Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

London, September 3rd - 7th, 1962

To all those visiting London for the Conference, we extend a
very warm welcome.

With the co-operation of the Hotel Russell, we have tried to
anticipate your needs. If you have any requirements in relation to
the hotel, please contact the Reception Desk.

For all other arrangements in relation to the Conference, please
feel free to call upon me or a steward in the Administration Room.

In your briefcase you will find a list of the hotel facilities
as well as the arrangement of the social programme both for you and
the ladies.

From the volume of paper distributed, it looks as if this
Conference will be very hard work, but I hope that your stay will
be both constructive and enjoyable.

My Group is here for you to call upon to this end.

G. P. R. Esdale
Conference Administrator

General Information

Hotel Russell, London, W.C. 1,
Terminus 6470

The Hotel and its facilities are available to all members of the
Conference. We list below a few items which you may find of
help. If you need anything else please ask at the main reception
desk.

The Hotel charge for your accommodation, breakfast lunch and dinner is £4:10:0 per person per day; this charge includes gratuities. An extra 10/- per person per day is to be added if you have a private bathroom. We should be glad if you would settle your bill on departure with the hotel cashier. Should there be any problems concerning the hotel charge, please contact the Administrator, Mr. G. P. R. Esdale, immediately.

Mail
All external mail will be posted in the pigeon holes at the reception desk.

Documents
It is expected that the majority of papers will be distributed to the seats in the Conference Hall. However, extra copies will be available from the document table in the dining room.

Drinks in Bars
There are several bars in the hotel, and it is requested that members pay CASH in these bars.

Drinks at
Mealtime
Members can either pay cash for these, or they can be charged to their account provided that they give their name and room number.

Gratuities
These have been included in the charge except for special personal services.

Telephones
All telephone calls are charged to the members. The hotel will take cash, or will charge to your account provided that you give your name and room number.

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Hotel Services

The hotel has the following services, and the Hall Porter - Mr. Fowler - would be pleased to help at all times:-

Valet, laundry and dry cleaning

Hairdressing Saloon for Ladies and Gentlemen

Car Hire

Television Room and private bedroom sets

Telex

Shops selling newspapers, toilet requisites and fancy goods, etc.

Foreign Exchange Bureau.

Members may put any charges for the above on their account provided that they give their name and room number, except for the Hairdressing Saloon and shops where they are requested to pay cash.

Tenth Pugwash Conference - London, September 3-7, 1962

## General and Social Programmes

### GENERAL PROGRAMME

<table><tr><td>7.30 a.m. - 9.00 a.m.</td><td>Breakfast.</td></tr><tr><td>9.15 a.m. - 12.45 p.m.</td><td>Conference Session (see separate Scientific Programme).<br/>Coffee will be served at approximately 10.45 a.m.</td></tr><tr><td>1.00 p.m.</td><td>Lunch.</td></tr><tr><td>2.15 p.m. - 4.45 p.m.</td><td>Conference Session (see separate Scientific Programme).<br/>Tea will be served at approximately 3.45 p.m.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">DINNER will be served from 7.30 p.m.</td></tr></table>

### SOCIAL PROGRAMME

#### Monday, September 3rd

The Royal Society invites you to a reception at Burlington House at 8.30 p.m.

A short film "The Revealing Eye" will be shown in two sittings during the reception. Coaches will leave the Hotel at 7.45 p.m. and will be available for return to the Hotel from 10.30 p.m. to 11.00 p.m.

#### Tuesday, September 4th

A show of four interesting films will be given in the Hotel Russell at 8.30 p.m. Each film runs for between 20 and 30 minutes.

1) **The Little Island:**
   Amusing moral Cartoon.

2) **A Light in Nature:**
   A film relating Science as a powerful force with international coverage.

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## 3) The Peaceful Revolution:

A film on international co-operation in India.

## 4) Mathematical Snapshots:

Light Cartoon illustrating aspects of symmetry, topology, etc.

### Wednesday, September 5th

There will be no conference session on this afternoon, and a tour on the River Thames has been arranged.

Coaches will leave the Hotel for Westminster Pier at 2.00 p.m. where a launch will take you to Greenwich arriving at Greenwich Pier at 3.30 p.m. Here there would be time to visit the National Maritime Museum, the Cutty Sark and the Royal Naval College (especially the Painted Hall in the main building). The launch will leave Greenwich at 4.10 p.m., and tea will be provided whilst returning to Westminster. At Westminster coaches will be available to take you to a Government Reception at Lancaster House. Coaches will leave at 8.00 p.m. to take you from the Reception to the Hotel Russell, where dinner will be served.

### Thursday, September 6th

There will be an official dinner in the Hotel at 8.00 p.m. in the Wharncliffe Suite. Dress will be informal.

Please do not hesitate to contact our official entertainments bureau run by the Express World Travel Co. Ltd. They are here to help your entertainment or travel arrangements. Their representative will be in attendance in their office at the following times:-

8.45-10.00 a.m., 12.30-2.30 p.m., 5.30-8.45 p.m.

Moreover, do not hesitate to ask any of the staff at times other than the above if you require any special arrangements to be made.

London 1962

TRAVEL AGENTS TO THE PUGWASH CONFERENCE

Tel: MONarch 6611

Express Travel & Transport Co.,
89/91 Newgate Street,
London, E.C.1.

and in Room 142 at the Russell Hotel
for the duration of the Conference

We shall be pleased to assist participants and members of their families to enjoy their stay in London. In addition to theatres, concerts and cinemas, for which tickets can be obtained through us, we would arrange sightseeing in London or beyond, by coach, chauffeur-driven private car, or self-drive car.

Any travel tickets by air, sea, or rail, could be purchased through us. Mr. David Formosa will be in charge of our office at the Russell Hotel. Do not hesitate to contact him for whatever you may require.

Cambridge 1962

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# Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

## "The Way Ahead"

P. M. S. Blackett

A year ago in Vermont the Eighth International Conference on Science and World affairs discussed the problems of Disarmament and World Security at one of the most tense moments in international affairs for many years. Nevertheless, some progress was achieved in the task of mutually understanding the detailed problems of disarmament, and the labours of the Working Parties led to some specific proposals for compromise on important questions proving acceptable to members coming from both the Western and Soviet blocs.

1.

Many important world events have taken place since then and it is now our task, here in Cambridge, to take up again in the light of present circumstances the study of possible ways of achieving disarmament as an essential step towards increased security. We meet at a time when the international atmosphere is much calmer than it was a year ago, due I think in part to the growing realization of what nuclear war would mean for mankind: this calmer atmosphere should facilitate frank discussions of our mutual problems. I want here to make a personal plea. I hope that the participants from both the Soviet and Western blocs will attempt, more clearly perhaps than they have done in the past, to visualize the armament and disarmament scene as it must appear from the other side. Participants from unaligned countries have much less difficulty in doing this - hence perhaps the valuable impact of the delegates from the eight unaligned countries at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. Such mental role-reversal - far from being an indulgence in dangerous thoughts, as sometimes seems to be thought in both East and West - may well be the condition of national, if not human survival.

Very soon after the Vermont Conference, a joint statement by the United States and by the Soviet Union on agreed principles

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for future disarmament negotiations was presented to the United Nations. It is a remarkable tribute to the wisdom of the two governments and to the skill of the two chief negotiators, Mr. McCloy and Mr. Zorin that so important an agreement should have been signed at a time of such tension: perhaps it was the very crisis itself which facilitated agreement, by the emphasis it gave to the acute dangers of the present arms race.

In the spring of this year both Soviet Union and the United States tabled draft treaties for General and Complete Disarmament at Geneva. I think that a major task before this C. O. S. W. A. Conference is to examine the provisions of these two treaties in the light of the general principles laid down in the McCloy - Zorin agreement. In such an examination many of the conclusions reached last year at Vermont are highly relevant.

I intend now to discuss some of the main areas of disagreement between the two treaties, particularly in relation to the problem of maintaining the balance during the early stages of the disarmament process. I hope, of course, that these vital matters will be discussed in much greater detail in the working groups: here I want only to emphasize some points which seem to me to be particularly important.

The all-important Clause 5 of the agreed principles reads:

"All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all."

I want to start by saying frankly that I think both the Soviet and the American draft treaties conflict with this essential requirement of balance in certain important respects.

For instance, the Soviet requirement to eliminate all foreign troupes and bases in the first stage would weaken the present Western defence position in Europe more than that of the Soviet bloc. This arises, of course, because of accidents of geography and of the history of nation building. Europe consists of many independent nations with the Atlantic between them and their major ally, the United States of America. On

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the other hand, the Soviet bloc is much more a unity, both geographically and politically. If the Soviet proposals were carried out, the American forces would have to withdraw across the Atlantic, whereas the Russian forces would only have to withdraw a few hundred miles eastward. It does not, therefore, seem to me reasonable for the Soviet Union to demand effectively that the present joint military policy of the Western powers should be dismantled in the first stage of the disarmament.

All present here know well the terrible losses - some 20,000,000 dead and untold destruction of wealth - suffered by the Russian people due to the invasion of their country by Germany in 1941 - losses far greater than those of all Russia's Western allies taken together. Little imagination is needed to gauge the depth of the traumatic experience induced in the Russian people by finding themselves, soon after this devastating war, ringed round by nuclear bases and so with her cities exposed to nuclear attack, to which for many years she had no power to reply. Given all this, I still do not think that the demand by the Soviet Union to liquidate all troops and bases on foreign soil in the first stage of disarmament is the best way to further the more fundamental aims of the Soviet government. Perhaps some progress at reconciling the Eastern and Western views on this matter might arise by distinguishing between the two extreme forms of bases: bases for conventionally armed troops on the one hand - these might be phased out along with the reduction of conventional forces in general: and on the other hand bases for strategic nuclear weapons, which could be phased out along with all other strategic nuclear weapons. I hope the possibilities of some such compromise will be frankly discussed in the working groups.

Surely a still more profitable proposal would be for the Soviet Union to press the West still harder to reduce in the first stage the agreed total number of armed manpower to such a low level that conventional aggression of a major kind would be excluded. It will be remembered that the Soviet Union in its draft

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treaty proposed 1.7 million for both American and Russian
total armed manpower at the end of the first stage and that
American proposed 2.1 million. Corresponding limitation on the
armed manpower of other countries was implied. Mr. Khrushchev
is reported several years ago to have offered to reduce the
total to 1,000,000 if the West would agree. From the Soviet
point of view it would seem more important to ensure the reduction
in the total number of Western troops in Europe than to
worry much about whether any particular group of them is
deployed on its own national soil, or that of another country.

One very satisfactory aspect of all recent disarmament
negotiations is that both America and the Soviet Union accept the
principle of reducing the total armed manpower to an equal
fixed number for both countries - the only dispute here is the
very minor one as to whether the higher American or the lower
Soviet figure should be adopted. Since the present Soviet armed
manpower appears to be about 3.8 millions compared with the
present American figure of 2.4 millions, the Soviet proposal
to reduce to 1.7 million implies that America would reduce her
armed strength by 30% and the Soviet Union by 55%. So the
Soviet has in fact proposed in her treaty to abolish her present
superiority in total strength over America. It is to be noted
that a recent estimate shows that the total armed strength of
the Western bloc is bigger than that of the Soviet bloc - the
figures are 8.1 and 7.3 millions respectively.

In contrast to the case of total manpower, the American
draft treaty lays down that the nuclear delivery systems of both
major powers should be reduced by a given percentage - in fact
30% in the first stage. The proposal to make a percentage
reduction was included in the reports of the working parties at
Vermont and had as a basis the assumption that the total
nuclear hitting power of both great powers was not very dissimilar. However, official statements from Washington last
autumn estimated that overall nuclear strength was several
times that of the Soviet Union. A paper has been prepared for
this conference by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London,
giving an estimate of the probable relative strengths of the
American and Soviet nuclear delivery systems at the end of this

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year, as measured by the number of missiles and aircraft -
inadequate information is available as to the explosive power
of all the warheads.

For ICBM, the numbers are 226 American and 75 Soviet,
giving a ratio of 3 to 1. In long range bombers, the ratio is
nearly the same, 630 American to 190 Soviet. Neglecting
one way 'suicide' flights - militarily a very unreliable type
of operation - the ratio of the number of Western nuclear
vehicles which can reach Russia as compared with the number
of Soviet vehicles which can reach America becomes still
larger. This is due to the large numbers of medium and short
range bombers based in Europe and elsewhere, which can reach
the Soviet Union, whereas the Soviet Union has no bases near
enough to the USA to allow similar types to reach America. Of
course the Soviet Union has very many medium range bombers
and missiles able to reach all parts of Europe, but this does
not affect the relative nuclear strengths of the Soviet Union
and America to attack each other.

In such a case, where there is a big disparity between the
nuclear strengths of two powers, a reduction in the same per-
centage of the nuclear strength would weaken relatively the
already weaker nuclear power. For instance, at a certain
stage of such a disarmament process the nuclear strength of
the weaker power would fall below that level which constituted
an adequate minimum counter-city retaliatory force, whereas
the stronger nuclear power would still be well above this level.
It would seem quite unreasonable to expect the USSR, as the
weaker power, to agree to accept such a state of nuclear
inferiority during the many years that the American disarmament
plan would last. Not only would there be the factor of simple
prestige - if Russia agrees to equality of total armed strength
why should not America agree to equality of nuclear strength -
but the imbalance which would be produced by the American
plan might be militarily dangerous. For, if the Soviet nuclear
strength did fall, during the disarmament process, *below* that
which would be believed in America to be such that even after
an American attack, the Soviet could inflict unacceptable
damage on America, then the Soviet Union would have nothing

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to rely on but America's statement of her peaceful intentions.
Now the whole basis of the attitude of both sides, but particular-
ly the Western, to the disarmament problems is that reliance
on good intention alone is not enough.

One must conclude from this analysis that the first stage
of both the Russian and the American draft treaties seriously
conflict with the requirement of the McCloy - Zorin agreement
to maintain the balance during the process of disarmament.

From a purely military point of view, the most rational
first step would seem to be for both sides to reduce their
strategic nuclear forces rapidly to the same equal and low
level: this might be defined as the minimum that was necessary
for a country to destroy a few major enemy cities, after it had
itself been attacked. This is the balance at the minimum
deterrent level which was much discussed at the Moscow con-
ference as a plausible temporary goal on the way to complete
nuclear disarmament - it could be argued that it is perhaps the
only negotiable multilateral one. However, at Moscow in my
view, the minimum deterrent level was put far too high - a few
dozen ICBM in invulnerable sites or a suitable number in sub-
marines for both sides should be quite adequate: in defining
the minimum deterrent balance, the explosive power of the war-
heads as well as the number of missiles could be taken into
account. If then some such goal was set, to be reached at some
stage in the disarmament process, then America, because of
her much bigger nuclear force, would have to destroy more
nuclear delivery vehicles than the Soviet Union: just as the
Soviet Union would have, and indeed has agreed, to reduce her
total manpower more than America because of her greater
present strength. I have heard this situation neatly expressed
by stating that Russia would have to pay a disarmament surtax
on her greater manpower and America on her greater nuclear
strength.

Another subsidiary difficulty about agreeing to a percentage
reduction of nuclear delivery systems, as opposed to reduction
to a fixed number, arises when these are rapidly increasing in
number. For instance, if an existing missile stock were in-

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creasing at 20% a year and if a disarmament clause involving a
10% reduction a year were being discussed, then the total
number of missiles would increase twice as fast in every year
by which the agreement was not signed, as they would decrease
in each year after the agreement was signed.

It may well be argued that such reasoning may be quite
valid in theory, but that it may not be very relevant in practice
at the present time because of the possibility that the American
people would not accept now such a drastic step of disarmament
as the loss of their nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.
For 18 years this nuclear superiority has been built up in the
public mind as the main guarantee of the survival of the American
way of life. Only a year or so ago, the American public were
being told that the Soviet Union was about to acquire a nuclear
superiority over the United States and that it would then be
expected to launch an all-out nuclear attack on America. After
so many years of the prevalence of such views, one wonders
whether it would be possible for President Kennedy quickly to
get Congress to approve at the present time such a drastic step
of disarmament as the acceptance of approximate nuclear
parity with the Soviet Union. For this, I feel convinced, is
what any major disarmament agreement must mean.

Another reason why it may be difficult for the American
Government to adopt at the present time a policy of nuclear
parity with the Soviet Union, as they have for total manpower,
is the uncertainty as to the social and economic effects of such
a drastic policy: this is especially worrying at a time when there
is talk of a recession in the United States and when international
currency problems lend an air of uncertainty to the economic
climate of the West.

Though I do not want to anticipate in detail the discussions
which will take place in the Working Party dealing with the
Economic Effects of Disarmament, I do want to express my
belief that the subject is of extreme importance. Two valuable
documents have recently become available: the report of the
Secretary of the UN embodying the study by the Consultative

2.

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Group - with the title "Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament": the second is 'Economic Impacts of Disarmament', issued by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Both documents agree that, in broad terms, adequate economic knowledge exists to avoid serious harm to a country's economy by a rapid process of disarmament. It is pointed out that the very drastic disarmament carried out after the second world war took place with few ill and very many highly beneficial effects: similarly a much smaller but significant degree of disarmament was carried through after the Korean war with relative minor ill effects on the American economy.

It is certainly gratifying that the Soviet economists on the UN study group were in complete agreement with their Western colleagues that the economic and social problems of disarmament in the industrialised free-enterprise countries could easily be solved. In their own centrally planned countries, the problem is seen in the UN report as a problem of planning not essentially different from that used in the normal direction of their economies.

The real problem of a big disarmament step in a Western country is seen in both reports as largely a political one: will in fact the political situation allow the requisite remedial actions to be taken - and taken in time. This doubt could lead to the climate of opinion becoming antagonistic to disarmament as such. Perhaps the attraction to many Westerners of arms control at a high level, as an alternative to drastic disarmament, may sometimes have had less to do with purely military arguments, than with a concealed fear of the economic and social consequences of disarmament. Of particular importance are the effects on senior Service personnel and on the employees of the armament industries. The same motivation may encourage the elaboration of control systems into vast organisations equipped with every possible technological device. Has it not been said by a wise American "It seems necessary to convince the American electorate that we can spend as much on disarmament as we do on armaments".

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So we conclude that, to reduce the opposition to disarmament, it is necessary to bring out into the open its social and economic consequences and to plan the necessary economic and political measures to deal with them. This is not something to be left till after a disarmament treaty has been signed: it must be done now. This is why the publication of these two documents is of such importance; it is therefore very apt that the conference should set up a special working party to study the subject in detail.

From a study of these two publications on the social and economic effects of disarmament, one gets the impression that it is not at all easy to foresee just what would happen in the event of a drastic step of disarmament being carried out. It is possible that Western free-enterprise countries would take it in their stride and that great economic benefits would ensue. It is also possible that the centrally planned Soviet economies might make mistakes in their planning the resulting changes in the economy, and so would fail to gain the full economic advantages. However, what is more immediately important than what might happen, is what is believed might happen. Here an important difference exists between a centrally planned economy and a free enterprise country. In a centrally planned country it is official policy to believe that disarmament is economically highly advantageous: in free enterprise countries the lack of a clear official policy leads to many doubts among the public.

We have now touched, inevitably rather than superficially, on some reasons why the American Administration may be reluctant to agree to such a drastic goal as involved in accepting nuclear parity with the Soviet Union at an early stage of disarmament, even though purely military considerations make this of great importance. I do not think it fanciful to suppose that the much longer time scale of the American disarmament programme compared with the Soviet plan (up to about 10 years compared with 4 years), may be not so much related to military or technical considerations, but perhaps to realistic estimates as to the time it might take to make drastic disarmament palatable politically to the American electorate. The time this might take would depend critically on Soviet action in relation to such points of conflict as Berlin, the test ban, etc.

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There is still another factor in the relationship between disarmament and economics which must be born in mind. Since America is wealthier than the Soviet Union, an arms race between them, which involves comparable absolute expenditures, imposes a greater economic burden on the Soviet Union than on America: at the present time a big arms budget spent within the country itself is probably, on balance, an economic advantage to the USA. So it comes about that an arms race between these two countries, by the harm it can do to the growth of the Soviet economy, may appear to some in the West as an important weapon in the cold war. This factor again may strengthen opposition to disarmament itself. For the disarmament policy adopted by Mr. Kennedy would, if adopted, ease the economic burden on the Soviet Union and so allow her living standards to be raised more rapidly. This would increase her influence in the world, especially in the unaligned and under-developed countries of the world.

Russia's reaction to a feeling that some part of Western defence policy may be motivated more by considerations of gaining successes in the cold war than by normal military considerations is likely to spur her to maintain her military security at the lowest economic cost. As regards strategic nuclear weapons, her most suitable policy would seem to be to rely on a minimum deterrent, that is on a relatively few very efficient ICBM with large war-heads in geographically secret sites, supplemented by some medium range missiles carried by submarines. If geographical secrecy of her sites were lost, she would be faced with a very expensive programme of increased production of missiles and the dispersal and hardening of their sites. Probably such a rearmament programme is already under way and is, in fact, imposing a severe strain on the Soviet economy.

I have gone into these various social and economic points in some detail in order to emphasise my view that serious discussions of the progress of the present armament talks cannot be usefully carried on only at the overt level of purely military considerations, but that attention must also be paid to the complex non-military motivations lying sometimes even below the surface of individual consciousness.

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A danger arises here. Just in so far as the strategic balance of nuclear terror becomes recognised as rather stable against rational acts of sane nations, so there may arise a tendency in the West to discount the danger of nuclear war and so to feel more free to indulge in an arms race, not so much to deter a fighting war as to wage an economic one. Such a policy would inevitably lead to the proliferation and spread of nuclear weapons, increase the danger of nuclear war by accident or irresponsibility, and make very difficult any type of arms agreement.

Let us now suppose that such difficulties can be overcome and that it be agreed at Geneva that a state of near nuclear parity at an agreed low level be reached at an early stage of disarmament. Then comes the problem of devising a mutually acceptable plan for the phasing of the actual destruction of armaments and for the growth of the necessary inspection system. Then I think many of the arguments and conclusions reached at Vermont and included in the reports of Working Parties I, II, and III, can be applied. In the simplest terms the scheme might be as follows.

3.

On conclusion of the Treaty, all states would publish a complete inventory of all their armaments - here we will only consider the case of nuclear delivery systems. Then would begin the destruction of an agreed number of missiles and aircraft under strict supervision by the United Nations. As soon as the calculated remaining stocks (that is the original number in the inventory, less the number witnessed as destroyed) reached the agreed target figure, then inspection would start with the object of verifying the *actual* number of remaining stocks, so as to compare with the *calculated* number. The inspection and verification system would clearly have to have initially a sampling character, but would be gradually built up so as to become essentially complete by the time that complete disarmament was achieved. I hope that the relevant working parties will be able to make progress in working out in much more detail some system of this kind.

I want now to speak about some of the problems which could well be discussed by Working Group III under their terms

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of reference 'Political and Technical Measures Contributing to the Lessening of International Tensions'.

I think that the most important possible measures which might reduce tension at the present time and so pave the way for a comprehensive multilateral disarmament agreement, are individual and independent actions by individual nations or groups of nations. I think the scope for such actions is much larger than is often thought: I do not think it true no progress at all can be made short of a complete multilateral disarmament agreement: in fact I think much can be done independently to facilitate such a wider agreement. I want to make it clear that I think any negotiable multilateral disarmament agreement must be comprehensive, involve very big steps of disarmament, and must include approximate parity in both nuclear and conventional forces. With the exception of the Test Ban, I doubt if the toil and frustrations of attempting to formulate in legal phraseology the details of some minor measure of multilateral disarmament are worth while. On the other hand, every measure of unilateral disarmament and conciliation carried out independently by any nation is of great value.

Clearly the task of working out possible independent actions to reduce tension must be tackled mainly by the nationals of the different countries, though of course mutual discussions between the different countries may be necessary to elucidate the international implications of possible unilateral actions.
I would like to see more effort by individuals to persuade their countries to adopt national policies on armaments, which would produce a more favourable atmosphere for these all-important multilateral negotiations. A basic assumption of all such efforts is that both East and West must share the blame for the present impasse. In order to study possible ways in which each country might alter its military posture so as to facilitate a multilateral agreement, it is clearly necessary for individuals to subject their own Government's defence and disarmament policies to a critical examination.

I now want to mention a few possible steps which I would like to see Britain carrying out. All the matters which I will

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discuss have been discussed in Parliament and the Press in recent months: all the matters are controversial and divide internally all three political parties in Britain. I am sure that all my British colleagues at this Conference here will disagree with some of my suggestions, and maybe some will disagree with all. Since I have not the time here to argue all the points in detail, I will necessarily be somewhat didactic in my suggestions.

In his recent speech, Mr. McNamara said that:

> "-- limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility".

I believe this to be true and very important; also that the British nuclear forces must be included in this criticism. I therefore consider that Britain should take the necessary actions to remove any degree of independence which our nuclear forces now have. Expert knowledge would be needed to specify these steps in detail, but they would presumably include the placing of all British nuclear forces immediately under a joint British-American safety catch. I would go further and hope that the Government would plan a gradual phase out of the British strategic nuclear forces, and not seek to prolong their operational effectiveness for a few years by the adoption of Skybolt, or other anologous device. I hope also that no thought is entertained of converting new high performance civilian aircraft to carry nuclear weapons. In reaching these views, I took fully into account the problem of France and Germany.

In general, I hope that Britain will support in the future all the American Government's welcome efforts to reduce the dependence of NATO forces on tactical nuclear weapons. Whether or not the recent cancellation of Blue Water by the British Government is connected with this tendency, I welcome it: just as, in the field of strategic weapons, I welcome the proposed withdrawal of the Thor missiles.

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Another point, on which I feel strongly, is the present
deployment of British nuclear weapons, both land and carrier
based, in the Middle and Far East. In case of a war, any
possible military advantage which their use might bring, would
surely be vastly outweighed by the calamitous political con-
sequences which would ensue if Britain dropped nuclear bombs
on the countries of the East. As the Defence Correspondent
of The Times (26 July 1962) pointed out, the recent White
Paper on Defence -

"-- turned out to be a series of variation on the familiar theme of national prestige - the nuclear deterrent, the strategic reserve poised to pounce on trouble makers in the four corners of the world, and the promise of naval task forces majestically patrolling the "Far East Station" - these are the symptom of a lingering obsession with world power which serves in Britain as a substitute for strategic planning."

The changes in British policy discussed above would tend
towards a bi-polar world with the Soviet Union and the United
States of America being the only strong nuclear powers - person-
ally I would like to see them the only nuclear powers. This,
I believe, is the most realistic step on the way to a disarmed
world. There has always been much force in the argument that
perhaps the most hopeful stage on the road to disarmament might
be a period of Pax Russo-Americana and that any diffusion of
nuclear weapons might upset the balance (Times loc: cit). A
comment from the Observer on July 22nd is worth quoting:

"By far the most significant aspect of this new emphasis
in Washington on restricting the spread of nuclear weapons is
the possibility that it opens up an accommodation between the
ideological blocs, which could change the fate of the whole world,
committed and otherwise. A restriction on nuclear arms has
always been practised by the rulers of the Soviet Union, who nev-
er have passed them to their chief ally China, and alone in the
world are in a position to press the Chinese not to develop these
weapons. The advantage to the whole world of an agreement
between the blocs to restrict the ownership of these weapons,

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effectively, to the US and the Soviet Union could be enormous."

Returning to the immediate tasks, I think that if Britain
would proceed to act as suggested, it would greatly assist
the formulation of a Western defence policy with enough
internal coherence to form a sound basis for negotiating a
comprehensive disarmament treaty at Geneva.

Even the limited steps which I think Britain should take -
or perhaps already is taking - steps not so much of disarmament
but of a redeployment of our defence resources - would cause
a big upheaval both in the Armed Forces and in certain indus-
tries. It is therefore vital that suitable steps be taken in
advance to prepare generous and timely measures to avoid
serious opposition from individuals or groups whose personal
or corporate status would be adversely affected.

Special consideration should be given those industries
which are specially dependent on defence orders: prominent
among these are aircraft and electronics. Measures must
be prepared for any resulting big shift of demand for labour,
and methods must be worked out for aiding the research and
development groups in industry to switch from defence to civil
work.

As I have already indicated, I think it primarily the
job of citizens of each country to study possible independent
actions by their own governments which could increase the
likelihood of a comprehensive disarmament agreement
being reached. Having already expressed some criticisms
of my own country's recent defence policy, I will now make
some further critical comments on certain aspects of both
Soviet and American defence policy.

I should have though that the Soviet Government would
have been wise to have made much plainer than it did that
it believed that a successful counter-force strike was im-
possible between two such powers as America and the
Soviet Union: and consequently that the Soviet strategic
nuclear forces were planned for a purely counter-city

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retaliatory role (I am assuming that recent Western conclu-
sions to this effect are correct). It is true that Mr. Khrush-
chev did state clearly in January 1960 that he believed that
a counter-force strike could not be successful and announced
that he was cutting back on long range bomber production.
However, it was not till the autumn of 1961 that Western
official circles accepted that the Soviet ICBM force was so
small as to possess only a retaliatory counter-city role and
that it could not then have any possible effective counter-force
capability against the much larger and widely dispersed
American nuclear forces.

Would it not have been possible for the Soviet Union to
inform the West of their actual nuclear strength without in any
way compromising the geographical secrecy of their missile
sites? If they had succeeded in doing this, they might have
killed at birth the growth of the mythical missile gap, which was
a major cause of the new big nuclear armament programme
initiated by America in 1961. Surely here excessive secrecy
has harmed the Soviet interests, since by leading to a rearma-
ment programme of its own, it has put a severe strain on the
Soviet economy.

One way in which I think both American and Soviet tactics
have been at fault has been in the publicity given to technical
successes with anti-missile-missile tests. Of course it
would be possible, given enough expense and development to
destroy a single ballistic missile in flight under set-piece
conditions. But to make an operationally useful system is
vastly more difficult, even if possible. Even if, at fantastic
cost, a country could produce a system which could destroy one
half the opponents' counter-city retaliatory blow, the opponent
would only have to double the number of the few deployed
retaliatory missiles to cancel out the effect of the anti-missile-
missile system. Then there are always many ways of foxing or
saturating such a defensive system: thus the attacker can
expect to evade a great part of such a defensive system.

Thus I think that over-emphasis on anti-missile missiles
is fallacious operationally and could lead America and the Soviet

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Union into technological arms race of little military
significance, but at a vast cost. Moreover if an anti-missile-
missile system became a normal form of armament it would
lead to a huge number of anti-missile nuclear warheads being
deployed in defended areas all over the world. These nuclear
armed missiles could be used by irresponsible people for quite
other than defensive purposes.

One aspect of American defence policy which I hope will
be discussed here, in view of its possible implications for
the disarmament negotiations is the following statement of
Mr. McNamara:

"The US has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principle military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

All will applaud the humane intention in this new policy.
Moreover, the political intention is important: it can perhaps
be put in the following way: the American Administration is
rightly alarmed by the dangers arising from the growth of
independent national nuclear forces. It knows that a major
motivation for the growth of such independent forces is the
doubt that America would in fact use her strategic nuclear
weapons against Russian cities in a European conflict because
of the destruction of American cities which could result from
a Soviet retaliatory blow. In order, therefore, to reassure
her European Allies that America would launch her strategic
nuclear forces, it was necessary to have a plan to use them in
such a way as not to provoke a counter-attack on American
cities. This was achieved by the statement that the Strategic
Air Command would not attack Soviet cities but only military
objectives.

One profound effect of this military policy of controlled
and flexible response on the possible steps to disarmament is
that it seems to exclude the low minimum deterrent nuclear
force as a possible acceptable temporary step on the way

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to full disarmament. For such a counter-military-target policy could demand a very large and flexible nuclear force able to compete with all possible types of military targets: there is no obvious limit to the number of nuclear weapons required for this purpose, as there is for the policy of a purely retaliatory counter-city policy.

When one comes to thinking about how a counter-military-target policy would work out in action, one meets many of the difficulties which have arisen in relation to the use of tactical atomic weapons: of particular importance is the chance of escalation, whichever side, the West or Russia, initiated the use of nuclear weapons. For many military targets are near centres of population, and, to the inhabitants, an attack on a military target might be hard to distinguish from an attack on a city.

If such an attack on some military target related to a local war provoked a retaliatory attack against a city, then the first steps up the ladder would have been taken. To avoid such steps, extreme restraint would have to be exercised by both sides, amounting virtually to both obeying a set of necessarily rather arbitrary rules. Now, in relation to tactical nuclear weapons, the devoted labours of many analysts have quite failed to envisage any set of rules which have much chance of ever being operated.

Once either side doubts that the other will conform to his own sets of rules, the possibility of escalation has to be envisaged. It is not a big step from envisaging that escalation may happen, to that of deciding that the chance is high enough to justify one acting as if it will happen. So one concludes that escalation is not so much a process which could take place, step by step on the battlefield, but as something which will happen, before the war starts, in the minds of the military planners - leading to the demand to start with a nuclear attack on all the enemy's nuclear bases. But since this would not be wholly successful, vast civilian casualties would be inflicted by the enemy's counter-blow. If this is a realistic military

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appreciation of the likely situation, then it is clear that very
little flexibility or real choice exists, as soon as the actual
fighting of a nuclear war is contemplated in detail. Here is
a very difficult but highly important point in the military
theory of the use of nuclear weapons which requires further
study.

The more I ponder these difficult questions, the more I
conclude that a major step forward towards a general dis-
armament agreement would be achieved if the military
policies of the major powers were more closely related to
their disarmament policies. Sometimes one might think that
they were formulated by different Government Departments
quite independently. This divorce of the two fields is also
often in evidence in some published studies by students of
military and international affairs. Inview of the necessary
and vitally important requirement in the McCloy - Zorin
agreement that a military balance must be maintained
throughout the various stages of disarmament, it is more
evident than ever that arms policy and disarmament policy must
be studied together - like two sides of the same coin. May
the proceedings of this Conference further this task.

Cambridge 1969

IX:4

## "General and Complete Disarmament"

A. V. Topchiev

A year has passed since the last Pugwash Conference took place in the United States. In the meantime the world has witnessed quite a number of events, some giving rise to our hopes, and others bringing new anxieties. The characteristic features of acute contradictions in the world today are the powerful collision of opposing tendencies around the fundamental question of war and peace and a further polarisation of opposing forces. These, on the one hand, broaden the ranks of the peace movement, and on the other do not lessen the contravention of those supporting the idea of "deterrent" or intimidation. The latter only use other subtler methods. Such is the historical background which underscores the significance of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The idea of disarmament is beginning to acquire such an all-embracing influence that it calls for action. It commands awareness of peoples, urging those still wavering to a more resolute parting from the deep-rooted notion of the capability of military power in international affairs, to act with more decisiveness in the field of science. Among scientists themselves, there is daily increasing optimism, strengthening the will of people. The recently concluded World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow is a vivid confirmation of this idea, one of the most noteworthy events in international life.

"What we need now is action, and once again action, not words" - these words sum up the purpose of this world forum which demonstrated, on a scale never seen before, the desire of peoples really to support peace without arms. As far as the Soviet people are concerned, their actual contribution to the cause of peace is best demonstrated by their heroic effort in building the glorious Communist society.

The reason why we are now witnessing a broad upsurge of the peace movement is precisely because millions upon millions of people are going through the process of re-evaluation in their way of thinking.

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Activity of neutralist nations has also notably increased. This fact alone was responsible for the adoption by the United Nations of a number of positive resolutions that bear directly upon the problem of general and complete disarmament. Thus, among others, a resolution has been adopted, pledging the atomic powers to sign an agreement on banning nuclear tests, limiting the spread of atomic weapons, creating an atom-free zone in Africa.

A promising note was struck when the Soviet Union and the United States governments issued a Joint Declaration concerning the principles for disarmament talks, which was reported to the 16th General Assembly of the United Nations and was approved by it.

Given goodwill and a desire to interpret it without prejudice on both sides, this document may serve as a serious aid in the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. At present this is the most pressing of all practical problems.

Therefore it may seem that we have no basis for pessimism. Our combined effort does not desintegrate in the void, but is bearing some useful fruit.

Nevertheless, it is with regret that we are compelled to acknowledge that the general situation has in a certain sense deteriorated and not improved. Instead of attaining progress in disarmament we are faced with the maddening pace of the arms race. To the means of extermination which already exist in huge quantities, new and more lethal instruments of destruction have been added.

The burden of war expenditures is steadily rising. If a year ago the world spent 100 billion dollars for war purposes, now this figure has jumped to 180 billion. Armament programmes for the next few years, adopted in a number of countries of the West, namely the United States, Federal German Republic and France, will demand a sharp increase in expenditures. In the Federal German Republic this year alone there will be a 30% increase in direct military spendings. In the United States

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expenditure will reach 53 billion dollars - a sum that almost equals the national income of Latin America and which is about one third of the national income of under-developed nations. These are very alarming facts.

The principal factor which sharply deteriorated the international situation and darkened the life of all nations was the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and their continued testing. Allow me to point out the following basic facts.

The United States have conducted the most numerous series of nuclear tests, both at home and over the islands in the Pacific. The United States have conducted high-altitude tests, thus, in fact, provoking a nuclear arms race in space.

Nuclear potential continues to be stockpiled. Until recently fission materials were weighed by the gram. Now they are weighed in hundreds of tons. Only a few years ago nuclear weapons were counted in tens or hundreds, now in tens of thousands. The press has carried a report that there is enough fission material already stored to shower each person of this planet with dozens of tons of TNT.

Some of the countries of Western Europe strive to establish an atomic force by arming the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons and strengthening France's nuclear potential. The British and French governments are continuing nuclear tests.

The NATO forces have received submarines armed with rockets with nuclear warheads. At the same time some countries are stepping up the manufacture of various types of rockets and especially the ICBMs. As a result there is a tendency within the framework of member-countries of Western alliances to broaden the membership of the Nuclear Powers' Club.

At the same time some countries, and especially the United States, are witnessing a resurgence of activity at home of those who support the theory of a nuclear deterrent force. This only provokes indignation of the general public, as well as of scientists.

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In this connection it is difficult to remain unalarmed by the statement of the President of the United States - John Kennedy - in which he says that under certain conditions the United States may take the initiative in using nuclear weapons.

This statement only testifies to the fact that the United States still entertains the idea of a preventive war which is closely linked to the nuclear intimidation tactics. It should be borne in mind that the "certain conditions" alluded to by Mr. Kennedy may easily be provoked by the revenge-seeking elements from Europe, who resist the results of World War II. The absence of a Peace Treaty with Germany in fact is being used by these elements for provocative actions fraught with dire consequences.

To eliminate the very possibility of creating a war situation in the centre of Europe, the Soviet Union strives for a peaceful settlement of the German problem. Any delay with the signing of a peace treaty imperils the cause of disarmament by turning itself into a catalytic agent for the arms race and a stimulant for irresponsible threats.

Nuclear tests are one of the most dangerous and dreaded manifestations of the arms race. Western press has written so much nonsense concerning nuclear testing, that this question merits special attention.

It is well known that the United States of America were first in developing nuclear weapons, and they did not hesitate to test their effect upon people. They have destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, annihilated over two hundred thousand people, including women, children and the aged. Now it is admitted in the United States that those bombs had been dropped at a time when there was no special military gain to be had from this act. Therefore we have evidence showing that the attitude of intimidation overpowered a sense of responsibility.

Since then the roar of nuclear explosions has never ceased. Up to now the United States and their allies have exploded considerably more nuclear devices than the U.S.S.R.

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These facts indicate that from the very beginning of nuclear testing the United States bear the responsibility for initiating and furthering the nuclear arms race.

Much was said at the last conference about the so-called breach by the Soviet Union of the nuclear arms testing moratorium. At that time some of our colleagues saw the steps taken by the Soviet government in the wrong light.

In connection with this it is appropriate to recall certain points that shed light on the actual state of affairs in this matter. After the Soviet proposal in March 1958 to actually enact a controlled ban, the United States and Britain conducted a wide series of nuclear tests in the autumn of the same year. Then, after a year's pause, on December 29th, 1959, President Eisenhower made an official statement to the effect that the United States does not consider itself bound any longer by the moratorium and may start tests whenever they find it necessary. He said that "the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing would expire on December 31, 1959" ('The New York Times', December 30th, 1959). This statement was actually meant to be an invitation to other powers to be ready and to conduct nuclear tests, to start on a new lap of the arms race. All know that the Soviet Union did not follow this invitation. On the contrary, it entered upon a considerable reduction of its armaments unilaterally.

But France, an ally of the U.S. in the NATO, wasted no time in answering Eisenhower's statement accordingly. Starting with the first half of 1960 it conducted a series of tests in the Sahara desert. At the same time the United States, according to the press, carried out extensive preparations prior to a wide series of underground nuclear tests. It was during the very years of 1960 - 1961 that a network of underground tunnels were being prepared in Nevada and other places. The tunnels were designed for testing the so-called neutron bomb, which received such a wide coverage in the American press in 1960.

It is difficult to gloss over another fact, that during the same period the U.S. A. F. ordered from the A. E. C. (Atomic Energy Commission) a 60 megaton bomb. It was not created in the United States, alas, not for reasons of love for mankind. During the so-called uncontrolled moratorium on nuclear arms testing,

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appropriations for nuclear weapons in the U. S. A. were left at a very high level, and the nuclear industry operated at a tense pace. According to press reports, the United States produced over 16,500 tons of concentrate $U_3O_8$ and imported another 18,000 tons during 1960 alone. In 1961 the industrial capacity of processing uranium ore in the United States was boosted to 32,100 tons a day.

Stockpiling of huge amounts of nuclear material and the need for experimental testing of newly introduced devices - all this provided the U. S. with a serious reason for ending tests in 1962. It stands to reason that the purpose of these tests was the striving of the United States for supremacy in nuclear arms over the Soviet Union.

With the coming of the new administration under President Kennedy, the tendency for military supremacy notably increased. The interests of corporations in military profits increased proportionally.

This was made quite evident from the four billion dollar rise in military spendings in the United States in the 1961 - 1962 fiscal year as compared to the 1960 - 1961 fiscal year. The increase was announced at the very beginning of 1961. As we all well remember such an increase was later explained by the "Berlin crisis" artificially created through efforts of certain Western circles.

Thus, in this aggressive vein, the government of the United States has acted despite the peaceful actions of the Soviet Union in their task of reducing armaments and solving unsettled international problems. Therefore the responding actions of the Soviet Union, which was compelled to resume testing in the 'interests of the country's safety, as well as the safety of its friendly nations, are quite obvious and well-grounded.

The switching by the United States to high altitude testing of atomic weapons may lay the foundation for a new stage in the nuclear arms race. This step creates particular dangers for the safety of other nations. The 'United States News and World Report' giving an account of this new series, is voicing a hope that the testing of new weapons conducted at the present time in

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the Pacific Ocean will restore leadership to the United States in the nuclear arms race. But it is well-known, that with the loss of atomic monopoly by the United States, the initiative of the United States in the nuclear arms race has not yet, and we may add with confidence, never will, bring them military advantage.

"As far as the high-altitude explosions are concerned, they should demonstrate whether the United States are capable at their own option to neutralize the radar network that protects Soviet Russia". ('United States News and World Report'). "This rather crude confession only serves once again to underscore the fact that the aim of the high-altitude tests lies in finding possibilities to paralyze the defences of peace-loving nations. At the same time high-altitude tests threaten many other ills, such as disruption of communications, but primarily such harm as increasing the radioactive fall-out in the atmosphere.

A start in the nuclear space race will undoubtedly lead to the swelling of the burden of military expenditures and will worsen the chances for peace.

These are the facts which characterize the far from attractive image of the world today. We see, that as the arms race proportionately grows as in a chain reaction, so grows also the folly, and naturally the profits, of weapon-producing monopolies. All this inevitably pushes mankind towards the line where the feeling of terror and insanity may win over reason in manning the weapons of the so-called "intimidation", and the world will be thrown into the abyss of disaster.

Summing up all the aforesaid we come to the following conclusion: the gap between acknowledging the necessity for disarmament and the actual moulding of people's will into reality does not diminish of its own accord, and sometimes it even increases.

Our mutual task is to prevent such a turn of events by focusing our attention upon the creation of most favorable conditions for the purpose of reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament as swiftly as possible. The agreement should positively consider the interests of all parties concerned.

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How to achieve this? To our mind the first step should be taken in the direction of an unbiased study of the existing draft agreements and general lines laid down, along which we could reach a better understanding than has been the case until now.

During the month of March, conforming with the recommendation from the 16th session of the U. N. General Assembly, which binds the 18-Nation Committee specially created for this purpose to draft an agreement on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet government prepared and submitted to the Committee its draft of an agreement. Urged by the desire to give the talks a concrete and functional nature at the very outset of the work of this Committee, the Soviet government proposed a document which, article after article, clause after clause, in the exact language of binding terms, offered a programme of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet draft was based on the principles of general and complete disarmament agreed upon by both the U. S. S. R. and the United States. The Soviet draft had also taken into account several comments and remarks of other countries, which had been voiced earlier in connection with the Soviet programme on disarmament.

The draft of the agreement determines measures, which, when carried out, ensure during a relatively short period of time the liquidation of the entire war machinery of separate countries, conducted under a strict international control. It specifies three definite and interlocked stages, each specifying the exact obligations of states both in disarmament and in control.

The main idea of the first two stages is the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war hanging over humanity.

In the very first stage, the foremost problem of which is the simultaneous liquidation of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons and of all foreign bases, the implementation of these measures will in practice neutralize the danger of an attack with nuclear weapons. Other measures called for at this stage to help neutralize the danger of a nuclear war and safeguard the nations are: a ban on using space for military purposes.

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poses and a control after launching of rockets for peaceful purposes; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries; a ban on nuclear weapons tests (if such a ban has not yet been effected prior to the signing of the disarmament agreement). This will offer from the very beginning additional guarantees to the effectiveness of disarmament measures.

The first stage envisages, together with measures aimed at eliminating the danger of a nuclear attack, a sizable reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons (30%), as well as withdrawal of all troops from foreign territories. The duration of the first stage was set at 15 months.

The second stage embraces steps aimed at complete liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, a further reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons (35% of the original level), their manufacture and military spendings. The duration of the second stage is also set at 15 months.

At the third stage (one year long) the liquidation of armed forces and conventional weapons will be concluded, the manufacture of armaments stopped, military institutions abolished, compulsory service in the armed forces and military instruction dispensed with and spendings for military purposes banned.

All three stages provide for extra measures ensuring peace and security. Various institutions within the framework of the U. N. are to be created for maintaining security of nations, as well as providing the Security Council with contingents of the police force, which are to be under the joint command of representatives of the three main groups of states.

The U. S. S. R. does not present anybody with an ultimatum, and is ready to give serious consideration to all sensible proposals by its partners in negotiations, if their proposals do not tend to undermine the very essence of disarmament. The Soviet representatives, for instance, pointed out that the overall period of disarmament suggested by the Soviet Union is not final. It may be somewhat extended, but not to such a degree as to drag out the disarmament and to endanger the fulfilment of this great task.

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In supplements to the Draft Treaty the U. S. S. R. met the wishes of the U. S. with respect to the reduction of conventional armaments by one third during each of the three stages.

The inclusion into the Draft Treaty of additional measures to provide for peace and security not only in the course of disarmament but also after its completion, is in accord with desires of a number of states. At the same time this is completely in keeping with the position of the Soviet government which, as is known, in September last year, put forward a wide programme of international measures which sought, without waiting for the completion of disarmament, to achieve relaxation of tension and were intended to contribute to the fulfilment of the basic task in general and complete disarmament. Let me recall the contents of this programme. It envisages:

- freezing of war budgets,
- renunciation of nuclear weapons,
- prohibition of war propaganda,
- conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Pact,
- withdrawal of army contingents from foreign territories,
- measures to halt further spread of nuclear weapons,
- creation of atom-free zones,
- measures to lessen the dangers of a sudden attack,
- prohibition of nuclear testing.

Some of these proposals have become integral parts of the Soviet Draft Treaty, imparting to it a multi-purpose character and a great flexibility, for example, prohibition of atomic weapons and withdrawal of army contingents from foreign territories.

In fact, all these proposals can be carried out before the Treaty on the general and complete disarmament comes into force, at the same time they constitute elements of disarmament, since they contribute to the development of the process of general and complete disarmament.

In this sense, for instance, the decision to stop nuclear testing is acceptable not only within the framework of the Treaty on general and complete disarmament but also by way of concluding a separate agreement. Such an agreement would have

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to include mutual control with the use of the existing systems. The practical possibility of such a control has been proved by the scientists.

However, this proposal is stubbornly opposed by the United States in spite of the fact that in the Committee of 18 they became somewhat isolated on this problem.

Those who assert that the Soviet Union is against strict control on the international basis are deeply in error. On careful acquaintance with the Soviet Draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament, one will hardly fail to notice that it further develops the principle of strict international control over disarmament.

The Soviet proposals combine definite measures of disarmament with reliable international control in the course of each stage. Flexible balancing of disarmament measures with measures of control within each stage, granting a right to the international body to freely perform their obligations in observing the fulfilment of agreement and in registration of infringements, progressive build-up of control from stage to stage - all these measures constitute a practical development of the principle under which the character and amount of control must correspond to the character and amount of disarmament measures, the very principle which has been approved by the governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.S., and the whole of the United Nations Organization.

In giving a general appraisal of the Soviet Draft Treaty, it is very important to point out that this project, as well as the programme of general and complete disarmament put forth earlier by the Soviet government, retains the idea of a strict sequence and simultaneous implementation of disarmament measures in all countries as a result of which not a single state will be capable of obtaining any military advantages either in the course of disarmament or after its completion.

We would not be objective if we failed to note as a positive circumstance that after a prolonged period of time, the U.S. government has finally given a more detailed outline of its proposals on the problem of general and complete disarmament.

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As a result we can now more distinctly understand the way of thinking of the authors of these proposals, comparing them to the Soviet Draft Treaty.

We regret to say that the American outline of the basic provisions of the Treaty on general and complete disarmament is not a Draft Treaty in the full meaning of this word. It even forgets to mention the time limits of the disarmament process. That is why a comparison is possible only on a limited basis. Nevertheless the contours of the U.S. scheme are clear enough in order to get, at least, a better idea of the main tendencies in the approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament, and with regard to certain specific matters, in the light of disarmament principles agreed upon by the Soviet Union and the United States.

Thus, first of all we are interested in the positions from which the authors of the scheme approach the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Draft Treaty proceeds from the fact that the elimination of the danger of the atomic war is the main task of the agreement and that the contents of the Draft Treaty as well as the sequence of the stages should be subordinated to this main requirement; the U.S. scheme is based on another conception which is, in fact, a doctrine of nuclear deterrent which has been modified and adapted to some disarmament measures. Some people may think this conclusion strange and far-fetched. Is it really possible to give such an appraisal of the U. S. plan, when the government writes in black and white that it is ready to put an end to nuclear arms racing? This question may be answered with certainty, that such an appraisal suggests itself from the analysis of this scheme whose authors, it seems, were too much tied to the concepts that justify the existence of the armed world.

First of all I would like to call your attention to the fact that in the course of a comparatively long period of time, three years, set aside for the first stage, the scheme envisages measures for reducing the means of delivery of nuclear weapons by a mere 30%. The remaining 70% which, it should be noted, would have to be assessed by the international control body, is to remain intact, and only in the succeeding three years this major portion will be reduced

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by 50%. What is to be done with the remaining armed forces will be decided only at the third stage. Since the duration of the third stage is not specified in the plan at all, we are free to assume that these armed forces are here to stay for an indefinite period of time.

And how do the matters stand with the nuclear weapons?
Although the production and testing of these weapons will be stopped in the course of the first stage, as in the Soviet Draft, the plan does not specify clearly what amount of stockpiles and at which stage they would have to be destroyed. Apparently up to the last day of the third stage, in other words, in the course of a long total period of disarmament, there will remain a quantity of nuclear weapons which would at least correspond to the remaining portion of the means of its delivery. It is clear that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction remaining in the possession of each side would have to be registered by the international inspection body and that the plants capable of producing and processing fissile materials as well as their production capacity would have to be declared and their location indicated for the inspected zones. It follows that each side, though retaining their nuclear weapons and rockets, would receive a considerable amount of information pertaining to the Armed Forces of the other side. That is why we refuse to believe that such a state of affairs would decrease the danger of rocket-nuclear war.

In this way the United States, proposing rather limited measures for the first stage of rocket-nuclear disarmament, namely a reduction of the means of delivery by 30%, demand the disclosure of important strategic data.

One may ask: is there a guarantee that under these conditions one of the sides will not be tempted to infringe on the agreement and start a war? No, no such guarantees are foreseen in the scheme which is incapable of producing them, since the method of proportional nuclear reduction in the course of the whole disarmament period is, in our opinion, basically inadequate.

Although this method is good in the case of conventional armaments, it is unsuitable to rocket-nuclear armaments due to a number of reasons which are cited below.

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Really, let us assume for a minute that the disarmament would develop in accordance with the U.S.A. scheme. Even if we imagine that as a result of the reduction of armaments there would remain a minimum quantity of nuclear armaments, a mere 5% of the existing stockpiles, according to some proposals of the Western states, it would run into several thousands of nuclear charges (of different systems) capable of destroying whole states, hundreds of millions of people.

It turns out that the concept of "deterrent" which constitutes the basis of American method of disarmament may become, in fact, a danger to peace not only under the conditions of cold war, but also if we were to follow the path of disarmament proposed by the U.S. Some people may say that the dangers of such a disarmament are nothing as compared to the dangers of unbridled arms race. But in discussing specific disarmament proposals one should deal with specific categories, giving preference to those existing schemes that reduce these dangers to a minimum.

In connection with this it is worth while recalling what our English colleague, Mr. Blackett, said last March, namely, that the standing danger of accidental and unreasoned war is a good argument in favour of great and rapid steps in disarmament process. It is just these steps that are not envisaged in the U. S. plan.

There have been other proposals aimed at retaining a symbolic quantity of "deterrent" armaments, a few nuclear bombs, after the completion of disarmament. But these proposals cannot be justified because the so-called symbolic means of nuclear deterrent, being in themselves actual weapons of mass destruction, are consequently unsuitable and inhuman means of maintaining security and can provide a pretext for a new race of nuclear armaments. That is why it cannot be permitted that the weapons of mass destruction be placed at the disposal of the International Armed Forces, not even the smallest fraction of nuclear weapons.

We, the participants of this forum, know better than others that a small percentage of the existing stockpiles of this weapon is sufficient to inflict an irreparable damage to a number of states.

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I am well aware of the fact that we scientists still differ as to the meaning of the term "danger" when it is applied to the process of disarmament.

What we, Soviet scientists, regard as a danger is considered by some of our colleagues as a danger deterring element.

The danger presented to the cause of peace by the method of proportional nuclear disarmament dragged out to an indefinite period of time, will become all the more obvious if we take into account other considerations, and first of all that system of control which stems logically from this method.

Recalling our discussions at last meetings it may be pointed out that some speakers came to the conclusion that the main obstacle to disarmament should be sought in the different approach of the Soviet Union and the U. S., to the problem of control. In reality this obstacle lies in the unwillingness to disarm on the part of certain Western groups which use the problem of control as a means to hinder the agreement. It is true that the establishment of international control over disarmament, which touches the sensitive interests of states, is a difficult and complex matter, especially if we take into account the mounting mistrust during the years of the "cold war".

Both sides are well aware of the fact that the problem of control over the implementation of the Disarmament Treaty is extremely important.

This problem has come to the fore because of the loss of mutual trust, which was a result of a prolonged "cold war" waged by the Western states against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. One can hardly forget that the Russian people have twice experienced, in this century alone, the treachery of a sudden attack. Peoples of all countries should realize that our mistrust is not a fanciful idea. How are we to understand repeated flights of the American aircraft over our territory, one of which has ended in the destruction of the airplane? Launchings of spy-satellites and air balloons equipped with photographic equipment can hardly increase our trust in the United States.

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Somehow the root of the matter, to my mind, lies not
in the difference of opinion on the problem of control, but rather
in a different approach to the very problem of disarmament.

This is especially noticeable now when we can compare the
two documents and establish in detail the connection between
disarmament and control. As I said before the Soviet Draft
based on the idea of nuclear controlled disarmament which is to
be carried out in limited and short periods of time, envisages
the following connection between disarmament and control.

The amount of control is to correspond to the character
and amount of disarmament. What does it practically mean
when we consider it with respect to the first stage? In this
stage the destruction, let us say, of all means of delivery of
nuclear weapons is accompanied by a progressive and unhindered
control by an international inspection organ of all plants, factories,
and dockyards which were earlier engaged in complete or partial
production of the means of delivery of the nuclear weapons, such as
rockets, aircraft, and warships. In case of an infringement of
the treaty, the international disarmament organization will
consider the issue and will make a corresponding decision es-
tablishing this or that fact. As is known the right of veto is not
foreseen within the framework of this organization.

Thus the principle agreed upon between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R., under which the measures conducted in the field of
disarmament must correspond to the measures in the field of
control, is combined in the U.S.S.R. Draft with the effectiveness
of control.

But the American plan neither displays such a combination
nor provides for sufficiently effective technique of control.

Instead, the authors of the plan offer us a method of
selective zonal control. This new proposition is worth dis-
cussing.

First of all, one cannot fail to see that not only the text
of the plan but also the official commentaries do not interpret
some, to my mind very important, details, and this by the way,
is inherent to the plan as a whole. In reading the text of the U.S.
proposal we remain in the dark as to who and how one is going

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to determine the zones liable for inspection. If these zones (or squares) are to be chosen by drawing lots, the process of control becomes subject to an element of chance and, consequently, it is bound to cause lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the measures conducted. The countries that are interested in strict and effective control, the Soviet Union being one of them, might find themselves in a ridiculous position of an unfortunate gambler since the lot may point to a zone which need not be controlled at all. It may turn out that there are no military installations liable for destruction in the selected zone, whereas the neighbouring zone containing such installations will be beyond the scope of activity of the international control body.

This method of control may be warranted to some degree for the countries in which the means of defence and attack are distributed more or less uniformly over the entire territory. However, since such uniform distribution of armaments and military installations in both countries is highly improbable, the agreed principle concerning equal conditions for disarmament and control will not be observed in this case. This is even more true for another variant of selective control, namely, when the zone to be checked is selected by the interested side which is not the object of the check. In this case distrust may grow giving rise to undesired complications in the process of disarmament. As the sponsors of the plan apparently have in mind this variant, and as it is closely related to the idea of a so-called "proportional" disarmament, the method in question is nothing less than an additional channel for espionage especially at the first stage. In fact under the U. S. plan only 30% of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons are to be destroyed at the first stage, while the control within the selected zone is to be extended to all means of delivery, rocket launching sites, airfields, harbours. The controllers will be given the right of access to all industrial enterprises engaged in the manufacture of military equipment and armament. Using all means at their disposal including aerial inspection, the inspectors will rummange through all corners of this or that zone. Can this method of control promote confidence when the bulk of the rocket-nuclear armaments remains intact? No, it can only bring the opposite results.

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The method of control suggested by the U. S. government is an obvious departure from the disarmament principles agreed between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. This departure is by no means accidental. The control of the armaments stems from the very method of the so-called proportional rocket-nuclear disarmament, from the desire to apply a dangerous concept of "deterrent" to disarmament.

If pistols are pointed at each other for a long time to see that the deal is honoured by both sides one of the pistols may go off regardless of whether its clip is fully loaded or contains just a few cartridges. The element of chance will remain as one of the partners who will be predisposed to anticipate, the ill will of the other partner may suffer a nervous breakdown and the fatal shot will be fired.

However, the danger of war is involved not only in the possibility of an accident. The U. S. plan is fraught with a dangerous tendency to obtain a unilateral military supremacy in the course of disarmament. A good proof of this is the problem of military bases. The U. S. plan which calls for reduction of the means of delivery of the nuclear weapons, does not envisage abolishment of foreign bases at the first stage and as to the subsequent stages it only mentions the abolishment of 'agreed' military bases at the second stage and provides for retention of a certain number of bases up to the completion of the third stage.

The Soviet Union has no bases on foreign territories. It is well known that the Soviet Union possesses the most perfect means of delivery of nuclear weapons - powerful rockets which are capable of delivering multimegaton nuclear warheads to any point of the globe. It stands to reason that voluntary renunciation of this weapon or its reduction designated by the U. S. for the first stage will mean weakening of the U. S. S. R. defences. Meanwhile what is going to happen to the American military bases, most of which encircle the U. S. S. R.? Under the U. S. plan these bases are to be left intact for the first three years of disarmament; more than that, atomic weapons directed against the U. S. S. R. and other peace-loving nations will remain on these bases as before.

Another fact that cannot be glossed over is that though the American plan mentions the necessity of taking measures

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against the spread of atomic weapons, it confines itself to an
obligation not to transfer the control of nuclear weapons to other
states. No mention is made of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons
from foreign territories. And notwithstanding all this, some
American spokesmen keep saying that the U. S. follow the agreed
principles as regards provision of equal conditions for all states
in the course of disarmament.

In summing up, the following conclusions may be drawn.
Whereas the U. S. S. R. draft treaty about general and complete
disarmament is motivated entirely by a desire to eliminate the
threat of a nuclear war within the shortest possible time, the
American scheme is based on the idea of retaining the rocket-
nuclear weapons for an indefinite period of time. Agreeing to
a highly limited and lop-sided disarmament which would give the
Western powers predominance over the Soviet Union and other
peace-loving states, the U. S. insists on an ineffective system of
control, rather far-reaching in one definite respect only, and
reiterates its demands that the Soviet Union agree to controlled
disarmament being substituted by control without radical
disarmament.

I would like to repeat that no matter now important is the
problem of controls, it only manifests the differences but
does not constitute their essence. The essence of the differences
with regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament
lies in the very method of its solution and associated tendencies.

It is in this light that we must evaluate the two draft
treaties so as to help our governments to find more quickly a
compromise solution and give the world at last a single treaty
which will mark a new state in the development of international
relations.

"Peoples are interested in disarmament negotiations as
such", states the memorandum of the Soviet Government dated
March 15th, 1965, "and not in new programmes or other docu-
ments of which quite a lot have been compiled in the past and
which do not advance the matter in any way. They are interested
in the final outcome of the negotiations, i. e. in an agreement
treaty on general and complete disarmament." And this is
very true. It is our duty to use all our knowledge, efforts and

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influence to promote the solution of the urgent problem - to deliver
mankind for ever from the horrors of a destructive war.

Many discussions and arguments sprang up among the
scientists of the world who try to provide scientific support for
various approaches to the solution of the disarmament problem.

As a result of these discussions two groups of scientists
emerge ever more clearly whose differences concern the very
crux of the problem. Naturally, no clear-cut dividing line
can be drawn between the two groups. An individual capable
of genuinely creative thinking tends to reconsider his former
views under the influence of reality. This process may be
extremely painful and controversial, it may produce a multitude
of various connotations which distinguish today's outlook from
yesterday's.

The first group, which in the U.S. and in a number of
West European countries is closely tied in with the military-
industrial complex, advocates the expansion of arms saying that
the orders for rocket-nuclear weapons will inevitably increase,
which, strange as it may sound, will lead to the strengthening of
peace. This group includes certain scientists employed by
Rand Corporation and some others.

The scientists and public figures in the second group
realise the dangers of the present world situation and promote
the idea of reduction of armaments and radical disarmament.
The peace activities of such public figures and outstanding
physicists as Mr. Noel-Baker, L. Szilard, B. Bethe and Bohr
and many others are well known; such scientists as psychologists
Prof. C. Osgood and A. Etzioni, who actively seek the way to
disarmament have proposed a theory of gradual steps towards re-
laxation of international tension and disarmament.

Studying the problems of cosmic space and properties
of atomic nucleus we are used to taking a broad view of the
matter and examining different possible solutions of the problems.
In the field of international relations we are likewise ready to
discuss any proposals aiming at stopping the arms race, at
improving mutual understanding and promoting friendly relations

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IX:4

between states. Along with this, however, any objective person
understands the difference between the increase and decrease of
armaments, between full-scale preparation for war and full-scale
preparation for peace.

We Soviet scientists are well aware that the theories for
the perfection of armaments and strategic plans, the theories
dealing with the building of underground shelters and depots are
nothing but practical and psychological preparation for war,
whose consequences for mankind will be much graver than "experts"
on thermo-nuclear warfare maintain.

At the same time various theories, basically rational,
concerning the destruction of armaments, promotion of international
economic, scientific and cultural ties, international organizations,
research into the social, psychological and national peculiarities
and interests of other nations aimed at improving mutual understand-
ing meet with our great interest and support. We hold definite
views of our own with regard to the timing and methods of disarma-
ment, as well as to the various methods of international control,
some of which are actually used even now. Of course, we
cannot sacrifice our ideological principles, but the important
thing is that one of our major principles - the peaceful coexistence
of different social systems - provides for peaceful settlement of
disputes between the states with different social structure, for
the development of all countries, for co-operation with all those
who share at least some of the ideals in which we believe and
which have an objective scientific basis.

The idea of general and complete disarmament and peaceful
co-existence of states promoted by the U. S. S. R. is much broader
than some of our Western colleagues believe. It includes not only
reduction and subsequent complete destruction of armaments, not
only a mere negation of war; we believe that along with disarmament
a whole system of international security, new international
bodies, and, if necessary, international police force must be set
up. Application of international law will expand radically.
Co-operation will be promoted between the states with different
social systems in political, economical, scientific and cultural
fields. We also believe that under these conditions progressive,
democratic tendencies of development will be intensified in the
whole world. Of course, society will not remain frozen in one

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IX:4

ideal state. Apparently there will be considerable changes and conflicts. But I would like to emphasize that disarmament paves the way for progressive changes while the arms race and wars are the most reactionary phenomena of our times. Assuming that we are all guided by a common desire and realise the necessity to strive for an agreement about general and complete disarmament, we must think of how co-operation among the scientists of the whole world can be made as effective as possible, so as to find a creative scientific approach to the practical solution of this urgent problem by a comprehensive study of the variants that have been so far proposed, and by examining new ideas; a more purposeful co-operation becomes necessary. Besides, we must have regular and systematic discussions of the main problem - the problem of general disarmament - as well as of the specific measures designed to ease the international tension.

I suggest that a leading body elected by all those present here should elaborate a series of measures for the near future. This system of measures might be referred to as the "International Year for Preparation of Disarmament". The measures to be undertaken within the framework of this system might include the international co-ordination of the already existing national scientific groups for disarmament, the setting-up of an international group for disarmament, holding of colloquiums, exchange of the results of scientific research into the problem of disarmament, strengthening of the social position of the scientists, drafting by the scientists of the three groups of states of the solutions for various problems of disarmament and control.

All these measures will be carried on and intensified until a practical agreement is reached on the disarmament plan approved by the governments of East and West. Thus we could fulfil our duty to mankind, make the best and real contribution to prevention of a thermo-nuclear catastrophe which now threatens the world, and by our incessant efforts make the best account to our conscience and to that of the present and future generations.

Having come close to our cherished dream - a world without arms - each of us will have the right to say, paraphrasing the well-known quotation "I have done a good deed and saved my soul".

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 2.6.

Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
Working Group II:

Note by N.F.Mott

The fifth McCloy-Zorin principle states that "All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the Treaty could any group of states gain military advantage, and that security is ensured equally for all."

If security is to be ensured equally for all, security must be ensured for Europe and other countries as well as the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

The Soviet draft treaty proposes in Stage I the elimination of means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the reduction of the armed forces of the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union to 1,700,000 each, and that of other countries to "agreed levels".

I would ask our Soviet colleagues to explain how these "agreed levels" will be determined - in accordance with the fifth McCloy-Zorin principle. It must be remembered that the American forces, according to the Soviet draft Treaty, will have returned to their own country, together with their tanks and heavy equipment, and that their bases in Europe will be destroyed. Moreover, it seems that article 10, para 2, prohibits joint defensive planning even by European states.

It is clear that, unless the "agreed levels" for European States is substantial and unless the European States remain joined in an alliance until the end of Stage III, the Fifth McCloy-Zorin principle cannot be implemented. Europe would be vulnerable to a Soviet armoured threat before the United States could send much military support. Philip Noel-Baker (para 53 of his memo) has therefore suggested that all tanks, mobile artillery, etc. be abolished in Stage I, thereby making conventional attack as well as nuclear attack impossible.

I am the last to believe that the Soviet Union would in fact attack West Europe at the end of Stage I if they could with impunity - any more than I think that the United States would in fact launch a counterforce first strike on the U.S.S.R. if it had the capacity and the necessary exact information. I think either course of action is almost inconceivable. But we all know that these fears exist. Therefore I think that it is essential to adhere to the fifth McCloy-Zorin principle if we are to have any hope of agreement.

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IX WG 2.6.

I would therefore like to suggest, while nuclear means of delivery are being eliminated (or, as second best, reduced to minimum deterrent level on U.S. and Soviet territory only) that the working group discusses, for conventional weapons, a Stage I(A) and a Stage I(B), as follows:

Stage I(A)

Reduction of conventional armed forces, armed with heavy equipment, to a level such that there is real balance between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces; U.S. forces to remain in Europe *if necessary* to achieve this.

Stage I(B)

Abolition of all tanks and mobile artillery; return of all U.S. forces to the territory of the United States.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 3.6

<u>Some remarks about Berlin as the place for an Intercontinental Science Centre</u>

by G. Burkhardt

1. Introductory remarks

At the 7th Pugwash Conference at Stowe/Vermont the proposal had been made to create an intercontinental Centre of "big science" with the aim to promote international cooperation in science and to conduct big research-projects which would eventually be beyond the capacity of any single nation. This centre would comprise mainly research on ultra-high-energy-physics (particle-accelerator of about 300 GeV), ultra-heavy element chemistry, macromolecular biology, health research etc. with a large-scale computer as nucleus. A capital investment of about $5 x 10^9$ was envisaged.

In the discussion there was brought up the idea to locate this
centre at Berlin. This indeed is a very fascinating and inspiring idea:
Science as the most characteristic and fundamental feature of our
century - combined and concentrated in a huge world-centre; world-wide
collaboration as the promise of bridging the gap between East and West,
and this centre in Berlin, which now is a striking symbol of this
divided world, the place where the two opposing systems are in closer
contact than anywhere else in the world!

The proposal had been discussed in circles of educated and
politically interested people in Germany during the last year and has
found a vivid and mostly consenting resonance. No doubt, it would have
raised a much broader resonance and enthusiasm in a large part of the
German population, if more publicity had been given to it by the great
newspapers. The governments of both the German states have shown a
rather reserved and sceptical attitude to this idea.

The numerous difficulties, inherent to this plan, must not be
overlooked, but they are not unsurmountable. Inspite of a good deal of
utopian appearance, this plan seems to be more realistic and to offer
a more hopeful promise of a lasting solution of the Berlin-problem than
any other proposal made by anyone on this question up to now.

The events of the last days at Berlin have again brought the danger
of the present situation to the public eye. They demonstrate the
urgency of looking for a way out of this unstable situation. Therefore,
the proposal to build an international science centre in Berlin should
be kept in mind and further discussed. In the following some data are
given about the social and economic status of the city and some short

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IX WG3.6

### 3. Political aspects

Regarding the future political status of Berlin, the following three types can be considered:

(a) The Science-Centre is established in West-Berlin maintaining the present political status of this city.

The existing close connection between West-Berlin and the Fed.Rep. of Germany is maintained. Western troops remain stationed in West-Berlin to guarantee the invulnerability of its territory, wholly enclosed by the German Democratic Republic. The free access is warranted by international treaty.

This type of political status will probably be technically the easiest to realise. In comparison with the now existing status of West-Berlin it has the advantage of creating a stronger "raison d'être" for Berlin as an independent city. This proposal would very probably find the assent of the Bundesregierung and the Senate of West-Berlin, but it would probably be opposed by the nations of the Eastern block.

Indeed it would not offer a really satisfying solution of the problem. The status of this city, quite unnaturally divided into two antagonistic parts, with a wall between them, would not really be changed; the tensions and frictions along the border would persist.

As a first step however, which gradually would be transformed in status, characterized under paragraph (c), this proposal deserves serious consideration. Just now, in the existing political status, some international scientific institutions as precursors of the large scientific centre could be established there.

(b) The Science-Centre is established in West-Berlin which gets an international status.

The same objections must be raised against this proposal as in (a). By internationalizing one part of the city, the existing tensions caused by the unnatural division would really not be reduced. Incidents at the border would continue to endanger the peace of the world.

The problem of approval by the governments would surely be reversed: the proposal might be approved by the governments of the Eastern alliance. It would certainly be refused by the Bundesregierung and the Senate of West-Berlin because they feel the position of the city, if it were independent of the government of East-Germany, would be weakened in international status.

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IX WG3.6

(c) Total Berlin as an international city becomes the seat of
the Scientific Centre.

This would be the only solution which does justice to the problem
in its full dimension, at the same time it is the most difficult one to
achieve. The total territory of East- and West-Berlin will become
international territory belonging neither to the Bundesrepublik nor to
the German Democratic Republik, but will form one unity. Such a
neutral territory would offer the best possibilities for fruitful
cooperation of scientists from East and West, with the common aim to
contribute to the welfare of mankind by scientific work. Moreover,
the much larger area and capacity of the whole city would make it
technically easier to establish the planned cluster of research
institutes.

But there is one grave obstacle, which seriously weakens this
solution: the capital of the DDR has to be removed from East-Berlin
to another city in eastern Germany. As a German myself I am inclined
to regard the present location of both German capitals, Bonn and East-
Berlin, as a provisional arrangement. Therefore, a proposal to shift
one or both of these capitals to another place seems to me not wholly
an immoral suggestion, if it would create a new, more stable and
favourable situation for both parts of Germany as well as for the whole
world. The city of Berlin, taken out from the East-West-antagonism,
would then constitute the ideal platform to raise to a higher level the
relationship between the two now existing German states - a proving-
ground for coexistence.

There are of course a number of other difficulties connected with
the internationalizing of Berlin, especially in economic and administra-
tive respects, which shall be mentioned here only briefly.

There must be a government of the Community, elected by the
population of Berlin. Coordinated to it there should be a council
comprizing members from countries belonging to the existing western
and eastern alliances and from nonaligned countries in equal numbers.
The military security of the city, guaranteed by an UN-police-force,
and the administration of the Science Centre itself would be the
responsibility of this council.

The viability of a city of 4 million people cannot be warranted by
the Science-Centre alone. The existing economic capacity of the town
must be maintained. The very close entanglement of the economy in West-
Berlin with the Fed. Rep. and of East-Berlin with the DDR raises many
problems. These difficulties may be overcome only by establishing a
separate currency in the territory of Berlin, the rate of exchange with
the currencies in the Fed. Rep. of Germany and the DDR being fixed in
an appropriate way; the Berlin-currency would have to be guaranteed by
the World-bank. All these problems demand a thorough discussion by a
special committee of experts.

Cambridge 1962

WG 1:5

IXth Pugwash Conference on Science and
World Affairs

Chemical weapons, as weapons of mass destruction,
must be banned and destroyed.

M. M. DUBININ

In the reports which I made at the 5th and 6th Pugwash Conferences I
noted that over the past ten to fifteen years there has been intensive work on
new poisonous substances and on methods of their use in warfare. As a result
of this, the power of chemical weapons has increased enormously, their power
of destruction has increased and the potential for the production of poisonous
substances has grown immeasurably. The reliable military value of poisonous
substances used during the First World War has long since gone and their place
has been taken by new substances, which make it possible to obtain the necessary
military effects for a fraction of the cost. Of primary importance among these
are the nerve-paralysing (phosphoro-organic) poisonous substances and substances
which remove personnel from active service as a result of their action on the
human mind.

The exceptionally high destructive properties of nerve-paralysing poisonous substances which latter were known fairly early on - substances such as zarin (isopropide ether methyldiphospine acid) and zoman (pinopotassium ether methyldiphospine acid) have been surpassed many times over by newer phosphoro-organic substances from the dialkydoaminoalkyltiphosphorous acids group. These have a truly fantastic toxicity 1,2. We have no basis for asserting that this sorry progress to seek out substances of still greater toxicity has ceased. The characteristics of the new substances in this group lie in their destructive action on the organism of a person, not only through the respiratory system but also through skin surfaces. This has made tremendously complex the problem of defence against such substances, in particular, defence of the civilian population.

According to their group, the psychic poisonous substances produce either
temporary physical weakness (for example, paralysis, blindness or deafness), or
lead to temporary psychic disturbances 3. Among these substances are those
which can have their effect in concentrations similar to those of the nerve
paralysing poisonous substances 3.

At the 6th Pugwash Conference I made an elementary calculation which led me
to a conclusion which was not refuted in discussion, whereby it may be asserted
in summary form that the potential effectiveness of modern chemical weapons
(using modern means of delivery) is in general comparable with the effectiveness
of conventional atomic weapons such as, for example, a medium-calibre atomic bomb
(the equivalent of about 20,000 tons of TNT).

It therefore follows that modern chemical weapons are indeed weapons of
mass destruction and are a serious danger to humanity. This danger continues to
grow in measure as science and technology progresses and the means of chemical
warfare improve.

2.

WG 1:5

Cambridge 1962

The objectives of the action of chemical weapons have in the past few years been extended from man to plant food resources which ensure life for men. The sorry experience of the use of substances which destroy plant life is still fresh in the memory of all participants in the Conference. A progress as great in agricultural technology as the invention of selective action herbicides for the destruction of weeds among cultivated plants i.e. the carrying out of chemical weed destruction by using modern methods of mechanisation - has been used to invent overall action herbicides. One can quote as an example of a substance of this kind, well-known from the literature, dimethyl arsenous acid. Doses of such herbicides for the overall destruction of plant life are approximately these or smaller doses than those typical of the military use of substances like mustard gas, which have been known for a long time. I am leaving out of this the extremely obvious cases, the possibility of the application of chemical weapons for the destruction of cattle, the infection of cattle-fodder, the contamination of water, etc.

Apart from the elaboration of new substances and methods of their military use, organisational military measures are being carried out, testifying to preparations for the military use of chemical weapons on a large scale. According to a report by U.P., for example, in the United States army a special bacteriological and chemical corps has been created, and its budget for the current year has been doubled 1.

All Soviet citizens and Soviet scientists in particular look upon chemical weapons, alongside atomic, thermo-nuclear and biological weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, the use of which is compatible with humanitarian demands and the standards of international law. Chemical weapons, therefore, and other varieties of weapons of mass destruction should be banned, and all types of chemical weapons, in the possession of armies, in stores and repositories, should be immobilised and destroyed.

In the majority of cases the production of poisonous substances is closely linked with the chemical industry producing for peaceful purposes. This applies in particular to the production of nerve-paralysing poisonous substances. In many countries the production of phosphoro-organic insecticides such as paration, sistox, and malaton, is being widely developed. There is no real difficulty in turning the production of these insecticides into the preparation of phosphoro-organic poisonous substances, for example, zarin or zoman. In a similar fashion, the production of psycho-poisonous substances is closely tied up with the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, which have developed enormously in a number of countries.

Only within the framework of general and complete disarmament under strict international control can the problem of the complete destruction of all kinds of chemical weapons with the simultaneous destruction of all means of their military use, transport and special provisions and adaptations for the keeping and storing of this type of weapon, be solved. There should be a simultaneous, complete ban on their production of all types of poisonous substances and all means and adaptations for their military application, transport and storage.

Cambridge 1962

3.

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The inspectors of the international disarmament organisation will not only control the destruction of chemical weapons, but permanently see to it that chemical products in all countries are used only for peaceful purposes.

The whole Soviet people, all Soviet scientists, warmly support the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament under strict international control, which is the key to a peaceful and happy life for the whole of mankind.

August 13, 1962.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Tammelin, L.E., *Acta Chem. Scand.* II, 859, 1340, 1738 (1957).

2. Tammelin, L.E., *Svensk Kemisk Tidskrift*, 70, 4 (1958); Larsson, L., 70, 10 (1958).

3. *Report of the Committee on Science and Astronautics*, U.S. House of Representatives, No.23, Washington, 1959 (this Report was distributed to participants at the 5th Pugwash Conference).

N.B.

All examples of poisonous substances and their characteristics are taken from my reports to the 5th and 6th Pugwash Conferences. The proposal for the destruction of chemical weapons and control is taken from the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

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"Problems of Conventional Disarmament
in Stages I and II"

Philip Noel-Baker

The Importance of Conventional Disarmament

1. Since 1945, attention has been chiefly concentrated on nuclear disarmament; indeed, it is still often suggested that, in order to make resort to nuclear weapons less likely, conventional armaments should be increased.

2. The major Governments have, in theory, rejected this view, and have declared that conventional and nuclear disarmament must be begun together in Stages I and II. The reasons in favour of this view are:

(i) Even for the nuclear powers, conventional forces and weapons absorb about 85% of their Defence Budgets; for all other nations, 100%.

(ii) The constant improvement of conventional weapons by military research and development, and the consequent obsolescence of existing weapons, involve large-scale and increasing waste.

(iii) A general war, even if fought only with the improved conventional forces and weapons of today, might imperil the future of civilization no less than a nuclear conflict.

(iv) It might be very difficult to prevent a conventional war from escalating into war in which every kind of weapon was employed.

3. For these reasons:

(i) The Soviet Draft Treaty presented to the Committee of 18 proposes the abolition of something between 50% and 60% of the Soviet Union's conventional armaments in Stage I, i.e., within 21 months; with further large reductions in Stage II.

(ii) The US Outline of Basic Provisions proposes the abolition of 30% in Stage I, and a further 35% in Stage II, i.e., 65% within six years.

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# The Factors of Conventional Armed Strength to be Dealt with in a Disarmament Treaty

4. In 1954, the UK Delegation put in a paper to the UN defining the factors of military strength with which a Disarmament Treaty must deal. They included:

(i) Manpower;

(ii) Weapons, for use on land, sea, or air;

(iii) Other warlike equipment and installations;

(iv) Military, naval and air transport;

(v) Arms factories, proving-grounds and research stations;

(vi) Land, Naval and Air Bases;

(vii) Dockyard, tank and aircraft repair depots;

(viii) Budgetary appropriations for all forms of military preparation.

## Manpower

5. Conventional weapons are now of far greater importance than manpower; it has been said that an Army of 50,000 men with the conventional weapons of 1962 could defeat an Army of a million who had only the weapons of 1914.

6. Nevertheless, when in 1952 the US, UK and France first proposed their manpower ceilings of "1 or at most 1.5 million men" for the forces of the major powers, and 1% of population for other nations, they declared that "a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element" in any disarmament programme. They gave three reasons:

"(a) All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

"(b) A substantial reduction of armed forces ... in itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression.

"(c) Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces, minimising the likelihood and fear of successful aggression, should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the armaments supporting these armed forces."¹

7. The "numerical limitation" proposed by the US, UK and France was to be a global limitation on the total manpower of the Army, Navy and Air Force of each signatory nation.

¹ cmd. 8589. May 28, 1952.

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12. The real gap between the Soviet and US proposals, however, may be even greater than the above figures make it appear.

13. For the Soviet figures of 1,700,000 and 1,000,000 include not only "enlisted officers and men", but also "civilian employees".

14. The US "Basic Provisions" only speak of "appropriate arrangements ... to ensure that civilian employment .. would be in accordance with the objectives of the obligations respecting force levels". This appears to mean that civilians employed by the Armed Forces would be additional to the 2,100,000 proposed by the US at the end of Stage I.

15. Since some Western Governments now employ many civilians to do jobs which used to be done by men in uniform (e.g., US approximately 1,250,000; UK 350,000), this is another major difference between the Soviet and US proposals.

16. The question of civilian employees does not appear to have been considered yet in the Committee of 18.

17. The method by which manpower is limited must be capable of application both to forces which consist of long-term professional soldiers, sailors and airmen, and to forces which consist principally, or largely, of short-term conscripts.

18. It must also provide guarantees that signatory Governments will not be able to build up secret reserves of trained manpower in violation of the Treaty, without detection by UN Inspectors.

19. These requirements involve a number of technical problems, solutions for which are suggested in Appendix I.

20. It should be noted that both the Soviet and the US proposals for Stages I and II (see page 3) envisage a level of manpower which is very high in comparison with the military establishments of Governments before the second World War.

In 1938-9, Hitler's standing forces were as follows:

Army: 750,000
Navy: 50,000
Air: 206,000
Total: 1,006,000

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Weapons & Equipment: "Qualitative" Disarmament

21. While reduction and limitation of manpower must be a "major element" in Stages I and II of a Disarmament Treaty, it would be unacceptable, and relatively worthless, unless limitations were also placed on the armament with which the permitted manpower remaining at the end of each Stage is equipped.

22. These limitations must apply both to the *quality* (i.e., the destructive power and other desirable characteristics), and to the *quantity* of permitted weapons and equipment.

23. In pre-1939 discussions on Disarmament, primary emphasis was laid on the *quality* of permitted weapons; and there was wide agreement that, if any effective Treaty was to be made, it must be founded on the principle of what was called "Qualitative Disarmament".

24. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt defined this principle as follows:

> "Modern weapons of offence are vastly stronger than modern weapons of defence.

> If all nations will agree wholly to eliminate from possession and use weapons which make possible a successful attack, defences automatically will become impregnable, and the frontiers and independence of every nation will become secure."

25. It was generally agreed in 1933 that, in the light of the experience of the first World War, the "weapons of offence" included:

- Tanks and other armoured vehicles;

- Mobile artillery of over 4" calibre;

- Poison gases;

- All military aircraft and Air Force installations and equipment;

- Capital ships (battleships and armoured cruisers) of over 10,000 tons displacement;

- Aircraft carriers;

- Submarines.

26. Since 1933, the power of weapons of offence has very greatly increased. In 1957, the British Minister of Defence, Mr. Duncan Sandys, said that "the power of defence is, for the time being, at a very low ebb, in relation to the power of attack." This has become increasingly true, with every

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succeeding year. It is true, not only of the "modern" mass-
destruction weapons, but also of the weapons which are called
'conventional'.

27. In 1958, the Western delegations to the Geneva Con-
ference on Measures to Prevent Surprise Attack, drew up a list
of weapons which would help an aggressor to make a successful
surprise attack. This list included all the weapons classified
as "weapons of offence" in 1933, together with the "modern"
nuclear weapons, and the new means of delivery - rockets,
missiles, pilotless aircraft, etc.

28. If the purpose of a Disarmament Treaty is to increase
national security, and to reduce the danger of successful
aggression, then it is clearly desirable that the weapons of
offence should be abolished as completely and as rapidly as
possible.

Large strides towards this objective should be made in
Stages I and II.

29. Some general considerations about the application of the principle of Qualitative Disarmament to Air, Sea and Land armaments may be useful.

Air

30. The second World War showed that, in a conflict where only conventional armament was used, military aircraft were the most important of all weapons. They played a predominant part in all the campaigns from the first assault on Poland to the final collapse of Germany and Japan.

31. Long distance air bombardment became a vitally impor-
tant strategic factor in the winning of the war. But aircraft
also played a decisive role in land battles, and in attacks
on warships and merchant vessels.

32. Above all, aircraft proved to be the most effective weapons of attack. They were the indispensable instruments without which offensive operations by which all the early aggressions of the Axis were carried through, and with which the counter-offensives of the Allies could not have succeeded.

33. The aircraft of 1962 are still more pre-eminently weapons of offence; they are much harder to intercept, and much less efficient for any purpose of defence, than the aircraft of Hitler's war.

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## Sea

34. The same is true of Navies. Before 1939, Hitler said to Rauschning: "Aircraft and the U-boat have turned surface fleets into the playthings of the wealthy democracies".

The War, and all subsequent naval developments, have proved him right. Today Navies consist primarily of aircraft carriers and submarines.

35. The submarine has proved itself in two wars to be pre-eminently a weapon of offence. Some authorities believe that nuclear powered submarines may be capable of defending convoys, and of hunting the enemy's nuclear-powered submarines. This is disputed: what is undisputed is that the nuclear-powered submarine is far more effective for purposes of offence than its predecessor.

36. The US Assistant Secretary for the Navy said of the first super-aircraft carrier, the "Forrestal", that it was capable of deep invasion of an aggressor's land mass". Equally, an aggressor's carriers would be capable of deep invasion of its victim's land mass.

37. Aircraft carriers are particularly vulnerable to bomber or missile attack. One US Admiral said, in answer to the argument that the Forrestal could travel 15 miles during the 25 minutes it would take a Russian missile to arrive: "I would not want to be within 15 miles of an H bomb."

38. But during those 25 minutes the carrier could launch its offensive onslaught on the enemy. In theory, and in practice, the carrier is pre-eminently a weapon of offence. Neither Pearl Harbour in 1941, nor the Suez Operation of 1956, could have been attempted without carriers.

## Land

39. Apart from the miscalled "tactical" nuclear weapons, the main armament of Land Armies now consists of "armour" (tanks and other armoured vehicles), and heavy and medium mobile artillery. These proved themselves in the Second World War to be pre-eminently weapons of offence.¹

¹ "The tank is now a familiar, conventional weapon; it was the tank that overran vast areas of Europe, and was responsible for the deaths of millions, and the enslavement of millions more." Marshal of the RAF Sir J. Slessor, "Strategy for the West", p. 16.

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With the large-scale development of fire-weapons, it
may be said that modern armies have been equipped to overcome
the power of national defence, and utterly to destroy the
country attacked.

Application of the Principle of Qualitative Disarmament in
the Proposals now being Discussed in Geneva.

40. It is clear from what has been said that the most effective measures of conventional disarmament in Stages I and II, and the measure most likely to reduce tensions and exorcise the fear of sudden, unprovoked aggression, would be the abolition or large-scale reduction of the armaments classified as "weapons of offence" in 1933, or as "-weapons that assist surprise attack" in 1958.

41. The Soviet Draft Treaty applies this principle in respect of the "means of delivery", or "vehicles by which the nuclear and other mass-destruction weapons can be used." It proposes the total abolition of these vehicles in Stage I, i.e., within 21 months, together with the total prohibition of their manufacture.

42. The vehicles are defined as including any of the
following means of transport that are capable of delivering
nuclear etc. weapons:

(i) rockets or missiles of all ranges;

(ii) pilotless aircraft;

(iii) launching pads, ramps and platforms, except those
required for peaceful space research;

(iv) military aircraft;

(v) surface warships;

(vi) submarines;

(vii) artillery systems.

43. No attempt is made in the Soviet Draft Treaty to lay
down the horse-power, unladen weight, displacement tonnage,
or other characteristics of the vehicles which are deemed
to be "capable of delivering nuclear weapons".

Technical solutions can, of course, be found for the
questions which this detailed definition of the "means of
delivery" will raise. But the negotiations on the matter may
be complex.

44. No discussion on the matter appears to have taken
place in the Committee of 18.

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45. The abolition of the means of delivery in Stage I was not originally a Soviet idea. It was first proposed in the UK; then taken up by M. Moch, and urged in the UN General Assembly and in the Committee of Ten; it was endorsed by the British Foreign Secretary, and by President de Gaulle. It was only after this had happened that Mr. Khrushchev transferred it to Stage I of his Plan of June 2nd, 1962.

46. If carried out, it would, of course, be in itself a major measure of disarmament, and ceteris paribus, it would greatly reduce world tensions and the present fear of sudden aggression.

47. But it is not clear that other things are equal. The Soviet Draft proposes the simultaneous abolition of all military bases maintained by any nation on foreign soil, and the withdrawal of all troops to their own country.

It has been strongly argued that this is inconsistent with the 5th McCloy-Zorin Principle:

> "All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the Treaty could any group of States gain military advantage, and that security is ensured equally for all."

48. This presumably means gaining military advantage as compared with the balance of the present status quo. If so, the Soviet proposals would seem to give them a military advantage in two ways:

(i) According to the US Secretary for Defence and Assistant Secretary, the US have many more "vehicles" than the Soviet Union; if so, total abolition by both will mean a military gain to the Soviet Union.

(ii) The abolition of Bases on foreign soil and withdrawal of foreign troops to their native countries would greatly weaken the strategic position of NATO Air, Sea and Land Forces compared with the strategic position of the forces of the Soviet Union.

49. This military gain to the Soviet Union would be largely offset, if the Soviet Government were also to propose the application of the principle of Qualitative Disarmament to Land forces.

The abolition in Stages I of all Land weapons which assist attack against defence (i.e., tanks etc., and heavy and medium artillery) would largely remove the Western fear

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that Europe could be overrun during Stage I and II by
superior Soviet Land Forces.

50. The Soviet Government, however, have not proposed
this, and their Draft Treaty thus seems difficult to reconcile
with the fifth McCloy-Zorin principle.

51. The same is true of the US Basic Provisions:

(i) The manpower level of 2.1 million men proposed for
the US and Soviet Union in Stage I would mean a reduction for
the US of 400,000 men, or 16% of present strength; for the
Soviet Union a reduction of 1.7 million; or 44%.

(ii) A 30% cut of all weapons "across the board" might give
no military gain to either side in some types of conventional
armament.

On the means of delivery, however, it would appear to
give the US a large military gain. If what Mr. McNamara and
Mr. Gilpatric say about US strength is true, then a 30% cut
would operate to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union pre-
cisely as the one-third cut in Forces proposed by the Soviet
Union ten years ago would at that time have given the Soviet
Union a military gain.

52. It may be impossible to secure agreement for anything
like a strict application of the fifth Zorin-McCloy principle.

And, perhaps, it is unnecessary to do so. If general
and complete disarmament is to be carried through in a
relatively short period of years, a rough balance of strength,
giving "military gains" in some regards to the US, and in
other regards to the Soviet Union, may seem acceptable to both,
and certainly less risky than the continuance of the Arms Race.

53. As suggested above, the best way to eliminate "mili-
tary gains" to either side might be to abolish in Stage I
all the "means of delivery" on the one hand, and all the Land
"weapons of offence" (tanks, etc., mobile artillery) on the
other.

But it is most unlikely that the US will accept the
first, or that the Soviet Union will accept the second. If
agreement is to be reached, concessions must be made by both
sides. A reasonable compromise would be for both to accept
in Stage I a 50% reduction of the means of delivery on the
one hand, and of the Land weapons of offence on the other.

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54. In any case, this question of "military gains" to the US and Soviet Union inherent in their respective plans, and of the amount of disarmament in manpower and weapons to be accomplished in the first three years after the Treaty is signed - this, and not Inspection and Control, - is the real crux of the problem which confronts the Committee of 18. Until they face it, and seek a middle way between the US and Soviet proposals, it is unlikely that they will make substantial progress.

55. Suggestions are made in Appendix 2 about the technical methods by which different classes of conventional weapons can most conveniently be reduced and limited during Stages I and II.

## Military Research and Development

56. Another vital question which must be dealt with in Stage I is that of Military Research and Development.

The present expenditure on Research and Development is astronomical ($8,400m for the US in 1960, and no doubt as much for the Soviet Union); and it is continually increasing. Dr. Herman Kahn has asserted that this expenditure is now producing a complete revolution in weapons systems in a period of four years; and that the period may become less.

57. If this is allowed to continue, no stable balance of strength can result from any Disarmament Treaty that may be signed.

Yet the US Basic Provisions appear to suggest that nothing shall be done about Military Research for six years. It is not clear that even in Stage III all military research would be specifically forbidden, although this may be the intention of Stage III, Section E, paras. 1 and 2 of the US Draft.

58. The Soviet Draft Treaty makes it plain that all Military Research must be abolished in Stage III, together with all other military establishments and activities.

But there appear to be no adequate provisions in Stages I and II.

59. In any case, Military Research and Development is a factor of conventional military strength, which in 1962 is of fundamental importance. The Committee of 18 should immediately institute a study of the provisions required to secure its abolition at the earliest possible date.

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This would not be nearly so difficult a process as is often supposed, provided drastic measures of Inspection, international scientific cooperation and budgetary control are accepted.

## Budgetary Reduction and Limitation

60. It is not clear in either the US or the Soviet proposals at what point in the Disarmament process a full system of budgetary reduction and limitation of all military expenditure is to be set up.

61. It is doubtful whether any "partial" measure, such as appears to be suggested in Article 13, paras. 1-3, of the Soviet Draft Treaty, would succeed.

62. A full system, however, would be a most valuable supplementary means of verifying that the obligations of a Disarmament Treaty are faithfully observed.

63. Its efficacy in this regard would depend on the right to verify budgetary information by inspection, not only of military estimates, accounts etc., but of the forces and armaments actually maintained.

This might be done by a "sampling" system; in any case, it need not compromise the secrecy of missile-launching sites.

64. It would be desirable to establish such a system of Budgetary Reduction and Control as soon as possible. The technical proposals worked out by the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932 are still relevant.

## Concluding Notes

65. This paper is about conventional disarmament, and not about Inspection and Control. But it must be repeated that the main difference between the US and Soviet proposals is not about Inspection and Control, but about the amount of disarmament to be accomplished in the first and second stages, and about how many months or years these stages should last. If agreement on these points could be reached, the problem of Inspection might be much easier to solve. It is urgently important that the order of discussion in Geneva should be reversed, and that the problems of disarmament should be tackled before the problems of Inspection. Of course, no Government would be bound by any provisional agreement on disarmament measures, until agreement on Inspection had also been reached.

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66. The Soviet Draft Treaty proposes that more drastic disarmament should be carried out more quickly than the US Basic Provisions, especially with regard to the "means of delivery", manpower and conventional armament.

There would be no technical difficulty in carrying out the Soviet proposals; on the contrary, large-scale reductions rapidly executed may be technically simpler than less ambitious measures. In the present world situation, the arguments in favour of rapid action are very strong, and speak for themselves.

The main difficulty lies in securing the political decisions required, particularly in the United States. It should be recognized that if President Kennedy could obtain Congressional agreement to the abolition of two-thirds of the existing armaments within six years, it would be a studious achievement. Six years is only the period that has elapsed since the Suez War.

67. The Governments have not shown the zeal in pursuing the present negotiations for General and Complete Disarmament which they promised in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Declaration of March 1961; in President Kennedy's speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1961; in the letters exchanged between Mr. Khrushchev, President Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan in February 1962; and in the opening speeches of the Foreign Ministers in the Committee of 18. The Government of the UK, for example, has given to the Common Market many times the effort that has been given to Disarmament; yet, on any rational view of world affairs, the Common Market is a matter of comparatively minor importance.

But zeal is not enough. If a Disarmament Treaty is to be made, there must be major concessions by both East and West. So long as the delegates in the Committee are junior Ministers or officials, with instructions to stand firm on their own Governments' proposals, there will be no Treaty, and the arms race will go on.

68. The arms race is itself the greatest danger to the Committee of 18. President Kennedy came into office pledged to strengthen US defences; in his first few weeks he added $3,000 million to the military budget, and in his first year increased it by 25%; Congress voted 800 Minutemen.

Mr. Khrushchev replied by stalling on a Test Ban; by cancelling the reduction of Soviet manpower from 3.8 million to 2.4 million; by conducting a series of multi-megaton tests;

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and by an intensified programme of intercontinental missiles. It is plain from the records of the Committee of 18 that, while the tone of the discussions is generally polite, the attitude of the delegations is one of deep suspicion.

It is probably not practical politics to get a stand-
still agreement on defence expenditure; but it is eminently
desirable that the Governments should recognize that the
massive annual increase of armaments does not create a good
atmosphere for the preparation of a Treaty for General and
Complete Disarmament.

69. It is now often said that a disarmed world will be more
dangerous than the armed world of 1962.

In reply it may be suggested that general and complete
disarmament would produce the military result described by
President Roosevelt in the Statement quoted in para. 24
above. It would be so fundamental and momentous a reform
in the conduct of human affairs that its psychological effect
would be immeasurable. In any case, the Governments have now
committed themselves without reserve to this reform; failure
would be a very grave disaster for mankind.

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Appendix I

Manpower: Land Forces

1. The Treaty of Versailles imposed a tactical organiza-
tion on the permitted German Army, laying down the number
of divisions, regiments, battalions, batteries, and other
units which it might maintain, the number of effectives in
each unit, etc. It would be exceedingly difficult to secure
general agreement on any such tactical organization for
the first two stages of the disarmament process. Nor is it
necessary to do so, if the methods proposed below are
adopted.

2. It is certain that the majority of nations will refuse to give up conscription during the first two stages. This means that some method must be found of equating conscripts with long-term volunteers.

3. It is generally agreed:

(a) that the long-term professional is of greater military value than the conscript;

(b) that the shorter the conscript's service, the more quickly does the effect of his training wear off;

(c) that if the period of service is short enough, the conscript will not be capable of playing a part in offensive operations;

(d) that even if the period is longer, he will only be useful as a trained reserve for a short period of years.

4. Discussion of these points led the League of Nations Preparatory Commission to propose that the limitation of "man days with the Colours" could be used to limit both effectives "with the Colours" and "trained reserves" by a common method applicable both to conscript Armies and to long-term volunteers.

5. To secure a balance in the military value of a given number of men, Sir Anthony Eden proposed in his Draft Disarmament Convention of March 1933 that:

(a) The number of officers should be 1 to 25 of other ranks;

(b) the number of NCOs should be 1 to 15;

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(c) the period of service of conscripts should be 8 months.
It was believed in 1933 that conscripts could not be
sufficiently trained in 8 months for offensive operations;

(d) Reserves called up for re-training were to be counted "man days with the Colours" permitted to each signatory Power.

There were various refinements of these basic provisions drawn up by the Disarmament Conference of 1932. The system worked out then appears to be wholly applicable for the limitation of manpower in land forces today.

# Appendix II

## Land Forces: Weapons

1. The Treaties of Peace of 1919 forbade Germany and her Allies to have any of the "weapons of offence", as defined above.

2. They also laid down the exact number of weapons and the exact amount of ammunition of each permitted category which each of the Powers was allowed to have per 10,000 men.

3. They further stipulated the number of factories in which permitted arms and ammunition might be manufactured, and the quantities which might be produced.

4. This system would be suitable for the lightly armed militias which are to be permitted to each signatory Power at the end of Stage III. Many of the articles of the Treaties of Peace might serve as a useful model.

5. It may not be necessary to have so rigid a system for Stages I and II of the Treaty for General and Complete Disarmament, especially if the duration of the stages is short.

It will, however, be necessary to have some limitation both on the quality and the quantity of the permitted weapons. This was done by Sir Anthony Eden in his Draft Convention of March 1933, in the following way:

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<table><tr><td>(i) Tanks, etc.</td><td>(a) by weight of each tank.<br/>(b) by total number permitted.</td></tr><tr><td>(ii) Heavy or other<br/>mobile artillery.</td><td>(a) by calibre of each gun<br/>(b) by total number of guns<br/>permitted.</td></tr><tr><td>(iii) Ammunition for<br/>the above.</td><td>by numbers of rounds permit-<br/>ted.</td></tr><tr><td>(iv) Machine guns, rifles,<br/>other small arms and<br/>side arms.</td><td>by a fixed budgetary sum<br/>of money per annum.</td></tr><tr><td>(v) Ammunition for machine<br/>guns etc.</td><td>by a fixed budgetary sum<br/>of money per annum.</td></tr></table>

## Appendix III

### Navies

1. Manpower: The methods suggested for Land Forces can be applied equally to naval personnel.

### Warships and Weapons:

2. As the Navies are virtually to disappear at the end of Stage III, there will be no need for the elaborate provisions about limitations on calibre of guns, replacement of ships after a fixed "useful life" etc., which were contained in the Treaties of Naval Disarmament made in Washington in 1922, and in London in 1930.

3. The only question for agreement will be what types and numbers of existing ships shall be retained at the end of Stages I and II. This may lead to prolonged technical argument about what ships will constitute an acceptable balance of strength between different Powers. But this will be mainly a political decision.

4. For any technical problems that may arise, the Washington and London Treaties will furnish a useful model.

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# Appendix IV

## Air Forces

1. **Manpower:** The methods suggested for Land Forces are also applicable to Air Forces.

## Aircraft:

2. If military aircraft are to be dealt with in Stages I and II this can be done in any one of three ways:

(i) total abolition of all military aircraft, aircraft installations, airfields, depots, etc.

(ii) Abolition of aircraft capable of carrying bombs (or nuclear bombs), together with the reduction and limitation of the numbers and quality of the permitted aircraft which remain.

(iii) A percentage cut of all classes of existing military aircraft.

3. System (i) is technically the simplest, and the easiest to control.

4. System (ii) requires an elaborate definition of the aircraft permitted to remain. After prolonged discussion in the Disarmament Conference of 1932, Sir Anthony Eden proposed to abolish all military aircraft of over 3 tons unladen weight. It was believed that aircraft of this size would be useful short-range fighters, but would be unable to carry bombs.

5. The Soviet Draft Treaty provides that all military aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons shall be abolished in Stage I. It makes no suggestions about the size, weight, power, or other characteristics of military aircraft.

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NINTH PUGWASH CONFERENCE

Note by N.F. Mott

I believe we all agree that the most important task of disarmament isto rid
the world of the danger of nuclear weapons. May I propose that this group, in
discussing conventional weapons, concentrates on trying to find out what proposals
about conventional weapons will make most probable the achievement of a satisfactory
Stage I, in which either nuclear weapons are abolished entirely, or both sides adopt
a minimum deterrent position with which a counterforce strike is manifestly impossible.

Europe is used to the protection of the American nuclear deterrent. It now
doubtsg its credibility. France seeks a minimum deterrent of its own. MacNamara
offers a counterforce strategy, partly to reassure Europe. Germany insists on
nuclear weapons in the frontline. All this is dangerous.

In order to achieve maximum nuclear disarmament, it is essential to make
Europeans feel that conventional defence is possible. Our Soviet colleagues may argue
that the American nuclearprotection is illusory, because a nuclear war would destroy
Europe. Europeans know itwould, but many think that the American nuclear threat
"deters" an agression which might otherwise occur. Prof. Rabi emphasized this, and
the fear remains, whatever the truth about Soviet intentions may be.

May I then appeal toour Soviet colleagues to consider the possibility that
American conventional armaments, (troops, tanks, aircraft) would remain in Europe in
Stage I. General Talensky has said - if I understand him - that national bases
should be manned by national troops except in time of crises. The implementation of
Stage I will be a time of acute anxiety. Until it has safely passed, and the world
reassured, let U.S. troops remain in Europe; and Soviet troops, if the Soviet
government so decides, in East Europe too. A few years later would be the time for
withdrawal.

N.F. MOTT.

Cambridge, 1962

IX WG2.1

- 19 -

which shall be permitted, nor about the numbers that shall be allowed during Stages I and II to each Power.

6. It may be that <u>all</u> existing military aircraft are capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and should therefore, under the Soviet Draft Treaty, be abolished. If this is the intention, it should be clearly stated; if it is not, then provisions for the limitation of the quality and numbers of permitted aircraft should be worked out.

7. System (iii) is that proposed in the US Basic Provisions, i.e., a 30% cut in all classes of aircraft. It would be a matter of extreme difficulty, under this system, to draw up Treaty clauses that would give an acceptable balance of strength between different Powers. It would also be extremely difficult to control the observance of the Treaty obligations of such a system. The technical complexities are too great for discussion here.

Cambridge 1962

1X.WG.1.13

Report of Working Group I

Problems of reduction and elimination under international control of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery.

Having considered the official disarmament schemes presented to the Committee of 18 since the last Pugwash meeting at Stowe, we have been able to agree that a first stage which aims at the elimination during a short period of time of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction would constitute a satisfactory beginning to the process of general and complete disarmament.

We are not agreed, however, as to the extent of the initial destruction of these delivery systems. Admittedly, the problem is complicated by the difficulties encountered when attempting to define in detail what is meant by "the means of delivery". It is clear enough when long-range missiles are considered. It is made more difficult by the existence of small dual-purpose guns and aircraft. If for no other reason, it is clearly essential that elimination of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction shall be linked in time and extent with substantial reductions in conventional armaments.

Two main proposals have emerged. The first requires the complete destruction during the first stage of all systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons, together with verification of the destruction process, and dismantling of factories declared to be relevant by the nation possessing them*. The second requires a very substantial destruction of delivery systems down to a minimum level which would maintain the balance of force between the two sides. This would be followed by a later reduction to zero as adequate means were provided to enable all nations to convince themselves in a reasonable manner that disarmament was in fact proceeding according to the terms of the treaty and that adequate measures existed to prevent rearmament. We also considered briefly a third proposal which will be mentioned at the end of our report.

Whatever procedure is adopted, it is important to take into account the uncertainties involved in any verification process. These uncertainties are a highly technical matter relating to the sizes, types and distributions of the systems considered. We spoke of an average uncertainty of about ten per cent as representing what we believe to be the correct order of magnitude of the uncertainties arising from the initial verification processes applied to the production plants. In the case of the second proposal in which the initial reduction is to a level different from zero, we recognized that it would be meaningful to relate this interim level to the uncertainties of verification and to the requirement of military parity between the two sides.

* and presenting to the International Disarmament Organization such data on the military production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons as are necessary to accomplish the measures envisaged at this stage.

Cambridge 1962

2.

1X.WG.1.13

In either case, stage 1 would end with a complete, or at least a very substantial, reduction having been made in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Even this, we felt, would lead to a considerable relaxation of international tension and to a growth of confidence. The first stage would be followed by a second stage in which nuclear weapons themselves and military-grade fissile materials would be reduced or eliminated. This problem was considered very thoroughly by Working Group 1 at the Stowe meeting. We have studied their report and recognise that it still remains a most valuable and useful guide. Provided that it is no longer taken necessarily to refer to stage 1 of the disarmament period, we can accept all of its technical considerations and we see no need to repeat its conclusions here.

However, two points of view were expressed regarding the extent of the reductions to be recommended in stage 2. Those who insist upon the complete elimination of the means of delivery in stage 1 also insist upon the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons and fissile materials, or conversion to peaceful uses of these materials, in stage 2 together with the verification of destruction, cessation of production, and control and inspection of all production plants. Others wish to keep more closely to the Stowe proposals which envisage a preliminary reduction of nuclear stockpiles down to a level related to the uncertainties they believe to be inherent in such a verification procedure.

Those who would prefer to see initial reduction of vehicles and of weapons to interim levels different from zero would accept broadly the control and verification procedures laid down in the Soviet draft treaty as being adequate for reaching those interim levels, because the levels themselves would be chosen as being commensurate with the uncertainties of the inspection system applied to the initial verification of production plants. They would insist, however, that some more comprehensive measures of inspection would probably have to be imposed during the final elimination both of the means of delivery and of the nuclear stockpiles. We agreed that it was important to ensure as far as possible that no inspection procedure should lead at any stage to a diminution in the security of the state being considered, and we fully recognised that secrecy was an essential element of security. A point of view was expressed that some form of zonal sampling, possibly combined with the complete isolation of inspection personnel from contacts outside the International Disarmament Organisation, might meet this stringent requirement. We agreed that whatever the inspection procedure adopted for declared factories, it could be extended to cover other factories for which a reasonable suspicion could be shown to exist that they were engaged upon clandestine activities.

The relation between the destruction of the means of delivery on the one hand, and the elimination of foreign bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil on the other, was broadly discussed. The view was expressed by some that since bases were capable of being used for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and since ballistic missiles were intended in part to balance the existence of foreign bases and the presence of foreign troops, the complete elimination of bases and the complete withdrawal of troops from foreign soil must accompany the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. We tried to make a distinction between bases capable of delivering nuclear weapons and those intended merely for the use of conventional forces and armaments. The general elimination

Cambridge 1962

3.

1X.WG.1.13

of the means of delivery would of course include the elimination of systems
mounted on foreign bases. However, the view was expressed that all bases were
capable of delivering nuclear weapons of some kind: The question of foreign
bases is also linked to the general problem of the elimination of conventional
forces and armaments considered by Working Group II and to which we have already
drawn attention.

Biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction have destructive powers and delivery systems which parallel rather closely those of some atomic weapons. We were therefore able to agree without difficulty that these should be treated in much the same manner as atomic weapons so that, for example, a complete elimination of delivery systems in general would go a long way towards rendering them useless for practical purposes.

A variant of the above proposals was discussed briefly, and although we did
not attempt to reach agreement upon it, we put it forward as a possible scheme
which might deserve further and more detailed study. It has been introduced partly
in an attempt to deal with the point of view that, whereas larger weapons are most
easily controlled by eliminating the means of delivery, there comes a point at which
smaller weapons might more easily be controlled by the elimination of fissile
material. Some overlap between what has hitherto been called stages 1 and 2 is
thus envisaged. The first stage of this new scheme consists in the reduction of
delivery systems down to a minimum level determined by the uncertainties of the
initial verification process, let us say 10% for the sake of argument, although it
would be rather less for large systems such as submarines and long-range rockets
and rather more for the smaller means of delivery. The second stage would contain
two operations: the elimination of nuclear stockpiles down to the uncertainty level
of, say, 20%, and the complete elimination of the remaining delivery systems. Thus,
the second stage would end with there being no delivery systems and only 20% of the
nuclear stockpiles. Only at this point would the locations and types of the
remaining nuclear weapons be declared. The final elimination of this remaining
stockpile would then be done in stage 3 under considerations of completely open
control and inspection.

We had no time to discuss other schemes such as zonal disarmament which, it
was suggested by some, might be of value either as alternatives, or in combination
with the schemes discussed above.

It is clear from what has been recorded above that many disagreements remain
regarding the means to be adopted for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction
and their delivery systems. Nevertheless, we would like to draw attention to the
following points on which a large measure of agreement has been attained. Firstly,
we are agreed that a very substantial, or even complete, reduction of the means of
delivery would constitute a satisfactory basis for stage 1. We have reached
agreement on presenting to the International Disarmament Organisation such data on
the military production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons as are necessary
to accompany the measures envisaged at this stage. We have agreed that verification
procedures could be extended to cover factories believed to be engaged in clandestine
production although not originally included in the lists of declared factories.

Cambridge 1962

4.

1X.WG.1.13

We have agreed that the procedures envisaged for the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery would also be adequate for the elimination of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. We have seen that there still exist other schemes of disarmament which are at least worthy of further study. Finally, we wish to stress that complete, or even a very substantial, elimination of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction during the first stage of the disarmament process would lead to a significant relaxation of tension and a corresponding growth of confidence in the efficacy of the procedures adopted to bring about complete and general disarmament.

Cambridge 1962.

Addendum

IX IV. 5. C

Authority for International Police Force

The group discussed the functioning of an international police force and recognized two requirements which are difficult to reconcile.

(a) To exclude the possibility of the force being misused, or becoming a political influence. This leads to the view that the force should take no action without specific authorization, on each occasion, by the Security Council.

(b) To give all nations, particularly small ones, the confidence that they would be protected from aggressive action by their neighbours; this led to the suggestion of delegation of authority which would allow the police force to act quickly without depending on the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council.

We believe that the difficulty of reconciling these requirements could be eased if the Security Council could delegate to some other organ power to take limited and precisely defined measures which would involve no threat to any state and no interference with any internal affairs. An example of such a measure would be to provide, at the request of a nation which feels threatened by its neighbours a force to guard its frontiers. If this force was prohibited from crossing the border and from taking action against any individuals other than those attempting an illegal crossing of the border it could not represent a threat to security and could therefore be despatched speedily and on delegated authority.

Cambridge 1962

IX.4.5b

Working Group 4 August 28, 1962

National Police Forces in a Disarmaed World

The subject of discussion was the detailed specification of the
national police forces which will be needed in a disarmed world. The
police forces have two functions, to keep internal order within each
country, and to supply contingents for service in international peace-
keeping operations at the request of the Security Council or other
international authority. It was agreed that the contingents designed
for international service will require different training from the
rest of the police force, and probably different weapons also.

It was agreed that the domestic police forces should be numerically
small and equipped with light weapons only. The requirements of
different countries for police weapons differ considerably. In England
police are customarily unarmed. In Iraq and Pakistan, on the other hand,
the police force would probably require aircraft armed with machine-guns
or high-explosive bombs for the control of tribesmen in accessible
mountainous areas. If certain countries are to be allowed to maintain
heavier police weapons than others, these heavier weapons must be strictly
supervised to see that they do not create a threat to neighbouring
countries. In no case will domestic police forces be allowed nuclear
weapons.

One member of the group expressed the opinion that the domestic
police forces should be allowed weapons of heavy calibre such as fixed
Maginot-line fortifications, anti-aircraft guns and rockets, provided
that these weapons were made immobile so that they could not be used
except for purely defensive purposes. The rest of the group objected
strongly to this suggestion. The view of the majority was summed up in
the following words: Security in a disarmed world must not be based on
national defence but on the power of an international authority.

Cambridge 1962

IX 4.5.

# War Propaganda.

## R.E. Peierls

It is important for the stability of a disarmed world to eliminate incitement to violence, to rearmament and generally to violation of international treaties.

One approach would be to leave this matter to national legislation and enforcement. Nations might then undertake a general obligation to deal with this problem, but the detailed content of the relevant laws and the machinery of enforcement would be at the discretion of the national authorities.

This approach would make the drafting of the relevant clauses in the treaty very easy, but the group felt that there was the danger that such laws might not be effectively enforced, particularly in countries involved in acute controversy with their neighbours. In circumstances in which emotions tend to get involved, the prohibition of incitement to violence is of particular importance.

Alternatively, one could envisage a treaty which would lay down conditions with which the legislation and enforcement machinery would have to conform, so that complaints could be brought before some international authority against a nation which did not meet these obligations.

Or there could be an international law against incitement to rearmament or aggression to be enforced by an international criminal court.

The last two solutions would be more effective than the first, but would require a very careful study of the definition of dangerous propaganda, to avoid arguments about the distinction between dangerous propaganda which should be prohibited, and the expression of opinions, however misguided, which should be allowed.

Some members of the group would be reluctant to support an enforceable treaty, or the jurisdiction in this matter of an international criminal court without being satisfied that sufficiently clear definitions can be given, but saw in the concept of "clear and present danger", which occurs in American constitutional law, the hope that a sufficiently clear distinction may be worked out.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 4.4

Working Group IV - Chairman's
Progress Report

R.E. Peierls

We interpret our terms of reference to contain the assumption that general and complete disarmament has been achieved. We are to discuss the problem of the stability of the world in these circumstances.

We agree that the fact of disarmament will by itself result in a changed climate, and will make the solution of some international disputes easier because it will have removed the fear of sudden aggression, it will have eliminated the preoccupation with strategic objectives, and will have reduced the element of mutual distrust.

It is understood that each country will retain forces for keeping internal order, and that these will be equipped with light firearms (including machine-guns). Hence the physical possibility of waging war will have been reduced, but not completely eliminated.

We must expect that there will remain, and there will arise in future, many disputes and conflicts of interest between nations, including some which will be regarded by the affected nations as of vital concern, and which will therefore tend to build up dangerous pressures if they are left unresolved for long.

Wherever possible, such disputes should be settled by direct negotiation between the nations concerned, but it would be unrealistic to expect this to be possible in all cases, or even in the majority of cases involving major conflicts of interest. In the past bilateral negotiations have sometimes been successful because they were conducted in the knowledge that failure to agree would lead to the use of force by either side or by third parties; in a disarmed world this element of compulsion will be absent.

Some disputes may be referred to the International Court. Its jurisdiction is not, however, accepted by all nations without reservation, and while some nations may find it easier, in a disarmed world, to accept the jurisdiction, it would be realistic to expect universal acceptance to be an automatic consequence of disarmament. (A proposal that the implementation of the disarmament treaty should be contingent on all nations promising unqualified acceptance of the jurisdiction at a suitable stage did not find much support in the group.) In any event, the Court can only interpret international law, not make new law, or rule on the merit of situations not covered by existing laws or treaties.

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IX WG.4.4

We expect, therefore, that important disputes will remain which can be settled neither by bilateral negotiations nor by reference to the International Court. Such disputes might arise, in particular, from a report that a country was violating the terms of the disarmament treaty. It is assumed that there would exist an international control authority with the right of unlimited inspection, including aerial surveys. This authority would function without a veto.

Some disputes may be matters for the Security Council, including, in particular, reports from the control authority of attempts to rearm. If the permanent members of the Council fail to reach agreement on the action to be taken, the Council may not be in a position to take any action. Most of the members of the group were agreed that one should not press for the abolition of the veto right in the Security Council. It is, however, debatable whether the present list of member states possessing the right of veto is the right one, or whether it should be altered by agreement. One would hope that the climate of a disarmed world may make possible also other changes in the procedure and functions of the United Nations which would strengthen and extend its authority.

We recognize the likelihood that some conflicts of interest will remain unresolved, and we have no suggestion how this can be remedied.

We do not think it would be possible or desirable to attempt to lay down in advance rules that would cover all possible situations, impossible because they could never be made acceptable to all, and undesirable because they would tend to preserve the status quo and freeze the present relative positions of different countries. The world must be allowed to develop.

Unresolved conflicts may tempt nations to resort to force (using their police forces, or resorting to illegal remilitarization and rearmament) and therefore the need for an international police force is agreed. We have not yet discussed the question whether such a force should be a separate body of individuals organized by the United Nations, or whether it should consist of national contingents (parts of the national police forces already mentioned).

The international police force will have only light firearms at its disposal, and it will not be strong enough to intervene against either of the major powers. Many members of the group therefore feel that there is no need to envisage action by the police force in the event of a violation of international law by a major power. The view was, however, expressed by some that the appearance of the international police force in the area in which a violation was taking place, or was about to take place, would by itself have a strong moral effect.

[LC]

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IX WG.4.4

On the question of the command of the international police force, it was agreed that it would not be realistic to expect command by a single person, such as the Secretary-General, to be acceptable to all. The alternative favoured by the Soviet delegates, a "Troika" command, would, in the opinion of many other members of the group, have the disadvantage of frequently failing to agree, and therefore failing to command. The group discussed other possible arrangements which might solve the problem of command, but has not so far come to one which would receive substantial support within the group.

It is agreed that the international police force would not interfere in the internal affairs of nations, except where internal actions affect international treaties (as in the case of re-militarization or the manufacture of arms). Some difficulty is anticipated in the interpretation of the concept of internal affairs.

In this connection the question was raised of one country fostering a violent change of government (revolution or counter-revolution) in another. It was agreed, at one end of the scale, that it would be impossible and undesirable to outlaw propaganda, and at the other end that the military intervention in favour of either side would be regarded as armed interference and would require action by the international police force. We had no conclusive discussion as to where the line is to be drawn between these extremes.

The prospects for the stability of a disarmed world would be favoured by improvement in the international climate, and for this, as for other reasons, we are convinced of the importance of increasing further international cooperation in scientific, technological, educational and other fields.

The group did not discuss, and is not proposing to discuss, the situation which would arise if, for a considerable time after the disarmament treaty had taken effect, there remained in some nations the suspicion that other nations might have succeeded in retaining clandestine stocks of weapons of mass destruction, since this problem seemed to be outside our terms of reference.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG.5.4

Report - Working Group 5

Economics of Disarmament

"All the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind."

These words were unanimously agreed by the United Nations Study Group on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament at the conclusion of a long and detailed study. We wholeheartedly endorse them.

The arms race is an unprecedented waste of resources. It is estimated that in total about $120 billion a year is now devoted to military expenditure. Scientific and technical talent is wasted on a vast scale on military research and development. The greater part of military expenditure is undertaken by the advanced industrial countries of the world; but in the poor countries arms and armies absorb resources which might otherwise be devoted to economic development; they are a harsh burden.

The diversion of these resources to peaceful uses could bring great benefits to all nations undertaking disarmament. It would provide a unique opportunity for the rich countries to increase aid to the underdeveloped nations of the world.

The way in which the resources are used will be a matter for each nation to decide. Broadly speaking, it can apportion the resources between increases in personal consumption, increases in social expenditure, such as health, education and housing, and increases in productive investment that will accelerate the rate of economic growth.

General disarmament does not mean that everyone who contributes to military production will have to change his job. Those who produce food, steel, nuts and bolts and many other items now used for military purposes would stay in the same jobs; their products would be needed for peaceful purposes. But quite a number would have to change jobs. These would mainly be those now employed in the military services themselves (apart from those retained in residual forces and in inter-

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IX WG.5.4

national inspectorate and police forces) and those employed in industries which have been abnormally swollen by military demands - notably the aircraft and ship-building industries and the production of nuclear weapons. The transfer of manpower and machines, however, can be smoothly accomplished provided three conditions are met:

(a) The general level of demand and production in maintained.

(b) Measures are taken to ensure that alternative jobs are provided in regions where defence industry is now concentrated, or aid is given to workers to move elsewhere.

(c) Retraining facilities are provided for those whose skills become redundant or are inadequate for civil life.

We believe that these conditions can be satisfied by appropriate national policies. The experience of demobilization after World War II (and of the reduction of military expenditure in the mid 1950's in many countries) shows that if these conditions are fulfilled there is nothing to fear. Indeed the changes required are no different from those that take place anyway as the economies of every nation grow and the patterns of consumption and production change.

The main tasks and problems are outlined in the following paragraphs. It should be noted that the economic policies required for disarmament - for example policies for regional unemployment and policies to promote research - are policies that are needed and, in many cases, are being introduced anyway.

**(a) The general level of demand**

In centrally planned economies reconversion and the provision of new jobs will require the adaptation of existing economic plans. The smoothness with which this is conducted will depend on the efficacy of the planning machinery.

In private enterprise and mixed economies, such as America and Britain, the problem will be to regulate the general level of demand. As military expenditure is reduced, peaceful demand can be increased either by reductions in taxation, which leave industry and consumers with more money to spend, or by increases in government spending. To the extent that tax cuts are made, they will have to be rather larger than the amount of expenditure they are required to induce; those who benefit will not spend all the extra income they gain. For this reason it may be necessary to plan for smaller surpluses or for

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IX WG.5.4

deficits in public budgets. Most countries are likely to choose some combination of tax cuts and increased government spending on those civil projects that have been neglected in the face of the competing claims of defence.

(b) Regional policies

Defence industries are often concentrated in particular areas. In most countries, however, policies have already been evolved for influencing the location of industry and meeting local unemployment. In the Soviet Union national planning is in any event done in regional terms. In Britain, development area policies have been applied since the war. In the United States new legislation for this purpose has recently been passed. We believe that, if these established types of policy are vigorously applied at the time of disarmament, it will be possible to overcome the regional problems that may arise. It is important in the meantime that when particular defence contracts are completed or cancelled governments should take steps to ensure that temporary compensation and alternative employment are provided. In this way they can demonstrate that they are capable of dealing with the problems that will arise at the time of disarmament.

(c) Retraining

Retraining is not a big problem, except for officers and men with specialized military training. Generally speaking, numbers of modern armed forces are equipped with skills that are valuable in civil life; and most workers in military production can turn their skills to civil production.

After the last war, and also in those instances when the armed forces were reduced more recently, most countries provided compensation and retraining facilities for demobilized officers and men. Generous schemes of this kind are the way to deal with the problem at the time of disarmament.

For workers in military production who become redundant there will be a need for temporary compensation and for retraining facilities. In most countries retraining facilities exist and redundancy schemes are spreading. It is recognized that both are needed as an aid to the mobility of labour. If developed on a reasonable scale, they will meet the needs of disarmament.

(d) Scientists and technicians

Very large sums are now spent on military research and development. A big part of this expenditure goes on the production of experimental equipment and prototypes by production workers with everyday skills.

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IX WG.5.4

But a considerable number of scientists and qualified engineers is employed too. The way in which they are redeployed at the time of disarmament is of special importance. They can make a great contribution to the advance of peaceful technology.

All governments already accept responsibility for promoting and financing research. Much research cannot, or should not, be financed out of private funds: the cost of many projects is too great; the ideas and benefits often cannot, or should not, be reserved to the owner; and in many fields, for example, medicine or nuclear techniques, innovation must in some measure be a public responsibility. At present quite a lot of civil research in America is financed out of military budgets for lack of other support; and in every country military research has some civil applications.

To meet the needs of disarmament governments must find ways of financing and organizing peaceful research directly instead of through military budgets. It is desirable that they should begin to develop programmes of this kind now so that they have experience on which to build at the time of disarmament.

There is an obvious temptation to go for increased expenditure on space research, civil aircraft and peaceful uses of atomic energy. The government is used to financing work in these fields and military research teams could probably be diverted to them with comparative ease. On the other hand, there are great fields for increased research in industry, transport, energy, automation and other everyday economic activities, which have hitherto been neglected. And there is a case for more research into techniques that are suitable for use in under-developed countries, as well as for a larger supply of teachers and technicians to help those countries.

## (e) International trade

We agree with the conclusion of the United Nations Study Group that if the conversion of the major industrial economies of the world was undertaken smoothly (i.e. without any serious dip in production), there would not be any significant damage to international trade in the transition; demand for raw materials and food would not generally decline, though special assistance might be required for producers of some raw materials. On the other hand, disarmament might benefit international trade in two ways. In the first place, as resources are transferred to increased capital investment and increased civil research and development, the general pace of economic growth should quicken. Secondly, the easing of international tensions at the time of disarmament should help to remove the strategic and political obstacles which now restrict trade between East and West and to create a better atmosphere for international trade and economic cooperation.

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IX WG.5.4

## (f) Aid to developing countries

The underdeveloped countries of the world have great potential needs for economic aid and technical assistance. When military expenditure is reduced we urge that the rich countries should use a substantial part of the freed resources to meet this need. It would be necessary to increase the flow of aid and technical assistance progressively, fitting it in with expanded plans for development in the recipient countries. The fact that disarmament will be a special opportunity to give more aid does not mean, however, that more could not and should not be done in the meantime.

## Obstacles

There is obviously considerable fear of disarmament in the world. This is partly the result of political mistrust and the tensions of the Arms Race. But it also has economic origins. Economic fears are a subsidiary element in the opposition of professional military personnel to the curtailment or abolition of the services to which they belong. More commonly they arise in the minds of those whose wages or profits are dependent on military production. For example, when military contracts are curtailed there is an immediate and visible threat to the income of workers and shareholders in the firms concerned. It would be wrong to exaggerate economic fears of this kind, but it must be admitted that they are widespread and that they must be dispelled. Fortunately all governments contributing to the United Nations Study Group expressed their confidence in their ability to realise the economic benefits of disarmament and to handle the problems of transition. We too are unanimous in the view that this can be done, provided the right policies - on which nearly all economists agree - are put into effect.

## The time scale

Finally, what about the speed with which economic redeployment could be achieved? Judging by post-war experience, we would estimate that it could, at the minimum, be done in 2 years. That would be a rush. 3 or 4 years would be comfortable. More than that would make the task look smaller, but we do not believe it would really make it much easier. The problems would still arise. You would have more time to think about them and get used to them, but that would not necessarily make it easier to take action or to persuade other people to do so.

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IX WG.5.4

## Conclusion

It is important that people should be brought to understand the economic benefits of disarmament and to overcome any fears of it that they feel. The general nature of the problem and the lines along which it can be solved have been agreed by the Report of the UN Study Group. We believe that the conclusions of that document should be widely disseminated, perhaps by means of the preparation of a popular edition. But generalizations agreed at an international conference are not enough. People will only be convinced when the problems of their own nation have been studied and their governments have shown that they know what to do and are willing to do it. So we believe it both vital and urgent that, in each nation, detailed studies be made of the economic and social steps which will have to be taken when disarmament starts. Moreover, we believe that these measures should be made public so that the electorate may see that disarmament, far from injuring them, will be of great national and international benefit.

23/3/62

Participants at the Ninth Pugwash Conference

Cambridge, 25-30 August

1962

Australia

Sir Mark Oliphant, Australian National University, P.O. Box 4,
Canberra A.C.T.

Brazil

Dr. Oscar Sala, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Caixa Postal 8 105,
Sao Paulo.

Bulgaria

Prof. G. Nadjakov, Academy of Sciences, Sofia.

Czechoslovakia

Mr. Theodor Nemec, Parizska 11, Praha 1

Acad. Vladimir Prochazka, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences,
Prague.

Dr. Ludek Urban, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.

Denmark

Prof. O. Kofoed-Hansen, Atomic Energy Commission, Research
Establishment Risø, Roskilde

France

Prof. F. Perrin, Commissariat a l'energie Atomique, 69 rue de
Varenne, Boite Postale 307, Paris 7.

Prof. Pierre Rosenstiehl, 30 Boulevard Flandrin, Paris 16.

Germany

Prof. G. Burkhardt, Tizianstr. 5, Hannover

Prof. E. Menzel, Institut für Internationales Recht an der
Universität Kiel, Danischestr. 15, Kiel 23

Hungary

Prof. F.B. Straub, Orvostudomanyi Egyetem Orvosi Vegytani
Intezete, Puskin Utca 9, Budapest VIII.

India

Prof. V. Sarabhai, Physical Research Laboratory, Ahmedabad 9

Japan

Prof. H. Yukawa, Research Institute for Fundamental Physics,
Kyoto University, Kyoto

Netherlands

Prof. B.V.A. Röling, University of Groningen, Groningen

Pakistan

Prof. Abdus Salam, Imperial College of Science and Technology,
Prince Consort Road, London S.W.7

Poland

Prof. Leopold Infeld, Instytut Fizyki Uniwersytetu Warszaw-
skiego, ul. Hoza 69, Warsaw

Rumania

Acad. H. Hulubei, Academy of Sciences, Bucharest.

9th Conf.

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28/8/62

United Kingdom

Prof. P.M.S. Blackett, Imperial College, Prince Consort Road, London S.W.7

Mr. Alastair Buchan, Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London W.C.2

Sir Edward Bullard, Department of Geodesy and Geophysics, Kadingley Rise, Madingley Road, Cambridge.

Sir John Cockcroft, Churchill College, Cambridge.

Mr. Michael Howard, 63 Onslow Square, London S.W.7

Sir Nevill Mott, Cavendish Laboratory, Free School Lane, Cambridge.

Mr. Philip Noel-Baker, 16 South Eaton Place, London S.W.1

Prof. R.E. Peierls, Mathematical Physics Department, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham.

Sir William Penney, U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, Charles II Street, London S.W.1

Prof. C.F. Powell, H.H. Wills Physical Laboratory, Royal Fort, Bristol 8

Prof. J. Rotblat, Physics Department, St. Bartholomew's Hospital Medical College, Charterhouse Sq., London E.C.1

Mr. Wayland Young, 100 Bayswater Road, London W.2

U.S.A.

Dr. D.G. Brennan, The Hudson Institute, Quaker Ridge Road, Harmon-on-Hudson, N.Y.

Prof. Harrison Brown, Division of Geological Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Calif.

Prof. Paul Doty, Conant Laboratory 308, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.

Prof. F. Dyson, School of Mathematics, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J.

Prof. B.T. Feld, Physics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Mass.

Prof. Bentley Glass, Mergenthaler Laboratory for Biology, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore 18, Md.

Prof. R. Gomer, Department of Chemistry, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Harvard University, 6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge 38, Mass.

Mr. Richard S. Leghorn, Garrison Lane, Osterville, Mass.

Prof. W. Leontief, Littauer Center 309, Harvard University, Cambridge 38, Mass.

Prof. Walter Munk, University of California at La Jolla, La Jolla, California.

Prof. Jay Orear, Department of Physics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

Prof. I.I. Rabi, 450 Riverside Drive, New York 27, N.Y.

Prof. Eugene Rabinowitch, Univ. of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois

Prof. F. Seitz, Department of Physics, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill.

Prof. L.B. Sohn, Law School of Harvard Univ., Cambridge 38, Mass.

Prof. Leo Szilard, Hotel Dupont Plaza, Washington D.C.

Prof. C. Townes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge 39, Mass.

PUGWASH CONTINUING COMMITTEE

Telegraphic address: Pugwash, London
Secretary-General: Prof. J. Rotblat

8 Asmara Road,
London N.W.2

13 September 1962

To Participants of the Ninth Pugwash Conference in Cambridge:

We have started work on the preparation of the Proceedings
of the Ninth Conference and we hope that it will be possible to
complete this task before the end of the year. In the meantime
I enclose copies of the final reports of the Working Groups as
well as the list of participants. Please check whether you
are correctly entered on this list and let me have any correction
not later than 1st October.

J. Rotblat

9th Conf.

- 3 -

28/8/62

U.S.S.R.

Acad. L.A. Artsimovitch, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. A.A. Blagonravov, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. N.N. Bogolubov, Steklof's Mathematical Institute, Moscow

Acad. M.M. Dubinin, U.S.S.R. Institute of Physical Chemistry,
Moscow

Prof. W.S. Emelyanov, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

Prof. N.N. Inozemtsev, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. V.A. Kargin, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. V.M. Khvostov, Institute of History, Moscow.

Prof. F.I. Kozhevnikov, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. A.M. Kuzin, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. A.I. Leipunski, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. U.V. Riznichenko, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. M.I. Rubinstein, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. N.A. Talensky, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. I.E. Tamm, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. A.V. Topchiev, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Acad. A.N. Tupolev, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Prof. A.N. Vernov, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow

Yugoslavia

Prof. Ivan Supek, Sveuciliste-Universitas, Institut teorijske
fizike, Zagreb, Marulicev trg 19