- 35 -

tutes one of the dilemmas which is likely to continue to pursue
the Soviet leadership over the next decade.

The attitude toward religion and the churches repre-
sents still another problem area. In effect the regime has
tried to achieve a temporary settlement in this field by allow-
ing believers the right to worship while demanding that the
churches and the clergy yield political fealty to the State.
But the settlement at best is an ambiguous one. Both state and
Party exert unremitting pressure through the schools and the
youth organizations to undermine the basis of religious faith,
and believers encounter difficulty in making careers in the
Party-dominated atmosphere of Soviet society. At present
there is no direct persecution of the faithful, and the apparent
decline of interest in religion among the young renders the
regime tolerant of the existing settlement. But intensification
of activity on the part of the churches or any strong renewal
of religious belief among the young would present the regime
with a real challenge and an invitation to revive church per-
secution. For the moment at least there is no sign of a
religious revival on the Soviet horizon, though the possibility
can never be completely foreclosed as long as the churches
retain even their present precarious foothold in Soviet life.

The problem of freedom of expression in literature
and the arts offers another test case in "controlled relaxation".
Compared with the glacial silences of the Stalinist era, the
literary and artistic mood of post-Stalinist Russia is one of
ferment and change. The worst excesses of the anti-cosmopolitan

terment and change. The worst excesses of the anti-oosmopolitun
fiterary and artistic mood of boat-Statinat Ruses is one of
Combined with the Socialist affections of the Statinat era, the
and the arts offers another test case in "controlled relaxation".

The problem of freedom of expression in literature
result even their present preoccupations to fold in Soviet file.
can never be completely foreclosed as long as the common
reflections revival on the Soviet horizon, through the boshiflship
secession. For the moment at least there is no sign of a
with a real challenge and an invitation to revive common ben-
ot of religions perfect among the homog would present the regime
of activity on the part of the common or any strong renewal
regime tolerant of the existing settlement. But intensification
decide of interest in religion among the homog renders the
there is no directration of the faithful, and the apparent
hardly-dominated atmosphere of Soviet society. At present
and defevers encounter difficulty in making careers in the
homog organizations to undermine the basis of religious faith,
partly exert unmitting breesame through the schools and the
But the settlement at least is an amorphous one. Both a state and
commones and the clearly field political leadership to the state.
ing defevers the right to work and while demanding that the
tried to achieve a temporary settlement in this field by allow-
ences still another problem area. In effect the regime has
the attitude toward religion and the common repre-
the Soviet leadership over the next decade.

- 32 -

- 36 -

campaign have been repudiated, and a cultural window to the
West has been opened again. Writers who were under a ban for
many years are being reprinted, and plays that were suppressed
are again being performed. Writers are permitted greater free-
dom of characterization and write about believable people
instead of stilted types. Love has wedged its way back into
the theatre, and triangle plays are all the rage. Poets strike
an occasionally daring note, claiming the right to their own
intuitions and rebelling against the fetters which bind them.
Intellectuals press for more elbow room, and to some extent,
they have attained it. But the cultural commissars of the new
dispensation have also made clear that the Thaw has its limits.
In the authoritative words of Kommunist (No. 18, December 1955);
the writer must not forget that he is still "a fighter in the
ideological front," that he "has the obligation to support the
germs of the new in all areas of life with his weapons of
artistic expression and to propagate the progressive experience
of communist construction." The craftsmen of the pen have been
reminded that they are still artists in uniform, and that the
Party remains the ultimate custodian of orthodoxy. The Soviet
intellectuals face a cruel dilemma. Their appetite for freer
expression has been whetted, but how far dare they go without
risking retribution? And the regime in turn faces its own
dilemma. Having loosened the bonds, will it have to tighten
them again when inquisitive minds open up lines of inquiry which
the regime would prefer to see closed forever?

There remains the question of ideology and belief.

There remains the question of ideology and effet.

the regime would prefer to see closed forever?
them again when indigressive minds open up lines of industry which
diffuse. Having loosened the bonds, will it have to strengthen
baking contribution? And the regime in turn faces its own
expression has been whetted, but how far dare they go without
inteligence face a new dilemma. Their abhorrence for their
party remains the ultimate anathom of outmoded. The Soviet
reminded that they are a stiff autocrat in uniform, and that the
of communit construction." The craftsman of the benave pen
artistic expression and to propagate the progressive experience
gems of the new in all areas of life with his weapons of
ideological front," that he "has the obligation to support the
the writer must not forget that he is a stiff "a tighter in the
In the authoritative words of Kommunist (No. 18, December 1922):
demOCRATIZATION have also made clear that the Third has its limits.
they have attained it. But the cultural commissars of the new
inteligibles press for more epistol room, and to some extent,
intuitions and reproofing against the letters which bind them.
an occasionally gawing note, claiming the rights of their own
the theatre, and triangle plays are all the rage. Poets a strike
instead of shifted eyes. Love has wedded its way pack into
gdom of characterization and write spout peevish people
are a gain being berlonged. Writers are bemirfed Greater free-
many here are being rebranded, and plays that were unbreast
Most has been opened again. Writers who were under a pen for
campaign have been rebranded, and a cultural window to the

- 30 -

(14)

- 37 -

Any visitor to the Soviet Union is immediately made conscious of the fact that communication channels are saturated and clogged with agitation and propaganda celebrating the superiority of the Soviet system and denouncing the evils of capitalism. Such constant indoctrination undoubtedly leaves its impact, and it would be both foolish and dangerous to dismiss the outpourings of the Soviet agitprop apparatus as a mere waste of words. But this is not the whole story. The observant visitor who has an opportunity to talk with ordinary Soviet citizens is soon made aware of another peculiar by-product of totalitarian propaganda. In some respects the Soviet citizen is the most apolitical of men. Politics and ideology are deemed the affairs of the leaders and not the concern of ordinary men. The ideological barrage may leave its unconscious deposit, but the topics which dominate conversation are not ideology, but work, wages, food, clothing, housing, and the concrete experiences and problems of daily life. Most Soviet citizens know somehow that life outside the Soviet Union is not as dark as the Soviet journals paint it. At the same time patriotism and love of country are deep-seated, and the regime finds its broadest base of support when it tunes its propaganda to this theme. But for many of the rank-and-file Marxism-Leninism is jargon and gibberish. They judge the regime by its performance. When the load is heavy, they grumble and endure. When the burden is lightened, they applaud and rejoice.

Among the intellectuals, party people, and members of the middle and upper classes there is, of course, a far

of the middle and upper classes there is, of course, a fan
abband and retort.
Among the infidelities, partly people, and members

they Krupp and engine. When the burden is lightened, they
They judge the regime by its performance. When the load is heavy,
many of the rank-and-file Marxists-Leninists in Jargon and Rippen-
hip of support when it means its propaganda to this theme. But for
commonly are deep-seated, and the regime tends its proponent past
Journals being it. At the same time patriotism and love of
that file outside the Soviet Union is not so dark as the Soviet
problems of daily life. Most Soviet citizens know somehow
load, clothing, housing, and the concrete experiences and
which dominate conversation are not ideology, but work, wages,
logical barrage may leave its unaccustomed deposit, put the topics
of the papers and not the concern of ordinary men. The ide-
separate of men. Politics and ideology are deemed the altars
propaganda. In some respects the Soviet citizen is the most
is soon made aware of another benefit, dy-broader of politicalism
who has an opportunity to talk with the ordinarily Soviet citizen
words. But this is not the whole story. The observant visitor
dozing of the Soviet ergothrob abstrums as a mere waste of
ing it would be both too far and cumbersome to diatribe the out-
tain. Such constant indolence undoubtedly leaves its impact,
tority of the Soviet atom and denouncing the evils of capital-
cfogged with agitation and propaganda celebrating the amber-
of the East that communication channels are saturated and
Any visitor to the Soviet Union is immediately made conscious

(N)

- 33 -

- 38 -

higher degree of ideological sophistication. Indeed, a certain minimum skill in manipulating ideological symbols is a sine qua non for a successful career in Soviet society. With some it is a matter of deep belief, and the righteous self-assurance of the thoroughly indoctrinated is something which has to be experienced to be fully understood. With others it is a matter of pro forma faith, something which is done because that is the way things are done in the circle in which one moves. With still others, it may be a matter of cynical adjustment where inner doubts are suppressed in the interest of successful career-making.

Most observers who have watched the Soviet Union over a period of years detect a decline in ideological maturity and commitment in Soviet society as compared with the evangelical fervor and messianic dedication of the first revolutionary generation. Even a cursory reading of the ideological pronouncements at the 20th Party Congress reveals a certain impatience on the part of the present leadership group with all Party ideological work that is divorced from production, from what is called "the struggle for the realization of the practical tasks of Communist construction." This pragmatic cast of mind, one suspects, probably fits in well with the professional drives of the technical intelligentsia and other members of the state middle class whose real interests are administrative, managerial, technical, and scientific rather than ideological. Should such interests play an even more important role in Soviet society, one would expect an even greater adjustment of Party

society, one would expect an even greater adjustment of hard
should any interests exist an even more important role in Soviet
management, technical, and scientific rather than ideological.
the state middle class whose real interests are administrative,
interests of the technical intelligentsia and other members of
mind, one aspects, properly fits in well with the professional
team, takes of Communist construction." This pragmatic cast of
what is called "the attitude for the realization of the bache-
party ideological work that is divorced from production, from
benevolence on the part of the breast leader and from all
pronouncements at the 30th Party Congress reveals a certain im-
portant and generation. Even a common reading of the ideological
evolving itself, then and measurable dedication of the first re-
tancy and commitment in Soviet society as compared with the
over a period of years does not detect a decline in ideological min-
imo operators who have watched the Soviet Union
successful career-making.
Treatment where inner circles are unmeasured in the interest of
move. With at least others, it may be a matter of critical ab-
just that if the way things are done in the circle in which one
is a matter of pro forma latter, something which is done because
put to be experienced to be fully understood. With others it
assurance of the thoroughly indoctrinated is something which
some it is a matter of deep belief, and the righteous self-
same due now for a successful career in Soviet society. With
thein minimum skill in manipulating ideological symbols is a
higher degree of ideological appreciation. Indeed, a cer-

- 39 -

dogma to the problems of managing a society in process of rapid
industrialization.

There are other forces which support such a development.
The spread of higher education can be expected to usher in a
demand for a more sophisticated and complex picture of reality
than is permitted by the orthodox shibboleths of Marxism-
Leninism. Given the will on the part of the leadership, it is
not inconceivable that ideological readjustments can be made.
The repudiation at the 20th Party Congress of Stalin's "over-
simplified" view of the rapid decay of the Capitalist West
furnishes one example of the possibilities.

But here a note of caution needs to be struck. It
is one thing to develop a more subtle and sophisticated variant
of Marxism-Leninism. It is quite another to cast the whole
structure overboard. Of the latter there is no sign, and,
short of catastrophe for the Soviet leadership, there is un-
likely to be one. The regime is still committed to the doctrine
that communism is the wave of the future, that the Party is the
true custodian of the interests of the toilers, and that it must
remain dominant until communism is realized.

It may be that even these fundamentals will be in-
creasingly challenged in the years ahead. My own encounters
with a few dissident students inside the Soviet Union provide
at least some ground for believing that fundamental criticism
is not dead. New generations work their own mysteries, and the
hallowed orthodoxies of one sometimes emerge as the discarded
follies of the next. Those who have travelled in the Soviet

littles of the next. Those who have traveled in the Soviet
performed orthopoxies of one or two times emerge as the disenchanted
is not dead. New generations work their own materials, and the
at least some ground for proving that fundamental criticism
with a few resident students inside the Soviet Union know
creatively challenged in the beans area. My own encounters
It may be that even these fundamentals will be in-
remain dominant until communism is realized.

true enrolement of the interests of the toiler, and that it must
that communism is the wave of the future, that the party is the
likely to be one. The regime is still committed to the doctrine
of catastrophe for the Soviet leadership, there is nu-
certainty overpopulous. Of the latter there is no sign, and,
of Marxism-Peninnsim. It is quite another to cast the whole
is one going to develop a more ample and adequately armed
But here a note of caution needs to be attuned. It
unmitigated one example of the boshifities.

ambified view of the rabid decay of the Capitalist West
The rebustation at the 50th Party Congress of Stalin's "over-
not inconceivable that ideological requirements can be made.
Peninnsim. Given the will on the part of the leadership, it is
thus is permitted by the orthopox Hippodroma of Marxian-
gendered for a more apprehensive and complex biotume of reality

The abroad of higher education can be expected to happen in a
There are other forces which abhor such a development.
injustification.

dooks to the problems of managing a society in process of living

- 33 -

(Y)

- 40 -

Union recently can testify that the revelations about Stalin
came as a profound shock to the youth, and in the backwash of
reaction, some basic questions are being asked. The step from
total commitment to total rejection may be shorter than most
students of totalitarianism have been prepared to concede.

It is my own impression, nevertheless, that total
disillusionment is still a marginal factor in Soviet student
life. However great their inner doubts and however sceptically
they may view their own communication media, the student genera-
tion does not give the impression of being a revolutionary
generation. Most students whom I encountered had their eyes
trained on their own careers, viewed the future more or less
hopefully, and, at least outwardly, expressed considerable
pride in Soviet achievements and Soviet prospects. Criticism
and ferment there is, but the young intellectuals are not yet
the "superfluous men" of Czarist times, estranged from the State,
hatching conspiracies to overthrow their autocracy. That time
may come, but it is not now, and short of a major crisis or
profound repulse to Soviet power, it is unlikely to transpire
over the next decade.

There remains a final question -- the extent to which
American policy can affect Soviet development over the next
decade. Since American and Soviet interests impinge in vir-
tually every corner of the globe, it is obviously a question
on which much can be said and presumably will be said in the

on which much can be said and broadly will be said in the
turnly every corner of the globe, it is optionally a question
decade. Since American and Soviet interests impinge in air-
American policy can affect Soviet development over the next
twenty years -- the extent to which
over the next decade,
prolongeduce to Soviet power, it is miffed to transcribe
may come, put it is not now, and short of a major crisis on
interfering inconsistencies to overtake their unsecured. That time
the "ambivalent men" of Casuarit times, arranged from the state,
and ferment thereat, put the young intelligentsia are not yet
pride in Soviet achievements and Soviet prospects. Criticism
poorly, and, at least, outmoded, expressed considerable
trained on their own careers, viewed the future more or less
Generation. Most students whom I encountered had their likes
to do not give the impression of being a revolutionary
they may view their own communication media, the student Genera-
file. However great their inner concepts and however acutely
differentiation is at all a marginal factor in Soviet student
It is my own impression, nevertheless, that total
students of totalsimilarity have been prepared to concede.
total commitment to total rejection may be shorter than most
reaction, some false declarations are being made. The atab from
come as a prolong shock to the youth, and in the packman of
Union recently can be fully said the revelations about Stalin

- 40 -

(2)

paper which Dr. Mosely is preparing on Soviet foreign policy.
The discussion here will be confined to the impact of American
policy on Soviet domestic developments.

If we proceed on the assumption that the Soviet Union
and the United States will not be involved in nuclear warfare
in the next decade and that the relations between them will
be defined by the concept of competitive co-existence, that
is rivalry by every means short of world conflict, we must,
I believe, posit a situation in which American influence on
Soviet internal developments will be at best indirect.

Regardless of what the United States may do, the
Soviet industrial drive will continue, though the pace of the
Soviet advance and the allocation of resources among various
alternative uses will reflect the conditions of competition
with America. An increase in the American rate of growth,
a high rate of military expenditures, and an active large-
scale program of American aid to underdeveloped countries would
put maximum pressure on the Soviet economy, since the Soviet
leadership is likely to respond by seeking to match American
strength as much as possible. Given this situation, the
burden of the race would fall with particular force on the
consumption sector of the Soviet economy and impose a real
brake on improvements in living conditions. The tensions
generated by such pressure combined with the rising aspirations
of the Soviet populace might well force a reappraisal of Soviet
commitments and even a scaling-down of expenditures on heavy
industry or armaments. If, on the other hand, American growth

inquiry or summations. It, on the other hand, American growth commitments and even a scaling-down of expenditures on heavy
of the Soviet belligerent might well force a readjustment of Soviet
Generated by such breather combined with the raising aspirations
prize on improvements in living conditions. The tension
consumption sector of the Soviet economy and imposes a real
pressure on the race world itself with particular force on the
strength as much as possible. Given this situation, the
leadership is likely to rebind by seeking to match American
but maximum breather on the Soviet economy, since the Soviet
scare program of American aid to underdeveloped countries would
a high rate of militarily expenditures, and an active large-
with America. An increase in the American rate of growth,
alternative means will reflect the conditions of combat
Soviet advance and the affloecion of resources among various
Soviet industrial drive will continue, though the pace of the
regardless of what the United States may do, the
Soviet internal developments will be at least indirect.
I believe, both a situation in which American influence on
is rivaled by every means short of world conflict, we must,
be defined by the concept of competitive co-existence, that
in the next decade and that the relations between them will
and the United States will not be involved in unclean warlike
It we proceed on the assumption that the Soviet Union
belliger on Soviet domestic developments.
The discussion here will be confined to the impact of American
bar, which Dr. Moseley is preparing on Soviet foreign policy.

(A)

- 42 -

is sluggish, military expenditures are sharply reduced, and the American economic challenge abroad is relatively modest, the Soviet leadership will enjoy much greater elbow-room in manipulating and allocating its resources. In such circumstances the Soviet economy may well be able to provide more amenities for its own people and to undertake ambitious commitments abroad while still maintaining a relatively high rate of industrial growth.

It is much more difficult to visualize how American policy can influence Soviet social and political developments. The state of tension or lack of tension on the international scene will of course affect the way in which the regime manages its policy of "controlled relaxation," but one suspects that the long-run decision to broaden or abandon the policy will largely be determined by internal forces within the Soviet empire itself. Perhaps the most direct influence which American policy can exert is in the area of informational penetration and cultural exchange, though even these must be considered marginal weapons at best.

Most visitors who have been in the Soviet Union recently can testify from their own experience that despite the most virulent anti-American propaganda, there remains a reservoir of good will toward America and a lively curiosity about the United States on which American policy can build. There are many Soviet students and intellectuals who are far from satisfied with their own official media and who turn to alternative news sources, such as BBC, VOA, and the Jugoslav

["alternative news sources, such as BBC, VOA, and the Associated\npress, associated with their own officials and who turn to\nthere are many Soviet students and intellectuals who are far\napart the United States on which American policy can build.\nreservoir of God will toward America and a lively curiosity\nthe most vibrant anti-American propaganda, there remains a\nrecently can readily from their own experience that debits\nMost visitors who have been in the Soviet Union\nmark their meander at least.", "and cultural exchange, though even these must be considered\nbitter can exert it in the area of informational penetration\nembargo itself. Perhaps the most direct influence which American\ntargeted be determined by internal forces within the Soviet\nthe long-term deceleration to proceed or suspend the bitter will\nits bitter or \"controlled relaxation,\" put one aspect that\nseems will of course affect the way in which the regime manages\nthe state of tension or lack of tension on the international\nbitter can influence Soviet social and political developments.", "It is much more difficult to idealize now American\nglobal growth.", " spread while a diff maintaining a relatively high rate of in-\nter its own people and to undertake ambitious commitments\n the Soviet economy may well be able to break free more energetics\nfrom and affecting its reasons. In areas of circumstances\n Soviet leadership will enjoy much greater e东 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝 - 帝

- 43 -

newspaper Borba, for information which they cannot obtain from their own journals. Above all, they appear to want objective news, rather than counter-propaganda, and the BBC, which comes nearest to meeting this demand, was a particular favorite of the serious young people whom I met. VOA, on the other hand, has a large audience of jazz lovers, but its propagandistic tone, apparently, carries less conviction. It is significant that, despite jamming and the regime's disapproval, an audience for foreign broadcasts exists. American interests obviously can be served by reaching this audience with news which will give its members an objective view of events which is denied them by their own communication media. The precise effects of such broadcasts may be difficult to measure, but any activity is to be welcomed which provides even some Soviet citizens with a more realistic appreciation of the world, which keeps their critical faculties alive, which gives impetus to their aspirations, and reminds them of values which we and they share in common.

The same can be said of properly managed experiments in cultural relations. Obviously we must be on our guard to make certain that the advantages which we gain from such experiments are at least equal to those which the Soviet regime hopes to attain. But my own observations lead me to believe that we have less reason to fear such contacts than have the Russians. Large-scale direct exposure to the West of even the most indoctrinated Soviet youths is likely to have only healthy consequences. The layer of indoctrination is thin and brittle,

consequences. The leader of indoctrination is thin and brittle, most indoctrinated Soviet women is likely to have only a little Russian. Large-asome direct expanse to the West of even the that we have less reason to fear such contacts than have the probes to attain. But my own observations feed me to believe berlements are at least equal to those which the Soviet regime make certain that the advantages which we gain from such ex- in countries relations. Unfortunately we must be on our guard to The same can be said of probably managed experiments common.

tions, and reminds them of values which we and they share in critical thinking alive, which gives impetus to their search- more realistic appreciation of the world, which needs their to be welcomed which provides even some Soviet citizens with a prosdoads may be difficult to measure, but only activity is their own communication media. The precise effects of such members an objective view of events which is denied them by be served by resounding this audience with news which will give its for foreign prosdoads exist. American interests obviously can that, despite jamming and the regime's disapproval, an audience tone, abnormally, carries less conviction. It is a significant has a large audience of less foveaux, put its propaganda the serious long people whom I met. NOV, on the other hand, nearest to meeting this demand, was a baronier favorite of news, rather than counter-propaganda, and the BBC, which comes their own journal. Apove all, they appear to want objective newspapermen, for information which they cannot obtain from

(4)

- 13 -

and the contrast between what students have been told about the
West and what they will see with their own eyes provides its own
unforgettable lessons. This is an area where we can afford to
be bold and venturesome. What we have to show can be the most
effective form of subversion.

But we must not expect that American policy can work
wonders. What we do may influence Soviet development, but we
cannot dictate or control it. Such changes as take place in
the Soviet Union over the next decade will ultimately reflect
Russian conditions and pressures. And even the most liberal
conceivable Soviet regime will still present us with problems.

conceivable Soviet regime will still present us with problems.
Russian conditions and measures. And even the most fideyf
the Soviet Union over the next decade will ultimately reflect
cannot dictate or control it. Such changes a take place in
wonders. What we do may influence Soviet development, but we
But we must not expect that American policy can work
effective form of administration.

be bold and venturesome. What we have to show can be the most
unforgettable reasons. This is an area where we can afford to
rest and what they will see with their own eyes provides its own
and the contrast between what students have been told about the

- 44 -

DUPLICATE
HARPER & BROTHERS

PUBLISHERS SINCE 1817

49 East 33rd Street, New York 16, N. Y.

November 7, 1957

George Dwight, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hope and Hadley
15 Broad Street
New York, New York

Dear George:

Here are our figures on the Rockefeller Special Studies Project. They are predicated on three different sizes of book and four alternative publishing arrangements as follows:

1. Publication on a straight royalty basis, as previously quoted to Dr. Kissinger, with no guaranteed purchase on the part of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

2. Publication with royalties waived by the RBF, but no guaranteed purchase on the part of the RBF.

3. A guaranteed purchase of 2500 copies at 50% discount with regular royalty provisions in effect.

4. A guaranteed purchase of 5000 copies at 50% discount with regular royalty provisions in effect.

Enclosed is a table which sets these figures down in tabular form since this is probably the clearest way to indicate the retail prices we would expect to fix under each condition and the corresponding amount we would agree to spend initially for advertising and promotion.

The advertising appropriation listed in the table represents what we would expect to spend on a projected first printing. Of course, if the book sold well we would continue to apply additional money to advertising and promotion as released by sales.

CABLE ADDRESS : HARPSAM · TELEPHONE : MURRAY HILL 3-1900

HARPER & BROTHERS

PUBLISHERS SINCE 1817

George Wright, Esq.

November 7, 1957

Page 2

Under arrangements three and four the royalty paid on copies purchased at 50 per cent discount would be 10 per cent of the price received. This is a set provision in our contract and it is what permits us to sell books at such a large discount.

In our conference with Mr. Ruebhausen the question arose as to whether Harpers would be willing to relinquish the rights to a cheap edition. As a matter of policy we feel that we should retain these rights; however, we will be willing to cooperate insofar as possible on any plan that the RBF may want to try to work out for a reprint edition at a reasonable interval after original publication.

Incidentally I had a call this morning from John Fischer, the Editor of Harpers Magazine, who said that he would be interested in seeing a finished manuscript at an early date to consider the possibilities of using some part of it in Harpers.

I hope this letter covers the information you want. If you have any further questions don't hesitate to call on me.

Yours very best regards,

RBM Aube

CABLE ADDRESS : HARPSAM TELEPHONE : MURRAY HILL 5-1900

COPY

The Rockefeller Foundation

49 West 49th Street
N.Y. 20, N.Y.

September 12, 1956

Dear Mr. Kissinger

Recently there has been an opportunity for me to
bring to the attention of my colleagues for discussion the
subject of our conversation of August 16, namely, the
possibility of assistance from The Rockefeller Foundation
toward the continuation of the Harvard International Seminar.
All of us were in agreement that the Seminar has chosen its
participants well and that its sessions have proved stimu-
lating and beneficial to those with whom we have come in
contact. Nevertheless, it was our feeling that this was
not a project for which we could hope to obtain support from
the Foundation, since at the present time we have our own
programs for international exchange in fields of particular
interest to the Foundation.

I should like to congratulate you on the success of
the Seminar and to express the hope that you will be able
to find from other sources the assistance which you need to
continue it.

Edward q. Armitage

Sincerely yours,

continue if.
to find from other sources the saarastance which you need to
the Seminar and to express the hope that you will be able
I should like to congratulate you on the success of

interest to the Foundation.
programs for international exchange in terms of baccalaureate
the Foundation, since at the present time we have our own
not a program for which we could hope to obtain support from
contact. Nevertheless, it was our feeling that this was
favourable and beneficial to those with whom we have come in
participate well and that its sessions have proved attractive
all of us were in agreement that the Seminar has chosen ita
toward the continuation of the Harvard International Seminar.
benefitability of saarastance from The Rocketteler Foundation
subject of our conversation of August 16, namely, the
pring to the attention of my colleagues for consideration the
Recently there has been an opportunity for me to

Dear Mr. K. Kastner,

September 15, 1926

N.Y. 50, N.Y.
113 West 48th Street

The Rocketteler Foundation

COKY

## EXPERTS TO EXPLORE WHAT FUTURE HOLDS

Some of the nation's leaders in business, the professions, labor and science will try to prepare the United States to meet its problems and opportunities in the next decade under a project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

The fund has set aside more than $100,000 for the special studies project to explore and determine what the future may hold and to develop concepts that might be helpful in meeting the challenges presented. Nelson A. Rockefeller is president of the fund, which was established by the sons of John D. Rockefeller Jr. for philanthropic and research purposes.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, director of the Harvard International Seminar, is in charge of the study. Experts will examine the trends of international security, politics and economics and will seek to analyze factors affecting domestic economic, social and manpower problems.

It will be some months, it was said, before the first reports based upon the deliberations of the panel will be published.

### Church Segregation Cited

LOS ANGELES, Nov. 16 (AP)—The majority of Los Angeles Protestant churches exclude Negroes and Orientals from their memberships, according to a report by the Church Federation of Los Angeles.

September 6, 1955

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

FOR

AUGUST-OCTOBER PANEL

Second Meeting

1. The next meeting of the Panel will be held at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia from September 25 to September 29, inclusive.

2. Participants should plan to meet at 4:30 P. M. on Sunday, September 25, in the lobby of the Executive Office Building at Seventeenth and Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest.

3. Participants will depart from Washington, D. C. by official automobiles to arrive at Quantico in time for dinner on Sunday. The conference will end with an evening session on Thursday, September 29.

4. Arrangements are being made for housing, messing, recreation and all services for the participants at the Marine Corps Schools through Friday morning. Transportation back to Washington will be furnished.

5. All participants will receive U. S. Government travel orders authorizing transportation to and from their residences to Quantico.

6. Each participant will receive $12.00 per diem subsistence, less a small charge for Government quarters. Each will be billed after return home for his meals, laundry, dry cleaning, etc.

7. Hotel reservations in Washington will be secured if requested for participants arriving in Washington prior to Sunday, September 25.

8. Further details on administrative arrangements will be provided you upon your arrival.

OFFICE OF NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

September 8, 1955

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We have finally completed arrangements to hold the next meeting of the Panel at Quantico from the evening of September 25 to September 29 inclusive. Chairman Anderson desires that as much as possible of the substantive work be accomplished by Wednesday evening since an unbreakable engagement will preclude his remaining through Thursday. However, he plans to have the meeting continue in his absence if need be.

We are circulating herewith, for the retention of each panel member, certain background documents. It is requested that they be brought to the next meeting for possible use at that time.

Inclosures

1. Peaceful Co-existence

2. The Ideological Issue:
Freedom or Coercion

3. Western Influence and Asian
Opinion

4. New U. S. Foreign Economic
Policy

5. Random Remarks Concerning the
    Cold War and the Present
    Soviet Peace Drive

1. LIAISON OFFICER

a. Major A. R. EPPLIN will be your Liaison Officer. His telephone numbers are:

4149 - 2117 - During working hours
5788 - Quarters Y

2. QUARTERS AND OFFICE SPACES

a. Suites "A", "L", and "K" in Harry Lee Hall and Suites "2", "3", and "4" in Waller Hall have been made available for living quarters. Tun Tavern has been converted into a Conference room with office space on the Mezzanines of Harry Lee Hall.

3. MEALS

a. Meals will be provided at HARRY LEE HALL except the evening meal on Sunday 25 September. In order that noon and evening meals may be served promptly menus will be provided at least two (2) hours prior to both meals. It is requested that the meal order and the desired time of dining be delivered to the caterer at HARRY LEE HALL.

b. The evening meal on Sunday 25 September will be served in the Dining Room, Waller Hall with cocktails served prior to the meal in the Hunt Room.

c. Meals are also available in the WALLER HALL Dining Room. Hours and price ranges are as follows:

| | | Price Range Regular Menu |
|:---|:---|:---|
| Breakfast | 0700 - 0830 | .30 - 85¢ |
| Luncheon | 1130 - 1330 | .55 - 90¢ |
| Dinner | 1830 - 2030 | $1.50 - 3.25 |

a. It is requested that individual members of the party sign dining room chits denoting meals ordered to assist in keeping an accurate account and in rendering the final bill.

4. TRANSPORTATION

a. Guest passes will be provided for all private cars.

b. Parking spaces will be made available at the North West End of HARRY LEE HALL.

c. Transportation will be assigned to take those living in WALIER HALL to HARRY LEE HALL each morning and return each evening.

d. Transportation will be provided on an "on call" basis to make special runs aboard the post. Phone 7121.

## 5. COMMUNICATION

a. Each suite in HARRY LEE HALL and WALLER HALL is equipped with one phone. In addition there will be three (3) phones in the Mezzanine, and one outside the Conference Room (DESK HARRY LEE HALL). See telephone directory attached to this information sheet for assigned numbers.

b. All the telephones provided are authorized for use of official Long Distance and Defense Department circuits. The phones are authorized priority access to Defense Department Circuits for official calls.

c. To make either of the calls listed above, dial 10 and give operator the desired number. Party making call should identify himself to the operator and state which circuit is desired.

d. Personal calls will be handled in the same manner (Dial 10), however it is requested that the party making a personal call inform the operator of this fact and state his name and number.

e. Western Union is available for both official and personal use. Personal messages maybe phoned into the Western Union Office (Telephone No. 7798). Official messages sent by Western Union must be delivered to the Communication Center ("E" Barracks) in person and released by a member of the staff who is so authorized.

## 6. GENERAL INFORMATION

a. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Services (one day) are available. All suites will be supplied with a sufficient number of laundry and dry cleaning slips. All persons desiring this service fill out slip and leave clothing, (bundled up and with slip attached) in their quarters where the maid can collect it.

b. The Post Office is located in the lobby of the Marine Corps School Theatre.

Hours: Monday - Friday - 0830 - 1730
Saturday - 0830 - 1200

c. Payment of bills. An itemized bill will be forwarded to the home office. This bill will be in two categories. The first category will include all expenses of an official nature. The second category will include all expenses of a personal nature such as, dry cleaning, personal phone calls, meals, etc, and will be further broken down by names of persons in the party.

2

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">FORM DS-17a<br>6-2-52</th><th>DEPARTMENT OF STATE<br>AUTHORIZATION OF OFFICIAL TRAVEL</th><th>A - Authorization Number<br>70<br>6-1620</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">U.S. Department of State</td><td>Dr. Henry A. Kissinger<br>58 East 68th Street<br>New York 21, New York</td><td>B - Authorization Date<br>September 16, 1955</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">D - You are hereby authorized by the Department of State to perform official travel at Government expense as indicated herein. This travel is not ordered at your request nor for your convenience, except as provision is made for leave as allowed by law. You are to proceed in accordance with the instructions contained herein or as amended. Unless otherwise noted, all expenses and the maximum per diem under the regulations checked below are authorized. Vouchers should be submitted promptly as provided in the applicable regulations.</td></tr><tr><td>E - Official or Official Visiting Place of Business:<br>Post You are Leaving<br>303-220-8668</td><td colspan="2">New York, N. Y.</td><td>F - If Transfer or New Assignment, Post to which You are Proceeding.</td></tr><tr><td>G - The following information MUST be entered on all Transportation Requests issued. Failure to do so may result in your financial responsibility for travel performed.</td><td>Authorization Number<br>6-1620</td><td>Appropriation Number<br>1963930.002</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Allotment Number<br>6DD-2099</td><td>Obligation Number<br>209</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">H - Itinerary, Purpose, Remarks, and Special Instructions and Authorizations.<br><br>On or about September 24, 1955 proceed from New York, New York to Quantico, Virginia and return on or about October 1, 1955. In proceeding to and from Quantico you are authorized stopover Washington to Consult with officials of OCB/PCG<br><br>Purpose: To participate in panel discussions to be conducted by the Planning Coordination Group of the Operations Coordinating Board.<br><br>Appropriation: Consolidated Working Fund, State, Sundry, 1956<br><br>(WAE Consultant)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">I - Status of Traveler</td><td colspan="2">J - Applicable Regulations</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Service<br>Officer or Employee</td><td>Recipient of Cultural<br>Cooperation Grant</td><td colspan="2">I FSM III 180 FSTR</td></tr><tr><td>Departmental<br>Employee</td><td>ORO asd OCB/<br>FCG</td><td colspan="2">Manual of Regulations and Procedures</td></tr><tr><td>O - Authorizing Officer</td><td></td><td>X Standardized Government Travel<br>Regulations</td><td>International Contingencies<br>Department of State</td></tr><tr><td>~~H.A. Blundin, Chief, FD/T~~</td><td></td><td>Public Law 600—79th Congress<br>(60 Stat. 806), as amended, and<br>Executive Orders Pertaining Thereto.</td><td>International Information and Educa-<br>tional Activities, Department of State</td></tr><tr><td>~~Transportation Branch, Division of Central Services~~</td><td></td><td>22 CFR 1:65</td><td>Government in Occupied Areas</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>N-Travel<br>Requested<br>By:<br>Office<br>OCB</td><td>L - Fiscal Year<br>1956<br>M - Activity<br>Officer,<br>Charles E. Johnson<br>Executive Assistant</td></tr></tbody></table>

IMPORTANT: Every Voucher and Message Concerning This Travel Must Refer to Authorization Number and Date at Top.

COPY FOR TRAVELER — SEE REVERSE SIDE

IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRAVELER

FOLLOW THESE RULES TO AVOID DIFFICULTIES AND INSURE PROMPT REIMBURSEMENT OF
YOUR TRAVEL EXPENSES. THEY ARE NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FULL REGULATIONS
UNDER WHICH YOU ARE TRAVELING BUT THEY WILL REMIND YOU OF SOME OF THE
IMPORTANT THINGS YOU MIGHT OTHERWISE OVERLOOK.

1. Provide yourself with a handy note-book or Travel Memo (Form DS-871) and keep careful record of:

a. Date, hour and minute of every departure and arrival, every change from one type of conveyance to another, and every crossing of an international boundary where a change in per diem is involved.

b. Every cash payment for which you will claim reimbursement. Note the date, place, purpose, and amount, the latter in local currency if you are abroad.

c. Serial number of each Government Transportation Request used, the nature and value of the service or accommodation received, and the name of the transportation company (also name of ship used if traveling by sea).

d. Number of pieces of baggage carried, and the weight if carried as excess baggage or shipped by express.

e. Exact date and hour of entry upon leave of absence and return to duty status. If any extra travel is performed for personal reasons, the extra time taken is chargeable to leave and the extra expense must be borne by you.

DO NOT RELY ON YOUR MEMORY FOR THIS IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY INFORMATION

2. Obtain receipts (and attach them to your voucher) for:

a. All items of expenditure of more than $3, except for local taxicab fares and baggage transfer charges.

b. Steamer chairs, cushions, and rugs.

c. All purchases of foreign currency, showing the rate of conversion and the commission charged.

d. All cash purchases of transportation or of Pullman accommodations (Pullman stubs for the latter.) You must use Government Transportation Requests wherever possible for official travel (NEVER USE THEM FOR PERSONAL TRAVEL).

e. Excess baggage carried, showing weight and terminal points.

3. When transportation requests are used and no claim is to be made for per diem or other expenses, you must still prepare a voucher indicating dates and points of travel, means of transportation, numbers of transportation requests used, and citation to your travel authorization number and date.

4. Follow exactly your travel authorization given on the reverse side. Do not stop over any place en route unless authorized to do so, except in an emergency which must be fully explained in your voucher. It will not be considered an emergency if you delay because your baggage does not arrive on schedule. If this happens, do not wait for it but leave forwarding instructions.

5. If excess baggage is carried and is not specifically provided for in your travel authorization, an explanation justifying the official necessity for it *must* accompany your claim for reimbursement in addition to the receipt.

6. If you are a Foreign Service officer or employee and your family has been authorized to travel at Government expense, only the cost of direct uninterrupted travel may be allowed. If you stop over on official business under orders and your family delays to be with you, no per diem will be allowed for your family for that period and any excess transportation costs incurred as a result of use of other than minimum first-class accommodations in this connection must be borne as a personal obligation.

Nicholas Nyary

Objective of Research:

To investigate where American public opinion, specifically Congressional leaders, stood on a philosophy of defense during the decade since World War II.

What pattern or tendencies have evolved in Congressional thinking on American military policy? If such a pattern or tendencies are perceivable can they be attributed to specific military, political, or economic developments?

What was Congressional opinion at any one time since World War II on the following topics, and did that opinion change subsequently?

1. Appraisal of alliances - generally or individual instances

2. Value and limitations of the atomic bomb.

3. Notions on limited war and all out war

4. Concept of a military "deterrent"

5. Evaluation of U.S. military security and/or superiority

-0-

General - Historical

Senate appropriation committee hearings reflect a somewhat haphazard adjustment of military policy to day-to-day requirements - and seem conspicuous for the lack of an overall military policy objective.

In a way this must be unavoidable due to the intent of Congress to keep in step with fluctuating public opinion. However, such adjustment to the public will seems entirely instinctive and no attempt appears to be made to formulate long range military policy. Of course, long range goals are set up but these are continually revised in the light of temporary exigencies of domestic politics.

In the Senate hearings on the 1946 appropriation during June 1945 there was one policy amplified by three considerations: V-J Day would mean the end of military planning and return to 1939 "normalcy". This was to be carried out by 1. reduction of armed forces quickly as possible and 2. efficient redeployment in the Pacific. (The atomic bomb was still an unknown factor at the time of the hearings.) 3. economy, by cutting aircraft procurement from 12.5 to 5.8 billion dollars.

The hearings on the 1947 budget had one overriding consideration: economy. General Eisenhower, then

Chief of Staff, was aiming at a reduced army of 1 million men.
To his surprise no one questioned his figures although he
thought it low. One military function remained, that of
occupation and, of course, necessary logistics. Reductions
justified by: 1. faith in United Nations, 2. decrease of
obligations.

Hearings on the 1948 budget show a reassessment
by the military but not by Congress. Ten billion dollars
requested for army and air, cut by Secretary to 8.4, by
Bureau of Budget to 5.9 and by House to 5.5 billion dollars.
War Department fights for restoration on basis that vigorous
aviation industry needed for the upkeep of our first line
of defense, the Air Corps. Also smallness of Army considered
inviting disaster.

Reminiscent of more recent events is the Supplemental Appropriation for 1948 in April 1948. Congress tried to force 800 million dollars on the Air Force for procurement of new planes. Secretary Forrestal showed caution: military problems cannot be solved by a 70 group Air Force alone! Need for a balanced defense establishment was emphasized. However, there was no military aid considered for Western Europe for 1949.

During the appropriation hearings of the 1949

budget the Army sought restoration of ordnance funds cut
by the House, but needed to replace and rehabilitate World
War II equipment. Simultaneously it was hoped that Army
strength could be increased from 560,000 to 700,000 men.

The hearings for the 1950 budget show attempts
at long range planning. Some reduction in active strength
desired in order to build up reserves, industrial mobilization
planning, and training of civilian components. It was not
expected that military assistance to European nations would
permit reduction of American defense requirements.

Such was the development of U.S. military policy
before the Korean conflict.

Against this background of American military plans
the following general attitudes and reactions in the Senate
can be perceived:

1. The temptations of reduced spending have traditionally sent Congress looking for a single defense panacea; a cure-all now found in the atomic bomb.

2. The bomb as a military instrument was not emphasized, although its availability was apparent to all. As a result complete demobilization was made possible strategically, as it was inevitable politically after the last war.

3. American military security was never questioned, due to confidence in U.S. productive potential and atomic stockpiles. It seems that defense potential and actual defense capabilities were considered to be permutable concepts.

4. Only gradually did it become clear that the effectiveness of the atomic bomb depended on reliable delivery to its target. Therefore,

a. Since 1947 the aircraft industry was encouraged to keep up production and research, and,

b. the army and navy began to be considered as essential protectors and suppliers of the Air Force.

5. Congress received the first real jolt in this complacency with the announcement of the existence of Soviet atomic bombs. ( A total of nine votes in favor of an additional half a billion dollar airplane procurement fund was quickly changed to a vote without dissent.)

6. However, it should not be overlooked that not one single research and development budget was ever cut since World War II.

7. Alliances did not constitute part of the American defense picture until forced by events. For a long period aid granted to friendly states was clearly distinguished

from treaty obligations. Only Soviet successes made us
move, toward the acceptance of Nato. Hence alliances became
a part of American defense policy.

8. For several years the Atomic bomb had only
had a psychological deterrent value. The first attempts to
give it real force came with the question of the super-
carrier and the B-36. The problem of delivery remained
unresolved at the time and a compromise solution was found
in the SAC deterrent airbases; the first U.S. bases with a
primarily aggressive mission.

In conclusion it should be pointed out that during
this period there was no articulate "Fortress America" campaign
in Congress. Both houses were controlled by Democrats who,
by and large, stood for "balanced forces". Only after
sufficient deterrent power has been amassed at Russia's door-
step did a lively debate develop to reduce overseas commitments.
Thus once a semblance of security was achieved U.S. policy went
the full circle returning to the "go it alone" attitude held
prior to the current power conflict.

--0--0

July 20, 1956

Dear Mr. Brown:

I am writing to enlist your collaboration in a program sponsored
by Nelson Rockefeller under the auspices of the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund.

The project grew out of our belief that many of our difficulties,
both domestic and foreign, are due not so much to an absence of good
ideas, but to our inability to find concepts and attitudes to deal with a
situation changing more rapidly and in directions different from what our
national experience led us to expect. This problem seems to us compounded
by the fact that most of the leadership groups in this country are taught to
administer rather than to conceptualize, to specialize rather than to
think in general terms. As a result, most policy makers deal with poli-
tical problems as an administrative process, which tends to emphasize
the peculiarities of each situation and which inhibits an understanding
of the relationship between the political, economic, psychological and
military components of policy.

It therefore seemed to us important to launch a series of
studies designed not to write specific policy recommendations but to
develop the conceptual framework on which the consideration of policy
might be based, to sketch longer term trends and to outline alternative
means of coping with them. Another purpose of the studies would be
to encourage a more sustained consideration of the problems on which,
trite as it may sound, our national survival may well depend.

To achieve these objectives, we are planning the formation of
a number of panels composed of individuals recognized as leaders in
their fields and respected for their lack of partisanship. Each of these
panels would consider a specific problem area of U.S. policy with the
expectation that at a later stage of the study the conclusions of the
panel might be considered by an overall group which would seek to re-
late these problems to each other and to a basic U.S. posture.

I think you will agree, however, that panels are not productive
of sustained effort unless they meet on the basis of a disciplined

Mr. Brown

2

July 20, 1956

intellectual framework. Before forming the panels we are therefore
inviting a number of thoughtful individuals from the academic
community to prepare papers on which the deliberations of the panels
might be based. We are not thinking of long research efforts but of
an analysis growing out of research in progress or completed or re-
flecting the author's thinking about a problem that has long concerned
him. The papers should project the author's assessment of trends over
the longer term (say a 10-15 year period), the objectives which we
might set ourselves, and the alternative ways of thinking about the
problems together with the author's recommendation of the basic con-
cepts that should underlie our policy in this field. These papers would
then form the point of departure for the panels.

Out of this procedure at least two kinds of publication are con-
templated: one, a report which reflects the view of the overall panel
(or its agreed disagreements) about long term trends of U.S. policy; and
two, insofar as our funds permit, a symposium of the individual memo-
rande on which the deliberations of the panel were based but for which
the author would be solely responsible.

Obviously the key to the success of this program is the quality
of the individuals who prepare the initial papers. They will not only be
regular members of the panel but in a real sense they will define its
intellectual framework. I hope very much that we might induce you to
undertake a paper on the future utilization of manpower, particularly
the problem of how our educational system can supply the training of
leadership groups we will require in various fields and a projection of
which fields are likely to be most critical. Beyond writing this paper,
we might ask you to sit with the panel we are setting up perhaps two or
three times during the fall. You would however be under no obligation
to modify your views or to change your paper as a result of the panel
discussions.

I hope very much that you will agree to participate, and if
you were to agree to undertake this we would pay you $500 for your
paper, which should be between 30 and 50 manuscript pages in length.
We would like to have it by October 1, although I should be glad to dis-
cuss an extension of the deadline. I would welcome an early opportunity
to write you further about the project or to discuss it with you personally
should you be in New York. Should we come to an understanding, we
can then arrange to have a formal letter sent to you from the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund confirming the arrangement.

October 31, 1956

Dear Mr. Wilson:

I am writing to enlist your assistance in what I believe to be an important project being undertaken by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

This project grew out of our belief that the United States finds itself today in a paradoxical situation: we have succeeded in our domestic development to an extent which would have been considered unrealizable even twenty years ago; internationally, we have emerged as the strongest nation of a world in ferment and yet, because of their very magnitude, our achievements and our strength appear in some ways to have outrun our goals. Therefore, it would seem that we must bring to bear the best thinking of which we are capable on a reappraisal of our concepts and attitudes to deal with a situation changing more rapidly and in some cases in directions different from what our national experience has led us to expect.

In an effort to make a contribution to this, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund has organized a Special Studies Project to analyze the problems and opportunities which may confront the United States over the next decade and to re-evaluate our national purpose in relation to them. Our concern is not with writing specific policy recommendations but to develop the conceptual framework on which the consideration of policy might be based, to sketch longer term trends and to outline alternative means of coping with them.

After consultation with leaders in education, business, labor and government, we have proceeded with a number of preliminary studies and have commissioned some of the most thoughtful individuals in various fields to outline the trends and objectives in their special area of competence. One of the fields in which we are particularly interested relates to the United States international security objectives and strategy and it would mean a great deal to us

- 2 -

to have the benefit of your experience and imagination in this area.

We are organizing the Project on the basis of an overall panel and six subpanels. Each subpanel will be composed of some members from the overall panel, two or three authors and several persons with broad experience in the specific area of United States objectives and policy under consideration. I would hope very much that it would be possible for you to participate in the deliberations of the subpanel on U. S. International Security Objectives and Strategy which will be chaired by General James McCormack, Jr.

This subpanel will meet perhaps four or five times over the next six months, beginning in mid-November. The enclosed memorandum describes the organization more fully, including a list of the authors who have prepared papers to be considered by the subpanel we hope you will be able to join.

The success of this project will depend on the assistance and best thinking of our ablest citizens and I feel your participation would contribute immeasurably. If you agree to serve on this subpanel, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Director of Special Studies, will be in touch with you concerning arrangements for the first meeting.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Mr. Carroll Louis Wilson
V. P. - Gen. Manager,
Metals - Controls Corp.
Attleboro, Mass.

December 6, 1956

Dear Mr. Floberg:

After consultation with leaders in education, business, labor
and government, we have proceeded with a number of preliminary studies
and have commissioned some of the most thoughtful individuals in
various fields to outline the trends and objectives in their special area
of competence. One of the fields in which we are particularly interested
relates to the United States international security objectives and strategy
and it would mean a great deal to us to have the benefit of your experience
and imagination in this area.

December 6, 1956

We are organizing the Project on the basis of an overall panel and six subpanels. Each subpanel will be composed of some members from the overall panel, two or three authors and several persons with broad experience in the specific area of United States objectives and policy under consideration. I would hope very much that it would be possible for you to participate in the deliberations of the subpanel on U.S. International Security Objectives and Strategy which will be chaired by General James McCormack, Jr.

This subpanel will meet perhaps three or four times over the next six months. The enclosed memorandum describes the organization more fully, including a list of the authors who have prepared papers to be considered by the subpanel we hope you will be able to join. A meeting of the subpanel will be held on Thursday, December 20, and I hope it will be possible for you to attend.

The success of this Project will depend on the assistance and best thinking of our ablest citizens and I feel your participation would contribute immeasurably. If you agree to serve on this subpanel, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Director of Special Studies, will be in touch with you concerning arrangements for the meeting.

Mr. John Forrest Floberg
World Center Building
Washington 6, D. C.