December 2, 1973

NOTE for --- Mr. Vest, Mr. King, Mr. Hare -- S/PRS
From -- W.P. Brown -- Richard Tyner -- S/PRS
Subject - Attachment --

Attached is a copy of the Secretary's Backgrounder On
Plane - Seoul to Anchorage. You will find this a useful but in-
complete transcription. We have been over the tape three times and
we think that the Secretary's remarks are accurate though there are
a few words of his left out which could not be distinguished on the
tape. The incompleteness of the transcription arises from the fact
that the voices of the reporters are all too frequently unclear or
completely inaudible. This is a most significant press conference
with the insights it gives to the working of the Secretary's mind
as well as to his negotiations on his trip and his policy views.
We think that there should be a complete transcription for operational
purposes and for a historical record. This can be accomplished
by borrowing other available tapes of the conference and working
with reporters who were present, one of whom has already offered
his services. We await further instruction, are making no distribution
and regret that time did not permit us to have this transcription
professionally typed.

[L]

THE SECRETARY'S BACKGROUNDER - ON PLANE - SEOUL TO ANCHORAGE

Note - The general conversation between the Secretary and the members of the press at the beginning of the recording and which is not entirely audible has not been transcribed. Throughout this transcription 'R' stands for reporter and 'S' for the Secretary.

R - In talking to him (Chou) did you get any impression from him that apart from politics he wanted to come to the U.S. to see what it is like ?

S - I couldn't tell you, I really couldn't judge that.

R - He doesn't show any curiosity, he doesn't ask questions ?

S - Oh no, he shows great curiosity about the U.S., but more of an intellectual kind. He doesn't ask what does a street look like in New York, or what would be a good thing to see in Washington.

R - Did the communique have reference to high officials getting together without any geographic limitation ? Is that supposed to leave open the possibility that somebody should come to the U.S. ?

S - Yes, it certainly leaves it open.

R - Anything laid on ? (Kalb)

S - No.

R - Inaudible.

S - No, I don't say it takes an.... of necessity. What you have to do is look at the nuance. In the Shanghai communique it said it would be desirable to stay in contact, it didn't say where the contact was. In fact it was most of the time in Paris or New York through Huang; but from time to time a high U.S. official might come to Peking. In this communique the liasion offices already exist so you you don't have --- you have the advance vis-a-vis the Shanghai communique of liasion offices whose functions are being expanded and nevertheless there is a reference to authoritative visits.
( At this point several reporters make remarks which are not clear enough for transcription.) And then if you noticed, since you have to assume that the Chinese are always very meticulous about words-- there is the first part, I don't have the communique here but the first part of the sentencesays --- when I explain the communique consider it guidance and not authoritative sources --- this can be your own interpretation --- but we in that nomenclature

S - (continues) authoritative level, it says from time to time
for an exchange of views and then it says and without negotiat-
-ing for third parties complete consultations on matters of
mutual concern, so that the exchange of views can affect third
parties complete consultations would be that in the context of
negotiation. You know there are two levels of ... complete
consultations and an exchange of views and the qualification
is referred to the complete consultation.

R - Why is that kind of refinement written in?

S - I must say that I try to be meticulous in drafting but they are
super-meticulous. To them really every nuance has, I have found
leaving aside now this communique that never on any trip to China
does any Chinese of any level say anything to me that doesn't
fit into a central scheme. I may not know that right away but
its usually like a symphony with many instruments, but from the
minute the first protocol girl talks to me on the plane I have a
pretty good idea of what the mood is going to be, and I may not
know exactly how far it is going to go.

R - Do you think that is why some of us might be made to toast no matter what happens in the future or in the Administration ?
We thought you might have been referring to the present difficulties because the people at our table, where Marvin and I were seated, the Chinese were showing a great deal of curiosity.

S - The major question the Chinese ---- see the Chinese conduct a pretty
long range policy and clearly of all the leaders I have met they
are the ones that think in most global terms and also in most long
range terms. Their big concern in their expressions to me --- of
course they have some concern about Watergate but that is sort of
anecdotal or journalistic in the sense that there is nothing we,
can do about it. Their real concern is, is this policy for real
or is this an accident of the President and myself and above all
are the Democrats isolationists. And that is the question I was
asked at very high levels several times.

R - What gives them that impression ?

S - I did not ask them what gave them that feeling.

R - What do they mean by ... isolationists doesn't really have any
meaning. They could have ... in mind ... form ...

[cc]

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S - It depends on how they interpret it. If it means an American withdrawal from Asia to the extent that we are removed as as weight in the scales, that Japan may start running loose, that the Soviet Union may feel we are no longer an Asian power; that is what they must mean by isolationism.

R - several voices --- general inaudible remarks -- no answer to what may have been a question.

R - Maybe I got the wrong impression but I thought the other night you were suggesting you won't be making as many trips to China. I may have heard you wrong. Did I ?

S - You know this depends on circumstances whether I'll make two a year as Secretary of State -- you know this is really off the top of my head now, I have questions.

R - You say you will make two a year ?

S - No, I question whether I make --- I have been making on the average two a year since my first trip. I would now again, you know, barring something unusual needing to be done or things perhaps -- you know I don't want to give a frequency.

R - Would you ask the President go back again for ......... ?

S - Well, I'd like to see how how this normalization is going to proceed over the next months.

R - Mr. Secretary, how do you expect an old Chinese leader such as Chang Kai-shek to regard the series of step by step moves toward rapproachement with Peking ? Do you expect him to be understanding of this or to regard each step as a slap in the face ?

S -- It is a painful process, it is not something that you do with joy. I think we are providing a decent period of transition to a new situation in which the changes will hopefully -- will be -- are still standing for whatever -- for peaceful evolution.

R - Peaceful evolution assuming that both parts of China can make a deal between themselves ?

S - Yes, but the --- I do not have the impression that the PRC will force the issue ?

R - But from the point of view of Chang Kai-shek and Taiwan and the politics in that island how do you really envisage their response to these series of actions ? They are Chinese, they have a matter of face, they have a long sense of history toward the same as the mainland.

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S - Well I will certainly not --- The possibility of their returning to the mainland as the uncontested ruler is ... (unclear - one word).

R - Isn't the deal the most hopeful outcome of this process?

S - It is one possible outcome but we are not pushing it.

R - inaudible ...

S - How Chiang Kai-shek regards this ... (unclear - several voices break in.)

R - inaudible

S - I said we are not pushing any particular arrangements.

R - Could a deal between Taiwan and Peking is one possibility ( inaudible and several voices again break in )

S - No, we quoted verbatim what we said in the Shanghai communique.

R - ... you left out the reduction of forces on Taiwan.

S - The question is did we scale down our position in Taiwan in the communique as compared to the Shanghai communique? We quoted verbatim what we had said in the Shanghai communique about one China, and we made no addition to it. The Chinese --- if you compare the sentence the Chinese used with the sentence in the paragraph they used in the Shanghai communique I think you can draw your own conclusions that this is a very --- you know --- it is a ( reporter cutting in says- its is a very fundamental shift). S - well, I don't want to use the word fundamental shift--- any interpretations of the Shanghai communique though I don't want to have ascribed. Now this communique has anybody got the Shanghai communique ?

R - We did drop the specific language on the deploy of our force level ...

S - We said we would withdraw our forces as conditions in the area eased. We did not We did not reaffirm that. They stated that they are opposed to one China, one Taiwan, two Chinas. They listed only one China can be recognized and so forth. This time they only said that recognition of the principle confirming that there is only one China which we had already said in the previous sentence.

R - Let me ask something about ( inaudible -- several voices )

S - Because we were talking only about the one China, aspect.

R - ... inaudible ... do we and they consider that that sentence that precedes it actually consist of a ... inaudible -- confirming the principle of one China?

S - Thatbis what remains, what remains to be explored by the --- but it comes awfully close. Well, it has certainly been considered.

5.

[Lc]

S - (continues) the past. I don't know whether that particular dinner where you were, Huan Chen (sp?) and many dinners where we happened to be together exchanged notes, --- such as to give you a sense of the elliptical this can't be ( three words unclear) the elliptical nature, at three different dinners he congratulated me on the superb drafting of the Taiwan formula in the Shanghai communique. Let me make some reference at our toasts saying that there was one phrase in particular for which we are grateful to Mr.... unclear ... (several voices cut in)

R - I don't remember that.

R - inaudible--

S - Well, he has done it on a number of occasions. Here the Chinese idea is to reaffirm its position. The Taiwan question is the crucial question of practical normalization of relations, the government of then-PRC is the sole legitimate government of China, Taiwan is a province of China, the separation of Taiwan with China is an internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere. All U.S. (unclear) military (unclear) must be withdrawn from Taiwan, the Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of two Chinas (unclear). Here they say, the Chinese government reiterated its position that the normalization of relations between China can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.

R - Does that mean ... I just want

S - Well, that is what we have to ask --- I can't tell you.

R - When the Canadians established diplomatic relations according to their formula they had to recognize Peking as the sole government of China. As I understand it they did not actually break with Taiwan before Taiwan broke with them. Does this open up the possibility that China would be willing to ---

S - I really, I am not being evasive. It is clearly a different formulation, it is clearly not taken lightly, it was --- our attention was called to it. Now the question is in my experience with them it is a mistake --- a mistake on my part to ask them the questions which you are asking me because now it is up to us to make some sort of a move.

R - Let me ask you --- if you are referring to the toast in which they complimented you on some kind of phraseology can you say what it is.

[L]

S - Yes. The phraseology which we repeated, it is the phraseology
from the Shanghai communique in which we said the U.S. announces/
that all Chinese on either side of the Strait maintain that there
is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. does
not challenge that position.

R - But I get the impression from your conversation about the communique
that most of these words were put in by them.

S - Nollwell.

R - As though you were accepting almost a document that they handed you.

S - No, no, no no, no. What happened was we gave them a document which
they then edited.

R - Are you talking about this recent one ?

S - We gave them a document which they edited in interesting ways.

R - inaudible --- several reporters talking.

S - Yes, but there is now question--- I mean don't go off on that tack
because there is no question in anybody's mind that that is being
maintained. We could not give up on that.

R - Is it a theoretical possibility or is it conceivable ---

S - It was not in the Shanghai communique, it was not in the Shanghai
communique.

R - inaudible --- voices of several reporters and Secretary.

R - That is what you said after you said after the Shanghai press
conference.

S - In the Shanghai press conference I affirmed it just as I am doing it
now.

R - Did your formulation which you initially presented on this point, ...

S - That is from the Shanghai communique.

R - Did you presumably put in something that they should say ?

S - No.

R - They just added this, you didn't have some formulation that this
went beyond or was ...

S - No, I left it up to them what they wanted to say.

R - They just added that sentence directly afterwards and then ...

R - Was it at the expense of dropping something they could have...

S - I tell you my experience with them is totally different from most
negotiations. It isn't bargaining, it isn't bargaining in the way
we do in almost every other negotiation or the way you would do
with the Soviets. You know if you take out a comma in the Soviets

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7

S - ( S continues ) they want a semi-colon. So, and you get a nego-
tiation, and with most other negotiations. But the Chinese I have
found the best tactic is to tell them our real position and make
sure our real position is sensible and they don't bargain like
this, they give us their real position and then we can accept
it or reject it. They may modify it, but they will modify it ---
one good example was during the Shanghai communique. You remember
the first third of it as the section that says --- the U.S. side says,
the Chinese side says. Now the Chinese side in their draft had
a number of sentences that were extremely offensive in a document
to be signed by the President and their leader, even though it was
a Chinese statement. So, I told Chou I'll take out these two
sentences even though I have no right to demand this since it is
your statement I would appreciate it if you would take out these
two sentences and you can take out any two sentences from the U.S.
statement. He said, no, no, no. I said I'll give you any two
sentences from the U.S. statement. He said if you want to give two
sentences from the U.S. statement give them to your President, I
don't want them. If you want our two sentences you will have to
explain to me why it will make the document less useful and if
I agree with you I will take them out. And he took them out without
anything. Now you can say, I don't want to make him sound idyllic
because you can also argue that this part is policy in the long
term because it establishes a claim to noblesse oblige so that
when he really asks for something you can't haggle with him as
much as you would otherwise do. It is a different style of negotiation
so this wasn't that we had to drop something since ....

R - You said that now on the basis of this they are waiting for you to make the next move.

S - I said that it is now up to us to decide what they are going to do.

R - unclear ...

R - What was the implication of the U.S. saying we confirm the principle of one China?

S - Well, lets -- I don't want to say what we are going to do.

R - But there are things you could do ?

S - Yes, our past record has been that each communique has had a

[L.C]

S - (continues) --- practical section and atypical section, that we try to find out as much as we could of the practical and then to try and make a move with the theoretical ones. After the Shanghai communique we firmed up the contact of establish exchanges, established the liaison offices. That was the .... matrix of the Shanghai communique, but we had not agreed on any of them at the Shanghai communique. What we can do with this now remains to be seen.

R - you said in Tokyo that the ---

S - I really, I don't know and you shouldn't overdo it. I am just calling attention to it as, you know, as a road that might be traveled.

R - You said in Tokyo that the importance of that sentence was that it was an affirmation of a principle. Is it theoretically possible that the question of formal diplomatic relations can now be resolved by language rather than some physical action? Is that an of the theoretical possibilities?

S - Or by maybe some less drastic physical action than was taken in any other case.

R - But that also, the language is also one of the possibilities?

S - That I really (unclear) not totally excluded.

R - But what can we hope for over the next few months ...

S - I really will be in a better position. I really want to think about it. I know this was not trivial and in fact we discussed that it was serious. Now how we go -- you know there is no great hurry. I think it is more important to do it right than to think up some gimmic. As we explore it I can talk to you more completely. It will certainly open something, how far and how fast that remains to be seen.

R - Can you go into any more detail now than you did at the briefing we had in Tokyo on the conversation about Indo-China?

S - No, I really have never --- I mean for your guidance, I mean I don't want to have this, say this (Unclear) deep background. I do not have the impression that the Chinese are going to force the mainsail, encourage forcing the pace. Of course that is an impression. I might be wrong.

R - But the pace I gather can be forced with or without the Chinese

[L]

R - continues -- pushing or are they really that closely tied in ?

S - Not that closely tied in, but also not irrelevant.

R - No, hardly irrelevant but can they control an offensive or are they the people who would call it ?

S - It depends what assessment you make on how many supplies there are now in the country and at what level of supplies the NVNese will feel justified in starting an offensive. I have not personally ... (unclear - one word) the Chinese. I have gone through phases. I went through a phase at the end of October when I thought an offensive was maybe 52-48. My present feel, not from Peking, but from just the whole context of information I have available is that it is 55-45 the other way --- against a massive offensive, in this dry season. But you know 55-45 doesn't mean I am wildly optimistic.

R - Did you get any ...... whether or not the Chinese ... inaudible./

S - Well, I can't. I think that is a sort of a basic factor.

R - Do you feel that the trip itself, the meeting, has as a by-product has some usefulness as a deterrent to the Soviets ?

S - Really, we conduct our relations with the Chinese as --- you know you can't say it is an end in itself but not as a means of deterring the Soviets because that would be a damn reckless way of proceeding, and I plan to meet with Dobrynin very shortly after I return. We are not --- this is not an anti-Soviet policy as far as we are concerned.

R - Certainly they must look at your opening toast, for example, and read into that that we are moving as quickly as we can to put our relations with China on as much of an equal footing as our relations are with the Soviets.

S - But they have no right to complain about that. Brezhnev is going to India and we are not protesting about a Brezhnev trip to India.

R - Several voices -- unclear --

S - No, just a general review of the situation.

R - Have you gotten any feeling that the Chinese concern about the Russians has been diminished a bit. They took us to this air raid shelter ... unclear ... the day you had your first talks with Chou.

S - I have never seen it, I have never asked to see it.

R - Don Anderson from the Liasin Office was with us.

S - I have always had the impression that if I asked for it they would show it to me, but I have never felt that I should ask..

R - Let me just finish -- the point of it was that the air raid shelter was a detergent it couldn't protect anybody, it had no food or water in there. It seemed to me that they really didn't believe there would be an attack.

R - Several voices -- inaudible.

S - That I don't agree with .

R - The interesting thing about the air raid thing, David ...

S - I think they believed in the possibility of being attacked..

R - The interesting thing about the shelters, that what they really are are a net work of escape tunnels to get out to the edge of the city. They are all interconnected. They will get you out to the edge of the city.

S - But I say that not on the basis of the conversations in particular but I just thought ...

R - May I raise another subject, namely the ME ?

R - Before you go to the ME .... inaudible --- or will it be satisfactory just to talk with the Israelis ?

S - Look, on this basis I will never be in Washington ( voices -laughter) ....... until somebody kicks me in the teeth I'll be shuttling back and forth. No, if the President --- as you know the President is planning to go to the Soviet Union next summer, that was announced in the last Summit communique. Now it has been habitual that I should go to the Soviet Union some six months before, four to six months before to lay out the framework of the negotiation. In that context and if the Salt negotiations reach a certain point it is possible that I will go to the Soviet Union.

R - What about the ME ? ( several, voices -, not clear)

S - But I will not in the next -- where are we now -- middle of November --- I will not go to the Soviet Union before 1974.

R - Is there any slowing down of Soviet interest in Salt or MFR. The question goes to whether or not the President could get these treaties through Congress even if they went through the process of negotiation .... not clear.

S - But had we a bargain we won't have any trouble getting through Congress. We might get it through uni-laterally. SALT is still in a stage --- first of all it is a damn hard problem, intellectually

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S - continues -- it is a tough problem and we have to say candidly -- you know I take an interest in that beyond my official position because I have been working on SALT since strategic arms limitation since the late fifties. So, I am trying to come up with ideas of my own, apart from what the bureaucracy may disgorge. And I am having a hell of a time thinking not what is negotiable but what is right. What do you really do in a MERVED world that improves the security of all sides? When you had single warheads, when you had numbers you could think it, you know, conceptually you could do it. In a MERVED world you really have a tough intellectual problem. Some of the proposals we made in June which I think were all right, and nevertheless whenever we made them they have already been overtaken by technology on the Soviet side. So on the other hand until the Soviets now put something more complete on the table it's foolish for us to change that position because we will just be making proposal ... unclear ... without eliciting the response. Our negotiators have the sense that in recent weeks the Soviet interest in SALT has picked up. The normal pattern of the way these things have happened is that Dobrynin and I will make an agreement in principle of the direction in which the negotiations are supposed to go and then the negotiators will work out the details. We have not made that agreement in principle, partly because we don't know exactly where to go but even more importantly because I don't think they know where to go. We have a better idea than they do and I think -- they admit that in private conversations, but I think by Christmas, not that we will have solved it, but that by Christmas I think the dimensions of the problem will be clear, or clearer.

R - Is it always true that in these negotiations we have to be more tentative in our proposals? Because of their sensitivity?

S - That is right and we have been. But now we have to find out not specific proposals but what ball park they are interested in or can think about. Then we can make specific proposals.

R - Middle East, Middle East -- we go back to near distance history and to the day of the alert. Could you now tell me what the

R - (continues) ingredients were that prompted the decision --- you mentioned at the time that you might be able to .

S - Let me tell you, let me say something. I am sorry now that I said at that press conference -- that I got carried away at that press conference and that I said I will let you know within a week. The reason I am hesitant to do it is not because we couldn't make a good case. Let me go on deep background with this first to explain my present position. If you look at my press conference I went out of my way not to challenge the Soviet Union. I said there were ambiguous indications. Even though this sort of thing led into your questions because if they were ambiguous maybe we over did it. But I wanted to avoid a situation in which we had confronted the Soviets and faced them down. And then there were other press conferences that made that a little more explicit. Now what I am trying to avoid is a situation where I put out a lot of stuff which I believe will conclusively answer the question that was put to me, but which could not be written in any other way except, they did this, we did that and then they did -- and I don't see what good it would do at this stage when they are very uncertain about my trip through the ME; when they wonder where our whole relationship is going because of the Congressional pressures, if on top of it I gratuitously put out communications. All I can say is that when I met with the House FAC and the Senate FRC I don't think any member questioned the necessity of the alert, after I explained our reasoning to them. I confess I didn't do the right thing by -- I didn't think through where I would be a week after this. I didn't forsee other statements that might be made and I really think at this stage in our relations, when it is more ancient history when we are back, that is my real concern about it. I can tell you that when we woke up Wednesday morning we had no idea that by mid-night we would be in a crisis; but during the day there was an accumulation military intelligence that at first we didn't pay too much attention to which was followed by an escalating set - number of diplomatic moves in a very short period of time culminating in one that one simply couldn't ignore when there were so many military indicators going with it. Either one of these things apart you could have ignored. That was the situation on Wednesday night.

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[Lc]

R - Could you give us that one ?

S - The one what ?

R - You said it culminated in --

S - Well it culminated in many news stories about it in a rather explicit communication.

R - You mean those to Brezhnev ?

S - Yes.

R - Is any part of the decision at all on the alert a part of a feeling to demonstrate to the Soviets that we had not been weakened in any way ?

S - I, when you deal with the President you can never be sure what is in his mind in addition to what he says. The sequence was that when the communication came in he was informed. I then convened the NSC without him to go through what everybody thought. We distributed all the communications we had received during this whole crisis not everyone which had been seen by everybody there so that every man who was in this room could judge by himself whether that was an unusual communications or just a slightly more nervous and the unanimous opinion was that this was an extremely serious matter. Then it was the recommendation was made and approved. Now whether additional advantages were seen in it I --- in that while evening the domestic situation was not discussed once. As far as my own perception of the domestic situation was concerned you have to remember one thing, that Saturday night events that roiled Americans so much happened when I was in Moscow. And the first I heard about their dimensions, about the intensity of the reaction was at mid-night Monday at the London airport when we got English newspapers and we said, good God. I mean off the record the way I found out about this is after I had met Brezhnev I called Haig. It was three in the morning Moscow time, it was about eight o'clock Washington time, and I told him about some crappy problems that I had and I said, get off my back with that crappy problem. And he said I have so many problems of my own that I don't want you to yell at me.

I said, what problems could you have on a Saturday night ? And that is when I found out. So you know the State Department group was living in a different world that you were and therefore your questions were more shocking to me than they should have been had I been here from Sunday on.

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14

R - Let me ask you --

S - We had no perception. I mean we knew what had been done but we didn't know what the reaction was.

R - Going back to Wednesday night -- the device that got everybody off the hook was that non-aligned resolution at the Security Council.

S - Not at all. That night the demands in the SC kept escalating. This is what made it eerie. First, there was just going tombe an affirmation of the ceasefire. Then there was an expeditionary force. Then it was to be an expeditionary force including Soviet and U.S. -- that came as a separate proposal. The next morning we took the position that --- we immediately took the position also in our reply that no Soviet and U.S. forces could go in. We put that formally on Thursday morning and that was accepted, but I learned about its acceptance right after the press conference. When I was told that the Soviets had accepted it. Now they might have accepted it during the press conference.

R - But on Wednesday night you thought the non-aligned resolution might not get through? — The Emergency Force

S - The emergency force for what the Soviets accepted from my information around one o'clock but you can check what time it was accepted, was the exclusion of the permanent members from the emergency force.

R - So you thought on Wednesday night when the non-aligned resolution was tabled that it might be a device to get the Soviet Union in ?

S - several voices -- inaudible -- There was one mistake we made about the alert. We did not think it would become public because we had been on alert in the Jordan crisis in 1970 -- or we didn't think it would become public so fast. In the Jordan crisis in 1970 we had also been on alert and I don't think total alert. I think Alaska and the Canal Zone were not on alert but---

R - It was not a global alert. (several voices - inaudible)

S - We were basing it on the last experience we had had. We were once during this Administration on a SACK alert which didn't get in the press at all. We were once in this Administration in 1970 on an almost global alert in the areas that were not included, really probably should not have been included in this one either, and that didn't get into the papers for two days and never as a global alert. It only got into the papers at that time with the 32nd

15.

[L.C]

15

S - (continues) - airforce being on alert and so when we went on alert we wanted the Soviets to notice it, but when I woke up, I got to bed at about three or three-thirty I醒了, I got up at seven and turned on the TV, I thought good God. So that was a slip-up.

R - Let me ask --- inaudible and Sec. cuts in ...

S - It may seem inconceivable but it is true.

R - Inaudible.

S - Well, I will have to study to what extent this alert went beyond the 1970 alert. I had in the back of my mind that the practical consequences would be like September 1970 暴動 that people would see the 82nd airforce go on alert, see this until go on alert but I did not think we would hit the newspapers the next morning with a global alert.

R - --- Having created that impact ... people putting water in their bath tubs that day ... that atmosphere ... inaudible ... lay it out to the American people even though it might create some problems with the Soviet Union ... inaudible.

S - Well, if you are talking philosophically and I know in this present mood this is not. I think there has to be a minimum of ... on the part of the people that their government would not play with their lives frivously and that therefore since the peace of the world depends more on some stability in our relations with the Soviet Union we have felt that should be our first order of business. And after that sometime when it becomes history then you can go back to it in the context of some positive momentum. But you know the Soviets --- I don't know whether the Soviets were -- you know--- it is not inconceivable to me that the Soviets felt -- I mean if you look at it from the Soviet point of view I am in Moscow. I go to Tel Aviv. Four hours after I leave Tel Aviv the Israelis jump up and back the Egyptian army. Now can you imagine Gromyko after I make a deal with Brezhnev, imagine Gromyko had come to Washington, had gone from Washington to Cairo and four hours after he leaves Cairo the Egyptians jump up and back the Israeli army. And then the United States doesn't move heaven and earth to get that blockade lifted? You know you might say they weren't all that rational either on that Wednesday.

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16

R - What was the affection on the Soviets? Did you have any reaction?

S - Well, I think the Soviets have this -- the Soviets -- you look at the combination that they are now facing in the U.S. --- of the combination of the protest against their treatment of Soviet intellectuals, the treatment of the MFN question, the culminating confrontations on the ME, the role they are going to have to play now in the ME negotiations. They could be very uneasy. Dobrynin said to me on one occasion that in many ways their public position in the U.S. is worse now than it was at the height of the Cold War, because the people who use to defend them during the Cold War, namely the liberal intellectuals are in a period of detente attacking them more than they ever did, and that is a very serious problem. And we have been assuming that this detente was just a period drawn interest on and we could pile a lot of other things on it.

R - largely inaudible --- concerns Israeli elections.

S - No, the schedule is still

R - I know for the peace conference, it is on target but --

S - I haven't ever left any doubt in anybody's mind that in my judgment it will require an Israeli government with a popular mandate to make the tough decisions. This is not new, I have said this from my first contact with every Arab leader and I believe that the only --- I can't outbid either the Arab radicals or the Soviets if they want to play around. The only contribution I can make to the negotiation is to be the one man who may be in a position to deliver what he says, and therefore it is extremely important that I never say anything that can't be realized. So it is a lot better for me to give a realistic time table that then happens then to hold out a lot of vague promises which just puts me into the league with a lot of other guys making vague promises.

R - Do you feel--- what of the criticisms of the ---occasionally in the papers of the possible inter-relationship between Watergate and foreign policy --- has been, it would harm or effort to deliver on our promises? Do you feel that this trip since it has been as productive as it has been has had a peripheral --- literally been of benefit to the Administration in the sense that it has

R - (continues) -- demonstrated some ability to deliver on --

S - You mean abroad ?

R - Yes.

S - Abroad other countries have to look at the reality of the power of the US and the continuity of the US, and in the conduct of foreign policy I think this is our paramount -- has to be our paramount concern. Three years is nothing in the history of people and therefore our principal goal on these trips is, or in the whole conduct of foreign policy, is to do something that others will want to carry on. If we can't do that it will just be a comment no matter what is achieved, and that is why I am making such an effort on the Hill and with many Democratic Senators and also with the institutionalization of policy in the Department of State. It is a very profound conviction. Now whether it helps the President at any particular moment that will be a blip in newspapers. It is not the key issue that should concern us. My own personal view is that Watergate is beyond foreign policy but that I don't want written.

R - For example in Time and News Week this week --

S - It is not effective basically one way or the other.

R - How do you explain the war powers bill ?

S - Negatively, yes.

R - inaudible --

S - I am saying that it is foolish. I do not recall, I cannot think of one thing that has begun in foreign policy that was done in order to alleviate Watergate, take attention away from Watergate and so forth. It is a drama that takes place independent of foreign policy. It affects foreign policy in so far as it affects other peoples' perceptions. As I said in that -- you know on April 23rd when I made that Atlantic speech and when I thought all there was to it would be, who bugged the Democratic headquarters I said the issue is what will foreign people think of our ability to act over a period of time.

R - Doesn't Watergate give you more freedom in the sense -- this is an upside down point of view. Doesn't Watergate give you more freedom for creative foreign policy in the sense that the Administration isn't terribly successful domestically ?

R - (continues) that, you know, putting it in a judgment
but ---

S - No, I think in foreign policy you have to say, if you look
at it since 1969 the attempt has been to do what was right as
it was perceived.

R - If you look for example at my point, if you look at Time and
News Week this week the story about your trip appears before
any news about Watergate in both magazines which is sort of
an interesting example of that fact that -- you know -- in a
week that was full of Watergate developments foreign policy
was able to hold ---

S - Because foreign policy in one sense is a national activity.
I mean it affects the whole nation.

R - But it has become crucial to the Administration, hasn't it ?

S - Yes, but what I am trying to fight is the idea that because of
Watergate the foreign policy the Administration is now putting
on a spurt in foreign policy. That is simply not the case. You
look at the events that triggered this trip and those events
have been on reality.

R - I wondered ...... inaudible .... SALT.... end of Brezhnev's term..

S - It is a very good point. We have found the principle, you know,
in future Administrations from '77 on, every President will
conduct foreign policy in his own style. In this Administration
it has been found and with this Soviet leadership it has been
found helpful to have a top level channel between the top leaders
which in practice was operated by Dobrynin and myself in which
agreements in principle were achieved, in which ideas could be put
forward free from the bureaucratic rigidities of both sides..
If Dobrynin left tomorrow it would be very hard to reconstruct
this unless they found another man. It is not the habit of Soviet
diplomats to proceed with tactical flexibility.

R - inaudible ---

S - No, he assumed that Dobrynin would leave fairly soon. I do not
believe Dobrynin will leave before the next Summit.

R - Inaudible --

S - Well, you know one doesn't preculate the other. We will appoint an
Ambassador to Moscow before the end of this year.

R -

19.

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19

R - It will be a whole year though --- inaudible.

S - I was committed to two months from my confirmation but something funny happened in the ME and Matt Davis is on the plane to help me keep that promise.

R - Inaudible --

S - I was confirmed, I was sworn in on September 24th. I'll miss it by a month maybe. I will have it done by the end of this year.

R - inaudible --

S - I hope by the end of this month I'll have a fair number of announcements to make.

R - Mr. Secretary could you summarize for us your own ...... inaudible Middle East, China and Japan ?

S - Well, I can't say much that I haven't already said in many different ways. In the ME when I left the ceasefire was coming apart and the problem was to get not only the ceasefire stabilized but to get it stabilized in such a way that one could move as rapidly as possibly to peace negotiations, given the messy situation in the ME, given the fact that these parties are not known for a spirit of compromise, however have nevertheless fairly steadily moved towards implementing those Six Points and towards the peace negotiations. In China we wanted to see whether we could make another step forward on the road to normalization both conceptually and practically and I think that was more or less accomplished together with the regular exchanges of views that always take place. And in Japan and Korea -- at this point the tape ended --

W.P. Brown - Richard Tyner -- S/PRS

NEWS

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

RELEASE

Department of State
Office of Media Services

[LC]

Press Conference

SECRETARY KISSINGER ON
NEW STATE DEPT. APPOINTMENTS
AND MIDDLE EAST

December 6, 1973

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press conference by Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State, December 6, 1973,
in the International Conference Room of the
Department of State, Washington, D.C.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With your agreement, ladies and gentlemen, I thought we could do the press conference in two parts. As you know, some appointments were announced at the White House -- [interrupted by sound of tape recorder rewind] -- I have known about the Washington Post all along [Laughter], but this is the first time they carry it into a press conference. [Laughter]

MR. MARDER: We are doing a tape on you, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought this was a tape of one of your editorial
conferences. [Laughter]

MR. MARDER: No -- that would come through much more clearly. No need
to stop.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not on your editorial page.

Some appointments were announced at the White House this morning. I
thought I'd go over those briefly for the benefit of this group, take some
questions about those appointments, and then go on to the substantive part,
if that is agreeable to you.

Now, with respect to the announcements that were made at the White
House today, a total of nine nominations were announced -- three ambassa-
dorial and six Departmental.

The President has nominated the following as Ambassadors: DAVID POPPER as Ambassador to Chile, DAVID NEWSOM as Ambassador to Indonesia, and WALTER STOESSEL as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Popper is currently Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
national Organization Affairs. In this position, he did a distinguished
job in handling the Middle East at the United Nations from this end. He is
a Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Career Minister, and served
previously as Ambassador to Cyprus.

David Newsom, who is currently Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, is being nominated to succeed Francis Galbraith as Ambassador to

12/6/73

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Indonesia. As you know, Ambassador Newsom has served admirably in his current position in bringing the importance of Africa to the attention of the country, and in conducting his office in a manner which won him the award, the 1973 Rockefeller Public Service Award yesterday, of which the Department of State is extremely proud.

As Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the President is nominating Walter Stoessel, an old friend -- if I may say so, student -- from Harvard. He has had extensive experience in European and Soviet affairs since entering the Foreign Service in 1942. His nomination underlines the importance we attach to the Ambassadorship in the Soviet Union.

Now, turning to Departmental appointments. As Counselor of the Department of State, the President intends to nominate HELMUT SONNENFELDT. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is a Class One Foreign Service Officer, has been a close associate of mine on the National Security Council staff. Prior to that, he has held a number of positions in the Department of State. He was recently confirmed by the Senate Finance Committee for the position of Under Secretary of Treasury. He will work as Counselor, obviously, on such matters as may be assigned to him, but he will particularly concentrate on European relations, SALT, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the sort of problems he worked on also previously.

As Ambassador-at-Large, the President is nominating ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, presently Ambassador to Cyprus. I do not have to introduce Ambassador McCloskey to this group. He will be given various negotiating responsibilities and other assignments on an ad hoc basis. In addition, he will have overall supervision of the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Congressional Relations, and the Office of Press Relations.

As Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, the President is nominating DONALD B. EASUM, presently Ambassador to Upper Volta, with considerable experience in both African and Latin American affairs, and one of the ablest young Foreign Service Officers.

As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the President is nominating ARTHUR HARTMAN to succeed Walter Stoessel. Mr. Hartman is presently Deputy Chief of Mission to the European Community, he worked in the State Department Secretariat, and has wide experience in European affairs and a good background in economic matters.

As Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the President is nominating WILLIAM B. BUFFUM, presently Ambassador to Lebanon. He has had exceptional experience in the U.N. and international organization affairs.

As Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, the President is nominating THOMAS ENDERS to succeed Willis C. Armstrong. Mr. Armstrong has served as the head of this Bureau with distinction since he returned from retirement in 1972.

Mr. Enders is presently our Chargé in Phnom Penh, one of the ablest young Foreign Service Officers, who has, under extremely difficult conditions, performed in a remarkable fashion in Phnom Penh. He has also an exceptional record in the economics field.

I would like to say a word about two fine officers who have elected to resign from their posts. WILLIAM CASEY, Under Secretary for Economic

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Affairs, has informed me of his intention to assume the position of President of the Export-Import Bank. As you know, this is a most prestigious and important post, one well suited for a man of such exceptional talents as William Casey. I regret that he is departing, but wish him every success in his new assignment.

JOSEPH SISCO's resignation as Assistant Secretary of State and retirement from the Foreign Service were announced yesterday. I need hardly emphasize how deeply I regret his departure. His career has been characterized by tireless work and splendid performance. In the last two months, Mr. Sisco has been an invaluable source of strength for this country, for the President, for the Department, and for me personally. He has agreed to remain in his present assignment for another several months before going on to assume the Presidency of Hamilton College.

I intend to recommend to the President individuals to succeed Messrs. Casey and Sisco in the near future.

Now, I will be glad to take some questions on personnel, and then I will go on to substantive questions. Do you want to wait for that?

Q A question on personnel. You had expected to name an Ambassador to Tokyo shortly. What's the outlook for that now?

A I nearly said within a week. (Laughter) We consider the Embassy in Tokyo one of the most important assignments in the Government, and we are looking for the best man. We are not yet ready to make an announcement.

Q Has the President withdrawn Mr. Sonnenfeldt's nomination as Under Secretary so there won't need to be a vote in the Senate? And will he have to be confirmed by the Senate for the new job?

A He will have to be confirmed by the Senate for the new job. He will be put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and after that the entire Senate will have an opportunity to vote on Mr. Sonnenfeldt, and we are confident that a man of his distinction will be confirmed rapidly.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there is now no Ambassador to Sweden, or even a DCM. Is it your intention to fill that post?

A I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would review the question of relations with Sweden at the time that we are reviewing all other Ambassadorial appointments. And I will keep that promise.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the light of Mr. Sisco's distinguished service, can you tell us what efforts were made to hold him, to retain him?

A Mr. Sisco felt that he was -- of course, Mr. Sisco should speak for himself. My understanding is that Mr. Sisco felt that he was at a time in his life where, if he ever was going to make a change to a senior administrative position in academic life, this was the appropriate moment to do it, and maybe the last moment to do it.

I attempted to dissuade him from this. He has assured me that it was only the importance of the assignment on which he was working that made him hesitate.

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I can only emphasize again that I'm losing a trusted colleague and a valued friend. But I'm also certain that he will be consulted frequently.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you explain how Secretary Shultz was persuaded to defer taking Mr. Sonnenfeldt as his Under Secretary of the Treasury and what criteria were behind the Administration's decision to take him into the Department of State instead?

A Well, Mr. Sonnenfeldt, as those of you who know him can confirm, is not exactly a chattel that gets passed from hand to hand, and he has been known to express strong views about what he would intend. So finally the decision was left up to Mr. Sonnenfeldt. It was thought that, given the extraordinary importance that we attach to the SALT talks, to the MBFR discussions, and to our relationship with Europe, and given the policy of having some individuals on the Seventh Floor responsible for the range of issues of interdepartmental significance, that Mr. Sonnenfeldt had unique qualifications for that position.

I'm delighted that I managed to persuade him to accept this position. Secretary Shultz would have been delighted, as he should have been, to have Mr. Sonnenfeldt associated with him at the Treasury, but he recognized also that Mr. Sonnenfeldt can make a very major contribution here.

Now, let me turn to substance. Let me make a few comments on the Middle East and on my forthcoming trip, and then let me answer your questions.

On the Middle East, the last time I met with this group I indicated that we might be able to make a formal announcement as to the time and place of the conference in a relatively brief period of time. I seem to have an obsession with weeks, and I think I indicated that it would be done in a week.

The fact is that we consider it extremely probable that the conference will begin on December 18 in Geneva. There are some technical details to be worked out as to the form of invitation, as to the nature of the invocations, and matters of this kind. We believe them to be relatively easily soluble, and we're in touch with the parties now as well as with the Soviet Union and the Secretary General to work out the appropriate procedure. But we have no reason at this point to doubt that the conference will take place in the manner in which I have indicated.

We believe that once the conference starts a negotiating process will be under way which, dealing first with issues of a military nature and then turning to the overall settlement, will bring about a settlement in accordance with (U.N. Security Council) Resolution 242. And the United States, as I have stated repeatedly, will use its influence to bring about such a settlement.

With respect to my trip to the NATO meeting, obviously there has been some disagreement. Equally clearly, the Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone of our foreign policy, and I'm going there with the attitude that the need for starting and for giving a new impetus to the Atlantic relationship remains and that the United States will spare no effort to inject new vitality, creativity, and hope into the Atlantic relationship. I'm not going in an attitude of confrontation and acrimony.

I'll be glad to answer questions.

[Lc]

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Q In light of the breakoff of Kilometer 101 talks, the Israeli forces being in a high state of alert, the continued oil squeeze, what reasons, as specific as you can be, do you have for expecting a constructive peace conference in Geneva?

A The Kilometer 101 talks concerned the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. And while we regret that they have been broken off, we believe that the issues that were raised at this conference are soluble and can be dealt with particularly when other countries can play a more active role in relation to them.

The high state of alert of both sides is, to a considerable extent, produced by the military dispositions that now exist. Both sides have their forces in the rear of the other. And both sides are in danger of imminent encirclement if military operations resume. Therefore, the penalty for being surprised is extremely serious. This calls attention to the fact that there is a need of a separation of forces that reduces this danger. And I believe that the experience of the last two months will have brought this home to both of the parties.

With respect to the oil embargo, I have stated our position at the last press conference, which is that we understand the Arab point of view. The United States prior to October 6 perhaps did not see the situation with the same degree of urgency as some of the Arab countries. And we can understand also the decisions that were made during military operations.

Now that the United States is taking an active part in the negotiations and has affirmed that it will work for an implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, we continue to believe that discriminatory measures against the United States and pressures are no longer appropriate, and we are talking in that sense to those Arab nations with which we are in contact.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've spoken with regard to your NATO visit, the obvious disagreements which exist there. Of course, you've got the biggest piece of real estate pulled out of there sometime ago as far as the military went to France. Now, you've had the damage -- if such is the right word -- damage done by the different view some of the NATO countries took of the Middle East situation than we did.

My question is: How easy -- and this is difficult to say; I know -- but how easy do you think that this can be repaired? And how much will it depend not on what you do at NATO now, but what you do at Geneva later?

A First, it is clear -- as I pointed out last time -- that there are a number of significant disagreements in the Alliance -- some of them produced by style, some of them produced by the fact that some of our Allies have been absorbed with bringing about European unity, while we have naturally put more emphasis on Atlantic unity, and some of them produced by a different view with respect to Middle East policy.

I believe that we will be able in the discussions -- taking the last point first on the Middle East -- to make clear that this was not a difference in tactics but perhaps a different assessment as to what was at stake -- the relationship between what was at stake to the energy crisis, and the possibilities that existed for individual action.

I believe that the discussions that may take place at NATO can contribute

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to clarifying the points of view. In any event, whatever happens at the NATO meeting can only be the beginning of a process; it cannot bring about a final resolution.

Now, obviously, what happens in the Middle East -- even more importantly, the perceptions of the two sides about the relationship of what happens in the Middle East to their energy problem -- will greatly affect the vitality of the relationship in the long term. We believe that the energy problem is accentuated by the Arab-Israeli conflict but that it has much deeper sources, the most important of which is that demand has outrun the incentives for supply and that it is an aspect of the rapid industrialization of the developed nations.

Q Mr. Secretary, you were told earlier this week that the 101 talks might be resumed by week's end. Now, probably something has happened to change your estimate of that; and we hear that the Israeli Defense Minister may be delayed in getting to Washington to talk to you. And we hear about reports today of Israeli and Egyptian planes being shot down.

What has happened, and do you think it now likely that the cease-fire could come apart and jeopardize the holding of that conference?

A In a situation in which the forces are as closely mixed as they are and in which we, of course, do not control the decisions of either side, any prediction is somewhat hazardous. We do not believe that the cease-fire will come apart and that the conference will be jeopardized. But, I must repeat: I must add the caveat that we do not, of course, control the decisions.

As for the delay of the arrival of the Israeli Defense Minister, all I have is the news ticker. I don't know what caused it. We have not been officially informed that he is, in fact, delaying his arrival; and I expect to get some official notification, if there is a delay in his meeting with me -- which was scheduled for tomorrow -- later in the day.

The resumption of the 101 talks really depends on the assessment both sides make of what should be done in the 101 talks and what should be done later at the conference. This is no conclusive indication of the difficulty of making progress; it may simply be a decision as to the venue at which some of these issues will be discussed.

Q Sir, do you expect the 101 talks to resume before December 18th, or do you think that whole operation will be transferred to Geneva?

A I am not sure whether they will be resumed. It is one of the issues we want to discuss. At any rate, the subject matter of those talks -- if the talks are not resumed before Geneva -- will, of course, require the most urgent consideration at Geneva.

Q Mr. Secretary, since you have two job descriptions, but basically this single function of being the architect of U.S. foreign policy, I'm wondering if Henry Kissinger, as Secretary of State, now finds himself at odds with Henry Kissinger of the NSC (National Security Council) on the question of what is properly held secret.

And this is by way of asking if the Secretary of State is now prepared to tell the nation in precise detail the reasons for the October alert when perhaps the Chief of the Security Council is not.

A You're trying to institutionalize schizophrenia.

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[LC]

The hesitation about going into all the details was produced by the fact that we did not think that it would be helpful in the present situation, when we're trying to bring about a settlement cooperatively with the Soviet Union, to recreate a spirit of confrontation of a rather intense 36-hour period.

As many news reports have pointed out, we formed the view, on the basis of evidence that seemed to us conclusive, that there was a possibility of a unilateral Soviet move in the Middle East. And this was reinforced by certain communications that we received.

A military alert, moreover, should be clearly understood. We went from Defense Condition 5 to Defense Condition 3 -- Defense Condition 1 is imminence of hostilities. So this was not a very high state of alert; it is the state of alert in which the Pacific Command is at all times. So there was no additional alert taken in the Pacific. The Strategic Air Command is always in Defense Condition 4, so that was only a slight increase in its readiness. And all an alert does is to prepare our forces in case they would be needed; it has no other practical consequence.

It was produced by what we thought would have been a very significant move, the first time that Soviet combat forces were introduced in an area not contiguous to the Soviet Union, and for reasons not connected with the preservation of a socialist regime. And, therefore, it was a matter taken extremely seriously.

We have never published the details of correspondence between the President and the General Secretary (Brezhnev) because, if we once start this process, every exchange will be written from the point of view of its impact later. And we have given as much of our reasoning as we could, and we have given a more detailed chronology to certain Congressional committees.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I would like to get back, if I could, for a moment to the oil situation, which is such a vital concern of the American people. There have been a number of reports in the last day or so that there may be consideration of a phased return of oil supplies to the United States in return for a phased Israeli withdrawal. Now, you yourself are reported to have indicated to Egyptian President Sadat on your last trip that any Middle East settlement is likely to take a fairly long period of time, perhaps as long as a year or two. In view of that, is the phased withdrawal idea the best hope that the American people have of getting a return of these vital oil supplies?

A First of all, when I saw President Sadat, we were alone. And what you are referring to is a conversation at a dinner party with an Egyptian editor of a somewhat enthusiastic frame of mind. You cannot conclude from that that this is necessarily the discussion I had with President Sadat.

We have not engaged in a public discussion as to the methods by which the oil embargo might be mitigated, because we recognize that this is also a difficult problem for the Arab countries that have to make the decision.

Our basic philosophy was stated in the last press conference here, which is that we do not think it is helpful for us to negotiate -- prior to a conference which will address these questions -- a separate agreement relating oil to particular issues at the conference table. And I have stated our general philosophy earlier.

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Q Mr. Secretary, have you detected any change in the Arab policy on oil?

A I think we will have to let events speak for themselves. You all heard Minister Yamani when he appeared yesterday. And while we are in the process of engaging in these discussions, before my trip I don't think I want to speculate on that.

Q Mr. Secretary, on another subject -- we have seen a resurgence of military activity in Viet-Nam. Do you foresee any possible introduction of U.S. combat forces in Viet-Nam, either through use of the War Powers legislation or through any other form of current or future legislation?

A With respect to the War Powers legislation, there has been speculation that the War Powers legislation supersedes existing legislation. It is a question that was asked of me in executive session in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would make a legal study. Our legal adviser has concluded that the War Powers legislation does not supersede any existing legislation, and we will notify the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to that effect in a formal letter.

Therefore, any military action that would be contemplated would be taken only in accordance with the provisions of both the Joint Resolution and existing legislation -- in other words, would be fully discussed by the Congress.

Q Does that mean, sir; that if there was a decision by the Administration to reintroduce forces, that it would seek new legislation, or simply consult over the existing status. I don't quite follow you -- because the existing legislation, I believe, does foreclose the reintroduction of any U.S. combat forces into Indochina.

A Without congressional approval -- that is correct. And that is what we would seek.

Q Would that require new legislation in your judgment?

A I think it would require whatever form the Congress expresses its approval. But we do not foresee this as an imminent possibility.

Q Mr. Secretary, with the confirmation of a new Vice President, there is increased congressional discussion about the possibility of impeachment of the President or of the President possibly resigning. How does this discussion of impeachment and resignation affect the conduct of foreign policy?

A Well, I have pointed out at two previous press conferences that the constant -- to the degree that the authority of those who have the constitutional responsibility for conducting foreign policy is being drawn into question by whatever process, it complicates the task of foreign policy and it creates long-term dangers.

I might say one other thing -- one thing to Mr. O'Leary, which is that as Secretary of State, as I said in my confirmation hearing, and as I have attempted to practice, I do recognize the importance of openness and of maximum disclosure.

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Q May I follow this up. You mentioned Sheikh Yamani. When he came out I think he said that once Israel had agreed to a timetable and begins to pull back, the restrictions on the oil shipments would be gradually eased. It seems it may be an ambiguous statement. How do you understand that? Does Israel have to agree to the total pullback although only taking initial steps before the shipments are partially resumed?

A Well, I think also that the Minister pointed out that we both expres-
sed our views frankly and I believe he said constructively, which usually
means that we did not necessarily agree to each other's formulas precisely.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A I don't know why I keep calling on former student. Go ahead, Les.

Q Two brief questions. One -- the Soviet Union has more or less slipped into the background of the Middle East diplomacy.

A Has done what?

Q Has more or less slipped into the background of the Middle East diplomacy. What sort of helpful role are they playing in this conference between the Israelis and the Arabs? The second question is -- I noticed in your explanation of Departmental appointments that you frequently used the word "young", and that indeed many of the people you are appointing are relatively junior Foreign Service Officers. Are you signaling something to the senior Foreign Service Officers?

A With respect to the first question -- as I pointed out at previous press conferences, the Soviet Union, as I suppose all participants in the diplomacy in the Middle East, have various incentives produced by their existing associations. We did not consider some of the actions that the Soviet Union has taken constructive. We believe that in setting up the conference, and in helping to define possible agendas, participation, framework, the Soviet Union has played a constructive role. A settlement in the Middle East cannot be carried out without the Soviet Union -- the principal supplier of arms to several of the participants -- and given its close association with and friendship with several of the countries. And if the Soviet Union attempted to push extremist solutions, it would make a settlement extremely difficult.

Now, up to now most of the discussions have been procedural. And I
cannot form a final judgment as to what the Soviet Union will do once the
conference has actually opened. As far as we are concerned, we will try to
give maximum encouragement to a moderate course, and we will cooperate if
a moderate position is adopted. And if the behavior in the procedural phase
is carried out over into the substantive phase, then I think it will be
extremely helpful.

As far as the Departmental appointments are concerned, I stated from
the beginning that it is one of my principal objectives in coming to the
Department of State not simply to conduct foreign policy effectively from
my office, but to create a tradition in the Foreign Service and a discipline
so that future administrations can rely on this organization, and so that
the debate that has gone on where the locus of foreign policy responsibility
should be, will be settled by the professionalism, the discipline, and the
dedication of the existing institution. And therefore I am trying to se
to it -- and my associates, the new Deputy Under Secretary for Management,
the Director General of the Foreign Service, are fully supporting it -- to
see to it that younger officers are promoted rapidly and get into key posi-
tions. There is no disrespect to other officers who will be judged on their
performance and not on their age.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you and other officials have pointed out that the United States is the one country in touch with all sides in the Middle East. You also pointed out in your last press conference, which you quoted here, that if the oil embargo continues for any length of time, the United States would have to consider counter-measures. Would the United States consider withdrawing from Middle East diplomacy if this oil embargo continues?

A The particular answer to which you refer occurred about two-thirds through the press conference as a response to questions. It was not volunteered by me.

What the United States might do if other countries treat it unreasonably, or what we consider unreasonably, we will leave until that situation arises.

We believe very strongly that a constructive settlement in the Middle East will not result from an attitude of confrontation between the Arabs and the United States, but from an attitude of cooperation between the United States and Arab countries. And this is the attitude with which we are approaching the negotiation.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you perceive is going to be the role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the conference? Do you expect them to participate from the start of the conference, or do you leave this to the parties to decide?

A The question of the Palestinians has at least three aspects. One is, who speaks for the Palestinians in general. Secondly, what is their relationship at the conference to Jordan, to Israel and the other parties. And thirdly, what are the concrete terms that are going to be advanced for the solution of the Palestinian question.

Our view is, with respect to the participation of the Palestinians, and the role they might play at the conference, that this would best be settled by the parties at the conference. With respect to the specific terms, this of course also will have to be discussed at the conference. Some relationship will have to be found between the rights of Palestinians, to which the United States has made reference in several international documents, and the limitations of absorption in the mandated territory of Palestine.

Mr. Gwertzman.

Q Mr. Secretary -- I am just trying to get one question in here.

A Go ahead.

Q A year ago at this time you were deeply engaged in Viet-Nam negotiations. It was rather secret, with a sort of semi-public aspect to it. How do you find yourself at this time in the Middle East diplomacy -- what differences do you find in the two situations -- and do you expect, once the negotiations start, that there will be both a highly secret aspect as well as a sort of public forum?

-11-

[LC]

A Anyone who has to negotiate with three Vietnamese and five Middle East parties in one year qualifies for some sort of medical help after some period.

But there are a number of differences.

In Viet-Nam we were one of the principal parties and our actions could directly control major decisions. In the Middle East, this is not the case. In Viet-Nam, the issues, while extremely complex, were nevertheless rather finite. In the Middle East, they affect many other nations, and they have even greater complexities than they do in Viet-Nam.

Procedurally, I would assume that once the conference organizes itself, there will be formal sessions and less public negotiations. And if my experience is any indication, the real progress is apt to be made in the less public forums.

Q Dr. Kissinger, yesterday we were told, in response to a question at the Daily Briefing, that you might, in the end, find mutually acceptable the notion that the ultimate guarantee of a peace agreement might be a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force in the Middle East, and making the distinction that --

A He was running some sort of shop there that I didn't know about --

Q But making the distinction that we are talking about a new arrangement after a peace agreement -- not the UNEF [UN Emergency Force] or UNTSO [UN Truce Supervision Organization] -- is it possible that in the end, a joint U.S.-Soviet peace force might occur to you to be a mutually -- or acceptable from your side?

A I don't want to undermine the self-confidence of Mr. Vest, but I haven't actually read the text of that particular remark.

We are prepared to consider the question of guarantees in its broadest sense, and we are willing to examine any idea that any of the parties might put forward as to what would constitute adequate guarantees.

We believe, however, that the issue of guarantees can be faced in detail only after a settlement has been reached, and on security arrangements between the parties -- that is to say, such issues as demilitarized zones, joint inspection teams, and so forth that might constitute the body of the security arrangements between the parties. Then we will know what it is that outside countries should guarantee.

Now the question of U.S. and Soviet guarantees, or anybody else's guarantee, has two aspects:

One, the formal guarantee.

Second, the force that might be used to implement it.

We are prepared to consider -- I said to "consider," not necessarily to agree -- either individual or joint guarantees.

-12-

[LC]

As to the permanent stationing of U.S. and Soviet forces in the Middle East, we are somewhat dubious. We do not rule it out totally, but we are reluctant to get into this, and our position there was expressed at the Security Council discussions that formed the UNEF. But I think we can make a more reasonable decision on the nature of guarantees after the other elements of the settlement are in place.

Q Mr. Secretary, on your earlier peacekeeping effort, or peacemaking effort in Viet-Nam and Indochina, there appears to be some question whether it will be able to hold together under "nibbling" operations, and one thing and another. Would you give us your assessment, please, of what might be expected there?

A In Indochina?

Q In Indochina.

A There is always when one discusses Indochina or any other settlement-- one has to understand that no settlement is self-enforcing. It is not possible to write an agreement whose terms, in themselves, guarantee its permanence. Any agreement will last if the hostility of the parties is thereby lessened; if the parties have an incentive to observe it; and/or if the parties pay a penalty for breaking it.

If those three conditions are not met, no matter what the terms of the agreement, there is a tendency toward erosion.

In Viet-Nam, in civil war conditions, the hostility of the parties does not significantly lessen.

The incentives and penalties have been affected by many events of the past year, with which you are familiar.

So, at this moment, a great deal depends on the perception of the two sides of the existing military balance. And we have succeeded with a settlement -- not in guaranteeing necessarily a permanent peace but in moving the decision to a Vietnamese decision, which is what we always said our objective was. And we believe that there is a possibility of maintaining the peace within that framework.

Q Dr. Kissinger, following up the remark that you just made, you spoke of "civil war" conditions in Viet-Nam. Does this mean that the United States now regards the hostilities between North and South Viet-Nam as a civil war?

A No. The conditions in Viet-Nam, the psychological conditions, are those of a civil war in the sense that they are people of the same general nationality fighting for the control of political power.

And the conflict between the Saigon Government and the NLF is the civil war part of it.

We, of course, consider the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces in total violation of Article 7 of the Agreement an international event and not a civil war action.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I would like to turn to the question concerning Korea:

-13-

[LC]

Quite accidentally, in the wake of your recent trip to Asia, a trip through Peking, Tokyo, and Seoul, the United Nations General Assembly adopted what is called a "consensus" statement last month -- actually delaying the discussion of Korea for another year. But at the same time assigning the task of resolving the Korean question to the Koreans themselves, alone.

Now I would like to have your assessment about the U.N. decision. How do you think the North and South Koreans, themselves, could resolve their own questions without taking what the United Nations -- while the United Nations, is still deeply involved in the Korean question, for example, by keeping the United Nations Command there?

And my second question is:

Quite recently, senior State Department officials often refer to a "cease-fire agreement" including William -- Under Secretary William Porter and Ambassador John Scali -- who almost successively said that they could become willing to explore such an intelligence on a cease-fire agreement. What does the State Department have in mind in referring to that or to encourage it?

A. We have encouraged, and we continue to encourage, the talks between North and South Korea that started, leading at first, we hope, to mitigating the conditions of confrontation that exist on the Korean Peninsula -- and perhaps, ultimately, to a political solution.

The Consensus Resolution did not take the United Nations out of concern with the question of Korea. It deferred a debate this year, and no doubt in subsequent years the issue can be raised again by either of the parties that feels that inadequate consideration has been given to their views.

We consider the Consensus Resolution a constructive step taken by both sides, in which a partial progress was made on some issues such as the UNCURK issue -- and in which some other issues were left for further discussion, and later elaboration -- and particularly those that concerned the two Korean parties, themselves.

As my two associates pointed out, we do not have a closed mind on arrangements that were made twenty years ago, and we are prepared to discuss them -- first, of course, with our ally in Korea and then with other interested parties -- to see how they can be adapted to current conditions.

Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you attach special importance to your trip through Syria, in view of the question of the Israeli prisoners of war?

A. Well, the United States, of course, believes that a release of prisoners of war is an essential part of the cease-fire agreement, and we have made our view known to the parties.

As to the specific topics that will be raised on particular stops, I don't think it would be appropriate for me to discuss them.

A. Thank you very much, sir.

[The proceeding was terminated at 12:58 P.M.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 6, 1973

No. 442

#5

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DECEMBER 6, 1973

MR. MARDER: We are going a tape on you, sir.

Now, with respect to the announcements that were made at the White House today, a total of nine nominations were announced -- three ambassadorial and six Departmental.

For further information contact:

PR# 442

2

Ambassador Popper is currently Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. In this position, he did a distinguished job in handling the Middle East at the United Nations from this end. He is a Foreign Service Officer with the rank of Career Minister, and served previously as Ambassador to Cyprus.

David Newsom, who is currently Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, is being nominated to succeed Francis Galbraith as Ambassador to Indonesia. As you know, Ambassador Newsom has served admirably in his current position in bringing the importance of Africa to the attention of the country, and in conducting his office in a manner which won him the award, the 1973 Rockefeller Public Service Award yesterday, of which the Department of State is extremely proud.

As Ambassador to the Soviet Union, the President is nominating Walter Stoessel, old friend -- if I may say so, student -- from Harvard. He has had extensive experience in European and Soviet Affairs since entering the Foreign Service in 1942. His nomination underlines the importance we attach to the Ambassadorship in the Soviet Union.

PR# 442

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Now, turning to Departmental appointments. As Counselor of the Department of State, the President intends to nominate HELMUT SONNENFELDT. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is a Class One Foreign Service Officer, has been a close associate of mine on the National Security Council staff. Prior to that, he has held a number of positions in the Department of State. He was recently confirmed by the Senate Finance Committee for the position of Under Secretary of Treasury. He will work as Counselor, obviously, on matters, such matters as may be assigned to him, but he will particularly concentrate on European relations, SALT, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, the sort of problems he worked on also previously.

As Ambassador-at-Large, the President is nominating ROBERT McCLOSKEY, presently Ambassador to Cyprus. I do not have to introduce Ambassador McCloskey to this group. He will be given various negotiating responsibilities and other assignments on an ad hoc basis. In addition, he will have overall supervision of the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Bureau of Congressional Relations, and the Office of Press Relations.

PR # 442

4

Ambassador to Upper Volta, with considerable experience
in both African and Latin American Affairs, and one of the
ablest young Foreign Service Officers.

As Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
the President is nominating ARTHUR HARTMAN to succeed Walter
Stoessel. Mr. Hartman is presently Deputy Chief of Mission
to the European Community, worked in the State Department
Secretariat, and has wide experience in European affairs
and a good background in economic matters.

As Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, the President is nominating WILLIAM B.
BUFFUM, presently Ambassador to Lebanon. He has had excep-
tional experience in the U.N. and international organization
affairs.

PR #442

5

WILLIAM CASEY, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, has
informed me of his intention to assume the position of
President of the Export-Import Bank. As you know, this is a
most prestigious and important post, one well suited for
a man of such exceptional talents as William Casey. I regret
that he is departing, but wish him every success in his new
assignment.

JOSEPH SISCO's resignation as Assistant Secretary
of State and retirement from the Foreign Service was announced
yesterday. I need hardly emphasize how deeply I regret his
departure. His career has been characterized by tireless
work and splendid performance. In the last two months,
Mr. Sisco has been an invaluable source of strength for
this country, for the President, for the Department, and
for me personally. He has agreed to remain in his present
assignment for another several months before going on to
assume the Presidency of Hamilton College.

PR# 442

6

A I nearly said within a week. [Laughter]
We consider the Embassy in Tokyo one of the most
important assignments in the Government, and we are
looking for the best man. We are not yet ready to make
an announcement.

PR#442

7

A Mr. Sisco felt that he was -- of course,
Mr. Sisco should speak for himself. My understanding
is that Mr. Sisco felt that he was at a time in his life
where if he ever was going to make a change to a senior
administrative position in academic life this was the
appropriate moment to do it, and maybe the last moment
to do it.

PR# 442 (c)

8

PR# 442

9

(cc)

The fact is that we consider it extremely
probable that the conference will begin on December 18
in Geneva. There are some technical details to be worked
out as to the form of invitation, as to the nature of the
invitations, and matters of this kind. We believe them to
be relatively easily soluble, and we're in touch with the
parties now as well as with the Soviet Union and the
Secretary General to work out the appropriate procedure.
But we have no reason at this point to doubt that the

PR# 442

10

We believe that once the conference starts a
negotiating process will be under way which, dealing first
with issues of a military nature and then turning to the
overall settlement, will bring about a settlement in
accordance with Resolution 242. And the United States,
as I have stated repeatedly, will use its influence to
bring about such a settlement.

With respect to my trip to the NATO meeting,
obviously there has been some disagreement. Equally
clearly, the Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone
of our foreign policy, and I'm going there with the
attitude that the need for starting and for giving a
new impetus of Atlantic relationship remains and that
the United States will spare no effort to inject new
vitality, creativity and hope into the Atlantic relationship.
I'm not going in an attitude of confrontation and acrimony.

Q In light of the breakoff of Kilometer 101
talks, the Israeli forces being in a high state of alert,
the continued oil squeeze, what reasons, as specifically
as you can be, do you have for expecting a constructive

PR# 442

11

peace conference in Geneva?

PR# 442

12

PR# 44214

I believe that the discussions that may take
place at NATO can contribute to clarifying the points
of view. In any event, whatever happens at the NATO
meeting can only be the beginning of a process; it can
not bring about a final resolution.

Now, obviously, what happens in the Middle East
-- even more importantly, the perceptions of the two sides
about the relationship of what happens in the Middle East
to their energy problem -- will greatly affect the
vitality of the relationship in the long term. We believe
that the energy problem is accentuated by the Arab-
Israeli conflict but that it has much deeper sources,
the most important of which is that demand has outrun the
incentives for supply and that it is an aspect of the
rapid industrialization of the developed nations.

Q Mr. Secretary, you were told earlier this
week that the 101 talks might be resumed by week's end.
Now, probably something has happened to change your estimate.

PR# 442

17

(lc)

(Laughter.)

The hesitation about going into all the details was produced by the fact that we did not think that it would be helpful in the present situation, when we're trying to bring about a settlement cooperatively with the Soviet Union, to re-create a spirit of confrontation of a rather intense 36-hour period.

A military alert, moreover, should be clearly understood. We went from Defense Condition 5 to Defense Condition 3 -- which is that Defense Condition 1 is imminence of hostilities. So this was not a very high state of alert; it is the state of alert in which the Pacific Command is at all times. So there was no additional

PR# 442

18

We have never published the details of correspondence
between the President and the General Secretary because,
if we once start this process, every exchange will be written
from the point of view of its impact later. And we have
given as much of our reasoning as we could, and we have given
a more detailed chronology to certain Congressional Committees.

PR# 442

19

PR# 442

20

PR# 442

21

D-3
supersedes existing legislation. It is a question that
was asked of me in executive session in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and I promised the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that we would make a legal
study. Our legal adviser has concluded that the War
Powers legislation does not supersede any existing
legislation, and we will notify the Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to that effect
in a formal letter.

Q Does that mean, sir, that if there was a
decision by the Administration to reintroduce forces,
that it would seek new legislation, or simply consult
over the existing status. I don't quite follow you --
because the existing legislation, I believe, does
foreclose the reintroduction of any U.S. combat forces
into Indochina.

PR #442

22

(le)

your judgment?

PR#442

23

A Well, I think also that the Minister pointed out that we both expressed our views frankly and I believe he said constructively, which usually means that we did not necessarily agree to each other's formulas precisely.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Mr. Secretary --

A I don't know why I keep calling on former students. Go ahead, Les.

A Has done what?

PR #442

24

A With respect to the first question --
as I pointed out at previous press conferences, the
Soviet Union, as I suppose all participants in the diplomacy
in the Middle East, have various incentives produced
by their existing associations. We did not consider some
of the actions that the Soviet Union has taken constructive.
We believe that in setting up the conference, and in
helping to define possible agendas, participation, framework,
the Soviet Union has played a constructive role. A
settlement in the Middle East cannot be carried out without
the Soviet Union -- the principal supplier of arms to
several of the participants--and given its close association
with and friendship with several of the countries. And
if the Soviet Union attempted to push extremist solutions,
it would make a settlement extremely difficult.

Now, up to now most of the discussions have
been procedural. And I cannot form a final judgment as to
what the Soviet Union will do once the conference has
actually opened. As far as we are concerned, we will
try to give a maximum encouragement to a moderate course,

PR #442

26

PR #442

27

A The question of the Palestinians has at least three aspects. One is who speaks for the Palestinians in general. Secondly, what is their relationship at the conference to Jordan, to Israel and the other parties. And thirdly, what are the concrete terms that are going to be advanced for the solution of the Palestinian question.

Our view is, with respect to the participation
of the Palestinians, and the role they might play at
the conference, that this would best be settled by
the parties at the conference. With respect to the
specific terms, this of course also will have to be
discussed at the conference. Some relationship will have
to be found between the rights of Palestinians, to which
the United States has made reference in several internation
documents, and the limitations of absorption in the
mandated territory of Palestine.

Mr. Gwertzman.

28

one question in here.

A Go ahead.

Q A year ago at this time you were deeply engaged in Viet-Nam negotiations. It was rather secret, with a sort of semi-public aspect to it. How do you find yourself at this time in the Middle East diplomacy -- what differences do you find in the two situations -- and do you expect once the negotiations start, that there will be both a highly secret aspect as well as a sort of public forum?

Procedurally, I would assume that once the conference organizes itself, that there will be formal sessions and less public negotiations. And if my experience is any indication, the real progress is apt to be made in the less public forums.

PR #442

(je) 29

Q. Dr. Kissinger, yesterday we were told in response to a question at the Daily Briefing, that you might in the end, find mutually acceptable, the notion that the ultimate guarantee of a peace agreement might be a joint Soviet-American peacekeeping force in the Middle East, and making the distinction that --

A. He was running some sort of shop there that I didn't know about --

Q. But making the distinction that we are talking about a new arrangement after a peace agreement -- not the UNEF or UNTSO -- is it possible that in the end, a joint U.S.-Soviet peace force might occur to you to be a mutually -- or acceptable from your side?

A. I don't want to undermine the self-confidence of Mr. Vest, but I haven't actually read the text of that particular remark.

We believe, however, that the issue of guarantees can be faced in detail, only after a settlement has been reached.

PR #442

30

and on security arrangements between the parties. That
is to say that such issues as demilitarized
zones, joint inspection teams, and so forth that might
constitute the body of the security arrangements between
the parties. Then we will know what it is that outside
countries should guarantee.

One, the formal guarantee.

We are prepared to consider -- I said to "consider
not necessarily to agree -- either individual or joint
guarantees.

As to the permanent stationing of U.S. and
Soviet forces in the Middle East, we are somewhat dubious.
We do not rule it out totally, but we are reluctant to get
into this, and our position there was expressed at
the Security Council discussions that formed the UNEF.
But I think we can make a more reasonable decision on the
nature of guarantees after the other elements of the settle-
ment are in place.

Q Mr. Secretary, on your earlier peace-
keeping effort, or peacemaking effort in Viet-Nam and Indo-

PR #442

31

A In Indochina?

Q In Indochina.

A There is always when one discusses Indochina
or any other settlement--one has to understand that no
settlement is self-enforcing. It is not possible to write
an agreement whose terms, in themselves, guarantee its
permanence. Any agreement will last if the hostility
of the parties is thereby lessened; if the parties have an
incentive to observe it and/or if the parties pay a penalty
for breaking it.

If those three conditions are not met, no matter
what the terms of the agreement, there is a tendency
towards erosion.

So at this moment, a great deal depends on the

32

perception of the two sides of the existing military balance.
And we have succeeded with a settlement -- not in guarantee-
ing necessarily a permanent peace but in moving the
decision to a Vietnamese decision, which is what we always
said our objective was. And we believe that there is a
possibility of maintaining the peace within that framework.

A No. The conditions in Viet-Nam -- the psychological conditions are those of a civil war in the sense that they are people of the same general nationality fighting for the control of political power.

PR #442

33

Quite accidentally, in the wake of your recent trip to Asia, a trip through Peking, Tokyo and Seoul, the United Nations General Assembly adopted what is called a "concensus" statement last month -- actually delaying the discussion of Korea for another year.

But at the same time, assigning the task of resolving the Korean question, to the Koreans themselves, alone.

Now I would like to have your assessment about the U.N. decision. How do you think the North and South Koreans, themselves, could resolve their own questions without taking what the United Nations -- while the United Nations, is it still deeply involved in the Korean question?

For example, by keeping the United Nations Command there.

And my second question is:

Quite recently, senior State Department officials often report to, referred to as "cease-fire agreement" including William -- Under Secretary William Porter and

PR #442

34

Ambassador John Scali, who almost successively said that they could become willing to explore such an intelligence on a cease-fire agreement -- what does the State Department have in mind, in referring to that or to encourage it?

A. We have encouraged, and we continue to encourage the talks between North and South Korea that started, leading at first, we hope, to mitigating the conditions of confrontation that exist on the Korean Peninsula -- and perhaps, ultimately, to a political solution.

The Concensus Resolution did not take the United Nations out of concern with the question of Korea. It deferred a debate this year, and no doubt in subsequent years the issue can be re-raised by either of the parties that feels that inadequate consideration has been given to their views.

We consider the Concensus Resolution a constructive step taken by both sides, in which a partial progress was made on some issues such as the UNCURK issue -- and in which some other issues were left for further discussion, and later elaboration -- and particularly those that concerned

PR #442

-35-

As my two associates pointed out, we do not have
a closed mind on arrangements that were made twenty years
ago, and we are prepared to discuss them -- first, of
course, with our ally in Korea -- and then with other
interested parties -- to see how they can be adapted to
current conditions.

Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you attach special im-
portance to your trip through Syria, in view of the question
of the Israeli prisoners of war?

A Well, the United States, of course, believes
that a release of prisoners of war is an essential part of
the cease-fire agreement, and we have made our view known
to the parties.

Q Thank you very much, sir.

[The proceeding was terminated at 12:58P.M.]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 10, 1973

No. 446

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

DECEMBER 8, 1973

I am delighted that my first stop in Europe as Secretary of State is in Brussels which is the heart of both European unity and Atlantic unity.

This NATO meeting, in its 25th year since the founding of NATO, comes at a very important moment. The Europe of today is very different from the Europe of 1949, and it will play a role that its unity and its affluence entitle it. The United States, in its attempt to build a structure of peace and to put East-West relations on a new basis, has made an initiative toward Europe to redefine our relationship in the light of these new conditions. This dialogue is continuing and has not been without stress. I intend to pursue it in my conversations here in Brussels. With whomever I will speak among my colleagues, I will stress that the Atlantic Alliance remains the cornerstone of American foreign policy. But I shall also emphasize that a new act of vision is necessary so that it can remain the cornerstone of our common endeavor.

******

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PWR [LC]

December 10, 1973

No. 448

STATEMENT OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON AWARD OF NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

DECEMBER 10, 1973

The Nobel Peace Prize is as much an award to a purpose as to a person. More
than the achievement of peace, it symbolizes the quest for peace. Though I deeply
cherish this honor in a personal sense, I accept it on behalf of that quest and in the
light of that grand purpose.

Our experience has taught us to regard peace as a delicate, ever-fleeting
condition, its roots too shallow to bear the strain of social and political discontent.
We tend to accept the lessons of that experience and work toward those solutions that
at best relieve specific sources of strain, lest our neglect allow war to overtake peace.
To the realist, peace represents a stable arrangement of power; to the idealists, a
goal so preeminent that it conceals the difficulty of finding the means to its achieve-
ment. But in this age of thermonuclear technology, neither view can assure man's
preservation. Instead, peace, the ideal, must be practiced. A sense of responsibility
and accommodation must guide the behavior of all nations. Some common notion of
justice can and must be found, for failure to do so will only bring more "just" wars.

In his Nobel acceptance speech, William Faulkner expressed his hope that
"Man will not merely endure, he will prevail." We live today in a world so complex
that even only to endure, man must prevail — over an accelerating technology that
threatens to escape his control and over the habits of conflict that have obscured his
peaceful nature.

Certain war has yielded to an uncertain peace in Viet-Nam. Where there was
once only despair and dislocation, today there is hope, however frail. In the Middle
East the resumption of full-scale war haunts a fragile cease-fire. In Indochina, the
Middle East and elsewhere, lasting peace will not have been won until contending
nations realize the futility of replacing political competition with armed conflict.

America's goal is the building of a structure of peace, a peace in which all
nations have a stake and therefore to which all nations have a commitment. We are
seeking a stable world, not as an end in itself but as a bridge to the realization of
man's noble aspirations of tranquility and community.

If peace, the ideal, is to be our common destiny, then peace, the experience,
must be our common practice. For this to be so, the leaders of all nations must
remember that their political decisions of war or peace are realized in the human
sufferings or well-being of their peoples.

PR #448

-2-

As Alfred Nobel recognized, peace cannot be achieved by one man or one nation. It results from the efforts of men of broad vision and good will throughout the world. The accomplishments of individuals need not be remembered, for if lasting peace is to come it will be the accomplishment of all mankind.

With these thoughts, I extend to you my most sincere appreciation for this award.

*****

[lc]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 11, 1973

No. 450

#6

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
NATO HEADQUARTERS
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
DECEMBER 11, 1973

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I thought I'd meet with you briefly to answer a few questions. I have read some of the dramatic accounts of great confrontations and I wanted to say a word about the spirit in which we came here and where I think we stand.

There have been many changes in Atlantic relationships and in world affairs since the creation of the Alliance 25 years ago. The United States took an initiative earlier this year proposing that the relationships within the Atlantic community be re-examined and be adapted to the dramatically changed circumstances of the 1970s. This discussion has proceeded and within NATO has produced a draft document submitted by France which gives promise of significant progress. I came here in order to discuss with our closest allies the problems and the opportunities that are produced by these changed circumstances — by detente, by the emergence of the European community as a political entity, by the changed situation in the field of weapons, by conditions in other parts of the world. Obviously, there were some frank exchanges, and points of view were openly expressed; but I think we have all gained a better understanding of each others positions. I think we have made progress toward the objectives that we have sought, and I think the Alliance is stronger for having had this meeting.

Now I'd be glad to take a few questions.

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The question of a meeting with the Nine is agreed to in principle, but there is a procedural problem of finding a time when all the Ministers, particularly those who are not in NATO, can come. But there is no problem in principle about it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, will this be in Brussels this afternoon or some other time?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If the meeting takes place — and it is really now only a purely technical question — the meeting will be in Brussels. But I'd like to stress that my colleagues have agreed that it would be natural for the Secretary of State to meet with the Nine, and if for any technical reason it doesn't happen now, it will happen soon.

PR #450

-2-

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, before leaving Washington you made a distinction between European and Atlantic unity. Do you think the two are or could become incompatible?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not make a distinction between European and Atlantic unity. There are sometimes implications in statements that there is such a distinction. The United States believes that European unity and Atlantic unity can reinforce each other and have reinforced each other, and the United States strongly supports European unity.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, if the June 22 agreement with the Soviets does not negate the NATO Agreement in any way, and if it was not invoked at the beginning of the Middle East crisis, what function does the Agreement of June 22 serve now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The Agreement of June 22 specifically excludes the Alliance obligations in, I believe, Article 6 and therefore there is no question about the Agreement superceding any Alliance obligations. The contrary is the case. The purpose of the Agreement is to reinforce in a formal manner certain rules of conduct operating as restraints prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and it establishes very clearly, as I pointed out in the briefing I gave when the Agreement was signed, that the way to prevent nuclear war is to prevent all wars. It is to be seen as a code of conduct, not as a description of a method of warfare.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you been able in your talks here to narrow the differences with the Europeans on the Middle East questions and have you gotten support for the negotiations in Geneva?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It's an interesting phenomenon — where I look one way and the voice comes from the other direction. I am interested to know by what principle that operates.

Now, those of you who are veterans of NATO meetings, which I am not, will not assume that the opportunity for dialogue at the formal sessions is extreme and, secondly, I did not come to the NATO Meeting to obtain support for our Middle East policy. Our Middle East policy is to attempt to bring about a just and lasting peace by helping the parties to resolve the conflict and to implement Security Council Resolution 242. I believe that this is an objective shared by all of those who have concern for peace in the world and for peace in the Middle East. But we did not specifically ask for an endorsement of our policies by NATO; but, of course, we had individual discussions with individual ministers in the intervals between monologues.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, now that you've had a chance to talk with your NATO allies, what is your feeling about their impression of the United States and the Soviet Union together trying to solve not only the Middle East problem but a number of the others that beset the whole world?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is a mistake to consider these meetings, or at least this meeting, since it's the only one I've attended, as an arena of titanic confrontation. The problem that is posed by the relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union has many aspects. At the time of the formation of the NATO Alliance, the Soviet threat seemed pervasive and the world was relatively simpler, when all issues could be seen in terms of an imminent military onslaught. Under present circumstances, with the increase of extremely destructive weapons on both sides,

PR #450~

-3-

we believe — and I have to assume our European allies agree — that there exists an obligation to prevent the dangers of a nuclear holocaust. It is an obligation that circumstances impose, especially on those countries that possess the most destructive arsenals. Obviously, this creates problems of intellectual adjustment and sometimes it involves problems of adjustment to specific circumstances. We owe our European allies respect for their sensibilities so that they do not feel they have become the objects of policy. And there was general agreement in the discussions that the process of consultation within the Alliance, particularly in these circumstances, must be strengthened. The United States expressed its willingness to do so and made specific proposals to accomplish this end.

Maybe I'll take one more question.

**QUESTION:** Returning back to the Middle East again, I want to know your opinion about the Israelis' theory of secured borders by occupying other countries' territories and retaining them. Don't you think that this, in principle, will be the beginning of an international world anarchy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has repeatedly stated that it stands for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and that there must be a settlement that will be acceptable to all of the parties. What will emerge as acceptable should not be defined by me at the very beginning of this process.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L]

December 12, 1973

No. 452

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 4:00 P.M. E.S.T. WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1973.
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE A DINNER MEETING OF
THE PILGRIMS OF GREAT BRITAIN

EUROPA HOTEL
LONDON

December 12, 1973

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you this evening because, like most Americans, I am seized by a mixture of pride and terror when invited to appear before a British audience. In my particular case and without any reflection on this distinguished assemblage, it is probably more terror than pride for there is no blinking the fact -- it is there for all to hear -- that my forebears missed the Mayflower by some three hundred years.

Our two peoples have been more closely associated than any other two nations in modern history -- in culture and economics, in peace and in war. We have sometimes disagreed. But the dominant theme of our relationship in this century has been intimate alliance and mighty creations.

In 1950, while the Atlantic Alliance was considering a continuing political body, my great predecessor Dean Acheson spoke to this Society. Describing the travails of creation, Acheson noted that a "strange and confusing dissonance has crowded the trans-Atlantic frequencies." But he added that this "dissonance flows from the very awareness that difficult decisions must be made and is a part of the process of making them."

Again today America and Western Europe find themselves at a moment of great promise and evident difficulty -- of renewed efforts to unite and old problems which divide. It is a time of both hope and concern for all of us who value the partnership we have built together. Today, as in 1950, we and Europe face the necessity, the opportunity and the dilemma of fundamental choice.

## The Year of Europe

Because we have an historical and intimate relationship, I want to speak tonight, frankly, of what has been called the "Year of Europe" -- of the difficulties of 1973 and the possibilities of 1974 and beyond.

Last April, the President asked me to propose that Europe and the United States strive together to reinvigorate our partnership. He did so because it was obvious that the assumptions on which the Alliance was founded have been outstripped by events.

[L.C]

PR #452

-2-

-- Europe's economic strength, political cohesion, and new confidence
-- the monumental achievements of Western unity -- have radically altered
a relationship that was originally shaped in an era of European weakness
and American predominance.

-- American nuclear monopoly has given way to nuclear parity raising
wholly new problems of defense and deterrence -- problems which demand a
broad reexamination of the requirements of our security and the relative
contribution to it of the United States and its allies.

-- The lessening of confrontation between East and West has offered
new hope for a relaxation of tensions and new opportunities for creative
diplomacy.

-- It has become starkly apparent that the great industrialized
democracies of Japan, Europe and North America could pursue divergent
paths only at the cost of their prosperity and their partnership.

These historic changes were occurring in a profoundly changed psycho-
logical climate in the West. The next generation of leaders in Europe,
Canada and America will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional
commitment to the Atlantic Alliance of its founders. Even today, a majority
on both sides of the Atlantic did not experience the threat that produced
the Alliance's creation or the sense of achievement associated with its
growth. Even today, in the United States, over forty Senators consistently
vote to make massive unilateral reductions of American forces in Europe.
Even today, some Europeans have come to believe that their identity should
be measured by its distance from the United States. On both sides of the
Atlantic we are faced with the anomalous -- and dangerous -- situation
which in the public mind identifies foreign policy success increasingly
with relations with adversaries while relations with allies seem to be
characterized by bickering and drift.

There exists, then, a real danger of a gradual erosion of the Atlantic
community which for 25 years has ensured peace to its nations and brought
prosperity to its peoples. A major effort to renew Atlantic relations
and to anchor our friendship in a fresh act of creation seemed essential.
We hoped that the drama of the great democracies engaging themselves once
again in defining a common future would infuse our Atlantic partnership
with new emotional and intellectual excitement. This was the origin of
the initiative which came to be called the "Year of Europe."

Let me lay to rest certain misconceptions about American intentions:

-- The President's initiative was launched after careful preparation.
In all of our conversations with many European leaders during the winter
and spring of 1972-73 there was agreement that Atlantic relations required
urgent attention to arrest the potential for growing suspicion and alienation
between Europe and America.

[Lc]

PR #452

-3-

-- We do not accept the proposition that the strengthening of Atlantic unity and the defining of a European personality are incompatible. The two processes have reinforced each other from the outset and can continue to do so now. The United States has repeatedly and explicitly welcomed the European decision to create an independent identity in all dimensions -- political and economic. Indeed, we have long -- and more consistently than many Europeans -- supported the goal of political cohesion.

-- We have no intention of restricting Europe's international role to regional matters. From our perspective, European unification should enable Europe to take on broader responsibilities for global peace that ultimately can only contribute to the common interest. The American initiative was meant to mark Europe's new preeminence on the world scene as well as within the North Atlantic community.

-- A comprehensive reexamination of all aspects of our relationship -- economic, political, and military -- is imperative. It is a fact that our troops are in Europe as a vital component of mutual defense. It is also a fact -- indeed, a truism -- that political, military and economic factors are each part of our relationship. In our view, the affirmation of the pervasive nature of our interdependence is not a device for blackmail. On the contrary, it is the justification for conciliatory solutions. For the specialized concerns of experts and technicians have a life of their own and a narrow national or sectarian bias. The purpose of our initiative was to override these divisive attitudes by committing the highest authority in each country to the principle that our common and paramount interest is in broadly conceived cooperation.

## The European Identity

Since last April Europe has made great strides toward unity -- particularly in political coordination. The United States strongly supports that process. But as an old friend we are also sensitive to what this process does to traditional ties that in our view remain essential to the common interest.

Europe's unity must not be at the expense of Atlantic community, or both sides of the Atlantic will suffer. It is not that we are impatient with the cumbersome machinery of the emerging Europe. It is rather the tendency to highlight division rather than unity with us which concerns us.

PR #452

-4-

I would be less than frank were I to conceal our uneasiness about some
of the recent practices of the European Community in the political field.
To present the decisions of a unifying Europe to us as faits accomplis
not subject to effective discussion is alien to the tradition of US-
European relations.

This may seem a strange complaint from a country repeatedly accused
of acting itself without adequately consulting with its allies. There is
no doubt that the United States has sometimes not consulted enough or
adequately -- especially in rapidly moving situations, but this is not a
preference; it is a deviation from official policy and established
practice -- usually under pressure of necessity. The attitude of the
unifying Europe, by contrast, seems to attempt to elevate refusal to
consult into a principle defining European identity. To judge from recent
experience, consultation with us before a decision is precluded, and
consultation after the fact has been drained of content. For then Europe
appoints a spokesman who is empowered to inform us of the decisions taken
but who has no authority to negotiate.

We do not object to a single spokesman but we do believe that as an
old ally the United States should be given an opportunity to express its
concerns before final decisions affecting its interests are taken, and
bilateral channels of discussion and negotiation should not be permitted
to atrophy -- at least until European political unity is fully realized.
To replace the natural dialogue with extremely formalistic procedures
would be to shatter abruptly close and intangible ties of trust and
communication that took decades to develop and that have served our common
purposes well.

The United States recognizes the problems of a transitional period
as Europe moves toward unity. We understand the difficulty of the first
hesitant steps of political coordination. But we cannot be indifferent
to the tendency to justify European identity as facilitating separateness
from the United States; European unity, in our view, is not contradictory
to Atlantic unity.

For our part we will spare no effort to strengthen cooperative
relationships with a unifying Europe, to affirm the community or our
ideals and to revitalize the Atlantic relationship. That was the purpose
of our initiative last April. It remains the central goal of our foreign
policy.

## The Common Challenge

The leaders of the European Community meet this week. They will
consider the nature of European identity; no doubt they will adopt common
policies and positions. In the light of this important meeting, let me
outline the position of the United States:

- Detente is an imperative. In a world shadowed by the danger of
nuclear holocaust there is no rational alternative to the pursuit of
relaxation of tensions. But we must take care that the pursuit of detente
not undermine the friendships which made detente possible.

PR #452

[LC]

-5-

-- Common defense is a necessity. We must be prepared to adjust it to changing conditions and share burdens equally. We need a definition of security that our peoples can support and that our adversaries will respect in a period of lessened tensions.

-- European unity is a reality. The United States welcomes and supports it in all its dimensions, political as well as economic. We believe it must be made irreversible and that it must strengthen trans-Atlantic ties.

-- Economic interdependence is a fact. We must resolve the paradox of growing mutual dependence and burgeoning national and regional identities.

We are determined to continue constructive dialogue with Western Europe. We have offered no final answers; we welcome Europe's wisdom. We believe that this opportunity will not come soon again.

So let us rededicate ourselves to finishing the task of renewing the Atlantic community.

First, let us complete the work before us; let us agree on a set of declarations equal to the occasion so that they may serve as an agenda for our governments and as an example and inspiration for our peoples.

Second, let us then transform these declarations into practical and perceptible progress. We will restore mutual confidence if our policies begin to reinforce rather than work against our common objectives. And let us move quickly to improve the process of consultation in both directions. The United States Government made concrete suggestions in this regard at the recent meeting of the foreign ministers in the North Atlantic Council.

But let us also remember that even the best consultative machinery cannot substitute for common vision and shared goals; it cannot replace the whole network of intangible connections that have been the real sinews of the trans-Atlantic and especially the Anglo-American relationship. We must take care lest in defining European unity in too legalistic a manner we lose what has made our alliance unique: that in the deepest sense Europe and America do not think of each other as foreign entities conducting traditional diplomacy, but as members of a larger community engaged, sometimes painfully but ultimately always cooperatively, in a common enterprise. The meeting to which the foreign ministers of the Community were courteous enough to invite me marks a significant step forward in restoring the intangibles of the trans-Atlantic dialogue.

Let us put false suspicions behind us. The President did not fight so hard in Congress for our troops in Europe, for strong defenses, for a conciliatory trade bill, for support for allies around the world; he did not strive so continually to consult on SALT and develop common positions on MBFR; he did not stand up so firmly to challenges in crises around the world -- suddenly to sacrifice Western Europe's security on the altar of condominium. Our destiny, as well as the full strength of our military power, is inextricably linked with yours.

PR #452

-6-

As we look into the future we can perceive challenges compared to which our recent disputes are trivial. A new international system is replacing the structure of the immediate post-war years. The external policies of China and the Soviet Union are in periods of transition. Western Europe is unifying. New nations seek identity and an appropriate role. Even now, economic relationships are changing more rapidly than the structures which nurtured them. We, Europe, Canada and America, have only two choices: creativity together or irrelevance apart.

## The Middle East and Energy

The Middle East crisis illustrates the importance of distinguishing the long-range from the ephemeral. The differences of recent months resulted not so much from lack of consultation as from a different perception of three key issues: Was the war primarily a local conflict or did it have wider significance? Has the energy crisis been caused primarily by the war or does it have deeper causes? Can our common energy crisis be solved by anything but collective action?

As for the nature of the Middle East conflict, it is fair to state, as many Europeans including your Foreign Secretary have, that the United States did not do all that it might have done before the war to promote a permanent settlement in the Middle East. Once the war began, the United States demonstrated great restraint until the Soviet effort reached the point of massive intervention. Once that happened, it became a question of whether the West would retain any influence to help shape the political future of an area upon which Europe is even more vitally dependent than the United States. We involved ourselves in a resupply effort, not to take sides in the conflict but to protect the possibility of pursuing after the war the objective of a just permanent settlement which some of our allies have urged on us ever since 1967.

At the same time, we must bear in mind the deeper causes of the energy crisis: It is not simply a product of the Arab-Israeli war; it is the inevitable consequence of the explosive growth of worldwide demand outrunning the incentives for supply. The Middle East war made a cronic crisis acute, but a crisis was coming in any event. Even when pre-war production levels are resumed. The problem of matching the level of oil that the world produces to the level which it consumes will remain.

[c]

PR# 452

-7-

The only long-term solution is a massive effort to provide producers an incentive to increase their supply, to encourage consumers to use existing supplies more rationally and to develop alternate energy sources.

This is a challenge which the United States could solve alone with great difficulty and that Europe cannot solve in isolation at all. We strongly prefer and Europe requires a common enterprise.

To this end, the United States proposes that the nations of Europe, North America and Japan establish an Energy Action Group of senior and prestigious individuals, with a mandate to develop within three months an initial action program for collaboration in all areas of the energy problem. We would leave it to the members of the Nine whether they prefer to participate as the European Community.

The group would have as its goal the assurance of required energy supplies at reasonable cost. It would define broad principles of cooperation, and it would initiate action in specific areas:

- To conserve energy through more rational utilization of existing supplies;

- To encourage the discovery and development of new sources of energy;

- To give producers an incentive to increase supply; and

- To coordinate an international program of research to develop new technologies that use energy more efficiently and provide alternatives to petroleum. The United States would be willing to contribute our particular skills in such areas as the development of the deep seabed.

The Energy Action Group should not be an exclusive organization of consumers. The producing nations should be invited to join it from the very beginning with respect to any matters of common interest. The problem of finding adequate opportunity for development, and the investment of the proceeds from the sale of energy sources would appear to be a particularly important area for consumer-producer cooperation.

As an example of a task for the Energy Action Group, I would cite the field of enriching uranium for use in nuclear power reactors. We know that our need for this raw material will be great in the 1980's. We know that electric utilities will wish to assure their supply at the least possible cost. We know that European countries and Japan will wish to have their own facilities to produce at least part of their needs for enriched uranium. Such plants require huge capital investment. What could be more sensible than that we plan together to assure that scarce resources are not wasted by needless duplication?

The United States is prepared to make a very major financial and intellectual contribution to the objective of solving the energy problem on a common basis. There is no technological problem that the great democracies do not have the capacity to solve together -- if they can muster the will and the imagination. The energy crisis of 1973 can become the economic equivalent of the Sputnik challenge of 1957. The outcome can be the same. Only this time, the giant step for mankind will be one that America and its closest partners take together for the benefit of all mankind.

PR #452

-8-

We have every reason of duty and self-interest to preserve the most successful partnership in history. The United States is committed to making the Atlantic Community a vital positive force for the future as it was for the past. What has recently been taken for granted must now be renewed. This is not an American challenge to Europe; it is history's challenge to us all.

The United Kingdom, we believe, is in a unique position. We welcome your membership in the European Community — though the loosening of some of our old ties has been painful at times. But you can make another historic contribution in helping develop between the United States and a unifying Europe the same special confidence and intimacy that benefitted our two nations for decades. We are prepared to offer a unifying Europe a "special relationship," for we believe that the unity of the Western world is essential for the well-being of all its parts.

In his memoirs Secretary Acheson described the events of his visit to London in the spring of 1950. He described the need of his time for an "act of will, a decision to do something" at a crucial juncture.

We require another act of will - a determination of surmount tactical squabbles and legalistic preoccupations and to become the master of our destinies. We in this room are heirs to a rich heritage of trust and friendship. If we are true to ourselves, we have it in our power to extend it to a united Europe and to pass it on, further enriched and ennobled, to succeeding generations.

********

# The United States and a Unifying Europe:
The Necessity for Partnership

Address by Secretary Kissinger ¹

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you this evening because, like most Americans, I am seized by a mixture of pride and terror when invited to appear before a British audience. In my particular case, and without any reflection on this distinguished assemblage, it is probably more terror than pride; for there is no blinking the fact—it is there for all to hear—that my forebears missed the Mayflower by some 300 years.

Our two peoples have been more closely associated than any other two nations in modern history—in culture and economics, in peace and in war. We have sometimes disagreed. But the dominant theme of our relationship in this century has been intimate alliance and mighty creations.

In 1950, while the Atlantic alliance was considering a continuing political body, my great predecessor Dean Acheson spoke to this society. Describing the travails of creation, Acheson noted that a “strange and confusing dissonance has crowded the trans-Atlantic frequencies.” But he added that this “dissonance flows from the very awareness that difficult decisions must be made and is a part of the process of making them.”

Again today America and Western Europe find themselves at a moment of great promise and evident difficulty, of renewed efforts to unite and old problems which divide. It is a time of both hope and concern for all of us who value the partnership we have built together. Today, as in 1950, we and Europe

face the necessity, the opportunity, and the dilemma of fundamental choice.

## The Year of Europe

Because we have a historical and intimate relationship, I want to speak tonight frankly of what has been called the “Year of Europe”—of the difficulties of 1973 and the possibilities of 1974 and beyond.

Last April the President asked me to propose that Europe and the United States strive together to reinvigorate our partnership. He did so because it was obvious that the assumptions on which the alliance was founded have been outstripped by events:

- Europe's economic strength, political cohesion, and new confidence—the monumental achievements of Western unity—have radically altered a relationship that was originally shaped in an era of European weakness and American predominance.

- American nuclear monopoly has given way to nuclear parity, raising wholly new problems of defense and deterrence—problems which demand a broad reexamination of the requirements of our security and the relative contribution to it of the United States and its allies.

- It has become starkly apparent that the great industrialized democracies of Japan, Europe, and North America could pursue di-

¹ Made before the Pilgrims of Great Britain at London on Dec. 12 (press release 452).

December 31, 1973

777

These historic changes were occurring in a profoundly changed psychological climate in the West. The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada, and America will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders. Even today, a majority on both sides of the Atlantic did not experience the threat that produced the alliance's creation or the sense of achievement associated with its growth. Even today, in the United States over 40 Senators consistently vote to make massive unilateral reductions of American forces in Europe. Even today, some Europeans have come to believe that their identity should be measured by its distance from the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic we are faced with the anomalous—and dangerous—situation in which the public mind identifies foreign policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries while relations with allies seem to be characterized by bickering and drift.

There exists, then, a real danger of a gradual erosion of the Atlantic community which for 25 years has insured peace to its nations and brought prosperity to its peoples. A major effort to renew Atlantic relations and to anchor our friendship in a fresh act of creation seemed essential. We hoped that the drama of the great democracies engaging themselves once again in defining a common future would infuse our Atlantic partnership with new emotional and intellectual excitement. This was the origin of the initiative which came to be called the "Year of Europe."

—The President's initiative was launched after careful preparation. In all of our conversations with many European leaders during the winter and spring of 1972-73 there was agreement that Atlantic relations required urgent attention to arrest the potential for growing suspicion and alienation between Europe and America.

—We do not accept the proposition that

the strengthening of Atlantic unity and the defining of a European personality are incompatible. The two processes have reinforced each other from the outset and can continue to do so now. The United States has repeatedly and explicitly welcomed the European decision to create an independent identity in all dimensions, political and economic. Indeed, we have long—and more consistently than many Europeans—supported the goal of political cohesion.

—We have no intention of restricting Europe's international role to regional matters. From our perspective, European unification should enable Europe to take on broader responsibilities for global peace that ultimately can only contribute to the common interest. The American initiative was meant to mark Europe's new preeminence on the world scene as well as within the North Atlantic community.

A comprehensive reexamination of all aspects of our relationship, economic, political, and military, is imperative. It is a fact that our troops are in Europe as a vital component of mutual defense. It is also a fact—indeed, a truism—that political, military, and economic factors are each part of our relationship. In our view, the affirmation of the pervasive nature of our interdependence is not a device for blackmail. On the contrary, it is the justification for conciliatory solutions. For the specialized concerns of experts and technicians have a life of their own and a narrow national or sectarian bias. The purpose of our initiative was to override these divisive attitudes by committing the highest authority in each country to the principle that our common and paramount interest is in broadly conceived cooperation.

## The European Identity

Since last April Europe has made great strides toward unity—particularly in political coordination. The United States strongly supports that process. But as an old friend we are also sensitive to what this process does to traditional ties that, in our view, remain essential to the common interest.

778

Department of State Bulletin

of Atlantic community, or both sides of the
Atlantic will suffer. It is not that we are im-
patient with the cumbersome machinery of
the emerging Europe. It is rather the ten-
dency to highlight division rather than unity
with us which concerns us.

I would be less than frank were I to con-
ceal our uneasiness about some of the recent
practices of the European Community in the
political field. To present the decisions of a
unifying Europe to us as faits accomplis not
subject to effective discussion is alien to the
tradition of U.S.-European relations.

This may seem a strange complaint from
a country repeatedly accused of acting itself
without adequately consulting with its allies.
There is no doubt that the United States has
sometimes not consulted enough or adequate-
ly—especially in rapidly moving situations.
But this is not a preference; it is a deviation
from official policy and established practice—
usually under pressure of necessity. The at-
titude of the unifying Europe, by contrast,
seems to attempt to elevate refusal to consult
into a principle defining European identity.
To judge from recent experience, consulta-
tion with us before a decision is precluded,
and consultation after the fact has been
drained of content. For then Europe appoints
a spokesman who is empowered to inform us
of the decisions taken but who has no author-
ity to negotiate.

We do not object to a single spokesman, but
we do believe that as an old ally the United
States should be given an opportunity to ex-
press its concerns before final decisions af-
fecting its interests are taken. And bilateral
channels of discussion and negotiation should
not be permitted to atrophy—at least until
European political unity is fully realized. To
replace the natural dialogue with extremely
formalistic procedures would be to shatter
abruptly close and intangible ties of trust
and communication that took decades to de-
velop and that have served our common pur-
poses well.

The United States recognizes the problems
of a transitional period as Europe moves to-
ward unity. We understand the difficulty of
the first hesitant steps of political coordina-
tion. But we cannot be indifferent to the tend-

ency to justify European identity as facili-
tating separateness from the United States;
European unity, in our view, is not contra-
dictory to Atlantic unity.

For our part, we will spare no effort to
strengthen cooperative relationships with a
unifying Europe, to affirm the community of
our ideals, and to revitalize the Atlantic rela-
tionship. That was the purpose of our initia-
tive last April. It remains the central goal of
our foreign policy.

The Common Challenge

The leaders of the European Community
meet this week. They will consider the nature
of European identity; no doubt they will
adopt common policies and positions. In the
light of this important meeting, let me out-
line the position of the United States:

—Détente is an imperative. In a world
shadowed by the danger of nuclear holo-
caust, there is no rational alternative to the
pursuit of relaxation of tensions. But we
must take care that the pursuit of détente
not undermine the friendships which made
détente possible.

—Common defense is a necessity. We must
be prepared to adjust it to changing condi-
tions and share burdens equally. We need a
definition of security that our peoples can
support and that our adversaries will re-
spect in a period of lessened tensions.

—European unity is a reality. The United
States welcomes and supports it in all its di-
mensions, political as well as economic. We
believe it must be made irreversible and that
it must strengthen transatlantic ties.

—Economic interdependence is a fact. We
must resolve the paradox of growing mutual
dependence and burgeoning national and re-
gional identities.

We are determined to continue construc-
tive dialogue with Western Europe. We have
offered no final answers; we welcome Eu-
rope's wisdom. We believe that this opportu-
nity will not come soon again.

December 31, 1973

779

let us agree on a set of declarations equal to
the occasion so that they may serve as an
agenda for our governments and as an ex-
ample and inspiration for our peoples.

Second, let us then transform these decla-
rations into practical and perceptible prog-
ress. We will restore mutual confidence if
our policies begin to reinforce rather than
work against our common objectives. And let
us move quickly to improve the process of
consultation in both directions. The U.S.
Government made concrete suggestions in
this regard at the recent meeting of the For-
eign Ministers in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil.

But let us also remember that even the
best consultative machinery cannot substi-
tute for common vision and shared goals; it
cannot replace the whole network of intangi-
ble connections that have been the real sinews
of the transatlantic and especially the Anglo-
American relationship. We must take care
lest in defining European unity in too legalis-
tic a manner we lose what has made our alli-
ance unique: that in the deepest sense Eu-
rope and America do not think of each other
as foreign entities conducting traditional di-
plomacy, but as members of a larger commu-
nity engaged, sometimes painfully but ulti-
mately always cooperatively, in a common
enterprise. The meeting to which the Foreign
Ministers of the Community were courteous
enough to invite me marks a significant step
forward in restoring the intangibles of the
transatlantic dialogue.

Let us put false suspicions behind us. The
President did not fight so hard in Congress
for our troops in Europe, for strong de-
fenses, for a conciliatory trade bill, for sup-
port for allies around the world; he did not
strive so continually to consult on SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and de-
velop common positions on MBFR [mutual
and balanced force reductions]; he did not
stand up so firmly to challenges in crises
around the world—suddenly to sacrifice
Western Europe's security on the altar of
condominium. Our destiny, as well as the full
strength of our military power, is inextrica-
bly linked with yours.

challenges compared to which our recent dis-
putes are trivial. A new international system
is replacing the structure of the immediate
postwar years. The external policies of China
and the Soviet Union are in periods of transi-
tion. Western Europe is unifying. New na-
tions seek identity and an appropriate role.
Even now, economic relationships are chang-
ing more rapidly than the structures which
nurtured them. We—Europe, Canada, and
America—have only two choices: creativity
together or irrelevance apart.

The Middle East and Energy

The Middle East crisis illustrates the im-
portance of distinguishing the long-range
from the ephemeral. The differences of re-
cent months resulted not so much from lack
of consultation as from a different percep-
tion of three key issues: Was the war pri-
marily a local conflict, or did it have wider
significance? Has the energy crisis been
caused primarily by the war, or does it have
deeper causes? Can our common energy cri-
sis be solved by anything but collective ac-
tion?

As for the nature of the Middle East con-
flict, it is fair to state—as many Europeans
including your Foreign Secretary have—that
the United States did not do all that it might
have done before the war to promote a per-
manent settlement in the Middle East. Once
the war began, the United States demon-
strated great restraint until the Soviet effort
reached the point of massive intervention.
Once that happened, it became a question of
whether the West would retain any influence
to help shape the political future of an area
upon which Europe is even more vitally de-
pendent than the United States. We involved
ourselves in a resupply effort not to take
sides in the conflict but to protect the possi-
bility of pursuing after the war the objec-
tive of a just, permanent settlement which
some of our allies have urged on us ever since
1967.

780

Department of State Bulletin

10

explosive growth of worldwide demand out-
running the incentives for supply. The Mid-
dle East war made a chronic crisis acute, but
a crisis was coming in any event. Even when
prewar production levels are resumed, the
problem of matching the level of oil that the
world produces to the level which it con-
sumes will remain.

The only long-term solution is a massive
effort to provide producers an incentive to
increase their supply, to encourage consum-
ers to use existing supplies more rationally,
and to develop alternate energy sources.

This is a challenge which the United States
could solve alone with great difficulty and
that Europe cannot solve in isolation at all.
We strongly prefer, and Europe requires, a
common enterprise.

To this end, the United States proposes
that the nations of Europe, North America,
and Japan establish an Energy Action Group
of senior and prestigious individuals with a
mandate to develop within three months an
initial action program for collaboration in
all areas of the energy problem. We would
leave it to the members of the Nine whether
they prefer to participate as the European
Community.

The Group would have as its goal the as-
surance of required energy supplies at rea-
sonable cost. It would define broad princi-
ples of cooperation, and it would initiate
action in specific areas:

any matters of common interest. The prob-
lem of finding adequate opportunity for de-
velopment, and the investment of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of energy sources, would
appear to be a particularly important area
for consumer-producer cooperation.

As an example of a task for the Energy
Action Group, I would cite the field of en-
riching uranium for use in nuclear power
reactors. We know that our need for this
raw material will be great in the 1980's. We
know that electric utilities will wish to as-
sure their supply at the least possible cost.
We know that European countries and Japan
will wish to have their own facilities to pro-
duce at least part of their needs for enriched
uranium. Such plants require huge capital
investment. What could be more sensible than
that we plan together to assure that scarce
resources are not wasted by needless dupli-
cation?

The United States is prepared to make a
very major financial and intellectual contri-
bution to the objective of solving the energy
problem on a common basis. There is no
technological problem that the great democ-
racies do not have the capacity to solve to-
gether—if they can muster the will and the
imagination. The energy crisis of 1973 can
become the economic equivalent of the sput-
nik challenge of 1957. The outcome can be
the same. Only this time, the giant step for
mankind will be one that America and its
closest partners take together for the bene-
fit of all mankind.

We have every reason of duty and self-
interest to preserve the most successful part-
nership in history. The United States is com-
mitted to making the Atlantic community a
vital positive force for the future as it was
for the past. What has recently been taken
for granted must now be renewed. This is
not an American challenge to Europe; it is
history's challenge to us all.

The United Kingdom, we believe, is in a
unique position. We welcome your member-
ship in the European Community—though
the loosening of some of our old ties has been
painful at times. But you can make another
historic contribution in helping develop be-
tween the United States and a unifying Eu-

December 31, 1973

781

rope the same special confidence and inti-
macy that benefited our two nations for dec-
ades. We are prepared to offer a unifying
Europe a "special relationship," for we be-
lieve that the unity of the Western world is
essential for the well-being of all its parts.

In his memoirs Secretary Acheson de-
scribed the events of his visit to London in
the spring of 1950. He described the need of
his time for an "act of will, a decision to do
something" at a crucial juncture.

We require another act of will—a deter-
mination to surmount tactical squabbles and
legalistic preoccupations and to become the
master of our destinies. We in this room are
heirs to a rich heritage of trust and friend-
ship. If we are true to ourselves, we have it
in our power to extend it to a united Europe
and to pass it on, further enriched and en-
nobled, to succeeding generations.

The Nobel Peace Prize: Symbol
of the Quest for Peace

*Statement of Secretary Kissinger* ¹

Our experience has taught us to regard
peace as a delicate, ever-fleeting condition,
its roots too shallow to bear the strain of so-
cial and political discontent. We tend to accept
the lessons of that experience and work to-
ward those solutions that at best relieve
specific sources of strain, lest our neglect
allow war to overtake peace. To the realist,
peace represents a stable arrangement of
power; to the idealist, a goal so preeminent
that it conceals the difficulty of finding the

means to its achievement. But in this age of
thermonuclear technology, neither view can
assure man's preservation. Instead, peace,
the ideal, must be practiced. A sense of re-
sponsibility and accommodation must guide
the behavior of all nations. Some common
notion of justice can and must be found, for
failure to do so will only bring more "just"
Wars.

In his Nobel acceptance speech, William
Faulkner expressed his hope that "man will
not merely endure: he will prevail." We live
today in a world so complex that even only
to endure, man must prevail—over an ac-
celerating technology that threatens to escape
his control and over the habits of conflict that
have obscured his peaceful nature.

Certain war has yielded to an uncertain
peace in Viet-Nam. Where there was once
only despair and dislocation, today there is
hope, however frail. In the Middle East the
resumption of full-scale war haunts a fragile
cease-fire. In Indochina, the Middle East, and
elsewhere, lasting peace will not have been
won until contending nations realize the fu-
tility of replacing political competition with
armed conflict.

America's goal is the building of a struc-
ture of peace, a peace in which all nations
have a stake and therefore to which all
nations have a commitment. We are seeking
a stable world, not as an end in itself but as
a bridge to the realization of man's noble
aspirations of tranquillity and community.

If peace, the ideal, is to be our common
destiny, then peace, the experience, must be
our common practice. For this to be so, the
leaders of all nations must remember that
their political decisions of war or peace are
realized in the human suffering or well-being
of their peoples.

As Alfred Nobel recognized, peace cannot
be achieved by one man or one nation. It
results from the efforts of men of broad vision
and good will throughout the world. The ac-
complishments of individuals need not be
remembered, for if lasting peace is to come it
will be the accomplishment of all mankind.

¹ Read at the Nobel Peace Prize award ceremony at Oslo on Dec. 10 by Thomas R. Byrne, Ambassador to Norway (press release 448).

782

Department of State Bulletin

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 20, 1973

No. 461

VISIT OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO LISBON, PORTUGAL
DECEMBER 17-18, 1973

Joint Communique

1. The Secretary of State of the United States of America, Dr. Henry Kissinger, made an official visit to Lisbon on December 17 and 18 at the invitation of the Portuguese Government.

2. In the course of his visit he was received by the President of the Republic and had talks with the Prime Minister. In various meetings held at the Foreign Ministry, Dr. Henry Kissinger and the Foreign Minister, Dr. Rui Patricio, had the opportunity to review the more important problems of the current international situation. There was a full discussion of bilateral United States-Portuguese relationships.

3. The talks took place in a markedly friendly atmosphere and produced a frank exchange of views. There was a large area of agreement with respect to the problems of concern to the two countries.

4. Dr. Kissinger, on behalf of all his associates, expressed warm appreciation for the cordiality and hospitality with which he was received.

******

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 20, 1973

No. 462

VISIT OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO MADRID, SPAIN
DECEMBER 18-19, 1973

Joint Communique

1. The Secretary of State of the United States of America, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, made an official visit to Spain on December 18 and 19, at the invitation of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don Laureano López Rodó.

2. During his stay in Madrid, he was received by His Excellency the Head of State and by His Royal Highness the Prince of Spain. He also held conversations with the President of the Government, Admiral Carrero Blanco, and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Señor López Rodó, of the Palace of Santa Cruz, the seat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two working meetings were held, in which the following subjects were examined with special care:

a. The present state of Atlantic relations.

b. The conflict in the Middle East.

c. The situation in the Mediterranean.

d. The existing energy situation.

e. Matters relating to the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the U.S. of 6 August 1970.

3. Secretary Kissinger was entertained by his Spanish colleague at a dinner in the Palace of Viana, and the Secretary hosted a working luncheon in the United States Embassy on December 19.

4. The talks took place in an atmosphere of the greatest cordiality and understanding. Agreement was reached in principle to develop a joint U.S.-Spanish declaration of principles. Both parties agreed that Spain is essential for the security of the West and for the maintenance of peace. They agreed as well that Spain must participate on a basis of equality with the other countries of the Atlantic area in the establishment of a just and stable international order.

5. The Governments of both countries declare their intention to continue these close contacts at a high level for the purpose of strengthening U.S.-Spanish friendship, promoting the resolution of problems of common interest, and contributing to world peace.

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December 22, 1973

No. 470

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
UPON ARRIVAL IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DECEMBER 20, 1973

I have come to Geneva today, at the behest of the President of the United States, in the cause of peace.

The fate of Arabs and Jews has been inextricably linked throughout their history, rising and falling together. In recent centuries both had been reduced to an equally cruel state — the one dispersed and persecuted throughout the world, the other deprived of autonomy and freedom in its own former empire. But over the past quarter century both have stood on the verge of overcoming their past, no longer restrained by outside forces but by their struggle with one another. Thus in the land of Arabs and Jews, where the reality of mistrust and hate so tragically contradicts the spiritual message which originates there, it is essential for the voice of reconciliation to be heard.

The war that began last October 6 — like its three predecessors — proved the futility of military solutions. There is no acceptable alternative to a negotiated settlement of the issues so long in dispute, and to a determination on the part of all the parties who will assemble here tomorrow to make these negotiations succeed.

For its part, the United States comes here with that determination. President Nixon has instructed me to engage the influence and resources of the United States in a major effort to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I shall carry out my instructions with all my heart and all my energy.

In my meetings with Arab and Israeli leaders over the course of the past ten days, I found none who wanted the war to continue; none who would not recognize that now is the time to break the cycle of uneasy truce and violent war.

Upon us and what we do here depend the lives and hopes of people, and it is to the people we shall have to answer should we fail. The Middle East whose dramatic, tragic and heroic peoples have produced three great faiths is challenged today to another act of faith; that hatred can give way to reconciliation; that peace can become our purpose, compromise our method and hope our inspiration.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L.C.]

December 22, 1973

No. 469

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE OPENING SESSION
OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

DECEMBER 21, 1973

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished Foreign Ministers, Delegates

As one of the co-chairmen of this conference, let me express my gratitude to the United Nations and to you personally for providing such excellent facilities for the conference, for convening it, and for doing us all the honour of presiding at this historic moment.

We are convened here at a moment of historic opportunity for the cause of peace in the Middle East, and for the cause of peace in the world. For the first time in a generation the peoples of the Middle East are sitting together to turn their talents to the challenge of a lasting peace.

All of us must have the wisdom to grasp this moment to break the shackles of the past, and to create at last a new hope for the future.

Two months ago what we now refer to as the fourth Arab-Israeli War was coming to an end. Today, there is the respite of an imperfect ceasefire, but the shadow of war still hangs over the Middle East. Either we begin today the process of correcting the conditions which produced that conflict, or we doom untold tens of thousands to travail, sorrow and further inconclusive bloodshed.

When the history of our era is written, it will speak not of a series of Arab-Israeli wars, but of one war broken by periods of uneasy armistices and temporary ceasefires. That war has already lasted twenty-five years. Whether future histories will call this the era of the twenty-five year Arab-Israeli War, or the thirty-year war, or the fifty-year war, rests in large measure in our hands. And above all, it rests in the hands of the Israeli and Arab governments, not only those whose distinguished representatives are seated around this table, but also those who are absent and who we all hope will join us soon.

We are challenged by emotions so deeply felt -- by causes so passionately believed and pursued -- that the tragic march from cataclysm to cataclysm, each more costly and indecisive than the last, sometimes seems preordained. Yet our presence here today in itself is momentous accomplishment -- is a symbol of rejection of this fatalistic view. Respect for the forces of history does not mean

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PR #469

blind submission to those forces. There is an Arab saying, eli fat mat, which means that the past is dead. Let us resolve here today that we will overcome the legacy of hatred and suffering. Let us overcome old myths with new hope. Let us make the Middle East worthy of the messages of hope and reconciliation that have been carried forward from its stark soil by three great religions.

Today there is hope for the future, for the conflict is no longer looked upon entirely in terms of irreconcilable absolutes. The passionate ideologies of the past have, in part at least, been replaced by a recognition that all the peoples concerned have earned, by their sacrifice, a long period of peace.

From two recent trips through the Middle East I have the impression that people on both sides have had enough of bloodshed. No further proof of heroism is necessary; no military point remains to be made. The Middle East -- so often the source of mankind's inspiration -- is challenged to another act of hope and reconciliation -- significant not only for its own peoples but for all mankind.

What does each side seek? Both answer with a single word: peace. But peace has of course a concrete meaning for each. One side seeks the recovery of sovereignty and the redress of grievances suffered by a displaced people. The other seeks security and recognition of its legitimacy as a nation. The common goal of peace must surely be broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

For the United States, our objective is such a peace.

I cannot promise success, but I can promise dedication. I cannot guarantee a smooth journey towards our goal. I can assure you of an unswerving quest for justice.

The United States will make a determined and unflagging effort.

President Nixon has sent me here because for five years he had endeavored to build a new structure of international peace in which ties with old friends are strengthened, and new and constructive relationships replace distrust and confrontation with adversaries.

But world peace remains tenuous and incomplete so long as the Middle East is in perpetual crisis. Its turmoil is a threat to the hopes of all of us in this room.

It is time to end it.

The question is not whether there must be peace. The question is how do we achieve it. What can we do here to launch new beginnings?

First, this conference must speak with a clear and unequivocal voice: the ceasefire called for by the Security Council must be scrupulously adhered to by all concerned. Prior to last October the United States did all it could to prevent a new outbreak of fighting. But we failed because frustration could no longer be contained.