THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1984

Dear Henry:

Eight months ago I asked you to assume the chairmanship of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. I did so with confidence based on my keen appreciation of your record of distinguished service to our Nation. Few share your qualifications in the foreign policy field, or possess the stature needed to bring about a reasoned, bipartisan consensus on the nature of the economic, political and security situation in Central America, one of the most pressing foreign policy issues facing us today.

Your Commission's report is a landmark contribution to our understanding of that region's complex problems. Most importantly, you have given us a practical blueprint that will help my Administration and the Congress come to grips with these problems and make progress toward their solution.

In this regard, I hope the same spirit of bipartisanship that went into preparing the report will go into the passage of the Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative legislation I have proposed. That legislation is drawn from the recommendations of the Commission, and I am confident that it represents well the blueprint you created. I firmly believe, and I am sure you agree, that early passage will signal to the Central American countries the commitment of the United States to their economic well-being and political security.

I am convinced that without your leadership the historic contribution made by the Bipartisan Commission may not have been realized. The Nation is in your debt for your unselfish service.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

MAY 22 1984

It seems to me, however, that -- and not just to me, but
to my colleagues on the Commission -- that the government of El
Salvador must be able to find a way of winning this conflict without
recourse to such methods. And that we must bring the maximum influence
to bear on their government to put and end to this. And that there
will be no excuse if an end is not brought to it in a measurable
time, as long as we keep in mind that it is a chaotic situation and
cannot happen from one day to the next -- but it must happen in a
measurable, and in a short, time. On that there was no disagreement.

Q But will we inevitably lose this, if the right-wing terrorism -- the human rights violations -- don't stop?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Will we lose the struggle if the right-wing terrorism doesn't stop? We will certainly lose domestic support in the United States if the right-wing terrorism doesn't stop, and we will lose the possibility of a democratic center and therefore, in the long-run, perhaps the possibility of getting popular support.

Q If that's the case, though -- just one last thing --
if that's the case, don't we have to have a policy that, in no
uncertain terms, tells the Salvadoran establishment that it must stop.
I mean -- is it enough to operate by persuasion and -- and without --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I think it is always -- one can
always make a caricature of a problem by citing the alternatives in
the most absolute terms -- either you

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wreck everything that exists, are prepared to wreck everything that exists or you can get an end to the death squads.

I think we can get an end to the death squads within the clarification that I have put forward. And how to do this and the methods to do this, abstract persuasion by itself, the eloquence of any one emissary alone will not do it. It will require a certain amount of pressure to bring it about. And I think they also have to know that we are determined to assist them in the guerrilla war and that we do not make an exact equivalence between what we are supporting and the guerrillas.

Q If I understand you correctly, to follow up, you are saying in your clarification that you are absolutely opposed to cutting off military assistance, no matter what, if it would lead to Marxist-Leninist victory.

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Well, you know, "no matter what" goes very far; but I would think it is inherently illogical in the name of human rights to bring into power people who have never demonstrated the slightest concern for human rights and who have never permitted their governments to change from their totalitarian way in any country in which they were in office. So, in that sense, yes. But "no matter what" means that we have absolutely no influence over a government to which we give a large amount of aid.

After all, the intensity with which we support aid requests before the Congress, the scale of the aid requests, I mean, there are innumerable ways that we have. And, moreover, it is my impression -- it was our impression when we were there -- that there are many people in Salvador on the government side that would like -- that share our feelings. So it is not a question that nothing happens or everything happens.

Q I can understand your saying that -- as you do here -- that you would rather have U.S., American vital security interests protected than the human rights thing enforced vigorously --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Well, you know, when you put it that way you are already sort of loading it that, you know -- Yes, but fundamentally I'm saying it makes no sense, in the name of human rights, to bring Marxist-Leninists into office.

Q When you say -- I think -- aren't you saying to the death squads that "you people who have killed 30,000 of your own citizens, bad as you are, you are preferable to Marxist-Leninists"?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I'm saying, "I am confident that we can take care of the death squads without going to the other extreme."

Q So, hypothetically, you could see a statute that would require the administration to certify progress in the human rights area for assistance over and above a -- perhaps, a base level. Is that what you're --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I could -- You know, now, I'm going beyond what the Commission said. I certainly, as an individual, could imagine -- I could imagine a statute to that effect very easily.

Q You've made a big jump in logic I would like you to explain for us. When you say that this would just wipe away the existing structure, why do you think a requirement for certification would, as you seem to suggest, automatically destroy what's there and --

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COMMISSION OFFICIAL: But I'm not saying that. I have signed a report supporting the conditionality clause. I am saying it should be interpreted in a manner that, while it brings considerable pressure on the government to change, stops short of overthrowing the existing structure. I'm not --

Q Give us a model then.

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I'm not saying the certification procedure -- we have not, incidentally, used the word "certification" -- that the recording procedure would automatically overthrow the government. I'm not saying that at all.

Q Give us a model then. What do you suggest? You've described --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I am suggesting that we make clear our concern as to human rights objectives and our unalterable position to the death squads. I have signed a report in which we say that this can be enshrined -- that this could be enshrined in legislation requiring periodic reports on the subject and, obviously, that the amount and kind of aid is affected by this.

The only point I'm saying that I want to make clear and on which -- I don't know what -- I didn't try to get a majority of the Commission, I didn't try to take a vote on that proposition for a variety of reasons. In interpreting this, I would like the administration and the Congress to keep in mind the limits beyond which it should not be pushed, but also to keep in mind the limits to which it should be pushed.

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COMMISSION OFFICIAL: -- the Sandinistas hinted that this is something that they might consider. But I would not pay too much attention to it at this point.

All we can do as a commission -- we cannot conduct a negotiation. We cannot say what the reaction of the United States should be to the ebb and flow of various proposals and counter-proposals that are made. What we can do is to state what we think objectively the terms, the conditions are under which security can be achieved in Central America. If we can reduce military forces in Central America to traditional Central American levels, if we can remove foreign military advisors and bases, if Nicaragua becomes another, a normal state in the region, and if there is advance towards pluralism in all of the states, then we believe there are objective conditions for security.

Now our President might well decide that he will compromise one or the other of those conditions in the process of negotiations. He will then run an increased risk, but he has to balance this against the risk of not coming to an agreement and the consequences of that. That is not for a commission -- a commission cannot, offering a program, also offer various alternative positions because they will then become the starting point for --

Q When you did your research on this, did you come to the conclusion that if all foreign forces literally were removed, all the Cubans from Nicaragua, and the Americans from Salvador, the indigenous insurgents in Salvador could be defeated today? And if some miracle occurred and all of the forces were withdrawn --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: First of all, all the Americans in Salvador, there are not that many Americans that would fall under this category in Salvador. The more

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[LW]

serious problem would occur in Honduras as far as military forces are concerned. We only have 55 military advisers --

Q Well there are -- there are perhaps a few others, and other things -- but that wouldn't -- in other words -- military aid would cease also, wouldn't it?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- I mean, if the Nicaraguans were cut off from military, outside military aid, wouldn't the Salvadoran?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: No, the proposition is that there would be agreed levels of outside military support. And that, of course, would have to be negotiated.

Our belief is not that insurgents be totally defeated in Salvador -- that's a big order. But insurgents reduced to normal -- what to the sort of proportions that have occurred previously in Central America as an indigenous problem, without part of an international intelligence and military apparatus. That, I think, can be achieved.

Q We were told that one reason you met last week with the President to -- giving him an early briefing on the contents of the report -- was so that he could take into account some of its fiscal components in preparing his budget. Have you any reason to believe that he's inclined to accept some of these on the fiscal side?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I don't know. It is -- you're quite correct -- I met with him in order to give him our preliminary -- our conclusions as they then stood, and I knew they weren't going to change, as to the budgetary implications. I must say, I met with a group of Senators this morning. They were of the view that this program ought to be presented as an omnibus program. That it should not be presented as being added to the -- to individual appropriations bills where it might fit. And that the Congress should be asked to commit itself to an overall approach.

Q Multi-year?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: That certainly would be put to them in our briefing. Now, these were all Republican Senators this morning -- it was not our choice --

Q Can you clarify your aid figure?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: In a second. -- and, I must say -- not speaking for the Commission because we did not discuss it -- I think that that is a good idea, and I think that it is important that a coherent vision of what it is we want in Central America be put -- so that people can take a look at it?

Can I clarify the aid figure?

Q On page 53, you talk about -- of the $24 billion that will be required in five years, $12 billion --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: No. The $24 billion -- that are required by 1990 --

Q All right -- six years --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: In six years.

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LCA

with the immediate crisis than with the long-range crisis. Certainly, I was in a position of responsibility during those twenty years and I cannot recall, although probably some smart person is going to find that I'm not telling the truth right now, but I do not recall anyone ever submitting a memorandum saying, "Look at the situation in Central America. It's getting out of control and you'd better start thinking about it before ten years later, you may have to have a bipartisan commission on Central America."

The general attitude of government is, "If it isn't broken, don't fix it." So they wait until it's broken. And that's true of every administration and -- how to build into our -- when you're Secretary of State, what awaits you when you come into the office is a file selected by your staff of incoming cables that require immediate attention. And there's nothing in the system that naturally leads our top officials in any administration towards long-range problems. That is a great problem and I have often thought that -- I think a reorganization of the Department I know best, the State Department would -- you see, unless you have somebody who's entitled to raise the issue and unless some time is freed on a calendar, it doesn't

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could be assembled. I would like to point out to this group that
we have made one contribution to report writing, for which I hope
some of you will give us credit, we dropped both the phase "carrot
and stick" and also the phase "hearts and minds." (Laughter.) And
I hope somebody will give us credit for making that contribution
to --

Q Do you think this report could be interpreted
as an endorsement of a particular candidate in the coming election
in El Salvador?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Oh, look, I don't know how this
report is interpreted; but I think I am not giving away any secret
if I tell you that it was the unanimous conviction of the Commission
that a victory of Duarte would be compatible with the objectives of
the process towards democratization. But, obviously, our assignment
was not to endorse any particular candidate. But it would be wrong
to leave any doubt on that subject. That --

Q -- the converse also the conclusion, that the
victory of his opponent would be detrimental to the objectives of
this report?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: You're speaking now about the
private views of the members of the Commission, which I am interpreting
for you and it may be that I will be shot down by some of my
colleagues.

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[L]

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Well, but now he is President
Reagan and I don't believe --

Q Well, he will also be candidate Reagan for a
period of some months --

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Well, but if he needs a foreign
policy adviser on the plane, he's in deep trouble, I mean --
(laughter) -- he has a Secretary of State, he has a Secretary of
Defense, he has the whole machinery of government. (Laughter.)

So, I think that issue is certainly not going to arise.

Q We will not see you in public life again?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I'm not --

Q We're not going to have -- to kick around anymore?

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: I'm not saying that -- I certainly
have no aspirations.

Q Is there any need -- in one manner or another --
to "go to the source" in this connection? Is there anything either
diplomatically or militarily that we should be doing vis-a-vis Cuba,
or diplomatically with the Soviet Union to solve these problems.

COMMISSION OFFICIAL: Well, we have stated in this
report that we don't really see how we can negotiate on this problem
with the Soviet Union without getting into a spheres-of-influence
kind of discussion -- which would be very difficult to conduct or to
sustain politically.

We did not address the issue of negotiations with Cuba
which has a long, and complicated, background -- but which, at some
point in this process, could certainly occur.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

3:32 P.M. EST