Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

Director Shultz/Mr. Kis
3:16 p.m., August 4, 1970

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

- 2 -

K: It isn't a straight budget issue. The budget clarifies people's minds marvelously.

S: It allows them to think their cloudy minds are really clear after all. I am concerned that we don't let Laird go off with the 76 figure.

K: Could we do this? We have a DPRC meeting on Friday. Could you say after that you are going to set out a figure? That would get them working like crazy for the DPRC meeting. He is playing two games: (1) Not having any Defense cuts, and (2) trying to kill the DPRC.

S: But I thought he wanted the DPRC set up.

K: But it is doing things he didn't intend it to. He wants it to cut his budget; what he doesn't want it to do is to develop a rationale for it. On the other hand, I am not interested in cutting his budget, but I would like to have a rationale.

S: Suppose I speak to him at the meeting tomorrow and say I know there is a DPRC meeting on Friday. After that meeting, we will have a number over for him.

K: That would be superb. Then I will have carried the DPRC as far as I can carry it.

S: The DPRC meeting -- does it have to be on Friday? I am blanked out that whole day.

K: You have to make it. We will do it on Monday -- we will do it on any day you can make it.

S: On Friday, there is the first meeting of the Productivity Committee and I am winding up as chairman. Monday & Saturday are find.

K: I will check and let you know first thing in the morning.

lds

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

4:00 pm 8/4/70

K: I called you earlier to see if there was anything I could do.

R: I was returning his call. Also I am going to tell Fulbright we are going to sign this thing.

K: He is with Goodpastor now. He was napping earlier.

R: I will see him later. I was returning his call. I will see him later.

K: OK. I just wanted you to know he was in his little room.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Frank Mankiewicz

8/4/70 6:50 p.m.

K: What are you calling about?

M: I just go through life making things easier for you. That story last
night was the most important news story in years. And nobody's done anything
about it. Nobody knows what the real stories are.

K: Of course I don't think your sidekick got it straight but never mind.

M: That's very upsetting. I feel very bad. He wrote it.

K: I know.

M: What can I do about it?

K: I'd just leave it. What did you call about?

M: Just to help you again. It involved your writing down a name. David Lazar--AID Mission Director in Panama. Before that he was either Mission Director or Deputy in Bolivia. And before that he was lawyer in Peru. I don't know how familiar you are with Foreign Service but he's a 5 in Spanish, which means fluent and he's a 3 in Ketua (?). Now for some reason, known only to AID I guess, he's starting a nine-week course to go to I-Corp in Vietnam. He's going to be the Deputy Corpsman in I-Corps. He and Furfer are switching. He's not upset--he's a career man and accepts it. But you have a position open as (Mission Director?) in Peru. It's a shame to waste a man with that talent in Latin America in Vietnam.

K: But you don't know our plan.

M: Oh, okay...

K: We've found that Vietnam experts don't help us so why not try a Latin American man?

M: Oh I see. Well I don't know his politics--I suspect none. But I think it
would be a terrible waste to send him to Vietnam!

K: I'll check into that.

M: Okay, now this other things bothers me.

K: No forget it--to correct all the nuances of every situation is impossible. I wonder anyway whether dinner conversations ought to be the subject of columns.

M: Well, that's what bothered me for awhile.
[K said he had to say goodbye to someone and would call right back.]

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
7:11 pm 8/4/70

L: I wanted to make sure that everybody I called earlier as far as the WH is concerned on Cambodian ____ raids that everyone handles it the same.

K: We won't say anything.

L: We have to get guidance to Phenom Penh.

K: We will shift it to you.

L: Do. I had a bad day on the Hill on that. There's no problem but we don't want two different stories going.

K: We will say the plli cy is as the President stated and anything else go to Laird.

L: They had a very high level ____ strategy meeting as far as ____ opposition is concerned and the budget on appropriation ____ is to be delayed until after the ____ elections. Tjey will work on the 13 others and then ____ say they have increased the budget and say the Defense bill --

K: And cut it. That's what they will hold out.

L: Right. A high level decision as far as they are concerned. __________

K: That's cheap.

L: So we won't have '71 budget until Jan.

K: Nothing we can do?

L: They will take off for 3 weeks for elections. I will attack them some.

K: When will they vote on the ABM?

L: The appropriation after Nov. and the authorization early next month. The appropriation is important because that's where the money is.

K: How is the vote going?

L: All right. I picked up a pair today and I am having lunch with Pierson. I am working on him. What I am doing -- on the '71 budget I am hardlining it.

K: That's good. That won't bother us.

L: The delay makes it difficult to administer the Dept. because I will have to

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

7:11 pm

8/4/70

-2-

L: (cont.) double up cuts in the 3rd and 4th quarter. I thought you should be aware of that. It's a rather unusual development not having this large a part not acted on.

K: It's pretty political.

L: It's the first time.

K: We should be able to attack them.

L: They are going to hold this hostage on what the other appropriations are. You understand that.

K: Not as well as you.

L: They have worked it out. That's why I don't want any words out that we will not fund the volunteer service. We have to keep that close.

K: We will go on DPRC on doctrinal issues.

L: When is the NSC?

K: Aug. 26.

L: But not on Defense.

K: I think so. I am sure.

L: On planning purposes I will go higher then I will come up with. I don't want it to seem we are weakening.

K: You don't want to seaken your position in '72 by asking low '71.

L: The volunteer service and pay increases we may drop. But I don't want it to look like we are going below the preliminary level.

K: We will get your fiscal guidance after the DPRC meeting close to what you want.

L: You have a group of questions over there.

K: We can't answer those for this meeting. This is just part of the general review.

L: That's fine but the quality of our work wouldn't be up to that in 3 days.

K: Right. That's all. I enjoyed that weekend with you.

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

7:11 pm 8/4/70

L: That's fine. Do you think I should mention the appropriation thing to the Cabinet meeting?

K: I would be no how you will handle it internally. One thing -- Dave will have details. The President wants maximum possible for Cambodia this summer. This may require fiscal stretching. He has the details.

L: I have taken that money from Turkey. I will have to tell Turkey, Greece, and ______ about this next week.

K: It's outside the MAP program.

L: Were you present when the President talked to Stennis?

K: Yes.

L: Did he say operation would only be in sancutry areas?

K: No. He talked on the phone. I am not sure but I will look at the record. He talked first. I don't assure him of that. I talked with him the other day and/said anything we wanted to talk on a private basis he will be more flexible then on a formal basis. He will approve specific issues.

L: He can't approve it if he puts it in law.

K: I will call him when you want. Put in a paper what you want.

L: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? we should not be limited that way. That's tough. OK.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/The President

10:18 p.m., August 5, 1970

K: Mr. President, I'm sorry to disturb you. There are two matters. First, Rabin came in late this afternoon in an agitated frame of mind about the ceasefire and made a tough statement about the whole trend of public discussions going ~~X~~ K against them; and the fact that while discussion of a ceasefire is going on, the Soviets have advanced SAM sites to a distance of roughly 30 miles and established a site within 10 miles of the Canal which gives them a shot into the Sinai and also the capability to protect artillery positions along the Canal. He said there were two demands: (1) insist that the Soviets pull these back to where they were before, or (2) get them equipment to take them out -- or failing that, they wouldn't accept a ceasefire and would take them out in their own way. I was tough with him -- I said I would transmit this to you and that you were deeply concerned. I said if they did this, we wouldn't think it was in the spirit of a peace move. Three hours later, he called back (I wasn't here; I was having dinner with Frank Murphy) saying they were withdrawing the conditions. He still said they would take out these sites by direct or indirect means but would accept a ceasefire. I personally conclude that they are going to take them out tonight. What he had read to me at 5:30 seemed solid. There is nothing we can do about it because if they are going to hit them, they are doing it already.

P: Well, there is no ceasefire yet.

K: Right, it is not our concern. I had written you a memo on this meeting which you will still get. They are approaching again a state of extreme agitation and they could hit the sites and then accept a ceasefire.

The second item is we have a report that a heavily armed boat has left Miami manned by Cubans to sink a Soviet tanker which is off the coast of Florida heading for Cuba. We have a Coast Guard ship trying to escort that Soviet tanker, just in case the Israelis hit tonight. This would look like we were slapping them in the face. Subject to your approval, I think we should let that Coast Guard ship shepherd that Soviet tanker out of harm's way.

P: Sure,

K: We can try to intercept that other boat and stay with the Soviet tanker. After that Soviet note, if one of their ships was sunk off Miami

By KMC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

it would look like a kick in the teeth. I would guess that the Israelis, if they don't hit tonight, will strike within the next 48 hours. Rabin does not talk idly. I think they have decided to move.

P: I would do that. See that that tanker is protected.

K: I think two planes should go up to find that other ship to see where it is. They could go up from Homestead.

P: That's a good thing.

K: Things are always happening.

P: What were the casualties this week?

K: I don't have them before me. I will get them right away.

P: No, that's all right. I'll get them in the morning. How's Frank Murphy's temperature?

K: He was at the Grove and also wrote a memo on his trip. He didn't have anything new.

P: Good. It takes a little time. The editorials are not bad -- just their columns.

K: Except the deadline for withdrawal.

P: Let's forget that. The main thing is what happens here. People aren't taking the papers seriously any more. They are having a time making a case.

K: All the people he quoted were saying, "He is getting the troops out anyway." That was fascinating.

P: In Tennessee we have strong support. A lot of people don't want the President kicked around, whoever he is. The critics don't win on these things. They think it is unfair.

K: I have the casualties now -- there were 78.

P: The same level as last week.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: With every passing week, it's the longest period of lowest casualties. We have never had five weeks below 100.

P: Is that right? Let's keep them down. We will see.

K: If you compare the five weeks since Cambodia with the five weeks before Cambodia -- they were getting up to 150.

P: I am glad we are using air in Cambodia.

K: COSVN instructions were to keep casualties above 100.

P: They were? Okay, see you tomorrow.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Rabin
8/5/70; 11:10

K: In light of your call to Sisco and General Haig -- everyone is free to draw his own interpretation. May I make a suggestion? If you are planning to do something I think it would be in everyone's interests if the President did not read about it in the newspapers first. If you could give us a few hours warning.

R: I can say one thing. I can immediately deliver it back home.

K: Don't make it an official communication.

R: I will go my own way to explain it.

K: You don't want to share that.

R: I would like to make it clear. I don't know any specifics.

K: What is your personal interpretation?

R: My personal interpretation is that I am sure that we are trying to find out what they can do vis-a-vis the sites, vis-a-vis the Egyptian targets, etc. This is my personal interpretation and I am in no position to say it for sure.

K: My interpretation was that this was not a hint of inactivity prior to ceasefire.

R: It is my interpretation that it is activity prior to ceasefire. I would say... I would like to make it clear -- prior to establishment of a ceasefire.

K: That is exactly my interpretation. I just wanted to check it out.

R: There was some sort of misunderstanding. I will try to find a way to communicate with him personally. This is the clear answer that I got -- prior to.

K: There was a misunderstanding in what you communicated to me?

R: Only about conditionalities of our freedom of activity to the ceasefire. I said it will delay the ceasefire till we destroy the new sites. After the clarification I explained that first we feel free

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Rabin
8/5/70; 11:10 p.m.

Page 2

if by political means they will not return to the 40-60 kilometer
line, directly or indirectly to attack, secondly we will accept cease-
fire on date it is agreed on and third that there are no conditionalities
and the exact meaning to you is it is prior to ceasefire. Once we
agree to ceasefire we will commit ourselves to the terms of the
ceasefire.

K: But you have not agreed yet, have you?

R: No, only in principal.

K: Let me sum up my understanding -- until you have agreed to the
ceasefire you have no restrictions.

R: Exactly.

K: You will implement the ceasefire whenever it will be agreed upon?

R: Whenever it will be agreed upon.

K: That doesn't restrict you.

R: Ceasefire is something that has to be reciprocal, mutually observed
according to terms that have to be worked out.

K: Until that time you reserve freedom of action -- but you do not
demand anything until that time. You will sign the ceasefire if you do
not get the equipment?

R: Well....

K: I understand what you are saying -- you have removed unconditionalities.
I will look into the question of deliveries tomorrow.

R: The question is the sooner the delivery will be it will be much easier
for us to cope because this kind of equipment can help us only when it
comes to SAM sites. Our intention is to use this equipment against the
SAM sites with first priority to newly established ones near the Suez
Canal.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Admiral Zumwalt
8/5/70 11:45 a.m.

Z: President Mobulu is a very impressive guy.

K: Isn't he?

Z: I ran through the concepts of our operations in Vietnam; he expressed pleasure at the education involved. Along the Congo River he said he has a situation essentially equivalent to our ocean work. He pressed for some boats . . . .

K: I don't understand how what he wants differs from what State is offering.

Z: He wants a clear naval force, not just 10 craft, as State is offering.

K: What are those 10 craft?

Z: P ______ boats.

K: Is there anything you can do?

Z: What I suggested to him--what we ought to do, if it is satisfactory to our President is to send one of our experts over there to survey the situation. He says they have a shipyard and 20 trained naval officers. They have almost no enlisted personnel. The best thing that we can get done now is to have an expert go and survey the situation. . .

K: Were you alone with him? Or was someone else there? from State?

Z: There was an interpreter from State--a fairly low-level I surmise. It was quite clear to me that if my government agrees . . .

K: What the President wanted was for me to be able to tell him something he had ordered.

Z: He should say he has ordered the Navy to send an expert over and come up with a plan for the long haul and what, if anything, can be done in the short haul. He is interested in at the moment in building "farrow"(?) cement boats . . .

K: What are they?

Z: They are small cement boats, both cheap and . . .

By: KHC U NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Amb. Zumwalt

8/5/70 11:45 a.m. page 2

K: In our experience, whenever we want to do something that for some reason some element of the bureaucracy opposes, we study it to death.

Z: We can avoid that. The President could offer to survey and offer to train some of their naval personnel in our facility at M ______ Island. That's a useful and low-cost . . .

K: We don't care about the low cost. We're going to do it if the President decides to do it. But it has to be within some rational limit.

Z: Well, he really must do these things first. He could also commit himself to a small number of craft. I would recommend 10 of the PBR types. . . .

K: How much would that cost?

K: It would be about $100,000 apiece.

K: Would you put on a piece of paper what I can tell him and how we move it there?

Z: It would be completely unstaffed by the bureaucracy.

K: I understand. Just send over to me. It doesn't commit you--just the sort of thing that can be explored.

Z: Will do.

K: Mention training and also what I tell Mobutu to get that started.

By: KLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Adm. Zumwalt/Kissinger

2:30-ish pm 8/5/70

K: xhawx Who is going to pay for all of this.

Z: It's one of those things I will wolve if the President said to do it. If he thinks it's important I will have to rush to Laird to do it.

K: If you can pin him to the mat, you are a good man.

Z: We are loosing 262 ships. I can't be happy about it but I support you and the President.

K: If I could pick the time to be National Security advisor, I wouldn't pick this period.

Z: I feel the same way about being C&O.

K: Let's go ahead with the ? ? ? . The 10 PRVs -- if he said we are prepared to do the training right away but we prefer to do the other after a survey --

Z: That paragraph fell out in re-type.

K: I want to show him some actions. Do we have a Naval Attache' there?

Z: A Defense Attache' but not Naval. I will get his name. (Zumwalt's office called back later to say it is Col. Clyde W. Armstrong, USAF).

K: I can't find him. He can deal with me and I will deal with you.

Z: On the Defense Panel, how much time should I waste shooting down the parts of that.

K: I doubt it but it would not hurt to address it. Get upx us your views quickly. On whatever you had in mind.

Z: Right.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Gerard Smith
2:00 pm 8/5/70

On the secure phone-- very difficult to hear

S: . . . . said look that was part of a comprehensive approach and he
had the feeling that it was of special interest to the Soviet Union and not
the U.S.

K: Who said this?

S: Manhanov (?). He would be the first to say let's postpone it. ? ? ? ?
I really said I thought there was no difficulty with it regarding one side or
the other but it inolved other people. I was afraid to put it in a telegram
because some people might say forget it and others want to keep it open.

K: How should we persue it?

S: Get the other ? ? ? ? in. I didn't report in a formal telegram but I could do it in a backchannel. The State Dept. would just say that's the end of that.

K: Did you tell him the door is not closed to it and that's on the authority
of the President? What you said is correct.

S: I will do that at the first opportunity.

K: Put it in a backchannel or letter.

S: Do you see any difficulty in Nov. 2?

K: No. I wouldn't squeeze them.

TELCON
Laird/Kiss
3:06 pm

8/5/70

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

L: There are two things. I hate to bother you. We want to send out that guidance and it was cleared by State. It was press guidance. They have now got recordings of our pilots using napalm over Phenom Penh. They will use it on TV. The forward controller was talking to our guys and they picked it up. They have to have those directions, especially when we are near troops. I will handle it. The next thing -- I believe it's important for this POW emissary. I understand you have Borman. He visited with me yesterday. I think as he leaves if the Pres. could wish him well it would be good. He is leaving Tuesday.

K: We will do our best.

L: It doesn't hurt the President to show he is wishing him well. The President knows him well. Just wish him well and how important it is.

K: I will do my damndest.

L: Do you want me to do something?

K: I can get it done.

L: I was disappointed with that Israeli reply. That 50 km.

K: Was there a new one? No, yesterday.

L: Getting SA-3s and 2s removed. That should be in their meeting and not ahead of time. It's too bad.

K: We will not let them be the final obstacle.

L: Then the Egyptians will say remove your F-4s. I thought I should warn you about that thing. He might listen to that radio. But now we have to have communications between ground and aircraft.

K: The President asked Westmoreland to have Zumwalt brief Mobutu on naval operations. He did that but didn't commit anything. Just a discussion of riverine operations in VN.

L: They should let us know and then we are in a better shape. Just let Murphy know.

K: When I know, you know. I just found out this morning.

*

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
3:17 pm 8/5/70

R: A couple of things. I am not sure the President is not making a decision. I talked to Haldeman. The XEXAX MAP program. Mel thinks it should be in Defense. I think that's a mistake.

K: I recommended to the President he go along with you.

R: Fulbright and Morgan wojld raise hell.

K: I think the message you will get will satisfy you. Mel recommended the other way but we went with you.

R: On the Ash and Peterson Committees. I think it would be a serious mistake to set up another organization to take this up. It should be more State Dept. machinery. In the long run the economic matters will be paramount in foreign policy, as we decrease military involvement. So if I understand it, you are with us.

K: On the proliferation of Presidential assistance and too many bodies, I am with you. How to set up foreign economic policy I have no view but I lean toward your criticism. I have one view that interdepartmental machinery should be chaired by one Dept. I have not stated a view and I am sort of with you. Shultz is most adamant on foreign economic side.

R: He wants to be involved? I think he should be involved but not chairman. An Under Secretaries Committee chaired by State.

K: And reporting to the NSC. I have no problem.

R: I don't want a new mechanism with State a member. It's a vital part of foreign policy. I am very much interested in it. We should be stronger and do more as a government.

K: In the present NSC office I have no competence in this field. I would try to stay out. I wouldn't want to chair anything. I would only have a member of my staff on it.

R: And Shultz. Major decisions made by the President and should be part of the NSC. I would like to chair it. I think there are misconceptions -- the President talks about not having favorable balance of trade. We do. We don't have a favorable balance of payments. It's useful to have top people know about it.

K: Nothing on the Ash Committee has come through here yet. If the President makes his decisions I will see you have a voice.

R: On the Bohemian Grove speech, we have more foreign investments than any other

Rogers/Kis
3:17 pm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/13/04

R: (cont) countries put together.

K: That takes care of the isolationists.

R: That's how it came up. I said you are all involved in it. I read stories that the Japanese will catch up in GNP. That's nuts!

K: When you start at a low base you can have huge percentage increases.

R: We heard that the Russians were going to take us and we have 3 times theirs now.

K: I will send you the foreign aid message which doesn't set up foreign economic policy.

R: Fine. Good.

By KCLW

NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/5/70 3:40 p.m.

S: I am trying to get the cease-fire proposal into effect, but it's very complicated Henry.

K: I can imagine.

S: I just did a cable which I am going to take to the Secretary. It is a definitive proposal for a cease-fire standstill. We want to put it to the Israelis first. But I am recommending to the Secretary that it be cleared with you. I would be much more comfortable if it goes through you first.

K: Isn't it a policy matter? So it has to be cleared with me?

S: Well I think it is. Secondly, I wanted to report to you where we stand on the question of military assistance which Israel has requested. They want as a matter of priority four things: 1) Helicopter standoff equipment to help jamb SAM electrical equipment, 2) Shrikes, 3) CBUs (to attack SAM sites), 4) Pods--electrical equipment. I have had two good talked with Packard. He will, by tomorrow morning, see what is possible to present to the Israelis. But there needs to be a discussion with our Secretary of State and I think this is a matter of interest to the White House as well. The Secretary believes that the over-riding objective should be to get the cease-fire working immediately. If there is any further delay there may be incidents and also a loss of momentum. When the package is gotten together the Secretary wants to know whether and how we should tell the Israelis. Let me give you the Secretary's thinking on this: If the Israelis are the cause of any delay in the establishment of a cease-fire, we shouldn't provide the equipment. If, however, the Egyptians cause a delay and in a manner which would improve their situation, then we should study the whole thing further. In other words, the Secretary wants to look at the existing situation before we go ahead. Rabin has informed the Pentagon (either on a tactical basis or under instructions, I don't know) that unless they get the four items and get the opportunity to hit the SAM sites, there may be a delay on the cease-fire. This is a form of pressure that didn't go well with the Secretary. We took the view that the compelling need is to get on with the cease-fire and that it is just as much in the interest of the Israelis to do so as the others involved, if not more so. But the problem is that if you have a cease-fire and then the Israelis make a dramatic attack, the other side will feel the need to restore the balance and then you might as well not have a cease-fire.

K: If there is a cease-fire will they get the equipment?

*

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/5/70 3:40 p.m. page 2

S: Yes, the Secretary feels that we should give them the equipment and Dave Packard agrees, if there is a cease-fire.

K: So we can tell them that if therex is a cease-fire they will get the equipment?

S: Yes.

K: Do you agree with this?

S: Yes, generally. Backx The Secretary and I agree that the overriding consideration is to get the cease-fire as quickly as possible.

K: When these things are discussed where is Saunders? Do I have a man in there?

S: No the reason is that these discussions go on back in the Pentagon. The only discussion we've had with Parkard are two brief telephone conversations. On this organizational thing, I'll be taking care of that once we get over the hump on the cease-fire; it's tough Henry.

K: How does the cease-fire look to you?

S: There's a real hope. My only worry is that the Israelis will be insistent about getting the quick equipment and hitting the SAM sites before it. One other thing Rabin said to me and you may hear it from him...

K: He's coming over this afternoon.

S: I didn't know that, but you should know one other thing he said was--last night he said to me that his government would in the cease-fire and standstill a political proposal for a rollback. I said that would be knocked out by the other side and that it changes our proposal. Then he said well at least give us the means immediately. I told him it is being looked at and that within 48 hours there will be some kind of judgment. But I would leave that very neutral; we'll have to weigh these considerations. Their argument is "Never mind a perfect package: if you think we are wrong let us have the chance to prove it--just give us the wherewithal." But the problem is if this were to go it would take days and we want the cease-fire in three or four days. I said there's no way which, by a major attack, you can get this balance when they've got mobile SAMs; so the best think for you to do is to get a cease-fire right away.

By KHLU

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/5/70 3:40 p.m. page 3

K: Good, that's the line I will take. You have been very helpful.

S: It's been very difficult--but *without* who thought is was going to be easy?

K: Without your eternal optimism we'd be dead.

S: We've got to pull this off for the President.

By KLC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/5/70 6:40 p.m. page 2

K: We can't just let the agencies make an agreement and then force us to agree to it.

X: What Packard is going to tell Rogers is what kind of package they think feasible.

K: Yes, but you know their attitude--they don't care what's technically feasible. If the President were to ask me the issue, I would have to say that ISA is just against giving them anything.

S: I know. I am trying to figure out how we can have a meeting of the NSC Review Group which . . .

K: I would just call it.

S: Okay, and when I get word there is such a meeting . . .

K: On the basis of this memcon.

S: Excellent. In the morning I will say Rabin saw Henry on this and Henry has called a meeting of the NSC Review Group--why don't Alex and I go with Packard . . . I will do that when your secretary confirms to me in the morning that you called that meeting. There's not even any need for you to call me. I will set this.

K: Excellent.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Admiral Zumwalt
8/5/70; 7:40 p.m.

(I didn't hear the first sentence -- Adm. Zumwalt was asking something about the Mobutu visit.)

K: He is going to leave his Naval Aide here and he should work with you for the next ten days before he goes back. We would like to see what we can work out that he can take back with him now. Did you understand that the $900,000 would come out of your budget or out of MAP money?

Z: We were counting on MAP.

K: Well, that doesn't exist.

Z: We will ____ it if we have to.

feg

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/The President

10:18 p.m., August 5, 1970

P: Sure,

By KCL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
9:40 am 8/6/70

S: The Israelis have agreed to the cease-fire. They want it tonight and not Saturday, with some slight variations.

K: What's going on?

S: In the 6 hours between Rabin's talking to you and me and then the telephone traffic.

K: I was pretty tough.

S: So was I. I think he told them we were rocks.

K: Can you get it done?

S: I will try. I doubt it. If not, they want no forward movement between tonight and Sat.

K: Can they be that scared?

S: I hate to put it that way because it will look like they have a hard position of being weak. I am wasting time on the phone. I have some things to do.

K: Right.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
11:07 am 8/6/70

S: I am having sent over to you a cable I have just dispatched to Cairo going ahead on the proposal with a slight variation from what we asked you to clear last night. Israel likes it. We are suggesting as they suggested, midnight tonight local for the cease-fire to go into effect. I think it may be short but if they cannot do it there will be an understanding there will be no movement forward from midnight until 6:00 a.m. when the cease-fire starts. We originally would have the reconnaissance aircraft go up to the Suez Canal. Israel said that's too close. 10 km on each side of the Canal. And 3rd, they wanted a line saying the convention on POWs with the Red Cross stays.

K: What have they done?

S: They have concluded that a cease-fire is in their benefit and we will deliver the goods.

K: I said there would be no difficulty after the cease-fire. But they said that would be too late.

S: Dayan said if there was an attack now it would delay the whole thing. He is being very sensible. If the Egyptians can move it will be in effect tonight. I am drafting a message for the President to make. I will send it to you. I will get Saunders on this. Welcoming the cease-fire and saying each side must be conciliatory.

K: That will be 4:00 our time.

S: I will be up all night.

K: When are you planning to have the Pres. go on TV?

S: I will get a feel for that. Also since the reconnaissance proposal means our helping out, Alex has had an aircraft moved closer.

K: A U-2?

S: Yes.

K: Where?

S: In England. Secondly, we promised the Israelis 2 reconnaissance Phantom aircraft. I told Dave I want them there in 48 hours.

K: Good.

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/6/70 3:00 p.m.

K: I just wanted to find out the situation in the Middle East.

S: Bergas (sp?) is talking to the Egyptians right now. I am waiting for a report.

K: The Israeli communications is a total bafflement to me.

S: Me too. We have to get together and talk about this. They are running scared.

K: In the first half you could interpret that they were going to do something, and then he just caves.

S: I know. I want first to achieve this. [? ]

K: You haven't sent me that announcement for the President yet.

S: It's just coming out of the typewriter now. I'll have to over to you in 10 minutes.

K: Your system is slipping. Dean Acheson had lunch with me today. He said that some of the things that come out of State baffle him, including on the Middle East, but he knows that Joe Sisco is the best man over there.

S: We are getting a new Under Secretary soon. I know who it is-- at least I think I do.

K: Who do you think it is?

S: Jack Irving. Is that correct?

K: It sounds right. He isn't going to burn the building down.

S: You know where I first met him? I led him, literally by the nose, for three months as a member of the General Assembly delegation under the previous Republican Administration. For three months! He's a nice fellow and the world is paved with them.

K: You know my feelings.

S: I know.

K: The President wants you to come over with some of your close

*

By KAL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Ahterton/Kissinger

10:30 pm 8/6/70

K: Do you know about this Israeli blow up?

A: That's why we are here. We are putting together a condensed memo
here for you.

K: That would be helpful. Rabin and Argove are here.

A: It came to a head this afternoon. It came to a phone call from Israel
this afternoon.

K: I have them in a separate room. I have asked them to tell me the difference
between the two versions. They claim that the Jarring message wasn't
to be surfaced.

A: That's not plausible. Their reply was understood in the same light as
from Riad and the Jordanians.

K: They said thier government will disintegrate if they do.

A: That's what Meir said.

K: Do I get the President in?

A: We are trying to get up some gimmicks which Jarring and U Thant can use.

K: We have to extablish some communication. Can I get a piece of paper on
what this is about in case the President asks?

A: We are putting one together but it won't be ready for at least an hour.

K: What happens now if the Egyptians accept x tomorrow morning and
the Israelis don't?

A: On the cease-fire or the program formula?

K: The cease-fire goes into effect anyway?

A: If they get wind of the waffling it may blow up. The Egyptians and Jordanians say they accept and we can tell Jarring and the UN. We can launch this tomorrow if Israel says ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . If Jarring deos it that way, they will have to renounce it.

K: For my own education. I am not arguing it. The Arabs are not giving
up a lot by that formula. They want 242. The Arab contribution is a willing-
ness to talk.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Atherton/Kissinger

10:30 pm 8/6/70

-2-

A: Any place. Plus a just and lasting peace and a right on both sides to exist.

K: The Israeli concession is to accept the resolution.

A: And there are negotiations that Jarring recommends rather than face-to-face. And withdraw in accordance with 242.

K: What do the Israelis most object to?

A: (Something about withdrawing and borders)

K: Argov, when I quieted them down, said when I said I cannot tell the President you don't like this, went back to the letter. One letter says accept and the other within the framework.

A: Our formula is general. They have made it more specific. Joe told the P.M. that your position is protected by your letter to us which is your interpretation of what you want. The others are also protected. If we don't have a common formula, we cannot get off the ground.

K: What do they say?

A: They say that they made a consession in the letter to direct negotiation. It was so clear from the beginning that the core of our proposal was our *Note* to Jarring. Any reservations they should register, which they have done. I cannot understand their stand --

K: But Joe said this letter is not as good as the Egyptians because it puts a reservation into the body. Rabin said to me tonight -- I will send you a memcon -- they said they were watching Sisco reading the letter and when he didn't object they sighed with relief.

A: He said it's clear and didn't say it was good or bad. We wanted to analyze it. We thought this problem might come up. We talked to Yost to find words that came within but not giving up their interpretation. The problem came when Barber worked out with the P.M. the wording *if the* Tekoah would make that ? ? ? ? and they understood as a substitute.

K: If you could do a memo on how this arose you will make me look better. Do it as an Eliot memo to me. That's the right channel.

A: That's what we are doing tonight.

K: I will wait here for Sisco to call me.

By KCL- NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

ca. 11:30 pm 8/6/70

(first 2 - 3 mins. missed, looking for a paper for HAK)

S: ... ". . . the Israeli Government is prepared to designate a representative in accordance with paragraph one of our statement. In this view we are drawing your attention to that Israel would ? ? ? ?" When they formulated this we sent it to Jarring. That doesn't mean every sentence in the formula. In their reply they expressed various reservations. Tekoah handled it clumsily. Jarring said "you accepted this text." Tekoah said "no." He should have said he stated the Israeli position and have said nothing more to add. Then Jarring went on. All Tekoah would have to do was call Jarring and say that paper he left this morning represents the Government's position. We had already reported that our people would go on that basis. What bothers the Israelis ? ? ? ? ? then the three part proposal. They want us to change the sentence that Israel agrees. If we do that it opens the entire negotiation between the UAR and Israel. We are only 12 hours from cease-fire. It is the UAR and Jordan from cease-fire. They both said we accept the language in that text. We have tried to find a formula but none (satisfied her). At the end I started crying about how much I loved Israel, hoping that would work.

K: What's going to happen?

S: I don't know. Give me a couple of hours. I will think of something or another formula. I want you, the Secy. and the President to know where we stand. I will try in the morning. But I will be here. Let's not give up. It's too close.

K: What can I tell Rabin?

S: I didn't want to talk to Golda. They put here on to calling me because they gave up with her and they thought I could convince her. They want out of this office with their tails between their legs.

K: I told them -- do you want me to talk to the President? They said yes. I said, I want to know, then, what's wrong with the statement except that you don't like it.

S: They told Jarring only that they don't accept the statement. ? ? ? ? ?
At that point Tekoah presented a letter from the Israelis with reservations.

K: I told them to dictate a paper to my secretary, that I must be too thick to understand. After 15 mins. they said they couldn't because that would bind them. I will send them home.

By KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

Sisco/Kissinger

ca. 11:30 pm

8/6/70

xakjok -2-

S: The Secy. said he didn't understand the difference. I don't either.

K: I do. They feel they must start from a maximum position but so do the Arabs.

S: But they are.

K: (something to the effect that they can agree to the Jarring statement but with the proviso that their views are this and so.)

S: You hit it. That's what the purpose of these formulae are. The Jarring statement ? ? ? ? without the full negotiation on the other side. I have been trying as you suggested.

K: I can add nothing new.

S: I am going to try to get Yost to get the Secy. Gen. to make an announcement that he has recieved the views of the parties -- "in light of the acceptance ? ? ? ? on the 19th and 20th of June ? ? ? ? I have asked Jarring to ? ? ? ? ?" I am trying to get Yost. I am worried that it's beginning to leak. I am going to try to get the Secy. General to get this out without circulation. I will try working on the other end.

K: Will the Arabs agree?

S: If he puts that out the danger is the Egyptians and Russians will balk. I am glad to have the opportunity to talk to you. It's always good to have a fresh mind on a problem one is working on all day.

K: I don't know how I contribute.

S: You have confirmed what I have done.

K: Please be sure we are informed as quickly as anyone else.

S: There have been no lapses. We wound up at 9:00 and I went out for a sandwich and asked for a memo for you. If the President calls me tomorrow morning and asks me to explain the problem, I am not sure I can explain it easily. When two bright people like Joseph Sisco and Henry cannot explain the problem, maybe there's no problem.

K: We have to convince Golda Meir.

S: I failed.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
ca. 11:30 pm (shortly after previous)
8/6/70

K: I talked to Rabine and said as a friend the only thing you are arguing about is the protection of your opening position. You don't want someone to say you cannot make it. I said no one is going to context your opening position. But what you have ? ? ? ? ? . If Joe Sisco and I have trouble discussing this what will I tell the President? I told him you were going to be up all night. But I said what would you come up with. Rabin finally said I am acting under instructions.

S: He knows we are trying.

K: See if you can find a new wrinkle. They have a suicidal impulse. This is the least of their problems. Wait until Yost gets that far power talk going.

S: That's the best joke you have told all day.

K: It's not a joke, it's the truth.

By KCL- U NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Saunders/Kissinger
evening 8/6/70

K: Are you aware of the embroiglio with the Israelis?

S: I am aware of the last few days and it came to a head tonight. We have been writing to you every morning. I wrote you a memo this evening and left it at 7:00, an up-dating memo with this issue. With a note from me.

K: They say they cannot accept this thing.

S: That's what they are saying --

K: When we are in the middle of a crisis, you can't handle this bureaucraticly!

S: You were gone and Al and I bazzx gave it to Dave.

K: I read these things in 24 hours. Rabin is here.

S: How can I get across if not in writing? I have talked to Al and given him the memos.

K: My immediate problem is what I do now.

S: Well --

K: Sisco and Atherton are working tonight and I would like my man on it too. I want to know how the course of events will be.

S: One would be for Jarring to try to call a meeting without our document.

K: Would the Egyptians agree?

S: It depends on how badly they want talks started. It would require sang froid on Jarring's side. Another possibility is keep the pressure on Israel.

K: They say their government will collapse if they accept this.

S: That in itself could be -- it doesn't rule out our going back.

K: Sisco has talked to Mier.

S: I know she had called him (K: Jesus Christ!)

K: Did you talk to Sisco? Is he in the office?

S: I found out a few minutes ago from Atherton. I don't know what has happened. The second possibility is going back to them.

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

-2-

K: I consider that has been done. That's the position I am taking taking with Rabin.

She

S: She told Barbour a couple of more Cabinet Ministers including perhaps herself would not stay on if they had to accept this but it doesn't rule out a heart to heart on it and see if there's something she can do. The 3rd possibility is for Jarring to issue a fudged statement having received acceptance from the parties that I am authorized to call a meeting."

K: Will you work with Atherton and Sisco on choices by tomorrow morning.

S: Sure.

K: Good.

## Second conversation -- shortly afterwards

K: Could you get the key cables together by the morning?

S: I will. I have given you a memo on the Israeli response to go to the Pres. -- a couple of days ago. I don't know if it went.

K: Oh, yes. It's the relationship between that and the Jarring note I don't understand.

(interrupted.)

Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon presidential
Materials Staff

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/7/70 8:15 a.m.

S: Uhad another idea. I am going to be talking to Yost. I'll keep you read in over the next hour or hour and a half. It's to marry the ideas in our paper, Yost's and Barbour's. I asked to Rabin to let him know. I said I'm afraid I can't find the answer. I'm going to let him sweat. Wally told me my talk did some good. Apparently it shook the Madam somewhat. And then your talk following told them that there was no difference of view between us and it shook them up.

K: Also I told him as a personal friend that he should save his credit for the big issues.

S: I told Wally to tell the Israelis we prefer that we ourselves make the announcement. I suggested noon today (6:00 tonight in Israel). The reason is that the sooner we announce it, the more we freeze it. I am now going out with a cable to Cairo saying that we want to make it at noon out time, and please get the Egyptian okay.

K: Okay, I have edited the statement.

S: You aren't supposed to have it.

K: I know, on a personal basis.

S: And I will tell the Secretary to concert it with the White House.

Okay?

K: Yes, that's okay. There's no question of protocol.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

8/7/70 9:30 a.m.

S: An approach by which our proposal wouldn't be [escalated?]
at all--that would be the first preference of the Israelis. If that were to
be okay, the Secretary General would proceed on the basis of option 2.
The other alternative is: we would try to actually reopen the text--get
Jarring to reaffirm: "The UAR, Jordan, and Israel advise me, as stated
in the attached documents [The Israeli letter which has been circulated,
the Egyptian letter and the Jordanian letter] that they agree to the
proposal of the U. S.:" then the rest reproduced. I don't propose to tell
the Israelis anything--let us see what we can work but in New York.

K: What do you mean by that?

S: Charlie is talking to Ralph Bunch. If they are willing to proceed on
that basis then we know whether to go ahead . . .

K: On the basis of option two?

S: Option 2 or the other option.

K: And that's acceptable to the Arabs?

S: That's the risk we take. Both sides would have to close their
eyes. Let's see which way New York is leaning.

K: Do you ever play it safe?

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
8/7/70 8:35 a.m.

K: The Egyptians have now accepted the cease-fire, but Sisco and I worked several hours last night. The Israeli thing has come unstuck again. It's some shell game between Rabin and Sisco with both trying to sneak texts past each other. It has to be done with Jarring's presentation to the Secretary General. Israel feels that the text we gave Jarring constricts their negotiating position. Anyway, both sides were not making their differences explicit, hoping to sneak versions by each other. We're getting our announcement out around noon. It's supposed to go into effect at 6:00 tonight. I am not sure we can hold it.

P: Well, good luck on it.

K: We have a text for you later in the morning. There is nothing you can do on it now; I just wanted to let you know. If there is something later in the morning, I will let you know.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

8/7/70 12:00

R: I just read the memcon of your meeting with Rabin last night. I think it was a mistake for him to do that.

K: It went immediately to Sisco.

R: But for you to meet. He thinks that way he can get two shots. It's so screwed up at the moment. How did you leave it?

K: That he would be hearing from Sisco. Every time I made a move I checked it with Sisco and reported back to him afterwards.

R: I think we should do it one way.

K: My understand is that I have followed exactly what Sisco told me. He said he had a personal message for the President from Mrs. Meir.

P: I think we're going to have to be pretty tough with them. The Israeli Ambassador went to Jarring and said that the ______ of their acceptance and then handed them this piece of paper which re-states it. They can't possible back away from that, or say 'we accept it but we have rewritten it.' Jarring is prepared to go ahead. I don't know how we can avoid that. I will talk to Rabin and explain it.

K: I am out of it--the only thing Sisco thought helpful was to make it clear to them that there was no split. I hadn't been clued in on all the detalis during the day so I didn't know what he was talking about.

R: Jarring is prepared to go ahead now.

K: The President thought we should have Ziegler just release the message you phoned over and have you do any backgrounding you want.

R: Let's wait and see, because I think it's bettwe to have it done here. It's just easier if we go ahead and give the statement and fill in because Ziegler doesn't understand it very well. And if it falls through then the President isn't involved. If that's what you want to do Okay, but I think it's a mistake. He shouldn't be involved in these operational details.

K: The President understood that you didn't care where it was announced.

R: No, but this may not even hold. We are doing it because we want to make it hold and we are trying to force them. I don't think he should be involved.

By KCLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
8/7/70 12:30 p.m.

R: I have had McCloskey go in and he won't refer to this.

K: We can't do anything about it now anyway. What the President wants is to give the announcement here and give the backgrounding to you.

R: What is the announcement? I understand "Godspeed" is in there.

K: We got the lines from you.

R: But if the thing falls through, which it might, and they had the statement from the President he'd have egg on his face. I am willing to take some risks, but I'm not sure the President should.

K: When should it be done?

R: Well, we said 12:00. It's now 12:30. But if you announce it you are going to get a million questions that can't be answered.

K: The UAR hasn't agreed to it yet.

R: We were going to say that there are rules, but we're not releasing them now. We may now have ruined the thing.

K: Not me because you haven't been talking to me.

R: These things are operational and I think I should take the lead. This meeting last night screwed it up so badly...

K: Don't be ridiculous.

R: I'm not being ridiculous.

K: You are being absurd. The thing was totally screwed up and everything I did was checked with Sisco. He said Mrs. Meir was about to resign...

R: You either have somebody running the operation or you don't.

K: If you have a complaint, talk to the President. I am sick and tired of this. If he has a message for the President he isn't going to give it to you. I was at a dinner last night. I had an urgent call. I came back to my office. As soon as I came in I called Sisco and Atherton for instructions.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

8/7/70 12:30 p.m. page 2

R: He didn't have a message for the President; he wanted to talk with you. When you have an audience with him they think they have two ways to play it. I don't think it's a good procedure. I am not saying you shouldn't be involved . . .

K: I don't want to be involved. I said I noted what he said and they would hear their answer from Sisco.

R: Well, you and I don't see alike on these things. They need to have the idea that when we are acting we act persuant to the President. If they have a feeling that there are two channels to the President they will use them differently.

K: I didn't take it to the President. He doesn't even know about it yet.

R: But they think you did. It would be helpful to me if, when all it is is carrying out orders, you would not take part in the discussions. When they had a message that's different, but when they have a complaint about something they did with us, you should refer them to me or Sisco. I don't think when you have such a critical matter they should have a feeling that they have got two ways to play it. They should think when we speak that we speak for the President.

K: There is no separate channel. Every conversation I have had I have sent you a memcon and I have checked every comment with Sisco and I have been told the fact that I backed Sisco has helped.

R: Why do you think they go to you?

K: To try to end run and get the President to overrule you

R: That's right.

K: But that has never heppened.

R: But why give them the impression that it might.

K: I thought they were going to tell me that they had attacked the SAM sites across the Canal.

R: I'm not making any headway. I think this is operational--I don't think you should see these people. Anyway, let me know what the President wants. When is Ron going to do it?

K: When we get word from you that we can.

By KCLW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
8/7/70 12:52 p.m.

R: I have just talked to Bergus. Nasser has not approved making this public yet. He's going to TV in an hour and 15 minutes to announce it and I think we should coordinate it so the President can make it at the same time.

K: The President is not going to make it.

R: Well, the White House.

K: Okay, and if you have any change in the text let us know. I will have what we have phoned over to you.

R: Okay, also Nasser doesn't want the ground rules made public. Then we don't really have any background to give out.

8/7/70 1:00 p.m.

K: In looking over what we have here and thinking over all the loose ends, that have to be tied together, I think the announcement ought to be made at State. The point you made that if anything goes wrong, the President shouldn't be in it is right.

R: Okay. I just talked to Bergus: Nasser wants to make it and Mrs. Meir wants to announce it and I don't want to get the President into that kind of thing.

K: Okay. You will make the statement that was dictated over the phone. The President is in a meeting so he doesn't know about this yet, but I will take the responsibility for it.

R: Okay, now, timing is a question. We will probably do it in the next hour. We will try to coordinate it with Israel and Egypt.

By KCLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

R: Well, the White House.

8/7/70 1:00 p.m.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
3:13 pm 8/7/70

R: We just had Rabin in here. In trying to solve this problem we have been in touch with U Thant and Jarring and we have a statement we are going to release. We have just worked it out. It's not going to please them. We will read it to you and send you a copy. A U Thant statement. "I have been informed by the U. S. that their peace proposal has been accepted by Israel, Jordan and the UAR. Subsequently, my ? ? ? ? ? ? ? has been given confirmation by these 3 governments." That's confirmation by letter. That protects them. "In accordance with that proposal and acceptance given by ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the letter." The letter has our initiative. They object to the ? ? ? ? but if you don't agree, there's nothing left. "(finished quote)" Rabin is satisfied but he can't show it because his Government will be upset. We didn't give them much notice.

K: I think he is closer to us than his instructions.

R: I asked what was in the language he doesn't like. He thinks there should have been more. I said that's in your acceptance.

K: If it had been included ? ? ? ? ? . They will be better off that way.

R: It may be a problem for her./ In the first place no one will notice because people think you have already done this. Secondly, if you come out and say you don't accept the language of our draft on the initiative, you will have to state what you don't accept and the fact you accepted it at all.

K: I went through this last night. I couldn't get him to put on paper what is wrong.

R: I said what do you object to? You agreed to 242, indirect negotiations, withdrawal, and you have ______ a cease fire. You might mention it to the President,

K: I will. You had not choice and that's a subtle way of dealing with it.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/64

TELCON
Javits/Kissinger
3:30 pm 8/7/60

J: Sisco would like a statement from me hailing the cease fire. My inclination is to say, if I put out anything -- I'm going to be on "Face the Nation" on Sunday -- to say its a first step for our President to lead to peace in the M.E. Should I do it?

K: That's all right. But I wouldn't go any further.

J: You don't want to talk to me yet about OPIC?

K: No, but I am following it up.

By: KHLW

NARA, Dato.

5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
6:25 pm 8/7/70

L: I wanted to make sure that you had an opportunity to see that memcon with Helmut Schmidt. I sent it over yesterday. It has to do with the agreement they signed today. It makes some interesting observations and ?? that they won't be submitted for ratification for 6 months. They know it would be difficult as far as the affirmative vote goes. He realized and thought Brandt realized that there would have to be an understanding before it could be submitted to their Parliament.

K: It's fascinating.

L: Helmut was here and I spent half a day with him. He was in touch with me today and he is leaving tonight. He is happy.

K: Is he at the German Embassy?

L: He is coming in from Ft. Bliss and leaving at 11:00 tonight from Dulles. An AF jet is taking him to Dulles.

K: Please get word to him sending my warm regards.

L: I have already done that. He wanted to see you on the 10th but now that's off.

K: He is the only one we can rely on in that government.

L: They are not up to speed in that government. With all the stuff you have, maybe you overlooked it.

K: I will dig it out.

L: You did a good job on Borman.

K: You deserve credit for keeping after us.

L: On that other matter, we are still keeping those cutters out there. I think we should pull them off. It's been 48 hours. Maybe that's a good report but I don't think that boat can stay out that much longer.

K: If you think it's safe, pull them off.

L: I will do it tomorrow morning.

By KHLN NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

Telecon
The President
8/7/70 8:05 p.m.

P: I thought you should know that when I saw Bill I told him about the fact that Javits put in a request for a meeting with Fulbright and Aiken. He felt strongly that we shouldn't rush into it. After all, Fulbright has been cutting us up. I thought it was good to tell him frontally that we had had leaks.

K: He took it well.

P: He knows it's true. Also, if you can talk with him before he goes on Meet the Press or Issues and Answers, whichever, it would be good to say that without the President's strong stand there wouldn't have been a cease-fire. We don't know how it will come out, but we would all be dead without what he did.

K: We would have been rejected without your letter in (April?), and again if you hadn't gotten tough and if you hadn't written the second letter.

P: Eliot Richardson said it nicely. He said that had I not said what I did on July 1 there wouldn't have been a cease-fire.

K: That's true.

P: And Bill said that's true.

K: Yes. Bill felt so strongly about making the statement at State and you were so busy that I decided to let him do it.

P: No harm. The Administration will still get the credit.

K: I was a little bit uncertain about that. And he felt so strongly that I thought you wouldn't want to make an issue of it.

P: Absolutely. Okay, you talk to Jack and tell him to get that message across and that the 71 Senators and all of that.

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

12:00 noon

8/8/70

K: How are you?

S: First rate.

K: We have that vote next week on that issue we discussed. Some people here wondered if you would consider coming back to talk to 2 or 3 of the waverers to talk about that subject.

S: I think it's important I finish up here next week.

K: To be useful to the vote you would have to be here Monday or Tues and go back. This is not an order.

S: There's a possibility we can finish up here Wed. You tell me what to do.

K: You should be here for the closing.

S: It will look peculiar if I'm not.

K: Could you put it back to Friday?

S: I spent some time yesterday urging that we wrap it up Wed. so I can get back. Couldn't it be done on the phone?

K: I suggested that.

S: What Senators?

K: Percy, Pearson, Proudly, and maybe Symington.

S: Symington is -- we are on an open line wire here, I can't be in two places at once. I will do whatever you order me to do.

K: I will call you back after I talk to Haldeman.

S: It will seem funny if I am not here for the finish. I will talk on the telephone.

K: Would you be prepared to initiate some calls?

S: That's rough. Did you see the advertisement in the Star? That's close to libel. You know my personal feelings.

K: I know your feelings and I knew nothing about it before it came out. We have a lot of active public relations officers here.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

12:00 noon 8/8/70

-2-

S: Foster said the same thing to Time magazine.

K: I agree. I will call and let you know.

S: My judgment is it would look very curious if I went back and then came back here two days later.

K: They are in Camp David. Let me talk to them there.

By KCLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Haldeman/Kissinger
12:05 pm 8/8/70

K: I wanted to check with you. I talked to Gerard Smith about his coming back on ABM. They have the wind up on Wed.

H: He shouldn't come back. Oan't he talk on the phone.

K: Colson said that's not good enough.

H: Tell him that's what he is going to get.

K: He prefers it if they call him rather than have him initiate the call.

H: Colson or Timmons should go to Senate office and place the call with him and ask there to accept it.

K: He thinks it would look odd for him to come back, lobby for ABM, and go back to them.

H: I agree.

K: Is the President up? On that aid thing, I haven't gotten to him.

H: He's up.

K: I will call him in half an hour.

By: KHL NARA, Dato' S/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Gerard Smith

August 8, 1970

12:20 p.m.

jlj

K: Hello

S: Hi Henry.

K: Jerry, I have the ruling for you which is you should not come back.

S: As usual your wisdom prevails, Henry. If there is anything I can
do to help I will be glad to do it.

K: I will ask our people to go up to the Hill. We have four or five
separate waivers (wavers ?). We'll get them all in one room and then
place a call to you and you can brief them all at once. That would be
better than separate calls. One call and you can say it all then. If
anything changes I will let you know.

S: That's fine. Whatever you work out is fine. [Said something referring to the ad which I didn't get.]

K: I am raising holy hell . . .

S: It is pretty close to libel. I testified in executive session but
did not say that. [Said something about one statement being close to libel.]

K: I am raising holy hell.

S: This was the first time I saw it. XXXXX No one said a word to
me about it.

K: I thought it was a disarmament ad when I saw it because of that
mushroom . . .

S: It's a good thing nobody reads it. You have no problem with the
press today - the 12 o'clock session . . . ?

K: No, 'OK Jerry, have a good weekend. Where are you?

S: In Shrasfushel (phonetic). I recommend it.

K: Eat some slogged over (phonetic) for me.

S: See you next week I hope.

K: I look forward to it.

By: KLC W NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
6:17 pm 8/10/70

L: I wanted to find out if you were satisfied with the DPRC.

K: It went well and I appreciate the cooperation Dave and Tom gave and the paper was first class. I talked to the President about it and he was pleased. He has it on his mind now. Not the budget part but what we are trying to do. He has approved the air sorties in VN. He wants to know what we are doing.

L: We flew 100 sorties in Cambodia. I will take the heat. I try to screw it up.

K: He says he appreciates your position. I was going to call you when I got your message.

L: On the DPRC, we had only a short time. One thing I would like to see him do. If I could get Shultz, Weinberger and including State and bring SAC out here for a briefing of 40 minutes.

K: That's essential.

L: I suggested that Dave suggest it at the next meeting. The same as in Omaha but only 40 mins.

K: Let's definitely schedule that. We will schedule a special meetings

L: I had them come out today for the Joint Chiefs. It's an up-grade because of MIRV. When I got back I told them the DPRC should have it.

K: Let's give them an hour. We will schedule it in the next month. We are going to have a ________ meeting next week.

L: How does the President feel about activity in the north? Does he want to hold off until Sept.?

K: It wouldn't take much to make him go now. He is eager.

L: We are flying missions and haven't had a reaction. There are some thing in the DMZ but I haven't gotten good intelligence. This week they cut off infiltration. They are going around the DMZ and not coming through.

K: What were the casualties last week?

L: Around 84 or 86.

K: Right.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

6:17 pm

8/10/70

-2-

L: It's up a little bit. Of those 84 there were only 54 killed during the week. The others died in the hospital afterwards -- due to Fire Base Ripcord.

K: It was good you pulled out of there. He doesn't want to do it without provocation but if the casualties go above 100 --

L: What if we don't get provocation? I don't mind going north.

K: Better get over 100. If there's provocation, we had better go up north.

L: I have tried but can't get anything.

K: I need contingency planning. Could we do it over here?

L: Sure. I will keep the DMZ in the background here. Also a strike on one of the bases. We can go in a hurry.

K: Let's keep that until something comes up.

L: You don't want to do it near his speech.

K: Before Sept. 1 or after the election.

L: I think so. It may be better after the election. Let's see how it goes. We have some things on the burner. I was giving a briefing in the House last Friday morning and there's a lot of discontent developing over the fact that they think military plans are in good shape in Indochina but they are worried about the economic thing.

K: We have to get to that. We are going to get a paper out this week on the devaluation.

L: You have our paper. That's a good paper. If we fall on our faces on other areas than military --

K: The President sent a paper to Bill Rogers setting up a group on S. E. A. strategy. You are right. You have called that shot all along.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
8/10/70; 6:35 p.m.

K: On the matter we discussed this morning -- foreign aid message -- if you are agreeable, we will leave it out of the message all together and put it in to the Under Secretaries Committee. Since that is under your Under Secretary's chairmanship, it will give you another crack at it. He won't rule the way you and I recommended and this keeps it open until after the elections. I will send it over to you for any comments and submit it on Friday.

R: Okay. How did you miss this dinner tonight?

K: Oh, for Lasker? I guess I was lucky.

R: The Vice President kept calling me and now that I look at it, it is mostly contributors.

K: No one can suspect me of that.

R: Okay, Henry.

feg