the two sides begin to speak each other.

point in hundreds of weapons and in the means of delivery the capabilities of
systems have been a decided advantage in an all-out war. (4) the period when
these put our authority in the hands and the attractive advantage of our peace
the period when the combat of Union began to develop a substantial delivery
ended put when we still possessed a monopoly of the means of delivery. (3)

of the means of delivery. (5) the period when our monopoly of weapons was
began when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and the monopoly

technically which has caused strategy to pass through four phases: (1) the
beginning of the war, (2) it led to fake into consideration the operating
but however effective this conception may have been at the
protection.

short of complete optimization of the opponent seemed to offer an opportunity
to demand for an increase in their numbers. Of this calculation nothing
every increase in the definitive power of weapons seemed also to offer for
deterrance came very rapidly to be established with maximum definitiveness.

easy to determine how highly the aggressor might value and fix the objective,
aggression out of protection so the objective might be never

III - 2

[1]

III - 6

During phases one and two of the deterrent equation - during the period, that is, of our atomic preponderance - our retaliatory force could be conceived of as a deterrent to any aggression we chose to resist. It was a positive deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make our response dependent on the magnitude of the threat. Rather our primary problem was to decide that some response was called for. Massive retaliation could be effective because our invulnerability caused our willingness to react to appear to be high; our threat of all-out war was therefore credible.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear and missile capability, the threshold of provocation which would unleash the United States and British retaliatory force has constantly been rising -- or so an aggressor might calculate at least. In these circumstances, the threat of all-out war will deter an ever smaller range of possible challenges. Its credibility will constantly decline, and it will so increase the inhibitions of the side relying on it that it will only encourage appeasement as the alternative.

The challenge over Berlin was made possible because the Soviet advances in missiles have neutralized at least to a degree our strategic striking power and the vast Soviet ground strength has thus been freed for pressure

[Y] III - 8

and industrial potential far exceed those of the Soviet Union, should not be able to make a much more substantial effort to improve the capability for local defense.

It is argued by many that since Europe is no longer necessary to the United States as a base in an all-out war, the need for a substantial military establishment on the Continent has disappeared. But it is surely inconsistent to argue that the United States should be prepared to run greater risks than ever for an area which has become strategically less important. It is precisely the dispensability of Europe in an all-out war that creates the need for a greater effort of local defense. It is essential to deprive the Soviet Union of the belief that the change in Europe's strategic importance will make us less ready to come to its defense.

Nor is it necessary to decide in the abstract the line of demarcation between limited war and all-out war in Europe. All NATO governments must have a common interest in seeking to avoid the outbreak of an all-out war. But they must have an equal interest in preventing a situation in which such a war can be avoided only by surrender. And they must not create temptations for Soviet pressure either through weakness or

9. See Speech by Ambassador Quaroni.

3. See Secretary of State, Budget. (1948).

What not create situations for Soviet pressure either through weakness or
situation in which such a war can be avoided only by surrender. And then
of an off-out war. But they must have an enough interest in preventing a
government must have a common interest in asking to avoid the outbreak
democratisation between limited war and off-out war in Europe. Effort
is it it necessarily to decide in the abstract the line of
independence will make us lose ready to come to its defence.

the Soviet Union of the period that the enemy in Europe's aggressive
due for a greater effort of local defence. If it is essential to debit
the need for a greater effort of local defence. It is essential to debit
If it precisely the diabaseability of Europe in an off-out war first arises
make them ever for an area which may become effectively less inhortant.
inconvenient to us since that the United States should be bristled to run faster
warsily adaptedment on the continent has dragooned. But it is enough
the United States as a place in an off-out war, the need for a substantial
It is argued by many that since Europe is no longer necessary to
local defence.

be able to make a much more superannuous effort to improve the capability for
and industrialist Scientist to exceed those of the Soviet Union should not

III - 9

III - 9

[N]

irresolution. The stronger the military establishment on the Continent, the larger must be the Soviet attack designed to overcome it. The more the required effort approaches the scale of all-out war, the clearer the challenge to our security and the more plausible our over-all deterrent.

The stronger the local forces of NATO, the less likely it will be that the Soviet Union will be tempted to adventure. In short, as the horrors of all-out war multiply and cripple the will to resort to it, the minimum objective of the forces in Europe must be to raise the scale of the Soviet effort required to defeat them to a scale that can leave no doubt about their ultimate objective.

The Soviet concern with wrecking NATO makes sense after all only if directed against the capability for local defense. The Soviet Union must realize that a point will soon be reached where the United States does not require European bases in a show-down with the USSR. Elimination of NATO would thus not crucially affect the over-all deterrent equation. NATO does represent an obstacle to the Soviet domination of Eurasia by means which will not seem "worth" an all-out war.

10. For an excellent discussion of NATO strategy see Gordon, *Lincoln, Yale Review*.

## Yalta Reunion.

10. For an excellent discussion of NATO strategy see Gordon, *Lynedoch*.

Will not seem "worth" an eff-out war.

RePRESENT an op-ed to the Soviet domination of Europe if means which would time not correctly affect the overall deterrent education. NATO GOSS requires European presence in a show-down with the UERU. Elimination of NATO realize that a point will soon be reached where the United States does not it directed after that the capability for focal defense. The Soviet Union must The Soviet concern with wrecking NATO makes sense after all only objective.

Required to detect them to a scale that our leave no doubt about their fitness of the forces in Europe were to raise the scale of the Soviet effort one war unifly andcripple the will to resort to it, the optimum objective Soviet Union will be ambushed to assume. In sport, so the porrows of eff- The stronger the focal forces of NATO, the less likely it will be that the confidence to our security and the morehrable our overall deterrent the redried effort abhorrence the scale of eff-out war, the easier the further must be the Soviet attack declared to overcome it. The more interpretation. The stronger the slightly interpretation on the continent,

111 - 8

III - 10

The task before NATO then is to redress the military balance
on the Continent rather than perpetuate an inequality which is one of the
causes of the current Soviet challenge and which will represent a growing
invitation to further adventures as the Soviet retaliatory might grows.

The schemes that deal with the military aspects of European security proceed
from the erroneous promise that a danger which has arisen because of the
disproportion of power in Central Europe can be ameliorated by "freezing"
that relationship. It adds to the prevailing confusion by lending credence
28
to the Soviet argument that it is the extent of the Western defense effort
rather than its inadequacy which produces present tensions. A troop freeze
in Central Europe would not affect Soviet control of any of its territories
-- in fact the attraction of the scheme to the Soviet Union is precisely
that it confirms this domination. The liberalization of satellite regimes
promised for disengagement hardly applies to this situation.

The same inequality inheres in the proposal to create a denuclearized
zone in Central Europe. For better or worse the strategy of the NATO shield
forces has been geared to nuclear weapons. A denuclearized zone would
lead to the expulsion of American forces from Germany since nuclear weapons are

[x]

III - 11

an integral part of their arsenal, and since without nuclear weapons they
11
could offer no effective opposition to Soviet numerical preponderance.

It would therefore make NATO defenseless without any significant reduction
in the Soviet threat. And the Soviet Union will retain sufficient conventional
forces to suppress any domestic upheavals in the satellite orbit. It can
be maintained, of course, that since the West is not prepared to make the
sacrifices necessary to assure an improved local defense it might as well
obtain the political benefits of offering to perpetuate its weakness. But
such an admission of futility cannot be the last word of Western policy. A
more worthy response would be to attempt to develop a more rational strategy. 29

Would the withdrawal of foreign forces from Germany at least
represent a means to achieve unification? It is thought by some that since
the East-German regime is maintained by Soviet troops, a mutual withdrawal
would bring about the collapse or at least the liberalization of the East
German satellite. The establishment of a zone of controlled armaments,
followed by the withdrawal of American, British and Soviet forces, should
be accompanied by "some form of negotiation" between the Federal Republic

11. It is not necessary to argue here whether nuclear weapons are a substitute for numbers. They will at least add to deterrence by imposing on the Soviet Union an unfamiliar mode of warfare.

III - 12

and the East German satellite. This would, in some undefined manner, bring
the two regimes closer together and lead to reunification on the basis of
some kind of free elections at some unspecified future date.

It would seem incumbent on anyone advocating the withdrawal of
Western forces from Germany with such precision to give some indication of
the nature of the contact between the two parts of Germany and the manner in
which it is supposed to reduce the gap between the two systems. The East
German Communists have announced that they would not tolerate a change in
their system and have at their disposal the apparatus of a police state.
It is therefore not inconceivable that they might maintain themselves and
use the quest for unification to separate Germany not only from NATO but
from all its other West European ties. It is not likely that the most
Stalinist satellite and the one that has most to lose from unification will
prove more accommodating on this issue than its Soviet patron.

It can be argued, of course, that withdrawal of foreign troops
from Germany will facilitate the transformation of the East German system.
But the idea that East Germany can be eased out of the Soviet orbit without

12. See Denis Healey, "Disengagement and German Reunification," *New Leader*, May 20, 1959.

III - 15

from German territory. But before the West can negotiate effectively on this it must admit to itself that the evasions and inconsistencies of NATO may cause the Soviets to believe that they would gain no additional security from any such control scheme. Thus, effective negotiations may be prevented not by the strength of NATO but by its weakness.

not by the strength of NATO put by its weakness.

from any such control scheme. Time, elective negotiations may be prevented

may cause the device to believe that they would gain no **benefit**/**advantage**

from it must be admitted that the evasions and inconsistencies of NATO

III - 72

IV - 3

The presence of Soviet troops at the German frontier on the other hand, would create an enormous pressure on an independent Germany. With a local defense against Soviet attack impossible, the weight of Soviet influence may grow proportionately even if NATO should be maintained based in the Low Countries and France -- a contingency which in the absence of careful study cannot necessarily be taken for granted. It may be argued, of course, that Germany would still enjoy the protection of NATO, that in fact the sanction against Soviet re-entry would be about the same as at present: the fear of an all-out war with the United States. This argument if pressed far enough would put into doubt the utility of NATO and counsel its transformation into a unilateral guarantee at the precise moment when the inhibitions to total war are constantly increasing.

On the other hand, if Germany is to assure her protection with her own forces -- a notion inseparable from that of neutrality -- the result would be a spiraling rather than a reduction of armaments. German forces would then have to approximate those planned for the NATO shield. But if NATO is alleged to disquiet the Soviet Union, a German force of approximate size under independent control would seem to give even greater cause for

["C - VI", "und sofern nicht mehr erhält sich ein eigentum derjenige, der es\nverlangt, sich aufzubringt, sich zu beweisen, ob er sich nicht\nin die Hand desjenigen, der sich nicht beweisen kann, und sich\ndarüber aufzubringt, sich zu beweisen, ob er sich nicht\ndarüber aufzubringt, sich zu bew

IV - 6

thus

there would be either Soviet domination of Central Europe or that of the scheme outlined earlier: the Oder as the dividing line between NATO and the Warsaw pact with a zone of controlled armaments on both sides to reduce the danger of surprise attack. An explicit arrangement to that effect would accomplish all the security objectives of the neutral <ins>belt</ins> without the political <ins>no</ins> dangers of legitimizing constant Soviet pressure and of establishing a <ins>under which</ins> precedent where in the guise of expanding the neutral belt the United States is gradually pushed out of Europe.

Most importantly, the West ought to be clear about the political implications of a decision to negotiate about the military neutralization of Germany. It is difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union with its belief in the predominance of "objective" social forces would content itself with such a measure. The Krenlin, which after all has attacked both the Marshall plan and the Common Market as "aggressive imperialism," is almost certain to counter with the proposal already in its draft of a peace treaty that Germany should not be permitted to be part of any arrangement not also signed by the USSR. This would mean the end of European integration <ins>for</ins> and to resist it would presuppose a degree of cohesiveness in the West belied by recent

it would breach a degree of consensus in the West deemed by recent
the US to mean the end of Groenman's intervention and toreat
Germany should not be permitted to be hurt or any arrangement not thus
conform with the breach struck in its half of a piece treaty first
began and the common market an effective interlaium, if not certain to
achieve a measure. The treaty, which after all has attached to itself the
in the preambulate of "objectives" social terms worth content itself with
Germany. If it difficult to imagine that the Soviet Union with its diet
indications of a declaration to negotiate upon the military neutralisation of
the West ought to be offered upon the belligerent
the truce between the warring parties.

broadest where in the case of expanding the warlist itself the United States
guarantees of fighting conduct Soviet presence and of satisfying a
secondment of the security objectives of the neutral without the benefit of
the guarantee of arms race attack. An explicit arrangement to that effect would
the War end with a note of controlled statements on points agreed to reduce
the scope outlined earlier in the Open as the guiding line between NATO and
then would be either Soviet domination of Central Europe or that of the
West.

IV - 8

IV - 7

events. Is it likely that Great Britain would reject a European settlement
in order to keep Germany as a member of a common market, she has refused to
join? Will a German government be able to resist such a proposal? Will the
Scandinavian countries, the Low Countries, or Italy be able to resist Soviet
pressures to expand the neutral belt?

Moreover, in all the clamor for flexibility, it seems to have been
overlooked that even Germany is the last country which should be encouraged
to be "flexible." Germany's attempt to pursue an isolated policy in the
center of the Continent has brought disaster to Europe twice in a generation.

The possibility to make arrangements with both sides -- the political
expression of neutrality -- is also capable of menacing both sides, if only
by the threat of a change of front. Such a Germany would be disastrous for
the peace and the stability of Europe. It might engage in revisionism in
the East or, more likely, it might start a race to Moscow by the Western powers
which would wreck European unity. In these terms, the greatest contribution
of Chancellor Adenauer may have been the quality for which he has recently
been criticized: his refusal to take advantage of the policy of petty
maneuver inherent in Germany's history and geographic situation, was essential.

["maneuver inherent in Germany's policy and geographic situation was essential to her success. Prior to World War I, Germany had been offically neutral in Germany's war with Austria and in the Balkans. However, in 1914, after the Austro-Hungarian war broke out, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would wreck European industry. In these terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which he has recently been criticized: the refusal to take advantage of the benefit of the war. In 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Germany. In those terms, the Austro-Hungarian conflict which would have been the catalyst for which

V - 2

which may refrain from seeking security in expansion, because it relies on Western support against aggression. It will be watched by many of the uncommitted in quest not only of economic assistance but above all of purpose.

Western cohesion cannot be measured by our ability to develop common negotiating positions. If German unification cannot be achieved, it is essential that Germany become an ever more integral part of the European community, just as Europe must find in the strengthening of its internal relations an outlet for the energy that in previous decades projected it overseas. Too much is at stake to permit open disagreement. The test is whether the allies most threatened feel that they were supported in their hour of need and that their special problems were understood. If our Continental allies feel deserted, or if we and Great Britain bring home to them a sense of impotence, the long-term results will be calamitous, even if the immediate reaction should be negligible. It can at least be argued that British actions in 1959 can best be explained by the sense of impotence produced partly through our actions in the Middle Eastern crisis of 1956.

The West should therefore use this crisis to demonstrate its

V - 4

Against this background, the debate which was evoked by the
Soviet note on Berlin of November 27 has in many respects been peripheral
to the real challenge confronting the West. Much energy has been spent
on elaborating a negotiating position for the forthcoming conferences.
The issue between the "hard" and the "soft" position has been defined as
a difference in assessment as to whether the Soviet Union was "sincere"
and prepared to do some "real" bargaining. There has been a nightmarish
quality about this argument and a measure of disingenuousness too. For it
would be easy enough to discover at the conference table whether or not the
Soviet leaders are prepared to negotiate -- indeed this is presumably one
of the purposes of the conference -- provided the West were clear about its
goals.

The basic weakness revealed by the Soviet initiative is confusion
in the West about its purposes. This confusion comes to expression in the
insistence on establishing a moral equivalence between the free world and
the Soviet system. Too many in the West confuse peaceful coexistence with
moral equivalence -- indeed they derive the former from the latter. This

*HTX 18. See New York Times.*

V - 5

leads to the preposterous argument that the brutalities of Stalin were
due to the failure to admit the USSR into the League of Nations in 1923,
and the current hostility of Khrushchev to the failure to accept the
19
Soviet disarmament package of May 10, 1955. The aberrations of our
internal security system are equated with the Soviet police state; NATO
with the Warsaw pact; the British landing in Egypt with Hungary; our overseas
bases with the Communist repression of Tibet. The eagerness to establish
a moral equivalence deprives the West of the inward assurance which is
required to negotiate effectively.

To be sure, Many of these reactions are an understandable,
indeed a healthy reaction to the popular tendency to see complicated
political problems in absolute categories of black or white. But in the attack
on the simplification, the critics run the risk of reducing all issues to
a single shade of grey. They are confirmed in their tentativeness by the
fear that the alternative to the postulate of moral equivalence may be
nuclear war. But in the nuclear age it should be possible to find a
motive for peace other than denying our values. The more insecure we grow,

19. See broadcast by Philip Noel-Baker, the Norwegian Broadcasting Company, reprinted by the New England Regional Offices, American Friends Service Committee.

V - 8

To be sure, many of our difficulties reflect the fact that
the stability of our society and that of the other Western democracies has
been due to an environment in which statements could be taken at face value
and appearances were at one with reality. But this only defines the
problem; it does not solve it. It still leaves us the task of finding
the spiritual élan to act with conviction in a world where the only certainty
available is within ourselves. Our central problem is not how to react to
this or that Soviet overture but, to overcome the malaise which has made us
the prisoner of petty calculations and small motives. A great deal of
discussion has been directed to the problem of our ability to survive.
It is likely, however, that the ultimate answer transcends technique and
depends on our worthiness to survive.

["depends on our worthiness to survive.", "If it is likely, however, that the ultimate answer transmits through and through the prisoner of both calumnies and small motives. A great deal of time or that Soviet overture put to overcome the mistake which has made us available is within our reach. Our central problem is not how to reset so the spiritual ego to set with conviction in a world where the only certainty is the problem: it does not solve it. If it still proves to be the task of landing and abhorrence were at one with reality, but this only defines the problem: it does not solve it. If it