CLC

FOR

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

PROGRAM The Today Show

STATION WRC-TV
NBC Network

DATE June 14, 1978

8:16 AM

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT U.S. and Soviet Relations

TOM BROKAW: Many newspaper headlines today have a kind of deja vu quality, as if we're back in the '50s, during the height of the cold war. For instance, "The Soviets Intensifying Their Attacks on the United States."

Well, that's a very contemporary headline because there's a new chill in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, is in our Washington studios this morning. He's there with NBC News diplomatic correspondent Richard Valeriani to talk about these developments.

RICHARD VALERIANI: Dr. Kissinger, the Administration seems to be having some trouble making its case for Cuban involvement in the invasion of Shaba Province in Zaire now. Do you think that's because it has a flimsy case, or does it go beyond that, something deeper involved?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: I think that some of this is a legacy of the Vietnam War, with an attempt to replay this over and over again.

I think we ought to assume that when the President of the United States says something, that he's telling the truth. Whether every little piece of evidence can be presented is another matter.

But the fact is that these Katanga gendarmes that made the invasion of Shaba Province have been there for 12 years in Angola. There's never been an invasion of Zaire until the Cubans showed up. After the Cubans showed up, there have been two inva-

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sions in two years. I think that is pretty good circumstantial evidence.

Now, what other additional evidence the Administration has, I don't know. But I don't think one should always assume that the Administration is not telling the truth. I'm assuming they are telling the truth.

VALERIANI: You have said, Dr. Kissinger, that the Administration should draw the line on the Cubans and the Russians in Africa. How do you do that?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, I think that we have 40,000 Cubans, a country of nine million off our shores having an expedi- tionary force of 40,000 in Africa, having intervened in Angola, in Ethiopia, having troops in Mozambique, even in South Yemen on the Arabian Peninsular.

I think the Soviet Union has to be made to understand that there cannot be proxy wars and detente at the same time.

Secondly, I can not believe that it is beyond the wit of the free peoples, together, to stop a Caribbean island of nine million that is really totally dependent for its logistics on the Soviet Union.

VALERIANI: Well, what would you suggest, some kind of economic sanctions, collectively?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't think I should go into the tactical advise, but I think we have our political relationship, we have our economic relationship. There's now some talk of a joint force, as there has been in Shaba Province, in Zaire.

But above all, I think it has to be understood that this is an unacceptable behavior.

VALERIANI: What ever happened to detente?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all, one has to understand what detente is. There are always elements of competition and cooperation in our relationship with the Soviet Union. I think what has happened over the last year or two is that the Soviet Union may have acquired the idea that we were not ready to face the competitive aspect of it, and gradually escalated its involvement in Africa and in such places as Afghanistan, where, whether they did it directly or not, a Communist government has been put into office. And that is incompatible with detente.

VALERIANI: And do you think this was a test of the new Administration by the Russians?

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DR. KISSINGER: I think it was. At the beginning of almost any Administration, there is a test. There was one at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, there was one at the beginning of the Nixon Administration. And I think that President Carter is now going through his period of testing.

VALERIANI: And you say we have to make it to clear to them that what they're doing is unacceptable. Well, how do we make it clear, beyond rhetorically? What do we do physically?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have proposed, for example, that the extension of credits -- the Communist World owes the industrial democracies nearly $50 billion worth in credit. Now, it's absurd for us to be financing foreign interventions and to be helping indirectly the Soviet military buildup.

Now, this is the sort of thing that should be made clear to the Soviets: that if they want to have peaceful coexistence, then, of course, we can also have more normal economic relations. But we can not be financing their military adventures abroad.

VALERIANI: Do you think that President Carter clarified American policy toward the Soviet Union in his Annapolis speech?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, he took a step towards it. I personally -- there was some gap between some of the philosophical points and some of the practical points. I don't know what an Indian Ocean treaty means that we always keep mentioning when the Soviets are in Ethiopia, when the Soviets can threaten all of the countries of the Indian Ocean area from land and we can defend them only from the sea.

So I have questions about particulars, but I think the philosophical statement was very important to make.

VALERIANI: And do you think that the United States should go ahead trying to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Russians while the Russians are misbehaving in Africa?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that, as the President pointed out in his Annapolis speech, that it will be extremely difficult to ratify the SALT agreement, anyway. It will become nearly unmanageable if it has to be ratified at a time that there are conflicts going on all over Africa and elsewhere. And I think that if the Soviet Union wants a relaxation of tension, all we're asking from them is not to engage in foreign military adventures. That isn't asking too much.

VALERIANI: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DATE July 5, 1978 7:00 AM CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Interview with Henry Kissinger

JANE PAULEY: Henry Kissinger has joined us this morning. He's with Bob Abernathy in our Washington studio. We wanted to get his sense of some things in world affairs.

BOB ABERNATHY: Let's begin with the Middle East. Israel and Egypt, apparently, will have direct talks again, for the first time since last January. Their foreign ministers and Secretary of State Vance are going to meet in London.

How do you assess that?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: I think it's a hopeful sign. There have to be direct talks between Egypt and Israel to make progress. I think the elements of progress exist.

ABERNATHY: As I understand the situation, Israel will not agree to give up control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Egypt insists there must be at least a promise of that.

Whose move is it now?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have to say I don't like the procedures that are now being followed, where both sides state public positions, and then the compromises are being made in public. It becomes extremely difficult for either side to deviate from their position once they have made it public.

If you look at the formal positions, it's hard to tell whose move it is, because they've stated a position that the other one doesn't accept.

I think the important thing to do now is to have some

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quiet negotiations to see what it is that either side might possibly accept that they can both live with.

ABERNATHY: Is it time for the United States to put forward a compromise proposal of our own?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it would be a mistake for us to put forward a compromise proposal at this stage. I think we -- when the parties are this far apart, we run the risk of making a proposal that is rejected by one or the other, or that we have to impose on one or the other.

I think the two sides have to negotiate more, get a lot closer. Then, after we talk to both sides, we might be able to put something forward that they've already told us privately they'll accept, but which is easier for both of them to accept from us than from each other.

This is the role of an American proposal, but not when the gap is so large.

ABERNATHY: Do we also have a role, perhaps, in putting pressure on one side or the other, or both?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that at this stage we should let the negotiations run, under our -- with our advice and with our goodwill; and I don't think this is the time to discuss pressure.

ABERNATHY: Let's turn to relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A few weeks ago it looked as if another cold war were about to start. Has it?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think, in relations with the Soviet Union, the most important quality to keep in mind is consistency. And in the last year there have been oscillations between fears of cold war, fears of excessive concession, almost in monthly cycles; unilateral steps where we gave up certain weapon systems, then a return again to a harsher tone.

What is above all necessary is that the Soviet Union understands one clear and consistent line of American foreign policy; and that will make it then possible to negotiate.

I don't think a cold war in the sense of the 1950s is in the interests of either side or of mankind.

ABERNATHY: Why has there not been this consistent policy in Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, partly because any new Administration has to sort itself out, partly because there are obviously conflicting points of view within the Administration as to how to

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deal with the Soviet Union, and partly because the temptation, when you have conflicting points of view, is to let each one of those points of view have a little bit of the action; and that then creates a gap within which the Soviet Union is tempted to probe, and that creates, then, these recurrent crises.

ABERNATHY: The conflict has been between, apparently, those personified by Secretary of State Vance, on the one hand, those personified by National Security Adviser Brzezinski, on the other. Has that conflict -- is that conflict over now? We're told that it is Vance that speaks for the President.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, there's always -- Washington always personalizes the policy differences that may exist.

I think, fundamentally, leaving aside my agreement with particular individuals, I think the foreign policy has to be conducted by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President; and there has to be one central focus for the conduct of foreign policy.

ABERNATHY: And does that exist now?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I wouldn't blame it on any particular individual. It's ultimately the President who has to see to it. He hasn't the time to watch all the nuances of day-to-day execution. On the other hand, of course, he has to set the basic line.

ABERNATHY: Two American reporters have been accused of slander in Moscow, ordered to trial. How do you read that?

DR. KISSINGER: I read it as part of that phase. This is one of the Soviet reactions to the verbal human rights campaign, in which we haven't actually done all the things we have said we would do; but the Soviets then use it to demonstrate to their own people, and to us, that these public pressures don't work. And I think this is the sort of fencing -- we cannot accept it. We can not permit our reporters to be harassed and have the freedom of our press undermined.

ABERNATHY: The Soviet President, Mr. Brezhnev, attacked the U.S. recently for trying to play the Chinese card. He called that a shortsighted and dangerous policy.

What's your assessment of the idea that the U.S. and China should move closer together, work closer together, in order to try to contain and control the Soviets?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we have to keep in mind that we cannot play the Chinese card; the Chinese has to play itself.

I have great belief in closer relations with the Peoples

Republic of China. I was among the first to negotiate with them when I was in office. But we must not create the impression that a people that has conducted its own policy for 3000 years is going to be there as a card for us to play.

When we have complementary interests, as we often do, we should cooperate with them. When we don't, then we should pursue our own interests. But we mustn't create the impression that we are using them against the Soviet Union, or that they're using us, or that anybody's using anybody. When we have parallel interests, we will pursue them, or should pursue them, on the basis of our own convictions.

ABERNATHY: A quick question about Africa. The Administration, as I understand it, has made it clear that we'll try to help African countries solve their fundamental problems, but we'll not necessarily react just because the Soviets or the Cubans there have acted.

Is this all right with you?

DR. KISSINGER: As an abstract proposition, this is all right with me. As a practical proposition, the time scale for solving some of these economic and political problems is likely to be much longer than the time scale posed by Soviet and Cuban intervention. And we cannot simply announce the end of an East-West conflict in Africa by our own unilateral decisions.

So, as an abstract principle, I don't question it. In concrete situations it can be extremely dangerous by creating a vacuum.

ABERNATHY: Dr. Kissinger, many thanks. Good to talk to you.