January 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM

Conversation with Couve de Murville in Paris, January 12, 1963

by Henry A. Kissinger

The meeting was arranged by M. Lucet at the request of
Couve de Murville.

Even though Couve de Murville had requested that I come
to see him, he opened the conversation by asking whether I
had anything particular I wanted to discuss. I said that he
had asked me to come to see him and I would be glad to dis-
cuss anything of interest to him. He then asked me what I
thought of the current state of Franco-American relations.
I said that I had had the impression in Washington that from
our side, we would make a most serious effort to enter into
a serious dialogue with France. I had been struck by the
sincerity of all those dealing with NATO matters in putting our
relations with France on a new footing.

Couve remained very aloof. He said that of course
France had not asked for a dialogue. It could only "observe
with melancholy" the fate of Great Britain. Moreover, why

with melancholy," the late of Great Britain. Moreover, why
France had not asked for a dialogue. It could only "operve
Conve remained very aloof. He said that of course
rierations with France on a new footing.

sincerity of all those dealing with NATO matters in putting our
a serious dialogue with France. I had been struck by the
our side, we would make a most serious effort to enter into
I said that I had had the impression in Washington that from
thought of the current state of Franco-American relations.
cuse anything of interest to him. He then asked me what I
had asked me to come to see him and I would be glad to dia-
phad anything particular I wanted to discuss. I said that he
to see him, he opened the conversation by asking whether I
Even though Conve de Muraille had repurposed that I come
Conve de Muraille.

by Henry V. Klausinger

Conversation with Conve de Muraille in Paris, January 15, 1963

MEMORANDUM

January 31, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Couve de Murville -2- January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

was the United States so insecure? Why was it so afraid to
stand alone? Why all this talk of integration, multilateralism
and so forth? France in any event was determined to insure
her own security by her own means. Our constant insistence
on the small size of the French nuclear force was irritating.
France knew the small size of its nuclear force-to-be better
than we. But it was a curious doctrine that a nation was
not entitled to have small forces. Why did we not propose to
abolish the French Navy? I said there was a difference in
global impact between the use of nuclear and of conventional
weapons. Couve said this was precisely why France considered
nuclear weapons essential.

I asked Couve about the Nassau agreement and the approach
that had been made by Ambassador Bohlen. Couve said he did
not quite see what the new approach was. Ball's speech had
been the same old record about multilateralism. As far as
Couve could see, France was again being asked to sign on the
dotted line of a program prepared without its participation.
At the same time that the United States made its vague offer
of Polaris submarines to France, it was organizing the other

of Polaris submarines to France, it was organizing the other
At the same time that the United States made its vague offer
dotted line of a program prepared without its participation.
Conve could see, France was again being asked to sign on the
been the same old record about multilaterality. As far as
not quite see what the new approach was. Bell's speech had
that had been made by Ambassador Bohlen. Conve said he did
I asked Conve about the Maasen agreement and the approach
nuclear weapons essential.

Weapons. Conve said this was precisely why France considered
global impact between the use of nuclear and of conventional
applies the French Navy? I said there was a difference in
not entitled to have small forces. Why did we not broach to
than me. But it was a curious doctrine that a nation was
France knew the small size of its nuclear force-to-be better
on the small size of the French nuclear force was irritating.
per own security by per own means. Our constant inattention
and so forth? France in any event was determined to insure
stand alone? Why all this talk of integration, multilaterality
was the United States so insecure? Why was it so afraid to

January 13, 1963

Conversation with Conve de Muraille -5- January 31, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Couve de Murville -3- January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

European countries into a multilateral force, thus seemingly
encircling France. Moreover, did we really think anybody in
Europe wanted such a force? The fact was that we would wind
up having to pay Italy and Belgium for their participation
directly or indirectly.

It was odd that we always accused France of acting in-
dependently. It was Britain who constantly rejected cooperative
action; Britain who constantly insisted on playing a lone hand.
Germany had been extremely upset by the Nassau agreement. It
had asked France to accept nothing without prior consultation.

This led to a long disquisition on Britain's anti-European
bias very similar to that of M. Jurgensen's on January 10.
If Britain failed to join Europe it was not that Europe re-
jected Britain but that Britain had separated itself from
Europe.

I asked about the Polaris offer. Couve again was very
reserved. He did not see the utility of discussing in great
detail the use and acquisition of missiles which would not
be available for four to five years. Moreover, France had
neither warheads nor submarines. And it could not afford

neither warheads nor submarines. And it could not afford
be available for four to five years. Moreover, France had
detail the use and acquisition of missiles which would not
reserved. He did not see the utility of discussing it in great
I asked about the Polaris offer. Conve again was very
Europe.

jected Britain put that Britain had separated itself from
It Britain failed to join Europe it was not that Europe re-
pise very similar to that of M. Jurgensen's on January 10.

This led to a long disputation on Britain's anti-European
had asked France to accept nothing without prior consultation.
Germany had been extremely obtuse by the Masson agreement. It
action; Britain who constantly instated on playing a lone hand.
dependently. It was Britain who constantly rejected cooperative
It was odd that we always accused France of acting in-
directly or indirectly.

nd paving to bad Italy and Belgium for their participation
Europe wanted such a force? The fact was that we would wind
encroaching France. Moreover, did we really think anybody in
European countries into a multilateral force, thus seemingly

January 15, 1943
Conversation with Conve de Muraville -3-
January 31, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Couve de Murville -4- January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

both its own program and a Polaris program. Then there was
the problem of communication; he had the impression that the
United States would still control the Polaris force by con-
trolling a worldwide communications network. I said that it
seemed to me that these technical concerns were proper sub-
jects for conversations between our two governments. I had
the impression that we would be extremely ready to discuss
ways of meeting these problems.

Couve replied that he was not yet convinced France
really wanted a Polaris force. At the moment the most posi-
tive aspect of our offer was its implication that we recognized
France's right to continue testing. Since France did not
possess nuclear warheads for the Polaris we must obviously be
prepared to let her test to develop them.

I said that France was obviously free to choose any
weapon that seemed to be appropriate. Yet independence
surely could not be pushed to the point that any conclusion
reached by an ally was for that reason wrong. Couve smiled
and said the point he was trying to make was that without
granting France's right to independence no real dialogue
was possible. I said that my impression was that Nassau
could mark just such a recognition. Couve said that he did

["could mark just such a recognition. Conne said that he did\nnot see any reason why France should not be recognized\nas a nation. Conne said that he did not see any reason\nwhy France should not be recognized as a nation.\nI said that France was obviously free to choose any\nhostile point of view, but I said that France should not\nbe allowed to choose any point of view.", "bassous nuclear warheads for the Polaris we must opaquely be\nFrance's right to continue testing. Since France did not\ntake any part in the decision, I said that it was illogical\nthat we should not have any right to decide.", "Conne replied that he was not yet convinced France\nwould be able to prevent the核武 program.\n\nConne replied that he was not yet convinced France\nwould be able to prevent the spread of nuclear\nwarheads for the Polaris we must opaquely be\nFrance's right to continue testing. Since France did not\ntake any part in the decision, I said that it was illogical\nthat we should not have any right to decide\nthe impression that we would be extremely ready to discuss\nthe problem of communication. I said that it\nwould be extremely difficult to discuss\nthe problem of communication; he said the impression that the\nUnited States would still control the Polaris force by con-\npanying the nuclear forces of the other powers. Then there was\nthe problem of communication; he said the impression that the\nUnited States would still control the Pol

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Couve de Murville -5- January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

not know just what kind of multilateralism we were proposing.
Who would command the NATO force? How could France withdraw
its forces in case of emergency? Had we considered that
withdrawing forces in an emergency might advertise a split
in the Alliance at a most unfortunate moment? It would
merely exacerbate inter-Allied differences. Moreover, the
multilateral force proposed by Secretary Ball seemed to
differ from that of the Bohlen conversation with De Gaulle.

I asked whether Couve was saying that joint planning and
targeting were never possible in an Alliance. Couve said
coordination was possible; joint planning was acceptable.
But integration or multilateralism as we were pushing it was
unacceptable. I said that the dispute seemed to me almost
theological. Perhaps both sides should avoid abstract phrases
and concentrate on concrete problems. Couve said he agreed.

I told Couve that I was not clear about the current French
attitude with respect to consultations. Was France still
interested in the idea of permanent inter-Allied consulta-
tions advanced first by General De Gaulle in September, 1958?
Couve said many things had changed since then, but in principle
France was always ready for discussion.

Conve said many things had changed since then, but in principle
tions advanced first by General De Gaulle in September, 1958?
interested in the idea of permanent inter-Vilified consulta-
tion with respect to consultations. Was France still
attitude with respect to consultations. Was France still

I told Conve that I was not clear about the current French
and concentrate on concrete problems. Conve said he agreed.
theological. Perhaps both sides should avoid abstract phrases
unacceptable. I said that the dispute seemed to me almost
But integration or multilaterallism as we were pushing it was
coordination was possible; joint planning was acceptable.
targeting were never feasible in an Alliance. Conve said

I asked whether Conve was saying that joint planning and
ditter from that of the Bohlen conversation with De Gaulle.
multilaterral force proposed by Secretary Ball seemed to
merely exacerbate inter-Vilified differences. Moreover, the
in the Alliance at a most unfortunate moment? It would
withdrawing forces in an emergency might advertise a split
its forces in case of emergency? Had we considered that
Who would command the NATO force? How could France withdraw
not know just what kind of multilaterallism we were brooding.

January 15, 1963

Conversation with Conve de Murville -2- January 31, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[x]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with Couve de Murville -6- January 21, 1963

January 12, 1963

I asked Couve about Germany. Couve said that was a vexing problem. Of course, Germany was prohibited from building its own nuclear weapons. The best chance for dealing with Germany was to spur political unity in Europe.

was to abate political unity in Europe.

own nuclear weapons. The best chance for dealing with Germany
problem. Of course, Germany was prohibited from building its

I asked Conve apout Germany. Conve said that was a vexing

January 13, 1963

Conversation with Conve de Muxaiffe -6- January 31, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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