P. H. Nitze

18 May 1978

# THE FALPIS CONCEPT

1. The growing vulnerability of our current fixed ICBM launching system is hardly in doubt.

If the Soviet Union deploys only those MIRVed ICBM types which have already been tested, in numbers no larger than permitted by the already agreed terms of a SALT II agreement, and with a number of RVs per missile no larger than that already demonstrated in flight tests, the Soviet Union will have approximately 6000 MIRVed ICBM RVs, each with a yield of somewhere in the range of 500 kilotons to somewhat more than a megaton.

There is little reason to believe that they cannot in time, say, by the early or mid-1980s, achieve accuracies better than .15nmi, and perhaps .1nmi.

This would give them a high probability of achieving better than 90 percent destruction of our MINUTEMAN missiles in their silos using less than half of their available MIRVed ICBM force.

2. Because of their high accuracy, their high reliability and alert rates, and their short time of flight, ICBMs are the weapons most likely to dominate the initial exchanges in a nuclear war.

The SLBMs have greater endurance and therefore lend themselves better to being held in reserve.

The bombers have too long a flight time and their effectiveness is subject to too many uncertainties to be the prime weapon system in the initial exchanges, particularly if the main thrust of those exchanges is counterforce.

The priority task in improving the U.S. strategic posture is therefore that of decreasing the vulnerability and increasing the endurance of U.S. ICBM systems.

Because of the imminence of the Soviet deployment of more than enough ICBM RVs for a two-on-one attack on all U.S. ICBM silos with an adequate combination of yield and accuracy, a significant increase in endurance should be achieved in the next two or three years, if at all possible.

3. It is the thesis of this paper that this can be done through a crash program to deploy a Fixed Alterative Launch-point ICBM system (FALPIS).

4. What is such a system?

One or more additional silos, each capable of holding a cannister and each cannister capable of holding a missile of approximately the size of a MINUTEMAN III, would be deployed around each existing MINUTEMAN silo. Existing launch control facilities could be connected to the additional silos. MINUTEMAN missiles could be modified to permit their transport in a horizontal position within a cannister. Transporter erectors would be needed for periodic random movement of cannisters from one silo to another. Each new silo would contain a cannister; only one cannister or silo per complex would contain a missile. The non-live cannisters could be dummied to have equivalent weight, heat, or other signatures.

Initially a single additional silo per existing silo might be deployed; this would double the number of aim-points which the Soviet Union would have to target in an attack on our MINUTEMEN; each additional silo per existing silo would add an additional multiple. Two additional silos per existing silo would assure that more than half of our MINUTEMEN would survive an attack by Soviet MIRVed ICBMs equipped with the maximum number of RVs that it is now estimated they will have by 1985.

Existing MINUTEMAN silos are spaced three to five miles apart. Up to eight to 24 additional silos could be deployed around each MINUTEMAN silo while

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keeping their spacing sufficiently large so that even a two megaton weapon
dropped half-way between any two silos would not destroy a missile contained
in a cannister in either of the two silos, provided the silo/cannister/missile
combination was 300 psi hard. A Soviet deployment adequate to overcome such
a deployment is hardly conceivable. Against a lesser threat many fewer silos
with much less hardness would be adequate.

The existing MINUTEMAN fields are said to cover an area of 30 to 40 thousand square miles. To barrage so large an area with more than 300 psi would be an impracticable task.

5. How fast might FALPIS be deployed?

The greatest uncertainty involves the time necessary for decision. If
a SALT Treaty were rejected by a majority of both Houses of Congress, if
the Soviet Union then reacted in a threatening manner, and if the Executive
Branch then wished to strengthen our strategic posture with all deliberate
speed, it should be possible greatly to compress decision time.

Under those circumstances, the Executive Branch, backed by a majority
in both Houses of Congress, could waive such sources of delay as Environmental
Impact Statements, restrictions on Military Construction Funds, etc.

It is estimated that the task of modifying MINUTEMAN missiles to make
them horizontally transportable might take a year of preparatory work, after
which modifications at a rate rising from 20 a month should be practicable.

Initial silo and cannister construction might take a year. Thereafter
a rate of perhaps a thousand going up to two thousand a year or more might
be practicable.

Some have suggested that concurrently with building silos in the existing
fields, additional fields might be started in the southwest to exploit the
better weather conditions there.

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6. What are the growth potential of FALPIS?

Cannisters and silos of a size to carry MINUTEMAN III could hold a new
MINUTEMAN IV missile using new but proven technology, with more than double
the throw-weight of the MINUTEMAN III.

A missile with the throw-weight contemplated for the M-X or the D-5 would
require somewhat larger and therefore more expensive cannisters, silos, and
transporters.

A cost benefit analysis would be necessary to determine the best method
of proceeding.

7. What are the SALT implications of FALPIS?

a. Under SALT II agreements such as those now under negotiation:

Those agreements would ban deployment of mobile ICBM systems, at
least during the period of the Protocol, and would ban the start
of new fixed ICBM launchers. It can be argued that the cannisters
and transporter/erectors contemplated for FALPIS are no more
mobile than the cannisters and transporter/erectors used by the
Soviets for their SS-11s, -17s, -18s, and -19s. It can also be
argued that just as the start of X-type silos was not considered
by the Soviet side to be in violation of Article I of the Interim
Agreement because those silos were intended only to contain launch/
control equipment, so, inasmuch as only one FALPIS cannister and
silo in the group, or "island," of silos and cannisters associated
with each currently existing MINUTEMAN silo is intended to be capa-
ble of launching an ICBM missile, each "island" as a whole (i.e.,
the currently existing MINUTEMAN silo plus its new fixed alternate

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launch-point silos and their cannisters) should be counted as a
single launcher. This intent could be backed up with a proposal
to limit the number of missiles deployed or in inventory on each
side to 120 percent of the number of deployed launchers or "islands"
accountable under the SALT ceilings for that type of missile.
Such a provision would also be helpful in controlling the reload
problem.

It further could be argued that the reason why we must have the
right to a FALPIS deployment is the threat of the high weight,
high accuracy, MIRVed RVs tested on the Soviet ICBMs. They make
a FALPIS deployment by the U.S. mandatory if crisis stability
is to be preserved. We could also propose to limit the number
of FALPIS silos deployed in any "island" to a number no greater
than the maximum number of RVs tested or deployed on a Soviet
ICBM.

The Soviet side is likely not to wish to agree to the above
rationale. Therefore it would be mandatory to make the above
explanation before entering into a SALT II agreement and be
prepared not to conclude a SALT II agreement unless they do
agree.

b. In the event there is no SALT II agreement because of refusal by the Congress to ratify it, or because of other reasons, there should be no bar to a FALPIS deployment. However, it would still be wise to make the explanation in (a) above in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to what we were doing and why.

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P. H. Nitze

25 May 1978

# THE ALPS CONCEPT

3. It is the thesis of this paper that this can be done through a crash program to deploy an Alternative Launchpoint System (ALPS).

4. What is such a system?

One or more alternate silos, each capable of holding a cannister and each cannister capable of holding a missile of approximately the size of a MINUTEMAN III, would be deployed around each existing MINUTEMAN silo. Existing launch control facilities could be connected to the alternate silos. MINUTEMAN missiles could be modified to permit their transport in a horizontal position within a cannister. Transporter erectors would be needed for periodic random movement of cannisters from one silo to another. Each new silo would contain a cannister; only one cannister or silo per complex would contain a missile. The non-live cannisters could be dummied to have equivalent weight, heat, or other signatures.

Initially a single alternate silo per existing silo might be deployed; this would double the number of aim-points which the Soviet Union would have to target in an attack on our MINUTEMAN; each additional alternate silo per existing silo would add an additional multiple. Four alternate silos per existing silo would assure that an attack upon our MINUTEMAN by Soviet MIRVed ICBMs equipped with the maximum number of RVs that it is now estimated they will have by 1985 would be unprofitable for the Soviet side.

Existing MINUTEMAN silos are spaced three to five miles apart. Up to eight to 24 alternate silos could be deployed around each MINUTEMAN silo while keeping

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their spacing sufficiently large so that even a two megaton weapon dropped
half-way between any two silos would not destroy a missile contained in a
cannister in either of the two silos, provided the silo/cannister/missile
combination was 300 psi hard. A Soviet deployment adequate to overcome such
a deployment is hardly conceivable. Against a lesser threat many fewer silos
with much less hardness would be adequate. Against a maximum threat it would
be possible to complicate any Soviet attack with a preferential ABM defense
of those silos actually containing a missile. The ABM Treaty permits us to
deploy 100 ABM interceptors at Grand Forks. Even 100 interceptors could add
300 to 600 RVs to the attackers' force requirement. In the event the ABM
Treaty were to lapse, a hardpoint defense system with a large number of
interceptors could multiply the attackers' total force requirements many fold.

The existing MINUTEMAN fields cover an area of some 30 to 40 thousand
square miles. To barrage so large an area with more than 300 psi would be
an impracticable task.

The cost of an ALPS deployment (particularly if combined with an ABM
hardpoint preferential defense) should be substantially less than that of an
offensive force designed to defeat it.

5. How fast might ALPS be deployed?

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Some have suggested that concurrently with building alternate silos in
the existing fields, additional fields might be started in the southwest to
exploit the better weather conditions there.

6. What is the growth potential of ALPS?

7. What are the SALT implications of ALPS?

a. SALT II agreements such as those now under negotiation would ban deployment of mobile ICBM systems, at least during the period of the Protocol, and would ban the start of new fixed ICBM launchers.

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It can be argued that the cannisters and transporter/erectors con-
templated for ALPS are no more mobile than the cannisters and trans-
porter/erectors used by the Soviets for their SS-11s, -17s, -18s,
and -19s. It can also be argued that just as the start of X-type
silos was not considered by the Soviet side to be in violation of
Article I of the Interim Agreement because those silos were intended
only to contain launch/control equipment, so, inasmuch as only one
ALPS cannister and silo in the group, or "island," of silos and
cannisters associated with each currently existing MINUTEMAN silo
is intended to be capable, at any given time, of launching an ICBM
missile, each "island" as a whole (i.e., the currently existing
MINUTEMAN silo plus its new alternate launchpoint silos and their
cannisters) should be counted as a single launcher. This intent
could be backed up with a proposal to limit the number of missiles
deployed or in inventory on each side to 120 percent of the number
of deployed launchers, or "islands," accountable under the SALT
ceilings for that type of missile. Such a provision would also be
helpful in controlling the reload problem.

It further could be argued that the reason why we must have the
right to an ALPS deployment is the threat of the high weight, high
accuracy, MIRVed RVs tested on the Soviet ICBMs. They make an
ALPS deployment by the U.S. mandatory if crisis stability is to be
preserved. We could also propose to limit the number of ALPS
silos deployed in any "island" to a number no greater than the
maximum number of RVs tested on any Soviet ICBM.

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b. In the event there is no SALT II agreement because of refusal by the Congress to ratify it, or because of other reasons, there would be no bar to an ALPS deployment. However, it would still be wise to make the explanation in (a) above in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to what we were doing and why.

8. ALPS and the Verification Problem.

In the event the SALT II agreements are not ratified, the question of
verification would become moot. The question only becomes meaningful if
SALT II agreements permit an ALPS deployment and are ratified by both sides.

The Soviet side would not have any significant verification problem
during the term of the Treaty. We have closed down the MINUTEMAN III produc-
tion line. It is not contemplated that any other ICBM, such as the M-X or
the D-5, will be ready for deployment before 1985. Even if the U.S. were
to enter into a crash program to produce ICBMs for deployment prior to 1985,
the Soviet side would know about it well in advance and would have little
difficulty in verifying our adherence to the 120 percent limitation on
missile numbers discussed in paragraph 7 above.

A more serious question--as to our ability to verify Soviet compliance--
might arise if the Soviet side decided to deploy an ALPS. They have little
incentive to do so during the period of the SALT II Treaty. During that period

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our ICBMs could not take out as high a percentage of their ICBMs as the per-
centage of our ICBMs we would have to devote to the effort, even if they do
not go to an ALPS deployment mode.

But nevertheless let us assume they do so. Could we monitor and verify
that no more than one cannister and silo in an "island" contained a missile?
We could not. We would have to concentrate on monitoring the number of missiles
produced, stored, and deployed to the support facilities near the missile
fields. The margin of error in our estimates might be ten to twenty percent,
or even greater.

The important point, however, is that margins of error, even up to ±
100 percent, are unlikely to be as strategically significant as the destabilizing
imbalance which is almost certain to exist in the absence of an ALPS deployment.

7

PAUL H. NITZE

30 October 1978

# CURRENT SALT II NEGOTIATING POSTURE

The negotiations are intended to produce a SALT II Treaty, a Protocol, and a Statement of Principles.

## 1. THE SALT II TREATY

The Treaty is to run to December 31, 1985. Significant points regarding its contents follow:

a. The aggregate number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles (SNLVs)*-- i.e., launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), plus launchers for submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), plus "heavy bombers," plus air-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers (ASBMs)--is to be limited initially to 2,400 each for the United States and the Soviet Union. By a date, now reported to be in 1982, the initially authorized limit of 2,400 SNLVs is to be reduced to 2,250.

b. Within the permitted aggregate number of SNLVs, a sublimit of 1,320 will be placed on the number of launchers for ICBMs carrying multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) plus launchers for MIRVed SLBMs, plus aircraft equipped to carry armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with a range greater than 600 kilometers.

c. A sublimit of 1,200 is to be placed on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers plus MIRVed SLBM launchers.

d. A sublimit of 820 is to be placed on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers. Within this 820 limit, the Soviet Union will be permitted to have a number of fixed modern large ballistic missile (MLBM) launchers equal to their present force level--which is 308 (or 326 if 18 operational MLBM launchers

* The phrase strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) is often, but less precisely, used to describe this aggregate.

at the Soviet test range are counted). The United States--which has no fixed
MLBM launchers--will be permitted none in the future. New ballistic missiles
with useful payloads (throw-weight) greater than that of the Soviet SS-19
will be considered to be MLBMs, and ballistic missiles with useful payloads
greater than that of the Soviet SS-18 will be banned.

e. The rules governing what missile boosters are to be considered to be boosters for MIRVed missiles, and what launchers are to be counted as launchers for MIRVed missiles have been agreed. Any missile booster of a type which has been tested with MIRVs is to be considered to be a MIRVed missile booster. Any launcher of a type from which a MIRVed missile booster has been launched will be considered to be a launcher for MIRVed missiles. What is meant by "type" has been left somewhat ambiguous.

f. Limited modifications of existing types of ICBMs are permitted. However, any test of an ICBM with more RVs than has previously been tested on that type of ICBM will cause it to be classified as a "new type." The U.S. has tested 3 RVs on a MINUTEMAN III and the Soviet Union has tested 4 RVs on the SS-17, 6 RVs on the SS-19 and 10 RVs on the SS-18. Testing of certain other types of modifications will also cause an ICBM to be classed as a "new type." The sides have agreed that each side will be permitted to flight test and deploy one "new type" ICBM (MIRVed or unMIRVed) during the Treaty period. There is no limit to the number of "new type" SLBMs which the sides are permitted to test and deploy during the life of the Treaty.

g. The United States' side has proposed, that during the period of the Treaty there be a ban on the flight testing and deployment of a larger number of RVs on any "new type" ICBM missile than the largest number already flight tested by either side on any of its ICBMs (i.e., 10), and a similar restriction with respect to the further fractionization of SLBMs (i.e., 14). The Soviets, however, have taken the position that since the one "new type" ICBM permitted under the Treaty will not be a "heavy missile" but a "light missile" (i.e., ballistic missiles with useful payloads equal to or less than that of the Soviet SS-19), that the largest number of RVs per "new type" ICBM should be 6, not 10. The Soviets have agreed with the U.S. position with respect to the maximum fractionization of RVs for "new type" SLBMs, i.e., 14 RVs per missile. There is now agreement by both sides that the number of ALCMs carried on a single aircraft is to be similarly limited, although the specific number of ALCMs per aircraft (between 20 and 35) has not yet been agreed.

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h. As a general rule, United States' B-52s and B-1s and the USSR's BEARS and BISONS are to be counted as "heavy bombers" and thus counted under the ceiling on SNLVs. Also, any bomber or transport aircraft equipped to carry armed ALCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers, is to be counted as a "heavy bomber." If an aircraft is equipped to carry more than the agreed maximum number of ALCMs per aircraft, it will be counted as being an appropriate multiple of one "heavy bomber" under the 1,320 limit.

i. Both sides are now agreed that the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber is not to be counted as a "heavy bomber" (unless it were to be equipped to carry ALCMs of range greater than 600 kilometers).

* The Soviet Union is reported to have indicated willingness to make an informal declaration--outside the contractual forms of the Treaty--of its intention not to raise the production rate above the present level, which the Soviet Union refuses to disclose but which is estimated by the United States to be between 30 to 50 a year, and not to increase the BACKFIRE bomber's present unrefueled operational radius. (No United States' bombers are capable, without refueling, of striking their designated targets within the USSR and returning to the bases in the United States from which they took off.) The United States is now reported to be asking, in addition, for Soviet assurances not to deploy BACKFIRE in a way that threatens the United States. The United States, on its part, will declare its intent to retain the option of producing and deploying a new penetrating bomber of a type similar to BACKFIRE which also would not be counted against the SNLV limit.

* With respect to Soviet "heavy bomber" variants (these include BEARS and BISONS reconfigured to reconnaissance, tanker and antisubmarine roles, but still retaining the bomb bays), the United States' position has been that only a portion of them, to include BISONS reconfigured as tankers, should be counted as SNLVs. The Soviet position has been that none should be so counted. How this issue has been resolved is not known.

* With respect to bombers other than BISONS, BEARS, B-52s, B-1s, and transport aircraft equipped to carry ALCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers, it has been the United States' position that all such aircraft may be so equipped but must then be counted, not only against the SNLV limit, but also against the 1,320 limit. It has been the Soviet position that only transport aircraft newly constructed for the specific purpose of carrying ALCMs may be equipped to carry ALCMs. It is not known how this issue has been resolved.

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j. Cruise missile range is defined as the maximum distance the missile can achieve measured by projecting its flight path onto the earth's surface. With respect to ICBMs, intercontinental range is specified as being 5,500 kilometers or more. No specification has been agreed to as to the range cutoff distinguishing SLBMs classed as SNLVs and submarine-launched missiles considered to be for tactical use only.

k. The Soviet position is that during the period of the Treaty, the deployment of armed ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers will be prohibited. The U.S. position is that this limitation should apply only during the duration of the Protocol.

l. There are no limits on the number of missiles or warheads which may be produced and stored. ICBMs in excess of those needed for permitted launchers and storage facilities for such ICBMs near launching sites are to be prohibited. The development, testing, and deployment of rapid reload systems for ICBM launchers are also to be prohibited.

m. Both sides are agreed that there will be a commitment that neither side will take any action which would circumvent the purposes of the agreements. Such a provision would appear to ban the significant transfer to third countries of weapons limited by the agreements. The extent to which it would ban the transfer of components or technology is not clear. The USSR interpretation has been reported to be that the transfer of components, blueprints, and technology directly pertinent to such weapons, is included in such a ban.

n. Obligations for reciprocal disclosures of pertinent data have been agreed. The Soviet Union has made certain data available, and has agreed that additional information will be made available.

o. Obligations to refrain from interfering with techniques unilaterally controlled by the respective sides for verification of performance of the other side are now basically agreed.

p. The start of additional and the relocation of existing fixed ICBM launchers is to be banned.

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## 2. THE PROTOCOL

The United States has proposed that the terminal date of the Protocol be June 30, 1981. It is reported that the Soviet Union has proposed that the terminal date be December 31, 1981.

The only significant restriction in this Protocol, beyond those in the Treaty, concern mobile ICBMs, ASBMs, and launchers for ground and sea-launched armed cruise missiles.

a. The flight testing or deployment of mobile ICBMs and of ASBMs is to be banned during the period of the Protocol. After the expiration of the Protocol, the Treaty language, unless then amended, would permit the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBMs and of ASBMs, but launchers for each such missile would have to be counted under the pertinent limits. Both sides apparently are agreed that the testing of mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs during the Protocol period is not prohibited, provided that no missile is fired from such launchers.

It has been reported that the Soviets have raised serious concern over a United States' insistence that a multiple aimpoint (MAP) system (which in some deployment schemes may not strictly be a mobile system) could, in fact, be deployed under the terms of the Treaty after the expiration of the Protocol.

b. During the period of the Protocol the deployment of armed ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers will be prohibited. (If this provision is in the Treaty it will not be required in the Protocol.)

## 3. THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The negotiations for the next stage in SALT, with the Principles serving as guidelines, are anticipated to follow-on soon after the completion of SALT II.

a. The United States has proposed the following principles, or targets:

* A reduction in the aggregate number of SNLVs

* A reduction in the MIRVed missile launcher limit

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* An MLBM launcher limit lower than the present Soviet deployed number

* Provisions further restricting the development, testing, and deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs

* Provisions restricting the flight testing of ICBMs and SLBMs

* Further restrictions on strategic defenses, including air and civil defenses

* Steps to strengthen verification

b. The Soviet Union's position is that such a statement of principles should make clear that the United States and allied theater nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union must be taken into account in arriving at new ceilings, and that the subject of restrictions on strategic defenses beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty are not appropriate for SALT.

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PAUL H. NITZE

30 October 1978

CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGREEMENT:

Such as that Foreshadowed by the SALT II
Negotiating Position of the Sides in Early
October and Taking into Account Recent U.S.
Defense Policy Decisions

OUTLINE

1. U.S. SALT Objectives and the Constraints within which those Objectives must be Sought.

2. The ICBM Balance to be Expected by 1985, MIRVed and unMIRVed.

3. The SLBM Balance by 1985, MIRVed and unMIRVed.

4. The Bomber/Cruise Missile Balance by 1985.

5. The Definition and Verification Problem.

6. The Active and Civil Defense Aspects of the Problem.

7. The Command, Control, Communications Pre- and Post-Attack
Intelligence Problem.

8. The Relation of the Strategic Nuclear Balance to the Theater
Balance, Conventional and Nuclear.

9. The Impact of the Agreement Upon the U.S. Ability to Reverse Current Trends.

10. The Situation in the Absence of an Agreement.

11. The Continuing Negotiation Problem.

12. The Political and Diplomatic Consequences of the Strategic Balance.

CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGREEMENT:

1. U.S. SALT OBJECTIVES AND THE CONSTRAINTS WITHIN WHICH THOSE OBJECTIVES MUST BE SOUGHT

The SALT II negotiations began six years ago. The U.S. objective was a treaty of indefinite duration, limiting offensive nuclear forces, to match the treaty limiting ABM defenses which had just been ratified. It was intended that the SALT II Treaty should provide equal limitations on the two sides such that essential equivalence in offensive nuclear capabilities would be assured and such that "crisis stability" could and would be maintained. "Crisis stability" was the phrase used to describe a situation in which neither side could hope to gain in relative capabilities from initiating the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. It was hoped that, if these two objectives had been met, a foundation would have been laid for a reduction in the resources both sides would consider necessary to devote to their offensive nuclear armaments.

It was recognized that there were four constraining considerations which must be taken into account in achieving the primary U.S. objectives. One constraint was that the limitations strategically important to the U.S. should be verifiable. The second was that the legitimate interests of our allies must be taken into account and the terms of the agreement reasonably acceptable to them. The third constraint was that the limitations be such that it would be economically and politically practicable for the United States to deploy those permitted forces necessary to maintain essential equivalence and crisis stability. The fourth was that the terms of an agreement be acceptable to the Soviet side, otherwise the Treaty would not be negotiable.

Early in the SALT II negotiations it was evident that there were potential conflicts among the objectives and the constraints, that difficult choices would have to be made in finding an optimum solution. One such conflict was between

the objective of maintaining crisis stability and the constraint of verifi-
bility. It had long been recognized that limiting the number of missiles
was much more important than limiting the number of launchers. But it was
more difficult to monitor the production and storage of missiles than to
count the number of large ICBM silos, which could be photographed from satel-
lites. So it was decided to limit launchers rather than missiles. It was also
recognized that it was more important to limit the aggregate throw-weight of a
force than the number and size of its launchers. This proved to be difficult
to negotiate. Verifiable and negotiable controls over missile accuracy also
proved to be unattainable.

During the course of the six years of the SALT II negotiation, the origi-
nally formulated three U.S. primary objectives and the first three of the con-
straints have been progressively compromised so as to accommodate the fourth
constraint--that the terms of the agreements be acceptable to the Soviet side,
thereby facilitating their negotiability.

The first casualty was a treaty of indefinite duration. That objective
was given up in the summer of 1974 in order to announce a negotiating break-
through at the Moscow conference which otherwise would have been without result.
Each negotiating break-through since the Moscow conference has produced a
further retreat from our original objectives.

Today the Executive Branch has reduced its claim for the SALT II agree-
ment to the assertion that it would be better than no agreement at all. The
judgment on this issue is not obvious, partly because the negotiations, as
of this date, are not concluded. The following sections deal with the princi-
pal considerations involved in arriving at a judgment.

2. THE ICBM BALANCE TO BE EXPECTED BY 1985

a. The MIRVed ICBM Balance

The U.S. has closed down the MINUTEMAN III production line and
has delayed the initial operating capability (IOC) date of a
follow-on missile to 1986 or beyond. Therefore, there is essen-
tially no possibility of the U.S. having any deployed MIRVed

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ICBM launchers by the expiration date of the Treaty in 1985 other than the 550 MINUTEMAN III silos currently deployed. The accuracy of the MINUTEMAN III has recently been upgraded and it is planned to substitute MARK-12A warheads for the MARK-12 warheads currently deployed on the MINUTEMAN III. No other significant changes in MINUTEMAN III are now planned. The useful payload of the MINUTEMAN III is approximately 2,200 pounds. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on the MINUTEMAN III is three RVs. The aggregate useful payload (throw-weight) of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will therefore not exceed 550 x 2,200 which equals approximately a million and a quarter pounds. The aggregate number of MIRVed ICBM warheads in the U.S. force will not exceed 550 x 3, which equals 1,650 RVs.

The USSR is permitted by the proposed terms of the agreement to deploy in excess of 300 SS-18s and approximately 500 SS-19s and -17s. The SS-18s have a useful payload approximating 16,000 pounds, the SS-17s and -19s have a useful payload approximating 7 to 8,000 pounds respectively. The SS-18s have been flight tested with as many as ten RVs, the SS-17s four RVs, the SS-19s six RVs. It can therefore be anticipated that the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's MIRVed ICBM force will approximate eight to nine million pounds of throw-weight by 1985, and that the number of RVs deployed on those MIRVed missiles will approximate six thousand, each RV having a yield several times that of the U.S. RVs. There is no reason to believe that the accuracy of the Soviet MIRVed RVs by 1985 will be significantly less than that of the improved accuracy of the MINUTEMAN III RVs. The U.S. is developing its more radical accuracy improvement, the Advanced Inertial Reference System (AIRS), for incorporation in a new follow-on missile to be deployed after 1985.

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If current Soviet accuracy is no better than approximately a
fifth of a mile, it would be difficult for them to eliminate
more than 70 percent of our MINUTEMAN silos in an initial strike,
assuming that they target two of their RVs on each silo. If
their accuracy approximates fifteen hundredths of a mile, around
90 percent of our silos would be vulnerable to such a two-on-one
attack. A two-on-one attack would require less than half of the
MIRVed ICBM RVs they are expected to have available by 1985.
When their accuracy approximates a tenth of a mile, around 90
percent of our silos will become vulnerable to an attack by a
single RV against each silo, provided that additional RVs are
programmed to substitute for missiles that fail during their
launch phase.

If we were to use all our MINUTEMEN III, taking account of their
improved accuracy and the substitution of MARK-12A for MARK-12 RVs,
it is unlikely we could destroy more than 65 percent of the Soviet
ICBM silos.

b. <u>The UnMIRVed ICBM Balance</u>

Until 1985 or beyond the U.S. is expected to have 450 MINUTEMAN
II, each with a throw-weight of less than 2,000 pounds and
carrying a single RV in the megaton range. These would give us
approximately a million pounds of throw-weight and 550 megatons
of yield in our unMIRVed MINUTEMAN ICBM force. In addition, we
may choose to maintain the 54 TITAN missiles which were deployed
prior to 1965. They have an aggregate yield of some 450 megatons.

In coming down to the 2,250 limit, the Soviet side can be expected
to retain at least 360 non-MIRVed ICBMs during the life of the
Treaty. It now being agreed that each side will be allowed to
test and deploy one new type of ICBM (MIRVed or non-MIRVed)
during the period of the Treaty, it is likely that the Soviet

4

side, having little need for a new MIRVed ICBM, will test and
then deploy a new non-MIRVed ICBM with a throw-weight of approxi-
mately 8,000 pounds and a warhead yield of 15 to 20 megatons,
and substitute it for approximately 360 of the currently deployed
SS-11s. The aggregate throw-weight of such an unMIRVed ICBM
force could be in excess of two and one-half million pounds, and
its megatonnage approximately six thousand megatons.

3. THE SLBM BALANCE BY 1985

a. MIRVed SLBMs

The U.S. is scheduled to have the following MIRVed SLBMs by 1985:

* 21 POSEIDON boats, each with 16 missiles, each missile carrying eight to ten RVs, the yield of each RV being 40 kilotons;

* 10 POSEIDON boats, each "backfitted" with 16 TRIDENT I missiles, each carrying approximately eight RVs, each missile with a substantially longer range (4,000 miles), and each RV with more than double the yield of the 40 kiloton POSEIDON RV;

* 10 TRIDENT boats, each with 24 TRIDENT I missiles.

It was thus expected that we would, by 1985, have 41 nuclear-
propelled SLBM submarines with some 736 tubes and approximately 6,000
RVs. Some 60 percent of these might be at-sea at any given
time, giving us some 3,600 RVs at-sea. Assuming a reliability
rate of 80 percent, this amounts to approximately 2,900 at-sea
reliable RVs, representing an aggregate yield of approximately
200 megatons. In the event of a crisis, it should be possible,
in a number of days, to increase the at-sea force by some 25
percent. It now appears, however, that delays in the TRIDENT
shipbuilding program make this target optimistic.

5

The Soviet side, if they deploy close to the full 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers permitted under the MIRVed ICBM limit, will be able to deploy close to 400 MIRVed SLBM launchers and still stay within the 1,200 limit on MIRVed missile launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet TYPHOON submarine will be significantly larger than the present Soviet SLBM submarines and will carry 20 to 24 missiles each with up to 14 RVs; their smaller MIRVed SLBMs, the SSN8s, are expected to have no more than half that number of MIRVs. The TYPHOON missile could have the throw-weight of the projected U.S. TRIDENT II missile, development of which has not yet been authorized. The TRIDENT II missile is planned to be approximately twice the size (volume) of the TRIDENT I missile, but will not be deployed prior to 1985.

It is probable, nevertheless, that the U.S. will continue to have a lead in the number of MIRVed SLBM tubes and RVs into the 1985 time period. However, the accuracy and yield of the U.S. SLBM RVs are substantially less than that of our ICBMs. The U.S. SLBM force does not now, and is not expected by 1985 to, add significantly to our capability against Soviet hard targets, such as hardened silos.

## b. UnMIRVed SLBMs

The U.S. is expected to phase out its unMIRVed POLARIS force by about 1985 and thus to have no unMIRVed SLBMs by that time.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can be expected to retain over 600 unMIRVed SLBM tubes. Some of these may carry MRVs as our POLARIS missiles do today. Such missiles may be useful as MIRVed missiles against small area targets that are not very hard, such as airfields.

## 4. THE BOMBER/CRUISE MISSILE BALANCE IN 1985

The B-1 issue was incorrectly stated by the administration to be a choice between relatively cheap cruise missiles and expensive B-1s. Cruise missiles have to be launched from some kind of survivable platform, preferably one that can endure in a nuclear war environment for more than a few hours. The Executive Branch's position is that this preferably should be an aircraft. Thus, one requires a bomber/cruise missile system consisting of bombers and tankers so based as to give a high probability of prelaunch survivability for those that are on alert, whose take-off is sufficiently rapid and which are so hardened against nuclear effects that it becomes difficult to barrage their escape routes; bombers that are able to penetrate close enough to the target to launch cruise missiles to destroy or suppress defenses; and cruise missiles able to penetrate area and terminal defenses and accurate enough to kill the targets they are aimed at. The cruise missile is thus only part of a multi-faceted system. The bomber that launches it and the tankers that refuel the bombers are equally essential parts of the system. The system is greatly improved and the enemy's defensive problem greatly increased, if some of the bombers have the capability for rapid take-off, are hardened against radiation, are more confidently able to penetrate Soviet defenses and thus to launch SRAMs, other types of missiles, or gravity bombs, close to the target.

The B-1 program having been cancelled, the 1985 bomber/cruise missile balance depends critically on whether a Soviet barrier defense around the northern perimeter, and of the eastern and western flanks, of the Soviet Union against the B-52s is possible, upon the number of cruise missiles that will be able to penetrate new Soviet terminal defenses, upon the number of B-52s equipped with cruise missiles that we deploy, the prelaunch and escape survivability of our B-52s and their tankers, and the extent to which a portion of the bomber force can be reconstituted, after it is flushed on warning, so as to endure in a war environment protracted for more than a few hours.

7

Without limitations on air defense systems, including both forwardly deployed and area or terminal defenses, the effectiveness of U.S. cruise missiles may be degraded during the mid to late 1980s. Limitations on air defenses are not to be included as a part of the SALT II agreement and there is a question as to the Soviet's willingness even to discuss this issue as part of the SALT III negotiations.

The U.S. contemplates deploying some 120 to 150 aircraft equipped with intermediate range ALCMs. The majority of these aircraft are planned to be B-52s; however, some type of transport aircraft carrying a larger number of ALCMs than does a B-52 is also being considered. If an aircraft is equipped to carry more than an agreed maximum number of ALCMs per aircraft, it will be counted as being an appropriate multiple of one "heavy bomber" under the 1,320 limit.

As it now stands, with 550 MINUTEMEN III launchers, plus our 496 POSEIDON launch tubes plus our planned 240 TRIDENT tubes totaling 1,286 MIRVed missile launchers, we will have room for only 34 heavy bombers carrying ALCMs under the 1,320 ceiling. If we wish to deploy more than 34 B-52s or transport aircraft with ALCMs there will have to have been a delay in the TRIDENT program or we will have to phase out a sufficient number of MIRVed MINUTEMEN III or of POSEIDON SLBMs in order to make room for the additional ALCM-carrying aircraft under the 1,320 ceiling. It is uncertain that the Navy would recommend phasing out POSEIDONs or the Air Force the MINUTEMEN III.

Even if we assume 120 to 150 deployed ALCM-carrying aircraft, it would be unlikely that more than some 50 percent would be on continuous alert or that more than some 90 percent could be brought to readiness under conditions calling for fully-generated strategic forces.

The Soviet Union faces a much simpler problem. The U.S. has no substantial air defenses and the Soviet BACKFIRE is not to be counted under any of the proposed limits. Even if BACKFIRE production is limited to current production rates, the number deployed will grow to significant numbers, they can be dispersed to a larger number of fields than our B-52s and their chances

8

of surviving an initial exchange are thus enhanced. The potential of the
BACKFIRE to survive the initial exchanges of a nuclear war coupled with its
capability to penetrate very limited U.S. defenses would contribute signifi-
cantly to a greater possibility of Soviet domination of the subsequent phases
of such a war.

Whether the FB-111H (which is 40 percent the size of the BACKFIRE) can
penetrate depends, among other things, on whether U.S. tankers can survive in
sufficient numbers for the required multiple inflight refuelings of the FB-111Hs.

5. THE DEFINITION AND VERIFICATION PROBLEM

It is impossible to verify compliance unless what is to be limited and
the nature of the limitation have been clearly defined and the definition
agreed in depth between the parties.

As can be seen from the current state of the negotiation, difficult
problems in definition are evident. What is the range of a cruise missile?
How is it to be measured? These are issues which are conceptually difficult
to define--not merely difficult to negotiate. What is the permitted production
rate of BACKFIRE bombers? Presumably the current rate; the Soviet side will
not say what that is, but it is reported that we estimate the rate at approxi-
mately 40 per year. What is the permitted "useful payload" of a "small"
missile; i.e., exceeding what number of pounds of "useful payload" could cause
it to be classed as an MLBM? Apparently the "throw-weight" of an SS-19, which
term we define as the useful payload a missile booster can put into an inter-
continental trajectory. But the Soviets will not tell us how they measure
useful payload or what they assess the useful payload of an SS-19 to be. Etcetera.

Even where the limitations are clearly defined, compliance is in many
cases difficult to verify. How do you verify the range of the other side's
cruise missile, no matter how precisely "range" is defined? How do you
distinguish an ALCM from a GLCM or SLCM, or assure that an ALCM cannot
be launched from a sea- or land-based launcher? How do you determine that a
new missile having the throw-weight of an SS-19 and carrying a bus similar

9

to an SS-19 bus, but with a single RV, is not capable of being deployed as a
MIRVed missile? How do you determine that retired missiles or missiles taken
out of retired launchers or extra newly produced missiles are not stockpiled
and available for relatively prompt deployment on soft pads or reloaded in
surviving launchers?

Quite clearly, in many instances unambiguous verification is not possible. For this reason the arms control community now uses the phrase "adequately verifiable." It is correct that "verifiability" is not an absolute requirement; it is a means toward the end of a good agreement. A wholly verifiable bad agreement would still be a bad agreement. If those provisions of an agreement which are strategically significant to us are adequately verifiable, the agreement might be a good agreement, even if its less important provisions are not confidently verifiable. The difficulty, however, rests in determining which provisions are "strategically significant" to us and what is meant by the word "adequate." Both phrases lend themselves to subjective judgments.

6. THE ACTIVE AND CIVIL DEFENSE ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM

The United States has over the last twenty years phased out most of its
continental air defense capabilities. The Congress has forced the virtual
deactivation of the U.S. ABM defenses permitted under the ABM treaty. In the
mid-sixties the U.S. Navy was told that it was not to ask for equipment, men
or funds for the purpose of developing ASW capabilities designed to attack
Soviet SLBMs; as far as we know that order has never been rescinded.

The USSR has persistently put relatively more emphasis on active defensive
capabilities than has the United States.

The Soviet Union has put a truly enormous effort into air defenses. It
has deployed 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers and approximately 2,700
interceptor fighters. It has deployed thousands of inter-netted air defense
radars and ground-control-interceptor centers. It is apparently ready to deploy
a new high capability mobile phased-array radar/missile system called the SAX-10.
It has recently been reported that the SAX-10 is being deployed on surface ships,
thus affording the Soviets the capability to forwardly deploy a barrier defense
against our bomber aircraft.

10

The Soviet Union has maintained and somewhat improved those ABM capa-
bilities it had earlier deployed in the Moscow area. It is significantly
increasing the capabilities of its phased-array ABM "early warning" radars
around the periphery of the USSR. This is permitted under the ABM Treaty
on the assumption that, in the event of war, such a network, being close to
the periphery, could be destroyed. It is also assumed that the even more
powerful radars in the Moscow area could, with greater effort, be destroyed.
However, Soviet large phased-array radar deployments coupled with the develop-
ment of a transportable phased ABM radar and high acceleration interceptor
combination could give them a reasonably rapid break-out capability toward
an important "damage limiting" ABM capability, particularly against U.S.
SLBM RVs.

Even more important are the civil defense aspects of the problem.
Many who have carefully studied the problem concur that a well executed civil
defense program--to evacuate most of the population of Moscow and Leningrad
would take several days--can reduce fatalities by a factor of roughly ten as
well as substantially reducing industrial damage and the time necessary for
economic recovery. There is now little doubt that the Soviet Union is working
on civil defense much harder than was realized as recently as two years ago.

7. THE COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND PRE- AND POST-ATTACK INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

Second strike deterrent forces will fail in their purpose if civil
authority is not able effectively to command and control them. This requires
that civil authority survive an attack, have time for a considered and intelli-
gent decision, and be able to communicate with those in immediate control of
the launching of surviving forces. For these decisions to be intelligent and
effective, continuing information, both as to the status of our own forces and
those of the enemy, is essential.

Neither those in the Executive Branch nor those outside it have confidence
in the current status of what is called our C³ + I. In fact, improving its
effectiveness and survivability is given the highest priority by most analysts
of our strategic posture. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has put

11

a vastly greater effort than has the U.S. into providing themselves with
redundant and survivable C³ + I systems capable of enduring, if necessary,
through a protracted nuclear war. They have also been developing anti-
satellite and other capabilities which could deny us pre- and post-attack
intelligence.

The SALT II limitations do not directly bear upon C³ + I. But the diminishing survivability and endurance potential of our forces to be expected during the Treaty period sharpen the need for improved U.S. C³ + I.

8. THE RELATION OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE TO THE THEATER BALANCE, CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR

At all times since World War II the Soviet Union has had superior non-nuclear forces on the European central front and on its northern and southern flanks. This has, in part, been due to geography, the USSR enjoying the central position and interior lines, and, in part, to the greater effort that has been made by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact than by NATO.

In the years up to the early 1950s this was offset by the U.S. nuclear
monopoly. Later the conventional deficiency was in large measure offset by
U.S. superiority in theater nuclear weapons. Today that theater nuclear
superiority has disappeared and it has proved necessary to assign a number of
our POSEIDON submarines to cover targets of interest to NATO, and thus maintain
a theater balance. As the Soviets deploy increasing numbers of SS-20 MIRVed
missiles and BACKFIRE and other high performance theater bombers, maintaining a
theater nuclear balance will become increasingly difficult. More and more
of our surviving strategic nuclear forces will be called upon for assignment
to that task. This consideration is rarely taken into account when the strategic
nuclear balance is being examined; it should be.

Moreover, the SALT II agreement could have a serious negative effect
upon the evolution of the conventional balance. The European NATO
countries have hoped to exploit the cruise missile technology in its theater

12

conventional weapon applications. The fact that cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers are to be limited in SALT favors the Soviet side. It supports the erroneous Soviet claim that ballistic missiles deployed in the Soviet Union for peripheral area missions, with medium or intermediate ranges but which under SALT II can have ranges up to 5,500 kilometers, are not "strategic"; while cruise missiles developed in NATO Europe, if over 600 kilometers in range, whether nuclear or conventionally armed, are "strategic."

In specific terms, the SALT II agreements may prevent the United States from transferring technology important to the conventional defense of Europe because of limitations on the transfer of weapons, components, or technical information relating to weapons limited by the SALT Treaty, as well as prohibiting the deployment of conventionally armed cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers.

## 9. THE IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT UPON THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO REVERSE CURRENT TRENDS

The Vladivostok Accord did not restrict the USSR from deploying those new weapon systems it planned to deploy, but neither did it restrict us from deploying those weapon systems necessary to maintain stability and rough equivalence, and thus reversing then current trends. It did not restrict the ability of the United States to deploy the B-1, the MINUTEMAN III and the MX missile in a survivable deployment mode, TRIDENT II, ALCMs, GLCMs, and SLCMs of any range, continental air defenses, more durable and reliable command and control, or enhanced civil defense preparations.

U.S. program decisions and delays in making decisions since Vladivostok, plus the terms of the probable SALT agreement now make it difficult to maintain crisis stability, and impossible to maintain rough equivalence, by reversing presently unfavorable trends during the period of the agreements.

It is argued by some that the restrictions in the agreements, as they apply to the United States, are of little significance; they do not keep us from doing anything we now should or would want to do during the period of the agreements. Whether this is so or not depends in large measure on whether

13

or not the agreements permit the deployment of a multiple aimpoint system (MAPS). Under this concept the U.S. would construct an indefinitely large number of vertical protective shelters or silos, each capable of holding a cannister containing an ICBM (a MINUTEMAN III or a follow-on missile such as the MX) and its launch mechanism; or, alternatively, a cannister which would contain no missile or launch mechanism but which would be indistinguishable from those that did. The cannisters containing the missile and launch mechanism would periodically and randomly be moved and substituted among those that did not. The U.S. has maintained that such a system would be a "mobile system" and thus be permitted under the Treaty after the expiration of the Protocol. The Soviet side is reported to have questioned its permissability under the already tentatively agreed language.

If it is agreed by both sides that a MAP deployment is permitted, it is conceivable that the U.S. could deploy such a system rapidly enough to maintain crisis stability. If not so agreed, there does not appear to be any feasible way to do so within the period of the SALT II agreements.

Under the now most likely provisions of a SALT II agreement, we run a risk, while negotiating SALT III, of having to rely almost entirely, on a bomber deterrent capable of enduring no more than a few hours, and on an SLBM force at-sea of less than 25 boats, each boat constituting four percent of our "enduring" deterrent power and thus worth enormous Soviet efforts to negate.

## 10. THE SITUATION IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT

The proponents of ratification of the treaty emphasize that whereas the USSR now has some 2,500 strategic launchers and, under SALT II, will have to reduce these to 2,400 some months after entry into force of the agreements and to 2,250 some three years thereafter, in the absence of an agreement they might well decide not to make any such reductions and might well add some 400 new strategic launchers to those they would have under SALT II.

This might well be so. It should be noted, however, that the 300 launchers they are expected to phase out to reach 2,250 are obsolete ICBMs and SLBMs which add little to their capability. Their presently programmed forces of

14

new missiles will provide them with such an excess of MIRVed hard target kill capability, of unMIRVed megatonnage, and of additional RVs, as to give them more than sufficient target coverage, that it is hard to see what strategic benefit more of the same would give them.

It is now anticipated that as the Soviet side completes its deployment of its new ICBMs and SLBMs that they will concentrate more heavily on adding to their defensive capabilities, in particular more attack submarines designed for an ASW role, improved look down-shoot down aircraft radar capabilities, and deployment of improved anti-aircraft systems such as their SAX10 mobile anti-aircraft batteries, etc. For the Soviet Union to shift resources back to offensive forces from a contemplated strengthening of their defenses may not be disadvantageous to the United States.

The most important question concerning the situation in the absence of an agreement would appear to be what the United States might do under the SALT II agreements--and in the absence of such agreements--to reverse current strategic nuclear trends. There are also important short term and long term foreign policy considerations involved.

## 11. THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATION PROBLEM

With the worsening nuclear balance projected for the period covered by the SALT II agreements, how do we expect--after SALT II is ratified and in the absence of substantial new U.S. programs beyond those now contemplated--to negotiate a SALT III treaty more favorable to us than what is now negotiable? Might not the Soviet actual and breakout potential then be far greater than ours? Will a SALT III agreement far worse for U.S. national security interests than SALT II then be preferable to none? If the Treaty expires in 1985 without such programs, and without a SALT III agreement, might we not then face unprecedented dangers?

## 12. THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF A SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

Some proponents, rather than taking exception to the main thrust of the analysis contained in the preceding eleven sections, argue a different series of points along the following line:

15

a. The United States' March 1977 comprehensive proposal leaned over backward in attempting to be fair to the Soviet Union. It offered them complete assurance against any significant counterforce threat from the United States while not assuring comparable protection for the United States.

b. That proposal was wholly unacceptable to the USSR, and any proposal which would in fact assure stability and rough equivalence at lower levels of nuclear armaments would be even more unnegotiable.

c. To insist on such an equitable agreement would assure that there would be no success, at least in the next few years, in negotiating a SALT II set of agreements. Such a delay would risk a break-down of detente.

d. Rather than risk such a breakdown, it is wiser to negotiate the best deal that is now reachable, preserve at least the outward forms of detente, and open the way to follow-on negotiations for a better deal in the future.

e. And in any case, a deterioration in the state of the strategic nuclear balance will have no adverse political or diplomatic consequences.

To some of us who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, the last and key judgment in this chain of reasoning--that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences--comes as a shock. In the Berlin crisis of 1961 our theater position was clearly unfavorable; we relied entirely on our strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum. In Cuba, the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced; both sides compromised.

It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect
international politics and diplomacy from a consideration of the underlying
real power balances. The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall
power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all other
levers of influence--military, economic, or political--rest.

How confident can we be that there is not at least a measure of validity
to that viewpoint?

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF CALCULATIONS IN FIGURES 1, 2, & 3
WITH SEC DEF BROWN'S FIGURES IN FY 1978
BUDGET AMENDMENT TESTIMONY, TABLE 2

Static Measures of Strategic Balance
(U.S. as % of Soviet)

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">BROWN'S</th><th colspan="2">FIGURES 1, 2, & 3</th></tr><tr><th>1977</th><th>1986<br>(B-52/CM)</th><th>1977</th><th>1985<br>(B-52/CM)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>WARHEADS</td><td>240%</td><td>126%</td><td>249%</td><td>149%</td></tr><tr><td>MEGATONS</td><td>35%</td><td>25%</td><td>36%</td><td>27%</td></tr><tr><td>THROW-WEIGHT</td><td>75%</td><td>48%</td><td>68%</td><td>47%</td></tr><tr><td>COUNTER-MILITARY<br>POTENTIAL</td><td>160%</td><td>67%</td><td>165%</td><td>67%</td></tr></tbody></table>

PAUL H. NITZE
20 November 1978

[LC]

## 1. THE SALT II TREATY

a. The aggregate number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles (SNLVs)¹-- i.e., launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), plus launchers for submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), plus "heavy bombers," plus air-to-surface ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers (ASBMs)--is to be limited initially to 2,400 each for the United States and the Soviet Union. By a date, now reported to be in 1982, the initially authorized limit of 2,400 SNLVs is to be reduced to 2,250.

b. Within the permitted aggregate number of SNLVs, a sublimit of 1,320 will be placed on the number of launchers for ICBMs carrying multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) plus launchers for MIRVed SLBMs, plus aircraft equipped to carry [armed]² [nuclear armed]³ air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with a range greater than 600 kilometers.

¹The phrase strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SN DVs) is often, but less precisely, used to describe this aggregate.

²The Soviet's position is that the Cruise missile limits should apply to "armed" cruise missiles; thus covering both those conventionally armed and those nuclear armed.

³The United States' position is that the limits should apply only to cruise missiles which are nuclear armed.

e. The rules governing what missile boosters are to be considered to be boosters for MIRVed missiles, and what launchers are to be counted as launchers for MIRVed missiles have been agreed. Any missile booster of a type which has been tested with MIRVs is to be considered to be a MIRVed missile booster. Any launcher of a type from which a MIRVed missile booster has been launched will be considered to be a launcher for MIRVed missiles. What is meant by "type" has been left unagreed.

f. Limited modifications of existing types of ICBMs are permitted. However, any test of an ICBM with more RVs than has been previously tested on that type of ICBM will cause it to be classified as a "new type." The U.S. has tested 3 RVs on MINUTEMAN III (the U.S. has tested 7 RVs on MINUTEMAN III, but the Soviets are reported to claim that this was not an operational test; the U.S. side is reported to have agreed to their position) and the Soviet Union has tested 4 RVs on the SS-17, 6 RVs on the SS-19 and 10 RVs on the SS-18. Testing of certain other types of modifications will also cause an ICBM to be classed as a "new type." The sides have agreed that each side will be permitted to flight test and deploy one "new type" ICBM (MIRVed or unMIRVed) during the Treaty period. There is no limit to the number of "new type" SLBMs which the sides are permitted to test and deploy during the life of the Treaty.

g. The Soviet side is reported by some to have agreed, and by some not to have agreed, to the United States' proposal that during the period of the Treaty there be a ban on the flight testing and deployment of a larger number of RVs on any "new type" ICBM missile than the largest number already flight tested by either side on any of its ICBMs (i.e., 10). The Soviets have agreed with the U.S. position with respect to the maximum fractionization of RVs for SLBMs, i.e., 14 RVs per missile. There is now agreement by both sides that the number of ALCMs carried on a single aircraft is to be similarly limited, although the specific number of ALCMs per aircraft (between 20 and 35) has not yet been agreed.

2

* With respect to Soviet "heavy bomber" variants (these include BEARS and BISONS reconfigured to reconnaissance, tanker and antisubmarine roles, but still retaining the bomb bays), the United States' position has been that only a portion of them, to include BISONS reconfigured as tankers, should be counted as SNLVs. The Soviet position has been that none should be so counted. It is reported that the United States has now agreed to the Soviet position.

j. Cruise missile range is defined as the maximum distance the missile can achieve measured by projecting its flight path onto the earth's surface. Thus, the operational range, after allowing for zigs and zags to avoid defenses, will be significantly less than the defined range. With respect to ICBMs, intercontinental range is specified as being 5,500 kilometers or more. No specification has been agreed as to the range cutoff distinguishing SLBMs classed as SNLVs and submarine-launched missiles considered to be for tactical use only.

k. The Soviet position is that during the period of the Treaty, the deployment of armed (including both conventional and nuclear armed) ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers will be prohibited. The U.S. position is that this ban should apply only to nuclear armed cruise missiles and only during the duration of the Protocol.

o. Obligations to refrain from interfering with techniques unilaterally controlled by the respective sides for verification of performance of the other side are now basically agreed, but a disagreement as to the applicability of these obligations to encoding of telemetry is now reported.

4

## 2. THE PROTOCOL

The only significant restriction in this Protocol, beyond those in the Treaty, concern mobile ICBMs, ASBMs, and launchers for [armed]⁴ [nuclear armed]⁵ ground and sea-launched cruise missiles.

b. During the period of the Protocol the deployment of [armed]⁴ [nuclear armed]⁵ ground and sea-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers will be prohibited. (If this provision is in the Treaty it will not be required in the Protocol.)

⁴Soviet Union's position.

⁵United States' position.

5

* Steps to strengthen verification through "cooperative measures," in addition to "national technical means."

b. The Soviet Union's position is that such a statement of principles should make clear that the United States and allied theater nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union must be taken into account in arriving at new ceilings, that the subject of restrictions on strategic defenses beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty is not appropriate for SALT, and that no "cooperative measures" other than in support of "national technical means" should be considered.

PAUL H. NITZE

4 December 1978

CONSIDERATIONS BEARING
ON THE MERITS OF AN AGREEMENT

Such as that Foreshadowed by the SALT II
Negotiating Positions of the Sides in Mid-November
and Currently Projected U.S. and
USSR Defense Programs

1. U.S. SALT II Objectives and the Constraints Within Which Those Objectives Have Had to be Sought

4. The Bomber/Cruise Missile Balance in 1985

7. The Number and Hardness of Targets Problem

8. The Breakout Problem

9. The Command, Control, Communication and Pre- and Post-Attack
Intelligence Problem

10. The Relation of the Strategic Nuclear Balance to the Theater
Balance, Conventional and Nuclear

11. The Impact of the Agreement Upon the United States' Ability to Reverse Current Trends

12. The Situation in the Absence of an Agreement

13. The Question of Strategy

14. The Continuing Negotiation Problem

15. The Political and Diplomatic Consequences of a Shift in the
Strategic Nuclear Balance

PAUL H. NITZE

1. U.S. SALT II OBJECTIVES AND THE CONSTRAINTS WITHIN WHICH THOSE OBJECTIVES HAVE HAD TO BE SOUGHT

The SALT II negotiations began six years ago. The U.S. objective was a treaty of indefinite duration, limiting offensive nuclear forces, to match the treaty limiting ABM defenses which had just been ratified. It was intended that the SALT II treaty should provide equal limitations on the two sides such that essential equivalence in offensive nuclear capabilities would be assured and such that "crisis stability" could and would be maintained. "Crisis stability" was the phrase used to describe a situation in which neither side could hope to gain in relative capabilities from initiating the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. It was hoped that, if these two objectives had been met, a foundation would have been laid for a reduction in the resources both sides would consider necessary to devote to their offensive nuclear armaments.

It was recognized that there were four constraining considerations which must be taken into account in achieving the primary U.S. objectives. One constraint was that the limitations strategically important to the U.S. should be verifiable. The second was that the legitimate interests of our allies must be taken into account and the terms of the agreement reasonably acceptable to them. The third constraint was that the limitations be such that it would be economically and politically practicable for the United States to deploy those permitted forces necessary to maintain essential equivalence and crisis stability. The fourth was that the terms of an agreement be negotiable; that is, be acceptable to the Soviet side and also be ratifiable by the Congress.

Early in the SALT II negotiations it was evident that there were potential conflicts among these objectives and constraints, and that difficult choices would have to be made in finding an optimum solution. One such conflict was

between the objective of maintaining crisis stability and the constraint of verifiability. It had long been recognized that limiting the number and quality of missiles was much more important than limiting the number of launchers. But it would require cooperative measures to monitor the production and storage of missiles; satellite sensors would be inadequate. The Soviets refused to agree to cooperative measures. ICBM silos, however, could be photographed from satellites, and counted and their size estimated. It was also recognized that it was more important to limit the aggregate throw-weight of a force than the number and size of its launchers. This proved to be impossible to negotiate. Verifiable and negotiable controls over missile accuracy also proved to be unattainable. The basic and primary currency of the negotiations thus became limits on the number of launchers, not limits on missiles or their characteristics. This has proven to be the wrong currency.

During the course of the six years of the SALT II negotiation, the originally formulated three U.S. primary objectives and the first three of the constraints have been progressively compromised so as to accommodate one aspect of the fourth constraint--that the terms of the agreements be acceptable to the Soviet side, thereby facilitating their negotiability. At the same time, the U.S. side has been inhibited in publicizing Soviet recalcitrance in the negotiations because of the other aspect of the fourth constraint--that the agreements be ratifiable by the Congress.

The first casualty among our original objectives was that of achieving a treaty of indefinite duration. That objective was given up in the summer of 1974 in order to announce a negotiating breakthrough at the Moscow conference which otherwise would have been without result. Each negotiating "breakthrough" since the Moscow conference has involved a further retreat from our original objectives.

What we have gained from these concessions has been a series of relatively unimportant adjustments in what otherwise would have been the Soviet program for deployments over the next six years, in part, balanced by even less significant adjustments in our programs for future deployments. In essence, most of the negotiating process has been one of trading marginal adjustments to their large strategic program versus marginal adjustments to our much smaller one.

The following sections deal with the principal considerations involved
in arriving at a judgment on the merits of the agreements as they appear to be
emerging from that process and from the differential strategic nuclear programs
of the two sides.

a. The MIRVed ICBM Balance

This component of the overall balance is of particular significance. It is likely that if deterrence fails, this component, because of its power and accuracy, its short time of flight, the greater reliability of its command and control, and its known location, would be the key element in an initial strike and any initial counterforce response. This exchange could well determine the military outcome of the war.

(1) The U.S. has closed down the MINUTEMAN III production line and has delayed the initial operating capability (IOC) date of a follow-on missile to 1986 or beyond. Therefore, there is essentially no possibility of the U.S. having any deployed MIRVed ICBM launchers by the expiration date of the Treaty in 1985 other than the 550 MINUTEMAN III silos currently deployed. The accuracy of the MINUTEMAN III has recently been significantly upgraded and it is planned to substitute MARK-12A warheads (with approximately double the yield) for the MARK-12 warheads currently deployed on the MINUTEMAN III. No other significant changes in MINUTEMAN III are now planned. The useful payload of the MINUTEMAN III is approximately 2,200 pounds. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on the MINUTEMAN III is three RVs. The aggregate useful payload (throw-weight) of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will therefore not exceed 550 x 2,200 which equals approximately a million and a quarter pounds. The aggregate number of MIRVed ICBM warheads in the U.S. force will not exceed 550 x 3, which equals 1,650 RVs.

(2) The USSR is permitted by the proposed terms of the agreement to deploy in excess of 300 SS-18s and approximately 500 SS-19s and -17s. The SS-18s have a useful payload approximating 16,000 pounds, the SS-17s and -19s have a useful payload approximating 7 to 8,000 pounds respectively. The SS-18s have been flight tested with as many as ten RVs, the SS-17s four RVs, the SS-19s

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(3) If current accuracy is no better than approximately a fifth of a mile, it would be difficult for them to eliminate more than 70 percent of our MINUTEMAN silos in an initial strike, assuming that they target two of their RVs on each silo. If their accuracy approximates fifteen hundredths of a mile, around 90 percent of our silos would be vulnerable to such a two-on-one attack. A two-on-one attack would require less than half of the MIRVed ICBM RVs they are expected to have available by 1985. When their accuracy approximates a tenth of a mile, around 90 percent of our silos will become vulnerable to an attack by a single RV against each silo, provided that additional RVs are programmed to substitute for missiles that fail during their launch phase.

(4) If we were to use all our MINUTEMAN III, taking account of their
improved accuracy and the substitution of MARK-12A for MARK-12 RVs, it is unlikely
we could destroy more than 65 percent of the Soviet ICBM silos.

The utility of large single RV unMIRVed ICBMs, which can have very
high megatonnage and thus very high fallout potential, is largely as terror
weapons to deter the other side from using its surviving deterrent in a second
strike.

(1) Until 1985 or beyond the U.S. is expected to have 450 MINUTEMAN II, each with a throw-weight of less than 2,000 pounds and carrying a single RV in the megaton range. These would give us approximately a million pounds of throw-weight and 550 megatons of yield in our unMIRVed MINUTEMAN ICBM force.

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(2) In coming down to the 2,250 limit, the Soviet side can be expected to retain at least 360 non-MIRVed ICBMs during the life of the Treaty. It now being agreed that each side will be allowed to test and deploy one new type of ICBM (MIRVed or non-MIRVed) during the period of the Treaty, it is likely that the Soviet side, having little need for a new MIRVed ICBM, will test and then deploy a new non-MIRVed ICBM with a throw-weight of approximately 8,000 pounds and a warhead yield of 15 to 20 megatons, and substitute it for approximately 360 of the currently deployed SS-11s. The aggregate throw-weight of such an unMIRVed ICBM force could be in excess of two and one-half million pounds, and its megatonnage approximately six thousand megatons.

### 3. THE SLBM BALANCE BY 1985

SLBM forces at-sea are particularly difficult to find and destroy. They can be expected to endure beyond the initial exchanges. They should, therefore, be prime candidates for being held back as strategic reserve forces to influence the later phases of a war or influence the period of war termination and beyond. It is not expected that SLBMs will achieve high accuracy by 1985. The reliability of SLBM communications constitutes a continuing problem.

#### a. MIRVed SLBMs

It was thus expected that we would, by 1985, have 41 nuclear-propelled SLBM submarines with some 736 tubes and approximately 6,000 RVs. Some 60 percent of these might be at-sea at any given time, giving us some 3,600 RVs at-sea.

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Assuming a reliability rate of 80 percent, this amounts to approximately 2,900 at-sea reliable RVs, representing an aggregate yield of approximately 200 megatons. In the event of a crisis, it should be possible, in a number of days, to increase the at-sea force by some 25 percent. It now appears, however, that delays in the TRIDENT shipbuilding program make the above target virtually unattainable.

The Soviet side, if they deploy close to the full 820 MIRVed ICBM launchers permitted under the MIRVed ICBM limit, will be able to deploy close to 400 MIRVed SLBM launchers and still stay within the 1,200 limit on MIRVed missile launchers. It is expected that the new Soviet TYPHOON submarine will be significantly larger than the present Soviet SLBM submarines and will carry 20 to 24 missiles each with up to 14 RVs; their smaller MIRVed SLBMs, the SSN8s, are expected to have no more than half that number of MIRVs. The TYPHOON missile could have the throw-weight of the projected U.S. TRIDENT II missile, development of which has not yet been authorized. The TRIDENT II missile is planned to be approximately twice the size (volume) of the TRIDENT I missile, but not be deployed prior to 1985.

b. <u>UnMIRVed SLBMs</u>

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The essential characteristic of the bomber/cruise missile forces is that while--particularly on the U.S. side--they have great potential power, it is only that portion of the force that is on alert prior to the initial attack that can be expected to survive, and the bulk of even that portion of the force must be used within the initial eight hours of a nuclear war or it too runs the danger of being lost.

The B-1 issue was incorrectly stated by the administration to be a choice between relatively cheap cruise missiles and expensive B-1s. Cruise missiles have to be launched from some kind of survivable platform, preferably one that can endure in a nuclear war environment for more than a few hours. The Executive Branch's position is that this preferably should be an aircraft. Thus, one requires a bomber/cruise missile system consisting of bombers and tankers so based as to give a high probability of prelaunch survivability for those that are on alert, whose take-off is sufficiently rapid and which are so hardened against nuclear effects that it becomes difficult to barrage their escape routes; bombers that are able to penetrate close enough to the target to launch cruise missiles to destroy or suppress defenses; and cruise missiles able to penetrate area and terminal defenses and accurate enough to kill the targets they are aimed at. The cruise missile is thus only part of a multifaceted system. The bomber that launches it and the tankers that refuel the bombers are equally essential parts of the system. The system is greatly improved and the enemy's defensive problem greatly increased, if some of the bombers have the capability for rapid take-off, are hardened against radiation, are more confidently able to penetrate Soviet defenses and thus to launch SRAMs, other types of missiles, or gravity bombs, close to the target.

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The U.S. contemplates deploying some 120 to 150 aircraft equipped
with intermediate range ALCMs. The majority of these aircraft are planned
to be B-52s; however, some type of transport aircraft carrying a larger
number of ALCMs than does a B-52 is also being considered. If an aircraft
is equipped to carry more than an agreed maximum number of ALCMs per air-
craft, it will be counted as being an appropriate multiple of one "heavy
bomber" under the 1,320 limit.

As it now stands, if we maintain 550 MINUTEMAN III launchers, plus
our 496 POSEIDON launch tubes, and were to deploy our planned 240 TRIDENT
tubes, this would total 1,286 MIRVed missile launchers. This number would
exceed the 1,200 limit on MIRVed missile launchers. Therefore, unless
there is a delay in the TRIDENT program, we will, in any case, have to
phase out some 86 POSEIDON or MINUTEMAN III launchers. If we propose to
deploy more than 120 ALCM-carrying planes, we will have to phase out addi-
tional POSEIDON or MINUTEMAN III launchers to stay within the 1,320 limit.
It is uncertain that the Navy would recommend phasing out POSEIDONs or
the Air Force the MINUTEMAN III.

Even if we assume 120 to 150 deployed ALCM-carrying aircraft, it would
be unlikely that more than some 50 percent would be on continuous alert or
that more than some 90 percent could be brought to readiness under condi-
tions calling for fully generated strategic forces.

The Soviet Union faces a much simpler problem. The U.S. has no sub-
stantial air defenses and the Soviet BACKFIRE is not to be counted under
any of the proposed limits. Even if BACKFIRE production is limited to

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current production rates, the number deployed will grow to significant numbers, they can be dispersed to a larger number of fields than our B-52s and their chances of surviving an initial exchange are thus enhanced. In view of our limited defense, BACKFIRE carried cruise missiles would not need to have a range greater than 600 kilometers. If the Soviets exploit their current technology, they could deploy a significant number of such short-range ALCMs on BACKFIREs prior to 1985. The potential of the BACKFIRE to survive the initial exchanges of a nuclear war coupled with its capability to penetrate very limited U.S. defenses would contribute significantly to a greater possibility of Soviet domination of the subsequent phases of such a war.

Whether the FB-111H (which is 40 percent the size of the BACKFIRE) can penetrate depends, among other things, on whether U.S. tankers can survive in sufficient numbers for the required multiple inflight refuelings of the FB-111Hs. If the FB-111H were to carry ALCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers, they would have to be counted under both the 1,320 ceiling and the 1,200 ceiling.

## 5. THE DEFINITION AND VERIFICATION PROBLEM

It is impossible to verify compliance unless what is to be, limited and the nature of the limitation have been clearly defined and the definition agreed in depth between the parties.

As can be seen from the current state of the negotiation, difficult problems in definition are evident. What the range of a cruise missile is and how it is to be measured have proven to be conceptually difficult to define--not merely difficult to negotiate. What is the permitted production rate of BACKFIRE bombers? Presumably the current rate; the Soviet side will not say what that is, but it is reported that we estimate the rate at approximately 40 per year. What is the permitted "useful payload" of a "small" missile; i.e., exceeding what number of pounds of "useful payload" could cause it to be classed as an MLBM? Apparently the "throw-weight" of an SS-19, which term we define as the maximum useful payload an SS-19-type missile booster has put, or can put, into an intercontinental trajectory. But the Soviets will not define "type," will

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not tell us how they measure useful payload, nor tell us what they assess the
useful payload of an SS-19 to be. Etcetera.

Even where the limitations are clearly defined, compliance is in many
cases difficult to verify. How do you verify the range of the other side's
cruise missile, no matter how precisely "range" is defined? How do you
distinguish an ALCM from a GLCM or SLCM, or assure that an ALCM cannot be
launched from a sea- or land-based launcher? How do you determine whether
it is conventionally armed or nuclear armed? How do you determine that a new
missile having the throw-weight of an SS-19 and carrying a bus similar to an
SS-19 bus, but with a single RV, is not capable of being deployed as a MIRVed
missile? How do you determine that a missile tested both from land-based
launchers and SLBM submarines is an SLBM and cannot be used as an ICBM? How
do you determine that retired missiles or missiles taken out of retired launchers
or extra, newly produced missiles are not being stockpiled to be available for
relatively prompt deployment on soft pads or for reload in surviving launchers?

Now that the Soviet side has taken firm action to demonstrate that it does
not intend to be bound by any commitment not to deny us information by encrypting
the telemetry from their test ranges, we can no longer count on having as much
information as we have had in the past to assist in the task of monitoring
compliance with SALT limitations.

Quite clearly, in many instances unambiguous verification of the SALT II
limitations will not be possible. For this reason the arms control community
now uses the phrase "adequately verifiable." It is correct that "verifiability"
is not an absolute requirement; it is a means toward the end of a good agree-
ment. A wholly verifiable bad agreement would still be a bad agreement. If
those provisions of an agreement which are strategically significant to us are
adequately verifiable, the agreement might be a good agreement, even if its less
important provisions are not confidently verifiable. The difficulty, however,
rests in determining which provisions are "strategically significant" to us and
what is meant by the word "adequate." Both phrases lend themselves to subjective
judgments.

The Soviet Union has devoted a truly enormous effort to air defenses. It has deployed 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers and approximately 2,700 interceptor fighters. It has deployed thousands of inter-netted air defense radars and ground-control-interceptor centers. It is apparently ready to deploy a new high capability mobile phased-array radar/missile system called the SAX-10. It has recently been reported that the SAX-10 is being deployed on surface ships, thus affording the Soviets the beginnings of a capability to deploy a forward barrier defense against our bomber aircraft.

The Soviet Union has maintained and somewhat improved those ABM capabilities it had earlier deployed in the Moscow area. It is significantly increasing the capabilities of its phased-array ABM "early warning" radars around the periphery of the USSR. This is permitted under the ABM Treaty on the assumption that, in the event of war, such a network, being close to the periphery, could be destroyed. It is also assumed that the even more powerful radars in the Moscow area could, with greater effort, be destroyed. However, the large Soviet phased-array radar deployments, when coupled with the development of a transportable phased ABM radar and high acceleration interceptor combination, could give the USSR a reasonably rapid break-out toward an important "damage limiting" ABM capability, particularly against U.S. SLBM RVs.

Even more important are the civil defense aspects of the problem. Many who have carefully studied the problem concur that a well executed civil defense program--to evacuate most of the population of Moscow and Leningrad would take several days--can reduce fatalities by a factor of five to ten as well as substantially reducing industrial damage and the time necessary for economic

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It has recently been announced that the Executive Branch will request an
expansion of the U.S. civil defense program to include work to enable more rapid
evacuation of our urban population in the event of a crisis. Approval of such
a program could be of major importance. It should be noted, however, that after
such expansion our program would cost about one-tenth of what the Executive
Branch estimates the Soviets are spending on civil defense.

7. THE NUMBER AND HARDNESS OF TARGETS PROBLEM

The potential effectiveness of offensive nuclear forces should be judged
in the light of the target structure they might be called upon to strike. From
the standpoint of the military outcome of war, were deterrence to fail, the
most important targets are hard targets (silos, launch control facilities,
command, control and communication bunkers, nuclear storage facilities, and
the like). It is because of their strategic significance that they have been
hardened. The list of Soviet hard targets is larger than ours, and the targets
are generally harder. Their list is growing while ours is not. The Soviets
will, by the mid-1980s, have twice as many hard targets as the United States
and on the average they will be twice as hard.

Against soft targets the important criteria are soft target (area) potential
EMT, megatonnage, number of warheads, and the relative effectiveness of the
civil defense measures on the two sides.

8. THE BREAK-OUT PROBLEM

The essential effort in the ABM Treaty negotiation was to assure that
neither side could break-out of the agreement and thereafter rapidly deploy a
significant ABM defense. That was why the main emphasis was put on preventing
the deployment of a widespread ABM-capable radar network, the element requiring
the longest leadtime.

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In the early SALT II negotiations the break-out problem with respect to offensive systems was given much attention by the U.S. side. This effort has had to be put to one side in the interest of negotiability. This has resulted in provisions that leave rapid break-out by the Soviet Union entirely feasible.

For instance, the proposed provisions designed to limit Soviet ability to reload their silos cannot be counted on to be effective for any extended period of time.

The agreements appear to involve such phrases as "cruise missiles can be carried only by heavy bombers." Those who actually have worked on and designed cruise missiles say that any bomber with hard points on its wings can rapidly be converted to carry cruise missiles and that any cruise missile operable from a plane can rapidly be adapted to be launched from ground- or sea-based launchers.

There seems to be no concern with the potential conversion to a damage-limiting ABM role of new air defense systems, designed to counter the U.S. SRAM/cruise missiles.

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## 9. THE COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND PRE- AND POST-ATTACK INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

Second strike deterrent forces will fail in their purpose if responsible civil authority is not able effectively to command and control them. This requires that responsible civil authority survive an attack, have time for a considered and intelligent decision, and be able to communicate with those in immediate control of the launching of surviving forces. For these decisions to be intelligent and effective, continuing information, both as to the status of our own forces and those of the enemy, is essential.

Neither those in the Executive Branch, nor those outside it, have confidence in the current status of what is called our C³ + I. In fact, improving its effectiveness and survivability is given the highest priority by most analysts of our strategic posture. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has put a vastly greater effort than has the U.S. into providing themselves with redundant and survivable C³ + I systems capable of enduring, if necessary, through a protracted nuclear war. They have also been developing antisatellite and other capabilities which could deny us pre- and post-attack intelligence.

It was hoped that the SALT II provision obligating each side not to interfere with the other side's national technical means of verification would give useful protection to our pre-attack technical intelligence capabilities. With the Soviet Union's demonstration of its determination to protect its right to encrypt test range telemetry much of our technical intelligence capability becomes dependent on unilateral Soviet decisions.

The diminishing survivability and endurance potential of our strategic forces to be expected during the Treaty period sharpen the need for improved U.S. post-attack C³ + I.

## 10. THE RELATION OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE TO THE THEATER BALANCE, CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR

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In the years up to the early 1950s this was offset by the U.S. nuclear
monopoly. Later the conventional deficiency was in large measure offset by
U.S. superiority in theater nuclear weapons. Today that theater nuclear
superiority has disappeared and it has proved necessary to assign a number of
our POSEIDON submarines to cover targets of interest to NATO, and thus maintain
a theater balance. It has been estimated that the Soviet Union has two to
three times as many theater nuclear weapons, with six times the area destructive
potential, ten times the throw-weight, and twenty-five times the megatonnage
as we. As the Soviets deploy increasing numbers of SS-20 MIRVed missiles,
BACKFIRE and other high performance theater bombers, maintaining a theater
nuclear balance will become increasingly difficult. More and more of our sur-
viving strategic nuclear forces will be called upon for assignment to offset
that imbalance. This consideration is rarely taken into account when the
strategic nuclear balance is being examined; it should be.

Moreover, the SALT II agreement could have a serious negative effect upon
the evolution of the conventional balance. The European NATO countries have
hoped to exploit cruise missile technology in its theater conventional weapon
applications. Agreement that armed cruise missiles with a range greater than
600 kilometers are to be limited in SALT would favor the Soviet side. It
would support the erroneous Soviet claim that nuclear ballistic missiles deployed
in the Soviet Union for peripheral area missions, with medium or intermediate
ranges, which under SALT II can be up to 5,500 kilometers, are not "strategic,"
while cruise missiles deployed in NATO Europe, if over 600 kilometers in range,
whether nuclear or conventionally armed, are "strategic."

In specific terms, the SALT II agreements, particularly if the Soviet
position that conventionally armed cruise missiles as well as nuclear armed are
to be limited is accepted, may prevent the United States from transferring
technology important to the conventional defense of Europe because of limitations
on the transfer of weapons, components, or technical information relating to
weapons limited by the SALT Treaty, as well as prohibiting the deployment by
the U.S. of conventionally armed cruise missiles with ranges greater than 600
kilometers.

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These limitations could also result in the U.S. Navy being limited to
cruise missiles less than 600 kilometers in range, while countries not party
to the agreement would not be so limited, and could then significantly out-
range it.

11. THE IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT UPON THE UNITED STATES' ABILITY TO REVERSE CURRENT TRENDS

U.S. program decisions and delays in making decisions since Vladivostok,
plus the terms of the probable SALT agreement now make it difficult, if not
impossible, to maintain crisis stability and rough equivalence.

It is argued by some that the restrictions in the agreements, as they
apply to the United States, are of little significance; they do not keep us
from doing anything we now should, or would want to, do during the period of
the agreements. Whether this is so or not depends in large measure on whether
or not the agreements permit the deployment of a multiple aimpoint system (MAPS).
Under this concept the U.S. would construct a large number of vertical protec-
tive shelters or silos, each capable of holding a cannister containing an ICBM
(a MINUTEMAN III or a follow-on missile such as the MX) and its launch mechanism;
or, alternatively, a cannister which would contain no missile or launch mechan-
ism but which would be indistinguishable from those that did. The cannisters
containing the missile and launch mechanism would periodically and randomly
be moved and substituted among those that did not. The U.S. is reported to have
told the Soviets that it considered that such a system was permitted under the
Treaty. The Soviet side is reported to have expressed its most serious reserva-
tions about any such interpretation.

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If it is agreed by both sides that a MAP deployment is permitted, it is conceivable that the U.S. could deploy such a system rapidly enough to maintain crisis stability. If not so agreed, there does not appear to be any feasible, alternate way to do so within the next decade.

Under the now most likely provisions of a SALT II agreement, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how we can reverse recent adverse trends. Beginning in the early to mid-1980s, we would have to rely on an ICBM force useful, if deterrence fails, only if the President decides to launch it from under an attack in the few minutes he may have available to do so, a bomber force capable of enduring no more than a few hours, if not earlier used, and an SLBM force at-sea of less than 25 boats, each boat constituting four percent of our "enduring" deterrent power and thus worth enormous Soviet efforts to negate.

## 12. THE SITUATION IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT

The proponents of ratification of the treaty emphasize that whereas the USSR now has some 2,500 strategic launchers, under SALT II they will have to reduce these to 2,400 some months after entry into force of the agreements, and to 2,250 some three years thereafter. They assert that in the absence of an agreement, the Soviet side may not make any such reductions and may well add some 400, or even more, new strategic launchers to those they would be limited to under SALT II.

Based upon past experience, this is unlikely. The most careful student of Soviet past defense budgets and programs, William Lee, tells us that he can identify little if any modification in the general magnitude of Soviet defense budgets and therefore of defense programs in response to international events or changes in U.S. programs. Whereas it is generally said that the increased Soviet emphasis on expanding its intercontinental strategic capabilities was in direct response to the Cuban missile crisis, Lee finds no evidence that this is so. The Soviet five-year planning process is so interrelated and complex, that anything beyond marginal adjustments is extremely disruptive and, in the past, has rarely occurred. He also notes the difficulty the Soviets would have

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in increasing the percentage of their GNP devoted to defense, which he estimates
has now risen to approximately 18 percent.

Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded that the Soviet side,
in the absence of SALT II, would not decrease the number of its strategic
launchers to 2,250 and, instead, would increase them.

It should be noted, however, that the 300 launchers they are expected to
phase out to reach 2,250 are obsolete ICBMs and SLBMs which add little to their
capability. Their presently programmed forces, largely composed of new missiles,
will provide them with such an excess of MIRVed hard target kill capability, of
unMIRVed megatonnage, and of RVs needed for target coverage, that it is hard to
see what strategic benefit more of the same would give them. Increased inter-
mediate range systems to cover requirements against China are not limited by
SALT.

It is now anticipated that, as the Soviet side completes its deployment
of new ICBMs and SLBMs, they will concentrate more heavily on adding to their
defensive capabilities. This is where the principal gaps in their warmaking
potential now lie. In particular, they are expected to add more attack sub-
marines designed for an ASW role, and aircraft with improved look-down/shoot-
down radar capabilities, and to deploy improved antiaircraft systems such as
their SAX-10 mobile antiaircraft batteries, etc. For the Soviet Union to shift
resources back to offensive forces from a contemplated strengthening of their
defenses may not be disadvantageous to the United States.

The more important question is what the United States can be expected to
do under the SALT II agreements--and in the absence of such agreements--to
reverse currently unfavorable strategic nuclear trends.

13. THE QUESTION OF STRATEGY

Fundamental to the debate over SALT II and over our strategic nuclear
program is the question of what strategy to follow, if deterrence were to
fail, and the relationship of strategy to deterrence.

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Some start from the assumption that a nuclear war is "unthinkable"; that those who do think about it must be Dr. Strangelove's; that deterrence has nothing to do with the military strategy either side intends to follow in the event deterrence were to fail; that, regardless of strategy and of the probable balance of the initially surviving and then enduring nuclear forces, there could be no meaningful winner or loser in a nuclear war.

Others believe that a nuclear war is thinkable, that the United States can best avoid a nuclear war, while preserving its independence and honor, by thinking seriously about nuclear war and taking prudent and timely actions to forestall it. They view the quality of deterrence to be importantly affected by the strategy we intend to follow and could effectively implement, if deterrence were to fail. They question the wisdom and credibility of a so-called minimum deterrence strategy. Under such a strategy, deterrence would depend on the United States' ability and will to launch, in response to a Soviet attack, some limited number of warheads against Soviet cities and industry protected by extensive active and passive defenses. The fact that the remaining U.S. military forces and U.S. population and industry would then be defenseless against ten thousand megatons or more of a Soviet third and fourth strike capability would be ignored.

Few now overtly support the minimum deterrence approach. They are more apt to describe their position with such phrases as "sufficiency" or "flexibility." This leads to the question of how much of what is enough? That judgment in turn must rest importantly upon the relative emphasis placed on the counterforce aspects of nuclear strategy and the countervalue aspects. Neither aspect can be ignored. If our counterforce capabilities, survivable after an initial Soviet strike, were sufficient to out-fight Soviet residual forces, while our other forces were capable of holding Soviet population and industry in reciprocal danger to our own, the quality of deterrence would be high because the Soviets would know we were in a position to implement a credible military strategy in the event deterrence were to fail.

If our strategy were restricted to a revenge attack on, for instance, the 200 largest Soviet cities, the military forces required to support such a

19

strategy would be relatively small. Such a strategy, however, would be suicidal if implemented, vastly more destructive to us than to the Soviet Union, and militarily hopeless. One could, therefore, have only limited confidence in deterrence based upon an implied determination to execute such a strategy to defend vital U.S. interests.

Those that claim that we are stronger than the Soviet Union now and will continue to be so during our lifetimes, more or less regardless of what we do, must equate forces designed to support such a minimum deterrence strategy with superiority.

## 14. THE CONTINUING NEGOTIATION PROBLEM

It has been characteristic of the SALT negotiation process that the U.S. Executive Branch, in justifying existing agreements, has stressed its hope that their deficiencies will be corrected in future agreements. This argument characterized the justification of the SALT I Interim Agreement. That agreement specified that its terms were not to prejudice, in any way, the scope or terms of the long term comprehensive agreement contemplated for its replacement, the negotiation of which both sides had agreed should begin immediately after entry into force of the Interim Agreement. Despite the best efforts of the U.S. side, the terms of the Interim Agreement have, in fact, prejudiced the terms of SALT II. The nature of the continuing programs of the two sides and the political and psychological pressures on the U.S. made it difficult to achieve any other result.

As one looks into the future, SALT III negotiations are contemplated to begin shortly after SALT II is ratified and enters into force. Two hurdles must be met by the U.S. negotiators during those negotiations. The first is the expiration of the Protocol around January 1, 1982; the second will be the expiration of the Treaty at the end of 1985. It is likely that negotiations will concern themselves with both subjects and that the Soviet side will press for the extension of those provisions of the Protocol which they would have preferred to see in the Treaty, and link that pressure to the SALT III treaty negotiation. The question of whether the U.S. can expect to prevail with respect

20

to its hopes for SALT III will largely depend on the relative bargaining posi-
tion of the two sides during the negotiations. The evolution of the relative
strength of the two sides in the strategic nuclear arena is almost certain to
be negative during the entire period prior to expiration of the SALT II Treaty.
If the MX and TRIDENT II versions of the "largely-common missile" are then
close to their IOCs, this could have a favorable bearing on the negotiations.
The impending deployment of the MX version could, however, be destabilizing
if a basing mode capable of assuring its survivability and endurance were not
concurrently available.

If the SALT II Treaty were to expire in 1985 without replacement and
without a survivable and durable U.S. ICBM component, the U.S. could face
unprecedented dangers. We would then have to take seriously both existing
Soviet nuclear strategic superiority and a superior Soviet breakout potential.
To avoid these risks, we would be under pressure to agree to a SALT III less
favorable than SALT II, rather than hold out for a more favorable one.

15. THE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CONSEQUENCES OF A SHIFT IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

Some proponents, rather than taking exception to the main thrust of the
analysis contained in the preceding sections, argue a different series of
points along the following line:

c. To insist on such an equitable agreement would assure that there would be no success, at least in the next few years, in negotiating a SALT II set of agreements. Such a delay would risk a breakdown of detente.

22

TABLE 1

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

September 19, 1978

I thought you might be interested in some observations with regard to your possibly running for the Senate in 1980.

My first reaction was that you should not do so, and that on the other hand you should develop contacts so that you could serve whoever obtains the Republican nomination for President. On further thought, I believe you should seriously consider the Senate race.

For any Republican to win in 1980, in view of the overwhelming registration advantage any Democrat will have, is at best a relatively long shot, unless the administration falls totally on its face in handling what will probably be the major issue in 1980 - inflation and the high cost of living. And you may find that you could not comfortably serve with whoever happens to become the Republican candidate.

In the Senate you would have a powerful forum for years to come and could be a major force in developing a bipartisan foreign policy in the Vandenberg tradition which the country desperately needs.

Should you decide to seek the Senate seat I believe the following game plan should be implemented:

You should decide in your own mind immediately after the November elections to become a candidate.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger

September 19, 1978

You should make no public announcement, but
should allow trusted and discreet friends
like Pete Flanigan to begin contacting
party leaders with the objective of obtaining
private commitments and keeping others from
getting them.

You should ask Herb Brownell to be your
primary adviser. He is by all odds the best
and most influential politician in New York
state.

If he deems it advisable, Brownell should
privately contact Javits. If Javits is
determined to go, you of course must not
take him on. If he indicates he wants to
delay his decision he should be made to
realize that if you do not get into the race
early, someone else will do so and the chance
to keep an eminently qualified foreign policy
spokesman in the Senate (conceding that Javits
is one) could be seriously jeopardized.

Jack Kemp presents a difficult problem. If he
goes all out you might defeat him in a primary,
but there would be so much blood-letting that
any middle road Democrat would win. Kemp is
a decent man who is particularly well quali-
fied on domestic issues. But he has to realize
that he has become a national figure as a
member of the House and does not need the
Senate forum to remain one. If he runs and
loses, he would probably be finished as a
national political figure. Brownell is the only
one who could possibly handle the contact with
Kemp. To keep your options open, Kemp must
understand that you probably will become a
candidate. Without indicating in any way
that there would be a deal, Brownell could
discreetly let Kemp know that because of the
accident of birth you cannot seek national
office and that you would look sympathetically
on his efforts to do so in 1980 or 1984.

September 19, 1978

You should have no problem in getting money.
Brownell will be able to advise you as to how
the Flanigan or some other group could, with-
out your public approval, go forward in raising
necessary funds for staff, polling, travel,
etc., during the period when you are not an
announced candidate.

I think any public announcement should be
delayed until after your book comes out next
summer or early fall. The best way to build
yourself is through non-political public
appearances and private meetings with in-
fluential party leaders.

You need no advice on foreign policy issues,
but you should develop a small, top-flight
staff on domestic issues. In the Spring, a
couple of major speeches or articles on the
economy will be helpful in establishing your
credentials in that area. I would urge you to
be conservative on economic issues, liberal
on civil rights, and hard-line on foreign
policy and national defense. You thereby
can get the support of Republicans who are
disenchanted with Javits' ultra-liberal views
on all issues.

A final note of advice. Two of the most able poli-
tical leaders of our time, Dewey and Taft, were im-
placable foes but were alike in one respect -- they
could not tolerate fools. You must learn not to
make that mistake. People you might justifiably
consider to be stupid may be the ones you will
need to get the nomination and win the election.

As I told you on the phone, I would appreciate your

Nomura Research Institute

PHONE : 03-211-1811

1-11-1 NIHONBASHI
CHUO-KU, TOKYO
JAPAN

TELEX : 2226542 NRITKY J
CABLE : NOMURARESEARCH TOKYO

April 17, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am pleased to send you copies of my latest Newsweek column, Gloomy 'Places in the Sun,' and an NRI forecast of the fiscal 1978 economy. As you can see, even after taking additional stimulus packages into account, we are forecasting a growth of 5.1 per cent in the current fiscal year.

With best regards,

JT:yh

Encl.

By Jiro Tokuyama

Gloomy 'Places in the Sun'

Each day they come to the office. Attentive office girls make them cups of tea. They sit at their desks and go through the daily newspapers. They do little else. For them, as the title of one recent best seller put it, "Everyday Is Sunday." Yet for this routine, they draw substantial salaries and often have access to lavish expense accounts as well. Some of them are Japan's "windowed" executives, men who rose to managerial ranks during the nation's heady days of growth and now, either because they are ill-equipped for modern business or the business simply isn't there, they have little to do. They survive largely because of Japan's system of lifetime employment. But now, many of them are upset, gripped by the fear that the continuing economic slump and the country's worsening employment picture may eventually cost them their places in the sun.

They have good reason to be worried. In the West, unemployment hits hardest at the young. But in Japan, unemployment strikes at the middle-aged or older workers. At present, those over 40 account for nearly 40 per cent of the jobless—in the U.S., by comparison, only 24 per cent of the unemployed are over 40. The main reason for this difference is that Japan has a higher percentage of older workers who are employed in such shrinking industries as shipbuilding and textiles. When layoffs occur—and in these industries they are becoming increasingly common—it is the older workers who are asked to leave, often three to ten years before the mandatory retirement age of 55.

JOB SECURITY

Older workers find that seniority frequently jeopardizes their job security. Since a worker's pay rises along with his seniority—even if his job remains the same—a worker with more years on the job is obviously more expensive than a younger man. According to a 1976 survey, an employee over 40 costs a firm 50 per cent more in wages than a worker between the ages of 20 and 24. Therefore, employers looking for ways to cut back on costs are tempted to ax the older man. The problem is compounded by the fact that the number of older work-

ers in the total Japanese work force is itself rapidly rising. In the United States, it took 40 years for the proportion of older workers (above 45) to grow from 25 per cent to 35 per cent of the total labor force. In Japan, this same process will take less than a decade.

The total employment picture has worsened every month since last autumn. The number of jobless—those who aren't gainfully employed for more than one hour during the last week of the month—climbed from 1 million last October to 1.1 million in December and up to 1.2 million this January. And as the soaring value of the yen reduces Japan's competitive advantage in world markets and damages the domestic economy, the jobless figure may well go much higher, perhaps reaching an unprecedented 1.5 million this month. Since January 1977, the monthly number of job openings also dropped from the year before. At present, there is only one job available for every two job seekers who register at employment offices.

LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT

Of course, Japan's unemployment figures and the official unemployment rate of 2.4 per cent look ridiculously low by international standards. But the low figures are deceptive. The numbers are kept down largely by the lifetime-employment tradition. Under this policy, companies seldom fire employees—except for serious misbehaviors or mistakes. Only if the firm is heading for bankruptcy will the management sometimes ask employees to retire voluntarily or leave the company. If that happens, workers usually go along with such requests, for fear that if they stay and the company does collapse, they might end up losing their severance pay.

Unemployment statistics are misleading in other ways as well. First, in calculating the unemployment rate, the denominator—the labor force—is larger than in other countries. The Japanese labor force includes everyone 15 years and older; in the U.S., youths are not considered part of the work force until they are 16. The Japanese figure also includes the military but the American statistics do not. Second, the numerator—the number

of unemployed—is smaller in Japan than in other nations. Workers who are laid off in most other countries are included in the unemployment fig-

ures. But in Japan, companies place their redundant workers on temporary leave and keep them on the firm's payroll at reduced wages. Technically, such workers—who are estimated to total 2 million—are not included among the jobless. When these workers are included in the figures, Japan's unemployment rate jumps to more than 6 per cent—almost equal to that in the U.S. and Western Europe.

SLUGGISH ECONOMY

These workers are now so pervasive in Japanese industry that even when production does start picking up, there will be no resultant rise in the employment figures. In fact, although Japan's industrial output reached its low point in 1975, companies have been extremely cautious about taking on new, regular employees. To increase production, they have depended primarily on overtime work by the existing labor force, or they have hired temporary workers. As a result, while America's total employment for 1977 was well above its 1970 level, Japan's was still below its level of eight years ago.

Under these pressures, traditional lifetime employment and seniority-based pay systems are changing. The seniority-based income structure, in particular, is quickly becoming a myth. Today, its practitioners include only the government bureaucracies and a handful of the large companies. Lifetime employment is also bound to change as well in the coming years. In the past, high economic growth provided jobs for more than 50 million workers in Japan—often for life. Today, the sluggish economy cannot go on providing everyone such jobs. Japan's task, therefore, is somehow to strike a balance between the need for jobs on the one hand and economic rationalism on the other.

Jiro Tokuyama is managing director of the Nomura Research Institute.

12

Newsweek, April 10, 1978

FISCAL 1978 ECONOMY

IN OUR DECEMBER FORECAST, WE ESTIMATED THE RATE OF REAL GROWTH IN FISCAL 1978 (APRIL 1978-MARCH 1979) TO BE 4.6 PER CENT. OUR LATEST FORECAST, MADE IN MARCH, ALSO FORESEES THE RATE OF GROWTH TO BE 4.6 PER CENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT.

THEY ARE:

1. IN THE RECENT FORECAST, WE REVISED DOWNWARD PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE. IN THE EARLIER FORECAST, WE EXPECTED A ¥1 TRILLION INDIVIDUAL TAX REBATES. THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET PROVIDES FOR A TAX REBATE OF ONLY ¥300 BILLION FOR INDIVIDUALS.

2. EXPORTS HAVE BEEN INCREASING AT A RATE HIGHER THAN WHAT WE HAD ANTICIPATED.

WITH 4.6 PER CENT GROWTH, JAPAN WILL NOT BE ABLE TO REDUCE ITS CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS TO THE TARGET LEVEL OF $6 BILLION.

IN ADDITION TO A ¥2 TRILLION STIMULATIVE PACKAGE ANTICIPATED FOR JUNE, WE ASSUME THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL ADOPT IN THE AUTUMN ANOTHER PACKAGE, AMOUNTING TO APPROXIMATELY ¥1.5 TRILLION (¥1.0 TRILLION IN TAX REBATES AND ¥500 BILLION IN PUBLIC WORKS EXPENDITURE). BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION, WE RAISED THE EXPECTED RATE OF GROWTH TO 5.1 PER CENT.

- I -

A. COMPARISON OF FISCAL 1977 AND 1978 ECONOMIES

I. THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATE AND EXPORTS

THE YEN'S EXCHANGE RATE AGAINST THE DOLLAR DURING FISCAL 1977 ROSE 37 YEN (FROM THE FISCAL 1976 AVERAGE OF ¥293 TO THE FISCAL 1977 AVERAGE OF ¥256). IN FISCAL 1978 IT IS EXPECTED TO RISE 36 YEN TO ¥220.

DURING FISCAL 1977 EXPORTS ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE INCREASED 7.5 PER CENT ABOVE THE PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR. DUE TO THE ADOPTION OF SUCH MEASURES AS THE STEEL REFERENCE PRICES, AN ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENT ON COLOR TVs AND VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS ON AUTOMOTIVE EXPORTS, THE RATE OF INCREASE IN EXPORTS HAS BEEN DECLINING SHARPLY.

IN FISCAL 1978 WE EXPECT ZERO GROWTH IN EXPORTS. JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY MINISTER KOMOTO ALSO EXPECTS NO GROWTH DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. AS EXPORTS ACCOUNT FOR 17.7 PER CENT OF JAPAN'S GNP, THE RATE OF INCREASE IN GNP WILL DECLINE 1.3 PER CENT AS A RESULT OF THE SHIFT FROM 7.5 PER CENT TO ZERO GROWTH OF EXPORTS.

2. PUBLIC WORKS EXPENDITURE

IN FISCAL 1977, GOVERNMENT FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IN REAL TERMS INCREASED AN ESTIMATED 16 PER CENT OVER THE PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR. IN THE ORIGINAL BUDGET FOR FISCAL 1978, GOVERNMENT FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION IS EXPECTED TO INCREASE ALSO 16 PER CENT IN REAL TERMS. THUS, EVEN AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF THE EXPECTED

- 2 -

ADDITIONAL STIMULUS PACKAGES, WHICH TOGETHER WILL BE WORTH ¥3.5 TRILLION (¥2 TRILLION IN JULY AND ¥1.5 TRILLION IN THE AUTUMN), THE RATE OF GROWTH IN FISCAL 1978 IS ESTIMATED AT 5.1 PER CENT.

IN OUR FORECAST, WE EXPECT NO CHANGES FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR IN PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, PRIVATE PLANT AND EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT, INVENTORY INVESTMENT AND HOUSING CONSTRUCTION. WE CONSIDER THIS IS A REALISTIC ASSUMPTION.

THE JAPANESE ECONOMY REACHED ITS HIGH POINT DURING THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1977 AND HAS BEEN SLOWING SINCE. THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND TRADE PROTECTIONIST MOVES HAVE BEEN OFFSET BY INCREASED PUBLIC WORKS EXPENDITURE. THE ECONOMY WILL CONTINUE TO BE INACTIVE THROUGH THIS SUMMER. FROM THIS AUTUMN, IT IS EXPECTED TO EXPAND AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF 6 PER CENT.

## B. FOUR SCENARIOS

### 1. THE DREAM SCENARIO

THE GOVERNMENT WILL STIMULATE THE ECONOMY UNTIL IT ACHIEVES BOTH THE 7 PER CENT GROWTH AND $6 BILLION CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS TARGETS. THE RATIO OF DEBT-FINANCING TO THE TOTAL TREASURY REVENUE IN THIS CASE WOULD BE 32 PER CENT.

### 2. THE MOST REALISTIC SCENARIO

THE GOVERNMENT WILL ADOPT STIMULUS PACKAGES IN JULY AND AUTUMN TOTALLING ¥3.5 TRILLION. THE RATE OF GROWTH WILL BE 5 PER CENT. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS, HOWEVER, WILL

- 3 -

REMAIN ABOVE $10 BILLION. THE RATE OF DEBT FINANCING WOULD BE 37 PER CENT.

### 3. THE IMPOSSIBLE SCENARIO A

THE GOVERNMENT WILL REFLATE THE ECONOMY TO ACHIEVE 7 PER CENT GROWTH. THE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS WOULD BE AROUND $10 BILLION, AND THE DEBT-FINANCING RATIO 40 PER CENT.

### 3' THE IMPOSSIBLE SCENARIO B

THE GOVERNMENT WILL REFLATE THE ECONOMY UNTIL THE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS IS REDUCED TO $6 BILLION. THE RATE OF GROWTH THEN WOULD BE 10 PER CENT, AND THE DEBT-FINANCING RATIO 50 PER CENT. THIS SCENARIO WILL BRING WITH IT A HIGH INFLATION OF ABOUT 10 PER CENT ANNUAL CONSUMER PRICE INCREASES BEGINNING THIS AUTUMN.

### 4. THE IMPOSSIBLE SCENARIO C

THE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS WILL BE REDUCED TO $6 BILLION THROUGH VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRICTIONS AND OVERSEAS TRADE PROTECTIONIST MEASURES. THE RATE OF GROWTH THEN WILL BE 2 PER CENT.

### 4' THE IMPOSSIBLE SCENARIO D

AFTER ACHIEVING THE $6 BILLION CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS TARGET, THE GOVERNMENT WILL REFLATE THE ECONOMY TO 7 PER CENT GROWTH. THE DEBT-FINANCING RATIO WOULD BE 50 PER CENT.

- 4 -

## ANALYSES OF THESE SCENARIOS

CASE I WILL DETERIORATE THE FABRIC OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY TO THE EXTENT THAT IT CAN CAUSE A WORLDWIDE RECESSION. THE SAME IS TRUE WITH CASES 3, 3', 4 AND 4'. CASE 2 IS MOST REALISTIC. IN THIS CASE, THE RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT (INCLUDING LATENT UNEMPLOYMENT) WILL BE AROUND 6 PER CENT. HOWEVER, THE SHARP BIPOLARIZATION THAT IS TAKING PLACE AMONG INDUSTRY AND ENTERPRISES CAN LEAD TO SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

### C. CORPORATE PROFITS

CORPORATE PROFITS ARE EXPECTED TO DECLINE FOR THEE CONSECUTIVE SIX-MONTH PERIODS FROM MARCH 1977 TO SEPTEMBER 1978. CORPORATE PROFITS DURING THE TERM ENDING SEPTEMBER 1978 ARE EXPECTED TO BE ONLY 68 PER CENT OF THEIR 1973 LEVEL. (46.6 PER CENT FOR THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES.) THE PROFITS TO SALES RATIO IS ESTIMATED AT ONLY 42.7 PER CENT OF THE 1973 RATIO. (29.4 PER CENT FOR THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES.)

AMONG THE 402 MAJOR LISTED COMPANIES, 81, OR 20 PER CENT, ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN DEFICIT AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. ABOUT ONE-THIRD (147 COMPANIES) WILL NOT PAY ANY DIVIDENDS.

### D. THE MONEY SUPPLY

THE FISCAL 1977 INFLOW OF FOREIGN CAPITAL TO JAPAN AMOUNTED TO ¥7.2 TRILLION. THIS EXPANDED THE DOMESTIC MONEY SUPPLY. IN FISCAL 1978, LARGE NET PAYMENTS OF TREASURY FUNDS ARE EXPECTED. COMBINED WITH THE CONTINUING HEAVY INFLOW OF

- 5 -

FOREIGN CAPITAL, THIS MAY CREATE EXCESS LIQUIDITY. ALREADY THE SITUATION IS SIMILAR TO THE SITUATION IN 1971-72, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT WAS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE BULGING MONEY SUPPLY. THERE MAY WELL BE SOME STRONG INFLATIONARY FORCES.

E. POSSIBLE MEASURES

1. AN EXPANSION OF FOREIGN AID

2. RESTRUCTURING OF THE ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY TO MATCH THE SLOW GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY. JAPANESE INDUSTRY, AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, ARE HEAVILY GEARED TOWARD EXPORTS. ADOPTION OF FIVE-DAY WORK WEEKS AND COMPLETE LIBERALIZATION OF INTEREST RATES ARE ALSO SUGGESTED.

3. LARGER TAX CUTS TO SIMULATE PERSONAL CONSUMPTION

TODAY WE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN AN ABNORMAL SITUATION AND TAKE BOLD MEASURES TO WEATHER MANY DIFFICULTIES.

###

- 6 -

INSTITUTE for CERTIFYING SECRETARIES

A Department of THE NATIONAL SECRETARIES ASSOCIATION (International)
2440 PERSHING RD. • SUITE G 10 CROWN CENTER • KANSAS CITY, MO. 64108 • 816-474-5755

December 15, 1977

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Georgetown Institute for Strategic &
International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington DC 20004

Karin Louise Nordstrom

Name of CPS Applicant

same

Former Name

Your cooperation is needed in order to process the application received from the above applicant who has applied to take
the Certified Professional Secretary Examination.®

The Institute for Certifying Secretaries would appreciate your verification of the experience supplied by the applicant. Also, on the back of this form please indicate your opinions of the applicant's experience. The information provided by you will be treated in the strictest confidence.

Your cooperation will help to expedite the processing of this application and our notification to the candidate of acceptance.
We shall appreciate receiving this completed Employer's Statement within two weeks.

COMMITTEE ON QUALIFICATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYER'S STATEMENT

A. Based on the following definition of a secretary,
was applicant employed as a secretary in your organization?

Yes

No

"A secretary shall be defined as an executive assistant who possesses a mastery of office skills, who demonstrates the ability to assume responsibility without direct supervision, who exercises initiative and judgment, and who makes decisions within the scope of assigned authority."

B. Employed as a secretary by your firm.................... 12/1/74 11/2/75

C. Employed as your secretary.................... Full-time same
Part-time

If part-time, how many hours per week?....................................

## EXAMINATION CONTENT

The examination is based upon an analysis of secretarial work, with emphasis on judgment, understanding, and administrative ability gained through education and work experience. It includes skills, techniques, and knowledge in the following areas:

### PART I-ENVIRONMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN BUSINESS

This part of the examination tests the principles of human relations and understanding of self, peers, subordinates, and superiors. It focuses on the fundamentals of one's own needs and motivations, nature of conflict, problem-solving techniques, essentials of supervision and communication, leadership styles, and understanding of the informal organization.

### PART II-BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY

This part examines knowledge of the major elements of business law involved in the secretary's daily life, particularly contracts and bailments, law of agency and sales, insurance, negotiable instruments, and real property. Public policy in the form of government regulatory legislation is also examined.

### PART III-ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT

Three subject areas are included in this part: applied economics, principles of management, and elements of business operation. The management of personnel, finances, production, and marketing is examined.

### PART IV-FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND THE MATHEMATICS OF BUSINESS

The principles of financial and managerial accounting are tested in this part. The candidate is also required to make the computations necessary for the analysis and interpretation of financial reports and statistical data.

### PART V-COMMUNICATIONS AND DECISION MAKING

This part is a performance test presented as an in-basket exercise. The candidate is asked to establish job priorities, describe actions to be taken, and specify how the work is to be completed. Dictation and typewriting abilities are necessary and skills are employed in editing, listening, composing, abstracting, judging work acceptability, and follow up.

### PART VI-OFFICE PROCEDURES

This part tests the administrative know-how of the secretary. It concerns the basic concepts of current secretarial procedures and office and records management. The fundamentals of business data processing are also examined.

## TIME AND PLACE OF THE EXAMINATION

The examination is administered annually on the first Friday and Saturday in May at approved colleges and universities. A tentative list of institutions from which a candidate may make a choice is sent to qualified applicants.

## PREPARATION

The examination is based on knowledges and skills which may be gained through education and work experience; however, every effort is made to develop an examination in which secretarial experience is an aid.

A variety of institutions offer courses designed to help candidates prepare for the examination. The Institute itself does not sponsor or offer any course.

Should the applicant desire to study independently, a study outline and a bibliography of books and periodicals dealing with each of the parts of the examination are available without cost from the Institute for Certifying Secretaries, G10 Crown Center, 2440 Pershing Road, Kansas City, MO 64108. No claim is made that study of this material will ensure the passing of all or any part of the CPS Examination.

## THE EXAMINATION MAY BE RETAKEN

If one or more parts are passed on the first attempt, the candidate may use the next four consecutive examination periods to complete the remaining parts, taking one or all of the remaining parts at any one examination administration. All six parts must be passed within the next four years; otherwise, the candidate must repeat the entire examination sequence. No limit is set on the number of attempts on any part within this period.

New candidates and those retaking the entire examination must pass at least one part or they must retake the entire examination on their next attempt.

## CERTIFICATION

The Institute for Certifying Secretaries awards certification to successful candidates and will provide official notification. The Institute will, also, attest to certification when a valid inquiry is received.

Printed in U.S.A — No. 4 — 10/76

GUIDELINES FOR
CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL
SECRETARY®
EXAMINATION

THE
CERTIFIED
PROFESSIONAL
SECRETARY®

A Certified Professional Secretary* is one who has successfully completed an examination developed and administered by the Institute for Certifying Secretaries, a department of The National Secretaries Association (International), and who has met the secretarial experience requirements.

THE PURPOSES
OF THE CPS® PROGRAM

1. To improve secretarial personnel by giving specific direction to an educational program and by providing a means of measuring the extent of professional development.

2. To provide secretaries with the assurance which comes from having attained a professional educational standard.

3. To promote the professional identity of the exceptional secretary.

4. To assist management in selecting qualified secretaries.

5. To plan and sponsor additional programs of continuing professional development for the Certified Professional Secretary®.

QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO TAKE THE CPS® EXAMINATION

A(1) WHEN EXPERIENCE IS COMPLETED BEFORE TAKING THE EXAMINATION

A(2) WHEN EXAMINATION IS TAKEN BEFORE EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS ARE COMPLETED

Candidates must meet the following education-and-experience requirements:

(a) A person who completes a two-year certificate, diploma, or associate degree program in an accredited school of business, a two-year college, a technical institute, or a four-year college and passes the CPS Examination must complete two years of verified secretarial experience before certification as a CPS

(b) A person who completes a bachelor's or advanced degree program and passes the CPS Examination must complete one year of verified secretarial experience before certification as a CPS

(c) A person who graduates by August 31 of a given calendar year may take the CPS Examination in the Spring of that year. Students who graduate after August 31 must wait until the following year.

(d) A person must take the complete examination within 12 months of receiving the certificate, diploma, or degree; otherwise, follow the qualifications stated in A(1).

Candidates must meet ONE of the following education-and-experience requirements:

(a) High school graduate or equivalent (if not a high school graduate, two additional years of secretarial experience for each year of high school not completed will be required) plus a minimum of three years of verified secretarial experience, one of which must have been for 12 months continuous with one employer within the past five years, and the total experience within the past 25 years.

(b) Two years of post high school formal education plus a minimum of two years of verified secretarial experience, one of which must have been for 12 months continuous with one employer within the past five years, and the total experience within the past 25 years.

(c) Four-year college graduate plus 12 months of accumulative verified secretarial experience within the past five years.

B. Applicants presently employed as business educators must have a minimum of 12 months of accumulative secretarial experience within the past ten years.

C. For the purpose of evaluating experience, no period of less than three months of continuous employment will be counted.

APPLYING FOR THE EXAMINATION

D(1) SECRETARIES WITH WORK EXPERIENCE

Processing of the application requires verification of employment and education. Therefore, all applications received by December 1 of any year are processed for the examination to be given the following Spring. Applications received after December 1 are processed for the examination given one year later.

E. The applicant does not need to be a member of The National Secretaries Association (International) and does not have to be employed as a secretary at the time of application for the examination.

F. The examination is open to men and women.

G. Any material misstatement made in connection with the application will void the application.

H. Requests for application forms are to be directed to the Institute for Certifying Secretaries, 610 Crown Center, 2440 Pershing Road, Kansas City, MO 64108.

EXAMINATION FEES

The processing fee to be submitted with the application to take the CPS Examination is $15 for members of NSA, and $30 for nonmembers. No refund is allowed on the processing fee. An applicant may request further processing of a rejected application; however, an additional fee is charged for processing an application formerly rejected. If an applicant does not take the examination within five years of the date for which application is approved, a second processing fee must be paid and the credentials reevaluated.

The examination fee is $60 for the entire examination. A fee of $10 is charged for each part which is retaken. Candidates scheduled for more than one part who withdraw for any reason after March 1 may have half of their fees refunded. No refund is given in case of absence without notice to the Institute before the date of the examination.

Copyright 1975, By The National Secretaries Association (International)

November 27, 1978

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Norwegian Broadcasting System
Mr. Frantz Olav Saksvik
Oslo 3
NORWAY

This will confirm interview which we have been discussing on
telephone, but note the new time and date. Only possible
time available is 10:30 am Tuesday, December 5 in London.
Repeat 10:30 am Tuesday, December 5. Please confirm by telex
to William Hyland, 1800 K Street, Suite 520, Washington, DC
20006.

Assuming this is acceptable, person to contact in London on
your arrival is Walter Bothe, at Claridge's Hotel. He can
help arrange details.

William Hyland

REGARDS FRANZ OFAN SAKSVIK STUDIO 0210

INTERVIEW IN LONDON DEC 21. TK2 YOUR COOPERATION

RE OUR IGS OF NOV 99 REGRET HAVING TO CANCEL PLANNED

WASHINGTON (DC50000)

1800 K 21 WW 2011E 250

MR WILLIAM HYLAND

0210 3813E 1 0928

NUNU CO 1000 028

FCSK YMB2582 RM11E23 RM15E34 WMB6E7

western union

[LC]

of Norskian
Telegraphy

LLA060 WAB084(0705)(1-074764G333)PD 11/29/78 0704
ICS IPMIIHA IISS
IISS FM ITT 29 0704
PMS WASHINGTON DC
AWR164 VIA ITT OSN409
UIWA CO N000 042
OSLO TLX 42/41 29 1253
MR WILLIAM HYLAND
1800 K STNWSUITE 520
WASHINGTON/DC(20006)

TKS YOUR TGR. WE CONFIRM DESIRED **INTERVIEW** IN LONDON DEC 5TH
AT 10.30 AM. TERMS AS AGREED BY TELEPHONE. WILL TAKE FURTHER
CONTACT WITH BBOOTHE AT CALRIDGE'S REGARDS

FRANTZ OLAV SAKSVIK STUDIO OSLO
COL 520 200006 5TH 10.30

NNN

1978 NOV 29 AM 7:40

SF-1201 (R5-69)

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE INSTITUTE

ROUTE 29 NORTH
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 22903

April 19, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I think you will be interested to read the enclosed article of mine in the *Foreign Service Journal* entitled: "South Africa: Is Race War Inevitable?" because it deals in part with your efforts in 1976 to reorient U.S. policy in southern Africa. You may also be interested in the three future scenarios I outline in the article, one of which suggests the partition of South Africa by the Vorster Government.

This article is condensed from a chapter in my forthcoming book *National Interests and Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities* (Westview Press, 1978). The book is complimentary of your running of U.S. foreign policy during the 1970's, especially the NSC policy-making machinery you established. If you are interested to have the book, I'll be glad to have the publisher send you a copy.

November 20, 1978

Dear Professor Nuechterlein:

Dr. Kissinger appreciates your kind
inscription and thanks you for sending
him your latest book which will be a
nice addition to his library.

With Dr. Kissinger's best regards,

Donald E. Nuechterlein, Ph.D.
Professor of International
Relations
Federal Executive Institute
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

FVB:clw

223 Meyers Drive
Greenville, S. C. 29605

March 13, 1978

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman of the Board
International House
500 Riverside Drive
New York, N. Y. 10027

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Mrs. Rice and I were indeed honored to be asked to serve on the Council of World Members to represent the South Eastern section of the United States. The philosophy of the International House has had a lasting impact on our lives, and we will be most happy to accept the responsibility of expanding the goals and ideals of the International House in any way possible.

In the past few years, we have become increasingly aware of the tremendous expansion of foreign investment both in our own state and the entire South Eastern region. Along with this growth, there has also developed an increased need for the promotion of the type of cultural awareness which we experienced during our student days at the International House.

We are looking forward to the meeting in New York in May.

cc: Mr. Howard A. Cook