STRATEGY for PEACE CONFERENCE

510 MADISON AVE., ROOM 701, NEW YORK 22, N.Y.

PLaza 3-3547

Chairman
C. MAXWELL STANLEY
Stanley Engineering
Muscatine, Iowa

April 1, 1965

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

STRATEGY FOR PEACE - 1965

I invite you to meet with a group of leaders in business, government and the professions for a Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace. The Conference will be held over the week end of Thursday, May 20, to Noon Sunday, May 23, 1965, at Airlie House, a pleasant conference facility an hour's drive from Washington, D. C., near Warrenton, Virginia.

We will explore off the record and in depth certain urgent foreign policy concerns. The topic of the Conference will be: A TEN-YEAR LOOK AHEAD AT A STRATEGY FOR PEACE.

We will follow our usual pattern of separate discussion groups which will consider:

I. EUROPE - Berlin - NATO - European Politics

II. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL - Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

III. THE UNITED NATIONS - Peacekeeping - Financing - Organizational Problems

IV. THE FAR EAST - China - USSR - Viet Nam - Indonesia - Malaysia - India

V. IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY - Outer Space - Automation - Other Developments

This Conference will be the Fifth Anniversary of STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCES, which over the years have made significant contributions to our foreign policy.

SPONSORED BY THE STANLEY FOUNDATION

["STRATEGY FOR PEACE - 1965", "Page 2", "In the past, government officials have participated fully in our Confer-
ences, and again their role as observers will be respected with regard\nto any published report.", "It occurs to us that some of you to whom this invitation is extended may\nwell wish to propose appropriate individuals from your organization in\nthe event that you cannot take part in the Conference.", "We will look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.\nA reply postal card is enclosed on which you may indicate your discussion group preference, residence requirements at Airlie, and transportation needs.", "There will be a registration fee of $25 payable on registration at Airlie.", "Information about Airlie House is enclosed, along with a time schedule\nfor the Conference.", "There will be motor coaches departing from the Alumni Rooms of George Washington University, 20th and H Streets, N. W., Washington, D. C., at 3 P. M. on Thursday, May 20, and returning from Airlie to Washington on Sunday, May 23, 1965, at 2 P. M. As usual, special transportation arrangements can be made, and should you be arriving at Dulles International Airport, we would like to have this information.", "Previous Strategy for Peace Conferences have been successful because\nthinking citizens have been willing to come together to discuss the aspects\nof a strategy for peace. Looking forward to your participation this year,\nI am", "Enclosures"]

From the Potomac River bridges, follow the shaded route to Airlie House via routes 495 and 66. (Approximate driving time 45 minutes)

This map will also aid conferee's in locating Airlie Buildings.

AIRLIE

Warrenton, Virginia

Airlie House is operated by Airlie Foundation as an educational and research conference center. The facility is offered for use to groups who wish to study and work in privacy and informality. The primary purpose of The Center is to encourage the exchange of ideas and to provide a forum for the discussion of the problems within our society.

Airlie House is the first rural center of its type accessible to the Nation's Capital. Distinguished speakers are readily available from private life, The Congress, government agencies, research centers, universities, and industry without the problems of

excessive expense or time lost in travel. This Center, therefore offers distinct advantages for conferences in national and international affairs.

Airlie House is operated by Airlie Foundation, a non-profit corporation chartered by the Commonwealth of Virginia. The facility is not operated to produce a continuing profit. Airlie House is designed to provide a modern, functional conference center maintained in a rural setting. Charges for the use of the Center are contingent upon achieving these goals.

STRATEGY for PEACE CONFERENCE

PLaza 3-3547

April 1, 1965

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was good to talk with you the other day. We are delighted that you may Chair one of the discussion groups at the forthcoming Fifth Anniversary Conference on a Strategy for Peace, to be held on Thursday, May 20 to Sunday, May 23, 1965.

The Conference will be held at *Airlie House* where we have met before. It is an extremely pleasant conference facility near Warrenton, Virginia, about an hour's drive outside of Washington. As you know, we originally held our Conferences at Arden House but since we have been at Airlie we find that holding conferences here makes it possible for more government observers to take part and we feel this is of importance.

Since our first Conference in 1960 was deemed so successful we have gone on from year to year, holding these annual conferences on major foreign policy concerns, with smaller in-depth conferences in between.

This year we wish to take a Ten-Year Look Ahead to 1975 at certain urgent concerns in the light of immediate crises, but more importantly delineating where we should be going and how to get there.

The Conference format which we have successfully used to date, is to permit participants to choose their discussion group and stay with the group for the entire period. This in effect means that you have 20 to 25 discussion participants who constitute a continuing unit. Our participants continue to be the same kind of mix which we had at the initial Conference - business men, academicians, experts, and appropriate government observers. Our invitations are extended to persons on the basis of their concern, expertise, and the contribution they make to the discussions.

At our May Conference our discussion groups will be as follows:

I. **EUROPE** - NATO, Alliances, MIF, Berlin, political developments and other problems.

II. **DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL** - Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Page 2.

April 1, 1965

### III. THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE KEEPING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS.

### IV. CHINA, THE USSR AND THE FAR EAST - Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and India.

### V. IMPACT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY - Outer space, use of automation, other developments, etc.

Kenneth P. Young, Jr., President of The Asia Society, and former Ambassador to Thailand will Chair Discussion Group IV, and Don Brennan, President of The Hudson Institute will Chair Discussion Group II. Your group of course will be Discussion Group I. on Europe and related problems. As a matter of fact I think your group will attract considerable interest.

Your duties as a Discussion Group Chairman will be to preside at the appointed times listed on the enclosed schedule. Discussion Group Chairman also provide for their participants a one page outline or series of questions which we distribute on arrival, and which serves as a focus for getting the discussion off the ground. This outline does not have to be extensive and can be anything you wish. We have experimented over the years with the advance distribution of working papers and have found that most participants just did not refer to them. Rather when you have persons who choose to come to these conferences because of their concerns and expertise, the important role is the directing and guiding role of a knowledgeable Chairman.

Each discussion group has one or two Rapporteurs, the number to be decided by the discussion Chairman. These Rapporteurs assist the Chairman in the preparation of the report and/or recommendations of the discussion group. These reports and/or recommendations are prepared on Saturday night and presented to a Plenary Session on Sunday. No effort is made to coerce decisions in discussion groups nor in the final Plenary Session. There is an overall understanding that what is arrived at is a sense of the meeting. This is an opportunity for you to do whatever you wish with the group.

Both of the Rapporteurs who served on the European Discussion Group the last time have volunteered to serve again. They are Professor Walter Goldstein, who is a Professor of Political Science and Government of Brooklyn College, and Dr. Walter Yondorf of the Mitre Corp. There is no obligation to either of these to serve again so that you can nominate your own Rapporteurs.

As I mentioned to you, Thursday night will be a Plenary Session for speakers. I cannot tell you at this moment just who these speakers will be. If your schedule is such that you will be arriving Friday morning, May 21, in time to begin Chairing your Discussion Group, this will be satisfactory, and don't worry about transportation arrangements because we can take care of this adequately.

(DRAFT INVITATION LETTER TO 5TH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE)

Dear

STRATEGY FOR PEACE - 1965

This is to invite you to meet with a group of leaders in business, government and the professions at the Fifth Anniversary of a Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace over the week-end of Thursday, May 20 to Noon, Sunday, May 23 at Airlie House, a pleasant conference facility an hour's drive from Washington, D. C. near Warrenton, Virginia. We hope you will be with us.

This Fifth Anniversary Conference will take a look at recommendations made five years ago at our first conference at Arden House in June, 1960 and a ten year look ahead to 1975.

We will explore off-the-record and in-depth certain urgent foreign policy concerns.

The topic of the May, 1965 Conference will be: "A TEN-YEAR LOOK AHEAD AT A STRATEGY FOR PEACE." We will follow the pattern of having separate discussion groups which will consider:

III. **THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PEACE KEEPING AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS.**

IV. **CHINA, THE USSR AND THE FAR EAST** - Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and India.

AND

V. **IMPACT OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY** - Outer space, use of automation, other developments, etc.

In the past, government officials have participated fully in our conferences, and again their role as observers will be respected with regard to any published report.

STRATEGY FOR PEACE - 1965

Page 2

It occurs to us that some of you to whom this invitation is extended
may well wish to propose appropriate individuals from your organiza-
tion or agency in the event that you cannot take part in the Con-
ference.

We will look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
A reply postal card is enclosed on which you may indicate your dis-
cussion group preference, residence requirements at Airlie, and trans-
portation needs.

There will be a registration fee of $25.00 payable on registration at
Airlie.

Information about Airlie House is enclosed, along with a time schedule
for the Conference.

There will be motor coaches departing from the Alumni Rooms of George
Washington University, 20th and H Streets, N.W., Washington, D. C. at
3:00 P.M. on Thursday, May 20, 1965, and returning from Airlie to
Washington on Sunday, May 23, 1965 at 2:00 P. M. As usual, special
transportation arrangements can be made, and should you be arriving at
Dulles International Airport, we would like to have this information.

Strategy for Peace Conferences have proved successful because thinking
citizens have been willing to come together to discuss the short and
long range aspects of a Strategy for Peace. We hope that you will
join us.

Looking forward to your participation, I am,

## Location and Transportation

Airlie House is located on Airlie Farm four miles West of Warrenton, Virginia, on Route 605. Airlie Farm is a 1,200 acre estate in the Bethel Valley at the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains. There are three accessible airports, Friendship in Baltimore, the Washington National in Alexandria, and the Dulles International in Chantilly, Va.; the latter is approximately twenty miles from Airlie House. A private airstrip is being planned along with helicopter pads.

Chartered buses as well as private transportation may be made available from Washington on request. Buses from the Trailways Terminal in Washington are regularly scheduled at frequent intervals to Warrenton, Virginia.

Those wishing to use private automobile travel may plan on one hour's driving time from the Potomac River Bridges in Washington. Most of the forty mile trip is on a dual highway and travel time will be considerably reduced by the Route 66 Expressway.

For Further Information, Write or Call

AIRLIE FOUNDATION, WARRENTON, VA.
Telephone 347-1300

Washington Office: Telephone 273-6554

AIRLIE

WARRENTON, VIRGINIA

AIRLIE HOUSE

CONTENTS

PREFACE .................................................... 5

SCHEDULE .................................................... 6

DISCUSSION GROUP LEADERS ................................ 7

OPENING REMARKS By Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman ........ 8

DISCUSSION GROUPS

I. Asia.................................................. 9

II. Europe................................................ 12

III. Arms Control and Disarmament .................... 16

IV. Economic Aspects of a Strategy for Peace ............ 21

V. The United Nations and Peacekeeping.................. 24

IV. Space - National and International Policies............ 27

FINAL PLENARY SESSION

Remarks by Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley.................... 30

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS .................................... 32

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE .................................... 36

PREFACE

Groups of several hundred leaders in business, government, and the professions throughout the United States have participated in five conferences to discuss a Strategy for Peace. The first conference was held in June, 1960 at Arden House, with Mrs. Albert D. Lasker and Mr. Tom Slick as co-hosts. Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley joined Mrs. Lasker and Mr. Slick in sponsoring the second conference at Arden House in January, 1961, and the third conference at Airlie House in October, 1961. The fourth conference, a memorial to Tom Slick who was killed in a plane crash the previous October, was held at Airlie House in January, 1963, co-hosted by Mrs. Lasker and Mr. Stanley.

This report deals with the Fifth Strategy for Peace Conference, carried on under the sponsorship of the Stanley Foundation and chaired by Mr. Stanley. The meeting covered a broad range of topics and was concerned with the interrelated aspects of Asia, Europe, Arms Control, the United Nations, Space and the Economic Aspects of a Strategy for Peace. We hope that this report of discussions on these subjects will be of value in the thinking and planning for a Strategy for Peace.

We wish to thank a generous group of contributors who helped make this meeting possible. They include: Aerojet-General Corporation, Herbert Barchoff, Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Mel Dubin, Henry E. Niles, Miles Pennybacker, the estate of Tom Slick, Joseph Weingarten, David Winton, and others.

Government officials taking part in the conferences are in no way committed to any position or findings of the discussion groups. Also, while the report more or less commends itself to the majority, members supporting various parts do not necessarily endorse it in its entirety or specific language.

We are moving ahead with plans for another conference.

C. Maxwell Stanley
Chairman

5

TO PLAN A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

DISCUSSION GROUPS

Chairmen and Rapporteurs

I. Asia

<table><tr><td>Chairman:</td><td>Dr. Richard C. Raymond, Consultant - Information, Advanced Technology Services, General Electric Company</td></tr><tr><td>Rapporteur:</td><td>Robert C. Herber, Managing Editor - ORBIS, The Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania</td></tr></table>

II. Europe

<table><tr><td>Chairman:</td><td>Dr. Norman C. Peterson, Manager - Arms Control Programs, Hughes Aircraft Company</td></tr><tr><td>Rapporteurs:</td><td>Prof. Walter Goldstein, Department of Government, Brooklyn College, The City University of New York<br>Dr. Walter Yondorf, The Mitre Corporation</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Chairman:</td><td>Dr. Albert Hibbs, Chief - Arms Control Study Group, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Rapporteur:</td><td>Thomas C. O'Sullivan, Manager - Advance Systems Requirements, Space and Information Systems Division, Raytheon Company</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Chairman:</td><td>Prof. Emile Benoit, Director - Research Program on International Economics, Disarmament and Arms Control, Columbia University</td></tr><tr><td>Rapporteur:</td><td>Prof. John S. Gilmore, Research Economist, Denver Research Institute, University of Denver</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Chairman:</td><td>Dr. Arthur M. Cox, Director - UN Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution</td></tr><tr><td>Rapporteur:</td><td>Richard Hudson, Editor, War/Peace Report</td></tr></table>

VI. Space - National and International Policies

<table><tr><td>Chairman:</td><td>Dr. John B. Phelps</td></tr><tr><td>Rapporteur:</td><td>William Leavitt, Associate Editor, Air Force/Space Digest</td></tr></table>

7

OPENING REMARKS

by C. MAXWELL STANLEY

Welcome to the Fifth Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace. We anticipate another interesting and worthwhile exchange of ideas on important aspects of the vital problem of finding a path to a secure peace with freedom in this troubled world.

If this conference follows the pattern of its predecessors, there will be a worthwhile exchange of ideas, both within and without the discussion groups. This should produce discussion group reports which will be of significance.

The opening of this Fifth Conference signifies that we have found a way to carry on the Strategy for Peace program initiated by the late Tom Slick and me in 1959. The Stanley Foundation has undertaken the sponsorship of the conferences and will continue them so long as they successfully meet a need and purpose, and so long as adequate financial support is forthcoming.

Six interesting and timely topics have been selected, each of which will be the subject matter of a discussion group:

* Group I - Asia

* Group II - Europe

* Group III - Arms Control & Disarmament

* Group IV - Economic Aspects of a Strategy for Peace

* Group V - United Nations and Peacekeeping

* Group VI - Space: National and International Policies

Two of these, Asia and Economic Aspects of a Strategy for Peace, are new topics upon which our efforts may be largely exploratory. The other four topics have been examined in earlier conferences, although the bases of reference today may be slightly changed. On these repeat topics we will no doubt probe deeper.

Our procedure will be similar to that followed at the last conference. Most of the time will be given to the discussion groups, each under the leadership of a chairman and rapporteur. Each discussion group will bring a report to the final plenary session Sunday morning.

These reports will be for information and discussion only. No effort will be made to adopt them by the conference as a whole nor to determine its degree of consensus. Nor is it intended that the discussion groups seek consensus. If there is general agreement, the report may so state. If not, differing or opposing points of view should be stated. The published report of the conference will state clearly that no one is bound by the reports of the discussion groups.

The success of this conference depends upon you. We have again brought you together with a minimum of structuring, prepared position papers and proposals. Such limitation of advance planning is deliberate. We want to give you the maximum opportunity for unrestricted discussion and exploration. From past experience we have learned that this free-wheeling approach not only produces beneficial results, but is also highly acceptable to the participants.

My best wishes to you for an interesting and successful conference.

8

DISCUSSION GROUP I - ASIA

Chairman: DR. RICHARD C. RAYMOND
Rapporteur: ROBERT C. HERBER

A. *The Situation*

The Chinese Communists have embarked on a policy of expansion in Southeast Asia -- a policy which is limited chiefly by its own internal problems, the developing Sino-Soviet rift, and the United States military presence in the area. The most obvious evidences of this policy are Peking's actions in Tibet, along the border of India, and in various parts of the Indo-chinese Peninsula.

Southeast Asia is an area which is characterized, with some noteworthy exceptions, by weak and unstable governments, economic underdevelopment, illiterate and often apathetic populations, and lack of technical and managerial skills. On the whole, it is a food-surplus area, which makes it attractive to Peking; moreover, there are parts of Southeast Asia which are underpopulated. If the Southeast Asian nations are to resist Chinese Communist aggression, they will need external assistance -- chiefly from the United States.

In almost all parts of East Asia, the population explosion increasingly looms as a serious problem; the result may well be a serious food shortage in the near future. The extent of poverty and the difficulty of persuading the people to adopt family planning make it seem unlikely that the rate of population increase can be reduced materially in the near future. Thus, this pressure of the population against the food supply will be, for many years, a destabilizing factor in most of East Asia.

Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, by reason of their off-shore locations and economic growth, appear to be islands of relative political stability. They provide Asia with examples of socio-economic development through cooperation between state and private enterprise. Malaysia, after the defeat of Communist insurgency, has emerged since 1958 as a stable, progressive nation. India, although suffering from serious economic and population problems, is striving valiantly and with some success to industrialize under a mixed socialist-capitalist economy and representative institutions. These five countries, together with Pakistan and Thailand which appear to be developing a degree of political stability and economic progress, offer some hope for maintaining a pro-Western, non-Communist position around the periphery of China.

Indonesia, under its present government, is pursuing a policy of ultra-nationalism and expansion seemingly aimed at some degree of political hegemony in Southeast Asia. Its leaders have used foreign adventures in order to distract the attention of the Indonesian people from economic failures at home. It is doubtful that the present rulers are capable of providing adequate leadership in domestic affairs; thus, they are likely to play upon the external theme as long as possible.

9

## B. United States Objectives

1. Containment of Communist Chinese expansionism.

2. Promotion of economic development throughout East Asia.

3. Strengthening of responsible and popular governments.

4. Encouragement of regional groupings and cooperation.

## C. Specific Issues

The members of the discussion group arrived at a consensus (not always unanimous agreement) on the following issues:

### 1. South Vietnam

The United States cannot withdraw in the face of the Communist challenge in South Vietnam, without greatly endangering the non-Communist position throughout all of Southeast Asia. Asians would lose confidence in the United States intentions and ability to defend other parts of mainland Southeast Asia. Neutralization of South Vietnam is simply a prelude to communization, as it provides for the withdrawal of the United States military presence, leaving the field to Communist irregulars in the same manner as the "neutralization" of Laos. The current level of effort in South Vietnam is unlikely to bring victory to the Saigon government. The only other alternative is to raise the level of effort in order to defend South Vietnam and prevent further Communist inroads into the area. There is a wide variety of military actions which could be taken to reduce, and eventually, eliminate Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam. One of these actions might well be the enforcement, by military operations if necessary, of Laotian neutralization. The risks - vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists - incurred by this policy would be small and preferable to the risk of losing the war in South Vietnam under present United States policy and level of effort.

### 2. Laos

The United States, as one alternative to intervention with military force to preserve the independence of Laos, might explore with the Soviet Union -- one of the guarantors of neutral and independent Laos -- the possibility of a cooperative development program in that country. The primary purpose of such a program would be to promote the economic development of Laos through concentration on such specific targets as an improved network of roads, increased hospital facilities, more schools, etc. A secondary purpose would be to provide a working example of the value of functional cooperation between the United States and the USSR in an otherwise tense, potentially "hot", area of the world.

### 3. U. N. Admission of Communist China

It seems likely that Communist China will be admitted to the United Nations within the next few years. It is important that the United States plan in advance, with its friends and allies in

10

the UN, so that the entrance of Communist China is accomplish-
ed on terms least unacceptable to the U. S. These terms should
include Communist China's recognition of Taiwan as a separate
state and the retention of Taiwan in the United Nations. If the
United Nations seats the Peking government but fails to retain
Taiwan, the U. S. should exercise its influence against this ar-
rangement and vote against it. But the United States should not,
under any circumstances, withdraw from the United Nations.

Continued support for self-determination on Taiwan rules out
recognition of the Peking government until the Communist Chi-
nese change their policy of making a break with Taiwan a condi-
tion for establishing diplomatic relations.

4. Trade and Exchange With Communist China

In the face of the increasing desire of other non-Communist
countries to trade with Communist China, the U. S. should re-
lax its efforts to halt the expansion of this trade and at the same
time take steps to trade with China in nonstrategic items. The
United States should pursue every opportunity to provide for an
exchange of newspaper correspondents, cultural groups and in-
dividual tourists with Communist China.

5. Outer Mongolia

Recognition of Outer Mongolia, which had previously sought
diplomatic ties with Washington, would offer the U. S. an oppor-
tunity for increased contact with this remote part of Asia, lying
between China and the Soviet Union. Representation in Ulan
Bator would give United States diplomats an opportunity to es-
tablish contact with this important area.

6. Malaysia

The United States should continue its efforts (e.g., diplomatic and economic pressure) to arrange an effective cease-fire in North Borneo, seek the withdrawal of Indonesian-supported guerrilla forces, and eventually convince Djakarta to call off its policy of confrontation. If this approach fails, the U. S. should support Great Britain and Australia in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of Malaysia.

7. Economic and Technical Assistance Programs

The United States, in conjunction with its military and diplomat-
ic strategies, should increase economic and technical assist-
ance programs in the non-Communist countries. This will
require increased efficiency and skill in the operation of United
States economic aid programs and a better "public relations"
effort to secure support for these programs from the American
people and the Congress. These programs must be soundly con-
ceived and informed by a clear economic aid strategy which em-
phasizes aid to those countries that are both vital to United
States interests and capable of utilizing this aid to best advan-
tage.

The United States must find new and better ways of enlisting
available human resources for service in the economic assist-

11

ance field. Too many of the U. S. economic aid programs in foreign countries have failed because of the absence of qualified personnel. One pool of resources which might be drawn on would be the many educated and skilled, yet underemployed, persons in some of the more advanced Asian countries. Teams of such personnel, at work in their own countries, could make a valuable contribution to a more effective U. S. foreign aid program. Increasing numbers of foreign students should be trained in the United States, Japan and elsewhere to provide more technicians and managerial personnel for these underdeveloped economies.

Special emphasis should be placed on the need for the U. S. to improve its programs for economic development in South Korea -- a country which is largely dependent on the United States and which has failed to achieve much economic progress to date.

## DISCUSSION GROUP II - EUROPE

Chairman: DR. NORMAN C. PETERSON

Rapporteur: PROF. WALTER GOLDSTEIN
DR. WALTER YONDORF

### A. European Environment

The European Discussion Group considered U. S. policy toward Europe in the light of the changing context of the European situation. The group thought that the West perceived a much lessened threat of Soviet aggression in Europe. With this perspective in mind, the participants assessed the need to maintain conventional forces in Western Europe and examined U. S. foreign policy goals. As part of the changed political environment, the participants noted a great revival of independent national wills within the alliance. It was suggested that this would lead to a fluid situation in which the power structure would not remain bipolar but would tend to become pluralistic. There was agreement that this changed condition would necessitate modifications in the role and structure of NATO. It was further noted that De Gaullism was probably not an isolated phenomenon but that such nationalistic manifestations were likely to appear in several other countries. Little agreement was reached over the forms of economic or political integration that could be realistically attained within Western Europe or between the East and West in Europe.

### B. U. S. Goals in Europe

After some deliberation, there was consensus that among the principal goals of U. S. policy in Europe, three were of chief significance. They are:

1. The maintenance of peace in the area and the preservation of the internal stability of Western European nations.

2. The encouragement of some level of integration among West

12

European States in order to reinforce stability. (There was not unanimity over the forms of integration that could be realistically implemented.)

3. Renewed U. S. interest in and encouragement for the liberalization of Eastern Europe.

### C. Problems and Issues

#### 1. The Multi-Lateral Force

A great deal of anxiety was expressed on the problem of nuclear sharing. A considerable range of opinion was expressed concerning the advisability of implementing the U. S. proposal to establish a multi-lateral force (MLF) within the NATO alliance. First, it was asked whether the German Government and public opinion were favorable or hostile to the question of nuclear weapons under some form of German control. Evidence was presented on both sides. Second, it was suggested that bringing the Germans into a joint force would discourage their national nuclear ambitions. This theory of "preventive inoculation", it was claimed, would deter the Germans from seeking French nuclear support. Those participants who advocated an American withdrawal from the MLF proposal, however gracefully, were reminded that the Germans might regard this as a first step toward an American withdrawal from Europe.

In opposition to these views, a majority of the group felt that the implementation of the MLF would eventually lead to the establishment of a separate European deterrent. This would impair the tight American control of nuclear warheads. It might, in fact, encourage the dissemination of nuclear weapons. It was urged that the decision to establish the MLF was premature. With the exception of France, no continental state had expressed any desire to build a nuclear third force. That the U. S. promoted the scheme was criticized by many participants. They felt that the timing was bad, and that it would increase the nuclear appetite of the European nations. Contrary to the evaluation by the U. S. Government that the MLF was an instrument to cope with the Nth Country Problem, many participants felt that directly the opposite development could result.

#### 2. German Reunification

The group found general agreement that the reunification of Germany could not be viewed as a major goal of either Western or Soviet policy in Europe. The disadvantages of reunification to either super-power were explored; many felt that neither genuinely wishes to encourage the concentration of economic and political power in central Europe in the form of a neutralized or confederated Germany. It was also pointed out that, while the Germans attach importance to reunification, they also attach a greater value to maintaining close security and economic ties with the West. Though both East and West implicitly recognize the continuing division of Germany, neither wishes to avow this explicitly.

13

### 3. Berlin

The problem of Berlin was treated separately from that of Germany. One proposal mentioned was to internationalize both East and West Berlin, and to make this palatable to the Soviet Union by a Western offer to recognize the legal status of East Germany and of the Oder-Neisse line.

In disagreement it was urged that this proposal probably would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and certainly not to Bonn. Though Berlin was likely to remain as a constant fuse in East-West relations, the point was added that Soviet pressure upon the western position in the city had in the past had the positive effect of rallying the Atlantic Alliance. Berlin would continue to be viewed as a prestige symbol to the West, and any withdrawal of American commitment would once again resemble a withdrawal of American interest in European security.

### 4. Limited War Strategy

Secretary McNamara has stated the American position - that the widest range of options should be maintained to counter any form of Soviet aggression. This theory of a graduated and carefully controlled response directly rejects the sentiment that since strategic weapons are available "war would be so horrible that it just won't happen".

In line with Secretary McNamara's emphasis, the U. S. Government has urged its European allies to build up their conventional forces. The group was informed that some Europeans opposed this recommendation since they believed that the U. S. could be relied upon in any case to increase its own limited war capability on European soil in order not to risk the destruction of American cities, while deterring a limited Soviet attack. Further, they held that the decreasing availability of European manpower and the increasing cost of limited war capability would influence the European allies to decrease - not increase - their own contribution. Another factor tending to decrease the European contribution was anticipated to be the continued demand for the emergency deployment of European forces outside the NATO area.

### 5. The Concept of the "Fire Break"

Discussion ranged over the advisability of establishing a clear demarcation between the employment of conventional weapons and very small tactical nuclear weapons. A few participants felt it was best to deemphasize the distinction between the two weapons, and to act on the principle that the choice of weapons should be governed solely by the need to accomplish a particular mission. According to this view, nuclear weapons should be used whenever they are more discriminating than conventional weapons, or more appropriate for the accomplishment of a particular job. The decision whether to use nuclear weapons should be determined by considerations of timeliness and efficiency, rather than by psychological or political considerations.

As against this view, it was held that a "fire break" would, firstly, satisfy many allied reservations about the first use of

14

any nuclear weapons; and, secondly, it would permit a much closer command and control over the escalation of force levels; and, thirdly, it would underline the special message content - the gravity - of NATO employment of nuclear weapons.

Disagreement followed over two secondary considerations. First, could the explosive burst of small nuclear weapons and of conventional weapons be clearly distinguished in the heat of battle; and, second, if a "fire break" were to be crossed, would it be possible to preserve later "fire breaks" to arrest the process of nuclear escalation. As one participant noted, the U. S. has never pledged to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, but it is concerned that they should not be used lightly or in ambiguous situations.

## 6. Regional Arms Control Proposals

The first proposal discussed was that of the geographical disengagement of tactical nuclear weapons. Whereas General Gallois had recommended that tactical nuclear weapons be deployed in the forward lines, most participants felt that this would be potentially very dangerous. If the weapons were removed from the danger of being immediately over-run, it would lessen the pressure on the command for immediate release of nuclear response. A time lag is required before nuclear weapons are fired if tight control is to be retained. There was little agreement as to how far back from the front lines the weapons should be deployed, but it was agreed that some withdrawal, while remaining in Germany, would greatly increase safety.

Even if there were no negotiated agreement with the Soviet Union upon the disengagement of nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of such weapons from the western forward lines was to be encouraged. Further, the maintenance of troop formations with dual capability (tactical nuclear and conventional) was viewed as difficult. If a functional separation of military groups could be achieved, this need not impair security and would likely enhance safety.

The second proposal was linked to the first. This featured the establishment of ground observation posts to cope with the problem of surprise attack. It was noted that the Soviet Union and the U. S. view this proposal in a very different light. The Soviets insist that the exchange of observation posts should be linked with a thinning out of troops, or to a denuclearization of the central area. On the other hand, the U. S. has proposed that the purpose of the observation posts is that of providing safeguards against the danger of surprise attack.

The third point discussed was that of the necessity of European initiative and participation in arms control negotiations. It was generally agreed that European involvement in the negotiations could alone alleviate the suspicion of a planned American withdrawal from Europe. Further, it was agreed that NATO negotiations with the Soviet Union for arms control measures should be accomplished before the American forces are voluntarily reduced.

15

### D. Recommendations

As already noted in the foregoing section, the discussion group talked about several recommendations. Consensus was not reached upon all of them, but the following proposals received the widest endorsement:

1. The U. S. Government should not, at this time, pursue the implementation of the MLF.

2. The U. S. Government should reiterate its opposition to dissemination of nuclear weapons.

3. A clear-cut "fire break" should be maintained to distinguish between the employment of conventional and small tactical nuclear weapons.

4. A geographical disengagement of tactical nuclear weapons from the forward line should be established.

5. An exchange of ground observation posts should be negotiated so that experience can be gained in the inspection processes involved in disarmament.

6. European initiative and participation in arms control negotiations are strongly to be encouraged.

## DISCUSSION GROUP III - ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Chairman: DR. ALBERT HIBBS
Rapporteur: TOM C. O'SULLIVAN

### A. Points of Departure

Throughout our discussions, two separate points of departure were evident. One might be called the long range approach, and the other the short range. One member suggested that an analogous separation exists between disarmament planners in the Soviet Union and those in the United States. The former seem to find most acceptable those concepts which fit into some long range plan of social order, while the latter search for ideas practical today.

One member described this situation as follows. It is as if we stand on one edge of the Grand Canyon. Some of us have telescopes and enjoy viewing and describing the opposite rim without paying too much attention to the canyon that separates us from it. Others seem to concentrate on how to take the first step over the edge. What we need is a description of the route all the way down to the bottom and up the other side and some arrangements for getting the trip underway.

Although most of the group fell into the class of the pragmatists or short-range planners, some suggested longer range concepts. One of these was the idea of limited world government which was seen as a complete package rather than something which could be accepted a piece at a time. It

16

might be considered as a revised United Nations with a legislature repre
sentative of national power and economic strength and having the authority
to create world law. It would also include an enforcement agency seen as
truly effective only after disarmament had proceeded almost to completion.

Another member forsaw a considerably more powerful world force
growing out of modern technological advancements. In his view the role of
those concerned with arms control and disarmament would be, first, to
contribute to current national defense capabilities until international secur-
ity systems could be demonstrated; second, making increasing contributions
to our deterrent capability even though recognizing that this is a temporary
solution; third, asisting in the prevention of accidental war; and fourth,
advancing the technological and sociological requirements of an eventual
international security force.

Some members of the group felt that the risks in the present course be-
ing followed by our country and the world for preventing war are too great
to be acceptable for a period of many years. While arms control measures
are required to reduce the probability of war which might result through
heightened tensions or accident, and to reduce the economic burden, it must
be recognized that they are means and not goals. The goal is a world free
from international war. This requires a dependable peace system. It is
recommended that, concurrent with our pursuit of arms control agreements,
the United States further develop and press for comprehensive measures
that will lead to the establishment of a world order based on enforceable law
capable of preventing international violence.

Generally, the group accepted as a final goal the concept of a world con-
sisting of a community of free nations under an international rule of law but
felt that the road from here to there was far from clear, and many felt that
this clarification was not provided by those who described the long range
plan. However, one statement of what to avoid along this future road seem-
ed agreeable. It was made originally by a foreign service officer deeply in-
volved in the negotiations which established the neutrality of Austria after
the Second World War, and read to us by one of the participants:

"There is, however, a tendency at times to think of international agree-
ments as a device for one party to get an advantage over the other, either
by imposition or trickery, or sleight-of-hand, or just plain out-smarting
him as a device to compel a nation to undertake something contrary to its
own interest. This is foolish. No nation keeps such agreements, not even
we. Even if achieved, such an agreement would be dangerous not merely
for one, but for both parties, because of its inherent instability, resting on
false premises."

It was generally agreed that if steps are taken or planned toward these
long-range goals, serious consideration must be given to the possibility that
doors can be closed as well as opened. Acceptance of some ideas can per-
haps be purchased only at the expense of rejecting others. It is possible,
for example, that the Senate ratification of the partial test ban treaty was
obtained only by guaranteeing the continuation of underground testing and
thus the indefinite postponement of a full test ban.

With a general acceptance of the long-range goal of arms control and
disarmament as stated, for example, in the opening section of the U. S.
draft treaty, the group moved on to a discussion of specific actions which
might be taken in the near future. Several points made in these meetings

17

reproduced here do not necessarily represent a consensus. In fact, no votes were taken. The ideas described here are rather those which, in the opinion of the Chairman, typify the lines of interest which developed in the discussions.

## B. *Suggestions Which Affect Principally the United States*

1. The discussions which surrounded the U. S. entry into the Test Ban Treaty seem to indicate a lack of commitment to and understanding of arms control and disarmament concepts on the part of the U. S. public. To remedy this, it was suggested that the Congress be persuaded to establish a Joint Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament which would hold hearings frequently on the progress of these concepts and their negotiations with a view to keeping both the Congress and the public constantly informed and encouraging stronger bipartisan support. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should be given more authority and financing to disseminate to the public factual information on the U. S. policy, studies, and negotiations in this field. The mass media should be persuaded to establish staff experts on arms control and disarmament and take other steps to focus continuing public attention on this issue.

2. The U. S. has a special problem in reacting to covert military forces bent on overthrowing neutral governments. Although in general the status quo is strengthened by arms control measures, the process of decreasing conventional forces must take account of this U. S. difficulty. For example, the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from territories of states might be countered by a proposal for the prohibition of shipments of arms across borders of states with an effective verification procedure.

3. The much discussed rising tide of expectation on the part of underdeveloped nations should be formally linked with potential benefits of arms control to secure as much support as possible for the U. S. position.

4. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty may not be a complete step on the road to arms control and disarmament, but it is at least a measure which had to be taken to enable further measures to be realized. Some of these further measures which the U. S. might suggest are:

a. Arrangements for joint evaluation of nuclear technologies to improve our estimate of the effects of the Test Ban.

b. The exchange of information on command and control policies and implementation.

c. Continued working toward cessation of production of fissionable material.

d. International controls on research which might have military significance.

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C. Suggestions Which Affect Europe Principally

1. It was suggested that the NATO Alliance cannot be patched up, and that our attitudes toward relations with Europe should be based on some other picture of the future, but another member suggested that our approaches to disarmament may ignore or place in jeopardy European security, and thus be the cause of this apparent dissolution.

2. The U. S. has proposed the exploration of a freeze on the production of strategic delivery vehicles. The Soviets have proposed the destruction of all bombers. A negotiating position between these two might seriously jeopardize European security since it might increase the importance of Soviet mid-range missiles.

3. The Nth Country Problem was considered critical now - a conclusion significantly different from that reached in last year's discussion. In particular, France should now be considered an Nth Country and Germany a candidate. A number of possible measures for discouraging Nth nuclear powers were suggested:

a. Since *status* is the prime incentive for a certain nation to attempt development of nuclear weapons, disbanding the nuclear club by general and complete disarmament would remove their incentive.

b. Since the possession of a *trigger* (to activate U. S. forces) is an important incentive, the U. S. should make every effort to make credible its guarantees for the defense of our European allies.

c. The Test Ban should be extended to all environments. Perhaps this could be offered as an optional clause in the existing agreement which might be signed by those countries which do not feel the need for inspection.

d. We should support the Irish resolution before the UN which would prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to nations not now possessing them.

e. We might give command and control capability to nations which do develop weapons in order to guard ourselves against accidents.

f. We should establish the policy of not automatically retaliating for, say, one nuclear explosion, until the possibility of accident can be evaluated.

g. We should propose not simply the de-nuclearization of continents, but the complete demilitarization of them (Africa or South America, for example).

h. We should provide nuclear weapons to a United Nations peace-keeping force.

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i. We should devote some energy to thinking up more incentives for a smaller country avoiding the development of nuclear weapons and dis-incentives for having them.

j. We should keep our shirts on when the next nuclear power emerges, and in fact develop now a contingency plan for this situation. We might prepare - by declaring our intention to protect countries against nuclear blackmail - both our nation and others for this eventuality.

4. The Soviets have proposed the reduction of foreign troops stationed in other countries as an alternate to their primary proposal of complete removal of such troops. In discussing this proposal, it was suggested that we could easily know whether or not the Soviets were violating such an agreement since major troop movements are almost impossible to conceal. However, it was also pointed out that the ability to detect is not equivalent to the ability to react. There was some discussion as to whether the disengagement of U. S. and Soviet forces in Europe would be stabilizing or destabilizing. It was felt by some that such disengagement would encourage the Federal Republic of Germany to develop its own nuclear deterrent. A suggestion was made that the U. S. response to this Soviet proposal be prepared with the assistance of West German personnel and, in fact, that West Germany be involved in the development of all U. S. arms control plans which affect that portion of Europe. It was further suggested that European participation at the planning stage of arms control proposals be undertaken generally.

### D. Suggestions Which Are Important Primarily Regarding Relations With the Soviet Union

1. The Soviet Union does not appear to be moving very rapidly toward compromise of differences on basic problems of arms control and disarmament. It was suggested that this indicates a Soviet conclusion that the world situation is after all fairly stable. Therefore, we should also feel there is probably no immediate crisis.

2. New estimates of Soviet conventional troop strength, which put the number lower than estimates of a few years ago, may make agreements on conventional forces simpler to obtain in the near future.

3. Our proposal for a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles includes a proposal for a freeze on anti-ballistic missiles. There is a potential ambiguity involved in the identification of a Soviet anti-ballistic missile versus a Soviet air defense missile. This situation should be treated with care in negotiating this proposal.

4. The Soviet proposal for bomber destruction was discussed at length. It was suggested by one member that the complete destruction of both U. S. and Soviet heavy bombers would work to the advantage of the U. S. Briefly, it was suggested in partic-

20

[w]

ular that the number of ICBMs currently devoted to the support of our heavy bomber force, and targeted against the bomber bases of the Soviet Union, is greater than the number of bombers which could effectively carry out a second strike on the Soviet Union. Although many of the ideas which were brought forth in support of this were questioned by other members of the group, there seemed to be considerable agreement that this suggestion merited detailed analysis.

### E. Some Concluding Statements

In the concluding statements, two basic ideas were brought out. First, it was pointed out that the "threat to the peace" is not fundamentally a result of weapons - nuclear or otherwise - but rather a result of the aggressive tendencies of mankind. The peace can be preserved finally only by dealing properly with these aggressive feelings and the ideological differences. Nevertheless it was recognized that the state of knowledge about psychology and sociology is such that weapons and other elements of military technology are easier to manipulate and restrain than are the men who use them. Therefore in the near future, we should probably look forward to more attempts to gain the peace through the control of weapons.

Second, it was pointed out that we have been identifying the international situation as a crisis ever since the close of the Second World War. Although numerous limited wars ranging from the Mau Mau uprising to the Korean action have filled these two decades, the long predicted nuclear catastrophe still seems as far away as ever. Perhaps we should look forward not to a quick negotiation of a disarmament treaty with the Soviet Union, but rather to many more decades of argument at Geneva. Considering nuclear war as an alternate, this future seems quite acceptable.

## DISCUSSION GROUP IV - ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF A STRATEGY FOR PEACE

Chairman: PROF. EMILE BENOIT

Rapporteur: PROF. JOHN S. GILMORE

While admitting the possible relevancy of general and complete disarmament or other types of arms limitation, under certain conceivable conditions, our group preferred to concentrate its attention on the economic impact of limited defense cutbacks judged by some to be realistically likely in the next few years in the event of continued reduction in world tensions. A reduction of $5 billion from the present annual rate of DOD and AEC expenditures for strategic weapons, delivery systems, and associated research was accepted as a hypothesis and its economic impact examined.

Even this cutback, it was agreed, would have a severe impact on a large part of the highly specialized defense industry which is already feeling the pinch of slowdowns and economies in procurement. Defense-dependent communities and regions would be markedly affected.

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On the basis of prior experience, it seemed clear to members of the defense industry (and was agreed to by other members in the group) that conversion of specialized defense facilities and staffs to the production of routine commercial items would in most cases be difficult or impossible. Defense industry has become highly specialized; vast differences now exist between military and civilian goods in standards and requirements, in management orientation and skills, in wage scales and labor skills, and in other vital respects. Defense industry has increasingly centered on large-scale innovational Research and Development (R&D) programs looking toward technological breakthroughs and the elaboration of complex engineering and administrative systems, with extremely demanding dependability and other performance specifications, but with relatively little attention paid to cost and marketing considerations. This specialization, plus rigidities introduced on the labor side by seniority provisions and trade union jurisdictional claims and work rules, greatly restrict the feasibility of utilizing defense facilities and staffs for ordinary commercial lines of production.

In the absence of special programs of assistance, top management of defense-specialized companies, or company divisions, will therefore often find it necessary to allow their specialized defense facilities to deteriorate, and much of their defense-oriented staffs to be dispersed, while they seek to conserve the value of their stockholder's equities by transferring their financial resources to other fields through the medium of company acquisitions or in other ways.

It was noted, on the other hand, that the vast reservoir of high-calibre R&D production and administrative capability, which has now been developed within the defense industry, could be of extraordinary value to the civilian economy if a method could be found by which it could be conserved and applied to high-priority national needs other than defense.

To this end, it was adjudged by the group that it would be helpful if there were a Congressional Resolution reaffirming the U. S. Government's commitment to the goals of the Employment Act of 1946 and adopting, by way of implementation, a statement of national intent:

1. By means of tax and expenditure measures, promptly to generate sufficient new public and private demand fully to offset any cutback in defense demand, and

2. To develop major new public programs and to stimulate (e.g., by revised business depreciation allowances) large-scale business re-equipment programs, which would utilize these special defense-industry capabilities for large-scale applied R&D and for the pioneering of major new engineering and administrative systems. This, it was agreed, would help to preserve additional standby defense capability, as well as contribute most fully to long-term national goals.

Possible examples of public programs mentioned were: improvement of urban life, elimination of poverty in the U. S., improvement of educational levels and public health, basic improvements in our transportation system, water purification and use, industrial use of the oceans, bold use of new communication techniques for world education and development, etc.

22

It was deemed necessary that a National Commission or other type of public body should explore the relative advantages of alternative programs, decide upon relative priorities, and recommend methods by which these objectives could best be implemented.

Readjustment policies of the type implied above, if promptly enough adopted would, it was thought, have the additional advantage that they would, to a considerable extent, tend to conserve and utilize the vast and expensive public and private resources which have already been invested in the economic infra-structure (roads, housing, schools, hospitals, etc.) of defense-dependent communities, and avoid the additional heavy social costs of major relocations of the work force and the deterioration of the social and tax structure of communities stricken by loss of economic function and income.

Commercial firms may hesitate to locate facilities in a "defense community" which will often suffer from high costs and other disadvantages. Since the Federal Government established the defense market in the first place, and is also responsible for withdrawing support from it when defense demand declines, it should assume some obligation to cushion the shock of readjustment. Such cushioning may require major funding such as is available only through the Federal Government; but care should be taken to avoid the establishment of permanent uneconomic vested interests by assuring that Federal subsidization, if required, be on a strictly temporary basis. Since state and local interests will also be involved, their participation in the administration and funding of such programs should be solicited.

With regard to international economic policies, it was agreed that the severe population pressures, together with rapidly rising economic aspirations and revolutionary ideologies, in poorer countries create dangerous tensions which U. S. policies could affect only to a very limited degree.

There was, however, strong sentiment in the group for a renewed effort to expand trade, including trade with Communist countries, as helpful to the establishment of contacts and the maintenance of communication, as well as to the meeting of emotional desires of these countries to be treated on the plane of equality. This would involve inter-alia a critical review of the current relevancy and utility of our strategic export controls program. It was hoped that new and more positive policies in this field would strengthen polycentric and liberalizing tendencies with the Communist world, help to turn its emphasis somewhat from ideological to welfare considerations, and improve the atmosphere for a less hostile and more fruitful East-West dialogue such as any realistic strategy for peace must pursue as a precondition for decisive progress.

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DISCUSSION GROUP V - THE UNITED NATIONS
AND PEACEKEEPING

Chairman: DR. ARTHUR M. COX
Rapporteur: RICHARD HUDSON

Peacekeeping operations of the United Nations - in Korea, Kashmir, Irian, the Congo, Yemen and now Cyprus - have never run completely smoothly. Yet, with all the many differences in these crisis areas and in the ways in which they have been handled, the outcome of these peacekeeping operations has substantially fulfilled the objectives established by majority decision of the United Nations. Without UN action, the alternative could have been Big Power conflict and a possible World War. It can be expected that in our turbulent world, the UN will continue to be called upon to perform peacekeeping functions, possibly more than in the past.

What principles and methods will be applied in the future? An analysis of the past gives these indications.

A Korea-type operation, in which the U. S. received a UN mandate to carry out a peacekeeping operation, seems rather unlikely to occur again. The Korean mandate to the U. S. was made possible only by the absence of the USSR from the Security Council, an occurrence unlikely to be repeated. Therefore, only if the U. S. and the USSR were in agreement could this happen again, and even then the problem would probably be disposed of in another manner.

In Kashmir, the United Nations has shown that a very small force can make an important contribution to peacekeeping. Only 35 troops, at an annual cost of $420,000, are credited with helping significantly in maintaining order in this tension-charged area. An important aspect of the Kashmir operation is that UN observers actually accompany Indian and Pakistani troops on both sides of the border.

In Suez, the UN for the first time took action against major powers. The decision was supported by the U. S. and the Soviet Union; nevertheless, it is significant that a small UN force restored order. Since that time the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) has done an excellent job of keeping peace on the Egyptian-Israeli border.

In the Congo, the UN itself undertook a major military commitment for the first time (UNOC). Imperfect as it was, it brought about a considerable improvement in a disastrous situation. But the Congo gave rise to very difficult problems of control and financing of peacekeeping operations.

In West Irian and Yemen, as one means of paying for a peacekeeping operation, the parties concerned agreed to cover expenses. In West Irian, the precedent was set of turning the peacekeeping over to one power, Pakistan, acceptable to both of the disputants, the Netherlands and Indonesia. Both of these procedures may prove useful in some future peacekeeping operations.

In Cyprus, new precedents are already being set, both on methods of

24

obtaining troops and of footing the bill. There was agreement that the original attempt to handle the problem in NATO was a mistake which weakened the ensuing approach in the UN both as to timing and as to contribution of troops and financing. A significant feature of the UN Cyprus force is the fact that a major power, Britain, has been accepted as a source of troops wearing the blue insignia of the UN.

Looking to the future, a standing UN police force would be desirable, and would, of course, be essential after disarmament. However, creation of a permanent UN force does not seem feasible now. Both the political and financial hurdles are great. The best hope for the near future may be an expansion of a trend well underway for nations to earmark forces for UN use. Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, the Netherlands and other countries have already earmarked such forces or are planning to do so. The United States has offered to supply transportation and communications support.

A forward-looking development at the 18th General Assembly was discussed - creation of the UN Research and Training Institute. To be financed by voluntary contributions, the Institute will engage in operations research in peacekeeping as well as in economic and social fields. It is intended that the Institute will train junior and senior level international civil servants, and also a small number of field grade officers in peacekeeping operations.

The group considered several new suggestions which included:

1. That the U. S. engage in advance planning for various contingencies so as to be able to implement better President Johnson's pledge of logistical support for peacekeeping operations; and

2. That the U. S. might offer to the UN a naval ship which would fly the UN flag. The ship might be used for training purposes or to house and transport UN observers.

In setting up future peacekeeping operations, past experience has demonstrated that certain guideposts should be observed. In general, peacekeeping operations must have the consent of those directly involved, including parties to the dispute and countries contributing forces. The only exception to this would be action undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression). It was recognized that though Chapter VII does provide legal authority, it is not likely to be used in the face of Big Power political opposition.

Mandates authorizing peacekeeping operations should be as specific as possible; likewise, agreements between the executor of the mandate (whether the UN Secretary-General or some other authority) and the powers contributing forces should be as explicit as possible. During the period of the agreement, the forces should be clearly responsible to the executor, not the contributing nation. Otherwise the forces might be weakened by political intrigue.

The question of who pays for peacekeeping operations should be settled at the time they are undertaken or before. In principle, all members should

25

be bound by a collective decision of the UN. However, this rule may not
prove practicable in the near future. Financial arrangements for peace-
keeping operations in the short run may have to be worked out on an ad-hoc
basis. Nevertheless, there is a need to devise a formula which will provide
a regular annual budget with enough elasticity to avoid the implementation of
Article 19, and to provide for the principle of consent. It is desirable for
the U. S. to be freed from the limit of a 33 per cent contribution to peace-
keeping as imposed by Congress. Such a limit, which is well below the
U. S. proportion of world production, imposes restrictions on the U. S.
which might prevent adequate support of UN peacekeeping operations which
are essential to U. S. security interests.

The matter of financing UN peacekeeping forces raises the pressing question of whether or not to seek enforcement of Article 19 at the next session of the General Assembly (under which the Soviet Union and other countries could be deprived of their votes in the Assembly for non-payment of assessments for peacekeeping operations). Some felt it would be wise to postpone this. There is, to begin with, the strong possibility that the U. S. might suffer a defeat on this vote. About a dozen other nations, including Nationalist China, are in the same category as the Soviet Union, and many others (including France) are delinquent, although not yet subject to Article 19. Another reason for postponement of the question is that the Committee of 21 is still at work on formulas for financing peacekeeping operations. The test of Article 19 should be delayed until after completion of the work of the Committee of 21. As to the Congo and UNEF contributions, which the Soviet Union will evidently continue to refuse to pay, it might be possible to avoid a showdown by arranging for the Soviets to make a contribution to some other UN activity.

The relation of the world's most populous power, Communist China, to
the world organization is of great importance to the future of peacekeeping
operations. When the Peking regime is admitted to the UN, as now seems
probable within the next few years, the U. S. should seek to protect the seat
of Formosa in the UN. Although the permanent Security Council seat may
go to the mainland government, the U. S. should try to use the debate on
this point to strengthen the possibility of China's acceptance of a separate
and independent government for Formosa. U. S. initiative on this point be-
fore the next General Assembly might sharpen the split between China and
the USSR and even result in China's rejection of membership in the UN.

In the context of general and complete disarmament, current U. S. pro-
posals for peacekeeping are inadequate. To begin with, peacekeeping
machinery should be advanced to the first stage of the current disarmament
treaty proposals. More attention should be given to the development of
peacekeeping procedures simultaneous with planning for arms control and
disarmament. It may be that new terminology, such as "building a world
security system", will have more appeal to Congress and the public. But
one thing is certain, that progress toward both reducing tension and dis-
armament will be greatly enhanced by development of workable international
procedures for peacekeeping.

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DISCUSSION GROUP VI - SPACE - NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

Chairman: DR. JOHN B. PHELPS

Rapporteur: WILLIAM LEAVITT

One important general conclusion the discussion group reached, insofar
as space issues bear on the search for a strategy for peace, is that there
have occurred -- in the past year -- some improvements in the internation-
al climate which might justify a cautious optimism regarding the prevention
of the extension of conflict into the space environment.

We noted with satisfaction the United Nations declaration against the de-
ployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, a declaration subscribed
to by both the United States and the Soviet Union. The limited nuclear test-
ban treaty, and the "hot line" agreements, while not so directly related to
space, are also a cause for hope. (1)

In this general context, we outline below our principal conclusions and
some of the points raised in our discussions of several aspects of space
policy. (2)

Orbital Weapon Systems And Antisatellite Capability

Although there are numerous cost-effectiveness, technical and political
arguments against the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit,

(1). There was considerable discussion of one participant's proposal that -- in the wake of the U. S. - Soviet adherence in principle to the UN declaration against the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in orbit -- the U. S. might consider offering the Soviets a treaty outlawing all military activity in space. Such a treaty might provide some on-site launch inspection of each side's space activities, based on agreed-on numbers, or percentages, of each side's launches. A primary advantage of such a treaty, according to its adherents in the discussion group, would be encouragement of Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection. This proposal was not generally endorsed and was seriously questioned on grounds that definitions of what constitutes military space activity would present such difficulties as to make such a concord unworkable and disadvantageous to U. S. security.

(2). Although we conducted our discussion in a "space is here to stay" frame of refer-
ence, it heard arguments from a visitor that: (1) the U. S. moon program is a
potentially destabilizing factor in U. S. - Soviet relations, (2) as a spur to detente
the U. S. should experimentally and for a specific period announce an avoidance of
all military space activity in the hope of Soviet reciprocation, and (3) a very sharp
cut in the NASA budget would spur congressional assent to the diversion of funds to
major social-purpose programs such as the "war on poverty".

The discussion group generally rejected the first argument on grounds that it was
essentially speculative. The argument for U. S. avoidance of all military space
activity was rejected on grounds that the price in national security might be too high,
particularly with reference to observation satellites as a stabilizing force. And the
argument that major cuts in NASA budgets would result in diversion of such funds to
earthbound social projects was generally rejected on the multiple grounds that:
(1) there is no political certainty of such a transfer of funds, (2) space activities
do produce observable scientific, national-security, and economic benefits, and
(3) existing political processes in Congress can provide brakes against excessive
space funding and unjustifiable crash programs.

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we cited a number of conceivable military advantages that under certain conditions might accrue to the deployer. These included: terror effects, relative invulnerability under some conditions, potential destruction of crucial targets such as national command and control systems, a high degree of uninspectability in the arms-control context, and military-political prestige. Balanced against such possible advantages are such difficulties as command and control, reliability requirements, and cost. On balance, we concluded that in the present strategic setting, orbital weapons systems appear to be disadvantageous and destabilizing, and that the United States ought not to undertake their deployment.

### Communication, Navigation, and, Weather Satellites, etc.

In analyzing the roles of satellites used for communication, navigation, weather observation, geodetic measurement, and other technological and scientific purposes, we recognize and urge public understanding of the fact that it is difficult to separate "military" and "peaceful" space applications since there is so much crossover in the purposes and functions of such devices. We believe that the United States should proceed with the development and operation of "working satellites" because of their present contributions to societal good and their future potential for such good. In the specific context of arms-control, we welcome Soviet willingness to accept distinction between weapon systems and other possible military uses of satellites -- as evidenced in the United Nations declaration. This seems a significant step in the right direction.

### Observation Satellites

For purposes of definition, in our discussion "observation satellites" were taken to mean sensor satellites in general. But our main discussion focused on optical systems of fairly high resolution. In that connection, we concluded that more attention ought to be given to the potential of such satellite systems in such fields as mapping (especially of remote areas such as Antarctica), resource surveys, various geophysical studies, ice-berg patrol, and numerous other tasks of national and international concern.

Especially relevant to questions of developing a strategy for peace is the application of observation satellites for arms-control inspection. Satellites may be used to supplement inspection by other means and reduce the amount of ground inspection necessary for viable agreements.

On this latter point, one participant urged that under no circumstances should the United States appreciably reduce its pressure for assent to maximum on-site inspection as a sine qua non for extensive arms-control agreements with the Soviets. He argued that, despite the substantive informational yields expectable from high resolution observation satellites, the long-term political advantages of continuous pressure for the opening of Soviet society ought not to be sacrificed in U. S.- Soviet negotiations.

On the expanded use of observation and sensor satellite systems for world-wide peaceful purposes such as those traced above, we believe that such programs would generally be the responsibility of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We would be pleased to see more NASA activity in this direction.

28

U.S.-Soviet-and Multilateral-Space Cooperation

While fully conscious of existing efforts within the United Nations con-
text in the field of international space cooperation, we concentrated our
attention, in terms of development of a strategy for peace, on the possibili-
ties of bilateral cooperation between the major space powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union.

Potential U. S.- Soviet cooperation in space ranges from data-exchange
agreements to joint "hardware" projects. We believe that the primary criteria
and rationale for any U. S.- Soviet space cooperation ought to be potential
net gains in the reduction of uncertainty on both sides, and hopefully, the
consequent reduction in tensions. We recognize that tension reduction is by
no means a certain consequence of cooperative agreements and that in cer-
tain cases fears might be enhanced on either or both sides because one side
might consider that the other was concealing significant activities or in-
formation. Such risks seem worth taking only if mutually acceptable co-
operation agreements can be made and put into effect. Significant potential
benefits of U. S.- Soviet space cooperation also include reduction of costs on
both sides and pooling of capabilities to get jobs done. Other potential spurs
to U. S. - S. U. space cooperation include the remote possibility of mutual
U. S. - S. U. interest vis-a-vis other powers, the technical necessities of
cooperation in some areas of activity such as communication, and the po-
tential of U. S. - Soviet cooperation as an indicator of the limits of U. S. -
Soviet mutual interest and cooperative capability as a kind of "thermometer"
for projection into other fields.

A number of participants questioned whether cooperation per se neces-
sarily produces a "team spirit" or sense of mutual interest even over long
periods of time, when the cooperators represent conflicting political and
social systems. In somewhat the same connection -- but suggestive of
other consequences -- one participant advanced the idea that U. S. and
Soviet technologists might pool talents and hardware in fields of fundamental
research where "breakthroughs" were conceivable that might be sharply de-
stabilizing if they were achieved by only one side. The political difficulties
of such cooperation were recognized by the discussion group.

29

FINAL PLENARY SESSION

Remarks by C. MAXWELL STANLEY

It is now time to close the Fifth Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace. We have had an outstanding group of participants providing varied points of view. It can be stated confidently that it has been a worthwhile conference. We have had enthusiastic participation, enlightening discussion, and a substantial degree of consensus on many points. Numerous participants have expressed to me their gratification with the conference, its format, its procedure, and its opportunity for cross-fertilization of ideas.

Only with time can the documents produced by this conference be evaluated, relative both to prior conferences and to the needs and challenges of today. We have adopted no earth-shaking programs or pronouncements. However, each of the six discussion groups has probed its subject matter with sufficient depth to uncover new ideas and to suggest areas for further research and study. I am confident, therefore, that the published reports of the discussion groups will contribute to the determination of an over-all strategy for peace.

In former conferences we have reached a considerable consensus as to the major elements of a broad strategy for peace against which our deliberations here may be measured. Perhaps it is desirable to restate these elements of an over-all strategy. Briefly, they are as follows:

1. To maintain adequate military strength providing us the maximum security which can be obtained with armaments and providing us with time to seek alternative security.

2. To strengthen our domestic economy.

3. To assist the developing nations toward a position of independence, economic strength and freedom oriented towards democratic processes.

4. To achieve acceptable arms control and enforceable disarmament.

5. To strengthen United Nations so that it can provide a rule of law in the world.

6. To seek political accommodation and settlement of some of the crucial outstanding international issues.

7. To educate the United States public on the difficult and long-range aspects of achieving peace.

It seems pertinent to comment upon the subject matter of future conferences. Perhaps we need to give more attention to the psychological and political aspects of achieving secure peace. How frequently do we find other

30

approaches failing because of unsolved political problems and psychological
blocks?

In this conference we have again noted sharp differences of opinion be-
tween the short-range and the long-range views of a strategy for peace.
These differences hinder full exchange and maximum consensus even on
points where there should be substantial agreement. Those involved in im-
mediate day-to-day problems may discredit the need for a long-range view.
Those who glimpse the ultimate pattern of peace may disdain to deal with
immediate problems.

Why not take as a base of reference for our next conference an assumed
intermediate situation, say that anticipated in 1975? This could be used to
examine and test those objectives and strategies which we propose. This
process might raise our sights above the pitfalls of day-to-day problems
without dazzling our eyes with ultimate goals, and overcome the deficiencies
of both short-range and long-range views.

The conferences would benefit from broader participation and better
balance of disciplines. We need more representatives from the business
and industrial communities, whose companies are not directly engaged in
military or arms control activities. Maybe we should invite a few con-
gressmen and seek several conferees from abroad.

These ideas will be considered as we develop plans for our next confer-
ence, which probably will be scheduled in early 1965. In the interim, we
must provide more adequate financial support for the conference. You will
be hearing from us about this important topic of money.

As I adjourn this conference, I again thank you for your participation
and trust you have found it a worthwhile and valuable experience. We look
forward to seeing you at the next conference.

31

CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Harold Adams
The Mitre Corp.
Bedford, Mass.

Herbert Barchoff, President
Eastern Rolling Mills, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

Mrs. Lilyan Barchoff
Eastern Rolling Mills, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

Joseph M. Barr, Vice President
United Aircraft Corp.
Washington, D. C.

Joseph Basilone, Market Analyst
Atlantic Research Corp.
Alexandria, Va.

Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Consultant
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.

Prof. Emile Benoit, Director
Research Program on International Economics,
Disarmament and Arms Control
Columbia University
New York, N. Y.

J. William Bethea, Executive Vice President
United World Federalists
Washington, D. C.

Col. Beryl L. Boatman, USA (Ret.), Director
New Program Development
Aerojet-General Corp.
Azusa, Calif.

Mrs. Sally Bray, Advisory Board
Strategy for Peace Conference
Cincinnati, Ohio

Victor D. Bremenkamp, Research Engineer
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, Calif.

Michael Brower
School of Industrial Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Mass.

Dr. Robert W. Bussard, Director
Nuclear Systems Staff
Space Technology Laboratories
Redondo Beach, Calif.

Dr. Seville Chapman, Director
Physics Division
Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, Inc.
Buffalo, N. Y.

Louis P. Clark, Advanced Requirements Engineer
Missile and Space Vehicle Department
General Electric Company
Philadelphia, Pa.

Rev. E. A. Conway, S. J., Director
Center for Peace Research
The Creighton University
Omaha, Neb.

Myron M. Cowen
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Arthur Cox, Director
UN Policy Studies
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.

John Coyle, Senior Scientist
Center of Naval Analysis
Arlington, Va.

Col. H. Ashton Crosby (Ret.)
Executive Director
Council for a Livable World
Washington, D. C.

Dr. James E. Dougherty
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa.

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, USN (Ret.)
Newport, R. I.

George R. Ellison
Sandia Corporation
Albuquerque, N. M.

Prof. Amitai Etzioni
Institute of War and Peace Studies
Columbia University
New York, N. Y.

Boyd France, Foreign Affairs Correspondent
BUSINESS WEEK
Washington, D. C.

Emil Gaynor, Director
North American Aviation, Inc.
Downey, Calif.

Prof. John S. Gilmore, Research Economist
Denver Research Institute
University of Denver
Denver, Colo.

Col. Robert N. Ginsburgh, Air Force
Research Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations
New York, N. Y.

Prof. Walter Goldstein
Department of Government
Brooklyn College
The City University of New York
Brooklyn, N. Y.

Morton Gorden, Research Associate
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Mass.

32

William Grinnell
Defense Systems Department
TEMPO
General Electric Company
Santa Barbara, Calif.

Walter Hahn, Research Associate
Institute for Defense Analyses
Washington, D. C.

Lester G. Hawkins, Jr., Research Analyst
Research Analysis Corporation
McLean, Va.

Robert C. Herber, Managing Editor
ORBIS
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa.

Mrs. Norma Herzfeld, Journalist
Silver Spring, Md.

Dr. Albert Hibbs, Chief
Arms Control Study Group
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, Calif.

Philip S. Horwith
Planning Staff
Norair Division
Northrop Corp.
Hawthorne, Calif.

Franklin P. Huddle, Arms Control Coordinator
Hughes Aircraft Co.
Fullerton, Calif.

Richard Hudson, Editor
WAR/PEACE REPORT
New York, N. Y.

Dimitry N. Ivanoff, Executive Assistant
Aerospace Analysis Department
Missile and Space Systems Division
Douglas Aircraft Co.
Santa Monica, Calif.

Terence G. Jackson, Jr., Economist
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, Calif.

Augustus Johnson, Research Director
Booz-Allen Applied Research, Inc.
Springfield, Va.

Amrom H. Katz
The Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, Calif.

Mrs. Amrom H. Katz
Los Angeles, Calif.

Wilmer H. Kingsford, Research Analyst
Summit, N. J.

Prof. Edward Kolodziej
Department of Political Science
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Va.

Howard G. Kurtz, Senior Associate
Handy Associates, Inc.
New York, N. Y.

William Leavitt, Associate Editor
AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST
Washington, D. C.

Daniel Leivick, Chief
Special Studies Team
Operations Analysis
Office, Vice Chief of Staff
Hq USAF
Washington, D. C.

Robert Levine, Economist
The Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, Calif.

Lord Lindsay of Birker
Professor of Far Eastern Studies
The American University
Washington, D. C.

Victor Magistrale, Staff Engineer
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
Pasadena, Calif.

Dr. Harold B. Malmgren, Head
Economics Group
Institute for Defense Analyses
Washington, D. C.

Howard Margolis, Washington Editor
BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Kenneth L. Maxwell, Executive Director
Department of International Affairs
National Council of the Churches of
Christ in the U. S. A.
New York, N. Y.

Richard McMahan, Jr.
Defense Systems Department
TEMPO
General Electric Company
Santa Barbara, Calif.

J. J. McSweeny, Director
Long Range Planning
Sperry Gyroscope Company
Great Neck, N. Y.

Mrs. Marion McVitty, Editor
THE INDEPENDENT OBSERVER
New York, N. Y.

Mrs. Roy W. Menninger
Topeka, Kansas

Dr. Martin B. Miller
Defense Systems Department
TEMPO
General Electric Company
Santa Barbara, Calif.

James Monroe, Research Consultant
Bureau of Social Science Research
Washington, D. C.

33

Bernard S. Weiss, Controller
Gimbel Brothers
Philadelphia, Pa.

David Wesley, Editorial Page Editor
THE GAZETTE AND DAILY
York, Pa.

Harold F. Wienberg, Manager
Special Projects
United Aircraft Corporate Systems Center
Farmington, Conn.

Anthony Wiener, Assistant to the Director
The Hudson Institute
Harmon, N. Y.

Arthur Barber, Deputy Assistant Secretary
to Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Abraham Bargman, Political Affairs Officer
Disarmament Affairs Group
UN Secretariat
United Nations

Lt. Col. R. M. Behr, USAF
HQ. Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.

Capt. John C. Busby, USN
Navy Aviation Supply Office
Philadelphia, Pa.

Samuel De Palma, Chief
Political Affairs
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Robert Finley, Deputy Assistant Director
Economics Bureau
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Charles R. Gellner, Chief
Defense Research Staff
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

William Hayne
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Charles Herzfeld, Deputy Director
Advanced Research Projects Agency
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Arthur Herzog, Writer
New York, N. Y.

Col. Carlton Johnson, U. S. Army
U. S. Army War College
Carlisle, Pa.

Col. D. P. Jones, USAF
HQ. Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.

David C. Williams, Public Affairs Adviser
President's Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Walter F. Yondorf
The Mitre Corporation
Bedford, Mass.

David Young, Director
Planning Division
Aerojet-General Corporation
El Monte, Calif.

OBSERVERS

Alexander F. Kiefer, Economist
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Robert W. Lamson, Staff Assistant
Office of Civil Defense
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dallas Lloyd
External Research Staff
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Stuart H. McIntyre, International
Relations Officer
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Col. Alvin F. Meyer, USAF
Hdq. USAF
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C.

Harland B. Moulton, Military Affairs Analyst
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Col. Denis P. O'Connor, Acting Director for
Arms Control
Department of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. Mark T. Orr, USAF
Officer of Deputy for Aerospace Plans
Directorate of Plans
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D. C.

Charles W. Phillips, Staff Assistant
to Senator H. H. Humphrey
Washington, D. C.

Dr. Edward Risley, Scientific Officer
Science and Technology Bureau
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Henry Wyner, Economics Officer
Economics Bureau
U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington, D. C.

Brig. General Millard C. Young, USAF (Ret.)
Management Research Services, Inc.
Annandale, Va.

35

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Strategy for Peace Conference is a non-profit, non-political project*
formed in 1960 for the purpose of bringing together leaders in business,
government, the professions and organizations for an interchange of views
on short and long-range aspects of comprehensive planning for a Strategy
for Peace. In furthering these objectives, our five conferences, each
attended by over 100 leaders, have been held at Arden House and Airlie
House in 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964. Smaller in-depth conferences
have also been held.

Discussions at the conferences have dealt with the interrelationship of
military technology, strategy and arms control; the concept of stable deter-
rence; disarmament, enforcement and inspection; the economic conse-
quences of disarmament; changing emphases within the United Nations;
economic development of underdeveloped nations; the development of world
law; peaceful settlements of disputes between nations; and the coordination
of the component elements of a comprehensive long-range Strategy for
Peace.

The Strategy for Peace Conference is not a membership organization.
It is sponsored by the Stanley Foundation under the chairmanship of C.
Maxwell Stanley with the assistance of an Executive Committee and an
Advisory Committee.

* Contributions to the Strategy for Peace Conference can be made to The Stanley Foundation, Stanley Building, Muscatine, Iowa; a tax-exempt, educational organization. Contributions are deductible for income tax purposes.

36

Henry V. Kieflinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards,

and I hope that things will work out.
difficulties. I would love to participate
I am sorry we are having so many

I hold off my final acceptance for now.
therefore like to broach to you that
be set for another week or so. I would
country in time. My schedule will not
be able to chair the discussion
I will be glad to help pack in the
I will be able to call the discussion
As I told you on the telephone,

April 1st.

Thank you for your letter of

Dear Miss Shutford:

New York 22, New York
Room 101
210 Madison Avenue
Strategy for Peace Conference
Miss Helen V. Shutford

April 8, 1962

STRATEGY for PEACE CONFERENCE

STANLEY BUILDING, MUSCATINE, IOWA

263-9494

Chairman

April 15, 1965

My dear Professor Kissinger:

I am gratified to learn of your willingness to chair the session on EUROPE at the Conference next month.

We have learned from long experience that these discussion sessions are much more effective if the chairmen have prepared in advance an outline of the points to be covered. In most of these sessions we are dealing with such broad topics that unless this is done we are apt to wander off the beam.

Therefore I am asking you to prepare an outline. Past experience would suggest that it need not be more than two pages, although I'll leave this to your judgment. When you have a first draft, I would be happy to review it and offer suggestions that may be helpful in coordinating it with the objectives of the Conference and with the discussions that will be carried on in other groups.

When it is in final form, we will have copies duplicated for distribution at the Conference to the participants in your discussion group.

The perspective of this Conference is "A Ten-Year Look Ahead". If the thinking and discussion can be oriented to this specific point in time, we can avoid the friction and lack of consensus among the advocates of the "too-short" look and of the "too-long" look at a strategy for peace.

Looking forward to working with you at the Conference, I remain

CMS:jd

cc: Helen A. Shuford

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University, 6 Divinity Ave.
Cambridge, Mass. 01922

STRATEGY for PEACE CONFERENCE

Chairman
C. MAXWELL STANLEY

STANLEY BUILDING
MUSCATINE, IOWA 52761

September 21, 1966

Dear Prof. Kissinger:

STRATEGY for PEACE - 1966

I invite you to meet with a group of leaders in business, government and the professions for a **Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace**. The Conference will be held over the weekend of Thursday, October 27, to Noon, Sunday, October 30, 1966, at Airlie House, a pleasant conference facility an hour's drive from Washington, D.C., near Warrenton, Virginia.

We will explore off the record and in depth certain urgent foreign policy concerns. We will follow our usual pattern of separate discussion groups which will consider:

I. **DISARMAMENT and ARMS CONTROL** - Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons - The 1967 World Disarmament Conference.

II. **EAST ASIA** - U.S. policy toward Asia - China - Japan - Vietnam - Thailand.

III. **EUROPE** - Period of Major Realignments.

IV. **PEACEFUL REVOLUTION** - A Search for Guidelines Between Self-Determination and Outside Intervention - Proliferation of Conventional Weapons.

V. **UNITED NATIONS** - Emphasis in U.S. Foreign Policy - Decolonization and Peacekeeping - Financing - Southwest Africa.

This Conference will be the Seventh of the **STRATEGY for PEACE CONFERENCES**, which over the years have made significant contributions to our foreign policy.

In the past, government officials have participated fully in our Conferences, and again their role as observers will be respected with regard to any published report.

TELEPHONES: (319) 263-9494 / 264-1500

STRATEGY for PEACE - 1966
Page 2

It occurs to us that some of you to whom this invitation is extended
may well wish to propose appropriate individuals from your organ-
ization in the event that you cannot take part in the Conference.

We will look forward to hearing from you at your earliest conven-
ience. A reply card is enclosed on which you are to indicate your
discussion group preferences, residence requirements at Airlie,
and transportation needs. Since participation in the discussion
groups is limited, we reserve the right to place you in an alternate
group if necessary.

Information about Airlie House is enclosed, along with a time
schedule for the Conference. Accommodations at Airlie House are
$20.85 each for a double room and $25.25 single per diem, Ameri-
can Plan (all meals included).

There will be motor coaches departing from the Alumni Rooms at
George Washington University, 20th and H Streets, N. W., Wash-
ington, D. C., at 3 P. M. on Thursday, October 27, and returning
from Airlie to Washington on Sunday, October 30, at 2 P. M. As
usual, special transportation arrangements can be made, and
should you be arriving at Dulles International Airport, we would
like to have this information.

Previous Strategy for Peace Conferences have been successful be-
cause thinking citizens have been willing to come together to dis-
cuss the aspects of a strategy for peace. Looking forward to your
participation this year, I am

CMS:jd

Enclosures

*Airlie House*, is operated by The Airlie Foundation, a non-profit corporation chartered by the Commonwealth of Virginia.

The facility is a conference center, designed to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas in the public interest and the discussion of problems within our society.

Over the years AIRLIE has achieved international distinction in the conference field.

Outstanding groups of academicians, scientists, industrial-business leaders, government officials,

students and diplomats from all over the world have met, studied and conferred here.

Removed from busy offices and urban distractions, AIRLIE is a working conference center. It has been called appropriately "an island of thought" ... a place where conference participants live, work, relax together; where an effective, productive conference is achieved through total concentration on the subject matter.

A successful conference requires special skills in planning and a special atmosphere to achieve its purpose. The staff at AIRLIE has a wealth of experience in providing the necessary elements for serious conferences. The Foundation itself has been designed specifically to offer visitors the privacy and freedom from interruption that allow them the time and the atmosphere in which to think and to exchange ideas.

Several large conference rooms for groups of up to five hundred people and a number of smaller rooms for group sessions and smaller meetings are available. Because of the physical relationship of

the conference rooms, several groups may meet simultaneously in privacy without interruption.

Projectors, tape recorders, public address systems, audio-visual aids are available, as well as staff photographers and secretarial assistance.

The AIRLIE staff is prepared to structure a conference independently or to assist the conference director in scheduling, planning and programming.

It is requested that each conference director make a personal visit to AIRLIE to plan his conference in order that the arrangements will be wholly satisfactory.

The AIRLIE table is varied but tends toward food native to Virginia.

The coffee and social hours can be planned out-of-doors or beside open fireplaces, depending on season.

The mild climate permits cook-outs six months of the year.

The unique dining facilities and the really fine cuisine highlight an AIRLIE conference.

"REPRIEVE"

"Report From Airlie"

REPORT FROM
AIRLIE

"Portrait of a Painter"

Report from
AIRLIE
"Far to Go"

Through AIRLIE Productions, a division of the Foundation, documentary films may be planned and produced for training, broadcast and private audience viewing.

Candid and portrait photography may be done by our staff photographers.

Publication and reproduction of conference reports and abstracts may be arranged.

"Report from AIRLIE," the award-winning series of special, half-hour color presentations has appeared in major cities, at prime time throughout the country. These documentaries cover a wide range of subjects, dealing with problems of our time.

Other films are produced in cooperation with appropriate sponsoring institutions.

## RECREATION INCLUDES:

**Health Center** — Supervised Sauna, steam room and gymnasium. Also Swedish-type massage by a trained therapist . . . all located in the Silo House.

**Swimming** — A heated pool permits excellent swimming eight-nine months a year.

**Tennis** — New all-weather courts are adjacent to Health Center.

**Shuffleboard** — Two courts overlook the lake.

**Game Preserve** — A large, private preserve provides six months of excellent upland shooting (October through March). Guides, dogs, guns and ammunition are available.

**Skeet Range** — Equipment and attendant provided.

**Golf** — Two courses are available. Transportation is provided.

**Fishing** — Lakes and streams provide fine fresh water sport.

**Riding** — Quarter horses are available for trail riding with a choice of English or Western tack.

**Hiking** — The countryside is ideal for a quiet walk or for hiking through open rolling fields.

**Bicycles** — AIRLIE has six miles of hard-surfaced roads, excellent for cycling. Bicycles are available at the Country Store.

**Side Trips** — Trips to the many historic shrines of Virginia may be arranged. The Manassas Battlefield, Thomas Jefferson's "Monticello," Colonial Williamsburg and the Virginia Tidewater country are all accessible from Airlie. The Skyline Drive and Shenandoah National Park are less than an hour away. The city of Washington, with its endless opportunities for sightseeing is forty-five miles away.

## CHURCH INFORMATION

Churches of all faiths are located in nearby Warrenton.

## DRESS

Guests are requested to wear jackets to the evening meal.

Sport shirts, slacks and outdoor apparel will fill your informal needs while at AIRLIE.

Plan to bring suitable clothing, if you wish to swim, ride, play tennis, fish, etc. A pair of old shoes and a raincoat should be included for a trip to the country.

## OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

It is suggested that guests bring cameras to AIRLIE. The landscape, charm of the restored buildings, offer unusual vistas to the photographer.

Due to the requirements of a successful meeting, conference directors have requested that no small children or dogs accompany conferees.

## LOCATION AND TRANSPORTATION

AIRLIE is located forty-five miles west and south of Washington, D. C., three miles north of Warrenton, Virginia. The Center is accessible throughout the year via new Interstate and State Highways from Washington as well as from Dulles International, Washington National and Friendship International airports. A heliport and a private airstrip are available on the grounds.

AIRLIE limousine service and chartered buses can be arranged. Public buses are regularly scheduled between Washington and Warrenton.

Driving time is a short hour from the Potomac River bridges.

For further information, write or call

### AIRLIE FOUNDATION
Warrenton, Virginia

Warrenton, Va. — 347-1300, Area Code 703
Washington, D. C. — 273-6554, Area Code 202