THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1961

Dear Henry:

As I said in our shorthand telephone conversation, the
President has asked me to talk with you at your early
convenience about the possibility of your joining up down
here. The only complication in the situation, from his
point of view, is that more than one part of the government
may want to get you. He does not want to seem to interfere
with any particular department's needs, but he does want
you to know that if you should be interested, he himself
would like to explore the notion of your joining the small
group which Walt Rostow and I will be putting together for
his direct use. If this should turn out to be a good idea
from both points of view, he would hope that it could be
arranged in such a way as not to give offense to others who
want you.

If you are coming to Washington soon after your arrival, we
can all have a talk about this, but the first course would be
to have a talk on the phone as soon as you get back.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

February 8, 1961

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mac:

I am afraid I was not too coherent after twenty
hours on the Federal when you called me Saturday night. The
assignment you and the President have in mind is challenging
as well as delicate and I will be thinking about our convoca-
tions.

I have resolved the problem as to the place where
I could make my greater contribution by writing to Dean Rusk
that I do not want to be considered for a position in the State
Department now. As for the White House, my major consideration
is less the fact than the mode of my participation. I have
written to the President to that effect and also that I would
be in touch with you on my decision.

I will be in Washington on February 17th and 18th
and perhaps we could have another talk on that occasion. It
appears that I will be free in the late afternoon on either day,
with a slight preference for the 17th. Could you let me know
about this?

With kind regards.

P.S. I am writing to you separately about my expenses.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1961

Dear Henry:

Thanks very much for your letter. I'm looking forward to seeing you when you are in Washington next week, and 4 P.M. on the 17th would be a good time for me. If this isn't convenient for you, please call my office when you get here and we'll arrange something else.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

February 10, 1961

Dear Mac:

I do not know whether you can pay any
of my expenses to Washington last week, or how
to claim them, but I am enclosing my hotel ticket
and a stub from the Washington to Boston train
ticket. (The former also includes the price of
the latter.)

My round-trip fare from Boston to New York
has been paid, and I came to Washington from New
York by plane. Perhaps you could just pay me
whatever you think is reasonable--I would suggest
round-trip air, Washington-New York and some kind
of per diem for the day. I will pay the difference.

With kind regards.

February 15, 1961

Dear Mac:

This is just to let you know that I will be in to see you at 4:00 p.m. on Friday. I am at the German-American Conference at the Statler-Hilton if you should want to reach me.

Kind regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1961

Dear Henry:

After our conversation of Friday, I talked to the President
and he is all for going ahead on the basis we discussed.
So I will start the wheels turning at once on a Consultant's
appointment for you, and perhaps before you get this
letter I will have called you about it. But I wanted to put
in writing my own great pleasure at your willingness to join
with us on this basis. I think you are one of the very few
people whose advice will be really helpful on this relatively
informal basis. We count on having your help, particularly
in the general area of weapons and policy and in the special
field of thinking about all aspects of the problem of Germany.

Neither of us has any way of knowing at present just how
heavy this job will be. The best model which has occurred
to me since our conversation is that of the President's
Science Advisory Committee, the members of which are on
call for advice on special problems in a fashion which is
determined by the problems and not by any a priori plan.
I think it will be that way in our work together, and I can
only say that I look forward to it very much.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Studies
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

February 22, 1961

Dear Mac:

Thank you for your very nice letter. I think the
arrangement we discussed affords the greatest degree of flexi-
bility. After a while you and the President will be able to
judge how useful it has been, and at that time if it turns out
that a part-time arrangement does not work well, or I find that
it takes a disproportionate amount of my time, we can then re-
consider the question of a full-time assignment.

In the meantime, let me tell you how very much I look
forward to the prospect of being associated with you again.

Kind regards.

P.S. We have since talked on the phone. I am taking Northeast
flight #231 on Monday the 27th, which arrives in Washington
at 9:53 a.m. I must leave on Northeast #234 at 1:30 p.m.
on Tuesday the 28th.

on Tuesday the 28th.
at 9:30 a.m. I must leave on Northeast 4234 at 1:30 p.m.
flight 4231 on Monday the 23rd, which arrives in Washington
P.S. We have since talked on the phone. I am taking Northeast

Henry V. Kiebler

Kind regards.

In the meantime, let me tell you how very much I look
consider the question of a full-time assignment.

it takes a disproportionate amount of my time, we can then re-
that a part-time arrangement does not work well, or I find that
Judge how useful it has been, and at that time it it turns out
pity. After a while you and the President will be able to
arrangement we discussed efforts the greatest degree of flexi-

Dear Mac:

Washington, D.C.
The White House
Mr. McGeorge Bundy

February 22, 1961

March 1, 1961

Dear Mac:

Many thanks for your various courtesies during my visit.

I thought it might be helpful to both of us if I could
give you some idea now of the dates I might be available.
Also, I would like to take this opportunity to respond to the
President's request of some weeks ago that I consider freeing
a maximum amount of time before September 1st.

In March, I could come to Washington on Monday and Tuesday
morning, March 13th and 14th. (I might use these dates to get
started on the German problem.) Alternatively, if you want to
have another go-round on the paper we discussed yesterday before
then, I could come down on Friday and Saturday, March 10th and
11th, if you can let me know by the 8th.

In April, I could give most of the week of April 2nd and three
or four other days if I can get some advance warning.

From the middle of May to the end of August I could give a
substantial portion of my time. However, if a major portion is
required in June, I would need to know fairly soon because I have
made tentative plans to go to Europe during that month.

It would certainly help my own planning if I could have some
indication soon about these dates so that I can arrange my schedule.

I will prepare the memorandum requested by the President yes-
terday about major defense options by the middle of next week.

Kind regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 9, 1961

Dear Henry:

I have been slow to acknowledge your nice note of March
first. As it looks now, I think what we ought to do is plan
on having a visit from you for several days in the week of
April 2nd, if that is still convenient to you. By then we
should have our planning process in better order, and even
if chaos continues, we could get a first crack at the Berlin
problem if we could have a few consecutive days with you
on hand. The other problem which we have discussed is
in fairly good shape for the short run, and we have plenty of
time to think about the long run in relation to it.

We are in no position now to say where in the summer we
shall most want your services -- I think perhaps the best
way of putting it is to say that we would like to have a month
or six weeks of your time, and perhaps it would be best for
us if you could come after your visit to Europe in June,
simply in order to have the advantage of an eye freshly
exposed to that part of the world.

Meanwhile, thanks again for all your help, and if it is con-
venient we will look forward to seeing you in the first week
of April.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

March 20, 1961

Dear Mac:

Two questions:

(1) I have been asked to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding my views on the future of NATO. Do you have any opinion on whether I should do it? In the past, I have avoided testifying, but I do not feel strongly about it either way.

(2) I have so far avoided seeing newspaper men who have been after me regarding my appointment. I would prefer to continue doing so. However, if there is some reason that you or the White House press office might have for my seeing them, I am open to persuasion. In this case, though, my preference is not to see any journalists.

As you suggested, I will be in Washington from around noon on April 3rd to the 6th.

You will be receiving one of the memoranda we discussed by Friday through the M.I.T. Center for International Studies and the other by the middle of next week at the latest.

Kind regards.

Henry A. Kiehlger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards,

Studies and the other by the middle of next week at the latest.
discussed by Friday through the M.I.T. Center for International
You will be receiving one of the memoranda we
around noon on April 3rd to the et al.

Vs you suggested, I will be in Washington from
preference is not to see any journalists.

 preference is not to see any journalists.
them, I am open to persuasion. In this case, though, my
you or the White House press office might have for my seeing
to continue doing so. However, it there is some reason that
have been after me regarding my appointment. I would prefer
(2) I have so far avoided seeing newspaper men who

strongly apart it either way.
In the past, I have avoided testifying, but I do not feel
of NATO. Do you have any opinion on whether I should do it?
Foreign Relations Committee regarding my views on the future
(1) I have been asked to testify before the Senate

Two questions:

Dear Mac:

March 30, 1961

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1961

Dear Henry:

I think probably it is better not to begin testifying at
this stage of the game if in the past you have avoided
it. The White House staff ordinarily does not get into
this sort of thing, and while certainly you have more
freedom as a Consultant, I should think your past rules
might as well continue in the present case.

I also see no reason for you to see newspaper men at
this stage. It may well be useful to have some back-
ground discussion with particular individuals later on,
but we can cross those bridges as we come to them.

# I. General Considerations

## The Psychological Problem.
Since the end of World War II military technology has undergone at least three major revolutions, greater in scope than any technological upheaval of previous generations: the discovery of the atom bomb; the emergence of thermo-nuclear weapons; the development of long-range missiles. As a result, there is no really valid experience on which to draw in strategic planning. Indeed, the traditional military expertise may, if anything, be an obstacle to understanding present trends. The "common sense" solution is likely to be wrong for it is based on patterns of thought in need of being transcended. At every level, what is thought about the significance of modern weapons is more important than the "real" power relationship; or, put more accurately, the assessment of the role of modern weapons is their chief significance.

When deterrence depends on what is essentially a conjecture regarding unprecedented technological developments, military policy may fail for any one of three reasons: (a) because the military staffs are unable to formulate a coherent doctrine or do not understand the political framework in which they must operate; (b) because the political leadership has been furnished a military capability which is difficult to translate into policy or (c) because the two sides interpret available data differently so that what one side considers an unacceptable risk is not so considered by the other or else is disbelieved.

I shall discuss each of these briefly:

a. **Strategic Doctrine and the Military Services.** Until power is used, it has been said, it is what people think it is. Because there is so little

fact the most frequent. If they are not, the strategic doctrine
will compound rigidities inherent in any improvisation. If they are,
it will confer assurance and a sense of direction.

There have been two difficulties with American strategic doctrine
since World War II:

1. Insofar as we have had an agreed doctrine, we have been best prepared for the kind of war we are least likely to conduct: a massive first strike against the aggressor. And even here, the undoubtedly absolute power which we have generated has been vitiated by a lack of precision as to the nature of general war--a point I will discuss later.

2. The disagreement about strategy among the services and the
struggle over roles and missions has further deprived us both of flexi-
bility and direction. Each service has had a tendency to state require-
ments designed to make the others dispensable and to develop war plans
with a minimum of coordination with the other services. Or put another
way: the existing definition of strategic objectives has produced a
litany of slogans like "general war," "limited war," "determine Soviet
intentions" etc., so vague that each service has had a maximum latitude
to emphasize its own preferred strategy.

The results have not been altogether bad. The "sabotage by ob-
fuscation" has prevented the New Look from being pressed to its logical,
indeed its avowed, conclusions. It gives us a much better base for re-
casting our strategy than would have been the case had the decisions of
the Eisenhower Administration been in fact carried out. Yet evince
of national policy cannot be permitted to continue even if occasionally
the results are better than expected. Reassessing and making precise our

strategic doctrine seem to me priority items. I shall discuss below
possible means of achieving this end.

b. **Strategic Doctrine and the Political Leadership.** New aspects of the contemporary world have been harder to grasp by the traditional military professional than the notion that there no longer exists any purely military solution, even if war should break out. The pattern of asking the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the "military" ingredient and the State Department for the diplomatic component of policy has produced abstractness in both. It has obscured the fact that a military capability which is not adequately understood by the political leadership or in which the political leadership can have no confidence will lose a great deal, if not all, of its effectiveness. Or else, the military planning will turn into a straitjacket for political decisions instead of being a tool of them.

Let me illustrate this with a current controversy--that of counter-force versus finite deterrence: One objection to heavy reliance on a counterforce strategy is the near impossibility of the military ever demonstrating a counterforce capability to the political leadership. The lack of experience with modern weapons, the gap in our knowledge about the location of Soviet missile sites is bound to produce serious doubts about the efficacy of a strategy of a massive all-out strike--all the more as the penalty for a mistake is national catastrophe and as even success is relative: it is hard to conceive a victory which does not produce several million casualties. I shall return to this problem when discussing the various actions of general war.

c. **Strategy and Deterrence.** To be effective for purposes of deterrence, our military capability must produce the consequences in the mind of the

potential aggressor which we are aiming for. The important standard of what risks are unacceptable is the aggressor's, not ours. An action intended as bluff but taken seriously is more useful than an action intended seriously but interpreted as bluff. Thus, returning to the previous example, even if we possessed a capability for an effective first strike the aggressor might not credit it. In that case, deterrence could easily fail. As the nuclear age develops, it will become increasingly difficult, for reasons I will discuss later to demonstrate both readiness and determination to strike.

Most of the Soviet missiles would have been launched. The remainder as well as the bombing force would be in a high state of alert.

A pure <u>counterforce</u> strategy after a Soviet first strike would require a retaliatory force of enormous size and a vast active defense as well as civil defense program. Such an effort could not be maintained without stripping ourselves of limited war forces and even then its practical utility would be highly doubtful. It makes sense only on the assumption of a nearly 100 per cent effective active air defense and in that case, the Communists would have to be extremely foolish to attack. Since this course is not likely to be pursued and requires force levels several magnitudes greater than any now envisaged, the strategic and political implications of a counterforce second-strike capability will not be discussed further.

B. <u>Counterforce-First Strike</u>. This presupposes a capability to win a general war by a massive first blow. ("First" here refers to the initiation of general war. It assumes very substantive Communist provocation.) Since on this assumption we would initiate the general war, the force requirements of offensive power, active and civil defense are somewhat smaller than for the strategy described earlier.

From a purely strategic point of view a capability for a decisive first-strike is the most desirable of all postures. If the retaliatory force is well protected, the Soviets could not profit from preclusive attack because, by hypothesis, our counterblow would still inflict intolerable damage. And they would have to be cautious about limited aggression since this might trigger a potentially decisive United States first-strike. Therefore many proponents of this strategy hold that

9. The military and psychological difficulties are matched by political ones. In tense periods, a first-strike strategy is very difficult to utilize as a political weapon. As the retaliatory force must rely for its security on a high state of readiness, determination is not easily demonstrated by physical moves. And there is a psychological problem as well. If deterrence of general war has been effective for any length of time, it may be very hard to make an aggressor believe that one "really" means it this time. Moreover, if the throat is believed, it is likely to aggregate an already critical situation. At the least it would alert the opponent's defenses and this might well make the difference between success and failure. A first-strike counterforce strategy is most effective as an offensive military thrust to be invoked essentially without warning. It is least useful for a country on the strategic defensive, both militarily and politically.

Finally, exclusive reliance on a counterforce first-strike capability may well doom one control negotiations based on the notion of stable deterrence. Neither side could probably afford the inspection required and we could in that case not agree to a ceiling on the size of our retaliatory force.

C. Finite Deterrence. This strategic concept is based on the notion that deterrence is achieved not so much by the capability to threaten victory in general war as by the ability to inflict punishment unacceptable to the aggressor. According to this view, the aggressor will be deterred by the prospect of the destruction of objectives he values, most usually cities. The variations of this doctrine are great. The "minimum deterrence" version seems to relate our force levels to the total number

price of increasing the incentive for local pressure. A finite deter-
rence posture will almost certainly have to be coupled with a substantial
step-up of the limited war forces of the free world.

Indeed, it may even create a new problem for the retaliatory force.
Hereinafter it has been assumed that the main threat to the retaliatory
force was a massive surprise attack. To me, this obsession with surprise
attack seems more a vestige of the airplane age than a discription of the
future. Under conditions of finite deterrence a strategic war of attrition
becomes a possibility and perhaps the most serious danger, particularly
against those forces based at sea. I do not think that our present
command and control arrangements or our war plans are well designed
for this contingency.

Enough has been said to illustrate my basic point: Each strategic
option is purchased at some price, and unless that price is paid the
option becomes ineffective. The choice between the various strategies
need not be made formally. Indeed, I believe it more effective if the
choice is made in relation to concrete situations rather than in reference
to a theoretical dispute. It does seem to me very important, however,
that there be sufficient advance planning to coordinate the delicate
balance of diplomacy, threat, conflict, allied relationships and world
opinion. Before turning to the problem of how to achieve this goal,
I would like to make some brief observations about limited war.

Finally, it is essential that we refine our understanding of how to use our military capability diplomatically without thereby making a show-down inevitable as was the case with the diplomacy leading to World War I. Equally important is to have standby plans for how to end a crisis. Any direct confrontation of the United States and the UNEP will almost surely not end with the status quo. Indeed, if the crisis is sufficiently severe, it may provide the option opportunity for a comprehensive arms control scheme.

## P. Nuclear and Conventional Forces: A Problem of Command and Control

I have written elsewhere about my views on the balance between conventional and nuclear forces and there is little I could add to the purely strategic discussion here. (I am attaching a reprint of the article in question.) I would like to make two observations, however, one with respect to allied relationships, the other concerning command and control.

I believe that much greater emphasis must be given to conventional forces than heretofore. At the same time, we must take care that this shift of emphasis does not push our allies or tempt the Soviets into rash acts. There has been a gap of about three to four years between our strategic thought and that of Europe (with Great Britain in an intermediate position.) As a result, our European allies are still very much under the influence of the offensive retaliation doctrine. Any sudden change of course is likely to be interpreted by them, not as a reassessment of a common strategy, but as a harbinger of United States

IV. Conclusions

A formal statement of our strategic requirements would go something as follows:

a. We must have an invincible retaliatory force, which can be used in a carefully controlled, selective manner.

b. We must have forces capable of resisting aggression which does not justify all-out war.

c. We must be prepared to use both nuclear and conventional weapons, though we will make every effort to shift the responsibility for initiating the use of nuclear weapons to the other side.

The difficulty with these statements is that they leave vague the dividing line between the various categories of general and limited war, of nuclear and conventional weapons. They will thus mask the services to be attained on their present course of taking anégide of major formulas to press their favorite program. This is true also that for most complete situations no truly adequate plans exist or that the plans which exist will have to be renegotiated under the pressure of events.

However, the vagueness of these statements make it difficult to achieve the synchronization between military and political measures without which events can easily get out of hand. The inadequacy of the new weapons, the penalties for misappropriation, the fact that the seemingly methodless may be the most successful, make advance planning imperative. Only by thinking through and in some manner equipping through possible responses to crisis situations can the political or the military leaders have confidence in the tools at their disposal.

On the other hand, an attempt to make the general "war" or "united war" or "battler's war" possible in strategy will almost certainly produce a vast amount of theoretical studies. The studies and their supporters on Capital Hill will be abhorred in a battle. The result of which may non-funily the best

This is probably the most serious error of modern war. There is no such thing as a "united war" to the nation. There are only several situations of interest and confusion and competition. Moreover, in all these situations, the political advantages in a given situation on the military. So the action may, a strategy which seems to turn out to be a tool of policy construction, may also be true.

The mistake, in conjunction with the tendency of the military to use
on the assumption that such a war will end in the desire to conduct a war on the
lines of purely military submission, that such war may be properly conducted
under the conditions of two million soldiers. I believe I
am correct in saying that while the Government Administration under the
Higher officials in the Defense Department had only the general assumption
of war (the present strategic situation being), that it meant we
have to a distribution of general war. Some of our soldiers need
it, he said, but not for an entire year in formulation; 12. But an average
knowledge and understanding of the still many essential for all the operations
of war, strategy, and warfare, should make it clear to us. It seems
devoted that the political command of general war is to be impervious
under the pressure of many

specific measure would we take? Or what if we chose the reserve course? How can an confident be prevented from turning into general war? How could we get a peace in general war operations? What terms would we offer? It would not be too hard to design questions which would test the flexibility of our strategic planning. The more sure of answering them would tend to clarify the nature of general war.

c. This is even more true with respect to limited war. Here it would seem to us, the most fruitful approach would be in terms of concrete situations. For example, it might be useful to ask the JCS to supply an answer to the following question: 'What are our requirements should we be forced to intervene in the conduct of war in the Middle East (e.g., Iran) and in Southeast Asia (e.g., Vietnam) facing in each case five Soviet or Chinese divisions? This intervention is to be made without using forces now deployed in Europe or Korea. Describe the requirements for 3-day and for each two-week period thereafter. The intervention is to be noncontiguous as long as possible. Describe the point at which the transition to nuclear war would be necessary and how it would be made.'

Of course, this question can be put also in terms of individual cases. On the basis of the answer it should be possible to state political requirements which must be met. In resuming the place for these considerations a limited war doctrine would emerge without the advisory of a theoretical debate. At the same time, the answer would give all parties a better idea of our capabilities.

d. Great attention should be paid to the transition points; to the prelude to intervention; to the shift from conventional to nuclear war and from limited nuclear to general war and above all to the possibility for negotiations they affected. My preliminary review of the Berlin contingency planning indicates that the scenario for the actions prior to our probes and the follow-up should the probes be regulated in our less advanced than the planning of the military actions themselves.

e. Our strategic planning must be synchronized with our disengagement planning; let the two efforts paralyze each other. Also, we should be aware with a comprehensive scheme for ending the various crises than can occur if they should turn into actual conflict.

I am confident that one such review should precede the planning for the next Deficit Budget.

March 24, 1961

Dear Mac:

In my recent memorandum there was a
reference to my views on nuclear weapons as
expressed in an article. I neglected to
enclose a copy of this article, and am now
enclosing two copies, just in case it should
still be useful.

I thought your speech yesterday was
brilliant.

Kind regards.

Dictated by Mr. Kissinger but signed in his
absence.

appearance.

Dominated by Mr. Kieasinger but signed in his

Henry V. Kieasinger

Kind regards,

brilliant.

still be useful.

enclosing two copies, just in case it should
enclose a copy of this article, and am now
expressed in an article. I neglected to
reference to my views on nuclear weapons as
in my recent memorandum there was a

Dear Mac:

Washington, D.C.
The White House
Mr. George Bundy

March 24, 1961

May 5, 1961

Dear Mac:

I have been giving some thought to things I might work on during the summer, as you suggested. Of course it is very difficult for me to say, and your needs should be the determining feature. I will therefore confine myself to stating general areas of interest:

(1) It seems to me very important that an analysis be made of our existing war plans, from the point of view of their political impact. I would urge that various feasible situations be analyzed in some detail, to see what we can learn from the Laos experience and to prepare for others that are likely to occur.

(2) Almost any subject in the NATO area.

(3) Arms Control. Here, however, I feel that before the White House can be effective, a better position must be produced by the Disarmament Administration. I frankly do not want to spend all my time pulling this together.

In addition, of course, I would be glad to take on any other problem to which you think I could make a contribution.

I will come to Washington on May 23rd and 24th. Perhaps we can talk then.

Every good wish and kind regards.

American Embassy,
Bonn, Germany,

May 11, 1961.

Dear Mac:

When I was in The Hague, Prince Bernhard, the Permanent head of the Foreign Office, and a number of other senior Dutch people seemed extremely agitated about the negotiations with respect to landing rights for KLM in Los Angeles. They seemed to think that our conditions will be ruinous for KLM and are discriminatory against the Netherlands. This comes on top of already existing irritation with respect to New Guinea. Just before I left, the President of KLM gave me the enclosed letter. I understand that negotiations are now in progress and I am, therefore, taking the liberty of sending you these documents.

It might be helpful if I made my own position clear. 1) No one in the Netherlands knows that I am contacting you. 2) I have no views of my own with respect to the landing rights. Indeed, I had never heard the term until I came to The Hague. 3) I am sending you this material only because the Dutch seem to feel that the President made a commitment to Foreign Minister Luns and to Prince Bernhard, and because I think it would be helpful for you or for the State Department to be aware of this situation. 4) I do not know whether the Dutch version of events is correct and I am passing no judgment on it.

I am having an extremely fascinating trip and will be in touch with you when I return toward the end of next week.

Enclosures:

Letter dated May 10, 1961, from E. H. Van Der Beugel, President of KLM, to Professor Kissinger.

Paper entitled "US-Netherlands' Air Relationship".

The Honorable
McGeorge Bundy,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C.

The White House,
McGeorgeబ୍ndy,
The Honorsble

Paper entitled "U2-Netherlands' Air Relationship".
of KIM' to Professor Klaasinger.
Letter dated May 10, 1961, from H. H. Van Der Bencel, President
Enclosures:

Henry V. Klaasinger

Warm regards,

I am having an extremely fascinating trip and will be in touch
with you when I return.

on it.

the Dutch version of events is correct and I am basing no judgment
Department to be aware of this situation. 4) I do not know whether
and because I think it would be helpful for you or for the State
made a commitment to Foreign Minister Lums and to Prince Bernhard,
this material only because the Dutch seem to feel that the President
never heard the term until I came to The Hague. 3) I am sending you
views of my own with respect to the landing rights. Indeed, I had
in the Netherlands knows that I am contacting you. 2) I have no
It might be helpful if I made my own position clear. 1) No one
you these documents.

now in progress and I am, therefore, taking the liberty of sending
me the enclosed letter. I understand that negotiations are
respect to New Guinea. Just before I left, the President of KIM
Netherlands. This comes on top of already existing irritation with
relations will be ruinous for KIM and are discriminatorily against the
rights for KIM in Los Angeles. They seemed to think that our con-
extremely agitated spent the negotiations with respect to landing
the Foreign Office, and a number of other senior Dutch people seemed
When I was in The Hague, Prince Bernhard, the Foreign Minister, head of

Dear Mac:

May 11, 1961.

Bonn, Germany,
American Embassy,

June 5, 1961

Dear Mac:

I have given a great deal of thought to our conversations of some weeks ago. The more I have reflected about them, the clearer it has become that I should not come to Washington for the summer as we had discussed.

When the President asked me to join the White House staff, it seemed to me a unique opportunity to be of service at a time of national crisis. For many reasons I could not accept a full-time position immediately. But I did give up all other consulting arrangements in order to free as much time as possible for whatever requests might come from the White House. You may recall also that I offered in my letter of March 1st to work practically full-time between May 15th and September 1st.

Still, after careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that under present circumstances I can make a contribution as effectively as an _ad hoc_ consultant. Let me explain my reasons.

There are essentially two ways in which an outsider can contribute to the policy making process. One is to furnish new ideas. The other is to help in developing a sense of proportion and direction. Of these, the latter seems to me by far the more important, even though the former is most frequently demanded. In an Administration containing such an unusual number of talented people, it would be amazing if any one person could come up with an idea no one had conceived before. Great disasters with irremedial penalties or enormous successes based on individual moves are rare indeed in foreign policy. Much more frequently the difference between success and failure is a nuance. An erroneous policy usually begins as only a minor deviation from what would have been correct. The real need, therefore, seems to me to lie in the relationship of measures to each other and in timing.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

-2-

June 5, 1961

I am convinced that in order to make a real contribution, I must be able to follow a given problem or a set of problems over a period of time. If I am to serve as an idea man, I will see the papers only when they are well advanced and usually with very little time for study. For example, it is next to impossible to make a significant contribution to, say, the NSC NATO paper when I have only an afternoon to read the document and prepare my comments. My uneasiness about certain features of our foreign policy, therefore, is bound to express itself in comments which must seem peripheral and irritating to those who have been participating in generating the policy papers. It is like being asked in the middle of a chess game to suggest a move without having been in a position to study the development of the game or being allowed to explain the rationale for the suggestion.

In this context, I do not feel that my physical presence is required in Washington at this time. Henry Owen has been assigned responsibility for NATO and Berlin. Carl Kaysen has been charged with following military policy. You explained to me that only permanent staff members could work in the area of military policy. I can appreciate your difficulty in finding an assignment for someone who proposes to join the staff on a temporary basis. However, since the subjects to which I have given the greatest professional attention are already being covered, I would be coming to Washington almost for the sake of being there.

I fully understand that in the week of preparing the President's trip overseas you could not be expected to concentrate on the problem of fitting one man into your staff for a period of a few months. Moreover, no Administration has faced a more cruel challenge than has this one: to reorganize the government, to give it a new direction and to deal with one of the great revolutions of history, while all the omissions of the past decade have to be compensated for at once. I am only too aware of the almost inhuman pressures that this process generates. I would genuinely like to be of help and of course remain available for consultation. Finally, you can always count on my moral support and my good wishes.

Kind regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1961

Dear Henry:

I have your letter of June fifth, and I think your decision is the
right one, in the light of the way you work and the way life
goes down here. I think your letter reflects one misunderstand-
ing, in that I had supposed that we reached agreement in our
meeting that you would be here for a substantial period after
the middle of June and that you would indeed have Berlin as
your problem -- not exclusively, because of course no one in
the White House can have an exclusive assignment on so very
large a problem -- but with all of the responsibility which your
own professional experience and your mastery of the subject
would have justified. But the misunderstanding is a small one
as against the general problem, and I think your diagnosis is
correct.

As I read the central paragraphs of your letter, the conclusion
which you reach is that the only way in which you could do the
central job of helping to develop "a sense of proportion and
direction" is to "follow a given problem or a set of problems
over a period of time." To my mind that means permanent
membership in the Government, or, alternatively, relatively
complete detachment, except as specific problems become
ripe for consultative treatment.

So, we will continue with our consulting arrangements and renew
your current contract on this basis after June 30th. I under-
stand from Henry Owen that he and you have discussed the need
for a special study of civilian control in NATO, and I share Dean
Acheson's hope that you may be able to have a look at that one
for us as an ad hoc problem.

Meanwhile, it is obvious that Berlin will be so much on our
minds, throughout the summer and fall, that I continue to hope
that I shall have a chance to talk with you about it from time to
time.

June 20, 1961

Dear Macs:

I would like to put before you my deep concern about the
state of our preparation for the disarmament conference. My concerns
is not produced by the fact that our proposals contain items with
which I disagree or that I have some pet ideas which have been excluded. My worry is that our draft position of May 31 is almost meaningless and in some respects reckless. These proposals, I am
convinced, can neither test Soviet good faith nor serve as a basis
for agreement. If the Soviets are cynical, they will be able to
use our present position either as a shopping list or as an example
of American lack of seriousness. They can then break up the conference
and take their case to the United Nations, as I am fairly confident they are planning to do anyway. If they are sincere, they
can only be utterly confused.

I could go through the position point-by-point to illus-
trate what I mean, but then I would have to write an endless docu-
ment. It would seem to me, however, that at this stage it is
irresponsible to have a proposal agreeing at the beginning of Stage
2 to renounce the use of nuclear weapons when no one knows just
what the strategic implications of force levels of 1.7 millions are;
indeed, when there does not even exist a good definition within
our government of what is meant by military forces. I do not think
that we are in a position to propose world government seriously or
that we have even made the analysis of what is implied by an inter-
national police force. Such phrases as "such nuclear free zones
as may be agreed to shall be established" either constitute an
invitation to another Rappel Plan proposal or they mean that we
will agree to what we will agree, which is a tautology. If we
are in no position to propose a specific nuclear free zone we
would be better off without any reference to it. I could multiply
examples. Indeed, too few of our proposals could withstand critical
scrutiny.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy

June 20, 1961

I think it would be a mistake to try to fix up the present document by changing this or that proposal. My frank opinion is that it would be better to scrap the whole thing and start from scratch. This view, I may add, is also held by Thomas Schelling and Paul Doty, different as their specific recommendations would be.

There is another matter peripheral to our proposals which it may be worthwhile to raise at this point. It seems to me that we are digging ourselves into an undulyarily obdurate position with respect to the control system for disarmament. We have elevated the notion of the "neutral" administrator into an article of faith without looking at the underlying realities, or at the purpose of the control system. I am putting aside for the moment the question of the test ban, where everything has been designed on the assumption that there would not be a veto. But as a general proposition, I am not at all sure that we should be so insistent on the question of the veto as we have been.

My reasons are as follows:

(1) If we continue to stress the control system and particularly the veto, we are tacitly agreeing to the desirability of complete disarmament. The only obstacle then, we would be implying, is Soviet insistence on a veto for inspection. We would thus be scoring debating points in a cause that seems to us highly dubious.

(2) In any serious control system the two major powers would want to reassure each other. It cannot be in the interest of either of them to behave in a fashion that raises doubt about their fulfilling the agreement. A consistent use of the veto would have the same effect as a violation of the agreement and probably the same penalties. It would seem to us, therefore, that it should be possible to devise inspection schemes in which a certain frequency of vetoing has the same impact as an actual violation.

(3) We are deluding ourselves if we believe that no veto exists even when there is no formal provision for it. For one thing, the possibilities of administrative harassment seem literally endless. For another, it is wrong to assume that the neutral chairman of a commission is acting as an impartial judge. In order to keep his franchise as a neutral, he will have to vote with the Communists a reasonable number of times. The result is that for all practical purposes they do have a kind of indirect veto even under our proposal.

I am not absolutely sure where I would come out if I pursued this topic, but it seems to me that we should not freeze ourselves into a position that we may not wish to maintain. At the very least, we ought

Paris, June 20, 1961

Dear Henry,

... I made a survey among my friends, mainly of the Foreign Affairs Department, and I can say now that the results have been extremely good. All my previous fears were vain and, as far as I know, the French counterpart has been most impressed by the intelligence, the knowledge, the determination and the long range views of your President. Naturally they disagree on main points, but I have the feeling that the understanding of each other's position has never been as good between two chiefs of State. In the Foreign Affairs circles, they have the impression that something grand can be worked out between the two men...

Paris, June 30, 1961

Dear Henry,

Grand can be worked out between the two men...
the Foreign Affairs circles, they have the impression that something
position has never been as good between two circles of state. In
but I have the feeling that the understanding of each other's
views of your President. Naturally they disagree on main points,
intelligence, the knowledge, the determination and the long range
I know, the French counterparty has been most impressed by the
extremely good. All my previous fears were vanishing, as far as
Foreign Affairs Department, and I can say now that the results have been
... I made a survey among my friends, mainly of the foreign

September 6, 1961

Dear Mac:

Leo Szilard gave the enclosed paper on Berlin to me. He claims that he knows his proposal is negotiable with the Soviets because of his conversation with Khrushchev last year.

As you know from my comments about Acheson's memo-
randum, I am not very enthusiastic about this kind of approach.
However, if we move toward recognition of East Germany, Szilard's
proposal have the advantage of a certain ingenuity.

Kind regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 30, 1961

Dear Henry:

Carl reported on your conversation with him in Cambridge yesterday. It seems to me that it would be most helpful if you could find time over the course of the next several months to do a paper on how we face the larger issues in the German problem, assuming that we get a settlement of the access problem in Berlin. In particular, you might address yourself to the question of what implications the creation of a NATO nuclear force and the enlargement of the Common Market would have for potential European security arrangements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, and how this in turn might relate to the question of how we approach the issues of German boundaries and reunification.

It is obvious, of course, that the usefulness of such a paper rests on certain assumptions about the nature of our settlement in Berlin and the future direction of military policy in NATO. I think, therefore, that you might time your work so that you can take account of these developments as they unfold in the next several months, and have a target date of April or May in mind for the completion of your study.

Would you suggest how you prefer us to handle the consulting arrangements?

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

December 26, 1961

Dear Mac:

Just a few notes to follow up our conversation of a few days
ago, as well as your letter of December 17th. Needless to say, I
made no comment about the declining effectiveness of SAC to Adenauer.
Neither my report nor that of the United States Minister who was
present throughout the conversation includes any such reference.

I understand, however, that this is not the basic concern.
From what I have heard, it does seem that Adenauer needs to be re-
assured. I would be glad to be of any help I can, though some limits
will be set by Adenauer's rather suspicious nature.

Some thought will have to be given to the context in which this
is arranged in order to make sure that there will be sufficient oppor-
tunity for a real conversation. Ambassador Dowling would have ex-
cellent judgment on this. My own sense would be that it would help
if the meeting were arranged by the Ambassador, rather than by me,
and if the Ambassador were present. The occasion of my visit to
Europe could be a private one. The best days from my point of view
are at the end of the week: Thursday, Friday, or Saturday. If
necessary, I could of course rearrange my Harvard schedule.

In this connection, I have a minor personal request. If the
occasion of my visit to Europe is to be some kind of talk, I would
prefer it to be on an informal a basis as possible. Strange as it may
seem, my vocabulary in German is not good enough to speak extemporaneously
on a complicated subject. Because my secondary and higher education was
in English, all my thinking on international and military affairs has
been in English also. (I have a superb German vocabulary for soccer,
if that should interest any audiences Dowling should dredge up.) An
occasion that would be least work for me, provided an occasion is necessary,
would be some kind of a seminar with give and take. A German Deputy
who is a confidant of Adenauer's has been after me for the longest time
to meet with the group of Ruhr industrialists with whom he is connected.
His name is Kurt Birrenbach, and his address is Königshaller 74, Dussel-
dorf. I am sure Dowling knows him. (He was over here in August on a
confidential mission to sound out American opinion, which he did with

Ms McGeorge Bundy

December 26, 1961

such great tact that he made both Lippmann's and Raston's columns.)

This is written rather hurriedly before leaving for India.
If you should wish to be in touch with me, I can be reached through
the Embassy in New Delhi between January 4th and 27th, and the
Embassy in Karachi between the 27th and February 3rd. My office
in Cambridge will have more precise addresses.

My very best wishes for the new year.

December 8, 1962

Dear Mac:

I thought you might be interested
to see the records of my conversations with
Prime Minister Nehru and Krishna Menon in
January.

Kind regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1962

Dear Henry:

We have been reviewing our outstanding consulting arrange-
ments, and as I come to your case I wonder if it is not really
better for both sides that we should let your appointment as
Consultant end at the end of this quarter -- September 30th.
My impression of your own position is that to hold a continuing
appointment as Consultant places you in a somewhat ambiguous
posture, and while I know how much effort you have given to
walking a careful line, it is also true for us here that occasionally
we are asked if your publicly stated opinions somehow reflect
those of the White House. In this situation, at a time in which
you are not actively engaged in official consultation, it seems to
me that we would do well to have a friendly parting.

We would of course continue to have the benefit of your public
writings, which probably have more impact within the Govern-
ment -- let alone outside it -- than what happens in most con-
sulting arrangements, and also of course the White House doors
will remain open to you whenever you have a particular point that
you would like to register privately. Moreover, we would hope
to be able to ask for your informal opinion from time to time even
without the existence of a formal consulting appointment. And
finally, I would like to say again, and in writing, that your
services over the last year and a half have been of high value to
the President and to all of us here.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts