[465]

Public Papers of the Presidents

August 3

The two sides agreed that this visit was another contribution to friendship and understanding between the Romanian and American Governments and peoples and to the valuable tradition of constructive dialogue which has evolved between the two countries.

Sinaia, August 3, 1975

GERALD R. FORD

President of the United States of America

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU

President of the Socialist Republic of Romania

NOTE: The text of the joint communiqué was released at Sinaia, Romania.

466

Remarks on Arrival at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

August 3, 1975

President Tito, ladies and gentlemen:

Mrs. Ford, our son Jack, and I have looked forward to this visit to Yugoslavia, a country of great beauty and a country with fierce pride in its independence.

It is also a very great pleasure for me to make my first visit here as President of the United States.

Twelve years ago I came to Yugoslavia as a Member of the Congress on a far less happy occasion—Skopje had been devastated by an earthquake. I remember the sad and very grim scene. Mrs. Ford and I visited Skopje. I am very pleased to learn that Skopje has been rebuilt into a beautiful and modern city.

This is representative of the progress made throughout Yugoslavia in recent years. It is a fine example of what creativity, hard work, and determination—well-known characteristics of the Yugoslav people—can achieve.

I am looking forward to my talks with you, Mr. President. You are truly respected in America and throughout the world as one of the great men of the postwar era. I am confident that our discussions of bilateral issues and questions affecting the peace and security and welfare of the world will add to our mutual understanding, to the friendly relations of our two countries, and the friendship between Yugoslavs and Americans.

Mr. President, you and I have just returned from Helsinki where we attended

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[467]

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This summit was an-
other step in the continuing efforts to reduce tensions and increase international
cooperation.

It represents progress which we, together with other Conference participants, must build upon. Full implementation of the Helsinki documents promises greater security, greater cooperation, not only in Europe but among people everywhere.

The meeting of the United States, Yugoslavia, and 33 other states in Finland, also serves as the latest reminder that today's world finds the people of the world increasingly interdependent.

As we meet today and tomorrow in Belgrade, so soon after our participation
together in the Helsinki Conference, we are mindful of the need for coopera-
tion by all nations on urgent international problems.

I am confident that our discussions will make a very positive contribution in this direction.

Thank you, the people of Yugoslavia, for your gracious welcome to this great
country.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 5:29 p.m. at Surcin Airport in response to remarks of welcome by Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.

Later in the day, the President met with President Tito at the Federal Executive Council Building.

467

Toast at a State Dinner in Belgrade.

August 3, 1975

Mr. President, Madame Broz, ladies and gentlemen:

I am very, very delighted to be back in Yugoslavia. Twelve years is much too long to be away.

Mrs. Ford and I thank you most sincerely for the warm and wonderful wel-
come of your people and for your own very gracious remarks, Mr. President.

While I am deeply appreciative of the justly renowned Yugoslav hospitality shown to Mrs. Ford and to me personally, I am very mindful that this kind expression represents the friendship which the Yugoslav people feel for the American people.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that this sentiment is fully reciprocated on
our part. We Americans have long valued our ties of friendship with Yugo-

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Yugoslavia. Americans have particularly admired Yugoslavia's independent spirit. Whenever independence is threatened, people everywhere look to the example of the struggle of Yugoslavian people throughout their history. They take strength and they take inspiration from that example.

Mr. President, this spirit and your courageous leadership brought the Yugoslav people successfully through the harsh trials of World War II and its aftermath, into an era of peace, stability, and economic growth. Yugoslavia is confident of its place in the world and its prospects for the future, and I believe your confidence is fully justified.

American interest in Yugoslavia's continued independence, integrity, and well-being, expressed often in the past, remains undiminished. Tonight, I have the pleasure to reassert my nation's positive interest in the future of your nation.

Yugoslavs and Americans have both benefited from many joint efforts to speed the economic development of Yugoslavia. Our bilateral trade continues to grow. It has more than doubled in 5 years. Yugoslav-American economic councils have been established in Belgrade and New York City. Many American firms are working closely with Yugoslav enterprises, such as the construction of your country's first nuclear power facility. Our Export-Import Bank plays a very positive role in supplying loans and guarantees. Yugoslav-American scientific, technological, cultural cooperation and exchanges are an increasingly important part of our bilateral relations.

But our mutual accomplishments in dealing with economic problems must be viewed from the perspective of the interdependence of all nations.

We have been distressed by the intransigence and irresponsibility reflected in some of the discussions of vital issues in United Nations forums. The growing alienation between developing nations can only harm the best interests of both and jeopardize the solution of universal problems.

I assure you, Mr. President, that the United States will play its full role and its full part in efforts to resolve these issues in the best interests of all people.

Yugoslavia has taken a very prominent role in international affairs under your guidance, Mr. President. The United States recognizes that your country's policy of nonalignment makes an active contribution to greater understanding among peoples.

Yugoslavia and the United States have consistently worked for cooperation based on the equality of all members of the international community under the United Nations Charter in settling of outstanding international problems.

Our two countries, as in the case of all friends, have had differences, but we are able to discuss them openly, as friends do, and to resolve them. The main

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point is that we are never in doubt about the importance of common goals or
about our deep commitment to the continuity of friendly relations.

At this time, with the aims of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe so clearly in our thoughts, let us emphasize the mutuality and the
interdependence of our basic concerns for peace, security, and human progress
in the years to come.

In that spirit, I ask you to join me in a toast to President Tito, whose courage, wisdom, and leadership have meant so much for Yugoslavia and the world, in which his country has played such an important part.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:50 p.m. in the Federal Executive Council Building in response to a toast by President Tito.

468

Remarks in Belgrade Following a Meeting With President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. August 4, 1975

Mr. President:

The talks that we have had for the last day have been too short, but we have discussed in great detail some of the very major matters that both of our countries are equally interested in.

We did discuss the bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and the United
States. That included, of course, our economic relationships. It did, of course,
include our military relationships. And in both instances, I indicated very firmly
that I would give both matters or problems my very personal attention because
of their significance.

We did discuss the results of the CSCE Conference in Helsinki. It was agreed
that this was a step forward, as both of us indicated in our speeches in Helsinki,
but that we had to produce progress if we were to justify the action. And when
we meet here in Belgrade 2 years from now, the success of Helsinki would be
proven by the actions that have been taken in the interim.

We did, of course, discuss the problems of the Middle East. I indicated that
the United States would continue its very vital interest in progress in the Middle
East. I stated very emphatically that a stalemate in the Middle East was unac-
ceptable. I indicated that moderation on the part of all parties was essential.

I also indicated that flexibility was necessary if we were to achieve the kind
of results that would avoid a potential, serious development, a catastrophe from

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August 4

the point of view of the world as a whole. Moderation, greater flexibility are
absolutely essential at the present time.

I, of course, thank the President for his cordial and friendly welcome, and I
express to the Yugoslavian people my gratitude for the warm reception given
to Mrs. Ford and myself and our son, and I look forward to an expanding and
improving relationship between our peoples.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:43 a.m. at the Federal Executive Council Building.

President Tito responded in Serbo-Croatian. His remarks were translated by an interpreter as follows:

It is a little difficult for me to make a statement, as the President of the United States has already said all that I wanted to say.

I must say that the talks have been going in a
very cordial and constructive spirit.

When we discussed bilateral relations, we found
that such relations are already very good, but
we agreed that they could be better and that we in-
tended to expand them in the future.

Both sides have obviously expressed concern about
the situation in the Middle East; I think [in] that
our views are quite identical, especially after I
heard what President Ford said about the actions
the United States intends to take in the future.

As far as the international situation is concerned,
we didn't discuss it in detail, but we discussed more
the economic situation. We found together that the
economic situation is very serious and that it will be

a matter of serious discussion at the forthcoming
Special Session of the United Nations. And after
I heard what President Ford and State Secretary
Kissinger said about the attitude the United States
are going to take, I think I can be hopeful that the
Special Session will be a successful one.

I think the talks with President Ford and State
Secretary Kissinger were in the spirit of the joint
declaration we adopted in Washington.

I wish to say that the visit has been a very suc-
cessful one; it has enabled us to get to know each
other a little better. I think President Ford has been
able to see that the peoples of Yugoslavia—judging
by the reception they gave you, sir—wish good rela-
tions with the United States of America.

So, I thank you for your visit which will be,
I am sure, beneficial for both countries and for
the future relations.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Earlier in the day, the President met with Prime
Minister Dzemal Bijedic at the Old Palace.

469

## Toasts of the President and President Tito of Yugoslavia at a Working Luncheon in Belgrade. August 4, 1975

Mr. President:

As our visit in Yugoslavia draws to a close, let me express my deep appreciation on behalf of Mrs. Ford and our son Jack and all of the American party who join me in thanking you once more for the warm hospitality and deep friendship that you have shown us. We have had a marvelous time in Belgrade.

Mr. President, I especially appreciate having had this chance to hear your views on our bilateral questions and on the issues affecting the international community. I appreciate your long experience and wisdom reflected in each of the subjects discussed during our conversations here.

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[469]

I have valued our discussions coming, as they do, immediately after the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which both you and I par-
ticipated, representing our two countries.

I am pleased, Mr. President, that you and I are agreed on the need for all
participating states to implement its documents fully and in good faith. If we
do so, we will contribute to greater stability, increasing contacts between our
peoples, greater cooperation throughout Europe. We will contribute, of course,
to the important goal we both share—a world in which all peoples enjoy peace,
prosperity, and security.

I am pleased that our views have been close on many, many of the matters
facing our two peoples and all of mankind. It is essential that we now work to
broaden our spirit of understanding and agreement, to achieve a better realiza-
tion within the international community of the interdependence of human
societies and their problems. The need for cooperation in seeking solutions to
the universal problems is very critical.

Mr. President, your country, with its own courageous determination to main-
tain its independence, can fully appreciate the importance to the American
people of our celebration of our 200 years of freedom. It is a time for Americans
to reflect upon the basic values that brought success to the Original Thirteen
Colonies' struggle for self-government.

We are proud of the significant contribution through the years of Yugoslav-
Americans to our national growth and development. They constitute a bridge of
understanding, good will and kinship between Yugoslavia and the United
States—and let us expand that bridge.

As I close, I raise my glass in deepest appreciation to you in a toast to you, Mr.
President, and to Yugoslav-American friendship.

NOTE: The President spoke at approximately 3 p.m.
at the Federal Executive Council Building in re-
sponse to a toast by President Tito.

President Tito spoke in Serbo-Croatian. His re-
marks were translated by an interpreter as follows:

Mr. President:

May I again express once again my great satisfac-
tion for having you in our country. Your visit is one
more important contribution to our traditionally
good relations, and I am convinced that the further
cooperation between our two countries will be pro-
moted in all fields.

Although your stay was short, you could, Mr.
President, see for yourself that the peoples of
Yugoslavia lavish friendship toward the American
people, and they wish the existing ties to be con-
solidated and sanctioned.

Yesterday and today we had very interesting
talks which showed that your country, as well as
ours, are very interested to peace in the world and
progress in international cooperation. On many
questions we have the same-views, and we are
equally ready to contribute to the solution of major
international problems.

I think we are on the good road because even on
the question on which our positions are different
there has been new consideration being expressed
and recognized for further dialog. We know that
the United States has a great responsibility for
peace in the world and the development of inter-
national cooperation and that on your involvement
depends, in a large measure, the solution of many
questions.

We appreciate the effort you are engaging in this
direction. Applying consistently the principles of

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August 4

the policy of nonalignment, Yugoslavia en-
deavors—and we shall continue to do so in the
future—to strengthen the spirit of cooperation be-
tween our peoples, to consolidate mutual confidence,
and to build such international relations in which
independence, equality, and cooperation among all
peoples will come to more and more expression.

I wish, Mr. President, to assure you that the
talks I had with you gave me great satisfaction. I
hope that you will have again the opportunity to
visit our country, to stay a little longer, and to get

better to know our people and the effort they
make in the building of a better life.

I would like, Mr. President, that you convey to
the American people the feelings of sincere friend-
ship of the peoples of Yugoslavia and our wishes
for further prosperity of the United States of
America.

I raise this glass to the good health and personal
happiness of you personally, Mr. President, of Mrs.
Ford, and your family, to the health of your asso-
ciates, to friendship between our two countries.

470

Remarks to Members of the Belgrade City Assembly.

August 4, 1975

Mr. Mayor and members of the Assembly, distinguished members of govern-
ment, ladies and gentlemen:

It is a great privilege and pleasure for me to again be in the "White City"
on this occasion, as a resident of the White House.

Twelve years ago, Mrs. Ford and I were privileged and honored to be in Belgrade. At that time, I was a member of the Interparliamentary Union. As a delegate to this international gathering, we were formally received not only by the people of Belgrade but we were entertained and equally made welcome by the delegates from your parliament. As a member of the American delegation, I participated in the various activities and speeches that were made in your parliament building.

Equally important, Mrs. Ford and I had an opportunity to visit Skopje and
also to visit Dubrovnik.

I would like to say with great emphasis, we found in our 10 days in Yugoslavia
the great warmth and cordiality of the people of Yugoslavia. We saw the cul-
ture and read about the tradition of your great country. And as the mayor has
pointed out, the long, long history of relations between the United States and
Yugoslavia has been a building block for the progress that has taken place in
the last 10 and 15 years.

This is a firm foundation that has been expanded by people-to-people ex-
changes, by officials from communities in Yugoslavia visiting officials and com-
munities in the United States and vice versa. Of course, the personal contacts
between top officials in your government and in mine have made our bilateral
relations better and better. The working together by your government and mine

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[471]

on many, many international problems has made the world a safer place in
which to live.

I therefore say to you, Mr. Mayor, and your associates in the Assembly, how
grateful I am for this beautiful golden plaque. And I thank you for the hos-
pitality extended to me, my wife, and our son Jack.

And on behalf of the American people, I invite you and all of your associates
to come to the United States to see and hear from our people on our Bicentennial
anniversary.

Thank you again. I am deeply grateful.

NOTE: The President spoke at 3:40 p.m. in the Belgrade City Hall. Prior to his remarks, he received the Golden Plaque of the city from Mayor Zivorad Kovacevic.

471

## Joint Statement Following Talks With President Tito of Yugoslavia. August 4, 1975

AT THE invitation of the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, the President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and Mrs. Ford paid an official visit to Belgrade, Yugoslavia, on August 3 and 4, 1975.

Continuing the established practice of regular contacts and consultations between the presidents of the two countries, Presidents Tito and Ford held cordial, open and constructive talks on a wide range of issues of mutual interest. Taking part in the talks were, from the Yugoslav side, Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, Vice President of the SFRY Presidency; Edvard Karelj, Member of the SFRY Presidency; Dzemal Bijedic, President of the Federal Executive Council; Milos Minic, Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Dimce Belovski, member of the Council of the Federation; Lazar Mojsov, Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Toma Granfil, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States; Aleksandar Sokorac, Chief of Cabinet of the President of the Republic; Nikola Milicevic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Andjelko Blazevic, Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of the Republic; Svetozar Starcevic, Director for the North American Department, Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs;

From the United States side, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Laurence H. Silberman, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Robert T. Hartmann, Counselor to

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the President; Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to the President; Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard B. Cheney, Deputy Assistant to the President; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State; Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State.

The President of the Federal Executive Council, Dzemal Bijedic, called on President Ford and conducted talks with him on matters concerning bilateral cooperation.

Presidents Tito and Ford reiterated the particular importance which the governments of Yugoslavia and the United States of America attach to the maintenance of peace and stability by the peaceful settlement of disputes, and by adherence to the principles of independence, mutual respect and full equality of sovereign states, regardless of differences or similarities in their social, political and economic systems, and in full accord with the spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter.

President Ford's visit provided an occasion for a thorough review of bilateral relations which continue to develop successfully. President Tito and President Ford confirmed that the principles contained in the joint statement, issued in Washington in October 1971, represent the continuing basis for relations and cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States of America. In conversations between President Ford and President Tito further stimulus was given to these relations. The two Presidents noted that additional progress has been achieved in cooperation in the economic area and agreed that possibilities exist for further mutually beneficial development of trade, investment and other contemporary forms of economic cooperation. Concrete ways to achieve expansion in this field were discussed.

The two Presidents once again emphasized the significant contribution of exchanges in the sphere of social and physical sciences, culture, education, information, etc., to the deepening of mutual understanding and respect and agreed to make efforts to further develop such exchanges.

President Ford greeted the readiness of the Yugoslav government to contribute to the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the United States of America through various cultural and artistic presentations.

The two Presidents emphasized the deep historical and cultural ties which exist between their countries, and especially the part which Americans of Yugoslav origin have long played in strengthening the bonds of friendship between their new and former homelands and agreed that these ties should be strengthened.

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[472]

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction over the recent conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They consider that the consistent implementation of the provisions of the final act which the signatory countries pledged themselves to fulfill, will contribute significantly to the achievement of the Conference's important goals and encourage further efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe and to improve political, economic and other relations among states and peoples.

President Tito and President Ford emphasized that the interdependence of all peoples and countries, developed and developing, is an essential factor in the search for a just and effective economic development. Reviewing the urgent problems facing mankind in the area of international economic relations, they agreed on the need to increase their efforts to find equitable solutions on the basis of improved international cooperation and respect for the interests of all.

The two Presidents reviewed a number of other important international problems, including the situation in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Cyprus and the questions of disarmament.

President Tito particularly presented views on the importance of the policy of nonalignment in today's world. He also emphasized the significance of United States policies in international affairs. President Ford set forth United States positions on various matters including the significance of the Yugoslav policy of nonalignment in international affairs.

President Ford reaffirmed the steadfast interest of the United States and its support for the independence, integrity, and nonaligned position of Yugoslavia.

The two Presidents on this occasion reaffirmed the importance of periodic contacts and consultations at various levels in fields of mutual interest.

The principles set forth in this joint statement are the foundation of United States-Yugoslav relations. They constitute the firm basis on which the friendly relations of the two countries will be conducted in the future.

NOTE: The text of the joint statement was released at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

472

Text of Remarks on Returning From Europe.

August 4, 1975

I AM, of course, very glad to be home, but I am also very glad that I went to Europe. By representing the United States of America at the 35-nation Con-

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ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at Helsinki, I was able to deliver in person a message of enormous significance to all Europeans.

That message was—America still cares. The torch in the Statue of Liberty still burns bright. We will stand for freedom and independence in 1976 as we did in 1776. The United States of America still believes that all men and women, everywhere, should enjoy the God-given blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in a world of peace.

The reception that I received from the peoples of the five countries I visited— West Germany, Poland, Finland, Romania, and Yugoslavia—was not a tribute to me so much as to the ideals and the continuing leadership of the United States in the worldwide effort for peace, progress, and prosperity for all nations.

That an American President could receive such warm and hospitable welcomes in the countries of Eastern Europe shows that the message I brought to Helsinki came through loud and clear.

And we will continue to encourage the full implementation of the principles embodied in the CSCE declarations until the 1977 followup meeting to assess how well all the signatory states have translated these principles into concrete action for the benefit of their peoples and the common progress in Europe.

Europeans—East and West—will also be watching. If the principles of Helsinki are lived up to, as each leader solemnly pledged, then we can consider the Conference a success in which we have played a significant part.

My reception in the Federal Republic of Germany and Finland and the personal talks that I was able to have with the leaders of our NATO allies and other governments were constructive and greatly gratifying. So were my discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev which, I am confident, will lead to an accelerated disposition of some of the differences which existed before our meetings.

I believe we are on the right course and the course that offers the best hope for a better world. I will continue to steer that steady course, because this experience has further convinced me that millions of hopeful people, in all parts of Europe, still look to the United States of America as the champion of human freedom everywhere and of a just peace among the nations of the world.

I repeat: I am glad that I went. I am happy to be back.

NOTE: Because of inclement weather, the President did not deliver the remarks on arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Md.

1110

Richard Nixon, 1971

Oct. 28 [340]

340 Remarks of Welcome to President Josip Broz Tito
of Yugoslavia. October 28, 1971

President Tito, Madam Broz, our distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:

Mr. President, I am very honored on
behalf of the American people to welcome
you again to the United States and to our
Nation's Capital. I welcome you on this
occasion first as the leader of a nation with
which the United States has very friendly
relations, but I welcome you also as a
world statesman of the first rank.

I recall on the occasion of the visit that I made to your country—the privilege of being the first President of the United States to visit Yugoslavia—the long talks that we had, not only about relations between our two countries but about the problems of the world generally. I look forward to resuming those talks today and on the occasions that we will meet while you are here. I know that our discussions will further the interests of better relations between our two countries, but will also contribute to the goal of peace in the world, to which you are dedicated and to which we are dedicated.

A moment ago, across these south
grounds of the White House, we heard the
music of your national anthem. The words
of that national anthem also have very
great meaning. One phrase reads like this:
“We will stand steadfast and strong, like
a granite mountain.” Mr. President, may
our friendship between Yugoslavia and
the United States always be steadfast and
strong, and may our dedication to the
principle of the right of every nation in
the world to be independent in a world of
peace be as steadfast and strong.

Mr. President, we welcome you warmly
not only to our Nation's Capital but also

to the other parts of America that you will
visit in the days that you are here.

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:06 a.m. on the South Lawn at the White House where President Tito was given a formal welcome with full military honors.

See also Items 342 and 343.

President Tito began his remarks in Eng-
lish; he then continued in Serbo-Croatian,
which was translated by an interpreter. His
remarks follow:

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gentle-
men:

May I thank you most warmly on behalf
of my wife, my associates, and in my own
name for this solemn and friendly welcome,
and for your kind words.

I find great satisfaction in the fact of meet-
ing you again after your important visit to my
country, the first visit paid by an American
President to Yugoslavia. Our encounters and
talks eloquently reflect the traditionally
friendly relations prevailing between our two
countries, allies in the World Wars, participants
in the founding of the United Nations, which
have had much in common in their past history.

Today we are also bound by the fact that
the fate of all countries and peoples is becom-
ing ever more common, as we live in a world
in which, in view of the present level of prog-
ress of mankind, we can achieve general pros-
perity or suffer general catastrophe.

Founded on mutual respect and enriched by
new possibilities for equal cooperation, our rela-
tions are developing in all fields. We have come
here, in the same way as you came to
Yugoslavia, to strengthen and promote precisely
such relations still further. This is in the interest
of our two countries, while, at the same time,
these relations constitute a significant factor of
peace and stability in Europe and in the world.

Mr. President, we are looking forward with
particular interest to our talks with you and
your associates on many important questions of
international relations in which your country
plays a very important role and bears a great re-
sponsibility. As an independent and nonaligned

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[340] Oct. 28

country, firmly resolved to remain the sovereign architect of its own internal development and of its foreign policy, Yugoslavia is vitally interested in the broadest democratic international cooperation and in the removal of all barriers and divisions that are hampering it.

Striving to contribute to the utmost to such cooperation in a world of indivisible peace and freedom, we are following with great attention and understanding the new trends in the "era of negotiations" to which you personally, Mr. President, are contributing with your initiatives and active involvement.

We are confident that this time, too, our open exchange of views will contribute to better mutual understanding, to the expansion of bilateral cooperation and strengthening of joint

efforts for the easing of tensions and peaceful solution of international problems which are burdening the world.

I am gratified, esteemed friend, that this time I shall also have the opportunity to visit some parts of your great and beautiful country, whose talented and enterprising people are engaged in accomplishing great achievements as well as in a search for solutions for the problems and needs of man in this dynamic epoch of development of science and technology.

I bring to the American people and to you, Mr. President, the friendly greetings of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

PRESIDENT NIXON. Zivila [Long live] Yugoslavia!

PRESIDENT TITO. Zivila America!

## 341 Remarks to a National Association of Manufacturers Teleconference. October 28, 1971

Good morning, Mr. Gullander, ladies and gentlemen:

I regret that I am unable to be with you today in person, but I do wish to take this opportunity to greet you and to make a few remarks on the subject of this very important NAM teleconference. I am happy to report that the 90-day wage-price freeze we put into effect in mid-August has been extraordinarily successful. This success has been a great tribute to the patriotism and the pride of the American people.

In just over 2 weeks we shall move into the post-freeze program. In formulating this economic stabilization program, I have talked with representatives of all segments of the population, including labor leaders, business leaders, manufacturers, agricultural groups, industrialists, Congressional leaders, and

consumers. Through this program the existing price and wage freeze will be replaced by price and wage control exercised by the Pay Board and the Price Commission working with the Cost of Living Council.

We are confronting inflation head on with this program. We have launched an offensive in this battle against inflation, and we are going to win this battle. I say that with confidence because the American people and you, an important and influential segment of the American people, have shown such cooperation during Phase 1.

The ideal of prosperity in a world of peace has caught the imagination and summoned up the will of the American people. And I call upon you this morning, the leaders of American business, to join with me during the post-freeze period in

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Oct. 28 [342]

the great task of revitalizing America's
economy so that together we can achieve
that great goal of full prosperity in a
world of peace.

I wish you every success in today's NAM
teleconference.

NOTE: The President's remarks were recorded on audiotape for closed-circuit television play to regional meetings of the National Association of Manufacturers in 26 cities. Some 20,000 business and civic leaders attended the sessions.

W. P. Gullander was president of the
Association.

342 Toasts of the President and President Tito of Yugoslavia. October 28, 1971

Mr. President, Madam Broz, our distinguished guests from Yugoslavia, and all of our distinguished guests from the United States:

As I was talking to President Tito to-
night, my memory went back to other
occasions in this State Dining Room of
the White House when other world
leaders have occupied the chair which he
now sits in. The great leaders of the world
have been here.

I recall the evening when Winston
Churchill was in this chair, Charles de
Gaulle, Adenauer, Nehru, Sukarno. I
think of those leaders and many others,
and then I think of President Tito of
Yugoslavia, our distinguished guest
tonight.

The men that I have mentioned all
headed countries that were bigger than
Yugoslavia, both in territory and in num-
bers. But I think that I can say without
fear of contradiction that no world leader
who has been honored in this room has
personally met and known more world
leaders in his capacity as head of state
and government than President Tito of
Yugoslavia.

This means that one who is so fortunate
to have the opportunity to talk to him
is able to talk to one who is as well in-
formed, if not better informed, than any

world leader in all the world today. This
tells us something about both the man
and his country.

Yugoslavia is a country about the size
of Wyoming. It has 20 million people, a
diverse country in terms of its people, just
like the people of the United States are
diverse. Yugoslavia has followed, under
the leadership of President Tito, a policy
of what is sometimes called nonalignment,
but which I would say simply would be
one of trying to have good relations with
all nations, whatever their philosophies,
whatever their geography, whatever their
background.

For this reason, our distinguished guest
tonight has traveled throughout the world,
has been received, honored, and re-
spected in nations throughout the world;
and, consequently, he has demonstrated
that it is possible to have good relations
with nations who may not have good
relations with each other. This makes him
rather unique on the world scene today.

For that reason, the talks that I had
with him a year ago, and again on this
occasion, have been most helpful and con-
structive. His contribution not only as a
leader in war but even more as a leader
in peace, to the cause of peace, to which
he is dedicated and we all are dedicated,
will be one which history will record is

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unique because of the position that he
has held.

In proposing a toast to him tonight, I
can refer to him as the President of a
friendly country, I can refer to him as a
leader in war, but I think that he would
prefer to be referred to as one who is a
leader in peace.

I know that all in this room, including
the several of our guests from America
who have backgrounds—as do so many
millions of Americans—from Yugoslavia,
that all of you will want to join me in
the toast that I will propose not just to
the man, President Tito, a world re-
nowned figure, but to a country of brave
people and courageous people with whom
we are fortunate to have friendly rela-
tions, and to the future of that country
and all countries like it in the world.
They may not be large in terms of ter-
ritory, they may not be numerous in
terms of numbers, but they are proud,
they cherish their independence, and they
have a right to that independence. We
respect it.

To the man who stands for the right of
every country in the world to choose its
own way, to have its own policy, the man
who stands for independence and peace
in the world, President Tito, I propose
his toast tonight.

To President Tito and Madam Broz.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:05 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. See also Items 340 and 343.

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, ladies and
gentlemen:

It is with particular pleasure that I have
responded to your cordial invitation to pay
my first state visit to the United States of
America. On behalf of my wife, my associates,

and in my own name, I wish to thank you
sincerely for the warm words you have ad-
dressed to us. We are greatly honored by this
distinguished gathering in the famous building
in which so many of the architects of your
country have lived and have been engaged in
creative activity.

This, Mr. President, is my second meeting
with you. I also had the pleasure of meeting
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Meetings
at the highest level between our two countries
have already become a tradition and are a
reflection of good and friendly relations, as
well as of the constant concern shown by our
two governments for such meetings.

Your exceptionally significant visit to Yugo-
slavia has raised relations between our two
countries to a higher level. You have deeply
impressed us by your broad interest in the in-
tensive development of these relations, and
by your efforts to promote meaningful coopera-
tion. It is also our desire that these relations
should be constantly expanded, and that our
cooperation should be further enriched and
expanded. In this connection, I have in mind
consultations and exchanges of views in the
context of our joint efforts to solve international
problems, more developed economic coopera-
tion, and new projects in the scientific, cultural,
and other fields.

Constant progress in our relations has been
due precisely to the fact that they have always
been founded on equal rights and mutual re-
spect, and that, on this basis, we have been
successful in discovering new possibilities for
their development. Relations built on such
foundations correspond best to the interests of
our two countries and constitute, at the same
time, a contribution by Yugoslavia and the
United States of America, with all their specific
features, to international cooperation in
general.

Mr. President, I have always been impressed
by the results of the dynamic development of
your country. The great achievements of the
American people, who are about to celebrate
the 200th anniversary of their revolution and
independence, have meant much for the gen-
eral progress of mankind. The United States
has made, and is making, a major contribution
to the solution of many problems facing man,
the citizens and producers of material goods.

Important processes and reforms are under-

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way in Yugoslavia. On the basis of the results achieved so far, they are creating conditions for an ever fuller assertion of man, of his creative initiative and his role in society, for even more democratic relations in our multinational community. We are just as resolutely endeavoring to stabilize our economy and to eliminate difficulties that we have never concealed—although they were not always caused by developments on our soil—and which are understandable in such a fast development as ours. Both actions will further strengthen the power and unity of Yugoslavia and its role in international cooperation.

During your visit to Yugoslavia, Mr. President, I acquainted you with our views of the world and our place in it, and I have tried to explain the basic principles of our foreign policy and how we see the most important international issues. I merely wish to underline on this occasion also that independent and nonaligned Yugoslavia never develops its relations with one country to the detriment of its relations with another country.

We have thrown open the borders of our country to a free flow of people and the widest circulation of ideas and goods. In our cooperation with other countries, we are not guided by any prejudices, and we appraise our partners according to their actual behavior toward the world and ourselves.

We know from experience that differences between countries do not, in themselves, preclude good cooperation, just as similarities do not automatically guarantee friendly relations. Our policy of nonalignment, policy of active coexistence, is aimed at strengthening equitable international cooperation, the independence and unhampered development of all countries, and peace in the world.

Nonalignment, in our view, is an active international factor, and not a policy of some kind of opportunistic "equidistance" or a priori alignment with these or those stands. We support all that we believe to be positive and oppose the use of force, attempts at domination, and all pressures, no matter where they come from, and we shall persevere along this road.

We have always appreciated, Mr. President, the understanding that the Government and public opinion of the United States have shown for Yugoslavia's progress and its position in the world. Your statement in Belgrade to the effect

that the United States of America respects Yugoslavia's nonaligned and independent position was received with particular satisfaction.

Mr. President, we are following with great interest and attention your initiatives, your realistic appraisal of new trends in the world, and your personal contribution to the "era of negotiations." Certain progress has been achieved in international relations in the past year. This has found expression in the expansion of the substance and increase in the number of participants in negotiations, in the alleviation of some major confrontations, and in the finding of solutions for some problems, for instance, those in the center of Europe which have been the constant cause of tension over a number of years. However, we continue to be deeply concerned at the lack of progress with regard to the solution of numerous burning problems and open foci of conflict that threaten world peace, like those in the Middle East and in Indochina.

We are going to continue, Mr. President, our useful and open talks, and, therefore, it is not my intention to deal with international problems at length at the present moment. However, I should like to draw attention to some issues in which the whole world is greatly interested. I have talked about them with many responsible statesmen in the course of the present year. Quite recently, in particular, I have had a series of meetings during my visits to Iran, India, and the Arab Republic of Egypt.

What is involved are grave problems that burden the world—the widening gap between the rich and the poor, between the developed and the underdeveloped, the hotbeds of war, dangerous confrontations, vestiges of colonialism, and so on. In paraphrasing the words of your great President Lincoln, we can say even today, transposing them to the broader international plane, that a world divided against itself, half slave and half free, cannot endure permanently. It is generally felt that all of us together—in addition to our awareness and material power—should possess sufficient will and courage resolutely to discard confrontations which have never brought profit even to one's own people, but have always done harm to others. I believe that you share the view that we should proceed with the energetic and rapid solving of outstanding issues and take concrete measures contributing toward that end.

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In your last year's message on the foreign policy of your country, you stated so eloquently and rightly that the edifice of peace could not stand if all nations did not take part in its construction and if, in all this, they failed to discern their own interests as well. This is precisely the demand put forward by the largest number of countries which support negotiations, while insisting, at the same time, on their own participation in the solving of acute problems. I feel that we can all agree, Mr. President, that in a world of indivisible peace and freedom, peace and freedom for all can only be the work of all.

The strengthening of the United Nations is, in our opinion, the best way to achieve this. That is why we consider that we all should jointly exert efforts in order to insure that the world organization should become the actual expression of the interests and will of the entire international community. The recently adopted important decision on the inclusion of almost one-third of mankind into the United Nations is a decisive contribution to its universality, and it is in accord with current significant actions aimed at establishing contacts and dialogue between all, conducive to peace and stability in the world.

Yugoslavia is particularly interested in détente and security in Europe and in the de-

velopment of the broadest cooperation among all European states. Positive processes and achievements have already taken place—as I have just mentioned—in certain parts of Europe. It is our desire, however, that this should also come to pass on the continent as a whole, including the regions directly linked to Europe, such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Dear friend, we can state, therefore, that there exist good reasons for and mutual needs in developing relations between our two countries. Our relations are traditionally good; we were allies in great wars against the common enemy; generations of our emigrants have taken part in the great construction of the United States. I am confident that we can go much further in expanding our cooperation.

We shall be gratified if this visit and our talks, too, will contribute to the further development of friendly relations and ties between our Governments, countries, and peoples.

I propose this toast, Mr. President, to you and Mrs. Nixon's personal health and happiness, to lasting friendship between Yugoslavia and the United States, and to the well-being and prosperity of the American people.

I propose to rise in toast to the President of America and Mrs. Nixon for long life, happiness, and health.

## 343 Joint Statement Following Discussions With President Tito of Yugoslavia. October 30, 1971

AT THE invitation of the President of the United States of America, Richard Nixon, the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, accompanied by Mrs. Broz and their party, is paying a State visit to the United States. Following their Washington stay from October 28 to October 30, 1971, President Tito and Mrs. Broz and their party are to visit several points of interest in other parts of the country, remaining in the United States until November 2, 1971.

The meetings between the two Presi-

dents, which took place in a cordial, frank and friendly atmosphere, provided the opportunity for comprehensive discussion of the principal issues on the current international scene. Full and mutual respect was accorded the views expressed by both sides in the talks, which covered areas of agreement and areas where differences existed. Each side presented its full and candid views on a broad range of topics which included, in addition to Yugoslav-US relations, European security, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Africa, the developing countries, the

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international monetary situation, and others. In the course of the visit, problems of environment and international measures for the control of illicit narcotics traffic were also discussed.

The two Presidents devoted particular attention to the importance of guaranteeing peace and stability by the peaceful settlement of disputes and by adherence to the principles of independence, mutual respect and the full equality of sovereign states, regardless of divergence or similarity in their social, political and economic systems, in full accordance with the spirit and principles of the United Nations Charter.

They welcomed the continuing growth of cooperation throughout the world and increased reliance on participation in negotiations to reconcile the interests of all nations, large and small, in a world of indivisible peace and interdependence.

It was emphasized in this regard that Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment has been a significant factor in international relations. Countries following such a policy, together with the rest of the world, can make an active contribution to the resolution of world problems and to the more favorable evolution of international relations.

Presidents Tito and Nixon stressed that meaningful disarmament and arms control measures, as well as productive economic and social development, are inter-related factors of peace, stability, and progress in the world. The two Presidents reviewed the problems and needs of the developing countries and the efforts these countries are making in order to improve their position, as well as the possibilities and interest of the international community to assist them in this, particularly in view of the present eco-

nomic and monetary situation in the world.

Presidents Tito and Nixon agreed that, since their last meeting, measurable progress has been made in the search for lasting peace and security in Europe. They believe that it is possible to take further significant steps along these lines which would serve the interests not only of the countries of Europe and the Mediterranean basin, but of world peace generally. They expressed their strong view that a firm peace and true security are indivisible and can be attained only in Europe as a whole, and not in only one or another part of it. They are convinced that each of the European and other interested states has an indispensable role in the construction of a Europe in which reconciliation, peace, and security are fully assured to all its peoples.

Both sides expressed the belief that general improvement in the international atmosphere and the broadening of the area of negotiations and cooperation must be supported by urgent efforts to achieve peaceful settlements of the more critical and dangerous conflicts, particularly those in the Middle East and South Asia. Each side stated its view on Southeast Asia.

President Tito conveyed to President Nixon his impressions from his recent meetings with the leaders of various countries. He acquainted President Nixon with the activities of Yugoslavia in the international field, and also with certain domestic questions concerning the Constitutional amendments and the economic development of the country. President Nixon reaffirmed the interest of the United States in the independence and nonaligned position and policy of Yugoslavia.

President Nixon advised President Tito

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THE PRESIDENT. I have been in East Europe. I haven't seen anything in Budapest or anywhere that equals that store.

Q. How do you like your reception so far?

THE PRESIDENT. It is a very warm-hearted reception, very friendly. President Tito, as we rode in the car, remarked that he was glad that everybody was so friendly and enthusiastic. He and Mrs. Tito couldn't have been more gracious and friendly. I was glad, after a long time, to have the opportunity to meet him personally, and Mrs. Tito as well, and I felt, too, that the spontaneity of the crowd was very heartwarming as we drove out through the country and as we went downtown, now as well as in the formal arrival.

Q. What was the store that you noticed downtown, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT. I think the Ambas-

sador² can tell me what it is. It was very fine looking department store and noticed the windows. I looked at it in the state region of New York with some beautiful displays of fashion and that sort of thing. I just said I want my wife to see it before she goes because it really is an outstanding store.

I had heard about some of the development here in the city, of the merchandising store, the Yucatan, and so on. I saw that it was one of the best that have seen, really, in the world. I think I am a fair judge of that. I have seen most of them.

NOTE: The exchange took place at approximately 6:05 p.m. as the President arrived at the Old Palace in Belgrade.

²United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia
William Leonhart

## 315 Toasts of the President and President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia at a State Dinner in Belgrade.

### September 30, 1970

Mr. President, Madame Broz, friends of Yugoslavia and the United States:

I am honored to be the first American President to visit Yugoslavia; and on this occasion, before this very distinguished company, with this beautiful banquet, I wish, Mr. President, to extend to you and to Madame Broz an invitation to visit our country again.

You have seen Washington and New York. But we would like for you to come again to Washington and then to see the Midwest and our State of California. Both areas are very proud to have many citizens of Yugoslav background who will give you a very warm welcome. We look

forward to your visit to the United States. Tonight, I think, after hearing your speech, Mr. President, of the many things you have to say about our countries have in common—you have the same values, the same traditions. I think first of the many Americans whose roots are here in Yugoslavia, personal friends that Mrs. Nixon and I have, for example, in California, and who have contributed so much to the life of our country.

Beyond this, both of our nations take pride in our diversity. Each of our societies is made up of people of diverse ethnic backgrounds, both in their cultural and religious backgrounds. Yet in each of our countries they have joined together to form one great, strong nation.

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Both of our nations have worked to reconcile regional diversity and national harmony within our countries. Now we must be leaders in reconciling national diversity and international harmony elsewhere in the world.

I think, too, of the steadfast independence, the courage, the love of freedom that are so much a part of the Yugoslav spirit and the Yugoslav strength, and of the times each of our nations has fought to preserve its freedom and its independence.

I think of the efforts Yugoslavia is making to help other nations, and of those places in the less developed parts of the world where our experts, your experts and ours, have worked side by side to assist with development programs.

I think of the exciting new industrial ventures that are being undertaken or planned here in Yugoslavia, in which Americans and Yugoslavs are investing together in the future of Yugoslavia, working together, to develop new enterprises.

I think also on an occasion like this of the great importance of the changes that have taken place in the world in the past 25 years, and of what those changes make possible in terms of a new structure of stability and mutual respect among nations.

A quarter of a century after World War II, we do live in a new world, a world of new nations, of altered relationships, of greater experience, and of new opportunities to strengthen that structure of orderly procedures of mutual respect that is the foundation of peace.

Even in this new world, we still confront many of the same old problems, but often in a new form.

The problem of European security still is high on the world's agenda. Yugoslavia

has tried to demonstrate to the rest of Europe the basic truth that true security must rest on a firm foundation of mutual respect for the independence and integrity of all European countries and of noninterference in their internal affairs.

This same principle lies at the heart of our policies, and there could be no better example of it than the relationship that we have developed with each other and that you have sought to develop with your neighbors, far and near, on this continent.

Long ago Yugoslavia made a decision. It chose the path of nonalignment, and for more than two decades Yugoslavia and you, Mr. President, have personally played major roles in the nonaligned movement throughout the world. We in the United States respect that position.

But the great question today is not whether a nation is aligned or nonaligned, but whether it respects the rights of others to choose their own paths, and Yugoslavia, by its example, has given heart to those who would choose their own paths. The great goal that we share in this decade is the building of a stable and a lasting peace. This far transcends differences in ideology, in geography, or in systems of internal order.

It is toward this end that we in the United States are seeking to put an end to the crises and confrontations that have plagued the postwar world.

In our relations with the Soviet Union, we are prepared to discuss the requirements of a stable strategic relationship and a limit on the deadly competition in nuclear arms.

In Europe, we are prepared to join with others in helping overcome the division in this continent, at reducing the military confrontations, at developing a full

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range of economic, cultural, and human contacts with each of the nations in Europe.

We respect the legitimate interests of others, including those interests that relate to their security. But we do not accept doctrines by which one power purports to abridge the right of other countries to shape their own destinies and to pursue their own legitimate interests. Every nation, large or small, has the duty to maintain its own security; but no nation has the right to do so by infringing on the security of others.

You can be our friend without being anyone else's enemy.

The pursuit of "total security" by one nation can only lead to the insecurity of others and, therefore, it will not bring order and peace.

Our sole objective in the Middle East, in Vietnam, and all other areas of the world is to help insure that people and nations will live in peace and be able to build their own lives in accordance with their own aspirations with due regard for those of others.

We oppose policies by powers outside the region that are designed to gain unilateral advantage or paramount influence.

Building a true peace requires more than coping with wars and the threat of wars. We recognize, as Yugoslavia does, that we cannot have true peace if many of the world's nations are frozen permanently into a "have-not" status. That is why we shall continue to help others who need help—and we welcome the efforts of Yugoslavia toward that same end.

As we look to the remaining decades of this century, as we attempt to plan for what Europe has not had, and America has not had, thus far in this century, a

full generation of peace, it is this pattern of mutual respect among nations, of respect for their right to independence, their right to choose their own way, their right to live without interference from their neighbors, whether large or small—it is these rights that we must preserve, that we must protect.

In politics, in the arts, in the development of its economy, and the life-styles of its people, in its distribution of rights and responsibilities, Yugoslavia has pursued its own national model. And this is what national independence means: the right of each nation, of each people, to pursue its own chosen destiny in its own way, limited only by its recognition of the fact that every other nation has that same right.

And so I ask all of you to join me in a toast to President Tito, whose courage, whose determination, whose independence, have been an example to the world, and also to the principles of mutual respect for which he stands, for which Yugoslavia stands, and which embody the hope of the world for a true and a lasting peace.

*Zivila* [Long live] Yugoslavia; *ziveo* [long live] President Tito.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:47 p.m. in the White Palace in response to a toast proposed by President Tito. An advance text of President Nixon's remarks was released by the White House Press Office.

President Tito spoke in Serbo-Croatian. A translation of his remarks, which was posted for the press by the White House Press Office, follows:

*Mr. President, Madame Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades:*

It is my pleasure, Mr. President, to greet you, on behalf of the peoples and the Government of Yugoslavia, in the name of my wife and my own, as the first President of the

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United States of America visiting our country. May I take this opportunity to extend to you, to Madame Nixon, and your associates our warm welcome.

In 1960, in New York, I had a cordial meeting with President Eisenhower, and in 1963, during my visit to your country, I had friendly and useful talks with President Kennedy. These talks contributed to the further development of relations between our two countries. We appreciate, Mr. President, your personal interest in, and contribution to, the promotion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States of America. Your visit marks, no doubt, a very important date in the history of these relations and will further encourage their continuous progress.

The relations between Yugoslavia and the United States of America are of long standing and rest on a positive, friendly tradition dating back to the establishment of relations between the U.S.A. and Serbia and the signing of a convention on consular and trade relations in 1881. Our two countries were allied in World War I. In World War II we fought together and each of us contributed his share to the struggle against the most sinister forces that threatened mankind. In those trying days of war, our partisans saved hundreds of American pilots from falling into the hands of the enemy. On our side, we have not forgotten the substantial assistance and support extended to us by the American people during our People's Liberation Struggle and after the war.

Your country, Mr. President, is a land of many nations. People from our country, too, by their work, talent, and thought have made a significant contribution to the development of America—from miners, fishermen, and farm laborers, at the time when the foundations of the progress of your country were being laid, to Nikola Tesla, Louis Adamic, Mihajlo Pupin, and many others who played an outstanding role in American scientific thought, culture, and public life. American citizens of Yugoslav origin have always been, and we wish them to remain, one of the bridges linking our two countries.

Your great country is about to celebrate the 200th anniversary of its independence. The world has always held in great esteem the deeds of the great sons and intellects of your country,

such as Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and many others. Your Revolution and the Declaration of Independence have become an integral part of freedom-loving and democratic aspirations and of progress in the world.

Mr. President, we live in a world of interdependence, a world which is becoming ever smaller and which—as the brave explorers of outer space saw it—reminds of a small ship, the fate of which we all share. The achievements of every people are today property of, and source of inspiration for the whole of mankind. By epoch-making advances in the field of science and technology, to which your country has also made a historic contribution, mankind has stepped into the 21st century.

Yet, the majority of the world population still lives in misery, and many peoples are not free and truly independent. In different parts of the world, wars are still claiming precious human lives and destroying all that has been so painfully built. The world of today is characterized, on the one hand, by the existence of boundless possibilities for unparalleled progress and prosperity and, on the other, by desperate needs, injustices, and problems, by which international relations are so heavily and dangerously burdened.

Mr. President, it is only natural that mankind should expect from so vast and developed a country as the United States of America a major contribution to the well-being of peoples and peace in the world. We welcomed the significant words pronounced by you in your inaugural address that mankind should move from the era of confrontation into the era of negotiation. We have been consistently devoting our efforts to this end. It was in 1961 that the Belgrade conference of nonaligned countries appealed to the big powers to start a dialogue in order to avoid a general catastrophe.

Yugoslavia views positively the present orientation of the big powers to negotiate. Having at their disposal weapons which can destroy the world as well as enormous potentials, the big powers bear a special responsibility for the fate of the world. That is why they are expected to use this immense might and strength for the benefit and the well-being of mankind.

We all agree that the world is becoming ever smaller and ever more closely interdependent.

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ent and that whatever happens in one of its parts—whether for the better or for the worse—is bound to affect the rest as well. Any conflict, any crisis has global repercussions. The whole experience of the postwar period testifies to the fact that universal peace and stability cannot be achieved by the big powers alone. Therefore, all countries, irrespective of their size and strength, must take an active part in the affairs of the world community, not only because it is their right but because it is also an indispensable precondition for the maintenance of peace and the development of international cooperation. In the same way as a "larger" peace cannot rest for long on "smaller" wars, so international cooperation cannot be promoted on the basis of anyone's monopoly or on the negation of the legitimate interests of other countries and peoples. In the absence of peace and progress for the small and underdeveloped, there can be no stable peace nor durable progress for the large and developed either.

There is, we feel, a growing consensus in the world that mere negotiations and the avoidance of confrontation between the big powers are in themselves no longer sufficient. If the basic world problems continue to remain unsolved, if we do not undertake with full responsibility the solution of the burning issues of development, disarmament, the elimination of the policy of force and interference in the internal affairs of others, the overcoming of the division of the world into blocs—then we shall gain only shorter or longer intervals of respite between periods of cold war and we shall continue to live under the permanent threat of the outbreak of a conflict with unforeseeable consequences. Actually, the postwar development has clearly shown that stable peace and co-operation cannot rest on the balance of strength and terror.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, we are striving for the negotiations and peaceful solution of controversial issues to become the generally accepted practice in international relations, in the relations among all states. Small and medium-sized countries, as well as all developing countries, are well aware of their obligations and responsibilities, both with respect to their own internal development and

with regard to the solution of international problems.

Besides, what I have been saying so far reflects also the essence of the message of the recently held conference of nonaligned countries in Lusaka. The nonaligned countries were unanimous in their demand for the democratization of international relations, respect for and realization of the inalienable rights of peoples to independence and sovereignty, accelerated development of the developing countries, strengthening of the United Nations, achievement of its universality, etc. They also manifested their determination to exert utmost efforts and make their own contribution towards the fulfillment of these aims.

Mr. President, our views concerning the most dangerous hotbeds of conflict—such as, in the first place, the long-continued war in Vietnam, which has been expanded to new areas in Indochina, and the crisis in the Middle East, which is becoming ever more dangerously entangled—are known. The peoples of these areas are being subjected to dreadful ordeals and suffering and peace in the world as well as the security of all of us are being jeopardized. We have always endeavored, within the limits of our possibilities, to contribute to the search for just solutions, and we shall continue to do so. Our position has always been, and still is, that the cessation of intervention by any foreign power and the securing of the legitimate rights of the peoples of these countries to full independence and free development, without any outside interference whatsoever, are preconditions for any equitable settlement.

As regards the Middle East, I wish to say that we received with profound grief and anxiety the news of the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, an outstanding statesman and a relentless fighter for peace. His loss, particularly in the present critical situation in the Middle East, makes it incumbent on all factors to exert maximum efforts to arrive at a peaceful and just political solution, for which President Nasser strove consistently and with dedication to his very end.

Mr. President, we are also urging the immediate eradication of colonialism which is still being maintained in vast areas of Africa. This is, indeed, the greatest shame for man-

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kind, in this very century of general emancipation of peoples, generations, and races.

The positive processes underway in Europe, which have resulted in a certain relaxation of tension, are paving the way for the gradual overcoming of the division into blocs and the establishment of European security on new foundations. As an independent and nonaligned country, which has in actual practice opted for a policy of open frontiers and free flow of ideas and goods, Yugoslavia is vitally interested in the promotion of all-round cooperation among all European states. We cannot conceive a stable system of European security in a permanently divided Europe.

Likewise, as a European and Mediterranean country, we are fully aware of the close interdependence between the European Continent and the entire Mediterranean region. It is, consequently, understandable that we are directly interested in the restoration of peace in the Middle East, which is so close to us, as well as in the transformation of the Mediterranean into a sea of peace and peaceful international cooperation, where the rights and interests of the peoples living on its shores will be fully respected.

Mr. President, I trust that I am sharing your opinion in saying that world peace and co-operation cannot be strengthened unless the principles of the United Nations are fully and consistently observed. The principles of independence, sovereignty, equality, noninterference, territorial integrity, and the like must be respected with no exception in the relations among all states, and the infringement of these principles cannot be justified by any political, ideological, or any other motives.

I am glad to say that the friendly relations between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States of America are developing precisely on the basis of these principles and in mutual respect. Mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries is progressing satisfactorily. There have been problems from time to time. It is only natural that it should be so. However, thanks to a realistic approach and good will on both sides, we have succeeded in preserving continuity and ensuring constant progress.

There has been, indeed, manifest progress in the relations between our two countries in

recent years. This can be partly ascribed to contacts and exchanges of views among high level representatives of the two countries and it is our wish that this useful practice be maintained. Particularly important are the results achieved in the field of economic cooperation; and we believe that there exist very good possibilities for its further expansion, especially as regards industrial cooperation, joint ventures, etc. We also attach great importance to the furtherance of scientific and, particularly, technological cooperation.

We have always been striving, Mr. President, for good relations with all countries, and it has always been our earnest desire that the promotion of relations with one country should not be to the detriment of relations with other countries. The promotion of friendly and stable relations with as many countries as possible in Europe and outside it, starting with our neighbors, is in our view a prerequisite for our accelerated development and for the strengthening of the security and the international position of Yugoslavia. Within this context, we attach great significance to the development of good relations in all fields with your country, considering them as an important factor of stability and peace in this part of the world and more widely, as well as an important factor of our economic, scientific, and technological advance.

Let me stress that the status of Yugoslavia as an independent, nonaligned, and socialist country is the unalterable basis of our entire policy and of our approach to international relations and problems. We are determined to maintain our independence, for which we paid such a high price. This is guaranteed primarily by the unity of our country and the readiness of our peoples to defend their independence and free internal development against any threat or attack.

Mr. President, the relations between the United States of America and Yugoslavia, between a large and a small country, with different social systems, testify to the viability and realism of the policy of peaceful and active coexistence. They make thereby a major contribution to wider international cooperation.

True, there have been and still are differences in our views and stands on different international issues. Such differences exist in

56-087-71-54

793

[315] Sept. 30

our relations with other countries as well. But
these differences have been no obstacle to the
development of friendly relations and cooper-
ation between our two countries.

Mr. President, I am looking forward to our
talks which will afford us the opportunity to
exchange opinions on the international situa-
tion and the furtherance of relations between
our two countries.

In the course of your visit, you will see some
of our achievements. We regret that your visit

is too short to enable you to become better ac-
quainted with the accomplishments of our peo-
ple and the beauties of our country.

I hope you stay among us will be a pleasant
one.

May I now propose this toast to your health,
Mr. President, to the health of Madame Nixon
and your associates, to friendship and coopera-
tion between the peoples of Yugoslavia and of
the United States of America.

316 Remarks at the Serbian Council Building in Belgrade.

October 1, 1970

I WOULD like to say to the President
that I wish my visit were long enough to
visit all of the major States in Yugoslavia,
but since I had to select two, naturally I
wanted to pay my respects to the President
of Serbia, the largest State, and then, of
course, to Croatia, the second largest
State.

I was very interested to learn that your
country, this country, is somewhat like

ours in that respect, that while it is one
country, Yugoslavia, that the States are
very competitive, what we call friendly
competition, between Serbia and Croatia
for the businesses, the new businesses. I
think that's good. We have a lot of that in
our country. It exists in California.

NOTE: President Nixon spoke at 8 p.m. His remarks were addressed to the President of the Assembly of Serbia, Dragoslav Markovic.

317 Toasts of the President and President Tito of Yugoslavia
at a Dinner in Belgrade. October 1, 1970

October 1, 1970

Mr. President, Madame Broz, and Your
Excellencies, friends of Yugoslavia and the
United States:

As we complete this visit of 2 days to
Yugoslavia, I wish to express appreciation
on behalf of Mrs. Nixon and myself and
all the members of our party for the very
warm reception we have received, both
officially and from all the people of Yugo-
slavia that we have had the privilege to
meet.

We shall always remember the welcome
we received in Belgrade, in Zagreb, and
at the President's birthplace, the third city
we visited in Yugoslavia.

PRESIDENT TITO. I thought it was the
second city.

PRESIDENT NIXON. After our visit, it
will be the first city in Yugoslavia.

Speaking now officially, I believe that
this visit has contributed significantly to a
goal to which all of us are dedicated—
better relations in every way between
Yugoslavia and the United States, friend-
ship, economic cooperation, and working
together in the cause of peace and
progress.

But it has also been, it seems to me, very
helpful and constructive on a much
broader scale, beyond the bilateral inter-

794

Richard Nixon, 1970

Oct. 1 [317]

ests of the United States and Yugoslavia. Over the period of the last 25 years, it has been my privilege to meet and to talk with over 70 chiefs of state around the world. No chief of state or head of government that I have met has had more experience all over the world and has known more government leaders around the world than President Tito.

It has been very helpful to me to get his appraisal of the various trouble spots in the world and his best advice as to what policies could be adopted which could lead to peace and cooperation throughout the world.

It has been for us a very worthwhile visit, if only we had the opportunity to know this country, the beauty of the countryside, the warmth of its people. But the visit beyond that has had very great significance in contributing to our joint thinking about the problems of the world and how we can develop better approaches to them.

That is why I looked to a continuing discussion with President Tito on these problems in which he gives me his best judgment, and I, in return, share with him my thoughts on problems that we have. Because after all, despite differences in systems of government, we have common goals: peace in the world and the right of each nation, each people, to choose its own system of government without outside interference.

And now, to put this visit in perspective—President Tito, to all of us who knew him only by what we read and what we heard, has built a worldwide reputation as a leader of his nation in war. But I am convinced, after this visit, that his great legacy will be that he will be remembered in history as a man of peace.

That is why I would ask that you all

join me in raising our glasses to peace and friendship between the United States and Yugoslavia, and to the world peace to which President Tito is dedicated and to which I am dedicated, working together, if possible, toward that great goal.

NOTE: The President proposed the toast at 9:47 p.m. in the Old Palace. President Tito responded in Serbo-Croatian. A translation follows:

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, comrades:

First of all, I wish to thank you very much indeed for this sincere and warm toast on behalf of my wife, on behalf of my associates, and in my own name.

And now, at the same time, I have to say how sad we are—and this is not a very pleasant feeling to know—that your visit to our country has been, alas, too short and thus you have not had the possibility to see much of what our working people have achieved since the Second World War. But you could convince yourself everywhere you went—your visit to Belgrade, Zagreb, and Kumrovec—how much the people of this country appreciate and love the American people and the United States, and how much they appreciate you personally, Mr. President.

Our people have very close contacts and roots, so to say, with people of your country. From Yugoslavia they went in large numbers in the days when poverty reigned here—in Croatia, in Slovenia, and also in Serbia—they went to win their bread to the United States, in order to earn their bread there. Many remained there. Some of them returned. And those who returned, they were actually those who were the bearers of sympathies towards the people of the United States, because there they saw something new, they saw a new democracy which made it possible for every man to live a life worthy of a human being.

Of course, they didn't say that milk and honey flowed in that country. They also spoke of very hard work, but that the efforts that people working there were making enabled them to lead a life, the same life, as the one I have just described.

And now a few words about your visit. I

795

Richard Nixon, 1970

Oct. 2 [319]

satisfaction the growth of good and friendly relations between their two countries. They pointed out in particular that relations between the SFRY and the USA were fully based on the principles of independence and mutual respect which are also the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The two Presidents expressed the conviction that relations on such a basis were not only in the interest of the peoples of their two countries but constituted a significant factor for stability and peace in Europe and

elsewhere in the world.

They resolved to continue to promote extensive bilateral relations. Concrete forms of cooperation were discussed, especially in the economic and scientific-technological fields.

The two sides agreed that it was useful and desirable to continue the practice of broad exchanges of views and contacts in their mutual relations.

NOTE: The joint statement was released at Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

## 319 Remarks on Arrival at Madrid, Spain.

### October 2, 1970

General Franco, Señora Franco, Your Excellencies, friends of Spain and the United States:

I am most honored to be the first American President to visit Spain since President Eisenhower was here in 1959.

I recall my previous visits to this country and the warm welcome that we have received. As I stand here I bring to all of the people of Spain the best wishes of all the people of the United States.

We Americans owe a great deal to Spain. We remember that it was Spanish explorers who played such a great role in the exploration and the development of the New World; and we in the United States, with diverse people and diverse culture, owe a great debt to the Spanish culture and people of Spanish background who have contributed so much to our Nation.

Since 1953, we have been partners together in defense in the Mediterranean area, and over this past period, particularly in the past 10 years, we have seen increasing economic cooperation between

Spain and the United States.

I am confident that the talks we will have here, with you, General Franco, and with the members of your cabinet, will contribute to closer cooperation, both in defense for peace and economic cooperation which will mean progress for all of our people in Spain and in the United States.

In recent weeks, the eyes of the world have been on the Mediterranean area. If we do not have peace in the Mediterranean, world peace will be very seriously threatened. An indispensable pillar for peace in the Mediterranean is Spanish-American friendship and cooperation. For that reason, I say, as I begin my visit to Spain, Viva la amistad Hispano-Americana.

NOTE: The President spoke at 12:15 p.m. at Barajas Airport in response to General Francisco Franco's welcoming remarks.

The transcript of remarks by Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler to Spanish reporters about the President's trip was released the same day and is printed in the Weekly Compilation of

797

# SUMMARY

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Nixon-Ford Years

#### Themes

##### Nixon-Tito - September 30, 1970 (Belgrade)

(One is struck throughout by the references to the enormous numbers of leaders whom Tito had met over the years, as a result of his pre-eminence among the non-aligned, as well as relations with major powers. He opened this meeting by noting that at the recent non-aligned conference in Lusaka, Tito had met with 45 heads of state).

—Tito's unfailing references to the importance of the non-aligned. Speaking of Africa, he expressed concern over "pressure" by South Africa and Rhodesia on neighboring black African states.

—The Africans were "concerned over being subjected to a new form of colonialism, i.e. technocratic neo-colonialism, resulting from their reliance on foreign experts." The Africans rather should be "raised to the level of partners to developing countries and not keep indefinitely as mere recipients of aid."

—Yugoslavia was very active in assistance projects, not only in Africa but also "working in Europe as well."

—On the Mideast, after Nasser's death, "one should not expect escalation of the situation....on the part of the UAR." Also "the Soviets did not want war....would not permit escalation." Tito praised Nasser as "head and shoulders above all other leaders in the area;" Tito had advised him that Israel must be accepted as a reality. "The USSR had also been favoring a peaceful solution." But "Israel should not be rewarded with territory for its territorial conquest."

—The US and USSR "bore great responsibility" for the Mideast situation and should try to find a solution. "However, hasty solutions would not be useful; any real solution must be a stable one, for if it left many injustices it would soon break down." Tito would like to be helpful and knew Sadat. But the US had great influence. "While he knew the US could not give orders to Israel, it should exert its influence on Israel to make it adopt a more realistic position."

##### Nixon - Tito - October 1, 1970

—On his part, said Tito, there would be "no obstacles" to expanding cooperation with the US "in economic, scientific and technical fields."

—Returning to the Middle East, Nasser was "an outstanding leader". "Main problem is Israel's insistence on retaining occupied territories as compensation." The US and USSR "should not hesitate to advance a new realistic plan....It should include all main problems. It should aim at voluntary

Yugoslavia - 2

agreements by the parties....by means of persuasive powers of both Soviets and Americans. An imposed solution could not lead to stability....It was a mistake not to include Palestine."

--Tito avowed that "The existence of Israel as a state is not in question.... GKY broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 but will reestablish them as soon as Israel changes its attitudes, renounces territorial claims and returns to pre-1967 boundaries. There simply is no point in insisting on territorial compensa-tion for use of force."

--Tito "did not think Soviets wish to fish in troubled waters....USSR interested in peaceful solution to the Middle East crisis. However, Soviets find it difficult to separate themselves from Arab cause because their prestige is so heavily committed." Tito took the Egyptian side in the argument of ceasefire violations which had been discovered (Rogers rebutted. Tito asked whether the terms of the ceasefire were in face "precise."

--Tito's concern over the Middle East was because "Yugoslavia, as a Mediterranean country is too near center of conflict for comfort. Conflict in Middle East cannot be confined and would surely affect this part of the world. To which (RN) responded 'and further'...."

--On Vietnam, Tito claimed Mme Binh's proposals represented progress. In response to RN's briefing on the US position on ending the war, "Tito replied that he fully understood US position, but he was deeply convinced that Vietnam war cannot be settled with victory for either side....Yugoslavia entirely understands both difficult position of President Nixon in his efforts to gain peace in Vietnam and reasons why capitulation is out of question."

--On Sino-Soviet competition in Black Africa, "Soviet influence is greater in Arab world; in black Africa, it is difficult to judge." Tito noted how China was more subtle in dealing with Black Africa. Also "Yugoslavia has supplied technical assistance to a number of African countries but has carefully abstained from any kind of interference in their internal affairs." "Changing attitudes in these countries is long-term process. Aid without interference will end well. A country that gives assistance not in egoistic way in the long run will have greatest influence." Tito also felt it was unwise "to regard any political change in Black Africa as a move towards socialism or communism....They will deal with ideologies and systems in their own ways, adapting them to their needs." "Experience has shown that interference in internal affairs of these states doesn't pay very well and results never last very long."

Kissinger-Tepavac (State Sec for For Aff) - Oct 1, 1970

--Yugoslavia understood RN had "inherited" the Vietnam war and thus it viewed his difficulties "with understanding." But that does not mean the Yugoslavs agreed with US policy; thought NVN side showing some flexibility.

--On Soviets in the Mideast, T. felt "The Soviets do not want war, but neither do they want to limit their global interests." Since they did not have a sufficient economic basis for playing a global role, "they

Yugoslavia - 3

sought to maintain or advance their position in the world on the basis
of their military power."

--T. felt Sec Rogers latest statement on the Brezhnev Doctrine was too vague; all it had said was something to the effect that the US hoped the USSR would be very careful as regards application of that doctrine to other countries. "He hoped that any further US statement on the subject would be more specific and forceful."

--T. carefully raised the following: "The question, he said, was whether (HK) believed that an attack on Yugoslavia would result in a third world war...whether there would be a reaction to such an attack." In T's view, there was no question that the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav peopole would fight and put up stiff resistance to the attacker."

Nixon - Tito, later - Oct 1, 1970

--RN suggested his preference for quiet diplomacy; he'd like to talk with Yugoslavia privately, having in mind such issues as China and the Mideast, although public statements could sometimes also be necessary. Tito suggested to Tepavac "that he should take note of that." Mr. Ribicic "also agreed, and stressed the importance of harmonizing not only biews but also actions."

--Noting Soviet sensitivity to Yugoslavia, RN asked about Brezhnev versus Khrushchev. Tito said "Khrushchev had always expressed his views very directly and that even when he strongly disagreed with others he tried to understand their approach....Although K's style....had been rather peculiar, he had always thought things through before taking action."

--On US-Soviet talks, "Yugoslavia had nothing against" these....However, this did not mean that Yugoslavia was not interested in what was being talked about. If the talks dealt with issues directly affecting only the US and USSR...that was all right, but Yugoslavia could not accept talks about issues concerning third parties without those parties being present."

--The US should talk to both the USSR and China "but not with one at the expense of the other. The purpose of such talks should be to seek consensus on world problems." Of China "it if was kept in isolation and nottreated as an equal, it could become very dangerous." Tepavac: "It was important that the Soviets knew that the US was not seeking to exploit their rift with China."

--As to the 1968 invasion of Czech., "Yugoslavia had condemned the Soviet action there, but had now shleved the issue because it did not believe that further talk about it would serve any useful purpose....further talk about Soviet policy towards that country would only worsen Yugoslav relations with the USSR." Ribicic: "Relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia had not improved, which only showed that the methods used by the USSR were wrong." Tito "explain(ed) that Yugoslavia wanted

Yugoslavia - 4

as good and as broad relations as possible with the USSR. However,
Yugoslavia always made it clear that it did not want anybody to
interfere in how it solved its internal problems - those...were
Yugoslavia's own and nobody else's business."

--RN asked if Czech. or Hungary could take the same position. Tito
said "they could not proceed in exactly the same manner. However,
Hungary was quietly going its own way, carrying out reforms of far-
reaching significance. In foreign policy, however, Hungary was following
the Soviet Union in order not to irritate it." "Ribicic interjected
that the trends in the socialist countries....depended on the trends
in Europe at large. If the general European situation were to open
up, those trends would intensify."

--On CSCE, Tito believed "that such a conference should include all
European countries rather than only those belonging to the two blocs".
Also "No useful purpose would be served by a conference that would result
in a very limited agreement....The agenda for an ESC should include the
German problem, disarmament and withdrawal of foreign troops from European
countries. Only a conference dealing with all these problems would be
useful since it would result in the disappearance of blocs."

--Tepavac "commented that when relations between the two blocs became
cool Yugoslavia shivered."

--Tito on the Mideast, "If the problem of the Middle East were resolved,
the Soviets would no longer be able to play the role of a tuor in the
area." Placing its bets on Israel, "the question was why the US had
antagonized the whole Arab world." RN defended the US presence in the
Mediterranean. "Tito said that here US and Yugoslav views differed.
The Yugoslav view was that neither US nor Soviet naval forces were needed
in the Med." He even wondered "if it had not been the US itself that had
facilitated, perhaps unwittingly, the Soviet entry into the Med. area."

Tito Visit to US - October 1971 (as South Asian crisis brewing)

--Briefing memo for visit noted that Tito's meeting with Brezhnev "seems
to have secured a partial repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine as applied
to Yugoslavia and for the first time in years he accepted economic credits
from Moscow."

Tito - Nixon - October 28, 1971

--Tito was concerned about war in South Asia. He had cautioned Yahya Khan
and had also seen Mrs. Gandhi at the recent Iranian Percepolis event.

--In Tito's view, "the East Pakistani problem was internal and not one between
India and Pakistan....While he had not wished to tell Yahya what to do,
he had pointed out to him that Yugoslavia had had an even more difficult
problem because of its multinational composition and the disparity in the

Yugoslavia - 5

economic development of the various regions, but that it had managed
to solve it." Tito said a pro-war faction was putting pressure on
Gandhi.

--Tito favored more active US involvement in the problem. He had seen
Podgorny "and that the latter was also convinced that everything should
be done to prevent war." From Brezhnev "he had deduced that the Soviets
also did not want a war." The US and USSR should both tell the sides
they would not be assisted in any war. As for the India-Soviet treaty,
Gandhi had "stated that the treaty was consistent with non-alignment
because it was not a military pact. He had told her that if the treaty
was indeed not a military pact, it was all right."

--On Brezhnev's recent visit to Belgrade, "the final text as it emerged
from the talks made clear that the USSR and Yugoslavia were dealing with
each other as two sovereign states and that Yugoslavia had the right to
develop its own social system." As for other East European states, they
belonged to the Warsaw Pact but at the same time, Tito "believed that
the Soviets were changing their policies. Brezhnev's personal position
was now much stronger....(he) had said specifically that the Soviets
wanted best possible relations with the US." Brezhnev was now in Paris
and "the whole situation and constellation was changing, and that the
President had contributed a great deal to this development with his
initiatives concerning China, the USSR, etc."

--RN asked if the Soviets were doing this for pragmatic reasons. Tito
replied in the affirmative "adding that the Soviets were also greatly
interested in reducing arms expenditures and other commitments so as to
be able to develop their economy."

--Yugoslavia was not afraid of Soviet maneuvers in Eastern Europe and
would conduct its own, something not done for a long time. "To avoid
any misunderstanding, the maneuvers had been conducted along a vertical
line across the country so that no one could say they were against the
East or the West." (!)

--"Yugoslavia had told the Soviets that it wished good relations with
everyone and that its relations with China were not aimed against anyone."

--Usual discussion on the Mideast, with Tito saying the talks should include
the USSR. Brezhnev did not want war and would withdraw advisers as soon
as a settlement were reached. Tito was interested in the area "not only
from the standpoint of preserving peace but also economically."

--Tito reiterated that "he had told the Indians that East Pakistan was
an internal problem India should not interfere in, but that the Pakistanis
needed assistance and encouragement in searching for a solution."

Yugoslavia - 6

Nixon-Tito - Oct 30, 1971

--On the import surcharge, Tito "felt that it would be very useful from the standpoint of US prestige if something could be done in this matter," in view of upcoming UNCTAD session and meeting of the 77 in Lima.

--They seek US investment in Yugoslavia and Tito outlined how his country amended its legislation concerning foreign investment "so as to encourage such investments."

--RN noted that the independence of Yugo. and Romania were consistent with US interests but not with Soviets. "Tito interjected that there were great differences between Romania and Yugoslavia." RN said he was not going to Moscow to discuss 'liberation' of Eastern Europe but "his position would be to avoid any kind of understanding with Moscow that would give the Soviets encouragement to fish in troubled waters in Yugoslavia." Tito "said he fully understood what the President had in mind."

--On his meeting with Brezhnev on the subject of blocs, Brezhnev had "told him that if such security could be assured in Europe as would stabilize the situation, then the Soviets would agree to the elimination of both blocs, and to have different arrangements among European states, for example, on a bilateral basis." This surprised Tito because previously the Soviets had been very tough on this issue. RN said he did not believe the Soviets would tolerate any division or independence inside their bloc.

--RN defended need for increased US military strength and alluded to those upon whom Tito had influence who criticized this. Tito "said that the nations the President was referring to did not criticize the US for strengthening its defense but rather for its inadequate participation in their development."

--On Vietnam, RN insisted the US was not going to walk away and dump Thieu. Tito "interjected that this was not his position. His position was that a solution should not be sought only by military means and that a government should be formed including all elements in SVN. Such a government would not be a communist but a democratic one...."

Tito then said he was sympathetic and "it was a mistake to say that he believed the US should get out at any cost, because that would be regarded as weakness." But he hoped for a peaceful solution. (A few days later Tito said publicly the US could not withdraw in a precipitous way and could not lose its 'prestige').

--Tito closed by stressing the friendship of all Yugoslavs for the US and that their policy was "not based on the ideas of one man or one group."

Yugoslavia - 7

Kissinger Visit to Yugoslavia - November 1974

Highlights from HK's summary memo (only)

--Tito remained concerned about the Mideast situation "because he fears either an outbreak of war which may affect Yugoslavia or new Soviet inroads in the area." While still favoring an overall solution, he "does seem to understand that total solutions are unachievable".

--"I tried to draw Tito out about his concerns with the Russians but he was rather bland and mentioned no complaints -- unlike his neighbor Ceausescu."

--"The Yugoslavs are anxious to pick up again on military relations with us which we have deliberately throttled back in recent years because of Yugo's unhelpful foreign policies."

--HK had seen the For Min and explained that the US did not object to Yugoslav independence and non-alignment "but could not accept it if these principles are habitually translated into hostile and unhelpful policies." Cyprus "worries the Yugoslavs and I assured him....that we had nothing to do with the original coup."

(Joint statement issued)

Ford Mtg with Prime Minister Bijedic - March 19, 1975

--He favored increased cooperation in economic, scientific and cultural planes. "Differences....must not be allowed to become an obstacle."

--Favored an overall solution for the Middle East.

--Yugoslavia would not renounce its principles. "This is true for relations with both the US and the USSR, not permitting any form of interference and influence on our internal affairs...."

--In the changing international environment, urged "cooperation with the non-aligned as equal partners and a factor which must be taken into account in today's world."

Ford Visit to Yugoslavia - August 1975 (after Helsinki)

--Tito wanted to talk about "the future." Felt the Middle East was "the most troublesome point." Also wanted to talk about European security. "I think that after Helsinki the moral factor will become important." "I think there is a connection between the reduction of arms and Helsinki ....Otherwise, we haven't done much."

Yugoslavia - 8

--On the non-aligned, "There have been some rocky days...but we will get by. It is not good to be exclusive groups."

--Ford raises the issue of the need to avoid public criticisms of each other. Tito: "I quite agree. A criticism can be expressed with friendly words or in a not friendly way....We also want to be constructive."

Ford-Bejedic - Aug 4, 1975

--Bejedic on World War II: "The Germans, the Italians, Bulgarians and Austrians - we had to fight them all, and inside enemies also."

--On follow up to Helsinki, "the spirit of Helsinki could be further if there are some practical results."

--On the Mideast, "among the non-aligned there is a firm believe that if the US pushed harder, something could be done with Israel."

Ford-Tito - August 4, 1975

--Usual presentation on the Mideast, that "Israel's behavior" is responsible including for talk of possible Israeli expulsion from the UN. Tito said "One has to look to the future....ten or 15 years ahead when the Arabs will be completely armed; there will be 150 million of them against only 5 or 6 million Israelis....As a general principle, aggression should not pay. And the country that commits aggression should suffer the consequences." "Israel must withdraw and in return it must be recognized as a fact, as a state."

--Ford offered assurances he would personally ensure the bureaucracy would move on arms sales, to which Tito replied "It was very good of you to raise the question because that saved me the trouble of raising it."

--Kardelj, noting Yugoslavia had moved from being a less developed country, appealed for US investments. "The greatest source of capital can come from the US. We want to have a larger connection of American capital to our industry" but felt there was some "mistrust in certain American circles."

Minic: "If we want to improve the economy, we also need to have better cooperation between developed countries and less developed countries".

Tito concluded by stressing that he wanted to talk to the US about relationships between it and the non-aligned world. "I would like to see how we can establish contact."

Approved
LCMSS

March 19, 1975 Bijedic - Ford

Yugoslavian Prime Minister Bijedic - White House Lunch

(note: This was report
from Y. embassy, not US
side)

In response to American side discussion of importance of strengthening ties and implementing the 1971 joint statement. Bijedic agreed that it "was necessary to develop cooperation on this basis for it is in the long term interest of Yugoslavia to develop broad cooperation with the US on economic, scientific and cultural planes....Differences (which have sometimes occurred) ...must not be allowed to become an obstacle....Through a dialogue and an exchange of views outstanding questions should be resolved."

On the Mideast, Bijedic renewed this position that "only an all encompassing solution can be lasting."

"With respect to Ljubljana's cooperation with Michigan, (Ford) renewed his desire for this cooperation. (B) said that Yugoslavia also wants this, for the current development of Yugoslavia and its nonaligned policy demonstrate that it has always been in favor of cooperation and always emphasized that it would not renounce its principles nor change its course. This is true for relations with both the US and the USSR, not permitting any form of interference and influence on our internal affairs whether connected with the 'philosophical cases' or other 'cases.' Often one side or the other side criticizes us that we are changing but they do not like the fact that we are not changing."

On economic issues, B. described the difficulties for the EEC created by
the world energy crisis.

On China, Ford had talked about the establishment of diplomatic relations
as the beginning of a new US orientation towards cooperation through dialogue.
B. "emphasized that there should also be in that manner an orientation toward
cooperation with the nonaligned as equal partners and a factor which must
be taken into account in today's world."

Approved
LCMSS

# TITO VISIT TO WHITE HOUSE WITH NIXON - OCTOBER 1971

October 1971 -White House

Briefing memo for visit noted Tito is trying to deal with the end of his period: "He is attempting a major reform of the Yugoslav system to decentralize authority, so that the chronic problem of nationalism among the Yugoslavs can be contained. At the same time he is assiduously seeking definitive recognition that Yugoslav independence from both East and West will be respect. His meeting with Brezhnev seems to have secured a partial repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine as applied to Yugoslavia and for the first time in years he accepted economic credits from Moscow." Tito had also just visited Gandhi and Nixon is seeing her November $ (this is in the middle of the growing South Asian crisis). Tito sided with Gandhi in a communique urging Pakistan to settle with Mujibur Rahman.

October 28, 1971 -- White House TITO-NIXON

Tito opened noting that all the leaders at the Iranian celebration at Persepolis were concerned about the prospect of war between India and Pakistan and had sought to impress on Yahya Khan the need to avoid war. He had seen Gandhi and Tito felt this was useful.

Tito said "he had told Yahya Khan that, in his view, the East Pakistani problem was internal and not one between India and Pakistan...the problem was primarily an economic one..." with the West Pakistanis getting all the benefits. "Tito said he had told Yahya Khan that he should look for a different solution to the problem." On the current situation, both Gandhi and Yahya Khan had given their versions (different).

"Tito continued that he had told Yahya Khan that a conflict should be avoided; there were too many conflicts in the world already, although some of them were on the way to solution." Tito "noted that while he had not wished to tell YK what to do, he had pointed out to him that Yugoslavia had had an even more difficult problem because of its multinational composition and the disparity in the economic development of the various regions, but that it had managed to solve it." Tito found the Indians "nervous and tense". He had also tried to influence them against war. "Gandhi had said she was against war but that there was a pro-war faction that was putting pressure on her."

Tito "said that in those talks he had thought of the President and the US generally, and that he believed that the US involvement in this problem should be increased." He had also discussed the matter with Podgorny "and that the latter was also convinced that everything should be done to prevent war." "In sum, this was a neuralgic area of the world and, while he had told neither side what it should be doing, he had told both of them what he would do to solve the problem."

Nixon briefed on US efforts to date. "Tito interjected that from his discussions with Brezhnev he had deduced that the Soviets also did not want a war." Tito felt it would be useful if both Soviets and US "were to tell

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the two sides that they would not be assisted in any military conflict."
Tito said he asked both Gandhi and Brezhnev about the Soviet-Indian treaty
and whether it was a military pact. "Both of them had said that it was only
a treaty of friendship and cooperation." In response to a question, Mrs.
Gandhi had "stated that the treaty was consistent with non-alignment because
it was not a military pact. He had told her that if the treaty was indeed not
a military pact, it was all right. However, he wished to stress again to the
President that there was a strong pro-war faction in India, although not within
the government itself."

Tito said of Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia, there had been much speculation
about Soviet intentions and threats. Tito wanted to point out that the draft
declaration "Brezhnev had brought with him...had already clearly reaffirmed
Yugoslav independence and sovereignty and stated that the 1955 principles
remained valid. The final text as it emerged from the talks made clear that
the USSR and Yugoslavia were deal with each other as two sovereign states
and that Yugo. had the right to develop its own social system."

RN wanted to know if this applied only to Yugoslavia in light of press reports
that the Brezhnev doctrine was being changed. Tito replied that "the other
Eastern European countries were members of the Warsaw Pact. At the same time,
he believed that the Soviets were changing their policies. Brezhnev's personal
position was now much stronger....(he) had said specifically that the Soviets
wanted best possible relations with the US...." Further, they raised no
objection to Tito's current visit to the US and "had also asked that the Soviet
desire for good relations with the US be conveyed to the President. This was
also a sign of change in the Soviet policy." Brezhnev was now in Paris and
"the whole situation and constellation was changing, and that the President
had contributed a great deal to this development with his initiatives con-
cerning China, the USSR, etc."

In response to RN's query whether the Soviets were interested in good ties for
pragmatic reasons, Tito replied in the affirmative "adding that the Soviets
were also greatly interested in reducing arms expenditures and other commit-
ments so as to be able to develop their economy." Tito found Brezhnev the
best ever at this time and "Recalling Soviet maneuvers in Eastern Europe,
Tito said that he had told Brezhnev that the Yugoslavs were not afraid of
them...he had also pointed out that Yugoslavia would also conduct maneuvers,
something it had not done for a long time....To avoid any misunderstanding, the
maneuvers had been conducted along a vertical line across the country so that
no one could say they were against the East or the West."

On ties with China, the Soviets had not liked it when Yugo. first exchanged
ambassadors with Beijing. "However, Yugo. had told the Soviets that it wished
good relations with everyone and that its relations with China were not aimed
against anyone."

Usual discussion of Middle East; Tito had just seen Sadat and found him desiring
to find a political solution and "it was quite clear that he did not mean war."
Tito believed the US should continue its efforts "but that the dialogue should

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involve not only the US and the UAR but also the USSR." According to Tito Brezhnev did not want war and said "the Soviets had too many expenses anyway and that they would withdraw all their experts and advisers as soon as a settlement was reached."

In general, Tito said Yugo. "was interested in the Middle East not only from the standpoint of preserving peace but also economically." Tito found Sadat "somehow faster and more dynamic than Nasser. The latter, however, had been more reflective and perhaps also more profound. Sadat had risen to the situation, but he was also under considerable pressure."

Returning to South Asia, Tito said "he had told the Indians that East Pakistan was an internal problem India should not interfere in, but that the Pakistanis needed assistance and encouragement in searching for a solution."

RN gave assurances that the US wanted to be most forthcoming on bilateral issues, including economic matters and military cooperation.

## Tito-Nixon

### October 30, 1971

In response to RN query about whether Tito was satisfied on bilateral issues, Tito mentioned one problem - that of the import surcharge. T: "He felt this problem was especially important because the third UNCTAD session was to convene soon and also because there was a meeting of 77 nations in Lima. He felt that it would be very useful from the standpoint of US prestige if something were done in this matter." RN said action would be taken soon.

Tito was pleased with his talks with Sec Stans and US businessmen. They seek investments and "Yugoslavia had amended its legislation concerning foreign investment so as to encourage such investments." Nixon noted the difficulty of working out trade arrangements with socialist states because they have no private corporations but that Yugoslavia was different. Romania wanted the same treatment the US accorded Yugoslavia, Ceausescu had told RN, but RN noted that Yugoslavia had a different system. RN: "Thus, if (Tito) could influence other socialist states to make arrangements similar to those in Yugoslavia, trade with those states would go up."

RN then moved to big briefing on how he viewed the world and the Soviets, noting the Soviets would want to bring its neighbors under increased influence and that "the independence of Yugo. and Romania, regardless of these two countries' internal systems was consistent with US interests but was not consistent with Soviet interests." Tito interjected "that there were great differences between Romania and Yugoslavia." RN said he was not going to Moscow to discuss 'liberation' of Eastern Europe (Hungary showed that was suicide) but "his position would be to avoid any kind of understanding with Moscow that would give the Soviets encouragement to fish in troubled waters in Yugoslavia. He felt that he did not have to say more than that." Tito "said he fully understood what the President had in mind." Tito said he wanted to tell RN about Brezhnev's comments concerning blocs. "Brezhnev had told him

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that if such security could be assured in Europe as would stabilize the situation, then the Soviets would agree to the elimination of both blocs, and to have different arrangements among European states, for example, on a bilateral basis." Tito said this has surprised him because previously the Soviets had been very tough on this issue. RN didn't believe the Soviets would tolerate any division or independence inside their bloc.

Tito said it was true that Yugoslavia had been "a thorn in the Soviet side" but "little by little the Soviets were coming to adjust themselves to change, although the President was right that they would never allow those states to lave their orbit."

On SALT, RN briefed on what US wanted to achieve but noted if there is no agreement he would have to make decisions to increase our arms. "Tito expressed the view that it was important for the US to discuss arms control with the Soviet Union because if agreement was reached in this area, that would make it easier to reach agreement on other issues as well."

RN went on about how he was a man of peace but he wanted to be clear he was not a soft man, not peace at any price. RN: "Noted that some leaders on which President Tito had influence might criticize the US for increasing its military strength, but that he firmly believed that this served the interests of peace." Tito "said that the nations the Pres. was referring to did not criticize the US for strengthening its defense but rather for its inadequate participation in their development. Many of those nations were tired of hearing only words about such participation and wanted to see some action."

RN briefed on Vietnam, making clear that the US was not simply going to walk away, turn the country over to the NVN and dump Thieu. Tito "interjected that this was not his position. His position was that a solution should not be sought only by military means and that a government should be formed including all elements in South Vietnam. Such a government would not be a communist but a democratic one...." RN took tough line in response. Tito felt the US should "discuss this with both the Soviets and the Chinese." Tito hadn't had discussions with the NVN but he had talked to Madame Binh. "However, the South Vietnamese could not make NVN move if the latter did not want to." RN again use the theme that Tito might want to convey impressions to others that while RN was for peace, he was also a strong man.

Tito was sympathetic indicating he understood US troubles over Vietnam and "it was a mistake to say that he believed the US should get out at any cost, because that would be regarded as weakness." But he hoped every effort was being made to find a peaceful solution. Tito was optimistic because of RN's planned trips to China and the SU and also because of Soviet willingness to talk. T: "As Galileo had said, 'The earth is moving just the same'."

Tito closed by stressing the deep friendship of all Yugoslavs for good ties with the US and that their policy was "not based on the ideas of one man or one group of people."

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# FORD VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA - AUGUST 1975 (After Helsinki Conference)

## August 3, 1975 - Fed. Exec. Council Building, Belgrade

Opening greetings by Tito, Ford. The meeting is held to plan for longer talks tomorrow. Tito: "I think our bilateral relations are good. We discussed international relations in Helsinki. Maybe we could talk about the future." Ford lists Greece, Turkey (i.e. Cyprus crisis) and Mideast as priorities. Tito feels the Mideast is "the most troublesome point. I feel that there is some deterioration and that the situation could get more and more complicated." He also wants to discuss European security: "I think that after Helsinki the moral factor will become important." Tito says he has heared there may have been progress between Greece and Turkey at Vienna and also progress in SALT. "I think there is a connection between the reduction of arms and Helsinki. Otherwise, we haven't done much." Ford assures that he is trying to get off a deadlock in MBFR. "We think the spirit of Helsinki should push the negotiations forward. T: "Reduction of arms certainly falls within the Helsinki concept. It is important not to let things stagnate." Minic: "Otherwise the spirit that we now have would be dissipated."

Tito says "In 1977, after your elections, there will be a summing up of the Helsinki follow-on.... All the international conferences held in Belgrade have been successful. For example, the first non-aligned conference." HK: "It is now bigger than the two blocs! It's the biggest bloc now." Tito: "It is not a bloc. (laughter) There have been some rocky days in the non-aligned group but we will get by. It is not good to be exclusive groups.... I would like you to understand our position." Ford, exchewing blocs, says "In the kind of world we live in today, there can't be the kind of confrontation and military activity which took place during your time and mine." On any differences between the two countries, Ford: "The feeling for Yugoslavia is very strong (in the US) and under those circumstances criticism is easily misunderstood. So I would hope we could each moderate our statements." Tito: "I quite agree. A criticism can be expressed with friendly words or in a not friendly way.... We also want to be constructive. We have had many contacts with the heads of government in Helsinki and with others with whom we have disagreements, and we agree we won't let the press lead our relations. But if there are differences we will meet and talk them out."

## Ford-Bijedic - Aug 4, 1975 Breakfast

### August 4, 1975 - Breakfast with Dzemal Bijedic, President, Federal Executive Council

There is discussion of World War I and II. Bijedic (re WW II): "The Germans, the Italians, Bulgarians and Austrians - we had to fight them all, and inside enemies also." HK: "Did the Germans actually set up an independent Croatian state". B: "Yes." Silberman: "It included Bosnia-Herzegovina and Voivodina." HK: "The old Austrian Empire." Silberman: "Except Slovenia was incorporated into the Reich and Italy."

Turning to issues, Ford asks about follow up to Helsinki and if the promises will be implemented before the Belgrade conference. Minic hopes so, "at least

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partially." He felt "the spirit of Helsinki could be furthered if there are some practical results. I mentioned Cyprus, the Middle East, SALT and Vienna. That would greatly assist prospects for our next meeting." Expressing concern about the Middle East and the need for early diplomatic progress, Minic: "We share your feeling. This situation encourages the radical Arabs and probably also the Israelis. Now there is a move to throw Israel out of the UN." HK feels Syria is stirring things up. Minic: "They are worried they will be left out of a settlement."
Minic later notes "Among the non-aligned there is a firm belief that if the US pushed harder, something could be done with Israel."

Ford - Tito - August 4, 1975

August 4, 1975

Ford, HK open by telling Tito of an outrageous Japanese Red Army kidnapping of some Americans and Swedes, demanding release of some Japanese terrorists in jail in Japan. Stress the US will not cave in. HK: "These Japanese are the same ones responsible for the Tel Aviv killings."

Ford opens with discussion of Mideast and need for progress to avoid war (US is working on Sinai II step). T: "The possibility for progress lies with Israel because Israel has not complied with" 242 and 338. He hoped progress would have been achieved through US step-by-step diplomacy "but only one step has been achieved. Now we seem to be in a stalemate."
Tito felt "Israeli behavior has brought about all this talk of the possibility of expulsion (of Israel) from the UN." "Israel continues to violate the will of others and therefore we think more pressure should be put on Israel." Tito said he has always worked to try to find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli problem, including talks with Naom Goldman, head of the World Jewish Congress. "He... looks much farther ahead." In Tito's view, "One has to look to the future...ten or 15 years ahead when the Arabs will be completely armed; there will be 150 million of them against only 5 or 6 million Israelis. Under such conditions the Arabs might be tempted to do what they threatened to do years ago, that is, to throw Israel into the sea. As a general principle, aggression should not pay. And the country that commits aggression should suffer the consequences."

T, continuing, "Israel must withdraw and in return it must be recognized as a fact, as a state." Ford briefs on US hopes for a next step and that there not be an Israeli expulsion from the UN which would make "Israel a martyr and disturb progress." Ford hopes Tito will urge moderation among the non-aligned. Ford recalls HK speech at Milwaukee as reflecting US position on the UN. HK then briefs Tito on the state of play in trying to bring about another step between Egypt and Israel: "We feel that there is a chance to finish by the end of August....Then we can turn to the Syrian problem.
After that, we can move to an overall solution." On the Israeli side, their strategy is that they are much more comfortable with the radical Arab leaders than with the moderates....they can appeal to the groups in the US that are anti-Soviet and....have a better chance of getting their positions accepted."
HK urges Tito to influence the Arabs in a moderate direction: "The objective conditions are not here yet for an overall solution which is what (Tito) wants

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but we must continue the moderate position and curb some of the Arab
desire for epic cavalry charges." Warns against measures to expel Israel
from the UN. Tito says Minic will "do what he can" at the Lima conference
to avoid this. Yugoslavia is against throwing Israel out but the situation
is difficult. "I have great confidence that extreme measures will not be
applied. But there are other intermediate measures. We are not against
sanctions."

HK says if he goes to the Mideast before the non-aligned in Lima, Tito can be assured that there is a great chance of success, because Ford would not let him go unless the US rated the chances for success as better than 90%. Wants Yugoslavia to do its best for moderation among the non-aligned.

Minic asks what will happen if there is not success on HK's next trip. Ford: "We will have to proceed with our reassessment. One possibility is...(a) move to Geneva and advocate a broad settlement even though we know that that is a less desirable course of action. But it might temporarily help to avoid a conflict but for the moment we strongly feel that a step-by-step policy is superior." HK notes that whatever the outcome, "we are definitely committed to go to Geneva at some point. It is just a question of timing." US side hopes the Yugoslavs will talk to people in the US Congress giving Belgrade's analysis of the situation in the area.

Ford volunteered to Tito that he would personally move to assure the bureaucracy was moving on the issue of arms sales. Tito: "It was very good of you to raise the question because that saved me the trouble of raising it." Ford acknowledged that he realized there were some in the USG that "have not given (the matter) the proper attention and expedited the request that you have made..."

On economics, Edvard Kardelj, Member, SFRY Presidency, says Yugoslavia has moved on now from the stage of being a less-developed country....We believe that the greatest source of capital can come from the US. We want to have a larger connection of American capital to our industry....We notice that there is still mistrust in certain American circles. It would be good for the US Administration to support this effort more to help to create an atmosphere under which trust can be developed in this cooperation."

Ford links the strength of US industry to the strength of the US economy. Minic: "If we want to improve the economy, we also need to have better cooperation between developed countries and less-developed countries. That is why we are very interested in the Seventh UN Special Session." Notes importance of US position at the Seventh "since the US had reservations about the way the Sixth Session went" and seeks US views on relations between developed and less-developed countries. Given the "catastrophic" economic situation in 30 to 40 less-developed countries, Minic foresees "a harsh debate in the UN and you will need to have patience." Ford says the US will take a constructive attitude but points to the oil crisis and says it is not the US fault. HK's concern about the UN session is "are we going to have another ideological confrontation and no practical results?"

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Minic: "As far as we know the less-developed countries do not intend to have a philosophical debate on the new economic order. They intend to raise, however, their special problems but I am worried that it is impossible to reach an agreement even on the agenda......We hope that you Americans will help to make progress in this session."

Concluding, Tito said "I would also like to have a discussion on the relationships between the US and the non-aligned world" but there is no time left. "I would like to see how we can establish contact." He wants HK and Minic to discuss this in the car. HK: "Excellent. We certainly do lack this kind of contact."

END

(Note on this visit, Tito was 83; briefing memo noted growing concern over post-Tito stability and that Tito et al were working hard to ensure a smooth succession when it happened).

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October 1971 -White House

Briefing memo for visit noted Tito is trying to deal with the end of his
period: "He is attempting a major reform of the Yugoslav system to decen-
tralize authority, so that the chronic problem of nationalism among the
Yugoslavs can be contained. At the same time he is assiduously seeking
definitive recognition that Yugoslav independence from both East and West
will be respect. His meeting with Brezhnev seems to have secured a partial
repudiation of the Brezhnev doctrine as applied to Yugoslavia and for the
first time in years he accepted economic credits from Moscow." Tito had
also just visited Gandhi and Nixon is seeing her November $ (this is in
the middle of the growing South Asian crisis). Tito sided with Gandhi in
a communique urging Pakistan to settle with Mujibur Rahman.

(This is right after the Jordan crisis and Nasser's death)

YUGOSLAVIA

Nixon Trip - Sept 30-Oct 1, 1970

WHY:

Several hours later, about 2:00 A.M., I awoke with a start and remembered that we had scheduled a firepower demonstration for the next day. It seemed to me that to commemorate Nasser's death by setting off high explosives in the Mediterranean would be an act of supreme insensitivity. After checking my judgment with Rogers and Laird, I canceled the firepower display without rousing the President again.

It proved to be a grievous error. Presidential Assistants should not overwhelm their chief with trivia; after a while they should be sufficiently aware of Presidential preferences to make some decisions in his name. But they had better be sure, for they have no authority except the President's confidence. It turned out that Nixon had his heart set on the firepower demonstration. I could almost certainly have talked him out of it. But presenting him with a fait accompli the next morning produced a rare display of Nixonian temper. For twenty-four hours I was subjected to the little gestures by which others can read Presidential disfavor. For example, I was consigned to the backup helicopter for one of the Presidential movements on that day. I was seated at the periphery of meetings on the Sixth Fleet flagship. Soon the storm blew over. It was a small foretaste of what I would later undergo after the India-Pakistan crisis. I was correct on the issue. But I had also been given a lesson in the limits of my authority.

We were greeted at the airport in Belgrade by Marshal Tito in gray-blue uniform with golden epaulets — an incongruous dress for a Communist chief of state were it not for the fact that nowhere in Europe are

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1970-1971: *From Turmoil to Hope*

the middle-class values of the 1930s preserved in more pristine form
than in the "classless" societies of Eastern Europe. There, where life is
colossally dull, bureaucracy suffocating, planning all-pervasive, it is not
the notion of the proletariat or Marxist ideology that moves people. In-
ternal cohesion is achieved, even after a generation of Communist rule,
by nationalism of a kind nearly extinct in the more cosmopolitan West-
ern Europe.

Josip Broz Tito was by now the last survivor in office of the legen-
dary figures of the Second World War — a storied guerrilla chieftain,
the first Communist leader who dared to challenge Stalin, the inventor
of nationalistic Communism, and now one of the champions of
nonalignment. By September 1970 he had been in power for twenty-five
years. He exuded the authority of a man who has disposed of all pos-
sible rivals. His manners were those of a middle-class Central
European — courteous, clearly enjoying life, a rather self-satisfied
sense of humor. But he was also wary and careful. His eyes did not
always smile with his face. He had learned to deal with capitalists but
not necessarily to accept them. In the immediate postwar era he had
been one of the most intransigent of Communist leaders. There had even
been a brief confrontation with the United States in 1946, when Yugo-
slavia shot down an unarmed American transport plane and detained its
crew.

After his break with Stalin the Western perception of Tito changed. His concern to preserve his regime was seen — in no small part thanks to his own skill — as an abjuration of the values that had helped to establish it. All but forgotten was the fact that Tito had broken with Stalin over the issue of national autonomy, not over the validity of Communist theory. Through all vicissitudes Tito remained a member of the Leninist faith. The requirements of survival forced him to reinsure himself against Soviet aggression; they did not significantly alter the convictions shaped by a lifetime of revolutionary dedication — nor should they have been expected to. Only strong beliefs could have sustained a man through the perils and ordeals of conspiracy and guerrilla warfare. Why should he give these up in his hour of victory?

The reluctance to face this fact caused endless misunderstandings.
Yugoslavia was an asset to us in the Balkans and to a lesser extent in
Eastern Europe. It symbolized the possibility of independence. It re-
lieved to some extent the threat to NATO. But outside of Europe Tito
pursued his convictions, which on the whole were not hospitable to
Western interests or ideals. His sympathy for revolution in developing
countries did not differ significantly from Moscow's. Indeed, Tito was
even more aggressive in catering to the radical developing nations; he
saw in their support a buttress for his own independence and an addi-
tional political inhibition to Soviet pressures. In turn, his autonomy

Crisis in the Alliance

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from the Soviets gave him a greater influence in the developing world
than would have been possible for any of the satellite regimes of Eastern
Europe. Therefore Yugoslavia rarely supported our position in interna-
tional forums. It was, for example, a sponsor of the annual UN resolu-
tion for Puerto Rican independence. In the Middle East it generally en-
couraged the radical Arabs.

I faced this with equanimity. Yugoslavia had not broke with Stalin to
do us a favor; it did not pursue its course to further our interests. Yet
whatever Tito's motives, Yugoslavia's autonomy improved our global
position. Stalin was quite right in worrying about the disruptive example
it established for other countries of Eastern Europe. In addition, the se-
curity of Europe was enhanced by Tito's refusal to join the Warsaw
Pact. Finally, there was a limit beyond which he would not go: He
could not afford to antagonize us to a point that made his security
depend on the goodwill of the Soviet Union. He needed us to maintain
his sense of equilibrium. We therefore were under no pressure to curry
his favor. We had no reason to be obsequious or reluctant to stand up
for our interests with the same intensity as he pursued his own.

There were several areas of potentially fruitful cooperation between
Yugoslavia and us. Belgrade was a useful source of information about
trends in both the Communist and developing worlds. It could convey
our attitudes to its friends, though it had too many separate purposes to
be a reliable intermediary on detail. Periodic high-level exchanges were
important in order to synchronize policies as much as possible and to
underline our interest in Yugoslavia's independence.

We did not seek to win Yugoslavia over to our point of view. We
recognized that its policy of nonalignment, like India's, reflected a cold
analysis of its self-interest. The serious nonaligned countries — not
those which, removed from all danger, traffic in slogans — seek to
calculate the margin within which they can manipulate the international
equilibrium. They will not hazard their security or well-being in quix-
otic gestures against us (unless tempted to do so by American supine-
ness or sentimentality). Nor will they run the risk of becoming too
closely associated with us no matter how "understanding" of their proc-
lamations our policy may be. Paradoxically, if we approach too closely,
they will have to move away; as we distance ourselves, they will have
to move toward us; that is the almost physical law of nonalignment. In
short, we did not succumb to the sentimental illusion that nonalignment
resulted from specific grievances or misunderstandings. But we paid the
nonaligned, and most particularly Yugoslavia, the compliment of recog-
nizing that they were conducting a serious policy. Yugoslavia could not
be won over by accepting its rhetoric nor could it be permanently antag-
onized when we defended our own interests.

Tito's assessment of the international situation was unsentimental,

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1970-1971: From Turmoil to Hope

slightly doctrinaire, and always interesting. As it turned out, on this
visit his principal concern was the Middle East. He warned us against
putting all our chips on Israel. He considered Nasser the outstanding
leader in the area; his death had dealt hopes for peace an extremely
serious blow. He told us that during the September of crises the Soviet
Union had urged Syria and Iraq to withdraw from Jordanian territory,
which accorded with our own information. Some of his associates
sought to explore how America would react to a Soviet attack on
Yugoslavia. Tito never raised the subject, perhaps because he was too
proud, perhaps because he knew that it would not come up in his life-
time. Nixon had now visited two capitals in Eastern Europe, Bucharest
and Belgrade. The symbolism was inescapable. The United States
would pay special attention to those Eastern European countries pursu-
ing an autonomous foreign policy. The Chinese were to notice this, as I
have mentioned.

The only other noteworthy feature of our visit to Belgrade was to expose our Communist hosts to the wonders of American public relations. The sorely beset Haldeman faced the same problem in Belgrade that he had overcome in Rome: the absence of a "photo opportunity" involving crowds. His dilemma stemmed from an inexplicable lapse of the advance team. One of the fixed Presidential acts in any country is to lay a wreath on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. It is a thoughtful gesture; it cannot fail to draw a crowd. Such a wreath-laying had been arranged in Belgrade as the first item on the President's schedule. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav tomb is located some twenty miles outside of Belgrade. The advance team had apparently neglected to report this fact — or perhaps the distance had simply not registered. As the motorcade wound its way deeper and deeper into a sylvan setting where no crowds disturbed the opportunity for reflection, the radios carried by all advance men crackled ever more insistently with the incredulous exchanges between Ziegler and Haldeman, whose joint outrage knew no bounds. But Haldeman was equal to the challenge. On the way back the Presidential limousine suddenly left the motorcade and, drawing all other cars with it, headed for the center of Belgrade, where its bewildered police escort ultimately caught up with it. Once more a monumental traffic jam developed; again the emotion of the captive audience reached extraordinary heights. And Nixon, jumping onto the hood of his car and waving to the crowd, in fact evoked genuine enthusiasm.

Whatever his satisfaction with a Presidential visit, Tito could not have been overjoyed that Madrid was our next port of call, that we were going from the capital of one aged autocrat to the lair of another, who antedated even Tito. Franco had come to power during the Fascist ascendency in Europe. He had not permitted the debt he owed his fellow dictators to stand in the way of keeping his country neutral in the Second World War. But when the Fascist empires collapsed, Franco found

Nixon - Tito - September 30, 1970, Dvor, Belgrade

After opening remarks by Nixon,

*

As to the President's remarks about his numerous contacts with foreign leaders, Tito noted that at the recent non-aligned conference at Lusaka alone, he had had private meetings with 45 heads of state. Those meetings had been very interesting, in particular since they gave him a general impression of what Africans were striving for. Given the fact that 64 countries and 3 liberation movements had been represented at Lusaka, he was rather surprised that the conference had demonstrated such a great degree of unity. The participants had managed to put aside their bilateral controversies and had shown earnest desire for cooperation, especially in the economic area. This was true particularly with respect to black Africa. The earlier OAU meeting in Addis Ababa had also been very successful, particularly in view of the fact that it had produced reconciliation between Nigeria and those African states that had recognized Biafra.

The President agreed that this was a very positive development and expressed gratification at the termination of the tragic strife in Nigeria.

President Tito noted that he had observed in Lusaka great concern over the pressure South Africa and Rhodesia were putting on Zambia. He felt that Zambia and other African states should be left alone and that no one should interfere in their affairs. Particular concern had been voiced at Lusaka over the UK decision concerning arms deliveries to South Africa. Tito observed that Zambia was an extremely beautiful country, with great aspirations toward cultural development. The same was true of Tanzania. Both countries were developing quite rapidly but their resources were limited. Although they had been the object of colonialism, they were still basically virgin territories.

The President noted that one of the problems the new African states had was lack of experience and technical personnel, since the former colonial powers had done very little in the way of training local experts.

Tito agreed and said that the Africans were very sore that this was so. They had no specialists of their own and they were concerned over being subjected to a new form of colonialism, i.e., technocratic neo-colonialism, resulting from their

reliance on foreign experts. He said that while Africans did
want foreign assistance they also wanted to have their own
experts.

The President commented that this problem was similar to that
of teaching a child: if you don't teach the child, the child
never learns.

Tito said he believed the method of dealing with Africans
should be changed, i.e., they should be raised to the level
of partners to developing countries and not kept indefinitely
as mere recipients of aid. He thought the US could help in
bringing about such a change.

In responding to the President's question as to the extent of
the Yugoslav assistance program in Africa, Tito said that the
Yugoslav program involved numerous projects. In Zambia, for
example, Yugoslavia had 2,000 personnel, of whom 700 were
building the biggest hydro-electric power plant in the country.
However, in many instances the equipment involved was manned
by Africans themselves.

Asked by the President if Yugoslavia was importing copper from
Zambia, Tito replied in the negative, noting that Yugoslavia's
own production of copper amounted to 100,000 tons and was now
being developed even further. In this connection, he mentioned
that Yugoslavia had also deposits of such rare metals as
geranium, gold, silver, etc., although those deposits were
not significant in every instance.

Returning to Yugoslav assistance projects in Africa, Tito said
that some of them were also in the medical field. For example,
Yugoslavia was building hospitals in Ethiopia and had 500
doctors in Libya. Moreover, Yugoslav assistance projects were
not limited to less developed countries alone: Yugoslavs were
building entire city blocks in various countries, even in West
Germany, and the biggest crystal factory in Czechoslovakia had
also been constructed by Yugoslavia. Thus, Yugoslavs were
working in Europe as well. Further Yugoslav assistance projects
included a naval harbor in Ghana, which had recently been com-
pleted, as well as different projects in other African states
and Pakistan. Tito noted that these assistance projects were
possible also because Yugoslavia abounded in specialists. At
the present time, there were 220,000 students at Yugoslav
colleges and universities, and not all of them could be absorbed
in the country. Unfortunately, many of them went abroad,
especially to Germany. In general, Tito felt that migration
of technical personnel that could be observed today reflected

the desire of people to attain the next higher standard of
living: thus, while Yugoslavs went to Germany, the Germans
and the British went to the US, where they were attracted by
that powerful magnet, the dollar.

*

Turning to the Middle East:

Tito said that on the basis of his knowledge of Nasser's associates, he did not expect a sharp turn in UAR policies. Sadat, Nasser's closest associate, was not as strong a personality as Nasser but would certainly continue the search for a political solution. Sadat, Ali-Sabri, and other close associates of Nasser had all come to power as a group, so that it was unlikely that anyone from outside that group would gain predominance. Consequently, one should not expect escalation of the situation in the Middle East on the part of the UAR.

The President asked if Tito did not believe that a demagogue might come to power and try to outdo Nasser. In this connection, he noted the belief of some that Nasser's acceptance of the US peace initiative had disappointed certain elements, such as the Palestinians and other radicals. Did Tito believe that any of those extremists could come to power in the UAR?

Tito replied that he did not think so. He also pointed out the Soviet factor in this situation, saying that the Soviets did not want war and, with their strong influence in the area, would not permit escalation.

The President observed that some thought the Soviets wanted chaos in the area.

Tito said he disagreed. A good indication of Soviet attitude was the fact that the Soviets had very energetically demanded Syrian and Iraqi withdrawal from Jordan. The fact that in taking that action they were prepared to sacrifice their prestige in those countries reflected their desire for peace.

As to Nasser, Tito said that he had been completely exhausted after the Arab summit, where he accomplished the great deed of bringing the Arabs together. The day he died, after a long

night session, Nasser called Heykal at 6:00 a.m. and told him that he was extremely tired. Heykal advised him to go to bed and get some rest, but Nasser said that he could not because he had to see off the Emir of Kuwait. This showed how devoted Nasser was to his task. In fact, Nasser was head and shoulders above all the other leaders in the area. He was a strong man, but also willing to receive advice. Recalling that he had met him 22 times, Tito said that after the Israeli attack he had advised Nasser that the Arabs had to accept the reality of Israel's existence and seek a peaceful solution, with Nasser listening very carefully to these views. Tito added that since the June war the USSR had also been favoring a peaceful solution.

Tito agreed but pointed out that Israel should not be rewarded with territory for its territorial conquest. He recalled that he had made this point on several occasions to the President of the Jewish World Congress, Goldmann, and that the latter had agreed with it but was then rebuked by the Israeli Government, which told him that he was not authorized to discuss such matters. Tito also noted that, during his visit to

the UAR after the June war, he had suggested a framework for the solution of the Middle Eastern problem which included such points as Israeli withdrawal, recognition of Israel's existence, freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, and solution of the Palestinian refugee problem. As to the last point, Tito said that during his last talk with Goldmann, the latter had expressed the view that the Palestinians in Jordan, or at least a large majority of them, now consisted of a new generation which was not interested in the old country, and that all they wanted was an opportunity to lead a life worthy of human beings. Therefore they should be given the possibility and means for settling in the West Bank area or elsewhere. Tito felt that this idea should be pursued; Israel had spent billions of dollars on war, and if it were to spend a few millions on assistance to Palestinians, that would be extremely helpful. Tito also recalled that during that conversation Goldmann had expressed general agreement with the framework for a settlement he had suggested and that, as far as he could remember, Goldmann had not referred to the problem of the Golan Heights. After that conversation, Goldmann had planned to go to Cairo, and he, Tito, had written about this to Nasser, but the trip failed to materialize.

Nixon noted the importance of King Hussein's remaining in power:

Tito agreed and said that a modus vivendi in Jordan should be found. While the situation there was relatively quiet now, it could again explode at any time. The US and the USSR, as well as others, bore great responsibility for the Middle Eastern situation, and should make every effort to find a solution for it. However, hasty solutions would not be useful; any real solution must be a stable one, for if it left many injustices it would soon break down. Tito then repeated that he was waiting for the return of his delegation from Cairo to hear what, if any, information they had been able to obtain there. In that connection, he noted that he knew El Sadat, and that the latter had always been very friendly towards Yugoslavia. As to himself, Tito said that he would always remain available to assist in reaching an equitable solution.

Tito then reiterated that the US bore great responsibility for
the Middle East, and said that while he knew the US could not
give orders to Israel, it should exert its influence on Israel
to make it adopt a more realistic position. He said that Golda
Meir occasionally reproached him for talking only with one
side, but no one had authorized him to be mediator, and he was
also talking with Goldmann. Tito went on to say that, in the
context of his remark about US responsibility in the Middle
East, he wanted to make one specific point. It should be made
clear to Israel that its chances for recognition were better
now than ever before. If he were in Israel's place, he would,
having demonstrated Israel's military capabilities, withdraw
from Suez and demand recognition in return. The Arabs used
to talk about throwing Israel into the sea, but they knew now
that they could not do it and they should recognize Israel just

as so many other countries, including the US and Yugoslavia,
had done. In his conversations with Nasser, the latter had
agreed with this view but said that he could not say it
publicly for obvious reasons.

Nixon - Tito - Plenary - October 1, 1970 - Tito's Office

Nixon opened noting he and Tito had come to agreement on "expediting broader economic, technical and scientific cooperation" between the two countries. Tito responded that "on his side there would be no obstacles for expansion of cooperation between Yugoslavia and the US in economic, scientific and technical fields." The two Presidents agreed that their advisers in separate meetings should develop these bilateral forms of cooperation further.

Discussion turned to the Middle East:

President Tito replied that death of Nasser was great blow to prospects for peaceful settlement. Nasser was an outstanding leader and most outstanding Arab of this generation. He was a man who thought before he took any decisive action. Yet he was also flexible in his approach, eager to avoid confrontation and escalation. No one in UAR can fully replace him. But, Tito said Nasser's collaborators are likely to continue his policy of seeking peaceful solution to problem of Israel. He agreed that further development of Middle East situation depended to large extent on attitudes of new UAR leadership, Soviet policy, and reactions. Arab World. Main problem is Israel's insistence on retaining occupied territories as compensation. Israelis must demonstrate more flexible

attitude; if they continue to insist on territorial aggrandizement, there was
no real prospect for peace. No Arab leader could give up attempts to recover
territory taken by Israel by force, this even more true now that Nasser is
gone. Nasser had told him that if he conceded any captured territory to Israel,
his prestige in Arab world would be destroyed and he would be replaced as UAR
leader. In aftermath of his death, great powers should exercise restraint in
Middle East and try bring about a peace equitable to both sides.

Tito continued that some Arabs, notably in Syria, Iraq and Algeria, favor
radical solution and, together with younger generation in UAR, wish to settle
issue with Israel by war. This tendency has been strengthened by most recent
events. After meeting with Secretary in Ethiopia earlier this year, Tito had
talked with Nasser at Aswan. Nasser had told him that Israeli air strikes at
factory near Ciaro which had resulted in over 100 casualties had put great
pressure on him to retaliate. He had resisted this but it had taken all his
prestige in Arab world to do so. Bombing of schools which killed many
Egyptian children had aroused young offices in arms, again resulting in
demand for Arab counter-attack. Nasser had been able to resist this pressure
also. But Yugoslavs wonder now what will happen if Israelis repeat such
mistakes.

Tito said US and USSR should not hesitate to advance a new realistic plan
for a Middle East solution. This could open new perspectives in situation
which is now hopeless. It should include all main problems. It should aim at
voluntary agreement by the parties directly concerned by means of persuasive
powers of both Soviets and Americans. An imposed solution could not lead to
stability in area; sooner or later it would break down. It was a mistake not
to include Palestine. So long as its future is in doubt, all Arabs would be
united against Israel, and there would be more of violent reactions as we have
recently seen.

Any new approach, Tito said, must also take into account evolution of
Palestinain movement. It has entirely different character now. There is a
new Palestinain generation with its own army and military resources, a
generation which has lived under conditions of terrible deprivation for years.
They are now prepared to die to the last man to liberate Palestine. They are
new factor with whom it will be necessary to consult...

Tito said the existence of Israel as a state is not in question. Nasser
himself considered Israel a political reality. By judicious use of moderate
policies, Israel has better opportunity today than ever to achieve its goal of
Arab recognition of its existence. Instead, however, its intemperate policies
militate against its interests. Not only US, but all other counties with which
Israel has diplomatic relations would never permit Israel to be pushed into
the sea. GKY broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967 but will re-establish
them as soon as Israel changes its attitudes, renounces territorial claims

and returns to pre-1967 boundaries. There simply is no point in insisting on territorial compensation for use of force. Its pre-1967 borders could be internationally guaranteed and Israel in those circumstances would have no cause for alarm re its security.

*

Nixon inquired about Tito's views on Soviet Middle East policy:

"Tito said he did not think Soviets wish to fish in troubled waters. As example, Soviet concern that conflict in the Middle East might escalate, he cited Jordan and USSR role in Syrian withdrawal and in preventing Iraqis from intervening, even after those states had publicly pledged use of their troops to prevent Palestine massacre. USSR interested in peaceful solution in Middle East crisis. However, Soviets find it difficult to separate themselves from Arab cause because their prestige is so heavily committed."....

Tito "commented he thought USSR had made its position known to UAR. Soviets are opposed to violation of ceasefire by either side. Tito said Yugoslavia has information UAR does not intend to escalate conflict. Moreover, violations of ceasefire are not at all as Israelis have presented them to US. UAR says alleged new missile sites were already there before agreement, but camouflaged by sand. UAR does not deny that there are some new sites but argues that sites under dispute were already there."

Rogers rebuted this and cited the violations. "Tito replied that whether missiles moved or not is not important. What is important is whether they are offensive or defensive weapons. Clearly they are defensive in nature. All armies take defensive measures during ceasefires. He had been a soldier in World Wars I and II and knew that every time shooting stopped, they tried to improve their positions or move them forward inconspicuously. UAR has moved some missiles. But GOI has also been fortifying its positions. On formal point, Secretary Rogers is right but this is not main issue." Tito even asked whether as regards the ceasefire the "terms of agreement were precise."

Rogers pointed out the difficulty of who to deal with among Palestinian leaders. Tito felt "Arafat is strongest."

*

The President emphasized US would do all in its power to deal honestly with new UAR leaders in effort to improve Middle East situation. We are trying to be fair and balanced in our approach. Tito's influence could be important in cooling down radical elements or those leaning toward radical solutions if new KUAR leaders will rectify situation, all may yet be all right. If it turns in another direction, then all are in danger. But we must trust in deeds, not words. We have a saying in US that pictures don't lie. That UAR has violated ceasefire agreement by moving in more missile sites is absolutely clear. These are the facts and we must deal with the facts. But we are not discouraged and will continue to press every opportunity for peaceful solution to problem.

Tito said his country is also devoted to objective of bringing about a more stable peace in Middle East. It is a confused situation but of serious concern to Yugoslavia, as Mediterranean country is too near center of conflict for comfort. Conflict in Middle East cannot be confined and would surely affect this part of the world. To which the President responded "and further."

President Tito asked President Nixon for his assessment of situation in Far East, particularly Vietnam. The President replied that there are two fronts in Vietnam, one diplomatic, the other military. On diplomatic front, there has been no progress. There had been some re-formulation of terms but no real change in substance. On military front, there have been very significant changes. South Vietnam military have finally jelled into formidable fighting force. North Vietnam forces have been substantially weakened. In-filtration in the South is down. Ability of Vietcong to assume offensive has been greatly reduced. Casualty rates are lowest in last several years. US withdrawal is assured and will continue. South Vietnam military are now in position to defend against Vietcong or North Vietnam regulars to extent latter wish to continue conflict. US would prefer to end war earlier and on diplomatic front, but US will not compromise right of Vietnamese people to decide their own future for themselves.

Tito thought there might be a third way. In PRG of South Vietnam, communists are a minority. Democratic elements from GVN and PRG could form a joint provisional government which could work out a formula which would permit Vietnamese people to decide their own future. Some years ago Tito had told Harriman that a prominent South Vietnam political figure had told him that South Vietnam was interested in such a solution. However, nothing came of it. People of South Vietnam long have been struggling for their independence and prize it highly. An independent South Vietnam government aligned with none of big powers might provide acceptable solution and act as a kind of buffer between China and other powers. His

recent conversations in Lusaka with Madame Binh had led him to believe such a solution could still work. Binh had said she was interested in a peaceful settlement on basis of PRG eight points. She was willing to form new government with any except three people in present GVN, whose names too hard for Tito to remember. Question of unification of North and South Vietnam could wait until much later. Prisoner of war problem could be taken up immediately, and withdrawal of US troops phases out over longer period.

Nixon outlined US policy on Vietnam avowing "We will see it through to the end."

Tito replied that he fully understood US position, but he was deeply convinced that Vietnam War cannot be settled with victory for either side. He cited Algeria where France had had half-million troops for so many years. Because De Gaulle had courage to put end to conflict he was regarded as outstanding stateman evey by those who opposed French withdrawal. Yugoslavia entirely understands both difficult position of President Nixon in his efforts to gain peace in Vietnam and reasons why capituation is out of question. He was grateful for President's frank expose of US policies and problems, and their implication in this difficult situation.

The President said he would be interested in Tito's estimate of Sino-Soviet competition in Black Africa. US knows little of state play between these two super-powers in this area. Which did Tito think was ahead?

Tito replied this was hard to say. It was his impression that China presently taking flexible and shrewd approach, spending a lot of money, and careful to avoid offense to local people. They were constructing a 1,000 kilometer railroad from Tanzania to Zambia; their construction workers were living very modestly. It appeared to be Chinese policy to provide large economic assistance and to ask little in return. Long-term implications of this strategy are large. Soviet influence is greater in Arab world; in Black Africa, it is difficult to judge.

The President responded that on basis of these comments, he would conclude Chinese policy is more clever and sophisticated than was Soviet. Tito commented Chinese have learned lesson from their own earlier expulsions. They profit from past mistakes and recognize that Africans have had experiences at hands of former colonial powers and hence want no more of such domination. They want to be masters of their own houses and will not tolerate interference in their internal affairs by anyone. Chinese may also have learned from Yugoslav experience. On a modest scale Yugoslavia has supplied technical assistance to number of African countries but has carefully abstained from any kind of interference in their internal affairs and their aid people have never been expelled anywhere.

The President asked Tito what he thought Black African attitude was toward US. Do Africans consider US imperialists, or US assistance a form of neo-colonialism?

Tito answered that his impression was that Black Africa is critical of US because most of its assistance goes to southern Africa and US seems to seek closer relations with South Africa and Portuguese colonies than with Black Africa. They want US but not at expense of interference in their internal affairs. (Secretary Tepavac intervened to say many African countries expect much of US during UN second development decade.) Tito continued that one shouldn't be too impatient about results. Changing attitudes in these countries is long-term process. Aid without interference will end well. A country that gives assistance not in egoistic way in the long run will have greatest influence. Most of these countries are aware that economic assistance is tow-way partnership. Economic development eventually means equal economic relations which promotes trade to benefit of donor nation.

Tito said it is also quite unwise to regard any political change in Black Africa as a move towards socialism or communism. These countries are quite far away from communism and socialism. They wish to make revolution in a constructive sense. They will deal with ideologies and systems in their own ways, adapting them to their needs. Kaunda of Zambia thinks that "humanism" is highest from of progress. Nyerere of Tanzania is gifted and capable man who seeks friendly relations with all countries. Kenyatta of Kenya is another African leader who believes in peaceful coexistence. Experience has shown that interference in internal affairs of these states doesn't pay very well and results never last very long. They are determined to be independent, but they require financial assistance. Concept of giving one percent of national income to developing countries has caught on with some European states, and there are better prospects of developing multi-lateral forms of assistance. Tito noted that USSR has not yet shown interest in these proposals.

Kissinger - Dr. Mirko Tepavac, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs

October 1 aboard aircraft from Zagreb to Belgrade

HK opened expressing hope Yugoslavs understood US position on Vietnam.

Mr. Tepavac "said that Yugoslavia was aware of the fact that the present Administration had inherited the Vietnam problem, and that Yugoslavia therefore viewed the Administration's difficulties with understanding. However, this did not mean that the Yugoslavs agreed with US policy.... He thought that Dr. K. would agree that the eight points advanced by the NLF in Paris were not as rigid as the previous ten-point program."....

HAK demurred, explaining the difficulties of dealing with the NVN.
Tepavac reiterated his view that "the new eight points were more flexible
than the previous ten, eventhough they might not be entirely satisfactory.
They represented a small step forward, and could lead to further steps
provided the US encouraged that process." HK hoped the Yugoslavs could
help by influencing the NVN "toward greater realism." Tepavac said "that
Yugoslavia had contact with the other side in several places, and especially
in Paris. He said that (they) would be prepared to talk to them in the
sense suggested by Dr. K, i.e., to attempt to influence them not to treat
the US like a child and to be more realistic."

HK turned the discussion to Soviet motives in the Middle East in light
of ceasefire violations:

Mr. Tepavac said that since the Soviets did not have a sufficient
economic basis for playing a global role, they sought to main-
tain or advance their position in the world on the basis of
their military power. The Soviets do not want war, but neither
do they want to limit their global interests. In his view,
it was this that accounted for the ambivalence of Soviet policy.
As to the Middle East, however, he wished to note that the
door for Soviet influence and presence in that area had been
opened not by the USSR itself. If Israel were to adopt a more
responsible position, and especially if it withdrew, that
would have considerable effect also on Soviet ability to main-
tain influence and presence in the area.

Mr. Tepavac then said that, in the context of the USSR's efforts
to consolidate or expand its influence, he wished to note that
Secretary Rogers' latest public statement on the Brezhnev
Doctrine had been rather vague. All it said was something
to the effect that the US hoped the USSR would be very careful
as regards application of that doctrine to further countries.
As he had already mentioned to the Secretary, he hoped that
any further US statement on the subject would be more specific
and forceful. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, how-
ever, Tepavac said that he was not suggesting such a statement
in connection with the President's visit or in any immediate
future, but was rather making a general point.

Tepavac concluded with the following interesting question about Yugoslavia's
security:

After reflecting for a while, Mr. Tepavac asked Dr. Kissinger if he could pose what he called an "airplane question," a question which he felt could be asked only in the strictly private and informal atmosphere of his joint flight with Dr. Kissinger. The question, he said, was whether Dr. Kissinger believed that an attack on Yugoslavia would result in a third world war.

Dr. Kissinger replied that such an attack certainly could not be ignored. Asked by Mr. Tepavac whether this meant that there would be a reaction to such an attack, Dr. Kissinger said that that would depend on a number of factors, including that of whether or not the Yugoslavs would fight. Mr. Tepavac said that, although there would probably be some quisiings in Yugoslavia, there was no question that the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav people would fight and put up stiff resistance to the attacker.

Nixon - Tito (small group) after dinner - October 1, 1970

The conversation began in a light vein, with comments about the difficulty of getting good cigars in the US in view of the state of US-Cuban relations. Tito used this opportunity to note that Castro did not like Yugoslavia either, noting facetiously that this was perhaps because Yugoslavia liked the US. He said that Castro apparently did not recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence, although he was now becoming more reasonable, perhaps because he was experiencing difficulties.

The President said that on the plane from Zagreb Tito and he had had a very good talk on various world issues, such as East-West relations, the Soviet Union, and China. He had told Tito that if the U.S. and Yugoslavia could have very close relations in the future, Tito could be a bridge with the people we did not know very well, in particular those in the Middle East and Africa, and perhaps also the Chinese. Of course, this should be only when Tito believed it useful and desirable, and it should not involve any compromise of his views. But we lived in a time when it was very important not to leave any opportunity for promoting peace unused.

The President said that he wished to speak in very direct terms. He wanted to stress that the U.S. realized that President Tito and Yugoslavia were in a very delicate position. The U.S. wanted to cooperate with and help Yugoslavia, economically or otherwise, but wanted to help without hurting Yugoslavia. The U.S. did not want Yugoslavia to have to choose between the U.S. and somebody else.

*

Dr. Kissinger noted that he could not add much to what had been said today and yesterday. In a backgrounder he had given the press just before dinner tonight, he had said that Yugoslavia's policy of neutrality was in best conformity with its position in the world today, that such policy served the interest of peace, and that Yugoslavia -could play an important intermediary role in various areas. Dr. Kissinger then commented that Stalin had been right in assessing the effects of Yugoslavia's independent policy, and that was why he had reacted so sharply. Dr. Kissinger thought that in all socialist countries today there were conflicting trends regarding the role of the party and other interests. Those trends helped explain Soviet policy. We believed that Yugoslavia, with its example, could help the positive trends in those countries, trends towards peace and a more humane approach.

*

Nixon then went on to explain his preference for quiet diplomacy: "We would like to talk with Yugoslavia privately and directly, although public statements could sometimes also be necessary." RN had in mind on this point the Middle East and China: "The less said on these problems the better, and then perhaps the course of events in those areas could be changed."

Tito turned to Tepavac and suggested smilingly "that he should take note of that." Mr. Ribicic (President of the Federal Executive Council) "also agreed, and stressed the importance of harmonizing not only views but also actions."

Nixon turned to the Soviets: "The Soviet Union had been very sensitive about Yugoslavia. In fact, the present Soviet leadership seemed to be even more sensitive. In this connection, he noted that (Tito) had told him that Khrushchev had been more flexible than the present leaders."

Tito said that Khrushchev had always expressed his views very directly and that even when he strongly disagreed with others he tried to understand their approach. Sometimes, upon reflection, he would even agree with them. In this connection, Tito recalled that during a meeting he had had with Khrushchev in Romania, he had asked him why the Soviets were constantly reproaching Yugoslavia for importing US wheat. After he explained to Khrushchev that such imports were necessitated by the extremely serious situation resulting from Yugoslavia's devastation during the war, Khrushchev understood, saying that "when one quarrels, one is not choosy about the stick" and even adding that if the Soviet Union were in Yugoslavia's shoes it would also take US wheat.

The President recalled his own meeting with Khrushchev during his visit to the Soviet Union in 1959, which involved very lengthy and at times heated discussions. Although he would not say this publicly because such a statement could be misunderstood, he felt that Khrushchev had been very direct, and much more flexible and decisive than the present leaders.

Tito said that the best proof of this was Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. Although Khrushchev's style, as exemplified by his shoe-banging in the UN, had been rather peculiar, he had always thought things through before taking an action.

The President asked if Tito thought that it was a good idea to create the impression of an intensive US-Soviet dialogue.

Tito said that he wanted to make clear the Yugoslav position. As he had stated in Lusaka, Yugoslavia had nothing against US-Soviet talks. At the 1961 non-aligned conference in Belgrade, Nehru, Sukarno, and himself had tried to do their best to bring about talks between the US and the USSR, and in fact had sent special emissaries to Washington and Moscow for that purpose. Yugoslavia could not oppose now what it favored at that time. However, this did not mean that Yugoslavia was not interested in what was being talked about. If the talks dealt with issues directly affecting only the US and the USSR -- such as outer space, disarmament, etc. -- that was all right, but Yugoslavia could not accept talks about issues concerning third parties without those parties being present.

The President observed that the Soviets seemed to be sensitive about our conversations with the Chinese. He asked if Tito thought that the U.S. should refrain from exploring the possibilities for discussions with the Chinese in order not to complicate US-Soviet relations, or that the U.S. should talk with both the Chinese and the USSR.

Tito replied that one should talk with both, but not with one at the expense of the other. The purpose of such talks should be to seek consensus on world problems. He thought it would be a great mistake not to talk with the Chinese. China was building nuclear weapons and would become a big power in a few years. If it was kept in isolation and not treated as an equal, it could become very dangerous.

The President wondered if our conversations with the Chinese did not make the Soviets less prepared to talk with us.

Mr. Tepavac thought that, on the contrary, U.S.-Chinese conversations made the Soviets even more interested in talking with the U.S. However, it was important that the Soviets knew that the U.S. was not seeking to exploit their rift with China.

Sec. Rogers asked about Czechoslovakia.

Tito replied that "Yugoslavia had condemned the Soviet action there, but had now shelved the issue because it did not believe that further talk about it would serve any useful purpose. There was nothing Yugoslavia could do to help Czechoslovakia, and any further talk about Soviet policy towards that country would only worsen Yugoslav relations with the USSR. However, there was some difficulty in restraining the Yugoslav press from pursuing the issue."

Mr. Ribicic noted "that relations between the USSR and Czechoslovakia had not improved, which only showed that the methods used by the USSR were wrong." Mr. Tepavac commented that "the Czech. affair was a sad story but that it constituted no danger to peace."

Tito "said that he wanted to explain that Yugoslavia wanted as good and as broad relations as possible with the USSR. However, Yugoslavia always made it clear that it did not want anybody to interfere in how it solved its internal problems - those....were Yugoslavia's own and nobody else's business."

The President asked if Czechoslovakia or Hungary could take the same position.

Tito replied that they could not proceed in exactly the same manner. However, Hungary was quietly going its own way, carrying out reforms of far-reaching significance. In foreign policy, however, Hungary was following the Soviet Union in order not to irritate it.

The President observed that Hungary was in a difficult position since it was close to the USSR territorially and had Soviet troops on its soil. Romania was also in a difficult situation, and it was risky for it to be too independent.

Mr. Ribić interjected that the trends in the socialist countries, which Dr. Kissinger had referred to, depended on the trends in Europe at large. If the general European situation were to open up, those trends would intensify.

*

In response to Nixon's query about what Tito thought of a Conference on European Security:

Tito replied that if such a conference were prepared on the basis of the Yugoslav conception, it would be useful. Yugoslavia believed that such a conference should include all European countries rather than only those belonging to the two blocs. Preparation of an ESC would obviously be a very long process and would require a great deal of effort. In any event, no useful

purpose would be served by a conference that would result in a
very limited agreement not covering the major outstanding issues.
The agenda for an ESC should include the German problem, disarmament,
and withdrawal of foreign troops from European countries. Only a
conference dealing with all these problems would be useful, since
it would result in the disappearance of blocs.

Dr. Kissinger commented that what President Tito had described
amounted to a general European settlement.

Mr. Tepavac noted that if not Yugoslavia, at least others already
enjoyed security on the basis of blocs.

*

Mr. Ribićić observed that with the development of Soviet economic ties with such countries as the FRG, Italy and France, a return to cold war would be difficult.

Mr. Tepavac commented that when relations between the two blocs became cool Yugoslavia shivered.

The President asked about Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Bulgaria, and others.

Tito said that Yugoslav relations with Hungary, Italy and the FRG were good, but were not so good with Bulgaria.

The President thought that while Yugoslavia wanted peace, the Bulgarians wanted Macedonia.

Tito laughed and agreed, noting that the Bulgarian position with
respect to the very existence of the Macedonian nationality had
been changing in accordance with political expediency at any given
time. As to Yugoslav relations with Albania, he said they were
improving.

In response to Secretary Rogers's question, Tito said that Yugoslav relations with Iran were very good. He noted that he was greatly impressed with the Shah of Iran, who was very capable and very knowledgeable, especially as regards the economic situation in his country.

*

Tito said that if the problem of the Middle East were resolved, the Soviets would no longer be able to play the role of a tutor in the area.

The President pointed out that apart from the Israeli-Arab problem, the Soviets were seeking to build up, for their own interests, their position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. He stressed that the situation would be difficult if there was no agreement on that aspect as well.

Tito said that this was up to the US. The US had placed its bets only on one card -- Israel -- while the Soviets had placed their bets on 100 million Arabs. Thus, the question was why the US had antagonized the whole Arab world.

*

Secretary Rogers noted that the situation in the Middle East involved Yugoslavia as much as, or even more than, the U.S., since Yugoslavia was close to the area and the US was far away.

Tito said this was precisely the reason why Yugoslavia was so concerned with the situation.

The President said he was sure that Yugoslavia understood why we believed we must maintain our Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The purpose of our naval presence in the Mediterranean went beyond the Middle East crisis and served the broader objective of assuring stability in the area. It did not constitute a threat to any Mediterranean country, and we believed that a defensive force of that kind was needed in the area at this time.

Tito said that here US and Yugoslav views differed. The Yugoslav view was that neither US nor Soviet naval forces were needed in the Mediterranean.

Nixon then stressed that the US presence did not threaten any state in the Mediterranean "but that he was not sure that this was true of the USSR. This was not a cold war statement but merely a statement of fact."

Tito "wondered if it had not been the US itself that had facilitated, perhaps unwittingly, the Soviet entry into the Med. area."

Nixon said "The US wants peace in the Middle East, the Soviets want the Middle East." Tito "commented that the US could influence the Arabs and the Africans by using means other than its Sixth Fleet."

Rogers concluded by expressing doubts that the Soviets would leave when the UAR asked them to. Tito "thought this was a difficult question to answer."

End

HK SUMMARY of his NOVEMBER 4 Visit to Yugoslavia (1974)

"Tito was remarkably spry, recent rumors to the contrary notwithstanding. In fact I found him more lively, better informed and more cogent than when he was in the U.S. some three years ago. His main concern was with the Middle East which worries him a great deal because he fears either an outbreak of war which may affect Yugoslavia or new Soviet inroads in the area. He still is strongly inclined toward Arab views but my impression is that he has become somewhat more moderate on this score and may be counseling moderation. He has widespread and good contacts with the major Arab leaders. I spoke to him forcefully about the necessity of proceeding step by step and while he still maintains that all the issues must be tackled simultaneously, he does now seem to understand that total solutions are unachievable and even to advocate them, as the Yugoslavs have traditionally done, harms the prospects of progress. When we jointly met the press, Tito strongly supported our activities and said nothing about usual Arab claims.

"With the other leaders, particularly the Prime Minister, I went over the state of bilateral relations. In the economic area these have evolved quite well but the Yugoslavs are anxious to pick up again on military relations with us which we have deliberately throttled back in recent years because of Yugoslavia's unhelpful foreign policies. I agreed that Dob Ellsworth could visit Belgrade before the end of the year to survey Yugoslav needs.

"With the Foreign Minister, I spent the better part of an hour explaining that we did not object to Yugoslav independence and non-alignment but could not accept it if these principles are habitually translated into hostile and unhelpful policies. While the Foreign Minister is an unyielding type, I think he got the point. We also talked about Cyprus, which worries the Yugoslavs, and I assured him, as I had already done in New York, that we had nothing to do with the original coup. I stressed our support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the island and outlined the possibilities for a settlement. I suggested that if the Turks make the gestures for which we are working, it would be helpful if Yugoslavia showed its support.

"I agreed with the Yugoslavs that regular consultations would be helpful and might avoid misunderstandings in future and we will probably arrange some meetings among senior officials after New York.

cepts the invitation with pleasure. It was agreed
that the visit will take place at the earliest possible
date.

Secretary Kissinger expressed appreciation for the
cordial reception he was accorded in Romania as
well as for the full exchange of views during his
visit in Bucharest.

THE VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA, NOVEMBER 4

Remarks by Secretary Kissinger
Upon Arrival, Belgrade

Press release 468 dated November 4

Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentlemen: This is my first visit to Yugoslavia in four years. A country with which we have had friendly and cordial relations for almost the entire postwar period, Yugoslavia with its fierce spirit of independence and its independent policy has made a significant contribution to world peace. I look forward to exchanging ideas with the Foreign Minister, with President Tito, and with all of their colleagues in the spirit of frankness and cordiality that has always marked our relationship.

Thank you very much.

Remarks by President Tito and Secretary Kissinger¹¹

President Tito

We had today very good talks with the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger. The Secretary of State had talks before that with our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The talks were concerned with bilateral relations and also international problems, mostly the Middle East. As regards bilateral relations, we of course agreed to continue to develop and expand them. Current relations so far also are not bad; as regards international problems, especially the Middle East, concern was expressed on both sides because of the stagnation that is there. Much depends on the Government of the United States, which so far was the main influence in the

¹¹ Made at the conclusion of their meeting on Nov. 4 (text from press release 476).

carrying out of the disengagement and for a
peaceful solution of the conflict between the
Arab states and Israel. The Secretary of
State will soon visit again this region, and he
will know best what this situation is and
what there is to do.

The discussions we had were very useful,
and I am very glad Secretary Kissinger vis-
ited Yugoslavia, and on many things we dis-
cussed, our positions were identical.

Secretary Kissinger

I wanted to thank the President for the
very cordial reception he has had for me and
the very frank and friendly talks that we
had. The President and I as well as his asso-
ciates reviewed the bilateral relations be-
tween our two countries. I agreed completely
with what the President said. Those relations
were good to begin with and we decided to
strengthen them through consultations and
other means.

With respect to international problems, we
reviewed several of them and special empha-
sis was paid to the Middle East. We, the
United States, would like to do our best to
prevent any stalemate from developing. This
requires that all of the parties on both sides
understand the special necessities of the other
and make an effort to bring their positions
closer to each other.

It is for this purpose that I am going to the
Middle East to see whether useful negotia-
tions can be conducted and in what manner,
and I pledge that the United States will do
its utmost to improve matters in the Middle
East to a just and lasting peace.

Altogether I would evaluate my visit here
very useful, contributing to mutual under-
standing and to the strengthening of our re-
lationship.

Joint Statement at the Conclusion
of the Visit to Yugoslavia ¹²

At the invitation of the Vice President of the Fed-
eral Executive Council and Federal Secretary for
Foreign Affairs Milos Minic, the Secretary of State

¹² Issued at Belgrade on Nov. 4 (text from press release 475).

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November 25, 1974

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733

of the United States of America, Henry A. Kissinger, together with his wife, paid an official visit to Yugoslavia on November 4, 1974.

The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito received Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who, on that occasion, conveyed to the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a message from the President of the United States of America Gerald Ford. The President of the Republic entertained Henry Kissinger, together with his wife and associates, at lunch. Mr. Kissinger was also received by the President of the Federal Executive Council Dzemal Bijedic. Vice President and Federal Secretary Minic and Secretary of State Kissinger held talks concerning all questions of interest to the two countries.

The talks held during these meetings in an atmosphere of friendship and openness, covered the most important international questions and bilateral relations between the two countries. Special attention was devoted to crisis areas in the world, such as the Near East and Cyprus. The two sides put forth their views about the paths towards a settlement of these and other outstanding world problems, affirmed the importance of continued regular contacts and consultations at all levels in various fields of mutual interest, and stressed the benefit these provide to increased understanding and mutual respect for one another's viewpoints and positions.

On the basis of the progress achieved at the Conference on European Security and Cooperation for preserving and consolidating peace in Europe and for further advancement of all-round constructive cooperation among European states, the two sides stressed their mutual interest in continued coordination of efforts to attain acceptance of basic principles for inter-European cooperation and security, and an early and successful conclusion of that conference.

The two sides gave special attention to current problems in the sphere of international economic developments and relations. Recognizing the fundamental interdependence of all nations and peoples, the two sides agreed that real peace and stability in the world could come only with significant progress towards solution of the pressing problems facing mankind in the fields of international economic relations, world economy, and economic development. They agreed further that lasting solutions to these problems could be found only on the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty, equality and non-interference among all states regardless of whether they have similar or different social, economic or political systems.

Reaffirming the necessity for widespread cooperation based on equality of all members of the international community on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in settling outstanding international problems, it was recognized

that Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment makes an active contribution to greater understanding among peoples and the search for peaceful solution to international problems and conflicts.

Both sides assessed that bilateral cooperation between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States of America is developing favorably, and stressed the interest and readiness for its further advancement and expansion, especially in the spheres of economic, financial and scientific-technological cooperation, as well as in joint investments. They emphasized particularly the importance of the agreement under which United States and Yugoslav firms are cooperating in construction of Yugoslavia's first nuclear power plant.

They also confirmed their readiness to actively encourage further expansion of cultural cooperation and expressed their expectation that the participation of Yugoslavia at the forthcoming bicentennial of the United States of America will contribute to the deepening of understanding between the peoples of the two countries. They also emphasized the significance of the contribution to the development of the United States of America by U.S. citizens of Yugoslav extraction who represent a strong link of lasting friendship between the peoples of the two countries.

Attaching extraordinary importance to the principles contained in the joint statement signed October 30, 1971 during President Tito's visit to the United States on which mutual relations of the two countries are based, as well as to the messages exchanged between Presidents Tito and Ford reaffirming these principles, the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milos Minic and the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted that these are the documents which, for Yugoslav-American relations, constitute a lasting basis of stable friendly relations and broad, mutually advantageous cooperation between the two countries.

## THE VISIT TO ITALY, NOVEMBER 4-5

### Dinner Hosted by President Giovanni Leone, Rome, November 4

Press release 478 dated November 5

*Toast by President Leone*

Since this is the third time I have had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Kissinger, I would like to say that the cards between us are on the table, there is no bluffing, so it is useless to prepare speeches which won't be read and then thrown in the wastebasket—one speaks

extemporaneously. last trick upon me. eign Minister Moe had sent in a draft he dropped it and not on the draft. some experience and answering him often time we haven't got a tional respectable changing speech changing the cor phrases. And then a rule, even such a ject of the meeting revolutionized dip erously, with ded messenger of peace more here at the G

This is the third five months ago, meetings in Rome and, in between, in Paris and other States accompanied Moro. And today we requested and accepted and well is due to the World will open tomorrow, contribution your strength of the third that conference will be of all the responsibility of the signficant and evolution of history.

For years now and Italy gave it its of Rome, [Aurelio] also in recent co mania—for a very slight forecast of next century has come. This conference are the responsible countries and will have a major responsibility, but also a lesser extent—its moral strength,

734

Department of State Bulletin

November 25, 1974

TITO VISIT TO THE US - 1978 (March)

HAK apparently met with Tito or saw him on Tito's visit to Pres. Carter.
No records of the occasion.

Tito Profile Done in Advance of This Visit

1. VISITS MOSCOW, PEKING AND NOW WASHINGTON IN JUST NINE MONTHS. ATTRACTS TO BELGRADE TWO OF 1978'S MAJOR MULTILATERAL GATHERINGS -- CSCE AND THE NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE.
FATHER OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT THIS MAY.
STAGE-MANAGING A PARTY CONGRESS IN JUNE WHICH WILL CONFIRM HIS UNDISPUTED RULE AT HOME.

2. TITO AT 85 -- ALERT, TOUGH AND STILL AMBITIOUS.

3. WHAT CONTINUES TO DRIVE HIM AND HOW CAN HE BE INFLUENCED? TITO HAS AMPLE REASON TO REST ON HIS OARS AND TO IGNORE THE COUNSEL OF OTHERS. NO OTHER COMMUNIST LEADER IN POWER TODAY

CAN CLAIM TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION.

NO ONE ELSE IS LEFT FROM THAT EXTRAORDINARY GENERATION OF LEADERS, DELEGATES, WORLD WAR II CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT, STALIN, AMONG THE POST-WWII DELEGATES WHO BROUGHT TOGETHER THE MAJORITY OF

MANKIND IN OPPOSITION TO THE TWO SUPER-POWERS, -- THE UNITED STATES, NASSER'S SIONIST, ONLY TITO IS STILL HERE TO GUIDE THE NON-

ALIGNED.

4. AND GIVING SPECIAL STATURE TO HIS VIEWS AS WELL AS HIS PERSON, TITO HAS SEEN THE WORLD MOVE IN HIS DIRECTION ON A WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES. HE WAS CAST OUT OF THE COMMUNIST CAMP IN 1948 ONLY TO BE COURTED LATER BY THE SOVIETS AND MORE RECENTLY BY THE CHINESE. HE TOLD THE UNITED STATES FOR DECADES THAT WE WERE HURTING OUR OWN LONG-TERM INTERESTS BY THE STANDS WE TOOK IN INDOCHINA, PANAMA, SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. HE IS CONSULTED BY EUROCOMMUNISTS AND NORTH KOREANS, BY EGYPT AND THE PLO. HE ENJOYS A DEGREE OF INFLUENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE SIZE OF THE COUNTRY HE RULES.

5. IN YUGOSLAVIA ITSELF HE HAS REASON TO BE SATISFIED WITH HIS ACCOMPLISHMENTS. IN THIRTY YEARS HE HAS TRANSFORMED A LARGELY RURAL, ILLITERATE, BALKAN BACKWATER INTO A SOCIETY TWO-THIRDS URBAN AND ON ITS WAY TO JOINING EUROPE'S MODERN, DEVELOPED MAINSTREAM. THE COMMUNIST PARTY HE HAS HEADED FOR

FORTY YEARS HAS ENFORCED STABILITY ON A PEOPLE PREVIOUSLY
BEST KNOWN FOR THEIR ASSASSINATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO
THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WARS. SOCIALIST SELF-MANAGEMENT
WITH ITS WORKERS COUNCILS (WHICH KARDELJ AND HE CREATED)
AND YUGOSLAVIA'S OPEN BORDERS MAKE IT THE MOST DEMOCRATIC
OF ALL COMMUNIST REGIMES.

6. BUT TITO SEES HIS VISION ONLY PARTLY FULFILLED, AND THOSE THINGS HE HAS ACCOMPLISHED THREATENED BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD. WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE STREETS IN 1971, HE WAS RUDELY REMINDED THAT MANY OF HIS PEOPLE STILL CONSIDER THEMSELVES CROATS OR SERBS FIRST; OLD ENMITIES AND ASPIRATIONS ARE STILL PRESENT NOT FAR BENEATH THE SURFACE DESPITE HIS BEST EFFORTS. THE OPPOSITION OF SEPARATIST, PRO-SOVIET AND LIBERAL FORCES STILL LEADS HIM TO KEEP SOMETHING OVER 500 POLITICAL PRISONERS IN JAIL. AS HE LOOKS FORWARD OVER THE NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS AND HIS INEVITABLE DEPARTURE FROM POWER, HE IS NO LONGER CERTAIN THAT HIS COUNTRY WILL HOLD TOGETHER AND THE PARTY REMAIN IN POWER.

7. EQUALLY DISTURBING TO HIM IS A GLOBAL SITUATION FRAUGHT WITH UNCERTAINTIES AND PRESSURES.

-- THE SOVIET UNION, YUGOSLAVIA'S MAJOR MILITARY THREAT, CONTINUES TO GROW STRONGER AND TO DEMAND MILITARY BASE AND OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS HERE AND A SPECIAL

["POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP. TITO IS AS NERVOUS ABOUT POST-\nBREZHNEV SOVIET POLICIES TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA AS HE IS\nABOUT POST-TITO INSTABILITY AT HOME.", "-- EARLY SIGNS THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE\nMORE \"PROGRESSIVE\" THAN FORD-KISSINGER ON A WIDE VARIETY\nOF ISSUES ENCOURAGED A SUBSTANTIAL WARMING OF THE\nBILATERAL ATMOSPHERE. BUT WHILE TITO IS CLEARLY MORE\nCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS ADMINISTRATION, HE NEVERTHELESS\nCONTINUES TO LOOK UPON THE UNITED STATES AS A NATION\nCOMMITTED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF THE GLOBAL STATUS QUO.\nHIS CONCERN FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM, UNDIFFERENTIATED\nANTI-COMMUNISM AND, PERHAPS ABOVE ALL, OUR \"TOLERATION\"\nOF CROATIAN SEPARATIST TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES\nIS ALWAYS CLOSE TO THE SURFACE. FOR HE IS NEVER FAR\nREMOVED FROM HIS LONG-TIME FEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES\nAND THE SOVIET UNION, A LA YALTA, WILL SPLIT YUGOSLAVIA\nNORTH-SOUTH AFTER HE GOES.", "XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

8. ALL THIS ADDS UP TO A MAN WHO EXPECTS TO RECEIVE HIS DUE AS AN ELDER STATESMAN, WILL NOT CHANGE HIS STRATEGIC COMMITMENT TO "PROGRESSIVE CAUSES" ABROAD OR AT HOME, AND IS HIGHLY HYPERSENSITIVE TO PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HE/AWARE OF WEAKNESSES IN HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION, IT'S NEED FOR HELP AND THEREFORE, TO PREPARED TO SHOW A CERTAIN TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY IF IT WILL STRENGTHEN YUGOSLAVIA'S SECURITY, INDEPENDENCE AND ROLE IN THE WORLD.

9. TALKING ABOUT PRE-WAR, PRE-REVOLUTION YUGOSLAVIA, THIS FORMER POOR METAL-WORKER ONCE REMARKED "A FEW PEOPLE HAD COMPLETE ABUNDANCE WHILE MOST HAD LACKED. EVEN THE BASIC NECESSITIES". THIS RESENTMENT AGAINST PRIVILEGE STILL MOTIVATES NOT ONLY HIS STRIVING TO BUILD A MORE EGALITARIAN, SOCIALIST SOCIETY AT HOME BUT HIS CENTRAL FOREIGN POLICY GOAL OF ACHIEVING MORE EQUAL RELATIONS AMONG STATES.

Background on Tito for his 1978 Visit to US

## II. SETTING

Defying generalization, Yugoslavia is Balkan, Mediterranean and Middle European in essence; with a history going back through the Roman era but a state only in this century; Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem; bearing the marks of both the Turkish and Austro-Hungarian Empires, as well as indigenous kings and despots; a contemporary state poised strategically and politically between East and West, and playing a world role far beyond what size or power would dictate.

Site of the spark that ignited the First World War, Yugoslavia arose out of that war as a state welded--or patched--together from pieces of the Kingdom of Serbia, of the crumbled Turkish Empire and of defeated Austria-Hungary. Little more than twenty years later it fell victim to German and Italian invasion, and was torn by Civil War between the communist-led Partisans under Tito, the Mihailovic forces built from remnants of the pre-war regime and the Ustashi forces in the Nazi puppet "Independent State of Croatia". In vicious and tragic fighting against the occupiers and each other almost 2 million Yugoslav lives were lost -- about half at the hands of other Yugoslavs.

 Marshal Tito came out of the war an authentic national hero, able to form in Yugoslavia the only post-war communist regime in Europe not imposed by Soviet arms or subversion. But, good communist that he was, Tito worked closely with Moscow until forced to demonstrate that he was an even better nationalist. The historic break with the Soviets in 1948-49 has profoundly affected Yugoslavia's course for the 30 years that have followed.

An outcast in the communist world after 1949, and threatened by Soviet power, Yugoslavia found the United States prepared to support its independence with military and economic assistance programs totalling $2.9 billion from 1949 to 1965. With the security this offered, Tito embarked on policies which have largely formed today's Yugoslavia and which explain its importance as a country. Internally, he set in train political and economic trends which have made Yugoslavia a maverick in communist theory and practice.
While still

of a highly centralized system characterized by
virtually total suppression of individual rights.
Externally, Tito joined with India's Nehru and
Egypt's Nasser to create the nonaligned movement,
thereby giving focus to the growing number of
newly-independent and underdeveloped states seeking
a voice in the post-war world. Sole survivor of
the three and, by now, the only remaining national
leader of the Second World War generation, Tito
stands as an elder statesman and leader of the
nonaligned and the third world.

The economy-and the underlying economic
philosophy- start from premises which are unorthodox
in communist practice. Unlike the rest of communist
Europe, industrial property is not state-owned or
managed via a government bureaucracy. Rather,
industrial and economic activity is carried on
through a "workers' self management" system which at
least in theory places ownership of enterprises in
the hands of those who work in them (except in
agriculture, a percentage of which is in private hands,
and in retail marketing and small manufacturing, some
of which is privately-owned). These enterprises operate
under a broad economic policy and planning mandate,
but with substantial independent management authority
which they share with the workers' self-management
organs (having a voice in selection of managers,
production, investment and wage policy) within each
enterprise. This unique system, coupled with
Eastern Europe's only real banking system and active
participation in international markets, has given
Yugoslavia a dynamic industrial quasi-market(albeit
somewhat inefficient)economy which is, in many respects,
far removed from the statist economies of its
Eastern European neighbors.

As a self-proclaimed leader of the nonaligned
movement, Yugoslavia participates actively in a host
of international bodies and often seeks the role of
spokesman or mediator on issues which concern the
nonaligned and the third world. Yugoslav positions
on most international questions reflect both the
leadership's philosophical proclivities and their

sense of what will reinforce Yugoslavia's position in the nonaligned movement. While these motivations more often than not lead Yugoslavia to positions different from ours, there have been some recent signs of a tendency to play a moderating role between opposing positions, such as the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. This is illustrated in Yugoslavia's recent actions on Middle East developments. Without dropping their long-standing support for the Arabs, the Yugoslavs have moved significantly to express openly the view that the existence of Israel must be accepted and assured. Tito has recently lent his personal prestige to this position in messages to Arab leaders.

In the contemporary dynamics of today's world, with East-West issues at the surface at the CSCE in Belgrade, with Eurocommunism near the surface in Western Europe, and with an array of issues facing us all in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere, Yugoslavia will inevitably retain an importance and, thus, have an interest to the United States well beyond its nominal place in the world.

Whether Yugoslavia's importance will survive Tito's departure from the scene--a prospect which must be considered despite his remarkable longevity--will depend on both internal and external forces. Yugoslavia's leaders have had to contend with nationalist strains among the ethnic and religious groupings, as well as with wide disparities among the republics in economic development. Tito's passing will remove the greatest single symbol of national unity and could threaten the nation's stability. It is difficult to predict what the Soviets might be tempted to do in such a situation in the interests of bringing Yugoslavia back into communist conformity. Clearly the Yugoslavs are totally committed to preserving their independence. Equally clearly, their leaders are aware of the risk of Soviet interference, and believe that Western interest, engagement and commitment to Yugoslav independence could be their best insurance against Soviet meddling in a time of transition.

Press Interview with Tito - 1978 (March)

# At 85, Tito Still Looks to Future And Worries About the Present

## In Interview He Gives Views Before Visit to U.S. Next Week

By JAMES RESTON

Special to The New York Times

IGALO, Yugoslavia, March 2—President Tito of Yugoslavia, the last of the World War II European leaders, is disturbed by trends in East-West relations, by what he termed “deadlock” in Middle East negotiations, and by the fighting in the Horn of Africa.

He said he would discuss these and other issues with President Carter at the White House next week.

In a remarkably candid two-hour interview here at his new winter residence on the south Adriatic, the 85-year-old marshal talked not only about present political issues but also about Stalin, Churchill, religion, death, what might happen in Yugoslavia after he's gone and even about difficulties between himself and his wife.

The President had no trouble concentrating on the shifting and sometimes

Excerpts from interview, page A6.

delicate questions in the interview, which took place Tuesday morning in the living room of his modern dwelling overlooking a spectatular bay jutting into steep coastal mountains. He is stocky but still physically strong and mentally agile. He was immaculately dressed in a dark blue suit. He smoked two long cigars and drank a couple of light scotch whiskeys during the conversation.

Among the points he made were the following:

1. United States-Yugoslav relations were "good, friendly," and he indicated that even the differences over transferring nuclear technology and fuel from the United States to Yugoslavia had been resolved. If so, this is news to American officials here, who insist that Marshal Tito and President Carter still had critical safeguards to discuss on this subject in Washington.

2. He was "worried very much" about

Continued on Page A6, Column 1

Vincent Mentzel

President Tito

At 85, Tito Still Looks to the Future

Continued From Page A1

the disagreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union at the review
conference in Belgrade on the East-West
Helsinki "human rights" question. It was
an important question, he said, but it
should not be made the test of many
other critical world questions of arms
and hunger that had to be resolved.

It was important, he agreed, to re-
solve the war between Ethiopia and
Somalia, and he disclosed for the first
time that he had been deeply involved
with President Carter in trying to find
a political solution before the Ethiopians
reach the Somalia border. For he pointed
out that almost all the new Africa nations
had border disputes with their neighbors,
and if these disputes were to be settled
by military force in the Horn of Africa,
the philosophy of war might spread
throughout the continent.

The situation in the Middle East, he
said, was "even more entangled," and
on this point he was high critical of Presi-
dent Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt for the
first time in public—though it is known
here that he has been saying the same
thing in private during the last few
weeks.

I "President Sadat has not succeeded in his plan," President Tito said. "A dead-lock has occurred there. By visiting Is-rael, he has not succeeded in accomplishing anything, as it seems now. He entertained illusions. True, what he did [in going to Jerusalem] was a very courageous move.

A Question of Succession

"However, when something like this
is undertaken, it is indispensable to as-
sess whether the necessary elements and
realistic prospects exist for success. I do
not think that the way he acted was
a good way, since he had not consulted
any Arab country, and this is wrong.

"Because Syria, and Jordan and the
Palestine Liberation Organization also
fought, and yet he did not inform any
one of them. He did not inform either,
tone of them. He did not inform me either,
though we are friends. Otherwise, I
would have told him not to act so, since
in that way he cannot succeed."

President Tito was asked to consider
the fact that he had started many things
in Yugoslavia that could not possibly be
achieved in anybody's lifetime, or even
at the close of this century, so what re-

sponsibility did he feel to prepare for
his succession?

This produced a gasp from his press
counselor and his interpreter, the only
other persons in the room, but he faced
the question of death as a responsible
and inevitable problem, and addressed it
with complete composure.

"We have established the Presidency,"
he said, "so that we may insure ourselves
against trouble even when I no longer
hold that post. ... We are doing all we
can so that nothing will change. ... We
have today a new organization of au-
thority, from top to bottom. ... Our over-
all system is directed toward the
strengthening of the unity of our country.
All our republics and autonomous prov-
inces have their own rights within the
framework of the federation."

Written Replies to Written Questions

President Tito dealt with this same
question in written replies to written
questions requested by him before the
interview.

He replied that nobody should be con-
cerned about Yugoslavia's departing in
the future from its policy of independ-
ence and detachment from any political
 bloc.

"It is forgotten," he said, "that Yugo-
slavia has never belonged to any bloc.
Our revolution was from the very begin-
ning authentic, and no changes are apt
to bring into question our basic orienta-
tion. . . . Those who are well-intentioned
in posing such questions have no cause
for concern."

He was asked about a speech he made
last December suggesting that the Yugo-
slav Army would be the force for unity
and continuity in the country after he
was gone. He replied that the party was
the "ideological-political guiding force,"
and that it was integrated into the army
and the "system of all-people's defense,
which has become law in our country."

Tito Still Looks More to Future

"I would not like you to misinterpret
what I have said about the role of the
army. We do not think that one day the
army could take up the administration
of the state into its hands. It has nothing
to do with that. The army is the force
which is called upon to defend the coun-
try and only in this sense is it the most
important factor."

One of the most interesting aspects
of this interview was that Marshal Tito
seemed to be more excited about the fu-
ture than about the past. He pulled him-

▲5

C

# Excerpts From Transcript

Special to The New York Times

IGALO, Yugoslavia, March 2—Following are excerpts from the transcript of an interview with President Tito as his new winter home here, south of Dubrovnik. He was questioned by James Reston of The New York Times. The others present were Blazo Mandic, press counselor to Marshal Tito, and Llana Ocokljic, his official interpreter.

Q. There are two questions which may seem rather sensitive. You have started many things that cannot be possibly concluded in a lifetime and therefore, first, I ask, what responsibility do you feel to the state to prepare for your succession? And, second, what was the meaning of your statement in December about the army being the force for unity and for continuity in Yugoslavia?

A. We have always stressed that the Communist Party is the ideological-political guiding force. And communists are in the army as well, in a high percentage, especially among the leaders. Almost all the leaders are Communists. When we speak about the army, we are not thinking about the regular army only, but about all the people which is encompassed by the system of all people's defense, which has become law in our country, covers several millions of persons.

I would not like you to misinterpret what I have said about the role of our army. We do not think that one day the army could take up the administration of the state into its hands. It has nothing to do with that. The army is the force which is called upon to defend the country and only in this sense it is the most important factor.

You have also asked the question what is being done to insure the continuity of the policy which I have been pursuing as the head of our country. We are doing all we can so that nothing will change in this respect. As it is known, we have today a new organization of authority, from the top to the bottom. Today there exists the presidency of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia as a collective president, which is headed by myself. The presidency has already assumed many of my duties because

there are so many things that should be done. And I am also the president of the League of Communists and the supreme commander. I must also deal with foreign policy and questions relating to our internal development. It is for these reasons that we have established the presidency, so that we may insure ourselves against trouble even when I no longer hold that post.

The same is true, as I have already said, with regards to the question of all people's defense. Within the framework of the all-people's defense and within our available possibilities, the people are constantly being armed. This is not only on paper—this is in reality. In our country, for example, even factories have been procuring aircraft guns and other weapons for possible defense.

Our overall system is directed toward the strengthening of the unity of our country. All our republics and autonomous provinces have their own rights within the framework of the federation. Actually, this is nothing new. Already before the war we placed the national question into the foreground, stressing that it must be solved in such a way that each nation should have the right to decide its own fate and its own course of development. All questions, including the controversial ones, are today solved through agreement and accommodation of views. This perhaps takes more time occasionally, but what is essential is that problems are resolved in a correct and democratic manner.

## Impressions of American Change

Q. As you can see, America is in a course of great changes. In my lifetime there has never been a period when all the relationships of human life in the United States were so under such serious scrutiny and analysis: whether the relations of husband and wife, parents and children, the state to the citizen, the manager to the worker, the priest to the parishioner, the teacher to the student. Therefore, people will want to know what you think about America as you have seen her change? Do you see her as a capitalist country unreconstructed, or do you see her as a revolutionary country?

A. It is difficult to speak about this

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Checklist for Your Visit to Yugoslavia

**US Objectives:** Convince Tito and his lieutenants that **lasting improvement in political relations requires avoidance of contentious criticism** of US positions on key international issues. Gain a **clearer appreciation of current situation and prospects for post-Tito era** by establishing personal relationships with Kardelj and other persons likely to play important roles on Tito's demise.

**US-Yugoslav Political Relations:** Stress that **US is ready to improve relations but** that **fundamental progress will hinge on avoidance of verbal attacks** on each other's policies. We continue to consider Yugoslavia's independence, integrity and economic well-being as key factors for peace and stability in Europe. **Principles enunciated in October 1971**
**Joint Statement remain valid.**

**Military Sales:** **EUR, PM and DOD believe suspension of closer military contacts** which has been in effect since Yom Kippur War **should now be lifted.** Assistant Secretary Ellsworth **is prepared to visit Yugoslavia** November 15-16 for exploratory talks on military contacts **if you so recommend.** You may wish, depending on success of your talks, to tell Minic we are prepared to discuss closer military relations including cash sales of selected classified military items of a defensive nature.

**Bijedic Visit:** Premier Bijedic, who has had outstanding invitation to visit US since July 1972, may anticipate some word on whether a visit in 1975 is a possibility. You may wish to tell him you will look into possibility of arranging a visit for late 1975.

**Response to Tito-Ford Letters:** Tell Tito that **response to his letter inviting the President to visit Yugoslavia is pending.** If talks go well, you may wish to indicate that you will recommend that President visit sometime in late 1975.

SECRET/EXDIS

(GDS)

SECRET/EXDIS

- 2 -

**Economic Relations:** Stress our support for continued expansion of US-Yugoslav trade. Express satisfaction that current version of the trade bill permits consideration of Yugoslav eligibility for generalized tariff preferences.

**Cyprus:** Note that although our views on the genesis of the crisis may differ, our outlooks on the elements necessary for a solution--negotiated settlement preserving Cyprus' independence and guaranteeing rights of both communities--are similar.

**Middle East:** Outline US objectives in Middle East and give your assessment of prospects for further progress in negotiations.

**US-Soviet Relations:** Give your assessment of East-West relations, including SALT, MBFR and CSCE, in light of your talks in Moscow.

**World Food Conference:** Explain US objectives, i.e. establishment of food reserve system and improvement of food aid coordination, and urge constructive Yugoslav role with the non-aligned.

Department of State

October 1974

SECRET/EXDIS

BELGRADE

November 4

CHECKLIST:

Bilateral Military:

-- We are prepared to discuss closer military relations including sales of selected classified items.

-- DOD Assistant Secretary Ellsworth is prepared to visit later in month to discuss this issue.

Bilateral Economic:

-- The US supports the continued expansion of trade.

-- The US continues to seek to foster equity investment on part of US firms.

CSCE:

-- We appreciate the constructive Yugoslav role in CSCE.

-- US will continue to work for realistic agreements on CBMs.

-- We support the Danish suggestion on follow-up, but will study all proposals.

-- We support the Italian draft on the Mediterranean and cannot accept extension of CBMs to the Mediterranean.

-- We wish to limit military security to prior notification of military maneuvers and observer exchanges.

-- We assume results will justify a meeting at the highest level, but will base decision on results.

US-Soviet Relations, Detente:

-- We do not discuss Yugoslavia with Soviets.

-- Re MBFR, we will not allow agreement to diminish security of nations on flanks of reduction area.

Relations with Neighbors:

(A) Trieste/Zone B

-- We are not involved in dispute, and hope it will be resolved constructively.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

SCENARIO FOR MEETING AND
LUNCHEON WITH PRESIDENT TITO
12:30 - 3:30 p.m., and
DEPARTURE at 4:00 p.m.

12:25 p.m.: Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger depart for White Palace in Car A, with Ambassador Ruzic.

12:30 p.m.: Arrive White Palace accompanied by Ambassador and Mrs. Toon, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, Mr. Hartman, and Chief of Protocol Ruzic. Party will be greeted by Mirko Milutinovic, Chief of Protocol for the President, who will introduce the Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger to President and Madame Broz.

12:30 - 2:00 p.m.: Secretary's meeting with President Josip Broz Tito (photo opportunity at 12:30; press will be let in again at 1:30 when Tito will take questions for 5-10 minutes).

Yugoslavian Participants

Edward Kardelj (Member of the State Presidency of the League of Communists)

Foreign Secretary Minic

Ambassador Granfil

Deputy Secretary Mojsov

North American Director
Starcevic

Mrs. Tambaca, interpreter

2:00 - 3:30 p.m.: Private luncheon with President Tito.

Yugoslavian Guests

President and Mrs. Tito

Premier and Madame Bijedic

Mr. and Mrs. Edward Kardelj

Foreign Secretary and Mrs. Minic

US Participants

The Secretary

Ambassador Toon

Counselor Sonnenfeldt

Assistant Secretary Hartman

US Guests

Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger

Ambassador and Mrs. Toon

Mr. Sonnenfeldt

Mr. Hartman

- 2 -

Mr. and Mrs.

Amb. and Mrs. Granfil
Deputy Secretary Mojsov
State Presidency Member
Peter Stambolic and Mrs. Stambolic
LCY (Party) Executive Committee
Secretary, Steve Dolanc

Counselor to the President for
Foreign Policy Questions, Jelko Blazevic
Chief of Protocol Mirko Milutinovic
State Presidency Member Vladimir
Bakaric (health permitting)

Two Interpreters

3:30 - 3:35 p.m.: Motorcade forms for departure for the airport. Secretary Kissinger will be accompanied by Foreign Secretary Minic and an interpreter.

3:50 p.m.: Arrive at airport. Departure ceremony. With minor exceptions, those present to greet Secretary on his arrival will be at the airport to bid farewell. In addition, and first in line, will be Italian Ambassador G. Walker Maccotta. The Yugoslav party will be in ascending order of importance with Ambassador and Mrs. Toon placed just before the Foreign Secretary and Mrs. Minic. Flowers will be presented to Mrs. Kissinger by children just before Secretary and Mrs. Minic say goodbye.

4:00 p.m.: Plane departs for Rome.