June 30, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Pending Action Determined at Meeting June 30 between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lindsay

I. Each study panel will have a secretary as well as an author.

A. Mr. Lindsay is to contact the following:

1. Europe WallyNielsen, Ford Foundation

2. Military Tim Hoopes

3. Economic Forest Merden, Ass't to Henry Ford
   Policy & Objectives

4. Resources Phil Coombs, Fund for Advancement of Ed.

5. Governmental Robert Roosa, V.P. Fed. Reserve NYC
   responsibility for economic progress and stability.

B. Dr. Kissinger to see after Lindsay contact. NH to set up appointments.

II. Mr. Lindsay is to write the following papers:

A. Think piece based on the Cal. Tech report and the PEB
   Population Report. *Appleton*

B. Utilization of Manpower

III. If possible, Mr. Lindsay will have the following by July 6 for Dr. K.:

A. Recommendation on what Ordway and the Conservation Foundation could do to supplement the study.

B. Recommendation on Harold Groves for taxation paper.

C. Discussion of his conversation with Phil Coombes and Clarence Faust, particularly re education's role in producing "generalists".

nh

III. Panel Studies Initial Papers Status Deadline (c)

Two major areas. The papers commissioned would
be analytical "Think" pieces of about 50 pages.

A. Area and Functional Objectives and Strategy

Close liaison to be maintained between Area and Functional Studies:

1. Area Studies

<table><tbody><tr><td>a. Europe</td><td>Schulman<br>Speier<br>Possony</td><td>Tentative commitment</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>Special case study: Germany</td><td>Kraemer<br>Speier</td><td>Tentative commitment</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>b. Latin America</td><td>A. Berle</td><td>Tentative: NAR to call</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>c. Far East</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Special Case Studies:</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Japan</td><td>Linebarger</td><td>Tentative commitment</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>China (US policy)</td><td>Rostow ?</td><td>Tentative commitment</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>d. South East Asia</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>e. Middle East</td><td>Max Thornburg</td><td>Tentative: NAR to call</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>f. Africa</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>g. Trends in the Soviet Orbit</td><td>Mosely</td><td>Tentative commitment</td><td>October 1</td></tr><tr><td>h. Trends in China</td><td>Linebarger<br>Rostow</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

June 29 -3-

| 2. Functional Studies | Initial Papers | Status | Fees | Dead |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. National Security Policy | Gen. McCormack | Committed<br>HK to discuss | $500/ | |
| Implications of Technological Trends | Ellis Johnson | HK to contact | | |
| Relation between technological trends and policy problems | Walkowicz | Committed | None | |
| Problems of Integrated Strategic Planning | McCormack | Committed | | |
| Problems of Protracted or Limited War | Kintner<br>Possony | Committed<br>HK to contact | | October 1 |
| Non-military Defense | Halaby<br>Bascom | Tent. HK to discuss<br>HK ltr 6/29 | None | |
| Military aspect of Alliance | Kissinger or McCormack | | | |
| b. Psychological Strategy and Policy:<br>The Conflict of Ideas | Possony | HK to contact | | After "I" |
| c. The Role of Alliances<br>Military (see "a" above)<br>Other groupings including regional. | Dexter<br>Shulman | HK ltr 6/29<br>HK to see | $350 | |

July 26, 1956

STUDY OUTLINE

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>INITIAL PAPER</th><th>FEE</th><th>STATUS AND/OR ACTION NECESSARY</th><th>RBF Letter</th><th>DEADLINE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. AMERICAN VALUES AND PURPOSES</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1. The American Heritage Summary for Panel</td><td>Elliott</td><td>$ 750</td><td>Committed (7/5)</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>Expenses</td><td></td><td>$ 750 (FPRI)*</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Support for Book</td><td></td><td>$1000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>American Values</td><td></td><td>$5000</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2. The Systemic Revolution</td><td>Pettee</td><td>**</td><td>Author to be selected. HK to see Finkelstein 7/26</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>3. America's Objectives in a Changing World</td><td>Free</td><td>None</td><td>In progress, Free revising first draft</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Cantril</td><td>None</td><td>In progress, writing introduction to above</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>4. America's Role in the Conflict of Ideas</td><td></td><td>**</td><td>Author to be selected</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Committed</td><td></td><td>$7500</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>**Estimate for above</td><td></td><td>$7500</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5">*FPRI total fee ($1750) shown on outline.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5">VALUES STUDIES ESTIMATED TOTAL $15,000</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

July 26, 1956

## II. OUR MAJOR PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES AS A NATION

(NAR Letters of July 2&3)

| **INITIAL PAPERS** | **FEE** | **STATUS AND/OR ACTION NECESSARY** | **DEADLINE** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berle | | In progress/ HK to discuss on return to US Sept. | |
| Sarnoff | | No paper/ Panel/ HK discussed 7/17, HK 1tr 7/18 | |
| Cowles | | Committed/ HK to write | |
| Lockwood (NAR saw) | | Pending/ HK to discuss | |
| Ruml | | Pending reply | |
| Herter | | No paper/ Panel/ HK discussed 7/20; may do comment on outline | |
| Luce | | Paper?/Panel/ HK saw 7/17; 1tr 7/20 and to write memo for record | |
| Anderson | | Committed/Panel/(Overall & Trade) HK saw 7/11 | |
| Bowles | | Pending reply/ HK 1tr 7/17 to see | |
| Bush | | Limited help/ HK to discuss | |
| Conant | | Pending reply | |
| Dickey | | Interested/ HK to see 7/27 | |
| Granger | | No overall paper, but 2 for sub-panels/ HK saw 7/25 | |
| Greenewalt | | May help/ HK 1tr 7/25 | |
| Hesburgh | | Pending/ out-of-country until September | |
| Hoffman | | Interested/ HK to see July 26/ Committed paper & panel | |
| Meany | | Interested/ HK to see in Washington week of August 6 | |
| Taylor | | Committed/ HK discussed 7/25; HK to write | |
| Killian | | Pending reply | |
| **ISSUES STUDIES ESTIMATED TOTAL** | **$3,000** | | |

July 26, 1956

<table><thead><tr><th>III. PANEL STUDIES</th><th>INITIAL PAPER</th><th>FEE</th><th>STATUS AND/OR ACTION NECESSARY</th><th>RBF Letter</th><th>DEADLINE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>A. Area and Functional Objectives and Strategy</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>1. AREA STUDIES</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Nature of the American Interests in the World</td><td>Rostow</td><td>$ 400</td><td>Committed/ HK 1tr confirming 7/18</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>a. Europe</td><td>Nielson</td><td>$ 400 est.)</td><td>To prepare outline by August 1</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>With respect to NATO</td><td>Strausz-Hupe</td><td>$ 200<br>$ 200 (FPRI)</td><td>Committed (verbal 7/18) HK to confirm</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Germany</td><td>Kraemer</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Committed (verbal phone) HK to confirm</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>Germany(alliance &amp; NATO)</td><td>Scammon</td><td>$ 250</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/25</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>b. Latin America</td><td>Berle</td><td>--</td><td>Committed (NAR, Verbal) HK to discuss</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Knapp</td><td>$ 500</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/19</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>c. Far East</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>American attitudes toward</td><td>Henderson</td><td>$ 300</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/10</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>Japan (trends &amp; US policy)</td><td>Linebarger</td><td>$ 300<br>$ 200 (FPRI)</td><td>Committed (verbal 7/19, HK 1tr 7/2)<br>(alternates: Reischauer, Jansen)</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>China (trends &amp; US policy)</td><td>Walker</td><td>$ 500/50</td><td>Committed/ HK to see August</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Col. Ekvall</td><td>$ 400</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/7</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>d. Southeast Asia</td><td>Phillips</td><td>$ 300</td><td>Committed, but limited paper; HK 1tr 7/25</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>Stability in SE Asia</td><td>Pye, Lucien</td><td>$ 350</td><td>Committed (verbal); paper in progress / HK 1tr. 7/18</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr></tbody></table>

July 26, 1956

<table><thead><tr><th>III. PANEL STUDIES</th><th>INITIAL PAPER</th><th>FEE</th><th>STATUS AND/OR ACTION NECESSARY</th><th>RBF Letter</th><th>DEADLINE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>A. Area and Functional Objectives and Strategy</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>1. AREA STUDIES</strong></td></tr><tr><td>e. <u>Middle East</u><br>Arab-Israeli problem</td><td>Thornburg</td><td>$1000/75<br>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Committed (NAR verbal) paper in progress<br>HK 1tr to Rainey for suggestions; Rainey reply 7/19<br>HK to take action</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>f. <u>Africa</u><br>West Africa<br>South Africa</td><td>Cowan, Gray</td><td>$ 300<br>$ 500/50</td><td>Committed (verbal) to HK 1tr 7/11<br>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/18</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1<br>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Dvorin</td><td>$ 300</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/25</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Rossberg</td><td>$ 300</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/18</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Van Bilsen</td><td>$ 100</td><td>Committed (verbal HK)</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Belgian Congo</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>North Africa</td><td>$ 500 (est.)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Problems of political stability<br>in backward countries (what is<br>a nation, etc.)<br>casestudy Africa</td><td>Millikan</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Tent. Commitment</td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td rowspan="3">g. <u>Trends in Soviet Orbit</u><br>Extent to which US policy<br>can affect Soviet development</td><td>Mosely</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Committed (verbal to HK)</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>Shulman</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Tent. commitment/ to call HK 7/27</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td>Rostow</td><td>$ 300 (est.)</td><td>Tent. commitment (verbal to HK) HK 1tr 7/18 confirming</td><td></td><td>Oct. 1</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Fainsod</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Tent. commitment/ will let HK know mid-Oct on return from<br>USSR</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="4"><strong>AREA STUDIES ESTIMATED TOTAL</strong></td><td>$10,500</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

July 26, 1956

RBF
Letter

Page 5
DEADLINE

III. PANEL STUDIES

INITIAL PAPER

FEE

STATUS AND/OR ACTION NECESSARY

2. FUNCTIONAL STUDIES

a. National Security Policy

<table><tr><td>Implications of Technological Trends</td><td>Johnson, Ellis</td><td>None<br/>$ 500 (est.)</td><td>Committed</td></tr><tr><td>Relation between technological trends & policy problems</td><td>Walkowicz</td><td>None</td><td>Committed</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of integrated strategic planning (weapons & missions)</td><td>McCormack</td><td>$ 500</td><td>Committed</td></tr><tr><td>Re Defense Department</td><td>Pettee</td><td>$ 400/50</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/7/Declined 1tr. 7/24</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of protracted or limited war</td><td>Kintner</td><td>$ 200<br/>$ 200 (FPRI)</td><td>Committed</td></tr><tr><td>Problems of guerrilla and civil war</td><td>Cross, James</td><td>$ 350</td><td>Committed (verbal) HK confirmed 7/18; HK write 1tr to clarify</td></tr><tr><td>Non-Military Defense</td><td>Halaby</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Tent. commitment/ preparing outline for approval</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Bascom</td><td>$ 400 (est.)</td><td>Committed/ HK to see 7/31</td></tr><tr><td>Military Aspect of Alliance</td><td>Kissinger</td><td>--</td><td></td></tr></table>

b. Psychological Strategy & Policy

<table><tr><td>Conflict of Ideas</td><td>Pettee<br/>Possony</td><td>($400/50<br/>$ 200 (est.))</td><td>Pending/ HK 1tr 7/7/Declined 1tr. 7/24<br/>Tent. decline/ HK to discuss</td></tr><tr><td>Projection of race problem abroad</td><td>Granger</td><td>$ 300 (est.)</td><td>Committed/ HK discussed 7/25</td></tr></table>

Henry A. Kissinger

# OUTLINE OF STUDY

## I Introduction

### A. The Problems of Security

1. Nature of technological breakthrough

2. Calculus of power

3. Calculus of intentions

B. Theories of war: Machiavelli, Montecuccoli, Clausewitz, Foch, Hart, Lenin, Mao

## II Revolutionary Situation

A. Destructiveness of weapons - Data

B. Relations between offensive and defensive capabilities

C. Rate of technological change - obsolete weapons systems before they leave the blueprint stage

D. Expectations of humanity - Relation between peaceful and military uses

E. "Fourth" atomic powers

## III Components of Strategy

A. Importance of time factor: strategy must be tied to own weapons system and to relative position vis-a-vis enemy

B. Technology - Weapons systems at the end of 5 - 10 - 15 year period including changing importance of base structures and changing character of delivery means and defenses

C. Implications for strategy

1. Meaning of nuclear stalemate

2. The nature of military superiority

3. The crucial relationships: offense - defense

a) Meaning of land warfare

b) Meaning of air warfare

October 29, 1956

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT OF THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund is:

1. To seek to define the problems and opportunities that the United States may face over the next ten to fifteen years.

2. To review our national purposes and objectives in terms of these problems and opportunities.

3. To develop a framework of concepts and considerations on which policies and decisions to implement our purpose might be based.

PROCEDURE

The Special Studies Project proposes to proceed in four stages:

1. The commissioning of experts to do papers outlining the trends in their special fields of competence and the alternative measures for dealing with them. These papers are conceived as analyses which can form the nucleus of subsequent discussion.

2. The formation of a panel of outstanding Americans who will seek to develop an integrated approach to the challenges of the next decade. In view of the scope of the study, it is proposed that at its initial meeting the overall panel form a number of sub-panels.

3. The presentation of the papers to these subpanels, which are to be composed of members of the overall panel, authors and specialists. It is proposed that each subpanel, in the light of the discussion of the basic papers and of related topics, submit a report covering its field.

4. The preparation and publication of a report based on the deliberations of both the subpanels and the Overall Panel.

-2-

# ORGANIZATION OF STUDIES

## The Overall Panel

The Overall Panel will be composed of leaders experienced in education, business, labor, law, science, publishing and government. The aims of the panel would include:

1. Outlining the nature of the problems and opportunities which, in its judgment, will confront the American people over the next decade.

2. Analyzing American purposes and objectives in relation to these problems and opportunities.

3. Developing the considerations on which policies and decisions designed to secure these values and to attain these objectives might be based.

The panel would undertake this by guiding the work of the subpanels and by considering a report designed to integrate the deliberations of the subpanels into an overall conceptual framework.

Because our sense of national purpose is inseparable from our attitude toward the moral and philosophical challenge of our time, the Special Studies Project has established a close relationship with an interdenominational group of theologians and philosophers whose members last year included Louis Finkelstein, F. E. Johnson, John La Farge, I. I. Rabi, Lyman Bryson, Robert M. MacIver, Ernest Nagel and Dorothy Lee. During the coming months it is hoped that this group will consider the topic, "The Problem of the Relation of Moral Insights to the Survival and Growth of Democracy". The group is prepared to meet from time to time with members of the overall panel and to discuss with them its conclusions or its views on problems raised by members of the overall panel.

-3-

## The Subpanels

In order to facilitate discussion of the problems and at the same time to make it possible for the Project to receive the benefit of the thinking of a larger number of persons experienced in the fields being considered, six sub-panels will be formed. Each group of approximately fifteen persons will include the following:

a. A Chairman and three or four members drawn from the Overall Panel.

b. Four or five individuals with experience in the field with which the subpanel deals who can bring their background and imagination to bear on the papers prepared by the experts.

c. Three or four of the authors who have prepared papers for the consideration of the subpanel.

d. A Subpanel Secretary who will prepare an analytical report growing out of the discussions of the subpanel.

All papers to be considered by a subpanel at a given meeting as well as synopses of related papers which are being discussed by other subpanels will be circulated beforehand to members. The full text of any paper being prepared for the project will be made available upon request.

## Schedule of Meetings

It is anticipated that the Overall Panel will meet four times between November 20 and April 15.

Each subpanel probably will meet between three and five times during this same period.

## The Papers to be submitted to the Subpanels

The papers are 30 - 50 page analyses outlining the author's assessment of trends over the longer term in his field, the objectives which we might set ourselves, and the alternative ways of thinking about the problems. Where appropriate, they include recommendations concerning the basic concepts that should underlie our policies in the area.

- 4 -

The subpanels will be composed of three categories of participants:

1. Some of the authors who have prepared the papers which will be on the initial agenda of the subpanel.

2. Specialists in the field with which the subpanel deals.

3. Those members of the overall panel who desire to participate in the work of the subpanel. (Members of the overall panel will have the option of joining the subpanel of their choice.)

The Chairman of the subpanel will be in every case a member of the overall panel. A Subpanel Secretary will prepare for the overall panel an analytical report growing out of the discussions of the subpanel.

Summaries of pertinent documents will be made for the convenience of panel participants and the full text will be made available upon request. To keep all members of the overall panel informed of the progress of the various subpanels a monthly status report will be circulated.

## Schedule of Meetings

It is anticipated that the overall panel will meet four times between October 15 and April 15.

East subpanel probably will meet between three and five times during this same period.

Thus, those members of the overall panel who join a subpanel will, on the average, only attend about one meeting a month.

## PARTIAL LIST OF PAPERS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE SUBPANELS

The papers are 30-50 page analyses outlining the author's assessment of trends over the longer term in his field, the objectives which we might set ourselves, and the alternative ways of thinking about the problems. Where appropriate, they include recommendations concerning the basic concepts that should underlie our policies in the area.

Major Issues

November 19, 1956

# THE IMPORTANCE OF A FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL PURPOSE

## - Questions -

### I. Problems and Opportunities

A. What major problems will the United States have to face, at home and abroad, during the next ten to fifteen years?

B. What major opportunities will be available to the United States at home and abroad during the next ten to fifteen years?

### II. Moral and Spiritual Values

A. What are the basic moral and philosophic beliefs which motivate the United States?

B. Are these values sufficiently universal in their application to reflect the hopes and aspirations of peoples who are born to non-Western religions and philosophic beliefs?

C. What factors today militate against our moral values and what challenges do they face from other conflicting systems?

D. What degree of diversity of values can be encompassed in a more general system of purpose?

E. What set of values can unite societies of different cultural patterns?

Major Issues
Questions

November 19, 1956

- 2 -

### III. National Purpose

A. Is there a basic and irreconcilable conflict between our moral values and our material values or are they in reality compatible?

B. Do we have a basic sense of purpose as a nation and a people related to our sense of values which can and should make possible the development of a framework of concepts and motivate our policies?

C. Can U.S. interest be defined in terms of a set of values of universal application?

D. If so, how can these values and the policy concepts derived therefrom be related to day-to-day decisions and actions?

November 14, 1956

# MAJOR ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PANEL

## THE IMPORTANCE OF A FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL PURPOSE:

There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period.

On the physical plane, the power of modern weapons has grown so great as to bring major changes in the relationship of force and the objectives for which it might be employed. As a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find that some of the restraints upon the use of our strength are produced by the implications of our own weapons technology. Moreover, the rapid rate of technological change is in itself a factor of instability. Each scientific advance impels us and other nations into a further, more intense, technological race. We must therefore stay ahead of our competitors over an indefinite period and in every strategically significant category and the penalty for failure to keep up is national catastrophe.

On the political plane, many of the newly independent powers continue to inject into their foreign relationships the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence.

On the economic and social plane, there has occurred what has been called the revolution of rising expectations, which causes the peoples of the world to rebel against standards of living, as well as social and racial barriers, which have remained virtually unchanged for centuries. This ferment is fed by newly awakened hopes for freedom and human

- 2 -

Major Issues
Framework

dignity and by the rapidity with which the aspirations of hitherto inarticulate
peoples can be communicated.

And these factors, of themselves explosive enough, are manipulated
by the Sino-Soviet bloc, organized to exploit all hopes and dissatisfactions
for its own ends.

This raises immediately one of the cardinal problems of our time:
the changed nature of international relations in a revolutionary period. The
temptation of a nation absorbed as ours has been primarily with domestic con-
cerns is to treat the manifestations of a revolutionary period primarily as
calling for mechanical or technical solutions and to seek to deal with them
by "ordinary" diplomatic methods. However, diplomacy, the art of restrain-
ing the use of force and the settlement of disputes by negotiation, presupposes
a framework considered reasonable by all parties. In its absence, diplomatic
conferences turn into sterile repetitions of basic positions and endless
wrangling over what constitutes a "reasonable" demand. The emphasis of
traditional diplomacy on "good faith" and willingness does not apply in
dealing with a power dedicated to overthrowing the international system.
For it is precisely this lack of "good faith" and this willingness to come to
an agreement which distinguish the revolutionary policies of the Sino-Soviet
bloc. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade each other. Diplo-
matic conferences therefore become elaborate stage plays which seek to in-
fluence and win over public opinion in other nations; their purpose is less the
settlement of disputes than the definition of issues for which to contend; they
are less a forum for negotiation than a platform for propaganda.

- 3 -

Major Issues
Framework

In the great periods of diplomacy between the Congress of Vienna and World War I negotiations were effective because there was a general acceptance of the framework of the international system (and because the powers which disagreed with it, such as the colonized peoples, were not strong enough to make their protest effective). This did not prevent disputes but it limited their scope; wars occurred but they were fought in the name of the existing order and the peace was justified as a better expression of agreed arrangement. In a revolutionary period, on the other hand, disputes do not concern adjustments within a given framework but the framework itself.

The attack on the framework of the international order takes two forms: the drives and aspirations of the former and present colonial peoples which attack the international system because it does not live up to its own values; and the Communist assault which seeks to overthrow not only the structure but also the values of the traditional international order. The formerly subjugated people and those still in colonial status are in ferment precisely because they have accepted the Western concepts of freedom and human dignity; because they have in a sense been converted to the principles of Judeo-Christian civilization. Their challenge to the West is to live up to its own values.

The Communist challenge on the other hand is an attack on the very basis of our values. They propose to order the world anew on the basis of irreconcilable principles. Unless there is a fundamental change in Soviet outlook, relations between us and the Soviet bloc will therefore tend to be based on force or the threat of force.

Major Issues
Framework

-4-

As for the revolution of the newly independent powers, there is every
possibility of constructive action, for here there is a large area of agreement on
fundamentals, at least potentially. Most of the leaders of colonial uprisings
were educated in the West and drew their revolutionary inspiration from its
teachings of the value of the individual and the "right" to self-government.
The task of colonial governments was relatively simple only so long as the
colonial peoples accepted their rule. However, when the ideals of the French,
British and American revolutions became diffused, partly through the very
spread of colonialism, the seeds were sewn for the destruction of colonial
government itself. The growing community of values with respect to the worth
of the individual and human dignity prevented the continuing maintenance of
foreign rule. As a result many of the newly independent powers are playing
roles drawn from a Western script. Even so the revolution of the newly
independent peoples is not solved simply by understanding their new-found
hopes and aspirations. For while dissatisfactions in these areas have united
in a protest against existing orders, no clear substitute has been proposed.
The revolution of the newly independent nations can therefore be constructive
only to the extent that their hopes and resentments find a sense of direction.

A sense of direction is not something that can be developed or imparted
in the abstract, however. For our contribution to be constructive it must flow
from our national purpose and national purpose to be vital must spring from the
genius by which a people grew. A society, in short, cannot assume a position

-5-

Major Issues
Framework

of leadership abroad unless it can develop a sense of direction for itself. It
cannot project abroad values different from those which distinguish its domestic
performance, a truth well recognized in the early days of the Republic. For both
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were, above all, the
expression of our national aspiration and values. Although written for a
specifically American context, they were conceived as guideposts of universal
applicability proclaiming the dignity and brotherhood of man, concepts derived
from our Judeo-Christian beliefs.

The challenge to the United States domestically is of a different order,
however, from that confronted by any other society. Where the rest of the
world is oppressed by the disparity between its aspirations and reality, the
United States faces the paradoxical problem that in many areas of our national
life reality has become at one with our aspirations. We have achieved a
standard of well-being, opportunity and freedom for our citizens that would
have been considered unattainable even a generation ago and we have done so
while expanding the area of individual freedom. Yet we should not feel
complacent about our success for a society cannot stand still without
stagnating. If it loses its dynamism it will also lose its cohesiveness for the
problems which confront it never stand still. Ahead of us are unparalleled
opportunities produced by the scientific revolution, the expanding economy and
the possibilities of an increasingly educated citizenry. Our domestic challenge
then is to our imagination and our vision: to define the society in which we wish
to live in keeping with our national tradition.

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Major Issues
Framework

This need for a national purpose in turn directly poses one of the basic problems of international relations: how to relate one nation's national purpose to the national purpose of others. Domestically, the actions of a nation are limited only by the national purpose and (especially in a free society) by what will be accepted as just by most citizens. To itself, a nation appears as an expression of justice because people will accept laws voluntarily only if they believe them to be in the general interest. (Even totalitarian states find it necessary to obtain the acquiescence of their peoples. Their methods are two-fold: an intensive indoctrination to convince their citizens of the merit of their policy and a secret police apparatus to liquidate those who cannot be convinced.)

But internationally a people may be challenged as to the universality of their own notion of justice since another factor is added, the will of other sovereign powers. For this reason sovereign nations can never regard each other in the same terms as they look at themselves and the international order depends on the reconciliation of different national purposes. If the objectives and the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order are sufficiently similar, the challenge may not become apparent. In a revolutionary situation, such as exists in the world today, however, national purposes of different nations will clash and their conflict will underlie all relationships. In these circumstances, problems become insoluble unless there exists a generally accepted code as to what constitutes justice among all nations.

Thus, both domestically and internationally the definition of a national purpose is a prerequisite to effective and integrated action. In this task, the

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Major Issues
Framework

U.S. confronts particular difficulties. Until the end of World War II, the primary concerns of our society were domestic. Because American society was sure of its values, they were rarely elaborated. Domestically, our tasks seemed set to us by the impulse to develop a continent. And, internationally, our objectives with respect to the rest of the world were primarily motivated by a desire to be left alone by it. To be sure, there occurred a steady outpouring of missionaries and American business was becoming increasingly active internationally. But until the end of World War II our foreign involvements were either explicitly idealistic or explicitly economic. Foreign policy, perhaps outside of Western Hemisphere relations, was not conducted as long-range strategy but as a response to a developing situation and, in practice, was confined to dealing with overt threats and only challenges to our national existence were in fact considered overt threats. Until the end of World War II, the security conferred by two great oceans and the existence of the British Navy created the illusion that the nature of our foreign commitments was entirely up to us.

The temptation of our history, then, is to treat most problems as primarily technical because the vision which formed America has been so much taken for granted among our own people that it was rarely made explicit. Moreover little thought was given and there appeared little need for reconciling it with the hopes and aspirations of other peoples. But narrowly conceived nationalism is no longer possible. Two world wars have demonstrated the impossibility of physical isolation and the power and speed of modern weapons have removed our traditional invulnerability. Moreover,

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Major Issues
Framework

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our economic well-being has become inevitably connected with that of the
rest of the world through the dependence of our economy on foreign sources
of raw materials. Above all, the challenge of the present revolutionary
period is not technical but moral; it is to strengthen our sense of direction
domestically and to unite it with humanity groping for a new definition of
itself and of its purpose. We therefore cannot avoid a more explicit
consideration of our values.

October 29, 1956

PURPOSE

PROCEDURE

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# ORGANIZATION OF STUDIES

## The Overall Panel

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## The Subpanels

## Schedule of Meetings

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## Schedule of Meetings