CHAPTER 4:
"Bangladesh: One Genocide, One Coup, and One Assassination"

In the spring of 1971, Bengali separatists in East Pakistan moved to declare independence from central government rule. In response, Islamabad arrested separatist leader Mujibur Rahman ("Mujib") and instituted a harsh military crackdown on his supporters. A Pakistani civil war soon resulted, in which Bengali guerilla armies battled Islamabad's forces for control of East Pakistan. In November 1971, India intervened on the side of the guerillas and declared an independent state of Bangladesh.

Hitchens argues that, because Washington's 1970-72 opening to China relied in part on a Pakistani diplomatic channel, Kissinger is thereby guilty of "deliberate collusion in mass murder, and later in assassination, in Bangladesh"; and that the White House's failure to denounce publicly the conduct of the Pakistani military constitutes "direct complicity, on Nixon and Kissinger's part, in the massacres."

1. Assertion:

"In late April 1971, at the very height of the mass murder, Kissinger sent a message to [Pakistani head of state] General Yahya Khan, thanking him for his 'delicacy and tact.'"⁷⁶

Facts:

Throughout Nixon's first term, Washington and Beijing sought a rapprochement. Since the two longtime adversaries lacked any means of confidential communication, they relied on third-party governments as intermediaries.

On April 27th, 1971, Islamabad's Ambassador to Washington, Agha Hilaly, delivered a breakthrough letter in which Premier Chou Enlai invited President Nixon to China "for a direct meeting and discussions." Chou suggested "that it is entirely possible for public arrangements to be made through the good offices of President Yahya Khan."⁷⁷

The next day, Nixon wrote the Pakistani president:

> My warm thanks for the helpful role you have played. I particularly appreciate the delicacy and tact with which you have handled these important exchanges. Please thank Chou-en-lai for his message which I think is positive, constructive and forthcoming. I will soon be replying to it in the same spirit.⁷⁸

Nixon traveled to Beijing in February 1972, ending two decades of Sino-American estrangement.

2. Assertion:

"Those who like to plead realpolitik, however, might wish to consider some further circumstances. There already was, and had been for some time, a back channel between Washington and Beijing. It ran through Nicolae Ceauşescu's Romania - not a much more decorative choice but not, at that stage, a positively criminal one. There was no reason to confine approaches, to a serious person like Chou En Lai, to the narrow channel afforded by a blood-

⁷⁶ Hitchens, p 47.

⁷⁷ "Message from Premier Chou Enlai dated April 21, 1971 (Delivered to Mr. Kissinger - 6:15 P.M., April 27, 1971)," declassified 01/03/02. See also "Appended Documents."

⁷⁸ Nixon, April 28, 1971 message to Yahya Khan, as quoted in "Extract of MEMCON dated May 5, 1971 Message from Ambassador Hilaly." See "Appended Documents."

23

soaked (and short-lived, as it turned out) despot like the 'delicate and tactful' Yahya Khan. Either Chou En Lai wanted contact, in other words, or he did not....

"There is another consideration outside the scope of this book, which involves the question: why did Kissinger confine his China diplomacy to channels provided by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes? Why was an open diplomacy not just as easy, if not easier? The answer - which also lies outside the scope of this book - is apparently that surreptitiousness, while not essential in itself, was essential if Nixon and Kissinger were going to be able to take the credit for it."⁷⁹

**Facts:**

During Nixon's summer 1969 round-the-world trip, the president approached the leaders of both Pakistan and Romania to express his desire for a "new relationship" with the People's Republic of China. Nixon hoped to enlist Islamabad and Bucharest as intermediaries between Washington and Beijing.

Washington, for its part, had a slight preference for a Pakistani channel, since the Islamabad government had no ties to Moscow. (Nixon and Kissinger worried that a precipitate discovery of Sino-US ties might prompt the Soviets - who had amassed 42 divisions on the Chinese border, and stepped up a propaganda campaign against Beijing - to initiate military action against the PRC.)

Washington soon learned that Beijing also favored the Pakistani channel. Perhaps fearing Soviet penetration of the Ceauşescu government, the Chinese had reacted coolly to Nixon's first Romanian overture; several days later, they sent a more detailed response through Pakistan.

In the meantime, the two governments attempted to send conciliatory signals through France, Norway, Holland, and Poland. None of these channels flourished - again due to concerns about Soviet intelligence penetration.

In November 1970, Chou Enlai sent a letter that underscored the importance of the Islamabad connection. Chou observed that while Washington and Beijing had thus far communicated through several different channels, "this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head [Mao], through a Head [Yahya Khan], to a Head [Nixon]. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."⁸⁰

Thereafter, Washington and Beijing conducted the bulk of their correspondence through the Pakistani government - including the arrangements for Nixon's 1972 visit to China.

**3. Assertion:**

"The knowledge of this secret diplomacy and its accompanying privileges obviously freed the Pakistani general of such restraints as might have inhibited him. He told his closest associates, including his minister of information, G.W. Choudhury, that his private understanding with Washington and Beijing would protect him. Choudhury later wrote: 'If Nixon and Kissinger had not given him that false hope, he'd have been more realistic.' Thus the collusion with him in the matter of China *increases* the direct complicity of Nixon and Kissinger in the massacres."⁸¹

⁷⁹ Hitchens, p 47-48.

⁸⁰ Chou Enlai, personal message to Richard Nixon via Yahya Khan, November 1970. As quoted in Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p 254. See also "Appended Documents."

⁸¹ Hitchens, p 48.

24

Facts:

In fact, G.W. Choudhury argued precisely the opposite point. He wrote on several occasions that Nixon's private entreaties for peace served as a moderating influence on Yahya Khan, and that the American president "did his best for a political solution of the crisis" on the subcontinent.

In the book that Hitchens appears to be citing,⁸² Choudhury observed:

> Nixon never condoned the Pakistan Army's action in East Bengal; indeed he put the strongest pressure on Yahya to make a political settlement of the crisis and to give up the path of repression and suppression.... [Yahya] showed me the contents of Nixon's letters to him, and I can say without fear of contradiction that Nixon did his best for a political solution of the crisis. Most probably the Nixon-sponsored efforts would have averted the Indo-Pakistani war on Bangladesh, which destroyed not only the economic infrastructure of Bangladesh but also its social fabric."⁸³

In his subsequent volume, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers*, Choudhury was even more adamant:

> Despite the criticism and disappointment both within the United States and abroad over American policy during the Bangladesh crisis, neither the American government in general nor Richard Nixon in particular condoned Pakistan's military atrocities in East Bengal [or] opposed the aspirations of the Bengali nationalists. It was Nixon's intervention that saved the life of Mujib, whom the hawkish Pakistani generals, backed by Bhutto, were planning in August and September 1971 to execute; Bhutto told me in September that Yahya should execute Mujib before departing the following month for Tehran, where President Nixon would also be in attendance at the two thousandth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. Yahya withstood the severe pressure to do away with the Awami League leader only because of Nixon's strong pleas to refrain from such a course. Similarly, President Nixon pressed Yahya to make a political settlement with the Awami League leaders exiled in India, and Yahya agreed. It is not certain that even if all parties had fully cooperated Nixon's efforts for a political settlement would have been successful, but those who know the inside story, as I do as a result of my private visit to [the Pakistani Military's General Headquarters at] Rawalpindi in September 1971, realize that the Nixon administration was doing its best both to avert Indo-Pakistani war and to achieve in the shortest possible time the goal of the Bengali nationalists. President Nixon's personal sympathy for Pakistan, his cherished China policy, and the unpleasant image of Pakistan's dismemberment under the guns of Soviet-backed Indian forces motivated him and his government to work diligently toward an honorable settlement suitable to both the Bengalis and the West Pakistanis.⁸⁴

4. Assertion:

> "On 6 March 1971, Kissinger summoned a meeting at [sic] the National Security Council [sic] and - in advance of the crisis in East-West Pakistan relations that was by then palpable and predictable to those attending - insisted that no preemptive action be taken. Those present who suggested that a warning to General Yahya Khan be issued, essentially advising him to honor the election results, he strongly opposed."⁸⁵

⁸² It is difficult to ascertain, since *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* contains no footnotes, page citations, or bibliography.

⁸³ Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan*, pp 219-220.

⁸⁴ Choudhury, *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers: Politics of a Divided Subcontinent*.

⁸⁵ Hitchens, pp 48-49.

25

**Facts:**

Precisely the opposite is true.

U. Alexis Johnson opened and closed the meeting (not a meeting "at" the National Security Council, but a meeting of the interdepartmental Senior Review Group) with an argument for American noninvolvement the Pakistani political crisis. Rather, he suggested, Washington might ask Britain to take the lead. Christopher Van Hollen seconded Johnson's proposal, and Johnson continued, "It would be most unwise to do anything to prejudice our relations with Yahya." Dick Helms agreed.

At this point, Kissinger asked if the United States could not go in "as a friend" and warn Yahya Khan that "the use of force would be unwise." The response to this proposal was negative, and the matter was dropped.

**5. Assertion:**

"In 1971 Henry Kissinger had attempted the impossible by trying to divide the electorally victorious Awami League, and to dilute its demand for independence. In pursuit of this favor to General Yahya Khan, he had initiated a covert approach to Khondakar Mustaque, who led the tiny minority who were willing to compromise on the main principle. A recently unearthed 'Memorandum for the Record' gives us details of a White House meeting between Nixon, Kissinger and others on 11 August 1971, at which Undersecretary of State John Irwin reported: 'We have reports in recent days of the possibility that some Awami League leaders in Calcutta want to negotiate with Yahya on the basis of giving up their claim for the independence of East Pakistan.' This can only have been a reference to the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, set up in exile in Calcutta after the massacres, and could only have been an attempt to circumvent its leadership. The consequences of this clumsy approach were that Mustaque was placed under house arrest in October 1971, and that the American political officer who contacted him, George Griffin, was declared persona non grata when gazetted to the US embassy in New Delhi a decade later."⁸⁶

**Facts:**

After Islamabad's crackdown on the Awami League, Khondakar Mustaque, the Acting Foreign Minister of the Bangladesh government-in-exile, sent an emissary to the US Consulate in Dacca to request American assistance in securing Bengali autonomy. Mustaque's aim was to trade formal independence for the release of Mujib from prison and Islamabad's acceptance of the Awami League "Six Point" plan for self-rule.⁸⁷

Under Secretary of State Irwin raised the topic at an August 11, 1971 meeting of the Senior Review Group. Irwin presented it not as a "favor to Yahya Khan," but as a step that Washington might wish to *pressure* Yahya into accepting, for the sake of peace on the subcontinent:

> *Mr. Irwin said that they had discussed with Secretary [of State William] Rogers that morning the question of dealing with the Awami League. We have had reports in recent days of the possibility that some Awami League leaders in Calcutta want to negotiate with Yahya on the basis of giving up their claim for the independence of East Pakistan. The question being discussed is whether Ambassador Farland could talk to Yahya just suggesting that if the Awami League is serious about withdrawing its claim to independence Yahya might consider talking with them.⁸⁸*

Kissinger, for his part, was not optimistic about the initiative, and commented:

⁸⁶ Hitchens, p 53.

⁸⁷ Sisson and Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*, p 183 and pp 193-195.

⁸⁸ August 11, 1971 meeting of the Senior Review Group, "Memorandum for the Record." This is the "recently unearthed" document that Hitchens cites as proof of the administration's alleged treachery.

26

If the Indians genuinely need an excuse for calling off the guerillas and some conciliatory move by Yahya would evoke that Indian response, then we might be justified in making that point to Yahya. But asking him to deal with the Awami Leaguers in Calcutta is "like asking Abraham Lincoln to deal with Jefferson Davis"... Yahya is "not the brightest man in the world." But asking him to deal directly with the Awami League would be hard to do.⁸⁹

Nonetheless, Nixon authorized the contact, and Ambassador Farland broached the topic with Yahya Khan. Yahya's reaction was "surprisingly favorable"⁹⁰: he even conceded to Farland's description of Khondakar Mustaque as the "Bangladeshi Foreign Minister" – thus implying a tacit recognition of the Awami League exiles as an autonomous government.

Shortly after, however, the initiative collapsed. India placed the Awami League accommodationists under house arrest, and formally warned Mustaque's emissary against any further contact with the American government. Within weeks, India and Pakistan were at war.

**6. Assertion:**

"After returning from China in July, [Kissinger] began to speak in almost Maoist phrases about a Soviet-Indian plot to dismember and even annex part of Pakistan, which would compel China to intervene on Pakistan's side. (In pursuit of this fantasy of confrontation, he annoyed Admiral Elmo Zumwalt by ordering him to dispatch the aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* from the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal, while giving it no stated mission.) But no analyst in the State Department or the CIA could be found to underwrite that bizarre prediction..."⁹¹

**Facts:**

With India and Pakistan at loggerheads over the Bengali refugee crisis, the Soviet Union perceived a strategic opportunity: Moscow would provide India with military and political support for an attack on East Pakistan, and thereby achieve the humiliation of the government that had served as the crucial intermediary between Washington and Beijing.

Moscow was already as a major supplier of military hardware to India. Now, in the summer of 1971, it moved to assure New Delhi that the arms pipeline would remain open in the event of war. (This was particularly provocative, since Pakistan was already barred from further American military aid.)

A major concern in New Delhi was the possibility that an Indian attack on East Pakistan would trigger Chinese intervention. By June, however, Moscow promised to respond to such an eventuality with a diversionary strike against China's northwestern Xinjiang province.⁹²

On August 9, 1971, the two sides codified these assurances in a formal "Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." Article IX of the agreement stipulated:

> In the event that any of the parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual consultation with a view to eliminating the threat and taking appropriate effective measures to secure peace and security for the countries.⁹³

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p 870.

⁹¹ Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, p 49.

⁹² Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp 856-57, p 874.

⁹³ Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Article IX, as quoted in Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, p 172.

27

Privately, Moscow underscored its commitment by promising to use its veto in the UN Security Council should India be charged as an aggressor against Pakistan.⁹⁴

In late October, the Soviet Foreign Minister visited New Delhi. In his trail was Marshal Pavel S. Kutakhov, Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Air Force. Several days later, Moscow began an airlift of military equipment to India. By this point, there could be no doubt of Moscow's active support.

On November 22, New Delhi launched a major offensive against Islamabad's forces in East Pakistan. Possessing six-to-one military superiority, the Indian army decimated its rival. Soviet naval forces had taken up positions in the Indian Ocean, and were rumored to be offering active assistance to Indian military operations.⁹⁵

With Indian regiments operating at will in East Pakistan – and New Delhi having declared the area an independent state – Washington moved to deter an Indian attack on the West. To this end, Nixon ordered an aircraft carrier task force to steam towards the Bay of Bengal. The USS *Enterprise's* formal mission was to evacuate American citizens from the war zone; but its presence was also intended as a signal to Moscow and New Delhi that Washington would not permit the total annihilation of Pakistan.

To the disappointment of the Islamabad government, the USS *Enterprise* and the Seventh Fleet never enjoined the conflict. But to New Delhi and Moscow, the signal had been sent. On December 16, India offered an unconditional ceasefire in West Pakistan. The war was over.

## 7. Assertion:

"This is also strongly suggested by Kissinger's subsequent conduct, as Secretary of State, towards Bangladesh as a country and towards Sheik Mujib, leader of the Awami League and later the father of Bangladeshi independence, as a politician. Unremitting hostility and contempt were the signature elements in both cases.... In the fall of the next year, 1974, he inflicted a series of snubs on Mujib, then on his first visit to the United States as a head of state. In Washington Kissinger boycotted the fifteen-minute meeting that Mujib was allowed by President Ford. He also opposed Mujib's main request, which was for emergency United States grain shipments, and some help with debt relief, in order to recuperate the country so ravaged by Kissinger's friend and ally.... In November 1974, on a brief face-saving tour of the region, Kissinger made an eight-hour stop in Bangladesh and gave a three-minute press conference in which he refused to say why he had sent the USS *Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal three years before."

### Facts:

There is no factual basis for this account.

When Mujib visited the United States, he met with Kissinger in New York and Ford in Washington, DC. Kissinger arranged to see Mujib in New York because he was based there for the opening of the UN General Assembly. (This, per Hitchens, is evidence of Kissinger's "unremitting hostility and contempt" for the Bangladeshi Prime Minister.)

In Washington, Ford approved $60 million in emergency grain shipments to Bangladesh. This was in addition to the nearly $500 million in humanitarian aid the

⁹⁴ Several months later, India was in fact brought before the Security Council as an aggressor against Pakistan. Moscow vetoed the 14-2 vote.

⁹⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p 211.

28

Washington had provided since the advent of Bengali independence, and the $250 million
Nixon had directed towards refugee relief during the 1971 crisis.⁹⁶

Kissinger traveled to Bangladesh on October 30-31, 1974. His visit lasted not "eight
hours," but nearly two days. (Nor was it in "November 1974," as Hitchens asserts.) In
Dacca, Kissinger discussed the US aid package personally with Mujib. In the press
conference following their meeting, Kissinger praised the Prime Minister in fulsome terms:

> Ladies and gentlemen, I first of all want to express my appreciation to the Prime
> Minister and to all of his associates for the very warm reception that we have received
> here. I have long admired the Prime Minister. It isn't often that one has the privilege of
> meeting someone who has been the father to his country and who created a nation out
> of his convictions.⁹⁷

During the subsequent question and answer session, local journalists asked Kissinger for his assessment of the Bangladeshi economy and of Islamabad-Dacca relations. Since no one at the press conference asked about the USS Enterprise or the 1971 India-Pakistan war, Kissinger can hardly be said to have "refused to say why he had sent the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal three years before."⁹⁸

Afterwards, Kissinger attended a formal dinner with Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Hossain. There, Hossain extended a formal toast to Kissinger, and expressed his hope that US-Bangladeshi ties would flourish:

> It gives me great pleasure to extend on behalf of the Government and people of Bangladesh a warm welcome to you, to Mrs. [Nancy] Kissinger, and to the members of your delegation, on your first visit to Bangladesh. We are indeed happy that you have found time, despite your many preoccupations, to come to Bangladesh soon after the recent meeting in Washington between President Ford and our Prime Minister Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and our meeting in New York, when we were able to note with satisfaction the steady development of friendly relations between our two countries. Your visit to Bangladesh will contribute toward further development of the friendly relations which we both value.⁹⁹

Kissinger responded in part:

> Mr. Foreign Minister, Mrs. Hossain, distinguished guests: When I saw all these microphones brought and placed in front of us, I said to my friend the Foreign Minister that one of us had better say something intelligent and I am glad to know that he has already relieved me of any burdens that I may have with his eloquent toast. It is of course difficult to respond to someone who speaks better English than I do.

> I would like to express my great pleasure at being the first Secretary of State to visit Bangladesh, and it is a particular privilege for me because your Foreign Minister, whom I knew at Harvard, gave me an opportunity to renew my acquaintance with him first in New York and then here, and several other former colleagues from Harvard have also been invited to this occasion. But, above all, I am moved to be here because it is not often that one can visit a country whose courage and suffering earned its independence in a so-recent past and which symbolizes so much the necessities of our period....

> So, I want to say that my visit here has been too short. I have been touched by the warmth of Bengalee¹⁰⁰ hospitality. I have been delighted to renew my acquaintance with

⁹⁶ *Department of State Bulletin*, October 14, 1974, "Department Surveys U.S. Policy and Developments in South Asia."

⁹⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, November 25, 1974. "The Visit to Bangladesh, October 30-31."

⁹⁸ A transcript of Kissinger's remarks, and the question-an-answer period that followed, is presented in the November 25, 1974 issue of the *Department of State Bulletin*.

⁹⁹ *State Department Bulletin* (November 25, 1974).

¹⁰⁰ "Bengalee" was at the time the preferred spelling.

29

so many old friends and to have met so many new ones. I was particularly pleased to
have my talks with the Prime Minister, who had made a profound impression already
when we met in New York and who had a very good, and I believe, very fruitful talk
with President Ford.

So in bringing you the good wishes of our President I would like to propose a toast
to the President of Bangladesh, to the Prime Minister, to the Foreign Minister, and to
the enduring friendship of our two peoples.¹⁰¹

Kissinger spent the night in Dacca, and departed the next day for Islamabad.

8. Assertion:

"Within a few weeks of [Kissinger's] departure [from Dacca], we now know, a faction at the US embassy in Dacca began covertly meeting with a group of Bangladeshi officers who were planning a coup against Mujib. On 14 August 1975, Mujib and forty members of his family were murdered in a military takeover. His closest former political associates were bayoneted to death in their prison cells a few months after that....

"Only a reopened congressional inquiry with subpoena power could determine whether there was any direct connection... between the secret genocidal diplomacy of 1971 [sic] and the secret destabilizing diplomacy of 1975 [sic]. The task of disproving such a connection, meanwhile, would appear to rest on those who believe that everything is an accident."¹⁰²

Facts:

There is no factual basis whatsoever for this accusation. Hitchens' sole "evidence" is
his own fictional account of Kissinger's "eight-hour stop in Bangladesh" and "unremitting
hostility and contempt" for "the Bangladeshi people" [cf. Note 7].

The fact that Kissinger was once present at a meeting during which one of
Mostaque's colleagues was mentioned [cf. Note 5] does not make Kissinger "criminally
responsible" for Mostaque's ascendance to power in a military coup four years later.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Hitchens, pp 50-54.

30

CHAPTERS 7 & 9:
"Cyprus" & "A Wet Job in Washington?"

1. Assertion:

"In May of 1974, two months before the coup in Nicosia which Kissinger later claimed was a shock, he received a memorandum from the head of his State Department Cyprus desk, Thomas Boyatt. Boyatt summarized all the cumulative and persuasive reasons for believing that a Greek junta attack on Cyprus and Makarios was imminent... Kissinger now admits that he saw this document in real time, while engaged in his shuttle between Syria and Israel (both of them within half an hour's flying time of Cyprus). Yet no demarche bearing his name or carrying his authority was issued to the Greek junta."¹⁰³

"[I]f Kissinger did have any knowledge of the events he describes, he is guilty of collusion¹⁰⁴ in an assassination attempt on a foreign head of state, in a fascist military coup, in a serious violation of American law (the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits the use of US military aid and *materiel* for non-defensive purposes), in two invasions which flouted international law, and in the murder and dispossession of many thousands of noncombatant civilians."¹⁰⁵

Facts:

Hitchens' argument is neither factually nor conceptually sustainable. The relevant events occured as follows:

Since the advent of Cypriot independence in 1959, Athens and Ankara had vied for advantage in Cyprus' longstanding ethnic disputes.¹⁰⁶ The Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios III, managed the island's precarious position by appealing alternately to the demands of Greek nationalists (who favored Cypriot *enosis*, or "union," with Greece) and local leftist groups (which favored independence, and looked to the international Non-Aligned Movement for sustenance).¹⁰⁷

Through the spring and summer of 1974, most observers – including Makarios himself – believed that this balance still held. On May 7, the archbishop hosted a meeting between Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, where Makarios observed:

> The problem of Cyprus is one of patience. We have not had many incidents between the two communities. Often we have intra-Greek and intra-Turk incidents....We hope to resume the intercommunal talks....In my view, if no formula can be agreed on in a short while, the Secretary General of the U.N. is coming here soon, and perhaps he can get the sides together.¹⁰⁸

Later that month, Kissinger's office received a memorandum from Thomas Boyatt, the State Department's desk officer for Cyprus. Boyatt predicted an effort by Athens to instigate a coup against Makarios, and recommended that Washington warn the Greek junta against such a course of action.

Although Kissinger was absent from Washington at the time (on the Syrian-Israeli "shuttle"), the acting Secretary of State approved Boyatt's recommendation, and the

¹⁰³ Hitchens, p 81.

¹⁰⁴ The import of Hitchens' argument is: 'If Kissinger received Boyatt's memorandum, but nonetheless declined to fly to Cyprus to try to avert personally the coup that Boyatt had predicted (and which was not to occur for another two months), then Kissinger is legally responsible for, and guilty of "colluding in," the Greek coup, the subsequent Turkish invasion, and the resulting displacement of Cypriot civilians.'

¹⁰⁵ Hitchens, p 79.

¹⁰⁶ In 1964, Turkey responded to intercommunal riots by threatening a full-scale invasion. By 1967, Athens was estimated to have infiltrated over 10,000 Greek Army personnel into the Cyprus National Guard.

¹⁰⁷ Bunge et al., *Cyprus: A Country Study*, Chapters 1, 4, and 5.

¹⁰⁸ Makarios to Kissinger in Nicosia, 7 May 1974, as quoted in Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p 203.

31

American ambassador in Athens, Henry Tasca, relayed the warning to the Greek president and foreign minister.

In the meantime, the CIA reported that the Greek junta had abandoned its attempts to unseat Makarios. On July 12 – three days before the coup – Makarios told the American ambassador in Cyprus, Rodger Davies, that the situation was “delicate” but not “critical.” “He gave no indication [that] he was seeking any US intervention with Athens,” Davies reported to Washington.

That the subsequent coup against Makarios incurred catastrophic consequences for Cyprus is not disputed. But Hitchens' argument – that Kissinger's inability to single-handedly predict and prevent a Cypriot coup constitutes his “collusion in”¹⁰⁹ and “responsibility for”¹¹⁰ that coup – is patently absurd.

## 2. Assertion:

"[O]n page 199 of [the third volume of Kissinger's memoirs] *Years of Renewal...* President Makarios is described without adornment as 'the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions.' Makarios was the democratically elected leader of a virtually unarmed republic, which was at the time an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC), the United Nations and the Commonwealth... To describe his [sic] person as 'the proximate cause' of most of the tensions is to make a wildly aberrant moral judgment.

"The same aberrant judgment, however, supplies the key that unlocks the lie at the heart of Kissinger's presentation. If the elected civilian authority (and spiritual leader of the Greek Orthodox community) is the 'proximate cause' of the tensions, then his removal from the scene is self-evidently the cure for them. If one can demonstrate that there was such a removal plan, and that Kissinger knew about it in advance, then it follows logically and naturally that he was not ostensibly looking for a crisis - as he self-pityingly asks us to disbelieve [sic] - but for a solution. The fact that he got a crisis, which was also a hideous calamity for Cyprus and the region, does not change the equation or undo the syllogism. It is attributable to the other observable fact that the scheme to remove Makarios, on which the 'solution' depended, was in practice a failure. But those who willed the means and wished the ends are not absolved from guilt by the refusal of reality to match their schemes."¹¹¹

## Facts:

This argument is at best tangentially related to reality. The full quotation from *Years of Renewal* is as follows:

> When all was said and done, Makarios, the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions, was also the best hope for a long-term peaceful solution. For once he had exhausted all possible maneuvers, he could be eminently practical about his necessities.¹¹²

This is followed by a tribute to the late Archbishop:

> Once Makarios returned to Cyprus [on December 7, 1974], he played his usual complicated [political] games, gradually edging, however, toward a settlement on terms he would have rejected indignantly two years earlier. When he died of a heart attack in 1977, I felt that with the by then somewhat chastened archbishop had also died the best hope for a rapid negotiated settlement of Cyprus. When all was said and done, Makarios more than any other Cypriot leader had the imagination to accept reality and the prestige to lead his compatriots

¹⁰⁹ Hitchens, p 79.

¹¹⁰ Hitchens, p 88.

¹¹¹ Hitchens, pp 79-80. The meaning of the phrases "self-pityingly asks us to disbelieve," "[i]t is attributable to the other observable fact," and "the refusal of reality to match their schemes" is unclear.

¹¹² Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p 199.

32

in the direction of their necessities. I can imagine the sardonic gleam in the archbishop's
eyes were he aware how many of his erstwhile critics missed him and his complicated,
occasionally devious maneuvers. Makarios was, after all, a big man in a world not blessed
with an excess of them.¹¹³

It is only through selective quotation and nonsensical wordplay that Hitchens claims to find
in these accounts "proof" of a supposed "crime against humanity."

3. Assertion:

"Thus the [Elias] Demetracopoulos story, told here in full for the first
time, makes a prima facie case that Henry Kissinger was at least aware of a
plan to abduct and interrogate, and almost certainly kill, a civilian
journalist in Wahsington, DC. In order to be cleared of the suspicion [of
'personal involvement in a plan to kidnap and murder a journalist living in
Washington, DC'¹¹⁴], and to explain the mysterious reference to Demetracopoulos'
death [sic]¹¹⁵ in his own archives, Kissinger need only make those same archives
at last accessible - or else be subpoenaed to do so."¹¹⁶

Facts:

There is no factual basis for this charge. Hitchens' "evidence" — that a National
Security Archive computer index contains the phrase "Mr Demetracopoulos death in
Athens,"¹¹⁷ and that Henry Kissinger has not responded with sufficient alacrity to Elias
Demetracopolous' requests that Kissinger personally elucidate the meaning of this reference
— could at best be described as circumstantial.

¹¹³ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 237.

¹¹⁴ Hitchens, *Preface*, x, "Proper Bill of Indictment."

¹¹⁵ Demetracopoulos is still alive as of this writing.

¹¹⁶ Hitchens, p. 119.

¹¹⁷ In December 1970, the dissident journalist Elias Demetracopoulos petitioned the Greek government and the United States Senate to allow him passage into Athens to visit his ailing father. Later that month, while the dissident journalist was still in Washington, the elder Mr. Demetracopoulos succumbed to pneumonia and died in Athens.

33

CHAPTERS 8 & 10:
"East Timor" & "The Profit Margin"
{ROUGH DRAFT}

1. Assertion:

"The date of the Indonesian invasion - 7 December 1975 - is of importance and also of significance [sic]. On that date, President Gerald Ford and his secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, concluded an official visit to Jakarta and flew to Hawaii. Since they had come fresh from a meeting with Indonesia's military junta, and since the United States was Indonesia's principal supplier of military hardware (and since Portugal, a NATO ally, broke diplomatic relations with Indonesia on the point), it seemed reasonable to inquire whether the two leaders had given the invaders any impression amounting to a 'green light... Kissinger moved this suspicion a shade nearer to actualization in his own more candid comment, which was offered while he was still on Indonesian soil and 'told newsmen in Jakarta that the United States would not recognize the FRETILIN-declared republic and that "the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question."""¹¹⁸ Thus does Hitchens accuse Kissinger of "[t]he incitement and enabling of genocide in East Timor."¹¹⁹

Facts:

In 1975 Portuguese Timor (now the independent state of East Timor) was a devolving colony of ambiguous legal status. Attempts to broker a political solution for its autonomy had collapsed when the leftist FRETILIN faction boycotted the negotiations in Macao.¹²⁰

The Ford administration's policy was not to court involvement in what appeared to be a decolonization issue involving only Portugal, Indonesia, and the competing Timorese political parties.¹²¹

Nonintervention remained the American policy during the Carter Administration. It was during this period that the bulk of the Timorese casualties to which Hitchens refers occurred.

2. Assertion:

"In his furious meeting at the State Department on 18 December 1975, shortly after his moment of complicity with the Indonesian generals over East Timor (see pages 101-106), Kissinger makes the following peculiar disavowal:

'I don't care if we sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it, I get no rakeoff.'

One might have taken it for granted that a serving secretary of state had no direct interest in the sale of weapons to a foreign dictatorship; nobody at the meeting had suggested any such thing. How peculiar that Kissinger should deny an allegation that had not been made: answer a question that had not been asked."¹²²

Facts:

This interpretation is unwarranted. Kissinger was making a sarcastic joke in a staff meeting - not issuing a "disavowal" of an imagined "allegation" concerning official corruption.

¹¹⁸ Hitchens, pp 91-92.

¹¹⁹ Hitchens, x, "Proper Bill of Indictment."

¹²⁰ Cf. Kriege (ed.), *East Timor and the International Community: A Documentary Collection*.

¹²¹ Cf. "Appended Documents" on Portuguese Timor.

¹²² Hitchens, p 120.

34

3. Assertion:

"But the following year, in March 1991, Kissinger was back in Indonesia with [business partner James] Moffett, closing a deal for a thirty-year license to continue exploiting a giant gold and copper mine. The mine is of prime importance for three reasons. First, it was operated as part of a joint venture with the Indonesian military government, and with that government's leader, the now-deposed General Suharto. Second, it is located on the island of Irian Jaya (in an area formerly known as West Irian): a part of the archipelago which - in common with East Timor - is only Indonesian by right of arbitrary conquest. Third, its operations commenced in 1973 - two years before Henry Kissinger visited Indonesia and helped unleash [sic] the Indonesian bloodbath in East Timor while unlocking [sic] a flow of weaponry to his future business partners.

"This could mean no more than the 'harmony of interest' I suggested above. No more, in other words, than a happy coincidence."

Facts:

It is unclear what "war crime" or "crime against humanity" is implied by the
observation that Kissinger now serves on the board of a company operating a mine in the
same region of the world as East Timor, and which began operations "two years before
Henry Kissinger visited Indonesia" in an official capacity.

4. Assertion:

"The 'local inhabitants' who came last on that list are the Amungme people, whose protests at the environmental rape [sic], and at working conditions in the mine, were met by Indonesian regular soldiers at the service of [mining company] Freeport McMoRan, and under the orders of Suharto. In March 1996, large-scale rioting nearly closed the mine at a cost of four deaths and many injuries."

Facts:

There is no international legal significance to the fact that Kissinger serves on the
board of a company that has been accused by a local tribe of "environmental rape."
Similarly, the notion that Kissinger is guilty of "crimes against humanity" because "large-
scale rioting" at one of Freeport McMoRan's mines caused "four deaths and many injuries"
is unprecedented.

35

Select Bibliography

Memoirs and General Histories

1. Bundy, William. *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency*. New York: Hill & Wang, 1998.

2. Chennault, Anna. *The Education of Anna*. New York: Times Books, 1980.

3. Clifford, Clark (with Richard Holbrooke). *Counsel to the President*. New York: Random House, 1991.

4. Dobrynin, Anatoly. *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents*. New York: Times Books, 1995.

5. Haldeman, H.R. *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House*. New York: Putnam, 1994.

6. Hersh, Seymour. *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*. New York: Summit Books, 1983.

7. Hitchens, Christopher. *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*. New York: Verso/New Left Books, 2000.

8. Johnson, Lyndon B. *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.

9. Isaacson, Walter. *Kissinger: A Biography*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

10. Kissinger, Henry A. *Years of Renewal*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

11. Kissinger, Henry A. *Years of Upheaval*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982.

12. Kissinger, Henry A. *White House Years*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.

13. Morris, Roger. *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

14. Moynihan, Daniel Patrick. *A Dangerous Place*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975.

15. Nixon, Richard. RN: *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1975.

16. Summers, Anthony. *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon*. New York: Viking Penguin, 2000.

17. Witcover, Jules. *The Year the Dream Died: Revisiting 1968 in America*. New York: 1997, Warner Books.

Chile

18. Kornbluh, Peter. *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. Washington, D.C.: New Press, 2003.

19. Sigmund, Paul E. *The United States and Democracy in Chile*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

China

20. Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

21. Dreyer, June Teufel. *China's Political System*. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2000.

22. Han Suyin. *Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.

36

Cyprus

23. Bunge, Frederica M., et al. *Cyprus: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C., America University Foreign Area Studies, 1980.

East Timor

24. Hainsworth, Paul, et al. *The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.

25. Krieger, Heike. *East Timor and the International Community*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

26. Marker, Jamsheed. *East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Independence*. New York: McFarland & Company, 2003.

India, Pakistan & Bangladesh

27. Choudhury, G.W. *The Last Days of United Pakistan*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974.

28. Choudhury, G.W. *India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and the Major Powers*. New York: MacMillan/Free Press, 1975.

29. Jones, Owen Bennett. *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

30. Kissinger, Henry A. "The Visit to Bangladesh, October 30-31: Remarks by Secretary Kissinger." *Department of State Bulletin*. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 1974.

31. Sisson and Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

32. Talbot, Ian. *Pakistan: A Modern History*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

33. Zaheer, Hasan. *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

34. Ziring, Lawrence. *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Indochina & the Paris Negotiations (incl. the Korean War precedent)

35. Asselin, Pierre. *A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.

36. Berman, Larry. *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

37. Diem, Bui (with David Chanoff). *In the Jaws of History*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987.

38. Gardner, Lloyd C. *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995.

39. Herz, Martin. *The Prestige Press and the Christmas Bombing: Images and Reality in Vietnam*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980.

40. Kaplan, Morton et al. *Vietnam Settlement: Why 1973, Not 1969?*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Rational Debate Series, 1973.

41. Kimball, Jeffrey. *Nixon's Vietnam War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998.

42. Kissinger, Henry A. "The Viet Nam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, December 1968.

43. Kissinger, Henry A. *Ending the Vietnam War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

44. Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

37

45. Mann, Robert. *A Grand Delusion: America's Descent Into Vietnam*. New York: Basic Books, 2001.

46. Michel, Marshall L., III. *The 11 Days of Christmas: America's Last Vietnam Battle*. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002.

47. *New York Times* editorial staff. "A Chronology of the *Mayaguez* Episode." May 16, 1975.

48. Prados, John. *The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999.

49. Sorley, Lewis. *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam*. New York: Harcourt, 1999.

50. Staats, Elmer B. "The Seizure of the *Mayaguez* - A Case Study of Crisis Management," Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, May 11, 1976. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1976.

51. Stueck, William. *The Korean War: An International History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

52. Taylor, Telford. *Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy*. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1970.

53. Tin, Bui. *Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a North Vietnamese Colonel*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995.

54. Tucker, Spencer C., et al., *Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History*. 3 Volumes. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2000.

55. Tucker, Spencer C., et al., *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History*. 3 Volumes. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1998.

56. Wetterhahn, Ralph. *The Last Battle: The Mayaguez Incident and the End of the Vietnam War*. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2001.

38

## Appended Documents

### I HAVE INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

1. Map: The Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos.

2. Map: North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, circa 1973.

3. "A Chronology of the *Mayaguez* Episode," *New York Times*, 16 May 1975.

4. "Taylor Says by Yamashita Ruling Westmoreland May Be Guilty," *New York Times*, 9 January 1971.

5. Jonathan Bush, May 2001 letter to *Harper's Magazine* in response to Christopher Hitchens, "The Trial of Henry Kissinger" (*Harper's*, February & March 2001).

6. Selected correspondence from the Washington-Islamabad-Beijing diplomatic channel, 1970-1971:

a. Kissinger to Nixon, December 1970 memorandum re: "Chinese Communist Initiative." Includes "Tab B - Message from Chou En-Lai."

b. "Message from Premier Chou En Lai dated April 21, 1971."

c. "Extract of MEMCON dated May 5, 1971." Includes text of Nixon's April 28th letter to Yahya Khan.

d. Nixon, May 10 response to Chou En Lai.

e. Yahya Khan handwritten note conveying "Message from Premier Chou en [sic] Lai to President Nixon, May 29, 1971."

7. "MemCon" of Senior Review Group meeting with Nixon, August 11, 1971. Subject: East Pakistan/Bangladesh crisis.

### I AM IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING:

8. [NSC meeting in which HK asks, "Can we go to Yahya as a friend?"]

9. [Boyatt's postmortem on the Cyprus coup, including his notes about conflicting intelligence reports.]

10. [Several documents from the Cambridge University volume *East Timor and the International Community*. These show the ambiguous legal status of Portuguese Timor, as well as the FRETILIN boycott of the Macao talks.]

11. [A few documents from Peter Kornbluh' volume *The Pinochet File*. Kornbluh is pro-Allende, and does his best to spin the documents and their historical context. But, as Rogers pointed out to me, a close reading of Kornbluh's documents actually disproves Hitchens' allegations.]

39

(LC)

LETTERS

HARPER'S
MAGAZINE

Editor

LEWIS H. LAPHAM

Managing Editor

ELLEN ROSENBUSH

Literary Editor

BEN METCALF

Senior Editors

CHARIS CONN, ROGER D. HODGE,
CLARA JEFFERY

Art Director

ANGELA RIECHERS

Associate Editors

MARGARET CORDI, ELIZABETH GIDDENS,
JOHN JEREMIAH SULLIVAN

Assistant Editors

MARY J. LAMOTTE, RACHEL A. MONAHAN,
BILL WASIK

Assistant Art Director

STACEY D. CLARKSON

Assistant to the Editor

ANN KYLE GOLLIN

Editorial Interns

NAOMI KIRSTEN, JAN LAQUE,
JENNIFER MAYER, SYLVIA SELLERS-GARCIA

Art Intern

NEIL JAMIESON

Contributing Editors

SCOTT ANDERSON, CHARLES BOWDEN,
L. J. DAVIS, EDWIN DOBB, MARK EDMUNDSON,
BARBARA EHRENREICH, TED C. FISHMAN,
DAVID GUTERSON, TONY HENDRA, JACK HITT,
MARK KINGWELL, BARRY LOPEZ,
PETER MARIN, VINCE PASSARO, GEORGE PLIMPTON,
MICHAEL POLLAN, FRANCINE PROSE,
PAUL ROBERTS, RICHARD RODRIGUEZ,
ELIZABETH RUBIN, DAVID SAMUELS,
BOB SHACOCHIS, EARL SHORRIS, KEN SILVERSTEIN,
MARK SLOUKA, PATRICK SYMMES, PAUL TOUGH,
DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, TOM WOLFE

JOHN R. MACARTHUR, President and Publisher

Vice President and Associate Publisher
PETER D. KENDALL

Vice President and General Manager
LYNN CARLSON

Circulation Director
SHAWN D. GREEN

Assistant to the Publisher/Rights and Reprints
DIANE KRAFT

KIM LAU, Senior Accountant

JANELLE R. SARCH, Office Manager

ANGLIQUE BUFFALO, MATTHEW SALAMONE, Staff

ELLEN RYDER, Public Relations Consultant
(212) 226-6563; FAX: (212) 274-8417

Public Relations and Special Events Coordinator
KIM DENNISON
(212) 614-6500; FAX: (212) 260-1096

ADVERTISING SALES:
(212) 614-6500; FAX: (212) 260-9207

New York Manager
CHARLES J. JOHNSMEYER

New England Account Manager
JOHN P. KILCULLEN

JENNIFER E. TADAKI, Production Manager

LORI WAGNER, Advertising Coordinator,
Classified Sales Manager
Sales Representatives

Detroit: MAJORANA & PARTNERS, LTD.,
(248) 546-2222; FAX: (248) 546-0019

San Francisco: DEMOUTH ASSOCIATES, LTD.,
(510) 339-2281; FAX: (510) 339-2283

Regarding Henry

In attempting to construct an argu-
ment for trying Henry Kissinger as a
war criminal ["The Case Against Hen-
ry Kissinger," February, March],
Christopher Hitchens writes that the
President's National Bipartisan Com-
mission on Central America was
"staffed by Oliver North and [that it]
whitewashed death-squad activity on
the isthmus." I served on the Kissinger
Commission and can report that al-
though its staff was large and competent
it did not include Oliver North. He
simply coordinated security trips we
made to Central America. He had
nothing to do with the commission's
work or its report. This is a compara-
tively minor howler.

Hitchens's remark about the death squads, however, shows that he has not read the commission's report. This document repeatedly condemns death squads in Central America, characterizing them as "designed to terrorize opponents, fight democracy, protect entrenched interests, and restore reactionary regimes. Whatever their aims, these methods are totally repugnant to the values of the United States."

The report characterized the securi-
ty forces in Guatemala thus: "In the
cities they have murdered those even
suspected of dissent. In the countr-
side, they have at times killed indis-
criminately to repress any sign of sup-
port for the guerrillas. Such actions are

Harper's Magazine welcomes reader response. Please address mail to Letters, Harper's Magazine, 666 Broadway, New York, NY, 10012, or email us at letters@harpers.org. Short letters are more likely to be published, and all letters are subject to editing. Volume precludes individual acknowledgment.

morally unacceptable.” And again: “the
United States cannot countenance the
brutal alternative methods of counter-
insurgency which wreak intolerable vi-
olence upon the civilian population.”

Given Hitchens's preposterous claim that the commission "whitewashed" the death squads, who can put any credence in anything he says? One is reminded of the title he gave one of his books: *No One Left to Lie To*.

By Hitchens's bizarre definition of
"war criminal," Kissinger would have
distinguished company on the dock:
Churchill, Truman, Carter, and Bush,
along with any other national leader
who has made responsible use of ad-
ministrative authority.

John Silber
Chancellor, Boston University
Boston

Christopher Hitchens's originality and his use of evidence and international law are open to debate. But his reliance on the late General Telford Taylor's writings to argue that criminal heads of state must be tried, and that aerial bombardment constitutes a triable offense, is in error. As his biographer, my impression is that Taylor, though a passionate Vietnam dove, had too nuanced and forthright a view of international law to provide the ammunition Hitchens needs.

True, Taylor did say that Generals Westmoreland and Abrams, and even Presidents Johnson and Nixon, might be guilty of war crimes based on the Yamashita decision (in which the Supreme Court let stand a military conviction of a Japanese commander for atrocities in the Philippines that he neither ordered nor condoned nor knew

4 HARPER'S MAGAZINE / MAY 2001

of). But, like most civil libertarians, Taylor also thought that Yamashita was a procedural disgrace. He argued that the law was more accurately stated in Nuremberg's "Hostage Case" (U.S. v. List), which held commanders responsible for war crimes only when they "knew or should have known" of the atrocities, a more restrictive standard.

Similarly, Taylor wrote repeatedly against the aerial bombing campaigns over both North and South Vietnam. But he knew that, except where it was demonstrably unnecessary, indiscriminate, and disproportionate, strategic bombing had not been criminal during World War II and that international law in this area had not evolved in the intervening twenty years. Taylor's view of bombing is illustrated in his December 1972 trip to Hanoi with Joan Baez and others who opposed the war. The delegation not only saw devastation but was itself bombed—Nixon's Christmas surprise. Taylor, nonetheless, told the press and his North Vietnamese hosts that the bombing was cruel, destructive, but not a violation of the laws of war. (The clear violation, he added, was North Vietnam's failure to evacuate American POWs to shelter as soon as bombing began.)

Taylor opposed stretching the rhetoric of international law to challenge even dreadful policy, as Hitchens could have discovered. In misconstruing Taylor's arguments, what Hitchens has managed to do is convince this long-time opponent of Nixon and Kissinger's foreign-policy disasters that even Kissinger deserves better than to be tried before the kind of international tribunal recently endorsed by the contrite Robert McNamara.

Jonathan A. Bush
Center for Scholars and Writers
New York Public Library
New York City

Christopher Hitchens responds:

I accept John Silber's inanely niggling correction: Oliver North was "security," not "staff." I seem to remember the whole Reagan-Bush Administration experiencing a similar confusion as to whether the lieutenant colonel worked in the White House basement or the Oval Office.

Much of that confusion was of

WRITE
WHERE
THINGS
ARE
HAPPENING

ANTIOCH
UNIVERSITY

LOS ANGELES

13274 Fiji Way
Marina del Rey, CA 90292
(310) 578-1090
1-800-7-ANTIOCH
admissions@antiochla.edu

Antioch University Los Angeles offers a unique low-residency MFA in Creative Writing Program with single and dual concentrations in Poetry, Fiction and Creative Nonfiction.

Award-winning faculty include JoAnn Beard, Karen Bender, Wendy Bishop, Leonard Chang, Jill Ciment, Bernard Cooper, Hope Edelman, Ruth Forman, Frank X. Gaspar, Amy Gerstler, Eloise Klein Healy, Tara Ison, Jim Krusoe, Peter Levitt, Paul Lisicky, Sharman Russell, Darrell Spencer and Alma Luz Villanueva.

Recent guest artists include Paula Gunn Allen, Dorothy Allison, Charles Baxter, Aimee Bender, Amy Bloom, Robert Creeley, Mark Doty, Janet Fitch, Albert Goldbarth, Donald Hall, Maxine Hong Kingston, Robert Pinsky, Scott Russell Sanders, Mark Strand and Jean Thompson.

This two-year program combines the best of classroom learning with creative on-line conferencing and discussion. Students attend two 10-day intensive residencies each year and participate in ongoing, individualized mentoring and stimulating collegial discussion with other student writers via the Internet.

Visit our website: www.antiochla.edu

It makes radio sound "simply amazing."
Imagine what it can do for your CDs.

The remarkable Bose® Wave® radio/CD. When the Bose Wave radio was introduced it woke up an entire industry, delivering breakthrough sound the critics at Radio World called "simply amazing." How could we top that? The answer: combine the Wave radio's revolutionary acoustic waveguide speaker technology with a CD player, all while adding only ¼ inch to the radio's size. The result is a countertop marvel that brings out the full clarity and richness of your CDs, and you can still tune in great radio. Buy direct from Bose, the most respected name in sound. Our installment billing plan lets you make **twelve interest-free monthly payments of just $41.58** for the Wave radio/CD. The Wave radio is available for twelve monthly payments of $29.08*. Your satisfaction is guaranteed. In fact, we believe once you hear the simply amazing sound, parting with it will seem unimaginable.

Call 1-800-764-2073, ext. T6700.

For information on all our products: www.bose.com/t6700

Please specify your color choice when ordering. Wave radio/CD: ☐ Platinum White or ☐ Graphite Gray
Wave radio: ☐ Platinum White or ☐ Graphite Gray

<table><tr><td>Mr./Mrs./Ms.</td><td>( )</td><td>( )</td></tr><tr><td>Name</td><td>(Please Print)</td><td>Daytime Telephone</td><td>Evening Telephone</td></tr><tr><td colspan="4">Address</td></tr><tr><td>City</td><td>State</td><td>Zip</td><td>BOSE<br>Better sound through research®</td></tr></table>

Bose Corporation, Dept. CDD-T6700, The Mountain, Framingham, MA 01701-9168.

©2001 Bose Corporation. Patent rights issued and/or pending. The Wave radio design is also a registered trademark of Bose Corporation. Quote: Frank Beacham, Radio World, 12/8/93. *Installment payment plan not to be combined with any other offer or applied to previous purchases, and available on credit card orders only.

First payment to include shipping, handling and applicable sales tax. Price and/or payment plan subject to change without notice.

LETTERS 5

course feigned for purposes of obfus-
cation, and the rest of Silber's letter
shows the petty skills he learned in
that very school. But he cannot ex-
pect us to forget that:

1) Henry Kissinger announced in
advance that his commission's objec-
tive was "to take Central America out
of politics."

2) The mild and formal rhetoric on death squads in the report was accompanied by lavish praise for General Ríos Montt's appalling regime in Guatemala and by requests for hugely increased military aid to the armed forces of El Salvador, whose leaders were also the named conveners of the death squads.

3) The report contains a dissenting end note, signed by Henry Kissinger and John Silber, objecting to the main report on the grounds that even its equivocal words on "conditioning" U.S. aid to a reduction in state-sponsored murder are too likely to be interpreted as soft on Communism!

Silber may have forgotten his own
role in this, not to speak of his role in
"certifying" a grotesque election in
Guatemala in 1985 as "free and fair,"
or of his effort to purge his own uni-
versity of its scholarly dissidents. But
others have not acquired the neces-
sary amnesia, or the readiness to think
of history as bunk. Only a hysterical
"bunkist" could conceivably bracket
the name of Churchill, or even Bush,
with that of Kissinger. What assassi-
nation orders, issued by these men, is
Silber thinking of? Which secret car-
pet-bombings? Which military coups
in neighboring democracies? Silber is liv-
ing proof that our system of higher ed-
ucation is indeed failing us badly.

I'm naturally sorry to have depressed
Jonathan Bush, but I would urge him to
bear in mind that Telford Taylor wrote
his splendid book before the bombing
of Cambodia was revealed. As for Gen-
eral Yamashita, it has been persuasively
argued that he himself did not receive
a fair trial. This, however, is not the
same as to say that the standards by
which he was judged were not the right
standards. Nor is it the same as to say
that the United States did not agree, as
it did, to be bound by those same rules.
That was my point in the first place.

Correction

“The Case Against Henry Kissinger,

Part I" incorrectly states that the Unit-
ed States dropped a 15,000-ton bomb
on Koh Tang Island in Cambodia. The
bomb, a BLU-82, weighed 15,000
pounds. We regret the error.

Banana Republicans

In his recent Notebook [“Civics Les-
son,” February], Lewis Lapham mar-
vels, as I did, at the extreme rhetoric
of Republican partisans during the re-
cent electoral farce and wonders where
they got their sense of entitlement,
that “certain knowledge of their own
virtue.” Lapham makes a strong case for
transcendent ideological zeal, but there
may be a simpler explanation. Under
our capitalist system one condition—
payment for goods and services—
makes people absolutely certain
something belongs to them. The Re-
publicans *knew* Florida was rightfully
theirs for the unassailable reason that
they had already paid for it.

Tom Faulkner

Royal Oak, Mich.

Floral Derangement

We at the Society of American Florists (SAF)—representing more than 15,000 growers, wholesalers, importers, and retailers of flowers and plants—read with disappointment the Annotation on the global flower trade [“Fleurs du Mal,” Niala Maharaj and Donovan Hohn, February]. It includes several inaccuracies, particularly about flowers imported from Colombia.

Despite the article's claims to the
contrary, people who work on flower
farms in Colombia benefit from stable
jobs, above-average pay, and extend-
ed benefits, according to the Interna-
tional Labour Organization. Workers
earn one and a half times the mini-
mum-wage requirements and receive
such benefits as medical and dental as-
sistance, pensions, child care, and
transportation services.

Additionally, Colombia has clear
and stringent legislation on agro-
chemical products and has made enor-
mous efforts to promote safe practices
in the handling and application of pes-
ticides. Only those products registered
with the Colombian Agricultural In-
stitute and licensed by the Ministry of
Health may be applied, and only those

registered for use in the United States
are authorized in Colombia. In addi-
tion, extensive training and protective
gear are provided to all personnel in-
volved in applying pesticides.

National entities such as the
Colombian Social Security Institute
and the National Institute of Health
have conducted investigations re-
garding occupational health. One re-
cent study by the NIH shows that the
frequency of health problems among
flower workers who handle pesticides
is no higher than among those work-
ers who are not exposed. The Colom-
bian floriculture community continues
to be an active participant in programs
oriented toward improving the health
of workers and decreasing occupa-
tional risks.

Furthermore, Colombian flower
growers participate in an aggressive
social and environmental program
called Florverde. Using environmental
audits, codes of conduct, and counsel-
ing, Florverde has brought immense
improvement to pest and disease con-
trol, human management, and rational
soil and water utilization.

Peter Moran

CEO

Society of American Florists

Alexandria, Va.

My experience, as Dole's global di-
rector of environmental affairs, sug-
gests that the Colombian flower in-
dustry's environmental practices are
quite different from those Maharaj
and Hohn describe. Although I can't
speak for the industry as a whole, the
workers I see on Dole farms are
equipped with proper protective gear
and are trained in environmental
awareness, prevention of pollution,
and general safe practices. Much care
is taken in the greenhouses to mini-
mize the use of crop-protection prod-
ucts, and the conservation of water
and the management of soil and or-
ganic waste is exemplary.

As a reflection of their environ-
mental ethic, twenty of Dole's farms
in Colombia and Ecuador were recently
certified to the International Organi-
zation for Standardization's environ-
mental-management standard, ISO

*Continued on page 80*

6 HARPER'S MAGAZINE / MAY 2001

Sino-American Rapprochement and the Cold War,
1969-1972:
Declassified U.S. Documents

Part I

Compiled for the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW)
Conference on the Sino-American Opening and the Cold War,
8-9 February 2002
Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University

Edited by William Burr, the National Security Archive,
with the assistance of James G. Hershberg, History Department, and
Marina N. Barnett, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies,
George Washington University

With support from the Henry Luce Foundation and in cooperation with the
Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive

The Secret Trip:

Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, July 1971

Source: Still Pictures Division, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

By NARA Date 01/03/62

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Chinese Communist Initiative

At Tab B is the text of the exchange which President Yahya had with
Prime Minister Chou En-Lai and President Yahya's comments on the
Chinese reply. Chou En-Lai made the point that the Chinese reply
represented the coordinated position of Chairman Mao, Vice Chairman
Lin Piao and himself.

At Tab A is a draft Note Verbale which would respond to the ChiCom
communication and:

-- states U. S. pleasure at Peking's offer proffered at the
February 20 Warsaw meeting to receive a U. S. representative to discuss
outstanding issues between our two Governments;

-- welcomes high level discussions seeking the improvement
of relations between our two countries; and

-- proposes a meeting of our respective representatives at
the earliest possible moment to discuss the modalities of a higher level
meeting.

Attachments

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Authority E.D. 12958

By NRB NARA Date 01/02/62

Dear Mr. Premier:

The U.S. representative at the meeting between our two sides in Warsaw on January 20, 1970, suggested that direct discussions be held either in Peking or Washington on the broad range of issues which lie between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., including the issue of Taiwan. This proposal was an outgrowth of the consistent policy of the United States Government to seek opportunities for negotiating the settlement of outstanding issues between us. The United States was welcomed into the discussions at the People's Republic of China, therefore greatly pleased when your representative at the Warsaw meeting in China expressed his willingness of your government to receive in Peking a U.S. representative of Ministerial rank or a special Presidential envoy.

In the light of your remarks to General-Yahya, as well as the continuing United States interest in U.S.-China discussions at a higher level, the United States Government believes it would be useful to begin discussions with a view of bringing about a higher-level meeting in Peking. The meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions between our two countries. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, you should know that the policy of the United States Government is to reduce progressively its military presence in the region of East Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.

Authority C. O. 1 A. T. JO

By MB NARA Date 01/03/62

The United States therefore proposes that representatives of our
two sides meet together at the earliest possible moment, either in
Government's convenient to both sides,
Rawalpindi or in some other convenient location, to discuss the modalities
of the higher-level meeting. These modalities would include the size of
our delegation, the duration of the meeting, the agenda and a clear
understanding on the status and amenities which the U.S. delegation would
the People's Republic of
enjoy while in China.

Authority E.D. 12958

By MB NARA Date 01/03/62

Ambassador Hilaly dictated the following in Mr. Kissinger's office at
6:05 pm, December 9:

The message was duly conveyed and Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's
reply given after three days of deliberations was as follows:

"This (meaning the reply) is not from me alone but from Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin Piao as well. We thank the President of Pakistan for conveying to us orally a message from President Nixon. China has always been willing and has always tried to negotiate by peaceful means. Taiwan and the Straits of Taiwan are an inalienable part of China which have now been occupied by foreign troops of the United States for the last fifteen years. Negotiations and talks have been going on with no results whatsoever. In order to discuss this subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking."

Chou En-Lai said, in the course of the conversation:

"We have had messages from the United States from different sources in the past but this is the first time that the proposal has come from a Head, through a Head, to a Head. The United States knows that Pakistan is a great friend of China and therefore we attach importance to the message."

President Yahya's comments:

"I think it is significant that Chou En-Lai did not accept or reject the proposal as soon as it was made and that he consulted Mao and Lin Piao before giving the answer. This in itself reflects a trend which holds out some possibility. Further, at no stage during the discussion with the Chinese leaders did they indulge in vehement criticism of the United States. The banquet speech of Vice Chairman Tung Pi-Wu also made no reference to the United States by name. These are additional indications of modification of the Chinese approach in their relations with the United States."

Authority E.D. 12958

By MR NARA Date 04/05/71

Message from Premier Chou En Lai dated April 21, 1971 (Delivered to Mr. Kissinger - 6:15 P. M., April 27, 1971)

Premier Chou En Lai thanked President Yahya for conveying the message of President Nixon on 5 January 1971. Premier Chou En Lai is very grateful to President Yahya and he will be grateful if President Yahya conveys the following verbatim to President Nixon:

"Owning to the situation of the time it has not been possible to reply earlier to the message from the President of the U.S.A. to the Premier of Peoples Republic of China.

"At present contacts between the peoples of China and the United States are being renewed. However, as the relations between China and the U.S.A. are to be restored fundamentally, a solution to this crucial question can be found only through direct discussions between high-level responsible persons of the two countries. Therefore, the Chinese Government reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the U.S. (for instance, Mr. Kissinger) or the U.S. Secretary of State or even the President of the U.S. himself for direct meeting and discussions. Of course, if the U.S. President considers that the time is not yet right the matter may be deferred to a later date.
As for the modalities, procedure and other details of the high-level meeting and discussions in Peking, as they are of no substantive significance, it

Authority E.O. 12958

By WDP NARA Date 1/4/02

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Ambassador Hilaly called today asking that the following information be passed to the President:

The message which Dr. Kissinger gave him on April 28 was transmitted directly to President Yahya that same evening. President Yahya has cabled Hilaly confirming that Yahya personally conveyed the message to the Ambassador of Communist China on Saturday morning, May 1. It most probably reached Chou-en-lai the same day or the following day.

Ambassador Hilaly said that what he had told President Yahya on behalf of President Nixon on the basis of Dr. Kissinger's talk with him was as follows:

The President asked that the following message be passed to President Yahya:

Ambassador Hilaly noted further that Dr. Kissinger asked him to convey the following to Chou-en-lai stated as President Yahya's personal views:

> I feel that President Nixon is very anxious to handle these negotiations entirely by himself and not to let any politician come into the picture until a government-to-government channel is established. My Ambassador in Washington thinks this is because President Nixon will find it more difficult to move quickly in the matter if American politicians come into it. Therefore, it would be best until President Nixon's reply is received and an American envoy is designated for these discussions if the Chinese government would not discuss the matter with any American politician. This does not mean that there is any objection to continuation of the People-to-People program. In fact, Ambassador Hilaly thinks that President Nixon would be very happy if every other kind of American visitor is encouraged to visit China--students, reporters, scholars, etc.--so this is a temporary thing until the official link is established.

Ambassador Hilaly said that he received a telegram from President Yahya saying that the above was conveyed as suggested.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Authority E.D. 12458

By MR.

NARA Date of Issue 04/04/71

President Nixon has carefully studied the message of April 21, 1971, from Premier Chou En-Lai conveyed through the courtesy of President Yahya Khan. President Nixon agrees that direct high-level negotiations are necessary to resolve the issues dividing the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Because of the importance he attaches to normalizing relations between our two countries, President Nixon is prepared to accept the suggestion of Premier Chou En-Lai that he visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. At such a meeting each side would be free to raise the issue of principal concern to it.

In order to prepare the visit by President Nixon and to establish reliable contact with the leaders of the Chinese People's Republic, President Nixon proposes a preliminary secret meeting between his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai or another appropriate high-level Chinese official. Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to attend such a meeting on Chinese soil preferably at some location within convenient flying distance from Pakistan to be suggested by the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger would be authorized to discuss the circumstances which would make a visit by President Nixon most useful, the agenda of such a meeting, the time of such a visit and to begin a preliminary exchange of views on all subjects of mutual interest. If it should be thought desirable that a special emissary come to Peking publically between the secret visit to the People's Republic of China of

Authority E.D. 12958

By MB NARA Date 6/10/66

- 2 -

Dr. Kissinger and the arrival of President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger will be authorized to arrange it. It is anticipated that the visit of President Nixon to Peking could be announced within a short time of the secret meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-Lai. Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to come from June 15 onward.

It is proposed that the precise details of Dr. Kissinger's trip including location, duration of stay, communication and similar matters be discussed through the good offices of President Yahya Khan. For secrecy, it is essential that no other channel be used. It is also understood that this first meeting between Dr. Kissinger and high officials of the People's Republic of China be strictly secret.

SECRET / NODIS

August 11, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Henry F. Kissinger, Assistant to the President

John Irwin, Under Secretary of State

Thomas Moorer, Chairman, JCS

Robert Cushman, Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence

Maurice Williams, Deputy Administrator, AID

Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State

Armistead Seldon, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense, ISA

Harold H. Saunders, NSC Staff

DATE AND PLACE:

3:15 - 3:40 p.m. Wednesday, August 11, 1971,

in the President's Old Executive Office

Building Office

At the opening of a scheduled Senior Review Group meeting on Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger said that the President would like to see the principal members of the ERG in his office to talk about Pakistan.

Then the group had moved from the Situation Room to the President's office, the *President* began by saying that he had had a chance in San Clemente to discuss the South Asian situation with Admiral Moorer, Mr. Helms and, of course, he had been in continuing touch with Secretary Rogers. But he had not had a chance to talk with other members of this group.

The President said that he felt it was important that he state his views on just how the emphasis must be played in the South Asian situation. It is "imperative" to play it this way, he said. He then spoke along the following lines:

First, we must look at this situation above all in terms of US interests. The interests of the US would be 'very much jeopardized by any development that could break into open conflict. We will have to do anything--anything--to avoid war.' We will do 'anything--all we can--to restrain' those who want to be involved in a war.

SECRET / NODIS

SECRET NODIS

- 2 -

On the public relations side, the media no longer have a great deal to write about on Vietnam. The big story is Pakistan. The political people--Democrat and Republican--are "raising hell" about this issue. "And they should from the standpoint of human suffering."

While there are great differences between the situation in South Asia and that in 1969 in Nigeria, the US in connection with Biafra stayed out of the political side of the problem. We are deeply concerned about the suffering in East Pakistan and about the refugees in India. We must increase our effort on that front. We have already done a lot, but we must think of the "most massive" program possible in terms of our budget. And we must encourage other international support.

Dr. Kissinger interjected that there are two aspects to the humanitarian problem. First, there is the problem of potential famine in East Pakistan. Maury Williams is working on our programs to avert that. Second, there is the problem of the refugees that already exist in the Indian refugee camps.

The President continued:

Whether we help in a bilateral or an international framework, we must do the most that can possibly be done. Indian Ambassador Jha had been in a month or so ago. The Ambassador was "bullyragging me" about the great statements the French and British had made with regard to the Pakistani situation. He had told the Ambassador not to talk about what they had said but to look at what they had done. The US has contributed more to refugee relief than all the rest of them combined in terms of simply aiding the refugees in India.

We have to press other European countries to contribute. We are "not going to get very much" but we should "make a little issue of it." Em- barrassing them a little bit will make it easier for us to dramatize how much we have actually done.

He doubted that this problem would generate a great deal of enthusiasm in the US. It would not generate as much response as the catastrophe in Chile had. Still we must "go all out--all out--on the relief side."

Turning to the political part of the problem, he could not emphasize his position too strongly. India's interest, some Indians think, would be served by war. Some Pakistanis would be willing to have a war. "The USSR--I don't know what they want." The interests of the US would not be served by a war. The new China relationship would be

SECRET NODIS

SECRET NODIS

- 3 -

imperiled, probably beyond repair, and we would have a "very
sticky problem" with the USSR.

"Now let me be very blunt." He had been going to India since 1953. Every Ambassador who goes to India falls in love with India. Some have the same experience in Pakistan--though not as many because the Pakistanis are a different breed. The Pakistanis are straightforward--and sometimes extremely stupid. The Indians are more devious, sometimes so smart that we fall for their line.

He "holds no brief" for what President Yahya has done. The US "must not--cannot--allow" India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. The President said with a great deal of emphasis that he is "convinced" that that is what India wants to do. That is what he might want to do if he were in New Delhi.

Now, as far as the US is concerned, the US has to use its influence in the other direction. The USSR has "this little deal" with India. [Reference to USSR-India Friendship Treaty signed August 9.] Some think that the Russians want to punish the Pakistanis for their relationship with China. In his view, the Russians are looking at this situation as they looked at the Middle East before the June war in 1967. The danger is that they may unleash forces there which no one can control.

The problem is that if the Indians "romp around in East Pakistan" or send guerrillas, the Pakistanis may well go to war even though they feel that would be suicidal.

Returning to his basic point, he said to Mr. Sisco and Mr. Irwin that we "have to cool off the pro-Indians in the State Department and out in South Asia." We want to help India but we will not be parties to their objective [of breaking up Pakistan]. "If there is a war, I will go on national television and ask Congress to cut off all aid to India. They won't get a dime."

We have to keep some leverage in Pakistan. Our concerns must be communicated to the Pakistanis through Ambassador Farland. If we go along with the Congress and cut off all assistance to Pakistan, then we will lose what influence we have on the humanitarian problem.

SECRET NODIS

SECRET NODIS

- 6 -

The President assented, agreeing that Mr. Williams could give Yahya an opportunity to "do something political in the name of humanitarian relief."

Dr. Kissinger illustrated by recalling that Mr. Williams had earlier made the point that the army had never had a big civil function in Pakistan. Now that a substantial civil effort in food distribution is necessary, one could argue that the restoration of civil administration is essential to food distribution. The emphasis could be put on restoration of civil administration by talking in terms of food distribution, yet in the knowledge that the restoration of civil administration would also have political implications.

Mr. Williams agreed that that might be a good entering wedge.

The President, returning an earlier theme, said that the other side of the coin is that Mr. Irwin and Mr. Sisco should "tell your people that it isn't going to help for them publicly to take a stand on the political issue. Our people have got to stay neutral on the question of political accommodation in public." Privately, we can tell President Yahya that he should not shoot Mujib.

Mr. Irwin summarized Mr. Sisco's presentation by making the point that the degree to which we can get Yahya to move toward a political accommodation will increase the ease of moving toward a successful relief program. He noted that we could move behind the scenes in doing this.

The President asked Dr. Kissinger whether he had found "any give in Yahya."

Dr. Kissinger replied that he felt that Yahya would listen if we could put our suggestions in the form of suggestions on a refugee program. The issue is whether we are going to use relief to squeeze Yahya to set political conditions or whether we are going to use relief to deprive the Indians of an excuse to attack.

The President said that we do not care "who runs the place out there." We can't answer that problem.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 989505
By NWP NARA Date 8/8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

THE SECRETARY'S PRINCIPAL'S AND REGIONAL STAFF MEETING,
TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1975

pp 2 - 5 Reports of coup in Portuguese Timor. Habib recommended that the US not get involved. Secretary agreed that we should express no public opinion.

pp 5 - 7 Leaks re question of Presidential visit to India. Secretary referred to Gwertzman article in N.Y. Times. Atherton was certain source was not NEA; he undertook to assure that all hands would keep quiet on this subject.

pp 7 - 9 Argentina sitrep by Rogers. Secretary requested ARA briefing memorandum on dynamics of internal situation in that country.

pp 9 - 12 Panama Canal negotiations. Rogers mentioned favorable reaction to announcement of Bunker's return, and Secretary agreed that Defense group could visit Panama in early September. Rogers discussed Defense desire to play larger role in negotiations. Secretary stated that he would not permit DOD reps to be on negotiating team because of larger considerations related to such a step. Rogers promised Secretary a memorandum on subject.

pp. 13-16 CSCE implementation on maneuvers. Armitage discussed situation with respect to Autumn Forge series of NATO exercises. Secretary agreed with Hyland-Lord view that maneuvers should be notified. Armitage promised memorandum on subject.

p. 17 Secretary said that Somali Ambassador should have appointment with President in order to deliver message from President Siad.

pp 17-20 Rhodesian situation. Mulcahy gave status report on prospective negotiations and South African interest in settlement.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 989505

By NWP NARA Date 6/8

Reproduced at the National Archive

SECRET
-2-

pp 21-28 Articles in press (e.g., Zumwalt) re allegations of Soviet SALT violations. Hyland suggested possibility of classified "white paper" for selected Congressmen. Secretary approved idea of paper and requested that it deal with origin of agreement as well as question of violations. Secretary said he would not testify before Senator Jackson, but was willing to appear before Morgan.

pp 29-31 Indian situation. Atherton discussed reimposition of pre-censorship and resultant problem for VOA correspondent. Secretary agreed that correspondent should be withdrawn quietly in event of pre-censorship. Secretary requested NEA to get Prime Minister Chavan's visit dates changed to avoid conflict with Japanese Emperor's visit.

pp 31-34 Sitreps by Buffum on Vietnam UN membership issue, Israeli UN expulsion question, and North Korean UN resolution. Habib discussed North Korean desire to negotiate peace treaty with US, noting US requirements that South Koreans and Chinese be included.

pp 35-38 Secretary's speech at UN Special Session. Secretary requested from Enders, by end of day, listing of unresolved issues and general outline of speech. (Needed for discussions with President at Vail.)

SECRET

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Authority NND 989505</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By NWP NARA Data 6/8</td>
  </tr>
</table>

reproduced at the National Archive.

2

SECRET

PROCEEDINGS

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Joe.

MR. SISCO: Nothing.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: Nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Phil.

MR. HABIB: We have had an incomplete series of reports on a coup in Portuguese Timor, which is creating a little bit of flak in Indonesia and Australia. We are not sure what happened, but evidently one of the Timorese Liberation for Independence groups has taken over the government one way or another. We don't know what their intentions are.

The Indonesians are quite upset and are mobilizing some forces very quietly.

When the situation becomes clear, we will know whether or not it is sufficiently serious that the Indonesians will take action. It is quite clear the Indonesians will not let a hostile group -- that is to say a Communist-dominated group -- take over.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But who is that group?

MR. HABIB: As best we can tell, it is a group called the UDT, the Democratic Union of Timorese, which is not a Communist-controlled group. There is another group on the island which has some armed forces which is a

SECRET-

SECRET

3

Communist-dominated group.

If it is the UDT, it may very well be that the Indonesians are behind it and are not telling anybody yet. But from intercept traffic, we are not sure that the Indonesians are that fully clued in. And we will just to have to wait. We should have some more information today.

In any event, whichever way it goes, if it is an Indonesian move, or the Indonesians move against it, I think it is a situation in which we should just do nothing. It is quite obvious that the Indonesians are not going to let any hostile element take over an island right in the midst of the Indonesian archipelago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later.

MR. HABIB: Eventually. That is always expected. The only ones liable to react verbally will be the Australians, who will feel impaled to say something.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why should Whitlam care about the disappearance of a vestige of colonialism?

MR. HABIB: Whitlam has said over and over again they don't mind what happens to Portuguese Timor so long as it is with the consent of the people -- and he has taken

SECRET

By 13 NARA Date 8-28

(LC)

SECRET

4

that high posture, and his party is on record.

As a matter of fact, he said something like that to
you when he was here. And they have assumed that it eventually
if it will be free, the preferable thing would be to let it
stay in Portuguese hands for a couple of years while it sorts
itself out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does "sort itself out" mean in Timor?

MR. HABIB: The answer is until the Indonesians
have organized sufficiently the Timorese into some kind of
pro-Indonesian enosis group.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Aren't you getting carried away a little bit?

MR. HABIB: It is a Greek word I learned from
Tom Enders, who speaks Greek fluently. Or is that Latin you
speak?

But in any event, the important thing is that we
should not get ourselves sucked into this one by having
opinions, unless you disagree -- I mean publicly.

(Laughter)

I think it is just made to order --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You didn't mean that last
phrase at all.

MR. HABIB: Well, subject to your confirmation,

SECRET

5

I have provided the guidance yesterday we should have no comment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our Indian desk takes the news for this week, doesn't it. Why is there a daily comment on what is going on in India about the cancellation of the Presidential trips?

MR. ATHERTON: I have seen one story in the *Times* this morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw another story in the *Times* on Sunday. I didn't even know there was such a study going on.

MR. ATHERTON: There was a memorandum to you on this. That is the only thing.

MR. HYLAND: This intelligence quote -- by Binder.

MR. ATHERTON: There is an intelligence study on internal developments. But on the question of the President' visit, the only thing I know of is the memorandum we had with you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Has that gotten to me?

MR. ATHERTON: I think so.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to hurt Gwertzman's feelings that I have seen a memo before he does.

MR. ATHERTON: Gwertzman's story today refers to

SECRET

REPRODUCED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES NARA Dac 10/4/81

By W.D.
 Authority
 Classified
 NWD9979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 2 -

Indonesian side an overly optimistic impression of our ability to assist Indonesian development and security programs and an inadequate appreciation of the growing constraints that are acting to depress US aid levels everywhere. Your visit can be helpful in alerting Suharto to the likelihood of a declining US aid level and making him understand the reasons.

Our goal now is to encourage Indonesia's sense of self-reliance commensurate with its importance to the region, and to focus our dialogue increasingly on broader issues of continuing major interest of the two governments:

- The US role and US interests in East Asia, both for their own sake and to balance Soviet and PRC pressures;

- Indonesia's perceptions of its place in Southeast Asia against this broader backdrop;

- Indonesia's importance in North-South and other multilateral issues and our growing efforts to make a constructive contribution on such issues;

- Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia;

- And our increasingly varied and close bilateral relations.

## II. BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

In the post-Vietnam environment, U.S. interests in Indonesia are based both on its present position in the region and, especially, on its anticipated future role. Indonesia, the fifth most populous nation in the world, is more than three times the size of any other Southeast Asian country and includes within its border about half the region's total population. It is potentially one of the richest. Its geographic location and resources are of major strategic importance in the region. Flanking the Southeast Asian mainland, Indonesia controls the sea passages between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

NARA Date 1941

By W.D.

W.D.197508

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

SECRET

- 3 -

Japan's life line to Middle East oil; its own oil fields provides a significant portion of Japan's oil consumption and a small but increasing part of our own oil imports. Its other major resources -- rubber, tin and tropical products -- are also of some significance to the United States.

On the international scene, Indonesia, under Suharto has sought to carve out for itself a somewhat unique diplomatic position as an anti-Communist but non-aligned country capable of carrying on a dialogue with both radical "third world" states and the west while cautiously pursuing policies generally compatible with the latter. The government's desire not to offend politicized Moslem elements in Indonesia, however, influences it to side with the Arab states on certain issues, such as zionism; moreover, it values highly its membership in OPEC and supports OPEC actions, although it has never played a very active role at OPEC meetings.

Within the region, Indonesia is generally recognized as "first among equals" in the five-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and increasingly regards the organization as the cornerstone of its regional policies.

Realization of Indonesia's potential is hampered by severe domestic problems and by economic backwardness which even its increased oil revenues have scarcely begun to overcome. Because of the Suharto Government's decision in the late 1960s to favor economic development over military preparedness, Indonesia's armed forces are poorly equipped and inadequately supplied. At best, it will be years before Indonesia can play a significant regional security role. The speed with which Indochina fell upset Suharto's calculations that Indonesia would have an extended grace period to develop its internal strength before confronting a communist threat from the north. To meet the changed situation following the loss of Indochina, President Suharto appears to have become, if anything, even more convinced in the months since your meeting at Camp David that Indonesia's policies must be based on the maintenance of close ties with the United States -- although not to the extent that its non-aligned image is tarnished.

SECRET

NARA Date 10/01

By WSD

WSD979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 4 -

President Suharto will want to hear about your dis-
cussions in Peking, particularly as they relate to Southeast
Asia, and may also express some uncertainty about detente.
He undoubtedly will take the opportunity to explain Indo-
nesia's own views on regional security, and the future of
ASEAN. He will probably describe the GOI's own tactics of
gingerly approaching the question of restoring relations
with the PRC and the GOI's assessment of the potential
communist threat to Southeast Asia (which he sees largely
as one of insurgency and subversion in the short run).

We expect Suharto will reaffirm Indonesia's non-
aligned posture and its commitment to the doctrine of
"national resilience", a somewhat mystical "do it yourself"
concept of developing internal strength by combining equal
parts of military self-reliance, broad based economic
development and a political identity between the government/
military and the people. Nevertheless President Suharto
will probably try to obtain further general US understand-
ings regarding economic and military assistance. He may
express concern that, despite indications we gave at Camp
David, the prospect for future aid seems uncertain.

President Suharto may also bring up other issues raised earlier at Camp David or of mutual interest to the two governments: Law of the Sea, Portuguese Timor, Indonesian exclusion from receiving tariff preference under the 1974 Trade Act and U.S. policy on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports. We anticipate, however, that his comments will be general and philosophic in character and that he will not expect detailed definitions of U.S. policy in response.

A straightforward, low-keyed, generally frank presentation will be most effective with Suharto. He may still harbor latent concerns as to the constancy of US policy toward Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and he is especially anxious that we recognize the magnitude of Indonesia's need for outside aid. Our desire to move away from preoccupation with aid toward a more balanced dialogue should thus be projected with caution, avoiding the impression of a change in the U.S. attitude toward Indonesia. The main forum for more detailed exchanges on this subject will be the Joint Commission.

SECRET

NARA Dae 1949

By W.D.
 Authority MDD979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 5 -

### III. US-INDONESIA JOINT COMMISSION

A key aspect of our strategy for the visit will be the announcement of the formation of a Joint US-Indonesia Consultative Commission. The announcement should specify that its first meeting is to be held in Washington next spring. Although the Indonesians have clearly intended that the first meeting be held in Jakarta, your visit and the fact that the announcement itself is being made in Jakarta should help us persuade the Indonesians to agree to Washington as the venue.

As worked out with the Indonesians, the Commission's purpose will be to broaden the range of our consultations with the Indonesian Government on major issues -- the latter to include cooperative programs in various fields, although the Commission will not actually negotiate programs or supervise their execution. The two co-chairmen will be Foreign Minister Malik and Secretary Kissinger, with representation on our side to include Treasury, Defense and such other agencies (AID, for example, or Commerce) as may be indicated by the agenda topics. The Commission is being created for renewable two-year terms and will meet annually, alternating between the two capitals. It will be supported by informally constituted subcommissions, initially a Joint Economic Subcommission and a Joint Security Subcommission, which will meet annually and be chaired on the U.S. side at the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level.

In discussing the Commission with Suharto, you may wish to stress the following points:

- We are especially pleased that agreement has been reached on establishing the Commission, and we look forward to the first meeting in the Spring.

- We see it as a most useful device for broadening the range of consultation and cooperation between our two countries and, on our side, as an indicator of the special importance we attach to our ties with Indonesia.

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, NARA Dac 1901

**DECLASSIFIED**

**By WPD**

**Authority**

**WPD 979508**

SECRET

- 6 -

IV. ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

1. Indonesia and the People's Republic of China

Of all the non-communist Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has remained the most cautious about establishing (or in Indonesia's case, re-establishing) relations with Peking. Many Indonesians believe the PRC was behind the 1965 communist coup attempt and are highly skeptical of PRC pledges of non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors. They see their problem complicated by a sizeable Chinese minority in Indonesia (more than three million). Although Indonesia will probably normalize its relations with the PRC eventually, opinions differ within the GOI as to how quickly to proceed.

Suharto will be looking forward to your comments on your discussions with the Chinese and will be curious about our own plans for normalization with the PRC. You may wish to pass on any insights gained from your talks in Peking on Chinese intentions towards Southeast Asia (a topic in which Suharto will be keenly interested), while avoiding any appearance of advising the Indonesians on how they should handle their own relations with China. It is not in our interest to push Indonesia toward the PRC.

2. US-Soviet Detente

Indonesia's relations with the USSR are correct but wary. The GOI seeks aid from the Soviet bloc and receives a small quantity. (Aid from the USSR itself, terminated in 1965, will be resumed with a $100 million Soviet credit for hydroelectric projects announced in November 1975). The GOI, however, remains innately suspicious of Soviet intentions. Especially in the context of your comments on China, Suharto may inquire briefly about detente. He will be seeking primarily a reassurance that we, too, are careful to keep our guard up in dealings with Moscow.

3. Indonesia's Regional Policies

Indonesia's answer to the potential threat by a communist Indochina is to build up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN - pronounced AH-see-an) as a cohesive regional organization (but without provoking Hanoi by portraying it as a defensive alliance); to encourage

SECRET

NARA Date 1/24/19

By W.D.
 Authority W.D.979508
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 7 -

greater "national resilience" in each of the ASEAN countries; to step up its own defenses without diverting excessive resources from its economic development programs; to hold out a wary hand to Hanoi and Saigon (both of whom it recognizes) as an inducement to choose cooperation rather than confrontation with their non-communist neighbors; and to persuade the U.S. to maintain its presence in the region, especially in the form of "over the horizon" forces. As he did at Camp David, Suharto will want to acquaint you with his views of the region, Indonesia's position therein, and perhaps how he envisages the U.S. role. He will probably express concern about Malaysia's growing internal security problems (see below) and possibly about Thailand's as well.

## Your Talking Points

- We welcome Indonesia's lead in developing regional cooperation, particularly through ASEAN. In our view, ASEAN represents an encouraging and constructive Southeast Asian effort to work toward regional self-reliance and security.

- We recognize that ASEAN is, and must remain, an organization of the Southeast Asian states themselves. We want to cooperate both with ASEAN's member countries and with ASEAN itself in way that ASEAN states find useful, but we look to ASEAN itself to give the lead in determining the extent and nature of our cooperation.

- For our part, we intend to maintain an effective presence in the region. We will honor our treaty commitments and we are determined to maintain our close ties with friends such as Indonesia.

- (If Suharto asks) We intend to retain our bases in the Philippines and certain facilities in Thailand with the agreement of the governments concerned.

SECRET

REPRODUCED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES NARA Dae 10/4/81

By W.D. W.D.979508

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

SECRET

- 8 -

## 4. The Malaysian Insurgency

The Indonesians profess great concern over the situation in Malaysia, where the chronic communist insurgency has become appreciably more active in the past year. Indonesia sees this as an opportunity for the Vietnamese Communist regimes to open a new and (for Indonesia) dangerous front by moving in with material support for the insurgents. While Malaysia is among their closest friends, the Indonesians fault the Malaysian Government for failing to take the domestic measures Jakarta believes necessary to minimize the threat -- particularly an easing of the legal and economic discrimination that favors the Malay plurality (44%) at the expense of the wealthier Chinese minority (38%). The Indonesians have some justification for their concern, but we believe their fears exaggerated. They are also concerned, but less immediately, with the insurgent threat to Thailand.

### Your Talking Points (if raised by the Indonesians)

- We share Indonesia's concern over developments that could give the communists an opening to support subversion in the ASEAN region. Thailand and Malaysia appear particularly vulnerable in this regard. We hope that Indonesia, as Malaysia's close friend will help with advice and counsel.

- For our part, we sent a small military team to both Malaysia and Singapore at the request of those governments to discuss defense equipment needs. We are helping both governments in selecting military equipment and are planning to offer Malaysia credit (about $15 million) for some of the purchases the year.

## 5. US Security Assistance to Indonesia

At Camp David President Suharto expressed concern to you about the potential threat of arms smuggled from the north to support insurgencies in Indonesia's neighbors and eventually in Indonesia itself. He sought our cooperation in reviewing Indonesia's equipment requirements.

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE NARA Date 10/4/88

(LC)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

LWD 979508

SECRET

- 9 -

During subsequent consultations in September with an Indonesian military mission we agreed to provide a modest military package ($30 million in grants and $12.5 million in credit for a total of $42.5 million) of helicopter, ships, communication and radar equipment to meet Indonesia's primary threat -- the sea infiltration of arms -- and to maintain more effective control of the archipelago. Since we could not supply all their requirements, we agreed to work with them on a longer term effort to rehabilitate their military forces.

The level of military assistance which we told them they would receive this year, however, was later readjusted by switching approximately $10 million from grant to credit. Given Congressional attitudes, overall prospects for security assistance in future years are not bright, a fact that the GOI may not adequately grasp. They could, in fact, be disappointed next spring if FY 1976 security assistance is significantly reduced as is quite possible.

## Your Talking Points

- We recognize the seriousness of Indonesia's security concerns and have proposed to Congress approximately doubling the present level of our overall security assistance to Indonesia in the present fiscal year.

- For budgetary reasons we have had to make certain readjustments this year in the mix of grants to FMS credits. Increasingly, in the future, security assistance will be in terms of credit.

- We will continue to cooperate with Indonesia in the security assistance field within the limits of our capabilities. At the same time, Indonesia should not gauge US interests in Indonesia solely by our bilateral aid levels.

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES. NARA Dac. 10/4

By WPD
Authority
WPD979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 10 -

## 6. North-South Economic Issues

Indonesia supports restructuring the world economy to bring greater equilibrium between rich and poor countries, but prefers to deal with practical questions rather than ideological confrontation. The Indonesians responded favorably to the U.S. "comprehensive" speech at the UNGA Special Session, but remain skeptical about our willingness to fulfill our promises and differ with us on such fundamental issues as our reliance on market forces to bring about changes in world economic structure. They dislike our criticism of OPEC and the non-aligned.

Indonesia exerts a moderating influence among Third World and OPEC countries. A sustained dialogue with Indonesian leaders could narrow the gap between our differing views of the policies best suited to improve the economic position of the Third World. Indonesian leaders have to be persuaded about the sincerity of U.S. North-South policies. At the same time they should be aware that U.S. domestic public support is essential for policies to benefit the developing countries and that several recent third world actions, particularly in the UN, have endangered that support.

### Your Talking Points

- We sympathize with the Third World desire to bring a better equilibrium between the developed and developing countries, and we also recognize Indonesia's commitment to this goal.

- We have demonstrated the seriousness with which we propose to deal with these issues. Secretary Kissinger's speech to the UNGA Special Session contained more than 30 proposals covering trade, commodities, agriculture, finance, and technology. Many of them should be of particular benefit to Indonesia.

- In some areas we may differ on how best to pursue North-South objectives. We think market forces have a key role to play, for example, and their exclusion leads only to inefficiencies and dislocations.

SECRET

NARA Dake

By W.D.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

WD 979508

SECRET

- 11 -

We believe both producer and consumer interests should be taken into account in discussing commodity policies.

-- If we deal with the specifics of these issues we should be able to narrow our differences and reach practical solutions. We hope to discuss these matters with Indonesian policy makers in all appropriate fora: The Joint Commission, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation and elsewhere.

-- Indonesia should also be aware of our political problems in this area. We need the support of the U.S. public to pursue policies to benefit the developing countries. We would welcome Indonesia's help in discouraging Third World positions which can only erode U.S. public support for a forthcoming U.S. posture.

## 7. Energy Issues

The Indonesians place considerable emphasis on solidarity with OPEC. Nevertheless they have played a passive moderate role at OPEC meetings and during the latest round kept their price increases significantly below those of other OPEC countries. They did not participate in the Arab oil embargo. The United States accounts for the bulk of Indonesia's oil investment (about 86%) and an increasing amount (about 11%) of our crude oil imports are from Indonesia.

There are two energy related issues which the Indonesians could raise in discussions: (a) Indonesian mandatory exclusion (as a member of OPEC) from the 1974 Trade Act benefits and (b) their hope for a favorable FPC ruling which would permit the GOI to go ahead with a major project to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) to California.

**Your Talking Points** (if the subject is raised)

-- We have noted Indonesia's recent decision to hold its oil price increases below that sanctioned by OPEC. We have also appreciated Indonesia's moderate stance in other issues relating to OPEC. But we believe that in the long run Indonesia stands to gain most from increasing production and sales.

SECRET

REPRODUCIBLE AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE

NARA Dae

By W.D.
Authority
MD979508

By W.D.
 Authority
MD979508
DECASSIFIED

SECRET

- 12 -

-- The Federal Power Commission will be taking up the Indonesian LNG case in the very near future. Meanwhile, the Administration's Energy Resources Council will be working toward decisions on our overall energy policies, including the question of LNG imports. While we cannot foretell what these decisions will be, we are very much aware of Indonesia's interest in LNG.

-- We favor Congressional action to enable Indonesia to become eligible to receive those tariff preferences conferred by the 1974 Trade Act. However, Congressional concern over OPEC policies will make this difficult.

## 8. US Economic Aid to Indonesia

At Camp David President Suharto emphasized that "Indonesia's most important need was economic rather than military", reflecting the realistic Indonesian view that domestic socio-economic and political problems are the chief threat to the country's stability. Particularly on Java, where 80 million people are already as densely crowded as anywhere on earth, unemployment and grinding poverty are endemic. Compounding Suharto's political problems are signs that despite ten years of development under the "New Order" the gap between the rich and poor is growing, while corruption and maladministration remain widespread.

In response to Suharto's comments at Camp David, you expressed your intention to increase aid to Indonesia. Subsequently you proposed to the Congress an additional $20 million in loans for Indonesia, bringing the total proposed U.S. assistance package of $85 million for FY-1976. (Japan this year is providing almost twice as much, while the other members of the Indonesia aid consortium are providing roughly $230 million). Prospects for future U.S. economic assistance are less clear since there are proposals now under interagency review which could cut our aid significantly as part of worldwide budgetary reductions.

### Your Talking Points

-- We fully recognize Indonesia's continuing need for developmental assistance. We have asked Congress for $20 million in additional development loans to Indonesia this year for a total of more than $80 million in aid, the biggest single increase we have proposed this year for any Asian country.

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVE
NARA Date 10/4/19
By W.D.
AUTHORITY
MMD979508
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 13 -

-- We intend, within Congressional limits, to maintain a meaningful aid contribution to Indonesia. At the same time, Indonesia should not gauge U.S. interest in Indonesia solely by bilateral aid levels.

-- Private foreign investment can become an increasingly important source of capital and technology for Indonesia's economic growth. We hope your Government will actively continue to encourage the foreign investor.

-- We also hope that Indonesia will support our proposals at the UNGA Special Session to protect developing countries against cycles in their export earnings, to provide them with better access to western capital and to expand international facilities to finance development, to promote the transfer of technology, and to achieve an international consensus governing relations between trans-national enterprises and governments.

## 9. Indonesia and the UN

Indonesia walks a tightrope in its UNGA voting, maintaining a show of solidarity with the non-aligned majority while attempting to avoid too frequent opposition to the U.S. and the West. This is reflected in abstentions and behind-the-scene efforts at compromise. In 1974 Indonesia worked hard to defend the seat of the Lon Nol delegation. The 1975 record has been mixed: On Korea Indonesia voted for the friendly resolution and abstained on the hostile one; on Zionism, however, it voted with the majority, to some extent because of internal political considerations arising from the pressure of Moslem political parties in Indonesia.

SECRET

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL SCALE.
NARA Date 10/2/61

By W.D.
W.D.79508

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

SECRET

- 14 -

## Your Talking Points.

- Despite the continued tendency of the UNGA non-aligned majority to use its voting strength irresponsibly, we are making every effort to avoid acrimonious confrontations.

- We understand Indonesia's dilemma in wanting to avoid taking issue with the non-aligned majority, and we appreciate Indonesia's support when we receive it.

- If the UN is to retain its importance, however, greater realism and consideration for the actual issues must be injected into the UNGA. It is in the interest of major countries such as Indonesia to ensure that the UN acts more effectively and responsibly. If every country voted forthrightly for what it actually believed, the extremists in the UN would find themselves a small minority.

## 10. Indonesia and the Law of the Sea

Indonesia has long sought international recognition of the archipelago principle, under which all waters within the Indonesian archipelago would be under extensive Indonesian control. We have not accepted the principle, but we have indicated that we could accept an objectively defined archipelago as part of an over-all Law of the Sea treaty which effectively guarantees our transit and over-flight rights through both archipelagos and international straits. After over two years of negotiation, we have narrowed our differences with Indonesia. We are prepared to resume bilateral discussions with the GOI on this subject whenever the Indonesians wish. A short while ago they expressed a desire for bilateral talks, but most recently seem to have backed away again.

- We understand Indonesia's position on the archipelago question.

SECRET

NARA Date 10/24/64

By W.D. W.D. 9/79/50

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
W.D. 9/79/508

SECRET

- 15 -

-- The United States can accept the archipelago principle in the Law of the Sea negotiations as part of a comprehensive treaty protecting our interests in transit through and over archipelagoes and international straits.

-- We are willing to continue detailed law of the sea consultations with Indonesia to find a mutually acceptable solution to this important problem.

## 11. Indonesia and Human Rights

The human rights problem in Indonesia concerns about 35,000 suspected communists still under detention from the 500,000 or so arrested in the chaotic months following the attempted communist coup of September 1965. Held without trial or in many cases formal changes, these detainees have attracted a good deal of world (and Congressional) attention and criticism of Indonesia.

The Indonesians recognize the issue as a serious problem and are troubled by the criticism. They feel themselves in a dilemma. However, they are convinced the wholesale release of the detainees would lead to civil strife and a recrudescence of the Indonesian Communist Party.

We have frequently discussed the issue with the GOI in a quiet, non-accusatory manner, seeking to speed resolution of the problem, and we have alerted them to the human rights provisions of our aid legislation. The Indonesians have been responsive. During a recent US visit by a high level Indonesian delegation headed by General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto's close advisors, the group raised the issue with Members of Congress and told them that they plan to step up the phased release of more detainees.

We believe it would be helpful if you raised this issue in a low key.

## Your Talking Points

-- The matter of the detainees in Indonesia has attracted a good deal of attention and concern in the U.S. and has affected Congressional and public attitudes toward Indonesia.

SECRET

NARA Dae 1961

By W.D.
 Authority MDD979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 16 -

-- The Congress has placed human rights restrictions on both economic and security assistance legislation which could make implementation of these programs more difficult. We understand that the delegation led by General Murtopo (Moor-TOE-poh) discussed this constructively with Members of Congress.

-- Indonesia's release of about 1,500 detainees during the past year and the implementation of what we understand are present plans for the phased release of more detainees has already had a favorable impact on Congress and the U.S. public.

12. Indonesia and Portuguese Timor

Indonesia was content to leave in Portuguese hands the small colony (600,000 people) that shares with Indonesia the island of Timor. With the dismantling of the Portuguese empire, however, Jakarta has become concerned that the backward and resource-poor colony would attain what the Indonesians expect would be a weak, unviable in-dependence leaving it susceptible to outside -- especially Chinese -- domination.

For about a year Jakarta has been maneuvering to absorb the colony through negotiations with Lisbon and covert military operations within the colony itself, showing considerable restraint. A small scale civil war between quarreling Timorese parties has opened the way to wider Indonesian intervention in support of pro-Indonesian factions. Portugal, meanwhile, has almost completely lost control of the colony.

A merger with Indonesia is probably the best solution for the colony if the inhabitants agree. Indonesia use of US-supplied weapons in an overt occupation of the territory, however, would contravene U.S. law. We have quietly pointed this out to the GOI, and it appears to have been a restraining factor.

SECRET

["ACTION COPY", "Department of State", "TELEGRAM", "SECRET", "NOD267", "PAGE 01 JAKARTA 14946 01 OF 03 061141Z", "29", "ACTION NOOS-00", "INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W.", "COPY 1 OF 15 COPIES", "051972", "P. 061000Z DEC 75", "FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA", "TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1579", "S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 JAKARTA 14946", "NODIS", "DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR SCOWCROFT", "EO 11652: GDS", "TAGS: OVIP(FORD GERALD R PRESIDENT)", "SUBJ: FORD-SUHARTO MEETING", "DECLASSIFIED", "E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6", "By: del NARA, Date: 10/26/01", "1. FOLLOWING IS MEMCON OF MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT SUHARTO IN JAKARTA DECEMBER 6. ALSO PRESENT WERE SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER, FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK, MINISTER OF STATE SUDHARMONO, AMEMBASSADOR NEWSOM, AND AN INTERPRETER.", "2. SUHARTO-I WISH TO EXPRESS MY THANKS AND VERY GREAT APPRECIATION FOR YOUR WILLINGNESS, MR PRESIDENT, TO ACCEPT MY INVITATION TO VISIT INDONESIA, ALTHOUGH THE VISIT IS VERY SHORT. I BELIEVE IT WILL BE MOST USEFUL. THE PROMOTION OF PERSONAL CONTACTS BETWEEN US IS IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT FOR BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES.", "3. FORD-MY DELEGATION IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL, MR PRESIDENT, FOR THE SPLENDID ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISIT. I REGRET THAT THE TIME IS SHORT BUT AFTER ELECTIONS, I HOPE TO COME BACK AGAIN FOR A LONGER PERIOD. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH FACE TO FACE MEETINGS IS ALSO HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR ME. THE CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED THROUGH SUCH MEETINGS IS IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POLICIES. I CONSIDERED THE MEETING AT CAMP DAVID TO BE MOST FRUITFUL, AND I AM CERTAIN THAT THIS CURRENT VISIT", "SECRET", "Declassified\nPhotocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library", "ZBOPSTOZBOPSTOZBOPSTO

Declassified
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 JAKARTA 14946 01 OF 03 061141Z

WILL EVEN FURTHER ENHANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO CONTINUE A STRONG INTEREST IN AND INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC, SOUTHEST ASIA AND ASIA. AS A WHOLE, WE HOPE TO EXPAND THIS INFLUENCE DESPITE THE SEVERE SETBACK OF VIETNAM. OUR COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS ARE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE POLICIES.

4. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM CHINA WHERE WE HAD DISCUSSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND AN IN DEPTH REVIEW OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE EXPANSION OF ANY NATION OR COMBINATION OF COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. WE VALUE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA AND RESPECT YOUR REGIONAL AND NON-ALIGNED RELATIONSHIPS.

5. SUHARTO-WHAT ARE YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM?

6. FORD-THEY WILL VIGOROUSLY EXPANSIONISM. BY OTHERS INTO ASIA, IN THIS THEY THINK PARTICULARLY OF THE USSR. THEY DON'T APPEAR TO HAVE AMBITIONS OF THEIR OWN.

7. KISSINGER-WE BELIEVE THAT CHINA DOES NOT HAVE EXPANSIONIST AIMS NOW. WE CANNOT PREDICT WHAT THE SITUATION WILL BE IN FIVE YEARS. RIGHT NOW THEIR FIRST CONCERN IS THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR SECOND VIETNAM.

8. FORD-I HAD THE IMPRESSION OF A RRESTRAINED CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY LARGELY DIRECTED AT MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF RUSSIA AND VIETNAM.

9. SUHARTO-AT CAMP DAVID WE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM. THAT SEEMS NOW TO BE MOVING AHEAD. LAOS AND CAMBODIA SEEM ALREADY UNDER VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE. DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THE THREE WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO ONE COUNTRY?

10. FORD-THE UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM HAS COME MORE QUICKLY THAN WE ANTICIPATED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA TO THE INFLUENCE OF HANOI. WE ARE WILLING SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 23 JAKARTA 14946 01 OF 03 061141Z

TO MOVE SLOWLY IN OUT RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA, HOPING
PERHAPS TO SLOW DOWN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE
ALTHOUGH WE FIND THE CAMBOODIAN GOVERNMENT VERY DIFFICULT.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS IS DISTURBING AND APPEARS TO DE-
MONSTRATE AN ACCELERATED INTEREST ON THE PART OF NOTTH
VIETNAM.

11. KISSINGER-IT IS INTERESTING THAT IN LAOS SOUVANNAVONG IS NOW IN A SUBORDINATE POSITION. THE CHINESE WANT TO USE CAMBODIA TO BALANCE OFF VIETNAM AND ARE KEEPING TROOPS IN CONNECTION WITH ROAD BUILDING IN THE NORTH. WE DON'T LIKE CAMBODIA, FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN MANY WAYS IS WORSE THAN VIETNAM, BUT WE WOULD LIKE IT TO BE INDEPENDENT. WE DON'T DISCOURAGE THAILAND OR CHINA FROM DRAWING CLOSER TO CAMBODIA.

12. SUHARTO-THE FACT REMAINS THAT SIHANOUK, DESPITE SUPPORT FROM CHINA, HAS NO AUTHORITY AND THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERSHIP IS CLOSER TO HANOI. THEY ARE GUIDED BY THE WILL OF HO CHI MINH.

13. KISSINGER-LE OOC THO USED TO TELL ME THAT THEIR AMBITION WAS ALL OF INDOCHINA AFTER WHICH THEY WOULD PROCEED TO TAKE OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA.

14. SUHARTO-IN RECENT POWER POLITICS THE THREE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES ARE TRYING TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM THE BIG POWERS AND BECOME MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. CAMBODIA AND LAOS ARE MEMBERS ALTHOUGH HANOI IS NOT YET A MEMBER. THIS CAN CAUSE NEW PROBLEMS FOR THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. SEVERAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES NOW WANT TO BE NON-ALIGNED. YUGOSLAVIA, CUBA AND ROMANIA ARE EXAMPLES. NOW AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES THERE ARE NO CONSISTENT POLICIES AND NO SOLID BLOC.

15. ONE OF INDONESIA'S MAIN CONCERNS IS THE DANGER FROM INDOCHINA WHETHER THERE IS ONE STATE OR THREE. THIS DANGER APPLIES TO ALL OF THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

16. FORD-FROM PAST HISTORY IT IS CLEAR THAT INDOCHINA
SECRET

N002S200S200S

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-SECRET-

NOD271

PAGE 01 JAKARTA 14946 02 OF 03 0612112

20
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1001 W

P 061000Z DEC 75
FM AMEMASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1580

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 JAKARTA 14946

062500

NODIS

OF OPINION. THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, WITH A COMMON BORDER WITH INDOCHINA, SAW NO IMMEDIATE THREAT AND WANTED TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH HANOI. INDONESIA ADVISED THEM THAT EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS NO PHYSICAL THREAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THERE WAS AN ABSENCE OF DANGER. THE LOCAL INSURGENCIES REPRESENT A GREATER DANGER THAN WOULD AN OVERT PHYSICAL THREAT. THE ASEAN LEADERS HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT THE INSURGENT ELEMENTS HAVE STEPPED UP THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE ASEAN LEADERS WILL SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR ACTION IN THE FORTHCOMING ASEAN SUMMIT. THE AGENDA WILL INCLUDE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS AS WELL AS SECURITY.

18. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL RESILIENCE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO COOPERATE CLOSELY TOGETHER SO THAT NO COUNTRY IS A WEAK LINK. IN THIS CONNECTION THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WISHED TO TAKE A COMMON STAND ON TRADE RELATIONS AND AVOID COMPETITION AMONG THEMSELVES. A RELATIONSHIP NOW EXISTS WITH THE EEC AND CONSULTATIONS ARE CONDUCTED THROUGH A SPECIAL COMMITTEE CALLED SCAN. INDONESIA WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIONS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS BY ASEAN WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED. INDONESIA IS THE LEADER OF THE GROUP TALKING WITH THE EEC AND THE PHILIPPINES WILL BE THE LEADER OF THE GROUP IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. (THIS POINT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CLARIFIED WITH GENERAL SUDHARMONO.)

-SECRET-

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-SECRET-

PAGE 02 JAKARTA 14946 02 OF 03 0812117

OMN PORD-WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH DISCUSSIONS AND WILL
WAIT UNTIL THE INITIATIVE IS TAKEN BY THE PHILIPPINES FOR
THE GROUP.

20. SUHARTO-THE ASEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT WISH TO EMBARK ON OVERLY AMBITIOUS PROGRAMS BUT WISH TO FIND PROJECTS BENEFICIAL TO ALL PART OF THE EFFORT WILL BE IN INDUSTRIES IN WHICH PRODUCTS ARE CLEARLY IN DEMAND SUCH AS IN FERTILIZER. INDONESIA IS NOW PRODUCING UREA FERTILIZER AND THE PHILIPPINES HAS THE PROSPECT OF PRODUCING PHOSPHATES.

21. FORD-WHERE WOULD THE CAPITAL COME FROM FOR SUCH PROJECTS?

22. SUHARTO-WE ENVISAGE JOINT VENTURES WITH ALL FIVE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

23. KISSINGER-WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH PROJECTS AND HAVE LONG SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT.

24. SUHARTO-WE UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE LOOKING FOR CAPITAL FROM THE US ALSO FOR SUCH PROJECTS.

25. IN DISCUSSIONS OF SECURITY AMONG THE ASEAN COUNTRIES, WE ARE SEEKING TO AVOID ANY OUTWARD INDICATION OF A PACT. WE INTEND TO BEGIN BY AN EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES AND ESTIMATES. WE WILL THEN DECIDE WHAT METHODS WE SHOULD USE TO REINFORCE OUR SECURITY.

26. FORD-DO YOU CONSIDER THE INSURGENCY IN THIALAND AND MALAYSIA YOUR MOST IMMEDIATE THREAT?

27. SUHARTO-EXACTLY. IT IS THERE THAT WE ARE NOW TRYING TO ANALYSE WHAT WE SHOULD DO, WHAT WE DO MUST BE CLOSELY RELATED TO OUR CAPABILITIES, TO ADETERMINATION OF HOW STONG WE ARE. THESE CAPABILITIES ARE CURRENTLY LIMITED. IT IS IMPORTAT, THEREFORE, THAT WE CONSOLIDATE THE STRENGTH OF THE PEOPLE'S IDDEOLOGGY, POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY. ALL VILLAGES SHOULD BECOME

-SECRET-

ZODIAC

Identified
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-SECRET-

PAGE 03 JAKART 14946 02:0F 03 061211Z

FORTRESSES. THIS REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL SMALL ARMS, THAILAND AND INDONESIA ARE STUDYING THE MEANS OF PROVIDING SUCH ARMS. BOTH MALAYSIA AND THAILAND ARE INTERESTED IN SMALL ARMS PRODUCTION BUT FOR SECURITY REASONS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE THIS PRODUCTION IN INDONESIA. WE WOULD LIKE TO BUILD A PLANT TO PRODUCE M-16 RIFLES. WOULD THE UNITED STATES CONSIDER ASSISTING IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUCH A PLANT?

28. KISSINGER-WE WOULD FAVOR THIS AS A GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF ITS INDICATION OF WIDER COOPERATION.

29. FORD-WE WOULD BE MORE THAN SYMPATHETIC, WE WOULD BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT SUCH A CONCEPT.

30. SUHARTO-WE ARE NOW TAKING FORMAL STEPS. HE LEADER-SHIP ON THE PROJECT O IS LEFT TO INDONESIA.

31. FORD-WE WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO WITHDRAW FROM THAILAND AS RAPIDLY AS THE THATS WANTED.

32. KISSINGER-WE WILL KEEP UTAPAO AIR BASE.

33. FORD-WE ARE STILL IN THAILAND. WE ALSO HAVE HAD SOME CONTACTS WITH MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE ABOUT INCREASED MILITARY AIO.

34. SUHARTO-INSURGENCY HAS NOW REACHED THE CAPITALS IN BOTH THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FACE THIS INSURGENCY. FOR ONE THING, THERE ARE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN BOTH THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. THE RECIAL PROBLEMS IN MALAYSIA ARE AN EXAMPLE. THE COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO SUBVERT BY CUTTING LINKS BETWEEN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. THEY WANT TO CUT MALAYSIA FIRST.

35. FORD-WHERE ARE THE INSURGENTS COMING FROM?

36. SUHARTO-MAINLY FROM CHINA. 40 PCT OF THE POPULATION IN MALAYSIA ARE CHINESE, VIETNAM AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT STAND STILL IF THEY FEEL THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES IN MALAYSIA. WE NEED TO FORTIFY MALAYSIA BUT THIS IS NOT EASY TO DO BECAUSE OF THE CHINESE INFLUENCE IN MALAYSIA.

-SECRET-

NODS NODS NODS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHOR'S PERMISSION.

Declassified
Photocopy, from Gerali R. Ford Library

Department of State TELEGRAM

-SECRET-

PAGE a4 JAKARTA 14946 02 OF 03 061211Z

THIS CAUSES GREAT CONCERN TO SINGAPORE WHICH WOULD BE IN DANGER IF MALAYSIA FELL. WE ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE IT WOULD BRING THE COMMUNISTS RIGHT TO OUR THRESHHOLE.

37. FORD-IS THAILAND THREATENED BY VEITNAM?

38. SUHARTO-YES. THERE IS A LONG HATRED BETWEEN THAILAND AND VIETNAM.

39. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ABOUT ANOTHER PRbeln, TIMOR. WHEN IT LOOKED AS IF THE PORTUGUESE RULE WOULD END IN TIMOR WE SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE THE PORTUGUESE TO AN ORDERLY DECOLONIZATION PROCESS. WE HAD AGREEMENT WITH THEM ON SUCH A PROCESS AND WE RECOGNIZED THE AUTHORITY OF PORTUGAL IN THE CARRYING OUT OF DECOLONIZATION AND IN GIVING PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEIR WISHES. INDONESIA HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. WE ARE CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT THE SECURITY, TRANQUILITY AND PEACE OF ASIA AND THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE, IN THE LATEST ROME AGREEMENT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO INVITE ALL PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE. SINILAR EFFORTS WERE MADE BEFORE BUT FRETELIN DID NOT ATTEND. AFTER THE

-SECRET-

Department of State

TELEGRAM

-SECRET- NOD274

PAGE 01 JAKARTA 14946 03 OF 03 0612372

20
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 7/001 W

052850

P 0610007 DEC 75
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1501

SECRET SECTION 3 OF 3 JAKARTA 14946

NO013

FRETELIN FORCES OCCUPIED CERTAIN POINTS AND OTHER FORCES WERE UNABLE TO CONSOLIDATE, FRETELIN HAS DELARED ITS INDEPENDENCE UNILATERALLY. IN CONSEQUENCE OTHER PARTIES DECLARED THEIR INTENTION OF INTEGRATING WITH INDONESIA. PORTUGAL REPORTED THE SITUATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS BUT DID NOT EXTEND RECOGNITION TO FRETELIN. PORTUGAL, HOWEVER, IS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. IF THIS CONTINUES IT WILL PROLONG THE SUFFERING OF THE REFUGEES AND INCREASE THE INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.

40. FORO-THE FOUR OTHER PARTIES HAVE ASKED FOR INTEGRATION?

41. SUWARTO-YES, AFTER THE UDT, INDONESIA FOUND ITSELF FACING A FATE ACCOMPLI. IT IS NOW IMPORTANT TO DE Termine what we can do to establish peace and order for the present and the future in the interest of the security of the area and Indonesia. THESE ARE SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WE ARE NOW CONTEMPLATING. WE WANT YOUR UNDERSTANDING IF WE DEEM IT NECESSARY TO TAKE RAPID OR DRASTIC ACTION.

42. FORO-WE WILL UNDERSTAND AND WILL NOT PRESS YOU ON THE ISSUE. WE UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM YOU HAVE AND THE INTENTIONS YOU HAVE,

43. KISSINGER-YOU APPRECIATE THAT THE USE OF US-MADE ARMS COULD CREATE PROBLEMS.

-SECRET-

NATIONAL
DEFENSE
AGENCE
DE
L'AIR
NATIONALE
DE
FRANCE

Department of State

-SECRET-

TELEGRAM

PAGE #3 JAKARTA 14946 03 OF 03 0612377

WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO MAXIMIZE OUR INCOME. IN THIS CONNECTION THERE IS AN IMBALANCE OF PROFITS BETWEEN THE OIL COMPANIES OPERATING IN INDONESIA AND TOSE OPERATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. INDONESIAN COMPANIES MAKE AS MUCH AS $2.50 A BAREL WHEREAS THE PROFITS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE UNDER $1.00 A BARREL.

53. FORD-ARE' THEY REINVESTING AND EXPANDING OPERATIONS?

54. SUHARTO-YES, WE DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE WITH THAT BUT WE BELIEVE THEY CAN STRETCH OUT THEIR PROFITS. WHAT WE DO SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS NATIONALIZATION. WE ARE SEEKING AN UNDERSTANDING AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY. PROSPECTS ARE ENCOURAGING. WE ALSO WANT THE UNDERSTADING OF THE USG HOWEVER.

55. FORD-THEY SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THAT THEY ARE TREATED WELL HERE IN INDONESIA, MUCH BETTER THAN IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM WILL BE BENEFICIAL AND THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT YOUR EFFORT.

56. KISSINGER-OUR MAIN CONCERN IS THAT WHATEVER YOU DO DOES NOT CREATE A CLIMATE THAT DISCOURAGES INVESTMENT. BASICALLY THE MATTER IS BETWEEN YOU AND THE COMPANIES. WE ARE NOT INVOLVED IN SUCH PROBLEMS.

57. SUHARTO-WE HAVE TAKEN THESE VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT AND EVERYTHING THAT WE DO WILL BE BASED ON EXISTING LAWS. WE WANT TO FIND WAY OF OBTAINING REVENUE WHICH WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE FAIR PROFITS FOR THE COMPANIES.

58. KISSINGER- WE APPRECIATE YOUR CLARIFICATION OF THIS MATTER.

59. FORD-LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT WE UNDERSTAND YOUR SITUATION. WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR RECOMMENDATIONS.

60. SUHARTO-ONCE MORE, I THANK YOU FOR THIS VISIT. WE ARE A COUNTRY THAT HAS MANY NEEDS AND WE CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES TO HELP US.

-SECRET-

Department of State

SECRET-

TELEGRAM

PAGE 04 JANUARY 14 1946 03-0F-03 061037Z

YON FORD-WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN. OUR PROBLEM IS TO CONVEE CONGRESS WHERE WE HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTIES. ALTHOUGH PROSPECTS MAY BE A LITTLE BETTER THAN WE HAD THOUGHT EARLIER, ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, WE ARE SEEKING TO OBTAIN THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT WHICH IS IN THE VICINITY OF $80 MILLION THIS YEAR. WE WILL ALSO TRY TO GET CONGRESS TO MODIFY THE TRADE ACT WHICH EXCLUDES OPEC COUNTRIES FROM GENERALIZED PREFERENCES. WE REALIZE THAT INDONESIA DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE OIL EMBARGO. CONGRESS HAS, UNFORTUNATELY TREATED ALL OPEC COUNTRIES IN THE SAME FASHION.

82. I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ALSO, MR PRESIDENT, THAT I WANT TO MAINTAIN A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP. IF YOU HAVE ANYTHING SPECIAL, I HOPE YOU WILL COMMUNICATE WITH ME DIRECTLY BY WHATEVER MEANS SEEMS APPROPRIATE. NEWSON

SECRET-

Confidential
Phycology from Gerald R. Ford Library