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D. STAFFING THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The future of the national security staff involves the classic
staff problem: should the President relate directly to the line oper-
ators or does he need assistance in dealing with them? There is gen-
eral agreement, for example, that the Secretary of State needs a staff
in order to deal with his bureaus. Does the President need assistance
any less in dealing with the departments and agencies?

In 1961 the same principle of increased responsibility was
applied to both State and Defense. Kennedy and Johnson did not acquire
staff assistance on defense matters because they got what they needed
from McNamara. The same Presidents found they needed staff assistance
in the foreign affairs area and in relating foreign and military affairs.
There was no way of predicting that things would turn out as they did.

This experience should make a new President wary of placing too
much faith in one system as opposed to another. It also suggests that
the new President should not move too fast in dismantling the existing
staff until he sees how his new arrangements will work. For example,
an energized SIG/IRG linked to the NSC makes a lot of sense--on paper--
but it might take a while to shake down. In the interim, the NSC staff
operating under such restrictions as the President indicated, would
provide him invaluable assistance in the critical early phase of his
administration.

And a final point. There is a tendency to think that the next
President might turn the major portion of his attention to domestic
rather than foreign affairs. In part this is a reaction to what has
been considered an overly personal involvement in foreign affairs by
Kennedy and Johnson.

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The proposition that a President can delegate a major portion of his authority in national security affairs to one of his cabinet officers should be approached with great caution. The public has come to expect a fairly conspicuous involvement of the President in foreign affairs. His performance in this area has become one of its measures of his ability.

Given the stakes, and the unsettled condition of the world, the new President may not have complete freedom of choice in the degree of his involvement. The more personally involved he is, the more he will want staff resources immediately at hand. His options in this respect are the subject of this final section.

## 2. The Special Assistant's Job

The next President may first consider whether or not he wants a national security staff. During the past eight years the NSC staff has been accused of disrupting relations between the President and the permanent departments and agencies. Furthermore, it has been alleged that the Special Assistant has interfered with the flow of information to the President and used his privileged position to narrow rather than to maximize alternatives open to the President.

A new President, influenced by such charges, might decide not to fill the post of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, just as President Kennedy did not designate an Assistant to the President-- a post which had been filled by Governor Sherman Adams under Eisenhower. He could do this if he wanted to, but he would probably find that someone else with another title would soon be doing many of the things done now by the Special Assistant.

There are some basic staff functions which must be performed at

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the White House in order for the President to handle effectively his
responsibilities in the national security area. All Presidents have
certain self-generated requirements in this area which they want
handled within their own official household. Perhaps most important
will be the new President's need to have someone else who can "plug him
in" to the continuing activities of the departments and agencies.
Even if he decided just to sit back and see what the national security
community sends him and needs from him, he and his staff would soon be
overwhelmed. trying to determine what needed to be handled first--or
handled at all. The basic requirement is for someone, presumably his
man, to impart some basic order to the flow of paper and communication
to and from the national security area. Whether he wants anything more
than this will depend on how he perceives his role in the national security
area and his attitude toward his principal advisers, the departments
and the agencies. The more active he expects to be and the more wary
he is of the bureaucracy, the more help he will want. Whoever handles
such matters for him, he should ensure that they relate to the permanent
institutions in some orderly coordinated manner. Otherwise, no matter
how congenial or personally responsive these individuals are to him,
it may be difficult for the permanent institutions to give him the
help he will be seeking.

The chief of the President's national security staff should estab-
lish relations of mutual respect and confidence with the heads of the
operating institutions and with their respective chiefs of staff, such
as the Executive Secretary of the Department of State. (In order to
achieve the familiarity with the President's business referred to above)
he should also be privy to as much of the President's most sensitive

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national security business as possible. In the absence of such a relationship, there will be no single individual in the White House short of the President to whom cabinet members and top operating officials can turn on procedural matters which are of ultimate concern to the President but should not occupy his time. Such matters should not become the concern of other White House staff members who are not familiar with the overall aspects of national security affairs.

Whether this individual, in addition to performing the above role, becomes adviser, coordinator or enforcer, is a matter for Presidential determination.

### 3. The Minimum Essentials

Before discussing further the various alternatives available to the President in national security staffing, it might be well to suggest the minimum functions of any national security staff.

**Consolidated handling of the regular flow of intelligence--summary and specific--and diplomatic and military reporting.** The primary purpose of this material is to meet the informational needs of the President and to support his national security staff in the role which the President has designated for them. Therefore, supervision of its handling should be a conscious concern of a Presidential designee.

**A focal point for Presidential inquiries** arising out of his information/intelligence intake. This should be someone who is directly involved in the formal and informal substantive between the President and his principal advisers. This is an important point because the absence of integration can produce confusion which will impair the ability of the rest of the government to respond effectively. The extent to which response is provided from NSC staff assets or from the permanent insti-

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tutions will depend upon the nature of the NSC staff retained and the relationship of the staff to the departments and agencies.

**Effective control and management of substantive written communication between the principal national security advisers and institutions and the President.** The basic minimum is receipt, control and filing. Whatever else is done with this material once it reaches the White House is a matter of how the President wishes to use his staff. Oversight of this function should be the responsibility of a senior aide who enjoys the President's confidence and is intimately familiar with his interests and priorities. His minimum responsibility is to impart order to the flow of paper--to make sure that the most important business is handled in an efficient manner which meets the needs of the President as well as the requirements of the rest of the town.

**The President's decisions should be a matter of record--for his own reference and for the guidance of the departments and agencies.** What forms this will take, and how it should be promulgated are details which may vary but it should be formalized in some manner so there is one central point of reference for everyone. Maintainence of such a record would also facilitate follow-up on these decisions.

**Staff support of the National Security Council should be assured.** The nature of this support will depend upon the use which the President intends to make of the Council. Agendas and attendance must be controlled. If practicable, attendees should have, in advance of meetings, copies of papers to be discussed, or at a minimum, enough written material to define agenda items and the nature of the desired Council activity. In order to provide these, some Council staff support would be required at least of a Secretariat nature.

**Provisions should be made for the supervision of intelligence activities,** particularly those of a clandestine nature. The absolute