MEMORANDUM

From: Deirdre

To: Mr. Kissinger

Re: Research on Attitudes towards "Co-existence": 1953-1958

Although shifts in mood, alternations of hope and disillusionment, occured between 1953-1958, most informed commentators on world affairs felt that the problem of co-existence with Russia remained impossibly difficult and absolutely necessary. Whereas, at the end of World War II, we believed that the Russians were willing to "live and let live"; now our hopes for the future, our predictions of a "change of mind" or a "change of heart", on the part of the Soviets, were always qualified by doubt and hesitation. Constantly we were aware that at the root of the problem of co-existence lay a fundamentally different attitude towards "peace" between ourselves and the Soviet.

In an article entitled "Can we co-exist with Soviet Russia?", (New York Times, magazine section, May 24, 1953), Warren B. Walsh, Professor of history at Syracuse University, pointed out that the United States and Russia have irreconcilably different attitudes on co-existence: The West holds that peace is the absence of hostilities, and the consequent existence of harmony, mutual concord and lack of fear. Co-existence is possible if the other fellow will only "mind his own business" and "leave us (and our interests) alone". Incompatible systems (dictatorship, communism) can exist side by side with a democracy as long as they stick to their own affairs.

To the Communists, however, peace is a situation which cannot exist until the day of the final proletarian victory. The communists believe that there can be no true peace until a classless society replaces and eliminates the capitalist states. With this demand for total Communist victory, the Reds align their belief that "peace" (as it now exists) is merely a continuation of struggle. The only way in which "the cold war" can be labeled peace is that "only measures short of war are employed". Peace without Communist triumph is "partial war". As Eleanor Roosevelt observed to A. M. Rosenthal upon leaving her post at the United Nations (New York Times, Magazine Section, January 18, 1953): Co-existence means nothing to the Russians: "'It is a word they use often...You must say you believe in co-existence, otherwise, why you are saying that people are doomed to kill each other off.'".

2.

Although co-existence in the sense of mutual toleration between
capitalist and communist countries is an impossibility to Communist
doctrine, in the opinion of most commentators, co-existence in the
sense of a necessary phase on the road to Communist triumph is a
necessity to them. To refrain from engaging in total war is, after
all, the necessary condition for survival. They co-exist in order
to ultimately conquer.

Underlying the statements of United States commentators is
the assumption that co-existence is an absolute necessity for sur-
vival. Since they are quite aware that the Communist goal has not
deviated, United States observers felt through out this period,
that ideal co-existence in the Western sense is impossible and that
practical and possible co-existence must be guranteed by specific
measures on the part of the Soviets: by the solution of the most
pressing issues between the West and the East. Since the Russians
do not want any permanent peace settlement, the West must strive
for "a continuing process of adjustment with Russia, realizing that
no settlement can be permanent. ("Needed a Counter to Moscow New
Line" by Frederick C. Barghorn, New York Times, Magazine section,
September 20, 1953) Co-existence has become a delicate balance act
upon the edge of doom.

1953

The cautious U.S. attitude towards Soviet peace proposals and
the possibility of co-existence is indicated to us by Hanson W. Baldwin's
(New York Times, Jan. 4, 1953) comments on the Soviet proposal for end-
ing the Korean War. The only motive that he can discover for the Soviet
move is their belief that peace will hurt the U.S. more than war. War
brings prosperity to capitalism, but peace will inevitably bring de-
pressions. The Soviets feel that co-existence is possible because
they believe that capitalism carries within itself the seeds of its
own destruction.

In his last state of the Union message, President Truman supple-
mented and elaborated the reasons for co-existence. The Soviets, he
felt, had to revise Lenin's concept of war as an instrument or a stage
in the development of communism:

"'Lenin was a pre-atomic man, who viewed society and history with pre-atomic eyes...War has changed its shape and its dimensions. It cannot now be a 'stage' in the development of anything save ruin for your (Stalin's) regime and your homeland!'" (New York Times, January 8, 1953) Co-existence is forced upon the Russians (and, by implication, upon us: this, however, is not fully developed until the Russians detonate their first hydrogen bomb) because the weapon system precludes anything else.

3.

[y]

Co-existence might be imperative for both sides, but this realization in itself was not enough to insure its maintenance. The problem of reaching some agreement, some settlement, some security pact with the Russians remained: On the basis of her experience with the Russians at the United Nations, Mrs. Roosevelt observed: "Not one Soviet delegate...ever changed his position a kopeck's worth, publicly or over the confidence of a tea cup, as the result of any argument or speech from the other side at the United Nations; not one had ever said a word to indicate that he would seriously take his opponent's case into consideration; if there were any changes they were the result of strategy, not conviction through argument; if East and West are ever to come to any living terms it will have to be done on the highest level because Soviet diplomats are too adamant and too terrified to be counted as real negotiators". (*New York Times*, Magazine section, "On Dealing with the Russians", by A. M. Rosenthal, Jan. 18, 1953.

Mrs. Roosevelt's opinion received much support during the ensuing year---not from U.S. officials, but from British and other Western officials. With the death of Stalin and the succession of Malenkov, with the de-Stalinization program and the new Moscow soft line, hopes were raised that a solution of the cold war might be possible in the near future. Sir Winston Churchill went so far as to say that there might be "'a change of attitude; and...of mind... in the Soviet domains and particularly the Kremlin since the death of Stalin'" (*Times*, May 24, 1953) However, the United States press seemed extremely cautious in its estimate of the possible change of climate in Russia. Most observers watched the new Russian line with suspicion. Doubtful hoping was the most they would permit themselves. Yalta and Potsdam, and the mood of anxious expectation and disillusionment which followed these war conferences, were still too close to permit Americans to feel too optimistic about settlement with the Soviet Union.

The death of Stalin left many observers wondering: "After Stalin What?" On March 8, 1953, C. L. Sulzberger (*New York Times*, Sec. E Page 3) said that he felt Stalin was a factor leading towards continued co-existence: While Stalin's caution would have kept him from gambling on an all-out war, his successors may be much more reckless. Sulzberger felt highly suspicious of the Malenkov peace offensive which closely followed Stalin's death. On April 5, 1953, (*N.Y. Times*, Page 3) he analyzed the possible motivations behind the new soft line:

1. Real change of heart by Moscow and a genuine acceptance of co-existence.

2. Fear of mounting Western strength and its own internal weakness.

3. Desire to spike the re-arming of West Germany.

4. Hope of inducing the West to cut back its power.

Since Sulzberger was highly suspicious of the first possibility, he warned that this was no time for the West to retrench its positions or its armed forces.

4.

The Russian peace offensive gained momentum. From a mere statement of good wishes, it developed into the most massive peace offensive yet launched by the Soviets. As if to persuade the world that they were serious, the Soviets followed words with deeds; The Korean truce was signed, Oatis was released, the land reform program in East Germany was abandoned, the U.S. was softly treated in Soviet newspapers. United States commentators remained unconvinced. The Reds, they felt, are merely indulging in a change of tactics; their basic strategy remains constant.

Assessing the impact of the Communists' internal and external trouble, however, Sulzberger commented that the struggle for power in the Kremlin and the unrest in the satellite countries might explode like a powder keg, weakening the Soviet Union and creating the conditions necessary for peaceful co-existence. (New York Times, July 5 and 19) However, Sulzberger carefully avoids being too hopeful; he speaks in a hesitant, tentative key.

While James Reston might speak of the hopeful change in the world's climate, (New York Times, September 27, 1953) most reporters were non-committal or pessimistic, while the Western statesmen seemed to agree that the Russian peace offensives were mere tactical moves with ulterior motives behind them. They feared the new popular mood they felt in the air: the people's desire for peace might dig the ground from under their feet. (New York Times, April 12, 1953)

By the end of the year, Moscow's line had hardened once more. When Malenkov, in his August 8th speech, declared: "We stood and stand for peaceful co-existence", he made it quite clear that "peaceful co-existence" would have to stand without any major Russian retrenchments, particularly in its policy towards its satellites. (New York Times, August 16, 1953) Thomas J. Hamilton reported towards the close of the year that the Russians no longer felt any sense of urgency about settling the old problems. (New York Times, November 8, 1953) E. L. Sulzberger re-estimated Russia's unvarying attitudes as follows: (New York Times, November 22, 1953) 1. "Moscow clearly does not want a full-scale war at this time; otherwise, needing no provocation, it would have started one". But... 2. "It does not know how to devise a peace that would not permit the inevitable development of an anti-Communist state along Soviet and Chinese borders."

5.

During the Truman administration, the policy of checking Communist Expansion had followed the Kennan formula: "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." (New York Times, March 15, 1953). It was felt that this strategy would eventually bring about either the breakup or the mellowing of Russia. Dean Acheson felt that it was wisest to wait for a final settlement until the United States had built up "positions of strength". (Ibid)

During the 1952 campaign, Dwight D. Eisenhower had had held out the promise that the United States would follow a new, tougher, more aggressive and dynamic policy: a policy that would aim at the "liberation" was to be accomplished without the erruption of World War III was not discussed by the presidential candidate.

On April 16, Eisenhower stated the "new" objectives of American foreign policy:

1. A free and united Korea

2. A free and united Germany

3. A free Indo-China and a free Malaya

4. Full independence for the Eastern European nations

5. A disarmament plan backed by free inspection.

James Reston felt, like the President (!), that these were the conditions for permanent and peaceful co-existence. (New York Times, July 19, 1953) However, most observers were convinced that the "liberation" policy was more a campaign slogan than a policy that could be implemented. Although Thomas J. Hamilton hoped that the instability following Malenkov's succession might create the opportunity to liberate the satellites, he emphasized that great care could have to be followed to prevent the erruption of World War III. (New York Times, March 15, 1953)

Serious pressures were soon exerted upon the new administration to revise its thinking about liberation. Both the facts of the situation, the possible consequences of world disaster, and America's western allies militated against it. By September 15, 1953, as is quite evident from Dulles' speech that day, the administration itself was beginning to doubt the wisdom of this policy and to retrench its former stand. Dulles stated that the Communists could prove their desire for peace by:

1. Stopping their aggression in Indo China

2. Allowing the re-unification of Germany with free elections

3. Concluding the Austrian treaty

4. Allowing the reunification of Korea through free elections.

On the satellites, Mr. Dulles was extremely cautious: He stated that while the United States did not invite violence and revolution, it did not believe that enduring peace could be secured while Russian troops occupied the satellites.

6.

Despite early administration hopes, our policy could not change fundamentally the objectives set up during the Truman administration. However, experts felt that "a new American line" was still needed. Fredrick C. Barghorn ("Needed a Counter to Moscow's New Line", Magazine section, *New York Times*, September 20, 1953) declared that our "new" policy should involve the following:

1. Containment: "the first and indispensable pre-requisite to any policy is to hold the line against any further Soviet aggression."

2. Accommodation: "we must offer to negotiate--but only on a very clear basis". and

3. Liberation: defined as "the attempt to influence developments inside the Soviet orbit".

Barghorn felt that we must continually urge the freedom of all subject and unwilling people (including the Ukranians) by propaganda. He concluded: "We must not limit ourselves to containment or accommodation or liberation, but manage to combine all three."

1954

Looking back over the course of 1954, the *New York Times* (Dec. 26, 1954, SE) commented that the situation had changed considerably since the close of 1953: "A year ago the situation was static, the outcome uncertain, the new leaders on both sides were untested. Now the pattern is one of change, and there emerges before the world the prospect of long term maneuver as the free and Communist systems compete--without war--for survival."

From both sides, there were declarations of the advisability, the advantages, the necessity for peaceful co-existence. Malenkov said: "The Soviet Government held, and holds, that capitalist and Socialist systems can quite well co-exist peacefully, competing economically with one another." (Ibid) Chou-En-Lai of China protested: "All the people of Asia want peace. The menace to the peace of Asia comes from outside, but Asia today is not Asia of yesterday. The age when outside forces could decide at will the fate of Asia has gone forever." (Ibid)

To these declarations of peaceful intentions, with their threatening undertones, the western leaders added their resolutions and their hopes. Churchill propheisied: "We might even find ourselves in a few years moving along a broad smooth causeway of peace and plenty instead of roaming and peering around on the rim of hell." (Ibid) And Eisenhower admitted: "Let us recognize that we owe it to ourselves and to the world to explore every possible peaceful means before we even think of such a thing as war." (Ibid)

Still haunted by the fear of having merely one more futile parley, the Eisenhower Administration was, at the beginning of the year, quite unsympathetic towards any proposal of a top level parley with the Communists. Although its Western allies repeatedly urged that the West could lose nothing by making "one more try" to make an accommodation with Russia, the United States government was generally unresponsive to the idea. By the end of 1954, however, there were signs that the United States were modifying its position; and the possibility of a summit meeting became more distinct.

7.

GJ

Only once did a national figure arise to challenge the general assump-
tion on co-existence. On November 19, during the hearing on censoring
Senator McCarthy, Senator Knowland challenged the Administration's position
quite sharply: Co-existence was "a Trojan Horse", a Communist technique
whereby the world could be conquered piecemeal. Instead of deriving com-
fort from the possibility of an atomic stalemate, Senator Knowland felt
that the United States' position was being seriously weakened. (*New York
Times*, November 16, 1954) "Co-existence and atomic stalemate will result
in ultimate Communist victory." Once atomic stalemate had been reached,
the Soviet would feel freer to act. It could then "nibble away" at the
strength of the West ("Operation Nibbling") till it succeeded in isolating
the United States and presenting her with the choice of surrender or annihilation:

"'The Communist concept of 'peaceful co-existence' means that the United States or other free nations of the world will be allowed to exist only until communism is able to subvert them from within or destroy them by aggression from without!'". (Ibid) What solution did the Senator propose? Immediate atomic retaliation if the Communists attacked either overtly or internally. Not atomic attack at the threatened point, but nuclear retaliation aimed at the heart of the Communist homeland!

This speech squarely placed the Senator in opposition to the President. On October 19 (*New York Times*, October 20), Eisenhower had declared "it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace if there is to be a happy and well world." In the interests of peace, the President had vetoed a proposal by three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney and General Twining) that the Chinese Nationalists be permitted to bomb inland in Red China to prevent a Communist landing on Quemoy. (The military brass had also suggested that American planes join in the bombardment if the Communists seemed to be getting the upper hand.) (Ibid)

On November 16, at his news conference, Dulles answered the Senator's challenge. (*New York Times*, Nov. 17) He felt that everything depended on definition. If by co-existence, you meant: "'the ability of people who think differently to exist in the world,'" then, of course, it was feasible. If you meant, "'the compatibility of the different philosophical views held by the free nations and Russia!', then it was impractical.

As James Reston pointed out, there were several conflicting viewpoints between the President and Senator Knowland: (*New York Times*, November 17, page 28)

1. The Senator wanted to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union for Moscow's repeated affronts to the United Nations and for her unprovoked attacks upon U. S. planes. The Administration felt that such a move would be dangerous and unwise.

2. The Senator wanted a public declaration by the United States that any additional Communist expansion, by any means, including subversion and infiltration, would inevitably expose the Communist world to attack by the United States at places of its own choosing. The Administration was prepared to respond in this manner against open aggression, not against subversion.

8.

3. The Senator backed the recommendation of the three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the defense of Quemoy. The Administration had vetoed this proposal.

4. The Senator felt that the trend of time was running against sweeping investigation and reversal of policy. The Administration felt that we had achieved a more secure balance of power.

5. The Senator declared that: co-existence was a Trojan horse. The administration felt that co-existence was *modus vivendi* with the Communists. Indeed it felt that no alternative solution was possible.

Knowland alone seemed to call for a bolder policy than containment. Eisenhower, the Senator suspected, had long ago abandoned his announced policy of "liberation".

Walter Lippmann (New York Herald Tribune, Nov. 18) challenged Knowland's assumptions and conclusions. The atomic stalemate was not a thing of the future; indeed it was a thing of the present: "I has existed since the Soviet Union broke the American atomic monopoly in 1949. Ever since then it has been a major premise of all our allies, as well as of the great uncommitted nations like India, that the prevention of atomic war is essential to their survival." (Ibid) "There is no ground for his (the Senator's) assertion that an atomic stalemate means the Communist conquest of the world" (Ibid) Examining the pattern of Soviet expansion, Lippmann pointed out that the major Communists advances were made while the U.S. had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. Rather than grounds for despair, Mr. Lippmann saw reason for hope: "There is just and good grounds for believing that an atomic stalemate, which renders general war intolerable and improbable, will give the free world a better chance for the allegiance of mankind." (Ibid) Peace, feels Mr. Lippmann, favors totalitarianism. (Even the most democratic nations have to renege in times of crisis). If Senator Knowland didn't believe in co-existence, did he believe in non-existence?

Although Washington rejected most of the soft speeches of the Russians as mere propaganda, some experts wondered if there were not more positive points of view in Russia on peace. (New York Times, Nov 17) Saburov, Deputy Premier, described the conditions he thought necessary for an easing of world tensions: "a desire on both sides to co-operate...a readiness to fulfill obligations assured... (and an)...observance of the principle of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states."

Suburov amplified his plan for peace. To reach full co-operation, we needed a four power agreement on Germany's reunification, a general agreement on disarmament, the banning of atomic weapons, and an all European pact for collective security. (Ibid) Earlier in the year, Jawahral Nehru and Ehou-En-lai had worked out the basic ground rules for peace:

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty;

2. Non-aggression;

3. Non-interference in one another's internal affairs;

4. Equality and mutual benefits; and

5. Peaceful co-existence.

9.

Another authority, Eugene Varya, the Russian economist, predicted that the capitalist and the communist systems could co-exist for a long time. After all, he explained, conversion from a capitalist to a communist economy is a complex, long-range program. Ultimately, however, the capitalist state will collapse from its own contradictions. (Ibid) The Soviets, therefore, were still not ready to settle for any ultimate agreement for peaceful co-existence. The Soviets would obviously continue their activities. They would, at the most, guarantee not to use force of arms.

1955

The nuclear stalemate led the Soviets to shift their tactics. Now, they decided to carry on their struggle for power on economic and political, rather than military lines. But 1955 confronted the West with a further danger: a general weariness (particularly in Europe) with the issues of the cold war.

With the accession of Khruschev and Bulganin to power, the Soviets shifted their tactics once more from the hard line to the amiable touch. Furthermore, the Communists backed their words with deeds: they co-operated in the final settlement of the Austrian peace treaty; they attempted to woo Tito back into the Red fold. Because of Russian amiability, a new atmosphere developed, a pressure to solve the mounting issues of the world, to reach a permanent peace settlement. This pressure led to the famous summit conference at Geneva (July 18-23).

In his column, "Today and Tomorrow", Walter Lippmann analyzed the high goals entertained by Premier Bulganin and President Eisenhower at Geneva: "a goal of understanding and not merely...an armistice in the cold war and a measure of co-existence." In public, Lippmann observed, they had embraced the same attitude towards the cold war: "that the conflict between the two great coalitions is due not to opposing interests but to a misunderstanding". Therefore, the key technique was to change the "spirit" in which the conferences are conducted.

Consequently, Bulganin asserted: "It is sometimes said that a peaceful settlement of international issues in dispute is prevented by the difference in the social and state structure of different countries. Yet the social and state structure is a domestic affair of the people of each country... Why should the difference in social and state structures prevent the people from living in peace, respecting each other, developing mutually advantageous trade and cultural relations?"

But, as Lippmann commented, as long as there was secrecy throughout the Soviet, as long as the instruments of her foreign policy were deliberately obscured, there could be no real peace, only co-existence, mere living side by side while aimed and ever on the alert. In other words, as long as we operated under inequality (the U.S. operating in the open and the Soviets operating in secret), as long as the Russians could launch a surprise attack upon the United States, "the best we can hope for is co-existence with a strict balance of power."

10.

Strangely echoing Senator Knowland, Joseph Alsop warned that the United States was attending the Geneva Conference under a disadvantage. Atomic stalemate, Alsop declared, meant the paralysis of American power. Now the Russians would be freer to use their overwhelmingly superior conventional forces. (*New York Herald Tribune*, July 17, 1955)

From the meeting at Geneva emerged the tacit acknowledgment from both sides that the great powers were definitely in atomic stalemate. Therefore, war was out of the question; and the main problem remained the dispelling of the fog of suspicion and distrust between the two power blocs. The President attempted to break this deadlock by his famous proposal of "open sky inspection". Much spirit, but little fundamental agreement of basic issues, emerged from the Geneva conference.

By November 16, however, the "spirit" of Geneva had shattered into illusion. The foreign ministers meeting in Geneva broke up without having settled any of the basic issues dividing the East and the West: German unification, European security, disarmament, and "contacts" between the Communist and the free world. (*New York Times*, January 1, 1955, p. 8) In the meantime, the Soviets had used the "Geneva spirit" as a weapon to pry European allies away from the United States. Therefore, at the end of the year, although the West had questioned the predominantly military coloring of its containment policy, the United States decided that its emphasis on military aid should continue.

HARVARD DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

*Memorandum*

FROM: Deirdre

To: Mr. Kissinger

I have more notes on this which
I did not get time to type up
today, but will give you on Monday.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: D.H.

TO: Mr. Kissinger

RE: Dag Hammarskjold's position as UN negotiator

In reading about Mr. Hammarskjold's major negotiations in Suez, Hungary, and Lebanon, I looked for the

(a) attitude of governments toward his role as Secretary General of the General Assembly.

(b) the amount of jurisdiction in negotiations delegated to him by nations and

(c) his own conception of the job.

(a) The United States attitude toward Hammarskjold's position has been generally that of looking to the Secretary General as a person who would carry on until a crisis gets out of hand. For example, Eisenhower stated on March 21, 1957 with respect to Suez:

> The United States as a member of the UN would seek such disposition of the UN Emergency Force as would assure that the Gaza Strip could no longer be used as a source of armed infiltration and reprisals. (Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1957)

In the meeting with MacMillan at Burmuda (March '57) Eisenhower was firm in not agreeing with the British Prime Minister that the U.S. and Britain should go outside the U.N. As has been pointed out, however, over a period of time the U.S. has not hesitated to take action outside the U.N. whenever the USSR prevents its policies from being implemented, i.e. Berlin airlift, Marshall Plan, NATO. Of course, Churchill denounced the work of the General Assembly in Suez and called it "interference". (N.Y. Times, April 23, '57)

(b) As to Hammarskjold's right to negotiate, as Secretary General he has the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter he feels is necessary. He is formally given power to act upon any resolution made by the General Assembly, as for example in the Middle East Crisis, the Nov 2 resolution stated that the Assembly "urges that upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation". (Christian Sci. Monitor, April 1, '57), and the resolution of Feb 2, '57 gave Hammarskjold his

order to "consult with the parties concerned".

(c) Mr. Hammarskjold's conception of his own position is that of an impartial negociator in that he has never committed himself to one side. He speaks of his role as "non-political" and thinks of himself as an administrator. Officially he says that he carries on consultations with nations which have begun at the foreign minister level at the UN. It is clear despite his claim to be merely an administrator that he does a great deal more through secret diplomacy. "In a number of issues, moreover, he has not revealed the position he has taken in confidential negociations". (N.Y. Times, April 13, '58, Thomas J. Hamilton) As the London Economist says he is skilled in the presentation of his reports and is often able to pursue nations as to the wisdom of his thinking.