Draft VIII

2/1/76

# THE PERMANENT CHALLENGE OF PEACE
## UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

America enters its third century and its 48th Presidential election with unmatched physical strength, a sound foreign policy design, yet scarred by self-doubt. In the past decade and a half we have seen one President assassinated, another driven from office and a third resign. We have lived through the agony of Vietnam and Watergate. We are still struggling to overcome the bitterness and division that have followed in their wake. We face no more urgent task than to restore our national unity and our national resolve.

For we, the strongest free nation cannot afford the luxury of withdrawing into ourselves to heal our wounds. Too much depends upon us -- peace or war, prosperity or depression, freedom or

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tyranny. Too much is at stake for America to paralyze itself tearing
up the past, seeking sensational headlines in the present, or offering
panaceas for the future. For our own well being -- American lives
and American jobs -- will be affected if we permit our domestic
disunity and turmoil to cause us to falter in our meeting our inter-
national responsibilities.

And so, it is imperative that the national debate in this election
year -- the greatest demonstration of how free people govern
themselves -- strengthen, not undermine, our confidence and our
capacity to carry out an effective national policy. It is essential
that we quickly rebuild our national unity, the sense that we are all
part of a shared enterprise.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to discuss America's
relations with the world's other superpower -- the Soviet Union.
In recent months that relationship has become -- as it should be --
an important part of our national debate. I want to explain the

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Administration's view of the conditions that gave rise to the policy known as "detente, " the goals we seek, and the relationship of our Soviet policy to the over-all design of American diplomacy.

The United States is today confronted by one challenge unprecedented in its own history, and another challenge without precedent in the history of the world. America finds itself for the first time, permanently and irrevocably involved in international affairs. At the same time, the unprecedented danger of nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity that transcends traditional concepts of diplomacy and balance of power, to shape a world order that finds stability in justice, self-restraint and, ultimately, cooperation.

For the first century and a half of our history our peace and security were provided for us by two oceans, the shield

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of the British Navy, and equilibrium among the European powers. The success of our democracy at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it was up to America to choose whether and when we would participate in the world.

Since de Tocqueville it has been a cliche that Americans, as a people, are slow to arouse, but that once aroused we are a tremendous and implacable force. Thus, even when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, we identified our exertion as a temporary disruption of our tranquility. Our history, except for the Civil War, was without the tragedies and the sense of practical external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other people.

Our triumphs seemed to teach us that any problem could

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be solved -- once and for all -- by determined effort. We
considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign
involvement appropriate only long enough to remove some
temporary threat or disorder. We entered World War I as
"the war to end wars," and to "make the world safe for democracy."
We fought World War II until "unconditional surrender."

Even in the first twenty-five years after World War II
-- an era of great creativity and unprecedented American
engagement in foreign affairs -- we acted as if the world's
security and economic development problems could be
conclusively resolved by the commitment of American
resources, know-how and effort. We were encouraged --
even impelled -- to act as we did by our unprecedented

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predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse
of the great colonial empires. We considered our
deployment of troops in Europe and elsewhere to be temporary.
We thought that the policy of containment would transform the
Soviet Union, and that a changed Soviet society would then
evolve inexorably into a compatible member of a harmonious
international community.

At the same time, the central character of moral values
in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the
purity of means -- and when we disposed of overwhelming power
we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made
compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it unnecessary.

Today, while we still have massive strength, we no longer
enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. We remain the world's

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most productive and innovative economy, but we must
now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and
Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing
nations, and we must make new choices regarding our
economic relations with the Communist countries. Our
democratic principles are still far more valued by the
world's millions than we realize, but we must also compete
with new ideologies which assert progressive goals but pursue
them by oppressive methods.

Today, for the first time in our history, we face
the stark reality that the challenge is unending; that
there is no easy and surely no final answer; that there
are no automatic solutions. We must learn to conduct
foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it.

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for so many centuries -- without escape and without respite,
knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful
of the necessities of self-preservation, conscious that the
reach of our national purpose has its limits. This is a new
experience for Americans; it prompts nostalgia for a simpler
past. As in the past it generates the search for scapegoats,
holding specific policies responsible for objective conditions
that no policy on our part could avoid.

It is precisely because we no longer predominate but
must pursue a long-term course that there is a premium on
our constancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford to swing
recklessly between confrontation and abdication. We must
not equate tough rhetoric with strong action; nor can we

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wish away tough realities with nostalgic hopes. We can no
longer act as if we engage ourselves in foreign affairs only
when we choose, or only to overcome specific problems, so
that we can then shift our priorities back to our natural
concern with ourselves. The reality is that there can be
no security without our vigilance and no progress with our
dedication.

It is in this context that U. S. -Soviet relations must
be seen.

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# The Contemporary Challenge of US-Soviet Relations

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a central feature of American policy for three decades. What is new today is the culmination of thirty years of post war growth of Soviet industrial, technological and military power. No American policy caused this; no American policy could have prevented it. But American policy can keep this power from being used to expand Soviet influence to our detriment; we have the capacity to enable allies' and friends to live with a sense of security; we can use our assets to advance the process of building an international order of cooperation and progress.

We must do so, however, in unprecedented conditions. In previous periods, rivalry between major powers has

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almost invariably led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable. We must manage a fundamental clash of ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nuclear superpowers, first into coexistence, and then mold coexistence into a more positive and cooperative future. For as President Kennedy once said, "in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

In the period after World War II, our nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after consolidating its occupation of Eastern Europe, might seek to spread its control to other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia. Our policies therefore sought to building alliances and positions of military strength from which we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet Union might be forced to settle for peace; transformations might occur

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within Soviet society that would curb expansionist
tendencies and make the USSR over time into a more
cooperative participant in the international system.

These policies served us and our allies well.

Soviet expansion was checked. Behind our shield of security and with our assistance, our friends and allies in Western Europe restored their economies and rebuilt their democratic institutions.

Yet the hope that these policies would produce permanent
stability, positive evolution of the Soviet system, and
greater normality, was only partially realized. In the
immediate post war period, the aggressiveness of Soviet
ideology in the Stalinist era obscured some of the real
weaknesses of the Soviet state. Indeed, as late as 1962

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during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States enjoyed
a five-to-one superiority in strategic missiles, a three-to-one
superiority in strategic bombers, total naval superiority
everywhere, and rough equality on the ground in Europe.

Gradually with the acquisition of nuclear technology and
the transformation of the international system through decolonization,
the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first-class military
power.

In strategic military terms the USSR has achieved a broad
equality with the United States, as was inevitable for a nation
whose rulers were prepared to impose great sacrifices on
their people and to give military strength the absolute top
priority in resources -- with only half of our Gross National
Product, Soviet military expenditures exceed those of the
United States.

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For the first time in history the Soviet Union can
threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian land-mass --
including the United States. With no part of the world
outside the range of its military forces, the USSR has
begun to define its interests and objectives in global terms
for the first time in Russian history. Soviet diplomacy
has thrust into the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This
evolution is now rooted in real power rather than a
rhetorical manifestation of a universalist doctrine which
in fact has very little validity or appeal.

Coping with the implications this emerging superpower has
been our central security problem for the last several years.
This condition was not caused by American policy; it could
not have been prevented by American policy, unless by

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launching a nuclear war. It will not go away, and it will perhaps never be conclusively "solved." It will have to be faced by every Administration for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the consequences. The emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing international structure is a recurrent phenomenon.

Historically, the adjustment of an existing order to the arrival of one or more new actors almost invariably

was accompanied by war -- to impede the upstart, to remove or diminish some of the previously established actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised system.

But in the nuclear era, when casualties in a general nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter of days,

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the use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It is our
responsibility to contain Soviet power without global war,
to avoid both abdication as well as confrontation.

This requires a delicate and complex policy. We
need an equilibrium of power but we must move beyond it
to develop mutual habits of restraint, coexistence and
ultimately, cooperation. We must stabilize a new international
order in a vastly dangerous environment, but our ultimate
goal must be to transform ideological conflict into
constructive participation in building a better world.

This is what is meant by the process called "detente"
-- not the hunger for relaxation of tension, not the striving
for agreements at any price, not the mindless search for
friendly atmosphere which some critics use as naive and

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dangerous caricatures.

The policies pursued by this Administration have been designed to prevent Soviet expansion, but also to build a pattern of relations in which the Soviet Union will always confront penalties for aggression, and also acquire growing incentives for restraint. These goals are attainable, for Soviet power is evolving with considerable unevenness.

Soviet society is no longer totally cut off from contact with and the influences of the world around it nor is it without its own needs for outside relationships. Its rigidity and pervasive conservatism are clearly a brake on its growth into a technologically advanced and innovative society.

It is the great industrial democracies, not the Soviet Union, that are the engine of the world economy and the most

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promising partners for the poorer nations. The industrial democracies, if they face their challenges with confidence -- if they do not mesmerize themselves with the illusion of simple solutions -- possess vast strengths to keep Soviet power from becoming dominant and influence the manner in which it is used into constructive directions.

Our essential task is to recognize the need for a two pronged policy that simultaneously and with equal vigor curbs expansionist drives while seeking to shape a more constructive relationship. We must prevent the Soviet Union from translating its growing strength into global or regional preponderance. But we must do so without escalating every crisis into a massive confrontation. The United States has resisted aggressive moves by the Soviet Union to establish

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a naval base in Cuba, to impede the access routes to Berlin,
to exploit the explosive situation in the Middle East.

Recently we have sought to halt blatant intervention in Angola --
until prevented from doing so by Congressional action.

At the same time, we have a historic obligation to
mankind to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations on concrete
problems and to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe.

At the very least we owe it to our people to demonstrate its
government has missed no opportunity to achieve constructive
solutions and that crises which occur were unavoidable. For
whatever the rhetoric the Americans will not support
confrontations they consider contrived. This is why the
United States has set forth principles of responsible
relations in the nuclear age: respect for the interests of all,

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restraint in the uses of power, and absence from efforts
to exploit instability or local conflicts for unilateral
advantage. The United States has sought to give life to
these principles in major negotiations on arms control,
the prevention of accidental war, and in the settlement of
political issues such as Berlin. And we have begun to
construct a network of cooperative agreements in a variety
of functional areas -- economic, scientific, medical,
environmental, and others -- which promise concrete
benefits if political conditions permit their full implementation
and further development. It has been our belief that with
patience, a pattern of restraints and a network of vested
interests can develop which will give coexistence a more
hopeful dimension and which would make both sides

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This policy has represented the deepest aspirations of the American people. In the early 1970's when current U. S. -Soviet relations were shaped, our nation had already passed through traumatic events and was engaged in an anguishing war. There were riots in the streets and on the campuses demanding rapid progress towards peace. Every new defense program was challenged -- including the ABM which was approved by only one vote, the development of multiple warheads, the Trident submarine, and the B-1 bomber. Successive Congresses passed resolutions urging the Administration to reorder our national priorities away from defense. We were continually attacked for not making concessions in the SALT talks. The Congress and many

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interest groups pressed continually for the opening up of
East-West trade and agitated against the Administration's
approach of linking progress in economic relations with
prior progress in political relations. Throughout the
course of 1970 and 1971, we were involved in a series of
crises with the Soviet Union and were often accused of
provocation or bellicosity in the process.

Thus only a few short years ago the pressures in this
country and from our allies were overwhelmingly to move
rapidly toward better relations with Moscow. We resisted
these pressures then, just as we now refuse to let ourselves
be stampeded in the opposite direction. In the Administration's
view the country needs a balanced policy, combining firmness

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and conciliation, strong defense and arms control, political
principles and economic incentives. And it must be a policy
for the long term, that the American people can sustain,
offering promise of a constructive future.

It is therefore, ironic that our national debate seems
now in many respects to have come full circle. The conditions
in which detente originated are largely forgotten. Those who
pressed for concessions and unilateral restraint towards Moscow
now accuse the government of being too conciliatory. Those
who complain about our failure to respond with sufficient vigor
to Soviet moves are often the very ones who incessantly seek
to remove this country's leverage for influence or action --
through restrictions on trade and credit, through weakening
our intelligence capabilities, through preventing aid to

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friends who seek to resist Soviet aggression.

The restrictions on trade and credit are a case in point.

The human rights issue is a matter of deep and legitimate concern to all Americans. But the Congressional attempt to link it openly with economic relations, without subtlety or understanding of Soviet politics both deprived us of economic levers and sharply reduced Soviet emigration. Other industrial countries have stepped in to provide credits and technology, with less concern for the objective of inducing political restraint which we had envisaged.

So let us understand the scope and limits of a realistic policy.

-- We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power,

but we can prevent its use for unilateral

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advantage and political expansion.

-- We cannot prevent a build-up of Soviet forces but we have the capacity together with our allies to maintain an equilibrium. We cannot neglect this task and then blame the Soviet Union if the military balance shifts against us.

-- We have the diplomatic, economic and military capacity to resist expansionism, but we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confrontation while depriving ourselves of the means to confront.

-- We must accept that sovereign states, especially of roughly equal power, cannot

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impose unacceptable conditions on each other
and must proceed by compromise.

-- We must live with the reality of the nuclear threat but we have it in our power to build a new relationship that transcends the nuclear peril.

Ha) So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful and overwhelming while American policy is bumbling, uncertain and weak.

We have a design and the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a united people.

Against this background let me discuss two current

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Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from
all previous historical periods -- the existence of enormously
destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost
instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No
part of the globe would be spared in a general nuclear exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military
power could be translated into almost immediate political
advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic
weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or
military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side
expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably
match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived
inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable

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even though it has become difficult to define precisely what
purely military purpose is served.

We thus face a paradox: at current and foreseeable
levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous
to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic
weapons of the two sides determined the outcome. Today
these arsenals increasingly find their purpose only in
matching and deterring the forces of the opponent. For
under no foreseeable circumstance could the United States --
or the Soviet Union -- avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear
exchange. Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty of
finding a way to get off the treadmill.*

* To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side could use its strategic forces and how in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide. They are invariably based on assumptions such as that one side would permit its missile silos to be destroyed without launching its missiles before they are actually hit -- on which no aggressor would rely where forces such as those possessed by either the U.S. or the USSR now and in the years ahead are involved.

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This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility
on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the
nuclear competition requires endless invocations of theoretical
scenarios of imminent or eventual nuclear attack. The attempt
to hedge against all conceivable contingencies, no matter how
fanciful fuels political tensions and has a potential of leading
to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic
arms imbalances inherent in an unrestrained arms race
diverts resources into strategically unproductive areas --
particularly away from forces for local defense where shortfalls
and imbalances could indeed be turned rapidly to our disadvantage.
If no restraint is developed, the competition in strategic arms
can have profound consequences for the future of international
relations, and indeed of civilization.

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The United States, therefore, has sought and achieved,
since 1963, a series of arms control agreements which build
some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant
breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972. If the 1974
Vladivostok accord leads to a new agreement, an even more
important advance will have been made.

Yet, at this critical juncture, the American people
are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender
of American interests. There are assertions that the United States
is falling behind in the strategic competition and that SALT has
contributed to it. The charges are unsupportable that the
Soviets have systematically violated the SALT agreements.

None of this is accurate.

What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960's

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set the level of our strategic forces for the 1970's. We
then had the choice between two landbased weapons, a large,
heavy throwweight missile called Titan and a smaller more
flexible weapon called Minuteman or various combinations.
The Administration then in office chose to rely entirely on
an arsenal of 1000 small, sophisticated and highly accurate
ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats,
along with heavy bombers; we deployed them rapidly, and
then stopped our build-up of launchers unilaterally in the
1960's when the programs were complete. The Soviets made
the opposite decision; they chose larger, heavier missiles;
they continued to build up their forces through the 1960's and
1970's; they passed our numerical levels by 1969-1970, and
continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year until
stopped by the first SALT agreement.

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Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago
by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight
while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity
and sophistication, and we possess larger numbers of warheads.

In 1972 when the SALT agreement was signed the Soviet Union
was still building at the rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based
launchers a year while we were building none as a result of
our own repeatedly reaffirmed unilateral decisions of a decade
previously. Since new American programs to redress the
balance existed only on the drawing boards, there was no way
to reduce the numerical gap before 1977 when more modern
sea-based missiles and bombers were scheduled to become
operational.

The Interim SALT Agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers
of launchers on both sides for five years -- thereby limiting

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the momentum of Soviet programs without affecting any
American ones. It stopped the Soviet build-up of heavy
missile launchers. It forced the Soviets to dismantle 210
older land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on
missile carrying submarines. The agreed-upon silo limitations
permitted us to increase the throwweight of our own missiles,
if we decided on this avenue of improving our strategic forces.
We have so far chosen not to do so although, through R & D,
retaining the option. By any measure, the SALT agreements
prevented the then evolving gap in numbers from widening
while enabling us to retain our advantage in other categories
and easing the problem of redressing the balance when new
programs became operational. What no negotiation could
do is reverse by diplomacy the results of our own long-standing

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decisions with respect to weapons design and deployment.

Moreover, the SALT agreements ended for an indefinite
period the prospect of a dangerous and uncertain competition
in anti-ballistic missile defense -- a competition that promised
no strategic advantage, but potentially serious instabilities
and the expenditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were therefore without
question in the American national interest. In the five-year
respite gained by the 1972 Interim Agreement, it was our
intention to negotiate a long-term pact on offensive weapons
that would firmly fix both sides at an equal level once
our new programs became operational. This is precisely what

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President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2400 strategic weapons covering strategic missiles and heavy bombers -- but *not* counting any of our forward-based aircraft and missiles in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2400 is *lower* than the level the Soviet Union already has reached; it would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons while the planned levels and composition of our forces would not need to be reduced or changed. An equal ceiling of 1320 was placed on numbers of strategic weapons with multiple warheads. Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain frozen. These limits would cap the strategic competition in numbers for a 10-year period, yet preserve all the

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programs we need to assure deterrence and strategic
sufficiency.

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem.

This is not a question of loopholes but of an evolving tech-
nology with respect to which we must remain vigilant

But if we succeed in turning the Vladivostok accord into

the 10-year SALT agreement now being negotiated, we will

have crossed the threshold between total, unrestrained

competition and the difficult but promising beginning of

long-term strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces.

The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed

to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase

of the negotiations starting in 1977.

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One would have thought that these accomplishments
would speak for themselves. Instead they have triggered
a flood of charges which mislead the American people and our
friends, give a wrong impression of irresoluteness to our
adversaries and complicate the prospects for a new agree-
ment, that is in the overriding national interest.

No charge is more irresponsible and potentially more
dangerous than the allegation that the United States has
knowingly tolerated violations of the first SALT agreements.

What are the facts? A Standing Consultative Com-
mission was created by the agreements of 1972 precisely
to consider disputes or ambiguities in implementation.
Such incidents were almost certain to arise in a first, quite
limited agreement between long-standing adversaries

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possessing weapons systems of great complexity whose
growth is verified not by some neutral policing mechanism but by
each side's own intelligence systems. Every questionable
activity that has arisen has been systematically analyzed by
this Government and considered by the President and his
advisors. Whenever any question remained, it was then
promptly raised with the Soviets. All instructions to the
American representative on the Consultative Commission
reflected the unanimous views of all U. S. agencies
concerned and the data and assessment produced jointly
by them. No one had a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets --
an inherently malicious charge. No one prevented all question-
able or suspicious activities from being raised with the Soviets.
And not all the questioned activities were on the Soviet side.

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All of these issues have been and will continue to
be seriously handled and dealt with through a process that has
proved effective. Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump
together incidents that have been explained or are still being
considered with wild allegations that have no foundation. They
sometimes put forward inaccurate figures and data which
often can be refuted only by divulging sensitive intelligence
information. Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations no
recommendations are made of what countermeasures we
should take, or how to assess the significance of any given
alleged violation. Would those who inaccurately allege
violations simply throw over all the agreements, regardless
of the benefits they provide to the United States? Would they
halt the negotiation of further agreements? What purpose

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is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to
believe -- totally incorrectly -- that the United States is
blind to violations or that its government deliberately
deceives its people? Can anyone seriously believe that this
Administration which has strenuously resisted Communist
advances in every part of the world -- and is often strongly
criticized for it -- would ignore Soviet violations of a formal
agreement?

I can assure you that this Administration will not
tolerate violations. It will continue to monitor Soviet
compliance meticulously. It will pursue energetically all
signs of non-compliance. But it will not be driven by
demagogery to make false or hasty judgments. No

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violation of the agreement has been reported to the
President and the National Security Council by any
department or agency charged with responsibility for
this problem.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one question:
what is the alternative to the agreement we have and seek?
If the SALT process falters, we must consider what new or
additional strategic programs we would undertake, their
likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose. An
accelerated strategic buildup over the next five years could
cost as much as an additional 30 billion dollars. Failing a
satisfactory agreement, this will surely be the path we must
travel. It would be a tragic ally missed opportunity. For,

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in the process of such a build-up, and the atmosphere it
would engender, it would be difficult to return to serious
negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to increase;
a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future
negotiations would eventually have to begin. And in the
end, neither side will have gained a strategic advantage.
At the least they will have wasted resources. At worst,
they will have increased the risks of nuclear war.

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder these
alternatives as well. Their sense of responsibility must
equal ours if there is to be an equitable and durable agree-
ment based on strict reciprocity.

Let me sum up:

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-- We will never stand for the violation of a
solemn treaty or agreement and we will
remain alert.

-- We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic
balance against us; by violations of agreements,
by unsatisfactory agreements or by neglect of
our own programs; we will spend what is
necessary to maintain a strategic equilibrium.

-- The President is determined to pursue the effort
to negotiate a saner strategic balance -- because
it is in our interest, and because we have an
obligation to our own people and to world peace.

The Soviet Union and Angola

As the United States strives to shape a more hopeful
world, it can never forget that global stability and security

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rest upon an equilibrium between the great powers. If
the Soviet Union is permitted to exploit opportunities arising
out of local conflicts by military means, the hopes we have
for progress toward a more peaceful international order will
ultimately be undermined.

This is why the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented
intervention in the internal affairs of Africa with nearly 200
million dollars of military equipment, its advisors, and its
transport of the large expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban
combat troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have
moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their
choice. It is the first time that the U. S. has failed to respond
to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit.

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And it is the first time that Congress has halted national
action in the middle of a crisis.

When one great power tips the balance of forces
decisively in a local conflict through its military intervention --
and meets no resistance -- an ominous precedent is set, of
grave consequence even if the intervention occurs in a
seemingly remote area. Such a precedent cannot be tolerated
if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if the
pattern is not broken now, we will face harder choices and
higher costs in the future.

The United States seeks no unilateral goals in Angola:
We have proposed a ceasefire; withdrawal of all outside
forces -- Soviet, Cuban and South African; cessation of foreign

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military involvement; including the supply of equipment;

and negotiations among all three Angolan factions. This approach has

the support of half the nations of Africa.

Last summer and fall, to halt a dangerously escalating
situation, the United States provided financial support through
African friends to those in Angola -- the large majority -- who
sought to resist Soviet and Cuban domination. Using this as
leverage, we undertook an active diplomacy to promote an
African solution to an African problem. We acted quietly, to
avoid provoking a major crisis and raising issues of prestige.

At first, it was feared that the Soviet-backed faction
because of massive Soviet aid and Cuban mercenaries would
dominate totally by Independence Day, November 11. Our

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assistance prevented that. African determination to oppose
Soviet and Cuban intervention became more and more evident.

On December 9, the President warned Moscow of the consequences
of continued meddling and offered to cooperate in encouraging a
peaceful outcome. The Soviet Union appeared to have second
thoughts. It halted its airlift from December 9 until December 24.

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate over-
whelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. It was demanded that
we explain publicly why our effort was important -- and then
our effort was cut off. After the Senate vote to block further
aid to Angola, Cuba more than doubled its forces and Soviet
military aid was resumed on a large scale. The cooperativeness
of Soviet diplomacy declined. Since then the situation has
continued to deteriorate.

- 50 -

As our public discussion continues, certain facts must be understood. The analogy with Vietnam is totally false; this nation must have the maturity to make elementary distinctions. The President has pledged that no American troops or advisors would be sent to Angola, and we were prepared to accept legislative restrictions to that effect, in addition to the War Powers Act which already exists. What was involved was modest assistance to stabilize the local balance of forces and make possible a rapid political settlement in cooperation with African countries.

It is charged that the Administration acted covertly, without public acknowledgment. That is correct, for our purpose was to avoid an escalated confrontation that would make it more difficult for the Soviets to back down, as well as to

- 51 -

give the greatest possible scope for an African solution. Angola was a case where diplomacy without leverage was likely to be impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve needless risks. This is precisely one of those grey areas where unpublicized methods would enable us to influence events short of direct conflict.

And we complied totally with Congress' new standard of Executive-Legislative consultation on secret activities. Between July and December 1975 we discussed the Angolan situation, and what we were doing about it, with more than two dozen Senators, 150 Congressmen, and over 100 staff members of both Houses. Eight Congressional Committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of Congress, and there was little sign of active opposition to our carefully-limited operations.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be eased out by the Africans themselves over a period of time. This may

- 52 -

or may not prove true. But such an argument, when carried
to its logical conclusion, implies that we can abandon the
world to interventionist forces, and hope for the best. And
reliance on history is of little solace to those under attack,
whose future is being decided now. The degree of Soviet
and Cuban intervention is unprecedented; they will have
effectively determined the outcome. There is no evidence to
support the claim that they will be quickly removed or that
other nations may not draw damaging conclusions dangerous
to our long-term interests.

It is maintained that we should meet the Soviet threat in
Angola through escalated methods of pressure such as
altering our position on SALT, or grain sales. But these
arrangements benefit us as well as the Soviet Union. And history

- 53 -

has proved time and again that expansion can be checked
only when there is a local balance of forces, indirect means
can succeed only if rapid local victories are foreclosed.

As the President has pointed out, the Soviet Union has survived
for nearly sixty years without American grain; it could do so
now. Cutting off grain would still lose Angola. We would
duplicate the experience of the Trade Act, which cut off the
trade relationship with the USSR to ensure emigration --
and ended up with neither.

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile slogans about not
becoming the world's policeman. We have no desire to play
such a role. But it can never be in our interest to have the
Soviet Union act as the world's policeman. There are
many crises in the world where the United States cannot and

- 54 -

should not intervene. But here we face a blatant Soviet and
Cuban challenge, which could have been overcome if we
had been allowed to act prudently with limited means at the
early stage. By forcing this out onto center stage, our
divisions simultaneously escalated the significance of the
crisis and guaranteed our impotence.

To claim that Angola is not an important country, or
that the United States has no important interests there, begs
the principal question. If the United States is seen to waiver
in the face of massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, what
will be the perception of leaders around the world as they
make decisions concerning their future security? And what
conclusions will an unopposed superpower draw when the
next opportunity for intervention beckons?

- 55 -

Where are we now? This Government has a duty to make clear in the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again. Congress and the Executive must come together -- in the national interest and in the interest of world peace.

The Administration will continue to make this case however unpopular it may be temporarily. Let no nation believe that Americans will long remain indifferent to the dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast supplies of arms to impose minority governments--especially when that expeditionary force comes from a nation in the Western Hemisphere.

## National Strength and the Debate at Home

We live in a world without simple answers. We hold

- 56 -

our values too dear to relinquish defending them; we hold
human life too dear to cease the quest for a secure peace.

The first requirement of stability is to maintain our defenses
and the balance of power. But the highest aim of policy in the
nuclear age must be to create out of the sterile equilibrium
of force a more positive relationship of peace.

America has the material assets to do the job. Our
military might is unmatched. Our economic and technological
strength dwarfs any other. Our democratic heritage is envied
by hundreds of millions around the world.

Our problems therefore are of our own making -- self-
doubt, division, irresolution. We must once again become a
confident, united and determined people.

Foreign countries must be able to deal with America as

- 57 -

an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. If our
divisions paralyze our international efforts, it is America
as a whole that will suffer. We have no more urgent task than
restoring the partnership between the American people, the
Congress, and the Executive. A new partnership can enable
the President of the United States, in his constitutionally-determined
role, to address the world with the central authority of the
spokesman of a united and purposeful America.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But restraint is
the cement of national cohesion. It is time to end the
self-torment and obsession with our guilt which has threatened
to paralyze us for too many years. It is time to stop dismantling
our national institutions and undermining our national confidence.

Let us learn -- even in an election year -- the self-discipline

- 58 -

to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive
process.

One of the forgotten truths of our history is that our
Founding Fathers were men of great sophistication in foreign
affairs. They understood the balance of power; they made use
of the divisions of Europe for the advantage of our own
Revolution. They understood the need for a strong executive
to conduct the nation's diplomacy. They grasped that America
required economic, political, and moral links with other nations.
They saw that our ideals were universal and they understood
and welcomed the impact of the American experiment on the
destinies of all mankind.

In our age whose challenges are without precedent, we
need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our

- 59 -

ideals must give us strength -- rather than serve as an
excuse for abdication. Our pragmatic tradition must help
us understand reality and shape it, rather than be diverted by
an obsession with technical detail or method without purpose.

Our love of our country must inspire us to persevere with
dedication and unity and not to consume our substance in civil
strife. Our idealism should remind us that we remain the
beacon of hope for all those who love liberty and that this
imposes a heavy responsibility on us.

The American people want an effective foreign policy. They
want America to continue to help shape the international order
of the coming generation according to our ideals. We have
done great things as a united people. We have it in our
power to make our third century a time of vibrancy and hope
and greatness.

*****************

Draft VII

2/1/76

# THE PERMANENT CHALLENGE OF PEACE:
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

design, yet scared by self-doubt. In the past decade and a half

of Vietnam and the dishonor of Watergate. And now we are still struggling to overcome the bitterness and division that have

For we, the most powerful and free nation cannot afford the luxury of withdrawing into ourselves to heal our wounds.

- 2 -

Too much depends upon us -- peace or war, prosperity or depression, freedom or tyranny, -- to permit such self-indulgence. Our responsibility to ourselves and the generation of Americans who come after us demands that we move quickly to rebuild our national consensus, and purpose, while at the same time continuing to act with wisdom, strength and compassion abroad. Too much is at stake for America to paralyze itself tearing up the past, seeking sensational headlines in the present, or offering panaceas for the future. For our own well being -- American lives and American jobs -- will be affected if we permit our domestic debate to cause us to falter. Mr. Rockefeller meets our international友, but And so, it is imperative that this national debate in

- 3 -

this election year -- the greatest demonstration of how
free people govern themselves -- further and not

undermine our capacity to carry out an effective national

policy. Disagreement there must surely be, but whatever

we do, we must build, not destroy the faith and

confidence without which we can have no future.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to discuss
America's relations with the other superpower in this
small planet -- the Soviet Union. In recent months that
relationship has become -- as it should be -- an important
part of our national debate. I want, today, to explain
the Administration's view of the conditions that gave rise
to the policy known as "detente," the goals we seek, and
the relationship of our Soviet policy to the over-all design

-4-

of American diplomacy.

The United States is today confronted by one
challenge unprecedented in its own history, and another
challenge without precedent in the history of the world.
America finds itself, for the first time, permanently
and irrevocably involved in international affairs. We
~~cannot withdraw for to do so would inevitably mean the~~
eventual collapse of our security. At the same time, the
~~danger of unprecedented risks of nuclear war impose upon us the
need to transcend necessity of building a new international order beyond~~
traditional concepts of diplomacy and balance of power,
to create a world that finds stability in justice, cooperation and self-restraint. And, ultimately,和平.

- 5 -

For the first century and a half of our history our
peace and security were provided for us by two oceans,
the shield of the British Navy, and equilibrium among
the European powers. The success of our democracy
at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad,
nourished our sense of uniqueness and fostered the
*illusion* of a conviction that it was up to America to choose whether
we would *participate* in and when to be part of the world.

- 6 -

the norm of tranquility. Our history, except for the Civil War, was without the tragedies and the sense of practical external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other people.

Our triumphs seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved -- once and for all -- by determined effort. We considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign involvement ~~required only long enough to~~ appropriate
remove ~~temporary~~ some finite threat or disorder. We entered World War I as "the war to end wars," and to "make the world safe for democracy." We fought World War II until "unconditional surrender."

-7-

-- an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs -- we acted as if the world's challenges of security and development could be conclusively resolved by the commitment of American resources, know-how and effort. We were encouraged -- even impelled -- to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires. We considered our deployment of troops in Europe and elsewhere to be temporary. We thought that the policy of containment would transform the Soviet Union, and that a changed Soviet

then evolve inextrably into a compatible society would become automatically a peaceful member of member of Adamsmans (the international community.

At the same time, the centrality of moral ideals in

character values

- 8 -

Today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending; that there is no easy and surely no final answer; that there are ~~no permanent solutions.~~ *automatic* solutions. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have conducted it for so many centuries -- without escape and without respite, knowing the limits of what is attainable, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, conscious of the reach of our national purpose. This is a new experience for us, as it limits, *blat* *blat* *blat*

- 9 -

While we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy a nuclear monopoly. We remain the world's most productive and innovative economic power, but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. We must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations, and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our ideals are still far more valued by the world's millions than we realize, but we must also

- 10 -

It is precisely because we no longer predominate
that our constancy and purposefulness, are at a premium
there is a premium on
We cannot afford to swing recklessly between confrontation
and abdication. We can no longer act as if we engage
ourselves in foreign affairs only when we choose, or only
so that we can then
to overcome specific problems, then to shift our
priorities back to our natural concern with ourselves.

We must not confuse tough rhetoric with strong action, nor
can we wish away realities with nostrilless lies.
The reality is that there can be no security and progress
without our continued vigilance and our continual efforts - dedicating
no progress with
To maintain a stable equilibrium of power. It is in this
context that U. S. -Soviet relations must be seen.

- 11 -

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has
been a central feature of American policy for three
decades. What is new today is the culmination of thirty
years of post-war growth of Soviet industrial, technological
and military power. No American policy caused this; no
American policy could have prevented it. But American
policy can keep this power from being used to expand
Soviet influence to our detriment; it has the capacity to
enable allies and friends to live with a sense of security;
it can construct an international order of cooperation
and progress.

It must do so, however, under unprecedented
conditions. In previous eras in history, rivalry
between major powers has almost invariably led to war.

- 12 -

In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten
casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an
outcome is unthinkable. For the first time in history,
we must manage a fundamental clash of ideologies
and national interests in the shadow of nuclear peril.

We must harness the rivalry of the nuclear superpowers,
first into coexistence, and on that basis develop a more
positive and cooperative future. For as President
Kennedy once said, "in the final analysis our most
basic common link is that we all inhabit this small
planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish
our children's future. And we are all mortal."

- 13 -

was that the Soviet Union, after consolidating its
occupation of Eastern Europe, might seek to spread
its control to other contiguous areas in Europe
and Asia. Our policies therefore concentrated on
building positions of military strength from which
we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union. In this
way the Soviets might be forced to settle for peace;
transformations might occur within Soviet society
that would curb expansionist tendencies and gradually
change the USSR into a less antagonistic and, over
a more cooperative participant in the international
system.

- 14 -

Soviet expansion was checked. Behind our shield of security
assistance,
and with our help, our friends and allies in Western Europe
rebuild their
restored their economies and democratic institutions.

Yet the hope that these policies would produce
positive
permanent stability, evolution of the Soviet system, and
realized
greater normality, was only partially fulfilled. In the
immediate postwar period, the aggressiveness of Soviet
in
era
some
ideology and the Stalinist myth obscured the real weakness
Indeed, 1962 during
of the Soviet state. As late as the Cuban missile crisis,
the United States enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in
strategic missiles, a three-to-one superiority in strategic
bombers, total naval superiority everywhere, and rough
equality on the ground in Europe.

- 15 -

But gradually with the acquisition of nuclear
technology and the transformation of the international
system through decolonization, the Soviet Union began to
emerge as a first-class power, in military terms. It
acquired the most advanced weapons, which enabled it,
for the first time in its history, to threaten distant places
beyond the Eurasian landmass, including the United States.
It became a naval power, and -- as other naval powers in
the past -- sought to translate its strength into political
influence in regions never before of interest to Czarist
or even Bolshevik Russia. Despite many flaws in its economic
system, the Soviet Union was prepared to allocate massive
economic resources to military purposes to aid programs

- 17 -

Thus, the United States, and the world at large, is now confronted with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower on a world scale. Coping with its implications

years, Whoever exercises leadership responsibility will confront the same problem in the years to come.

This

have been prevented by American policy, unless by launching

a nuclear war. It will not go away, and it will not be

conclusively "solved," It will leave us faced by
every Administration for the foreseeable future.

- 18 -

emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing
international structure is a recurrent phenomenon. We
must ensure that no military imbalance arises and that
we and our allies firmly resist expansionist pressures.
At the same time, we must reach from confrontation to
serious negotiation. But historically, the adjustment of
an existing order to the arrival of one or more new actors
almost invariably was accompanied by war -- to impede
the upstart, to remove or diminish some of the previously
established actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised
system. But in the nuclear era, when casualties in a
general nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a
matter of days, the use of force to cope with the emergence

- 19 -

of a new power threatens utter catastrophe. We cannot

afford either abdication or rhetorical confrontation. We

resisting
challenge to

must contain Soviet power without global war, to avoid war
abdication as well as confrontation.

This is our

to avoid host

We are challenged to pursue a complex policy and
This requires a delicate & complex
policy.

to mobilize public support for it. We need an equilibrium
mutual

of power but we must move beyond it to develop habits
and, ultimately, cooperation.
of restraint and coexistence, ✓ We must stabilize a new

but our ultimate goal must be to channel the drives of
conflict into
powerful nations toward constructive participation in

transform idealogical

building a better world.

-- not the alleged hunger for relaxation of tension, not the

- 20 -

striving for agreements at any price, not the mindless
search for friendly atmosphere which some critics use
+ *dangerous* as naive caricatures. We cannot hide from the reality
of growing Soviet power; oratory will not make it go
away; verbal bellicosity is not a strategy.

The policies pursued by this Administration have
been designed to prevent Soviet expansion, but also to
build a pattern of relations in which the Soviet Union
*will always* confronts new penalties for aggression, and fresh-
*growing* incentives for restraint. [ These goals are attainable, for
Soviet power, *while growing*, is itself evolving with
considerable unevenness. Soviet society is no longer
*antireligious and anti-religious* ]
totally cut off from the world around it nor without its own
*God*.

- 21 -

needs for outside relationships. Rigidity and essential
conservatism are clearly a brake on its growth into a
technologically advanced and innovative society. The
industrial democracies, if they face their challenges
with confidence, if they do not mesmerize themselves with
the illusion of simple solutions, possess vast strengths
which should enable them, with prudent effort, to keep

Soviet power from becoming dominant and influence the
intervention directions
manner in which it is used. The past thirty years have
been
proven repeatedly that the great industrial democracies,

not the Soviet Union, are the engine of the world economy,
the most permitting partners for the poor and弱
Thus our assets and opportunities in seeking relations
of greater stability are substantial.

- 22 -

For a
the purpose
our essential task is to recognize the need for both
time projected policy thus
strands of policy simultaneously and to pursue them with
curbs
equal vigor -- curbing expansionist drives while seeking
constructive relationship,
to shape a more positive international order. We must

prevent the Soviet Union from translating its growing
global or regional conflict into a political preponderance, without escalating
massive information.

every crisis into a global challenge. We have resisted
the United States' aggressive moves by the Soviet Union to establish a
naval base in Cuba, to impede the access routes to Berlin,

to exploit the explosive situation in the Middle East. And
have we sought to halt blatant intervention in Angola -- until
stopped by Congressional action.

Recently
prevented
our

At the same time, we have a historic obligation to our

people and mankind to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations
on concrete problems, to push back the shadow of nuclear
catastrophe. At the very least we owe it to our people to
demonstrate that crises which occur were unavoidable, that
its government has missed no opportunity to achieve
constructive solutions. This is why the United States has
set forth principles of responsible relations in the nuclear
age: respect for the interests of all, restraint in the uses
of power, and absention from efforts to exploit conflicts
for unilateral advantage. The United States has sought to
give life to these principles in major negotiations on arms
control, the prevention of accidental war, and settlement

- 24 -

of political issues such as Berlin. And we begin to
construct a network of cooperative agreements in a
variety of functional areas -- economic, scientific,
medical, environmental, and others -- which promise
concrete benefits if political conditions permit their full
implementation and further development. It has been
our belief that with patience, a pattern of restraints and
a network of vested interests would develop which
would give coexistence a more positive and hopeful
dimension.

(N)

(N)

Such a dual policy requires subtlety, understanding and self-discipline. It will fail if our public debate deliberately confuses a necessity with a preference; if the give-and-take of any responsible relationship is one-sidedly and demagogically presented as unilateral concessions. The conditions that threaten mankind cannot be removed by tough talk.

Are our memories so short that we have forgotten the conditions in which the policy of relaxation of tensions originated? In the early 1970's when this policy was shaped,

any nation had already passed through traumatic events and was engaged in an anguishing war. There were riots in the streets and on the campuses demanding rapid progress towards peace. Every new defense program submitted was challenged --

- 26 -

including the AMB which was carried by only one vote, the MIRVing
multiple-carriers, and successive
of missiles, the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber. Congress
successfully passed resolutions urging the Administration to


reorder our national priorities away from defense. We were
continually attacked for not making concessions in the SALT
talks. The Congress and many interest groups pressed continually
for the opening up of East-West trade and agitated against the

Administration's approach of linking progress in economic relations
pier with progress in political relations. We endured a series of
crises with the Soviet Union in 1970 and 1971 - and the Government
was often accused by its critics of provocation or bellicosity in the manner.

with progress in political relations. We endured a series of
crises with the Soviet Union in 1970 and 1971 - and the Government
and were
was often accused by its critics of provocation or bellicosity in the manner.

-27-

Thus a few short years ago the pressures in this country
and from our allies were overwhelmingly to move rapidly toward
better relations with Moscow. We resisted these pressures and
just as we now refuse to let ourselves be stampeded in the
opposite direction. In the Administration's view the
country needs a balanced policy, combining firmness and
conciliation, strong defense and arms control, political
principles and economic incentives. And it had to be
a policy for the long term, one that the American people
could sustain, one offering promise of a constructive future.

It is, therefore, ironic that now our national debate
seems more and more to take the conditions in which we detente
has in many respects come full circle. Those who pressed for
unilateral restraint towards Moscow now accuse the government of
concessions being

(Y)

-28-

too soft. Those who complain about our response to Soviet moves

concessions

immediately seek to remove les

are often the very ones who took away the government's levers

counties leverage influence or action - though遏制

for action.

on trade & credit - though weakening are intelligent capacity
though preventing aid & friends we seek to resist Soviet
aggression.

There has been a systematic attack on our

intelligence capabilities which has sharply reduced the effectiveness
of an indispensable tool of national policy. Our defense budgets
remain under constant attack. Most recently the denial of
aid to Angolans resisting Soviet-Cuban military intervention
weakened the risks against further expansionism. And much
of our economic leverage has been taken away.

The human rights issue is a matter of deep and
inal
legitimate concern to all Americans. But the Congressional

openly

attempt to link it with economic relations, without subtlety or

-30-

-- We cannot prevent a build-up of Soviet conventional forces but we have the capacity together with our allies to maintain an equilibrium. We cannot neglect this task and then blame the Soviet Union if the military balance shifts against us.

-- We have the capacity, Diplomatic, economic and military to resist expansionism, but we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confrontation while depriving ourselves of the means of resistance.

-- We cannot change reality of the nuclear threat but we have it in our power to build a new relationship that transcends the nuclear peril.

-31-

American policy is bumbling, uncertain and weak. We have a design and
we will deal with the Soviet Union.

the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union.
we will
it can succeed if we implement it as a united people.
more forward

Against this background let me discuss two current
issues that illustrate the two strands of policy that we
are concurrently pursuing:

wh

-- The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in
which we are seeking to shape a more
positive future.

-- The Angolan situation, where we are
attempting to curb Soviet expansionism.

-32-

Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods -- the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared in a general exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that additions of military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side seeks to expand its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably respond. The race is maintained partly because a perceived

-33-

inequality is considered ~~by either~~ side as politically unacceptable even though it has become difficult to define precisely what ~~purely~~ military purpose is achieved. ~~served~~.

We thus face a paradox: at current and foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them in a crisis. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides been relevant to the outcome. Today these arsenals increasingly find their purpose only in matching and deterring each other's forces. For under no foreseeable circumstance could the United States -- or the Soviet Union -- avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange. Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty of designing a way to get

(H)

-34-

off the treadmill. *

This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the nuclear competition requires endless invocations of ~~immediate~~ *nuclear arms race* or *eventual* danger of imminent nuclear attack. Thus the nuclear arms race all conceivable contingencies, no matter how dangerous, fuels political tensions and perhaps leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

* To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side *could* use its strategic forces *and how* in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide. They are invariably based on assumptions such as that one side would permit its missile silos to be destroyed without launching its missiles before they are actually hit -- on which no aggressor would rely where forces such as those possessed by either the U. S. or the USSR now and in the years ahead are involved.