TELCONE

Paul Doty/Kissinger

9:22 a.m. - 1/6/73

K: Hello.

D: Henry, Paul. I do hate to bother you at such a time but I just felt so upset about the near demise of ACDA that I thought I should put in

K: What do you mean the near demise?

not report

D: Well, I just had a feeling that with the budget cut and with the negotiator/to them they're sort of cut off at the knees or worse.

K: Why is the negotiator not reporting to them?

D: Well, that's just what I heard.

K: That's not my impression.

D: He would be acting only for the President. And I really think that they contributed to all that inter-agency work and all the rest put together and I know on occasion he has upset you and the others that it really has been objective by all the standards I think one can ask.

K: Frankly a lot of these things have been done while I've been away so I'm not - I mean it's not my impression that the negotiator will not report to them.

D: That would change it a little bit because I just have the view looking down the street that if he doesn't have a base in ACDA, while he has lots of experience he's awfully dumb, that once he gets in a negotiating scene himself, he's just going to be led by the nose.

K: I know about the budget cut which is not again - I do not chop up bureaucracies just because they recommend something I don't like. It's my - I can sort it out if I don't like it, I don't have to ruin the bureaucracy in order to have it happen. Besides I couldn't name you three things they recommended that particularly upset me. When I differed with ACDA it was usually over nuances, I think 80% of what they recommended they did.

D: Yes, and I think that's just going to disappear if things go not through.

K: I just don't think -- I can assure this isn't from me.

06/05/73

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BANA DAE 5/10/73

2

D: You mustn't deny that if you can just hold the line where it is until you come back and think of it.

K: My problem is that I have not been in on much of this reorganization.

D: I know it's just going on like a volcano everywhere.

K: I have a certain veto over personnel but I do not have control -- that's not my method of operating.

D: No, it isn't. This is almost to the point where they are almost to the last step and I think if you could hold off any action on the Director until you have time to have some input and you may see ... ground on the Committee - on the negotiating thing you would still have a chance of saving things.

K: Again, I don't have any reason to suppose Harold Brown will be drafted.

D: There were just a lot of rumors coming in yesterday that everything was going to go and start from scratch and that seemed to me impossible as far as getting anything done.

K: That's not my impression but I've had no formal talks about it. I'll try to put a hold on things.

D: Just hold it until you've had time to make sure it was deliberately done with your own best interests in mind, I think everything would be a lot safer.

K: But you know I don't want this broadcast about but I have no interest in getting ACDA chopped up. Why should I?

D: That's exactly why I called Henry, because

K: Yeh, but I couldn't even name you five issues on which they and I, I'm sure there were some, but if my life this minute depended on it, I couldn't tell you three.

D: Yet they do work along and without them that whole interagency would be kind of captured by the Pentagon. They just are the only ones that can balance off the interests of the other side.

K: I have no question about that. Hell, I was one of those who urged the creation of it.

D: Yes, I remember that very well. They are a very good little team now.

K: They have not given me any trouble. Besides even if they had that's not the way I would deal with them. They are the least powerful bureaucracy. I can absorb 50 reports from them if I don't want to deal with them.

D: Oh sure they don't have any constituency but they do have about 15 people that make it work and they feel that with the budget cut, the negotiator by their view is not going to have any dependency on them, they are just about at the end of the rope. But anyway if you can freeze it and we can talk about it some other time.

K: Good. Let's talk about it when I get back.

D: All the best of luck.

K: I need it.

D: OK.

K: Bye. Bye.

950-555-5555

Aubrey 301/255
B. MARRIAGE DEC 5/10/84

TELCORN

Ambassador Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

2:35 p. m. 1/6/73

AC: Thank you for returning my call. This is only (a) to wish you G odspeed on your....

HK: Aren't you nice.

AC: And also to add that London is finding it progressively more difficult to keep up a good front through _________ of information and so I think it would be really quite unfortunate if visit with _________ doesn't go through.

HK: Oh it will definitely go through--

AC: No, but I know your problems of getting backwards and forwards-- I mean you may get so tied up with this thing in Paris.

HK: Well, I may not see him in Paris/which case I'd see him on the 15th

AC: Yeh, well that's fine, as long as -- he's very happy to come here on the 15th

HK: Well, I'll see him one place or the other

AC: Well, that's great, but they are feeling a little neglected.

HK: Well, they are right.

AC: I mean you can understand it.

HK: And I will give them full information and in fact why don't I get Haig who is the one who knows the negotiations best to brief you on Monday

AC: That'd be fine if you can do that.

HK: Yes I'll do that.

AC: That would be absolutely splendid. Because they are just feeling a bit left out of things, you know what I mean--

HK: I will let Haig--let me tell you another thing though--Schumann is going around claiming that he is being kept informed in great detail.

BCLASSIFIED
BY ORDER 3017958
DATE 5/1/73

Page 2

AC: Yeah, I don't think that's disturbed London.

HK: Well, it isn't true.

AC: (laughing) that is suspected in London.

HK: I am making sure he's kept 4 laps behind the real state of events

AC: Well, that's fine. If Al gets in touch in Monday, that'll be very
helpful.

HK: Good, I will do that.

AC: And all the best of luck to you.

HK! Thank you.

BECLASSIFIED

E0172958

Author: B. NARA DATE: 5/1/64

TELCOM

Haig/Kissinger

1/6/73 2:38 p.m.

GH: Yes, Henry.

HK: Al, the British are getting very restive, Ambassador Cromer say, about ~~the~~ being kept uninformed. Could you stop over there on Monday

GH: Sure

HK: And give him a little briefing, on the recent negotiations and what happened and why.

GH: Right, I'll do that.

HK: Good, thank you.

GH: Are you all set?

HK: As set as I'm going to be.

GH: Yeh, I'll bet you had some good guidance this morning?

HK: Well, he wants to cave completely

GH: Yeh.

HK: GH: This fellow that Ross Perot sent over to Laos to talk to the top NVA guy there comeback and made a number of interesting points--he's very close to this guy--(1) is they think that--they expected to be bombed and were glad they did because it turned this way, but that the bombing was far more extensive and damaging than they thought it ever would have been, (2) they think there will be a settlement before the inauguration, (3) that they are still going to hang tough on the sovereignty issue and they raised it as the sovereignty issue--one Vietnam because they insist do not when they meddle in the future in the South want to be accused or have it portrayed as one nation attacking another.

HK: Yeh.

GH: But it was interesting that he did say that they do want to settle-- not end the war--they are going to continue but to change it and to do this before the inauguration. So I told this guy to give a detailed report.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E017958
Date: 5/1/91

BANA DAE 5/1/91

Page 2

HK: Yeh, but you know the President is determined if we get a settlement to leak it out before the inauguration.

GH: Oh, I'm sure.
Well, I think you'll have a tough go again, but probably get the minimum

HK: Well, see.

GH: We'll be thinking of you Henry and God bless you over there.

HK: Thank you Al.

GEBSSVO 256

Aubrey

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

2:53 pm, Jan. 6, 1973

K: Mr. President

P: Have you had your lunch?

K: Yes, I'm in the office.

P: Oh, fine. How'd it go. Anything new.

K: Nothing new. We talked mostly--this was scheduled to discuss, other matters than Vietnam. We haven't had a report yet or he said he hadn't had a report from Le Duc Tho who is Moscow. But apparently these guys lied to them so much that he's totally confused as to what the issues are. He listed a whole batch of them that are already settled. So, I sent him some more pages from a protocol, just so that they know, and the most of the rest his discussed was European security conference, mutual balance, force reductions, and I took the position that all of this, frankly, that as long as Vietnam is going on I just can't turn to it effectively. This is a way from keeping us from doing--

P: Oh, you really come to the point as to whether the Chinese and the Russians are going to put a little pressure on them or not, I don't know.

K: I'm sure the Chinese are.

P: Yeah.

K: Because it just isn't in the Chinese interest to have the Russians-- two things on the Chinese interest; one they don't want Vietnam unified under Hanoi, and two they don't Russian influence to predominate in Hanoi. But, and I think the message from Chou En-lai---

P: That seems to me to have some significance.

K: They do not talk lightly. Now Le Duc Tho arrived today in Paris and made a blood-curdling statement, saying that this was going to be the last of him. Now, that's actually quite good. We've already told him it's the last talk. He's taking again a free ride like with the end of bombing.

P: Said what?

K: He said this is going to be our final attempt. Which was what we had already told him first.

P: Yeah.

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Authe: B. M. Dic. 5/1/73

2

K: But that has an advantage because at least it means he can't be stalling, whatever else he's doing. And he said if the United States' changes are not unreasonable, if we insist on unreasonable changes they won't agree, which suggests that if we insist on reasonable ones, they will agree. In any event we aren't insisting on any of that now.

P: We are not insisting on any changes, are we?

K: No.

P: I don't think, I don't know.

K: No, no, we don't.

P: They're insisting on the changes, not we.

r

K: Exactly.

P: Maybe, of course, what he's referring to is--

K: No, I think he's just making a grandstand play.

P: One thing about it, sometimes I wonder if our restraint in our public statements may be misinterpreted.

K: No, I don't think so.

P: You know, they play everything up to the propaganda hilt. We refuse to talk, and so forth. What do you think?

K: I don't think they have pretty restrained except they couldn't let this opportunity go by arriving at the airport.

P: Right. One thing I wanted to tell you. Needless to say in the course of these meetings, if you think--say that you have just received a message from me, you know, you feel free to use one, you know.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: You know the various things we've covered and they are all there, so you just pull out anything you want, you pull out a piece of paper and say well I just got this message, you know, okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

TELCORN

Henry Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

3:06 p.m. 1/6/73

HK: Anatol?

AD: Yes--thank you very much Henry, it was rather interesting.

HK: And you see that they even withdrew their demand on prisoners
and technical personnel

AD: Yes--

HK: And they reintroduced it two days later.

AD: Yes, it does look so, it's really not clear why.

HK: And this explains why we were so furious.

AD: Yeh, it's really not clear why.
Thank you very much for this one--it will put it through right now
in any case I do hope that you two boys will find a solution.

HK: Yeh, but on this basis it will be impossible if they don't get serious
--but the technical people have worked pretty well.

AD: As of now, yes?

HK: Slowly but you know

AD: So maybe it's a rather good indication--to us they are mention to their
people to find compromise, what kind of compromise is up to you to find
out--this is rather going to be tough, I understand, for both of you to
find that--this is a big question and a very important one.

HK: That is correct. Okay.

AD: Well, Henry the best to you.

HK: Anything you can do will be important.

AD: Yeh, I understand. Well, I wish you the very best--both of you.
And for you in particular.

HK: I'll see you when I come back.

AD: You don't know exactly when it will be
Maybe the end of the week.

HK: Certainly by Saturday. Yes, I'll be in touch.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958
By: N.A. Spada-Otter

TELCON

Henry Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

3:06 p. m.

1/6/73

HK: Anatol?

AD: Yes--

AD: As of now, yes?

HK: Slowly but you know

HK: That is correct. Okay.

UNCLASSIFIED

Date: 20-02-95

Author:

B: 1-1-95 11:00AM

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

2:40 pm, March 12, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Sure, how are you.

K: You keep me waiting on the telephone all the time.

D: Because I am now clearing the lines, with my telephone here, so I am--

K: You are gonna tell me with whom, or am I going to have to ask the FBI.

D: Oooh, I was just speaking with Petrov, and my wife just arrived from Moscow, so I think the answer is very clear, then what kind of answer you could get, really. She's saying giver her best regards to you.

K: Thank you. You want to talk a little later after your lunch.

D: You know, we could discuss right now why I decided to call you, not because of the situation, but chiefly I received a telegram from Brezhnev in connection with you asked about Shultz.

K: Yeah.

D: He just ask me to tell you that definitely he is going to receive Shultz.

K: That's a good idea.

D: So, you may be sure that Brezhnev will receive Shultz. And he said to me, I told you so, so what is the question.

K: Evidently, Anatol, it might be just as well if you don't raise the Jewish question with Shultz.

D: Don't raise with Shultz.

K: Don't raise it, because, unless there is something positive you want to say, because if you do raise and then you see, he is not quite as devious as I am, he may report something honestly which causes us trouble with the Congress.

D: I see, okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: MM. APAS, F-50047

2

K: But it's up to him, you; know, if he wants to say that he will do something.

D: I understand. Shultz mentioned to me when I saw him, he asked me to -- he mention in a way he's willing to report to Kimov rather the text which the President says--

K: That's fine, that he will do.

D: You know, the difficulty with him, the question--

K: He will say that much, but he can let it go at that. Now, I have talked to the President about the date. Our difficulty is that the NATO meeting is the 14th to the 16th.

D: 14th to 16th.

K: Yes. So we can't do it the week of the 11th, but we can do it the week of the 18th if that's possible.

D: I will check, I think it not be bad idea, but I have to check. Let me check, then because I think--

K: Because it just isn't possible for Rogers not to go to a NATO MEETING because we have a meeting with the Soviet leaders, that would be a--

D: Yeah, I understand, it rather==not the best policy. So you can do it the week of the 18th, it will be quite all right with you.

K: That will be fine with us.

D: Yes, okay, I will pass the word tomorrow.

K: That's fine.

D: But it will be all right.

K: Yes.

D: Okay, Henry, I will do it. Tomorrow I will give you the answer. I will see you the day after tomorrow?

K: Yes, but I noticed they put something down for lunch. How about--

D: If you would like, I could talk to you--

K: All right, let's say at 3:00 o'clock.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E.O. 101
Date: 10-1-79
By: N.A.S.A. Agency
W.W.

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kennedy

1/15/73 8:10 p.m.

AD: I just received some information from Moscow which to refer to Henry
and the President--

CK: Right.

AD: This is dealing with the European Conference--this is a very confidential
document which Mr. Brezhnev feels would be good as a basis at least from
our side to adopt already on the conference --it will be on a final stage--
not now but this is what we really have in mind to adopt for --on a final
stages as a final result of the European Security Conference because it is
put on the highest level including the top people later on--but my government
--Mr. Brezhnev would like the President to know our way of thinking through
the draft document which we are going to use much later --not now, but
later.

CK: Yes.

AD: In private consultations so to speak. But this particular was given to
Pompidou when he met with Mr. Brezhnev and today we are forwarding on
a very basis through our private through our private channels to Chancellor
Brandt--not through the foreign office, but through some private channels
we have there. And the same way we are doing here to Henry for the
President. I would like simply to send to you this particular draft of ours
--and tomorrow I will explain in more detail to Henry--

CK: Fine.

AD: Okay?

CK: Good.

AD: Mr. Vorontsov will be in touch with you on how to arrange it and he will
deliver it himself or he send my assistant to you within a half hour.

CK: That's very good.

AD: This is draft of the final document we would like to have adopted on the final
stage of the European Security Conference. This was introduced Mr.
Brezhnev to the President on a basis of confidential discussion in Moscow
and then after Henry discussed with Mr. Brezhnev too this issue. So this
is on a very confidential basis. We didn't give it to the foreign office so
don't give it to the State Department.

CK: No, no we will not.

TELCORN

1/15/73 8:10 p.m.

CK: Right.

AD: This is dealing with the European Conference--this is a very confidential document which Mr. Brezhnev feels would be good as a basis at least from our side to adopt already on the conference --it will be on a final stage-- not now but this is what we really have in mind to adopt for --on a final stages as a final result of the European Security Conference because it is put on the highest level including the top people later on--but my government--Mr. Brezhnev would like the President to know our way of thinking through the draft document which we are going to use much later --not now, but later.

CK: Yes.

AD: In private consultations so to speak. But this particular was given to Pompidou when he met with Mr. Brezhnev and today we are forwarding on a very basis through our private through our private channels to Chancello Brandt--not through the foreign office, but through some private channels we have there. And the same way we are doing here to Henry for the President. I would like simply to send to you this particular draft of ours --and tomorrow I will explain in more detail to Henry--

CK: Fine.

AD: Okay?

CK: Good.

CK: That's very good.

AD: This is draft of the final document we would like to have adopted on the final stage of the European Security Conference. This was introduced by Mr. Brezhnev to the President on a basis of confidential discussion in Moscow and then after Henry discussed with Mr. Brezhnev too this issue. So this is on a very confidential basis. We didn't give it to the foreign office so don't give it to the State Department.

CK: No, no we will not.

TelCon
Adm. Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 pm, Jan. 15, 1973

K: Hello.

M: Hey, Henry.

K: Tom, how are you.

M: Fine, thank you.

K: Tom, the President wanted to make sure that we are not cutting down sorties as a result of this.

M: You mean in the other places.

K: No, but the total number of sorties should be flown, they should just go to other places. Is that understood?

M: Yes. I don't know any reason why the--you know there might be some one-day reduction as they try to readjust, having already scheduled the other; but certainly we'll maintain the sorties.

K: And also tac-air.

M: Yes, sure.

K: Cause I notice that's down to about 200, day after day.

M: No, I think they've been doing about 800 or plus total, Henry, but I'll see that--

K: Okay. Now we want to make a very major effort in Cambodia. That's the area which is least clearly defined in the agreement.

M: All right, fine. I didn't know about that.

K: Could you start that immediately?

M: Sure.

K: And wouldn't you do me a favor and hit that God damned Jap (?) plantation, you hit a lot of other things that haven't done any good.

M: All right. I think the first thing to do of course would be to do some more altitude rushing on it and then hit it where it will do the most good.

K: Yeah, but you don't have unlimited time.

CLASSIFIED

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K

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M: All right. Okay.

K: Well, will you do that.

M: Sure.

K: And will you lay on a major effort in Cambodia to weaken the communist there as mush as possible.

M: Right, sure thing.

K: Good. And starting immediately.

M: Starting immediately. Right. I'll lay it on as fast as I can. I'll call out there right now and talk to the people out there.

K: Good, many thanks.

M: Okay, Henry. I just finished my fourth session before the Congress, some 12 hours now.

K: Good. They are quieting down now aren't they?

M: Yeah, I think so. I had the Stennis Committee today, and went through the whole bit, of course they always get into the decision making part. I think it came out real well.

K: Right. Well I was under the impression that you were up in Camp David, to talk to the President about it.

M: Of course I did. I talked to him many times. I mean I was just--they didn't get that from me, they got that from some other source.

K: Well, that's what they always like to--we're not worried about that here.

M: I know that. Right. No, I think they handled it pretty well. Well, I'll get in touch with the people out there--

K: If you do that, I'd appreciate it.

M: All right.

K: Thank you, Tom.

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:00 a.m., January 16, 1973

D: ... you generally are doing fine but I would like to know what you are doing right now. [Laughter] Because you are quiet.

K: You're up to something.

D: No. Rather what I really would like to tell you, I received from Gromyko several documents which I could give you tomorrow but I am rather preferred to send it today to you and then to discuss with you tomorrow. I will tell what they all about. In addition to what I give you yesterday -- it was late so I didn't want to bother you -- through Kennedy. You have seen them?

K: Yes.

D: Now he asked me and I give you, it's rather oral but I --

K: You mean what you also gave to Pompidou?

D: About Pompidou I don't tell you something which there was no nothing there but I am going to tell you something. But, in addition, on European and this multi-lateral reduction in troops, you know.

K: Yes.

D: Two points. There is consideration now -- Does he give a reply that we are agrees with your ideas that at least one point or two should be included in this consultation in Helsinki about this strengthening stability and confidence in Europe, you know.

K: Right.

D: You propose there that: mutual notification of major military maneuvers in those stipulated areas and of the exchange, by invitation, of observers at the maneuvers of that kind.

K: Right.

D: So we're accepting this idea and we are prepared to exchange the first point of our agenda of European conference in the following way. But as a text, how are you going to introduce it?

And second, we accept idea to single out the questions of cultural cooperation, contacts among people and of increased information as a separate point of the agenda. And he would like me to tell you -- to talk to you and to the President because it is rather some out of this confidential discussion.

TELCONE

7:00 a.m., January 16, 1973

K: You're up to something.

K: Yes.

K: Yes.

K: Right.

K: Right.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ron Ziegler
1/16/73; 9:37 a.m.

Z: Hello, Henry, this is a little better line I guess.

K: Yeah.

Z: Henry, there is a story moving out of Saigon which says that American military spokesmen said that escort fighters were ordered to bomb or attack any Communist plane or anti-aircraft gun fired on reconnaissance planes.

K: Just tell them . . .

Z: And that reconnaissance planes would be accompanied by fighter-escort. Now that's different than the impression we created yesterday. What I said yesterday . . .

K: I'll have to check into that.

Z: Yeah. See what I said yesterday we didn't expect that as an issue to arise.

K: Yeah, but they are interpreting it the right way. Interpretations of that phrase I see is that we seem to believe that the North Vietnamese won't fire at us.

Z: Is that the right way to interpret it?

K: Well, I didn't know they were flying escorts. I'll handle it with the Pentagon. Just say you stick with you have nothing more to say.

Z: Yeah.

K: We will not get into rules of engagement.

Z: Sure.

K: Because once we say we stood them down and we start them up again we are in trouble.

Z: Yeah. But, in continuing to say we don't expect that to be an issue --

K: Just say I will have nothing to add to what I said yesterday.

Z: Yeah. Okay. I think it is playing all right.

DECLASSIFIED
by: E. P. Burt
DATE: 5/1/73

202258

BANA

MAR 06 73 5/1/73

1/16/73; 9:37 a.m.

-2-

K: I think it is playing beautiful.

Z: Let me just ask you a couple of questions not from the standpoint of the press but just for my own information. Marvin Kalb had a story I guess out of State or somewhere that the supervisory force will ultimately consist of more than 2,000 troops. Is that correct?

K: It depends on what you count as the supervisory force.

Z: Yeah.

K: If you include the Vietnamese personnel and their commissions it is true. If you count only international personnel it is not true. I wouldn't get into that.

Z: I am not going to at all. Then we have Poland, Hungary, Canada and Indonesia as the four nations making it up -- is that right?

K: Poland, Hungary, Indonesia and Canada.

Z: Poland, Hungary, Indonesia and Canada. So they are all just moving around but I think . . .

K: Well, you see they can't get any good information because no one knows anything.

Z: Sure.

K: Stewart Hensley had a shit piece.

Z: I saw that.

K: Which he must have got either from Scali or Rogers. They are the only two people who . . .

Z: They are worried about what's being burned.

K: Yeah.

Z: Yeah, I know, I saw that. Well, I don't think I say anything more today.

K: I wouldn't say any more.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 30 1973 9:55

-3-

Z: But if you would check on that recon thing for me and let Kennedy
get back to me and I would appreciate it.

K: Yeah, but I wouldn't say one word about it.

Z: No, I am not but I just want to feel -- my state of mind -- I want it
to be right.

K: Right. But I don't want you to say anything that looks like a stand down,
because if this thing gets unraveled, which it still may, we want to be able
to fly again.

Z: I understand.

K: Okay.

Z: Now, on these photos, we are thinking about releasing them on the 19th?

K: Yeah, but you can do it on the 18th, too, if you want to.

Z: What time is it agreed. Nineteenth at noon, or something.

K: Yeah, well they prefer it -- you know, they wanted them out immediately.

Z: Yeah. Okay, but when we were talking the other day . . .

K: You have them. Ron, did Win give them to you?

Z: Huh?

K: Did Win give them to you?

Z: No. They are better off being in Washington.

K: Right.

Z: We decided the 19th at noon, didn't we?

K: Yeah. And there is undeveloped TV film, too.

95CLASSIFIED

AUBurn 30122958

BAMA DATE 5/16/73

1/16/73; 9:37 a.m.

-4-

Z: Undeveloped?

K: Yeah.

Z: Okay, I am going to have Bruce Whelihan get that from Win.

K: Right.

Z: Okay.

K: We should release them because they wanted to do it over the weekend and I kept them back from it.

Z: Okay.

K: They are looking for every sign that we are welching again.

Z: Yeah. Okay.

K: They are not earthshaking photos so it doesn't make any difference.

Z: Well, we will take a look at them.

K: Right.

Z: Okay, I don't have anything more.

K: And we now have a precise text of the 18th announcement. Where are we going to be? Are you going to make it in Key Biscayne?

Z: Yeah, I think so. Do you want to give that to me now?

K: I better send it to you classified.

Z: Yeah, you better. Okay.

K: Good.

Z: Thanks a lot. Bye.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED
E012658
August 20, 1973
BRA Date 09/01/73

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

January 16, 1973 - 10:02 a.m.

K: Hello, Bob?

H: Hi.

K: How are you?

H: Well it all came out pretty well I think, don't you?

K: I think it came out superbly, couldn't be better.

H: That's right.

K: Don't you think? I see no negatives at all.

H: No there could be some but doesn't seem to be, certainly not on
the first bounce.

K: You know some guys are saying, well will we be disappointed
again, but it helps us, it keeps it down and they will look sick
later.

H: Most of them are even saying that on a fiarly low-key basis.

K: That's right, that's the worst one we have gotten and what events
of the last three months have done is that the hawks are enthusiastic
now.

H: Yes, that's right. I think it's just fine. One thing, you're having
dinner with Rabin tonight.

K: Yes.

H: When does he leave do you know?

K: Well, the President mentioned it to me yesterday, you know he
asked me to stop by before I left.

H: Oh, so he mentioned he wanted to see him.

K: Yes. He is formally leaving his post at tne end of the month and
taking his wife home.

H: Oh fine they he can see himnext week then.

K: That's right. But if that doesn't work he's coming over again

CLASSIFIED
E012958

Authored By: B. M. Dae

- 2 -

with Mrs. Meir.

H: I see.

K: So we can work it out but it's a very nice thing to be able to tell him.

H: I think he'd rather see him next week.

K: That's fine.

H: Rather than when Mrs. Meir is here because he wanted to spend a half an hour with her.

K: I think it would be great and I think--

H: It would be better to do it at the time of his official departure.

K: I think this is excellent. I just wanted to give you the flexibility.

H: Right, ok.

K: I think that ~~would~~ should be done.

H: If he'll be around next week there shouldn't be any problem.

K: He'll be around until--I think his official departure is on the 26th. So he could see him on the 25th for example.

H: After the 23rd, yeah.

K: I think maybe the 25th would then be the best.

H: OK.

K: And he'll greatly appreciate that

H: Good.

K: And that, incidentally, is a small dinner, no press present just six or eight people.

H: He went to a dinner now?

K: No, no that I am with

H: That you are having

97011111-97

05/21/93

B&H MRA Date 5/21/93

- 3 -

K: That I am with tonight

H: No, I know that. I just--I didn't know he had talked to you about it and I thought you might want to mention it to Rabin tonight.

K: I think it's excellent to do it. Haig has had a talk with Thieu.

H: How did it go?

K: Well, you know if these were rational people you'd say it went very well. You know and we've got some word of Thieu's subsequent briefing of his NSC which seemed to me to set them up for a cave.

H: Really?

K: Yeah.

H: Well what's in the paper and all it certainly looked that way.

K: That's the way it looks.

H: Yeah.

K: The President is getting a little cold feet again about sending Agnew out right after wards. But I think we've got to do it because it will take--well first of all we've already offered it. Secondly, it takes the heat off us for the step I'm going to take.

H: Yes. Is the President going to have to meet with him?

K: Well maybe. It also gives us much more flexibility about the President meeting with him. He may have to meet with him at the end of February or early march. But he shouldn't meet with him while I'm on my trip.

H: Right.

K: And if he has to meet with him I could at least prepare the other place for it then.

H: Yes, yes, ok. Well I think we're right to track still.

K: I think the thing is going fine. With all the stuff that is being leaked by everyone is positive. And so confusing that no one knows what the hell is going on.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EOL72558
Date: 5/1/69
B

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Admiral Moorer
Secure Phone
1/16/73; 10:20 a.m.

K: I just had a cable from Haig saying that Weyand was asking for more authority for B-52's.

M: I had a long conversation with him (Weyand) after you called me. I just checked for bomb availability. We have plenty of bombs so we can do it.

K: Areas such as Cambodia . . .

M: We have some B-52's going in there today.

K: For which you have half-way reasonable targets.

M: Right. We don't want to flatten a village. I understand what you want and we are doing our best.

K: I would also make a maximum tac air effort over the next week.

M: We are trying to help out Godley all we can. An increase over Ho Chi Minh Trail. Our sorties yesterday were over 800 targets.

K: Do you think we can shut up our military briefing officers out there?

M: I don't know who they are. I talked to Weyand last night. They are not going to say anything in the briefings. This comes from discussions in bars. The press have their good contacts. We are doing everything we can to shut them up.

K: Will you get in touch with me directly if there is any hold up along the line?

M: I am handling it by telephone. There should not be any hold up. Henry, Anytime we could get to see the protocol -- and balance it against my checkoff list.

K: I will let you read it tomorrow. We have General Woodward in Paris who has been looking at it.

M: Yes, but we would like to check it against our list.

CLASSIFIED

E012958

Anchorage, AK

BROA. ARA. DUE 01/10/73

-2-

M: I have ordered them to get all Humint and photography intelligence as possible.

K: You know we don't give a dam if we hit a few French installations.

M: Mekong Province is looking better. We will get every target we can. I passed the substance of our conversation to Weyand immediately after you called me last night.

K: After Saturday you have direct access to the White House. That's been laid down to Richardson in my presence.

M: That will save us a lot of problems.

DECLASSIFIED
By: E012958
Date: 5/1/68
To: NARA

B

TELCONE
Ronald Ziegler/Kissinger
January 16, 1973 - 10:45 a.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: Ron, I just wanted you to know that your proposal of 11:00 release, you know what I mean?

Z: Yes.

K: Has been accepted.

Z: Good, that's perfect.

K: So we whip it to the press then. They'll need about an hour and a half to two.

Z: Maybe at 9:30 and they move at 11 and you go at ---

K: At 12:00

Z: Right, Good. Henry, as you know and I'm not concerned about this so take this in the proper context. We knew this was going to happen but let me get your judgment on this, ok?

K: Yeah.

Z: Not what I say to the press but just my own state of mind ok?

K: Yeah.

Z: There's an awful lot now, AP just has within the last few moments a bulletin out of Saigon. The focus seems to be shifting toward for some reason the 19th.

K: Well, first--

Z: Let me finish here, I think I'm wired in on the thing as we discussed but the focus seems to be shifting to the 19th. I'm not going to refer to anything, deny it or anything else it's just for my state of mind. But it is also focussing to the fact that---

K: I pulled them off this.

Z: OK, but it al---let me finish--it also is focussing to the fact that the President through Haig has told Thieu that there's--an international

USCLASSIFIED

E012958

Anm
BANGLA Dac

GHOLOCA

- 2 -

agreement has been reached that would preclude further hostilities
by North Vietnam and that he is reported to have told Thieu trust
in me.

K: Ron, do not make any comment whatsoever.

Z: I don't intend to. I do not intend to. I absolutely don't intend to.

K: I mean we will get, we will have every Vietnamese nobody is now
going to posture themselves and we'll just say nothing.

Z: Right, right I agree. But on my major--

K: Nothing will happen on the 19th.

Z: That's what I thought.

K: I give you my word on that.

Z: In other words the South Vietnamese are not going to do anything?

K: Well, I can't tell you what they're going to do but it seems almost
inconceivable to me.

Z: Yeah, ok.

K: In fact it seems inconceivable to me.

Z: OK.

K: If it happens it will be as much of a surprise to me as to you.

Z: That's what I thought.

K: And it is actually contrary to our game plan.

Z: That's what I thought, too.

K: So it is not going to happen and you'll look good.

Z: What they are doing is trying to drive us to the fact that an agreement
is in place and I'm going to pull them off of that.

K: Well, the A-teams will take care of that.

Z: Well that's going to suggest otherwise, huh.

9501-5555-5555

5/10/93

BANGKOK DIFE

- 3 -

K: The A-team's announcement will refer to the fact that negotiations will be resumed to complete the text. In other words that makes it clear the text is not yet complete.

Z: That's exactly right. That's perfect.

K: So all we have to--

Z: We'll posture on that the negotiations are in progress, right and I'll not have any further comment.

K: And don't let yourself be driven off it. These guys have gone from extremes of gloom to extremes of the other way.

Z: I agree.-

K: OK.

Z: OK I'm going to hold on the line that negotiations in progress, we have an agreement not to discuss, right?

K: Absolutely and--

Z: Now ________ has you going to Paris tomorrow I'm going to of course turn that off and say we'll let you know when Henry plans to go period.

K: Right, ok.

Z: But there's no significance in the 19th that you can see?

K: Absolutely not.

Z: OK Henry, thanks a lot,

K: Bye.

92-10-21 10:21

8502103

BANK OF AMERICA DECE 5 1/1/01 10:21

TELECON
Herb Schlosser
1/16/73 12:15 p. m.

S: Will I be seeing you tomorrow evening?

K: Absolutely. The only thing Herb is I think I had better not come to that party. There are going to be too many newspeople there.

S: I know that that would be your thinking.

K: And it's almost impossible for me to say something right now that doesn't make headlines. And therefore also I have proposed that we have dinner at the Metropolitan Club because if I go to a restaurant that's another story.

S: Fine.

K: About 8:00 at the Metropolitan Club.

S: Okay, fine, I'm not sure about how to get there. Could I do this with you Henry. I must appear at that party, only briefly. Would 8:30 be too late?

K: No.

S: Could I let your office know whether it will be 8:00p or 8:30? And then where I will be staying. I could call later in the day with all of that information. And do you want me to go right to the Club or could one of your cars pick me up? What would be the best way to handle it?

K: I'll get them to pick you up.

S: Okay, fine. I will call Julie and tell her whether it will be 8:00 or 8:30 and where I'm going to be staying.

K: Terrific.

S: It's nice talking to you, I look forward to seeing you.

K: Bye.

GARDENERS
ASSOCIATION
OF
NEW YORK

25027103

ANDY
BENJAMIN
DEES

5/16/73

7

TELECON
Taft Schreiber

1/16/73 12:18 p.m.

S: Sorry I missed you while you were out here. I was in Hawaii getting sun while you were getting loaded, and going to parties. I hope everything worked all right.

K: Everything worked fine.

S: Isn't that nice. And you'll be ready for another holiday soon I hope.

K: I hope so for God's sake.

S: Yeah, you must be somewhat exhausted but also I hope a little bit excited and pleased. The papers are full of things and radio is just constant, they're pounding away. And I just hope it's all as reported.

K: Well, it's pretty good.

S: That's darn good. I know that you're probably going to go back there. Are you going to be there for the, during the Inauguration period or not?

K: I would think so.

S: I see. We're coming in Wednesday night. We'll be there Thursday and Friday and Saturday and part of Sunday and then leave and I'd love to see you but I don't know. We've got a Nixon Foundation meeting on Friday and . . .

K: Well why don't you call me and let's see whether we can get together.

S: All right, I'd love to see you. I was sorry that Lou was so ill. He just has not been well. He's very anxious to sit and talk as you know. And this is no time to do it, you've got other things that must be done. But I'll try to get with you and I just want to know if you're going to be there and I'll call you.

K: Good, marvelous.

S: All right, see you later.

K: Bye Taft, nice to hear from you.

CLASSIFIED

E0172958

Authored by: B. MARRI DATED: 5/1/73

TELECON

John Scali

1/16/73 1:12 p.m.

K: I have to run off to a lunch at the British Embassy now and I have to work there the better part of the afternoon. But I'll call you the minute I come back unless you want to ride out there with me.

S: No, I'll talk to you afterwards.

K: What is it about?

S: Oh it's about Vietnam and the stories on how they're getting out of hand and problems they're going to create for the President on Inauguration Day.

K: Okay, I'll call you the minute I get back.

S: All right.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Author: E0172958
Date: 5/16/73

TELCOM
Amb. Phuong/Mr. Kissinger

3:10 p. m. 1/16/73

HK: I have here an AP dispatch from Saigon.

AP: Yes.

HK: Which that says that a high official with close ties to President Thieu --and you and I know who that is--has said that Hanoi has now dropped this demand for the phrase "administrative structure"

AP: Ohhhh

HK: And has done it as the result of the bombing. And now you know damn that this probably means that Hanoi is going to withdraw that concession again.

AP: I'm very sorry about that.

HK: Now I want you to know and the Palace to know that if Hanoi withdraws that now I will not insist on it anymore. I just cannot conduct business this way.

AP: I understand.

HK: It took me six weeks to get this thing taken out and this is just frivolous -- you know what the impact of this is going to be in Hanoi.

AP: I see. I am sorry about that. I will get one to Saigon right away.

HK: If they want to play games like this--if they want to commit suicide let them do it--but were trying very hard, fighting a very tough congressional battle--how can we explain this. Well you know what I have--you didn't do it, so there's nothing you can say

AP: Yeh, yeh. I am very sorry about that. This was an AP dispatch from saigon--it said "High office close to the President"

HK: Do you want me to send it over to you?

AP: If you could I would appreciate it very, very much.

HK: I send it right over.

AP: Could you send it to the office please--has the house --its 4535 32nd St. NW--

HK: We will send it right away.

TelCon
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:43 pm, January 16, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry. I was just checking. We were going to get together today, so I hopped right to it.

K: How long are you going to be in your office.

R: Well, I can bee here for a while. Or I can come back. I thought we were going to--Mrs. Rogers is having sort of--its pretty silly, the White House telephone operator say the Blair House is the reception.

K: That's right. Are you going to be over there.

R: Yeah. Why don't you just come over here now. Can we do it now? Are you free now.

K: In about 15 minutes, yes.

R: Why don't you do that.

K: Okay, otherwise I would have suggested you swing by here. But no, I'll come over there.

R: Well, I really have some calls coming I should take. If you don't mind I---

K: No, I don't mind at all.

R: Okay.

K: I'll see you there by 6:00.

R: Okay, good.

K: Bye.

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Oh, Henry, did you have a hard day?

K: Well, I had a long day. I spent the afternoon with Burke Trend.

P: Right. Just a second, -- Bebe, would you turn the music down a bit.

K: And then I went over to see Rogers to give him a sort of a briefing.

P: [Laughter] Well, how did Trend go?

K: Very well.

P: I trust he was not bitching.

K: Oh, on the contrary.

P: What did he say?

K: Oh, he's delighted.

P: He thinks we did the right thing.

K: Absolutely, no question about it. And, of course, they never said
anything while it was going on.

P: Well, they shouldn't. No, no, no; I agree. They were very restrained.
But what does he personally think, or could you tell?

K: Oh, he's strongly for it. If anything, his instinct is like yours, he
would have liked to have won.

P: Really.

K: Yeah.

P: Well, you and I know we couldn't do that.

K: We couldn't go any further.

P: That's right. How's it going with Rogers? Did you pin him down?

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

- 2 -

K: Oh, yeah. I told him I wasn't going to come to the signing ceremony and that made him so happy that he forgot almost everything else.

P: [Laughter] Right, right, right.

K: And this really -- I could see he brightened up immediately.

P: Right.

K: He wanted to run right up to the Foreign Relations Committee and testify and I said he shouldn't do that before the signing.

P: Testify? Good God --

K: No, he wanted to do it after the initialing and before the signing.

P: Oh, never, never, never. We just play it very hard until this thing is signed. There isn't going to be any testimony before anybody.

K: Well, I told him also --

P: But, as you know, there will be a briefing of the Leaders.

K: That's right.

P: The meeting after -- the day after the initialing but he can't do that.

K: Yeah, he can't do that.

P: Right.

K: And he won't know the agreements well enough by then anyway.

P: [Laughter] Well, how does he feel? Is his morale good?

K: His morale is good. Oh, no; he's all for it.

P: Yeah. Did he say anything about the bombing?

K: No, no; he says: Well, we tried everything. We tried bombing, we tried mining, we tried B-52s. None of it was -- we couldn't do any more.

P: Yeah.

K: So he says we are absolutely right in making this agreement.

CLASSIFIED

301-2258

BY: J. M. DICK

5/1/73

B. M. DICK

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

P: Well, Burke Trend didn't feel that way ....

K: Oh, no; Burke Trend is enthusiastic.

P: How? In what way?

K: Well, he thinks that Europe will be thankful to you someday for what you did. I told him that you -- that what the Europeans had done had done more to undermine the NATO alliance --

P: Good.

K: Than any other event he's --

P: Except for Heath.

K: Except for Heath. I said, here is a man who -- why did he do it? Not for himself. Not even primarily for the United States but --

P: Not even for a miserable Vietnam but because Europe, the Mid-East; let's face it.

K: Exactly.

P: Did you tell him that?

K: Absolutely.

P: The stakes are a lot higher than that.

K: And I said, what did the Europeans do? Sent unilateral notes, not give him the benefit of any support. And I said the President feels very bitter.

P: Good. Did you? What did he say?

K: And I think you ought to tell that to Heath.

P: Oh, I will.

K: He said he understands it. He said that was their reason why they didn't do anything. They were under enormous pressure but they refused to accede to it and that's true.

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

- 3 -

P: You talk about the enormous pressure though, Henry. It's from the media. It's a media-oriented thing, isn't it?

K: Absolutely, Mr. President. Absolutely. As most of these things are.

P: Yeah, yeah. Oh, sure, they'll affect public opinion for a moment but then it will pass and then something else will happen. So that's that. Now at this point, I guess that Haig is just getting up. He'll meet with Thieu at 9 o'clock I presume in the morning. 9 o'clock our time tonight. He will be meeting in a couple of hours with Thieu, right?

K: Right. No, no; he'll be meeting with Thieu at the end of the day tomorrow so that will not be until 8:00 a.m. or so tomorrow morning our time.

P: Oh, I see. Why is he going to meet with him at the end of the day? Why not early in the morning? No reason?

K: Because we gave him until the evening of the 17th to give us a reply.

P: I have just been thinking that Thieu's tactic will probably be to ask for a delay of a week. Now I just want to be sure -- I know Haig realizes that there can be no delay, no change. Do you think we --

K: Oh, Haig understands it. Haig understands that fully.

P: Yeah. But don't you agree that that will be Thieu's tactic?

K: Well, he will do two things. He'll ask for a delay and he'll start bitching about the protocols.

P: What did Haig say? Has Haig got adequate instructions for that because --

K: Absolutely.

P: It's going to be, Henry, totally cruel, believe me. Brutality is nothing. You've never seen it if this son-of-a-bitch doesn't go along, believe me.

K: Mr. President --

P: Even if it's before the Inauguration, I'm going to do it.

K: He's had the protocols for 2 and a half months and he hasn't commented on it so he cannot bitch now.

DECLASSIFIED

Date: 1/10/73

By: BAMA DATE: 5/10/73

TELCONE

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

- 4 -

P: But the point is we need his agreement before the 20th for reasons that are very apparent. You know what I mean?

K: Right.

P: Otherwise, you know, if you don't have it before the 23rd, we're in a hell of a spot.

K: That's right.

P: So is he.

K: That's right. In that case, we should just face him down and initial it anyway.

P: I understand that. We initial it but we're in one hell of a spot in terms of telling the people that this is the end.

K: Of course. No question we need it.

P: So he's got us by the balls too, hasn't he?

K: Well, except -- he has us by the balls if he wants to commit suicide.

P: Incidentally, what do you hear from Timmons, and Kennedy and the rest that are in contact with people as to how this damn thing is being --

K: Oh, tremendous enthusiasm.

P: You sure? Give me a little rundown. Have you got a minute? You have to go to Rabins.

K: Oh, yeah.

P: I told you I want to have a time to see him before he leaves.

K: I've already talked to Haldeman about that.

P: Yeah, well, it's done and Rabin will be here a couple weeks, won't he?

K: He'll be here through next week anyway.

P: Good. I'll see him next week.

K: Oh, no, he'll be here through a couple of weeks, you're right. Till the 27th.

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved 3/1/85

By: J. M. Dine

Date: 5/1/85

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

- 5 -

P: Well, I've just been thinking of it. I might just invite him on a weekend to come to Camp David to have dinner with me. You might tell him that.

K: Okay.

P: Don't you think that would be great.

K: That would be very outstanding.

P: You know what I mean, you see, I'll be up there anyway and I'll say you and he would come up on the helicopter and we'd have dinner and have a little chat. He has been a great friend and by God, we're going to reward our friends.

K: Absolutely, absolutely.

P: But now give me a rundown.

K: Well, I haven't got it name by name but I know --

P: But Timmons and you know --

K: The Congressional reaction, their only problem is to keep them from going hog wild. And Scali tells me that the press --

P: Did you talk to Scali? Good. Don't be so suspicious of him not to use him, Henry.

K: Oh, no, no, no. I thought --

P: Use him.

K: But he also felt that the danger was not -- was excessive enthusiasm and that they would build -- but that has been deflated a bit now by Ziegler saying I wouldn't go over this week, which was right.

P: Good. Nothing before the Inauguration.

K: That's right.

P: Which is a very good thing. It shows it's not a trick.

K: Exactly, exactly. And the press play is uniformly good. I have a list of press calls which is literally two sheets long now.

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p. m., January 16, 1973

P: Great, great.

K: Of course I don't return any of them.

P: Good. And that's the best thing that will ever happen to them.

K: And even from the good guys I don't return it.

P: None of them. Don't return any. None. You think it's playing about right, Henry.

K:

K: Oh, it's playing beautifully. And people like Taft Schreiber are calling in.

P: What's the kind of people you should talk to. I mean, what did he say?

K: Oh, God, he said congratulations to the President. He's just wildly enthusiastic.

P: He saw Jack Dreyfus down here. Do you know Jack Dreyfus?

K: I don't know him, I know who he is, of course.

P: Well, he's basically peacenik and enormously wealthy and the rest but Bebe was telling me he saw him at Stung Pratt Joe's (?) and that Jack Dreyfus said a very interesting thing. He said: I want you to tell the President he did exactly the right thing and he and Dr. Kissinger by going at their own pace and not being panicked into doing something that was wrong. Isn't that interesting?

K: Yeah.

P: You see, Jack Dreyfus, he's the boss of the guy you know.

K: Yeah, I know.

P: Isn't that interesting though?

K: That is the way it is going to work out. I think when this thing -- Also, the way we are ending it so deliberately now.

P: Yeah. Well, anyway the one thing I would suggest is that you -- you Have kept in touch with Colson, have you?

K: Oh, yes, I had a brief talk with him this morning. And he's extremely enthusiastic.

TELCONE
The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

-7-

P: Good. The thing I mean is I don't want them to say anything but they've got to hear from you to know so that they don't go down with their -- their chins down.

K: Well, that's why I thought I'd talk to Scali and I also had a talk with Colson.

P: Did you? What did you tell Colson?

K: Well, I just told him that the President is moving deliberately at a measured pace. He's got to do this right. But Colson is so enthusiastic, he even wrote me a note afterwards.

P: Did he? What did he say?

K: I'm trying to find it.

P: Just tell me, you can remember.

K: Well, in substance, he said this is one of the greatest achievements and no one knows how much it costs.

P: Of course, some of our people -- Colson is a hard-liner and basically so is Scali on this. But you know, you've got the whole __________, Ehrlichman and all the rest, Finch.... They are great friends but they just want to ...... the goddamn thing.

K: That's right.

P: I hope that in your conduct with the staff you'll set it -- like with Ehrlichman, with Ash, with Finch and the rest -- build them up a little so that they aren't too negative. Have you seen any of them?

K: I haven't seen anybody of them yet except Colson and Scali.

P: Right. If you see any of the staff types, don't let them go around with gobbers down.

K: I think there's no danger of that at all, Mr. President.

P: You don't?

K: No. You know, in Key Biscayne you may not have a sense of this. There's a tremendous sense of excitement here.

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:05 p.m., January 16, 1973

- 8 -

P: Really?

K: Oh, yeah.

P: Well, we'll see what Mr. Thieu does to it tomorrow. And if he doesn't do it, we may take him on before the Inauguration. Don't you agree?

K: I'd wait till after so that it doesn't look as if you're doing it because of the Inauguration.

P: Oh, no. I mean, though if we have to do it before the Inauguration in order to get him to do something, the hell with the Inauguration. You know what I mean. The main thing is how this comes out.

K: That's right.

P: And he cannot screw us again.

K: Well, he isn't that insane.

P: What?

K: He'd really have to be insane.

P: Well, we'll see. You don't think he is?

K: No. But I could be wrong.

P: Yeah. We could all be wrong. What time would you call me tomorrow on this? I'll wait for you to call.

K: Well, I should have something -- Well, he's seeing him say 7 o'clock our time so we may not have a report before Noon.

P: About Noon. Okay. And don't be discouraged by it, believe me.

K: No, Mr. President.

P: But be sure Haig knows that he's to be tough and unrelenting and uncompromising as hell. Have you told him that?

K: I've sent him 4 telegrams to that effect.

P: Good. But, Henry, don't you agree that's all we can do?

DEC 14 1973

850127

B.M.A. Date 5/1/73

TELCOM

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p. m., January 16, 1973

K: Hello, Anatol.

D: Yes, you just finished with the President, yeah?

K: That's right.

D: Well, to sum up; to make it short, that's really what we would like now in considerations of talks you have with Breshnev, Gromyko and myself since the last time. They want to continue this very confidential exchange of __________ of European things.

K: Okay.

D: In this connection, there is three rather documents. One is a document which I gave yesterday through Kennedy --

K: Yeah, I haven't had a chance to study it.

D: No, no; I am not adding your comments. Please don't misunderstand because I give you the document without any comments. The idea is this is a final document which we think may be useful at the end of the Conference.

K: Right.

D: Why we giving now before half a year, we think maybe it's useful to begin a little by little to frank exchange on a we propose it basis. If you could have another one, we are quite prepared. It is not a matter of two, three days; it take quite a time but we feel it will be useful to both of us, I mean two government Presidents and my leadership. So you consider this and to find a really mutually common acceptable document.

K: Right.

D: So this is why the document [long playing] we gave only to Pompidou and today they giving to Brandt and nobody else.

K: Right.

D: They're not going to publish any in the near future at all. Because if the document is a final and give you at the same time what we are thinking how this conference could be ended. And we would like you to have our confidence exchange on the basis of this document. And I don't expect you tomorrow to give me answer but just for you to understand.

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., January 16, 1973

- 2 -

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Right.

D: And the other two things. I'm just sending to you for you. If you maybe have some question, you will ask me tomorrow. It too I am not specifically expecting any answers because there is no need on this second. Second is this delivered talking points with you in connection with your remarks about this was a good idea to include on this timing consultations in Helsinki about this maneuvers and observers.

K: Right.

D: So we accept it and we respond and make changes -- suggestions for the agenda in Helsinki.

K: Good.

D: We didn't propose it yet but we would like first for you to look into this one. And it is the same about cultural. It's current negotiations in Helsinki. And the last one, which I too will send to you today. If you will need some clarification, I am prepared to discuss tomorrow. It's connected with the coming negotiation on the 31st of January of this troop reduction business.

K: Right.

D: I will not take the official text [or not], which we have not yet sent anyone because it is official reply to your government. This was delivered to me through State Department by Rogers.

K: Right.

D: We probably several days we would not give them this text because we would like you first to study. But this is really text which we are going in a few days to send to all the governments of NATO in reply to their notes which we received, including the State Department.

K: Right.

D: So they would like you to look about this note which we are going to send and practically we really accept in this note all that was proposed

CLASSIFIED

30122658

AUG 11 1971 9:12:01

By: NARA DRE 9/12/71

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p. m., January 16, 1973

D: (cont'd) by -- I don't really -- you may look, you may find something else. But from a first reading I don't see any really differences which we discussed with you. My impression is really [second consideration] and . . . . . . . . . . . second point which they would like me to tell you in this connection. It's practically the same but in more detail and some delicate points explained how it stands, just for you and the President's information.

K: Excellent.

D: This is the three group of . . .

K: And are you sending this over now?

D: Yeah, I will send it within if you don't mind, within 45 minutes. I think by 8 o'clock I could tell you.

K: That's fine.

D: Okay. I'm sorry but I'm still hopping he will -- my assistant will come . . .

K: Well, I may not have a chance to have studied it all --

D: No, no, no. I understand. If you will have a chance in the morning to look through with some corrections or some comments to give me, you are most welcome. If you can't, you just say you haven't a chance and leave it as it is.

K: Now I had prepared yesterday with the President a talking paper for you on European matters.

D: Well, that's fine.

K: That may be overtaken by some of the things you are giving me but I'll give it to you anyway.

D: Okay. I think it's useful in any event.

K: It will just show how our minds were working.

D: Yeah, I think it is good. Because in this case, this too was exactly -- I have instructions to in the spirit of this very confidential negotiation to -- you have to have how we thinking and to find a common ground.

Tel Con

7:10 pm, January 16, 1973 (Cont'd)

............

D: ...... because he feels basically as a good wife going home for a vacation.

K: Look, I'm having a small group for dinner tomorrow night. It's entirely non-serious.

B: If it's non-serious, include me.

K: At the Metropolitan Club.

D: Okay, fine.

K: It has this man Schloesser, you met him at the dinner he gave on the West Coast. You remember he understands you.

D: Yes, I remember.

K: And a member of my staff and Frank Sinatra.

D: Oh, fine.

K: So, if you would like to join us.

D: Okay, I would be glad to.

K: About 8:00 o'clock at the Metropolitan Club.

D: Eight o'clock, fine, thank you very much. I will do it.

K: It's entirely social.

D: I understand. No business at all.

K: But don't you go telling these people about MBFR or (laughter)

D: Why not?

K: Because I know how--

D: I will try to make them for a minute serious.

K: Okay, see you soon.

2

D: And Henry, if you don't mind, do you know how the Tricia impression was because I receive from Moscow and they said that their impression was everything was all right, but she left one day before her husband from Leningrad, so they were a little puzzled.

K: I'll call her tomorrow before I leave, before I see you, then I'll talk to you.

D: Okay. Henry, would you give me the text of the agreement on this in Paris. I receive a telegram from Paris where there are our friends telling ______, but I don't have a text from them and it is difficult to judge. They concentrate on the political prisoners, civil prisoners, and they at length explain our impression of what they ______ could compromise. But--

K: What the hell did they achieve on Christmas?

D: I will put it this way. I will look in my---All prisoners of war from the United States, other foreign governments and these prisoners of war will be released within two months. All civilian prisoners from the United States, other states and ______ feel prisoners will be released in a two month period. As far political prisoners in South Vietnam there is an understanding with the United States that American side will use its influence in Saigon---the main parts of political prisoners will be freed within two months. And either party of those political prisoners will be released as fast as is required. Then he says there is a comm request with you about some compensation which was caused by your bombardment including the last bombardment, altogether they ask $5 billion, I think. And this was for discussion. Now, he said that two protocols are now completed about a ceasefire, about your troops withdrawal and join our Commission. Then after this we are going to discuss two other protocols about how to evacuating your mines in the port, the territorial water, and about the prisoners of ---

K: Anatol, I must run. It's essentially true and I'll bring you the text of the agreement.

D: Yes, I think it will be good, because otherwise it is a ______ because I know it is serious and they will send it to Moscow to take up another time.

K: Well, I'll bring it tomorrow.

D: Okay, just bring it with you.

K: Good.

CLASSIFIED

3012958

B-144, Date 5/2/65

3

D: Okay. So, until tomorrow.

K: Which means you are way ahead of our Cabinet.

D: Oh, come on, come on. The whole text, very few people really read it. They just read the headlines, which I am sure you will provide a proper one.

(Laughter)

K: I don't know that we moved the demilitarized zone up to ________.

D: You do not. Who knows. Sometimes nobody knows where is the demilitarized, where it is here, where it is there, but is only a line. Sometimes you go into geometry, draw a line, in a different location. Okay, Henry I---

K: I'll see you tomorrow at 1:15 and then again for dinner.

D: Exactly. And within an hour I will send you this one.

K: Okay. Good.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

CABINET COPY

07/05/15

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., January 16, 1973

K: Hello, Anatol.

K: That's right.

D: Well, to sum up; to make it short, that's really what we would like now in considerations of talks you have with Brezhnev, Gromyko and myself since the last time. They want to continue this very confidential exchange of _________ of European things.

K: Okay.

D: No, no; I am not asking your comments. Please don't misunderstand because I give you the document without any comments. The idea is this is a final document which we think may be useful at the end of the Conference.

K: Right.

K: Right.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: MW Dake
Date: 01 Jan 1973

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p. m., January 16, 1973

- 2 -

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Right.

K: Right.

K: Good.

D: We didn't propose it yet but we would like first for you to look into this one. And it is the same about cultural. It's current negotiations in Helsinki. And the last one, which I too will send to you today. If you will need some clarification, I am prepared to discuss tomorrow. It's connected with the coming negotiation on the 31st of January on this troop reduction business.

K: Right.

K: Right.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By N.W.APR. 5/24/73

["TELCONE", "Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "7:10 p.m., January 16, 1973", "- 3 -", "D: (cont'd) by -- I don't really -- you may look, you may find something else. But from a first reading I don't see any really differences which we discussed with you. My impression is really [second consideration] and . . . . . . . . . . . .

TelCon
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
7:10 pm, January 16, 1973 (Cont'd)

D: ...because she feels basically as a good wife going home for a vacation.

R: If it's non-serious, include me.

K: At the Metropolitan Club.

D: Okay, fine.

D: Yes, I remember.

D: Oh, fine.

D: Okay, I would be glad to.

K: It's entirely social.

D: Why not?

K: Because I know how--

K: Okay, see you soon.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: MN State Date 01-05-94

2

D: I will put it this way. I will look in my---All prisoners of war from the United States, other foreign governments and these prisoners of war will be released within two months. All civilian prisoners from the United States, other states and ______ feel prisoners will be released in a two month period. As far political prisoners in South Vietnam there is an understanding with the United States that American side will use its influence in Saigon-------the main parts of political prisoners will be freed within two months. And either party of those political prisoners will be released as fast as is required. Then he says there is a ______ request with you about some compensation which was caused by your bombardment including the last bombardment, altogether they ask $5 billion, I think. And this was for discussion. Now, he said that two protocols are now completed about a ceasefire, about your troops withdrawal and join our ----------Commission. Then after this we are going to discuss two other protocols about how to evacuating your mines in the port, the territorial water, and about the prisoners of ----

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012054
By W.W.ага

3

D: Okay. So, until tomorrow.

(Laughter)

K: Okay. Good.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

TelCon
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

7:30, January 16, 1973

K: Ron?

Z: Yeah, hi Henry.

K: I've been trying to get out of here for an hour. What's the problem?

Z: I don't think we have any problem, I just wanted to check in with you.

K: Things are going along fine as far as I can tell. You know there is an unbelievable lot of crap coming out of Saigon.

Z: Yes, I know. I just finished watching the news, and the interpretation is that we cooled it today a little bit, but that's all right, don't you think.

K: That's fine.

Z: I think we are better off cooling it than having to be on Friday, don't you?
everyone

K: I just wouldn't worry about it. This thing is going to build and build.

Z: We dampened it today.

K: Well on Thursday you're going to have it quieted. Everyone will then know what the schedule is.

Z: Sure. Well I just wanted to see if you were concerned.

K: Not at all. I think it's going beautifully.

Z: I hope I didn't do wrong today.

K: No, no, I think you did the right thing exactly. Otherwise they would have played our not going this week as a--

Z: That's the point. We had to face it like Valeriana said tonight, there was evidently a change in Kissinger's plans because I said yesterday relatively near future, and today I'm saying the same thing. That's no problem, do you think.

K: No problem, no problem.

Z: When we do indicate when you are going to go, we'll just say that based on your consultations and the situation as it developed, you decided to go, right.

-2-

K: They'll be releasing it at the same time.

Z: Yeah, but I mean, we don't have to say that you, that we knew all along you were going, then.

K: No, but you shouldn't say the opposite because the Noth Vietnamese may contradict us.

Z: Yeah. That's right. Well, we'll talk before Thursday.

K: Okay.

Z: But you feel all right.

K: I feel fine.

Z: And you think the dampening was all right today.

K: It was no damage.

Z: Tomorrow I'm going to say nothing.

K: I just wouldn't say anything.

Z: No, there's nothing we can say--

K: They are going to interpret everything you say now as another twist.

Z: That's right.

K: I told you I wouldn't have said it, and strung it out for 48 hours, but I could make equally good arguments for your position.

Z: If we hadn't done it, there would have been expectation based upon this AP story out of Saigon that something was going to happen Friday.

K: I think we're good shape, really in good shape.

Z: Okay, Henry. I'll see you later.

K: Bye.

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