H. Sonnenfeldt
9407 Kingsley Ave.
Bethesda, Md.

RD

June 26, 1960

Dear Henry:

Enclosed are some very hurried and unrefined ideas. I hope they will be of some use. I am also enclosing E. B. White's recent New Yorker piece, as reprinted in the Washington Post. To my great surprise White says some extremely pertinent and forthright things.

I will send you later tomorrow a copy of a brief critique of the latest Soviet proposal.

I would hope R. can stay away from making too specific proposals. The air is full of them these days and few of them have been thought through; one more set will merely add to the confusion. I do think a forthright and careful demonstration of the uselessness of the Soviet approach would be in order -- since no other Republican has yet seen fit to do this. And then an equally careful exposition of how arms control policy should supplement and augment defense and national security policy.

Let me know if there is anything else I can do. I am conscious of the inadequacy of the enclosed.

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

order to show Soviet readiness to compromise. In this instance an especial and explicit bow is made to French insistence on early restrictions on nuclear delivery systems (though Moscow distorts the French position); but some other points stressed by the Western nations participating at the Geneva committee are also adapted. Moreover, there is an adjustment that is evidently designed to accommodate Chinese Communist views on disarmament delegations.

The latest Soviet move in the disarmament field had been fore-
shadowed in private and public Soviet statements for some time. Zorin
had on several occasions, before the ten-nation committee recessed on
April 29, expressed Soviet willingness to move provisions for nuclear
disarmament from the final stage to the initial one; the Soviet paper
of April 8 on disarmament "principles" had said nothing about the
sequence of disarmament measures, a modification of the September 18,
1959 plan which bloc representatives portrayed as indicating flexibility
on this score; throughout the first phase of the committee's meetings,
bloc speakers stated that its task was to draft a treaty, and the new
proposal is in the form of "basic provisions" for a treaty; during his
conversations with de Gaulle last March, Khrushchev gave endorsement to
the former's thesis regarding the need for early measures applicable to
nuclear delivery systems, and Foreign Minister Gromyko in his May 26
speech at the UN Security Council commented that "it should be admitted
that there is a large grain of truth in putting the question of the
means of delivery" in the way the French were doing; Finally, Khrushchev
indicated during the abortive summit conference in Paris that he had
brought certain "constructive proposals" with him which would now have
to be submitted in Geneva.

Soviet Objective

Viewed in the context of Soviet disarmament proposals since
September 1954, when the first signs of greater flexibility appeared in
Soviet disarmament policy after Stalin's death, the new program represents
a further step in the direction of greater specificity and credibility.
Nevertheless, it outlines measures of highly dubious technical feasibility
— not to mention its lack of political realism, remains vague or in-
adequate on many crucial issues of control and inspection, and has some
serious inequities from the standpoint of the West. Moreover, from the
standpoint of negotiations, the proposal is evidently intended as an
inseparable package which has to be accepted _in toto_ as a basis for
discussion.

There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets expect this
program to be the subject of concrete negotiations with the West. Indeed,
in the covering letter transmitting the proposal on June 2, Khrushchev
asserted his view that the West is "not ready to implement it." Thus,
the immediate Soviet purpose appears to be to add new plausibility to
the Soviet approach, anticipatory to renewed world-wide agitation and
United

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 3 -

United Nations consideration of the disarmament issue. (UN consideration is not explicitly referred to in the Soviet proposal, despite Khrushchev's recent allusions to it. Soviet delegate Zorin in a Geneva press conference on June 7 did reportedly refer to it, however, and it is in any case true that, whether or not Moscow attempts to get a special session of the General Assembly convened, the regular fifteenth session this fall will take up the issue.)

Moscow may hope that the pressures that can be generated by these means will in time tend to drive the West into negotiations on more limited measures deemed advantageous by the USSR.

## Specific Elements

Following are client specific elements in the proposal:

(1) **Time limit.** While, as before, Moscow cites a time limit for the first stage (one year to eighteen months), none is now mentioned for the succeeding two stages in the body of the proposal. However, in the introduction Moscow still insists on a fixed over-all period, preferably four years. Bloc representatives had previously indicated that there was flexibility on this over-all period, but the principle of a definite time period has always been firmly adhered to.

Moscow now goes some way toward meeting the Western view that passage from one stage to the next must depend on a control organ finding that the preceding stage has been faithfully implemented, but Moscow calls for such a finding without providing that implementation of the next stage must actually await it. In effect, therefore, Moscow refuses to have execution of the plan held up pending assurance of faithful implementation of each stage, a position that is a logical consequence of its insistence on a firm over-all time limit.

(2) **Delivery Systems.** The Soviet plan advances radical measures against delivery systems (i.e., their total elimination) to the first stage. But there would be no concomitant reductions of conventional forces in this stage. Hence, Moscow reverts to its old approach of proposing the dismantling of the Western strategic deterrent while leaving Sino-Soviet bloc conventional forces intact. The Soviet plan thus distorts known French views, which Moscow claims to be accommodating, on at least three counts: (a) that measures against delivery systems should be prededed by feasibility studies, (b) that these measures should proceed by stages, and (c) that there should be simultaneous cuts in conventional strength. On the latter point, Moscow would probably be willing to make adjustments to show its readiness to compromise — a not very startling change, if it did occur, since it would square with past Soviet proposals.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4

Moscow stated that the proposal to eliminate all delivery vehicles capable of carrying mass destruction weapons would at the same time remove the danger of surprise attack. Soviet statements suggest that the new proposal is intended, at least in part, to blunt new proposals on aerial inspection which the US has indicated since the U-2 incident it plans to make in order to cope with the surprise attack problem.

(3) Movements of naval vessels and aircraft. The Soviet plan also incorporates previous Soviet proposals against movements by naval vessels and aircraft capable of carrying mass destruction weapons beyond national limits. The former had been mentioned in a letter from Khrushchev to President Eisenhower during the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis; the latter was tabled by the USSR in the Security Council in April 1958 and again in the surprise attack talks in November of that year. The proposal lends itself to exploitation in connection with the current Soviet campaign on the U-2 incident.

(4) Space objects. Evidently in response to Western proposals on the banning of space objects capable of carrying nuclear weapons, Moscow includes a provision against the "putting into orbit or the placing into outer space of special devices." This clause appears together with the provision against naval movements or military aircraft flights with mass destruction weapons, and it is not clear whether the space devices to be banned would be only those capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. The term "special device" could also apply to reconnaissance or surveillance vehicles, particularly since the Soviet plan repeats an old Soviet provision (March 1958) permitting the launching of "rockets" for peaceful purposes only. Soviet propaganda has recently castigated the US TIROS, MIDAS and SAMOS systems as military espionage devices. Thus, this provision on space devices could be used by the Soviets as a demonstration of meeting the West half way; but it could also be the kick-off of a more authoritative campaign than hitherto against reconnaissance satellite programs.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-5-

(5) **Western bases.** In line with long-standing Soviet insistence that nothing can be done to curb missiles unless Western bases are dis-mantled, the provision for foreign base liquidation is now moved up from Stage II (where it was in the September 1959 scheme) to Stage I.

(6) **"Nth country problem".** Reflecting the measure of concern regarding the "nth country problem" that was expressed in some recent Soviet pronouncements, the new program includes a proviso against transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons information to states not now possessing them. A similar, though less inclusive, point was contained in Soviet memoranda to the UN in September 1957 and 1958. Moscow now also proposes prohibiting the manufacture of nuclear weapons by countries not possessing them. In terms of tactics, these proposals seem designed to counter Western proposals for a cut-off of fissionable materials production for weapons purposes, which the West views as curbing the "nth country problem."

(7) **Joint studies.** Moscow for the first time incorporates suggestions for joint studies in its program, particularly on the problem of nuclear stockpile elimination, which East and West have acknowledged since 1955 poses presently insuperable technical difficulties. However, prejudging the outcome of such studies, the USSR proceeds to propose elimination of nuclear stockpiles in Stage II. Introduction of provisions for joint studies makes the principle of a fixed over-all time limit all the more questionable, especially since to all appearances no studies could be undertaken until after the Soviet program as a whole has been accepted.

(8) **Budgeting and conventional arms cuts.** The Soviet plan proposes conventional arms cuts and budgetary reductions consonant with conventional force cuts and the other proposed measures, but gives no indication of the Soviet view of how these various measures are to be related.

## International

(9) **Peace-keeping forces.** As a further ostensible bow to the West, Moscow now allows for some form of peace-keeping machinery after the disarmament process, including the placing of national militia contingents at the disposal of the Security Council. (Nothing is said of the possibility of making these arrangements at an earlier stage, in step with the reduction of national military establishments.) The Soviet approach conforms essentially to Article 43 of the UN Charter -- which the USSR has never been willing to implement -- rather than to broader Western concepts of a real international force. Zorin has stated that the Western idea is unworkable because an international force would be controlled by either one side or the other in the East-West conflict, an arrangement acceptable to neither. The Soviet provision is further

UNCLASSIFIED

restricted by the caveat that militia forces placed at Security Council disposal cannot be used against "peoples fighting for independence and social progress," i.e., by Soviet interpretation, countries or groups fighting against "imperialism." (Soviet propaganda has claimed that Western proposals for an international force are designed to facilitate military intervention against "national liberation movements," etc.) Through its Security Council veto, Moscow could, of course, hamstring the use of these forces in any case.

(10) **National police forces.** Moscow still says nothing specific about the size of residual national police forces or about their armaments, beyond the stipulation that they should be "small." Transfers of these forces "near state frontiers" would be communicated to the control organ, but are not prohibited, a point of some importance if Moscow wanted to stage a show of strength in case of trouble in an adjoining satellite. The Soviet proposal leaves unclear whether the control organ would be able to monitor militia movements.

## Controls

(11) **Inspection.** The Soviet proposal contains the most detailed control provisions ever included in a Soviet general disarmament proposal. It lists as subject to inspection, among other things, factories, other construction facilities, airfields, ports, sites where the destruction of prohibited equipment occurs, and sites for launching peaceful rockets as well as these rockets themselves. It should be noted, that although this is the most detailed list ever advanced by the USSR, Soviet proposals going back to 1947, 1951, and 1956 had already provided for inspection of factories and manufacturing installations of various sorts.

The basic limitation of the latest Soviet scheme is that control functions throughout the actual disarmament process would be carried out essentially only at plants and sites declared by governments, and apparently these functions would be exercised on a continuous basis at only some of these plants and sites, whereas others would be subject to periodic visits. (The concept of periodic rather than continuous inspection was advanced by the USSR in the late 'forties but was ostensibly given up in 1952 in response to Western criticism.) The basis of the Soviet approach is that only disarmament -- that is, the act of dismantling the military establishment -- should be subject to control, rather than what remains of military strength after a given measure or set of measures. This approach, which has been expressed with considerable precision by the USSR in Geneva, is inconsistent with the Soviet proposal that at the end of the second stage US and Soviet force levels should be at 1.7 million men, since under the Soviet program these force levels could not be verified.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[cc]

Not until after completion of the program would there be mobile teams, under the Soviet proposal, that could search for clandestine activities. And aerial inspection, as in the September 18 plan, is reserved until the third stage. These limitations alone could be especially serious because an undetected violation of the radical <u>provisions of the first two stages</u> could give a state a significant, perhaps decisive, military advantage.

(12) **Communication channels.** The Soviet plan provides that inspectors shall communicate with the control council "through existing channels" and that "privileges shall be provided that will insure prompt delivery of reports and instructions." The term "existing channels" apparently means the communication facilities of the country in which the inspectors are operating. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that the Soviet proposals on prevention of surprise attack, submitted in Geneva on December 12, 1958, provided that inspection posts would communicate with their headquarters through the facilities of the country in which they are located. This proposal also provided that the code to be used should be known to all participating states. This Soviet approach is intended to insure that the Soviet Government will be informed of at least all communications within the control machinery emanating from Soviet territory. Actually, Moscow would probably be aware of control organ communications anyway through the Soviet nationals in the control system.

A more important matter arising from the Soviet view that the control organ must depend on host-country communications is that a country could obstruct the prompt flow of information relating to a possible violation. Conceivably this ability to prevent vital information from getting out of a country might provide a violating country with time to take decisive military action.

(13) **Staffing.** For the staffing of the control system, Moscow proposes a tripartite arrangement similar to that being negotiated in connection with the treaty on discontinuing nuclear weapons tests. There would be representatives of bloc countries, Western allies -- presumably including members of NATO, CENTO, SEATO, OAS, and bilateral allies -- and neutrals. The precise proportion of each of these groups is left open, an important point because of the two-thirds majority requirement for certain decisions contained in the Soviet plan.

(14) **Voting.** As regards voting in the control system, Moscow implies that on certain issues it will insist on an absolute veto, not just the two-thirds majority requirement noted above. In his June 3 press conference, Khrushchev, in effect, asserted continued Soviet insistence on a veto when he said that the USSR has no intention of asking for a revision of the UN Charter. (The Soviet-proposed control organ would be "within the framework of the United Nations.") This insistence on a veto seriously circumscribes all facets of the Soviet proposals on

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 8 -

control since Moscow could well insist on a veto on all major decisions involving the exercise of control organ functions. It places a question mark over the whole Soviet program despite the fact that it includes such seemingly far-reaching provisions as that providing for the dispatch of mobile teams to any place chosen by the control organ after the disarmament process is complete.

(15) **Implementation.** Finally, as regards implementation of controls, it should be noted that the preparatory commission which Moscow proposes as the body to set up the permanent control apparatus will would not begin to function until after signature of the disarmament treaty. While this provision may be intended to appear analogous to the arrangement already agreed upon in the nuclear test ban treaty, the new Soviet plan does not make it clear whether all details would in fact be incorporated in the disarmament treaty and hence binding upon signature. Khrushchev, for example, stated on June 3 that elaboration of control would follow agreement "in principle" on disarmament. And Soviet delegate Zorin stated in Geneva on June 7 that the "terms of reference" of the control organization would be specified in the disarmament treaty, a formulation which leaves in doubt exactly how much detail the USSR would be prepared to include. Thus, on the face of it, the Soviet plan, for all its novel detail, appears still to have the basic deficiency of past Soviet schemes in which disarmament obligations preceded specific obligations on inspection and control.

## Communist China

An interesting aspect of the Soviet plan is that for the first time since May 1955, Moscow now omits mention of a force level for "China." Evidently Chinese Communist force levels, and other provisions applicable to Mainland China would not be discussed until a world conference (which would consider accession of states other than the ten members of the Geneva disarmament committee. In this way, Moscow would appear to be taking account of Peiping's repeated declarations -- reiterated by People's Daily on June 8 -- that it cannot be bound by agreements in whose negotiation it did not participate. The omission also seems to make less likely, however, a Soviet move to bring Peiping into the ten-nation committee. (Moscow's plan also omits French and British force levels, perhaps in part to make the omission of Chinese levels less pointed.)

It should be noted, in conclusion, that although Peiping, by means of a government statement and the June 8 People's Daily article, promptly endorsed the Soviet proposal, it stated more blatantly than Moscow that in its view the scheme was designed solely to "expose" the West. Peiping contended that it was "inconceivable" that "imperialists" could accept general and complete disarmament. As part of its more general debate with Moscow on the nature of "imperialism," it also questioned whether the West would ever be prepared to allocate savings resulting from disarmament for the benefit of the "working masses" and the underdeveloped countries. This line is a direct slap at the Soviet proposal, which like all Soviet proposals since 1955, proposes to the West that precisely such allocations be made.

UNCLASSIFIED

9407 Kingsley Avenue
Bethesda 14, Maryland

Dear Henry:

I have been wanting to congratulate you on your
for appointment as a White House consultant. I
was happy to note that you will be able to preserve
your independence, at least to an extent, by not
coming on full time; and I am glad you did not
become a colleague of mine! I know your contribution
will be most valuable and just hope it won't be
eroded or negated by the full-time people. If
I can be of any help to you on Soviet or disarmament
matters, I shall be delighted to do so.

We were also happy to learn (I hope it wasn't
just a rumor) that Anne is expecting another
child. It's sheer joy, I assure you. Incidentally,
you, or at least your dog, made a tremendous impression
on my daughter last fall. She picked you out immediately
on the CBS show 'last month: "that's Herbie's daddy,
Mr. Kissinger."

I came across the enclosed a couple of weeks
ago. You obviously have a long life ahead of you.

Again, congratulations, in which Margie
joins.

April 4, 1961

Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
9407 Kingsley Avenue
Bethesda 14, Maryland

Dear Hal:

Many thanks for your kind letter and
your good wishes. I hope to see you on one of
my visits to Washington.

Kind regards as always, also to Margie.

Dictated by Mr. Kissinger but signed in his
absence.