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Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Senator Warner: Mr. Chairman, prior to the first vote, the Chair announced it might be in the Interest of all Members if all Members left at one time and then came back, thereby allowing Dr. Kissinger to share his views with everyone present, and I would suggest to the Chair we follow that.

Senator Levin [presiding]: Are you done?

Senator Shelby: If my time is up. If you want to give me six more minutes, I will take it.

Senator Levin: We are all going to vote at one time because none of us want to miss you, so we will be back in ten minutes.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator Levin: The committee will come to back order.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for your understanding. You are an old pro, and you know the problems we have.

Going back to the Republican side, Senator McCain would be next, at least for those who are here, and it would be Senator Glenn after you, Senator.

Senator McCain: May I proceed, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Levin: Yes.

Senator McCain: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for again, your always illuminating and stimulating testimony, as well as response

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1 to the inquiries of the Members.

2 I read your testimony with great interest, Doctor, and I
3 have to say I came away to some degree questioning where we
go next. You call for a major shift in European attitudes
4 that would respond to the INF treaty, and I certainly am in
5 total agreement with that, by creating a cohesive strategy
6 and stronger European forces, and I think your eloquent
7 statement sets that out very clearly.
8

8 But I wonder if you or I believe that we or Europe will
9 pay for the improved conventional and theater nuclear
capabilities that we need. I have analyzed the data on NATO
11 and Warsaw Pact force modernization and U.S. and European
12 military equipment production in great detail, and these data
13 show me, anyway, that NATO fell behind the Warsaw Pact in
14 virtually every measure of conventional force strength during
15 a period when both we and our allies were increasing real
defense spending far more quickly than we are today or in the
17 future.
18

19 I suspect that you know far better than I do that the
20 constraints on NATO are enforced by money, the size of the
21 Warsaw Pact effort, and the fact that most of the key
technologies for any conventional defense initiative will
22 take a decade or so to fully deploy, plus we have acute
23 limits on current military equipment production facilities.
24

25 I would like to begin by asking you your opinion as to

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the trends in the conventional balance, as to whether you
feel there is any conceivable chance that NATO will fund a
robust conventional defense option over the next five years,
and if so, what should their priorities be.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe there is some chance, as a
result of the impact of recent events, that Europe will make
a more coherent if not a larger effort. ~~I think we have to~~
face the fact that if this effort is not made, and if these
inconsistencies in NATO strategy that I have pointed out and
that almost all experts agree on are not met, that sooner or
later we will have to pay a price for it. This may be
delayed, but ~~sooner or later,~~ there are no free lunches in
foreign policy. Sooner or later one will have to pay a price
for that. There will be some crisis in which we will come up
short. ~~I may not be able to predict what that crisis is.~~

Now, the first step has to be that the Alliance lays out
what its requirements ought to be so that at least if it
falls short, it knows where it has fallen short, and why, and
that it develops some kind of coherent military strategy that
the key Alliance members agree to.

Senator McCain: And your view of what their priorities
should be?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe -- well, from where we are --
of course, the strengthening of conventional forces is
generally agreed on as a desirable objective, though it is

35

1 never reached.

2 Now, to meet some of the problems caused by the INF
3 agreement, a European capability for stand-off weapons would,
4 in my view, be highly desirable, and if the British and
5 French were to combine to create a stand-off weapon, the
6 United States should be very sympathetic, even though the
7 fact is that it would be in a way - I mean, you would then
8 ask yourself what is the sense of going through all these
9 exercises in arms control if you find another weapon that
10 replaces the weapon you have taken out.

11 Still, I would favor a European stand-off weapon. I
12 would favor some cruise capability for some of the
13 dual-purpose aircraft based in Germany. And I would favor
14 some of the modernization proposals that have been made with
15 respect to the nuclear tactical forces in Germany.

16 But it becomes very difficult if we do these things
17 piecemeal and one at a time.

18 Senator McCain: Thank you, Doctor.

19 I am sure you are also aware that the fastest growing
20 area in Warsaw Pact forces has been nuclear forces, that to a
21 significant degree will not be reduced as a part of the INF
22 agreement. This includes a rise in theater nuclear strike
23 aircraft that JCS estimates have given them a three-to-one
24 advantage in numbers, which has more than doubled their range
25 payload capability and includes a 50 percent increase in

36

short-range nuclear delivery systems since 1980.

Given this background, If you had known we were going to eliminate the Pershing II and GLCM, would you still have supported the reductions in other NATO theater nuclear systems that cut 2800 warheads from the NATO stockpile?

Dr. Kissinger: I do not think that those 2800 yes, almost certainly I do not think those 2800 are relevant to the problems caused by the INF agreement. They were all short range, if I remember correctly.

Senator McCain: And you do share a lot of our concerns about Genscherization or the triple zero option?

Dr. Kissinger: I am very concerned about the trends in the Federal Republic towards the triple zero option which will have as an inevitable corollary a no first use doctrine, and that will then create a distinction between the non-nuclear and the nuclear members of NATO and between the European members of NATO and the American members of NATO because you cannot ask countries that are not themselves attacked to run risks which the attacked country is not prepared to run for itself, and it will create an increasingly complex psychological situation.

Senator McCain: It also appears to me, Doctor, conspicuous by its absence from Chancellor Kohl's statements is any commitments towards modernization of existing short-range nuclear forces.