[L]

OCTOBER 13, 1985

Los Angeles Times Magazine

PEOPLE • PLACES • PLEASURES

On the Cover: Vin Scully, photographed by Marlene Wallace. "Scully's philosophy is that baseball should be savored before being dissected—and there's a hint of regret that he can no longer watch the game as he did when he was an 8-year-old boy at the Polo Grounds . . ." Story on Page 18.

Features

HOW TO WATCH A BASEBALL GAME **18** BY HENRY WEINSTEIN

Vin Scully's primer for neophytes and connoisseurs.

SO SAYS DUSTY STREET **20** BY DENNIS MCDOUGAL

A conversation with the KROQ-FM disc jockey, den mother to more than a million teens.

ANSEL ADAMS' PEOPLE **22**

Portraits and comments from the late photographer's just-released autobiography.

THE BIG ONE **26** BY DAVID DEVOSS

During the Nobel season, checking in with Henry Kissinger, Linus Pauling and Norman Borlaug, American winners of the Peace Prize.

THE RELUCTANT CELEBRITY **48** BY PAUL DEAN

Chuck Yeager, the man who broke the sound barrier, took to the woods when his best-selling autobiography came out.

THE PLACE WHERE GARDENERS GATHER **72** BY ROBERT SMAUS

The upcoming Los Angeles Garden Show is a testimony to the accomplishments of nurserymen.

ON THE WATER **82** BY TOM MORAN

Venice and Marina del Rey have more in common than the ocean.

**8 THE WEEK**
The subdivision of Wolfskill
Ranch and the birth of the
Westside; Celebrations

**10** JACK SMITH
*Changing Times*

**14** SUNDAY READING
The spirit of the humanities in California; new frontiers for innovation; driving the boulevards, and bamboo in Pasadena.

30 JOHN RILEY
Random Events

34 BEVIS HILLIER
Hat Trick

38 PERSONAL PLEASURES
When Mayor Bradley Takes a Break

42 FASHION
Clotheslines

46 BEAUTY
Beauty and the Bike

52 MIV SCHAAF
Mayan Culture

58 ON WINE
Wonder Wines

60 FOOD
A Bit of Seasonal Change

62 GARDEN JOBS
Daffodils: Cool Is Kind

78 ANIMALS
The Heart of an Aristocrat

80 PUZZLER

Special! Our First Neighborhood Map: Venice and Marina del Rey. See Back-Cover Fold-Out

Ansel Adams'
PEOPLE

LEFT: PAINTER JOHN MARIN,
CLIFFSIDE, N.J., 1948.

"After my experience with that sensitive man in the beauty of the Southwest landscape, I was astonished to find him living in a drab little house in a depressed neighborhood just west of the Palisades. I recall gray, stuffed furniture, curio ashtrays from Atlantic City and a tiny, bleak fireplace over which bung, in an assertive way, an empty picture frame. . . . I made a few casual portraits. . . . to show the spirit of the man and his environment."

RIGHT: PHOTOGRAPHER AND HISTORIAN BEAUMONT NEWHALL AND HIS WIFE, NANCY, NEW YORK CITY, 1939.

On a different occasion, "I convinced Beaumont and Nancy to join me on a trip through the Southwest. We moved from Zion to Bryce to the Grand Canyon and other areas of this astonishing country. One evening, after a grueling day of photographing, driving over miles of beautiful desolation, we came . . . to the brink of Bryce Canyon. Before we prepared a supper-in-the-dark, I begged them to walk to the edge of the great vista that was slowly yielding to twilight. Beaumont, tired, dusty and hungry, waited for Nancy's glowing response to the scene and then said quietly, 'Ob Gawd, more Nature.'"

RIGHT: CHINESE BAPTIST
KINDERGARTEN CLASS,
SAN FRANCISCO, CIRCA 1920.

Adams' first commercial assignment was to do class photos. But he used too much flash powder: "There was a tremendous PPFFUFF!! . . . No one was in sight. There was dead silence, then a chorus of terrified wails arose from under the desks. The considerable cloud of smoke . . . billowed over the schoolyard and quickly alerted the fire department, who arrived with sirens screaming."

# The Big One

## Checking In With the Three Living American Winners of the Nobel Peace Prize

BY DAVID DEVOSS

On a warm afternoon in the late summer of 1963, more than 200,000 people from throughout the United States marched to the base of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington. One of them, Martin Luther King Jr., had a dream.

"We cannot be satisfied as long as the Negro's basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one," he said in the dramatic cadence of his Southern Baptist heritage. "We can never be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi can't vote and a Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream."

King's appeal for human dignity carried far beyond our borders. And on Oct. 14, 1964, 21 years ago Monday, the 35-year-old preacher from Atlanta who believed that nonviolence was the avenue to black equality became the youngest man ever to receive the world's highest honor: the Nobel Peace Prize.

The search for peace has / Continued

Henry Kissinger, left, in his Park Avenue office and, right, Linus Pauling—the only person to have won two unshared Nobel prizes—on the beach at Big Sur.

PHOTOGRAPHS BY DAVID HUME KENNERLY AND ROSEMARY KAUL

[LC]

The Big One

*Continued* / been an elusive quest. Though a century seldom passes without some attempt to assure tranquility, violence usually prevails. Following World War I, diplomats negotiated numerous pacts "outlawing" war in perpetuity. That the guarantees fell short of the goal was not lost on skeptics such as Thomas Hardy, who dismissed the much-touted Locarno Treaty, which guaranteed the territorial integrity of its seven European signatories, in the doggerel "Christmas, 1924":

"Peace upon earth!" was said. We sing it
and pay a million priests to bring it.

After two thousand years of mass
We've got as far as poison gas.

The dichotomy between the actions of man and his professed aspirations was embodied in Alfred Nobel, the Swedish inventor of dynamite and blasting gelatin. Nobel spent most of his life selling arms and explosives. His life changed in 1888, however, when his brother Ludwig died and a French newspaper, confusing the two, published Alfred's obituary beneath the headline: "The Merchant of Death."

So aghast was Nobel at the prospect of carrying that moniker through eternity that he vowed to change his image by rewriting his will. Nobel's new legacy would be a series of prizes, funded by the interest earned on his $9-million estate, that each year would reward those who "have conferred the greatest benefits on mankind in the fields of physics, chemistry, medicine, literature and peace."

Blessed with the wisdom that occasionally attends the 11th hour of one's life, Nobel realized that progress toward peace would be more difficult to measure than scientific advancement. To insure against its diminished value, he ordered that the Peace Prize should be awarded only when justified, and then only by Norwegians, since they among all Europeans—even his fellow Swedes, who were charged with administering the other four prizes—had proved the most adept at avoiding armed / *Continued on Page 32*

*Plant geneticist Norman E. Borlaug*
*in New York's Central Park.*

Photograph by David Hume Kennerly

LC

## Quotes from David DeVoss - Los Angeles Times Magazine

"There's no doubt the Nobel is the highest and most satisfying award a political figure active in the field of foreign policy can achieve."

"In my particular case, the subsequent circumstances were rather tragic, and that obviously has to affect my recollection of it."

Writing in his memoirs of the Toi (?) award, Kissinger expressed surprise "a representative of a country that had invaded all neighboring countries could win a peace prize for making a cease fire that even then it was violating in every provision."
(DeVoss said he took this from a news article.)

"When you make a peace agreement you have to assume the United States will enforce its side of the terms because otherwise you are just surrendering."

"It never occurred to us that Congress would legislate a prohibition against enforcing the agreement or that it would cut aid from $2 billion in the first year (1972) to $750 million 3 years later. Congress did both of these things so I was very gloomy and when Le Duc Tho returned his award it was a harbinger of things to come."

"Weapons today are capable of destroying humanity, but almost all the leaders in the world are preoccupied with getting through the next year or two of their incumbency."

"This disproportion between the power of weapons and the foresight of governments is a great problem."

Re KAI: "We never discuss our clients. That's the method by which we operate."

Re forecasts we do: "We do it orally; we prefer not to do paper."

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BURBAY INTERVIEW—KISSINGER(eP)

SIDE A ................(ep)
......................(ep)

.... I mean, historically summits have tended to create
expectations that haven't been satisfied. And perhaps that's
inevitable in the process or something?(ep)

A: Except maybe one of '72.(ep)

Q: Yes. But do you .(n).(n). have you any more optimism about
this summit? What's your feeling about it? Can much be
achieved?(ep)

A: It depends on what you expect. If people expect a
completed arms control agreement, that can not be achieved. If
people expect that foreign policy is a theological process of
conversion, in which a sudden change of personality or
philosophy emerges, that also cannot be achieved. I think what
can be achieved is the beginning of a process by which the
Soviets without changing their fundamental position,
understand how we interpret reality so that they have a
framework for handling specific proposals that are put forward
in subsequent negotiations. I think this is important because
.(n).(n). especially so long as this much emphasis is given to
arms control. The numbers that are thrown around in Geneva are
almost impenetrable, without some guide to the philosophy
that's behind them, since the numbers as such, are very often
bureaucratic compromises. Secondly, with respect to arms
control, I believe a Vladivostock (spl?) type agreement is
possible. By that I mean an agreement that defines the
parameters of the subsequent discussion. With respect to
offensive weapons, maybe even the rough numbers that will be
the ceilings. And perhaps some guidance about the relationship
between defensive and offensive negotiations that will take
place subsequently. Any attempt to do more I think will lead
to a stalemate or to a superficial agreement that has no
significance .(n).(n). or marginal significance.(ep)

Q: Are we at a propitious or historical moment in the arms
race in relations in the super powers that some breakthrough
is possible?(ep)

A: I think we are a propitious moment in terms of the internal evolution of the super powers. On the American side, because it is now apparent, that the democracies cannot conduct policies of confrontation unless it is demonstrated that they have no other choice. So even a Machiavalian policy will dictate the need to have a peace program. And I don't believe that President Reagan is Machiavalian by nature.(EP)

Q: Did you see SDI.(n).(n). [interrupted] (EP)

A: ...... in the Soviet Union it is even more imperative because they have at least four problems: One, the structure of their government. They have to make it less feudal, less personal and more constitutional-not democratic, but constitutional, so that obligation runs more to the office than to the person. Secondly, the economy cannot be continued by central planning. It can be continued but only at the price of falling further and further behind and they have to learn how to integrate information technology and similar things. Third, they have a major change of population composition. And fourth, their foreign policy while enormously persistent, has not been particularly successful. All of these things need to be integrated.(n).(n). and dictate a period of respite for the Soviet Union. The question is whether the respite will be achieved by both sides, with something serious, or whether it is mostly atmospheric.(n).(n). excuse me.(n).(n). you were .........(EP)

...........(EP)

some kind of break in tape? somebody stamping something ??(EP)

...................(EP)

...................(EP)

Q: Shall we start ? ? regular ? ?(EP)

A: No, no. Go ahead.(EP)

Q: Two questions, really. They may be linked. Do you think the Gorbachev has the strength and the internal dynamic of Soviet society to make it possible for him to achieve these four points that you've mentioned? And secondly, this is obviously ? to an extent, in this country, is SDI ever going to be.(n).(n). do you think Ronald Reagan ? bargaining chip or does he see it as something which has got to be pursued at all costs and in all events?(EP)

A: With respect to the first question.(n).(n). that of course is the great test of Gorbachev.(n).(n). Can he pursue all of these objectives simultaneously.(n).(n). ? improve all four of these areas simultaneously. That's not self-evident. Especially as the bureaucratic problem for reforming the economy for him, requires a different contiguency from the bureaucracy to make foreign policy more flexible.(EP)

...........................(EP)

break in tape ...........(EP)

A: In order to reform the economy, my guess is that Gorbachev will have to rely on those institutions in the Soviet Union that are in competition with the outside world, namely the military and the KGB, in which they will have some standards of achievement in order to get more flexibility into foreign policy. Well, let's put it another way.(n).(n). those are

the very institutions that would inhibit greater flexibility
in foreign policy. And therefore his temptation must be to
maneuver in such a way that he does not have to make both
foreign policy and domestic choices simultaneously. And this
works against real progress. Now, on SDI .(n).(n). your question
implies, if I may say so, the conventional view .(n).(n). that SDI
is the obstacle to negotiation and that, therefore, progress
will be made when Reagan is willing to accept a cut in
offensive forces in return for in affect, dismantling SDI. My
own view, which is probably a minority view in the
intellectual community in this country, is different. I did
not particularly like the manner in which the SDI proposal was
first put forward. I think it was much too simple and made
many too sweeping claims. On the other hand, I believe that a
strategy based on unopposed retaliatory forces is bound to set
us into a deadend, no matter how much these forces are reduced
by arms control. To rely for deterrents entirely on mass
extermination validates what the unilateralists and pacifists
are seeking to achieve. Because there is no very good rational
argument to counter them except that they will lead to
surrender which is of course true. Now, I believe also that
due to the particular way in which a debate has evolved in the
United States, there has not been any new creative thinking on
arms control or strategy since the late '50s. And therefore
SDI runs up not only against what the Soviets object to, but
also against established preconceptions by the people who
created the previous dispensation. With all its weaknesses and
with all its vasueness, I believe that SDI is the first new
idea that has been put forward. And I therefore would hate to
see it dismantled in the name of formal arms control. I would
like to see it <AA>shaped <AI>by arms control and by negotiations. And
if one asks the question not, how can we make Soviet proposals
.(n).(n). what can concede to the Soviets in order to get into
the rembers (sounds like ...?) of their scheme. But rather, if
we asked ourselves, what kind of a strategic world do we want
in 10 to 15 years that is most likely to produce stability
.(n).(n). I would tend to think it should have a defensive
component. And therefore I believe SDI should not be given up.
But SDI should be negotiated concurrently with offensive
limitations so that the resulting balance has the minimum
incentives for nuclear war. Now, will the .(n).(n). the
administration seems to me to be ensased in a very curious
course. They insist on .(n).(n). that all they're doing is
research and that existing agreements permit testing. And that
really implies that they don't need to negotiate deployment
because they're not yet ready for deployment. I believe that
deployment should be on the agenda. And I would be both
tousher than our allies, but also more flexible. Tousher in
the sense that I would not give up deployment, but maybe more
flexible than the administration in that I would be prepared
to talk about limits on deployment and limits on purposes for
deployment. And I think if we do not face that issue head-on,
we are going to get ourselves into a never-never world in
which we claim we have the right to do things which nobody
else concedes us. And we will be in constant controversy with
our Congress, the Soviets, our allies .(n).(n). of what is
testing, what is research, what do previous agreements imply,
etc.(ep)

3

Q: The indication of which is that I think the President would take the view that since SDI is purely defensive, it's no more an act of aggression than a bullet proof jacket is an act of aggression against a man with a gun. And this leads us to two points: One which is that in the end you can't actually ? deployment or research, never ever negotiate a ? because it is primarily defense. And secondly, the President's point which he's made once or twice but not recently, which is if you be prepared to share SDI technology with the Soviets.(EP)

A: Well, I don't really believe in that either. Simply because SDI technology involves (n).(n). we have restrictions on the export of computers that are infinitely simpler than the computers that are needed for SDI. What we can share with the Soviets is what we're trying to do. And to explain it to them in great detail. Secondly, what we can seek to achieve with the Soviets are agreed limitations on deployment. So, in other words, modernize the ABM treaty so that what is protected is agreed upon. And especially if one went in the direction of severe limitations of offensive forces, obviously the defensive forces and their purposes, could also be severely constrained. I put forward one possible scheme (n).(n). in fact, you printed it.(ep)

Q: Yes.(ep)

A: I think de-.... (?) weapons is an infinitely more fruitful approach than cutting warheads by 50%. Because if you begin negotiating the cuttings of warheads, you will immediately set into an endless debate as to what warheads are counted. Secondly, you set into various ? debates about the relationship between warheads and launchers. And the relative advantage to be gained if you set rid of warheads on launchers that carry many warheads as against those that carry a few, thereby increasing the vulnerability of the side that has fewer warheads. None of this would exist if you set rid of all multiple warheads, or most multiple warheads, because then you would have an exact one-to-one ratio between launchers and warheads and you would increase the defensibility of the launchers.(ep)

Q: Could I take you back briefly to Gorbachev and what personal impression you gathered of him. I mean he has moved very (or fairly ?) decisively in one or two areas (n).(n). I mean, moving Gromyko, change of prime minister, changes in the Politburo (n).(n). this may just be the license allowed to a new leader perhaps, but have you formed (n).(n). got any feelings for (n).(n).(EP)

A: I don't think the Soviet system allows any license. Well, I think first of all you have to say that anybody who sets to the top of the Soviet hierarchy at a relatively young age, must be a formidable person. That is a vicious competition. And he must combine (n).(n). he must be a strange or a rare, combination of orthodoxy and darins. He could not have got into a position to compete for the leadership unless he had been considered orthodox by those who promoted him. And

5

CYJ

especially when you consider that his sponsors were Suslov (spl?) and Adropov. They surely did not think of him as a revolutionary. That in itself is not decisive. On the other hand, to make it from the position of eligibility to the actual consumation of his prospects, that requires great daring. Clearly, he has studied the system and formed some strong opinions. In that respect he has some similarities to ? Ghandi, (?) who also probably was not considered by his mother as a threat to existing institutions. I think he's very shrewd. He knows what he has to do to survive in the system, to strengthen his position. I personally think he's overdoins the publicity. He has obviously studied Western publicity (.n).(n). publicity methods. He has obviously been annoyed by the clumsiness of his predecessors. I wonder whether by becoming so totally Western in his handling of publicity, he is not presenting a phenomenon that Western media really understand. And whether they don't think they're being manipulated so that a more traditional type who presented subtler variations of previous scenes (?) might in the long run, be more effective. I've just wondered this recently. Is he a man of historic vision or is he a very clever tactition. Has he asked himself where he wants to be 20 years from now? Or does he want to pocket every advantage he can over the next six months, to help himself domestically. That will be the test.(ep)

Q: I remember ? saying, I think it was about Brezhnev, that one thing about those old Soviet leaders who've been through the war, is that they knew things wouldn't work sometimes in the Soviet Union, and this made them cautious.(ep)

A: I've said before, God will probably punish me.(n).(n). I rather liked Brezhnev. And I thought Brezhnev was not a bad leader with us to deal with. It is not that Brezhnev was not .(n).(n). of course Brezhnev ? people ? countries weaker than he was extremely weaker than the Soviet Union.(n).(n). or significantly weaker than the Soviet Union, was very uncomfortable. But he had many advantages. One, he grew up in a period before World War I in which Russia was very backward. And I think there was a latent sense of inadequacy in him where he believed that at the end of the day if the Soviet Union ensaged in huge enterprises, they would somehow screw it up. And therefore, while he wouldn't mind picking up Afshanistan and suppressing Czechoslovakia, <AA>really <AI>bis adventures involving challenges to the very structure of the West, would in my view be ?? That whole generation was exhausted by the pursues and the war. So they picked up loose change. But I'm not so sure that that is necessarily true of the Gorbachev generation. And I have always thought that the period between '72 and '75 was, in a sense, a tragedy. Because if there was an opportunity it was then, in previous period. And that was the .(n).(n). and it was also in '72, the period when Nixon was at the height of his power. Then the collapse of our domestic authority brought about a curious coalition of liberals and conservatives against what was called detente at that time. And therefore we don't know what might have been achieved had we been able to continue. But at any rate Gorbachev is a different type.(ep)

Q: Do you think .(n).(n). I mean he has inherited things like Afghanistan .(n).(n). do you think there's any prospects that the Russians might want to seek a way out of that? Could it happen at this summit?(ep)

A: So far the indications are in the opposite direction. The Soviets have stepped up their military effort in Afghanistan under Gorbachev. And they stepped up their military effort in Ansola under Gorbachev, which almost leads one to think that they may be wanted to get into a position where the upheavals of South Africa are not settled locally, but involve them in some manner. Now, is that the precursor of a global negotiation in which mutual restraints are negotiated?(ep)

Q: Including Nicaragua perhaps?(ep)

A: I believe that sooner or later, if there is to be peace, some such negotiation will have to be attempted. What does he really want to prevail in every trouble spot? That's again one of the questions.(ep)

Q: We don't know.(ep)

A: We don't know. I believe we'll never know unless we test it concretely.(ep)

Q: You mentioned South Africa, which is obviously as always, been a very dangerous situation that could involve the super powers. Do you see signs .(n).(n). I mean Ansola, they've certainly stepped up military aid, haven't they, in the last 12 or 18 months .(n).(n). And does it concern you that this could become more of a super power battle?(ep)

A: At this moment it is not a super power battle and should not be looked at primarily as a super power battle. I gave a speech in South Africa three years ago in which I said, not to the total edification of my audience, that South Africans had to understand that while they were economically and strategically important, if the West ever had to choose between its fundamental values and its strategic and economic concerns, it would in this case almost certainly choose its fundamental values. I didn't say almost certainly .(n).(n). certainly it's true. That remains to be true. Now how that is applied towards what solutions in South Africa, that is ?? It seems to me one should come up with creative ideas before it becomes a super power confrontation.(ep)

Q: Constructive ensasements being written off in the press. Do you think that, as a policy, has virtually collapsed.(ep)

A: Well, if one measures constructive ensasement by the actual steps that the South African government took to improve the situation, I believe that many .(n).(n). anyone who knows South Africa would have to give credit to the South African government for having done more in say the last three years, than in any comparable decade before then. The tragedy of revolutionary situations is that one has to measure not against comparable periods in the past, but against the magnitude of the problem. And in relation to the magnitude of the problem it has not been enough. So if you measure constructive ensasement on the basis of what has .(n).(n). that in fact, something has been done, it was not a ? Was that something enough, in that sense? And you would have to say no, it was not enough.(ep)

7

Q: And ? the Middle East, because I mean you wrote I think for us, that the administration really shouldn't get involved in the Mid-East peace crises (?) at this time.(ep)

A: No, I think what I said was, it shouldn't get involved unless it is willing to see it through. I wanted to point out that it was not enough that much of our domestic ? emphasizes the process. I believe the negotiation should emphasize the conclusion of ? Purpose. Starting the process is complicated but it's not an end in itself. And especially as I am convinced that however the process starts, whoever participates, it will deadlock. And we will then be asked to break the deadlock. If we are not prepared to have ideas of our own which we're willing to back, then we better not start the process. That was the principal point I wanted to make. And since I judge from public statements that we seem to think that direct negotiations will produce an automatic solution .(n).(n). and since I do not believe this to be true, I would prefer us not to start something we're not prepared to finish. But if you were to tell me the administration will see it through, I think then it's a noble effort.(ep)

Q: One result of the recent hijacking, seajacking, etc., it may be to damage the peace process.(ep)

A: Well, again you could argue that both ways. I would tend to think that as a general proposition, the peace process is aided when radicals suffer a setback and moderates can point to the futility of the radical cause as a remedy to Arab grievances. And I believe also that to the extent that the United States appears as if it can be a dominate force in the area, or a major force in the area, it's own role is an ? So I think it is possible that the role of various groups has been damaged, such as the PLO. I think the process as such maybe an ?(ep)

Q: Once Egypt sets over its loss of pride?(ep)

A: Well, everybody has to set over the immediate situation. And I have been doing on television the last day urging us not to make Egypt the focal point of our frustrations of the last few years. It would be a terrible irony if at the end of this process the terrorists achieved via a seajacking, what they have not been able to do by direct pressure, namely estrange the United States and Egypt.(ep)

Q: Do you think that this is the result ? ? little euphoria in the states in the moment, as a successful operation. Do you think in reality it is a breakthrough in the international battle against terrorism or is it .(n).(n).(ep)

A: No, I think it's a success. It is not a breakthrough. But I think the opposite .(n).(n). if it had ended with another American being killed, with another proclamation of American impotence, with another series of dire threats unrelated to anything that we are physically able to do, that would have been a potential disaster. And that in my view might really have wrecked the peace process. We have to remember that much of this terrorism is aimed at the moderate resimes in the area, including Egypt, to show that their cause is not necessary to achieve Arab objectives. And that America cannot protect them against a dominant threat in the area. And therefore .(n).(n).. so I think that in the long run, it will probably help the peace process. And we have a duty to reconcile with Egypt. It would be destroying our own work if we did not do that.(ep)

Q: You said frequently during the TWA hijackings that it's vital to hit the terrorists very hard. And unfortunately the administration couldn't see any way which that could be done without creating far more harm to the United States. ? there's been a marvelous ? ? ? skills of the American military ? Nothing has been achieved. But do you see any general rules (?) curbing terrorism ...... (ep)

A: I didn't .(n).(n). you know my position during the Beirut crisis was sort of caricatured because I wound up in opposition to the conventional wisdom. I had two basic principles, which I recognize are very difficult to apply. One is that there must be no negotiation with terrorists. And when one states this, I mean, one has to be serious about it, which means no negotiation by body language, no negotiation that hints that the ? ? volunteer what a negotiation might produce. The reason for that is that once you begin a negotiation with terrorists, you're conceding that there is some price you are willing to pay for the hostages. So therefore they're going to gain something as a result of the operation. Secondly, one should try to contrive a situation at the end of which the terrorists have physically either lost or not gained anything. That involves the willingness to take certain risks. Now, take the Beirut situation .(n).(n). It was always said that there was nothing we could do. And of course if you say that saving the lives of the hostages is the only objective, that is true. But, the government of the United States or any other Western government, is responsible not only for the lives of these hostages but for future hostages that may be taken, and those too may not be exactly objective, may not be exactly parallel. But take Beirut .(n).(n). there are altogether maybe 10,000 Shias .(n).(n). they are confined in a geographically limited space. When they leave it they are in hostile territory. So it cannot be beyond the wit of man to know more or less, where at least some of them are. Their readiness to take significant casualties in a war not related to the Lebanese civil war, must be limited, because whatever they lose, we can ? capacity in the power struggle inside Lebanon. And it would have seemed to me that analyzed this way, it might have been possible to construct a calculus of risks for them, that they were not willing to accept. Of course, if you ask a bureaucracy what to do, they will always tell you the risks of any course outweigh the benefits because they will get penalized for not foreseeing risks. Nobody has ever been penalized for not foreseeing opportunities. That was my view in the Beirut crisis. Maybe if it had been studied the way I suggested, one would still have concluded that not much could be done. But I didn't have the impression it was looked from that point of view. And I agree it isn't always possible to implement the principles I've stated here. But it is .(n).(n). but unless they're implemented in some fashion, in most circumstances, it is impossible to combat terrorists.(ep)

Q: Could I ask a British question. As you know Mrs. Thatcher as a result of her Middle East tour, has invited PLO representatives to come to London. Do you think that should be reviewed in the light of this recent episode?(EP)

A: I was not ecstatic about the idea to begin with. And I think it should be (n).(n). probably should be reviewed, but I have trouble enough recommending things for America without settings involved in British policies. My general view has been fairly consistent of this problem. I believe that the attempt to involve the PLO in the first phase of negotiations on the Middle East, will absorb us in so many procedural matters, and in so many convoluted schemes like this Jordanian-Palestinian negotiation, that it is likely to make the negotiations endlessley protracted. I think it would be better to separate the issue of the return of territory from the ultimate control of that territory. And to return it ? if necessary, to a consortium of existing Arab states--say, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. And leave the issue of the ultimate government to some later period, say five years or some other agreed period, from now, instead of going through these convolutions. Now it seems to me, and from all the evidence that I've been able to find from people who should know, the PLO apparently did know enough about this recent terror act so that it cannot be absolved of it. That is an impression I have from people I trust, that are not Israelis.(EP)

Q: Yes, I heard the Israeli ambassador this morning.(EP)

A: I know the Israelis say this, but I have had that impression from people who do not represent the Israeli government and who ought to know.(EP)

Q: That the PLO are directly involved?(EP)

A: Well, it depends how you define directly. But, they were certainly informed and didn't interpose themselves, at a minimum.(EP)

Q: I see. This year's the 40th anniversary of the United Nations, lots of celebrations and so on. Have you any general reflections on the value of the institution? How it could be made more effective?(EP)

A: Well, it depends how one defines effectiveness ? of the United Nations. The original idea which was to substitute a concept of collective security for the traditional alliances, which was favorite American dream, probably never had the chance of working. Nations defend their interests, however defined. They don't fight for abstract principles of legal adjudication. I remember in 1961 when I was a marginal consultant to the Kennedy administration, many of my colleagues from Harvard thought (n).(n). not then in Washington, thought that somehow India could be involved in the Berlin crisis and that we should construct proposals that India could support in the Berlin crisis. I always held the view, which I think is probably correct on that issue, that it would make India to involve itself in an issue so far away, and to risk relationships that were of no immediate consequence. So

therefore the idea that this is a real problem, leaving aside
all ideological issues in which every nation has an equal
interest in every crisis and judges it entirely on its legal
or moral merits, never could work. Now you add to it
ideological conflicts and different stages of development, it
becomes very difficult to implement the original idea. On the
other hand, there are many things the United Nations can do
very well, or reasonably well. It can provide a meeting ground
that sometimes would be very difficult to construct otherwise.
It provides a forum for what I take to be increasingly one of
the most difficult problems of our period. (n).(n). It is very
easy to acquire data. It is very difficult to understand what
it means. Governments are overwhelmed with more knowledge than
they ever possessed before. But statesmen have less of a feel
for the significance of this. So to have a forum in which not
to much what is said in the speeches, but what takes place in
the private meetings, that permits an assessment of the
thinking of statesmen, is of great importance. I know when I
was secretary of State, and I'm sure this is true of every
previous ? successor, at the United Nations you see foreign
ministers you not have a normal reason ever to see during your
whole term in office. And you must talk to them about
something of common concern. Sure there are technical issues
of population, development, for the United Nations provides a
good forum. And I know, again in my period, I'm sure this is
true. (n).(n). I keep mentioning my period only because I know it
.(n).(n). obviously in more detail. (n).(n). there were two.(n).(n). one
? and one I think the 7th special session, on development,
which generated specific proposals we would not have otherwise
made. We might have made them over a period of time. All of
this is positive. On the other hand.(n).(n). the extreme rightism
of existing blocks (?). The anti-Western tendency that has
often been remarked on of some of the more active members in
the secretariats and in these committees, is a worrisome
phenomena.(ep)

Q: ... If you were one of the European states, ? ? ?
Reagan ? ? what would you say to him?(ep)

A: Oh, I know what they're going to say to him. They're
going to say, we all are having elections and we none of us
want to have to explain that the Americans are at fault in
current crisis, and we therefore hope that you will take the
extra step to put us into a position to say to our publics
that the Americans have made a great effort. And they will be
probably think that he ought to make some major concessions on
SDI. I think if SDI suddenly went away, most European leaders
would either be relieved or certainly not shed a tear. On the
other hand, that doesn't mean they're right. What I would like
them to say is (n).(n). but what they won't say.(n).(n). is you may
have an unusual opportunity to usher in a new era. I hope you
do it right and we hope you study it carefully enough because
these opportunities do not recur all that frequently. And that
therefore we are willing to be patient as long as we all
almost prayerfully look at what.(n).(n). that we just don't
repeat what we've been doing for the last 20 years. But not
because it was bad, but because conditions have altered.
That's what I would like them to say. But they won't say it.
Governments don't act that way. And if I were in office I
probably wouldn't say it either.(ep)

Q: If you were Reasan what would you say to them? (ep)

A: You know I would Reasan to say to them the reverse of what I've said to you. If I were Reasan I would like Reasan to say. Look, I was in opposition for 16 years. I had a certain constituency. And I have certain convictions. I said many things which are explicable by the political process. I've now been in office for five years. And I obviously want to go down in history as having made a difference, which is why we are all in office, if we are serious people. However, I've come to two perhaps seemingly contradictory views. One is I must deal with the Russians, and that no agreement can last that does not reflect their interests as well as ours. Secondly, we lack the intellectual tools right now to do that in the existing framework. And therefore I will engage in a conceptual dialogue first with Gorbachev to explain him what I'm about. He will not necessarily believe this because dumb he isn't. I'll therefore set up some means of communications so that he can go to the Politburo, not with an equally complicated proposal to his, but with something that he can say, this is what the American want. And I hope that over a year to 18 months, this will lead me to an agreement that 15 years from now people will still look at. That's what I would like him to say. But again, I know that this is not the way the pressures of the media, of the process, of personal ambition generally operate.(ep)

Q: Do you believe, do you subscribe to the view that President and Mrs. Reasan have a real concern to go down in history as having made a bigger step to peace .(n).(n).(ep)

A: Well, it depends how they interpret history. Do they interpret history as the editorial in the leading newspapers? Or do they have a feel for what history is like .(n).(n). 10-15 years from now, the really great statesmen .(n).(n). when Churchill or deGaull did not have a higher IQ than some of their competitors, but they had an almost intuitive sense for the rhythm of history. And whether the modern political process generates that, it's ?? question.(ep)

Q: Do you think Ronald Reasan has ? ?(ep)

A: Ronald Reasan is a very strange type of leader. On the one hand he is clearly not an intellectual. On the other hand, he has dominated every political process in which he has participated. That cannot be denied. He often puts forward propositions that are easy to attack. And yet it also often happens that these propositions are correct and that when one attacks, what one attacks is the formulation, and that he may have a radar of the essence of a problem that is .(n).(n). it's not like Churchill's .(n).(n). Churchill's was based on a sense of history. Reasan's is more intuitive .(n).(n).(ep)

Q: Populist instinct .(n).(n).(ep)

A: And more populist.(ep)

Q: But his political strength is his electability .(n).(n).(ep)

A: Yes, but electability cannot go on forever. It must show results. I mean, you must show results if you want to be elected.(ep)

Q: That's true, yes. There's substance as well as style involved.(ep)

A: Over time.(ep)

Q: We seem to have covered quite a lot of ground.(EP)

Q: Another voice: One final question. (n).(n). is there any
international question that keeps you awake at night, that
really worries you as being? ... flashpoint ? ? ??(EP)

A: No, I think the only area that is a visible potential
flashpoint, where I believe the super powers could be
sincerely drawn into. (n).(n). it's the Middle East. I can see how
it might evolve in South Africa, over time. In Southern Africa
over time. But not in the next two or three years. I can
imagine immense tragedy happening in Southern Africa in the
next two or three years. Same is true of Central America. Same
is true. (n).(n).(EP)

end of side a .....(EP)

...........(EP)

...........(EP)

SIDE B ...........(EP)

...........(EP)

...........(EP)

(n).(n). brings back into the modern world and do the recent
changes (n).(n). this shift to ? more capitalist system (n).(n).
capitalist economy (n).(n). I mean, some of my colleagues, one
old China watcher, says he thinks it's generally underrated;
that this really is sort of cataclysmic change that could have
important effects.(EP)

A: Let me add China to the list of potential flash (ports
or points). I believe that (n).(n). I'll answer your question,
which is a different one, in a minute. I believe that if China
succeeds in its modernization that then there is a potential
critical point at which the Soviet Union has to decide one,
whether it permits an ideological competitor to be that
successful unless they themselves have done that route. And
secondly, whether they can afford to permit a major power to
exist with a growing military capacity on that frontier. And
if the Soviet Union should attempt to solve that problem
militarily, then unforeseeable consequences could occur. And I
have always thought that it was not impossible that they might
choose the military course. They don't have to make that
decision in the next three to five years. Now to answer your
question. I think that that what China is attempting to do
is, philosophically, incompatible with the management of the
economy of the Communists/Stalinists model as it has been
practiced in the Soviet Union. It is therefore a profound
challenge to the Soviet system should it succeed. It is also
a cataclysmic change within China. Because fundamentally it
involves a shift from society based on prerogative, which is
what a totally planned economy has to be, to a money economy,
that involves some corruption. But it also involves that the
previous ruling group lose the preeminence that they have
anjoyed on an almost class basis. And therefore I think it is
a huge (n).(n). it's a sort of a spiritual exercise. And (Denk)?
if he brings it off, will really go down as a tremendous
figure. ? ? this about if he does. I think the odds are that
he'll succeed.(EP)

Q: Military attack by the Soviet Union on China could only
be a nuclear strike ? possibly occupy the country?(EP)

CY

A: No, they couldn't occupy the whole country. You couldn't. You could imagine that they would try to detach the unpopulated region, say Manchuria or relatively thinly populated region, Manchuria, Sinkang (sP1?), inner-Mongolia. Tibet they couldn't attack directly. But that they would to compress China into its heavily and densely populated areas, and then attack the industrial targets in those areas, and keep it at a close to ? level as they can get it.(EP)

Q: ??(EP)

A: Military.(EP)

Q: Yes but ? occupied ? ?(EP)

Q: Air strike.(EP)

A: The occupying army would not set into the densely populated area.(EP)

Q: So you'd ? bombing of Peking and Shanghai and so forth?(EP)

A: Industrial areas. I think the strategy would not be to occupy all of China. The strategy would be to prevent it from establishing a major military presence (presence?) on Soviet eastern border. But I'm talking about things five-plus years down the road.(EP)

Q: Be a colloidal sample for them to take.(EP)

A: It would be. It would be a huge effort.(EP)

Q: We're constantly told by conservatives here that the Soviet Union does wish to expand. And then the whold raison deetre (sP1?) of the internal dynamic of the Soviet Union is to expand and occupy other countries. Their experience in Afghanistan, ? the lot ? satellite countries in Europe, seems to have been extremely damaging for them.(EP)

A: Well, it depends how one conceives Afghanistan. I think probably they (slid)? into Afghanistan on the basis of the misunderstandings that it had been conceded to them, because in the Carter administration, we did not protest when a communist government was established at Taraki (sP1?) to replace the previous (.n).(n). not unfriendly to Soviet Union, neutralist government of Daou (sP1?). Then we did not protest when every ministry was populated with Soviet advisors. Nor did we object when 5,000 Soviet troops showed up in Kabul to protect those advisors. And then suddenly they go in with 100,000. And all hell breaks loose. I don't know what the Soviet would have done if early in this process we had pointed out to them that we would not accept Afghanistan as a part of the Soviet military sphere, that we have no aspirations there ourselves. But that it had to operate as a sort of buffer (?) in its historic role. Once they went in there, I look at it as a sort of forward base, vis-a-vis Iran and the subcontinent ? primarily vis-a-vis Iran. They don't probably care very much whether they have very orderly government there as long as they have the main routes of communication at the air bases. And my impression is that they're dealing with it the way they ? ? with the prince of Paladis (sP1) occupied in the 19th Century, by wearing down the resistance and hoping in time to make it an outer Mongolia. That seems to me to be their strategy. And (.n).(n). but now to get to your other question: Are the Soviets expanans? I don't think they're expansionist in the sense of Hitler (.n).(n). that they have a master plan for

[Y]

13

world conquest. I don't even think they are aiming directly at
world conquest. The problem seems to me to be that their
definition of security cannot be satisfied at this moment as
long as there are equivalent states left in the world. So
there is a constant threat to gain an additional edge, which
has the objective consequence of aiming for our weakening and
neutralization. Which move they will make when has no
particular time table. I consider Iran a Soviet stratesic
objective. But .(n).(n). as it was a Russian objective in the 19th
Century and would truly have been occupied and would now be a
Russian province had Great Britain not intervened because of
its interest in India. Now when they will implement this, if
ever, that has no timetable. And therefore I think that the
Soviet threat is manaseable by determined and flexible
American action. And that indeed the Soviets have before them
.(n).(n). I mean, I cannot believe that in the year 2000 the
Soviet Union will present the same threat that it represents
today if we act with wisdom. This being the case, if we can
.(n).(n). a prolonged period of peace will force the Soviets to
face increasingly intractable domestic dilemmas. And in this
sense I believe history is on our side even though the Soviet
intentions are, in a way, to neutralize us. After all they may
not .(n).(n). there's no law of history says that they can achieve
all their intentions.(ep)

Q: Well, thank you very much. (ep)

(ep)

end of side b ............

15

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Inches: 102.81 Body: 102.81 Film depth: 102.81 EDITED SINCE JUST./NEVER JUST.

(q1)
<A2>Don:(ep)

I have trimmed about 2,000 words from this,
including an entire passage about Ms. Thatcher
inviting the PLO to London because events passed
both the question and the answer by.(ep)

You should find copies of the original transcript
and the edited version. I have also send both to
Washington for Carolina Shields to show HK. I
probably will not come to the office early, so I'd
appreciate it if you could call that to her attention
by phone.(ep)

If there are questions, you can call me at home
818-799-5752. After about 10:30, you can get me
through Arnold Horelick's office at RAND 393-
0411.(ep)

Also, please check my spelling of Dens Chao
Pins.(ep)

Cheers. jb ep

<A1> Q: Historically summits have tended to create
expectations that haven't been satisfied, except
perhaps, as you have noted, in 1972. What's your
feelings about the November summit?(ep)

A: If people expect a completed arms control
agreement, that cannot be achieved. If people
expect that foreign policy is a theological process
of conversion, in which a sudden change of
personality or philosophy emerges, that cannot be
achieved, either. What can be achieved is the
beginning of a process by which the Soviets,
without changing their fundamental position, can
understand how we interpret reality so that they
have a framework for handling specific proposals
that are put forward in subsequent negotiations.(ep)

This is especially important because so much
emphasis is given to arms control this time. The
numbers that are thrown around in Geneva--num-
bers that are very often bureaucratic compromis-
es--are almost impenetrable without some guide to
the philosophy that's behind them. With respect to
arms control, I believe a Vladivostok-type agree-
ment is possible. By that I mean an agreement that
defines the parameters of subsequent discussions.
That might mean rough numbers that will be the
ceilings for offensive weapons, with perhaps some
guidance about the relationship between defensive
and offensive negotiations that will take place
subsequently. (ep)

Any attempt to do more I think will lead to a
stalemate or to a superficial agreement that has
either no significance or only marginal signifi-
cance. (ep)

Q: Are we at a propitious moment in the arms
race when some breakthrough is possible? (ep)

A: I think we are a propitious moment in terms of
the internal evolution of the superpowers. On the
American side, because it is now apparent that the
democracies cannot conduct policies of confronta-
tion unless it is demonstrated that they have no
other choice. So even a Machiavellian policy will
dictate the need to have a peace program. And I
don't believe that President Reagan is Machiavel-
lian by nature. (ep)

On the Soviet side, it is even more imperative
because they have at least four problems: One, the
structure of their government. They have to make
it less feudal and more constitutional—not demo-
cratic, but constitutional—so that obliation runs
more to the office than to the person. Secondly, the
economy can be continued by central planning
only at the price of falling further and further
behind. They also have to learn how to integrate
information technology and similar things. Third,
they have a major change of population composi-
tion. And fourth, their foreign policy, while
enormously persistent, has not been particularly
successful. (ep)

All of these things dictate the need for a period
of respite for the Soviet Union. The question is
whether the respite will be achieved by both sides,
with something serious, or whether it will be
mostly atmospheric. (ep)

Q: Do you think that General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev has the strength to achieve these four
points that you've mentioned? (ep)

A: That is the great test for Gorbachev. Can he pursue all of these objectives simultaneously, improve all four of these areas simultaneously? That's not self-evident. My guess is that in order to improve the economy, Gorbachev will have to rely on those institutions in the Soviet Union that are in competition with the outside world, namely the military and the KGB. And those are the very institutions that would inhibit greater flexibility in foreign policy. And therefore his temptation must be to maneuver in such a way that he does not have to make both foreign policy and domestic choices simultaneously. And this works against real progress. (ep)

Q: Does Ronald Reagan see the Strategic Defense Initiative as a bargaining chip or does he see it as something which has got to be pursued at all costs and in all events? (ep)

A: Your question implies, if I may say so, the conventional view that SDI is the obstacle to negotiation and that, therefore, progress will be made when Reagan is willing to accept a cut in offensive forces in return for, in effect, dismantling SDI. My own view, which is probably a minority view in the intellectual community in this country, is different. I did not particularly like the manner in which the SDI proposal was first put forward. I think it was much too simple and made too many sweeping claims. On the other hand, I believe that a strategy based on unopposed retaliatory forces is bound to lead us into a deadend, no matter how much these forces are reduced by arms control. (ep)

To rely for deterrence entirely on mass extermination validates what the unilateralists and pacifists are seeking to achieve because there is no very good rational argument to counter them, except that they will lead to surrender, which is of course true. Now I believe also that due to the way in which debate has evolved in the United States, there has not been any new creative thinking on arms control or strategy since the late 1950s. And therefore SDI runs up not only against what the Soviets object to, but also against established preconceptions by the people who created the previous dispensation. With all its weaknesses and with all its vasueness, I believe that SDI is the first new idea that has been put forward. And I therefore would hate to see it dismantled in the name of formal arms control. I would like to see it <A4>shaped <A1>by arms control and by negotiations. So one should not phrase the question as, What can we concede to the Soviets in order to get into the rubric of their scheme? One must ask, What kind of a strategic world do we want in 10 to 15 years that is most likely to produce stability? I would tend to think it should have a defensive compo-

ment. And therefore I believe SDI should not be
given up. But SDI should be nesotiated concur-
rently with offensive limitations so that the
resulting balance has the minimum incentives for
nuclear war.(EP)

Now, the Administration seems to me to be
embarked on a very curious course. They insist
that all they're doins is research and that existing
agreements permit tests. And that really implies
that they don't need to nesotiate deployment
because they're not yet ready for deployment.(EP)

I believe that deployment should be on the
asenda. And I would be both tougher than our
allies, but also more flexible. Tousher in the sense
that I would not give up deployment, but more
flexible than the Administration in that I would be
prepared to talk about limits on deployment and
limits on purposes for deployment. And if we do
not face that issue head-on, we are soins to get
ourselves into a never-never world in which we
claim we have the right to do things which nobody
else concedes us. And we will be in constant
controversy with our Congress, the Soviets and
our allies over what is testins, what is research,
what do previous agreements imply, and so forth.(EP)

Q: The President's view seems to be that SDI is
purely defensive and no more an act of aggression
than putting on a bulletproof jacket. That raises
two questions. Can you ever nesotiate defenses?
And what of the President's proposal to share SDI
technology with the Soviets.(EP)

A: Well, I don't really believe we can share the
technology. We have restrictions on the export of
computers that are infinitely simpler than the
computers that are needed for SDI. What we can
share with the Soviets is a detailed explanation of
what we're trying to do. What we can seek to
achieve with the Soviets is an agreed limitation on
deployment. In other words, modernize the ABM
[Anti-Ballistic Missile] treaty so that what is
protected is agreed upon.(EP)

I think developing defensive weapons is an
infinitely more fruitful approach than cuttins
warheads by 50%. If you besin nesotiating the
cutting of warheads, you immediately get into an
endless debate over what warheads should be
counted. You get into debates about the relation-
ship between warheads and launchers and the
problem of increasins the vulnerability of the side
with few warheads if you set rid of warheads on
launchers that carry many warheads as against
those that carry a few. This would be resolved if
you got rid of all multiple warheads, or most
multiple warheads, because then you would have
an exact one-to-one ratio between launchers and
warheads and you would increase the defensibility
of the launchers.(EP)

CYD

18

Q: Gorbachev has moved very decisively in some areas, moving Andrei Gromyko out of the foreign minister's job, changing the Politburo, setting an economist with experience in industry in the Prime Minister's post. What impression of him have you gathered as a result of all of this. (ep)

A: First of all, you have to say that anybody who sets to the top of the Soviet hierarchy at a relatively young age must be a formidable person. That is a vicious competition. And he must possess a rare combination of orthodoxy and daring. He could not have got into a position to compete for the leadership unless he had been considered orthodox by those who promoted him, especially when you consider that his sponsors were Suslov and Andropov. They surely did not think of him as a revolutionary. But to make it from a position of eligibility to the actual consummation of his prospects, that would require great daring. (ep)

Clearly, he has studied the system and formed some strong opinions. In that respect he is somewhat similar to Ghandi, who probably was not considered by his mother as a threat to existing institutions. I think he's very shrewd. He knows what he has to do to survive in the system, to strengthen his position. I personally think he's overdoing the publicity. He has obviously studied Western publicity methods. He has obviously been annoyed by the clumsiness of his predecessors. I wonder whether by becoming so totally Western in his handling of publicity, he is not presenting a phenomenon that Western media really understand—manipulation. A more traditional type, presenting subtler variations of previous Soviet themes might, in the long run, be more effective. He makes me wonder whether he is a man of historic vision or a very clever tactician. Has he asked himself where he wants to be 20 years from now? Or does he want to pocket every advantage he can over the next six months, to help himself domestically? We will only know when he has been tested. (ep)

Q: It has been said that one thing about the old Soviet leaders like Leonid Brezhnev was that they knew things sometimes wouldn't work in the Soviet Union and that made them cautious. (ep)

A: I've said before, I rather liked Brezhnev. I thought Brezhnev was not a bad leader to deal with. Of course his penchant for keeping neighboring countries significantly weaker than the Soviet union was very uncomfortable. But he had many advantages. He grew up in a period before World War I in which Russia was very backward. And I think there was a latent sense of inadequacy in him

that made him believe that if the Soviet Union
ensased in huge enterprises, it would somehow
screw it up. And therefore, while he wouldn't mind
picking up Afghanistan and suppressing Czecho-
slovakia, <A4>really <A1>bis adventures involving challeng-
es to the very structure of the West, would be
unthinkable. That whole generation was exhausted
by the pursues and the war. So they picked up loose
change. But I'm not so sure that is necessarily true
of the Gorbachev generation.(ep)

And I have always thought that the period
between 1972 and 1975 was, in a sense, a tragedy
because if there was an opportunity it was then.
And that was also the period when Richard Nixon
was at the height of his power. Then the collapse of
our domestic authority brought about a curious
coalition of liberals and conservatives against what
was called <A4>detente <A1>at that time. And therefore we
don't know what might have been achieved had
we been able to continue. But at any rate,
Gorbachev is a different type.(ep)

Q: Gorbachev has inherited things like Afghani-
stan. Do you think there's any prospect that the
Russians might want to seek a way out of that?
Could it happen at the summit?(ep)

A: So far the indications are in the opposite
direction. The Soviets have stepped up their
military effort in Afghanistan under Gorbachev.
They have stepped up their military effort in
Ansola under Gorbachev, which almost leads one
to think that they want to be in a position where
the upheavals of South Africa are not settled
locally, but involve them in some manner. Now, is
that the precursor of a global nesotiation in which
mutual restraints are nesotiated?(ep)

A: I believe that sooner or later, if there is to be
peace, some such negotiation will have to be
attempted. But does he really want to prevail in
every trouble spot? That's again one of the
questions. As of now, we don't know. I believe
we'll never know unless we test it concretely.(ep)

Q: Southern Africa is a very volatile area. Are
you concerned that it could become the focus of a
superpower battle.?(ep)

A: At this moment it is not a superpower battle
and should not be looked at primarily as a
superpower battle. I save a speech in South Africa
three years ago in which I said, not to the total
edification of my audience, that South Africans had
to understand that while they were economically
and strategically important, if the West ever had to
choose between its fundamental values and its
strategic and economic concerns, it would in this
case choose its fundamental values. That remains
true. But still it seems to me that one could come
up with creative ideas that would prevent that
kind of choice and would prevent a superpower
confrontation there.(ep)

Q: Do you agree with those who are writing off "constructive engagement" as a failed policy?(ep)

A: Well, if one measures constructive engagement by the actual steps that the South African government took to improve the situation, I believe that anyone who knows South Africa would have to give it credit for having done more in, say, the last three years, than in any comparable decade before then. The tragedy of revolutionary situations is that progress is measured not against comparable periods in the past but against the magnitude of the problem. And in relation to the magnitude of the problem it has not been enough. So if you measure constructive engagement on the basis of what has been done, you must ask, Was that enough? And you would have to say, No, it was not enough.(ep)

Q: You wrote recently that the Administration really shouldn't be involved in the Mideast peace crises at this time.(ep)

A: I think what I said was that it shouldn't be involved unless it is willing to see it through. Starting the peace process is complicated but it's not an end in itself. I am convinced that however the process starts, whoever participates, it will deadlock, and we will then be asked to break the deadlock. If we are not prepared to have ideas of our own which we're willing to back, then we had better not start the process. That was the principal point I wanted to make. And since I judge from public statements that we seem to think that direct negotiations will produce an automatic solution and since I do not believe this to be true, I would prefer us not to start something we're not prepared to finish. But if you were to tell me the Administration will see it through, then I would say it's a noble effort.(ep)

Q: Will the Achille Lauro piracy damage the peace process?(ep)

A: Well, again you could argue that both ways. I would tend to think that as a general proposition, the peace process is aided when radicals suffer a setback and moderates can point to the futility of the radical cause as a remedy to Arab grievances. And I believe also that to the extent that the United States appears that it can be a major force in the area, it's own role is enhanced. So I think it is possible that the role of various groups, such as the PLO, has been damaged but that the process as such may be enhanced.(ep)

A: Well, everybody has to set over the immediate situation. I have been ursins us not to make Egypt the focal point of our frustrations of the last few years. It would be a terrible irony if at the end of this process the terrorists achieved via a seajacking what they have not been able to do by direct pressure--namely estransins the United States and Egypt.(ep)

[Y]

21

Q: Do you think that the capture of the hijackers was a breakthrough in the international battle against terrorism? (ep)

A: No. It's a success, not a breakthrough. But I think that if it had ended with another American being killed, with another demonstration of American impotence, with another series of dire threats unrelated to anything that we are physically able to do, that would have been a potential disaster. That in my view might really have wrecked the peace process. We have to remember that much of this terrorism is aimed at the moderate resimes in the area, including Egypt, to show that their cause is not necessary to achieve Arab objectives and that America cannot protect them against a dominant threat in the area. In that respect, the episode probably helped the peace process. And we have a duty to reconcile with Egypt. It would be destroying our own work if we did not do that. (ep)

Q: You said frequently during the TWA hijacking that it's vital to hit the terrorists very hard. Would you regard that as a principle rule for curbing terrorism? (ep)

A: My position during the Beirut crisis was sort of caricatured because I wound up in opposition to the conventional wisdom. I had two basic principles, which I recognize are very difficult to apply. One is that there must be no negotiation with terrorists. And when one states this, one has to be serious about it. And that means no negotiation by body language, no negotiation that hints at results that a negotiation might produce. The reason for that is that once you begin a negotiation with terrorists, you're conceding that there is some price you are willing to pay for the hostages; that tells them they're going to gain something as a result of the operation. Secondly, one should try to contrive a situation at the end of which the terrorists have physically either lost or not gained anything. That involves the willingness to take certain risks. In the Beirut situation, it was always said that there was nothing we could do. Of course, if you say that saving the lives of the hostages is the only objective, that is true. But the government of the United States, or any other Western government, is responsible not only for the lives of these hostages but for future hostages that may be taken, and those incidents are not likely to be exactly parallel. (ep)

Take Beirut, where there are altogether perhaps 10,000 Shias confined in a geographically limited space. When they leave that space, they are in hostile territory. So it cannot be beyond the wit of man to know, more or less, where at least some of them are. Their readiness to take significant

casualties in a war not related to the Lebanese civil
war must be limited, because whatever they lose
weakens their capacity in the power struggle
inside Lebanon. And it seemed to me that analyzed
this way, it might have been possible to construct a
calculus of risks for them that they were not
willing to accept. Of course, if you ask a
bureaucracy what to do, they will always tell you
the risks of any course outweigh the benefits
because they will get penalized for not foreseeing
risks. Nobody has ever been penalized for not
foreseeing opportunities. That was my view in the
Beirut crisis. Maybe if it had been studied the way I
suggested, one would still have concluded that not
much could be done. But it is certain that unless
they're implemented in some fashion, it will be
impossible to combat terrorists in most circum-
stances. (ep)

Q: This year is the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. Have you any general reflections on the value of the institution? How it could be made more effective? (ep)

A: Well, it depends on how one defines
effectiveness. The original idea, which was to
substitute a concept of collective security for
traditional alliances, was an American dream that
probably never had the chance of working.
Nations defend their interests, however defined.
They don't fight for abstract principles of legal
adjudication. I remember in 1961, when I was a
marsinal consultant to the Kennedy Administra-
tion, many of my colleagues from Harvard thought
that somehow India could be involved in the Berlin
crisis and that we should construct proposals that
India could support in the Berlin crisis. I always
held the view, which I think is probably correct on
that issue, that it would have been madness for
India to involve itself in an issue so far away, and
to risk relationships that were of no immediate
consequence. So therefore the idea that, leavins
aside ideological issues, there are crises in which
every nation has an equal interest and judges the
problems entirely on their legal or moral merits,
never could work. Now when you add to that
ideological conflicts and different stages of devel-
opment, it becomes very difficult to implement the
original idea. On the other hand, there are many
things the United Nations can do reasonably well.
It can provide a meeting ground that sometimes
would be very difficult to construct otherwise. It
provides a forum for what I take to be increasingly
one of the most difficult problems of our period: It
is very easy to acquire data; it is very difficult to
understand what it means. Thus governments are
overwhelmed with more knowledge than they
ever possessed before. But statesmen have less of a
feel for the significance of this. So to have a forum

that permist, not so much in public but in private
meetings, assessments of the thinking of states-
men, is of great importance. All of this is positive.
On the other hand, the extreme rigidity of existing
blocks and the anti-Western tendency of some of
the more active members in the secretariats and in
committees, those are worrisome phenomena.(EP)

Q: If you were head of one of the European states
talking to President Reasan before the summit,
what would you say to him?(EP)

A: Oh, I know what they're going to say to him.
They're going to say, We all are having elections
and none of us wants to have to explain that the
Americans are at fault in the current crisis, and we
therefore hope that you will take the extra step to
put us into a position to say to our publics that the
Americans have made a great effort.(EP)

And they will be probably think that he ought to
make some major concessions on SDI. I think if SDI
suddenly went away, most European leaders
would be relieved, or certainly not shed any tears.
That doesn't mean they're right. What I would like
them to say--but what they won't say--is, You
may have an unusual opportunity to usher in a new
era. We hope you do it right and we hope you study
it carefully enough because these opportunities do
not recur all that frequently. And that therefore
we are willing to be patient as we all almost
prayerfully look on as long as we don't just repeat
what we've been doing for the last 20 years. But
not because it was bad, but because conditions
have altered. That's what I would like them to say.
But they won't say it. Governments don't act that
way. And if I were in office, I probably wouldn't say
it either.(EP)

Q: If you were Reasan what would you say to
them?(EP)

A: I would have Reasan say to them the reverse
of what I've said to you. If I were Reasan, I would
say, Look, I was in opposition for 16 years. I had a
certain constituency. And I have certain convic-
tions. I said many things which are explicable by
the political process. I've now been in office for
five years. And I obviously want to go down in
history as having made a difference, which is why
we are all in office, if we are serious people.(EP)

However, I've come to two perhaps seemingly
contradictory views. One is I must deal with the
Russians, and that no agreement can last that does
not reflect their interests as well as ours. Secondly,
we lack the intellectual tools right now to do that
in the existing framework. And therefore I will
engage first in a conceptual dialogue with Gor-
bachev to explain him what I'm about. He will not
necessarily believe this because dumb he isn't. I'll

therefore set up some means of communications so
that he can go to the Politburo, not with a proposal
as complicated as his, but with something that will
enable him to say, This is what the American want.
And I hope that over a period of a year to 18
months, this will lead me to an agreement that 15
years from now people will still look at. That's
what I would like him to say. But again, I know
that this is not the way the pressures of the media,
of the process, of personal ambition generally let
leaders operate. (ep)

Q: Do you subscribe to the view that President
and Mrs. Reagan have a real concern to go down in
history as having taken a major step toward peace? (ep)

A: Well, it depends on how they interpret
history. Do they interpret history as the editorial in
the leading newspapers? Or do they have a feel for
what they want the world to be like 10 or 15 years
from now. The really great statesmen, men like
Winston Churchill and Charles De Gaulle, did not
have higher IQs than their contemporaries, but
they had an almost intuitive sense for the rhythm
of history. And whether the modern political
process generates that is the question. (ep)

Q: Does Ronald Reagan have a sense for the
rhythm of history? (ep)

A: Ronald Reagan is a very strange type of
leader. On the one hand he is clearly not an
intellectual. On the other hand, he has dominated
every political process in which he has participat-
ed. That cannot be denied. He often puts forward
propositions that are easy to attack. And yet it also
often happens that these propositions are correct
and that when one attacks, what one attacks is the
formulation, not the proposition. He may have a
radar of the essence of a problem that is not unlike
Churchill's, even though Churchill's was based on
a sense of history and Reagan's is more intuitive.
And more populist. (ep)

Q: Some observers think that China's efforts to
join the modern world through economic changes
is not just tinkering but could be a cataclysmic
change with important effects. (ep)

A: You raise, indirectly, another important
question. I believe that if China succeeds in its
modernization there will be a critical point at
which the Soviet Union will have to make two
decisions. First, whether it will permit an ideologi-
cal competitor to be that successful unless the
Soviets themselves have done that route. And
then, whether they can afford to permit a major
power to exist on their frontier with a growing
military capacity. And if the Soviet Union should
attempt to solve that problem militarily, then
unforeseeable consequences could occur. And I
have always thought that it was not impossible
that they might choose the military course. They
don't have to make that decision in the next three
to five years. (ep)

Now to answer your direct question. I think that what China is attempting to do is philosophically incompatible with the management of the economy of the Leninist/Stalinist model as it has been practiced in the Soviet Union. It is therefore a profound challenge to the Soviet system, should it succeed. It is also a cataclysmic change within China. Because fundamentally it involves a shift from society based on preresonative, which is what a totally planned economy has to be, to a money economy, that involves some corruption. But it also means that the previous ruling group loses the preeminence that it has enjoyed almost on a class basis. And therefore I think it is a huge, almost spiritual, exercise. And <A2>Deng Chao Pings, <A1>if he brings it off, will really go down as a tremendous figure, and I think the odds are that he will succeed.(EP)

Q: Military attack by the Soviet Union on China could only be a nuclear strike because they couldn't possibly occupy the country.(EP)

A: No, they couldn't occupy the whole country. You could imagine that they would try to detach the relatively thinly populated regions, say Manchuria, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia. Tibet they couldn't attack directly. But you could assume that that they would try to compress China into its densely populated areas, and then attack the industrial targets in those areas from the air. An occupying army would not get into the densely populated area. The strategy would not be to occupy all of China. The strategy would be to prevent it from establishing a major military presence on the Soviet eastern border. But I'm talking about things five-plus years down the road.(EP)

Q: It would be a colloidal sample for them to take.(EP)

Q: We're told by conservatives that the Soviet Union is expansionist and that the internal dynamic of the Soviet Union is to expand and occupy other countries. Yet their experience in Afghanistan and Poland and other satellite countries in Europe seems to have been extremely damaging for them.(EP)

A: Well, it depends how one conceives Afghanistan. I think probably they slid into Afghanistan on the basis of a misunderstanding. They probably thought it had been conceded to them because the Carter administration did not protest when a Communist government was established to replace the previous neutralist government that itself was not unfriendly to Soviet Union. Then we did not protest when every ministry was populated with Soviet advisors. Nor did we object when 5,000 Soviet troops showed up in Kabul to protect those advisors. And then suddenly they went in with 100,000 troops and all hell broke loose.(EP)

I don't know what the Soviets would have done if, early in this process, we had pointed out to them that we would not accept Afghanistan as a part of the Soviet military sphere, even though we have no aspirations there ourselves. But we should have said that it had to operate as a sort of buffer in its historic role. I think they went in there to establish a sort of forward base, vis-a-vis Iran and the subcontinent, primarily vis-a-vis Iran. They don't probably care very much whether they have very orderly government there as long as they have the main routes of communication and the air bases. And my impression is that they're dealing with it the way they dealt with it as a principality in the 19th Century, wearing down the resistance and hopins, in time, to make it an Outer Mongolia. That seems to be their strategy. (ep)

But to get to your other question: Are the Soviets expansionist? I don't think they're expansionists in the sense of Hitler—that they have a master plan for world conquest. I don't even think they are aiming <A4>directly <A1>at world conquest. (ep)

The problem seems to me to be that their definition of their own security cannot be satisfied at this moment as long as there are equivalent states left in the world. So there is a constant threat to gain an additional edge, which has the objective consequence of aiming to weaken and neutralize us. Which move they will make and when has no particular timetable. I consider Iran a Soviet strategic objective, just as it was a Russian objective in the 19th Century that would surely have been occupied and would now be a Russian province had Great Britain not intervened because of its interest in India. Now when they will implement this, if ever, that has no timetable. And therefore I think that the Soviet threat is managable by determined and flexible American action. I cannot believe that in the year 2000 the Soviet Union will present the same threat that it represents today if we act with wisdom. This being the case, a prolonged period of peace will force the Soviets to face increasingly intractable domestic dilemmas. And in this sense I believe history is on our side even though the Soviet intentions are, in a way, to neutralize us. After all, there's no law of history that says that they can achieve all their intentions. (ep)