DECLASSIFIED

Authority E11285R

By

CHINA

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

10:22 a. m., February 1, 1970

K: The President has your letter. I have had a brief talk with him about it and will talk to him again. We will reply to it in due course.

D: You wouldn't know when it will be? I don't want to know the exact date, just approximately. Could you make a guess for my own information?

K: The President is going to Chicago on Thursday -- it will be either then or early next week; toward the end of this week or early part of next week. I will let you know. This is not an official statement of when. We are reading it with the respect that any communication from your Prime Minister receives here. We will answer it in the same spirit.

D: You will let me know?

K: Yes. (Jokingly), If you take me away from the ballet again, there will be drastic consequences. I didn't see it; I went right back to Washington.

D: Could I arrange the next one for you?

K: Are you coming with your editors on Tuesday?

D: I may, but I'm not sure. Sometimes they want to come alone.

K: That wouldn't be an occasion for us to talk, but it would be a pleasure to see you.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101285B

By CHNARA Date 05/03/90

*

TELCORN
Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:35 pm

2/3/90

D: Is our editors still with you?

K: I got them a special tour of the WH. They are not with me but they may
still be here. They are very good and intelligent.

D: They are very important and good people. I am glad they had a chance for this
broad discussion with you and the Secretary.

K: You have influence. You will be getting a reply tomorrow from Sisco.

D: That's all right with me. Tomorrow? The form of a letter? He will call
me?

K: He will but I wanted you to know this.

D: I will wait for his call.

K: This is just an informal advance notice. Since it is generally known that
these communications were received we think we should handle it on this basis.
But it will be a signed letter by the President.

D: OK

Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Packard/Kissinger
9:05 am 2/9/70

K: Two things. One is, can we see to it that McCain and others keep quiet about where we are sending troops?

P: I will try.

K: The second thing is that Mel, Wheeler, the President and I talked yesterday about ABM and where we are heading. Would you set up a task force? To make sure we all say the same thing.

P: I though I would get Foster.

K: Harlow suggested Buzzard?

P: I will check with him although I think Foster is a good man.

K: We will not surface anything on the Hill til we get straightened out.

P: I think we had better get as much home work done as we can.

K: But not at the Hill.

P: No, of course, Not until Mel goes up.

K: Could you do one on the Whightman proposal?

P: What about ACDA?

K: We don't want ACDA or State in now.

P: We will get something going right away.

K: Then we'll bring in State and ACDA.

*

TELCOM
Keogh/Kissinger
9:15 am 2/9/70

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

HAK: We are getting the State of the World thinking thing into mild shape. Some parts are ready and other parts need to be re-written. I think the man to whose temperament it is best suited is Ray Price.

K: Price rather than Saffire?

HAK: It's more philosophical. But I have no problem. I like Bill. We are shwoing it to the other departments yet. Please keep it in mind and not have it discussed in the bureaucracy. I will get you the Introduction and those sections that will be changed this morning. The rest, tomorrow morning. It's about 120 pages. I will talk with Bill on how to exploit it.

K: He will be good.

HAK: How quickly will we get it back?

K: I don't know yet. What's your frame of reference?

HAK: Wednesday.

K: That's fast.

HAK: We have to put it in final Thurs. and Fri.

K: You think it's better in pieces?

HAK: Each piece is fairly self-contained.

K: That's a short fuse. I think it will be best.

HAK: The trouble is we are in the process -- he has all week to work at it. Just give us the gross changes. In fact, he may come down to Key Biscayne and work with me on it. I am sorry, it just didn't get the substance in it.

K: He will need as much time as he can have with it.

HAK: I will get you some this morning.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN

Attorney General/Kissinger
3:35 pm 2/9/70

AG: two short things. The genocide treaty is that under control?

K: I guess but I am not on it. What do you mean?

AG: We have recommended that it be sent back to Congress. It's good for Biafra and the Black Panthers. Timewise, the American Bar Assoc. will bring it up in Atlanta this month.

K: If you and Rogers approve I will move it. This week.

AG: Secondly, On the Pompidou visit over here. Ingorsoll tells me that Rogers will talk to the PM on the drug business.

K: I think the President should talk to Pompidou too. I will talk to him to take care of it. Will you send me a memo?

AG: The police part must be worked out.

K: I don't know who he is bringing -- if there is anyone competent. On one occasion on another I will see that you get a few minutes with Pompidou.

AG: Fine, if it's constructive. Or if he is bringing his Minister of the Interior

K: I don't think he is. I will have that checked and let you know by tomorrow. Have Ingorsoll send over what he has in a memo to the President.

AG: Everything else under control?

K: We are working on the State of the World.

AG: You will get yours out before State.

K: They finally sent theirs over from State for us to look at it. We will get ours out first but they knew we were finished. I have had to do with three people what they have had a whole department do.

AG: I find the same over here sometimes.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Packard/Kissinger

4:05 pm

2/9/70

P: I have some papers on the Middle East that WSAG is meeting on. I am disturbed because they have not been approved by the Secretary or the Joint Chiefs. They need to get up where people know what's going on.

K: They can't go to the Under Secretary's meeting in one form or another.

P: What you have is all sorts of ? ? ? ? actions without military actions. I have a memo I am sending to you with further details.

K: These have been done for a long time and I don't know what -- they came out of the Pentagon.

P: The meeting through lower levels. I won't let it go until I can see the Secretary.

K: I assume that when it goes through the interdepartmental group the right people have seen it. We are not doing it. Nutter and Nils Johnson are both on the group.

P: It needs to be reviewed at a higher level. Some are very dangerous and need to be settled.

K: Obviously there is a problem to be worked out with the NSC. I don't know if we can hold them up.

P: We are going to hold them up until they go through the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary.

K: What will I tell the President if he asks?

(made yet)

P: Tell him that they have not been looked at and it is being worked on.

K: I can't judge that. I can't ask every man if he speaks for his agency. These are not recommendations. It's what has to be done.

P: They are not viable options unless viewed by responsible people here and they have not been.

K: That's entirely up to you.

P: In any case, I will get them in channels over here.

K: They weren't out of channels. Nutter and the JCS have always been present. They are represented by a 3 star admiral or general.

*

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Packard/Kissinger
4:05 pm 2/9/70

-2-

P: They have not been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs themselves. I have also sent a memo to you recommending

K: You don't understand. This is not a recommendation. It is contingency plans.

P: They ought to be combined with others involved

K: We don't know *w* how you clear

P: There's a lot of input that hasn't been cleared here.

K: WSAG has existed for a year and this is how it has been operating and there has been no question about it before.

P: It may have been operating for a year *x* but any options they submit should be considered higher up before they go to the President.

K: How you clear things in the Pentagon is up to you.

P: These are very serious options.

K: After the WSAG they go to the NSC. The President will not see it before it goes to the NSC. If you want you can up date the WSAG to a higher level but the Under Secretaries group has not been used for Contingency plans.

P: I think we should do that. Not all of these are viable options.

K: It has to be in the same structure that it is now. It can't just be shifted out into some other group.

P: When you get to the point where you are ready to present it to the President, they should be checked by higher level.

K: Let me suggest that after this next meeting we will call an Undersecretaries meeting for next Monday to go over where it should be. I will schedule it for next Mon.

P: That will be good.

K: We will have another WSAG meeting on Wed. to be sure that the preliminary is in shape. They would *not* have gone to the President in this ____ anyway.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Max Frankel/Kissinger

4:15 pm

2/9/70

F: I am about to start moving about your document. Is the length the same?

K: Our present plan is that we will give it to the Press on the 16th for release on the 18th. The length is the same -- about 25,000 words.

F: Is it organized topically? Areas of the world?

K: It has some reference to various areas and a general philosophical framework.

F: If we wanted to break it up with maps, what would be appropriate? If we are pushed to the wall on the space?

K: You know the President has written every word himself.

F: Any section that's more dispensable?

K: Maybe the economic policy. Of course, there are some -- again the NSC process but that's one of the things -- It's fairly tightly written. It attempts -- but don't tell everyone -- a general philosophical approach rather than a chronological one.

F: Is it in chapters?

K: Yes, and you can decide pretty quickly which of the areas ones should be condensed.

F: It may be a command decision to hold it to a ____ space.

K: Keep that information very tight. I have no -- we are not yet -- just getting it to the departments today. I don't want them to think I talked to you before them.

F: They will add all kinds of qualifiers.

K: I am going to Key Biscayne so they will have to find me. I enjoyed my visit and lunch.

F: We found it most useful too, the weekend flap notwithstanding.

K: There was nothing malicious there. Sometimes preconceptions get in the way.

By KHLW

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Moynihan/Kissinger

5:15 pm

2/9/70

K: I am doing an annual report for the President on the world situation. I find it's beyond the State Dept. and my staff to write something on the Committee of the Modern Society, even though you stole it from me in the best Harvard tradition.

M: Do you want us to do something?

K: If you would -- two or three pages. ? ? ? ? and how you have gone about it and where you are going with it.

M: Every country except Norway is signing up for this or that.

K: It's a damn good idea. That speech of the President's last April and now everyone is talking about it.

M: I have said that.

K: Explain how it is organized.

M: When do you need it.

K: Tomorrow afternoon.

M: I will have it for you then.

K: Two or three pages. Four if it's absolutely necessary but we'd prefer no more than three.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

5:30 pm

2/9/70

S: I have sent you an Eliot/Kissinger with the piece you requested. The
It offers two alternatives -- One - I do it here tomorrow and Beam follows
on Wed. Or alternatively, Beam does it all Wed.

K: That cease fire? What do you think?

S: I would like to keep the channel here. It means we can say cease fire and then
very softly we can say -- I have used the term cautionary note rather than
warning.

K: I will get you an answer tomorrow morning. We would feel better if you
did it.

S: Then I can be sure of doing it with care and then Beam, with equal care --
not that I don't think he wouldn't.

K: But you know them better than he does.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCORN
Keogh/Kissinger
5:35 pm 2/9/70

K: two thoughts, quickly. I have been talking with Saffire. We are under
real pressure from the President to keep things short. If you could shorten
it, it would be wise.

HAK: We really can't do anything major.

K: I understand. Then there's something Saffire brought up. To follow the
economic counsel style, a short ____ by the President followed by a National
Security Council.

HAK: I don't want to sign this thing. We do want a 5 page summary at some
point. The President has seen this length and it doesn't bother him. He is
content with it.

K: He always says half ____ as long and gives you material to make it twice
as long.

HAK: The President will sign it. I don't want to appear as a principal.

K: You owe us some more pieces.

HAK: I'm sorry you are under the gun like this but we are under the same gun.

K: Will you have your people send them to Saffire now?

HAK: Yes.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger
6:55 pm 2/9/70

K: Do you think I made my point to him?

H: I think so. It took a time. He asked after you left if the President
doesn't like him. I just told him we had all these things to do. That's the
line I will use when we organize him out.

K: You could see what he was doing. He didn't deny that that
was what he had done.

H: No, he didn't.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon

HAK/Dwight Chapin

2/9/70; 7:20 p. m.

K: Dwight, I called about the breakfast with Mansfield.

C: Right, 8:00 o'clock.

K: Does he want to tell him about our report that early?

C: He said 8:00 on Wednesday.

K: He doesn't want to talk about our report?

C: He wants to talk about the State of the World message. It was an instruction, Henry.

K: You have called Mansfield?

C: Mansfield has been called.

K: And does he know what it is about?

C: Yes.

K: This will be a disaster.

C: We will have to back-track. Are you going to talk to the President tonight?

K: Tomorrow morning. That was what Harlow said we must never do. He said they must know last. No one thought he would ask for a meeting with Mansfield.

C: I will check Timmons and see what Mansfield was told.

K: If there is just a meeting, that is easy.

C: I know the President thinks it was to do that.

K: Well, we can handle the breakfast.

C: I just will have to come up with something to say.

K: All right.

ms

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Packard

2/9/70 7:30 p.m.

K: I just received your memo and I consider it an outrage. I request that you withdraw it.

P: Why?

K: The special charter of the Washington Special Action Group . . . . makes no recommendation that military action is called for. It just asks that all factors be considered. If you look at the charter of the Washington Special Action Group you will see this.

P: I'm just trying to do what's right.

K: You are not doing what's right and I will not hold still for this sort of innuendo. The charter of the Special Action Group says it is to consider those circumstances where military action might be called for.

P: It may be my fault: We don't have our boys lined up. I don't want to embarrass you.

K: The Special Action Group is part of the NSC structure. The implication that I am cooking up a special group that will take the country to war is outrageous.

P: I apologize; I don't intend to imply a thing.

K: I'm going to send it back; I am not going to accept it.

P: Okay, send it back.

K: The charter of that group says it deals with military crises. I am not recommending that these actions be taken. I am saying if military force is to be used we want to be sure the President has the whole menu in front of him.

P: The think I got concerned about is when I saw these things that the Joint Chiefs didn't know about, and Mel didn't, and I didn't.

K: We got these things from Nutter and Vogt--I don't get these things until State sends them.

P: I'm not trying to imply anything as far as you're concerned.

K: I'm sending this back. I'll call an Under Secretary's Meeting.

Telecon
Packard

2/9/70 7:30 p.m.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

P: I don't mean to embarrass you. We are working together.

K: That's what I thought until I got this letter. The last thing
anybody in this building wants to do is to take this country into war period,
especially without consent of the senior advisors.

P: I'm not trying to embarrass you. I'm just trying to do what's
right. I have the greatest respect for you, and I'm trying to help you any
way I can.

K: I think it should be called back from Richardson also.

P: Okay, there were only two copies of this. Henry, Please
accept my apologies.

K: I accept them.

P: I want to help you.

By KCLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Timmons/Kissinger

7:55 pm

2/9/70

K: I don't know whether Dwight reached you. I am concerned about that invitation to Mansfield. I don't think we should talk about the State of the World.

T: No, I just said that the President wanted to see him and you will be there. We didn't discuss the message at all. We were afraid that the Republicans would be upset.

K: Great. You did exactly right.

T: We are trying to set up some meetings next week.

K: We can give him a review of the world situation. We can make him think it's hot stuff.

T: 8:00 Wednesday.

K: In the Residence?

T: Yes.

By: KML NARA, Dato. S/13/04

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
9:00 am 2/10/70

K: I wanted to check with you. Dave Packard sent over a letter yesterday on WSAG. Did he call it back?

R: I'm told he talked with you and then called here and asked that it be sent back.

K: I sent back my copy and I would have had to send a stiff reply -- to you too if he had not withdrawn that copy. That's the whole point of WSAG. It's to let State at the contingency plans. These are not recommendations to the President. If the President decided to take military action it is ? ? ? if he wants to do this at some point. These are the associated steps he would take.

R: Do you know if the President will be seeing Peterson tomorrow?

K: I think so. They are considering it.

R: I want to send over and ask you to glance at a memo that the Secretary Rogers has approved which sets forth State's views on the organization of AID. The President might want to be aware

K: I think it's essential. Frankly, he hasn't focused on this so I will be amazed if he committed himself tomorrow. I will put in it my briefing papers.

R: Bill would appreciate it if it was done.

K: You can be absolutely certain of it.

R: There's some concern about the work of the task force. I hear there's been some second guessing on what the climate will bear rather than what will be and leaving that to the President. I am not sure that this is true.

K: If I understand you, I think a task force should be out ahead. It should not be too cautious.

R: If I understood it originally, I understood that a task force could help to raise the sites and serve as a basis for new spectrum of public support. A lot of value is lost if they start assuming attitudes are public attitudes.

K: The President wanted them to say what is right and not what is possible.

R: We have not wanted to be in a position of trying to lobby them. It's a concern but I am not sure how true it is.

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Richardson/Kissinger

9:00 am

2/10/70

-2-

K: The President could just say I hope. As long as we are talking -- there are a couple of things. One is that proposal of a demarche to the Soviets. The Sisco one. I haven't shown it to the President yet -- whether you should call in Dobrynin. I should think the President's instincts will be to let Beam do it because Beam complained about not having enough.

R: I would support that. I wondered whether I should have him change that.

K: I don't know where the President's views will be. I am leery of channeling everything through Dobrynin. In some cases there is an advantage in having it go through someone who doesn't have all the details. He is less flexible. And there is some advantage to having things go directly.

Finally, ADDA. I haven't seen that cable you referred to. What instructions were you talking about? To Beam?

R: yes a cable to Beam. Gerry was away over the weekend. I talked to him yesterday and told him that I had questions about it and didn't want to send it to the WH in that form. The upshot was that he was going to talk to you in general terms.

K: He hasn't done it yet. He (the President) is restive with the Advisory Committee of ACDA. He feels that if it had been run as it was told it would not have gotten out of control. They are taking testimony and only to embarrass him. Our impression is that while ACDA did not encourage them they didn't discourage them.

R: They felt that, based on my talk with Gerry, it was exceedingly hard to do.

K: What the President meant to say -- he wanted to put to them that he was flexible on MIRV and ABM. But he didn't expect them to make separate studies. We will make new rules so that they cannot interpret except through written instructions. We are not unreasonable on his negotiating.

R: On Gerry's account, I saw a memo from Cy Wise who had had lunch with Gen. Allison and he went out of his way to say how faithful Gerry had been in Helsinki.

K: In Helsinki he was. This President reacts badly on what he considers bureaucratic ploys.

R: I will talk to McCloy.

K: The President will be talking to him tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

-3-

R: Maybe I will finesse.

K: I will let you know.

R: If there is any follow up here, I could do it with individuals.

K: That would be very helpful.

R: I expressed some misgivings on that cable so he may have decided against it.

(Re McCloy -- the President is now set to see him at 11:30 am, 2/17)

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Packard/Kissinger
9:20 am 2/10/70

P: I wanted to let you know that I looked into WSAG and the boys had everything screwed up.

K: We have worked together as friends, and we will continue to do it.

P: I'm sorry that I got you upset.

K: You are a big man to call me. I will look forward to working more closely in the future.

P: Well, I am here to help you and please call on me whenever I can. And let me know if I am not doing something just right. I will get this straightened out.

K: Thank you, Dave.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCONE
Safire/Kissinger

9:30 am 2/10/70

S: I have been getting misives from you. I see that Ron has announced that it will be the 16th or 17th.

K: What good does it do to announce the day we are heading for? Why? We don't want the Democrats all geared up. We will have to do it early next week. Laird is making his later next week. We have had to do this on our own because the departments refused to cooperate. They are putting out competing reports.

S: Can we make sure they are supplementary reports?

K: Yes, we can. Could I have most of your comments by Wed. night?

S: When do you go to Key Biscayne?

K: Wed. Night

S: I have 1/3 of it.

K: Let me know when you run out of things. You will have more this morning. We have to put it to bed for typing reasons by Saturday night.

S: I should come down on Friday.

K: The President has read it already and he likes it. Don't make any major revisions.

S: It's not turgid but not desperately interesting. A newspaper man would be pressed to find leads in it. Could we find find substance paragraphs and turn them into more interesting stuff?

K: We need a 5 page summary that would be more interesting.

S: Who would put out the summary?

K: We will.

S: Maybe the President could.

K: This document is signed by the President.

S: But a summary from the President would be much more countable (?) then a summary of what is written.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
Safire/Kissinger

9:30 am 2/10/70

-2-

K: ? ? ? ? ? ?

S: It's a monumental thing.

K: This is light years ahead of McNamara.

S: It will look like we are flying in three different directions if they don't
you.

K: But they are following us. Defense is no problem and State goes into
detail. Basically there should be one *nx* report but the President didn't
want to fight it.

S: The President never quotes himself.

K: He expressly said he wanted to, to show continuity. I don't care.
You don't have to say "as I said."

S: I want to avoid him quoting himself. It's awkward and pompous.

K: He could quote me. When I sent a gift to Rogers' son I told him I
couldn't have achieved what I did without his father's help. Do you think
that was gracious of me?

*

*

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
12:50 pm 2/10/70

By: KH NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

K: I just got to the President on the Middle East thing. He agrees with our judgment that it should be done in Moscow. Will you break that news to your associate. If we could see what he is going to say.

R: Beam? Sure, OK

K: I imagine it will follow the general tone. He thinks its a good idea to do that. Thanks

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinge
1:00 pm 2/10/70

S: We have a request from Cairo. The Egyptians have said that we have a somewhat garbled text from the Russians, both of the Kosygin and the Nixon reply. Would we give them a clean English text of both.

K: You are very meticulous to check with us. I am for it. What's against it? That the Russians would get mad?

S: We have briefed the Israelis very well, as Golda Meir said, but we have never made the texts known to them. If we make it available to the Egyptians I think we should make it available to the Israelis too.

K: I agree.

S: We are to give it to Beam on the cease fire.

K: It's not a reflection on you. The President did not want to make a talk.

S: It's better for Jake to do it on the overall context.

By KHLW NARA, Dale

5/12/04

TELCON
Sen. Case/Kissinger
4:05 pm 2/10/70

C: John Cooper and I wondered if you could give us 15 or 20 minutes at your office. We want to talk about ABM.

K: Certainly.

C: We want to do it before any announcement.

K: It's always a pleasure to see you. Shall we say 11:00?

C: That will be fine. But if we could do it later it would seem like we were going for lunch and no one will know where we are going.

K: That's fine. I can make it at 12. In the West Basmt. He knows where.

*

By KMLN

NARA, Dalo

5/13/04

TELCON
Klein/Kissinger

4:45 pm

2/10/70

K: I thought I'd let you know the Sec. of State was stoned today.

HAK: Really? Did they hit him?

K: They got a couple of cameramen. He came along after.

HAK: That schedule you have worked out for backgrounders makes no sense. We think it should go out Monday, not Tuesday. That's too late and it may KX leak. There's nothing hot in it.

K: They will need a chance to read it before you do anything.

HAK: We xx will have it ready by noon Monday for 10 - 15 top reporters and the WH press corps.

K: We will need a separate one for the TV people. One other thing. Are you firm in thinking there should be no follow-up by the President himself?

a 10 minute excerpt.

HAK: Nor at all firm.

K: The follow up -- It's obvious he can't do the whole message. We have thought of doing the three networks with a conversation with the President. A philosophical approach, two or three days afterward.

HAK: I think that's good.

K: A news conference would have him picking one against the other. Or a speech.

HAK: I think the 3 networks would be best

K: Why don't you mention that to him in the morning and I will follow up with a memo.

HAK: I hope to see him tonight. That's a good idea. You just keep plugging away and you may make it some day.

K: Just keep working with you.

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Kissinger
5:50 pm 2/10/70

J: I forgot to mention to you the very serious economic crisis that effects these people. They represent that it is the same as military supply. They have represented serious ____ to Hardin re PL 480, ? ? ? ? ? ?, and one to the Pentagon on extension of time for payment. I just thought that what you and I had discussed would not be complete unless you understood that.

K: That's important. What you say weighs heavily.

J: I understand there may be some better ____ from the French. If it comes that will make a better atmosphere for Pompidou.

K: That will help.

J: You will know when I do.

K: Your intelligence is better than mine.

J: Where are you going for the holidays?

NK: Key Biscayne with the President but I will have to work.

J: Sorry you can't come to the Cummings (?).

K: That's the night of the Pompidou visit. I'm sorry I can't come.

J: Perhaps another time.

*

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger

7:35 pm

2/10/70

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

R: I bring you a small problem. I have a memo here from AF with regard to an export license for Boeing 707 to Portugal for troop transport.

K: We can't do it while the Secretary is in Africa.

R: It's within the scope of NSSM 38. "... dual purpose aircraft for civilian and military use." This memo is a plea not to go forward before the Secretary returns. I understand Stans is pushing hard.

K: I promised the Secretary I would not do anything to embarrass him while he is on his trip.

R: We will leave it that if you find there is a lot of heat from Commerce and if it would help you to hear from us, I will send this over.

K: I will sit on it unless there is a time limit on it.

R: It doesn't appear that there is. You don't need anything?

K: I don't need to make a showing of inefficiency. You will get the rest of our papers tomorrow morning. We have a typing problem. You will not have any problems. There may be a little overlap. Yours goes into more detail.

R: Kind of "My Year in the State Department."

K: It's like the McCain briefing. He said this year, Mr. President, is Thailand (?). We don't go far beyond that.

*

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELECON
Mr. Kissinger
The President
2/10/70; 10:30 p.m.

P asked how K enjoyed the Russell thing -- said he didn't know K went to such things. K said he went along because of Russell working with us on the Armed Services Committee. P said he was terribly moved by Russell's statement. K said yes, for Russell to say what he did about a Republican President! P said Russell said it in such a patriotic way. P said we ought to get the transcript of that powerful statement. K said he told Bryce that it was a moving occasion.

P said as a group, those Southerners have more patriotism than any other thing. P said the only thing we differed on with them was the school thing. P said he thought we should take another look at the integration thing. P said he thought we should talk to Schultz and Garment and bring them into line. K said he thought it had become a self-defeating thing. P said the North is de facto segregated -- they talk about having their kids go to a school that has blacks..... P said he didn't think it would work with the lower classes. K said and to challenge the mores in such a way. P said he was concerned that this was an emotional issue that could destroy our ability to work on other things. P said when you see a guy like Russell talking, you think we should have him on our side. P said Stennis, too. P said New York City is a tinderbox. K said yes, very few families send their children to high schools in New York anymore -- they send them to private schools. K said he would much rather deal with Stennis than Goodell or Percy -- you know exactly where Stennis stands.

P said with regard to the Mansfield meeting in the morning, spend time on the Toxin thing. P said he isn't going to leak it. K said we could tell him we still have to bring the Joint Chiefs around. P said to ask him what he thinks about it -- act as if we are still working on it. P said the other thing he is greatly interested in is China and you might tell him how our meetings have evolved. P said tell him you have opened the possibility of other channels. K said that's risky. K said he thought Mansfield might mention it to ________. K said we can say we are exploring other channels. P said to ask him if he has any ideas on this -- we have to find something to talk about. P asked what if the ABM comes up. K said he didn't think he would bring it up since he is so opposed to it. K said if it is brought up, we can say we have made the decision on the basis that it is fully consistent with what you said last year.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Kissinger/President

2/10/70; 10:30 p.m.

P said undoubtedly Mansfield will be against us and in the end he will be -- it flatters him. P said he would like to hang over him the idea that we are moving in a direction that he doesn't know about -- that's probably the way to get to him. P said he would try to turn the conversation in such a way that K does a lot of the talking. P said we know there are certain areas that he will not agree with us. P said tell Mansfield that as a result of his report we have mandated all our Ambassadors to follow the Nixon Doctrine -- people are now beginning, we think, to understand it. K said he would be pleased with the general approach to China. P said we will play a little of his game, which will make him uncomfortable. P said he didn't want him to say we have not continued to dialogue, and just the fact that we have talked to him makes the record. If it comes up in the future, we have that hanging over him. K said basically he is not a bad guy. P said he has to do this -- the Democrats are divided -- his interests were with Teddy. P said maybe he thinks they can resur-rect Teddy. K said he didn't see it by '72.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Richardson/Kissinger

12:50 pm

2/11/70

R: I wanted to relay to you some questions raised yesterday by Shriver. I take it you are the right person to talk to about the timing and content (?) of his resignation. I called him back at Bill's request to see what he had in mind. He is willing to do what we want. He would be attending a dinner at the Elysee on the 17th of Feb. It would be easy to tell Pompidou at that time that he had resigned and have the President and Pompidou discuss his successor and then make the announcement of his successor during the visit.

K: That sounds OK to me but let me check with the President.

R: Alternatively, He could tell Pompidou on the 17th, have it discussed by the President and Pompidou during the visit and name his successor at a later time.

K: I will raise it with him, I guess this afternoon.

R: As far as a successor is concerned, Watson is on the track subject to problems being discussed with Jack Stevenson, the Legal Advisor here, of his extensive IBM holdings and the large IBM business in France.

NX It's a sticky problem. Don't have a clear cut answer at this point. It's the only hangup I know of on that front.

K: I will talk to you the President and let you know by tomorrow.

R: I read the first installment last night and it was fine. I have no problems at all.

K: You should have the rest by now.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
M. Green/Kissinger

3:45 pm

2/11/70

G: I was just calling about Thanat Khoman coming to the States. I had lunch today with Jim Linen. He has been out there and he told me that Thanat Khoman wants to come to Washington especially to see you. He didn't say what he wanted to say to you. But with your position . . .

K: You know how to talk to me.

G: I wouldn't know if you saw the ______. The Ambassador here said he didn't plan to come to Washington except if there were an emergency. A compelling reason in the offing. Ungar came back saying he would be miffed with that. I w explained you would like to see him but there's nothing extraordinary to bring up. When he talked with Linen he said he tried to call you but you were out. He wanted to say to him that you would be gald to see him and then back channel to Len. Then he would know he could come down. If he comes to the States, he will give a speech in NY. It's a big speech and if he feels he is not well received he may take off on the U. S. but if he gets a good reception then he will give a better response.

K: Why don't you do that?

G: Fine.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger

5:45 pm 2/11/70

K: With respect to that issue, we discussed before. I am still trying to see the President. Just so you know and I know. Look at the memo of Nov. 26X 27, 1969, NSSM 80, which exactly lists what we proposed to cover. The first paragraph said the President has dictated a review of American foreign policy ? ? ? and then asks for the Dept. to submit drafts and report by Dec. 27, which we never got. We never got this. Remember, at a lunch you said it could hardly be possible that you haven't heard this.

R: I remember the memo of Oct. (?) 27.

K: We didn't sneak anything by you.

R: The problem wasn't that XXXXX your weren't in line.

K: We have no problem with Defense. We are working with them perfectly. I am eager to ______ it and Ted Eliot called Haig and ______ it. We never saw it until Mon. It was caught in our Administrative office from Sat. until Monday. We didn't write this in the last day and a half. It took that long to type it.

R: If I had foreseen the present problem

K: I didn't foresee the length. I want you to think we have been fair at every length. We let Eliot know at every time, the length. That doesn't solve the substantive problem but I want to get the point of honor straight. I value the open relationship we have had. It's one hell of a mess. On the point of mentioning the department or State on the NSC section, why don't your people draft something and we will put it in. We don't mention anybody by name.

R: The Under Secretaries Committee, the Interdepartmental Group.

K: That must go in. The Interdepartmental Groups don't indicate they are chaired by State,

R: ______ The other is to ask Cargo to look at the document from the standpoint of how a relative emphasis between the two documents might be worked out. We are proceeding on these lines.

K: Very helpful. Do you want someone to work with Cargo from our end? Haig or Lake. Pending the more fundamental approach, let's get that done.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
Richardson/Kissinger
5:45 pm 2/11/70

R: OK. You can solve problems sometimes by approaching them from either end. My only concern is letting this appear on the face that they are complimentary and not competing.

K: We are going to say that country items would be done by Defense and State.

R: I don't know whether it's possible to condense our overall bulk. //
Conceptual aspects of our statement.

K: Do you want the President? He is not eager for this kind of dispute.
From my own selfish point of view I would have him talk to you.

R: If we can agree

K: If you want it cut by 15%, we could agree but if you wanted to cut it by 50 percent, we couldn't agree.

R: I think I had probably better talk to him and see what he wants to do.
Bill would like to see if he were here. Meanwhile, it would help to get them
together.

K: We will proceed on this basis. The last thing we want is a confrontation.
We are part of the same Administration and all we want is the President to
look good.

R: I will agree with that. I will tell Cargo He can expect to here from you.

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Tatecon
Frank Shakespeare
2/11/70 7:10 p.m.

S: Three things: on the question of Greece--I'm leaving Monday night for Africa; I'm coming out by Brussels. We left it that there was some possibility I should go to Greece. I'm now checking.

K: When, on the way over or the way back?

S: On the way back, around February 23.

K: Let me check--I'll get word to you tomorrow.

S: Okay, Item 2. I was talking with him Lennon about another matter...

K: I Christ, Thanat. I want to see him, but it's almost unbelievable that anyone as savvy as Lennon could know so little about the bureaucracy. He went to Marshall Green...

S: I asked him how things had gone with his buying the Bangkok World. He is extremely close to Thanat--his son is his ward in the United States. He told me Thanat is one of the closest friends he has in the world. He said the problem with him is simply, he has no power base in Thailand. People are out to get him. He's the one who knows the Americans--when something happens and the Americans do something, and he doesn't know about it, it really undercuts him. When something happens and he's caught off base, it ruins him. He said it would be extremely helpful to Thanat to see Henry Kissinger--not that you can do a damn thing for him, but it would be a face-saver back there. That seems to me to be very rational.

K: I'm eager to see him. I just said that I would see him this morning. He's been a good friend of the US and we've kicked him around a lot.

S: Okay, finally, it takes us a while to get a top security clearance for a private citizen going to the Soviet Union. Do you have any suggestions?

K: My problem is I just don't have any suggestions. You tell me who you have in mind and I may have a negative suggestion.

S: Okay, before we lock anybody in we'll let you know.

K: Good.

S: And you will let me know about Greece?

K: Yes.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Jos. Kraft/Kissinger
2/11/70

HAK: Elliott Richardson called me and said he was going to call you about that article. I said I have already done it.

K: I misunderstood. He just mentioned it to me.

HAK: I don't give him the content of my conversations. He was going to call you and say it was unfar. I thought I was keeping him off your back.

K: I wanted you to know that I was mystified but I was ready to wait. I don't understand your relationship on this issue with the President.

HAK: I can't provide a check list on what I recommend and what I don't. When I know a Presidential view then I have to see that it gets full consideration in the bureaucracy. Not that no other view can get consideration but that view must have my options. Whatever you want, I cannot state a personal view different from the President.

K: That's what you were doing.

HAK: I don't remember I was trying ? ? ? ? and a rational for our program. They were only a partial explanation of what he is doing. He was asked about area defesne which was unfortunate.

K: He was asked

HAK: If they had been anticipated he should have given the whole rationale. The problem arose that he had changed his rationale back to Sentinel without the Sentinel circumstances. The second point he wanted to convey, I don't know if you have talked with Paul Doty, ? ? ? ? the ______ going into the issue.

K: Do you know Paul's views?

HAK: Yes, and they are hostile. I enormously respect him. They would be opposed. I can safely say his view would be to hold up.

K: Of course

AHK:: I wanted to make the point that Paul agreed

K: I wanted you to know that he and others had not given you a frank opinion, and it bothered them. They felt it had been fuzzed over.

*

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Jos. Kraft/Kissinger

2/11/70

HAK: You wouldn't identify them and you shouldn't. I met with Paul and a group of scientists twice and they gave me their view which was critical and I put it fully to the President.

K: I came from our conversation thinking we had some unfortunate rhetoric in the press conference. But then I decided that the rhetoric is extremely important and it is important to unsay (?) the rhetoric.

HAK: I think you will find in this the rational for a safeguard. I will not say there will be no further deployment. It's consistent with last year's rational. It puts last year into a much clearer perspective. I wouldn't go as far as you would go.

K: Nuclear blackmail, to me, is not critical. That is in terms of rhetoric. There are other things. Why 30 days on the Israeli thing? The supplementary delivery?

HAK: The decision, not the delivery. That's (true or through). I think just to bring the debate to an end.

K: It's not a bargaining against the circumstances or someone in the game. ???. And a denial that a decision had been made.

HAK: That's the ________. We are still studying what we can and should do. It's a difficult issue to decide what level and when it will be needed.

K: It's not an easy one. It all looks to me like -- and maybe I am, over-speculating.

HAK: I can tell you frankly and I shouldn't do that, but this was not a deep game. Any speculation to that aspect, given the tension of the situation, is not helpful. It may contribute to that but we are trying to ? ? ? ? ? .

K: We are trying one thing -- Playboy wants to do an interview with you.

HAK: I have not, for this job, spoken for the record.

K: Let me advise you to continue that posture.

HAK: If you are involved I will take it seriously.

K: I'm not interested and I don't think it would be good.

HAK: I don't think my first public statement should be in Playboy.

K: Even if it does reach the armed forces.

*

TELCON

Hugh Sidey/Kissinger

10:20 am 2/17/70

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

K: What has happened to you?

S: I've been on Administration matters but I'm for phasing back in again.

K: I always enjoy seeing you.

S: I'm writing a piece about your report. Do you have a few spare minutes?

K: Sure. What time?

S: Suit yourself.

Who

K: Let's try for 11:30. I was a little concerned. How was the fellow who kept asking about the hard line to the Soviets? He was a little solid. Did you get that?

S: No.

K: Good

S: I want to talk about the Soviet thing.

K: It has a definite Soviet philosophy but -- a whole -- as you read the first section on An Era of Negotiation shows how important we think negotiation is.

S: It shows a change in the whole atmosphere. It's great. It's straight forward and clear and a pretty powerful document.

K: Let's try for 11:30

*

TELCON
Barth/Kissinger

11:00 am 2/17/70

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I am calling about that thing in the Welt am Sontag

B: I didn't do it

K: It's an outrage. I printed that in 1968 and it was printed as a new piece.

B: That's absurd. But I don't work for Welt am Sontag. I'm with Die Welt

K: They're both Springer publications, aren't they? Can you contact him?

B: I will contact him immediately.

K: I want it made perfectly clear

B: Was it printed as a by-line?

K: Everyone thinks as if it were my view on the current state of NATO. It was written before I every came to this job. NATO is much stabler now -- and I don't write for publication now.

B: There has been a change in the chief editorship recently and Jacoby of Speigel took over. Jacobi is a bold-faced newspaperman. He wanted to dash forward.

K: It's in every newspaper in Europe as my views on NATO. I don't write for publication.

B: Not in an American paper, much less in a European paper. I will call as soon as I finish talking with you.

K: Will you let me know what decision is made to rectify it?

B: You want rectification and that it is not your view but written before you took over in the WH? When was it written?

K: In 1968 -- Agenda for the Nation.

B: Oh, yes. This is simply too primitive.

K: It has been around for two yaary.

B: I commented on it more than a year ago.

K: It was published more than a year ago and I wrote it in Aug. 1968.

By KCL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Barth/Kissinger

11:00 am 2/17/70

B: I am terribly sorry that it happened and I am not responsible and I will do everything to see that a (clarification) will be published. I will talk to Kraemer if not Springer directly and I will let you know the answer.

K: Thank you.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN
Zeigler/Kissinger

1:25 pm

2/17/70

Z: ?? ?? did you see that foreign policy message generated. You said
San Clemente today, didn't you?

K: Key Biscayne. I have a memo to prove it.

Z: It was the structure of the NSC that allowed this document to come about.

K: Did you have a chance to make a statement about that article? It's
terribly important. (re article in Welt am Sontag on HAK 1968 article on NATO)

Z: I will do it at 4:00

K: You can't just make a statement.

Z: No, I will do it in answer to a question.

K: Good.

*

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

1:45 pm 2/17/70

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

S: A small point. We coughed up that the President write Indira Gandhi.

K: He won't do it. He doesn't like her.

S: Hewrote to YaYa (phonetically). This came up in the framework.

K: He doesn't include Indira in those he loves.

S: I feel the same way. Keating has gotten into this thing over some number of months re the question when he arrived if there would be a Presidential letter. If I tell Keating that the President is not disposed -- I don't know what I can say -- I have said to Keating that he do all he can there. The general feeling is that it is not the right time. But you are apt to get a letter from Keating. May I suggest that he write you directly?

K: Sure, and I can't say the President won't change his mind. He wants to send his foreign policy report to a number of leaders and certainly Indira is among those.

S: Why don't I add a special paragraph in the letter

K: We had backgrounders. They are trying to make something out of "grave concern."

S: I read that with great care and I think it's just right. I am afraid that we will appear a paper tiger in the Middle East. You tell the President for me sometime. The Soviets think we are so preoccupied with VN that we don't care about the Middle East.

K: Well, then, you are right on his wave length. He will be pleased and you can fend off questions.

By: KALU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON

Hightower/Kissinger

1:55 pm 2/17/70

H: Thank you for including me.

K: I called you about that. I don't remember if you were the one who thought we had an excessively hard line against the Soviets

H: I raised that.

K: The tone that was conveyed was hard line. That's far from our intention. If you read that part before the Era of Negotiation, you will see.

H: Let me go one step further. The story I wrote last night is really related to this but it is not an editorial. It takes up missile balance. This is a real issue and relates to the ABM.

K: That's perfectly true. The problem we are trying to get at with the Soviets is to convey to them we want a solution to the problems but not the問題 overlook the problems that divide us. And that's a very delicate balance.

H: I don't understand the inner meaning. I felt in reading it that you wanted the public to understand. I found a general statement that while we made some progress our relations with the Soviets are generally unsatisfactory.

K: They are far from satisfactory.

H: There are comments on the Middle East and other areas. Your reaction is that this is realistic

K: We need to have negotiations and ??_

H: The stories should be balanced that we

K: If I didn't respect you, I wouldn't call you. But it seems (?) you are a thoughtful and serious writer.

H: I was struck by the comments made in that part of the report. I thought it was useful to talk it out and I thought your response was helpful. You said to keep the whole timing in mind. Another thing -- we got information that all of you may be taking a trip to Vienna in April.

K: There's no plan that I know of at all. Maybe the Secretary of State has that idea. I am not aware of any plans of his either. Certainly we have no plans for going there in April.

*

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Amb. Lucet/Kissinger
6:10 pm 2/17/70

K: You want to come see me?

L: If you are too busy -- nothing special. I have been speaking to your staff and I hope to have an answer tomorrow. About the visit

K: Let me try to work it out before Friday.

L: There's no urgency. It's nothing special. I am very worried about NY and Gov. Rockefeller has dropped out from the dinner. There's nothing to do

K: I will talk with him. He has an election this year and that is his basic concern.

L: I understand the problem

K: We will work it out.

L: Just a few minutes. I don't want to impose.

K: You never impose yourself and I am very appreciative of what you are doing.

L: I will get in touch with your peoples. That's very, very, very impostant and I know it.

By KHLN NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
2/17/70; 7:00 p.m.

P asked K how he got along. K said he thought it went very well. He
said there was not a huge turnout because some Republicans heard it
in the morning. K said Fulbright was there and was extremely benign.
K said all the peaceniks were there. K said they were extremely
complimentary. P said he would see. P asked K if <u>Time</u> was going to
do a cover. K saidyes, a week from Monday. K said Grunwald said
they felt they had not treated P fairly. K said this is true, but amazing
since he is extremely far left. K said Grunwald said he has come to
the conclusion that P's Vietnam policy is right. P said K should
talk to Bob (Haldeman?).

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

2/17/70

Z: Regarding reactions to the midi skirt -- not the mini.

K: I'm against them.

Z: I'm going to have Reg ______ call you. If you have a colorful reaction

would

K: I have enough. I could say it did undermine the morales of people working in basement offices.

Z: Keep it clean. Give me a quote and I will give it to him. It's a matter of personal publicity and important to you.

K: I'll think about it.

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
2/18/70 10:10 a.m.

J: Any word from Tokyo?

K: I called him over the weekend, and he has a call in to me now. I might have word in 15 minutes. I talked to him Saturday night, and since he doesn't know about the substance, he had to check. He said Sato asked to find this interpretation. He said we should just go to Geneva and it would all work out. I said that's what you've been saying at every step. Our negotiator is shocked at the little he understands of your position, so you can understand how the President feels. He said he would go back to his man.

J: The Japanese textile lawyer came over Monday. I gave him a hard time. I asked our talk over to you.

K: He said Sato has an incredible time with his textile people.

J: That's clear, and it's clear he isn't going to be able to deliver.

K: Well, stay hard.

J: I've never been tougher--I have no further place to go.

K: I got the President's approval to settle for 70%.

J: I've been trying to signal to them that if they come in with something reasonable, we'll settle. It's hard for us to come up with a proposal but they can't get one of their own. Their Embassy here has a proposal but they can't get it through there. The textile people have to come along "voluntarily." They have no legal way of imposing it.

K: I got so tied up with the report, and there was nothing to tell you.

J: No, I understand. And by the way, I think it came out first-class.

K: Bill and Miriam couldn't have been more helpful, and I think it said that to Elliot, and to the President in front of them.

J: Well, once we got straightened away on procedure, this is the king tax thing to do.

K: And I think it was helpful to the Department.

By KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

page 2

J: Yes, for the first time, we have an authoritative program.

K: Yes, and I don't think you could have handled the Defense
posture along--better to subsume it all under one statement from the
President.

J: Right. The product was very good. Another thing: on the
message from Libya I sent over 10 days ago. . .

K: Didn't you get word on that?

J: No.

K: The President says we shouldn't hold out hope on F-5 delivery
at the end of this year.

J: But we don't want to turn them down now.

K: No, the idea is to go ahead with the servicing you need to do now.

J: That's right. On the F-5s we said if they raise it, we'll have to
come back to Washington. But we had an FYI that it might be in our inter-
est to fulfill it.

K: That's what bothered the President. . . I have a call from my
Japanese friend. I talk with you.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Y

2/18/70 10:20 a.m.

Y: My friend called several hours ago; he asked me to convey the following message. Lately he has been concerned about the progress of the problem and he is anxious to reach an early and mutually acceptable position. Since he is not satisfied with what has been accomplished in ordinary diplomatic channels, he feels it is necessary to do something else. One, he thought of sending his new aide--the number two gentleman. You understand?

K: Commerce?

Y: That's right--to talk with your top people. But at this moment the Diet is in session and this gentleman is not able to leave the country. My friend wonders if you yourself, Mr. Jones, could come over here to talk with himself and his top aide. I warned him that Mr. Jones is not an expert on this . . .

K: That's an understatement.

Y: . . . but my friend expressed his personal confidence in you and would like to have you here at the earliest opportunity.

K: I would be the toughest negotiator you ever met, because I don't know what I am talking about. I wouldn't yield; I don't know what I could yield on. It's very hard for me to get away.

Y: But you will have a word with your friend?

K: Yes, but if I did come, I know nothing about the subject. I would have to follow my instructions literally.

Y: My friend is very concerned, and is trying to work some kind of ___________. [didn't understand what Y said]

K: Let me discuss it with my friend. I will call you tomorrow.

Y: My friend is agreeable to any suggestions you or your friend might have.

K: I'll call you at about this time tomorrow. Or maybe tonight.

Y: About 7:00 p.m. your time tonight is very convenient for me.

K: At your home?

Y: No, at my office.

K: All right, I will try for that.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

U. Alexis Johnson/Kissinger

11:50 am 2/18/70

K: I talked to this guy who expressed Sato's agitation and concern at this problem and he wanted to send his Commeree man here but with the Diet in session it's not possible. Sato wants me to come but I told my contact I couldn't get away and I'm a tough negotiator and I would have to follow written instructions and I don't know enough. I don't think I should go.

J: I don't know what they mena.

K: They will accept proposals but we have given them proposals.

J: Our point is that we have given them proposals. In fact, I am working up a proposal

K: I said I would call him tonight and say what could be done. I don't know how it could happen without attracting attention.

J: It would cause a great deal of attention. We could draw up a proposal.

K: But what do I add ot it? How about your going?

J: If I had instructions and an understanding of what the President is willing to settle for

K: The only advantage I have is that I can't settle for anything and I have no ill will. How long would it take?

J: It can go quickly. Actually, these things -- it's a matter of weeks but it need not be that. The problem with my going is that all the wrath of the industry and commerce would come down on my head. I don't care. Settling for less

K: Japan?

J: No here.

K: My advantage would be as a Presidential advisor. If there is any negotiation to it, I can add nothing -- this is it.

J: I think it can be settled without either of us going.

K: That was his proposal

J: We need to get it settled

By K.L. NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

-2-

K: I have no interest in doing it. It will take four days anyway

K J: At least that, and it will be some hard bargaining.

K: Then I can't do it because I can't bargain on what I know nothing about.

J: That person to send with the proposal is Phil Trezise. We must decide here the parameters and then send Phil. They respect him. Stans will scream if no Commerce man goes. I would work up a proposal here that the President is prepared to accept and I would send Phil Trezise over. That would be my thought.

K: What do I tell them?

J: Suggest this to them. They know Phil. Do you think the President is in a mood -- we are a long ways apart -- to take 60 or 70 percent of what we have been shooting for?

K: 60 is low. 80 he would probably take. I don't know how to explain it. If we show it's fairly close to what he wants. We have Stans on

J: Very much on our neck. We can get an agreement with the Japanese that will in substance meet the economic needs of our industry but they will not be happy with it. They want the whole loaf. We will have to bring Stans on it.

K: I will mention all this to the President. I will tell him my conviction, that you share, is that I should not get involved. I won't say I won't however talk to Sato but not now.

J: That's right. I will have something ready this afternoon. Maury is coming back this afternoon. I would prefer you, I and Maruy get together on my proposal and see if we can get Maury along. Then we will take it to the President.

K: I will mention this to the President and recommend he not send me. You are keeping me from raw fish but the Japanese drive me up a wall.

J: They're not my favorite amusement either. I will have something late this afternoon to talk about.

By: KHL NARA, Dated: 5/13/04

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
4:35 pm 2/18/70

K: I don't know if the President has talked about the demonstrations in NY. Both the Mayor and Governor have regretted the dinner.

VP: When is it?

K: My staff hasn't been able to tell me but I think it's March 2 because they go to Calif. on March 3.

(Remainder of conversation, except for very end, lost)

VP: I will come back a day early. I will certainly

K: The French and the President would appreciate it.

By KHLN NARA, Dated 5/13/04

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
2/18/70 4:55 p.m.

K: If you hear my spiel once more you can give it yourself.

R: Of course I can, Henry.

K: Well, I mean you can anyway, but in a more elegant form.

R: I don't know about that. It's like a bonafide head from the
Amazon Valley--you can shrink it down to any size you want. We've
got a problem on messages from Godley. On the face of it, the Secre-
ry of State, or the Acting Secretary as the case may be, ought to
get a copy by one means or another. They are all over the Pentagon
but apparently the Secretary of State isn't an addressee. One way of
doing it is to put him on as an addressee, or ask Godley to repeat it
on the NODIS/CHEROKEE channel. I think either way can be done.

K: I agree with you and it will be done.

R: If Rogers gets back and finds he'd left out ...

K: The last thing I want is for it to appear that during your
stewardship major functions were taken away from State. I'll do
something about it today. While I've got you on the phone, a French
lady who is unbelievably persistent, who is doing a TV thing on me

R: Is she pretty?

K: Quite. Can she come in and take pictures of you and me?

R: At lunch tomorrow?

K: Yes.

R: Fine.

K: Can you speak French?

R: Yes, somewhat.

K: She wants you to state your views or whatever else you
want to say about me.

R: I think I can do that.

K: But I must warn you I understand French.

R: Okay, see you tomorrow.

TELCORN
Vice President/Kissinger
5:15 pm 2/18/70

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

VP: Is Mrs. Pompidou accompanying her husband ?

K: Yes. If Mrs. Agnew could come, everyone would be delighted.

VP: I'm trying to keep here off the KM circuit a little bit to stay home with my daughter. We will see how it works out.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON

Merriman Smith/Kissinger

2/18/70

K: I always knew you had it in for us.

S: I'm sitting here shafting you.

K: Don't be surprised if ? ? ? ? ? ? You asked a number of questions yesterday about that Soviet line. If you read the first 3 or 4 pages of the Negotiation section, as I am sure you have, you will see -- they balance out.

S: What I was getting at and ? ? ? act in community. A TV news operation is that you have to start with one point first and then two or three. Out across the world, starting tonight, we will ship this story. There won't be HAK there to explain. Was the Administration aware when it drafted this thing that it would be possible to make a strong anti-Russian case?

K: Every regional bureau and every Assistant Secretary saw it. It shows a great willingness to cooperate.

S: This Government has already expressed these views privately.

K: If you look at the first 4 pages -- it is essential to negotiate and come to an understanding. The way we see it, we have achieved some of it and still have other problems.

S: Our problem is to praise it with accurate balance without either whipping up smoke or undue optimism. It's hard on that balance to think you have some diplomatic viewpoint.

K: I understand. I don't think your question was unfair.

S: I was fearful that someone along the line -- construction (?) of news. When we write a story we have no guarantee that a paper will write any of it. So we have to write newr the top.

K: I was greatful for the chance to straighten it out.

S: We are struggling with it. What was your reaction to the memo on Abu Sabi?

K: I never saw it.

S: Jerry Warren said he would be sure you saw it. I ran across what I thought was frightening information. I put it on brown paper

K: Let me pick it out.

Merriman Smith/Kissinger

2/18/70

By KHL

NARA, Dato. S/12/04

-2-

S: It's much smaller than a letterhead. Information about Adi Sabi investing money in W. German steel and concrete processes. Where are they getting the dough? From Russia. Their representatives are shuffling from Moscow to Persian Gulf and then to ____ and the Shiek is getting rich. And the W. Germans are involved.

K: I will check on it and be up on it when I next talk to you.