C O P Y

4. Although the Action Group believes in the emergence of West African union, we think that the question of Pan-Africanism ought to be approached with great caution, particularly in relation to Egypt and other Arab States. We shall endeavour to show in this pamphlet that there is no community of interest whatever between Egypt and the Arab States on the one hand, and the other States of Africa, particularly those inhabiting the area South of the Sahara. We believe, in particular, that the activities of President Nasser of Egypt should be closely watched as his attitude to non-Arab Africans does not appear to be conductive to mutual co-operation...

7. As noted in para. 4 above, we consider that the question of Pan-Africanian ought to be approached with great caution. The most difficult natural obstacle to cooperation among the territories of the West African Continent is the Sahara Desert. It is a natural barrier which cannot be removed. It divides Africa roughly into areas inhabited by people of Arab descent on the one side, and the Black Africa on the other. If a leadership is to emerge among all the peoples of African descent on the continent of Africa, we believe that that leader should be a Black African and not an Arab.

This natural desire is in direct opposition to the aims and ambitions of President Nasser of Egypt. President Nasser is concerned first and foremost with the building and consolidation of a Federal Arab Republic. So far, he has succeeded in forming a union of Egypt and Syria, and is using questionable methods to bring in the other Arab States. His ambition appears to be fostered by the U.S.S.R. for reasons best known to that country. There is no doubt, however, that President Nasser is also interested in Black Africa. The extracts from his book, "Egypt's Liberation - The Philosophy of the Revolution", quoted in the appendix of this pamphlet, ought to make those who advocate Pan-Africanism among us ponder.

8. It is clear that President Nasser will only tolerate an Arab leader for the Continent of Africa. He is apparently convinced that the black peoples of Africa are backward and that Egypt has a mission of leadership to fulfil on the Continent of Africa.

The Action Group considers that it is the height of folly and short-sightedness to have close political association with Egypt, so long as President Nasser holds sway in that country.

9. Finally, we see no reason why we should co-operate to any greater extent with Egypt - or, for that matter, Libya or Tunisia - than, for example, with Great Britain or France, with whom we have close economic ties, or Brazil with whom we have similar economic interests.

9. Great Britain or France, with whom we have close economic ties, or Brazil with Egbet - or, for that matter, tipper or tipuisi - then, for example, with Nigeria, we see no reason why we should co-operate to any greater extent

President Maaer polies away in that country.

agreement to have close political association with Egbet, so long as
The Action Group considers that it is the right of fully and short-
on the Continent of Africa.

10. Africa are packaged and that Egbet has a mission of leadership to fulfill
Continent of Africa. He is abnormally convinced that the black bodies
It is clear that President Maaer will only tolerate an Arap leaser for the
who advocate Pan-Africanism among se bouger.

Revolution", quoted in the abengix of this Pamphlet, ought to make those
The extracts from his book, "Egbet's Lipoperation - The Philosophy of the
no doubt, however, that President Maaer is also interested in Black Africa.
to be made in the other Arap States. His ambition abhors to be
has succeeded in forming a union of Egbet and Africa, and is making tremendous
with the tailoring and consolidation of a Federal Arap Republic. So far, he
President Maaer of Egbet. President Maaer is concerned that and foremost
This natural desire is in direct opposition to the aims and ambitions of
Arap.

11. Africa, we believe that that leaser should be a Black African and not an
of Africa. It is a natural barrier which cannot be removed.
To coöperate among the territories of the West African Continent
ought to be approached with great caution. The most difficult natural
Vs noted in bars. 4 above, we consider that the question of Pan-Africanism
mutual co-operation...

as his attitude to non-Arap Africans does not abhor to be co-operative to
that the activities of President Maaer of Egbet should be closely watched
in those incepting the areas south of the Sahara. We believe, in particular,
States on the one hand, and the other States of Africa, particularly
there is no community of interest whatever between Egbet and the Arap
other Arap States. We wish endeavour to show in this pamphlet that
abroaded with great caution, particularly in relation to Egbet and
union, we think that the question of Pan-Africanism ought to be
through the Action Group believes in the emergence of West Africa.

C O P Y

A RECORD OF LAWLESSNESS

From the Sinai Campaign to the beginning of this year Egypt refrained
from interfering with the passage of Israel cargoes through the Suez Canal.

The acts of interference were resumed in the month of March this year
and grew more frequent as the society of nations showed its indifference
and its inability to safeguard the principle of freedom of passage in
actual practice and without any exceptions.

The progress of growing provocations becomes clear from the following
list of ships held up by the Egyptians:

1. On 9 March, the Liberian ship "Capetan Manolis" was held up.
After her cargo had been unloaded and confiscated the ship
was allowed to proceed.

2. On 17 March, the West German ship "Lealott" was held up
and her cargo confiscated.

3. On 21 May, the Danish ship "Inge Toft" carrying 4000 tons of cement, 1500 tons of potash and 13 tons of copper scrap was held up. The Danish captain refused to acquiesce in the demand of the Egyptian authorities that he should unload his cargo, and the ship was detained. Since then she has not been allowed to proceed.

4. On 16 June, the Panamanian ship "Nord" was held up for two days.

5. On 28 October, the West German ship "Nobistor" was held up for three days when she passed the Suez Canal on her way to Djibuti in ballast.

U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL OBTAINS U.A.R. ASSURANCES

In the months that have passed since the "Inge Toft" was detained,
Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has

(more)

-2-

made certain efforts to ensure the passage of ships carrying Israel cargoes.
Following these efforts with the U.A.R. authorities the U.N. Secretary General
told us that he had reason to believe that, if Israel would agree to send
her export cargoes through the Canal in the ownership of the purchaser
(that is, F.O.B.) and to import goods intended to pass through the canal
towards her own ports under the ownership of the seller (that is, C.I.F.),
the U.A.R. authorities would not obstruct the passage of ships carrying
these cargoes. Various other parties grasped at this proposal and began
to urge us to accept it. We did not regard this method favorably at all.
The Government of Israel is not prepared to recognize the right of any one
to dictate to it methods of trade that discriminate unfairly against
Israel. But those who recommended to the Israel Government to try out
this method explained that it would not be long before the U.A.R.
authorities would be able to make another step forward and to agree to
return to the status quo that existed before the acts of interference
that began at the beginning of this year. Every one who recommended to
us the acceptance of this arrangement for the time being emphasized that
of course it was contrary to the legal situation, but in view of the in-
transigent Egyptian attitude they believed that we would do better to try
it out in practice.

ISRAEL WENT TO LIMITS OF MODERATION

We did not succeed in convincing those friendly parties who repeatedly
advised us to try out this system that it had no substance, and that it was
only a maneuver of the Cairo authorities designed to mislead friends of
Israel and to create an impression of moderation and of a readiness on the
part of the U.A.R. to bring about a compromise and reasonable arrangements
in regard to passage through the Canal. For this reason, we came to the
conclusion that we must try sending a ship on the conditions and according

(more)

to the methods recommended by these friendly parties. In our struggle for
freedom of passage we decided that we would try even this unpromising road.

These were the considerations that guided us when we decided to send
the Greek ship "Astypalea". And now the thing we warned against has
happened. On Thursday, 17 December, the Egyptian authorities detained this
ship in Port Said on its way from Haifa to Djibouti. She carried a cargo
of 400 tons of cement that had been purchased by an Asmara company. The
conditions of despatch were F.O.B. and the ship was on voyage charter in
the name of the purchaser.

We sent prior notification of our intention to send the ship, of the
method of despatch and of the date of departure to the U.N. Secretary
General and to all the friendly parties who advised us to adopt this
method, and we were in constant contact with them. All these parties
welcomed our step and expressed the opinion that we had gone to the
limit of moderation and their confidence that the cargo would pass.

We imposed a complete blackout on all information regarding the
ship's movements as we wished to forestall the argument that was put
forward in the case of the "Inge Toft" to the effect that the ship was
held up because of advance publicity. The purpose of this blackout was
to enable those who had advised us to act in this way to ensure the
passage of the ship without pressure and without enabling the U.A.R.
authorities to argue that they were unable to permit her passage because
of the publicity attending the voyage. Thus another excuse the U.A.R.
might have used was refuted. The first news of the arrest of the ship
was given by correspondents of world news agencies in Egypt and precisely
from Cairo, not from Port Said, and reached all parts of the world on
Friday, 18 December.

Even when the departure of the ship and its detention became known,
we abstained, up to this very moment, from any official reaction. One of

(more)

the reasons for this self restraint on our part in the face of the completely justified demand of the Israel public and press to know the facts, was our desire to enable the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjold, to act without the Egyptian dictator being able to complain that the matter had turned into a test of strength between himself and Israel.

## U.A.R. AGAIN BETRAYED CONFIDENCE

By this time, however, there is no point in continuing to maintain our silence. The facts are plain, and so are the reasons for them. All those who displayed such endless patience with the Egyptian dictator and placed almost boundless confidence in him, must realize by now that he has betrayed them. May we now hope that they have at last been convinced that Nasser must not be trusted, though this remains in doubt. This is not the first time that the Egyptian dictator has broken his promises, even when he gave them to those who were eager to help him. There are some with whom he has played false time and again.

## WORLD BANK MUST NOT REWARD PIRACY

Only yesterday the Board of Directors of the World Bank approved a loan of 56 million dollars to the Suez Canal Authority for the improvement of the canal. Even if we accept the thesis that the Bank must consider the approval of loans from the economic point of view alone, and need not concern itself with political considerations, there cannot be any doubt that the Bank must not give a reward to a country which violates international law and commits acts of piracy. The granting of this loan for the improvement of the canal in the face of this conduct on the part of Egypt, its blocking of an international waterway to the shipping of another nation, thus in itself constitutes a political act and Nasser, at any rate, is bound to regard it as an encouragement to him to take similar action in the future.

(more)

U.S. CLEAR AND UNDISPUTABLE ON FREEDOM OF PASSAGE

The World Bank is an instrument of the society of nations, the same society to which President Eisenhower was referring in his television address to the American people on February 20, 1957:

"Egypt, by accepting the six principles adopted by the Security Council last October in relation to the Suez Canal, bound itself to free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination and to the principle that the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country."

The President emphasized that it should not be assumed that in the future Egypt would prevent Israel shipping from using the Suez Canal, and said that if Egypt violated her international obligations, then, and I am quoting his very words, "this should be dealt with firmly by the society of nations."

The Egyptian policy in respect of the Suez Canal is the direct outcome of the tolerant attitude of the United Nations to Nasser's policy of boycott and threats against Israel who is also a member of the United Nations, and to his violations of the United Nations Charter.

A few days ago I stated in this House that those who appease Nasser are likely to become the victims of their own policy. The Secretary General of the United Nations told us on more than once occasion that he had reason to assume that this arrangement would work. We have no doubt that when he made this statement he had something to rely on. Now he stands helpless at the Egyptian dictator's door. The various powers that in the course of weeks and months planned the loan and tried to persuade us to put our faith in the application of "quiet diplomacy" have reached the stage when Nasser is ready to show consideration for them only in so far as they are ready to shower him with benefits.

ISRAEL TO PERSIST IN STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM OF PASSAGE

We shall not cease our efforts to expand our commercial relations

(more)

with countries near and far. We shall continue to insist on our right to
free and non-discriminatory use of the Canal. We shall persist in our
struggle to ensure this right.

We hope that we shall not be alone in this struggle. The regime
that should prevail in the Canal is the concern of all the nations of
the world. The violation of the right of one nation is bound to lead
to violations of the rights of other nations. At any rate, Israel is
not prepared to be the victim of a policy of appeasement in any sphere
whatever, including that of the freedom of passage in the Suez Canal.

Personal

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

11 EAST 70TH STREET
NEW YORK 21, NEW YORK

TRAFALGAR 9-7600

קונסוליה כללית

של ישראל

January 27, 1960

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The announcement of the conclusion of the negotiations for the
second stage of the Aswan Dam has prompted a number of requests to us
to evaluate the continued Soviet involvement in the United Arab Republic.

Accordingly, we have asked our research people to go into the
matter, and you will find attached hereto a general outline of some of
the major trends in this direction, all of which can, of course, be
documented in great detail. I think you will find that far from having
decreased, such involvement has, in fact, been intensified in recent
months. Suspicions that Colonel Nasser's apparent flirtations with the
West were only meant to be utilized as a bargaining lever with Moscow
have apparently proved to be correct.

The question now, of course, is whether governments of other newly
independent Asian and African countries will be led to believe that these
same tactics can be successfully emulated and that such bargaining will
not only succeed in its direct objective of gaining support from the East
but also, in turn, command heavy offers of economic assistance from the
West. It might be relevant to point out here that in the past year alone
no less than $147 million have been given to Cairo and another $150 million
promised from the United States, and an additional $250 million from other
Western sources (West Germany, Italy, Japan), plus $56 million from the
World Bank.

The central problem is the nature of Colonel Nasser's neutralism. The
neutralism of the U.A.R. is totally different from the positive neutrality
of countries such as India, which simply do not desire to get involved in
any way in the East-West conflict. Nasser, by contrast, consciously tries
to use the East-West conflict, dynamically seeking to play one side off
against the other while working both sides of the street.

The timing of the most recent agreement for the completion of the
Aswan Dam is, I think, of special interest. Having obtained a loan of
$93 million for the first stage of the Aswan Dam and another $211 loan
from the U.S.S.R., Communist China and East Germany, for industrial develop-
ment in Egypt, Colonel Nasser received numerous offers of aid from the U.S.,
the World Bank, Italy, West Germany, Japan, etc. A NEW YORK TIMES correspon-
dent in Cairo last November reported that arrangements had then already been
made for the Soviet Union to complete the whole dam. This was indignantly

-/2

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

TRAFALGAR 9-7600

- 2 -

קונסולית כללית
של ישראל

denied by Egyptian Government spokesmen, who pointed out that the
U.A.R. was still "open to offers from any source", and offers were
indeed forthcoming from various Western governments, with a German
Cabinet Minister announcing his departure for Cairo for negotiations
on this issue.

In a public speech on January 9, 1960, Colonel Nasser stated
that his government would welcome Western, as well as Eastern, aid
for Aswan construction, but within a week he had already announced
acceptance of the Soviet offer. The West was simply not given time
to put in bids for work to be carried out in three or four years'
time.

Colonel Nasser's action was reminiscent of his announcement of
the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. He then used the pretext
of the withdrawal of the original Western offer to aid in the construction
of the Aswan Dam to announce the nationalization of the canal, plans for
which he later admitted had been drawn up some months previously.

What really worries me at the moment is the effect that this success
at working both sides of the street might have on other newly independent
and developing countries of Africa and Asia, many of which have major
development projects of their own which they would like to see implemented,
such as the Volta River development scheme in Ghana. These countries have
so far resisted the temptation.

All the above and the enclosure should, of course, by no means be
connected with any Israel source. I am sending you this letter and enclosure
for your general background and hope that you will find it of interest.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center of International Studies
Harvard University
6 Divinity Street
Cambridge, Mass.

Cambridge, Mass.

6 Diainith Street
Hartford University
Center of International Studies
Dr. Henry Kieinger

Shirley Vrad

Sincerely home.

for torn General background and hope that you will find it of interest.
connected with and from the source. I am sending you this letter and enclose
all the words and the enclosure above, of course, by no means be
so far related the temptation.

and as the Volta River development scheme in Ghana. These countries have
development projects of their own which they would like to see implemented,
and developing countries of Africa and Asia, many of which have water
at working poor sides of the street might have on other newly independent
What really worries me at the moment is the effect that this success
which he later submitted had been drawn up some months previously.

of the Vavau Dam to announce the nationalization of the canal, plans for
of the withdrawal of the original Western offer to aid in the construction
the nationalization of the one Canal in 1962. He then said the factext
Colonel Maeser's action was reminiscent of his announcement of
time.

to but in place for work to be carried out in three or four years,
acceptance of the Soviet offer. The West was simply not given time
tor Vavau construction, but within a week he had already announced
that his Government would welcome Western, as well as Eastern, aid
in a huge agreement on January 9, 1960. Colonel Maeser stated
on this issue.

Cabinet Minister announcing his departure for Cairo for negotiations
into effect forthcoming from various Western Governments, with a German
U.V.R. was still "open to offers from such source", and offers were
denied by Egyptian Government spokesman, who pointed out that the

TRAVELER 8-1800

NEW YORK 51, NEW YORK

11 EAST 20TH STREET

CONSULVATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

- S -

שלא יתורש
לא יתורש

NASSER AND THE SOVIET BLOC

The United Arab Republic - Soviet agreement on the construc-
tion of the entire Aswan Dam is but the latest and most telling
example of Egypt's growing involvement with the Soviet bloc, despite
some anti-Communist propaganda inside its borders. This latest
agreement has subjected Egypt's economy, at least for the next decade,
to Soviet domination. Nasser's involvement with the Soviet Union
continues to express itself in:

a) General foreign policy, with particular emphasis recently on Latin America.

b) Economic affairs.

c) Armaments.

d) Propaganda and U.N. votes

In all these respects, the short-term aims, at least, of
both Moscow and Cairo appear to coincide, while the Egyptian
propaganda campaign against Communists within the borders of the
U.A.R. seems to be dictated primarily by the increased totalitar-
ianization of political life in the U.A.R. and the resulting
suppression of any political groups or movements not directly
subservient to Nasser.

U.A.R. dependence on the Soviet Union has by now progressed
beyond the point of no return and Colonel Nasser could not disengage
himself and shift to a pro-Western or truly neutralist position even
if he wanted to.

Timing of Agreement

It should be stressed that the conclusion of the Aswan nego-
tiations was effected quietly while Nasser continued to advertise
abroad his alleged desire for rapprochement with the West and while
making feelers for Western support for the second stage of the Aswan
Dam. It would thus clearly appear that he was only interested in
utilizing the many Western offers for the second stage of the Aswan
Dam, including suggestions made by President Eisenhower, the Bonn
Government and the Governments of Italy and Japan merely to obtain
a better deal from the Soviet Union.

-2-

These Western steps had proceeded to a point where West Germany's Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. G. Ehrhardt, had announced his impending arrival in Cairo for such negotiations.

## Political Involvements

The most significant new departure in U.A.R. foreign policy has been its increased involvement in the affairs of strife-torn Central-American capitals, primarily in Havana and Panama City.

1) Cuban Foreign Minister Raoul Rao has just left Cairo where he was feted as the U.A.R.'s official guest. According to the NEW YORK TIMES "Cuba and the U.A.R. have decided to sponsor a conference of the under-developed countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia, to be held in Havana next September...The two countries have set themselves up as a committee on arrangements to extend invitations and to suggest the agenda."

Both countries' governments are reported to have found themselves in complete agreement on their desire to utilize this venture for anti-Western activities.

2) In Panama, daily broadcasts from Cairo beamed especially at the Canal Zone call for nationalization of the waterway. The U.A.R. mission is constantly offering experts and advice towards the achievement of that goal.

"...Two broadcasts are beamed nightly from Cairo to Panama, dedicated almost wholly to the alleged unfair treatment the nation is receiving from the United States in respect to the Canal. Cairo's motives for this activity are obscure." (NEW YORK TIMES, December 2, 1959)

"Agents of Egypt's Nasser have been in Panama advising the politicians of that country on the moves to make to get eventual control over the Panama Canal away from U.S. Nasser is able to pose as an expert, having taken the Suez Canal from its owners." (U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December 14, 1959)

## Economic Involvement

With the latest Aswan Dam agreement, Soviet credits to Cairo (in addition to arms purchases valued at $350 million) total nearly $700 million. Credits for the Aswan Dam amount to some $466 million;

further loans for industrial development in the U.A.R. total $211 million. A number of other major Soviet projects in the U.A.R. have recently been announced, including a Euphrates Dam project in Syria.

Egyptian official cotton export figures, including those for the 1959 season, now published, show that no less than 68% of this major export crop are being sold to countries of the Soviet bloc and to Communist China. This represents an increase over the preceding season, despite Colonel Nasser's anti-Communist speeches.

Following are tables showing the 3-fold increase of cotton sales to the Soviet bloc between 1955-1956 (the year of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal) and 1958-1959:

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1955-56</th><th>1956-57</th><th>1957-58</th><th>1958-59</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>USSR</td><td>2.7%</td><td>22.3%</td><td>24.9%</td><td>30.%</td></tr><tr><td>China</td><td>2.7</td><td>9.2</td><td>10.1</td><td>12.</td></tr><tr><td>Czechoslovakia</td><td>14.5</td><td>9.7</td><td>11.5</td><td>10.</td></tr><tr><td>East Germany</td><td>--</td><td>4.8</td><td>6.5</td><td>4.4</td></tr><tr><td>Poland</td><td>3.7</td><td>4.3</td><td>4.7</td><td>3.9</td></tr><tr><td>Other East Bloc</td><td>3.8</td><td>4.5</td><td>7.3</td><td>7.7</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td></td><td>27.4%</td><td>54.8%</td><td>64.7%</td><td>68.%</td></tr></tfoot></table>

To continue payment for arms purchases, Nasser has been forced to mortgage future cotton crops for many years ahead.

## Armaments

The U.A.R. armed forces continue to be equipped exclusively with Soviet-manufactured arms. Additional armaments of all types still arrive at Egyptian ports. In particular, the Egyptian submarine fleet, believed still to be manned at least in part by Soviet bloc crews, has been increased substantially, and the U.A.R. Navy now includes more than twelve such craft, the majority of which are of the long ocean going type. The dispatch of U.A.R. officers to Soviet military academies continues, and the battle formation of the Egyptian Army is built on the Soviet model.

## Propaganda and U.N. Votes

Direct anti-Western propaganda from Cairo continues to be beamed in a number of languages and to various directions, particularly

to Africa where appeals for uprisings are constantly made to
opposition groups in the newly independent Cameroons, Kenya,
Somali, etc.

The voting record of the U.A.R. delegation at the last
session of the U.N. General Assembly also indicates no basic
change in its voting pattern in support of basic Soviet initia-
tives.

January 1960

["The following are the statements of the facts in connection with the case:\n\n1. The claimant was a passenger on board the steamer \"Hawthorn\" when she was hit by a large wave which caused her to fall into the sea. The claimant was a passenger on board the steamer \"Hawthorn\" when she was hit

February 5, 1960

Hon. Shimshon Arad
Consulate General of Israel
11 East 70th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Mr. Arad:

It was very kind of you to send
your letter of January 27th and the attached
material. I found it very interesting, but
I did want to make the point that I am honor-
bound to say that it came from an Israeli source
if I make any use of it. It would be impossible
for me to make use of material from a foreign
embassy without crediting it properly.

Do you want me to refer to it under
these circumstances?

With kind regards.

October 31, 1960

Mr. Shimshon Arad
Consul
Consulate General of Israel
11 East 70th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Mr. Arad:

This is just a note to tell
you again how sorry I was that my wife and
I were unable to attend the Israel Philharmonic
concert last week. It was very kind of you
to invite us, and we regretted having to miss
it.

Kind regards and all good
wishes.

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

wishes for the new year.

With kind regards and all good

opportunity soon.

you in New York, and hope we will have another

I too was sorry to miss seeing

December 22nd.

the material on Nasser with your letter of
I appreciate your sending me

Dear Mr. Arad:

New York 31, New York
11 East 30th Street
of Israel
Consulate General
Mr. Shmuel Arad

January 2, 1961

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

Please reply to:
11 East 70th Street
New York 21, New York

January 9, 1961

315.5

Dear Sir,

The INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE IN THE ADVANCEMENT OF NEW STATES which was held at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovoth, Israel, in August, 1960 attracted 127 delegates from forty-seven countries on five continents. Among them were leaders of the new states in Africa and Asia, educators, and scientists of international repute.

This was thus a Conference which brought together, for the first time in history, the leaders of the new states in Africa and Asia who had the problems, and the experts who had the answer.

At its conclusion the Conference issued "The Rehovoth Declaration 1960 and Reports of Working Groups." The pamphlet expresses the aims, purposes, and some of the results of the Conference.

In view of the importance of the theme of the Conference, we are enclosing "The Rehovoth Declaration 1960" and other material which we hope will be of interest and use to you.

encl/mo

February 19, 1962

Mr. Shimshon Arad
Consul General of Israel
11 East 70th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Mr. Arad:

Upon my return to this country, I would
like to thank you for everything that was done
for my wife and me during our visit to Israel.
Our stay was extremely interesting and exciting,
and we were grateful for all the courtesies that
were extended to us by the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs. I know that many of the arrangements
that were made for us were due to your efforts.

With kind regards.

February 6, 1963

Mr. Abba Eban
Minister of Education and Culture
Government of Israel
Jerusalem, Israel

Dear Mr. Eban:

At the very pleasant occasion of dinner at your home, you mentioned to me your interest in promoting studies of regional disarmament at the Weizmann Institute. I have recently become associated with the editorial board of an international journal on disarmament, and one of the problems we would like to deal with is precisely regional disarmament in the Middle East. I was wondering whether you or your associates could suggest somebody in Israel who might address himself to this question. Could you let me know about this as soon as possible?

I regret very much that you could not come to Harvard last fall, and hope we can rectify this soon.

With kind regards.

ISRAEL

קונסוליה בללית
CONSULATE GENERAL

Professor Henry Kissinger
Professor of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

May I take the liberty of advising you that in a few weeks
I shall be leaving this country upon the termination of my
tour of duty in the United States.

Five years will have elapsed since I arrived to assume my
present position. It has been my privilege, during this
period of time, to meet you or come in contact with you.

Allow me to thank you for your kind hospitality and co-
operation. Working with you and with members of the
Academic Community in the United States has been for me
a most rewarding and interesting experience.

May I take this opportunity to introduce to you, my colleague
and successor, Consul Avraham Avidar. I trust that he too
will have the privilege of your counsel and co-operation.
Please do not hesitate to call on him for advice and
assistance.

Thank you.

With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,

David Ben-Dov
Consul and Educational Attache'

מדינת ישראל
ISRAEL

April 10, 1964

11 EAST 70TH STREET
NEW YORK 21. NEW YORK
---
TRAFALGAR 9-7600

קונסולציה כלכית
CONSULATE GENERAL

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Studies
Harvard University
6 Divinity Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I do not recall whether you had the opportunity of
meeting Mr. Arye Levavi, the Deputy Director-General of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during your visit to Israel,
though I rather suspect that you did.

Mr. Levavi will be visiting the United States shortly,
prior to assuming the post of Director-General, which is
equivalent to the Undersecretary of State here.

Needless to say, we are anxious to include Boston in
Mr. Levavi's itinerary, and of course a visit with you. Our
plans call focus to spend the whole of Monday, June 4th, and
possibly part of June 5th in the Boston area, and I am wondering
whether you will be able to accommodate a meeting with us at
that time.

I shall take the liberty of calling you this coming
Monday, April 13, to find out.

ישראל
GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
DIVISION OF SUPPLIES

PLAZA 2-5600
CABLE ADDRESS: DEFISRA

SUITE 607
650 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

New York, April 20,1964.

Mr. Thomas Schelling
Center of Int'l Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Sir,

I herewith take the liberty to write to you on the following
subject:

Col. D. Hiram of this Ministry plans to visit the U.S. towards
the end of May to acquaint himself with the latest developments
in the field of "System Analysis".

While in England he met Dr. Morton Halperin who was kind enough
to make some suggestions as regards his itinerary while in the
U.S.

Amongst others Dr. Halperin strongly suggested he see you and
also Messrs. Henry Kissinger and Robert Bowie at Harvard.

Would it be possible for you to meet Col. Hiram and grant him an
interview and if so, would Monday June 1st be a convenient date?

As soon as I have received your reply I shall write to the other
two gentlemen, in the hope they are willing and able to see Col.
Hiram on the same day.

Of course if it would be possible for you to check with Messrs.
Kissinger and Bowie on our behalf whether they are ready to grant
Col. Hiram interviews and if so whether the same date is convenient,
it would simplify things considerably.

0/2

מדינת ישראל
ISRAEL

11 EAST 70TH STREET
NEW YORK 21, NEW YORK
---
TRAFALGAR 9-7600

קונסוליה כלכית
CONSULATE GENERAL

June 9, 1964

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Director, Defense Studies Program
6 Divinty Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I have been requested by my superiors at the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to inquire into the
possibility of the participation of a senior Israeli
civil servant in the Senior Fellow's Program of the
Center for International Studies.

I understand that the Ministry wishes to recommend
a suitable candidate for the course, and I would be grateful
for any advice you could give us, as to how we should
proceed in this matter.

SA/hc

June 25, 1964

Mr. Shlomo Argov
Consul of Israel
Consulate General of Israel
11 East 70th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Mr. Argov:

Professor Kissinger has shown me your letter of June 9 inquiring about the Fellows program at the Center. We are very glad indeed to know of your Government's interest. As you probably know, Yehuda Tamir of the Israeli Ministry of Housing participated this year. He was an outstanding Fellow and we would be happy to consider the nomination of other Israeli officials of comparable stature. I have received from personal friends indirect inquiries indicating that Mr. Pinhas Eliav (Deputy Chief of the Israeli Mission to the Common Market) and Mr. Shaul Bar-Hain (now at the Israeli Embassy in Washington) might be interested in participating. I am attempting to find out whether they are indeed interested and when they might be available for consideration. I understand that in Mr. Eliav's case, the year after next, that is the academic year 1965-66, would be the earliest feasible time.

The Fellows are a group of 14 or 15 senior public officials of various nationalities whom we annually invite for a year of advanced study at the Center. The Fellows are appointed by the Corporation of Harvard University and like the Faculty have the rank of officers of the Corporation. They work at the Center not as students but as colleagues of the faculty. They participate in research seminars at the Center and may attend lectures and courses of special interest throughout the University. Each Fellow writes an analytical paper on a topic of his choice, for discussion at a seminar in the spring.

What needs to be emphasized is the stress that needs to be put on individual work. The success of the program depends on a Fellows ability to exploit the intellectual advantages of the Harvard environment with the minimum of direct guidance or formal organization. The Center conceives its function mainly as providing opportunity and stimulation rather than close supervision.

Mr. Argov

2

June 25, 1964

The financing of the Fellowships varies from country to country and from man to man. In some instances, governments meet the full expense; in others, they support their men while here but we pay travel; in still others, governments pay basic salary (without allowances) and we supplement this with a Fellowship stipend which may vary in amount but in no case exceed $4,000 (or $4,500 in the case of Fellows accompanied by their wives). I mention these complexities because besides being limited to a total of fifteen Fellows in any given year, we are also under financial limitations which set a strict ceiling on expenditures for the program in any given year. This means that we must explore the problem with each government and work out a mutually acceptable and feasible arrangement.

Our planning for next year is already far advanced and it is by no means clear whether there will be an opening for an Israeli Fellow. This possibility is, however, not excluded. If your government is interested in sending a man next year we would be glad to hear from you. In any case, the outlook for the appointment of an outstanding Israeli official for the academic year 1965-66 would appear to be very favorable.

I enclose a recent report of the Center's activities which may be of some use.

BHB:1h
Enc.

["P.2. What do you think of our presidential campaign?", "Henry V. Kietinger", "Best regards.", "me to know by September 12th.\nwhich I have not definitely accepted yet. It would help\nI have already been asked to do something early in January\nknow whether Colonel Marklee brosters January or June, 1962.\now visit to Israel, it would be very helpful for me to\nI am glad Schelling was such a success. As for my\nI am sure we will all benefit from your help.", "I am sure we will all benefit from your help.\nI am glad Schelling was such a success. As for my\nI am glad

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

Dear Mr. Cohen:

Boston, Massachusetts 02116
144 Commonwealth Avenue
Consulate of Israel
Conanul
The Honorable Johan C Cohen

December 13, 1962

CONSULATE GENERAL OF ISRAEL

144 COMMONWEALTH AVENUE
BOSTON, MASS. 02116

TEL. 266-3800

קונסוליה כללית של ישראל
בוסטון

May 31, 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I write you on the first anniversary of the climactic events of a year ago which in the months of May and June 1967 convulsed the Middle East. To us in Israel the peril and agony of those dark days when our people suddenly felt themselves confronted with the menace of swift annihilation at the hands of our Arab neighbours, is still a very present memory. I enclose in this connection some material relating to that period. Never in her twenty years of renewed nationhood has Israel been free from the possibility of actual physical extinction. But last May, literally overnight, the threat escalated into grim reality, as the Arab States prepared to deliver what was intended to be the final blow. President Nasser of Egypt had earlier said in unequivocal terms: "We will choose the time; we will choose the place. It will be total war, and our aim is the destruction of Israel." He now chose the time - and the place. In the third week of May of last year, he expelled the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, including the Straits of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Eilat; he massed 100,000 troops and 1,000 tanks on Israel's Sinai border; reimposed a blockade on all Israel shipping into the Straits; concluded new aggressive alliances with Syria, Jordan and other Arab States who in turn joined in the massing of troops along our borders; and in a series of unprecedentedly violent statements announced Egypt's intention to throw the Jews in the sea and eradicate their state from the map. Battle orders were issued to the Egyptian Air Force. The Jordanian Army for their part were instructed to wipe out all inhabitants of captured villages, and the Syrians in turn intensified their artillery bombardment of farm settlements in the Jordan Valley.

We were left in no doubt that we were facing a fateful moment of truth.

The Arab masses were whipped up by their leaders into a paroxysm of joy at the coming massacre: those who saw them will not forget the blood-chilling scenes recorded on television of the Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Algiers and Baghdad mobs yelling hysterically for Israel's total annihilation.

- 2 -

The Arab aggression of 1967 failed. It shattered itself on the fortitude and efficacy of Israel's citizen-army. But its failure in no degree modifies the fact that this was a considered aggression in the full sense of the term; nor does Israel's victory change the fact that Israel's response was one of self defence against that aggression.

May 1967 presents us all with a series of vitally important lessons:

- The crisis which ignited when the Arabs embarked on their aggressive course carried with it the menace of world war.

- There is no guarantee in present circumstances that such a crisis will not recur.

- It is vitally important that there should be a settlement in the Middle East and that it should be a firm, stable and enduring one, not such as will leave the way open to new and even graver crises.

- The United Nations has unhappily not, in these twenty years, succeeded in preventing renewed conflict in the Middle East. Its limitations were graphically reflected in the precipitate withdrawal on Nasser's demand of the U.N. Emergency Force. Thereafter during those days of deep crisis the Security Council did no more than polemicise: the Soviet delegation denied the existence of any threat to the peace, the Arabs refused to discuss Israel's international rights, the Secretary-General pointed out that even if he had refused to evacuate the UN army, two of its chief contributors, India and Yugoslavia, would have gone along with Egypt's demand and pulled out their troops. And the Egyptians, with Soviet support, used every procedural device in order to hamstring and paralyse United Nations intervention.

- The assurance of the international maritime community given in 1957 that freedom of passage for Israel shipping through the Straits of Tiran was unchallengeable was reduced to a dead letter. When in May 1967 it came to the crunch, a pitifully small handful of nations stood by Israel's right to use the Straits - and even they were not prepared to put the issue to the test.

- Israel thus stood alone; she had not really expected it to be otherwise. The Powers have vital interests of greater import to them than Israel's survival. Israel has not. The clear lesson is that guarantees without teeth are not only valueless, they are actually an encouragement to our adversaries to choose at leisure the moment for renewed assault.

- 3 -

- For twenty years Israel had acquiesced in borders that, in the face of hostile neighbours, were vulnerable to the point of being suicidal - her major centres of population well within Arab artillery range; her coastal plain liable to be cut in half by enemy tanks in half an hour or less; her capital city sundered in half. They were borders which invited Arab aggression. It is clear why we can not go back to them as they were in May 1967.

In short, the lessons of May are that there is no substitute for agreement on secure and recognised borders within a freely negotiated contractual peace agreement between Israel and her neighbours in which the Arabs will unequivocally abandon their twenty years' effort to destroy the Jewish State.

June 1967 also had its telling lessons. They are:

- Israel has once again proved that, when her survival is menaced, she can and will defend herself, and defend herself successfully.

- It has become abundantly clear even in countries not particularly friendly to Israel that there can be no going back to the borders and the belligerency of yesteryear; the United Nations repeatedly and decisively rejected moves to slander Israel as the aggressor and to stipulate her unconditional withdrawal forthwith from the occupied territories. The world knows today that world peace demands that there must be a new and more rational map for the Middle East, with clearly defined agreed and secure boundaries.

- Last but not least, June 1967 and the subsequent year has shown that despite all assertions to the contrary Jews and Arabs can live in amity, accepting a new situation. One million Arabs in the administered areas are growingly aware of the mutual advantages of peaceful coexistence and the futility of further warfare. Trade across hitherto sealed borders, visits to and from other Arab countries, pilgrimages, the maintenance of normal contacts with their fellow-Arabs of the Middle East, all are leading to new thinking and a new approach. Having experienced these wholesome changes in Middle East life, the inhabitants of the Israel-administered areas have refused to collaborate with the terrorists sent in from neighbouring countries to unleash violence and bloodshed against Israeli civilian life.

It is my hope that after reading this letter you will agree that what needs to be done now - one year after the 1967 watershed - is to help the Arab Governments, in whatever way possible, to accept the conclusion that the only way to go now, is forward to peace; that neither