August 5, 1959

Letter to the Editor
Mr. Arthur H. Sulzberger
Publisher, New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York 36, New York

Dear Mr. Sulzberger:

The announcement of the exchange of visits between President
Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev has been greeted with so much
enthusiasm that it may seem ungracious to utter a word of caution.
Nevertheless a warning seems in order. It is true that Mr. Khrushchev
during his visit will have a first hand opportunity to learn of the
peaceful intentions of the American people and our productive ability.
And there is no doubt that Mr. Eisenhower will impress Mr. Khrushchev
and later on the Russian people with his sincerity and good will. The
question is whether such intangibles will have any effect on the issues
we face, or whether they outweigh the dangers of our current policy.
It is after all possible that Mr. Khrushchev is so intransigent not
because he fails to understand contemporary America but because he
understands it too well.

Khrushchev's previous meeting with the President was followed
by the sale of arms to Egypt, the perpetuation of the division of
Germany, the suppression of the Hungarian revolt and innumerable threats
of missile and nuclear war. Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Great Britain in
1956 did not prevent the exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East
or the threat of rocket attacks during the Suez crisis six months later.
Neither the travels in America of Mr. Mikoyan nor those of Mr. Kozlov
have produced the promised relaxation of tensions. Indeed Mr. Mikoyan's
visit was followed by a noticeable sharpening of Soviet policy.

The President is reported to have expressed puzzlement that
Mr. Khrushchev has failed to heed our repeated statements that we were
determined to defend Berlin. But the explanation may not be so difficult.
A great nation is most convincing through actions, not through policy
declarations. And as Mr. Khrushchev contemplates the Western world he
has little reason to be impressed. He sees nations quibbling about
which technical expedients they might concede; he notes the steady
shrinking of Western conventional power. He observes in the United
States a greater concern with inflation than with economic growth. We

Mr. Arthur H. Sulzberger

2.

August 5, 1959

have not succeeded in devising dynamic, creative programs for our
relations with the underdeveloped countries or with Europe. The
West's inward insecurity has resulted in an obsession with determining
Soviet intentions. Delegations of political leaders from all Western
countries and from almost all political parties descend on the Communist
capital creating the impression that an interview with Mr. Khrushchev is
almost a prerequisite for domestic political success.

Visitors have repeatedly commented on the cockiness of Mr.
Khrushchev. What else should we expect of a man who took over a
bewildered country in 1953, weathered three satellite upheavals and
innumerable purges and yet constantly improved his position in foreign
policy. As Mr. Khrushchev contemplates the outside world, it must
seem that the international situation confirms only too well the Marxist
prediction of a demoralized, constantly shrinking democratic community.
It is not inconceivable that Mr. Khrushchev may believe that Lenin
established the revolution, Stalin solidified it in Russia and that
under his stewardship it will spread across the entire world. This,
at least, is the theme of all his speeches and experience has shown
that dictators generally do mean what they say. The doctrine of
peaceful coexistence is justified in the Soviet Union after all by the
not very flattering argument that war is no longer required to encompass
the downfall of the West.

Little that has happened since the unprovoked Soviet threat
against Berlin has served to inspire the Soviet leaders with caution.
If Khrushchev compares his situation then with his present position he
can only conclude that the best way to deal with the West is to bring
pressure on it. As a result of his Berlin overture he has already
gained the following points:

1) A de facto recognition of the division of Germany. An
East German delegation was seated at Geneva -- to separate it six inches
from the main table was a meaningless maneuver. The Western plan for
unification was presented with singular lack of conviction and withdrawn
at the first sign of opposition. No formal declarations to the contrary
will convince the German people or those of the satellites that the
exchange of visits between Eisenhower and Khrushchev can mean anything
else but the perpetuation of the present dividing line.

2) A demonstration of the lack of unity in the West. The
public quarrel among the allies preceding the Geneva conference was
bad enough. With the MacMillan sortie and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev
exchange of visits, the principle that each ally might negotiate
separately is well established. It is idle to suppose that Germany and
France will not feel that they too must have high level exchanges with

Mr. Arthur H. Sulzberger

3.

August 5, 1959

Moscow. Against this background the cancellation of Mr. Khrushchev's visit to Scandinavia becomes comprehensible. With negotiations for an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting well advanced, he could dispense with an unpromising sojourn in Northern Europe, knowing very well that after his American travels the Scandinavian ministers would be under nearly irresistible pressures to deal with him.

It is possible to argue, of course, that the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings are not "negotiations." But surely the heads of state must talk about something and this in the past has usually been described as negotiation; a meeting of heads of state does not become "unofficial" by being declared so. This is not to imply that our allies cannot trust us. The point is that during a period when allied unity has never been more necessary, the alliance is in danger of being split into separate units each making its own reconnaissance. The mere fact of separate meetings implies the possibility of separate settlements.

3) An Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting is a Soviet diplomatic triumph at least on the tactical level. From the start of the Berlin crisis we have insisted that we would not go to a summit conference under duress, that there had to be some "progress" at a lower level before the heads of state convened. Throughout, Mr. Khrushchev has maintained that the Foreign Ministers would settle nothing and that the "heavyweights" should talk. The threat to Berlin has not been withdrawn; the Geneva foreign ministers' meeting has not made progress. Mr. Khrushchev has not achieved a four-power conference. He has done better. He has arranged a bilateral summit meeting at which our allies are not present.

The writer has always advocated summit meetings, provided we know what we want to discuss. A basic task before American diplomacy is after all to open avenues for settlement or at least to define the issues for which to contend. But this requires some understanding of the kind of world we want to bring about. Everyone is for peace; nobody is opposed to coexistence. We should not waste energy arguing about the obvious. Our task is to create an image of a world in which our values retain their meaning and which does not jeopardize our security.

The more we talk about peace and coexistence in the abstract the more we demoralize ourselves, our allies and the rest of the free world. We will show our moderation better by the generosity of our proposals, than by having no proposals at all to make. A concrete plan on European security or on control of arms is a policy; a general expression of good will is not. Indeed, if President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev meet only to talk "in general terms," there is particular cause for alarm, for it will merely serve to compound the prevailing

Mr. Arthur H. Sulzberger

4.

August 5, 1959

confusion. It is imperative that we make clear that we realize the
cold war is not to be ended by proclamation, that we require not words
but mutual adjustments. It would not have been too much to require
Khrushchev to withdraw his threat to Berlin before inviting him to the
United States. There is a nightmarish quality about a world in which
threats with time limits are delivered with the bland explanation that
they are not an ultimatum and meetings of heads of state are described
as unofficial.

Now that the visit is arranged we must see what favorable
results it may bring. We must avoid the blandness of assuming that a
ten day exposure to the United States will change the attitudes of a
man who has spent his life as a devout Communist; or of believing that
all our international obligations are exhausted by proving to a commissar
that we are "regular fellows." We must not succumb to the smugness of
acting as if the impact of the United States were automatically favorable,
and as if we could rest on past performance. Our purposes may have
more significance for Mr. Khrushchev than our achievements. If Mr.
Khrushchev should learn that we are a united country, with a clear
sense of direction and a bold vision of the future, the trip may yet
prove useful. But to make this impression we would have to give up
our cult of "normalcy," our bureaucratic pedantry, our concern with
maneuver. Administrative machinery is no substitute for conviction;
great periods require great conceptions. What divides us from the
Soviet Union is something deeper than the relative ability to produce
consumer goods. Our task is to make the concepts of freedom and human
dignity a living reality for ourselves as well as for the rest of the
free world. It is time to end the obsession with determining Soviet
intentions and to become clear about our own.

Few major moves in U.S. foreign policy have been undertaken with so little debate as the exchange of visits between the President and Mr. Krushchev. Such discussion as has occured has been almost uniformly favorable. The impression has been created that the exchange of visits represents a major step towards realizing our goal of a peaceful world.

In this atmosphere it seems almost ungracious to express a word of caution. It is dangerous for democracies to create the impression that all issues can be reduced to personalities. The Cold War may be frustrating but it is *not* the result of a misunderstanding. The Cold War may be frustrating, but we did not invent it. We may be bored with a catalogue of the reasons that produced current tensions: Soviet suppression of freedom in Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany; Soviet refusal to accept schemes for control of arms; Soviet pressure on all peripheral areas; the unprovoked pressure on Berlin. They are none the less real or affected by the impending exchange of visits.

2.

(The following paragraph may be misplaced)

The issue is not whether a visit by Mr. Khrushchev to the United States is desirable in the abstract. Policy always involves a question of timing. The problem is whether in these circumstances it will appear less the result of American initiative than a surrender to Soviet pressure. It would not have been unreasonable to require Khrushchev to withdraw the threat to Berlin before we agreed to the forthcoming conferences.

Of course, it is desirable to end the Cold War. No one can question the necessity of striving for peace. We should not waste energy inquiring about the obvious. The only meaningful debate is whether Western policy since the beginning of the threat to Berlin is likely to achieve these ends.

And here there is reason for serious concern. Little in the Eastern reaction to a threat advanced with dire warnings of missile and nuclear attacks is likely to inspire the Soviet leaders with caution. If Mr. Khrushchev compares his position won with that at the end of November when he first raised the Berlin question, he

at the end of November when he first raised the Berlin question, he with caution. It Mr. Krasnapchev compares his position now with that missile and nuclear attacks is likely to inspire the Soviet leaders the Eastern reaction to a threat advanced with dire warnings of

is whether Western policy since the beginning of the threat to Berlin
waste energy inquiring about the opinions. The only meaningful debate
can discussion the necessity of attaining for peace. We should not

tortious conferences.

Krasnapchev to withdraw the threat to Berlin before we agreed to the
to Soviet brevement. It would not have been unreasonable to require
it will appear less the result of American initiative than a surrender
a discussion of timing. The problem is whether in these circumstances
United States is desirable in the abstract. Policy always involves

The issue is not whether a visit by Mr. Krasnapchev to the

(The following paragraph may be misplaced.)

3.

3.

can only conclude that the best way to deal with the West is to
frighten it. Visitors have repeatedly commented on Mr. Khrushchev's
cockiness. What else should we expect of a man who remembers the
bewilderment of the Soviet leadership group after Stalin's death in
1953; who weathered innumerable domestic purges and three satellite
revolutions while constantly improving the Soviet position inter-
nationally? What else is to be the reaction of a gambler whose every
throw of the dice seems to . As a result of his Berlin
overture Khrushchev has already gained the following points:

(a) <u>A de facto recognition of the division of Germany.</u>

The division of Germany may be inevitable, but for us a great deal
depends on demonstrating what makes it so. If we cannot stand for
the freedom of a peoples to determine its own fate our values have
lost all relevance. Adjustment to facts is no doubt often desirable;
but the great things in history have been accomplished by those who
sought to change them. If we are excessively "realistic" about
accepting Soviet oppressiveness in Germany we may bring about what
we should fear most: a militant, dissatisfied power in the center

we should fear meat: a militant, disinterested power in the center accepting Soviet obsequiousness in Germany we may print apont what sought to change them. If we are excessively "reliant" apont put the great thinks in history have been accomplished by those who lost all relevance. Adjustment to facts is no doubt often desirable;

the freedom of a people to determine its own fate or values has
debound on demonstrating what makes it so. If we cannot stand for
the divination of Germany may be inequitable, put for us a great deal
(s) A de facto recognition of the division of Germany.

overcome Khrushchev has already gained the following points:
throw of the dice seems to

*   As a result of his Berlin
*   revolution while constantly improving the Soviet position inter-
*   1923; who weathered numerous domestic crises and three satellites
*   peacemonger of the Soviet leadership group after Stalin's death in
*   coolness. What else should we expect of a man who remembers the
*   tighten it. Visitors have repeatedly commented on Mr. Khrushchev's
*   can only conclude that the past way to deal with the West is to
*   3.

4.

of the Continent, a Germany in similar to that which produced two world wars. We can be moderate in the means we pursue our goal of unification but to abandon it will lay the basis for endless upheavals. We may have to acquiesce in the division of Germany but we cannot be part of an arrangement that endorses it.

When an East German delegation was seated at Geneva, a major step was taken not only towards the perpetuation of the division of Germany -- which may be inevitable -- but towards our accepting the East German regime as legitimate. This was underscored by the lack of conviction with which the Western plan for German unification was presented and the haste with which it was pigeonholed at the first sign of opposition. No formal declarations to the contrary will be able to convince the people of Germany or those of the satellites for that matter that the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of visits at this particular time can mean anything but a hardening of present dividing lines.

(b) A jeopardizing of well-established Western rights by THE MERE PLEA OF CHANGED CONDITIONS. The Geneva conference after a

5.

preliminary period of

soon resolved itself into an

issue in which the West could at best draw and at worst lose: a

changed status for West Berlin. The original Western proposal that

if occupation rights lapsed all of Berlin be placed under a new

regime soon emerged as a mere bargaining device and a not very

useful one. The only topic under discussion during the second part

of the Geneva conference was an alteration of our position. The

interim agreement offered by the West had the advantage from the

Soviet point of view that it put a time limit on our rights. Its

key word was interim and not agreement; it was "banked" by Soviet

negotiators and will be the starting point of any future conference.

If the Soviet Union succeeds in asking us to "solve" problems she

creates, it will always be our rights which are in question. If

the Soviet Union is permitted to jeopardize our position

by declaring it "abnormal" we must not be surprised if we are always

on the defensive and constantly under pressure. If we do not

recognize the effrontery of an overture that invites our counter-

proposals on a suggestion that we surrender our friends, the free

brothers on a negotiation that we surrender our friends, the tree
recognize the authority of an overture that invites our counter-
on the defensive and constantly underbreast. It we do not
by declaring it "unpossible" we must not be umbrised it we are afraid
the Soviet Union is permitted to jeopardize our position

creates, it will eliminate our rights which are in opposition. It
It the Soviet Union acknowledges in asking me to "solve" problems he
negotiators and will be the starting point of any future conference.
key word was interim and not agreement; it was "penetrated" by Soviet
soviet point of view that it but a time limit on our rights. Its
interim agreement offered by the Soviet had the advantage from the
of the Conference conference with an alteration of our position. The
next one. The only topic under discussion during the second part
regime soon emerged as a were pending device and a not very
it accommodation rights labeled off of Berlin peaced under a new
changed status for West Berlin. The original Western proposition that
itane in which the West could at least draw and at least lose: a
preliminary period of

seem related itself into an

2.

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6.

world will soon be completely demoralized. One need only imagine
Soviet reaction or that of world opinion if we announced that the
position of Albania surrounded as it was by non-Soviet states
should be "rectified."

(c) A demonstration of the lack of unity of the West.
Ever since the formation of NATO it had been assumed that whatever
the disagreements among the Western allies outside of Europe, a
direct threat to the Atlantic community would meet a resolute,
united response. As a result, as short a time as a year ago Soviet
pressure in Europe was considered the least likely eventuality. In
the meantime, this conviction has been proved illusory. The
immediate reaction to the Soviet threat on Berlin was a public debate
on what to concede and public imputations of bad faith and irreso-
lution among the allies. Three weeks before the foreign ministers
conference there was still no agreed Western position and the lack
of conviction with which the position which finally emerged was
maintained during the negotiations revealed that agreement on it
was largely formal. The behavior of the West since the beginning

was largely formal. The behavior of the West since the beginning
maintained during the negotiations revealed that agreement on it
of conviction with which the position which finally emerged was
conference there was still no agreed Western position and the lack
inhibition among the allies. Three weeks before the foreign ministers
on what to concede and public impositions of pad faith and irre-
 immediate reaction to the Soviet threat on Berlin was a public debate
the meantime, this conviction had been proved illfated. The
breath in Europe was considered the least likely eventuality. In
united reasonae. 'As a result, as short a time as a year ago Soviet
direct threat to the Atlantic community would meet a resolute,
the disagreements among the Western allies outside of Europe, a
Ever since the formation of NATO it had been assumed that whatever
(c) A demonstration of the lack of unity of the West.
should be "rectified".
position of Virginia announced as it was by non-Soviet states
Soviet reaction or that of world opinion it we announced that the
world will soon be completely generalized. One need only imagine
p.

C43

7.

of the Berlin crisis indicates that there may exist some vague
ideas as to what to prevent but that the alliance lacks any clear
conception of what it might achieve or common purposes for which
to strive. Ther

There has been a great deal of discussion about abstractions
like rigidity or flixibility but little debate about a program that
might give them meaning; the clamor for a summit meeting has rarely
included a description of the issues it might discuss. The opportunity
of responding to Soviet pressure with a bold, dynamic, common program
has been missed.

Instead, the inward insecurity of the West has taken the
form of an obsession with determining Soviet intentions. From the
beginning of the crisis the Western response has been geared to the
expectation of Soviet overtures: the Mikoyan visit, the 21st Party
Congress, the Macmillan trip, the Kozlov journey, the Nixon visit.
Delegations of political leaders from all over the Atlantic Community
and almost all political parties have descended on the Communist

8.

capital. The impression has almost been created that an interview
with Mr. Khrushchev is a prerequisite to domestic political success
and the chief guide to Western policy. In this respect the
Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings are merely the culmination of the
trend of the past year. Separate meetings raise at least the
possibility of separate arrangements or at least they imply a
special fitness of some ally in dealing with the Soviets. It would
be idle to deny that the Soviet Union has made great strides towards
splitting the alliance. The Allied unity so often invoked has
increasingly a liturgical function. It is idle to say that the
President and Premier Khrushchev will not "negotiate". Heads of
state must talk about something and that in the past has usually
been described as negotiation. And if the President and Premier
Khrushchev agree our allies will be under nearly irresistible
pressure to accede. And if they do not agree we will hardly be
in a position to criticize. None of this is calculated to produce
moderatness in Soviet leaders: it compounds too well the Communist
expectation of a shrinking, demoralized, democratic world unable to

expectation of a shrinking, generalized, democratic world map to
modestness in Soviet leaders: it combines too well the Communist
in a position to criticize. None of this is окончательно бронzu
breast to agree. And it is clear that we will hardly be
Kurmanchea agree on allies will be under nearly irresistible
peen described as negotiation. And it the President and Premier
state must talk about something and that in the beat has really
President and Premier Kuranchea will not "negotiate". He has of
increasingly a liturgical function. It is idle to ask that the
splitting the alliance. The Allied might so often invoked has
be idle to deny that the Soviet Union has made great strides towards
special fitness of some ally in dealing with the Soviets. It would
be difficult to separate arrangements or at least they imply a
trend of the beat year. Separate meetings rise at least the
Eisenhower-Kurmanchea meetings are merely the culmination of the
and the chief guide to Western policy. In this respect the
with Mr. Kuranchea is a bruiser to domestic political success
capable. The impression has almost been created that an interval
of

8.

C.Y.3

9.

develop its own goals to deal with its own problems. This theme --
constantly repeated by Khrushchev -- may be based less on a misap-
prehension as is commonly maintained then on his experience with the
Western world.

(d) The demonstration of the unsuitability of the Western
military establishment for the crisis it actually confronts. Many
factors have combined to produce the tentativeness of Western
policy. A key reason is the sterility of Western strategy. The
exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons, the concept that deterrence
is best achieved through the threat of maximum destructiveness,
causes the forces we have available to be rarely suitable for dealing
with the threats which we actually confront. The one-sidedness of
"plied military establishment has forced Western political

Whether Berlin was "worth" the tens of millions

clear war -- the only war which we

The dilemma posed by this prospect was

at the recent "off the record" dinner

not capable of fighting a conventional war

not capable of lighting a conventional war
at the recent soft the record is given.
The difference based on this broadest was
the only war which we
feared was —

Weather Berlin was "worth" the cause of millions
lifted military eataplaiment has forced Western political
with the threats which we actually confront. The one-aitude of
cause the forces we have available to be really capable for dealing
is past achieved through the threat of maximum destructions,
exclusive reliance on unclean weapons, the concept that deterrence
belliger. A key reason is the sterility of Western strategy. The
factors have combined to produce the contrivances of Western
military eataplaiment for the sake it actually contains. May
we

(d) The demonstration of the munitions' fertility of the Western
Western world.

Preparation as is commonly maintained then on his experience with the
canonical repeated by Khrushchev — may be passed less on a wash—
develop its own goals to deal with its own problems. This theme —
9.

CAY

10.

in Europe, but he stayed awake at night worrying about a nuclear
conflict. We would of course resist a direct Soviet attack on
Berlin, but we could not be expected to underwrite its economic
prosperity. Even if these statements do not encourage the Soviet
leaders to believe that the economic strangulation of Berlin would
not be resisted, they may well cast doubt on our willingness to
defend our rights. And it does not matter how determined we "really"
are: if the Soviet leaders doubt our determination they may provoke
the crisis we are striving hard to avoid.

President Eisenhower is reported to have expressed
puzzlement that our repeated warnings over Berlin have apparently
failed to impress Mr. Khrushchev. The reason is not hard to seek:
our threat to resort to our only strategy has lost its credibility,
not because our leaders are irresolute but because it is inherently
implausible. Were it not, the issue of Berlin would probably never
have been raised. Once the Soviets applied pressure, however, few
of our actions were calculated to reinforce our words. We did
nothing to remedy the weakness of NATO in the conventional field;
on the contrary in a year of a dire Soviet threat we reduced both

on the contrary in a year of a dire Soviet threat we reduced path
nothing to remedy the messiness of NATO in the conventional field;
of our actions were calculated to reinforce our cause. We did
have been raised. Once the Soviets subjected Brezhnev, however, ten
impunityable. Were it not, the issue of Berlin would properly never
not because our leaders are irritable but because it is imperially
our interest to resort to our only attraction has lost its credibility,
toied to impress Mr. Khrushchev. The reason is not paid to seek
assurance that our repeated warnings over Berlin have abysmally
breastaurant power is reported to have expressed

the crisis we are attaining hard to avoid.

are: it the Soviet leaders don't own determination which will break
attend our rights. And it does not matter how determined we "really"
not be reated, they will cost them will cost them will cost them
leaders to believe that the economic attrition of Berlin would
broaden. Even if these statements do not encourage the Soviet
Berlin, put we could not be expected to underwrite its economic
conflict. We would of course resist a direct Soviet attack on
in Europe, put we at least awake at night working upon a single
10.

EJ

11.

our army and the Marines. It is beside the point that thirty thousand men would not be decisive in a ground war in Europe. The impact of this gesture was psychological; it may have encouraged a Soviet belief that our show of determination was bluff, that we were not to be deflected from our quest for "normalcy."

Nor is our only choice between the level of forces at the beginning of the crisis and the present reductions. NATO

twice the manpower and three times the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union cannot repeat that it is unable to afford what is plainly required for its survival and what the USSR provides for itself from much smaller resources. Our weakness is a blank check which the Soviet Union can fill in at

ment. It has contributed to the start of the Berlin crisis;

position of not being willing to face renewed

re of the Geneva foreign minister's
of the reasons mentioned for the

dev.

II-5

decline of power and influence of Europe. The adjustment to new conditions
has inevitably been painful. The loss of a position of pre-eminence is
never easy to accept. Europe had been so used to commanding events
that one of the paradoxical results of its new position is to exaggerate
its current weakness. The shrinking influence has occasionally been
accompanied by a decline in responsibility expressed in niggling criticism
or in a perfectionism which paralyzes all action. As a result, Europe
has not always fulfilled all the potentialities for political initiative
she still retains; or played fully the role inherent in her cultural and
political tradition.

Recent events can have done little to contribute to the European
self-assurance. It was bad enough when the United States humiliated its
allies during the Suez crisis of 1956. (The issue is not whether the
British and French action was wise - it was not. It is doubtful however
whether it was necessary to stress our disagreement so self-righteously
and to bring home the limitations of their power to our allies quite so
brutally.) Now during a crisis in which our European allies are directly
threatened we extended an invitation to Mr. Khrushchev without even informing

3.

[y]

democratic world. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence is justified in the
Soviet Union after all for the not very flattering reason that war is no
longer required to encompass the downfall of the West.

longer required to encumber the downfall of the West.

Soviet Union after all for the not very flattering reason that war is no democratic world. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence is justified in the

4.

And little that has happened since the unprovoked Soviet threat against Berlin has served to inspire the Soviet leaders with caution. If Khrushchev compares his situation then with his present position he can only conclude that the best way to deal with the West is to bring pressure on it. As a result of his Berlin overture he has already gained the following points.

1) A de facto recognition of the division of Germany. This is not only revealed by the seating of an East German delegation at Geneva but also by the lack of conviction with which the Western plan for unification was presented at Geneva. No formal declarations to the contrary will convince the East German people that the exchange of visits between Eisenhower and Khrushchev can mean anything else but

2) A demonstration of lack of unity in the West. The public quarrel among the allies preceding the Geneva conference was bad enough. Now with the MacMillan sortie and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of visits, the principle that each ally will negotiate separately is well established. It is idle to suppose that Germany and France will be able

ratified. It is idle to suppose that Germany and France will be able
actuate, the principle that each ally will negotiate separately is well
Now with the MacMillan sortie and the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange of
discourse among the allies preceding the Geneva conference was past enough.

S) A demonstration of lack of unity in the West. The haphazard
Khrushchev can mean anything else but

the East German people that the exchange of affairs between Eisenhower and
was presented at Geneva. No formal declarations to the contrary will convince
put into play the lack of conviction with which the Western框框 for multination
not only revealed by the seating of an East German delegation at Geneva

1) A de facto recognition of the division of Germany. This is
already gained the following points.

to bring peace on it. As a result of his Berlin overture he has
position he can only conclude that the best way to deal with the West is
caution. It Khrushchev compares his situation then with his present
threat against Berlin has served to insinuate the Soviet leaders with
And little that has happened since the unprovoked Soviet

47.

5.

to avoid the trip to Moscow in time. It is possible to argue, of course,
that the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meetings are not "negotiations." But
surely the heads of state must talk about something and this in the past
has usually been described as negotiation. A meeting of heads of state
does not become "unofficial" by being declared so. This is not to say that
our allies cannot trust us. The point is that when Allied unity has never
been more necessary, the alliance is in danger of being split into separate
unites each making their own reconnaissance.

3) The mere fact of an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting is a Soviet
diplomatic triumph. We have insisted ever since the start of the Berlin
crisis that we would not go to a summit under such duress, that there
had to be some "progress" at a lower level before the heads of state
convened. Mr. Khrushchev has maintained throughout that the
Foreign Ministers would settle nothing and that the "heavyweights" should
talk. The threat to Berlin has not been withdrawn; the Geneva foreign
ministers' meeting has not made progress. Mr. Khrushchev has not
achieved a summit meeting. He had done better. He is coming to a summit
meeting at which our allies are not present. It is not easy to see in what

way this will encourage moderation.

4) The writer has always advocated summit meetings, *provided* we know what we wanted to discuss. A basic task before American diplomacy is after all to open avenues for settlement or at least to define the issues for which to contend. But this requires some understanding of the kind of world we want to

8.

Now that the visit is arranged we must see what favorable results
it may bring. It will be important however to be clear that the impact of
America is not automatic. We must at least avoid the self-righteousness of
assuming that America can rest on its performance or the blandness that all
we require is to prove we are "regular fellows." It is after all not
inconceivable that Mr. Khrushchev is so intransigent not because he considers
us bellicose but because he believes he can defeat us. Our purposes may be
of more significance to Khrushchev than our achievements. If. Mr. Khrushchev
should learn that we are a united country, with a clear sense of direction
and a bold vision of the future the trip may yet prove useful. But for this
we have to give up our cult of "normalcy," our quest for equilibrium, our concern
with maneuver. Great periods require great conceptions. It is time to end
the obsession with determining Soviet intentions and to become clear about
our own.