07-10-95 12:16PM

TO KENT

P015

14

relate seemingly disparate events to each other; pictures,
on the other hand, teach by impressions which emphasize the
mood of a moment. All this foreshortens the policy
perspective and makes it more vulnerable to fluctuating
sentiments and transitory occurrences.

These factors have shaped the argument between the
advocates of a national interest-based philosophy and the
so-called multilateralists. The first point of view states
that America should base its foreign policy on a clear
perception of the national interest, evoking some of the
resistances I have sketched earlier. ~~Those~~ of us who
embrace this proposition do not interpret the national
~~the outcome versus~~ described above~~ the interest in a ~~purely selfish manner~~ it ~~They~~ would argue that
the national interest, properly understood, has to encompass
the relevance of our values to other societies; indeed, that
forming an international consensus was part of America's
interest. But we would also insist that objectives

07-10-95 12:16PM

TO KENT

P016

15

essential for American security or American values should be pursued alone, if necessary. While we would prefer some international support, in the extreme, we would be prepared to act alone.

The opposing point of view considers the American role in the Cold War to have been presumptuous, excessive, and even potentially evil, and seeks to discipline American power by reining it in through international institutions.

Though its proponents now present themselves as internationalists, they generally derive America's international role on a multilateral consensus.

Emphasis on multilateral diplomacy was one of President Clinton's campaign themes; Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, in May 1993, insisted that America was losing the capacity to act alone while UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright has described administration policy as "assertive multilateralism." The implication of such statements is

07-10-95 12:16PM

TO KENT

P017

16

that the national interest is on the whole defined by the attainable global consensus. "If you believe we should deal with these problems in a multilateral way," proclaimed the President, "the United States has got to work through the United Nations, and all of our views may not always prevail."

The trouble is that excessive reliance on passive a view of foreign policy tends to produce stagnation. Multilateral diplomacy is proving starkly at variance with the realities of ethnic conflict, rampant nationalism and the emergence of multiple centers of power sketched earlier. In this fragmented world, excessive multilateralism leads either to abdication (as in Bosnia) or to sacrifices not tolerated by the American public because they are not perceived to reflect basic US interests (as in Somalia).

To be sure, only extreme and unrealistic isolationism could categorize the national interest and international

07-10-95 12:16PM

TO KENT

P018

17

consensus as polar opposites. In the real world, the
difference is one of nuance: whether to start with the
national interest and exercise American leadership to shape
multilateral views; or whether the definition of the
national interest should be made dependent on the acceptance
of a multilateral consensus. Yet on this very nuance
depends the possibility of a dynamic American foreign
policy.

Let me now apply these principles to two foreign policy
areas: Europe and Asia. There are many other policy areas,
such as the Western Hemisphere, nuclear proliferation or the
Middle East. Given the limitations of time, I shall deal
with these areas on another occasion as it is in Europe and
Asia that our foreign policy seems to me in deepest trouble.

07-10-95 12:16PM

TO KENT

P019

18

US European Policy

For over a generation, the Atlantic Alliance has been
the bedrock of American foreign policy, uniting the oldest
functioning democracies with genuinely pluralistic systems
and economies based on the market. In the end, the nations
of the Atlantic area need each other in their own self-
interest. Without America, Europe turns into a peninsula at
the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium much less
unity and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar
to that of ancient Greece in relation to Rome--the only
outstanding question being whether America or Russia will
play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America will become
an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of
pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its
true nature.

Without Europe, America's path will be
precarious and lonely; after all, we fought two world wars
to prevent the domination of Europe by potentially hostile