-35-

The race in strategic arms diverts resources into strategically unproductive areas -- particularly away from forces for local

use where an imbalance could be turned into a rapid disadvantage to our disadvantage, indeed against us. Thus if no restraint is developed, the competition

in strategic arms can have profound consequences for the future of international relations, and indeed of civilization. A realistic reduction of tensions can not coexist with unrestrained and aimless strategic competition. Therefore,

the United States has sought and achieved, since 1963, a series of arms control agreements which build some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok accord leads to a new agreement, an even more important advance will have been made.

-37-

called Minuteman. The Administration then in office chose
~~only entirely small, sophisticated and highly accurate~~
to build an arsenal of small, sophisticated and highly accurate
656 on 4/4/65
ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles, along with heavy
bombers; we deployed them rapidly, and then stopped our build-up
~~when the programs were complete,~~
of launchers unilaterally in the 1960's. The Soviets made the opposite
| continued to
| decisions; they chose larger, heavier missiles; they build up their
forces through the 1960's and 1970's; they passed our numerical levels
by 1969-1970, and continued to build at an average of
200 missiles a year until stopped by the first SALT agreement.

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago on
| by
| while
both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight, our missiles
are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity and sophistication;
| and
we also possess larger numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the
#

-38-

SALT agreement was signed the Soviet Union was building at the
rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a year while

we were building none as a result of our own unilateral decisions.

Since American programs existed only on the drawing boards,

there was no way to restore the numerical balance before 1977
when more modern sea-based missiles and bombers were
scheduled to become operational.

The Interim SALT Agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers
of launchers on both sides for five years -- thereby limiting the
momentum of Soviet building programs without affecting any
American program. It stopped the Soviet build-up of heavy
missile launchers. It forced the Soviets to dismantle 210
older land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on

-40-

missile defense -- a competition that promised no
strategic advantage, but potentially serious instabilities and
the expenditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were therefore without
question in the American national interest. We made clear
from the beginning that in the five-year respite gained
by the 1972 Interim Agreement, it was

our intention to negotiate a long-term pact on offensive weapons
that would place equal numerical ceilings on both sides,
one new program become operational. This
We were castigated for two years for agreeing to unequal
is precisely what
aggregates though we had no means of changing them until

-41-

President Ford achieved what we had always promised in Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2400 strategic weapons covering strategic missiles and heavy bombers -- but not counting any of our forward-based aircraft and missiles in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2400 is lower than the level the Soviet Union already had reached, and would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons while our planned force levels would not need to be reduced or delayed. An equal ceiling of 1320 was placed on numbers of strategic weapons with multiple warheads.

Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain frozen. These limits would cap strategic numerical competition for a 10-year in numbers.

This is not a question of loyalties but of an evolving technology which will respect what we must remain diligent.

-42-

period, yet preserve all the programs we need to assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency.

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem. But turning to the Vladivostok accord with if we succeed in concluding the SALT agreement now being negotiated, we will have crossed the threshold between total, unrestrained competition and the difficult but promising beginning of long-term strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces. The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase of the negotiations starting in 1977.

One would have thought that these accomplishments would speak for themselves. Instead they have triggered a well-~~of charges which mislead the American people and our friends,~~

-45-

that have been explained or are still being dealt with and

wild allegations that have no foundation. They confuse developments

that may concern us with actions that are prohibited by the

agreement. They give inaccurate figures and data which often can

be refuted only by divulging sensitive intelligence information. Yet

with all the recent flurry of allegations no recommendations are

made of what ~~precise~~ countermeasures we should undertake, or

how to assess the significance of any given alleged violation.

Would those who inaccurately allege violations simply throw over all

the agreements, regardless of benefits they provide to the

United States? Would they halt the negotiation of further agreements?

What new programs beyond those already planned would they undertake?

- 47 -

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one
question; what is the alternative? If the SALT process falters,
we must consider what new or additional strategic programs
we would undertake, their likely cost, and above all, their
strategic purpose. An accelerated strategic buildup over the
next five years could cost as much as an additional 30 billion
dollars, as both sides engage in new programs. Failing
a satisfactory agreement, this may well be the path we
must travel. It would be a tragic missed opportunity. For,
in the process of such a build-up, and the atmosphere it would
engender, it would be difficult to return to serious negotiations
for some time. Tensions are likely to increase; a new, higher
baseline will emerge from which future negotiations would

- 48 -

eventually have to be undertaken. And in the end, no one will
have gained a strategic advantage. At the least they will have
wasted resources. At worst, they will have increased the
risks of nuclear war.

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder these
alternatives as well. Their sense of responsibility must
equal ours if there is to be an equitable agreement based on
strict reciprocity.

Let me sum up:

alert

-- We will remain to any possible violations.

We will never stand for the violation of a
solemn treaty or agreement and we will remain

alert

-- We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic
balance against us; we will spend what is

by violations of agreements, by
unilateral agreements
or by neglect of our
own programs;

- 49 -

necessary to maintain a strategic equilibrium

-- The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner strategic balance -- because it is in our interest, and because we have an obligation to our own people and to world peace.

## The Soviet Union and Angola

strives to achieve

As the United States pursues a more hopeful world, it will never forget that global stability and security rest upon an equilibrium between the great powers. If the Soviet Union is permitted to exploit opportunities for expansion, the hopes we have for progress toward a more selectively peaceful international order will ultimately be undermined.

- 50 -

This is why the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa with nearly 200 million dollars of military equipment, its advisors, and its transport force, the large expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time in modern history that the People's Republic of Angola represents the first time in modern history that the U. S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted the Executive's action while the President is on a visit. It was in the process of meeting this kind of threat.

- 51 -

When one great power tips the balance of forces decisively in a local conflict through its military intervention -- and meets no resistance -- an ominous precedent is set, of *leave enormous consequence* even if the intervention occurs in a seemingly remote area. Such a precedent cannot be tolerated if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if such a pattern is not broken now, we will face harder choices and higher costs in the future.

It is in this context that we have framed our goals in the law proposed. Angola: a ceasefire; withdrawal of all outside forces -- Soviet, Cuban and South African; cessation of foreign military involvement; and negotiations among all three Angolan factions.

- 52 -

This approach was taking effect last fall. In the hope of making a dangerously escalating situation, the United States provided our financial support to those in Angola -- a majority -- who sought to resist Soviet and Cuban domination. Using this as leverage, we undertook an active diplomacy to promote an African solution to an African problem. We acted quietly to avoid making a major crisis and raising the stakes of prestige on both sides. It was feared that the Soviet-backed faction would dominate totally by Independence day, November 11.

Our assistance prevented that defeat. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention became more and more evident. On December 9, the President warned Moscow of the consequences of continued meddling and offered to

- 53 -

cooperate in encouraging a peaceful outcome. The Soviet
Union appeared to have second thoughts. It halted its airlift
from December 9 until December 24.

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate over-
It was denigrated that we explain publicly why
one effort wasortsent - and then one efforts
whelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. After the Senate vote

to block any further aid to Angola, the Cubans more than doubled
their forces and Soviet military aid was resumed on an
larger scale. The scope of Soviet-Cuban intervention increased
drastically -- Cuba has more than doubled its forces
since and the Soviet airlift has been resumed; the cooperativeness
of Soviet diplomacy declined. Since then the situation has continued
to deteriorate.

The analogy with Vietnam is totally false; this nation
must have the maturity to make elemental distinctions. U.S.

- 55 -

scope for an African solution. The Angola situation is one in
which diplomacy without leverage is impotent, yet direct
military confrontation would involve unnecessary risks.

This is precisely one of those grey areas where secret
unpublished methods are crucial if we are to have any prospect of
influencing events short of direct conflict.

And we complied totally with Congress' new standard
Executive Legislative consultation on court activities.
of consultation. Between July and December 1975 we discussed the
Angolan situation, and what we were doing about it, with more
than two dozen Senators, 150 Congressmen, and over 100
staff members of both Houses. Eight Congressional Committees

- 56 -

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be eased out by the Africans themselves over a period of time. This may or may not prove true. But such an argument, when carried to its logical conclusion, implies that we can abandon the world to interventionist forces, and hope for the best. And it is

of little solace to those under attack, whose future is being decided now. The degree of Soviet and Cuban intervention is unprecedented; they will have effectively determined the outcome. There is no evidence to support the claim that they will be quickly removed or that other nations may not draw conclusions dangerous to our long-term interests.

Those who draw such facile comfort from the eventual expulsion of Soviet influence from some countries in Africa

- 58 -

Where are we now? By failing to respond to an early stage of expansionism, we may well be tempting miscalculation and necessitating a greater response in the future. If we do not exercise our responsibilities to maintain the international balance, if Congress and the Executive are unable to act in concert when vital national interests are affected, the prospects for world security are ominous.

The time has come -- both in Washington and in Moscow -- to recognize clearly the implications of Soviet and Cuban actions in Angola. Only then can this country effectively tailor its

-59-

policy to the long term challenge of Soviet power. Let us not

bemuse ourselves with facile slogans about not becoming the

world's policeman. For it can never be in our interest to

have the Soviet Union as the world's policeman. There are

many crises in the world where the United States cannot and

should not intervene. But here we face a challenge in Soviet-

blatant challenge, which could have been averted if we had been

allowed to act prudently with limited means at the early stage.

The Congress' action, forcing this out onto center stage,

simultaneously escalated the significance of the crisis and

guaranteed our defeat.

To claim that Angola is not an important country, or that

-60-

the United States has no important interests there, begs the
principal question. If the United States is seen to waiver in
the face of massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will
be the perception of leaders around the world as they make
decisions concerning their future security? What conclusions
are they to draw when Cuba sends over 11 thousand combat
troops and the Soviet Union send 200 million dollars in military
equipment while the United States refuses even financial
assistance to friends fighting for their very existence? And
what conclusions will an unopposed superpower draw when the
next opportunity for intervention beckons?

This Government has a duty to make clear that Angola sets

no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again.

-61-

Congress and the Executive must come together in this --
in the national interest and in the interest of world peace.

The Administration will continue to make this case
however unpopular it may be. National leaders must stand
naturally believe that Americans will long
for what is right and what they believe to be in the national
remain indifferently to the dispirited exasperation
interest.
force and vast supplies of arms to compose minority
governments, especially when the exasperated
force comes from a nation in the Western Hemisphere.
National Strength and the Debate at Home
Americans may be
sore distance

We live in a world without simple answers. We hold
our values too dear to relinquish defending them; we hold
human life too dear to cease the quest for a secure peace.

The first requirement of stability is to maintain our defenses
and the balance of power. The highest aim of policy in the
nuclear age must be to create out of the sterile equilibrium

-62-

of force a more positive relationship of peace.

America has the material assets to do the job. Our military might is unmatched. Our economic and technological strength dwarfs any other. Our democratic heritage is vibrant and cherished by hundreds of millions around the world.

Our problems therefore are of our own making--self-doubt, division, irresolution. We must once again become a confident, united and determined people.

Foreign nations must be able to deal with America as an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. If our divisions paralyze our international efforts, it is America as a whole that will suffer. If our unity brings success, it is the nation as a whole that will benefit. We have no more

-63-

(N)

restoring the partnership

urgent task than that of achieving a new sense of trust

and shared purpose between the American people, the

Congress, and the Executive, a new partnership that

can enable the President of the United States, in his

constitutionally-determined role, to address the world

with the central authority of the spokesman of a united and

purposeful America.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But restraint
is the cement of national cohesion. It is time to end the
self-torment and obsession with our guilt which has
threatened to paralyze us for too many years. It is time
to purge ourselves of the vicious accusations and the
constant assault on motives which threaten our security
and our future. It is time to stop dismantling our national
institutions and undermining our national confidence.

-64-

Let us stop pretending that restricting credits to 300 million
dollars can change the Soviet domestic structure but that a
tenth of that amount must not be spent to resist Soviet adventures
in distant continents.

Let us end the vilification that implies that the inevitable
growth of Soviet strength results from U.S. policies and ask
ourselves what we can do to shape a coexistence within which
freedom can thrive.

Let us learn -- even in an election year -- the self-discipline
to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive
process.

One of the forgotten truths of our history is that our
Founding Fathers were Men of great sophistication in foreign affairs.

-65-

They understood the balance of power; they made use of the
divisions of Europe for the advantage of our own Revolution.

They understood the need for a strong executive to conduct the
nation's diplomacy. They grasped that America required
economic, political, and moral links with other nations.

They saw that our ideals were universal *ideals* and they
understood and welcomed the impact of the American experiment
on the destinies of all mankind.

In our age whose challenges are without precedent, we need
once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our ideals must
give us strength -- rather than be used as an issue for abdication.

Our pragmatic tradition must help us understand reality and
shape it, rather than *generate* an obsession with technical detail

-66-

or method without purpose. Our love of our country must inspire us to persevere with patience, dedication and unity and not to consume our substance in civil strife. Our idealism should remind us that we remain the beacon of hope for all those who love liberty and that this imposes a heavy responsibility on us.

The American people want an effective foreign policy. They want America to continue to help shape the international order of the coming generation according to our ideals. We have done great things as a united people. We have it in our power to live our third century with the vibrancy and optimism that have enshrined our two centuries in greatness. As we celebrate our Bicentennial let us prove ourselves worthy as mankind's greatest hope for a just and bountiful future.

*****************