# I. Introduction

Our subject, TECHNOLOGY AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GENERAL WAR, is the central theme of perhaps the greatest of the great debates of our time: "What is the best formula for achieving national security?" This debate has gone forward with intensity for over seven years and has, if anything, become more vociferous recently. The debate is bound to go forward regardless of the nature of governmental decisions on means of implementation. The world revolution of our mid-twentieth century will assure that accepted conclusions of yesterday will continue to be questioned today and discarded tomorrow during the period of our generation, if only because technology has made absolute security impossible, and this is the era of a technological revolution.

The subject is vital. But, rather than the vital nature of the subject, two other reasons probably underlie the intensity of this debate. First, the conclusions accepted determine the type and scope of an enormous impact of taxes and personal service on our citizenry. Secondly, the most expert, and often the loudest, voices in the discussion are parties having either personal or institutional interests, or both, in the nature of the conclusions. This problem does not lend itself to presentation before a supreme court. Nor does it lend itself to field maneuvers, command post exercises, or other laboratory-type tests, if only because the actions and reactions of the world's 2.7 billion people to a general war cannot be "war-gamed" with any useful degree of certainty.

# II. U. S. Attention to Military Thought

The military philosophy, the generally accepted tenets of what is now called national security, of any country are materially determined by historical experience, national traditions, and the ways of thinking in nonmilitary matters. In the U.S. case, we are still conditioned by some of the instincts of a frontier society, even though in materialistic matters we are the most advanced portion of civilization. Our educational system, with its responsibility for underwriting mass production, a rising standard of living and continual technological advance, is thereby inevitably somewhat on the pragmatistic side. Our interests and way of analysis in military and other national security matters tend to be likewise on the pragmatic side. Since military and national security matters are rarely directly contributory to the way of life we have, and to which we aspire, this pragmatism turns to a search for formulae which by positive and specifically defined actions bring simple, well-defined answers to existent or anticipated national security problems. There is little, if anything, in our national background that conditions us to planning and preparation on the presumption of an era of perpetual crisis; or of accepting anything less than clearly defined total success in any military or national security project. The rather well-worn thesis that in successful diplomacy there are no victories and no defeats is not very acceptable to our people or to much of our leadership in the national security area. Perhaps we don't know victory when we experience it?

1

American military thought has been most influenced, and certainly most publicized, by the doer and the pragmatist. We have produced no Clausewitz and only one Mahan. The subtleties of the use of military force for the achievement of the sound ends of that force, which are non-military objectives, have not attracted sufficient attention. Any concept other than full victory has been largely incomprehensible to Americans. It is questionable that there is general understanding of the high probability that in modern war there is no victory, only differing degrees of damage and cost. This is true, in spite of sober statements by responsible leadership such as that by the Chief of Staff of the U. S. Air Force, General Twining, that: "For the first time in history, no head of state, whether democracy or dictatorship, can promise the man on Main Street clear-cut and certain victory in war." (Speech at Air Force Association Convention, San Francisco, 12 August 1955.)

The influence of intellectuals in the military service has been limited. Among them the only American I mention here, Admiral Mahan, was an officer of my sister service. Sailing on what Lord Bryce called our "summer sea" in foreign affairs, due to our detached "fool-proof" position, we feel that the influence of these intellectuals has been on succeeding generations rather than on contemporaries. In this world of racing change, levered forward by technology and other forces, there is a greatly increased danger that such a lag in military thought will be disastrous. For instance, American military thinking has been greatly conditioned by the German military philosophy, such as the doctrine of Cannae: the tactical objective of annihilation which has now been listed as a principle of war by the Soviet military. Is this applicable? Some men apply purely military principles to problems of national policy.¹ Those who come late to an interest in military problems tend to grasp at such things as the classical principles of war in their barest forms. But these were originally identified and enunciated as guides to tactics and battle strategy, not to strategy for national security.

¹ The principles now emphasized by the American, British, French, and Russian military forces follow. The American list contains 9 principles, the British 10, the French 3, and the Russian 10. Frequently the titles differ, but the inherent concepts are substantially in accord. Comparable principles of the four nations, not necessarily listed in order of importance, are: (1) Objective (United States), Selection and Maintenance of the Aim (British), Advance and Consolidation (Russian); (2) Offensive (United States, Russian), Offensive Action (British); (3) Unity of Command (United States), Cooperation (British), Combined Arms (Russian); (4) Mass (United States), Concentration of Force (British), Concentration of Effort (French), Concentration (Russian); (5) Economy of Force (United States, Russian), Economy of Effort (British); (6) Maneuver (United States), Flexibility (British), Liberty of Action (French), Maneuver and Initiative (Russian); (7) Surprise (United States, British, French), Surprise and Deception (Russian); (8) Security (United States, British), Adequate Reserves (Russian); (9) Simplicity (United States); (10) Maintenance of Morale (British); (11) Administration (British); (12) Annihilation (Russian).
(From: *Notes on the Principles of War*, by Colonel V. J. Esposito, Department of Military Art and Engineering, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.)

2

In our current era, when each and every year is critical by itself, there is a real
need for maximum intellectual effort in the area of military and national security mat-
ters. A significant portion of our citizenry, over two-thirds of our huge budget,¹ and
a major portion of our scientific research and development are devoted to these mat-
ters. Ours is a continual rendezvous with destiny. Possibly civil-
ization is at stake due, in great part but not entirely, to the march of technology. It
is unfortunate in some ways that most professionally trained minds in this area are
hampered by being tagged inevitably as partisans in the great debate I have mentioned.
But we are fortunate that those who have the knowledge and the sense of responsibility
have not been completely bound to an organization and centralized supreme command
with authority to make long lasting determinations. Debate and dissension may be less
worse than clear-cut, but wrong, decisions on direction of policy in the obscurities of
an era of revolutionary change. This situation, however, is all the more reason for
an interest in the problem by the best intellectual capabilities of our social scientists.

### III. Method of Approach to this Subject

Let me make clear that my views do not present any policy or way of thought of
any agency of our government and, if some of my statements happen to be similar to
policies or views expressed by some of our policy making officials, the similarity is
coincidental. Since so much has been said there are bound to be coincidences.

This paper had the choice between either digging a post hole in one part of the sub-
ject or plowing a broad field. I choose the broad field and the objective of identifying
some bench marks and reference areas from which I hope my colleagues will launch
themselves - not at the paper but in extension of it.

Specifically, this discussion is a background, framework and launching platform
for certain propositions pertaining to technology and general war, each with a brief
discussion.

Our subject does not lend itself to a statement of unqualified conclusions, other
than the conclusion that here there are no absolutes. So it is with social phenomena.
A proffered conclusion that leaves even a small gamble unmentioned is an ill deed to
our country. Any gamble permitted is the risk of our way of life for ourselves and com-
ing generations. It is also the risk of the civil way of life called "freedom" for hundreds
of millions who now possess it or might someday attain it. When such is the stake we
may do well to pay careful attention to risks alleged to be of low probability. I make
this statement, admittedly defensively, to caution those who would confine this discus-
sion to an atomic Armageddon. Such a megaton conflagration could occur, of course,
and might well be the final general war of our civilization. Any then succeeding "gener-
al war" would be limited by the residual technology to military operations with sticks
and stones as weapons.

¹ The U. S. national security budgets equal or exceed the total production of any other country in the free world except Britain and France.

3

Our difficulties in this subject include knowing what is meant by the terms used.

#### IV. Technology

By "technology" we mean simply applied science, including military science. Our leaders in thought have, since Hiroshima, reflected often, and in much better phrases than I command, on the "gaps between revolutionary technology and evolutionary man, between cosmic gadgets and conscience."¹ It is common to lament that we have many men of science, too few men of God. But it is pertinent to our subject that technology has made possible most of the tangible aspects of what we consider to be the good life while giving time and opportunities for realization of the intangible values.

Technology, for instance, has made possible the high concentration of population and high standard of living of the Greater New York area. But this victory of technology is a critical vulnerability in war, when assessed against modern destructive possibilities - again the product of technology. The interdependence of communities, nations and areas of the world is a comparatively new contribution of technology, seen against the long sweep of history. It has similarly changed the nature of war, which is always a community project.

This is the technological age in the flow of human history. It overlaps the period of other aspects of the Atomic Revolution. It presages the Age of Terror. The technological surge is paced by and related to other revolutionary surges -- the communist drive, the revolution of nationalism in full blaze in the rimland of Asia (and rising in Africa), the era of the population bomb as well as of the atomic bomb, the implications of automation in production, and probably a revolution in international state boundaries. The combined impact of these several revolutionary surges -- technological, sociological, and political -- clearly poses an unprecedented challenge. It places a fearsome strain on civil men whose vast populations have both the right and the collective capacity to rule themselves.

In the military picture the technological revolution brings unprecedented problems and possibilities. A technological advantage may alone be materially significant in world relations and decisive in war. A major technological breakthrough may shift the military equation, and hence the political and economic equations, decisively. Such a breakthrough can render whole weapons systems, and even whole security programs, obsolescent. The advance of military technology is paced by an increasing complexity of testing, production, and training, with consequent long "lead times" between decisions to adopt security measures and the actual capability to use them. In the interim, political and social changes may make the adopted program of questionable applicability. At the same time a whole world of untried revolutionary methods may become the only instruments possibly usable.

¹ Norman Cousins, *Modern Man Is Obsolete* - Viking, 1945.

4

The past experiences in use of military power are questionable precedents on which to lean, if only because other streams of world revolution, mentioned above, have added something new. The difficult big decisions on military policy, hard enough in times when the coming nature of war was comprehended (although not always correctly), now are decided with much less accurate guidance meters.

And, as final points on this almost unlimited subject of military technology, weapons "systems-in-being" now become almost overriding in determining the military alternatives open to our country in case of world tension or of war. Furthermore, there is an increasing question that the traditional roles and organization of military services, with roots in over a thousand years, are the most appropriate ones for achievement of the military security objective. If we had the capability to utilize management consultants from Mars in a study of our national security organization and allocation of roles, it is highly likely that the resulting report of Martian Management Consultants, Inc. would consign the current organization and assignment of roles to the museum with the cavalry and the cutlass and propose some drastically different arrangement.

## V. Types of War

The uses of the word "war" has changed and expanded from the time when Clausewitz defined war as an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will, the object of which is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. Parenthetically, Clausewitz was careful to indicate that by "destruction" he did not necessarily mean annihilation but rather the putting of enemy forces in a condition such that they can no longer continue to fight. We have had recently a "general cold war", described by Winston Churchill as "all mischief short of war", with only intermittent and limited overt use of military force. Undoubtedly World War II was a general war, pre-atomic type. But it did not involve all the powers called "great" until some time after its initiation. It had approximately a year during which its method of conduct caused it to be called "phony" by some non-belligerents. Nor was it, in the beginning, a "total" war in the sense that the principal belligerents all undertook a maximum effort. Germany, for instance, did not move to total mobilization until after the North African landing. Although available in World War II, lethal gas was not used. Our most recent war, the fourth largest in our country's history, has sometimes been called a "police action". But as it was largely conditioned by the existence of atomic weapons, it might be called the first "atomic war" from the political standpoint. The two countries sometimes called super-powers were involved, one openly, one covertly. So also were most of the European great powers, one of Asia's greatest powers, and many lesser powers. Was this a "general war", modern type? Although the war was localized geographically and, although the most advanced and destructive weapons were available, not all such weapons were used. Perhaps it was a general war.

It does appear that a definition of "general war", even though this phrase is not unusual in both public and official discussion, is difficult. Conceivably the term might be defined as a military clash among states involving a total military effort on the part of the states concerned. Even then there would be no atomic conflagration unless at least two of the opposing powers possessed nuclear weapons, had the capability to deliver them, and chose to use them.

5

It is too easy to give to general war an arbitrary definition somewhat along the line of "direct engagement, using all available forces of the two principal allied power blocs in the world." This currently unlikely situation must certainly be considered and is a major conditioning factor of our military policy. But even concentrating only on this possible situation there are important portions of the likely related progression of events which must be considered: these include the preceding period of tension, the political and military aspects incident to getting to the situation envisaged by the foregoing definition, the respective objectives of belligerents (for war, by any modern state, is once again for objectives other than military defeat of the opponent), and the state of civilization (and what to do about it) as active hostilities subside.

The suggestion which I understand Professor Hans Morgenthau made during a recent series of lectures at Columbia University is worth most serious consideration. He points out the historical fact that the monopoly position of one great power in atomic weapons contributed to a polarizing effect in international affairs. The United States became a sort of focus and switching center for alliances. Now that at least two great powers have such weapons, the effect in international affairs may be more one of repulsion rather than attraction. Hence, applying Professor Morgenthau's line of thought to the above definition of general war, there may come, more and more, to be a contradictory unreality to the concept of a "general", meaning "no holds barred", allied war. This suggestion should not be considered as directed only to those parts of the globe often referred to as the free world, which have raised questions about the meaning of such phrases as "massive retaliation." Perhaps knowledgeable peoples and leadership in so-called satellite countries will also come to feel this atomic repulsion. Why, for instance, should a wise Communist Chinese leadership remain certainly committed to incurring grave damage to a developing economy, when taking distance from a full-scale atomic clash would, at the minimum, mean little loss and might give space to the Arctic Circle for Chinese power and China's expanding hundreds of millions? Perhaps the more "general" a war of the future is envisaged to be in terms of use of weapons, the less general it is likely to be in terms of direct initial involvement of countries. At sometime after the initial stage there would most likely be a rush to scavenge the global battlefield as Italy moved in 1940 against France.

## VI. History of Technological Impact on War

At this point in the discussion, let us turn to a look at those historical trends in war and the use of military force, its "changing nature", which are derived primarily from technology. This cursory survey is particularly necessary to combat the traditionalism tending to characterize some of our thinking.

The traditional, but not the only, method of making war has been to neutralize or destroy opposing armed forces and/or people.

To make war, either on offense or defense, a modern state traditionally has had to have in being (1) organized military manpower, (2) weapons, (3) lines of communications

6

[lc]

from the basing facilities to areas of hostilities, and (4) a home base to furnish person-
nel, supplies and the will to war. We are speaking here of the modern state situation
and not of the conditions exploited by Alexander the Great or Tamerlane. The four
components just mentioned are stressed because this categorization lends itself to an
analysis of the effect of technology. Technology has increasingly, since the dawn of
the Industrial Revolution, made possible the release, for long periods, of greater pro-
portions of manpower to a military effort from the business of making a subsistence
living for the national community.

Technology has given increasingly effective weapons, first in dealing with opposing military manpower and later as a counter to opposing weapons. A case can be argued that World War I, despite its human slaughter, was the divide between emphasis on the battle of man against man and of machine against machine. The term "machine" is used here in a very broad connotation to include barbed wire. This transition of emphasis took place a bit earlier in sea warfare. Today, the battle military objective is to kill the machine, either by destroying it directly, or destroying the men who man it. For man -- the only instrument for the managing of other men -- remains both the controller and the ultimate target of military action.

Technology made possible lines of communication that could give sustained support of military force with the increasingly large tonnages required by masses of manpower and hungry military machines. Naval power was the first method of providing sustained lines of communication. Our own country, in the Civil War, pioneered the next great development of military lines of communication--the railroad. The internal combustion engine made possible the maintenance of huge military forces in combat and the maneuver incident thereto.

The march of technology, accelerating since the beginning of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, has brought an increasing economic interdependence among countries; hence an
increasing dependence on lines of communication to other countries in order to support
a military effort and even, as in the case of the UK, for survival from starvation. In
effect, the total military and economic base of almost every modern nation now pre-
sumes resources available from beyond its formal political control.

Lines of communication, while making possible the use of military forces called "modern" during the first half of this century, have also contributed another serious vulnerability in attack and defense. This has occasioned a great expansion in the strategy and tactics of war illustrated by the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. We may, however, be moving into an era when air transport and guided missiles will change both the nature and relative importance of military communications. In this perspective the Korean war could be termed a Border Clash.

The home base only a few generations ago, or less, was not recognized as a com-
ponent to be organized as an integral part of a tactical effort. Now it is the scene of
the main battle in a "one-campaign" war.

The production of increasingly complex weapons and the support of weapons and
forces has placed an increasing requirement on industry. The advance of technology

7

coupled with changes in the art of war had, by the end of World War I, made modern forces and modern warmaking impracticable for states lacking a significant increment of production above the subsistence level. For the past generation at least no state lacking a modern industry has been capable of participating actively in a general war unless it received munitions assistance from an industrialized ally. This trend has continued until today there are only a few states able to manufacture the more complex modern weapons. Extended general participation is difficult in any hostilities contingent on supply arrangements, as well as political and military arrangements, among associating states. Moreover, since transportation and weapons training are now major matters, the technological factor is a lever toward alliances and other readiness arrangements.

Yet, this attraction of states for mutual security complicates and is complicated by the technological situation. Should the producers of the more modern weapons permit them to pass into the possession of smaller states? Are all leaders of small states equally competent to utilize such weapons? When defense against extinction is dependent on the use of such weapons in general war, how do we rationalize our inaction if we fail to press their provision to allies?

The ideological importance of the home base has made it a military objective. Is it the decisive battlefield? Technology has, in our time, provided the airplane, submarine and perhaps the guided missile as machines to transport destruction against this target as well as against lines of communication. One of the comparatively new results of this development, a result not in U.S. traditional thinking and hence given only reluctant attention, is the requirement for disaster control and for emergency re-habilitation in case certain types of general war occur. This requirement might in the future exact far more effort than that devoted to the conventionally military activity.

War may have evolved, due primarily to the advance of technology, from a situation where practically every active participant operated on the cutting edge of the military effort to a condition where only a small proportion of actively engaged individuals so operate, if indeed any do at all. The accompanying requirement for discipline and special organizational and administrative measures among people in civilian clothes is more readily met, in a timely manner, in a police state which already has an apparatus in being. It is not met so readily or so quickly in a democracy. Even as the distinction of a democracy has tended to disappear in the direction of a dictatorship in time of modern war, so also does it tend to disappear in the "garrison state" type of high state-of-readiness. But isn't there a difference between a garrison state and an armed society?

Referring back to the four components of military effort listed above, it is worth serious thought that technology is greatly reducing the vulnerability of manpower, and perhaps of lines of communication, for supporting the most advanced weapons. A war of guided missiles might be predominantly against, and dependent on, weapons and home-bases. One of the difficulties of such a war of long distance megaton destruction will be the imprecision in relating military action to political aims. A few days lag in

8

recognition of victory (whatever that word means in such a situation) might well create
such an insurmountable problem of control and rehabilitation of the defeated, that this
problem alone might well change the course of civilization.

VII. War Objectives

Military objectives in war, like military forces in times short of war, are solely
means to political ends. Throughout modern history the political objectives sought in
war have almost without exception been limited. It is hard to identify any general war,
however the term may be defined, between the campaigns of Tamerlane and the uncon-
ditional surrender objective of World War II, which did not have objectives stopping
somewhat short of complete extinction of the opposition's entity and way of life. For
those who wish to mention Sherman's march through Georgia, the rejoinder is that it
occurred in a local war, albeit the most modern war, measured by the yardsticks of
military art, prior to World War II.

The objectives of wars have been limited for two main categories of reasons.
First, they have been limited for political reasons on the part of both victors and van-
quished, "War", said Clausewitz, "is an instrument of policy." Limited political ob-
jectives tend toward limited wars. Secondly, war has been limited because there was
not a capability to achieve and exploit a total victory at a cost at all acceptable to de-
cision makers -- principally because of the stage of technology. These two reasons
are worthy of lengthy discussion but space permits only a few suggestions for analysis.

Now the technological dimension of feasible war objectives has been relaxed so it
is much less of a restriction. Modern military power now overleaps natural barriers
which were useful insulation only recently. Small states, and even large ones having
their nerve centers of industry and political direction concentrated in a few spots, can
conceivably be paralyzed in a few hours. Distance alone becomes progressively less
and less of a barrier to destruction and the only counters are defensive measures on a
level of technology matching the attack. Even the technologically modern defense may,
however, be ineffective unless distance is available for its deployment.

Technology has caused a social and economic way of life which is, in turn, most
vulnerable to the technology of modern destruction. Yet we must not confuse objectives.
There are two: men and machinery of production and destruction. We can destroy
mankind, can we destroy the race? Will someone survive? Populations no longer have
the potential they once possessed in passive and irregular resistance to an enemy. In
1776 the American farmer and his rifle could be placed in the same league with the
British infantryman and his weapon. Now the technology and art of war make a civilian
population almost powerless. In Alexander's time, and even in Napoleon's, the tech-
niques existed to destroy effective opposing military power but not to exploit total vic-
tory politically. Now the techniques of police power, the technology of communications
and propaganda, give the possibility of consolidating the fruits of victory in a general
war, rather than reverting to a rearranged balance of power system as has been the
case after every modern general war until World War II.

9

The relaxation of the technological limitation on both military possibilities and political war objectives needs study from the standpoint of the effect on freedom of action of political leadership in any hostilities, whether categorized as limited or general. Not long ago there were usually fairly definite limitations to victory. Possibilities existed of retaining some negotiating position in defeat. Now with a wide spectrum of choice in use of military force the statesmen of democratic countries have a new problem in pressures and criticisms from their peoples concerning conduct of active military operations. Consider, for instance, the difficulties which would have faced the U.S. Government if it had chosen an objective in World War II somewhat short of the temporary complete demise of Germany. Or, as another example, the public soul searching and questioning in the U.S. during the Korean War was not the type of factor likely to concern Soviet or Chinese communist leaderships within their respective countries. And consider the differing weights likely to be given the same factors by a dictatorial leadership of a police state, compared to a democratic leadership, in assessing a course of action risking major destruction on the homeland.

In considering the effect of technology on political objectives once hostilities have begun, we need careful analysis of the alternatives, and consequent likely choices, of a national leadership faced by the threat of extinction of itself, or its way of life, or both. This was the situation presented to the Hitler leadership of Germany in the late summer of 1944. Under such circumstances there is a reasonable probability that the leadership would exert its complete capability in nuclear effort before giving way to the opponent's objective. While one can argue that millions of casualties and tens of billions of destruction can be accepted for adequate fruits of victory, a pattern of political objectives triggering a kamikaze atomic effort from the enemy is far more sobering than the Japanese kamikaze program, which was hurtful enough.

Following the time-worn truth that he who presses an enemy against a closed door must be prepared for a death struggle, one can make a case for the argument that any war of the future between opponents possessing atomic weapons will be either a limited objective war or an atomic Armageddon. For either type there is, if newspaper reports concerning current and future power of weapons are to be accepted, certainly an indefinite zone of atomic saturation beyond which nuclear explosions are merely terrorizing a population already dying. One cannot help wondering whether the advance of technology does not tempt us to concentrate attention on stacking up twice total destruction against total destruction. Speculations in this area and the vocal way we go about them have, according to Chester Bowles in his latest book, contributed materially to the results of a recent public opinion poll in Calcutta, India: 38 percent of those questioned believed the U.S. would start the next war, only 2% felt the USSR would be the starter.

Nearly forty years ago Clemenceau voiced the view that war is too important to be entrusted to generals. Technology now may be making war even too dangerous to be used by responsible statesmen in pursuit of national objectives. Our own President has indicated his views to the effect that war is an anachronism in the world and that general

10

war is suicidal. Over two years ago (March 12, 1954) Malenkov stated in a speech
that a new war with modern arms would mean the "destruction of civilization". Even
though Malenkov has now ceased to be the main mouthpiece for Soviet policy, it may be
that Soviet policy still holds to his view. Some, both laymen and experts, now turn to
total dependence on deterrent atomic power, trusting that "safety will be the sturdy
child of terror". ¹ Others argue that complete dependence on atomic deterrence is a
blinded approach ignoring the numerous alternative use of armed force available
under a mutual atomic stalemate and also failing to allow for needed flexibility in a
future that no one can see. Still others take refuge in conclusions that regulation of
armaments or world government are just around the corner.

We should not charge our predicament entirely to technology. Dr. Shotwell has
provided a summary, yet very searching statement taking into account changes in soc-
iety, of why war may be an anachronistic instrument of statecraft.

"Now ... war is as uncertain in its direction as in its intensity, or
its spread. It is no longer a safe instrument for statesmanship...
In short, war which was once a directable instrument of policy has
now changed its nature with the nature of modern society and ceases
to be controllable and directable... it becomes a contagion among
the nations; and one cannot safely use a contagion as an instrument."

VIII. Some Propositions for Consideration

**Proposition 1:** Total general war in the pattern of World War I and II may not occur again. These wars, dissimilar from any previous modern wars, were not of a pattern consistent with use of existing and projected modern weapons. Moreover, their pattern, including unlimited political objectives, if attempted, would in due course lead to the use of all available power by the coalition apparently losing. For "he who uses force ruthlessly must gain an advantage if the adversary does not do the same. Therefore, each pushes the other to extremes to which the only limit is the strength of resistance of the other side."² Hence, if a conflagration of the nature of the general wars of this century gets underway, the alternatives of outcome are an atomic Armageddon or a politically (or socially) negotiated arrangement less than total victory. The latter alternative places a very great emphasis on political action working against fearsome time deadlines.

**Proposition 2:** While general atomic war is unlikely, it is a definite concept for which it is practicable to estimate and prepare; limited war, on the other hand, is an indefinite concept not lending itself to precise planning and preparations. Parenthetically, it is highly questionable, as indicated below, that we have faced up to such

¹ Winston Churchill

² Clausewitz

11

preparations as those implied, among other places, in Philip Wylie's arresting book, *Tomorrow*. Limited war, either atomic or other, is an infinitely complex concept in the mind of statesmen and people compared to total atomic war. Nevertheless, a precise scientific appraisal extending to the epilogue of an all-out atomic war, may show it to be an even more complex concept than a limited war. But, and here is the proposition for consideration: we must prepare for general atomic war while recognizing, in case of a threat of such war, all existent political, psychological and social forces in the world will almost certainly press action toward a limited war. The corollary is that we need means for the limited war and may be crucially deficient if such means are lacking. The only alternatives are either all or none. Another corollary is that both military and political strategy, in such a limited war situation, will have to be devised, in great part, as events develop. Hence, there is a high premium on prior preparations with military means and military-political organization which give flexibility and choice in actions and which permit rapid and clear estimates and direction.

**Proposition 3:** The new and future nature of military power, and the effects of its use or threat of use, make essential a close coordination and integration of military, political and economic planning and direction.

Such was not a pressing necessity when security expenditures were only a small component of national effort, when military force in action was confined to localized situations and time was permitted for statesmen to debate while the military went about their business. Now the military-political situation can conceivably change markedly in a matter of hours.

The above proposition raises a logical question as to the leadership and the organization for handling crisis situations in a nuclear world. The U.S. military have striven toward preparation of leadership through programs such as the war colleges and civilian graduate schools for officers. Currently, for example, the impact of technology on war can be given major credit or blame for the flow of over 40% of West Point graduates through civilian graduate schools. There is no significant similar training for civilian policy makers. As to organization, this is much too large a subject for this paper and is left with the rhetorical question" Is the Pentagon organized today to deal with an all-out atomic general war, or even the many possibilities inherent in the term "limited war"?

**Proposition 4:** The nature of war, like power, has always been, and now is, what statesmen and peoples think it is until such time as the appearance of the situation has been tested by actual hostilities.

History is full of instances where the appearance, even as interpreted by presumed experts, has proven far different from the reality as demonstrated under the stress of open conflict. Our own very recent experience of strategic surprise in Korea, for example, was also a surprise to our intellectual effort in the security area and must have made a lot of top secret studies look a bit foolish in hindsight. The imponderables and obscurities in assessing the nature of war increase geometrically with the advance of

12

technology and other revolutionary surges in the world. Because history gives pro-
gressively less guide to reality as we move forward in this era of rapid change, we are
increasingly dependent on original, creative and imaginative intellectual effort.

It is quite possible that our accepted guidelines, and consequent programs in se-
curity and international affairs, may diverge far from reality and, if never tested, may
do so safely. But, if such divergence occurs and is so demonstrated by a test, or by
convincing conclusions derived from intellectual effort, we may have national turmoil
and confusion comparable to the scramble out of the morass of neutrality and isolation-
ist thinking in the late thirties and early forties.

Turning to the internal scene, our country has no tradition or historical foundation
on which to base the maintenance of large, ready military power. Nor have we any
appreciable background in the higher education of the current leadership generation or
in other ways for appraising and carrying out our sudden responsibilities for greatness
in a world situation gravely conditioned by the nature of military force and of war. As
an example, our traditional military personnel and pay policies have had to undergo
major change over the last decade and may still have to undergo further shakeups.

The fifth proposition for consideration is not new. It was enunciated in substance
in 1922. Elihu Root spoke of the problems of any democracy required to "stand tall"
in international affairs, being solved with knowledge, stating that otherwise "misrepre-
sentation will have a clear field and ignorance and error will make wild work with for-
eign relations." Over thirty years later Walter Lippmann, in much the same vein,
questioned our research and study in intellectual and social preparation for war. I
know of few intellectual efforts outside of government and government subsidy in the
area of national security and of only one solid educational effort -- the Defense Studies
Program at Harvard. There may be a danger that our national strategy might become
captive to technology rather than to technology and military strategy being the instrument
and servant of national strategy.

Proposition 6: By tradition, historical experience, and the emphasis in popular
information programs, the awareness of the American people concerning technology
and war is unbalanced.

There is great interest in speed and power of military weapons, little public inter-
est, as evidenced by the embryonic civil defense situation, in defense. Yet defense may
now be far more important to a country than a few decades ago when a military strategy
could envisage acceptance of some damage, and even defeat on one border, in order to
mass adequate power for a decisive victory in another area. A recent, and perhaps
classical, example of such a major decision to accept damage to the homeland was the
German von Schlieffen plan of World War I. Even with the limited speed and power of
military force in 1914, the resolution of the German leadership wavered in actual exe-
cution of the plan.

In 1914 the conversion of force from attack to defense, or vice versa, was in con-
siderable part a matter of shifting geographic location and could be accomplished quickly.

13

Now, technology makes any such conversion a matter which has to start from the pro-
duction line, or even the design board. The gap in time and effort and other adjust-
ments to shift divisions from France to Poland in 1914 must be contrasted to the gap
in shifting resources from bomber to Nike, or vice versa.

Continuing with the point on the balance of emphasis given by different statesmen
and peoples to aspects of military technology, there are many states with an historical
background of invasion and of internal military damage. These peoples logically put
more emphasis on questions concerning defense and may have less confidence in the
efficacy of dependence primarily on the psychological shield of atomic deterrence,
particularly when it is beyond their political control.

**Proposition 7:** Technology, time and current philosophies of war, which vary in leadership, may be occasioning a fluidity in international relations which will soon make current theories of international politics as obsolescent as the cavalry horse now is, and as the bomber may become in our lifetime.

It is generally agreed that there has been a recent major shift in method and direc-
tion of communist policy. This shift has been ascribed by at least one informed source,
Mr. Dulles, to the successful methods of U. S. policy. There is really little basis for
denying that U. S. policy has had a great deal to do with this shift. But, and here is a
corollary, perhaps there is an accompanying, and even more important, reason in the
conclusions reached by the Kremlin on technology and nature of general war; that
reason being coupled with conclusions as to the opportunities for exploitation of the
attitudes of opponents and allies. Lenin is recorded as being impressed by Clausewitz's
observation that "A conqueror is always a lover of peace; he would like to make his
entry into our state unopposed". ¹

**Proposition 8:** Over a decade ago at a time when the full threat, complexity, and
obscurity of military technology were receiving even less attention than today, a colla-
borator of our chairman wrote in a book on *Technology and International Relations* that
"we cannot wisely use all the powers of destruction now at our command" (p. 81). This
is a proposition which might receive unquestioning acceptance. The great question of
this decade, worthy of assault by the mass of our best trained intellects, is how we
gain, by decision, psychological and political control over the power now made available
by the non-political genius of mankind.

¹ This and some other references to Clausewitz are discussed in *War As A Continuation of Politics* by Colonel V. J. Esposito, Professor of Military Art and Engineering, U. S. Military Academy, and published at the U. S. Military Academy.

14