Kyoko Baba

417 Riverside Drive New York, NY 10025

Jan. 12, 1981

Dear Ms. Vick

Enclosed please find a copy of the transcription
of our interview with Dr. Kissinger.

Mr. Takemura, the interviewer, promised Dr. Kissinger to send this to him. With this copy, he has sent his best wishes to Dr. Kissinger.

Have you had a wonderful holiday season, I hope? Time passes so fast that sometimes I feel dizzy--almost.

You must be busier than ever, as the Republican administration will be born soon...

Best of good luck, and please take care...

JAN 19 1981

INTERVIEW OF MR. KISSINGER BY MR. TAKEMURA

**TAKEMURA:** Now, in the coming year, what will be your prediction? Will Soviet Russia continue to extend her power?

**KISSINGER:** Are we on television already?

**TAKEMURA:** Yes.

**KISSINGER:** I see.

**TAKEMURA:** In the coming year, do you believe that the Soviet Union will continue to extend its power and the West continue to retreat?

**KISSINGER:** Of course, it depends on who is the President of the United States. I think that inherently there is no reason why the Soviet Union should be able to expand its power. Inherently there is no reason why the West should retreat. The West is more powerful. Its population is more numerous. Its industry is more effective.

**TAKEMURA:** So, it is of their own making.

**KISSINGER:** It is of her own making. It is the question of leadership.

**TAKEMURA:** I see. That is what you have been telling the world. And what would you suggest as the remedy to change this trend?

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**KISSINGER:** I think that the Soviet leaders have to know that there is a penalty for expansion and they have to be shown the determination to resist. At the same time, I think we have to be prepared to negotiate serious differences. Fundamentally, the pattern of the last few years cannot be permitted to continue.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes, the Soviet Union received the penalty after they invaded Afghanistan. Do you think they repent their invasion?

**KISSINGER:** No, because it didn't receive much of a penalty.

**TAKEMURA:** Oh, they didn't?

**KISSINGER:** No.

**TAKEMURA:** The food embargo ...

**KISSINGER:** The food embargo was a blow to them but they were able to buy some of the food in the open market and it was more a diversion of the normal purchasing, in which they then bought Argentine wheat and we supplied wheat to some of the Argentine customers.

**TAKEMURA:** So, you think that the food embargo didn't affect very much the Soviet Union.

**KISSINGER:** Oh, it affected them to some extent, but not in any decisive way.

**TAKEMURA:** You could have done --- If you were the Secretary of the State, for instance after that Afghan

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invasion, could you have done better?

**KISSINGER:** I would like to think that if I was somebody who is heard like me, I don't like to say this is ---- it is not a personal matter ---- if I have been the Secretariat of the State that it would never have reached the point of Afghan invasion. This is, I think, is more important than what you do after an Afghan invasion.

**TAKEMURA:** I see. So, you or any politician of the United States should take more precautionary measures so that the Soviet Union will not extend that far.

**KISSINGER:** That is right. The harder foreign policies to prevent crisis from happening, not to manage them.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes, starting from Angola to Ethiopia, to South Yemen, and so forth.

**KISSINGER:** South Yemen, Afghanistan, Cambodia.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes, I see, that is your view.

**KISSINGER:** Yes.

**TAKEMURA:** And what in the coming year should the U.S. Administration do primarily?

**KISSINGER:** Well, the Administration will have to do four or five things simultaneously. It has to strengthen their military forces. It has to make them relevant to the crisis that are most likely to arise in places such as we have seen, the Persian Gulf, the

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Middle-East, and so forth.

Third, they have to strengthen our alliances, so that there is a greater cooperation between countries with which we are normally associated. Then, we have to develop a new approach to the developing countries. That is to say, we have to develop a policy whereby moderation is rewarded and the extreme is punished. And finally with the Soviet Union we have to put a limit to their expansionism, all the time being prepared to have serious negotiations, if that should become necessary.

**TAKEMURA:** You said to strengthen the U.S. military power. But is it possible for the present capacity of the U.S. economy to increase?

**KISSINGER:** Certainly with all our difficulties our capacity is a lot greater than that of the Soviet Union.

**TAKEMURA:** Indeed. And also the capacity of the Western allies.

**KISSINGER:** And one shouldn't simply count the United States. You would have to add the allies to it.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes.

**KISSINGER:** And you have even to include Japan in it.

**TAKEMURA:** Do you think you can include Japan in this connection?

**KISSINGER:** I do, yes.

**TAKEMURA:** You do.

**KISSINGER:** Yes.

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**TAKEMURA:** But Japan has been quite reluctant to increase its power, though. Japan is now a half as regards the U.S. in GNP.

**KISSINGER:** Of course, I hold the view that Japan is in the process of increasing its power in its own way in the Japanese method, which means by consensus, slowly, not yet visibly. That is my impression. But I could be wrong.

**TAKEMURA:** You have come to realize that Japan could do things although it may take longer than the Western countries.

**KISSINGER:** Well, I think the interesting thing about Japan is that it takes Japan longer to make decisions than the Western countries. It implements its decisions faster than the Western countries. And we make decisions fast and are then very slow in implementing them.

**TAKEMURA:** And that is not your diplomatic talk. That is your honest view.

**KISSINGER:** No, no, I have written this and this is my view. It took me several years to begin to understand the Japanese way of thinking. Of course, to a Japanese it isn't complicated but to a non-Japanese it is a very interesting and complicated and subtle way of making decisions.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes, indeed. Last year in April or May you came to Japan and I had a brief encounter with you at the NTV office and I remember you mentioned that. So, I do believe that you now know that Japan does act but it takes time.

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**KISSINGER:** Yes, Japan generally does more than it says it does.

**TAKEMURA:** I am glad to hear that.

**KISSINGER:** With us it is often the opposite. We say more than we do.

**TAKEMURA:** I see. What about the other Western allies, France, for instance, or West Germany?

**KISSINGER:** Well, of course, their method of thinking is more similar to ours. Their decision-making process is more similar to ours. But I believe we need two things from our Western allies. One, I think they have to carry also a greater burden of common defense. Secondly, we need some agreement with them on a common strategy. We cannot assume the responsibility for the defense of every threatened area.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes. But don't you think that those Western nations particularly France and West Germany are more on the side of appeasing Soviet Russia than confronting them?

**KISSINGER:** No, both President Giscard and Chancellor Schmidt are old and respected friends of mine. So, I think I know their philosophy fairly well. I don't believe that they are in favor of appeasing the Soviet Union. Their problem is that specially because in Germany----- well in both cases, they have the domestic situation with large leftwing groups or in the case of Germany with the divided country --- and they have lost confidence that the United States will stick to a strong line and they don't want to be caught in an impossible situation.

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**TAKEMURA:** Yes. But those Western nations have continued to have stronger economic ties with the Soviet Union. These strong economic ties may hinder them to move to confrontation. The U.S. hasn't ...

**KISSINGER:** Well, nobody is in favor of confrontation with the Soviet Union just to have confrontation. Whether there is a confrontation with the Soviet Union depends on the Soviet behavior. If the Soviet Union stays within its orders, if it doesn't have territorial ambitions, if it doesn't make military adventures in Afghanistan or maybe Poland or whatever, then there is no reason for us to have a confrontation with it.

**TAKEMURA:** That's very true.

**KISSINGER:** If they make a military adventure or other aggressive moves, then there is the problem of confrontation. Certainly some Western countries are more reluctant than others to do this.

**TAKEMURA:** That's right. And after the Afghan invasion Japan was the only Western ally that really sided with the United States in its economic sanctions. France and West Germany have increased a great deal of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. What would you say?

**KISSINGER:** Well, I think that is extremely shortsighted. And it confirms the dictum of Lenin who said that at the end the West is going to sell us the rope with which to hang them.

**TAKEMURA:** Oh, that's your view.

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**KISSINGER:** That's what Lenin said.

**TAKEMURA:** That's what Lenin said. Now coming to the second point, you said that to do some preventive measures in the possible trouble areas --- do you think you can predict what areas would be the trouble areas?

**KISSINGER:** No, I don't think you can predict every specific country. You can predict the general area, yes. The Persian Gulf and the Middle-East is going to be one trouble area. Morocco is going to be a trouble area. Southern Africa may become complicated. The Caribbean and Central America are certainly......

**TAKEMURA:** So many areas that the United States have to take care of.

**KISSINGER:** Well, that is why I say we need more support, we can't do them all by ourselves. Not all of them by military means. I am not saying that the military means are the only solution.

**TAKEMURA:** I know, but when you have so many areas that you can spot some troubles ahead, don't you think it is a little bit beyond the U.S. capacity indeed? The West must really cooperate.

**KISSINGER:** Well, again, I want to stress-- not every troubled area is the military problem. And even where there is a potential military danger, this would be absolutely the last resort. But even intellectually you are quite right. The United States should not be asked to solve every problem as its own political

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adventure. And we need the support of other countries.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes. And do you think the American people, the general trend of the American attitude is now moving back again to the pre-Viet-Nam days? I mean after the Viet Nam people sort of liked to retreat rather than go ahead.

**KISSINGER:** No, it doesn't go back exactly to the situation of the pre-Viet-Nam days. Because there we had a rather naive belief that we could solve every problem ourselves and quickly. But I also think that the American people are getting tired of being pushed around. The American people do not like to be confronted with crisis that threatened their vital interests all the time. The American people do not like to be told that there is nothing we can do about these challenges. So, in this sense, strong leadership in this country would be greatly respected.

**TAKEMURA:** To be frank, I know--- I was a graduate student 26 years ago in the U.S. and since then I have been coming and going--- but in my view, so, I quite agree that the American people don't like to be pushed around. But when they were pushed around they didn't know how to react--- like the Iran hostages.

**KISSINGER:** I don't know what the American people knew. The American leadership did not believe that it should react. But the American people you cannot expect from the general public in a situation as complicated as Iran to know exactly what to do. All you can

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expect from the public is -- the only question is:
Will they support the stronger leadership? I believe
when we were in office we never had hostages for
more than two or three weeks. In this case we have
hostages for a year. Of course, the local conditions
differ. But still a year is a long time for hostages
to be held.

**TAKEMURA:** Personally, I quite share your opinion. But it seems to me that the Administration is at a loss. To what degree should they be tough? You know. It is difficult to know how tough they should be.

**KISSINGER:** Yes, but this is what you have the leader for. Of course, it is difficult to know. All difficult things are complicated.

**TAKEMURA:** Indeed.

**KISSINGER:** Otherwise, anybody could solve them.

**TAKEMURA:** Sure.

**KISSINGER:** Still I believe that when American hostages are taken--- American diplomats as hostages --- a year is a very long time for the United States. Of course, it is a difficult problem. That is what you have the government for to make proposals to its public. Maybe the public won't support it. I believe the public would support any reasonable measure.

**TAKEMURA:** I think so. And you have to, sort of, have a philosophy or a rule to react to such a situation. This rule--- it seems that the past Administration has been sort of

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incoherent in dealing with various events. So we
don't know where, for instance, the past administration
or Carter Administration would go. The world thinks
as you think.

**KISSINGER:** I think one of the important attributes of any Administration has to be predictability. Other nations have to know, friends have to know what they can expect, and the adversaries would have to know what they would have to fear. And without that you are under the risk of prolonged crisis that has no end.

**TAKEMURA:** That's right. And about this predictability can or do you think you can predict what the Japanese government would do, what Japan would do?

**KISSINGER:** You know in 1969 when I first entered the government, I thought I could predict it and I was always wrong. Because I didn't understand the Japanese.

**TAKEMURA:** You are very honest.

**KISSINGER:** Because I didn't understand the Japanese thinking. Today I think I could predict within a margin what the Japanese government will do. I think the Japanese-- once you understand the Japanese --- are very predictable, which I say as a praise. I don't say that as a criticism.

**TAKEMURA:** I see.

**KISSINGER:** It is highly improbable to be confronted with a Japanese shock. It is not the way the Japanese conduct affairs.

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**TAKEMURA:** And what would you expect or wish Japan to do in the coming year or in the coming world situation?

**KISSINGER:** Of course, I have --- one of the things I have learned about Japan is that what I wish maybe one minor factor in the decision but that they are the people in the consensus system. They are not thinking about this on their own regardless of what I wish. And that in all probability the Japanese will move on the basis of their own considerations towards their own purposes. And again this is, as it should be, it is a great nation of over 100 million people with tremendous economy. But I think Japan will --- I wish it but they also will do it for their own reasons --- play a greater international role. Japan will become a really equal partner of the United States, not just in words but in reality. Japan will play a larger role in the security of the area and I think the international system will expand to include Japan as one of the major visible participants.

**TAKEMURA:** Militarily are you talking about or economically?

**KISSINGER:** Well, economically already it is a major participant. I think the sequence will be that right now Japan is economically, extremely strong but does not yet play even politically the same role that is plays economically. I think that the next step that it will

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happen is that it will play the more significant
political role. That will be followed by a more
significant military role by the end of 1980s.
This is my prediction and I could be wrong.

**TAKEMURA:** I hope this prediction will prove right, you know.
Because I am telling the Japanese people everyday
on my TV show, you know, that Japan should always
look around outside Japan. And the Japanese intelligent,
educated people --- once they open their eyes
and once they feel that it is necessary to open their
eyes, they will, I hope.

**KISSINGER:** That is my belief, too.

**TAKEMURA:** Now, again on another thing. What about the food
embargo problem? Do you still think that the food
should be or not merely food but also strategic
weapons?

**KISSINGER:** When you say strategic weapons it has a bad notation. But I think that economics in general including food should be a part of overall foreign policy. If a country is in difficulty with food and all it needs is economic considerations to buy it, and at the same time conducts a very aggressive policy, then in effect we are supporting its aggressive policy. So, I think that we should have the strategy for food, just as OPEC has the strategy for oil.

**TAKEMURA:** That's right. And if you don't have a sort of an
international agreement at least among the Western
nations, that food embargo will not be as effective
as it should. For instance, in the case after the Afghan

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invasion the U.S. did bring about that food embargo
but other nations helped export their foods. So, in
1974 or something at Rome in the Food Conference you
proposed that ......

**KISSINGER:** Yes, well, I proposed the international food reserves.
And I proposed that there be some international approach to the problem of food. And I still maintain that.

**TAKEMURA:** You do that. But is it possible that there will be
a sort of conference like OPEC to control the worldwide food supplies?

**KISSINGER:** It will be difficult but I think it's possible.

**TAKEMURA:** Now we come to the --- we got some more minutes.

**KISSINGER:** We will go, yes.

**TAKEMURA:** The more I know about you, the more I feel that I shouldn't really take too much of your time, you see.

**KISSINGER:** You are very polite.

**TAKEMURA:** Well, I am honest. But you know in Japan I feel at
times that the Soviet Union has sort of overextended
now. Like before, the Russo-Japanese War at the
end or toward the end of Czar Russia. And the Soviet
might disintegrate of itself by overextending.

**KISSINGER:** Well, first if you take the example of the Russo-Japanese War, would they have disintegrated without the Russo-Japanese War? That is the interesting question.

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Does the country disintegratd without being stopped
somewhere? And if they could have continued expand-
ing and taken Korea --- I am talking about 1905 now
--- taken Korean, taken Northern China, which is
what would have happened.... I think basically the
Soviet Union is overextended. Basically the Soviet
economy is in a terrible shape. Basically the Soviet
leadership is in a terrible shape. And when you have
to replace a 76 year old Prime Minister with a 75
year old Prime Minister, and when all your top leader-
ship group is of that age now --- I know in Japan
your leaders are also older than in the United States
as a general rule, but in Japan you rotate your
leadership very frequently and you have a very big
reserve of leaders, and you train them from an early
period, which are the different issues. But in Russia
you have the same leaders that are in key positions
for 20, 30 years. And they are afraid to let go of
their power because they have no idea what comes
after them. So you have all of these problems and
you cannot think that the Soviet Union can possibly
represent the wave of the future, except if they are
so successful in foreign policy that it overrides
all other considerations.

TAKEMURA: By overextention I mean the Soviet Union did succeed in establishing a socialist state in Angola, turning Ethiopia into a socialist state, or South Yemen, too.

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But those leaders who once sort of appreciated the
Soviet's military help in the beginning are soon
discouraged or disillusioned....

**KISSINGER:** Well, but if you look at the reality, take Angola, from the American Point of view we have no vital interest in the particular form of government in Angola. We do have an important interest that this government not be imposed either by the Soviet Union or by Cuba. Today, I am sure that they do not like in Angola the Cuban presence. But they have no alternative. And therefore the Cubans in a way are performing some of the functions that the Portuguese used to perform, they are watching the government, they are supporting the military, they are supplying the military rule.

**TAKEMURA:** And wouldn't they revolt, I mean, wouldn't the people revolt against Cubans as they did against Portuguese?

**KISSINGER:** Well, first of all, there was the opposition movement led by Sabembei (ph.) which also, incidentally, fought against the Portuguese. But it is not so easy to revolt against the totalitarian state.

**TAKEMURA:** And it is not easy for you to help that revolt.

**KISSINGER:** It's a complicated problem for us, too.

**TAKEMURA:** And you don't propose for --- or you don't go that far.

**KISSINGER:** No, I don't go that far. It's a very complicated problem. And I am in favor of giving the local people like the Angolan patriots an opportunity to

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free themselves from the Cubans. And they can do that
with their own government that is now in office or with
some alternative structure that has to be seen.

**TAKEMURA:** Yes. Now, the last question. The Soviet economy is on the downfall and they know that by 1985 their military power would be at the peak, after that it will be again surpassed by the U.S. and the Western powers. Well, do you have some fear as many do about the Soviet gamble before that 1985?

**KISSINGER:** Now, I would say first of all that for the Soviet Union to go to war is a big enterprise because while they have great power they also have great inefficiencies. And for them to sustain a prolonged war would be a major problem. If you look at Russian history, on top of Communist history, you will remember that in prolonged wars the Russian system has never worked very well. There are many inefficiencies. And great strength-- I know they won the World War II. But even that they wouldn't have won without Western help even though they fought heroically. Now, nevertheless, there is a merit to be in your question and reasonably concerned. The Soviet Union has about ten years in which to use eight years its military power. After that they would have to undertake domestic reforms and other reforms. And they will be very tempted to use their power during the period when they are still fairly strong. I don't

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think they will be inferior necessarily after 85. But
they will have to modernize everything yet again, which
is a tremendous strain on their resources.

**TAKEMURA:** And before they become weaker than the Western powers, do you predict they will gamble at the nuclear war?

**KISSINGER:** The nuclear war, they will not. But I think they will be very tempted to make military adventures. Or if China should become much stronger, they might be very tempted to solve for a while their China problem. That is a big issue for us.

**TAKEMURA:** But China will not become so strong in that short period of five years.

**KISSINGER:** No, not in five years. But if they see China begin--- supposing they conclude that China in 1983 is like in 1953 and if they wait 20 years China will be like Japan is in 1973.

**TAKEMURA:** Do you think China will grow as fast as Japan?

**KISSINGER:** It's very difficult for a population of 900 million with a different historic tradition to grow as fast as Japan.

**TAKEMURA:** As individuals I believe that the Chinese are as agile, alert, intelligent as the Japanese. But its bureaucracies and the administration system, did you study.....

**KISSINGER:** No, no, it would be more complicated. They do not have the same tradition of organized effort. And they are not as cohesive a society historically as Japan is.

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**TAKEMURA:** And the leader change might---

**KISSINGER:** That's true.

**TAKEMURA:** --- bring about a big change, too.

**KISSINGER:** On the other hand, if you look at the historical record of Chinese, outside of China and even in the past inside China, they have the capacity for great achievements.

**TAKEMURA:** They do, individually, yes. But the government itself--- you know that system, you know.

**KISSINGER:** That's very difficult.

**TAKEMURA:** That's right.

**KISSINGER:** But they are trying very hard to reform it.

**TAKEMURA:** So, then, you wouldn't advise Japan... to go rush into helping China become a big economic power.

**KISSINGER:** Oh, no, I think that it is very important for Japan and China to cooperate. I think it is very important for the United States and China to cooperate. I think it is inevitable that China will become sooner or later an important economic country. This is, maybe, a problem for the Soviet Union.

**TAKEMURA:** That's right. That's the point.

**KISSINGER:** But that's their problem, not our problem.

**TAKEMURA:** But the Soviet might be instigated...

**KISSINGER:** Yes, but they may do that any way. You cannot say that a country of the size and importance and history of China must remain forever weak in order to keep the Soviet Union happy.