantastic complexity in the weapons field, the time measurement,
all of these things are beyond the comprehension of individuals and
even our more powerful methods of systems analysis are certainly
not up to sorting out all these elements. This, therefore, increases
the danger that this will build up as a series of moves back and forth
which no man can possibly see beyond the next one and the next two
or three.

MR. HARR: Well, Frank, as long as each side maintains the
ability at this stage, which so far the Soviets have been very careful
to do, and we have been very careful to do, as long as they maintain
that ability, we have not crossed the Rubicon, particularly when
you measure the consequences of plunging into nuclear war.

MR. NASH: There are certain steps that people suggest we
take now in different situations, but which are analysis proved to
involve a willingness to go all the way or not to take. In other words,
this is the kind of thing we might turn on commitments, or guarantees
to a country, or diplomatic notes to the Soviet Union which say,
just don't do that -- or sponsoring of the U.N. force to go into
one of these countries, which we know that once we have done that
we have to in advance decide that we are willing to support that up
to and including a major involvement of the United States; or we
ought not to do it, because we are either going to sabotage the UN

ought not to do it, because we are either going to adopt the U.N.
to and including a major involvement of the United States; or we
we have to in advance decide that we are willing to support that up
one of these countries, which we know that once we have done that
just don't do that -- or sponsoring of the U.N. force to go into
to a country, or diplomatic notes to the Soviet Union which say,
this is the kind of thing we might turn on commitments, or guarantees
involve a willingness to do all the way or not to take. In other words,
take now in different situations, but which are analyses proved to
MR. MARCH: There are certain steps that people and about me
you measure the consequences of blundering into nuclear war.

that ability, we have not increased the Rapicon, particularly when
to do, and we have been very careful to do, as long as they maintain
ability at this stage, which so far the Soviets have been very careful
MR. HARR: Well, Frank, as long as each side maintains the
or three.

which we can possibly see beyond the next one and the next two
the danger that this will build up as a series of moves back and forth
not up to sorting out all these elements. This, therefore, increases
even out more powerful methods of systems analysis are certainly
all of these things are beyond the comprehension of individuals and
tantastic complexity in the weapons field, the time measurement,

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ECS

## II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

### III - II

as a force mechanism by doing it that way or get into a war very possibly. So all that I am saying is that whatever the decision, rightly or wrongly, it is going to involve a determination on our part to back it up all the way whenever such a decision is made. I think the negative factor is going to loom terribly large.

MR. LINDSAY: Karl, insofar as their recognizing the step that we take, I think there will be lots of steps that may be taken in which they may not be realized.

MR. HARR: I think that we have come closer and closer to the point now, both the Soviet Union and ourselves, where the danger of miscalculations is greatly increased and the geometry for the leverage of miscalculations is expanded.

GENERAL MCCORMACK: On the other hand the compulsion to recalculate becomes greater at the same time.

MR. HOOPES: What is being implied here is that because there is such a great fear that the first step in response to any kind of talent will lead to general war and because we are afraid of general war therefore we cannot afford to pin our interest anywhere because war is indivisible. It leads in a swift chain from early response to general holocaust. This is a frightfully terrorizing position.

MR. HARR: In the first place I don't believe for a minute that

MR. HARR: In the first place I don't believe for a minute that
reasons to general holocaust. This is a terribly terrifying position.
Because war is individual. It leads in a small chain from early
general war, therefore we cannot allow to bin on interest anywhere
of talent will lead to general war and because we are afraid of
there is such a great threat that the first step in reason to any kind
MR. HOOKE: What is being implied here is that because
to recalculate becomes greater at the same time.

GENERAL MCCORMACK: On the other hand the combustion
for the leverage of microcosmations is exhausted.
Gauder of microcosmations is greatly increased and the geometry
to the point now, both the Soviet Union and ourselves, where the
MR. HARR: I think that we have come closer and closer
in which they may not be realized.

MR. LINDSAY: Karl, in order as their recognizing the step
think the negative factor is going to loom temporarily large.
But to pack it up all the way whenever such a decision is made. I
rightly or merrily, it is going to involve a determination on our
possession. So all that I am saying is that whatever the decision,
as a force mechanism by doing it that way or get into a war very
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III - 12

a little war or a little conflict will inevitably lead to a holocaust.

In the second place I think what you are now raising is the central problem of our present foreign policy how to retain political initiative in the light of these crevasses and chasms in which we find ourselves along the way. All I am saying is, that being so and none of the horrible aspects of this showing a prospect of going away, we have to face up right now, to the facts that: (a) we cannot afford to lose our political initiative; (b) that in exercising that initiative we are running these terrible risks

MR. HOOPES: That's the essence of being the American government in this era.

MR. HARR: That's never been true before, Tim.

MR. HOOPES: Well, it's pretty true now and if you take a position that there is no alternative for peace, then it's terribly difficult to persuade the people that they ought to fight local wars to prevent large ones.

MR. WILSON: Is it possible that the very fact of the Soviet Union's and the United States' standing, seeing each other across these issues more clearly than before, might in fact, provide greater maneuverability than they did in the recent past because of the enormous inhibitions upon the all-out war because of parity and

the enormous responsibilities upon the all-out war because of harry and
d Greater maneuverability than they did in the recent past because of
these issues more clearly than before, might in fact, provide
Union's and the United States' standing, seeing each other across
MR. WILSON: Is it possible that the very fact of the Soviet
to prevent large ones.

difficult to because the people first they ought to fight local wars
position that there is no alternative for peace, then it's terribly
MR. HOOPES: Well, it's pretty true now and if you take a
MR. HARR: Trust's never been true before, Tim.
government in this era.

MR. HOOPES: That's the essence of being the American
initiative we are running these terrible makings
aid to lose our political initiative; (b) that in exercising that
away, we have to face up right now, to the facts that: (a) we cannot
none of the horrible aspects of this showing a broadest of going
find ourselves along the way. All I am saying is, that being so and
initiative in the light of these crevasses and crams in which we
problem of our present foreign policy how to retain political
In the second place I think what you are now raising is the central
a little war or a little conflict will inevitably lead to a holocaust.

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III - 13

so on, that the inhibitions on each party to localize conflict or not
take the decision to spread it to an all-out war, have grown enormously
and therefore, you've got a kind of safety wall more visible than
existed before in terms of what has been assumed in some cases
to be an almost brush-fire-like thing which you couldn't step once
you touched the first fuse.

GENERAL MCCORMACK: That is what I was reaching for when I spoke of the compulsion to recalculate. Very definitely you think harder before you start but you also think harder from time to time as you go along...

DR. SMITHIES: On the alliance question, if we took an extreme point of view and abandoned the national alliances, and say substituted force for the idea of a threat to intervene, I would reject this as being rather infeasible. I would say in some form that it is an alliance. It would seem to me that this would greatly increase the probability that almost every conflict would be a conflict with Russia, and that the only thing to do in these circumstances would be to intervene with the most modern A-bomb technology that we have and attack Russia. It seems to me that this would be the thing that would increase the probability of an all-out conflict with Russia and for that very reason it would be a thing that we would be rather hesitant to do.

Prevent to do.

and for that very reason it would be stining that we would be rather
that would increase the propability of an all-out conflict with Russia
have and attack Russia. It seems to me that this would be the thing
be to intervene with the most modern A-bomb technology that we
suppressed force for the idea of a threat to intervene. I would reject
extreme point of view and abandoned the national alliances, and say
dr. SMITHES: On the alliance question, it we took an
time to time as you do along...

You think harder before you start put you also think harder from
when I spoke of the combustion to reasonable. Very definitely
GENERAL MCCORMACK: That is what I was reaching for
you touched the first time.

to be an almost push-the-like thing which you couldn't step once
existed before in terms of what has been assumed in some cases
and therefore, you, we got a kind of safety wall more viable than
take the decision to abase it to an all-out war, have grown enormously
so on, that the inhibitions on each party to localize conflict or not

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552

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III - 14

It does seem to me that in line with the doctrine of limited war that many of us here adhere to, it's most important wherever possible that we do not have this kind of policy with Russia. I do not feel that it is quite inevitable in view of technological reasons that we do have this kind of thing. It seems to me that if we do have a system of alliances that some kind of an intermediate kind of conflict becomes more possible and it seems to me in our interests and in the Russian interests, to engage in limited wars and to fight these things right are more significant. I think that if one does have a system of alliances the internal subversion kind of conflict is more likely, and I think it is much more in the interests of the kind of peace that we have to have this kind of conflict rather than attacks against Russia and conversely. I feel that there is a strong case for retaining some kind of alliances. I can readily understand that alliances can be so complicated and so rigid that they can restrict our freedom of action. But to go to the other extreme and substitute the threat modern technology has entirely for the alliances seems to me to be a mistake...

MR. ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Chairman, is there a clear enough understanding on our part on what is the common purpose within the alliance? Or is there enough emphasis in our discussion on common purpose rather than too much on the fear of any possible holocaust that will come? I think that we should concentrate more on that. If

that will come? I think that we should concentrate more on that. It
bursts rather than too much on the fear of any possible holocaust
alliance? Or is there enough emphasis in our discussion on common
understanding on our part on what is the common burboase within the

MR. ROCKEFELLER, Mr. Chairman, is there a clear enough

technology has entirely for the alliance seems to me to be a mistake...

and conversely, I feel that there is a strong case for retaining some

have to have this kind of conflict rather than attacks against Russia.

alliances the internal supervision kind of conflict is more likely, and

Russian interests, to engage in limited war and to fight these things

not want that many of us here adhere to, it's a most important wherever

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III - A15

we had a clearer sense of that we wouldn't have gotten into trouble
with the British and French in the Suez situation. We split off too
much and lost our objectives. We started to break down on what are
really the ground rules, while they are important, keeping together
on what we are trying to achieve in reflecting the aspirations of the
peoples, is as important as anything. If we concentrated more on
these mutually accepted ends, we can then prevent the enemy from
splitting our objectives and splitting us up in the process.

GENERAL MCCORMACK: Carroll Wilson's paper bore down
very hard on the point of the common purpose. The one way that
stands out in my mind, at any rate, is that we have to reach an
understanding of some sort with the British, probably with the French
and maybe in due course with the Germans. I just don't know the
extent of it, an understanding, particularly with the ex--or almost
ex--colonial powers as to what the schedule is for working better
with the aspirations of recently liberated and sometimes not quite
stable people. Certainly one of the ground rules within an alliance,
one of the point of common purpose that will have to be solved, is
how do we feel about the opinions of such people? Did the British
and French consider this factor when they went to Suez? What about
the opinions of Saude Arabia? This may go on to what the Indians
thought and this had an important impact on the Pakistan position

thought and this had an important impact on the Pakistan position
the opinions of Sade Vaidas? This may do on to what the Indians
and French consider this factor when they want to Sade? What about
how do we feel about the opinions of such people? Did the British
one of the point of common purpose that will have to be solved, is
staple people. Certainly one of the around rules within an alliance,
with the aspirations of recently liberated and sometimes not quite
ex-colonial powers as to what the schedule is for working better
extent of it, an understanding, particularly with the ex--or almost
and maybe in due course with the Germans. I just don't know the
understanding of some sort with the British, properly with the French
at large out in my mind, at any rate, is that we have to reach an
very hard on the point of the common purpose. The one way that

GENEVW MCCORMACK: Carroll Wilson's better pole down
splitting our objectives and splitting us up in the process.
these mutually accepted ends, we can then prevent the enemy from
beings, is as important as anything. If we concentrated more on
on what we are trying to achieve in reflecting the aspirations of the
really the around rules, while they are important, keeping together
much and lost our objectives. We started to break down on what are
with the British and French in the Sade situation. We split off too
we had a clearer sense of that we wouldn't have gotten into trouble

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## II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

### III - 16

and that hot position affected the attitude of Indonesia. It all winds up in the problem of building a common purpose and such common purpose may be pretty hard to find.

MR. ROCKEFELLER: But at least the reconciliation of different objectives is better furthered by identifying a framework of some kind on an open basis rather than a separate action and an open fight between us and our allies. What worries me, when people talk about dropping alliances and argue they are no use to us any more, they are thinking only in terms of military objectives rather than in economic, social, political and psychological objectives which are an integral part of this problem. Just one illustration: if we drop our alliances, we won't have a friend in the United Nations, and there is an Assembly there where we have to have votes to support us or we lose on the political front all the things we are struggling for on the military front...

MR. HOOPES: It has been said that the British and French and other allies have lost their capacity to act, that they cannot act necessarily effectively. But they can lead the world and ourselves in grave situations from which we may be the only factor for extrication...

MR. HARR: Well, now, I think that you have touched on a very important aspect of the matter and perhaps a historically decisive one. Even before the British, French and Israel venture into Suez there was a general recognition that the sole major

into some there was a general recognition that the sole major

decisive one. Even before the British, French and Italian venture
very important aspect of the matter and hence a historically

MR. HARRIS: Well, now, I think that you have touched on a

in grave allusions from which we may be the only factor for exploitation...
sot necessarily effectively. But they can lead the world and ourselves
and other allies have lost their capacity to act, that they cannot

MR. HOOPES: It has been said that the British and French
struggling for on the military front...

to subvert us or we lose on the political front all the things we are
Nations, and there is an Assemplty there where we have to have votes
it we crop our alliances, we won't have a friend in the United
which are an integral part of this problem. Just one illustration:
than in economic, social, political and psychological objectives
more, they are thinking only in terms of military objectives rather
talk about crobbing alliances and argue they are no use to us and
open fight between us and our allies. What worries me, when I think
of some kind on an open front rather than a separate station and an
different objectives is better furthered by identifying a framework

MR. ROCKELEITER: But at least the reconciliation of

bureaus may be pretty hard to find.

in the problem of building a common bureaus and such common
and that not bostition affected the attitude of Indonesis. If all wings

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ECO

II - Mock-up (9/4/57)

III - 17

capability for independent decisive action rested with the United
States...

MR. JOHNSON: I disagree that U.S. in free world is the
only country which could exercise great political and military
power. Certainly if you look at the technological situation in the
free world Europe is still an exceedingly potent source for invention,
both basic and applied. And if you look at productivity overall, its
capability is nothing to sneeze at, if you put the whole business
together. There is an organization problem but I don't think I would
be willing to agree that Europe, if it were detached from the United
States and became neutral and then had a mind to organize and develop
its full technical and productive capability as a unit, could be
dismissed as an entity which would have insignificant military,
economic and political power.

I think that the situation rather is, oh that may be so now
because of disarmament it doesn't necessarily have to continue in
that direction. They don't have to catch up with us in any technological
race. They know the productivity within a reason and if they could
make that situation really work (they know a lot about politics and
power politics too) then you could foresee a situation in which if
we abandoned Europe by not supporting them in this period when they
are having their troubles and if they became neutral, and if they then

are having their troubles and if they become neutral, and if they then
we spontaneous Enobe by not embarking them in this period when they
power politics too) then you could foresee a situation in which it
make that situation really work (they know a lot about politics and
race). They know the productivity within a reason and it they could
that direction. They don't have to catch up with us in any technological
because of dismantlement it doesn't necessarily have to continue in
I think that the situation rather is, on that may be so now
economic and political power.

dismantled as an entity which would have insignificant military,
its full technical and productive capability as a unit, could be
States and become neutral and then had a mind to organize and develop
be willing to agree that Enobe, if it were detached from the United
together. There is an organization problem but I don't think I would
capability is nothing to sneeze at, if you but the whole business
both paste and applied. And if you look at productivity overall, it's
free world Enobe is still an exceedingly potent source for invention,
power. Certainly if you look at the technological situation in the
only country which could exercise great political and military

MR. JOHNSON: I disagree that U.S. in free world is the
States....

capabilities for independent decisive action related with the United
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III - 18

decided because they have strong national aspirations to join
together in technical, economic, political and military development
then we might really have to deal with a third force which would be
a very potent one and which might not necessarily be altogether
favorable to us.

We ought not to think only of today; we have to think about
tomorrow and tomorrow after that. Our implications were timeless.
In fact, you're extrapolating, saying the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are
going to be the only power sources in the world and I would say
that that is maybe true now, but it is debatable in the future. If
we want it that way, fair enough, but there is at least a possibility
that other countries may become equally powerful in the long-run.

VOICE: By the year 2000, half the people in the world are
going to be Chinese!

COLONEL LINCOLN: I wouldn't be surprised. With the risk
of the danger of being accused of levity I'd like to strike a blow for
NATO by mentioning two prodigious screw threads. If you are going
to unify Western Europe, it is essential that you standardize your
screw threads in this industrial community of ours. I suggest that
our security arrangements, our military alliances will give great
impetus to the standardization of screw threads and other little items.

in behalf to the standardization of screw threads and other little items.
our security arrangements, our military alliances will give great
screw threads in this industrial community of ours. I suggest that
to unity Western Europe, it is essential that you standardize your
NATO by mentioning two prominent screw threads. If you are doing
of the danger of being accused of gravity I'd like to strike a blow for
CORPORATION LINCOLN: I wouldn't be embroiled with the risk
going to be Chinese!

VOICE: By the best 1900's, half the people in the world are
that other countries may become usually powerful in the long-run.
we want it that way, let enough, but there is at least a possibility
that that may be true now, but it is deplorable in the future. It
going to be the only power source in the world and I would say
In fact, you're extrapolating, saying the U.3. and U.2.3. are
tomorrow and tomorrow after that. Our implications were timeless.
We ought not to think only of today: we have to think about
favorable to us.

a very potent one and which might not necessarily be sitoaether
than we might really have to deal with a third force which would be
together in technical, economic, political and military development
decided because they have strong national aspirations to join

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[L2]