Newsweek
Monday, April 1, 2002

For now, America should avoid pressure for a final settlement and
help both sides agree on attainable goals. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

# What We Can Do

THE REAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVE AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's foreign policy (and count
among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread
call for Washington to play a dominant role. These pleas have been

given fresh impetus by the initiative of
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,
which proposes normalization of relations
between the Arab world and Israel if Israel
returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice
President Dick Cheney's journey to the
Middle East, intended to elicit Arab sup-
port for a possible showdown with Iraq,
was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an oc-
casion for a new initiative to end the Arab-
Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention
from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in
itself a considerable achievement for Saudi
diplomacy. At the same time, the near una-
nimity in Europe and the Arab world urg-
ing American intervention stems from the
hope that, in the end, we will impose on
Israel a settlement essentially identical to
the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diploma-
cy has been the catalyst for practically all
the progress the peace process made. But
given the explosive politics of the region, it
is all too easy to overestimate what is possi-
ble. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to set-
tle all issues in one negotiation of limited
duration at Camp David contributed to the
outbreak of the current warfare.

In present conditions, a comparison of
both sides' positions demonstrates that
another attempt at a negotiated final solu-
tion would not fare better. The only for-
mal plan by an Israeli government was put
forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at

Camp David. In it, he offered more than
90 percent of the disputed territories (the
formula was complex) but retained about
70 percent of the settlements. In ex-
change, the Palestinians were asked to re-
nounce any future claims, including the
right to return into Israel proper (though
they would be free to return to a Palestin-
ian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat
preferred the *intifada* to the implications
of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

Welcome as this engagement in the
peace process is—the first by an Arab
state not having a direct national conflict
with Israel—its specific terms represent a
restatement of a position that has pro-
duced the existing deadlock. The pre-
1967 “border” in Palestine—unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers

with Israel—was never an international
frontier but a ceasefire line established at
the end of the 1948 war. It was never rec-
ognized by any Arab state until after the
1967 war and has been grudgingly accept-
ed recently by states that do not yet recog-
nize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never
encountered an Israeli prime minister or
chief of staff who considered the '67 bor-
ders defensible, and especially if coupled
with an abandonment of a security posi-
tion along the Jordan River. This is be-
cause the '67 borders leave a corridor as
narrow as eight miles between Haifa and
Tel Aviv and put the border of Israel at the
edge of its international airport. More-
over, Israel would have to give up settle-
ments containing approximately 200,000
inhabitants (about 4 percent of its Jewish
population).

In return, Israel would achieve diplo-
matic relations with its neighbors. But in
almost all other negotiations, mutual
recognition of the parties is taken for
granted, not treated as a concession. In
fact, nonrecognition implies the legal
nonexistence of the other state, which, in
the context of the Middle East, is tanta-
mount to an option to destroy it. Once
granted, recognition can always be with-
drawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a
recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does for-
mal normalization involve much else: Is-
rael's peace agreement with Egypt of 23
years ago has brought little in the way of
enhanced economic or cultural relations
other than an exchange of ambassadors
who are rarely brought into play.

While the terms of the crown prince's
proposal represent no breakthrough, Sau-
di engagement could be important if it is
used to produce a ceasefire and to start ne-

(over)

-2-

gotiations without preconditions from either side. But if its ultimate purpose is to induce the United States to impose its specific provisions, it would undermine the security of Israel and ultimately the stability of the region.

The precariousness of Israel's position is paradoxical. Israel has never been more powerful, and at the same time never more vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically draining. The intifada has generated an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is growing despair over the seeming futility of the enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli casualties to that of the guerrillas going up, and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a certain point will not be tolerated by the United States, a sense of resignation is spreading. The desire to turn on the tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for peace at any price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played out for two generations now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional (and to bystanders), excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to trigger intervention by the international community, especially the United States. In the process, sanctuaries are established—however dubious their basis in international law—that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to the root of the guerrilla challenge. That process gradually erodes Israel's margin of survival even while the world's media and diplomats bewail its excesses. Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into paralysis.

ment are more a matter of adjectives than substance.

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of marginal utility in over coming this problem. Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against chal lenges that are likely to be ambiguous. The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against invasion from neighboring states. Aside from raising pro found domestic questions in the United States, this would bring with it an American veto of Israeli retaliation against less than all-out attack and be almost impossible to apply against the resumption of guerrilla warfare.

What, then, are the alternatives? The beginning of wisdom is to recognize the impossibility of a final settlement under cur rent conditions. Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invoca tion of unattainable goals will foster a gener al climate of irresponsibility.

Yet a less ambitious mediation may have some prospects, if for no other reason than that the status quo is becoming increasingly intolerable for all the parties. The Palestinians have fought with dedication and ferocity and produced the classic para digm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to estab lish. For the other Arab states, their impo tence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able for domestic reasons to support an overall settlement.

Two broad choices present themselves. The first is to let the conflict in Palestine play itself out unless and until one or both of the parties are willing to adjust their posi tion. The second is for a more active American role in pursuit of more limited objectives. The former course is difficult to sustain in the face of pressures from allies and from friends in the Arab sphere. In the present situation, the Palestinians will not stop because they believe they are winning; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence, especially if the outcome rewards terrorism. Only the United States has a chance, however slight, to bridge that gap. It must urge Israel toward a peace pro gram; it must impress upon its Arab friends the limits of achievable concessions.

3/20/2002

Israel cannot sustain support for its mili-
tary actions internationally-or, in the long
run, even in America-without a peace pro-
gram. The Palestinians cannot achieve their
maximum objectives except at the risk of
destroying their own society. A possible
interim agreement would envisage estab
lishing a secure border, including the
removal of outlying settlements, the cre
ation of a Palestinian state with contiguous
territory and the elaboration of a code of
coexistence between the two states. Issues
such as the holy places and refugees would
be left to a later negotiation. The United
States should play a major role in generat
ing such an outcome, provided it can get
Arab agreement to the strategy it implies. So
long as the United States appears to be grad
ually veering toward imposing the '67 bor
ders, it tempts continuation of the conflict.
And such an outcome would also validate
terrorism as a form of warfare.

If America is to contribute to gen
ine progress, it must help dispel the
mirages of current diplomacy. It must back
a program that respects Arab dignity and
concerns and Israel's necessities for sur
vival. Drifting is no longer an option.

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By Henry A. Kissinger

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepida-
tion. Hope, because the rage of both parties
is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation,
because both sides know their objectives to
be in many respects incompatible. The
secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of
the status quo. For Palestinians, it is the
imposition of terms reducing Israel to its
1967 borders and facilitating the eventual
destruction of the Jewish state. For

Europeans, it is an outcome very similar to
the '67 borders plan, which would be guar-
anteed internationally and would reconcile
the Islamic world with the West. For
America, it is a "compromise" that would be
acceptable to all parties and finally end ten-
sions.

Many who generally criticize America's
foreign policy (and count among our sins
obliviousness to their advice) are joining the
widespread call for us to play a more active

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role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, a principal reason for the near unanimity urging an American role is the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diplomacy has been the catalyst for practically all the progress that has been made. But given the explosive politics of the region, it is all too easy to overestimate what is possible. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to settle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

----- End of column -----

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both sides' positions demonstrates the impossibility of a negotiated final solution.

The only formal offer an Israeli government has ever made regarding a final settlement was presented by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, where he offered over 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the Intifada.

According to its impressive outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in return for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return

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Welcome as it is, the Abdullah plan,
unless modified, represents a restatement of
a position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"—unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with
Israel—was never an international frontier
but a ceasefire line established at the end of
the 1948 war. It was never recognized by
any Arab state until after the 1967 war and
has been grudgingly accepted recently by
states that do not yet recognize the legitima-
cy of Israel. I have never encountered an
Israeli prime minister or chief of staff—and I
have known them all—who considered the
'67 borders defensible, and especially so if
coupled with an abandonment of a security
position along the Jordan river. And main-
taining that position makes sense. The '67
borders leave a corridor only eight miles

-------- End of column --------
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the edge of its interna-
tional airport. Moreover, Israel would have
to give up settlements containing 200,000

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inhabitants (almost 5 percent of its Jewish population of).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomatic relations with its neighbors. But in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies the legal non-existence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an intent to destroy it.

Once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization recognize much else:

Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in the way of economic or cultural normalization other than an exchange of ambassadors who are rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons, the Crown Prince's proposal is no breakthrough. The call for America to impose it is not simply an issue of diplomatic preference; it goes to the heart of Israel's ability to survive.

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vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly
able to inflict disproportionate losses on
Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has
evolved into a middle class advanced society
and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the
Intifada has generated a strange ambiva-
lence in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo
agreement the Israeli peace movement
viewed reconciliation with the Arab world
primarily in terms of psychological reassur-
ance; land would be traded for peace even
though the Arab quid pro quo would be
revocable. But since the Intifada, the vast
majority of Israelis no longer believe in rec-
onciliation; they want victory and the crush-
ing of their Arab adversaries.

--------- End of column---------

At the same time, there is a growing sense
of despair over the seeming futility of the
enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli
casualties to that of the guerrillas going up,
and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a
certain point will not be tolerated by the
United States, a sense of resignation is
spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on

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their tormentors is beginning to be offset by
signs of a hunger for peace at any price.
Israel finds itself facing the classic
dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played
out for two generations now. The guerrillas
not only do not recoil from terrorism but
practice an egregious form of it because a
violent, emotional (and to bystanders)
excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to
trigger intervention by the international
community. In the process, sanctuaries are
established—however dubious their basis in
international law—that, to all practical pur-
poses, eliminate the capacity of the defend-
ing forces to get to the root of the guerrilla
challenge. Tunisia played that role during
the Algerian war; Cambodia and Laos dur-
ing the Vietnam war. The pattern is now
recurring with respect to Zone A and the
refugee camps in the West Bank.

The chief difference, however, is that
France in Algeria and America in Vietnam
were fighting on distant territories; they had
the ultimate, albeit painful, option to with-
draw. For Israel, survival is at stake, not
colonies or geopolitical interests.

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Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into ambivalent rigidity. The other day, I asked a high-ranking Israeli army officer what immediate strategy he advocated for the current struggle. He replied: an all-out attack on the Palestinian authority. When asked what ultimate outcome he expected, he said the imposition of some version of the '67 borders.

Yet this progressive demoralization will not be solved by the imposition of the indefensible '67 frontiers. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the End of column

rest of the world) that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western sense—as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation. In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule. The real schism is between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle, and those who believe that an agreement now would be a

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better strategy to rally forces for a renewed
struggle later on. And Israelis will be rein-
forced in this sense of futility by the West's
response to the Intifada, which so often is
directed more against the targets than the
perpetrators of terrorism.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a
"final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be
replaced by radical successors. A peace
agreement will not quell but may stimulate
the intransigence of Hammas and of radical
states. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an
entrance price into negotiations because his
radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a
peace settlement? Thus the differences
between a permanent and an interim settle-
ment are more a matter of adjectives than
substance.

NATO, American or other third-party
guarantees are of marginal utility in over-
coming this problem. Nobody can seriously
believe that the European countries would
go to war for Israel, especially against chal-
lenges that are likely to be ambiguous. The

DEPT:

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only possible solution would be an
American guarantee against invasion from
neighboring states. Aside from raising pro-
found domestic questions in the United
States, this would bring with it an American
veto of Israeli retaliation against less than
all-out attack and be almost impossible to
apply against the resumption of guerrilla
warfare.

--------- End of column ---------

impossibility of a final settlement under cur-
rent conditions. Some crises can only be
managed, not solved. The constant invoca-
tion of unattainable goals will foster a gener-
al climate of irresponsibility.

Yet a less ambitious mediation may have
some prospects, if for no other reason than
that the status quo is becoming increasingly
intolerable for all the parties. The
Palestinians have fought with dedication
and ferocity and produced the classic para-
digm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla
wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be
approaching where the costs of the war
exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil

MIDKISS2

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PG:

society the guerrillas are seeking to estab-
lish. For the other Arab states, their impo-
tence on the Palestine issue threatens in
time to radicalize their domestic politics.

The first is to let the conflict in Palestine
play itself out unless and until one or both of
the parties are willing to adjust their posi-
tion. The second is for a more active

American role in pursuit of more limited
objectives. The former course is difficult to
sustain in the face of pressures from allies
and from friends in the Arab sphere. In the
present situation, the Palestinians will not
stop because they believe they are winning;
the Israelis will not yield because they fear
for their existence, especially if the outcome
rewards terrorism. Only the United States
has a chance, however slight, to bridge that
gap. It must urge Israel toward a peace pro-
gram; it must impress upon its Arab friends
the limits of achievable concessions.

Israel cannot sustain support for its mili-
tary actions internationally—or, in the long

MIDKISS2

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run, even in America—without a peace pro-
gram. The Palestinians cannot achieve their
maximum objectives except at the risk of
destroying their own society. A possible
interim agreement would envisage estab-
lishing a secure border, including the
removal of outlying settlements, the cre-

ation of a Palestinian state with contiguous
territory and the elaboration of a code of
coexistence between the two states. Issues
such as the holy places and refugees would
be left to a later negotiation. The United
States should play a major role in generat-
ing such an outcome, provided it can get
Arab agreement to the strategy it implies. So
long as the United States appears to be grad-
ually veering toward imposing the '67 bor-
ders, it tempts continuation of the conflict.
And such an outcome would also validate
terrorism as a form of warfare.

If America is to contribute to gen-
ine progress, it must help dispel the
mirages of current diplomacy. It must back
a program that respects Arab dignity and
concerns and Israel's necessities for sur-
vival. Drifting is no longer an option.

MIDKISS2 Page 12 of 13

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