2316 WORDS

KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 3/17/01

The return of an American mediator to the Middle East has been greeted by all sides with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because all the parties and interested bystanders are exhausted by the bloodshed; trepidation, because all of them know that their objectives are in many respects incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is for a legitimization of essentially the status quo; of the Palestinians for the beginning of a process leading to the ultimate destruction of the Jewish state; of the Europeans for a

2

diplomatic solution indistinguishable from the Arab formal peace
program though "guaranteed" by the outside world, which would
reconcile the Islamic world with the West. Russia, too, is urging a
solution to the conflict though with less precision? that Europe.

The alleged intransigence of Israel and its Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon, are cited as the principal cause of the deadlock by
the clattering ______ around the world. The call for the United
States to play a more active role is nearly unanimous even among
those who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and who
then add the ignoring of that advice to their catalogue of America's

3

woes). These urging have been given impetus by the overture of
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia suggesting normalization
of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to
the 1967 frontiers. And Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to
the Middle East has symbolized the incentive of the need for Arab
support in a possible showdown with Iraq.

A major American role in Middle East diplomacy can be
important?. American diplomacy has been the catalyst of the
progress that has been made in the last thirty years. But it is also
the case that the impetuous attempt at Camp David to settle all

4

issues in one negotiation of limited duration never was a major
factor in producing the present state of affairs. A final solution
means that all parties abandon future claims - a demand in itself
certain to generate radical opposition. It also will lead to a
protracted negotiation.

Before America launches itself on a diplomatic role, it is
important to understand its nature and its possibilities - lest we
magnify the crisis that tempted our involvement. A number of
principles must be kept in mind:

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First, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has a different time dimension than the decisions required for the issue of the possession of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq. Negotiating a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli violence will - if it is possible at all - take a long time. The favored remedy of imposing the 1967 borders on Israel will require an extended confrontation and a change of attitude in historic American policy rejecting the imposition of a final solution. This would involve so many ____ confrontations as to destroy the focus on Iraq - a partial reason why so many countries are urging American involvement. If

6

negotiations on the Israel-Palestinian conflict are conceived as a
precondition of the goal of ending the threat of Iraqi possession of
weapons of mass destruction, neither objective will be achieved.

The reason there is near unanimity on the importance of

America's role in the negotiations is precisely the device of most of

those urging it to impose a settlement on Israel, and because the

United States is the only country in a position to do so - albeit at

heavy risk to the future survival of Israel.

The positions of the parties are simply too incompatible.

Israel asks for an end to the intifada but offers no program of what

7

it is prepared to do in return. It has accepted the early stages of the
Mitchell plan, which deal with the establishment of a ceasefire and
a series of confidence-building measures. The only formal position
adopted by an Israeli government was the proposal made by Prime
Minister Barak at Camp David, which offered the abandonment of
over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) for
which the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return
into Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state).

The Sharon government has rejected that proposal and Yasir Arafat
preferred to start the intifada rather than accept it.

8

The most forthcoming Arab position has been put forward by
Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. According to its vague outline,
Israel is to return to the dividing lines in Palestine in return for
reconciliation with the Arab world. Ritually, this would imply the
abandonment by Israel of all its settlements and Arab control of the
old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. Moreover, the
Abdullah plan suffers from at least two disabilities: it does not
define what is meant by normalization, and it leaves open such
other issues as the right of refugees to return - though this demand
is certain to reemerge in the course of an actual negotiation.

9

Moreover, on the face of it, the balance of the negotiation in the Abdullah plan is unequal. Israel is to give up territories, settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost 5% of the Jewish population of Israel) and control over the holy places, in return for diplomatic relations. These are taken for granted in all other negotiations between other parties; non-recognition implies that the alternative to acquiescence is the extermination of the negotiating partner. And even once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor is the prospect of other than diplomatic

10

relations bright; the peace agreement with Egypt has brought little
in the way of normalization other than ambassadors that are rarely
used.

On the face of it, negotiations for a final peace in existing
terms are therefore certain to deadlock. The constant? call for them
is based either on illusions or the determination to impose it on one
of the parties - either by Israeli victory over the Palestinians or by
____ pressure on Israel. Nothing is to be gained by repeating that
mantra.

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This is the case even though the status quo for all parties is
becoming increasingly intolerable. The Arab side has fought with
dedication and ferocity toward producing the classic paradigm of
asymmetrical warfare that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.

Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war
exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the society they are seeking to
establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the
Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic
politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able
domestically to support what overall settlement is attainable.

12

The pressure on Israel is even greater and for paradoxical reasons. Israel is ____ stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to exact disproportionate losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But as a middle class Western society, they may not be able to stand the strain of such sustained warfare.

Indeed, the second intifada has generated a dual split in Israeli society. On the one hand, the peace movement that saw the achievement of peace with the Arab world as a problem of psychological reassurance has disappeared with the collapse of the Oslo process. The vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in

CD

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reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of the Arab
tormentors. On the other hand, there is a growing sense of despair
caused by the seeming futility of the enterprise. More and more
Israelis feel that the proportion of their casualties to that of the
Arab side is going up and they can stand it less being a middle
class society and far less numerous. They also see that the methods
of repression that might work will not be tolerated by the
international community; witness the withdrawal of Israeli forces
from Palestinian territory imposed by the United States prior to the
______ mission?. They therefore see emerging before them the

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classic vista of guerrilla warfare established for two generations
now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but
practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional - and
to the bystanders - excessive retaliation serves their purpose of
triggering intervention by the international community. In the
process, sanctuaries are established - however dubious their basis
in international law - that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the
capacity of the defending forces to get to the root? of the guerrilla
challenge. This happened in Tunisia during the Algerian war; in

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Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam war; it is now recurring
with respect to ______ and the refugee camps in Palestine.

The chief difference is that France in Algeria and America in
Vietnam were fighting on distant territories; they had the ultimate -
albeit painful - option to withdraw. Israel is on its homeland; at
stake is its existence, not its possessions.

A stalemate, or at least a protracted war, is almost inevitable
during the course of which an increasing number of Israelis will
insist on "political" alternatives that translates into peace at any
price. Israeli society is thus torn between rage and despair,

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between a recognition of theoretical necessities and the pull of
emotional imperatives. The other day a high-ranking Israeli
military responded to my question [of] what actions he
recommended with an enhanced version of the attack on the
refugee camps; when asked what outcomes he expected, he said
some version of the '67 borders.

This recipe for progressive demoralization will not be solved
by the acceptance of the Abdullah plan. For after the experiences
of Oslo, Israelis know - as the rest of the world should - that the
real division in the Arab world is not between those who want

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peace in the Western and Israeli eschatological sense - as a point at
which tensions magically disappear and the world lives with a
consciousness of reconciliation (the number of Arab leaders
holding this view is minuscule); but between those who want to
bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present
struggle and those who believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for a renewed struggle later on. They
will be reinforced in this conviction because of their awareness that
the introduction of long-range missiles will gradually diminish the
Israeli military edge.

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And even if those who sign a permanent agreement on the
Arab side have no afterthoughts, they cannot guarantee their
replacement by radical successors. If, as is said, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into
negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement?

Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim
settlement is more the adjective than the substance. The likelihood
is also that anything like the Abdullah plan, even if Israel is
prevailed upon to accept it, will lead to the eventual destruction of

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Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff - and I have known them all - who believed that the '67 borders are defensible, and especially so if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan river.

And the NATO, American or other guarantees are empty.
Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against the ambiguous challenges that are most likely. Nor would the United States be able to operate an open-ended guarantee against threats ______ massive ground invasions from neighboring states.

20

Thus the Abdullah plan in anything like its present form
spells the long-term destruction of Israel, especially when
combined with its inevitably related features of refugee return and
'67 frontiers. Such an outcome would break the cohesion of Israeli
politics. The elements sustaining its defenses? would be
demoralized; those acquiescing would have to seek their remedy in
submission, much like the rump Czechoslovak regime after
Munich.

What, then, are the options? It must be admitted that no good
options are available. But the beginning of wisdom is to recognize

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the impossibility of a final settlement under current conditions.

Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable, or at least undesirable, goals will foster a general climate of irresponsibility.

Two broad choices present themselves: to let the conflict in Palestine play itself out unless one or both of the parties are willing to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American role. The former course is under constant pressure from allies in Europe and from friends in the Arab sphere?. The latter course has so far lacked an operational definition. In the present situation, the

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Palestinians will not stop because they believe they would thereby remove any Israeli incentive to make concessions; the Israelis will not settle because they do not want to reward terrorism. Only the United States has a chance, however slight, to bridge that gap.

Israel cannot sustain its military actions internationally without a peace program; the Palestinians cannot achieve their maximum program except at the risk of destroying their own society. If Israel is capable of generating a national policy, it should seek to come up with a proposal for substantial withdrawals, including the removal of non-contiguous settlements,

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the creation of a Palestinian state and the principle of coexistence
between the two states. It could pay respect to Arab and Palestinian
remaining concerns by calling this an interim settlement for a
specified period.

The United States should play a major role in generating such
a proposal provided it can achieve Arab agreement to the strategy
implied. So long as the United States appears either as if it is
unconditionally backing Israeli measures or gradually veering
toward an Abdullah-type plan, it has no diplomatic function other
than the wrecking of Israel.

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If America is to contribute to genuine progress, it must help dispel the mirages of current diplomacy. It must back a program respectful of Arab dignity and concerns and Israeli necessities.

Drifting is no longer an option.

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1. MIDDLE EAST: US stance lifts spirits in Palestinian camp: Senior leaders tell Harvey Morris in Ramallah how they think their armed struggle against Israel has been vindicated

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Financial Times; Mar 18, 2002

By HARVEY MORRIS

Since Ariel Sharon was obliged by US pressure to pull his tanks out of the West Bank town of Ramallah, Palestinian leaders believe they finally have Israel on the run.

The spectacle of the US administration slapping down the Israeli prime minister over his military methods has much to do with the near-euphoria in the Palestinian camp.

But among those who have spearheaded the assaults on Israeli targets, the shift in mood is also based on a belief that what they regard as their armed struggle has been vindicated.

"This time, Anthony Zinni is with us," Nabil Sha'ath, senior Palestinian negotiator, said yesterday, referring to the current mission of the US Middle East envoy. "He's come with instructions to get the Israelis out of Palestinian Authority areas.

"The Israelis wanted to break our will and to reshape Palestinian expectations of what we could get out of the peace process," he said. "That strategy has failed. They have lost the deterrent of the fear of death. Palestinians aren't afraid any more."

Mr Sha'ath said: "I think we are winning - meaning there's a chance for a real, fair and reasonable peace. I think we're nearer to getting what we want than we were when peace talks broke down."

There was no indication from Palestinian militants, however, that hope of a

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http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/article.html?id=020318001873&query=%22US+... 3/18/2002

Page 2 of 4

breakthrough meant there would be a let-up in armed attacks. "Resistance is working. Absolutely," said Marwan Barghouti, head of the Fatah Tanzim militia in the West Bank. "And even if they leave area A (territory under Palestinian Authority control), the resistance will continue.

"The message to the Israelis is that they won't achieve security through occupation and building settlements," he said.

Mr Barghouti said **Palestinians** had never been so close to achieving their independence. "We have succeeded in disturbing the Israeli theory of security and the day will come when the Israeli prime minister will declare a full withdrawal from the occupied territories.

"We will continue the fire to reach our freedom and independence. We're not against talking but it must focus on ending the occupation. The Palestinian people won't settle for anything less."

Mr Barghouti acknowledged that since mid-January, when one of their leaders was assassinated by Israeli forces, armed groups linked to Yassir Arafat's Fatah movement had been taking the lead in what he called armed resistance.

"I hope they don't assassinate me," Mr Barghouti said, "because I would be sorry for the tens of Israelis who will be killed in reaction to that."

He said the **Palestinians** were not out to destroy Israel. "We recognise it and will continue to do so. But the Israelis have to realise that if they bomb Ramallah, then why should we provide security in Tel Aviv?"

Both his optimism and his militancy were echoed by Hamas, the Islamic group that for a time suspended its gun and bomb attacks after Mr Arafat, the **Palestinian** Authority president, declared a ceasefire in mid-December.

Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a Hamas leader in the West Bank, said the **Palestinians** were now much closer to achieving their aspirations than they were before the start of their uprising 18 months ago.

"It's building up. Go down to the streets and look at what the people are doing. Because of the size of the sacrifices, a momentum has been gained and the popular voice is to push ahead."

Referring to Gen Zinni's mission, Sheikh Hassan said: "The occupation is in big trouble and Zinni has come to get the Israelis out of this mess. Zinni's role must be to exert pressure on the Israelis to end the occupation."

He added, however, that "the **US** position gives no rights to the **Palestinians** and that only leaves resistance as an option". Editorial Comment, Page 22 For regional reports, www.ft.com/mideastafrica

Copyright: The Financial Times Limited 1995-2002

Rebecca Jordan

From: John Simpson [john.simpson@latsi.com]

Sent: Monday, March 18, 2002 12:36 PM

To: rjordan@kmaglobal.com

Subject: Re: Article by Kissinger

Rebecca,

Thank you. Once the article is turned over to Newsweek, please forward me a copy so we can
syndicate it internationally. Best regards, John, rjordan@kmaglobal.com writes:

>John -

> Dr. Kissinger wrote an article over the weekend for Newsweek. The
>article is still going through edits but I wanted to be sure you were
>aware of the article. I will let you know when the final copy is given
>to Newsweek.

John M. Simpson
Executive Editor
Los Angeles Times Syndicate International
www.latsi.com
www.tms.tribune.com
202 West 1st Street, 10th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Tel: +1- 213-237-3216
Fax +1 - 213:237-4614
E-mail: john.simpson@latsi.com

1

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Jon – Gina, Bremer and Stape will work with HAK on the article. He and Gina spoke and I think HAK will only need to work with Gina on Sunday. Then on Monday he will begin with Stape and Bremer. I distributed the customary fax with all of the contact numbers for weekend and Monday for Gina, Bremer, Stape & HAK to Gina and Bremer and Frank. (Stape does not have a fax.) I will have the numbers at home if you would like me to fax you a copy of what I sent them. However, I think HAK only needs Gina's numbers on Sunday.

Also, Korda asked HAK to call over the w/e. TF 845-635-3795.

Rebecca Jordan

To: rjordan@kmaglobal.com

Rebecca,

>John -

1