SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON'S

"GETTING READY FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM"

A. <u>Underlying Assumptions</u>

1. During coming year GVN will be engaging in open political competition with VC/NLF.

2. US should not wash its hands of the problem.

3. "One should get the opponent to agree to play the game" and then "beat him at the game which he has agreed to play."

4. An NLF shift to political competition is desirable and requires NLF have:

- "increasing cost from the military contest"

- "some chance of benefits from the political contest"

-- i. e. if political competition:

- "insures its continued survival as an organization"

- "offers a reasonable probability of its being able to achieve national power either through political competition or by later reopening a military struggle on more favorable terms."

-- these minimum aims could be achieved for NLF by:

- "NLF participation in a coalition government" and/or

- "by recognition of NLF authority in those areas of the country-
side in which they exercise de-facto control."

5. "It would appear to be clearly in the interest of the US and the GVN. . . to make substantial concession in terms of NLF local control in order to minimize concessions of national power to the NLF."

- On questions of (1) degree of autonomy and authority conferred on NLF local structures and (2) extent of territory in which such NLF authority was recognized, "there is ample room for substantial inducements to the NLF without serious injury to the interests of the US and GVN."

B. Possible Arrangements for Local Control

1. "GVN could be ready to concede any or all of the following:"

- "recognition of the NLF Liberation Committee structure as the only legitimate government of the area."

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- "confirmation of the authority of the existing officials of the Liberation Committee as local officials of the GVN."

- "a guarantee that no subsequent appointments of GVN officials within the local government will be made without the approval of the local authorities."

- "acceptance of the VC/NLF guerrilla-militia units as the Popular Force-Self Defense units in the district."

- "a guarantee that no regular ARVN units will enter the district except with the approval of the local government."

- "recognition of local control over taxes and the uses of tax revenues."

- "recognition by the GVN of the legality of previous NLF Liberation Committee decrees on land tenure and other local issues."

- "provision by the GVN (and US) of material assistance for reconstruction"

- "immediate representation of the district in the Lower House by election of a representative to one of the 63 'unfilled' seats."

2. "NLF should agree to at least the following:"

- "acceptance of the formal authority of the GVN as the national Government"

- "a guarantee of free movement and security in and out of and within the designated districts for all civilians, international observers and civilian GVN officials."

- a guarantee of free movement and security of goods and commerce.

- "acceptance of the functioning within the district of (potentially) selected civilian ministries of the GVN"(e. g. agriculture, education).

C. Acceptability of NLF Local Control

1. Advantages for U.S./GVN:

- Prevents NLF from gaining open foothold in cities; "If the future of Vietnam lies in its cities, it is worthwhile from the US and GVN viewpoint to pay a significant price to minimize the NLF presence in the cities."

- "Local control undermines the image of the NLF as an equal of the Saigon government and instead reduces it to the level, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, of a communal group like the Hoa Hao or Montagnards." The NLF lay claim to the traditional "mandate of heaven." "No matter how much territory or how many people the NLF may control locally, if it allows its claim to be an equal to the government to be undermined, it will suffer a severe setback."

- "In contrast to shared national authority, local control will tend to

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enhance the importance of political competition at the provincial
and local level and to reduce its significance at the national level."

- "The underlying problem in Vietnam has been to bridge the gap between the countryside and the cities." The US has been bridging the gap by inducing substantial migration to the cities and by promoting economic development in rural areas.

2. Acceptability of Local Control to the NLF

- (The US should "trade off local control for national power, to concede a few more villages or districts to the NLF in order to keep control of more Saigon ministries.")

- Provides NLF minimum objectives:

- "reasonably secure base which guarantees its survival and maintains its options for future political and military struggle."

- "reflects existing realities"

- Liberation Committees "purportedly been elected in some 1,000 villages and 10 provinces. Obviously the GVN cannot accept the legitimacy of all these bodies, but . . ."

3. Areas to be Conceded to NLF control

- defined as a result of prolonged negotiation in terms of villages and districts, sometimes hamlets within villages

- districts most readily conceded are identified by inventory based on "the most recent and accurate results of the HES and other sources of information."

D. Constitutional and Legal Changes

1. Article 4 of the GVN Constitution which declares that "the Republic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form and that every activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited." But these phrases can be interpreted to mean almost anything the government wants them to mean, and if an agreement were made for VC and NLF participation in the political system they could easily be ignored."

2. The Election Law of 1967 excludes candidacies of "those who have directly or indirectly worked for communism and pro-communist neutralism or worked in the interests of communism." -- "Presumably these provisions would have to be repealed."

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3. "The next regular Presidential election is scheduled for September 1971. Under the Constitution it would, however, be possible to have a new Presidential election before that date if the President resigned his office before November 1, 1970 or if both President and Vice President resigned between November 1, 1970 and the regularly scheduled election in September 1971." -- "These provisions would make it possible within the framework of the Constitution, to agree with the NLF to have new presidential elections at almost any time, provided (and it may be a big proviso!) that Thieu and Ky can be persuaded to resign."

4. A number of changes could be made in the 1967 election laws without amending the Constitution.

S.F.K.

Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam

Samuel P. Huntington

## Summary

### I. A Strategy for Political Competition

The US needs to develop a strategy for political competition in Vietnam to supplement its military and diplomatic strategies and to be closely geared to those strategies. The US will have a significant although less important role to play in political competition than it has in military and diplomatic conflicts. A political strategy, unlike the military and diplomatic strategies, has a double goal: to persuade the enemy to compete politically and then to beat him at that competition.

### II. National Power and Local Control: Incentives to Play the Game

The NLF will want an extensive share of national power and full local control of the areas it dominates. It is in the interest of the US and GVN to trade local control for national power. The NLF can be permitted to have a substantial degree of autonomous control of substantial rural areas without serious damage to US-GVN interests.

### III. Political Competition: Arenas and Influences

Low levels of political competition are likely in NLF-controlled rural areas, communal-controlled rural areas, and the district and provincial towns. Political competition in the metropolitan centers will be continuing and intense but not polarized. Competition in the contested rural areas will be intense, polarized, but temporary, as one group or another will establish predominance quickly. Hence US efforts to develop political organizations should be concentrated in those areas.

The three crucial elements in a political competition are:
(a) the rules of the game; (b) the number and identity of the players; and
(c) the resources which they have at their disposal. The US can influence these in descending order.

### IV. Fixing the Rules of the Game: The Electoral System

Electoral laws significantly affect the outcomes of political competition. The Vietnamese constitution permits considerable flexibility

in setting up an electoral system. Voting in Vietnam has been highly fragmented, and under the existing electoral system the NLF would have serious advantages. Vote fragmentation has been associated with: (a) low levels of group cohesion; (b) high levels of urbanization; and (c) high district magnitudes. Reducing district magnitude should reduce the fragmentation. A single-seat plurality system would accomplish this goal, but also would reduce proportionality and pose electoral risks to both GVN and NLF. A run-off majority system with multi-member districts would offer the best mix of pay-offs in terms of proportionality, cohesion, and minimizing NLF opportunities to manipulate the system.

## V. The Players and How We Can Help Them

The postwar Vietnamese party system will reflect the strength of the NLF and the degree of coalescence by non-communist groups. A one-and-a-half party system would be most desirable from the US viewpoint but a four or five party multi-party system seems most likely.

Local political competition will be intense in contested rural districts and the metropolitan centers. In the former competition will decrease rapidly as one group -- the NLF, for non-communist -- establishes effective control. Consequently, the US should give top priority to short-run projects to build non-communist organizations in these districts, with particular attention to the role of communal groups and small Intellectuals.

In the metropolitan centers competition will continue to intensify over a number of years. The cities will be susceptible to mass movements and will be the center of opposition to the government. It is consequently crucially important to encourage non-communist opposition leaders and groups and to prevent the NLF from monopolizing the urban opposition to the government.

Among the political resources which the GVN and the US can employ to counter the organizational strength of the NLF are: (a) popular, charismatic candidates; (b) the mass media, and (c) opportunities for constituent service by existing assemblymen.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Dean Moor
THROUGH: Richard Sneider
SUBJECT: Professor Huntington's Plan for a Political Settlement in Vietnam

Attached is a letter from Sam Huntington enclosing a very interesting exploration of some of the far out possibilities for a political accommodation in South Vietnam. Sven Kraemer has prepared a brief outline of Huntington's paper (Tab C).

A copy of Huntington's proposals found its way to the Under Secretary of State and was the subject of a critical commentary from State's East Asian Bureau. The State critique centered around the exceptional concessions required of the GVN in Huntington's approach. (Tab D)

It is possible, of course, that we will need to do some thinking along these lines ourselves in the future, and if we do, Huntington's paper will provide some useful angles. (Tab B) We shall keep a copy in our files with that possibility in mind.

Recommendation: That you sign the reply at Tab A.

Coord. in draft: RLSneider (3/25/69)

C. F.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1969

Dear Sam,

Thank you for forwarding the final version of your
paper, "Getting Ready for Political Competition
in South Vietnam."

I am hopeful that my schedule will afford an
opportunity before long to discuss the study with
you.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington
Harvard University X
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 8, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Dean Moor
THROUGH: Richard Sneider
SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of Vietnam Study sent by Samuel Huntington

Professor Samuel Huntington at Harvard has sent you the complete and final version of his paper prepared for A. I. D. on "Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam." (Tab B)

For your information, copies are attached of your earlier correspondence with Professor Huntington concerning the earlier version of his study and of the Department of State's critique of the exceptional concessions required of the GVN in Huntington's proposals. (Tab C)

RECOMMENDATION:

ACTION

March 27, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Dean Moor

THROUGH: Richard Sneider

(Tab D)

Coord. in draft: RLSneider (3/25/69)
Secretariat - 2

WH file - 1

DM:mlb (3/26/69)

DM:wp (3\Sp\p0)

WH file - $

Secretariat - 7
Coord. in draft: RTSneider (3\Sp\p0)

files with that possibility in mind.
will provide some useful angles. (Tap B) We shall keep a copy in our
these lines ourselves in the future, and if we do, Huntington's paper
It is possible, of course, that we will need to do some thinking along

cessions required of the GAV in Huntington's approach. (Tap D)

Asian Bureau. The State critique centered around the exceptional con-
of State and was the subject of a critical commentary from State's East

Huntington's paper (Tap C).

THROUGH: Richard Sieber

FROM: Dean Moor

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

March 31, 1969

ACTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>SUMMARY</td><td>i</td></tr><tr><td>I. Planning for Political Competition</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>II. National Power and Local Control: Incentives to Play the Game</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>A. Local Control as an Inducement to Political Competition</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>B. Possible Arrangements for Local Control</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>C. Extent of Area to be Subject to NLF Local Control</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>D. Advantages for U. S. -GVN of Local Control</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>E. Acceptability of Local Control to NLF</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>III. Political Competition: Arenas and Influences</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>A. Arenas of Competition</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>B. Factors Affecting Outcomes of Competition</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>IV. Fixing the Rules of the Game: The Electoral System</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>A. Electoral Laws Make a Difference</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>B. The Vietnamese Constitution Permits Great Flexibility in the Electoral System</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>C. Voting is Highly Fragmented in Vietnam but Changes in District Magnitude can Significantly Affect the Degree of Fragmentation</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>D. A Shift in the Vietnamese Electoral System to a Multi-Member Run-Off Majority System Would Reduce the Probability of the NLF Receiving Disproportionate Representation in the National Assembly</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>V. The Players and How We Can Help Them</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>A. Coalitions of National Players: Parties and Party Systems</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>B. Arenas of Local Competition</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>C. The Contested Rural Areas: Monopolizing Control</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>D. Metropolitan Centers: Monopolizing Opposition</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>E. Techniques of Political Appeal</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>VI. A Program for Political Competition</td><td>79</td></tr></tbody></table>

FINAL DRAFT

3/7/69

# Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam

Samuel P. Huntington

## SUMMARY

### I. Planning for Political Competition

The U.S. needs to develop a strategy for political competition in Vietnam to supplement its military and diplomatic strategies and to be closely geared to those strategies. The U.S. will have a significant although less important role to play in political competition than it has in military and diplomatic conflicts. A political strategy, unlike the military and diplomatic strategies, has a double goal: to persuade the enemy to compete politically and then to beat him at that competition.

The NLF will want an extensive share of national power and full local control of the areas it dominates. It is in the interest of the U.S. and GVN to trade local control for national power. The NLF can be permitted to have a substantial degree of autonomous control of substantial rural areas without serious damage to U.S.-GVN interests.

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another will establish predominance quickly. Hence U.S. efforts to develop political organizations should be concentrated in those areas.

(a) the rules of the game;

The U.S. can influence these in descending order.

(c) high district magnitudes.

The postwar Vietnamese party system will reflect the strength of the NLF and the degree of coalescence by non-communist groups. A one-and-a-half party system would be most desirable from the U.S. viewpoint but a four or five party multi-party system seems most likely.

Local political competition will be intense in contested rural districts and the metropolitan centers. In the former, competition will

- ii -

decrease rapidly as one group -- communist or non-communist -- establishes effective control. Consequently, the U.S. should give top priority to short-run projects to build non-communist organizations in these districts, with particular attention to the role of communal groups and small intellectuals.

Among the political resources which the GVN and the U.S. can employ to counter the organizational strength of the NLF are:

(b) the mass media, and

## VI. A Program for Political Competition

1. Establishment of channels for regular U.S. -GVN consultation on political competition.

2. Review of USAID and JUSPAO programs for their effects on political competition.

3. Amendment of existing electoral law to provide for run-off elections.

4. Survey, identification, and support of key political "building blocks" in highly contested rural areas.

5. Preparation for rapid introduction of anti-communist political cadres into contested rural areas.

6. Laying the groundwork for a moderate, non-communist urban opposition.

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FINAL DRAFT

3/7/69

IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. PLANNING FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

For three years the United States has encouraged the South Vietnamese to develop the constitutional framework, electoral process, political institutions, and administrative machinery required for a legitimate, responsible, and effective political system. Simultaneously the U.S. has been fighting a major war and carrying out a military strategy designed to provide minimal security against invasion and subversion. In April 1968, a second, diplomatic, front was added to the military competition, and it became necessary for the U.S. to devise and to apply a negotiating strategy for the Paris talks with Hanoi. At some point during the coming year, it appears likely that the conflict will be extended to a third, political, level as the GVN and the groups associated with it engage in open political competition with the VC and NLF. At this point the political progress and preparation of the past three years will be put to the test.

The purpose of this paper is to identify, in a very preliminary

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way, * some of the problems involved in this political competition and the factors affecting its outcome and to suggest the outlines of a strategy for the U.S. to follow and for the U.S. to urge upon the GVN.

Three points affecting this discussion should be made clear at the outset.

**First.** While the U.S. has played the overwhelmingly dominant role in shaping allied strategy on the military and diplomatic levels, it will play a much less important role in shaping strategy on the political level. Ideally, it might well be desirable for the U.S. to play no role whatsoever in the political competition, but to leave the determination of the rules of the game and the playing of the game to be worked out by the GVN and the VC-NLF, with the U.S. confining itself to negotiating with Hanoi the arrangements to end the military conflict. Such a situation has many attractions, not the least being avoidance of deeper U.S. involvement in the subtleties and complexities of Vietnamese politics.

*This paper is based on brief talks with perhaps a dozen Washington officials and casual reference to a few documents. It clearly is only the beginning of a consideration of a subject which deserves much closer attention than it has thus far received.

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(ic)

Yet, it is extremely dubious whether the U.S. can, in fact,
duck the issue so neatly. It is also highly debatable whether it
should even try. Much of our grief in Vietnam has come about
as a result of our alternating policies of deep involvement in and
then withdrawal from Vietnamese politics. During the late 1950s
and again immediately after the fall of Diem, for instance, we
consciously refrained from taking action to shape the course of
Vietnamese political development. The results in one case were
the alienation of the Government from its people and in the other the
virtual disintegration of the system into coups and chaos, each of
which then led to renewed intervention by the U.S. to compensate
for the effects of its earlier abstention.

Since early 1966, we have played an active role in attempting
to develop a viable political system in South Vietnam. The accom-
plishments have been substantial. These accomplishments, plus
the American stake in the political future of Vietnam, plus the
sacrifices and costs which we have incurred in the effort over the
past three years to influence that future -- all dictate against another
phase of withdrawal, washing our hands of the problem, and limiting
ourselves to the military and diplomatic sides of the conflict. On

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the other hand, it is clear that the South Vietnamese role in shaping
the political competition and in engaging in that competition will be
much more important than it has been in the military and diplomatic
struggles.

**Second.** At the present time the struggle is going on simultane-
ously on the diplomatic and military fronts. This imposes a need
to coordinate negotiating strategy and military strategy. It is possible
that the military and diplomatic struggles will end before the political
competition in South Vietnam really gets underway. It is also possible
and even likely that the political competition will go on simultaneously
with negotiations at the diplomatic level. Some more overt forms of
political competition are already getting underway long before the
achievement of a military cease-fire. Undoubtedly all three forms
of competition will continue to overlap in the coming months. But,
also, undoubtedly, political competition will tend to become more
important and the military and diplomatic struggles less important.
Hence, U.S. military and diplomatic actions should be increasingly
shaped by the effects which they will have on the political competition.

**Third.** The problem of formulating a strategy for political com-
petition is more complex than those involved in formulating military
or diplomatic strategies. In the latter, the goal is simply to win as

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much as possible from the opponent in the struggles on the battle-
field and at the negotiating table. In devising a political strategy,
however, the first requirement is get the opponent to agree to play
the game, that is, to work out an agreement on the rules, and then,
secondly, to beat him at the game which he has agreed to play.

This is obviously a subtle and tricky business, requiring a complex
balance of inducements and guarantees for both sides.

(10)

## II. NATIONAL POWER AND LOCAL CONTROL:
### INCENTIVES TO PLAY THE GAME

#### A. Local Control as an Inducement to Political Competition

The NLF's principal incentive to engage in political competition is the beating it is getting in the military competition. If, however, political competition offered at best only an equal chance of losing, it could well conclude that the best course was to continue the military fight in which it would retain greater freedom of action to adjust its tactics and level of operations to its own convenience. An NLF shift to political competition, in short, requires not only increasing costs from the military contest but also some chance of benefits from the political contest. At a minimum, it seems likely that the NLF will agree to participate in political competition only if the structure of that competition:

(1) insures its continued survival as an organization;

(2) offers some probability of its being able to achieve national power either through political competition or by later reopening a military struggle on more favorable terms.

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(10)

These minimum aims could be achieved by a negotiated agreement for NLF participation in a coalition government (presumably headed by a neutralist but including some elements now in the GVN) and/or by acceptance of NLF authority in those areas of the countryside where they exercise de facto control. The NLF would probably be prepared to sacrifice some elements of local control in order to achieve a greater share in national power. It would appear to be clearly in the interest of the U. S. and the GVN, however, to make substantial concessions in terms of NLF local control in order to minimize concessions of national power to the NLF. These concessions could cover:

(a) the degree of autonomy and authority conferred on NLF local structures; and

(b) the extent of the territory in which such NLF hegemony was recognized.

At both these levels there is ample room for substantial inducements to the NLF without serious injury to the interests of the U. S. and GVN.

## B. Possible Arrangements for Local Control

The past two years have seen an accelerating trend toward the decentralization of power and authority in the Vietnamese political

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system. Simultaneously, economic development, population movements, the growth of a rural market economy, improvements in transportation and communication, all have tended to multiply the linkages between rural and urban areas. Economic integration has been the partner of political decentralization. The extension of both these processes to the areas currently controlled by the NLF would provide a basis for the immediate political autonomy and physical security which the NLF will demand and, at the same time, prepare the way for the incorporation of those areas into the national economy which will eventually undermine the NLF power base.

The processes of economic integration complement political decentralization in non-NLF areas and also reduce the risks of granting autonomy to NLF areas. Clearly, however, there are some limits beyond which the GVN cannot go in granting local autonomy. Any such arrangement would require insurance against continued infiltration of military forces and equipment from the North into NLF-controlled areas. In addition, the NLF presumably would have to agree to at least the following:

(1) acceptance of the formal authority of the GVN as the national government;

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(10)

(2) a guarantee of free movement in and out of and security within the designated districts for all civilians, including local population, international peace-keeping observers (if such should be created), and civil officials of the Saigon Government;

(3) a guarantee of the free movement and security of goods and commerce in and out of and within the district;

(4) acceptance of the functioning within the district of (potentially selected) civilian ministries of the Saigon Government such as agriculture, health, and education.

In return for these concessions by the NLF, the GVN could be prepared to concede any or all of the following:

(1) recognition of the NLF Liberation Committee structure as the legitimate local government of the area;

(2) confirmation of the authority of the existing officials of the Liberation Committee as local officials of the GVN;

(3) a guarantee that no subsequent appointments of GVN officials within the local government will be made without the approval of the local authorities (a concession comparable to those which the GVN has in the past made to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao);

- 10 -

(4) acceptance of the VC-NLF guerilla-militia units as the Popular Force-Self Defense units of the district (as has also been done with Hoa Hap and other communal units);

(5) a guarantee that no regular ARVN units will enter the district except with the approval of the local government (again a commitment somewhat like those made to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in some provinces);

(6) recognition of local control over taxes and the uses of tax revenues (a principle already being applied within GVN-controlled rural areas);

(7) recognition by the GVN of the legality of previous NLF-Liberation Committee decrees on land tenure and other local issues;

(8) provision by the GVN (and ultimately, presumably, the U. S.) of material assistance for reconstruction in the district;

(9) immediate representation of NLF districts in the lower house of the National Assembly by election of representatives to the 63 "unfilled" seats.

### C. Extent of Area to be Subject to NLF Local Control

The areas to be conceded to NLF local control would undoubtedly have to be defined in terms of villages and districts, although in some

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cases, particularly in the Delta, hamlets within a village might
have to be divided between NLF and non-NLF control. The specific
definition of the areas would clearly be the result of prolonged
negotiation. In preparation for this possibility, it would seem highly
desirable that negotiating positions be developed identifying which
villages and districts could be most reasonably conceded to the NLF,
which might be conceded, if necessary, and which should definitely
not be allowed to become subject to NLF rule. Such an inventory
would have to be based on the most recent and accurate results of
the HES and other sources of information.

In some provinces, such as Camau and Quang Ngai, NLF
hegemony presumably would have to be recognized over substantial
rural areas. The problem of determining which local structure,
NLF or GVN, should be the legitimate one would be peculiarly
acute in the most heavily contested rural areas, such as, for
instance, large portions of Hau Nghia and Long An. In these areas
of substantially overlapping control and influence, two solutions
are possible:

(1) Negotiated trade-offs could be arranged so that a bloc
of heavily contested villages might be divided between

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existing GVN and NLF local authorities with broader
considerations of equity and balance overriding marginal
differences in local control in individual areas. In this
event, it would, of course, be particularly important to
insure guarantees of freedom of movement, so that a
minority of pro-GVN villagers in a village assigned to
NLF local rule would have an opportunity to move
elsewhere if they so desired, and vice versa.

(2) Conceivably, in some highly contested areas, recognition could be withheld from both GVN and NLF local structure, and village council elections held to establish new local governing bodies. The problem here, of course, is:

- Who would administer such elections? If these elections were held in relatively limited local areas, however, they could be administered or at least supervised by international observers. The feasibility of this would be enhanced by the extent to which such local elections could be staggered in time.

D. <u>Advantages for U.S. -GVN of Local Control</u>

If NLF local control can be negotiated as a substitute for
substantial NLF participation in the national government, the
advantages for the U.S. -GVN are considerable.

- 13 -

(1)

It prevents the NLF from gaining through negotiation what they have not been able to win through military means, i. e., an open foothold in the cities. If, on the other hand, the NLF did get control of a substantial number of Saigon ministries, it would be in a position to give substantial help to its former underground urban organization in developing political appeal and strength in the cities. If the future of Vietnam lies in its cities, it is worthwhile from the U. S. and GVN viewpoint to pay a significant price to minimize the NLF presence in the cities.

(2) Local control undermines the image of the NLF as an equal of the Saigon Government and instead helps to reduce it, in the eyes of Vietnamese, to the level of a communal group like the Hoa Hlao or Montagnards.

Vietnamese traditionally tend to think of the government as an entity more or less endowed with the "mandate of heaven" and existing above conflicting social and political groups. The NLF is laying claim to that mandate. No matter how much territory or how many people the NLF may control locally, if it allows its claim to be an equal to the government to be undermined, it will suffer a severe setback.

- 14 -

(10)

(3) In contrast to shared national authority, local control will tend to enhance the importance of political competition at the provincial and local level and to reduce its significance at the national level. Fragmentation and disunity among noncommunist groups are likely to be greater at the national level than in any particular locality and the undesirable consequences of that disunity are also much greater there. The NLF is, after all, the most powerful purely political national organization: at the national level of competition, its organization in areas which it does not control would be weighed in the balance along with its strength in the areas it does dominate.

(4) The underlying problem in Vietnam has been to bridge the gap between the countryside and the cities. The VC-NLF propose to do this by bringing a mixed urban-rural leadership group to power by mobilizing support in the countryside. Constrained by urban leadership divorced from the countryside, neither the Diem nor post-Diem GVN has been able to bridge this gap. The U. S. however, has been bridging the gap through two means: (a) inducing

- 15 -

substantial migration of people from the countryside
to the cities; and (b) promoting economic development
in rural areas and marketing and transportation links
between them and the cities. In one form or another
these developments will undoubtedly continue after the
end of hostilities and will confront the NLF with a
difficult choice. If the NLF attempts to isolate the
areas under its control from these developments, it is
likely to be confronted by population drainage and an
increasing gap between the economic and social
well-being of its areas and those areas integrated into
the national economy. The experience of efforts to
maintain comparable autonomous enclaves more or
less independent of central government control, such
as the communist controlled "red republics" in
Colombia or the Kingdom of Rwenzori in Uganda,
suggests that in the absence of outside support the
long-term viability of such areas is dim. If, on the
other hand, the NLF permits extensive contacts to
develop between its areas and the cities, the social and
economic grievances in large part responsible for its

- 16 -

appeal will be undermined by economic development
and the opportunities for entrepreneurship opened up
by the integration of these areas into the national economy.

## E. Acceptability of Local Control to NLF

The NLF undoubtedly wants a substantial share in national
power as well as local control of large areas. When it comes to
concessions, however, it is in the interest of the U. S. and the GVN
to trade off local control for national power, to concede a few more
villages or districts to the NLF in order to keep control of more
Saigon ministries. If this is the preferable line for the GVN, is
there any chance that the NLF can be persuaded to accept such trade-
offs except at outrageously high prices?

Several reasons exist why local control should be an acceptable
if not a desirable alternative to the NLF.

First, local control of substantial, even if disconnected, rural
areas does provide the NLF with its minimum prerequisites: a
reasonably secure base which guarantees its survival and maintains
its options for future political or military struggle. Assured power
in selected rural areas would provide the NLF a degree of security
which it would lose if it bargained away such control in order to
obtain a more dramatic but also less secure foothold in Saigon.

- 17 -

Second, agreement on local control would reflect existing realities. In Korea the armistice eventually simply legitimated the front between the two armies. In Vietnam, as everyone points out, there is no front. There are, however, reasonably clear distinctions between areas which are under GVN control, under NLF control, and disputed. A settlement which has any hope of lasting must be based on those realities. The ultimate rationale for local control is simply that each side continue to exercise through political means the authority which it has so far been able to win and maintain through military means.

Third, recent actions by the NLF suggest that they may well be placing themselves in a position to bargain for and to accept arrangements for local control. The Alliance which they announced wish such fanfare a year ago has been quietly back-tracked while increasing emphasis has been put on the Liberation Committees supposedly elected in various provinces and districts. The Alliance was the type of urban-based group which might play a critical role in a national coalition government. The unveiling and promotion of the Liberation Committees, on the other hand, are efforts designed to establish the authority and legitimacy of the NLF governmental structures in local areas. Such committees have purportedly been elected in some 1,000 villages and 10 provinces. Obviously, the GVN cannot accept the legitimacy of all these forces, but the rush.

- 19 -

### III. POLITICAL COMPETITION: ARENAS AND INFLUENCES

#### A. Arenas of Competition

In almost every society both the extent and the intensity of competition vary significantly from one part of the society to another. They reflect electoral structure and social structure. The larger the electoral districts, for instance, the more competitive the elections. The greater the predominance of social (horizontal) cleavages over territorial cleavages, the larger the number of districts with high levels of competition.

In terms of political competitiveness it seems reasonable to divide South Vietnam into five areas, three of which will have continuing low levels of competition (particularly between NLF and non-NLF groups), one which will have continuing intense competition not polarized along NLF-non-NLF lines, and one which will have intense temporary competition polarized along NLF-non-NLF lines.

The three areas which are likely to have continuing low levels of competition are:

(1) NLF-controlled rural areas, described above in Section II.
In these areas the probability of candidates and agents of non-NLF

- 20 -

groups effectively challenging NLF control will be very slight.

Non-NLF political activists will at best take the risks and confront the fate of civil rights workers in rural Mississippi -- before the police power and judicial authority of the Federal Government was extended to those areas.

(2) **Communal-controlled rural areas.** In predominantly Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Catholic, and perhaps Montagnard villages and districts, it seems unlikely that the NLF will initially be able to make significant appeals. It is possible, however, that: (a) rival cliques and factions among the communal groups may compete vigorously with each other; and (b) the NLF may well try to capitalize on the splits within such groups by negotiating alliances with some factions.

(3) **District and provincial towns.** These are the outposts in the countryside of the GVN administrative-military-policing apparatus. They are likely to be the centers of conservatism in Vietnamese politics, and it seems probable that they will for a substantial period of time remain under the effective control of the local-powers-that-be. Some degree of electoral competition may be allowed for appearances' sake, but in the final analysis the desires of the governmental bureaucracy are likely to prevail.

- 21 -

Low levels of political competition are normally associated with low levels of urbanization. Rural areas are more likely to be one-party areas. Urban centers mean greater social heterogeneity, exposure to more diversified viewpoints, higher levels of literacy and education, and more intense and complex communications patterns. All these lead to greater political consciousness, political activism, and political competition. Thus, it seems likely that the *metropolitan centers* of Vietnam (by which I mean primarily Saigon-Gia Dinh, Danang, Hue) will have highly competitive politics. The large number of active groups and individuals combined with the indeterminate but clearly not dominant strength of the NLF will probably preclude NLF-non-NLF polarization unless the NLF is able to monopolize opposition to the government in these cities.

Finally, there are the *contested rural areas* in which neither the GVN nor the NLF have been able to establish effective control through military means. If political methods of war substantially replace military methods in these areas, the competition will still be intense and it is likely to be all the more so because a tremendous premium exists for the side which first gets an effective political organization functioning in the area. In terms of the stakes involved,

- 22 -

these are the areas where the greatest concentration of effort
should be made to develop non-NLF political strength.

B. <u>Factors Affecting Outcomes of Competition</u>

The results of the political competition are a function of
three things.

(1) <u>The rules of the game.</u> The most important rules concern the electoral structure, which can have decisive impact on who gets into what office. In addition, the extent to which informal rules exist modifying or cancelling the formal rules is also crucial. Of particular significance in Vietnam will be the extent to which violence and corruption play a role in the electoral process.

(2) <u>The players of the game.</u> The individuals and groups which compete for office can change significantly from one contest to another.

The most important difference in any new elections in Vietnam will be participation by the NLF. But, other new actors are also likely to appear on the scene.

(3) <u>The resources of the players.</u> Among these, the most important are:

(a) money

(b) organization

(c) political skill

- 23 -

(d) candidate popularity

(e) issue appeals (i.e., ability to develop or to exploit issues which arouse favorable popular response).

The U.S. wields a decisive influence in Vietnamese politics by shaping the environment in which the political process takes place, and particularly by creating expectations as to its own future role in that environment. The factors listed above which more directly affect the outcome of political competition, however, are in general not so easily influenced by the U.S. and the influence which the U.S. can wield varies significantly among them.

(1) The U.S. can play a major role in shaping the rules of the game through its negotiations with Hanoi and the NLF and through advice to the GVN.

(2) The U.S. could, if it seemed desirable, influence the identity of the players in the game by encouraging or discouraging some individuals (e.g., Generals Minh or Thi) or groups (e.g., the CVT) to participate in politics. Perhaps the key policy issue here is the attitude which the U.S. should assume toward active ARVN participation (overt or covert) in the electoral process. The U.S. could also provide inducements and coercions to foster alliances or mergers among political actors.

- 24 -

(3) The U.S. can give money and material support to candidates and groups. This can be done either through covert means or openly through the distribution of economic assistance and "pork barrel" projects. The U.S. might also be able to impart some specialized organizational and political skills to some Vietnamese leaders, although it is highly dubious whether there is much U.S. politicians or bureaucrats can tell Vietnamese politicians on how to win in Vietnamese politics. In general, the U.S. is severely limited in what it can do to influence the resources which the players bring to the competition. These resources are largely within the control of the Vietnamese. Even the resource (positive or negative) which might be thought to be most directly under U.S. control, i.e., identification of a candidate or group with the U.S. is not always easily manipulated!

There, thus, would seem to be some reason for the U.S. to concentrate its attention on the rules of the game and the number and names of the players. The next section of this paper will, consequently, focus on the electoral system and the following section on the probable and possible participants in the two most highly competitive arenas: the contested rural areas and the metropolitan centers.

- 25 -

IV. FIXING THE RULES OF THE GAME:
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Post-armistice political competition will take many forms,
including violent ones. Vietnamese do not make the neat distinction
which Americans do between peaceful, political competition, on the
one hand, and violent, military struggle, on the other. War and
politics, persuasion and coercion, talk and terror, are to them
simply all ways of carrying on the struggle for security and power.
Consequently, even if there is a cease-fire, violence and terror
are likely to play roles in "peaceful" political competition in
Vietnam. International observers undoubtedly would help in mini-
mizing incidents from both sides. In addition, the extent to which
such activities determine the outcome of elections will depend on
the extent to which each side is able to deter or to counterbalance
the violent propensities of the other. If effective central control
does indeed exist in the VC-NLF, the GVN may be able to minimize
VC rural terror by retaliation or the threat of retaliation against
VC-NLF candidates, organizers, and supporters in the cities. One
clear gain for the VC-NLF from a shift to political competition would

- 26 -

be the ability of its cadres to surface and to operate more openly in urban areas, and presumably it might be willing to minimize rural terror in order to maximize this opportunity. Both formal and informal mechanisms for controlling violence, consequently, will significantly affect the outcome of the electoral process.

In addition, however, the electoral laws themselves will also make a difference. The electoral system of a polity reflects the interests of the dominant groups in that polity. It is also, however, an independent factor in its own right. Different types of electoral systems can produce markedly different types of results. In parliamentary elections, for instance, rarely does a single party get a majority of the vote. But, in 27 out of 117 elections in 20 different countries the electoral laws produced artificial majorities in the parliament which had not been created by the voters. In almost two-thirds of the cases where a single party got a majority in the legislature, the result was produced by the electoral laws not the electorate. * Electoral laws can be designed to exacerbate certain types of conflict and to minimize other types: the Lebanese system,

* See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (Yale Press, 1967), pp. 74-75.

- 27 -

(lc)

for instance, is beautifully rigged to virtually eliminate religious
rivalry from elections. Changes in electoral laws can produce
changes in government. In Guyana a shift in the electoral laws
was responsible for the defeat of Jagan's Peoples Party.

That electoral laws make a difference is not unappreciated in
Vietnam. In 1967, the Constituent Assembly deputies consciously
rejected proposals for a runoff presidential election in order to
enhance the probability of the military candidate winning with a
plurality of the vote. Similarly, the Senate electoral system was
designed to benefit and did benefit well-organized minority groups,
most notably the Catholics who, with perhaps 10% of the population
and 12% of the senatorial candidates, landed 43% of the senators.

In terms of the criteria of equity and democracy, some electoral
systems clearly leave much to be desired. Among many varieties of
electoral laws, however, it is virtually impossible to choose in terms
of these general criteria. Good cases in terms of equity and democracy
can, for instance, be made in favor of both plurality voting and pro-
portional representation. Consequently, within the broad range of
reasonably equitable and democratic systems, choices have to be made
in terms of the consequences of the system: Which groups will it help?
Whom will it hurt?

- 28 -

The principal elements of the electoral system subject to
manipulation are:

(1) qualifications for voting;

(2) qualifications for office;

(3) offices to be elected;

(4) criteria for winning, i. e., the electoral formula
(majority, plurality, proportional representation);

(5) number of electoral districts;

(6) number of seats in districts (district magnitude);

(7) equality in size of districts;

(8) boundaries of districts (gerrymandering);

(9) salience of parties and candidates in electoral choices; and

(10) timing and frequency of elections.

The discussion in this analysis of the Vietnamese electoral system
will focus primarily on the electoral formulae, district magnitude,
district boundaries, and the timing of elections.

The 1967 national elections were carried out under a system
prescribed in part by the Constitution and in part by electoral laws
passed by the Constituent Assembly. In terms of constitutional

- 29 -

provisions, however, the system has great flexibility, and a number
of changes could be made in the 1967 system without amending the
Constitution. This flexibility could play a most important role in
negotiations with the NLF by making it possible to accommodate
reasonable demands on their part within the existing Constitution
and thereby eliminating or weakening one argument which they could
make for completely junking the present Constitution. The changes
possible could both encourage NLF participation and reduce the
probability of NLF victory.

In a country which has gone through as many coups and con-
stitutions as Vietnam has in recent years, presumably much is to
be said for attempting to build the legitimacy of the existing system
by adapting it to changing circumstances.

## Electors and Candidates

Article 4 of the Constitution declares that "The Republic of
Viet-Nam opposes Communism in any form" and that "Every activity
designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited." If
applied strictly, they would have to be changed before overt communists
could overtly operate politically. But, these phrases also presumably
can be interpreted to mean almost anything the Government wants them
to mean, and if an agreement were made for VC and NLF participation

- 30 -

The Constitution nowhere explicitly prohibits Communists or NLF members from either voting or running for office. The 1967 senatorial election Law, however, excludes from candidacy "those who have directly or indirectly worked for communism and pro-communist neutralism or worked in the interests of communism." (The Presidential and Lower House Laws, I assume, have similar provisions.) Presumably these provisions would have to be re-pealed to open the doors for NLF participation in the system.

## The Lower House

The Constitution provides for the election of 100 to 200 representatives for 4 years by "universal suffrage, direct and secret ballot." It also says that "Candidates run as individuals from separate constituencies no larger than provinces." In fact, in 1967, 137 representatives were elected on a plurality basis from 69 different electoral districts, 21 from single-member districts, 16 from single-member ethnic districts, and the remaining 100 from two-to-six-seat districts. (See Table IV-1).

With respect to Lower House elections, it would be possible, without constitutional amendment:

(1) to add up to 63 new representatives, an obvious means of providing for NLF representation;

- 32 -

Apparently it would not be possible, without constitutional amendment, to have a new election for the 137 seats filled in 1967 before 1971.

## The Upper House

Less flexibility exists in the senatorial electoral system. Unlike representatives, senators must be elected by plurality and must be elected on a list system. The Senate is also at its constitutional limit of 60 seats. One-half of the current membership will, however, come up for reelection in 1970. At that time, voters would, presumably, elect 3 ten-man slates of senators. If the NLF participated in such an election, it would seem highly probable that it could elect at least one slate. The electoral system which in 1967 favored the Catholics could in 1970 favor the NLF.

## The Executive

The Constitution simply provides that the President and Vice President are elected on one list for a four-year term "by the entire nation by direct and secret ballot." The 1967 election was run on a straight plurality basis. It would be possible by law, however, to provide for a runoff election or for the Australian majority-vote system. The next regular presidential election would be in September 1974. Under the Constitution, it would, however, be

- 33 -

possible to have a new presidential election before that date if the
President resigned his office before November 1, 1970, or if both
President and Vice President resigned between November 1, 1970,
and the regularly scheduled election in September 1971. In these
cases, indeed, the Constitution requires that a new election be held
within three months after the Presidency becomes vacant. The
Constitution also provides that this election will be for "a new term
of office." Since the Presidential term is defined as four years,
this early election would not be simply to fill out the unexpired term,
until November 1, 1971, but would be for a new four year term
dating from that election.

These provisions would make it possible, within the framework
of the Constitution, to agree with the NLF to have new presidential
elections at almost any time, provided (and it may be a big proviso!)
that Thieu and Ky can be persuaded to resign.

## Provincial and Local Elections

The Constitution provides for the popular election of village,
provincial, and municipal councils and of province chiefs and mayors.
Provincial and municipal councils were last elected in May 1964, and
they should have been elected again in May 1968, but they were not.

- 34 -

Village council elections were held in many villages in April 1967 and have been held in other villages since then. The Constitution provided that province chiefs could be appointed during the first presidential term. Consequently, if the Constitution is adhered to, province chief elections presumably should take place no later than 1972 and would have to occur earlier if the Presidential term ended earlier.

The timing and structure of both provincial and local elections could easily be adapted within the Constitution to whatever arrangements seemed desirable to provide for the participation of the NLF. In this connection, it should be noted that the NLF claims to have elected Liberation Committees for 10 of the 44 GVN provinces and for 1,000 to 1,200 villages. As of August 1967, GVN village councils had been elected in some 1,037 villages.

### C. Voting is Highly Fragmented in Vietnam but Changes in District Magnitude Can Significantly Affect the Degree of Fragmentation

The 1967 voting was highly fragmented. Eleven tickets contested the Presidency; the winning slate received 34.8% of the total vote. Forty-eight slates (of 10 candidates each) contested the 6 slate-places in the Senate. The slate which came in first got only 20.1% of the

- 35 -

total vote; the 6th slate, which also was elected, received 11.4% of the vote. The vote for the other 42 slates varied from that percentage down to 5.7% of the vote. In the Lower House elections, 1,172 candidates ran for 137 seats, an overall ratio of 8 contestants for each seat. Roughly 30% of the successful candidates for non-ethnic seats were elected with less than 15% of the vote, 60% were elected with less than 20% of the vote, and almost 80% were elected with less than 25% of the vote. While there were significant variations in the extent of fragmentation, the overall pattern was certainly characterized by highly personalized candidacies and the absence of broad-based electoral coalitions. (See Table IV-2.)

The average senate slate was elected with 13.1% of the vote; the average Lower House winner by 20.5% of the vote. Almost no elected national official in Vietnam -- except those holding ethnic seats in the Lower House -- won as many as 35% of the votes in his contest.

- 36 -

Table IV-2. Votes of Representatives by City and Corps

<table><thead><tr><th>% of Vote in<br>District</th><th>Saigon -<br>Gia Dinh</th><th>Other<br>Municipalities</th><th>I</th><th>II</th><th>III</th><th>IV</th><th>Total<br>Minus<br>Ethnic</th><th>Ethnic</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0-15</td><td>24</td><td></td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>35</td><td>0</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>15-20</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td></td><td>10</td><td>7</td><td>16</td><td>37</td><td>1</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>20-25</td><td></td><td>2</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>24</td><td>0</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>25-35</td><td></td><td>1</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>13</td><td>2</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>35-50</td><td></td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td></td><td>4</td><td>9</td><td>6</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>over 50</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td></td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>26</td><td>6</td><td>15</td><td>23</td><td>17</td><td>34</td><td>121</td><td>16</td><td>137</td></tr></tbody></table>

A fragmented system like this, it has been suggested, would open the way for the NLF as a highly cohesive, well-organized, sizeable minority (averaging perhaps 20 to 30% of the vote nationally) to win a highly disproportionate share of the seats in the legislature and conceivably even to elect a President. The existing electoral system, which benefits the relatively cohesive and well-organized Catholic and military minorities, could be turned against them by the perhaps somewhat better organized and larger minority represented by the NLF.

The frequency of multi-seat districts also enhances the desirability of disciplined, bullet voting, at which presumably the NLF would also excel.

- 37 -

What are the causes of this fragmentation and to what extent is
it the product of the electoral system?

The underlying causes lie in the nature of Vietnamese society and
culture: the high degree of personalistic individualism, the dominance
of particularistic family loyalties, and the relative absence of trust
in social behavior. In addition, the political leaders and groupings
which figure in GVN politics have, by and large, failed to develop
effective electoral organizations reaching down to the grass roots.
Politics, consequently, as in many societies at low levels of political
modernization -- witness 18th century England and America -- tends
to reflect personality, family, and clique. It is basically a politics
of factionalism.

Significant variations in vote fragmentation do, nonetheless,
occur in Vietnam. These variations can be explained by differences
in the cohesion of social groups and in the magnitude of electoral
districts.

(1) Socio-political Cohesion and Vote Fragmentation

The number of candidates contesting any given seat is largely
independent of the electoral structure, which has an equal impact
throughout the country. The candidate/seat ratio may hence be taken
as a rough index of group cohesion versus social fragmentation. If

- 38 -

an extremely large number of candidates run for office in a particular district, the level of socio-political cohesion in the district is presumably low. If a small number of candidates run, the level of socio-political cohesion is high: at least some non-structural factors were operating to reduce the number of aspiring office holders. As the data in Table IV-3 suggest, the level of social cohesion in a district (as measured by the candidate/seat ratio) is strongly associated with vote fragmentation.

Vote fragmentation is least among the ethnic minority constituencies. (See Table IV-4.) The average vote for the winning candidate in these districts was a very respectable 53.7%. The candidate/seat ratios varied from 2.0 to 5.5, with the data suggesting high levels of socio-political cohesion among the Southern Montagnards, Chams, and Cambodians, and a slightly lower but still high level among the Northern Montagnard refugees. The effect of communal groups is perhaps also visible in Tay Ninh, An Giang, and Chau Doc provinces whose candidate/seat ratios of 5.7, 6.2, and 4.7 were also distinctly below the national average. These low ratios did not, however, translate into winning vote percentages significantly higher than the national averages.

Vote fragmentation and candidate/seat ratios in I Corps also suggest significantly higher levels of socio-political cohesion there than elsewhere in the country. These undoubtedly reflect the strength of the Revolutionary Dai Viets, VNQID, and Buddhist movements in those provinces.

Vote fragmentation in the urban areas was very high. Thirteen of the 15 winners in Saigon won with less than 15% of the vote, and the other two got less than 20%. None of the 11 winners in Gia Dinh got more than 15% of the vote. Four of the six representatives from

- 42 -

the other municipalities won with less than 25% of the vote. The
average winning percentage in the six municipalities plus Gia Dinh
was 12.8%; the average for the non-ethnic seats in the rest of the
country was 23.3%.

High urban vote fragmentation reflected high candidate/seat ratios, which, in turn, suggest low levels of socio-political cohesion in the cities. The candidate/seat ratio of 14.6 in Saigon-Gia Dinh was completely out of line with those in the rest of the country. In part this was undoubtedly due to the twin facts that:

(a) most candidates are urban residents; and (b) campaigning in a city is less difficult -- and less risky -- than campaigning in the countryside. It also, however, undoubtedly reflects the greater heterogeneity of the urban population.

Vote fragmentation thus varies inversely with the strength of communal groups and parties and directly with the level of urbanization.

(2) District magnitude and vote fragmentation

Despite these relationships between social factors and vote
fragmentation, an even more powerful explanation of differences
in vote fragmentation for Lower House elections exists in the structure
of the electoral system. The decisive factor would appear to be simply

- 44 -

District magnitude also explains in large part the apparent differences in urban and rural vote fragmentation. Four of the five largest districts are urban districts. Vote fragmentation within urban areas also varied directly with district magnitude. Urbanization clearly has some positive effect on fragmentation, but it is secondary to the impact of district magnitude.

The strong association between district magnitude and vote fragmentation found in Vietnam is a fairly common phenomenon, also prevalent in electoral systems with much higher levels of political cohesion and organization. In his study of 117 elections, mostly in Western democratic systems, Rae found that the fractionalization of both elective and parliamentary party systems varied directly with district magnitude: "high magnitudes are associated with great fractionalization, and vice versa." The relationship was, however, also found to be curvilinear, with the fractionalization increasing at a decreasing rate as magnitude increased.*

The effects of district magnitude on fragmentation in Vietnam can also be seen by comparing Upper House, Lower House, and presidential voting. The president was elected, in effect, in a

*Rae, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.

- 45 -

one-seat district, and hence we should expect his winning percentage
to correspond closely to that of the winners in the single-seat lower
house contests. This does, in fact, turn out to be the case: the
presidential winner got 34.8%; the average Lower House single-seat
winner got 30.8%. Similarly, we should expect the average winning
percentage for the Senate slates (elected in effect in a six-seat
district) to correspond closely to the average winning percentage in
the six-seat lower house districts. Again this turns out to be the
case: the six-seat house winners average 11.4% of the vote; the
winning Senate slates averaged 13.1% of the vote.

It thus seems reasonable to predict that given the social structure
and current level of political cohesion in South Vietnam, a candidate
can win a single-seat plurality election by getting roughly one-third
of the total vote. As the district magnitude increases, a candidate
can expect to win with a decreasing percentage of the vote, about 12%
of the vote being necessary in a six-member district. Thus, in the
three-slate senatorial election scheduled for next year, one would
predict that a slate would have to receive 21% or 22% of the total vote
to win.

D. A Shift in the Vietnamese Electoral System to a Multi-Member Runoff Majority System Would Reduce the Probability of the NLFWinning Senate Slates

- 46 -

The most significant factor in reducing vote fragmentation will
be NLF participation in the electoral system. Cohesion does tend
to generate cohesion. The prospect of a well-organized, sizeable
minority attempting to win electoral victories will undoubtedly promote
intense efforts at electoral cooperation among non-communist politicians
at both the local and national levels. The participation of the NLF
could well be the critical factor which would move the Vietnamese
system from the politics of factionalism to that of polarization and
expansion.* If the NLF participation in the system does not have
this effect, on the other hand, the existing electoral system is likely
to lead to the NLF receiving highly disproportionate representation
in the national assembly.

It would be desirable to safeguard against this eventuality by
altering the existing electoral system. The principal alternatives
available are outlined in Table IV-6. The current system is a
plurality mixed (single and multi-member) district system. The
principal alternatives are: (a) proportional representation; (b) a
single-member district plurality system; or (c) a runoff majority
system.

* See my *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale, 1968), pp. 412-420.

- 47 -

Table IV-6. TYPES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

<table><thead><tr><th>District</th><th>Electoral Formulae</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Magnitude</td><td>Plurality Proportional</td></tr><tr><td>Majority</td><td>Proportional Representation</td></tr><tr><td>Runoff Australian</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Proportional Representation

A proportional representation system maximizes proportionality of legislative seats to popular votes. It would ensure that if the NLF got 20% to 30% of the total vote, it would not get more than that in legislative seats. It would not, however, offer inducements for non-communist groups to coalesce in the electoral process; coalescence if it took place at all would take place in the legislature. There would also be some question over the constitutionality of PR for Lower House elections. The present Constitution provides that candidates for the lower house must "run as individuals". This would, presumably, preclude the most simple and common forms of PR, all of which require candidates to run as members of party slates and require voters to vote for a slate rather than an individual.

- 48 -

Single-Member District Plurality System

The earlier analysis relating district magnitude to vote frag-
mentation suggests that an effective antidote to excessive fragmen-
tation would be a straight single-member district plurality system.
Those western democracies which have such electoral systems almost
invariably have two party political systems. The winning percentage
consequently is normally 50% or more. As we have noticed, in the
1967 Vietnamese elections, the winning percentage in single-member
contests averaged about 33%. The difference between these two
figures is, in some degree, a measure of the organizational under-
development of Vietnamese politics.

The universal use of single-member districts in Vietnam would
tend to produce greater cohesion and to raise the winning percentage.
The NLF would attempt to add to its hard-core vote whatever allies
it thought necessary to produce the winning margin, while the leading
non-NLF group or political figure would similarly attempt to enhance
his appeal to win a plurality. Single-member districts produce fewer
parties and benefit the stronger ones. The NLF undoubtedly would
be one of the beneficiaries of such a system. The extent to which
other groups benefited from it would be directly proportional to the
extent that the introduction of the system induced them to form broader-based

- 49 -

(ac)

electoral coalitions. A single member plurality system is more likely than any other to lead to something like the Japanese "one and a half party system", with a majority non-NLF coalition opposing a minority NLF grouping.

A single-member district system would also tend to reduce the scope and intensity of electoral competition. In many provinces GVN-groups could be sure of at least carrying the district with the provincial capital while NLF and communal groups might be equally sure of carrying one or more of the rural districts. Each group would be likely to have a certain number of safe seats which would enhance its sense of security with the system.

Single-member districts, on the other hand, do pose some problems.

(1) In multi-member districts the boundaries are not so important. In single-member districts boundary drawing (gerrymandering) can easily decide the election long before it is held. Some of the electoral competition is transformed into legislative competition. Who draws the boundaries becomes of crucial importance. This problem could probably be minimized only if the GVN and NLF agreed in advance on the use of some existing territorial units (such as administrative districts or combinations of such districts) as legislative districts.

(2) Single-member districts produce less proportional results than multi-member districts. They greatly overrepresent the strongest party. If we can be sure that party is not the NLF, the system is fine. But can we be sure?

- 50 -

(3) Single-member districts give each contestant an incentive to promote divisive candidates to take votes away from his principal opponents. The NLF is better able to do this than other groups. In a district where both the NLF and Cao Dai are strong, for instance, the NLF is more likely to be able to get two or three "fake" Cao Dai to enter the race than the Cao Dai will be able to get dissident NLFers to play its game.

(4) Single-member districts are more vulnerable to shifts in population than multi-member districts. In Vietnam such a system could in a few years produce a number of rotten boroughs from which the population had moved but whose boundaries it would be very difficult to alter.

## Majority Vote Systems

Majority vote systems are seldom used because of the complex mechanisms required to produce majorities. To get a majority the voter almost inevitably has to vote twice, either in the same election (the Australian majority system) or in two successive elections (the run-off system). Under the Australian system the voter indicates first, second, third choices, etc., among the candidates for the seat or seats. If no one gets a majority of first place votes, the votes of

- 51 -

the lowest candidate are redistributed according to their second choices. This process continues until the requisite number of candidates receive majorities. The usefulness of such a system in Vietnam would depend upon voters who cast first-place votes for one non-NLF candidate casting their second-place vote for another non-NLF candidate. It seems likely, however, that this is just precisely what the average Vietnamese voter would *not* do. He is, instead, likely to feel that he has an interest in keeping a foot in both camps and hence is likely to cast his second choice if not his first for the NLF.

The run-off system does not pose the same problem. For here the second choices are made more by the politician than by the voter. Presumably non-communist candidates who lost out in the first election would normally tend to throw their support to the remaining non-NLF candidate in the run-off election. So long as the NLF is a 20% to 30% minority, it is clearly in the interests of the anti-NLF groups to polarize the election into a choice between the NLF and the most non-NLF candidate. This is precisely what the runoff system, unlike the Australian majority system, does.

A run-off majority system could be applied to either single-member of multi-member districts. Given some of the problems

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involved with one-seat districts, it might be well to continue with a predominantly multi-seat district system but adding the requirement that a candidate receive a majority of the votes in the initial election in order to win. If one or more seats were not filled by majority vote in the initial election a run-off election would be held. The number of candidates in the run-off would be twice the number of seats to be filled; they would be those who received the largest pluralities in the initial election; and they would be elected by plurality in the run-off election. Thus, if there were 15 candidates contesting three seats in the initial election, and only one candidate got a majority of the votes cast, the four candidates with the largest pluralities would contest the two remaining seats in the run-off.

The principal disadvantage of a run-off system is the inconvenience and expense (to government, candidates and voters) of running two elections to secure the results of one. On the other hand, the system does have many real benefits. It would not produce the same strong tendencies towards an enduring two-party system that a single-seat plurality system would, but it would also involve fewer risks to either side. It should lead to a greater proportionality between popular votes and legislative seats than a single-member plurality system. It could, in addition, be easily introduced by legislative action without changing

- 53 -

the existing constitution, Moreover, the same run-off majority
system could also be applied to the Presidential election. The
introduction of such a system would seem to be a natural next step
in Vietnamese political development.

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# V. THE PLAYERS AND HOW WE CAN HELP THEM

## A. Coalitions of National Players: Parties and Party Systems

The principal players in national politics in the immediate postwar period will presumably include:

1. the NLF

2. the GVN military-administrative apparat

3. Buddhists

4. Catholics and northern refugees

5. Hoa Hao and Cao Dai

6. Ethnic minorities (Chinese, Montagnard, Khmer)

7. Labor (CVT)

8. Urban intelligentsia

9. Old line parties (Dai Viet, Tan Dai Viet, VNQDD)

The cleavages and coalitions which exist among these players will shape the South Vietnamese party system. The key issue, of course, is the extent to which the participation by the NLF in national political competition engenders greater cooperation among non-communist groups. This cooperation could take a variety of forms. At the lowest level of political organization, this coalescence

- 55 -

could simply involve highly temporary alliances among essentially
narrow-based and personalistic cliques; thus preserving past patterns
of factional politics. It is quite likely, however, that the combination
of widespread political participation plus the threat of the NLF plus
wartime experiences in electioneering and organization-building
will bring postwar Vietnam out of the politics of factionalism and
into the development of more long-lived and substantial political
organizations.

In the past, collective political actors have been largely
either functional groups (like the military or labor) or communal
groups (like the Catholics or Montagnards). These groups will
obviously continue to play major roles in Vietnamese politics. The
great distinction between these groups and the NLF, however, is that
each functional or communal group appeals to an inherently limited
constituency. At present, only the NLF can potentially appeal to
all or most Vietnamese. Successful competition with the NLF will
thus require transforming or transcending these limited functional
and communal groups and developing multi-group organizations
capable of effectively aggregating interests through broader political
appeals. The creation of such organizations is the heart of political

- 56 -

development, and postwar Vietnam appears to be ready for this
"political take-off." There are, indeed, few countries in the world
which have achieved the levels of modernization characteristic of
South Vietnam (in terms of urbanization, literacy, education) which
have not developed political party systems much more highly
structured than that which has existed in South Vietnam. Some sort
of real political party system, significantly different from the
old patterns, seems likely to be one of the major innovations on
the postwar Vietnamese political scene.

Any one or combination of four types of party systems --
two, dominant, one-and-a-half, multi- might emerge in postwar
Vietnam. A two-party system, of course, carries the endorsement
of the present Constitution. Paradoxically, however, the probability
of such a system developing in postwar Vietnam depends upon the
political skill and strength of the NLF leaders. The key characteristic
of such a system is that each of the two major parties has a
reasonable chance of electing a president and controlling the National
Assembly. Presumably the NLF and the GVN military-administrative
apparat would be the cores of the opposing parties and the extent
to which they competed equally would depend upon the extent to which
the leaders of the two parties were able to make effective alliances

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(a)

with other groups. The most likely two-party system in South
Vietnam would look something like this:

(1) <u>Two-Party System</u>

<table><thead><tr><th>Party A</th><th>Ambivalent</th><th>Party B</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>Chinese</td><td>NLF</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics</td><td>Montagnards</td><td>Buddhists</td></tr><tr><td>Northern refugees</td><td></td><td>Urban intelligentsia</td></tr><tr><td>Hoa Hao</td><td></td><td>Cao Dai?</td></tr><tr><td>CVT</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

A <u>dominant party system</u>, such as in India, seems much less likely to emerge in South Vietnam. The key characteristic of such a system is one reasonably well organized party usually occupying the political center with fragmented opposition to both the left and right. The fragmentation of the opposition imposes much lower demands on the dominant party. With a fragmented opposition, the party need not even be a majority party in order to be a dominant party. (The Congress Party in India has, indeed, never won a majority of the votes in a national election.)

In Vietnam, however, the majority is fragmented while one extremist minority is well organized. The most likely dominant party system to emerge might be one in which the NLF was the core of the dominant party and was opposed by fragmented religious, nationalist, and ethnic minorities. This, in short, would be the system

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which would emerge if no further cohesion developed among
non-communist groups. Such a system would in all likelihood
be a highly unstable one, serving simply as a stepping stone to
the imposition of a full-scale communist dominated party dictatorship.

(2a) Left Dominant Party System

<table><thead><tr><th>Dominant Party</th><th colspan="3"> Splinter Parties</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NLF</td><td>Hoa Hao</td><td>-</td><td>Dai Viets</td><td>GVN Apparat CVT</td></tr><tr><td>Buddhists</td><td colspan="3">Cao Dai</td></tr><tr><td>Urban intelligentsia</td><td colspan="3"></td></tr><tr><td>Chinese</td><td colspan="3"></td></tr><tr><td>Montagnards</td><td colspan="3"></td></tr></tbody></table>

An alternative type of dominant party system might result from
the coalescence of a number of moderate and neutralist groups
into a broad-gauged centrist coalition governing the country against
fragmented opposition from both the left and right. Such a system
might look like this:

(2b) Center Dominant Party System

<table><thead><tr><th>Right Splinter Parties</th><th>Dominant Party</th><th>Left Splinter Party</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>Catholics</td><td>NLF</td></tr><tr><td>Dai Viets</td><td>Buddhists</td><td>Urban intelligentsia</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Cao Dai</td><td>Hoa Hao</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>CVT</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Again, this system is unlikely to be a stable one. The principal
problem is the absence from the dominant party coalition of the three

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(cc)

groups -- Catholics, GVN apparat, NLF -- which have demonstrated
any reasonable level of organizational skill and administrative
effectiveness. It seems likely that a centrist dominant party of
this sort would be fairly quickly torn apart by personal rivalries and
doctrinal conflicts among its participants. It would, in all likelihood,
be supplanted by a left dominant system, in which the NLF played the
decisive role.

A third type of dominant party system might emerge as a result
of an effective coalescence of GVN and Catholic groups, much like
that which might occur in a two-party system, but with the opposition
to this coalition remaining fragmented.

(2c) Right Dominant Party System

<table><tr><td>Dominant Party</td><td>Splinter Parties</td></tr><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>Buddhists VNQDD Urban NLF<br>intelligentsia</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics and northern<br>refugees</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Hoa Hao</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CVT</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Montagnards</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Chinese</td><td></td></tr></table>

The likelihood of this type of system emerging seems rather slim,
since the principal stimulus to coalescence among anti-communist
groups will be the threat of a communist take-over. If the NLF is

- 60 -

so weak as to be only a splinter party, this coalescence becomes
highly improbable.

If, however, the NLF is strong enough to be considerably
more than a splinter but considerably less than a majority, a
one-and-a-half party system becomes a real possibility. This system
has two major parties, but differs from the two-party system in that
one party is quite clearly the majority party while the opposition is
clearly the minority: and is faced with the prospect of life as the
permanent opposition. Japan is the most notable current example
of a one-and-a-half party system. In some periods of history the
U.S. has approximated such a system nationally (what Lubell has
called a "sun" and "moon" party system). The emergence of such
a system in South Vietnam depends upon the non-communist groups
achieving a high level of coalescence in the face of only a medium level
threat from the NLF. Over time such a system could conceivably
evolve into a two-party system if the NLF-dominated coalition
was able to broaden its appeal and win the support of other groups.
The experience of the Japanese Socialists -- not to mention that
of the much more moderate SPD in Germany -- suggests that this
is not an easy transition to accomplish.

- 61 -

(3) One-and-a-Half Party System

<table><thead><tr><td>Majority Party</td><td>Minority Party</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>NLF</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics</td><td>Urban intelligentsia</td></tr><tr><td>Northern refugees</td><td>Some Buddhists</td></tr><tr><td>Hoa Hao</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Cao Dai</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Montagnards</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Old line parties</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CVT</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

The difficulties involved in achieving a high level of non-communist coalescence in the face of moderate NLF strength suggest that a multi-party system is a more likely alternative than a one-and-a-half party system.

Multi-party systems normally have four or five major parties and are produced by the existence of a number of lines of cleavage of about equal salience to politics. Thus, in France of the Third and Fourth Republics, the principal cleavages between secular and Catholic, republican and anti-republican, leftist and conservative produced a system of five or six major parties, each representing a unique combination of views on all three issues and each capable of aligning itself with a different combination of parties on any one issue. The cleavages in Vietnam would include: communist and neutralist vs. anti-communist; Buddhist vs. religious minorities, urban vs. rural; southerners vs. Annamites and northerners; ethnic minorities vs. ethnic Vietnamese. In Vietnam such a party system might take the following form:

- 62 -

(4) A Multi-Party System

<table><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>Hoa Hao</td><td>Buddhists</td><td>Dai Viets</td><td>NLF</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics</td><td>Cao Dai</td><td>Urban intelligentsia</td><td>Annamites</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Montagnards</td><td>CVT</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>

The elections of 1967 and the shifting coalitions in the national assembly suggest that this type of party system may well already exist in embryo.

In a parliamentary system, the formation of a government depends upon a sufficient number of these groups coalescing together to form a parliamentary majority. Where the government is not responsible to parliament, as in South Vietnam, this impetus to the formation of even a temporary majority coalition is lacking. Coalition incentives are also largely absent from the existing electoral system, although some could be furnished by provisions for run-off elections, as suggested above in Section IV.

Any guess as to the probability of a particular type of party system emerging in South Vietnam depends on the assumptions made with respect to:

(a) NLF political strength, including its ability to win allies; and

(b) the degree of coalescence which will take place among non-communist groups.

Alternative combinations of high, medium, and low non-communist coalescence could produce the following outcomes in terms of party

- 63 -

systems.

Table V-1. NLF STRENGTH, NON-COMMUNIST COALESCE NCE, AND POSSIBLE PARTY SYSTEMS

<table><thead><tr><th>Non-Communist Coalescence</th><th>High</th><th>NLF Strength</th><th>Medium</th><th>Low</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>High</td><td>a. Two</td><td>d. 1 1/2</td><td></td><td>g. x</td></tr><tr><td>Medium</td><td>b. x</td><td>e. Multi</td><td></td><td>h. Dom-Right</td></tr><tr><td>Low</td><td>c. Dom-Left</td><td>f. Dom-Cent.</td><td></td><td>i. None</td></tr></tbody></table>

Three of the nine spaces are not accounted for by our six systems.

Box g embodies an inherently highly improbable situation, which can be ignored for all practical purposes. Under Box i conditions, no new organized party system is likely to emerge, and the existing pre-party pattern of politics would continue with the NLF joining in the old game but not changing the game. The Box b situation is also relatively improbable. If NLF strength is very high, non-communist groups are likely to choose one or another polar alternative as far as coalescence is concerned. Either they combine together (Box a.) to defeat the NLF in a party-to-party battle (like Italy 1948 or Chile 1964) or they break ranks and attempt to make the best deal they can by joining with the NLF in a dominant left coalition (Box c.).

Anyone can make their own predictions as to party system outcomes based on their own as to NLF strength and non-communist

- 64 -

coalescence. For my part, I conclude this analysis with what seems to me to be a reasonable summary of the relative desirability of these systems from the viewpoint of the U.S. and the relative probability of their actually occurring.

Table V-2. POSSIBLE POSTWAR PARTY SYSTEMS

<table><thead><tr><td>Rank</td><td>Desirability</td><td>Probability</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1 1/2</td><td>Multi</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Dom-Right</td><td>Two</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Multi</td><td>1 1/2</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Two</td><td>Dom-Left</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Dom-Center</td><td>Dom-Center</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>Dom-Left</td><td>Dom-Right</td></tr></tbody></table>

All of which would seem to indicate that the U.S. should push for a one-and-a-half system but that it should be prepared to settle for a multi-party system.

## B. Arenas of Local Competition

While greater coalescence on the national level is clearly desirable, it will only really bear fruit if the groups involved have themselves deep roots in local political organization. The NLF is, in itself, not a very broad or diverse grouping; its

- 65 -

strength derives from the extent to which it can mobilize effective
organization at the local level. A broad-gauged coalition of
nationalist groups -- Catholics, labor, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, et
cetera -- would not necessarily be an effective counterbalance to
the NLF unless its elements also were well organized for political
competition at the local level.

The level of political competition is likely to be low in the
hard-core VC areas, the rural areas dominated by religious or
ethnic communal groups, and the provincial and district towns
dominated by the GVN administrative-military bureaucracy.
Competition is likely to be intense in those rural areas in which the
fighting was the hardest and in the metropolitan centers of Saigon,
Danang, and Hue. It is in these areas, consequently, that the U.S.
should concentrate its efforts to help its friends and to defeat its
enemies. The evolution of competition in these two areas, however,
is likely to differ significantly. In the contested rural areas, competition
is likely to be intense for a brief period and then to decrease rapidly
as one group or another established control over each locality.
In the cities, competition is likely to intensify indefinitely as the
cities become the principal sources of opposition to the government.

- 66 -

The principal characteristic of these areas is the absence of effective political and social organization beyond the hamlet level. This vacuum has been responsible for the heavy fighting, for the intensive GVN pacification efforts, and for the intensive VC counter efforts. These military and political struggles, in turn, tend to perpetuate the organizational vacuum by discrediting traditional authorities, enhancing distrust, dividing villages and families against each other.

The end of the shooting will lead to intensive efforts by both sides to fill the organizational vacuum through political means. The importance of these initial efforts is all the greater because rural localities generally are not conducive to prolonged political competition. The relative homogeneity of the population and the shortage of organization skills tend to lead to a situation in which one group becomes dominant and other groups disappear or become distinctly subordinate. In a short time either the NLF or one non-communist group will establish itself as the dominant group in that area (which may mean a village, a district, or perhaps even a province). The basic organizing group in a rural area may be a

- 67 -

political party, a church, or a labor union. It is a mistake, however, to assume that most rural areas; even in a society with as highly mobilized a rural population as South Vietnam, can support a large number of different organizations. Hence the U.S. and/or the GVN ought to promote one particular non-communist rural organization in any given rural area. In some areas it may be the Hoa Hao; in others the Tenant Farmers' Union; in others the VNQDD; in still others a cooperative group. The choice obviously depends upon which group already has the strongest roots in the area. The key point, however, is not to disperse effort and support among two or more non-communist groups in any one rural area.

-The other key principle is the need for prompt action. Longer range measures designed to link village and city, such as extension of the market economy, are undoubtedly desirable, but they are not substitutes for getting in first when the shooting stops. Similarly, the current Village Development Program which is being rapidly and apparently effectively implemented also furnishes a foundation for successful competition with the NLF. The decentralization of functions, the subordination of RD cadres to village authorities, the establishment of a Joint Fund arrangement for direct U.S. support of village activities, the proliferation of village committees and subcommittees

- 68 -

to promote communal development, the assumption by the village
of major responsibilities in land reform -- all these tend to make
the village government itself a more effective counterweight to the
NLF and its Liberation Committees. On the other hand, they also
make village government a more important target for political
competition. Developing an effective village government is a necessary
precondition to successful competition with the NLF but it is not
sufficient. Social forces and political groups must still be organized
to win and to maintain control over that local government.

In many contested rural areas the strongest local group will
be a religious or ethnic communal group. This group may encompass
only a minority of the people in a village, but in most cases it will
undoubtedly be better to encourage and to build upon this group, local
minority as it is, than to attempt to promote organization of a majority
which has never been organized before. The basic principle will
be to capitalize on existing building blocs. In some areas these
blocs may be unique to the area. They will, nonetheless, provide
more effective resistance to NLF efforts at takeover than would
a national communal group (e. g., Catholics or Hua Hao) which did

- 69 -

(ic)

not have the same existing strength in the area. More often, the key
to establishing control in the area will be a national communal group.
The GVN consequently should give high priority to developing
cooperative relationships with these groups, and the U.S. should support
such efforts politically and perhaps with material resources.

Clearly one key to local control will be the local Popular Forces
and militia; the more effectively these forces are organized and related
to the local communal group, the easier it will be to resist NLF
take-over. In addition, in the immediate cease-fire period, the
countryside is likely to be overrun with roving bandits and marauders.
The group which is able to furnish reasonably effective security against
these dangers will have a strong claim to the allegiance of the average
peasant. One important step to improved relations between the GVN,
on the one hand, and the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Khmers, and Montagnards,
on the other, would be for the GVN to bring representatives of these
groups into high positions in the national administration. A more
extensive sharing of national power with these groups is likely to be
the only realistic alternative to an extensive sharing of power with
the NLF.

- 70 -

Another critical group in terms of bridging the gap between countryside and city consists of what may be termed, after Belden Paulson, "the small intellectuals." These include small businessmen, traders, local clergy, the more prosperous resident farmers, and, above all, the school teachers. They are the people who normally furnish the non-administrative linkage between the world of the peasant and the world of the metropolis. They have some education, but typically have not completed the university and, most importantly, their social functions require them to live continuingly in the rural areas. The past weakness of this particular class has been one of the major contributing factors to the political problems of Vietnam. Many of those people who might have assumed these roles in Vietnamese society were recruited into the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong.

The small intellectuals differ from both traditional village leadership and from the local agents of the national bureaucracy. Compared to the former, the small intellectuals are more likely to be committed to modern and egalitarian values and to rest their status on achievement rather than ascription. In comparison with the national bureaucrats, the small intellectuals are more likely to have roots in the local community.

- 71 -

Effective competition with the NLF will be helped by an increase
in the number of small intellectuals in the countryside and an increase
in the political activity and leadership roles assumed by such
individuals. As in many other modernizing countries, the key person
in this process may be the local school teacher. It would be highly
desirable to insure that the school teachers being trained and dispatched
to the rural areas receive a good training in politics as well as in
education. As Everet Bumgardner reports in his memo of 6 January
1969, many Vietnamese "do not fear anyone who could win an election
because of their belief that only nationalists would be recognized by
the village intellectual and teacher groups at the voting level. These
people in turn determine who would win the election."

Another potential source of anti-communist local cadres will
be the demobilized ARVN noncoms and enlisted men who return to
their villages. These men will, in large measure, be already
identified with and committed to the CVN cause; they will have a
tangible stake in not allowing the NLF to take over their villages.
They will also, presumably, bring with them out of the army certain
minimal educational, organizational, and military skills which will
be desperately needed in the political competition. They could easily

- 72 -

be a crucial factor in determining which way a village would swing.
In the election of the Constituent Assembly of 1917 in Russia, for
instance, the voting behavior of rural districts was often determined
by the party which the demobilized soldiers returning to those
districts had joined while still in the army. Villages whose re-
turning servicemen had been propagandized and signed up by the
Bolsheviks in the army voted Bolshevik in the elections. Villages
whose returning servicemen identified with other parties supported
those parties.*

Similar patterns are likely to exist in the first postwar
Vietnamese election. Hence, it would seem highly desirable:
(a) to begin immediately indoctrinating and training ARVN troops
to play political roles when they return to their villages; and
(b) to recognize that after a cease-fire it may well be in the GVN's
interest to demobilize more rather than fewer troops in order
more effectively to engage in the political competition.

*See Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election of the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917*. (Harvard Press, 1950).

- 73 -

While competition in rural areas normally leads to one group winning effective control, competition in the cities tends to be a continuing process. One of the few generalizations about politics in modernizing countries which is almost universally true is that the metropolitan centers are the principal source of opposition to the government. In democratic countries the ruling party seldom carries the capital city in an electoral contest. In non-democratic countries intellectuals, students, military groups, sometimes labor organizations, are all alert in the capital ready to pounce upon the government. This has been as true in Vietnam as anywhere else. The opposition to Diem was centered-in Saigon and, to a lesser degree, in Hue. In 1967, Thieu-Ky failed to get both a plurality and 30% of the total vote in seven provinces and municipalities. Three of these were Saigon, Danang, and Hue.

A prolonged period of open political competition will inevitably lead to the emergence of strong anti-government groups in the cities. This urban opposition proclivity offers great opportunities to the NLF to move in and establish itself as the dominant opposition group. While the key question in the contested rural areas concerns who will

- 74 -

monopolize control, the key question in the cities concerns who, if anyone, will monopolize the opposition.

From the U.S. viewpoint the most important goal is to insure the existence of a non-communist opposition to the GVN. The worst situation in the cities would be for the NLF to dominate the opposition there. The end of the fighting will see a number of groups, including the NLF, emerge on the surface of urban politics. While undoubtedly war-weariness will translate itself into politics-weariness too, the postwar urban scene should also present ample opportunity for messianic leaders and mass movements. Conceivably the Buddhists could re-emerge as a dominant group. Quite possibly a movement like the Soka Gakkai could get established in Vietnam, a development whose probability is increased by the prominent role which Japanese interests may play in the postwar reconstruction. Any developments like these ought to be viewed favorably from the U.S.-GVN viewpoint. It might also be in the interest of the U.S. and GVN to encourage Generals Thi or Minh or Trich Tri Quang to take the lead in organizing the urban opposition to the government. Such an organization would at least occupy the field and prevent the NLF from monopolizing the opposition and thereby attracting to itself all those groups and individuals with real or imagined

- 75 -

grievances.

## E. Techniques of Political Appeal

The NLF may well be the best organized political group in South Vietnam. To counter the NLF top priority has to be given to developing non-communist dominant organizations in the contested rural areas. Organization, however, is not all of politics, and at least three other political resources can be used effectively by pro-GVN groups.

### (1) Populist leaders

Non-communist politics in Vietnam is fragmented and personalistic. Loyalties are to individuals rather than to organizations. Clique and faction play preeminent roles. Studies of political development suggest that this pattern of politics is often followed by the emergence on the political scene of charismatic popular leaders. Personalistic politics, in a sense, is transferred from the cabinet to the street. Certainly one of the most striking lacuna in recent Vietnamese politics has been the failure of any 'single political leader (except Diem) to develop widespread mass popularity. In part, of course, this reflects the restricted and authoritarian character of the politics of the Diem and immediate

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post-Diem periods. The political obstacles to the emergence of charismatic mass leadership have now been removed, however, and the end of the war will generate conditions of flux, uncertainty, and quite possibly unemployment favorable to the emergence of such leadership.

It is highly probable that the NLF has one or more leaders who could meet this need. It is conceivable that Thieu and/or Ky could also meet it. In both the NLF and ARVN, however, the emphasis is on organizational rather than popular leadership. It has only been slowly and reluctantly that Thieu has learned to play the demagogue, although Ky clearly is temperamentally more inclined in this direction. In any event, it seems likely that some mass political leaders will emerge who have been closely associated with neither the NLF nor the GVN. Tzu was in a small way a taste of the future. Such individuals can play a highly functional role in developing a mass appeal which would rival and perhaps undercut that of the communists. In South American terms, Vietnam would seem to be ripe for a Peron or a Rojas Pinilla.

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## (2) Mass media

Closely related to the emergence of populistic leadership is the role of the mass media. The expansion of the media offers another important counterweight to the NLF, particularly in the cities. It would seem very much in the interest of the U.S. to give media development a high priority now and in the immediate postwar period. Subsidies to newspapers, investments in radio and TV installations, and distribution of radio and TV sets should all have significant positive benefits for the government. While experts differ on the political impact of the media, the old view that tended to discount its importance has now been superceded by new evidence that it can play a major role, particularly where other sources of information and viewpoint are weak or conflicting.

## (3) Constituent service

Much can also be done to strengthen existing non-communist political activists by furnishing them with the opportunity to do good -- or to appear to do good -- to their constituents. It would seem to be particularly important to furnish these opportunities to those assemblymen and senators who potentially confront formidable NLF opposition. Opportunities were apparently missed to involve Congressmen in the introduction of HR-8. It would

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indeed be tragic if similar opportunities were again missed with
the land reform program. Assemblymen and senators perhaps can
also play some role in the distribution of war surplus material and
installations. Another opportunity will be in the promotion and
implementation of bonuses and other benefits for former service-
men -- who will comprise, after all, a significant portion of the
male population. In terms of winning support, the way in which
benefits are provided to people is just as important -- and perhaps
more important -- than the extent to which they are provided.

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# VI. A PROGRAM FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

As a negotiating strategy to get the NLF to participate in political competition, the U. S. and GVN should be willing to trade significant amounts of local control to the NLF in return for maintaining a firm hold on the national centers of power. In preparing itself for such competition, the analysis of the preceding pages suggests that the U. S. should give high priority to the following measures:

## 1. Establishment of Channels for Regular U. S. -GVN Consultation on Political Competition

The U. S. should establish channels in Saigon for regular consultation and cooperation with the GVN in the preparation for post cease-fire political competition. On the U. S. side, responsibility for these contacts should be located with an Embassy officer who would be responsible for enlisting support and cooperation from A. I. D., CIA, and other sources. The point of contact on the GVN side presumably should be a trusted official in the President's office. It may also be desirable to bring from the U. S. for periods of time political activists and/or political scientists for consultation and work on particular problems.

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## 2. Review of A. I. D. and JUSPAO Programs for Their Effects on Political Competition

USAID and JUSPAO should review all their major programs in Vietnam to determine how such programs may contribute to or detract from the non-communist potential for political competition.

Of particular importance, here is not just the substance of the ongoing programs, but also: (a) what new programs (e. g., more media support) might be initiated to bolster the political effectiveness of non-communist groups; and (b) how existing and future programs can be administered so as to maximize the political benefits for non-communist politicians and groups (e. g., by involving them in the distribution of services to their constituents).

## 3. Amendment of Existing Electoral Law to Provide for Run-Off Elections

The U. S. should urge the GVN to consider the desirability of promptly amending the existing electoral law so as to provide for run-off majority elections for the national executive and legislature.

The earlier such legislation is passed, the more difficult it will be for the NLF to charge that the system is being rigged against them.

When they do charge that, one answer, of course, is that surely if,

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as they claim, they represent the majority of the people in Vietnam, they cannot object to the government being chosen by majority vote. If the NLF is adamant in demanding some other system, the GVN can always, if it wishes, agree to some compromise, but its bargaining position will be strengthened if the electoral law is changed promptly.

### 4. Survey, Identification, and Support of Key Political "Building Blocks" in Highly Contested Rural Areas

A high priority should be given to surveying and identifying the social, economic, and political groups in contested rural areas which are best suited to become the "core" anti-communist group in those areas. This presumably could be a major responsibility of the joint consultative group suggested above. Once identified, such groups should be strengthened through advice, material support, and the channeling of services and benefits through them.

### 5. Preparation for Rapid Introduction of Anti-Communist Political Cadres into Contested Rural Areas

The GVN and U. S. ought to plan carefully for an all-out campaign to introduce effective anti-communist political cadres into the most heavily contested rural areas. The most likely sources of such cadres are schoolteachers and ARVN veterans. The GVN

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Ministry of Education and ARVN should give high priority to the indoctrination and training of rural schoolteachers and soldiers (particularly noncoms) from rural areas in the methods of political competition.

6. Laying the Groundwork for a Moderate, Non-Communist Urban Opposition

The U. S. should urge upon the GVN the constructive role which a non-communist urban opposition can perform and should be alert to the opportunities to encourage appropriate leaders in the development of such an opposition.