# Sinai and Its Aftermath

by Yigal Allon

## I

Thinking of the Sinai Campaign, in the fall of 1956, as an effort to effect what previous diplomacy had failed to do has resulted since the conclusion of that campaign, permitted the levelling of charges of aggression, or at the very least, of impetuosity, against Israel. This, from a single basic misconception. Clausewitz's aphorism that "War is the extension of diplomacy by other means" was never less applicable than when examining the Sinai Campaign. True, as in any other war, the military operation carried its concomitant political and diplomatic ramifications, but these were by-products, so to speak, and not the main objective. The offensive into the Sinai did not follow upon a breakdown of

alternative into the Sinait did not follow upon a breakdown of
products, so to speak, and not the main objective. The
political and diplomatic ramifications, but these were by-
and other war, the military operation carried its concomitant
capable than when examining the Sinait Campaign. True, as in
extension of diplomacy by other means was never less equiv-
liaconception. Clausewitz's aphorism that "War is the
imbetnoeity, against France. This, from a single basic
the foeefling of charges of aggression, or at the very least, on
the Sinais, shall be the concentration of Sinais Campaign, which
is an effort to effect what previous diplomacy had failed
to do has, at least the concentration of Sinais Campaign, which

Thinking of the Sinais Campaign in the fall of 1948

I

by Yigal Yaron

Sinais and Its Aftermath

-2-

immediate prior diplomatic relations; it aimed at solving
no political problems, nor to gain diplomatic objectives
not otherwise to be achieved. It was purely an act of
self-defense by a beleaguered people, and must be so viewed
in retrospect to understand and evaluate, whether to justify
or condemn.

The Sinai Campaign, indeed, did not spring, full blown,
from the sands of the Negev like Minerva from the head of
Zeus. Rather, it was a climactic event, and, alas, perhaps
not the final event, in a war imposed upon Israel by all
of the Arab leaders, indeed nurtured by them, since 1948.
In this venture the otherwise fratricidal Arab governments
expressed a unique unanimity of purpose, whether ~~idealist~~
Soviet-oriented, or at present subscribers to the Eisen-
hower Doctrine.

The Arabs had continuously, publicly, and scrupulously
insisted that a state of war existed between themselves and
"the Zionist State of Palestine." But matters went far
beyond mere declaration and technical status. The Fedayeen
depradations across the Gaza boundary into Israel, of which
Radio Cairo daily boasted, are matters of public record and
well known to the readers of the daily press. The Egyptian
blockade of the Straits of Tiran, the barring of passage to
Israel's shipping in the Suez Canal, in the face of the Con-
stantinople Convention of 1888, and U.N. declarations, have
also been repeated "page one" material. Perhaps not so well

also been repeated "bake one," material. Perhaps not so well
atautinoble Convention of 1888, and U.N. declarations, have
Israelk snipping in the Sues Canal, in the face of the Con-
pockade of the Straita of Tisra, the parring of passage to
well known to the readers of the daily press. The Exptisan
Radio Cairo daily posated, are matters of public record and
depradations across the Gaza pommard into Israel, of which
behond were declaration and technical status. The Redseem
"the Zionist State of Palestine." But matters went lar
inauated that a state of war exiated between themselves and
The Arap had continuously, publicly, and circumspectly
power doctrine.

Bozofet-oriented, or at present unaccompensated to the Elaan-
expressed a midive munimty of burbose, whether or not
In this venture the otherwise tristrofidal Arap Governments
of the Arap readers, indeed nurtured by them, since 1948,
not the linsl event, in a war imposed upon Israel by all
Zena. Rather, it was a climactic event, and, as far, perhaps
from the sands of the Negev like Minerals from the head of
The First Campaign, indeed, did not spring, full blown,
or condemn.

in retrospect to understand and evaluate, whether to justify
self-defence by a beleaguered people, and what he so viewed
not otherwise to be achieved. It was briefly an act of
no political problem, nor to gain diplomatic objectives
immediate prior diplomatic relations; it aimed at solving

-5-

-3-

reported, but a brutal fact all the same, was the economic
blockade of Israel which cost her more in any one year than
all the foreign aid received in that year. Add to this the
diplomatic assaults, the refusal to negotiate, and the
vitriolic propaganda directed against Israel, and there
emerges a picture of a real and bitter war, already in being.
When, during 1956, Fedayeen raids, bent on widespread terror-
ism, increased in efficiency of organization, tempo of
attack, and degree of penetration, with accelerated loss of
Israel's life and property, the people of Israel, for all
their toughness, felt this constant threat to the individual's
life, at any moment of the day or night, no longer tolerable.
The irritant had to be excised, or truly the cancer of
demoralization would set in.

This latter state of affairs alone, in my opinion,
was sufficient to justify a large-scale military operation
to eliminate the Fedayeen bases, and put an immediate end
to the bloodshed. But the threat went further; the threat
was the cataclysmic extinction of the very state itself
and its population. A font of the state was compelled
to fulfill its first and primary obligation, to
insure the survival of its people and its own existence.

II

The *realpolitik* of the Great Powers, as they dealt
with this state of Middle Eastern affairs, fell to its lowest

with this state of Middle Eastern affairs, felt to its lowest

<u>The respopoli</u> of the Great Powers, as they desist

II

future the arrival of its people and its own existence.
to fulfill its first and primary obligation, to
and its population.

A few years ago the state was compelled
by the cataclysmic extinction of the very state itself
to the flooded. But the threat went further: the threat
was the cataclysmic extinction of the very state itself
to eliminate the Bedouen paaes, and put an immediate end
was sufficient to justify a large-scale military operation
This latter state of affairs alone, in my opinion,
demoralization would set in.

The irritant had to be excised, or truly the cancer of
life, at any moment of the day or night, no longer tolerable.
their tombeaux, left this constant threat to the individual's
Iarosek file and property, the people of Iarose, for all
attack, and degree of penetration, with accelerated loss of
life, increased in efficiency of organization, tempo of
When, during 1920, Bedouen rida, pent on widespread terror-
emerges a picture of a real and bitter war, already in being
aitroïolic broagsands directed against Iarose, and there
diplomatic assaults, the refusal to negotiate, and the
still the foreign aid received in that year. Add to this the
blockade of Iarose which cost her more in any one year than
reported, put a brutal fact all the same, was the economic

-3-

-4-

depth of cynicism. East and West had engaged in a ludicrous bidding in arms to win ~~dubious~~ Arab friendship, while denying to Israel, for whose destruction the Arabs intended these arms, the right to purchase, at any price, defensive arms. Only France, at a late stage and in limited quantities, proved a lone and courageous (though not wholly altruistic) exception; and this, by no means, righted the imbalance. Thanks to foreign technicians and instructors, German and Russian in Egypt and Syria, and Western in Jordan and Iraq, the rate of assimilation of new arms by the Arabs accelerated as 1956 wore on. Israeli intelligence advised, and later the military, upon advancing into Sinai, confirmed by observation, that here was a base geared for imminent attack; jet airstrips close to the border; field supply stations strung out all along axis of advance; supplies of fuel, ammunition, medicines and perishables, stocked far in excess of the quantities required for forces stationed in the peninsula itself; abandonment of earlier defensive development projects, following the Czech arms deal, spelled out unmistakably to the trained observer only one thing--an all-out invasion, ~~this~~ to begin, if not in a matter of weeks, then surely in a matter of a few months.

At this juncture an ominous event occurred which made certain, if any doubt remained, what all these preparations presaged. In the summer of 1956 the total armed forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were unified under the single command

Egypt, Syria, and Jordan were united under the single command
breached. In the summer of 1926 the total armed forces of
certain, if and only remained, what all these preparations
At this juncture an ominous event occurred which made
a matter of a few months.

to begin, it not in a matter of weeks, then surely in
the trained operator only one thing--an all-out invasion,
following the Czech armies dealt out毫不留情 to
itself; abandonment of earlier defensive development projects,
durabilities required for forces stationed in the peninsulas
medicine and penstocks, a stock of sin in excess of the
out all along axis of advance; subplies of fuel, ammunition,
stratipoes close to the border; field supply stations arising
from here was a base earned for imminent attack: let
the military, upon advancing into Egypt, confirmed by opereas-
as 1926 more on. Irsell intelligence advised, and later
the rate of assimilation of new arms by the Arapas accelerated
Russeu in Egypt and Syria, and Western in Jordan and Iraq.
Thanks to foreign technicians and instructors, German and
exception; and this, by no means, righted the imbalance.

proved a lone and consolations (though not wholly allustrious)
arms. Only France, at a late stage and in limited quantities,
these arms, the right to purchase, at any price, defensive
denying to Irsell, for whose destruction the Arapas intended
pidding in arms to win a diploma Arap friendliness, while
depth of cynicism. East and West had engaged in a judicious

-4-

-5-

of the Egyptian Supreme Commander. This, it should be noted, was not a mere device for coordination of the armies, as in 1948. This was a true unification into one, monolithic structure. This move could serve no other possible purpose than the joint invasion of Israel from all directions. But luckily for the historian, this was not left to conjecture, for the invasion and destruction of Israel was declared to be its avowed purpose at the moment of unification.

Then, for the first time in modern history, Syrian infantry moved into Jordanian territory and took positions on the river Jordan close to the Israel border, near its most strategic fording point. It prepared for larger forces to come and join with the Jordanian army, and thus compose a striking force directed at the most vulnerable and sensitive point in Israel, the point where Israel is geographically the narrowest. The presence of the Syrian unit incidentally insured against any Jordanian recalcitrance. Simultaneously the Gaza strip, also pointed at the vitals of Israel, was a splendid bridgehead, already occupied and ready for the crossing.

While the destruction of Israel was the immediate purpose of the military unification and was meant in deadly earnest, it was but one step, though an absolutely imperative one (a *sine qua non*, so to speak, for what was to follow) in an ambitious, grandiose scheme. The Egyptian military junta intended no less than the literal creation of an Arab Empire

intended no less than the literal creation of an Arab Empire
an amphitheatre, Grandiose scheme. The Egyptian military units
one (a *aine dha non*, so to speak, for what was to follow) in
ermineat, it was put one step, though an absolutely imperative
pose of the military multiplication and was meant in deadly

While the destruction of Israel was the immediate bur-
crossing.

a splendid bridgehead, already occupied and ready for the
to come and join with the Jordanian army, and thus composite
army strategic landing point. It prepared for larger forces
on the river Jordan close to the Jordan border, near its
industry moved into Jordanian territory and took positions
then, for the first time in modern history, Israeli
served purpose at the moment of multiplication.

invasion and destruction of Israel was declared to be its
for the historian, this was not left to conjecture, for the
the joint invasion of Israel from all directions. But first
line. This move could serve no other possible purpose than
1948. This was a true multiplication into one, monolithic struc-
was not a mere device for coordination of the armies, as in
of the Egyptian Supreme Commander. This, it should be noted,

-2-

-6-

sweeping from the Atlantic in the west to the Persian Gulf in the east, to the sources of the Nile in the south. The destruction of Israel under Egyptian leadership would boost Egypt's prestige, already on the ascendency in the Arab world. With the territories of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Palestine all contiguous to one another, Egypt's domination of this bloc would inevitably follow. This accomplished, Egypt would have a springboard from which to absorb completely a weak and defenseless Lebanon, a corrupt Saudi Arabian monarchy, and an Iraqi regime deeply divided from its people, keeping a shrewd eye all the while on North African territories, as well as the Sudan and beyond, for future opportunities. The scheme was not unrealistic. With East and West and even neutral powers already vying for Egyptian favor, how much more secure would she have been with the IsraelX scalp at her belt? The end result would have found Egypt a major power, controlling vast areas with large populations, controlling the world's greatest sources of oil on which Western Europe depends for her life, rich rivers, long coastal lines on the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. The Red Sea would be an internal Arabian lake, spreading athwart vital inter-ocean and inter-continental lines of commerce and routes of trade. Finally, Egypt's over-abundance of people would spill over into the less populous Arab world, to Egyptianize the whole. Thus would not only sovereign nations be enslaved, but there would emerge a new and colossal threat to world trade and peace, by an irresponsible and aggressive power.

power.

to world trade and peace, by an unreasonable and aggressive
be enlivened, but there would emerge a new and colossal threat
Egyptisense the whole. Tuna would not only sovereign nations
would spill over into the less populous Arab world, to
routes of trade. Finally, Egypt's over-abundance of people
inter-ocean and inter-continental lines of commerce and
would be an internal Arabian lake, adorning stwart vital
lines on the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. The Red Sea
Western Europe depends for her life, rich rivers, long coastal
controlling the world's greatest sources of oil on which
a major power, controlling, controlling, power, controlling
as well as the苏丹和 beyond, for future opportunities,
keeping a sharp eye on the whole on North African terr-
munities, and an Israeli regime deeply divided from its people,
s weak and defenseless Lebanon, a corrupt Saudi Arabia
Egypt would have a springboard from which to expand completely
of this block would inevitably follow. This accomplished,
Palestine all contiguous to one another, Egypt's domination
world. With the territories of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and
Egypt's prestige, already on the ascendency in the Arab
destruction of Israel under Egyptian leadership would boost
in the east, to the sources of the Nile in the south. The
sweeping from the Atlantic in the west to the Beresian Gulf

-6-

-7-

Yet, for all this grandiose vision, there stood the
hard reality of Israel; and without her destruction, nothing.

The Egyptians were well grounded in recent history
when they believed that U.N. forces and the Great Powers would
do no more than verbalize their opposition to new aggressions
against Israel. All forces had to beCOMBINED against into a moment of
decision. For reasons of economic compulsion, Egypt must
either use her costly machine or demobilize it. There was
no international deterrent. The immediate invasion of
Israel was certain.

### III

The totality of the threat to Israel and the absolute
compulsion that was upon her to take the tactical initiative
cannot be grasped without an awareness of Israel's very
special geo-strategical situation. It is in that context
that one must visualize Israel's fate, had she permitted her
enemies to set a time of their own choosing for the launching
of an offensive, as they volubly promised to do.

While Israel is tiny, of no more than 8,048 square
miles, she is at the same time so elongated that she possesses
borders 594 miles in length, and for the most part lacking
topographical conditions useful for defense. In the coastal
plain, indeed, a mere ten miles separates Jordan on the one
side from the Mediterranean on the other. Every foot of this
inordinately long boundary touches on militantly hostile

inordinately long poundal touches on militarily hostile
side from the Mediterranean on the other. Every foot of this
bismarck indeed, a were ten miles separatest Jordan on the one
tobographical conditions useful for defense. In the coastal
polders 264 miles in length, and for the most part lacking
miles, and is at the same time so elongated that she possesses
while Israel is tiny, of no more than 8,048 square
of an offensive, as they obviously promulgated to do.

enemies to set a time of their own choosing for the launching
that one mustifikize Israel's fate had she permitted her
special geo-strategic situation. It is in that context
cannot be grasped without an awareness of Israel's very
compulsion that was upon her to take the tactica! initiative
The totality of the thrust to Israel and the abolate

III

Israel was certain.

no international deterrent. The immediate invasion of
either one her coaly machine or demobilize it. There was
decision. For reasons of economic compulsion, Egypt must
against Israel. All forces had been moved into a moment of
do no more than aeroplane their opposition to new aggressions
when they believed that U. M. E., and the Great Powers would

The Egyptians were well grounded in recent history
hard resity of Israel; and without her destruction, nothing.
Yet, for all this expiring aroon, there stood the

-1-

-8-

territory. A good deal of Israel's population, industry, and even some military bases, are within easy reach of the enemy's long-range artillery, to say nothing of its air force. This geo-strategical reality permits the Arab armies the advantage of endless feinting and, of course, with the ever present threat of a genuine attack under a joint command from all directions simultaneously, which may in quick order dissect the country at various points.

Military strength of a nation is a resultant of a number of fundamental factors: the population factor, the geo-strategical position, economic strength, political position in the international arena, and finally, though first in importance, the social structure and the system of internal government--all these, at the same time, juxtaposed against the same factors in the opposing camp. What then did we have in the Middle East? We saw the few against the many; a small land strip hugging the coast, pressed on all sides by a continent with vast hinterland; an economy pared to the bone matching one lubricated with rich oil and replete with life-giving waters; a tiny politically isolated nation standing alone against a large military alliance endorsed by Great Powers. Israel's social structure is that of a modern democracy rooted in the Jewish concepts of ethics and morality, with the resulting vigor of intellectual and technical skills, as well as morale, of the population, which count in battle. When utilized to its fullest, the fruits of democracy were sufficient to withstand the assaults of all the Arab advantages, when those

around the saasufa of all the Arap advantages, when those
its fullest, the fruits of democracy were sufficient to with-
of the population, which count in battle. When utilised to
vigor in intellectual and technical acclima, as well as morale,
the judicious concepts of ethics and morality, with the resulting
Tarsel's social structure is that of a democracy rooted in
against a large military alliance endorsed by Great Powers.
water; a tiny politically isolated nation standing alone
one indebted with rich oil and replete with trade-Giving
with vast hinterland; an economy based to the bone matching
a stripugging the coast, pressed on all sides by a continent
in the Middle East? The few against the many; a small land
the same factors in the opposing camp. What then did we have
Government--all these, at the same time, juxtaposed against
in importance, the social structure and the system of internal
tion in the international arena, and finally, though first
Geo-strategic position, economic strength, political post-
number of fundamental factors: the population factor, the
Military strength of a nation is a resultant of a
order disacord the country at various points.
and from all directions simultaneously, which may in turn
ever present threat of a genuine attack under a joint com-
advantage of endless feinting, and ofAIM, with the
This geo-strategic reality permits the Arab armies the
enemy's long-range artillery, to ask nothing of air force.
and even some military passes, are within easy reach of the
territory. A good deal of Tarsel's population, industry,
and the saasufa of all the Arap advantages, when those

-9-

advantages were pressed by military dictatorships, corrupt monarchies, and masses suffering social and economic deprivations.

In spite of the continuous threat posed by the Arabs, sometimes more threatening, sometimes less, Israel cannot afford a large standing army. Her armed forces are based principally on reserves, well-organized, well-trained, and capable of mobilization on short notice. Her armed force when mobilized, however, must constitute a powerful striking force. Wars cannot be won by sheer static defensive systems. The counter blow must follow. For Israel, with no geographical depth, to rely on defensive measures alone, however stubborn, is to commit an act of suicide. Her striking force must be capable of taking the initiative when and wherever necessary to conclude a victory in the shortest possible time.

Let the reader project his imagination, if he will into the situation that would result were the Arabs permitted to take the initiative. Arab bomber bases are fifteen minutes flying time from major Israel cities; less, from Israel air bases. Thus, no warning net can be effective. Given the favorable political moment, the first measure would have been to achieve control of the skies over Israel by sudden air attack, destroying the Israel air force, surprised, and on the ground. The Israel air force destroyed and the

and on the ground. The Irsaeli air force destroyed and the
and then air attack, destroying the Irsaeli air force, ambushed,
have been to achieve control of the skies over Israel by
the favorable political moment, the first measure would
air passes. Thus, no warning net can be effective. Given
flying time from major Israeli cities: less, from Israel,
take the initiative. Arab powder passes are fifteen minutes
the situation that would result were the Arapas permitted to
Let the reader project his imagination if he will into
possible time.

wherever necessary to conclude a victory in the shortest
force must be capable of taking the initiative when and
atopborn, is to commit an act of anvilde. Her striking
case depth, to rely on defensive measures alone, however
The counter blow must follow. For Israel, with no geographical
force. Wars cannot be won by sheer static defensive systems.
when mobilized, however, must constitute a powerful striking
capable of mobilization on short notice. Her armed force
principally on reserves, well-organized, well-trained, and
afford a large standing army. Her armed forces are based
sometimes more threatening, sometimes less, Israel cannot
In spite of the continuous threat posed by the Arapas,
tions.

mobilizations, and masses antifiring social and economic deprivations
were pressed by military dictators, corrupt

-3-

-10-

fields pitted and unusable, the Arab planes could, with impunity, bomb cities, industries, and populations. Even more fatal, with roads bombed out, and ground movements pinned down from the skies, Israel's reserve, which is her army, would be fragmented, unable to mobilize, so that Israel might not even put men in the field to oppose the Arab armies advancing behind the rain of incendiaries and explosives. Further, such ground forces as could take the field would operate with no tactical air support and with supply lines cut. Though she might survive such an initial blow, Israel's cost would be huge casualties and a prolonged war fought on populated soil rather than on the denuded wastes of the Sinai. When Pearl Harbor was taken by surprise and major units of the U.S. Fleet immobilized, the continent of North America was still thousands of sea miles away, with the population and industry untouched, and a vast hinterland to absorb, stall, and drive back an invasion.

A blow at Pearl Harbor inflicted a grievous wound but not a fatal one. A comparable strike at Israel is a blow to the heart itself. Israel is military force, people, and industry in one small package--no reserves of area and no factories "behind the Urals." Permitting the other fellow to strike the first blow under these circumstances would have been the grossest irresponsibility.

have been the Grosvenor irrepressibility.
to strike the first blow under these circumstances would
 factories "behind the Unisa." Permitting the other fellow
 industry in one small backg--no reserves of area and no
 the heart itself. Israel is military force, people, and
 a first one. A comparable strike at Israel is a blow to
 A blow at Pearl Harbor inflicted a grievous wound but not
 hinterland to spain, at all, and drive back an invasion.
 with the population and industry untouched, and a vast
 of North America was still thousands of miles away,
 and major units of the U.2. Fleet immobilized, the continent
 wastes of the East. When Pearl Harbor was taken by ambuscade
 was taught on populated soil rather than on the denuded
 blow. Israel's coat would be made into clothes and a prolonged
 supply lines out. Though she might survive such an initial
 field would operate with no tactical sin and port and with
 explosives. Further, and ground forces as could take the
 Arap armies advancing behind the rain of incendiaries and
 Israel might not even but men in the field to oppose the
 her army, would be fragmented, unmaple to mobilise, so that
 pinned down from the area, Israel's reserve, which is
 more vast, with roads pumped out, and ground movements
 impeded, pomp cities, industries, and businesses. Even
 fields bitted and unmaple, the Arap bienee cold, with

-10-

-11-

IV

For eight years the Arabs had waged their war sporadically, and harassed continuously. Now, they were on the very brink of final military fulfillment. Time had virtually all but run out for Israel; to wait further was to court complete disaster. Because of her geo-political vulnerability Israel had to wrest the initiative, regardless of political climate. At that point, as it developed, Russia, which had been the chief supplier of offensive arms to Syria and Egypt, and was very much on the scene, was profoundly distracted with a restless Poland and a Hungary in revolt. Egypt herself had developed a tense political duel with France over Egyptian intervention in Algeria, and with Britain over Suez. This, then, was Israel's historic moment, and she had the courage to seize it.

The taking of operational initiative by the Israel\* infantry, armor, and paratroops, supported by the air force, and to a lesser extent by the navy, and the utmost exploitation of the element of surprise, though not entirely eliminating the enemy's capacity to resist, did reduce his freedom to maneuver to a minimum. The speed and mobility of the Israel forces, their daring and initiative in action, and the brilliant performance of the Israel\* Air Force in the air battles even before the Anglo-French intervention, made possible the consummation of the campaign within a few days,

possible the consummation of the campaign within a few days,
such battles even before the Anglo-French intervention, made
the brilliant performance of the Irselk Air Force in the
Irsel forces, their daring and initiative in action, and
to maneuver to a minimum. The speed and mobility of the
ing the enemy's capacity to react, did reduce his freedom
of the element of ambience, though not entirely eliminst-
and to a lesser extent by the usd, and the utmost exploits-
infantry, armor, and barstroops, supported by the air force.
The taking of operational initiative by the Irselk
and are had the courage to seize it.

Britain over Suez. Tufa, then, was Irsel's historic moment,
France over Egyptian intervention in Algeria, and with
Egypt herself had developed a tenac politcal foe with
tracted with a relentless Poland and a Hungary in revolt.
Egypt, and was very much on the scene, was profoundly dis-
used been the chief supplier of offensive arms to Egypt and
climate. At that point, as it developed, Ruafa, which
Irsel had to treat the initiative, regardless of political
complete disaster. Because of her geo-political vulnerability
all put run out for Irsel; to wait further was to court
very drunk of fatal military误fillment. Time had airfully
cially, and herself continuously. Now, they were on the
For eight years the Arapahus had waged their war against

IV

-11-

-12-

and with a minimum loss of life to both sides. This con-
fronted the Egyptian command with a *fait accompli*, and con-
vinced the other Arab armies that it was worth their while
to stand aloof and escape a similar fate. Thus were pre-
vented the pro-Egyptian world powers from military or poli-
tical intervention in the midst of battle. One may imagine
how much longer the war would have lasted, and how much
heavier would have been the casualties, had so-called
foreign "volunteers" reinforced the Egyptian Army before
it collapsed.

During the pause between the Anglo-French ultimatum
and their bombardment, the Egyptians managed, with the help
of the instructors from East Europe, to fly out of Egypt
a good number of aircraft. Nevertheless a considerable
portion of their air force was destroyed on the ground,
and what is more important, most of the airfield installations
were rendered useless so that the landing of any possible
foreign *AIRCRAFT* reinforcement was eliminated. Without derogating
from the value of the contribution of the Anglo-French air
force, the IsraelX air force, though *only* a tactical rather
than a strategic one, by the use of the element of surprise,
and with its excellent combative skill and courage, might
well have neutralized the Egyptian air force, though not
actually destroying it.

Within five days the IsraelX forces controlled the
entire Sinai peninsula including the Gaza strip and the

entire thrusts including the Gaza strip and the
Within five days the Irsell forces controlled the
actually destroying it.

well have neutralized the Egyptian air force, though not
and with its excellent comparative skill and courage, might
thus a strategic one, by the use of the element of surprise,
force, the Irsell air force, though empty a tactical rather
from the value of the contribution of the Anglo-French air
foreign reinforcement was eliminated. Without derogating
were rendered useless so that the landing of any possible
and what is more important, most of the airfield installations
portion of their air force was destroyed on the ground,
s a good number of aircraft. Nevertheless a considerable
of the instructors from East Europe, to fly out of Egypt
and their bombardment, the Egyptians managed, with the help
During the phase between the Anglo-French ultimatum
it collapsed.

foreign volunteers" reinforced the Egyptian Army before
heavier would have been the casualties, had so-called
how much longer the war would have lasted, and how much
total intervention in the midbat of battle. One may imagine
vented the pro-Egyptian world powers from military or political
to stand aloof and escape a similar fate. Thus were preceded
the other Arab armies that it was worth their while
fronted the Egyptian command with a last aceeess, and con-
and with a minimum loss of life to both sides. This can-

-15-

-13-

straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba. Had there been no Anglo-French ultimatum, no bombarding by their planes of airfields in the Suez zone, nor later landings at Port Said, it was well within the realm of probability that the Israeli Army would have gained control of both banks of the Suez Canal.

By taking the initiative, the Israelis obtained still another tactical advantage. Since she selected the time of engaging the enemy, and the front, Israel was able to concentrate most of her power against Egypt while holding back sufficient reserves to meet intervention from another quarter. Thus Israel achieved local superiority on the Egyptian front despite her over-all quantitative inferiority as against the total Arab forces. Further, by taking on and soundly defeating the single largest and most aggressive of her enemies, the Israelis took the heart out of the other smaller Arab allies.

The Israelis utilized the unconventional methods and tactics of the indirect approach: extreme mobility, surprise, use of unlikely and unexpected roads and approaches, sudden flanking movements, night fighting--much the same tactics as those developed against the same enemy in the WAR of 1948-49, though now embellished with newer weapons, greater firepower, armor and air force, more highly motorized transportation, and the altogether new weapon, the paratrooper dropped well behind the enemy lines.

Werd
omitted

transportation, and the altogether new weapon, the bazooker
Greater firepower, armor and air force, more highly motorized
of 1948-49, though now emplanted with newer weapons,
such as those developed against the same enemy in the W.W. II
fighting movements, night fighting--much the same tactics
use of unlike and unexpected roads and approaches, sudden
tactics of the indirect approach; extreme mobility, ambience,
The Israelis utilized the unconventional methods and
Arp forces.

enemies, the Israelis took the heart out of the other ammen-
dating the single largest and most aggressive of her
total Arap forces. Further, by taking on and soundly
debate her over-all unithintative inferiority as against
Tune Israel achieved local superiority on the Egyptian front
frequent reserves to meet intervention from another quarter.
trate most of her power against Egypt while holding pack and
engaging the enemy, and the front, Israel was able to concen-
sother tactical advantage. Since she selected the time of
By taking the initiative, the Israelis obtained still
of the Suez Canal.

that the Israel Army would have gained control of both banks
of the Suez Canal, it was well within the realm of probability
their bases of strength in the Suez zone, nor later land-
there been no Anglo-French ultimatum, no bargaining by
agreements of Tinnan at the mouth of the Gulf of Adabs. Had

-13-

-14-

To a student of military science, such daring strategy
may seem foolhardy, an all or nothing move which should
never be made unless in the last extremity. This point
might be well taken had the opponent been an army up to
European standards. But military planning takes into account
the calibre of the enemy. Given the quality of the opponent
here, and the relatively favorable political conditions,
the risk of such a move was tremendously lessened.

Generally speaking, in this campaign the Egyptians
seemed less inclined to put up a fight than in 1948. Many
of their best officers had forsaken the army, in the interim,
for politics. Further, the Egyptian military leaders were
mentally geared for attack, and had conditioned themselves
to think of Israel quickly succumbing to the combined on-
slaughter. Suddenly to find themselves outflanked was more
than confounding, it was unnerving, and they never recovered
their equilibrium.

This is not to say that the sudden collapse of the
Egyptian forces means that they were not indeed a serious
force with which to contend. Rather, from the foregoing,
the reader must conclude that the taking of the initiative
and the utmost exploitation of the element of surprise were
of the greatest importance, precisely because the Egyptian
force was formidable and could be defeated only by these
methods in this situation, and these methods did, in fact,
produce the results intended.

produce the results intended.

methods in this situation, and these methods did, in fact, force was formidable and could be defeated only by these of the greatest importance, precisely because the Egyptian and the utmost exploitation of the element of amphora were the reader must conclude that the taking of the initiative force with which to contend. Rather, from the foregoing, Egyptian forces means that they were not indeed a serious This is not to say that the sudden collapse of the their equilibrium.

than confounding, it was unnerving, and they never recovered from it. Suddenly to find themselves outflanked was more to think of Israel quickly accompanying themselves. Further, the Egyptian military leaders were of their best officers had tormented the army, in the interim, seemed less inclined to put up a fight than in 1948. Many generally speaking, in this campaign the Egyptians the risk of such a move was tremendously lessened.

here, and the relatively favorable political conditions, the calibre of the enemy. Given the quality of the opponent European standards. But military planning takes into account might be well taken had the opponent been an army up to never be made unless in the last extremity. This point may seem toothless, an all or nothing move which should To a student of military science, such daring strategy

-14-

-15-

This large-scale operation was not without serious errors, tactical and otherwise. But on the whole, objective foreign military analysts have concluded that the campaign was brilliantly conceived and bravely and daringly executed. Thus were accomplished the three principal objectives of the Sinai Campaign: the striking power of the enemy had been destroyed, shipping was opened to Israel through the Red Sea to Eilat, The Fedayeen centers in the Gaza strip were eradicated, and the control of the Gaza area seemed to insure that it would no longer be the pestilential breeding ground for these infiltrators.

V

BY SOME FEW ISRAELI LEADERS

It was not unforeseen that the Anglo-French intervention might be a mixed blessing, with perhaps the greater weight on the side of the disadvantages to be gained by Israel. Without underestimating the advantage which the Israel forces gained from the Anglo-French intervention, and the crucial French veto power in the U.N., nevertheless one is safe in saying that the Israel victory was assured without it, and in point of fact secured long before the landing at Port Said. Save for the French arms supplies to meet, to some degree at least, the huge Arab arsenal, Israel was in no need of any foreign military assistance. Indeed there is good reason to feel that in the long run the Anglo-French intervention inflicted more harm than good upon Israel. After all, that

EFFECTED MORE HARM THAN GOOD UPON IARSEL. AFTER all, that
feel that in the long run the Anglo-French intervention in-
together military assistance. Indeed there is a good reason to
lesst, the unge Vrapraensel, Iarsel was in no need of any
Save for the French armee subplies to meet, to some degree at
in point of fact seemed long before the landing at Port Said.
Asking that the Iarseg victory was secured without it, and
French veto power in the U.M., nevertheless one is safe in
Bained from the Anglo-French intervention, and the crucial
Without underestimating the advantage which the Iarseg forces
weight on the side of the disadvantages to be gained by Iarseg.
tion might be a mixed blessing, with perhaps the greatest

It was not unforeseen that the Anglo-French interven-
MAY BE FAIMED AGAINST THE GREATER

V

Ground for these infiltrators.

In name that it would no longer be the bestialist breeding
were eradicated, and the control of the Gass area seemed to
Red Sea to East. The Bedouin centers in the Gass strip
been destroyed, subipping was opened to Iarseg through the
the First Campaign: the striking power of the enemy had
Thus were accomplished the three principal objectives of
was brilliantly conceived and pravely and daringly executed.
Foreign military assistance have concified that the campaign
errors, tactical and otherwise. But on the whole, objective
This large-scale operation was not without aero-

-12-

-15a-

intervention was not intended for Israel's benefit; on the
contrary it was probably, at least as far as the British
were concerned, undertaken in spite of the possibility of
such benefit, *JUST* as Israel's campaign was not
undertaken to supply an excuse for Britain and France to
conquer Egypt, but in spite of such a possibility.

- continue p. 16 -

- continue p. 16 -

condure Egypt, but in spite of such a boshelplicity.
undertaken to supply an excuse for Britain and France to
such benefit. In the same way as Larsef's campaign was not
were concerned, undertaken in spite of the boshelplicity of
contrary it was properly, at least as far as the British
intervention was not intended for Larsef's benefit; on the

-13a-

-16-

The operation by the French and English, though of motivation wholly unrelated to Israel, nevertheless gave the affair the character of a jointly motivated operation.

Thus Israel acquired the label of "tool of imperialist powers" which may, for years to come, impede Israel's desirable and necessary integration into the regional affairs of Asia.

Far from acting in this matter in any degree in Israel's interest, Britain was clearly acting for limited gains at a local level. When the affair was over, it was to be anticipated that Britain, her dependency on Middle East oil in mind, would seek to recoup her prestige and favor in the Arab world, and this, in her traditional fashion, by offering up Israel as the sacrifice. The recent withdrawal of the British Oil Companies from Israel bears out this anticipated tactic. British intervention thus, in the long view, was to widen the gap between herself and Israel, rather than close it.

Without intervention, Israel's defeat in the 1967 war was still certain. Defeat by Israel standing alone would have brought about Israel's complete personal downfall. As it was, the Anglo-French intervention provided the alibi, and he emerged a "hero who stood off three attacking powers simultaneously." A new legend has thus been created, more grist to the mill of propagandists in preparing for a third round.

Some of the Israeli leaders felt at the time that there was good reason to believe Israel would not be permitted to

was good reason to believe Israel would not be permitted to
some of the Israelite leaders felt at the time that there
preparing for a third round.

created, more frat to the will of Measera, probands in
BET B'OR, THE PARENTS, attacking bowers simultaneously. A new legend was thus HAVENOT, THE BURIAL, the birth of a complete person, would, without dren-
tsin. Defeat by Israel standing alone would, without cer-
Without intervention, Measera's defeat was still cer-
the gap between herself and Israel, rather than close it...
British intervention thus, in the long view, was to widen
Off Companies from Israel per se out this anticipated tactic.
Israel as the sacrifice. The recent withdrawal of the British
world, and this, in her traditional fashion, by offering up
wind, would seek to rebind her breath and favor in the war
bated that Britain, her dependency on Middle East off in
local level. When the stallion was owned, it was to be antici-
interest. Britain was clearly acting for limited gains at a
Erat from acting in this matter in any degree in Israel's
益

Bets. As
spare and necessary integration into the regional stadia of
bowers," which was, forbes to come, indeed Israel's dear-
Time Israel received the thrust from "tooth of imperishable
stain the character of a jointly motivated operation.
Israel the YAHWEH
 whomly unrelated to Israel, nevertheless gave the
The operation by the French and English, though of motiva-

tion wholly unrelated to Israel, nevertheless gave the
The operation by the French and English, though of motiva-
tion wholly unrelated to Israel, nevertheless gave the
The operation by the French and English, though of motiva-

-16-

-17-

take and hold both banks of the Suez Canal (until settlement of the differences), This being so, they reasoned that it would be wiser not to advance beyond the lines required by good military strategy. That is to say, the destruction of the Egyptian concentration which was in the North Sinai, relatively close to the Israel borders, the establishing of a topographically defensive line just west of the Egyptian bases with short lines of communication, and a line protecting the flank of the column which was advancing southward to Sharm Al-Sheikh, on the Straits of Aqaba. The deep advance into the Sinai peninsula beyond such a proposed line suggested to the world that this was an act of territorial expansion, rather than an act of defense. It gained nothing militarily, and was bad public relations.

One final error should be mentioned. This brilliant military campaign was not preceded by a suitable public relations program. World opinion had not been made sufficiently aware of the real character of the state of War that in fact existed despite the signing of armistice agreements, and was therefore surprised, not so much by the timing of the operation as by its boldness and scope. It seemed presumptuous and ill-conceived. Public relations in this matter did not mean that Israel need have tipped her hand. It did require that the world be acquainted with the background conditions and Israel's rights in that light. The failure of good public relations and an effective communication

The failure of good public relations and an effective communication
background conditions and Israel's rights in that light. The
It did require that the world be informed with the pack-
matter did not mean that Israel need have tipped her hand.
preempted and ill-conceived. Public relations in this
the operation had by its powers and scope. It seemed
and was therefore amounted, not so much by the timing of
in fact exalted despite the signing of armistice agreements,
ciently aware of the real character of the state of Israel that
relations program. World opinion had not been made until-
warfare campaign was not preceded by a suitable public
One final error should be mentioned. This is brilliant
and was bad public relations.

rather than an act of defense. It gained nothing favorably,
to the world that this was an act of territorial expansion,
into the State boundaries beyond such a proposed line suggested
Sharm-Ar-Sheiky, on the Strait of Adapa. The deep advance
ing the flank of the column which was advancing southward to
passes with short lines of communication, and a line protect-
ing of a topographically defensive line that was of the Egyptian
relatively close to the Irsellk borders, the east planning
of the Egyptian concentration which was in the North State,
by good military strategy. That is to say, the destruction
it would be wiser not to advance beyond the lines required
ment of the differences). This being so, they reasoned that
take and hold both banks of the Suez Canal (until settle-

-11-

-18-

with the rest of the world finally contributed to Israel's
political defeat following its military victory.

VI

If the destruction of the striking power of the enemy
was almost completely achieved, the case is not so with regard
to freedom of shipping in the international water-ways. The
Suez Canal is again under the exclusive control of the Egyptian
dictator and closed to Israel\* ships in violation of the
Constantinople Convention and U.N. declarations. At the
moment Israel\* is passing through the Straits of Tiran,
and the Eilat harbor is developing rapidly. But the test
will come when the U.N. emergency force, UNEF, evacuates its
positions in Sharm-al-Sheikh. The recent joint declaration
of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, following upon previous declara-
tions by the Egyptian dictator, which attempts to define
the Red Sea as Arabian private property, together with their
allegation of an Israel\* threat to the security of the Mecca
pilgrims, indicate that the Red Sea is likely to see stormy
weather unless the U.N. fulfills its duty in securing free
navigation to all nations, including Israel, through both
international waterways.

Israel cannot and must not abdicate her right to free-
dom of navigation. It is not only a matter of principle;
it is of the highest importance for reasons of economy,
and therefore politics, and security. The natural markets

and therefore politics, and security. The natural markets
it is of the highest importance for reasons of economy,
dom of navigation. It is not only a matter of principle;

Israel cannot and must not advocate her right to free-
international waterways.

navigation to all nations, including Israel, through both
weather unless the U.N. trifles its duty in securing free
b Pilgrimage, indicate that the Red Sea is likely to see atom-
sallegation of an IsraelX threat to the security of the Meca
the Red Sea as Arapian private property, together with their
tions by the Egyptian dictators, which attempts to define
of Saudi Arabia and Jordan, following upon previous decia-
ments in Sham-er-Sheikh. The recent joint declaration
will come when the U.N. emergency force, UNEP, evokes its
and the East horizon is developing rapidly. But the test
moment Israel is passing through the straits of Tires,
Constantinople Convention and U.N. declarations. At the
dictator and closed to IsraelX ships in violation of the
Brezestina is again under the exclusive control of the Egyptian
to freedom of shipping in the international waterways. The
was almost completely achieved, the case is not so with regard
It the destruction of the striking power of the enemy

VI

Political defeat following its military victory.
with the rest of the world thusly contributed to Israel's

-18-

-19-

for Israel's industrial products in the Arab countries are unfortunately closed to her; and the alternative markets are in East and South Africa, Asia, and the Far East. Those countries are able to supply a substantial part of Israel's needs in foodstuffs and raw materials. This mutually beneficial trade is not possible without the short sea route through the Red Sea. Moreover, the prospects of development of natural resources of the Negev, such as potash, copper, salt, marble, and phosphates, are largely dependent upon the possibility of export by sea to the East. Indeed, freedom of navigation is one of the most important means for Israel to attain the economic independence so vital to her. Just how vital economic independence can be was brought home to every Israeli by the threats and actualities of economic sanctions used against Israel by the United States and the Soviet Union during Israel's recent political rearguard action.

The struggle for freedom of navigation is still on. But we may say at the very least that the prospects are more hopeful than at any time since the signing of the Armistice Agreements in 1949. Be that as it may, Israel will tolerate no further inroads upon her freedom of shipping even if she has to protect her ships by force of arms.

With regard to the subsidiary advantages accruing to Israel from the Sinai campaign, perhaps the most important was the destruction of the Nasser legend and the relative

was the destruction of the Maaan legend and the relative
Israel from the Zinat campaign, perhaps the most important
With regard to the supplementary advantages accruing to
has to protect her ships by force of arms.

no further inscriptions upon her freedom of shipping even if she
Agreements in 1949. Be that as it may, Israel will tolerate
hopeful than at any time since the signing of the Armistice
But we may ask at the very least that the broacts are more
The attraction for freedom of navigation is still on.

resignation action.

States and the Soviet Union during Israel's recent political
of economic sanctions need against Israel by the United
brought home to every Israeli by the threats and actualities
to her. Just how vital economic independence can be was
meant for Israel to attain the economic independence so vital
Indeed, freedom of navigation is one of the most important
dependent upon the possibility of export by sea to the East.
botsan, copper, salt, marmel, and phosphates, are largely
development of natural resources of the Negev, such as
ses route through the Red Sea. Moreover, the prospects of
mutually beneficial trade is not possible without the short
Israel's needs in foodstuffs and raw materials. This
Those countries are able to supply a substantial part of
are in East and South Africa, Asia, and the Far East.
unfortunately closed to her; and the alternative markets
for Israel's industrial products in the Arab countries are

-10-

-20-

liberation of the rest of the Arab world from his impact
upon their imagination. This latter development however
should not be overestimated, since a new myth may well be
in the making. Whatever may be the stories of the Arab
propagandists, more Arabs than ever before, and particularly
the thousands of Egyptian prisoners-of-war, know the truth
about Israel's strength and determination. Without under-
estimating the effects of propaganda in the future, the
Arab rulers will undoubtedly think twice ~~BEFORE~~ ABOUT resuming
large-scale war against Israel, unless they ~~AGAIN~~ find themselves
in an exceptionally favorable international situation, as
may well happen.

The Sinai campaign did make clear to the world the
true nature of the situation in the Middle East, on the
basis of which, it is to be hoped that more and more powers
will come to the conclusion that a final settlement is needed.
It looks as if even the Arabs themselves had needed such further
proof that the annihilation of Israel is not within the
scope of their possible attainment, as a stage in their
gradual reconciliation to the fact of her existence. More
specifically, the Arab refugees who had, until the campaign,
accepted the propaganda of the Arab leaders that their only
solution lay in their return to Israel after its destruction
by avenging Arab armies, have now undergone their own
"agonizing reappraisal," and now face up to the realistic
directions of a solution--resettlement in the underpopulated

directions of a solution--re settlement in the underpopulated
"sionizing resbristaf", " and now face up to the realistic
py swaging Arap armies, have now undergone their own
solution lay in their return to Israel after its destruction
accepted the propaganda of the Arap leaders that their only
specifically, the Arap refugees who had, until the campaign,
GRUSHAL reconciliation to the lot of her exatence. More
sabe of their boasie attainment, sa a stage in their
bront that the annihilation of Israel is not within the
It looks sa if even the Arap themselves needed and further
will come to the conclusion that a final settlement is needed.
pars of which it is to be hoped that more and more powers
true nature of the situation in the Middle East, on the
The Sisst campaign did make clear to the world the
sa well happen.

in an exceptionally favorable international situation, sa

large-asiee war against Israel, unless they find themselves
Arab rulers will undoubtedly think twice about rearming
estimating the effects of propaganda in the future, the
spont Israel's strength and determination. Without under-
the thousands of Egyptian prisoners-of-war, know the truth
propaganda, more Arap than ever before, and particularly
in the making. Whatever may be the stories of the Arab
should not be overestimated, since a new myth may well be
upon their imagination. This latter development however
aggeration of the rest of the Arab world from his impact

-50-

-21-

areas of the fertile Arab crescent to the north of Israel.

The large quantities of arms which fell into Israel's hands during the Sinai campaign may also be regarded as one of the gains of the war, though they by no means free Israel from the necessity of acquiring new equipment to match the recently acquired Arab supplies, which, at this writing, have more than recouped her losses.

~~The~~ Political achievements of this kind, notwithstanding their importance, do not justify the use of force for their attainment. Only in two cases--in the struggle for national liberation from a foreign conqueror, and in the struggle against a domestic tyrant--is the use of armed force for purely political ends justified. Otherwise, political ends must be achieved by political means, even though the progress is infinitesimally slow. In Israel's case, the first and foremost objective was defense of the country against a foreign invader. Any nation which intends to survive is, in such a case, not only justified, but obliged to resort to armed force in her self-defense. Otherwise, our world would become a paradise for aggressors.

Due to international political conditions, the victory in the Sinai does not, alas, mark the end of belligerency; but it did save Israel from a terrible and immediate trial, and won for her another breathing space, at least, for immigration, construction and development in relative security.

now for her another preaching abode, at least, for immigration,
it did save Israel from a terrible and immediate crisis, and
the Sino does not, alas, mark the end of pell mell ood; but
Due to international political conditions, the victory in
our world would become a paradise for aggressors.

to resort to armed force in her self-defence. Otherwise,
to survive in, in such a case, not only quantified, but obliged
country against a foreign invader. Any nation which intends
case, the first and foremost objective was defence of the
though the progress is infinitely small. In Israel's
political ends must be achieved by political means, even
force for purely political ends quantified. Otherwise,
attract against a domestic tyrant--is the use of armed
national liberation from a foreign conqueror, and in the
their attainment. Only in two cases--in the angle for
ing their importance, do not quantify the use of force for

the political achievements of this kind, notwithstanding
have more than recomped her losses.

recently acquired Vap abattoirs, which, at this writing,
the necessity of acquiring new equipment to match the
of the gains of the war, though they pay means free Israel
panda during the Sino campaign may also be regarded as one
The large quantities of arms which fell into Israel's
area of the fertile Vap crescent to the north of Israel.

-SF-

- 22 -

VII.

The failure of the Nasser's regime down fall was, nevertheless, most surprising. All dictatorships - especially a military dictatorship such as that of the Egyptian clique - are founded on the authority eminating from diplomatic achievements on the external front, on economic achievements on the internal front and last but not least, they are based on military force which suppresses all opposition- potential or existing. Whilst the Egyptian junta had little to show on the front of economy, as compared to its own promises or to Egypt's most pressing economic needs, the clique did, indeed, show the most amazing success on the diplomatic front. It could have been thus assumed that when serious clouds arose on the external horizon on one hand, and when the military basis on which the regime relied was seriously shaken on the other hand - the regime would collapse. Further events frustrated this logical sequence. In the first place, most of the regime's would-be opponents were already in Egypt's graveyards, or safely behind barbed wire or in exile. The Chief-in-Command, in whom many see a possible alternative to the present dictator, shared in the responsibility of defeat. Furthermore, even as Egypt's military forces were engaged in desperate warfare, the military junta retained sufficient forces in Cairo and Alexandria to mantain their hold over the masses.

Reliable observers testified that when Sinai was taken by Israel forces and Port Said was in the hands of the British and French, the Egyptian ruler seriously considered abdication. At that very moment a ray of hope appeared in the form of the

- 23 -

support given him by the two greatest powers the United States on
one hand and the Sovient Union on the other, each motivated by
different reasons. The regime was saved from immediate collapse.
Nevertheless, tens of thousands of Arabs, including thousands of
Egyptian soldiers, saw the regime at its weakest. Furthermore,
Egypt is beset by economic difficulties on an increasing scale,
caused by over expenditure for the military added to the ever
existing basic economic problems of the country. Consequently, it
is reasonable to assume that in the future this regime will not
be spared trials and tribulations.

The results of the Sinai campaign - and even of the inconclusive
French-British landings in the Suez zone - accorded the world a
golden opportunity to tackle some of the real problems of the
Middle East. The opportunity was not seized. A similar opportunity
had been lost at the close of the 1948-9 war, when the United Nations
imposed upon Israel a vague armistice agreement, rather than a firm
peace.

The Russians discovered all of a sudden that their god-child,
the Egyptian military regime whom they had derrfully and lovingly
reared, proved to be "the staff of bruised reed". They hastened to
the dictator's rescue, using vain threats aimed at Israel, Britain
and France, intimidating the use of guided missiles and the dispatch
of so called "volunteers". Russia summarily suspended her oil
shipments to Israel and recalled her Ambassador from Tel-Aviv, she
did not matter enough courage to recall his colleagues from London
and Paris.

The American Administration was panic stricken. One could not help sensing that the Administration's policy was one of annoyance; annoyance at her NATO allies for having done it alone, annoyance at Israel for not having heeded the President's earlier warning. Even at a later stage this policy was continued, possibly in order to fish in troubled waters whilst Russia was busy in Hungary, whilst Britain and France were deeply involved in Egypt, how could the United States resist the temptation to be the one, the only one to hold out the "torch of freedom"? Thus, the United States too used all the pressure at her disposal - political and especially economical - to effect Israel's total withdrawal.

And the Secretary General of the United Nations, who not once during his entire tenure, brought pressure on Egypt to act according to her irrevocable obligations under the Armistice Agreement (to refrain from belligerancy, not to engage in hostile acts, to permit free navigation in the Suez Canal) adapted a super legalistic attitude. The Secretary General would not be satisfied with anything less than the restoration of the status quo, he was incapable of grasping the historic opportunity which was his, that of the highest civil servant of the world community. Since the military battle was decided within a short time and the advance of the armies had come to a standstill after but a few days, there was no truth even in the assumption that this engagement might have brought about another Korea. The reasonable thing to have done under these circumstances would have been to impose a "cease fire" there and then and to engage in peace negotiations at once. After all what would have been asked to do? She was not required to make any

- 25 -

territorial concessions, not to pay damages, nor to renege the
nationalization of Suez Canal Company, nor did anybody suggest that
she change her regime. All that was asked of Egypt was to make peace
with the Egyptian military and her neighbors and to guarantee free
passage to all flags through the Suez Canal. Does it not stand to
reason that Egypt faced with the alternative of the Suez Canal and
the Sinai Peninsula occupied and her economy on the verge of collapse
would have chosen to negotiate peace in return for Sinai and the canal.
Unfortunately, the combined forces of a prestige complex, of political
expediency and the lack of real statesmanship restored the geographic
positions with their built in inevitable troubles and tribulations.
Proof, indeed, that greatness is not always related to size, strength,
wealth or office. To-day, a year later, when dark clouds are again
rising in the Middle East, in Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, not to
mention others, it is evident to all how shorsighted the post Sinai
policy of the great Powers and the U.N. was.

- 26 -

VIII.

It is not accidental that the French and the British yielded
to pressure after a short while, abandoning Israel to withstand it
on her own, for there had been no military alliance between Israel
and these two and since their interests at state were, evidently, not
as vital as those for which Israel fought. The political courage
of Israel in her refusal to yield to increasing pressure should
not be minimized. For four long months Israel fought a lone and
difficult political battle against a one sided U.N. resolution,
adopted by an overwhelming majority. She did so with a view of
arriving at a solution which would make peace possible or failing
that make war impossible.

It is nonsense to say that Israel's stubbornness amounted to
a violation of international democracy. With all due respect to
the importance of the United Nations to-day and to its hopes for the
future, the United Nations Organization is not as yet a world goven-
ment, not is it an impartial international Supreme Court. During
the very days of United Nations pressure on Israel, the Secretary
General of the U.N. was not even permitted to visit Hungary, yet
the Hungarian problem was under discussion at the same time and
resolutions adopted to cope with it. The U.N. is nothing but an
additional forum - a most important one, it is true - of international
deliberation and of power struggle amongst the nations. One cannot
approach it formally and academically; of necessity one must deal
with it realistically and politically, and in doing so each of its
member nationa must strive to improve it and to contribute to its

- 27 -

prestige and power, based on equality between nations in order to
gradually make it into the safeguard of international justice and
peace.

Frankly, whilst not underestimating the severe risks
involved, I, personally, felt that Israel should not have yielded
to pressure, at least not in the case of Gaza and the Straits of
Tiran, choosing the least of the two evils (?). The Israel Government
in deciding to evacuate Gaza did so because she had been given to
understand that she was so doing on the assumption that she could
expect that Egyptian forces would not be permitted to reoccupy the
Strip. Nevertheless, within a short while Egyptian rule was restored.
Gaza had never been part of Egypt, and was always an integral part
of historical Palestine. Egyptian rule of the Gaza Strip was a
result of Egyptian military occupation in defiance of the then
existing U.N. resolutions. The narrow, over craded Gaza Strip is
of no service to Egypt economically; the sole purpose Egypt's
occupation of the Strip serves is to perpetuate the nursing of the
refugees in it and to make it impossible for ever for anyone to
tackle their problem and solve it. The other purpose of retaining the
strip under Egyptian control is to use it as a military bridgehead
against Israel.

Neither the present thinly spread line of U.N.E.F. soldiers
along the borders of the Gaza Strip, nor a more densely guarded line
can prevent the infiltration of well trained Bed Sheetens. In spite of
the good intentions and devotion of the U.N.E.F., there have already
been casualties in the Negev caused by Egyptian terrorists from
behind the U.N. line. True, Israel's security situation has

- 28 -

improved considerably, thanks to the Sinai campaign, yet there is
sufficient evidence that, whilst there is no prospect of immediate
all out Arab attack, Israel might face increasing guerilla and
terroristic attack from across the borders.

It seems as if inadvertently the U.N.E.F. serves as a
cover for vast new Russian arm shipments to Egypt, for the re-
organization of Egypt armed forces, for the reconstruction of
military bases, for the continued defiance by Egypt of international
law in the Suez Canal, and last not least, for the reestablishment
of Bedéyehen units under Egyptian command and their training for
future incursion into Israel from various directions. It looks
as if history repeats itself.

While the political achievements Israel derived from the
Sinai Campaign fell short of her expectations, the major aim of
the campaign was, nevertheless, achieved, the threatened destruction
of Israel was averted. History will judge this event as having
been successful and justified.

- 29 -

IX.

It is a mistake to assume that the Middle East crisis is a result of the conflict between the Arab States and Israel. The state of war in the M.E. is but a result of the global cold war between East and West, whereas those professing neutrality are not "neutral" in their approach to the M.E. either. Were it not for the irresponsible competition between the Great Powers for hegemony in the Middle East there would be better prospects for peace in the M.E. Why should any Arab government make peace with Israel when it is not subject to any pressure from the U.N., or the Great Powers, including India, politically, economically and morally, to abandon belligerency and choose peace. Unfortunately, the great powers act in the old imperialist tradition of "divide and rule" and exploit the conflict between Israel and the Arab nations, as well as the conflict between the Arab nations themselves and social tension in Arab society, to their own advantage and expediency. Shipping arms, corrupting governments and appeasing Arab rulers - at the expense of Israel at times - serve the Great Powers but one purpose, to gain footholds in the region. This policy can lead to one result: setting the Middle East on fire again, a fire which the chancelleries of the world may spread.

It is wrong to assume that there is a vacuum in the Middle East, created, as it were, by the termination of British and French colonial rule. The Middle East at the mid-point of the twentieth century is not what it was at the time of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. There are in the Middle East today independent nations and nations on the road to independence, as there are in Asia and Africa. Their independence is endangered by any unilateral "protection". They will not preserve their independence by being oversaturated by arms, exaggerated armament leads to adventure and overtaxes their economies. The only safeguard for their independence is in economic development, in social reform, helped along by international aid.

- 30 -

The clash of last October in Sinai and Suez was an inevitable result of this adventurous policy on the part of all the great powers. The prevention of similar outbreaks in the future will come about by new policies, not by policing. It is high time that the U.N., the great powers and, last not least, the people of the Middle East should think in terms of real solutions and a peaceful settlement. It stands to reason that such a course of action would also serve the interests of the great competitive Powers.

The economics of the U.S. and of Russia - unlike those of the former European colonial powers, do not depend on the Middle East for either their sources of raw materials and energy or their markets. True, the American oil companies have vast interests in the Middle East, but those are commercial interests of profit-seeking companies rather than vital parts of the American economy. It appears, that henceforth the interest of the Great Powers in the Middle East is strategical and ideological rather than economical. The tremendous development of the strategical Air Forces, and the great advance of the intercontinental guided missiles, accompanied by the overwhelmingly destructive power of the nuclear weapons, have to a large degree reduced the importance of air bases in proximity to the opponents' borders. It is being said, that nuclear weapons have made global warfare impossible and that we shall have local limited wars. There is no guarantee, however, that local wars, in the M.E. or elsewhere, might not bring about a global clash, especially since the great powers are further committing themselves militarily to their respective blocs. It does not follow, that the overwhelming nuclear strength should make either side surrender to the other's blackmailing. On the other hand, in as much as local fires may spread to their own backyards, it appears to be in the vital interest of the Big Powers to avert these local clashes. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have, by now, made strong footholds for themselves in the Middle East. It is no longer possible for either to drive the other out by ordinary

means, as much as they would want to, whilst it is too dangerous to do so militarily. Might it, therefore, not be advisable for both to reach a mutual agreement to withdraw militarily from this most sensitive area? The Russians would be relieved of the proximity of American strategic bases, whilst the Americans would no longer worry about Russian penetration to the rear of the Northern tier and into territory vital to international lines of communications. The people of the Middle East would then be given an opportunity to establish their attitudes and relationships with the world powers and ideologies. In those circumstances feudal Kings and slave merchants might cease to be regarded as saviours of parliamentary democracy and fascist regimes as emissaries of communist ideas. The bargaining position of the Arab nations would be reduced to its proper proportions, whilst at the same time social evolution and changes in Arab society would be permitted to take their natural course. The western fuel consumers would not be deprived of Middle Eastern oil. Indeed, the world will reconcile itself to the idea that oil is a product to be bought commercially and not gotten through concessions, bases and bribery. The Middle Eastern countries need commercial markets for their oil as much as the West needs this source of power. Thus commerce and trading between the Middle Eastern countries and the world would also assume a more normal relationship.

It is the duty of the smaller nations not to abandon this field to the two giants. Obviously, Poland and Yugoslavia, the Scandinavians and the French, the Vatican and the Latins, Ghana and Burma, amongst others, have a contribution to make. A special role can and should be India's. India, having recognised Israel, must draw the logical conclusion of establishing diplomatic relations with her. India's failure to do so is interpreted by Arab governments as a qualified recognition. Because of India's special standing in the Middle East she must do more than play lip service to Israel's existence. Action by India at this juncture would be a great contribution to normalising the Middle East.

Neutralizing the Middle East in the East-West conflict should not bring about the isolation of the area from the rest of the world. The Middle East needs economic, technical and scientific assistance. Some of the Middle Eastern countries because of their relative youth guard their independence and sovereignty with exaggerated zeal and might distrust, alas dislike, a potential source of aid. A special international agency to provide the Middle East with the help it requires is thus called for.

This program may sound utopian and unrealistic. Yet this program is a must for all concerned, and therefore it is possible. Sooner or later it will have to come about. It is the duty of statesmanship to initiate it before there is further disaster. A solution such as this will not put an end to competition between the powers in the Middle East. It will, however, restrict competition to more responsible means and be focused to a large degree on competition between ideologies and systems of government. It might be beneficial if the Middle East were to experience genuine competitive co-existence. Moreover, this may have some beneficial effects on the internal policies of the Great Powers, who will endeavour to improve those in order to sell them abroad.

Will the ones to embark on a program of this kind remain above perhaps? This is not likely, but if they do, then it will be proven to the people of the area, who have their welfare at heart and who do not. This, too, would work to the advantage of those with enough foresight to have initiated this program in the first place.

- 32 -

X.

Whilst untiring efforts must be invested in such a long-range comprehensive program, policies addressing themselves to problems at closer range must nevertheless be initiated in the meantime. True, the situation is complex. It is as dangerous to have illusions as it is to despair. Immediate peace between Israel and the Arab Nations may not be feasible, yet it is imperative that problems be tackled one by one with consistency and vigour. The more problems solved - less danger of war and better prospect for peace. It is suggested that:

(1) In order to avoid military clashes it is necessary - since disarmament is not possible - to bring about an arms embargo. This is to be done after a military balance is established in the entire area. If after an embargo is agreed on it should be disregarded by anyone, it will be possible to redress the balance at once.

(2) The tragic problem of the Arab refugees, especially those of the Gaza Strip, should be taken out of the hands of the Arab Governments, some of whom use their plight as a political tool. The U.N. should initiate negotiations with the refugees themselves. A realistic attractive program, especially one with a time limit to it, will convince increasing numbers of refugees that there is an alternative to their misery. Some Arab Governments began to realise that the refugees are a double-edged sword and would cooperate with such a scheme. Settlement programs in the fertile crescent, in Iraq in particular, will greatly enhance the economic development of these countries. Israel should be asked to cooperate in such program, and will do so willingly. With resoluteness this problem is capable of a solution.

(3) Irrigation projects should be initiated forthwith, even if initially not all countries agree to cooperate. It has been shown that it is technically possible to implement irrigation schemes, such as the Johnston Jordan River Plan, gradually. If a beginning is made, eventually such schemes will engulf all who stand to benefit from them.

(4) The U.N. would contribute greatly if it insisted that the Armistice Agreements be fully respected, in letter and spirit. The U.N. and Governments should make it abundantly clear that economic boycott against Israel is illegal. The Arab boycott should and can be hoisted. All Arabs cannot afford to be isolated commercially from the entire world.

It should be made crystal clear that there will be free navigation, free to all flags, in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Aqaba. This would be the condition for final recognition of Egypt's understandable demands for full ownership of the Suez Canal.

The U.N. should insist that the Arabs desist from belligerency in all forms, word or bullet. The U.N. must clearly differentiate between acts of aggression and acts of defence.

The 1949 Armistice Agreements were meant as but a step toward peace settlements. It is the duty of the U.N. to see that those provisions in the agreements calling for negotiated peace be enforced.

It is to be assumed that if moral, political and economic pressure - similar to that used on Israel during the Sinai dispute - were used on the Arab governments, it would oblige them to adhere to those provisions of the Armistice Agreements to which they are signatories.

And Israel? Israel's ability to contribute to the solution of these problems is, of course, more limited than that of the great powers and the U.N.. Nevertheless, she, too, can make a decisive contribution. Israel's desire for peace must be channelled into a more dynamic strategy. Israel must improve her public relations, not only vis-a-vis the world at large, but especially regarding the Arab world. She must reach not only the Arab Governments, but the Arab masses.

- 35 -

Israel has something to offer to her neighbours, in return for peaceful relations. Israel is a natural market for some of the products of the Arab countries, which Israel today imports from far away lands. Israel can offer her neighbours technical and scientific aid without political strings. As a result of Israel's geographical position in the area - between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea - no land communications in the Middle East are possible without Israel participation.

Israel can offer free port facilities to those land-locked Arab countries. Israel will also make a substantial financial contribution to the settlement of the Arab refugees.

More and more Arabs realise that continued conflict, in addition to bringing disaster upon them, is exploited by outside powers, as it is exploited by reactionary leaders in the Arab countries, and that it works to their disadvantage economically.

Ours is an age in which neighbouring countries organise for economic, political and security cooperation. The Middle East more than any other region of the world needs such cooperation. The objective of Israel's foreign policy must be her integration into a Regional Commonwealth of Nations, in the widest sense of the word, for economic, political and scientific cooperation. Such an organisation would provide the basis for independence, prosperity and, finally, could be a safeguard for lasting peace in the area. Regional cooperation of this kind would transform the Middle East from an underdeveloped problem child of the world into an area which would make to the world the contribution which it historically is to make.