INSERT 2 to gelluy #6

Regardless of how successful the West is in coordinating its approach to Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, a specific plan for the unification of Germany will have to be developed. Any new approach to the problem of German unification should seek to escape the process whereby every succeeding Western plan has moved closer to the Soviet position. If every new Western proposal incorporates additional features of the Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any particular program exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet framework for German unity becomes established: that it be negotiated directly by the two German states, which is another way of saying that the East German satellite would be consolidated.

But it is important that all concerned recognize that no plan on German unity can avoid a consideration of the difficult and sensitive issue of Germany's frontiers. This tragic issue

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be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as two German states exist, they are bound to interact with each other. If they consider that their social and political systems are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the other. Since they contain the same basic population and a similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will be beyond the control of either East or West—and perhaps of the Germans themselves. The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own interests, they will realize that the present course may have the gravest long-term consequences.

If Germany unification is to be a central concern of the Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East, it should be given every encouragement to make a major contribution to the formulation of an *Allied* position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and December 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification, he deserved a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the Western Allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. If we can discuss only those items the Soviets have declared negotiable, the agenda of any conference will be determined by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that, if no progress toward unification is made, the onus for it rests on the Soviets.

-In developing a German program, two areas of policy—require particular attention: relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the definition of Germany's eastern frontier.

Today the East German regime is being widely supported in Eastern Europe at least in part because of the historical fear of Germany and the memory of the Nazi occupation. The East European countries are much less committed to the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany than to a divided Germany, which may seem to them the best guarantee of their security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified Communist Germany might worry the East European states hardly less than any other powerful unified German state. There is reason to believe that the East German regime is despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot be fully exploited so long as the Federal Republic is not able to pursue a more active policy in Eastern Europe.

Heretofore, the Federal Republic has refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by estab-

Heretofore, the Federal Republic has refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. One possible solution, however, ameliorating the Hallstein Doctrine further would be for the Federal Republic to announce that in order to promote a final settlement it would establish diplomatic relations with all of Germany's neighbors, enabling it to bring about direct contact with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a policy will not in itself lead to unification. Nor will it make the East European countries abandon their preference for a divided Germany. It will, however, contribute to the isolation of East Germany and hence promote its demoralization. It is likely to reduce the already small East European incentive to support Soviet or East German pressures against exposed Western positions such as Berlin. And it could be an opening wedge into the difficult problem of Germany's eastern frontiers, which is perhaps the most sensitive issue in relations with the East European governments.

The tragic issue of Germany's eastern frontier, particularly the Polish-German border, has its origin in 1945, when the Potsdam Agreement placed the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which had been German for centuries, under Polish administration pending a final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland then proceeded to expel the 13 million Germans living there and to replace them with Polish settlers, mostly from Polish territories taken over by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly because of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed territories, most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the human tragedies of our time. Expelling 13 million people from their ancestral homes cannot be justified by citing German crimes during the war. The reluctance of the Federal Republic to renounce territories which had been German for centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something cynical about the insistent East European demand that the Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East German satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East European countries. The Eastern European countries obviously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany divided along the Elbe; but they also insist that the Federal Republic recognize the eastern frontier of the Soviet puppet regime on the Oder-Neisse. These inconsistencies complicate a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these obstacles, the perpetuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line complicates progress on the issue of unification. It provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to territories that no longer contain any German settlers per

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be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent
that gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as
two German states exist, they are bound to interact with each
other. If they consider that their social and political systems
are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the
other. Since they contain the same basic population and a
similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The
Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their
own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate
the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will
be beyond the control of either East or West—and perhaps of
the Germans themselves. The permanent division of Ger-
many into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous.
If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own
interests, they will realize that the present course may have
the gravest long-term consequences.

If Germany unification is to be a central concern of the
Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the
Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings
with the East, it should be given every encouragement to
make a major contribution to the formulation of an Allied
position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder
proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and De-
cember 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplo-
matic overtures on behalf of German unification, he deserved
a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the
Western Allies were probably correct in their view that any
proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove
negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only
one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one.
If we can discuss only those items the Soviets have declared
negotiable, the agenda of any conference will be determined
by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose
of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that, if no
progress toward unification is made, the onus for it rests on
the Soviets.

In developing a German program, two areas of policy
require particular attention: relations with the countries of
Eastern Europe and the definition of Germany's eastern
frontier.

Today the East German regime is being widely supported
in Eastern Europe at least in part because of the historical
fear of Germany and the memory of the Nazi occupation.
The East European countries are much less committed to the
existence of a Communist regime in East Germany than to a
divided Germany, which may seem to them the best guaran-
tee of their security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified
Communist Germany might worry the East European states
hardly less than any other powerful unified German state.
There is reason to believe that the East German regime is
despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot be fully
exploited so long as the Federal Republic is not able to pur-
sue a more active policy in Eastern Europe.

Heretofore, the Federal Republic has refused to maintain
diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the
East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has
sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by estab-
lishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. One possible
method for ameliorating the Hallstein Doctrine, further

diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the
East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has
sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by estab-
lishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. One possible
method for ameliorating the Hallstein Doctrine further
would be for the Federal Republic to announce that in order
to promote a final settlement it would establish diplomatic
relations with all of Germany's neighbors, enabling it to
bring about direct contact with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Such a policy will not in itself lead to unification. Nor will it
make the East European countries abandon their preference
for a divided Germany. It will, however, contribute to the
isolation of East Germany and hence promote its demoraliza-
tion. It is likely to reduce the already small East European
incentive to support Soviet or East German pressures against
exposed Western positions such as Berlin. And it could be an
opening wedge into the difficult problem of Germany's east-
ern frontiers, which is perhaps the most sensitive issue in
relations with the East European governments.

The tragic issue of Germany's eastern frontier, particu-
larly the Polish-German border, has its origin in 1945, when
the Potsdam Agreement placed the territories east of the
Oder-Neisse line, which had been German for centuries,
under Polish administration pending a final settlement in a
peace treaty. Poland then proceeded to expel the 13 million
Germans living there and to replace them with Polish
settlers, mostly from Polish territories taken over by the So-
viet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to accept the
Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a bargaining
lever for an eventual peace conference, partly because of the
pressure of the refugees from the disputed territories, most of
whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the
human tragedies of our time. Expelling 13 million people
from their ancestral homes cannot be justified by citing Ger-
man crimes during the war. The reluctance of the Federal
Republic to renounce territories which had been German for
centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something
cynical about the insistent East European demand that the
Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East Ger-
man satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East
European countries. The Eastern European countries obvi-
ously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany
divided along the Elbe; but they also insist that the Federal
Republic recognize the eastern frontier of the Soviet puppet
regime on the Oder-Neisse. These inconsistencies complicate
a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these obstacles, the per-
petuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-
Neisse line complicates progress on the issue of unification. It
provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintain-
ing their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements Soviet rela-
tions with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to
territories that no longer contain any German settlers, per-

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perpetuates foreign rule over 17 million Germans between the
Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line. The refusal to face the issue of
the Polish border guarantees that the frontier of free Ger-
many will remain on the Elbe.

To be sure, it is an important tactical question at what
point the Federal Republic should make this gesture. It is
possible to sympathize with the reluctance to offer such a
painful sacrifice gratuitously. But it is essential to recognize
that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have
to be part of any responsible program for unification. Unifi-
cation is impossible so long as it is considered an inevitable
prelude to a new set of pressures in Eastern Europe.

Any new approach to the problem of German unification
should seek to escape the process whereby every succeeding
Western plan has moved closer to the Soviet position. If every
new Western proposal incorporates additional features of the
Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any particular
program exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet framework for Ger-
man unity becomes established: that it be negotiated directly
by the two German states, which is another way of saying that
the East German satellite would be consolidated.

Thus the primary purpose of a new approach should be
to change the terms of reference of the negotiations. Three
factors must be reconciled in any plan for Germany's future:
(1) the German desire for self-determination, (2) the East
European concern for security and (3) the Soviet concern
lest a unified Germany impair its own security and shake its
international position. These objectives are, of course, in-
compatible to some extent. A great deal depends on whether
it proves possible to convince those most concerned that to
strive for absolutes will lead first to stagnation and ultimately
to crisis.

For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a detailed
program; rather, the primary need is to agree on a new con-
cept. One possible course would be to separate the issue of
self-determination from that of unification for an interim
period, say fifteen years. Pressure for immediate unification
consolidates all opponents of Germany in Eastern Europe
and *sub rosa* in Western Europe as well. Self-determination,
on the other hand, is a moral imperative commanding wide
consensus. If rejected by the Communists, it would place
them at least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: The
Western countries, including the Federal Republic, could
declare that, while the unification of Germany remains the
ultimate goal, their immediate aim is to enable the popula-
tion of East Germany to choose the form of government it
prefers. The Western Allies could, therefore, declare their
willingness to acquiesce in the existence of an East German
state provided its government emerges from a process of free
elections. For a period of fifteen years the territory now
called the German Democratic Republic would have a status
similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation
could be established between the two German states, but East
Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized.
For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of
the present German Democratic Republic to the East Euro-
pean countries, including the Soviet Union, could be main-

Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A commission composed of the European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps Finland, would monitor the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebiscite supervised by the same commission to determine whether East Germany wanted to continue as a separate state in loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral commission certified that the government of East Germany was freely elected, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist.

Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany. Within the Federal Republic foreign troops would retire an average distance of 100 kilometers from the Western borders of the new East German state, and the number of West German troops in that belt would be limited. The Federal Republic would renounce access to the ownership of strategic nuclear weapons.

Even if there were agreement in principle, many details would remain to be worked out: for example, the precise definition of demilitarization or what international undertakings would be consistent with the neutral status of the new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution for East Germany is taken, the advantages would be plain: while Germany would have to defer full unification for fifteen years, the German states that emerged would no longer be antagonistic. There would be opportunity for conditions within Germany to be equalized gradually. A foreign regime detested by the population would be removed. The East European states would gain the security of a divided Germany for fifteen years and a demilitarized belt along their borders for the indefinite future. The East European economies could adjust to the loss of the East German partner over a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Germany's frontiers would be settled both juridically and psychologically because the generation that was expelled from Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time Germany was unified. Arms control schemes for Europe could be considered in a new atmosphere.

The price, of course, would be high. The Federal Republic would have to defer its hopes for immediate unification in return for agreement on a terminal date to the division of Germany. The Soviet Union would have to be prepared to

similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

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give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East Euro-
pean governments would have to change their policy of
acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior
partner. The Western Allies would have to overcome inertia
and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

But the rewards would be great. Such a program would
end a situation that is bound to become more dangerous the
longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of
arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could
be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program
rejected initially by the Soviets, it would change the frame-
work of negotiations. Rather than begin with enhancing the
status of the East German regime, as is the case with current
schemes, the new program would focus attention on its op-
pressiveness as the principal obstacle to unification. By taking
a stand on the issue of self-determination, the West would
have a platform most likely to command international sup-
port. By separating self-determination from unification, an
interim period for adjustments and a framework for meeting
legitimate security concerns of Germany's neighbors are
provided.

Nevertheless, it is improbable that any negotiating
formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasona-
ble program is likely to be rejected by the East. The long-
term hope for German unity therefore resides in the unity of
Europe. As nations lose their former significance, the fear of
any one state will diminish. A united Western Europe more-
over will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern
Europe. If an all-embracing European structure ever comes
to pass, the existing dividing lines may seem less crucial.

This is why the existing rift in the West is so unfortunate.
The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that
each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by
holding out vague hopes and grandiose schemes for the
achievement of Germany's maximum objectives. German
leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies
and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so
often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of
repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by
committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special
friendship, it was braking temptations of nationalism and
providing for the construction of Europe. Washington's atti-
tude toward the Treaty of Collaboration was motivated by a
desire to combat Third Force tendencies. These competing
efforts stand in danger of producing what they seek to pre-
vent; the attempt to use Germany as a balance wheel will
complete the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany
from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Repub-
lic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the
Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the
West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political
dilemmas of a divided country and (2) the ability to make
the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These
policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other
is to defeat both. It is to the construction of this larger com-
munity that we must now turn.