PEACETIME DEFENSE SPENDING

A NEW NATIONAL debate is developing over the prom-
ise or peril of detente with Russia as it relates to this
country's nuclear arsenal. The debate is being brought to
public view by a new defense budget and a new secretary of
defense, James R. Schlesinger. He is challenging decade-old
assumptions about the adequacy of America's nuclear deter-
rent—even the prevailing concept of how to achieve deterrence.

The defense budget for fiscal 1975, beginning this July 1,
presents the highest spending request ($85.8 billion) that
Congress has ever received, either in time of war or peace.
While many defense items other than nuclear weaponry
account for the added costs, the new budget does represent
Schlesinger's views. He contends that while this country
was spending billions of dollars fighting a war in Vietnam,
Russia was undertaking an intensive weapons development
program which lessened and in some instances overcame
America's strategic superiority. He also points to a stream of
sophisticated Soviet arms supplied to the Arabs during their
war with Israel last October and speaks of a Russian naval
buildup in the Indian Ocean. There can be no detente, he
insists, unless this country maintains at least a military "equil-
ibrium" with the Soviet Union.

Schlesinger has repeatedly stressed this view in testimony
before Congress on the new budget. "We must continue to
build our peace structure on the hard facts of the international
environment rather than on gossamer hopes for the instant
perfectibility of mankind," he told the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee Feb. 5. Schlesinger, as a proponent of the
so-called "hard line," is often contrasted with Secretary of
State Henry A. Kissinger, who has been the Nixon ad-
ministration's principal architect of detente with Russia.¹

Those who try to gauge the mood of Congress and the nation
perceive a weakening of detente because of the Soviet mili-
tary buildup, an apparent lack of progress in Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT II) and Russia's exile of Alexander
Solzhenitsyn. The Solzhenitsyn drama aroused the Ameri-

¹ Schlesinger, a former classmate of Kissinger's at Harvard, was a defense expert at the Rand Corporation and the federal Budget Bureau. In the Nixon administration, he served as head of the Atomic Energy Commission and Central Intelligence Agency before he became secretary of defense on July 2, 1973.

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can people and, according to columnist George F. Will, "Anti-communism is becoming respectable again."² These occurrences, together with an economic slowdown at home, have led to widespread belief in Washington that Congress will cut the new requests for defense spending only minimally, if at all.³

## Record-High Requests in New Defense Budget

The $85.8 billion spending requests,⁴ if granted, would top the previous peak of $81.6 billion that was spent in 1945 at the close of World War II. But Defense Comptroller Terrence E. McClary told newsmen on Feb. 2 that 1945 military spending expressed in 1975 dollars would amount to more than $300 billion. The Pentagon maintains that the military share of total federal spending was being reduced from 27.9 per cent in fiscal year 1974, which ends June 30, to 27.2 under the new budget. Defense outlays were portrayed as representing less than 6 per cent of the gross national product (GNP), in contrast to 8.3 per cent in 1964, the last year before the American military buildup began in Vietnam.

Schlesinger told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the $5.5 billion increase in the new defense budget over the last one "is wholly consumed by pay and price increases." And he told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that the defense budget would climb to $100 billion in three years just to keep military forces at this year's level of strength. The Pentagon's increase-only-to-cover-inflation argument has been questioned by several groups. The National League of Cities-U.S. Conference of Mayors argued in a study it issued Feb. 9: "The military budget is up 9.3 per cent in real terms. This means that military programs are being expanded at a much greater rate than is necessary to allow for inflation, pay increases and fuel price rises."

A staff study by the congressional Joint Economic Committee's Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government accused the Pentagon of juggling figures "to show a leveling off of defense spending when in fact it is increasing sharply, far beyond the rate of inflation." Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.), the subcommittee chairman and a leading critic of high defense spending, contends that after allowing for inflation, the proposed budget includes an 8 per cent in-

² Column appearing in *The Washington Post*, Feb. 19, 1974. Will is Washington editor of *National Review* magazine.

³ See "Defense Outlook: Estimates Point to Moderate Cuts," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, March 23, 1974, pp. 735-740.

⁴ The Defense Department asked for a total obligational authority (TOA) of $92.6 billion, of which $85.8 billion would be spent in the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974.

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crease over the preceding year. Proxmire, among others, has
charged that a $6.2 billion supplemental request for 1974 was
used to conceal the size of the increase in the 1975 budget.

## Impact of Middle East War on Military Spending

In his budget message to Congress, President Nixon asked for an increase of $2.8 billion—part of the $6.2 billion supplemental request for 1974—"to improve combat readiness and modernize forces, to augment munitions stock levels in accordance with lessons learned in the Middle East war and to meet higher fuel costs." Schlesinger, in the annual defense "posture statement" on March 4, said: "We learned...from the Middle East crisis that the readiness and level of modernization of our forces were not wholly adequate. With the support of the Congress, we are taking steps to correct this...We found our dependence on airlift heightened. We need to increase that capability."

"The October war shattered the illusion that detente with the Soviet Union...had actually been achieved," Eugene V. Rostow, a former undersecretary of state (1966-68), wrote in the February 1974 issue of *Commentary*. "There is no detente. The Soviet Union continues to build up its armaments in every category on a scale that has no parallel in modern history." *Time* magazine asked on Feb. 11: "Is the U.S. falling behind the Soviet Union militarily?" It noted that the Russian armed forces are larger and often equipped with newer weapons.

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The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its year-
ly appraisal of world military strength, *The Military Balance:
1973-1974*, reported Soviet gains in strategic arms.

Question of Russian Strategic Arms Development

President Nixon's signing of the original SALT agreements in Moscow, May 26, 1972, was widely heralded as the first major step toward detente and an end to a quarter-century of Cold War. It committed the United States and the Soviet Union to ban the deployment of defensive anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), except for two sites apiece. There was also an interim agreement to freeze the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for five years. Upon his return from Moscow, Nixon said in an address to Congress that the agreements he had signed there "forestall a major spiralling of the arms race." At the same time, he pledged that the United States would remain the strongest power on earth.

By the time the latest defense budget was sent to Con-
gress, the administration's accent was on the need to maintain
America's strategic position. "The Soviet Union continues to
pursue an aggressive program to develop new military weap-
ons," President Nixon told Congress in his budget message.
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Feb.
5, that the Soviet Union had generated a momentum in of-
fensive weaponry that could upset the present "equilibrium"
if the SALT II negotiations failed or if the United States did not
continue research and development (R&D) programs. De-
fense officials stress the need for new weapons to be used as
bargaining chips in the SALT II talks. These talks on limiting
strategic offensive arms resumed in February in Geneva.

Pentagon spokesmen picture the Soviet Union as spending twice as much as this country on weapons research and development. To bolster the American effort, the administration is requesting $8.4 billion for R&D funding—a $1.4 billion increase—for a host of strategic weapons "initiatives," including advanced land-based ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, "cruise" missiles to be launched by plane or submarines, and nuclear warheads. "Because the time required for development and deployment of major weapons systems is long, decisions made today will shape the ability of the United States to maintain its strength five to 10 years from now," the President said in his budget message. While $8.4 billion represents less than 10 per cent of the defense budget, once production and deployment begin the costs could multiply.

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## Peacetime Defense Spending

For strategic offensive weapons (bombers and land- and sea-based missiles) and their defensive counterparts (air and ballistic-missile defenses and early warning systems) the Defense Department asked for $7.6 billion, $700 million more than in fiscal 1974. This sum excludes an Atomic Energy Commission request for $1.5 billion for nuclear warheads, military reactors and weapons testing. The Navy's Trident missile submarine, which is to be the backbone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force and successor to the Polaris-Poseidon, is budgeted for $2.1 billion. The Navy originally wanted to start building three Trident submarines in fiscal 1975 but Congress in 1973 limited the funding to one. The new budget seeks to raise the figure to two.

Foes of the spending proposals focus on four arguments: (1) that many of the new weapons might encourage the Soviet Union to speed up its weapons programs rather than spur arms-limitation negotiations; (2) that some of the weapons are not needed,⁵ (3) that considerable money could be saved if the Pentagon slowed down its arms procurement and eliminated large cost overruns that have characterized many weapons programs; and (4) that many weapons are either poorly constructed or obsolete by the time they are ready for use.

## Pay and Related Costs for All-Volunteer Force

Despite their growing cost, weapons take considerably less of the defense budget than does manpower. Civilian and military personnel now account for 56 per cent of the budget, compared to 42 per cent in 1968. During that time, moreover, there has been more than a one-third reduction in troop strength—from 3.5 million to 2.2 million—and a 20 per cent cutback in civilian employees. In contrast, it is estimated that the Soviet Union, with 3.4 million men in its armed forces, spends only 25 per cent of its defense funds on manpower.

Rising personnel costs are a result of pay increases, higher retirement pay and bonuses offered to volunteers. Since 1968, the serviceman's average annual pay has doubled, from $5,500 to $11,000—$12,500, if benefits are included. Congress in 1967 required that military pay increases keep pace with those given to government civilian workers. A study conducted by the Congressional Research Service and released by Rep. Les Aspin (D Wis.) on Sept. 16, 1973, indicated that they had more than kept pace. "Average military pay and benefits are

⁵ For example, *The Defense Monitor* newsletter, published by the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, contended in its Sept. 1, 1973, issue that the Trident would be a wholly unnecessary expense, would not add significantly to the defense of the United States, could threaten the existing arms agreements with the Soviet Union and would further the arms race.

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## Peacetime Defense Spending

In 1973 issue of *Fortune*. "Including rear-echelon personnel, it took 18,500 men ten years ago to staff, train, supply and maintain an army division; today the number is 26,500." Promotions to high rank and retirement benefits also contribute to higher costs. Because of what the military refers to as "grade creep," there is now one four-star general for every 20,-000 men in the army, compared with one for every 145,000 in 1950. Former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford pointed out in the January-February 1974 issue of *Center* magazine: "Twenty-five years ago, the Army had seven recruits for each sergeant; today there are more sergeants than recruits.... With a total defense establishment of 315,000 men less than in 1948, we now have 26,000 more captains, 31,000 more majors, 15,000 more lieutenants colonels and 4,000 more colonels."

"Grade creep," in turn, contributes to higher retirement costs. Retirement accounts for about $5.5 billion, or 6 per cent of the new defense budget. In the past ten years, the number of military retirees has doubled while the amount of money they receive has quadrupled. While would-be cost cutters have been advocating manpower reductions, particularly among civilian employees of the military services,⁶ there is little likelihood of lower personnel expenditures as long as an all-volunteer Army is retained. Before and after drafting ceased in 1973, fears were expressed that the armed services would become a mercenary force filled with the poor, the uneducated and the maladjusted. Far less attention was paid to cost problems.

In a study of the 1974 federal budget, *Setting National Priorities*, the Brookings Institution reported that an all-volunteer service would cost about $3 billion a year for incentive pay raises, bonuses and special recruiting programs.⁷ Not included were the costs of improvements in the military standard of living and in military and personnel policies. The General Accounting Office has estimated that these improvements may have increased military costs by $1 billion a year.

Despite efforts to attract volunteers, all the services except the Air Force have fallen short of their 1974 recruiting goals. By February, the Army was about 20,000 men and women short, the Navy 12,000, and the Marines 6,000. The Air Force, in contrast, had recruited about 250 more volunteers than it needed. Pentagon spokesmen insist that enlistments have risen

⁶ In fiscal 1974, they numbered 1,013,000 and were expected to receive more than $12 billion. Their average pay was $14,500.

⁷ Bonuses include up to $2,500 for four-year enlistments in combat "arms" and $15,-000 for physicians who volunteer for military service.

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in the past few months and that, overall, the four services have become stronger and more efficient under the voluntary system.⁸

Nevertheless, existing shortages have moved some critics, both civilian and military, to call for better inducements or a return to the draft. Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D La.), chairman of the House Armed Services Commitee, predicted on March 27 that the all-volunteer Army "will be a complete flop...Within three years, we'll have a peacetime draft." But few congressmen relish the politically unpopular idea of voting for a reinstatement of the draft. Faced with the increasing cost of the volunteer forces, they might be tempted to accept the explanation given by Assistant Secretary William Brehm at a news conference on Feb. 15, 1974. He said the Defense Department estimated that it would save about $500 million a year in manpower training costs by 1977 because recruits are signing up for longer tours of duty than they did before the draft ended.

## Growth of The Defense Establishment

UNTIL THE PAST quarter-century, American defense spending was kept low except during wartime. This was due to the nation's isolation and, in part, to an abiding distrust of the military. The Continental Congress disbanded George Washington's army at the close of the Revolutionary War in 1783, declaring that "standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican government, dangerous to the liberties of a free people and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." Thus upon becoming President, Washington had only the state militia to call on to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania in 1794. That uprising of frontiersmen over a tax on their whiskey sales frightened the new federal government into recognizing the need for a standing army—even though for a century or more the peacetime army rarely numbered more than a few thousand men.

Even in the 1930s the defense budget amounted to only about $900 million, equivalent to about $7 billion at today's prices and wage scales. This sum financed a powerful navy, a small air force and ground forces that amounted to little more than

⁸ See Report of the Secretary of the Army to the President, "The Volunteer Army—One Year Later," Feb. 11, 1974.

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## Peacetime Defense Spending

a nucleus for mobilization. Fewer than 300,000 men were in uniform and 150,000 civilians were employed by defense agencies—about one-seventh of the present totals. “As a whole, the U.S. defense posture of that time reflected disillusion, in the aftermath of World War I, about America’s capacity to influence events in Europe and the wisdom of doing so.”⁹ One cause of disillusionment was revelation of profiteering by steel, oil and gas companies on defense contracts during the war. During the 1930s these abuses were given wide publicity by Sen. Gerald P. Nye (R N.D.) and his committee which began investigating the “munitions lobby in 1935.

World War II changed American thinking about national security. At its outset in 1939, the nation's military establishment consisted of active duty forces totaling 335,000 with a budget of little more than $1 billion. On the eve of victory six years later, almost four years after Pearl Harbor, more than 12 million Americans were in uniform and the military budget had surpassed $80 billion. The big army demobilized promptly but American thinking was far different than it had been after World War I. Few leaders thought seriously of once more relying upon the country's geographical isolation as a substitute for preparedness. The emergence of air power coupled with the atomic bomb had demolished for all time the notion that America might safely stand apart in another general war.

## Global Commitments Arising From the Cold War

Since the end of World War II, Congress has appropriated well over a trillion dollars for defense. One key to the Pentagon's success in obtaining funds was its close relationship with the powerful military committees in Congress—the armed services committees and defense appropriations subcommittees in the House and Senate. It was a relationship based both on common ideological ties and on the “pork barrel,” the immense political clout that went into decisions on where to locate military bases and assign lucrative defense contracts.

Even more important was the Cold War. Suspicions about Soviet intentions in Europe arose soon after World War II and by 1947 this country was committed to a global policy of “containing” communism. As long as the United States retained its monopoly on nuclear weapons, fear of the Soviet threat was relatively limited. But Russia's detonation of an A-bomb in 1949 brought demands for greatly expanded weapons spending. Responding to these demands, President Truman announced Jan. 30, 1950, that he had directed the Atomic

⁹ Edward R. Fried et al., *Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget* (Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 336.

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Energy Commission to work on "all kinds of atomic weapons, including the so-called super bomb."

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 spurred the arms race and greatly increased defense spending. The United States tested its first hydrogen bomb on Nov. 1, 1952. Ten months later, Radio Moscow announced that the Soviet Union had done the same. The arms race escalated with each action and reaction. Robert S. McNamara has described an instance of needless escalation when he was Secretary of Defense (1961-67). The new Kennedy administration ordered a strong buildup of intercontinental missiles to counter what it perceived to be a "missile gap"-an issue on which Kennedy campaigned in his 1960 presidential race against Nixon. The "gap" did not exist, it was later learned, but McNamara said in a speech long after the event that he felt justified in ordering a buildup because the Russians had the capability for a superior missile force and "might have been planning" to use it. As it turned out, they did not begin a buildup until after the United States did. Despite the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and improved relations between the two superpowers, defense spending continued to rise.

## Effect of Changing Strategic Doctrine on Spending

For a quarter of a century, U.S. strategic doctrine has been based on the Cold War premise that the Soviet Union was America's enemy and that survival depended upon a strong defense. The basic strategy of deterrence¹⁰ has undergone a number of modifications, however, as the relationship between the two superpowers has alternately warmed and cooled. These modifications, in turn, have affected the level of defense spending.

During most of the Eisenhower administration, deterrence was based on the doctrine of massive retaliation. This concept was outlined by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 13, 1954. "We want for ourselves and for others a maximum deterrent at bearable costs," Dulles said. In an analysis of the new strategy, Edgar M. Bottome wrote: "In order to secure the two goals of security and solvency, the Eisenhower administration initially adopted a dual posture....Strategically, the policy of threatened massive retaliation emerged to deter Soviet aggression. On the tactical level, especially

¹⁰ Deterrence depends on what strategists call "credibility." This means that a nuclear power must convince its opponent that it has not only the ability but the will and determination to deliver a devastating strike if attacked or intolerably threatened. See "Nuclear Balance of Terror: 25 Years after Alamogordo," E.R.R., 1970 Vol. II, pp. 485-506.

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## McNamara and Defense Management

Robert S. McNamara, upon becoming secretary of defense in 1961, sought to exert strong central—and civilian—control over defense planning and spending. He recruited from private business a group of bright young analysts, who became known to their detractors in the Pentagon as the "Whiz Kids."

There are arguments to this day as to whether McNamara's "systems analysis" approach to the defense budget really worked—and if so, whether it was for the better or worse. Those who have examined his record and chronicled his achievements and failures tend to give him high marks for bringing some order to defense spending, especially in the field of missile development. At the time he took office, the Air Force had no fewer than three competitive ICBM's, while the Army and Navy had their own rival projects going.

On the other hand, McNamara has been faulted for refusal to heed military advice in his desire to bring economy to the defense establishment. The most notable case was the TFX fiasco. He sought, over Navy opposition, to build a fighter-bomber that both the Air Force and Navy could use. So many problems developed in the aircraft that Congress finally killed the project in 1968.

in Western Europe, it was felt that should deterrence fail, the United States would have the option of conducting tactical nuclear war rather than being forced to choose between capitulation or all-out war...."¹¹

The doctrine of massive retaliation did permit some reduction in defense spending. But the strategy was not designed to cope with insurgency, such as had occurred in Indochina, Algeria and Cuba. Soon after taking office, President Kennedy signaled a shift in military policy with the declaration that "we intend to have a wider choice than humiliation or all-out nuclear action." The new strategy, known as flexible response, had been recommended in the late 1950s by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who became a Kennedy adviser. Despite the best cost-control efforts of McNamara and his Pentagon "Whiz Kids" with their systems analyses (see box, above), the flexible response doctrine contributed to a $10 billion increase in defense spending between 1961 and 1964.

Commenting on flexible response and the men who propa-
gated it, Seymour Melman wrote: "These men were evidently
captured by the prospect of wielding political decision-power

¹¹ Edgar M. Bottome, *The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race* (1971), pp. 21-22.

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by applying America's technical brains and industrial capacity toward forging a super military machine.... So they escalated the nuclear overkill forces, created the 'Green Berets' to fight guerrillas, enlarged the Army to 18 divisions and lavished money, manpower and industrial might on the military without stint."¹²

Flexible response was based on a strategy that McNamara called "mutual assured destruction," or MAD for short. The strategy assumed that the Kremlin would be deterred from launching a surprise attack on the United States if this country had its offensive missiles sufficiently protected to survive that attack and still inflict great damage on Russia. This "second strike" capability required that American ICBMs be placed in underground "silos" and submarines. The Nixon administration has been dissatisfied with "mutual assured destruction" and Schlesinger, especially, has been pushing for a new strategic policy (see p. 17).

## Vietnam War and the 'Military-Industrial Complex'

Rising defense budgets in the 1960s drew little unified opposition until late in the decade when the Vietnam War became increasingly unpopular.¹³ During that time, Congress tended to provide almost everything the military wanted—sometimes over McNamara's objections. As public support for the war evaporated, the phrase "military-industrial complex" became a rallying cry for war protesters who felt that they detected collusion between the Pentagon and the nation's defense industries. Defense planners were put on the defensive and increasingly they sought to justify their proposals in terms of new Soviet threats and—in 1974—on the additional ground of unemployment.¹⁴

A major focal point of the defense controversy in the late 1960s was the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which if fully deployed would probably have been the most expensive weapons program ever undertaken by any nation. McNamara opposed ABM deployment as too costly, possibly ineffective and certain to provoke escalation of the arms race. But under White House orders, McNamara announced late in 1967 that

¹² Seymour Melman, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (1970), p. 206.

¹³ Defense costs attributed solely to the war increased from $100 million in fiscal 1965 to a peak of $29.2 billion in fiscal 1969.

¹⁴ Schlesinger told the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense on Feb. 26, 1974, that the White House Office of Management and Budget permitted an increase of $1 billion to $1.5 billion in the fiscal 1975 defense budget because of an expected "easing of the economy and some growth in unemployment." Rep. George H. Mahon (D Texas), the subcommittee chairman, later estimated that the figure was close to $5 billion.

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work on the Washington site pending development of a comprehensive site plan. Approval of the ABM system marked a break with the McNamara argument that it would be too costly—and perhaps useless—to try to intercept a nuclear attack. The only effective strategy, in his mind, was deterrence through the ability to strike back. But even deterrence has required tens of billions of dollars.

> "The need for options other than suicide or surrender, and other than escalation to all-out war, is more important for us today than it was in 1960..."

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger

> "...Counterforce strategies always turn out to require, or at least justify, many more and generally larger weapons..."

Herbert F. York, former Defense official

Cost estimates of new programs usually prove to be vastly understated, whether because of inflation, mismanagement or unforeseen technical and industrial problems. By the early 1970s, massive overruns or "cost growth"—a term the Pentagon prefers—were in prospect on virtually every new weapons project. One of the most publicized episodes of cost overruns involved the C-5A jet cargo aircraft built by Lockheed. A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a civilian cost-efficiency expert for the Air Force, lost his Pentagon job after telling a congressional committee in 1968 that C-5A contracts would probably cost $2 billion more than Congress intended. Fitzgerald spoke and wrote extensively of waste and mismanagement in defense procurement and eventually was returned, by Civil Service Commission order, to a post in the Defense Department, although not to his old job.

The Defense Department issued a study, *The Economics of Defense Spending*, in July 1972 that disputed charges that the profits on defense work were excessive. "Cost overruns have been grossly misrepresented.... There are few, if any, major areas of public spending that show as little growth from the late 1950s to the spending levels of today.... It is wildly inac-

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## Peacetime Defense Spending

curate to allege that billions or tens of billions could be saved through management improvements. Defense management is simply not that bad."

## Prospects for Cutting Defense Costs

TO MAINTAIN "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union, Schlesinger and kindred defense planners—Director Fred C. Ikle of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is sometimes included—seek to define a new doctrine of deterrence and develop new kinds of forces. Why? "For once, the answer is not the armed services' ever-present hunger for new weapons," according to Edward N. Luttwak, a student of strategic policy.¹⁵ "Nor is Schlesinger's offensive the last twitch of a Nixonian attempt to undo Democratic policies for the sake of undoing them.... For once, then, the doctrinal controversy is really about doctrine.... A growing band of dissenters are acutely dissatisfied with McNamara's orthodoxy, arguing that what started off as a harmless device for setting strategic priorities has become a paralyzing dogma which has crippled strategic innovation...."

Schlesinger is arguing for a deterrent strategy known as "counterforce"—a strategy which McNamara once adopted briefly and then abandoned.¹⁶ Counterforce is based on the premise that in a nuclear war the enemy might not be deterred by weapons that destroyed cities and population—on however vast a scale—if military targets were not knocked out. Thus counterforce involves choosing a new list of targets—and new or refined weapons capable of knocking out those targets.

Critics of the new strategy contend that it might speed up the arms race and encourage either country to strike first. In addition, they argue, it will tend to slow down the negotiations toward arms limitation agreements. On the other hand, Defense Department officials maintain that the Soviet Union already has nuclear counterforce flexibility and that the United States must have the same to maintain "essential equivalence." These officials typically say that since an effective counterforce strategy requires increased spending for strategic weapons, it

¹⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, "Nuclear Strategy: The New Debate," *Commentary*, April 1974, p. 53. Luttwak is the author of books on nuclear strategy and visiting lecturer at the School of International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

¹⁶ See John L. Frisbee, "Counterforce Revisited," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1974, p. 2.

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could encourage the Soviet Union to consider new arms limita-
tion agreements. Without an improvement in the U.S.
strategic position, they argue, this country will have little lever-
age in the SALT II talks.

Evaluation of U.S. and Soviet Weapon Systems

During Soviet Premier Leonid I. Brezhnev's visit to the United
States in June 1973, he and President Nixon committed their
two nations to the objective of signing a strategic arms limita-
tion treaty by the end of 1974. The authors of a Brookings In-
stitution study, *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies*
(1973), noted: "Because the issues are complicated and involve
forces and concepts that are hard to define, the negotiations...
are likely to be long and arduous." Secretary of State Kiss-
singer's failure to reach any agreement on strategic arms limi-
tation with Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev during his visit
to Moscow in late March confirmed the Brookings analysis
and made the prospects for a SALT II accord this year very
doubtful.

On Feb. 19, 1974—the day the SALT II talks resumed—*The Wall Street Journal* editorialized that if the SALT I interim agreement¹⁷ was a valid indication, the shape of SALT II “will be determined by the fate of the research and development proposals the new Pentagon budget puts before Congress.” At SALT I, the *Journal* said, “Soviet negotiators in effect said, either you sign a treaty giving us the advantage, or we will get an even greater advantage by exploiting our head-start in current building programs.... American negotiators face something of a similar position [in SALT II]....”

Major difficulties in the SALT II negotiations center on evalu-
ating and balancing the three types of offensive weapons—
bombers, submarines and land-based ICBMs—and on
methods of verifying any agreement. Joseph J. Kruzel, a former
delegate to the SALT talks, suggested that the United States
“reduce its expectations” and try for “more realistic limited
measures that have some chance of being negotiated.” Among
the possibilities would be a reduction by both sides in the
number of ICBMs by 10 per cent every year for three years and
a limitation on MIRVs.¹⁸ The Multiple Independently

¹⁷ The agreement, which expires in 1977, established land-based intercontinental ballistic missile ceilings of 1,054 for the U.S. and 1,410 for the Soviet Union and sea-launched missile ceilings on 710 for the U.S. and 950 for the U.S.S.R. The agreement did not cover bombers.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, Feb. 11, 1974. Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), in a Senate speech on Dec. 4, 1973, proposed that “we invite the Soviets to consider a SALT II agreement in which each side is limited to 800 ICBMs and no more than 500 submarine-launched missiles. Long-range strategic bombers would also be limited to 400 on each side.”

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## Peacetime Defense Spending

Targeted Reentry Vehicle enables a rocket to carry several warheads, each aimed at separate targets. Of difficulty in reaching an agreement on limiting MIRVs is the inability to detect, by aerial surveillance, missiles that have been equipped with multiple warheads.

If adequate inspection and verification methods could be found, some observers, including the Federation of American Scientists and analysts at the Brookings Institution, have suggested that both sides abandon land-based missile systems completely. A number of experts, among them Fred C. Ikle, are not opposed to unilateral American abandonment of land-based missiles. *Time* magazine noted that "such a change would save billions of dollars and still leave the U.S. its missile-firing submarines and nuclear bombers. But Pentagon strategists point out that bombers can be shot down and that eventually submarines may also become vulnerable. They prefer to complicate the Russian offensive problems by relying on the present triad nuclear force."

## Debate Over Troop Withdrawals and Manpower

The strategy debate bears on America's relations with its European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Since America's "nuclear umbrella" is their ultimate protection from Russia, the "credibility" of the American nuclear force is of overriding concern to them. The NATO alliance is currently in a state of disarray¹⁹ and a major issue involves the prospect of some American troop withdrawals from Europe as a cost-saving measure. So far, the Nixon administration has been successful in blocking congressional attempts to reduce U.S. forces in Europe—currently about 300,000 men—and their dependents, arguing that it would undermine the American position at talks in Geneva aimed at reducing forces maintained in Central Europe by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

By some estimates $30 billion or more is spent yearly to maintain 500,000 U.S. servicemen in other countries, 100,000 on fleet duty far from American shores, 360,000 dependents of the foreign-based U.S. personnel, and some 200,000 foreigners who are employed at American bases abroad. The Defense Department insists that conventional forces have been cut as much as possible and that further reductions would be dangerous.

¹⁹ See "Faltering NATO Alliance," E.R.R., 1974 Vol. I. pp. 221-240.

19

Editorial Research Reports

April 12, 1974

Responding to current criticism of waste, the Pentagon announced plans in February 1974 to abolish seven Army headquarters around the world. In an interview published in *U.S. News & World Report* on Feb. 25, Air Force Chief of Staff George S. Brown said: "We are reducing our officer strength. We need legislation to reduce senior officers...to reimburse them for that amended contract. That's not a lot of money, and Congress will probably do it. If it does, we are prepared to retire some colonels and lieutenant colonels."

Another target for cost cutting is the civilian payroll. Civilian defense employees now cost the nation $12.8 billion a year. In its fiscal 1975 request, the Pentagon asked for a $2.1 billion increase so that it could add 30,000 workers to the one million already employed by the military services. If this request is approved, civilian employment would account for about 16 per cent of the total defense budget. The Pentagon insists that the increase is the result of "civilianization" of jobs formerly performed by the military.

The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in an effort to reduce civilian spending, recently directed all branches of the military to study the feasibility of hiring private contractors to perform up to 30 per cent of the civilian jobs at military bases. OMB Director Roy Ash ordered the study "with the view of adopting such a plan as a cost-saving measure." Rep. William D. Gunter Jr. (D Fla.) said on Feb. 13 that the program would mean thousands of job losses at military bases and a "dislocation of local economies."

## Reevaluation of Alliances; Indian Ocean Question

Talk of reducing overseas forces and, to a lesser extent, strategic weapons R&D have caused this country's allies to begin questioning America's commitment to its global alliances. In its analysis of the 1974 budget, the Brookings Institution found a difference between the U.S. commitment to Europe and Asia. "In the administration's view, U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe...are for military as well as political reasons essential to a credible conventional defense posture in Western Europe." The Brookings authors found, however, that administration statements on Asia "contain subtle ambiguities and indications of change which, taken together, point to a declining U.S. military role in the area."

Yet the Defense Department's request for $32.3 million to expand an existing communications station on the tiny island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean would suggest the opposite. The base would be capable of refueling and restocking

20

## Peacetime Defense Spending

U.S. warships, including aircraft carriers, in the Indian Ocean—an area controlled by Britain until its withdrawal of naval and military forces at the end of 1971. A number of U.S. admirals have expressed fear that a growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, if unmatched by the American Navy, will exert undue political influence in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.²⁰

"By Pentagon standards, the Diego Garcia request is a mere pittance, less than one-third the price of a modern destroyer," Richard J. Levine, a military-affairs reporter, wrote in *The Wall Street Journal* on April 4. But "there is the unsettling prospect that a base at Diego Garcia...will provide the Navy in years to come with new rationales for an 'Indian Ocean fleet' and ever-bigger shipbuilding budgets."

The Senate Armed Services Committee postponed "without prejudice" the Diego Garcia fund request on April 3 but by no means resolved the question of what America's role in the Indian Ocean should be. To try to prevent a costly U.S.-Soviet arms race, Sens. Claiborne Pell (D R.I.) and Edward M. Kennedy (D Mass.) have introduced a congressional resolution urging that the two countries negotiate a limit on naval facilities and warships in the Indian Ocean.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, has predicted that the Soviet-American relationship "will continue to shape a tense, unstable and competitive peace in the years ahead." There will be "some cooperation," he predicted, but it will not lead to the resolution of conflicts in "third world" areas or to "a global settlement in the Seventies."²¹ Until the fruits of detente become more visible, the United States would in this situation be left with the choice of neo-isolationism or continued and increasingly costly defense programs.

²⁰ See "Indian Ocean Policy," E.R.R., 1971 Vol. I, pp. 189-206.

²¹ "U.S.-Soviet Relations" in *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (1973), pp. 130-132.

21

Selected Bibliography

Books

Bottome, Edgar M., *The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race*, Beacon Press, 1971.

Enthoven, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*, Harper & Row, 1971.

Fitzgerald, A. Ernest, *The High Priests of Waste*, W. W. Norton and Company, 1972.

Fried, Edward R., et al., *Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget, Brookings Institution*, 1973.

Fulbright, J. William, *The Pentagon Propaganda Machine*, Liveright, 1970.

Loory, Stuart H., *Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine*, Random House, 1973.

McNamara, Robert S., *The Essence of Security*, Harper & Row, 1968.

Melman, Seymour, *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*, McGraw-Hill, 1970.

Proxmire, William, *Report from Wasteland: America's Military-Industrial Complex*, Praeger, 1970.

Yarmolinsky, Adam, *The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society*, Harper & Row, 1971.

Articles

"Arming to Disarm in the Age of Detente," *Time*, Feb. 11, 1974.

*Aviation Week & Space Technology*, selected issues.

Cameron, Juan, "The Rethinking of U.S. Defense," *Fortune*, December 1973.

Clifford, Clark M., "Detente and Defense," *The Center Magazine*, January-February 1974.

*The Defense Monitor*, Center for Defense Information, selected issues.

Luttwak, Edward N., "New Strategy: The New Debate," *Commentary*, April 1974.

Loehwing, David A., "New Arms Race?" *Barron's*, Jan. 28, 1974.

"The Military and American Society," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March 1973.

Rostow, Eugene V., "America, Europe and the Middle East," *Commentary*, February 1974.

Scoville, Herbert Jr., "Flexible Madness?" *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1974.

Reports and Studies

Editorial Research Reports: "European Security," 1973 Vol. I, pp. 47-64; "Faltering NATO Alliance," 1974 Vol. I, pp. 223-240; "Future of U.S. Defense Economy," 1969 Vol. II, pp. 711-730.

Federation of American Scientists, *F.A.S. Public Interest Report*, March 1974.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1973-1974*, 1973.

Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, selected studies.

Quanbeck, Alton H. and Barry M. Blechman, *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies*, Brookings Institution, 1973.

Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, "A Comparison of the Fiscal 1974 and 1975 Defense Budgets," Feb. 22, 1974.

22

National Security Policy: 1973-76

One of the Vietnam War's legacies that influenced the 93rd and 94th Congresses was a revulsion from U.S. involvement in Third World conflicts. That attitude, which transcended party and ideological lines, was evident in the massive margins by which Congress barred military assistance to a rapidly disintegrating South Vietnam in the spring of 1975 and covert military aid to anti-Soviet forces in the Angolan civil war in late 1975.

But in other areas of national security policy Congress continued to show its traditional deference to the judgments of the executive branch. Pentagon spending requests climbed by about $10-billion a year between 1973 ($77-billion) and 1976 ($108-billion). Although congressional cuts in the Defense Department's budget were substantial, climbing to $7.3-billion in 1975, the 1976 request was cut by less than half that amount, $3.6-billion.

Some major weapons were challenged on grounds of cost, particularly the B-1 bomber and additional nuclear-powered warships, but there was no serious congressional challenge to the administration argument that U.S. global commitments could be met only by expansion and continued upgrading of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces. To support these commitments, President Ford in 1976 called for—and Congress approved—a Pentagon budget that contained more than $7-billion in "real growth"—defined as an increase beyond that necessary to offset inflation.

Buttressing Congress' traditional conservatism on national security issues was a growing suspicion of Soviet intentions, which were fueled in 1975-76 by an apparently rapid Soviet military buildup. Reinforcing these developments were the greater security consciousness of the American public and the impact of the 1976 election campaign.

## Doubts About Detente

The aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy jarred widespread American expectations that the policy of U.S.-Soviet detente established during the Nixon presidency would foster global stability. Soviet incitement of the Arab combatants in the 1973 Middle East War was the first of a series of events that culminated in Russian diplomatic and financial support of leftist revolutionary movements in Angola and elsewhere in southern Africa in 1975-76.

Congressional reaction, particularly among liberal Democrats, carried undertones of resentment at the betrayal of hopes borne by the Nixon-Kissinger campaign to sell their approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. The growing suspicion of basic Soviet policy was fanned by Moscow's continued intransigence toward Soviet civil rights activists and Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel.

Reinforcing the skepticism about Soviet aims was a broader congressional concern triggered by the collapse of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia: that America's allies and adversaries might conclude that the United States lacked the will to maintain its other commitments. One result was strong and widespread congressional support for the administration's swift recourse to military force when Cambodian gunboats seized the U.S. merchant ship *Mayaguez* in 1975; another was the widespread acceptance of the administration's argument that cuts in the Pentagon budget or in overseas troop levels could have a symbolically adverse effect on other countries' view of U.S. willingness to continue its world leadership role.

## Shifting Military Balance

In this atmosphere of deteriorating political relations, the continuing Soviet military buildup reinforced congressional concern over the Soviet threat and guaranteed the political success of Pentagon funding requests. Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger's insistence that Moscow's arms expansion demanded a major increase in U.S. defense spending was a factor leading to his dismissal by President Ford in November 1975. But the firestorm of criticism that greeted Schlesinger's firing indicated the breadth ofquiet over the shifting military balance. And in the opening months of 1976 the arguments of the Pentagon pessimists were supported by three studies, two by the Central Intelligence Agency, the other by the Library of Congress:

* According to a CIA analysis released in 1976, it would have cost the United States $114-billion (in 1974 dollars) to pay for the Soviet Union's 1975 military machine—40 per cent more than the United States actually spent on defense that year. If the costs of military pensions were disregarded, the "dollar gap" was 50 per cent in favor of the Soviet Union. The analysis concluded that in real terms, Soviet military spending had increased by nearly 3 per cent annually since 1965, while U.S. spending had declined.

* According to another CIA study, roughly 15 per cent of the Soviet Union's $900-billion annual gross national product (GNP)—twice the proportion estimated earlier—went to military purposes. The U.S. military effort consumed about 6 per cent of its $1.5-trillion GNP. This analysis added to the earlier estimates of Soviet defense costs the heavy burden of the Soviet policy of "hardening" and geographically dispersing industrial facilities to speed economic recovery from a nuclear attack.

* "The quantitative military balance since 1965 had shifted substantially in favor of the Soviet Union," according to a Library of Congress study. The study concluded

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National Security - 2

Defense Department Budgets

FISCAL YEARS 1950-1977

(in thousands)

<table><thead><tr><th>Fiscal Year</th><th>Budget Requests</th><th>Final Appropriation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1977</td><td>$107,964,472</td><td>$104,343,835</td></tr><tr><td>1976</td><td>97,857,849</td><td>90,466,961</td></tr><tr><td>1975</td><td>87,057,497</td><td>82,576,297</td></tr><tr><td>1974</td><td>77,250,723</td><td>74,218,230</td></tr><tr><td>1973</td><td>79,594,184</td><td>74,372,976</td></tr><tr><td>1972</td><td>73,543,829</td><td>70,518,463</td></tr><tr><td>1971</td><td>68,745,666</td><td>66,595,937</td></tr><tr><td>1970</td><td>75,278,200</td><td>69,640,568</td></tr><tr><td>1969</td><td>77,074,000</td><td>71,869,828</td></tr><tr><td>1968</td><td>71,584,000</td><td>69,936,620</td></tr><tr><td>1967</td><td>57,664,353</td><td>58,067,472</td></tr><tr><td>1966</td><td>45,248,844</td><td>46,887,163</td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>47,471,000</td><td>46,752,051</td></tr><tr><td>1964</td><td>49,014,237</td><td>47,220,010</td></tr><tr><td>1963</td><td>47,907,000</td><td>48,136,247</td></tr><tr><td>1962</td><td>42,942,345</td><td>46,662,556</td></tr><tr><td>1961</td><td>39,335,000</td><td>39,996,608</td></tr><tr><td>1960</td><td>39,248,200</td><td>39,228,239</td></tr><tr><td>1959</td><td>38,196,947</td><td>39,602,827</td></tr><tr><td>1958</td><td>36,128,000</td><td>33,759,850</td></tr><tr><td>1957</td><td>34,147,850</td><td>34,656,727</td></tr><tr><td>1956</td><td>32,232,815</td><td>31,882,815</td></tr><tr><td>1955</td><td>29,887,055</td><td>28,800,125</td></tr><tr><td>1954</td><td>40,719,931</td><td>34,371,541</td></tr><tr><td>1953</td><td>51,390,709</td><td>46,610,938</td></tr><tr><td>1952</td><td>57,679,625</td><td>56,939,568</td></tr><tr><td>1951</td><td>13,078,675</td><td>13,294,299</td></tr><tr><td>1950</td><td>13,248,960</td><td>12,949,562</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: Above amounts do not include any supplemental requests or appropriations not considered or made in the regular annual Defense Appropriation Acts.

Source: House Appropriations Committee (1960-1973), Congressional Quarterly (1950-1959; 1974-1977)

that "U.S. qualitative superiority never compensated completely and, in certain respects, was slowly slipping away."

Pentagon critics in Congress did not deny that the Soviet buildup required a U.S. response. But they maintained that the administration exaggerated the situation by assuming that the Soviet Union directed its military activity exclusively against the United States, ignoring their heavy commitments on the Chinese border and the need to police Eastern Europe.

They also insisted that the administration's argument understated the technological superiority of U.S. weaponry. Cost comparisons of U.S. and Soviet forces were meaningless since many U.S. technical advantages were beyond Soviet reach at any cost, they added.

But many of the leading congressional critics accepted the Pentagon argument that military spending had to increase at a rate sufficient to offset the cost of inflation and, in addition, show some real growth to counter the Soviet buildup.

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Support for Defense Buildup

Public support of defense spending showed a clear increase over the four-year period. A Gallup Poll released March 7, 1976, reported that since September 1974 the proportion of respondents who felt that too much was being spent on defense dropped from 44 per cent to 36 per cent. The proportion responding that defense spending was too low rose from 12 per cent to 22 per cent. In both polls, 32 per cent of the samples said the level of defense spending was "about right."

In a May 1976 poll conducted by the Gallup organization, a national sample agreed by a margin of 52 per cent to 41 per cent that "the United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the very brink of war if necessary." National samples had rejected the same statement in 1974 (42 per cent to 43 per cent) and in 1972 (39 per cent to 50 per cent).

The same series of polls showed an increase in the proportion of respondents supporting higher defense spending—from 9 per cent in 1972 to 17 per cent in 1974 and to 28 per cent in 1976.

The new public mood was reflected in and played upon during the presidential election campaign. In 1976, as in 1972, relations with the Soviet Union were central issues in the election campaign, but the focus was different. In 1972 the policy of detente—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's cultivation of a web of U.S.-Soviet cooperative ties—was the centerpiece of President Richard M. Nixon's carefully crafted image of statesmanship. Four years later, there was strong criticism in both major parties about what detente might be costing the United States in its continuing competition with the Soviet Union for political and military influence. Leading the attack on the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger policies were Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.) and Republican hopeful Ronald Reagan, former Governor of California. Both were long-time opponents of any accommodation with the Soviet Union on terms that they deemed too soft; both attacked the Ford administration for permitting what they viewed as the erosion of the nation's military strength.

Ford's response was to emphasize his determination to avoid "nuclear holocaust," implying that a harder line in foreign policy could have catastrophic results. He stressed his experience in foreign affairs and lamented that "nit-picking" challenges to the administration's foreign policy were not helpful to the country.

Although Ford was adamant in defense of his policies, there was evidence of a hardening of the administration's line on U.S.-Soviet relations. Critics charged that major areas of national security policy, including negotiations on a new strategic arms limitation (SALT) agreement with the Soviet Union, were being sacrificed to the President's renomination strategy. To avoid any last minute alienation of the Republican Party's right wing, Ford acquiesced in changes in the party's 1976 campaign platform drafted by Reagan delegates that repudiated aspects of the Kissinger foreign policy.

In the campaign for the Democratic nomination, the "hard line" on national security policy was muted by the early failure of Sen. Jackson's campaign. But the party showed no desire to challenge Ford on defense spending or on any other major aspect of the administration's national security policy.

In the election campaign, Democratic Party presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was careful always to

1973 Chronology

emphasize that any reductions in defense spending would be made by cutting fat and waste from the Pentagon budget rather than by reducing force levels or procurement programs.

Congress' disinclination to forcefully challenge the administration on national security issues, especially in 1976, was particularly apparent in three broad areas of policy:

**Defense Spending.** Congressional cuts in the Pentagon's budget requests increased each year from 1973 to 1975. But Secretary Schlesinger's campaign against that trend, which had some impact on the 1975 defense debate, triumphed decisively in 1976.

Schlesinger and his successor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, argued that defense spending would have to increase from year to year as a matter of course by 1) an amount sufficient to offset the effect of inflation and 2) an additional amount of "real growth" sufficient to keep pace with the Soviet military buildup. It was significant of Schlesinger's political victory that in 1976 the leading congressional critics of Pentagon spending challenged neither of these propositions. They merely insisted—and unsuccessfully—that the amount of real growth requested by President Ford in 1976 was greater than necessary.

**Nuclear Strategy.** The Nixon and Ford administrations easily turned aside congressional opposition to the policy—formally announced only in January 1974—of equipping U.S. forces to wage limited nuclear war.

Supporters of the administration strategy argued that a threat to devastate Soviet cities if the Soviet Union engaged in a limited aggression would fail to deter Soviet action because the threat would be unbelievable: Soviet leaders would not believe that the United States would, for limited stakes, take an action that would surely bring Soviet nuclear retribution against U.S. cities.

By this argument, only the ability to destroy limited, but extremely valuable, economic and political targets would give credibility to the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Opponents of the new policy warned that the increases in warhead size and accuracy that were required to strike economic targets could be seen by Soviet leaders as a threat to the Soviet nuclear deterrent. They argued that the administration's policy could "destabilize" the balance of nuclear terror and increase the risk of war.

**Intelligence Agency Reforms.** The conduct and results of the congressional probes in 1975-76 into abuses and illegal activities by U.S. intelligence agencies offered substantiation to the charge that Congress was inclined to err on the side of too much rather than too little concern for the requirements of "national security" at the expense of public or congressional scrutiny of executive branch activities.

The House probe of the intelligence agencies by a special committee, stalled for months at the outset over charges that the first chairman was too sympathetic to the intelligence bureaucracy, produced recommendations—including the creation of a House committee on intelligence—on which the House took no action. And the panel's final report was quashed by the House when the administration insisted that its publication would be damaging to national security.

The parallel Senate inquiry did result in the establishment of a permanent intelligence oversight committee. But the new panel adopted strict rules on disclosure of classified information obtained from the executive branch.

# Chronology

## of Action

### On National Security

#### 1973

Policy issues dominated congressional action in the national security area in 1973. And some congressional challenges met with dramatic success, exemplified by passage of legislation ordering a bombing halt of Cambodia by Aug. 15 and by landmark legislation, passed over President Nixon's veto, limiting presidential war-making powers by making him more accountable to Congress.

Although fiscal 1974 appropriations for the Defense Department ($74.2-billion) were slightly lower than the fiscal 1973 level, the Pentagon's budget did not experience the sizable reductions—the "peace dividend"—that some members had anticipated after the U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia.

Despite cutbacks in military and civilian manpower, the personnel costs of the Pentagon continued to skyrocket. From 1968 to 1974 the Pentagon's manpower costs rose to $41.8-billion from $32.6-billion. Part of the reason for the soaring costs lay with the all-volunteer army concept, which required the military services to compete with private enterprise in attracting well qualified young men.

Several of the Pentagon's major new weapons, including the Trident missile-launching submarine, the B-1 bomber and the F-15 fighter, were funded at or near the levels requested by the Defense Department. This occurred despite legislative attempts to kill or delay the programs. Attempts to reduce the size of U.S. military forces abroad were no more successful.

Part of the administration's success in these two areas was attributable to extraordinarily intense lobbying, especially against moves to delay the Trident submarine and cut U.S. troops in Europe. The October (Yom Kippur) War in the Middle East was another factor accounting for the Pentagon's budget successes in 1973. The early victories scored by the Arab countries raised questions about Israeli strength and Soviet diplomatic intentions in the minds of some congressional liberals who generally had favored reductions in Pentagon spending.

### Defense Spending

Congress approved a $73.7-billion appropriation for the Defense Department for fiscal 1974, a reduction of $3.5-billion in the amount requested by the administration.

Critics of various Pentagon programs were unsuccessful in several attempts to reduce defense spending by amending the weapons procurement authorization bill (HR 9286—PL 93-155) and the related appropriations measure (HR 11575—PL 93-238). One proposed amendment, which would

5-A

1973 Chronology

have cut $950-million from the overall authorization level, was adopted by the House, but dropped by the conference committee on the weapons bill.

## Authorization/Appropriation

As reported July 18 by the House Armed Services Committee (H Rept 93-383), the weapons procurement bill (HR 9286) authorized $21.4-billion for weapons purchases and military research in fiscal 1974, $625-million less than the amount requested by the administration.

During debate on the bill July 31, the House rejected several attempts to cut funds for specific weapons programs before passing the bill. But in an unusual rebuff to the Armed Services Committee and its chairman, F. Edward Hebert (D La.), the House adopted by a key vote of 242-163 (R 82-100; D 160-63) an amendment requiring the Defense Secretary to cut the authorized spending level by an additional $950-million. Sponsored by Les Aspin (D Wis.), the proposal restricted weapons funds to $20,445,255,000—the amount appropriated in fiscal 1973 plus a 4.5 per cent increase to cover inflation.

The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended a $20.4-billion authorization in its version of HR 9286 (S Rept 93-385). Before passing the bill Oct. 1, the Senate adopted amendments that increased to $20.9-billion the total amount authorized. The Senate rejected two amendments that would have reduced the authorization level. A proposal by William Proxmire (D Wis.) that would have frozen authorizations at the level approved for fiscal 1973, thus cutting the committee recommendation by $4-billion, was rejected Sept. 25 by a vote of 30-64. On Oct. 1 the Senate rejected, 47-51, an amendment that would have cut the authorization by $500-million. That amendment, sponsored by Robert C. Byrd (D W.Va.), earlier had been substituted for a $750-million cut sponsored by Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.).

As agreed to (H Rept 93-588) Oct. 13 by a Senate-House conference committee, the authorization measure contained $21,299,520,000. The Aspin-sponsored ceiling that had been adopted by the House was dropped.

The conference report was approved by the House Oct. 31 and by the Senate Nov. 5.

The fiscal 1974 defense appropriations bill (HR 11575) as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H Rept 93-662) contained $74.1-billion. This reflected a $2.8-billion reduction in the amount requested by the administration.

The House reduced this amount by only $5-million. It rejected by a 118-250 vote a $3.5-billion reduction proposed by Joseph P. Addabbo (D N.Y.). The House then passed the bill Nov. 30.

The version of the bill reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S Rept 93-617) contained $73.2-billion for the Pentagon in fiscal 1974. Various minor amendments adopted on the Senate floor raised the appropriations level to $73.3-billion. HR 11575 then was passed Dec. 13.

The conference agreement (H Rept 93-741) on the bill appropriated $73,714,930,000 for the Pentagon. Final action came Dec. 20 when the House approved the compromise amount by a vote of 336-32 and the Senate approved it by voice vote.

## Strategic Weapons

Congress imposed modest reductions on the major strategic weapons program for which the administration

sought funds. One system, the Trident missile-launching submarine, narrowly survived a major funding cut attempt during Senate debate on the weapons procurement bill.

**B-1 Bomber.** For the B-1 bomber, which was intended to replace the Air Force's aging B-52s, Congress appropriated $448.5-million, $25-million less than had been requested. The funds were for completion of the first prototype plane and for continued construction of two other test models.

The reduction had been imposed by the authorization bill. The Senate had cut the program by $100-million after its Armed Services Committee had voiced dissatisfaction with Air Force management of the project. But the House earlier had rejected, by a 96-313 vote, an amendment that would have killed the program. The reduction was agreed to in conference.

**Trident Submarine.** For the Trident submarine, under development to replace the smaller Polaris-launching submarines, Congress appropriated $1.3-billion, cutting the administration request by $240-million. The reduction did not slow construction of the first four ships, but delayed the next three.

During action on the authorization bill, the project weathered two attempts, one in the House and one in the Senate, to cut funding for Trident by upwards of 50 per cent. Trident critics maintained that the program was proceeding with undue haste that would lead to inefficiencies in construction. In the House, an amendment was rejected by voice vote that would have cut $832-million from the program. In the Senate, a related amendment was narrowly rejected by a key vote of 47-49 (R 10-30; D 37-19) following two days of heated debate and intense administration lobbying in behalf of the Trident.

**Project Sanguine.** For research on Project Sanguine, a system for communicating with submerged missile-firing submarines through vast subterranean antennas, Congress provided $8.3-million, half the amount requested. The House, following the recommendation of its appropriations panel, had denied all funds for the project. But the Senate approved the request for $16.6-million after rejecting by voice vote an amendment that would have killed the program. A second amendment that barred actual construction in fiscal 1974 for Sanguine was adopted by the Senate and accepted in conference.

**Safeguard ABM.** For completion of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system at Grand Forks, N.D., Congress appropriated $159.3-million, plus $171.6-million for ABM-related research. Included in the research funds was $110-million of $170-million requested for a Site Defense ABM designed to protect U.S. strategic missiles against Soviet attack.

The House had gone along with its Appropriations Committee in deleting all funds for the program, arguing that deployment of such a system was prohibited by the 1972 ABM treaty with the Soviet Union. But the Senate restored $135-million of the amount requested, insisting that the system was a necessary hedge against Soviet abrogation of the treaty, which limited the deployment of ABMs.

## Manpower Levels

Congress funded an active-duty military force of 2,165,000 men for 1973. This resulted in a personnel reduction of 68,000 from the administration's request. The authorization level approved accounted for 43,000 of the reduction, a com-

6-A

1973 Chronology

promise between the House-passed cut of 12,000 and the Senate reduction of 156,100. The related appropriations bill incorporated a House-passed provision restricting the proportion of inductees lacking a high-school diploma, a reflection of congressional concern over the quality of the all-volunteer force that was then in its first year.

## NATO Commitment

The House rejected amendments to the authorization bill that would have cut to 300,000 the number of U.S. troops stationed abroad and set the ceiling at 400,000. A proposal by Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) requiring a 40 per cent reduction in overseas troop deployments over a three-year period was rejected. But the Senate adopted by a key vote of 48-36 (R 7-34; D 42-12) an amendment by Robert C. Byrd (D W.Va.) requiring a cut of 110,000 in U.S. forces abroad.

The reduction was strongly opposed by the administration and did not survive the conference on the measure. But conferees did accept another Senate-passed provision that required a 10 per cent cut in U.S. troops in Europe unless the European members of NATO began to offset the cost to the United States of maintaining those forces abroad.

## Southeast Asia Involvement

For military aid to South Vietnam and Laos, Congress appropriated $900-million. The administration originally had requested $2.1-billion, but reduced the request to $1.6-billion after the cease-fire in South Vietnam in January. During the year Congress required the Pentagon to turn over to the State Department responsibility for the aid program for Laos. Aid to Laos and South Vietnam had been made a Pentagon responsibility in 1966.

Reflecting strong opposition on Capitol Hill to North Vietnam aid, the final version of the weapons authorization legislation contained a ban on any aid to North Vietnam without prior congressional authorization.

## Naval Forces

Congress provided the $657-million requested to complete a fourth nuclear-powered aircraft carrier after both houses rejected by large margins amendments that would have deleted the funds. Other major naval programs funded at the levels requested included nuclear-powered attack submarines ($958-million), anti-submarine destroyers ($612.1-million) and the controversial LHA amphibious attack ships ($169.2-million).

## Tactical Air Power

Congress approved purchase of another 50 F-14 fighter planes for the Navy, appropriating $692.9-million, nearly $10-million less than the administration request. The Senate Armed Services Committee had moved to block any funds for additional procurement of the plane because of a contractual dispute between the Navy and Grumman Corp., the plane's manufacturer. But the committee dropped its opposition to the purchase after the disagreement was resolved.

Citing problems in the testing program of the Air Force's F-15 fighter, Congress reduced to $848-million (for 62 planes) the administration's $918.5-million request (for 77 planes).

## Military Construction

Congress provided $2.66-billion for military construction projects for fiscal 1974, $335-million more than was approved for fiscal 1973. Congress had approved an authorization of $2.77-billion. Some of the increase went to additional military family housing and bachelor quarters, as requested by the Pentagon to support the all-volunteer armed forces. Other projects funded included initial construction of a massive facility for the new class of Trident missile-launching submarines.

## Legislative Action

As passed by the Senate Sept. 13, the fiscal 1974 military construction authorization bill (S 2408) totaled $2,835,657,000—$157-million below the Pentagon request. The amount was only $213,000 higher than had been recommended by the Senate Armed Services Committee in its report (S Rept 93-389).

The House Armed Services Committee recommended an authorization of $2,715,924,000 in the report on its companion bill (HR 10614—H Rept 93-534). The House Oct. 11 passed the bill without amendment.

Conferees reached agreement Nov. 13 on a compromise version (H Rept 93-634) authorizing $2,773,584,000. The House adopted the conference report Nov. 14, the Senate, Nov. 15, completing congressional action (PL 93-186).

The related fiscal 1974 military construction appropriations bill (HR 11459), containing $2,609,090,000, was passed by the House Nov. 14. No changes were made in the version reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H Rept 93-638).

The version of the bill reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S Rept 93-548) and passed Nov. 20 contained $2,670,972,000. The conference version of the bill (H Rept 93-693), filed Dec. 4, appropriated $2,658,861,000—$286-million below the administration request (PL 93-194).

**Trident Submarine Base.** The appropriations bill provided $112.3-million for the first major construction work in support of the Navy's projected fleet of Trident missile-launching submarines.

The funds were for preliminary construction at Bangor, Wash., Puget Sound base, of the Trident fleet and at Cape Canaveral, Fla., of missile testing facilities. In 1972 Congress had slashed the funds for Trident base construction because the Navy had not yet selected the location of the facility.

## Military Dependents Assistance

Congress June 29 cleared for the President legislation (HR 8537—PL 93-64) making permanent certain provisions of the Dependents Assistance Act of 1950 dealing with special housing allowances for armed services junior enlisted men and their families.

Authority for the allowances expired June 30. Without the extension, over 368,000 enlisted personnel would have suffered reductions in pay from $15 to $76.50 a month.

HR 8537 also extended the authority for special monthly pay for medical personnel through fiscal 1975 and for initial enlistment bonuses in certain combat categories through fiscal 1974.

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Defense, CIA Nominations in 1973

Top posts in the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) changed hands several times in 1973 as President Nixon realigned his Cabinet in the wake of the Watergate scandals.

Elliot L. Richardson, who became Defense Secretary in January, left that post in May to become Attorney General—replacing Richard G. Kleindienst, who resigned as a result of his close association with administration officials implicated in the Watergate affair.

Replacing Richardson at Defense was James R. Schlesinger, who had been director of the CIA only since January. Schlesinger's replacement at CIA was William E. Colby, who moved up from deputy director of operations of the agency.

**Elliot L. Richardson.** Richardson's tenure as defense secretary was the briefest in the 26-year history of the office: a little more than three months. He was confirmed Jan. 29 by a vote of 81-1. On April 30 Nixon announced that Richardson was his nominee for Attorney General, and Richardson was confirmed in that post May 23 by an 82-3 vote.

Richardson's tenure at the Justice Department also was brief. He resigned as Attorney General Oct. 20 rather than obey an order from the President to fire Archibald Cox, the special Watergate prosecutor whom Richardson had hired.

Richardson had served as under secretary of state at the beginning of Nixon's first term. He subsequently headed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare before becoming Defense Secretary.

**James R. Schlesinger.** Schlesinger was picked May 10 to succeed Richardson as Defense Secretary and was confirmed June 28 by a 91-0 vote.

Schlesinger joined the Nixon administration in 1969 as an assistant director of the old Budget Bureau. After the administration's reorganization of the Budget Bureau into the new Office of Management and Budget

(OMB), Schlesinger was appointed assistant director of OMB with responsibilities in the area of national security.

In 1971 Nixon appointed Schlesinger chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. As chairman of the AEC Schlesinger earned a reputation as a conscientious administrator intent on opening up the agency's operations to public scrutiny whenever possible. Schlesinger remained chairman of the AEC until late December 1972. It was at that time that Nixon once again reached into his administration to appoint Schlesinger director of the CIA. The Senate Jan. 23 confirmed him in that post by an 85-0 vote.

During the first four months of 1973, Schlesinger had been reorganizing the CIA's upper staff levels in what was regarded as a major shakeup of the agency. He had reportedly encouraged many older employees to seek an early retirement and had appeared before Congress to push for fewer restrictions on CIA retirement standards.

**William E. Colby.** Colby was selected May 10 to replace Schlesinger as CIA director. A career CIA official who formerly served as Deputy Director of Plans, the agency's clandestine activities branch, Colby was confirmed Aug. 1 by an 83-13 vote.

It was Colby's direction of the controversial "Phoenix" program in Vietnam during the late 1960s that was a focal point of Senate debate and Armed Services Committee hearings on his nomination. The Phoenix program allegedly was part of a covert effort to infiltrate Viet Cong cadres in South Vietnam to obtain information about enemy activities against the Thieu government. Critics claimed the operation was used to torture and murder enemy soldiers.

Colby had been the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans only three months when the President selected him to head the agency. He had been CIA comptroller since Jan. 10, 1972.

**Legislative Action.** The House passed HR 8537 June 19.

The House-passed bill was identical to the bill as reported (H Rept 93-282) by the House Armed Services Committee.

The Senate June 22 discharged the Senate Armed Services Committee from further consideration of HR 8537 and passed by voice vote the companion Senate bill (S 1916) as reported by that committee June 20 (S Rept 93-235). The Senate then sent the House version to conference after substituting the provisions of S 1916 for those of HR 8537.

House conferees agreed to a Senate provision including dependent illegitimate children under the allowances, with the understanding that "dependent" would mean that over one-half of a child's support was provided by a member of the armed services.

House conferees also agreed to extend special combat enlistment bonuses only through fiscal 1974, noting that the issue could be considered again in new legislation.

The Senate and the House June 29 agreed to the conference version (H Rept 93-361), completing congressional action on the bill.

Veterans' Programs

Veterans' Pensions

Congress Nov. 16 cleared for the President legislation (HR 9474—PL 93-177) providing a cost-of-living increase in the monthly pension payments to veterans and their dependents.

The bill raised the monthly payments to single and married veterans, their dependents and the survivors of deceased veterans by roughly 10 per cent. The first-year cost of the bill was estimated at over $240-million.

HR 9474 also increased the monthly pension for hospitalized single veterans from $30 to $50. In addition, it included a mechanism that made disabled veterans eligible for pension payments from the day they were injured rather than from the date they made application.

A Senate provision was included in the final bill for a lump sum payment of $25,000 to any veteran of the Brownsville, Texas, racial riot of 1906.

Omitted from the bill were two Senate provisions that would have raised the ceiling allowed on outside income for

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both a veteran pensioner and his wife. The existing ceilings were $2,600 for an unmarried veteran and $3,800 for married veterans. Pension payments ceased after a veteran exceeded the income categories. The House had opposed the provisions on the grounds that they were not warranted and that hearings had not been held on the increase proposed by the Senate.

HR 9474 was passed by the House July 30 (H Rept 93-398). The Senate passed the bill with amendments on Aug. 2 (S Rept 93-373).

The House agreed to the Senate version with further amendments Nov. 13. The Senate approved the House changes Nov. 16, clearing the bill for the President.

## VA Medical Programs

Congress July 19 cleared for the President legislation (S 59—PL 93-82) expanding Veterans Administration (VA) medical programs.

President Nixon had vetoed similar legislation in 1972.

S 59 broke new ground in the VA medical program by ensuring that veterans and their dependents would be eligible for out-patient care and by providing hospital and medical care to the wife or widow and the dependents of veterans who were totally disabled from service-connected causes or who died as a result of a service-connected disability.

Reacting to charges that VA facilities were not adequate to serve all veterans in need of care, the earlier legislation also had mandated certain minimums for the number of beds to be maintained in VA hospitals and for staff-to-patient ratios. In his veto message, President Nixon had said that these provisions could lower the quality of care available.

The compromise version directed the VA to maintain enough beds to ensure immediate acceptance of all seeking care and required the National Academy of Sciences to study staff-patient ratios.

**Provisions.** As signed into law, S 59 (PL 93-82):

* Extended outpatient care privileges to veterans currently eligible for hospital care, peacetime veterans and those 80 per cent or more disabled because of service-related causes.

* Authorized the VA to contract for care of dependents of veterans with total and permanent service-connected disabilities and survivors of veterans who died as a result of service-connected injuries if they were not eligible for care under the military insurance program.

* Authorized, under limited circumstances, the VA to reimburse certain veterans for hospital and medical services not normally furnished by the VA.

* Required the VA to staff and maintain enough hospital beds to admit all eligible veterans in need of care and to double the number of VA nursing home beds to 8,000.

* Increased per diem reimbursements for care of veterans in state soldiers' homes and increased to 65 from 50 per cent the maximum federal share of building or renovating costs of such homes.

## Israeli Aid

President Nixon's request for $2.2-billion in fiscal 1974 emergency assistance for Israel as a result of the October Middle East war sailed through Congress. Expeditious

committee action, easy defeats of attempts to limit the aid and lopsided votes on passage gave proof of Capitol Hill's continuing support for Israel.

Congress completed action on HR 11080 (PL 93-199) Dec. 20, when the Senate passed the bill unamended on a 66-9 vote. The House passed the measure Dec. 11 by a 364-52 vote. Final action on HR 11088 (H Rept 93-702; S Rept 93-657) came on the eve of the Mideast peace talks in Geneva. The White House and the bill's supporters in Congress insisted the negotiations never could succeed unless the United States aided Israel in maintaining a military balance in the Mideast.

Israel had purchased over $1-billion in military equipment from the United States since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East Oct. 6. Moreover, Israel indicated requirements for further military equipment totaling nearly $2-billion.

All of the equipment supplied to Israel had been on a cash sales basis. The Foreign Military Sales Act provided that payment was due within 120 days of delivery. During congressional hearings, administration witnesses repeatedly stressed that without U.S. military grant assistance or credits Israel might default on these payments when they came due in February-March 1974. Even before the October war, Israel owed the United States $1.2-billion in repayments of credits and $500-million for cash sales.

Provision of the military grant assistance authorized by HR 11088 would be a first in the U.S. aid program for Israel. All previous military aid had been in the form of cash sales and credit purchases.

## 1974

Although the size of the administration's $87-billion defense spending request for fiscal 1975 made it a logical target for major spending cuts in the fight against the double-digit rate of inflation then taking place, Congress cut the request by only $4.4-billion.

For the first time in a decade U.S. troops were not involved in military action on foreign soil, but concern over Soviet advances in weaponry and the foreign policy consequences of the 1973 Middle East War fed congressional reluctance to make heavier cuts.

Most of the Pentagon's major weapons systems were funded at about the levels requested, and the administration beat back moves to impose major reductions in U.S. troop strength abroad. The only program funded through the Pentagon budget to suffer significant congressional cuts was aid to South Vietnam, cut to $700-million from a requested $1-billion.

The most far-reaching congressional action apart from its treatment of the defense budget was enactment, over President Ford's veto, of legislation increasing education benefits for veterans of Vietnam and the post-Korean War era.

Two events late in the year relating to national security had no immediate impact on congressional action, but cast shadows on the administration's effectiveness that were to remain through the rest of the Ford term: the Vladivostok

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accord with the Soviet Union on the control of strategic
arms and the revelations of illegal domestic activities by
the Central Intelligence Agency.

On Nov. 24 President Ford, meeting with Soviet leaders in Vladivostok, announced an agreement in principle on a "cap" on the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. The accord imposed on each country a ceiling of 2,400 long-range missiles and bombers and 1,320 MIRVs, levels higher than those possessed by the United States at that time. Over the next two years, administration efforts to translate this agreement into a formal treaty (SALT II) were thwarted by Soviet refusal to accept an agreement that Ford could sell to the Pentagon and conservatives in his own party.

On Dec. 22 *The New York Times* published allegations that the CIA had conducted illegal domestic intelligence operations against antiwar and other dissident groups in the 1960s. The disclosures caused Congress and the White House to initiate investigations of the secrecy-shrouded intelligence community that set the stage for major clashes in 1975-76 over the rights of Congress and the press in this delicate area.

## Defense Spending

Congress appropriated $82.6-billion for operations and programs of the Pentagon in fiscal 1975, exclusive of military construction projects. Although this amount was $4.5-billion less than the administration had requested, the House and the Senate rejected across-the-board reductions in the defense appropriations bill (HR 16243-PL 93-437) and in the annual weapons procurement authorization measure (HR 14592-PL 93-365).

The administration was able to sidetrack congressional moves to reduce the number of U.S. troops abroad and terminate costly projects intended to increase the accuracy of U.S. strategic missiles.

For weapons procurement and military research programs needing legislative authorization, the administration requested $23.1-billion. The House Armed Services Committee, in approving the defense authorization (HR 14592-H Rept 93-1035), cut that figure by $487-million, recommending $22.6-billion. The House approved the committee bill May 22 after rejecting, 185-209, an amendment that would have reduced the overall authorization by $733-million.

Supporters of the amendment argued that it would have allowed the Pentagon the same amount as had been authorized the previous year, plus an additional 7.4 per cent to offset inflation.

The Senate Armed Services Committee cut the administration request by 5.5 per cent, recommending a $21.9-billion authorization (S Rept 93-884). The Senate passed HR 14592 June 11 after deleting, at the panel's recommendation, $24.8-million for the Trident submarine program. The amount had been added instead to a fiscal 1974 supplemental defense authorization bill. (*Details below*)

The House-Senate conference version (H Rept 93-1212, S Rept 93-1038) authorized $22,159,364,000, reducing the budget request by $970,775,000. The final bill was adopted by the House July 29 and by the Senate July 30.

The Pentagon's requested $87-billion appropriation was trimmed to $83.7-billion by the House Appropriations

Committee in reporting the fiscal 1975 defense funding bill (HR 16243-H Rept 93-1255). The House, before passing the bill Aug. 6, reduced the appropriations further-to $83.4-billion-but it rejected by a vote of 178-216 an amendment by Joseph P. Addabbo (D N.Y.) that would have cut the appropriation to $81.2-billion. Supporters of the Addabbo proposal maintained that the additional reduction would come out of the Defense Department's cushion of unobligated funds carried over from prior years, but opponents of the move insisted that the funds were committed to specific projects, although for accounting purposes they had not yet been formally obligated.

The Senate Appropriations Committee recommended a 5.7 per cent reduction in the budget request, allowing $82.1-billion (S Rept 93-1104). The Senate Aug. 21 approved that amount, with minor increases, after defeating by a key vote of 37-55 (R 7-32; D 30-23) an amendment by Thomas F. Eagleton (D Mo.) that would have cut an additional $1.1-billion from the appropriation.

The final conference version (H Rept 93-1363) provided $82,576,297,000 and was approved by the House Sept. 23 and by the Senate Sept. 24.

## Fiscal 1974 Supplemental Funds

Congress appropriated $4.7-billion of $6.2-billion requested to supplement the funds appropriated for the Pentagon for calendar 1973. In addition to Pentagon civilian and military pay increases, which are routinely handled by such legislation, the supplemental request also included funds to correct deficiencies in U.S. military readiness that surfaced during the 1973 Middle East War.

Of the $1.3-billion of the request that required legislative authorization (HR 12565-PL 93-307), Congress approved $769,049,000. But it insisted that many items in the funding request were not emergencies and could be funded through the regular appropriations legislation.

The House April 4, following the recommendation of its Armed Services Committee (H Rept 93-934), initially approved $1.1-billion of the request. The Senate May 7 accepted the recommendation of its Armed Services Committee (S Rept 93-781) for a reduction in the authorization to $571-million ($415-million in new authority and $156-million to be transferred from other accounts).

The conference report on HR 12565 (H Rept 93-1064), agreeing on a compromise level of $769-million, was approved June 4 by the House and June 5 by the Senate.

The fiscal 1974 supplemental appropriations bill (HR 14013-PL 93-305) included $4,688,098,000 for Pentagon programs, $1.5-billion less than the amount requested.

The House-passed version (April 10) contained $4,959,045,000, the amount recommended by the House Appropriations Committee (H Rept 93-977).

The Senate version (May 7) contained $4,914,550,000, the same as the amount recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S Rept 93-814).

The conference report on the appropriations bill (H Rept 93-1070), with the compromise $4.7-billion figure, was adopted by the House June 4 and by the Senate June 5.

## Strategic Weapons

Congress generally endorsed the administration's strategic weapons programs, turning back attempts to kill or slow down development of the Trident submarine and its missile, the anti-ballistic missile research programs and the B-1 bomber. Attempts to delete funds that had been re-

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quested for increasing the accuracy of U.S. land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles also were defeated.

**B-1 Bomber.** For continued research on the B-1 bomber, Congress appropriated $445-million, $54-million less than the administration requested. The House Armed Services Committee had reduced the authorization for the plane to $455-million, from $499-million, and that was the amount provided in the final version of the authorization bill. The House overwhelmingly rejected, 94-309, an amendment that would have deleted all funds for the program, and the Senate turned down an amendment that would have cut the program by $200-million.

The $445-million subsequently appropriated was a compromise between the House-passed figure of $455-million and the $400-million approved by the Senate.

**ABM.** For the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which was intended to protect Minuteman missiles at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, Congress approved $45-million of $60.8-million that was requested, and for the successor Site Defense ABM system, $118-million of the $160-million requested. The House rejected, 182-219, an amendment to the appropriations measure that would have deleted all funds for the ABM. Supporters of the amendment said it made no sense to continue spending money on the missile system when the newer Site Defense ABM was under development and the United States was limited by treaty to a single ABM system.

**Trident.** For construction of the second and third Trident missile-launching submarines and for continued research and development on the submarine and the missile, Congress appropriated $1.9-billion. The fiscal 1974 supplemental appropriation included $24.8-million to begin work on the two ships. The House rejected an amendment to the authorization measure that would have slowed the rate of construction from two ships annually to one ship.

**Counterforce.** Funds were approved as requested for the administration's program to increase the accuracy and power of U.S. land-based and sea-based strategic missiles. These weapons were intended for use on selective Soviet military targets, including missile silos. By very large margins, the House defeated amendments to both the authorization and the appropriations bills that would have denied the requested funds. By a 37-49 vote, the Senate turned down a similar amendment to the authorization legislation.

The authorization bill did incorporate a ban on a planned test firing of a Minuteman missile from Montana to a Pacific Ocean target area. The ban was backed by senators from the five northwestern states over which the missile was to pass.

## Overseas Troops

By energetic lobbying, the administration beat back proposals for major reductions in U.S. forces abroad. Proponents had to settle for a provision making a 12,500 cut in overseas troop strength (excluding ship crews), reducing the total to 452,000.

During debate on the authorization bill, the House rejected, 163-240, an amendment by Majority Leader Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D Mass.) that would have required a 100,-000-man cut in troop strength. The Senate rejected proposed manpower reductions of 125,000 (by a vote of 35-54) and 76,000 (by a two-vote margin, 44-46).

The authorization bill also incorporated a Senate provision requiring a cut of 18,000 in non-combatant support

troops stationed in Europe, but allowing the substitution of an equal number of combat troops. Sponsors of the provision insisted that U.S. forces in Europe had too low a ratio of combat manpower to support manpower.

## Binary Gas Weapons

The appropriations measure provided $3-million—the same amount as that approved in the authorization—for research on binary chemical ammunition. After being fired, this ammunition forms a lethal nerve gas from two chemicals that are harmless until combined. The administration had requested $4.9-million for research on binaries and $5.8-million for production facilities for the munitions.

In addition to cutting the research funding to $3-million, Congress added an amendment to the appropriations bill deleting the $5.8-million requested for production facilities. It had been adopted by the House, 214-186. The Senate subsequently went along with the House decision.

## Warships

Congress appropriated $1.2-billion for Navy shipbuilding other than missile-launching submarines. Included were funds for three nuclear-powered attack submarines, a nuclear-powered anti-aircraft missile ship and seven anti-submarine destroyers. The final version of the authorization incorporated a provision introduced by the House Armed Services Committee that required nuclear power for all future Navy ships designed to serve with carrier strike forces or on independent missions.

Congress dealt harshly with plans begun by Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, to construct low-cost ships to serve in areas where potential opposition would be of limited strength.

Funds requested ($142.9-million) for a proposed sea-control ship—a small helicopter carrier—were denied, and release of $24.9-million previously appropriated for design of the ship was delayed. A request for $436.5-million for seven anti-submarine frigates was cut to $186-million for three ships. Opponents of both projects maintained that approval of the amounts requested would have been premature, resulting in production problems.

## Tactical Airpower

Congress trimmed the procurement requests for several tactical aircraft, but appropriated funds for the F-111F fighter-bomber and the A-7D attack plane. Neither plane was requested by the administration.

For 25 A-10 attack planes, Congress appropriated $138-million. It added $205.5-million that had not been requested for 12 F-111F fighter-bombers. Proponents of the plane maintained that keeping open the F-111 production line gave Congress the option of, ordering additional strategic bomber versions of that plane (FB-111) if the proposed B-1 bomber proved unsatisfactory.

Congress also added $100.1-million for 24 A-7D attack planes to equip Air National Guard units.

A Navy request for $34-million to begin research on a new lightweight fighter plane was denied. The House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees instead directed the Navy to consider adapting the existing F-16 and F-17 fighters.

The request for $494.4-million to procure 12 AWACS radar-warning and communications planes was cut to

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$370.7-million for six planes. House Armed Services members said the slowdown was prudent, that it would allow time for the plane to demonstrate its suitability for its new mission. Originally designed to detect low-flying bomber attacks against the United States, AWACS' mission was changed to cover Europe, specifically NATO's air defenses.

CIA Budget

The Senate rejected, 33-55, an amendment to the authorization bill that would have required the Central Intelligence Agency to divulge annually the amount requested for all U.S. intelligence programs. But another amendment, designed to close the loophole that had allowed the CIA to be drawn into the Watergate cover-up and related scandals, was adopted. It amended the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-253) to insert the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" each time it appeared, thus clarifying the intent of existing law barring CIA involvement in domestic activities.

Soviet Trade

As enacted, the authorization bill empowered the Defense Secretary to recommend that the President bar exports to Soviet-bloc nations of goods, technology and industrial techniques developed as a result of Pentagon programs. If the President overruled a recommendation from the Secretary, Congress could block the export by passing a concurrent resolution within 60 days.

As originally proposed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), the provision would have allowed the Defense Secretary to veto any export that would "significantly increase the military capability" of the recipient country. But by a vote of 47-43 the Senate accepted a modification providing that the President, not the Secretary, would make the final determination.

Military Construction

For military construction projects in fiscal 1975, Congress appropriated nearly $3.1-billion, reducing by $310-million the administration's request. The largest single item funded was military family housing, for which Congress allowed $1.2-billion. No new funds were appropriated for construction of the controversial air and naval base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Congress did approve, however, the reprogramming for that project of defense funds appropriated for other purposes, provided the President certified that the base was "essential to the national interest." Either house of Congress could adopt a resolution disapproving the project.

The amounts requested were approved for continued construction of the Trident submarine base ($103.8-million) and for initial construction of an armed services medical school located at the naval hospital at Bethesda, Md.

For military construction projects requiring separate legislative authorization, the House approved $2,983,821,000, the same as the amount recommended by the House Armed Services Committee (HR 16136—H Rept 93-1244).

The Senate Armed Services Committee approved a slightly higher figure, $3,079,651,060 (S Rept 93-1136), and the Senate increased that amount by $3.7-million.

The conference agreement (H Rept 93-1545), settling on a $3,039,804,060 authorization, was approved by the House Dec. 12 and by the Senate Dec. 14, thus completing congressional action (PL 93-552).

The House Appropriations Committee pared the administration's request by $224-million to less than $3.1-billion (HR 17468—H Rept 93-1477). The House increased the amount slightly, to $3,062,108,000. An amount approximately $20-million higher was recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee (S Rept 93-1302) and that sum, $3,082,480,000, was approved by the Senate.

The conference report (H Rept 93-1617), adopted Dec. 18 by both houses, appropriated $3,072,842,000 (PL 93-636).

Diego Garcia

The administration requested $29-million for the Navy and $3.3-million for the Air Force to expand the U.S. base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. The installation, it argued, was an essential counterweight to increased Soviet military and naval activity in the area. Opponents of the project maintained that the Soviet presence in the region was modest, but that it might escalate if the United States expanded its facilities on Diego Garcia.

The House rejected, 28-58, an amendment to the authorization bill that would have deleted all funds for the project. But the Senate cut the base construction authorization, and it barred use of the funds until the President certified to Congress that expansion of the facility was in the national interest and both houses approved construction.

The conference committee retained the Senate's funding reduction. But it watered down the Senate's restrictive language.

The House approved the amount authorized ($18.1-million) in its version of the related appropriations measure, but the Senate, going along with the recommendation of its Appropriations Committee, denied all funds. The final conference version provided that the Navy and the Air Force could divert to Diego Garcia "any construction funds available...in the appropriation," providing the requirements of the authorization bill were met.

In a parallel line of attack, Senate opponents of the Diego Garcia project drafted amendments to the fiscal 1975 State Department authorization bill (S 3473—PL 93-475) to require prior congressional approval of any military bases agreement between the United States and a foreign country. The language of the proposal specifically required congressional approval of any agreement signed after Jan. 1, 1974, between the United States and the United Kingdom to expand the Diego Garcia base, a British possession. The provisions were eliminated from the conference version (H Rept 93-1447) after the Senate had included similar restrictive language in the military construction authorization legislation.

Military Family Housing

As an inducement to join the armed forces, the administration in 1974 sought funds for 10,462 new family housing units as a first step in a five-year program to ensure that all married members of the services had suitable housing. But the House, accepting the recommendation of its Armed Services Committee, recommended only 5,552 new units. The committee had argued that it was premature

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to embark on a housing program for new personnel while
career military families still were unsuitably housed.

The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended an authorization of 7,120 new units, but cut in half the request for 3,000 units for families of junior enlisted personnel. The panel ordered the Pentagon to make clear in its recruiting efforts for the all-volunteer force that such housing was not generally available to low-ranking enlisted members of the service. The final version authorized 6,802 housing units.

The appropriations bill fully funded the number of housing units authorized, but the Senate reduction in the housing for junior enlisted personnel was allowed to stand. This drew criticism from the House Appropriations Committee, which called for adequate housing for all married military personnel.

## Controls on Nuclear Exports

Outraged by President Nixon's offer during his June Mideast trip to sell nuclear reactors to Egypt and Israel, Congress passed legislation (S 3698—PL 93-485) in 1974 empowering the legislative branch to disapprove proposed international agreements for sharing nuclear technology. Existing law did not provide Congress with an effective check against agreements with foreign countries for peaceful uses of atomic energy, although there was such a procedure on the statutes for military agreements.

Congress also rejected an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) proposal to delete a provision in existing law requiring congressional approval of the amount of nuclear fuel the AEC could distribute to other countries for peaceful purposes.

### Legislative Action

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy June 25 reported S 3698 (S Rept 93-964)—HR 15582 (H Rept 93-1149) amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (PL 83-703) to give Congress authority to disapprove proposed international agreements on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The new procedure applied to agreements involving nuclear reactors capable of producing more than five megawatts of heat as well as the fuel for such reactors.

Under the new procedures, the AEC was to submit proposed international agreements first to the President for his approval and then to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. An agreement would not take effect if Congress within 60 days passed a concurrent resolution disapproving it.

The speed with which the joint committee acted on the bill—it was introduced and reported on the same day—reflected congressional determination to have a say in Nixon's proposed agreements with Israel and Egypt. At the same time, the joint committee hoped by its quick action to prevent the introduction by other members of legislation that would be even more restrictive.

**Senate Action.** The Senate passed S 3698 July 10 by a 96-0 roll call after adopting an amendment to prevent a resolution of disapproval from being delayed by filibuster or other procedural devices.

But the Senate rejected by a three-vote margin, 46-49, an amendment that would have required an affirmative vote by both houses before a proposed agreement could take

effect. (The bill as reported required an affirmative vote by only one chamber.)

**House Action.** The House passed its version of the bill (HR 15582) July 31 after approving by a three-vote margin, 194-191, an identical amendment requiring approval by both houses. The House also adopted an amendment providing that the new approval procedure would apply to any international agreement proposed after July 1, 1974.

House-Senate conferees filed their report (H Rept 93-1299) on Aug. 29. The seven conferees, members of the joint committee which had drafted the bill, approved a substitute that was very similar to the bill reported originally and later amended by the House and Senate.

**Conference Action.** Under the final version, proposed agreements would be submitted to the joint committee and would become effective unless both houses passed a concurrent resolution of disapproval.

Conferees dropped the Senate provision that required an up-or-down vote on determining the outcome of a disapproval resolution. They also dropped the House amendments providing that no such agreements would become effective unless both houses acted affirmatively and making the new process applicable to agreements proposed or entered into after July 1, 1974.

The House Oct. 10 adopted the conference report after rejecting, 143-230, a motion to recommit the bill with instructions to House conferees to insist on the original House provisions requiring approval of proposed agreements by both houses. The Senate routinely approved the report later the same day, completing congressional action.

## Nuclear Fuel Distribution

Along with the passage of the nuclear export agreements bill, Congress showed its displeasure with President Nixon's proposal to sell reactors to Israel and Egypt by rejecting an AEC proposal to eliminate provisions of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act requiring congressional approval of the amount of nuclear fuel the AEC could distribute to other countries.

Congress' action came during consideration of legislation (S 3669—PL 93-337) making changes in the 1954 act. Major changes adopted:

* Authorized rewards to persons having information concerning 1) the introduction or attempted introduction illegally into the United States of nuclear weapons or material, or their illegal manufacture in the United States; 2) unlawful export or attempted export of nuclear weapons or material or 3) a conspiracy to introduce, manufacture, acquire or export nuclear weapons or material.

* Authorized the AEC to increase the amount of nuclear material it distributed to groups of nations above statutory ceilings if both houses of Congress did not disapprove the increase within 60 days.

* Allowed the export of small amounts of nuclear material for peaceful purposes to countries not having an agreement for nuclear cooperation with the United States.

### Legislative Action

The Joint Atomic Energy Committee reported the omnibus atomic energy amendments bill (HR 15416—H Rept 93-1155) (S 3669—S Rept 93-989) on June 26 and July 9 respectively. The committee strongly favored retention of its formal control over distribution of nuclear fuel to the

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1974 Chronology

Congress Wins Restrictions on Aid to Turkey

In a preview of confrontations to come, Congress in
the fall of 1974 sharply challenged President Ford and
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger on their conduct of
foreign policy.

A normally routine continuing appropriations
resolution became the vehicle for congressional efforts to
cut off further U.S. military aid to Turkey in reaction to
Turkey's July invasion of Cyprus with American
weapons supplied through the foreign aid program.

As finally enacted Oct. 17, the measure (H J Res 1167—PL 93-448) barred U.S. military assistance to Turkey until the President certified that Turkey was in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act and that substantial progress had been made toward agreement on military forces on Cyprus. However, the President was permitted to suspend the aid ban until Dec. 10, 1974, if he determined the delay would help the negotiations—but only if during that time Turkey observed the cease-fire on Cyprus, did not increase its forces there, and did not transfer to Cyprus any U.S.-supplied “implements of war.”

Temporary Agreement

After a nine-day stalemate over the issue of U.S.
military aid to Turkey, Congress and the White House
Oct. 17 finally reached a compromise clearing the way for
enactment of the emergency funding resolution allowing
various government agencies to continue to operate and
allowing Congress to begin an election recess. The recess
was to have begun Oct. 11.

Federal agencies, departments and the foreign aid
program, whose regular appropriations bills had not been
enacted, had been without funds since Sept. 30 when the
previous spending resolution expired.

Despite the emergency caused by the delay in
approving a stopgap funding bill to carry on the federal
government's operations during the congressional recess,
Congress and the White House held firmly to their
positions for over a week. During the standoff, Congress
cleared two resolutions: H J Res 1131, H J Res 1163; Ford
vetoed both, and Congress failed to override them. Final
action on the third version (H J Res 1167) came only after
Ford "very, very reluctantly" agreed to compromise
language on Turkey.

The confrontation had arisen Oct. 9 when Congress,
despite veto threats, cleared H J Res 1131 containing a
ban on aid to Turkey. By a 307-90 key vote (R 127-52; D
180-38), the House Sept. 24 had approved the first
amendment aimed at cutting off aid to Turkey during
floor consideration of H J Res 1131. The Senate Sept. 30
approved a Turkish aid cutoff amendment on a 57-20
vote.

Congress delayed its recess awaiting Ford's action
on the resolution. He vetoed it Oct. 14, and it was
sustained by the House Oct. 15. Congress then cleared a
similar measure (H J Res 1163) Oct. 16, which Ford
vetoed Oct. 17; Ford was again sustained by the House.
Approval of the third resolution came the same day.
After completing action on it, Congress recessed until
Nov. 18.

The override attempt Oct. 15 was the first Ford veto
challenged by Congress.

Passage of the Turkish aid cutoff was a victory for the Greek-American community. The Order of AHEPA (American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association) had spearheaded an extensive lobbying campaign in support of an aid ban. (Early in 1974, the Senate had approved a measure that called on the President to terminate U.S. military sales and aid to Greece until he determined that Greece was fulfilling its North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO—obligations. However, the House took no action on the bill, and the issue became moot in July when the invasion of Cyprus led to the overthrow of the Greek military regime and its replacement by an elected government. Similar provisions had been defeated in the Senate in 1969 and 1970. The cutoff moves were in reaction to the April 1967 coup by the Greek military.)

Later Action

Proponents of the Turkish aid cutoff had insisted on
adding it to the funding resolution because of uncertain-
ty over whether foreign aid legislation would be enacted
in 1974.

The administration favored continuing foreign aid
programs under the emergency funding apparatus at
least until after the November elections because of its
unhappiness with restrictions on executive branch
authority added by the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee to the regular fiscal 1975 foreign aid authorization
bill (S 3394). With administration support, the Senate
voted Oct. 2 to recommit S 3394 to the committee.

However, in the closing days of the 1974 session,
Congress approved a compromise version of S 3394 that
included a provision authorizing the President to delay
the Turkish aid cutoff until Feb. 5, 1975. A similar provi-
sion also was included in a further continuing resolution
(H J Res 1178—PL 98-570) that provided funding for the
foreign aid program through Feb. 28, 1975.

Turkish Aid Arguments

Supporters of an aid cutoff, led in the House by Ben-
jamin S. Rosenthal (D N.Y.) and in the Senate by
Thomas F. Eagleton (D Mo.), contended that continued
aid was illegal because Turkey had used U.S.-supplied
equipment in its invasion of Cyprus, in violation of
foreign assistance laws.

They also argued that Congress had a legitimate role
in foreign policy, that backing down on the issue would
make Congress and the United States a laughingstock,
that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger could not ig-
nore U.S. laws as he pleased, and that the cutoff would
force Turkey to negotiate with Greece on a peaceful
settlement of the Cyprus situation.

Ford and Kissinger, on the other hand, contended
that a congressionally mandated cutoff would remove
their flexibility to get negotiations going, would irritate
the Turks and harden their stance and would jeopardize
the NATO alliance in the Mediterranean. Throughout
its dispute with Congress, the White House never
acknowledged that Turkey had violated any U.S. laws.

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1974 Chronology

International Atomic Energy Agency—having a membership of 104 countries—and to other groups of nations.

The Senate passed S 3669 on July 11 without change. The House passed the bill without amendment Aug. 1, completing action on the bill. By a vote of 88-298, the House first had rejected an amendment that would have required specific approval by both houses of any increase in nuclear fuel distribution above the statutory levels. It also rejected by voice vote an amendment that would have barred export of any nuclear materials to nations that had not signed the 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.

## Military Pay Bonuses

On consecutive days, Congress enacted bills increasing enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses for physicians and for enlisted personnel having skills in critical areas. Both measures were requested by the Pentagon to attract and retain volunteers having essential skills; with the threat of being drafted lifted, men were less willing to join the service.

### Physicians

Congress April 23 cleared for the President S 2770 (PL 93-274), increasing special pay and re-enlistment bonuses for physicians in the armed services.

The bill, passed routinely by the Senate in late 1973, provoked unexpected controversy when the House in March expanded it to cover dentists, optometrists and veterinarians. The expanded provisions—labeled “Christmas tree” embellishments by defense spending critics—were knocked out of the final version by House-Senate conferees.

As cleared, S 2770 increased monthly special pay for doctors to $350 after two years of service; under existing law, doctors became eligible for the $350 monthly special pay only after 10 years of service. The bill also authorized the Defense Department to pay an annual bonus of up to $13,-500 to physicians who agreed to remain on active duty for a certain number of years under a written agreement. The re-enlistment bonus was $2,000 under existing law.

Since 1947 the Defense Department had offered special incentives to induce doctors to join the armed forces, but found those incentives inadequate after expiration of the military draft in June 1973. Without new financial incentives, the Pentagon estimated that only 1 per cent of the 3,-500 medical officers then in the service would remain in the armed services after completing their two years of obligated service in 1974 or 1975.

In late 1973 the Defense Department proposed an increase in bonuses for military medical officers; at the same time, it proposed to broaden enlistment and re-enlistment incentives for all members of the armed forces. The proposal would have authorized an annual bonus of up to $15,000 for physicians.

**Senate Action.** The Senate Armed Services Committee reported S 2770 (S Rept 93-658) on Dec. 19, 1973. The committee made only minor changes in the administration proposal.

It limited eligibility for special bonuses to medical officers below the rank of colonel instead of leaving eligibility to the discretion of the Defense Secretary. The committee also proposed to reduce the maximum annual bonus to $10,000.

The Senate approved the bill without debate Dec. 20, 1973.

**House Action.** After broadening the scope of the Senate-passed bill, the House Armed Services Committee reported (H Rept 93-883) the measure on March 7. The panel adopted amendments to extend the special pay and bonuses to dentists, optometrists and veterinarians. The purpose was to obviate the need for the Defense Department to seek benefits in the future for those health professionals. But the report emphasized that payment of any bonus was at the department's discretion.

The committee also restored the proposed $15,000 annual bonus at the request of the department. It decided to broaden the eligibility for the bonus to include officers at, as well as below, the rank of colonel.

Before approving S 2770 April 2 by a 291-106 vote, the House narrowly rejected, 194-201, a substitute that would have limited the bonus increases to physicians. The House earlier had rejected amendments to limit the bonus increases to physicians and dentists and to broaden the bill to include psychologists and podiatrists.

**Conference Action.** Senate conferees were adamant about restricting the bill to physicians, but gave way on other minor differences between the two versions. A conference report (H Rept 93-984) was filed April 10. Conferees agreed to extend the new bonuses to those with the rank of colonel. They split the difference between House and Senate amounts for the annual bonus, settling on a maximum of $13,500.

On April 23 the bill was cleared for the President when the conference report was adopted by the House, 372-17, and by the Senate by voice vote.

### Enlisted Personnel

Congress April 24 cleared legislation (S 2771—PL 93-277) revising the special bonus pay program for enlistment and re-enlistment in the armed services to help promote the all-volunteer armed forces.

Bonuses of up to $3,000 were allowed for enlistments of at least four years in any critical area. Previously, these bonuses could be paid only for initial enlistments in the combat sectors (infantry, armor or artillery) of the Army or Marine Corps.

The bill established a “selective re-enlistment bonus” of up to $15,000 for re-enlistment in any critical skills area, with the maximum amount restricted to the nuclear power field. The selective re-enlistment bonus replaced automatic bonuses of up to $2,000 for all re-enlistees and variable bonuses of up to $8,000 in essential skills, with a limit of $10,000 per individual over the span of a service career.

**Legislative Action.** The Senate Armed Services Committee reported S 2771 in December 1973 (S Rept 93-659). The bill allowed up to $12,000 for selective re-enlistment bonuses for servicemen in critical skills areas and up to $3,-000 for a four-year enlistment in any critical skills area.

The Senate passed the bill Dec. 20 after approving a nongermane amendment allowing women to enter the service academies.

The House Armed Services Committee reported S 2771 (H Rept 93-857) in March.

In addition to deleting the provision allowing women to attend the service academies, the committee made several other changes: it raised the maximum re-enlistment bonus from $12,000 to the $15,000 requested by the Pentagon; modified the effective dates; and it provided that a ser-

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1974 Chronology

viceman re-enlisting for the maximum of six years could not receive less in total bonuses than someone who re-enlisted for two three-year periods.

The House passed the bill without amendment March 18. Several members expressed strong opposition to the committee's deletion of the Senate amendment admitting women to the service academies, but the provision could not be re-offered on the House floor because the bill was considered under a procedure that did not permit amendments.

Conferees April 10 filed a report (H Rept 93-985) on S 2771. House-Senate conferees made only one major change in the version passed by the House.

House conferees dropped language that would have precluded service personnel from receiving more money for several short re-enlistments than for a single maximum re-enlistment of six years. The Defense Department had expressed concern that this would have hampered its ability to retain highly trained enlisted personnel.

In the four other major areas where House and Senate versions differed, the Senate accepted the following House provisions:

* The maximum re-enlistment bonus was set at $15,000, rather than $12,000 as in the Senate bill. The conference report said that the maximum bonus would be limited to persons having skills in the nuclear power field.

* The legislation was given a June 30, 1977, expiration date, rather than making it permanent legislation as the Senate proposed.

* The bill became effective the first of the month following enactment, rather than Jan. 1, 1974, as in the Senate version.

* The Senate amendment authorizing women to attend the service academies was deleted.

The conference report said the Senate receded "reluctantly" on the issue of women at the service academies, after the House conferees "pointed out that the leadership of the House Armed Services Committee has indicated its intention to hold hearings on this legislation, and such would be the most appropriate way of dealing with the matter."

S 2771 was cleared for the President when the Senate April 23 and the House April 24 adopted the conference report without opposition.

## Veterans' Programs

Overriding a presidential veto, Congress enacted a major liberalization of veterans' education benefits, increasing allowances by 22.7 per cent, instituting a new loan program and extending both the length of time in which a veteran could draw education benefits and the length of time after leaving the service that a veteran remained eligible for benefits earned. Other legislation enacted liberalized veterans' pensions, disability benefits and life insurance programs.

In various appropriations measures enacted in 1974, Congress approved a total of $15.7-billion—a $2.3-billion increase over 1973—for programs and services run by the Veterans Administration.

Some $14-billion of the amount was approved in the regular appropriations measure (HR 15572—PL 93-414) for the VA. An additional $812.3-million, intended for education and subsistence benefits to veterans, was approved in a supplemental appropriations bill (H J Res 1180—PL 93-624).

## Veterans' Education Benefits

By stunning margins, the House and then the Senate overrode the first veto by any President of a veterans' education bill (HR 12628—PL 93-508). The votes were 90-1 in the Senate—30 more than the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution—and 394-10 in the House—137 more than needed.

Intended to assist post-Korean War and Vietnam-era veterans, the bill increased education allowances by 22.7 per cent, boosted on-the-job training funds and vocational aid for the disabled by 18.2 per cent, created a new $600-a-year education loan program and extended for nine months the existing 36-month entitlement period for veterans working on undergraduate degrees.

Under the bill—which carried a price tag of $807.8-million and was made retroactive to Sept. 1—a single veteran attending school received $270 a month, an increase of $50 over the previous level approved by Congress in 1972. A married veteran drew an additional $60, receiving $321 a month.

It was mainly the 22.7 per cent increase in benefits that prompted Ford's veto. In a Nov. 26 veto message to Congress, Ford said the bill provided "excessive increases and liberalization of veterans education and training benefits." Stating that his decision "had not been an easy one," Ford, nevertheless, complained that the increase "would cost the taxpayers half a billion dollars more in fiscal 1975 than is appropriate in view of the country's current economic situation."

Ford also criticized the bill for providing "benefits that are greater than those granted to World War II and Korea veterans," objected to the nine-month entitlement extension and maintained that "benefit increases enacted through 1972 have substantially exceeded the rise in the cost of living."

**Legislative Action.** President Nixon in January proposed an 8 per cent increase in veterans' education benefits. But the House Veterans' Affairs Committee reported a bill (HR 12628—H Rept 93-792) increasing the regular living allowances for veterans in school by 13.6 per cent; a similar increase in special allowances for eligible students participating in vocational rehabilitation and on-the-job training programs was recommended. The bill also increased to 10 years after discharge, from eight years, the period during which a veteran was eligible for education benefits, an extension that was opposed by the Veterans Administration. The House passed HR 12628 Feb. 19 without amendment.

The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee reported a companion bill (S 2784—S Rept 93-907) that was much broader than the House version. The Senate panel's bill provided up to $720 a year for tuition grants and up to $2,000 a year for loans in addition to the usual living allowance for veterans attending school.

The bill also provided an 18.2 per cent increase in the monthly school living allowance compared to the 13.6 per cent increase voted by the House.

The Senate June 19 adopted an amendment broadening the loan provisions to include veterans in technical and vocational schools. Rejected, 35-54, was a proposal to gear the benefits to the Consumer Price Index through an escalator clause. The Senate then passed the bill, and the different versions were sent to conference.

Conferees Aug. 19 filed a report on HR 12628 (H Rept 93-1303, S Rept 93-1107). The conference version provided

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1974 Chronology

for a higher increase (23 per cent) in veterans' allowances than was contained in either the House or the Senate bill.

In other major provisions the conference compromise contained a modified version of the Senate tuition loan plan, permitting veterans to borrow up to $1,000 a year. Like the Senate bill, the conference version extended to 45 months from 36 months the period in which a veteran could attend school and receive veterans' benefits.

The Senate approved the conference version Aug. 21. When it was considered by the House the following day, a point of order was raised against the conference report because the final benefit levels agreed to by House-Senate conferees were higher than those approved by either house. The Speaker subsequently sustained the point of order.

After scrapping the conference report, the House voted for a less expensive substitute version. The new version of the bill approved by the House reduced to 18 per cent from 22.7 per cent the monthly increases in on-the-job and vocational training allowances for post-Korean War and Vietnam War veterans.

The Senate Sept. 30 by voice vote disagreed to the House changes and asked for a further conference.

House-Senate conferees Oct. 7 filed a second conference report (H Rept 93-1435) on HR 12628.

Bowing to the Aug. 22 House action, the conferees approved an 18.2 per cent monthly increase in benefits for veterans participating in vocational rehabilitation and job-training programs.

A special tuition assistance program approved by the Senate June 19 was dropped by the first conference, but conferees Oct. 7 approved a provision directing the Veterans Administration to study possible abuses and administrative problems that such a program might entail.

The version of the bill approved by the House Aug. 22 did not extend the benefits eligibility period from 36 to 45 months as adopted by both the Senate and the original conference committee, but the House conferees to the second conference accepted the extension with the stipulation that the added time could be used only for undergraduate work.

In another major action, conferees established a Veterans Administration loan program under which former servicemen could borrow up to $600 a year to meet their education costs.

The Senate originally had approved a $2,000 loan program, which the first conference reduced to $1,000. Neither House version contained the loan funds.

The original Senate and House bills had included a provision extending to 10 years, from eight years, the period in which veterans could use their education benefits. With the omnibus veterans' education bill still enmeshed in controversy, and nearly 4 million veterans approaching the eligibility deadline under the existing law, Congress lifted the two-year extension from HR 12628 and passed it as a separate bill (S 3705-PL 93-337) on June 27. (Earlier legislation (S 3398-PL 93-293) had extended veterans' eligibility through June 1974.)

The second version of the conference report was adopted by both the House and the Senate on Oct. 10, sending the bill to the President.

**Veto Override.** President Ford vetoed HR 12628 Nov. 26 on grounds that it provided "excessive increases and liberalization of veterans' education and training benefits." The House Dec. 3 overrode the veto by a 394-10 vote and the Senate the same day voted 90-1 to override, thus enacting the bill into law.

## New Programs Funded

Congress in March cleared a supplemental appropriations bill (H J Res 941-PL 93-261) providing an additional $750-million for veterans' education benefits in fiscal 1974. The Nixon administration had requested the additional funding because participation in the program proved to be more expensive than had been anticipated.

Another supplemental funding measure (H J Res 1016-PL 93-321) approved by Congress appropriated an additional $179-million for the VA.

Funds in the measure included:

* $100-million to provide 15 to 18 per cent increases in disability compensation for 2.2 million veterans and 375,000 widows, children and parents of veterans.

* $77-million to continue GI bill benefits for 285,000 veterans discharged prior to June 1, 1966. A bill signed into law in May (S 3398-PL 93-293) continued their eligibility through June. Otherwise, their benefits would have ended May 31 under terms of a law limiting veterans to an eight-year period after discharge in which to use the GI bill.

* $2-million to begin the VA's "man-on-campus" program, which was intended to solve a widespread problem of delays in subsistence checks for student veterans. The program called for establishing 1,327 veterans' representatives on campus—one for each school having 500 or more veterans enrolled and a number who would serve smaller schools on a part-time basis.

## Other Veterans' Benefits

**Pension Increase.** Congress Dec. 10 cleared for the President legislation (S 4040-PL 93-527) liberalizing pension benefits for veterans and their survivors effective Jan. 7, 1975.

The bill authorized a 12 per cent increase in pension benefits for about 1.2-million veterans and their survivors and increased the existing $2,600 limitation on earnings for a single pensioner by $400. (The income ceiling for a pensioner with a dependent was also boosted by $400-to $4,200.)

Vance Hartke (D Ind.), chairman of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, said that as a result of cost-of-living Social Security increases in 1972, many veterans were denied their benefits because the increase pushed their income above the limitations.

A veteran was eligible for pension benefits if 1) he served in the Armed Services for at least 90 days, including at least one day of service during wartime; 2) his income did not exceed limits specified by law; 3) he was permanently and totally disabled (veterans 65 or older were defined as totally disabled), and 4) his net worth was not excessive as determined by the Veterans Administration.

Besides increasing pension benefits and income ceilings for eligible veterans, the bill authorized the Veterans Administration to study the adequacy of the pension system for veterans older than 72.

The estimated cost of the benefit increases for fiscal 1975 was $145.9-million.

The bill was reported (S Rept 93-1226) by the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee and passed by the Senate Oct. 7 without amendment. The House Veterans' Affairs Committee reported it (H Rept 93-1499) with minor amendments and the House passed it Dec. 9. The Senate Dec. 10 concurred in the House amendments, thus clearing the bill for the President.

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1975 Chronology

**Disability Benefits.** Congress May 23 cleared for the President legislation increasing benefits for disabled veterans and their dependents.

The bill (S 3072—PL 93-295) provided a $566.8-million cost-of-living increase in benefits to 2.2 million veterans with service-connected disabilities and their dependents and survivors.

Benefits were raised 15 per cent for veterans rated as 10 per cent to 50 per cent disabled. The range for these was raised from $23-$149 a month to $32-$171.

For veterans with 50 per cent to 100 per cent disabilities, the benefits were increased 18 per cent, rising from $179-$495 to $221-$584.

Dependency allowances were raised 15 per cent for the 358,100 veterans who were receiving such benefits and were 50 per cent or more disabled.

Allowances for widows and other dependent survivors of disabled veterans were raised 17 per cent. These formerly ranged from $184 to $469 a month, depending on the veteran's rank, and were increased to a range from $215 to $549.

Final provisions were in an amended version of S 3072 as reported by the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee (S Rept 93-798) and passed by the Senate May 2.

The House Veterans' Affairs Committee had reported (H Rept 93-991) a slightly different bill (HR 14117). The House passed its version May 7.

The Senate May 20 passed S 3072 a second time, amending it to conform to the original Senate-passed bill and adopting a House-passed provision equalizing compensation between peacetime and wartime disabilities. The House-passed version of S 3072 had provided increases somewhat lower than 15 per cent in benefits for veterans with 10, 20 and 30 per cent disabilities.

The House May 23 cleared S 3072 for the President by concurring in the Senate amendments.

**Life Insurance.** Legislation designed to improve life insurance programs for members of the military reserves and veterans of the Vietnam and Korean Wars was signed into law May 24.

The bill (HR 6574—PL 93-289) made four major changes in previous laws pertaining to life insurance coverage. The new Veterans Insurance Act of 1974:

* Provided full-time coverage under Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) for members of the ready reserves, National Guard and certain members of the retired reserves who were under 60 years of age and had completed at least 20 years of service. The 1,005,000 affected reservists formerly were covered only while on active duty.

* Provided for the automatic conversion of SGLI policies to a nonrenewable five-year term policy known as Veterans' Group Life Insurance (VGLI), effective the day after the veteran's SGLI policy expired. This in effect gave the veteran five years, instead of the previous 120 days, in which to convert the term insurance to a whole life policy held by one of the 616 insurance companies participating in SGLI. Veterans whose coverage already had terminated also became eligible for VGLI for up to five years after the expiration date. More than 3 million veterans became eligible for these benefits.

* Increased to $20,000, from $15,000, the maximum coverage under SGLI and VGLI.

* Authorized the return of excess premiums, in the form of dividends, to the 600,800 holders of Veterans' Special Term Life Insurance, a program for Korean War veterans.

The House passed HR 6574 on May 7, 1973. This version contained only the provision extending full-time coverage to the reserves. The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee added the other provisions to the bill, reported March 1, 1974, as S 1835 (S Rept 93-723). The Senate then passed HR 6574, as amended by the provisions of S 1835, on April 8.

The House May 9 concurred in the Senate amendments, clearing the bill for the President.

## 1975

The year witnessed the high-water mark in the campaign that began in the 1960s to cut the Pentagon budget. Congress cut $6.2-billion from the $96.6-billion sought by the Ford administration for U.S. military forces. But the year also witnessed clear evidence of a growing mood of frustration in Congress and in the country with an intratable world scene. A heightened concern for the nation's military security, due in large part to suspicions of Soviet global intentions, was to result in a near total rout of congressional critics of Pentagon policies the following year. (1976 action, p. 26-A)

The seeds of this discontent had been sown by continued Soviet intransigence over the treatment of internal dissidents and by Soviet encouragement of Arab adventurism that preceded the 1973 Middle East War.

The end of direct U.S. combat involvement in Southeast Asia removed a major source of domestic hostility to the U.S. military establishment. And the final debacle in Cambodia and South Vietnam still elicited a desire to prove American resolve and military prowess to a hostile world.

That this desire did not involve support for renewed direct involvement in distant wars was evident in Congress' refusal to provide military supplies and equipment for the South Vietnamese government in its last months. The same reservation was evident in the overwhelming rejection by both houses of President Ford's plans to give covert military assistance to the anti-Soviet faction in the civil war that wracked Angola, a former Portuguese colony in southwest Africa that became independent in 1975.

But the sense of national frustration was reflected in the euphoria that greeted President Ford's decision to send in the Marines to rescue the crew of the American cargo ship *Mayaguez* after the ship's seizure by a gunboat of the newly victorious Communist regime in Cambodia. And the growing uneasiness over Soviet intentions was evident in the angry reception accorded Ford's decision to fire Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger. Schlesinger had strongly disagreed with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger on the extent of the risk to the United States of the Soviet military buildup and had fought Ford's efforts to restrain the Pentagon's budget requests.

## Defense Spending

The administration requested more than $98.2-billion for the Pentagon in fiscal 1976, including $1.3-billion in aid to South Vietnam and $300-million for a special fund for Defense Department purchases of military equipment for subsequent sale to other nations.

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Foreign Policy and National Security

ciency; that is, on how many and what kinds of forces provide a
secure retaliatory capability against present Soviet strategic forces.

Controversy within the government over strategic forces, therefore,
rests less on broad differences over the goals of strategic doctrine than
on how these goals should be achieved. Three questions are of central
importance:

* What forces are required as a hedge against unforeseen developments, such as a breakthrough in Soviet technological capability, a reversal of the trend in U.S.-Soviet relations toward détente, or a breakdown in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and abrogation of the existing agreements?

* What forces are required for political reasons, such as deterring the Soviet Union and China from hostile foreign policy initiatives, maintaining the confidence of allies, and generally underwriting the U.S. position in foreign affairs?

* What forces are required for "bargaining chips" to encourage progress in U.S.-Soviet arms limitation negotiations?

One's view of much of the fiscal 1974 strategic force budget depends on the position taken on each of these questions. The same is true for major weapon development programs now being funded—programs that will shape the nation's strategic posture and dictate the cost of strategic forces for the next fifteen to twenty years. Consequently, this section examines the major strategic programs in terms of how they would be affected by alternative positions on these three questions—in other words, by alternative criteria for strategic sufficiency.

The Trident Program

Sea-based missile systems, the least vulnerable element of the triad (see Chapter 9), will be the keystone of the U.S. strategic deterrent for the indefinite future. At some point a follow-on system will be necessary to replace the present Polaris/Poseidon submarines, the newest of which will be twenty years old (the retirement age for planning purposes) by 1987. Hence, the issues raised by the Trident strategic submarine and missile program are not whether but rather how fast and in what numbers it should be built and what its characteristics should be.

In 1972, the administration, with the support of the Congress, accelerated the Trident program, advancing the date on which the sys-

Defense Budget Issues

339

tem was to enter service from the early 1980s to 1978. It did so principally for two reasons: (1) to induce the Russians to agree to the inclusion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the first SALT accord; and (2) to allay concern at home and among U.S. allies that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the USSR. Apparent success in the first purpose has led the Defense Department to continue emphasizing the accelerated program as an important bargaining chip in the second-stage SALT negotiations.

If these political factors were not considered dominant, the Trident program could be carried out at a more moderate pace and at a significantly lower cost over the balance of this decade without jeopardizing U.S. security. Savings would be possible from two sources:

* Stretching out the pace of modernization (assuming constant force levels) would make longer use of existing systems possible. Furthermore, a more moderately paced program would avoid the waste inherent in concurrent development and procurement of a complex system. Development would be more orderly and contracting procedures more effective. On the other hand, if the present pace of development is maintained, the real cost of building ten submarines—the present program—is likely to be significantly more than $13.5 billion, the cost estimate announced in 1972 and the most recent one available.

* Moving directly to development of the Trident II missile, which has a range of 6,000 nautical miles, instead of first developing the 4,500-mile-range Trident I missile would also save money. The latter was originally justified for possible use in existing Poseidon submarines should the USSR appear on the verge of a breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology during the brief period before the Trident submarine became available. Slippage in the Trident I missile program's schedule, so that it will now be available at about the same time as the new submarine, indicates that this consideration is no longer believed important. A decision to slow down the submarine program, therefore, could also lead logically to a parallel decision to skip development of the Trident I missile and move directly to development of the longer-range Trident II missile. This eventually could save at least $2.5 billion—the estimated total cost of developing one generation of these missiles.

Estimates taking both factors into account are that, if it was decided to revert to the earlier schedule, bringing the first Trident into service

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in the early 1980s, the strategic force budget would be reduced by an average of $1.0 billion a year for the rest of this decade. Perhaps half of this cost reduction would represent a deferral of costs into the 1980s and half would be savings from greater production efficiency in building the submarine and from avoiding the cost of building the Trident I missile.

## Strategic Bomber Force Levels

With the scheduled reduction of two B-52 squadrons in fiscal 1974, the strategic bomber force will decline to 438 planes deployed in operational squadrons. Nearly 60 percent of this force—255 aircraft—will consist of newer B-52s, the G and H models built between 1958 and 1962. These planes are now the core of the strategic bomber force, and their effective service life should extend into the 1980s. They are being equipped with new air-to-surface short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) and will eventually be equipped with subsonic cruise armed decoys (SCADs) to improve their penetration capability. Also, measures have been taken to increase their chance of escaping destruction on the ground in the event of concentrated missile attacks launched from Soviet submarines. About 40 percent of these aircraft are kept on constant ground alert and could therefore be expected to survive any preemptive attack. The on-alert part of the strategic bomber force alone is considered capable of destroying a large enough portion of the USSR's population and industry to deter a Soviet first strike.

The remainder of the bomber force will consist of 117 older B-52s—D models built in the late 1950s—and 66 FB-111s, first introduced into the force in 1971. Whether to continue to operate the older part of the B-52 force and the FB-111s constitutes a significant budgetary issue. These planes add little to U.S. strategic capabilities and are expensive to operate. The older B-52s are not considered worth equipping with new missiles, and the FB-111s, although very new, are severely limited in range and payload. Furthermore, these bombers require an equivalent number of tanker aircraft to operate effectively, which adds considerably to total operating costs. It is estimated that if the older B-52s, the FB-111s, and their tankers were gradually phased out of the active force over the next few years and placed in storage, possible savings could average $1.2 billion a year over the balance of the decade.

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## Defense Budget Issues

Arguments against this course of action focus on two factors: first, that the United States should not reduce its bomber force without persuading the USSR, through SALT, to make an equivalent reduction of its strategic forces; and second, that the possibility of using the older B-52 bombers for conventional bombing, as in the Vietnam war, justifies keeping them in operation.

## The B-1 Program

If the United States is to maintain indefinitely a bomber force as an independent element in its strategic deterrent, it will be necessary to introduce a follow-on bomber to the B-52 sometime in the 1980s. Concern about the B-1, which is now the sole candidate, centers on the possibility that it will provide only marginal improvements in capability at very high cost. A danger exists that in 1975—the date of the scheduled procurement decision—the B-1 will be chosen simply because it is the only option available.

One alternative would be to postpone decisions on any new bomber until the second-round SALT discussions shed more light on future requirements.

Another alternative would be to postpone a decision for two or three years and invest now in the parallel development of a different kind of strategic aircraft: a standoff bomber carrying long-range cruise missiles. Research and development costs would be relatively low, since this kind of bomber could be based on aircraft designs already in use, such as that of the Boeing 747 or the Lockheed C-5A, and could use missile systems already being developed, such as the Air Force's SCAD. Procurement costs would also be lower than those of the B-1; since the new bomber would not have to penetrate Soviet air defenses, it would not need as much sophisticated electronic equipment as the B-1 and would not have to be acquired in as large numbers. Finally, operating costs would be lower because tankers would not be needed.

To pursue this option probably would require additional research and development expenditures during the next several years, since experimental work on the B-1, though slowed down, would not be discontinued unless work on the concept of a standoff bomber proved it to be preferable. The relatively small additional investment required might be worthwhile to permit an informed choice in the

342

mid-1970s. Should a standoff bomber prove to be the more desirable system, its cost in the 1970s might average approximately $600 million a year less than that of the B-1 program.

### ICBM Force Levels

Budgetary issues relating to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) arise, in part, from real doubts as to their ultimate survivability. Should the United States continue to spend money on programs designed to make the ICBM a credible deterrent for the indefinite future? Or should such investments be avoided on the ground that they are not likely to contribute enough to deterrence to justify their cost? The administration has moved toward the first course of action, but with some equivocation. It has carried forward the MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) and the Silo Upgrade programs for the 550 Minuteman I missiles and has requested initial, though still small, funding to extend these measures to the 450 Minuteman II missiles. One Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) site is being completed, and the fiscal 1974 budget request includes funding for a high level of ABM research and development. On the other hand, by negotiating the SALT agreement, the administration has avoided building the full Safeguard system. It also has decided against other costly programs seeking to make ICBM sites less vulnerable, and apparently it has not made a final decision on converting Minuteman II missiles to MIRVs.

A lower-cost alternative still consistent with continuing the triad would be to maintain ICBMs at reduced force levels. The 550 Minuteman/MIRV missiles, which will be fully funded in fiscal 1974, will have enough destructive potential to serve as an independent deterrent for many years to come, and continuing research and development on ABM technology could provide some insurance for their future capability. But instead of investing additional funds to convert them to MIRVs, the United States could phase out the Minuteman II missiles. This course of action would save approximately $500 million a year ($300 million a year from avoiding the cost of a Minuteman II/MIRV program and $200 million in direct and indirect operating costs). Arguments against this course of action would be: (1) the possible loss of a bargaining chip at SALT; and (2) concern over the political repercussions of a deteriorating U.S. position in numerical force comparisons with the USSR.

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Defense Budget Issues

### How Much Air Defense?

The administration seems to have adopted far more modest objectives for strategic air defense than heretofore.¹ These new objectives are to defend Washington, D.C., from air attack, to defend generally against small air attacks (with a few days' warning), and to restrict unauthorized penetration of U.S. air space. Apparently, the administration no longer plans to build forces to defend military and key urban-industrial targets against major air attacks—a change in planning criteria that should lead to substantial savings in the future. For example, plans to buy the new surface-to-air missile (SAM-D) as a strategic defensive system have evidently been dropped, which will save $2.3 billion. Moreover, procurement of a new manned interceptor for air defense seems to have been postponed for at least a few years.

A program designed strictly for these newly reduced objectives could probably be carried out with even smaller force levels and slower-paced modernization programs than are now contemplated. A more modest program would call for: (1) phasing out the present force of surface-to-air missiles in the next several years; (2) deactivating the seven active Air Force interceptor squadrons and further postponing purchase of a new interceptor; and (3) reducing projected procurement of the airborne warning and control system from forty-two to twenty units. Savings from such a cutback in the air defense program would average $900 million a year from fiscal years 1974 through 1980.

### Abandoning the Triad

Beyond the kind of issues outlined above, judgments also differ on the number of independent systems necessary to provide confidence in U.S. strategic retaliatory capabilities. Maintenance of the triad is founded on the view that the unique capabilities inherent in three different and independent systems are desirable from a military perspective because (1) they provide a high-confidence hedge against a technological breakthrough in defenses against, or unforeseen operational failures in, any one system, and (2) they complicate Soviet strategic planning. If the United States were prepared to reduce the level of

1. See, for example, the definition of air defense objectives in U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1974* (1973), p. 18.

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confidence that this type of redundancy provides, further cuts in strategic forces could be contemplated.

One alternative would be to base strategic planning on a "dyad" consisting of sea-based missiles and bombers. All programs to protect or modernize ICBMs would be abandoned, and the land-based missile force as a whole would be phased out; this would be done gradually—say, by 1980—to diminish unfavorable political consequences. This approach would mean canceling the Minuteman/MIRV program, the one-site Safeguard ABM program, and most ABM research and development programs. Annual savings from these actions would average $2.0 billion for the rest of the decade. Judgments about the possible military consequences of this course of action depend on estimates of not only the benefits of redundancy but also the potential vulnerability of land-based missiles. Judgments about the probable political consequences depend on how much weight is attached to numerical force comparisons as an element in the conduct of foreign policy.

A more drastic alternative would be to move toward reliance on a sea-based system alone, gradually phasing out all other offensive programs as the Trident became available. Additional savings might average about $3 billion a year. With reduction to a single system, uncertainty about both military and political consequences becomes very large; this course of action therefore has implications that are fundamentally different and potentially involve much greater risks than those of previously outlined measures.

## Issues and Budgets: A Summing Up

Spending on strategic forces can be reduced in three ways: by cutting offensive forces, by slowing weapon modernization, or by reducing air defenses. Spending less would imply that the United States was giving up some military or political capabilities: redundancy in retaliatory forces, flexibility in war-fighting capabilities, political potentialities related to force levels, or bargaining chips in U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. Hence, the desirability of the reductions depends ultimately on subjective judgments of how much, if at all, these capabilities are in fact affected and on the dollar value attached to any changes in these capabilities.

Differing positions on the major strategic programs discussed above reflect differences in these kinds of judgments. At the risk of over-

## Defense Budget Issues

simplification, these positions can be grouped into four alternative strategic postures: maintaining the current strategic force, which is as ambitious a posture as seems likely in view of the fiscal and foreign policy considerations discussed in earlier chapters; a less costly triad; a dyad composed of submarines and bombers; and a sea-based system only. Average annual costs (in 1974 dollars) for each of these postures range from $13 billion to $20 billion over the balance of this decade. The composition and projected cost of each set of strategic forces, shown in Table 10-1, are summarized below.

Alternative 1 is a projection of the administration program—maintenance of the triad with extensive modernization of each element. This posture constitutes a high-confidence strategic deterrent that emphasizes political considerations and the need to negotiate with the USSR on further arms reductions from a position of strength.

The estimated cost of this program, as described in Chapter 9, will rise steadily throughout this decade, averaging $20.2 billion a year in 1974 dollars.

Alternative 2, a lower-cost triad, maintains all the major precepts of current strategic planning but places much less weight than alternative 1 on political factors and bargaining chip considerations. It calls for: (1) the unilateral elimination of the relatively less effective components of present U.S. strategic forces (the older B-52 bombers

Table 10-1. The Cost of Alternative Strategic Postures, Fiscal Years 1974, 1977, and 1980

Total obligatory authority in billions of 1974 dollars

<table><thead><tr><th>Alternative</th><th>1974</th><th>1977</th><th>1980</th><th>Annual average, 1974-80</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. The present posture<sup>a</sup></td><td>18.0</td><td>21.0</td><td>21.7</td><td>20.2</td></tr><tr><td>2. A less expensive triad<sup>b</sup></td><td>16.4</td><td>15.8</td><td>17.6</td><td>16.2</td></tr><tr><td>3. A dyad—bombers and sea-based missiles<sup>c</sup></td><td>16.0</td><td>13.6</td><td>15.9</td><td>14.4</td></tr><tr><td>4. A sea-based force<sup>d</sup></td><td>16.9</td><td>12.6</td><td>10.5</td><td>13.0</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Authors' estimates. All cost estimates include an allowance for indirect operating expenses such as training, medical care, and administration.

a. Projection of the cost of carrying out present strategic programs. See Chapter 9, pp. 307-15, for details.

b. Differs from alternative 1 in a slower development pace for Trident; slower development of a new strategic bomber, including a choice between the B-1 and a standoff bomber; phase-out of older model B-52s and FB-111 bombers; selected reductions in air defense (see text); and curtailment of the Minuteman/MIRV program at 550 missiles.

c. Differs from alternative 1 in all the measures listed for alternative 2 plus phasing out all land-based missiles and antiballistic missile systems by fiscal 1980.

d. Differs from alternative 1 in stopping all modernization programs for offensive weapons except Trident and gradually phasing out all strategic bombers, land-based missiles, and antiballistic missile systems by fiscal 1980; and selective reductions in air defenses (see text).

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MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

* Limited military aid to Southeast Asia to $1-billion, compared with $1.126-billion in fiscal 1974.

* Strengthened the secretary of defense's power to halt exports that would significantly enhance the military potential of Soviet-bloc nations.

* Authorized $77-million for controversial new programs to increase the power and accuracy of U.S. nuclear missiles.

* Required a cutback of 18,000 U.S. support troops in Europe by June 30, 1976, but allowed this to be offset by a corresponding increase in combat troops.

* Barred during fiscal 1975 controversial overland missile tests planned by the Air Force in the Northwest.

* Set the active-duty strength of the armed services at 2,149,300—2,810 fewer than the administration requested.

* Required nuclear propulsion for all future aircraft carriers, submarines and other major combat vessels, unless the President reported that this would not be in the national interest.

* Provided $3-million for development of binary chemical munitions, which after being fired create a lethal nerve gas from two relatively harmless chemicals.

## Procurement Hearings

The Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 5 and 19 and the House Armed Services Committee Feb. 13, 14 and 19 held hearings on the U.S. defense posture. Highlights of the testimony:

— The possibility of a renewed nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union was raised Feb. 5 by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee as he defended the Pentagon's record $85.8-billion defense spending request.

Despite the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement limiting U.S. and Soviet defensive missiles, and the policy of detente with the Soviets and the ongoing SALT negotiations concerning limits on offensive missiles, the Soviets had continued building weaponry with "a depth and a breadth that has been surprising to us," Schlesinger told the committee. "Arms control is a two-way street. We are prepared to go in either direction. The pace set by the Soviet Union will determine" the outcome.

Schlesinger's testimony was followed by that of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on U.S. military posture.

Schlesinger put aside his 24 pages of prepared remarks and spoke extemporaneously for more than an hour. He indicated that the United States was considering building more than the planned 10 new Trident missile-firing submarines—possibly 20 more—"if the Soviets fail to show restraint." But if the Soviets changed their tactics, and as an inducement for restraint, Schlesinger said the Trident building program could be switched to a lighter, shorter-ranged "Narwhal" class of submarine.

Schlesinger left the details of the growing Soviet arsenal to Moorer, but expressed concern that the enemy's new SS-17 and SS-19 offensive nuclear missiles, still under development, could give them by 1980 a nuclear warhead capacity five times that of the United States.

"For the foreseeable future," he said, "we have an appropriate balance of strategic forces." but he warned Congress not to make drastic cuts in the programming for increased "military efficiency" in his department's budget.

including greater spending on the Trident, B-1 bomber, more sophisticated missiles and warning systems and tactical aircraft.

Most of the committee members reacted favorably to Schlesinger's comments, but Stuart Symington (D Mo.) was skeptical. He questioned whether the Pentagon's new counterforce strategy, which retargeted some U.S. missiles against Soviet military installations instead of exclusively on population centers, was a real policy change or a "rhetorical bargaining chip" for the SALT talks. Replying, Schlesinger said it was a real policy change to give the President new targeting options.

He also said that he contemplated no immediate reduction in the U.S. contribution to NATO, although European allies "should do more" for themselves and that it still was too early to gauge the results of the all-volunteer force, but that the latest studies "encouraged" him. Elimination of U.S. land-based missiles in favor of more submarine-launched weapons was "an unwise move," he said, unless the Soviets did the same.

Moorer testified that the United States and the Soviet Union were "in a state of dynamic equilibrium" in terms of strategic arms, but that the Soviet Union had generated a momentum in offensive weaponry that could upset the balance if SALT negotiations failed or if the United States did not continue research and development programs.

"The advantages in the strategic balance which the United States holds over the Soviet Union are primarily qualitative in nature and are in areas of high technology," he said. "But these technological advantages are transitory at best and are partially offset by the larger warhead yields and missile throw-weight (lift-off capacity) of the USSR."

Moorer said that because of the strategic balance, emphasis must be placed on U.S. general purpose forces to defer anything short of all-out nuclear war. His review of general purpose forces concluded that the Soviet Union was closing the "technological gap" with the United States in tanks and other armored vehicles; that it could not match U.S. sea power, and that its tactical air forces held quantitative and qualitative advantages over the United States.

## NAVY TESTIMONY

The United States Navy was standing at its point of "greatest weakness" and "greatest jeopardy" in comparison with Soviet naval forces, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, chief of naval operations, told the Senate Armed Services Committee Feb. 19.

Zumwalt and Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner were testifying in support of the Navy's $29-billion budget request for fiscal 1975.

Zumwalt said his remarks were based on a recently completed review of the U.S. and Soviet navies and that "when I apply the personal assessments of my fleet commanders as to the readiness of the remaining (U.S.) forces to our net assessment, the picture is grim indeed."

The admiral's judgments appeared gloomier than those of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the same committee Feb. 5.

Zumwalt called on Congress to help maintain the momentum in the Navy's fleet modernization budget.

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Arms Procurement - 7

not," Price said. "We must admonish the Air Force and take the necessary action to ensure against subsequent ineffective management. Killing the B-1 may be an answer to the problem but it is not the solution."

Pike later replied that "admonishing the Air Force by hitting them with half a billion dollars is not going to be very bad, as far as the Air Force paying attention."

The House handily rejected Pike's amendment, 94-309. (Vote 156, p. 52-H)

Counterforce Strategy

Bella S. Abzug (D N.Y.) submitted an amendment to prohibit the use of funds in the bill for eight research programs "designed to build counterforce capabilities." The programs totaled $255.4-million and included the Mark-500 warhead for the Trident, improved targeting of submarine-launched missiles and improved accuracy and yield for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Abzug contended that the programs were intended to give the United States a "first-strike" capability to destroy the Soviet Union's retaliatory weapons. The assurance that neither nation had that ability, she said, "is the essence of our long-standing policy of nuclear deterrence.... Are we really naive enough to imagine that, once we embark on this policy, the Soviets will not hasten to emulate and, if possible, overtake us in this race to blow up the world?"

But opponents contended that the programs would enhance deterrence, not impair it.

Price said that the Soviet Union was "engaged in a massive ICBM development program," testing missiles with increased accuracy and payload or "throw weight." If unmatched by U.S. developments, he said, the Soviets would gain "a clear advantage in counterforce capability over the United States.... As a consequence, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent could be questioned and the Soviets would be able to use their strategic advantage for political leverage in their dealings with the United States and our allies...."

The Abzug amendment was defeated, 34-370. (Vote 157, p. 52-H)

Aspin Amendment

A coalition of liberals and fiscal conservatives backed Aspin in his unsuccessful effort to cut $733.1-million from the committee-approved bill by holding procurement at fiscal 1974 levels plus a 7.4 per cent increase for inflation.

In a "dear colleague" letter urging House members to support the amendment, Aspin and 14 co-sponsors said, "the spending levels sought under this amendment could be achieved without touching research and development funds and without canceling a single program."

Signers of the letter, besides Aspin, were John H. Rousselot (R Calif.), James T. Broyhill (R N.C.), Tom Railsback (R Ill.), Richard W. Mallary (R Vt.), Pierre S. (Pete) du Pont (R Del.), John H. Heinz III (R Pa.), Bill Frenzel (R Minn.), John H. Dent (D Pa.), Clement J. Zablocki (D Wis.), Mike McCormack (D Wash.), Frank E. Denholm (D S.D.), James W. Symington (D Mo.), John Brademas (D Ind.) and Otis G. Pike (D N.Y.). During the floor debate, Aspin also listed Frank E. Evans (D Colo.) as a cosponsor.

Hebert disagreed with Aspin's denial that he was espousing "a meat-ax approach." "This is a meat-ax approach and we cannot dress it up in any pretty words." Hebert said, "I appeal to the House, do not destroy the committee system. Do not destroy the power of the Congress to control its own destiny and its own future."

Aspin argued that Congress would not be surrendering any of its authority to the Pentagon, because Congress would have 30 days in which to approve or reject the adjustments proposed by the Defense Department to stay within the ceiling.

But the difficulty of predicting the rate of inflation posed the biggest problem for the Aspin amendment.

Samuel S. Stratton (D N.Y.), a member of the Armed Services Committee, said he recently had attended a Library of Congress seminar where it was stated that current inflation was 11.8 per cent and "all the experts agreed that probably before the end of the year it will be up around 15 or 16 per cent."

A supporter of the 1973 Aspin amendment, John B. Anderson (R Ill.), said he did not anticipate "the astronomical rates of inflation we have suffered since last summer." He said he could not support the ceiling approach again.

Aspin, an economist, said that the relevant index was federal purchases of durable goods, "which is a 6.8 percent increase." He and Rousselot argued that the Pentagon's own figures indicated that a 6 per cent increase in authorizations would offset the effects of inflation, and that the committee's report on the bill cited "nearly 8 per cent" as an appropriate inflation factor. The amendment was rejected, 185-209. (Vote 160, p. 54-H)

Before the bill was brought to the floor, the rule setting the guidelines for the debate was adopted by a 298-0 vote. (Vote 151, p. 52-H)

Senate Committee Action

Citing inflation, "poor program management" and Soviet initiatives in strategic weapons as the principal factors, the Senate Armed Services Committee May 29 in reporting its version of HR 14592 (S 3000—S Rept 93-884) recommended authorization of $1.7-billion more for fiscal 1975 weapons procurement and research than was appropriated for fiscal 1974. The committee vote was 15-0.

Despite the increases, the committee's recommended total of $21,859,712,000 was $1,270,427,000 below the administration's request of $23,130,139,000—a 5.5 per cent reduction—and $783,251,000 below the House-passed version.

In its 190-page report, the committee said that it "must again stress, as it has in the past three years, its concern that the escalating cost of weapons systems and manpower is keeping the defense budget at a consistently high level, a high level which buys fewer weapons and less manpower with each passing year. This year the concern is expressed with a real sense of urgency as the United States is in the grip of the worst inflation since World War II."

But "far too much of the increased cost is directly attributable to poor program management," the report said. While commending the Pentagon for moving to eliminate waste, the committee said that "at today's

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NATIONAL S

President halt such exports of goods and technology if the secretary felt they would "significantly increase the military capability" of the recipient country. The President would have to make the final decision.

Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.), sponsor of the original amendment, argued that "it is only the quality of our weapons, based on our more advanced technology and know-how, which allows us to maintain an adequate military deterrent. If some of the protocols and contracts already signed by American companies with the Soviet bloc are allowed to go through we will have lost a large part of the technological basis for this deterrent."

Jackson said the Commerce Department, which controlled most export licenses, was ill-equipped to assess the military implications of the export of computers and other high-technology products.

He said that a 1974 secret study by the National Security Council concluded that "there is indeed a much larger flow of military-related technology to the Soviets than the government had previously suspected" and that "it is a situation that borders on scandal."

His amendment applied to exports to the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Walter F. Mondale (D Minn.) said that until the enactment in 1969 of the Export Administration Act, which controlled exports of military and strategic goods, there was virtually no trade with the Soviet Union because the Defense Department "saw military significance in practically everything." He said the Jackson amendment would have returned the United States to that situation.

Jackson's amendment caught most senators, including Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.), by surprise when he brought it up Friday, June 7, a day when relatively uncontroversial amendments were being considered.

Mansfield succeeded in delaying a vote on the amendment until June 11 after objecting that "this is a momentous decision, which I do not think we should consider in a haphazard fashion." Mansfield said that the views of President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger should have been solicited.

White House lobbyist Tom C. Korologos said later that the President opposed the Jackson amendment, even though Jackson modified it to provide that the President—and not the secretary of defense—could make the final determination.

A motion by Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R Pa.) to table the Jackson amendment, and thus kill it, was defeated, 40-50, on June 11. (Vote 232, p. 37-S)

Minutes later, the Senate approved, 47-43, a further modification, offered by Alan Cranston (D Calif.), that gave the President the power to block military-related exports, on recommendation of the secretary of defense. Then Jackson's amendment, as amended, was adopted by voice vote. Korologos said the White House regarded the Cranston amendment as an improvement but formally took no position on it. (Vote 233, p. 37-S)

Arms Procurement - 14

MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

* By voice vote June 10 an amendment by Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa) in which the Army Command and General Staff College would be authorized to award the degree of master of military art and science.

* By voice vote June 11, an amendment by Stennis deleting $24.8-million from the bill because the same amount was provided in the fiscal 1974 defense supplemental authorization (HR 12565-PL 93-307) for procurement of long lead-time articles for the Trident submarine program.

* By a 48-43 vote June 11, an amendment by Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.) to prohibit the Defense Department from denying scholarships or other financial assistance solely because the would-be recipient was studying at a college or university that had terminated its Reserve Office Training (ROTC) program. (Vote 235, p. 37-S)

* By voice vote June 11, an amendment by George McGovern (D S.D.) making some 1,700 former U.S. prisoners of war in Southeast Asia, who were being denied the Silver Star and other congressional service awards because of statutory deadlines, eligible for such awards. The amendment provided a one-time, two-year extension of the time limitations.

## Other Amendments Rejected

Among miscellaneous amendments considered and rejected were these:

* By a 27-55 vote June 4, a McGovern amendment to authorize $100-million for Defense Department economic conversion demonstration projects to test the extent to which excess military production capacity could be transferred to the civilian sector. (Vote 215, p. 35-S)

* By a 31-59 vote June 5, a McGovern amendment to reduce by $255-million the $455-million in the bill for development of the B-1 manned bomber. (Vote 219, p. 35-S)

* By a 32-57 vote June 5, an amendment by James Abourezk (D S.D.) to bar military aid to South Vietnam until it gave assurances that it would release by Dec. 31, 1974, all persons imprisoned without court trials. (Vote 220, p. 35-S)

* By a 29-56 vote June 5, an amendment by Jacob K. Javits (R N.Y.) to increase from 30 days to 60 days the interval before funding procurement of the A-10 or A-7 aircraft once a competition between the two was decided if one of the Armed Services or Appropriations Committees objected to the decision. (Vote 221, p. 35-S)

* By an 18-61 vote June 5, an amendment by Harold E. Hughes (D Iowa) to reduce to $11-million, from $38-million, funds for development of a submarine-launched cruise missile. (Vote 223, p. 36-S)

* By voice vote, a Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R Md.) amendment to restore $16-million denied by the Armed Services Committee for initial development of the SSBN-X, a smaller nuclear missile submarine than the Trident.

* By a 64-27 vote, a motion by Stennis tabling a Helms amendment to prohibit the use of federal funds for abortions, abortion referral services, transportation to abortion clinics or for medical assistance or supplies used in connection with abortions. (Vote 237, p. 38-S)

## Conference Action

The conferees reached agreement July 23 on HR 14592 after meeting 15 times since June 30 to reconcile numerous differences between the House and Senate versions of the

bill. House conferees filed their report (H Rept 93-1212) July 24, Senate conferees July 30 (S Rept 93-1038). The final bill authorized $22,159,364,000.

## Aid to Vietnam

The compromise authorized $1-billion as a separate appropriation for Southeast Asia to replace the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. The Defense Department had requested a ceiling of $1.6-billion.

In the House bill, the ceiling had been set at $1.126-billion, and the $263.9-million in items requiring specific authorization had been commingled with other procurement items in the bill. On the other hand, the Senate had lowered the ceiling to $900-million and had required that $212.3-million in new authorization be appropriated.

As a compromise, the House conferees agreed to the separate funding while the Senate conferees accepted the House figure of $263.9-million in new authorizations.

## Troops in Europe

The conference report contained new language requiring a reduction of 18,000 U.S. support troops in Europe by June 30, 1976—6,000 of them by June 30, 1975—and authorizing a corresponding increase in combat troops.

This modified a Senate provision that would have required a 20 per cent reduction (about 23,000 support troops) by June 30, 1976, with half of that to be accomplished by June 30, 1975.

The report said House conferees opposed the Senate provision in its original form because they felt it would undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) position in current talks with the Warsaw Pact nations concerning a mutual reduction of troops in Europe.

House conferees accepted a section of the Senate amendment freezing the number of tactical nuclear warheads in Europe while the secretary of defense studied the role of such weapons. The freeze was set to expire June 30, 1975.

## Overland Missile Tests

Conferees killed, for fiscal 1975, the Air Force's proposed "Great Patriot" project, in which Minuteman Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched from Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont., would pass over parts of five states before crashing into the Pacific.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.) and other northwestern senators strenuously opposed the tests.

The Senate version of the bill deleted $13.6-million for conducting the overland flights and limited Minuteman flight tests to Vandenberg Air Force Base, which is on the Pacific Coast at Lompoc, Calif.

"The House conferees strongly supported the desirability of such realistic testing," the report said. "However, the Senate conferees were adamant. The House, therefore, recedes."

## B-1 Bomber Development

The conference committee accepted the Senate figure of $455-million for three prototypes of the controversial B-1 manned bomber. The House had approved the full $499-million requested by the Air Force, including funds to start a fourth prototype aircraft.

Conferees inserted language to defer the fourth aircraft until after the first one had been successfully flight tested. Funds to begin the fourth prototype then could be requested from reprogrammed funds within the B-1 program.

584-1974 CQ ALMANAC