PR #237

Governor Mandel, Senators Mathias and Beall, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am grateful for the honor you do me today. After the events of the past few weeks, I had come to believe that I would never again receive a kind word from a "conservative" organization.

The state of Maryland will have an increasing number of out of state visitors in the next few weeks. I also am a visitor, but with a different motive. All I want is a quiet and friendly town to seek asylum.

I want to take a few moments this evening to recall some of our basic objectives and opportunities in the world — the permanent interests and concerns for which this nation is responsible, and why our commitment to the security and survival of Israel is an essential element of our global policy.

We have been committed for thirty years to the maintenance of global peace. No other nation has the strength to do so without us. The United States for thirty years has been the engine of the world economy and the promoter of economic development. No other nation has the resources or technology or managerial skill to do so alone.

Without our commitment there can be no security; without our dedication there can be no progress. This role is not an act of altruism but a matter of vital self-interest. Upheavals in key areas — such as the Middle East — menace our friends and allies, jeopardize our prosperity, and raise the risk of global confrontation. The Middle East war of 1973 brought a confrontation with the Soviet Union and contributed to the most severe recession in the postwar period.

But neither peace nor progress comes inevitably or automatically. These goals are mere abstractions if they are not pursued with strength, vision and conviction. For a generation America has been the leader in maintaining the balance of power, in offering help to friends to ensure their survival, in mediating conflicts, in building and sustaining international cooperation for economic progress. We could not have done so without our strength; we would not have done so without our convictions.

Today we can be proud of where we stand.

After 35 years of continual tensions and intermittent conflict, America is now at peace; no American is at war anywhere in the world. Militarily, our power is vast and growing, superior in technology and in the most important categories of strategic strength. We have solid and secure allies. Our readiness and our resolve deter wars and buttress global stability.

Economically, the United States and the great industrialized democracies have shown once again the resiliency and basic vigor of free economies. We have successfully come through a period of recession and inflation induced in large part by drastic and unwarranted oil price increases. The solidarity of our major alliances has dramatically proved itself in a new sphere of common endeavor — economic recovery and energy policy — adding another dimension of unity above and beyond our collective defense.

Our founding fathers were men of faith and vision.

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They had faith in the future of a free people. And they had the vision to understand, as Edmund Burke said, that "you can never plan the future by the past."

We need these qualities as much today as two hundred years ago. Faith, because to our people dedication to the cause of freedom transcends partisanship and ethnic or social division. Vision, because while we must learn from the past, we are not and must not become its prisoner.

These qualities of faith and vision are characteristic also of another people — the people of Israel. They are qualities we need especially as we contemplate the future of the Middle East and seek to build there — together — a lasting peace.

There is no greater example of the power of faith than the creation of the State of Israel. For centuries it was a dream for the persecuted and oppressed; then it became a reality. And a reality it shall remain. The survivors never lost their faith and they built a modern nation in the desert in our own lifetime. Now they dream of peace. And that, too, they will achieve.

The road ahead is almost certainly more difficult — but nonetheless inescapable — than the steps we have taken so far. But we are launched together on that road, and we shall continue together with confidence and dedication.

For our relations with Israel are central to and inseparable from the broad concept of our foreign policy. The United States has permanent and fundamental concerns in the world that reflect the values of our people. True to the origins of our own nation:

- We have always been inspired by moral aims, committed to use our power for the cause of freedom, justice and international security.

- We have maintained a strong defense and supported our friends, knowing that we could not leave the future of freedom to the mercy of others.

- We have wielded our strength as a creative force for peace, promoting solutions to conflicts and new endeavors of cooperation, confident that mankind is not doomed to anarchy and destruction; that its power can be used for conciliation and progress.

- And we have exerted our leadership as well in the economic realm, conscious that the wellbeing of nations and peoples was a fundamental component of international order and of a better future.

These principles will guide our policy as we seek peace in the Middle East.

## Morality and Foreign Policy

The genius of America has always been its moral significance. Since its birth America has held a promise and a dream to which others have clung and many have sought to emulate. As Gladstone said, "the Constitution of the United States was the greatest political instrument ever struck off on a single occasion by the minds of men."

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Americans have always believed that what we did mattered not just for ourselves but for all mankind. We have been the bulwark of democracy, a refuge for those fleeing persecution, and the most humanitarian nation in history.

Since the end of World War II global peace and prosperity have depended to an extra-
ordinary degree upon America. Throughout this period America's might has always
been used to defend, never to oppress. So it will be in the future.

The relationship between America and Israel rests fundamentally on this moral basis.
If the world is to be peaceful and equitable, the conduct of nations must have an
ethical foundation. Those who have suffered from its absence, who have been victimized
by arbitrary power — and no people has been more than the Jewish people — know in
their bones how without ethical principles the ruthless will rule and the weak will
suffer. Peace with justice must have a special meaning for a people — like the
Jewish people — who have, through history, sought it so fervently, but experienced
it so rarely.

For all these reasons, Americans look upon Israel as a loyal friend committed, as
are we, to the principles of freedom and democracy. We value the part we played in
creating the State of Israel and in sustaining its survival. The United States can
never ignore its moral responsibility for the fate of nations which rely upon us as
the ultimate defender of their survival and freedom. We are thoroughly convinced
that Israel's survival is inseparable from the future of human dignity and we shall
never forget that Israel's security has a special claim on the conscience of mankind.

Nor will we forget that the true strength of friendship lies in our honesty and candor with each other. Our relationship with Israel is too important for us to delude ourselves with less than our honest opinions. We do not prove our friendship by ignoring the realities we both face. We undermine our common future if, for temporary expediency, we tell each other fairy tales. We prove our good intentions by working together with dedication, facing hardship and reality for the common good, and above all by never forgetting how important our partnership is for all that we each seek in the world.

America's aim is a just and lasting peace in the Middle East — and so is Israel's.
During the United Nations consideration of the Palestine question over 25 years
ago, an American diplomat expressed the hope that, "the day will come when the Jews
and Arabs in the Middle East will live together in the true spirit of Christian
brotherhood." We may be amused by the phrase, but it reflects a basic aspiration.
Israel is entitled to live with its neighbors in the same sense of safety and
normalcy that is taken for granted almost everywhere else in the world.

The United States and Israel can debate over tactics but never over the basic
reality that our relationship with each other is special for reasons that transcend
tactics. What ties us together is not legal documents but a moral connection which
cannot be severed.

A Strong Defense

The second strand of American policy is a realistic appreciation of the importance of American strength. Aspirations for a better world are empty without the strength to implement them. No one should understand better than the Jewish people that

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weakness is not a virtue and that righteousness alone is no protection in a world
of insecurity and injustice.

There can be no security without equilibrium, and no safety without the restraint
which a balance of power imposes. Only when the rights of nations are respected by
necessity, when accommodation supplants force, can mankind's energies be devoted to
the realization of its higher aspirations.

For thirty years the United States has occupied a central place in the global balance
of stability. Our strength or our weakness, our effectiveness or ineffectiveness,
affect decisively the calculations of nearly every nation in the world and determine
our ability to shape events to our purposes. We cannot surrender one strategic part
of the world to those who oppose us and remain secure and unchallenged in another.
So those who want America strong in one part of the world have a special obligation
to keep it strong in all strategically important areas. Nations, wherever they are
located, that rely on us cannot fail to be affected whenever America abdicates
responsibility — whether in Asia or in Africa.

The American people have never been comfortable with weakness. We have never
relished abdication. And when it is imposed on us by domestic divisions it has its
inevitable reaction. It is reassuring to see the American people once again
emphatically united on the necessity of a strong defense. This year's defense
budget will allow us to continue to improve our military forces — to ensure that
no other nation can threaten us, our interests, or our friends.

As President Kennedy wrote, "we did not ask to be the watchman on the walls of freedom." But circumstances have made us so. History taught us that our own tranquility depends on global stability. From Waterloo to Sarajevo, America benefitted from the stability of a world balance of power which maintained global security and prevented international war. That responsibility now rests, in large measure, with us. It is a responsibility we cannot skirt.

The United States will keep its friends and allies strong enough to defend themselves with our support — to ensure that peace is seen clearly by their adversaries to be the only feasible course.

We will not fail to provide for Israel's security. American aid to Israel was $437
million in Fiscal Year 1973; since then it has increased to 2.3 billions of dollars
for the current fiscal year — a five-fold increase in three years. Israel now
receives about a third of our total foreign assistance. Israel has received $6 billion
in aid since its founding; we have proposed $4.1 billion for the next two years.
Those who opportunistically question our dedication to the security of Israel should
examine these statistics.

## Maintaining a Stable Peace

Strength alone is not enough. It is useful only in the service of a concept of the
national interest, and wielded with creativity, wisdom and compassion to shape the
course of events. Thus our true strength is not military power, but the dedication
of a free people which knows its responsibility, which has a vision of what it seeks
and the courage to seek it.

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The United States has never been defeated for lack of military power. All our recent setbacks from Indo-China to Angola have been self-inflicted; they have occurred because of divisions among ourselves that paralyzed our action.

Together there is little we cannot do. Divided, there is little we can attempt.

The most urgent challenge before America is a national consensus on our purposes and objectives. As a nation, we must maintain the balance of power and have the vision to fulfill positive aspirations. There is no ultimate safety in a balance of terror constantly contested. We must vigilantly protect our own security, and that of our allies and friends, but we must also seek to build habits of communications and relationships of cooperation. With respect to our adversaries, we are determined to resist moves to gain unilateral benefits by military pressure, direct or indirect. The United States will not accept any further Angolas. At the same time, we owe it to ourselves, and to the world, to seek to push back the shadow of nuclear holocaust, to slow the strategic arms race, to resolve political problems through negotiation, and to expand our relations on the basis of strict reciprocity.

This process is meant to serve, not to sacrifice, our interests and values. The state of relations between the United States and the Communist powers is vastly better today for us and for global peace than it was ten years ago — when crises were frequent, when communication was rudimentary, and when the world did not have the luxury of criticizing efforts to reduce tensions.

Our policy in the Middle East, similarly, is designed to serve our most positive goals. The extraordinary steps that have been taken in the last few years between Arab states and Israel have brought us progress undreamed of a few short years ago. The process of negotiation between the parties is continuing; the United States remains in a pivotal position to promote a balanced negotiation, to support friends and dampen conflicts. The Middle East today is at a moment of unprecedented opportunity:

- Israel has shown in negotiation the boldness for which it is renowned in battle, and that in turn has made possible concrete political steps toward a durable peace settlement.

- Some of the Arab countries are now at last speaking openly and wisely of making peace and bringing an end to generations of conflict.

- The United States has shown that its determination and ability to promote a just and enduring solution between the parties, to prevent this region from again becoming the focal point of global crisis.

- If we continue to conduct our relationship with the major outside powers with reason and firmness, we can move toward a global environment of restraint that will enhance even further the possibilities of constructive negotiation and progress.

The negotiations ahead in the Middle East will present difficult obstacles and difficult decisions. We understand the complexity of Israel's position. Any negotiation will require Israel to exchange territory in return for political and therefore much less concrete concessions. Even Israel's ultimate goals — a peace treaty and recognition from its neighbors — are inherently intangible. But they

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would be the greatest step towards security since the creation of the state. We do not underestimate the dilemmas and risks that Israel faces in a negotiation. But they are dwarfed by a continuation of the *status quo*. And we recognize our obligation, as the principal support for Israel's security, to be understanding of Israel's specific circumstances in the process of negotiations.

All of us who are friends of Israel and who are at the same time dedicated to further progress toward peace understand Israel's uncertainties — and at the same time we share her hope. There will be no imposed solutions; there should be negotiations between the parties that will eventually have to live in peace.

It is a delicate but careful process, because no American and no friend of Israel can be ignorant of what is at stake. Much work and many dangers — most immediately the situation in Lebanon — remain but the peace process has come further than all but a very few dared hope.

As the process continues, the United States will not weaken Israel by failing to perceive her needs, or by failing to understand its worries, or by abandoning our fundamental commitment to its survival and security. In this process there is hope; in stagnation there are mounting dangers. Together we can achieve what a few years ago seemed a vain dream: a Middle East whose nations live at peace and with a consciousness of security.

## A Prosperous World Economic Order

A fourth element of American foreign policy is our commitment to sustain the world economic order. A dominant issue of international relations for the next generation will be the economic division of our planet between North and South — industrial and developing — which has become as pressing an issue as the division between East and West. I have just returned from Nairobi, from addressing a meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, where I put forward new ideas for multilateral cooperation.

Peace would be fragile, indeed, in a world of economic stagnation or frustration, in an era of economic warfare or unremitting hostility between the industrial world and the developing world. In the last few years the world community has been reminded dramatically by the oil embargo and the ensuing recession of the extent to which economic relations are an essential foundation of the international order. Bold new policies are needed to make the international economic system more secure and more dynamic. Therefore, just as we seek to move beyond a balance of power in East-West relations, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations in favor of more creative and constructive relationships in tune with the sweep of human aspirations.

We do so in our own self-interest. As the world's strongest power, the United States could survive an era of economic warfare. But the American people would not be true to ourselves were we to turn our backs on the legitimate hopes of tens of millions for a better life. Our own self-interest requires us to use our preeminent economic strength to strengthen and build upon the interdependence of all nations in the global economy.

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No other country has our opportunity to build long-term relations of partnership in helping nations to develop their resources and economies. All over the globe American economic strength is admired and sought; it should be seen by us not as a "give-away" but as an unmatchable advantage which can be creatively used to strengthen our diplomacy for peace and the prospects of a stable and just world order.

Israel too has made a great contribution to the cause of constructive relations between the advanced and the developing countries. The imagination and creativity which the pioneering settlers of Israel used to make the desert bloom have been generously offered to many developing countries. We support those initiatives and we will do what we can to assist them.

Israel faces serious economic difficulties in the years ahead, partly because — let us face it squarely — Moses had some shortcomings as a petroleum geologist. In place of natural resources, Israel's economy must be driven by creativity, hard work and determination — assets which fortunately are in abundance in that little country. To prosper, Israel must have access to world markets, and countries and companies that wish to trade with her must be free to do so.

The United States will continue to help Israel's economy overcome world recession, higher petroleum prices and the costs of a strong national defense. The United States is committed to ending restrictions on Israel's rights to trade and on the rights of others to trade with Israel. Steps toward peace in the political and military field must include steps to end the economic warfare.

## America and Israel

As America makes progress toward all its broad objectives of global peace and well-being, the world is made safer for all countries that rely on us. But if legislative battles and domestic divisions weaken America's leadership, it will not be America alone which pays the price. Our friends and allies will grievously suffer.

Americans and Israelis must work together creatively and boldly in the challenging period ahead. Diplomacy at its best is a process of creation, not of passive reactions to events. For Americans and Israelis above all, who have always shaped actions out of purposes, there is no excuse for political wrangling that in perilous times makes coherent and purposive action impossible.

America has a special responsibility. Never has there been any question about our physical power. As our economy rebounds from recession, there is every reason for confidence about our long-term — and indeed permanent — superiority in the economic and technological strength that is the basis of our military power as well as of our economic welfare. The challenge to us at this point in our history is whether we can restore the consensus and national confidence that can make this power effective for our goals.

I am optimistic. We are not weak; we are only hesitant. It lies within us to remedy our difficulties.

The former Foreign Minister of France, Maurice Couve de Murville, said on the floor of the French Assembly three days ago: "The instability in the world is above all a result of the American crisis caused by the defeat in Viet-Nam and the Watergate affair, rather than by the increase in Soviet power . . ."

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Americans know that when all is said and done, there cannot be peace for one nation. There must be peace for all nations, or all are in jeopardy.

The world looks to us. This is one fact that I have found whatever continent I have visited — Africa, Latin America, Asia, or Europe. Although we no longer enjoy the preponderant power we once had, we are still the strongest single country, and a nation recognized throughout the world for its honesty, its decency and unselfishness. If we persevere, if we use our great moral and physical influence to maintain the balance of power, promote world prosperity, mediate conflicts, and put our considerable weight on the scales of justice — if in short we do as we have always done — we will usher in an unparalleled period of progress and peace.

President Roosevelt once said that his generation of Americans had a rendezvous with destiny. Let it be said of our generation of Americans that they have had a rendezvous with peace and with progress.

*****

INFORMAL TOAST FOR THE SECRETARY'S
WORKING LUNCHEON IN HONOR OF
DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSEN ON
MONDAY, MAY 10 AT 1:00 P.M.

Mr. Minister, Distinguished Guests:

I am delighted to welcome you here today. We are very pleased that you have come to participate in the visit which Her Majesty, Queen Margrethe, (phonetic: Mar GRAY-tuh) and his Royal Highness, the Prince of Denmark, are paying to the United States in connection with our Bicentennial.

At the outset I want to say that I admire the Danish people, not least because they take nothing seriously -- including themselves. That is also one of my most endearing traits. The Danes pride themselves on not being able to make up their minds -- as witness Hamlet and your great philosopher Kierkegaard's (phonetic: KIR-kuh-gore) famous work, *Either Or*, which was of course the inspiration for the State Department's options papers.

Moreover, we share a taste for rueful maxims. For example, Piet Hein (phonetic: Pete Hine) tells us:

> "Experts have their expert fun
> Ex cathedra telling one
> Just how nothing can be done."

That's my staff for you. I ought to have that saying printed, framed, and hung on the wall behind my desk.

Mr. Minister, I have a strong personal recollection of your diplomatic skills. You displayed them ably when EC President at a time which placed you more or less in between

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former French Foreign Minister Jobert (phonetic: Zho-BAIR) and me. That was the "Year of Europe." This is the "Year of the United States -- election," and I am thinking of trying somehow to place you between me and Ronald Reagan.

To continue in a serious vein, the Queen's visit is a significant event for the Bicentennial and for US-Danish relations which, I am glad to say, are excellent. We attach great importance to our ties with Denmark, an honored friend and ally, and to exchanging views with Danish leaders on a continuing basis. The various meetings which the President and I have had with Prime Minister Jorgensen (phonetic: YUR-en-sen) and with you in recent months were valuable in this respect, and our meeting today is a further contribution to that important dialogue between us.

We want to intensify our bilateral relations with Denmark, and our cooperation with you in NATO. The United States is committed to a strong and effective NATO, which we continue to regard as the cornerstone for Western security and negotiations with the East. It is vital that all Allies maintain their defense commitments to NATO, and that nothing be permitted to diminish the West's overall security. It is also highly important that Denmark and the United States maintain close contact to keep current on each other's views and interests concerning the European Community, and in international organizations such as the United Nations to seek coordinated and, where possible, common approaches to

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the world problems we face.

Mr. Minister, I want to say how deeply grateful we are
for the outstanding contributions which the Danish Government,
Bicentennial Committee, and people have made to the observance
of our Bicentennial. We are impressed by the many programs
undertaken, and touched by the warmth of these expressions
of friendship during our 200th anniversary of nationhood.

We are aware that US-Danish relations go back to 1801,
and Danish recognition of our Republic to 1791. Our friendship
is thus a long one, reinforced by shared values of democratic
government, individual freedom, economic and social progress.

Gentlemen, I ask you to join me in a toast to Foreign
Minister Andersen, and to continued excellent ties between
our two countries. May the next 175 years of US-Danish relations
be equally fruitful, and may the bonds between us endure and
strengthen as we work together for a just and lasting peace
in the world.

The Secretary
of State

Statement

May 13, 1976

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

## AFRICA

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Senate*
*Foreign Relations Committee.*

I am pleased to have this opportunity to re-
port to you on my visit to Africa and on the state
of our relations with this increasingly important
continent.

A sound relationship between America and Africa is crucial to an international structure of relations that promotes peace, widening prosperity, and human dignity. When I began my African trip, war had already begun in the south of the continent, risking possible great power conflict. Africa's hopes for steady economic development were being distorted by increasingly radical forces; and the course of peaceful social change threatened to degenerate into widespread bloodshed. For this reason President Ford directed me to go to Africa to present proposals aimed at bringing about moderate, negotiated solutions to the urgent political problems of southern Africa, to the long-term economic development of the continent; and to strengthen our ties with Africa in the service of interests we share—peace, independence, prosperity, respect for human dignity, and justice.

I believe that we have laid a sound foundation for progress in these areas. It is this progress which I want to discuss with you today.

## Africa's Importance to the Industrial Democracies

Africa is of immense size, strategically loca-
ted, with governments of substantial significance in
numbers and growing in influence in the councils

of the world. The interdependence of America and
our allies with Africa is increasingly obvious. Africa
is a continent of vast resources. We depend on Afri-
ca for many key products: cobalt, chrome, oil,
cocoa, manganese, platinum, diamonds, aluminum,
and others. In many of these commodities Africa
supplies from 30 to 60 percent of our total im-
ports.

In the last two decades American investments
in black Africa have more than quadrupled—to
over $1.5 billion. Trade has grown at an even faster
rate; Africa's importance to us as a commercial
partner—as a producer of energy and commodities
and as a market for our own products—is substan-
tial and bound to grow in the future.

The reliance of Europe and Japan on Africa for key raw materials is even greater than our own. For example three-quarters of the manganese imported by the European Community, and over half that imported by Japan, comes from Africa. The continent provides a growing area of investment for our allies and is an important trading partner as well. Western Europe and Japan's combined trade with Africa now exceeds $30 billion a year.

Thus an independent and prospering Africa is
of considerable consequence to the security, politi-
cal, and economic interests of all the great indus-
trial democracies. For its part Africa recognizes full
well the crucial importance of our markets and
investments to its own prosperity. And politically
the emphasis which African leaders placed in con-
versations with me on the need and importance of

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American action and support is proof that our assets and our moral influence are recognized and valued on the continent.

We are, in addition, bound by a moral dimension—the cultural heritage of 23 million Americans and the moral sympathy of over 200 million Americans who understand the motivations of peoples who would establish their freedom and prosperity against great odds.

Thus the formulation of a sound relationship between America and Africa is of considerable importance to our country. It is, as well, a complex and difficult task.

* Never before in history has so revolutionary a change occurred with such rapidity as Africa's transition from colonialism to independence. Many African states are but a decade or so old.

* Moreover a continent of nearly 50 nations cannot easily, if at all, be encompassed by a single, coherent policy. Africa's drive for unity is a reality; yet Africa's great diversity makes clear-cut, general formulations difficult to achieve and apply.

* If Africa is not to become a grave source of great power conflict and of international tensions, Africa's problems must be for Africans to solve. They must not be permitted to become the subject of great power rivalry and confrontation. Their ultimate resolution lies in the processes of Africa's own internal political and social evolution.

Significant developments in recent years make it clear that Africa occupies an important place in the course and the conduct of international affairs. The spread of national independence in Africa has done much to transform the numerical and the political makeup of world institutions and the nature of international affairs. Political and social pressures, especially in southern Africa, have raised the threat that the continent might once again become an arena for big power competition, with profound implications for global stability. And major changes have taken place in the international economy, leading the developing nations of Africa to claim more control over their economic destiny and a greater share in global prosperity.

To take account of such changes on the international scene, and with the aim of strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa, President Ford in 1974 ordered a review of

our African policy. As part of this effort I announced one year ago that I would visit Africa in the spring of 1976. Last September [23] I set forth the fundamental elements of our policy toward Africa to members of the Organization of African Unity assembled in New York for the United Nations.

I said then that America had three major concerns:

* That the African Continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict;

* That all of the continent should have the right of self-determination; and

* That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the global economic order—an economic partner with a growing stake in the international system.

Late last year the situation in Africa took on a new and serious dimension. For the first time since the colonial era in Africa was largely brought to an end in the early 1960's, external interventions had begun to control and direct an essentially African problem.

In the hope of halting a dangerously escalating situation in Angola, we undertook a wide range of diplomatic and other activity pointing toward a cessation of foreign intervention and a negotiated African solution.

But the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. In January [29] on behalf of the Administration, I put before the Senate our views on the consequences of our inaction on Angola. I shall not review those arguments again today.

Soviet-Cuban intervention had contributed to an increasingly dangerous situation turning the political evolution away from African aspirations and toward great power confrontation.

* The Soviets and Cubans had imposed their solution on Angola. Their forces were entrenched there, and fresh opportunities lay before them.

* With the end of the Portuguese era in Africa, pressure was building on Rhodesia, regarded by Africans as the last major vestige of colonialism. Events in Angola encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in Rhodesia.

* With radical influence on the rise and with

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immense outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, even moderate and responsible African leaders—firm proponents of peaceful change—began to conclude there was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence. By March of this year guerrilla actions had begun to break out against Rhodesia.

* On a broader scale our friends in Africa were increasingly dismayed by our irresolution in countering external pressures and embarrassed by what they interpreted as passivity or worse on the most central issue of African politics—the future of southern Africa. The possibility grew of an emerging pattern of accommodation to the reality of the Soviet presence and American inaction. We saw ahead the prospect of war—which indeed had already begun—fed by outside forces; we were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan.

* There was no prospect of successfully shaping events in the absence of a positive political, moral, and economic program of our own for Africa.

It was for these reasons that President Ford and I determined that the African trip, which had long been planned as part of an unfolding process of policy development, now had a compelling focus and urgency. Indeed, it had become an imperative. We had these aims:

* To provide our African friends once again with a moderate and enlightened alternative to the grim prospects of violence so rapidly taking shape before them—prospects which threatened African unity and independence and indicated growing violence and widening economic distress;

* To strengthen U.S.-African relations by applying our policy to the critical problems of the moment—the issues of self-determination and economic development;

* To stress the positive elements in our policy around which our friends could rally, to make it possible for responsible African leaders to identify with the United States, and to work with us; and

* To give friendly and moderate African governments the perception that their aspirations for

justice could be achieved without resort to massive violence or bloodshed and that their hopes for prosperity and opportunity can best be achieved through the open economy of the West rather than by submission to the determinist economic dogma of the Communist world.

In short we sought to show that there was a moderate and peaceful road open to fulfill African aspirations and that America could be counted on to cooperate constructively in the attainment of these objectives. My trip addressed the three major issues facing Africa:

* Whether the urgent problems of southern Africa will be solved by negotiation or by conflict;

* Whether Africa's economic development will take place on the basis of self-respect and open opportunity or through perpetual relief or the radical regimentation of societies; and

* Whether the course of African unity and self-determination will once again be distorted by massive extracontinental interference.

It is clear that these issues are interrelated. A just, negotiated, and peaceful resolution of the problems of majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress can only take place in a continent which remains free from great power intervention. But American calls for an end to outside intervention would receive scant if any attention from African leaders who did not also perceive that we shared their aspirations that justice, self-determination, and prosperity spread throughout the continent.

## The Political Dimension: Southern Africa

The issue of overriding concern to Africans is the question of southern Africa—most urgently, the question of Rhodesia.

When my trip began, armed struggle had already been declared from the nations bordering Rhodesia. At the same time, it was clear that if the United States put forward a package of proposals on Rhodesia which moderate governments could support, they would be prepared to concentrate on an African solution, stressing a peaceful evolution to majority rule around which the nations of Africa could rally. I believe we have achieved this; the possibilities of a negotiated solution have been greatly enhanced.

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In Lusaka [on April 27] on behalf of the President I set forth a 10-point program aimed at helping achieve an outcome that would end bloodshed, permit a negotiated solution, block external encroachment, and make possible the eventual achievement of an independent and multiracial society under majority rule and with guarantees of minority rights.

The cumulative substantive thrust of these points and the fact that the speech was made on African soil signaled a new departure for American policy. We made, I believe, an immense and welcome impact in Africa on those-of all political persuasions-who truly care for peace, independence, and justice. These themes were also the basis of my subsequent private talks and public statements in Africa. The reactions were universally positive.

An important development is the agreement by a number of African leaders that outside powers should not, in the future, deal directly with liberation movements in southern Africa. We agreed to this and urge all other countries to do the same. This represents a significant step in the direction of African solutions to African problems-and toward direct negotiations between the African groups involved, whether black or white.

Unfortunately the violence in southern Africa has already begun. But the United States has lent its weight to the only route that can stop the fighting and achieve objectives which I believe all Americans can support-the goals of independence, self-determination, majority rule, minority rights, and peaceful change. It is clear from my conversations with the African leaders that they recognize and welcome this strong endorsement of a policy which offers a peaceful and principal resolution of the major problems facing Africa.

There was always considerable suspicion in other African countries of the Cuban presence in Angola and considerable apprehension as to where they might direct their energies next. But instead of seeing such intervention as inevitable-or, worse, beyond their power to prevent-I believe many African leaders now see that there is an alternative and that they can coalesce around a peaceful approach. I believe that it is becoming more unlikely that other African countries will invite Cuban troops, and the opportunities for other external intervention are being reduced.

In sum I believe we have achieved a platform which moderate and responsible Africans can support and which serves interests we share-for peace, justice, progress, and for an Africa free from outside pressures.

* The possibility of a negotiated settlement now exists; our active concern has increased the possibility that the moderate African leaders can take the lead away from "the men with the guns" and that the burning questions of southern Africa can be solved without the great loss of life which seemed inevitable only a short while ago.

* By offering a realistic alternative to violent change, the possibilities have been enhanced for black and white to work out themselves the mode of their future coexistence and cooperation. The Republic of South Africa is offered the opportunity to turn away from its increasingly isolated position and positively engage in a moderate and hopeful process of peaceful change.

* And African leaders recognize that our support, and their best chance for continued independence, depends on the absence of external military intervention. This is above all in the interest of Africa. Big power intervention can only undermine unity, set African against African, and involve the risk of conflict. I can state categorically that the United States has no such designs on the continent and that, therefore, further Soviet or Cuban military intervention would raise the gravest questions.

## The Economic Dimension

Beyond the immediate political crisis of southern Africa lies the long-term problem of the continent's economic future. Africa has emerged as a continent of 47 states whose boundaries-based on the former colonial frontiers-have brought not only political and social consequences but economic fragmentation, as naturally complementary regions are often divided among two or more states. Consequently there has been a lack of coherence in economic development programs.

In addition many of the poorest nations of the world are in Africa. Their plight has required massive relief efforts from the United States and other major donor countries of the industrialized world.

5

It is for these reasons that during my African trip we put forth proposals aimed at providing moderate African states with positive programs through which they can work together toward common objectives. And we proposed measures aimed at ultimately ending Africa's heavy reliance on international relief efforts and setting them on the road toward greater self-reliance. The idea that the United States, along with other industrial nations, can hope to solve, or even basically alleviate, the economic problems of others simply by massive applications of emergency relief is no longer tenable. Today what is most needed is not relief but assistance programs designed to solve ultimately fundamental development problems by enhancing the possibilities for developing nations, either individually or in regional cooperation, to attain self-sustaining economic growth.

In this regard, at Dakar [on May 1] and at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD on May 6] in Nairobi I presented the Administration's views on how best to overcome two major causes of persistent economic distress: The recurrent natural disasters which nullify development progress and the problems which many developing nations experience in adjusting to the dynamics of the global market economy—problems of trade, technology, and investment which often interrupt their progress toward sustained economic advance.

Until long-term goals are reached, foreign assistance will continue to be an important element of our efforts to strengthen the global economic system. Aid will continue to be a crucial response of the international community to natural disasters, other national economic emergencies, and the need to come to grips with basic economic problems which have prevented the achievement of self-sustaining growth.

In this regard I strongly welcome and support the action of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week in taking the initiative to provide assistance for Zambia, Zaire, and for other countries affected by the problems of change in southern Africa. This is a critically important initiative to meet immediate needs of the area, and we will be working closely with you during the legislative process.

The responsibility to assist cannot be a purely American effort requiring large new outlays. We

need a reorientation of programs and a new sense of direction coupled with strategic new initiatives. These should overcome the fragmented national approaches of current programs and involve all key industrial and recipient nations.

We welcome the proposals of French President Giscard d'Estaing as a most valuable initiative. President Gcard has proposed an exceptional fund for the advancement of Africa which will incorporate two basic institutions—a council of donors and a council of recipients. Its primary objectives will be to improve transportation, agriculture, and mineral development in Africa and to control drought in the Sahel.

In addition President Gcard has proposed a European-African institute to facilitate the transfer of technology to enable African countries to process their own raw materials.

These are the kinds of major and coordinated efforts with participation by all concerned which are required if the root causes of development problems are to be addressed. We welcome President Gcard's proposals and will be discussing them further with him next week. It is especially important to recognize that these are not proposals for further handouts but efforts to rationalize and coordinate existing programs with the aim of turning relief programs into self-sustaining development.

In recent years the drought-stricken area of the Sahel has been a major recipient of relief assistance. The time now has come, as we pointed out in Dakar, to strike at the heart of the problem.

At Dakar we pointed out that the United States strongly supports the efforts of the international group of donor countries called the *Club des Amis du Sahel*. The Club is working on mobilizing foreign and local investment on a major scale over the next decade with the aim of reversing the current economic and ecological decline of the area. I know the Congress shares this view and had already requested the Administration to prepare a long-term comprehensive development proposal for the area. This report, sent to the Congress on April 30, outlines the basic strategy which we and all nations concerned believe will lay the foundations for future growth in the Sahel.

At the UNCTAD conference in Nairobi I sought on behalf of President Ford to advance the

6

positive trend in the North-South dialogue which has been evident since the United States set forth our comprehensive proposals at the U.N. Seventh Special Session last September. Our aim, then and now, has been to address the issues most troubling the developing nations—commodities, trade, technology, investment, balance-of-payments, and the needs of the poorest countries, not only in their interest but in ours.

We hope that, by the end of the conference, a consensus will emerge on the broad outlines of our comprehensive and constructive approach. We would then look to smaller international groups to deal with the individual proposals we have made.

With the critical political issues of southern Africa—including Namibia and South Africa as well as Rhodesia—dominating the scene, the economic dimension of our policy could not in itself be decisive. But it is essential. With the platform established by the Lusaka speech our economic policy strongly reinforces our position. Over time, as the problems of southern Africa are resolved, the relative importance of development issues will increase. At Nairobi we have laid a firm foundation for constructive, mutually beneficial cooperation on those issues.

I found in Africa a great concern with three cardinal objectives:

* That aspirations for self-determination be achieved;

* That Africa must take its place as a responsible and healthy participant in the global economic system; and

* That Africa should be free from external intervention.

And I found a warm welcome for the concrete proposals by which we applied this policy to the issues of most immediate concern to Africa.

I believe that our policy is moderate and reasonable. More than that it is right.

* We have advanced the possibilities for peaceful change by giving African nations an alternative to the path of bloodshed that had already started and was certain to escalate.

* We have fostered an economic process aimed at giving all nations a stake in a fair and mutually beneficial global economic system and aimed at the

ultimate termination of handouts from rich to poor nations by enabling developing countries to move toward more basic economic self-reliance.

* We have laid the foundation for a strengthened relationship between the United States and Africa, a continent with vast potential for the future.

* And we have taken important steps to resist Communist encroachment and preserve the balance of global stability—not by truculently throwing our weight around but by identifying ourselves with principles which America has always stood for and which the world still looks to us to foster and defend.

Thus our African policy is an important element in our overall international effort to help build a structure of relations which fosters peace, widening prosperity, and fundamental human dignity.

We have regained the initiative. We have offered our African friends a welcome alternative to the future, both political and economic. We have told much of the world that America continues to have a positive vision and to stand ready to play an active and responsible role in the world.

But we should have no illusions. A two-week trip cannot solve all our problems. Africa will be watching us closely to see that we match our speeches with concrete action.

Over the long term the crucial factor in Africa—as in our dealing with all parts of the world—will be the restoring of our domestic fabric and projecting ourselves with coherence and steadiness in the world.

The African Continent today presents us with a major challenge. We are on the way to meeting that challenge successfully. Our actions will have to continue to be comprehensive and well-integrated. We have a solid base from which to work. And we have the essential assets to carry out a successful policy. Much will depend on our performance—Congress and the Executive together—over the next few months.

And if we carry out these policies together America will vindicate what it has always stood for—conciliation rather than violence; human dignity rather than oppression; self-determination and not colonialism, new or old; progress and hope.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 13, 1976

No. 246

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

MAY 13, 1976

The United States and Africa

I am pleased to have this opportunity to report to you on my visit to Africa and on the state of our relations with this increasingly important continent.

A sound relationship between America and Africa is crucial to an international structure of relations that promotes peace, widening prosperity, and human dignity. When I began my African trip, war had already begun in the south of the continent, risking possible great power conflict. Africa's hopes for steady economic development were being distorted by increasingly radical forces; and the course of peaceful social change threatened to degenerate into widespread bloodshed. For this reason President Ford directed me to go to Africa to present proposals aimed at bringing about moderate, negotiated solutions to the urgent political problems of southern Africa, to the long-term economic development of the continent; and to strengthen our ties with Africa in the service of interests we share — peace, independence, prosperity, respect for human dignity, and justice.

The Importance of Africa to the Industrial Democracies

Africa is of immense size, strategically located, with governments of substantial significance in numbers and growing in influence in the councils of the world. The interdependence of America and our allies with Africa is increasingly obvious. Africa is a continent of vast resources. We depend on Africa for many key products: cobalt, chrome, oil, cocoa, manganese, platinum, diamonds, aluminum, and others. In many of these commodities Africa supplies from thirty to sixty percent of our total imports.

In the last two decades, American investments in black Africa have more than quadrupled to over one and one-half billion dollars. Trade has grown at an even faster rate; Africa's importance to us as a commercial partner — as a producer of energy and commodities and as a market for our own products — is substantial and bound to grow in the future.

The reliance of Europe and Japan on Africa for key raw materials is even greater than our own. For example, three-quarters of the manganese imported by the European Community, and over half that imported by Japan, comes from Africa. The continent provides a growing area of investment for our allies, and is an important trading partner as well. Western Europe and Japan's combined trade with Africa now exceeds $30 billion a year.

For further information contact:

PR #246

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Thus, an independent and prospering Africa is of considerable consequence to the security, political and economic interests of all the great industrial democracies. For her part, Africa recognizes full well the crucial importance of our markets and investments to her own prosperity. And politically, the emphasis which African leaders placed in conversations with me on the need and importance of American action and support is proof that our assets and our moral influence are recognized and valued on the continent.

We are, in addition, bound by a moral dimension — the cultural heritage of 23 million Americans, and the moral sympathy of over 200 million Americans who understand the motivations of peoples who would establish their freedom and prosperity against great odds.

Thus, the formulation of a sound relationship between America and Africa is of considerable importance to our country. It is, as well, a complex and difficult task:

- Never before in history has so revolutionary a change occurred with such rapidity as Africa's transition from colonialism to independence. Many African states are but a decade or so old.

- Moreover, a continent of nearly 50 nations cannot easily, if at all, be encompassed by a single, coherent policy. Africa's drive for unity is a reality; yet Africa's great diversity makes clear-cut, general formulations difficult to achieve and apply.

- If Africa is not to become a grave source of great power conflict and of international tensions, Africa's problems must be for Africans to solve. They must not be permitted to become the subject of great power rivalry and confrontation. Their ultimate resolution lies in the processes of Africa's own internal political and social evolution.

Significant developments in recent years make it clear that Africa occupies an important place in the course and the conduct of international affairs. The spread of national independence in Africa has done much to transform the numerical and the political makeup of world institutions and the nature of international affairs. Political and social pressures, especially in southern Africa, have raised the threat that the continent might once again become an arena for big-power competition, with profound implications for global stability. And major changes have taken place in the international economy, leading the developing nations of Africa to claim more control over their economic destiny and a greater share in global prosperity.

To take account of such changes on the international scene, and with the aim of strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa, President Ford in 1974 ordered a review of our African policy. As part of this effort I announced one year ago that I would visit Africa in the spring of 1976. Last September, I set forth the fundamental elements of our policy toward Africa to members of the Organization for African Unity assembled in New York for the United Nations.

- that the African continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict;

- that all of the continent should have the right of self-determination; and

- that Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the global economic order — an economic partner with a growing stake in the international system.

PR #246

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1960s, external interventions had begun to control and direct an essentially African problem.

But the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. In January on behalf of the Administration, I put before the Senate our views on the consequences of our inaction on Angola. I shall not review those arguments again today.

Soviet-Cuban intervention had contributed to an increasingly dangerous situation turning the political evolution away from African aspirations and towards great power confrontation.

-- The Soviets and Cubans had imposed their solution on Angola. Their forces were entrenched there, and fresh opportunities lay before them.

-- With the end of the Portuguese era in Africa, pressure was building on Rhodesia, regarded by Africans as the last major vestige of colonialism. Events in Angola encouraged radicals to press for a military solution in Rhodesia.

-- With radical influence on the rise, and with immense outside military strength apparently behind the radicals, even moderate and responsible African leaders — firm proponents of peaceful change — began to conclude there was no alternative but to embrace the cause of violence. By March of this year, guerrilla actions had begun to break out against Rhodesia.

-- On a broader scale, our friends in Africa were increasingly dismayed by our irresolution in countering external pressures and embarrassed by what they interpreted as passivity or worse on the most central issue of African politics, the future of southern Africa. The possibility grew of an emerging pattern of accommodation to the reality of the Soviet presence and American inaction. We saw ahead the prospect of war — which indeed had already begun — fed by outside forces; we were concerned about a continent politically embittered and economically estranged from the West; and we saw ahead a process of radicalization which would place severe strains on our allies in Europe and Japan.

-- There was no prospect of successfully shaping events in the absence of a positive political, moral and economic program of our own for Africa.

It was for these reasons that President Ford and I determined that the African trip which had long been planned as part of an unfolding process of policy development now had a compelling focus and urgency. Indeed, it had become an imperative. We had these aims:

-- to provide our African friends once again with a moderate and enlightened alternative to the grim prospects of violence so rapidly taking shape before them — prospects which threatened African unity and independence, indicated growing violence, and widening economic distress;

-- to strengthen US-African relations by applying our policy to the critical problems of the moment — the issues of self-determination and economic development;

-- to stress the positive elements in our policy around which our friends could rally, to make it possible for responsible African leaders to identify with the United States and to work with us;

PR #246

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-- to give friendly and moderate African governments the perception that their aspirations for justice could be achieved without resort to massive violence or bloodshed; and that their hopes for prosperity and opportunity can best be achieved through the open economy of the West rather than by submission to the determinist economic dogma of the Communist world.

In short, we sought to show that there was a moderate and peaceful road open to fulfill African aspirations and that America could be counted on to cooperate constructively in the attainment of these objectives.

-- whether the urgent problems of southern Africa will be solved by negotiation or by conflict;

-- whether Africa's economic development will take place on the basis of self-respect and open opportunity, or through perpetual relief, or the radical regimentation of societies; and

-- whether the course of African unity and self-determination will once again be distorted by massive extra-continental interference.

It is clear that these issues are interrelated. A just, negotiated, and peaceful resolution of the problems of majority rule, minority rights, and economic progress can only take place in a continent which remains free from great power intervention. But American calls for an end to outside intervention would receive scant if any attention from African leaders who did not also perceive that we shared their aspirations that justice, self-determination and prosperity spread throughout the continent.

The issue of overriding concern to Africans is the question of southern Africa -- most urgently, the question of Rhodesia.

In Lusaka, on behalf of the President I set forth a 10-point program aimed at helping achieve an outcome that would end bloodshed, permit a negotiated solution, block external encroachment, and make possible the eventual achievement of an independent and multiracial society under majority rule and with guarantees of minority rights.

-5-

#246

The cumulative substantive thrust of these points and the fact that the speech was made on African soil signalled a new departure for American policy. We made, I believe, an immense and welcome impact in Africa on those -- of all political persuasions -- who truly care for peace, independence and justice. These themes were also the basis of my subsequent private talks and public statements in Africa. The reactions were universally positive.

An important development is the agreement by a number of African leaders that outside powers should not in the future deal directly with liberation movements in southern Africa. We agreed to this and urge all other countries to do the same. This represents a significant step in the direction of African solutions to African problems -- and toward direct negotiations between the African groups involved, whether black or white.

Unfortunately, the violence in southern Africa has already begun. But the United States has lent its weight to the only route that can stop the fighting and achieve objectives which I believe all Americans can support -- the goals of independence, self-determination, majority rule, minority rights, and peaceful change. It is clear from my conversations with the African leaders that they recognize and welcome this strong endorsement of a policy which offers a peaceful and principled resolution of the major problems facing Africa.

There was always considerable suspicion in other African countries of the Cuban presence in Angola and considerable apprehension as to where they might direct their energies next. But instead of seeing such intervention as inevitable -- or, worse, beyond their power to prevent -- I believe many African leaders now see that there is an alternative and that they can coalesce around a peaceful approach. I believe that it is becoming more unlikely that other African countries will invite Cuban troops and the opportunities for other external intervention are being reduced.

In sum, I believe we have achieved a platform which moderate and responsible Africans can support and which serves interests we share -- for peace, justice, progress and for an Africa free from outside pressures.

-- The possibility of a negotiated settlement now exists; our active concern has increased the possibility that the moderate African leaders can take the lead away from "the men with the guns" and that the burning questions of southern Africa can be solved without the great loss of life which seemed inevitable only a short while ago.

-- By offering a realistic alternative to violent change the possibilities have been enhanced for black and white to work out themselves the mode of their future coexistence and cooperation.

-- And African leaders recognize that our support, and their best chance for continued independence depends on the absence of external military intervention. This is above all in the interest of Africa. Big power intervention can only undermine unity, set African against African and involve the risk of conflict. I can state categorically that the United States has no such designs on the continent and that therefore further Soviet or Cuban military intervention would raise the gravest questions.

#246

-6-

## The Economic Dimension

Beyond the immediate political crisis of southern Africa lies the long-term problem of the continent's economic future. Africa has emerged as a continent of 47 states whose boundaries, based on the former colonial frontiers, have brought not only political and social consequences, but economic fragmentation, as naturally complementary regions are often divided among two or more states. Consequently there has been a lack of coherence in economic development programs.

In addition, many of the poorest nations of the world are in Africa. Their plight has required massive relief efforts from the United States and other major donor countries of the industrialized world.

It is for these reasons that during my African trip we put forth proposals aimed at providing moderate African states with positive programs through which they can work together toward common objectives. And we proposed measures aimed at ultimately ending Africa's heavy reliance on international relief efforts and setting them on the road toward greater self-reliance. The idea that the United States, along with other industrial nations, can hope to solve or even basically alleviate the economic problems of others simply by massive applications of emergency relief is no longer tenable. Today what is most needed is not relief but assistance programs designed to solve ultimately fundamental development problems by enhancing the possibilities for developing nations either individually or in regional cooperation to attain self-sustaining economic growth.

In this regard, at Dakar, and at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Nairobi I presented the Administration's views on how best to overcome two major causes of persistent economic distress: the recurrent natural disasters which nullify development progress, and the problems which many developing nations experience in adjusting to the dynamics of the global market economy -- problems of trade, technology and investment which often interrupt their progress toward sustained economic advance.

Until long-term goals are reached, foreign assistance will continue to be an important element of our efforts to strengthen the global economic system. Aid will continue to be a crucial response of the international community to natural disasters, other national economic emergencies and the need to come to grips with basic economic problems which have prevented the achievement of self-sustaining growth.

In this regard, I strongly welcome and support the action of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week in taking the initiative to provide assistance for Zambia, Zaire and for other countries affected by the problems of change in southern Africa. This is a critically important initiative to meet immediate needs of the area and we will be working closely with you during the legislative process.

The responsibility to assist cannot be a purely American effort, requiring large new outlays. We need a reorientation of programs and a new sense of direction coupled with strategic new initiatives. These should overcome the fragmented national approaches of current programs and involve all key industrial and recipient nations.

We welcome the proposals of French President Giscard d'Estaing as a most valuable initiative. President Giscard has proposed an exceptional fund for the advancement of Africa which will incorporate two basic institutions, a council of donors and a council of recipients. Its primary objectives will be to improve transportation, agriculture and mineral development in Africa and to control drought in the Sahel.

-7-

#246

In addition, President Giscard has proposed a European-African Institute to facilitate the transfer of technology to enable African countries to process their own raw materials.

These are the kinds of major and coordinated efforts with participation by all concerned which are required if the root causes of development problems are to be addressed. We welcome President Giscard's proposals and will be discussing them further with him next week. It is especially important to recognize that these are not proposals for further handouts, but efforts to rationalize and coordinate existing programs with the aim of turning relief programs into self-sustaining development.

In recent years, the drought-stricken area of the Sahel has been a major recipient of relief assistance. The time now has come, as we pointed out in Dakar, to strike at the heart of the problem.

At Dakar we pointed out that the United States strongly supports the efforts of the international group of donor countries called the Club des Amis du Sahel. The Club is working on mobilizing foreign and local investment on a major scale over the next decade with the aim of reversing the current economic and ecological decline of the area. I know the Congress shares this view and had already requested the Administration to prepare a long-term comprehensive development proposal for the area. This report, sent to the Congress on April 30, outlines the basic strategy which we and all nations concerned believe will lay the foundations for future growth in the Sahel.

At the UNCTAD Conference in Nairobi I sought on behalf of President Ford to advance the positive trend in the North-South dialogue which has been evident since the United States set forth our comprehensive proposals at the UN Seventh Special Session last September. Our aim, then and now, has been to address the issues most troubling the developing nations -- commodities, trade, technology, investment, balance of payments, and the needs of the poorest countries, not only in their interest but in ours.

We hope that, by the end of the Conference, a consensus will emerge on the broad outlines of our comprehensive and constructive approach. We would then look to smaller international groups to deal with the individual proposals we have made.

With the critical political issues of southern Africa -- including Namibia and South Africa as well as Rhodesia -- dominating the scene, the economic dimension of our policy could not in itself be decisive. But it is essential. With the platform established by the Lusaka speech our economic policy strongly reinforces our position. Over time, as the problems of southern Africa are resolved, the relative importance of development issues will increase. At Nairobi we have laid a firm foundation for constructive, mutually beneficial cooperation on those issues.

Mr. Chairman, I found in Africa a great concern with three cardinal objectives:

- that aspirations for self-determination be achieved;

- that Africa must take its place as a responsible and healthy participant in the global economic system;

- and that Africa should be free from external intervention.

-8-

#246

- We have advanced the possibilities for peaceful change by giving African nations an alternative to the path of bloodshed that had already started and was certain to escalate;

- We have fostered an economic process aimed at giving all nations a stake in a fair and mutually beneficial global economic system, and aimed at the ultimate termination of handouts from rich to poor nations by enabling developing countries to move toward more basic economic self-reliance;

- We have laid the foundation for a strengthened relationship between the United States and Africa, a continent with vast potential for the future;

- And we have taken important steps to resist Communist encroachment and preserve the balance of global stability -- not by truculently throwing our weight around, but by identifying ourselves with principles which America has always stood for, and which the world still looks to us to foster and defend.

Over the long-term the crucial factor in Africa -- as in our dealing with all parts of the world -- will be therestoring of our domestic fabric and projecting ourselves with coherence, and steadiness in the world.

The African continent today presents us with a major challenge. We are on the way to meeting that challenge successfully. Our actions will have to continue to be comprehensive and well-integrated. We have a solid base from which to work. And we have the essential assets to carry out a successful policy. Much will depend on our performance -- Congress and the Executive together -- over the next few months.

And if we carry out these policies together America will vindicate what it has always stood for: conciliation rather than violence; human dignity rather than oppression; self-determination and not colonialism, new or old; progress and hope.

*****

REMARKS

Walter Cronkite Dinner

New York

May 13, 1976

I have always been advised to begin a talk like this on a note of humility -- which is occasionally difficult for me. But after an introduction like that one I have just had from Howard Cosell, and in Howard's presence, it is relatively easy to project humility -- by contrast. And it does not even sound phony.

Maybe Howard and I are both egotists, but there is one difference. We both have books whose titles are composed of our last names -- but in my case, at least the last name of the author is different from the title of the book.

I have just come back from a two week trip to Africa. In Howard's very special way of using the language, you might

-2-

(LC)

characterize my trip as the "shocka in Lusaka."

Of course I met a great many Presidents and Foreign Ministers
on my trip as I tried to hammer out a new relationship between
the United States and Africa.

But I gather the coverage of the trip back here gave a slightly
different perception -- and made it appear to be one long safari.

In fact, I think it is a tribute to the power of the American
media that a few pictures of me, visiting a game park in
a safari jacket and a bush hat, have succeeded in transforming
me from the "lonesome cowboy" into the "great white hunter."

Incidentally, that safari jacket which made the news here
was given to me by Senator Javits. So when one of the reporters
on the trip asked if he could borrow it, I had to refuse.

-3-

I was compelled to tell him that I had not bought it --
that I had not paid for it -- but that I was certainly going to
keep it.

I am particularly glad to be back home from this trip.
Before I left, I talked to some of the President's closest
political advisers. They told me that they had no problem at
all with my going to Africa, and that they were very enthusiastic
about it. What they had a little trouble with was the thought
of my coming back.

Walter Cronkite, in addition to being a man of the highest
character and a personal friend, is one of the towering influences
in the American media. He has perhaps as finely-tuned a
comprehension of what impact those in media can have -- for
good, indifferent, or evil -- as any man alive today.

-4-

Like many of us, Walter was formed in the climactic events
of the last World War, its prelude and aftermath. Middle
American, of mixed Dutch-German stock -- in that he was at
least halfway in the right -- Walter hit the beaches
of Normandy, dropped into Holland with the 101st Airborne,
covered the Nuremberg trials -- and came home graven with
the conviction that the mistakes which led to the catastrophes
of the 30's and 40's must never be allowed to happen again.
He has contributed since then as much as any individual to the
understanding and edification of the American people about
the true meaning of events, of our responsibilities in the world,
and of the burdens which we must accept as the greatest nation
on earth and the homeland of freedom and democracy.

-5-

Walter Cronkite's contribution to his profession transcends his 40-plus years of superb craftsmanship, for the simple reason that he mastered the transition from print to electronic journalism better than anyone else. He has shown that it is possible to live by the principles of a free press while working in the television medium -- and that it is possible to do so as a newsman, not an entertainer. He recognized that the new medium could only be effective and credible as a source of news if it carried on in the tradition of the first amendment, and scrupulously observed its commitment to truth, integrity, and objectivity.

Television has come to be perhaps the decisive medium of news and information. It has the basic ability to tell more of the story than a commentator or reporter can, because it

provides its own instantaneous interpretation in the form
of pictures. But as Walter himself has pointed out, the
advantages of television news in one sense also represent
shortcomings.

For the instantaneous quality of television raises -- at least
in the area of foreign policy -- a serious question of what is
news and what is not. In foreign policy the real news is often
intangible. It is often a series of cumulative nuances, any
one or several of which may go unobserved, but which have
the net impact of changing events. If those events are reported
as they happen -- without any prior analysis of the tiny changes
in perceptions, attitudes and personalities which come together

-7-

to produce the events - - then only a part of the picture is
being conveyed.

Television is, in other words, the ideal medium for the
kind of ferocious news gathering which Ben Hecht depicted
so well in the "Front Page." Television is a triumph of
tangibility; it reports better than any other medium those
things which can be seen, touched and felt. But in the area
of foreign policy, that very fact leads to something of a
quandary, for the important news in foreign policy can rarely
be seen, felt, or touched. Rarely are there new facts or events
to be discovered. In foreign policy, instead, effective reporting
is best measured by the degree of analysis and the degree
of attention to intangibles.

-8-

Walter Cronkite has done much to develop a style of television news broadcasting which emphasizes the medium's strengths, and resist its shortcomings. His special genius has been his attachment to the dispassionate reporting of events, tangible and intangible, and his dogged avoidance of editorializing.

His approach in the final analysis pays the ultimate complement to his listener -- it says, in effect, here are the facts -- you must use your own judgment and draw your own conclusions.

But what we are talking about in Walter's case is more than style. It is a reflection of Walter's absolute personal integrity, his humanity and his ironclad conviction that the American people

-9-

can be hurt more by what they don't know than what they do
know. It is a reflection, too, of a man of character and of
beliefs. I would just read you as an example a few words
Walter gave in a speech some years ago. He said, "Since
at least World War I, each generation has become more
cynical than the last. The belief in old values slips away
faster than we can replace them with adequate substitutes.
Our faith in our fellow man fades and is replaced with doubt
and distrust. . . Honesty has become old-fashioned. This
is not just a moral or philosophical problem. I think it has
grown to such proportions that today it is a real, an immeidate
problem that could directly affect our ability to survive. The
democratic system is built on honesty and the belief in the
honesty of our fellow man."

-10-

Today we are going through one of our periodic oscillations -- a time of shifting moods, of uncertainty and seeking on the part of the American people. We go from peace marches to bellicosity, from debunking to blind acceptance. To the extent that this leads to a reasonable re-examination of the options before us and a consensus on where we go next, it is constructive. But we must be sure that the constant denigration of our recent past and the current credibility gap not be permitted to combine to produce a mood of unreasoned faith in unproven solutions.

We have, with our honor and our principles intact, come through a very difficult period -- a period in which aggressive investigative journalism played a very important part. And

-11-

just as the institutions of government and the attitudes of
the public have progressed beyond that period, while learning
from it, so have the American media begun to adapt themselves
to the more normal times in which we find ourselves. We
have begun, I think, to return to a sensibly critical relationship
between the government and the press.

There must continue to be criticism and searching scrutiny
of the actions of public men and public institutions. We in
public office must never be given the false luxury of an inattentive
press, or one which is not vigilant. I do believe, though, that
there must occasionally be some minimum degree of faith and
confidence in the well meaning intentions of those in government --
if not in the unerring perfection of their actions. Criticism is
constructive if there is some small element of trust. If

-12-

there is not, criticism can become an end in itself -- and
a destructive and sterile exercise.

In these days of debate over the place of pessimism or
optimism in our foreign policy, it is well to recall that we
have done what we have done through a realistic and honest
appreciation of our problems -- with I admit a bias toward
self-confidence, because we have believed in ourselves.

The greatest optimism is to face problems squarely,
to strive to understand the risks as well as the rewards, and
to do so with the confidence of a free people whose history has
shown that they can, together, achieve great things.

Men like Walter Cronkite help us to sustain the belief that
we have within ourselves the capacity to confront and surmount
the problems which face us in the world. They do so because

-13-

they are themselves men of beliefs, of principles, and of
character -- and because they thus inspire the rest of
us.

And, ladies and gentlemen -- as Walter reminds us
each evening -- that's the way it is.

PR #248

**MISS WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, how do you feel knowing that you are the target of criticism for a whole segment of the Republican party? How do you feel knowing that you are considered a liability?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Foreign policy is an important aspect of the lives of Americans and most Secretaries of State have been the subject of attack at one point or another. I do not look at my task as a political one. I have to do the best I can for peace and the economic progress of the United States and I cannot worry about particular political attacks.

**MISS WALTERS:** Doesn't it ever get to you personally? It has been an awful lot.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My father, who collects news clips on me, indicates that he would prefer getting different ones than the ones he has been receiving. I would prefer more unanimity, but I can live with what is going on.

**MISS WALTERS:** If President Ford is re-elected, would you stay on as Secretary of State?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to tie the conduct of foreign policy to me personally. If a foreign policy is well designed, then it should be able to be carried out by many people.

So, on the whole, I would prefer not to stay.

On the other hand, I do not want to say today, when I do not know the circumstances that exist, the necessities that the President may feel he has, that I won't even listen to him, but on the whole I would prefer to leave.

**MISS WALTERS:** One of the most controversial matters concerning you has been the report in the Woodward and Bernstein book, *The Final Days*, that Richard Nixon, in those last days, asked you to get down on your knees and pray with him. Woodward and Bernstein say that this is true, that you told aides of the incident. Is it true or false?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have taken the position that I would not comment on incidents in the Woodward and Bernstein book. The last week of President Nixon's incumbency was a very tragic, personal experience for a man who had gone through a great deal of travail, and with whom I had worked closely.

I do not believe that the authors understood the complexity of human motivations in all the accounts they give of various incidents, but I do not want to go into the details of what was a very difficult and a much more complicated period.

- 2 -

PR #248

**MISS WALTERS:** I have to pursue this, Mr. Secretary, because this
is such a telling point. As far as the motivations, that is some-
thing one can have disagreement about, but as to whether an
incident occurred when there are only two people who would know it,
one being the President and one being the Secretary of State, and
the Secretary of State refuses to say whether it is accurate or
not, leaving aside the motivations, I think it is very hard for an
audience to understand why.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Because I believe that for me — if I start
going into one event, I have to go into all events.

**MISS WALTERS:** Well, that is the major one.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If I go into all events, I will then have to
write my perception of the history of that period. I simply
believe that it is not appropriate for me, for somebody who had
such close experience now to go into essentially personal matters
on television or anywhere else.

**MISS WALTERS:** Is the book essentially accurate?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the rendition of the sequence of
events, insofar as I know it, it was essentially accurate.
Many other aspects of the book I consider factually inaccurate.

**MISS WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, another point of controversy about
you stems from the statement allegedly made by you to Admiral
Elmo Zumwalt, former Chief of Naval Operations.

In his book he quotes you as saying that in 1970 you said, "The
United States has passed its historic high point. It is on a down-
hill. My job is to negotiate the second-best position for the
United States available before the Soviet Union and the United
States both perceive these changes in balance have occurred."

Did you ever say anything like this?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the statement is totally untrue.
Admiral Zumwalt alleges that I made this statement on a train going
to an Army-Navy football game. Now, if anybody has even been on
a train going to an Army-Navy football game, you cannot imagine
that a group of Admirals and advisors to the President sit to-
gether and discuss the relationship of Athens to Sparta and whether
that is a particularly good audience to which to say the United
States has passed its zenith. Nor when you go to an Army-Navy

PR #248

-3-

football game with the Chief of Naval Operations do you expect that he then writes a memorandum of conversation, God knows how many days or weeks later, of his recollection of what may or may not have been said. I did not say it. It is not my view.

Our policy has never been conducted on that assumption. Our policy assumes that the United States can achieve its purposes in this world and can work for peace without giving up its values or interests.

**MISS WALTERS:** You also supposedly said to Admiral Zumwalt, "The American people lack the will to do the things necessary to achieve strategic parity and to maintain superiority." Is that incorrect?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think Admiral Zumwalt is running for the Senate in Virginia against somebody who is not called Kissinger, but I am not sure he has yet fully understood this. I do not believe that the United States lacks the will to achieve strategic parity. I have supported, since I have come here, every budget recommended by the Defense Department. I believe we have strategic parity. I believe we can maintain it. We have suffered no setback anywhere in the world ever for lack of strength.

**MISS WALTERS:** There has been much talk about the fact that your trip to Africa might have hurt President Ford's chances in the primaries in several southern states. One member of the Ford Election Committee is quoted in *Newsweek Magazine* as saying, "Sending Kissinger to Africa to be the black man's brother right before three southern primaries was insane." Couldn't you have taken this trip later, after the primaries?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I wasn't sent to Africa, first of all, to be anybody's brother. I was sent to Africa to prevent a conflagration in the southern part of Africa and to see whether the Communist influence from the Soviet Union and Cuba could be checked and a hopeful evolution could be started. Now, as for my trip --

**MISS WALTERS:** Couldn't you have done it after the Texas primary, for example?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is my responsibility as Secretary of State to recommend to the President the best timing. The timing was dictated by these factors: there was a meeting in Nairobi, an international meeting in Nairobi, which I wanted to address on behalf of the President and the Administration, about international developments.

Secondly, several of the key leaders of Africa whom I had to see on this problem were leaving for the month of May on various trips they had already planned. This is why I picked the period.

PR #248

-4-

The President and I went over this in great detail. As in all other things, he personally approved every proposal that I made. I briefed the Cabinet two weeks before I went, in the presence of all of the political experts, and nobody said this was a bad, inopportune time to go. I don't believe it is my obligation as Secretary of State to introduce political considerations into the conduct of foreign policy.

The President decided that this was the right time to go, and I think he deserves a great deal of credit for focusing on the substance of foreign policy and not gearing it to the weekly primaries that are taking place.

**MISS WALTERS:** How do you feel about the controversy over the Panama Canal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, it has to be understood that these negotiations on the Panama Canal are not something that was invented recently. The negotiations on the Panama Canal have been going on for 12 years. They have been conducted by three different Presidents, and they have been conducted by three different Presidents because each of them came to the conclusion that he had an obligation to see whether it was possible to assure the safe and neutral passage of ships of all nations, including, of course, of the United States, through the Panama Canal without alienating all of Latin America.

Up to this moment, not one line of an agreement has even been put down on paper. After such an agreement exists, which is — I don't know — certainly not imminent — after such an agreement exists, one-third and one members of the Senate can block it. We need a two-thirds vote in the Senate to ratify. Before we conclude it, we will discuss it in full detail with both houses of the Congress.

There is no question of giving up the Panama Canal. The issue is whether our interests in the Panama Canal should be maintained under conditions of constant political tension with the entire Western Hemisphere or whether we can bring about a safer and better arrangement.

If necessary, we will defend the Panama Canal. When we defend the Panama Canal, we want to be able to tell the American people that we've made every effort to achieve a better arrangement. And we cannot agree to the proposition that a President should not even make that exploration, and should not even engage in a negotiation to see what is possible. Which is all that is going on at this moment.

**MISS WALTERS:** If there should be a war over the Panama Canal, we would send troops?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If we have to defend the Panama Canal, we will defend it. And that will depend whether we can get the terms we consider essential for our security.

PR #248

-5-

**MISS WALTERS:** Cuba. You warned Cuba against further intervention in Africa.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes.

**MISS WALTERS:** Well, suppose Cuba doesn't take your warning. Suppose it sends troops to Rhodesia. What will the United States do?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, our African policy is designed to avert this eventuality.

**MISS WALTERS:** But suppose.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If Cuba — I have said it repeatedly — if Cuba engages in further military adventures, it will raise the gravest question for the United States. I said it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee only last week. I have said it publicly --

**MISS WALTERS:** But what? Troops? Would we send troops? We have given these warnings, and a lot of people say "Fine, Mr. Secretary. You give these warnings, but, you know, what specifically are you talking about?"

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What we would do and where we would do it, I don't think we should discuss now, and I don't believe that the danger is imminent. I believe that we can avert the problem. But if the Cubans engage in military adventures in Africa, it can only be as surrogates of the Soviet Union, and if that happens, we are facing a serious international crisis, which we would then discuss fully with the Congress, explain fully to the American public, but towards which this Administration will certainly not be indifferent.

**MISS WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, earlier in this interview we talked about the vague possibility, but still the possibility, that there might be a war, a battle over Panama. And you said if there were that we would fight, that we would send troops --

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is correct.

**MISS WALTERS:** Now, if you say it about one part of the world, I would think you would be willing to say it about another. If Cuba should intervene and send troops into Rhodesia, would there be the possibility of our sending troops?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would think that it is a problem that can be dealt with without sending troops to Africa, but I also believe that it is the primary objective of our foreign policy to prevent this from happening, and I am confident that we can prevent it, or at least I hope very much that we can prevent it from happening.

**MISS WALTERS:** The way you answer that question makes me want to ask, are you then talking about taking some direct action in Cuba?

PR #248

-6-

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Barbara, I think it would be extremely unwise for me to say what we will do in circumstances that have not yet arisen, on which we have not made any final decisions, and I must warn, I can only warn, any country, any outside power that thinks of military adventures in Africa that it would not be taken lightly in the United States.

MISS WALTERS: Realistically, Mr. Secretary, how can we support the black majority while protecting the white minority? If fighting breaks out, the probability is that we would not commit troops. So, what leverage do we have?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem in Africa before my trip was that war in southern Africa had already started, that we had seen in other parts of Africa, that if these operations continued to gain momentum, the danger of Soviet and Cuban intervention would multiply and that therefore we would see more and more external intervention and the radicalization of a continent upon which we depend for 30 to 60 percent of our imports of critical materials, and Europe and Japan from 60 to 90 percent of some of their critical materials like manganese, cobalt and similar items.

The United States is attempting to deflect this into a peaceful path, and to give the nations in the area a moderate alternative, and to give the black and white communities an opportunity to work out their destinies through negotiation with each other.

The leverage we have is... if we can promise them, or if we can indicate progress and hope rather than conflict, that perhaps all of the parties will conclude that negotiation is preferable to bloodshed.

MISS WALTERS: And we turn our attention to the Middle East. Prime Minister Rabin said this week that he thought that it might be possible to have negotiations with Syria during this year to end the state of war. He said they would need the help of a third nation; that is probably the United States. Now, is that the next step — negotiation with Syria?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are prepared to be helpful in whatever forum the parties can agree to. Until recently, Syria has taken the position that it would not negotiate separately, but only together with other Arab countries. When Prime Minister Rabin was here in the United States last February, we agreed on certain procedures that could be followed, and certain proposals that could be made. We began exploring these ideas with various Arab governments when the situation in Lebanon erupted to a point that it absorbed all of the energies of all of the parties and, therefore, the process of exploration has been interrupted since the end of March -- not because it has been — because there have been any conclusive answers yet. I believe that as the situation in Lebanon settles down, it will be possible to begin this process of exploration again.

In this, Israel indicated it was prepared to proceed on all fronts simultaneously in return for a certain progress towards ending the state

PR #248

-7-

of war. We have, as I said, had no conclusive answers. If that approach does not work, then we will have to talk to the parties again, either about the possibility of separate negotiations, or some other framework for all of the negotiations.

**MISS WALTERS:** Well, there seems to be such a stalemate, this past fall. Now, with this possibility of conversation with Syria, it seems that something has happened. Has something? Or is this just wishful thinking?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** In the Middle East things usually oscillate between excessive optimism and excessive pessimism. And they always go through periods of stalemate in which all parties feel each other out, and come to an understanding of the limits of their possibilities. I believe that progress towards peace in the Middle East is possible. I believe that the chief elements for it exist, and that it is only a question of time before the momentum starts again.

**MISS WALTERS:** The first time you and I did an interview together — it was eight years ago — and I asked you if you thought the crisis in the Middle East would be over in ten years, and you said, "Yes." That gives us two more years to go.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Three more years.

**MISS WALTERS:** I don't add. That is one of my problems. Three more years to go.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think in three more years we can have made very substantial progress towards peace, or achieve peace.

**MISS WALTERS:** Do you think we may have peace in three years?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think it's possible.

**MISS WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, turning to Viet-Nam. Are you surprised that there was no bloodbath there, as was predicted?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am gratified that in Viet-Nam itself there has not been a bloodbath, although in Cambodia there has been horrendous suffering and hundreds of thousands killed and by any definition there has been a terrible bloodbath in Cambodia. We don't know yet what is going to happen in Viet-Nam. It is only a year since Saigon fell and the process of assimilation has only started. But we would be very pleased if the loss of life and suffering in Viet-Nam would have finally stopped.

**MISS WALTERS:** When do you think the United States will recognize the Government of Viet-Nam? What would it take for us to do that?

PR #248

-8-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the issue between us and Viet-Nam is the accounting for missing in action and full accounting for the remains of Americans who were shot down over Viet-Nam or otherwise killed in Viet-Nam. This is the absolute precondition without which we cannot consider the normalization of relations. All our talks with the North Vietnamese up to this point have concentrated, I would say, almost exclusively on the subject of the American missing in action, and only as we make progress on that can we begin other diplomatic conversations.

**MISS WALTERS:** Are you making progress?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** So far we have not made any progress, no.

**MISS WALTERS:** Why?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Because the North Vietnamese believe they can blackmail us by using the remains of Americans to extort economic and other aid, and we will not be blackmailed by the American suffering, and we will not attach any conditions to the missing in action.

**MISS WALTERS:** China. Have you had any contact, have you had any word through the Chinese envoys in this country that the policy and the relationships with the United States are the same since the new government in China has taken place?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** All indications are that the relations between us and China have not been affected by the domestic changes in the People's Republic, and every conversation that American officials or other Americans have had in China has confirmed this.

**MISS WALTERS:** Do you have any plans, or would you like to go back to China now and meet the new leader?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, it's been an annual event. But I think I should wait until our own domestic turmoil has calmed down a bit.

**MISS WALTERS:** Can you imagine yourself going before, let's say, November or January?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can imagine myself going before January, but not so easily before November.

**MISS WALTERS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary

* * * * *

REMARKS

Stu Hensley Memorial Service

May 17, 1976, Monday

Only rarely can you -- in the Department Press Corps -- and I, as Secretary of State, afford to think of each other in personal terms.

From your point of view any member of the press covering a Secretary of State must be inherently suspicious and critical, to guard against that loss of independence and of perspective which could damage your believability with the public.

By the same token any Secretary of State must recognize that no matter how captivating and charming your personalities, you represent first and foremost an independent institution whose purposes, and whose outlook, are different from his own.

-2-

Thus it is probably inevitable, though no less sad, that
it is only on occasions such as this that we can address each
other as individuals.

My own acquaintance with Stu Hensley was relatively
brief. But it was more than sufficient to give me a real sense
of personal loss here today.

Most of you knew Stu for many more years than I did. When
I came to Washington he had already built a reputation as one
of the most experienced and versatile foreign affairs correspondents
which American journalism has produced.

He was a distinguished and brave war correspondent, a
confidant of Presidents and Secretaries of State, and he served
as UPI's senior diplomatic correspondent for over 18 years.

-3-

A few weeks ago at a brief ceremony which some of you attended, I sketched what I saw as the contrast between the kind of journalist who makes a consistent and positive contribution to the reporting and analysis of foreign affairs, and the kind of journalist who played such an important part in the traumatic events of recent years in this country.

Stu Hensley was very much an example, if not the epitome of the former. He understood better than most that effective reporting on foreign policy depends more on the amount of brain power expended than on the quantity of shoe leather worn out.

He saw as his primary purpose the explanation of what foreign policy was, and how it was being carried out, to ordinary Americans -- and he rarely succumbed to the temptation to tell policy makers

-4-

what they ought to be doing. Not that I am suggesting that
anyone here ever succumbs to that temptation.

Tough as he may have been on us though over the years,
Stu Hensley was highly conscious of the ethics of good reporting
and he scrupulously respected those ethics. He earned respect
through hard work and through the persistent application of the
fundamentals of reporting -- not through his qualities as
an entertainer, or through sensationalism.

His integrity, humanity and grit brought a touch of distinction,
and occasionally a touch of nobility, to this room. We will
remember him for that.

LUNCHEON TOAST

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing,
distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

Mrs. Kissinger and I are honored to
welcome you to the Department of State. I
have read that you, Mr. President, frequently
dine in the homes of ordinary citizens and I
was therefore emboldened to offer my own
invitation.

Mr. President, it seems that we have a
few things in common. We were both born
in Germany. We have both become associated
with "Independent Republicans". We share
certain problems by virtue of the intrusion of
foreign words into our national languages. For
example, I understand that France has attempted

(L)

-2-

to rid itself of a certain number of English
expressions which had somehow come into
general usage. A good number of French
words insinuated themselves into the English
language after 1066 and we cannot eliminate
them completely. Nonetheless, some of
these words present us with occasional
difficulties. "Detente", for instance.

Despite our linguistic concerns, France
and the United States have had a most
extraordinary relationship throughout the
years. The relationship was, and is, so
comprehensive that many otherwise intelligent
observers have failed to understand it at all.

Old, true friends speak their minds. The
certainty of their shared values makes their
passing differences a source of additional vigor

-3-

in their common action. They know that
on all important matters they can count on one
another.

And so we sometimes take our
relationship for granted. But there are some
assumptions we make about France which have
the status of certainties.

We assume that France will uphold the
freedom of individuals and nations -- and she
always does so.

We assume that France will continue to be
one of the leaders in the vitally important task
of the construction of European unity -- and we
pledge again our support for the achievement
of that age-old dream.

-4-

We assume that France will be a leader
in the North-South dialogue -- and she has
done this most recently in your bold initiative,
Mr. President, concerning Africa.

We assume that France will manifest a
certain excellence and logic which are the
essence of her style -- and, with envy, we
have found this to occur time and time again.

In every great cause of this century
France and the United States have worked
together. As free and equal partners the two
countries have shown that unity is all the more
meaningful when based on independence. Our
approaches to some questions occasionally vary,
but we have shared a common purpose to
enhance peace, well-being and freedom in
this world.

-5-

Mr. President, the friendship of
France and America is a little like the
discovery of prose by that bourgeois gentleman
of Molière -- so natural and necessary a
thing that we have experienced it quite
unawares. I hope that the United States will
always be worthy of that trust and help
bestowed on us by France two hundred years
ago. I am confident that both our countries
will always cherish that special friendship
based on mutual respect which means so much
to us and which no one has done more to
strengthen than you, Mr. President.

And if I may add a personal word -- of
the leaders of the world I have been

-6-

privileged to meet -- none has had greater
vision, humanity, culture and dedication
to freedom than our honored guest.

And now I ask this company to rise and
to drink to the health of the President of the
French Republic, and to the enduring friendship
of France and the United States.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

May 20, 1976

No. 255

STATEMENTS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY DIMITRIOS BITSIOS
FOREIGN MINISTER OF GREECE
FOLLOWING BILATERAL MEETING
OSLO, NORWAY, MAY 20, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Foreign Minister and I had a very useful talk in a very friendly atmosphere. We reviewed bilateral Greek-American relations, which are excellent, and we also reviewed the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. I stated the American position, which is that we favor a rapid settlement of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the solution of the territorial question and of the constitutional arrangements, and we have repeatedly stated that the present territorial arrangements cannot be permanent and that new arrangements should respect the sense of dignity and equity of the populations on the island. So we hope that in the talks that may take place here between the various foreign ministers, and in talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, rapid progress will be made.

**FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS:** As Secretary Kissinger said, we have pursued in a friendly atmosphere the talks which we have had in Washington recently. We have reviewed the situation in the Mediterranean. I have briefed the Secretary on recent developments, and I have found understanding.

* * * * * *

PR #256

MS. OSMER: Mrs. Kissinger, do you think that the public has a view of the Henry Kissinger that you know?

MRS. KISSINGER: Well, I think they have a view, yes. They don't know very much about what he is like privately, other than his sense of humor but they can't know him in any personal sense.

MS. OSMER: When you read about yourself do you recognize yourself?

MRS. KISSINGER: I don't think I have read any of the interviews that have been done.

MS. OSMER: Why?

MRS. KISSINGER: Well, you know, it is a sort of water over the dam and it is better not to know in some cases.

MS. OSMER: Have you read some of them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Nancy's interviews, yes.

MS. OSMER: Do you recognize her?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. I think I -- I mean no interview can give a complete picture of a person, but I think they have been on the whole rather well done.

MS. OSMER: Well, as you have said they have been a lot more positive than some of the ones of you. How do you feel about that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that is just as bad. The positive ones about Nancy are justified and, of course, I think the critical ones of me are unfair.

MRS. KISSINGER: It is an unfair question because he is in a public position and I am not.

MS. OSMER: Mrs. Kissinger, you have known the Secretary of State for a long time and over that period of time a lot of things have happened and you obviously viewed them from New York for a while and are now viewing them from Washington. I wondered if you sense any great change, having now been more on the inside as it were here in Washington. Does it give you a different perspective of the workings of government?

MRS. KISSINGER: Only in the sense that you know the people who are involved and are aware of what they go through in making a decision, and so you are in a way less able to criticize because you know (1) how complicated the problem is and (2) the personal cost that is often involved in any decision-making. And I think that is really the only change.

MS. OSMER: Mrs. Kissinger, you have taken some trips with the Secretary and you have stayed home for some. Which do you prefer?

MRS. KISSINGER: Oh, generally I prefer to travel with Henry but it isn't always possible. Either work or something is going on here that keeps me home.

-2-

PR #256

MS. OSMER: You have a solid background in history and political affairs. When you are on these trips sometimes or sitting here reading about them, don't you want to be more involved, wouldn't you like to be a real contributor?

MRS. KISSINGER: No, I think sitting on the sidelines is quite hectic enough. I think being involved in them requires a tremendous -- it is a full-time occupation or pursuit and there is no way you can be involved in them unless you know everything that is going on which would mean you have to be on Henry's staff and working, you know, a twenty-hour day.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, actually Nancy has been on most of my trips. The ones she has missed she has either been ill or had to do her own job.

MS. OSMER: Well, there are reports from some of the staff that they say the Secretary of State is much easier to deal with when Mrs. Kissinger is along.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is probably true. I am calmer.

MS. OSMER: You are more calm?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is probably right.

MRS. KISSINGER: But that is only natural. If you have a member of your family with whom you can talk. Otherwise you are fairly isolated.

MS. OSMER: Do you find when you are under that kind of pressure and on one of those trips that you can really relax or do you find that you are inevitably talking about the issues that are being discussed and the things that are going on?

MRS. KISSINGER: I think you relax.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We relax. We also talk about what is going on but the two aren't so separated. When we were on the Syrian shuttle, Nancy would take me to the airport and pick me up at the airport, which is about an hour away from Jerusalem where Nancy stayed most of the time and we talked about what was going on and we talked about other things.

MS. OSMER: Do you use Mrs. Kissinger as a sounding board, sometimes?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, she is a lady of strong opinions and good judgment.

MS. OSMER: What about when the press starts in, as they are quite recently, there are more attacks and there are criticisms and there is the controversy about resignation or staying or whatever. How do you react to this kind of press?

MRS. KISSINGER: Well, often I don't read it and the other part -- it just depends a great deal what person is criticizing the situation or Henry. I have, of course, as everyone does, people whose opinion I respect and others whose opinion I think is less worthy of attention.

MS. OSMER: Do you find that it is difficult to co-mingle with people who are semifriends on the one side and critics on the other?

MRS. KISSINGER: No, because they have their roles just as we have ours.

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PR #256

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then, of course, if they criticize, we know they are wrong so we can forgive them.

MS. OSMER: But you get a lot of attention. If you go anywhere, the cameras roll or the people write about it --

MRS. KISSINGER: I think if Henry goes anywhere, the cameras roll. I find that, you know, I can go really any place and be quite obscure.

MS. OSMER: You came in in a little different way as wife of a Secretary of State in that you have a substantial career of your own and yet there always have been sort of role configurations assumed to be played by the wife of a Secretary of State. Did you look to any of your predecessors or did you just --

MRS. KISSINGER: No, I unfortunately have not done as much, I don't think, as my predecessors but I have done whatever I have had the time to do and whatever I felt was important or was important to Henry.

MS. OSMER: Have you ever felt a real conflict between Nancy Maginnes Kissinger, career orientation, and Mrs. Henry Kissinger, wife of the Secretary of State?

MRS. KISSINGER: No, because I don't really have a career in the sense that a career is towards some definite end, a doctor or a lawyer. I have a job, which is quite different. It is something I enjoy doing, but which has no definite end. I have no goal in mind.

MS. OSMER: Do you feel that in this role in Washington and with the pressures and the lack of time that you really do have any time to spend with real friends and do you have time to let your hair down?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, actually under the pressure of events in Washington, the friends you have turn out to be really very close friends. We know very many people but those whom we consider friends have -- we have seen now for many years, even before we were married, and those are people with whom we can let our hair down.

MS. OSMER: Well, after all the stories of the garbage pail and *The Final Days* and all these things, do you really feel that you can trust anybody?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I must say I have never seen Nancy as outraged by anything as when the garbage was stolen. And as far as *The Final Days* are concerned, most of the stories came from members of my staff who had left five or six years ago in various kinds of disagreement and who had their own biases. My close friends, the ones who have been with us for eight years, nearly, I think really a very firm bond has been created. And one of the lasting and valuable experiences of my government service has been the people with whom I have worked, who have stayed together as a group and who undoubtedly will be close friends for the rest of my life and who are also good friends of Nancy's.

MS. OSMER: How do you feel, Mrs. Kissinger, would you like to be in Washington for another four years?

MRS. KISSINGER: I don't think -- you know, the position, in a way, has nothing to do with it. It is whether you like what you are doing and I think if you have had enough of what you are doing then you quit and do something else.

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But you don't live with the position, you live with the human being who is either happy with what he is doing or not.

MS. OSMER: But it will be an enormous change when you do leave, for the both of you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It will be an enormous change whenever one leaves and it ought to be considered from the point of view of what is best for the country and how much one can still do, rather than from whether it is going to be a change because it will be a change now, two years from now, four years from now. Whenever it happens.

MS. OSMER: There is a lot of pressure even today in the press again about you, Mr. Secretary, and about resigning and whether you are a plus or a minus in the Administration. How are you reacting to these increases in pressure?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: These speculations have been going on for quite awhile and in an election year it is inevitable that somebody who has been around for nearly eight years attracts a fair amount of attention.

MS. OSMER: Are you saying you are attributing all this to the fact that it is an election year?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think most of it is due to the fact that it is an election year. Because on the issues the disagreement doesn't seem to be all that fundamental. And the range of possible decisions is somewhat limited and I am sure that once the primaries are over, certainly once the election is over, what seems now so vital is going to be seen in much better perspective and the passions will die down.

MS. OSMER: What you are saying, Mr. Secretary, is that you can't really go anywhere in an election year until the primaries and the nominating process is over.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying that as Secretary of State I have to recommend to the President what I think is in the best interests of the United States and I can't look at what primaries are going on every week in order to determine what is politically desirable and I can't bend with every wind that blows in an election campaign.

MS. OSMER: But you have in the past deferred from being that involved on the political side and this year you have been barnstorming, as some people, I believe, call it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That isn't true. I started giving speeches around the country at the frequency of about one every three weeks starting December 1974. I have kept to exactly that schedule. I have given about one speech every three weeks in different parts of the country.

As foreign policy has become more politicized, more attention has been drawn to these trips but the trips themselves have followed a pattern that was established eighteen/

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months ago and which I am carrying out in order to explain
our foreign policy to the American people and to learn
from them what they think. But the speeches themselves
are not geared in any sense to the political campaign.
They explain some aspect of foreign policy --

MS. OSMER: You have said in the past that you thought if there was any real danger to American democracy it would come from the right and at this time we are moving more and more to the right politically in terms of the candidacy of Ronald Reagan and-even the reactions of President Ford, and that has certainly had some repercussions on American foreign policy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said you cannot attack the
basic values of a society like that of the United States,
tell them that they are run by criminals, that every
enterprise they undertake is bound to fail, that the
intelligence services are corrupt, that children are in
rebellion, without having a reaction in which people say,
"Enough of this, we want to stand for something in this
world and we want to have a more affirmative approach."

That seems to me to be the dominant mood of 1976. They are
tired of all this self-flagellation and this is why the
candidates who either have simple solutions or who simply
affirm simple values are having a great
appeal. But I think this too will be seen in its right
perspective in time and I think it is in some ways a healthy
corrective to what has been going on. As long as we don't
forget that the problems are complicated and don't have simple
solutions and that we must be willing to stick with them.

MS. OSMER: If you thought it would make a significant
difference, either in the future of American policy or
for the President, would you resign, now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I thought it made any difference
in the future foreign policy, certainly. As far as the
President is concerned, I think it is not for me to make
the political decisions. We are six months before an
election. I don't think one should move around positions
just with the ebb and flow of the primary campaign. Somebody
has to conduct a policy which is somewhat complicated.
Somebody new would have to take it over. This has to be
taken into account. As far as my decision is concerned,
I told the President in December that I thought on the
whole it was best to make a change to prevent the
politicization of the office. He disagreed. Since he
disagreed, since I felt he had to make that decision, I
agreed to stay. But it is not a question of my holding
on to a job. It is a question of what serves the country
in a turbulent period in which we have crises in the
Middle East, crises in Africa in which somebody will

PR #256

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have to manage them if they blow up, and that is from
the foreign policy point of view. From the political
point of view I am ready to leave at any moment, in
full support of the President, no matter what happens.

MS. OSMER: If you felt you no longer had the confidence
of the President, you would --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There would be absolutely no
question about it. Then it would be my decision. But
that hasn't arisen.

MS. OSMER: Is there anything that would keep you on
if President Ford is elected for another term?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have stated repeatedly that I
would prefer to leave. I have also felt it was
discourteous to say ahead of time that, not knowing the
circumstances, I would not give the President a chance to
talk to me, but my predisposition is to believe that after
eight years in public service I should now pass on this
position to somebody else.

* * * * * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

May 21, 1976

No. 257

STATEMENTS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY IHSAN CAGLAYANGIL
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING IN OSLO, NORWAY

MAY 21, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Foreign Minister and I had a very good review of the situation. We discussed our bilateral relations, including the defense arrangements, and we discussed also the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. As is known the United States strongly supports early resumption of negotiations and the progress toward a satisfactory solution, and we discussed the modalities by which this could be achieved.

**FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL:** The statement made by my distinguished colleague summarizes our talks. We have reviewed in great detail our bilateral relationships. We have also dealt with other subjects which are of direct concern to the two countries. We are determined that the work shall be resumed within the framework of the Brussels agreement. This agreement, I mean the Brussels agreement, has a setup, a very good mechanism, which doesn't give room to any break in the talks. It has been decided that all aspects of the Cyprus problem, which includes of course the territorial aspect, should be dealt with in a form of a package deal. I am sure that provided there is a good will, the work within such a mechanism is bound to be successful.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** When the Foreign Minister said it has been decided, it has been decided between Greece and Turkey, not between the United States and Turkey.

**QUESTION:** Will you have another meeting?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** With the Foreign Minister? We may be in touch with each other while we are both here.

**QUESTION:** Will there be another meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Just within the framework of the Conference. I will have a few words with the Greek Foreign Minister today.

**QUESTION:** Is the Turkish-US agreement before the US Congress coming up in the next few days?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are in favor of a rapid approval by the Congress, and it will be there in the near future, as soon as the aid bill is completed.

* * * * * * *

TELEGRAM

INDICATE

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

<table><tr><td>FROM</td><td>USDEL SECRETARY IN OSLO</td><td>CLASSIFICATION</td><td>UNCLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>E.O. 11652:</td><td>N/A</td><td></td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>TAGS:</td><td>NO, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SUBJECT:</td><td>SECVISIT -- TRANSCRIPT OF GERMAN TV INTERVIEW OF SECRETARY, OSLO, MAY 21</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>SECSTATE WASHDC -- IMMEDIATE 1996</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>INFO:</td><td>AmEmbassy PARIS<br>AmEmbassy BONN<br>AmEmbassy LONDON</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>UNCLASSIFIED SECTO 13072</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AMB</td><td>DEPARTMENT FOR NSC FOR MR. SCOWCROFT AND WHITE HOUSE</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DCM</td><td>FOR MR. NESSEN</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CHRON</td><td>FOR S/PRS</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>RF</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>POL - 3</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>USIS - 3</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>S/S - 10</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">Below is unofficial translation from German of interview of Secretary Kissinger by German TV following Quadripartite Meeting, Oslo, May 21, 1976:</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">QUESTION: At the NATO conference, it has been emphasized that the threat is through the arming by the Soviets. On the other side, you have said that America relies on the Alliance. Which is correct?</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">THE SECRETARY: Both are correct. We are of the opinion that we are in the position to maintain the balance of</td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>CAO:WRvBuskirk:pk</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>5/21/76</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>709</td><td>CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:</td><td>S/S AMG</td></tr></table>

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power and to find the means to prevent the Soviet Union from committing military forces to political ends. And although the Soviet military development of weapons is advanced, we trust that we can preserve the security of the West.

QUESTION: Is the balance of power now at hand?

THE SECRETARY: The balance of power is now in force, and we must make greater efforts to maintain the balance in the next ten years. We have the capability, and we will do it.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, a last question. The southern flank of NATO is weakened for the moment. The north is also not as strong as it should be. What significance does this have for cooperation between the U.S. and the Federal Republic?

THE SECRETARY: Our relationship to the Federal Republic is very close and we work together in complete trust. I believe the Federal Republic, as well as we, see our security within the NATO Alliance and not as a bilateral alliance between the Federal Republic and the US, so we have a close friendship with the Federal Republic and a close relationship within the NATO Alliance.

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QUESTION: So you don't believe a sort of "axis"
between the Federal Republic and the U.S. should come
about to strengthen the Alliance?

THE SECRETARY: I don't think the Federal Republic
wants that, and I don't think it's necessary, although
we would like to emphasize that we have the strongest
bilateral relationship with the Federal Republic within
the Alliance.

QUESTION: Isn't there a distrust on the side of the
French of an overly close relationship between Germany
and Washington?

THE SECRETARY: We have welcomed the fact that the
French have fulfilled their contributions of conventional
weapons.

QUESTION: Mr. Kissinger, you have today spoken of
ideology in Soviet policy as an active factor, and you
said that it could be hard to reconcile its aggressiveness
with coexistence. What can the Atlantic Alliance do to
counter this aggressivity?

THE SECRETARY: We must insist that all great powers have
a responsibility for self restraint to exercise and that

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we cannot permit the threatening of the coexistence
of the states, on the one hand, and on the other, a
class struggle in the whole world in the form of
liberation movements. These two purposes of Soviet
policy cannot be reconciled.

QUESTION: You also said that something like Angola
mustn't happen again. What can the Alliance do?

THE SECRETARY: First, we must understand that we had
the military capability to prevent Angola. The reasons
we didn't do it were of an internal nature inside the
Alliance and inside the U.S. And where the U.S. is
concerned, we had a responsibility to see that our
people understood what was at stake and then to under-
stand the military possibilities. We don't want to
introduce the cold war into Africa. We want Africa to
be developed by the Africans, and we want all powers to
stay out of military involvements there. We're ready
to do so.

QUESTION: How will detente, with regard to the Soviet Union, be continued in Europe?

THE SECRETARY: There are many ways to negotiate. In
1977, in Belgrade, there will be a conference. We're

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PR #258

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Ladies and gentlemen, I will make no opening statement. I will say two things. First, I want to comment about some press reports that I have seen that attempt to win the Pulitzer Prize for fiction, in particular, that I expressed some doubts about President Ford's campaign rhetoric. I want to make absolutely clear that whatever foreign policy pronouncements are made in the United States are done in complete harmony within the Administration. When occasionally I am asked questions about some of the more extreme statements that may be made by some of the candidates, my reply applies to extreme statements by other candidates and never by our own Administration. I suppose one should take this for granted, but I simply want to make that point clear.

Second, with respect to the NATO meeting, I thought it was an extremely harmonious one in which the assessment of the Ministers with respect to East-West relations, with respect to Africa, and with respect to other issues that were discussed, were as close to unanimous as I have seen them, and in which the conviction existed that NATO is a going concern, that the military equilibrium must be maintained, and that the West has the capabilities and the determination to preserve its security and to maintain its values. And now I'll be glad to answer your questions.

**QUESTION:** In view of some of the campaign statements that have been made in the United States, have you found any serious concern among your NATO colleagues about the direction and constancy of American foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't think basically that it's appropriate for me to comment on the American campaign while I am abroad. I believe that our allies understand that every four years we are seized by a fever that leads to very exalted statements. But they will also remember the constancy of American policy throughout 30 years of the postwar period. I have the impression that our allies understand that the main lines of American foreign policy enjoy wide support among the American public and that this will remain true as it has been in the past.

**QUESTION:** Why didn't you propose this year a link between Spain and NATO? Is it because you have invoked a military agreement, bilateral, between the United States and Spain?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No. We have never asked for a specific decision on this subject either last year or this year. Our view has been and remains that Spain should be brought into Western institutions as rapidly as possible. Our allies know these views, and we believe that as the political evolution in Spain develops the conditions for closer relations between Spain and our allies and the Alliance and the European Community will be developed.

**QUESTION:** Can you tell me, sir, if you are concerned with the prospect of the Alliance being weakened by Communists coming into government in Italy after next month's elections?

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PR #258

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that it should be understood in Europe what is not always made clear, that almost all of the statements that are attributed to me with respect to Communist participation in governments either comes from classified documents which were not written for publication but which were leaked to the press, or in response to questions. But I have now learned not to respond to every question. I have stated our views on this subject. And I don't think there is anything I can add.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My understanding is that this particular deal broke down on financial considerations and that discussions are continuing between the Canadian and U.S. Government, and possibly between the Canadian Government and other companies, that would make new financing possible. So until these discussions are concluded, I don't want to draw any conclusion.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the U.S. Government interest is in the anti-submarine capability of the Alliance. In this sense we have favored this deal, but we believe that a useful arrangement can be worked out with the Canadian Government.

**QUESTION:** We understand that Africa has been discussed. What is NATO's problem in Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** NATO as an institution does not take a position on Africa. But it is customary in NATO that Ministers who have engaged in foreign policy initiatives report to their colleagues since events in other parts of the world can affect the security or progress of NATO countries. It was in this spirit that the British Foreign Secretary reported on his trip to China. I reported on my trip to Africa and on the American policy towards Africa. We did not ask NATO as an institution to take a position with respect to Africa. Nor will NATO as an institution get involved. Several member states of NATO have historic relationships with certain African countries, and they may want to coordinate their efforts. I have already publicly expressed our support for the proposal of the French President. But this is not within a NATO framework. For this, new institutions or new mechanisms of coordination will have to be created. It is not a NATO matter.

**QUESTION:** While not wanting to comment any further about the political problems, possibly raised by Communist participation in NATO-member governments, can you say whether as a result of informal discussions you've had here in the last couple of days, there is now a prepared response to such an eventuality?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have taken the view, and I believe all

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PR #258

of our colleagues share it, that NATO as an institution cannot
deal with a question of domestic jurisdiction of other countries.
Individual NATO members can draw their own conclusions after
certain events have occurred with respect to their own policies.
But no attempt has been made to develop a consensus and it was
not a topic of conversation. So I cannot advance the matter
beyond where it was when I got here.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you explained, I believe, that plans for the increase of the present Soviet force were the result of defense plans which were decided upon five or ten years ago. Have you reason to believe that the plans made now are more favorable, less disquieting if you like, than those which preceded them?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The point that I was making is that the military forces that exist in any one year are the result of decisions that are made at least five and probably ten years previously. And this is true on both sides. Therefore, the Soviet forces that exist today reflect essentially decisions of the late nineteen-sixties and represent a long-term trend. There is no reason to believe that the current decisions are any different from the decisions of the late nineteen-sixties. I called attention to the necessity in the West to plan a long-term military program that can prevent the balance of power being turned against us — and the necessity of doing this on a long-term basis — and not on a year-to-year basis, because it is almost impossible to assess on a year-to-year basis what the precise decisions are. So this was the basic thrust, not to imply that current decisions are different. In fact, our assessment is that Soviet strength is likely to grow — that therefore larger efforts by NATO are necessary, especially if the field of conventional and tactical forces.

**QUESTION:** I understand you have been meeting with the British Foreign Minister this morning, Mr. Crosland. Did you discuss the fishing dispute between Iceland and Britain?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The British Foreign Secretary brought me up to date on his discussions with the Icelandic Foreign Minister. And, I also had a brief word with the Icelandic Foreign Minister. The United States is of course intensely interested in a satisfactory solution of the dispute between two close friends, and we are hopeful that progress will be made in the negotiations between Great Britain and Iceland while they are in Oslo.

**QUESTION:** Could you please explain why the American Government couldn't lease or lend Iceland, patrol boats, one or two to the Icelandic Government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First — above all — we have not taken an official position on this matter. We haven't been asked to take an official position on this matter. I've seen many press reports on the subject. But up to now we have not taken an official position.

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PR #258

**QUESTION:** Could you say something about the timetable for a second SALT agreement. Whose is that next move? (inaudible)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** What is the question?

**QUESTION:** The question is could you say something about the timetable for a second SALT agreement. Whom does the next move have to come from and when do you expect it?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, of course, the timetable does not depend entirely on us. There are a certain number of issues that remain to be resolved — what types of weapons are to be included in a SALT agreement — and how they are to be counted if they are to be included — and what their limitations are if they are not to be included. The Soviet Union gave us their considerations some weeks ago. We are now studying them, and we will submit a reply in the next few weeks. I would not want to give a timetable. I would say that progress has been made, The remaining issues are relatively few in number, but they are important. But I would not want to give a timetable.

**QUESTION:** On the Italian problem once again, if you don't mind. You said before that each country, of course, has the right to take its own preparations for certain occasions which might occur, and you said also that you have not made any concrete NATO plans to this problem. Does that mean you have had problems convincing the European countries of certain standpoints?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not made any effort at the NATO meeting to achieve a common position or to convince any other countries. Our own position is well known. There is no need to take any further decisions; and no effort was made. There was no failure to achieve any agreement because no effort was made.

**QUESTION:** There were some reports this morning in the press stating that, while you were speaking last night in the NATO meeting, you were interrupted by somebody because apparently you were digressing from the problems considered. Could you say if there is any truth in such statements?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Apart from the technical impossibility of interrupting a Harvard professor when he is in mid-flight [laughter], this is one of those stories that reflect the fertile imagination of some journalists. Nothing like this — or remotely like this — happened. I was not interrupted for that or any other reason, and I didn't raise that subject.

**QUESTION:** Have these two days of detailed discussions here on NATO in any way affected your own personal plans about your future?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My own personal plans are a matter of intense interest to many people in this political year. I have stated my views. I am not taking a poll among my colleagues about their views. It is my responsibility to try to conduct American foreign

PR #258

-5-

policy. American foreign policy is geared to the permanent interests of the United States and our friends. Our NATO interests have been pursued since the founding of NATO. They have nothing to do with our primary campaign. They are independent of any personalities. They've been carried out by every Secretary of State in the postwar period. My own plans have absolutely nothing to do with these meetings. This meeting was conducted in a spirit of great cordiality, common purposes, and common understanding of the world situation. This common understanding is not due to individuals. It reflects the permanent interests of our countries and should not be seen in personal terms.

**QUESTION:** You have started a mini-diplomacy in the Hotel Scandinavia between the Turks and the Greeks. You saw the Greek Minister, then the Turkish Minister. You are going to see both of these Ministers again. Do you think that a solution will be found to this dispute between two NATO allies?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Turkey and Greece have managed to exist for several hundred years without any overwhelming success in solving all of their problems. And while no one has ever accused me of underestimating my abilities [laughter], I do not believe that I will necessarily interrupt this historical pattern in two breakfast meetings. [Laughter] We have attempted to urge on both parties the importance of settling their differences. We believe it is in their interest. It is in the interest of Western defense, and it is in the interests of all the communities involved. We are trying to facilitate some of the procedural and substantive issues, but the situation is extremely complicated and it is overlaid by domestic considerations in both countries. We will do our best. We hope that when the two Foreign Ministers meet tomorrow that some progress will be made. But I do not believe they will announce the final solution of all issues between Greeks and Turks tomorrow.

**QUESTION:** When do you think that the new Turkish-American agreement will be sent to the Congress.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Within the next few weeks. Very soon.

**QUESTION:** There are times when it seems that the foreign policy that you are conducting and the domestic debate in the United States, particularly as it comes from the White House, are not exactly the same. Do you feel that at any time you were being undercut by the White House?

#258

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**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Absolutely not. First of all, I do not believe that what is being said by the White House differs from the foreign policy that is being conducted since the fundamental decisions on foreign policy are taken by the President. And there is complete unanimity. There is no feeling of being undercut, quite the contrary. I simply don't agree with your basic proposition.

**QUESTION:** What were the differences on Africa?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There were absolutely no differences on Africa between the White House and myself. Before I went to Africa I went over all the points that were going to be made, on several occasions, in great detail with the President. The President himself directed certain lines to be taken. I briefed, at the request of the President, both the Cabinet and the National Security Council, and I stated at a press conference before I went to Africa the main lines of what I was going to do there. This doesn't mean that there may not be this or that person who has nothing to do with foreign policy who may be mumbling something in the corridors of the White House. But I'm talking about the President, about all those officials who have anything to do with foreign policy.

There has been complete unanimity, and there is no independent foreign policy being conducted. Every initiative that is being taken is discussed in full detail and ordered by the President.

**QUESTION:** The agreements you have signed with Spain and with Turkey and Greece on the one hand, and the Italian situation on the other hand, give the impression that the United States is more interested in following defense policy for the West in a bilateral way than in the framework of NATO. What's your impression?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We believe very strongly that the cohesion of the Western alliance is the absolutely fundamental element of our foreign policy. With respect to the defense agreements with Spain, Greece and Turkey -- in each of these cases there have been special conditions which required a bilateral solution. All of this has been fully discussed with our allies and I believe has their general agreement, as was reflected with respect to Greece and Turkey in the communique today. I'll take two more questions.

**QUESTION:** This will again be on Italian Communism, but not to ask your short-term judgment on the Italian elections. From the point of view of a Harvard professor, how would you judge in global terms the possible emerging of a model of Communism in Western Europe different from those we know, the Soviet and the East European allies model, and the Chinese model?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I'm afraid that I can be an issue in only one election at a time (laughter), and I have to give preference to my own country (laughter).

#258

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**QUESTION:** Yes, but I was speaking to the Harvard professor. You are at your own university now. You are not at an Italian university now.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are many people who are trying to speed my becoming a Harvard professor here (laughter), and when that condition has been reached I will give you an answer which will then take fifty minutes (laughter).

**QUESTION:** Is it true what some newspapers reported that you have decided that after the elections you will give up your position even if President Ford wins the election?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Very precisely, my view on that matter is somewhat more complicated than you have just expressed. But I believe that having stated it I should not repeat it, and I should now conduct foreign policy to the best of my ability. I wish we would all remember that there are many critical areas in the world, and that we cannot be obsessed all the time with the personal decisions of individuals. I have stated my view. I will not say any more on my plans for the rest of this year.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible) ... you are the Secretary of State throughout the next Administration through 1980?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think my reply speaks for itself. It was designed to put an end to this discussion. I think the reply is self-explanatory, and I will say no more about my personal plans than I have already said, but it is not to mean that I don't appreciate your interest.

**QUESTION:** May I ask you more precisely about Spain? Are you for a quick entrance of Spain into NATO?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope that you will all notice that I am being drawn into Italian domestic politics and Spanish domestic politics, and I'm already heavily involved in other domestic politics. I think the evolution of Spain towards institutions more comparable to those of other European countries will have a positive impact on their membership in NATO and in the European Community, and I expressed this view when I visited Spain at the end of January as well.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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PR #258

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PR #258

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible)

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PR #258

**QUESTION:** Could you please explain why the American Government couldn't lease or lend Iceland patrol boats, one or two to the Icelandic Government?