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The recent French presidential election provides an unusual opportunity to examine the relationship between French internal politics and French participation in political integration. Although it would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of General De Gaulle's personal views and policy in regard to European unification, he does not by any means speak for a unanimous and monolithic France, no matter how much he or his admirers may pretend to do so. In the presidential election De Gaulle was opposed by an ideologically diverse group of candidates who were out to deflate his prestige by cutting into his popular support as tangibly measured at the ballot box. If these candidates were to arrive at a consensus on the positions they found politically advantageous to take for the purpose of such a campaign, this consensus would then represent the considered judgement of a jury of French professional politicians as to which policies were among the more attractive to the French people at the time. Such a consensus does appear, in fact, to have existed among the candidates in regard to certain foreign policy issues, most of which tended to involve, in one way or another, relations between France and the European Community.

The opposition presidential candidates involved in deriving this consensus were François Mitterrand and Gaston Defferre on the Left, Jean Lecanuet and Pierre Marcilhacy for the Center, and Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour on the Extreme Right. Not included is the last-minute candidate of no political significance, Marcel Barbu. Gaston Defferre is included even though he withdrew from the presidential race in June 1965. He had been the leading candidate of the Left for about one and three-quarter years; since his intended campaign strategy differed significantly from that later adopted by Mitterrand, and since Defferre's campaign statements are abundantly available, the inclusion of his campaign positions is helpful and relevant to this discussion. Our source for the campaign statements by the opposition is the newspaper Le Honte supplemented by a few lengthy interviews published in Le Nouvel Observateur. In the interest of succinctness and simplicity, quotations from these candidates will not be inflicted on those hearing this paper, and I will inevitably engage in some rather sweeping generalizations regarding the overall campaign positions of the candidates that will overlook many interesting nuances and exceptions that certainly merit further study and close scrutiny.

## The National Consensus

On certain general issues the opposition candidates were more or less in agreement with the views usually attributed to General De Gaulle. The three most important of the opposition candidates, Mitterrand, Defferre, and Lecanuet, agreed with General De Gaulle on the utmost importance of securing French independence from alleged American "hegemony,"; the dispute was over who could best accomplish this and how to do it, not over whether the United States in fact exercises excessive influence over France. Only the extreme Right-wing candidate

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Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour adopted a pro-American posture; his very belligerence in vociferously endorsing the policies of the American State and Defense Departments may well have stemmed from his apparent desire to attract attention to a hopeless candidacy through shocking and sensational statements. Conversely, there seems to have been a consensus, with the same exception of Tixier-Vignancour, over the unimportance, or even non-existence, of the Cold War; the United States is viewed as much more of a problem than the Soviet Union. Even Tixier-Vignancour went so far as to favor French signature of the test-ban (which, of course, was opposed by General De Gaulle) and thus indicated that he might well be less of a "Cold Warrior" than his ideological counterparts in other countries, such as the United States itself.

Almost as much a bug-aboo as the United States, and of far more concern than the Soviet Union, was the future role of a resurgent Germany. On this the "national consensus" was surely universal; whatever disagreement there might be about what to do about Germany, there was agreement without exception to the effect that Germany poses a real problem for France. But it also seems to have been universally, if tacitly, agreed that the old system of anti-German alliances was obsolete and that reconciliation rather than hostility was the favored solution.

Finally, there appeared to be a negative national consensus toward major political, economic, or legal reform on a world-wide scale. It is not that the candidates were all violently or explicitly opposed to increasing the standard of living of poor nations, developing world law, encouraging the spread of democracy, promoting new methods and devices for disarmament or arms control, population policy, "strengthening" the United Nations, and all the other innumerable "do-gooder" projects that bulk so large in American political oratory; it is rather that the candidates were simply not much interested in these matters, with the very striking and significant exception of the transformation of Europe. That Europe must be an object of extensive reform is certainly part of the national foreign policy consensus reflected in the presidential campaign, although De Gaulle and his opponents split over how Europe should change.

These concentrations on policy towards the United States, Germany, and Europe are, of course, interrelated. All the candidates, including Tixier-Vignancour, agreed that "Europe" is an important means by which the problems of relations with both the United States and Germany may be resolved. It was in regard to the kind of "Europe" that might fulfill this role that De Gaulle and his opponents sharply diverged.

## The Opposition Consensus

If there was a sort of "national consensus" consisting of all or most of the opposition candidates plus General De Gaulle, there was also what might be called an "opposition consensus" usually consisting of all, or all but one, of the opposition candidates. All the

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opposition candidates did regard Gaullist diplomatic style, particularly General De Gaulle's behavior in regard to the United States, as characterized by a unilateralism that isolates France from possible friends in the rest of the world. Worse yet, Gaullist diplomacy was condemned as self-defeating even when its objectives were laudable. Gaullist behavior toward the United States is unjustifiable whatever one might think of American foreign policy. To the extent that the Americans are right, and are attempting to bear, almost alone, the burdens of the free world, De Gaulle is ingloriously sabotaging the American effort without any corresponding reward for France. To the extent that the Americans are wrong, and are engaging in adventurism, General De Gaulle has proven himself to be utterly incapable of influencing American policy; on the contrary, the United States does what it likes just as if France did not exist.

General De Gaulle's alleged failure to obtain for France its proper place in relationship to the United States is attributed by the opposition not only to the clumsiness and unnecessarily provocative style of his diplomacy (and even the candidates most critical of American foreign policy were emphatic in denouncing General De Gaulle's treatment of the United States), but also to his alleged inability to support his diplomacy with sufficient power. Although some of the candidates denounced De Gaulle for being a Metternichian power politician who does not realize that the world has changed, all the candidates condemned him for not helping to organize a united Europe which alone can generate the kind of power and influence that will make an impression on the United States. Instead of pursuing policies that could build up the power required to support his diplomacy, General De Gaulle squanders the substance of France on the wasteful and useless "force de frappe" which impresses no one, least of all the United States, but consumes significant resources needed for French economic and social development.

The unanimity of the opposition in favor of a united Europe and against the independent French nuclear force was complete. It is true that Tixier-Vignancour was criticized by an organ of the Extreme Right for being too willing to give up national sovereignty, but Tixier obviously paid little attention to such criticism, and the actual election revealed that he had mobilized the great bulk of the ultra-rightist electorate.

On the Left one might have imagined that Francois Mitterrand would have been compelled to moderate his pro-European campaign in order to obtain and retain official Communist endorsement. That did not prove to be the case at all. On the contrary, the Secretary-General of the French Communist Party, Waldek-Rochet, indicated that although the Party still disliked the European Common Market, it realized that the Common Market was here to stay, and that it would now be wise to work within it rather than against it. He called for the representatives

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"of the elected assemblies of each country to have access to the real authorities" of the institution. Of course this is just the sort of thing in behalf of which the champions of European integration have been agitating for many a year. Perhaps the French Communists, like the British, have decided that "if you can't beat them, join them" and bore from within. In any event, Waldeck-Rochet's statement illustrates how universal the opposition consensus had become; General De Gaulle and his supporters remained the only intransigent opponents of the specific political reforms that might encourage the gradual evolution of a politically integrated Europe.

This clear-cut division between the "Europeans" and the "nationalists" moved Le Monde's foreign editor, Andre Fontaine, to propose that the presidential election be fought on that one issue. He suggested that the opposition unite on a single "European candidate" to oppose General De Gaulle. Undoubtedly Fontaine was confusing the substantive importance of the Europe issue (he contended that foreign policy controls everything else and therefore should be the main issue), with the normally subordinate role played by foreign policy issues in the mind of the average voter when his country is at peace. Nevertheless Fontaine certainly put his finger on a very significant development that could have incalculable consequences. The fact is that the entire opposition to General De Gaulle, from the Communists to the Extreme Right, was unanimously in favor of progress toward the political integration of Europe, and that this position was being taken during an active campaign for votes against the best vote-getter in France since Louis Napoleon. There is little reason to suppose that half the French people are passionately enthusiastic about merging France with a larger entity; on the other hand, there is equally little reason to suppose that the candidates were consciously taking a position they thought to be unpopular but which they felt was a matter of principle that they could not morally evade. Why, then, this unanimous agreement on the issue of Europe? An answer may be suggested through examination of some specific justifications offered by the opposition candidates for their pro-European position.

## Europe in the Opposition Campaign

The opposition candidates certainly agreed that European unification was indispensable for the solution of the main problems confronting France; they naturally varied considerably among themselves in regard to the definition of these problems and the specific way in which European integration would contribute to their solution. The candidates all rejected the Gaullist view that France by herself can still play a great part in world affairs; on the contrary, the future was said to be with the super-powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and possibly China. Only a united Europe could compete with these Great Powers on a equal footing; if France did not help build such a Europe, she would find herself at the mercy of the Big Two or Three.

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Even within Europe France would herself incur danger from a resurgent Germany if German ambitions were not moderated and redirected through an integrated Europe; Gaullist policy was depicted as stimulating German nationalism and as encouraging the Germans to make their own arrangements with the Big Two at the expense of France.

It was in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States that the candidates differed in their interpretations of the problems involved, though all agreed that Europe was the solution whatever the problem might happen to be. The majority were for "peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet Union, and felt that this objective could be fulfilled only through a united Europe that the Soviet Union would respect. Candidates who still believed in the existence of the Cold War naturally thought that a united Europe was necessary to protect France against the Communists. Similarly the majority of candidates feared American "hegemony," but felt that the only way to deal with this problem was through a powerful united Europe; the candidate who supported American foreign policy whole-heartedly considered a united Europe essential for bringing France closer to the United States.

In the economic field the candidates were unanimous on two points. They felt that in the then current Brussels negotiations on Common Market agricultural policy, France was substantially right in its strictly economic demands, but that there was no justification for General De Gaulle to break off the negotiations. De Gaulle was accused of policies that might wreck the Common Market and thus ruin French agriculture; all the candidates pledged, if elected, to resume the negotiations immediately and unconditionally. In the broader sense, all the candidates felt that a united Europe was absolutely indispensable to French prosperity.

The candidates did differ on why or how a united Europe would aid French economic development. Gaston Defferre thought that a united Europe would offer a wonderful opportunity for the development of socialism, while Tixier-Vignacour thought that a united Europe would result in a renaissance of unrestricted free enterprise. A more nuanced appraisal was offered by Jean Lecanuet who maintained that the French economy had stagnated under protectionism but was not ready to compete under a system of free trade; a united Europe which could plan its international trade was therefore just what France needed to provide sufficient, but not excessive, economic competition.

François Mitterrand combined both foreign policy and economic considerations into arguments intended to show that a united Europe was absolutely essential for democracy. A Europe whose internal relationships were dominated by "power politics" was a Europe in which governmental leaders had to be given the right to make foreign policy without regard to public opinion, for the diplomacy of power politics requires a secrecy and flexibility that is incompatible with democracy.

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But since foreign policy requires national power, and national power depends on domestic economic and social policies, the letter policies must also be made by the "Great Leader" independently of the wishes of the people. The Gaullist regime is a typical result of a world of power politics, and indeed General De Gaulle, in a sense, plays his part well. But France should be in a position where its domestic social and economic policies can be dictated by what the people want, not what the Leader deems necessary for his diplomatic maneuvers. To arrive at this more democratic system requires the reduction of power politics. A united Europe would eliminate or transform politics within Europe, and at the same time help bring about "peaceful coexistence" that will reduce the requirements of power politics outside Europe.

This argument is, of course, open to the Gaullist and Communist criticism that a united Europe will be run by "technocrats" who will supersede the democratic governments of Europe and thus eliminate democracy in any event. Mitterrand's response to that criticism was to point out that the only way to combat technocracy is to introduce democratic institutions into the European Community just as the champions of European integration have long advocated. Only a politically integrated Europe can guarantee democracy both within the member countries and at the level of the Community itself; a "Europe of fatherlands" would mean the decline of democracy at every level.

Finally, all the opposition candidates agreed that it was General De Gaulle, and De Gaulle virtually alone, that stood in the way of the veritable cornucopia of benefits that would pour out from a united Europe. If only De Gaulle could be eliminated from public life, Europe would gradually unite, and most French international and internal problems would soon be on their way to solution.

## Conclusions

For the opposition candidates Europe was a veritable panacea that could resolve almost any French internal or international problem that one might raise. It is not that the opposition was in general disagreement with General De Gaulle over the recognition of specific problems, such as alleged "American hegemony" or reconciliation with Germany. It is rather that General De Gaulle thinks France should resolve her difficulties primarily through her own efforts and strength, while the opposition apparently contended that such a national approach requires resources that France alone simply does not possess. The opposition felt that if General De Gaulle excessively strains French resources, domestic programs and needs will be sacrificed to international goals. Such a sacrifice could be avoided, the opposition thought, only by taking advantage of the strength of a united Europe.

This reasoning, in turn, implies that the fundamental divergence between the Gaullist position and that of the entire opposition was

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not "supranationalism" versus "nationalism," but was rather a conflict between two variations of nationalism, one of which is internally oriented while the other is oriented to the outside world. For the opposition candidates, whatever their ideological tint, what came first was the material welfare of the French people, and not the power and glory of the French nation. The purpose of foreign policy is to facilitate domestic policies of prosperity and social progress. In other words, the consensus of the opposition in favor of supranationality may, in fact, have been motivated, by a very definite form of nationalism, a nationalism which consisted of treating one's own people as well as possible rather than spending the people's resources to impress, intimidate, or assist foreign nations. Through a supranational Europe, Germany could be contained without an expensive nuclear arms race, American influence could be minimized at relatively little cost to France, while the French could spend more on welfare measures within the Hexagon, such as housing and education, rather than on nuclear weapons and foreign aid. The unanimous denunciation of the French independent nuclear deterrent by the opposition candidates, who all indicated that they felt French domestic needs were far more pressing than the pursuit of prestige through atomic weapons, as well as their apparent lack of enthusiasm, and in some instances bitter hostility, for Gaullist foreign aid programs, tend to support the view that the pro-European position of the opposition reflected a desire to concentrate French energies on domestic rather than international affairs.

General De Gaulle's nationalism, in contrast, is oriented to the outside world. French domestic prosperity is important because it increases French capabilities in international affairs, rather than the other way around. In one sense, General De Gaulle is perhaps correct in claiming to be a better "European" than his opponents; certainly he is more of an internationalist. For him, participation in the European Community is a way for France to assume ever greater responsibilities in Europe and the world; for the opposition, such participation is a way of using the European Community to relieve France of her national burdens in the world at large in order to concentrate on domestic welfare. If this latter motivation is less idealistic than the official ideology of European unification, it probably is more politically realistic. It would not be the first time that lofty and morally exalted goals have been politically served by motives of a relatively mundane and materialistic origin.