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did not attend regularly until mid-1967. Since that date he
has become a regular participant, thus helping to counter the
allegation that professional military opinion was being disregarded
in this forum. Others are frequently invited, depending on the
subject matter and what important official be visiting in town,
e.g., Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland. According to recent
news accounts, the President has indicated that George Ball, the
new US representative to the United Nations, will henceforth attend
the Tuesday Lunch.

f. <u>The Situation Room</u>

The Situation Room symbolizes one of the greatest changes in
the President's relation to the national security process: the
change in his proximity and access to operations. The proximity and
access afforded him by the Situation Room are literal as well as
figurative, for it is located in the West Basement--about 45 seconds
time by messenger from the Oval Office. The conference room
adjoining it has frequently been used by the President as a command
center in times of high crises.

The "Sit Room" staff prefer to refer to it as a "communication
facility." When President Kennedy took office, the departments and
intelligence agencies still selected the communications to be sent
to the White House and delivered them by hand. Today a very high
proportion of significant State and Defense telegraphic traffic goes
automatically to the Situation Room--most of it by telegraphic relay.
This means that today the President can and often does know of a new
development as soon as or before his principal cabinet advisers.

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Furthermore, the information processed there enables the White House staff, as a Kennedy adviser put it, "to be able to ask the Departments the pregnant questions and not be put off by sterile answers".

The flow of unofficial or public information to the President has been accelerated in like manner. The ultimate step in this development, of course, was the installation of wire service tickers in the Oval Office. While the next President may not continue this particular device (the Cabinet officers and the bureaucracy should not) he may well want to have someone watching the news tickers and FBIS Service just as the Situation Room now does.

Information of all types now received in the Situation Room is closely monitored by its staff, who bring significant items to the immediate attention of the Special Assistant. The latter determines what goes to the President. The tendency, reflecting the President's dislike for surprises is to give him more rather than less.

The President's basic daily intake of intelligence consists of a specially prepared daily CIA summary, which synthesizes the product of the intelligence community and State Department's cable traffic, and morning and afternoon State Department summaries. In addition, early each morning the President receives a memorandum called the "Ops-Intelligency Summary" prepared by the NMO at the Pentagon and summarizing last minute military intelligence and operational information. In recent months this has been primarily

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oriented toward Vietnam but it includes other critical events
as well. During crisis periods (e.g., the Middle East war of
June 1967 and the Pueblo Crisis) the Situation Room also forwards
directly to the President periodic situation reports prepared by
operational task forces usually located in the State Department
Operations Center.

g. <u>Informal-Unofficial Advisers</u>

In September 1964, President Johnson announced the formation
of a panel of private citizens with whom he said he would consult
"on major international problems facing the United States". They
included such distinguished former officials as Dean Acheson,
John McCloy, Arthur Larson, Robert Lovett, George Kistiakowsky,
Eugene Black and Allen Dulles. The President noted that although
the panelists had all served informally as advisers in the past,
he wished "to re-emphasize the role of leading private citizens,
without regard to party, as counselors to the President."

There certainly is nothing unusual or improper in this
procedure--every President has had his equivalent of a "kitchen
cabinet." This group is noted here not for its significance per se,
but for the attention it draws to the importance of private
consultation in current process.

A former adviser has said that the public references to the
group were primarily intended for public relations purposes and
that its influence was initially rather minimal. On the other
hand, when the President became truly concerned over Vietnam and
was really looking for advice, he kept his meetings with the group
secret, since their counsel was of more value to him if their
prestige and personalities did not become involved in the public
debate.

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C. Elements and Functions of Recent White House Staffs

1. Introduction

The President's staff requirements for exercising his national
security responsibility will depend on (a) the extent to which he
personally involves himself in national security affairs, and (b)
the means of direction which he employs.

His degree of involvement does not always represent a conscious
choice. With President Kennedy it was; on the other hand, President
Johnson did not set out to direct the Vietnam war.

Similarly, the President has no way of knowing in advance whether
the means which he employs will be effective. They will not be effec-
tive simply because he has chosen them. Eisenhower thought that by
establishing the Planning Board, the NSC and the OCB, he had assured
his ability to direct the process. Some of his later views indicate
he may have recognized his error.

Kennedy thought he could assure direction and responsiveness by
increasing the authority of his cabinet officers. He was right about
Defense but wrong about State. As a direct result Kennedy and Bundy
had to compensate by strengthening the NSC staff's capability in the
foreign area, but not in defense matters.

As these illustrations indicate, recent White House staffing has
mirrored the Presidents' intentions and experiences in seeking to
direct the conduct of national security activities.

In this section the significant elements and the functions of
recent White House staffs will be analyzed in terms of their relation
to each President's way of doing business, and the lessons which may
be drawn from their operation.

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## 2. President Truman

The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments provided the nucleus as well as the statutory basis for most of the subsequent elements of Presidential staff support in the national security area. The nucleus of course was the Council. The Act specified that the Council would "advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." And the Act declared that "the Council shall have a staff. . . (emphasis added)." Succeeding Presidents have used both the Council and its staff as they saw fit. Their right to this flexibility has never been challenged any more than has the Congress' right to tell the President how he should go about conducting foreign affairs or being Commander-in-Chief.

President Truman's initial attitude toward the NSC provisions of the Act was influenced by his concern that it not infringe, or even appear to infringe, upon his constitutional powers. Nevertheless, from the outset he availed himself, in varying degrees, of the services of the Council and its Executive Secretary and staff.

The function of the original Executive Secretary contained the seeds of the future Special Assistant's role. He briefed the President daily on intelligence, diplomatic and military matters, and in the process, felt it his responsibility to point out matters which he believed required additional attention. He relayed to the permanent institutions any Presidential reactions to these briefings and suggestions and followed up on them to insure response. But when the responses came, it was to the President, unless Council action was involved.