Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

3

D: Okay. I will mention to him specifically.

K: Okay. Good.

D: Because his instruction now is before he has to notify because he will make a statement against -- on a principle position about, not touching you at all, but about Israel, that kind of thing, but at the same time he will not tell him that it doesn't matter . . . . [obscure thing].

K: Right.

D: Okay?

K: Right.

D: So I will just warn him not to tell anything to Scali, as I understand you want it. Or is it better not to tell them . . . . . . . . they'll be sitting there -- I don't know, what do you think?

K: Tell them not to go to Scali because Scali doesn't know anything about it and he's very excitable.

D: (laughs) I understand.

K: And we have told -- The only people who know up to now are the President.

D: I understand.

K: And, as you will see very soon, the President cannot possibly address this question for a couple of hours.

D: I understand.

K: But what I've told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.

D: No, no, no. I understand. But does this coming affect in any way --

K: It affects nothing.

D: Nothing. I mean, from the point of view of foreign policy.

K: In terms of foreign policy, it, if anything, strengthens our abilities.

D: I speak in a sense of ability not a public relations because sometimes
......

K: In terms of our foreign policy, it either affects it not at all or strengthens it.

D: Okay.

K: But in terms of making a decision and in terms of getting time with the President, that is now very difficult until into the afternoon.

D: I understand. Okay. Well, until the end of the day.

K: And, therefore, we don't want to get anything started with a lot of other countries.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much. I will await your call.

K: And we have emphatically not yet discussed it with the Israelis.

D: I understand.

K: Because we do not want their lobby to start working here.

D: Yeah, I think this is the wise thing.

K: Before we have a chance to ....

D: To make your own decision.

K: To make our own decisions on how to handle it.

D: I understand.

K: Good.

D: All right.

wgh

TELCONE
Amb. Scali - Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

12:15 p. m.

K: I know what you are going to tell me and I already know it.
I want you to just... stay cool...

S: No, I want to tell you something new. I know you have talked to Malik. If Scowcroft is doing his job... I want to tell you something new. Hoveda, the Israeli Ambassador still manages to be on friendly terms with El-Zayyat and he said to El-Zayyat, it seems to me you already have a victory. You should now be thinking of the next step. El-Zayyat said, "We are open to a move towards peace and will study it."

K: That's all right. Just sit tight, John. We've got to get all the pieces together. But you must give me this kind of information.

S: Could you give me some guidance for my own personal information.

K: I don't know yet... expecting to hear something later on today.
I will be in touch with you as soon as we have confirmed it.

S: Larry McIntyre, the President of the Security Council, now feels under some pressure to show the manhood of the Security Council. He is quite willing to do nothing today, but I don't think I can keep him from resuming tomorrow.

K: Exactly what I am counting on.

S: Avoid today if we can. ?

K: Try to avoid it today. Try to make sure to get all the pieces in place and be ready to move tomorrow. Going to do some more cross checking today.

S: All right.

K: ...all the principal parties... we are being in touch with .. to
not to get any eager beavers up there, jumping the gun...

S: Nobody's going to jump the gun...

K: I don't mean you... other people up there who may be getting some
sense of things.

2.

S: Just a moment ago the Syrians urgently went to Malik saying they needed to discuss something of great importance.

K: Well, I think the Israelis are bombing in Syria again.

S: They said it was very, put it in very urgent terms.

K: OK, John, as soon as I know something ....

S: Just remember on the other end I can't do what I am supposed to do....

K: Actually, John, you probably know a tiny bit more than I do. But I don't want to move until I have all the pieces in place. As soon as I have more information I will call you.

S: I know that, I understand and approve of that.

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E012958
Date: 09/29/94

BY KARA DAE

TELCOM

B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

12:25:p. m.

K: You talked to Dobrynin. Were you firm?

S: I was firm. He said he would call off Malik right away and tell him to shut up.

K: Tell him to stop running around in New York. Because that could get unmanageable... if this thing gets out.

S: ...back to the position.

K: You tell him, ...that that's the position and we will do it...

S: That's what I told him.

K: Then there's no need for me to call him.

S: I don't think so. No.

TELECON

Eban/Kissinger

October 10, 1973

12:35

E: I would like to share a few thoughts with you. I talked with the President of Security Council and others. Before that I would like to thank you and your government warmly for response to certain requests we have been making. Everybody in Israel very moved by that. The second matter, very strange situation indicates deadlock likely to be prolonged. Third, Soviet/Arab position of asking for a cease-fire with return to the situation of 7 years ago. Not put forward. No consensus. know it wouldn't be adopted.

K: We would veto that.

E: Sufficiently assumed that deter anybody from making proposal. Secondly, your Ambassador suggested.

K: I understand, I have several people waiting for me...and thirdly it is the straight cease-fire in place, right?

E: Cease-fire in place. British admit position on ground no....to it. My feeling is they are going to get regular cease-fire. On the news Arabs, Sadat told European Ambassadors that even if they lost 1 million men there.. they wouldn't have a cease-fire. We must get used to the idea that won't have a cease-fire unless the Soviets change.

K: Supposing we could get one, what would you say?

E: Position remains as it was. Some...recalled to my people that we do...balance of interests.

K: That would be my advice.

E: It may be happening in the North. Even no sure they could do more.

You have to understand what I have told our Ambassador. We will not put anything forward. Will become very tough for us if somebody else puts something forward.

E: I agree we have seen no signs of it here. Did not wish...

K: I have just instructed Scali to do nothing today which is against his temperament.

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

4:50 pm

K: Did you tell him we have not told anybody?

S: I told him we haven't told anyone. I told him we had told no one and we were telling him ... you were in discussion with the President He said could you tell me what direction they're going in. I said no that they were discussing it now.

K: Yeah.

S: And, let's see, he is still worried about resupply.. to run it up.

K: You can call and say we have definitely decided not to have any meeting today and we have authorized the charter service to ... we favor chartering planes to Israel.

S: No indication of the trend of your thinking?

K: Say -- no joint US/Soviet resolution. we will try to stay away from... Did you tell him not to do anything?

S: I said keep fighting hard but it would be disastrous to do anything to pre-empt the President -- like anythingfoolish like bombing downtown Cairo. He said the Prime Minister has said we will not rest til we have punished them severely for their aggression. I said we were aware of what the Prime Minister said. I'll call him back and tell him

K: You think we're doing the right thing.

S: I do. I tried.. if they have any idea of their time-table it would be helpful... we're not the only factor. He didn't respond. He said he had another 40 aircraft grounded for the rest of the week -- that means one-third of the airforce is out of action. He said had delivered 2 and in addition there would be 5 more. I said no, there would be 3 more for a total of 5.

K: You call Schlesinger and say if we have to sweeten the pot how many aircraft can we spare to do it, but call him on the secure line.

S: Yes.

END

Author: E012358
Date: 10/1/73
From: MARS

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler - Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

5:18 p. m.

K: ... had had a press conference, we could desist from personnel announcements...what does, Bob McCloskey thinks, and there is a lot to be said for it, that we should go ahead and...the Vice President strengthens this. ...foreign governments not that sure...impression of assurance.

Z: Don't think you should announce

K: Personnel, I'm not arguing that...

Z: Have to stay away from the Vice President...

K: Most useful not to talk about the Vice President, but speak firmly and positively about foreign policy.

Z: I agree.

K: What is your judgment? We could do it Thursday or Friday.

Z: Friday, but...

K: Let me look at cables first to see what's going to be going on Thursday and Friday.

Z: Do you want me to raise it with the President? Really should.

K: Why don't you.

Z: I'll tell him I favor it.

K: Tell him we've already sort of announced it, after checking.

Z: Now, Henry. You received the letter at 2:05?

K: I received the letter at 2:05 in my office, at the White House.

Z: Yes, sir.

K: I took the letter to the President, we talked for a bit and I attended a White House meeting.

Z: I am going to say Henry, that Haig received the same letter at 2:06, then took it to the President.

8/15/73
BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

5:40 p. m.

To: He just mentioned to me, wasn't Harrison... information he received... wanted some additional information.

K: It's unbelievable.

D: He was on the telephone. I was there, exactly on my left hand, he himself was surprised. Harrison... was calling on instructions from Scali. Malik knows all about it.

K: I am telling you Anatoly, nobody is authorized, nobody in our government knows anything about our conversations except the President and me.

D: He was referring to Scali, not to the government... said Scali had asked for some details like he wanted to clarify from Malik. Malik doesn't know anything. It is nothing, ... said ... when could he...

K: Tell Malik nobody in NeSS York knows anything, tell him not to say anything to anybody.

D: Yes, Henry. OK.

K: Yes, I will be in touch a little later.

D: You can call me.

K: I will call you. Present significant problems for us. As well as for you. Would not push you. I understand, privately, waiting for a couple ... problems. We consider it a serious proposal and we have to think this thing through to think how to answer.

D: Henry, I see in the news media... build-up.

K: For your information, we are doing next to nothing.

D: It says build-up going on in news media, suspect beginning of new, ... check with Malik doing something or not?

K: Anatoly, you have gone through too many crises with me. We are trying to get this thing settled. You are going to hear from us during the course of the evening.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: MW Allred Date: 04/04/73

2.

D: Did you receive a letter?

K: When, this morning you mean. ?

D: Of course, you received letter at 2:05.

K: Oh, from the Vice President.

D: Henry, why it was you who received it?

K: According to law I sign all commission so resignations have to be made to me.

D: So, if you refused it couldn't be made.

K: I threatened the President with that.

D: Makes you the second, perhaps the first, most powerful man in the country because you could refuse to accept it.

K: Telephone... from the State Department.

D: You are calling from State?

K: Connected in a straight line from the White House, they can just throw the switch when I am at the State Department.

D: Scowcroft called me... Malik on the telephone. I call...

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: N.A.A.C. 502-3 by: N.W.

TELCOM

October 10, 1973

5:40 p. m.

D: He just mentione to me, wasn't Harrison... information he received... wanted some additional information.

K: Its unbelievable.

D: He was referring to Scali, not to the government... said Scali had asked for some details like he wanted to clarify from Malik. Malik doesn't know anything. It is nothing, ... said ... when could he....

K: Tell Malik nobody in New York knows anything, tell him not to say anything to anybody.

D: Yes, Henry. OK.

D: You can call me.

K: I will call you. Presents significant problems for us. As well as for you. Would not push you. I understand, privately, waiting for a couple ... problems. We consider it a serious proposal and we have to think this thing through to think how to answer.

D: It says build-up going on in news media, suspect beginning of new, ... check with Malik doing something or not ?

2.

D: Did you receive a letter?

D: Scowcroft called me... Malik on the telephone. I call....

- 2 -

K: Well, if I want to sweeten the pot for the Israelis -- what planes
can you scrape together?

S: I just don't know.

K: Look, this is based on the assumption of no combat.

S: Only phantoms..

K: The Israelis told me this afternoon that in addition to the 52, they
have lost, 40 others are out of action.

S: We're scraping spare parts for them to try and fix that up....
the Soviet resupply operation.

K: Good, it is much more massive than ours. Dobrynin called me and
he said Henry, I know you too well. When I read about our resupply
I know you're doing it too.

S: You know him too well.

K: That's right and maybe that will get us out of this. I think we
may be able to get something up here.

S: Good. You know what the problems are.

K: I am painfully aware of the problems and it won't be much longer.
We're working on that right now.

S: When do you expect a WSAG?

K: As soon as I have something to say but I will give you a special
briefing on the phone tomorrow.

S: Good. thank you.

END

TELECON

Secretary General Waldheim/Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

8:27 pm

W: I am sorry to disturb you but I thought I should inform you about the situation here. The meeting was not satisfactory. As you know .. the controversy with Malik. Zayyat informed the non-aligned countries not to do.. to avoid any resolution in the Security Council because they wanted to continue fighting and any resolution would prevent this. That is why the non-aligned did not insit on working out a draft resolution. As you know the Israelis are not interested in having a resolution. I talked to Eban and he told me that the Council debate cannot continue ...on a resolution... they intend to hold ..tomorrow afternoon...have 3 speakers.

K: who?

W: Peru, Kenya, and Guinea.

K: Who?

W: Guinea.

K: I didn't know Guinea was in the Security Council.

W: It is not definite yet. The situation here is that both sides don't want a resolution. Both sides don't want a cease-fire because both think they will gain ..

K: I have asked John Scali to come back here and give me a full story and we'll be in touch with you.

W: I hope to give a brief statement to all parties about stopping the fighting.

K: Let's see what the situation is and I will give you my judgment.

W: I would appreciate if if you could let me know what you are feeling.

K: You're not bound by my views but why don't we talk in the morning.

W: More and more people and people in the government are asking me what is the Secretary doing to stop the fighting. ..why is the Secretary not trying to stop the fighting and get them back to the negotiating table. That's the psychological background.

- 2 -

K: I understand and I am not objecting. I thought if I could give you my view and then you could do what you want.

W: I am very grateful and I understand. My impression is that they are not interested in doing anything against wish of Arab countries. And I am very worried about the message from Breshnev to ______ and the airlift to Syria is very dangerous... dangerous developments.

K: We agree and we're saying something about this tomorrow.

W: Thank you very much.

K: Please stay in touch and I will take the liberty of contacting you in the morning.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Author: EO 12358

Date: 6/19/94

Dated: 6/19/94

TELECON, 8:59 p.m. October 10, 1973

Secretary-General Scowcroft

K. HEM 70 AD - still in the experimental stage. He claims we have
about 300 of them. I don't know whether that is true.

S. I was told we had hadn't picked up enough signals. Could
be we are still experimenting and --based on the fact that we hvent'
picked up enough signatls -- that's why we are playing with it. This
could be a useful experiment.

K. Can you please tell those guys in Defense to expedite these
shipments?

S. On those F-4's, two are scheduled to go tomorrow and three the
next day. Yes, I'll get on on the rest.

TELECON

October 10, 1973

8:59 pm

K: Brent, look, the Defense people are just going to have to stop dragging their feet. First, the Israelis are going wild. They think we are stabbing them in the back

S: They are really up-tight.

K: Yes, why shouldn't they be. What is your personal judgment?

S: I wish we could get some feeling about what is going to happen over the next 48 hours. If we settle into a stalemate we will have big trouble. If they break out we can move ahead on track but if not there will be strong pressure for a cease-fire. We either have to go for a cease-fire or a massive re-equipment. Did he give you any idea of what may happen?

K: No. He asked for a chance for Golda Meir to reply. Dobrynin can wait.

S: You still have an excuse.

K: I don't need an excuse just tell him I can't get a decision.

S: I think you can get by tonight.

K: But in 48 hours we face the same problem. If there is no resolution in 48 hours can we get through the weekend.

S: I don't think we can.

us

K: The only thing that is holding up is that they are all afraid of our veto.

don't

S: I think we can get through the weekend, do you?

K: No.

S: Without knowing their prospects, anything decisive happens, we can get through to Friday. You can build on maybe 48 hours but we can't stall 48 hours because I think somebody will do something.

K: Right. and we cannot veto it.

S: I think that would be disastrous.

K: OK, fine. Thank you.

RECEIVED

Author's E012828 8
Date 09/24/73

D. A. M. B. M. A. D.

Secretary General Scowcroft

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>RECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Author: E 012858</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>2 Nov 1973</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELECON

October 10, 1973

8:59 pm

S: They are really up-tight.

S: You still have an excuse.

S: I don't think we can.

don't

K: No.

S: Without knowing .. their prospects.. anything decisive happens, we can get through to Friday. You can build on maybe 48 hours but we can't stall 48 hours because I think somebody will do something.

K: OK, fine. Thank you.

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

9:14 pm

K: Al, where are you?

H: In my office.

K: I have just had a bloody session with the Israeli Ambassador and he says he cannot acquiese to this without giving Mrs. Meir a chance to get to the President so we have to wait til tomorrow morning.
My judgment is that we have to give them the 12 hours.

H: Absolutely, absolutely.

K: I'll just call Dobrynin and tell him we can't give them an answer.
Another thing, what happens if...

H: They have to understand if the thing is gonna go that's it. Do you think there is any way..

K: They are also saying the end result will be a victory achievement with Soviet arms and both sides of the Canal in Egyptian hands.

H: What will be the outcome?

K: They think they are going to win.

H: They think they can do it. You know they can ... we could make a proforma cut off and no addition til somebody asked... if they are trying to stall us f; r 2 weeks or a month -- that's impossible.

K: Yes, that's impossible. Well, I'll get a time from them.

H: I knew that time would be the issue

K: Could you stiffen Schlesinger's back because the guy is totally panicked. Clements is beating after him... if the Egyptians win we will lose our position. It is the Soviets that are putting in the strong.

H: No question about it.

K: Almost like the India/Pakistan

H: What we have to do ... you have to see how long you can hold it together.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012958
Date: 05 Oct 1973
By: N.N. Patsin

TELECON

Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

9:45 pm

D: I am going to have a quiet dinner alone.

K: Alone. Do you want me to send someone over?

D: Laughter.

K: Anatoyl, given all the events of today and that we have to talk to some other people, we won't be able to give you an answer till tomorrow.

D: OK, you will call tomorrow.

K: Yes. I will call and I must say from all reports I have heard, your people are much more disciplined than mine. We may have a lousy foreign policy in the next month that I am here but there will be discipline.

D: I understand. You with your pious quite well. Don't overplay the theme of Russian irresponsibility.

K: Who has said anything about Russian irresponsibility?

D: From your speech, as you know.

K: That was just a little warning. I did not say you had as yet been irresponsible.

D: I am just telling you .. that I not argue with you.. they use expression you usually use.

K: What was that, look, if it was Marvin Kalb.. I did not talk to him.

D: Well, I don't know.. the theme on the radio is the State Department wants..

K: I will keep things quiet tomorrow. I promise you there will be no comment from the State Department about Russian irresponsibility or else.

D: But this then goes on.. in the briefing.. some off the record and some on the record.

K: By whom? what do you think... no one has been authorized. just a minute Anatdyl, before you go into one of your wild charges.

D: You understand that..

K: Your engaged in a massive airlift in the Middle East and that is not helpful because we have been very restrained.

D: I don't know.

K: I'll be glad to send you the figures. I spend all day at the White House but tomorrow I promise you..

D: Eann McCloskey made some comment on and off the record. I like him -- he is very nice -- but he too makes comments

K: What did he say?

D: I don't recall but on the record he said, he was asked what Russians were restrained... He said he couldn't report..

K: You have to ..that the message to the General Secretary sent to did not fill us with ectasy.

D: Well, nothing really...nothing followed after this.

K: Anatdyl, I will tell you now, no State Department spokesman will say tomorrow -- or will any White House spokesman or will Defense Department make any statement. Now you can inform Moscow this on behalf of the President.

D: Good

K: We will be in touch tomorrow.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12580
By W. M. Beane, 0-24-04

TELECON
Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

9:45 pm

K: Alone'. Do you want me to send someone over?

D: Laughter.

K: Anatoyl, given all the events of today and that we have to talk to some other people, we won't be able to give you an answer til tomorrow.

D: I understand. You are playing quite well. Don't overplay the theme of Russian irresponsibility.

K: By whom? what do you think... no one has been authorized. just a minute Anatoyl, before you go into one of your wild charges.

D: You understand that..

D: I don't know.

D: Even McCloskey made some comment on and off the record. I
like him -- he is very nice -- but he too makes comments

K: What did he say?

K: You have to . . . that the message to the General Secretary sent to
______ did not fill us with ectasy.

D: Well, nothing really... nothing followed after this.

K: Anatoyl, I will tell you now, no State Department spokesman will
say tomorrow -- or will any White House spokesman or will Defense
Department make any statement. Now you can inform Moscow this on
behalf of the President.

D: Good

END

TELECON

Ambassador Dinnitz/Secretary Kissinger

October 10, 1973

10:00 pm

K: Sometime during the course of tomorrow. You have to understand when I said .. Monday or Tuesday that my nightmare is that the Egyptians will come into a resolution which we might have to veto and that would be regretable. .. if were Egyptians asking for a cease-fire. so this is the reality I want you to know. I am not asking you to accept it.

D: I understand. I am now in the process of receiving some cables from Israel that might shed some light on this.

K: I must have an idea of how much time you will need, if you want to pass this on to Eagleburger...

D: I can't because it is of an operational nature.

K: Can I call you?

D: Anytime, anytime. I will be in the office all night. I have talked to my staff about the charter. I hear from my Air Force that the Phantoms that were to leave tomorrow will be delayed because of a hurricane.

K: Well, I can't help that.

D: I know, this is something that I just learned and..

K: That means five will go on Friday.

D: So, maybe all five can go on Friday. I am just telling you this.. but it may get out. So, I'll expect a call from you..

K: Yes, I'll call you and thank you.

END

TELECON

October 10, 1973

K: I haven't had a chance to tell you that I think that you brought it off great. It is a horrible, human disaster. but it is the only thing to do.

H: No alternative.

K: I don't intend to offer any suggestions. My personal view would be Rockefeller. Failing that it would be Ford.

H: I don't think he will make up his mind for a while. He is asking for recommendations.... Mansfield said they would take John Sherman Cooper or Bill Rogers.

K: We can't afford Rogers.

H: My God. I think Gerry Ford would go right through.

K: I think Rogers has done enough damage. He....with his vanity.

H: I said, Mr. President we have been in this crisis since Saturday and I have yet to read of one leak....

K: Even if he didn't... do it. he did nothing to discourage it. They'll do anything over here. Over here the Secretary is God.

H: That how it is at Defense. but I think it is tighter at State.

K: They do anything the Secretary says. Al, I wo nder if I can take your mind off the domestic for a bit. I,, the Israelis that the Soviets oppose a joint resolution for a cease-fire. that was to scare the pants off them. I have now told him that we are thinking of a joint abstention. Has Schlesinger been bugging you about this.

H: Since early this morning.

K: If you could give him a call and tell him to stop panicin g.

H: Oh my God.

K: I think he is a decent guy. I didn't realize that he just panics easily -- more than I though. You are aware that this may draw some flack.

H: You bet.

-2-

K: And the President is aware.

H: Yes, he knows.

K: ...the resolution is... if it surfaces that we rejected a simple cease-fire we're through in the Arab world and here.

H: I know... I hope... we can... keep the noise down.

K: I will see Dinnitz tonight. I will then see Dobrynin too late to do anything. I will then propose to Dobrynin that tomorrow night we are moving in the Security Council...and getting the British to put up a proposal...that is dilatory so that it will be adopted on Friday. This will give them Friday as a fighting day and if they reject it they get even another day. If they have suffered the losses they have -- they may not get to do much fighting.

H: I think they're making more noise than feeling..;

K: If they ...lost... in Sinai were crushed..

H: Oh boy.

K: They are just not doing well.

H: We just can't take any other position.

K: What's the alternative.

H: There isn't any. talk about materiel, but..

K: We have the King ready to go on and the Saudis ready to go and I am holding them both.

H: The agreement on a resolution that can be strongly imposed... only 48 hours away.

K: I got the gist of this in the morning but I didn't want to get the President hepped up. I have gotten some time -- 36 hours.

H: Good, I think its being handled very well. It's agonizing for the Israelis as long as it goes on. It gives the Arabs a sense of unit and confidence will grow. It will be totally unmanageable.

K: Yes.

END

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

8:25

K. We think we should move with the British and we have had
a call from the Prime Minister to that effect. I told him we
will talk first thing in the morning.

D. The Security Council will meet in the morning.

K. In the morning? Just let me set it up first.

D. As to now, what exactly can I say about the British?

K. I do not have a ... now but I have started my discussions
with them.

D. The first impression was all right?

K. The first impression was positive.

D. As of now the first reaction was favorable but the final reply
will be given tomorrow.

K. That is right but I have not told them about your involvement.
I don't want an overzealous man in your Embassy staff in London
to go running.... Let me handle it. I will be back to you
tomorrow around noon at the latest. I will tell you by one.
Nothing will happen at the Security Council meeting that isn't
fully coordinated with you. We are arranging that only after you
approve will we proceed so there will be no call to meeting
unless you approve. We will try to work out some resolution
and if you approve it we will get someone to call a meeting.
We will get the British to call the meeting.

D. That is all right. I think it is maybe good to tell our
people.

K. I can't let Scali into this until I have the British lined up.

D. Tomorrow you will call. In the meanwhile I will explain
to Moscow that they need to think it over.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012657
Date: 10/11/73
M01100

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

8:25

TELECON

Ambassador Cromer/HAK

October 11, 1973/9:45 a.m.

C: That what we're hearing about the Russians is the same as what you're hearing I'd expect.

K: It's very massive.

C: So I gather. There's nothing we can do about it is there.

K: Well, not very quickly.

C: Things haven't moved quickly as both you and I anticipated.

K: No, that's the problem.

C: I don't know whether there is anything we can work on that the fact that to the extent so far the Egyptians have somewhat proved their virility and got them over this tremendous inferiority complex they had before. You know what I mean.

K: Well, Rollie, I may be--I have to see the President today--right now. If you have nothing urgent and operational what I would like to do is see him and then perhaps get together with you later today.

C: I'd like that very much.

K: Because I think we might want to talk.

C: Let's do that. I'm at your disposition obviously.

K: Good. Bye.

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 012858</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 10/24/73</td></tr><tr><td>Attn:</td></tr></table>

TELCORN
Governor Rockefeller/HAK

October 11, 1973/10:18a.m.

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: Listen, every day I just thank God you're there. Although I know its awful tough.

K: It's a rough situation.

R: But there's a little outside chance someday I might be there with you. Any advise. I'm just staying quiet.

K: I think you should stay quiet. I think it's beyond anything you can do. What I'm trying most now is to keep Connolly out.

R: Fantastic.

K: I think anything positive I do is going to be counter-productive.

R: Very interesting. I agree. And I feel anything I might do would be counter-productive.

K: Exactly. But I think we've made major progress in that area.

R: You do. Fantastic. I'm even embarrassed to talk to you about this you know when you've got everything else.

K: No, good God no.

R: But it has some effect on your future structure there too.

K: Look, you know my view about, not for yourself but for the Country.

R: Henry, I'm with you and if something does happen...

K: But I think as long as its anyone other than Connolly your situation in 1976 remains very promising, don't you.

R: I do. I'm here on this panel now and with Muskie, Jack Jackson, McCarthy, McGovern and Hubert Humphrey.

K: When are you going back?

R: I'm going back at 12:30

RECLASSIFIED

REDACTED

Date 6/19/97
Attn:

K: Oh you are.

R: I don't want to bother you because I...

K: Nelson, there is no possible way you could bother me.

R: Yeah, but you're handling the problems of...

K: As in most crisis there is really not a hell of a lot you can do.

R: Just pray.

K: You know we're trying to, it's a high wire act. The Israelis are letting us down by not winning as quickly as they should.

R: That's right. They were a little over-confident maybe. Have they ______ with the Syrians.

K: No, my judgment is that they're going to leave the Egyptians alone but they haven't solved that problem because the Egyptians have put in massive anti-aircraft defenses so they can't use air to knock out the Egyptian tanks and they haven't got the artillery because they counted so much on the air.

R: A pity.

K: If I had to bet I would bet that they're going to now go for Damascus.

R: Oh brother, well hold on tight Henry.

K: Nelson, Haig and I are working on the other problem.

R: I understand and I'm just with you and I just wanted to touch base.

K: But as soon as I hear something I'll be in touch.

R: Great. Take care.

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E012958
Date: 1994-04-07
D: BARBARA

TELCONE

The President/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, October 11, 1973

11:00 a.m.

N: Are you back at State ?

K: Yes.

N: The thing I wanted to say was this. In following this strategy I want you to lean very hard on the Israeli Ambassador that I am very distressed about these stories and I have information -- I am talking to the press people -- it is not coming from him but from lower level people who are putting out the line that we are not supporting Israeli. I will not tolerate this and if I hear any more of this I will hold him responsible. Will you tell him?

K: Yes.

N: You and I know that Israel is not going to lose this war but we cannot fight both sides. If we hear any more stuff like this I will have no choice domestically except to turn on them. I can get the names of these people.

K: These fellows that are writing...

N: I know but these people go over there. They think it helps the Israelis but it does not. The Embassy people should have them cool it.

K: I will have them do it immediately.

N: We are helping them; he knows that doesn't he?

K: Yes.

N: It is like the Agnew thing. He talked all right but his lower level people did not. The Israelis have to trust us or there is no game.

K: I will call him immediately.

END

TELCON
Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

11:10 a.m.

K: What is the Ambassador doing in a Synagogue on Thursday.

S: It is the first day of ______ and a bar mitzvah and for morale he went for a few minutes.

K: For my morale, it is not very good for you on the one hand to ask me to slow down the UN and you get Dyan to say on radio and TV that you are heading for Damascus. How can we get the UN to slow down when you make this kind of announcement by your Defense Minister.

S: You have a point.

K: With the greatest difficulty I got the President to slow things down and now I am confronted with that news item. What will I tell the Soviets now?

S: I will get on to Israeli.

K: Point two. The President is beside himself with what he considers inspired newspaper articles and I urge you to keep your people under control in what they say to the press. If it gets back to the White House that someone has talked to Israeli personnel there will be hell to pay.

S: Do you have anything specific?

K: I have nothing but he said he has. I was going to wait and call you about this after I had something else to talk to you about. If you want to cooperate with us diplomatically you must cooperate with us on this. We cannot ask the UN to slowdown with this announcement that is out. I am sitting here with my associates now working on this 36 hour delay when we get this ticker. Second, what in the hell am I now going to tell the Russians. This looks like the most extreme form of collusion and bad faith. You would have had the 8 hours for the reality of this to become apparent if you had kept quiet. See what you can do to quiet things down in Israel and for God's sake stay off the radio and TV. Will you let me know?

S: I will.

END

TELCON
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

2:40 p.m.

K: The Israelis are running amuck on this 2234@##$ charter thing.

S: I know. Let me tell you where we are. This is the point where you had better intervene. The charter people have been very cooperative in the sense they are scouting around trying to find them. The problem is there does not seem to be a great deal available. Whether this is in any way politically motivated on the part of these people, I do not know. What has been done before is when this came up in the context of other emergencies-- I think related to VN-- what we threatened to do is the Secretary of Defense has the authority in coordination with the Secretary of Transport to mobilize up to 200 aircraft for DOD operations in support of this kind of an emergency. This would be civilian type. When the Defense Department threatened to do this then the civilian carriers got off their dime and did something. The situation of course is not necessarily comparable in the sense that they were talking about VN rather than Israel. We have been having a problem on the Pentagon side. They are dragging their feet. That is our impression. I would suggest if you could take a minute with Schlesinger and ask him what he thinks of this notion. The civilian carriers are not falling in line.

K: Could you call them and find them and tell them this is what we will have to do.

S: I will call you back.

K: And I will call Schlesinger.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 01 2358</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 6/14/73</td></tr><tr><td>TO: ANNA</td></tr></table>

TELECON

October 11, 1973

3:05 pm

D: I just got a cable from Golda. She says she is doing everything in her power to restrain.

K: Not in action but in words..

D: I said your remark was to the words and not the action. She understands the situation and well I'll let you talk now.

K: Two things: First, I have just ordered the military to charter twenty aircraft and then you'll have them. They will be civilian aircraft chartered by us.

D: Good.

K: Secondly, I can delay the Security Council meeting through tonight. But I can't avoid doing something with the Russians. I have been avoiding Dobrynin all morning, though he has called every half hour. I think by tomorrow night we'll have to move in that direction. You should develop a "yes/but" strategy.

D: Anstandstill resolution -- is that what you have in mind?

K: That's what I have in mind.

D: You think the Russians will want a standstill resolution by tomorrow night ... the Russians want to ... the resolution now.

K: Well they are driving me crazy since early this morning. If he has another proposition for..

D: Could you tell me what he has in mind?

K: Of course, there will be no tricks..no trickery. The President is getting furious because he thinks you are churning up the press.

D: We are caught in a real dilemma. We are not telling them that the Resolution is no alright. When we say the President is as usual, we can't tell them anything. All this situation ... one contradictory after the other and everybody is speculating, but you can assure the President..

K: Look, you know what the problem is. Jackson called me about my lack of attention to the problem.

D: He called you after he talked to .. I told him we have a logistical problem. ... that is what he called about and he said that Dr. Kissinger ... but Schlesinger is scared..

K: He is.

D: damn right. We are appreciative of the charter. Can you do something about the planes?

K: They will move tomorrow.

D: The five.

K: Yes.

D: Can we get a large scale .. should I talk to Schlesinger?

K: Let me talk to him.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>Phone Number: 614-947-6747</td></tr></table>

TELCOM
Maw/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

3:45 p.m.

K: We are thinking about announcing your appointment tomorrow.

M: Fine. Where do you want me and when?

K: You don't have to be down here.

M: Very well.

K: We will just announce it tomorrow then. We won't have anybody present.

M: All right. I will wait your instructions. I have a few things to talk to you about when you have time and when we get together.

K: Fine.

NED
END

<table><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr><tr><td>AUTHORISED</td></tr><tr><td>EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/24/84</td></tr><tr><td>BY KISSINGER</td></tr></table>

TELCONE
Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

4:30 p.m.

D: I want to bring you up to date on the situation, up to 5:00 (6 hours ago in Israel). We have penetrated in a front which is 12 Ks wide and 10 Ks inside the Road to Damascus.

K: Right.

D: I have another cable.

K: You are going to wind up like Paul on the road to Damascus.

D: As long as we don't wind up like Peter. Another cable says we have advanced 20 Ks. Probably some places 20 Ks.

K: You understand that I was not telling you...

D: I understood you completely but I don't think my boss did. Even before I talked to you. We have since that time, the Syrian troops are dismantling. The Syrian troops and armour are in disarray.

K: Good.

D: I don't want to bother you with the airports we have bombed. It is important that the Syrian Air force not particularly active and seven were shot down. We observed 5 ton 12 airplanes from the Soviet were on the way to Damascus. They returned to their base in Europe because of our tanks at the airport. They came again in the afternoon and this time they landed. Twelve landed in Syria with equipment. Until 5:00 our losses on the two fronts were 10 aircraft -- 3 Phantoms, 6 Skyhawks and 1 Super ____.

K: How many?

D: 10 Aircraft -- 3 phantoms, 6 Skyhawks and 1 super ____.

K: How did you lose them?

D: All to missiles. We have information that on the Egyptian front there has been no change. Our air force was active there. We estimated 700-800 tanks on the East bank of the Canal. There attempt to go to Adaz(sp) was not successful. We have

TELCOM

Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

4:40 p.m.

K: I forgot what I called you about.

S: I have talked to Brinegar and he will get right on it and call me back.

K: That would be the best solution. Call off the WSAG for 6:00.. What is my schedule for in the morning. They don't seem to share it with me.

S: An energy meeting at 10:00. You have nothing before that.

K: Will I get a book.

S: Too early. Do you want to hold that one.

K: I don't know what is in the book. How do I know?

S: I will get it over to you.

K: I am wondering about having a WSAG in the morning. I have a press conference at 11:00. Cancel th SRG.

END

TELECON

Sisco/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

4:40 pm

S: If you could see him tomorrow it would be very nice.

K: We have to get our ducks in a row. with the Saudis. I have
the Chilean Foreign Minister on my schedule -- and he can't do
anything for us.

S: Why don't I try to work something out with Jane and.

K: Tomorrow afternoon -- I have a press conference in the morning.

S: Tomorrow afternoon. I will call this guy and set it up for
tomorrow afternoon.

K: I want to keep them from doing something crazy.

S: Well the latest from the King... it just came in one hour ago. I have
developed a proposal. I wish I could meet with you.

K: I will meet with you. When I have something.

S: Well we have to revise the procedures. Everybody is so busy and no one
want to barge in on you. I will call the 7th floor and get them to get
this information into your file.

K: We have to get the bloody Saudi in. I should call him

S: OK

K: Alright, I will call him.

END

TELECON
Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister

October 11, 1973

5:00

K: I have not yet received your message but I expect to receive it shortly.

S: I have already sent somebody.

K: I was wondering if you would like to come down to talk to me. We could meet tomorrow morning at, say, 9:00.

S: Tomorrow morning at 9:00?

K: Or, say, 9:30?

S: Thank you very much. I don't have much to tell you. I'll be there at 9:30.

K: Good. I won't have a great deal of time but I think we could at least review the situation.

S: Alright, I don't have much information. Goodbye.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 01/29/88</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 6/24/88</td></tr></table>

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, Oct. 11, 1973

5:20 p.m.

K: The Soviet Ambassador called me about a UIP ticker #130 that said you said at the briefing that I am holding a press conference to discuss the stress of the Arab/Israeli war on Soviet/American relations.

M: Absolutely not so. I said in response to the last questions that if the circumstances permit the Secretary will have a press conference tomorrow. Dobrynin goes around with a lot of tickers that don't say what I say.

K: He just sent it over.

M: I have the transcript.

K: It says Kissinger will hold a news conference tomorrow to discuss the state of the Arab/Israeli war...

M: I will get it and also I will get the transcript.

K: You don't have to get the transcript. I just wondered what it was based on.

M: I would think that a press conference would be dominated by you on news of the war.

end

TELECON
Popper/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

5:30 p.m.

K. Not being able to reach you I called Sisco and was given some
information on the Security Council.

P. Did he tell you what he knows about the Council meeting? It
is at 6:45.

K. No, I didn't know that. The Kenyans called it and they will
want to talk first. Zayyat will now make some statement about
the bombing....

P. He did that...and he may do it again. I am surprised, Mr. Secretary, Scali talked to the President of the Council who told him Zayyat had called the meeting.

K. My point is for us to stay out of the line of fire and under any
circumstances for Scali to stay quiet.

P. Right. You will....

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 10/1/73</td></tr><tr><td>Subject: D. K. Scali</td></tr></table>

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

Oct. 11, 1973

5:35 p.m.

K. Can't reach Scali for possible instructions. I have reliable information that the Security Council is meeting tonight. It was called by the Kenyans who want to make a speech. Zayyat feels he has to express something and will express his outrage about the bombing and about the call for....

S. Sure, right.

K. Now, under no circumstances is Scali to say anything.

S. If the press ask... No press. Scali called and said he would like to see Malik. I told him not to see him until I get to talk to Henry.

K. He should not see Malik. I will do my best.... Tell him if it is an attack on us he should say nothing.

S. I will call Scali with these instructions. You are not to say anything.

<table><tr><td>10/11/73</td></tr><tr><td>8:52:07</td></tr><tr><td>Mon, Oct 11</td></tr><tr><td>1973</td></tr></table>

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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RECLASSIFIED
Author: E012958
Date: 6/14/94
D: NARA Doc

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON
Rush/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

6:50 p.m.

K. Ellsworth Bunker came in this afternoon and I asked him about Under Secretaries. I didn't give him any particular one, only four possible candidates: Sisco, Davis, Sam Burger, and Unger. I knocked out Berger and Unger right away. He thinks Mat Davis is by far the best.

R. Is that right?

SANITIZED

K. From whom?

R. I have been tapping my sources, including my own assistant. They know him and have worked with him and don't feel he is right for the job. I hear he is ambiguous.

K. You hear ambiguous reports about me, too.

R. I only hear good things about you, Henry. I would really rather go with Sisco. Let's face it, Ellsworth is a wonderful man but I don't think he has had any real contact with these men.

K. We will stay as it is with the Under Secretary position for a while.

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE</td></tr><tr><td>Author</td></tr><tr><td>E 012558</td></tr><tr><td>Subject</td></tr><tr><td>D. Ellsworth Bunker</td></tr><tr><td>Date</td></tr><tr><td>10/11/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

7:55 p.m.

K. Hello.

S. This is..., Henry. The switchboard just got a call from
10 Downing Street to inquire whether the President would be
available for a call within 30 minutes from the Prime Minister.
The subject would be the Middle East.

K. Can we tell them no? When I talked to the President he
was loaded.

S. We could tell him the President is not available and perhaps
he can call you.

K. I will be at Mr. Bradens and the President will be available
tomorrow morning our time.

S. Are you coming over here at all this evening?

K. No, first thing in the morning.

S. Did you talk to Schermehorn about the F-4s scheduled for
tomorrow?

K. I think two a day is fine.

S. Two a day can ....

K. Throw in another one and make it six.

S. They have in mind keeping a two a day schedule. Send
two from here and two from Europe and then two from here again.

K. For an indefinite period?

S. At least through six.

K. Then tell Dinitz he is getting at least six but that we may
keep it going.

S. Right, ok. I will say the President will not be available
until first thing in the morning but you will be this evening.

K. In fact, I would welcome it.

S. Very good.

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 11, 1973

8:10 p.m.

D. Good evening.

K. How are you?

D. All right.

K. I want to tell you about the conversation with Mr. Breman(?) He sounded now much more urgent even than yesterday. I don't have to know....He wanted to deliver a personal letter to the President. I told him I would have to think about it overnight, and in the meantime the British have approached us on two matters. They have been approached, as we have, by the King of Jordan who is under enormous pressure. He wants to move a brigade into Syria out of harms way but wants our assurance.

(The conversation was interrupted because of disconnection)

K. I am in an insane hurry. It was that the Jordans, in order to avoid the pressures, want to move a brigade out of Syria i which is out of harms way. They don't care what you do but they want to make sure you don't attack them.

D. Is it an infantry brigade?

K. An armor brigade.

D. Will they fight us or will they just stand there?

K. They will just stand there.

D. I will have to pass it on to my Government.

K. We will get you the name of the area.

D. This is called, Dr. Kissinger, to fight war with all of the conveniences.

K. He said it is a wooded area and not agreeable. Eagleburger will call you. Call me through the White House board. I promised the British an answer tonight. They have to promote a ceasefire and they are getting extremely restive. I told them

CLASSIFIED

Author E012858
Date 10/1/73
At: JARBA

-2-

to wait until tomorrow. My present plan is to tell the British Ambassador around one that they should start exploring it, which should delay it into Saturday to give us another 48 hours.

D. When you said ceasefire, both in regard to Britian and Russia, is that ceasefire and standstill?

K. ...But you should be in a good position.

D. My judgment is that you should be better off...With the situation in the far north after tonight I have an inkling that the Russians will not be interested in a standstill tomorrow.

K. Well, that is their problem. I can only deal with one thing at a time.

D. I wouldn't wish that on the Russians, Mr. Secretary, that they should have your mind.

K. If they now do have a new proposal I will have to think it over and we should have another 48 hours. I think I should get it going underway.

D. I think the important thing now is to gain time. I have another several things I would like to discuss.

K. I was told by Scowcroft only a half an hour ago that the planes will be on their way.

D. I was told this afternoon to call the Secretary of Transportation who was out. I talked to the Under Secretary who said he would help me and get back. Scowcroft said he would get back to me.

K. I was told half an hour ago they are forthcoming. I can't actually handle it at this moment. Ignatious and Brinager were meeting to work it out. Where are the El Al planes?

D. They sent two yesterday and one or two flew today.

K. I am moving heaven and earth here....I want to tell you another thing. We are sending two tomorrow, two the following day, and two the next day. That is better than one a day because it gets a pipeline going.

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER _3_ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON

October 11, 1973

K: I was told by Sisco that he had arranged with Schlesinger that MAC would charter those twenty airplanes. Now I have told Dinnitz that I had ... that that had been agreed to and now I find out that is wrong. Schlesinger says it can be done by Transportation. I think if we can do that it would be better.

S: That way we will get a lot more people into the act.

K: Hold on just a minute... Look, if Brinegar tells the guys to charter to the Israelis then we'll still be out of it. Can you talk to him?

S: OK

K: Look, if it can't be done, we will have to go back to Schlesinger to night because we have to be ready for the other thing tomorrow.

S: OK, I'll talk to him.

END