-15-

Europe-focused; the approach tended to be traditional and moralistic (recall how the nation was then defining its national interest through endless debates over the finer points of the Neutrality Act!); and his teachers knew little of the vast world of Russia, the Near East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America that lies out beyond the familiar capitals of London, Paris, Rome, and Vienna.

It is worth remembering, finally, that we set the stage for this vignette of the 1930s in terms of one of the large Eastern institutions that could, in that day, claim leadership in the study of international affairs. We were not reviewing an "average" situation. This suggests how bleak the general landscape was for university-level work in world affairs.

The sharp contrasts awaiting the son of our student from the 1930s as he enters college in 1968 are too apparent to belabor: they are implicit in every characterization of that earlier period. Opportunities abound for young men and women today to build their higher education around the subject matter of international relations and the study of other cultures, or at least to learn something about this field along the way as they pursue their degrees in other professional, scientific, or disciplinary areas. The world has surely come to the doorstep of the American campus. And the student quite literally does make the world his campus." *

Many elements of our 30-year story of achievement are suggested in this passage. To amplify the picture, one may contemplate the number of Americans who have been involved in international education, at different stages of their lives, and the impact this has surely had on responsible citizenship for world affairs in the United States. One can visualize a large world map with a vast array of pins indicating overseas locations where Americans have studied, taught, done research, and provided other educational and technical services. One may imagine the hundreds of dots that would light up on a suitably wired map of the United States to mark the universities and colleges which today have significant programs and general curricula in international studies -- in contrast to the 10 or 15 institutions that could have been so identified even 20 years ago. And each light on the map, of course,

* William W. Marvel, "The University and the World", in Alvin C. Eurich, ed., *Campus 1980: The Shape of the Future in American Higher Education*, New York: Delacorte Press, 1968, pp. 68-70.

-16-

is a symbol of many faculty members and hundreds of students -- the latter constituting perhaps millions of citizens by this time who have gained some understanding of international affairs during their college years and are now scattered throughout American society representing almost every walk of life.

To complete this picture of growth and development in international education over the last several decades, we turn now to certain segments of the field where the sense of achievement is especially marked.

(1) **Language and area studies** have grown from a handful of programs in a few institutions in the late 1940s to more than 150 programs now, covering all of the 8 or 10 major regions of the world, located in some 65 universities. (This does not include other types of international affairs programs, institutes, and centers, a category that has grown proportionately over these same decades.)

(2) The post World War II phenomenon of rapidly growing numbers of United States citizens working, teaching and studying abroad -- documented in Harlan Cleveland's 1960 study, *The Overseas Americans* -- might have occurred independently of what went on in the universities during the 1950s. But in fact there was a close connection between the expanding ranks of the overseas Americans on the one hand, and the growing attention that the universities were paying to international studies on both the undergraduate and graduate levels.

(3) Although one cannot make a direct causal connection between the kind of education college students were receiving in the 1950s and "the American challenge in Europe" as portrayed in the thesis of Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber, it seems likely that many of the "agents" of this U.S. industrial and commercial expansion on the continent are young Americans who experienced the growing international enrichment of higher education in the years after World War II.

(4) To cite a random example of another kind, of the fourteen specialists on Chinese, Asian and general international affairs who testified during the Special Hearings on China policy held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March, 1966, eleven were academics whose principal association over the years, as student and/or professor, was with one of the major university international studies programs.

### International studies programs.

Under professor, was with one of the major university interna-
tions whose principal association over the years, as a student
in State Foreign Relations Committee in March, 1966, eleven were
selected during the Special Hearings on China policy held by the
agencies on Chinese, Asian and several international affairs.
(4) To cite a random example of another kind, of the fourt-
ter World War II.

After World War II, growing international enrichment of higher education in the years passed on the continent are Young Americans who experienced the many of the "students" of this U.S. industrial and commercial ex-
the theories of Jean Desnoyers, Benjamin-Zeller, it seems likely that
the 1920s and "the American challenge in Europe," a box study in
between the kind of education college students were receiving in
(3) Although one cannot make a direct causal connection
degraded levels.

were paying to international studies on both the undergraduate and
on the one hand, and the growing attention that the universities
connection between the expanding ranks of the overseas Americans
the universities during the 1920s. But in fact there was a close
American -- might have occurred independently of what went on in
the 1920s -- documented in Human Cleveland's 1920 study, The Over-
numbers of United States citizens working, teaching and studying
decades.)

(2) The boat World War II phenomenon of rapidly growing
centers a category that has drawn proportionately over these same
other types of international affair programs, institutes, and
world, located in some 62 universities. (This does not include
programs now covering all of the 8 or 10 major regions of the
world.)

especially marked.
To complete this picture of growth and development in Asia-
national education over the last several decades, we turn now to
the further constituting elements of citizenship by this time
is a symbol of many different nations and hundreds of students --

sociely representing almost every walk of life.
their college years and are now scattered throughout American
who have gained some understanding of international affairs during
the further constituting elements of citizenship by this time
is a symbol of many different nations and hundreds of students --

16

-17-

(5) The dramatic expansion of foreign language teaching at every level, elementary to graduate school, is familiar to most parents and citizens. The number of languages offered, the rapid growth of the more difficult languages in higher education, the extension of Russian into hundreds of United States high schools (from 1959 to 1964, the number of schools increased from eight or ten to over 500), and now even the start of Chinese language teaching in a few high schools -- all this shows the pace and direction of events as Americans have become more serious about learning foreign languages.

(6) American undergraduate programs abroad have grown in such numbers and variety that they are now considered a not-unmixed blessing. From a half-dozen junior year abroad programs in 1950, the number grew to 22 in 1956 and by 1965 there were 208 such college-sponsored programs. Although some of these overseas activities cause serious qualms because of their indifferent quality, many are well conceived and effectively conducted. Their effect on the new generation of young Americans is almost certainly healthy and enriching. Taking into account the more than 200 college programs, and those operated by such private organizations as the Experiment in International Living and the American Field Service, this one form of international education has probably reached into most of the cities and large towns of the United States.

(7) One of the breakthrough ideas of the post-war period was the conception of the Fulbright program: use of surplus U.S.-owned foreign currencies to support international exchanges at the graduate and advanced study levels. Now, more than 20 years after its inception the Fulbright Program has benefitted well over 30,000 Americans through grants for study, teaching and research in other countries, and nearly twice that many (57,000) foreign scholars and students who have come to the United States for educational purposes.

(8) The most familiar form of international education activity is the flow of foreign students to the campuses of America -- a phenomenon of which the Fulbright Program is a part, but numerically only a small part. Much has been written on this subject. The unremitting increases, year after year, in the number of students from abroad, has become a familiar annual statistic.

But it is extremely difficult to assess the contribution made to our objectives in international education by the foreign student phenomenon. The planning and conduct of their education

-18-

is a vexing question from one end of the United States to the other. Some of these young people doubtless return home dis-pleased with their experience here and perhaps hostile towards America. But it is the conviction of those who work closely with foreign students that many more of them leave these shores with greater understanding and sentiments of friendship and cordiality toward the United States. To confirm this assumption, one need only ask the president of any major university who has traveled ex-tensively in other countries. His answer is likely to be that he was especially sought out, and often feted to the point of exhaus-tion, by the loyal foreign alumni of his institution!

(9) Another important innovation of the 1950s was the university contract system for technical assistance pioneered by the Foreign Operations Administration, one of AID's predecessor agencies. Although this form of U.S. academic participation in teaching and institution-building overseas has not been uniformly successful, it has in general been a significant means of expanding the international dimension of American higher education. Beginning with the early relationships between one or two American univer-sities and several counterpart institutions abroad, this AID system has now grown to the point where now there are about 150 contracts held by 67 American universities for work in some 40 countries of the less developed world.

(10) The major recent innovation in this area is the *Peace Corps*. Begun in the early 1960s, it has grown steadily to the point where now almost 18,000 Volunteers -- all young Americans who have served abroad in teaching and other technical assistance operations -- have returned home having added an international dimension to their understanding of human problems and social organization. (Almost 14,000 other PC Volunteers are now in training, or in service overseas.) The Peace Corps may turn out to be one of the most effective means of international education this country has yet devised. Its impact, in the sense of how much these returned Volunteers feed back into the life and mind of our society, is hard to measure. But the spirit of adventure, courage, compassion and service to others which pervades the Peace Corps, corresponds exactly to the dominant motif of the younger generation in the late 1960s, regardless of whether a cause and effect relationship can be shown.

(11) If, despite the crucial role of the federal government, international education is at heart a "private affair", one of the main threats is found in the work of the many private voluntary organizations and associations, conducting programs both in this

-19-

country and overseas. More Americans have probably become concerned about international programs through the efforts of the Quakers, other missionary bodies and secular voluntary groups, than in any other way. And in the United States, untold thousands of citizens have been reached, directly or indirectly, by the World Affairs Councils and other adult education efforts -- including the extension services of our major universities -- in cities and communities across the country.

(12) It is likely that the international education activity which has put us in touch with the largest cumulative audience overseas is English language teaching, supported by many federal agencies and private groups. Here again, the measurement of impact is exceedingly difficult, but what impressionistic evidence we have suggests that these programs are much desired and widely acceptable, especially in the underdeveloped countries.

* * * * *

This brief catalogue of major elements of America's record in international education over the last several decades is not meant to suggest that all programs have been effectively conducted nor have contributed fully to achieving our goals. There is much room for a differential appraisal of results and much need to adjust priorities for the future.

In concluding this discussion of past accomplishments there is one highly important claim that can be made for international education. The great variety of opportunities for learning and experience falling under this broad umbrella helped unquestionably to condition the mind of America to the world leadership position in which this country found itself after World War II. The United States was called upon to support a whole set of new and unfamiliar commitments reaching to the far corners of the globe. To shift quickly from the comfortable observer role we had had in world politics over the decades of our isolationism, required a massive change in public attitudes. This was somehow accomplished, and a share of the credit belongs to efforts in the area of international education.

## Present Realities

It is an inescapable fact of the current balance of forces among the nations that the American people must again make a quantum shift in their attitudes toward world affairs.

-20-

If no other argument for international education were found persuasive, this alone would be sufficient justification for a renewed and invigorated effort in this field.

Immediately after World War II and on into the 1950s, this country occupied the pinnacle of might and influence in the world. That era has now passed and it has been succeeded by a period when power is widely distributed around the globe. Our ability to shape events is severely reduced, as is that of all the former "great powers."

It is not likely that we shall adjust easily or painlessly to the new reality of our non-omnipotence. Already there is a tendency toward polarization in American attitudes: either it is our destiny to police the world or else we should withdraw from it and concentrate on the solution of our urgent domestic problems. Professor Karl Deutsch of Harvard University presents the following cogent analysis of the relationship among a nation's power, its involvement in the affairs of the outside world, and public attitudes supporting international commitments:

"Support for research on international relations is related to the involvement of a country in world affairs, and the international involvement of the United States recently has begun to change in major ways. The international involvement of a nation is partly based on its power, in terms of its ability to make its own will -- its national preferences and desires -- prevail over those of other nations; and it is also based in part on its national stake in world affairs, in terms of its size, its vulnerability and its foreign commitments -- economic, cultural, political, and strategic.

International involvement based on power is associated with psychological rewards. The greater the superiority of one's power, the more pleasant it is to think of how to guide the fate of less fortunate countries; or even how to run the world, how to master and improve it according to one's national ethos and one's heart's desire. To think and plan about world affairs in such a god-like role can yield profound pleasure to one's emotion and imagination.

International involvement based on the size of one's stakes and risks, one's openness and exposure to events and threats from abroad, one's commitments and vulnerability is, on the contrary, associated with psychic deprivations. It is apt to lead to anxiety and fear, latent or overt resentment, and a lively desire for escape -- even if only by the withdrawal of attention.

-21-

Most men tend to turn their attention toward those things which they find manageable and rewarding, and away from those which they do not. In regard to international affairs, Americans long have been very human in this sense. Until World War II, while American power in the world arena was relatively limited, American research and intellectual concern about world affairs was likewise limited. During the first two decades after World War II, when American power had risen to an unprecedented peak, American research on world affairs, with some time lag, likewise rose to unprecedented heights.

Since the mid-1960's, this situation has been changing. In 1945, the United States had more than one-half of the world's income and produced more than one-half of the world's steel. Today we account for less than one-third of world income, and less than one-quarter of world steel production. And in 1945, we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons and of means for their delivery, while today we have not. Our relative power has declined. It is still formidable and will remain so, but it no longer can make our will prevail quickly in distant theaters; it cannot overawe rival superpowers; and its relative margin of superiority may well continue to decline." (From a paper prepared for an Education and World Affairs committee discussion)

Linked to this interpretation of America's declining attention to international affairs is the fact that, far from feeling all-powerful, we often find ourselves unable to exercise our will, or to make our influence felt, in the degree to which we had become accustomed. Military power has proved ineffective in forcing a decision in the United States' second land war on the Asian mainland in less than two decades. For most of the 1960's we have been living with Exhibit A of our neutralized power, ninety miles off Florida. No influence, or force we are prepared to use, has proved sufficient to alter the flow of events in Cuba toward a more congenial course.

In 1965, the United States found diplomatic means of handling a situation so near to our shores as the Dominican Republic inadequate, and thereupon proceeded with an overt, old-style, military intervention in the Caribbean. America's best efforts to assist nation-building seem to have almost dissolved in the case of Nigeria. Where we had given so much and hoped so sincerely, we must now stand impotently by and watch the denouement of one of the great human tragedies of the 20th century: the decimation of thousands of Biafran people.

-22-

In little more than twelve months, the American people have witnessed two traumatic events on the international scene, both in flagrant violation of the principles the United States professes in the conduct of world affairs. Neither with the 1967 five-day war between Israel and the Arab States nor with the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, could the United States prevent, soften or influence the harsh impact of events. For a people grown accustomed since the Second World War to the notion of near-omnipotence coupled with beneficent purpose, this new sense of the unmanageability of foreign affairs -- to borrow Karl Deutsch's term -- was sure to produce frustration with the complex, recalcitrant outer world.

One of the most sharply-etched current realities is the reduced willingness of the United States to spend public funds on what were traditionally considered the positive and constructive programs of international affairs: technical assistance to the less fortunate countries, educational exchange, international affairs curricula in colleges and universities, scientific and cultural exchanges, and others. The reluctance to invest in international education has appeared with dramatic force during the legislative year of 1968. The International Education Act, passed with apparent enthusiasm by the Congress two years ago, has met failure on every attempt to secure any part of its authorized funds, even a token appropriation. The budget of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, always the object of lively interest and substantial paring by the Congress, was more drastically cut than usual -- by more than one-third. The difficulties which the foreign aid program has faced year after year in its annual encounter with Congress have become a familiar, and by now almost unremarkable, part of the legislative year. But in 1968 the AID budget reduction was unprecedentedly large, pegging the total appropriations for foreign aid at the lowest level ever.

The education component of the foreign assistance program was not necessarily singled out for special attention, but simply shared the fate of the Agency's appropriations in general. Because it had become in recent years the largest single component of U.S. international cooperation in education, this cut-back in AID funds intensifies the already dark picture of government financial support for international education. The clear reality is that for the first time this year there is substantially less money for things specifically earmarked as "international" -- and there may be still less in the years ahead.

It is obvious, however, that what some observers are now calling a "retreat from internationalism" among the American public

-23-

is not the only, nor indeed the most important, reason for the
financial difficulties besetting international education. A much
more direct impact is being exerted by the compelling demand for
a larger share of our national resources by both the war in Vietnam
and the imperative that America move quickly toward equality of
opportunity for all races, the reduction of poverty, and the re-
building of its deteriorated urban centers.

The years 1965 to 1968 witnessed the steady escalation of
"the Vietnam problem" -- in Southeast Asia, in the United States
Congress, and among the American people generally. And this was
accompanied, during the very months when efforts were being made
to pass and fund the International Education Act, by another episode
which contributed to a general sense of perplexity and malaise with
respect to the government's international programs. This was the
disclosure in February 1967 of covert financial support from the
Central Intelligence Agency for the overseas programs of various
private voluntary agencies, several of them related to education.
This became a source of vexation and anxiety in many sectors of
the U.S. academic community. Logic suggested that the approach
then being proposed under the Administration's International Educa-
tion Program was a promising and attractive alternative to such
secret funding by CIA. But the net effect was otherwise, hardening
the opposition to the new initiatives in international education
and intensifying the general feeling of unease among Americans
with respect to things international.

There is a natural temptation to assume that the scaling down
or termination of our Vietnam involvement will bring an immediate
turning on of the faucet of public resources for a variety of
other national purposes including international education.

This is illusory. In the first place, as a nation we are
still seriously underestimating the magnitude of the urban and
racial crisis and the size of the bill that must be paid to redeem
our social health and welfare on this front. The easy optimism
which has often been remarked as an essential part of the American
character results in a tendency to miscalculate on the lower side,
the scale of our problems and the cost of their solution. Nowhere
is this more apparent than with respect to the awesome difficulties
we face in the ghettos and other poverty-ridden areas of the coun-
try. It is doubtful that the situation is perceived as being
serious enough, and that the will of leaders is strong enough,
to cause an allotment of the required portion of our GNP to this
problem area. But even if the Vietnam war were to end next month
and by some miracle of resource reallocation, all the dollars now
going into the military effort in Southeast Asia could be diverted
to cope with the crisis of our cities, even then the amounts avail-
able would probably prove inadequate.

-24-

Worse still, no such miracle of priority re-scaling away from the military establishment is likely to occur. Already positions are being staked out to maintain defense spending at extremely high levels in the post-Vietnam peace. The prospect of military hardware research and new weapons-systems development of great complexity and high cost are even now being sifted into the arena of public awareness. Even if these hopes of the military are not realized, we are certain to discover that the war in Vietnam is not the only thing that has been escalated in the last few years. Along with raising the level of annual defense expenditures to record-breaking heights in the last few years, we have elevated correspondingly the expectations of the military establishment and its capacity to make effective -- whether we are at peace or war -- its claim on a very high percentage of America's GNP.

## Future Needs

The point was made at the outset of this report that the United States has not gone more than halfway in satisfying those needs to which international education activities can contribute. To continue our progress, the following requirements must be met. They add up to a reasonable agenda for a country which is both a practicing democracy and one of the most powerful nations on earth.

First, the United States must move much farther along the road toward full national literacy in world affairs for the country's citizens. Although the course has been uneven and setbacks have been experienced, the contrast in public understanding of international affairs from the 1920s to the 1960s is dramatic. To continue that progress at the same rate is not adequate, for one of the evident facts of contemporary life is the telescoping of events in time and the steady acceleration of change. If our achievement of national literacy is to move at the same pace we cannot hold the line nor progress at the same rate as in the past. We must have a corresponding acceleration of effort. This calls for the extension of world affairs research, curricula, and programs into all of the nearly 2,000 four-year institutions of higher learning. It calls for a concerted effort to enrich teaching in the nation's rapidly growing number of two-year junior and community colleges, and in the schools of the nation, from the elementary grades to high school. For world affairs teaching to expand and improve in the nation's schools requires special attention to teacher training all across the country. And finally, no strategy for closing the sizeable gap in national literacy will

-25-

be complete until we have devised ways to stimulate and support
efforts in the field of adult and continuing education.

Second, there is a need that stares out at Americans from
the headlines of their newspapers almost daily in 1968 -- a
demand which can be responded to in part by invigorated interna-
tional education efforts in the colleges and universities. Para-
mount in the student-energized ferment now boiling through American
campuses is the question of the *relevance* of education to the
realities and demands of modern life. One avenue leading to the
genuinely modernized and relevant curriculum which the more
serious and constructive student dissents seek is in the area of
international affairs and foreign languages and cultures, including
the rapidly growing interest in Afro-American studies. The univer-
sities and colleges of America face the imperative of re-thinking
their role in society, restructuring their institutions and re-
ordering their processes. Although alone this is by no means the
full answer, one route which the universities should take in
responding to their current travail is to exploit the potentialities
of international studies. At the minimum, they provide a nexus
to relate the worried young people of this student generation with
the problems of human society in other parts of the globe.

Third, the demand of a leading world power like the United
States for highly trained people -- to staff its international
diplomatic, military, business, technical assistance, and voluntary
agency enterprises -- is virtually insatiable. This need is
different in kind and degree from the imperative of national
literacy, but both depend on essentially the same resources: the
colleges, universities and other educational institutions. This
point was forcefully stated in a policy statement by the Board
of Trustees of Education and World Affairs in 1967:

"Ever since the Second World War, the role of the
United States in world affairs has placed heavy demands
on the international research and training programs of
our universities and colleges. Despite the growth of
these programs in the academic community over the past
twenty years, however, we have by no means reached the
levels in research and the training of specialists
necessary to support the nation's worldwide commitments.
To cite an especially dramatic example: a recent search
for U.S. scholars pursuing research on Vietnam revealed
only eight such individuals in the entire country - at
a time when Vietnam constitutes the overriding problem
in foreign affairs for the United States."

-26-

Fourth, there is an urgent need for **objective and constructive criticism**, by well informed and detached analysts, of the **role of the military-industrial complex in American society** -- in the exact sense of former President Eisenhower's use of that phrase in his "farewell address" to the nation. This is clearly a need which should be met through the research and training activities of the social science and international studies segment of the academic community. The share of the GNP and especially of the federal budget, going to military and related expenditures is huge and getting learger. These allocations are responsible for many of the funding shortages in other areas of government activity. The excellent career development program of the armed forces over the past twenty years has produced a cadre of highly educated and articulate officers who represent the military most effectively in dealings with other parts of the government and with the private sector.

In contrast, there has been a withering away of the ranks of those on the civilian side of government and in the private sector who, by training and experience, should be in a position to serve as the society's counterbalance to the demands of the military establishment. Through the 1950s there was considerable activity in the academic community on the part of scholars concerned with civil-military relations, the analysis of national security policies, and broad strategic, geo-political thinking about American foreign policy. Through accident and the changing tides of academic interests, the group of men capable of detached, objective analysis and criticism in this field have diminished almost to the point of invisibility. There is no effective counterweight to the capabilities of the military in making effective their claim on an extremely large slice of the federal budget. This situation is not healthy.

College and university programs in international affairs and the work of research institutes and individual scholars constitute the base from which a cadre of social analysts of military and defense programs can be developed anew. Money alone is not the answer. But money in the right places, combined with a second-round stimulation of academic research and inquiry in this field would begin to provide the answer.

Fifth, another national need which can be met by putting money in the right places for international education, combined with the more careful articulation of purposes and a modicum of academic self-policing, relates to **the role of American educators overseas in both research and development assistance.** Through

-27-

our failure to perceive clearly the relationship between over-
seas research and institution-building activities in the less
advanced countries, through an undue casualness in approach and
performance, we have allowed the good reputation of the United
States and its academic community to suffer unnecessary damage.
The 1965 Camelot episode in Chile may be the most dramatic in-
stance, but it has by no means been the only case where we find
confusion of identity, a harmful mixture of intelligence-collecting
and academic purposes, and a failure to link constructively our
research and development activities.

It is entirely possible to enhance the stature of the nation
in the eyes of others by assuring that our policies and programs
conform to certain elemental truths. One of the most important
is that scholars conducting research overseas should take active
account of the other country's developmental needs in education
and research. An important link with educational development
needs is established when U.S. scholars enter into cooperative
arrangements with universities, research institutes and individuals
in the host country, contributing to the progress of education
there through teaching, working with local graduate students,
and giving professional advice. Donor agencies themselves can
exercise positive influence by fostering, through their grants,
this kind of relationship abroad.

These are five aspects of America's future needs in areas
related to international education. They are needs, not in the
sense of a bill of particulars or a projection of required dollar
outlays -- but in terms of the prerequisites for continued world
leadership which can be met partly through carefully conceived
and effectively executed programs in international education.

*

*

*

*

*

-28-

The proper note on which to conclude this section on "Past Accomplishments, Present Realities and Future Needs," is to highlight several areas of "comparative advantage" for international education. These characteristics and potentialities of international education underscore the relevance of continued vigorous efforts in this field despite the countervailing pressures created by other urgent problems.

First, measured on the scale of government spending in general -- and in the area of foreign and military affairs in particular -- international education programs do not involve large sums of money. It can be convincingly argued that such investments build, at quite low cost, the enduring foundations of international understanding and amity. Here is a field where momentum could be sustained, and some advances made, with annual Federal support of only $100 to $150 million above the total funds available in Fiscal Year 1968. This is scarcely more than one-tenth of one percent of the 1969 Federal budget! (The citing of this figure of $100 to $150 million should not be interpreted as an exact reflection of needs. It is illustrative only.)

Second, as this country swings away from its past pattern of international involvement, as it experiences growing frustration over the relative inadequacy of traditional political, diplomatic and military means of furthering American interests in the world, the educational and cultural field may well become an area of enhanced opportunity. Other nations in the past -- notably Spain, France and now England -- have accompanied their relative decline in world power with intensified efforts on the educational, intellectual and communications fronts. And as the New York Times observed editorially in commenting on the reduction of the Fulbright Program budget: "The exchange of persons helped to keep lines of communication open in the dreariest days of the cold war; now the program is performing a similar service in countering the divisive effects of the Vietnam war."

The intent here is not to argue that activities in this area are directly substitutable for diplomatic, military and political instruments. It is only to suggest that the possibilities of exerting constructive American influence in the world through cooperative educational and cultural channels is proportionately greater, not less, in this era when the manageability of foreign affairs is on the wane for all the leading nations and world power is being sharply depolarized. Especially in such times, international education provides the United States with an avenue of active participation in world affairs. Given adequate funds

-29-

and sufficiently imaginative institutions and arrangements, in-
vestments in these activities can redound to the benefit of all
nations and to the great credit of the United States.

Third, there is the strong prospect that assistance in
solving some of our most urgent domestic problems -- those of the
cities, of poverty and of racial tension -- can be found in the
experience and expertise accumulated through the involvement of
Americans in international educational activities. This will not
happen instantly nor automatically, but given the proper refine-
ments in our conception and approach, we have here a large poten-
tial for sharing information and understanding on these problems
among the nations.

Recent events at home and abroad have opened up the oppor-
tunity -- or more precisely, have dramatized the necessity --
for a systematic rethinking and redefinition of international
education. A new conception is waiting to be born -- placing
this field of activity in the mainstream of concern with the
great problems facing men and societies everywhere. It can no
longer remain what it was a decade or two ago, something special,
apart, and designed for only the privileged few.

Such a reformulation of international education is beyond
the scope and the possibilities of the present report. All that
can be done here is to urge that the new patterns developed for
federal efforts in this area retain sufficient flexibility so
that they can be accommodated to a possible future reorientation
of international education. As yet, we perceive only dimly the
form and shape which this field may assume in the years immediately
ahead. At the optimum, however, it will become a principal channel
for cross-cultural sharing of experience and understanding, a chief
means of collaborative attack on the most difficult problems common
to societies everywhere.

-30-

# IV. FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

## A. Current Patterns: "Primary" and "Secondary" Agencies

The material in Appendix B should be reviewed before proceeding with this and subsequent sections of the present document. There one finds portrayed in chart form the activities of all federal agencies which reported international education programs, accompanied by certain explanatory notes on the data. This chart was compiled from summaries of the submissions made by the various agencies. Even these summaries run to dozens of pages of text and have not been included because of the easy availability of essentially the same program descriptions in the CU publication cited in The Notes of Appendix B.

Behind these summaries stands the complete documentation, constituting the full submissions from the 34 agencies which made affirmative responses to the inquiry concerning their participation in international education. This latter documentation is contained in looseleaf binders in six copies -- four in the Department of HEW and two retained in the offices of Education and World Affairs.

*

*

*

*

*

The first observation that emerges from reviewing the material in Appendix B is the large number and wide diversity of activities which the agencies themselves consider to fall under the rubric of "federal programs that have to do with educational activities aimed at international understanding and cooperation." The agencies are so numerous, the extent of their participation so uneven, and the character of their programs so varied -- that there are formidable difficulties in interpreting and analyzing their roles in this field.

Viewed historically, however, this situation should not be surprising: no concept of a coherent, coordinated federal effort inspired earlier program developments. On the contrary, the *potpourri* of activities which now form the landscape of international education in the federal government are the result of a series of independent moves, largely unrelated one to another, undertaken over the last 25 or 30 years. From the exchange program established by the Buenos Aires Convention of 1936 -- a convenient starting point for explicit federal involvement -- to more recent developments such as the Peace Corps and the International Education Act, each program had its own immediate motivations and purposes, its particular promoters and beneficiaries, its own justification in educational and foreign policy

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terms, and its own rationale of contribution to the national interest. These programs have lacked a broad framework to fit into and a consistent philosophy to undergird them. Only in recent years have we begun to interpret convincingly the role of international education in America's broader purposes in the world.

The material in Appendix B is such as to confront the analyst with a serious pitfall, that of settling for an encyclopedic treatment and thus failing to see the configuration of the forest for the multiplicity and interesting variety of the trees. To find some means of ordering these data, the first step is to differentiate those agencies whose primary mission is *not* international from those which are clearly assigned the leading roles in this field. With all but ten of the 34 departments and agencies covered, their activities in international affairs are incidental to their principal responsibilities as determined by legislation and tradition. Whether it is in the training of foreign nationals by the Post Office Department, the loan of Treasury personnel for AID work abroad, or the scheduling of tour programs for foreign visitors by the Civil Service Commission -- in such cases international activities are manifestly secondary to the main agency missions.

An interesting commentary on the nature of the federal government's involvement in international activities emerges from this information. It is the fact that institutionalized contacts with the outside world are a part of practically every agency in Washington, a phenomenon that occurs independently of any articulated interest in, or established responsibility for, international education.

Here is revealed something so basic as the international outreach of virtually all segments of American society, in all their variety and complexity. When the Department of Commerce, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Department of Transportation and many others become involved in the international field, they serve as exponents of major elements and bodies of experience in American life. Indeed, as is noted elsewhere in this report, the active although limited participation of these "secondary" departments and agencies may be just as relevant to a reformulated conception of international education as are the more conventional activities of the "primary" agencies.

For the immediate purposes of this study, however, interest focuses on the "primary" agencies, those which have a formal

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mission related to foreign affairs, or in which substantial
international activity has been coupled, over time, with what
were originally domestic responsibilities. Of the ten "primary"
agencies, six belong to the first category -- those with an ex-
plicit international mission:

-Department of State; where general policy guidance originates with respect to the impact of activities in this field on the foreign policy and international position of the United States; whose Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) is charged with major responsibility for educational and cultural exchange; whose Bureau of Public Affairs has a small program for furnishing materials on U.S. foreign relations to school systems in this country; and whose Office of Overseas Schools is concerned with the problems of American community and bi-national schools in other countries.

-United States Information Agency; which manages the overseas libraries and bi-national centers; supports the corps of Cultural Affairs Officers serving in the embassies; handles part of the educational and cultural presentations program; supports a considerable portion of the government's English language teaching overseas (although several other agencies also participate); and has other scattered exchange activities.

-Agency for International Development; where the role of education in the development process has been increasingly recognized in recent years and has been translated into substantial educational assistance activity, including the assignment or loan of U.S. specialist personnel (AID's "direct hire" people) for overseas projects; where participant trainee components are part of many development programs (AID's "foreign student" function); where research on development-related problems is supported; and where responsibility is lodged for U.S. dollar assistance to such institutions as the American University of Beirut and the American University of Cairo.

-Peace Corps; conducting programs in the less-developed countries under which young Americans, many of whom are technically trained, are sent abroad to work as volunteers in projects benefitting those

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countries and their people, more than half of the
volunteers being engaged in teaching and other work
in the field of education.

--Department of Defense; whose training programs for
foreign military personnel in the United States bring
to this country the largest and least visible segment
of our "foreign student" population; whose substantial
support of overseas research on foreign areas in the
social and behavioral sciences has raised one of the
most complex sets of issues in this field; and whose
large network of overseas schools for children of
military personnel can be considered an important
aspect of "international education" for Americans.

--Central Intelligence Agency; whose covert financing
of various private voluntary agencies, some related
to international education, was publicly disclosed in
1967 and thereafter was terminated by Presidential
directive, effective at the end of 1967. (It is because
of the special nature of this agency, the fact that
there was no realistic possibility of obtaining data
that could be published in an open report, and the
termination of the agency's known participation in
"international education," that information on CIA pro-
grams does not appear in Appendix B.)

The other four "primary" agencies are those in which sub-
stantial international activities have been added over time to
what originally were essentially domestic responsibilities.

--United States Office of Education in the Department
of HEW; which, despite its primary concern with the
health and quality of education in the United States,
has for many years had a certain international orienta-
tion through its Comparative Education Program; which
has administered for the last ten years one of the
important programs of federal support for international
education in the colleges and universities (several
parts of NDEA, especially Title VI concerned with Area
and Language Centers); and where, within its large
annual appropriations, funds for relevant international
activities, especially with respect to research, are
often available even when not so earmarked.

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**Department of Agriculture;** which has a special relationship to this field for both historical and contemporaneous reasons; historically, because it began sending agricultural technicians overseas for development assistance work even prior to Point Four and the initiation of the formal foreign aid programs; (Agriculture's professional personnel are, of course, still much involved in education-related work in foreign countries, directly, on loan to AID, and in other ways); and currently, because it is responsible for the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities abroad whereby, under PL 480, U.S.-owned foreign currencies are generated, some of these funds being used for such international education activities as the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt programs.

**National Science Foundation;** which has taken on a modest international orientation, making research funds available for work by foreign scientists and for projects conducted in the universities and laboratories of other countries; and where, as the Foundation's attention to the social and behavioral sciences has grown, opportunities for support of research on international problems in these fields have expanded correspondingly.

**Smithsonian Institution;** originally a museum and research institution devoting itself to the advancement and diffusion of knowledge about American achievements and culture, now with substantial participation in international education, including operating responsibilities for certain scholarly, educational and cultural programs.

To reiterate, the respective roles and programs of these ten "primary" departments and agencies are the main focus of this report. It is assumed that under almost any adjustment or consolidation that might be undertaken, the "secondary" agencies would continue to participate in much the way they do today. But this is not necessarily true of the "primary" agencies since they inevitably cover the area where changes must be made if a more unified and coherent federal effort is to result.

The main question to be kept in mind as we move toward the recommendations in Sections V and VI of this report is this: what obstacles to a more effective national performance in this area

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are attributable to the present pattern of agency roles and responsibilities. Again, our attention is directed to the ten "primary" agencies -- and more to some of them, of course, than to others. It is their activities which raise the major controversial issues occasioned by the federal government's involvement in international education.

## B. The Major Issues

There are many serious policy problems that must be considered in arriving at sound recommendations for new patterns of agency responsibilities. Those discussed below do not constitute an exhaustive roster of such issues, but are clearly key matters on which future decisions must turn.

**First,** from a practical money standpoint, there is one overarching question in connection with any proposals for "adjustment and consolidation." What will the new balance sheet look like, that is, what will the gains and losses be in the willingness of the Executive to request, and of Congress to approve, appropriations under any given new arrangement. One argument -- not necessarily the decisive one -- for maintaining the status quo in the case of programs which have established a successful funding record with Congress is simply that they do have such a record. Major revisions might court the danger of upsetting the balance and, at least in the short run, seeing given programs suffer actual reductions in funds. Plans for the future should be calculated in the light of this possibility.

**Second,** to what extent can the United States advance its own basic purposes in the area of international education through increased support of the multilateral and international lending agencies? To what greater degree should they become the vehicles of United States-supported educational cooperation efforts abroad? Although there is some reluctance to make dramatic increases in the proportion of our technical assistance funds channeled through the multilateral and regional agencies -- perhaps on the assumption that we have less control and reap less "public relations" benefit -- this in fact may be a self-defeating, excessively short-run point of view.

To balance any such loss, if it should occur, there are several important advantages. First, the acceptability of assistance furnished by the major international entities -- the United Nations, the World Bank (IBRD), the Inter-American Bank (IDB),

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and others -- is higher in many less developed countries than is bilateral aid from an advanced nation. The latter has a history and reputation of "strings attached", tends to establish direct client relationships, drawing the recipient into a tacit alliance situation, and above all, is sometimes simply regarded as demeaning by the receiving country. Second, some international institutions, especially IBRD, enforce extremely high standards of planning and accountability on the part of the borrowers. And third, this approach opens up opportunities in appropriate situations for genuine "international education": in contrast to one-country efforts, multilateral aid can be based on systematic collaboration among the providers of capital and technical assistance, thus presumably drawing Americans into intimate colleague relationships at all levels with professionals of other countries.

This is not to suggest that multilateral agencies provide a panacea to solve most of our problems in this area. There are obvious limitations, from the standpoint of the focus of this report, including irrelevance to international studies on the campuses of America. Furthermore, multilateral assistance programs in general have not yet achieved the clarity of purpose and strength in programming that would be necessary before the United States would rely heavily on them. Nevertheless, the opportunities inherent in the multilateral approach should be carefully examined and suitably utilized as future patterns of action in this field are worked out.

**Third, how can this nation solve the multiple dilemmas presented by accumulations of U.S.-owned surplus foreign currencies in certain other countries and harness larger portions of these funds to constructive international education efforts?**

Generated in a number of countries by the sale of U.S.-supplied agricultural commodities under PL 480, The Food for Freedom Program and other efforts, these blocked balances present a mixture of problems and opportunities. The problems occur both in the United States and in the other countries. Congress has been reluctant to consider these funds as something separate and distinctive from dollar appropriations. Their use for education and related purposes has therefore been limited by the desire of Congress to hold expenditures at certain levels for particular agencies and activities. On the part of the countries themselves where these funds have accumulated, there has often been reluctance to release significant amounts for local expenditure. This is based partly on apprehension over their inflationary tendencies

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and partly out of fear that they will exercise a disruptive effect
on national economic planning.

The most imaginative plan put forward with respect to this
problem was that for a bi-national rupee foundation in India, to
be endowed with funds representing a considerable portion of the
U.S.-owned foreign currency in that country. One of the obstacles
to implementation was the concern of the Indian government over
establishing a large, independently-controlled source of economic
power whose managers might function independently of the whole
national planning process.

The opportunity inherent in these funds, of course, is that
there are sufficiently large accumulations in some dozen countries
of Europe, Africa and Asia to produce a strong positive impact on
international educational programs -- if mutually agreeable means
for their release could be worked out. So far this complex
issue appears not to have been subject to the kind of comprehensive
study that would give the Congress, the Executive Branch and
interested parties in the private sector a full picture of the
current situation and the issues involved. Systematic analysis
and the spelling out of alternatives is a necessary next step.
Only then can appropriate decisions be made for the constructive
use of these funds, within the limits set by the power of Congress
over appropriations and the national policies of other governments.

Fourth, given the American concept of democratic participation
in foreign affairs and the fact that international education is an
area where the role of private individuals and nongovernmental
institutions is central, how can we improve the structuring of public-
private relationships? This issue relates to both attitudes and
money. The state of mind of scholars, teachers and students toward
their government has a critical impact on the health and vitality
of the public-private relationship. This reality is currently so
much in the forefront of our attention -- in connection with such
episodes as Project Camelot in 1965 and the CIA-centered disclosures
of 1967 -- that it scarcely requires extended comment.

With respect to the use of public funds through private
channels, we have not shown as much imagination or institutional
inventiveness as often characterizes American performance. On the
assumption that private groups effectively and legitimately serve
public purposes, how can we devise flexible means of channeling
public money into private hands for international education activi-
ties manifestly in the national interest? How can we mobilize the
great strength of the private sector? How can private institutions

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and agencies be stimulated and facilitated in pursuing purposes they define as important and in the public interest, rather than simply becoming participants in government efforts or helping to advance explicit foreign policy aims? (This issue is intimately involved in the discussion appearing in the final section of this report.)

Fifth, to what extent should the inherent, natural relationships between the domestic and the overseas aspects of international education be reflected and reinforced in the assignment of roles and missions to the various federal agencies in this field? The tendency to maintain an unnatural dichotomy between the overseas and the domestic has been strengthened by the fact that the respective federal agencies (State, AID, USIA, Peace Corps, and Office of Education primarily) have dissimilar traditions and missions, distinct advisory groups, and different means and channels for relating to the private sector. Most important of all, their legislation and appropriations are handled by different committees and subcommittees within the Congress.

Although the separation is, of course, not absolute, there is still a wide opportunity to capitalize on the possibilities of mutual reinforcement between these major aspects of international education. Agencies with overseas responsibilities could be empowered to give more attention to sustaining the resource base at home, both for the training of people and the production of knowledge (as is the case with AID under Section 211(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act). Agencies whose primary responsibility relates to education and research in the United States could be granted more leeway to work with universities, research institutions, scholars and teachers in other lands. Just as the programs of NSF and NIH reflect this form of "internationalization", so the same principle could be applied more explicitly and generally to the Office of Education.

If by "exchange" we refer to a process that has implications and produces benefits both at home and abroad, then the responsibilities and programs of the federal agencies concerned should reflect this understanding.

Sixth, in attempting to "adjust and consolidate" the roles and programs of Federal agencies in order to achieve heightened effectiveness in this area, where should the balance be struck between the extensive pluralism we now have and the goal of greater concentration and coordination? One objective certainly is to get more mileage out of the same inputs. Some modification of the

present scattered pattern, some drawing together of the various compatible elements of these programs, is indicated. But it would be unrealistic, and almost certainly counter-productive, to re-recommend that all, or even most, Federal programs in this area be assembled into a single monolithic agency, existing or proposed. The solution will have to be worked out in a much more hand-tailored way, step by step. Neither bureaucratic dogma, nor "ideological" doctrine, nor simple conservative "stand pattism" should be allowed to influence the final decisions on a new pattern. The important question of pluralism versus concentration is much involved in the last and most crucial issue to be highlighted in this report.

Finally, to what extent should the heavy involvement of the mission-oriented foreign affairs and military agencies -- State, AID, USIA, and Defense -- in international education be superseded by other arrangements that would signalize the educational, rather than foreign policy, meaning of these programs? Which programs of those agencies would be more acceptable and more effective if conducted under other auspices? This is an urgent question because it involves not only the attitudes of foreign peoples toward the United States, but equally the relationship of our own academic community to the federal government.

This issue, however, cannot be answered in general. It calls for a careful consideration of each agency and its present responsibilities.

**State Department.** Here one is concerned with the proper definition of State's role in educational affairs. Are the operating almost foundation-like, activities of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) congruent with the traditions, and even the atmosphere, of a department orientated toward non-program and non-action functions?

Some observers point to the symbolism of the relationship, believing that the major State Department role tends to cast our overseas educational exchange programs in the mold of an "instrument of foreign policy," much to our disadvantage. This, they argue, mixes political considerations into decisions that should be based on educational values. They also question the logic of giving the State Department responsibility for such distinctly educational ventures as the East-West Center and overseas American schools. The issue here is whether these functions should more appropriately be handled where they would enjoy greater insulation from immediate, day-to-day foreign policy pressure than is likely within State itself. If these activities were to be transferred,

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however, provision would have to be made for the Secretary of State, through the corresponding Assistant Secretary, to exercise general policy supervision and guidance -- a responsibility that cannot realistically be separated from that department.

**Agency for International Development.** The participation of AID in overseas educational activities presents a more complex problem. Here also there is perhaps some basis for concern over symbolism, since this agency is part of the State Department and is directly oriented to our major foreign policy goals. But there is a more serious dilemma. Over the last decade, in accord with sound developmental theory and a growing body of experience, AID has increasingly based its operations on the integrated-country-plan approach. Within this framework, attention to the educational systems of developing countries has assumed a logically important place. To diminish AID's role with respect to education would undercut both the theory and practice of developmental assistance as it has evolved over recent years. The other horn of the dilemma, however, is the fact that Congress has restricted AID operations to certain designated foreign countries, and, in any event, it would not conform to the rationale of foreign assistance to conduct programs in the relatively more advanced countries, already launched into self-sustaining development.

Rather than the impropriety of AID's role in international education, therefore, the important question is one of hiatus -- the need for AID-type efforts (cooperative programs for university-strengthening, for example) in countries where that agency is not functioning, and for low-key follow-up arrangements in countries where AID has phased out. At a minimum, the new pattern of federal effort in this field should take this need into account. It should also recognize the importance of Section 211(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, authorizing AID to help strengthen the resource base for technical assistance in U.S. universities. This is one of the few places in Congressional legislation where explicit recognition has been given to the need to build bridges between overseas programs and domestic requirements in educational cooperation.

Perhaps the most difficult question to be faced with respect to AID's role is the decline of that Agency's fortunes with the Congress, as foreign aid generally has become less acceptable to the American people. It is being widely predicted that the aid agency will have to be rethought and reformulated within the next year or two. If that occurs, there will be an opportunity to consider in depth the questions raised here, sorting out the necessary authority that the new aid agency should have to function in the

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education field from those activities which could better be
handled at a location more removed from the Department of State
as the foreign policy center of the government.

**United States Information Agency.** In the minds of some well-informed observers, USIA does not present so complex an issue as does AID. The question is simply what programs of a genuinely educational nature should be administered by that official agency charged with responsibility for the federal government's efforts on the information and media fronts -- activities which other countries tend to classify less euphemistically as "propaganda." USIA's role comes under review here mainly because of its responsibilities for U.S. overseas libraries and bi-national centers, English-language teaching, and management of the corps of Cultural Affairs Officers in the embassies. At the present time there may be no better placement for the libraries and centers than with USIA, although the possibility of the Library of Congress or the Smithsonian Institution as sponsor merits exploration. If, however, Option 3, described in Section V of this report, were adopted, then responsibility for overseas libraries and bi-national centers should be transferred to that new body.

The Cultural Affairs Officers present a serious problem, one
that has been widely discussed in recent years (including extended
consideration of the question by the Presidential Task Force
established in 1965 after the Smithsonian speech). One cause of
dissatisfaction with the present pattern is that it places the
chief overseas representatives of U.S. education in a position sub-
ordinate to the Public Affairs Officers of the embassies, indivi-
duals who usually come from information and media backgrounds.
This almost certainly inhibits the recruitment for these posts of
educators of sufficient stature and experience to interpret our
philosophy to other peoples, and to forge close professional ties
with educational leaders and institutions of the other country.
Since USIA is not particularly oriented to the U.S. educational
community, there is naturally no tendency to develop genuine bonds
of interest and understanding academic leadership circles in the
United States.

It must be emphasized that further dispassionate analysis of
this problem, followed by a decision on the optimum arrangement
for educational representation abroad, is a sine qua non of achieving
effective "adjustment and consolidation" of federal activities in
international education.

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**The Military Security Agencies.** This issue of the association of international education activities with the mission-oriented foreign affairs agencies becomes most pointed in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

With regard to CIA, matters have presumably been resolved by the termination of that agency's involvement in this area. But the nation is left with a residue of doubt and anxiety flowing from the February 1967 exposure of covert CIA financing of U.S. voluntary agencies functioning abroad. At least two organizations which received such CIA support conducted programs which placed them clearly within the purview of this report: the Asia Foundation and the Congress of Cultural Equality. The 1967 disclosures had a serious impact both on the attitudes toward the United States in the leading intellectual circles of some, but not all, foreign countries, and in exciting suspicion and hostility among fellow members of the American academic community.

This CIA episode raised the issue in its starkest form of the scholar or student allowing himself to be used abroad, under cover of legitimate academic pursuits, as an actual instrument of American foreign policy and military interests. Obviously this is a nettlesome issue, one that is beyond the possibilities of this report to examine adequately. The key point for the immediate future, however, is that CIA's covert role was publicly acknowledged and then terminated at the end of 1967, by Presidential directive.

Obviously, for all the reasons that led to this stop-order by the President, safeguards should be established by the Congress to prevent any clandestine resumption of such CIA funding. The other side of the coin, however, is the need to provide a fully open, publicly-acknowledged and adequately funded base of support for U.S. voluntary agencies carrying out programs abroad in the national interest -- a matter to which we return in the concluding section of this report.

**Defense Department.** With respect to the Defense Department, however, the situation is still more complex. Defense support of research and other related educational activities, especially social and behavioral field research conducted in other countries under a "counter-insurgency" rubric, has been widely discussed in the mass media ever since the ill-fated Camelot episode in Chile during the summer of 1965. This became the subject of special hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May of 1968, where a revealing picture was drawn of Defense's extensive involvement in this area.

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The problem here arises out of the interaction among three key aspects of the present situation. First, at a time when government funds to support foreign area and international research are in short supply everywhere, Defense is the one agency disposing of large sums that can be made available for this purpose. Second, there is a positive side to Defense's interest in this field. Over the last 10 to 15 years, the department has come to recognize the importance, for its own strategic planning and performance, of knowledge about other societies which the social sciences can presumably furnish. This results largely from the great strides the military establishment has made -- through the advanced education of many of its officers in civilian universities -- in achieving sophistication in the analysis of national power and social dynamics. Defense therefore has a legitimate interest in the products of social and behavioral research with respect to other parts of the world.

Third, however, it is a simple truism that known Defense funding and/or sponsorship is often a severe handicap -- sometimes even the kiss of death -- for U.S. researchers seeking to investigate sensitive subjects in other countries. The hazard lies in thus explicitly identifying an American scholar with the promotion of U.S. strategic and military interests in relation to other countries. In the neutral and underdeveloped world, sensitivities on this issue are barely beneath the surface. To Indians or Chileans the appearances are so compromising that the reality of the scholar's motives almost cease to matter. A small incident can produce disastrous consequences for the reputation of the American intellectual community and therefore for the stature of the United States generally.

This question becomes urgent for another reason. Future re-interpretations of international education are likely to emphasize cross-cultural work on a variety of concerns that are strictly in the domain of a country's internal domestic affairs. If the United States wants to preserve its bona fides and be in a position to collaborate openly and effectively with its friends in other lands on such subjects as the organization of universities, demographic problems, urban redevelopment, water and air pollution, and transportation -- then the reputation of American academics for scholarly independence, objectivity and integrity must be protected. How far can scholars go in doing field research overseas under Defense -- or perhaps even State Department -- auspices before this reputation is severely tarnished?

This dilemma -- the legitimate needs of the Defense Department for social science research, as against the dangers which Defense

for social-science research, as against the dangers which Defense
This problem -- the legitimate needs of the Defense Department
is severely constrained.

For background, even State Department -- authorities before this reputation
can accede to in doing field research overseas under Defense --
Influenced by objectivity and integrity must be protected. How
inhibition -- even the reputation of American academics for scholarship
-- can be achieved, and the reputation of American academics for scholarship
-- is the subject of this paper.

States generally produce great-around consequences for the reputation of the American
the scholar's motives almost cease to matter. A small incident can
cause the authorities to so compromising that the reality of
on this issue are purely beneath the surface. To Indispose or
country. In the neutral and underdeveloped world, sensitivities
of U.S. strategic and military interests in relation to other
time explicitly identifying an American scholar with the promotion
date sensitive subjects in other countries. The hazard file in
even the rise of death -- for U.S. researchers seeking to investi-
gating and/or affiliating is often a severe handicap -- sometimes
Third, however, it is a simple truism that known Defense
world.

States therefore have a legitimate interest in the products of
affiliation in the analysis of national power and social dynamics.
Of many of its officials in civilian universities -- in achieving
civil military establishment -- made -- through the advanced equips-
ment furnished by the great nations
knowledge about other societies which the social sciences can
the importance, for its own strategic planning and performance, of
over the fast forward to 1950s, the department has come to recognise
there is a positive aids to Defense's interest in this field.
Of course, some that can be made available for this purpose. Second,
the import of supply everywhere, Defense is the one agency disband-
ing funds to support foreign areas and international research
aspects of the present situation. First, at a time when
The problem here arises out of the interaction among three

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funding and sponsorship of private scholars poses for America's
stature in the less developed world -- cannot be resolved by an
extreme solution at either end of the spectrum. To divest Defense
of its capacity to work with social scientists and support research
in this field, would be counterproductive on several grounds. It
would probably have the effect of simply reducing the total federal
funds available for this kind of research, at a time when there is
too little money in any event -- unless the Congress were willing
to increase the budgets of other agencies, such as NSF and HEW,
correspondingly!

Even if the overall level of funding could be maintained, a
stringent prohibition on the Defense Department would still be un-
wise. It is critically important for our best national interests
that independent social scientists be actively engaged in the analysis
of military security questions. They should be in a position to
contribute to Defense Department needs, but they should also
function as well-informed critics of U.S. policies in the broad
geopolitical area of defense strategy and national security policy.

Desirable as perhaps it would be to have this analytical and
critical function performed by scholars who were completely divorced
from Defense, this is not the way relationships tend to work in
the real world. For their criticism to be informed and for their
views to have impact, the outsiders must know a great deal about
the dynamics of the inside. The research relationship is, after
all, the background of the important role the hard scientists have
achieved in defense matters. The same outcome is possible for the
social and behavioral scientists, and for students of defense
policy, but not until we have discovered a framework of relation-
ships that protects the interests of both sides more effectively
than anything now in sight.

Neither does an acceptable answer to this question of the
Defense role in social research lie at the other end of the spectrum --
going blindly ahead under the present system as though no problem
existed. This involves far too many obvious hazards, including one
so far not mentioned. The prevailing attitudes of the social science
community toward research collaboration with Defense severely limit
the ability of that Department to attract high-calibre scholars to
work with it. As a consequence, and by testimony of some of its own
officials, Defense often does not get high quality products for its
expenditures in this field: lower-calibre scholars are attracted,
often lacking the sensitivities required for the tasks they embark
on; research questions are poorly framed; significant subjects are

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overlooked; and in the end, the usual self-regulating, standard-
enforcing procedures of serious scholarly research are not applied.

The answer can be found, however, by perceiving certain needs
and opportunities on both sides -- while at the same time, recog-
nizing candidly that the needs cannot be satisfied nor the oppor-
tunities seized unless a greatly improved model of relationships is
designed. The first step is to distinguish clearly between a situa-
tion where, on the one hand, the Defense Department builds a broad
open network of consultants, and directly commissions research
projects, in order to get the kind of studies and information it
needs; and, on the other hand, where Defense emerges as the largest
source of funds in the federal government for overseas social science
research. The latter situation is the one we now have; and it is
not conducive to the best interests of that department, of the
private research community, nor of the nation. The second step is
to develop a healthier pluralism on this front by increasing the
budgets, for this category of research, of federal agencies out-
side the military-intelligence establishment. With this kind of new
pattern, Defense could properly gain that access to the social science
community which is so necessary for the effective discharge of the
critical responsibilities with which it is charged.

* * * * *

Among all the issues raised by an examination of the present
pattern of federal agency activities in international education,
that of determining the optimum role for the mission-oriented
foreign and military affairs agencies is both the most crucial and
the most complex. It has been argued throughout this section of
the report that there is no simple, easy, all-at-one-fell-stroke
solution. The degree of adjustment and consolidation that can
realistically be recommended is limited, first by the importance of
strong relationships to international affairs on the part of many
agencies and departments of the government, and, second by the in-
evitable links to international education which characterize the
mission-oriented foreign affairs agencies.

This is not a startlingly new or dramatic conclusion. But
it points the only way the United States can move ahead effectively
to give international education that place on its agenda of priorities
which will enable us to realize the full potentialities of this
field. The options, recommendations and proposals discussed in the
last two sections of the report are based on this general assessment
of where the nation stands today.

V. OPTIONS FOR THE SHORT-RUN

The preceding parts of this report constitute the background necessary to assess what adjustment and consolidation of the activities of Federal agencies can be accomplished. In arriving at the final recommendations, we have taken into account the particular set of relationships among the parties to the study. Education and World Affairs undertook the preparation of this report at the request of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare who, in turn, was responding to a directive, incorporated in an Act of Congress, that a comprehensive review be conducted of Federal activities in international education. Thus HEW was both the department responsible for the study and also -- through the Office of Education -- one of the agencies centrally involved.

Given HEW's dual role, several things were indicated. It was especially important that EWA perform its assignment with the complete objectivity that befits an independent private organization -- regardless of where the conclusions pointed with respect to the future role of HEW. At the same time, it was logical to focus attention in the first instance on those changes which particularly involved HEW, separating out in the last section certain matters that have broader implications for the entire federal government. And finally, it was thought appropriate to present the recommendations in terms of three sets of options -- in effect, three levels of change, from modest, through intermediate to extensive -- rather than a single series of explicit proposals. Thus the way is left open for those who must make the final decisions to compare the costs and advantages of various courses of action.

## General Considerations

The three options making up the body of this section are based on certain general conclusions that were reached in the course of the study.

First, it is important to indicate what is *not* being recommended. The study staff encountered no general demand, inside the government or out, for a sweeping reorganization of agency responsibilities. Consequently, the concept of a wholesale reordering of programs among federal agencies is not involved in the recommendations. This negative conclusion has a bearing on both the role of the "secondary" agencies and the case for retaining certain international

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education activities in the mission-oriented foreign affairs agencies, on a case-by-case basis.

As noted earlier in the report, it is significant from both the philosophical and practical standpoints that the various "secondary" agencies have a role in international education. The responsibilities assigned to these departments and agencies represent virtually the full spectrum of problem areas in our national life-- whether it is transportation, regional development (the TVA), housing and urban affairs, movement of the mails, or the staffing of the federal bureaucracy (Civil Service Commission) -- American experience that may hold some value for the governments and people of other countries. It is generally agreed, furthermore, that the process of international education corresponds to a reciprocal flow of benefits along a two-way street. So with respect to those aspects of American society and economy represented by these federal bodies, there may be important lessons to be learned from abroad. Hence the rationale for "secondary" agency involvement is strong.

There is an analogous argument for having some of the mission oriented agencies in the "primary" list retain certain responsibilities in this field. It may be important for an agency to have this authority because its involvement is necessary for the successful accomplishment of its main mission. Section 211(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act, for example, empowers AID to assist university programs in the United States when this is deemed essential for the supply of knowledge or personnel to support the Agency's primary mission in development assistance. For reasons of history, tradition, and technical competence, it would be hard to imagine moving the international education component of the Agriculture Department to some other location in the federal government. The importance for the Departments of State and Defense of ready access to the expertise of the academic community has been stressed earlier in this report.

It is not surprising that we find no drastic, stem-to-stern reorganization of international education in the federal government to be indicated. The pattern of dispersion, with "pieces of the action" located in many different quarters, corresponds to the picture presented by the "hard" sciences: their interests are represented in a variety of departments and agencies. Indeed, it is a fairly common phenomenon throughout the government.

If it is both inevitable, and also reasonable, that the 24 "secondary" agencies continue to participate in this field, then considerable importance attaches to the way interagency coordination is handled. Because "coordination" is so easy of prescription and

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so difficult of achievement, the treatment of this question is
defferred to the last section of the report.

In thinking about "adjustment and consolidation" in the
short run, our interest lies with the ten "primary" agencies, and
among those, especially with the six that have explicit international
missions. Two of these six agencies, however, are omitted from
the conclusions and recommendations: the Central Intelligence
Agency, because its role as covert banker of certain activities
in this field was deemed not to be in the national interest and
was terminated by Presidential order; and the Peace Corps, because
it is *sui generis*, a single-purpose agency with much of its activity
in education, but a case where its functions are indivisible and
to alter the present pattern would be to terminate, or radically
transform, the activity itself.

Some of these same considerations apply to the Department
of Agriculture and the Smithsonian Institution, agencies not among
the six with traditional international missions. The latter is a
unique organization whose participation in international education
is logical and useful. The Smithsonian might well be given in-
creased responsibilities in this field as relevant opportunities
appear. In any case, it is not viewed as having activities which
should be candidates for consolidation or relocation elsewhere.

The same conclusion obtains with the Agriculture Department,
whose role in this field, as previously noted, is solid and historic.
Agriculture's activities in international education tend to strengthen
the department in the performance of its primary mission. At the
same time, given the imperative of increased food production around
the world, there is a strong case for the direct involvement of the
Department of Agriculture as an agent and disseminator of educa-
tion and technology in the food-deficient countries of Asia,
Africa and Latin America.

By this process of elimination, the field is narrowed to those
agencies whose programs are necessarily involved in any effort at
adjustment and consolidation: (1) the Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs (CU) of the State Department; (2) the United
States Information Agency (USIA); (3) the Agency for International
Development (AID); (4) the Department of Defense; and (5) the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, primarily the Office
of Education (OE).

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1. The case for possible relocation of responsibility for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' programs in international education -- which includes many of the government's exchange activities -- and for the East-West Center, has already been discussed in Section IV. It will therefore suffice to review briefly some of the questions that have been raised in the past: inappropriateness of conducting CU's foundation-like action programs in a non-action oriented department; the desirability of placing a layer of insulation between such genuinely educational activities and the conduct of American foreign policy on the diplomatic, political and military fronts; and the importance of finding a more suitable setting for these activities in order that constituency relationships with the American academic community can be more effectively developed.

The main non-CU activity of the State Department falling within the scope of this report is the Office of Overseas Schools, backing up the many American bi-national and community schools around the world. In any general redesign of agency responsibilities, a way should be found to relate this federal activity more closely to OE, the "educational heartland" of the federal government.

2. The problems presented by the United States Information Agency's responsibility for libraries and bi-national centers, the teaching of English overseas, and the Cultural Affairs Officers in the embassies has also been discussed in the "Major Issues" part of Section IV. The question here is not whether USIA has done an effective job in the discharge of these responsibilities -- most observers believe the agency has turned in a good performance -- but whether America's "image" in international education, the coherence of our efforts, and the building of strong constituency relationships, would not all be enhanced if these present USIA activities were placed under the aegis of the federal government's "education agency" instead of remaining with its "information" arm.

3. In the case of the Agency for International Development, uncertainty prevails as to the fate of the agency, and the size and form of the aid program under the new administration beginning in January 1969. For the purposes of this report, it can only be assumed that foreign assistance will continue in terms of roughly the same number of countries as at present, that the agency will follow its integrated country-plan approach, and that educational assistance, including participant training in the United States, will remain an important element. If these assumptions are borne out, the question will not be the inappropriateness of AID's

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involvement in international education, as far as it goes, but
rather the gap left by virtue of the philosophy, operations and
coverage of the foreign assistance program. There will be a need
for federal programs supporting AID-type educational relations
with countries on the upper rungs of the development ladder, those
which do not qualify for American assistance. There should also
be programs to facilitate direct university-to-university cooperative
arrangements outside the AID country plan, even in those nations
where the agency functions. And of particular importance is the
possibility of sustaining a series of low-profile educational
efforts after AID has phased out of a particular country. These
should take the form of relationships in research, teaching and
service between American universities and institutions in other
countries. New, highly flexible arrangements are needed, further-
more, to support the placement of U.S. academic personnel in the
higher educational institutions of the developing countries, through
the Fulbright program and by direct foreign-university hire, with
U.S. topping-up funds.

With respect to AID itself (or its successor agency if one is
created), the emphasis should be on the refinement of concepts,
programming and administration, to assure effective performance
and the building of sound relationships with the American academic
community. Here the problem is not that of terminating, or finding
a new home for, presently misplaced functions.

4. As has been indicated earlier in this report, the role of the Defense Department presents two special problems, one comparatively minor and the other serious. The former relates to the training of foreign military personnel in the United States, primarily at the war colleges and various military installations. (There were almost 8,500 such persons in training in the United States during Fiscal Year 1968). Much of this training is presumably of a highly technical nature, so these "foreign students" represent a reasonable and proper involvement in international education by the military establishment. There seem to be no grounds for suggesting adjustment or consolidation of this activity or its relocation elsewhere in the government.

On the other hand, because so little is known publicly about
the nature of the training given these armed forces representatives
from other countries, there is room for doubt as to whether an
important opportunity is being fully utilized. Even the casual
observer of the international scene is aware of the critical
position the military occupies in almost every country, especially
in the underdeveloped world of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

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There they often constitute the largest corps of highly trained and educated manpower. Given the potentially crucial role of military officers in their own countries, what happens to them during their training period in the United States becomes a matter of considerable moment. It is to be hoped that they are not simply instructed in the techniques of military organization and management and the handling of weapons. A proper strategy in this matter would call for combining their specific military training with other educational experiences in the colleges and universities, so that they would learn more about the United States and have a genuine opportunity to sample its educational offerings.

A specific recommendation is that, within the limits of military security requirements, this whole question be opened up for careful exploration by a combined panel of Defense officials and civilian educators and men of affairs. This group should be asked to suggest new programs to enable these military "foreign students" to enjoy as significant and well-rounded an educational experience, in proportion to the time available, as West Point cadets now receive during their four years of study at the Military Academy.

The more troublesome question in the bailiwick of the Defense Department will be reviewed briefly here because it has been elucidated in an earlier section of this report. This problem, of course, is Defense sponsorship and funding of social science, especially foreign area field research by university scholars. As was suggested earlier, this is not a black-and-white situation. Defense legitimately needs the contributions of the social sciences, particularly as they relate to understanding the dynamics of other countries. The United States, on the other hand, needs a group of scholars of integrity, independence and expertise to serve as the objective critics of national security policy, geopolitical strategy, and military spending, organization and effectiveness. The Defense Department cannot achieve the first, nor is it likely to be subject to the vigilance of the second, if it is entirely divested of its power to support research as one means of relating to the social science community.

It is therefore not a question of whether Defense should be involved in research support in this field, but rather how it should perform this function and what magnitude of funds it should dispose of for this purpose. There is a wide difference in the concern which informed citizens feel between, on the one hand, having the Defense Department pursue its legitimate purposes through the commissioning of research studies, assembling of panels

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of specialists, and the conduct of seminars and conferences, and,
on the other hand, finding that Defense is, by a factor of four
or five, the largest source of easily available funds for foreign
area research.

The answer to this problem lies in simultaneous moves on
several fronts. First, the coordinating mechanism of FAR in the
State Department should be sustained and strengthened, thus
assuring that overseas field investigations involving Defense
grants pass muster as undertakings that will not affront the sensi-
bilities of people in the less developed countries. Second, the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) -- the source within
Defense of virtually all these funds -- should give vigorous atten-
tion to the enforcement of quality criteria for research by
establishing panels of independent scholars to screen and approve
project submissions. Third, the universities of the United States,
as the main protagonists of scholarly integrity and high research
standards, should use every influence at their command to impress
their faculty members with the hazards created for the entire
teaching and research profession by casualness -- or worse still,
by dissembling -- in the use of Defense Department funds for work
in other countries. Finally, limitations might be set on the
level of funds Defense is authorized to expend in this area -- but
only if the federal government, especially the Congress, were pre-
pared to adopt simultaneously a multiple-funding-sources strategy.
This would require an increase of federal funds available for re-
search in these same areas, through such other agencies as the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation,
the Arts and Humanities Foundation, and the Office of Education.

If such a concerted attack were mounted on this problem,
simultaneously from all fronts, one of the most disturbing issues
in the entire area of federal activities in international educa-
tion would be well on its way to resolution. Furthermore, this
question of the dominant (and sometimes prejudicial) role of
Defense in supporting social science research abroad could be
handled independently of the other recommendations embodied in
the three options set forth below.

5. The pivotal agency from the standpoint of possible adjustments and consolidations of federal programs in this area is the U.S. Office of Education (OE). This is partly because the primary concern of OE is with "the condition and progress of education in the several states and territories", in short, the quality of education available to Americans. It is also because our most pressing national need in this area is, as previously discussed, the achievement of full national literacy in world

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affairs, the growth of the nation's pool of specialized, highly
trained manpower -- the teachers, scholars and practitioners we
shall need in ever-increasing numbers, and the expansion through
research of America's intellectual capital and store of knowledge
on international affairs. Such needs almost automatically place
the Office of Education in the center of future planning.

Limitations of time and space make it impossible to present
in detail the history of OE's role in international education.
Through its Comparative Education Program, until recently located
in the Bureau of Research, OE has long had an identification with
this field. The base from which the Office's future role will
develop is comprised mainly of its responsibility over the last
ten years for Title VI of the National Defense Education Act (pro-
viding support for Language and Area Centers in the Universities,
now administered by the Division of Foreign Studies, made part
of the recently-created Institute of International Studies), and
its intended role as the home of the International Education Act,
recently extended for two years by the Congress as an amendment to
the Higher Education Act.

the Higher Education Act.

recently extended for two years by the Congress as an amendment to
its intended role as the home of the International Education Act,
of the recently-created Institute of International Studies), and
now administered by the Division of Foreign Studies, made part
living support for language and Area Centers in the Universities,
ten years for Title VI of the National Defense Education Act (pro-
deliver is combined mainly of its reproductivity over the fast
time field). The phase from which the Office's future role will
in the Bureau of Research, OF the found had an identification with
through its Comparative Education Program, until recently located
in detail the History of OF a role in international education.

the Office of Education in the center of future planning.
on international affairs. Such needs almost automatically place
research of America's intellectual capital and store of knowledge
at its need in ever-increasing numbers, and the expansion through
trained manpower ... the teachers, the scholars and practitioners we
require, the growth of the nation's pool of specialised, highly

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- 54 -

During 1966-1967, it was planned that the Center for Educational Cooperation -- the "focal point of leadership" for the new efforts in this field proposed in the President's February 2, 1966, message to Congress -- would be located in the Office of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. This was decided, not because the Office of the Secretary was a logical or traditional locus for such operating activities, but because in some quarters it was felt that OE was not yet in a position to take on these responsibilities. This judgment stemmed from the traditional view of the Office of Education as mainly linked with the elementary and secondary school level and dominated by the "schoolmen" who were not in close touch with the mainstreams of U.S. higher education. Had the Center been established and the International Education Act funded, the actual grant-making and other authorized operations would presumably have been handled by the Center within the Office of the Secretary.

As the prospects for these appropriations grew dimmer during 1968, it was decided to bring together the various international education activities of HEW in a new Institute of International Studies, established within the Office of Education. This reflects, among other things, the new situation wherein OE's relations with the higher educational community have been strengthened as its overall annual budget has grown toward the five billion mark. Negatively, this decision confirms the unsuitability of placing such educational operating functions in the office of the Secretary who presides over health and welfare as well as education.

Thus, in terms of the traditional responsibilities of agencies, the major attention of this report focuses on the Office of Education. And in the light of recent developments, OE's new Institute of International Studies assumes considerable importance -- both for what it represents today and for the potentiality it holds for the future. It must be recognized, however, that if the Office of Education, through this institute, is to function as a center of consolidation for various federal activities in international education, as suggested in two of the sets of options which follow, it will have to be substantially strengthened in several directions. For the Institute to become a major voice for international education, it will also have to be vested with a certain "critical mass" of new responsibilities. Simply to move small pieces of the federal effort to the Institute, to have it grow episodically without plan and by acretion, would deny it the possibility of becoming a real center of strength for federal interests in this field. The three options which conclude the present section of the report are based on this assessment.

There is a further reason for holding to the pattern now established and strengthening the Office of Education to become the

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nation's "focal point of leadership," in preference to placing
such functions in the Office of the Secretary of HEW. A far-
reaching reorganization of that department has been widely dis-
cussed in the upper eschelons of Washington for several years.
Apparently the two leading possibilities are, first, the creation
of three new cabinet level departments for, respectively, educa-
tion, health and welfare; and second, adoption of a "Pentagon
pattern": separate sub-cabinet departments for each of these
three areas, the entire complex presided over by a Cabinet level
secretary as at present. Regardless of which reorganizational
route is followed, the recommendation to center international edu-
cation in OE would be congruent with the future pattern. It would
provide the basis for a new federal Department of Education to
develop from the outset a strong international dimension.

The principal "candidates" for adjustment and consolidation
of federal international education activities are, of course, the
programs and agencies discussed in the preceding pages of this
section. To suggest the range of choices available to the Execu-
tive branch and the Congress, the various moves that might be made
are arranged in a series of graduated options, representing a
sequence from the most modest to the most extreme changes.

OPTION 1: Concentrate on improvement of individual federal
programs in international education without any significant re-
location of activities or establishment of new institutional
arrangements.

This would be a "strengthen-in-place" answer to the adjust-
ment and consolidation question. It would reflect, among other
things, a belief that the mood of the country and of the Congress
would not support any major departures or innovations in this
field during the next year or so. The underlying assumption would
be that the greatest net gain would be achieved by leaving all
programs essentially intact, located where they now are, especially
those which have enjoyed a stable and successful funding relation-
ship with the Congress.

Under this option, the traditional roles of CU, AID and USIA
would be unchanged, with effort concentrated on program refine-
ments and improvements. Within this option, it would still be
possible and desirable, however, to undertake the following moves:

1. Thoroughly reevaluate and reformulate the Fulbright-Hays Act so as to make it a more effective vehicle for educational exchanges.

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2. By legislation or executive action, bring greater liber-
ality and flexibility into the use of PL 480 funds for international
education.

3. In order to achieve genuine, long-run international collaboration in educational cooperation efforts, make use of the multilateral organizations and lending agencies to the extent justified by the effectiveness of their procedures and performance.

4. Continue to strengthen the clearance and coordination arrangements for overseas research already developed by FAR in the State Department, and follow a multiple-funding-sources strategy in this area of federal financing by increasing the opportunity for social science research scholars to receive support from other relevant agencies of the government in addition to the Defense Department.

5. With respect to the Office of Education, strengthen its new Institute of International Studies and continue efforts to gain appropriations for the support of international studies in the universities, colleges, and schools through the recently extended International Education Act.

Under this option, the present pattern of agency involvement in international education would persist much as it is reflected in Section IV and in Appendix B of this report. A modest approach, this option would probably not respond fully to the desire for "adjustment and consolidation."

**OPTION 2:** Undertake the moves embodied in Option 1 and,
in addition, give concerted support to the strategy already embodied
in the new Institute of International Studies for Office-of-Education-
wide attention to international education, by using as many of the
existing legislative authorities as possible.

The proposal here is similar to that of Option 1 in that no
major relocation of programs or reassignment of responsibilities
would be contemplated. It differs, however, in proposing that the
more prominent role of the Office of Education portended by the
establishment of the Institute of International Studies, be fully
supported with adequate budget and staff so that its potential role
in OE can be fully realized. This would result in the development
of a systematic strategy to make appropriate use of all available
education legislation to meet the United States' top priority needs
in international education: national literacy, specialized manpower
development, and research.

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In addition to the extended International Education Act, there are a number of other legislative authorities which should receive attention. With the notable exception of Title VI of NDEA, however, most of them are neither labeled "international" nor usually considered from the standpoint of their possible contributions to this field. It is nevertheless true that with respect to the Higher Education Act -- especially Title III for the support "Developing Institutions" -- the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and now the new Education Professions Development Act -- the legislative authority can be interpreted to include the building of an international dimension in U.S. education at all levels: universities, colleges, junior colleges, teacher-training institutions, and schools.

Those interested in the development of international programs in American education, however, can be made aware of the potentiality of these pieces of "domestic" legislation, only as The Institute becomes a strong "strategy center" within OE. Its role should be, on the one hand, to develop a convincing case for increased funding under the explicitly international acts and authorities -- such as the International Education Act, Title VI, of NDEA, and the Comparative Education Program -- and to work out guidelines on OE policies and procedures for grant applicants so that all possible advantage can be taken of the large omnibus legislative acts.

The underlying philosophy of this approach is that international education, as it is pursued in the curricula and on the campuses of American schools and colleges, is of the very essence of education itself, not a separate and special thing. Thus an awareness of the international dimensions of education at every level can be effectively woven through the fabric of the Office of Education, stimulated by the "strategy center" in the Institute of International Studies.

As part of such a consolidation of effort in OE, two other important needs should be considered. The first is to assure -- given the extensive support which the federal government now renders to education of almost every type and level -- that adult and continuing education, and professional retraining, do not escape concentrated attention. In an era of rapid change, it is critically important that there be programs which enable Americans to move in and out of the educational process as their needs and opportunities dictate. This is relevant to the main thrust of the report because such educational efforts should, insofar as possible, include a strong international component.

One of the genuine anomalies in the pattern of federal agency involvement in international education is the support of elementary

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and secondary schools overseas by, on the one hand, the Office of
Overseas Schools in the State Department, and, on the other hand,
the Department of Defense with its network of Dependents' Schools.
The paradox is not simply that these two mission-oriented foreign
and military affairs agencies should operate school systems, but
rather that no significant liaison seems to have been developed
between these schools and that agency of government, OE, which has
primary responsibility for the health of elementary and secondary
education in this country.

It is probably not practicable, at least in terms of this
option, to move responsibility for Defense's Dependents' Schools
or the support of American bi-national and community schools over-
seas, to the Office of Education. But short of such actual relo-
cation of authority, means should be sought to forge closer re-
lationships between these schools and the heartland of American
public education at home, and especially to make them eligible for
OE support through the various relevant titles of the Elementary
and Secondary Act, the Vocational Education Act and others.

(The closest parallel of an activity misplaced by its location
in the State Department, is the support of the East-West Center
in Hawaii. Inasmuch as this is a responsibility which should
properly be transferred to the Office of Education, however, it
falls under Option 3.)

OPTION 3: Further strengthen the Office of Education so that it becomes not only a "focal point of leadership" for federal activities in international education, but also a base to which certain highly relevant programs and functions could be transferred.

This option embodies the most extreme approach to adjustment
and consolidation recommended in the report, largely because the
role envisaged for the Office of Education is considerably enlarged
beyond the traditional place this agency has occupied in interna-
tional education. But if we could shut out for a moment the schema-
tic arrangement of federal agency responsibilities which has become
familiar over the years, there is no inherently logical reason that
OE could not take on certain functions now located elsewhere.

In assessing the viability of this approach, it must be remem-
bered that OE already performs certain activities of a CU or AID
type under contract with those agencies, or through specific legis-
lative authority. Such relocation of responsibilities would in any
event require that the Office of Education be strengthened in staff,

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resources and outreach to the point where it could handle them effectively. To accomplish this rearrangement, new legislation and appropriate executive orders would probably be required and transfers of personnel would have to be authorized. Within HEW, and especially within OE itself, there would have to be dedication and commitment to the international dimensions of education going beyond anything known there up to this time. Granted these qualifications, however, there is much to recommend this course of action.

Specifically, what is proposed is the creation within the Office of Education of a new organizational entity, incorporating the present Institute of International Studies but lifting the international enterprises of OE to a new and higher level of visibility and authority. It would carry out three kinds of functions (at least two of which are already within the authority of the Institute): first, operate those legislative programs specifically designated "international," such as the International Education Act and Title VI of NDEA; second, spur the development of OE's research capability in international studies, both in-house and through grants to universities, colleges, institutes and individual scholars, thus enlarging OE's role as one of the factors balancing off the predominant position of the Department of Defense and helping to strengthen a multiple funding sources strategy; and third, develop the "strategy center" approach covered in Option 2, prodding all parts of OE to bring the international dimension into clear focus, and to seize all legislative and fund-granting opportunities to support this critical dimension in American education.

If these criteria were met by the Office of Education, additional "adjustment and consolidation" measures could be undertaken that would add up to the "critical mass" OE must have in order to discharge effectively its enlarged new responsibilities. In addition to the question of overseas schools as discussed in Option 2, OE could then have transferred to it the following programs and functions:

- the educational exchange programs and responsibilities of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, with the qualification that there should remain a central point in State for policy guidance and coordination with respect to those activities directly impinging on U.S. foreign policy, presumably in the office of an Assistant Secretary of State for this area.

- responsibility for the East-West Center in Hawaii, now vested in the State Department.

- the overseas library and bi-national centers program of USIA.

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--the coordination and/or management of English language teaching abroad.

--the "housing and care" of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO (now lodged in the State Department).

--the backup and support, from the standpoint of the U.S. academic community, of a new corps of Education Officers to serve in embassies abroad, at the level of the Public Affairs Officers rather than subordinate to them. (These officers would probably be under the direction of the Department of State while at their posts overseas, inasmuch as they would belong to the "country team" headed by the Ambassador.)

As the highest level of response to the expressed desire for "adjustment and consolidation," this option would raise a number of important details for further decision as plans were implemented. The panoply of advisory groups, for example, should be reviewed and necessary changes made to produce greater simplicity and clarity in this area. It is recognized, furthermore, that to propose a more direct role for the Office of Education in overseas matters would require considerable change in our pattern of thinking about this area, as well as in public images and channels of communication. But it is not fundamentally illogical for OE to move in this direction in the 1970s when we remember that the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Labor, to mention only two, have long established, widely accepted roles paralleling that suggested here for the education agency.

*

*

*

*

*

The essential meaning of these recommendations, under three separate sets of options, is that there is no other preferable and feasible means of achieving substantial adjustment and consolidation except to base it on the U.S. Office of Education. The only alternatives would be to establish a new, coordinating mechanism in the federal government or create a quasi-public instrumentality, related to the Office of Education but specifically empowered to encourage, support and manage a variety of educationally-related overseas programs. It is even doubtful that these are alternatives to Option 3; they are probably supplementary. In any event, as indicated earlier in this report, such proposals are deemed to fall outside the main purview of this study. Rather than include specific recommendations on these matters, therefore, the various parameters of the problem are discussed in the next and concluding section of this report.

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VI. DIRECTIONS FOR THE LONGER RUN

The pattern suggested in Option 3 would represent a considerable degree of adjustment and consolidation of federal activities in international education. It would place the United States in a substantially stronger position to accomplish its objectives more efficiently and expeditiously. This represents about as far as the specific recommendations of the report should go. More extensive changes and innovations will probably not be feasible for the next year or two.

There remain for future consideration by the Executive Branch and the Congress, however, two important matters. The purpose of this concluding section is to suggest some of the parameters of these questions.

The first is interagency coordination, a need that should be kept under continuing review because many federal agencies now have -- and even more may have in the future -- some degree of participation in international education. Many of the departments and agencies now have assistant secretaries responsible for the international interests of the department, or special offices or bureaus to handle such matters. The objective of coordination would be to maintain a "rolling balance" of effort in this field, to guard against unnecessary duplication and conflicting directions in agency efforts, and to achieve, not absolute symmetry and harmony, but a reasonable level of coherence.

Coordination raises the issue of whether it is to be based on a "top-down" or a "bottom-up" approach. The latter points to the need for the private sector constituency having already achieved a reasonable degree of rational organization in its own right. Individuals and organizations making up the primary interest groups must be thoroughly familiar with the issues which make coordination necessary; must accept a give-and-take attitude; and must be prepared to accept and abide by the coordinating arrangement. It is open to reasonable doubt whether the private sector involved in international education meets this criterion.

"Top-down" coordination takes various forms. One angle that seems to have received less than its due share of attention in the

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current federal picture is the degree of interagency coordination that could be achieved through the powers of initiation, program planning and presentation, information collection and inquiry and reporting. This latter concept of "review and report to Congress" on the full situation among the agencies was to have been the basis of influence for the never-activated National Advisory Committee for International Studies authorized in the International Education Act of 1966. It is obvious that any interagency mechanism could be effective under this theory of coordination only to the extent that it enjoyed clearly specified authority, adequate funds, and a strong staff.

The mechanism of the present Interagency Council for Educational and Cultural Affairs should be examined from the standpoint of its being sufficiently strengthened to meet the requirements of a coordinating mechanism. To correspond to the shift in focus from the traditional foreign policy orientation to a new educational emphasis in international education, reflected in the Option 3 changes, the chairmanship should be vested elsewhere than in the Department of State where it is presently located.

If the federal Interagency Council approach were retained and strengthened, leadership responsibility might well be vested in the Secretary of HEW or perhaps in the Executive Office of the President. If this function is to be effectively discharged from HEW, the Office of the Secretary of that department would have to be appropriately staffed and oriented. It is believed that the Secretary's Office is not now so organized and would probably not be capable of performing the coordination function at the highest levels of government, vis-a-vis other departments concerned. There would presumably have to be a "presence" in the Office of the HEW Secretary -- perhaps a Special Assistant for this purpose -- to assure that the necessary initiatives were taken within the Department. Thus support would have to be given fully and systematically from this quarter to the role of OE in international education, much as this is now apparently down for the Public Health Service with respect to other federal agencies in the fields of medicine, health and biological sciences. The important point here is simply that if interagency coordination is to become an HEW responsibility, the requisite interest, knowledge and commitment must be reflected in the staffing, organization and functioning of the Office of the Secretary.

As the full pattern of international involvement by federal agencies unfolds over the years ahead, it might prove desirable to consider coordination at a higher level, establishing an Executive Office level special assessment and coordinating body. This might

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be called the Federal Council on International Programs and would be essentially a strategy and priority-setting board. Made up of both public and private members, receiving directives from, and reporting to, the President and the Bureau of the Budget, it would conduct a continuing review of the total government effort in this area, would make public reports and appropriate recommendations to the Budget Bureau and the President. Possibly this Council should incorporate the present FAR overseas research coordinating mechanism now located in the State Department. It would perhaps be an analogue to the Office of Science and Technology. In any event, its stated purpose would be to achieve a highly concerted and coordinated effort on both the overseas and domestic fronts of international education. It should be noted, finally, that this issue of coordination is distinct and largely separable from the remaining question of future need for a new quasi-public instrumentality.

This other question focuses on whether even the changes proposed in Option 3 would provide an adequately flexible arrangement for relating the government to the full spectrum of private sector initiative and activity. Would we perhaps still fall short of having the conceptual framework and institutional arrangements necessary to tap the rich resources of energy, motivation and expertise of private citizens and organizations?

It is fundamentally in response to this aspect of the public-private relationship that the idea of a new quasi-public instrumentality in the international field has been a recurring motif for the last decade or longer. In the various public studies and reports bearing on our present area of concern published during the last 10 to 15 years, there is no note sounded so persistently and repetitively as the call for a new "public-private" agency.* Although the prescriptions as to type, size, shape and location of agency vary, there appears to be a consensus among the recognized spokesman for this field that some kind of flexible new mechanism is needed.

Perhaps the most important consideration is the need to provide a "home", rallying point, supporter and stimulator for the voluntary agencies in international affairs. The strong and effective work that such agencies do reflects what might be called the "native American style" in this field. At their best, they represent and project in other lands one of the strongest and most admirable characteristics of American life. Whether in the field of adult education, rural cooperatives or village development, they are a low-cost, high-yield form of endeavor. As the CIA-funding episode of 1967 showed, as President Alan Pifer of Carnegie has argued persuasively in two of his Annual Report essays -- here is a great potential force that we have no means of supporting adequately or

* See Appendix C

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bringing into fully effective public service. Not just to take
care of the so-called "CIA-orphans", but to capitalize on a major
national resource, a new quasi-public instrumentality should
become the vigorous headquarters of U.S. private voluntarism applied
to international affairs.

To detail the specifications of the new mechanism goes far
beyond the scope of this report. Considerable study and delibera-
tion would be required to settle the many difficult questions and
thorny issues; this is probably a job that should be assigned to
a special Presidential task force. To suggest the general nature
and tone of the organization, however, the following are important
characteristics:

--It should be chartered by the Congress, and through its
board or in other ways, a special relationship with the
legislature should be established, so that Members of
Congress would feel it was "their" organization as much
as that of the Executive Branch -- although in fact it
would be the "wholly-owned subsidiary" of neither.

--Its independence and integrity would be assured
through the appointment to its board of citizens
of the highest prestige and experience, thus giving
the new entity a position of great unassailability.

--It should be semi-independent or fully autonomous
in relation to the federal government.

--Its financial base should be a combination of
some private money with very substantial public
funds.

--It should be allowed a high degree of flexibility
in program and operations, approaching as nearly as
U.S. practices will allow, the model of the British
Council.

--It should be empowered to deal with institutions,
organizations and individuals in the United States
and in other countries.

--It should be capable of supporting long-range
programs and efforts and therefore should be provided
with no-year funds by the Congress.

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—It should be insulated from short-run foreign policy considerations not only by its being "situated" remote from the foreign-military-intelligence agencies, but also by there deliberately not being assigned to it any highly political type of programs. (It should be expected to function in terms of educational and cultural criteria, not political ones.)

—It should have the power to grant funds, to conduct operations, and both to carry on in-house research and to support research activities outside.

An agency possessing these characteristics may seem unattainable — but anything much less independent or less capable of attracting high-quality staff and both public and private funds will not be able to fill the largest gap of all in this field: to release the enormous energy and potential of American private voluntarism.

On the other hand, to guard against the danger of this new instrumentality appearing a completely open-ended operation, functioning all across the board without standards and criteria, it would be essential to begin on a modest basis, giving careful attention to the definition of program, setting of priorities, and establishment of evaluating procedures.

* * * * * * * *

The immediate prospects for creating this kind of mechanism do not appear bright, but the time may well arrive in a few years when it will become feasible. In the meantime, it should be the subject of careful study and creative design efforts. Whatever planning is done in the short-run on a new instrumentality, there is no inconsistency in proceeding vigorously at the same time with the adjustments and consolidations recommended in Option 3.

If eventually this piece of "institution building in the United States" can be accomplished, it will open up bright prospects for the future of American educational involvement on the world scene. It could provide the leverage to move this country up to a new level of sophistication and effectiveness by strengthening the role of the private sector generally and by emphasizing the people-to-people meaning which is at the heart of International Education.

EWA/WWM:ew

October, 1968

# DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

## Federal Programs in Education Designed to Improve International Understanding and Cooperation

### Summary

## I. INTRODUCTION

The central focus of the report is on the changes, adjustments, and consolidation necessary to achieve our national goals through international education more "efficiently and expeditiously." New arrangements are necessary: 1) to define the basis for evaluating the federal government's efforts in international education; 2) to achieve greater efficiency in the use of high-level manpower and funds; 3) to assure close agency linkage, interpenetration, and reinforcement between domestic and overseas aspects of international education; 4) to highlight the relevance of international education to the urgent domestic problems of American society; 5) and to take account of sensitivities of peoples in less advanced countries.

## II. INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: Meaning and Objectives

International education is best pictured as a wide umbrella encompassing: research, development of trained manpower, achievement of national literacy in world affairs, educational and cultural exchanges, and educational cooperation with the less developed countries. As declared by Congress in the IEA, federal involvement in international education is closely tied to our national interest: to sustain a position of effective and compassionate world leadership, the United States must have a continuing flow of knowledge, and expanding resources of both specialized manpower and educated citizens; we must meet the responsibility which our wealth and advantages give us to share our experience and skills with less developed peoples. Other motivations including business, commercial, national security, and humanitarian interests also provide rationales for the support of international education. Yet, in attempting to "adjust and consolidate," this very complex of rationales impedes the process of both analysis and prescription. Moreover, dichotomies are inherent in international education: it takes place here and abroad; the flow of benefits is in both directions; motivations of both self-interest and altruism are simultaneously at work; it has been justified both in terms of foreign policy and in genuine educational terms; and finally it is an area of shared public and private effort.

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# III. PAST ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PRESENT REALITIES AND FUTURE NEEDS

## A. Past Accomplishments

Our accomplishments in the field of international education are a necessary backdrop for any future recommendations. The real accomplishments are not quantifiable; achievements are found in the realm of attitudes, ideas and intellectual growth. However, the picture of international education in the 30s provides an historical measure of accomplishment. The possibilities for world affairs education in the colleges and universities during the 30s -- reflecting the world role of the United States -- were parochial. Today, opportunities are available to build higher education around a wide selection of international relations courses and the study of other cultures.

Past progress is also reflected in the increased activity in international education in recent decades: 1. language and area studies have grown since the 1940s to 150 programs at 65 universities; 2. there has been a rapid growth of Americans working, teaching, and studying overseas, and correspondingly a heavy flow of foreign students coming to American campuses -- one of the major developments was the Fulbright program; 3. there has been a dramatic expansion of foreign language teaching at every level; 4. there has been a marked growth of undergraduate study programs abroad; 5. the university contract system for technical assistance was begun in the 50s; 6. the Peace Corps was begun in the early 60s; and 7. English language teaching has reached a large audience overseas.

## B. Present Realities

The great variety of opportunities for learning helped to condition the mind of America to the world leadership position in which this country found itself after World War II. Today the American people must again make a quantum shift in their attitudes toward world affairs. We are living in a period of widely distributed power. Our ability to shape events is severely reduced -- events have become unmanageable resulting in a sense of malaise and frustration among Americans.

Recent trends cutting funds for support of what were traditionally considered positive and constructive programs in international affairs is symptomatic in part of this malaise. International education programs have shared the general fate of across-the-board cuts, especially in AID funding. A retreat from internationalism is but one of the problems besetting international education -- both the war in Vietnam and our racial and urban problems have drastically reduced available resources. The years 1965-68 witnessed escalation of the Vietnam problem during the months when efforts were being made to pass

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and fund the International Education Act. And the February 1967 ex-
posure of covert funding of overseas programs by the CIA intensified the
general feeling of unease among Americans with things international

C. <u>Future Needs</u>

In order to maintain world leadership: 1) the United States must
move further toward full national literacy in world affairs. 2) While
the universities are in a process of rethinking the relevance of their
curriculum in answer to student dissent, they must exploit the
potentialities of international studies. 3) We must meet the continuing
need for highly trained people to staff international diplomatic,
military, business, technical assistance and voluntary agency enter-
prises. 4) We must meet the need for objective criticism of the military-
industrial complex. 5) And finally, a concerted effort must be made to
link effectively our overseas research and development activities. The
possibilities of exerting constructive influence in the world through
cooperative educational and cultural channels is proportionately greater,
not less, in this era when the "manageability of foreign affairs" is
waning. There is also a strong prospect that assistance in solving
urgent domestic problems can be found in experience accumulated through
involvement in international activities.

A. Current Patterns: Primary and Secondary Agencies

Of the 34 agencies with responsibility for federal programs that have to do with educational activities aimed at international understanding and cooperation, 10 agencies were designated as having primary responsibility for international education programs by virtue of legislation and tradition. However, the active, although limited participation of secondary agencies may be just as relevant to a reformulated conception of international education as are the more conventional activities of the primary agencies -- the Department of State, USIA, AID, the Peace Corps; DOD, the CIA, OE, the Department of Agriculture, the National Science Foundation and the Smithsonian Institution.

B. Major Issues

There are several key matters which must be considered in making
recommendations:

1) What will the new balance sheet look like -- what will the gains and losses be in the willingness of the Executive to request, and of Congress to approve, appropriations under any given new arrangement?

Congress to approve, appropriations under and given new arrangements and losses be in the willingness of the Executive to repurchase, and of

recommendations:

## B. Major Issues

* VID, the Peace Corps; DOD, the CIA, OE, the Department of Agriculture, activities of the primary agencies -- the Department of State, USA, conception of international education as are the more conventional
* tion of secondary agencies may be just as relevant to a reformed
* lation and tradition. However, the active, although limited particula-
* reponsibility for international education programs by virtue of legia-
* standing and cooperation, 10 agencies were designated as having primary
* have to do with educational activities aimed at international under-
* Of the 34 agencies with reponsibility for federal programs that

## V. Current Patterns: Primary and Secondary Agencies

## IA. FEDERAL PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

involvement in international activities.

urgent domestic problems can be found in experience accumulated through
warning. There is also a strong prospect that assistance in solving
not less, in this era when the "moral responsibility of foreign affairs" is
beginning to emerge.
cooperative educational and cultural channels is proportionately broader,
through effectively our overseas research and development activities.
The
industrial complex. 2) And tinsally, a concerted effort must be made to
briess. 4) We must meet the need for objective criticism of the military,
and for highly trained people to arise international diplomatic,
portrayals of international studies. 3) We must meet the continuing
curriculum in answer to student demand, they must exploit the
move further toward full national literacy in world affairs. 5) Write
In order to maintain world leadership: 1) the United States must
be sure of correct funding of overseas programs by the CIA, internationally
and fund the International Educational Act. And the February 1967 ex-

## C. Future Needs

general testing of measures among Americans with three international
bureaus of correct funding of overseas programs by the CIA, internationally
and found the International Educational Act. And the February 1967 ex-

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2) To what extent can the United States advance its own basic purposes through increased support of multilateral and international lending agencies?

3) How can this nation solve the multiple dilemmas presented by accumulations of U.S.-owned surplus foreign currencies in certain other countries and harness larger portions of these funds to constructive, international education efforts?

4) Given the American concept of democratic participation in foreign affairs and the fact that international education is an area where the role of private individuals and non-governmental institutions is central, how can we improve the structuring of public-private relationships?

5) To what extent should the inherent, natural relationships between the domestic and the overseas aspects of international education be reflected and reinforced in the assignment of roles and missions to the various federal agencies in this field?

6) Where should the balance be struck between the extensive pluralism we now have and the goal of greater concentration and coordination?

7) Finally, to what extent should the heavy involvement of the mission-oriented foreign affairs and military agencies in international education be superseded by other arrangements that would signalize the educational, rather than the foreign policy, meaning of these programs? This issue cannot be answered in general but rather calls for a careful consideration of each of the following agencies and its present responsibility:

1. State Department

2. AID

3. USIA

4. The Military Security Agencies

5. Defense Department*

## V. OPTIONS FOR THE SHORT-RUN

Recommendations are presented in terms of three sets of options rather than as a single series of explicit proposals.

### General Considerations

These options are based on certain general conclusions that were reached in the course of the study:

* The agencies are examined individually in the body of the report pp. 39-45.

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a) The study staff encountered no general demand for a sweeping, total reorganization of agency responsibility.

b) The 24 "secondary" agencies have a role in international education, as do some of the mission oriented agencies on the "primary" list. The pattern of dispersion, with "pieces of the action" located in many different quarters, corresponds to the picture presented by the "hard" sciences. Their interests are represented in a variety of departments and agencies, and this is a fairly common phenomenon throughout the government.

## Adjustment and Consolidation in the Short-Run

Here again our interest lies with the ten "primary" agencies -- especially those that have explicit international missions. Of these agencies, two will be omitted from the conclusions and recommendations: the CIA because its role as covert banker has been terminated; and the Peace Corps because it is *sui generis*. Some of the same considerations apply to the Department of Agriculture and the Smithsonian Institution -- agencies not among those with *traditional* international missions.

1. **CU** -- Relocation of responsibility for CU programs in international education should be undertaken with the following questions in mind: the inappropriateness of conducting CU's foundation-like action programs in a non-action-oriented department; the desirability of placing a layer of insulation between genuine educational activities and the conduct of American foreign policy on the diplomatic, political and military fronts; and the importance of finding a more suitable setting for these activities in order that constituency relationships with the American academic community can be more effectively developed. In addition, a way should be found to relate the Office of Overseas Schools to OE.

2. **USIA** -- USIA's activities might be greatly enhanced if they were placed under the aegis of the federal government's "education agency" rather than remaining with its "information arm."

3. **AID** -- If AID continues in roughly the same form, the question will not be the inappropriateness of AID's involvement in international education, but rather the gap left as a result of the very specific philosophy, operations and coverage of the foreign assistance program. For instance, attention will have to be given to AID-type educational relations with the more developed nations and with those universities outside the AID country plan. New arrangements are needed to support the placement of U.S. academic personnel in higher educational institutions abroad. With respect to AID itself, the emphasis should be on the refinement of concepts, programming and administration to assure effective performance, and the building of sound relationships with the

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American academic community.

4. DOD -- Are the 8,500 or so "foreign students" who come to the U.S. for military training being given a fully rounded educational experience? This question should be examined by a panel of Defense officials and civilian educators and men of affairs. But the more important problem is that of Defense sponsorship and funding of social science, especially foreign area field research by university scholars. The question is not whether Defense should be involved in social science research -- it should -- but how. The answer lies in several moves: 1) the coordinating mechanism of FAR should be strengthened to screen DOD field investigations; 2) ARPA should enforce strict quality criteria for research projects it funds; 3) U. S. universities should try to sencitize their faculty members about the hazards of casual use of DOD funds; 4) limitations could be set on the level of DOD funds, but only if Congress will fill the gap with a multiple-funding-sources strategy.

5. OE -- This is the pivotal agency from the standpoint of future planning, and should become the nation's "focal point of leadership." OE has manifested a traditional sense of responsibility for international education and this is being continued through its new Institute of International Studies. However, before OE can function as the center of consolidation for various federal activities in international education it will have to be substantially strengthened. The following three options are based on an expanded role for OE. The essential meaning of these options is that there is no other preferable and feasible means of reform, except to base it on OE.

**Option 1:** Concentrate on improvement of individual federal programs in international education without any significant relocation of activities or establishment of new institutional arrangements.

**Option 2:** Undertake the moves embodied in Option 1 and, in addition, give concerted support to the strategy already embodied in the new Institute of International Studies for Office-of-Education-wide attention to international education, by using as many of the existing legislative authorities as possible.

**Option 3:** Further strengthen the Office of Education so that it becomes not only a "focal point of leadership" for federal activities in international education, but also a base to which certain highly relevant programs and functions could be transferred. (This section of the report should be read in full because it contains the most significant recommendations.)

## VI. DIRECTIONS FOR THE LONGER RUN

Two important matters remain for future consideration:

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1) **Interagency coordination** - Greater coordination is necessary in order to maintain a "rolling balance" of effort in international education; to guard against unnecessary duplication and conflicting directions in agency efforts; and to achieve, not absolute symmetry and harmony, but a reasonable level of coherence. This report takes the view that the appropriate locus for such coordination might rest in the Office of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, provided that the requisite commitment and orientation can be assured.

2) **A new "public-private" agency** - Perhaps we should consider a new quasi-public instrumentality in view of the possibility that the changes proposed in Option 3 will not provide an adequately flexible arrangement for relating the government to the full spectrum of private sector initiative and activity. This idea has been a recurring theme in various reports of the last 10-15 years. But the most important consideration is **the need to provide a rallying point, supporter and stimulator for the voluntary agencies in international affairs.**

While the immediate prospects for creating this kind of mechanism do not appear bright, we should begin planning for it at the same time as we proceed with the adjustments and consolidations recommended in Option 3. A new mechanism could provide the leverage to move our country up to a new level of sophistication and effectiveness by strengthening the role of the private sector generally, and by emphasizing the people-to-people meaning which is at the heart of international education.

EWA:PSH/aa

October, 1968

October, 1968

BWP:R2H\SS

co-people meaning which is at the heart of international education. The role of the private sector, generally, and by embracing the people- up to a new level of application and effectiveness by attitudinal change. Option 3. A new mechanism could provide the leverage to move our country as we proceed with the adjustments and consolidations recommended in do not appear bright; we should begin planning for it at the same time. While the immediate prospects for creating this kind of mechanism

voluntary agencies in international affairs. provide a fulfilling role, supporter and stimulator for the users. But the most important consideration is the need to have a recurring theme in various reports of the last 10-12 spectrum of private sector initiative and activity. This flexible arrangement for relating the government to the full the changes proposed in Option 3 will not provide an adequately new dual-public involvement in view of the possibility that 3) A new "public-private" agency - perhaps we should consider a and orientation can be assumed.

Education, and Welfare, provided that the requisite commitment coordination might meet in the Office of the Secretary of Health. This report takes the view that the appropriate focus for and close symmetry and harmony, but a reasonable level of cooperation. Flicting directions in agency efforts; and to achieve not specific education: to ensure against unnecessary duplication and con- order to maintain a "rolling balance" of effort in international Interagency coordination - greater coordination is necessary in

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CONDUCT OF STUDY AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study was carried out under contract between Education and World Affairs and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Its terms of reference were the following provisions in the Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1968, directing the Secretary of HEW to carry out:

"--a comprehensive study of all authorized Federal programs that have to do with educational activities aimed at improved international understanding and cooperation, with the objective of determining the extent of adjustment and consolidation of these programs that is desirable in order that their objectives may be more efficiently and expeditiously accomplished--"

The work was in every sense a collaborative effort between HEW and EWA. The first step was to establish contact with the several departments and agencies of the federal government whose programs constituted the substance of the study. Mr. Ralph Flynt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of HEW for International Education, wrote to those departments, referring to the survey of their international education activities recently conducted by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department (in preparation for what became the publication "A Guide to U.S. Government Agencies Involved in International Education and Cultural Activities," Department of State Publication number 8405) requesting them to amplify and update the information previously submitted to State. Each agency was asked to designate a contact officer so that the study staff could have someone through whom to obtain additional data and fill in gaps in coverage.

Mr. Flynt set up a special office for the three-man HEW staff assigned to work with EWA. Miss Janice Johnson and Mr. David Hohman of the Department of HEW, and Mr. John Sartorius, on special assignment to HEW from the Woodrow Wilson School of Foreign Affairs of the University of Virginia, constituted this group.

In addition to receiving the submissions made by the various departments and agencies in response to Mr. Flynt's letter and the accompanying questionnaire, it was necessary for the HEW staff to go back to most of the agencies (in some cases, to have personal interviews and make contact a number of times) in order to get full information on their relevant activities. The other task primarily

-2-

handled by the HEW staff in Washington was the initial identification, summary and analysis of the various public reports making up Appendix C. Although this work was finally completed by the EWA staff in New York and the grid chart at the beginning of Appendix C was done in New York, much of the basic work had been accomplished by the HEW group in Washington.

Miss Margie Reinhart was responsible for the analysis and organization of the agency program data which resulted in the summary charts of Appendix B. Mrs. Patricia Huntington completed the reviews of major reports and their presentation in the form appearing in Appendix C. Peter N. Gillingham, Joel L. Johnson and David B. Arnold, Executive Associates in the New York office of EWA, and Andre E. Rheault, Director of EWA's Washington office, all undertook assignments in connection with this study. Mr. Gillingham made special investigations of two important problems within the area of the study -- the role of the Defense Department in overseas research, and the use of PL 480 and other U.S.-owned foreign currencies. Mr. Johnson dealt with the role of the multilateral agencies and international lending institutions. These special pieces of work were of great importance as a basis for the analysis and recommendations of the report. Messrs. Arnold and Rheault, the former in New York and the latter in Washington, were responsible for general coordination and liaison as the study proceeded.

Special mention should be made of the contributions of two individuals who served as consultants to EWA in the course of the study: Mr. Steven Muller, Vice President for Public Affairs of Cornell University, and Professor Richard Snyder of the University of California at Irvine. Both were active in producing relevant memoranda and in making themselves available on numerous occasions for extended conversations with the Project Director and other staff members.

In order to gain the advantage of the thinking and experience of members of Congress in connection with international education -- and also to enable the project staff to sense the legislature's attitudes and anticipations -- a number of interviews were arranged with key members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. At the same time, direct discussions were held with the heads or their representatives of the primary federal agencies involved in the study: the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department, AID, USIA, Department of HEW, Office of Education, Bureau of the Budget; and also with persons intimately familiar with the situation in both the Department of Defense and the Central

with the situation in both the Department of Defense and the Central
Society of the Budget; and also with persons intimately familiar
with the study: the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the
State Department, "AID," "UNM," Department of HWA, Office of Education,
and also with persons in the field of the primary federal agencies involved in
the same time, direct discussions were held with the Senator
with key members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Attitude and participation -- a number of interviews were arranged
and also to enable the project staff to sense the federal structure of
members of Congress in connection with international education --
In order to gain the advantage of the thinking and experience
members.

for extended conversations with the Project Director and other staff
memoranda, and in making themselves available on numerous occasions
of California at Irvine. Both were active in producing relevant
Cornell University, and Professor Richard Bayler of the University
study: Mr. Steven Miller, Vice President for Public Affairs of
individuals who served as consultants to EWA in the course of the
Special mention should be made of the contributions of two

coordination and liaison as the study proceeded.
New York and the latter in Washington, were responsible for general
tions of the report. Measa. Arnold and Breslau, the former in
were of great importance as a basis for the analysis and recommendations
international fielding institutions. These special pieces of work
Mr. Johnson dealt with the role of the multilateral agencies and
and the use of E1 480 and other U.S.-owned foreign currencies;
study -- the role of the Defense Department in overseas research,
investigations of two important problems within the area of the
media in connection with this study. Mr. Griffitham made special
Rheese, Director of EWA's Washington office, at the under took session
Executive Associates in the New York office of EWA, and Anne E.
Dix C. Peter M. Griffitham, Joel P. Johnson and David B. Arnold,
major reports and their presentation in the form appearing in Abba-
nation of Appendix B. Mrs. Patricia Huntington completed the reviews of
the agency program data which resulted in the summary charts
Miss Harrie Reinhardt was responsible for the analysis and organi-

HWA group in Washington.
In New York, most of the basic work had been accomplished by the
New York and the grid chart at the beginning of Appendix C was done
Dix C. Although this work was finally completed by the EWA staff in
summary and analysis of the various public reports making up Abba-
nation by the HWA staff in Washington was the initial identification
handled by the HWA staff in Washington was the initial identification.

-3-

-3-

Intelligence Agency. In both the Legislative and Executive branches, these contacts were made on the part of EWA by one or more of the following four individuals: Mr. Herman B Wells, Chairman of the EWA Board of Trustees; William W. Marvel, Project Director; and Messrs. Andre Rheault and Peter Gillingham, the last name serving as organizer and coordinator of the interviews.

A review conference on the first draft of the report was organized by Education and World Affairs at the Hotel Biltmore in New York City on September 16. This meeting was attended by a distinguished group of educators and men of public affairs, all widely experienced in the matters under discussion. (The conference participants are listed at the end of this appendix.) The draft had been circulated to the conferees beforehand, and in the course of three long working sessions -- morning, afternoon and following dinner -- all aspects of the analysis and recommendations were carefully reviewed. The Project Director felt that this was one of the most stimulating and fruitful sessions of its kind he had ever attended. Full notes were taken and many of the suggestions made by the conferees were used in the substantial redrafting which produced the present report.

The Project Director wishes to take this occasion to express his thanks to all who participated in one phase or another of the study and contributed so fully to the final product. Appreciation is extended to those specifically mentioned in this Appendix, Deputy Assistant Secretary Flynt, the members of the study staff at both HEW and EWA, the two consultants, Messrs. Muller and Snyder, the members of the Executive and Legislative branches who were helpful in discussing various aspects of the study with EWA representatives, the conferees at the September 16th meeting, and the secretaries at EWA who assisted with that meeting and who performed so well under forced draft in completing both the preliminary and final versions of the report: Arceil Amodio, Marilyn Berry, Brenda Klein, Catherine Murphy, Karen Slater, Mary Swalling, Ellen Welch, and Stephanie Young.

As will be understood from references in the opening paragraphs of the report, despite the indispensable help rendered EWA by many individuals in the course of the last few months, final responsibility for the accuracy of the information, the analysis and commentary on federal programs, and the recommendations for change, is assumed by Education and World Affairs itself.

EWA/WWM:ew

October 1968

October 1968
ENW/AM/1:ew

Chandra, is seemed by Education and World Affairs itself.
and commentary on federal programs, and the recommendations for
responsibility for the accuracy of the information, the analysis
by many individuals in the course of the last few months. Final
draft of the report, despite the indispensable help rendered ENW
will be understood from references in the opening bars.

Ellen Melch, and Stephanie Young.

Brando Klein, Catherine Murphy, Karen Slater, Mary Swallow,
and final versions of the report: Arneil Amodio, Marillyn Berry.
Formed so well under forced draft in completing both the preliminary
the secretaries at ENW who assisted with that meeting and who ber-
representatives, the conference at the September 16th meeting, and
were helpful in discussing various aspects of the study with ENW
Snyder, the members of the Executive and Legislative branches who
at both ENW and ENW, the two consultants, Measles, Muller and
Debry Assistant Secretary Flunt, the members of the study staff
is extended to those specifically mentioned in this Appendix.
Thanks to all who participated in one phase or another of the
study and contributed so fully to the final product. Appreciation
The Project Director wishes to take this occasion to express

produced the present report.

made by the conferences were used in the substantial rewriting which
ever attended. Full notes were taken and many of the suggestions
of the most stimulating and fruitful sessions of the kind he had
carefully reviewed. The Project Director felt that this was one
dinner -- all subjects of the analysis and recommendations were
of three kind working sessions -- morning, afternoon, and following
had been circulated to the conference before lunch, and in the course
participants are listed at the end of this appendix.) The draft
widely experienced in the matters under discussion. (The conference
discussed a group of educators and men of public affairs, all
in New York City on September 16. This meeting was attended by a
organised by Education and World Affairs at the Hotel Biltmore.
A review conference on the first draft of the report was

the organiser and coordinator of the interviews.
Measles, Andre Ruesli and Peter Gillingham, the last ones serving
ENW Board of Trustees; William M. Marvei, Project Director; and
following four individuals: Mr. Herman B. Mella, Chairman of the
these contacts were made on the part of ENW by one or more of the
interference Agency. In both the Legislative and Executive branches

-3-

PARTICIPANTS IN SEPTEMBER 16, 1968 WORKING CONFERENCE ON THE REPORT

Vincent Barnett
President
Colgate University

The Honorable Lynn Bartlett
Assistant Secretary for Education
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

David E. Bell
Vice President
The Ford Foundation

John Caldwell
Chancellor
North Carolina State
The University of North Carolina
Raleigh, North Carolina

William Carey
Assistant Director
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D.C.

Douglass Cater
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Francis J. Colligan
Executive Director
Council on International
Education and Cultural Affairs
Department of State

Jack Dalton
Dean
School of Library Service
Columbia University

Curtis Farrar
Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Program and Policy
Agency for International
Development

John Fisher
Executive Secretary
Modern Language Association

Ralph C. M. Flynt
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Education
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

Herbert Fredman
Assistant Director
USIA Information Centers

Shelton Granger
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

Michael Harris
President
Franklin Books Programs

James Hobbs
Assistant to the Under Secretary
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

David Hohman
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

Kenneth Holland
President
Institute for International
Education

Harold Howe, II
Commissioner
U.S. Office of Education
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

-2-

Janice Johnson
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

Bryant Kearl
Acting Chancellor
The University of Wisconsin -
Madison, Wisconsin

Robert Leestma
Assistant Commissioner and
Director
Institute of International
Studies
Office of Education
Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare

Paul Miller
Professor of Education
University of North Carolina
Charlotte, North Carolina

Steven Muller
Vice President for Public Affairs
Cornell University

James A. Perkins
President
Cornell University

Frank Rose
President
University of Alabama

Richard C. Snyder
Professor of Administration
and Political Science
University of California
Irvine, California

Glen Taggart
President
Utah State University

Logan Wilson
President
American Council on Education.

Harris Wofford
President
State University College of
Old Westbury
Planting Fields Campus, Box 540
Oyster Bay, New York

Cornell University

Ade President for Public Affairs

Steven Miller

Charlotte, North Carolina
University of North Carolina
Professor of Education
Paul Miller

and Welfare
Department of Health, Education
Office of Education
Studies
Institute of International
Director
Assistant Commissioner and
Robert Reemaus

Madison, Wisconsin
The University of Wisconsin
Acting Chancellor
Bryant Keri

and Welfare
Department of Health, Education
Janice Johnson

Oyster Bay, New York
Planting Field Campus, Box 240
Old Heuston

State University College of
President
Harrie Mottord

American Council on Education
President
Rodan Wilson

Utah State University
President
Glen Taggart

Irvine, California
University of California
and Political Science
Professor of Administration
Richard C. Snyder

University of Alabama
President
Frank Rose

Cornell University
President
James A. Perkins

-3-

1

1. Notes on Appendix B

1. The materials submitted by the agencies were summarized on the attached chart for convenience of quick review and to make rough comparisons possible. This classification of programs should not be overinterpreted as it is not intended to be a definitive presentation. It represents only an approximation of the present pattern of federal agency programs.

2. Anyone not familiar with the actual programs of these federal agencies may wish to refer to available program descriptions. Considerable material of this kind was, of course, assembled in the course of the study -- and is available to anyone wishing to consult it. But we have not included summaries or synopses of the programs in the Appendix because this information is easily available in the September 1968 publication of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, "A Guide to U.S. Government Agencies Involved in International Educational and Cultural Activities." This Department of State publication #8405, International Information and Cultural Series #97 is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

3. No attempt has been made in the chart that follows nor in the text of the report to derive overall totals, either in dollars, numbers of persons, or numbers of programs for the full range of federal agency activity. Such totals would be almost meaningless because of the disparity of programs and the different interpretations and reporting procedures from one agency to another. In assembling this information, it became clear that many agencies did not sort out their activities in such a way as to make it possible to put an "international" label on all relevant programs. Some agencies did not submit statistics at all. For these same reasons, the totals indicated for various individual agency programs are suggestive rather than definitive.

4. One important factor tending to produce double reporting-- and contributing to inaccuracies on the high side in any effort to present total dollar or people figures -- is the prevalence of reimbursed programs and interagency contractual arrangements. This is particularly true as between the Office of Education on the one hand and AID and CU of State on the other hand, but is also found with respect to a number of other agencies.

2

5. The functional categories to which the columns on the chart correspond represent a compromise. They are adequate for the sorts of activities engaged in by the "secondary" agencies, but do not reflect so accurately the nature of all activities in the case of such "primary" agencies as CU of State, Department of Defense, Office of Education and Peace Corps. For example, activities classified here as study and research opportunities for U.S. citizens and formal training opportunities for foreign nationals are often structured within "exchange programs" according to agency classification.

6. It is difficult to distinguish precisely between "training of foreign nationals" and "programming of foreign visitors." Visitor programs are often considered training opportunities by the agencies concerned, but in other cases consist of only orientation sessions conducted by those agencies.

7. Although it is not specifically identified anywhere on the summary chart -- it is apparently subsumed under other program titles -- the teaching of English overseas is supported by a number of the "primary" agencies. This may well be the most highly dispersed single activity covered in this study.

8. The training programs reported by the "secondary" agencies are mainly conducted in the United States. Those of the "primary" agencies, however, usually include activities both in the U.S. and overseas, and are often not distinguishable from "technical assistance."