86

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

empress. Keith made a reply in which he as studiously
confined himself to the phrase Arch-duke of Austria,
assuring the commissioner that the *Empress* his sovereign
would always feel it a pleasure to assist the house of the
*Arch-duke*. M. Haslinger was a little put out by this, and
to avoid exposing himself to similar rubs, sent off an
express to Vienna, which brought him orders invariably
to use the title Empress when speaking of the Russian
sovereign. The Austrian generals, however, on many
other occasions, exhibited abundance of arrogance, and the
Russian generals often had unpleasantnesses in their in-
tercourse with them on this ground. As for Keith,
the court of Vienna never forgot his speech, or let slip
an opportunity to do him mischief.*

While marshal Munich had been employed in Poland,
his enemies at court had not neglected the chance of
blackening him to the empress. He had given some
opening for blame in his attack upon Hagelsberg, which,
as it was said, he had undertaken too lightly. But when
he returned to court at the end of the campaign, he found
means to justify himself, and was restored to favour. He
was upon all the councils; and it was resolved to declare
war against the Turks, as soon as the affairs of Poland
should be entirely settled. Munich was sent back to
Warsaw to put the finishing hand to these. At length,
everything there was terminated agreeably; peace was
concluded; and all Poland submitted to the king that
Russia had given it. Munich then left Warsaw, and re-
paired to the Ukrain, where the command of the troops had
been bestowed upon him. As I wished to relate the
affairs of Poland without interruption, I will now set
down some other remarkable events that took place in
the mean time during the years 1734 and 1735.

* This paragraph is found only in the French edition.

ATTEMPT TO DISCIPLINE THE TURKISH ARMY. 87

The advantages which Thomas Kouli Khan gained over the Turks gave great pleasure to the court of Petersburg, as it received repeated advices that the French ambassador at Constantinople had used his best endeavours to induce the Porte to come to a rupture with Russia, a danger which could not but give some uneasiness to the empress, though there were no signs of it outwardly. This uneasiness was greatly augmented on its becoming known at Petersburg, that the Count (or rather then Bashaw) Bonneval had taught a body of Turkish troops all the exercises and evolutions which were practised in the other armies of Europe; and that his project was to put the whole militia of that vast empire upon a regular footing. The count Bonneval had, for training these troops, availed himself of the service of several Frenchmen who had taken the turban, and among others of Messieurs De Ramsey and De Montchevreuil, who left France in company with the Abbé Mascarti.* But this project did not succeed. So long as Bonneval contented himself with training 3000 men, the Turks diverted themselves with it, as they might do at a play. The Sultan and all his ministers were delighted at the dexterity and expertness of the men with their exercise. But so soon as he gave signs of wanting to go further and make the improvement general, he found insurmountable obstacles; and the Divan gave it all up, fearing an universal revolt, in case of an attempt to introduce any innovation in the militia.

But it was not enough for the Empress of Russia to be satisfied that this project had come to nothing; she wanted to withdraw from Constantinople all such persons as

* Query "M'Carthy." Ramsay was doubtless a Jacobite refugee in France, and so passed for a Frenchman.

G 4

88

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

might be capable of serving the Porte, in the event of its resuming the plan. Her minister at that court had orders to tamper with those officers and try to induce them to quit Turkey, to tempt them with great offers, and assure them they might make their fortune in Russia. Ramsey and Montchevreuil suffered themselves to be persuaded. They concealed themselves for some days in the house of the English ambassador, and afterwards got a passage in a ship for Holland. Montchevreuil died by the way. Ramsey got to Petersburg, where he was taken into the service as major. He took the name of count of Balmaine, and distinguished himself on all occasions. After rising to the rank of colonel, he was killed in the action of Wilmanstrand.

It was in the course of the year 1734, that the court of Petersburg once more renewed its treaty of alliance with Thomas Kouli Khan, who engaged not to make a peace with the Porte without securing the interests of Russia. The empress tried as much as possible to establish a close connection and friendship with that potentate, but the Shah did not keep faith with her. He made a peace with the Porte at the very time when Russia was in the thickest of the war with the Turks.

In 1735 Sweden held a diet, which gave some uneasiness to the Russians. They well knew that France was using its utmost efforts to bring the Swedes to a rupture. This nation had already given some indications of its ill-will; for when Stanislaus had taken refuge in Dantzig, a number of Swedish officers had, with the consent of the senate, repaired thither to offer their service to that prince; and when the town was taken they were made prisoners. But the empress immediately released them, and sent them back to Stockholm. Some complaints indeed were made on the occasion; but as it was

THE EMPRESS RESOLVES ON WAR WITH TURKEY. 89

of great consequence to the empress to have peace on that
side, she made such offers to the court of Sweden as de-
termined it to renew the treaties of alliance and commerce
which had subsisted between the two powers. Russia took
upon herself to pay 300,000 florins which Sweden owed
the republic of Holland, and engaged to give Sweden the
preference to all other nations in purchasing and exporting
grain from the ports of Livonia.

In the month of July, there occurred at the court of
Petersburg a minor incident, which may, however, deserve
a place in these Memoirs. It was imputed to Madame
d'Aderkass, the head-governess of the Princess Anne, that
instead of vigilance and attention to her conduct, and
giving her a good education, she had been induced to lend
her assistance to an intrigue between the princess and a
certain foreign minister.* This being discovered, the
governess was dismissed, and sent off to Germany. The
minister, who had aspired to this great conquest, was some
time afterwards entrusted with an affair that obliged him
to return to his court, to which there was at the same time
a hint conveyed, that his return to Petersburg would not
be acceptable. A gentleman of the chamber to the
empress, named Brilkin, being suspected of some privity
to this intrigue, was sent away from the court, and had a
place of captain in the garrison of Kasan. There he re-
mained till the Princess Anne had the Duke of Courland
arrested†; when she recalled him, and made him chamber-
lain and attorney-general to the senate.

After the disturbances in Poland were quieted, Russia
thought herself compelled to begin a new war against the

* This individual was Count Lynar, who had been accredited to the court of Petersburg by Augustus II. of Poland. The princess was only sixteen years of age.

† This was six years afterwards, in the revolution effected by Munich.

90

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

Turks. The frequent incursions which the Tartars had made into the Russian provinces served as a pretext for this rupture. The court of Petersburg had made reiterated complaints to the Divan, without receiving any satisfactory answer. In revenge for this, a war was begun, which cost immense sums and a great number of lives, without any real advantage resulting.

The truth however is, that Peter I. had already projected this war, having never been able to digest the peace of the Pruth. He had prepared large magazines on the Don, and amassed a great quantity of materials for building flat-bottomed boats to go down the Dnieper and the Don, at Woronetz, Novo-Paulowska, and other places on the frontiers; as also an ample provision of arms, ammunition, and clothing for the soldiers: in short, everything was ready for taking the field, when death prevented the execution of his designs.

As soon as Anne had ascended the throne, Loewenholde, the master of the horse, brought this project again upon the carpet; and Keith, who was at that time major-general and inspector-general of the army, received in 1732 orders, when reviewing the troops, to visit the stores that had been collected on the frontiers, and, in case of finding that the provisions laid up there were damaged, to purchase fresh, and replenish the magazines. Keith found in them a great quantity of flour spoiled; all the clothes, having been kept for years laid in heaps, were rotten, and the arms eaten up with rust; and all this through the negligence of the officials who had the care of them. He laid in a great store of corn, and put the management on a better footing. The disturbances that came on in Poland hindered the empress from immediately attacking the Turks; but everything being at last pacified throughout the rest of Europe, she judged it a favourable time to take her

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.

91

revenge on the Ottomans, and the more so for their being
at the time engaged in an unsuccessful war with Persia.

She did not, however, choose as yet to declare herself
openly, it being necessary first to complete her projected
arrangements. Her minister at Constantinople, Neplueff,
who had resided there several years, was recalled, in order
that the government might receive from him personally
authentic accounts of the actual circumstances of the
Porte. He had his audience for taking leave precisely at
the juncture when the Turks had suffered a fresh blow
from Thomas Kouli Khan, which abated a good deal of
the grand vizier's haughtiness; so that he treated him with
all the politeness imaginable, endeavouring to excuse the
invasions of the Tartars, and promising not only to hinder
the like for the future, but to give all sorts of satisfaction
to Russia for the past. But these concessions came too
late: the court of Petersburg had already taken its re-
solution.

The general Count Weisbach, who commanded in the
Ukrain, had orders to assemble, in the month of August,
20,000 men, and to hold them in readiness to march; but
this general died just about the time that he was to begin
operations. Upon this, the court gave the command to
Lieutenant-general Count Douglass; but he too hap-
pened to be under the influence of a malignant fever when
the commission was brought him. At length, General
Leontew was put at the head of the troops. But by these
messages to and from Petersburg, there were near six
weeks lost, and the general could not get ready to march
before the beginning of October.

His instructions chiefly set forth the desire of Russia
to obtain satisfaction for the invasions of the Tartars, and
that this special time of falling upon the Crimea had
been chosen, because the khan was absent from it with his

92

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

best troops, on an invasion of Daghestan, a province dependent on Persia. The general, then, had orders to march into the Crimea with all possible expedition, and put everything to fire and sword, to deliver from slavery the subjects of Russia, and entirely exterminate the Nogay-Tartars, who inhabit the deserts, or steppes, between the Ukrain and the Crimea, in huts which they transport from one place to another.

Leontew, for this expedition, had with him 20,000 regulars, the most part dragoons, and 8000 Cossacks. With this army he entered the steppes in the beginning of October. The outset of the enterprise was auspicious enough. His parties found several hordes of the Nogay-Tartars, above four thousand of whom were massacred, and very few spared. They got from them a great quantity of cattle, especially sheep. But these advantages cost the Russians dear. The expedition had been begun at too advanced a season; the pasturage began to fail; the nights, which in that country are fresh even in summer, began by this time to be extremely cold. Sickness multiplied in the army, both among men and horses. Hardly a day passed without numbers of both dying. They were obliged too to drag the sick along with the army, for there are no towns in those deserts in which to form hospitals. The army was already in want of necessaries, when it still had ten marches to make before arriving at the lines of the Crimea. Leontew, with the generals and chief officers of the regiments, held a council of war, and at this it was resolved to return. The army lay then encamped near Kamenoï Saton, and the night before it set out on its march back, the snow fell a foot thick on the ground, and above 1000 horses perished by it. The troops returned into the Ukrain, where they took up their winter-quarters towards the end of November, the regiments all

DESCRIPTION OF THE LINES OF THE UKRAIN. 93

of them in sad plight. This expedition cost above 9000 men, and at least as many horses, without the Russians gaining any advantage by it.

The court was extremely vexed at the miscarriage of this project, which they had believed impossible to fail. The plan of it had been furnished by the deceased count Weisbach; and, perhaps, he himself would have executed it better than his successor, had he lived to take charge of it. The court was not pleased with Leontew's conduct, but he fully justified himself before a court-martial.

While Leontew had been occupied with his unfortunate attempt, marshal Munich had arrived in the Ukrain, and taken the command of the troops. He then set to work with all imaginable diligence, in making the proper dispositions for the ensuing campaign. He began with inspecting the docks of Woronetz, and ordering a new one to be made at Briansk, for building small vessels that might be of service on the Dnieper, the Don, and the Black Sea. On his return thence, he went to visit the lines of the Ukrain, which he took care should be repaired in many places. He also had all the fortifications, or rather towns and entrenched villages, along the frontier, put into a condition of defence against the insults of the Tartars. It will be easily conceived that this required no great matter to accomplish, since 2000 Tartars will never so much as think of attacking a redoubt guarded by fifty men.

Here, I imagine, it will not be irrelevant to give an idea of the lines of the Ukrain. They had been projected by Peter I. in order to check the inroads of the Tartars. After his death, nothing was done in the matter till the year 1731, when the lines were begun. They were finished in 1733, but the forts were not so till 1738. The right of these lines rests on the Dnieper, the left on the

94

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

Donetz. They are in length above 100 French leagues. At convenient distances there are forts, fifteen of which have an earthen parapet staked, a ditch full of water, a glacis, and a palisaded counterscarp. Between these forts there are, besides, some good redoubts and redans along the lines. There is a body of militia, (20,000 dragoons,) to guard them, posted in the forts and in villages built on purpose for them. In time of peace they receive one third less pay than the other troops; to make amends for which, they have lands distributed to them, which they cultivate. This militia is draughted from 200,000 families of gentlemen of small fortune, who inhabit the provinces of Koursk and Rilsk. They are called in Russia *Odnodwortzi*, that is to say, people possessed of but one dwelling, and who cultivate their land with their own hands.* The 200,000 families, out of which this militia is draughted, are obliged to send every year a certain number of labourers to assist the militia in its work at the lines. And here let me remark by the way, that these soldiers constitute the finest body of troops in all Russia. It was from this body that the Empress Anne draughted the Ishmaëlow† regiment of guards, and Munich's regiment of cuirassiers. It was also by the counsel of Munich that this body of militia was formed [or rather augmented] in 1731. There were already 6000 of them in the time of Peter I. These arrangements have not, however, proved capable of preventing the Tartars from making incursions into the Ukrain, the extent being too great to be easily guarded. They have often passed and repassed the lines, without the militia hindering them. It was only in this war

* The " statesmen " of Cumberland, and the αὐτοῦογολ of ancient Attica, may serve to illustrate the nature of this class.

† See above, page 46.

MUNICH'S DISPOSITIONS.

95

that these vagabonds were often well beaten, and their
plunder recovered from them, by means of the good
dispositions made by marshal Munich.

After visiting the docks and the lines, the marshal
established his head-quarters at Izioum, a Cossack town not
far from the latter. The plan which he had laid down for
the campaign was, to begin with the siege of Azoph, and
at the same time to make the greatest efforts against the
Tartars of the Crimea, so as to conquer all their country
if possible, and form a settlement on the Black Sea. In
consequence of this arrangement, a great part of the
magazines, which had been so long preparing, became
useless. Munich tried to remedy this, by having a great
quantity of grain brought from Russia. But notwithstanding
all the pains he took, things did not go on so
fast as he wished.

The regiments had orders to prepare their field equi-
pages. Munich introduced anew the use of pikes, which
had been entirely laid aside since the peace of Neustadt.
Every regiment was obliged to provide for itself 350,
eighteen feet long; and twenty *chevaux-de-frise*, each a
fathom * in length, to defend the head of their camp.
These *chevaux-de-frise* were of great service; for as soon
as the troops were entered into camp, they were planted,
and the army was safe from all surprise, as they formed
a kind of entrenchment. But the pikes served only to
embarrass the soldiers in their march, the second rank
being obliged to carry them; besides requiring the
augmentation of the carriages of each regiment by two
carts, to carry the pikes of the sick. Munich also or-
dered the officers and non-commissioned officers to lay aside

* What is meant is doubtless the *sajene*, which is seven feet. This
measure is commonly rendered by "toise" in French, and "faden" in
German. The pikes were perhaps three sajenes, or twenty-one feet, long.

96

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

their espontoons and halberds, and, in lieu of them, to take small guns with bayonets, judging these more useful than the espontoons.

The arrangements which the Russians were making in the Ukrain, and the expedition, unfortunate as it was of general Leontew, gave the Porte uneasiness. It had received another check on the side of Persia, and was afraid of having much the worst of it if attacked at the same time by Russia. The grand vizier sent for M. Wisniakoff, who had succeeded Neplueff, and, treating him very graciously, declared to him that he was fully disposed to preserve peace with all the Christian powers. He even offered to compel the Tartars to make good the damage they had done on the Russian territories. He spoke at the same time to M. Thalmann, ambassador from the court of Vienna, and to the other foreign ministers, to engage them to interpose their good offices, and endeavour to reconcile the differences between the two courts. But he did not, at the same time, neglect to take all necessary measures for putting the frontiers into a state of defence. He had the garrison of Azoph augmented, and sent a fleet into the Black Sea to cover the place on that side.

The maritime powers * tried to dissuade the empress from this war; but she had already made up her mind.

A part of the ministry, and especially count Osterman, were against the war. They argued, that the Russian nation could never hope to gain any the least advantage by a war with the Turks; that it would involve an immense waste of treasure and blood, without the possibility of any real good resulting from it. Their opinion also was, that since it was the Tartars that had committed hostilities in the provinces, revenge should be taken on them alone,

* Probably England and Holland are meant.

THE RUSSIAN MANIFESTO.

97

without making any formal declaration against the Porte; that, for this purpose, there should be got ready a competent number of light troops, supported by a body of regulars, to march, in the proper season, into the Crimea, carry fire and sword into the country as far as they could penetrate, and then retire into the Ukrain. If the Otto-man court should complain of this, a justification was ready, in the answer that there was no sort of intention to come to a rupture with it; but that satisfaction having been frequently asked for the damages caused by the Tartar invasions and not having been obtained (possibly because the Porte, being otherwise embarrassed, wished to keep on terms with the Tartars), the empress had found herself obliged to make use of the power she had in her own hands, to punish those vagrant robbers, whose intention appeared to be not only to ruin her dominions, but to embroil her with the Porte; that in all other respects the empress did not desire any thing more than to live on a perfectly good understanding with that court.

After the war was over it appeared very clearly, that those who were of this opinion were entirely in the right. For Russia lost an infinite number of lives in the quarrel, and got scarce any advantage by it; as, among the advantages to the state, there can hardly be reckoned the glory that her army, or rather some individuals of it, acquired in the course of the war. Even marshal Munich himself was not of the opinion to begin war against the Turks; although after it was once declared, he would not have been sorry for its continuance some years longer.

The count Osterman, by order of the empress, wrote the Grand Vizier a long letter, which served at once for a manifesto and a declaration of war. He entered into a specification of all the infractions of the peace, committed by the Turks and Tartars since the beginning of the current

II

98

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

century, and concluded with saying, that her majesty found
herself obliged to have recourse to the power which God
had given her, and to employ it against the Porte, in order
to provide for the security of her subjects against insult;
that she did not, however, take this resolution without
regret, and designed only to procure herself satisfaction in
proportion to the injuries and losses which her empire had
sustained, and to obtain the establishment of a peace,
on such conditions as would guarantee for the future, in
the most solid manner, the safety and tranquillity of her
states and subjects; that she would readily come into any
reasonable terms of accommodation, to spare effusion of
blood; so that if the Porte was of the same disposition, it
might acquaint her majesty with the fact, and send its
ministers to the frontier, with full powers to enter into an
immediate negotiation.

The Grand Vizier received this letter of count Oster-
man just at the same time that he had advice of siege
being laid to Azoph, and of the Russian army being in full
march towards the Crimea. This determined the Porte
to publish a manifesto at Constantinople, in which war
was declared against Russia. The Grand Vizier had a
numerous army assembled, with which he passed the
Danube, but he did not undertake any the least thing
during the whole campaign. The Porte, in this war,
observed a policy which it had never before practised; it
permitted M. Wischniakoff, minister of Russia, to with-
draw from the Turkish territories; whereas, formerly,
its custom constantly was to arrest the ministers of such
courts as it was going to war with, and to send them pri-
soners to the Seven Towers, until peace was made.

Munich having made all the necessary arrangements
for opening the campaign early, went, at the beginning of
the month of March, to St. Anne, a fort which had been

MUNICII'S ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE AZOPH.

99

built on the frontier of Turkey, about eight leagues from Azoph. He there assembled six regiments of infantry, three regiments of dragoons, and 3000 Cossacks of the Don. The commandant of Azoph having intelligence of this, sent one of his officers to the marshal to congratulate him upon his arrival on the frontier, feigning not to have the least apprehension of any attack; but giving him all possible assurances of friendship, with abundance of offers of service on his own part; and adding, that he hoped the same disposition existed in marshal Munich, as he could not entertain a belief that he was come into those parts with any bad intentions against the Porte, there having been no war declared, and he, on his side, having never given any cause of complaint. The Turkish officer was very civilly received by the marshal, who caused his forces to defile before him, and managed the parade of them in such a manner as to make this small force appear an army of 20,000 men. After this he sent him back to Azoph without any positive answer, only charging him with his compliments to the Bashaw.

Hitherto it had actually been the custom every year to assemble near the fort of St. Anne a body of troops, which commonly remained encamped there for five or six months; and this circumstance tended to diminish the enemy's suspicions. But on the 27th of March, Munich passed the Don, and began his march upon Azoph. Before break of day on the 31st, the army being upon the march, major-general Sparreuter was detached with 600 foot and a party of Cossacks of the Don, that were to serve for the vanguard, and to drive in the advanced posts of the enemy. He pushed on with so much caution and rapidity, that he got to the two castles, situate on the banks of the Don near Azoph, without having been perceived by the enemy. These he attacked, and carried

H 2

100

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

them without the loss of a single man. The marshal, who had at the same time advanced near to the town with his army, seized several positions, and caused redoubts to be constructed at convenient distances to cover his troops from any sallies from it, entirely blockading it on the land side. The Bashaw had, for the whole day, kept firing cannon, as a signal to the inhabitants of the neighbourhood that he was about to be attacked, and that they should retire into the town; but all those people chose rather to seek shelter among the Tartars of the Kuban.

On the 3rd of April, the marshal ordered the fort of Lutick to be attacked in the night-time. It also was carried with very little loss, there being but a lieutenant and three men killed, and twelve wounded. They found there twenty cannons, iron and brass. Fifty janissaries and an officer were taken prisoners, and at least as many had been killed. It was the same general Sparreuter who was at the head of this detachment. On the 4th, general Lewaschew arrived in camp with a regiment of dragoons, and three regiments of infantry. Munich gave him the command of the troops that were to continue the blockade of Azoph on the land side, till the arrival of count Lacy, to whom the siege of the place was entrusted.

On the 5th of April Munich left the camp before Azoph, in order to put himself at the head of the grand army that was forming near Zaritzinka, a little town situate at the extremity of the lines of the Ukrain, at the distance of two leagues from the Dnieper. He arrived there on the 18th. There were already at the rendezvous several regiments of foot and dragoons, under the orders of the Prince of Hesse Homburg. The rest of the army got there on the 19th, 20th, and 21st. It consisted of twelve regiments of dragoons, fifteen of foot, ten of militia, ten squadrons of hussars, and 12,000 Cossacks, of whom 5,000 were of the Don, 3,000 Zaporavians, and the rest

PREPARATIONS OF THE GRAND ARMY.

101

from the Ukrain; so that, on the whole, the army amounted to about 54,000 men. The generals, who served in this campaign under Munich, were the Prince of Hesse Homburg, grand-master of the ordnance, lieutenant-generals Leontew and Ishmaëlow, and major-generals Spiegel, Prince Repnin, Magnus Biron, Stoffeln, Hein, Tarakanow, Lesley, and Aractschew.

The regiments were served with an allowance of two months' bread, and the officers had orders to provide themselves for at least that time. The marshal would gladly have taken with him a greater quantity of provisions for the army. There had been store enough laid in during the winter, but there was a deficiency of transport for more. Yet the marshal would not for that delay the opening of the campaign, but left the care of this concern to lieutenant-general Prince Troubeltzkoi, with orders to send him on large convoys as soon as ever he could procure draught-beasts, and follow them himself. Several regiments that, having had their winter-quarters at too great a distance from the frontier, could not arrive time enough at the rendezvous of the grand army, were ordered to escort the convoys. But the Prince Troubeltzkoi, far from seconding the marshal's ardour, acted so remissly and with so much slowness, that he had not finished every thing when the army got back into the Ukrain. The convoys he did send were too scanty to suffice for the subsistence of the army, which suffered greatly by famine, as will hereafter appear. Another great reason that determined Munich to take the field at once, was, that never having made war in that country, he knew nothing of the Crimea but what he had learnt from the Cossacks, who had been there in the course of their trade*, and he believed

* A trade in cattle. Its fertility was as a grazing country.

H 3

102

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

that as it was an extremely fertile country, the army
would, as soon as it arrived there, find subsistence enough
in the enemy's territories, without needing adventitious
supplies.

The army was divided into five columns. The general
Spiegel led the first, which constituted the vanguard, with
three regiments of infantry, three regiments of dragoons,
and a part of the light troops. The Prince of Hesse
Homburg led the second; lieutenant-general Leontew,
the third; lieutenant-general Ishmaëlow, the fourth; and
major-general Tarakanow, the fifth.

The marshal for the most part marched at the head of
the vanguard. Four of these columns were separate from
each other about the distance of a march. The general
Tarakanow followed more slowly, not having got to the
rendezvous at the time the others set out. The army
pursued its march along the Dnieper, or at only a small
distance from that river, till near Kamenoï Saton, opposite
to Setz, the capital of the Zaporavian Cossacks. It was
there that the four first columns assembled, on the 10th of
May.

The army made five more marches still without seeing
anything of the enemy. At length, on the 17th of May,
being encamped on the small river Drouschka, a party of
as near as could be guessed 100 men showed themselves
at about half a league's distance from the advanced posts.
The Cossacks instantly pursued them, but could not
overtake one. The next day, a more considerable body
of the enemy approached the right wing of the army, and
again retired without so much as coming to a skirmish with
the Cossacks.

May 19.—The marshal sent off five detachments, each
composed of 400 dragoons, and 150 Cossacks; and as this
country is one vast plain, these detachments had orders to

FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE TARTARS.

103

march at certain distances, within view of each other, and
to close up to that one which was nearest the enemy,
should he appear. General Spiegel had all these divisions
under his command. They had not advanced above two
leagues before they met with a party of about 200 Nogay
Tartars, who fled the instant that they saw them from afar;
but the Cossacks overtook them, killed some, and made
two prisoners. The general, having orders to get as near
the enemy as he could, had hardly proceeded two
leagues farther, before he was obliged to unite all the de-
tachments as quickly as possible. A body of 20,000 men
appeared advancing rapidly upon him. Spiegel had but
just time to form a square of his dragoons, ordering the
first rank to dismount, when he found himself entirely
surrounded. The enemy attacked with the most horrid
yells, and poured a cloud of arrows on him. The dragoons,
without being in the least disconcerted, reserved their fire,
never discharging their pieces but when they were sure of
their mark. This kept the Tartars in such awe, that they
durst not approach within 100 paces of the square. They
contented themselves with harassing the troops on all
sides, firing off some carbines, and letting fly a prodigious
quantity of arrows. Marshal Munich, being apprised of
the danger in which general Spiegel was, put himself at
the head of 3000 dragoons and 2000 Cossacks, and marched
directly with general Leontew, to his relief. The colonel
Dewitz, with ten companies of grenadiers and picquets of
all the foot, followed close after. As soon as the enemy
saw them approach they retreated with precipitation,
leaving above 200 dead upon the spot. Spiegel had stood
their attack for above six hours together and had not
above fifty killed and wounded; among these last were
he himself and colonel Weisbach. The greater part of
the wounds were from arrows.

H 4

104

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

This action produced a great effect on both sides. The Tartars began to stand more in awe of the Russians than they had done, while these on the other hand conceived a hearty contempt for their enemies; and this first impression greatly contributed to the victories which they afterwards gained over the latter in the course of this war.

It was ascertained from the prisoners, that the Khan with his whole army consisting of above 100,000 men, was encamped at twenty leagues distance from this spot, and that the body which had retreated was commanded by the Kalga Sultan.* He had been sent to reconnoitre the Russians, of whose march the Khan had been apprised only ten days before.

The army all advanced to the field of Spiegel's battle, the name of which was Czernaia Dolina, or Black-Soil.† Here they encamped. On May 21st, for the first time, they marched in form of a hollow square, having the baggage in the middle; and this order was observed during the whole war, whenever the army found itself near the enemy. Some more prisoners, whom the Cos-sacks took, confirmed the statement that the army of the enemy was at least 100,000 strong; adding withal, that all the inhabitants of the Crimea had been obliged to take up arms for the defence of their lines. The army encamped at a place called Tatarskie Kolodesi, which signifies the Tartars' Wells. There is no brook for above four leagues round; but on digging the earth, you find

* The Kalga Sultan is the title of the generalissimo of the Tartars of the Crimea. It is the first post in that country; the Khan generally be-stows it on his brother, or the nearest of his relations, and the Kalga Sultan commonly succeeds to the Khan. (Note of the French editor.)

† Patches of the black mould appear here and there in the midst of the limestone surface of the steppes of southern Russia.

MUNICH SUMMONS PEREKOP.

103

very good water at no 'more than a foot from the surface.

The army remained a few days in this camp. On the 24th, the Cossacks intercepted two couriers coming from Constantinople, upon whom were found some letters from the Grand Vizier to the Khan, in which he absolutely denied him all hope of receiving any succours during that campaign. There were even some expressions of anger against the Tartars for having brought this new war upon the Porte.

On the 26th of May, the army made a march of six French leagues, and encamped on the small river Kallantschi. Scarce had it marched out of its former camp, when the square was surrounded by Tartars, who attacked them on all sides, with hideous cries. The Russians fired no small arms at them, but used their field-pieces with such effect, that the first shots killed a great number. This struck such terror into them, that they fled in a hurry, and took shelter behind the lines.

On the 28th, the army pitched its camp within cannon-shot of Perekop. The two following days were employed in erecting batteries, and on the completion of these they began to bombard the town.

As soon as the army had arrived near the lines, Munich sent a letter to the Khan, acquainting him that he was sent on the part of the empress, to punish the Tartars for the frequent incursions they had made into the Ukrain, that he was proceeding to execute this order, and lay all the Crimea waste; but nevertheless if the Khan would put himself under the protection of her imperial majesty, receive a Russian garrison in Perekop, and bind himself to acknowledge the sovereignty of Russia, he would immediately enter into a negotiation, and cease from all hostilities; but that the surrender of the town of Perekop

106

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

was an indispensable preliminary. In answer to this
letter the Khan, on the 30th, sent a Mirza, or Tartar
gentleman, to Munich, to represent to him that no war
having been declared, he was astonished that they should
come to attack him in his own country; that the Tartars of
the Crimea had never made any irruption into Russia; that
if any such there had been, it must have been committed
by the Nogays, who, though they had long been under
the sovereignty of the Tartars of the Crimea, had never
been amenable to order; that to these guilty parties
Russia ought to confine her resentment, and punish them
at her pleasure, of which, in fact, a beginning had been
made the last year. He added, that as to himself, he
was too much hampered with the court of Constantinople
to be able to break with it; and that as to Perekop,
were he even willing to surrender it, the garrison there
would not consent, consisting as it did of Turks and
being independent of his orders. Meanwhile he entreated
the marshal that he would suspend hostilities, as he was
ready to enter into immediate negotiation; and he ended
by declaring that if attacked he would defend himself as
well as he was able.

The marshal finding there was nothing to be done with
these Tartars except sword in hand, sent the Mirza back
with the reply, that since his master would not acknow-
ledge the favour shown him by the court of Russia,
in offering these mild terms, he would soon see his
country pillaged, and his town burnt; and that Tartar
faith was too well known to be trusted on the bare pro-
posal of a negotiation. The messenger being dispatched,
the marshal ordered the army to hold itself in readiness for
marching.

As soon as the tattoo was beat, the regiments stood to
their arms, and marched. None were left in the camp but

MUNICH FORCES THE LINES.

107

the sick, and ten men from each company to guard the baggage. The army marched by its right in six columns. The 1500 men that had been told off for the batteries had 1000 added to them, with orders to approach the right * of the lines, and to make a false attack an hour before daybreak to draw the attention of the enemy to that side. The army marched all night in profound silence. They rested about an hour, waiting the break of day, at about a quarter of a league's distance from the lines. The Tartars, who had known nothing of the march of the army, and who had directed the greatest part of their forces to the side of the false attack, were much surprised when they saw the Russian army formed in six columns, in order of battle, on their left.

The Russian troops marched with a proud bearing to the attack. The fire of the enemy was at first extremely brisk; and the soldiers were a little astonished on coming to the side of the ditch, to find it so deep and so broad; but as it was dry they threw themselves into it, and, pressing on, assisted one another to clamber with their pikes and bayonets; the artillery, in the mean while, keeping up a constant fire against the parapet. The Tartars, seeing how serious the affair began to be, did not wait for the soldiers mounting to the top, but betook themselves to flight, abandoning their camp, which indeed was poorly enough provided. There did not then remain any the least impediment to the troops passing the lines, which are extraordinary works, as may be judged by the following summary description.

Their length is about seven wersts, or near two French leagues, extending from the sea of Azoph, or *Palus Mæotis*, to the Black Sea. There is but one entrance,

* This would be the proper right of the fortifications of Perekop, i. e. the nearest point to the Siwasch.

108

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

viz. by the main road to the town of Perekop, and this is included in the lines. Along the lines there are six towers of stone, mounted with cannon. The ditch is twelve toises broad, and seven deep. The height from the bottom of the ditch to the crest of the parapet is seventy feet, and the thickness of the parapet is in proportion. Five thousand men had, for several years together, been at work to put the lines into this condition, and the Tartars imagined them impregnable. True it is, that any other troops than they might have made the passing them very difficult; and yet the entry into the Crimea would not have been the less practicable, had they not been passed. For it was afterwards discovered, that the arm of the sea of Azoph joining to these lines*, dries up in summer, so as not to have above three feet of water; so that the lines may be turned. The count Lacy entered the Crimea on that side, the two campaigns following.†

The towers which, as I just remarked, are along the lines, still retained their garrison, consisting of janissaries. That which was nearest to the army kept up a fire of cannon, and killed some of the Russians. Upon this, Munich ordered the Prince of Hesse Homburg to send an officer with a detachment to storm it. The captain of the grenadiers ‡ of the regiment of Petersburg, happening to be near the prince when he received the order, requested to be sent on this service. The prince granted his request, and he marched with sixty men of his company. The gate was forced open with hatchets, not-

* The Siwasch.

† The French justifies the translation, being "les deux compagnes suivantes," but this is no doubt an inaccurate expression; for in 1737, Lacy, according to Manstein, entered the Crimea by the spit of Arabat. In 1738, he really did cross the Siwasch in the part here referred to.

‡ Manstein, the author of these Memoirs. (Note of the French editor.)

CAPITULATION OF PEREKOP.

109

withstanding the fire of the Turks, and the captain entering with his men, offered quarter to the enemy. They accepted it, and were beginning to lay down their arms, when a grenadier giving a stroke with his bayonet to a janissary, the other Turks, irritated at this action, seized their sabres again and stood to their defence. They killed six grenadiers, and wounded sixteen including the captain; in revenge for which, the whole 160, that constituted the garrison of this tower, were massacred to a man. Those in the other towers were wiser; they fled in time, and followed the Tartars. The whole of this day cost the Russian army only one officer and thirty rank and file killed, and one officer and 176 rank and file wounded. The marshal then sent for a working party of 2000, who opened the lines in several parts to allow the baggage to pass and join the army, which encamped on the other side. General Tarakanoff, with the regiments of militia which he had under his orders, entered the camp which the army had left the night before.*

Munich next ordered the Bashaw, the commandant of Perekop, to be summoned to surrender the place. He asked a truce of twenty-four hours to consider of it, which was granted him; and on the 1st of June, he sent two officers to the marshal, to demand a free passage out with his garrison to go and join the Khan of Tartary. But it was insisted upon, that they should surrender as prisoners of war. However upon his refusal to do this, it was promised him, after several parleys, that he should be escorted to the nearest seaport, and be embarked there with his garrison and attendants for Turkey, upon engaging not to serve against the Russians for two years to come. But this capitulation was not observed. On coming out

* The last two sentences are found only in the French edition.

110

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

of the town, the commandant with his whole garrison of 2554 men, were made prisoners of war; and when he complained of this treatment, he was told for answer, that the Porte and the Khan had detained above 200 Russian merchants, contrary to the stipulation made in the last treaty, and that he and his men would not be released till those were set at liberty.

The place of the Turkish garrison was now supplied by 800 grenadiers. Count Munich took up his quarters in the town, the magazines in which were not over well provided. There were found sixty cannon in the place and in the towers, some with the Russian arms upon them, which had been lost in the unfortunate expedition that Prince Galitzin had made into the Crimea the century before. The town of Perekop contains about 800 houses, the greatest part of which are of wood; the streets are, as in all Turkish towns, very narrow; the walls are flanked with towers, built in the ancient manner of fortification, but of a kind of bad sandstone that crumbles away at the first cannon shot. In short, Perekop was in no condition to stand a siege of long duration.

The marshal put the regiment of Beloser into the town, and made Dewitz, colonel of that regiment, commandant of the place. He left him besides 600 Cossacks, and made the other requisite dispositions for holding the lines.

On the 4th of June, Lieutenant-general Leontew was detached with 10,000 regulars, and 3000 Cossacks, toward Kinburn, a small fortified town near the mouth of the Dnieper, opposite to Ockzakow, with orders to take it, and hinder the Tartars of Budziack from passing that river.*

* At this time there was a ferry across from Ockzakow. Tott describes the distance as being more than two leagues; of which all but a small space in the middle was performed by punting. It took him three hours to get over. (Mémoires, vol. ii. p. 88.)

RUSSIAN COUNCIL OF WAR HELD.

111

On the same day, the marshal held a council of war upon the operations to be resolved on for the remainder of the campaign. The opinion of almost all the generals was, to encamp with the army near Perekop until the end of the campaign, and only to send parties into the country to lay it waste. But Munich, whose mind was set upon nothing less than the conquest of the Crimea, did not relish this advice. He urged upon the others that they would gain nothing by that; that the reduction of Perekop would be of no service if they did not pursue their victory; that it was dangerous to send out small parties, as they could not penetrate any considerable way into the country without being cut off or defeated. The generals represented, on the other hand, that the army not having bread for above twelve days, there was a necessity for at least awaiting the arrival of the first convoys with provisions. To this Munich rejoined, that as the army was in an enemy's country, it was but right to endeavour to subsist it at his expense; that the chief advantage which the court of Russia could derive from the campaign was, that they should not give those robbers a moment's breathing-time, but should ruin their whole country, if it were not found practicable to effect a more solid settlement in it. At the same time, he ordered the army to be ready for marching the next day. From this moment marshal Munich and the Prince of Hesse Homburg ceased to be friends; and the conduct of the prince, during this campaign and the ensuing one, did him little honour.

It was on the 5th of June that the marshal left the neighbourhood of Perekop to penetrate into the interior of the Crimea. The Tartars had entirely surrounded the army, (which kept on constantly marching in a square,) and harassed it incessantly but always at a good distance; and if they approached within cannon-shot, it was only

112

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

firing a few rounds at them, and they presently took to
flight.

On June the 8th, they might have gained a great ad-
vantage over the Russians, if they had but known how to
avail themselves of the opportune moment. The army
marching on the road to Koslov*, arrived at an arm of the
sea called Baltshick, which it was necessary to pass.
They had no bridge; but the Cossacks discovered several
fords by which the army passed, and this made an opening
of more than 1500 paces in the square. On the Tartars
seeing this, a troop of about 200 horse broke into it at full
speed; but instead of charging the troops, they went
straight to the baggage for plunder, while their main
army, which was not above a cannon-shot distant, re-
mained tranquil spectators. This inaction gave time to
the Russians to close their ranks again, and enclose the
enemy, of whom a part were killed, but the rest had
courage enough to cut their way out.

On the 9th, the army halted. The marshal having
notice that the enemy were encamped at not more than
three leagues from him, detached in the evening all the
grenadiers of the army, 1500 dragoons, and 2000 Cossacks
of the Don, under major-general Hein, with orders to
march on through the night, using all possible precautions,
and to try to surprise the enemy at break of day.

If any other than general Hein had been pitched upon
for this expedition, it would in all probability have suc-
ceeded, and the best part of the enemy's army have been
destroyed; but this man, instead of hastening his march,
amused himself half the night with parading his troops,
and then proceeded very slowly. The Cossacks of the
Don who had gone on in advance, fell, by break of day,
upon the camp of the Tartars, whom they found for the

* Eupatoria.

RUSSIAN SEVERITY IN PUNISHING.

113

most part asleep, and immediately put to the sword all that came in their way. In the mean time, the alarm spreading through the camp of the enemy, they mounted and rode out, and seeing they had none but Cossacks to deal with, they attacked them in their turn, and obliged them to retreat with considerable loss; indeed they would have totally defeated them, had they not perceived the advance of the detachment under general Hein. At the sight of these troops they themselves fled, and abandoned their camp, with a great quantity of forage and a number of tents.

The marshal had begun his march with the whole army at the first break of day; and coming up, he pitched his camp on the ground which the enemy had just quitted. The loss had been nearly equal on both sides, of about 300 men each; and the chief difference was, that the enemy had lost several officers of distinction. Hein, who had failed to execute the marshal's orders, was put under arrest, and tried by a court-martial, which condemned him to be degraded from his rank and nobility, and to serve the rest of his life as a private dragoon in the militia. This sentence was executed to the letter,—a punishment rigorous enough for one single act of cowardice, or perhaps only of stupidity, for want of knowing how to make the proper dispositions; but such strictness is indispensably necessary in Russia, where instances of mildness do not make so much impression as examples of severity, none being accustomed to do any thing except they are compelled to it by force; and this principle obtains so widely, that it is rare to give any instructions to an officer, without adding a string of threats, in the event of his neglecting to execute them.*

* The last clause of the sentence is found only in the French edition.

I

114

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

Though the project of surprising and defeating the Tartars had not altogether succeeded, yet they durst not, after that affair, encamp so near the Russian army, which was several days without seeing them, except in small parties and at a great distance.

The army still continued its march towards Koslov, and on the 15th of June arrived within two leagues of the town, in which they saw a great fire. On the 16th, count Munich detached all the grenadiers of the army, with the Cossacks of the Don, and the Zaporavians, under the command of general Magnus Biron, to attack Koslov. They found the gates of the town open, and all the suburbs burnt; the Tartars having set fire to the greatest part of the houses belonging to the Christian merchants. All the Turkish inhabitants had retreated towards Bacht-schi-Serai, and the Turkish garrison had embarked on board thirty vessels for Constantinople. There remained in the town only about forty Armenian merchants.

Koslov has good stone-walls, flanked with great towers; the ditch is cut into the rock, and of considerable breadth. The port is very good and spacious, capable of containing more than 200 vessels. It is the chief trading town of the Crimea. There are about 2500 houses in it, most of them of stone. It has some fine mosques, and the Christians have a church in the suburb. The Turks commonly keep a garrison of 3000 men in it. The inhabitants had, on their retreat, endeavoured as much as possible to conceal their effects, burying them under ground, or throwing them into wells; but the Cossacks and soldiers soon found them out, and made a very great booty in gold and silver, pearls, rich stuffs, clothes, &c. There was in particular so great a quantity of copper-vessels, that it was impossible to carry them all away. There were, besides, found twenty-one brass cannon, and a pro-

WANT OF WATER IN THE CRIMEA.

115

digious quantity of lead; as also stores of rice and wheat
sufficient to form a magazine for an army much more
numerous than the Russian. Marshal Munich caused
thirty-four days' allowance of these to be distributed to the
whole army, for it had already begun to be in want of
bread.

Water also had been very scanty on the road from
Perekop to Koslov. The Tartars, in their flight from the
villages, not content with consuming and burning all the
provisions, had spoilt the water of the wells, by throwing
every sort of filth into them; and river-water is very
scarce in those countries, there being between Perekop and
Koslov, which is a distance of thirty-five French leagues,
only three streams of fresh water; for in the Crimea
there are lakes of salt water, from which issue rivulets
the water of which is not drinkable. It may easily be
imagined that this caused the troops to suffer a
good deal, and that disease could not fail of becoming
rife among them. But what completed the enfeebling
them was, that the common soldiers, who are not used to
eat other than sour bread made of rye, were obliged to eat
the sweet bread of wheat, which they ground themselves
in handmills that were taken in the villages through
which the army passed, and which they found all reduced
to ashes. The Cossacks had found means to carry off
10,000 sheep, and some hundreds of horned cattle, which
delighted the soldiers extremely, for they had not eaten a
bit of flesh-meat for fifteen days past.

On the 18th of June, major-general Lesly reached the
army, with a convoy of some provisions he had brought
from the Ukrain, under the escort of 2000 men. He
had been attacked on the 17th by the whole army of the
enemy, but he had made so good an use of two field-
pieces which he had taken with him from Perekop, that

12

116

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

the enemy, after having harassed him for four hours together, and lost a great number, was obliged to retreat. The Tartars had come as far as the *chevaux de frise*, so near, that the general killed one of them with his own hand, by a stroke of his sword.

The army remained encamped five days near Koslov, to rest, and to have bread baked. On the 21st, they resumed their march for Bachtschi-Serai, keeping along the shore of the Black Sea.

Since the troops entered the Crimea, they had never found provisions of all kinds in such plenty as now; for the enemy, not having imagined that they would take this road, had destroyed nothing. Munich, to deceive them the more, had had it given out, that he was returning straight to Perekop by another road. The Tartars were deceived by this, and laid waste all the other side of the country.

On the 22nd, the marshal dispatched lieutenant-general Ishmaëlow, and major-general Lesly, with two regiments of dragoons, four regiments of foot, and some Cossacks, to the left of the army, to dislodge the enemy from some villages. They made a greater resistance than had been expected, but at length were forced to take to flight. There was found a great quantity of cattle, which were brought to the army, and distributed to the soldiers. The Russians had, in this affair, an officer, three soldiers, and two Cossacks killed, and a major and twenty men wounded. On the same day, intelligence was got from some prisoners, that the Khan expected 6000 or 7000 Turks, which the Capitan Bashaw was sending him from the fleet, that had arrived in the port of Caffa, after failing to effect any thing against the Russians before Azoph.

On the 27th, the army reached the gorges of the hills that cover the plateau round about Bachtschi-Serai. The

BACHTSHI-SERAI SACKED.

117

enemy was discovered opposite to them, advantageously posted on the eminences. As the road which had to be passed to get to Bachtschi-Serai was extremely difficult, it was necessary to steal a march upon the enemy; the marshal, therefore, resolved to go with none but the flower of his army, leaving all the baggage and the sick, with the rest of the troops, behind, under the orders of major-general Spiegel. As soon as the tattoo was beat in the evening, he began his march, and continued it with so much order and celerity, that he turned the position of the enemy without their knowing in the least anything of the matter; and they were much surprised at seeing, at the break of day, the Russians close upon Bachtschi-Serai. A body of Tartars intermixed with janissaries advanced and furiously charged the Cossacks of the Don, and the Wlodimer regiment of foot posted near them; attacking with such vigour that they made the Cossacks give way, and took a cannon of the infantry regiment; but the marshal causing five other regiments to advance, with some pieces of cannon, under major-general Lesly, the enemy could not long stand the fire, but fled, and left behind them the field-piece which they had taken.

After the retreat of the enemy, Munich sent one fourth of the army into the town, to plunder it, while the rest remained under arms. All the inhabitants had quitted their houses, and carried off the best of their effects into the mountains; but notwithstanding there was still a considerable booty made.

Bachtschi-Serai signifies the Garden-palace, and is the usual residence of the Khan of the Crimea. It is situate in a deep valley, and contains about 2000 houses, of which one third belong to Christians of the Greek rite, who have a church there. Here is also a mission of Jesuits; but as they had been obliged to follow the Khan,

13

118

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

their dwelling and library were as little spared as the
other houses. The palace of the Khan, which contained
several spacious buildings, tolerably handsome and very
clean, was, as well as the whole town, reduced to ashes.
[It had no fortification.]

As soon as the enemy had been driven from Bachtschi-
Serai, they detached a large body of troops to attack
general Spiegel and the baggage-train. They found the
Cossacks of the Ukrain outside the camp, busy in
foraging. These they attacked, and gained some advantage
over them, killing 200 and making some prisoners; but
they could make no impression on the regulars; they
several times attacked the barricades formed with the
baggage-waggons, but were always repulsed with loss, so
that at length they abandoned their enterprise.

The army quitted the neighbourhood of Bachtschi-Serai,
on June the 29th, and encamped on the river Alma, where
it was joined by the baggage.

On July the 3rd the marshal detached lieutenant-
general Ishmaëlow and major-general Biron, with 8000
regulars, 2000 Cossacks, and ten pieces of cannon, to
attack the town of Ach-Metzid*, or Sultan-Seraï (this
last signifies the palace of the Sultan), which is the resi-
dence of the Kalga Sultan, and of the principal Mirzas.
They found hardly any one in it, the inhabitants having
quitted it two days before. All the provisions were carried
to the camp; and the town itself, which contained about
1800 houses, mostly of wood, was reduced to ashes. The
enemy attacked this detachment on its return, and met
with the usual reception. The Russians had four soldiers
and six Cossacks killed, and a few wounded.

* Simferopol. The Tartar name *Akmetshet* is equivalent to the English *Whitchurch*. For the Kalga Sultan, see the note on p. 104.

MUNICH RETURNS TO PEREKOP.

119

Since that day, the army never saw the enemy but at a distance and in small parties. A Georgian, who had made his escape from slavery, brought advice, that the Turks had retreated on Caffa, and the Tartars into the mountains, in the resolution not to trouble themselves any longer to no purpose in disputing the passes, but only to have small parties of observation follow the Russian army.

Hitherto the army had constantly kept the road to Caffa, and the marshal would have been very glad to make himself master of it, and occupy it permanently, but the army was visibly diminishing; a third of it was sick, and the rest so weak, that they could hardly drag their legs after them. I have above mentioned some of the reasons of this, to which may be added the heat, which is excessive in the Crimea during this season, so that it was decided to return to Perekop, to give the troops rest during the height of the warm weather.

The enemy had laid the whole country waste round Caffa, and burnt all the villages, to deprive the Russians of subsistence,—a measure they much repented, when they saw the latter take the road to Perekop.

On July 17th, the army encamped near Perekop, and were extremely rejoiced at finding biscuit for fifteen days there. This the major-general Arachtschew had brought from the Ukrain, together with two regiments of dragoons. On this occasion a good number of sutlers arrived, with wine and other provisions, and the troops, after all the fatigues they had undergone, saw something like abundance in the camp.

On the 18th, colonel Wedell arrived, with a reinforcement of three regiments of dragoons, who had been stationed upon the Don, and under their escort came another convoy of provisions, although but an inconsider-

I 4

120

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

able one. Forage being very scarce within the lines,
Wedell had orders to encamp in the steppe, six leagues
off Perekop. The marshal, on his arrival there, received
advice from general Leontew, that he had, with his body
of troops, advanced to near Kinburn, whence he had sent
an aide-de-camp to summon the commandant, who imme-
diately entered into negotiation, and surrendered the
place upon condition of being allowed to retire to Ock-
zakow with his garrison, consisting of 2000 janissaries.
The taking this town therefore did not cost Russia a
single man; and, indeed, in the whole expedition, there
had not been above three or four men killed in any one
skirmish. Two hundred and fifty Russians, detained in
slavery at Kinburn, were delivered up; and in the town
there were found forty-nine brass cannon, and 3000
horses.

The Cossacks, under the orders of Leontew, had carried
off 30,000 sheep, and 400 or 500 horned cattle, which
the inhabitants had concealed in a wood.* After the re-
duction of Kinburn Leontew remained quiet, with his
troops encamped under the fort, having nothing for them

* By this expression is probably meant the brushwood which grows along the sides of the ravines which intersect the steppe, and run generally in a direction from north to south. Tott, who went through Kinburn to Perekop, which was the regular road into the Crimea at that time, (1767), passed the first night he spent in Bessarabia in such a ravine, and gives a most interesting description of the Tartar camp which he found in it. (Mémoires, vol. ii. pp. 67. seqq.) These ravines are, in fact, the water-courses, by which the snow-water drains off the steppe. They are about a quarter of a mile broad, and sometimes sixty or seventy miles long, sunk thirty or forty feet below the surface. At the bottom, even in the summer, there is often a succession of pools of stagnant water, which, disgusting as it is to the eye, is a most precious boon to the shepherds in the violent heats. The opportunity which such ravines give for the surprising an enemy ignorant of their existence is obvious. At a few hundred yards off their existence would not be suspected.

SUMMER FORDS ACROSS THE SIWASCH.

121

to do; as neither Turks nor Tartars of Budziack attempted to pass the Dnieper.

The Turkish garrison of Perekop, made prisoners as above mentioned*, who had been carried with the army throughout its march, were sent to the Ukrain under a strong escort; for the Khan not having released the Russian merchants whom he kept prisoners against the stipulations of the last treaty, the court of Petersburg thought it had a right to use reprisals with this garrison.

Upon advices which the marshal received, that the arm of the Sea of Azoph, adjoining the lines of Perekop, was fordable in many places, and that the Tartars were, by that way, sending strong detachments to attack the redoubts, which had been constructed in the steppe in order to facilitate the communications with the Ukrain, and the arrival of the convoys from thence, he sent general Spiegel, with five regiments of dragoons and 2000 Cossacks, to hinder the enemy from getting out of the Crimea, and to make an exact survey of the fords. But notwithstanding all the precautions that the marshal could take these brigands found means, from time to time, to carry off horses and cattle from the army, especially after its return to Perekop; for the forage failing all round the camp, they were obliged to send the horses to the other side of the lines, at a distance of six leagues from the camp. This, it is true, was never done but under a good guard, and yet the Tartars surprised several, and in fifteen days carried off more than as many hundred horses. Light parties were often sent after them, but there was no overtaking them.

To economise the provisions and forage, which became every day more and more scarce, the Zaporavian Cossacks,

* Page 109.

122

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

and those of the Ukrain, were allowed to return home. The former had orders to send out frequent reconnaissances in the direction of Ockzakow and Bender, to get intelligence of the designs of the Turks, and of the strength of their army.

The marshal having represented to the court the impossibility of maintaining his ground in the Crimea, received orders to return into the Ukrain with his army. To facilitate his march, he detached major-general Biron, with six regiments of dragoons and 2000 Cossacks of the Don, to escort the sick.

On August 25th, 3000 men were ordered to raze the lines in several places, and to demolish the towers. There were also mines made under the walls of Perekop. On the 27th all the artillery and the garrison were withdrawn from the place, and on the 28th, in the morning, the Russian army moved out of the Crimea, marching in two columns. About an hour afterwards, the mines were sprung, and threw down a part of the walls, and some houses of the town.

The army marched on very quietly, from its leaving the Crimea, till the 27th of September, when it arrived on the banks of the Samara*, without the enemy having once dared to attack them. They were too much delighted at seeing themselves rid of such troublesome guests, and had, besides, too much to do to get themselves into something like order again, to think of molesting the Russians in their retreat.

On Sept. 2nd, general Leontew rejoined the army, with the body of troops under his command, and brought to it 20,000 out of the 30,000 sheep he had taken. They were distributed among the army. Spiegel, who had been sent to hinder the Tartars from passing the fords of the Siwasch

* This river is that which falls into the Dnieper from the East, at Ekaterinoslav.

LOSSES OF MUNICH'S ARMY.

123

had orders to march direct to Backmout, and to reconnoitre
the ground thoroughly, in order to ascertain whether it
was easier to march into the Crimea by that way, or along
the Dnieper. The conclusion was, that they would not
only be gainers in point of distance, but that the stations
would be more convenient in the matter of wood and
water. Accordingly marshal Lacy, who commanded the
expeditions into the Crimea in the two following campaigns,
took that route. Spiegel was attacked once only upon
his march, and having repulsed the enemy with a con-
siderable loss, they durst not repeat the experiment.

The marshal having arrived at the river Samara, re-
viewed all his regiments, and found those that had gone
through the march into the Crimea with him terribly
crippled. All of them had been complete * at the opening
of the campaign, and now there was not one that could
muster 600 men under arms, so that one half of this army
had perished in one campaign; and what is more remarka-
ble, not 2000 had been killed [or taken] by the enemy, in-
cluding even the loss of the Cossacks. There were none
but the body of troops detached under lieutenant-general
Leontew that were in unimpaired condition, and he had
had no loss, having remained quiet in his camp at Kinburn
after the capture of that town.

The regiments were sent back into winter-quarters in
the Ukrain, but care was taken so to distribute them, that
they could assemble at the shortest warning, in case of the
Tartars attempting an invasion of the Russian territory in
the winter.

* A regiment of foot at that time had two battalions, and was composed of 1280 rank and file; and with the officers, non-commissioned officers, &c. amounted to 1575 men. The complement of a regiment of dragoons, including officers, non-commissioned officers and privates, was 1231. (Note of the French editor.)

124

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

While marshal Munich had been engaged in the Crimea, general Lacy had carried on the siege of Azoph, of which I shall here set down the most remarkable particulars.

Munich having quitted the body of troops which was to carry on this siege, general Lewaschew, being left in command till the arrival of Count Lacy, increased the stringency of the blockade, and took particular care to fortify his camp, so as to be at his ease with regard to any attack from the besieged; their garrison being at the least as numerous as the regular troops the Russians had before the place.

On April 14th, 300 horse and as many foot of the garrison made a sortie to carry off a convoy of 150 waggons, that were escorted by only a lieutenant and 100 men; but this officer, seeing from a good distance the Turks coming towards him, formed a retrenchment of these waggons, and defended himself so well for more than two hours, that he gave the Cossacks time to come to his assistance, and the enemy was driven back to the town again.

The besiegers, not discouraged by this bad success, ventured two days afterwards another sally with 1000 janissaries and 500 horse, and attacked the redoubts which had been built to blockade the place. Their cavalry fell impetuously on the Cossacks of the Don, posted between the redoubts, while the janissaries attacked one of these with all imaginable bravery, but they were several times repulsed, and at length put to flight, and pursued up to the glacis. The enemy lost above 100 men in this affair, together with the commanding officer of the party. The besiegers had in all but seventeen men killed and wounded.

On May 6th, almost the whole garrison sallied out of the town to attack the Russian army. The general, who

LACY ARRIVES BEFORE AZOPH.

125

had received previous information, posted the Cossacks of the Don in an ambuscade, where they waited till the greatest part of the enemy had passed; and then, rushing out on a sudden, they attacked them at once in flank and rear, overthrew all in their way, and obliged them to fly for shelter to their walls, with a considerable loss. After this encounter, the besieged remained quiet for some time. At last on the 15th, general Lacy arrived in the camp before Azoph, having narrowly escaped being taken by the Tartars.

This general, whom the empress had, in the month of February, raised to the rank of marshal, had commanded the auxiliary troops sent to the Emperor of Germany. These he had orders to quit, and repair to Azoph in order to take charge of the siege. To accelerate his arrival at the army, he had taken but a small escort of Cossacks, who rode before his post-chaise, at some hundreds of paces distant. In the way from the lines of the Ukrain to Izioum, it is necessary to pass a steppe about three French leagues broad. The escort was attacked by a party of Tartars, who were hovering in the neighbourhood, and all the Cossacks dispersed or taken, so that the marshal had scarcely time to save himself on horseback. He owed his escape as it was purely to the Tartars being unable to resist the desire of pillaging his carriage; for without the help of the delay so caused, it would have been impossible for him to have got off from them.

On the same day that Lacy arrived before Azoph, the trenches were opened, and pushed on with great spirit. The generals, who commanded under the marshal, were general Lewaschew, lieutenant-general count Douglass, and major-generals Brigny the elder, Brilly, Sparreuter, and Brigny the younger.

On May 19th, the vice-admiral Bredal, who had come

126

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

down the Don with fifteen galleys, nine prahms, and a great number of other vessels, arrived off Azoph, having the battering train on board, which was immediately landed. The same day a reinforcement of four regiments of foot and two of dragoons arrived in camp. On the 20th, major-general Brigny was ordered with 400 foot, and 150 Cossacks, to seize a post near the entrenchment that covered the town. He succeeded, and made a lodgment there. Upon this, the enemy made a sally with 300 horse, and 500 janissaries, to retake the position. They attacked with such fury, that the detachment of the besiegers was obliged to retreat, with some loss; but Brigny being reinforced in time, the enemy were in their turn repulsed, with a considerable number of men killed. After the artillery was landed, the marshal ordered the vice-admiral Bredal to post himself with his flotilla in such a manner as to batter the town on the side towards the water. This order was admirably executed; the prahms never ceased, night or day, battering the place and throwing bombs into it.

The Turkish fleet, under the Capitan Bashaw Dgianum Codja, entered the Palus Mæotis*, to succour Azoph, but could undertake nothing, the mouth of the Don being almost entirely barred with sands and shoals, so that in the deepest places there were not above three or four feet water; whereas the Russian fleet was so advantageously posted, that the Capitan Bashaw could not send any the least assistance to Azoph, either in shallops or other flat-bottomed vessels, and consequently was obliged to return without doing anything. It is, however, these shoals at the mouth of the Don that were the cause of the Russian

* The Sea of Azoph. Both the French and English edition have this Latin title, which is the more remarkable from the use of the ordinary name in the course of the paragraph.

SIEGE OF AZOPH CONTINUED.

127

fleet's not acting more effectively on the Sea of Azoph; as there was no getting any vessels into it, except double sloops and other small flat-bottomed vessels, with which admiral Bredal assisted in the two next campaigns, as will be shown in the sequel.

Lacy, willing to spare his men, had the works carried on only by sap, and this he continued till the 13th of June. In the meanwhile the besieged made several sallies, but without any effect. On the 14th, the besiegers having advanced to within forty paces of the palisaded line, the Turks made a strong sortie upon them, drove them from the trenches, and filled up a part of their works. Marshal Lacy and general Douglass, having hastened in support with fresh troops, ordered an attack on the enemy, who was not only repulsed, but dispossessed of a post which he had maintained within twenty paces off the palisades. The Russians instantly made a lodgment there, and raised three batteries on the spot. They, however, lost a good many men in this encounter; the marshal himself received a gunshot wound in the thigh, and had a narrow escape of being taken prisoner, as he advanced rather too far to animate his men, when he was surrounded by the Turks.

The enemy, not choosing to leave the besiegers in quiet possession of the post they had taken, made continual sallies; but as they were expected, there was a double guard prepared to receive them; and they were always repulsed, and the lodgment and batteries at length secured.

On June 18th, a bomb-shell fell on one of the largest powder-magazines, situated in the middle of the place. Five mosques, and more than a hundred houses, were thrown down with the explosion, and more than 300 men lost their lives by it.

The work of the sap was continued till the 28th of June,

128

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

when the besiegers found themselves at the foot of the retrenchment, the enemy having disputed the ground with them inch by inch. Lacy, who began to be tired with the length of the siege, ordered colonel Lohman, with 800 grenadiers, 700 fusileers, and a working-party of 600, to force the line. The attack began at midnight; when the besieged defended themselves with great obstinacy, and sprung two mines, which did no damage. They were at last obliged to take to flight, and to abandon some cannon. They were pursued up to the gates of the town, and the besiegers made a lodgment in the retrenchment. The Russians had no more than twenty men killed and sixty wounded.

On the 29th, the Bashaw commandant sent a letter by an officer to the marshal, to request a capitulation; and on the 1st of July, four Turkish officers, deputed by the commandant, arrived in camp to settle the terms. Lacy insisted a good while on the garrison's surrendering as prisoners of war; but the commandant firmly answered, that rather than yield to those conditions, he would bury himself under the ruins of the town; and it was at length agreed to grant him the liberty of coming out of the town with his troops, without, however, military honours, and being conducted to Abskouk, a town belonging to the Grand Signor, under the condition of not serving for the whole next year against Russia. As soon as this capitulation was signed, the commandant gave the Russians possession of a gate, and on the 4th of July, the Bashaw came out of Azoph at the head of his garrison, which consisted of 3463 men, accompanied by 2233 women and children. In the town there were found 291 Christians, who had been made slaves and were now set free. Sixty-three merchants, part Armenians, part Greeks, staid in the town

LACY GOES INTO WINTER QUARTERS.

129

The ramparts were mounted with 137 cannon and 11 mortars of brass, and 26 cannon and 4 mortars of iron. There was also in the town a great quantity of ammunition and muniments of war, but very little provisions, the magazines having been destroyed by the bombs, which had spoiled a great part of the victuals, and so obliged the commandant to give up the place sooner than he would otherwise have done; for the Russians had not as yet forced the palisades of the covered-way, nor made the least breach in the body of the place, though the inside was nothing but a heap of ruins, through the great quantity of shells which had been thrown into it.

After the surrender of the place, marshal Lacy set to work to get it restored to a condition of defence, and remained with the army in the neighbourhood till the beginning of August. General Lewaschew was appointed governor, and the elder Brigny commandant of Azoph. Four thousand men were put into it as a garrison, and it was provided with everything needful.

Lacy, having made all the necessary arrangements, had orders from the court to go with the troops under him to join marshal Munich. He was able to take no more than 7000 men with him. With these he began his march. Having advanced as far as the river Calmius, his vanguard met three Cossacks, who said they belonged to the corps commanded by general Spiegel, with which he was marching to Backmout; that they had lost their way in the steppe, and were endeavouring to rejoin him. The marshal could not believe this account, and ordering the Cossacks to be arrested, pursued his march. The next day four other Cossacks were brought to him, who confirmed the statement, adding, that marshal Munich had, with his army, quitted the Crimea, and was on his way back into the Ukrain; upon which Lacy retraced his

K

130

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

steps. Without this lucky meeting of the Cossacks, he
would have marched on to the Crimea, and with so small
a force as he had with him, have probably run a great risk.
It is this march that was the beginning of the quarrel
between Munich and Lacy.*

In the beginning of October the marshal arrived at
Izioum, and ordered the regiments which composed
his army into winter-quarters at the eastern extremities of
the lines of the Ukrain, at no great distance from the
Donetz. Their quarters were so disposed, that they could
assemble and assist one another at any the least notice of
the approach of the Tartars. Marshal Lacy had his head-
quarters at Charkow.

Scarce had he sent away a part of his troops, when he
had advices that the Tartars had made an incursion within
the frontiers, carried off a number of people and cattle,
and laid several villages in ruins. Upon this he detached
Krasnatschoka, the colonel of the Cossacks, at the Don,
with 2000 Cossacks and Calmucks, to give them chase.
Krasnatschoka marched two days without a moment of
rest. At length, on the third, at break of day, it being
the 27th of October, he came up with a troop of 200
Tartars, between the river of Konskie and Molotschnie-
Wodi, at a place called Waltzien-Bujerak, fell upon them,
killed 170, and made the other thirty prisoners. From
these he learnt, that a more considerable party, with
a brother of the Khan at their head, was in advance
of them. Upon this he resumed his march, and came up
with them about noon of the same day. This troop con-
sisted of 800 men, part Turks, part Tartars. He attacked
and defeated them, killed 300, and took forty-seven
Tartars and three Turks prisoners. All the Russian
subjects that had been slaves, amounting to the number

* The last sentence is only found in the French edition.

CALMUCK INVASION OF THE KUBAN.

131

of 3000 men, were set free, and the Cossacks made
a booty of 400 horses.

The Porte, not being satisfied with the conduct of the
Khan of the Tartars of Crimea, deposed him, and set up
the Kalga-Sultan in his place.

The court of Petersburg, not content with having
attacked the Porte on the side of the Crimea, and with
the capture of Azoph, had a mind to humble the Tartars
of the Kuban still more. For this purpose it sent orders
to Don-Duc-Ombo, chief or prince of the Calmucks who
inhabit the region between Zaritzin and Astrakhan, to
invade them in the beginning of April. Accordingly he
set out on his march with 20,000 of his subjects. A
party, which he had sent to reconnoitre, brought him in a
prisoner. Of him they learnt that 5000 kibitkas, or
moveable huts of the Tartars, each of which contains a
family, had assembled, in order to retire as far as possible
into the steppe, there to settle and put their wives and
children in a place of safety from the Calmucks. Upon
this news Don-Duc-Ombo accelerated his march, and
overtook the Tartars between the rivers of Kuban and
Orp.* They had posted themselves very advantageously,
having formed their waggons in three lines of barricade in
front, by way of intrenchment. But this did not hinder
Don-Duc-Ombo from attacking them. He put his son
Goldan Narma at the head of 10,000 men, and ordered
him to force the enemy's barricades. Goldan marched
straight up to them, and making his men dismount, at-

* By this name is no doubt meant that river which is called by the Nogays Uarp or Arp, and by the inhabitants of the Kabarda, Urup. It is one of the affluents of the Kuban, and falls into the latter by the left bank, about sixty miles below the Greater Indschik, and eighty above the Laba. In order to reach the Tartars in their position, Don-Duc-Ombo must have crossed the Kuban.

K 2

132

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

tacked the Tartars with the greatest bravery. They received him with equal valour; but after two hours' resistance, their defences were at length forced on all sides, and the carnage was great. All the men were massacred; none were spared but the women and children, to the number of about 10,000 souls, and the Calmucks made a considerable booty of cattle. Twenty-four Mirzas, or chiefs of the Tartars, and near 6000 men, were left killed on the field.

Don-Duc-Ombo, after having sent the booty and the
slaves under a good escort to a place of safety, continued
his march to the river Jegorlik*, and encamped there, to
give his people and horses time to refresh themselves.
Some time after, having had advice that the four principal
hordes, amounting to 30,000 tents, had assembled at forty
leagues distance behind certain defiles, where they had
resolved to wait for him, he marched to them with his
troops, and kept the Tartars blocked up for thirty-seven
days, not being strong enough to attack them in the post
they occupied. On the other hand, the Tartars did not
avail themselves of the numerical inferiority of Don-Duc-
Ombo's troops. They were afraid of foregoing their ad-
vantage, and remained behind the defiles, in the hope that
want of provisions would at length oblige the Calmucks to

* The river Jegorlik is an affluent of the Manytsch. It rises in a curious secondary branch of Elbruz, which consists of sandstone upon a limestone, and stretches northwards from the bend of the Kuban to near the source of the Kuma, a distance of nearly 100 miles. This ridge forms the water-shed between the streams that run into the sea of Azoph and those which fall into the Don. On its top is a valley surrounded by hills, through which runs the river Dongusla (Hog's river). The Jegorlik rises on the eastern side of the range, which in the winter is remarkably warm as compared with the western. It falls into the Manytsch after a course first eastward, and afterwards north-eastward, of about fifty miles. From the situation of his camp, it is plain that Don-Duc-Ombo had recrossed the Kuban to the north side.

SUFFERINGS OF MUNICH'S ARMY.

133

retreat. But Don-Duc-Ombo, being reinforced by a large body of Don Cossacks, made the necessary dispositions for forcing the enemy. These had intelligence of his design, and being afraid of losing everything, should they await extremities, deputed some of their principal Mirzas to the Calmuck prince, with a declaration that they would submit to the empire of Russia, and desired him to receive them as subjects of her Imperial Majesty. This request was granted with pleasure. Their Sultan, with 200 Mirzas, repaired to the camp, and took the oath of allegiance, leaving some of their principal men as hostages.

While the Russian armies under the marshals Munich and Lacy had been occupied with the operations in the Crimea and the siege of Azoph, the body of troops which the empress had sent into Germany was brought back by lieutenant-general Keith to the Ukrain. These troops had had their winter-quarters in the empire, and having crossed Bohemia and Poland, they arrived at Kiev at the end of September, and there remained in garrison for the winter.

It will have been remarked in the account I have given of this campaign, that the Turks and Tartars whom the Russian army had to combat, were what it had the least to dread. Hunger, thirst, continual fatigue, marches in the intensest heats of the summer, were things much more fatal to it. And, though I am a great admirer of Count Munich, it is impossible for me to acquit him entirely of the mistakes made in this campaign, which cost Russia nearly 30,000 men. It must be owned that during the preceding winter, he had taken all the pains imaginable to have the magazines well stored; and that it was the fault not of him, but of the commissariat, that he had not carriages sufficient for the provision necessary to the subsistence of the army. It would, however, have been

κ 3

134

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

better to have begun the campaign two months later, or at once to have given up the command of the army, than led so many thousand men into a distant country at the hazard of losing them all, on the bare hope of possibly subsisting them at the expense of the enemy. Add to this, that Munich was too harsh, and unnecessarily fatigued his troops. In the burning heats of summer, instead of making them march in the night, or some hours before day-break, to take advantage of the freshness of that time, the army never used to begin its march till two or three hours after sunrise, which greatly contributed to the distempers that got among the troops; and the suffocating heat and fatigue so overcame them that they often dropped down dead on the march. There were even officers who, in this campaign, died of hunger and misery of all kinds.

But what completed the ruin of the army, was the dissensions and feuds that prevailed among the highest generals. Marshal Munich had, as I before observed, the Prince of Hesse Homburg under his orders, who by no means loved the fatigues of war. This prince, not content with being himself slothful and neglecting the orders given him, stirred up factions in the army. He found fault with all the arrangements that the marshal made, and used to speak slightly of his general before the officers, and even before the common soldiers, expressing his pity of their case every time that they suffered any the least hardships, adding that all this proceeded from the little precaution taken by the general of the army, whose object apparently was to have them all perish with hunger and fatigue. This unworthy conduct, which was owing only to a personal hatred, could not but produce very bad effects in the army. The soldiers did nothing with a good heart; they were discontented at everything, and any the least fatigue made them murmur.

HOSTILITY OF THE PRINCE OF HESSE HOMBURG. 135

The Prince of Hesse carried things yet farther. He found means to gain over to his way of thinking some of the native Russian generals, as also major-general Magnus Biron, cousin to the grand chamberlain*, who had the narrowest of intellects, while the others were not much better. However, the prince often held meetings with them; and when the army was in the Crimea, near Bachtschi-Seraï, he proposed to them, in case of the marshal's intending to march farther, that they should resist his orders, and if he attempted to exert his authority, put him under arrest, and confer the command upon the senior general of the army —that is, himself! His counsellors were, on this occasion, more considerate than he was, representing to him, that it was as much as their heads were worth to dare to attempt such an action; that there could be no convicting marshal Munich of any crime, as they did not know his instructions, so that it would be risking too much to proceed in such a manner against the general of the army; that the most they could do would be to represent to the marshal in writing, that the sick were increasing daily, and that, if better measures were not taken, the whole army would perish. The prince was obliged to give in to this opinion. He wrote however to the court, and secretly dispatched a courier to the grand chamberlain, who sent the original back to Munich. It is easy to judge how much this must have augmented the animosity of the two generals, and how natural it was they should afterwards hate one another mortally. The prince, indeed, often wished to reconcile himself to Munich, and made all possible advances for that purpose; but the marshal never could prevail upon himself to give him any the least mark of friendship. This

* The favourite of the empress.

136

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

went even so far, that, on occasions of meeting, when it
was indispensable to show him some civility, any one
might plainly see by his air that he was doing violence to
himself.

Though Biron had sent the letter of the Prince of Hesse back to Munich, it had nevertheless made some impression at court and on the ministry, among whom the marshal did not want for enemies. It was there resolved to have his conduct examined by a council of war, of which marshal Lacy was to be the president. But Lacy desired to be excused, and the affair stopped there. By great good luck for count Munich, his most inveterate enemy count Loewenwolde, the grand equerry, had died towards the end of the year 1735, or else he would not have come off so well.

During the winter marshal Munich went to Petersburg, where he found means to re-establish his credit, which had suffered a considerable decline in his absence. To the empress he cleared himself so thoroughly, that far from blaming him, she made him a present of some fine lands in the Ukrain, which had reverted to the crown on the death of count Weisbach. As to the Prince of Hesse, he was never able to retrieve this false step; on the contrary, by one blunder after another, he came at last to be hated and despised by all the world.

The manner of marching observed by the Russians in their campaigns against the Turks was singular. As soon as the general had notice of the enemy not being far off, the army formed into one or more squares with the baggage in the middle. Such an order of march would be practicable nowhere but in such deserts as those of that country, which is one whole plain, with very few defiles. In ten leagues of ground there is perhaps but one hillock to go up or one ravine to descend. Besides,

DIFFICULTIES OF THE STEPPES.

137

there is no necessity for keeping the road, so that the thing is easy enough. But then the baggage and provisions which the army is obliged to carry along with it is proportionately embarrassing; for, as there is no town in the whole country between the Ukrain and the Crimea, except the capital of the Zaporavians (which is not equal to a good village), it is absolutely indispensable to provide every necessary for the whole campaign, and this to such an extent, that it is sometimes requisite to carry water and fuel from one place of encampment to the next. It will then be easily conceived, that the baggage-train of such an army must be immense. I am very clear that I do not exaggerate in averring, that never did the army under count Munich take the field without having 90,000 carriages in its train, especially after learning by experience the difficulty of subsisting at the expense of the enemy. The mention of such a prodigious quantity of carriages may stagger the belief of the reader, but I can easily explain the matter. For an army of 80,000 men, there was transport required for six months provision of flour; and this alone took up 40,000 carriages.* The baggage of each regiment employed at least 250. Add those for the use of the generals, of the irregular

* These carriages were not the arabas now in common use in the steppes of Southern Russia, but a vehicle drawn by a single horse. It carried about 25 poods, i. e. 900 pounds avoirdupois. Jonas Hanway, who travelled in Russia seven years after Munich's campaign, describes these carriages as being "9 or 10 feet long, and 2 or 3 broad, and principally composed of two strong poles, supported by four wheels of near an equal size, and about as high as the fore wheels of our ordinary coaches, but made very slight: many of the rounds of the wheels are of a single piece of wood, and open in one part for near an inch, and some of them are not shod with iron." The ration seems to have been two pounds and a half of flour daily, which makes the quantity mentioned in the text exactly enough for 180 days.

138

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

troops, and of the artillery train, with 7000 or 8000 sutlers and victuallers, and I leave any one to judge whether I have exceeded the bounds of truth. Certain it is, that without this terrible incumbrance, the campaigns of Munich would not have been so fatiguing, and Russia might have derived greater advantages from them. One of the circumstances, indeed, in favour of the army was, that there was no need of providing forage, the Russian horses being accustomed to be at grass all the summer, and the steppes or deserts through which they had to pass affording the best herbage in the world. The country is one of the finest in Europe, and a great pity it is that it remains uncultivated for want of wood and water. One may sometimes go four or five leagues together without seeing so much as the smallest bush or the least rivulet, which caused the necessity of carrying wood for cooking from one camping-ground to another, in the uncertainty of finding any. Every company also constantly carried a large cask of water for the soldiers to drink by the way. There was besides another use for such casks. Every regiment was obliged to have with it eight or ten of them, with as many thick planks; of which bridges* were occasionally made, to pass the infantry and the lighter carriages, and pontoons were only used for the heavier baggage and the cavalry.

In two places of these deserts, there are found traces of towns that once existed there; the one called Samara, the other Bieloserka, both of them names taken from the rivers on the banks of which they were built. The first was demolished in conformity with the articles of the peace made by Russia with the Turks in the last century; the other, which had its own proper sovereign, was demolished by a Tartar prince called Sultan Mamaÿ, a

* To pass the water in the ravines. See note on page 120.

DANGER FROM FIRE IN THEM.

139

man very renowned among the people of these regions in
the fourteenth century.

The sepulchral barrows of the Tartars in these deserts,
are also very remarkable. They are great hillocks, found
here and there, from Samara to within twenty leagues of
Perekop. On the top of several of these eminences
there are statues of a coarse workmanship, made of free-
stone, of which some represent men, others women.
Some of these barrows have been opened, and urns
found in them full of ashes, with some coins of gold and
of copper, on which are Arab characters half obliterated.

To give an idea of the fertility of these countries, I
need only observe that the herbage grows in parts above
the height of the tallest man. Asparagus is there in great
quantity*, and botanists have found extremely rare plants
well worth cultivating with care in our physic-gardens.
There grows also in these steppes a kind of grass, of
which the Turks and Tartars make use for their matches.†
In the month of July or August, the Tartars burn the
herbage on the steppes, for as they have not the means of
cutting it for hay, and it dries up under the influence of
the great heat which prevails in June, July, and August,
the old blades of the grass would choke the new. The
Tartars also set fire to it to deprive their enemies of forage;
and if care were not taken to preserve a camp against
conflagration, it would run a great risk of being burnt.
To obviate this accident, Munich ordered there should be
a large broom for each carriage, to damp a fire; besides
which, they turned up the turf two feet in breadth round the
camp, and with these precautions felt safe not to be burnt

* This is especially the case where the soil is impregnated with salt, as in the steppe of Astrakhan. On the eastern side of the Wolga, near Zairitzin, Pallas speaks of the wild asparagus as most luxuriant.

† I. e. for their matchlock guns.

140

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

alive. Game, such as hares, partridges, woodcocks, &c. are met with there in great plenty; the soldiers used to take numbers of them with their hands; there was, withal, such a multitude of quails, that there was not a march on which they did not catch as many as they chose.

Count Munich kept his communications open with the Ukrain during the campaign of 1736, by the following means. As soon as the army was well out of the Russian territory, he caused redoubts to be made as he went on. If their situation with respect to wood and water allowed of it, they were no farther from each other than one or two French leagues. There were also, in the more advantageous places, considerable intrenchments made, as at Samara on the small river of Bieloserka, and at Kisikjermen on the Dnieper. There was left in guard of the simplest redoubt, an officer, with ten or twenty soldiers or dragoons, and as many as thirty Cossacks. The intrenchments were garrisoned by 400 or 500 regulars and about as many Cossacks, under the command of a staff officer.* These detachments were to secure the transit of the couriers, and to work at making hay to supply the baggage animals of the army, in case of its returning so late in the season that there should be no more grass to be had. These redoubts and intrenchments were also of great use for the convoys that followed the army, who found in them a security against all surprise from the enemy, and commonly passed the night in one of them. But what is most astonishing is, that though these little block-houses were in the midst of the steppe, and insulated from one another, and though the Tartars attacked several of them, they did not take one, nor even intercept above one or

* "Un officier de l'Etat-Major."

TARTAR INVASIONS OF THE UKRAIN.

141

two of the couriers sent by Munich to the court.* As he returned into the Ukrain he withdrew all the garrisons from these fortifications, except from the intrenchment of Samara, where there was one kept up all the time of the war. There has even remained one since the peace, and a kind of fortified town has been made out of the place.† There was no need of demolishing the redoubts, for the Tartars know as little of defending themselves behind ramparts as they do of attacking them.

Though this method of keeping up a communication with the Russian dominions succeeded perfectly well in the campaign of 1736, the marshal did not choose to make use of it in the succeeding years, lest the enemy, growing bolder in time, should take the redoubts, and by that means get a great number of prisoners; besides that all these little garrisons could not but in some degree weaken the army.

It is natural to imagine, that, after so fatiguing a campaign as that which the Russian army had just undergone, it would be allowed to enjoy some rest during the winter. But no, nothing like it; near half of the men were employed in guarding the frontiers, to hinder the incursions of the Tartars; and more than 30,000 were dispersed along the Dnieper, from Kiev to the lines

* By the statements which have appeared in the foreign newspapers, it seems probable that a similar line of posts has been established from Aleschki (and possibly Berislav) to Perekop during the latter part of the present summer (1855). No doubt the facilities for obtaining water have formed a principal element in the determination of their site.

† This new fortified town was on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, and on the south side of the little river which there falls into it. The old Tartar Samara, mentioned above (p. 138.), had been on the north side of the latter. The modern town Ekaterinoslav, which is on the western bank of the Dnieper, has succeeded to both.

142

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

of the Ukrain, an extent of near 200 French leagues, to
break the ice of that river, and thereby hinder the
Tartars from passing. It is easy to conceive the hard-
ships attending such a task and the impossibility of en-
tirely succeeding in it; yet it was of some use, as it ren-
dered invasions more difficult, though it could not quite
hinder them. For with all imaginable precautions there
was no preventing the incursions of these vagabonds, nor
their carrying off people, and burning a great number of
villages. They were twice or thrice overtaken, and the
booty they had made recovered; but all that was nothing
in comparison to the damage which the Ukrain suffered
from them during the four years that the war lasted with
the Turks.

The Russian army had, during its stay in the Crimea,
plundered and laid waste a great part of the country.
The Tartars had their revenge by their forays into the
Ukrain. They made several of these during the winter
of the year 1736—1737, notwithstanding all the pre-
cautions that Munich had taken to bar the way. Some
of their incursions succeeded, and they burned some
small towns and villages and carried off above 1000
families, of whom they made slaves. The most consider-
able of all the incursions they undertook was in the month
of February of the year 1737, when some thousands, on
the 24th, passed the Dnieper on the ice, near the small
town of Kaliberda. The major-general Lesly whose
head-quarters were not far from there, seeing that the
Tartars had found means to enter the country between
the posts in his charge, hastily assembled 200 men, with
whom he went to attack the enemy. They, imagining at
first that it was the vanguard of some large body, were
beginning to retreat, but seeing that Lesly received no
reinforcements, they returned, attacked the detachment,

TARTAR MODE OF WARFARE.

143

and defeated it. The general and the greatest part of his men were killed on the spot. There were none taken prisoners but Lesly's son, who was serving as his aide-de-camp, and about twenty men. After this blow, the Tartars entered farther into the country, burning and destroying an infinite number of small villages for forty-eight hours together; but in this interval, the troops, having had time to assemble, seized the passes through which they had to return. They were stopped at several, and although they at length found a free place, they could not pass so quickly but that they were overtaken by major-general Rading, who fell upon their rear-guard with 2000 dragoons, killed near 300, and retook part of the booty they had made. On their return to the Crimea, they attacked the capital of the Zaporavian Cossacks, but were repulsed thence with a considerable loss; and all the damage they did there was to burn a few hamlets.

The manner in which these Tartars proceed, when they make their forays, is very singular. Each of them, on taking the field for such an expedition, has two or three led horses with him, besides the one on which he rides himself, for a change in the event of the first being fatigued; or if one of these horses should be so knocked up as to be no longer able to hold out, his master leaves him at large in the steppe to recover himself, and generally, at his return, finds him again in good plight. One may judge of the goodness of the Tartar horses by the incursions these people make, sometimes at the rate of twenty-five leagues a day without the horses knocking up; thence too may be understood with what rapidity they execute their marches. All their provision consists of what they can carry themselves, which is commonly no great matter.* They

* Tott, who joined an expedition into the Polish Ukrain, in which almost

144

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

are frugal when their interest requires them to be so, contenting themselves with bread and biscuit till their return from the enemy's country, where they generally get wherewithal to make better cheer at home. They never enter with their whole army into the Ukrain; it is commonly about a third, or sometimes half, that they detach, and these never venture to stay in the enemy's country above forty-eight hours; at the end of which time they make the best of their way back again, to rejoin the main body with the booty they may have got.

In order to be informed of all the designs of the Turks, the court of Russia had contrived to gain over some of the secretaries or interpreters of the Porte, and also of the Prince of Moldavia, who did not fail to give Munich the earliest intelligence, as soon as any the least enterprise was under consideration. But that was not sufficient to secure them against surprise by the Tartars. The Zaporavian Cossacks had always some parties of observation out towards the line of the Crimea, noting the least motions of the Tartars, and duly gave advice on the enemy's setting out on a march. There were erected, along the frontier, every half league, three poles, and on the top of each was placed a tar-barrel, with dry wood and straw. As soon as notice was given that the Tartars were on their march, the beacon was lighted on the first pole of the three along the frontier, for a warning to the

the whole of the Tartar tribes took part, describes each man as carrying eight or ten pounds of flour of baked millet in a leathern bag. This was a 50 days' victual; but the led horses furnished an additional resource, as, in case of necessity, they are killed and eaten. (Mémoires, vol. ii. p. 217.) This diet may explain the success of Prince Donducoff in keeping the field in Armenia during the present year (1855) in an exhausted country. His name indicates a Calmuck origin; and the cavalry he commanded, may well have been Tartars of Kara-bagh.

CALMUCKS AGAIN INVADE THE KUBAN. 145

advanced posts and to the inhabitants, to be on their guard. When the enemy showed himself near any post, the second beacon was fired; and as soon as they had made their way through into the country, the third was lighted; and then all the troops without delay put themselves in motion in the direction of the signal beacon to cut off the retreat of the enemy. To expedite their march, there were distributed to each regiment of foot 200 horses, that were harnessed in pairs to sledges, on each of which sat three or four men. I should imagine that, humanly speaking, it was hardly possible to take greater precautions, and yet, for all that, there did not pass a single year in which some one of the Tartar invasions did not succeed; for every year they made several.

Having said enough of the Tartars of the Crimea, I will now return to those of the Kuban, and relate the further expeditions made by the Calmucks and the Cossacks of the Don, under the famous Don-Duc-Ombo, against these last.

These same Tartars had been defeated in the month of May, and several hordes had submitted to Russia*, but the greater part of them had remained faithful to the Porte. The court of Petersburg, desiring to be completely secure on that flank, sent orders to the Calmuck prince to proceed with his troops and the Cossacks of the Don, under Krasnatschoka and Jefremow, both of them colonels of the latter, to the Kuban, and to reduce those Tartars so thoroughly as to be a guarantee against their lifting up their heads again for a long time.† These troops, to the number of 25,000 men, put themselves in

* This apparently refers to the surrender described in p. 133.

† Similar instructions, and with a similar object, were given the year before Munich's expedition. See above, page 92.

L

146

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

motion on the 30th of November, and having advanced as
far as the river Jegorlik they sent on a small detachment
to get intelligence. They were so fortunate as to fall in
with a party of the enemy, which they defeated, and
brought away a prisoner, of whom they learnt that one
of the most powerful hordes, called the Horde of Jetis-
kooly, which could bring 20,000 horse into the field, was
come out of the mountains, where it could subsist no
longer, and was actually then grazing its horses and
cattle in the fields on that side of the river Kuban; and
that to secure these from Calmuck and Cossack incursions,
they had established several well-fortified posts in the
defiles or straits, which must necessarily be passed to
attack them. Upon this intelligence, Don-Duc-Ombo
detached a body of Cossacks under the command of the
two colonels Krasnatschoka and Jefremow, to reconnoitre
the situation of the Tartar posts, following in person with
the rest of his troops. During the day, they examined
the ground in the neighbourhood of the enemy's intrench-
ments, and at nightfall the Cossacks attacked the prin-
cipal position, guarded by 1000 men, and carried it, not-
withstanding an obstinate resistance. As they had been
fortunate enough to secure all the horses belonging to the
Tartars who defended this post, not a man could escape;
and they were every soul massacred, except the com-
manding officer, who was brought to the Calmuck camp
to get some further intelligence out of him. As soon as
Don-Duc-Ombo had examined his prisoner, he divided his
troops into several parties, marched upon the enemy, and
attacked on several sides at once. Having totally de-
feated them, he swept the whole extent of country along
the river Kuban as far as the sea of Azoph, and ended by
utterly crushing this horde. All the inhabited places
along the river were sacked. He advanced even to Kapil,

MUNICH'S FRESH PREPARATIONS.

147

a walled town, and the usual residence of the Sultan Bachti-Gerëi, chief of these Tartars, took it by storm, and totally destroyed it. This incursion lasted from the 1st to the 14th of December. The booty the Calmucks and Cossacks made in the expedition was immense. Above 10,000 women and children were made slaves; and the quantity of animals taken was prodigious. The Calmucks had for their share 20,000 horses, besides horned cattle and sheep. Don-Duc-Ombo averred, that for a long time no such complete victory had been obtained, for it had cost the enemy at least 30,000 souls, including the slaves that were made. Near 15,000 men had been slain upon the spot, and the rest were drowned in endeavouring to pass the Kuban by swimming, the sides being frozen and the waters very high.* Don-Duc-Ombo, not contented with this victory, sent off all the booty, and secured himself with his troops and the Cossacks along the Kuban. Some time afterwards, having notice that 3000 Tartars were moving upon him, he sent a detachment against them. They made a stubborn resistance, but were at length routed and put to flight.

The campaign which Munich had made in the Crimea had taught him how difficult it was to take an army through those vast deserts. As soon therefore as his troops were distributed in their quarters, he began the arrangements for the next campaign. In the course of the winter he had gone to the court of Petersburg, and managed every thing so successfully that there was scarcely felt the least want of any kind during the campaign of 1737. The regiments were made up to their

* I. e. there had been a partial thaw, which hindered them from crossing on the ice, while the frozen edge under the surface prevented them from swimming to the bank. The waters would rise from the melting of the snow.

L 2

148

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

complement by 40,000 recruits, which the empire furnished. Great diligence was also used in the construction of the new docks of Briansk, for building flat-bottomed vessels, to be used for descending the Dnieper and acting in the Black Sea. They were called double sloops, were armed with four 4-pounders, and eight 1-pounders, and could carry 100 men. It was necessary to make them extremely flat on account of the falls of the Dnieper, which it is very difficult to pass in common boats. Yet after all the Russians derived but little advantage from this new flotilla: the only service it did was in carrying provisions to Ockzakow,—no officer having been disposed to attempt any operations with it on the Black Sea.

The campaign of 1737, in which the Russian army took Ockzakow, was the most bloody one of the whole war. Munich returned from court at the end of February. As soon as he arrived at his head-quarters at Kiev he completed the arrangements which had been begun for the ensuing campaign. In the middle of March all the regiments had notice to hold themselves in readiness for marching within twenty-four hours after they should receive the order.

In the beginning of April the whole army came out of quarters. The infantry was embarked in great boats, on board of which it fell down the Dnieper to within some leagues of Perevolotschna*, where the regiments were billeted in the neighbouring little towns and villages, as, for want of grass, the time for taking the field had not come.

Towards the end of the month the army took the field,

* It was near this little town that Charles XII. of Sweden passed the Dnieper, after his unfortunate battle at Pultowa. (Note of the French editor.)

MUNICH'S SECOND CAMPAIGN.

149

and passed the Dnieper in three different places. The first division under general Romanzow crossed at Kremschuk, the second under lieutenant-general Leontew at Orlik, and the third under the Prince of Hesse-Homburg at Perevolotschna, upon a bridge of boats of 503 toises in length, and which had taken 128 boats to construct it.

By May 6th the whole army had passed, and the same day three battalions of the foot-guards and 300 horse-guards entered the camp. Prince Antony Ulric of Brunswick also joined the army, to make the campaign as a volunteer. On the 12th the army commenced its march, and the divisions all joined on the 3rd of June, in the same camp, on the river Omelnick.

The army was composed of sixty-three battalions of foot, two squadrons of horse-guards, one squadron of cuirassiers of Munich's regiment, and twenty-nine regiments, or 145 squadrons, of dragoons. The corps of artillery and engineers consisted of 3000 men. The light troops consisted of 1500 hussars and at least 13,000 Cossacks of all kinds; so that the whole might be reckoned to amount to between 60,000 and 70,000 men. There were in the artillery train, sixty-two battering-pieces, from 18 to 24-pounders, eleven mortars, sixteen howitzers, 165 field-pieces, from 3 to 12-pounders, and 392 small mortars for grenades of six pound weight.

The generals who commanded under the marshal were, the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, grand-master of the ordnance, general Romanzow, lieutenant-generals Leontew, Keith, Charles Biron, and Loewendal, major-generals Tarakanow, Magnus Biron, Prince Basilius Repnin, Stoffeln, Bachmetew, Arachtschew, [and Gustavus Biron, who commanded the three battalions of guards]. This army marched in several columns to the river Bug,

L 3

150

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

keeping as much as possible along the side of the river Dnieper.*

On June 25th the army arrived at the river Bug, and the 26th was taken up with throwing three bridges over it, one of pontoons, the other two of casks.† The army passed the river in three days, without any the least obstruction from the enemy. The rendezvous of their army being under Bender, and they themselves not being entirely assembled, they could not imagine that the Russians were already so far advanced.

Before the army quitted the river Bug it was joined by several foreign officers, who came to make the campaign in the capacity of volunteers, and also by more than 28,000 waggons of provisions and 2000 camels; which last were distributed among the regiments, each company having two, for carrying their tents.

On July 2nd the army, having left the bank of the Bug, did not advance above four wersts, or a French league, to the small river Souchaia-tzchertala, This was the first time that it marched in a square this campaign; and, as it was numerous and had much baggage, it was divided into three squares, which marched in such disposition as to be able to support each other. On the 3rd the army advanced seventeen wersts, or about four leagues, to the small river Mertwie-Wody. There were several defiles to be passed‡, so that a part of the baggage, as well as of the provisions, with the rear-guard, could not get to the camp before the 4th; and what was the most vexatious in this march was, that there was not a drop of

* This is the reading of both French and English texts, but it is obviously an error, perhaps a slip of the pen, for the Ingul.

† The passage seems to have taken place near the site of the present Vosnesensk.

‡ These "defiles" are doubtless the ravines caused by the drainage of the steppe surface-water. See the note on page 120.

ADVANCE UPON OCKZAKOW.

151

water all the way from Tzchertala to Mertwie-Wody, so that the cattle remained twenty-four hours without watering. As to the men, they had provided themselves, each having been ordered to fill his flask, besides taking care to replenish the casks.*

Hitherto the army had not deviated from the route that leads to Bender, that they might put their enemies upon a false scent, so as to make them withdraw part of their troops from Ockzakow; but the marshal, learning that the Turks, far from being misled by this feint, were detaching some of their best troops to reinforce the garrison of that town, resolved to quicken his march as much as possible, so as to reach the place without giving time to the enemy to fortify it more, or even to arrive there with all his army. To be less incumbered in the march, he had the heavier baggage, the magazines of provisions, and a part of the battering train left behind, under lieutenant-general Leontew and major-general Tarakanow, with orders to follow by slower marches.

On July 6th the army marched full five French leagues, and encamped on the Bug. The reconnoitring parties, which had been sent in the direction of Bender and Ockzakow, came in and reported that they had seen several advanced posts on the road towards the latter, who had retreated at once upon perceiving them, without waiting for their coming up.

On the 7th the army marched along the side of the river Bug, down the stream; and as there were many defiles, they could not advance above three leagues. On the 8th they could not make above three more, having still several defiles and also the small river of Jatitzkaya to pass. The enemy showed himself to the vanguard

* See page 138.

L 4

152

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

at a good distance, but durst not attempt any thing, retreating as soon as ever he saw the light troops advancing to the attack.

On July 9th the army set out very early in the morning, and did not arrive till very late in the night at the river Jantzchikragh, having marched seven French leagues. This was an unbroken country enough, but there was not a drop of water to be had in the way from one encampment to the other. A party of the Don Cossacks fell upon an advanced post of the enemy, and took prisoners three Beschleys, or Asiatic horsemen. It appeared that they had been sent from Ockzakow to reconnoitre the march of the Russian army; that the garrison there was at the time composed of 15,000 men; and there was expected on that very day, or the next, a reinforcement both by sea and land; that they had been at work for a whole twelve-month, putting the fortifications of the place into a good state of defence; that it was provided with near 100 pieces of artillery, cannon and mortars; that there were eighteen galleys and several transports in the harbour; that they had also begun to repair the fortifications of Kinburn, which had been destroyed the preceding year by the general Leontew, but on advice that the Russian armies had taken the field, had withdrawn the workmen from thence; moreover, that the Tartars of Budziack, who had been encamped near Ockzakow, had taken to flight, notwithstanding all the representations of their sultan, and, deserting him, had sought safety in their own country.

The enemy, to deprive the Russian army of forage, had burnt all the grass, from the river of Jantzchikragh to Ockzakow, for four leagues round.

On July 10th the army got under march by break of day, and as it was not above three leagues from Ockzakow,

MUNICH DISAPPOINTED OF HIS SIEGE TRAIN. 153

it soon came in sight of the advanced guard of the enemy. The Cossacks came to blows with them, and after a sharp skirmish were obliged to give way. Stoyanow, a colonel of the hussars, rode up with his regiment to support the Cossacks; but as the enemy kept receiving succours from the town, and manœuvred with a view to surround the light troops, there were detached a regiment of dragoons and two regiments of infantry, with some pieces of cannon, and these soon obliged them to retreat. Several prisoners were made, and among others four officers, who stated that they had arrived only the night before at Ockzakow, with 7000 picked men, consisting of Bosnians and Arnaouts, so that the garrison was more than 20,000 strong, of whom 5000 of the best mounted had just measured their strength against the light troops. The skirmish, which lasted near four hours, cost the Russians no more than ten hussars and fifteen Cossacks. The enemies lost above 100 men, killed, wounded and prisoners.

The army, having advanced within cannon-shot of Ockzakow, encamped there at nightfall, not without a good deal of confusion. They thence saw the suburb all in flames, the governor having ordered it to be fired.

In the morning the army shifted its camp, and occupied the whole space between the Liman (so the mouth of the Dnieper is called) and the Black Sea. The marshal then held a grand council of war, in which it was resolved to attack the town with the utmost vigour, before the arrival of the fresh reinforcements that were expected, or the approach of the Turkish army which was concentrating at Bender to come to its relief. The council had not yet done sitting, when, at ten in the morning, the enemy sallied out of the place, to the number of 15,000 men. They formed two divisions, and pushed forward the one against the left of the army; but as their greater strength

154

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

was opposed to the right, where the Cossacks of the Don were encamped, Baron Loewendal was detached at the head of the picquets of the army, with several field-pieces, to stop these. The firing was very brisk, and lasted near two hours. But the enemy, having lost a number of their men by the fire of the Russian artillery, were at last obliged to retreat. There might be about 200 killed on both sides. The Russians did not lose a single officer, and the Don Cossacks contrived to secure more than 200 of the enemy's horses.

Munich, on his opening the campaign, had despatched orders to Prince Troubeltzkoi to come down the Dnieper with the fleet which had been built at Briansk, and to embark on board of it a part of the heavy artillery, with a great quantity of provisions, and munitions of war, and all other necessaries for a siege. The army, which had besides a prodigious quantity of baggage, could not encumber itself with that convoy. But for want of intelligence or of good-will on the part of its chief, this fleet did not arrive by the appointed time at the mouth of the Dnieper. The excuse was, that it had been detained for several days by storms and contrary winds; besides which, the Dnieper had happened to be so low at the cataracts that it had required several days to get the vessels past. So that Munich, on arriving at Ockzakow, instead of meeting his fleet there, found himself in want of everything for undertaking the siege. There was no wood to burn, nor to make fascines; nor was there pasturage for the horses [within eight leagues round], the enemy having burnt it all, as I have above observed. As to the horses, the general had resolved to send them to join the heavy baggage; but the greatest difficulty was, where to get wood, and the necessary utensils for the siege which were on board the fleet. Munich thought that it

ATTACK UPON OCKZAKOW.

155

could not, at the worst, be long before they arrived; and
in this hope the siege was begun.

It is astonishing that this general, who understood men
so well, could bring himself to entrust for the second time
so important a service to a person like Prince Troubelt-
skoi, who the year before had so entirely failed in a simi-
lar commission, and by his indolence had caused the death
of a good part of the army, for want of the provisions he
should have sent them. Any one except Prince Trou-
beltskoi would have paid dear indeed for two such enor-
mous blunders; but marshal Munich, who wished him
well, screened him, and even rendered him very great
services. By way of gratitude the prince did him in the
sequel some very ill turns.*

In the evening of July 11th, 5000 pioneers, supported
by 5000 men, were ordered to raise five redoubts, and the
needful épalements between the Liman and the Black
Sea, which might in the sequel serve for lines of contra-
vallation, and to cover the tail of the trenches. There
was a clear moonshine, the night was short, and the
ground as hard as rock; so that, notwithstanding all the
pains the troops took, it was found impracticable to raise
a single redoubt before day. The marshal was anxious
that at least the middle one should be in a condition for
service, and therefore set a working party of 2000 upon it;
but the sun rose without their having been able to pen-
trate two feet into the ground. The Turks at the same
time began a heavy fire from their ramparts on the troops,
who were not above short cannon-range from the glacis,
which made the marshal recall them into camp.

Brigadier Lieven and colonel Jerepkin had been

* This last paragraph appears only in the French. So do the words "for want of intelligence or of good-will on the part of its chiefs," and "the excuse was, that" in the preceding one.

156

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

ordered to accomplish the raising of the two redoubts at the extremity of the right near the Black Sea; but they found, so to say, ready-made ones to their hand, with parapet and ditch, so that, after having repaired them and surrounded them with *chevaux-de-frise*, they posted their men there. The fact was, there were some gardens of the town separated from one another by good dry ditches and parapets, [wood for paling being scarce there]. These two gardens or redoubts were not above half cannon-shot from the town, so that it was to be expected that the enemy would not fail to make a sally on that side. General Romanzow, by break of day, repaired thither, at the head of the picquets of the right wing, with some field-pieces. At the same time, the picquets of the rest of the army, the companies of grenadiers, and the Cossacks, had orders to form at the head of their encampments. On the 12th, at six in the morning, the advanced guards began to engage with a great deal of bravery on both sides. The whole army was ordered to get under arms. Half of the regiments, with their colours flying, marched in the direction of the town; the other half remained in the camp under the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, who fell sick exactly on the day that the Cossacks took the first prisoners, and did not recover till after Ockzakow was taken.*

The enemy had on their right, on the side of the Liman, a retrenchment, or rather hollow way, which they lined with men; and on the other side they had posted themselves in some of those gardens just described. There they made a stubborn defence, but were at length driven out, and forced to retreat behind the palisades. The Russians immediately occupied those posts, and, under favour of the gardens, approached to within musket-shot

* See above, page 66.

MUNICH PRESSES THE ASSAULT.

157

of the counterscarp. The firing was continued on both sides from morning till nightfall. The marshal caused the battering-cannon and the mortars as well as the field-artillery to be brought up; and, finding a convenient garden, had them placed there, without throwing up parapet or laying down platform. In this way the artillery was soon in condition to act; and a continual fire having been kept up, the town was seen in flames in several places during the day, although it was also seen that these were presently extinguished.

During the night the men began to work at the trenches, with a view at least to join the gardens by communications, but to no purpose; such was the hardness of the ground. It would have taken at least forty-eight hours to perfect the parapet and establish a cover from cannon-hot. By singular good luck there happened to be no need of this work. The cannon had not ceased playing the whole night, nor the mortars from throwing shells, when about an hour before day, on the 13th, a fire appeared in the middle of the town. In order to hinder the enemy from extinguishing it, the bombardment was continued, with the greatest success, and the flames extended so that one could distinctly observe several streets in a blaze. The marshal, to make his advantage of this, sent orders to Keith, who was posted in the centre of the attack and nearest to the town, to advance with his troops to within musket-shot of the glacis, and keep up an incessant fire, draw the garrison to the rampart, and hold it in such alarm as to disable it from aiding in putting out the fire. Keith returned for answer, that he was already within less than a musket-shot of the glacis, and that the enemy had killed and wounded a number of his men with musket-shot from the rampart in the position where he then was. A moment afterwards the marshal sent a fresh

158

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

order to Keith to keep up a continual fire of musketry
against the rampart. He was obeyed. The fire had not
lasted five minutes before the marshal ordered the troops
to come out from behind the redoubts and fire without
cover. Keith immediately executed the order, but sent
at the same time a representation that this manœuvre
would cause the loss of a great number of men to no
purpose. Scarce, however, had the troops got to the
outside of the redoubts, when the marshal again sent an
aide-de-camp to Keith to tell him that himself, Roman-
zow, and general Biron at the head of the guards, had
just advanced with the right wing up to the foot of the
glacis, and that he hoped Keith would do the same. Loe-
wendal, who was with the left wing and the artillery, some
hundreds of paces in the rear of the centre, had had the
same order; upon which, with his troops, he joined Keith,
and they advanced towards the town. Arriving at the
foot of the glacis, the troops found a ditch about twelve
feet broad; nor could they pass it, not having with
them any the least thing necessary for an assault, or for
getting over. However, there they stayed near two hours
[exposed to the hottest fire], without retreating one step,
constantly seeking for some means of passing. Some even
got clear over the ditch, but not in number enough to de-
cide the fate of the town. At length, the troops growing
disheartened, on seeing there was no means of passing
this fore-ditch or of gaining a lodgment in the covered-
way, retired in considerable confusion into one of the
gardens or redoubts which they had occupied the pre-
ceding night. Some hundreds of Turks made at the
same time a sally from the town, and killed a number in
the retreat, especially of the wounded, who could not get
off the ground fast enough.

If the Seraskier or the governor of the place had had
the sense to make a sally with the garrison, they could

UNEXPECTED CAPTURE OF OCKZAKOW.

159

have beaten the Russian army completely, and forced it not only to raise the siege, but to return to Russia.

The marshal, who on this failure had given up every thing for lost, was wrapped in the greatest affliction. But the great fire in the town, which had become nearly general, by about nine o'clock in the morning restored his affairs. The chief powder-magazine blew up, and not only overthrew part of the town, but buried above 6000 men in the ruins. This blow threw the Seraskier and the whole garrison into consternation; and, as there was now no possibility of extinguishing the fire, he judged it would be madness to suffer so many to perish by the flames or be buried under the ruins. He accordingly ordered all the flags, with which the ramparts and glacis were stuck in the Turkish manner, to be taken down, and the white flag to be hoisted. He sent at the same time his Bash-Tzchaus, or adjutant-general, to Count Munich, to desire of him an armistice of twenty-four hours. His request was rejected, and he was required to surrender himself and his garrison prisoners of war in an hour's time, or to expect no quarter. While this was in agitation, advice came that the hussars and Cossacks of the Don had penetrated into the town on the side next the sea. The Seraskier and a part of the garrison had got out of the place, in order to escape on board the galleys and vessels of transport, while the capitulation was preparing. The Cossacks and hussars seeing that the Turks were en-deavouring to escape, fell furiously upon them, forced them to return into the town, and entered *pêle-mêle* together with the fugitives. The Seraskier, upon this, sent a second time to the marshal, and surrendered at discretion, requesting nothing but life, which was granted. A detachment of the foot-guards took immediately possession of a gate, and the garrison was disarmed and conducted to the camp.

160

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

While these arrangements were making, some hundreds of soldiers entered the town, and massacred a number of people. About 2000 found means to get to the galleys, and so escape. As many more were drowned, who had thrown themselves into the sea to swim to the transports,—as these, seeing the town taken, weighed anchor, and stood out into the offing, to carry to Constantinople the news of the success of the Russian expedition.

Orders were given to put the fire out, but its fury was so great that these could not be at once executed. Two more magazines blew up, and a party of Russians who had entered the town for the purpose of pillage was destroyed.

The Russian loss was the following:—Killed on the spot, 2 captains of the guards, 4 colonels, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 58 other officers, and 987 non-commissioned officers and rank and file. Wounded, lieutenant-generals Keith and Loewendal, major-generals Chroutschef and Aractschew, brigadiers Lieven and Hanf, 2 captains, 2 lieutenants, and 2 ensigns of the guards, 6 colonels, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 19 majors, and as many as 100 officers and 2703 non-commissioned officers and rank and file. The marshal had one horse killed under him and another wounded. Prince Antony Ulric, who had not left his side for an instant, had also a horse killed. Lieutenant-colonel Homburg, who accompanied the prince, was killed by his side, and of his orderlies, one was killed and another wounded.*

Of the enemy, the prisoners made were, the Seraskier Jaya, Bashaw of three tails and commander-in-chief of all the troops, son-in-law to the last Grand Vizier, and who had been master-of-horse to the deposed Sultan; the

* The last six sentences are not found in the English edition.

MUNICH'S SINGULAR GOOD FORTUNE.

161

governor of the place, Mustapha, Bashaw of two tails;
30 other officers of distinction, 60 subalterns, 3174 private
soldiers of different bodies, as Janissaries, Spahis,
Bosniacs, and Arnaouts; 200 servants, and 1200 women
and children; 54 Greeks, who took service in the hussars,
and some hundreds of slaves, who thus recovered their
liberty.

By this enumeration may be judged the number of
men the Turks must have lost in the town, the garrison
having been 20,000 strong, besides the inhabitants. By
July 20th there had been already interred 17,000
Turks; and there were still a great number of bodies
buried under the ruins, which could not be dug out till long
after.

On the ramparts were found 82 brass cannon, 6 iron, 7
mortars, and 1 howitzer. There were taken 9 horse-tails,
8 truncheons of command, and a great quantity of very fine
arms. The colours were near 300; and the booty the
troops got was very considerable.

The Cossacks of the Don distinguished themselves
greatly before Ockzakow; for they voluntarily fought on
foot, and marched up to the assault.

The above is a detailed account of the siege of Ockza-
kow; a siege the most singular that the world ever saw.
Nothing less than Munich's good luck could ever have
brought it to that issue; for, after the faults he committed
in attacking it with so little consideration, he deserved to
be beaten and compelled to raise the siege. He began the
attack without knowing in what manner the town was
fortified, and even without having reconnoitred it. He
caused the assault to be made on the best fortified side,
without having fascines or anything else for passing the
ditch of the counterscarp, the very existence of which
was unknown till the moment of coming upon it. If he

M

162

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

had turned the town, and made his approaches to it on the
side towards the sea, he would have taken it much more
easily, there being only a single wall, and that damaged in
some places. When the marshal was repulsed he wanted
to throw the blame of the whole affair on Keith, telling
the Prince of Brunswick, in presence of some generals,
that it was owing to the over-great ardour of Keith that
the assault had been made and had succeeded so ill; but
that, as the fire still continued burning, he hoped every-
thing would come right again. This was told to Keith,
who, extremely piqued at the imputation to him of a
measure in which he had acted against his own will, sent
a request to Munich to cease reproaching him, as he had
done nothing but follow his orders; adding, that he was
ready to demand a court-martial, before which he would
show the faults that had been committed in beginning
the siege. The marshal came next morning to pay him a
visit, and among other things said to him, "It is, sir,
partly to you that we are indebted for the success of this
great enterprise." Keith, who had not forgotten his
speeches of the preceding evening, answered, "I beg your
pardon, sir, I do not pretend to any the least honour from
it, having done nothing but merely obey your orders."

The town of Ockzakow forms an oblong square. It is
very irregularly fortified, and flanked by various bastions.
Three sides are surrounded by parapets, a dry ditch, a
glacis, and a ditch in front of it; but the side opposite
the Liman has only a plain wall in bad condition. During
the winter a guide had been sent charged with a com-
plimentary message to the Bashaw in command, but in
reality to try if he could not get the plan of the fortifica-
tions of the town. The man was hardly allowed to look
out of the window of his room; but, nevertheless, wishing
to recommend himself to Munich, he gave him the plan

THE ARMY MOVES FROM OCKZAKOW.

16

of a hexagonal fortification, assuring him that it was the
exact outline of the town. It was actually on the report
of this man that the siege of Ockzakow was undertaken.

On July 14th the major-general Bachmetew, and colonel Bratke of the engineers, entered the town, with two regiments of dragoons, twelve battalions of foot, and 2000 Cossacks. Two regiments were to be sent under colonel Wedel to Kinburn.

As there was no question but that the Turks would make the utmost efforts for the recovery of Ockzakow, it was ordered to be provided with every necessary, and put into a condition for making a long resistance. A great part of the artillery was left there, and a number of engineers to direct the works. The town had been turned into such a heap of stones, that the garrison could not be lodged in it, but encamped on the side of the ditch of the counterscarp, where they began to work at a retrenchment that was to extend all along the front of the town, having the Liman on the right and the Black Sea on the left; but, as this was a work that required a great deal of time, there were two small retrenchments provisionally made on each side; after which the intended grand one was proceeded upon, but was not finished. These lines were to serve for advanced works, to oblige the enemy, in case of an attack, to begin his trenches at a great distance, for those works which were completed were too well constructed to leave any fear of their being carried sword in hand.

The army remained two days more in camp at Ockzakow, to rest itself from the fatigues which it had undergone for thirteen days successively; after which the marshal resumed his march. His instructions were to proceed towards Bender; but, as he learnt that the enemy had burnt all the grass on that side, it was necessary to take

M 2

164

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

another route. The Russian army was diminished, not
only by the garrison left at Ockzakow, and the numbers
they had lost in the course of the siege, but also by the
multitude of sick with the army; insomuch that its strength
in the field was from 20,000 to 24,000 men less than at
the opening of the campaign. It was resolved not to move
to any distance from the Bug, but to make some marches
and countermarches, that should lead the enemy to believe
that they were bending their force against him; but the
true design was to cover Ockzakow, and to hinder the
Turks from forming the siege of it till the garrison should
have had time to repair the fortifications and to erect such
buildings as might serve to lodge them during the winter.

On July 22nd the army was at sixty wersts or fifteen
leagues from Ockzakow, on the bank of the Bug. There
the general Leontew, who had been left behind with the
heavy baggage and stores, rejoined it.

On the 23rd the army, very early in the morning, com-
menced its march; but had scarce proceeded a quarter of a
league when the Cossacks of the Don, who had been sent
on a reconnoitring party towards Bender, brought word
that a great body of the enemy was advancing against the
army, and was not above half a league off. Hitherto they
had heard no more about the enemy than if the army had
been marching in a friendly country, so that, though they
advanced in squares, they had allowed the baggage to go on
before or follow behind, just as should be most convenient.
The marshal himself having ordered the army to move on,
was himself stopping in his tent to dispatch a courier to the
court. He was scarce got on horseback when a body of
the enemy attacked his baggage and that of the prince of
Brunswick. Munich, who had always with him an escort
of some squadrons of horse, detached them against the
enemy, whom they repulsed on that side. They had

ITS FORAGERS SURPRISED BY THE ENEMY.

16

however, time enough to kill some of the people of the baggage-train and to carry off several horses.

Nearly at the same time colonel Fermor and lieutenant general Lieven, who were performing the duty of quarter-masters general, and, having no conception of a hostile encounter, had gone on before with only the quarter-masters and storekeepers*, making up in all 350, and had not waited for the two regiments of dragoons whose duty it was to escort them, found themselves on a sudden surrounded with some thousands of Turks and Tartars. Fermor on the instant made his little troop dismount and form into square. The enemy's horse and foot fell upon them, but were several times repulsed with a considerable loss. The quarter-masters' men reserved their fire, and managed it well, that they did not pull a trigger in vain. The Turlim imagined they should gain their ends better by setting fire to the grass, but Fermor was on the alert, and made with his troops so skilful a movement, that, before the fire could reach them, they got to a spot where there was nothing combustible. The enemy on this made a fresh attack, but was repulsed as before. The quarter-masters must, however, have been overpowered by numbers if some regiments had not luckily come up in time to disengage them. The Russians had on this occasion 50 men killed and wounded, and near 100 were taken prisoner but most of them only horse-boys.† Some slave who had found means to escape, declared that the enemy had consisted of 5000 Turks and 10,000 Tartars, who had been sent from Bender to attack the general Leontew on his march before he could join the army.

* "Les quartier-maîtres et les fouriers."

† "Goujats de l'armée."

M 3

166

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

On the 25th general Bachmetew sent word that the works at Ockzakow were in considerable forwardness, and that 1500 Zaporavian Cossacks had arrived there in thirty-eight vessels; that they had made an expedition in the Black Sea and in the islands on the coast of the Crimea*, but that they had found them all abandoned by the inhabitants.

On the 26th the army went up the Bug about four leagues, and encamped at a place called Andriewska, where there are to be seen the ruins of a town. The marshal caused a fort to be built there, giving it the name of St. Andrew; and into it put the greatest part of the artillery, under the guard of two regiments of foot, commanded by the Prince of Holstein, there to await the arrival of the fleet that was to carry them to Ockzakow. For, as the enemy had burnt up the grass, there was a great scarcity of forage, and the horses and oxen which drew the guns died every day by dozens. The next day the marshal received news that a part of the fleet under colonel Chripounoff was at length arrived at Ockzakow, to the number of 14 double sloops and 70 large boats, each of 150 tons burthen. These vessels were loaded with a great quantity of all sorts of provision; some thousands of bomb-shells, balls, grenadoes, gabions, wood for burning and for building. This was the flotilla which ought to have brought the army the necessaries for conducting the siege of Ockzakow. It did not arrive till fifteen days after the taking of the place. Hence may be seen, that there is no relying with certainty on water-carriage, especially on such a river as the Dnieper,

* By these are perhaps meant the little islands in Kinburn Bay. The Zaporavians apparently took the peninsula of Tendra for the coast of the Crimea.

ZAPORAVIANS ASCEND THE DNIESTER.

16

where there are a great number of falls not passable whe
the water is low.

The army, having proceeded up the side of the Bug a
far as the conflux of the Ziczakleya, learnt that thei
was, on the other side of the river, forage and wood i
abundance; upon which it was resolved to cross it at th
place, though it is ninety-five toises broad and marsh
on the western side; and on July the 30th they began
to work at getting two bridges ready. On the 1st of
August the first regiments passed over the river.

The Zaporavian Cossacks had, in their little vessel
made a new expedition to the mouth of the Dniester; ha
gone up the river, plundered several villages on the bank,
set fire to a number of others, and thereby spread a
alarm over the whole country as far as Bender. The
returned with a great booty, and afterwards at times re
peated these expeditions, but with less profit to themselves
the people of the country having gone off with their best
effects to Bender, or else inland.

On August 7th, at night, it was observed that the
enemy had set fire to the woods and bushes on the othe
side of the Bug, on the way to Bender, at about four
leagues distance from the camp. It was at first imagine
that it might be a great body of the Turks, or even thei
whole army, advancing to attack the Russians; but, after
several parties of Cossacks had gone out and scoured th
country a good way beyond the fire without discovering
any traces of the enemy, the alarm went off.

Since the affair of the quarter-masters there had no
been any the least news of the enemy, which made th
army feel as secure as if they had been in the midst of
Russia. They went foraging without so much as th
smallest covering party, and some of the servants venture

M 4

168

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

as far as two or three leagues off; an imprudence for which
they paid dearly.

On August 11th a party of Tartars, 1500 strong, having swum the river some leagues above the camp, fell upon the foragers of the left division, whom they found dispersed all over the country round about, massacred a number of them, and carried off more than 1000 horses and oxen before the alarm reached the camp. The Cossacks of the Don, who were encamped the nearest to the place where this was passing, mounted instantly and rode at full speed towards the enemy. These, who were by no means come on a fighting errand, thought of nothing but making the best of their way off the ground as soon as they saw the Cossacks approaching. Accordingly they detached the main part of their troops before, with the prisoners and the booty, while the boldest of them kept in the rear, and followed more slowly. This enabled the Cossacks to come up with the latter, when they charged them, killed a hundred, and made twenty prisoners. They pursued the rest ten leagues from the camp, as far as Mertwie-Wodi; but these, having had so great a start of them, were fortunate enough to escape with their prize.

After this annoying affair the army was more on its guard, and marshal Munich, who never forgave any the least negligence in his officers, caused the business to be rigorously examined into, to find by whose orders it was that the foragers had gone out of the camp without covering parties. The whole blame fell on the colonels and majors of the regiments; so that there was not one regiment of the left wing which had not a superior officer* punished. Some lost their rank for a time, others were mulcted of several months' pay.

THE ARMY RETURNS TO THE UKRAIN.

16

On the 12th the marshal detached general Romanzow with the guards and some regiments of dragoons and Cossacks, to return into the Ukrain. Under their escort he also sent away all the Turkish prisoners. The object of this measure was to economise the supply of forage for the army.

On the 19th brigadier Boraitinsky, who commanded the second division of the fleet originally designed for the siege, and now for the victualment of Ockzakow, came down the Dnieper to about the point which was abreast of the encampment of the army. This division consisted of 48 double sloops, 4 cantzchibasses, and 5 large boats, having on board a great quantity of ammunition, material of war, and provisions, with 187 men, soldiers and sailors. The third division of this fleet which was of nearly the same strength, was to come down under the command of rear-admiral Mamonow; but it was unable to reach Ockzakow till towards the middle of September.

The next day the army shifted its camp, and went down along the Bug to near its confluence with the Dnieper*, where it stayed some days. From here marshal Munich, accompanied by Prince Antony Ulric, repaired on a visit of inspection to Ockzakow, to satisfy himself with his own eyes whether the works both of this place and of Kinburn had been properly repaired and enlarged.

As Munich had no sort of doubt that the Turks would besiege Ockzakow, and as it was a point of importance to Russia to have an intelligent officer there, major-genera Stoffeln was sent for that purpose. Bachmetew having besides, requested to be relieved on account of his bad health, Stoffeln, who desired nothing better than to have

* The Ingul appears to be meant.

170

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

an opportunity of distinguishing himself, accepted this command with pleasure; and the sequel will show that a better choice could not have been made.

After the return of the marshal the army made some marches along the side of the Bug *, and in the last days of August began its way back to the Ukrain. Munich divided it into several corps, who were, however, all obliged to repass the Dnieper on the bridge of Perevozlotschna, where they separated, and each regiment took its route for its winter-quarters. Munich fixed his own at Pultowa.

This campaign did much honour to Munich, and greatly contributed to augment the reputation of the Russian troops; but it was in fact of very little more service to the state than the preceding, fatiguing and murderous as it was. The army had lost in the course of it 11,000 regulars and 5000 Cossacks. The loss in servants and peasants that drove the magazine carriages might be of double the number. As I have given details of the cases where any were killed or taken by the enemy, it will be readily seen that the greatest part must have perished by disease; for as to desertion, it is a thing unknown in the Russian armies.

There is one cause that, in a very great measure, accounts for the amount of sickness in the armies of Russia, viz., the almost continual fasts which they are obliged to observe, according to the Greek ritual. This condemns them for nearly three-fourths of the year to abstinence from flesh-meat; and to such a length is the superstition of the nation carried, that, though the synod grants them a dispensation for eating flesh during the actual campaign, there are few that choose to take the benefit

* This appears to be a *lapsus calami*, if not a mistake, for the Ingul.

GREAT LOSS OF TRANSPORT CATTLE.

171

of it, preferring death to the sin of breaking their rule. The Russian soldiers, withal, in the campaigns, lie on the bare ground, never so much as thinking of collecting straw or having coverings in their tents. True indeed it is, that in the war with the Turks there was no such thing as getting any conveniences of this kind, the campaigns being nothing but incessant marches. It was a wonder to continue five days together in the same camp. The care taken of the sick in these circumstances could not be much; and notwithstanding all that has been said of the Russians and their being so robust and hardy, they are subject to several diseases, as the scurvy and fevers, also in the field to dysentery, &c. Commonly one-third of the sick die. Nor is it anything extraordinary in a regiment, though in quarters, to have 200 sick at the beginning of spring and towards the autumn. There is to every regiment but one head-surgeon and his assistant, who are withal not of the most skilful. As to the surgeons of the companies, scarce can they shave. On a review of recruits a colonel will order a common peasant, who may have followed the plough-tail, to be a surgeon: the poor fellow protests in vain that he has no inclination to the profession, and that he shall never be able to learn it; but this avails him nothing, he must try; and if he has a thick head, it is made more penetrable by dint of blows. In the same manner are their bands chosen; so that one may easily judge of the quality of their military music.

The mortality of the cattle was extremely great during this campaign, there having fallen but little rain, which made the grass dry up sooner than usual. The Tartars, moreover, took care to set fire to it, so that the army often made two marches without finding grass enough for their horses and horned cattle. The artillery alone lost above 15,000 pairs of oxen; which was partly imputed to the

172

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

bad arrangements taken by the Prince of Hesse in not appointing, when the army first took the field, a sufficient number of supernumerary sets for draught; which he might have done, as there was a surplusage of some hundreds of pairs of oxen. The army had not made a dozen marches before disorder manifested itself in the artillery train; for, some pairs of oxen being foundered, a necessity arose for diminishing the number harnessed to the heavy guns; so that this arm, not being able to follow quick enough, often occasioned a delay in the march; an inconvenience which did not cease till the arrival of the army before Ockzakow. That town being taken, the marshal ordered the greatest part of the artillery to be left there, and that no more should be taken on than could be conveniently drawn. The Prince of Hesse, instead of obeying this order, left only a small part of the artillery in that place, and consequently at the second or third march there was no getting the train on. More than a fourth of the guns came to a halt soon after leaving the encampment, and the rear-guard was sometimes obliged to stop for twenty-four hours, till such oxen as had drawn one part of the artillery into the new camp were sent back to fetch the remainder from the old one. This it was which obliged the marshal to construct the fort of St. Andrew on the side of the Bug, and to send a great part of the artillery with the fleet to Ockzakow; and this too ultimately prevented farther confidence being placed in the Prince of Hesse Homburg, and led to his being no longer entrusted with any command of consequence. If the Russians had had to deal with an enemy of any skill they would have lost two-thirds of their artillery; perhaps more, for there were several very necessary precautions neglected.

While the army commanded by count Munich was

LACY'S SECOND CAMPAIGN.

173

acting on the side of Ockzakow, marshal Lacy marched into the Crimea with another, consisting of thirteen regiments of dragoons, twenty regiments of infantry, and from 10,000 to 12,000 Cossacks and Calmucks; the whole amounting to about 40,000 combatants. The generals who commanded under Lacy were the general Lewaschew, lieutenant-generals Douglas, Spiegel, and Brilly, and major-generals Brigny the younger, Jerepkin, Dewitz, &c.

The infantry of this army assembled in the beginning of the spring on the river Mius, opposite to the small fort of Paulovsky, and thence marched in several columns as far as the Calmius, where they rested some days, to wait for the flotilla under the command of rear-admiral Bredal, which was to act on the Sea of Azoph, in concert with Lacy, so as to second his operations in the Crimea. As soon as it arrived Lacy continued his march to the river Berda. There it was that the whole army assembled. Count Douglass had brought the dragoons from Backmout, by the directest way through the steppes; Lacy on his march established some redoubts for keeping up the communications with Azoph.

After the marshal had held several conferences with Bredal, whose flotilla kept at anchor at the mouth of the Berda, and had concerted with him the operations of the campaign, he resumed his march, keeping as close as he well could along the shore of the Sea of Azoph. On arriving at the river Molotzchnie-Wodi, he built a fort there, in which he left a strong garrison and all the sick of the army.

On June 26th the army encamped on the shore of that arm of the Sea of Azoph which joins the lines of Perekop; and the fleet lay at not more than a cannon-shot distance from it.*

* This would probably be within the channel of Yenitchi. It will be remembered that no vessel drew four feet of water. See above, p. 126.

174

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

Lacy, who wanted to enter the Crimea without loss of
time, instantly ordered the construction of a bridge, which
was finished by the 28th; and some regiments of dragoons
and 3000 or 4000 Cossacks passed over it immediately.
By the 30th the whole army was got across, and con-
tinued its march along the shore of the Sea of Azoph. On
July 2nd it was joined by 4000 Calmucks, under Golden
Narma, the son of the Khan Don-Duc-Ombo.*

The Khan of the Tartars of the Crimea, who had never imagined that the Russians would enter his country on that side, was exceedingly astonished when he received the news. He had posted himself, with all his troops, behind the lines of Perekop, which he had taken care to get repaired, and trusted to dispute the passage with the Russians more successfully than had been done by his predecessor the year before. But all this was so much trouble in vain. Lacy was in full march upon Arabat without having lost a single man.

As the Russian army was obliged to continue its
march on a narrow spit of land formed by the Sea of
Azoph, which stretches as far as Arabat, the Khan
imagined he might retrieve his game at the outlet of the
spit. Accordingly he marched there with all speed, in
the hope of stopping the Russian army by means of the
lines which had been carefully constructed at the base of
that tongue of land, and of compelling it to retreat, or at
least to fight at a disadvantage, if determined to force a

* It seems likely that these Calmucks came from one of the mouths of the Kuban, and were landed on the spit of Arabat. Perhaps the object of Don-Duc-Ombo in wintering on the banks of the Kuban (p. 147.) was to be in a position to effect this junction with the Russian army. The banks of the Kuban at Ekaterinodar are covered with fine oaks, and if these were felled in the winter, the melting of the snows in the spring would enable them to be brought to Temruk to form rafts for the transit of the horses.

HIS BOLDNESS ALARMS HIS GENERALS.

175

passage. But Lacy baffled all his plans. Having received
intelligence that the Khan was arrived at Arabat, and
was there waiting for him, he caused the depth of that
arm of the sea which separates this tongue of land from
the rest of the Crimea to be sounded; and having
found a place proper for his purpose, he had a floating
bridge made *, for the construction of which he used all
the empty casks of the army and the timbers of the
chevaux-de-frise, and by this means crossed the channel
with the infantry and baggage train. The dragoons,
Cossacks, and Calmucks, swam or forded it over.

It was not the Khan alone who judged this enterprise of
marshal Lacy, in marching along the spit of land towards
Arabat, a rash one; for the generals of his own army were
of the same opinion. All of them, except Spiegel,
waited on him one morning in his tent, and represented
to him that he was exposing the troops too much, and
that they were running the risk of all perishing to-
gether. The marshal answered them, that there was
danger in all military enterprises, but that he did not
see more in this than in others. However, he begged
to know what they thought best to be done. They
unanimously replied, "To return with all possible speed."
Upon which Lacy rejoined that, since the generals had a
mind to return, he would have their passports made out
accordingly; and actually called for his secretary, ordering
him to make out and deliver them without delay. He
even commanded a party of 200 dragoons to be their
escort to the Ukrain, there to wait his return. It was
three whole days before the generals could prevail on the
marshal to relent, and forgive them the presumption
they had shown in proposing a retreat to him.

* French "des radeaux." See the note on p. 179.

176

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

The Khan, who had imagined he should beat the
Russian army on its debouching near Arabat, was alto-
gether disconcerted to learn that it had crossed the arm of
the sea and was now in full march towards him. But he
did not think fit to wait for it. He retreated towards
the mountains, harassed by the Cossacks and Calmucks at
his heels. Lacy, having had advice of the retreat of the
enemy, would not continue his march towards Arabat, but
wheeled to the right, in order to get among the mountains
in quest of the Khan, and give him battle, if the thing
should be practicable.

On July 23rd the Russian army encamped at the
distance of twenty-six versts, or about seven French
leagues, from one of the best towns of the Crimea, called
Karasu-Bazar. There it was attacked by a large body of
picked troops, commanded by the Khan in person. The
charge of the Tartars was at first very vigorous, but, after
an hour's combat, they were repulsed with loss and driven
off the field by the Cossacks and Calmucks, who pursued
them four leagues into the mountains. The army re-
mained in the same camp, but the light troops made a
reconnaissance in the direction of Karasu-Bazar, to
destroy the habitations of the Tartars. They returned
the same day, with about 600 prisoners, a considerable
booty, and a great quantity of cattle.

On the 25th lieutenant-general Douglass, in command
of the vanguard, which consisted of 6000 men, dragoons
and foot, and of the whole of the light troops, marched
upon Karasu-Bazar. Marshal Lacy followed them with
the rest of the army, having left behind him the baggage-
train and the sick, with 5000 men to guard them, under
the orders of brigadier Kolokoltzow.

The detachments of the enemy that endeavoured to stay
the advance of these troops were uniformly repulsed; and

HE SACKS KARASU-BAZAR.

177

there was discovered, on a height near the town, an en-
trenched camp, in which there might be about from 12,000
to 15,000 Turks. Having surveyed this encampment, the
marshal reinforced Douglas with two regiments of dragoons,
and gave him orders to attack the enemy and make himself
master of Karasu-Bazar. This was executed with all
imaginable success; and the Turks fled after a contest of
about an hour.

The inhabitants had entirely abandoned the town, so
that there were none remaining in it but some Greek and
Armenian families. The place therefore was taken with-
out any resistance, but was not the less pillaged and
reduced to ashes. This town, of which above one half
was built of stone, contained about 6000 houses*, thirty-
eight mosques and Turkish chapels, two Christian churches
for the Greeks and Armenians, fifty water-mills, and a
number of other public buildings. The booty the troops
made was very considerable, the inhabitants not having
had time to save their effects. As the town is situate at
the foot of the mountains, where the passes are so narrow
that scarce three men can march abreast; and as, besides,
there was no forage in the neighbourhood, the marshal
measured back his steps, and encamped at a league distance.
The Cossacks and Calmucks had orders to penetrate as
far as they could into the mountains, and to burn all the
habitations of the Tartars.

On the 26th the army commenced a retrograde march
towards the same camp in which they had left their
baggage. Scarce had they got into the plain, when they
saw the enemy advancing, with the bulk of his forces,
on the other side of the river Karasu. Marshal Lacy
instantly detached Douglass, with several regiments of foot

* The English edition has "10,000 houses."

N

178

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

and dragoons, and all the light troops, to make an attack. Douglass crossed the river a league above the enemy, and marched direct upon him. They cannonaded one another for near an hour, after which the Cossacks came to close quarters with their opponents. The skirmish was kept up smartly on both sides. The Cossacks were thrice re-pulsed; but as the regular troops kept advancing with an imposing aspect, the enemy was at last obliged to retreat, and the army encamped on the field of battle.

During the action Lacy had ordered the Calmucks to turn the enemy and take him in rear and flank. After the affair was over no Calmucks appeared; at which the marshal was extremely uneasy, apprehending they might have pursued the enemy too far into the mountains, so as to have their retreat to the army cut off, and perhaps all have been put to the sword. But two days afterwards they returned to camp, bringing with them above 1000 prisoners; and among them several Mirzas, that they had taken in this inroad, which of their own idea they had continued across the mountains as far as Bachtchi-Serai.

On the 27th the army returned to the camp, which it had occupied before its advance upon Karasu-Bazar. The marshal then held a grand council of war, in which it was resolved that, since the plan of operations prescribed to them had been executed, and there remained nothing considerable to be undertaken, it would be advisable to move towards the frontiers of the Crimea.

It took the army five days to get from this camp to the mouth of the river Schoungar, all of which time the light troops were engaged in reducing to ashes the habitations of the Tartars, for four or five leagues round the army; the number of which amounted to 1000 villages, or little open towns, the country being extremely populous on that side. They brought also to the camp above 30,000

THROWS A BRIDGE ACROSS THE TSCHUNGAR. 179

oxen, and something like 100,000 sheep. The enemy, on
their part, did not cease to harass the army in its march,
and indeed found means at different times to carry off
some of the officers' servants, who were imprudent enough
to go beyond the line of the advanced posts, as also some
hundreds of horses belonging to the train. As soon as
the army was arrived upon the Schoungar, a bridge of
boats was ordered to be got ready. It was finished by
the morrow, the 2nd of August; when, on the same day,
part of the army crossed it. The army had scarcely had
time to form, when the enemy appeared with his whole
force to oppose the passage. They had been reinforced
by some thousands of Turks, come two days before from
Caffa. Full of resolution they attacked the light troops
several times, but were constantly repulsed. At length,
tired with their fruitless attempts and with losing so many
men by the fire of the artillery, they retreated, leaving on
the spot about 100 of their dead.*

* This campaign of Lacy is not related by Manstein as an eye-witness, as the campaign of Munich in 1736 was. Accordingly the narrative of the last part of the marshal's movements is somewhat obscure. In all the maps of the present day the name Tschungar is given, not to any river or arm of the Siwasch, but to a peninsula of the main land. But in the Gentleman's Magazine for 1739 is a rude map, illustrative of the campaigns of 1736 and 1737, which professes to be a copy of one published by the Academy at Petersburg, from the charts sent by the generals Lacy and Munich in those years. This profession is probably true; for the dates given in a letter-press description in the margin of the map are those of the Russian Calendar, and correspond, mutatis mutandis, with those in Manstein, except in one instance, which is manifestly a clerical error. In this map the name Tschungar is given not to the peninsula, but to the estuary at the south of it.

In the same map the attack of the Tartars upon Lacy on the 2nd of August is supposed to take place *before* the passage of the Tschungar, whereas Manstein undoubtedly describes it (although in very vague language) as taking place *afterwards*. It is not easy to see how Turks, if

N 2'

180

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

On August 4th the marshal passed the Schoungar with the rest of his army. There he remained a few days encamped; after which he formed a camp near the river Molotschnie-Wodi*, where he stayed out the whole month of August, finding there a locality abounding in forage. During that time he detached several parties of light

reaching an army upon the north side of the estuary, could be said to have arrived "from Caffa." In this particular instance Manstein's description seems to arise from a false account of the authority he followed; or perhaps from an inaccurate use of the phrase "pour s'opposer à ce passage." The attempt really seems to have been one to crush the rear of Lacy's army after the rest had got across; Manstein's expression leads one to suppose he regarded it as an attempt to drive back the van.

Another point of some interest suggests itself here. It seems plain, under any circumstances, that the passage of the Tschungar having been effected on a pontoon bridge, the pontoons must have been brought from Azoph by Bredal's flotilla; and that consequently, in the month of July, there was water enough to enable the crews to enter the strait of Yenitschi, and when there, co-operate with Lacy's army. It may therefore perhaps be conjectured, that some portion of the time which elapsed between July 2nd (when Lacy was considerably advanced upon the spit of Arabat), and July 23rd (when he was encamped within 26 versts of Karasu-Bazar) was employed in the transport of materials for his rafts by means of the boats of the flotilla. The map in the Gentleman's Magazine says that he did make use of "fifteen Cossack boats," together with the empty casks, to form "the bridge" by which he crossed from the spit of Arabat to the peninsula. By "Cossack boats" must be meant boats from the Don above Azoph; for the present Tschernomorien Cossacks were not inhabiting the country of the Kuban in 1737, that region, as Manstein relates, being occupied by the Nogays, who were so mercilessly destroyed by the Calmucks acting under the inspiration of the court of Petersburg. It is common in Southern Russia to cross rivers on raft bridges of the coarsest construction, consisting simply of logs of timber chained together; and the different features of Lacy's passage of the Siwasch from the spit of Arabat may apparently be well reconciled, by conceiving that the "radeaux" of Manstein were made in this way of the stems of the *cheavux de frise*, and that the casks and Cossack boats were made to compensate for the slender scantling of these by the great additional power of flotation they conferred.

* Milk-river.

NAVAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TURKS. 181

troops in the direction of Perekop and towards the Dnieper, to reconnoitre the motions of the enemy; for he had received advice that the Khan, with from 30,000 to 40,000 men, had come out of the Crimea, to attempt some enterprise. On the 17th one of the Russian parties fell in with another of Tartars, which they attacked and beat. The prisoners brought into camp said it was true that the Khan had come from behind the lines of Perekop immediately after the Russian army had passed over the steppes; but that, on learning that marshal Lacy had posted himself near Molotschnie-Wodi, he was afraid of his coming to attack him; and that this had determined him to re-enter the Crimea.

On August 9th the Russian fleet, under rear-admiral Bredal, had an affair with that of the Turks. The action came off in this manner. Bredal, having got abreast of the point of Kiskow\* with his fleet, consisting of 100 sail, all double sloops, or other small vessels (the large not having been able to get over the shoals at the mouth of the river Don), perceived some Turkish vessels, which were bearing down on the same point. Upon this he thought fit again to get closer into shore, and to come to anchor in a convenient place. Towards two o'clock in the afternoon the whole Turkish fleet appeared in the offing. It consisted of two men-of-war, thirteen galleys, and forty-seven half-galleys; and one of the ships bore the Capitan Bashaw's flag. Bredal took all the measures necessary for a good defence. He made some of his vessels warp in yet closer to the land, and at the same time armed a battery on shore of fifteen guns, carrying from three to twelve-pound balls. At five

\* This is probably the promontory called the spit of Berutchi on modern charts.

N 3

182

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

o'clock the cannonade began with equal briskness on both sides, and lasted till eight o'clock; when the Turks' fire slackened, and soon after they retreated out of gunshot. The Russian ships suffered very little, almost all the Turkish shot having gone high.*

At eight o'clock the next morning the Turks returned to the attack. The ship that carried the Bashaw's flag was that which ventured the nearest to the Russian fleet, and kept up a hot fire upon it. But this was returned with such effect from the gun-boats and the shore-battery, that he was obliged to draw off, together with the whole fleet, after an engagement of three hours. The Capitan Bashaw's ship, and some other of the Turkish vessels, were much damaged. On the part of the Russians there were not above thirty men in all killed and wounded. The Turkish fleet remained till noon of the 11th in sight of the Russian, and then, weighing anchor, got into the offing, taking an eastward course. Some time elapsing without any news of the enemy, Bredal on the 20th detached a sloop, which brought back word that, having proceeded as far as the river Berda, she had not seen a single vessel of the enemy. Some days afterwards advice came that their fleet had passed the straits†, and got into Caffa.

In the beginning of the month of September count Lacy quitted his camp at Molotschnie-Wodi, and resumed his route to the Ukrain. The Tartars, very glad at seeing

* The Russian shore-battery was probably on the cliff to the north of Yenitchi; and the fire of this would tell so much upon the Turks, that they would naturally be induced above all things to try to silence it. Very probably the battery had been constructed by Lacy for the defence of the strait of Yenitchi, and all that Bredal did was to put some guns into it. He could hardly have had time to do more.

† Of Yenikalč.

THE TURKS BESIEGE OCKZAKOW.

183

him take his departure, let him go without harassing him on his march. In the month of October he arrived on the frontiers of Russia, and sent his troops into winter-quarters along the Don and Donetz. His own he took up at Charkow. Here I cannot help mentioning a very curious circumstance that, in the course of this campaign, occurred in the Russian army. I have it from the marshal himself. While he was on the march to the Crimea there was one day discovered near the camp a spring of yellowish coloured water with a slightly bitter taste. A great number, officers as well as soldiers, under the pressure of thirst, drank some of it. A little while after all who had done so appeared drunk and stupefied. The marshal was terribly alarmed at this: he was afraid of losing his troops before they had seen the enemy. But a few hours of sleep relieved them. They had nothing come of it but a diarrhoea, which lasted some hours. There are, it seems, springs of this kind on the frontier of Persia, in the direction of Kisliar.

One of the most considerable events in the course of the year 1737 was the siege of Ockzakow, which the Turks undertook towards the end of the autumn, and which they were compelled to raise by the gallant defence of general Stoffeln.

The Turks, who had not been able to gain any advantage over the Russians during the whole summer, conceived hopes of better success in the autumn, now that at the beginning of October the Russian army was already on the other side of the Borysthenes (Dnieper). They resolved then on the siege of Ockzakow.

But before I enter on an account of this siege I must go a little back. I have already, when relating the reduction of Ockzakow by the Russian army, observed that the town had been reduced to ashes, and that the garrison had been obliged to encamp behind the walls,

N 4

184

MEMOIRS OF RUSSIA.

for want of houses to lodge in. From the first instant
of taking possession they had been employed on nothing
but making all the possible arrangements for convenience
and defence. I also stated that the town of Ockzakow
was situated in the middle of a desert, where not only all
materials for the building of houses, but even the necessa-
ries of life, were wanting. Great care had indeed been
taken to send everything of that kind from Russia by the
flotilla. But the falls of the Dnieper and bad weather
generally hindered the boats from arriving in time, so that
the garrison suffered extremely by the delay. Besides
which, it was obliged to work without respite at the con-
struction of lodgements for the winter, and at completing
the lines designed to be carried quite round the place from
the Liman, or mouth of the river, to the Black Sea.

These great fatigues, combined with the scanty sus-
tenance of the soldiers, and the exhalation from so many
corpses buried under the ruins, did not fail to cause great
sickness. The garrison, which had been 8000 men strong,
saw itself, by the end of September, reduced to 5000, of
whom too there were above 1000 sick. Such was the
condition of the garrison with which Stoffeln stood
this memorable siege.

The enemy had from time to time sent out parties, which
always kept at a distance without attempting anything
beyond the carrying off some cattle; so that the garrison
remained quiet enough, as far as the Turks were concerned,
till the 17th of October; when for the first time some
Turkish vessels came to anchor a cannon-shot off Kinburn.
There however they did not stay more than two hours, in
the fear of being attacked by the Russian fleet, which was
then in the port of Ockzakow. They made sail again, and
met with a severe storm.

On October 19th, towards midnight, a large detachment

INVESTMENT OF OCKZAKOW.

185.

of the Turkish cavalry approached the new redoubt erected near the Liman, and dismounting, thought to surprise the garrison; but having been discovered, they were received by a well-sustained fire, which obliged them to retreat precipitately. Their expedition had not, however, been quite in vain, for they found means to carry off near 100 oxen that were grazing before the lines.

On the 24th Stoffeln received advice by a Cossack party that the enemy was not above ten leagues from Ockzakow; upon which he redoubled his vigilance and care for putting everything into the best condition possible for making a vigorous defence. He held a council of war with the officers of the garrison, in which it was resolved to defend the place to the last extremity, and neither to take nor give quarter.

On the 26th the enemy's vanguard appeared before Ockzakow. In the night the place was invested on the land side; and the next day (the 27th) the whole Turkish army came to an encampment at a cannon-shot and a half from the glacis. Scarce had they pitched their tents when some detachments advanced to threaten the redoubts; others skirmished with the Cossacks under colonel Kapnist. Kapnist had taken care to rest his rear upon the glacis, so as to prevent the enemy's surrounding him, and by his good position kept them effectually in check. The rest of the army without much loss of time fell to opening the trenches in broad daylight, made some retrenchments, and armed some batteries; and this with so much diligence, that they opened fire and threw shells the following night.

The enemy's army was composed of 20,000 Turks and 20,000 Tartars; the seraskier Jentzch Ali Bashaw, the Khan of the Crimea, Begli-Gheri, and the Sultan of Bielogorod having the command of it.