having its territory devastated by the Germans and having lost, by
Europe? Would the U.2.S.R. have risked a general war so soon after
would we really have acquiesced in the Soviet Union's taking over
dispositionsble. Assuming that there had never been an atomic bomb,
in our favor. Indeed, even its importance as a deterrent is
apparent, it did not enable us to achieve a strategic transformation
While it may have prevented a further expansion of the Soviet
over the reason, our atomic monopoly had at least a deterrent effect.
about the process in which we found ourselves involved. But what-
s Alliance with the Soviets, humanitarian impulsaes, lack of clarity
was based on the necessity of total victory, the memory of the wartime
political advantage. This was due to many factors: a theory of
we never succeeded in translating our military superiority into a
retaliation. But it was a stalemate nonetheless in the sense that
a decade the United States was relatively immune from Soviet
Ungasaki. To be sure, it was not a physical stalemate: for nearly
it has existed ever since the exploitations over Hiroshims and
of our national policy, the stalemate is not anything new. Actually,
unclear mesoups and a long-range air force. But for the burpoe

most conservative estimates, 10,000,000 dead? Not even a dictator-
ship can do everything simultaneously.

Apart from the questionable assumption that all-out war was
prevented by our atomic monopoly, the decade witnessed the con-
solidation of a satellite orbit in Eastern Europe, the triumph of
Communism in China, and most fundamental of all, the growth of the
Soviet atomic stockpile. In fact whatever slight possibility
existed to take a strong stand on the satellite issue was probably
removed by our atomic monopoly which lulled us into the belief
that the Soviet expansion was unimportant in the face of our
strategic superiority. Those who think that the problems of the
nuclear period are primarily technical would therefore do well to
study American reactions after Nagasaki and Hiroshima. No foreseeable
technological breakthrough is likely to be more fundamental than our
discovery of the A-bomb. Yet possession of it did not enable us
to prevent another power which never hid its hostile intent from
expanding its orbit and developing a capability to inflict a mortal
blow on the United States.

blow on the United States.

expanding its orbit and developing a capability to inflict a mortal
to prevent another power which never did its hostile intent from
discovery of the A-bomb. Yet possession of it did not enable us
technological breakthrough is likely to be more fundamental than our
unclear period are primarily technical therefore do well to
strategic superiority. Those who think that the problems of the
that the Soviet expansion was unimportant in the face of our
removal by our atomic monopoly which pulled us into the pellet
existed to take a strong stand on the satellite issue was properly
Soviet atomic stockpile. In fact whatever slight possibility
Communism in China, and most of its growth of the
solidation of a satellite orbit in Eastern Europe, the triumph of
prevented by our atomic monopoly, the decade witnessed the con-
absent from the questionable assumption that all-out war was
ship can do everything simultaneously.

Now you're going better

27

How did this come about? Primarily because we added the A-bomb
to our arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking;
because we saw it merely as another tool in a theory of warfare which
knew no goal save total victory and no mode of war except all-out war.

The notion that war and peace, military and political goals
were separate had become so commonplace in our strategic doctrine
by the end of World War II that the most powerful nation in the
world found itself paralyzed by the enormity of its own weapons
technology and by its inability to adjust its political aims to the
risks of the nuclear period. In every concrete instance, even in
the matter of the regulation of the atom which affected our very
survival, we found ourselves stalemated by our own preconceptions.
The consequences of military actions which we might take always
seemed to outbalance the gains to be achieved. Thus our policy
became entirely defensive. We possessed a doctrine to repel overt
aggression, but we could not translate it into a positive goal.
And even in the one instance where we resisted aggression we did not

And even in the one instance where we resented aggression we did not
aggression, but we could not translate it into a positive goal.

became entirely defensive. We possessed a doctrine to rebel overt

the consequences of military actions which we might take always

survival, we found ourselves asthmated by our own preconceptions.

risk of the nuclear period. In every concrete instance, even in

at the end of World War II that the most powerful nation in the

to our arenaal without integrating its implications into our thinking!