UPI

The McGoverns and Humphrey after victories: Plus a wild card named Wallace and an elusive Kennedy

UPI

## Now, It's a New Democratic Race

There were five names on the Presidential-preference ballot in the Democratic primary election in Pennsylvania last week and twelve in Massachusetts on the same day—an almost nostalgic reminder of the clog of candidates that confused and bedeviled the Democratic race when it all started in New Hampshire not quite two months ago. But most of the names had already become vestigial-dropouts in fact if not in fantasy—and the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania primaries took the simplification process to the semifinal step. Emphatically trounced in both states, Maine's Sen. Edmund Muskie removed himself from the primary campaign—clearing the way for a two-month, two-man duel for the nomination between Minnesota's Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey and South Dakota's Sen. George McGovern.

The reduction was not quite absolute— not with Alabama's Gov. George Wallace continuing his heady raids on northern voters and noncandidate Sen. Edward Kennedy maintaining his membership in the Democratic Party. But until further notice McGovern and Humphrey have no active rivals but each other. Humphrey, effectively reactivating the classic Democratic coalition of organized labor, blacks and ethnics, took 35 per cent of the popular vote and 42 per cent of the elected delegates in Pennsylvania, leaving Muskie mired in fourth place behind Wallace and McGovern, who campaigned only lightly in the state. In liberal Massachusetts, which Humphrey all but ignored, McGovern put on the campaign's most impressive vote-getting show thus far, winning 52 per cent of the popular vote (Muskie, in second

place, got 22) and a clean sweep of 102 convention delegates.

To many Democratic pros, however, this distillation of the contest into a two-man race holds at least as many worries as had the earlier crowded confusion. Once again, the bitter four-year-old split between the party's traditional and liberal wings has been brought into bold relief. Humphrey's claim to the Democratic center is now disputed fiercely by McGovern's insistence that he is creating a "new center" built upon a turnabout in Vietnam policy, limited defense spending, sweeping tax reform and vastly expanded social programs. At the same time, McGovern's astonishingly effective grass-roots organization is challenging the traditional Democratic power base of big labor and big-state politicians (following story). Whether or not McGovern's organization can carry him through to the nomination in Miami Beach or to the White House in November, the Dakotan's insurgence this year could just change most of the methods and assumptions that have ruled Democratic Party politics since the coming of the New Deal 40 years ago.

### 'A Fact of Political Life'

In any case, the McGovern-Humphrey triumphs meant the end of the road for Ed Muskie as an active candidate. In just three months, his position eroded from that of an odds-on centrist favorite, blessed equally by politicians and polls, to one of a desperate last-chancer who gave up on Massachusetts in his native New England to try to stay at least close to Humphrey in Pennsylvania. The afternoon after the elections—with the

Pennsylvania figures showing him in fourth place with only 20 per cent of the vote and 29 of 182 delegates—Muskie met with four major aides and advisers at his home in suburban Bethesda, Md. Campaign manager Berl Bernhard spoke to the candidate "cold turkey," according to one witness, saying that Muskie had no money and no serious hope of bettering himself in any future primary. Muskie, relaxed and tuned-in, made phone calls to such important backers as Ohio's Gov. John J. Gilligan, his main sponsor in this week's primary, and United Auto Workers president Leonard Woodcock, and then accepted his phase-down as "a fact of political life this year."

With four of his aides keeping him company over a take-out dinner from a Chinese restaurant, Muskie made some 30 calls to his high-powered political endorsers, telling them of his decision to drop out. Alone at last, he went to bed, then rose at 5 a.m. to write a statement for a press conference that morning admitting that his all-primary strategy had been "a mistake" and blaming lack of money for his decision to quit—an explanation that was true enough but hardly told the whole story of the senator's campaign debacle (page 35). Muskie hoped to hold on to his delegate strength, he declared, and to present himself to the Miami Beach convention as a compromise nominee in the case of a deadlock, although he added that his delegates were free to "reassess" their commitments.

Muskie's departure caused an immediate casting of lines from the McGovern and Humphrey camps to Muskie's sup-

22

Newsweek

Newsweek

January 13, 1972

November 13, 1971

April 7, 1971

April 20, 1970

December 15, 1969

4, 1969

April 26, 1972

The President on Vietnam: 'We will not be defeated and we will never surrender our friends to Communist aggression'

AND THE WAR GOES ON

Nine times Richard Nixon had gone on television to explain his plan to end the war in Indochina. Each time he had vowed that he would extricate the U.S. from that searing conflict without sacrificing the sovereignty of South Vietnam. Last week, the President took his case to the country again, but this time his TV address was made under the shadow of ominous new circumstances. In Vietnam itself, the four-week-old Communist offensive raged ever stronger and threatened to cut the country in half. And at home, the deep but long-dormant hostility that most Americans feel toward the war sputtered sullenly, like coals waiting to be fanned into flames.

Given these pressures, many people expected that Mr. Nixon would unveil some dramatic new turn in U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Instead, he chose to give his audience more of the same. Once again, he proclaimed his determination to defend the regime of South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu. Sternly, he announced his intention to continue bombing North Vietnam until the Communists "stop their offensive." At the same time, with an eye to domestic opinion, the President revealed that U.S. troop withdrawals would proceed as planned and that U.S. ground strength would be cut to 49,000 men by July 1. Then came the only new element in the speech: apparently on the strength of a secret trip that Henry Kissinger made to Moscow two weeks ago, the President expressed his conviction that meaningful new negotiations would soon be under way in Paris—and he hinted at a resumption of secret talks as well.

All in all, it was a cool and confident performance—which was remarkable in view of the alarming news reports from the battlefield. There, some 120,000 North Vietnamese regulars, backed by

an impressive array of Soviet-made tanks, artillery and missiles, were dealing the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) one severe setback after another. Three provincial capitals—Quang Tri in the northern part of South Vietnam, Kontum in the central highlands and An Loc north-west of Saigon—were gripped in an ever-tightening ring of Communist troops. As tens of thousands of refugees fled to the uncertain sanctuary of areas under Saigon's control, casualties mounted on both sides. According to the latest weekly casualty report, in fact, more ARVN troops—a total of 4,525—were killed and wounded in the seven days ending April 22 than in any previous week since the war began.

**Gamble:** Despite all this, the President presented an optimistic picture of the military situation. Flourishing a red binder containing a report from Gen. Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam, Mr. Nixon declared: "The South Vietnamese are fighting courageously and well in their self defense ... General Abrams predicts ... weeks of very hard fighting ... But his conclusion is that if we continue to provide air and sea support, the enemy will fail in its desperate gamble to impose a Communist regime in South Vietnam."

As the President himself implied, the key element in his upbeat assessment was the support being provided the South Vietnamese by an expanded U.S. naval armada and 600 U.S. planes. Clearly, though Mr. Nixon sought to leave the impression that the ARVN was doing all the fighting, the U.S. had mounted a massive effort on the sea and in the air. In addition to the daily strategic bombing of North Vietnam, U.S. planes provided close tactical air support in South Vietnam in a dramatic campaign to stave off an ARVN debacle. During

the month of April, B-52s and jet fighters dropped an estimated total of 98,000 tons of bombs on targets throughout Indochina—a figure that was only slightly below the 1969 monthly average of 100,000 tons.

It was against this background of an escalating conflict—a conflict that threatened to cancel Mr. Nixon's scheduled summit in Moscow later this month—that Henry Kissinger undertook his clandestine rendezvous in Russia. After attending a party at the home of Polly Wisner, a leading Washington hostess, Kissinger

UPI
Land-mine victims near Quang Tri

May 8, 1972

19

was whisked off to Andrews Air Force Base where he and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin boarded a U.S. Air Force jet for Moscow. Once in the Soviet capital, where he was treated to a VIP sightseeing tour and the customary overabundance of caviar, Kissinger plunged into an extraordinary round of talks with Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev that lasted fourteen hours. So intense were the discussions between the two men that Kissinger even extended his planned three-day stay by an extra 24 hours.

Inevitably, Vietnam was a principal point of discussion in the Brezhnev-Kissinger meetings. In effect, Kissinger delivered a professorial lecture on Mr. Nixon's view of how the war is related to the broader sweep of international relations. And he clearly tried to convince Brezhnev that a relaxation of tensions would be as beneficial to the Soviet Union as it would be to the United States.

**About-Face:** Precisely what had come out of the talks was, of course, a matter of speculation. But the President himself provided a clue when he announced that the U.S. had decided to return to the Paris negotiating table. This step represented a sharp about-face from the position that the U.S. would continue to boycott the Paris talks until the Communists called off their offensive in South Vietnam—a position the White House had reaffirmed only a day before Mr. Nixon's TV speech. The most plausible explanation for this policy reversal was that Brezhnev and Kissinger had struck some kind of deal in Moscow. And there were signs that that was exactly what had happened. A few days after Kissinger returned from his Soviet sojourn, the Kremlin dispatched two high-ranking officials to Hanoi. At about the same time, Le Duc Tho, a powerful figure in the Hanoi Politburo, flew off to Peking en route to Paris. And in the French capital, the chief Viet Cong negotiator, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, noted that the Communists had no objections to help from the superpowers in arranging a settlement.

By holding out the hope of a negotiated settlement, the President clearly intended to defuse domestic criticism. And for the time being he apparently had succeeded. True, there were numerous disruptions by radical students—most notably at Cornell, Kent State and Columbia University, where a few hundred undergraduates occupied buildings for five straight days. But most college students seemed more interested in attending classes than demonstrations. And even among Congressional critics of the war, the reaction was restrained. Both Sen. George Aiken of Vermont and Sen. Robert Griffin of Michigan suggested that dissent would only encourage Hanoi to continue fighting. Still, in the primaries so far, pollsters have found the war up

permost in the minds of many voters.

Indeed, President Nixon himself was surely aware that he had never been under quite the same kind of pressure as he was now. In order to make his patiently constructed Vietnam policy work, it was imperative that the South Vietnamese stave off military disaster. It also was clear that if the hope of a negotiated peace with honor was to retain any credibility with U.S. voters, there would have to be visible progress at Paris in the fairly near future. Should Mr. Nixon's hopes be frustrated on the battlefield or at the conference table, it is hard to see how he would ever be able to offer yet another encore of his Vietnam television speech to the American people.

Conrad—© 1972, Los Angeles Times

'Someday, President Thieu, all this will be yours!'

## THE VIEW FROM HANOI

When it comes to an appraisal of the situation in Indochina, both North Vietnam and the U.S. are in agreement on one major point—1972 will be a year of decision. But naturally enough, the view from Hanoi of the potential risks and opportunities this year is far different than the view from the White House. As the North Vietnamese see it, President Nixon is vulnerable in many ways: all but a few of his ground combat troops have been brought home, the South Vietnamese are still an uncertain ally and, most important, Mr. Nixon must face a challenge at the polls this fall. In short, the small band of dedicated revolutionaries who rule North Vietnam decided some time ago that, militarily and psychologically, the time was ripe to strike. "The Communists are now trying to convince everyone that they are going to

win this war," says a U.S. official. "Clearly, they are going to stay longer and fight harder than at any time since the Tet offensive of 1968."

Almost from the moment that Hanoi unleashed its ferocious artillery and tank assault on Easter Sunday, U.S. analysts concluded that North Vietnam was seeking a series of quick knockout victories. Last week, for instance, a senior official in the Nixon Administration told NEWSWEEK that he had expected the loss of two or three provincial capitals by now and that he had even counseled abandoning the central highlands in order to defend more critical areas. When such dramatic Communist gains did not materialize, however, many in the Administration contended that the offensive had been stopped. But it soon became clear that that conclusion was premature. For the Communists had planned a campaign of sudden assaults mixed with periods of respite; whenever allied forces breathed a sigh of relief at a sudden lull, Hanoi lashed out again. Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger now estimates that the Communists have enough supplies to keep their conventional warfare offensive going until as late as July. And officials in the Pentagon predict that this summer, as Americans turn their attention to the political conventions, the Communists will be ready to launch phase two—local uprisings sparked by the Viet Cong to shatter government control in populated areas.

**Strategy:** But Hanoi has not put all its chips on a military victory. The North Vietnamese are devout believers in the strategy of talk-talk, fight-fight. Indeed, ever since the spring offensive began, the North Vietnamese have been trumpeting their insistence that the U.S. return to the negotiating table in Paris. Hanoi's diplomatic strategy is not hard to discern. By bloodying the South Vietnamese Army and undermining Saigon's control of the countryside, the Communists are calculating that they can force the U.S. and South Vietnam into granting concessions at the bargaining table. Presumably, the North Vietnamese hardly expect an outright American capitulation that would hand over Saigon to Communist rule. Instead, Hanoi is gambling that its military victories can be translated into a political deal that would permit it to obtain meaningful power in a neutralist government in Saigon. Thereafter, the total subversion of South Vietnam would be only a matter of time.

Officially, the Nixon Administration holds fast to the belief that the North Vietnamese offensive can and will be stopped. But even Henry Kissinger, the principal architect of Mr. Nixon's Vietnam policy, readily admits that Hanoi may yet achieve its broader diplomatic goals. Echoing Kissinger's thinking, the President said last week: "[The Commu-

20

Newsweek

nists'] one remaining hope is to win in the
Congress of the U.S. and among the peo-
ple of the U.S. the victory they cannot
win... in South Vietnam."

The trouble with this view, however, is
that it fails to place sufficient emphasis on
the Communists' proven perseverance.
By conservative estimate, the North Viet-
namese have suffered 600,000 casualties
during the past decade of war. And yet,
despite their suffering and reversals,
they have always managed to bounce
back. Thus, even if American resolve does
not break and Hanoi's current offensive
fails in its objectives, it seems likely that
the Communists will simply retreat and
lick their wounds, awaiting yet another
chance to realize their 20-year-old dream
of uniting the two halves of Vietnam.

THE VIEW
FROM MOSCOW

Ever since the United States began re-
ferring with unconcealed annoyance
to the Soviet Union's role as chief armor-
er of the North Vietnamese spring offen-
sive, the Kremlin leadership had become
increasingly fretful. Would President
Nixon cancel his proposed summit trip to
Moscow? Or would the U.S. military re-
sponse to Hanoi's invasion take on such
fierce proportions that Russia itself would
be forced to scrub the meeting as a ges-
ture of loyalty to its North Vietnamese
ally? Either way, cancellation of the
summit would be a grievous blow to the
Russians who have as much, if not more,
to gain from the meeting than the U.S.
And so, an extraordinary invitation was
issued from Moscow by Soviet party
leader Leonid Brezhnev himself. It
might be helpful, Brezhnev wrote Mr.
Nixon, if a trusted aide of the President's
could come to the Soviet Union for con-
sultations. And within days, Mr. Nixon's
envoy par excellence, Henry Kissinger,
was off on another secret mission.

The Russians' deep need for reassurance that the summit would not be scuttled became apparent to Kissinger early in his four-day visit. "When the Soviets treat you with great courtesy," he said afterward, "it is not an accident. You can be sure it reflects a policy." What seems essential to Moscow, as Kissinger put it, is "a visible relaxation of tensions" around the world. And a suddenly escalated war in Vietnam was nothing but a barrier to those hopes. At a time when the Soviet Union not only seeks détente with America's allies in Western Europe but is eager to counter the newly established cordiality between Washington and Peking, it was in Moscow's interests to do some courting of the Nixon Administration. "The Russians are ready to do business with the U.S.," said one American official. "The leadership has a great stake in specific agreements with us and they are not going to let Vietnam stand in the way."

There is no denying that the forth-

coming negotiations with Mr. Nixon hold
the promise of rich benefits for the Soviet
Union—in economic as well as diplomatic
terms. And that is no accident. Since the
early days of his Administration, Mr.
Nixon has sought to create and empha-
size incentives for Moscow to help the
U.S. out of its Vietnam dilemma. In that,
he has succeeded. Moscow is just as
anxious as Washington for an agreement
to limit the production and deployment
of expensive nuclear weapons. And the
prospect of expanded trade with the
U.S. in everything from feed grains to
sophisticated technology appeals to the
Russians almost as much.

Quite obviously, this Soviet attitude
gives the Nixon Administration no small
amount of leverage in its attempts to
convince the Russians to bring their in-
fluence to bear on Hanoi. "There is con-
siderable reason to believe," said one
U.S. official, "that Moscow wants some
things from us strongly enough to take
the heat out of some critical areas, such
as Southeast Asia."

**Attitudes:** It would be a grave mis-
take, however, to assume that Russia is
any more likely to walk out on its friends
in Hanoi than Mr. Nixon is ready to
abandon his allies in Saigon. "Vietnam is
no longer on the front burner for the Rus-
sians," says one American specialist in
Soviet affairs. "But I don't think that
means they will help us directly in any
way. Their attitudes are not any more
benevolent; they will do nothing that
would leave them open to a verifiable
charge of selling out a client." Beyond
that, many people hold to the view that
it is still in Moscow's interest for the war
to drag on. Says Columbia University's
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The continuing
war exacerbates U.S. difficulties with
China, contributes to domestic discon-
tent and drains the U.S. economy."

UPI

Panic at An Loc: ARVN troopers cling desperately to departing helicopter

Even if the Russians should seek to
temper North Vietnam's enthusiasm for
fighting to the finish in Indochina, more-
over, there is little guarantee that they
would succeed. To be sure, Moscow has
no small amount of influence in North Vi-
etnam. The Soviet Union is Hanoi's prin-
cipal patron—especially in terms of mili-
tary equipment. And Soviet deliveries to
Hanoi, which totaled more than 1 million
tons last year, will be increased in 1972,
according to Soviet officials. Yet, for all its
reliance on outside assistance, North
Vietnam has always remained a fiercely
autonomous state. As Wolfgang Leon-
hard, a top European analyst of Commu-
nist affairs, notes: "North Vietnam has
never been anyone's puppet, and Mos-
cow can only influence Hanoi to a very
limited degree. You can put pressure on
a satellite, but not on an ally."

In a sense, then, both Moscow and
Washington have found themselves en-
snarled in a similar position as the Viet-
namese war has refused to disappear.
Both of these powerful governments
have seen their broader global designs
hobbled by their small but often bellig-
erently independent allies. And surely,
just as the U.S. would like to apply its
energy and resources to more rewarding
and important international matters, so
Moscow must seek the freedom to pur-
sue its larger goals in Asia and the West
without having to bankroll a seemingly
endless Indochinese war. Accordingly,
Henry Kissinger may be right when he
judges that the Soviet Union has almost
as much to gain from dampening the
Vietnamese fires as does the United
States. It is one thing for Moscow to be
jubilant at America's predicament in
Vietnam. But it is quite another for the
Soviets to indulge the North Vietnamese
at the risk of losing their chance for an
historic détente with the West.

May 8, 1972

21

Indianapolis Star

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1972

THE INDIAN

# Kissinger In Moscow For 4 Days
To Arrange Nixon's Visit In May

(AP Wirephoto)

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER TALKS WITH NEWSMEN
Secret Moscow Trip Made While Kissinger Was Said To Be At Camp David, Md.

Washington AP)—President Nixon secretly dispatched adviser Henry Kissinger to Moscow last week for four days of talks with Soviet leaders on Vietnam, disarmament and Mr. Nixon's coming summit conference there.

Kissinger's clandestine journey, the latest in a series of secret foreign missions he has undertaken for Mr. Nixon, was disclosed by the White House and the Kremlin in a terse joint announcement yesterday—24 hours after he returned to the United States.

The Thursday-to-Monday visit to the Soviet capital was made while White House officials were reporting falsely that Kissinger was at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland conferring with Mr. Nixon.

THE SECRECY was necessary, Kissinger told newsmen yesterday, because "we are at the moment in a very delicate phase of international relations."

The joint announcement said Kissinger's talks with Communist Party head Leonid I. Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko "dealt with important international problems as well as with bilateral matters preparatory to talks between President Nixon and Soviet leaders in May."

Kissinger described the sessions as "useful ... frank ... satisfactory," and said they resulted from extensive exchanges between Mr. Nixon and Brezhnev during the last two years.

He would not divulge the specific issues discussed in Moscow, saying "We have

agreed that neither side would go into the details of the talks."

There were clear signs, however, that Kissinger relayed Mr. Nixon's unhappiness over Soviet shipment to North Vietnam of arms being used in the current North Vietnamese thrust into South Vietnam—a flow of weapons which Mr. Nixon has twice obliquely criticized.

"ONE PURPOSE of my going," Kissinger said during his seven-minute White House news conference, "was to put before the Soviet leaders the considerations of the President on major international problems."

Asked specifically whether the talks included Vietnam, Kissinger repeated that he had agreed not to reveal the

subjects discussed. "But," he continued, "I think you can draw your conclusions from an announcement which says that important international problems were discussed."

Just as Mr. Nixon is unhappily about Soviet arms shipments to North Vietnam, Soviet leaders were upset when, they claimed, four Russian ships were damaged in a U.S. air raid on Haiphong.

There were indications that the Kissinger mission, arranged within a week after Mr. Nixon sent U.S. warplanes against Haiphong and Hanoi targets, was intended to prevent further deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations because of Vietnam.

THE MOSCOW talks obviously dealt, too, with U.S.-Soviet negotiations to limit strategic arms.

These talks resumed yesterday in Helsinki after a brief suspension last week while the chief Soviet negotiator reportedly returned to Moscow —a trip roughly coinciding with Kissinger's arrival there.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers said this week Mr. Nixon hopes to sign an arms limitation pact while in Moscow next month.

The Moscow summit is the second of Mr. Nixon's major talks with Communist superpowers.

Asked for more details on the Nixon-Brezhnev exchanges, Kissinger said, "They have been conducted on the whole by correspondence."

Kissinger said he flew to Moscow on military aircraft and was in very frequent communication with Mr. Nixon during his four-day stay.

ZIEGLER refused to say which side initiated the Kissinger journey, It was, he said, "mutually agreed to have the meeting."

Ziegler said it was decided not to disclose Kissinger's mission until after his return because "pre-announcement would have led to a great deal of speculation ... and the trip would be jeopardized."

Even after Kissinger reached Moscow, Ziegler was telling reporters he was at Camp David. Confronted on this, he responded, "I would agree that that is misleading."

Deputy press secretary Gerald L. Warren also was telling newsmen over the weekend that Kissinger was at the mountaintop retreat. But Ziegler said Warren was not aware of the Kissinger mission. Because of the "delicacy of the situation," Ziegler said, "I didn't want to put him in an awkward situation."

KISSINGER SAID the deci-

K

THE NEW YORK TIMES, WE

# The Kissinger Miracle

By JAMES RESTON.

Henry Kissinger has got beyond the news. He is like most of the men of power in Washington: He is going to be left to the psychological novelists.

It is easy to criticize the role President Nixon has given him as principal foreign policy adviser, negotiator and private spokesman in the White House; but leaving that aside for a moment, it is hard to deny Dr. Kissinger's obvious intelligence, unfailing discretion and ceaseless energy.

His latest secret trip to Moscow, following on his quiet and meticulous preparation of the President's mission to Peking, is only the most dramatic illustration of the confidence and power Mr. Nixon has entrusted to him. And it is a tribute to them both that this confidential relationship endures despite Kissinger's insistence on expressing his independent judgments, even when these go against the President's inclinations and decisions.

Just before the White House announced that Kissinger had been con-ferring for four days with Brezhnev and Gromyko in Moscow, Representative Morris K. Udall, Democrat of Arizona, made a report to the House Civil Service Committee in which he accused Mr. Nixon of building up a "palace guard" of White House advisers who shape national policy without having to answer to either the Congress or the American people.

Well, it is true, and it is hard to deny, as Representative Udall charged, that this growing system of private unaccountable power, protected by "executive privilege," goes against the spirit of separate and equal constitutional powers. Even Dr. Kissinger, who grappled with such questions as a professor at Harvard, would agree that this is a valid constitutional question.

But there are many as well as constitutional questions involved here, and

given the President's assignment, which would go to somebody else if not Kissinger, Kissinger's performance is beyond anything any other White House aide, from Roosevelt's Hopkins to Kennedy's Bundy or Johnson's Moscow, has been asked to sustain.

To master the details and complexities of the President's agenda in Peking and Moscow, to keep the summit meetings alive while American troops are in Taiwan and American bombers are over North Vietnam, to keep the fundamental differences straight and still find areas for agreement and common interest—all this is hard enough.

But Kissinger has taken on other responsibilities almost as delicate and arduous. Somehow he has managed to keep a narrow line of communication open to the President's critics in the universities, the Congress and the press. He has been loyal to the President without ignoring or evading the opposition or assuming bad faith on the part of those who oppose the war.

And this has not been easy. He has been scalded and villified by many of his former university colleagues and even by some of his oldest friends in the university community, but he has heard them out. He has tried to get around the constitutional question and the charge that he was both powerful and unavailable by meeting privately with Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee and other members of the Congress and submitting to the most searching questions.

Even in the heat of these endless crises over the war and trade and monetary policy, he has found time early in the morning before breakfast or late at night to listen to the passionate anxieties of the world he lived in before he got caught up, almost by accident, in the world of White House power.

He has been asked many times why he serves an Administration whose policies divide the nation; why use all this intelligence and energy for all this pointless misery and death? But, for all his doubts about the bombing and his yearning for unity, he does not accept the premise and goes on believing in the President's objectives.

So many ugly things have been said about all this and even thrown in his teeth: He loves power, loves all the notoriety and the secret trips in the night and the opportunity to put thought to action in the Kremlin and the Forbidden City (who wouldn't?), but through it all he has attempted many things most of his colleagues in this Administration have avoided, and rescued a respect denied others.

All this is obviously subject to argument, beginning with Udall's question about whether even good and intelligent men should be given such power beyond reach of the Congress; but something still has to be said for Kissinger.

How he performs this delicate and dangerous role is a miracle which defies physical and intellectual endurance. He felt confident about the President's visit to Peking because he had been there and probed the quality of Chou En-lai's mind. A couple of weeks ago he was worried about the Moscow trip because he had no feeling about Brezhnev. Now, presumably, he has. But how he goes on at this pace is a mystery, and intelligent and tough as he is, maybe even a danger.

We have a Government now of men, not really of laws and accepted procedures. We have an alliance with Chou En-lai but not yet with China. But if this is the way it is to be, it is not Kissinger's fault, and he is a man. He is an instrument of the President, but he has played his role with astonishing courage, patience and skill.

UPI-30

(MOSCOW MISSION)

MOSCOW--DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID TODAY COMMUNIST PARTY CHAIRMAN LEONID BREZHNEV INITIATED THIS WEEK'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER HENRY KISSINGER AND THAT THEY LED TO THE U. S. DECISION TO RESUME THE PARIS VIETNAM PEACE TALKS THURSDAY.

THE HIGHLY QUALIFIED DIPLOMATIC SOURCES ALSO SAID BREZHNEV PLANNED TO DO MOST OF THE TALKING WHEN NIXON VISITS MOSCOW ON MAY 22.

THE DIPLOMATS SAID THE WHITE HOUSE AT FIRST THOUGHT KISSINGER WOULD BE TOO BUSY WITH OTHER WORK. WASHINGTON DEEMED THE KISSINGER TRIP UNNECESSARY, SINCE HIGHLY COMPETENT AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW COULD HANDLE THE PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS.

BUT THE WHITE HOUSE LATER DECIDED TO ACCEPT BREZHNEV'S OFFER DUE TO THE GRAVITY OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND SIGNS OF INCREASING CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS THE POSSIBILITY OF A REJECTION OF WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK.

IT WAS ALSO ASSUMED THAT BREZHNEV AND KISSINGER WENT INTO THE DETAILS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IN VIEW OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, SCHEDULED TOMORROW.

THE DIPLOMATS ALSO SAID WHEN NIXON BEGINS HIS STATE VISIT MAY 22, HE WILL SPEND MOST OF HIS WORKING TIME WITH BREZHNEV.

THE REST OF THE SOVIET TROIKA--PREMIER ALEXEI KOSYGIN AND PRESIDENT NIKOLAI PODGORNY--AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSIONS, THE SOURCES SAID, BUT BREZHNEV WILL BE THE ACTUAL HEAD OF THE SOVIET TEAM. THIS IS IN SPITE OF PROTOCOL RULES THAT PODGORNY AS TITULAR HEAD OF THE SOVIET STATE IS NIXON'S DIRECT OPPOSITE NUMBER.

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NEW YORK, APRIL 26, REUTER--AN AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATION TODAY CHARGED THAT RUSSIAN JEWISH ACTIVISTS ARE BEING ROUNDED UP IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENT NIXONS TRIP TO MOSCOW.

A SPOKESMAN FOR THE UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS SAID THAT 12 LEADING JEWISH ACTIVISTS HAD BEEN ORDERED TO REPORT FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS TODAY IN PREPARATION FOR BEING CALLED TO SERVICE WITH MILITARY RESERVE UNITS.

AMONG THEM, HE SAID, WAS GAVRIEL SHAPIRO, WHO WAS ONE OF A FOUR-MEMBER DELEGATION OF JEWS SEEKING TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL WHICH HAD WRITTEN NIXON REQUESTING A MEETING WITH HIM IN MOSCOW.

ALSO ON THE LIST WAS VLADIMIR LERNER, THE SON OF SCIENTIST ALEX LERNER. IT WAS AT THE ELDER LERNERS APARTMENT THAT NEW YORK CONGRESSMAN JAMES SCHEUER WAS TAKEN INTO POLICE CUSTODY LAST SUMMER. SCHEUER WAS LATER ORDERED EXPELLED FROM RUSSIA.

THE COUNCIL MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH SOVIET JEWISH LEADERS THROUGH A REGULAR NETWORK OF TELEPHONE CALLS. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT ONE OF THE LEADERS TALKED TO LAST NIGHT SAID THE MILITARY CALLUP OF THE 12 ACTIVISTS WAS "THE BEGINNING OF THE CLEARING OF MOSCOW" AND PREDICTED THAT OTHERS WHO MIGHT PROVE AN EMBARRASSMENT DURING THE NIXON VISIT ALSO WOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF CIRCULATION.
;; REUTER JCK/OQ

MS 2

KISSINGER 3 WASHINGTON (PUS 70)

THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION HERE THAT NIXONS MOSCOW COMMITTEE MAY BE JERAPOLYED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA. LHERE THE UNITED STATES HAS CARRIED OUT HEAVY BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IN RESPONSE TO THE INVASION IN THE SOUTH.

KISSINGER'S SECRET JOURNEY TO MOSCOW TOOK PLACE WHILE HE WAS BELIEVED TO BE COULING THE WEEKEND WITH PRESIDENT NIXON AT THE PRESIDENTIAL RETREAT AT CAMP DAVID, IN THE MARYLAND MOUNTAINS, ON THE SCORE AND TIMING OF NIXONS NEXT VIETNAM TROOP WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

ASKED TO EXPLAIN WHY THE WHITE HOUSE LIED ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS, KISSINGER SAID IT WAS DECIDED JOINTLY BY WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW TO KEEP THE TRIP SECRET UNTIL AFTER IT WAS COMPLETED SO THERE WOULD BE MINIMUM OF SPECULATION AS TO AG/PL 1218.

MS 3

KISSINGER 4 WASHINGTON

(JOINT U.S.-SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF TWO SENTENCES SAID KISSINGER WAS IN MOSCOW FROM APRIL 20 TO APRIL 24 TO CONFER WITH BREZINSKY AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTERS.)

IT ADDED: "THE DISCUSSIONS SEEM WITH IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS WELL AS WITH BILATERAL MATTERS PREPARATORY TO THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND SOVIET LEADERS IN MAY.

KISSINGER'S TRIP WAS THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF SECRET FOREIGN MISSIONS HE HAS CONDUCTED ON NIXONS BEHALF.

LAST YEAR HE FLEW SECRETLY TO Peking TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER CHOU EN-LAI AND PREPARE THE GROUND FOR NIXONS DRAMATIC ANNOUNCEMENT HE WOULD GO TO CHINA.

THEM EARLY THIS YEAR, NIXON DISCLOSED THAT KISSINGER HAD BEEN MEETING SECRETLY WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, TRYING UNSUCCESSFULLY TO BREAK THE STALEMATE IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS.

MORE AG/PL 1227

MS 4

KISSINGER 5 WASHINGTON

EXPLAINING THE SECRECY SURROUNDING THE MOSCOW TRIP,
KISSINGER SAID: "WE ARE IN A VERY DELICATE PHASE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS."

HE DECLINED TO ELABORATE, BUT OBSERVERS NOTED THAT THE
NITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE ENGAGED IN NEGO-\TI TIONS ON A NUMBER OF FRONTS, NOTABLY AIMING TO REACH AN
AGREEMENT TO CURB THE ARMS RACE.

THE U.S. HAS ALSO PUBLICLY ACCUSED THE SOVIET
NION OF HELPING TO MAKE THE CURRENT NORTH VIETNAMESE
OFFENSIVE POSSIBLY BY SUPPLYING HANOI WITH TANKS AND
OTHER SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

KISSINGER SAID IT WAS DECIDED EARLY LAST WEEK HE
SHOULD GO TO MOSCOW DURING A LONG DISCUSSION BETWEEN
NIXON, SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM ROGERS AND HIMSELF.

HE EXPLAINED THAT NIXON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SOVIET
LE DERS ON IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS FOR SEVERAL
YE RS, AND IT WAS DECIDED NOW THAT A MORE DIRECT
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WAS DESIRABLE ON THE EVE OF HIS VISIT TO
MOSCOW, SET TO BEGIN ON MAY 22.
MORE AG/PL 1,27

MS 5

KISSINGER 6 WASHINGTON

KISSINGER, WHO SAID HE FLEW TO AND FROM MOSCOW
IN A U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT, TOLD REPORTERS THE RECEPTION
HE RECEIVED WAS EXTREMELY COURTEOUS.

ASKED WHETHER HE DISCUSSED VIETNAM, HE REPLIED THAT BOTH
SIDES AGREED NOT TO REVEAL THE SUBJECTS OF THE TALKS,
BUT ADDED THAT REPORTERS COULD DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS
FROM THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
LERE ON THE AGENDA.

WHEN ASKED IF VIETNAM WAS THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THE
TRIP, KISSINGER SAID A WHOLE RANGE OF MATTERS WAS
DISCUSSED, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT MOST IMMEDIATELY
FFECT U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS.

KISSINGER MAY HAVE INFORMED SOVIET LEADERS OF THE
DECISION NIXON WILL ANNOUNCE LATER THIS WEEK ON U.S.
TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM VIETNAM BEYOND MAY 1, BY WHICH TIME
U.S. FORCES THERE WILL BE BELOW 69,000.
REUTER AG/PL 1232

UPI-67

(KISSINGER)

WASHINGTON--NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISER HENRY A. KISSINGER PAID A SECRET FOUR-DAY VISIT TO MOSCOW FROM THURSDAY NIGHT TO MONDAY AFTERNOON TO CONFER WITH TOP SOVIET LEADERS ON A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING VIETNAM AND TO ARRANGE PRESIDENT NIXON'S SUMMIT VISIT STARTING MAY 22, THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCED TODAY.

IN A SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT WITH MOSCOW, AT NOON EST, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RONALD L. ZIEGLER SAID THAT KISSINGER WAS I MOSCOW BETWEEN APRIL 20 AND 24 TO CONFER WITH COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER LEONID I. BREZHNEV AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRE GROMYKO.

"THE DISCUSSIONS DEALT WITH IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS WELL AS BILATERAL MATTERS PREPARATORY TO THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT NIXON AND SOVIET LEADERS IN MAY," ZIEGLER SAID.

AFTER ZIEGLER'S ANNOUNCEMENT, KISSINGER THEN MADE AN APPEARANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING CENTER, TELLING REPORTERS THAT HIS RECEPTION "WAS EXTREMELY COURTEOUS AND DISCUSSIONS WERE FRANK AND USEFUL" DURING HIS CLANDESTINE STAY IN THE RUSSIAN CAPITAL.

HE SAID THAT BY AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS, IT WAS DECIDED THAT "NEITHER SIDE WOULD REVEAL THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS."

ASKED WHETHER THE VIETNAM CRISIS WAS THE "PRINCIPAL REASON" FOR HIS SURPRISE QUICK VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION, KISSINGER DECLINED TO ANSWER THE QUESTION DIRECTLY. BUT HE ADDED THAT THE "WHOLE RANGE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WAS DISCUSSED" INCLUDING THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES.

HE MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE HEAVY FIGHTING IN VIETNAM THAT HAS CAUSED NEW TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, WAS HIGH ON THE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS.

4-25-GE/SH1207PES

51

WASHINGTON--ADD KISSINGER (50)

KISSINGER, WHO MADE A SECRET TRIP TO PEKING TO ARRANGE NIXON'S
HISTORIC CHINA VISIT, WAS IN THE SOVIET CAPITAL FROM LAST THURSDAY
UNTIL MONDAY AND MET WITH COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF LEONID L. BREZHNEV AND
FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO.

THE DISCUSSION "DEALT WITH IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AS
WELL AS WITH BILATERAL MATTERS PREPARATORY TO TALKS BETWEEN SOVIET
LEADERS AND PRESIDENT NIXON IN MAY," PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY
RONALD L. ZIEGLER SAID AS HE READ A BRIEF STATEMENT RELEASED
SIMULTANEOUSLY IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

THE SECRET TALKS WERE OCCURRING AT THE SAME TIME THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS SAYING THAT KISSINGER WAS AT THE SECLUDED CAMP DAVID PRESIDENTIAL
RETREAT IN MARYLAND WITH THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE--THE SAME TYPE OF
PLOY USED TOCOVER 12 SECRET TRIPS TO PAIRS FOR PRIVATE TALKS
KISSINGER HAD WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

KISSINGER, APPEARING BRIEFLY BEFORE NEWSMEN AT THE WHITE HOUSE,
REFUSED TO DIVULGE SPECIFIC TOPICS COVERED IN HIS FOUR DAYS OF
CONFERENCE.

SR1209PES APRIL 25

52

WASHINGTON--ADD KISSINGER (51)

BUT HE CLEARLY INDICATED THAT VIETNAM-AND THE SOVIET SHIPMENT OF
ARMS TO THE COMMUNISTS THERE--WERE A MAJOR ITEM.

KISSINGER DISCLOSED, TOO, THAT NIXON HAS BEEN CARRYING ON
EXTENSIVE EXCHANGES WITH BREZHNEV. HE SAID THAT THESE EXCHANGES
WERE THROUGH CORRESPONDENTS, RATHER THAN VIA THE MOSCOW-WASHINGTON
HOTLINE.

WHILE REFUSING TO DIVULGE DETAILS, KISSINGER SAID THE "TALKS WERE
USEFUL, FRANK AND SATISFACTORY."

"WE AGREED NEITHER SIDE WOULD REVEAL THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS,"
KISSINGER RESPONDED WHEN ASKED WHETHER VIETNAM WAS DISCUSSED.

BUT HE POINTED TOWARD THE JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT'S USE OF THE PHRASE,
"IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS," AS A CLEAR SIGN THAT VIETNAM
WAS INDEED A MAJOR TOPIC.

SR1212PES APRIL 25

PMS 79

KISSINGER & WASHINGTON

KISSINGER TOLD A WHITE HOUSE PRESS CONFERENCE
U.S. AND SOVIET LEADERS AGREED NOT TO GIVE ANY DETAILS OF
THE TALKS, BUT HE INDICATED THAT VIETNAM WAS AMONG THE
SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

HE MET SOVIET PARTY LEADER LEONID BREZHNEV AND FOREIGN MINISTER
ANDREI GROMYKO WHILE IN MOSCOW FROM LAST THURSDAY UNTIL
YESTERDAY.

KISSINGER DESCRIBED HIS TALKS AS USEFUL, FRANK
AND SATISFACTORY.

ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN ANY POSSIBILITY BEFORE HIS
MOSCOW TRIP THAT NIXONS OWN VISIT THERE NEXT MONTH
LOULD BE CANCELLED, KISSINGER REPLIED: "NONE."
MORE AG/PL 1208

Western Europe, p. 2 Asia, Africa, p. 11 Communist Countries, p. 13

KISSINGER MOSCOW TRIP, PARIS TALKS

Summary

Foreign media gave top news treatment to Henry Kissinger's trip to Moscow, generally regarding it as confirmation that President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union will take place.

Some early discussion linked the secret trip to the announcement that the U.S. will return Thursday to the Vietnam talks at Paris.

These were among wide-ranging speculative assessments:

- "Paris-based Europe One radio said the resumption of the Paris talks was clearly "a first consequence of the Kissinger trip to Moscow," as well as "a major concession by Washington to the Soviets" and "a first step in de-escalation."

- "The London *Daily Mail* surmised that through Mr. Kissinger the President "has told the Kremlin he has no intention of being wined and dined in the Soviet Union while... American troops left in South Vietnam are being encircled by Soviet-made tanks and guns."

- "*Messaggero* of Rome, supposing that Mr. Kissinger had sought a Soviet pledge "not to encourage North Vietnam's military and political extremism," thought it "more difficult to infer what Washington might give in return."

Meanwhile, reports that a 1969 study revealed differences of official opinion on the Vietnam war drew scant notice. The *Times* of London said that "despite Dr. Kissinger's Moscow coup, President Nixon was severely embarrassed yesterday by the revelation that his Administration started out deeply divided over the prospects in Vietnam..."

Hanoi radio alleged that "the Nixon clique was forced to agree to participate in the Paris conference again so as to soothe the public's indignation."

Moscow TASS announced the Kissinger visit in a brief dispatch without attribution to a news source.

* * *

No. 54

1

4/26/72

Paris Radio: "Talks Resumption a Result of Kissinger Trip"

The Paris-based commercial Europe One radio this morning said of the announcement that the U.S. will return to the Paris peace talks, "The Americans let Moscow persuade them." Its New York correspondent asserted that resumption of the talks was clearly "a first consequence of Kissinger's trip to Moscow," as well as "a major concession by Washington to the Soviets" and "a first step in de-escalation."

TV: "Trip a Blow to Rumors"

State-run television's first-network anchor man declared that the Kissinger trip "confirms that the North Vietnamese offensive, on the one hand, and the bombings of Haiphong and Hanoi on the other, have not lessened the Soviet and U.S. desire for closer relations."

The second network called the Kissinger journey "a sharp blow to rumors that the Moscow summit was imperiled."

Networks also reported a demonstration in Paris last night by 48 organizations protesting the war in Indochina.

"Did Kissinger Go Only to Moscow?"

This afternoon's mass-circulation *France-Soir* of Paris said in a Washington report by Adalbert de Segonzac:

"The fact that Mr. Kissinger went to Moscow and that the Soviet leaders agreed to receive him shows that both sides are eager to save the summit talks...

"The fact that a joint communique was issued means that both sides convinced each other they did not intend to create a situation risking their prestige. Americans and Russians are equally interested in not cancelling the meeting because the signing of a series of impressive agreements appears possible during the Nixon visit...

"But the war in Vietnam may become the main topic and a solution may perhaps emerge from the conversations. Even more so since some people are wondering whether Kissinger went only to Moscow during these four days."

No. 54

2

4/26/72

The correspondent noted that the announcement "says rather curiously that his sojourn in the USSR took place 'between' April 20 and April 24 and not 'from' the 20th to the 24th" and asked:

"Can one infer from this that President Nixon's mysterious traveling salesman did not spend four days in Moscow and had conversations with other personalities elsewhere, for example, with Mr. Le Duc Tho... in Paris or elsewhere? After all, nothing is impossible with that devil-of-a-fellow Kissinger."

## "Doubt Cancellation Never Contemplated"

Left-of-center *Combat* of Paris today said Mr. Kissinger "convinced no one yesterday when he asserted the cancellation" of the Moscow trip "had never been contemplated. This actually was the only card Washington had available." It added:

"The Soviets have needed Mr. Nixon too much recently.... The nature and diversity of their requirements place them in the position of askers. They have just brilliantly reversed that position by acquiring unexpected trumps, for which Mr. Nixon will have to pay a high price."

## Prediction on Tonight's Speech

Financial *Les Echos* of Paris said today of Mr. Nixon's announced television report to the people:

"At the moment when the test of strength reaches its climax in the field, President Nixon is about to make a statement in which he cannot avoid specifying his intentions concerning continuation of the war....

"The President is known as a man who likes surprises and unexpected decisions. Yet it is clear that a few weeks before his visit to Moscow, and in the midst of an election campaign, his margin for maneuver is rather limited. His principal hope rests finally in an upsurge in ARVN resistance and in the exhaustion--so far not in sight--of the Communist offensive."

No. 54

3

4/26/72

AFP on Views of Soviets in Hanoi

Agence France Presse reported today from Hanoi that Soviet diplomatic circles there "stress the importance of the Nixon visit to the interests of world peace. The Vietnam problem is of a different order, they say. But they add that support for the Indochinese people will never waver.

"Thus diplomatic circles here are convinced that Moscow has done its utmost to persuade Washington at least to limit the bombing in the populous regions north of the 20th Parallel....

"They point out that... only the burning issue of Vietnam could justify Dr. Kissinger's lightning visit to the Soviet capital.

"The current Seventh Fleet semi-blockade of the North Vietnamese coast and threat of further action against Hanoi and Haiphong raise the possibility of a new Cuba-type confrontation--something which neither the Americans nor the Russians want, say the diplomatic observers."

London: "Warned Moscow on Vietnam"

The British press, television and radio gave major news emphasis to Mr. Kissinger's trip. Under the heading "Secret Trip to Warn Moscow," the conservative London *Daily Mail* wrote today:

"One thing at least is clear--President Nixon has told the Kremlin he has no intention of being wined and dined in the Soviet Union while...American troops left in South Vietnam are being encircled by Soviet-made tanks and guns.

"The President will consent to go to Moscow... only if he is given advance assurances that he can present his visit as a positive step towards a Vietnam peace."

No. 54

4

4/26/72

"U.S. Domestic Support Growing"

In a separate commentary the paper stated:

"Dr. Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow shows that President Nixon means business.

"The military situation in South Vietnam has worsened considerably in the past few days.... In this situation Mr. Nixon had deployed every threat available to him.

"He is ready to cancel his Moscow summit, to intensify the bombing or even to blockade the coastline of North Vietnam. What he cannot afford to do is to halt the withdrawal of American combat troops. In fact, if the situation gets still worse, he would have to whisk them out even faster."

The paper asserted that "American voters are desperately weary of the war," but that "the humiliation of conceding complete military victory to the Communists would destroy any President." It said that "so far there is no evidence to show that most Americans disapprove of what he is doing."

"The very reverse. The latest poll shows support hardening for the President. And from here it looks as if he is doing the only thing he can do."

"Rift at the White House"

Yesterday the paper reported from Washington that "a rift in the White House was revealed... over President Nixon's handling of the deepening crisis in Vietnam." The story maintained that most of the President's aides "are out of sympathy with his recent moves to escalate the war."

Today's liberal Manchester Guardian, a frequent critic of U.S. Vietnam policy, said in a report from Washington on Mr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow:

"The Vietnam situation is clearly at a crisis point and Administration officials concede that what happens on the ground during the next four to six weeks may well decide the outcome of the war."

No. 54

5

4/26/72

"But it is hard to see what, if any, assurances Kissinger
could hope to gain which could affect the current fighting
except the limited one that Soviet leaders still believe a
summit meeting with President Nixon worthwhile.

"More likely, in the view of some observers here, is
that the visit was tied to the strategic arms limitation talks
on which the Administration is anxious to secure the broadest
possible agreement."

The writer concluded, "It is possible that Kissinger may have gone to Moscow to thrash out the shape of the SALT agreements which President Nixon is apparently determined to bring home."

"Embarrassment--Despite Moscow Trip"

The prestigious independent *Times* of London declared today in a story from Washington that "despite Dr. Kissinger's Moscow coup, President Nixon was severely embarrassed yesterday by the revelation that his Administration started out deeply divided over the prospects in Vietnam but agreed on virtually only one conclusion--that the South Vietnamese forces even when modernized would be incapable of fighting on alone."

"Vietnamization--All Is Not Lost"

A report from Saigon in the paper today said that "even if the North Vietnamese fall short of the immediate goal of unseating Mr. Nixon, they can still be seen to have achieved a great deal. Broadly, they have wiped out most of the military gains made by the Americans, with support from the South Vietnamese, over the past four years."

As for Vietnamization, it continued, "if this vaguely defined concept means--
as it probably does--shoring up South Vietnam long enough to permit the
extraction in reasonable order of the last American soldier, then all is
certainly not lost. If, on the other hand, it is intended to leave the South
Vietnamese with the military and political capacity to thwart the Communist
designs for the foreseeable future, then the outlook has seldom looked more
bleak."

No. 54

6

4/26/72

# "'Intensity' Bombing Has Ominous Ring"

Yesterday the paper, quoting a _Newsweek_ magazine report that the air strikes were "ineffective," said that "the disclosure tends to reinforce assumptions that President Nixon ordered the bombing for psychological and diplomatic reasons. However, the convictions of the State and Defense Departments that 'greater intensity' bombing 'free of the militarily confining restraints' could effectively interdict rail supplies from China if Haiphong harbor was blockaded have an ominous ring."

The independent London _Financial Times_ asserted today that the bombing of North Vietnam "has at least had the advantage of making it clear that the U.S. is prepared to back its Vietnamization program to the hilt in an election year and that Hanoi must now take account of this in pushing ahead with its invasion."

# Election Worries?

A front-page by-liner in today's mass-circulation, left-oriented _Daily Mirror_ said that "Mr. Nixon sent these mass destruction bombers over North Vietnam because he feared that a hawkish Republican-voting minority would punish him in the November election if he conceded defeat too quickly." The writer continued, "I believe the Americans will despatch Mr. Nixon (in November) just as they despatched Mr. Johnson. Meanwhile, there will be no peace..."

# BBC: "Bombing a Warning to Moscow"

BBC radio reported yesterday that "the Communist offensive continues to make progress..." Washington correspondent Charles Wheeler said on another program that President Nixon resumed the bombing "because he has no alternative. He couldn't just sit there and do nothing while the news got worse." Wheeler added:

"The bombing is not a warning to North Vietnam--it is a warning to Russia."

No. 54

7

4/26/72

Rome TV: "Confirms Nixon Trip as Planned"

Italian TV last night called Mr. Kissinger's Moscow trip "sensational...not an unusual feat for Kissinger." The report included the text of the Washington-Moscow announcement.

A commentator asserted that "Kissinger's trip to Moscow and his meeting with Brezhnev confirm that despite the developments of the Vietnam war, the President's trip to Moscow will take place as planned."

Rome radio's New York correspondent commented this morning:

"One surprise after another: Kissinger's trip to Moscow and the resumption of the peace negotiations in Paris. After Kissinger's return, Nixon began to write his speech on Vietnam troop levels, although it is said that his adviser's trip will not influence that announcement..."

"Saigon Worried About Tonight's Statement"

A Hong Kong correspondent stated on radio, "The announcement of resumption of negotiations was given simultaneously in Washington and Saigon. Now it is up to the north to show their good will. Saigon hopes the north will slow down the offensive."

He added, "All is quiet in Saigon despite the fighting around An Loc. No one is worried about that. Instead they are worried about the announcement that Nixon is about to make. It is believed that the pullout will continue, but at a slower rate."

"Soviet Papers Avoid Attacks on Nixon"

Milan's influential *Corriere della Sera* carried its Moscow correspondent's suggestion today that Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Brezhnev discussed U.S.-USSR trade relations and economic cooperation, SALT, the Middle East, Vietnam, and a European security conference. He continued:

"Political observers believe, however, that Vietnam was the main subject.... The Americans blame the Soviets for helping the North Vietnamese launch the offensive by supplying them with arms.

No. 54

8

4/26/72

"In spite of polemics and mutual accusations, Soviet papers have in the past few days avoided any direct attack on President Nixon. This clearly shows that the Soviets do not intend to cause cancellation of the Moscow summit."

## "De-escalation Agreement Reached?"

The paper's New York correspondent wrote:

"Because of the tone in the joint communique and Kissinger's statements...many U.S. observers have the impression that at least an agreement on a 'de-escalation' program was reached."

Influential left-of-center La Stampa of Turin ran its New York correspondent's view that Mr. Nixon's aims in sending Mr. Kissinger to Moscow were "to ascertain the USSR's role in the escalation of the Vietnam conflict" and to insure the success of his coming trip to Moscow.

The New York correspondent of middle-of-the-road Il Messaggero, Rome, stated:

"It is easy to imagine what Kissinger asked of the Soviet leaders: A pledge not to encourage North Vietnam's military and political extremism.... However, it is more difficult to infer what Washington might give in return."

A number of Italian papers yesterday carried wire service stories on "the advance of North Vietnamese troops in the central highlands area and the South Vietnamese loss of four bases." Reports said the North Vietnamese were preparing "the final attack to divide South Vietnam into two parts."

## Duesseldorf: "Trip to Consolidate Nixon Position"

Pro-Christian Democratic Rheinische Post of Duesseldorf said today that "the last word on Kissinger's policy has not yet been said..."

"Whether Vietnamization will end in failure depends on General Giap rather than on the White House's plans."

"But in one respect Kissinger excels, and that is in his ability to revive secret diplomacy... The Kissinger trip to Peking was designed to improve Nixon's chances for re-election; his excursion to Moscow represents an attempt to consolidate the President's shaky position. Strange as it may seem, Moscow obviously is ready to go along despite the bombings of Hanoi. The interests of the two superpowers meet on a level above that of conventional policy."

No. 54

9

4/26/72

"But not all of Nixon's dreams will come true in Moscow. The President hopes to return with an agreement on SALT. He is also still waiting for some helpful gesture by the Kremlin about his endangered position in Vietnam. Despite Kissinger's secret diplomacy, such hope will not be fulfilled. But Moscow will try to keep dark clouds from forming over the visit and Nixon may have to content himself with that."

## "ARVN Has Corrected Image"

Adalbert Weinstein, military writer of independent-right Frankfurter Allgemeine, wrote today in Saigon that neither side had won the battle for the cities and the villages and that the struggle "is turning into one for psychological control of the people." He stated that the ARVN "has corrected the negative image the world had of its staying power." He reported that "cautiously optimistic Americans believe every day of fighting brings Saigon closer to mastering the crisis," which he said the Americans expect to last at least for two more months. Noting that the U.S. Navy controls the entire coastline and calling attention to the "increasingly devastating effect of the USAF air attacks," he concluded:

"No modern army, no guerrilla forces can stand up to such raids for any length of time.... Nowhere has the South Vietnamese population followed the appeals of the North Vietnamese. None of the big cities has fallen. The peasants have fled from the enemy. If the South Vietnamese army holds out, the combination of military Vietnamization and U.S. bombing offers a good chance."

## "Nixon May Call Off Trip"

The Social Democratic Party's weekly Vorwaerts declared that "regardless of whether Giap's offensive is successful... one thing is certain--President Nixon's Vietnamization program has come to naught."

"Washington must compensate for Saigon's military weakness... by stepped-up air and naval operations...."

"Giap's use of Soviet weapons shortly before Nixon's visit to the Kremlin suggests that the USSR wants to weaken its guest's position. But they mistake Nixon's psychology in this effort. It is more likely that he will call off the visit at the last moment if things in Vietnam become catastrophic, rather than negotiate from a position of weakness."

No. 54

10

4/26/72

## West Berlin: "Moscow Cooler Toward Nixon Visit"

The Washington correspondent of independent *Tagesspiegel* of West Berlin declared that "President Nixon was right" when he judged that the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong would not disturb U.S.-USSR relations, and that the USSR would continue to be interested in concluding agreements on trade, shipping and nuclear plants. He said a failure of the West German parliament to ratify the draft treaties with Moscow and Warsaw "surely would not spoil what the American bombing of Hanoi could not destroy." He judged that "the atmosphere in Moscow now is cooler" toward the planned Nixon visit, and "lower temperatures would not be welcome."

## Stockholm: "Resumption a Defeat for U.S."

Swedish media today gave wide coverage to the Kissinger trip and the U.S. decision on resumption of the Paris talks. Sparse early comment included a speculative report on radio that the return to the conference table in Paris might have been the result of Russian pressure communicated to Mr. Kissinger.

This afternoon's Social Democratic and anti-U.S. Aftonbladet of Stockholm front-paged this banner headline: "SOVIETS FORCE NIXON TO PEACE TALKS." The paper's New York correspondent stated, "The news that the peace talks will be resumed... can be viewed as a major diplomatic defeat for the U.S."

## Tokyo TV Coverage

Japanese television networks reported the U.S. and Saigon had stated their readiness to resume the Paris talks, that Mr. Kissinger had returned from Moscow and that the President would speak tonight on Vietnam. There was no comment on these developments.

## "Nixon Trip of the Greatest Importance"

Independent-moderate Mainichi of Tokyo declared yesterday that President Nixon's talks in Moscow would be "of the greatest historical importance," and added:

"From the viewpoint of power politics, President Nixon may say that the very importance of the Moscow talks made it necessary for the U.S. to resort to a 'show of force' by bombing North Vietnam. The current U.S. policy of escalation is... a warning to the Soviet Union to refrain from the large-scale military aid to North Vietnam that made the offensive possible....

No. 54

11

4/26/72

"Judging from the consistent Soviet policy of aiding North Vietnam ever since the beginning of the American intervention, U.S. hopes for deals with the Soviets will most probably be in vain.

"Not only that, the more expectations the Americans have regarding deals with the Soviets, the more confidence the Russians will gain in relations with the U.S., for Mr. Nixon has maneuvered himself into a position where he needs Soviet help to end the Vietnam war."

Singapore: "Do Polls Encourage Nixon to Risk All?"

Leftist Sin Chew Jit Poh of Singapore, long hostile to U.S. policies in Vietnam, said today that during the past few days the U.S. seemed to have "created" a climate of public opinion to justify President Nixon's Vietnam policy. It said opinion polls "recently conducted in Washington" purported to show that "more Americans back Nixon's Vietnam policy, and that 80 per cent oppose anti-war demonstrations." It concluded:

"Nixon has kept silent on the military situation in Vietnam. Is he standing at a crossroads, or being encouraged by the support of his countrymen, as revealed in opinion polls, to stake all he has on the Vietnam gamble?"

Lagos: "U.S., USSR Seem to Need Each Other"

The Government-owned Morning Post of Lagos said today:

"The Russians seem to need the Americans as much as the Americans need them.

"The Russians seem to be looking both East and West, but with the overriding aim of persuading Mr. Nixon that the USSR is America's chief negotiating partner."

In another article the paper declared that "the way ahead is clearly that of negotiations, not confrontation, as the means of solving international issues." It suggested that Soviet policy had been evolving along similar lines and concluded: "Mr. Nixon's visit may prove to be the climax."

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Santiago: "Hanoi Acted Without USSR, PRC Approval"

Chile's independent-conservative El Mercurio of Santiago said stepped-up
hostilities in Indochina seemed not to have cooled U.S. relations with China
or the USSR. It said this "suggests that the North Vietnamese offensive
did not have the prior approval of its two big allies and providers, but was
an expression of arrogant independence at a time when both are enjoying
better relations with the U.S."

Hanoi: "Public Opinion Forced U.S. Return to Talks"

Hanoi radio domestic service said today:

"Last night... the Nixon Administration declared that it would continue to attend the sessions of the Paris Conference on Vietnam effective Thursday, April 27, 1972...

"Sympathizing with our people's just struggle, American and world public opinion have unanimously demanded that the Nixon Administration put an end to the war of aggression and the policy of Vietnamization of the war, withdraw all U.S. troops, abandon the puppet administration, stop bombing North Vietnam and return to the Paris conference on Vietnam.

"Driven into this embarrassing, passive, isolated and defeated position, the Nixon clique was forced to agree to participate in the Paris conference again so as to soothe the public's indignation. But this does not mean it is ready to stop the war of aggression and settle the Vietnam issue through negotiations...

"Using the same arrogant language, White House spokesman Ziegler, when announcing the U.S. resumption of the Paris talks, insolently said that the Nixon Administration would continue bombing North Vietnam..."

Moscow Dispatch on Kissinger Visit

Moscow TASS yesterday announced Mr. Kissinger's visit in a brief dispatch
without attribution to a news source. It said:

"A report published today says that between April 20 and April 24, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was in Moscow to confer with the General Secretary of the

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Central Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev and Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko. The report says the discussions dealt with important international problems as well as with bilateral matters preparatory to the talks between President Nixon and Soviet leaders in May."

## Belgrade Report From Moscow

Belgrade Tanjug's Moscow correspondent reported today:

"Those well acquainted with Kissinger's hitherto successful missions consider that his talks in Moscow were centered on Vietnam. This most sensitive subject threatens the good atmosphere pending the visit of the U.S. President to the Soviet Union. According to some reports, it had even brought into question the visit itself...

"Some reports indicate that Kissinger might have agreed in Moscow to the resumption of the Paris negotiations, as the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had proposed. Some quarters close to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow are hinting not only that an agreement has been reached on resumption of the negotiations, but also on the agenda of the meeting.

"In any case, the atmosphere pending the Brezhnev-Nixon meeting would not be very promising regarding the success of their talks if at least a minimum step forward were not made in connection with the Vietnam issue..."

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