["[Y]", "IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "dence-building measures on arms. All\nthese are suitable for the kind of embracing\ninstitution Moscow has put forward.+", "[7]", "These designs gain even greater relevance against the backdrop of the drama playing itself out inside the Soviet Union. In so fluid a situation, it is reckless to gear policy to one man; the only safe course is to put forward objectives and purposes to which any emerging Soviet leader could re- late. By the same token, the Western democracies will lose their bearings if they focus all issues on personalities and equate amiability with harmony.+", "[11]", "One of the issues in need of criteria is the Soviet ethnic problem. The West has, properly, behaved with great circumspection regarding the conflict between the various Soviet republics. We have an interest in preventing repression there, because it would surely elicit a public outcry in the West that would arrest further progress toward normalization of East-West relations. But we cannot encourage chaos, because it would raise fears of nuclear proliferation and international conflict on the", (((MORE)))))"]

["IN0925 policy", "DEPT.", "fringes of existing tenderboxes such as the\nMiddle East.", "[14]", "Some leaders in the various Soviet re-\npublics, including Yeltsin, have spoken of a\nconfederal structure in which national de-\nfense ~~would be~~ is carried out in common but\neach republic would have the freedom to\nevolve internal policy, ~~and some foreign~~\npolicies as well. From the point of view of\ninternational stability, it would be an ideal\nsituation outcome—a Russia strong enough to de-\nfend itself but too decentralized to attack,\nsufficiently cohesive for large domestic\nprojects but not enough for foreign expan-\nsion. It would also supply an answer to the\nancient dilemma of how to reconcile Rus-\nsia's vastness with European equilibrium.\nThis outcome is not within America's\ncapacity to achieve. But at future summits,\nAmerican leaders should not be embar-\nrassed to outline their ideas in quiet\nsessions.", "[20]", "Though I am of the view that America\nhas prevailed in the Cold War, I also believe\nthat a new international order can emerge\nonly if neither side claims victory and nei-", {"bbox": [757, 1374, 888, 1397], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

-1-

DR. KISSINGER'S NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 6/7/90

Along with millions of others around the world, I watched the extraordinary televised press conference with which Presidents Bush and Gorbachev concluded the summit. Their carefully modulated phrases, so skillfully attuned to the nuances of public opinion, could not wholly conceal the underlying reality: the American President stands at the end of a process during which his country achieved almost all the foreign policy goals it had set for itself forty years earlier; the Soviet leader represents a country in the throes of a crisis of economics, of political legitimacy, indeed of the structure of the state.

[y]

-2-

Both men conducted themselves like the professionals they are. Bush was tactful and self-effacing, careful not to claim any victories. Gorbachev appeared confident, seemingly oblivious to crises, ebulliently elevating necessity into inspiration.

Yet observing the demonstrative good will and public euphoria during Gorbachev's subsequent travels, I could not avoid feeling a certain uneasiness. It was not caused by the agreements that were signed, which represent standard summit fare: arms, control, trade and cultural exchanges. These in any event dealt with yesterday's agenda and will soon be engulfed in the traditional domestic controversy generated by those who want all concessions on the other side.

The agenda of the future was apparently side-stepped. From the briefings, it appears that there was some standard controversy over German membership in NATO but little discussion of the relations of the two superpowers to an

-3-

emerging Europe. Lithuania seems to have come up primarily
in the context of its impact on American public opinion and
the deeper question of the limits of the nationality con-
flict.

Yet these issues - much more than the arms race - are
likely to generate tension, perhaps even chaos, in the next
decade. For the moment they have been submerged in an
extraordinary atmosphere of good personal relations among
leaders which satisfies the American nostalgia for foreign
policy by conversion of the wicked. A mood of falling in
with the American predilection for peace as the norm also
suits current Soviet necessities: just getting through the
day is its own reward for the current Soviet leadership. All
these factors create an overwhelming temptation for both
sides to seek the future in a denial of the past and to
equate amiability with harmony.

[4]

-4-

It may be churlish to point out that we have been there
before. In 1954, the first post-war summit between
Eisenhower and Khruschev was landed by the _New York Times_ as
follows: "Mr. Eisenhower had done even better than defeat an
enemy in battle as had been his assignment a decade ago. He
had done something to prevent battles from happening...Other
men might have played strength against strength. It was Mr.
Eisenhower's gift to draw others into the circle of his good
will and to modify the attitudes if not the policies of the
little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe."

This is not to diminish the subtlety with which
President Bush handled the difference in the positions of
the two sides. The world has in fact changed dramatically
since 1954; it is precisely because the Cold War has ended
that a design is needed for the journey from where we are to
where we have never been. In its absence, statesmen will be
engulfed by events their very achievements made inevitable.

-5-

Such a design cannot be imposed on the world by the
United States. But this country is in the best position to
conceive it. I have never encountered a Soviet delegation
more tentative than this one. Some of its members seemed
nonplussed by the collapse of the Communist Party, a process
which destroyed a familiar structure without creating a
governing alternative. Others appeared torn between the
familiar contours of central planning and the potential
attactions of market economics. The head of the Gosplan -
the central planning agency - first lost command of his up
until then quite adequate English when asked how his office
was going to coordinate with the market sector, and then did
not seek to hide his irritation about a state of affairs
that made such a question possible in the first place. The
same sort of frustration about what were in effect the
consequences of Soviet actions characterized other
interlocutors' attitudes toward the changed situation in

-6-

Europe. They offered a series of complaints, fears and
speculations. But these had a tentative, even plaintive,
quality about them, as if they hoped America would rescue
them from the consequences of their own actions. Through
this maelstrom glided the eloquent, apparently confident
figure of Gorbachev - more verbose than previously, but
otherwise pondering - an extraordinary tour de force.

Respect for this performance could not obscure my
conviction that Gorbachev's role as a deus ex machina is
coming to an end. Not that I expect him to be overthrown. I
have no way of judging such a prospect; I would surely
regret it. But the scale of the upheaval he has wrought will
force him to rely on constituencies other than those which
brought him thus far and that is a difficult process to
manage. No doubt Gorbachev has already assured his place in
history. He diagnosed the maladies of his society and set
about with great courage to remedy them. History may also

[y]

-7-

record that he produced consequences far more dramatic than
he ever intended and that he was better at diagnosis than at
remedy. I have yet to meet a Soviet personality in a posi-
tion to know, who believes that Grobachev's purpose in 1989
was to collapse the Soviet satellite empire. What he appears
to have sought was to foster growing access to Western
economy and technology by putting in place reformist Commu-
nists capable of liberalizing, not overthrowing, existing
institutions. But when matters got out of hand, Gorbachev
displayed extraordinary fortitude. He confined the Red Army
to its barracks even while Communism was being dismantled
all over Eastern Europe. Since history judges the result
more than the intention, it will surely be kind to
Gorbachev.

But the disparity between intentions and results makes
Gorbachev an unreliable guide to the future. Or, to put it
another way, it places a special burden to seek creative

-8-

solutions on American shoulders. For the Soviets are too
traumatized by what they have conjured to allow themselves
to deviate once again from the familiar. They find it
difficult enough to face the geopolitical reality of the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of a united
Germany. Perhaps subconsciously they may fear that seeking
to shape it might unleash another avalanche. They are in a
better position to ratify than to propose. This may explain
Gorbachev's frequent appeals - echoed privately by his
adversaries - for some new American ideas.

In any event, either at the next summit or soon
thereafter, Gorbachev will likely represent a different
constellation of forces. He rose to office as the standard
bearer of the Communist party. After two years he saw it as
an obstacle to reform, not its tool. With great daring, he
set about to dismantle the apparatus which he had served all

[Y]

-9-

his life and to which he owed his meteoric rise. His device
was a complicated system of elections designed to
vent resentments but incapable of creating a national
alternative party structure. On paper this must have looked
like a masterful, even Machiavellian, maneuver to fragment
the opposition and enhance personal rule. But history does
not always follow theory.

Gorbachev will not be the first revolutionary to set in
motion events that sweep him beyond his design. The elec-
tions so artfully designed to thwart the appearance of
national movements or parties have caused something akin to
democracy to emerge in the fifteen constituent republics.
This has not only brought to the fore the centrifugal
tendencies of the empire (only half of whose population is
Russian) but threatens the very cohesion of the historic
state known to both tsars and commisars.

[Y]

-10-

If present trends continue, perestroika can proceed and national unity can be maintained only by a deal between the center and the elected heads of the various republics who in turn are hostile to Gorbachev's centralizing instincts. Thus Gorbachev the reformer is in danger of becoming a symbol of the central apparatus he sought to overcome. Probably he can regain legitimacy in only one of two ways: by repression which risks his relations with the outside world, or some sort of deal with the populist forces that produced Yeltsin and other elected leaders in the republics and thus transform the nature of the Russian state. Whatever course he chooses, Gorbachev will represent a different Russia in the future - assuming he succeeds in managing the forces he has unleashed.

The composition of future summits is also likely to change. We are approaching the end of summits in which the future of Europe is discussed without European

[Y]

-11-

participation. As Europe becomes politically unified and as the issues move away from security, the special advantage of the superpowers - their nuclear supremacy - becomes less and less relevant to the political issues. In the near future these key issues will require a larger forum.

This may explain why the discussion on Germany at the summit appeared so hackneyed. The Soviets, shackled by the categories of the past, advanced a plethora of ideas that have been staples of Soviet foreign policy since the days of Stalin: that Germany join both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; that Germany become neutral; that it remain in the political but leave the military organization of NATO; that the Soviet Union join NATO; that an all-European security system - including the US, Canada, and the Soviet Union - replace existing alliances. The number and staleness of these proposals suggests that the Soviets find it hard to disenthrall themselves from their old dream of separating

[Y]

-12-

the United States from Western Europe which suggests that
the Soviets were groping for a way out.

The American response has been based on the assumption
that in the end the Soviet Union would prefer to preserve
NATO as America's sole institutional link to Europe because
Moscow looks to Washington to act as a restraint on a
unified Germany. This is why, together with its allies, the
United States has offered a number of concessions to make
the idea of German NATO membership more palatable, such as
changing the emphasis of NATO to a more political
institution; imposing a variety of arms limitations on
Germany; some kind of economic assistance to the Soviet Union
from a reunified Germany. German payment for Soviet troops
in present-day East Germany for a specified period; and,
reducing the number of nuclear forces on German soil.

The upheavals of the past year make the creation of a
new structure for European security essential. It must take

-13-

into account the imminent unification of Germany as well as
the de facto collapse of the Warsaw Pact. It has to define
America's new relationship with Europe. And it must grant
the Soviet Union a serious role.

But the Western democracies must not encourage any
effort to organize Europe on the basis of the fear of
Germany. However understandable the fears of German
resurgence, a policy of isolating Germany would throw that
country back on its own resources. Germany would repeat its
historic tragedy of wandering between two worlds and
disquieting both.

Now the magnitude of the expression of Soviet fear is
surely not without some design. It is difficult to believe
that the Soviet leaders in possession of well over ten
thousand nuclear warheads and the largest tank force in the
world genuinely fear another German attack. And if they do,
they would be better off with German forces as a part of

-14-

NATO which would surely veto any such preposterous
enterprise.

Yet too many in the West fall into this trap. In
various meetings with members of the Soviet delegation, I
was stunned by the enthusiastic acquiescence of their
non-official interlocutors - some of them senior
establishment figures - in the Soviet definition of the
German problem. They did not seem to understand that to the
extent they are taken seriously, they also prevent a Soviet
consideration of realistic alternatives

It may be true that in the end the Soviet Union will
settle for a stability based on continued US presence in
Central Europe, but it is dangerous to assume that this is
the Soviet first choice. However remarkable the personality
of Gorbachev, he is a product of Russian history as much as
he is of the Communist experience. And Russian foreign
policy, at least since Peter the Great, has been a tale of

[4]

-15-

expansion from an area surrounding Moscow to the gates of
India, the northern part of China and deep into Central
Europe. Whenever a limit was reached, the Russian empire -
under tsar and commissar - relentlessly sought to undermine
whatever it defined as the competing power center: Sweden,
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, China, Britain in the Middle
East and after World War II the United States.

Since the days of Stalin, the various Soviet proposals
regarding Germany have had one common characteristic: they
have sought to sever the organic security link between
Europe and the United States and thus destroy the principal
common transatlantic task. This would be achieved by the
device of either Germany joining both alliances or the
Soviet Union joining NATO on the overarching security
system, each making an American presence absurd. For as soon
as the American military presence is removed, the Soviet
Union's huge nuclear arsenal and vast remaining tank armies

[4]

-16-

would be strategically dominant. Then a partially recovered
Soviet Union could attempt a deal where Germany is kept in
check by Soviet nuclear strength while Germany becomes the
chief engine of Soviet economic recovery. In this manner,
the Soviet Union would have used its weakness to achieve -
with German help - the hegemony over Europe which eluded it
when it seemed strong. And America would have acceded to the
domination of Eurasia against which it fought two world
wars.

This is why great care must be taken not to grant the
Soviet premise that Germany is the major threat to European
security. For this may tempt the Soviets into seeking more
ambitious goals than stability. And it encourages a
"compromise" whereby Germany remains in NATO but NATO is
emasculated through multiple reassurances to the Soviet
Union. The reluctance to classify the Soviet Union as a
potential military threat accentuates that danger. The

[4]

-17-

absurd Soviet proposal to join NATO was gently rejected, not
because NATO is designed to deal with a potential future
Soviet threat, but because the Soviet Union is not yet a
democracy.

For Gorbachev and his advisors surely realize in their
heart of hearts that they cannot in the end stop German
membership in NATO and that their threat to keep their
troops in East Germany unilaterally is empty. Unification
will occur because the so-called German Democratic Republic
will dissolve itself into the six states ("Laender") out of
which it was formed. Each of them would then seek admission
to the Federal Republic under Article 23 of that country's
constitution. All existing laws and treaties would apply
automatically, including German membership in NATO. A
neutral status would come about only if Bonn were expelled
from NATO or chose to leave it - both equivalent to the
deliberate destruction of the Atlantic Alliance.

-18-

Nor does the Soviet Union have a realistic option of simply keeping its troops in Eastern Germany as Gorbachev has hinted. For one thing, the Warsaw Pact provides that GDR obligations to it lapse after Germany is unified. Moreover, at that point the Soviet forces in East Germany no longer will have any local counterpart to facilitate their daily activities. Maneuvers, troop movements and other routine measures would become extremely difficult to implement. Reverting to the status of conqueror would mortgage the Soviet Union's long-term relationship with a unified Germany.

The most realistic security system would therefore have the following components: (a) the creation of a neutral belt composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the Austrian model; (b) the creation east and west of this zone - that is, in the Soviet Union and in Germany - of an arms control zone with strict limitations as to types of weapons

[4]

-19-

and numbers of men; and, (c) the territory of present-day
East Germany would have special restrictions once NATO
forces could be stationed there. In such a scheme neither
side could launch an attack without extensive violation of
the arms control regimen followed by a military operation
across several hundred miles of neutral territory. Such an
enterprise would require months of preparation, thus giving
substantial warning.

Such a comprehensive approach would be a realistic
Western vision of a new European arrangement. It would break
the pattern of searching among the various Soviet schemes
for those that do the least damage - an essentially sterile
enterprise. But a new design of this kind must receive its
impetus from the two Presidents. For it requires a radical
redesign of negotiations on conventional force reductions in
Europe. When the current negotiations on conventional arms
control began, the political dividing line ran through the

[Y]

-20-

center of Germany and Soviet ground forces were assumed to
be vastly superior. Thus equal force levels would have been
a major contribution toward stability. Since then, the
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have collapsed; most of
the successor governments have asked the Soviet Union to
withdraw its forces. For an interim period symmetrical
reduction of forces will provide a way for the Soviets to
withdraw forces without losing face and without creating for
the United States obligations beyond what the budgetary
process is likely to allow in any event. But with every
increment of withdrawal, the principle of symmetrical forces
will become more firmly established. Arms control runs the
risk of becoming a means to legitimize more forces in
Eastern Europe than the host countries want. Alternatively,
it could generate pressures on the United States to withdraw
all its forces from Central Europe, thus jeopardizing NATO.

[Y]

-21-

The design of a new security system for Europe and a
new approach to arms control requires, of course, the
closest consultation and coordination between Western Europe
and the United States. This is made necessary in any event
by the new strategic realities. For forty years, Europe
trembled before Soviet conventional preponderance. In the
foreseeable future, Soviet conventional forces will be
needed at home. But Soviet nuclear forces remain intact and
are preponderant vis-a-vis Europe. Deterring nuclear
blackmail requires specific military steps beyond the scope
of this article. But these will be empty unless the
political relationship supports the proposition that
European and American destinies are intimately linked.

The US-European dialogue has too long neglected this
challenge. In fact, as European unity advances with American
support, the existing institutions for transatlantic
dialogue will grow increasingly fragile. At present,

[4]

-22-

military issues are discussed within NATO; political issues
find their focal point in the European Community and will do
so progressively as Europe moves toward unity. The United
States has sought to make German membership in NATO more
palatable to the Soviets by downplaying the military element
and hinting at a new political role for NATO. But aside from
the difficulty of defining such a role, the proposal runs up
against the European suspicion that the US is somehow
manipulating NATO to undermine Europe's new-found political
identity. For in NATO, the US deals with the European
countries individually; the European Community is not
represented as an institution.

At the same time, the United States is for all
practical purposes excluded from the political deliberations
of the European Community. The standard procedure is for the
Council of Ministers to convey its conclusions to the Untied
States through a Chairman who rotates every six months. But

[Y]

-23-

that foreign minister is in effect an instructed messenger;
he has no negotiating flexibility. The best he can do is to
inform his colleagues of the American views. But since their
decision usually emerges from months of painful
deliberations, they are understandably reluctant to change
their views. Thus, security issues are relegated to a forum
inimical to European identity while political issues are
handled in a forum that excludes the United States from
meaningful participation.

A solution must be found to permit the European
Community while it is articulating political institutions to
participate in NATO discussions, and for the United States
to be heard within the European Community before
deliberations harden into formal decisions. Perhaps a new
comprehensive treaty between the United States and the
European Community will be in order when European unity has
sufficiently advanced.

[Y]

-24-

The Soviets are entitled to have their fears taken seriously. Their own proposal for a European security system embracing North America, Europe and the Soviet Union to replace existing alliances is far too sweeping. If everybody agreed on everything, no structure would be necessary. And if they differ, the "system" will fly off into competing national states. It would then in fact come rather close to the map of Europe prior to World War I. Europe would be disintegrating in the name of Europe.

There are, however, common objectives which unite rather than divide: the environment, economic growth, world-wide, cultural exchange, human rights, and confidence-building measures on arms. All these are suitable for the kind of embracing institution Moscow has put forward.

These designs gain even greater relevance against the backdrop of the elemental drama playing itself out inside

[Y]

-25-

the Soviet Union. In so fluid a situation, it is reckless to gear policy to one man; the only safe course is to put forward objectives and purposes to which any emerging Soviet leader can relate. The West has, properly, behaved with great circumspection toward the conflict between the various republics which dominates Soviet life. We have an interest in preventing repression there because it would surely elicit a public outcry in the democracies, which would arrest further Soviet progress toward normalization. But we cannot encourage chaos because it would raise fears of nuclear proliferation and international conflict in volatile areas at the fringe of existing tenderboxes such as the Middle East.

Some leaders in the various Soviet republics, including Yeltsin, have spoken of a confederal structure in which national defense would be carried out in common but each republic would have some scope in foreign policy and the

[Y]

-26-

freedom to evolve internal policies as well. From the point
of view of international stability, it would be an ideal
outcome to have to deal with - a Russia strong enough to
defend itself but too decentralized to attack; sufficiently
cohesive for large domestic projects but not enough for
foreign expansion. It would also supply an answer to the
ancient dilemma of how to reconcile Russia's vastness with
European equilibrium. Such an outcome is not within
America's capacity to achieve, or even to articulate
publicly. But in the quiet sessions of future summits,
American leaders could raise it in a conceptual framework.

At the meeting with so-called intellectuals, Gorbachev
took me aside to say that a road map for the future was his
most important concern. He was right. And that should be the
task that the Presidents now set themselves.

-1-

DR. KISSINGER'S NEWSWEEK ARTICLE EVENING 6/6/90

Along with millions of others around the world, I watched the extraordinary televised press conference with which Presidents Bush and Gorbachev concluded the summit. Their carefully modulated phrases, so skillfully attuned to the nuances of public opinion, could not wholly conceal the underlying reality: the American President stands at the end of a process during which his country achieved almost all the foreign policy goals it had set for itself forty years earlier. The Soviet leader represents a country in the throes of a crisis of economics, of political legitimacy, indeed of the structure of the state.

[Y]

-2-

Both men conducted themselves like the professionals
to claim any victories. Gorbachev appeared confident,
seemingly oblivious to crises, ebulliently elevating neces-
sity into inspiration.

[Y]

-3-

[Y]

-4-

This is not to diminish the extraor-dinary tactfulness
with which President Bush handled the difference in the
positions of the two sides. The world has in fact changed
dramatically since 1954; it is precisely because the Cold
War has ended that a design is needed for the journey from
where we are to where we have never been. In its absence,

-5-

[Y]

-6-

consequences of Soviet actions characterized other
interlocutors' attitudes toward the changed situation in
Europe. They offered a series of complaints, fears and
speculations. But these had a tentative, even plaintive,
quality about them, as if they hoped America would rescue
them from the consequences of their own actions. Through
this maelstrom glided the eloquent, apparently confident
figure of Gorbachev - more verbose than previously, but
otherwise pondering - an extraordinary tour de force.

[Y]

-7-

history. He diagnosed the maladies of his society and set about with great courage to remedy them. History may also record that he produced consequences far more dramatic than he ever intended and that he was better at diagnosis than at remedy. I have yet to meet a Soviet personality in a position to know, who believes that Grobachev's purpose in 1989 was to collapse the Soviet satellite empire. What he appears to have sought was to foster growing access to Western economy and technology by putting in place reformist Communists capable of liberalizing, not overthrowing, existing institutions. But when matters got out of hand, Gorbachev displayed extraordinary fortitude. He confined the Red Army to its barracks even while Communism was being dismantled all over Eastern Europe. Since history judges the result more than the intention, it will surely be kind to Gorbachev.

[Y]

-8-

But the disparity between intentions and results makes Gorbachev an unreliable guide to the future. Or, to put it another way, it places a special burden to seek creative solutions on American shoulders. For the Soviets are too traumatized by what they have conjured to allow themselves to deviate once again from the familiar. They find it difficult enough to face the geopolitical reality of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of a united Germany. Perhaps subconsciously they may fear that seeking to shape it might unleash another avalanche. They are in a better position to ratify than to propose. This may explain Gorbachev's frequent appeals - echoed privately by his adversaries - for some new American ideas.

[Y]

an obstacle to reform, not its tool. With great daring, he set about to dismantle the apparatus which he had served all his life and to which he owed his meteoric rise. His device was a complicated system of elections designed to vent resentments but incapable of creating a national alternative party structure. On paper this must have looked like a masterful, even Machiavellian, maneuver to fragment the opposition and enhance personal rule. But history does not always follow theory.

Gorbachev will not be the first revolutionary to set in motion events that sweep him beyond his design. The elections so artfully designed to thwart the appearance of national movements or parties have caused something akin to democracy to emerge in the fifteen constituent republics. This has not only brought to the fore the centrifugal tendencies of the empire (only half of whose population is

[Y]

-10-

[Y]

-11-

The composition of future summits is also likely to change. We are approaching the end of summits in which the future of Europe is discussed without European participation. As Europe becomes politically unified and as the issues move away from security, the special advantage of the superpowers - their nuclear supremacy - becomes less and less relevant to the political issues. In the near future these key issues will require a larger forum.

-12-

existing alliances. The number and staleness of these
proposals suggests that the Soviets find it hard to
disenthrall themselves from their old dream of separating
the United States from Western Europe which suggests that
the Soviets were groping for a way out.

The American response has been based on an *assumption*
which may not be valid. that in the end the Soviet Union
would prefer to preserve NATO as America's sole institution-
al link to Europe because Moscow looks to Washington to act
as a restraint on a unified Germany. This is why, together
with its allies, the United States has offered a number of
concessions to make the idea of German NATO membership more
palatable, such as changing the emphasis of NATO to a more
political institution; imposing a variety of arms limita-
tions on Germany; some kind of economic asistance to the
Soviet Union from a reunified Germany. German payment for

[Y]

-13-

Soviet troops in present-day East Germany for a specified
period; and
reducing the number of nuclear forces on German soil.

This is why great care must be taken not to grant
the Soviet premise that Germany is the major threat to
European security. For this may tempt the Soviets into
seeking more ambitious goals than stability. And it runs the
risk of a "compromise" whereby Germany remains in NATO but
NATO is emasculated through multiple reassurances to the
Soviet Union. The reluctance to classify the Soviet Union as
a potential military threat accentuates that danger. The
absurd Soviet proposal to join NATO was gently rejected, not
because NATO is designed to deal with a potential future Soviet
threat, but because the Soviet Union is not yet a democracy.

It may be true that in the end the Soviet Union will
settle for a stability based on continued US presence in
Central Europe but it is dangerous to assume that this is

[Y]

-14-

the Soviet first choice. However remarkable the personality of Gorbachev, he is a product of Russian history as much as he is of the Communist experience. And Russian foreign policy, at least since Peter the Great, has been a tale of expansion from an area surrounding Moscow to the gates of India, the northern part of China and deep into Central Europe. Whenever a limit was reached, the Russian empire - under tsar and commissar - relentlessly sought to undermine whatever it defined as the competing power center: Sweden, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, China, Britain in the Middle East and after World War II the United States.

The various Soviet proposals regarding Germany since the days of Stalin have one common characteristic: they seek to sever the organic security link between Europe and the United States and thus destroy the principal common transatlantic task. This is done by the device of Germany joining both alliances or the Soviet Union joining NATO on the

-15-

overarching security system, each making an American presence absurd. Once the American military presence is removed, the Soviet Union's huge nuclear arsenal and vast remaining tank armies would be strategically dominant. Then a partially recovered Soviet Union could attempt a deal where Germany is kept in check by Soviet nuclear strength while Germany becomes the chief engine of Soviet economic recovery. In this manner, the Soviet Union would have used its weakness to achieve - with German help - the hegemony over Europe which had eluded it when it seemed strong. And America would have acceded to the domination of Eurasia against which it fought two world wars.

JUN. 06 '90 12:56 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

[Y]

were a genetic German attribute invites not so much a recurrence
of Nazism for which not the slightest evidence exists but a
rootless romantic policy exploiting Germany's central location.
Isolating Germany would enable the Soviet Union to achieve in its
hour of crisis what it could not make happen by threats when it
appeared powerful. Yet in the West
into this trap. In various meetings with members of the Soviet
deblegation I was stunned by the enthusiastic acquiescence of
their non-official interlocutors--some of them senior
Establishment figures--in the Soviet definition of the German
problem.
They said not even in Germany are there really any

The danger is not only to accept the Soviet definition of
a Soviet reality
the problem--to which I am not sure the Soviets are all that
wedded--but to continue on negotiating tracks that are vestiges
of an earlier period. This is especially true with respect to
negotiations regarding conventional forces in Europe. When the
current negotiations on conventional arms control began, the

JUN. 06 '90 16:44 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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then in fact come rather close to the map of Europe prior to
World War I. Europe would be disintegrated in the name of
Europe.

The most efficient system would have the following
components: (a) the creation of a neutral belt composed of
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the Austrian model; (b)
the creation east and west of this zone--that is, in the Soviet
Union and in Germany--of an arms control zone with strict
limitations on types of weapons and numbers of men; (c) the
territory of present-day East Germany would have special
restrictions; in NATO forces could be stationed there.
In such a scheme neither side could launch an
attack without extensive violation of the arms control regimen
followed by a military operation across several hundred miles of
neutral territory. Such an enterprise would require months of
preparation, thus giving substantial warning.

There are, however, common objectives which unite rather
than divide: the environment, economic growth world-wide,

JUN. 06 '90 16:45 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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cultural exchange, human rights, confidence-building measures on
arms. All these are suitable for the kind of embracing
institution Moscow has put forward.

In this new architecture the promotion by the United States
of Western European unity becomes central. It will be a way for
the redistribution of responsibilities in the Atlantic Community
and to embed Germany even more deeply into Europe. But this will
cause the existing institutions for the transatlantic dialogue to
become increasingly fragile. At present military issues are
discussed within NATO; political issues find their focal point in
the European Community and will do so progressively as Europe
moves towards unity. The United States has sought to make German
membership in NATO more palatable to the Soviets by downplaying
the military element and hinting at a new political role for
NATO. But aside from the difficulty of defining such a role, the
proposal runs up against the European suspicion that the US is
somehow manipulating NATO to undermine Europe's identity. For in

JUN. 06 '90 16:46 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

NATO, the US deals with the European countries individually; the
European Community as an institution is not represented

At the same time, the United States is for all practical
purposes excluded from the political deliberations of the
European Community. The standard procedure is for the Council of
Ministers to convey its conclusions to the United States through
a Chairman who rotates every six months. But that foreign
minister is in effect an instructed messenger; he has no
negotiating flexibility. The best he can do is to inform his
colleagues of the American views. But since their decision
usually emerges from months of painful deliberations and
difficult compromises, they are understandably reluctant to
change their views. Thus, security issues are relegated to a
forum inimical to European identity while political issues are
handled in a forum that excludes the United States from
meaningful participation.

JUN. 06 '90 16:48 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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24

publicly. But in the quiet sessions of future summits American
could rain it in a plausible conceptual
leaders could make a significant contribution by planting this
mannier
seed.

At the meeting with so-called intellectuals Gorbachev took
me aside to say that a road map for the future was his most
important concern. He was right. And that should be the task
that the two Presidents now set themselves.

-1-

DR. KISSINGER'S NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 6/6/90

Along with millions of others around the world, I watched the extraordinary televised press conference with which Presidents Bush and Gorbachev concluded their summit. Their carefully modulated phrases, so skillfully attuned to the every nuance of public opinion, could not wholly conceal the underlying reality: the American President stands at the end of a process during which his country achieved almost all the foreign policy goals it had set for itself forty years earlier. The Soviet leader represents a country in the throes of a crisis of economics, of political legitimacy, indeed of the structure of the state. Both men conducted themselves like the professionals they are. Bush was

Necessity for Choice - from p 181-2

The temptation to conduct personal diplomacy derives from the notion of peace prevalent in both the United States and Great Britain. If peace is the "normal" relation among states, it follows that tensions must be caused by shortsightedness or misunderstanding and that they can be removed by a change of heart of the leading statesmen. President Eisenhower, before embarking on an unprecedented round of visits to foreign capitals, was at pains to insist that his purpose was to "clear" the atmosphere rather than to negotiate. If peace ultimately depends on personalities, abstract good will may well seem more important than a concrete program. Indeed, the attempt to achieve specific settlements can appear as an obstacle rather than as an aid to peace. "Our many post-war conferences," said President Eisenhower in 1955, prior to the Geneva summit conference, "have been characterized too much by attention to detail, by an effort apparently to work on specific problems rather than to establish the spirit and the attitude in which we shall approach them."

Within two years of assuming office, President Eisenhower, whose party had charged its opponents with being soft towards Communism, found himself engaged in a summit meeting which called forth a flood of self congratulatory comment, both in America and abroad. After a decade of Soviet intransigence, the press was almost

⁴ New York Times, July 16, 1955.

unanimous in its assertion that Soviet policy had been mellowed by the personal charm of one man, "No one would want to underestimate the change in the Russian attitude," said the New York Herald Tribune. "Without that, nothing would have been possible. . . . But it remains President Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace." Mr. Eisenhower had done even better than defeat an enemy in battle as had been his assignment a decade ago, "read an editorial in the New York Times. "He had done something to prevent battles from happening. . . . The occasion was, in fact, made for Mr. Eisenhower. Other men might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to draw others into the circle of his good will and to modify the attitudes if not the policies of the little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe."⁸

The conviction was widespread on both sides of the Atlantic that the Cold War had been due largely to personal distrust. Since this had been removed at Geneva, an era of peace was beginning: "It is indeed an intense sense of relief which unites President Eisenhower with President [sic] Bulganin. Neither ever conceived that his own country would launch war. But each giant was quite convinced that the other giant was capable of doing so. It was this conviction which created the climate of cold war and precipitated the rearward race. The cold war was suddenly called off at Geneva because both sides recognized that these suspicions were entirely unfounded."⁹ [Emphasis added].

JUN. 06 '90 10:50 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASHINGTON, DC

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-4-

Eisenhower and Khruschev was landed by the New York Times as follows in The New York Herald

Mr. Eisenhower was presented with a tribute from the people of Israel.

Tribute with: "No one would want to underestimate the change in the Russian attitude. Without that, nothing would have been possible...But it remains President Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace."

This is not to diminish the extraordinary tactfulness
with which President Bush handled the difference in the
position of the two sides. The world has in fact changed

dramatically since 1954, but it is fundamentally, because the world has ended that a design is needed for the Cold War, which is disintegrating, a road map becomes essential.

That, and not the arcane numbers of arms control, is the real challenge of contemporary foreign policy. In its

["[Y]", "-5-", "absence, statesmen will be engulfed by events their very achievements made inevitable.", "The design of such a road map falls especially heavily on the world by the United States. But this country is on the United States, I have never encountered a Soviet in the best position to conceive of. A delegation more tentative than this one. Some seemed nonplussed by the collapse of the Communist Party, a process which destroyed a familiar structure without creating alternatives. Others appeared torn between the familiar ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ←

JUN. 06 '90 12:53 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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[Y]

13

This is why great causes must be taken
There are at least two difficulties with this approach: it
 tends to grant the Soviet premise that Germany is the major
 threat to European stability, and thus may
 seeking more ambitious goals than stability. It runs the risk of a
 "compromise" whereby Germany remains in NATO but NATO is
 emasculated by multiple reassurances to the Soviet Union.

It may be true that in the end the Soviet Union will settle
for a stability based on continued US presence in Central Europe
but it is dangerous to assume that this is the Soviet first
choice. However remarkable the personality of Gorbachev, he is a
product of Russian history as much as he is of the Communist
experience. And
Russian foreign policy, at least since Peter the
Great, has been a tale of expansion from an area surrounding
Moscow to the gates of India, the northern part of China and deep
into Central Europe. Whenever a limit was reached the Russian
Empire--under tsar and commissar--relentlessly sought to
undermine the possibly competing power center: Sweden, the

JUN. 05 '90 13:37 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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7

NATO but it also appears to have offered a number of concessions
~~to make the idea more palatable~~ such as changing the emphasis of
~~NATO to a more political institution; various forms of arms~~
limitations on Germany; some kind of economic assistance from a
reunified Germany to the Soviet Union; German payment for Soviet
troops in present-day East Germany for a specified period;
~~finally reducing the number~~ of
reduction of nuclear forces on German soil.

~~American leaders seem to operate on an assumption which may
not be valid: that in the end the Soviet Union prefers Germany
~~that is~~ as part of NATO because NATO is America's sole institutional link
to Europe and because Moscow looks to Washington as a restraint
~~more on the unified Germany.~~

I do not consider either of these propositions self-evident.

Gorbachev is as I have said a remarkable historical figure. But
he is a product of Russian history as much as of the Communist
experience. Russian foreign policy at least since Peter the
Great has been a tale of expansion from the area around Moscow,

P.07

7

NATO but it also appears to have offered a number of concessions while peering into the minds of the leaders of the world. NATO was created to make the idea more palatable, such as changing the emphasis of the organization from being a political institution to being a more political institution; various forms of arms limiting agreements were made, and the number of troops in present-day East Germany was reduced. The reunification of Germany was achieved through the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union, and German payment for Soviet troops in the present-day East Germany was specified. Finally, the number of nuclear forces on German soil was reduced.

Now that American leaders seem to be operating on an assumption which may not be valid: namely, that in the end the Soviet Union prefers a Germany that is part of NATO because NATO is America's sole institutional link to Europe, and because Moscow looks to Washington as a restraint upon the unified Germany.

I do not consider either of these propositions self-evident. Gorbachev is as I have said a remarkable historical figure. But he is a product of Russian history as much as of the Communist experience. Russian foreign policy, at least since Peter the Great, has been a tale of expansion from an area around Moscow.

JUN. 05 '90 19:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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17

that the most efficient system would have the following components: (a) the creation of a neutral belt composed of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the Austrian model; (b) the creation east and west of this zone--that is, in the Soviet Union and Germany--of an arms control zone with strict limitations on types of weapons and numbers of men; (c) the territory of present-day East Germany would have special restrictions. In such a scheme neither side could launch an attack without extensive violations of the arms control regimen followed by a military operation across the continent and then an attack of several hundreds of miles across the territory. Such an enterprise would require months, thus giving substantial warning.

But the new situation cannot be mastered by arms control alone. A new way must be found to link Europe and America institutionally. The present system is not satisfactory. Within our present the Atlantic Community military issues are discussed within NATO; political issues find their focal point in the European Community.

JUN. 05 '90 19:15 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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18

and will do so *proceedingly* as Europe *mges towards unity*.
*achieves*

*that process gathers momentum, American military forces may turn*
*into the passive auxiliaries for the political decisions of*
*others.*
The United States has *strugged to make human*
*membership in NATO more palatable to the Soviet Union by proposing a new political role for NATO.*
But aside from the *military element* + *historical*+
difficulty of defining such a role, the proposal runs up against
*European*
*the historic suspicion of some Europeans* that the US is somehow
*manipulating NATO to undermine Europe's identity.*
For in NATO,
*the US deals with the European countries individually; the*
*European Community as an institution is not represented.*
*Indeed,*
*given Ireland's neutral status, it cannot be.*

At the same time, the United States is for all practical
purposes excluded from the political deliberations of the
European Community. The standard procedure is for the Council of
Ministers to convey its conclusions to the United States through
a Chairman who rotates every six months. But that foreign
minister is in effect an instructed messenger; he has no

JUN.05 '90 19:16 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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19

This makes it increasingly difficult for Europe and America to concert their roles and strategies. A solution must be found by permitting the European Community as it elaborates its political institutions to participate in NATO discussions and for the United States to be heard within the European Community before deliberations harden into formal decisions. Perhaps a new comprehensive treaty will be in order when European unity has advanced sufficiently.