August 14, 1962

Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge
Beverly
Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Lodge:

Ben Brown, my colleague at the Center for
International Affairs, has told me of your letter of August
9th about visiting us on October 8th.

As you may know, the Center staff has been
scattered this summer and I am afraid that communication between
us has not been very good. One of the unhappy results of this
is that I made an arrangement with Dr. Kurt Birrenbach several
months ago to come to the Center on the morning of October 8th,
unbeknown to Mr. Bowie. I do not know whether you have met
Birrenbach; he is a good friend of Chancellor Adenauer's, somewhat
sensitive, and capable of construing a cancellation of his visit
to the Center in the wrong way. I, therefore, have the embarrassing
task of writing to ask whether you could possibly change the date
of your visit to Tuesday morning, October 9th, from 10:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon. If this were not convenient, Friday, October 5th at
the same time would be another possibility.

I hope you will be frank to tell me if neither
the 5th nor the 9th would work out for you, and look forward to
hearing from you soon.

I have seen a bit of your son this summer, and
have also been following your own work with interest and admiration.

All good wishes.

Henry Cabot Lodge

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Beverly
Massachusetts

August 16, 1962

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Thanks for yours of August 14. I made the engagement
for October 8 with Bob Bowie.

I know Doctor Birrenbach very well; in fact, he is a
member of the Policy Committee of The Atlantic Institute
and I see him frequently.

It will be satisfactory to me to change the date for
my appearance from Monday, October 8, to Tuesday, October 9,
as you suggest.

Thank you for your kind words about my son and about
the work of The Atlantic Institute. I enclose one of our
pamphlets, which I hope may interest you.

May I add that I have read much of your writing with
great admiration and agreement?

Enclosure

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University Center for
International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

March 5, 1963

H.A. KISSINGER'S CONVERSATION WITH HENRY CABOT LODGE

Lodge claims that he knows from unimpeachable sources that Harold Wilson is planning to recognize East Germany. He also insists that he knows from equally unimpeachable sources that Goulart in Brazil is moving very far to the left, and that the situation is made worse by the competition of American agencies among each other.

Telephone conversation was 3/4/63

April 2, 1965

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Beverly, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is just a note to tell you how much we are
looking forward to your visit to the Defense Policy Seminar
on April 19th.

If you would like to come to my office a little bit
before 4:00 p.m. we could then go over together. The alter-
native would be to meet at the Roscoe Pound Room at Langdell
Hall at 4:00 p.m. Could you tell me which you prefer?

As for the substance, our usual procedure is for the
visitor to speak up to about fifty minutes and then to have
a free discussion for the remainder of the time. Everything
is very informal.

I have arranged a little dinner for some interested
Fellows and students to follow your visit with the Seminar
at 6:30 at the Harvard Faculty Club. Is there anyone you
would particularly like to invite?

I look forward to seeing you.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Kissinger

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

I look forward to seeing you.

would particularly like to invite you at 6:30 at the Harvard Faculty Club. Is there anyone who would like to follow your visit with the seminar I have arranged a little dinner for some interested

is very informal.

a free discussion for the remainder of the time. Everything
visitor to speak up to about fifty minutes and then to have
As for the attendance, our usual procedure is for the

Hill at 4:00 p.m. Could you tell me which hour better?
native would be to meet at the Roseme Room at Langdefl
before 4:00 p.m. we could then go over together. The after-
It you would like to come to my office a little bit
on April 19th.

looking forward to your visit to the Defense Policy Seminar
This is just a note to tell you how much we are

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Beverly, Massachusetts
The Honorable Henry Capot Lodge

April 3, 1963

I look forward to seeing you.

at Langdell Hall.
meets at 4:00 p.m. in the Rocece Pound Room
the Seminar if it should interest you. It
Of course, you are welcome to attend

19th at the Faculty Club at 6:30 p.m.
the Defense Policy Seminar on Monday, April
with Henry Capot Lodge after his talk to
This is just a note to confirm dinner

RICH: Henry Kissinger
TO: Colonel William Robinson
MEMORANDUM

April 2, 1962

April 5, 1965

Professor Milton Katz
Director of International Legal Studies
Langdell Hall, ILS

Dear Milt:

This is just a note to confirm
dinner with Henry Cabot Lodge after his
talk to the Defense Policy Seminar on
Monday, April 19th at the Faculty Club
at 6:30.

Of course, you are welcome to
attend the Seminar if it should interest
you. It meets at 4:00 p.m. in the Roscoe
Pound Room at Langdell Hall.

I look forward to seeing you.

Henry V. Kieisinger

Sincerely yours,

I look forward to seeing you.

Bound Room at Lengdell Hall.
You. It meets at 4:00 p.m. in the Roaceo
attend the Seminar if it should interest
Of course, you are welcome to

at 9:30.
Monday, April 19th at the Faculty Clap
talk to the Defense Policy Seminar on
dinner with Henry Capot Lodge after his
Dinner is just a note to confirm

Dear Mitt:

Lengdell Hall, N.R.
Director of International Legal Studies
Professor Milton Katz

April 2, 1962

April 5, 1965

Professor Stanley Hoffmann
Littauer 310

Dear Stanley:

This is just a note to confirm
dinner with Henry Cabot Lodge after his
talk to the Defense Policy Seminar on
Monday, April 19th at the Faculty Club
at 6:30 p.m.

I look forward to seeing you.

April 5, 1965

Professor Laurence Wylie
William James Hall
15th Floor

Dear Laurence!

Of course, you are welcome to
come to the Seminar if it should interest
you. It meets at 4:00 p.m. in the Roskoe
Pound Room at Langdell Hall.

I look forward to seeing you.

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

I look forward to seeing you.

Pound Room at Langdell Hall.
you. It meets at 4:00 p.m. in the Roome
come to the Seminar if it should interest
Of course, you are welcome to
at 9:30 p.m.

Monday, April 16th at the Security Clinic
talk to the Defense Policy Seminar on
dinner with Henry Capot Lodge after his
This is just a note to confirm

12th Floor
William James Hall
Professor Laurence White

April 2, 1962

April 5, 1965

General James Gavin
President
Arthur D. Little, Inc.
Acorn Park
Cambridge 40, Massachusetts

Dear Jim:

Of course, you are welcome
to attend the Seminar if it should
interest you. It meets at 4:00 p.m.
at the Roscoe Pound Room at Langdell
Hall.

I look forward to seeing you.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Kietinger

Sincerely yours,

step.
With kind regards and every good
to our conversation most illuminating.
You were a gracious host and I
the other day.

how much I enjoyed the launch at Beverly
This is just a note to tell you

Dear Mr. Lodge:

June 8, 1962

October 28, 1966

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy, Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your very nice note of October 21. I was in
Washington yesterday and saw your cable. It was very well received,
in particular by Katzenbach and Rostow.

I neglected to mention to you in my last note that by coincidence I passed through Tokyo while Harriman and Rusk were stopping off on the way to Manila. As they may have told you, I had a brief talk with them at the airport. I have also left a memorandum for the Manila contingent in Washington, urging them to give Saigon an opportunity to develop the program at a pace consistent with Vietnamese realities.

I am going to be seeing George for lunch today.

With warm regards and every good wish.

Henry V. Klaasder

Sincerely yours,

I am doing to be seeing Geordie for lunch today.

develop the program at a pace consistent with Vietnamese realities.
contingent in Washington, urging them to give Saigon an opportunity to
them at the airport. I have also left a memorandum for the Manila
the way to Manila. As they may have told you, I had a brief talk with
I passed through Tokyo while Harriman and Rusk were stopping off on
I neglected to mention to you in my last note that by coincidence
in particular by Katzenbach and Roatow.

Washington beersday and asw your cspc. It was very well received.
Thank you for your very nice note of October 21. I was in
my dear Mr. Ambassaodor:

San Francisco, California
APO 96343
American Empsaas', Saigon
Ambassaodor
The Honorsple Henry Capot Lodge

October 28, 1966

U.S. News & World Report

Effects of Election-

WHERE THE BACKLASH WAS FELT

Riots, demonstrations, civil-rights disputes-

How did white voters react?
What was the effect at the polls?

Election outcomes tell only a part of the story. Electronic computers, analyzing the vote by race and by region, come up with some revealing answers.

"White backlash" turned out to be an important factor in some of the November 8 elections. It failed to have much effect in some other races where it had been expected to be strong. Over all, the backlash pattern was mixed.

In California, white reaction against Negro rioting clearly helped Republican Ronald Reagan win the Governorship.

Electronic Vote Analysis (EVA) by the National Broadcasting Company showed this: The Democratic incumbent, Edmund G. Brown, won only 39.7 per cent of the votes in the Los Angeles area-scene of big Negro riots-where he got 52.5 per cent four years ago.

Governor Brown supported a State law barring racial discrimination in housing. Mr. Reagan opposed it. Governor Brown got 96 per cent of California's Negro vote but only 35 per cent of the white vote. Four years ago, Mr. Brown won 48 per cent of the white vote.

**A factor in Illinois.** A swing of white voters contributed to the defeat in Illinois of "liberal" Democratic Senator Paul H. Douglas-and raised problems for Chicago's Democratic mayor, Richard J. Daley.

The Democratic vote fell off in the Chicago area, where Negroes have rioted and staged mass demonstrations and where Mayor Daley made concessions to Negro demands for open housing.

Electronic Vote Analysis showed the Douglas vote in Chicago dropped from 66.1 per cent in 1960 to 57.3 per cent this year. In the Chicago suburbs, the decline was from 43.4 to 29.8 per cent. Statewide, the Negro vote for Senator Douglas rose 2 points to 87 per cent but the white vote for him declined 10 points to 41 per cent.

A Democratic Congressman, Representative Roman C. Pucinski, had a close call winning re-election in Chicago this year after winning handily two years

ago-and he blamed his reduced vote on a white backlash. However, some other Democratic Congressmen in the Chicago area who had feared a backlash vote won re-election with little difficulty.

Florida, the scene of several Negro riots this year, elected a Republican Governor for the first time in 94 years. The winner, Claude R. Kirk, Jr., opposed any statewide ban on housing discrimination and attacked his opponent, Robert King High, as an "ultraliberal."

Electronic Vote Analysis showed that Florida's Negroes voted 93 per cent for the Democratic nominee, compared with 85 per cent in the last previous election, while whites voted only 38 per cent Democratic, compared with 54 per cent previously.

In Delaware, voters defeated a Democrat who had served five terms as a Representative in Congress, and elected a Republican, William V. Roth, Jr., who opposed a federal open-housing law.

In New York City, it was a white vote that abolished a civilian review board that Mayor John V. Lindsay had set up to handle complaints against the police department.

The board had been demanded by Negroes, who frequently have raised the charge of police brutality. The vote against the board was nearly 2 to 1.

**Where backlash didn't show.** White backlash failed to materialize in some contests where it could have been an important factor. Massachusetts elected a Negro, Edward W. Brooke, a Republican, to the U. S. Senate.

Before the election, "Congressional Quarterly" listed 26 House races in which racial issues were considered to be significant. In those races, 19 likely targets for a backlash vote won re-election

and only a few of those seven who lost could finger backlash as a primary factor in their defeat.

**A reverse twist?** There appeared to be a "reverse backlash" against racism in some contests.

In Maryland, where registered Democrats outnumber registered Republicans nearly 3 to 1, George P. Mahoney won the Democratic nomination for Governor on a campaign against open-housing legislation with the slogan: "Your home is your castle-protect it."

Mr. Mahoney lost in the general election to Republican Spiro T. Agnew, who supported a limited form of ban against housing discrimination.

In this race, the Negro vote swung from 60 per cent Democratic to only about 6 per cent Democratic-and many whites also deserted the Democrats.

Arkansas, traditionally Democratic, rejected a segregationist Democrat for Governor and elected a racially moderate Republican, Winthrop Rockefeller.

Tennessee chose a racially moderate Republican, Howard Baker, for Senator over Democrat Frank G. Clement, with many Negroes switching from Democrat to Republican.

Negro candidates met mixed results.

All six Negro representatives in Congress-all Democrats-won re-election. But all five Negroes running as Republicans against white Democrats lost.

Macon County elected Alabama's first Negro sheriff since Reconstruction days. But seven Negroes running for offices in Lowndes County, Ala., were defeated.

At least 139 Negroes were elected to legislatures in at least 21 States.

In Michigan, a Negro Republican lost his bid for Secretary of State despite a Republican landslide in that State.

-Wide World Photo

*In some riot areas, vote shows evidence of "white backlash"*

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 21, 1966

65

U. S. News & World Report

OUTLOOK NOW FOR
THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Exclusive Interview With Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge

Where is the road to victory in Vietnam?

In this interview, the U. S. Ambassador looks beyond organized combat, which the U. S. is winning, to the "heart of the matter"—how to eradicate 150,000 Communist terrorists.

Henry Cabot Lodge, a former Republican Senator from Massachusetts, was U. S. Representative to the U. N. under President Eisenhower. He has been the American Ambassador to South Vietnam in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

At SAIGON

Q Mr. Ambassador, how do things look at this point in South Vietnam compared with a year ago?

A The over-all situation can be described as follows:

In the military war, our capacity to defeat the big Communist units and destroy redoubts is so well demonstrated that I would expect a very different military situation indeed here by next year.

Military success gives us the chance to get at the heart of the matter, the criminal or terrorist side, which is what gives the Viet Cong its base among the people.

On the criminal side, encouraging beginnings have been made where the Vietnamese have had the punch and protection of their own elite forces and the Korean and American military units. But pacification, although it is on the track, is not yet really rolling.

One bottleneck is the lack of enough "revolutionary development cadres." These are the community organizers, put in to administer a place after the Viet Cong has been cleared out. If this is hurried up too much, there is a sacrifice of quality which can mean failure. When pacification really rolls, I believe Hanoi will regard this fact as decisive.

Q Is it still useful to try to find a way out of this war?

A It is always useful to try to find a way out of warfare. In fact, it would be a sin not to do everything possible for peace. The fact is that, whereas we and our allies want peace, the Hanoi regime wants conquest. They are frank enough not even to pretend to want peace. There is no misunderstanding on this point.

There are many dangers to be aware of in this connection, arising out of the fact that in the Western countries we have a conventional view of warfare, since it is the only kind of warfare we know. In World War II, for example, after we had beaten the German Army, the war in Europe was over.

In this war, when we have beaten the Army of North Vietnam and the main-force battalions of the Viet Cong, we have simply won the opportunity to get at the heart of the matter, which is more than 150,000 terrorist guerrillas highly organized throughout the country and looking exactly like civilians. Even if, for example, regular North Vietnamese forces were to withdraw, a major guerrilla force containing critical elements from the North would still be in place and free to torture and murder—which often involves no firearms, only nameless brutality.

Q Just what is the nature of the enemy, anyway?

A Strictly speaking, there are three different kinds of enemy who are under arms:

The first is the Army of North Vietnam, which is conducting a classic and overt invasion. These are truly foreign troops in uniform, with identification cards stamped in Hanoi. They tell questioners they are from North Vietnam, and they speak Vietnamese with a North Vietnamese accent.

The second is the main-force units of the Viet Cong, the so-called enlisted men being from the South and the officers being from the North, or Northern-trained professional Communists.

Then the third is the guerrilla terrorist force, over 150,000 strong, which, although highly trained, is in civilian clothes and works in the village where everyone lives. This is officered and directed from the North. This force is the real cancer. The first two categories can be abolished and they can still always get started again if this terrorist organization is intact.

When you come to the enemy which is not under arms, you must include the people who collect taxes; who try to boost prices, and create vacancies so as to bring about famine; and you must include the secret agents and the undercover men who try to infiltrate the Government of Vietnam so as to overthrow it and subvert it.

When it comes to recruiting in the purest sense of the word, I would say that there was very little.

There is, however, a great deal of impression-shanghaiing men through terror-which is much more brutal. They can still impress many hundreds of men a month.

There is nothing ideological about it. Whatever ideological appeal the Viet Cong may have had in past years seems to have completely disappeared. Nowhere can one find a trace of evidence that the Viet Cong ideas or personalities have any popularity.

When it comes to fading away, I think there is a good chance that this is what the enemy will do when he makes up his mind that the jig is up.

I believe that one thing which he would regard as decisive would be the destruction by the Vietnamese and their allies of the organized guerrilla terroristic establishment—their base among the people. This would immediately open the roads; village officials would sleep in the villages at night, and the Viet Cong would not be able to start the war up again whenever he felt like it.

66

Copyright © 1966, U. S. News & World Report, Inc.

U. S. News & World Report

... "Viet Cong cannot win, and we cannot be defeated"

In that case, I think he might fade away, because it is not
in the traditions of these people to want to admit publicly
that they have aggressed, and still less to admit publicly that
they have been defeated.

Q Have we finally learned how to fight this kind of nonconventional war? Is there a danger, with all this conventional military equipment coming in, that we will make the same mistakes as the French?

A As I have said, we are learning how to fight what I call the criminal war, which involves an enormously elaborate police-type effort in which nine tenths of the manpower has to be Vietnamese, since it means working elbow to elbow in and among the Vietnamese people.

Remember that after the enemy troops have left, the people in the villages still feel the presence of the terrorists. The big net which you use to catch the whales—that is, the big battalions—doesn’t work in this case, and you need a fine-mesh net to catch the small and deadly fish of terrorism.

This means a census so that you have everybody listed. It means issuing identification cards. It means requiring permits for the movement of persons and vehicles. It means a curfew, so that you have a time after which everybody must account for himself. It means sifting out the hard-core professionals and trying them promptly.

This is, of course, a job for the Vietnamese to do themselves. But Americans have an important role in getting it started, in being sort of a catalyst, in working with them through the buddy system. Experience has shown that soon after this procedure gets started, we Americans can fade into the background, leaving only a token presence.

This is a complicated job, although our casualties in this kind of fighting will be slight. It means working with Vietnamese—and not just Vietnamese military men, either. We must also work with the police, local political community leaders, teachers, health workers, agricultural specialists, etc.

We are learning. It is going well in three or four places, but it is not yet really rolling on a wholesale basis. When it is really rolling, Viet Cong military manpower dries up, and the war is really over.

HOW THE WAR HAS CHANGED—

Q Then we are not operating as the French did—

A Our position in Vietnam and that of the French when they were here as a colonial power are totally different. There is literally no comparison.

For one thing, from a purely military standpoint, scientific development has transformed the art of war. I need refer to only two things: the helicopter and the devices which enable you to fight and see at night. We are not roadbound.

Our position here differs from the French position in other ways. As former Prime Minister Mendès-France—the Prime Minister at the time the French left Indo-China—said on April 1, 1966, there are “very important differences and contradictions” between the French experience and the present U. S. involvement. “To France,” he said, “it was a colonial war to maintain the status quo. . . . The kind of war being waged today is different from that being fought in 1954.”

Today, there is a Republic of Vietnam and a Vietnamese National Army, and we are trying to help this republic ward off aggression so that it can stand by itself. Under the French there was no Republic of Vietnam, no Vietnamese National Army such as we know it today, and the aim was to continue the status quo.

The French wanted to stay; the United States wants to leave.

Q Is there now political stability in Saigon?

A The political side, in spite of much fragility, evolves. The election of an assembly to draft a constitution was a major step forward, and was done with the remarkably high participation of the Vietnamese people.

One need not be an expert to see the difference between the political situation today and that which existed in and just after November, 1963. It is hard to measure the good which flows from having men in office long enough to learn their jobs, but it is surely great.

PROBLEM OF INFLATION—

Q You've talked about the military, guerrilla and political sides of the war—what about the economic side?

A The economic war is a constant struggle. As soon as measures are invented to cope with the inflation existing at the time, the requirements of the war naturally increase, and this strains the anti-inflation mechanism even further.

We can take satisfaction in the Prime Minister's devaluation order of last June, in the sale of rice to the crowds in the cities from backs of trucks, in the decision to turn the operation of the port over to the military—even though operation is still not fully satisfactory—and in the fact that for some time now the price rise has been halted. There is no famine. Crowds in the streets are not demonstrating against the high cost of living. This is a Viet Cong defeat.

We therefore can see that progress is being made with regard to all four kinds of war, but that progress is quicker with some than with others.

But we must also recognize these things:

The mileage of roads which are open to all categories of persons is just about what it has been; the percentage of the population living under secure conditions is only a little bit greater than it was; the percentage of the population under Viet Cong domination is not substantially diminished, but still stands at about 20 per cent; every day brings its tolls of public officials being assassinated, kidnaped and tortured, with certainly no dramatic diminution; and MACV—as the U. S. military headquarters is called—believes that the Viet Cong can still impress men at the rate of four battalions a month in South Vietnam.

These conditions make it clear that we have not yet achieved a satisfactory outcome.

Q Mr. Ambassador, do you feel that some sort of turning point has been reached here in Vietnam?

A Yes, we have reached a turning point. We did so in the President's far-sighted decision formally announced on July 28, 1965, to commit U. S. troops on a large scale here—which, as time goes by, appears more and more as a big turning point of history.

Because of this decision, there is still a South Vietnam. Because of this decision, it is clear to all that the Viet Cong cannot possibly win and that we cannot possibly be defeated. Because of this decision, the situation in this country is better than it has ever been before.

Q What is being heard from the countryside, the villages? Did the recent elections give a clue to anything significant?

A The recent elections were a massive vote of "no confidence" in the Viet Cong.

The Viet Cong went all out both by violent deeds and violent words. They did their utmost, using hand grenades, ambushes, strikes, broadcasts, printed matter and every known form of intimidation. Terrorism reached a high tide —15 times the usual amount. And it didn't work. The elec-

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 21, 1966

67

INTERVIEW with Ambassador Lodge

... "Hanoi has misjudged our intentions and our capabilities"

tion made it clear that the Viet Cong is not a socially conscious group of liberals on the model of Western socialism. Not one candidate for the Constituent Assembly made even the slightest gesture or statement aimed at attracting Viet Cong votes.

The vote did indicate that the Government is capable of influencing and providing security for more people than we have thought. On September 11 the number of people living under secure conditions was nearer 65 per cent than 55 per cent—which is the figure we have been using.

I believe also the elections indicated that the Vietnamese want to move toward a democratic constitution because they consider it a protection against the despotism to which they have been subjected in the past. They also consider it a move toward progress and a step away from coups. They have looked around them and have seen Korea and Japan and believe that this is the way to go.

Also, they regard it as a way to get rid of corruption. If you have two politicians running against each other, they will watch each other, and if one does something corrupt, the other will show him up.

SAIGON'S SUCCESSES—

**Q** As long as war is going on all around, is there any firm basis on which to build a stable Government?

**A** The Government now in power has successfully overcome the struggles of the spring and brought back the authority of the Government to Hue and Da Nang.

It has devalued the currency; it is modernizing the operations of the port of Saigon, and it has prevented wildcat, soul-destroying inflation.

It has conducted elections which were free from corruption and intimidation.

It is making major moves toward amnesty and national reconciliation.

Under its auspices, a constitution will be promulgated and elections for President and Congress will be held.

It is revamping the Army so that it can better cope with terrorism.

It has succeeded in unifying the Montagnards on the side of the Republic of Vietnam.

All of this is building a stable Government, and on the basis which exists—and which was about 65 per cent of the people on September 11.

**Q** Mr. Ambassador, is this becoming an American war? What are the South Vietnamese doing about mobilizing their own resources?

**A** I will take the second question first:

The South Vietnamese have more than 620,000 men under arms, a big proportion of their total population of 15 million—a proportion which we certainly do not approach.

I have already listed the steps which they have taken on inflation.

On desertions, they have enacted a stringent antidesertion law, and the desertions are going down. It should be realized that these desertions were not desertions to the enemy. They were desertions to go home, because they were worried about their family, or to transfer to some other unit. The Viet Cong is troubled with desertions, too.

I do not think this is becoming an American war in the sense in which you asked it—that the Vietnamese are sitting back and letting us do all the work. Recent casualty figures are revealing in this regard. During the month of September, 1966, for example, the Vietnamese armed forces suffered a total of 640 killed, and 135 Vietnamese civilians were as-

sassinated by Viet Cong terrorists, for a total of 775 Vietnamese who lost their lives in the war effort. This compares with 361 Americans killed in the same period.

It is very much of an American war in the sense that warding off this aggression involves the security of the United States, and an American military man who is fighting here is fighting for his country. And a South Vietnamese soldier is fighting for his country.

**Q** Is it possible that the Communists have misjudged our intentions and capabilities? What keeps them fighting?

**A** I believe the governing spirits of Hanoi have very much misjudged our intentions—and our capabilities. They have all sorts of notions about us which rest on no facts at all. They attach an importance to the exhibitionism of the demonstrators in America who oppose our Vietnam policy, which is out of all proportion to the truth. These demonstrators, who profess to want to end the war, should understand that their antics convince Hanoi that our will is weak and, therefore, tend to prolong the war.

Another thing which keeps them fighting is that, in the tough world of Communist dictatorship in the Far East, you do not—if unsuccessful—peacefully retire to a comfortable home. If you are out of office, you run a very good chance of being killed, and this exerts a powerful influence on the rulers at Hanoi.

Also, they want and need the rice of South Vietnam. But if peace were to come, this could certainly be an early object of peaceful negotiation, and it should be a simple matter to buy the rice without annexing the whole country and without riding roughshod over everybody in it.

But they want to conquer—because of rice and, above all, because of doctrine.

**Q** Do we know their ultimate intentions? If defeat is threatened, is there danger North Vietnam would jump in more forcefully, or Red China would come pouring down?

**A** I am not sure that we know their ultimate intentions. I do not believe that North Vietnam could jump in much more forcefully than she has already done.

To give a very short answer to your last question, one thing that keeps Red China from "pouring down" is a healthy respect for the strength and retaliatory power of the United States.

PREVENTING "WORSE WAR"—

**Q** What would be the effect if the U. S. were forced to pull out of Vietnam?

**A** I frankly believe in the domino theory when it comes to two places in the world: One is Berlin and the other is Vietnam. If we were to leave Vietnam—we cannot be forced out—there would be immediately disastrous consequences for the neighboring countries of Thailand, the Republic of the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan [Formosa]. Then it would be only a short time before Japan and Australia would feel themselves seriously threatened, and I cannot imagine a real threat to Japan and Australia which would not be so big as to involve us potentially in World War III, with all that that implies.

The limited effort which we are conducting here, therefore, is the best thing we can do to prevent an unlimited and much worse war.

The effect of the United States not living up to its commitment would also be disastrous outside of Asia. In fact, it would shake the Atlantic community to its foundations, and call into question all the international commitments which we have made.

[END]

68

WESTERN UNION

W. P. MARSHALL
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

TELEGRAM

R. W. McFALL
PRESIDENT

®

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

803P EDT AUG 21 67 803P EDT AUG 21 67 BA414
SYB478 SY WB046 DL PD WUX WASHINGTON DC 21 445P EDT
PROFESSOR HENRY A KISSINGER, CENTER FOR INTL AFFAIRS
6 DIVINITY AVE CAMBRIDGE MASS

AUG 22 1967

THIS IS A MOST CORDIAL INVITATION TO YOU TO BE MY GUEST AT
A SMALL AND INFORMAL LUNCH I AM GIVING IN HONOR OF LT. GENERAL
PHAM XUAN CHIEU, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE DIRECTORATE, WHO
RANKS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE GOVERNMENT
OF VIET-NAM. THE LUNCH WILL BE HELD ON MONDAY, AUGUST 28, AT
THE SOMERSET CLUB, 43 BEACON STREET, BOSTON, AT ONE OCLOCK.
PLEASE REPLY EITHER BY WIRE TO ME, ROOM 7312, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C. OR BY TELEPHONE, (202) DU-3-8576. I
HOPE VERY MUCH THAT YOU CAN COME
HENRY CABOT LODGE, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

28 43 7312 202 DD-3-8576

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WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

R. W. McFALL
PRESIDENT

416P EDT AUG 25 67 BA337

DEC267 DE WA061;

GOVT PD

WIX WASHINGTON DC 25

NFT

PROFESSOR HENRY A KISSINGER

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 6 DIVINITY AVENUE CAMBRIDGE
MASS

I AM VERY SORRY THAT I MUST CANCEL THE LUNCHEON FOR GENERAL CHIEU ON MONDAY, AUGUST 28 BECAUSE I MUST LEAVE FOR VIET-NAM THE DAY BEFORE. MANY REGRETS AND WARM REGARDS

HENRY CABOT LODGE
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.

AUG 28 1967

SF1201(R2-65)

[L]

Confidential - Not for publication

To put the Viet Cong into the Government of Viet-Nam is dangerous and reprehensible in the extreme unless done on an entirely token basis. It is like putting the fox into the chicken coop. To do so is thus not a middle ground or a half-way house, but a victory for the other side and defeat for us.

Similar is the Hanoi line that they won't negotiate with the Govern-
ment of Viet-Nam. They have learned that by repeating things often
enough they can get a substantial number of Americans to support
them. Refusal to negotiate with the Government of Viet-Nam means
that it has been brushed aside or destroyed. This would also be a
defeat.

Both Senators Kennedy and McCarthy have already come out in favor of so-called "coalition government" and thus have given away -- long before either of them have become President -- what would surely be the major bargaining point if our fortunes ever sunk so low. This would be a major error. To give away a major bargaining point either shows ignorance of the situation or else a cynical willingness to weaken our bargaining position for a momentary bit of applause.

Remember too that the constitutional Government of Viet-Nam is  
today strong enough so that it cannot simply be ignored. South Viet-  
Nam today is not "our" Viet-Nam. There is something to build on.  
There has been achievement.

When it comes to negotiations, neither side has won a clear-cut
victory on the battlefield and thus neither has a clear-cut victory
on which to base negotiations. Therefore negotiations must be a
process of mutual give and take and of adjustments. This
inescapably will take time. A speedy result can only be achieved
by one side conceding everything.

Those who say that a full complement of Viet Cong terrorists
should be put in the key governmental positions in Viet-Nam over-
look the fact that after our own Civil War we not only did not allow
former Confederates to hold office; we did not even let them vote.
No one suggested making Robert E. Lee Secretary of War.
Similarly after World War II in France no one who had served
under Marshal Peyton was allowed to vote or to hold office. By
what logic do we insist on more stringent requirements for the
poor little beat-up Vietnamese than we required for ourselves or
than the French required for themselves?

- 2 -

Thus a settlement must at a very minimum not erode the position
of countries trying to stand on their own feet and who have produced
such responsible statesmen as Pak Chung Hee of Korea, Thanat
Khoman of Thailand and Lee Kuan Yew, the President of Singapore,
who said that the nations of East Asia "would rather live with a
permanent American military presence than face the process of
emasculated South Viet-Nam." (On the subject of a minimum
settlement, and looking at it from another angle, two cardinal
points are: (1) that the ARVN should be able to use all the roads
and the railroad. No more road blocks, ambushes, blown bridges;
and (2) that terrorist violence be deterred and be dealt with on an
equal basis with military violence. This war is not like the war in
Europe where the defeat of the German army ended the hostilities.)

What then has been achieved? Let us go back to the President's
decision announced on July 28, 1965 to make a commitment of U. S.
military power.

At that time we feared that the enemy would cut Viet-Nam in two
along highway 19; that the aggressor would establish a capital in
some provincial city from which we could not oust him; that a
coup engineered by the Viet Cong would take over the Government
by subversion; that runaway inflation would cause famine; and
undercut everything else and that there would be an unending wave
of governmental instability with the result that no one in the govern-
ment would have time to learn his job and that the government
would become infiltrated by Viet Cong spies which would also lead
to a Viet Cong takeover. In particular we feared that the loss of
Viet-Nam would so encourage the aggressors that they would
move against other nations of East Asia. This, in turn, raised
the possibility of a third World War.

We can say today that Viet-Nam cannot be cut in two, that the
aggressor cannot hold any one point as an aggressor capital, that
a Viet Cong coup is out of the question, that runaway inflation has
been staved off and that a valid constitutional process has begun
under which a legitimate government functions. No previous
government could have survived the Tet offensive as the present
government has done. In Vietnamese terms, governmental
progress has been impressive. They are about to draft the 18
and 19 year olds -- not an easy thing to do in any country.

[L.C]

- 3 -

Outside of Viet-Nam that whole great area of islands and peninsulas constituting the edge of East Asia going from Korea and Japan south, west towards Burma, southeast to Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia to New Zealand -- all of which contains some 370 million people -- has been denied the expansionism of Peking and Hanoi. If we had been pushed out of Viet-Nam or if we had abandoned it, a catastrophe of global dimension might have ensued. Viet-Nam thus is important not only to Asia but to Europe and everywhere where our pledged word matters.

On the negative side, it is true that we have been sometimes unable to subordinate our military power to feasible political objectives. We have on occasion more nearly resembled a bull in a china shop than a surgeon performing a delicate operation. Viet-Nam's political shortcomings cannot be remedied by crude military pressure. Attacks on the North are no substitute for a viable southern strategy, necessary though they are. Moreover progress toward achieving political objectives, notably the creation of solid political institutions under which a police program can be conducted, would directly help the military by denying the infiltrator the safe haven which he now finds. The importance of police-type operations should be stressed.

I am one American who believes that, in the absence of terror, a viable non-communist regime can emerge and that the main thrust of our effort should be to revive and reorganize non-communist political life. There is, however, honest difference of opinion between Americans who have served in Viet-Nam on this subject -- including some who favor the utter destruction of the North as the only solution.

In reviving political life, there must be a "true revolution" which means nothing less than non-governmental activities through such entities as Tenant Farmers and Plantation Workers unions, village councils and Fishermens Cooperatives. They must be stimulated to want self-help -- even if it means that the French and Chinese owners and middle men may go to the wall. This is fundamentally a non-governmental activity. It cannot be done by the Government of Viet-Nam or by AID. But the Government of Viet-Nam must give the green light and AID can provide a little -- and most crucial -- help when called upon.

There are great and fundamental differences between the East Asian problem and the problem of Europe. Viet-Nam is not suited

to a plan administered like the Marshall Plan. There is no local
government in our meaning of the word and to pipe aid through
non-existent local government can only feed and encourage
corruption.

Finally, no list of adverse and unfavorable circumstances is
complete without mentioning the tremendous increase in the
number of Soviet weapons. When I first went to Viet-Nam in
1963 the typical captured Viet Cong weapon was made out of a
piece of plumbing pipe with homemade firing mechanism. Today
everyone in the Viet Cong from the top to the bottom is equipped
with the latest and most modern Soviet weapons and in many
cases better than those which we have made available to the
South Vietnamese. Obviously this has changed the whole nature
of the war.

If all efforts at achieving a mutually tolerable basis with the
enemy fail, we may then wish to consider a "long-term"
operation which would be flatly stated as such to the public.
This operation would be purely defensive militarily. The mili-
tary would be used as a shield only. It would not be like Korea.
There would be no more heavy casualties. The aim would be to
consolidate the GVN in the cities and in limited areas in the
countryside by police-type techniques similar to those used by
General Massu in Algiers. This would be inextricably inter-
twined with strenuous efforts to revive and reorganize political
life by stimulating self-help. A rough estimate is that such a
policy would require about 200,000 rather than 500,000 U. S.
troops and would require a U. S. expenditure of 12 billion
rather than 30 billion dollars. This might be a level which the
public would tolerate. It is _one way_ of dealing with the situation,
although not the only way.

In the late 40's and early 50's there were many in the Pentagon
who believed that it was inevitable that the cold war would "break
out" and that we should get ready to fight and win the cold war.
Today this seems like a mad idea, but it seemed logical to many
then.

When Eisenhower became President, he used his great prestige
to teach the American people that we must learn to live with the
cold war and try to influence it politically and economically, but
not to seek a military victory. Similarly we must learn to live
with this situation in Viet-Nam and not try for an impossible quick
military victory. But it is equally true that we must not abandon
Viet-Nam.