MIDDLE EAST

America's president; Syria's minister, far left, and Saudi Arabia's, right, with Shultz

After Lebanon: a conversation

We recorded this conversation with Henry Kissinger, a private citizen, in New York. It explores the opportunities and choices available in the Middle East after Israel's lunge into Lebanon, the departure from Beirut of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and the Reagan plan announced on September 1st.

Do you see still, after recent events, an opportunity for progress in the Middle East?

The circumstances for progress in the Middle East are the best I can remember.

Is the Reagan plan one component in that?

Let me define what I consider to be the essential elements of the Reagan plan: (1) That the negotiating partners on the West Bank should be Jordan and Israel; (2) that the West Bank authority elected by Palestinians should be associated with Jordan; (3) that annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel will not be accepted by the United States or by any other country; (4) that there be a moratorium on new Israeli settlements on the West Bank during a peace process; (5) that the negotiation must deal with Israel's security as well as recognition.

There are other aspects in the plan that I think are not as essential.

Now, suddenly, one is able to talk in these terms whereas, say, a year ago it was difficult to see one's way ahead. Were the military events in Lebanon a useful beginning of this process?

Like it or not, they changed things—so that out of the rubble there came the chance of a fresh beginning. I do not believe it would have been possible to achieve the kind of Arab reaction evoked by the Reagan plan had these military operations not taken place. First of all Lebanon strengthened the moderates in the Arab world by weakening the radicals. Second, it revealed the hollowness, or the limits, of Soviet support for its clients in the Middle East; the Soviets can supply arms but give no impetus to diplomacy. Third, it exposed the fact that the

new generation of American weapons seems to be much superior to the new generation of Soviet weapons....

American weapons with some Israeli frills....

With some Israeli frills, yes, but at any rate making the military option for those using Soviet weapons in the region less and less promising—and in the process devaluing Russia's principal export.

Finally, the lack of effective support for the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organisation] by the radical Arab states made it clear that the rejectionist front had rhetoric but no programme. All this eliminated to a large extent the military potential of the PLO. Therefore if the Palestinians are to participate in the peace process, it will have to be as a political and not as a military factor. These are the new objective conditions on the Arab side making for progress.

On the Israeli side the Lebanese action has removed, substantially, the argument that there was an imminent military threat to the existence of the Jewish state. It would have been unthinkable a few months ago that an Israeli prime minister would tell his parliament that for the first time in Israel's history all its frontiers were secure.

For all of these reasons conditions have never been better for negotiations—provided the Reagan plan is seen as a framework and not a blueprint, every last provision of which needs to be implemented as part of an agreement.

Which elements of it do you see, then, as being particularly encouraging as a framework?

Jordan as a negotiating partner; a decisive role, a political role, for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza in determining their political future, within the framework of association with Jordan; the recognition of Israeli security concerns on the West Bank; and the clear statement by the United States, which will remove any illusions that may have existed in Israel, that annexation (overt or disguised) is not an option we will support.

Those are the potential strengths in the Reagan plan. What are the potential weaknesses and dangers in it?

Some of the language is perhaps necessarily ambiguous; some of it will be

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KISSINGER ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Reagan, Begin: an unusual crisis

interpreted differently by the various parties and—I suspect—by different elements of our bureaucracy. This involves the risk of stalemate in the negotiations, tensions with friends on both sides and disagreement within our government.

The phraseology on Jerusalem in my view may well be only compatible with turning Jerusalem into a UN [United Nations] city, which is a non-starter. The phraseology that the location of the borders will depend on the degree of normalisation that the countries are prepared to undertake meets only part of the problem. It obscures the peculiar difficulty of Arab-Israeli negotiation in which one side has attempted to achieve annexation by subterfuge and the other side tries to evade all its problems by trading its maximum demands in return for recognition. In other words the location of the West Bank borders must be related to security as well as to recognition. Israel—as President Reagan has also implied—should not be asked to find security solely in recognition.

**You talk of the "peculiar difficulty" of Arab-Israeli negotiations.**

Two nostalgic illusions inhibit these negotiations. The Israeli nostalgia is that somehow or other they can manoeuvre

## Israel was not thinking of autonomy in any commonly accepted use of the word

events to a de facto annexation of the West Bank. The Arab nostalgia is that somehow or other, having lost the military option, they can manoeuvre us into accomplishing their maximum programme in return for verbal formulae, in the process demoralising Israel and with luck bringing about its collapse.

Another danger is that the Reagan plan will turn into a subterfuge for rehabilitating the PLO, establishing it with essentially unchanged composition and programme on the West Bank, threatening simultaneously Israel and Jordan.

The final danger is psychological. Having taken the unprecedented step of introducing a plan without consultation with Israel, we have to be careful not to turn an emergency measure into a regular procedure. Opposition to Israel must not become a congenital feature of our foreign policy lest we break Israel's back psychologically. This is not the case now; I am simply warning against turning what was a probably unavoidable first step into a permanent feature of our diplomacy.

Is this argument between America and Israel different in nature from previous

arguments?

I think that the crisis in American-Israeli relations that resulted from the Reagan speech is unusual in the sense that, for the first time, a presidential plan was put forward without consultation with the Israelis, and for the first time a presidential proposal was totally rejected. We've had tactical disagreements within an agreed strategy before, but this time the dispute involved a fundamental issue of principle. There probably was no other choice: there was a boil that needed lancing in that the Israeli definition of Palestinian autonomy and the definition that the Americans or the Arabs could give to the term had been at fundamental variance from the beginning.

The Israeli proposal for autonomy foresaw a self-governing authority arising out of some process of election. Because the *arrière pensée* of at least the key members of the Israeli government was, as is now apparent, that they would not give up sovereignty over any part of the West Bank, they were careful not to draw any territorial distinction. By implication the autonomy plan applied to the entire West Bank within the 1967 borders. Paradoxically the Begin government, against its preferences and ideology, was really proposing what all other nations were certain to treat as an embryo Palestinian state and, to compound the irony, within the 1967 border since none other was under discussion. Once there was an elected self-governing authority on the West Bank, an irreversible political fact would be created on the territory over which its authority was supposed to run. However limited this authority, it would soon turn into the nucleus of something like a Palestinian state, probably under PLO control. It would be so treated by almost all of the countries of the world except Israel.

**And that would be something to avoid, in your book?**

Well, it was clearly the main objective of the Israeli government to avoid it; its proposal was incompatible with its strategy. All this led to an inherent misunderstanding between the United States and Israel, not to speak of between Egypt and Israel. The only way the Israeli government could avoid the implications of its own proposal was to deprive the word autonomy of its dictionary meaning—for example by elaborating a distinction between autonomy of persons and autonomy of land. Deadlock between Egypt and Israel and latent tensions between the United States and Israel were thus built into the definitions of the problem.

**Not to mention Sadat.**

And Sadat. Between Sadat and Israel: it

probably contributed to weakening Sadat's position. It also fostered an American illusion that perhaps one could get around the problem by enumerating the powers of the self-governing authority. But the problem was insoluble because Israel was not really thinking of autonomy in any commonly accepted use of the word. Even without Lebanon, a show-down on that issue was inevitable sooner or later—the logical implications of the Israeli plan and the way the Israeli government wanted to implement and negotiate it had grown incompatible.

**Are you saying that since Camp David we have got stuck on an escalator, so to speak, on the use of the word autonomy which we now cannot get off?**

No, I'm saying that so long as some form of Israeli sovereignty over the entire West Bank was the objective the autonomy negotiations could not be brought to a conclusion acceptable to all parties; even without Lebanon a point would have been reached at which either the United States would have had to put forward its own definition of autonomy, or there would have been a blow-up of the negotiations.

Lebanon has now made it possible to involve other Arab states in the process and therefore to come up with a more comprehensive approach than would have been possible otherwise. That is the boil the Reagan plan has helped lance.

**Because it got back to the idea of Perez and others that Jordan ought to be the negotiating partner?**

That idea preceded Perez and should not be identified primarily with internal Is-

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raeli politics. It has been American policy
since 1967 that Jordan should be the
interlocutor for the West Bank.

Now, Jordan is talking with Arafat and the PLO. Does that not pose the danger that, by introducing Jordan into it, all we're doing is introducing the PLO on to the West Bank where it can be a threat either to Israel or to Jordan or both?

That is the key strategic question we must
all be clear about. The Reagan plan must
not turn into a device for introducing the
PLO in its present form and with its
present concepts on the West Bank. Jor-
dan would thereby become not so much
the principal negotiating partner as a
cover for the PLO domination of the
West Bank. By making the PLO part of
Jordan it will also lay the basis for an
eventual PLO takeover of all of Jordan,
reversing the events of 1970. The creation
of another radical state with irredentist
aims towards both Jordan and Israel is
irreconcilable with the stability of the
Middle East.

Do you feel that point of view is solidly enough embedded in the Reagan plan and in the thinking behind it?

I suspect it is solidly in the mind of the
secretary of state [George Shultz] and of
the president. I am not sure it is equally
solidly embedded in the minds of all of
those who have to execute it. It is clearly
contrary to the convictions of our Euro-
pean allies. A strategic decision has to be
made whether the proposed negotiations
seek to make Jordan the principal negoti-
ating partner or whether they are used as
a subterfuge for resurrecting the PLO
after its defeat. If we are not clear about
this, we will not be clear about whatever
else to do. Our European allies, especial-
ly, must understand that for them to build
up the PLO while we emphasise the role
of Hussein is certain to lead to paralysis
or worse.

But is the PLO—its military option appar-
ently destroyed, and deserted as it was by
its Arab friends when it needed to exercise
it—really such a threat now?

That remains to be seen; the future
evolution of the PLO is one of the key
questions before us. I believe its military
option has been substantially destroyed
except perhaps for terrorism. I would
also think that reasonable Palestinians,
reflecting about their experience of the
past 10 or 15 years, should come to a
Sadat-like insight that they must co-exist
with Israel in some form: they more than
any other people, despite—and perhaps
because of—the common suffering Israel
and the Palestinians have inflicted on
each other. If that happens, a new Pales-
inian leadership may well emerge, per-

haps even under the label of PLO. That
would not represent such a threat; it
could even turn into a major opportunity.
The PLO in its present composition and
with its present programme cannot make
such a claim. If the PLO is now resurrect-
ed without fundamental structural and
philosophical changes, it is likely to re-
main radical, seeking to upset the equilib-
rium on the West Bank and to destabilise
moderate governments in the area—
starting with Jordan. I think it should be
given an opportunity to demonstrate a
change of approach. But this requires
more than ambiguous phrases hinting at
recognition of Israel. It presupposes a
true turn towards the political option
reflected in the PLO's structure, pro-
gramme and personalities.

Can Arafat, now that the PLO is dis-
persed and has its military teeth drawn,
carry a suitably reformed organisation
into association with Jordan?

I do not know and perhaps he does not either.

What specific measures should be negoti-
ated on the West Bank for Israel's
security?

There is no such thing as absolute securi-
ty, but there is such a thing as absolute
insecurity. As President Reagan pointed
out, the narrow neck of Israel between
Haifa and Tel Aviv, with a width of only
nine miles in some places, cannot be
considered a secure frontier whatever the
degree of Arab recognition of Israel. The
areas essential for an improvement in

Israel's security on the West Bank are not
heavily populated by Arabs. Thus it
should be possible to return to the over-
whelming majority of Arabs living on the
West Bank and Gaza a controlling voice
in facing their future. The precise loca-
tion of these security frontiers will have
to be settled by negotiation.

Is recognition of Israel a starting point for
negotiation or the end-result?

In negotiations between Israel and Arabs
the question of recognition plays a dis-
proportionate and unprecedented role.

In all other negotiations mutual recog-
nition is assumed at the outset. I know no
other negotiation in which a country is
asked to accept recognition of its exis-
tence as the principal quid pro quo. The
Israelis sometimes give the impression
that their sole objective is recognition
and some Arabs, perhaps sensing the
opportunity, seem to imagine that they
can achieve their maximum programme
in return for nothing more than simple
recognition. So I would be much more
interested in how the PLO in fact con-
ducts itself towards the peace progress
than in arcane formulae of recognition.
However, the issue of recognition has
become so symbolic that it cannot be
avoided. Recognition of Israel is the
beginning of a process, not the end; it
does not meet—by itself—the needs of
the situation. It is not, when all is said,
much of a concession for the PLO to
make. Many recognised states neverthe-
less wound up being destroyed even in
our own time.

It comes down to some extent to Israel's
sense of being threatened. You have said
that Israel's claim to be threatened has
either been eliminated or strongly mitigat-
ed after the Lebanon military conflict.
Does Israel really have as many reasons as
it claims it has to go on being fearful?

In the immediate future, say over five
years, it probably has less reason to be
militarily fearful than at any time in its
history. However, over an historic period
a nation of 3m, in whatever borders can
be conceived, surrounded by 100m
people that will never be fully reconciled
to (even once they have accepted) its
existence, has reason to be uneasy. After
all, India has recognised Pakistan as a
state and yet one would not describe the
relations between them as one of great
confidence; Pakistan's sense of being
threatened has, rightly or wrongly, never
abated. It has remained a root fact of
Pakistani politics and diplomacy and I
suspect it will be a root fact of Israeli
politics even after peace has been
negotiated.

Second, the rate at which arms now
pour into the area from all sides will

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KISSINGER ON THE MIDDLE EAST

sooner or later erode Israel's present qualitative superiority.

Finally Israel must feel, perhaps only
subconsciously, that total dependence on
a distant superpower is extremely danger-
ous and precarious. It is after all the
essence of a superpower that its percep-
tions of the dangers may not be calculat-
ed by yardsticks relevant to a small coun-
try. The Israelis may feel, better than
they dare articulate, that, for a nation
with a narrow margin of survival, and a
people with a history of catastrophe, the
line between arrogance and hysteria, be-
tween overweening behaviour and panic,
is very narrow. If they are pressed too
close to that line there could be a political
and psychological collapse or a convul-
sive eruption. This fear is at the same
time the secret dream of some of Israel's
adversaries.

You drew attention to that thin dividing line when writing about your own negotiations with Israel. Are we not in danger of elevating that concept in Israel, whereas what we ought to be trying to do is diminish it, and to elevate in its place a combination of more realism and more self-confidence, which would allow Israel both to negotiate and to exist?

Well, at this point I don't think Israeli self-confidence needs any particular encouragement. Yes, we should encourage Israel to negotiate. Israel is more likely to do so, paradoxically, if it feels compassion on our side, maybe even affection, rather than unremitting pressure. Where we disagree with Israel on substantive points we must be prepared to express this—strongly if necessary. But it is a very difficult manoeuvre to bring off—to press Israel on individual points, as we must do with perseverance, and yet not cumulatively to harass it into emotional and psychic collapse.

This is also important in terms of our
negotiating position with the Arabs.
Arab leaders are given an incentive to be
conciliatory only so long as it is clear that
our support requires reasonable and
moderate positions on their part. If, how-
ever, the impression spreads that across-
the-board opposition to Israel is built into
us, so to speak, then their temptation to
stick to their maximum programme is
very great. In other words I feel that
pressure on Israel should be exerted
retail rather than wholesale, if one can
put it in such crude terms.

You talk of the conditions for Arabs getting "our support". Yet American support for Israel during the past 18 months has often been flouted, to the point that the Arabs must wonder what it is worth. Can America afford to see its wishes ignored so openly by a small,

especially to the president, risk the public
support for the sustained assistance on
which their policy ultimately depends.

No sanctions?

I would hope such a point will never be
reached.

It has been an American position and,
indeed, almost a universal position since
1967 that the West Bank cannot and
should not be annexed by Israel—yet,
expressed in terms of concrete, it is being
annexed or already has been. Is it now any
longer conceivable to talk in terms of
negotiation over the West Bank?

It is not only conceivable; it is imperative.
Annexation of the West Bank—overt or
disguised—will sow the seeds of endless
crises, one of which will inevitably erupt
into conflagration. It is not even in the
interest of Israel however narrowly con-
ceived. The incorporation of Gaza and

the West Bank into Israel will sooner or
later produce an Arab majority that will
destroy the essence of the Jewish state.
And if Israel seeks to escape this dilemma
by expelling all the Arabs it will lose the
moral support of even its best friends.
Over an historical period Israel would not
be able to withstand the crisis that would
result.

Begin has called the idea of an association
between Jordan and the West Bank "gro-
tesque". Should he be required, or asked,
in a negotiation to change his mind—and
what form of pressure can be brought by
the United States to help persuade him to
change his mind?

This is the fundamental issue between the United States government and Begin, so it is unfair to make him the symbol of negotiating difficulties. With respect to Egypt, after all, he made more concessions than I would have expected on the basis of my experience with previous Israeli governments. Granted all this, the present positions of the American and Israeli governments are nearly irreconcilable. As for pressures in the immediate future, the most effective one is for King Hussein to step forward with whatever Arab acquiescence he needs as the Arab negotiator for the West Bank. This would pose for all Israelis the concrete necessity for decisions. So long as the Arab participation in the process remains only hypothetical, the debate will be sterile and bitter. In the meantime the best that America can do is to state a reasonable definition of what it has in mind with respect to both security and to political evolution. If Hussein steps forward and we stick to our course, many Israeli fears will be reduced and responsible opinion in Israel will shift towards such a programme. We need a serious discussion with the Israelis on what we understand to be the security frontiers on the West Bank and what territories we expect would have to be returned.

We need as well a serious dialogue with especially the moderate Arabs. Moderate Arabs must know that their views will be respectfully heard in America; they must not be encouraged to believe that their sole contribution to the negotiations is the willingness to accept Israel. They must avoid the temptation of building an Arab consensus on the prospect of a gradual demoralisation of Israel by American pressure. They as well as Israel should work with us on the definitions of peace and security that are central to the peace process.

Should America be proposing these?

As a last resort, yes.

Prior agreement with Israel rather than

If Hussein steps forward

determined ally? And what, if it cannot,
should it do about it?

The Israeli outrage at the unilateral pro-
cedures preceding the Reagan plan would
have had more moral force had not Israel
proceeded unilaterally on a whole series
of issues and had it not made challenging
our views, sometimes provocatively, al-
most a principle of policy. America must,
as I have said, treat Israel compassionate-
ly and seriously. It must do its serious
best to achieve prior agreement before
taking initiatives affecting Israel's future.
In the end we cannot abdicate the defini-
tion of our national interests to a small
friendly country, however close. Respon-
sible Israeli leaders will know that contin-
ual open challenges to our government,

Pressure on Israel should be exerted retail rather than wholesale

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### prior agreement with Hussein?

Hussein will have to be part of the process; indeed it cannot start without him. Once negotiations begin, Hussein has to know what we are discussing with Israel and has to be given an opportunity to express his views. In a serious, sustained negotiation with Hussein I do not believe that any Israeli government could maintain opposition in principle to the return of the overwhelming majority of the Arab populations to some form of genuine Arab control. Therefore there should now be a moratorium on further theoretical exegesis of the Reagan plan; the urgent problem is to induce the relevant parties to start negotiating. The Israelis could maintain their position that they are negotiating on the basis of Camp David, and the Arab side would invoke the Reagan plan; the president has after all declared the terms are compatible.

### Why should Arafat agree that Hussein step forward?

Because this is the only way the Palestinians can achieve control over their future. The alternative to the course outlined here is not a PLO state but Israeli annexation of the West Bank and the loss of a historic opportunity.

### Do you feel able to define, in any negotiating terms, what those genuine forms of Arab control would be? And what the relationship, for example, between Jordan and a West Bank entity of some kind could be?

The Arab population on the West Bank and Gaza must be given a serious opportunity to express their preferences, which means free of Israeli pressure as well as of PLO intimidation. The first phase should be Jordanian control of the West Bank minus agreed Israeli security zones. Jordanian territory on the West Bank would—as seems generally agreed—be demilitarised. Under Jordanian aegis a process to elicit the genuine preferences of the Palestinians should then be started. This can take many forms, some as yet unforeseeable, but maintaining an association with Jordan is central. I do not believe that it is in the interests of the majority of Arab states to create a Libyan or a South Yemenite type of regime on the West Bank.

### Unlikely, given the nature of Palestinians, isn't it?

Unlikely unless outside pressures can be exercised in the form of terrorism. As the Palestinians develop an organisation that is genuinely geared to a political rather than to a military contest—or adapt existing organisations to that process—we should be open-minded with respect to their ultimate role. It would be more

appropriately negotiated between the Palestinians and Jordan and other moderate Arab states than by us.

We've talked about the dangers inherent in any form of pressure put on Israel ... I am not saying "any" form of pressure. It is the nature of Israel's politics that its leaders probably can make some concessions only when it is absolutely clear that America cannot be persuaded to an alternative; therefore it is imperative for the United States to be ready to state its own view and to persevere in the face of opposition. But it also requires, as I have said, acceptable Arab interlocutors with a reasonable programme.

That raises the second question I. was coming to about pressure on Israel: how manageable is that in terms of American politics? I recall the time of President Ford's "reassessment", for example.

Circumstances have changed enormously. I would think, in terms of current American politics, the greater probability is that leadership and public opinion will turn so emphatically against Israel that reasonable Israeli positions will no longer

be entertained and the long-term psychological threat to Israel will not be correctly evaluated. Certainly it is much easier for an American government to state its own position on individual issues than it was in 1975.

### You don't think you're saying that just because the Sabra and Chatila massacres are so recently in the American public's memory?

No. Well before the Lebanese crisis, American leadership opinion was moving decisively against the definitions that were commonly advanced by Jerusalem.

Is there a similar danger—I think of Sadat's last years—of destabilising Arab regimes that we would prefer not to destabilise, by having them associate themselves closely with compromises which are difficult for them to make and which associate them with the current state of affairs in Israel? I think, of course, obviously of Jordan, but also of Saudi Arabia.

Perhaps. In my view the Camp David process played a relatively small role in the destabilisation of Sadat. The major cause was the growth of fundamentalism

in the Arab world. And also the start of a feeling that perhaps we were shifting from Egypt to other Arab states that had dissociated from the peace process. The question arose in some Egyptian minds whether it had all been worth it since it seemed possible to gain all the benefits of American friendship without having run the risks of Camp David.

### That was true for Saudi Arabia, was it true for Jordan?

No, it was true for Saudi Arabia and it was not true of Jordan only because Jordan was not convinced enough that we could deliver.

### I wonder if fundamentalism and the peace process can be divorced that easily in the fevered mind? Is not the American embrace an incitement to fundamentalists?

Just as we have to pay attention to the intangibles of the Israeli situation, we have to take seriously the intangibles of the Arab situation and not push friendly governments beyond the point that in everybody's best judgment is domestically tolerable.

A successful peace process must be seen, first, to reflect the preferences of at least the moderate Arab states and, second, it must move fairly rapidly. The need for a consensus of Arab moderates is another reason why Arab states undermine themselves if they put on us the entire responsibility for the success of the peace process. As for the second condition, in so far as the autonomy negotiations weakened Sadat, their length and inconclusiveness was more important than their content. If the autonomy negotiations had led to a fairly rapid result...

### Somewhere, so to speak.

Somewhere, even on terms that were questioned. So long as Sadat could have said that his method brought about some improvement in the situation where nobody else had produced anything, I think he could have enhanced his position in Egypt and even in the rest of the Arab world through the autonomy negotiations. Therefore the negotiations that are now, one hopes, about to start must be concluded in a reasonably brief period of time, say 12 to 18 months. If they grow very prolonged, a moderate position will be cumulatively difficult to sustain and the domestic support of the participating governments will erode. Reagan's initiative must yield some tangible results while the impact of the PLO's lost military option is still fresh in everybody's mind.

It is said that American officials are disappointed in the Saudi support of the

## Reagan's initiative must yield tangible results while the impact of the PLO's lost military option is still fresh in everybody's mind

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[LC]

Reagan plan. Should they be?

It has been a consistent error of some of our policymakers to expect Saudi Arabia to deliver an Arab consensus. Saudi Arabia is in no position to do so; it is wise not to let itself be tempted into the complex details of the West Bank negotiations. Were we to prevail we would weaken the kingdom without furthering the negotiation process.

Saudi Arabia faces simultaneously the uncertainties of rapid modernisation and the challenges of Islamic fundamentalism. It has a secular radical neighbour to the south in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen; a perhaps reformed but always potentially radical neighbour in Iraq to the north. Across the Gulf it faces traditional Iranian expansionism allied to religious fanaticism; across the Red Sea there is a Soviet and Cuban base in Ethiopia. The kingdom would be tempting fate if it involved itself in all the passions of the Palestinian negotiations; it surely needs no additional enemies.

We must keep Saudi leaders informed of our plans, solicit their judgment, and take their views seriously. This dialogue will prosper in direct proportion to the discretion with which it is conducted. We may find Saudi leaders helpful where this can be done behind the scenes. To seek more is to deflect the kingdom from what are surely our common aims: security against covetous neighbours and against radical forces within.

It was interesting to see Syria's foreign minister in Washington last month visiting President Reagan along with more moderate Arabs. Do you think that Syria is going to play the same blocking role that it has appeared to play before?

I am struck by the presence of the Syrian foreign minister in Washington and also by the interview given by the information minister, Iskander, last month. Both of these events indicate a desire by Syria not to be left out of the negotiating process. If Syria plays a blocking role it may be more to achieve pre-eminence over the Palestinians than because of its objection to the concept of the settlement.

Syria usually wants a price, doesn't it, for participation, both from the Saudis in financial terms but also from others in political terms. Do you see the same pattern repeating itself?

Yes, but also Syria is now in a very difficult position because its military vulnerability has been clearly demonstrated and it cannot believe that it has a serious military option against Israel.

Is it conceivable to see Syria in any negotiation which still leaves the Golan Heights not its own? Strategically, if I

were the Israelis, I would want the Golan Heights long before I would want Nablus. It is not necessary for Syria to participate in West Bank negotiations. It is enough for it to acquiesce in them. In any event, the West Bank negotiations as I envisage them are unlikely to result in a peace treaty. They can at best lead to an interim agreement of a long duration—say 10 to 15 years. As for the Golan, I have always believed that in time it is possible to make another step there in return for something like non-belligerency that would enable Syria to maintain its principles and still participate in the process.

And Israel its security?

And Israel maintain its security by keeping a foothold on the Heights.

Jerusalem: you said earlier that it was a non-starter that it should become a UN city. That could by implication suggest that you feel that it's a non-starter that Jerusalem—become—internationalised in some way that allows all sides their access and pride in it.

Israel will rather go to war than abandon a united Jerusalem as its capital. I think that as part of an interim agreement

strategy, to conceive that, were there a favourable outcome to the kind of problems we've been discussing, greater avenues of co-operation would open up with Arab states in dealing with the threats in the Gulf?

The moderate Arab states of the Gulf must be looking now for opportunities for greater co-operation with the United States. Their self-interest is so intimately tied with American protection of both their internal structure and their borders against the danger developing from radicalism: either in the fundamentalist Iranian indigenous form or (which is not at all inconceivable to me) in the form of some domination of Iran by the Soviet Union if the Tudeh or some similar group were to succeed Khomeini. And they face a threat too from secular radical. Arabs like South Yemen or even Iraq. I would look at the West Bank/Gaza negotiations not as producing a change of mind—I think the change of mind about the desirability of American co-operation has already occurred—but as making it domestically feasible for the Arabs of the Gulf to implement what they know to be necessary.

"Domestically feasible for them to implement what they know is necessary": how close an American embrace does that mean? American bases, or ...?

The countries in the Gulf have to understand that we are prepared to protect both their domestic structure and their frontiers; and they need to be given confidence in the means which we will use. It would be extraordinarily desirable if we could repress our tendency for publicity, and if our military could restrain their compulsion to establish a visible presence.

How do you not publicise a military base, for example?

By not establishing it. I think what we need is installations into which we could move rapidly; a physical presence near the Gulf that is plausible; and a demonstration of how we could reinforce this presence. And we must generate a credible capability for rapid support against internal upheaval. The embrace must be real and serious, but as subtle and non-public as possible.

I much agree with you. You don't see the negotiation on the West Bank as a precondition for that?

No, but it would ease it greatly. I can conceive that Gulf governments, despite their very best judgment, might find themselves in a position where they have to court internal collapse because they simply cannot be associated with a total failure of the West Bank negotiations.

America's embrace must be real and serious, but as subtle and non-public as possible

something like the Vaticanisation of the holy places is conceivable and would be a wise Israeli move. Again, I have no illusions about the difficulty of achieving even this much; more than that is anyhow unattainable in the initial phase of negotiations. Any attempt to go beyond that would be to invite the collapse of negotiations and the building of an Israeli consensus that would make Israelis prefer isolation, even war, to any peace process.

Since neither Camp David nor the Reagan plan envisages a comprehensive peace at this stage the negotiations which are now in prospect cannot achieve a final settlement. The best that is attainable is a long interim agreement, say 10 to 15 years. Israel would agree to new lines on the West Bank in return for non-belligerency and precisely defined steps of normalisation with at least the moderate Arab states.

A step, in other words.

Yes, but 10 to 15 years is a very long time in the Middle East. Many other things are going to happen in that period which would put matters into a new perspective.

Is it a footnote to ask you, or do you think it should be an essential part of American

34

[LC]

October 29, 1982

Interview
Page 1

Q: Do you see still, after recent events, an opportunity for progress in the Middle East?

I think the circumstances for progress in the Middle East
are the best that I can remember.

Let me define what I consider to be the essential and positive
elements of the Reagan plan: (1) That the negotiating partners
on the West Bank should be Jordan and Israel; (2) that
the West Bank authority elected by Palestinians should be
associated with Jordan; (3) that annexation of the West Bank
and Gaza by Israel will not be accepted by the United States
or by any other country; (4) that the negotiation must deal
with the question of Israel's security as well as recognition.
I think these points provide a useful framework for negotia-
tion. There are other aspects in the plan that I think are
not as essential.

I think they were an indispensable beginning - painful as
this may be for some to admit. I do not believe it would

2

have been possible to achieve the kind of Arab reaction
evoked by the Reagan plan had these military operations not
taken place - for the following reasons: The military action
revealed the hollowness, or the limits, of Soviet support
for its clients in the Middle East; the Soviets can supply
arms but give no impetus to diplomacy. Second, it exposed
the fact that the new generation of American weapons seems
to be considerably superior to the new generation of Soviet
weapons...

With some Israeli frills, yes, but at any rate making the
military option for those using Soviet weapons in the region
less and less likely. (In the process it also devalued the
principal Soviet export).

Third, the lack of effective support for the PLO (Palestine
Liberation Organization) by the radical Arab states made it
clear that the rejectionist front had rhetoric but no programme.
All this eliminated to a large extent the military potential
of the PLO. Therefore if the Palestinians are to participate
in the peace process, it will have to be as a political and
not as a military process. These are the objective conditions
on the Arab side for making progress.

3

For all of these reasons I think that conditions have
never been better for negotiations provided the Reagan plan
is considered a framework and not a blue print, every last
provision of which needs to be implemented as part of an agreement.

Jordan as a negotiating partner; a decisive role, a
political role, for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza
in determining their political future, within the framework
of association with Jordan; the recognition of Israeli
security concerns on the West Bank; and the clear statement
by the United States, which will remove any illusions that
may have existed in Jerusalem, that annexation is not an option
we will support.

Some of the language is necessarily ambiguous; some of it
will be interpreted differently by the various parties and--
I suspect--by different elements of our bureaucracy. This

4

involves the risk of stalemate in the negotiations, tensions
with friends and disagreement within our government.

The phraseology on Jerusalem is in my view only compatible
with turning Jerusalem into a UN [United Nations] city, which
is a non-starter. The phraseology that the location of the
borders will depend on the degree of normalization that the
countries are prepared to undertake is only partially correct.
It obscures the peculiar difficulty of Arab-Israeli nego-
tiation in which one side has attempted to achieve annexation
by subterfuge and the other side tends to evade all its problems
by trading its maximum demands in return for recognition.
In other words the location of the West Bank borders must
be related to security as well as to recognition. Israel--
as President Reagan has also implied--should not be asked
to find security solely in recognition.

Can you elaborate on what you mean by "peculiar difficulty"
of Arab-Israeli negotiations?

Two nostalgic illusions inhibit these negotiations. The
Israeli nostalgia is that somehow or other they can maneuver
events to a de facto annexation of the West Bank. The Arab
nostalgia is that somehow or other, having lost a military
option, they can maneuver us into accomplishing their
maximum programme for them, demoralizing Israel and with luck
bringing about its collapse.

5

Another danger is that the Reagan plan will turn into
a subterfuge for rehabilitating the PLO, establishing it with
essentially unchanged composition and program on the West
Bank threatening simultaneously Israel and Jordan.

The final danger is psychological. Having taken the un-
precedented step of introducing a plan without consultation
with Israel, we have to be careful not to turn an emergency
measure into a regular procedure. Opposition to Israel must
not become a congenital aspect of our foreign policy lest
we break Israel's back psychologically. This is not the case
now; I am simply warning against turning what was an important
--perhaps indispensable--first step into a permanent feature
of our diplomacy.

But is there not really in Israel an excessive concern over
the question of autonomy and the question of a Palestinian
entity on the West Bank?

I think that the crisis in American-Israeli relations that
resulted from the Reagan speech...

The United States has been round this crisis track with
Israel before, hasn't it?

Well, this one is unusual in the sense that, for the first
time, a Presidential plan was put forward without consultation
with the Israelis, and for the first time a Presidential

6

proposal was totally rejected. We've had tactical disagreements
within an agreed strategy before, but this time the dispute
involved a fundamental issue of principle. There probably
was no other choice because there was a boil that needed
lancing because the Israeli definition of Palestinian autonomy and
the definition that the US or the Arabs could give to
the term had been at fundamental variance from the beginning.

The Israeli proposal for autonomy foresaw a self-governing
authority arising out of some process of election. Because
the *arriere pensee* of at least the key members of the Israeli
government was, as is now apparent, that they would not give
up governmental control over any part of the West Bank. They
were careful not to establish any territorial distinction.
Paradoxically the Begin government, against its preferences
and ideology, was really creating what all other nations would
treat as the origins of a Palestinian state and, to compound
the irony, within the 1967 border. Once there was an elected
self-governing authority on the West Bank, it and the territory
over which its authority was supposed to run would become
the nucleus of something like a Palestinian state. It would
be so treated by almost all of the countries of the world
except Israel.

Well, it was clearly the main objective of the Begin government

7

to avoid; its proposal was incompatible with its strategy.
All this led to an inherent misunderstanding between the
United States and Israel, not to speak of between Egypt
and Israel. The only way the Israeli government could avoid
the implications of its own proposal was to come up with an
exegesis that was almost incomprehensible to the non-Israeli
mind. It had to deprive the word autonomy of any meaning
that a dictionary would assign to it, for example, by making
a distinction between autonomy of persons and autonomy of
land. This led not only to a deadlock in the negotiations
between Egypt and Israel but to latent tensions between the
United States and Israel.

Not to mention Sadat.

And Sadat. Between Sadat and Israel: it probably contributed
to weakening Sadat's position. It also created an American
illusion that perhaps one could get around the problem by
enumerating the powers of the self-governing authority. But
the problem was insoluble because Israel was not really thinking
of autonomy in the dictionary use of the word. Even without
Lebanon, sooner or later we were going to come to showdown
on that issue -- the incompatibility between the logical
implications of the Israeli plan and the way the Israeli
government wanted to implement and negotiate it.

8

No, I'm saying that given the convictions of the Israeli
government it was never possible for the autonomy plan to
be brought to an acceptable conclusion; even without Lebanon
a point would have been reached in which either the United
States would have had to put forward its definition of autonomy,
or there would have been a blow-up of the negotiations.

Lebanon has now made it possible to involve other Arab
states in the process and therefore to come up with a more
comprehensive solution than would have been possible otherwise.
That is the particular boil the Reagan plan has helped lance.

Because it got back to the idea of Peres and others
that Jordan ought to be the negotiating partner?

That idea preceded Peres and should not be identified primarily
with internal Israeli politics. The autonomy plan as it was
presented was almost certain to lead to a PLO government on
the West Bank, within the 1967 borders, unless it was deprived
of its meaning.

9

Now, Jordan is talking with Arafat and the PLO. Does that not pose the danger that, by introducing Jordan into it, all we're really doing is introducing the PLO on to the West Bank where it can be a threat either to Israel or to both?

That is the nub of the proposed negotiations. In my view the western nations and the moderate Arab nations have to face what they have so far not admitted perhaps even to themselves. The Reagan plan must not turn into a device for introducing the PLO in its present form and with its present concepts on the West Bank. Jordan would thereby become not a principal negotiating partner but a front for the PLO domination of the West Bank. The creation of another radical state with irredentist aims towards both Jordan and Israel is irreconcilable with the stability of the Middle East. It involves the additional danger that by making the PLO part of Jordan it will lay the basis for an eventual PLO takeover of all of Jordan reversing the events of 1970.

Do you feel that that point of view is solidly enough embedded in the Reagan plan and in the thinking behind it?

No, I believe it is not solidly enough embedded in the thinking of all of those who have to implement the plan. I suspect it is solidly in the mind of the Secretary of State, and of the President. I do not believe it is solidly embedded in

10

the minds of all of those who have to execute it. It seems
to me contrary to the mindset of our European allies. A
strategic decision to be made is whether the Reagan plan
emphasizes the real pre-eminence of Jordan in the
negotiations or whether it is used as an excuse to resurrect
the PLO after its military defeat. If we are not clear about
this, we will not be clear about whatever else to do. And
sooner or later we will suffer a shipwreck. Especially our
European allies must understand that for them to build up
the PLO while we emphasize the role of Hussein is certain
to lead to paralysis or worse.

But is the PLO - its military option apparently destroyed,
and deserted as it was by its Arab friends when trying to
exercise it - really such a threat now?

That remains to be seen; the future evolution of the PLO is
indeed one of the key issues before us. I believe its military
option has been substantially destroyed. I would also think
that reasonable Palestinians, reflecting about their experience
of the past 10 or 15 years, should come to a Sadat-like insight
that they must co-exist with Israel in some form; they more
than any other people, despite -- and perhaps because of --
the common suffering Israel and the Palestinians have inflicted
on each other. If that happens, a new Palestinian leadership
may well emerge, perhaps even under the label of PLO. That

11

would not represent such a threat. The PLO in its present
composition and with its present program cannot make such
a claim; if it is now resurrected without fundamental
structural and philosophical changes, it may well remain an
essentially radical organization upsetting the equilibrium
on the West Bank and attacking the stability of moderate
governments in the area -- especially Jordan. I think it
should be given an opportunity to demonstrate a change of
approach. But this requires more than ambiguous phrases
implying recognition; it presupposes a true turn towards the
political option reflected in structure, program and
personalities.

Can Arafat, now that the PLO is dispersed and has its
military teeth drawn, carry the organization into association
with Jordan?

I do not know and perhaps he does not either. Moreover I
must call attention to my previous answer. Association of
the present PLO with Jordan is a threat to Jordan and not
a solution. The association to be sought must be between
Jordan and Palestinians genuinely dedicated to a peace process
and to stability in the area; this requires at a minimum
a programmatic and structural change in the PLO.

12

What specific measures should be negotiated on the West Bank for Israel's security?

As President Reagan pointed out, the so-called narrow neck of Israel with a width of perhaps nine miles between Haifa and Tel Aviv can not be considered a secure frontier whatever the degree of Arab recognition of Israel. Fortunately the areas essential for Israel's security on the West Bank are largely unpopulated. Thus it should be possible to return control over their future to the overwhelming majority of Arabs living on the West Bank and Gaza. The precise location of these security frontiers will have to be settled by negotiation.

Is recognition of Israel a sine qua non of negotiation or is it in fact the end result?

In negotiations between Israel and Arabs the question of recognition is playing a disproportionate and unprecedented role. In all other negotiations mutual recognition is assumed at the outset. I know no other negotiation in which a country is asked to accept its own recognition as the principal quid pro quo. The Israelis sometimes give the impression that their sole objective is recognition, and some Arabs perhaps sensing the opportunity imply that they can get their maximum program in return for nothing more than simple recognition.

So I would be much more interested in how the PLO in fact conducts itself towards the peace process than in arcane

13

formulae of recognition. However, the issue of recognition
has become so symbolic that it cannot be avoided. Recognition
of Israel is the beginning of a process, not the end; it does
not meet--by itself--the needs of the situation. It is not,
when all is said, much of a concession for the PLO to make.
Many states that recognized each other nevertheless wound
up destroying each other.

It comes down to some extent to Israel's sense of being
threatened. You have said that Israel's claim to be threatened
has either been eliminated or strongly mitigated after the
Lebanon military conflict. Does Israel really have as
many reasons as it claims it has to go on being fearful?

In the immediate future, say over a five-year period, it probably
has less reason to be militarily fearful than at any period
in its history. However, over a historic period a nation
of 3 million, in whatever borders can be conceived, surrounded
by 100 million people that will never be fully reconciled
to (even once they have accepted) its existence, has reason
to be uneasy. After all, India has accepted Pakistan as a
state and yet one would not describe the relations between
those two countries as one of great confidence; Pakistan's
feeling of being threatened has, rightly or wrongly, never
abated. It has remained a root fact of Pakistani politics
and diplomacy and I suspect it will be a root fact of Israeli

14

Secondly, the rate at which arms now pour into the area will sooner or later erode Israel's present qualitative superiority. Finally Israel must feel, perhaps only subconsciously, that it is extremely dangerous and precarious to be totally dependent on any distant superpower. It is after all the essence of a superpower that its perceptions of the dangers may not be calculated by yardsticks relevant to a small country. The Israelis may feel, better than they dare articulate, that, for a country with a narrow margin of survival, and a people with a history of catastrophe, the line between arrogance and hysteria, between overweening behavior and panic, is in fact very narrow. If they are pressed too close to that line there could be a political and psychological collapse. (This fear is at the same time the secret dream of some of Israel's adversaries.)

> You drew attention to that thin dividing line when writing about your own negotiations with Israel. Are we not in danger of elevating that concept in Israel, whereas what we ought to be trying to do is diminish it, and to elevate in its place a combination of more realism and more self-confidence, which would allow Israel both to negotiate and to exist?

Well, at this point I don't think Israeli self-confidence needs any particular encouragement. I'm talking about a

15

historical process. Yes, Israel must negotiate and we must
encourage Israel to negotiate. I think, paradoxically, Israel
is more likely to do so if it feels compassion on our side,
maybe even affection, rather than unremitting pressure. Where
we disagree with Israel on substantive points we must be prepared
to express this--strongly if necessary. But it is a very
difficult maneuver to bring off -- to press Israel on individual
points, as we must do with perseverance, and yet not cumulatively
to harass it into emotional and psychic collapse.

This is also important in terms of our negotiating position
with the Arabs. If the Arab nations understand that they
can obtain our support by moderate positions on individual
issues, then they have an incentive to be reasonable and
conciliatory. If they feel that across the board opposition
to Israel is built into us, so to speak, then their temptation
to stick to their maximum program is very great. In other
words I feel that pressure on Israel should be exerted retail
rather than wholesale, if one can put it in such crude terms.

You say the Arabs can "obtain our support". Yet American
support for Israel during the past 18 months has often
been flouted, to the point that the Arabs must wonder what
it is worth. Can America afford to see its wishes ignored
so openly by a small, determined ally? And what, if it
cannot, should it do about it?

16

The Israeli outrage at the unilateral procedures preceding the Reagan plan would have had more moral force had not Israel proceeded unilaterally on a whole series of actions and had it not made challenging our views openly almost a principle of policy. America, must as I have said, treat Israel compassionately and seriously. It must do its serious best to achieve prior agreement before taking initiatives affecting Israel's future. We cannot in the end abdicate the definition of our national interests to a small friendly country, however close. Responsible Israeli leaders will know that continual open challenges to our government, especially the President, risk the public support for the sustained assistance on which their policy ultimately depends. A warmhearted, consistent but determined American policy must wind up with obtaining Israel support.

> It has been an American position and, indeed, almost a universal position since 1967 that the West Bank cannot and should not be annexed by Israel - yet, expressed in terms of concrete, it is being annexed or already has been. Is it now any longer conceivable to talk in terms of negotiation over the West Bank?

It is not only conceivable; it is imperative. Annexation of the West Bank will sow the seeds of endless crises, one of which will inevitably erupt into conflagration. It is

17

not even in the interest of Israel however narrowly conceived.
The incorporation of Gaza and the West Bank into Israel will
sooner or later produce an Arab majority that will destroy
the moral essence of the Jewish state. And if Israel seeks
to escape this dilemma by expelling all the Arabs it will
lose the moral support of even its best friends. Over an
historic period Israel would not be able to withstand the
crisis that would result.

Begin has called the idea of an association between Jordan
and the West Bank "grotesque". Should he be required, or
asked, in a negotiation to change his mind - and what form
of pressure can be brought by the United States to help
persuade him to change his mind?

Begin and the Israeli government ought to be asked to change
their mind on this issue in a manner compatible with Israeli
self-respect but with firm perseverance. The best pressure
that America can bring is to come forward with a reasonable
definition of what it has in mind both with respect to security
and to political evolution. As we do so, many Israeli fears
will be reduced and responsible opinion in Israel will shift
towards such a program. We need a serious discussion with
the Israelis on what we understand to be the security frontiers
on the West Bank and what territories we expect would have
to be returned. There used to be talk about a strategic

18

consensus as the basis for our policy in the Middle East.
We do not require it--or are able to obtain it--on military
matters. It is imperative with respect to diplomacy.

Second, we need as well a serious dialogue with
especially the moderate Arabs. Moderate Arabs must know that
their views will be respectfully heard in America; they must
not be encouraged to believe that their sole contribution
to the negotiations is the willingness to accept Israel.
They must avoid the temptation of building an Arab consensus
on the prospect of a gradual demoralization of Israel by American
pressure. They as well as Israel should work with us on the
definitions of peace and security that are central to the
peace process.

Should America be proposing these definitions?

As a last resort, yes.

Prior agreement with Israel rather than prior agreement
with Hussein?

Hussein will have to be part of the process. Hussein has
to know what we are discussing with Israel and has to be given
an opportunity to express his views. In a serious, sustained
exploration I do not believe that any Israeli government could
sustain an opposition in principle to the return of the
overwhelming majority of the Arab populations to some form
of genuine Arab control.

19

Do you feel able to define, in any negotiating terms, what
those genuine forms of Arab control would be? And what
the relationship, for example, between Jordan and a West
Bank entity of some kind would be?

The Arab population on the West Bank and Gaza must be given
a serious opportunity to express their preferences, which
means free of Israeli pressure as well as of PLO intimidation.
The first phase should be Jordanian control of the West Bank
minus agreed Israeli security zones. Under Jordanian aegis
a process to elicit the genuine preferences of the Palestinians
should then be started in a demilitarized West Bank. This
can take many forms, some as yet unforeseeable, but maintaining
an association with Jordan is central. I do not believe
that it is in the interests of the majority of Arab states
to create a Libyan or a South Yemenite type of regime on the
West Bank.

Unlikely unless outside pressures can be exercised in the
form of terrorism. As the Palestinians develop an organization
that is genuinely geared to a political rather than to a
military contest--or adapt existing organizations to that
process--we should be open-minded with respect to their ultimate
role. It would be more appropriately negotiated between the
Palestinians and Jordan than by us.

20

We've talked about the first, Israeli, dimension of the
dangers inherent in any form of pressure put on

Israel in Israel.....

[Andrew: This is one of the rare cases where the answer is clearer than the question. Can you rephrase the question?]

It is the nature of Israeli politics that Israeli politicians probably can make some concessions only when it is absolutely clear that the United States cannot be persuaded to an alternative; therefore it is imperative for the United States to be prepared to state its own view and to persevere in the face of opposition.

And that raises the second question about pressure on Israel:
how manageable is that in terms of American politics? I
recall the time of President Ford's reassessment, for example.

Circumstances have changed enormously. I would think,
in terms of current American politics, the greater probability
is that leadership and public opinion will turn so
emphatically against Israel that reasonable Israeli
positions will not longer be entertained and the long-term
psychological threat to Israel will not be correctly
evaluated. I think it is much easier for an American
government to state its own position on individual issues
than it was in 1975.

21

Is there a similar danger - I think of Sadat's last
years - of destabilising Arab regimes that we would
prefer not to destabilize, by having them associate
closely with compromises which are difficult for
them to make and which associate them with the
current state of affairs in Israel? I think, of course,
obviously of Jordan, but also of Saudi Arabia.

I think that in the destabilization of Sadat, such as
it was, the Camp David process played a relatively
small role. I think the major growth was the growth
of fundamentalism in the Arab world. And also the
beginning of a feeling that perhaps we were shifting
from Egypt to other states that had dissociated from
the peace process: the question that arose in some
Egyptian minds was whether it had all been worth it since
it seemed possible to gain all the benefits of American
friendship without having gone to Camp David.

22

A successful peace process must be seen to at least reflect the preferences of/moderate Arab states and must move fairly rapidly. The first condition is another reason only Arab states undermine themselves if they put on us the entire responsibility for the success of the peace process. In so far as the autonomy negotiations hurt Sadat, their length and inconclusiveness was more important than their content. If the autonomy negotiations had led to a fairly rapid result...

Somewhere, so to speak.

Somewhere, even on terms that were questioned. So long as Sadat could have said that his method brought about some improvement in the situation where nobody else had produced anything, I think he could have enhanced his domestic position through the autonomy negotiations. Therefore the negotiations that are now, one hopes, about to start must be concluded in a reasonably brief

23

period of time, say 12 months to 18 months. If they
grow very prolonged, a moderate position will be
cumulatively difficult to sustain and the domestic
position of the participating governments will erode.
Reagan's initiative must yield some tangible results
while the impact of the PLO's lost military option is
still fresh in everybody's mind.

It was interesting to see Syria's foreign minister
in Washington visiting President Reagan with moderate
Arabs. Do you think that Syria is going to play the
same blocking role that it has appeared to play on
previous occasions?

I am struck by the presence of the Syrian foreign
minister and also by the interview given by the
information minister, Iskander, last month. Both
of these events indicate a desire by Syria not to be
left out of the negotiating process. If Syria plays
a blocking role it will be to achieve pre-eminence
over the Palestinians rather than because of its
objection to the concept of the settlement.

Syria usually wants a price, doesn't it, for
participation, both from the Suadis in financial
terms but also from others in political terms.
Do you see the same pattern repeating itself?

24

Yes, but also Syria is now in a very difficult position
because its military vulnerability has been clearly
demonstrated and it cannot believe that it has a serious
military option by itself against Israel.

Is it conceivable to see Syria in any negotiation
which still leaves the Golan Heights not its own?
Strategically, if I was the Israelis, I would want
the Golan Heights long before I would want Nablus.
First of all, the negotiation that I envisage even on
not the West Bank can/result in a peace treaty. It can
at best lead to an interim agreement of a long
duration -- say ten to fifteen years. Similarly I have
always believed that it is possible to make another
step on the Golan Heights in return for something
like non-belligerency that would enable Syria to
maintain its principles and still participate in the
process.

And Israel its security?

25

implication suggest that you feel that it's
a non-starter that it become internationalised in
some way that allows all sides their access and pride
in it.

Israel will rather go to war than abandon a united
Jerusalem as its capital. I think that as part of
an interim agreement something like the Vaticanisation
of the holy places is conceivable and would be a wise
Israeli move. Again, I have no illusions about the
difficulty of achieving even this much; more is
unattainable in the present phase of negotiations.
Any attempt to go beyond that would be to invite the
collapse of negotiations and the building of an
Israeli consensus that would make Israelis prefer
isolation, even war, to any peace process.

In any event, I do not believe the coming negotiations
can yield a peace agreement but only a long interim
agreement - 10 or 15 years. Israel would agree to new
lines on the West Bank in return for non-belligerency
and precisely defined steps of normalization with at least
the moderate Arab states.

A step, in other words.

Yes, But 10 to 15 years is a very long time in the Middle
East. Many other things are going to happen in that

26

Is it a footnote to ask you, or do you think it
should be an essential part of American strategy,
to conceive that, were there a favourable outcome to
the kind of problems we've been discussing, greater
avenues of co-operation would open up with Arab states
in dealing with the threats in the Gulf?

The moderate Arab states of the Gulf must be looking
now for opportunities for greater co-operation
with the United States. Their self-interest is so
intimately tied with American protection of both their
internal structure and their borders against the danger
developing from radicalism: either in the fundamentalist
Iranian indigenous form or (which is not at all incon-
ceivable to me) in the form of some domination of Iran
by the Soviet Union if the Tudeh or some similar group
were to succeed Khomeini. And they face a threat too
from secular radical Arabs like South Yemen or Iraq.

I would look at the West Bank/Gaza negotiations not as
producing a change of mind - I think the change of mind
about the desirability of American co-operation has already
occurred - but as making it domestically feasible for
the Arabs of the Gulf to implement what they know to
be necessary.

[LC]

27

"Domestically feasible for them to do what is necessary.":
*how close an American embrace does that mean? American bases, or...?*

The countries in the Gulf have to understand that we are prepared to protect both their domestic structure and their frontiers; and they need to be given confidence in the means which we will use. It would be extraordinarily desirable if we could repress our tendency towards publicity, and if our military could restrain their tendencies towards establishing a visible presence.

*How do you not publicise a military base, for example?*

By not establishing it. I think what we need is installations into which we could rapidly move a physical presence near the Gulf that is plausible; and a demonstration of how we could move rapidly into installations that could be prepared to handle what we send. And we must generate a plausible capability for rapid support against internal upheaval. The embrace must be real and serious but as subtle and non-public as possible.

*I much agree with you. You don't see the negotiation on the West Bank as a precondition for that?*

[y]

Andrew: You are free in your wish to place the questions more neutrally. In this form it may encourage Saudi negative reactions to this part of the interview.

I would place the Q & A on page 23 as the first full question.

Q. There have been reports that American officials are disappointed in the Saudi support of the Reagan plan.

What is your view?

A: It has been a consistent error of some of our policymakers to expect Saudi Arabia to deliver an Arab consensus. Saudi Arabia is in no position to do so; it is wise not to let itself be tempted into the complex details of the West Bank negotiations. Were we to prevail we would weaken the Kingdom without furthering the negotiation process. Saudi Arabia faces simultaneously the uncertainties of rapid modernization and the challenges of Islamic fundamentalism. It has a [western] radical neighbor to the [east] in South Yemen; a perhaps reformed but always potentially radical neighbor in Iraq to the north. Across the Gulf it sees traditional Iranian [nationalism] allied to religious fanaticism; across the Red Sea there is a Soviet base in Ethiopia. In this situation the Kingdom would be tempting fate if it involved itself in all the passions of the Palestinian conflict; it surely needs no additional enemies.

[Q] Nevertheless, we must keep Saudi leaders informed of our plans and take their views seriously. [We will benefit from this dialogue in direct proportion to the discretion with which it is conducted.] We may find Saudi

SHORTEN

[y]

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**Do you see still, after recent events, an opportunity
for progress in the Middle East?**

**Is the Reagan plan one component in that?**

Let me define what I consider to be the essential
elements of the Reagan plan.
(1) That there should be an associated West Bank state, not be a West Bank state but that it israelinegotiating partner should be Jordan and not the PLO.

(2) That annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel cannot be accepted by the United States or by anybody else.
(3) That the negotiation must deal with the question of security as well as recognition.

I think this provides a useful framework for
negotiation. There are other aspects in the plan that
I think are not as essential.

**Now, suddenly, one is able to talk in these terms
whereas, say, a year ago it was difficult to see one's
way ahead. Were the military events in the Lebanon
a useful beginning of this process?**

I think they were an indispensable beginning - painful
as this may be to some of the countries in the Middle

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[2]

It would have been unthinkable a few months ago that an Israeli prime minister would say before parliament that for the first time in Israel's history all frontiers are secure.

For all of these reasons I think that conditions have never been better for negotiations provided the Reagan plan is considered a framework and not a blueprint every last provision of which needs to be implemented as part of an agreement.

Jordan as a negotiating partner; a significant role, a political role, for the Palestinians, within the framework of association with Jordan; the recognition of Israeli security concerns on the West Bank; and the clear statement by the United States, which will remove any illusions that may have existed in Jerusalem, that annexation is not an option it will support.

I have the impression that in some parts of the Reagan plan some of the liturgical language of the debates

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This is the case [simply]
It is not now: I am just warning against turning
- [illegible]
what was an important first step into a permanent
feature of our diplomacy.

I think that the crisis in American-Israeli relations
that resulted from the Reagan speech ...

Well, this one is unusual in the sense that, for
the first time, a ~~complete~~ plan was put forward
without consultation with the Israelis, and for the
~~Presidential~~ first time an ~~American~~ proposal was ~~totally~~ rejected.
We've had tactical disagreements within an agreed
strategy before, but this time there was a boil that
needed lancing because the Israeli definition of
the US or the Arabs
autonomy and the definition that others could give to
~~treaties~~ had been
taken from the beginning.
autonomy were always at fundamental variance from the original.

The Israeli proposal for autonomy foresaw a self-
governing authority arising out of some process of
election. ~~Because the arrière pensée of at least the
key members of the Israeli government was, as is now

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apparent, that they could not give up any control
my part of Palestine
over the West Bank, the implication was that autonomy

was
would apply to the whole territory within the 1967
make it a predominantly
borders. Hence the Begin government, against its
 preferences, was really creating what to anybody
except itself would be the origins of a Palestinian
state within the 1967 border. It had always seemed
and a confounded lie
clear to me that once there was an elected self-
governing authority on the West Bank, it and the
territory over which its authority was supposed to
run would become the nucleus of something like a
Palestinian state. It would be so treated by almost
all of the countries of the world except Israel.

Well, it led to an inherent misunderstanding between
the United States and Israel, not to speak of between
the Arabs and Israel. The only way the Israeli
could avoid the implications of their own proposal
was to come up with an exegesis that was almost
incomprehensible to the non-Israeli mind. They had
to make a distinction between autonomy of persons and
autonomy of land. They had to deprive the word autonomy
of any meaning that a dictionary would assign to it,
and this led not only to a deadlock in the negotiations

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introducing the

negotiating partner

PLO in its present form and with its present concepts, would thereby be introduced on the West Bank and Jordan (becomes not a principal but a front for the domination of the West Bank). The legitimisation for a PLO presence on the West Bank, etc.

The creating of another radical state with independent aims would be violently against the stability of the Middle East, and it has the dual danger that not only will it involve additional problems for the PLO, but it will lay the basis for an eventual PLO takeover of all of Jordan because it will make the PLO part of Jordan and create the framework within which it can attempt to reverse the events of 1970.

No, I believe it is not solidly enough embedded in the thinking of all of those who have to implement the plan. I suspect it is solidly in the mind of the secretary of state.

And of the president.

And of the president. I do not believe it is solidly embedded in the minds of all of those who have to execute it no more in the minds of our European allies, not to speak of some of the Arab countries. The

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[4]

The question of recognition is playing a role. In negotiations between Israel and the Arabs that is disproportionate and unprecedented.

In all other countries, when they negotiate with each other, begin with mutual recognition.

I know

accept any own as the principal goal of geo-political

The Israelis sometimes want the objective is

pay any price for recognition. The principal objective is

to give the impression that they will pay almost anything

someone else for recognition, and the Arabs will say

that they will get something for recognition, and the Arabs will say

they will get something for recognition, that they can get their maximum programme in return for simple recognition.

the peace process conducts itself towards the negotiations that are

fact conducts itself towards the negotiations that are

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Well, at this point I don't think Israeli self-confidence needs any particular encouragement. I'm talking about a historical process. Yes, Israel must negotiate and we must encourage Israel to negotiate.
I think, paradoxically, Israel is more likely to do so develop that confidence if it feels compassion on our side, maybe even affection, rather than unremitting pressure. Where we disagree with Israel on substantive points we must be prepared to express this simply an anniversary. But it is a very difficult manoeuvre to bring off - to press Israel on individual points, as we must do with perseverance, and yet not cumulatively to harass it into emotional and psychic collapse.

This is also important in terms of our negotiating position with the Arabs. If the Arab nations feel that they can win our support by moderate positions on individual issues, then they have an incentive to be reasonable and cumulative. If they feel that opposition to the general Israeli position is built into us, then their temptation is to stick to their maximum programme is very great. In other words I feel that pressure on Israel should be exerted retail rather than wholesale, if one can put it in such crude terms.

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[43]

They as well as Israel should work with us on these definitions of security that are central to the peace process. I think if we could come forward with definitions. Hussein as a plausible negotiator with an American definition of security that reasonable people...

America should make a strenuous effort to agree with Israel on these definitions. Only if all this can be achieved can we have a chance of success. As a first step, yes

Hussein will have to be part of this. Hussein has to know what we are discussing with Israel and has to be given an opportunity to express his views. In a series of related explanations, if we could have an informal discussion of the parameters of the negotiation, not of the final negotiation, I do not believe that Begin under those circumstances, or any Israeli government, could sustain an opposition in principle to the return of the overwhelming majority of the Arab populations to some form of genuine Arab control.

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No, I made a speech nine months ago, well
the Lebanese crisis, a group of Jewish leaders
in which I said to them that in my view American leader-
ship opinion was moving decisively against the definitions
that were commonly advanced by Jerusalem, and that
the danger was that, unless some alternative were
devised, there would be an almost total acceptance
of a programme whose real significance would not be
understood simply because it was opposed by Jerusalem.

Is there a similar danger - I think of Sadat's last
years - of destabilising Arab regimes that we would
prefer not to destabilise, by having them associate
closely with compromises which are difficult for
them to make and which associate them with the
current state of affairs in Israel? I think, of course,
obviously of Jordan, but also of Saudi Arabia.

I think that in the destabilisation, such as it was,
of Sadat the autonomy negotiations sponsored by Camp
David, played a role but a relatively small role. I
think the major growth was the growth of fundamentalism
in the Arab world.

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No, it was true of Saudi Arabia and it was not true
of Jordan only because Jordan was not convinced enough
that we could deliver. Just as we have to pay attention
~~to~~ at the intangibles of the Israeli situation, we have
to look ~~at the intangibles of the Arab situation and~~
not push them beyond the point that in everybody's
best judgment is domestically tolerable. In so far as
the autonomy negotiations hurt Sadat, their length and
inconclusiveness was more important than their content.
If the autonomy negotiations had led to a fairly
rapid result ...

Somewhere, so to speak

Somewhere, even on terms that were questioned. So
long as Sadat could have said that his method produced
some improvement in the situation where nobody else
had produced anything, I think he could have maintained
~~enlarged~~ his domestic position vis-à-vis the West Bank. Therefore these negotiations that are now, one hopes, about to start must be concluded in a reasonably brief period of time, say 12 months to 18 months. If they get very prolonged, then a moderate position will be

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cumulatively difficult to bear. It must be brought
to a conclusion while the impact of the PLO's lost
military option is still fresh in everybody's mind.

Under those conditions, I think it can be carried out.

I am struck by the presence of the Syrian foreign
minister and also by the interview given by the
information minister, Iskander, last month (sic:
Henry this will have a November dateline). Both
of which seem to me to indicate a desire by Syria
not to be left out of the negotiating process. If
Syria plays a blocking role it will be for reasons of
its attempt at pre-eminence within the Palestinian
world, rather than because of its objection to the
concept of the settlement.