-20-

commitment to Atlantic partnership. It is also consistent with
active or latent neutralism eager to shift all responsibility

alid iz

to us. The American nuclear umbrella was sometimes exploited

by General de Gaulle for his own purposes can also be used--and

perhaps more dangerously for the West--to support policies amounting

to neutralism.

Three major solutions have been offered to the problem of

nuclear control: (a) Exclusive reliance on national nuclear forces

(b) Maintaince of American monopoly position in return for an INCREASE

in consultation (c) Some kind of European identity in the

nuclear field either growing out of the existing national forces

of or from the evolution of the proposed multilateral force. The

MLF is actually somewhere between b and c.

Exclusive Reliance on National Nuclear Forces

The chief exponent of the exclusive reliance on national
nuclear forces has been the French strategic theorist, General
Gallois. Nuclear weapons, according to Gallois have made alliances
obsolete. Faced with the risk of total destruction

-21-

no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack while leaving all other countries to their fate.

This formula would be a prescription for international chaos. Under conditions of growing nuclear power on both sides, the threat of nuclear retaliation has, of course, lost some of its credibility. The Gallois theory would, however, transform a certain degree of doubt about U.S. response into a certainly that the United States would not respond. Moreover, each country would need to develop fool-proof procedures which would enable it to assure the Soviets that a given nuclear blow did not originate from its territory in order to save itself from a counterattack based on a misapprehension.

This theory would not only end all alliances, it would also provide endless opportunities for piecemeal aggression. A country like Denmark has to-day a considerable guarantee that it would be protected regardless of the wishes of its government. Under the Gallois scheme, the Soviets could balckmail the government of

-22-

a small country with the assurance that it would stand alone.

The threatened country, in turn, would be forced to rely on a
threat which would guarantee its end as a functioning society.

Thus every country would have a high incentive to study either
methods of surrender or guarantees of non-involvement.

However, while I disagree with the extreme versions of General
Gallois, they do not prove that national nuclear forces cannot
e coexist in an alliance. It seems to me that we have been too
much concerned with juridical formulae and not enough with
the substance of the problem. But before turning to the possible
relation of national forces to each other within the Alliance, I
want to discuss various schemes of s consultation.

## B. Schemes of Consultation.

It has been frequently argued that the issue of nuclear
control would be solved by an improvement in the process of consultation.

According to this view, the restiveness of our European allies with
America's hegemonic position in nuclear questions is due largely to

-23-

insufficient information. Most of the restiveness could be allayed
by a fuller exchange of information. It has been suggested that more
Europeans serve on American staffs in the Pentagon, at SAC
headquarters and elsewhere. Some British Labor leaders have even
indicated a willingness to give up the British nuclear deterrent
in return for a greater voice in American policy. And there have
been several proposals for a reorganization of NATO to give Europeans
a larger say in NATO planning. The ideal solution according to
this school of thought would be a division of functions according
to which Europe would supply the conventional arms and the United
States the nuclear arsenal tied together by an intimate system of
consultation.

In assessing these proposals it is important to distinguish
two kinds of consultation: (a) that leading to an improvement
of technical knowledge (b) that involving a decision about goals.
The decisions where the dispute concerns technical issues are most
amenable to the system of consultation suggested in the various
proposals. A fuller exchange of information between us and our
European allies is desirable--regardless of the distribution of nuclear
power in the alliance. The close cooperation between SAC and the

-24-

British Bomber Command has not been impaired--it may even have been
strengthened--by the ps possession of nuclear weapons by Britain.
This system should be extended to other European allies.

However, it is important not to exaggerate what consultation
within an American decision-making apparatus can achieve--particularly
when the issue is something other than the technical implementation
of agreed objectives. If the national objectives conflict,
foreign officers on American staffs become either an extension of
our bureaucracy or representatives of their own government. If
the former, they lose influence at home; if the latter they
lose influence here.

Nor does the experience of our own bureaucracy suggest that
unanimity is the inevitable result of access to the same technical
data. Indeed, foreign members of our staff might find themselves
in a position of refereeing inter-service or inter-agency disputes.

The more important questions are what is it that allies wish
to consult about? And what is the best mechanism to obtain their
advice? The case is usually put in terms of joint strategic planning

-25-

or of access to targeting information. However, it is likely
that targeting is the least of the problems. It is a symbol, not
a cause, of the difficulty. The much more serious issue is how
allies can participate in solving problems which are much more common.

These are: (a) Ordinary, that is day-to-day diplomacy; (b) Crisis diplomacy such as the Berlin crisis (c) Diplomacy designed to define the casus belli (d) Actual conduct of a war (e) Intra-war deterrence, that is the decision about the level and the extent of conflict
(f) Termination of a war.

The procedures so far proposed will suffice at least for
contingency planning for a war. Yet it is almost a contradiction
in terms to have a unitary system for strategic operations while
the day-to-day diplomacy is conducted almost entirely bilaterally.
Nor should it be overlooked that much of strategic planning is contingent
on later decisions of governments to implement it. Thus the basic
problem is how to achieve a common diplomacy. If this can be
accomplished the problem of who can conduct independent military
operations will become much less urgent.
There have been sufficient
disagreements in the Alliance on issues like the Berlin
negotiations, disagreement, to name just a few, to indicate
that a difference in objectives is at least conceivable.

-26-

Thus any consultative process must be responsive to the
following three questions: Who has a right to be consulted?

Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three levels are not necessarily identical. Anybody
who has any experience in Washington knows that there are many
agencies with a right to express their views. There are many
fewer whose voice actually carries weight. When our British
friends suggest that they want a greater voice, the answer has to
be: Like who? Like the ACDA? Like the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Or the State Department? In our interdepartmental disputes it is
well-known that the outcome often depends on the constituency
the agency or department represents. How does a foreign government
bring pressure without straining Allied unity?

The weight given to advice is inevitably related to the
competence that it reflects and the ability to take certain actions
more or less independently. It has been argued that the Europeans
could influence our decisions by specializing on conventional
weapons. Indeed Secretary Acheson has argued in Foreign Affairs

-27-

that in an alliance based on such a division of labor "the United
States might not find it easy to obtain a voice equal to the
importance of its nuclear capabilities."

I doubt this. The asymmetry between the two sides will be
too great. For if Europe refused to commit its conventional forces
the United States would still have the option of nuclear retaliation.
While a failure by the United States to engage its nuclear arms
would spell Europe's doom.

Without in any way questioning the sincere effort of the desire
for equal consultation, it is not easy to see how over an extended
period o it can be healthy for the Alliance if the United States
retains an effective monopoly of nuclear power. The Multilateral
Force would not change this. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Schaetezel has said with respect to the relationship of European
nuclear forces to the non-nuclear countries (Ditchley Park, September
27, 1963): "An arrangement whereby two nations (Britain and France)
pooled their programs and agreed to share certain command and control
responsibilities with other European partners would still not answer

-28-

the basic questions of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment
of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement--the powers
which owned and operated the nuclear forces--in fact consult and
collaborate on an equal basis with their associate members?"

If this is true <u>within</u> Europe, it is likely to be equally valid
in Atlantic relationships.

However genuine our desire for equal consultation, we would
be likely to find very soon that Europe simply does not have
sufficient competence. And this in turn is likely to breed
irresponsibility, a right of consultation without the ability to
make a responsible judgment may in fact be the worst possible system.
It may produce Utopians, or extreme solutions or a form of inter-allied
diplomacy more akin to lobbying than to serious discussion.

The most fundamental problem is not the problem of consultation,
however. It is whether the system of unitary control of strategic
forces (and ultimately of diplomacy) is in fact desirable. The

trend of our policy is to create a structure which makes it impossible
for the member states (except the United States) to act separately.

-29-

(The Multilateral Force does not change this). It is an important question whether it may not be better for the long-term health of the Alliance to grant the possibility for separate action while working to REDUCE the desire for it. We are somewhat in the position of a father who tells his grown-up son that since they can never disagree he will continue to control the money. Such an attitude is likely to produce rebellion or an abdication of all responsibility. The wiser course is usually to act on the confidence that disagreements are unlikely.

There is, moreover, a serious question whether it is in our interest to create a structure which permits of no internal flexibility. If we look ahead a decade or more, it is likely that the United States will be increasingly engaged in the Far East, in South East Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will in all likelihood not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas--this has already been made explicit by President de Gaulle with respect to South East Asia. The question then becomes what kind of structure is more vital in the long run: A system that automatically

-30-

involves all our partners or one that permits some autonomy.

If the system is absolutely unitary, the Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe and this combined with European disinterest in the issues involved may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. If there exists some autonomous EU European nuclear power, this blackmail will be discouraged even though European disinterest would still exist.

For all these reasons I conclude that it would be highly desirable that there continue to exist an autonomous European nuclear entity closely coordinated with ours. This leaves the question whether it would grow out of existing national forces or out of the Multilateral Force or through a combination of both. This requires--at last--some discussion of the Multilateral Force.

-32-

The intractable problem of control remains. What is the significance of a force with an American veto. If we are willing to go to nuclear war both MLF and SAC go.

If we are not willing neither is fired.

What does giving up the veto mean?

What exactly would we commit ourselves to?

To go to war with the Multilateral Force?

Or to go to war with all our forces?

with

If, however, we go to war with all our forces what is the point of the Multilateral force?

Moreover how would we give up our veto? If we do it in response to a European initiative, a European force would have come about in the most divisive way imaginable.

Above all I am concerned about constructing yet another European grouping bringing together a group of countries with a curious combination of national motives and with Germany as the largest European nuclear

Will turn to this problem next time.

III

It would be tempting to ascribe this failure to the
mistakes of a particular Administration. It would be easy
to give the impression that the difficulties described here
are due to specific mistakes which can be reversed more or
less easily. But such a view would be mistaken. We have
oscillated between extremes of intransigence and extremes
of conciliation for too long. Many of the current disputes
repeat arguments current for decades in almost the same words.
The rigidity of the contemporary views on negotiations is
no doubt sharpened by the reaction to Mr. Dulles' self-
righteousness. But in its essential outlines it antedates
the Republican Administration. The question is therefore
raised whether Western societies do not suffer from an atti-
tude which makes it difficult for them to come to grips with
their challenge either in terms of power or in terms of diplo-
macy.

The arguments used to justify negotiations now are neither
as new or as bold as many of their proponents insist. Similar

III-2

views have been expressed on many previous occasions. The notion that Soviet purposes had fundamentally altered was first advanced during the war. "Russia's assurance that Russian Communism will not intermeddle in the affairs of other nations is a plea for solidarity among the nations fighting Hitler," said Senator Connally after Stalin disbanded the Comintern. "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of Communism, and the whole Western world will be gratified by the happy climax of their efforts."* And the LONDON TIMES commented editorially on the same occasion: "The decision announced from Moscow to dissolve the Communist International is a wise step and one of the most important political events of the war. It allays the last remaining apprehensions, long unfounded but persistent in many quarters, that the Russian government was pressing through this instrument a policy of world revolution...(It) refutes the insinuation that the spread of Communism in Europe is the Russian peace aim and the natural

*NEW YORK TIMES, May 23, 1943.

III-3

sequel of a Russian victory."*

It is understandable that countries engaged in a life-and-death struggle could not face the prospect of renewed schism. What is significant for our present purposes is not the inevitable stress laid on the practical need for cooperation but the insistence on discovering a convergence of the two systems--a view resurrected fifteen years later. Even so profound an observer as Reinhold Neibuhr could write in 1943: "...We have on the whole more liberty and less equality than Russia has. Russia has less liberty and more equality. Whether democracy should be defined primarily in terms of liberty or of equality is a source of *un*ending debate. But history proves fairly conclusively that if we subordinate one too much to the other, we shall end by losing both..." And then, as now the belief in a more liberal trend in the Soviet Union was ascribed to the influence of one man, the unlikely figure of Marshal Stalin. "Russia will prefer the peace of Europe to its communization," wrote FORTUNE. "The arguments

*LONDON TIMES, Editorial, May 24, 1943.

*LONDON TIMES*, Editoriat, May 24, 1943.

Europe to its communication," wrote BORTUNE. "The arguments figure of Marxist Stalin." "Kneais will prefer the peace of war was ascribed to the influence of one man, the nullist.

Now the peat in a more tipikal trend in the Soviet Union to the other, we ask end by losing both..." And then, as broke fairly concisively that if we endorgraduate one too much of equality is a source of much unending debate. But history democracy should be defined primarily in terms of liberty or just.

Kneais use less liberty and more equality. Whether have on the whole more liberty and less equality than Kraais opserver se Reinhold Neipfur could write in 1943: "...We

a view restarted fifteen years later. Even so brooding an the insistence on discovering a convergence of the two systems--

evitable areas laid on the practical need for cooperation put
must be significant for our present purposes if not the in-
gestible config not face the prospect of renewed squirm.

It is underestable that countries engaged in a life-long

society of a Russian victory."

III-3

III-4

in favor of this assumption are that Trotsky is dead and
that Russia will be too weak for aggression in Europe, even
ideological aggression after the war. It is the essence of
Stalinism to use Communism as an instrument of Russian national-
ist foreign policy; and as a nation Russia, though she has
been gradually expanding for centuries, is not so much land-
hungry as hungry for security on her borders. Given this
security she is likely to fix her attention on the develop-
ment of her enormous internal resources."* Marshal Stain,
moreover, was distinguished from his chief rival in much the
same terms as proponents of a "liberal" Khrushchev now com-
pare him to his predecessor? "What will Stalin do after vic-
tory?" wrote Sir Bernard Pares. "We have to wait for the vic-
tory, but perhaps this sketch will offer some answer. The normal
thing for Stalin to do is to return to the vast program of
home construction, so far only initiated, which has been the
great task of his life. It is simple fantasy to imagine that
the man who drove out Trotsky on the issue of world revolution

will now desert to the program of his enemy." And while
*FORTUNE, supplement"The United States in a New World," April, 1943.

**Sir Bernard Pares, "ON THE FEAR OF RUSSIA, " New Republic, 1943.

1943.

**Sir Bernurg Barea," ON THE NEAR OF RUSSIA," New Republi...

*BOSTONE, abpment,"The United States in a New World," April, 1943.
will now depart to the program of his enemy." And while

**

the man who drove out Trotaký on the issue of world revolution
great task of his life. It is a simple fantasy to imagine that
home construction, so far only initiated, which has been the
thing for Stalin to do is to return to the vast program of
tory, put because this sketch will offer some answer. The normal
Bary?" wrote Sir Bernard Barea. "We have to wait for the vic-
bare him to his predecessor. "What will Stalin do after vic-
same terms as brothers of a "familie"? Kurschchen now com-
moreover, was distinguished from his chief rival in much the
ment of her enormous internal resources."* Warahl Stalin,
security and is likely to fix her attention on the develop-
pment of the industry for security on her borders. Given this
been gradually expanding for centuries, it is not so much lang-
far foreign policy; and as a nation Russia, though she has
Stalinism to see Communism as an instrument of Russian national-
ideological aggression after the war. It is the essence of
that Russia will be too weak for aggression in Europe, even
in favor of this assumption are that Trotaký is dead and

III-4

III-5

today the amelioration of the Soviet system is predicted
because of the consequences of industrialization, it was
then prophesied as a result of the impact of the war: "The
Russians cannot fight a war as drastic as the one they are
engaged in without being changed by it. We can as yet have
little inkling of the character or extent of the change.
But we can guess that the thoroughgoing organization of the
war economy, the civilian resistance, the guerilla warfare
could only be achieved in a war that had become democratic in
its inner nature."

That these assumptions were proved erroneous does not,
of course, invalidate similar/argument made in a different context. The mere fact that previous expectations of a basic Soviet transformation have been proved illusory does not indicate that a change can never come. It should impose a certain caution, however, in staking too much on our assessment of Soviet trends. The key point is not that the estimate of the wartime period was wrong--given the pressures of wartime no other one was conceivable. We could not have lived with *Max Lerner, "After the Comintern," New Republic, June 7, 1943.

"Max Werner," After the Comintern, "New Republic," June 7, 1943. no other one was conceivable. We could not have lived with the maritime period was wrong--given the pressures of maritime

of Soviet trends. The key point is not that the estimate of
tain caution, however, in asking too much on our assessment
distinguish that a change can never come. If should impose a cer-
soiet transformation have been proved illogical does not in-
text. The were fact that previous expectations of a past
of course, investigate amiss. It was in a different con-
ments

That these assumptions were proved erroneous does not,
the inner nature."

could only be achieved in a war that had become democratic in
war economy, the civilian resistance, the querilla warfare
But we can guess that the thoroughgoing organization of the
little ingling of the character or extent of the change.

Engaged in without being changed by it. We can as yet have
Russians cannot fight a war so drastic as the one they are
then prophesied as a result of the impact of the war: "The
because of the consequences of industrialization, it was
today the smelting of the Soviet system is predicted

III-2

III-6

ourselves in the postwar world had we not striven so hard to
understand the Soviets in the previous period. But for our
wartime illusions we would never have known whether a more
trusting approach might not have been effective. It is striking,
however, that after seventeen years of further experience
with the Soviet Union, the rationale for negotiations has
remained essentially unchanged.

When Henry Wallace emerged in 1948 as the last major de-
fender of the wartime orthodoxy he based his plan for peace
on arguments which were oddly unaffected by three years of
Soviet intransigeance. The problem of peace was as simple as
the will for it: "In all earnestness, I assure you that/I
were President there would be no crisis in Berlin today. (re-
ference to the Berlin blockade.) I assure you that without
sacrificing a single American principle or public interest we
would have found an agreement long before this." To rely on
military power to assure our security was self-defeating. Con-
tainment did not prevent pressure, it encouraged it: "The get
tough policy' has spawned its inevitable bread (sic)--the
get tougher policy...Berlin need not have happened. Berlin

III-7

did not happen. Berlin was caused. There is no reason
why the peace of the world should hang on the actbns of
a handful of military men stationed in Berlin. I say the
peace of the world is too fragile to be shuttled back and
forth through a narrow air corridor in freighter planes. I
say the lives of our children and our children's parents
are too precious to be trusted to the tempers of second
lieutenants at road barriers where zone meets zone."

A decade later, similar arguments were to be made again
on the issue of Berlin and the problem of disengagement. There
was also resurrected Henry Wallace's nostalgia for the simple
alternatives of happier periods, the idea that we had a choice
between the Cold War and our domestic opportunities, between
the need to assure our security and meeting our challenges
at home: "In one fleet of heavy bombers lies wealth and skill...
that could have taken a million veterans out of trailer camps
and chicken coops," said Henry Wallace in 1948. "We can
build new schools to rescue our children from the fire traps
where they now crowd two to a desk, We can end the murderous

where they now crowd two to a desk. We can end the murderous
buttress new schools to rescue our children from the fire truce
and chicken coops," said Henry Wallace in 1948. "We can
that could have taken a million veterans out of trailer camps
at home: "In one fleet of heavy pompers lies wealth and skill...
the need to secure our security and meeting our challenges
between the Cold War and our domestic opportunities, between
alternatives of happier periods, the ideas that we had a choice
was also resurrected Henry Wallace's nostrums for the simple
on the issue of Berlin and the problem of disengagement. There
A decade later, similar arguments were to be made again
triumphant at road barriers where some meets zone."
are too precocious to be trusted to the tembers of second
say the lives of our children and our children's parents
forth through a narrow sir corridor in freighter planes. I
beside the world is too fragile to be unsettled pack and
a handful of military men stationed in Berlin. I say yes
why the peace of the world should hang on the outcome of
did not happen. Berlin was caused. There is no reason

III-7

III-8

tyranny of sickness and disease." In 1958, one of the most anguished and profound students of American foreign policy called for a new approach to foreign policy with similar arguments. In the Reith lectures asking for a re-examination of American foreign policy George Kennan said, "To my own countrymen who have often asked me where best to apply the hand to counter the Soviet threat, I have accordingly have to reply: to our American failings--to the things we are ashamed of in our own eyes: to the racial problem, to the conditions in our big cities, to the education and environment of our young people, to the growing gap between specialized knowledge and popular understanding. I imagine that similar answers could be found for the other Western countries. I would like to add that these are problems which are not going to be solved by anything we or anyone else does in the stratosphere. If solutions are to be found for them it will be right here on this familiar earth, in the dealings among men and in the moral struggles of the individual. If *Wallace, Henry, Acceptance speech, July 24, 1948.

*Wallace, Henry*. Acceptance speech, July 34, 1948.

*among men and in the most atrious struggles of the individual*. It
will be right here on the familiar earth, in the desolate
in the autoaspHERE. It solutions are to be found for them it
are not going to be solved by anything we or anyone else does
to them. I would like to add that these are problems which
similar answers could be found for the other Western coun-
tries knowledge and popular understanding. I imagine that
ment of our young people, to the growing gap between special-
conditions in our pig cities, to the education and evan-
gelism of in our own eyes: to the socialist problem, to the
just to reply: to our American friends--to the things we are
ably the fund to counter the Soviet threat. I have accordingly
"To my own countrymen who have often asked me where best to
examination of American foreign policy George Kennan said,
similar arguments. In the Reich lectures asking for a re-
policy cited for a new approach to foreign policy with
moststriking and protond students of American foreign
traditions of sickness and disease." In 1948, one of the
*

III-8

III-9

one had to choose between launching satellites and continuing
to give attention to these more homely problems, I should say
a hundred times the latter, for unless we make progress in
them, no satellite will ever save us. Whether we win against
the Russians is primarily a question of whether we win against
ourselves."

Throughout, the advocates of conciliation have compounded
the rigidities of the prevailing policies by the nature of
the case they made on behalf of negotiations. By juxtaposing
diplomacy and power, morality and security, they have per-
petuated the one-sidedness that they sought to combat. Our
moral conscience has never been more needed. But all too
often it has magnified the absolutism of our strategic doc-
trine and the occasional self-righteousness of our diplomacy
by making our choices seem simpler than they are. Negotiations
have never been more necessary. But we cannot make progress
in them as long as we justify them by myths and as long as we
enter them without a program.

*George F. Kennan, RUSSIA, THE ATOM AND THE WEST, Harper &
Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 13.

BROTHERS, New York, 1921, p. 13.
*GEORGE B. KENNEDY, RUSSIA, THE EAST AND THE WEST, Harper &
enfer them without a program.

IN THEM AS IUND AS WE JUSTIFY THEM BY MYTHS AND AS IUND AS WE
HAVE NEVER BEEN MORE NECESSARY. BUT WE CANNOT MAKE PROGRESS
BY MAKING OUR CHOICES SEEM ACHER THAN THEY ARE. NEGOTIATIONS
TRINE AND THE OCCASIONAL SELF-RIGHTEQUALNESS OF OUR DIPLOMACY
OCTEN IT HAS MAGNIFIED THE SPECULUM OF OUR STRATEGIC DO-
WORST CONSCIENCE HAS NEVER BEEN MORE NEEDED. BUT ALL TOO
DEBATED THE ONE-ALONENESS THAT THEY SAWNT TO COMPAT. OUR
DIPLOMACY AND POWER, WORSHIP AND SECURITY, THEY HAVE BE-
THE CASE THEY MADE ON PEACE OF NEGOTIATIONS. BY JUXTAPOSITION
THE RIDIGITIES OF THE BREASTFILLING POLICIES BY THE NATURE OF
THROUGHOUT, THE ADVOCACY OF CONCILIATION HAVE COMBINED
OURSELVES. "

THE RUSSIANS IS PRIMARILY A QUESTION OF WHETHER WE WILL AGAINST
THEM, NO ASTELLITE WILL EVER SAVE US. WHETHER WE WILL AGAINST
A HUNDRED TIMES THE ISTER, FOR UNLESS WE MAKE PROGRESS IN
TO GIVE ATTENTION TO THESE MORE HOMELY PROBLEMS. I SHOULD SAY
ONE HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LAUNCHING ASTELLITES AND CONTINUING

III-9

III-10

President Eisenhower, whose party had charged its
opponents with being soft towards Communism, found himself
engaged in a summit meeting within two years of assuming
office which was justified by the most abstract arguments
of the previous decade and which called forth a flood of
self-congratulatory comment both in America and abroad. There
was the inevitable assumption of a Soviet change of heart.

"No one would want to underestimate the change in the Russian attitude. Without that, nothing would have been possible.

it remains
But, President Eisenhower's achievement that he com-
prehended the change, that he seized the opening and turned
it to the advantage of world peace."* There was the conviction
both here and in Europe that the Cold War had been due largely
to a misunderstanding which had been removed at Geneva: "It
is an intense sense of relief which united President Eisenhower
with President Bulganin (sic). Neither ever conceived that his
own country would launch a war. But each giant was quite con-
vinced that the other giant was capable of doing so. It was

*NEW YORK TIMES, Editorial, July 21, 1955.

III-11

this conviction which created the climate of the Cold War
and precipitated the rearmament race. The Cold War was
suddenly called off at Geneva because both sides recognized
that these suspicions were entirely confounded" (Emphasis added)*
Once more there was the juxtaposition of power and diplomacy,
of negotiation or war: "There ain't gonna be any war," said
the then Foreign Secretary MacMillan. "This is based upon the
now accepted fact that in nuclear warfare there can be no vic-
tor. There are a lot of difficult problems to settle which
will take time. The very fact that war is excluded means that
the problems of the world have got to be solved by peaceful
means and by an acceptance of the new conditions of these

** what
times." Mr. MacMillan gave no indication/what he understood
or direction in which a
by adjustment to new conditions/of the/settlement was to be
sought. But the implication was strong both in the United
States and in Great Britain that good will supplied its own
rationale, that to intrude specific proposals into the atmosphere
of detente could only disturb the prevailing harmony: "Mr.

*Problems of the Garden-Party peace, New Statesman and Nation
August 13, 1955.

**MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, July 25, 1955.

III-12

Eisenhower has done even better than defeat an enemy in battle as had been his assignment a decade ago," read an editorial in the NEW YORK TIMES. "He has done something to prevent battles from happening...The occasion was in fact made for Mr. Eisenhower. Other men might have been capable of driving a sharp bargain. Other men might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to draw others into the circle/his good will and to modify the attitudes of not the policies of the little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe." Diplomacy was seen as a public debate between us and the Soviet Union with other nations occupying the moderator's chair and awarding the winner's prize: "The chiefút of the Geneva conference is so simple and breathtaking that cynics and comma-chasers still question it and Americans, for other reasons, find it a little difficult to grasp. The championship of peace has changed hands. In the mind of Europe which judges this unofficial

*NEW YORK TIMES, July 25, 1955.

NEW YORK TIMES, July 22, 1922.

cumbered hands. In the mind of Europe which judges this unoffensive
a little difficult to grasp. The championship of peace use
still question it and Americans, for other reasons, find it
is so simple and precluding that cynics and commissaires
winner's prize: "The chief representative of the German conference
other nations occurring the moderator's chair and presiding the
seen as a public debate between us and the Soviet Union with
visitors from the other side of the Elys. " Diplomacy was
the attitude of not the policies of the little band of
graw others into the circle's good will and to modify
of
strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to
of driving a sharp wedge. Other men might have blazed
made for Mr. Eisenhower. Other men might have been capable
prevent parties from tabbening... The occasion was in fact
eqitorist in the NEW YORK TIMES. "He has done something to
pattern as had been his assignment a decade ago," resd an
Eisenhower has done even better than defeat an enemy in

III-13

III-13

title, it has passed from Moscow to Washington."*

In retrospect it may be doubted whether the protestations of our peaceful intentions which were generally regarded as one of the main achievements of the Geneva summit conference were so unmixed a blessing, indeed whether it was not a mis-conception to believe that after a decade of Soviet intransigence it was our task to reassure the Communist leaders. Since we were unwilling or unable to relate to our protestations of peaceful intentions a concrete program embodying our concept of a negotiated settlement, the Soviet leaders may have become convinced that we identified the end of the Cold War with a change of tone. Accordingly, it is possible that they lost any incentive they may have had to resolve some of the problems that had been thought to have caused the tensions before Geneva. To the extent that we persuaded the Communist leaders of our horror of war, we may have raised the prospect that they could greatly improve their bargaining position by giving the impression that they were more willing to face a showdown than the West. In this manner, the Soviet *LIFE*, Editorial, August 1, 1955.

*FILE, Editorial, August 1, 1928.

to face a showdown that the West. In this manner, the Soviet
position by giving the impression that they were more willing
the prospect that they could greatly improve their position
Communist leaders of our horror of war, we may have raised
stone before Genes.

To the extent that we berated the
crime before Genes.

of the problems that had been thought to have caused the ten-
they lost any incentive they may have had to resolve some
war with a change of tone. Accordingly, it is possible that
have become convinced that we identified the end of the Cold
concept of a negotiated settlement, the Soviet fegere may
fions of peaceful intentions a concrete program embodying our
since we were unwilling or unable to relate to our proceeds-
evidence it was our task to reassure the Communist fegere.
conception to believe that after a decade of Soviet a trans-
were so unmixed a pleasure, indeed whether it was not a mis-
one of the main achievements of the Genes summit conference
of our peaceful intentions which were generally recharged as

title, it has passed from Moscow to Washington...

III-13

III-14

leaders were able to utilize the West's fear of conflict to perpetuate some injustices and to expand their influence into new areas. On the way back from Geneva, Mr. Khrushchev stopped in Berlin and committed himself to the sovereignty of East Germany, laying the basis for renewed pressure four years later. And within a month the world learned of the Soviet sale of arms to Egypt, which produced two years of upheavals and brought the world on several occasions to the very edge of the abyss.

The evasion of concreteness, the reliance on personalities, the implication that all problems could be solved in one fell swoop, ushered in a period of increasing demoralization. If international problems could in fact be resolved so easily, all the tensions and sacrifices of the post war period had been a frivolous imposition. Either the Cold War had been caused by issues serious enough to call for serious exertions or it had been an unfortunate misunderstanding. If the former, a relaxation of tensions, to be meaningful, had to attempt to solve some of the basic causes of the tensions. If the latter, the West had wasted a decade in an illusory endeavor and the

III-15

presumption was strong that any future Soviet intransigeance
the
would be answered by renewed calls for/\& remedy which once
before seemed so magically to dispel all clouds. Since
Geneva made no progress towards settling any of the issues
that divided Soviet Russia and the West, it was no accident
that a little more than a year later, the concurrent crises
of Suez and Hungary marked a renewal of the tensions of the
Cold War. Nor is it surprising that the result was not a
closing of ranks, but an increasing chorus for another summit
conference whose agenda was no more specified than that of
the previous one, but which was thought to be able to remove
distrust, establish good will, relax tensions and contribute
to the transformation of Soviet society--though just how, few
of its advocates were able to define precisely.

IV-15

homeland of <u>all</u> German workers."* (italics supplied). A similar
point was made by a leader of the East German Communist party in
March 1959: "Socialism will triumph in the German Democratic Repub-
lic in the next few years. When we will place this question before
the entire German people and in what manner depends on necessary real,
objective conditions. <u>Under present circumstances</u> (italics supplied)
the main task in West Germany and West Berlin is to bring about a
change in the balance of forces in favor of peace and democracy, <u>with-
out</u> as yet posing the demand for a transformation (italics supplied).
<u>of the social order</u>. Everything depends on taking a stand not as
a party of <u>opposition</u> but as the leading and the largest party
in all of Germany, a party which has a program for the solution of
the cardinal concerns of the <u>entire</u> German nation"***(italics supplied).

*Ibid.*

**Berliner Zeitung, March 5, 1959. Once the West had accepted East Germany it could not respond to a Soviet claim that its East German puppet represented all of Germany by pressing similar demands on behalf of the Federal Republic. The claim to representing the German people thus having been surrendered cannot be reclaimed.

IV-18

31
standard of living."

In 1948, Henry Wallace returned to this theme:

"I believe Russia is committed by her history of centuries of Czarist
tyranny to the use of repressive measures...until such time as an
abundance of consumers' goods makes possible the freedoms which mean

32
so much to us in the West."

At the time of the Geneva summit con-

ference in 1955, it was reported that: "Foremost among the reasons
why Russia could greatly profit from a relaxation of tension, these
experts (on Russia) say, is its desire for access to supplies in
the West of heavy machinery, consumer goods, rolling stock and other
materials that would speed both Russia and its principal ally, China,

33
towards their ambitious industrial goals."

And in 1959 Averell

Harriman wrote: "I think Mr. Khrushchev is keenly anxious to improve
Soviet living standards. I believe that he looks upon the current
Seven Year Plan as the crowning success of the Communist revolution
and a historic turning point in the lives of the Soviet people. He

also considers it a ... 3

31. Sumner Welles, *The Times for Decision*, New York, 1944, p.405.

32. *New York Times*, April 24, 1948.

33. *New York Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1955

33. *New York Herald Tribune*, July 18, 1922

31. *Summer Weller*, *The Times for Decade*, New York, 1944, p.402.

also considers it a
....
....
....

and a historic turning point in the lives of the Soviet people. He
Seven Year War as the crowning success of the Communist revolution
Soviet living standards. I believe that he looks upon the current
Herriman wrote: "I think Mr. Khrushchev is nearly axioms to improve
towards their ambitious industrial goals." And in 1959 Varezi

materials that would exceed both Kueta and its principal ally, China,
the Soviet heavy machinery, consumer goods, rolling stock and other
exerts (on Kueta) say, is its desire for access to supplies in
which Kueta could greatly benefit from a relaxation of tension, these
reference in 1952, it was reported that: "Hormone among the reasons
so much to me in the West." At the time of the Gorbachev summit com-
spasm of consumers, goods makes possible the freedom which mean
to many to the use of repressive measures...until such time as an
"I believe Kueta is committed by per policy of centuries of Soviet
standard of living."

In 1948, Henry Wallace returned to Chicago theme:
31

IV-18

monument to himself that will mark him in history as one of his
country's great benefactors. However, as I have indicated else-
where, he is finding it difficult to attain the ambitious goals
set forth in the plan as long as armaments are making such heavy
demands for scientific genius, technical skill and capital
investment.

Thus, whatever aspect of the Soviet system they have
considered, many in the West have sought to solve our policy
dilemma by making the most most favorable assumptions about
Soviet trends. At one time, we drew conclusions from the fact that
comfort from the fact that the Soviet leaders required peace in
order to devote themselves to building up their economy. A
decade and a half later, a more benign Sovietx existed was
policy was predicted with exactly the opposite argument.

Now, the already accomplished industrialization was thought to
give the Soviet leaders too much of a stake in their society for
them to risk foreign adventures. The concern with the transformations

Averell Harriman, *Peace With Russia*, New York, 1959, p. 168.