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BRIGHTON CONFERENCE ASSOCIATION

59 BRYANSTON STREET
LONDON W1

PAPER NO. 26

BASIC PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE.

By
B.H. Liddell Hart.

A basic question underlies any and all plans of Western defence. Can free Europe be defended? The answer - if we are honest, and brave enough to face hard facts - can only be that in the present conditions, and with present plans, effective defence is not possible.

For defence in the real sense of the word, as defined in dictionaries, means to "preserve, protect, keep safe, by resisting attack".

At the present time, if nuclear weapons of megaton power are actually used, no country can hope to keep safe, or even to avoid fatal destruction.

Moreover, as things stand, the NATO countries cannot even attempt to stop any strong invading forces without using such weapons. Their ground forces are far too weak, compared with those of Russia, to maintain a prolonged resistance with conventional, non-nuclear weapons.

So they have to put their trust purely in the chances, much less certain of deterring their enemies from attack by threat of nuclear retaliation.

The essential conclusion was put clearly by the British Prime Minister when speaking at a dinner given in London to welcome General Norstad, the new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. For Mr. Macmillan there said:

"Let us be under no illusion; military forces today are not designed to wage war; their purpose is to prevent it. There will be no campaigns again like the old ones, with victory at the end of a long and balanced struggle.

"total war today can only mean total destruction".

This basic fact should be kept constantly in mind when examining each aspect of the problem.

1. The Probable Conditions of Nuclear War.

Experience of the last war can be more of a handicap than a help in visualising what might happen in a war waged with nuclear weapons. Experience in conducting operations or in military administration during that war can be even more a handicap, because of the habits of thought and practice developed in those conditions.

2.

Even the worst bombing and resulting dislocation
was not comparable to the probable effects of
nuclear warfare. Reason and imagination can
hardly bridge the gulf.

The largest bombs used in Europe during the last war were no more than
five to ten tons, and in the largest scale attacks - with forces up to
a thousand aircraft - about 5000 tons were dropped. The first atomic
bomb, dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945, had an explosive force
equivalent to 20,000 tons.

Thus even in the infancy of nuclear warfare a single
bomber could exert four times as much destructive
power as a thousand had done previously.

Only two nuclear bombs have yet been used in war. But production in quantity has been going on for nearly twelve years, and development in destructive power has been much greater still. The first operational hydrogen bomb, tested in March, 1954, is known to have released an explosive force equivalent to 20 million tons - a thousand times greater than the original atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima.

But by then such immense destructive power had ceased to be an American preserve. For seven months earlier, in August 1953, Soviet Russia had demonstrated that she had developed weapons of similar kind, with an explosive force measured in millions of tons (megatons) instead of thousands (kilotons).

One such bomb can destroy the largest city. Only a few would have to
reach their targets in order to wipe out the main centres of industry
and population in any country of Western or Southern Europe.

Even one or two might suffice to paralyse the life
of such countries, when account is taken of the
vast stretch of the "fall-out" of deadly radio-
active dust, as well as of the shattering moral
effect.

If such weapons are actually used in war it is unimaginable that the
war could continue, even in the "broken-back" way of which Sir Winston
Churchill talked three years ago.

The conduct of war is a matter of organised action,
which would be impossible in such a state of chaos.

The NATO "shield forces" could not hope to maintain a defence when their sources of supply were destroyed, and their whole purpose would vanish once their homelands were destroyed. Any survivors would be fully occupied in collecting food and controlling mobs of starving refugees.

2. What are the Prospects of Defence against Nuclear Bombing?

The U.S. Air Defence Command has openly admitted that even "a 90 per cent effective defence might not be good enough to guarantee national survival." Another American authority has stated that "At best - and this is very optimistic - we might intercept one out of every four Soviet bombers."

It would be much easier for such bombers to
reach and annihilate the more accessible vital
centres of countries in Europe. In face of a
menace of this scale, the NATO schemes of air
defence and civil defence are no more than
trifling with the problem.

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Even if a 100 per cent effective anti-aircraft missile could be produced on the scale required to annul all attacks by bombers, there is no early hope of a counter to the ballistic rocket.

3. The New Menace of Rocket Bombardment.

In my 1946 book *The Revolution in Warfare* I argued that the greatest potentialities of the future lay in the rocket bomb, and that "the maintenance of a heavy-bomb force becomes a superfluity in the rocket and atomic age." In more recent years I have repeatedly emphasised that, even at a moderate rate of development, it was reasonable to expect that by 1955 the Russians would be able, at the least, to bombard London and any other of the great cities of Western Europe.

> But such arguments made little impression until last autumn - when Marshal Bulganin emphasised, in his threatening message to Sir Anthony Eden during the Suez crisis, that Britain was well within range of rocket bombardment from Russian launching sites.

Then on February 13th Britain's Minister of Defence, Mr. Duncan Sandys, publicly confirmed that there was "every reason to believe" that the Russians had developed a "rocket with a nuclear warhead" and that "the range of this rocket would probably be sufficient to reach Britain."

> By then, that admission understated the grim reality. For it was known from the evidence of radar-traced flights, that Russian rockets were reaching targets 800 to 1000 miles distant.

Moreover there was reason to believe that the Russians had successfully tested a rocket with a range of 1500 miles - sufficient to reach any of the American strategic bomber bases in North Africa and the Middle East.

> Then, on August 26th, the Russians announced that they had carried out successful tests of an inter-continental ballistic rocket that could reach "any part of the world".

Those were the key words of the latest Russian announcement that has startled the Western parts of the world. The shock has been all the greater, since it has come so soon after the first test launching of an American inter-continental rocket, the 5000 mile range Atlas, which ended in failure.

> Its immediate successor, the Titan, is not yet ready for test - and even if successful is not expected to be ready for operational use until the 1960s.

If the Russian claim about their super-rocket is true, the effects on the world balance of power, and our situation, are likely to be far-reaching. It is a very ominous prospect.

So the prime question is whether the Russian announcement is a bluff, or at least exaggerated.

General Schrierver, the American missile chief, has significantly remarked: "Russia seldom lies in its announcements to the outside world. When they said they had the atom bomb, they had it. When they said they had the so-called hydrogen bomb, they had it."

Experience of the previous Russian announcements that proved true strongly suggests that the latest is likely to be well-founded.

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Time after time the Russians have proved successful in reaching some fresh stage of scientific or technical development years before they were expected to achieve it. The success of the "Satellite" has drive home the lesson.

Novertheless there is the possibility that this one may be an exception. For it would be of great advantage to Soviet Russia if she could per- suade her possible opponents, and all the "fence-sitting" peoples, that she has developed such a supreme weapon in advance of any other country. It could be a method of "winning by suggestion".

A psychological strategist might see and exploit the possibilities of putting over a deceptive bluff of this scale, after paving the way for it by a prolonged course of putting out announcements that have proved true.

Even if it be a bluff on this occasion that does not necessarily weaken its force. For it is a bluff that the Western powers cannot venture to call - without the risk of fatal results to themselves.

In any case, the NATO countries of Europe, including Britain, all lie within range of the intermediate rockets which Russia has certainly got. Western Germany is in closest range of all.

The only protection of these countries lies in deterring the Russians from launching an attack - by being able to retaliate with H-bombs. This ability to retaliate depends mainly on the American strategic bombing force, supplemented by Britain's relatively small force of jet-bombers.

Here I would again emphasise that, whatever the value of such a force as a deterrent to enemy attack, it is of no real value as a defence. For if it were used it would merely result in mutual suicide. That would be the inevitable outcome of war with H-bombs.

### 4. The Prospects of Deterrence.

A powerful bombing force, armed with nuclear bombs, is a very strong deterrent to any attempt at delivering a knock-out blow with nuclear bombs or rockets, or even at overrunning the NATO countries by ground forces.

For it would be the most hazardous gamble for Russia, or any other country, to base a war-plan on the belief that the other side's power of retaliation could be nullified by a surprise blow - a new "Pearl Harbour" coup.

A sudden and complete knock-out blow would be far more difficult to achieve than in 1941 - and that had only a temporary success. For it would be almost impossible to ensure that every bomber on the opposing side is disabled, whereas even a few bombers that survived would be able, with H-bombs, to inflict tremendous destruction in reply.

To bank on nullifying the other side's power of retaliation would be as foolish as staking one's life on picking out "needles in a haystack".

For bombers can be distributed over many airfields. They can also, with the development of new means of short-length "take-off", be launched from small airstrips scattered throughout the countryside.

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The dream of a complete knock-out at the start of war
has become even more absured with the development of
ballistic rockets that can be launched from any-
where on land or sea.

Unfortunately, this "needle in a haystack" problem also casts grave
doubt on the belief still cherished by the Allied military planners -
in the Pentagon, at SAC, and at SHAPE - that once the bombers of the
U.S. Strategic Air Command are unleashed, they could annul Russia's
power of nuclear attack within a few days.

So we are brought back again to the conclusion that the
only hope of preserving Europe lies in preventing war -
and no longer, as in the past, in being able to win a
war.

As for the prospects of success in preventing war, their best found-
ation is formed, ironically, by the lack of any firm foundation for
aggressive planning - and the likelihood that the outcome would be as
fatal to the attacker as it would be to his victim.

It is the basic uncertainty of the outlook that does
most to strengthen the existing deterrent to aggression -
and particularly to any Russian attempt to overrun the
free countries of Europe.

There appear to be only two conditions in which a deliberately planned
onslaught would become more likely:-

1. One is a change in American policy towards a renewed "isolationism", leading the United States Government to withdraw its forces from Europe, and revert to a detached attitude towards what happens in Europe.

It has long been thought that the development of inter-continental
missiles would foster the American people's inclination to quit Europe.
But if Russia gains the lead over America with inter-continental missiles
that may well have the opposite effect - making the Americans more
anxious to stay in Europe in order to keep Russia within reach of
counter-bombardment by the shorter, intermediate range missiles which
they have already developed.

2. The second condition is the possible discovery and development by Soviet Russia of an effective means of countering, and nullifying NATO nuclear retaliation against Russia's territory, and forces. The situation would become perilously ill-balanced if Russia produced such a means in advance of the Western Alliance.

America has made much progress in developing anti-aircraft guided
missiles to counter bomber aircraft, and it is all too possible that
Russia has made similar progress.

If Russia should produce an effective antidote to the bomber, and thus
nullify our power of "massive retaliation", whilst at the same time
possessing the power herself of bombarding the Western countries with
atomic rockets, they would be reduced to a state of helplessness.

Even the necessity of reckoning that this dual
possibility may be a reality is sufficient to have
a paralysing effect.

I have long thought that a likely sign of success in developing such
a bomber antidote would be a bolder and more intrusive foreign policy
on the Russian's part. That has been manifest recently.

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But it may be due simply to confidence in their new long-range rockets coupled with the fact that the small launching sites required for these are much easier to conceal, and more difficult to knock out, than bomber bases.

But to gain the certainty of a decisive advantage Russian would have to produce the counter not only to bombers but to ballistic rockets, and to be sure that the antidote was 100 per cent effective - which, fortunately, is a distant and dubious possibility.

At present, the Western powers' capacity for nuclear retaliation should suffice to deter Russia from launching a large-scale invasion of free Europe, or from attempting to paralyse the Allies' retaliatory power by a surprise blow.

But, unfortunately, this power of retaliation is far less sure of proving a deterrent to smaller scale aggression, and it is thus much less of an insurance against the risk of an unintentional slide into an all-out war of mutual suicide.

This risk will be increased if the Russians should become increasingly confident that they have secured the lead in developing long-range rockets - that might tempt them to take a bolder and more provocative line of foreign policy.

Meanwhile the risk is certainly being increased by the way that the military heads of NATO tend to concentrate on planning and preparing for all-out nuclear war, without taking due account of more limited but more likely forms of aggression.

## 5. The Confusion of Defence Planning.

Even in planning for nuclear war, they show lack of realism. Their exercises and war-games are still governed by the old picture of a prolonged war.

In all solemnity, they try to work out the course of operations from H+30 (days), H+60, H+90. It is astonishing evidence of the persisting influence of habit - but it makes no sense.

Such a picture takes too little account of what will have happened in the NATO countries during a duel with nuclear weapons, however brief it may be. It is very obvious that the military planners' reason and imagination, conditioned by habits of thought developed in World War II, fail to grasp the difference between that and a war where even small nuclear weapons can produce a thousand "Hiroshimas" within a few hours, or where one weapon of megalon power will have a thousand time the force of the original Hiroshima bomb.

Some of them, however, can see things more clearly than they care to admit publicly. In a discussion of this kind on planning two years ago, one of the most acute-minded air chiefs shatteringly remarked to the generals and admirals present: "It is no use trying to plan anything beyond the first six hours of another war."

Moreover they show no realisation of the need of giving Governments and peoples some reason to hope that the defence, if put into operation, will not automatically entail suicide.

Nothing could be more damping to determination, and more conducive to hesitation, than the public statements that the heads of SHAPE have made about their plans. They have created a widespread, and still spreading, impression that they are planning to loose off nuclear weapons

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immediately in case of <u>any</u> attack - and not only against the attacking forces but against the countries behind.

The announcement of such plans has naturally increased the uneasiness of the peoples of free Europe, in view of the vulnerability of their own cities and more densely populated countries to attack by H-bombs.

It sounds all too like an insane reversal of the proverb "people who live in glass houses should not throw stones." To tell them that NATO can produce no better defence plan than to throw such "stones" is the surest way to make them hesitate about resisting aggression, to shake their determination, and to diminish their efforts to build up their forces for defence.

Confusion in the planning has been increased, and public anxiety deepened, by the introduction of what are called "tactical atomic weapons".

This is a general term for weapons of this tremendously destructive kind that are intended for use in the fighting zone of the armies, or against their immediate lines of supply and reinforcement.

## The Problem of Tactical Atomic Action

A new, and very dangerous, complication has arisen from the decision in 1954 to equip the NATO ground forces, and their supporting "tactical" air forces, with such weapons. It increases the risk that even a local conflict might soon develop into a war of mutual annihilation - unintended by either side.

The main argument in 1950 for building up the NATO land forces and tactical forces - at immense effort and expenditure - was that they would provide an effective and safer substitute for the atomic bomb as a deterrent to aggression. That argument is cancelled out by the adoption of atomic weapons for the use of these forces.

For the military heads of NATO have made it all too clear that they do not believe that it is possible to distinguish between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear action.

During a visit to London early this year General Norstad had a private talk with a large number of members of Parliament. When pressed as to whether nuclear weapons could be used tactically, against the enemy's forces, without using them strategically, against the enemy's country, he is reported to have replied that in his own mind he found it impossible to draw a line between these forms of action.

He left the impression that he could see no hope of stopping short of all-out war with H-bombs.

The argument for providing the NATO forces with tactical atomic weapons has been that these weapons are essential to counterbalance the Red Army's much larger numbers of men.

The soldiers responsible for defence planning naturally desire the maximum possible insurance, and it is not their responsibility to judge whether the <u>apparent</u> increase of battlefield insurance offered by atomic weapons is outweighed by the increased risk of chaos and collapse in the homelands.

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In bowing to the military argument for such extra insurance the statesmen may hopefully think that they can restrain its employment until the need is certain. But this is a frail hope. There is much greater risk in equipping armies with atomic weapons than air forces, since armies are posted in more advanced positions.

Commanders will always tend to use every weapon they possess rather than risk their troops being overrun - and in that immediate concern are apt to lose sight of wider issues.

Moreover, once doctrine and organisation are established on a particular weapon-basis an almost irresistible pressure is generated. Such pressure becomes all the more certain now that medium field artillery can be provided with atomic ammunition.

> But the possible benefits are outweighed by the drawbacks and dangers, unless we can find a way of establishing a dividing line between "tactical" and "strategical" action with such weapons - so that they could be used without precipitating a holocaust of the homelands with H-bombs, and civilisation's suicide.

To sum up - there would be great value in adopting tactical nuclear weapons if, by doubling the resisting power of the present NATO armies, they made it possible to repulse an invasion by the Communists' much larger armies without causing the general destruction by H-bombs of the countries on either side.

> But there is no sense in adding such costly tactical weapons to our armoury if they are not considered a practicable alternative to strategic nuclear bombardment, and are certain to lead to all-out war - as General Norstad appears to think.

## The Problem of "Graduated Deterrence".

The insanity of planning a defence that is bound to be suicidal has become so obvious, except to the planners themselves, that it has prompted a growing number of thoughtful minds to consider the possibility of graduated action, or "graduated deterrence" as it has come to be described - unleashing H-bombs only if it is clear that the enemy is making an unlimited attack and cannot be stopped by any lesser means.

To evolve a workable plan of graduated action is certainly a knotty problem, requiring extensive study, yet at least worth trying as an alternative to world suicide.

The best chance would obviously lie in confining nuclear weapons to the immediate battlefield, and the chances would decrease in such successive stage of deeper use.

At the same time, even the second stage in depth - their use against the aggressor's Lines of Communication area, and his airfields there - would involve a heavy additional handicap, since the British and American forces will be operating overseas and their seaport advanced bases will be more vulnerable than the other side's land communications.

So there would be compensating advantages for the Western powers in confining nuclear action to the battlefield - which is also the most practicable differential, and perhaps the only one that will allow the defence a chance of profiting by unconventional weapons without precipitating an all-out war.

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One can, however, see possible ways in which a land-based attacker of strategic ingenuity might nullify a defence geared to tactical atomic weapons - which depend for effect on suitable targets, and are ineffective against dispersion or intermingling.

Is there any other way of increasing our defensive strength, and with a greater chance of avoiding all-out nuclear warfare?

A better prospect of limitation is offered by the use of chemical instead of nuclear weapons. For chemical weapons are most effective in checking invasion and delaying all advancing movements on land, while far less effective against stationary forces and cities.

It is absurd to forego the defensive use of mustard gas, the most obstructive yet least lethal of weapons, while adopting the use of nuclear weapons - which are weapons of mass-slaughter, and violate the lawful code of warfare on more counts than such a weapon as mustard gas, which is relatively humane.

But the safest course of all in defence would be to rely on conventional forces using purely conventional weapons.

## The Problem of Deterrence and Defence with "Conventional" Forces.

Now that the Russians are matching American in nuclear weapons, the paradoxical consequence is to revive the danger of invasion in a conventional way.

For they may be tempted to venture on that kind of attack in the belief that, because of the "nuclear stalemate", the West would hesitate to unleash nuclear weapons - so long as the Russians limited their aims and their action.

Hence the need for conventional defence as a deterrent, is renewed. Is it really so impossible, militarily and economically, to provide adequate defence of this kind as the NATO Governments have come to assume.

Russia and her satellites, from a total population of 300 million, maintain standing armies of about 260 active divisions - of which perhaps 160 face westwards.

The NATO countries have a population of 230 million in Europe, and 400 million in total, yet produce barely 20 active divisions (of which the majority are not ready for action) to cover the Western, and central, area of Europe.

Indeed, until the Bundeswehr is ready, the defence of this area mainly depends on the American and British contingents.

The extreme disparity of ground forces is not due to disparity of available manpower, so must be due basically to deficiency of will or defective organisation. Neither is "impossible" to remedy.

In view of the number of divisions that the Soviet bloc can maintain, the question arises whether the NATO type and its supporting structure are needlessly elaborate and expensive. Given the will, and new thought, the answer could be found.

It makes no sense that the NATO countries should continue to live in mortal fear of a group inferior in population and material resources, and remain impaled on the horns of a "defeat or suicide" dilemma.

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Such a reorganisation would provide the NATO countries with a chance of effective defence without the extreme peril of resorting to nuclear weapons - and thus strengthen the deterrent.

For the prime need today is to reinforce the H-bomb deterrent which has turned into a two-edged threat, by developing a non-nuclear "fire-guard" and "fire-extinguisher" - on the ground, and ready for use without hesitation or delay.

## The New Development of Strategy.

Old concepts, and old definitions, of strategy have become *not only obsolete*, but *nonsensical* with the development of nuclear weapons

The development of long-range rockets, to replace the manned bomber aircraft, makes the absurdity even clearer.

To aim at "winning a war" to take "victory" as your object, is no more than a state of *lunacy*. For a total war, with nuclear weapons, would be fatal to both sides.

There is no sense even in planning for such a war - for a World War III, as it is often called.

In the present stage of scientific development, the destruction and chaos would be so great *within a few hours* that the war could not continue in any *organised* sense.

Yet it is astonishing to see the extent to which old-fashioned concepts continue to influence military planning. They are repeatedly revealed by the use of out-of-date terms, and the pattern of exercises.

This is shown even in the use of the word "sword" for the deterrent which is mainly provided by the U.S. Strategic Air Force - and "shield" for the NATO ground forces.

For the "sword" could not be *used*, actually, without producing mutual suicide. It is like the old ceremonial Japanese sword dedicated for committing *hara-kiri*.

And the old word "shield" does not suggest the kind of protection required to meet the nibbling, erosive forms of aggression that have now become more likely than "sword-thrusts". A shield is not a suitable protection against wasps, nor against incendiary fires.

Strategy - which aims at military victory - should always be subordinate to Grand Strategy, the realm of statesmanship which is concerned with the ultimate state of peace. This has too often been disregarded in the past. Now, more than ever Grand Strategy must be in the driving seat.

Statesmanship, in the H-bomb age must control not only the aims but the operations. It should direct military defence planning and the formulation of military doctrine.

Hence statesmen and their diplomatic advisers must have a greater knowledge of military technique than they needed in the past. That is as important as the need for soldiers to submit to political direction.

Even if we do not go so far as to merge the function of the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, they and their expert advisers must combine much more closely.

It is a new version of Plato's dictum that the affairs of the world would not improve until either the philosophers became the rulers or the rulers became the philosophers.

September, 1957