Potlatch

Potlatch Corporation

P.O. Box 3591
San Francisco, California 94119-3591
Telephone (415) 981-5980

Richard B. Madden
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

July 25, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International
& Strategic Studies
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 1021
Washington, D. C. 20006

JUL 27 1983

Dear Henry:

Thank you so very much for the delightful luncheon at The Pacific-Union Club in honor of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. It surely was one of the most interesting and enjoyable luncheons I have ever had the pleasure to attend. I also hope you had a good weekend at the Grove.

Relative to our luncheon discussion on your most challenging new assignment, just two thoughts. First, I completely agree with you that your group should focus initially on the political, economic and social issues involved in Latin America and general agreement may well be possible. Second, I believe your thought about not forcing a single proposal on implementation is absolutely correct. Minority opinions are far superior than too bland a set of proposals. Furthermore, as you suggested, there may be a most useful technique in developing two (not the State Department's three) proposals. This approach would permit a clustering of opinions and focus the debate along more classic lines, much as was possible a few years ago when there was more party discipline in the Congress.

All of us at the American Enterprise Institute look forward to seeing you in Vail with President Ford this summer.

One Maritime Plaza, San Francisco, CA 94111-3576

ALFREDO OSORIO

15555 Southwest 72 Court
Miami, Florida 33157
Telephone 305-253-9480

July 22, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
Central American Commission
1800 K St. N.W.
Suite No. 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

JUL 26 1983

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As a personal admirer of your distinguished personality and intellect, I take this opportunity to congratulate you in the Presidential appointment as Chairman of the Central American Commission. Always, my family and myself have followed with great interest and admiration your qualities of statesmanship, personal courage and scholarship.

As a native of Nicaragua, I am quite confident that the Commission under your Chairmanship, will find the solution that this most important issue requires. I should also state that in President Reagan, the United States not only has an extraordinary leader, but also the person that can recognize the value of his fellow citizens, as it is your case. I do pray that The Lord will guide the President, yourself and the Commission to the path that will preserve the freedom of so many hundreds of millions in the American Continent.

Modestly, please allow me the liberty to attach herewith a memorandum that I had prepared for you, in the hope that it may contain some ideas that probably could help in relation to the Sandinista Peace Proposal of July 19, 1983.

MEMORANDUM

TO: DR. HENRY KISSINGER
CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMISSION

FROM: ALFREDO OSORIO
15555 S.W. 72 CT
MIAMI, FLA. 33157

SUBJECT: NICARAGUA

HONORABLE DR. KISSINGER:

ALLOW ME TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS SOME PERSONAL CONCEPTS THAT MAY BE OF SOME HELP IN RELATION TO THE SANDINISTA PEACE PROPOSAL OF JULY 19, 1983:

1. THE SANDINISTAS WERE ONE OF SEVERAL GROUPS THAT RECEIVED SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES, VENEZUELA, MEXICO AND COSTA RICA TO OVERTHROW THE SOMOZA GOVERNMENT.

2. THESE SUPPORT WAS FOR THE GROUP, AND NOT FOR THE SANDINISTAS ONLY.

3. THE FACT THAT THE SANDINISTAS ELIMINATED THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP HAVE DISQUALIFIED THEM FOR SUCH A SUPPORT.

4. ALL THE FAULTS THAT LED TO THE CONDEMNATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMOZA HAVE NOW BEING FAR SURPASSED BY THE SANDINISTAS, THE OPPRESSION, THE EXPLOITATION, THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CORRUP- TION ARE NOW WORSE THAN IN SOMOZA'S REGIME. TO THIS WE HAVE TO ADD THE EXPORTATION OF WAR AND DEATH TO THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND THE THREAT OF THE SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE.

5. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS BEING IN THE SAME CONDITION AS WAS THE SOMOZA GOVERNMENT, THE REMOVAL OF THE SANDINISTAS NOW THAT THEY ARE IN REAL SERIOUS PROBLEMS BECOMES A NECESSITY FOR PEACE IN THE REGION.

MAY I SUGGEST TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING CONCEPTS IN REGARDS TO THE SIX POINTS OF THE SANDINISTA PROPOSAL:

POINT 1) IF A CEASE FIRE IS CONSIDERED, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE NOT TO BE INMEDIATE, BUT AT A TERM AFTER SOME BASIC AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED. A DISMANTLING OF THE FORCES OF THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS WHO HAVE GAINED THEMSELVES THE RIGHT TO BE TAKEN INTO SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATION IN THE NICARAGUAN POLITICAL SCHEME, SHOULD NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERED.

A NON AGRESSION TREATY WITH HONDURAS COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED SIMOULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ABANDONMENT OF THE COMMUNIST DOCTRINE BY THE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT AND THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN NICARAGUAN AFFAIRS, SUBJECT OF COURSE, TO VERIFICATION OF NICARAGUAN DEMILITARIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION WITHIN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, DECOMMUNIZATION OF THE ARMY, DEPARTURE OF ALL COMMUNIST AND TERRORIST ADVISORS, AND TOTAL TERMINATION OF AID AND ASSISTANCE TO GUERRILLAS IN THE CONTINENT, ALL THESE UNDER A FRAMEWORK OF ABSOLUTE VERIFICATION.

POINT 2) IF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO SALVADOR FROM THE UNITED STATES ARE TO BE STOPPED, WILL MEAN THE COLLAPSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SALVADOR. THE UNITED STATES IS SHIPPING ARMS TO A POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT ASSAULTED BY A NON-DEMOCRATIC ARMED GROUP BACKED BY A NON ELECTED NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT AND THEIR COMMUNIST ALLIES. THESE CAN NOT BE EQUATED, IT WOULD MEAN TO SANCTION, ACCEPT BLACKMAIL AND RELINQUISH THE SOVEREING RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND EL SALVADOR.

POINT 3) THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN TERRITORY FOR ATTACK TO ANOTHER COUNTRY HAS NO REASON AT ALL, EXCEPT IF A COUNTRY IS EXPORTING SUBERSIVE ACTIVITY AGAINST ANOTHER. SUCH PROHIBITION MEANS RELINQUISHING THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF NATIONS TO PROTECT THEIR COUNTRIES AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM ANOTHER.

POINT 4) THE RIGHTS OF SELF DETERMINATION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED BY ELECTIONS AND NOT BY THE WILL OF A FEW NON ELECTED, LIKE THE SANDINISTAS. THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM CONSISTS OF A NATIONAL DISTRUST IN ELECTIONS BECAUSE IN THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY, ONLY ONE ELECTION HAS BEEN HONEST, THAT OF MONCADA VERSUS BENARD. THE PROBLEM CONSISTS IN DESIGNING AN ELECTION SYSTEM WITH ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION, WITH THE USE OF MODERN VOTING EQUIPMENT, SUCH AS COMPUTERS, AND VERY IMPORTANT, TO PROVIDE A FINANCE FUND FOR THE CAMPAIGN, TO ENABLE POLITICAL PARTIES THAT ARE NOT RELATED TO THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT TO FUND THEIR CAMPAIGNS AND COMPETE IN FAIR BASIS WITH THE LARGE ECONOMIC GROUP THAT WAS LEFT IN NICARAGUA AFTER THE SANDINISTA TAKE OVER AND THAT HAVING COLLABORATED WITH THE SANDINISTAS SINCE 1979 HAVE INCREASED THEIR FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN DISPROPORTIONATE SCALE IN RELATION TO THE NICARAGUANS IN GENERAL WHO WITHOUT THAT FINANCE FUND THE DEMOCRATIC EXERCISE WOULD BE AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY, AND IN A FEW YEARS, THERE WILL BE MORE WAR IN NICARAGUA AND IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

NON INTERVENTION AGREEMENT FOR FOREIGN POWERS. THIS IS A COMPROMISE CONCEPTUALLY SIMILAR TO THE KENNEDY-KRUSCHEV AGREEMENT IN RELATION TO CUBA, EXCEPT THAT IT INVOLVES A WIDER AREA. IT LEAVES THE UNITED STATES IN THE HAND OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND UNABLE TO DEFEND ITSELF. IT IS UNTHINKABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD AGREE NOT TO INTERVENE IN THEIR OWN AREA OF INFLUENCE AND SECURITY OF INTERESTS.

POINT 5) END AGGRESSION AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS. THIS CAN BE READ AS THE REQUEST OF ECONOMIC AID FOR THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT. DURING THE FOUR YEARS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT THE SANDINISTAS HAVE INDEBTED THE COUNTRY IN AN ADDITIONAL 3.4 BILLION DOLLARS, AN IDEBTNESS THAT IS BEYOND THE ECONOMIC SCALE OF NICARAGUA. THE REPAYMENT REQUIS EXTRAORDINARY ECONOMIC EFFORTS OF VERY CAPABLE AND DEVOTED PEOPLE. THE 3.4 BILLION HAVE BEEN SQUANDERED IN WEAPONS, CORRUPTION, AND BLATANT INCOMPETENCE, SINCE NEARLY ALL THE COMPETENT ADMINISTRATORS, TECHNICAL AND PROFESSIONALS WERE EITHER EXPELLED OR LEFT THE COUNTRY. TO ALLOW MORE FUNDS FOR THE SANDINISTAS WILL ONLY WORSEN AN ALREADY DISASTROUS NATIONAL ECONOMY.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE PRIVATE BANKING SYSTEM SHOULD NOT CONSIDER NEW LOANS TO NICARAGUA, UNLESS NEW NEW ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES ARE TAKEN, SUCH AS: RETURNING TO FREE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM ELIMINATING THE COSTLY AND INEFFICIENT SANDINISTA OWNED ENTERPRISES, THE RETURN OF THE EXILES TO MANAGE THEIR PREVIOUS PROSPEROUS ENTERPRISES, THE RETURN OF PRIVATE BANKING AND THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN THE COUNTRY, A CLEAR POLICY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, COMMERCE AND SERVICES SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

POINT 6) PROHIBITION AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND A BAN OF FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISERS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. AS IN POINT 4) THIS IS A SURRENDER OF THE RIGHTS OF ANY SOVEREIGN NATION IN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT THE HEMISPHERE FROM THREATS FROM OTHER CONTINENTS. SPECIFICALLY LEAVES THE UNITED STATES AT THE MERCY OF THE ACTION OF THE SOVIETS, WHO HAVE THE PRACTICE OF MANNING WITH SOVIET PERSONNEL MILITARY BASES, THAT APPARENTLY BELONG TO SPECIFIC NATIONS, BUT IN REALITY IN ONLY A DISGUISE. IT IS UNTHINKABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD AGREE NOT TO ESTABLISH MILITARY BASES WHERE IT IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR THE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF THE NATION AND THE CONTINENT.

DANIEL JAMES

4201 CATHEDRAL AVE., N.W., SUITE 602W

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016

PHONE (202) 362.4236

July 25, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for Strategic & International Studies
1800 K Street, N. W., Suite 400
Washington, D. C. 20006

JUL 26 1983

Dear Henry:

Little did any of us at the Houston Roundtable dream that, only weeks
later, the President would be asking you to tangle with a porcupine. Whether you
deserve congratulations or condolences for taking on Central America, you'll need
all the support you can get to succeed in your task, and it is in that spirit that
I address this to you.

My intention, as one who has spent thirty years writing books and articles
on Latin America and lived in Mexico two-thirds of that time, is to offer some ideas
and impressions stemming from that experience which might prove useful to you.

I take as my point of departure a pertinent comment President Reagan made
the other day, before the Central America Outreach Working Group at the White House,
that an underlying fault of former U. S. aid programs for Latin America was that they
reflected "our way" of doing things, not "theirs." That is the trouble with the well-
intended "Marshall Plan" idea proposed recently by Senators Jackson and McMathias.
They, like U. S. leaders in general, were unaware that the Central Americans had
lofty ideas about solving their problems long before the Marshall Plan.

Above all, there is the intangible yet dynamic concept of "centroamericanismo,"
a deep sense of common identity shared by all Central Americans since time immemorial.
It not only expresses their innermost aspirations but has formed the basis for prac-
tical solutions over time. That they haven't worked is another story. But if the
wellsprings of centroamericanismo were tapped today, given the urgent interest of
the United States in the area, miracles could yet be brought about there on the most
significant levels: economic, political, strategic and psychological. For example:

Economic Level

An eminently practical expression of centroamericanismo was the creation,
in 1951, of the Central American Common Market. Fashioned by the UN's Economic Com-
mission for Latin America, it met Mr. Reagan's criterion of being "theirs," not "ours."
It achieved considerable success until it ran afoul the Honduran-Salvadoran "Soccer
War" in 1969 (which also, not incidentally, initiated El Salvador's time of troubles).
It probably could have been saved had the United States not been too busy elsewhere,
but in any case today we have every incentive to revive it, profiting from its own
and our mistakes and including in it two countries excluded at the time: Panama and
Belice. A sophisticated infrastructure is still largely in place, including the
Banco Centroamericano, which could use a substantial injection of funds to move

## Kissinger...2

projects already in being such as low-cost housing. I am told that the Common Market can be geared up in a matter of weeks. It is an idea, at any rate, for your Commission to look into.

Beyond the CACM there is the idea of regional economic integration en-
visioned as an outgrowth of the common market but had already begun to take on a
life of its own when the latter foundered. That was spelled out in a multilateral
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration signed in 1960, in -- of all
places -- Managua! Two years later, regionwide integrated industrial projects such
as a tire plant in Guatemala and a sodium chloride complex in Nicaragua were ready
for launching. Unfortunately, they never got off the ground. The concept of economic
integration remains to be implemented -- another possible task for your Commission.

Both a common market and economic integration are viable in Central America, whose size and common heritage enhance their practicality. But most importantly right now, they could produce some immediate results as they would lend impetus, direction and organization to presently weak and chaotic efforts to aid this or that faltering economy -- provided, of course, that we pitched in without stint. Their promise, too, of long-term yield would inspire the people of the area to work hard together for what they would perceive as a stake in the future.

## Political Level

Economic integration can lead eventually, as Central American leaders
originally intended and the vast majority of their people desired and hoped, to
realization of the historical goal of political unification. That objective was
actually achieved in 1823, following Independence, when the United Provinces of
Central America was formed; but 15 years later it broke up into the present five
separate republics when the new <u>caudillos</u> fought each other and plundered the former
colonies. A century and a half still later, the idea lives on, and indeed has been
periodically re-ignited in concrete efforts to unite the area, most recently while
the common market was progressing. Had the latter and economic integration been
fully realized, Central America today might have been a single, peaceful and pros-
perous republic instead of a battleground of warring ideologies.

Political union is not only still viable -- if only because most Central Americans want it -- but absolutely necessary. The principal obstacle, of course, is the existence of five nation-states and five nationalisms, but that can be overcome if to the popular will is joined our own will. And if unification does not materialize under Western auspices, it almost surely will under the Marxist-Leninists, who are, as you know, ignoring all national borders in their effort to bring about a "revolutionary" (ultimately, Soviet) Central America.

(As an interesting sidelight, any Central American can automatically enjoy the citizenship of any of the five republics if he/she so wishes. Each country's automobile license plates bear the words, "Centro América," after its name -- another expression of _centroamericanismo_.)

## Strategic Level

The movement toward economic and political unity can lead to, and also can be accelerated by measures looking toward a common regional strategy and defense. A

Kissinger...3

beginning in that direction, too, was made during the common market period when a
regional defense organism was established. Had it been seriously supported by the
United States, there would be no Soviet-Cuban foothold in the region today.

If Panama and Belice could be persuaded to join the unity movement, that
would help provide a solid security zone from Mexico to South America. Guaranteed
by the United States, it would contribute to the further isolation of Nicaragua, as
well as of Cuba. At the same time, Panama's participation would contribute toward
solving such problems as U. S. military bases on its territory while Belice's might
persuade Guatemala to relent on the issue of the former's sovereignty.

Psychological Level

The rebirth of centroamericanismo, through practical instruments such as
those indicated here, would galvanize the people of Central America and unite them
as nothing else can in the struggle for peace, freedom and democracy. They could
build a regional unity movement strong enough to overcome not only national barriers
but also local petty interests and passions, and at the same time hand the Marxist-
Leninists a type of challenge they have never before encountered. Invite the
Sandinistas to join such a movement, and let them dare refuse! Whatever their res-
ponse, they would be in a no-win situation.

Such a movement would, furthermore, alter radically in our favor the
perception our European and Latin American friends and allies have of our policies
as "dangerous." How could France and Spain, Mexico and Venezuela, fail to greet
with enthusiasm our lead in helping form that movement? Needless to add, Cuba and
the Soviet bloc would be put on the defensive.

Although the suggestions I make here dovetail with the July 19 Executive
Order, charing that "the commission shall provide advice...on elements of a long-
term United States policy that will best respond to the challenges of social, economic
and democratic development of the region," they cannot be carried out, I'm sure you
will agree, except under a military shield. Continued military aid to El Salvador
and the anti-Sandinista rebels is paramount. In fact, within the context of a regional
movement toward unity the Congress would more than likely approve Administration
requests for additional aid. If, then, your Commission could create the foundations
of Central American unity it could make a monumental contribution to regional peace.

The only other alternative, I believe, would be protracted conflict not
necessarily confined to Central America. I once wrote in a book on the Communist
infiltration of Guatemala in the 1950s -- forgive me for quoting myself -- "The
Battle of the Western Hemisphere has begun." Its Central American phase, at least,
can be won, if we exercise the imagination to strike out in the bold directions
indicated by the Central Americans themselves and their history; that, in turn,
could preclude a hemispheric conflagration.

Best of luck.

DANIEL JAMES

Mr. James has for the last thirty years been an author, editor, journalist and consultant specializing in Latin American affairs and based in Mexico much of that time. He has authored seven books, with an eighth scheduled for publication, in addition to shorter works. Mr. James has been a foreign correspondent for the Hearst and Scripps-Howard services, editor of the *Latin American Times*, and *Investors Mexican Letter*, a contributor to *Business Week*, *Fortune*, the *New York Times Magazine*, *Reader's Digest* and other mass-media publications. He has written an article on Mexico for the CSIS journal, the *Washington Quarterly*. Mr. James has been a consultant with the Inter-American Development Bank, the Council on Economics and National Security, and the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Washington, in addition to a panorama of other activities. He is the author of *How to Invest an Live in Mexico*, *Mexico and the Americans*, and other works.

THE
WASHINGTON
QUARTERLY

A REVIEW OF STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

SUMMER 1980

Nuclear Flashes in the Night: Kramish

The Iranian Hostage-Takers: Ioannides

Afghanistan—The Real Story: Heller

Crocker: Africa James: Mexico
Smyser: F.R.G.

REPORTS: Central America, Stockholm,
Ankara, Toronto, Lisbon

VOLUME 3

NUMBER 3

Published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University

TRANSACTION PERIODICALS CONSORTIUM

# Mexico: America's Newest Problem?

DANIEL JAMES

The U.S. preoccupation with the crises in the Middle East and Persian Gulf is distracting attention from an area potentially even more troublesome for the United States: the Caribbean basin. Because of its proximity and geography, this area remains a vital factor in world affairs. It was no historical accident that the Kennedy-Khrushchev "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation in 1962 occurred over the emplacement of Soviet missiles only 90 miles away in Cuba. Throughout the Caribbean a swing to the far left is currently taking place that could present a multiple threat to the United States, raising the prospect of not just "another Cuba" on our doorstep, but perhaps two or more.

Moreover, Mexico has recently initiated a new activist foreign policy, making a possibly irrevocable break with its traditional policy of relative passivity and neutrality in Caribbean and hemispheric affairs. Mexico has recently taken the side of the region's Marxists. Distinctly at variance with American policy, Mexico does not regard the possible emergence of "another Cuba" or two as a disaster, and sees nothing wrong in solidarity with the Marxist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in spite of its Cuban-Soviet overtones. The Mexican-Nicaraguan association could produce serious repercussions in the Central American isthmus, already wracked by fratricidal violence.

The gathering Caribbean crisis is paralleled by a crisis in U.S. relations with Mexico. Though muted, this tension adds considerably to the difficulty of dealing with that country at a time when its fabulous oil wealth is fortifying its new policy orientation with a large dose of machismo. The bilateral crisis touches the delicate issue of oil and gas, as well as older problems such as Mexico's chronic trade imbalance with the United States and the continuing flood of nondocumented migrants into this country.

A brief overview of these problems in the Caribbean presents a grim picture. First, on the eastern rim, Jamaica, Grenada, and Guyana are virtually under Cuba's tutelage already if they are not yet full-blown "Cubas." Hundreds of Cuban "technicians" swarm over those small countries performing such vital functions as training their paramilitary and security forces. In Grenada, with only 100,000 inhabitants, 250

Daniel James has spent more than 20 years in Latin America as an analyst, writer, and foreign correspondent. He is the author of seven books on the area, including *Mexico and the Americans* (New York: Praeger, 1963) and *Che Guevara: A Biography* (New York: Stein and Day, 1969), as well as many articles and studies.

88

The Washington Quarterly / Summer 1980

Cubans are constructing a jet airport that can be converted to military purposes. All three nations solidly backed Cuban President Fidel Castro's attempt to turn last September's nonaligned nations conference in Havana into a Soviet instrument in a bitter struggle against the very founding fathers of the nonaligned movement such as the late President Tito of Yugoslavia.

Second, in the western Caribbean, in Central America, the danger of one or more "Cubas" is quite real and here the prospect of U.S.-Mexican conflict is serious. Expressing the rising concern throughout the isthmus, President Rodrigo Carazo Odio of Costa Rica, the area's only genuine democracy, warned in a formal speech before his country's legislative assembly on May 1: "Central America's future will be decided in the coming months, when it may either win definitive and authentic emancipation for itself or succumb to foreign powers."¹

Carazo left no doubt as to what he meant when he added that "the totalitarian powers . . . have made their presence known in Central America," and that it must seek emancipation from "Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism." He expressed particular anxiety lest the "conflictive situation in Central America" spread into Costa Rica itself. And, he might have added, also into Panama on its southern border, where sympathy for Cuba has long been endemic.

Third, Nicaragua is, of course, the focal point of the conflictive situation, and its triumphant revolution has stimulated a surge of extreme leftist sentiment from Panama in the south to Guatemala in the north, an area embracing six countries. In the brief time since their revolution's victory on July 19, 1979, the Sandinistas have come close to turning their country into another Cuba. In March, barely eight months after they had interred the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza, the top leaders of the dominant *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional* (FSLN) visited Moscow and signed a joint communique endorsing Soviet policy—including the Afghanistan invasion—in return for economic aid; the Castro regime in Cuba, for purposes of comparison, had not reached that stage until 14 months after taking power.

During the same visit, Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega met with his Soviet counterpart, Dimitri Ustinov, who also happens to be a Politburo member and rumored successor to Leonid Brezhnev, to discuss military matters. With a Soviet ambassador installed in Managua shortly thereafter, the question arose of how soon the FSLN leadership would seek Soviet military support.

Nicaragua's relatively rapid "Cubanization"—a process not yet completed and perhaps still avoidable—has had an immediate, forceful impact upon El Salvador next door. The Sandinistas, reinforced by an estimated 2,500 Cuban "technicians" (at least 500 of whom are military), have been aiding the Salvadoran Marxist guerrilla groups in every way, including the infiltration of arms (via Honduras primarily) and some of their own seasoned guerrillas. The continuation of such support could tip the balance in the violent struggle between El Salvador's extremes of left and right, with the Washington-backed civilian-military junta in the middle.

Finally, a communist victory in El Salvador would leave Guatemala and Honduras in a highly vulnerable position. Although Guatemala's military-led extreme rightists

James

have proven more dutiful than ever despite the bloodshed. Pressure prove overwhelming, little resistance.

WASH

The only real determining factor in the last act of America, in the last act of very nature of an oligarch enough to sustain a movement? It has two choices (and with it the proba- forestall such a victory confront Washington with any chance of ending the communist regime). It could also lead to a short-lived victory in the neighborhood of Nicaragua is concerned, state. It could even drive the U.S.S.R. against yanons suggested by this scenario to act in concert, the national interest of the Caribbean. The answer to the big prize. Certainly since Constantine A.OUN the foresight to utilize it (even while America was still far more than a windowful of million people. The United States, say, Texas or California, borne out by a Chicago Convention of 53 percent of all American "great threat" to us, greatest in France or Italy.²

Assuming that the Mexican prime Caribbean threat is to encourage the

James

89

have proven more durable than their Nicaraguan and Salvadoran counterparts, so have the several Marxist guerrilla groups there which, hydra-headed, appear to be more active than ever despite a 15-year struggle with their arch enemy unrivalled for its bloodshed. Pressure from two communist neighbors, both backed by Cuba, could prove overwhelming. Honduras, the weaker of the two, would probably succumb with little resistance.

## WASHINGTON AND CARIBBEAN POLITICS

The only real deterrent to pro-Soviet totalitarian regimes throughout Central America, in the last analysis, is the United States. Since its policy of supporting the moderates in the key country of El Salvador has only a slim chance of succeeding—the very nature of an oligarchical society inhibits the development of a middle class strong enough to sustain a moderate political alternative—what will be Washington's next move? It has two choices, both discouraging: accept a Marxist victory in El Salvador (and with it the probability of Guatemala becoming the next domino to fall), or forestall such a victory by armed intervention. The same choices would, of course, confront Washington when Guatemala's turn came. But even if the Carter administration showed any interest in armed intervention, such action—although effectively ending the communist danger in northern Central America momentarily at least—could also lead to a showdown with Mexico, whose new policy is to tolerate Marxist regimes in the neighborhood. Likewise, this could lead to complications where Nicaragua is concerned, particularly if by then it had become a Cuban-Soviet client state. It could even drive Mexico into a common front with Nicaragua, Cuba, and the U.S.S.R. against *yanqui imperialismo*. Central to avoidance of the tragic dilemma suggested by this scenario is the role of Mexico. If Mexico and the United States were to act in concert, the nascent crisis could be aborted.

Mexico stands to lose the most from its new policy of encouraging the Cubanization of the Caribbean. The area's largest, richest, and most advanced country, Mexico is the big prize. Certainly it has been Moscow's most important Caribbean objective since Constantine A. Oumansky, its ambassador to Mexico during World War II, had the foresight to utilize it as a "window" to probe and exploit American weaknesses (even while America was a wartime Soviet ally). Mexico today, needless to point out, is far more than a window: it is a growing industrial power in its own right with 72 million people. The United States could no more afford to let it fall into Soviet hands than, say, Texas or California. That the U.S. public perceives Mexico in those terms is borne out by a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations opinion poll, which showed that 53 percent of all Americans would regard a peaceful communist takeover there as a "great threat" to us, greater even than a similar happening in Iran or, for that matter, France or Italy.²

Assuming that the Mexican government is fully aware (as it is) that it isCommunism's prime Caribbean target, what has impelled it to embark upon a policy whose effect is to encourage the enemy and whose ultimate consequence can only be to

90

weaken Mexico's own political system and render it vulnerable to Marxist penetra-
tion? The answer is that Mexico's leaders might agree with the first surmise but not the
second; they believe that "brotherly" relations with such regimes as Cuba's and
Nicaragua's and sympathy for the struggle against the "repressive dictatorships" in El
Salvador and Guatemala will buy Mexico immunity from the Marxist virus.

At any rate, Mexico is supremely confident, as President José López Portillo stated
in an interview with visiting Japanese reporters on March 25, that "the radical change
taking place in Central America will not lead to an internal struggle in our country,"
because the possibility remains open of transforming its social structure through
"institutional means."

Whether that is purely a rationalization or not, the new policy is dictated by a
combination of rising pressures within Mexico and the absence of leadership in the
Caribbean. As to the first, the Mexican government is able to do little just now to
alleviate the country's chronic problems of overpopulation, agricultural underpro-
duction, and high unemployment/underemployment, notwithstanding vastly increased
income thanks to oil. Mexico therefore feels compelled to trumpet more loudly than
usual its professions of revolutionary idealism, at home as well as abroad, both to
appease its critics on the left and tweak Tio Sam's beard. On the other hand, it is
dismayed and concerned over the failure of Washington to maintain order and stability
in its traditional domain, the Central American isthmus (López Portillo would have
preferred a less radical solution in Nicaragua), and has concluded that the yanquis
have abdicated their historical role as regional arbiter. Hence it was necessary for
Mexico to step into the resulting vacuum and attempt a policy of its own.

Washington has apparently done nothing so far to indicate its concern that its
neighbor has embarked upon a new foreign policy rife with ominous implications for
the United States and the Caribbean. Meanwhile the Mexican leaders, who have a
reputation for political perspicacity and discretion, have sent around no formal notes
to the State Department announcing this shift; they are playing it cool and do not wish
to disrupt normal relations with the United States, whose economic and technological
assistance they need. However, U.S.-Mexican relations have in reality been far from
normal during the Carter presidency. As all the ramifications of Mexico's "opening to
the left" in the Caribbean become clear, this new policy will hardly enhance the
prospects for improving them.

The new Mexican policy took shape and was launched about a year ago when
President López Portillo himself made a series of moves, in a matter of days, that
radically altered his country's traditional stance in foreign affairs.

He began by firing his secretary of foreign relations, Santiago Roel, on May 16,
1979. Known as "pro-American" (a characterization that is only relative, since in
Mexico for a leader to be demonstratively a friend of the United States is to court
political suicide), Roel was replaced by an undersecretary, Jorge Castañeda, who is
described by a former senior U.S. diplomat with Mexican experience as "a strong
nationalist with a leftist tinge." As if on signal, Castañeda immediately began to shift
Mexican policy away from Washington and toward Havana.

James

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On the island of Cozumel the very next day, May 17, López Portillo received none other than Fidel Castro, who was returning to Mexico for the first time since he had launched his revolution from there 22 years earlier. It was a unique and daring gesture; not even López Portillo's immediate and more radical predecessor, Luis Echeverría, had ventured such a step, fearing that Castro's presence on Mexican soil would precipitate a storm of criticism. López Portillo gave his visitor fond abrazos, indulged in high-flown public statements that were for him unusual, and greeted Castro with these gushing words, "I have always said, and I now reiterate, that you are one of the personages of this century."

The first tangible result of this meeting was a decided plus for Castro. After proclaiming upon his arrival that "Cuba does not come to Mexico seeking oil or gas—an indirect swipe at the United States who was then importing Mexico to sell it oil and gas—he succeeded in getting López Portillo to back a so-called triangular agreement under which Mexico would replace the Soviet Union as Cuba's sole supplier of petroleum, while the Soviet Union, in turn, would supply Mexico's customer, Spain. The arrangement would relieve Castro of an old, gnawing concern that the flow of oil to Cuba over the long, hazardous sea route from the Soviet Union might someday be interrupted, thus threatening the Cuban economy with paralysis. Cuba produces no oil of its own and lacks the money to buy it back on the world market (Cuba receives an estimated 11 million tons of oil a year from the Soviet Union). Oil shipments from Mexico would be both free of the risk of interruption and, of course, far less costly to transport. López Portillo practically guaranteed the lifeblood of the Cuban economy, yet as far as it is known, he received nothing in return.

If the two leaders concluded any other agreements at Cozumel, they remain a secret. But from subsequent statements and events, it can be inferred that two political objectives that were important to Castro were achieved. One was Mexico's identification with Cuba's Third World policy: Castro himself stated that his principal ideological purpose in visiting López Portillo was "to establish closer bilateral relations and work for a new international economic order and for the rights and interests of the peoples of the Third World"—words that closely parallel the philosophy of Mexico's new foreign policy. The second was the specific alignment of Mexico with Cuban policy toward Nicaragua. On May 20, with Castro scarcely departed from Mexican territory, López Portillo abruptly announced that he was severing diplomatic relations with the Somoza government, which he charged with committing "horrendous genocide" against the Nicaraguan people. He made the announcement at a luncheon in honor of another visiting chief of state from the neighborhood, Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica, who had also been pressing the Mexican leader to break with Somoza. According to the leading Mexican newspaper *Excelsior*, the rupture "caused stupor" among the luncheon guests, for it was in clear violation of Mexico's own cherished Estrada Doctrine, which holds that diplomatic recognition of one state by another does not necessarily signify approval or disapproval of that state's policies but is simply a technical instrument for maintaining formal, civilized ties among nations.

The new foreign secretary, Jorge Castañeda, promptly dispatched special missions to five neighboring countries in an active effort to persuade them to follow Mexico in

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breaking with Somoza, and expressed the hope that even the United States would do likewise. He issued a public statement asserting that Mexico's objective was nothing less than "the diplomatic and political isolation of Somoza to speed the downfall of his bloody regime."³

The severing of diplomatic relations with Somoza and the accompanying drive to gain adherents to follow suit were both moves that shattered two fundamental principles of Mexico's traditional foreign policy.

As noted, the first principle broken was the Estrada Doctrine. Only one other Mexican president had violated the doctrine in its 50-year history, and that was Luis Echeverría, who severed relations with the Augusto Pinochet regime in Chile following the overthrow of Marxist President Salvador Allende in September 1973. The reasoning was the same as López Portillo's six years later: Pinochet was a bloody (right-wing) dictator. Repetition of the Echeverría precedent obviously rendered the doctrine invalid as a force in future Mexican policy.

Implicit in the drive to overthrow Somoza was the contravention of that holiest of Mexican foreign policy principles: nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Castañeda's frank acknowledgement that Mexico's objectives were to "isolate" Somoza and to "speed the downfall of his bloody regime" differs little from Woodrow Wilson's justification for the occupation of Veracruz in 1914 intended to bring down the "usurper," General Victoriano Huerta, and replace him with a ruler more to Washington's liking. In defiance of Washington, the leader of the principal revolutionary faction in Mexico, Venustiano Carranza, made common cause with his chief foe, Huerta, in the name of defending Mexico's sovereign right to choose its own government and reject dictation by foreigners. Carranza's intransigent opposition to Wilson's well-intentioned intervention led to the evacuation of the U.S. Navy from Veracruz and the downfall of Huerta, and enshrined Mexico as the international champion of nonintervention.

In 1962, in the name of the same principle, of nonintervention, Mexico was the only member of the Organization of American States to oppose the quarantine of the young Castro regime in Cuba, on the ground that it was Cuba's sovereign right to select any government it wished, communist or other. Yet in 1979, Mexico would not only deny that right to Somoza's Nicaragua but call upon neighboring states to join in bringing about his "downfall"—as brazen an act of intervention as any on record, and the end of Mexico's proud history as the paladin of nonintervention.

Since the Mexican Revolution of 1910, successive Mexican governments followed a policy of virtual isolationism, participating almost perfunctorily in inter-American councils without making a real effort to join in solving regional problems or even entertaining them seriously. The country was too busy putting its own house in order to worry about its neighbors. The one great exception to this general policy came in 1881, when Mexico nearly went to war with Guatemala over Chiapas and Soconusco, which Mexico finally incorporated into the present state of Chiapas, the seat of the current oil boom.

In 1965, President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz became the first Mexican chief of state to

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venture into with Mexican trade at ion offices of 1 discovery of huge Mexico rather than oil, if not the met respect for its po producing Guatem dependence, Cast that "the sale of international act w intended to sell oi. Cuba, Jamaica, N Salvador and Guat Central America c notwithstanding M is Nicaragua, which

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venture into wildest Central America with the limited objective of paving the way for Mexican trade and commerce. Today, the area is dotted with branches and representation offices of Mexican companies and financial institutions. But it required the discovery of huge oil reserves to justify the Central Americans' jocular allusion to Mexico rather than the United States, as their "Colossus of the North." Now of course oil, if not the merits of Mexico's foreign policy, has enormously increased the area's respect for its powerful northern neighbor, since with the lone exception of oil-producing Guatemala, it is dependent on Mexico for the precious fluid. To insure that dependence, Castañeda, speaking on behalf of the Mexican government, has stressed that "the sale of petroleum is not only a commercial transaction but a complex international act which vitally affects our foreign relations."⁴ In other words, Mexico intended to sell oil to its friends—as it is actually doing in the cases of Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Panama—but not to its foes—which include El Salvador and Guatemala. Thus, the relationship that is evolving between Mexico and Central America conforms to the region's dominant culture, that of *patrón-peón*, notwithstanding Mexico's passionate denunciations of "colonialism." The exception is Nicaragua, which for many reasons is pivotal in the new Mexican policy.

MEXICO AND NICARAGUA

Mexico's commitment to the Sandinista cause apparently has been deeper from the beginning than even its break with Somoza might suggest. A source on the "inside" in Mexico, the journalist Manuel Buendía, who writes a daily column for *Excelsior*, noted recently that "López Portillo gave the Nicaraguan insurrectionists aid that was much more solid, broader, and more binding than has hitherto been acknowledged."⁵ That aid was channeled "through the party," meaning the Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI) which has ruled Mexico under various guises since the early 1920s. Buendía's somewhat cryptic disclosure suggested an ideological commitment to the Sandinistas that goes beyond the material and moral support the Mexican government had been giving them, perhaps involving a pledge of solidarity with the Sandinista program for the socialization of Nicaragua. Such a commitment could best be carried out through the PRI because, even though it was the government party, it could act with greater freedom than the government and commit Mexico to specific Sandinista policies and programs where the government could not. At the very least, it seemed to imply a promise that Mexico would not interfere with such policies or programs even when it might find them distasteful.

Mexican "protection" has emboldened the Sandinistas to make moves which under other circumstances would almost certainly have aroused Mexican antagonism. Thus they have even dared to attack Nicaragua's sacred cow, *La Prensa*, the principal bulwark of freedom throughout the whole long, dark period of Somoza rule. *La Prensa* produced the revolution's first catalyst and martyr, its editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro; his murder in January 1978 precipitated the revolt against Somoza. But last April the Sandinistas achieved what Somoza never could, the silencing of *La Prensa*,

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by simply sending their controlled printers union to close it down over an issue completely lacking any labor-management connection. They objected to the board of directors' ousting the editor, Chamorro's brother Javier, because he was too uncritical of the Sandinista regime, and replacing him with his son and namesake, who better represented the paper's independent tradition (though he was generally pro-Sandinista). The board, representing the owning Chamorro family, denounced the union's "arbitrariness," in a formal statement calling the occupation of *La Prensa's* premises "an attempt upon freedom of expression which profoundly damages Nicaragua's image before the world."⁶

What may have precipitated the union's occupation of *La Prensa* was the April 18, 1980 editorial signed by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro's mother, Doña Margarita, in which she came out openly against the government's pronounced Marxist line. Alluding to the "massive flight" of Cubans into the Peruvian Embassy in Havana only days earlier, she wrote:

> This that is happening [in Cuba] must make those of you who command the *comandantes*, above all Comandante Tomas Borge, reflect . . . that what the whole world vears for is freedom, and that freedom is what the Cubans do not have and have not had for twenty years.⁷

The Sandinistas' closure of *La Prensa*, in a manner uncomfortably reminiscent of the tactics Castro used to suppress the free Cuban press in 1960, produced a sharp protest from the watchdog Inter American Press Association but none from the media of the country which professes to be a champion of both freedom and the Nicaraguan revolution: Mexico.

Coincidentally, the Nicaraguan Revolution's first crisis came to a head at the same time, and the Chamorros were once again involved. This time it was the martyred editor's widow, Violeta, who resigned on April 19 from the *Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional*, the revolution's administrative organ. Appointed by the Directorate of the FSLN (Nicaragua's effective ruling body), the Junta de Gobierno was designed to give the impression of political representativeness—or *pluralismo* as it is popularly called—although three of its five members were admitted Marxists. Violeta Chamorro, like her husband a social-minded nationalist and libertarian, and Alfonso Robelo, a social-democratic businessman, were the only two noncommunists on it. She announced that she had resigned for "reasons of health," but nobody was taken in.

Within 72 hours came the resignation of the Junta de Gobierno's second noncommunist, Robelo, whose accusation that its Marxist majority was intent upon establishing a communist state in Nicaragua suggested the real reason for the Chamorro resignation. The immediate issue was Robelo's objection to a unilateral decision of the Junta's Marxists to enlarge the *Consejo de Estado*—Council of State—from 33 to 47 members, to ensure overwhelming Sandinista control of what was supposed to be a representative legislative body. Robelo saw that move, which violated an agreement signed with the noncommunist revolutionaries before Somoza's overthrow, as the

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culmination of the Sandinistas' march toward a one-party totalitarian state. As he declared in a statement explaining his action:

> I am basically a nationalist and I hope that foreign intervention will not return. In the past, we have suffered North American [intervention], but it seems to me that it would be truly sad—for a country like ours which has been destroyed by war and pillage, mortgaged by Somoza—that we escape from the influence of North American imperialism to fall into Soviet imperialism.⁸

As quoted in a dispatch from Managua, published in *Diario las Américas*, Miami, Robelo added: "We have emerged from one dictatorship and the people do not wish to fall into another dictatorship."⁹

Both the Nicaraguan private sector, whose spokesman in the Junta de Gobierno Robelo was, and such ardent outside supporters as the governments of Costa Rica and Venezuela were stunned by the radical turn of events in April. The *Consejo Superior del Sector Privado*—Superior Council of the Private Sector—issued statements similar to Robelo's and supported his action, while the above-named countries made their displeasure known. Even before the attack on *La Prensa* and the resignations from the Junta, Venezuela, whose generous loans and outright donations have kept the battered Nicaraguan economy afloat, had already expressed its great concern over the trend. President Luis Herrera Campins went to Nicaragua early in April to see for himself what was happening; he was given glib assurances that all was well—but no sooner had he departed than the Sandinistas proceeded to apply the screws on *La Prensa* and the noncommunists.

As this was going to press, the Sandinistas, in an effort to appease the Nicaraguan private sector and moderate political forces, permitted *La Prensa* to reopen, but after compelling it to pay a large indemnity to the printers union involving cash and newsprint with which to publish a new rival paper, *Nuevo Día* (New Day), under Javier Chamorro's editorship. Likewise, they replaced the two noncommunists who resigned from the Junta with two well-known businessmen with a firm belief in private enterprise. Though hailing these apparent compromises as "positive," senior U.S. officials involved in Nicaraguan affairs felt that a final decision whether to go communist had yet to come.

Mexico maintained a discreet silence during the crisis, even as the Sandinistas continued their "Cubanizing" efforts. Mexican officials were perhaps deceived by the Sandinista tactic of soft-soaping their critics with promises to behave. Not even the mass exodus of Cubans from Fidel Castro's once-vaunted "workers' paradise," seemed to daunt the Cuba-trained FSLN leadership—nor, apparently, the faith placed in it by Mexico.

Quite the contrary, in the midst of the flight of more than 100,000 Cubans, President López Portillo of Mexico went out of his way to strengthen his friendship with Castro by announcing that he would visit Cuba on July 31 for three days. The solidarity thus shown with the Cuban dictator was underlined by Mexico's studied refusal to accept a single one of their refugee compatriots despite an emotional appeal

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from Cuban exile leaders in Miami. Asked whether Mexico intended to take any refugees, Foreign Secretary Castañeda replied laconically, "no comment."

U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONS

The United States, which has always occupied a central role in Mexico's foreign-policy considerations (although Mexico, to the State Department, is practically nonexistent), is the centerpiece of the new policy as it was of the old. This has been publicly stated by Foreign Secretary Castañeda, who even before his appointment to that post had outlined the philosophy behind Mexico's new foreign policy with admirable realism and candor.

"Mexico's relations with the United States are at present the pivotal axis . . . of its foreign policy," he declared on October 30, 1978, during a symposium in Washington dealing with "Mexico Today," sponsored by Meridian House. But, Castañeda added, "though the United States is a key element in Mexico's external relations, it is not the only one." This was an important departure from Mexico's past position, for which Castañeda proceeded to give the rationale:

> As I said earlier, the idea of closing ranks with the Third World is intrinsically valid. We should continue our efforts to establish and consolidate a New International Economic Order. . . . It should be clear in our minds, though, that this is a long-range objective and not yet a reality; it is no substitute for the daily hard bargaining with the United States on commercial matters. But this objective should be an important element in our foreign policy. Aside from its inherent value, it is a symbol of Mexico's role in the world, of its political independence, and an affirmation of its international personality.¹⁰

Not only did Castañeda repeat, in exactly the same words Castro used at Cozumel, that Mexico's ultimate objective was the establishment of a "new international economic order," but he went out of his way to praise that avid Mexican champion of such an order, former President Echeverría, whose efforts to practice Third World politics brought his country to the edge of ruin. Notwithstanding the fact, also, that Echeverría's name is anathema in Mexico, and favorable mention of it particularly irks the powerful Mexican business community, Castañeda eulogized him for his "opening to the Third World," his "more dynamic foreign policy," and even his "rhetorical and militant stances," while questioning only mildly "some errors of judgment" on his part, then promptly excusing them on the puzzling grounds of "underdevelopment at the root of our underdevelopment." Castañeda was enunciating a policy that can only be described as *echeverrismo* without Echeverría—a policy whose development may well cause serious repercussions inside Mexico, particularly among its businessmen, as well as outside.

One fundamental difference, however, between López Portillo's *echeverrismo* and Echeverría's is that, unlike his predecessor, he is too realistic and practical to deliberately antagonize the United States, which he needs at this critical juncture in

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Mexico's economic development. Indeed, Castañeda went so far as to call the United States "pivotal" to Mexican policy. Hence, according to Castañeda's Meridian House speech, Mexico will continue staunchly to champion Third Worldism while at the same time preserving its traditional "pivotal" relationship with America. This may prove to be an impossible balancing act, but only time can tell.

On the other hand, sympathy for leftist movements generally, and tolerance of Marxists in particular, are endemic to the Mexican establishment. It goes back to the 1910 Mexican Revolution itself, which was essentially a leftist, though by no means Marxist, phenomenon. The constitution of 1917 was one of the most advanced social documents of its time, anticipating by two decades our own Social Security Act, for example, as well as much of our labor legislation. Since the revolution was under constant attack from the small, wealthy, and aristocratic upper class it had overthrown, and also from their sympathizers and supporters abroad (especially in the United States), the Mexican leaders developed a conditioned reflex which inclined them automatically to support leftist movements anywhere and to consider their opponents reactionary. Hence their propensity to damn out of hand such "right-wing dictatorships" as Argentina's or Chile's, while ignoring or condoning the excesses of left-wing dictatorships such as Castro's. The Mexicans are well aware of Castro's sins, but they fear they may encourage the "reactionaries" by attacking Cuban totalitarianism. Thus, while López Portillo and Echeverría have vehemently attacked Somoza and Pinochet, they have never murmured a word in criticism of Castro. The same reflex explains, also, their failure to support such humane causes as the liberation of Castro's political prisoners, including Huber Matos, once Castro's right-hand man, who was only released last October after serving his full 20-year sentence.

None of this means that the Mexican leadership is procommunist. Far from it. Mexican leaders have successfully controlled the native communists and warded off their attempts to subvert the country. It was President Alvaro Obregón (1920-1924) who established the practice of buying them off, on the logical ground that they would never bite the hand that feeds them. And whenever subvention failed, the Mexican leadership has never hesitated to apply repression in the extreme if necessary, as in 1968 when its troops mowed down many subversives who had taken up arms against it. Nor has it ever hesitated to take harsh methods against foreign attempts at subversion and espionage: it has frequently deported Soviet and other communist diplomats. It has, for that matter, kept even Castro's agents under strict surveillance since the earliest days of the Cuban Revolution. Mexico, then, is if anything strongly anticommunist where any internal threat to its stability is concerned, and its governments have never shown a tendency to favor the communist ideology—although they have warmly befriended and defended foreign communist regimes.

Within the Mexican Left, however, and especially among the intellectuals, there has always been a strong predilection for Marxism. This is only partly a result of the general leftist orientation of the Mexican Revolution; it is much more the consequence

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of the efforts of a minister of education in the early 1930s who, a Marxist himself, introduced the teaching of Marxism into the educational system, so that a whole generation of teachers and students favored that doctrine to one degree or another. The abrogation, in 1946, of an amendment to the constitution which decreed that education be "socialist education," could not repair the damage already done. Since those days, the Mexican intelligentsia has been hopelessly biased in favor of Marxism, with few exceptions, and has failed as a body to absorb the simplest lessons driven home by the negative experience with communism wherever it has been tried. It is perhaps important to note that López Portillo, though essentially a pragmatist, is himself a member of that intelligentsia, the author of several books, including a learned treatise on political science, and a professor at the University of Mexico.

Furthermore, Mexico does, after all, have a "mixed economy" which rejects both socialism and capitalism as viable economic models yet incorporates elements of those systems within what may be called the "Mexican system." Thus there is a large and growing "public" (i.e., socialist) sector—with not only oil but also steel, mining, and other basic industries owned by the state—and, existing side by side, a "private" (or capitalist) sector which is also, paradoxically, prospering. Indeed, even as respective Mexican governments have nationalized one industry after another, so have private business enterprises sprung up everywhere, with the result that Mexico, almost alone in Latin America and certainly for the first time in its own history, today possesses a true bourgeoisie. Moreover, and this is another paradox, it is a bourgeoisie that was created by the Mexican Revolution itself, leftist though it was. And irony of ironies, Mexico's bourgeoisie is composed in the main of former politicians who only yesterday were denouncing capitalism with great revolutionary Marxist fervor (while, behind the scenes, they plundered the treasury to obtain the capital with which they later went into business; this is done with regularity each sexenio—the six-year presidential term—because after that they are usually out of power permanently).

Notwithstanding the leftist tendencies mentioned above, which tend to express themselves more in rhetoric than in action, the Mexican political establishment has been noted for its caution and would never have adopted its present foreign policy were it not for the inconsistency, weakness, and confusion Washington has demonstrated in the Caribbean, particularly in Nicaragua. In a surrealistic replay of its role vis-à-vis the shah of Iran, the Carter administration hastily abandoned Somoza and tried to climb aboard the Sandinista bandwagon just as it was pulling away—too late to have the slightest influence over the Nicaraguan revolutionaries, even as it had belatedly tried to befriend the Iranian revolutionaries earlier. The administration then proceeded to unhorse the hard-line military rulers of El Salvador and, in the hope of saving that country, supplanted it with a "moderate" civilian-military junta. However, the winning side is more likely to be either the extreme Right or the extreme Left: in oligarchic societies such as the Salvadoran, there is no strong middle class to provide the necessary socioeconomic base for moderate political solutions, desirable as they may be. The Mexicans, observing with a mixture of fright and contempt all this backing and filling on Washington's part, concluded that they had better step into the situation themselves and offer a policy which—though algo picante, somewhat peppery—might be the better part of self-preservation.

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Nor was it lost upon the Mexicans that the Carter administration has also been floundering almost everywhere else in the world. Why, they asked themselves, should we put all our eggs into a basket shredded with holes? Hence, while joining in the near-universal condemnation of the taking of Americans hostage by the Iranian terrorists—a safe enough position—Mexico conspicuously failed to support U.S.-sponsored sanctions against Iran. Similarly, though it voted for the UN resolution denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is sending its athletes to the Moscow Olympics. Mexico has been free with verbal support—what does it cost?—but chary with the substantive kind. An odd policy for a neighbor that considers us “pivotal,” but understandable under the present circumstances.

In any event, if bilateral relations are one key to Mexican policy, they are by no means cordial. They have, in fact, been steadily deteriorating since the inception of the Carter administration—providing Mexico with perhaps the most convincing argument for going its own way.

Jimmy Carter's inauguration followed that of his Mexican counterpart, José López Portillo, by a scant seven weeks. The two chief executives seemed philosophically compatible and an era of good feeling seemed to be in the offing. Indeed, to speed that happy day along, Carter made it a point to invite López Portillo to Washington as his very first state visitor, in February 1977, and all appeared to go well.

But by December, a winter frost had begun to settle over bilateral relations, when then Energy Secretary James R. Schlesinger vetoed a deal made by six U.S. companies with the Mexican state oil monopoly, Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), to purchase Mexican natural gas. Although Schlesinger was motivated by the apparently sound economic argument that the price was too high—$2.60 per 1,000 cu. ft., compared to $2.16 charged by Canada—his veto was politically shortsighted. It failed to consider the larger and far more important business of encouraging Mexico to sell the United States increasing quantities of petroleum at a time when American imports from the Middle East were constantly threatened by that area's volatility. Moreover, Schlesinger is said to have offended Mexican sensibilities with his allegedly unceremonious treatment of the high-level emissaries sent by the Mexican president himself, thus offending López Portillo personally.

López Portillo had indeed stuck his political neck out to make a deal with the American gas companies. Since 1938, when all foreign oil companies were expatriated and expelled from Mexico for acting like a "state within a state," they had been considered the arch symbol of hated imperialism and no Mexican president would dare soil his hands by dealing with them. But López Portillo broke tradition because the national treasury was desperately in need of any funds it could lay hands on. The economy was a shambles due to the mismanagement, extravagance, and record corruption of the Echeverría administration; it left an unprecedented $30-billion national debt, a peso slashed to half its value, widespread economic recession, and rising unemployment. Furthermore, public confidence in the Mexican leadership was at its lowest ebb in a generation. López Portillo, who had never before held any elective office and could count on no political constituency of his own, sought desperately to obtain help from a presumably friendly and understanding United States—and was

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rudely turned down. Proud and sensitive like most Mexicans, López Portillo lashed back at the chief culprit, President Carter; at their second meeting, held in Mexico City, he accused him publicly of practicing "sudden deceit" in his administration's disapproval of the gas deal. He warned that the deception would bear "poisonous fruits which would sooner or later backlash." He went even further, to add: "It is difficult, especially between neighbors, to conduct cordial and mutually advantageous relations, in an atmosphere of mistrust or open hostility."

Although the U.S.-Mexican gas deal eventually went through some two years later and at a substantially higher price, bilateral relations have continued to suffer. Such problems as the illegal immigration of millions of Mexicans into the United States, and their abuse or exploitation by American employers and even officials, have become aggravated and are as far from a solution as ever. Meanwhile, efforts by the administration to right the situation have been more cosmetic than substantive, and clumsily executed at that.

The best example of Washington's altogether ineffectual handling of U.S.-Mexican relations is its diplomatic bungling from start to finish—one of the few consistencies in an otherwise inconsistent policy. The president began by appointing a man totally ignorant of Mexico and its language, in addition to being untrained in the diplomatic arts as ambassador. Former Wisconsin Governor Patrick J. Lucey turned out to be incompetent and a martinet to boot; his very first months in the Mexico City embassy saw the decapitation of the senior staff, whose collective experience in Mexico could have proved invaluable for a neophyte envoy. When Lucey was finally removed November 1, 1979, his post was left vacant for almost six months, until April 1980, and the failure to fill the position was regarded by the Mexicans as a deliberate snub. They pointed out resentfully that this would never have happened to a European or Middle Eastern nation. Finally the president named as ambassador another political appointee without diplomatic experience, and a Chicano, the California educator Julian Nava. It was obvious to everyone that Nava's appointment was motivated by the need to line up the Hispanic vote behind Carter in November, and Nava may be a lame duck if Carter is not reelected. Meanwhile, the Mexicans are none too pleased with Nava, simply because they regard a Chicano as neither Mexican nor gringo and hence an inferior person; even before Nava arrived, he was being caricatured as such in the Mexican press.

In still another cosmetic attempt to patch up bilateral relations, Carter created an Office of Coordinator of Mexican Affairs, headed by former Texas Congressman Robert Krueger, as ambassador-at-large, effectively superseding the ambassador and given direct access to both the secretary of state and the president.

Perhaps in retaliation, the Mexicans have set up their own base of operations in the United States outside the government, directly with our own Hispanic population. Thus López Portillo has deliberately promoted and given his blessings to a new group called the U.S. Hispanic Mission to Mexico, composed of 10 of the most important Hispanic organizations in America. Commission members have already held several meetings with Mexican officials, from the president himself on down, and intend to maintain closer contact as time goes on.

The slippage because of A

The protocol sale of oil problems Even the problems Mexico had . . . about pushers, and problem f (emphasis

Castañeda is an illegals solely receiving so much. There is thus little chance for a viable American cultivable land to feed the population inefficiently. Mexico can population generation. World population is approximately 5.6 billion living off the 10.8 means all, of the

These factors, their mutual benefit and unemployment heeded by American States itself. The leaders begin to recently put it, "The U.S. in Mexico." But an alternative, but any rate, that if L ópez Portillo were in office, a peaceful

It is almost certain incumbent. This was the case with López Portillo's spectrum—which he happens, the United States expect to face an ev

James

101

The slippage in U.S.-Mexican relations has taken place, in Castañeda's view, because of America's fundamental misconception of mutual problems. He complains:

> The problems of which we talk constantly—illegal migrants, drugs, trade, sale of oil and gas, etc.—are not seen as Mexican problems in the sense of problems of Mexico, but as problems *caused by Mexico* to the United States. Even the potential political and economic instability that could occur in Mexico is seen mainly as a problem for the United States. But what about our problems? Take the case of drugs. I don't read much in the American press ... about the problems caused to Mexico by all sorts of drug smugglers, pushers, and gangsters ... many of them Americans, not to speak of the problem for Mexico of having as a neighbor the main world market for drugs (emphasis added).¹¹

Castañeda is basically correct. For example, Americans see the problem of the illegals solely in terms of the inconveniences and costs that may be involved in receiving so many nondocumented migrants, but not in terms of the plight of Mexico. There is thus little or no appreciation on this side of the border of the fact that Mexico has simply run out of land to distribute under the agrarian reform. Much of the cultivable land is fast being eroded, while the remainder does not yield enough crops to feed the population, owing to a lack of technology and know-how plus the inefficient management of a swollen and corrupt bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the Mexican population is growing at such a rate that it is expected to double within a generation. Worst of all, about two-thirds of all Mexicans are under 24 and thus either just beginning to be productive or not productive at all. Translated into real terms, approximately 50 to 60 million Mexicans, according to the best statistics available, are living off the 10 to 15 million gainfully employed workers. These are some, but by no means all, of the facts that explain the flood of migrants heading northward.

These factors also indicate where both neighbors might begin to work together to their mutual benefit. Castañeda's veiled warning that Mexico's widespread poverty and unemployment could cause "political and economic instability" ought to be heeded by Americans, for that could contribute to the destabilization of the United States itself. The situation in Mexico is serious enough to make responsible Mexican leaders begin to think the unthinkable; as leading sociologist Jorge Bustamante recently put it, "This may be the last chance for the dominant groups that are in power in Mexico." Bustamante is not suggesting that the people will turn to communism as an alternative, but that chaos, disorder, and endemic violence may occur. It means, at any rate, that if López Portillo fails to deliver in his less than two years remaining in office, a peaceful transfer of power to his successor may be impossible.

It is almost certain that the next Mexican president will be to the left of the incumbent. This would represent the normal swing of the political pendulum, since López Portillo is considered to be to the right within the Mexican political spectrum—which he is in domestic matters, though not in foreign policy. If that happens, the United States, regardless of who becomes president in November, can expect to face an even more difficult period in bilateral relations than it has with López

January 1980

Portillo lashed in Mexico administration's poisonous add: "It is advantageous

years later offer. Such states, have ports by the intuitive, and

Mexican stencies in a totally diplomatic out to be our embassy in Mexico could be removed April 1980, rate snub, European or political educator invited by may be a good pleased ringo and ed as such

created an congressman and

ons in the population. A new group important several intend to

102

Portillo. It is doubtful, however, whether either of the two major contenders for the American presidency have any inkling of the coming problem or of how to deal with it.

POLICY OPTIONS

Oil, though potentially of enormous benefit for Mexico—and indirectly, perhaps, for the United States—is also the potential source of great trouble. “Mexico,” declared PEMEX Director General Jorge Díaz Serrano recently, “is now an oil power.” He announced it has 50 billion barrels of proven hydrocarbon reserves [of which 65% is oil and natural gas liquids, and 35% is natural gas], another 50 billion in probable reserves, and perhaps 200 billion more in potential reserves, putting it in the same class as Saudi Arabia. It may, in fact, be sitting literally on a sea of oil, as only 10 percent of its land surface and territorial waters has so far been explored.

The existence of such unheard-of wealth has created an ambiguous situation. While it is literally fueling an industrial boom, resulting in an economic growth rate estimated at eight percent this year, it has failed so far to create enough new jobs to relieve the unemployment problem. In other words, the billions of dollars that are already flowing into Mexico from oil sales abroad are not finding their way into the homes of the poor but into the pocket books of the rich, and economic polarization is increasing. Here a little-commented phenomenon must be stressed: the Mexican middle class has been growing rapidly and today comprises perhaps one-quarter of the total population. It could become, at a moment of high tension, a welcome political buffer.

The vast majority of Mexicans worry, of course, that big-scale oil production and exportation will dislocate their economy, irreparably damage their ecology, exhaust a nonrenewable resource, and eventually turn the country into “another Iran.” (This is not to equate the two countries, Mexico being far more advanced than Iran in almost every field of modern endeavor, and far more progressive in its social and cultural outlook.) From that point on, two schools of thought emerge and clash.

One holds that increased oil production and export for the U.S. market would inevitably bind the Mexican economy too closely to the American, making it in effect a satellite. Hence production should be kept to a minimum sufficient only to supply Mexico’s own needs and to sell abroad only enough to cover the trade deficit and finance social programs. This school is essentially quasi-Marxist and ultra-nationalist in outlook.

The second school believes it is necessary to increase exports steadily, while giving preference to domestic consumption, in order to obtain a large inflow of foreign capital that will stimulate general economic expansion. This would enable Mexico to purchase the expensive capital equipment required for the oil industry (and for industry in general), and finance the still considerable foreign debt as well as programs to reduce unemployment and poverty. The question is whether all three things can be done at the same time.

President López Portillo heads the second school of thought, and he is banking on

James

Mexico receiving stiffer finance his three objectives: planned 1.5 million one million barrels, office, from a project four million or perhaps

About 80 percent of it to the United States. First, that percentage, enabling us to obtain more than any in the Middle East, a day, this would amount to an offset the total loss, I would be of tremendous help about Middle East oil supplies for Western

It is very unlikely, however, that place, its president is focused on selling oil all over the market. Secondly, his production to anything ultranationalist-Marxist up in arms against the viceroyalty, getting, and would certify that quota unless, that is, the Mexican people.

Mexico needs food, money. Mexico’s grain three of the 17 million tons to Afghanistan invasion. That guarantee to supply all the water we can help Mexico raise technology and know-how to assist in a program to “get the border and eventually turn large numbers of potenti

These and other concerns, bilateral program involving neighbors benefit equally deal with mutual problems major reappraisal of United States with James Reston of the

LC

Ammer 1980

James

103

Mexico receiving sufficient money from oil this "zero year," as he terms 1980, to finance his three objectives. To make sure of that, he has raised oil production from a planned 1.5 million barrels a day in 1980 to 2.7 million, and exports from 700,000 to one million barrels. He is also expected to raise production in 1982, when he leaves office, from a projected 2.25 million barrels daily—already surpassed this year—to four million or perhaps even more.

About 80 percent of the more than 700,000 barrels of oil Mexico exports daily goes to the United States. Obviously, it would be desirable from an American standpoint if, first, that percentage could be maintained as Mexico increases oil production, thus enabling us to obtain larger quantities of oil from a more reliable and accessible source than any in the Middle East. Second, if Mexico could raise production to the 10 million barrels a day, which the CIA estimates it should be capable of doing by 1990, this would amount to 8 million barrels a day for the United States, more than enough to offset the total loss, let us say, of our supply from Iran before the revolution. This would be of tremendous help to the U.S. economy, and eliminate our constant worry about Middle East oil supplies. Almost as important, it would also release Middle East supplies for Western Europe and Japan.

It is very unlikely, however, that Mexico will treat us so generously. In the first place, its president is following a deliberate policy of diversifying its oil customers and of selling oil all over the world, precisely to avoid overdependence on the American market. Secondly, his successor, particularly if he veers farther left, will not raise production to anything like 10 million barrels in fear of a backlash from the ultranationalist-Marxist school of thought. Mexico's intellectuals, in particular, are up in arms against the very idea of selling the yanquis even as little oil as they are now getting, and would certainly inflame the populace against any substantial increase of that quota unless, that is, there were a quid pro quo that would decisively benefit the Mexican people.

Mexico needs foodstuffs to feed an exploding population almost more than it needs money. Mexico's grain shortfall¹² was dramatically exposed when it offered to buy three of the 17 million tons Washington decided to deny Moscow, to punish it for the Afghanistan invasion. The United States can help ease Mexico's situation through a guarantee to supply all the grain it can buy over a given period of time. In the long run, we can help Mexico raise agricultural production by making available the latest U.S. technology and know-how. A beginning could be made, almost at once, by offering to assist in a program to "green" the deserts of Sonora and Chihuahua just south of the border and eventually turn them into a giant breadbasket; that would likewise deter large numbers of potential migrants from crossing over into this country.

These and other concrete proposals should be packaged together in a common, bilateral program involving a pragmatic give-and-take all down the line, so that both neighbors benefit equally. López Portillo has already stated that he would prefer to deal with mutual problems as a package rather than piecemeal, in connection with "a major reappraisal of United States–Mexican relations," as he put it in an interview with James Reston of the *New York Times*. In a rundown of outstanding bilateral

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problems in his Meridian House address, Castañeda stressed Mexico's preference for that approach, hinting at the "linkage of international issues" affecting both countries—a signal, perhaps, that even its new foreign policy might be susceptible to adjustments under the proper conditions. He was scornful of the prevalent desire in the White House and State Department for a "special relationship" with Mexico while continuing to deal with it on an issue-to-issue basis. "No one in Mexico seriously believes any more, I hope," he began pointedly, "that there exists, or can exist, a 'special relationship' between the United States and Mexico." Such a belief, he added, "proved to be a delusion every time it was put to the test of a concrete problem during the sixties."

Yet after all, Castañeda admitted, Mexico needs the United States. At the end of his speech, he indicated clearly the "bottom line" in Mexican policy toward the United States:

> I personally consider that a major asset for present-day Mexico is its proximity to the United States . . . . Proximity means, first and foremost, that Mexico is one of the very few countries in the world that can afford the luxury of not being burdened by the cost of armaments and a heavy military establishment . . . . Second, proximity means a clear economic advantage. Being near the largest and richest market in the world should give us a natural competitive edge for exports. Oil and gas are typical examples of it. Finally, whether you like it or not—and you don't like it—and whether we like it or not—and we don't like it either, though for opposite reasons—proximity allows us to solve partially the problem of unemployment in Mexico.

In these frank words, the Mexican foreign secretary has laid down the basis for a pragmatic bilateral policy¹³ which can, at one and the same time, resolve several thorny issues between the two nations themselves and also open the way toward a joint effort to defuse the gathering Caribbean crisis. Considering the outstanding reputation Mexico enjoys throughout the area, as well as its new oil power, it could conceivably prove effective in helping tamp down the fires of revolution abroad that threaten its internal peace and stability and our own national interests.

But to be persuaded to play that role, Mexico seeks something more than a crass quid pro quo; something quite intangible but in some respects even more important to the Mexicans: equality of treatment as a nation and utmost respect in future bilateral contacts. The numerous affronts to Mexican dignity and pride that the United States has committed in the past, usually unwittingly, such as President Carter's tasteless humor during his last visit to Mexico (when he related the story of his bout with "Montezuma's revenge" on an earlier trip), must not be repeated. As Castañeda puts it, "our rapport with the United States ranks first in our international relations," but "it can and must be based on mutual respect." Nor is it necessary to strive toward that end through futile, almost childish exercises like reading the Bible in Spanish, as Jimmy Carter is said to do, which strain the credulity of Mexico's leaders (who, in any case, are largely anticlerical). Very simply, it is necessary to treat Mexico exactly as we do any European nation like France or England or, perhaps more to the point, as we have learned to treat Japan.

It remains to be seen whether the alternation of one en face Cuban satellite States that will determine the possibility of a non-adversary nuclear revolutionary, compel it region—in particular, crisis so closely to be precisely to

Ultimately to them in that power that, I remain a great

1. Quoted in

2. "American 1979), p. 9.

3. As quoted in

4. As quoted in

5. *Excelsior*

6. From the

7. From the

8. Ibid.

9. Op. cit.

10. Remarks on American, Mer

11. Op. cit.

12. Underscores June 16, the increase of tons. Further indigenous from the U

13. On a state of pointed statements common among [Mexico's] preferred to suggestion stressed that

James

105

It remains to be seen whether our leaders can match Mexico's in their pragmatism. The alternative would be unthinkable: a Caribbean struck by a revolutionary hurricane from one end to the other, offering an irresistible temptation to the Soviets and their Cuban satellite. This would inevitably create an untenable situation for the United States that would require us to intervene in a drastic manner, and thus open up the possibility of a second confrontation with Moscow in the Caribbean, only with an adversary militarily stronger than we are this time. It is also possible that the revolutionary pressure upon the United States could become of such magnitude as to compel it reduce its commitments elsewhere—say, in the Persian Gulf-Middle East region—in order to muster the strength and the personnel required to deal with the crisis so close to home. Indeed, a prime Moscow objective in the Caribbean may be precisely to divert our attention away from other areas.

Ultimately, our national interests in the Mediterranean are best defended by seeing to them in the "American Mediterranean." History records no example of a great power that, having failed to secure the region around its own shores, continued to remain a great power.

NOTES

1. Quoted in *Diario las Américas*, Miami, May 4, 1980.

2. "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1979" (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1979), p. 15.

3. As quoted in a dispatch to the *Washington Post*, May 23, 1979, datelined Mexico City, from a press conference given by Castañeda.

4. As quoted in *Excelsior*, March 22, 1980, Mexico City.

5. *Excelsior*, January 29, 1980.

6. From the text published in *Diario las Américas*, Miami, April 22, 1980.

7. From the text published in *Diario las Américas*, Miami, April 19, 1980.

8. Ibid.

9. Op. cit.

10. Remarks of Jorge Castañeda in the panel. "Mexico and the World," at the Mexico Today Symposium, Meridian House, Washington, D.C., October 30, 1979, English version.

11. Op. cit.

12. Underscoring how grave the shortfall is, a *Wall Street Journal* dispatch from Mexico City reported on June 16 that this year Mexico will have to import 9.5 million metric tons of basic feedgrains, an increase of 2 million tons over 1979, while in 1981 such imports could reach as high 10-12 million tons. Furthermore, more than one-third of the 1980 imports (3.5 million tons) will be corn—which is indigenous to the country and a staple since time immemorial. Most of the imported grain will come from the United States.

13. On a state visit to Canada at the end of May, President López Portillo emphasized this line in two pointed statements. In one, he rejected unequivocally the proposal to establish a North American common market to include Canada, Mexico, and the United States because it would "brake ... [Mexico's] industrial growth and condemn it to export raw materials in perpetuity." Instead, Mexico preferred to encourage bilateral relations. In the second statement he likewise rejected a Canadian suggestion of "a pact which could signify an offensive organized against the United States" and stressed that the solution to U.S.-Mexican relations "must be sought through negotiation."

BILL McCOLLUM
5TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

1507 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2178

DISTRICT OFFICE:
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1801 LEE ROAD
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FROM LAKE COUNTY, TOLL FREE:
383-8541

July 20, 1983

The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

JUL 22 1983

Dear Mr. President:

On July 15-18, 1983, I had an intensive visit in El Salvador along with my colleagues, Congressmen Eldon Rudd and Stan Parris. The purpose of this letter is to report to you my observations and conclusions on the status of certain matters of vital interest to our nation.

In addition to the usual Country Team Briefing by our key personnel in San Salvador, substantive briefings and visits were held with President Magana; Minister of Defense Vides Casanova; Constituent Assembly President Roberto D'Aubuisson; Monsignor Fredy Delgado, a leading member of the Human Rights Commission; Combined Plan Commander for "Operation Well-Being" Colonel Golcher; Leo Ruelas of A.I.D.; and Colonel Cruz, Commanding Officer of the government forces in San Francisco Gotera. In addition, I visited the military hospital in San Salvador with Dr. Hernand Morales, head of the recently sent U.S. medical team, and the main civilian hospital, Hospital Rosales. In both San Vincente and San Francisco Gotera I toured displaced persons camps and talked with the people in those camps.

It is obvious that a dramatic change has occurred in the last five weeks and the government of El Salvador has now gained the initiative against the guerilla forces. "Operation Well-Being," which was designed to clear the key agricultural departments of San Vincente and Usulatan of the rebel forces and restore the farming activity to provide a successful prototype of what the government can do when it directs sufficient resources into a region, has been a great success much sooner than anticipated. Virtually all guerilla forces had been cleared from San Vincente Department before we arrived and about one-third of Usulatan had been pacified. The highway between San Salvador and San Vincente, which had been closed off and on for a considerable period of time due to rebel activity and frequent ambushes, had been open to the free flow of traffic without threat of ambush for nearly two weeks when we arrived, and we made this trip by car. The government is busily engaged in getting people back to work on the farms in San Vincente and making the land once more productive to the economy. The morale and self-confidence of the Salvadoran Army is clearly high and many say it is the highest it has ever been. American military advisors and our State Department officials showed exceeding pleasure at this substantial progress.

Letter to President Ronald W. Reagan

July 20, 1983

Page - 2 -

The visit provided demonstrable and convincing evidence of the necessity of the military assistance and economic aid which you have requested from Congress. The Salvadorans do not want or need American troops. What they need is sufficient resources to expand their army to a size sufficient to hold the departments that they have taken and pacified and go further in doing the same type of "Operation Well-Being" in all of the other departments and in getting the farms operating again and the farmers back on their farms. It is clear that both military and economic assistance are required to stabilize this region and to provide long-term support for the democratically-elected government which now exists.

As you are aware, there are over 280,000 displaced persons in El Salvador. Many more who have been driven off their farms by the guerillas have sought refuge in neighboring countries or become the "feet" people moving into the United States. My visit to the displaced persons camp gives me great hope that the conflict in El Salvador can be resolved without additional massive migrations of Salvadorans to this country. When asked, "What do you need the most?," the answer was a universal, "Work!" In both camps, the people clearly indicated that they strongly wanted to return to their farms and would do so as soon as it was demonstrated that the violence had ended and their safety could be assured. They do not want to leave El Salvador and they are very much opposed to the rebel forces which drove them from the farms in the first place. The people of El Salvador have a very strong work ethic and the A.I.D. work program appears to be very successful. However, there is a severe shortage of medicine and medical care given to these displaced persons. The shortage is not limited to these people inasmuch as the visit to the hospitals showed that there is a general shortage of medicine in the country. I have personally initiated a U.S. business donation and airlift operation to provide a sizable quantity of needed medicines to the people of El Salvador in the next few days and assume I can obtain your blessings and support for this mission. We must do as much as we possibly can to give these people greater health care and get them to return to their farms to do what is essential for the economic well-being of the nation and a sustained economic recovery for El Salvador. If this can be accomplished, the number of "feet" people coming into the United States will decline dramatically.

The human rights effort is coming along very well. Although the atrocities which prompted so much criticism of many in the government have not been satisfactorily resolved, there is a very strong effort being made by those in the government to change the attitudes held by the soldiers and the civil defense citizenry. Written material is now given to every soldier on human rights and people like Monsignor Fredy Delgado are able to appear regularly in forums to urge human rights considerations and create a climate for long-lasting reform in this area.