57

of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, before the Symington Committee

that the U.S.S.R. had practically no ocean-going submarines until 1952. Similarly the

Air Force spoke of the numerical superiority of the Soviet strategic air force as early as 1952, despite the fact that the Soviet strategic air

force was then composed of TU-4's whose limited range enabled them to reach only part of the United States and then only on one-way missions. Thus a vicious circle was set up; the more terrible we painted Soviet power, the more confirmed we were in our belief in the necessity of an all-out strategy. But the more we relied on an all-out strategy, the more reluctant we grew to use it. In the process, the seeds were sown for a never ending interservice rivalry. For the identification of deterrence with maximum destructiveness inhibited the resolution of doctrinal differences and each service to hoard weapons of maximum range and power, as is well illustrated by recent rivalries over the control of ballistic missiles.

The literalness of our notion of power made it impossible to conceive of a relationship between force and diplomacy. A war which started as a surprise attack on us could be conducted only in a fit of righteous indignation

³³ Testimony of Admiral Burke before the Senate Armed Services Committee, p. 1352.

³⁴-³⁶ Ibid.

21- ¶¶: 1914.

32 ¶¶: Testimony of Admiral Burke before the Senate United Services Committee, p. 1325.

surprise attack on us could be conducted only in a fit of righteous indignation of a relationship between force and diplomacy. A war which started as a pre-emptive strike on our notion of power made it impossible to conceive any recent rivals over the control of pejorative misstatements.

each service to hold weapons of maximum range and power, as is well illustrated by the contrast between the resolution of doctrinal differences and the use of force in the identification of deterrence with maximum inter-service rivalry. For the identification of deterrence with maximum force we need to use it. In the process, the seeds were sown for such mending strategies. But the more we refied an all-out strategy, the more reluctant the more confirmed we were in our belief in the necessity of an all-out a vicious circle was set in; the more terrible we painted Soviet power, the more part of the United States and then only on one-way missions. Thus force was then composed of TU-7's whose limited range enabled them to reach force as early as 1925, despite the fact that the Soviet strategic air force ably supported by the Soviet ally of our B-26).

only part of the United States and then only on one-way missions. Thus force was then composed of TU-7's whose limited range enabled them to reach force as early as 1925, despite the fact that the Soviet strategic air force ably supported by the Soviet ally of our B-26).

Air Force spoke of the numerical anhiority of the Soviet strategic air force as early as 1925, despite the fact that the Soviet strategic air force was then composed of TU-7's whose limited range enabled them to reach

the U.S. Air Force practically no submarines until 1925. Similarly the ocean-going

of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, before the Washington Committee

and the proper strategy for it was one of maximum destructiveness. By
the same token, when the risks of war were so fearful the task of diplomacy
was to attempt to settle disputes by the process of negotiation and this,

a small
in turn, was conceived as a legal process in which force played ~~kittles~~ role.

The separation of force and diplomacy thus was accomplished to the detriment
of both: our military policy was sometimes reduced to empty posturing and
our diplomacy inhibited by an overconcern with finesse. Our diplomacy and
our military policy, therefore, tended to reinforce each other's abstractness.

This came to expression in our key post-war policy, the policy of containment,

which can be considered as a means to stop further Soviet aggression but

also as a device to make aggression unambiguous. It was based on the assumption

that military strategy and diplomacy represented successive phases of national
policy; it was the task of military policy to build strength and thereby to
contain Soviet aggression. After containment had been achieved, diplomacy

would take over: "I have often said," testified Secretary Acheson at the

Mac Arthur Hearings "that we must create situations of strength, we must
build strength and if we create that strength then I think the whole situation
in the world begins to change...With that change there comes the difference

59

in the negotiating positions of the various parties and out of that I
should hope that there would be a willingness on the side of the Kremlin
to recognize the facts...and to solve at least some of the difficulties
between East and West." 35 But international relations do not permit such
absolute divisions. Secretary Acheson's definition of containment implied
that strength was self-evident, that power would supply its own rationale.
It did not deal with the question of how the position of strength was to
be conveyed in the absence of a direct attack on us or on our allies; it
did not supply a doctrine for translating our power into policy except as a
response to Soviet initiative. Nor did it make clear what would happen if
the Soviets refused to negotiate after we had achieved a "position of strength"
and instead concentrated on eroding it or turning its flank.

Moreover the identification of a position of strength with a military
position and of resistance to aggression with all-out war led to a psychological
distortion in two ways: On the part of our allies, an all-out strategy
reinforced this sense of importance which was one of the main obstacles to
effective resistance to Soviet encroachments. Our justification of alliances

34. Mac Arthur Hearings, p. 2083.

M. Mac Arthur Hearnig, p. 5083.

effective resistance to Soviet encroachment. Our justification of alliances reinforced this sense of importance which was one of the main obstacles to distortion in two ways: On the part of our allies, an all-out strategy

the Soviets refused to negotiate after we had achieved a position of strength"

did not abply a doctrine for translating our power into policy except as a

be conveyed in the sense of a direct attack on us or on our allies! it

that strength was self-evident, that power would abply its own rationale.

absolute divisions. SecretaryА December's definition of containment implied

between East and West."

should hope that there would be a willingness on the side of the Krieglin

60

as providing bases was of little consolation to partners whose primary concern
was to avoid foreign occupation. Before the Soviets broke our nuclear monopoly
our allies had no military objection to our base system provided we gave them
sufficient protection against the danger that these bases might cause them
to be overrun. And they identified security with protection on the ground.

After the Soviets developed a nuclear capability our allies went along with
an all-out strategy only as a deterrent to war, not as a strategy for fighting it.
Thus the same doctrinal split which was latent among our services also existed
between us and our allies. Our allies were willing to accept the deterrent
value of our nuclear capability; they were reluctant to invoke it in an all-out
war and they did not see its relevance to any other form of conflict.

And if the fear of our allies of all-out war tended to undermine the
military basis of containment, our identification of positions of strength
with military power eroded its psychological foundation. For our concern with
building defensive barriers and our preference for military alliances over
other forms of cooperation began to run counter to the public opinion of our
allies. Their reluctance to believe in unbridgeable schisms was due in part
to an attempt to escape reality by denying it, in part, it was caused by our
military doctrine with its implicit threat of nuclear devastation.

military doctrine with its implicit threat of nuclear annihilation.

to an attempt to secure reality by demoting it, in part, it was caused by our
affairs. Their reluctance to believe in multidimensional phenomena was due in part
other forms of cooperation begun to run counter to the benefits obtained by our
building defensive barriers and our preference for military alliances over
with military power eroded its psychological foundation. For our concern with
military pairs of containment, our identification of positions of strength

And it the fear of our allies of all-out war tended to undermine the
war and they did not see its relevance to any other form of conflict.

since the same doctrinal shift which was latent among our services also existed

to be overruled. And they identified security with protection on the ground.

was to avoid foreign occupation. Before the Soviets probe our nuclear monopoly

as brooding bases was of little consequence to baroners whose primarily concern

60

61

above all as long as we could offer no protection on the ground. Heretofore would generally resist a nation threatened with attack because the potential destruction was insignificant compared the consequences of surrender. But when the outbreak of a war came increasingly to be considered equivalent to national catastrophe, neutrality--defense by denying a potential enemy the "right" to enter--more and more became increasingly attractive.

Communist strategy has been skillful at exploiting this dilemma. In the face of our concern with military pacts, American pressure must be represented to be almost as pervasive as that of the U.S.S.R. and American intranigueance became the shibboleth of the very people who would have blanched at the prospect of being left alone in Eurasia with the U.S.S.R. Our strategy thus put the cart before the horse. It conceived its task as primarily technical: to create an adequate defense force. But in fact the problem proved to be primarily psychological: to bring about a climate of opinion which would support such a force. On the other hand, we never tired of declaring that we would not use force except in resistance to aggression and we thereby removed any Soviet incentive for concessions on the issues actually in dispute: the satellite orbit, German unification and above all, international

in dispute: the satellite orbit, German unification and apes all, international
thereby removed and Soviet incentive for concessions on the issue actually
that we would not use force except in reistance to aggression and we
would support such a force. On the other hand, we never tried to declare
proved to be primarily psychological: to bring about a climate of opinion which
technical: to create an adequate defense force. But in fact the problem
turns but the cart before the horde. It conceived its task as primarily
at the moment of being left alone in Eurasia with the U.3.2.R. Our strategy
aggression became the shipwreck of the very people who would have planned
sented to be almost as persuasive as that of the U.3.2.R. and American intrans-
face of our concern with military chaos, American broussne if could be repre-
Comintern strategy has been skillful at exploiting this dilemma. In the
become increasingly attractive.

more and more

neutrality--defense by demaking a potential enemy the "right" to enter--

a nation threatened with attack, because the potential destruction was inag-


would generally exist

above all as found as we could offer no protection on the frontiers. Hereinafter

PT

62

control of the atom. In short, our posture was bellicose enough to lend

color to Soviet peace offensives, but not sufficiently so to induce Soviet

hesitations.

These then were the dilemmas of our military doctrine in the immediate
post-war period; they are still our dilemmas today. This, in fact, is the
only reason for going into them in such detail. They were caused by a belief
in final answers, by an over-emphasis on technology and above all by a concern
with "pure" solutions both in our diplomacy and in our military policy. But
the test of a doctrine is the marginal case; it is successful to the extent
that the marginal case is in fact unusual and that it provides for common
occurrences. The difficulty with United States military doctrine was that
all situations actually in dispute were marginal to it. The only contingency
for which it provided was all-out war and even there its goal was modest: to
prevent disaster: "Our forces," said General Bradley in 1950 less than three
months before Korea "are not sufficient to fight a major war. Our present
thinking regarding our own contribution is to build up gradually our forces
in being to a strength which can prevent disaster and which can strike
a retaliatory blow that will be strong enough to slow down the aggressor

a retaliatory blow that will be strong enough to slow down the aggressor
in pointing to a strength which can prevent disaster and which can strike
thinking regarding our own contribution is to build up gradually our forces
months before Korea "are not sufficient to fight a major war". Our present
prevent disaster: "Our forces", said General Bradley in 1920 less than three
for which it provided was all-out war and even there its goal was modest: to
all situations actually in dispute were marginal to it. The only contingency
occurrence. The difficulty with United States military doctrine was that
that the marginal case is in fact minimal and that it provides for common
the test of a doctrine is the marginal case: it is successful to the extent
with "pure" solutions both in our diplomacy and in our military policy. But
in first answers, by an over-emphasize on technology and spoke all by a concern
only reason for going into them in such detail. They were caused by a defied
boast-war belief: they are still our dilemma today. This, in fact, is the
These then were the dilemma of our military doctrine in the immediate
resistances.

color to Soviet peace alternatives, but not sufficiently so to induce Soviet
control of the atom. In short, our bovine was peccose enough to lend

25

247

which they would recoil were they aware of all its implications; all the
more so as the same ignorance which underlies the demand for all-or-nothing
solutions may also produce panic in the face of the unexpected consequences
of thermo-nuclear war. Conversely a public made aware of the dangers confronting
it and given a measure of security by an adequate civil defense program will
furnish a better support for the measures our leadership deems necessary.

VII

But whatever the theoretical advantages of peripheral actions, are they
practically feasible? Does not a policy of limited war run counter to the
geographic realities, specifically that the Soviet bloc possesses interior
lines of communication and can therefore assemble a superior force at any
given point? Can we afford a policy of limited war or will it not exceed
our resources as surely as all-out the mo-nuclear war? Does not this concern
with local resistance mistake the real problem, in major areas which is internal
development and political instability?

It must be admitted that we alone cannot possibly defend the Soviet
periphery by local actions and that the present period of revolutionary change
will not be managed by a military doctrine alone. Our task must continue to

will not be managed by a military doctrine alone. Our task must continue to
barrierly by local actions and that the present period of revolutionary change
It must be admitted that we alone cannot peaceably defeat the Soviet
development and political instability?

with local resistance затake the real problem in major areas which is internal
our resources as surely as all-out the mo-unclean war? Does not this concern
Given point? Can we afford a policy of limited war or will it not exceed
lines of communication and can therefore assume a stronger force at any
Geographic realities, specifically that the Soviet race possesses interior
breastvieffy leasiepe? Does not a bold of limited war run counter to the
But whatever the theoretical advantages of berrierst sections are they

AII

turning a better abutment for the measures our leadership seems necessarily
it and given a measure of security by an adequate staff defense program will
of thermo-nuclear war. Conversely a bulkie made aware of the dangers confronting
solutions may also produce basic in the face of the unexpected consequences
more so as the same ignorance which underlies the demand for all-or-nothing
which they would recall were they aware of all its implications: all the

573

248

Daxxtask to be to shore
shave up the indigenous will to resist which in the under-
developed third of the world means all the measures on which a substantial
consensus seems to exist: a political program to gain the confidence of local
populations and to remove the stigma of colonialism from us, together with
the degree of economic assistance which will help bring about political stability.

But though a political program may be essential, it will prove useless without
an increase in our capacity for local defense. We always seem in danger of

✓ focussing so much attention on the particular of the moment Soviet threat that we are taken
unaware by the Soviet Union's frequent changes of tactics. During the period
of Soviet militancy we were so preoccupied with building defensive barriers
that we neglected the supporting political and psychological framework. And
with the Soviet emphasis on more indirect methods of penetration, we stand
in danger of forgetting that economic development presupposes a modicum of
security against foreign invasion. Few political leaders will run the risk
of foreign occupation even though liberation is to follow eventually. The
promise of exit victory in a general war will mean little to the leader of a
country which meanwhile is Sovietized. For us the crucial victory is the last,
but for the leaders of the countries around the Soviet periphery the fate of
their countries will seem to hinge on the first battle. This was well expressed

249

in an *xxixx* editorial in a leading German newspaper: "We must oppose any
strategy, the basic postulate of which involves giving up our territory. Our
partnership in the Atlantic alliance means more to us than that our 12 divisions
represent a strategic asset for the West; it includes a demand for the protection
of the German people... A substantial retreat is equivalent to our moral and
physical destruction." ¹⁹⁾ The argument thus runs in a circle: Can the
peripheral areas be defended, assuming the willingness of the countries
concerned to resist and our readiness to help them? To support a negative
answer such factors are cited as the "unlimited" Soviet manpower or the vast
distances of the threatened areas from the centers of our strength. But while
underestimating an adversary may be disastrous, overestimating his resources
may lead to a needless paralysis of policy. Absolute numbers are important,
but only the part which can be utilized effectively is strategically significant.

In these terms Chinese manpower is limited by the Soviet-Chinese capacity¹⁰⁾ to equip and train it, and Chinese effectiveness by the difficulty of communications and supply. The vision of hordes of Chinese or even Soviet soldiers streaming into what has come to be known as the "grey areas" is unrealistic. If it
10. *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. December 2, 1954.

10. Frankfurter Allgemeine. December 5, 1944.

into what has come to be known as the "grey areas," is unreliefic. It is
and ably. The vision of hordes of Chinese or even Soviet soldiers streaming
up and train it, and Chinese effectiveness by the difficulty of communications
in these terms Chinese manpower is limited by the Soviet-Chinese capacity, so
at the Soviet plac

but only the part which can be utilized effectively is strategically significant.
may lead to a needless barter of booby. Absolute numbers are important,
underestimating an adversely may be diatatic, overestimating the resources
distances of the greased areas from the centers of our strength. But while
smaller and factors are cited as the "unlimited" Soviet manpower or the asset
concerned to resist and our readiness to deal with? To abdicate a negative
perturbant areas be deluded, assuming the willingness of the countries
physical destruction." The argument thus runs in a circle: Can the
of the German people... A substantial retreat is equivalent to our moral and
repreent a strategic asset for the West; it includes a demand for the protection
beneath in the Atlantic alliance means more to us than that our 13 diatatic
assembled, the base boatload of which involves giving up our territory. Our
in an unignificant editorial in a leading German newspaper: "We must obverse such

373

250

were possible to develop indigenous armies of moderate size but substantial firepower these should be able to fight delaying actions until the arrival of reinforcements, particularly if American air power (perhaps carrier-based) were hampering Chinese movements. Nor can the Soviets keep pouring in men and supplies so far from their own centers of production, despite the seemingly contrary lessons of the war in Korea. After the beginning of the armistice negotiations, the Korean war was fought under conditions nearly ideal for an army with inferior technology and air power; actions were always confined to a small segment of the front; they could be delayed until there had been an adequate build-up; they could be broken off when stocks were depleted. The risks were always tactical and not strategic; the penalty for failure was limited by the self-imposed restrictions of the armistice

the attempt of our air force to interdict Chinese negotiations. "Operation Strangle" therefore did not represent a fair test of the Chinese ability to sustain a major effort over a considerable period of time and in the face of superior air power. The only continuous drain on Chinese supplies occurred after the front was stabilized in March 1951, and from then until the beginning of the armistice negotiations in June the Chinese were much closer to a decisive defeat than we. Had we committed even four more divisions, indeed even if we had put a time limit on the truce negotiations, we might have achieved a substantial military victory.

we might have achieved a successful military victory.
more divisions, indeed even if we had but a time limit on the race for negotiations,
were much closer to a decisive defeat than we. Had we committed even four

from then until the beginning of the armistice negotiations in June the Chinese
Chinese subordinates occurred after the front was stabilized in March 1919, and
time and in the face of anterior air power. The only continuous drain on
of the Chinese spillover to sustain a major effort over a considerable period of
negotiations. "Operation Strange," therefore did not represent a fair test
the attempt of our air force to interdict Chinese

defile was limited by the self-imposed restrictions of the armistice
disbursed. The risks were always tactical and not strategic; the beauty for
had been an adequate build-up; they could be proven only when stocks were
continued to a small segment of the front; they could be delayed until there
ideal for an army with inferior technology and air power; actions were always
armistice negotiations, the Korean war was fought under conditions nearly
unlike contrary reasons of the war in Korea. After the beginning of the
and subcribes so far from their own centers of production, despite the seemingly
were pampering Chinese movements. Nor can the Soviets keep going in men
of reinforcements, baronially if American air power (perhaps carrier-passed)
firepower these should be applied light delaying actions until the arrival
were possible to develop individual armies of moderate size put in potential

were possible to develop individual armies of moderate size put in potential
were possible to develop individual armies of moderate size put in potential
were possible to develop individual armies of moderate size put in potential
were possible to develop individual armies of moderate size put in potential
were possible to develop individual armies of moderate size put in potential

520

251

To be sure, the limitations imposed on the Chinese freedom of manoeuvre
by the narrow peninsula and the proximity of our bases in Japan gave us an
advantage in Korea which probably could not be duplicated in other areas.
On the other hand, certain circumstances were propitious for the Chinese also.
Korea was close to their main production centers and the Russian supply lines,
and communications between Korea and China were good. Neither of these
conditions would be duplicated in, for example, Southeast Asia. We thus
might say that these are two prerequisites of effective local action by the
United States: indigenous governments of sufficient stability so that the
Soviets can take over only by open aggression, and indigenous military forces
capable of fighting a delaying action. If these conditions are met, the
to the defense of the "grey areas" will involve the creation
American contribution to a strategic reserve capable of redressing the balance
and of a weapons system capable of translating our technological advantage
into local superiority.

The most difficult problem will be to develop the weapons system appropriate
for a limited war. For with the complexity of modern weapons limited war
can generally not be fought by using a part of the strategic retaliatory force.
Even if technically feasible, this would be weakening the main deterrent
against expanding the war. Thus the fact that our forces had been reduced

252

in the immediate post-war period to levels barely able to undertake retaliatory
blows against the U.S.S.R. were the chief reasons advanced by General Vandenberg
against expanding the Korean war. Moreover, the nature of the weapons, the
training and the concept for their employment differ radically between forces
useful for an all-out war and those which should be ready for a limited war.

The weapons system for all-out war is designed to inflict maximum destruction
and to do so in the shortest possible time. In a limited war, on the other
hand, the weapons system should exhibit discrimination and flexibility. In
an all-out war the targets are known in advance, in fact our SAC crews are
training with mock-up of Soviet targets in their bomb sights, everything

depends on the efficiency with which a pre-planned strike can be launched.

But in a limited war neither the locale of the conflict nor the targets can
be predetermined; everything here depends on the rapidity with which planning
can adjust to a developing situation. In an all-out war, the chief problem
is to deliver the largest increment of destruction as rapidly as possible in
order to eliminate the enemy's retaliatory force before it has done too much
damage. But the problem in limited war is to be able to apply graduated

|| 14. Richard S. Meryman, Jr. "The Guardians," *Harper's Magazine*. October 1955, p. 39.

b. 30'.
(1) Richard S. Mertzman, Jr., "The Guardiana," *Harper's Magazine*, October 1922, 11.

The problem in limited war is to be able to sharply graduated order to eliminate the enemy's retaliatory force before it has done too much to deliver the largest increment of destruction as rapidly as possible in can adjust to a developing situation. In an all-out war, the chief problem be predetermined; everything done on the basis with which planning But in a limited war neither the locale of the conflict nor the targets can depend on the efficiency with which a pre-planned strike can be launched. Here fore training with mock-up of Soviet targets in their bomb sights. *Energetic an all-out war the targets are known in advance*, in fact our BAC crews are band, the weapons system should exhibit discrimination and flexibility. In and to do so in the shortest possible time. In a limited war, on the other The weapons system for all-out war is designed to inflict maximum destruction useful for small-all-out war and those which should be ready for a limited war. training and the concept for their employment differ radically between forces against expanding the Korean war. Moreover, the nature of the weapons, the flows against the U.S. Air, were the chief reasons advanced by General Vandenberg in the immediate post-war period to favor a purelypie to underwrite retaliatory

525

253

increments of destruction in phased amounts to keep the war limited and
also to permit the necessary breathing-spaces for political contacts.

A weapons system for limited war is therefore a more complex and subtle
problem than to develop a retaliatory force. The requirement for limited
wars is not one all-purpose force which we will always be rightly tempted to con-
serve for a major show-down, but units of high mobility and considerable
firepower which can be moved quickly to trouble spots. Given the power of modern
weapons and the speed of movement of military units everything depends on
establishing a position as rapidly as possible because it will be very difficult
to dislodge an enemy once he has become entrenched. Moreover the capability
for rapid deployment is crucial for psychological reasons as well. In
a real sense, a limited war is a gauge of the determination of the contenders;
in fact, it is unlikely to occur unless either side doubts either the capability
or the willingness of its opponent to resist. An ability to intervene rapidly
even with relatively small forces can serve as such a gauge and afford the
possibility of reestablishing an equilibrium before either side becomes too
heavily engaged. It is therefore imperative that each service develop units
capable of fighting local actions and that these units are not considered by

12 See Chapter below.

254

the strategic doctrine as part of the over-all retaliatory force. To be sure, as missiles become operative, the distinction between weapons suitable mainly for strategic operations and those of a local nature will diminish in significance. But in the intermediate period the biggest gap in our defense structure is for forces capable of fighting local actions. The army is too small and its organization too cumbersome; the Air Force too preoccupied with all-out war and with a doctrine of complete air superiority; only the Navy possesses a force capable of sufficient discrimination, but it is inherently a supporting element, but its very nature the Navy will be most effective in aiding the other services to establish an equilibrium on land.

Our army at the moment is too small and too cumbersome to fight a limited war and it will probably not be needed in an all-out war. The army consists of 19 divisions; allowing for trainees only 14 can be said to be ready for combat. It may be argued that this force does not absolutely preclude fighting limited wars from the purely military point of view; valid as this contention is in the abstract it is unrealistic psychologically. A limited war of any size would absorb so great a proportion of the present army that it would lose a great deal of flexibility to deal with any other threat. The unlikelihood

254

that any Chief of Staff would commit an army of the present size is shown
by the attitude of the then Chief-of-Staff General Ridgway with regard both
to Indo-China and the Chinese offshore islands. And the doubts of the military
will reinforce the inhibitions of the political leadership. Thus another
vicious circle is set up: the civilian leadership will tend to make its partici-
pation in a limited war dependent on military advice, but *xxx* the pressure
of the military will in all good conscience have to be against involvement
either be cause they do not possess adequate forces or because they lack an
adequate doctrine or both. The circle is broken in practice only if a
strong President assumes the responsibility for defining the limits of the
conflict and the nature of our commitment as happened in the Korean war.

Nevertheless the inadequacy of forces is relatively easily remedied
if we can adjust our notion of war to new conditions. (We reacted to the
frustrations of the Korean war with a determination never to be caught in such
a predicament again. Accordingly, we set about to reduce the deployment of
our troops overseas and to create a strategic reserve in the United States.
As a concept this is *unexceptionable*. A strategic reserve, however, implies
the *xxx* precise meaning of the term: a reserve for a force which is holding

the best precise meaning of the term: a reserve for a force which is holding

As a concept this is unambiguous. A strategic reserve, however, implies

a prudence again. Accordingly, we set about to reduce the deployment of

transitions of the Korean war with a determination never to be caught in such

if we can adjust our notion of war to new conditions. We reacted to the

~~Naples~~

Nevertheless the importance of forces is relatively easily remedied

strong president assumes the responsibility for defining the limits of the

adequate doctrine or policy. The circle is broken in practice only if a

either because they do not possess adequate forces or because they lack an

of the military will in all good conscience have to be against invalidation

bation in a limited war dependent on military advice, but even the measure

victims circle is set up: the civilian leadership will tend to make its partic-

will reinforce the implications of the political leadership. Time another

by the attitude of the then Chief-of-Staff General Ridgway with regard to policy and Chief of Staff would commit an error of the present age to be shown

that and Chief of Staff would commit an error of the present age to be shown

527

255

the line. Unfortunately one of the basic facts of the post-war period is the inadequacy of many local forces for this mission or at least their inability to offer prolonged resistance. A strategic reserve which cannot move to threatened areas quickly to bolster local resistance is a contradiction in terms: it will be either too small or too irrelevant for a general war; and too immobile to redress the strategic balance locally. The importance of forces ready to intervene rapidly was surely one of the lessons of the Korean war. For whatever the state of our readiness militarily or psychologically, the attack occurred in a fortuitous area, close to our only concentration of troops in Asia. And even these untrained troops, hastily assembled, and understrength managed to establish a perimeter and in a few months to restore the situation. Had we required even one more week to bring troops into Korea, it would have been too late and Korea could probably not have been recapatured without an effort that would have materially increased the chances of general war.

A strategic reserve must have mobility to be strategically significant. In the past this mobility was assured by command of the seas. But in modern war such a leisurely deployment is no longer possible. We therefore have two choices: we can either station ready forces in or close to likely trouble spots

choice: we can either station forces in or close to likely trouble spots

In the best this modifiy was assumed by command of the area. But in modern

A strategic reserve must have modifiy to be strategically significant.

without an effort that would have materially increased the chances of General war.

it would have been too late and Korea could properly not have been recapitalized

the situation. Had we required even one moreweek to print troops into Korea,

understrengthen managed to eat up a perimeter and in a few months to reframe

of troops in Korea. And even these untrained troops, partly assembled, and

Korean war. For whatever the state of our readiness militarily or bafeofologically,

of forces ready to intervene rapidly was surely one of the reasons of the

and too immobile to reboost the strategic balance locally. The importance

in terms: it will be either too small or too irrelevant for a General war;

inability to offer profited resistance. A strategic reserve which cannot

the fine. Unfortunately one of the past facts of the past-war period is

522

or we can keep the major portion of our strategic reserve in the United States, but give it the requisite mobility. The first alternative is politically difficult and strategically risky; the second presupposes two conditions, however: an organization of army units less cumbersome than the present division geared to relative slow cross-country movement and an airlift which will enable us to intervene in threatened areas within a time span that will be strategically effective. The reorganization of army units is required because our tactical organization has been based essentially on a doctrine of a war of position, geared to the speed of the internal combustion engine and the availability of roads. Such a division may prove too large, too cumbersome to fight an effective action in a situation which is not likely to have a stabilized front.

Too late in your argument to use conditional verbs.

Above all, it is too complicated to be transportable efficiently by air.

The current infantry division weighs approximately 28,000 short tons. It would require the entire available U.S. airlift, including the civil reserve

fleet, thirty days to move one such division from the United States to the provided all air transport units were in position when the crisis occurred-- a most unlikely contingency; Middle East, even the combat element of such a division weighs 7,000 short tons, and could there be any move in less than 10 days?

It is clear that one means for improving mobility is to reduce the weight of army units. Fortunately substantial steps in this direction are taking place. The army has given up its traditional organization of a division on

place. The army has given up its traditional organization of a division on
of army units. Fortunately underutilized areas in this direction are filling

If it is clear that one means for improving modifiy is to reduce the weight

If (could) here fore) not be moved in less than 10 days.
Middle Beat. Given the combat element of such a divisional weight 1,000 short tons and
a most unlikely contingency:
provided all air transport units were in position when the crisis occurred --
flown entirely due to move one such division from the United States to the

would require the entire available U.S. airift, including the civil reserve

The current infantry division weights approximately 58,000 short tons. If
above all, it is too complicated to be transportable efficiently by air.
effective action in a situation which is not likely to have a stabilized front.

of roads. Such a division may prove too large, too cumbersome to fight an
 organization has been based essentially on a doctrine of a war of position,
effective. The reorganization of army units is required because our need
 to intervene in threatened areas within a time span that will be strategically
to relative air cross-country movement and an airift which will enable us
an organization of army units less cumbersome than the present division has
difficult and strategically risky: the second breachbass two conditions, however:

put give it the requisite modifiy. The latter alternative is politically

528

257

the basis of three regiments and has substituted the Pentana concept: a division composed of five combat teams. This increases the number of self-supporting commands and thereby the flexibility of maneuver; it enables the application of a more discriminating increment of force. In addition a new type of airborne division has been created designed for rapid air-transport.

It would weigh 14,300 short tons and its combat element would weigh 5,000 short tons. This would halve the time required to move one division to the Middle East from the United States even with existing airlift.

But the existing airlift places us in a precarious situation from the point of view of limited war. Unless the combat element of a division can be lifted almost simultaneously it may arrive too late to affect events or in such small driplets that it can be defeated in detail. But to lift the combat element of a new type division would require a fleet of 200 C-133's; to move the entire division within a period of 10 days would require a fleet of 272 C-133's at a cost of 2.6 billion dollars. To support this in the field would require 9,438 short tons of supplies to be airlifted over a 30-day period, at the end of which time surface transports would probably take over most of the logistics. To be sure, as the high speed nuclear powered ships which are being planned by the Navy become operative in a decade or so, the requirement

["which are being planned by the War Department to become operative in a decade or so, the requirement most of the logistics. To be sure, at the high level authorized strips at the end of which time surface transporters could properly take over its would require 8,438 short tons of supplies to be airlifted over a 30-day period, at the end of which time surface transporters would properly take over its would require 8,438

261

in the light of the over-all requirements of United States strategy an
expenditure of 2.6 billion dollars to increase our strategic mobility does
not seem too high. It may be objected that airlift presupposes bases close
enough to the combat zone to be useful. But for the foreseeable future we
should be able to count on Okinawa as a staging area for the Far East, on
Cyprus as a staging area for the Middle East and on Britain as a staging area
for Europe. Thus once we possess strategic mobility, it is not at all obvious
that the Soviet bloc could utilize its interior position to assemble an
overwhelming force at any given point around its periphery, particularly in
areas where we can count on a measure of indigenous resistance or Allied support.

But can we counter even the forces they are able to assemble? If we
admit the local war thesis, do we not run the risk of having our army always
at the wrong place? To be sure, the Soviet bloc can pick the initial point
of attack, but the greater mobility of its interior position is illusory because
of the difficulties of communication. Once the Soviet armies are committed
in an area, they cannot be shifted at will against our air power or with greater
speed than we shift ours by sea. The Chinese, for example, cannot draw us
into Indo-China and then attack in Burma with the same army. They can, of
course, build up two armies, but we should be able to learn of this in time

conquer, build up two armies, but we should be able to learn of this in time
into India-Osman and then attack in Borneo with the same army. They can, of
abuse then we shift one by one. The Chinese, for example, cannot draw us
in an area, they cannot be shifted at will against our air power or with greater
of the difficulties of communication. Once the Soviet armies are committed
of attack, put the greater mobility of its interior position to illusory because
of the wrong place? To be sure, the Soviet race can pick the initial point
achieve the local war threats, do we not run the risk of having our army always
But can we counter even the forces they are able to assemble? If we
areas where we can count on a measure of indigenous resistance or Vichy authority,
overwhelming force at any given point around its border, certainly in
that the Soviet race could utilize its interior position to assemble an
for Europe. Thus once we possess strategic mobility, it is not at all obvious
Osman as a staging area for the Middle East and on Britain as a staging area
should be able to count on Osman as a staging area for the Far East, on
enough to put combat zone to be useful. But for the foreseeable future we
not seem too high. It may be objected that a shift in belligerents passes close
expenditure of $6 billion dollars to increase our strategic mobility does
in the fight of the over-all requirements of United States strategy an
SGI

501

262

and then decide to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending on the strategic situation. In any case, the two armies cannot support each other (the classic advantage of interior lines) and the power of modern weapons places an upper limit to the numbers of troops that can be profitably employed in any given area.

*strategically significant*

But assuming its feasibility would it be wise to let ourselves be drawn into a war of attrition with the Soviet bloc? Of course, the formulation of the question is somewhat beside the point for war in its very nature is a process of attrition. The problem for strategy is not how to avoid attrition but to determine which kind is strategically most significant. The notion that land war is inherently wasteful and that there are cheaper ways of winning victory is a legacy of our period of invulnerability. "If it is preferable to engage in a war of attrition", said Secretary of the Air Symington in 1949, "one American life for one enemy life then we are wrong. That is not our way. That is not the way in which the slaughter of American youth in an invasion of Japan was avoided. To whatever extent we can bring it about that weapons fashioned in Los Alamos and carried in aircraft fashioned in Fort Worth can destroy or diminish the power of an enemy to kill American soldiers, that method". (15) "A B-36 with an aircraft andirmen we are for pursuing that method." (16)

Quoted in B-36 Hearings, p. 402.

12.

1. CHOOSEN THE B-38 HEAVYWEIGHT B. 7000.
2. DETERMINE THE HEAVYWEIGHT FOR YOUR SPECIFICATION.
3. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
4. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
5. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
6. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
7. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
8. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
9. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
10. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
11. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.
12. DETERMINE THE WEIGHTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS.

weighs loaded in Los Vamos and carried in aircraft traditioned in Fort Worth
invasion of Japan was avoided. To whatever extent we can bring it about that
way. That is not the way in which the slaughter of American youth in an
"one American file for one enemy file then we are wrong. That is not our
to engage in a war of attrition" said Secretary of the Air Strategy in 1942.

The victory is a legacy of our period of invineresiliency. "If it is preferable
that land war is inherently useful and that there are cheaper ways of winning
but to determine which kind is strategically most significant. The notion
of attrition
process of attrition. The problem for strategy is not how to avoid attrition
of the question is somewhat beside the point for war in its very nature is
into a war of attrition with the Soviet Union. Of course, the formulation

But assuming its feasibility would it be wise to let ourselves be drawn
into strategy's significance.
employed in and given area.

wesons places an number limit to the numbers of troops that can be
elsewhere (the classic advantage of interior lines) and the power of modern
on the strategic situation. In any case, the two armies cannot afford
and then decide to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending
on the other side to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending

strategically significant.
employed in and given area.

wesons places an number limit to the numbers of troops that can be
elsewhere (the classic advantage of interior lines) and the power of modern
on the strategic situation. In any case, the two armies cannot afford
depot and then decide to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending
on the other side to defend one or the other area, or neither, depending

525

A bomb" said Secretary Symington on another occasion, "can take off from this continent and destroy distant objectives which it might require ground armies years to take--and then only at the expense of heavy casualties. The B-36 could do the job within 16 hours --all this at the risk of only 16 American lives." 16)

Unfortunately, the transformation of the strategic situation wrought by the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile is the fact that the risk has become much more than 16 American lives. Indeed, with the end of our invulnerability the most certain method for trading a life for a life is to engage in all-out *This has become the war of attrition, par excellence*. thermo-nuclear bombing, Moreover, as was demonstrated in a previous chapter the elimination of the enemy industrial potential would not affect the strategic equation rapidly enough to avoid catastrophic devastation, and conversely the point of diminishing strategic returns for both sides in an all-out war is likely to be reached before stockpiles are exhausted. Thus all-out war is precisely the kind of war in which our industrial potential is least significant because each side can inflict attrition on the other almost simultaneously. But attrition is effective only if one side reaches exhaustion while the other still has resources left to impose its will. Thus strategy conceived as an
16. *Ibid*., p. 315.

19. J. P. 1949, b. 31.2.

Still has resources left to impose its will. Thus a strategy conceived as an

But attrition is effective only if one side reserves expenditure while the other

precisely the kind of war in which our industrial potential is least觉-

education rapidly enough to avoid catastrophic devastation and conversely the

thermo-unclean pumping. Moreover, as was demonstrated in a previous chapter

His war has come to an end of attrition, for excellence.

the most certain method for trading a file for a file is to engage in all-out

much more than 10 American lives. Indeed, with the end of our invulnerability

by the growing Soviet unclean stockpile is the fact that the risk has become

unfortunately, the transformation of the strategic situation brought

lives," 19).

could do the job within 10 days ---all this at the risk of only 10 American
years to take---and then only at the expense of heavy casualties. The B-30
continent and destroy distant objectives which it might require ground armies
A pomp, said Secretary咽ington on another occasion, "can take off from here
this

503 - 527

284

attempt to make the enemy fight with the weapons system most advantageous

a
to us would actually favor MX policy of limited war. A limited war is the

only method to achieve a continuous drain of resources without exhausting

both sides. It is therefore the best means to derive a strategic benefit

✓ from our industrial potential. For we have shown in the previous chapter, the prerequisite for utilizing industrial potential in a strategy of attrition has been defined in the previous chapter as a weapons system sufficiently complex to require a substantial production effort but not so destructive as to leave the victor no effective margin of superiority. It may be objected that if it is to our advantage to fight a limited war, it must be to the disadvantage of the other side and that for this reason the Soviet bloc will have no incentive to keep a conflict limited. But it does not follow that because the Soviets stand to lose by limited war, that they would be able to calculate a gain from all-out war.

As long as we maintain a substantial retaliatory force, On the contrary, the U.S.S.R. confronts the same strategic dilemma as we that all-out war is useless as an instrument of policy except for acts of desperation.

Thus the argument that limited war might turn into a contest of attrition is in fact an argument in favor of a strategy of limited war. A war of attrition is the one war the Soviet bloc could not win.

Shouldn't you add that a capacity for waging limited war may arise from starting a limited war, just as SAC deter them from all-but war?

[y]

285

VIII

We have thus reached perhaps the most serious question connected with limited war: whether one of the limitations on the use of force should be to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. Are nuclear weapons consistent with a policy of limited war? The problem resolves itself into two parts: whether it is possible to use nuclear weapons without the war spreading and whether it is wise to do so.

The argument against the use of nuclear weapons start from the premise that it is now possible to make nuclear weapons of any desired size ranging from below one kiloton to several megatons. As long as this is true there exists no natural cut-off point in the use of nuclear weapons even remotely as sharply defined as that between conventional and nuclear weapons. The losing side will therefore have every incentive to redress the balance by using a weapon of greater power and this in turn will provoke counter-retaliation. Thus a limited nuclear war would spread by a series of progressive steps towards an all-out war without any clarity as to which side took the crucial step which caused the war to become total. A distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons would have the advantage of making the "atomic aggression" unambiguous. Moreover, so the argument runs, since the factor that limits

unmilitary. Moreover, so the argument runs, since the factor that limits
and nuclear weapons would have the advantage of making the "atomic
aggression"
Herefor-

which caused the war to become total. A distinction between conventional
an all-out war without any clarity as to which side took the crucial step
Thus a limited nuclear war would spread by a series of progressive steps towards
making a weapon of greater power and this in turn will broke counter-retaliation.

facing side will therefore have every incentive to regress the balance by
as separately defined as that between conventional and nuclear weapons. The
extends no natural cut-off point in the use of nuclear weapons even remotely
from below one kiloton to several megatons. As long as this is true there
that it is now possible to make nuclear weapons of any kind desired size ranging

whether it is wise to do so.

whether it is possible to use nuclear weapons without the war abating and
with a policy of limited war? The problem resolves itself into two parts:

To refrain from the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons consistent
limited war: whether one of the limitations on the use of force should be

We have thus reached perhaps the most serious situation connected with

AIII

382

286

a limited war is the risk of all-out thermo-nuclear war, a limited nuclear war does not avoid the problem of thermo-nuclear devastation and may even accelerate it.¹⁷

These arguments have great force. No one even generally familiar with the destructiveness of modern weapons can regard the prospect of any kind of nuclear war with equanimity. Yet the prospect of nuclear war is with us not by choice but because of the facts of modern technology. The only question for strategy therefore is which course will make all-out war less likely; whether limited nuclear war will add to our dangers or diminish them. It must be admitted that at the outset it is not possible to draw sharp dividing lines in the employment of nuclear weapons, that either side has therefore the technical possibility of expanding its commitment gradually until total war is reached. But the crucial point is surely not whether it can do so technically but whether it will be able to do so psychologically. The distinction between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons may be difficult to draw technically, but every state will have a powerful incentive to make some distinction, however tenuous its logic, the fear of all-out war. It is not likely that a war becomes unnecessary.

17. Some of these arguments have been presented in an unpublished paper by James E. King, Jr., "Graduated Deterrence," Operations Research Office, October 1956. Foreign Affairs, January 1957.

"Nuclear Plenty and Limited War"

287

all-out because of a logical syllogism. Korea should demonstrate the eagerness of both sides to draw limits, however arbitrary and however contrary to military logic. No one "wargaming" the Korean war in advance would have assumed it possible that a war with such ground rules could be fought, ~~that we would~~ *As it turned out* not even retali ate against air bases from which attacks on our forces ~~would be~~ *were being* leveled.

Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the losing side, if its defeat is kept within limits which do not threaten its retaliatory capacity, will lightly resort to all-out war. But if it is a foregone conclusion that the losing side will seek to escape its dilemmas by resorting to all-out war, then it is difficult to see why it would be restrained by a distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. For what precisely would be achieved by a distinction between conventional nuclear weapons? *To be sure,* it is clear that it would make nuclear aggression unambiguous, but the consequences that flow from this are much less apparent. Would the side which is prepared to unleash an all-out thermonuclear war *to be sure* to avoid defeat in a limited nuclear war be less willing to *do so* if it should suffer a setback in a struggle fought with conventional weapons?

Conversely what would be the sanction against introducing low-yield nuclear weapons in a war that started as a conventional war? If the reply is to be

Weapons in a war that started as a conventional war? If the reply is to be
Conversely what would be the annihilation against introducing low-yield nuclear
should an electron a setback in a struggle fought with conventional weapons?

Unclear to avoid defeat in a limited nuclear war be less waffling to do it if not less evident. Would the side which is prepared to unseem an all-out thermo-aggression unimportant, put the consequences that flow from this are much between conventional nuclear weapons? If so-even that it would make unclear unclear to be 20%.

and conventional weapons. For what precisely would be achieved by a distinction
is difficult to see why it would be retrained by a distinction between nuclear
side will seek to escape its dilemma by resorting to all-out war, then if
react to all-out war. But if it is a foregone conclusion that the losing
kept within limits which do not threaten its retaliatory capacity will lightly
Nor is it a foregone conclusion that the losing side, if its defeat is
leashed.

not even retrain against air passes from which attacks on our forces would be
it possible that a war with any ground rules could be fought. ~~we would~~
At it turns out

of poor sides to draw limits, however arbitrary and however contrary to militarily
all-out because of a logical illogism. Korea should demonstrate the effectiveness

584

[Y]

288

all-out thermo-nuclear war, reliance on conventional weapons would have brought on what it is designed to prevent. If the response is to use nuclear weapons in turn, but not resort to all-out war, a limited nuclear war would be taking place albeit at the second stage of the conflict.

A limited conventional war could be kept non-nuclear only by the threat of all-out retaliation should any kind of nuclear weapon be introduced. But this will be effective only to the extent that the threat will be credible. Is the rise of low-yield nuclear weapons a sufficient provocation to overcome the tremendous inhibitions against all-out war? It is difficult to be certain about reactions to contingencies which have never taken place. It is hard to believe, however, that the introduction of low-yield nuclear weapons or even more powerful weapons confined to military targets into a limited war would be considered the last resort which would induce a power to stake its national substance. It would be both implausible and unwise. For an all-out thermo-nuclear war which started for such a provocation would have brought on catastrophe before all possibilities of avoiding it had been exhausted. And because this is true, there will be every incentive to test the possibility of limited nuclear war before taking the irreversible last step of what President Eisenhower has called the "ultimate" war.

What President Eisenhower for once called the "ultimate war" was the feasibility of limited nuclear war before taking the irreversible والعشوؤد

exhausted. And because this is true, there will be every incentive to test
brought on catastrophe before all possibilities of avoiding it had been
all-out thermo-unclear war which started for and a provocation would have
its national and state. It would be both impossible and unsafe. For an
war would be considered the last resort which would induce a power to strike
or even more beyering weapons confined to military targets into a limited
is hard to believe, however, that the introduction of low-yield nuclear weapons
certain about reactions to contingencies which have never taken place. It
the tremendous implications against all-out war? It is difficult to be
Is the size of low-yield nuclear weapons a sufficient provocation to over come
this will be effective only to the extent that the threat will be credible.
ot all-out retaliation should any kind of nuclear weapon be introduced. But
A limited conventional war could be kept non-unclear only by the finest
taking place aspect at the second stage of the conflict.

in turn, but not resort to all-out war, a limited nuclear war would be
on what it is designed to prevent. It the reason is to use nuclear weapons
all-out thermo-unclear war, reliance on conventional weapons would have brought

A

588

289

A limited nuclear war, moreover, which grows out of a conventional war may be more difficult to limit than a war which *starts* as a limited nuclear war because it would be breaking out under the worst possible conditions. The sudden introduction of nuclear weapons during the course of a war would force the Powers to confront the problem of limitation in the confusion of combat when the possibilities of misunderstanding the opponent's intentions are greatest. And this may be compounded by bureaucratic inertia if war plans postulate the explosion of any nuclear device anywhere as the start of thermo-nuclear conflict.

The only advantage of limiting war to conventional weapons then would be to make the atomic aggressor unambiguous and in consequence of this would either be meaningless or it would make all-out war more likely. Moreover, limited conventional war even if it could be fought would not represent our most effective strategy. For limited war can be compared to a curve plotted on a graph one of the axis of which measures risk and the other measures commitment. At every point on this curve, the calculus of risks changes and every additional commitment forces the opponent to reevaluate the costs of continued war against the goals to be achieved. Somewhere on this curve there is a point for both sides at which they consider the risk of all-out

there is a point for both sides at which they consider the risk of all-out
of continued war against the foe to be achieved. Somewhere on this curve
and every additional commitment forces the opponent to reevaluate the costs
of commitment. At every point on this curve, the calibre of risks changes
on a graph one of the axis of which measures risk and the other measures
most effective strategy. For limited war can be compared to a curve plotted
limited conventional war even if it could be found would not represent our
would either be meaningless or it would make all-out war more likely. Moreover,
be to make the atomic aggressor unignorable and inconsequence of this
practice the

unclear conflict.

boastful the explosion of such nuclear device anywhere as the start of thermo-
blast. And this may be compounded by puresaneretic inertia it war biane
when the hostilities of misunderstanding the opponent's intentions are
the powers to confront the problem of limitation in the consumption of combat
subsequent introduction of nuclear weapons during the course of a war would force
because it would be precluding out under the worst possible conditions. The
be more difficult to limit than a war which starts as a limited nuclear war
A limited nuclear war, moreover, which grows out of a conventional war may

290

war too great to commit an additional increment of force. If that point is
the same for both sides, they will both be willing to run approximately the
same risks and the fear of all-out war becomes a mutual deterrent. If one
side is willing or able to operate further up on the curve, if, in other words,
it is willing or able to increase its commitment further than its opponent,
it will gain an advantage. Thus during the Korean war we had an advantage
we did not press: that we could better afford an all-out war than our opponents
and that the inhibitions against initiating an all-out war should therefore
have been greater on the part of our opponents than with us. At the lower
end of the curve an increased commitment will only force the opponent to
decide whether he will assume an additional risk; as the point of all-out
war is approached all calculations will be overlaid by the real or imagined
danger of all-out war.

For this reason one of the problems of limited war is to decide on which
part of the curve measuring commitments and risks to operate. The dispute
between those who identify limited war with conventional war and those who
believe in the possibility of limited nuclear war resolves itself into a
question whether it is safer and more productive to operate at the lower
or on the upper part of the curve, whether a limited war is kept limited better

or on the upper part of the curve, whether a limited war is kept limited by
direction whether it is salient and more productive to operate at the lower
place in the possessivity of limited unconfined war resolves itself into a
between those who identify limited war with conventional war and those who
between those who identify limited war with conventional war and those who
part of the curve measuring commitments and risks to operate. The dispute
for this reason one of the problems of limited war is to decide on which
genera of all-out war.

war is approximated all calculations will be overfled by the real or imagined
decide whether he will assume an additional risk; as the point of all-out
end of the curve an increased commitment will only force the opponent to
have been greater on the part of our opponents than with us. At the lower
and that the implications against initiating an all-out war should therefore
we did not press: that we could better afford an all-out war than our opponents
it will gain an advantage. Thus during the Korean war we had an advantage
it is wiffling or able to increase its commitment further than its opponent,
side is wiffling or able to operate further up on the curve, if, in other words,
same risks and the fear of all-out war becomes a mutual deterrent. It one
the same for both sides, they will both be wiffling to run approximately the
war too great to commit an additional increment of force. It that point is

530

291

by a strategy of minimum risk or by starting it with an initially larger commitment. Liddell Hart has argued for example, that deterrence is best achieved by a light scfeen of token conventional weapons for the enemy would know that overrunning them would be tantamount to a declaration of all-out war because we would not accept defeat without resorting to it. <sup>18</sup> But this is in effect another version of massive retaliation which interjects one small step—a limited conventional war—between peace and a thermo-nuclear holocaust.

And it is subject to the same criticism as massive retaliation. It is simply not credible that a defeat of a few conventional divisions should unleash a thermo-nuclear holocaust, nor is a strategy which would go through with such a threat a responsible one. Thus at the lower end of the scale where the

destructiveness of weapons is low, deterrence may be ineffective because the and the threat of all-out war not plausible.<sup>19</sup>

risk for the Soviet bloc is small; Conventional war, moreover, permits the opponent to substitute manpower for materiel on the battlefield. It enables him gradually to increase his commitment and to force us to decide at every stage of military operation whether to follow suit. It therefore gives the enemy the benefit of initiative in expanding the war by increments so small, including the jump from conventional to low-yield nuclear weapons, that none will seem a sufficient provocation for all-out war. Conversely, it will be <sup>20</sup> Saturday Review of Literature, May?

19

SG: Saturday Review of Literature, May?

will seem a sufficient provocation for all-out war. Conversely, it will be
including the jump from conventional to low-level nuclear weapons, that none
enough the benefit of initiative in expanding the war by increments so small,
at a rate of military operation whether to follow suit. If therefore gives the
him gradually to increase his commitment and to force us to decide at every
opponent to supplement manpower for materiel on the battlefield. It enables
risk for the Soviet foe is small. Conventional war, moreover, permits the
and the threat of all-out war not planable.
diminishment of weapons is low, deference may be reflective because the
a threat a reasonable one. Thus at the lower end of the scale where the
thermo-unclean holocaust, nor is a strategy which would go through with and
not credible that a defeat of a few conventional divisions should mean a
And it is subject to the same criticism as massive retaliation. It is simply
adequate—a limited conventional war—between peace and a thermo-unclean holocaust.
It is in effect another version of massive retaliation which intersects one small
war because we would not accept defeat without regranting to it.⁵⁰ But this
know that overrunning them would be tantamount to a declaration of all-out
seized by a light screen of token conventional weapons for the enemy would
commitment. Higbelfurt has argued for example, that deference is best
by a strategy of minimum risk or by arranging it with an initially larger

521

292

very difficult on this basis to maneuver the enemy into a position from which he can extricate himself *only* by all-out war--the condition for winning *P* To operate with a strategy of very or stalematating a limited war. At the upper-end of the scale, deterrence may limited commitments may there fore weaken deterrents to the point be ineffective because the threat of all-out war may not be credible and where aggression is encouraged.

because the strategy for fighting a war poses exorbitant risks. The best balance between deterrence and an effective strategy is in the intermediary range of risk and commitment: the area of limited nuclear war. Here a substantial risk is posed for the opponent and one that has the advantage of credibility. The Soviet bloc moreover will be deprived of the advantage of initiative in expanding the war because both sides will be operating close to the upper limit of risk. In short, in a policy of limited war it is safer and more effective to begin with an intermediary rather than a minimum commitment because the threat of all-out war which is the chief limiting condition of war will be more credible here and because the most difficult decision--whether to resort to all-out war is passed on to the enemy most effectively in this manner.

This is not to say that limited nuclear war is always the best or the wisest strategy; it is simply to indicate that it is possible and that

was a strategy; it is simply to indicate that it is possible and that

This is not to say that limited nuclear war is always the best or the
effectively in this manner.

decision—whether to resort to all-out war is based on to the enemy most
condition of war will be more credible here and because the most difficult
commitment because the threat of all-out war which is the chief limiting
and more effective to begin with an intermediary rather than a minimum
to the upper limit of risk. In short, in a policy of limited war it is easier
initiative in expanding the war because both sides will be operating close
credibility. The Soviet policy moreover will be deprived of the advantage of
undamental risk a posed for the opponent and one that has the advantage of
range of risk and commitment: the area of limited nuclear war. Here a
balance between deterrence and an effective strategy is in the intermediary
because the strategy for fighting a war based on exorbitant risks. The best
where addition is foreseen.

be inoperative because the threat of all-out war may not be credible and
limited commitment may therefor weaken deterrence to the point
or escalating a limited war. At the upper end of the scale, deterrence may
# To operate with a strategy of very
which he can exhort himself only by all-out war—the condition for winning
very difficult on this basis to maneuver the enemy into a position from

585

[y]

293

draw flexibility is increased not by attempting to establish a line between conventional and nuclear war, but by creating a smooth curve of non-nuclear and nuclear capabilities. In a limited war against a non-nuclear underdeveloped country, in a civil war, in a minor police action, the use of nuclear weapons may be unnecessary or unwise either for psychological or political reasons. In some circumstances too, it may be desirable to understate the response against a major power by using conventional weapons. But in a war against a nuclear power or in a war against an enemy whose resources of manpower would enable him to keep increasing his commitment by small increments, a limited nuclear war affords the best strategy for fighting a limited war effectively and for keeping it limited. The advantage of lower-yield nuclear weapons is that they shift the contest to a plane where our technological superiority over the Soviet bloc is at a premium. When the destructiveness of individuals weapons is small, the significant attrition of war is in manpower and conversely an increment of manpower introduced into a war may overturn the strategic balance. If the destructiveness of weapons is too large, a relatively few weapons will suffice to establish an equilibrium. But in an intermediary range of destructiveness, weapons are sufficiently complex to require highly trained manpower yet discriminating enough to permit the establishment of

trained manpower yet discriminating enough to permit the employment of
range of destructions, weapons are sufficiently complex to require highly
weapons will suffice to establish an equilibrium. But in an intermediary
balance. It the destructions of weapons is too large, a relatively few
an increment of manpower introduced into a war may offset the strategic
overturn

weapons is small, the significant attrition of war is in manpower and consequently
over the Soviet bloc is at a premium. When the destructions of individuals
is that they shift the context to a plane where our technological superiority
and for keeping it limited. The advantage of lower-yield nuclear weapons
nuclear war allows the best strategy for fighting a limited war effectively
enables him to keep increasing the commitment by amending increments, a limited
a nuclear power or in a war against an enemy whose reasons of manpower would
against a major power by using conventional weapons. But in a war against
some circumstances too, it may be desirable to understate the response
unnecessarily or worse, either for belated psychological or political reasons. In
in a civil war, in a minor police action, the use of nuclear weapons may be
capabilities. In a limited war against a non-nuclear underdeveloped country,
and nuclear war, put by creating a smooth curve of non-nuclear and nuclear
flexibility is increased not by attempting to establish a line between conventional

523

294

a significant margin of superiority. Thus while the growth of the Soviet strategic air force and nuclear should cause us to revise our concepts of all-out war, the introduction of nuclear weapons on a battlefield will shake the very basis of Soviet tactical doctrine. No longer will the Soviet bloc be able to rely on massed manpower as in World War II and in Korea. On a nuclear battlefield, dispersion is the key to survival and mobility the prerequisite of success. A great deal depends on leadership of a high order, personal initiative and mechanical aptitude, all qualities in which our military organization probably excels that of the U.S.S.R. To attempt to defend a perimeter like that of the Soviet bloc with conventional forces would impose a staggering drain on our manpower and would likely produce casualties far exceeding those of a short sharp nuclear war. Moreover, in a limited war the ability to establish an equilibrium rapidly is itself a factor of limitation. Small, highly mobile units of very great firepower which impose a large measure of dispersal on the enemy offer a better means of achieving this than the much more cumbersome conventional forces.

It may be true, as is frequently argued, that a nuclear war also requires substantial manpower and that its not effect may well involve an expansion of our military establishment. The significant point, however, is not the

of our military establishment. The significant point, however, is not the
apparent manpower and that its not enough may well involve an expansion
effect

It may be true, as it frequently argued, that a unclear war also requires
of achieving this than the much more cumbersome conventional forces,
which involve a large measure of diabolism on the enemy offer a better means
to factor of limitation. Suff, slightly mobile units of very great firepower
a limited war the ability to adapt an equilibrium rapidly in itself a
classifies far exceeding those of a sort and kind of nuclear war. Moreover, in
forces would involve a baffling drain on our manpower and would likely produce
attempt to defend a perimeter like that of the Soviet bloc with conventional
in which our military organization properly exceeds that of the U. S. A. To
of a high order, baneful initiative and mechanical aptitude, all duties
modify the prerogative of success. A great deal depends on leadership
Koreans. On a unclear battlefield, diabolation is the key to survival and
Soviet bloc peplep to rely on massed manpower as in World War II and in
will shake the very basis of Soviet tactical doctrine. No longer will the
concepts of all-out war, the introduction of unclear weapons on a battlefield
attractive air force and unclear atobattle should come to reaise our
a significant margin of superiority. Thus while the growth of the Soviet

587

A

295

quantity of manpower, but where this manpower is utilized: in a conventional war manpower is required to establish an equilibrium on the battlefield. In a nuclear war, it is needed in supporting technical units. Nuclear war would therefore enable us to utilize our large reservoir of technically trained manpower to best advantage; for despite great strides the U.S.S.R. has made in the training of scientists and technicians in recent years, there can be little doubt that on the over-all balance the Free World possesses an infinitely larger pool of technically trained manpower; and the disparity in the familiarity with technology on the part of the mass of the population which prove even more important is more pronounced still. To be sure, our technological equivalent superiority may be fleeting; with the spread of nuclear power technology many nations may come to possess plutonium and thereby the werewithal to make nuclear weapons. But it is one thing to master the manufacture of nuclear weapons; it is quite another to develop the whole range of supporting paraphenalia: the electronics for control, the light planes for maneuverability, the complex interrelationship between fire and movement. Even should a rough balance in technical manpower and competence exist in time, this would do no more than establish an equilibrium; nuclear war favors the defensive and is therefore to our net advantage since we are more likely to

296

The history of the Soviet arms deal with Egypt illustrates the difficulty of technologically backward nations in operating even complicated conventional equipment. Even should a rough balance in technical manpower and competence exist in time, this would do no more than establish an equilibrium of nuclear war favors the defensive and is therefore to our net advantage since we are more likely to resist than to initiate aggression. The possibility of a military stalemate all around the Soviet periphery would represent a net strategic advantage for us.

Nuclear war favors the defensive not only because it facilitates the establishment of an equilibrium but also because it may deprive aggression of one of its objectives: to control territory. The same esoteric quality which we have seen to characterize all-out thermo-nuclear war, will tend to distinguish limited nuclear war as well. Small, highly mobile units will be excellent tools for fighting their enemy counterparts; they are not efficient means for controlling territory or for rapid strikes to destroy important objectives.

The experience of the Hungarian revolution demonstrates the difficulty of a highly mechanized army in controlling even against a practically unarmed population. In the event the Red Army had to concentrate fifteen armored divisions to occupy a territory without modern arms. Such a concentration against an

to occupy a territory without modern arms. Such a concentration against an
inflation.

In the event the Red Army had to concentrate fifteen armored divisions
highly mechanized army at controlling even against a practically unarm ed hot-

The experience of the Hungarian revolution demonstrates the difficulty of a
means for controlling territory or for rapid strikes to destroy important objectives.
be excellent tools for lighting their enemy counterparts; they are not efficient
to distinguish limited nuclear war as well. Small, highly mobile units will
durability which we have seen to characterize all-out thermo-nuclear war, will find
aggression of one of its objectives: to control territory. The same esoteric
east expansion of an unknown equilibrium but also because it may deprive
of nuclear war favors the defensive not only because it facilitates the
strategic advantage for us.

military astute all around the Soviet border would represent a net
more likely to react them to initiate aggression. The possibility of a
war favors the defensive and is therefore to our net advantageous since we are
exist in time, this would do no more than establish an equilibrium in nuclear
enrichment. Even should a rough balance in technical manpower and competence
of technologically backward nations in operating even complicated conventional
The history of the Soviet arms deal with which illustrates the difficulty

530

296a

army equipped with nuclear weapons would be disastrous, however. Thus if nuclear units of high mobility are to control the countryside are supported by more stationary types of organizations to man hedge-hogs and to prevent a sudden coup against the cities a very difficult problem is posed for an aggressor. From the military point of view he requires highly mobile, small units. From the point of view of controlling territory against a hostile population or even one covered with fortified hedgehogs he requires massive forces. Against a determined enemy it will be very difficult to combine these two objectives; a determined defensive should be able to keep the aggressor constantly off-balance by never permitting him to consolidate any gain. And if this is coupled with rapid thrusts by small units deep into enemy territory which, in Europe at least, can be assumed to be hostile to the U.S.S.R. the Soviets might soon face a perhaps untenable situation. The purpose of mobile units in a limited nuclear war would be to disorganize the enemy's rear through the sudden destruction of key installations and the creation of centers of resistance. Our technological superiority, the superior initiative of our people, and the greater social cohesiveness of the Free World should give us a decided advantage in a limited nuclear war. This kind of a war. Limited nuclear war would therefore be conducted by small, highly mobile units; its analogy is not traditional land warfare, but naval warfare where self-contained units of high firepower gradually achieve domination by destroying their enemy counterpart in a war of maneuver without physically occupying the terrain.

In any case, the discussion about the advisability of limited nuclear war is somewhat beside the point. Our whole planning, procurement, research and development has been built around nuclear weapons to an extent that a change would put Eurasia at the mercy of the U.S.S.R.'s conventional forces, at least in an intermediary period while we readjusted our planning and procurement.

at least in an immediately period while we resubmitted our planning and procurement, change would be great at the merest of the U.S.3.R.'s a conventional force, and development has been put around unclear weapons to an extent that a war is somewhat possible the point. Our whole planning, procurement, research in any case, the discussion apart the adaptability of limited unclear of manner, without physically combating the terrain.

Belligerently scheme domination by destroying their enemy counterpart in a war
and warfare, put naval warfare where self-contained units of high tirepower
be conducted by small, highly mobile units; its analogy is not traditional
adventuress in a limited unclear war would therefore
and the greater social cohesiveness of the free world should give us a decided
fiance. Our technological superiority, the ancesor initiative of our people,
 sudden destruction of key installations and the creation of centers of real-
in a limited unclear war would be to disorganize the enemy, a rear through the
might soon face a bewilderment situation. The hunch of mobile units
in Europe at least can be assumed to be hostile to the U.S.3.R. the Soviet
conflict with rapid tunnels by small units deep into enemy territory which
balance by never permitting him to consoferate and gain. And if this is
a determined defensive should be able to keep the aggressor constantly off-
a determined enemy it will be very difficult to combine these two objectives;
or even one covered with tormented pedagogs be required massive forces. Against
from the point of view of controlling territory against a hostile population
from the military point of view he requires highly mobile, small units.

androgen comb against the cities a very difficult problem is based for an aggressor.
by more stationary types of organizations to man hedge-poles and to prevent a
unclear units of high mobility from control the countryside are unburdened
and thus equipped with unclear weapons would be disassembled, however. Thus it

30

297

And the same development is taking place among our allies. To be sure, this is an argument based on existing policy and policy can be reversed, although too drastic changes increase the psychological vulnerability. But for the reasons indicated above, it would be unwise to reverse the policy. Our task should be to break down the trauma that has surrounded the use of nuclear weapons not to contribute to distinctions which may prove illusory in wartime. If we do not succeed in making nuclear weapons conventional their psychological almost inevitable introduction in a war will produce consequences not warranted by their employment, but only by the way we have come to think about technology. For them, above all, with both sides possessing nuclear establishments, any war will be nuclear whatever the weapons system used. At a minimum forces will have to maneuver as if nuclear weapons might be used, because the side which concentrates its forces would offer a tempting target and thereby give its opponent the precise incentive he requires to use nuclear weapons. But if forces are dispersed they will not be able to hold a line with conventional weapons, because the power of conventional weapons is relatively so small that effective defense presupposes massed fire power. Finally, if an aggressor

See Chapter VII below.

298

suddenly introduced nuclear weapons against a conventional defense he could
✓ Sweep all before him before effective retaliation was possible. In short,
not using nuclear weapons in a limited war seems more risky than using them
both for fighting the war effectively and for preventing its spread. It is
✓ not for nothing that Soviet propaganda has played on two related themes: "there
is no such thing as limited nuclear war" and "ban the bomb." For both emphasize
the corollary "there is no alternative to peace," and both deprive our policy
of flexibility and sap our resistance to the preferred forms of Soviet aggression:
peripheral war, subversion and atomic blackmail. 20)

But assuming its theoretical feasibility is a limited nuclear war practical?

Will it not cause devastation which at least in the battle area would create

a degree of devastation almost as complete as of a thermo-nuclear war? Again

it is difficult to reply with certainty for many intangibles are involved.

It must be emphasized at the outset that the revolution, as every technological

revolution before it, must be accompanied by a revolution in tactics and

that it can be understood only in these terms. If nuclear weapons are added

to World War II tactics as merely another more efficient explosive the casualties

will be appaling, just as they were when medieval knights first charged

20. See below Chapter for an expansion of these ideas.

20. See below Chapter for an explanation of these ideas.

will be appealing, that as they were when medieval knights that charged
to World War II tactics as merely another more efficient explosive the armies
did that it can be underutilized only in these terms. It nuclear weapons are added
revolution before it, must be accompanied in place a revolution in tactics and
It must be emphasized at the outset that the revolution, as every technological
in technology.

it is difficult to rely with certainty for many insinuations are involved.
a degree of devastation almost as complete as of a thermo-nuclear war? Again
Will it not cause devastation which at least in the battle area would create

But assuming its theoretical feasibility is a limited nuclear war practical?
borderal war, supervision and atomic blacksmith. 20)

of flexibility and sup our resistance to the preferred forms of Soviet aggression:
the corollary "there is no alternative to peace," and both deprive our policy
is no more doing as limited nuclear war and pan the pomp." For both emphasize
not for nothing that Soviet propaganda has played on two related themes: "there
both for fighting the war effectively and for preventing its spread." It is
not using nuclear weapons in a limited war seems more risky than raising them
2 web all before him before effective retaliation were possible. In short, was
subsequently introduced nuclear weapons against a conventional defense he could

298

299

cross bows with the tactics of the feudal period. It seems that many of the predictions of exorbitant casualties are based on the assumption that a nuclear war would resemble World War II with the addition of nuclear weapons. In fact, nothing is more improbable. For nuclear war requires tactics of an entirely different order. With conventional weapons, it was necessary to mass large bodies of troops in order to achieve the required firepower. With nuclear weapons, much smaller units can achieve an incomparably greater firepower. As a result, a much greater degree of dispersion will be required to prevent one nuclear weapon from inflicting exorbitant casualties. And dispersion must be coupled with a high degree of mobility so that a target is not stationary long enough to invite attack. The army is currently thinking in terms of battalions spaced more than two miles apart so that a Hiroshima-type bomb would not be able to destroy more than one batallion at a time.

Two consequences result: the great dispersion of a nuclear battlefield makes it impossible to think any longer of a continuous front. The task of denying territory to an enemy must be accomplished by preventing him from assembling sufficient force to control it. Dispersal henceforth must be not only between units but also in depth, with small detachments capable of

not only between units but also in depth, with small detachments capable of
assessing sufficient force to control it. Diabasei! penstocks must be
demising territory to an enemy must be accomplished by preventing him from
makes it impossible to think any longer of a continuous front. The task of
Two consequences result: the great diabereu of a nuclear battlefield
the pump would not be able to draw more than one petalion at a time.
in terms of petalions spaced more than two miles apart so that a Hirohuma-
is not stationary long enough to invade attack. The army is currently thinking
diabereu must be coupled with a high degree of mobility so that a target
to prevent one nuclear weapon from inflicting exorbitant canities. And
lirepower. As at result, a much greater degree of diabereu will be required
of troo~s than e~v~red in any
unclear weapons, which amm further units can achieve an incomparable greater
mass large bodies of troops in order to achieve the required firepower. With
entirely different order. With conventional weapons, it was necessarily to
fact, nothing is more improbable. For nuclear war requires tactics of an
war would resemble World War II with the addition of nuclear weapons. In
predictions of exorbitant canities are based on the assumption that a nuclear
cross powers with the tactics of the tender period. It seems that many of the

533

300

making rapid penetrations and equally rapid departures. The second conclusion involves the consequences of mobility. Current army planning envisions helicopters capable of carrying ____ men and small field guns, the "flying platform" which enables an individual to move through the air in a rudimentary fashion for a distance of ____ miles at a speed of ____ miles. Vertical take-off aircraft will confer tactical mobility independent of the availability of airfields. Every combat team will soon be equipped with missiles of ranges between 10 to 400 miles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. And sophisticated communications systems permit coordinated action of widely dispersed units.²¹

These measures, while useful, only constitute a beginning. The ultimate aim must be to create units which carry the analogy of naval warfare even further. They should be self-contained both with respect to their supply and their maintenance. Since they will operate without a logistic system in the traditional sense and often deep inside enemy territory, they should be able to repair their own equipment and to support themselves from their own supplies. They would therefore approximate a naval vessel as a tactical formation and like a naval vessel they should be able by their very existence and mobility to deny the control of vast areas to an enemy. Since they will ²¹ Symington Hearings, p. (Lt. General Gavin).

300a

be operating in populated regions they will also have to be trained in an understanding of political relationships, hitherto thought outside military concerns. To the extent that they are able to distinguish friend from foe and to draw the consequences from it, they will complicate enemy moves and the reverse would equally be true. The experience of Hungary has shown the difficulty of sustaining warfare ¤ against determined civilian resistance.

A few U.S. units with the fire-power, mobility and discrimination described here might have made the Soviet position untenable. 22)

In this type of warfare many of the targets of traditional warfare have ceased to be strategically productive. One of the reasons for the estimates of high casualties is the belief that in a nuclear war cities would be hit with atomic weapons. But this lateral application of the tactics appropriate to conventional war does not follow. In conventional war the large number of troops, their cumbersome equipment and the complicated logistic system confined most movement to road or rail. In these circumstances, it made sense to attempt to interdict maneuver by bombing transportation centers.

But when units achieve the degree of mobility envisaged by the armies of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. the bombardment of communication centers

22. I am indebted to Dr. Edward Teller for some of these ideas.

55. I am indebted to Dr. Edward Teffer for some of these ideas.

Both the United States and the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Communication Centers, must when units achieve the degree of modify envisaged by the rules of

system confined most movement to road or rail. In these circumstances, if number of troops, their accompanying equipment and the complicated logistic appropriate to conventional war does not follow. In conventional war the large peat with atomic weapons. But this lateral application of the tactics estimates of high casualty in the belief that in a nuclear war cities would have ceased to be strategically productive. One of the reasons for the

55)

A few U.S. units with the tire-power, mobility and discrimination described in the reverse would equally be fine. The experience of Hungary has shown the and to draw the consequences from it, they will complicate enemy moves and concerns. To the extent that they are able to distinguish friend from foe understanding of political relationships, higher thought outside military

300w

301

may prove unnecessary and militarily unproductive. And on the battlefield,
dispersion and mobility should be used to set an upper limit to the size of
weapons it is profitable to employ. Military formations can thus be protected
by the uncertainty of the enemy regarding their location.

It may be objected that whatever the rate of casualties among troops
the losses suffered by the civilian population will be enormous because of
the necessity of gaining air superiority and the proximity of airfields to
centers of population in densely populated Western Europe. Neither the need
for air supremacy nor the bombing of airfields are as inevitable as *ex* classic
air strategy maintains, however. The concept of air supremacy by bombing
air fields is itself a symptom of an obsolescent strategy. It was valid only
so long as it was more economical to destroy a plane on the ground than in
the air, *ex* as long, in short, as planes had to be concentrated on a relatively
few bases for efficient operation. But the concurrent development of vertical
take-off aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles seem to make the destruction
of planes in flight at least as economical as the destruction of airfields.
Against vertical take-off aircraft there will be no runway left to crater
or concentration of planes to hit; it will be possible to achieve almost the
degree of dispersion where one weapon can destroy only one plane (which is
exactly the relation which obtains in attacking a plane in flight). And within
ten years anti-aircraft missiles can make the life of any manned plane exceedingly
difficult. In such a situation, tactical air support will have changed its
meaning: it will either be accomplished by missiles or by vertical take-off
aircraft. It will then become meaningless to speak of air supremacy in the
traditional sense. Missile launching sites can be so dispersed and they can
be made so mobile that it will be very difficult to locate them and

["be made so as to modulate that it will be very difficult to locate them and\nmake them so difficult to locate them and to be so diabolical and they can\nmake them

30la

impossible to destroy them all. This is not to say that nuclear war will not be costly, only that its cost should be weighed against the tactics appropriate to it. In any case, compared to the casualties of an all-out thermo-nuclear war those produced by a limited nuclear war would still appear mild. Limited nuclear war becomes attractive only compared to the cataclysm which a total war would produce.

One other aspect of limited nuclear war must be considered: the premium it places on surprise attack both for psychological as well as for strategic reasons. It is important psychologically because if the fighting can be transferred into the opponent's territory, his inhibitions against using nuclear weapons will be magnified by the concern for his own population.

The psychological balance in the use of nuclear weapons thus favors the aggressor--a point explicitly recognized in Soviet doctrine.²³) And the psychological importance is reinforced by considerations of strategy. In an all-out war

23. See below, chapter

53. See pelon, chapter

importance is reemphasized by considerations of strategy. In an all-out war
a point explicitly recognised in Soviet doctrine. 32)
And the bayesianical
The bayesianical balance in the use of nuclear weapons thus became the aggressor--

naming nuclear weapons will be magnified by the concern for his own victimation.
can be transferred into the opponent's territory, his inhibitions against
attractive reasons. It is important bayonologically become as the lighting
bloom in it places on surprise attack both for bayonological as well as for
One other aspect of limited nuclear war must be considered: the
catastrophe which a total war would produce.

abnormal wild. Limited nuclear war becomes attractive only compared to the
thermo-unclear war those produced by a limited nuclear war would still
appropriate to it. In any case, compared to the casualties of an all-out
not be costly, only that its cost should be weighed against the sacrifice
impossible to destroy them all. This is not to say that nuclear war will

302

a superior attack will prove strategically unproductive if it cannot reduce
the counterblow to unacceptable proportions. And as we have seen this will
become increasingly difficult to accomplish. But in limited war a sudden
thrust and a rapid consolidation may permit the aggressor to assume the
defensive to hold what he just captured. And the defensive in a limited
nuclear war has a decided advantage. The rewards for initiative are therefore
greater in limited nuclear war than even in conventional war. For this
reason, the side whose doctrine yields the first blow to its
opponent must pay particular attention that both its military capability
and its process for arriving at decisions permit it to act rapidly enough
to prevent the aggressor from consolidating his gain. It is the paradoxical
consequence of a period when technology has never been more complicated that
its effectiveness depends to such an extent on intangibles: on the subtlety
of the leadership and on its conception of alternatives.

IX

(a)a
Thus our discussion of strategy leads to these conclusions:/war between
major powers is likely to be a nuclear war. (b) Nuclear war should be fought
as something less than all-out war. Only in this manner will it be possible

as something less than all-out war. Only in this manner will it be possible
major powers is likely to be a nuclear war. (p) Nuclear war should be sought
Thus our discussion of strategy leads to these conclusions: war between
(a) a

IX

its effectiveness depends to such an extent on intangibles: on the intelligence
consequence of a period when technology has never been more complicated that
to prevent the aggressor from consolidating his gain. It is the paradoxical
and its process for arriving at decisions permit it to act rapidly enough
obponent must pay particular attention that both its military capability
reason, the side whose doctrine (kunckism) yields the most plan to its
greater in limited nuclear war than even in conventional war. For this
nuclear war has a decided advantage. The rewards for initiative are therefore
defensive to hold what he just captured. And the defensive in a limited
conflict and a rapid consolidation may permit the aggressor to assume the
become increasingly difficult to吞吞吐吐 the counterflow to unacceptable proportions. And so we have seen this will
a superior attack will prove strategically unprofitable if it cannot reduce
sublimate

305

303

to escape the dilemma of the nuclear age defined above as the choice between
Armageddon and defeat without war. The flexibility of our diplomacy depends\onal the adaptability of our strategy and the adaptability of our strategy
depends on our ability to alter doctrines developed in a more secure past.

The identification of deterrence with maximum retaliatory power, which has
been the basis of our entire post-war military thought, no longer holds:

Because it is not credible in most of the disputes actually at issue and because
it poses exorbitant risks should deterrence fail. A policy of deterrence
one should shrink from implementing as a strategy for fighting a war is a
contradiction in terms.

As a result, the challenge to strategy has become much more subtle and
complicated. At every point of tension and in every military contingency,
strategy must seek to harmonize political, psychological and military considerations
to relate military capability to psychological readiness. It cannot strive
to combine the best of all possible worlds to pose a maximum threat in its
policy of deterrence and yet conduct a policy of minimum risk. The main
*decide the* problem is what-price one is willing to pay for deterrence, but then to make
certain that this price will be paid if the need arises. Nor are the vistas
which are opened by this discussion of this chapter simple or easy to contemplate.

which are opened by the discussion of this chapter simple or easy to contemplate.

certain that this price will be paid if the need arise. Nor are the vias
which is proposed to be paid to buy for deference, put then to make
decide it.

belligerent of deference and yet conduct a belligerent of minimum risk. The main thing is that the price is willing to pay for deference, but then to make

a strategy that seek to harmonize political, psychological and military considerations
complicated. At every point of tension and in every military contingency.

As a result, the challenge to strategy has become much more ample and
constraining in form.

One should start from implementing as a strategy for fighting a war a
war should beprint from implementing as a strategy for fighting a war to a
war be has exorbitant risks should deference fall. A policy of deference
because it is not credible in most of the disputes actually at issue and because
been the basis of our entire post-war military thought no longer holds.

The identification of deference with maximum retentivity power which has
debates on our ability to alter doctrines developed in a more secure bar.

on the adaptability of our strategy and the adaptability of our strategy

Armageddon and defeat without war. The flexibility of our diplomacy depends
to escape the dilemma of the nuclear age defined above as the choice between

304

They are however, ~~But this is~~ the penalty for living in a nuclear period, a penalty we
consciously accept when we permitted our atomic monopoly to be broken in the
absence of international control. The strategy described in this chapter
not against the background of nostalgia for a more secure past, but
must be considered against the perils of all-out thermo-nuclear catastrophe.

It is designed to give us a gamut of options so that the alternative to
so that peace need not always be to stake the national substance, and the dilemma
of initiating all-out war—the most difficult decision of our period—can
be passed to our opponent. A strategy of limited war thus is an application
of the five principles discussed at the beginning of the chapter. It takes
of the preferred mode of action of the Soviet bloc with its
preference for indirect methods of penetration and solutions short of all-
out war. It affords the possibility of channeling these efforts by creating
a smooth curve of capabilities from conventional to nuclear war and it supplies
the flexibility to confront the enemy with unforeseen contingencies. It uses
America's assets, the industrial potential and reservoir of technology to
best advantage and it achieves its ends at much less cost than all-out war.
To be sure, it offers no final solutions and stalemates are more likely than
complete victories. But in many areas, now overshadowed by the Soviet threat,
the possibility of a stalemate represents a strategic advance.

the possessibility of a asset represents a strategic advance.

complete victories. But in many areas now overrun by the Soviet Axis

To be sure, it offers no final solutions and assetes are more likely than

past advantage and it achieves its ends at much less cost than all-out war.

a smooth curve of capabilities from conventional to nuclear war and it abides

out war. It allows the possessibility of channeling these efforts by creating

preference for indirect methods of penetration and solutions apart of all-

fakes a account of the preferred mode of action of the Soviet force with its

of the five principles discussed at the beginning of the chapter. It shows

pe based on to our opponent. A strategy of limited war thus is an application

be made not always be to take the national interest, and the differences

If it is designed to give us a gain of options so that the alternative to

must be considered against the benefit of all-out thermo-nuclear cataclysmes.

not against the background of reality for a more recent best put

presence of international control. The strategy described in this chapter

conventionally accepted when we permitted our atomic monopoly to be proven in the

But this is the benefit for living in a nuclear period, a benefit we

they are

307

307

305

It may be argued that a strategy which is based on the mutual fear of
thermo-nuclear devastation is inherently unstable. In the past new discoveries
often have been greeted with prophesies of impending doom or assertions that
they had made war impossible and in every case they were used to the limit
of their effectiveness. Why should this be different now? It cannot be denied,
of course, that many new discoveries have been taken to augur the end of war
and concluded by adding to the horror of war. Yet it is equally true
that no new discovery has ever added the increment of destructive power to
armaments that is represented by nuclear weapons, or ever came into existence
so suddenly. Gunpowder, for example, was introduced gradually over a period
of centuries. In _______ --over a century after it became widely known--
Machiavelli could still argue against its use because it was less efficient
than the then "traditional" armaments. <sup>26)</sup> And as late as 1825, the British
War Office could still seriously discuss a proposal to reintroduce the cross-
bow to replace the musket. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, have brought
with them an increase in the scale of destructiveness which amounts to a
qualitive change. When one side in a war used shrapnel or dum-dum bullets
<sup>26.</sup> Machiavelli. *Principles of War*. p.

were used

^ despite international prohibitions against their use, this demonstrated that international treaties will not restrain antagonists engaged on a mortal struggle unless they are reinforced by common interest. (In this respect, they are not different, of course, from other treaties between sovereign partners). These weapons were used because one side or the other promised itself a net advantage from their employment. The essence of the nuclear stalemate for all-out war, on the other hand, is that neither side can gain from its employment--it can only keep the other side from winning. To be sure, should one side ever achieve a net strategic advantage in the all-out war equation, the balance of interests would no longer hold, and all efforts must be made to prevent this contingency. The purpose of a policy of limited war is not to provide a substitute for all-out war, but to create a range of options where the response can be brought into balance with the provocation and where capability and the will to use it will therefore be in greater harmony, than in the stark case of all-out war.

Another argument against limited war is based on its effect on the economy. It is asserted that every limited war must be accompanied by preparations for all-out war and that a constant cycle of mobilization would

307

strain our economy to the limit⁹ Apart from the fact that it seems safer
to risk the effects of mobilization on the economy than the consequences of
all-out war, this argument too shows the persistence of a World War II pattern
of thinking. It is fallacious both with respect to a strategy for all-out
war as well as with respect to the psychological framework for limited war.

The all-out war capability cannot be created by mobilizing during the course
of a limited war--this has been the pattern of our history and it ended
possibility
with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and development of a Soviet
Long-Range Air Force. If our all-out capability is not in-being at all times,
will not be able to
we not only cannot fight a limited war, we will also risk being subjected to
an all-out surprise attack. Moreover, substantial mobilization during a
limited war could be interpreted by the opponent as the prelude to a maximum
show-down and may therefore induce him to anticipate it by unleashing all-out
war himself. Thus limited war, just as all-out war, will have to be fought
largely by the forces-in-being. This underlines the necessity of a military
establishment capable of fighting a gamut of actions rapidly and to do so
without substantial mobilization.

← While it is difficult to define force levels in the abstract, these

without substantial modification, capable of lighting a sum of actions rapidly and to do so largely by the forces-in-being. This underlies the necessity of a military war itself. This limited war, just as all-out war, will have to be sought down and may therefore induce him to anticipate it by releasing all-out limited war could be interpreted by the opponent as the prelude to a firm an all-out surprise attack. Moreover, substantial modification during a we not only cannot light a limited war, we will also risk being subjected to will not be able to long-range Air Force. If our all-out capability is not in-being at all times, with the growth of the Soviet unclear stockpile and development of a Soviet of a limited war--this has been the pattern of our history and it ended

The all-out war capability cannot be created by modifying during the course of war as well as with respect to the behavioral framework for limited war. of thinking. It is fallacious both with respect to a strategy for all-out all-out war, this argument too shows the heresy of a World War II pattern to risk the effects of modification on the economy than the consequences of

again our economy to the limit. Apart from the fact that it seems rather

**Bibliography:**

The all-out war capability cannot be created by modifying during the course of war as well as with respect to the behavioral framework for limited war. It is fallacious both with respect to a strategy for all-out all-out war, this argument too shows the heresy of a World War II pattern to risk the effects of modification on the economy than the consequences of again our economy to the limit. Apart from the fact that it seems ater

303

308

On considerations would seem to cast some doubt in the efficacy of a large reserve program, particularly for nuclear war which requires a degree of training and discipline unattainable by part-time training. As a result the major use of reserves may be to replace regular units in home defense and for disaster relief in case of all-out war.

Withal a strategy for limited wars will not eliminate the precariousness of our situation. The best strategy in this period can confer only a relative security and seek to prevent deferral of the worst ravages of all-out war as a last resort. Moreover, as nuclear technology becomes diffused, other and perhaps less responsible powers will enter the nuclear equation. The fear of mutual destruction which is the chief deterrent to all-out war for the major powers may be less effective with nations which have less to lose; indeed, whose negotiating position tends to be improved by their threat to commit suicide. Even in the relations among the major powers the strategy outlined in this chapter will not be easy to implement. It presupposes a diplomacy which can make its options clear to the other side and which can

keep every war from being considered as a prelude to a final showdown. Above all it requires strong nerves. For we can make the graduated employment of

If it requires strong nerves. For we can make the graduated employment of
keep enemy-war from being considered as a blemage to a final showdown. Above
CONFIDENTIAL

diplomacy which can make its options clear to the other side and which can
outlined in this chapter will not be easy to implement. If breaches a
commit suicide. Even in the relations among the major powers the strategy
indeed, whose negotiating position tends to be improved by their threat to
major power may be less effective with nations which have less to lose!
of mutual destruction which is the chief determinant to all-out war for the
beside less reasonable powers will enter the nuclear equation. The fear
fear resort. Moreover, as nuclear technology becomes diluted other and
security and seek to maximize detection of all-out war as a
will always seem in the background
of our situation. The best strategy in this period can confer only a relative
Withal a strategy for limited war will not eliminate the precarionness
for disaster relief in case of all-out war.

major use of reserves may be to replace regular units in home defence and
training and discipline satisfactory by part-time training. As a result the
reserve program, partially for nuclear war which requires a degree of
considerations would seem to cast some doubt in the efficacy of a large

O.V.

308

309

force stick only if we leave no doubt about our readiness to confront a final
show-down; its effectiveness will depend on our willingness to face up to
the risks of Armageddon.

The American strategic problem can therefore be summed up in these
propositions:

1. Thermo-nuclear war must be avoided, except as a last resort.

2. No power possessing thermo-nuclear weapons is likely to accept unconditional surrender without employing them and no nation is likely to risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the extent that it believes its survival to be at stake.

3. It is the task of our diplomacy, therefore, to make clear that we do not aim for unconditional surrender, to create a framework in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. But equally we should leave no doubt about our determination to achieve intermediary objectives and to resist by force any Soviet military move.

4. Since diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile, it must be the task of our military policy to develop a doctrine and a capability for the graduated employment of force.

4. Since diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of
and to resist by force any Soviet military move.

we should leave no doubt about our determination to achieve intermediately objectives
the direction of national survival is not involved in every issue. But equally
we do not aim for unconditional surrender, to create a framework in which

3. It is the task of our diplomacy, therefore, to make clear that
survival to be at stake.

risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the extent that it belies its
unconditional surrender without employing them and no nation is likely to

5. No power belligerent thermo-nuclear weapons is likely to accept

propositions:

The American strategic problem can therefore be summed up in these
the risks of Armageddon.

show-down: its effectiveness will depend on our willingness to face up to
force at risk only if we leave no doubt about our readiness to confront a final

306

310

The problem of limited war is therefore not simply a question of military capability or even of strategic doctrine. Before we turn to the consideration of the diplomacy to give it effect it is important to take account of the fact that national policy does not take place in a vacuum. It is important to consider the reactions of our allies, the uncommitted and of the Soviet bloc to the challenge of the nuclear age.

and of the Soviet Union to the challenge of the nuclear age.

It is important to consider the reactions of our allies, the uncommitted account of the fact that national policy does not take place in a vacuum...

consideration of the diplomacy to give it effect if it is important to take military and capability or even of a strategic doctrine. Before we turn to the problem of limited war is therefore not simply a question of

310

II

It is in NATO that the confusion of military doctrine is most pro-
nounced. Torn between the desire to pose a maximum threat and their quest
for a strategy of minimum destructiveness, between a wish for absolute
security and an attempt to escape the economic burdens of armament, NATO
has emerged as a patchwork of military doctrines and capabilities. Unsure
about the implications of nuclear war, uncomfortable with a World War II
type strategy, NATO has attempted to combine elements of both and therefore
stands in danger of suffering the worst of both worlds. In every crisis it
has been inhibited by the inconsistencies of its strategic
it poses. What is the purpose of atomic cannons, as long as the majority of
the allies believe that the explosion of any nuclear device anywhere will be
tantamount to the outbreak of all-out thermo-nuclear war? What is the point
of conventional forces after the NATO Council decision of 8 December 1954
that any defense of Western Europe would involve the use of nuclear weapons?
Is the employment of nuclear weapons intended to be limited or all-out and
if the latter what additional sanctions to the threat of thermo-nuclear des-
truction are posed by a nuclear defense on the ground? Answers to these ques-
tions are inhibited with our Continental allies by a lack of knowledge about

the implications of the nuclear technology and in Great Britain by the same
ambivalence towards power, deterrence and the conduct of war which also char-
acterizes U.S. doctrine.

In no other country have the dilemmas of the nuclear period become
more apparent than in Great Britain. For here, contrary to the United States,
increasing vulnerability was not coupled with a corresponding gain in ab-
solute strength. By its own efforts Britain could never hope for an equi-
valence in destructiveness against a major enemy and particularly against
the U.S.S.R. Yet in no country had the "pure" doctrine of air-warfare taken
deeper hold. The notions that the airpower was best employed in the offensive,
that wars were won by destroying the enemy industrial plant and undermining
civilian morale have been cardinal tenets of British strategic thought. It
may be going too far to assert that the doctrine of massive retaliation was
originated in Great Britain and sold to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff by Sir John
Slessor, then Marshall of the Royal Airforce. The two points of view were
nevertheless almost identical. Both placed chief reliance on the deterrent
effect of strategic air forces; both sought to inhibit aggression at its
source by bombing production facilities. "The kernel of airpower is the

13) See article in the *London Observer*, March 21, 1954.

11

bomber..." wrote Sir John Slessor. "Britain and the United States must main-
tain as a first charge on our military resources that force which is the
Great Deterrent, the real preventive of war, the only force, which if the
deterrent should fail can bring instantaneously overwhelming power to bear on
aggression at its source."

As a result, in Britain even more explicitly than in the United States
a distinction grew up in military doctrine between deterrent forces and other
military forces. "In a situation," said the British statement of defense for
1955, "in which the Communist world maintains...increasingly powerful armed
forces, the strength of our armed forces must also be developed and sustained
against the possibility of major war. To this end increasing emphasis must
be placed on the deterrent." "The increasing power of the deterrent," said
the British statement on defense for 1956, "that is the nuclear weapon and
the means of delivering it have made global war more frightening and less
likely. Our first and chief objective must be to prevent war by maintenance
of the Allied deterrent to which we have begun to make our own substantial
contribution." The identification of deterrent forces with nuclear striking
power underlined the basic problem of British Defense Policy. For if deter-
rence was achieved by retaliatory power, what was the point of maintaining the

Slessor, *Strategy for the West*, p. 77.

British Statement on Defense, 1955, p. 6.

British Statement on Defense, 1956, p. 4.

British Army on the Rhine in Western Germany, numbering four divisions? Again, what was the purpose of a British strategic striking force which could never be decisive by itself?

Nuclear weapons had in fact revolutionized Britain's strategic position even more than that of the United States. For in a thermo-nuclear war the size of the United States and our geographic location offer at least a measure of protection against a Soviet attack. While they cannot confer immunity, they complicate the possibility of a surprise attack and therefore give the United States the opportunity to deprive the U.S.S.R. of the fruits of a sudden onslaught. As has been described in a previous chapter, the calculus of all-out war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. offers no calculable margin of advantage to either side particularly if we concede the first blow. But while our early warning system, the geographic necessity that a Soviet attack must come across the Polar icecap and the dispersal of our airbases, *should* always enable us/to launch part of our retaliatory force, Great Britain is in no such fortunate position. In a crowded island dispersal of bases is very difficult and in any case a very few bombs -- no more than twenty of megaton size--could destroy half the population of Great Britain. Moreover, even under the best circumstances -- if all British planes were launched before Soviet bombs fell -- the British bombing force is not sufficiently powerful to inflict a mortal

Henry: I feel the same objection on this page that I felt in parts of Chapters II and III. It's really a matter of emphasis. The answer to your question seems to me obvious, but altogether what you imply. In the state of near-panic that swept over the Western world in the late '40s and early '50s, we were almost totally pre-occupied from detering the Soviet Union from launching a massive ground assault. Since we dispirited of stopping such an assault on the ground once it had started, we sought to take advantage of our nuclear weapons by developing an air capability and offering it as a counter-threat. When Russia developed nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, the West's air might seemed even more important as a deterrent. This is prime stuff with which I presume you would agree, for the reason herein reasoning behind it was valid as far as it went. What I think you need to emphasize constantly is that this was in essence a Maginot Line doctrine in that it was purely defensive and left the West with no capability for enforcing its will on the Soviet Union, for the very reasons you give. It was an offensive strategy only in the sense that"offense is the best defense", but it was recognized that Britain, for instance, could never take the initiative in using it. The British mistake, it seems to me, was not so much in developing this air-atomic capability as in assuming that with no other such capability they could continue to play the role of a great power.

blow on the U.S.S.R., while Great Britain itself would probably be elim-
inated as a major power and maybe even as a political entity in a thermo-
nuclear war. As a result, Great Britain cannot fight an all-out war with
the U.S.S.R. without U.S. assistance. But if the United States participates
in the war, the British strategic striking force, while useful, will not add
a decisive increment to our strength. The British contribution to the al-
liance would be in the category where the United States is already strongest.
Moreover, given the vulnerability of Great Britain, it would seem that all-
out war should be the last strategy invoked by it and then only if all else
failed. Why then the emphasis on strategic striking power? Why the reliance
on a threat which if implemented must lead to the collapse of Great Britain as
a world power# and perhaps even as a physical entity?

Part of the answer is of course that in Britain no less than in the
United States the air-doctrine of reliance on heavy bombers triumphed after
twenty years of bitter struggle at the precise moment when it was becoming
obsolescent. And just as in the United States, it has proved difficult to
assimilate two technological revolutions within a decade. The first of which
moreover, the discovery of the atom bomb, seemed through the monopoly posi-
tion of the United States to confirm the lessons of World War II, and therefore

inhibited coming to grips with the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons which called for a different strategic doctrine entirely. For although Britain had been saved in 1940 more by its fighter than its bomber command, it had served through the rest of the war as a stationary aircraft carrier off the continent. Even more than the U.S. Airforce, the RAF grew dedicated to the concept of area bombing. Since its raids were always conducted at night, no attempt at precision was made; an area was marked out by flares dropped from pathfinder planes and bombs were deposited indiscriminately within it. In adopting this strategy, Britain was impelled not only by the Douhet theory of air-warfare but also by a desire to "get even" for the Blitz of 1940 and by a tradition of warfare which had always relied on the attrition of the enemy economy. Thus Britain employed its airforce in the same manner it had formerly used its sea-power: to exhaust the enemy's economy before coming to grips with him on the battlefield. This strategy was possible because after 1941 Britain did not have to fear similar German retaliation and because the (retaliatory) destructive power of weapons was relatively so small that even a massive raid on Great Britain could not do decisive damage either to the economy or to the social structure.

When the United States emerged from World War II with an atomic monopoly, the British predilection for an all-out strategy seemed confirmed. Nothing

seemed to stand in the way of the Soviet armies poised threateningly on
the Elbe save the American atomic monopoly. "If it were not for the stocks
of A-bombs," said Sir Winston Churchill, "now in the trusteeship of the
United States there would be no means of stopping the subjugation of Western
Europe by Communist machinations backed by Russian armies and enforced by
political police. Of one thing I am quite sure that if the United States
were to consent in reliance upon any paper agreement to destroy the stocks
of A-bombs which they have accumulated, they would be guilty of murdering
human freedom and committing suicide themselves." And he went on to say
that the Free World should use its temporary advantage to obtain a settle-
ment of disputed issues before the U.S.S.R. developed an atomic stockpile.

Thus both the experience of World War II and the U.S. atomic monopoly
contributed to the British identification of deterrence with nuclear stra-
tegic striking power. And it was this factor, too, which induced Great Brit-
tain to enter the atomic race. But whatever the validity of the proposition
that only the stockpile of atomic weapons stood between the Red Army and the
Channel ports, during the period of the U.S. atomic monopoly, a new dimension
was added with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile. It is a measure
of the persistence of doctrines after they have been superseded by new

⑈) Llandudno speech, October 9, 1948.

15

developments, that even so great a figure as Sir Winston Churchill could see
in the growing Soviet strategic airforce soon to be equipped with thermo-
nuclear weapons only a confirmation of familiar doctrine. In his great speech
to the House of Commons on March 1, 1955, he laid down the principles which
have animated British defense planning in the period since. It amounted to
*reformulation* of the doctrine of deterrence through nuclear striking power,
a restatement that the new weapons, by posing an even more fearful threat,
made Soviet aggression even less likely: "Unless a trustworthy and universal
agreement upon disarmament, conventional and nuclear alike, can be reached...
there is only one sane policy for the free world in the next few years. That
is what we call defense through deterrents. This we have already adopted and
proclaimed...To make our contribution to the deterrent we must ourselves pos-
sess the most up-to-date nuclear weapons, and the means of delivering them..."
Sir Winston was reinforced in his belief by his confidence in U.S. nuclear
superiority and he called for an effort to "stimulate the nuclear superiority
of the Western Powers in every possible way."

The strategic transformation brought about by the development of thermo-
nuclear weapons unfortunately has made it impossible to transform into strategic
advantage superiority beyond a certain point. But Sir Winston drew comfort

even from this realization: "The broad effect of the latest developments
is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of
mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Russia
by putting her enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality or
near equality of vulnerability with our small densely-populated island and
with Western Europe. I cannot regard this development as adding to our dan-
gers. We have reached the maximum already. On the contrary, to this form
of attack continents are as vulnerable as cities...The deterrent will con-
stantly grow in value."

The doctrine that deterrence resided in the capacity for mutual anni-
hilation, the British version of "massive retaliation" has been the core of
British Defense Planning since 1954. It has been the theme of every Defense
White Paper and it has not been shaken by the growing Soviet nuclear threat.
"It is sometimes argued, " said the Statement of Defense for 1956, "that
with the build-up of a stock of thermo-nuclear weapons by the Russians the
deterrent value to the Western Powers of building up a stock of bombs and
means of delivery will diminish. This is not so. The objective of the
Western powers is defensive. They will never be the aggressors, but they
must have...the power of instant and overwhelming retaliation if attacked.

16) Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1956.

171

range of Soviet detection. Finally while the Soviet Airforce can
reach its targets in the U.S. only across some 1,500 miles of hostile
Canadian territory, many of the targets of our Strategic Airforce in
the U.S.S.R. are much closer to the Soviet early warning line. While
we can expect a warning time of about 2 hours, the minimum considered
necessary for passive defense measures, but the Soviets will have no
such assurance. To be sure, if the Soviets launch a surprise attack,
their defensive system can be expected to be alerted for our counterblow.
Nevertheless, the need to disperse their defenses due to our superior
base system and the geographic advantages makes it highly unlikely that
the U.S.S.R. will be able to reduce our retaliatory blow to acceptable
levels
limits.

In fact, in assessing the relative capabilities of both sides
for winning an all-out war, it seems that for a limited period of time
until Soviet Long-Range Airforce grows stronger and the development of
Intercontinental Soviet Ballistic Missiles, we could probably impose our will on the
U.S.S.R. through a surprise attack. If we launched a surprise attack,
the Soviet Long-Range Airforce might be seriously crippled and the
short warning time would cause an attack on industrial installations

short warning time would cause an strike on industrial installations
the Soviet Long-Range Airforce might be seriously crippled and the
U.S.A.R. through a surprise attack. If we launched a surprise attack,
Soviet Ballistic Missiles, we could properly impose our will on the
interior

until Soviet Long-Range Airforce grows stronger and the development of
until

for winning an all-out war, it seems that a limited period of time
In fact, in seeing the relative capabilities of both sides

limits
level 2

the U.S.A.R. will be able to reduce our retaliatory blow to acceptable
base system and the geographic advantages make it highly unlikely that
Nevertheless, the need to disperse their defenses due to our inferior
their defensive system can be expected to be offset for our counterblow.

such assurance. To be sure, if the Soviets launch a surprise attack,
neCESSARY for baseive defense measures, but the Soviets will have no
we can expect a warning time of about 2 hours, the minimum considered
the U.S.A.R. are much closer to the Soviet early warning line. While
Canadian territory, many of the targets of our Strategic Airforce in
reach its targets in the U.S. only across some 1,500 miles of hostile
range of Soviet detection. Finally while the Soviet Airforce can

117

172

to have maximum effectiveness. Even then the U.S.S.R. could probably
inflict serious but perhaps not crippling losses on us. This is not an
argument for preventive war; it is inconceivable that an American President
would order a surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. It is simply to indicate the
real nature of strategic relationships. In the short term then the stalemate
is a balance between our unwillingness to use all-out war to achieve our
goals and the Soviet inability to do so. With the growth of the Soviet
Long-Range Air Force and thermo-nuclear stockpile, the stalemate will be
between the ability of each side to inflict catastrophic blows on the other,
but only at the risk of its national substance.

IV

Will new technological developments be able to this relationship?

There has been a great deal of discussion of the danger of a technological breakthrough by either side, and given the rate of technological change, it is a real problem. It is important to be clear, however, between a technological advance and a technological breakthrough. A technological advance adds to an existing capability or it enables one to carry out more efficiently a mission one is already capable of performing. It is therefore helpful but not decisive. A technological breakthrough is either the development of a

not decisive. A technological breakthrough is either the development of a
a mission one is already capable of performing. It is therefore perhaps put
adds to an existing capability or it enables one to carry out more efficiently
logical advance and a technological breakthrough. A technological advance
it is a real problem. It is important to be clear, however, between a technolo-
breakthrough by either side, and given the rate of technological change,
there has been a great deal of discussion of the danger of a technological

IV

but only at the risk of its national status.
between the ability of each side to inflict catastrophic blows on the other,
long-range Air Force and thermo-nuclear stockpile, the astrolabe will be
lost and the Soviet inability to do so. With the growth of the Soviet
is a balance between our unwillingness to use all-out war to achieve our
real nature of strategic relationship. In the short term then the astrolabe
would order a surprise attack on the U.3.2.R. It is simply to indicate the
argument for preventive war; it is inconceivable that an American President
inflict serious but perhaps not crippling losses on us. This is not an
in to have maximum effectiveness. Even then the U.3.2.R. could properly

T.15

173

new capability which can prove strategically significant or the improvement of an existing one to a point where it can overwhelm its enemy counterpart.

In these terms the development of a superior bomber is a reassuring testimony to the state of our aircraft design; it will not amount to a technological breakthrough if the opponent's inferior planes retain the ability to launch a devastating counterblow. An intercontinental ballistic missile will greatly augment the strategic striking power; it will not confer a decisive edge if manned bombers are already capable of destroying its likely targets. Thus the significant technological breakthroughs are likely to occur in the relation of offense to defense: either through the discovery of a defense which can contain the opposing offense or through the development of an offense which can overwhelm the opposing air defense and eliminate the retaliatory force before it has been launched.

In assessing the significance of new technological developments, moreover,

it is necessary to examine the advantage they would give to the side which discovers them first as well as the implications for strategy if both sides possess them concurrently. For paradoxically a technological breakthrough is possible even if both sides develop a new weapon concurrently. Thus the

is possible even if both sides develop a new weapon concurrently. Thus the
possess them concurrently. For barically, a technological prestrong
discover them later as well as the implications for strategy if both sides
if it is necessary to examine the advantage they would give to the side which

before it has been launched.

can overwhelm the obliterating air defense and eliminate the retaliatory force
contain the obliterating offense or through the development of an offense which
of offense to defense: either through the discovery of a defense which can
the significant technological prestrongs are likely to occur in the relation
manned ponders are already capable of destroying its likely targets. Thus
augment the strategic striking power; it will not confer a decisive edge if
a devastating counterflow. An intercontinental ballistic missile will greatly
prestrong through it the opponent, a inferior foe, retain the spiffy to launch

-- G

In these terms the development of a superior power is a reasoning testimony
of an existing one to a point where it can overwhelm its enemy counterpart.

New capability which can prove strategically significant or the improvement

113

174

almost simultaneous discovery of the thermo-nuclear bomb added more to the
Soviet strategic balance then to ours because henceforth the threat of all-
out war against Soviet peripheral aggression lost a great deal of its
credibility. 16) So, too, the development of an air defense capable of in-
flicting an attrition rate of 100 per cent would help the Soviets more
than us, because they are so much more

Similarly an atomic

developed submarine by the U.S.S.R. will pose a greater threat to an ocean-going nation
locked
like ours than to a land-locked power like the U.S.S.R. Moreover,
the fact that our strategic doctrine concedes the first blow to our
enemy places a particular burden on us in the technological race: it means
that we cannot fall behind even for an instant or in any strategically
significant category and that we cannot use any technological breakthroughs
we may achieve to obtain a strategic transformation.

16. See below Chapter VI.

If. See below Chapter Al.

enEMY bares a particular burden on us in the technological race: it means

the fact that our strategic doctrine concedes the first that flow to our

like ours than to a fand-mixxxxxxx power like the U.3.2.R. Moreover,

locked

undermine the U.3.2.R. will lose a greater threat to an ocean-going nation

demoralized

than us, because they are much more

Similarly an atomic

inflicting an attrition rate of 100 per cent would help the Soviets more

credibility.

So, too, the development of an air defense capability of in-

out war in against Soviet peripheral aggression lost a great deal of its

Soviet strategic balance then to ours because henceforth the threat of sff-

armost aimultaneous discovery of the thermo-nuclear bomb added more to the

radius of destruction. The attrition rate of the air-defense against manned planes however powered is likely to continue to rise. It is already sufficiently uneconomical, at high that strategic attack with conventional explosives would be unwarranted.

Were the ballistic defense restricted to manned planes one might even foresee a theoretical point at which the attrition rate might make even thermo-nuclear attacks marginally effective. But long before this point is reached, a new family of offensive weapons will be developed which will pose extraordinary difficult problems for the defense: the ballistic missiles of various ranges.

A ballistic missile is a weapon which after it receives its initial impetus pursues a fixed trajectory. It is therefore analogous to an artillery shell. The ballistic missiles which will be used for strategic bombing are propelled by rockets: the first such weapon was the German V-2 which could fire ______ ton explosive charge for a distance of 200 miles. The distinguishing feature of ballistic missiles is their speed and the altitude at which they fly. The highest point of the trajectory of German V-2 was ______ feet and its speed approached ______ times the speed of sound. An Intercontinental Ballistic Missile would fly at a speed 20 times that of sound, the highest point of its trajectory would be ______ and it would have a range in excess of 500 miles. It would be in transit only about 30 minutes between Soviet and U.S.

182

at best destroy the opponent's national substance but not reduce his ability
to inflict a similar retaliatory blow. All-out war could still be devastating
but it will have lost its object.

V

Whatever the calculation then, whether it is the feasibility of a
surprise attack with present weapons and delivery systems or whether it is
the impact of imminent technological trends, it is difficult to see how either
side could count on achieving its objectives throughout all-out thermo-nuclear
war. It is possible to calculate relative advantages in base structure or
delivery capabilities but they do not add up to a margin which would leave
either side sufficient resources to impose its will on the other. 17) The
essence of the nuclear stalemate then is that it enables the two super-powers
to keep themselves from losing an all-out war by forcing the opponent to pay
an exorbitant price for victory. But the same power which is capable of
avoiding defeat is incapable of imposing victory. All-out war has thus turned
into a paradoxical relationship: a contest, the only outcome of which can be
that both contenders lose. Thus the nuclear stalemate should not be confused
with nuclear parity; it is brought about precisely by the fact that after
a certain point increments in destructiveness no longer pay strategic returns.
Under almost any conceivable circumstances an upper limit of destructiveness
is reached before attrition can become effective and the forces-in-being on
both sides will be able to inflict losses out of 6666.
17.

If both sides will be able to inflict losses on the enemy, the
is reached before attrition can become effective and the forces-in-force
Under almost any conceivable circumstances an upper limit of destruction
a certain point increments in destructioniveness no former bay strategic returns.
with nuclear parity; it is brought about precisely by the fact that after
that both contenders lose. Thus the nuclear stalemate should not be confused
into a barbadosical relationship: a contest, the only outcome of which can be
avoiding defeat if an incapable of imposing victory. All-out war has thus turned
an exorbitant price for victory. But the same power which is capable of
to keep themselves from forcing an all-out war by forcing the opponent to pay
essence of the nuclear stalemate then is that it enables the twoärner-bowers
either side an sufficient reason to impose its will on the other. (12) The
(11) The
delivery capabilities put they do not add up to a margin which would leave
war. If it is possible to calculate relative advantages in base structure or
side could count on achieving its objectives throughout all-out thermo-nuclear
the impact of imminent technological trends, if it is difficult to see how either
enables attack with present weapons and delivery systems on whether it is
whatever the calculation then, whether it is the feasibility of a

A

put it will have cost its object.

to inflict a similar retaliatory blow. All-out war could still be devastating
at least destroy the opponent's national amphetamine but not reduce his agility

185

engage in all-out war is difficult for us, it is next to impossible for most of our allies. We have, for a little while at least, the protection of distance; while it cannot prevent a heavy attack it can give us a measure of warning and permits a degree of defense. Most of Europe, however, is only some forty minutes flying time from advance Soviet bases; and the greatest Soviet air strength is in light or medium jet bombers. Moreover, while the size of the U.S. makes it at best conceivable that our society could withstand a thermo-nuclear onslaught, both history and geography combine to cast doubt on Europe's ability to do so. Thermally nuclear devastation after the ravages of two世界 Wars might lead to the collapse of the social structure. And the density of population would involve fearful casualties both from heat and plus blast plus from fall-out. A Prime Minister who knows that some 10 megaton weapons properly distributed could kill or injure over half the population of his country will not resort to all-out war except as a very last resort -- and perhaps not even then.

For this reason, e.g., Nowhere is the disparity between deterrence and the strategy for carrying out the war more mainly than among our European allies. They can consider an all-out strategy only as long as they believe that war is unlikely or that it makes war unlikely; they will recoil before implementing it because they know that a thermo-nuclear war, whatever its effects on the chief protagonists, would mean

the end of Europe.

The nuclear stalemate final affects not only relations among the nuclear powers but their relations to powers which do not have a nuclear establishment.

And here too the impact of the thermo-nuclear capability is paradoxical. While the relations of the two great powers are shaped by the consciousness that their thermo-nuclear capability enables them to avoid defeat but not to achieve a meaningful victory, the role of the smaller powers is strongly exalted by the increased strength of the super-states. This is true not only because the rivalry of the two blocs gives an increased importance to the role of the uncommitted; it is equally due to the fact that vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries the thermo-nuclear capability confers no meaningful increase of strength. Because the underdeveloped areas are hopelessly inferior to the major powers even in terms of conventional weapons, they will not be impressed by the fact that modern technology can encompass their destruction even more efficiently. Thus although the margin of superiority of the industrialized over the underdeveloped nations has never been greater, it has also never been less effective. For in every crisis from Korea to Suez, the non-nuclear powers have behaved as if nuclear technology did not exist. They could do so because they knew that two considerations would inhibit

above all will the responsible political leaders be to employ force if their strategic doctrine presents them no alternatives. They may invoke our all-out capability as a deterrent, but they will shrink from it as a strategy for conducting a war should deterrence fail. The more the military emphasize the most absolute Soviet capabilities, the more the responsible officials who will have to make the decision of peace or war will be tempted to escape their dilemmas by asserting the Soviet peaceful intentions. This is well illustrated by the Symington Hearings: the military leaders, particularly from the Air Force, described Soviet power as if all options were equally open to them and as if every increment in air strength were immediately translatable into strategic advantages. But Secretary Wilson insisted that the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile and long-range air force were less significant than the transformation of Soviet society which made all-out war increasingly unlikely. Thus the concern with a war fought on the basis of "purely" military considerations has as its counterpart the emphasis on "pure" diplomacy or reliance on historical trends. As a result, the crucial problem of modern strategy was never explicitly considered: what kind of military superiority is strategically significant and what strategy can give an impetus to policy rather than paralyze it?

¹⁸¹ Symington Hearings, p. 1666, testimony of Secretary Wilson.

The dilemma pointed up by the Symington Hearings has been defined as
the alternative of Armageddon or defeat without war. The enormity of modern
weapons makes the thought of all-out war seem repugnant; but the refusal to run
any risks would amount to giving the Soviets a blank check. We can overcome
the paralysis induced by such prospects only to the extent that our strategy
can pose our policy-makers less absolute alternatives. To be sure, we require
a capability for all-out war, so that on no calculation could an aggressor
hope to profit by surprise attack. But we must also realize that such an es-
tablishment is the condition of policy and not its end. A capability for all-
out thermo-nuclear war can prevent disaster; it cannot be employed to achieve
positive ends. We thus return to the dilemma which has characterized our
whole post-war military thought: whether the nuclear age permits the establish-
ment of a relationship between force and diplomacy, whether it is possible to
conceive applications of power less catastrophic than all-out thermo-nuclear war.

A very good chapter, excellent conclusion.