FRAGILE FRIENDSHIP:

UNITED STATES - JAPAN RELATIONS

AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN POST-COLD WAR ASIA

April 20, 1993

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

by

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

Introduction by President Richard Nixon

JOHN H. TAYLOR

This dinner has two owners and two custodians. One, of course, is the Conference, "Fragile Friendship" and the other is the President's Council of the Nixon Library and Birthplace, and those two custodians are Lawrence Eagleburger and Caroline Ahmanson. They would each like the opportunity to welcome you personally. Larry Eagleburger, our distinguished Co-Chairman, has a complete biography in your conference program. Suffice it to say that this former Secretary of State is one of our nation's most skilled and accomplished diplomats. Together with his Excellency, Toshiki Kaifu, former Prime Minister of Japan, from whom you will hear in just three or four hours, he was the indispensable element in making this conference possible. Please join me in welcoming Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

Mr. President, the absent Henry Kissinger, for when he heard I was going to say something, left. The job of a chairman of a conference like this is to move things along and say as little as possible, so Colonel Taylor told me just a minute ago. So I will be very brief. Let me say, first of all, to all of those who were instrumental in organizing this conference, it is our hope that it will provide an opportunity for Americans and Japanese to be frank and honest with each other at a time when the challenges to our bilateral relationship are indeed serious and likely to become more so in the coming years, and with the hope that when this conference has ended, both we and our Japanese friends and allies will understand that as we

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elder statesman, the thirty-seventh President of the United
States, Richard Nixon.

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

Thank you very much. I am most grateful to Lod Cook for his very generous introduction, and I want to say that it was due to his assistance that I was able to travel both to Russia and other states from the former Soviet Union and later to Japan and Korea and China. And I want to say too, that as to his reference to me as the greatest statesman, I am going to introduce the greatest statesman. So in introducing Henry Kissinger, however, I should like to say that everybody has a favorite Kissinger story. He has a few himself.

So, anticipating that, I remember so well, the State dinner we gave for Golda Meir in the White House in 1969. She was very concerned at that time that the Europeans were being too naive about the Soviets. She expressed her concerns to me at the White House dinner. The dinner was held in the State dining room. It was like this with round tables. Henry was sitting at the table across from us and Mrs. Meir was sitting at my right. I was trying to reassure her on that point that the Europeans might be a little too naive, and I wanted to make it very clear to her that we were not being naive. I said, "You know, we have a Golden Rule, a Golden Rule of diplomacy. It is different from the Golden Rule of the New Testament which of course is 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' The Golden Rule of diplomacy as far as we're concerned is do unto others as they do unto you." She started to nod in agreement, and across the table, Henry growled, "Plus ten percent."

In his monograph on Lord Rosemary, Winston Churchill observed that he had the misfortune to live in a time of great men and small events. Henry Kissinger had the good fortune to live in a time of great events, and he had the genius to match those events. For him to have done even one of the four great achievements that he accomplished during his period as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State would have been enough to make a very successful administration.

Let me briefly mention, he played a decisive, indispensable role in the opening to China. He played an indispensable role and a decisive role in the new relationship with the Soviet Union, and particularly the first arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. And then again, he played a decisive role in the Vietnam peace agreement. Finally, and this has not been as well known and not adequately reported actually, he played an indispensable role after the Yom Kippur War in working for the mutual

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disengagement which set up the possibility which then
matured in the Camp David Accords.

Any one of these achievements, as I have noted, would
have been enough to make it a successful administration.
But Henry had four of them, and that has to be a record.
It's like Nolan Ryan's five no-hitters. It's a record that
will never be broken. And so I would like to say tonight
that in introducing him, I introduce him as a friend, I
introduce him as a colleague and I introduce as the premier
diplomat of the Twentieth Century.

HENRY KISSINGER

Mr. President and friends of the Nixon Library, after
hearing this introduction, I can hardly wait to hear what
I'm going to say. I might point out a fifth achievement
which I owe to the President which is that for eighteen
months, I was simultaneously National Security Adviser and
Secretary of State. And the reason I mention that is
because never before and never since have relations between
the White House and the State Department been as harmonious
as they were in those days.

Mr. President, what you have said means everything to
me and it is however, giving me too much credit. Dean
Acheson once said the relations between a President and a
Secretary of State will always be good as long as the
Secretary of State knows who the President is, and
certainly, this is important for history. The decisions for
that direction were made by President Nixon. The direction
was established by President Nixon.

And I remember two lessons that may be aberristic that
he managed to sum up in a sentence each for me. The first
one was when I was prone to use three-syllable Harvard
words. He would say to me, "Remember the American people
will think what you have just said is a soft drink. So,
simplify it." And the second and really crucial lesson
which he always used to say, "The price you pay for doing
something halfway is the same as for doing it completely.
So, you might as well do it completely." Not an easy lesson
to learn for a professor used to hedging his conclusions.

I believe that the period of the Nixon Administration
will go down in foreign policy as one of the seminal periods
in our history. America has had a very particular approach
to foreign policy, shared by no other nation. When one
reads the speeches of most American presidents, I would say
almost without exception-- the only two exceptions I know,
one is Theodore Roosevelt and the other one is President
Nixon-- almost all the others, especially in this century,
would say when they described some issue: America has no

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MR. KISSINGER

interest in this issue. We're doing it for abstract principles, for the rule of law, for resisting aggression, for helping the needy. We are the only country whose leaders have prided themselves on making sacrifices because we had no interest in a problem. Almost in every other country, foreign policy is justified because the country has an interest. America has believed that public morality and private morality should be identical. Its leaders have argued that it has a special mission in the world to spread its institutions and its values all over the world, and that that is almost key criterion of its foreign policy. And it has maligned the balance of power and all the other principles by which other nations have had to conduct foreign policy.

We could afford such an approach because we had a huge margin of survival. For the greatest part of American history, we could afford to be isolationist. Even at the end of World War II, when we first became involved in international affairs, we had a margin of superiority so vast that foreign policy could be conducted like domestic policy. When you have a nuclear monopoly and then a vast superiority, when you produce forty percent at least of the total gross national product of the world, you do not need to make decisions on the basis of assumptions. You can wait until a threat becomes unambiguous and then overwhelm it with resources.

I mention all of this because when President Nixon came into office, we had come to the end of our period of innocence. We had entered the war in Vietnam for very American and for very moral reasons in, as you will all remember, a different administration from President Nixon's. We ended it because the president who made that decision believed they were fighting for democracy in distant parts of the world and they wanted to contribute to development of the world in peace, which was jeopardized by what they believed to be a communist global conspiracy ran from Moscow and extending through Beijing into Hanoi. We learned in Vietnam the limits of our earth, and it was a painful, national, dramatic experience. And having ended the war as an expression of morality, there were so many Americans who wanted to leave it in a state of moral indignation.

I have recently been reviewing some of the debates of the period when President Nixon guided our nation, on that subject, and it is absolutely astonishing to think that the difference between what the demonstrators were asking for and what was in fact being done was sometimes a question of six to nine months. Almost everything that was being asked for was in fact being done. But there was one important difference. President Nixon believed-- and so did those of us who had the honor to serve him-- that this country was too important for the peace and progress of the world to

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simply jettison an enterprise that had already cost tens of thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese lives, in addition to the fact that there was also no practical way of doing it even if one had wanted to do it when there were still five hundred and fifty thousand Americans on the ground surrounded by a million Vietnamese that were armed on both sides.

President Nixon believed that there were people, and I heard them who said to him, "Why don't you just say a horrible mistake has been made?" And I remember his reply was, "You cannot tell the mothers of thirty thousand dead that you're just going to turn this thing off and sacrifice tens of thousands more, and we owe it to our country to try to find a decent exit." And it was accomplished. And I repeat, the actual, practical difference wasn't so great. The real difference was that we were not prepared to say that this was a bad country and we were not prepared to pull out in the name of condemning America. Nobody saw more the anguish that President Nixon had to go through, and he got us out, and he reduced our forces by a hundred and fifty thousand each year, unilaterally. In the midst of this trauma, he also recognized, before he even entered office, that the communist block was not monolithic and that there was an enormous opportunity to promote peace in the world by dealing with the differential interests of communist China and the Soviet Union.

Now, I mention this last point particularly because when President Nixon came into office, America had reached, philosophically, the end of the period that had started with the great achievement of the immediate post-war world. President Nixon thought it was his duty to educate the American people as to its necessities in the world in which there would be many different powers, in which it was not possible to have a final answer to every question. America, historically, has been either isolationist or it has been able to commit itself to a project which had a finite conclusion. President Nixon stressed, and those of us who had the privilege of working with him, believed with him, that in the future, America could neither withdraw nor achieve a kind of resolution which would permit it again to withdraw, and relayed it to the rest of the world. It had to find a reason of why it was acting.

And so you will find in what President Nixon has said through the years, an emphasis on the American national interest and an attempt to define a reason why America should act in particular circumstances. This is important now. In those days, it was far-founded. Today, that truth is all around us. Communism has collapsed. All over the world, various national states are asserting ethnic and other special interests. They're going through one of the great structural changes. At the end of the Eighteenth

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MR. KISSINGER

Century, nobody had heard of the nation state. Fifty years later, nobody could understand how there could be anything other than a nation state. What will emerge out of this present chaotic international situation is not clear. But what is clear is that we will not possibly find our way through it without some definition of what the American national interest is.

Now this can be encompassing. It can, it must include being the kind of people we are, a moral component. But one must not pretend that the United States can wander around the world following every whim and pursuing every domestic preference without taking into account its capabilities and the way other nations act towards each of them.

I believe that we will be obliged to think that way about the successive states to the Soviet Union and that the tendency to personalize it will not be a permanent feature. But I want to talk primarily about Asia because in Asia, we find what I believe will be a characteristic of the present world, a group of states, largely national in character, conducting a foreign policy by principles that nineteenth century diplomats would easily recognize, but that in our century have been often rejected. When you have a group of nation states dealing with each other of more or less equal status, there can be only two results. One will dominate all the others and establish an empire, or some sort of equilibrium or balance of power will develop between them.

This I believe to be the emerging situation globally. But in Europe there are special circumstances produced by a different historic evolution, but it's especially true in Asia. In Asia, you have to follow your features. First, none of the nations there has any experience in the global management of international affairs. Japan, which is the subject of this conference, had insulated itself from the outside world for a period of five hundred years. It did not even deign to balance the barbarians up against each other or invent a system of trepidary relationships like the Chinese. It simply did not permit them to enter its domain. For five hundred years, Japan guided itself on its singularity, clarified its military tradition by civil wars, and grounded its internal structure on the conviction that its culture was so unique that it was not only impervious to foreign influence but superior to it. This enabled Japan to alter its domestic arrangements dramatically, when Commodore Perry opened it up forcibly. Determined not to suffer the fate of China, and with confidence in its cultural uniqueness, Japan adopted the methods of the outside world, secured in the knowledge that they would always remain culturally Japanese.

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MR. KISSINGER

It is important to keep that in mind because as one looks at Japanese politics today, we Americans have a tendency to overestimate the changes that occur. I do not believe-- but there are the few who know this better-- that most Japanese believe that in 1945 a total change in their society took place. What took place was an adjustment, similar to that of the major restoration in the Nineteenth Century, to the powerful realities of the end of the war. And therefore we have to look at Japan as a society with continuing traditions. One of these traditions, incidentally, seems to me to be the inability of any one Japanese leader to make a decision that binds the other Japanese leaders, and that there is therefore something faded about the dialogue between American presidents most of the time and Japanese prime ministers.

The American thinks that he must either persuade, charm his counterpart or pressure him into agreeing to some progress. The Japanese leader knows that he cannot deliver, that he must build a consensus even if he wanted to do what is being asked of him, which is also not always the case. So almost always the meetings end with great disappointment because, again, we're reflecting a cultural tradition. The Japanese Prime Minister will never say no. But when he says yes, what he means is "I have understood you," not "I will do what you have asked." The Japanese Prime Minister will never say no, but when he says yes, what he means is "I have understood you," not "I will do what you ask." It is therefore unwise to try to score points in domestic policy politics in America by humiliating or pressuring Japanese Prime Ministers publicly, press conferences or elsewhere. This is not to say that with any cultural method, it is a joy for Americans to negotiate with Japanese, and if I had discovered the method on how to do it, I would certainly put it to use in my consulting business before I give it away at a free speech. But nobody has yet worked this out. But let me come back to that point and let me make some others.

Japan has been independent and self-reliant for thousands of years. It therefore cannot be expected to continue foreign policy as an appendage of the American decision-making process for the indefinite future. In the decades ahead, I believe that we will look back with nostalgia to the happy days when all the troubles the Japanese caused us were in the economic field. I think it is inevitable, and even in the long run, desirable that Japan conduct its own foreign policy as it will, and as it must.

In the Cold War, Japan could nestle under the American protection because there was only one serious threat to the security of either country, but as the Soviet threat diminishes, it cannot be, and we would kid ourselves if we expected it, that Japan will interpret its security in the same way as we do.

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MR. KISSINGER

I expect some Japanese rearmament over the next decade and a half, not because it saves America some money, which is the reason why we usually recommend it, but for quite different reasons. If you believe in Asia dealing with countries that really have no cooperative local experience, I would imagine that over a period of decades, any Japanese leader will want a military establishment at least as large as Korea's, and I would expect over a period of time as large as China and Korea put together, not in size, in capability. This I expect, not because I welcome it with enormous joy, but because I think that it's inherent in the situation that I have described such that Japan will assert its own foreign policy.

Again, I don't say this critically. In fact, it may be healthier as long as we can manage to maintain a political dialog on common objectives which remain very large.

Now, let me turn for a moment to China, another country that has no experience in global management because they thought they were the globe for the greater part of their history. The middle kingdom believed that it was the center of the universe, that you can even find located geographically in a specific place at the Temple of Heavenly Peace in Beijing, and therefore, all other states which it knew were in some tributary relationship to it.

I just saw the other day a document from the Seventeenth Century where the Chinese, with particular subtle insolence, told the Russians they were not a tributary state; they declared them officially an enemy, which is not something that they frequently did. So, China, however, dealt with the outside world with greater assurance, and from the point of view of playing of the various barbarians against each other following the matter that they would prefer to deal with a different barbarian up against the barbarians, something which President Nixon recognized and benefited from in '71. Crude liquid, they did not particularly like us. They liked the Soviets a little less. Above all, the Soviets were closer, so they dealt with us and then you have Russia and Asia. In our history books, we always read about Russia and Europe, but throughout the Nineteenth Century, Russia was expanding in Asia as much as it was in Europe, and the Russo-Japanese War was about to break out in the early part of the century, 1904, control Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese offered the Russians Manchuria and wanted Korea for themselves. The Russians said they wanted both, and as often happened in their history, they lost them both.

I mention all of this because when you look at this historical experience, and then Korea, which was the hermit kingdom, even more closed off than the others, if that was possible, are all becoming significant players, and what

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this means is that for the United States, the relationship
between China, Japan, Russia and ourselves is the key, and
one cannot say one relationship is crucial. It is our
ability to maintain all relationships and our ability to
throw our weight in the direction that most serve our
interests in the piece of the world that will be decided.

Now, America had absolutely no experience with this
kind of foreign policy, and you can read scholarly journals
and the media the rest of this year and you will not find an
analysis of this kind, from which I conclude, you cannot
expect scholars and media to be right all of the time. But
seriously, the biggest foreign policy problem of the United
States at this moment is to define what its necessities are,
and I find it astonishing that we simultaneously tackled
Japan on the economy and China on human rights as if we were
some sort of a professor teaching a class of eager students
of how they should conduct themselves, and if they would
practically sit there and wait for our instructions and for
the privilege of dealing with us.

I believe Japanese-American relations are crucial, but
I don't know how we will conduct them effectively if we
drive China into a nationalistic policy of organizing Asia
against us, which is at least a possibility, nor do I
understand how we propose to proceed in our negotiations
with Japan by these endless guerilla negotiations in which
the weakest American industry stake a claim against the
strongest Japanese industry and get involved in this sort of
rescue operation.

Of course, the Japanese have also a lot to answer for.
They cannot hide forever behind their cultural peculiarities
and refuse a dialogue that Americans can comprehend. We may
be too impetuous, but the Japanese cannot let the whole
world wait on their consensus, and somebody has to help
shape it. We need a serious dialogue about the economic
issue, but we need also, even more importantly, a serious
dialogue of how we visualize the future of Asia when China
becomes a major military power, as it will within ten years.
If Russia, which it might, shift the center of gravity from
Europe to the Euros as it did last century once for a period
of thirty years, and as Southeast Asia, which I have not
even discussed yet, and don't get bored, I will not discuss
it, also articulates itself.

Two weeks ago, the Japanese Prime Minister was asked
whether Japan would accept a Korean nuclear capability, and
in very un-Japanese fashion, he said no and nothing else.
That is important. That was probably the most important
statement that was made by anybody in the last month.

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MR. KISSINGER/PRES. NIXON

You will hear tomorrow from President Nixon about his impressions of his journey, and he can and will go into much more detail than I did. I thought the most useful thing I could do is to explain that I really believe that this country is at an absolutely crucial point in its perception of the world, and what makes it so crucial is that we can rock along for quite a few years without anything showing up because these other relationships will develop gradually. The price will be progressive irrelevance, and a foreign policy of being almost like a common scold, lecturing everybody, but changing very little.

Mr. President, it has been a great honor to speak at this dinner honoring you and your achievements. I have told you when we worked together what I thought posterity would think of you and that it would treat you very kindly. And I believe that everything I have said here was implied, was fated in President Nixon's foreign policy, who took over a colossal crisis and refused to deal with its symptoms, insisted on dealing with its causes, opened to China to all practical purposes alone, negotiated with the Soviets and started a process which culminated ten years later, and most importantly, raised the fundamental question for future foreign relations, and it's our task now to continue to work on the answers.

Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

Dr. Kissinger, we express our appreciation for this very profound analysis of the great forces that move the world and particularly those that affect this conference. I should point out to you that former presidents are somewhat experienced in that role. Former Presidents have no power. But they do have a privilege, and that privilege is to propose just one toast at the end of a dinner like this. And I've been thinking to whom that toast might be directed. Of course, to our speaker, Dr. Kissinger, but I've already praised him enough. But in any event, there's more to come. I was thinking too, that as he spoke so generously about my role and as I spoke about his role, that he would agree with me that there are in this audience today, many others who helped us in what we accomplished in those years. We know, for example, what Larry Eagleburger did, what Brent Scowcroft has done in the Bush Administration, and as Henry will tell you, they were indispensable players in our administration as well. So, I toast them. And I'm sure that all of you would join me to say we should propose a toast to John Taylor and all of those who put on this beautiful dinner for us here. They've done an outstanding job.

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PRES. NIXON/MR. TAYLOR

And I have a different toast that I do want to propose. You will find it hard to believe, but that beautiful lady who stood here a few minutes ago and introduced Lod Cook was born in 1918. Just a few days ago, she celebrated her seventy-fifth birthday. To Caroline Ahmanson, on her seventy-fifth birthday.

JOHN H. TAYLOR

One's best tactic after magnificent presentations by the two preeminent geo-strategists of the age is to thank them and to send very quickly into conference logistics, Dr. Kissinger, for a beautifully presenting food for thought that our panelists and speakers will be able to mull over tomorrow at great length-- our thanks. And to President Nixon for giving us two glimpses of what is to come tomorrow at twelve-thirty, our thanks to you as well. "Fragile Friendship" is adjourned for the evening. Our next meeting is at eight o'clock in the Gold Room for a presentation by Clinton Administration official, Derek N. Shearer. We'll see most of you then in the Gold Room at eight o'clock. Thank you for being with us ladies and gentlemen.

* * *

Transcribed by STUDIO TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES 4-20-93

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FRAGILE FRIENDSHIP:

April 21, 1993

LUNCHEON HONORING
PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

"ASIA AFTER THE COLD WAR"

Introduction by

GOVERNOR PETE WILSON

JOHN H. TAYLOR,
DIRECTOR OF THE RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY AND BIRTHPLACE

Ladies and gentlemen, may I please have your attention? Would you all please join me in welcoming the 37th President of the United States, Richard Nixon, accompanied by Governor Pete Wilson.

HON. WILLIAM E. SIMON,
PRESIDENT, THE RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY
& BIRTHPLACE FOUNDATION

Ladies and gentlemen, I have known, watched and admired
Pete Wilson since he was the Mayor of San Diego. He was
then exactly what he is now, youthful, energetic,
idealistic. He thought then what he thinks now, that
government can and must be better, more rational, more
approachable, more responsive, and he fights today what he
fought for then, fiscal responsibility, clean government,
indeed, good government. Powerful entrenched interests
against him, such is the lot of a progressive Republican in
an era-- to borrow a phrase from our third panel discussion
this afternoon-- of "political correctness." But I know
Pete will win out in the end because class always does.
Also, I know that Pete comes from good political stock. You
all know about his brilliant academic career at Yale and at
UC, and his service in the United States Marine Corps. You
know about his meteoric political career: Assemblyman,
Mayor, Senator, Governor. But what you may not know is that
he got his start in politics as an advance man for a former
vice president who ran for governor of California in 1962.
Yes, President Nixon. President Nixon and Pete both came
back from that defeat to accomplish great things, and each

LUNCHEON HONORING PRES. NIXON

has great things yet to achieve. Ladies and gentlemen, it
is my great pleasure and honor to introduce the governor of
my adopted state of California, Pete Wilson.

GOVERNOR PETE WILSON,
GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Thank you. Thank you very much, Bill. Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests. As Bill has told you, the President and I go back some thirty-one years. In the fall of 1965, President Nixon, not yet president, was considering undertaking some campaigning for congressional candidates in the races that fall and was considering a run in 1968 for the Presidency. I was flattered to be invited to share an airplane ride with him during which it was set forth that he and I would discuss the possibility of my coming to work for him, to assist him in that endeavor. We got on the plane, sat down. We began to discuss it, and I said, "Mr. President, in good faith, I need to disclose to you that I am entertaining another option." And he said, "What's that?" I said, "Well, I have been approached to run for the State Assembly." And he looked at me and he said, "Oh boy." He said, "I think you've got the bug. You'd better do it. You'd better at least get it out of your system."

Now, some of you may know that the President as a boy
entertained a very different ambition than was to be his
fate. He has an encyclopedic memory and a great hunger for
knowledge of sports. He is the preeminent sports fan, and
as a boy, it was his ambition, I am told, to become a sports
writer. And, of course, I couldn't help thinking the other
day that if he had become a sports writer I might still now
be practicing law, and I would like to think, be making a
great deal of money, instead of being the Governor of
California. Mr. President, despite our long friendship,
well, I've almost forgiven you. However, if Richard Nixon
had instead become a sports writer, the world would have
been denied a vice-president who conducted the famous
Kitchen Debate, who won the Kitchen Debate with Nikita
Khrushchev, and in that moment, capsuled and symbolized the
resolve of the United States to win the Cold War, however
long it took. And indeed, the world would have been denied
a president who also had the diplomatic skills and the
daring and the imagination to combine the clarity of our
American strength with diplomacy to try to bridge a gap that
had existed for twenty years with Communist China. It was
Richard Nixon who went to China and who affected the
beginnings of that rapprochement.

LUNCHEON HONORING PRES. NIXON

Today, instead of writing about sports and explaining why Joe Montana has declined the 49ers and is going to play for the Chiefs, he is writing history, and his initials "RN" his staff think stand really, secretly, for a motto, "Rest Never." In the last sixty days, he has conducted a global fact-finding tour. In fact, two extensive tours. First, he went to Russia where he had an extended audience with President Yeltsin. His report to the American people on that was contained in an off-ed in the New York Times. It prompted a reader, who now occupies the White House, to call him and ask him to elaborate upon his views. And he has just returned from a two-week tour of Japan, Korea and China, three nations who clearly will figure with ever greater importance in the future of America. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great privilege to introduce to you a native Californian who will I think rank in all of American history as one of the most perceptive, persistent and certainly effective writers and makers of history, someone whose career has had the most profound and happy consequences for freedom throughout the world, President Richard Nixon.

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

Well, Mr. Prime Minister and distinguished guests, I want to express my appreciation to Pete Wilson for that very generous introduction, and I'm sorry I got him in so much trouble so many years ago. I cherish his friendship which I have had for over thirty-one years, but I admire also his political ability. I've had some successes, some failures in politics, as some of you know. I was elected to the House two times. I was elected to the Senate. I was elected as Vice President and had a pretty good running mate two times. And then I was elected President two times. I never made it for Governor. So I congratulate Pete Wilson for doing what I was unable to do.

As I heard him describe what I've been doing over the last two months, I sometimes wondered: Why does an eighty-year-old man go over to Russia and the Ukraine and Poland or Czechoslovakia, or Czech Republic, I should say, to Paris, and then to Japan, Korea, China, and then arrive here somewhat exhausted? Well, it's a little hard to explain. Perhaps an anecdote will explain it to you to an extent. One of the most memorable moments in the time that I served in the United States Senate was when I attended a joint session of Congress, which got together for the purpose of hearing General MacArthur after he had been relieved of his duties in Japan and of course in Korea by President Truman. It was a very emotional meeting, a very great speech, and I remember that he brought everybody to their seats, and tears to the eyes of many with his conclusion. He told of the lyrics of an old barrack song as he was concluding his

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LUNCHEON HONORING PRES. NIXON

speech. He said, "Old soldiers never die, they just fade away." If I may paraphrase, "Old politicians sometimes die, they never fade away."

Twenty-five years ago, I wrote an article for the magazine *Foreign Affairs*, which was entitled "Asia After Vietnam", and in that, I called for a new policy toward Communist China. Today, I would like to talk to you about a broader subject; that's Asia after the Cold War. In talking about that subject, it is first necessary to put it in an accurate perspective. It is almost a cliche to say the Cold War is over and the West has won it. That's only half true. The Communists have lost the war; the West has not yet won it. The Russian people, for example, rejected communism because it failed to provide a better life for the masses. Now, freedom is on trial. If it fails to provide a better life, the Russian people will not go back to communism, I can assure you of that, but they could go to a more authoritarian, aggressive nationalism, which shorn of the failed faith of communism, might be an even greater threat to the West than the old Soviet totalitarianism.

We must bear in mind, too, that while the Cold War is over in Europe, that in Asia almost a fourth of the world's people who live in China, Korea, North Korea and in Vietnam are still under communist governments. We must also remember, as we consider this, that we should put things in historical perspective. Forty years ago, President Eisenhower asked Mrs. Nixon and me to visit all of the non-communist nations in Asia. It was a long, arduous trip of sixty-nine days. I shall remember it all my life. It was the first extended trip as Vice President. And on that occasion, when we made that visit, we had no relations with Communist China, and Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were still French colonies. Think how things have changed since then. We have relations now with Communist China. All of the part of Southeast Asia-- I should say, of all of that part of the world, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, now have communist governments.

We also find at this time that due to the collapse of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union that Moscow no longer is subsidizing communist regimes in North Korea and in Vietnam. Those are enormous strategic changes. But an even more significant change, one that we noted in this trip in Asia, is that the Communists have lost the ideological battle. As we traveled to those newly independent countries, most of them were in that category so many years ago; the leaders of those countries, many of whom were not communist, were looking for a quick way to progress and were tempted to pick either the Chinese or the Soviet communist model. That is no longer true. The only economic success stories in Asia are in nations that have adopted free market policies, Japan, whose former prime minister honors our

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meeting today, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand. And even in China, although it still has a communist government, free market policies have led to spectacular progress particularly in the coastal provinces.

With that background then, let us turn to what I call the four giants in Asia, in Northeast Asia certainly. They will determine the future of Asia, and they are Russia, China, Japan and the United States. In discussing Russia, it is first necessary to dispel a myth. The Russians did not lose the Cold War. The Communists did. The United States and our allies paid a crucial role in containing communism and in rolling it back, but it was democratic Russia that gave the knockout blow to communism on December 14th in 1991. So therefore, we should treat Russia today not as a defeated enemy but as an ally and friend who joined with us in defeating communism in Russia.

With that background then, let us look at Russia, see what it is and where it will go. In my view, this is the most important, crucial subject or issue of the decade of the 90s: whether or not the government in Russia will fail or whether it will succeed. And at this time, it is a very close call. On the minus side, as you know, Russia is a huge country, carving eleven time zones. It has thirty-one autonomous republics and provinces, and believe it or not, a hundred and thirty-two nationalities. It is a country that's going through an economic crisis worse than the Great Depression in the United States in the 1930s. It is a country plagued by crime and corruption and ethnic strife. It has enormous problems from a governmental standpoint, because it has a constitution inherited from the Soviet era, which is a Rube Goldberg concoction with three hundred amendments. Nobody really knows what it is. It also has, unfortunately, a Congress from that same period, which is dominated by reactionaries and communists. Under the circumstances then, it looks to be almost hopeless, but there are some plus factors. We should look at them as well.

Russia is a country in which we find a very able, educated population. It has huge economic resources, but it also has huge human resources. Many people are not aware of the fact that ninety percent of those in the Russian workforce have a high school education or better. That's much higher than in the United States. We also find that twenty percent of the Russian economy at the present time is now in private enterprise, remarkable in view of the problems that they have confronted.

And we also have to realize that Russia is making progress in other ways as well. Probably its most important plus factor, however, is its leader, Yeltsin. I am not here to make the case for Yeltsin, he is doing that before the

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Russian people today. But we have to understand that he stands for values that we believe in. He's the first elected president or leader of Russia in its thousand-year history. Unlike Gorbachev, he has repudiated both socialism and communism. But most important from our standpoint, Yeltsin has adopted a non-aggressive foreign policy. Under the circumstances, therefore, we have an interest in his survival. And in this case, we have to give great credit to President Clinton for recognizing the need to support aid to Russia, a highly unpopular proposition in these days, but he has supported it and is trying to get other nations to go along with it. I emphasize again, the aid is not to Yeltsin, the man, it is to a government with the values that he stands for.

Under these circumstances, therefore, it is important now to see where we go from here. Why is it in the interest of the United States to provide aid for Russia when we have so many problems at home, and as a matter of fact, in other parts of the world? First, because aid to a non-aggressive government in Russia is an investment in peace. We have to bear in mind that in the event that the Yeltsin government falls, any one of his successors, and I met most of them, will be Russian nationalists probably. That would mean that we would have to change totally our defense budget. Instead of cutting it by billions, we would have to increase it by billions of dollars. The peace dividend would be down the tube.

The second point is that an investment in a free market government in Russia is an investment in prosperity. Consider these facts, Russia has a GNP seven times as great as that of China, yet China's trade with the United States is eight times as great as that of Russia. Why? Because over half of China's GNP is in private enterprise, and only a fifth of Russia's is. As Russia continues to privatize, that will mean millions and billions of trade and also hundreds of thousands of jobs for America. And aid to Russia, democratic Russia, is an investment in freedom, because for seventy years Communist Russia was trying to export communism to the rest of the world. Now, Democratic Russia can be an example of freedom for others to follow in the world.

A hundred and eighty-five years ago, Napoleon wrote: "China, there lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep because when he awakes he will move the world." I can assure you that the giant is awake and that he is beginning to move the world.

On this trip that I have just concluded, I had an opportunity to meet with the leaders, but also to meet many of the people and to see the developments that have occurred since then. Consider these facts: China's growth in GNP

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last year was the highest in the world-- twelve and eight
tenths percent. In the last ten years, the per capita
income has been tripled in that period of time. And, in
addition to that, we find that now over half of the Chinese
economy is in private enterprise.

With those numbers in mind, we can see that the giant
is certainly on the move. We also have to have in mind that
there are specific areas that prove this point. Right
across the border from Hong Kong is the city of Shenzhen.
It was a city that didn't exist eleven years ago. Then it
was a sleepy little town, twenty-six thousand people,
surrounded by rice paddies. Today, believe it or not, it's
a city of two and six-tenths millions of people. It has
modern skyscrapers and industrial parks. One of the
greatest cities in China and, for that matter, in the world.
And this was accomplished primarily by private enterprise
rather than the government enterprise.

This is fantastic progress. But there's a downside to
this which we have to consider. While there has been
substantial and very great economic reform in China, there's
been hardly any political reform. The question is: What
should we do about it? The answer is: What we should not
do is to revoke China's favored nation status. President
Bush vetoed such attempts several times. He was right to do
so, and I hope President Clinton will do exactly the same if
it comes to his desk after June 3rd when he has to make that
decision.

Why should we not revoke it? Look at what has happened
in Asia, for example. You look at Korea, you look at
Taiwan. Economic progress leads to political progress
inevitably, because with economic progress you must open up.
And as you open up, freedom is very, very explosive.
Churchill once said Russia fears our friendship more than
our enmity. That applies to the leaders in China today, the
hard line leaders, because, as far as they're concerned, a
dictatorship cannot survive without secrecy. Consequently,
if you have the free market, that means it opens up. It
means that inevitably there will be contact with the outside
world, and that contact makes it impossible for a
dictatorship to survive.

The question sometimes might be raised, however-- I've
seen it raised in several columns lately-- to the effect:
Why do we need good relations with China today? After all,
the Cold War is over and we no longer need China as a
balance for an aggressive Soviet Union. And the answer is,
and Dr. Kissinger will bear me out on this: We didn't just
go to China because of the Russian problem. That was part
of it. Even if there had been no aggressive Soviet Union,
it was right to go to China for this reason, and there are
several of them. First, because China is a huge country

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with a huge population. There's no question that within the
next century it will be an economic and also military super
power if it wants to be, and in that next century, it is
very important that we have a relationship with China.
China has a veto in the United Nations. And China is a key
player, for example, in political areas, hot spots like
North Korea, where we are not a key player, and in Southeast
Asia. So it is important to have a relationship with China
apart from the fact that the Soviet Union now no longer
exists and Russia is not an aggressive power.

This brings us back to the question of human rights.
In our dealings with the Chinese, we should emphasize our
concern on the issue diplomatically, but we should not go so
far as to weaken the private sector, because the growth of
economic freedom in China is the best way to produce
political freedom.

The Great Wall of China is very thick. All of you who
have been there know that. It's difficult to be heard when
you're inside the wall. It is impossible to be heard when
you are outside the wall. Economic and diplomatic isolation
of China is not in China's interest, but it certainly is not
in our interest as well.

I remember so well my meeting with the predecessor of
our distinguished honored guest today, Prime Minister Kaifu,
Prime Minister Yoshida. It was forty years ago on that trip
that Mrs. Nixon and I took together to Asia. He has a
marvelous, irreverent sense of humor. He said to me, "You
know, Mr. Vice President, you Americans did us a great favor
when you destroyed our old factories. Because, as a result
of that, we had build new ones. And as we build new ones,
we will be able to compete with you better." When he said
that, the Gross National Product, GNP of Japan, was one-
twentieth of the United States. Now it's approaching one-
half and gaining. He was quite prophetic. Japan has become
a player certainly on the economic side.

We see, too, that in Japan we have some differences
that have been raised. This conference, I think, has served
a very useful purpose in pointing out those differences, in
having them debated clearly, but also, in emphasizing the
point that whatever the differences are, we have some common
interests. Don't let the differences obscure the common
interests. We're both democracies. We're the two
strongest, richest free market economies in the world.
After the return of Okinawa twenty-one years ago, we had no
territorial disputes left over from World War II. And we
are both great trading nations, great trading nations who,
therefore, have a common interest in promoting free trade
and in resisting protectionism. That's why managed trade,

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for example, may be a temporary political expedient, but it
is not from the long-term interests of the United States or
Japan, and I trust will be resisted.

We come, too, to Japan's role in other ways. This is a
very sensitive issue. Lee Kwan Yu, the dynamic Prime
Minister of Singapore, whom I saw for the first time in
1967, said to me in speaking of Japan, "The Japanese are a
great people. They're not going to be satisfied with a
world role which limits them to making better transistor
radios and washing machines and teaching other Asians how to
grow rice." When he said that, the economy of Japan, the
GNP, was one-eighth of that of the United States in 1967.
Now Japan is an economic super power. And as Dr. Kissinger
pointed out last night, as an economic super power, it
inevitably is going to, and in my view, should play a major
role on the world stage.

The question is: What kind of a role can that be?
Let's consider for a moment what Japan is doing in the
national security area. Japan has increased its defense
budget. It's also increased its foreign aid budget, and its
foreign aid budget is the biggest in the world. And yet,
when you add the two together, its total national security
budget is only one and a half percent of its Gross National
Product-- that, compared with five and two-tenths percent
for our total national security budget. Now, how do you
make up that difference? There are some that say, "Have
Japan re-arm." Let's consider that for a moment. If Japan
re-arms, that causes enormous political problems. If the
re-armament goes beyond the defense of the home line, which,
of course, is totally justified, but if it goes beyond that,
it causes not only political problems in Japan, it also
causes consternation among some of the nations that were
occupied by Japan during World War II. That is not a good
option.

On the other hand, in the terms and period as far as
foreign aid is concerned, Japan, while it is a very generous
donor today, could well increase that, and by increasing it,
could close the gap between the burden that its national
security places on it, as compared with the burden our
national security places on ourselves.

This brings us to the problem of aid to Russia. Every
free nation has a huge stake in the survival in a non-
aggressive democratic government in Russia. And as one who
is a long-time friend of Japan, and will continue to be, I
regret to say that Japan has not done as much in this area
as it should have and as it could have. Consider these
facts: Korea has pledged three billion dollars in bilateral
aid to Russia and has delivered one and a half billion.
Japan, which has fifteen times the GNP of Korea, has pledged
three point six billion and has delivered only eight-hundred

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LUNCHEON HONORING PRES. NIXON

million. Now, Japan's reluctance to do more is somewhat understandable because they are concerned about the Russians not turning back the four islands, which they should do, following our example insofar as Okinawa is concerned. But on the other hand, it makes no sense to take that position with the Yeltsin government, because I can assure you, having met most of those who might be his successors, all of them are more nationalist. They are Russian nationalists. They would never get the islands back from any of them.

Under the circumstances, therefore, while it would be presumptuous for me to suggest what the Japanese government should do, I would say that when it hosts the Group of Seven meeting in Tokyo in July, Japan should consider the possibility of sharply increasing its aid to Russia, and thereby indicating that it is ready to play the role, which is economic power. It would certainly give it the right to play and also the duty to play.

During and immediately after World War II, there was a sterile debate among foreign policy experts in the United States between Europe-firsters and Asia-firsters. Some of you are old enough to remember. That debate didn't make any sense then, or very little sense, and it makes no sense at all now with the end of the Cold War. Anyone who has any doubt about the role of Asia, as far as the United States is concerned, must remember that three of the four wars the United States was involved in in this century began in Asia-- World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

In this period after the Cold War, it is necessary, it is important certainly, to keep adequate forces in Europe. It is indispensable to keep the present level of forces in Asia. Consider, for example, the case of Japan. There are those who say the Japanese are rich enough, let them defend themselves. Bring our men home. It won't cost us as much. So even though keeping our forces in Japan, incidentally, is less expensive than keeping them in the United States. But nevertheless, there is the argument that is made. It's time for the Japanese with their wealth to defend themselves by themselves.

Let us see where that leaves Japan. With the United States gone, it leaves Japan facing Russia, no longer a communist, but still a nuclear super power. Facing China with the capability of becoming a nuclear super power. And facing even North Korea, trying to become a nuclear power. What do the Japanese do? They have the painful decision, and it will be terribly painful, to go nuclear. We cannot do that.

I know that there are others who might say, "Why does the United States continue to have these burdens in the world? After all, the Cold War is over. Let somebody else

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LUNCHEON HONORING PRES. NIXON

step up and assume the burden that we've carried for so long, for the past forty-five years." Well, the answer is: If not us, who? The Japanese? The Chinese? The Russians? The Germans? They're the only ones with the potential, militarily and economically, to be world leaders. The answer is obvious. We must continue to bear that burden. And as we continue to bear it, let us also remember that in Asia, for geographic and historical reasons, we are the only power that is not considered to be a potential threat to any other nation in the area.

And so we must continue to lead. And the questions then arise: Does America have the means to lead? Well, we certainly have the military power and we have the economic power. When we look at America and its economic power, this is a very rich country. We're not rich enough to do everything. But we're rich enough to do everything important. And there's nothing more important than the survival of peace and freedom in the world.

Another question arises: Do we have the will, the will to play this world leadership role? In other words, putting it more bluntly: What's in it for us? Well first, America cannot be at peace in a world of wars. America cannot have a healthy economy in a sick world economy. There is a more reason than either of those. I can remember as if it were yesterday, a time just forty six years ago when Jack Kennedy and I, as freshman congressmen, passed our first major foreign policy votes in the United States Congress. We both voted for President Truman's program to provide military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. That was the program that initiated what later became the Marshall Plan and NATO. It was the best vote that either one of us cast as members of the House.

America responded magnificently to the threat of war when the Cold War began. The question is: With the Cold War over, can we not now respond to the promise of peace? War brings out the best and the worst in men. And peace will bring out only the best. The Twentieth Century will be remember as a century of war and dictatorship. And we, in America, can help make it a century of peace and a century of freedom.

There is another question: Are we worthy to lead? That is widely discussed these days and it is a very serious question. There's no question as far as the United States having the military power and the economic power. We lead the nations in military power. We lead the nations in economic power. We also lead the nations in drug abuse. We also lead the nations in high crime in our major cities. We have the best medical care in the world. Anybody who gets sick in a country abroad with state medicine comes here if they can afford it for operations. And yet, thirty million

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LUNCHEON HONORING PRES. NIXON

of our people do not have adequate health coverage. We have
the best universities in the world. Hundreds of thousands
of students come from all over the world to the United
States. And yet millions of our young people are illiterate,
virtually illiterate because of an education system that
just isn't doing the job.

So at a time that we're meeting our national security
problems abroad, we must deal with our problems at home. We
want America to be not just the strongest country, not just
the richest country, we want it to be a good country. We
want her to be a country with freedom at its best as an
example for others to follow. So, anything that we can do
now, anything that we can do to make our economy more
competitive, anything we can do to provide more opportunity
for all of our people to have proper health care, good
education, good jobs, to reduce the crime and the drug abuse
in our cities, to make America a better country in which to
live, that serves the cause of peace and freedom in the
world.

What is, then, America's mission today? It was put
best by a British Prime Minister a hundred and eighty five
years ago. After Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar,
William Pitt was toasted as the savior of Europe. A hundred
years later, Lord Curzon described Pitt's response as being
one of the three most eloquent masterpieces of English
eloquence. Listen to his words: "I return you many thanks
for the honor that you have done me. But Europe will not be
saved by any single man. England has saved herself by her
exertions, and will, I trust, save Europe by her example."
Today, the world will not be saved by any single nation.
But America can save herself by her exertions, and will, we
trust, save the cause of peace and freedom in the world.

* * *

Transcribed by STUDIO TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES 4-21-93

12

March 12, 1976

MEMORANDUM TO DR. HENRY KISSINGER
Personal and Private

I have prepared this report with the understanding that it would be delivered by hand to Dr. Kissinger.

This is a private report by a private citizen with no official status and should be so treated.

The contents, of course, should be made available to the President and to General Scowcroft to the extent they express an interest. I am submitting the report with the understanding that under no circumstances will it be distributed in whole or in part to the State Department bureaucracy or to others in the Executive Department or the Congress. Of course, the President, the Secretary of State and General Scowcroft can and should, in their discretion, use the substance of the report where they think it is relevant, _without attribution to me_, in policy discussions they may have on the subjects I will cover.

I strongly urge that my wishes in this regard be respected because in my talks with Mao, Hua and other Chinese officials, I told them at the outset that

Page 2

I would express my views freely and that they could
talk freely to me because I had no intention to disclose
the conversations to the media and that I would only
pass on their views where I considered it appropriate
to do so to the President, the Secretary of State and
the President's National Security Adviser. I indicated
that I would do this on my own initiative and that
no one in the Administration had requested before I left
that I brief them on the conversations that I might have.

Basis for the Report:

The primary sources for the report were the
conversations I had with various Chinese leaders
including the following:

1. A 1 1/2 hour discussion with Mao at which the Foreign Minister, Huang Chen and two note takers and two translators were present.

2. Nine hours of formal talks with Hua, plus informal conversations at three dinners and the automobile rides to and from the airport. At the formal talks, those present included the Foreign Minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua; the Director, American

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and Ocean Affairs Department, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Lin P'ing; Ambassador
Huang Chen; Mao's niece; two male note
takers and two translators.

3. A talk of about 45 minutes with Teng Ying-ch'ao (Premier Chou En-lai's widow).

4. A long talk in an automobile with my
host on the trip to Quei-Lin and Canton --
a rather impressive younger man, around
50 years of age, who is the Vice Chairman
of the Chinese Congress.

5. A discussion alone with Ambassador Huang Chen in Canton the day I left for Tokyo.

6. Highlights of discussions I had with Mao's fourth wife, Chiang Ch'ing, during the musical program which she had produced.

7. A rather long and revealing talk I had with Chien Ta-yung, who, together with the Chief of Protocol, was my host on the airplane going to and from China.

8. A talk of about an hour in Tokyo when we stopped for refueling, with the Chinese Ambassador in Tokyo, with regard to the current situation in Japan.

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I followed my usual custom of going to all of the talks alone, without notes. Except for the last formal meeting I had with Hua, I made no notes during the course of the meeting. Colonel Brennan was present at the last two meetings I had with Hua and made some notes of what the Chinese said in response to questions I asked. At the end of each day I made comprehensive notes of my recollections of the talks and this report will be based on those notes.

## Subjects Covered:

I shall try to give a personal appraisal of the top Chinese leaders I met, particularly of Mao and Hua. In this appraisal my purpose will be to provide an evaluation of what - if any - changes will be made in Chinese foreign and domestic policy as a result of the demotion of Teng and the promotion of Hua as Acting Premier.

I shall include in my summary of the subject matters discussed virtually all of their major positions. I recognize that much of what they said will be simply repetitious of the line that was taken with the President and Dr. Kissinger in December. This, of course, in itself is significant to the extent that it may indicate those areas where the line remains unchanged and possibly some nuances where the line may be in the process of

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some revisions. I will try especially to analyze the
meaning of the current debate on domestic issues
taking place in the PRC and provide my appraisal, for
whatever it is worth, of what, if any, effect the
domestic debate will have on foreign policy.

While no one could presume to predict the
future, I shall set forth my own views, not only as
to how established and accepted the current leadership
is but how long it will last and when and if a change
will be made. This, of course, will be pure guesswork
on my part but any views in this area probably are
worth passing on. Finally, I shall cover in the report
the explanation and defense of Administration policies
that I gave in every meeting I had whenever the opportunity
presented itself. This will include the appraisal I gave
them of what might happen before and during the election
year and after the election - a subject, of course, in
which they expressed a very keen and obvious interest.

## The Personalities:

Mao seemed to be a bit better physically than
I expected based on the report I had received from the
CIA and State Department briefing material and the
observations David and Julie made on their return.

Physically, of course, as has been reported,

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he is very frail. The effect of the stroke on his mobility was obvious though he was standing when we entered the room. He had to be helped to his chair and the first words he spoke were to the effect that his health had not been good and that it particularly effected his left leg and his speech. As I had been informed by other reports I have received, his speech was gravely impaired. It is quite remarkable that his monosyllabic utterances which one who did not know Chinese would describe as "grunts and groans" could make any sense at all to the interpreters. He followed the practice which I had heard of before - of listening to the interpretations and then asking for his note pad and writing out his answer so that the translator could get the full meaning of what he was trying to say. It is my appraisal that, while his stroke had a massive effect on his ability to speak, it has not impaired his brain. He understood every question and his answers were shrewd, perceptive and generally responsive. His personal warmth and his sense of humor were unimpaired. As a matter of fact, he was even warmer and less inhibited in his conversation than in 1972 when we met for the first time.

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There was one quite significant, profound
difference: He is obviously fatalistic about his
physical condition and without saying so openly,
inferred on several occasions that he had very little
time left to do what he wanted to do. To put it
bluntly, like most very old people, he knows that
the time of his passing is near and he does not try
to hide that from those who see him. On the other
hand, I would say that despite his grave physical
disabilities he is still without question in charge of
himself and in charge of the communistic bureaucracy
and government which runs the PRC.

Hua looks somewhat older than his age would
indicate. He walks and talks very slowly and very
deliberately. He is bland, virtually humorless,
bureaucratic in his approach to problems and obviously
almost totally unsophisticated in the field of foreign
policy - a point that I will address later in describing
the subject matter of our conversations. On the other
hand, he obviously has enormous stamina. He never
appeared tired at the end of the long conversations that
we had or at the end of the three dinners and the musical
affair which we attended together. He drank very little --
much less than Chou En-lai, and as we all recall
Chou En-lai had already cut down substantially on his
drinking by the time we saw him in 1972. He also, I

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noted, was very careful about smoking. He limited
himself, he told me, to 1/2 a pack of cigarettes a
day, after the Foreign Minister mentioned that he
smoked two packs a day. He is also obviously watching
his weight because he ate far less than most of the
others at the table. He was proper and courteous
but not warm and scintilating, in any sense, like
Chou En-lai. He is one who would find it very difficult
to excite either a crowd or close associates. He is
basically a plodder and if he has so-called charisma or
leadership qualities as Chou En-lai did, he certainly
did not display them. There were two interesting
sidelights. First, it appears that he is beginning
to grow a mustache and a beard although it is possible
that he just didn't find time to shave during the
period we were there!

The second point is perhaps more significant
in that it may indicate the attitude the intellectual
leader class in the PRC, of which Chou En-lai was such
an outstanding example, have toward him. After we
left Peking, I was talking to one of our translators.
I mentioned that I understood that Hua was from Hunan.
She responded that that was a "typical Eastern media
inaccuracy." She said that he was actually from Quan-Si
Province. She said he tries to talk Mandarin but he has
a very heavy accent. She said, "His accent is so heavy

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that even I have a hard time understanding him."

This may be, indicentally, one of the reasons he spoke
so slowly and ponderously during our conversations.

I was thinking as she told me this of how many of
the Russian leader class used to comment on Khrushchev's
bad Russian grammar and that some of the same criticisms,
of course, were leveled earlier at Stalin and later
even at Brezhnev. If there is a sophisticated Chou En-lai
leader group in the PRC, Hua may be their man, but he
is not one of them.

From the reports I had had before I left I
had gathered that Mao's fourth wife, Chiang Ch'ing,
while still a member of the Politbouro was out of
favor. This may be the case, but if it is the Foreign
Minister certainly is not aware of it. He came to see
me before the musical performance and spent 45 torturous
minutes telling me the story of each of the musical
numbers that we were to hear that night. He said that
she had asked him to do so in order that I would
understand the program. As far as her personal
attitude toward us was concerned, it was infinitely
warmer than in 1972 when she was cold as ice and would
not miss an opportunity to raise an unpleasant or
controversial subject. I thought that she would revert

Page 10

when I refused to stand up and cheer after the singing
of the controversial anti-Taiwan number. On the other
hand when the break in the program occurred we went in
for refreshments and she was warmer than ever before
and the following day sent the Foreign Minister over
with a book and some other personal gifts and, in
addition, arranged a tour in the afternoon of a part of
the Palace that has not yet been opened to the public,
where, by her direction, an exquisite tea, with all of
the special Chinese cakes, was served to us. In addition,
she ordered a special luncheon for us - all of this after
the incident with regard to the Taiwan song. Whether
any of this has any meaning is anybody's guess but at
least she still has enough stroke to treat the Foreign
Minister virtually as her personal messenger boy to carry
out her wishes. Hua treated her, I noted, with marked
defference and respect.

Major Subjects Covered in Conversations:

Before arriving in Peking, I discussed with
Chien the subjects that he thought the Chinese leaders
would want to discuss with me. He indicated that their
primary concerns were the following:

A. That the United States, after what had
happened in Vietnam and Angola might
for political reasons rather than because

[LC]

Page 11

of lack of military strength, be an unreliable ally or friend in countering what the Chinese believe is a massive Soviet effort to "reach out its hand in Europe, in Africa, India, Southeast Asia, Japan and eventually PRC itself."

B. He did not at any time blame the President or the Secretary of State in this regard but indicated that there was concern as to whether, in order to achieve a "diplomatic victory" before the election the U.S. might make a deal with the Soviet on arms control and other matters which would put the U.S. in an inferior position militarily and encourage the expansionist elements in the Soviet Union.

C. Helsinki was the example he used of an agreement with the Soviet which greatly concerned the Chinese because of the effect it was now having in creating a euphoric attitude among some of the NATO countries while Soviet control over its "satellites" was not only formally recognized but solidified in fact.

Page 12

D. He said that they were following the American elections with great interest and that they would be greatly interested in my assessment of what effect the elections would have on American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the PRC as well as other countries.

E. He mentioned Taiwan and Korea only in passing. I indicated to him that these were two areas where the U.S. and the PRC had different points of view but that I would be willing to answer any questions the Chinese leaders might have with regard to what I believed our policy was and the reasons for it.

F. In sum, he said that the Chinese position was that the only policy which would restrain Soviet expansionism would be a return to confrontation on all fronts, due to the fact that negotiations inevitably would result in Soviet "victories" and U.S. "defeats." I, in turn, told him that I would be greatly interested in learning what effect, if any, the change in leadership in the PRC and the debate on domestic policies would have on the PRC's foreign

Page 13

policy. It was against this backdrop
that I met Hua the day after I arrived.

A brief reference to the meeting I had with
Chou's widow might be of some interest. She told me
that Chou had been informed shortly before his death
that Mrs. Nixon and I had accepted the invitation to
visit the PRC, that it would occur on the 4th anniversary
of my meeting with him in 1972 and that he was extremely
pleased to receive this information. However, she
then very unequivocally pointed out that she had been
married to Chou for fifty years, that she had never
traveled with him on his trips abroad, that as Communists,
men have their work to do and that she would continue
to do her work. She was appreciative of the statement
I had made after Chou's death. I told her that he was,
in my opinion, one of the outstanding diplomats of
the Twentieth Century. I said that what particularly
impressed me about him was that he always spoke
courteously but at the same time firmly and that one
of his remarkable characteristics was that he spoke most
softly when he "had the cards."

I told her that there was no necessity for
a monument to be built to his memory -- that his monument
would be a new structure of peace -- not only for the
PRC and the U.S. but for all peoples -- a structure
which had to be built stone by stone for generations to

Page 14

come. This monument, I said, would be one that was
not visible to the naked eye but would be far more
meaningful so far as historians were concerned. I
recall illustrating this by saying "What you cannot
see is often more meaningful that what you can see."

She and the others present were visibly
touched by what I had said. She and virtually all
the others had tears in their eyes. But what was more
significant was that she went to great lengths to point
out that Chairman Mao deserved all the credit for the
PRC's foreign policy, including the credit for the new
relationship with the United States and that Chairman
Mao's policies would continue to be followed. It is
significant to note that in all the conversations I
had with the Chinese leaders, Chou's name was not mentioned.
It was only on the return trip - on the flight from
Tokyo to Anchorage that Chien spoke very movingly of
Chou and what he had accomplished. He said that the
cancer which eventually took his life was first diagnosed
in the later part of 1972. He said that despite his
illness, Chou worked and continued to participate
in decision making right up until the day of his death.
I would not conclude from the conversations I had and
the failure of our hosts to mention Chou that he, after
his death, will be relegated to the status of a non-person
or even be charged with having been a revisionist. But

Page 15

what comes through loud and clear is that the cadre's
have all received the message that it is Mao, not
Chou, who was responsible for the change of the PRC's
foreign policy toward the U.S. and that Mao not only
had called the signals in the past but was calling
them now and that his line would continue to be followed
after his death.

## Meetings with Hua:

(General comments on U.S. policy by R.N.)

In the first meeting with Hua which took
place shortly after I had paid my call to Madame Chou,
he said that following their custom they would like for
me to speak first - that they would appreciate my
expressing the views that I had with regard to Sino-American
relations as well as on the international situation
generally. Also Hua said they would be interested in
my evaluation of the American political scene insofar
as it might affect U.S. foreign policy, particularly
as it might relate to the PRC or to the Soviet Union.

I began by making a statement of considerable
length which I believe may to an extent have reassured
them with regard to U.S. strength, "U.S. will and
particularly with regard to strong U.S. leadership in
the Executive Branch.

I said that I had known President Ford for
over 20 years and that he was a strong, tough, determined

Page 16

leader.

With regard to the upcoming Salt negotiations with the Soviet, I told them that the Washington columnists who were suggesting that Secretary Kissinger would negotiate an agreement which would put the U.S. in an inferior position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union were writing "nonsense".

"I know Kissinger", I said. "He is a shrewd, tough, hardheaded negotiator. He will never recommend to the President any agreement which would give the Soviet Union an advantage in overall military strength."

I pointed out that many times in U.S. history there has been a tendency for superficial observers to conclude that the United States, after a war, will inevitably reduce its strength, fail to meet its responsibilities as a world leader and retreat into basically an isolationist posture. Those who had reached these conclusions in the past had all proved to be wrong. I said that the current trend toward what would appear to be an isolationist position was a temporary phenomenon and that the American people, particularly when they see a potential adversary making overt moves to expand in a way that would be detrimental to the United States or its friends and allies invariably would respond by increasing our strength to meet the threat and that the Congress would inevitably follow

Page 17

the attitudes of the American people in this respect.
I pointed out that President Ford had called for a
substantial increase in our Defense Budget and that
both the President and Secretary Kissinger had made
every possible effort to mobilize Congressional
support for opposing the Soviet-Cuban intervention in
Angola. I said that while the Congress did not follow
the recommendations of the President as far as Angola
was concerned that any further Soviet expansionist
moves could change the attitude of the Congress overnight
and that in any event the President and the Secretary
of State would be doing everything possible to mobilize
American public opinion in support of the Administration's
policies.

I told them that news reports they may have
seen to the effect that the President and Secretary of
State would "pay any price" in order to obtain an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control in
order to achieve a foreign policy "success" before the
elections were completely inaccurate. I expressed the
view that any negotiations with the Soviet would be
conducted in a hardheaded, realistic, pragmatic manner
and under no circumstances need they fear that the
United States would negotiate itself into a second

Page 18

class position vis-a-vis the Soviet. I also expressed the opinion that they need have no fear that the United States would negotiate any agreement with the Soviet which would be at the expense of our allies and friends in the world, including of course the PRC.

I then gave them my views with regard to the PRC's current strategic position. On the North they are confronted by a potential hostile superpower, the Soviet Union. On the South they face India, a country which I recognized they had considerable contempt for but one which with Soviet arms and a potential nuclear capability could be a serious threat in the future. In the Southeast, Vietnam, due to the fact that it received most of its heavy weapons from the Soviet Union could not be considered to be a friend and might in the future be a potential opponent. I emphasized the need for the PRC to continue to give every possible support to Pakistan so that India would not be tempted to gobble up the other half of Pakistan after having succeeded in slicing off the Southern half. In the Northeast, they face Japan - a country of enormous industrial strength but with no military strength. I emphasized that so far as Japan was concerned, the American-Japanese defense treaty was indispensable not only for Japan's survival but was vitally important to

Page 19

[LC]

the future security of the PRC. I said that in the event that the United States were to withdraw its support the Japanese would have only two choices - either to "go into business for themselves" or to make some kind of a security agreement with another strong power which would at this time be the Soviet Union and not the PRC. I told them that the U.S. support of a strong NATO which I recognized was a position they totally approved of was directly related to their security.

In sum, I said that if the U.S., Japan, the PRC and Western Europe stood together, Soviet expansionism or any adventurist policy would be contained. I discussed Korea and Taiwan only briefly because I wanted to hear their views first. But I told them that I recognized we had differences of opinion on both of these matters but that they had to make a decision between survival and ideology. I said that all should recall Churchill's statement during World War II when he said that Britain would be a friend of any nation who opposed its enemies. I told them that I recognized that this posed a difficult problem for them because in many instances countries with 'Communist regimes posed a threat to their security and survival whereas countries with non-Communist regimes, like the nations of Western Europe, Japan, the Philippines, and

Page 20

of course, the United States did not threaten their
security, and on the contrary were essential in
varying degrees to their defense and survival.

I was, of course, aware of the fact that the
Chinese leadership was somewhat enamored with what they
called the Schlesinger doctrine on detente and I then
proceeded to give them my assessment of the various
positions which were held in the United States on detente
and how each would affect the PRC's defense and survival.

At one extreme, I said there were the
"super hawks". "They are against U.S. detente with the
Soviet Union and are for a return to all-out confronta-
tion rather than negotiation."

"The 'super hawks' who oppose detente with
the Soviet also oppose detente with any communist
country, including the PRC."

I said at the other extreme we have the
"super doves". "They would have no hesitance in
acceding to your demands with regard to Taiwan. On
the other hand, they tend to be naive with regard to the
Soviet threat. Most of them would favor a withdrawal
of most or all of American forces from Europe and for
the reduction of American forces in Asia and other
key areas.

Basically, they are the "new isolationists".

Page 21

"Therefore your choice where the super doves are concerned is getting what you want on Taiwan at the risk of greatly increasing the Soviet threat because of the "doves" naive attitude toward the USSR.

"The third group is that represented by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger. That group supports a continuing American military role in Western Europe, a strengthening of American defenses so that we are never in a second class position vis-a-vis the Soviet, maintaining our defense commitments with Japan and continuing on a step by step basis to work toward normalization of relations with the PRC.

"From the standpoint of the PRC you will have to determine whether your major intents are best served by an Administration dominated by either super hawks, or super doves, or one that follows the pragmatic, hard-headed line which the current Administration is supporting."

The Foreign Minister, at this point when I was discussing the super-doves, said he had met several American leaders who were in this category and that he agreed with me that they were naive with regard to the Soviet threat and he recalled that many of them had supported proposals which would have drastically reduced America's overall Defense strength and also proposals that would substantially reduce our forces in Western Europe.

Page 22

Hua did not comment on any of the matters that I discussed at this meeting. It seemed to me that he was trying cautiously to feel his way and to prepare himself for the meeting that was to follow the next day where he would state the Chinese positions on the matters I had raised and others as well.

He gave a prelude as to what his line would be in his toast at the welcoming banquet that night in the Great Hall of the People. I include the following excerpt from his toast as background for the conversation I was to have the next day with Mao and the other conversations I was to have with Hua and his colleagues.

"Four years ago, President Nixon visited our country, and China and the United States issued the famous Shanghai Communique. That historic event has played a major role in improving and developing Sino-U.S. relations and exerted a far-reaching influence internationally. Mr. Nixon certainly showed far-sightedness in taking this courageous action in his capacity as U.S. President at a time when contacts between Chinese and American people had been suspended for more than twenty years.

"In the four years since then, contacts between our two peoples have resumed and the relations between our two countries improved on the basis of the principles set forth in the Shanghai Communique.

Page 25

"The American people are a great people.

The Chinese people are a great people. Our two peoples have always been friendly to each other. True, China and the United States have different social systems and ideologies and there are differences of principle on quite a number of issues; however, our two countries have many points in common in the world today. The Chinese Government has always pursued and will consistently pursue the line, principles and policies laid down by Chairman Mao in the field of foreign affairs. We remain convinced that so long as both sides earnestly implement the principles of the Shanghai Communique, Sino-U.S. relations will further improve, and that this conforms to the common desire of the Chinese and American peoples.

"In the past four years, the world has witnessed a series of important events, and encouraging changes have taken place in the international situation. The situation characterized by great disorder under heaven is developing further and becoming better and better. The danger of outbreak of a new war keeps growing as a result of the intense rivalry for world hegemony, and in particular, that imperialism which flaunts the signboard of 'socialism' has reached out its grasping hands everywhere and carried our rapid expansion; it has become the main source of war. This is a fact which attracts people's attention today. The only

Page 24

realistic and effective way to cope with this situation
is for the peoples of the world to heighten their
vigilance, strengthen their unity and get well
prepared against war. It will be recalled that Mr.
Nixon wrote in June 1972 that aggressive ambitions are
held in check not by idealism. It should also be noted
that this expansionism is pitiable, being lacking in
capabilities though wild in ambition. Its aggression
and expansion everywhere bear the seed of defeat.
History has time and again proved that expansionists
never come to a good end; such as was the case with
Hitler, and the hegemonism of today will come to no
better end. It is the people, and definitely not
hegemonism that is really powerful.

"In China, a revolutionary mass debate is going on in such circles as education, science and technology. It is a continuation and deepening of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It fully demonstrates the extensive democracy practiced in our country under the system of socialism. We are confident that, through this debate, Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line will find its way deeper into the hearts of the people, and our socialist

Page 25

motherland will be further consolidated. It will
also enable us to do better in making a greater
contribution to humanity in accordance with Chairman
Mao's teachings.

"The next fifty to hundred years or so, will be a great era of radical change throughout the world, an earth-shaking era without equal in any previous historical period. The road of advance of human history is always torturous, but we firmly believe that the people of the world, by waging unremitting struggle, will assure a most splendid future."

## Meeting with Mao

I have previously given an evaluation of Mao's physical and mental condition. I should add here that the Chinese in setting up the meeting wanted to be sure that there were a minimum number of people accompanying me. As a result, I did not take Secret Service with me, and only Colonel Brennan and Mrs. Nixon entered the room with me. After he greeted them warmly, they left and he was helped to sit down at his left with the Foreign Minister on my left and Hua on his right.

Page 26

He opened the conversation by mentioning Julie and David's visit. He said, "They are good young people." He said that Julie had sat in the same chair as I had.

His first question to me was how long will peace last? I replied, "That's what our meeting four years ago and the policies that the United States and the PRC have been following since then are about - the future of Julie and David and their generation."

He said, "Do you believe that peace can last for a generation?" I replied, "Longer." He then held up one finger, and I said, "longer than that." He then held up three fingers and I said, "longer than that." Each time as I responded, he smiled and finally said, "How long then?" I said, "Possibly a hundred years. You are world renowned for taking a long historical view and I believe that in this instance it is important that our two nations should set our goals high."

He responded, "It will be very difficult."

I quoted back to him his words, "'Nothing is hard in this world if one dares to scale the heights.' If we set our goals for a hundred years, maybe then we might get 25 years of peace. As you know, I am not unrealistic as to the dangers that threaten the peace but I believe we must set our goals high.'"

Page 27

Mao replied, "There can be no peace as long
as classes exist in the world."

I responded, "Why do you consider the Soviet
Union to be a threat to peace? There are no classes
there. It is a Communist state."

Mao responded, "You are wrong."

I replied, "That's what they tell me in
Moscow."

Mao tersely responded, "They don't tell the
truth." Mao then asked, "Is peace our only goal?"

I responded, "Not by itself. Peace in the
sense of simply being the absence of war is not enough.
The peace we seek must be creative, a world in which
the lot of all people may be constantly improved."

The subject changed to India. He mentioned
the fact that India was receiving arms, including
nuclear capability, from the Soviet Union. I asked
him whether the United States should give economic
assistance to India as we have been in the past and
are doing in the present in view of the apparent
increasing Soviet control over India because of
India's dependence upon Soviet arms.

There was quite a long pause before he
answered. Then he said, "Yes, India is not a
'running dog' with Moscow." I said, "Women sometimes

Page 28

are difficult to deal with and Mrs. Ghandi has proved
particularly so for you and for us."

He laughed and responded by saying, "Her
father was also difficult."

I asked him his view on Angola as to what
he thought the U.S. should do there. He responded
by saying, "We haven't recognized them yet."

The conversation then turned to NATO. I
expressed concern about what might happen in Italy.
He commented to the effect that the Italian, Yugoslav
and French Communist parties were different from the
Soviet Communist party. "They are not running dogs
for Moscow."

But then he asked me if the Communists came
to power in Italy or participated in a coalition govern-
ment as to what effect that would have on NATO.

I said that it would have a disastrous effect
on NATO particularly because in the United States most
people felt that Moscow had great influence with the
Italian Communist party. Many believe that the Italian
Communists are playing a very low posture game at this
time, but if they came to power they would show their
true colors and that Moscow would dominate Italy. I
pointed out that we were having increasing difficulty
as it is in the United States in getting support for
maintaining American troop levels in NATO. I said that

Page 29

If Italy were to have a government either Communist dominated or with the Communists in a coalition the doves who desire to reduce American forces in NATO or withdraw them altogether would be joined by the hawks who would never approve funds for NATO if a country as important as Italy had even the appearance of being Moscow influenced or dominated. I made the point to him here that I recognized this was a difficult problem for a Communist country like the PRC. "But what you must realize," I said, "is that you must choose between the survival of NATO which is vitally important to your survival or a Communist Italy which I can well understand would be a goal of your ideology. Where the choice is between survival and ideology - survival must always come first."

At this point he made a very interesting comment. He said, "You are too tense." The translator said that what he meant when he used the word "you" was that he was referring to the West generally and not to me personally. I, nevertheless, re-emphasized the point with regard to Italy by saying if the American forces were withdrawn from NATO, NATO would unravel and that was really what was at stake in the upcoming Italian elections.

I then repeated the theme I had used with Hua the day before that the PRC, the United States,

Page 30

Japan and Western Europe acting together and cooperating with each other would be able to contain and discourage further expansionism or adventurism.

Mao responded by saying, "We believe that Africa, Asia and Latin America are also important."

I answered by saying that in my opinion that was true if we were thinking of the long term but that in the short term the third world countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America lacked the power to play a decisive role in the world scene.

I told him that I felt that cooperation between the PRC and the United States could be the decisive factor in the immediate future and possibly even for as long as twenty-five years in keeping the peace. I emphasized that that cooperation should be in all fields, economic diplomatic and security.

I quoted Washington to him that "the way to peace is to be prepared for war." He nodded in emphatic agreement.

I made a move to leave several times after we had been there almost an hour but he motioned for me to sit down. He wanted to talk more. It was then that I sensed that he was talking in an almost fatalistic way as one who knew he had very little time to live, as one who is resigned to death, but as one who felt he still had much to do. I told him

Page 31

that what really mattered most was not one's physical
condition but the health of his mind and whether
he had the will to live. It was these factors that
keeps one young.

I closed the conversation by telling him
that I had come to the PRC as a friend in 1972, that
I was a friend now and would continue to be in the
future. I said this was the case not only because
of my personal affection and respect for my Chinese
friends but because pragmatically speaking, in terms
of national self-interest, that I believed as I
know he did that a new and closer relationship
between our two nations was indispensable not only
to peace and security for our own peoples but a
creative and a better world for all peoples.

He seemed moved and quite touched by my
remarks and picking up his tea cup suggested that we
drink a toast together and called the cameramen in to
record it. We tipped the tea cups and then after we
put them down he reached his hands over and we
concluded our conversation with a double handshake
just as we had four years before. As we were shaking
hands, I said that the Chinese people and the American
people were natural friends and that our two
nations were, clearly apart from any formal agreements,
in our self-interest necessary allies. He nodded in

Page 32

agreement. I then told him that President Ford had asked me to extend his best wishes. I said, "He is a good man and a strong man and you can rely upon him." He responded by saying, "Please extend my best wishes to President Ford."

An interesting sidelight is that I told the Chinese, through Brennan, that we would put out nothing to the press during the course of my visit and that they could determine what should be put out in the conversations that were held. In this case they put out the fact that my talk with Mao was friendly and that he sent his best wishes to President Ford. The day I left the PRC I had a talk with Huang Chen and told him that I hoped that the flap over whether or not my visit to the PRC affected the New Hampshire primary did not cause him any embarrassment since I knew he had played a major role in working out the arrangements for the trip. He just laughed and said that the Chinese leaders were puzzled by the press and political reactions because he said, "Don't you remember that Chairman Mao two days *before* the New Hampshire elections authorized the issuance of a statement after his meeting with you in which he sent his best wishes to President Ford?" Of course, I suppose it could be argued that getting best wishes from Chairman Mao could have been detrimental in New

Page 55

Hampshire but at least looking at it from the
Chinese point of view they considered this to be
about as strong an endorsement as anyone in the world
could possibly give or receive!

## Meeting with Hua

In our first conversation, Hua came in with
no notes because he, as previously noted, asked me to
state my position first and that he would respond.

In our other three conversations, he came in
with extensive notes, what we would call briefing
materials, and referred to them before responding to
key questions. Also during the course of these
conversations he would often turn to the Foreign
Minister, sometimes converse with him and other
times to get what I presume would be some signal as
to what line he should take. It was very clear from
the way that he conducted himself during these talks
that he was very unsure of himself in the foreign
policy field, and that he was simply stating the
standard line which had been prepared by the foreign
office or his other associates.

My guess is that the Foreign Minister played
a rather substantial role in preparing this line and,
as I have previously noted Hua never missed an
opportunity to quote Mao whenever a subject was
brought up on which Mao may have made any kind of a

Page 34

comment whatever no matter how inconsequential.

There will be inevitably a considerable amount of repetition in the memoranda of conversations I had with Hua. I shall however include remarks which are repetitious since they may indicate either how strongly the positions are held, or on the contrary they might indicate a sense of defensiveness - "the lady doth protest too much". That, of course, is for you to judge!

## (1) Hua's analysis of the general international situation

He began our second conversation with the old Chinese quote, "There is great disorder under Heaven and the situation is excellent."

"The United States must protect its interests in the world while the Soviet Union is trying to expand its influence in the world. This will lead to inevitable conflict."

I asked him what he meant by the situation being excellent. He responded along these lines:

"All nations want independence and liberation; all people want freedom, progress and revolution. This is a strong historical trend."

"Soviet socialist imperialism has wild ambitions, but they lack the strength to achieve their goals. The more they try to expand, the more

Page 35

we will be able to counter them because we will have
the support of the people."

"What the Soviet Union did in Czechoslovakia
in 1948, in Egypt in the 1970's and now in Angola
exposes Soviet imperialism for what it is."

"It is Chairman Mao's view that outward
expansion and adventurism carries with it the seeds
of defeat."

"The Soviet Union also has very great
difficulties at home. For example, after 50 years it
has not solved the problem of food."

At this point Hua waxed rather eloquent
because this is obviously a field in which he considered
himself to be an expert.

"We are optimistic about the future of the
world. The fact that China is preparing for war is
no indication of pessimism on our part. As Chairman
Mao has said and as Marx wrote many years ago, "As
long as imperialism exists in the world, there is
bound to be war."

"Ironically however it is Soviet Socialist
Imperialism rather than Capitalist Imperialism which
is the major threat to the peace of the world today.
As far as war is concerned, we simply consider it to
be a continuation of politics." (Obviously either
he or one of his advisors was once a student of our

Page 36

Secretary of State with his profound knowledge of the
doctrine German leaders were proclaiming before World
War I!)

"War emerges between periods of peace. It is significant to note that small wars which have occurred since World War II have not developed into a Third World War."

"There are two kinds of wars - just wars and wars for aggression."

"Though we generally consider that war is bad, this is not always the case."

"War can temper and strengthen a people. For example, the Japanese brought great suffering to China during the 1930's and 40's. But as a result of their aggression, the Chinese people were aroused, socialism prevailed and in the end the Chinese people won."

## (2) Comments on Nuclear War

"We believe that there will not be a nuclear war. No purpose is served in conquering a nation if everything is destroyed. It is Chairman Mao's view that if there is a nuclear war, communism will remain at the end and whoever resorts to it will be destroyed. We believe that conventional war is much more likely than nuclear war. That is one of the reasons

Page 37

why we are greatly concerned about the progress the
Soviet Union has made in building up its Navy and its
conventional forces. We fear that in this area the
United States is going to fall behind."

At this point in the conversation, I interrupted him and told him that if this was their belief that they should not object to the efforts of President Ford and Secretary Kissinger to negotiate a limitation on offensive nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. I pointed out that as far as the current balance of power is concerned, they should not underestimate the United States. We were ahead both in the sophistication and accuracy of nuclear weapons as well as number of warheads and that under no circumstances would any agreement be made with the Soviet Union which would leave them with an advantage which they might be able to use for nuclear blackmail against us or any of our friends or allies.

I went on to say that unless the United
States got an agreement with the Soviet Union limiting
offensive nuclear weapons similar to the one we had
limiting defensive nuclear weapons both nations would
then have to concentrate in building up its nuclear
forces. The United States would be able to do this,
but this might inevitably distort our defense budget.
The more the United States had to put into nuclear

Page 38

weapons the less we would have available out of our
defense budget to build up our conventional forces,
through modernizing our navy and in other areas as
well. Therefore, I went on to say, that in my
opinion the interests of both the PRC and the United
States would be served by having an agreement limiting
offensive nuclear weapons provided, of course, it
was one that did not place the United States at a
disadvantage. Hua did not react to my comment, but
I had the impression it made some impact on him
and the others as well because there was a rather
long pause before he went into his next subject.

(3) The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Hua had a number of comments to make on the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, some of which
seemed to be contradictory. I record them here for
whatever they may be worth, having in mind the fact
that this subject has already been covered in previous
conversations that have been held with the Chinese.

"The PRC has not signed a non-proliferation
treaty, nor has France. However, it should be noted
that the Soviet Union, which _did_ sign that treaty has
proliferated, to India for example. As far as the
PRC is concerned, we believe the more nations which
have nuclear weapons, the less chance there will be
of a nuclear war."

Page 39

I interjected a question at this point,
and asked whether they felt that Japan having
nuclear weapons would not be a potential danger to
peace in Asia and in the world. He replied after
chatting with the Foreign Minister that the Japanese
Constitution prohibited nuclear weapons. He said
that while it was the Chinese view that the proliferation
of nuclear weapons decreased their potential use,
that this did not mean that the PRC advocated proliferation

"Our position is - we have them, and we don't
say that others can't have them."

(4) Further General Comments on War and its Inevitability

He came back at another session to the point
that the Japanese attack on China was a disaster, but
it also served as a teacher, it awakened the Chinese
people. He summed up his views by saying, "War is bad,
but it can educate people and help develop consciousness."

He would then halfway contradict this by
saying, "We want, however, it understood that while we
are preparing for war, this does not mean that we
fear war or that we want it."

"China has nuclear weapons but we do not
overestimate their importance. In the final analysis,
people, not weapons, determine victory or defeat in a
just war."

Page 40

He then quoted Mao again and said that "atoms are a paper tiger".

"Our purpose in acquiring a nuclear capability is not for aggression but to break the nuclear monopoly of other countries. We favor proliferation because we are against a nuclear monopoly."

"We do not fear war, even from the Soviet Union. China is a vast country and any aggressor who gets in will find it very difficult to get out."

## (5) Hua's Analysis of Soviet Policy

Comments with regard to the Soviet Union ran all through the conversations I had. Following is a summary of what I consider to be the most relevant points that he made.

"The Soviet Union is the greatest potential source of war. The reason for this is because the Soviet Union has become revisionist in its domestic policy. It has in effect become capitalist and is no longer a classless society. Therefore as long as there are classes there will be war. The privileged class in the Soviet Union which has emerged is imperialist and expansionist and will continue to be so."

I asked whether he thought Soviet policy would change if there were a change in the Soviet leadership. His answer was, "No. Because the Soviet Union is now no longer a true socialist society, but

Page 41

one with a privileged class which is capitalist and expansionist in character."

"It is because Khrushchev and Brezhnev became revisionists and betrayed the true Marxist/Leninist line that we have seen the Soviet Union degenerate into a capitalist, socialist, imperialist power that tries to conquer the world."

"We will not resolve our differences with them. Changes of leaders in our country or in theirs will not resolve our differences. He referred to the fact that Mao had told Kosygin in 1965 that the debate between China and the Soviet Union would go on for 10,000 years and that Kosygin asked Mao after their conversation if he didn't think that he had convinced Mao that 10,000 years was too long, Mao said that he would be glad to knock off a thousand years in deference to Kosygin's pursuasive arguments but that the debate would go on for at least nine thousand years!"

I realize that this is not new, but it is interesting that they repeated it to me as they have to others.

He came back again in a later conversation to his theme with regard to the inevitable conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This time he quoted Mao.

Page 42

"The U.S. has interests in the world that it wants to protect. The Soviet Union is expanding. This can't go on. Therefore the possibility of both revolution and war is increasing." He followed the line that Teng had followed with the President and Kissinger when he said that the major thrust of Soviet expansionism was toward the west rather than toward the east - in other words, a feint to the East but the thrust and danger to the West.

"The Mideast," he said, "is simply a flank in the West, important but not decisive."

He went on to say however, "This does not mean that the Soviet does not want to expand in the East. It does not mean that we are trying to push the 'evil waters of the U.S.S.R.' to the West."

"But the main thrust of Soviet military strength is in Europe. Consequently, detente with the Soviet Union is a springboard that they are using with the backing of their military strength. Their purpose is to Finlandize Europe, a goal which the Helsinki Conference greatly served. Europe today is consequently very weak in will and the U.S. and the PRC should cooperate with each other in trying to strengthen the European will."

In this connection he noted the remarks by Margaret Thatcher with approval and I reminded him that

Page 43

Winston Churchill's grandson had made similar remarks in a speech in Europe.

As far as meeting the Soviet threat is concerned he said, "Outwardly the Soviet appears strong and ferocious, but they face great difficulties both at home and abroad. What we must do is wage a tit for tat struggle against the Soviet every place in the world."

He said that the United States, the PRC, Japan and Western Europe should be united in their efforts to "tackle the polar bear" and then on another occasion he used the words, "cope with the polar bear".

"If appeasement in Europe is overstressed, this will result in a reduction in confidence in those who must face the Soviet expansionist efforts in other parts of the world."

Reverting after a rather extended conversation with regard to Sino-Soviet relations and Soviet-European relations, he said, "I do not want to leave the wrong impression. We are optimistic about peace. We prepare for war in order to increase the vigilance of our people and to postpone war."

I asked him, in view of everything he had said, whether his conclusion was that as far as war in the short term is concerned he was optimistic, but as far

Page 44

[Ld]

as war in the long term is concerned he was pessimistic.

His reply was straight Marxist/Leninist
doctrine but quite revealing. He used Munich as an
analogy and pointed out that it may have postponed war
but it did not prevent it and it only encouraged Hitler
to engage in more aggression.

He said, "If China had not been prepared
for war the Soviet Union, long ago, would have reached
out its hand toward us."

Then he came back to his other theme.
"We must continue to wage a tit for tat fight against
Soviet expansionism."

(6) Miscellaneous Issues with Regard to Other Countries than the U.S.S.R.

Hua summed up the PRC policy by stating
that the PRC favored a united and strong Europe. They
favored the Japanese/American connection and put that
ahead of the Chinese/Japanese connection. With regard
to Japan he pointed out that they were having difficulty
in getting the Japanese to agree to include an anti-
hegemony clause in it similar to the one we had in the
Shanghai Communique of 1972. He said, however, that
the PRC was very relaxed about this because Tanaka
had agreed in principle to anti-hegemony when he
visited Peking and that "if we can't get it included
in a treaty, it will not be necessary for us to have a
treaty."

Page 45

My guess is, of course, that they will continue to try to get the Japanese to agree to such a clause even on some watered down basis but on the other hand it was clear that they consider the Japanese government to be very unstable at the moment and potentially weak.

With regard to Vietnam, Hua said that they disagreed with my opinion that Vietnam was primarily under Soviet control. They said that that was not valid because the Vietnamese had fought too long for independence to be controlled by anybody. Here, as on several other occasions, he said that the Soviet played "too heavy of hand" and that they would lose because of the reaction to a "negative example". This would backfire on the Soviet as their actions in Angola, Egypt and Czechoslovakia did. He pointed out that they were countering the Soviet in Southeast Asia by developing closer relations with Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia.

I emphasized the need to support Pakistan.

As I have previously indicated, they needed no pursuasion on this point. With some feeling (one of the few times he showed his emotions) Hua said that India dismembered Pakistan under the instigation of the Soviet Union. He said however that the Bangladesh people were waking up. I asked whether the PRC could be of assistance

Page 46

to the Bangladesh government. His response was that the PRC had to be extremely "cautious" in helping the Bangladesh government because of India's power and proximity and possibility of India intervening in the event that the Chinese hand showed to obviously.

He expanded a bit on what Mao had said with regard to the U.S. continuing to assist India. He said that the Chinese and Indian people want to be friends and that the present situation can't go on forever. However, he said that "India continues to bully small countries around."

He strongly urged that the U.S. increase its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Southeast Asian area generally.

It was interesting to note that when I raised the question of Indonesia, every Chinese official I talked to was studiously non-committal. My appraisal is that as distinguished from Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines where the PRC leaders indicate they are willing to make common cause with non-communist governments in order to counter the "encirclement" policies of the Soviet Union and Soviet supported regimes, they consider Indonesia to be in a different catagory. This may go back to the time when the group which brought Suharto into power so ruthlessly exterminated one to two million Chinese supported

Page 47

communists. However, I think a deeper reason is that they feel that Indonesia has a weak, corrupt government and that it is only a matter of time before revolutionary forces will emerge which they then will support all out and eventually achieve domination of that country, which is infinitely more important than all of the others put together in Southeast Asia. I would suggest that Indonesia is one country we should watch very carefully and to the extent that our capabilities are available, we should strengthen the capacity of the government to deal with internal communist supported groups.

With regard to Korea, he followed the usual line, "This is a matter that must be settled by the Korean's themselves without foreign interference. A country cannot be divided for any long period of time. Division of people is counter to their nature and in the end peoples will be unified. The danger of war comes from the South, not the North. You have the power to restrain the South."

I responded quite strongly to him on Korea by taking the following line: "From the public statements I had read it was Kim Il Sung of North Korea who was talking most belligerently."

I said both North and South Korea were loose canons on the deck "and that it was important

Page 48

for both sides to be held in check." I said that
the possibility of South Korea attacking the north
was in my opinion quite remote, but I added that if
the North should attack the South that "all hell
would break loose."

I added, "You must remember that the defense
of South Korea was not just a U.S. action, but a U.N.
action."

I continued, "The Korean problem, if there
is to be unification, must be settled peacefully.
If war should come, as a result of an attack by the
North, it would greatly jeopardize not only our
relations with the PRC but would be particularly
detrimental to the situation in Japan." I pointed
out that a communist dominated Korea would be considered
by the Japanese as a very potent threat to their
security, particularly if there was Soviet as well as
Chinese influence in the North Korean government.

With regard to Taiwan, Hua pointed out
that they had had quite good talks with President
Ford and Dr. Kissinger on the normalization question
in December. He then restated their standard line
on the Taiwan question: The United States should
adopt the Japanese formula - (1) withdraw all of its
forces, (2) break diplomatic relations and (3) renounce
our treaty obligations for mutual defense. He consulted

Page 49

the Foreign Minister, incidently, when discussing
Taiwan.

He made then what I thought was a significant
statement to the effect that the major aspect of the
Sino-U.S. relations was the international aspect
(meaning, of course, our mutual interest with regard
to containing Soviet expansion.) He said that a
lesser aspect of our relations was the Taiwan problem.
After he had stated his position, I said that under
no circumstances should this matter be pressed now,
during an election year. I said that I had no
authority to negotiate and that I had no answer for
the problem but that we had to find a peaceful
answer because Taiwan to an extent like Korea was an
issue which, if it got out of hand could jeopardize
our relationship on other issues which, important as
Taiwan was to the PRC, were far more important to their
survival. His response was, "To distinguish between
right and wrong is the affair of the United States."

"How to liberate Taiwan is China's affair."

Then, rather ominously, he said, "In the
final analysis if it is necessary we will have to
liberate Taiwan by war."

I again emphasized in the strongest terms
that we had to keep these important but nevertheless
peripheral issues in perspective and not allow them

Page 50

to be the cause of destroying a new relationship which
was vital for the survival of both of our countries,
involving the relations between the great powers.

His response was somewhat conciliatory. He
said, in effect, "We have some very basic differences
in ideologies which you recognized in 1972 and again
in our conversations this year. We should lay those
differences on the table and discuss them. We shall
find that in so doing we have many points in common
and that some of those points in common are more important
than our differences. To us, by far the most important
point we have in common is our attitude toward
- anti-hegemony."

(7) Relationship of the Current Debate over Domestic Policy in the PRC to Foreign Policy

I raised this subject with Hua on at least
three occasions and got a very strong denial that
there would be any change in foreign policy as a result
of domestic debate. He said, on one occasion, "The
speculation with regard to a change in our foreign
policy after Chou En-lai's death and Teng's demotion
shows a total lack of understanding of China."

After hearing Hua and his colleagues explain
in almost tortuous detail what they consider to be
the necessity for the meaning of what they call the
"great debate" on economic and domestic problems, I

Page 51

have an uneasy feeling that we may witness a new
version of the cultural revolution in the PRC in
the near future. This could be totally wrong, but
the emphasis they all placed on the necessity of
seeing that their society must constantly go through
periods of change and revitalization in order to
maintain its Marxist/Maoist purity would indicate
that they felt that they had moved too far in the
direction allowing the growth of an elite class in
the economic, educational and other fields as has
occurred in the Soviet Union.

Of course, this would be an enormous setback
to the rather minimal economic progress they have
made over the past ten years. But if ideology triumphs
over pragmatism, this is probably what will happen.

In this connection, I would respectfully make
one suggestion, which may or may not have some effect
on the outcome. I think we should greatly strengthen
the representation we have in our liaison office on
the economic side. I have no way to evaluate the per-
formance of those who have that responsibility at
this time, and I am not sure that the best economic
expert we have would be able to help devise ways for
American business to develop more trade with a country
which is so totally dedicated to a state ownership and
control as is the PRC. We know what difficulties
we have had in building our trade with the Soviet

Page 52

Union in this respect. The problem of doing so
with the PRC is even greater. However, Japan has
made rather significant progress in the past four
to five years in developing trade with the PRC and it
might be that we could take a leaf out of their book
and try to increase our trade also. I am not, of course,
so naive as to suggest that trading more with the
PRC is going to change them significantly in so far
as their internal economic and political views or
external policies are concerned. On the other hand
in the long process, which we must recognize is going
to continue for many years, of strengthening ties between
the U.S. and the PRC, trade is one area where they des-
perately need what we can provide for them, even
though they, of course, (for purely defensive reasons
in my opinion) pretend they don't care too much
about having more trade with us. The more we can
give them a stake in their relationship with us
other than the one they presently have, our common
interest in containing Soviet expansionist movements,
the more chance we will have to influence their
policies so that they will be less hostile and even
neutral or positive toward us when they no longer need
us as much on the security front. Here again, I make
this suggestion with no great confidence that it will
have significant success, but I think we have to try

Page 53

every possible method we can think of to develop a
closer relationship with the PRC, looking forward
to the time when their military strength will have
reached the point that they feel safe enough to
get along without us or anyone else and to embark
upon a course of their own type of "true communist
expansionism". In so far as trade is concerned,
of course, what American businessmen have to be
lectured on is that they have to do business in a
way that is consistent with the PRC's economic
ideology. With all of the experts our major corporations
have employed to explore ways to do business with
the PRC and for that matter with the Soviet Union,
most of them are pitifully naive and unrealistic
when they make proposals. The difficulty is that
they do not put themselves in the place of the
communist leaders with whom they have to deal and
consequently are unable even to communicate with them
on any basis which might produce some forward progress.

He said, "All policies are laid down by
Chairman Mao." In explaining the current domestic
debate, he said that it was a giant debate on science,
education and technology for the purpose of finding
the deeper meaning. "We must criticize the erroneous,
increase our understanding and correct what is wrong.
We must kill the illness in order to save the patient.

Page 54

Our constitution provides for airing our views. You have seen our posters. They are an indication of our true democracy. We allow strikes by our workers. By this means and by our debates, the revolutionary line of Chairman Mao will find its way into the hearts of our people. We want our people to be concerned with political matters. The broad masses of people are the masters and should have the right to criticize their servants - those of us who serve the government. As Chairman Mao has said we must remedy previous errors to avoid future mistakes. The purpose of this debate is to make sure that China does not change its color, that we do not go revisionist and to enable the Chinese revolution to continue its progress and its momentum toward complete fulfillment."

(8) The Difference Between Soviet and Chinese Support of Wars of Liberation

I noted as courteously as possible in the third conversation I had with Hua the fact that many in the United States could see no distinction between Brezhnev's proclamations to the effect that the Soviet Union would continue to support revolutionary wars of liberation and the position of the PRC which seemed to be the same.

His response is probably interesting enough to report. "Chairman Mao in effect is saying as a

ELC

Page 55

true Marxist/Leninist that all revolutions should
be internal."

"In the case of the Soviet Union, their invasion of Czechoslovakia and forcing upon the Czech people a new government through their superior military force was in direct contradiction of true Marxist/Leninist doctrine. The choice should be made by the people. One country, even a communist country, should not use its armed forces to impose its will on another country. Brezhnev did the same thing in Angola where with the help of Cuban forces he intervened in what was basically an internal Angolan affair with his armed strength. Also Brezhnev's doctrine has an aspect which is totally inconsistent with true Marxist/Leninist principles. That is the concept of limited sovereignty in some socialist countries."

Of course, I knew that the PRC's real objection to the Brezhnev doctrine is that if limited sovereignty applied to the U.S.S.R.'s small neighbors like Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, it might also be applied to a much larger neighbor, the PRC.

The basic difference, Hua insisted, is that the PRC favors the support for and establishment of _independent_ socialist states, while the Soviet Union favors and supports even to the point of overt aggression

Page 56

the establishment of <u>subordinate</u> socialist states.
Again he came back to his basic point. "The reason
the Soviet Union has followed this 'erroneous' course
in foreign policy is that it is no longer a Socialist
state. The fact that the Soviet Union has become
in effect an imperialist and capitalist state at home
leads it into the error of practicing capitalist
imperialist policies abroad."

In discussing this subject, he came back
again to the internal debate over domestic policy.
He recounted the fact that Mao had told Julie and
David of the need for continued struggle in order
to achieve excellence and progress. Hua went on to
say, "Our philosophy is one of struggle. Through
struggle we exclude erroneous things and we continue
our progress and advancement. All matters on earth
are the unity of opposition. If no struggle goes on,
it means the end of life for any people."

(9) <u>Miscellaneous Notes</u>

On the return flight from Canton, I had a
rather revealing conversation with Chien and the
Chief of Protocol. They indicated without of course
using his name that they did not share Mao's evalua-
tion of the communist party in Italy. They fear that
the Italian Communist Party is inevitably going to be

Page 57

Soviet controlled and dominated.

The Chinese Ambassador to Japan got on the plane, when we stopped there to refuel on our return flight. He expressed considerable concern about the Lockheed investigation and the effect it might have on the Japanese government. He indicated that it might even reach Ohira and other high officials that had yet to be named. On the other hand he had the feeling that the Japanese would survive it and that the problem would subside in thirty days or so.

He expressed concern about the growing strength of the Soviet controlled Communist faction in Japan. He said that together with the left-wing socialists they could be a very strong force and might come to power in the event that the present government becomes too weakened by issues like Lockheed.

He also expressed concern about the (what he called) Japanese militarists, who he said were advocating that Japan should "go it alone" (meaning, of course, go nuclear). He said while others in the Liberal party were not for going nuclear, that if Japan were left defenseless he believes that this could become their policy. He recognized that Japan's huge industrial base would make their going nuclear a relatively simple problem for them compared to what it is for the PRC.

Page 58

Mao's wife, as I have earlier pointed out, far from becoming hostile after I refused to stand up for the Taiwan song became even more considerate and friendly. There was a song in the program, for example, with regard to bridges. And she turned to me and speaking through the translator said, "Four years ago you and Chairman Mao started to build a bridge across the mighty Pacific." She said, "Now we must continue that great project, because it is essential for the survival of both of our countries." She asked in very warm terms that I extend her best wishes to President and Mrs. Ford.

An amusing sidelight was the way the Chinese were following the election returns in New Hampshire. On the fourth day I was in Peking Hua opened our conversation by reading a report he had just received with regard to the New Hampshire results and said that he had noted that President Ford had won by 52% to 48%. This incidently was the way I received my first definitive report with regard to the outcome of the New Hampshire primary! Hua also sent his best wishes to President Ford and opened his final toast with a toast to President Ford.

I shall not cover in this memorandum the visits to the bomb shelter, the university, the historical museum and the agricultural exhibit. I

Page 59

have extensive notes on all of them, and, of course,
will be glad to prepare a memorandum at some future
date if desired. What was surprising me, was when I
asked our Chinese guide as to what kind of a hit
the bomb shelter would take; he said it would be
adequate for conventional weapons. Of course, he
really had to say this because it was obvious to
anyone who had any sophistication whatever in this
area that it would not take a direct hit from an
atom bomb, let alone a hydrogen bomb.

Whether it is significant or not remains
to be seen, but the Chinese seemed to want to show
that their policy of a new relationship with the
United States had support of the people as well as
government and party leaders. They arranged for me
to walk through the Square of Heavenly Peace, where
I met a fairly good sized number of people who were
obviously not just the usual Party type. In Canton,
instead of taking me directly to the guest house, a
ride of about 10 minutes, they drove us for about
45 minutes through the business and residential
sections of the city. As distinguished from the
Soviet Union, where you will recall, the crowds were
held back on the side streets, the people were allowed
in this case to be on the street with just room for
the car to pass through. Of course, we did not ride

Page 60

in an open car, but nevertheless the Chinese were able to see through the car window and the reception was extremely warm. On our final day there, as has probably been reported in the press, they arranged for us to walk through the Canton Gardens, where there were literally thousands of people, due in part to the fact that it was Sunday afternoon.

There was no advance notice that we were coming, and the spontaneous reception was something that I did not see at any time in the Soviet Union, due of course, to the very strict inhibitions which were placed on the people by security personnel.

Here the only concern our hosts seemed to have was whether or not we would be hurt because the crowds were so spontaneous and tried to press in to shake hands and say welcome to China.

Afterwards in talking with the very impressive Vice Chairman of the Congress who was our ranking host on our travels outside of Peking he pointed out that this showed that the new relationship between the PRC and the United States was one that was based not only on the mutual interests of our two governments but also one that was supported by the natural friendship that existed between the Chinese people and the American people. Whether they will continue to allow this kind of contact remains to be seen.

Page 61

The Chief of Protocol told me that this is the first time that a foreign visitor had ever had this kind of contact with what he called the "masses of the people". He seemed to be delighted that it had been worked out that way. I am sure that this would not have happened had it not been approved at the very highest level.

I have referred to the Vice Chairman of the Congress and two or three of his comments are worth noting, since they underline some of the points that had been made earlier in some of the conversations I had with Hua and his group. He said emphatically that in his opinion any change in either the Chinese or the Soviet leadership will have no effect on the relations between the two countries. As he put it, "The interests of nations and the differences they have remain after the leaders change. The interests of the PRC and the Soviet Union and their differences are going to remain for years to come."

In talking about the Soviet Union, he said that it had really become a capitalist country. In fact, he said, "Just consider this - the leaders of the government and the party, artists, scientists, etc. have become millionaires and are acting like millionaires - that is the trouble in the Soviet Union today!"

Page 62

A final note with regard to when Hua's status will either be upgraded to Premier in fact, or whether someone else will take his place. Again, I asked Chien this question, not as to whether or who, but when the final decision would be made. His response was that the PRC Congress would be meeting in October. I said, "Does that mean you will have an Acting Premier until October?" He said, "No."

In his view the decision will be made much sooner. I don't know what his sources are, but in any event I report this for whatever it may be worth. My own judgment as I have indicated at the beginning of this memorandum is that if they have anyone else in the wings, who would be acceptable to Mao, Hua will probably not be the man selected for the highest post on a permanent basis. He simply doesn't have the mystique and other leadership qualities which I think the Chinese are going to have to have, particularly after Mao's death.

My final conclusion can be stated very briefly, the Chinese, despite all their bravado with regard to not fearing war and being able to handle the Soviets in the event that they attack them, have an overriding interest in maintaining their special relationship

Page 63

with us. We on our side, have a similar interest
for perhaps different reasons.

We should have in mind however that just
as the Soviet game makes the China game go, the
China game makes the Soviet game go. What we must
particularly bear in mind is that the Chinese are more
communist than the Soviet. Potentially, therefore,
in my view, in the long run they may prove to be
more expansionist. I know that many Soviet and Chinese
experts would disagree with this on the grounds that
the Chinese have not generally been an expansionist
people whereas the Russians have been. But I cannot
help but believe that once the Chinese have solved some
of their domestic problems and once they have gained
the strength that they think they need militarily, they
will inevitably begin in their own way to expand their
communist ideology throughout the world, because as
true Marxist/Leninists/Maoists, this has to be their
ultimate goal. That is why, while at this time we must
and should, in my opinion, tilt toward the Chinese,
it is vital to have in mind that 15 or 20 years from now
we may have to be tilting toward the Russians. No
one, of course, can see even five years ahead these days,
but for whatever it is worth, that would be my final
judgment after this second journey to the "Gate of
Heavenly Peace".