January 6, 1960

Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
Executive Chamber
Albany, New York

Dear Nelson:

I understand that you will be in Boston the weekend of February 6th and 7th to appear on a television program with Mrs. Roosevelt. Ann and I (not to speak of Elizabeth) would be so pleased if you would find it possible to drop by for a little while to meet Elizabeth and to give us a chance to return in a very small degree your hospitality. Since I know your schedule is very full, perhaps you might pick the time, either for a meal or at any other hour that you are free. We live about ten minutes from Harvard Square and it is about equidistant between Harvard and Brandeis.

It also occurred to me that you might wish to meet some of the younger faculty members who are generally kept from you at official functions. (Honesty forces me, however, to report that they are not much more interesting than the Senior faculty.) If you would like, I would be delighted to arrange an informal meeting.

Please don't feel any pressure for either of these things. I am suggesting the second only if you are interested in feeling the pulse around here, and not because of any personal interest on my part in it.

Much as we would love to have you, needless to say Ann and I will fully understand if your schedule prevents you from accepting.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

I will fully understand if you schedule prevents you from attending.

Much as we would like to have you, nevertheless to see you and

interest on my part in it.

in feeling thePlease don't feel any pressure for either of these

arrange an informal meeting.

Senior faculty.) It you would like, I would be delighted to
to report that they are not much more interesting than the
from you at official functions. (Honestly forces me, however,
some of the longer faculty members who are generally kept
from you at official functions. (Honestly forces me, however,
some of the longer faculty members who are generally kept
It also occurred to me that you might wish to meet
Harvard and Brandeis.

Harvard and Brandeis and it is a point adroitant between
any other whom you are free. We live spontaneous minutes
beneath you might pick the time, either for a meal or at
hospitality. Since I know you, schedule is very full,
give me a chance to return in a very small degree hom.
Pie to rob him for a little while to meet Elizabeth and to
Elizabeth) would be so pleased if you would find it possible
program with Mrs. Roosevelt. Ann and I (not to speak of
weekend of February 2nd and 3rd to appear on a television
I understand that you will be in Boston the

Dear Nelson:

Yipsbury, New York
Executive Chamber

Governor of the State of New York
How Nelson V. Rocketteller

January 6, 1960

February 10, 1960

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
Albany, New York

Dear Nelson:

I am trying to keep these to a minimum, but I do think it would be very nice if you would write Ros Gilpatric, who has been very helpful in analyzing the budgetary situation for us. As you know, it is hard to find people who are both knowledgeable and fair, and he has spent a lot of time on his paper.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing
a draft.

With best regards as always.

February 26, 1960

Dear Nelson:

I think it is fairly important that your article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS be bought adequately to the attention of the press. Generally, FOREIGN AFFAIRS makes a press release, but since they usually have several senior people writing for the same issue and since their main concern is to promote FOREIGN AFFAIRS, they may not promote your article adequately.

I would therefore recommend that you have the article mimeographed, with a release date on the same day as publication by FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Also, I thought you might like to know that FOREIGN AFFAIRS has a system of making reprints available to its authors. These are rather handsomely reproduced, and they may be a good means for circulating the article. If you think it all right, I could use about 100 copies to circulate to academic friends and government people abroad.

All the best.

March 3, 1960

Personal

To: Nelson A. Rockefeller

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I thought you might like to have some of the background of the material on which you are being briefed. I am marking this "Personal" so that it will not become part of your files.

General Bonesteel, under the direction of Generals Lemnitzer and Taylor decided in December 1958 that ballistic missile calculations the Stanford Research Institute had under way at that time should be completed earlier than planned because Wohlstetter's article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," was being reviewed by General Taylor and his staff in galley proof.

Following the completion of the study and its back-up (which is very lengthy--about 30 hours of briefing material) and a series of briefings to the General Staff Council, General Taylor directed through General Bonesteel three actions:

1. That a special study group be formed to examine the validity of the study and its implications for future strategy;

2. That a complete staffing job be done on the study and that all calculations and assumptions be thoroughly checked out; and

3. That the presentation be given to all of the major military commands and the military services and executive departments involved in the problems presented by the study, and that these groups critique the analysis.

As a result of the last directive, the Central War Briefing was given to governmental groups between February 4, 1959 and January 16, 1960. Among the groups and individuals briefed were the following: the Army General Staff Council; the Army Policy Council; General White, Chief of Staff, USAF; General Le May; General Twining and his staff; the JCS Joint Planning Staff; Admiral Burke; the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Navy Pentagon Staff; the Air Staff Council; General Power

Nelson A. Rockefeller

-2-

March 3, 1960

and the SAC Headquarters Command; General Partridge and the NORAD Headquarters Command; RAND; ORO; OEG; CIA; the Board of National Intelligence Estimates; Mr. Gates (On his first day as Secretary of Defense); Bureau of the Budget (twice); members of the White House Staff; including General Goodpaster and other; U.S. elements of SHAPE; Dr. Herbert York of DD R & E and his staff; ARPA; Mr. Frederick M. Eaton, the President's Chief Disarmament Negotiator; and others.

The Stanford Research Institute has since completed a study of Soviet ballistic missile war in Europe. Some of the results of this study will also be described. Working with members of the RAND Corporation, as well as with Dalimal Kybal, consultant to the State Department under the Coolidge Committee, S.R.I. has developed some of the problems inherent in disarmament and arms control as they affect the U.S. deterrent posture and negotiating position.

Much of the value of the work to date has resulted from combining under a single research program the passive and civil defense work for OCDM and the studies of military defense sponsored by Department of the Army and other agencies of the Department of Defense. The Stanford Research Institute has worked closely with Mr. Herman Kahn of RAND in the development of his concepts of "The Military Implications of Non-Military Defense." Much of the defense study work for the Army has been directed toward examining the interaction and trade-off between military and nonmilitary defense measures. Some of this active-passive defense trade-off analysis and a broad strategic analysis of the 1965-1970 period were incorporated in the so-called "Oberbeck Study" dated 1 October 1959, in which the Army stated (as a position) that there was a military strategic requirement for fallout shelters and other civil defense measures of equal priority to ballistic missile defense. (This is in addition to the "quick fix" fallout shelter program advocated by General Taylor in his book.)

March 9, 1960

PERSONAL

Dear Nelson:

I am sorry I had to rush off on Saturday morning without an opportunity to thank you for your various kindnesses and hospitality. It was wonderful to have an opportunity to talk with you at such length and I believe that you can make a major contribution if you proceed with your plan to speak about the nature of our values in the present situation.

You asked me after the session with Foster how reliable his figures are. I would separate this into two parts. The material dealing with central war coincides with similar conclusions reached by RAND and ORO, and, indeed, with every group in the field with whose work I am familiar. The briefing which had been arranged for me in Washington dealt only with the central war theme and that is what I had urged Foster and Bonesteel to give to you.

Unfortunately, perhaps to appeal to what they believed to be your interests or in order to justify the briefing, it seemed to me that Foster spent a disproportionate amount of time on civil defense. Here I thought his figures were less reliable and he hadn't given nearly as much thought to it as in the case of central war. I was sorry that it got so long and drawn-out, particularly after the hectic day you had already had.

I will be in New York again on the 18th if you should wish to pursue the speech on foreign policy.

All good wishes and kind regards.

P.S. I am marking this "personal" so that it doesn't automatically become part of your files.

March 7, 1960

To: The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I thought it might be helpful if I gave you
some of my views about your meeting with Chancellor
Adenauer. I have met him several times and I know
the German situation reasonably well. My assess-
ment is as follows:

Adenauer is frequently described as rigid, un-
imaginative, and tough. In my judgment, he is, with
the exception of Brandt, the Mayor of Berlin (who is
of the opposition party) the only man of stature in
political life in Germany today. His guiding principle
has been that he should tie Germany so closely to the
West during his lifetime that even the most mediocre
successor will not be able to break it away. It is
ironic that he should have gotten under such wild attack,
particularly in Great Britain, for in many respects no
one distrusts the Germans more than he does. He be-
lieves that it would be a disaster for Germany to try
to pursue an independent policy since this has led to
disaster for Europe twice within a generation. I think
he is right.

The last country we should encourage to be flexible
is Germany, particularly because then the latent hysteria
in the German scene would manifest itself with great vio-
lence. What worries me is that the man who has staked
everything on the West should be so vilified during the
first test of nerves that the Soviets have inflicted on
us. If the West should suffer what the Germans consider
a defeat--and, unhappily, the definition of victory and de-
feat does not depend on Mr. Haggerty--we will then see a more
and more neutralist policy, which must play into Soviet hands.

It has been said that we cannot give Adenauer a veto
over the summit, but I must say that I cannot for the world
see why the Germans cannot have a veto over the fate of a
German city. If in every situation where our allies feel
their vital interests at stake we add our pressure to that
of the Soviets, there will soon be no point in American

of the Soviets, there will soon be no point in American
their vital interests at stake we add our pressure to that
German city. It in every situation where our allies feel
see why the Germany cannot have a veto over the fate of a
over the summit, but I must say that I cannot for the world
It has been said that we cannot give Adenauer a veto
and more neutrophil policy, which must fly into Soviet lands.

test does not depend on Mr. Haggerty--we will then see a more
a detest--and, unashbly, the definition of victory and de-
na. It the West should suffer what the Germans connoiger
that test of nerves that the Soviets have inflicted on
everything on the West should be so vitiated during the
fence. What worries me is that the man who has asked
in the German scene would manifest itself with great vio-
la Germany, particularly because then the latent phateria
The last country we should encourage to be flexible

he is right.
disaster for Europe twice within a generation. I think
to brane an independent policy since this has fed to
fieves that it would be a disaster for Germany to try
one diametric the Germany more than he does. He be-
particularly in Great Britain, for in many respects no
tronic that he should have gotten under such wild attack,
successor will not be able to preck it away. It is
West during his lifetime that even the most mediocre
has been that he should tie Germany so closely to the
political life in Germany today. His guiding principle
of the opposition party) the only man of stature in
the exception of Bruck, the Mayor of Berlin (who is
insightful and tough. In my judgment, he is, with
Adenauer is frequently described as rigid, un-

ment is as follows:
the German situation reasonably well. My sasess-
Adenauer. I have met him several times and I know
some of my views about your meeting with Chancellor
I thought it might be helpful if I gave you

From: Henry V. Klaueger

To: The Honorsple Nelson V. Rockefeller

March 7, 1960

Nelson A. Rockefeller

-2-

March 3, 1960

friendship.

As for the last proposals we made in Berlin, it is easy to understand Adenauer's disquiet. I have met no senior official in the State Department who is not equally worried. We proposed an interim agreement, an end to subversive activities from West Berlin and a ceiling on troops in West Berlin. All of these offers gave the Soviets a unilateral advantage for which we got nothing in return except the end of a Soviet threat. They have these drawbacks:

1. An interim agreement will be a proof that the Soviets have a voice in the arrangements in West Berlin and when it happens we will be in an impossible position. No one can seriously maintain that if the West is reluctant to fight for its rights now that it will fight for an interim arrangement which has ended and at a time when the military balance will be even more unfavorable.

2. As for subversive activities, I have no objection to ending them; in fact, I do not think we should have used Berlin to quite this extent. I am worried, however, that the Russian definition of subversive and our differ widely. There has to be a control commission to watch this, and to the Soviets, freedom in West Berlin is in itself a subversive activity.

3. As for the ceiling on troops, this makes no difference, except that I would do it unilaterally and not with the Russians in order not to provide a pretext for Soviet intervention.

I think the most important notion to convey to Adenauer is that there are some Americans who have compassion for him. He is in a terrible position, assailed by neutralists in his own country, by nationalists and now on top of everything by his allies. To give him the feeling that he can count on us would be more important than anything specific that might be said. In this connection the President's statement that the situation in Berlin was normal was disastrous. I would appose that what Adenauer really wants is to be able to tell you his point of view and I have taken the liberty of writing this memorandum as a background.

background.

have taken the liberty of writing this memorandum as a
wants it to be able to tell you the point of view and I
wasPOSITION. I would advise that what Agendner really
dent's a statement that the situation in Berlin was normal
specific that might be said. In this connection the Presi-
dent can count on us would be more important than any other
everything by his side. To give him the feeling that
rate in his own country, by nationalities and now on top of
for him. He is in a terrible position, satisfied by neutral-
ism is that there are some Americans who have compassion
I think the most important notion to convey to Aven-
tisation.

the General in order not to provide a pretext for Soviet
ence, except that I would go to it multilaterally and not with
the Soviet activities.

3. As for the ceiling on troops, this makes no difference.

The military balance will be even more unimpressive.

to the Soviets, freedom in West Berlin is in itself a compo-
ment to fight for its rights now that it will fight for
No one can reasonably maintain that if the West is reprec-
sed when it does we will be in an unboastle position.
Soviets have a voice in the arrangements in West Berlin
3. As for supererative activities, I have no objection
to the military balance will be even more unimpressive.

The military balance will be even more unimpressive.
an interim arrangement which has ended and at a time when
tant to fight for its rights now that it will fight for
No one can reasonably maintain that if the West is reprec-
sed when it does we will be in an unboastle position.
Soviets have a voice in the arrangements in West Berlin
1. An interim agreement will be a proof that the
packs:

except the end of a Soviet threat. They have these draw-
s a multiyear advantage for which we got nothing in return
troops in West Berlin. All of these offers save the Soviets
supererative activities from West Berlin and a ceiling on
worried. We proposed an interim agreement, an end to
senior officials in the State Department who are not easily
easy to understand Agendner's, aoglomer. I have met no
As for the last proposals we have in Berlin, it is
friendly.

Nelou V. Rockettler

-5-

March 3, 1960

March 21, 1960

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
Executive Chamber
Albany, New York

Dear Nelson:

I have given some thought to your Philadelphia speech. I agree very much with the need for a philosophical approach and with relating our attitude towards the world to our moral purpose. At the same time, it seems to me important to begin on a more concrete plane. I think it is essential to get home to the American people the idea that we live in an extremely critical period with great dangers and great opportunities. After having explained the nature of this crisis, it would seem to me appropriate to discuss our moral purpose as the only means by which we can have a sense of direction to the contemporary upheaval. You might then consider concluding with some concrete expression of the relevance of our values to some contemporary issues.

Towards the end of the week I will send you a brief outline along these lines.

All the best.

March 23, 1960

Dear Nelson:

I have been asked by Fritz Erler, one of the leaders of the German Social Democratic Party whether I might be able to arrange a meeting for him with you.

Erler is the leading foreign policy and defense expert of his party. If the Socialists were to win an election he would undoubtedly be Foreign Minister and, under certain circumstances might even become Chancellor. In the much more likely event of a coalition of the C.D.U. and the Socialists after Adenauer's withdrawal or death, he would almost certainly become Defense Minister. In other words, he is a man who will have a major voice in future German politics.

Though his public declarations have to follow the Socialist party line he is a man who privately is very open-minded and basically very pro-Western. I think it would be very important for him to have the benefit of meeting with you. Incidentally, he speaks perfect English. He will be in New York only on May 10th and 11th, and perhaps the afternoon of May 7th, though I am sure he would be glad to come to Albany if necessary. If you agree in principle to this suggestion, may I work out a mutually convenient date with Ilene?

Warm regards.

Henry V. Kissinger

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards,

work out a mutually convenient date with Ilene?
If you agree in principle to this suggestion, may I
am sure he would be glad to come to Vipany if necessary.
Ith' and perhaps the afternoon of May 17th, though I
Eugliah. He will be in New York only on May 10th and
of meeting with you. Incidentally, he asks perfectly
it would be very important for him to have the benefit
very open-minded and basically very pro-Western. I think
the Socialist party line he is a man who privately is
through his public declarations have to follow

In other words, he is a man who will have a major
or death, he would almost certainly become Defense Min-
cer. and the Socialists after Adenauer's withdrawal
In the much more likely event of a coalition of the
under certain circumstances might even become Chancellor.
election he would undoubtedly be Foreign Minister and,
expert of his party. If the Socialists were to win an
Erler is the leading foreign policy and defense

might be able to arrange a meeting for him with you.
leaders of the German Social Democratic Party whether I
I have been asked by Britta Erler, one of the

Dear Nelson:

Vipany, New York
Executive Chamber
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

March 23, 1960

April 18, 1960

Dear Nelson:

In thinking about our conversation regarding
the civil rights speech, the thought has occurred to me
that, while I like George Hinman's approach very much in-
deed, there is a question of emphasis which must be guarded
against.

It is of course very important to say that law
is not enough and that the real problem with respect to
civil rights concerns our own attitudes. However, it is
important to phrase this very carefully to avoid the in-
terpretation that progress on civil rights must await a
change in our attitudes. As you know, many Southerners
are making precisely this criticism of the Supreme Court
decision.

For this reason, it would seem to me important
to endorse the attempt to deal with civil rights through
legislation, perhaps even referring to your efforts in New
York State and supporting recent measures. You might then
go on to indicate that it should go even further, and then
add the point about the relationship between law and our
attitudes.

It was good as always to see you.

All the best.

All the best.

add the point about the relationship between law and our
GOVERNOR to indicate that it should go even further, and then
York State and supporting recent measures. You might then
regulation, perhaps even referring to your efforts in New
To endorse the attempt to deal with civil rights through
For this reason, it would seem to me important

decision.
are making precisely this criticism of the Supreme Court
changes in our attitudes. As you know, many Southerners
interpretation that progress on civil rights must await a
important to phrase this very carefully to avoid the in-
civil rights concerns our own attitudes. However, it is
is not enough and that the real problem with respect to
It is of course very important to say that law
against.

against.

that, while I like George Hinman's approach very much in-
the civil rights issue, the thought has occurred to me

I think

Dear Nelson:

Vipany, New York
Executive Chamber
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockett

April 18, 1960

April 18, 1960

The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
Executive Chamber

Dear Nelson:

problems of the new countries,
excellent paper for you on the manpower
to Frederick Harpzeug, who has done an
acting like the draft I have enclosed,
be willing to send a short note, some-
what I wonder whether you would

Henry A. Klaasen

April 22, 1960

PERSONAL

Dear Nelson:

The meeting with Edward Teller is now arranged
for Thursday, April 28th, at 8:30 a.m. I thought it might
be helpful if he spoke to you--within the limits of security--
about two problems:

(1) The studies made at Livermore about evasions of nuclear testing.

(2) The future direction of nuclear weapons development.

I spent a day at Livermore recently and found it
fascinating and I understand that your brother Laurence was
there also.

I am marking this personal so that it doesn't
become part of your files.

All the best.

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE GOVERNOR
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

April 25, 1960

It occurred to me that when you see Edward Teller, you might want to thank him for the excellent paper he prepared for DNA on "Government and Science." A summary of the paper is attached.

Henry A. Kissinger

May 30, 1960

Dear Nelson:

I thought the enclosed memorandum might be helpful before the Council meeting on Tuesday. It includes some reflections about topics which come up in the question period and my views with respect to them.

All the best.

May 20, 1960

From: Henry A. Kissinger

(1) The Break-Up of the Summit. I think it is essential
that we separate two problems: (a) the ineptness of our
tactics and (b) the actual causes of the crisis. It seems
to me that the line taken by Stevenson, Walter Lippman and
many others is dangerous. Mr. Khrushchev's performance in
Paris strikes me as very well calculated. His policy over
the last few years has always made sense to me only on the
assumption that he is trying to wreck allied cohesion and
to provide a basis for great pressure against all countries
on the Soviet periphery. I have always been convinced that
at some point what were made as Soviet proposals during the
period of "peaceful coexistence" would be transformed into
demands. It has always seemed to me that he is trying to
maneuver us into the position of breaking up peaceful co-
existence by not agreeing to Soviet proposals which in effect
amounted to a demand for surrender. We are simply playing
into his hands by letting him emerge as the aggrieved party
and leaning over backwards to find explanations for his
actions.

(2) The Problem of Germany. It is often maintained that one of the Soviet purposes in the present crisis is to win Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and we are urged to yield to facts that we are powerless to change. In passing, it may be doubted that the only reasonable response to facts is to adjust to them. But in this particular instance, it is important to distinguish the problem of Germany from that of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

It is important to distinguish the problem of Germany from that to facts is to adjust to them. But in this particular instance, in basing, it may be deemed that the only reasonable response we are urged to yield to facts that we are powerless to change. Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and one of the Soviet purpose in the present crisis is to win

(3) The Problem of Germany. It is often maintained that

actions.
and leaving over packwars to find explanations for his
into his hands by letting him emerge as the aggrieved party
amounted to a demand for surrender. We are simply playing
existence by not agreeing to Soviet proposals which in effect
maneuver us into the position of preaking up beacful co-
demands. It has always seemed to me that he is trying to
period of "beacful coexistence" would be transformed into
at some point what were made as Soviet proposals during the
on the Soviet territory. I have always been convinced that
to provide a base for great pressure against all countries
assumption that he is trying to wreck allied cohesion and
the last few years has always made sense to me only on the
parties strikes me as very well calculated. His policy over
many others is dangerous. Mr. Kruschcheva's performance in
to me that the line taken by Stevenson, Walterriban and
tactica and (p) the actual causes of the crisis. It seems
that we separate two problems: (a) the ineptness of our
(1) The Break-Up of the Summit. I think it is essential

From: Henry V. Kiseinger

To: Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

May 30, 1960

Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -2-

May 20, 1960

In Germany, a Communist regime has been established in only a portion of the country, a portion that has no historical, ethnic or cultural tradition distinct from Germany as a whole. The problem in Eastern Germany is not only that a puppet government has been forced on a hostile population; a separate state there--even were it non-Communist--would run counter to the German desire for reunification. Even Khrushchev on his trip to Eastern Germany found it necessary constantly to reiterate that unification was the ultimate goal, though not until Western Germany was ready to accept the Soviet system. As long as Germany remains divided the position of the East German regime is perforce precarious.

For the East German regime is basically threatened not only by the hostility of its own population but through the existence of a free and prosperous West Germany. Any West German government must advocate reunification, however moderate it may be in the means it chooses to pursue this objective and however patient it may be in bringing it about. No West German government can accept as permanent the forcible partition of German territory without undermining its domestic support. An alliance which demanded such a price from the German people would lose its meaning in German eyes. And whatever the self-restraint of either the Federal Republic or the Western allies, the history of Europe in the nineteenth century and of the anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth demonstrates that the desire for national independence cannot be ignored by governments. Or are we to assume that the desire for self-determination and national dignity is less strong in Europe than in Asia or Africa?

The Federal Republic would suffer a perhaps irreparable blow if its allies accepted its present frontiers as final--even to the extent of not pressing for unification. The division of Germany may be unavoidable, but for the West a great deal depends on demonstrating what makes it so. An excess of "realism" about accepting the division of Germany will enable the Soviet Union to shift the responsibility for thwarting unification on us. If the Federal Republic is persuaded that it cannot achieve reunification through ties to the West, it is likely to seek its aims through separate dealings with the East. Unification could then be used by the Soviets as a lure to end, step by step, the achievements of European integration and to encourage a race for Moscow's favor. Alternatively, there may be a resurgence of virulent nationalism. Maintaining the Federal Republic as a willing partner of the Atlantic community is important not only for the future of Germany, it is even more vital for the peace of the world.

Germany, it is even more vital for the peace of the world, of the Atlantic community, is important not only for the future of nationalism. Maintaining the Federal Republic as a willing partner of European integration and to encourage a race for Moscow's part of the Soviet Union as a June to end, step by step, the achievements of separate dealing with the East. Unification could then be need through time to the West, it is likely to seek its aims through Federal Republic is persuaded that it cannot achieve reunification without the reasonableness forwarting unification on no. If the accepting the division of Germany will enable the Soviet Union to demonstrate what makes it so. An excess of "realism" about Germany may be unavoidable, but for the West a great deal depends to the extent of not breaching for unification. The division of Europe, as a rule, would accept its present frontiers as fine--even if it its allies accepted its present frontiers as fine--even the Federal Republic would suffer a berghap irreparabile.

in Europe than in Asia or Africa?
desire for self-determination and national dignity is less strong
cannot be ignored by governments. Or are we to assume that the
twentieth demonstrates that the desire for national independence
the nineteenth century and of the anti-colonial struggles of the
Federal Republic or the Western allies, the history of Europe in
in German eyes. And whatever the self-restraint of either the
minded such a price from the German people would lose its meaning
without undermining its domestic support. An alliance which de-
can accept as permanent the forcible partition of German territory
battent it may be in prizing it apart. No West German Government
be in the means it chooses to pursue this objective and power-
Government must advocate reunification, however moderate it may
existence of a free and prosperous West Germany. Any West German
only by the postivity of its own population put through the
For the East German regime is basically threatened not

carious.
divided the position of the East German regime is her force pre-
was ready to accept the Soviet system. We long as Germany remains
unification was the ultimate goal, though not until Western Germany
to Eastern Germany found it necessary constantly to retrench that
German desires for reunification. Even Khrushchev on his trip
there--even were it non-communist--would run counter to the
ment has been forced on a hostile population; a separate state
The problem in Eastern Germany is not only that a bubbling Govern-
ernment or cultural tradition distinct from Germany as a whole.
only a portion of the country, a portion that has no historical,
In Germany, a Communist regime has been established in

-S-

May 30, 1960

[n]

-3-

May 20, 1960

The present Soviet purpose goes far beyond perpetuating the status quo. The Soviet Union obviously sees in the consolidation of its East German satellite not only a means to destroy the cohesion of the West but also a first step in the Communization of all of Germany. "On what foundation should Germany be reunited?" Khrushchev said in Leipzig on March 7, 1959. "Can we agree when the capitalist world proposes to achieve the reunification of Germany at the expense of the German Democratic Republic and thus narrow down the front of socialism? (italics mine) We have not been and we do not live to yield to capitalism...The question can also be put thus: Why not reunite Germany by abolishing the capitalist system in West Germany and establishing there the power of the working class? But it would be unrealistic today...If you want your children and grandchildren to remember you with gratitude, you should fight for the conclusion of a German peace treaty which would be an important step towards the reunification of German..."

The Soviet draft of a peace treaty is not the end but the beginning of a process; it is a measure to consolidate a tactical base. Almost every clause in the Soviet treaty draft defines an opportunity for constant intervention. The Federation proposed by the Soviet Union will relax tensions only until the Soviets are ready to press for a reunification of Germany under Communist aegis and in the meantime it would be used to demoralize Western Germany and to separate it from its allies. The history of coalitions in Poland, Rumania, Hungary and even China indicates that as soon as the Communists feel strong enough they will withdraw their recognition of the Federal Republic and claim that their puppet regime represents all of Germany, much as was done with the Lublin Government in Poland. This has already been foreshadowed by the violent attack on the West German government at Geneva and by Khrushchev's Leipzig speech: "The German Democratic Republic is a republic of the working class. It is a republic of workers and peasants, the home of all German workers."

In all its negotiations the West must expose the cynicism of the Soviet proposal that unification should be worked out by the two Germanys. If it is to be worked out by the German people, free elections are the best method. Confederation, on the other hand, would give the East German satellite a voice in West German affairs. By adding its weight to the opposition of any existing government, it could demoralize political life in the Federal Republic or at the least force it into a rigid mold dangerous to democracy. It could press for weakening West Germany's European ties by insisting that they conflicted with unification. If the Federal Republic refused

["they conflicted with unification. If the Federal Republic refused to press for weakening West Germany's European ties by insulating that least force it into a regime would be dangerous to democracy. It could demoralize political life in the Federal Republic or at the bottom of all German workers' lives.\n\nThe German Federal Republic is a republic of the working class. It is a republic of workers and beasants, the Left派 idee: \"The German Democratic Republic is a republic of the working class\". This has already been foreseen by the violent represents all of Germany, much as was done with the Infitin Government of the Federal Republic and claim that their bubble regime the Communists feel strong enough they will withdraw their recognition. Hungary, Hungary and even China indicates that as soon as and to separate it from its allies. The history of coalitions in and in the meantime it would be used to demoralize Western Germany ready to break for a reunification of Germany under Communist sects by the Soviet Unifor will relax tensions only until the Soviets are opportunity for constant intervention. The Federation proposed peace. Almost every clause in the Soviet treaty draft defines an ending of a process: it is a measure to consolidate a tactical the Soviet draft of a peace treaty is not the end but the\n\nhome of all German workers.\"\n\nthe working class. It is a republic of workers and beasants, the Left派 idee: \"The German Democratic Republic is a republic of the working class\".

-4-

May 20, 1960

to withdraw from those ties, Eastern Germany, having obtained
recognition by the very fact of confederation, could leave the
confederation as the advocate of German unity. If the Federal
Republic accepted the Eastern overtures it would add fuel to
Western suspicions of Germany and lead to even further estrange-
ment.

Any negotiations on Germany thus face two seemingly
contradictory dangers: That we accept the division of Germany;
or that in bargaining for unification we accept solutions which
may lay the basis for the Soviet domination of all of Germany.
Indeed, the Western "package" plan--presented at the last
Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva--has gone dangerously
far in the latter direction. A commission of East and West German
officials to expand contacts between the two parts of Germany
has from the Soviet point of view many of the advantages of confer-
ation. It is not surprising that Mr. Gromyko described this
proposal as "constructive."

To strive for German unification is not a bargaining
device but the condition for European stability. Flexibility
cannot involve abandoning the principle of self-determination.
Are our principles to cease having validity wherever the Soviet
Union succeeds in creating a fait accompli? Are we to deny in
Europe what we have defended in Asia and Africa? Adjustment to
facts no doubt is often desirable but if we elevate it into a
universal principle we write a prescription for stagnation. During
Suez we insisted that we would uphold our principles even against
our allies. Are we to leave the impression now that we will uphold
them only against our allies?

them only against our allies?  
Are we to leave the impression now that we will uphold  
our allies.  
Yes we insisted that we would uphold our principles even against  
universal principle we write a prescription for stagnation. During  
facts no doubt is often desirable but if we elevate it into a  
Europe what we have defended in Asia and Africa? Adjustment to  
Union succeeds in creating a fait accompli? Are we to deny in  
Are our principles to cease having validity wherever the Soviet  
cannot involve abandoning the principle of self-determination.  
device put the condition for European stability. Flexibility  
To strive for German unification is not a bargaining  
proposal as "constractive."  
It is not surprising that Mr. Crompko described this  
pass from the Soviet point of view many of the advantages of con-  
officials to expand contacts between the two parts of Germany  
far in the latter direction. A commission of East and West German  
Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva--pass gone dangerously  
Indeed, the Western "package" plan--presented at the last  
may say the paste for the Soviet domination of all of Germany.  
or that in bargaining for unification we accept solutions which  
contradictory dangers: That we accept the division of Germany;  
Why negotiations on Germany thus face two seemingly  
ment.  
Western unification Germany and lead to even further estrangement  
Republic accepted the Eastern overtures it would add fuel to  
confederation as the advocate of German unity. If the Federal  
recognition by the very fact of confederation, could leave the  
to withdraw from those ties, Eastern Germany, having obtained

Honorable Nelson V. Rocksteller

May 20, 1960 -4-

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HENRY A. KISSINGER, Associate Director
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38
MASSACHUSETTS

June 3, 1960

Dear Nelson:

I am enclosing three papers:

1. A memorandum which contains some of the basic facts on the defense picture broken down into the major categories of our strategic posture. In each of the categories I have listed a statement of the basic problem, my own comments and a series of questions pertaining to that problem. The questions are in a box for easy reference.

2. The questions in the memorandum are typed up again separately.

3. The third paper is an important note which you should read.

It might be helpful if you would also glance through the two memoranda I left with you the other day on military affairs. They give the general philosophical background.

I will be home Sunday morning but, unhappily, I am tied up all of Sunday afternoon on the television program with Mrs. Roosevelt.

September 26, 1960

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Nelson:

I thought it might be helpful if I gave you a progress
report on where we stand with the various ideas we discussed at
lunch before I left for Japan. I am collecting material in three
major areas:

(1) <u>The Problem of Confederation.</u>

(2) <u>Disarmament.</u>

(3) <u>Education for Democracy.</u>

In each of these areas I am aiming for a memorandum by
the middle of November outlining:

(a) What must be done immediately.

(b) The steps that should be taken the first six months
of the new Administration.

(c) The steps that must be taken in the first two years
of the new Administration.

(d) The ultimate goals.

The status of the various projects is as follows:

(1) <u>The Problem of Confederation.</u> Oscar is collecting material on the legal background. Stacy is preparing some material on the steps to be taken in the economic field. I will prepare the material for the political and military field. Oscar and I will stay in close touch on this. We are concentrating on the North Atlantic Community and the Western Hemisphere because it seems to me that the way to promote the idea of confederation is to concentrate on those areas in which we can join and use them as a symbol for other parts of the world.

(2) <u>Disarmament.</u> I have all the papers of a study group composed of leading scientists which met during the summer. I am a participant in another group which brings together a number of

as a participant in another group which brings together a number of
composed of leading scientists which met during the summer. I

(3) <u>Disarmament</u>. I have all the papers of a study group

other parts of the world.
on those areas in which we can join and see them as a team for
that the way to promote the idea of confederation is to concentrate
Islamic Community and the Western Hemisphere because it seems to me
away in close touch on this. We are concentrating on the North At-
material for the political and military field. Oscar and I will
on the steps to be taken in the economic field. I will prepare the
material on the legal background. This is preparing some material

(1) <u>The Problem of Confederation</u>. Oscar is collecting

(d) The ultimate goal.
of the new Administration.

(b) The steps that should be taken the first six months
(a) What must be done immediately.

(3) <u>Education for Democracy</u>.

(2) <u>Disarmament</u>.

Major areas:

Inception before I left for Japan. I am collecting material in three
reports on where we stand with the various ideas we discussed at
I thought it might be helpful if I gave you a progress

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
33 West 28th Street

Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler

September 26, 1960

November 16, 1960

Dear Nelson:

I have given some thought to your foreign policy speech at West Point on November 30th. It seems to me that you have to make a basic choice before we can proceed. I frankly do not believe that this is the time for a fundamental speech by you for these reasons: (1) It might look like an attempt to run with the ball before the new Administration has even taken office. (2) It might come back to haunt you in four years as a statement that the situation was critical before Kennedy took office. (3) It might look like another slap at the Eisenhower Administration. It would therefore seem to me that the speech should be in very general terms and that you reserve any major pronouncements until after the new Administration has taken office.

As soon as you let me know about this, I will work with
Hugh Morrow on the actual text.

All the best.

Henry V. Kieisinger

Sincerely yours,

VII the best.

Ruth Morrow on the actual text.

terms and that you reserve and major pronouncements until after
therefore seem to me that the speech should be in very general
look like another step at the Kieensewer Administration. It would
situation was critical before Kennedy took office. (3) It might
might come back to permit you in four years as a statement that the
fall before the new Administration has even taken office. (3) It
these reasons: (1) It might look like an attempt to run with the
leave that this is the time for a fundamental speech by you for
make a past choice before we can proceed. I frankly do not pe-
at West Point on November 30th. It seems to me that you have to
I have given some thought to your foreign policy speech

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
23 West 22nd Street

November 19, 1960

It was nice to see you last

Dear Tom:

New York, New York
810 Fifth Avenue
Mr. Nelson V. Rockettler

November 31, 1960

November 21, 1960

Personal and Confidential

Dear Nelson:

I have given some thought to some of the points covered at our dinner last week, and I would like to take the liberty of putting some additional suggestions before you:

(1) As already indicated in my memorandum, I believe that each member of the policy planning group should also have some substantive responsibility. For example, it might comprise the heads of national organization, public relations, substantive positions, and so forth.

(2) In choosing people for this group, you might find it helpful to make a preliminary assessment by asking likely candidates to submit a memorandum to you about you future. This seems to me particularly helpful in the case of Oren Root. You might consider asking him to submit a memorandum outlining his views on political developments over the next four years. This might include a statement about your relations with the Administration, with Nixon, and with other leading figures. It might also contain a rather detailed description of the organizing tasks to be accomplished on a national basis.

(3) Similar memoranda might be solicited from George Hinman about the relation of state to national organization and Emmet Hughes about the public affairs impact.

(4) I may have left a misleading impression about my reaction to Emmet Hughes. I think he is a very skillful tactician who can be extremely useful provided there is a clear strategic concept. He might be a useful member of the group.

I hope you will get a good rest.

Warm regards as always.

Henry V. Krasinger

Warm regards as always.

concept. He might be a useful member of the group.
who can be extremely useful provided there is a clear strategic
reaction to Emmet Hughes. I think he is a very skillful tactician
(4) I may have felt a misleading impression upon my
Emmet Hughes upon the public affairs impact.

Human upon the relation of state to national organization and
(3) Similar memoranda might be solicited from George
on a national basis.
detailed description of the organization takes to be accomplished
and with other feeding figures. It might also contain a rather
ment upon your relations with the Administration, with Nixon,
developments over the next four years. This might include a state-
asking him to submit memorandum outlining his views on political
particularly helpful in the case of Oten Koot. You might consider
to submit a memorandum to you upon your future. This seems to me
helpful to make a preliminary assessment by asking likely candidates
(2) In choosing people for this group, you might find it
tions, and so forth.

parts of national organization, public relations, unsubstantive best-
substantive reasonableness. For example, it might comprise the
each member of the policy planning group should also have some
(1) Be already indicated in my memorandum. I believe that
busting some additional suggestions before you:

at our dinner last week, and I would like to take the liberty of
I have given some thought to some of the points covered

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
22 West 26th Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rocketteller

Personnel and Confidential

November 31, 1960

HOWARD CHASE ASSOCIATES, INCORPORATED

FOUR WEST FIFTY-EIGHTH STREET • NEW YORK 19, NEW YORK • PLAZA 2-1981

December 9, 1960

Dear Senator Kennedy:

Accepting the promise of the absolute necessity for moving this country (and the world) forward, I propose for your consideration four basic principles for the conduct of foreign policy:

1. Seizure of psychological initiative.

II. Physical disengagement of armed forces.

III. Unparalleled military striking power.

IV. World re-education for democratic revolution.

Taking them in order:

1. Seizure of psychological initiative;

Tens of millions of words have discussed the necessity of this principle.

Therefore, I shall illustrate by example:

A. Cuba

1. Recognition of a Cuban government in exile, preferably located in a Caribbean area other than Miami.

2. Proposing and supporting membership of this government in the United Nations.

C
O
P
Y

Senator John F. Kennedy - Page 3

December 9, 1960

It is extremely important to recognize that this policy does not mean unilateral retreat from the threat of force. On the contrary, it means mutual retreat from the threat of force.

### III. Unparalleled military striking power:

The necessity for this is so conspicuous as not to need explanation. There is almost unanimous agreement that this country must have unparalleled striking power because we are generally on the defensive around the world. It becomes even more essential if we are to "move forward".

### IV. World re-education for democratic revolution:

The moments of man's freedom in the span of history have been measured in decades while the agony of slavery has been measured in centuries. The Russian Revolution is essentially one of the great counter-revolutions against the principle of the dignity of man. The tyranny of the state over the individual, whether communism, fascism, nazism or under any other label, has dominated the record of man.

In this context, the great revolutionary movements of the west at a time when our own American revolution was a relatively inconspicuous example, were true revolutions against tyranny.

Tyranny does not arise easily and the subsequent Russian Revolution, fattening on genuine abuses against human dignity, has become the symbol of all the counter-revolutionary forces which would lead the world to the dark ages of the latter half of the 20th and 21st centuries.

America and the free world must be revolutionary again in behalf of man. We must recall our Tom Paine, Tom Jefferson, Patrick Henry, Sam Adams, Hamilton and Madison. The literature, the words, the poetry, even the music of revolution against tyranny is part of our national heritage. It is significant that

Senator John F. Kennedy - Page 4

December 9, 1960

In the evolving countries of Africa, Tom Paine is a far greater source of inspiration than Marx.

Therefore, I propose that the entire apparatus of the United States Information Agency be devoted to re-education for revolution, that we demonstrate to the world that we have no fear of the power and the strength of free men that there is a vital difference between the exercise of responsible freedom and membership in a mob.

Summary: I propose to you earnestly that the application of these four principles to our national policy would revitalize our own people; give hope to a world that no longer has basic confidence in the survival of freedom; provide a measure of the effectiveness of the men and women who you gather around you to assist in your own great mission; and save the world from tyranny of regimented men.

Under these principles, if we fail, we will have gone down fighting.
We will not fail.

Sincerely yours,

b

Senator John F. Kennedy
Washington, D. C.