WHITE HOUSE/NSC ORGANIZATIONAL - 1969

1968

<table><tr><td>Nov.</td><td>Transition studies (Areeda, Lindsay, May, HK) go to Nixon.</td></tr><tr><td>Dec. 30</td><td>Florida meeting on NSC System (Memo to President-elect).</td></tr><tr><td>Dec. 31</td><td>President-elect approves HK recommendations for revising NSC system - comparison with loose LBJ operation (Florida).</td></tr></table>

1969

<table><tr><td>Jan. 17</td><td>Memo to President-elect on NSC System.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 19</td><td>President signs NSDM's 2-3 on NSC System.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 20</td><td>NSDM 1 issued: Establishment of NSC Decision and Study Memoranda Series.<br>NSDM 2 issued: Regorganization of NSC System.<br>NSDM 3 issued: Direction, Coordination and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 21</td><td>NSC meeting on NSC procedures. President stresses he will make the decisions.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 23</td><td>Review Group meeting on organization and procedures.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 25</td><td>HK seeks approval for continued standard practice of limited distribution on backchannels from foreign leaders (re backchannel from PM Wilson).</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 27</td><td>HK tells Sneider(telcon) that NSC staff is to get involved in drafting process.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 28</td><td>HK tells Goodpaster (telcon) that DOD is trying to take over strategic policy paper. HK tells Packard (telcon) that President wants papers done inter-departmentally.</td></tr><tr><td>Jan. 30</td><td>Recommendation on organization of PFIAB.<br>NSDM 4 issued: Program Analysis.<br>NSSM 12: Contingency planning.</td></tr><tr><td>Feb. 3</td><td>HK tells Rogers (telcon) that President has invited HK to Key Biscayne and asks if Rogers wants to come. Rogers accepts.</td></tr></table>

White House/NSC Organizational - 1969

2.

Feb. 5 Pederson (telcon) says Secretary Rogers will exercise policy authority over what State puts into IG.

Feb. 7 . HK recommends to President possible new membership for PFIAB.

. White House press release discusses new NSC System.

Feb. 12 HK advises Rogers - re complaints of bureaucratic backlog between State and NSC - that NSC will try to improve response time on action items though State is also to blame.

Feb. 21 President tells HK (telcon) that HK backgrounder on Europe trip went well, and he should do more on the trip.

March 5 . Rogers lectures HK (telcon) about HK's calling State people without Rogers' knowledge.

. HK advises Ehrlichman of policy on Soviet Embassy invitations to White House staff members (conversations must be reported and it is preferable to refuse such invitations).

March 21 NSDM 8 issued: Crisis anticipation and management: request for preparation of contingency plans (as suggested by RG meeting of March 13).

March 25 HK reminds NSC staff of policy re Soviet Embassy invitations.

March 26 . HK request to McCracken that NSC staff be represented on Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy re foreign policy implications of economic issues.

. HK declines "Meet the Press" request: "... I can best serve the President if I...stay out of the public eye."

March 27 HK asks Haldeman for special White House mess privileges for meeting with academics (at President's request to "keep in touch" with their views).

April 3 HK tells Ziegler he can't tell Rogers not to have press conference.

April 14 Newsweek story on HK/Rogers rivalry (telcons with Rogers, Kay Graham, Kermit Lansner April 17).

3.

April 15 EC-121 incident.
April 24 Haldeman explains HK/Rogers situation to Dan Rather (see H/K telcon).
April 29 President approves HK recommendations to upgrade Situation Room.
May 5 Rogers complains about HK backgrounder (telcon), urges that HK make them shorter.
May 16 Memorandum creates WSAG.
May 26 President urges HK to give backgrounder on Vietnam de-escalation and casualties.
June 3 HK explains to Geyelin (telcon) that reason for backgrounder is that Rogers and Laird, not HK, are official spokesmen.
June 3-4 President furious about press leaks about Midway meeting, Okinawa; threatens to cancel NSC meetings (telcons).
June 18
* NY Times leak about alleged intelligence study discounting Soviet first strike intention. President wants investigation (Mitchell telcon).
* HK complains to Mitchell re State failure to clear cables.
* Rowley Evans struck by fact that HK was at Thieu meeting and Rogers was not (telcon).
June 20 HK directive to State, DOD, CIA: President desires review of contingency plans for potential crises areas beginning with Korea, M.E. and Berlin (ongoing politico-military planning directed by NSDM 8 not affected by this directive).
June 26 In response to President's concern about leaks of DOD documents, HK advises President (via memo) that "it would be difficult to trace the leaks."

WHITE HOUSE - NSC ORGANIZATIONAL - 1969

July 1 HK sets up arms control advisory panel under McCloy to operate like PFIAB and report directly to Pres. (telcons with McCloy and Laird)

HK cautions Erlichman against Houston plan to
attack "McNamara legacy" as part of ABM debate

HK transmits to Pres. Rogers proposal for establishing Working Groups on Vietnam. HK is not opposed if they are within NSC framework

July 2 First meeting of WSAG to discuss organization, procedures and functions

Pres. memo to Rogers indicating that Working Groups on Vietnam be staffed by HK within NSC system and that Mitchell should be included

July 3 NSDM 19 directs that contingency planning done by IG in accordance with NSDM 8 shall be forwarded to WSAG

RG considers US "internal defense" policy and agrees on reaffirmation of earlier policy

July 7
HK draws Haldeman's attention to State press analysis given public distribution that focusses mainly on criticism of President's specch to Air Force Academy. "I would not want to be associated with having brought this to your attention but it appears that this is the kind of departmental disloyalty we can do without"

In response to Erlichman request for views on Father Drinan's press article asserting that State "lies" about US Vietnam policy re POWs, HK advises Erlichman that the article if full of distorations designed to disparage Administration. No use in public polemics to rebut Drinan

July 10
NSDM 20 affirms "US Policy on Internal Defense in Selected Foreign Countries," May 23, 1968, as current US policy re internal security in developing countries

July 11
HK sends Pres results of Helms investigation of possible CIA leaker re NYT article of June 18. Helms concludes he found no leaker. Pres notes: "Ho Hum..."

July 12 Briefing memo for HK mtg with Mitchell on Rogers' "freewheeling actions" as Sec State and need for action to counter this or HK will step down (at issue is US-Sov relations; see July 12 US-Sov rel)

July 18 Pres. tells HK (telcon) that we should address big issues with Japan - not through State - and leave technical issues for bureaucracy

August or Sept General directive (Colorado Springs?) that all messages involving substance or policy be cleared with White House

August 4 In response to strong Pres. interest that comte of prominent citizens be formed to support the Admin policy on Vietnam, HK advises Erlichman that he will discuss with Buckley

August 9 HK memo to Haldeman urges more coherent speech clearance procedure on issues involving national security so that Pres. won't - through delay - end up having to rely on extemporaneous remarks

August 11 Pres. approval of HK recommendation that USIS activities around the world be "cut back drastically" (stimulated by complaints from Thais during Pres. visit)

August 12 Rogers Morton memo complains about the bland Captive Nations Proclamation issued on July 14 (on eve of Pres. visit to Romania), arguing that this will give the domestic political advantage to the Wallacites who have been working hard to woo ethnic groups by saying Pres. has forgotten them

August 14 HK memo to Richardson refuting Wall Street Jour and US News & World Report charges that HK deliberatly withheld from State copy of Pres. backgrounder at Guam and presenting false stories about HK-Rogers relations

HK memo to Pres. calling attention to the "inappropriate pressures" which State is putting on Thieu..."the kind of problem that we are dealing with (re State) at this most difficult time..."

Aug 15 HK memo to NASA conveys Pres. decision that all foreign trips by astronauts by controlled by HK office

Aug 18 Sonnenfeldt memo to HK shows State (Amb Puhan) moving out too far and fast in efforts to improve US-Hungarian relations; suggests need for better WH coordination

Aug 18 Arthur Burns gets Sett Kennedy under control about pressing Germans to revalue (telcon)

Aug 19 HK memo to Haldeman asking for more staff and office space at San Clemente given workload

Aug 20 Flora Lewis story says NSC staff and RAND doing contingency plans to overthrow govts in Thailand, Brazil, etc. HK denies it to Flora (telcon)

Aug 27 HK memo to Pres. defends research projects performed by RAND for NSC after Flora Lewis article in LATimes

. NSDM 22 assigns Panama questions to IG

Aug 29 Laird memo to HK argues for formalized interdepartmental structure for POW policy at the highest level

. Response to terse Haldeman memo requesting PR assessments on various Nixon initiatives. HK provides public opinion assessment on Nixon visit to Saigon (minor criticism in "liberal press" only) and other initiatives

Sept 6 HK directive to State that Pres. has decided backstopping operational monitoring of SALT talks be vested in the USC Comte of the NSC and that policy issues remain with NSC

Sept 9 HK memo to Mitchell calling attention to the "bureaucratic efforts of the past week to go beyond the President's wishes and handle this case (North Korean incident) in the same manner as the Pueblo". State again

Sept 13 HK creates Planning Group on NSC staff to identify problem areas

Sept 15 Pres. mtg with Congressional leadership. Pres. opposes providing copies of any Thailand contingency plans to Hill and specifically Project Taksin plan

Sept 16 NSDM 23 creates VSSG for more systematic analysis of facts underlying programs, policies and activities in Vietnam

Sept 16-17 WH, State, NSC work over draft of Pres. UN speech (telcons)

White House/NSC Organizational -1969

Sept 16
HK sends to Erlichman Laird memo on how DOD will handle Green Beret case (trial by general court-martial on non-capital basis). HK notes "I felt you should have a copy so that we could jointly share in its consequences"

Sept 19
HK sends Laird report to Pres on naval force reductions that affect our worldwide naval posture. HK recommends a Defense Program Review Comte to prevent faits accomplis of important changes in our military posture and to prevent allies from being faced with unilateral US decisions without prior consultation. Pres. approves

Sept 22
Pres. demands HK investigate Kraft 9/18 Post article on NSC staff resignations which gives bad impression of the way the Pres. does business (working level "shut out" of decision process), and to check Allen, Halperin, Ellsworth. HK reports "it could well be that Mort Halperin" might have been responsible but "I have not evidence to suggest that Halperin or any other individual" was really involved

Sept 25
HK memo to Pres. on Symington Subcomte hearings on national commitments. Concern that Symington will call witnesses down to desk level. HK recommends invocation of Executive Privilege on all contingency plans, that CIA not appear on Laos and that nuclear weapons deployments not be revealed

Sept 26
HK memo to Harlow urges tight coordination of agency communications with Hill on MIRV and SALT. DOD had sent overly detailed letter to Brooke revealing substantial information about Admin. thinking on MIRV and indicating DOD is not opposed to moratorium of MIRV testing. (Later leaked)

Sept 30
Draft Pres. statement re guidelines for USG employees testifying to Symington hearings - only limited information will be provided

Oct 1
HK briefing memo for Pres. with Symington notes that larger motive for hearings is passage of SR 85 "which seeks to seize for the Senate powers of formulation and implementation of foreign and defense policy..." Task Force has been established to ensure single Admin voice

Oct 2
HK agrees with staff recommendation that better coordination on European security issues and forthcoming NATO meetings be enforced since State's activisim is getting out of hand

* Sept 22
HK tells NAR he has to choose his targets on where he insists WH directives should be carried out; his credit isn't unlimited (telcons)

Sept 22
HK/Laird discuss creation, location, function of DPRC

Oct 6
Pres. approves HK recommend. for coordinated approach to Green Beret affair. Helms is particularly concerned that investigation could spill over into how intelligence is organized in Vietnam

Oct 7
Rogers upset that Bahr is coming to see HK. HK says it was Bahr's initiative (telcon). Pres. has no objection. President tells HK he sees no reason to tell Rogers about letter to Ho Chi Minh through Sainteny (telcon)

Oct 8
HK answers questions at State Department Senior Seminar on NSC system

NSSM 77 asks for program budgets for 13 countries

Oct 11
NSDM 26 established DPRC for review of diplomatic, political, military and economic consequences of defense strategies, budgets and deployments

Oct 15
HK memo to Erlichman expressing concern about 10/15 demonstrations and prospects for violence. HK suggests Erlichman staff touch base with Califano who dealt with similar problem under LBJ

Oct 17
HK appeal to traffic court re parking ticket!

HK apologizes to Rogers for Osgood contemptuous remarks about Rogers to State Dept personnel (telcon). HK tells Mitchell that Osgood is not malicious and HK doesn't want to fire him as Rogers insists (telcon 10/20)

Oct 24
HK directive to State, DOD, ACDA conveying Pres. decisions on SALT: Verification Panel to be permanent, NATO allies to be consulted

Staff complaint to HK that State is footdragging on Pres. desire to have a serious peace probe re Nigeria. "State is agreeing" to launch initiative but in a manner and toward a goal directly opposite the Pres. intentions

Oct 25
Pres. wants White House to clear all Paris Plenary session statements because he doesn't like plaintive tone of State drafts (telcon)

HK tells Pres. that Laird is peeved that bad news comes from DOD and good news comes from Rogers (telcon)

Oct 27 NSSM 80 directs agencies to submit drafts and comments for Pres. annual review of foreign policy, listing topics to be covered

Oct 30 Sample Keogh/Safire "one liners" (cute phrases) for Pres. speech on Vietnam

HK sends Erlichman complete wrap-up of USG statements on SALT, demonstrating problems with State on this issue (a useful wrap-up of statements). "I think you will want to review the chronology of the linkage problem and how it has been systematically eroded in conjunction with the evolution of the SALT issue"

Oct 31 Pres. request that Tom Houston be assigned to study the bomb halt (Cuban missile crisis and Diem murder as well). HK advises Haldeman that he would like to assign staff member to work with Houston

Nov 3 NSC staff memo urges clear guidelines for State briefing memos coming to WH. "The word is getting around State that we are rewriting everything anyway and the obvious result is a lessened effort on their part"

Nov 6 Rogers wants to know when HK meets with Dobrynin (telcon)

Nov 12 HK memo to Erlichman poses no objection to removal of OEP from statutory membership of the NSC at Pres request

Nov 14 HK assures Laird that DPRC is interested in political implications, not weapons systems analyses (telcon)

Pres. sends HK memo reminding him to stress several themes in future HK backgrounders: (1) The President is in charge of the major policy decisions (2) Nixon doctrine should be emphasized (3) we may be blamed for deteriorating situation in M.E. so describe it as impossible, something we inherited and something from which US is trying to dig out

HK sends Erlichman report on Eldridge Cleaver's activities in Algeria and Vietnam connection

Nov 15 Moynihan, HK analyses for Prs. on student demonstrators-who and what they are. Pres notes: "Can we win the Harvard et al types?) HK joins Moynihan in recommending against taking students on head on.

Nov 20 FBI report on radicals in US (HK sends through Erlichman to Pres)

Nov 21
HK returns to DOD latter's response to NSSM 50 on Navy needs for the 1970s. NAVY response seen as totally inadequate, out of line with NSSM 3 and NSDM 27 and a sloppy job by DOD which "washed its hands" of the problem. Staff analysis for HK urged that NSC system would be subverted if DOD is allowed to let Navy pass the buck to HK

Nov 24
HK tells Fulbright that Pres. has approved HK's mtg with SFRC members; set for 12/4 in Fulbright's office (Telcon)

Dec 1
HK complains to Mitchell about State "power play" to turn Xmas ceasefire into permanent ceasefire. Pres. wants to fire Sullivan (telcons)

HK recommends to Pres. strong guidance to Rogers to bring him into line on whether US should offer ceasefire now (useful wrap-up of State's own initiatives contrary to Pres. directives)

Dec 5
Staff memo to HK reporting on decisions taken by staff on HK behalf

Dec 8
Memo on Pres. request that his Vietnam speech be sent to Ambassadors abroad reveals problems with Haldeman/Magruder trying to take the lead (including drafting letters to foreign leaders) on matters more appropriately handled by NSC. HK advises Haig that these matters must go through NSC

HK telcon with Passman on Foreign Aid Bill mentioned in briefing memo

Dec 9
WH staff report of incredible performance by Amb. McClintock at Symington hearings - McC seen to have caved totally, straying way off reservation

Dec 10
Rogers tries to phone Pres. with news of Chinese agreement to open Warsaw talks. Haldeman checks with HK (telcon)

Dec 12
HK memo to Rogers complains of State working level indiscretion and breach of confidential reports (at issue was leak on Southern Africa NSSM)

Dec 15
HK report to Pres. on State working level indiscretion in dealing with foreign officials (at issue was State officer talking up US mil. aid to Israel to Egyptians): "It is small wonder that we have difficulties with US Middle East policy when Ciaro is fed this sort of information."

Dec 17
HK memo to Pres. on Newsweek article critical of
HK. Defends proposition that he has made a major
effort never to permit a "crack to develop between
our respective views on foreign policy"

Dec 18 Staff recommends that HK seek increase in ceiling of NSC staff from 75 to 83

HK end of year backgrounder discusses new, orderly
decision-making process, citing as examples Latin
America, SALT, DPRC. Process has to be one that
President's comfortable with. Nixon wants choices,
not bureaucratic consensus.

Dec 20
HK memo to Pres. expresses concern about problem of
leaks from State on Warsaw contact with Chinese.
HK directive to State follows reaffirming Pres.
Colorado Springs directive and Oct. 31 directive
on leaks, stressing need for White House clearance
on SALT and matters relating to Chicomes.

Dec 23
Pres. tells HK he doesn't like getting into discussion
of every budget item. He doesn't like Schlesinger
of BOB who is "too abrasive, dogmatic" and pushing.
(telcon)

Dec 26
HK reacts to staff memo indicating staffer trying
to negotiate outcome of NSSM before it is drafted
(a Latin American item). HK notes "I don't like
negotiated NSSMs."

Dec 30
HK memo to Mitchell expresses concern over State
working level contacts with Egyptians which under-
cut US strategy.

Dec 30
Telcon with Bill Moyers: Laird is seen as pushing
harder for disengagement, HK as for prolongation of
war.

Dec 31
Pres. statement on signing Foreign Assistance Act
of 1969: "I submitted the lowest aid request in
history and regret that this reduced that request
substantially. Further large cuts in the appro-
priations bill would have serious consequences for
U.S. foreign policy."

US-SOVIET RELATIONS - 1969

Dec.18 (1968) HK meets Sedov at Pierre Hotel: Linkage of issues. Lasting settlements must reflect real interests.

Jan. 20 Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman announces Soviet readiness for serious exchange of views on curbing the arms race.

Jan. 22 . HK tells Ellsworth (telcon) to tell Soviets that we look for signs of cooperation from Soviet Union on Middle East and Vietnam.

. Transmittal by HK to President of routine con-
gratulatory message from Podgorny and Kosygin.

Jan. 24 Approval of State draft of allied reply to Soviets re FRG decision to convene Federal Assembly in Berlin, but delay delivery.

Jan. 25 NSC meeting on Vietnam alternatives focuses on Soviet role, benefit of US unpredictability.

Jan. 27 . NSSM 10 asks basic review of East-West relations.

. HK gives more guidance to Ellsworth (telcon) for
lunch at Soviet Embassy: "we are determined to
end Vietnam war."

. In first news conference, President suggests that
arms control discussions with the USSR be
held "in a way...that will promote...progress on
outstanding political problems at the same time..."

Feb. 4 Presidential letters to Rogers and Laird laying out his basic view on US-Soviet relations as the framework for future policy.

Feb. 6 . President at press conference says summit would have to be well prepared.

. HK backgrounder discusses concept of "linkage".

Feb. 11
Memo to President on contingency planning re
East German Travel Ban.

Feb. 15 Dobrynin conveys message from Soviet leadership. Interest in channel for private dialogue "outside diplomatic establishment". Soviets prepared to move simultaneously on problems on several fronts, especially in bilateral discussions on Middle East.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

2.

Feb. 15
HK briefs President for meeting with Dobrynin: "Progress depends on specific settlements, not personal diplomacy. Summits should come at end of careful preparation." (Berlin, Middle East, Vietnam to be discussed.)

Feb. 17
President's first meeting with Dobrynin. Soviets prepared to move forward. HK memo analyzes Soviet intentions and linkage.

Feb. 18
. Rogers' assessment of Berlin situation: "Believe Moscow would find its interests best served by keeping harassments below threshold of significant Western counter-measures.

. HK views Dobrynin message (2/15 above) as forth-
coming. "We should seek to utilize this Soviet
interest, stemming as I think it does from anxiety,
to induce them to come to grips with real sources
of tension, notably in Middle East, but also
Vietnam..."

Feb. 19
NSC meeting on East-West relations, in preparation
for European trip. Assessment of "detente".

Feb. 22
. HK warns Dobrynin (telcon) about NVA offensive

. HK tasks State, Defense, and CIA to develop options
for increasing flow of military traffic to and from
West Berlin.

. Dobrynin tells HK (telcon) that Berlin should not
throw shadow on US-Soviet relations, therefore,
FRG should refrain from calling Federal Assembly in
Berlin.

March 3
HK luncheon with Dobrynin initiates special channel.
Dobrynin expresses Soviet interest in status quo in
Europe. HK expresses US interest in ending
harassment of Berlin access.

March 4
HK advises Ehrlichman it would be a "bad idea"
for Tricia to visit Moscow even on purely
educational trek.

March 11
HK/Dobrynin meeting on various topics. Dobrynin
gets emotional about China.

March 14
. President announces SAFEGUARD ABM decision.

. HK letter to National Academy of Science supports
their interest in academic contacts with Communist
world.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

3.

March 15
HK tells President (telcon) that Soviets (according to Marvin Kalb) reacted mildly to ABM announcement. HK calls Dobrynin and notes conciliatory TASS statement.

March 17
* State Department announces Dobrynin proposal that consulates be exchanged in Leningrad and San Francisco.

* Warsaw Pact calls again for CSCE.

March 26
Scenario for Amb. Beam's first encounter with Soviet leadership. Presidential letter to Kosygin and talking points: "I am prepared to explore with you and your colleagues every available avenue for the settlement of international problems..." Middle East, Vietnam, Europe (Berlin), Czechoslovakia ("a shock" to the US public), "sufficiency of" military strength - all mentioned in letter. China included in talking points. Administration will avoid "harsh words" about USSR.

March 28
NSSM 35 asks review of trade policy toward Communist countries, in light of June 30 expiration of ECA and Muskie-Mondale bill to liberalize.

March 29
HK concurrence to State re Congressional exploration re consulates proposal.

March 31
DeGaulle at Ike funeral urges direct US-Soviet contacts.

April 3
Dobrynin gives HK advance word of Soviet note on CSCE. Vietnam, China discussed.

April 4
HK assessment of Soviet call for CSCE: "desirable for us to be in a positive if cautious posture."

April 8
Presidential decision re handling of CSCE at NATO ministerial: We accept idea in principle but would delay convening conference.

April 9
President states at NSC meeting on trade that some restrictions on East-West trade are probably out-moded, but he wants to save them for possible bargaining in broader political context.

April 14
HK and Dobrynin discuss Vietnam.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

4.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>April 18</td>
    <td>At news conference, President criticizes Soviet ousting of Dubcek and warns future similar actions may affect relations with US.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 22</td>
    <td>Amb. Beam presents Nixon letter (March 26) to Kosygin.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 2</td>
    <td>HK backgrounder discusses preparations for SALT, calling it "most fundamental talks we have" with USSR. Also discusses Soviet system.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 7</td>
    <td>RG discusses East-West trade: premises and options.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 14</td>
    <td>President and HK inform Dobrynin of May 14 speech on Vietnam</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 15</td>
    <td>HK agrees with Laird (telcon) on no truck deal for USSR unless we get something for it.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 19</td>
    <td>Presidential approval of strategy for handling invitations to Cabinet members to visit Moscow: should be cleared with White House in context of our overall objectives.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 21</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>NSC meeting on East-West Trade: President insists on linkage.</li>
        <li>Soviets expel US journalist (Anatole Shub); HK concurs May 22 in State proposal to expel Soviet journalist from US.</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 28</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>NSDM 15 on East-West trade links economic liberalization to improvement in political relations, asks for no change in legislation.</li>
        <li>Kosygin reply to President's letter of March 26. HK analysis says reply shows "no substantive concessions."</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 2</td>
    <td>Presidential note that more USG officials should travel to Eastern Europe as "needle" to Moscow. Discussed guidelines for this at June 3 Cabinet-NSC meeting.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 11</td>
    <td>HK recommendation to State that Soviet Embassy official be expelled from US.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 14</td>
    <td>Soviets deliver to State a note on Sino-Soviet dispute (Toon telcon).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 28</td>
    <td>Nixon trip to Romania announced. HK backgrounder in New York on purpose of trip. Not directed at USSR.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

June 29 Reston attacks Romania trip as provocative "blunder."

June 30 HK memo to Pres. on Soviet jamming of VOA argues it would be undesirable to retaliate by jamming. Matter can be dealt with in relation to progress made on SALT.

* HK directive to Under Secretaries Committee requests options for improved US-Romanian economic ties in preparation for President's visit. NSDM 15 should be taken into account.

US - SOVIET RELATIONS - 1969

July 1 HK directive to State provides guidance on Nixon visit to Romania as reflecting a "desire to work for improved relations with the countries of East Europe on a basis of reciprocity..." and is in no sense an anti-Soviet gesture

July 2 HK tells Erlichman (telcon) to tell Pres. that Brezhnev/Kosygin visit to Romania has been postponed indefinitely due to Nixon visit

July 3 HK invites Gov. Dewey to serve on Disarmament Advisory Council, says we can get by another 5-6 years but another ten years of military deterioration is going to put US in a very difficult position diplomatically

NSSM 63 asks for review of policy choices confronting US as result of Sino-Soviet conflict. Due by 8/15

July 4 HK memo transmits to Pres Helms report on reduced level of ABM deployment around Moscow

July 7 HK transmits to Pres a DOD paper on Soviets objectives of developing a China-oriented ABM system: "Evidence is strong enough to suggest that Soviets will probably agree with us in SALT that both countries should maintain a ballistic missile capability against PRC and third countries...Soviets have a stronger incentive to build a light ABM than we do..."

July 10 HK to Pres. describes Gromyko foreign policy speech as "temperate," and "on the whole positive as regards relations with the United States" though no advance seen on Middle East, Vietnam, Europe and arms control

July 11 US Navy reconnaissance plans observe Soviet warships off Florida coast bound for Cuba on "friendly visit"

July 12 Pres interested again in options for stiffer protest re Soviet jamming of VOA. HK information memo makes no recommendation

July 12 Briefing memo for HK meeting with Mitchell on Rogers' "freewheeling actions" as Sec State and need for action to counter this or HK will step down (useful overview of Nixon strategy and "assets" vis-a-vis Sovs..."a short term approach which would involve a somewhat harder attitude toward the Soviet Union; which would involve a patient and reserved attitude toward movement in those areas of Soviet interest until the Soviets

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

had, in turn, indicated a willingness to reciprocate
in areas of prime concern to the US...) PRC, Vietnam,
ME, SALT, global strategy issues also treated

July 17
HK decides against liberalization of export items
for USSR and East Europe (Bergsten had argued that
this option would be consistent with policy towards
East Bloc and on negative Admin. position on liberal-
ization of Export Control Act)

July 18
HK backgrounder says US neither approves nor
disapproves of Soviet fleet visit to Cuba: "It
is a matter which we regard with utter indifference."
HK says, re Asian Collective Security scheme, that
"we do not foresee a great power condominium" in
Asia. US also feels Soviets have not done all they
can to help us end Vietnam war

July 19
HK directive to State to discreetly cool down
Romanian optimism about possible new economic
concessions from the US

July 21
Pres approves HK recommendation against approval
for diesel-powered sub reconn in Soviet waters

Aug. 5
Pres. approval of recommended position to be taken
by US with UK, France and Germany to probe Soviet
intentions on Berlin. HK notes this idea is largely
at German initiative and it is his judgment that the
probable results of such a probe of the Soviets will
not be encouraging though he does not oppose making
a try.

Aug. 7
Pres. decision overrules State/HK recommendation to
begin limited negotiations of Czech gold/claims issues.
President prefers not to take any initiative for the
present and only later consider the minimal negotiating
option.

Aug. 12
Len Garment reports on his Soviet trip. He had told
Soviets that HK speaks for President (telcon). HK
says we should low-key the anti-Soviet propaganda
(Czech film) because we have needled them quite a
bit lately.

Sep. 4
NSSM 72 creates International Space Cooperation
Committee to study possible cooperation with friendly
countries as well as USSR.

Sep. 11
HK to Pres. on CIA analysis of Kosygin-Chou meeting.
Analysis is that meetings were called by Soviets
and reflect Soviet concern that the Sino-Soviet
conflict is hurting them. Agency also believes it is
likely Kosygin sought to indicate to Peking that there
was little possibility of an imminent devastating
attack on PRC installations but they could expect a
strong reaction to further border provocations.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Sep. 17
Pres. agrees to HK recommendation that DuBridge carry letters to Tito and Ceausescu on increased scientific and technical cooperation during DuBridge's trip to Europe and East bloc. Will enhance chance for Pres. private channels to these leaders, especially Ceausescu.

Sep. 21
HK transmits to Pres. Hubert Humphrey letter on his trip to Moscow. Humphrey: Urges regular summit meetings (HK disagrees); urges US take the initiative in stopping testing of MIRVs (HK disagrees); urges US use USSR as an intermediary to Hanoi (HK notes that without authorization from Hanoi, the Soviets seem unwilling to take any initiative).

Sep. 22
Pres. reaction to Henry Brandon article in Saturday Review asserting that State Department is upset with Nixon's Soviet policy and its 'inherent contradictions'. Pres. asks who is spreading this line. HK notes "the line is characteristic of the Sovietologists who mistrust and resent any moves which would complicate improvements in US-Soviet relationships."

HK memo to President analyzes Soviet stalling on SALT over past few months. Shift in Soviet attitude between July and August. Soviets may feel no urgency about SALT" "...there is no persuasive evidence for being very optimistic...the Soviets have not been responsive to the concept of an era of negotiation, despite some moderately toned speeches..."

Views of Arbatov conveyed to HK. "All the old suspicions of the President had returned in Moscow, and prospects for progress in our relations had distinctly worsened...our talk of negotiations was a sham...he cited in the first instance China...next was the Romanian visit...the decision to continue to export controls as before...refusal to make constructive proposals on the ME...this mood in Moscow is basis of Soviet slowness in answering SALT proposal."

Sep. ___
Soviet reply to the 3-Power sounding of August 7 on Berlin. HK (9/26) memo to Pres. sees no substantive advance: "Little more than elaboration of Gromyko speech. Thus, I feel we should not appear at all anxious to move on Berlin, nor should we probe very hard for clarifications on the Soviet positions. They are obviously in no hurry."

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Sep. 26 HK tells Sen. Tower to tell Soviets that majority of Americans are hawks on Vietnam (telcon).

Sep. 27 Dobrynin grumbles at lack of progress in relations; HK stresses that Vietnam is the critical issue. Dobrynin asks who thought of Romanian trip; asks whether US prefers 2- or 4-party talks on Berlin. Soviets ask whether Chinese have responded to ending of travel restrictions. HK feels Soviets are eager to improve relations. (See HK/President telcon.)

Sep. 29 HK memo to Pres. on increase in Sino-Soviet tensions and Soviet probe on attitudes toward a possible Soviet air strike on PRC nuclear/missile facilities. NSC contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is underway, but HK notes concern about US responses in the interim to Soviet probes: "Soviets may be using us to generate an impression that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions. We should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics." State should be given clear guidance on deploring reports of a Soviet plan to attack PRC.

Oct. 15 In reaction to press item that Hickel may visit USSR, Pres. asks that HK be sure to brief him prior to his departure.

HK reports to Pres. on new Soviet arrangements for Berlin; the Allies will protest.

Laird asks for guidance on sophisticated communications computers being sold to Eastern Europe. HK asks for State and DOD views (HK/Laird telcon).

Oct. 20 President tells HK he should indicate to Dobrynin that President is "out of control" on Vietnam (telcon).

President receives Dobrynin. Dobrynin present note complaining "Moscow is not satisfied with state of relations." President says anything we do with China is not directed at USSR; complains that year has passed since bomb halt. If Soviets help us end war, US "might do something dramatic to improve US-Soviet relations." Soviet note covers Vietnam, Middle East, warns US vs. exploiting Sino-Soviet conflict.

Oct. 23 HK reports to President that the new Soviet line on Vietnam - most recently in the Franco-Soviet communique of 10/13 and Kosygin toast for Pham Van Dong 10/15 - reflects a new sense of urgency about a Vietnamese settlement and end to the war.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Oct 25 US and USSR agree to begin SALT on Nov. 17 in Helsinki.

* President wants no contacts with Soviets on any subject in week of Vietnam speech and "that's a command." (telcon) Rogers claims meeting scheduled with Dobrynin (telcons).

Oct 28 HK tells Stans to wait on decontrolling certain trade items until after Nov. 3 speech (telcon).

* HK tells G. Smith not to get into any substance when he meets Dobrynin (telcon).

* Sisco reports Dobrynin was somber in their Middle East discussion (telcon).

Nov 17 Pres. approves HK directive to State to put brakes on Rogers' latest proposal to go back to Soviets on Berlin.

Nov 26 HK sends Pres. latest NIE on Soviet strategic attack forces. HK argues that the NIE process is faulty and has produced superficial study. Pres. totally agrees, noting that "This report is virtually useless except for a superficial mindless recitation of what we know from the daily press - i.e. that the USSR is building lots of new missiles."

Nov 29 LBJ reports talk with Zorin who pointed to Romania visit as leading to Soviet delay on SALT.

Dec 3 Dobrynin confirms that Cyrus Eaton does not speak for Soviet Government (telcon).

Dec 11 LLewellyn Thompson advises we inform Dobrynin about proposed talks with Chinese. Rogers, HK advise against. (telcon).

Dec 12 HK memo strongly concurs with Rogers recommendation against advising Dobrynin of US talks with Chinese: "...If Dobrynin questions, we should respond with nonchalance that they concern matters of mutual interest and not go beyond that..."

Dec 16 Inozemtsev of Moscow Institute complains that US is linking US-Soviet relations to Vietnam.

US-Soviet Relations - 1969

Dec 18 Schlesinger (BOB) eliminates budget funds for Radio Liberty. HK tells Helms to appeal so he (HK) can restore it. (Helms telcon)

* HK end of year backgrounder states we are prepared for serious and concrete negotiation unemotionally on a range of issues. We need long-term policy, not oscillation. Summit should be carefully prepared.

* HK sends Pres. report on Rogers talk with Romanian First Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu; latter stressed Romanian interest in close bilateral relations; also indicated that Romanian interest in European security arose from the hope that progress in this field would make more difficult the Soviet application of Brezhnev doctrine. HK and Macovescu also discussed China and Vietnam.

Dec 22 Dobrynin suggests regular HK/Dobrynin meetings on special topics. Soviets seem eager to talk on several issues. Dobrynin says summit is best place to make progress; complains of linkage of Berlin and CSCE.

Dec 23 HK analysis to Pres. on various on-going Soviet foreign policy initiatives: Argues that the Soviets have several balls in the air - SALT, talks with PRC, new negots. with Bonn -- "...While it is tempting to see a grand design behind their diverse moves, one suspects there is a large element of improvisation..."

Dec 27 HK sends Pres. Agency analysis of Sino-Soviet relations which shows PRC the underdog: "Peking will remain the vulnerable and defensive party and seek to improve its international diplomatic position."

Dec 29 HK tells Dobrynin that Pres. agrees to regular HK/Dobrynin meetings.

* HK memo to Commerce favors early movement on liberalizing export controls to Romania by general licenses to free certain commodities.

Dec 30 Useful background memo on history of Soviet proposals on European security, 1966-1969.

SALT/ARMS CONTROL - 1969

Jan. 23 RG considers NPT and decides US ratification does not require pressing other countries to adhere.

Jan. 29 NSC meeting on NPT. President favors NPT but is concerned about allies.

Feb. 5 . NSDM 6: Decision to ratify NPT. President submits NPT to Senate for ratification.

. NSSM 13: Position of key countries on the NPT.

Feb. 12 NSSM 20: Resumption of Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC).

Feb. 14 NSC meeting on strategic posture. President wants SALT papers within three months and wants no hint to Soviets that we are committed to having these talks.

Feb. 20 . HK tells Doty (telcon) to indicate support of arms control in talks with Arbatov. HK hopes scientists will behave if we take their concerns into account on ABM.

. NSSM 25: Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and Limited Test Ban Treaty.

March 5 Lynn memo on Modified Sentinel System.

March 6 . NSSM 28: US Position for Possible SALT Talks.

. RG meets on NPT and ENDC.

March 8 HK and President (telcon) discuss advantage of ABM as protection for the deterrent. Fear that we may lose it in the Senate (later telcon).

March 12 NSC meeting on ENDC issues (CTB, fissionable materials, seabeds).

March 15 Nixon letter to Gerard Smith, head of US delegation to END C (result of NSSM 20) gives authority to take forthcoming position on seabeds treaty.

March 27 . Dobrynin tells Sen. Percy that US seems uninterested in SALT.

. Rogers says publicly that if Soviets give up their ABM, US would give up SAFEGUARD.

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

2.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>April 7</td>
    <td>Rogers says publicly that US plans to begin SALT talks in "late spring or early summer".</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 11</td>
    <td>NSSM 41 asks study of Seabeds Arms Control Treaty.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 21</td>
    <td>Gerard Smith proposes (telcon) MIRV ban; HK asks about verifiability.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 25</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>RG discusses seabeds treaty.</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 30</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>HK recommendation to President for slowing down State's efforts to fix early date for arms talks, so not to curtail US flexibility.</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 30</td>
    <td>NSC meeting on ENDC and seabeds treaty. Defense opposes it; State supports it.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 2</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>Rogers (telcon) urges we start discussing SALT procedures with Soviets.</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 2</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>HK backgrounder discusses SALT preparations, "most fundamental talks we have" with USSR.</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 5</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>HK analysis of Congressional pressure for strategic arms moratorium with the Soviets: "moratorium could be taken as an earnest of our good faith. But persuasive arguments can be made that by proceeding with our planned programs, we actually strengthen our position in negotiations."</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 14</td>
    <td>NSSM 56 on uranium enrichment facilities.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 21</td>
    <td>
      <ul>
        <li>Presidential directive to State re planned NSC meeting (June 18) on NSSM 28: Develop approach to be taken with Soviets on SALT timing; importance of consultations with allies.</li>
      </ul>
    </td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 22</td>
    <td>US submits draft seabeds treaty to ENDC.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 23</td>
    <td>Sen. Brooke makes strong pitch for MIRV moratorium (telcon).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 24</td>
    <td>Chronology of developments on talks with Soviets sent to President by HK to demonstrate bureaucratic momentum towards promising Soviets early date for SALT.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 28</td>
    <td>NSSM 59 on CBW arms control.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

June 10 Memo to President summarizing state of SALT preparations. President faces decisions on strategic criteria, then on basic SALT approach, then on consultations with allies, and then on negotiating package. Will take 3-4 weeks. US will face pressures in meantime for unilateral restraint on ABM and MIRV.

Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program cancelled.

June 12 RG meeting on SALT agrees that first NSC meeting on SALT will focus on scope of agreement and introduce itself to major issues. ACDA's "stop-where-we-are" (SWWA) proposal and other proposed packages would be used as illustrations.

June 14 Henry Owen views on SALT issues. He proposes US-Soviet moratorium on MIRV testing, coupled with Congressional decision to fund entire ABM but delay funding of deployment until SALT is explored.

June 16 HK suggests creating MIRV panel (G. Smith telcon).

HK forwards staff analysis of deep undercurrent of worry among our allies on SALT. British "disturbed" and Germans "deeply agitated".

June 18 NSC meeting on SALT (NSSM 28) reviews the four strategic criteria and begins SALT discussion. Given the criteria, US could beef up strategic programs, make modest improvements, or exercise restraint to promote SALT. Discussion of how to assess Soviet threat.

Brooke tells HK (telcon) he had to submit MIRV ban resolution "as matter of conscience". 40 co-sponsors.

June 19 RG meeting on verification. RG asks OSD/JCS to prepare counterarguments. SWWA looks good for US; therefore may not be negotiable. Steering Group is asked to prepared specific negotiating models and assess verification problems for NSC.

MIRV panel meets to seek consensus on facts on MIRV testing and deployment.

HK transmits to State President's desire that alternative SALT proposals based on "limited, intermediate, and comprehensive" options developed in NSSM 28 study be considered at 6/25 NSC meeting.

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

June 24 Second meeting of MIRV panel considers consequences of MIRV flight ban

June 25
NSC meeting on SALT. Meeting reviews several specific SALT packages or options ranging from simple ICBM freeze to comprehensive SWWA. JCS leans toward limited options; ACDA favors comprehensive options; most favor LBJ Admin. position. Meeting considers need for US consultations with allies. HK urges going slow on SWWA option until further study. Options papers not yet good enough for presentation to allies.

June 26
HK proposes President reply to Sen. Brooke arguing against draft resolution proposing joint MIRV moratorium (Pres. signs reply)

HK proposes written guidance to State, DOD, ACDA on SALT and preparations for NATO consultations to follow-up 6/25 NSC meeting

June 27 NSDM 18 asks review of policy on underground testing

June 30-July 1 First round of US consultations with NATO allies on SALT

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

July 1 NSSM 62 asks for preparation of alternative negotiating positions for SALT based on NSSM 28 report and NSC discussion. NSSM asks for examples of limited, intermediate and comprehensive agreements, including SWWA, and assessment of each in terms of various criteria. Due by July 11

* Pres approves guidance proposed by HK on consultations with NATO allies on SALT

July 3
HK concurrence with some revisions to Gerard Smith on text of "Draft Presentation on Illustrative SALT Alternatives"

* Pres message to ENDC

July 7
HK sends to Pres a DOD paper on Soviet China-oriented ABM system. Soviets will probably agree with us in SALT that both countries should maintain a ballistic missile capability against PRC and third countries. Soviets have a stronger incentive to build a light ABM than we do.

July 8-9 Second round of US consultations with NATO allies on SALT (US presentation of illustrative positions)

July 10 UK draft convention to ban BW submitted to ENDC

* Third meeting of MIRV Panel considers questions re
  Soviet MIRV capability

* Sen. Percy proposes MIRV moratorium and ABM delay (telcon)

* Gromyko foreign policy speech. HK describes as "temperate" and "on the whole positive as regards relations with the United States" though no advance seen on Middle East, Vietnam, Europe and arms control

* HK sends report to Pres on sessions with NATO allies on SALT. NATO reactions fall into two distinct attitudes: "Some were mainly impressed with what seemed to be a situation of 'parity' and others were more concerned with the new developments that threatened to upset the 'balance.' " "The principle preoccupation of the Europeans, however, seems to be whether SALT will undermine their own security"

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

July 15 Pres asks HK to meet with Howard Hughes re Safeguard ABM (Hughes against deployment)

July 17 RG reviews five alternative SALT negot. proposals developed by NSSM 62 study. Issue is whether opening SALT phase should be exploratory or specific negotiation

July 21 Pres. letter to Gerard Smith stresses verification, importance of criteria of strategic sufficiency, and willingness to consider both quantitative and qualitative limits on both offensive and defensive: "...I will judge the resulting relationship of US-Soviet strategic forces in terms of the criteria for self-sufficiency that I have established...I will accept limitations on our forces only after I have assured myself of our ability to detect Soviet failure to implement limitations...I am determined to avoid...divisive disputes regarding Soviet compliance or non-compliance...the margin of uncertainty must be reasonable..."

* Memo creates Verification Panel in view of USG differences over reliability of verification

* HK explains President's approach on verification to Richardson (telcon). Pres. wants concrete facts about verifiability

* HK report to Pres on consultations with NATO allies on SALT (country-by-country): "The allies have all expressed satisfaction with the way in which we are handling this...certain specific reservations...but in general seem confident...The British and Canadians were most eager to have us negotiate bans on ABM and MIRV..."

July 22 First meeting of Verification Panel discuss broad issues, asks for technical report by Working Group

Aug 6 US Senate approves authorization for Safeguard ABM by 51-49

Aug 8 Second VP meeting holds initial discussion of first draft of Verification Report. HK stresses purpose is to clarify factual base before making policy choices. VP asks working group to evaluate US capability to monitor NSSM 62 options.

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Aug 29 Third VP meeting reviews draft, asks for revisions of MIRV panel report

Sep 3-5 Seabeds treaty: Soviets want 3-mile limit; US wants 12-mile limit. Telcons with G. Smith, Laird, Rogers discuss compromise

Sep 6 Pres. decides backstopping of SALT talks to be vested in the USC Comte of the NSC and that policy issues would remain with NSC. HK advised Pres. that State option would have "circumvented" the NSC and nullified its procedures (i.e. Rogers had wanted group under his own Chairmanship)

Sep 10 At NSC mtg, Pres. asks for a quarterly report on Soviet strategic forces from CIA

Sep 19 MIRV panel redraft of VP paper "Technological Consequences of a MIRV Flight Ban"

Sep 22 HK memo to Pres. analyzes Soviet stalling on SALT. Shift in Soviet attitude between July and Aug. Soviets may feel no urgency about SALT: "...there is no persuasive evidence for being very optimistic ...the Soviets have not been responsive to the concept of an era of negotiation, despite some moderately toned speeches..."

Sep 23 HK memo to Pres. on UK-Dutch-FRG gas centrifuge project. US has potential problems with UK over transfer of US information or equipment without US consent and safeguards against diversion of enriched uranium

Sep 26 HK sends Pres. CIA analysis on PRC 9/22 nuclear test: PRC "now sufficiently advanced in their technology to undertake the complexities of an underground test program..."

HK memo to Harlow urges tight coordination of agency communications with Hill on MIRV and SALT if Pres. to remain in control

Sep 29 NSC staff analysis of Soviet seabeds proposal

4th VP meeting

Oct 7 US and USSR submit joint draft treaty banning nuclear weapons from ocean floor to ENDC

Oct 8 NSC meetings on Verification study

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Oct 11 NSDM 26 creates DPRC to review diplomatic, political, military and economic consequences of defense strategies, budgets and deployments

Oct 20 Pres. receives Dobyrnin; latter suggests Helsinki
Nov 17 for SALT opening

Oct 24 HK directive to State, DOD, ACDA conveying Prs decisions on SALT: VP to be permanent, SALT backstopping comte under the USC to be permanent; NATO allies to be consulted

Oct 25 US and USSR announce agreement to open SALT in Helsinki on Nov 17

HK report to Pres. that Pompidou, Wilson and Brandt have now received private Pres. messages advising them in advance of Sov proposal to begin SALT in Helsinki

Oct 28 Harold Brown's views on SALT sent to HK

Pres. signs (dated 10/30) guidance to State, DOD, ACDA re speculation on unilateral ban on MIRV test program: "...carefully avoid any statements... which might add to the speculation..."

Oct 30 HK sends Erlichman complete wrap-up of USG statements on SALT, demonstrating problems with State on this issue

HK explains SALT, Soviet build-up to AFL/CIO Executive Council

RG considers NSSM 59 paper on CBW. Paper to be reworked

Oct 31 VP meeting

Nov 4 VP meets and considers Evaluation Report (veri-fiability of SALT options)

HK meets Doty et al, who report Soviet interest in SALT reflected at Pugwash

*Oct 24 Pres. says he had told Rogers that MIRV was the issue we really want to hold the line on.

**Oct 28 Laird complains that G. Smith wants moratorium on everything (telcon)

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Nov 5 HK asks Rathjens, Ruina and Garwin to examine
MIRV moratorium idea (HK/Rathjens telcon)

Nov 6 HK approves DOD-suggested revisions re Belgian draft on the NPG consideration of nuclear weapons use. NPG will also consider the UK-FRG paper on guidelines for the use of tactical nuclear weapons

Nov 10 Announcement concerning status of uranium enrich-
ment facilities within AEC

. HK explains to Mitchell why MIRV question can't be
separated from questions of ABM, ELINT, radar, etc
(telcon)

. NSC reviews SALT options (options that limit numbers,
options that limit numbers and ban MIRVs and one
option that reduces numbers). Pres. skeptical of
MIRV ban as freezing Soviet edge unless Soviet ABM
is limited

Nov 12 NSDM 33 gives instructions for preliminary SALT talks. Objective is to develop work program. Discussion may include all offensive and defensive systems, quantitative and qualitative aspects, including MIRV restraints. Pres. is committed to area defense component of Safeguard. Verification is the key. Pres. also sends ltr to G. Smith: "I view arms limitation talks in the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union...progress in arms limitation must be accompanied by progress in the solution of critical political problems..."

Nov 17 HK tells Laird that Pres. has approved Phase II of Safeguard and our SALT delegation should guide themselves accordingly (telcon)

. Pres. briefs Congressional leadership on SALT

. First round of SALT opens in Helsinki. (HK Cong. briefing as well). Pres. message for Smith at the beginning of the talks: "...we will be guided by the concept of maintaining 'sufficiency' in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies...We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems....We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties..."

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Nov 18 NSC meeting on CBW. JCS sees CBW limit as to US
advantage

Nov 24 Presidium of Supreme Soviet ratifies NPT, NPT
signed in ceremonies by Podgorny in Moscow and
Nixon in Washington

Nov 25 NSDM 35 declares new policy on Chemical Warfare and Biological Research. No first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons (not covering riot control agents and herbicides; Geneva protocol to be submitted for ratification). US renounces all use and stocks of biological weapons -- only R & D for defensive purposes - and joins in UK draft convention banning use of BW.

Nov 26 HK briefs WH staff on SALT and CBW

HK tells Doty that if professors nit-pick on
teargas, Geneva Protocol won't get ratified.
No chance of doing it until war is over (telcon)

Nov 28 HK report to Pres. on first round in SALT (G.
Smith's views). Sovs seemed prepared to talk
about complex problems including interrelationship
of various weapons systems and verification. But
Sovs have also opened up possibility of impasse
by raising NATO arrangements

Dec 3 HK impression of first round of SALT one of "serious tone of the Soviet delegation, though...also...some of their positions could pose difficulties in the next phase of discussions..."

Dec 8 Pres press conf (mainly on Vietnam, with numerous questions as well on Agnew criticizing the press). On SALT, Pres defends US request for postponement as necessary to develop positions on issues and he cites prospects of the talks as "better than I anticipated they would be when the talks began."

Dec 15 HK sends Pres. G. Smith's third report on SALT:
Sovs have avoided raising MIRV; Sovs have virtually
reversed their thinking on ABMs since the Glassboro
conversations; however, Smith feels it is premature
to make a judgment on Soviet intentions though Sovs
seem to want to end this round on an harmonious
note. Pres. writes: "Gerry - Don't let them get
a cheap 'Glassboro' type communique - which will
read well now and look bad on the action side a
year from now."

SALT/Arms Control - 1969

Dec 16 President meets with GAC, says SALT is a "blue chip matter."

Laird complains that ACDA is claiming that toxins are not chemicals, when UN acknowledges that they are (telcon).

Dec 18 HK backgrounder explains SALT policy-making process.

Dec 19 Soviets insist on Helsinki for SALT site, then agree to Vienna after White House insists (telcon).

Dec 29 Pres. meets with G. Smith on SALT; Smith briefing to press.

Dec 31 NSSM 85 directs study of all aspects of US policy and programs re toxins, as follow-up to NSSM 59 study and in light of NSDM 35.