PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Betty Goetz Lall

In considering the question of preventing the spread of
nuclear weapons there should be included the following under the
meaning of "spread" or "proliferation": an increase in the number
of countries producing nuclear weapons; the spread of nuclear
weapons by means of one country giving, selling, or lending nuclear
weapons, nuclear weapons material or nuclear weapons information,
to another country not heretofore possessing nuclear weapons; and
the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of nations, in
areas, or environments, in which nuclear weapons had previously
been absent.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the problem of
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, i.e., warheads
and bombs; the matter of the vehicles for the delivery of nuclear
weapons is also discussed here, but to a lesser degree. The
problem is examined in light of recent political developments,
namely, the entry into force of a treaty banning nuclear weapons
tests in the atmosphere, underwater and space and the continued
determination on the part of France and Communist China to develop
a national nuclear weapons capability.

Included here are estimates of the likelihood of other
powers entering the nuclear club, measures that might be used
to prevent or inhibit nuclear proliferation, the extent to which

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the prevention of proliferation requires further disarmament or
other measures on the part of the nuclear powers themselves, and
an assessment regarding the possibilities for success.

I. The Problem

At the present time only four nations are producing nuclear
weapons. In the case of the United States and the Soviet Union,
particularly, the manufacture of nuclear weapons has been taking
place for over fourteen years and by now each nation has a large
and diversified stockpile of them. ¹ Great Britain also has been
accumulating nuclear weapons though its stockpile is not as large
and diversified as those of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. France, the
fourth nuclear power, has been in the business of producing nuclear
weapons only for the past few years, but recently it was disclosed
that France now has operational a small air unit of some six
Mirage IV bombers equipped with 40 kiloton bombs. It is estimated
that the complete planned French strike force, including three
nuclear powered submarines armed with Polaris-type missiles and
the Mirage IV bombers, will not be in existence before 1969; ²
there are also reports of difficulties in the French program
suggesting that 1972 is a more realistic date. ³

Nuclear weapons, if used either in all-out war or even in
so-called limited nuclear war, would cause tremendous damage not
only to the countries directly involved but also very likely to
countries not directly involved in the war, depending of course
on the extent of the war and the number of nuclear weapons used.
Therefore, nuclear weapons in the hands of four powers alone pose

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a threat to the security of the world. If the number of nuclear powers increases the threat to world security will be greater. The more countries having nuclear weapons the more likely they will be used in war. Also, each new entry into the nuclear club is likely to cause other, possibly rival, nations to want to enter, thus setting up a chain reaction for an increase in the number of nuclear powers.

There is a point of view which argues that the more nuclear powers there are the less likely nuclear weapons will be used in war because nations possessing such weapons will view them as less of an advantage in warfare. As part of this argument it is also contended that a nation producing nuclear weapons of its own will act more responsibly in world affairs, thus decreasing on the part of such nations aggressive intentions to start war. Therefore, it is contended that the nuclear powers should not fear the proliferation of nuclear weapons.⁴

Even granting the validity to some extent of this last point about nuclear responsibility the argument as a basis for policy is not accepted here; it is the assumption of this paper that the likelihood of nuclear war increases as the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons increases. Furthermore, the difficulty of negotiating to bring nuclear weapons under international control and to reduce and eventually eliminate them from national arsenals certainly would increase when additional states become nuclear powers.

The problem then is how to prevent, prohibit, or inhibit other nations from becoming nuclear powers; this is a key problem

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of world security facing all nations, whether they be major or minor, nuclear or non-nuclear powers.

## II. Possibilities for Increasing the Nuclear Club

About eight countries have the technical and industrial capability to join the nuclear club within the next half-dozen or so years. They are: the People's Republic of China, India, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, and Canada. To some extent Argentina, Brazil, the United Arab Republic, Australia, and Czechoslovakia also might be able to produce nuclear weapons, but after a longer period of preparation. This is not to say that each of the above mentioned countries has made the political decision to produce nuclear weapons; the political aspect is a quite separate matter. But the above list indicates something of the number of countries having the technical know-how and industrial base sufficiently well-developed to produce nuclear weapons.

### A. People's Republic of China

Communist China, by its pronouncements over the past several months and by its refusal to sign the limited test ban treaty, has made very clear its intention to produce nuclear weapons. The Chinese Communists have attacked the Soviet Union for signing the test ban treaty. They said this was an act by the Soviet Union "in open betrayal of the interests of the Soviet people, the people in the Socialist Camp, including the Chinese people,

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and the peace-loving people of the world." 6 On another occasion the Peking radio stated that American officials wanted "to realize the long-cherished U.S. dream of preventing China from becoming a power capable of countering nuclear blackmail." 7

Communist China has not specified any conditions under which it might shift its course and stop its nuclear weapons program, except that it has indicated that only under conditions of general and complete disarmament would it be safe to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Communist China has criticized, however, efforts to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Chinese Communists have stated:

"However, certain persons now actually hold that it is possible to bring about a world without weapons, without armed forces, and without war through general and complete disarmament while the system of imperialism and of the exploitation of man by man still exists. This is sheer illusion." 8

There is no indication that the Chinese intend to stop or inhibit their nuclear weapons development. 9 They have not yet tested a nuclear weapon, to public knowledge, but various officials in the U.S. Government have predicted that sometime in 1964 the Chinese might be able to explode a nuclear device. 10 These officials are quick to point out, however, that exploding a nuclear device and producing a sufficiently large supply of nuclear weapons to use in war are two different things; and that it might take the Chinese anywhere from a half to a dozen years before it

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could be considered an important nuclear power. Such estimates, of course, tend to view the Chinese role in the nuclear field as though it would follow a development comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union. It is conceivable that the Chinese might attempt to employ a different strategy, one that would not entail such a long and costly period of weapons development as that pursued by the present nuclear powers. For example, the Chinese might decide to forgo any attempt to have a stockpile of weapons that is diversified, or one that contains a minimum amount of so-called "dirty" nuclear material, or one that requires expensive and complicated means for delivery.

The Chinese will continue to pursue a course of becoming a strong nuclear power. Although the cost in terms of allocation of resources may act as a brake on China's nuclear program this is not likely. If the nuclear weapons development programs of the current nuclear powers continue improved and less costly techniques for producing nuclear weapons may become available, thus enhancing and expediting China's ability to join the nuclear club.

## B. India and Japan

The persistence of Communist China to become a nuclear power, and its ideological contentions that some wars are inevitable so long as "imperialist nations" such as the United States exist, will affect policy-makers in India and Japan. If Communist China remains hostile toward India and renews its attack on her while at the same time testing and producing nuclear weapons, then the

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likelihood increases that India will make the political decision to produce nuclear weapons as a protection to her national security. India continues to follow a policy of not producing nuclear weapons or acquiring them in any other manner. But India has a fairly active nuclear power program which could become the basis for a nuclear weapons development program. India will soon start building a 380,000 kilowatt nuclear power reactor, its first power reactor and one of the largest in the world. Therefore, though the Indian Government until now has declined to undertake a nuclear weapons program, its attitude would be subject to change as India watched Chinese power in the field of nuclear weaponry increase and as it watched the continued development of nuclear weapons by the major nuclear powers. ¹¹ A decision by India to enter the nuclear club would not necessarily be taken immediately upon Chinese entry into it. It could follow the path of France, which deliberately pursued a policy of not attempting to enter the nuclear club for several years after the U.S. and the Soviet Union had begun their weapons programs.

To some extent Japan is in a position not unlike India in its attitude toward producing nuclear weapons. It too has the industrial capacity and knowledge to produce nuclear weapons; but it too has been reluctant to take the political step of deciding that its security requires these weapons. Certainly a menacing China with nuclear weapons could change the Japanese attitude. Before the Japanese undertook to begin a nuclear weapons program by themselves they might first seek assistance through their alliance with the United States.

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## C. The Federal Republic of Germany

Technically and industrially West Germany would be able to produce nuclear weapons within a very short period of time. Politically, however, by a declaration of October 3, 1954, West Germany is pledged not to produce nuclear weapons in its territory. 12 There is no doubt, however, that some of West Germany's political, military, and industrial leaders believe that from the standpoint of its security nuclear weapons are essential for Germany.

An expression of the official German attitude and position was given in May 1963 by the Minister of Defense, Kai-Uwe von Hassel. In reiterating West Germany's support for the proposed Multilateral Nuclear Force, to be composed of surface ships armed with Polaris missiles with atomic warheads and manned by mixed crews from participating navies, Mr. von Hassel stressed that other measures would be necessary, namely the need to station intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and eventually the removal of the U.S. veto over the employment of nuclear weapons in the Multilateral Nuclear Force. 13 The U.S. has believed that the best way to prevent West Germany from becoming a nuclear power in its own right is to include West Germany in a M.L.F. In the absence of arrangements, however, for genuine reduction and control of armaments the pressure from West Germany for nuclear weapons and for a greater role in their use is likely to continue.

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## D. The Middle East

In the Middle East Israel and the United Arab Republic would be the two powers most able and most likely to produce nuclear weapons. Israel could do so within a few years, assuming she made the political decision to proceed. If Israel went ahead the U.A.R. would feel that its security required it to follow and attempt to match the Israeli pace. If technology precluded this, then the U.A.R. would try to acquire the weapons from an existing nuclear power. A nuclear arms race in the Middle East would have profound consequences for the security of the entire area and would not be without consequences for the major powers as well.

## E. Other Countries

Powers in Western Europe such as Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands would be more likely to acquire nuclear weapons through an alliance, such as NATO or a new alliance established by France and West Germany for European powers alone, than they would from their own production facilities. 14 Sweden and Switzerland, as neutral powers without the possibility of assistance from alliances, would be capable within a short time of producing nuclear weapons. They have not yet done so and the governments of these two countries appear to be reluctant to attempt to enter the nuclear club. The recent test ban agreement certainly, in the case of Sweden at least, served to give the majority party an additional incentive to stay out of the nuclear club. whether both countries stay out is dependent on major world and future European political developments.

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In Latin America, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico could produce nuclear weapons either in conjunction with a new or existing alliance system or on their own independent initiative, but not for several years. In the latter case it would take more than several years.

Canada should also be mentioned as a potential nuclear power. She has the capacity, but has thus far preferred to work closely with the United States, to the extent that she engages in any nuclear weapons activities. Canada would not likely decide to go into producing nuclear weapons just as a show of power; the future of NATO and of the disarmament efforts of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would appear to be the most controlling factors in any decision.

In the Asian and Pacific area the only nation, other than Communist China, India, and Japan, which could and might go into nuclear weapons production, is Australia. Here the future course pursued by China in its foreign and military policies would have a profound impact. As in the case of Japan, it is probable that Australia would consult with Great Britain and the United States before embarking on a nuclear weapons program of its own. It is also possible that Pakistan would attempt to acquire nuclear weapons if India acquired them or if India began a nuclear weapons production program.

### III. Measures for Preventing Proliferation

Given the possibility of certain countries, mentioned in Section II, to become nuclear powers, what, if anything, can

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be done to prevent or inhibit nuclear weapons proliferation?
This section will discuss measures, considered as arms control
or disarmament, which might have some impact on proliferation.

## A. Prohibition of Nuclear Testing

The present state of the art of nuclear weaponry requires
a certain amount of testing to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
It is possible to build weapons that might work without testing.
This was done with one of the weapons dropped on Japan in 1945.
And obviously the technology of producing weapons is now well
known in several countries by highly trained scientists and
weapons experts. But, nevertheless, testing is needed if a country
wishes to build a fairly diversified arsenal of weapons.

With the exception of France and Communist China all of the
countries of the world which are capable of becoming nuclear powers
within the next dozen years or so have signed the test ban agreement
prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, space, and underwater.
This limited agreement does serve to inhibit the proliferation
of nuclear powers because much about nuclear weapons can only be
learned or learned without great difficulty by testing in the
atmosphere or underwater. 15

The limited test ban agreement, however, does not prohibit
underground testing and if a country with the technical and
industrial capability wishes to pay the expenses of digging
tunnels and instrumenting them properly it could become a nuclear
power in this way.

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A comprehensive test ban agreement, prohibiting tests
underground, obviously would be more effective in limiting
advances in nuclear weapons technology than the present partial
treaty. The positions of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on an inspection
system to monitor such a comprehensive treaty had been not far
apart, i.e., as of mid-1963 the U.S. was asking for seven inspections
and the U.S.S.R. was willing to allow no more than three per year.
The U.S. believed a single inspection should be a thorough one
while the U.S.S.R. was maintaining that an inspection was only
political or symbolical. Since the signing of the Moscow treaty
in July, the Soviet Union has abandoned its stand of three inspections
and reverted to a position of refusing all inspections in connection
with a comprehensive test ban agreement.

Further technical research and renewed evaluation of
existing research, as well as military and political considerations
might lead the U.S. Government to modify its inspection requirements.
Even if this could be done it would not guarantee that the Soviet
Union would feel this much gain in further inhibiting the
development of nuclear weapons technology and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to other countries was worth the price of a
few inspections taking place in the Soviet Union.

As more is learned about nuclear weapons technology,
especially through continued underground tests, it may be that
testing will become less of a factor in the development and
production of weapons. Scientific advances cannot be predicted,
but to be able to build weapons without testing will undoubtedly

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be a challenge to scientists, regardless of nationality, and such possibilities should not be discounted. Whether those with military responsibilities would be willing to send troops into battle with untested weapons is another question. It is likely military officers would prefer to have weapons tested.

As important as the technical limitations placed on nuclear weapons proliferation by the limited test ban agreement will be the political attitude taken toward producing nuclear weapons on the part of some countries, especially those in the first instance which would be affected by the acquisition of such weapons by Communist China. The test ban treaty (Article IV) permits any signatory to it to withdraw from the agreement "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." For example, Japan, even though it has signed the treaty, might be forced by its security requirements to withdraw from it as a result of Chinese testing.

B. Agreement Not to Share with or Give Nuclear Information or Weapons to Non-Nuclear Powers.

During the past few years the U.S., U.K., and the U.S.S.R., as well as other nations, have considered signing an agreement which would be open to all nations for adherence, whereby they would be willing to agree not to give nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons information to powers not now producing or possessing them; and non-nuclear powers would agree not to receive such weapons or

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weapons information or to manufacture nuclear weapons. U.S. law already precludes nuclear weapons and certain kinds of nuclear weapons information being given or sold to non-nuclear powers. Although there is no known Soviet law comparable to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, containing such a prohibition, the Soviet Union since it withdrew its technicians from Communist China in 1960 has not indicated a desire to assist its allies in any independent national or multilateral nuclear weapons program. A Soviet Law, well publicized among its citizens, might increase confidence outside the Soviet Union that that country was not undertaking to equip its allies or any other country with nuclear weapons.

The United States has not wanted an agreement on non-proliferation to preclude some arrangement whereby the NATO countries might create a multilateral nuclear force, which would give some European countries, notably West Germany, greater control over nuclear weapons systems than they now have, but the U.S. would still retain a veto over their use. The Soviet Union, although at first appearing to view a distant MLF as the lesser of two evils--the second one being an independent European nuclear force under predominant or partial German control--now appears to have shifted its position somewhat. 16

The non-proliferation agreement which was adhered to by non-nuclear as well as nuclear powers would have more binding effect than the present situation whereby there is no international commitment on the part of any power not to acquire nuclear weapons. An agreement on non-proliferation would complement the agreement

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on nuclear testing limited as the latter is. The test ban
agreement deals primarily with inhibiting countries from engaging
in their own production of nuclear weapons, whereas a non-
proliferation agreement concerns mainly the acquiring of nuclear
-weapons by a country which did not previously possess such weapons.

The non-nuclear powers could negotiate among themselves for
a non-proliferation agreement. In 1961 two resolutions on this
subject, one sponsored by Ireland and one sponsored by Sweden,
were passed by the U.N. General Assembly. The Irish Resolution
passes unanimously, called

"upon all States, and in particular upon the States
at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their
best endeavors to secure the conclusion of an
international agreement containing provisions under
which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain
from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons. . .
and provision under which States not possessing
nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire control of such weapons."

The Swedish Resolution, which was opposed by the United States
and most of the countries of NATO but supported by the Soviet
bloc, requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
make an enquiry

"into the conditions under which countries not
possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to

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enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country. . . ." 17

An agreement among as many non-nuclear powers as possible not to accept nuclear weapons into their possession or on their territory would serve to limit the areas in the world where nuclear weapons could be located. Furthermore, the nations signing such an agreement could use its existence to put constant pressure on those nations which had not previously signed to become signatories, as well as on the nuclear powers to resolve their differences in order to accept the agreement themselves.

As in the limited test ban agreement, proposals offered by the United States and other countries on non-proliferation do not provide for verification through inspection. It would be extremely difficult, as a matter of fact, to check as to whether nuclear weapons existed in a given country. Moreover, it is assumed that ordinary observation as well as various intelligence techniques would reveal important shifts in the acquisition or storage of nuclear weapons by and in other countries.

### C. Nuclear-Free Zones

One proposal being given increased attention by nuclear as well as non-nuclear powers is that of establishing nuclear-free zones in various geographical areas of the world. Originally

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the nuclear-free zone concept was advanced by Communist countries in Europe as a means of forcing the withdrawal of U.S. forces, and hence U.S. protection of Western Europe. As proposed by the Polish foreign minister, Mr. Rapacki, the nuclear-free zone area, while affecting the U.S. forces in Europe and the defense of other NATO countries, would not have included any part of Soviet nuclear forces. As such the proposal was resisted strongly by both the United States and its allies in NATO. Somewhat later a similar proposal was advanced by the Soviet Union and Communist China for the Asian area, though this proposal was never pushed as hard as the one for Europe. The Asian proposal would have forced the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from its allies in that part of the world. It too was equally disliked by the U.S. and allied nations.

Because the original nuclear-free zone proposals were disadvantageous to United States and NATO defense strategy there followed a period when the United States questioned the wisdom of any nuclear-free zone proposal. In considerable part as a result of the placement by the Soviet Union of nuclear delivery vehicles in Cuba in the fall of 1962, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador introduced in the 1962 General Assembly a resolution recommending the creation of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. In such a proposal the U.S. saw the possibility of mutual advantage in the creation of nuclear-free zones in areas where nuclear weapons did not already exist.

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Perhaps the main reason why the nuclear-free zone concept has yet to be translated into reality in any area is that some of the non-nuclear powers are hesitant about becoming committed to such an agreement in the current international atmosphere. In Latin America opposition to a nuclear-free zone for that area has come expecially from Argentina, a few of the Caribbean republics, and Cuba. On April 29, 1963, however, five countries in Latin America, i.e., Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, and Ecuador issued a declaration to the effect that they "were prepared to sign a Latin American multilateral agreement by which the countries would undertake not to manufacture, receive, store or test nuclear weapons or nuclear launching devices." The five countries called upon the other Latin American Republics to accede to the Declaration "so that Latin America may be recognized as a denuclearized zone as soon as possible." No other country acceded to the Declaration but 18 Brazil inscribed an item on the agenda for the 1963 U.S. General Assembly Session urging Latin American states to study measures for banning all nuclear weapons from their territory. The measure passed the General Assembly, November 27, 1963, 91 to 0 with 15 absentions. The United States voted for the resolution; the Soviet Union and all of its allies except Rumania abstained. Venezuela also abstained on the resolution because it appeared to her that too many areas in the region would not be covered, i.e., 19 Cuba, U.S. bases in Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal Zone.

Africa also represents an area in which a denuclearized zone presents possibilities. There are now no known nuclear

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weapons in the area and except for French nuclear weapons testing there has been no apparent need on the part of any power to have nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons activities in the area. Most of the African states voted for a U.N. General Assembly Resolution, November 24, 1961, passed 55 to 0 with 44 countries abstaining, calling upon member states to refrain from nuclear testing or storing or transporting nuclear weapons in the area, and to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.

In the Middle East there are problems with respect to the treatment of Turkey, a member of NATO and a country in which nuclear weapons might be stored. If Turkey were excluded from the area the United States would apparently favor an agreement whereby that area of the world could be declared free of nuclear weapons.

In Asia only Indonesia recently has kept interest alive in a nuclear-free zone for that area; other states in the area, including India and Japan which are constantly worried about the Chinese nuclear program, have not encouraged Indonesia to press for such a zone. 20

The United States and other NATO countries continue to oppose a nuclear-free zone in Europe. And the Soviet Union has been unwilling thus far to include part of its territory in any denuclearized zone for the area. On March 5, 1964, the Polish Government announced an important modification of its proposal for a nuclear-free zone in Europe.²¹ The new plan, considered by the Poles as an extension of and not a substitute for the original

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proposal, would freeze nuclear weapons in the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Federal Republic of Germany along with their respective territorial waters and air space. The plan contemplates the area could be extended by other European states acceding to it. The Polish Government stated that the plan "while in no way affecting the existing relation of forces, it would contribute to the arrest of the nuclear armaments race." The freeze "would apply to all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear charges, irrespective of the means of their employment and delivery," and "parties maintaining armed forces in the area of the proposed freeze of armaments would undertake obligations not to produce, not to introduce or import, not to transfer to other parties in the area or to accept from other parties in the area the aforementioned nuclear and thermonuclear weapons." The plan envisages some verification in plants which might be used for nuclear weapons production, and at frontier railway, road, waterway junctions, sea and air ports by mixed commissions consisting of representatives of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Any country whose armed forces in the area of the freeze have nuclear weapons at their disposal "would exchange at periodical meetings of their representatives all information and reports for the implementation of the obligations with regard to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments."

This is an interesting proposal which the U.S. and other NATO powers should find worthy of serious study and possibly detailed discussion and negotiation. The proposed implementation,

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however, is not spelled-out, and if the U.S. and possibly the U.K., are the only countries with forces in the area having nuclear weapons it is not clear with whom they would exchange "information and reports." Possibly the Poles believe the Soviet Union has nuclear weapons in Poland or East Germany. It is uncertain what effect, if any, the plan would have on the proposed NATO multilateral nuclear force, although Mr. Adam Rapacki, Poland's Foreign Minister, said that the two things belonged "to two different categories." <sup>22</sup> Furthermore, NATO countries will want to examine the effect on their defenses if no modernization of nuclear weapons stored in Germany can take place while at the same time the Soviet Union is permitted to modernize such weapons stored in the Soviet Union along its western border. Another point of inquiry will be whether representatives of Warsaw Pact powers on the mixed verification commissions would have power of veto of inspection activities in Warsaw Pact countries covered by the freeze agreement.<sup>23</sup>

As pointed out with respect to an atomic freeze in part of Europe if nuclear-free zones are to be created an additional matter to be worked out is the verification system to be used so that all parties to the agreement will know it is being observed. The system need not be very complex, especially in those areas where nuclear weapons are not now present. Inspections teams, organized by the United Nations in consultation with the countries concerned, could be made available, if requested by a signatory, to conduct inquiries. It might also be possible for the U.S. to

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request the help of the International Atomic Energy Agency in conducting an inquiry. A third possibility is where there is a regional organization in the area of the nuclear-free zone, e.g., the Organization of American States, it together with the U.N. representatives, might be responsible for conducting inspections. Some verification should be provided for in any agreement; otherwise there exists the danger that one power in an area can accuse another of harboring nuclear weapons with no resource to determine the accuracy of the charge.

### D. Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Another technique for helping to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the use of the I.A.E.A. to inspect nuclear reactors of countries to assure that the nuclear materials used are not being diverted to weapons purposes. Until recently the I.A.E.A. has not been very successful in persuading countries to accept its inspection facilities. There are several reasons for this. For one thing the major powers have not been generous in providing the Agency with nuclear materials to be loaned or sold to other countries; hence, the Agency has had little bargaining power at its disposal. Secondly, the major powers have not been eager to set an example and allow the I.A.E.A. to inspect their nuclear reactors. The United States in 1962 offered to have Agency inspectors at three of its smaller government-owned nuclear plants, but these did not include all plants. In March, 1964, the United States announced its intention of having one of its largest

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nuclear reactors opened to inspection by the I.A.E.A. This is the privately-owned Yankee nuclear power reactor at Rowe, Massachusetts. The U.S. contended that this offer "will assist the I.A.E.A. in developing and demonstrating the effectiveness of its inspection techniques for large reactor facilities," and that it also would be "an example to other nuclear powers." The U.S. asked for a reciprocal offer on the part of the Soviet Union, but stated that the Rowe plant would be subject to inspection in any case. 24

A third difficulty in advancing the I.A.E.A. safeguards system is that there has been more activity on a bilateral level of one country supplying another with nuclear materials and there is no certainty the bilateral arrangements provide the same kind of safeguards that would apply in multilateral transactions through the I.A.E.A. Given a choice a country will accept the bilateral arrangement if it calls for less inspection on its own territory.

Fourthly, the newer countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and those in Latin America have been sensitive about their national independence and have thought that Agency inspection might be an undue infringement on their sovereignty; therefore, most of them have been reluctant to accept Agency safeguards. The U.S. now is in the process of attempting to transfer the administering of safeguards in its bilateral agreements with 24 countries to the I.A.E.A. "as rapidly as practicable." 25 Eight of these agreements expire in 1964 and the countries have been informed that in the renewal there must be provision for I.A.E.A. safeguards. 26 It is not known whether the Soviet Union

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and the other nuclear powers are considering using the I.A.E.A. safeguards system in their bilateral agreements. As many as 100 agreements could be affected.

An additional important break-through in the use of safeguards occurred in June 1963, when the Soviet Union joined the United States in voting approval in the Agency's Board of Governors of an extension of agency safeguards to nuclear reactors of more than 100 megawatts power, i.e., reactors capable of producing fissionable material. As to other members of the Board, none voted in the negative. The I.A.E.A. extended its safeguard system when its Board of Governors, on February 26, 1964, voted unanimously not only to subject to inspection large nuclear reactors with a capacity exceeding 100,000 kilowatts, but also to establish a working group to undertake a general review of the present safeguards system, especially with respect to safeguards for equipment. 27

In accord with the above developments India made a significant modification of its policy when it agreed in June, 1963 to accept international inspection of an American built nuclear plant to be erected near Bombay. Through the International General Electric Company the Indian Atomic Energy Authority agreed to buy a 380,000 kilowatt plant, which will be one of the largest in the world. India agreed to accept Agency control and inspection of the reactor provided they are consistent with safeguards of the United States under a bilateral agreement. Initial inspection will be done by the United States with eventual

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inspection by the International Agency. In November, 1963, Japan signed an agreement with the United States and the I.A.E.A. providing that the international agency would exercise inspection safeguards over all nuclear materials and equipment provided by the United States.

It is hoped that U.S. and Soviet collaboration with respect to the use of the I.A.E.A. safeguard program, and its extension to large nuclear reactors, will continue and be extended. This will help to ensure that other countries will be willing to follow their lead as their own programs develop.

## E. Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Space

The introduction to this paper stated that the definition of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons included environments as well as countries. Space is one such environment in which it would be desirable to restrict to peaceful pursuits. An important advance in this objective occurred on October 3, 1963, when the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space. This agreement in principle was translated into a resolution introduced in the U.N. General Assembly and approved unanimously, on October 16, 1963, by its political committee. Although France was not one of the original sponsors of the resolution (the resolution was sponsored by the 17 nations attending the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference of which France as a member does not attend), the French delegate to the United Nations stated that France would vote for the resolution.

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The resolution "solemnly calls upon all states to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any object containing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner." The resolution is not as binding as a treaty and it does not provide for any verification. It would be desirable if the resolution on outer space could at some early future time be followed by a treaty, especially if such a treaty could also encompass other measures on the control of nuclear weapons. In this connection the treaty designating Antarctica a nuclear free area might offer useful guidelines.

#### IV. Related Questions

A paper on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons would not be complete without mentioning the possible relationship of this problem to certain larger questions. One of these questions would be the relationship between measures to curb the spread of nuclear weapons and other measures on disarmament and arms control. There is at least one important reason for examining this relationship, which should be the subject of more extensive treatment in another paper. Non-nuclear powers and perhaps France would be more convinced of the desire of the United States and the Soviet Union to curb the arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war if these two powers actually reduced some of their own weapons such as nuclear delivery vehicles and possibly also

27

reductions in stockpiles of fissionable material for weapons
purposes. By such action non-nuclear nations may be more willing
to forego membership in the nuclear club by agreeing to measures
discussed here, which in themselves do little to restrict the
nuclear strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. The
more the nuclear powers can demonstrate their intention to stop
the nuclear arms race by agreeing to substantial disarmament
measures the more likely potential nuclear powers will be influenced
to cooperate with the nuclear powers in accepting measures to curb
the spread of nuclear weapons. ²⁹ Furthermore, when the nuclear
powers agree to an arms control or disarmament measure this acts
as a psychological incentive to many non-nuclear powers to adhere
to that measure. The limited nuclear test ban treaty is a good
case in point; almost all the non-nuclear powers signed the
treaty within a relatively short time period.

Another important and related matter is the question of
the defense strategy pursued by the major nations. Many
strategists in the U.S., for example, believe that in the event
of a Soviet attack on Western Europe nuclear weapons should not
be used in the first instance. Others believe that if such an
attack occurred nuclear weapons would need to be used to repel
it. Of relevance of course is the relative conventional armed
strength of the two sides. Nations views as to the need for
nuclear weapons in time of war and their estimates of conventional
strength have a bearing on the question of nuclear weapons
proliferation.

28

It is a conclusion of this paper that the Chinese Communists will not participate in agreements which would preclude them from becoming nuclear powers and that their full attainment of nuclear status would very probably set up a chain reaction of nuclear weapons proliferation. A second matter bearing on non-proliferation, therefore, is what if anything can be done to cause Communist China to be willing to submit to controls either before or after becoming a nuclear power? There are some unexplored avenues which might have an eventual effect on China. An exploration and analysis of such avenues goes beyond the scope of this paper; it should be the subject of more extensive treatment in another paper.

In the meantime, the pessimistic conclusion with respect to Communist China should not deter the United States and the Soviet Union from taking all possible steps at this time to prevent proliferation to other countries.

Another aspect of the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the question of the willingness of France to participate in agreements to contain the nuclear club. France is not likely to agree to any steps that will curtail her nuclear weapons program before its scheduled completion date. At the same time France would probably not consider it to her interests to see nuclear weapons in the hands of many powers. Therefore, depending on the policies and agreements sought and entered into by the U.S.S.R., U.S., and U.K., France might at some future date become favorably disposed to some or all of the possible ways discussed

## FOOTNOTES

1. The U.S. stockpile is now considered so large that there are reports the U.S. Government is considering a substantial cut in atomic arms production, as much as $1 billion of an $1.8 billion budget. There is apparently some concern that an excessive amount of atomic arms might increase the chance of accidental explosions or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. *New York Times*, June 30, 1963.

2. *New York Times*, October 4 and 10, 1963.

3. *New York Times*, March 29, 1964.

4. Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," *Orbis*, Summer 1963, Vol. VII, No. 2, pp. 226-249.

5. Italy also has the industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons. See page 9.

6. "Text of Peking Article on the Origin and Growth of Soviet-Chinese Quarrel," *New York Times*, September 14, 1963. In an article in Jenmin Jil Pao, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in Peking, the test ban treaty was referred to as "aimed at tying China's hands," *New York Times*, August 25, 1963, IV.

7. *New York Times*, July 23, 1963.

8. *New York Times*, July 5, 1963.

9. *New York Times*, September 23 and October 2, 1963.

10. Another estimate is that it will be 1964 or 1965 before Communist China successfully tests a bomb of her own. Edgar Snow, "China, the United States, Russia and the Bomb," in *The Other Side of the River*, Random House, New York, 1962, p. 644. A more authoritative source on the state of China's nuclear weapons program was given by Communist China's Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, October 28, 1963, when he was reported having stated that his country could not explode an atomic bomb for several years. *New York Times*, October 29, 1963.

11. Dr. J. Bhabha, chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission has forecast that minor nuclear powers will become major ones in 10 years. *New York Times*, January 29, 1964.

12. Text of the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference on Arming of West Germany, *New York Times*, October 4, 1954.

13. *New York Times*, May 28, 1963.

[LC]

14. Italy, however, does have the industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons and it also has a fairly active nuclear power program.

15. There is also the point that measuring the results of tests conducted underground is considered by some scientists much more difficult than measurements carried out in connection with tests in the atmosphere and underwater. This point, however, is disputed by other scientists.

16. Semyon Tsaraptin, Soviet delegate to the Geneva disarmament conference, is reported to have said that the MLF project must be "swept away" before agreement could be reached to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. *New York Times*, January 24, 1964.

17. The U.S. opposed the Swedish Resolution because of the last phrase which the U.S. considered to be detrimental to its defense arrangements with NATO powers and other allies regarding the storage of nuclear weapons in their territories. Some NATO countries voted for the Swedish Resolution, i.e., Canada, Iceland, Denmark and Norway.

18. "Declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America," Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, ENDC/87, May 6, 1963.

19. *New York Times*, November 28, 1963.

20. According to a statement made by Mrs. S. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister, Ceylon has indicated it favors atom-free zones and that it would deny entry to Ceylon to vessels and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons or those equipped for nuclear warfare. *New York Times*, January 25, 1964. It is possible there might be some mutually advantageous arrangements regarding a nuclear-free zone for Asia. The question of Communist China's participation, however, virtually assures that no such proposal can be worked out within the near future.

21. *New York Times*, March 6, 1964.

22. *Ibid*.

23. *New York Times*, March 8, 1964.

24. *New York Times*, March 6, 1964.

25. *Ibid*.

26. *New York Times*, March 23, 1964.

27. *New York Times*, February 28, 1964.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Beaton, Leonard and Maddox, John, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, Chatto & Windus, London, 1962.

Snow, Edgar, *The Other Side of the River: Red China Today*, Random House, New York, 1962.

Government Documents

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, On Executive M, August, 1963.

Documents on Disarmament, 1961, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August, 1962.

Documents on Disarmament, 1962, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August, 1963.

Newspaper Articles

"Texts of Soviet Letter to Peking and Chinese Bid to K," *Washington Post*, March 15, 1963.

"Excerpts from Rockefeller Talk Urging a European Nuclear Force," *New York Times*, April 26, 1963.

"Partial Text of News Conference Giving de Gaulle's Test Pact Views," *Washington Post*, July 30, 1963.

"Excerpts from New Moscow Statement Denouncing Peking," *New York Times*, September 23, 1963.

"Peking Foresees a Delay of Years on Atomic Bomb," and "Outline of Gains and Setbacks in China's Atom Plan," *New York Times*, October 29, 1963.

"4 Latin Lands Push U.S. Plan for Atom-Free Zone," *New York Times*, November 5, 1963.

"10 Latin Nations Ask Nuclear Ban," *New York Times*, November 10, 1963.