9359G81 — galley 4

This leads me to suggest that we should take
those widely touted warnings of "atomic black-
mail," which tend to fuel our procurement poli-
cies, with a very large grain of salt. History casts
serious doubt on claims that more nuclear
weapons will confer political advantage. Hal
Sonnenfeldt reminded us that during the last
five years there has been no crisis between the
superpowers comparable to earlier conflicts
such as those in Berlin or Cuba. As he spoke I
found myself recalling the hearings on SALT II in
1979, in which a battery of witnesses of great
distinction—one now a very senior arms con-
trol adviser—warned that the United States
was entering a period in which a "window of
vulnerability" would be open and the risk of
atomic blackmail high. The United States, de-
clared President Reagan's first secretary of state,
faced five years of "maximum danger."

Well, it didn't happen. The fear was unreal.
The strategic balance was robust throughout
that period; it is robust today. We are therefore
entitled to approach these matters with a cer-
tain self-confidence, and to be cautious when
asked to proceed on the basis of fear.

And what of SDI? How interesting that not
one of the reasons Mr. Adelman offered for it
was the one President Reagan gave the Ameri-
can people in March 1983. Compare the Presi-
dent's dream of making nuclear weapons
"impotent and obsolete" with the more practi-
cal goal of reinforcing deterrence, and it is clear
that there is Star Wars and there is SDI, and
they are not the same. The dream is not feasi-
ble; the reality is indeed destabilizing.

The path, then, is clear. Americans should
recognize that the Soviet fear of strategic de-
fense is genuine, and ask the Russians in return
to recognize that our fear of their land-based
missiles is equally so. And then we should take
all courage, and trade those fears in a grand,
historic bargain at Geneva.