MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

<table><tr><td>PARTICIPANTS:</td><td>Board of Directors of the Veterans of Foreign War (See list attached)</td></tr><tr><td>TIME AND DATE:</td><td>5:15 p.m., Monday, March 6, 1972</td></tr><tr><td>PLACE:</td><td>Roosevelt Room, The White House</td></tr></table>

[Dr. Kissinger was introduced to the group by Mr. Pat O'Donnell]

(Dr. Kissinger) I appreciate the willingness of you gentlemen to come down to the White House so that I can talk to you. As you may understand, I really cannot do "on-the-record" speaking engagements, and as a result wasn't able to speak to your entire convention. But I do welcome the opportunity to talk to you here. Rather than give a long exposition on foreign policy, I'd like to answer your questions so that I can have a feel for what particularly concerns you.

But let me first make some introductory remarks. Hopefully those remarks can give you an idea of what it is we are working on in this Administration, why we have gone that direction, and where we are headed from here.

When this Administration came into office in 1969, it was during a period in which the old policies of the post-war era were no longer valid. The entire post-war balance of power situation in the world had changed, and domestically we were facing a new isolationism which made it increasingly difficult for us to make appropriate informational commitments. These were the facts of life at that time.

The post-war era in which the United States had been the dominant nation in the world both physically and psychologically had ended by the time this Administration came into office. By that time, both Europe and Japan had grown enormously in strength -- partly as a result of our own policies. While these changes in the non-communist world were

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becoming clear, the communist world was experiencing a break in
the relations between the Chinese and the Russians which has resulted
in the world's most bitter national rivalry.

I would like to comment about a third factor we faced, a dramatically
changed balance of power with the Soviet Union. During the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis, when it is commonly said that we went to the edge of
Armageddon, the Russians had some 70 long-range ballistic missiles;
they all stood in the open, and each required some 10 hours to fuel.
Their missiles were sitting ducks for a pre-emptive American strike,
even if such a strike involved only aircraft. At that time we had some
600 missiles, and 1200 long-range strategic aircraft. The Russians
then had no submarines. The total result was that we had an overwhelming
strategic superiority.

Now the situation is drastically changed. Today we face 1500 Russian
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles -- all secured in silos.
In contrast to this reflection of Russian advancement, we have not
developed a single new missile since the Eisenhower Administration
and the Russians have a growing fleet of missile-armed submarines.
In our current balance of power status, nuclear war is only an option
in the case of absolute extremity. These are problems that we inherited,
not problems that we caused.

The same time that we faced this change in the balance of power, we
faced a growing spirit of domestic isolation -- in part caused by reactions
to the Vietnam war, but also caused by other international situations.
This new isolationism sought to separate the United States from all its
overseas commitments.

Our problem is the problem of maintaining a strong defense at home
while not abandoning our important international role abroad. It is often
argued that our international commitments of the 1950's and 1960's
overextended our power. When we came into office we found that the
American public could not psychologically or physically continue to
bear the burdens that they had borne in the 1950's and 1960's.

I am occasionally asked what I have learned in this job. You may under-
stand that it is not easy for a Harvard professor to admit that he could
learn anything (laughter), and I will have greater opportunity to reflect
in depth on this position after I have left the White House. But I can now

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observe that academicians have the rare opportunity to pick the problems they want to work on, and to be responsible only to themselves (or perhaps their peers) for the work they do in reaching a conclusion. Unfortunately that is not the situation at the top levels of government decision-making.

At the top levels of government the urgent is always in danger of driving out the important. The reason that policy planning fails in government circles, and I have done considerable academic writing about the desirability of policy planning, is that policy plans do not deal with crisis situations. Decision makers want to deal with crisis situations, not long-range policies.

There is a remedy, and I think that is to get policy planners involved in operations in such a manner that they cannot be ignored by the decision makers.

The problem in government is that you are always on a train track with the train headed toward you; as it bears down on you, you have the problem of trying to handle the highest priority items before the train hits you.

The real problem with American foreign policy is that we simply have too many high priority items. This situation is reflected in the Nixon Doctrine. What we are trying to do is to get others to help share the burden of these responsibilities.

Some have criticized the Nixon Doctrine as a way this Administration has posed for the United States to get out of the world. That is now our view. We view it as a way to enable this nation to stay in the world, and to exercise our responsibility in the most reasonable way.

Our policies, gentlemen, must related to the actual facts of the world. Our anti-communist critics oppose our China initiative on the ground that we are dealing with the Chinese; at the same time my academic critics oppose any exercise of a "balance of power" approach to world politics.

The fact is that prior to World War II, we didn't have to worry about the balance of power. Others took care of that concern for us. We were isolated by two huge oceans and we didn't have to get involved in problems until they reached a very acute stage. In the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's, we had an opportunity to exercise an enormous superiority of power, and

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we didn't use it. Now we have to be realistic -- we no longer have
the pre-eminent power that we had in those earlier decades.

Now we must pose the question to ourselves: aren't we worse off if we drive our communist enemies together than if we deal with them separately? I am telling you the hard facts of the situation, and I certainly hope that you are not going to quote me on it. I submit, though, gentlemen, that it just wouldn't be reasonable for us to force China to be hostile, when the Chinese have already indicated a willingness to pay a high price domestically in order to re-establish relations with us. They are willing to do this at a time when we are heavily involved in Asia, even at war in Vietnam.

We didn't have any illusions when we went to Peking. We were well aware that the Chinese made the decision to open communications with the United States because they thought it was in their interest. The Mainland Chinese leaders are more militant communists than the leaders of the Russians; but the Russian leaders have some 1500 intercontinental ballistic missiles and in their arsenal.

Gentlemen, when you are dealing with people in China who went through a revolution of the 20's, the long march of the 30's, a battle with Japan in the 40's, a fight with the United States in Korea in the 50's, and a conflict with Russia in the 60's, you know you are not dealing with people who are going to be pushed around and convinced to change their views by some nice language in toasts (laughter). But we gave nothing to the Chinese in Peking. If you look at the communique you will see it is a document that realistically reflects certain tensions between the Chinese and US. The Chinese and we have each had to recognize that there are certain parallel courses of interest for the two nations to follow.

We are interested in avoiding being ganged up on by the full communist bloc, united in opposition to our activities in Vietnam. Let me say, gentlemen, that we still do view negotiation as a possible route to settlement in Vietnam. But our foreign policy clearly recognizes the nature of the people with whom we are negotiating.

In the post-war period our diplomatic approach to the communists oscillated between two widely divergent views. One viewed the communists as ogres with whom you could not work at all. The other viewed the communists as rather regular fellows who, if they were properly

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understood and dealt with, would act basically like regular Americans. We have tried to avoid both of these extremes in our dealings with the communists. We have seen them as motivated by their own personal interests. We don't see the communists as misunderstood mid-western businessmen (laughter). If Mao had been that, he would be the president of a Shanghai bank today (laughter).

When this Administration came into office, we were under enormous pressure to rush to a Russian summit. Our view of the Russians was that the decades of difficulty that we have had with them had to reflect certain basic causes. We saw these causes as linked together; in other words, we felt that if we could reach a solution in one area, it would help us reach solutions in another area. We were roundly denounced by the newspapers in Washington and New York for this policy of "linkage". The result was that we dropped using the term "linkage", but we have continued the policy (laughter).

In dealing with the Russians we have made considerable progress in areas such as SALT, the Middle-East, Berlin, and the loosening of trade restrictions. We have been able to move with the Russians, and we expect more movement prior to and during the summit this spring.

Dealing with the Chinese, however, is different. China is not a superpower. It does not impinge on American interests throughout the world. If we are to have serious conflict with the Chinese, those problems will arise far in the future. So our dealings at this time with the Chinese run on the philosophical side. They require us to sit down with the Chinese and establish rather difficult things, such as understandings about intentions, motives, etc. These are difficult problems and are perhaps the reasons why these negotiations in China were the most difficult I have ever undergone.

We think, however, that this China initiative makes it more likely that we can have peace in the world, more likely we can settle the Vietnam war, more likely to have satisfactory relations with communist powers. Well, this is where we stand in broadest outline. Perhaps now I can take some questions.

**Question:** Is Mao actually just a figurehead, an image, or does he really hold the reins of power in China? Further, can you comment on the extent and context of the conversations that you and the President had with Mao?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, I can't really speak about the details of the conversations that we had with Mao, but I will say that Mao had a very strong personality. I had been told by people that if I saw Mao and Chou together there would be no question who was 'number one'. That I found hard to believe because, having dealt with Chou in the past, I found him to be quite an impressive and intelligent man. But there are people who, when you meet them, exude authority--people who, when they are sitting at a table, always constitute the head of the table. Mao, is like this physically and psychologically.

You know, I remember being told that Konrad Adenauer only had about three lucid hours a day. Well, if that is true, I had the misfortune of encountering Adenauer always during those three lucid hours he had each day. I can't bear witness to whether or not Mao has only one or two lucid hours a day, but I can say that he was extremely lucid when we dealt with him, and very impressive.

On the previous visits, I recall two times when we reached an agreement--that is to say, when Chou and I reached an agreement and the following day Chou returned to say that he had a message from Mao; then he would quote from what he claimed to be statements of Mao. I can say now that the style of those quotes was fully in keeping with the style of conversation that we encountered in Mao's discussions with the President. Of course, it is very hard to know in government circles exactly what role people play. But Mao is quite impressive.

**Question:** Regarding the reasons for the Chinese approach to the United States, can you tell me whether their problems with the Soviet Union really lay at the base of this?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, they have certainly never said that to us. Let me refer for a moment to the communique. An American would look at the communique and being as pragmatic as most Americans are, would ask "What is going to happen; what are we going to do; what names are they calling us now?" Well, let me say that regarding the issue of what names they are calling us now, that it isn't so important to note exactly what objective name we are being called. What is crucial is to note whether we are being called the same type of name that we have been called before, or whether

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there has been a change; if there has been a change, it is important
to note what direction that change has taken.

This communique was published verbatim throughout China. If
it represented a change in the Chinese line being taken against us,
even though it was not a fully positive line, it must have appeared
important to the Chinese people.

I think, in a way, that it is very hard for Americans to deal with
the Chinese. Our 16th Century ancestors would probably have done
a better job with the Chinese. The Chinese really exude a sort of
early Calvinist spirit; they place an enormous emphasis on moral
virtue and ideology.

Among the agreements that we reached in the communique were five
or six basic "principles"; for instance, both the United States and
China agreed to oppose the hegemony on the part of any individual
power in the Pacific region. Now what are we going to do if China
marches into Thailand. Well, we are not going to take this piece
of paper, wave it in a court of law, and succeed in getting the Chinese
to move out of Thailand. But the fact that the Chinese put this into
writing with the United States is something relevant to their public.
It is very relevant for the Chinese people to see that while the United
States militarily supported Taiwan and engaged in a war in Vietnam
the highly principled government of the People's Republic of China
entered into a written agreement with the United States related to
hegemony in Asia.

A fair question for the Chinese people might be to ask their leaders
why they allowed us to start our versions in a signed document of
that nature. The document, among other things, states that no country
can claim infallibility. Well that is a very, very serious thing for the
People's Republic of China to admit.

The North Vietnamese have been foaming at the mouth about the fact
that the Chinese did not insist on including hard support for the North
Vietnamese communists within the communique. My personal view
is that within the next week or two, we may find that the Chinese are
forced to rectify that situation. They have been taking too hard a
beating for the lack of support for the North Vietnamese in the
communique.

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Why are they willing to take this kind of abuse? It is not fully clear, but the answer must be related to the fact that they deem themselves to be in danger. Certainly they are threatened by the Russians; they are also worried about the Japanese, and more recently, it has become clear, about the Indians. They simply know that they cannot oppose the whole world. This international situation of threats to China is certainly a major part of their attitude toward us. If these conditions change, the nature of our relations with the Chinese will doubtless change. If these conditions do not change, we can persist in our current policy.

**Question:** What significance do you give to the unprecedented Chinese press coverage given to the President's party on the second day in China?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me first of all confirm that these remarks are fully off-the-record and that no one here is going to go out and talk to newsmen about what occurs here (persons in the Roosevelt Room nodded their heads in agreement). Actually the extraordinary press coverage wasn't exclusively on the second day; it continued day after day. On the first day that we were there any one of the Americans in China could have walked down the streets of Peking, said he was President Nixon, and fooled the Chinese. The fact is that the Chinese had never seen a picture of President Nixon prior to this visit; in fact, since 1949, they had never seen a picture of any American president.

When I was photographed with the Chinese leaders in China, it was the first time since the war that the Chinese leaders had ever allowed themselves to be photographed with an American official. When my picture appeared on page three of the People's Daily it was sensation.

Beginning on the second of the President's trip the pictures of Mao with the American leaders appeared on the front pages of the People's Daily and also on those of the provincial newspapers. In addition, the toasts of both sides were printed in full. These toasts, it is interesting to note, continually reflected comments about the friendship between the great Peoples of China and the United States. The communique itself was published in full text in the People's Daily and the provincial newspapers. In addition, the visit was covered on both

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the national and provincial radios.

You may wonder why I am distinguishing between the national and provincial media. The national paper is the paper which goes exclusively to the cadres; the provincial papers are papers which are never given to foreigners. Our intelligence, of course, gets more valid information from the provincial papers than from the national paper, which is published with a view toward distribution to foreign hands.

The fact that Mao met early with the President, however, was clearly intended to give Mao's blessing to the full extent of the Sino-American talks. Subsequently in our visit, Chou often commented: "Mao has said this", and "Mao has said that", and so forth. In addition, Madam Mao came out to the Revolutionary Opera with the President's party. These are all examples of the Chinese leadership's support of the American visit.

When Chou spoke at length about the communique on his return from Shanghai, our press read into his remarks that the Chinese thought they had achieved a great coup in the communique. This is "hog wash". The Chinese are not the kind of people who go about touting their own personal triumphs. If they thought they had really had the best of us, they would have been very quiet about it. They would not have nubbed our noses in it if they had "bested" us. What Chou was doing was meeting with a large number of very conservation Chinese leaders and continuing to press for support of the opening with the United States.

Let me repeat what I said before: I think in the next week or two we may be receiving a blast from the Chinese. For the Chinese there has simply been too much speculation in the press and elsewhere in the United States about the significance of the communique. At some point, it is just going to become too much, and they will be forced to strike out with their own view of it. Of course, I may be wrong.

The government official with whom I negotiated most, their Vice Foreign Minister... by the way, he is the man who absolutely drove the Russians crazy at the UN--he would rub Malik so hard that Malik's face would go red and he would begin to scream. At this point the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister would laugh and make Malik

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all the madder. It was very pleasant for our delegation at the UN for once to sit aside and let two other nations scap... The Vice Foreign Minister (returning to what I began to say) told me that it was hard to imagine what an enormous shock the communique would be to the Chinese people.

Shanghai itself is the location of the most radical political elements in China. It was there that General Haig, when he travelled on an advance trip, received a very, very harsh toast. In fact it was a toast so harsh that he really had no response at all. When we came to Shanghai this time, the head of the revolutionary committee who, by the way, is one of the functioning members of the Politburo (and now there are only seven such members, so he is one of the seven most powerful men in China) indicated and said that Shanghai was proud to be the location where the communique was published. This is really a considerable advance.

I hope soon that both sides can make their protests about the communique and that in the United States state all views--and then that everybody can just shut up (laughter). Maybe then we could just continue our business.

**Question:** As you may know, Mr. Kissinger, our organization has worked very hard on the prisoner of war problem. Can you tell us anything about the future for the prisoners?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Of course, one of our top objectives is the release of the prisoners, and we have been working very hard on it. There is still hope, in my view, for the negotiated settlement to an end of the war in Vietnam. We in this administration find ourselves in a rather curious world. We have been forced to negotiate with more with Americans domestically than with others abroad.

Last summer, for instance, people had the habit of telling us that they knew what would constitute a basis on which we could reach an agreement with the North Vietnamese. Of course, at the time we really knew, through secret negotiations, what the North Vietnamese wanted. We were told in the United States that if we would accept the first of their seven points that the North Vietnamese would settle with us. Of course, we knew more than that was required; in fact, we had their nine secret points. In February the situation was similar.

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I believe that if we give the North Vietnamese the impression that the POW issue is our sole concern, they will continue to turn the knife in our side. I also believe that if people in the United States continue to harp on the theme that there is a secret solution possible, and that it is only because of ignorance or malice in the White House that it is not reached, that there will be little incentive for the North Vietnamese to negotiate. I do believe that the North Vietnamese will be willing to settle when it is in their interest to settle. I do not think that prospects for negotiations this year are unfavorable. We want to negotiate with Hanoi, though, not with the *New York Times* (laughter).

Of course, we are interested in the POW's, but the real issue that remains--the sole significant issue--is whether we will end this war by aligning ourselves with the enemy in overthrowing and destorying our ally.

If the North Vietnamese think they can win a military victory, they should have accepted our proposal of May 1. If they think they can win a political victory, they should have gone for our proposal of January 25. We cannot be in a situation where we withdraw our presence and our full military and economic assistance but allow the North Vietnamese to maintain their levels of foreign military and economic assistance. That would be nothing other than an indirect way of turning the country over to the Communists. If we were to do that, nobody could believe any international American pledge in any part of the world.

We stand ready to start a political process that President Thieu can lose. We are also ready to listen to any alternative suggestions that the North Vietnamese have. We are also prepared to disengage militarily.

What do we confront domestically? We confront people who oppose our policy of Vietnamization on the ground that underneath the policy is a desire to enable Asians to kill other Asians. Similarly, though, the same people oppose our policies of ceasefire simply because by taking the North Vietnamese out of the conflict they would prevent Asians from killing other Asians. We stand ready to consider military or political solutions to the problems in Vietnam, and still have high hopes for the release of the POW's.

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**Question:** If the negotiation route does not prove successful in the future, can we look forward to the other military actions which would try to recapture the American POW's and remove them from North Vietnam?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I really can't discuss that type of action with you here today.

**Question:** Is my understanding correct that the President's position is that under no circumstances will he end the war in a way which abandons our prisoners in North Vietnam.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes. That is correct.

**Question:** On a lighter side, Dr. Kissinger, let me say that it must have been a pretty good joke that you were all laughing about there in the meeting with Mao.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I didn't see the television; you know you all saw more of the trip than I did.

**Question:** Chiang Kai-shek has said that he will see nobody but you. Are you planning a trip to Taiwan?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, the President just saw the Formosan Ambassador this afternoon. Let me say that we are having a tough time with Taiwan. But when we received the first openers which lead to the ping pong visit, what would have happened if we had kicked the Chinese in the teeth? They would have played the same game that the North Vietnamese play here in the United States. They would have had all of the anti-government, anti-stability groups in America visit China, and so forth. This would have had a dramatic influence on our policies abroad.

The real question is what would have been more in Chiang Kai-shek's interest. I believe that by keeping the future open our current policy is more in the interest of Chiang Kai-shek than a highly criticized policy in opposition to all contact with mainland China.

**Question:** Totally off-the-record, can you tell us whether you believe that if certain Senators would join the President in his current peace proposals that this would aid the likelihood of a negotiated settlement?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Off-the-record, I can answer that in the affirmative. One of our serious problems is establishing with the North Vietnamese that we have a floor below which we cannot go in our negotiations. If you pull out past demands made publicly in the United States and compare them with the results of this Administration, you will find that year after year we have exceeded what has been demanded of us.

For example, in 1968, Teddy Kennedy made a major speech in which he picked up the banner of his fallen brother. We have exceeded every one of the positions that he took at that time. At the beginning of every two-year period, if one examines the proposals that the *New York Times* has made in the Vietnam area, and then compares them to the performance of the Administration, the same result is clear.

What happens to us, though, is that when we make a proposal, as soon as it has sat for two or three months without action the public presses us to come up with another more imaginative, more flexible proposal.

Without attempting to bore you by the details of the various peace proposals, let me refer to point six in our plan (which is actually point seven in the North Vietnamese plan). This was never contested by the North Vietnamese in our negotiations. The places we hung up with the North Vietnamese regarded the overthrow of Thieu, and the definitions of withdrawal--the timing. The problem of timing and withdrawal was a soluble problem--everyone recognized that. Indeed on January 25 the solution to that was found. The problem of timing and withdrawal, of course, is very much related to the possible overthrow of Thieu. But there was no disagreement on our point six as far as the North Vietnamese were concerned. Still we were roundly attacked in the U.S. for making that proposal. This is just nonsense. This lack of domestic unity, even if it reflects the best of intentions (and I know that many people are seriously tortured over this Vietnam war situation), seriously undercuts our bargaining position.

**Question:** If the North Vietnamese become convinced that the President is going to be re-elected, will this brighten the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I think that if they become convinced that it is not certain that a Democrat will win, that there will be incentives created toward further negotiation. I would rather not sit here and

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make partisan statements, because I don't consider my office a
partisan office; but I think it is fair to say that the North Vietnamese
must decide whether they would rather deal with a lame-duck
President, if the President should be defeated and then with a new
administration. I am not at all convinced that people who now take
certain positions in the Vietnam area would convert their talk into
parallel action when they come to face the full responsibility of
office, and to understand the impact that such a decision would have.
I do not believe it is at all certain that it is in the interest of the
North Vietnamese to hang on for a possible Democratic administration.

**Question:** When General Haig spoke to us, and similarly when Secretary Laird spoke to us, I noticed that nobody has mentioned (and you have not mentioned today) the possibility of using the UN in these international problems. Am I to conclude that the administration's view of the UN is that it is not an effective means of settling international disputes?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Well, let's look at the situation in December involving India and Pakistan. There you had an 11-2 vote in the Security Council condemning India and a similar 104-10 vote in the General Assembly. There is no question that international opinion opposed the war, but this did not stop the Indians.

I believe the difficult in New York is that the UN is a body representing
governments, not people. Governments, in the abstract, always want
peace. The problem is that people who really want peace have to be
willing to run certain risks for peace. It is much easier to sign a
resolution at the UN than it is to run a substantial risk for peace.

My conclusion is that the UN is very useful when the great powers
agree, and when the great powers are looking for a buffer. An
example of this was the UN actions in the Congo, and other areas.
But where the great powers disagree, it is impossible for the UN to
be an effective international force.

**Question:** Our organization has always strongly supported Taiwan.
What can you say now about the future of Formosa?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me refer first of all to the communique
itself. There we reaffirmed, (and I emphasize we did not affirm—we
reaffirmed) our insistence on a peaceful solution—in other words, we

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opposed military action. In addition, in Shanghai, on Chinese soil, I personally reaffirmed our defense commitment to Taiwan. And the President himself said that our commitments were not affected by the trip to Peking.

I believe that what this does is give Taiwan the best chance to control its own destiny. If it wants to settle peacefully, we do not oppose it. If it does not want to settle peacefully, we are not going to apply any pressure.

And we also have to be aware that the governments of both mainland China and Formosa are governments headed by old men. Our policy today has to take into account the fact that these men are going to pass from the scene, and new conditions are going to arise. But let me emphasize that in no way did we agree to give the mainland Chinese a free hand with Taiwan.

**Question:** May we turn now to the Middle-East?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I have about 10 more minutes. Let me say that I consider the Middle-East the most potentially explosive area in the world today. It is very much like the pre-World War I Balkans, where you had individual small nations tied to great powers. Each of those nations in the Middle-East, as in the Balkans prior to World War I, is less concerned about world peace than about settlement of local differences. And to be truthful, both Israel and Egypt have persuasive positions.

There is pressure on the Israelis to make a peace settlement. Of course, all wars start between nations at peace. One of the peculiarities of the Middle-East situation is that it is an area in which wars begin between nations already at war (laughter).

When pressed to give up territories, the Israelis naturally are not too impressed by the fact that it will result in a state of peace. For example, they looked at the peace between India and Pakistan and saw what happened to the Pakistanis this past year.

The Arabs, of course, have their point of view. This is a very tough negotiating problem.

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The difficulties are made more serious by the heavy Soviet military involvement in Egypt. They have some 20,000 troops there—they have military aircraft and also bases which enable them to strike at the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. In sum I consider this the most difficult area in foreign affairs today.

**Question:** How about the Americans being held in China itself?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We have spoken to the Chinese about them. They are now holding only one military person and two civilians. We have talked to them about the problem.

**Question:** What chances are there that we are going to see a SALT agreement reached this year?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I would say that there is a reasonable chance that there will be a SALT agreement before Moscow.

Of course, we are just dealing with the tip of an iceberg in terms of costs of these weapons programs. The problem of an equality fight may be something very different. What we really fear with the Russians is not their deployment of new weapons, but rather their technology.

The question that I continue to ask is: "Beyond a certain point, why are the Russians interested in more strategic weapons?" If it is true that only a demented person would be interested in amassing strategically useless weapons, what do the Russians have in mind? That is what concerns us now, and I haven't figured it out.

I do, however, think that by the summit it is very likely that we will have reached a first round agreement in SALT, and that it will save us some dollars at least.

**Question:** As far as trade is concerned, what does China need, and how much?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) As far as we can tell now, our trade is not something of great potential with the Chinese. I would say that the outer limit for it today is about $500 million a year.

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**Question:** It seems that our approach to China has run the risk of encouraging a rush of Asian nations to Peking.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) This has been one risk that we have run, and one price that we have had to pay. We have two situations, however.

As far as the smaller countries are concerned, they are limited in their rush to Peking by the fear of being swallowed up by China. Their concern is that we may close a deal which gives China a free hand in dealing with them. And if you look at the communique itself, both the Chinese and the U.S. indicate that they oppose the exercise of hegemony in the Asian theater. This, of course, is not conclusive, but it is an interesting aspect of the communique.

As far as the larger nations are concerned the problem is different. It is often heard that we hurt Japan's feelings, and that due to this injury the Japanese have turned toward China. This is simply not so. In the post-war period I believe the Japanese have very calculatedly moved toward Asian independence. They have used free military defense from the U.S. to aid them in concentrating their resources in strategic industries which they can use effectively against us in world markets.

My view has been that the Prime Minister following Sato would take the step of re-establishing ties to the Chinese regardless of what we did. This is a natural evolution, I think, for the Japanese.

The real question to ask is what the Japanese are complaining about. Are they complaining because we separated from them as far as policy is concerned, or rather because our unilateral action prevented them from making the unilateral move themselves? As far as the second question is concerned, it is not a heartbreaking result to have prevented them from taking unilateral action themselves. We and the Japanese both know that a race to Peking would be a losing proposition for both of us.

The Japanese have to deal with basic realities in their relationship with China. They have to realize that it is extremely dangerous for them to separate themselves from the U.S., which is their only real market economically, and also the nation which provides in a major way for their defense. What should they do? Sit undefended off the coast of China and look for trade with China that doesn't exist?

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Hardly. Another alternative would be to separate from the U.S. and to rearm, perhaps in a nuclear manner. At this point, however, both the Chinese and the Russians would be seriously frightened and new elements of conflict and tension would be created in Asia. So, in the long run, the future for Japan is a realistic partnership with the U.S. Gentlemen, I am afraid that will have to be my last question.

[At this point, Dr. Kissinger left the room and the briefing ended.]