TelCon
Rollie Evans/Mr. Kissinger

10:05, 12-23-72

K: Hello.

E: Dr. Kissinger.

K: You're being presumptuous calling me at my office.

E: You've got an opportunity which I just thought I'd throw out to you. Have you got a full house tonight. In the box?

K: No.

E: You're still interested in it. You going?

K: Yes.

E: You don't want us? Whose looking after you?

K: I'd love you. Al and Nancy

E: Cause we have an illness, not serious, but the party thing is, Sarah can't go, so we are cancelling it.

K: Oh, I'm delighted.

E: You're sure.

K: Oh, yes.

E: Who's coming with you?

K: Well, Al Haig and his wife and Nancy.

E: That's terrific. Are you going to have dinner afterwards.

K: And we'll have dinner afterwards. I'm delighted.

E: If you mean it, I'd love--

K: No, I mean it. For a minute I even had your old pal Laird and that would have been too much.

E: I wouldn't have done that.

K: Yes, you would.

E: I don't think a guy could stand the strain of sitting there for two hours in a theater with you and Mel.

BRAUNER

AUG. 27 1966 - 27. MAI 1967

BIBLIOTHEK DER NAZI

K: You're good friends, I don't know why--

E: You know we are, I'm only kidding. He's one of the few top officials in this town who is making a point of knocking down all the speculation about a Kissinger/Nixon rift.

K: That's right. The others are hoping. Except they don't know which side I'm supposed to be on, left or right.

E: Well, now listen, tonight, where we meet you--at the theater at 7:30.

K: 7:30 at the theater and we'll have dinner afterwards.

E: How do we get in. Do we just go--

K: Well, wait at the, you know where they take the tickets.

E: Yeah, we'll be there at 7:15 then.

K: Good, we'll be there between 7:15 and 7:30.

E: We'll meet you there and you'll have the tickets.

K: You don't mind if I put you a little bit--not in the front row-

E: As long as I have Nancy beside me, that's all that matters.

K: Just as long as I'm not seen with you.

E: Is Mrs. Haig beautiful?

K: Oh, yes.

E: Put me next to Mrs. Haig. She and I are the lowest ranking guest anyway.

K: Good, that'd be great.

E: All right, we'll be there at 7:15, and wait for you at the main entrance.

K: Well, go to the Eisenhouer Theater and at the place where they take the tickets.

E: Where they take the tickets we will be waiting for you.

K: Good, it will be great to see you. Bye.

E: Bye.

2

10:45 a.m., December 23

Amb. Sullivan/Dr. Kissinger

S: Just wanted to report on the call. Have you had anything yet from Paris on this that you had this morning.

K: No, Haig told me something, but I didn't quite ...

S: I had a telephone call and they said they were sending a message to you through Colonel Gay's channels. But the essence of it is that they spent about 20 minutes berating us for our bombing, saying this was a violation of the obligation that you had undertaken.

K: Go on ...

S: Then our friends ... Eisen (sp?) went back to them and had at them for a while and then they said, what do you want to do? And the North Vietnamese said, well, you propose a time for a meeting. We want to meet some other day. So Eisen said how about the 27th, Wednesday, and they said we'll consider it. And that's the way it's been left.

K: Well, I don't want anyone to ever ask what do you want to do. I think next time we just say, let's go to the agenda.

S: Well, they wouldn't go to the agenda. And they said no they wouldn't, and we said, well, what do you want to do. And they said propose a day for another meeting. ________ decided to put it on the proposal on the grounds that rather than be breaking it off.

K: Well, what do you think they are trying to do?

S: Well, I don't know. They may be having some difficulty in getting their people together to get a decision. They still have ________ in Moscow.

K: Did the other guy come back from Paris?

S: I don't have a report on his return. I assume he was due back.

K: Well, I think we've been giving them a massive problem.

S: According to the Intelligence people they can find nothing to sustain this report that Giap has been killed. It turned out to be in-house Vietnamese traffic.

CLASSIFIED

Anon. E012 55-8
B-56 (SK) Dated 6/10/63

2

K: They seemed to have knocked out the Geolarm (sp?) Airport.

S: They've knocked out a good proportion on the runway on it.

K: They are aiming for something else.

S: Apparently they hit that hospital twice which isn't going to do us any good. And I gather that the Bulgarians came in this morning and their place got hit too.

K: Well, there's one happy thought. In Hanoi you can only hit unpleasant bastards.

S: Mostly. Although the Canadians have just called and want to come and see me, so may be we've done something to them. I don't know how they will fit in the category.

K: No. Do they also want to come in?

S: Well, I don't know what it's about; he didn't sound very urgent but he wants to come in to see me.

K: Well, they called me yesterday about something else and said whatever they may do to us ultimately they'll help us get started -- whatever that means.

S: Well, we'll see what they have in mind. I also have the Thai Ambassador coming in. Is there anything particular you want me to say to him?

Al

K: No. I think I'll take care of that pretty well.

S: How's Al's morale? Did he get anybody signed up.

K: Well, he got everyone signed except that son-of-a-bitch in Saigon.

S: That's the one that counts.

K: But my impression is from some of the intelligence I got here that in his city way he's moving about the way you said he would.

S: I think if we keep the screws on him he'll eventually come along. I think we'll have to assume is that we'll get a signature (?) which will be valid but perhaps his performance will be (?). That will give us ultimate problems but it is important that it will be over.

CLASSIFIED

Approved 12/26/84

BSENTENCED 12/1/84

3

K: But that's what my impression is -- that he is, you know, from some of the stuff we intercept -- that he is maneuvering in a particularly obnoxious way. You know, he has absolutely no ability to do for any long range thinking. Everything is just one little crappy move after another. That's the way he's lived. He's maneuvering for maximum survival in the short term and is almost guaranteeing his bemise.

S: OK Well, he has in effect said that to some of his ... from some of the stuff we've seen.

K: What?

S: That this is currently what he's doing with him on the short term and in the long term it looked pretty bad.

K: Yeh, but for what? What looks bad?

S: Everything. It looks bad in the sense that he won't be able to hold the situation together. Whether that is just a domestic thing.

K: Well, I think he's bringing that on himself, don't you?

S: Certainly as far as United States' Congress action is concerned, I think he will be. I'm not quite sure what the Congress will eventually come up with eventually.

K: Well, I think we can keep this up for a few more months.

S: Somebody is putting out optimism that we are going to be meeting before Inauguration, alleging from the White House.

K: Not I.

S: No, I know it's not you; I just wondered if that's any deliberate purpose because I've been sort of....

K: No, I stick with you. You know, you have all these wise guys that we've got running loose here, who, when they thought it was working put out the word that the Rx word that the President made me hit in -- now they are stuck with it, and I can never guarantee who puts out what. It is not authorized by the President -- that I know for sure.

S: That's what I figured; I couldn't imagine why 'cause it won't wash.

K: What do you think? Do you think they'll be no other meeting before the Inauguration?

DR. ASSISTED

Author: E.212.958-

B:G SM:V D: 6/10/93

["4", "S: I find it very hard to see how they can under the circumstances,\nalthough I must say you saw that Chinese exercise yesterday.\nThe two fellows who came in from Paris and refused to leave\neven the peace of paper, just made a very mild and oral <u>xx</u>\nand our people here interpret that just about the minimum they\ncan get away with.", "K: And the Russians have certainly been very muted.", "S: Breznov's statement was ...", "K: Well, it has to be the context of a long speech placing you as\nSoviet relations.", "S: Right. And publishing the President's statement in Tass.\nI don't know. But they've got problems - I agree with you\nthoroughly on that at the current moment.", "K: Let's review where we stand early next week.", "S: Okay.", "CLASSIFIED", "BROKERAGE", "5010100100100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

TELCOM

John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 p.m. 12/23/72

HK: John?

JS: Yes.

HK: Henry Kissinger. You wanted me to return a call to you.

JS: Yes, I wanted to know if you'd be interested in going to the football game.

HK: I got tickets already--

JS: All right. Just though we all needed to relax a bit and watch the Redskins--

HK: Aren't you nice. I appreciate that. I appreciate it very much.

JS: Very good, then I'll see you at the game tomorrow.

HK: Good Marvelous. Thank you John.

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 2012

By: SP科技 Date: 1/10/12

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Dave Kraslow

12/23/72 12:25 p.m.

DK: Listen, I didn't call you on any matters of great urgency--I just wanted to wish you a very happy holiday season--

HK: Dave, you're a good friend.

DK: And I want you to know I am just sick at what I see happening around town---the whole attitude is turning venemous once again.

HK: Dave you know there is nothing that I have more wanted than to end this thing with the spirit of reconciliation.

DK: I know it. And I am just sick at what's going on and I am sure you are too.

HK: Well

DK: I just hope it's not going to last that much longer because I can see signs of great difficulty ahead.

HK: There's no question about that--it's a great tragedy

DK: As I said I didn't call to ask any questions or get information.

HK: You've been a good friend, Dave and I've never forgotten that.

DK: Dappreciate that and you've been a friend too and I wanted you to know that I was thinking about you and hope that you can pull this goddamn thing off and get this monkey off our back.

HK: Believe me it won't be through lack of effort.

DK: Well I hope it won't be too long Henry. Have a happy holiday

HK: Same to you dave and hope to see you soon.

DK: I would like very much to see you if you're in town next week.

HK: Next week I'll be gone most of the week, but the week after then let's have lunch. I will definitely set it the week after.

DK: Good take care of yourself.

CLASSIFIED

Dated: 12/23/72

TELCONE
President/Mr. Kissinger

12/23/72 12:50 p.m.

HK: Mr. President.

RN: How are you getting along with your children?

HK: I'm back in Washington now, Mr. President.

RN: I see, you just went there for the day.

HK: That's right, for the evening.

RN: I see, how were they?

HK: They were fine, they couldn't be nicer.

RN: Good, okay. Anything new today?

HK: They flew 30 B-52's this morning and they all got back, so, you know, we'll still lose here and there but --it's two days in a row now that we haven't lost any.

RN: Right. They throw an important mission

HK: They went a little bit--outside the Hanoi area this time--they went up into the buffer zone with China, where they had found 100 railway cars piled up --and that's good. I've seen some pictures now, some of the damage we're doing--

RN: You still feel that way, Henry?

HK: Oh yeh, Moorer brought over some of the pictures--

RN: You got his attention huh?

HK: Ohhh, we got his attention Mr. President--we have his attention.

RN: Isn't a crime we have to do this though--we did it at Cambodia, we did it at ______, how many times do you have to do it?

HK: Well, I gave him hell and he said during the summer, he sent in at least 50 requests for new authorities which were disapproved

RN: The point is, did we ever know it?

Page 7

RN: I am really the only one who has to be around--the others can be off. There's not a damn thing any of us can do. Except to get the heat on--I guess the heat is on Moorer enough though.

HK: Oh the heat is on Moorer enough now Mr. President--I think frankly we ought to leave him alone for the next week or so --

RN: Fine, I'm all for it--he knows what he has to do and I think he's telling the truth--I think Laird is just--

HK: He's got a good plan now I'll send it down to you.

RN: No, I don't want to see it--if the plan is--you know what I mean--I will not get into tactics--I just want something stiffer--Do you think it is an adequate--

HK: It's a good plan--I spent an hour with him this morning.

RN: This is for what Henry?

HK: For next week's operation and their major emphasis now is going to cut off Hanoi from the rest of the country.

RN: I see.

HK: They are going after the transportation system again and so it looks-- they understand that the major weight of this can be kept north of the 20th

RN: Sure. Well--

HK: For the time being it's best to keep the heat on him than do too many other changes.

RN: Right. Okay We'll--you can give me a ring here if anything else develops. Wait a minute--this is already the 23rd--

HK: Right. There will be one more B52 strike before.

RN: Bye Henry.

CLASSIFIED

Autumn F012958-

B450105

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer
Secure Phone

12/23/72 1:05 p.m.

HK: I just had a long talk with the President and I strongly recommended to him that we will let you run this thing and will not make a lot of organizational changes. I think we can get him to go along with it but hand me this paper in the meantime.

AM: I am working on it.

HK: I won't pass it on except under extreme dur ess and we will not make changes, but on the other hand keep the major emphasis above the 20th and keep rocking them.

AM: I will have the paper over there tomorrow morning.

HK: I think on that basis we can keep everything steady. I told him that we shouldn't make command changes in the middle of an operation.

AM: My paper will be very helpful, I think. I will see that I do manage this thing also.

if

HK: I will hold it unless he insists on it and/we can keep it make sure a maximum effort is made especially on Tuesday

AM: Right.

HK: I think we can then keep this on a steady course.

BROKEN

TelCon

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

2:00, Dec. 23, 1972

K: Hello.

F: Hello, Henry. Your people told me yesterday that Lynch was
making a privat trip to this country and in all probability he
would be invited down to see the President.

K: I'm not aware of that.

F: You're not aware of the trip or the invitation?

K: Either. Is that Sonnenfeldt?

F: I got it cause Sonnenfeldt left, but it was somebody in your office.
It seemed to me that they were going to recommend that he would
ask to see the President and they were sure you would be very
enthusiastic about it.

K: I don't give a good God damn, but I have nothing against it.

F: My concern is as follows: We have fought with the Irish for 12
years over airline rights to Dublin.

K: I just don't see why we have to see Lynch when we won't see
Golda Meir.

F: (Laughter) Well, now, Henry, I don't want to get in an argument
in view of that, just because it's Christmas time, but--

K: That's not my holiday.

F: I see.

K: Okay, Flanigan, come to the point. You want that "mick" invited here?

F: No, no I don't particularly.

K: You do not want him invited.

F: I am concerned that if he comes to see the President, he'll talk
to the President about landing rights to the President and the
President will give it away, and we fought this thing for 12 years,
it will be an indication that we are not really going to fight for our
rights. The Irish airlines can land in New York and Boston and
Chicago, and we can't land in Dublin, and we're getting had. And
we were put off--we told them that we were going to cut them out
of New York unless they let us into Dublin, we--the year has expired
and--

DREASSIFIED

Autobiography 12/26/72
Box 844 Date 11/1/72

2

K: In other words, you don't want the President to invite him.

F: I don't want the President to invite him if he is going to go soft on Dublin. If he's going to invite him, he'll have to stay tough on Dublin.

K: Okay, I will keep that in mind.

F: Good. It would be better not to have him here than to go soft on Dublin, not so much on that issue alone but what it means to our --

K: Pete, fond as I am of the American Irish, I find the Irish Irish excrutiatingly boring.

F: And terribly difficult.

K: And therefore I am not behind that.

F: Good Henry. They said the decision was going to be made today and that's why I have been bothering you.

K: I see. Where are you?

F: I'm down in Virginia, enjoying this--

K: I noticed your influence with the Pope is really great.

F: What has he done now?

K: He came right back with another one.

F: He didn't!

K: He did.

F: Because I got a message yesterday that they hadn't meant it that way, they were most--

K: Well this time he said it was hard to understand.

F: Because I really whacked him harder than you suggested to me. It was inconceivable.

K: No, he's hit us again. And I'm glad to see you--how you stand with both the Irish and the Church.

F: I think it's better to have a non-churchman to handle these Catholics. Italian Catholics are worse than Irish Irish.

CLASSIFIED

Author: E.R.I. 12.26.58
Date: 11/05
Title: DR.

TelCon

Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

2:10, Dec. 23, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, have you seen where the Swedish Prime Minister has compared our bombing with the Nazi?

S: No, the bastard.

K: Well, I'd like the Swedish Ambassador called in by somebody and given a really brutal dressing down. Now who can do that?

S: Alex Johnson is tahe best, he knows the Swedes well and--

K: Where is Alex, on the golf course?

S: I don't know, he wasin the office this morning.

K: Well, let me get him.

S: Yes, he's the best to do it. The Ambassador I think is still in town; he was going back --

K: Okay, bye.

S: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Date: 12/2/72
From: B. Kissinger
Subject: TelCon

TelCon

Steven Graybard/Mr. Kissinger

2:35, December 23, 1972

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

G: I'm well. I want to wish you a Merry Christmas first of all.

K: Aren't you nice.

G: And secondly, I want to wish you a good New Year. I'm, third, I want to wish you health; fourth I want to wish you happiness; and fifth I want to offer friendship; and sixth I want to tell you I'm working very hard.

K: Good, I am delighted.

G: And I don't know what else. And I think you are too.

K: Yes, I'm working pretty hard.

G: I think so. When are you going to be free to see me for ten minutes to give you brotherly and fatherly advice.

K: Well, give it to me now.

G: Okay, first don't ever talk to people you don't know very well in Cambridge.

K: Like who?

G: A man named Paul Doty.

K: What did I say to him.

G: You at least tendered your spirit which was immediately communicated to most of the world.

K: Well, I didn't indicate anything.

G: Didn't you? Well, within four hours of his talking to you he went to the farewell dinner for Bowie, and I heard from three different people his note on your deep, deep depression.

K: Oh, baloney.

CLASSIFIED

Author: EDL2958-
Date: 12/1/72
By: B.S. SMITH

2

G: Well, this is what I--

K: He expressed condolences to me and I said I appreciate his calling very much. I don't think I talked to him for more than 30 seconds.

G: Henry, I said this to everybody, but this got out. You know he went to this dinner, I heard it first from Harvey Brooks, I heard it then from Daniel Bell, and I heard it thirdly from Stanley. I answered all of them exactly the way you just heard me, saying look he doesn't discuss these things on the telephone at all.

K: That's right. I'm not estatic about the way things turned out, but it doesn't mean what this fellow thinks it means.

G: Well that's it. But I just wanted you to know that -- well it confirms what I said to them, I was absolutely persuaded. Okay well, look, are you--

K: Look, who told you that Eliot wasn't my thesis supervisor, probably--

G: The man himself.

K: Well he shouldn't say it--

G: Of course. You see, this again is a fantastic story, Henry. He looked--

K: He didn't give me any help, but technically he was my supervisor.

G: I know. But what happened, Henry, was I told him he was very nice, I took him to lunch, and while I was sitting there I said, I want you to know the way I developed the story. I think you were absolutely crucial for Henry as an undergraduate, but I don't believe you really have the same kind of influence when he--on his thinking. He was a graduate student; to which he answers--I have no influence on him when he was a graduate student. I said oh well, Bill, you are exaggerating, of course you have great inference but not the same. He said I have none. I said what do you mean none. He said I had nothing to do with his thesis. I said what do you mean you had nothing to do. He said I never saw his thesis till the day it appeared as a book.

K: Well, that's inconceivable. He was technically my supervisor.

G: Not only technically, but even though he told me that Frederick was your supervisor.

K: What?

DECLASSIFIED

Author: F.D. 12-26
Date: 11-01-65

B. S. MARGED 11-01-65

3

G: Frederick.

K: Nonsense.

G: I know, but he gave me about seven hours work for nothing, Henry. Because obviously I thought, well, I know you had looked at that chapter but still you probably, in fact I was very grateful for the comments you made, but I also felt for all I knew you had missed that page.

K: No, no, no.

G: But you know, what I found also which obviously I went back--you know, I read your thesis as a thesis, that is in addition to reading your book version. Of course the way you thanked him indicates his role, but more importantly you can learn from the thesis who read it. And technically, he is one of the two readers.

K: Of course, he was one of the two readers.

G: Exactly, but you have idea, you know he's, I looked at him and said are you serious? He said absolutely serious.

K: Yeah, but he's a little bit --

G: I think so. But interestingly enough, Henry, there is no way in just looking at him that you can tell that. In fact when he sits down, it's amazing, the hair is not, the body is now a very old body and he's, as you know, totally incapable of walking at all well and all the rest of it, but physically if you just look at him sitting at a table you think he's the old Dorian. But again, the funnier person, of course, is Kraemer. You see, the reason I went to see both of these people is that they felt that I didn't do justice to either of them, in my account.

(Laughter)

K: I saw it on that draft, I thought it was very good. It needs a little more analysis, a little more narrative anyway.

G: Yeah, well this is what I have done and obviously as you've probably heard I am on to Campbell almost every third day and he never gets me through, but I wish you could see more of it but I obviously know what your life is like and I cannot impose at this time. But tell me, Henry, are you going to be there in the next day or two you think, or are you coming up here, are you--

4

K: No, I'm going to Palm Springs, I hope on Tuesday for three or four days.

G: I see, right. Are there any chance, do you have ten or fifteen minutes somewhere or would you rather postpone it until your sense of--

K: I mean, you're not coming out to Palm Springs.

G: I'll come anywhere you ask.

K: Well, let me get out there first and see what my life is like.

G: Okay.

K: Palm Springs is out near Los Angeles.

G: I know, but I would go where ever--I really would very much enjoy seeing you and I know exactly where it is and it's just across the country.

K: Yeah. When are you going to get the book done?

G: Well, what I've done, Henry, and again it's getting to be a good book, I mean, I'm cutting madly because it's got to be a quarter of a million words, for all sorts of reasons it shouldn't be that.

K: When are you getting it --

G: Probably by January 1st. You see, I have to go to Europe for a short conference in Italy on January 10, and I've got to have not only hand it to do them, but see what they've done on the copy editing side. So far, they really have been terribly happy although I, myself, feel, and your comment is exactly the one, I sometimes like your own copy, your own statement so much that rather than comment on it I paraphrased it and produced it and one shouldn't do that--

K: Oh, you can do it, but you have to explain what it means or the average reader will have trouble following it.

G: I think so. Right, right. But I find, I don't know if this has been your experience, Henry, but cutting the book is almost as difficult and almost as time consuming as writing a book.

K: Oh, it's a hell of a job.

5

G: It is just a terrible job. Incidentally I have, the only other person I've seen is Nelson Rockefeller and I had a very nice hour with him. And that has been useful because in/sense you remember that my description of that last chapter where I really say that this is the period in which you are kind of philosophical and not really writing about the daily events, yet obviously when you begin in January you are again very much in the events of the day and what I now realize is that the experience of working in the Rockefeller campaign really did pull you back to that even, let us say, nine months before you had to finally take responsibility. On this, he was very nice. I say Nancy, as she may havementioned to you, and he has sent some of the things that he could use at that time which, as you remember, were so badly reproduced in the newspapers, and they, again, I'm sure you haven't looked at them and again I'm not obviously going to quote from them directly, but it is not very obvious which is precisely yours and which is his, not his so much, but other members. I don't quote directly but again it's just fascinating in terms of time and in terms of European policy and in terms of--

K: 90 percent of it is mine.

G: Yeah. Well, I assumed as much from the phrasing and other things and it is a fascinating collection of materials and I've been in touch with Peter Rodman and I did like, and one day he just says your press conferences in the White House are--it would take a small carton to send them all up here and so what I will do is one day just go down and spend a day just pouring over them. But, I'd like if it is to be brought out on the day they say, it must be finished by Jan 1, Wx 2 or 3.

K: When is it coming out, in April?

G: In April or May.

K: Well, I'd better still be here, huh.

G: Well, as you can imagine, Henry, the last thing in the world that I care about is how much is going to sell, the thing I care about is how good it's going to be. That I really do care about and I shouldn't, you know, given the time and given the strength of other times, I've been *xk* keeping, I would say since September I've been *xk* keeping a 17 *xk* hour schedule and 18 hour schedule. I was up this morning at a quarter to five. I think that that frankly shows in the book; in other words, I think it is at the moment good, I hope it can be very, very good. If I had taken another six months if could have been absolutely first rate, I don't know.

K: Well, one always has that thought.

CLASSIFIED

856-272-1019
BYJ. S. M. D.

6

K: Okay, Steve.

G: Okay, well look, can I call you on Tuesday and find out where you are going, or whether you really want visitors.

K: Yeah, call me on Tuesday.

G: Out there or in Washington.

K: Call me on Wednesday when I'm out there.

G: Okay. I would really love to come, Henry, and if you are--

K: Call me out there and then I'll know what my life is like.

G: Okay. And really I wish you very much a Happy New Year.

K: Thank you and the same to you.

G: And all good health.

K: Bye.

G: Goodbye, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

Autobiography FEB 26 1957

BSEFMA Dated: 01/01/67

TELECON
(Secure Voice)

Secretary Laird

12/26/72 9:20 a.m.

L: We got that targeting all on and there will be 120 of these birds up there and all over targets within about 30 minutes. They will carry on their strike within a 30-minute period. It will be a massive strike. We have them coming in from all sides within that period. We have it all worked out and it will be over in about an hour. Didn't want it to come as a surprise to you. Will be hitting Hanoi, Haiphong and Tai Nguyen. I wouldn't talk about it except on a secure line to anyone. But I think it will be well coordinated and laid out and if you would like a special briefing on it we can give it to you.

K:

L: They may miss some targets, but they will do the best they can. There's a heavy cloud cover. Up to 8000 feet. Of course the B-52s do it by computer anyway. And if some do get shot down we never know where they will land either. Will try and minimize our losses rather than sending in at three times anyway. Coming in from north, east and west, all at different altitudes and I think it's a well-worked out plan. I think they have done a good job.

K:

L: One other thing -- we don't need to talk about it on the secure line but the budget thing, they are gaming me a little on that. I don't care how the President comes down, but when are they making these decisions?

K: Should have a memo to him today.

L: Very good, because it's important as far as getting our material packed up properly. State Department was put out that that report saying the should be transferred over to State.

K: I know, but we're not going to pay any attention to that.

L: From the standpoint of getting money next year it's better having it in our budget than in the AID budget. You follow me?

K: Yes.

L: And I hope the President understands that. Does he?

K: Well, I think so.

TelCon

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

11:05, December 26, 1972

K: Hello. Jerry!

S: Hi, Henry. You're still talking to me.

K: No, not really. But I must say, whoever gets you the information, that's really amazing. I mean that theme where I had allegedly-- you know I'm a megliamaniac--but there's a limit.

S: Which theme is that?

K: Where I said that I succeeded in Paris, I succeeded in Moscow, I succeeded in Peking, I'm going to; make it here, and you rapped me down.

S: Well, that's what Nha told somebody in Saigon.

K: You know Nha is a psychopath.

S: Yeah. Well--

K: I mean, Nha is almost crazy. I can assure it isn't just that that d9dn't happen, nothing remotely like it happened.

S: Well, I--

K: You know, this is just a pure invention.

S: Yeah. I don't know what to do about that. I could take a lot of this stuff out, and you know!

K: The President's lawyers are pointing out that it needed some guidening up. You know, after I got through going up, I--

S: Well, I--

K: Where did you get that happy piece of in formation.

S: I didn't get that, but you know, what happens here is that-- you sort of reconcile all the--everybody gets their foot in it.

K: You know, that's a lie. CIA sending a report that we would have trouble in Saigon, that's a lie.

S: Yeah. What did you like about it? (laughter)

K: Well, you know, it's not particularly positive, it's not particularly negative. So that part of it I didn't--you know, the story itself

DR. ASSIFIED

Audiog. F012958-

Date: 11/01/95

2

shouldn't

I won't comment about. But the chronology, you really use
these sources.

S: Well, I'm sorry about that. I mean I--well--

K: It's really not true.

S: Well, I mean, you know that story about Nha--

K: The story about Nha, the story about CIA warned us, the story
that Rogers and President together reviewed the draft, and that
the President's lawyers are--they spotted weaknesses, that isn't
true;

S: Well--

K: You know, it doesn't mean that the draft doesn't have weaknesses.
But the story that Rogers and the President studied it together--
that isn't true.

S: Well, that's what they are putting out over there. You know, just
between us, I mean, you know I sort of fight a battle over you,
I got a deal with--

K: No, but I've never lied to you.

S: No, well of course not, but the point is--

K: Rogers and the President never met on the draft, Just for your
information.

S: Yeah, yeah. But I think that the rest of this thing is just--after
all--according to the basic points, I think they are in here, about
why you use the phrase "peace at hand", keeping the negotiations
on the track, the fact that they changed their mind--

K: That's true, that is true. I have no complaint about the story but
it really is astonishing to me. I'm assuming that when you people
print something you are told it by people you believe, and I'm
always astonished at what you people can put out about it.

S: Well, I am too. It's one of the problems here--to reconcile all
this stuff, I mean, I got to try and do that. The other thing you're
under a terrible time pressure on this thing, it simply wasn't
advanced to--

K: No, you had a particular-- and the relationship between the
President and me just isn't that he--no matter what Crowder puts
out, he doesn't get into the details of the negotiations this way.

BRIEFING

10/19/79
856-2127

3

I mean, there is a lot of stuff in there, the President orders about the DMZ, not about the DMZ, that is not the way it happened.

S: Yeah. Okay.

K: But that is only for the insiders, no one get in there.

S: Well I suppose maybe--

K: No, no, it was on the whole, except for the chronology, I thought it was a fair piece.

S: I'm sorry about that, because I thought we tried to, you know, ..

K: Look, I know, that you--

S: We try to make some basic points of chonology, and it seems to me that it was, that the main thing was to explain what happened as best we could without knowing--you know, we still don't know what you considering the fundamental issues to be although we can certainly have a guess at that. We still don't really know--

K: Another point on which you're totally wrong is--there was a point in there that we had made a concession by granting the unity of Vietnam. That was really a (tape change here).....

S: Both sides wanted to simply have--

K: Yes, but I--actually that isn't really what we conceded. What we said is we affirm the Geneva agreement with respect to the unity of Vietnam. But that also provides for the two zones.

S: Right.

K: I mean, that is the way to keep the two zones without--that's the way of starching the sovereignty issue. It doesn't make it one Vietnam.

S: Right, yeah, well--

K: And we never pulled off that. That's not been the contentious issue.

S: What is the contentious issue? Prisoners?

CLASSIFIED

Autobiography, EFL 2.958

Brewster, M.D., D.O.

4

K: No. Well towards the end there was no contentious issue. Towards the end they were just making trouble. And that's where every newspaper is wrong. When everybody makes profound analogies how this or that triggered it, towards the end they were inventing objections faster than we could meet them.

S: Uh huh. Well what happened, I mean, when they sent this fellow back --

K: Also it's wrong to say that when I raised the DMZ again, Le D;uc Tho exploded. I never had a chance to raise anything when he was through the whole shebang. I had no reason to raise the DMZ at that point, I was satisfied with the DMZ.

S: I see. But you've been talking about a fundamental issue.

K: Sure, there was one issue.

S: What is that?

K: I didn't say it then, I won't say it now. I think if you don't go wizely overboard in your pessimism, you're gonna look better three or four weeks from now. Believe me.

S: Where do we stand this week. Is the bombing still going on?

K: Yes.

S: Are we still going to bomb up north.

K: Right. Until I tell you, don't be too pessimistic.

S: Okay. I believe you.

K: I mean about the evolution of this.

S: Yes. Well I'll see if we can't get some of this squared away. It's time we take a crack at it.

K: Okay, Jerry. I appreciate the way you have handled everything, I really do. You have been more than decent and fair.

S: Well, thank you.

K: I really mean that.

S: Well, thanks a lot. I really appreciate your calling.

K: Bye.

TELCON

Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger

11:42 a.m., December 26, 1972

C: Hi, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, Chuck, how are you?

C: Good. I just thought I would report to you on conversations, if you want it, that I just had with Al Singlinger (sp?), who I think is among the best of the pollsters 'cause he takes a daily reading.

K: Oh, yeah; what does he say?

C: Well, he says people support -- basically that the Hawk support is about the same as its been; the Dove objections are about the same as they have been; that there isn't very much intensity of feeling; there's confusion.

K: Yeah.

C: And people don't quite understand. He made a very interesting point. He said: you fellows very successfully got the public convinced that the war is over and that really our troops are out; that people now, therefore, do not understand why we are going back in to bomb. He said it's not that they oppose it nor that they favor it, it's just that they can't understand comments like: it seems stupid to be wasting all that money bombing. They don't understand. They don't draw a connection between the breakdown in the negotiations or prisoners or whatever connection we want them to draw. They don't draw that connection between bombing and the cause of it. He said some of the typical reactions, for example, are: how silly to be bombing when we were going to get our prisoners back. They don't understand that we weren't going to get our prisoners back.

K: So will you be there in about 45 minutes?

C: Sure.

K: I'll call you around 12:30. I have one other thing I want to ask your advice on.

C: Call me here because I think that what this leads me to is -- I personally think we're getting away with this just marvelously. I mean, I think we're coming out smelling like a rose but I do think -- I do have one suggestion for you so you call me when you're free.

K: 12:30.

C: Great, good. Bye, Henry.

wgh

TelCon

Sen. Symington/Mr. Kissinger

12:10, December 26, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

wanted

K: Steuart, I just/you to know I'm thinking of you. I just heard about it last night.

S: Oh, bless you.

K: And, there isn't ever anything anyone can say, but I just wanted you to know that--

S: You are kind, my dear friend, I appreciate your call.

K: I hope to see something of you in the New Year.

S: God bless you, and I do appreciate your call, Henry.

K: And if there's anything, you know, there's nothing anyone can ever do, but if there is you will call me won't you.

S: I will, my dear friend, thank you very much.

K: Good, Steuart.

S: Bye.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 2022

By: J. Kissinger

Tel Con

12:55, December 26, 1972

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, are you all set for your trip to California?

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: You're leaving about four o'clock.

K: I think they moved it up a bit.

P: Good, good.

K: I don't know when you are coming back.

P: It don't make any--don't -- I have to go out to the Truman Library in any event, so don't plan anything, you get the hell out of there and go to California, and get some sun while you can.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Fine, fine.

K: Now we've had an answer from the North Vietnamese, and they propose the meeting for the 8th. But that's a terrific cave.

P: Yeah, but what can they announce it.

K: They want us to stop the bombing immediately so what we are going to do is exchange a few more messages with them to run it up to the 31st. But I wanted to ask you--

P: You see judgment, the problem we have is that we've got to stay one jump ahead. One jump ahead of the Congressional people. When they come back I'll have to meet with Mansfield and all those jackasses on the 2nd or 3rd, you know, bypartisan, I always have to open that way.

K: Well we can certainly announce it before the 3rd.

P: I would like it announced, if possible, before the 1st, I think it's very important.

DRIASSIFIED

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2

K: All right.

P: But the point is that when you say exchange a few more messages and we get delayed past the first, and this--

K: You don't get delayed passed the first.

P: Let me explain something. In this instance, the reason that, I generally don't give one damn when these things go out, but in this instance we do have a problem which we have to take in mind of staying just one jump ahead of them and not allow something to build. Then of course have to argue and debate it, see my point. We've got to keep the debate on our grounds. Not ever let it move to their grounds. See?

K: Right.

P: That's the only reason that I want the announcement as early as possible. Now, if it isn't clear and advantageous to have it before Congress comes back, we'll just tough it through.

K: No, no, we can certainly have it before Congress gets back. The question is do we want it on the 31st or on the 2nd.

P: 31st.

K: All right. And, today is Tuesday--

P: I understand.

K: If you don't exchange messages, we'll have to stop it before Sunday, and that I think would be a sign of great weakness.

P: You mean, well what was your idea?

K: My idea is to tell them, to give them a few conditions which they'll need such as the technical people have to resume on the 2nd, the, and one or two other minor things, and as soon as they confirm it we'll stop bombing and announce on the 31st that we'll meet on the 8th.

P: We will stop the bombing when?

K: The 31st.

3

*

P: And meet on the 8th! Well, we give some on the bombing thing.

K: That's right.

P: Well I think it's all right.

K: We won't annou nce it before we stop the bombing.

P: I understand that and I see your problem about the 2nd thing, you
prefer the 2nd because it allows you to bomb longer.

K: No, it doesn't build up the euphoria quite so m uch. We have to
stop bombing on the 31st anyway--

P: Because of the holiday.

K: because of the holiday.

P: Yeah, well not as the euphoria is concerned. There's not much we can do about it one way or the other now, it's just, the events are going to shape this thing and as you and I both know, and we just have to do what is right. I'm would prefer if we can without too much loss to have an announcement by the 31st. That would-- that I think is very important from the standpoint of the Congress. It allows me to do a few little things. I can make a number of telephone calls to Democratic members of the House and Senate, we need to make, but I will not make until we have something positive to say, see what I mean.

K: Right.

P: I mean, I trying to--there are other games in Vietnam that I'm having
planning to play right now, and I've got, I would like to start getting
these guys softened up before they get back. Now I can wait,
but, if we can do that on the 31st then you see I come up on a
better basis, I would make the calls on the 1st that way. I was
hoping to make them before, but the 1st is fine.

K: Well, we'll aim for the 31st. What we have to make sure about,
Mr. President, is that we don't lock ourselves into a certain deal,
peace again, because will just drive the others into stone walling.

P: Oh. Christ yes.

K: I think we have now a good chance of winding it up at that meeting,
because we've gotten credibility with these guys again.

4

P: Well. Let me put it this way. We either wind it up at that meeting, or we go on option 2, right Henry. And I thinmk you ought to do it at that meeting.

K: I agree. Well I think we should break up the meeting and then you should--

P: Let me put it this way. I want before I go on, I want them to have an offer and a turn down on that thing, you see my point, that is one thing that is still not clear in the file, I know that it's clear in your mind and my mind that they were never williing to separate military from political issues, but you often ask the question, Have they ever flatly said no, see.

K: I think the way to do that, Mr. President, is to get it made publicly there. If I as much breath that we are separating these --

P: I'm talking about after it's all, after they have turned everything else flatly down. That 's what I'm suggesting.

K: Right.

P: You've got to negotiate down to the end of the crack, but then at some point that must be in the record. At some point before I go on it's got to be in the record that we offered it and they turned it down because we have to have basically a rationale for bombing in order to get the prisoners. You see my point.

K: Yes, but the way you could go on Mr. President in a more positive way is for you to make the offer and then get it turned down rather than to say it's already been turned down.

P: Make the offer, but continue to bomb.

K: No, I think what one would do--assuming the negotiations failed, then I come back, then you could go on television and say, we can no longer pursue the October framework. I now; make one last offer. Which is withdrawal for prisoners. Then if they turn it down, I'd resume bombing. If they turn it down very fast.

P: And we will say that we will not--then we

K: Then we don't go on television with a bombing speech, you go on television with a peace offer.

DREASSIFIED

Autumn 1965

B84 MA Dated 9/10/65

5

P: IN the meantime the bombing pause would still be in effect.

K: Uh, well

P: Well, I'm just putting it out as to what you're looking at, see. It's got to be in effect. You see--what have they accepted, to meet on the 8th? No bombing above the 20th parallel.

K: That's right.

P: All right, then when you come back, after the negotiations break down, you start bombing right away?

K: Well, you wouldn't probably want to do it the week before the inauguration anyway.

P: What, the bombing?

K: Yes.

P: That's the point, but I think we'd give them a week.

K: So therefore, supposing I come back on the 11th or 12th, and it's failed. Then you could go on and, on say the 14th or 15th, offer the quick POWs for withdrawal, and then right after the inauguration, whack them.

P: Yeah.

K: But I don't think it will come to that.

P: Well, it would seem to me that in view of their reaction here the chances are they are ready to talk, I mean they are ready to settle.

K:q That's my impression.

P: But we have felt that before.

K: But considering what we have done to them, this is a very soft reply.

P: Yeah. Now the question is what do we do about the bombing between now and the 31st.

K: I think we'd keep it up.

6

P: That's my view too.

K: That's why I want to exchange a few more messages with them.
Then we don't get into the issue of when do we stop.

P: Talking about a few more messages, we are now sitting here on
the 26th and the date that we want to have some sort of deal is
the 31st.

K: That's right, we can manage that because--that's right, Mr.
President, but they can answer these things very quickly.

P: What's your first message going to be.

K: I have to say something, Mr. President, about (a) that we
accept the 8th, then I have the problem if we don't stone wall--

P: Why don't you say you accept the 6th?

K: Well--

P: All right, accept the 8th, okay.

K: We accept the 8th. Secondly, I'd say the technical talks have
to resume on the 2nd, thirdly, I can only come for three days.
Fourthly, we'll make an announcement on December 31st that
these talks will resume. As soon as they confirm all these
things we will notify them of the time we will stop the bombing
but it will be no later than the 31st. We will certainly get back
by Friday.

P: Well, get that message off right away so that we can, if possible,
get it back by Friday. I'm not normally concerned about the
timing on these things, but this time it would be extremely helpful
for us to realize that the negotiating process and so forth, unless
it is almost mortally damaging to us, it is very important to
maintain our position here, for us to be on top of this by the 31st.

K: Right.

P: That's what I'm talking about. So this is one instance where the
negotiating process--you may have to give a little on that side if
it is not mortal in order to hold on another side.

K: I don't think that they are to mortal--

DECEMBER 1967

AUG 21 1967

JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC.

7

P: You don't understand what I'm talking about. The dates are totally mortal in terms of the domestic thing because if it comes on the 2nd or 3rd it's too late.

K: No, no, I understand that. I mean it isn't mortal if we do it on the 31st. The negotiations. So we can afford it.

P: I know, but we've got to be able to announce it, that's my point.

K: I agree.

P: And that's why the exchange of messages --that's fine if you want to do it, but if you feel you've got to have an exchange of messages I would do it, but I would not want to risk too much not being able to make the announcement on the 31st.

K: We would risk everything if we cave after this business right away.

P: I agree, I agree, what I'm getting at is that when you talk about exchange of several messages (end of tape)

01/15/87 8:56 2-127

TelCon

Mr. Varontsov/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 pm, December 26, 1972

K: Hello.

V: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

V: All right.

K: Every time your master is out of town there's a crisis.

V: Yeah, it seems like that.

K: You seem to be thriving on it.

V: (Laughter) Maybe I'll call him back. Just to feed him the crisis.

K: Well, I think we'll get it under control. I called you primarily about a story in the Washington Post today about the gas deal.

V: Yeah, I read it.

K: And I want your leaders to know that this was put out by the middle levels of the government, it does not reflect our policy.

V: Yes, we conferred about the real explanation from Peterson and from Lynd, so we know the story a little bit.

What

K: Don't pay any attention to it. I told the ambassador last week and what the President wrote to the General Secretary is our policy.

V: Right. Good, I'll report that and that will be helpful.

K: Good. And so are you.

V: And on the other thing, are you progressing?

K: Well, we're trying to set up--you've seen the message.

V: Yes, you haven't heard from them yet?

K: Yes, they've now replied and I think that after a few more exchanges we'll settle on a date.

V: Okay. Fine.

K: But it would be helpful if everyone just say with some restraint and commentary in the intervals.

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 7-12 1972
BASB 10/1/72
SJSU 10/1/72

TelCon
John Scali/Mr. Kissinger
1:30 pm, December 26, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Henry, John Scali.

K: Yes John.

Through

S: /Chuck Colson, the President has asked me to give him some suggestions on what if anything we can do to get our story across better on Vietnam. I would like to discuss this with you to make sure that my ideas are not causing any problems.

K: Right, I have somebody with me now, and I am going to
California this afternoon, let me try to get to you before I
go, otherwise I'll call you from California.

S: All right. He's coming back at 4:00 you know.

K: Right. My view is to say as little as possible.

S: Well, that's my basic view, but I want to mention two specific problems which maybe you and I could talk about to see if we can't come up with some joint ideas.

K: Good, thank you John.

DELEGATED

AUDITOR 7-12-76 B:84-MARK 10/1/76

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: M.N. (Retired) Date: 04/04/94

TelCon

Mr. Varontsev/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 pm, December 26, 1972

K: Hello.

V: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

V: All right.

V: Yeah, it seems like that.

V: Yeah, I read it.

V: Yes, we conferred about the real explanation from Petersen and from Lynd, so we know the story a little bit.

What

K: Good. Ambass.

V: Okay. Fine.

TELECON
(Secure Phone)
Admiral Moorer
12/26/72 2:32 p. m.

M: That big strike we had is now over.

K: Oh good.

M: There were 116 B-52s, lost one in North Vietnam and a second got to within one mile of the runway and didn't make it.

K: Oh god damn.

M: Over 100 tac air strikes plus 100 support aricraft. It was a hell of an operation. Did it beautifully. Totally ______ their whole system. We're going again tomorrow.

K: Same scale?

M: At least 60 -- maybe more, and the next day we're going to the Vinh area too.

K: I will mention it to the President.

DRECLASSIFIED

Autobahn E212 958-

B48 S/MAD Dated: 1/10/72