THE SOUTHERN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

January 29, 1988

The Honorable Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W
Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Please find enclosed a copy of the complete transcript from the December 18th, 1987 Secretaries' of State conference in Norfolk, Virginia. I hope that you enjoy reading it, and if you need anything else, please let me know.

320 W. PACES FERRY RD., N.W.
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OFFICERS

SAM AYOUSB
Chairman

PETER C. WHITE
President

CEDRIC L. SUZMAN
Vice President

JULIA A. WHITE
Secretary and Lega Counsel

RAY B. VAUGHTERS
Treasurer

TERM TRUSTEES

CECIL A. ALEXANDER

H. BRANDT ANERS

SAM AYOUSB

THOMAS A. BARTLETT

GEORGE D. BUSBEE

J. CRAWFORD COOK

JOHN L. CROUSE

FRED C. DAVISON

CHARLES E. FRASER

ROBERT P. FORRESTAL

JONATHAN GOLDEN

CLAUS M. HALLE

MARTIN J. MILLENBRAND

RUTH S. HOLMBERG

BLAINE KELLEY JR.

ROBERT J. LAGER

DENNIS P. LOCKHART

WILLIAM O. MCCOY

JULIE P. MONTGOMERY

JOHN C. PORTMAN III

CHARLES C. SMITH

DONALD M. STEWART

JULIA A. WHITE

PETER C. WHITE

WILLIAM F. WINTER

CHARTER TRUSTEES

SAM NUNN

DEAN RUSK

CYRUS F. VANCE

JOHN C. WEST

HONORED TRUSTEES

WILLIAM A. ALLAIN

GUY M. MISEED

GERALD J. BALLEES

Governo. de la

CARROLL A. CAMPBELL JR.

Governor South Carolina

BILL CLINTON
Governor Arkansas

JOE FRANK HARRIS
Governor Georgia

GUY HUNTER
Governor Alabama

MICHAEL LOMAX
Chairman, House Committee

JAMES G. MARTIN
Governor, Tenn. and Carolina

BOB MARTINEZ
Governor Florida

ANDREW YOUNG
Mayors of Atlanta

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Mr. Edwin Newman, NBC News anchorman, essayist, and correspondent for 31 years, is the moderator. Mr. Newman began his career in journalism in 1941 working for the International News Service and the United Press International. He served, for extended periods, in NBC News' foreign bureaus: in London, Rome, and Paris. Mr. Newman is the author of *Strictly Speaking: Will America be the Death of English?* (1974); *A Civil Tongue* (1976); and *Sunday Punch* (1979).

Mr. Newman is joined by three well-known correspondents who join him in asking questions: William Beecher, Charles Corddry, and Henry Trewhitt.

Mr. William Beecher is the Washington Bureau Chief for the *Star Tribune, Newspaper of the Twin Cities*. Mr. Beecher has been a Washington correspondent for over 25 years, previously working for the *The Wall-Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Boston Globe*. In 1973, he won both the Pulitzer Prize for national reporting and the Weintal Prize for diplomatic correspondence.

Mr. Charles Corddry is a defene correspondent for the *Baltimore Sun*, a panelist on "Washington Week in Review," a contributor to the British Broadcasting Corporation, and a lecturer on national and international security affairs. Mr. Corddry is author of *Beyond Reagan, The Politics of Upheaval*.

Mr. Henry Trewhitt is Deputy Managing Editor for international affairs at *U.S. News and World Report*, a lecturer, radio and television commentator, and a frequent panelist on "Washington Week in Review." In 1961, he served in the BONN Bureau to cover NATO, EEC, East-West relations, and the Berlin Crisis of the early 1960's. In 1982, Mr. Trewhitt was awarded the Weintal Prize for diplomatic correspondence.

**NEWMAN** Welcome to the fifth annual conference of Secretaries of State. This program is being brought to you by The Southern Center for International Studies in cooperation with the Commonwealth of Virginia and the City of Norfolk. It marks the first time that all six of these former Secretaries of State have gathered in a public forum to discuss their views on foreign policy matters, since the program began in 1983. Three of these men served in democratic administrations, three in republican. Together they represent an extraordinary resource on American foreign policy. Let me introduce them to you...

**Dean Rusk** served as Secretary of State from 1961 to 69 under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Before that, he was assistant Secretary of State for United Nations affairs and Far Eastern Affairs, from 1947 to 1952. Mr. Rusk is currently a professor of International Law at the University of Georgia, School of Law.

**William Rogers** served as Secretary of State from 1969 to 73 under President Nixon. His experience in government service dates back to the Eisenhower Administration, in which he was Attorney General from 1957 to 1961. Mr. Rogers is now a senior partner in the law firm of Rogers & Wells.

**Henry Kissinger** served as Secretary of State from 1973 to 77 under Presidents Nixon and Ford. He also served Presidents Nixon and Ford as National Security Advisor. In 1973, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts in achieving the Viet Nam ceasefire agreement. Dr. Kissinger is now Chairman of the international consulting firm, Kissinger & Associates.

**Cyrus Vance** served as Secretary of State from 1977 to 1980 under President Carter. Mr. Vance began his career in public service in 1961, when he was appointed General Counsel to the Department of Defense. He has also served as Secretary of the Army under President Kennedy and Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Johnson. Mr. Vance is currently a partner in the law firm of Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett.

**Edmund Muskie** served as Secretary of State in 1980 under President Carter. Early in his political career, Mr. Muskie served two terms as Governor of Maine, before being elected to the United States Senate, in 1958. He served in the Senate for twenty-two years. Mr. Muskie is now a senior partner in the law firm of Chadbourne, Parke, Whiteside & Woolf.

**Alexander Haig** served as Secretary of State from 1981 to 1982 under President Reagan. In 1969, he was named Military Advisor to Henry Kissinger and was, then, appointed Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President. General Haig has served as President Nixon's Chief of Staff and as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Mr. Haig is currently a consultant in Washington, D.C. and a candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination.

I would also like to introduce to you, before the opening question, three well-known correspondents who will be joining me in asking questions: William Beecher, Washington Bureau Chief of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Tribune; Henry Trewhitt, Deputy Managing Editor for International Affairs for U.S. News and World Report; and Charles Corddry, defense correspondent for the Baltimore Sun.

Now, to the opening question. I would like each of our six former Secretaries to take a shot at it, as briefly as possible, given the complexity of the subject.

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In September of 1987, seven former Secretaries of Defense supported an agreement, in principle, eliminating all intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Now that the United States and the Soviet Union have signed the INF Treaty, I would like to ask each of you this: If you were a Senator, would you vote to ratify the agreement as it stands? Mr. Rusk, would you begin?...

**RUSK** Yes, indeed I would, for very simple reasons. Those of us who have had a chance to look at the total effects of nuclear war, both direct and indirect, know that a nuclear war, between us and the Soviet Union, is simply a war which must never be fought. It would not only eliminate all the answers, but it would eliminate all the questions. Mr. Krushchev put it very well once when he said that, in the event of a nuclear war, the living would envy the dead. It makes no sense for us and the Soviet Union to race in weapons which must never be used. And so, I look forward to the possibilities of cutting down on these dreadful weapons. Now, I would approach this not in a spirit of gloom and doom. All the young people in the audience should be reminded that we have now put behind us forty-two years since a nuclear weapon has been fired in anger, and that is a remarkable achievement for the human race. But, I would support this treaty and without reservation.

**NEWMAN** Mr. Rogers...

**ROGERS** Yes, I would support the treaty. I think it is a remarkable achievement in two ways. One, it is the first time that we have had a treaty of this type, which resulted in the reduction of nuclear weapons. And, certainly, it is the first time that we have ever had an agreement with the Soviet Union, where the number of weapons that they have to reduce exceed ours by an amount of three, or four, to one. Secondly, it is remarkable in the sense that there is a verification procedure, certainly as far as the destruction of missiles systems are concerned, which I think is an excellent one. And, furthermore, it provides for on-sight verification, which I think most of us thought was probably not "do-able." I think that most of us believed, certainly I did, that the Russians would never agree to permitting Americans to be on their soil, for thirteen years, to observe what they were doing. Granted, it may not be perfect, but it is really remarkable in those two ways. So, I would support it enthusiastically. On the other hand, obviously, there are all kinds of cautionary considerations that we have to be smart about and not let the Russians take advantage of us. I do not see any signs, on the part of our government, that we are going to be at a disadvantage, at all. I think, both the administration and the Congress are well aware of the fact that the Soviets have not lived up to previous treaties, absolutely, and I think that we will be quite conscious of that. But, on the other hand, I think it is a turning point in our relations with the Soviet Union, which may serve the cause of peace very well in the years ahead.

**NEWMAN** Dr. Kissinger...

**KISSINGER** I support ratification of the treaty for, I'm afraid, a somewhat negative reason: that not ratifying it would do more damage than the treaty itself will do. I believe that, at this point, it is important that we do not delude ourselves about what has been achieved here. I agree with the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, democrat, Les Aspen, who thinks that we started with the wrong weapons and in the wrong order. The argument that we have verification has meaning, only if we can do something about what we find. Verification cannot make a bad agreement good. It can only make a good agreement enforceable. It is therefore something that one has to analyze what the consequences are. The fact is, that after this agreement, no matter what the Soviet violation is, we will never be

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able to put missiles back into Europe. Therefore, we do not have any easy sanction for this.
As to the argument that the Soviets have destroyed more weapons than we have...the Soviets
have not been, historically, in the habit of making unequal treaties. And I think that we
really ought to ask ourselves what are they getting out of it, in a political sense; since, I have
never known them to give away something for nothing. Now, I am in favor of ratification,
because to undo another agreement would put into severe question the credibility of the
United States. But, we must ask where we are going; how we are going to defend distant
countries; and how we are going to relate nuclear strategy to conventional strategy. I am not
convinced that this is the beginning of a new era. Whether it is the beginning of a new era
depends on what follows after. Therefore, that is what must be discussed, when this is up
for ratification- not in the form of reservations, but in the form of asking ourselves about
the future.

NEWMAN Mr. Vance...

VANCE
If I were in the Senate, I would enthusiastically support this treaty. I have read it carefully. It is a treaty that has been hammered out over many years. It is a good treaty. As has been said, it has the best verification provisions in it of any nuclear treaty that has been worked out to this date. I am of the view that it will be ratified by the Senate, and I believe it will not have any killer amendments. There may be reservations, or understandings, which are of a very different character from killer amendments. Therefore, I look forward to seeing, in this Spring, the ratification of this treaty. Let me say one more word. I do not agree with those who suggest that the implementation of this treaty is going to put our allies in Europe in a position in which they are essentially naked, as been said. They are going to have, still in the area, substantial nuclear strength on our carriers, in our aircraft- both tactical and the FB11's in Europe- and, indeed, there will still be some battlefield nuclear weapons. So, I simply don't buy the argument that this is leaving them in a position which puts them in peril.

NEWMAN Mr. Muskie...

MUSKIE
Yes, I would vote to approve this treaty. It is an important and significant treaty in its own right. It does something which this administration has been pointing toward for several years. So, on its own merits, I think it deserves ratification. Even more important, it is the first step in a negotiating process, which, clearly, is still underway, and the agenda of which carries issues of enormous importance to the United States, to our national security interests, and to our relationship with the Soviet Union. Now, whether or not that negotiating process succeeds, and whether or not it will truly serve our national security interests, are questions that only the future can answer. But, we cannot get to those questions, unless we deal with this one first- deal with it firmly, positively, and without hesitation.

NEWMAN Mr. Haig...

HAIG
Well, Henry you taught me well, because I share your concerns about this treaty. On the other hand, I also share your view that it has gone so far, and the price paid by our European friends to join this treaty is so substantial, that a reversal now could have even more deleterious effects than going ahead with it. But, I think it is well for the audience to have in mind why those of us- former President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Al Haig, Brent Scrocroft, Bernie Rogers, the illustrious think-tank in London- the James Defense Weekly- have all registered grave concerns about the fallacies and flaws in this

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treaty. First, because we are now putting a greater burden on our conventional capabilities in NATO, which are already seriously undermanned. Secondly, because we are putting a greater burden, in deterrence terms, on our central strategic systems, which, today, are at a disadvantage to the Soviet Union in first-strike capability in the neighborhood of three-to-one. Thirdly, I have to admit that I was appalled that my own party recently has abandoned the long-standing republican tenet of linkage. We have just witnessed a summit in Washington, in which the good news is an arms control treaty and the fact that the leaders of the Superpowers are talking. I welcome that. The bad news is that we have given the Soviet Union moral equivalence to the United States. We have enabled them to leave Washington, rejecting our concerns about human rights, the violations of Helsinki, and the continuing suppression of the exodus of Soviet Jews. Thirdly, we have gone ahead with this agreement, which I believe, as I think Dr. Kissinger has suggested, is more favorable to the Russians than to us. We have permitted them to achieve this, without assurances on their violations of international law in Afghanistan, Angola, Southern Yeman, Kampuchea, and right here, in our own hemisphere, in Central America. Now, these are the problems. I hope that the administration and the ratification process is going to come to grips with these issues in the context of ratification.

**NEWMAN**
Let me ask just one follow-up question, if I may. Mr. Rogers, you said that you believe the treaty represents a turning point. Why do you think that?

**ROGERS**
Well, for the reason that I said. We have never had a treaty of this type before. The fact that we have on-sight inspection, for example, is quite a turning point. The fact that, as Mr. Muskie says, we are in a negotiating process is very promising. Let me comment on what Mr. Haig said. I do not agree, for a moment, that the American people have come to the conclusion that, as a result of this summit, the United States and the Soviet Union are morally equivalent. Not for a moment.

**HAIG**
I hope not...

**ROGERS**
I have never heard anybody say, as a result of this summit, that the American people have forgotten history, and I think all Americans understand it. Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, ... all the things that the Soviet Union has been doing around the world. President Reagan pointed these things out every time he made a comment in this summit. So, I do not believe that anybody believes that the Russians are morally equivalent.

**NEWMAN**
Question for Mr. Trewhitt...

**TREWHITT**
However this relationship evolves, Secretary Vance, for the very short term, there is going to be considerable activity in Congress over the INF Treaty. Both Superpowers are committed to trying to achieve a second treaty, before President Reagan leaves office, to reduce long-range nuclear weapons. Does it seem credible to you that a START Treaty may be signed and/or ratified within the coming year, or year and a half?

**VANCE**
It is possible that an agreement could be signed within the next year; however, I think it is going to be a very hard treaty to negotiate. That treaty would deal with a cut of fifty percent of the existing nuclear weapons. There are big, indeed vast, gaps between our position and their position at this point. Perhaps the most important is: how does one deal with the Strategic Defense Initiative question? That has not gone away. The issue still exists. In my judgment, from what the Soviets say, it is still important to them. And therefore, I think you are going to have to bridge that gap, if you are going to get a

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treaty. And that is going to be very hard to do. There are also a number of more technical kinds of problems, such as what are the sublimits going to be on a whole variety of weapons. And that, again, is a very tough set of issues to deal with.

**NEWMAN**
Before I call on Mr. Beecher for a question, I would like to ask all of you...Given the fact that the INF Treaty has been negotiated, and assuming that it will be ratified, do you all agree that a further treaty covering strategic weapons, and reducing them by fifty percent, would be desireable? Is there anyone here who thinks it would not be?

**RUSK**
President Reagan seemed to say, just two days ago, that before such a treaty could come into effect that he would have to have an agreement on conventional weapons. I think this treaty does throw an added emphasis on conventional weapons, and so the trail to a big treaty on offensive nulcear weapons is very long and very complicated.

**ROGERS**
Yes, I think that that is a question the American people and the American government are going to have to face in the future. I do not think that any of us, certainly I would not be, are prepared to say that it is desireable, because it depends on what it contains. As Cy Vance has said, I think a lot of questions remain. The mere fact that we have the INF Treaty does not mean that we are going to have smooth sailing. There are a lot of difficult questions that Al Haig said about that. So, I would be very much opposed to the idea that we are all going to be euphoric about the next treaty and assume that we are going to have one. If we did that, we would be in a very weak negotiating position. If we set up a time-table for ourselves and all say that it is highly desirable to get a fifty-percent reduction in strategic weapons, we would box ourselves in. We would be in an unfavorable position vis-a-vis the Russians. So, I think we should proceed thoughtfully and with care. If we can work one out, fine. If we can't, fine,

**NEWMAN**
Dr. Kissinger...

**KISSINGER**
The distinguished Ambassador, Chip Bollin, used to say, "If you don't know where you are going, all roads will get you there." Let me express my concern in as simple language as is possible for somebody whose native language is German. For the whole post-war period, for better or worse, the West has relied on nuclear weapons to offset Soviet conventional strength, Soviet geographic proximity, and Soviet interior lines of communication. We are now dealing with a Soviet leadership that has huge domestic problems, and which, therefore, has high incentives to come to some agreement. I do not understand why, under those conditions, all negotiations have to focus on nuclear weapons, on which we have relied to offset Soviet conventional pressures. Therefore, I think that it is imperative that an integral link be established between the Soviet conventional and our conventional moves and the fifty-percent reduction. It would be a disaster to say we will do the fifty-percent reduction and then a great atmosphere will be created for conventional disarmament. I want to know how the Soviets interpret "conventional disarmament." I would like to see a specific proposal from their side and from our side. I think we have to stop playing these numbers games. A fifty percent reduction, by itself, does not mean anything, if the proportions between the various forces are uneven in the nuclear field. Most analysts have come to the view that, at least with relation to land-based forces as they are now composed, the vulnerability of American strategic forces will increase not decrease under the formulas that are now discussed. Maybe, these problems are solvable. But, we ought to face them and not deal with them in generalities.

**NEWMAN**
Now I keep saying we are going to call on Bill Beecher for a question,

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but I know that Senator Muskie wanted to say something, and then General Haig....

**MUSKIE** Well, I assumed that when you put the question, that wrapped up in it was the question of all the issues that must be dealt with from now on. The control of conventional arms, for example, is vital. And I think that has been pointed out in connection with this INF Treaty that one of the principles that it established was that an agreement could result in assymetrical reductions. In other words, the Soviets eliminated more INF weapons than we did. The same thing will have to be done with respect to conventional weapons in central Europe, at least, conventional forces, which include weapons and manpower. And, when I say I think it is essential to move toward negotiation of a treaty, I wrap up in it all these issues that must go along with it. And, to that extent, I agree with Henry Kissinger.

**NEWMAN** General Haig...

**HAIG** I would just like to make a brief observation about the numbers game. Our Vice-President asked me in Houstan, or made the comment that, your children and my children and our grandchildren will ask us how many nuclear weapons we destroyed. I think, that is the wrong question, for the wrong reasons. What our children and grandchildren will ask is: how many wars did we prevent? And, like it or not, the nuclear weapon has been the guarantor of an unusual, historic period of peace in the world. And, we deal with that arms control question, only in the broader context of making nuclear war an impossible conception.

**NEWMAN** Mr. Beecher

**BEECHER** I would like to follow-up on the question of the numbers games, particularly in terms of reducing conventional forces in Europe. Each of you, whether enthusiastic or unenthusiastic about the INF Treaty, speak of it as an important opening toward what happens next and the basic balance that will be determined, but what happens to negotiations, both in strategic and in conventional areas. Perhaps, General Haig, I can get you to take first swing at this, as a military man, on the conventional forces in Europe question. This administration, currently, is talking to its allies about an approach that would seek parity, numerical parity, in tanks, artillery pieces, and such, between the NATO forces and the Warsaw Pact. Now, given that, historically, the Soviets have wanted large forces in Europe for two purposes: one, to assure control of Eastern Europe; and second, to intimidate Western Europe. Is this approach, this assymetric approach, conceptually sound and viable?

**HAIG** Well, it is a very dangerous approach. Of course, we would all welcome a balance between the Warsaw Pact and the NATO forces, because that would be so much better than what it is today. But, in the long term relationships, we have got to remember, as Dr. Kissinger pointed out, the Soviets enjoy interior lines- a brief run from the Soviet mainland to the forward edge of the battlefield. We Americans, as we reduce our strength in Europe and as our European partners do the same, are going to find ourselves less able to reinforce in timely fashion. So, there has to be, as we talk about the nuclear question, a broad assessment, not just in terms of "bean-counting" of troops, and tanks, and guns, but the other, more esoteric, and sometimes less clear aspects, including the political one. And there, you are going to find a very tough Russian counterpart, as they view the importance of maintaining loyalty in the Eastern European satellites.

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**BEECHER** You mean that you would not even be satisfied with numerical parity?

**HAIG** Well, I said that it would be far better, but it is not totally risk-free. It would be far better than the environment we have today. I think I said that.

**NEWMAN** Dr. Kissinger...

**KISSINGER** May I make a point? I have been involved in arms control studies since they started in the 1950's. I think we have to recognize that the real problem, domestically, with respect to conventional arms control, is that there has not been any serious homework done, either in academic institutions or in the government, comparable to nulcear arms control. On the one hand, it sounds absurd to say that parity is not good enough. On the other hand, it is historically true that conventional deterrence has not worked. For hundreds of years, wars have occurred in Europe, and elsewhere, between forces that, on paper, were evenly matched, but in-which the leaders of these countries interpreted in a different way. So, I think one needs more imagination. And I do not pretend to have the answer. I do not know whether it is possible to emphasize defensive over offensive weapons and to establish assymetrical balances on that basis. I think it is essential that we do our homework, and that we relate conventional to nuclear disarmament. And if the Soviets are serious about wanting stability in the world and focusing on their domestic affairs, they should have a joint interest in that.

**NEWMAN** Well, that is a subject I would like to get to, but I would like to bring up something else up, if I may. At the conference of former Secretaries of Defense in September of 1987, all of them said that President Reagan's version of a perfect "Star Wars" defense was unrealistic. Does everybody around this table believe that, or are there some who think it is quite realistic? Senator Muskie...

**MUSKIE** I think there is serious doubt. I think that view is supported by leading scientists in this country, and, perhaps, by a majority of them. I happened to have a conversation with one of the more eminent ones just this week. He said, speaking for the scientific community, ...and he is in a position to do so- he is a foremost figure in the National Academy of Sciences, ...that a perfect defense, that is, a defense that would, indeed, intercept nuclear missiles from whatever source- not simply the ICBM's, but the manned bombers, the SLBM's, and so on- is not likely to be found. Now, I am not a scientist, and I cannot answer that...

**NEWMAN** Would there be any point in having an imperfect "Star Wars?"

**MUSKIE** Now, that, I think, is an issue that is worth discussing.

**ROGERS** I agree with Ed Muskie. It is highly doubtful that "Star Wars" would be a perfect defensive weapon. On the other hand, I think we should continue to develop it for obvious reasons. If the Soviet Union developed it ahead of us, we really would be vulnerable. And secondly, I think there is some useful purpose to be served, even if it is an imperfect defensive weapon system. It certainly would be in combination with offensive weapons, so it would probably be okay. I must say that I do not think we have to decide these things at the moment. I think that everyone agrees that we have to continue to develop SDI capabilities. And, I think, it has been useful in discussions with the Soviet Union, obviously. They have expressed their concern about it. That is one of the highest items on their agenda. So, obviously, they are concerned about it.

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NEWMAN Mr. Vance...

VANCE
Let me just say, very briefly. I would agree with the conclusion that the Secretaries of Defense reached. On the other hand, as Bill has indicated, I think it is absolutely essential that we pursue research on the Strategic Defense Initiative. That, I think, can be done. But, I think it is going to have to be done in a controlled way. Therefore, I would think that we should proceed with a measured program of research yet, at the same time, being willing to consider SDI as a bargaining chip, as you take a look at the broader equation of nuclear weapons, including the offensive weapons.

NEWMAN
If we move this discussion to, let us say, the political context, in which various agreements...

KISSINGER
Before you get off SDI, could I, please, just make one more comment?

NEWMAN Secretary Rusk, too? I am outvoted.

KISSINGER
I think that I agree with what has been said. President Reagan oversold the capabilities of the SDI system. A perfect defense is not possible. On the other hand, the various levels of imperfect defense in the nuclear world- against accidental launches; against limited attacks; against third country attacks; a protection of the retaliatory force- which seem, to me, highly valid and much more attainable. I agree with the statements that have been made, that research into SDI should continue. But, we, in fact, face a much more fundamental problem. It seems to me that the Soviets are trying to maneuver us into a position in which the allowable research cannot possibly yield deployable weapons. So that the combination of the agreement not to deploy for a number of years, plus their interpretation of the ABM Treaty, plus their threat that they will abandon the fifty-percent reduction, may well have the practical consequence of atrophying SDI. Now, we, in my view, should not slide into that by making some sort of half-baked domestic compromise, in which everybody says SDI is for research and avoids the real issue. The real issue is: Are we going to do testing that will lead to deployable weapons at the end of the deployment ban period? If we are not willing to do that, then we ought to sell SDI for something, like the Soviet long-range weapons. The worst outcome would be if we give away SDI, as frankly I believe we are in the process of doing, by subterfuge and indirection, while proclaiming we are preserving it. What we are preserving is a theoretical right of research, that is being interpreted by the Soviets and the Congress in a manner that will not, in fact, permit the sort of research that is needed. We ought to be clear, as a nation, what we are doing. If we are giving up that research, we ought to trade for it. If we are not prepared to give up the research, we ought to say so. But there is no form of words that can pretend that we are doing research which we are not doing, without our fooling our selves.

NEWMAN Mr. Rusk...

RUSK
I think we ought to pause as a human race to ask ourselves where we are going on this subject. Back in the 1960's, the world community, with unanimity, adopted an outer-space treaty, a basic treaty on this sphere of activity. It was clear that the human race, at that time, had the idea that outer space should be an area of peaceful cooperation and scientific research; that astronauts were to be the envoys of all mankind; that the weapons of mass destruction were to be prohibited; that nothing in outer space would be appropriated as national territory; that any nation who was in a position to assist astronauts

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should do so. Now, that is where we started. Have we scrapped all that? I must say that, so long as I live, which will not be too long, I suppose, I shall be opposed to the placing of weapons in outer-space. Although we ought to go ahead with research in order not to be overtaken by somebody else, to me, the idea of SDI is politically inflammatory, militarily non-essential, economically absurd, and aesthetically repulsive.

(laughter and applause)

**NEWMAN** Suppose we broaden this a bit to discuss the political context in which these negotiations are going on. Charlie Corddry, I think you have a question...

**CORDDRY** I would like to address my question to Mr. Rusk and to Dr. Kissinger. It has to do with the utility, or the disutility, of nuclear weapons. Can we imagine that we are at a point in history where the build-up of nuclear weapons has crested and will be going down and that the INF Treaty is a precedent for that? And what consequences do you see if this is the case? And, I choose you two, because I think that you probably have different views on the matter.

**RUSK** Well, I said earlier in the discussion, that a nuclear war is simply that war which must never be fought. The Soviets have understood that. We have gone through some very dangerous crises, without the use of nuclear weapons. If that war should break out, forget it. There won't be anything left. Now, I don't see any role for nuclear weapons except to insure that nuclear weapons are not used against us. It is the deterrent factor, and deterrence has worked pretty well. I pointed out earlier that we have put behind us forty-two years without the firing of a nuclear weapon. But, those who talk about limited nuclear war- a protracted nuclear war in which one side or the other can win or account for a strategy- that is all nonsense. That's all nonsense.

**CORDDRY** So should we eliminate them all?

**RUSK** Well...

**CORDDRY** Can we?

**RUSK** Quite frankly, I would go down to a few hundred on each side, so long as the capabilities of verification would permit.

**NEWMAN** Dr. Kissinger, your turn...

**KISSINGER** Thirty years ago, I wrote my first book on the proposition that the threat of nuclear war was bound to lose its credibility and its meaning, at a time when the United States had a huge nuclear superiority. At the same time, it is a fact that the operating defense of the United States, on which Allies have relied for forty years, has been the promise that, in the case of a Soviet conventional strike that threatens to overrun Allied countries, the United States would resort to nuclear weapons. This is not only a promise. The whole design of our military forces has been geared to that proposition. Now, with the growth of nuclear stockpiles, that promise is inherently more difficult to implement. But, to abolish, from one day to the next, all the nuclear weapons...to go to a few hundred warheads would produce, in my view, the worst of all worlds. It would make the world safe for conventional war, and at the end, when pressed against the wall, it would involve a high likelihood to trigger a nuclear war. I do not think that we have any choice except to make

9

[L.C.]

conventional and nuclear disarmament go in tandem with each other. Even though it is
easier to make emotional appeals against nuclear weapons, as such. We have not had a war
for forty-two years in any area in which there were nuclear weapons. It cannot be in our
national interest to stigmatize the weapons on which the defense of free peoples has been
based. If we want to do a transition, which in many respects is important, it will take us ten
years to get there, and we should do it in a way that maintains the peace and the freedom of
our friends, as well as of our own people.

(applause)

NEWMAN

A central question in all of this, and I think everybody here would agree, is what is happening in the Soviet Union? How significant is that? What part should it, and does it, play in American foreign policy? Perhaps, General Haig, you would begin on that...

HAIG

Well, there is no question that these changes are very, very important that we are witnessing in the Soviet Union. "Glasnost" is a phenomenon which we have not seen, since the last prime minister of the czar in 1908, who really did want to reform czarist Russia. But, it is important to remember that he was murdered in a theater by none other than a member of the czar's secret police. So, Mr. Gorbachev is an endangered species to the degree that he truly is a reformer. I happen to think that he is a very clever pragmatist. Now, that does not mean that we should not welcome these changes and that we should not encourage them. But, if we delude ourselves to believe that Mr. Gorbachev'sglasnost and the modernization of the Soviet system are being done as a favor to the West, then we are truly deluding ourselves. And that is the important aspect.

NEWMAN

Mr. Beecher...

BEECHER

I would like to follow up on the question of the implication of what is happening between the Soviet Union and ourselves, and I have a question for Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger, who I think are historically most appropriate to address it. More than a decade ago, we went through a period of detente with the Soviet Union that did not fulfill the hopes for the kind of constraint in foreign affairs that some hoped would result. Since a case can be made that what impels the Soviet leadership today is quite different, that their self-perceived need for economic support from the West to try to restructure that rather badly, woefully, obsolete economy, gives us more leverage. How would you two gentlemen try to restructure the relationship this time to increase the chances of Soviet moderation in places like the Persian Gulf, South Africa, and Central America?

ROGERS

Well, I think that all of us will agree that a lot of questions that are going to arise in the next six months, or a year, none of us really know the answers to. I remember I was at Camp David when Krushchev met Eisenhower in 1959. At that time, we were all very enthused about the fact that we had a spirit of Camp David. It did not last long. We had the Cuban Missile Crisis. We had many things happen that were, obviously, disillusioning. So, I think we have that prospect now. It may well be that the events in Nicaragua,...for example, what just happened the last few days with the defector disclosing the fact that the Soviets had a plan to increase the number of armed forces in Nicaragua to 600,000 and send MIG's, and so forth. We have to keep that in mind. Nevertheless, I think it is quite possible that the economy in the Soviet Union is so bad that Gorbachev may be interested in trying to proceed to reduce the tensions, reduce the weapons, and so forth. Now, I do not think that the fact that we are willing to discuss that with them is a sign of

10

[L]

weakness, or that we are being fooled by them, or anything of that kind. If they are, in fact,
willing to, they can show it in many ways. They can reduce their support for Nicaragua.
They can actually take some of the troops, or all of the troops, out of Afghanistan. They
can reduce the number of Cubans all over the world. So, there are many areas in the world
in which they can show the fact that they mean what Gorbachev says. And we should let
them try it. And we should be conscious of the fact, if that should happen, it will be very
constructive as far as the general public is concerned, throughout the world. So, all we can
hope for is that he means what he says. I, myself, do not believe it. I do not believe the
things he is saying. I keep listening to people saying, as if they are saying something
different, "I don't trust the Russians." Well, I do not know of anybody that trusts the
Russians. Did you ever hear anybody stand up and say, "I trust the Russians."?
Most of us were at the Summit meeting in one form, or another...dinners, etc. And, we were
there when they signed the treaty. Everytime President Reagan spoke, or George Schultz
spoke, they pointed out all these things that we have been saying, "We have to be careful."
We have got to reduce conventional weapons. In fact, we are already talking about that in
Europe. So, I think that our government is perfectly competent to work out a better
relationship with the Soviet Union than we have had in the past. And if Gorbachev means
it, he will have the chance to prove it.

NEWMAN

Dr. Kissinger and, then, Mr. Vance...

KISSINGER
The so-called period of detente in 1972 failed primarily because of American domestic divisions. And I think that has to be recognized. There are all sorts of myths now of President Nixon's being exceptionally euphoric. But President Nixon, who had some doubts about the undeluded goodwill of Americans, was not about to trust the Russians. That was not his problem. The problem was that, immediately, as the period began, there was Watergate. There were intense divisions on such issues as the Jackson Amendment. And, at that time, when our executive authority was declining, our domestic challenges to the Soviets were increasing. On that basis, no period of "relaxation of tensions" can possibly work. And one lesson we have to draw from that period is that without a united American people and some constant bi-partisan consensus, the process cannot be managed. Now, in the present period, I give Gorbachev a lot of credit for recognizing two realities: One, that the Soviet political system is not working very well; and two, that the Soviet economic system is not working very well. Otherwise, they are in reasonably good shape.

(laughter)

No doubt, he has shown considerable courage in trying to reform that
system, and he may become a victim of it. On the other hand, that is essentially his problem.
Our problem is the implication of that for foreign policy. And, therefore, it is our obliga-
tion to translate this general desire into foreign policy terms. I agree with what Bill Rogers
has said, that there are many areas where it can be shown: Afghanistan, troops in foreign
countries...we could all make a list. In the end, it all has to come down to some understand-
ing of what is permitted conduct of international politics. But, we cannot expect him to
offer concessions which we are not asking for. And, while it is true that everybody is
making these general statements that everything is related, until they are translated into
concrete proposals, they become ritualistic statements that have no operational significance.
I do not know whether Gorbachev is sincere, or not. I do not want to psychoanalyze
Gorbachev. I think he has incentives to come to some understandings. He has pressures in
the opposite direction. The duty of American foreign policy is to translate this into

11

[L]

concrete terms and to begin exploring them. And, then, we will know. But that has to be
done side by side with the other things going on, or it will turn into a form of unilateral
disarmament...

**NEWMAN** ...may I just ask a question here, a marginal question. You said that you did not want to psychoanalyze Gorbachev. Yet, while he was here in Washington, a very large number of employees of the United States government were, in fact, engaged in the psychoanalysis of Gorbachev: photographs being taken of him, microphones placed, his body language was being studied, all kinds of such studies by the CIA, especially, were going on. How large a part does this play?

**KISSINGER** I think it is a total waste of time.

(laughter)

**NEWMAN** Mr. Vance, if you want to follow that...

**VANCE** Yes, it is very hard to follow that. I would like to come back to Bill Beecher's question. Bill's question was, "What kind of things could you do differently this time around?" And I don't want to repeat what has been said by Henry and Bill, because I agree with much of what they have said. But, there is another aspect of this that has not been talked about, and that is the question of: can we multilateralize our response to some of the really crushing problems that face the world, not only in the arms control area but in things like the Persian Gulf, where, in my judgment, one could make use of the United Nations in a much more profitable way, such as, establishing an international naval peace-keeping force to help in keeping the sea lanes open in the Gulf. So that we are not the only one bearing the brunt of this. Other countries ought to share with us in handling this problem. There are some indications, from what Gorbachev has been saying, that the Soviets are in the process of, perhaps, reversing their position of not using multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, but now would like to turn back to that, which was the objective when the U.N. was started. I think we ought to explore this- not starry-eyed, but explore it and see if something can be done, along those lines.

**BEECHER** I would like to follow in that, Mr. Vance, please, though, but how do you answer that argument that, if there is a U.N. peace-keeping force that stops the tanker war, that you really make the situation safe for Iran to keep at war with Iraq, forever. That right now, Iraq uses the tanker war as its way of trying to get back at Iran for its land advantage?

**VANCE** Eventually, you are going to have to achieve a cease-fire agreement, such as the U.N. resolution, which all five permanent members of the U.N. have called for. In the mean time, however, you have a hot conflict going on, and the chances of it escalating grow larger and larger. Therefore, I think that something like the international U.N. peace-keeping force is needed to cool that down, as one then moves to try to put political pressure from all five, indeed from the world community, to try to move toward getting Iran and Iraq to resolve their issues, so that you can get into a cease-fire agreement, and then a political discussion.

**NEWMAN** Mr. Corddry...

**CORDDRY** I would like to go back to the Gorbachev Revolution, if I may call it

12

that, and ask this question. If communism, after 70 years, shows that nothing works, and Gorbachev says this, what happens if it goes creaking along the way it is, from our point of view? The other question is: If Gorbachev is successful in his reforms, and particularly economic reforms, is that good for the United States? Or, is that going to be a worse challenge than we have already had?

**NEWMAN** Secretary Rusk, would you like to take a shot at that?

**RUSK** Well, I would be willing to gamble on the success of his efforts to reform the Soviet system, both in terms of the easing of their dictatorship and the improvement of their economy. I think we can compete successfully with the Soviet Union under conditions of peace. We have been talking about that for more than forty years, and I have no doubt that that would be the case. I think the interesting question is, whether he will, in the course of these reforms, set off forces which he cannot control- which will be irreversible- both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. And, at that time, you may see them reverting to a most repressive regime in an effort to control these forces which he is unleashing. The future is very uncertain and extraordinarily interesting, in that respect.

**NEWMAN** Should we be attempting to help Gorbachev? For example, he proposed a U.N. force in the Persian Gulf. Is this something that would be desireable from our point of view, and would it be desireable for us to help him? Mr. Haig...

**HAIG** I think it is very important that we go back to the beginning of the change in the Soviet Union. These changes are a result of self-interest: the failure of the Marxist-Leninist system in the modern age, politically, economically, ideologically, demographically. Now, they have decided to change out of their own self-interest and imperative. And, incidentally, I would not worry about the Soviets recovering economically, because as long as they remain what they are, they will not. But, if it was, indeed, their own failure...and this gets back to your question...and we attempt to solve those failures for them, are we, then, providing an incentive for an abandonment of the reforms that we are hoping may emerge?

**NEWMAN** Let me ask you a question, at this point. You say that the changes in the Soviet Union are the result of self-interest. But, are not all changes the result of self-interest?

**HAIG** Most often. Although, I think Western democratic societies are guided by some...

**NEWMAN** But, if these changes are motivated by self-interest, does that make them any less, or any more, promising from our point of view?

**HAIG** No. The point I am making though, Ed, is that if we think we can influence the evolution of these internal decisions based on internal self-interest factors by casting favors, economically or through the transfer of technology,...these things must always be a product of the broad range of Soviet international behavior. And that gets to the question Bill raised. We are really talking, are you going to reapply linkage? Now, we know the Soviets need a great deal from us. We are unhappy with what they are doing, in human rights terms, in Central America and Afghanistan. Is it going to be made clear to them, before we give them something that they want in a particular sector, that we expect some progress in other sectors? I think that has been the benchmark of our foreign policy,

13

[L.C]

certainly as the Republican party is concerned, for some years. And I think I would like to
see it reinstituted- not in a rigid, mechanistic way, as some would suggest, but with a clear
assessment every inch of the way.

**ROGERS** It seems to me, we have to have linkage. The discussion about linkage at the summit meeting, I thought, was not properly placed. You cannot expect the Russian leader to come over here, and we ask that they get troops out of Afghanistan and Nicaragua, to say "Yes, I will do that." The test is going to be when he goes back, and what he does. If he does it, then that will be a manifestation that he means it. I thought the most serious admission that he made, while he was here....Henry, you and I were talking about Jewish emigration. And in the Nixon Administration, we had 40 or 50 thousand leave a year. Maybe it got as high as 60 thousand. Today, there are just a few thousand...was when he was asked that question. He said that they were not permitting emigration, as before, because the United States was deliberately trying to drain off their brains- the best brains they have in the nation. Now, if that is not an admission of failure that a nation as large as the Soviet Union is holding Jewish people that want to leave, because it would seriously affect adversely their government...that is an admission of giant proportions. And it also makes one very skeptical about whether you can believe him. Because obviously, it would be no problem for them to permit 40 to 50 thousand Jews to leave, as they did before. So, I think that they have a very weak economic situation. And, if it is true that they are not letting Jews leave the Soviet Union, because they are afraid that their best, smartest people will be leaving, that is a serious admission, on their part, that their system is not working.

**NEWMAN** Henry Trewhitt...

**TREWHITT** I just wanted to come back to General Haig and ask him if really the only way we can find out whether the Soviet Union is in a process of transition is to test them. Do you agree?

**HAIG** Absolutely. On very objective terms, though.

**TREWHITT** Engaging in negotiations?

**NEWMAN** Well, let's make this specific then: Afghanistan. It is the desire of the United States that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan. It is the stated desire of the Soviet government, through Gorbachev, that they withdraw from Afghanistan. Should the United States be assisting the Soviet Union to do that, by helping to draw up the terms of the withdrawal? Dr. Kissinger...

**KISSINGER** If I may say so, it is not, exactly, the right question.

**NEWMAN** You may not say so.

(laughter)

**KISSINGER** The question is not, "Do we assist them in getting out?" They should get out. The decision that they will have to make is whether they will permit the government of Kabul to fall, which it certainly will, as soon as they get out. If they say they will withdraw, only on the condition that we give a guarantee that the existing political arrangements in Afghanistan remain, which is, for one thing, beyond our power, and for another, would give them a constant excuse for intervention, then this we cannot accept. If,

14

[L.C]

on the other hand, they say, "We are willing to withdraw. We recognize that whatever happens to that government will happen. But, we don't want Afghanistan to be a Western base." We ought to help them in that respect. We don't want Afghanistan as a Western base. We can give any kind of assurance that is rational that Afghanistan will be a neutral country, in which the United States will not conduct any kind of military, or intelligence, activities. In that sense, it would be a fair arrangement. That is a discussion we can have, and should have. But, they must be willing to withdraw and, then, let nature take its course in Afghanistan, which all experts seem to think means the overthrow of the Kabul government. And they can have the satisfaction of knowing that the next government will also be overthrown, as has every Afghan government, since time's in-memorium.

(laughter)

NEWMAN Mr. Beecher...

BEECHER That Afghanistan domino, if you will pardon my putting it that way, leads to another domino. Assume in 1988, the Soviets do what they say they want to do and get out of Afghanistan, and we help them do it, because it is in our perceived self-interest to do so. That raises the question of what the next president does about Pakistan. The administration, as you all know, has been holding back on putting the blocks to Pakistan in its nulcear weapons development program, in large part, because of its help on supplying, or facilitating the supply of, Afghanistan, and, in part, because of the fear that if it did cut off aid that this might lead to an all-out development of nuclear weapons- no constraint by Pakistan in a race with India. I would like to address this question to Mr. Muskie. If you were giving advice to the next President on post-Afghanistan, what to do about the Pakistan nuclear question, what would that advice be?

MUSKIE Well, I suppose the answer to that is going to have to be an evolutionary one. We cannot, I think, abruptly, in advance, at this point, indicate a tougher policy and precisely what that would be. In the first place, we have not yet reached a point where the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan. Secondly, we do not know, exactly, what the situation within Afghanistan might become. It could well become chaos, which could impact upon Pakistan, so that for some period after the Soviet withdrawal, our relationship with Pakistan is going to have to continue. In the first place, there are some three million Afghan refugees.

NEWMAN I have actually seen the figure, Senator Muskie. Half the world's refugees are in Pakistan.

MUSKIE Yes, there is that problem to deal with. It can be dealt with, only with the cooperation of Pakistan. So, our evolving relationship with Pakistan, once the Afghanistan problem is behind both of us, is something that we have to address, at this point. And, I think, you cannot address it in terms of ultimatums. Now, when we were in office, in the pride of 1980, we had to deal with Pakistan and the nuclear question. As a matter of fact, I can recall discussing this with people in the Senate, like Senator Glenn, who is very much concerned about proliferation in the direction of both Pakistan and India. So, both of these problems are there. Neither of them are signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And each of them regards the other as their most deadly enemy. So, each of them has been reluctant to make a commitment to withdrawal from the nuclear option, down the line. So, it is going to be a difficult issue for us to resolve, with respect to our relations to Pakistan without resolving it with respect to our relations with India.

15

[L]

HAIG
weren't you?

I want to thank you, Ed. You were advising the next president,

(laughter)

Your real question is non-proliferation and are we now going to put the blocks to Pakistan, or are we going to wait until they no longer serve our purposes in Afghanistan? That is the way I read your question, Bill. And the answer is that both options are totally wrong. We cannot look at Pakistan in the proliferation area, having sat on our hands as India developed and exploded a nuclear weapons of its own. It is also very important, when you address the question of proliferation that you recognize that what drives nations to the nuclear alternative is insecurity. When the United States, in the conduct of its policy around the world, creates pockets of insecurity, because of its inconsistency, unreliability- shifting from a friend of Pakistan one day to a badgering, pedantic superpower the next day- we create more insecurity and a greater thirst for nuclear weapons, because these countries cannot afford to rely on a greater order or a greater sense of responsibility by the United States. When we talk this nuclear question, we sit here as though the only powers in the world that were nuclear were the United States and the Soviet Union. We have China. But for some courageous acts by Israel, we would have an Iraq with a nuclear weapon. There is a nation that would use biological weapons against Iranian teenagers. There is a nation that would not pause to use a nuclear weapon. So, these are the things that we have to remind ourselves of, not only to deter the Soviet Union, but irresponsible use of nuclear weapons by other powers. We must not have a double standard with our friends in Pakistan, who are strategically critical to us.

NEWMAN Mr. Vance...

VANCE What I wanted to say is, we face a dilemma with no good answer to it, here. The Pakistanis are violating, at this point, the nuclear policy of the United States, as legislated by the Congress. On the other hand, we do have the Indian problem. We also have the problem, still continuing, in Afghanistan. So, there is no good, simple answer. What I think is going to happen is that you will see that the problem is pushed off by some kind of legislation which says, "Let's let some time pass," whether it is six months, or something like that, and then the president will have to come in and certify whether it is in the national interest, or not, not to enforce the legislation, which currently would have to cut them off.

MUSKIE There is another point that relates to our first subject of this afternoon. That is that, when we negotiated the non-proliferation treaty, the Superpowers made the commitment that, in exchange for other countries signing it and denying themselves the nuclear option, the Superpowers would engage in meaningful disarmament talks. Now, we have the first, perhaps, meaningful treaty dealing with arms control- the first real reduction. But, whether or not we are able to enforce the objectives of the non-proliferation treaty...and it expires pretty soon...may well depend on how effectively we move from this INF Treaty to the on-going arms control discussions and agreements that they signal.

NEWMAN Henry Trewhitt...

TREWHITT I would like to move, just a little bit, in the same geographic area over

16

to the Persian Gulf. Dr. Kissinger, I will submit to you that it is not clear to me where we are going in the Persian Gulf. And I would like to ask you what the United States should be doing to both clarify policy and avoid a policy that tends to drive Iran, for the longer term, into the Soviet camp?

**KISSINGER** Before I answer the question, may I make a brief comment about something that has been said here constantly, which, with all respect, is not totally accurate. Namely, that this is the first significant arms control agreement. The ABM Treaty of 1972, whether one agrees with it or not, lead to the abolishing of ABM weapons. There is an offensive agreement of 1972 which lead to the abolishing of 240 Soviet long-range missiles. Unilaterally, it was unequal in that sense. And SALT-II would have required the dismantling of 300 Soviet long-range Soviet missiles, had it been ratified. I say this only to indicate that we should not mesmerize ourselves by these numbers. The INF Treaty is not, from this point of view, new. It is the first time both sides are giving up something. Now, to answer your question on the Persian Gulf. We have, it seems to me, the following problem. When the Iran-Iraq war broke out, I showed my diplomatic skill by saying, at a press conference, that my only regret was that only one of these countries could lose the war.

(laughter and applause)

The fact is, we have an interest in stalemate. A victory for either side would be fundamentally against our interests, because it would be a victory for secular radicalism if Iraq wins and for fundamentalism if Iran wins, and both of them would have no restraint in dealing with their moderate neighbors. This would, therefore, fundamentally affect our interests in that area. Now, I think, the present situation is that Iraq cannot win the war. And, so, we have a short term interest in preventing Iran from winning the war. Is the presence of the American fleet, in the Persian Gulf, a means of preventing Iran from winning the war? I have my doubts about that. It is a sign of our interest in that area. It was useful as a demonstration of determination, but as a permanent feature, it runs grave risks, including the risks that General Haig pointed out. Now, we have a longer term problem which is somewhat contradictory to the immediate one. The long term problem is that, from a geopolitical point of view, it is probable that Iran, no matter how obnoxious it is today, will be driven toward better relations with the West. Iran, historically, has been aboard the route of expansionism of imperial Russia and of the Soviet Union. Almost all invasions of Iran have come through that territory. It is, therefore, not likely that, as a permanent feature, that the United States would be perceived as the enemy of Iran. And, in that sense, Iran is in a position similar to China in the early 1960's. So, a wise American policy, if it can be managed, would, at one and the same time, try to prevent an Iranian victory now, but not get into unnecessary confrontations with Iran. I think the instinct of President Reagan in opening a dialogue with Iran was correct. What was wrong was to begin it with the sale of arms and to tie it to hostages.

**NEWMAN** Are we, because of our presence in the Persian Gulf, engaging in what you would call, and I use your term here, "unnecessary confrontations" with Iran?

**KISSINGER** The stated purpose of our presence in the Persian Gulf is to protect eleven Kuwaiti tankers that make, maybe, 200 passages a year. There are, all together, 26,000 passages a year through the Straits of Hormuz. So, if we got drawn, in the pursuit of that policy, into a military confrontation with Iran, I think we would, probably, be paying an exorbitant price for what we are achieving. Moreover, I do not believe an Iranian victory can be avoided by what is done at sea. If one were serious, one would have to do something

17

[LC]

on land, which would have no support in this country, and quite properly. So, we have to face this reality. I think, having shown our determination in the Gulf, we should reduce our presence to a level in which we do not become hostages to the sort of thing that went on in Beirut, where we are, then, forced to retali ate with respect to forces that should probably not be there in that quantity.

**HAIG** I just wanted to add, very briefly. The reality of our presence in the Persian Gulf...and incidently, now that we are there, it is not good for public officials to reflect abroad that we are less than unified on this question. We have 27,000 young American seamen exposed to the madness of Khomeini, and I think it behooves us all to be very careful about not inciting or inviting Khomeini attacks against our vessels, by showing disunity... Having said that, it is clear that, today, the Soviet Union is in a stronger position because of our entry than it was before we went in. We all know that Iraq, as Henry said, is not going to win this war. But, if the Soviets were to terminate their support, in tanks and other equipment, to Iran, I think the death knell may be rung for Iran. Now the Soviets sit there where they can feed to both sides. Cy Vance has been active in a U.N. proposal to get the American forces out. I find it difficult to understand why the administration is reluctant to do that, because I think that extracting, or lessening, our profile is ideal. Otherwise, we may confront an attack from Iran, which is going to demand such vigorous action, that Khomeini, himself, will be driven into the arms of the Russians- the very outcome we are in there to prevent.

**KISSINGER** Incidentally, I want to make clear, if there is an attack, I would favor very strong retaliation. We cannot be present with military force and permit them to operate surgically on us to see just exactly what our tolerance of pain is.

**HAIG** I agree with you.

**KISSINGER** So, if there is an attack, I quite favor retaliation.

**NEWMAN** I would like to put this question to Mr. Rusk, if I may... Mr. Rusk, there have been proposals for a U.N. force to take over in the Persian Gulf, and Mr. Vance has been one of the leaders in that movement. Elliot Richardson, among other people. And the Soviet Union, itself, has proposed a U.N. force in the Gulf. Would it make any sense to you to have a U.N. force there, rather than an Allied force with the United States and other European nations?

**RUSK** Well, I am very attracted to the idea put forth by Cy Vance, Elliot Richardson, and some others; particularly, if there is any chance of interesting the Russians in that. The idea would be that a combination of smaller powers- the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and so forth- would man those ships. I think it would be much more difficult for the Iranians to fight off those ships than to attack the ships of the great enemy, the United States. But, I am not sure that this idea will fly in the Security Council, because it depends, critically, upon the attitude of the Soviet Union. If we can get anything like an agreement with the Soviet Union, by way of the United States, because the United States has not taken up this matter as a matter of policy, then there is some real hope for it.

**BEECHER** Excuse me, Mr. Rusk, but the Soviet proposal is that there would be American and Soviet contingents in that fleet. That is their proposal.

**RUSK** Yes, well, traditionally, the United States and the Soviet Union have

18

[L]

stood aside on these U.N. peace-keeping forces, on the grounds that that makes them less dangerous and easier to manage. I would suspect that you could work it out so that neither we nor the Soviet Union would be a party in that kind of a force.

NEWMAN Mr. Vance...

VANCE Elliot's and my proposal was that you would not have, in the peace-
keeping force, itself, either Soviet or American naval forces. And this has been discussed
with the Soviet Union, and they do not rule out considering it.

NEWMAN This has been discussed by whom?

VANCE Various people.

NEWMAN Not by the United States government.

VANCE
No, not by the United States government, but by people in the United
Nations.

NEWMAN Mr. Rogers...

ROGERS Well, I think the discussion Henry and Al gave is correct, but it does point out the problems that public officials have. And we all know what the problems are, because we have been there. I think, myself, that President Reagan and others in the administration have handled this problem pretty well. Of course, there are always two sides to these things. But, I think, had we not reflagged and had we not sent our ships in there, then we might have an oil crisis now. And I think the fact that the other nations came along reluctantly and now support our policy is pretty good proof that, at least for the moment, the policy seems to be working. If, in fact, the Russians- and there is some suggestion they might do it- do support the U.N. resolution to, in effect, call for an arms embargo, it might show that the policy is working. I do not know what the alternative is. One of the things about foreign policy, that we all know, is that, no matter what choice you make, you had an unfortunate choice, because there are no good choices. And there was no good choice in this case. I think that the choice that the President made was a good one. And I think it is working. And I think it is very easy to fail to see that a policy like that is successful. Now, it may not be in the long run, but I think most people, now, feel that the policy is a good one. I certainly agree with the idea that we have got to figure out a way to get out of there and reduce our presence. But, for the moment, I think it is a good policy, and it has worked.

NEWMAN Dr. Kissinger...

KISSINGER The ambivalence, to put it mildly, of Soviet conduct is shown, it seems to me, in the Persian Gulf issue. It would be relatively simple for the Soviet Union to support the two resolutions. Well, they supported the first one, calling for a cease-fire, and the logical consequence would be an arms embargo. Instead, once we put ourselves in a position where we seem to be confronting Iran in the sea war, they have actually warmed up their relations with Iran, rather than support us, at least to the extent of discouraging Iranian aggressiveness. A Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister makes monthly visits to Iran now. The Soviets are selling oil that we are not buying, that the French are not buying, and that the Japanese are cutting down. They are selling it out of Paku as Russian oil. So, objectively, they are keeping the pot boiling in the Persian Gulf. And to get back to our original

19

discussion...If they want a real relaxation of tensions, they cannot say to us, "Get rid of the nuclear weapons with which you have been opposing us, while we keep stirring every crisis that goes on all over the world." The easiest thing in the world for them to do would be to join the second U.N. resolution on the arms embargo. And I would consider that an important test of whether they are even partially serious, or not.

**NEWMAN** I would like to ask one question and get a brief answer to it, if that is possible. Iran refuses to accept the United Nations' resolution, because it does not brand Iraq as an aggressor. Is that an unreasonable demand, on the part of Iran?

**HAIG** I don't think so. I think it is relatively easy one for Iran to accept, given the dire straits it is in. The real problem is that they, also, under the surface, continue to insist on reparation levels that are preposterous as well as the removal of the leader of Iraq, in which, of course, no one will participate. Let me just say a word, briefly. In the Spring of 1982, I sent a memorandum to President Reagan. In it, I said, "This is a war in which we want no winner." Just as Henry said. "But, it is a unique war, because if all else is even, East and West, North and South, all have an interest in bringing this war to a conclusion. It is one of those unique conflicts that should go to the United Nations. Now, that sat moribound until 1987. And we did not go to the United Nations, until we had entered into the unilateral flagging operation. I am not sure I am so comfortable about the wasting of this decision, Bill, because the risks have opened the door to Moscow. The policy is more welcome in Baghdad and Tehran, than it is in the United States today."

**ROGERS** Would you not have done it?

**HAIG** Not under those circumstances, no.

**ROGERS** Would you have done it at all?

**HAIG** Well, you know I am not known for being a dove. But, I think that when you use your power, you had better know where you are going to get out and what you are going to accomplish.

**ROGERS** But, it was a tough decision to make. And, I think, on the balance, it probably turned out to be good. But, it is not an easy decision.

**HAIG** No, very difficult.

**RUSK** Don't jinx those fellows on those ships out there in the Persian Gulf, Bill. Something may happen this afternoon, or tomorrow morning.

**ROGERS** Of course.

**NEWMAN** Well, gentlemen, we are going to leave this subject and, at this point, we are going to take a break. And, as they say on television, "We'll be back."

INTERMISSION

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**NEWMAN** Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to resume by discussing the United States and Central America, and I believe Bill Beecher has a question on that.

**BEECHER** Let's start with Nicaragua, and I would like to address this question to two members of the panel: the man who has had a career in the military and the man who has been a career diplomat, General Haig and Dean Rusk. Assume for the sake of discussion that the government of Nicaragua, essentially, lives up to its commitments in the Arias Plan and that the Contras whither away; following which, the government becomes much more repressive, domestically, and much more active among its neighbors in terms of supporting insurrectionist movements. In that event, what principal options do you think this government, be it republican or democratic, should consider? And what would you, personally, recommend?

**HAIG** First Bill, I am going to challenge your premise, because the Arias Plan, unfortunately, does not even treat the strategic dimension of Nicaragua- which is not the suppression of human rights or the adoption of Marxism, as undesirable as that is, but rather, illegal Soviet and Cuban interventionism in the internal affairs of Central American Republics. So, if you would premise your question with the fact that the Arias Plan is modified to insist that Cuba and the Soviet Union keep out of this hemisphere and indeed they do, then I might have an answer for you. And the answer would probably be: we cannot have a Breshnev Doctrine here in the Western Hemisphere. We are not entitled to tell our western hemisphere neighbors what kind of governments they are entitled to have. Were they to go to Marxism, independent of Soviet and Cuban imposition of that system, I would be reasonably confident that it would collapse of its own weight. The Nicaraguan people, whether of Hispanic or Indian origin, are fundamentally not with Soviet or Marxist philosophy. It is being imposed on them. That is the trouble with the Arias Plan. It does not even deal with that problem. That was the problem with our policy in Central America from day one, not only in this administration, but in the preceding administration.

**BEECHER** Does that mean that you would propose a policy of containment in that situation?

**HAIG** I would propose a policy, in light of your other very astute question about the additional leverage available to the West as the Soviet Union's demographic power is in decline, to insist that their violation of international laws through wars of liberation, directly and sur proxy, is no longer an acceptable course. I think we have the leverage to do this because Central America is not a causus belli, as perhaps Afghanistan or Poland would be. It is a target of opportunity. We started out the wrong way. We created a covert program in which we wanted to have it both ways. We could get up in the morning and be loved by the American people because we hadn't disturbed their tranquility and go to bed at night and tell ourselves we'd done something tough against all those Marxist Sandinistas. All the way we were deluding ourselves, because it is the Soviet Union and Castro's Cuba that are causing these problems. Of course, there is a major social justice problem, but that is for the people of that region to resolve with our help, and our sympathy, and our generosity.

**NEWMAN** Well, General Haig, about going to the source.

**HAIG** That's what I meant.

**NEWMAN** That's what you're talking about now?

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HAIG That's right. It did not mean landing marines in Havana harbor.

NEWMAN What did it mean?

HAIG It meant that we had geopolitical assets available to us as early as 1981, where these Soviet failures were very evident to all who were taking the trouble to look. And had we, through a combination of "carrots and sticks"- linkage, arms control, American technology and credits- which they are all going to get now rather healthily, I think we could have gotten an agreement for the Soviets to leave. In fact, in 1962 in February, Gromyko finally said to me, "Haig, all I ever hear from you is 'Cuba, Cuba, Cuba'. So from now on, Cuba is your problem." What a tremendous concession that was. We did not follow up on it.

NEWMAN You say that was in '62?

HAIG 82...excuse me. February of '82.

NEWMAN Mr. Rusk...

RUSK Well, to me, one of the serious missing pieces in this Nicaraguan affair is that we have allowed it to become a unilateral problem for the United States. We have very little support from the other countries of the Hemisphere. In February of 1962, the Organization of American States expelled Fidel Castro from the organization on the grounds that Marxist-Leninism was incompatible with the political traditions of the Western Hemisphere. In the Summer of 1964, Castro was caught, red-handed, landing men-in-arms on the coast of Venezuela. The foreign ministers of the Hemisphere met and imposed upon Castro all of the sanctions that were available under the Rio Pact, with the exception of the use of armed force. At that time, they said to Castro, "Now, if this activity continues, we do not exclude the use of armed force." Well, now, in the present situation, we have no allies in the Hemisphere to speak of. It would be a mistake for us to pursue this matter solely as a United States policy. We ought to seek the support of others in the Hemisphere.

NEWMAN Mr. Rusk, why do we have no allies in the hemisphere?

RUSK I don't know exactly why. Maybe it's because we haven't sought them. We haven't tried hard enough to get them.

NEWMAN At the end of November, the presidents of eight Latin American countries met in Mexico. It was the first time such a meeting had taken place without the presence of the United States. In the course of that meeting, they decided that they wanted to bring Cuba back into hemispheric organizations. Is that something that we should accept?

RUSK President Kennedy put before Castro the basis on which he could be brought back into the hemisphere: One, to stay out of the internal affairs of other countries in the hemisphere; two, to reduce his military relationship with the Soviet Union. Every year, for a number of years, he was in one way or another asked whether he had an interest in such a return into the hemisphere. We never saw any evidence of his interest in doing so. I do not know whether Castro is interested in reconciliation with the United States. I have not seen very much evidence of it. Maybe someone here knows more than I do about it. But it seems to me that we ought to concentrate on strengthening our relations with El

22

Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras and be very alert to anything that Nicaragua is doing to infiltrate those countries with agents, arms and other respects. I would take General George Marshall's advice to leave the military option as the last possible option- as the last resort. And I would not suggest anything like the introduction of American troops, until the situation was very much more dangerous than it is and we had more support from the hemisphere.

**NEWMAN**
But you would ultimately turn to that if necessary to prevent the establishment of a communist...

**RUSK**
Well, as a very last resort. That means at the very end of the trail. If we were to go into Nicaragua or Cuba with our armed forces, our closest friends in the hemisphere who do not like these regimes would tell us that those casualties would inflict scars on the hemisphere that would take generations to heal. You see, the Monroe Doctrine has been put on a multilateral basis through the charter of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. So we ought to try to work in concert with others to the maximum extent possible.

**NEWMAN**
Dr. Kissinger...

**KISSINGER**
I would like to make two points: one is with respect to Bill Beecher's question, and the other is with respect to yours. I think, Bill you have put your finger on the essence of the problem in relation to Nicaragua. Is our concern the domestic structure of Nicaragua, or is our concern the external conduct of Nicaragua abetted by the presence of Cuban and Soviet advisors? The Arias Plan focuses almost entirely on domestic arrangements in Nicaragua. Therefore, even if it were implemented completely, once the countries have disappeared, if it were reversed, we would have absolutely no sanction except the introduction of American forces if we wanted to do something. I have always believed the principal concern we should have is the presence of Cuban advisors, of a large Soviet group and of a large Nicaraguan army, that is as large as all the armies of the surrounding countries put together. It seems to me, that the conditions for settling with Nicaragua should focus on these things: get rid of the Cubans; get rid of the special ties with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc- the Communist state within the Western hemisphere; reduce your armed forces to traditional levels in Central America in relation to what other forces exist there. Then, the internal structure of Nicaragua is something that we might have preferences about. But, that would not be my principal concern. Above all, these objectives would be observable and enforceable, while democratization in a country that never has had democracy is such a vague idea, that 'A', you will not know whether it has been achieved, and 'B', you cannot do anything after it has been reversed. This is why most of the discussion about the Contra aid right now seems to me to be beside the point. Now, the point Mr. Newman raised. I believe that the meeting of the eight Latin American presidents in Acapulco, a few weeks ago, is one of the most significant events of recent years. It would have been inconceivable that Latin American presidents would meet without the presence of the United States and without any of them checking with Washington first about what our approach would be to those issues. That idea has never been put forward before. It has never happened. It argues very ill for what has been the one consistent American foreign policy over our history- namely, a special relationship in the Western Hemisphere. I think the biggest trigger for this is not Nicaragua but the Latin American debt question, which, in its present form, is unmanageable by their political processes, and in which banks are negotiating with governments about austerity measures over a long period of time. When we know the difficulties we have to cut thirty billion dollars out of the budget once, and we are

23

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asking them, by private institutions, to do this on a long-range basis, with fragile democracies, *they* are being put under tremendous pressure. If that continues, we are going to have our energies absorbed in the Western Hemisphere in a way that makes that debate on whether we are going to be able to defend Europe, or the Pacific, really almost beside the point. Now the question, "Why don't they support us on Nicaragua?" Partly, because they have important domestic problems. When I was chairman of the Central American Commission, an assignment given to me because it was the one area in the world in which I admitted I knew nothing,...

(laughter)

When I was Chairman of the Central American Commission, I was talking to one of the leaders of Latin America and he said, "I hope you won't invade Nicaragua, "because if you do, I will have to lead a march of a million people on the American Embassy in protest, praying every step of the way that you succeed."

(laughter)

KISSINGER And I think this is one of their ambivalences.

HAIG I think Henry has made a very good point on the Third World debt. I think it is rather outrageous that, for almost twelve years, we have failed to come to grips with this. It is also outrageous that only a courageous private-sector banker of Citibank had to start the process, within our private institutions, to write-off some of this debt. Clearly, a federal program is long overdue which would involve: discounting these debts; selling them off in secondary markets; debt-to-equity swaps; an infusion of capital, of the kind that Nakasoni offered last Spring to these developing nations to get them out of this dreadful bind, which has fundamental revolutionary potential.

NEWMAN We have been talking about the Arias Plan, President Arias of Costa Rica suggested that what Central America needed was a latter day Marshall Plan. Is that something the United States could afford?

HAIG No. Not in this environment. We need good business practices which involve a whole interrelationship between pulling up their socks in the developing countries emphasizing rather than conditionality, which simply did not work. Debt to equity swaps will propel this. And it's time we got with it.

NEWMAN Mr. Vance...

VANCE I am glad that Henry raised this problem of Third World debt, because I think it is one of the most serious problems that faces us. It is a ticking time bomb. It is entirely possible that within the next few months, perhaps even earlier, you may see Brazil continue on a non-accrual basis, saying, "We are just not going to pay our debts." Argentina, sadly, may be in the same kind of a situation. If they do that, then I wonder what may happen with respect to countries like Mexico, etc. Now, this is not a simple problem. It is not a problem that I think can be resolved by the banks alone. It is going to involve the United States government, itself, becoming involved in working with the banks. In addition, it is going to involve working with other nations...the Japanese, the British, the Germans, and others. But, the bomb is ticking, and we darn well better get on with doing something about it before time runs out.

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[L.C.]

**NEWMAN** Is the United States still, in your view, Mr. Vance, strong enough economically, given the budget deficit and the trade deficit, to undertake constructive action of the kind you are talking about?

**VANCE** Yes.

**RUSK** Well, we have one weakness. It is a little difficult for us, at the present time, to go to these countries and say, "You are running too large a government deficit."

(laughter and applause)

It isn't easy for us to help them put their house in order. Now, this private lending to the developing countries jumped considerably since I left office. And I was a bit surprised by it, because we knew, all along, that these debts were rollover debts: they would never be repaid. So, in my period, we tried to leave such lending to the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank, the aid programs and things that could be rolled over. Well, now the private banks have found themselves in a bind because of the large lending that they have incurred. Now, as Al Haig has suggested, they are beginning to break themselves out of it by selling these obligations at a discount of 50-60%, and some of them as low as 30%, to write these debts off. Well, that's one way of solving the problem. And it may solve a few, because some of these banks have enough loan loss reserves to cover a considerable part of it. But nevertheless it is a big problem, and I can not see how we can solve it without the government stepping in, provided that we find a way to pay for it. And there are not many candidates these days who step out and tell us how to pay for it.

**ROGERS** Here's your chance, Al.

(laughter)

**HAIG** The facts are that the program I describe write down debt-to-equity swaps, secondary market sales and a modest infusion from all of the developing world- not just Japan, with its offer of thirty billion, but western Europe and the oil-producing countries. The United States could make, I think, the curve of this indebtedness begin to precipitously drop, with hope and economic growth. At the same time, we are going to realize tremendous benefits from the relief of this Third World debt. We are losing about twenty billion dollars every year in support and as many as a million jobs here in America, because of the state of these economies.

**NEWMAN** Henry Trewhitt, you have a question for Dr. Kissinger I think.

**TREWHITT** Well, I want to get to Mr. Vance because I'm not going to let him get away with that one word answer. We seem to be dealing with one aspect...

**NEWMAN** I was thinking of legislating in favor of one word answers.

(laughter and applause)

**TREWHITT** I refuse to concede the point because it seems to me that if we've

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learned anything, Mr. Vance, in the last few years it is the importance of the economy, generally, in the position of a great world power. For a good part of the post World War II period, the United States was supreme because of its industrial capacity and its general economic position. Something for sure has happened. When did we begin to slide in that regard? What should we do about it? And is it possible for us to do something about it? You certainly can't answer that in one word.

**VANCE** I won't try. With respect to what one should do, it has got to be these various organizations working together. The banks themselves have to see if they can find common ground about how they're going to take steps, and we haven't got the time to talk about what those various steps might be. But they have got to work with the State Department and with the Federal Reserve. They have got to work with the Treasury Department. They must work also, through the government, with the World Bank, with the IMF and with other nations, such as Al and I have suggested. Out of all of this, I think you could put together a package that might begin to be able to deal with this problem. If we have everybody really sitting on their hands and doing nothing, the problem is just going to explode, and we start very damn far down on the ladder.

**TREWHITT** Well, isn't this a problem that is more broadly one of the nation's economy in general more than a government problem?

**VANCE** Let me say, on the nation's economy, we have overspent. We, now, find ourselves as the larger debtor in the world. We have been running these incredible deficits which we're not prepared to face up to. What the Congress and the Administration did in coming up with recent action is much less than what ought to be done. It ought to be multi-year, and more than just a couple of years. It should not include such things as selling assets and saying that you're really selling. You've really got to take the problem seriously. I don't think it's being taken seriously.

(applause)

**NEWMAN** Mr. Rogers...

**ROGERS** I think that is probably unfair to those who are working on the problem.

**VANCE** Nobody's suggesting that...

**ROGERS** Well, I didn't mean to criticize you, but I listen to things like debt-equity swaps. I've been involved in some of that lately of my profession, and it's an extremely difficult, complicated problem. I don't really think it's going to make much difference. I don't think that's a solution. I'm not even sure that anybody knows what the solution to these problems is. I think a lot of people are giving a lot of attention to it, certainly the financial markets are. There's one more major problem that relates to this. There has been a major change in what I call the "flow of money" among countries. The flow of money among countries is an amazing development. It contributed, in part, to the recent stock exchange drop. Money's flow back and forth not as people might think. Nobody carries cash back and forth in airplanes. It is all done on computers. It can be done in thirty seconds and on a twenty four hour basis. The money that exists in the world is affected a great deal by economic conditions. It can change overnight. We have not learned how to deal with that yet. The Japanese are probably better at it than we are. It

26

is going to have a great deal of effect not only on foreign policy but on leadership in different parts of the world. You have nations like West Germany, Japan, the United States, and a few-Korea, Taiwan- who are making tremendous strides. They have control over a lot of money. In fact, seven of the ten largest banks in the world are Japanese, which is really startling. We have to consider how to deal with this flow of money. It's sure not an easy problem, and it's one that a lot of people are giving a lot of thought to.

NEWMAN Dr. Kissinger...

KISSINGER I have been lapped a few times by my colleagues, since I raised my hand. I wanted to answer your question, "Can we afford a Marshall Plan for Central America?" The Central American Commission, the bipartisan commission, made an analysis and kept a unanimous conclusion. We added up all the money that is being spent in Central America, anyway, now, on a bilateral basis. Then, we tried to analyze what it would take to get Central America back to the situation in which it found itself when the civil war started. The increase that was needed was something like 250-300 million dollars a year.

NEWMAN Did you say million or billion?

KISSINGER Million. It was not a large sum that was involved. I know, you add a billion here and a billion there and pretty soon you run into real money.

(laughter and applause)

KISSINGER Well, we were all surprised at the relatively modest amount that would be needed if you could make a coherent plan that covers the whole area and don't piddle it away in a lot of bilateral programs institutions in which the various assistant professors are applying their latest theory of economic development to Central American countries. But that is a manageable problem. Frankly, we have had the hugest problems with the aid bureaucracy to get them to deal with it as a coherent Central American problem rather than as a national problem. But that one I think is manageable. Now on the Latin American debt question. I think that the fundamental necessity is to recognize the nature of the problem. The money was lent at a time when the banks were awash in oil money. Everybody thought the oil prices would keep rising, so that one would get paid back in inflated dollars. There was some reasonable expectation that it would work. Then the oil dropped, interest rates shot up, and all of the assumptions did not work. That produced the crisis. The crisis, up to now, has been handled by lending these Latin American countries money that then comes right back to us in order to pay interest. So that, as they pay interest, their debt increases and every year the interest increases. Now, that process has, mathematically, an end. It can't go on year after year. It's like compounding interest. It happened also at a time when democratic governments came into power and what is needed is a recognition by governments that this is a political problem. It's a political problem in the sense that the western hemisphere relationship has been central to American policy since the Monroe Doctrine. If we suddenly are confronted with a whole group of hostile countries south of us, the whole perception of the world of America will change. If we are excited about Cuba and Nicaragua, some tiny countries, what are we going to do when Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina become radical? But, now, what is the solution? Everybody has to make a contribution. The banks have to take some losses- some significant losses. The industrial democracies have to put up some money. The Latin American countries have to restructure their economies: but they cannot do that, unless it is part of a coherent program. They cannot do it just to get the interest that comes right back to us, which is the current

27

[L]

the picture we got when I was last in public office. Now, it's resurged in Nicaragua, "the
target of opportunity," as Al Haig put it.

**NEWMAN** But we know that during the recent visit of Gorbachev to Washington, he did, to some extent, discuss or mention Nicaragua. And there were suggestions that the Soviet Union was in the process of reducing its commitments there.

**MUSKIE** I think what he is quoted as saying third hand and so vague that you're not sure that it's a commitment. I think he was holding out a possibility.

**NEWMAN** Bill Beecher...

**BEECHER** I wonder if we could shift, for a moment, to the implications of the Iran-Contra mess. I would like to direct this question to the only former candidate for President on the dais, Senator Muskie. The actions of some of President Reagan's cabinet members in the Iran-Contra business, I'm speaking here specifically of Attorney General Ed Meese and the late CIA director William Casey, raised very troubling questions about propriety and wisdom of having long-time political allies in jobs that were particularly sensitive and that should require objective advice. President Reagan has not been the only Chief Executive with that problem. You can think of the Attorney Generals of presidents Kennedy and Nixon as well. Should all candidates for the highest office in the land be asked to pledge to appoint well-qualified essentially non-political men and women to such posts as Head of the Justice Department, the CIA, and the FBI?

**MUSKIE** No, I do not think so. This is a political system we have. Whether or not the wrong people have been appointed, because of their political lies, is a legitimate question. That question addresses itself to the judgment of the president and his perception of what is required. Now, I'm not going to get into any ad-homonym discussion of particular names suggested as illustrations. This is a political system. A point that we tried to make in the Iran-Contra Report of the Tower Board is that the president, who is, himself, an elected official, should work with the Congress made up of elected people in order to set the standards, because they are accountable to the political process. What went wrong, in part, in the Iran-Contra matter, as the congressional hearings revealed, was that policy was being made by people who were not accountable to the people who were electible.

**BEECHER** But why should it be particularly important to have a political soulmate in a job like that? Why is that important to a president?

**MUSKIE** I'm not sure I understand your point.

**BEECHER** Well, these are jobs that, generally, the institutions in government want to be objective, so they don't have to think that there are personal political factors that are involved in the judgments that are being offered.

**MUSKIE** But there are political factors that are involved in making foreign policy. If foreign policy cannot rest upon the support, understanding and knowledge of the people of this country, it isn't going to be worthwhile. In order for that to happen, you have got to have Congress involved. You've got to have the president involved, and the people they appoint. They must have a clear understanding of what the president expects of them. Congress has to have a complete understanding as to what they're doing. That's the nature of the process. For example, the National Security Council is made up of four people,

29

[L]

statutorily: the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Too many people refer loosely to the National Security Staff which is made up of 50 to 100 or more people as the National Security Council. They are not. Those people are not elected. They are non-political in the sense that they are not selected primarily for their political affiliations. That process failed. It failed because if you look through the documents, if you look through the Tower Report, if you look through the two congressional reports, what you have is the story of people even outside the government who were directly conducting the operations which lead to all the mistakes and failures that have been headlines in the country's newspapers for the last year. People like Secord, Hakim, and others. Ollie North was not an elected official. Ollie North was a member of the National Security Staff. He had no direct mandate or authority to do what he did. The CIA director, Mr. Casey, just brushed this responsibility aside for reasons we still don't understand. The CIA should have been conducting this operation. The CIA would have been headed by a man who understood what his responsibilities were. He also would have understood what his responsibilities to Congress were. Congress was kept in the dark for a whole year. So, I think, it is the fact that the elected political people stayed outside the process, that these other people got involved and ran it, and ran it into the ground.

**NEWMAN** Senator Muskie, are there any lessons to be learned from what you have been talking about, about the way in which foreign policy and covert actions go together?

**MUSKIE** Let's talk about covert activities. There may be differences of opinion among our group here as to the extent to which covert operations should be conducted. My own view is that there are occasions when they are needed. On those occasions, it ought to be clear that the president has authorized them, and that he has authorized them on the basis of what he considers to be vital national security reasons. It ought to be understood by those who have the responsibility for conducting these activities, that this was the president's decision. Now in the Iran-Contra case, there was no written finding by the president. A written finding came later and its existence concealed from the top people in the government. So there has to be that. Secondly, under the statutes of the government, there has to be the relationship of the Congress to covert operations. The Congress is supposed to be notified of the operation before the operation is undertaken, unless the President finds that there's a valid national security reason for not notifying the Congress on time. In this case, the Congress was not notified for a full year, and then only by accident.

**NEWMAN** In your experience, Senator Muskie, let's say the House and Senate Intelligence Committees are advised, as law requires, of covert activities about to begin. And suppose some members of the committee oppose this activity, this operation. What can they do? What should they do?

**MUSKIE** Indicate their disapproval.

**NEWMAN** To whom?

**MUSKIE** To the administration.

**NEWMAN** And if the administration goes ahead, then what?

**MUSKIE** If it's a majority of the committee, then the administration goes forward in face of congressional opposition.

30

NEWMAN General Haig...

HAIG This is the President's prerogative- his responsibility. It cannot be preconditioned by rule or by practice. In my experience with seven presidents, when it comes to the office of the director of the CIA or the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there's a great deal of the attention to the qualifications of the man, his potential for bipartisan support. In many instances, our directors of both of those agencies have gone on from administration to administration. There's a professionalism in those two offices. The Attorney General is, of course, the president's lawyer and he must be first and foremost his choice. But he must also be a highly qualified legal expert. If this administration has suffered from anything, it is in, on some occasions, failing to go to the quality that they should have, and then maintain the hands-on management that is necessary.

NEWMAN I would like to go back to a question I put earlier. Suppose an administration proposes to go ahead with a covert activity of some kind and members of the congressional committees disapprove of it. What should they do?

ROGERS Well, an honest answer is a short one: they leak it to the press. That is what they do. If they don't like it, they leak it to the press. One of the Intelligence Committees' members admitted that he did, and they forced him to resign from the committee. So, in real life, that is one of the problems the Executive Branch has. If you give information of that kind to the Senate, or to the House, and they don't like it, some member will leak it to the press. That is exactly why the cooperation is not as good as it used to be. That is something that should be corrected. Congress should work out a system of a few people that can deal with the president and that can trust him. It would make all the difference in the world.

KISSINGER My impression is, if the majority of the committee opposes it, you cannot go ahead with it. If the minority of the committee opposes it, then what Bill said is exactly what will happen: it will leak.

MUSKIE Is that why the President proposed to ask all of his cabinet members to take lie detector tests?

KISSINGER I am against lie detector tests.

MUSKIE Well, but it is obvious from that initiative by the President that the leak problem exists in the Executive Branch as well as in the Congressional Branch. Now, with respect to covert operations. If he is reluctant to inform the entire membership of the Intelligence Committees, he must, at least, notify the top eight people- the leadership of each House and the Chairman of each committee. Now, if he can't trust them...if our system of congressional government has reached the point where the president cannot confide in the congressional leadership of both Houses and the chairmen of the Intelligence Committees, then...and I think their record is excellent, not withstanding your charge, Bill. It is true that there have been leaks from the Executive Branch. There have also been leaks from the Congress. But, it is not a one-sided problem.

ROGERS Not at all. But, the question was, "What does a member of a committee do who disagrees with a policy of the president on a covert action, and the president goes ahead anyway?" What he does, and Senator Lay admitted this, is he leaks it to the press.

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Now, you cannot deny that.

MUSKIE You made it as a general accusation, that it always happens.

ROGERS No, not at all.

NEWMAN What **should** he do?

ROGERS I think what Ed Muskie says is exactly right: get a small group that are trustworthy and that the president can trust. As a matter of fact, that is the way it used to work. Even when Dean Rusk was there, I am sure it did. And before that, I know it worked. You had a few people in the Congress you could trust. You could go to the Speaker...

(laughter)

...Arthur Vandenberg and a few others like that. But, the fact is, Washington is a sieve now. You cannot do anything, unless you hold it within the confines of a few people. I am not excusing what they did in the Iran-Contra thing. I thought it was a mess. I mean, the whole idea of shipping arms to Iran was a dumb idea...just a dumb idea.

(laughter)

RUSK Let me point out to you that the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense strongly opposed it.

MUSKIE That is the point I wanted to make. If they had been backed up with the leadership in the Congress, of which I have just spoken, I doubt that this policy would have gone forward. I doubt it very much. Nobody would have had to leak.

NEWMAN Mr. Vance...

VANCE I just wanted to make a point that Ed has just made. I think it is a critically important point. I also think that it is clearly proper and right that there should be an oversight in the Congress for covert operations, and that they should be limited in number. Certainly, this handful of people, who have had long, long service in the Congress, can be entitled to receive this information, indeed, must have this information. I would like to add one more thing. Sure there have been leaks. But, during the Iran hostage crisis, I or my deputy, met at least five to six days a week with the leadership on both sides, Senate and House. I and Warren Christopher told them everything without one word of it being leaked. From time to time, when we met with large numbers of the Senate and of the House, we said, "Look, this will jeopardize our country's interests and others." And there were no leaks. So, it can be done.

NEWMAN It can be done when everybody has agreed on the purpose to be achieved, which was to get the hostages free. Can it be done when there's disagreement over the purpose to be achieved?

VANCE The answer is I think, in most cases is, yes, you probably can, if you realize the national interest of the country is involved...

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**RUSK** Well, I look back to the old joint Committee of the Congress. They received, for years, the most sensitive secrets of the government, and I don't think there was ever a leak from that committee that was any source of embarrassment. It can be done if the members are determined to do it.

**NEWMAN** Mr. Vance, I'd like to ask you a question based on something you told a Senate committee in 1975, when you were Secretary of State. You told the committee that...

**KISSINGER** If he told it in '75 and said he was Secretary of State, he was an impostor.

(laughter)

**NEWMAN** Thank you.

(laughter)

**NEWMAN** I think the phrase I'm searching for is, "I stand corrected."

(laughter)

**NEWMAN** In whatever capacity you had in those days, you told a Senate Committee...

**VANCE** ...private citizen...

**NEWMAN** ...that a covert activity should be undertaken only when it "is absolutely essential to the national security and when no other means are available." If the action is so essential, might it not be better for it to be taken openly?

**VANCE** Sure, it would be much better for you to take it openly if you can. But there are some rare occasions when you can't. Then, in the national interest, you ought to be able to do it covertly.

**MUSKIE** For example, in the case of the hostage rescue outfit. What was involved there if it became public was the safety of the hostages. As a matter of fact, in the case of this Iran-hostage matter, when the President signed that finding in January of 1986, he said that Congress should not be notified because what that finding contemplated was the delivery of arms in February in return for hostages. But the hostages were never returned. There was a reason not to notify the Congress at the time that the initiative was undertaken. That is a reason for not doing something publicly, but, rather, secretly.

**NEWMAN** We've talked a good deal today, gentlemen, about whether the Soviet Union's economic difficulty is forcing its hand in matters of foreign policy and of domestic affairs. The United States clearly is not as healthy economically as it once was. To what extent does this affect our foreign policy?

**HAIG** Well, it clearly affects it tremendously and increasingly. As we look at the long overdue efforts to bring our deficit under control, there's a tendency first to look to the defense spending sector as the main contributor, and therefore, to look for savings

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in defense to solve our deficit. Well, it didn't cause the deficit. Defense spending, although it was too high in the initial years, was not a contributor. Secondly, we are scaling down our assistance programs to every recipient nation around the world and we're gutting the size of our State Department. Sometimes I would like to see a trend in certain places but not as a general discipline. I think this deficit is perhaps the most urgent problem facing America. Not only in the context of or standard of living here in America, and the hopes for a world of peace in western industrialized democracies, but also in the conduct of our foreign policy. And it's long past the time that we got with it.

NEWMAN Mr. Trewhitt, I think you had a question on the subject.

TREWHITT Well, I just wanted to come back to Mr. Vance again on that. I'm still trying to get a real prescription for the domestic economy in terms of its application of foreign policy. What should we be doing internally, Mr. Secretary?

VANCE First of all, we should really be getting our budget deficits under control in a serious way, which we're not doing. Secondly, we have got to become more competitive. We have lost our competitiveness, and we really can have that back again if we're willing to dig in, work hard, trim the fat out and use our marketing skills which we've had over the years. We have to recognize not only where we are able to go and what we are able to achieve, but to how we're percieved. It is not enough to have military strength. You have to have economic strength and political strength as well. That is how you are percieved in the world. It makes a lot of difference in the clout that our country has in trying to do the things which are in our national interest.

ROGERS Well, I agree with the idea that the economy is a very important in the conduct of foreign policy. I don't agree, though, that the economy is weak-putting aside the deficit, which is obviously a problem. I think we're solving it. I think a more important problem is the trade imbalance. Other than that, our economy is very strong. I mean, we have the highest rate of employment we've ever had, by far. We have a very low rate of unemployment. We have a low rate of interest. We have low inflation. We are producing tremendous amounts of goods and services. We're the envy of the rest of the world. Other nations, like Germany and Japan, are still investing a lot of money in this country. So I think that the idea that we have a weak economy is a political argument. It's not a realistic argument. We've had a little trouble with the stock market. I think the stock market was too high, but it's coming back now. I don't think that our economy is weak at all. Talking to people from the rest of the world, they think our economy is good. They all complain about us, because that is par for the course. Europeans are always complaining.

HAIG This argument has deteriorated into an assault on the health of our economy. I think the original question had to do with the deficit and the measures taken to correct it and its impact on foreign policy. And I think it's a rather important impact.

ROGERS Well, I do too.

HAIG I share your view...

ROGERS I think Ed said, in the question, that we had a weak economy. I don't think we do. I agree with you. Obviously the deficit's a problem that we've got to solve. And the trade imbalance is a problem.

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**HAIG** We have to do it. And if we don't do it in prompt terms, then we're going to be facing a real problem...

**ROGERS** But we shouldn't keep beating ourselves over the back that we've got a weak economy. It's very good. One of the reasons the Russians are negotiating with us is that they know it. They say so. So do the Chinese. I don't think we should leave the audience with the idea that we have a weak system. We have some imperfections, which I believe we can correct.

(applause)

**RUSK** Something is weak about it, because I watch C-SPAN quite frequently and I see the Congress on every subject under the world, but they are neglecting there own main business. Not a single appropriations bill has gone to the president, and this is the third month of the fiscal year. The deficit, the trade imbalance,... surely anyone with common sense would know that there's got to be some revenue in connection with this problem. Well, they just refuse to consider it. I don't get much comfort from the advice we're getting from Wall Street these days. They've thoroughly loused up their own job. So I don't take their advice seriously.

(applause)

**RUSK** There seems to be an absence of will to get down to the main business at hand. I don't know what the answer for it is.

**HAIG** I've got the solution, but I'm not going to mention it in this group.

(laughter)

**CORDDRY** I don't think there's any doubt there are economic problems. We're also going into a period when we're going to have military problems. We're going to have to recast our military program. There isn't any doubt about it. I wonder, Mr. Vance, how you see forty-odd year old policy of containment being implemented over the next ten to twenty years?

**VANCE** I think we, clearly, have the resources that are necessary to do what has to be done in terms of containment. I think what we will be required to do will depend on many things, political and economic, as they develop. I really don't believe that we are hobbled to do the kind of things that have to be done to protect our security and to contain those who would do us harm. I just don't find that's a proper assumption.

**CORDDRY** Do you see the Soviet Union as continuing to be an expansionist power, or do you see chances for the policy of containment being changed?

**VANCE** They clearly have been an expansionist power. They clearly are in very serious economic condition at this time. And there's no doubt about it. They, themselves, admit this thing. Therefore, they, through their leader, Mr. Gorbachev, have said, "we have got to do massive restructuring." That, in my view, is one of the reasons we have the INF agreement, because they needed a breathing spell in terms of external relationships. That's one reason that they came to the table. I think, also, that that means for a period of time, because they have to take care of these economic problems they've got,

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there may be opportunities in other areas. And when they come up, we ought to look at them with a hard cold eye, and appraise them. If we see there are opportunities that are mutually beneficial coming out of this, then we ought to negotiate to see what can be done. But, again, I say we shouldn't be starry-eyed and think that the whole world has changed and that they're very different than were before...

**KISSINGER** I think it is quite possible that the Soviet Union will be focusing on domestic affairs. We cannot know in the abstract what they will do, because there's a possibility of crisis developing, not sought by either the United States or the Soviet Union, a revolution in one of the moderate oil-producing countries, for example- upheavals in other parts of the world. Therefore, we have a number of obligations. One, we must come to some political negotiations with the Soviet Union. We cannot turn arms control into a sort of escapism in which we truck all issues that produced the crisis. In this manner, we can tell whether containment can be replaced by some more constructive form of coexistence. Second, if we have to continue a containment policy it is essential that we restructure the military strategy of the past forty years. I'm extremely uneasy about the INF agreement, and its implications for nuclear strategy. But, realistically, reliance on nuclear weapons has to be reduced. I would not do it the way we are doing it. We have to find a method of defense. We have to be able to answer the question which is not being answered at this moment which we are in danger of losing, which is, "How are we going to defend distant allies under the circumstances, where reliance on nuclear weapons is reduced and nobody's building up any alternative forces?" and, "What should these alternative forces be?" Third, we have to think of the kind of world that is likely to emerge in teh twenty-first century. We are conducting a lot of this discussion in terms of East-West superpower relations, but in the year 2000, Japan, in my view, will be a military power of some size. China will be stronger. India will be stronger. Western Europe will either be neutralist or militarily stronger. Those are the two solutions that will emerge out of these negotiations. The United States, if it pursues containment, or any other policy, will be driven to do things that are against our whole historical tradition, namely some sort of balance of power concept-some sort of arrangement in which we make sure that the friendly nations with which we are associated are stronger than the hostile nations. That we have not been comfortable with in the past. So, we need some sort of a political doctrine. We need a military doctrine. Frankly, I think the way the political processes now work, with the candidates having to spend all their time (Al, forgive me) raising money; having more answers than there are questions, and not being able to address the fundamental issues...I think Al is a notable exception, because he's had a lot of experience at actually handling these problems...That is a big national concern in dealing with the question of containment or any other form of...

**NEWMAN** Does the length of our political campaigns and the extent to which foreign policy issues enter these campaigns affect the conduct of foreign policy? Mr. Rogers?

**ROGERS** Yes, I think they do.

**NEWMAN** Adversely affect it?

**ROGERS** Yes. Foreign policy has gotten involved in a partisan way to a much greater extent than it has before. Thirty or forty years ago that was not true. There was a bipartisan foreign policy. Foreign policy was not a political issue. Now, with a long campaign, it is the number one political issue. I suppose the economy is number two. Secondly, there's much more partisanship shown, and I don't know who to blame. I'm not

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blaming anybody, but it's a fact now more than ever before. In dealing with Nicaragua, for example, there is a pretty clear-cut division between the parties. There is a division on many other aspects of foreign policy. It certainly was true in the Iran-Contra thing. I'm surprised that some of the Republicans tried to defend the idea that it was okay to sell arms to Iran. But, nevertheless, that whole Iran-Contra thing, unlike your committee, the Tower Committee, was pretty partisan. And I think that is unfortunate. It makes it more difficult to conduct good foreign policy. I think you will see for the next year or so, it'll be more and more so. I think the emotions will get pretty high. I think people will not be talking sensibly about foreign policy. They'll be talking about it politically, which is unfortunate.

**NEWMAN** General Haig?

**HAIG** I couldn't agree more. A leader from the Middle East spoke to me last week, and he said, "You know, you Americans are so funny," he said. "You overthrew one president," meaning Jimmy Carter, "on the foibles of Khomeni, and now you're in a position where Mr. Khomeni can again influence your domestic policy profoundly." And it's true. The other point I wish to make is that bipartisanship is perhaps the most disasterous outcome of Viet Nam, Watergate, and the decade of the 70's in America. I think the next president is going to have to work with the leaders of both parties in the House and the Senate and the key committees in a way in which it's unprecedented.

**NEWMAN** Now, pardon me, you said bipartisanship was the outcome, but what you meant was the loss of...

**HAIG** The collapse of bipartisanship, excuse me. The point I'm making is that I don't think the next president can afford to do any less than at least one full day a week sitting down and trying to hammer out a consensus with the responsible leaders. That means the Congress and the Senate have an obligation, because they are living in legislative anarchy. One man, one vote. The more outrageous a Congressman, the quicker he gets the attention of the "tube," and the more likely he'll be returned with an overwhelming landslide into office. We've got to help the leaders of the committees to reestablish the authority. But, this is going to take a degree of patience and hard work which, with the disaster we face, makes it all the more urgent.

**NEWMAN** Dr. Kissinger..

**RUSK** The late Chief Justice, Earl Warren, visited our law school shortly before his death. On that occasion, he reminded us that if each branch of the federal government should pursue its own constitutional powers to the end of the trail, our system simply could not function. It would freeze up like an engine without oil. Impass is the overhanging threat to our Constitution. Now, the separation of powers is the fundamental concept of our constitution, but that involves a constitutional obligation to give a considerable degree of respect to the other branches of government. There is no remedy if that respect for the other branches of government is absent. There has been a deterioration, I think, of that in the last several years.

**NEWMAN** Dr. Kissinger...

**KISSINGER** I don't think this problem can be solved entirely by a procedural means. I agree that there is an urgent need for bipartisanship, but there may be an even

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more urgent need of trying to determine what the content of that bipartisanship should be. In the great period of bipartisanship at the end of World War II, for twenty years afterwards, we were really operating on the basis of two great historical experiences: internationally, on the experience of World War II, where we resisted a evil system that was bent on world domination, and domestically the experience of the New Deal where social programs helped to restore confidence in government. We applied the second to the Marshall Plan and the first to NATO. Now we're living in a much more complicated world. I must tell you, coming from the intellectual community, when I was a young person none of us ever dreamt of getting into government. The only thing we could do if we wanted to make a contribution is to have some good ideas about the future. Now, many of the intellectuals tend to be divided between job applicants for government and revolutionaries. You really don't have the group anymore that develop ideas on where to go. This seems to me essential. As to the candidates. When they have to raise ten million dollars, in thousand dollar lots, they meet a lot of interested people. They don't meet people who have a general view of the national interest, and they stagger through three years of campaigning, having done very little that prepares them for the job of governing. That seems to be...

(applause)

**HAIG** Let me suggest, as Henry's exception to the rule, that I'm not quite that discouraged about this changing conceptual framework you refer to, because I really do believe the power of the presidency is the bully pulpit. And a president's ability to articulate coherently and convincingly is a strategy which, hopefully, we have arrived at, Henry. It is a very powerful weapon, and it is beginning to break down the fragmentation that you spoke to. I think we can look to that in the future, too, with some hope.

**NEWMAN** Bill Beecher...

**BEECHER** I have a question on the limitation of power, and I address this to Secretary Vance. The Reagan administration has effectively encouraged the transition to more democratic forms in both the Philippines and South Korea. In the case, however, of Panama, where there is growing unease in the United States government over the regime of General Noriega, what is the appropriate line between Washington's desire to press for democratic change and the proper limits on direct interference in the affairs of a sovereign government?

**VANCE** Bill, it's very hard to draw a bright black line on what is proper in this area. Human rights clearly is an element of our foreign policy and it really must be very near to the core of our foreign policy. On the other hand, we live in a real world. Therefore, one has to, in dealing with human rights problems, deal with them on a case by case basis. This is very, very hard to do. When I was in the Carter administration, we at the State Department set up a panel which was chaired by the deputy Secretary of State. All of the major issues in the foreign policy area that came up, we put to that panel. It included people not only in our building, but people from other parts of the government to try and wrestle with "how do you deal with your national security interests on the one hand, and our commitment to human rights on the other hand?" And I must tell you, it's one of the hardest struggles and there's just no simple way. You have to do it on a case by case basis.

**KISSINGER** I'd like to make one point about these cases. Intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries is a very tricky business. Revolutions occur because you have a combination of resentments. Once one side has succeeded, the various components

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start struggling with each other. If the United States starts overthrowing governments, it must be prepared for the follow-on struggle. If it is not prepared to conduct a follow-on struggle, then the most radical, best-organized and, perhaps, least democratic group is likely to take it over. All I ask is, don't let's do the heroic thing of overthrowing somebody and then not be prepared to stay there. If we stay in there, we'll be forced into covert operations. So, we cannot have it both ways. If we want a democratic outcome, we must be prepared for the follow-on struggle or we shouldn't get started on it.

**RUSK** It's very important for us to avoid sanctimony in regard to this question, because we haven't earned the right to be the den mother of the universe on civil rights...

(applause)

**RUSK** When I joined President Kennedy as his Secretary of State, a black ambassador, coming to our nation's capitol, did not know where he could have lunch except at another embassy. His wife would ask a State Department wife to go to the supermarket with her because she was concerned about incidence. He found it very difficult to get apartments and office space for his embassy staff. He would drive down to a Maryland beach on a Saturday afternoon and be turned away. He would get on a plane to New York to go to the United Nations and the plane would stop-over in Miami for fuel. While the rest of the passengers were taken into the lunchroom to have lunch, he was put on a folding canvas cot in a corner of the Hanger and brought a sandwich on a wax paper. Now we're in no position to preach, until we've earned the right to do so. And I think we ought to be careful about that.

(applause)

**NEWMAN** That is the last word in this discussion. Gentlemen, thank you all for being with us today.

[c]

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